This is a modern-English version of The Shame of the Cities, originally written by Steffens, Lincoln.
It has been thoroughly updated, including changes to sentence structure, words, spelling,
and grammar—to ensure clarity for contemporary readers, while preserving the original spirit and nuance. If
you click on a paragraph, you will see the original text that we modified, and you can toggle between the two versions.
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Transcriber's Note:
Notes from the transcriber:
The cover image was created by the transcriber and is placed in the public domain.
The cover image was made by the transcriber and is in the public domain.
THE SHAME OF THE CITIES

CONTENTS
PAGE | |
---|---|
Introduction and Conclusions | 3 |
Tweed Days in St. Louis | 29 |
The Stigma of Minneapolis | 63 |
The Boldness of St. Louis | 101 |
Pittsburgh: A City Ashamed | 147 |
Philly: Corrupt and Complacent | 193 |
Chicago: Half Free and Continuing the Struggle | 233 |
New York: Putting Good Government to the Test | 279 |
INTRODUCTION; AND SOME CONCLUSIONS
This is not a book. It is a collection of articles reprinted from McClure’s Magazine. Done as journalism, they are journalism still, and no further pretensions are set up for them in their new dress. This classification may seem pretentious enough; certainly it would if I should confess what claims I make for my profession. But no matter about that; I insist upon the journalism. And there is my justification for separating from the bound volumes of the magazine and republishing, practically without re-editing, my accounts as a reporter of the shame of American cities. They were written with a purpose, they were published serially with a purpose, and they are reprinted now together to further that same purpose, which was and is—to sound for the civic pride of an apparently shameless citizenship.
This isn't a book. It's a collection of articles reprinted from McClure’s Magazine. They were created as journalism, and they still are, with no further claims being made for them in this new format. This classification might seem a bit self-important; it definitely would if I revealed the claims I have for my profession. But that doesn’t matter; I stand by the journalism. That’s my reason for taking these pieces out of the magazine's bound volumes and reprinting them, mostly without re-editing, as my reports on the disgrace of American cities. They were written with a purpose, they were published serially with a purpose, and they’re being reprinted now together to continue that same purpose, which was and is—to call out the civic pride of an apparently shameless citizenry.
There must be such a thing, we reasoned. All our big boasting could not be empty vanity, nor our pious pretensions hollow sham. American achievements in science, art, and business mean sound abilities at bottom, and our hypocrisy a 4race sense of fundamental ethics. Even in government we have given proofs of potential greatness, and our political failures are not complete; they are simply ridiculous. But they are ours. Not alone the triumphs and the statesmen, the defeats and the grafters also represent us, and just as truly. Why not see it so and say it?
There must be something like that, we thought. All our grand claims couldn't just be empty pride, nor could our sincere beliefs be mere facade. American achievements in science, art, and business reflect real skills at their core, and our hypocrisy shows a basic sense of ethics. Even in politics, we've shown signs of potential greatness, and our political failures aren't total; they’re just laughable. But they're still ours. Not just the victories and the politicians, but the losses and the corrupt also represent us, just as much. Why not acknowledge that and say it?
Because, I heard, the American people won’t “stand for” it. You may blame the politicians, or, indeed, any one class, but not all classes, not the people. Or you may put it on the ignorant foreign immigrant, or any one nationality, but not on all nationalities, not on the American people. But no one class is at fault, nor any one breed, nor any particular interest or group of interests. The misgovernment of the American people is misgovernment by the American people.
Because I heard that the American people won’t "put up with" it. You can blame the politicians or any particular class, but not all classes, not the people. Or you could pin it on the uninformed foreign immigrant or any specific nationality, but not on all nationalities, not on the American people. But no one class is to blame, nor any one race, nor any specific interest or group of interests. The misgovernment of the American people is actually misgovernment by the American people.
When I set out on my travels, an honest New Yorker told me honestly that I would find that the Irish, the Catholic Irish, were at the bottom of it all everywhere. The first city I went to was St. Louis, a German city. The next was Minneapolis, a Scandinavian city, with a leadership of New Englanders. Then came Pittsburg, Scotch Presbyterian, and that was what my New York friend was. “Ah, but they are all foreign populations,” I heard. The next city was Philadelphia, the purest 5American community of all, and the most hopeless. And after that came Chicago and New York, both mongrel-bred, but the one a triumph of reform, the other the best example of good government that I had seen. The “foreign element” excuse is one of the hypocritical lies that save us from the clear sight of ourselves.
When I started my travels, an honest New Yorker told me that I would find the Irish, specifically the Catholic Irish, were at the root of everything everywhere. The first city I visited was St. Louis, a German city. Next was Minneapolis, a Scandinavian city led by New Englanders. Then came Pittsburgh, which was Scotch Presbyterian, just like my New York friend. “Ah, but they are all foreign populations,” I heard. The following city was Philadelphia, the purest American community of all, and utterly hopeless. After that, I went to Chicago and New York, both mixed populations, but one was a triumph of reform, while the other was the best example of good government I had ever seen. The excuse about the “foreign element” is one of the hypocritical lies that keeps us from seeing ourselves clearly.
Another such conceit of our egotism is that which deplores our politics and lauds our business. This is the wail of the typical American citizen. Now, the typical American citizen is the business man. The typical business man is a bad citizen; he is busy. If he is a “big business man” and very busy, he does not neglect, he is busy with politics, oh, very busy and very businesslike. I found him buying boodlers in St. Louis, defending grafters in Minneapolis, originating corruption in Pittsburg, sharing with bosses in Philadelphia, deploring reform in Chicago, and beating good government with corruption funds in New York. He is a self-righteous fraud, this business man. He is the chief source of corruption, and it were a boon if he would neglect politics. But he is not the business man that neglects politics; that worthy is the good citizen, the typical business man. He too is busy, he is the one that has no use and therefore no time for politics. When his neglect has permitted bad government to go so 6far that he can be stirred to action, he is unhappy, and he looks around for a cure that shall be quick, so that he may hurry back to the shop. Naturally, too, when he talks politics, he talks shop. His patent remedy is quack; it is business.
Another example of our egotism is that we complain about politics while praising business. This is the common lament of the typical American citizen. Now, the typical American citizen is the businessman. The typical businessman is a poor citizen; he is too busy. If he is a “big businessman” and extremely busy, he doesn't ignore politics; oh no, he’s very involved and very businesslike. I found him buying off corrupt officials in St. Louis, defending swindlers in Minneapolis, starting corruption in Pittsburgh, teaming up with political bosses in Philadelphia, rejecting reform in Chicago, and using corruption funds to undermine good government in New York. This businessman is a self-righteous fraud. He is the main source of corruption, and it would be a blessing if he would just ignore politics. But he isn’t the businessman who neglects politics; that role belongs to the good citizen, the typical businessman. He is busy too, and he disregards politics because he believes he has no time for it. When his neglect has allowed bad government to get so bad that it finally moves him to act, he is frustrated and looks for a quick fix so he can rush back to work. Naturally, when he discusses politics, he talks about business. His so-called solution is misguided; it is just business as usual.
“Give us a business man,” he says (“like me,” he means). “Let him introduce business methods into politics and government; then I shall be left alone to attend to my business.”
“Give us a businessman,” he says (“like me,” he means). “Let him bring business methods into politics and government; then I’ll be free to focus on my own business.”
There is hardly an office from United States Senator down to Alderman in any part of the country to which the business man has not been elected; yet politics remains corrupt, government pretty bad, and the selfish citizen has to hold himself in readiness like the old volunteer firemen to rush forth at any hour, in any weather, to prevent the fire; and he goes out sometimes and he puts out the fire (after the damage is done) and he goes back to the shop sighing for the business man in politics. The business man has failed in politics as he has in citizenship. Why?
There’s hardly an office, from United States Senator to Alderman, anywhere in the country where a business person hasn’t been elected; yet politics is still corrupt, government is pretty poor, and the self-serving citizen has to be ready like the old volunteer firefighters to jump into action at any time, no matter the weather, to put out the fire. Sometimes they go out and extinguish the fire (after the damage is done) and then return to work, sighing for the business person in politics. The business person has failed in politics just as they have in citizenship. Why?
Because politics is business. That’s what’s the matter with it. That’s what’s the matter with everything,—art, literature, religion, journalism, law, medicine,—they’re all business, and all—as you see them. Make politics a sport, as they do in England, or a profession, as they do in Germany, and we’ll have—well, something else than we have 7now,—if we want it, which is another question. But don’t try to reform politics with the banker, the lawyer, and the dry-goods merchant, for these are business men and there are two great hindrances to their achievement of reform: one is that they are different from, but no better than, the politicians; the other is that politics is not “their line.” There are exceptions both ways. Many politicians have gone out into business and done well (Tammany ex-mayors, and nearly all the old bosses of Philadelphia are prominent financiers in their cities), and business men have gone into politics and done well (Mark Hanna, for example). They haven’t reformed their adopted trades, however, though they have sometimes sharpened them most pointedly. The politician is a business man with a specialty. When a business man of some other line learns the business of politics, he is a politician, and there is not much reform left in him. Consider the United States Senate, and believe me.
Because politics is a business. That’s what’s wrong with it. That’s what’s wrong with everything—art, literature, religion, journalism, law, medicine—they’re all businesses, just like you see them. Make politics a sport, like they do in England, or a profession, like they do in Germany, and we’ll have—well, something different than what we have now, if we even want that, which is another question. But don’t try to reform politics with bankers, lawyers, and merchants, because these are business people and there are two major obstacles to their ability to reform: one is that they are different from, but not better than, politicians; the other is that politics isn’t “their thing.” There are exceptions on both sides. Many politicians have transitioned into business and succeeded (Tammany ex-mayors and almost all the old bosses of Philadelphia are now prominent financiers in their cities), and business people have entered politics and done well (Mark Hanna, for example). However, they haven’t reformed their new trades, although they’ve sometimes sharpened them quite significantly. The politician is a business person with a specialty. When a business person from a different field learns the ins and outs of politics, they become a politician, and there isn’t much room for reform left in them. Look at the United States Senate, and believe me. 7
The commercial spirit is the spirit of profit, not patriotism; of credit, not honor; of individual gain, not national prosperity; of trade and dickering, not principle. “My business is sacred,” says the business man in his heart. “Whatever prospers my business, is good; it must be. Whatever hinders it, is wrong; it must be. A bribe is 8bad, that is, it is a bad thing to take; but it is not so bad to give one, not if it is necessary to my business.” “Business is business” is not a political sentiment, but our politician has caught it. He takes essentially the same view of the bribe, only he saves his self-respect by piling all his contempt upon the bribe-giver, and he has the great advantage of candor. “It is wrong, maybe,” he says, “but if a rich merchant can afford to do business with me for the sake of a convenience or to increase his already great wealth, I can afford, for the sake of a living, to meet him half way. I make no pretensions to virtue, not even on Sunday.” And as for giving bad government or good, how about the merchant who gives bad goods or good goods, according to the demand?
The business mindset is about profit, not patriotism; about credit, not honor; about personal gain, not national welfare; about trade and negotiation, not principles. “My business is sacred,” thinks the businessman. “Whatever benefits my business is good; it just has to be. Whatever gets in the way of it is wrong; it has to be. Taking a bribe is bad, sure; but giving one isn't so bad, especially if it helps my business." "Business is business" isn't really a political saying, but our politicians have picked it up. They generally view bribery the same way, only they maintain their self-respect by directing all their disdain at the bribe-giver, and they get to be honest too. “It might be wrong,” they say, “but if a wealthy merchant wants to do business with me to make his life easier or grow his vast wealth, I can afford to meet him halfway for my own survival. I don’t pretend to be virtuous, not even on Sundays.” And what about providing bad or good government? What about the merchant who offers bad goods or good goods based on what's needed?
But there is hope, not alone despair, in the commercialism of our politics. If our political leaders are to be always a lot of political merchants, they will supply any demand we may create. All we have to do is to establish a steady demand for good government. The boss has us split up into parties. To him parties are nothing but means to his corrupt ends. He “bolts” his party, but we must not; the bribe-giver changes his party, from one election to another, from one county to another, from one city to another, but the 9honest voter must not. Why? Because if the honest voter cared no more for his party than the politician and the grafter, then the honest vote would govern, and that would be bad—for graft. It is idiotic, this devotion to a machine that is used to take our sovereignty from us. If we would leave parties to the politicians, and would vote not for the party, not even for men, but for the city, and the State, and the nation, we should rule parties, and cities, and States, and nation. If we would vote in mass on the more promising ticket, or, if the two are equally bad, would throw out the party that is in, and wait till the next election and then throw out the other party that is in—then, I say, the commercial politician would feel a demand for good government and he would supply it. That process would take a generation or more to complete, for the politicians now really do not know what good government is. But it has taken as long to develop bad government, and the politicians know what that is. If it would not “go,” they would offer something else, and, if the demand were steady, they, being so commercial, would “deliver the goods.”
But there is hope, not just despair, in the commercialism of our politics. If our political leaders are going to act like political merchants, they will respond to any demand we create. All we have to do is establish a consistent demand for good government. The boss divides us into parties. To him, parties are just tools for his corrupt goals. He may switch parties, but we must not; the bribe-giver shifts his party from one election to another, from one county to another, from one city to another, but the honest voter must remain loyal. Why? Because if the honest voter valued the party any less than the politician and the corruptor, then the honest vote would dominate, and that would be bad—for corruption. It's foolish to devote ourselves to a machine that's designed to take our power away. If we left parties to the politicians and voted not for the party, not even for individuals, but for the city, the State, and the nation, we would have control over parties, cities, States, and the nation. If we voted as a collective for the more promising ticket, or if both options are equally bad, voted out the party currently in charge and then the next time, voted out the other party that takes its place—then, I believe the commercial politician would feel the pressure for good government and would deliver it. This process would take a generation or more to complete, because right now, politicians truly don’t understand what good government is. But it has taken just as long to cultivate bad government, and the politicians certainly know what that is. If it didn't work, they would provide something else, and if the demand remained consistent, they, being so market-driven, would “deliver the goods.”
But do the people want good government? Tammany says they don’t. Are the people honest? Are the people better than Tammany? Are they better than the merchant and the politician? 10Isn’t our corrupt government, after all, representative?
But do the people actually want good government? Tammany says they don’t. Are the people honest? Are they better than Tammany? Are they better than the merchant and the politician? 10Isn’t our corrupt government, after all, representative?
President Roosevelt has been sneered at for going about the country preaching, as a cure for our American evils, good conduct in the individual, simple honesty, courage, and efficiency. “Platitudes!” the sophisticated say. Platitudes? If my observations have been true, the literal adoption of Mr. Roosevelt’s reform scheme would result in a revolution, more radical and terrible to existing institutions, from the Congress to the Church, from the bank to the ward organization, than socialism or even than anarchy. Why, that would change all of us—not alone our neighbors, not alone the grafters, but you and me.
President Roosevelt has faced criticism for traveling around the country promoting good individual behavior, honesty, courage, and efficiency as solutions to our American problems. “Clichés!” the critics say. Clichés? If I’m right, fully embracing Mr. Roosevelt’s reform plan would lead to a revolution, more drastic and frightening to our existing institutions—from Congress to the Church, from banks to local organizations—than socialism or even anarchy. That would transform all of us—not just our neighbors, not just the corrupt individuals, but you and me.
No, the contemned methods of our despised politics are the master methods of our braggart business, and the corruption that shocks us in public affairs we practice ourselves in our private concerns. There is no essential difference between the pull that gets your wife into society or a favorable review for your book, and that which gets a heeler into office, a thief out of jail, and a rich man’s son on the board of directors of a corporation; none between the corruption of a labor union, a bank, and a political machine; none between a dummy director of a trust and the caucus-bound member of a legislature; none between 11a labor boss like Sam Parks, a boss of banks like John D. Rockefeller, a boss of railroads like J. P. Morgan, and a political boss like Matthew S. Quay. The boss is not a political, he is an American institution, product of a freed people that have not the spirit to be free.
No, the criticized methods of our disliked politics are the main strategies of our boastful business, and the corruption that appalls us in public affairs is something we practice ourselves in our personal lives. There’s no real difference between the influence that gets your wife into social circles or secures a good review for your book, and that which helps a political insider get elected, a criminal avoid jail, or a wealthy person's child land a spot on a corporation’s board; none between the corruption of a labor union, a bank, and a political organization; none between a token director of a trust and a legislator bound by party loyalty; none between a labor leader like Sam Parks, a bank mogul like John D. Rockefeller, a railroad tycoon like J. P. Morgan, and a political leader like Matthew S. Quay. The boss isn't just a political figure; he's an American institution, a result of a free people who lack the will to truly be free.
And it’s all a moral weakness; a weakness right where we think we are strongest. Oh, we are good—on Sunday, and we are “fearfully patriotic” on the Fourth of July. But the bribe we pay to the janitor to prefer our interests to the landlord’s, is the little brother of the bribe passed to the alderman to sell a city street, and the father of the air-brake stock assigned to the president of a railroad to have this life-saving invention adopted on his road. And as for graft, railroad passes, saloon and bawdy-house blackmail, and watered stock, all these belong to the same family. We are pathetically proud of our democratic institutions and our republican form of government, of our grand Constitution and our just laws. We are a free and sovereign people, we govern ourselves and the government is ours. But that is the point. We are responsible, not our leaders, since we follow them. We let them divert our loyalty from the United States to some “party”; we let them boss the party and turn our municipal democracies into autocracies and our republican nation 12into a plutocracy. We cheat our government and we let our leaders loot it, and we let them wheedle and bribe our sovereignty from us. True, they pass for us strict laws, but we are content to let them pass also bad laws, giving away public property in exchange; and our good, and often impossible, laws we allow to be used for oppression and blackmail. And what can we say? We break our own laws and rob our own government, the lady at the custom-house, the lyncher with his rope, and the captain of industry with his bribe and his rebate. The spirit of graft and of lawlessness is the American spirit.
And it’s all a moral weakness; a weakness right where we think we are strongest. Oh, we are good—on Sunday, and we are “fearfully patriotic” on the Fourth of July. But the bribery we pay to the janitor to look out for our interests over the landlord’s is just a smaller version of the bribe given to the alderman to sell a city street, and it leads to the air-brake stock given to the president of a railroad to have this life-saving invention adopted on his line. And when it comes to corruption, railroad passes, saloon and brothel blackmail, and watered stock, all of these are from the same family. We are foolishly proud of our democratic institutions and our republican form of government, of our great Constitution and our just laws. We are a free and sovereign people; we govern ourselves, and the government belongs to us. But that’s the issue. We are responsible, not our leaders, because we follow them. We let them shift our loyalty from the United States to some “party”; we let them control the party and turn our local democracies into autocracies and our republican nation 12 into a plutocracy. We cheat our government and we allow our leaders to rob it, and we let them manipulate and bribe our sovereignty from us. It’s true, they make strict laws for us, but we’re okay with them also passing bad laws that hand over public property in return; and our good, often impossible, laws we allow to be used for oppression and blackmail. And what can we say? We break our own laws and steal from our own government—the customs official, the lyncher with his rope, and the corporate leader with his bribe and his rebate. The spirit of corruption and lawlessness is the American spirit.
And this shall not be said? Not plainly? William Travers Jerome, the fearless District Attorney of New York, says, “You can say anything you think to the American people. If you are honest with yourself you may be honest with them, and they will forgive not only your candor, but your mistakes.” This is the opinion, and the experience too, of an honest man and a hopeful democrat. Who says the other things? Who says “Hush,” and “What’s the use?” and “ALL’S well,” when all is rotten? It is the grafter; the coward, too, but the grafter inspires the coward. The doctrine of “addition, division, and silence” is the doctrine of graft. “Don’t hurt the party,” “Spare the fair fame of the 13city,” are boodle yells. The Fourth of July oration is the “front” of graft. There is no patriotism in it, but treason. It is part of the game. The grafters call for cheers for the flag, “prosperity,” and “the party,” just as a highwayman commands “hands up,” and while we are waving and shouting, they float the flag from the nation to the party, turn both into graft factories, and prosperity into a speculative boom to make “weak hands,” as the Wall Street phrase has it, hold the watered stock while the strong hands keep the property. “Blame us, blame anybody, but praise the people,” this, the politician’s advice, is not the counsel of respect for the people, but of contempt. By just such palavering as courtiers play upon the degenerate intellects of weak kings, the bosses, political, financial, and industrial, are befuddling and befooling our sovereign American citizenship; and—likewise—they are corrupting it.
And this can’t be said? Not openly? William Travers Jerome, the bold District Attorney of New York, says, “You can say whatever you want to the American people. If you’re honest with yourself, you can be honest with them, and they will not only forgive your honesty but also your mistakes.” This is the belief, and the experience too, of a truthful person and an optimistic democrat. Who says the other things? Who says “Shh,” and “What’s the point?” and “Everything’s fine,” when everything is rotten? It’s the corrupt ones; the cowards too, but the corrupt ones inspire the cowards. The idea of “addition, division, and silence” is the doctrine of corruption. “Don’t hurt the party,” “Protect the city’s reputation,” are just cries for bribes. The Fourth of July speech is the cover for corruption. There’s no patriotism in it, only betrayal. It’s part of the game. The corrupt call for applause for the flag, “prosperity,” and “the party,” just like a bandit orders “hands up,” and while we’re cheering and waving, they shift the flag from the nation to the party, turn both into corruption machines, and turn prosperity into a speculative bubble to make “weak hands,” as they say on Wall Street, hold the inflated stock while the strong hands keep the real assets. “Blame us, blame anyone, but praise the people,” this, the politician’s advice, shows not respect for the people, but disdain. Through the kind of empty talk that courtiers use to manipulate the weak minds of ineffective kings, the political, financial, and industrial bosses are confusing and deceiving our sovereign American citizenship; and—similarly—they are corrupting it.
And it is corruptible, this citizenship. “I know what Parks is doing,” said a New York union workman, “but what do I care. He has raised my wages. Let him have his graft!” And the Philadelphia merchant says the same thing: “The party leaders may be getting more than they should out of the city, but that doesn’t hurt me. It may raise taxes a little, but I can stand 14that. The party keeps up the protective tariff. If that were cut down, my business would be ruined. So long as the party stands pat on that, I stand pat on the party.”
And this citizenship is corruptible. “I know what Parks is up to,” said a New York union worker, “but I don’t care. He’s raised my wages. Let him have his kickbacks!” And the Philadelphia merchant feels the same way: “The party leaders might be pocketing more than they should from the city, but that doesn’t affect me. It might raise taxes a bit, but I can handle that. The party keeps the protective tariff in place. If that were cut, my business would be ruined. As long as the party is solid on that, I’m solid on the party.”
The people are not innocent. That is the only “news” in all the journalism of these articles, and no doubt that was not new to many observers. It was to me. When I set out to describe the corrupt systems of certain typical cities, I meant to show simply how the people were deceived and betrayed. But in the very first study—St. Louis—the startling truth lay bare that corruption was not merely political; it was financial, commercial, social; the ramifications of boodle were so complex, various, and far-reaching, that one mind could hardly grasp them, and not even Joseph W. Folk, the tireless prosecutor, could follow them all. This state of things was indicated in the first article which Claude H. Wetmore and I compiled together, but it was not shown plainly enough. Mr. Wetmore lived in St. Louis, and he had respect for names which meant little to me. But when I went next to Minneapolis alone, I could see more independently, without respect for persons, and there were traces of the same phenomenon. The first St. Louis article was called “Tweed Days in St. Louis,” and though the “better citizen” received attention the Tweeds were the center of 15interest. In “The Shame of Minneapolis,” the truth was put into the title; it was the Shame of Minneapolis; not of the Ames administration, not of the Tweeds, but of the city and its citizens. And yet Minneapolis was not nearly so bad as St. Louis; police graft is never so universal as boodle. It is more shocking, but it is so filthy that it cannot involve so large a part of society. So I returned to St. Louis, and I went over the whole ground again, with the people in mind, not alone the caught and convicted boodlers. And this time the true meaning of “Tweed days in St. Louis” was made plain. The article was called “The Shamelessness of St. Louis,” and that was the burden of the story. In Pittsburg also the people was the subject, and though the civic spirit there was better, the extent of the corruption throughout the social organization of the community was indicated. But it was not till I got to Philadelphia that the possibilities of popular corruption were worked out to the limit of humiliating confession. That was the place for such a study. There is nothing like it in the country, except possibly, in Cincinnati. Philadelphia certainly is not merely corrupt, but corrupted, and this was made clear. Philadelphia was charged up to—the American citizen.
The people are not innocent. That’s the only “news” in all the journalism of these articles, and I’m sure that wasn’t new to many observers. It was new to me. When I set out to describe the corrupt systems of certain typical cities, I intended to show simply how the people were deceived and betrayed. But in the very first study—St. Louis—the shocking truth was that corruption wasn’t just political; it was financial, commercial, social; the layers of corruption were so complex, varied, and far-reaching that one person could hardly grasp them all, and not even Joseph W. Folk, the tireless prosecutor, could track them entirely. This situation was hinted at in the first article that Claude H. Wetmore and I put together, but it wasn’t communicated clearly enough. Mr. Wetmore lived in St. Louis, and he respected names that meant little to me. But when I next went to Minneapolis alone, I could see things more independently, without consideration for people’s status, and I noticed the same patterns. The first St. Louis article was titled “Tweed Days in St. Louis,” and although the “better citizen” received some attention, the Tweeds were the main focus. In “The Shame of Minneapolis,” the title reflected the truth; it was the shame of Minneapolis, not just the Ames administration or the Tweeds, but of the city and its citizens. Yet Minneapolis wasn’t nearly as bad as St. Louis; police graft is never as widespread as political corruption. It's more shocking, but it’s so dirty that it can’t involve as large a part of society. So I returned to St. Louis and revisited the whole situation, keeping the people in mind, not just the caught and convicted corrupt individuals. This time, the real meaning of “Tweed Days in St. Louis” became clear. The article was titled “The Shamelessness of St. Louis,” and that was the heart of the story. In Pittsburgh, the focus was also on the people, and even though the civic spirit there was better, the extent of corruption throughout the community’s social structure was evident. But it wasn’t until I got to Philadelphia that the possibilities of widespread corruption among the public were fleshed out to the fullest extent of humiliating confession. That was the right place for such a study. There’s nothing like it in the country, except perhaps in Cincinnati. Philadelphia is definitely not just corrupt, but deeply corrupted, and this was made clear. The blame was laid at the feet of—the American citizen.
It was impossible in the space of a magazine article 16to cover in any one city all the phases of municipal government, so I chose cities that typified most strikingly some particular phase or phases. Thus as St. Louis exemplified boodle; Minneapolis, police graft; Pittsburg, a political and industrial machine; and Philadelphia, general civic corruption; so Chicago was an illustration of reform, and New York of good government. All these things occur in most of these places. There are, and long have been, reformers in St. Louis, and there is to-day police graft there. Minneapolis has had boodling and council reform, and boodling is breaking out there again. Pittsburg has general corruption, and Philadelphia a very perfect political machine. Chicago has police graft and a low order of administrative and general corruption which permeates business, labor, and society generally. As for New York, the metropolis might exemplify almost anything that occurs anywhere in American cities, but no city has had for many years such a good administration as was that of Mayor Seth Low.
It was impossible to cover all the aspects of city government in a single magazine article, so I chose cities that notably represented specific issues. St. Louis represented corruption; Minneapolis showcased police bribery; Pittsburgh was an example of a political and industrial machine; and Philadelphia displayed widespread civic corruption. In contrast, Chicago was a case of reform, while New York represented good governance. All of these issues can be found in these cities. There have always been reformers in St. Louis, and police bribery still exists there. Minneapolis has experienced both corruption and council reforms, and corruption is resurfacing there again. Pittsburgh exhibits general corruption, and Philadelphia has a highly effective political machine. Chicago faces police corruption and a lower level of administrative and general corruption that affects business, labor, and society as a whole. As for New York, the city could illustrate almost any problem found in American cities, but no city has had such a solid administration in many years as that of Mayor Seth Low.
That which I have made each city stand for, is that which it had most highly developed. It would be absurd to seek for organized reform in St. Louis, for example, with Chicago next door; or for graft in Chicago with Minneapolis so near. After Minneapolis, a description of administrative 17corruption in Chicago would have seemed like a repetition. Perhaps it was not just to treat only the conspicuous element in each situation. But why should I be just? I was not judging; I arrogated to myself no such function. I was not writing about Chicago for Chicago, but for the other cities, so I picked out what light each had for the instruction of the others. But, if I was never complete, I never exaggerated. Every one of those articles was an understatement, especially where the conditions were bad, and the proof thereof is that while each article seemed to astonish other cities, it disappointed the city which was its subject. Thus my friends in Philadelphia, who knew what there was to know, and those especially who knew what I knew, expressed surprise that I reported so little. And one St. Louis newspaper said that “the facts were thrown at me and I fell down over them.” There was truth in these flings. I cut twenty thousand words out of the Philadelphia article and yet I had not written half my facts. I know a man who is making a history of the corrupt construction of the Philadelphia City Hall, in three volumes, and he grieves because he lacks space. You can’t put all the known incidents of the corruption of an American city into a book.
What I focused on for each city was what it had developed the most. It would be ridiculous to look for organized reform in St. Louis, for instance, when Chicago is right next to it; or to find corruption in Chicago with Minneapolis so close. After learning about Minneapolis, discussing administrative corruption in Chicago would feel repetitive. It might not be fair to only highlight the most obvious aspects of each situation. But why should I be fair? I wasn’t judging; I didn't assume that role. I wasn’t writing about Chicago for its own sake, but for the other cities, so I chose what each had to teach the others. While I may not have been thorough, I never exaggerated. Every one of those articles downplayed the issues, especially where conditions were bad, and the proof is that while each article amazed other cities, it let down the city it was about. Thus, my friends in Philadelphia, who knew what was really happening, especially those who were aware of my insights, were surprised that I reported so little. One St. Louis newspaper commented that "the facts were thrown at me and I fell down over them." There was truth in this criticism. I cut twenty thousand words from the Philadelphia article, and still hadn’t covered half of the facts. I know someone who is writing a three-volume history of the corrupt construction of the Philadelphia City Hall, and he’s frustrated because he doesn’t have enough space. You can’t fit all the known incidents of corruption in an American city into one book.
This is all very unscientific, but then, I am not 18a scientist. I am a journalist. I did not gather with indifference all the facts and arrange them patiently for permanent preservation and laboratory analysis. I did not want to preserve, I wanted to destroy the facts. My purpose was no more scientific than the spirit of my investigation and reports; it was, as I said above, to see if the shameful facts, spread out in all their shame, would not burn through our civic shamelessness and set fire to American pride. That was the journalism of it. I wanted to move and to convince. That is why I was not interested in all the facts, sought none that was new, and rejected half those that were old. I often was asked to expose something suspected. I couldn’t; and why should I? Exposure of the unknown was not my purpose. The people: what they will put up with, how they are fooled, how cheaply they are bought, how dearly sold, how easily intimidated, and how led, for good or for evil—that was the inquiry, and so the significant facts were those only which everybody in each city knew, and of these, only those which everybody in every other town would recognize, from their common knowledge of such things, to be probable. But these, understated, were charged always to the guilty persons when individuals were to blame, and finally brought home to the people themselves, who, having 19the power, have also the responsibility, they and those they respect, and those that guide them.
This may not be very scientific, but then again, I’m not a scientist. I'm a journalist. I didn’t collect all the facts without feeling and organize them neatly for future reference and lab testing. I didn't want to preserve; I wanted to expose the facts. My goal wasn't scientific at all; as I mentioned earlier, it was to see if the disgraceful facts, laid bare in all their shame, could break through our civic indifference and ignite American pride. That was the essence of my journalism. I aimed to move people and persuade them. That’s why I wasn’t interested in every single fact, didn’t seek out anything new, and dismissed many old facts. I was often asked to uncover something that had been suspected. I couldn't, and why should I? Uncovering the unknown wasn't my goal. The focus was on the people: what they tolerate, how they’re deceived, how cheaply they can be bought, how dearly they are sold, how easily they are scared, and how they are led, whether for good or bad. Those were the questions, so the important facts were only those that everyone in each city knew, and among these, only those that everyone in any other town would recognize, from their shared understanding of such things, as being likely true. But these, understated, were always attributed to the guilty parties when individuals were at fault, and ultimately brought back to the people themselves, who, having the power, also bear the responsibility, along with those they respect and those who lead them.
This was against all the warnings and rules of demagogy. What was the result?
This went against all the warnings and rules of manipulation. What happened next?
After Joseph W. Folk had explored and exposed, with convictions, the boodling of St. Louis, the rings carried an election. “Tweed Days in St. Louis” is said to have formed some public sentiment against the boodlers, but the local newspapers had more to do with that than McClure’s Magazine. After the Minneapolis grand jury had exposed and the courts had tried and the common juries had convicted the grafters there, an election showed that public opinion was formed. But that one election was regarded as final. When I went there the men who had led the reform movement were “all through.” After they had read the “Shame of Minneapolis,” however, they went back to work, and they have perfected a plan to keep the citizens informed and to continue the fight for good government. They saw, these unambitious, busy citizens, that it was “up to them,” and they resumed the unwelcome duties of their citizenship. Of resentment there was very little. At a meeting of leading citizens there were honest speeches suggesting that something should be said to “clear the name of Minneapolis,” but one man rose and said very pleasantly, but firmly, that the 20article was true; it was pretty hard on them, but it was true and they all knew it. That ended that.
After Joseph W. Folk thoroughly investigated and uncovered the corruption in St. Louis, the political rings managed to win an election. “Tweed Days in St. Louis” is said to have created some public sentiment against the corrupt officials, but the local newspapers played a bigger role in that than McClure’s Magazine. After the grand jury in Minneapolis revealed the corruption, and the courts tried and convicted the schemers there, an election indicated that public opinion had shifted. However, that one election was seen as conclusive. When I visited, the leaders of the reform movement were “all through.” But after they read the “Shame of Minneapolis,” they got back to work and developed a plan to keep citizens informed and to keep fighting for good government. These unambitious, busy citizens realized that it was “up to them,” and they took on the unwelcome responsibilities of their citizenship once again. There was very little resentment. During a meeting of prominent citizens, there were sincere speeches suggesting that something should be done to “clear the name of Minneapolis,” but one man stood up and, with a pleasant yet firm tone, stated that the article was true; it was tough on them, but it was true, and they all knew it. That put an end to the discussion.
When I returned to St. Louis and rewrote the facts, and, in rewriting, made them just as insulting as the truth would permit, my friends there expressed dismay over the manuscript. The article would hurt Mr. Folk; it would hurt the cause; it would arouse popular wrath.
When I went back to St. Louis and revised the facts, making them as insulting as the truth allowed, my friends there were upset about the manuscript. The article would hurt Mr. Folk; it would harm the cause; it would provoke public anger.
“That was what I hoped it would do,” I said.
"That’s what I hoped it would do," I said.
“But the indignation would break upon Folk and reform, not on the boodlers,” they said.
“But the anger would come down on the people and change things, not on the corrupt ones,” they said.
“Wasn’t it obvious,” I asked, “that this very title, ‘Shamelessness,’ was aimed at pride; that it implied a faith that there was self-respect to be touched and shame to be moved?”
“Wasn’t it obvious,” I asked, “that this title, ‘Shamelessness,’ was directed at pride; that it suggested a belief that there was self-respect to be affected and shame to be stirred?”
That was too subtle. So I answered that if they had no faith in the town, I had, and anyway, if I was wrong and the people should resent, not the crime, but the exposure of it, then they would punish, not Mr. Folk, who had nothing to do with the article, but the magazine and me. Newspaper men warned me that they would not “stand for” the article, but would attack it. I answered that I would let the St. Louisans decide between us. It was true, it was just; the people of St. Louis had shown no shame. Here was a good chance to see whether they had any. I was a fool, they said. “All right,” I replied. “All kings had fools in 21the olden days, and the fools were allowed to tell them the truth. I would play the fool to the American people.”
That was too subtle. So I replied that if they didn’t have faith in the town, I did, and anyway, if I was wrong and the people resented not the crime, but the fact that it was exposed, then they would punish not Mr. Folk, who had nothing to do with the article, but the magazine and me. The journalists warned me that they wouldn’t “put up with” the article, but would tear it apart. I said I would let the people of St. Louis decide between us. It was true, it was fair; the people of St. Louis had shown no shame. Here was a good chance to see if they had any. They called me a fool. “Fine,” I said. “All kings had fools in the olden days, and the fools were allowed to tell them the truth. I would play the fool to the American people.”
The article, published, was attacked by the newspapers; friends of Mr. Folk repudiated it; Mr. Folk himself spoke up for the people. Leading citizens raised money for a mass meeting to “set the city right before the world.” The mayor of the city, a most excellent man, who had helped me, denounced the article. The boodle party platform appealed for votes on the strength of the attacks in “Eastern magazines.” The people themselves contradicted me; after the publication, two hundred thousand buttons for “Folk and Reform” were worn on the streets of St. Louis.
The article that was published faced criticism from the newspapers; friends of Mr. Folk rejected it; Mr. Folk himself defended the people. Prominent citizens raised funds for a mass meeting to “set the city straight in front of the world.” The mayor of the city, a truly great man who had supported me, spoke out against the article. The corrupt party's platform sought votes based on the criticism in “Eastern magazines.” The people themselves disagreed with me; after the article came out, two hundred thousand buttons for “Folk and Reform” were seen on the streets of St. Louis.
But those buttons were for “Folk and Reform.” They did go to prove that the article was wrong, that there was pride in St. Louis, but they proved also that that pride had been touched. Up to that time nobody knew exactly how St. Louis felt about it all. There had been one election, another was pending, and the boodlers, caught or to be caught, were in control. The citizens had made no move to dislodge them. Mr. Folk’s splendid labors were a spectacle without a chorus, and, though I had met men who told me the people were with Folk, I had met also the grafters, who cursed only Folk and were building all their 22hopes on the assumption that “after Folk’s term” all would be well again. Between these two local views no outsider could choose. How could I read a strange people’s hearts? I took the outside view, stated the facts both ways,—the right verdicts of the juries and the confident plans of the boodlers,—and the result was, indeed, a shameless state of affairs for which St. Louis, the people of St. Louis, were to blame.
But those buttons were for “Folk and Reform.” They showed that the article was wrong, that there was pride in St. Louis, but they also proved that pride had been shaken. Until that point, no one knew exactly how St. Louis felt about everything. There had been one election, another was coming up, and the corrupt politicians, either caught or yet to be caught, were in control. The citizens hadn’t made any moves to get rid of them. Mr. Folk’s impressive efforts were impressive but without support, and although I had met people who told me the public backed Folk, I had also encountered the crooks, who only cursed Folk and were pinning all their hopes on the belief that “after Folk’s term” everything would be fine again. Between these two local perspectives, no outsider could choose. How could I understand the feelings of such a foreign community? I took the objective approach, presented the facts from both sides—the correct verdicts from the juries and the confident schemes of the corrupt— and the outcome was, indeed, a disgraceful situation for which St. Louis, the people of St. Louis, were to blame.
And they saw it so, both in the city and in the State, and they ceased to be spectators. That article simply got down to the self-respect of this people. And who was hurt? Not St. Louis. From that moment the city has been determined and active, and boodle seems to be doomed. Not Mr. Folk. After that, his nomination for Governor of the State was declared for by the people, who formed Folk clubs all over the State to force him upon his party and theirs, and thus insure the pursuit of the boodlers in St. Louis and in Missouri too. Nor was the magazine hurt, or myself. The next time I went to St. Louis, the very men who had raised money for the mass meeting to denounce the article went out of their way to say to me that I had been right, the article was true, and they asked me to “do it again.” And there may be a chance to do it again. Mr. Folk lifted the lid off Missouri for a moment after 23that, and the State also appeared ripe for the gathering. Moreover, the boodlers of State and city have joined to beat the people and keep them down. The decisive election is not till the fall of 1904, and the boodlers count much on the fickleness of public opinion. But I believe that Missouri and St. Louis together will prove then, once for all, that the people can rule—when they are aroused.
And they saw it that way, both in the city and in the state, and they stopped being just observers. That article really touched on the self-respect of the people. And who was affected? Not St. Louis. From that moment, the city became determined and active, and corruption seems to be headed for extinction. Not Mr. Folk. After that, the people declared his nomination for Governor of the State, forming Folk clubs all over to push him onto both his party and theirs, ensuring that the corrupt individuals in St. Louis and Missouri would be pursued. Nor was the magazine affected, or myself. The next time I went to St. Louis, the very men who had raised money for the mass meeting to denounce the article went out of their way to tell me that I was right, the article was accurate, and they asked me to “do it again.” And there might be a chance to do it again. Mr. Folk briefly opened up Missouri after that, and the state seemed ready for change. Moreover, the corrupt individuals from the state and city have banded together to suppress the people. The crucial election isn’t until the fall of 1904, and the corrupt expect public opinion to be fickle. But I believe that Missouri and St. Louis together will prove then, once and for all, that the people can govern—when they are fired up.
The Pittsburg article had no effect in Pittsburg, nor had that on Philadelphia any results in Philadelphia. Nor was any expected there. Pittsburg, as I said in the article, knew itself, and may pull out of its disgrace, but Philadelphia is contented and seems hopeless. The accounts of them, however, and indeed, as I have said, all in the series, were written, not for the cities described, but for all our cities; and the most immediate responses came not from places described, but from others where similar evils existed or similar action was needed. Thus Chicago, intent on its troubles; found useless to it the study of its reform, which seems to have been suggestive elsewhere, and Philadelphia, “Corrupt and Contented,” was taken home in other cities and seems to have made the most lasting impression everywhere.
The Pittsburg article didn’t change anything in Pittsburg, and neither did the one about Philadelphia have any impact there. No one expected it to. As I mentioned in the article, Pittsburg is aware of its issues and may recover from its shame, but Philadelphia seems satisfied and rather hopeless. However, the accounts, as I’ve said, weren’t meant for the cities they described, but for all our cities; the most immediate reactions came not from the places mentioned, but from others facing similar problems or needing similar actions. For example, Chicago, focused on its own challenges, found its own reform efforts to be unhelpful, while Philadelphia, labeled “Corrupt and Contented,” resonated in other cities and appears to have made a lasting impact everywhere.
But of course the tangible results are few. The real triumph of the year’s work was the complete 24demonstration it has given, in a thousand little ways, that our shamelessness is superficial, that beneath it lies a pride which, being real, may save us yet. And it is real. The grafters who said you may put the blame anywhere but on the people, where it belongs, and that Americans can be moved only by flattery,—they lied. They lied about themselves. They, too, are American citizens; they too, are of the people; and some of them also were reached by shame. The great truth I tried to make plain was that which Mr. Folk insists so constantly upon: that bribery is no ordinary felony, but treason, that the “corruption which breaks out here and there and now and then” is not an occasional offense, but a common practice, and that the effect of it is literally to change the form of our government from one that is representative of the people to an oligarchy, representative of special interests. Some politicians have seen that this is so, and it bothers them. I think I prize more highly than any other of my experiences the half-dozen times when grafting politicians I had “roasted,” as they put it, called on me afterwards to say, in the words of one who spoke with a wonderful solemnity:
But of course the tangible results are few. The real success of this year’s work has been the clear demonstration, in countless small ways, that our shamelessness is just a facade, and underneath it lies a genuine pride which, being real, might still save us. And it is real. The corrupt individuals who claimed you could place the blame anywhere but on the people—where it truly belongs—and insisted that Americans can only be swayed by flattery, were lying. They lied about themselves. They, too, are American citizens; they, too, are part of the people; and some of them were also touched by shame. The important truth I tried to make clear, which Mr. Folk emphasizes constantly, is that bribery isn't just an ordinary crime, but treason. The “corruption that pops up here and there from time to time” isn’t a rare offense, but a widespread practice, and its effect is literally to transform our government from one that represents the people into an oligarchy that serves special interests. Some politicians have recognized this reality, and it troubles them. I think I value more than any other experience the few times when corrupt politicians I had “exposed,” as they put it, came to see me afterward to say, in the words of one who spoke with remarkable solemnity:
“You are right. I never thought of it that way, but it’s right. I don’t know whether you 25can do anything, but you’re right, dead right. And I’m all wrong. We’re all, all wrong. I don’t see how we can stop it now; I don’t see how I can change. I can’t, I guess. No, I can’t, not now. But, say, I may be able to help you, and I will if I can. You can have anything I’ve got.”
“You're right. I never saw it that way, but you are absolutely correct. I don't know if you can do anything about it, but you’re dead on. And I’m completely wrong. We’re all in the wrong. I don’t see how we can stop it now; I don’t see how I can change. I can’t, I suppose. No, I can’t, not right now. But, you know, I might be able to help you, and I will if I can. You can have anything I have.”
So you see, they are not such bad fellows, these practical politicians. I wish I could tell more about them: how they have helped me; how candidly and unselfishly they have assisted me to facts and an understanding of the facts, which, as I warned them, as they knew well, were to be used against them. If I could—and I will some day—I should show that one of the surest hopes we have is the politician himself. Ask him for good politics; punish him when he gives bad, and reward him when he gives good; make politics pay. Now, he says, you don’t know and you don’t care, and that you must be flattered and fooled—and there, I say, he is wrong. I did not flatter anybody; I told the truth as near as I could get it, and instead of resentment there was encouragement. After “The Shame of Minneapolis,” and “The Shamelessness of St. Louis,” not only did citizens of these cities approve, but citizens of other cities, individuals, groups, and organizations, sent in invitations, hundreds of them, “to come and show us up; we’re worse than they are.”
So you see, these practical politicians aren’t so bad after all. I wish I could share more about them: how they’ve helped me; how openly and selflessly they’ve assisted me with facts and a better understanding of those facts, which, as I warned them and they knew well, I would use against them. If I could—and I will someday—I’d show that one of our best hopes is the politician himself. Ask him for good politics; hold him accountable when he gives bad, and reward him when he does good; make politics worthwhile. Right now, he thinks you don’t know and don’t care, that you need to be flattered and fooled—and that’s where he’s mistaken. I didn’t flatter anyone; I shared the truth as best as I could, and instead of backlash, there was support. After “The Shame of Minneapolis” and “The Shamelessness of St. Louis,” not only did the citizens of those cities approve, but citizens from other cities, individuals, groups, and organizations sent in hundreds of invitations, “to come and expose us; we’re worse than they are.”
26We Americans may have failed. We may be mercenary and selfish. Democracy with us may be impossible and corruption inevitable, but these articles, if they have proved nothing else, have demonstrated beyond doubt that we can stand the truth; that there is pride in the character of American citizenship; and that this pride may be a power in the land. So this little volume, a record of shame and yet of self-respect, a disgraceful confession, yet a declaration of honor, is dedicated, in all good faith, to the accused—to all the citizens of all the cities in the United States.
26We Americans may have fallen short. We might be greedy and selfish. Democracy might seem impossible for us, and corruption might feel unavoidable, but these articles, if they’ve shown nothing else, have proven beyond doubt that we can handle the truth; that there is pride in being an American citizen; and that this pride can be a force for good in the country. So this little book, a record of shame yet also of self-respect, a troubling confession, but a statement of honor, is dedicated, in all sincerity, to those who are accused—to all the citizens of all the cities in the United States.
TWEED DAYS IN ST. LOUIS
St. Louis, the fourth city in size in the United States, is making two announcements to the world: one that it is the worst-governed city in the land; the other that it wishes all men to come there (for the World’s Fair) and see it. It isn’t our worst-governed city; Philadelphia is that. But St. Louis is worth examining while we have it inside out.
St. Louis, the fourth largest city in the United States, has two big announcements for everyone: first, it's declaring itself the worst-governed city in the country; and second, it invites everyone to come visit (for the World’s Fair) and see for themselves. It's not our absolute worst-governed city; that title goes to Philadelphia. However, St. Louis is worth a look while it’s laid bare.
There is a man at work there, one man, working all alone, but he is the Circuit (district or State) Attorney, and he is “doing his duty.” That is what thousands of district attorneys and other public officials have promised to do and boasted of doing. This man has a literal sort of mind. He is a thin-lipped, firm-mouthed, dark little man, who never raises his voice, but goes ahead doing, with a smiling eye and a set jaw, the simple thing he said he would do. The politicians and reputable citizens who asked him to run urged him when he declined. When he said that if elected he would have to do his duty, they said, “Of course.” So he ran, they supported 30him, and he was elected. Now some of these politicians are sentenced to the penitentiary, some are in Mexico. The Circuit Attorney, finding that his “duty” was to catch and convict criminals, and that the biggest criminals were some of these same politicians and leading citizens, went after them. It is magnificent, but the politicians declare it isn’t politics.
There’s a guy working there, just one guy, all by himself, but he’s the Circuit Attorney, and he’s “doing his job.” That’s what thousands of district attorneys and other public officials have promised to do and bragged about doing. This guy has a very straightforward mindset. He’s a serious, thin-lipped, dark little man who never raises his voice but keeps working, with a twinkle in his eye and a determined expression, doing exactly what he said he would. The politicians and respectable citizens who asked him to run urged him on when he refused. When he said that if he got elected he would have to actually do his job, they replied, “Of course.” So he ran, they backed him, and he got elected. Now, some of these politicians are serving time in prison, and some are in Mexico. The Circuit Attorney, realizing that his “job” was to catch and convict criminals, and that the biggest criminals included some of these very politicians and prominent citizens, went after them. It’s impressive, but the politicians claim it’s not politics.
The corruption of St. Louis came from the top. The best citizens—the merchants and big financiers—used to rule the town, and they ruled it well. They set out to outstrip Chicago. The commercial and industrial war between these two cities was at one time a picturesque and dramatic spectacle such as is witnessed only in our country. Business men were not mere merchants and the politicians were not mere grafters; the two kinds of citizens got together and wielded the power of banks, railroads, factories, the prestige of the city, and the spirit of its citizens to gain business and population. And it was a close race. Chicago, having the start, always led, but St. Louis had pluck, intelligence, and tremendous energy. It pressed Chicago hard. It excelled in a sense of civic beauty and good government; and there are those who think yet it might have won. But a change occurred. Public spirit became private spirit, public enterprise became private greed.
The corruption in St. Louis started at the top. The best citizens—the merchants and major financiers—used to govern the city, and they did a great job. They aimed to outdo Chicago. The competition between these two cities was once a vibrant and dramatic scene that is rarely seen in our country. Businessmen weren’t just merchants, and politicians weren’t just corrupt; the two groups collaborated and used the power of banks, railroads, factories, the city's reputation, and the community's spirit to attract business and people. It was a tight competition. Chicago had the head start and always led, but St. Louis had determination, intelligence, and incredible energy. It challenged Chicago strongly. It excelled in civic beauty and good governance; some believe it might have prevailed. But then a shift happened. Public spirit turned into private interest, and public initiatives became private greed.
31Along about 1890, public franchises and privileges were sought, not only for legitimate profit and common convenience, but for loot. Taking but slight and always selfish interest in the public councils, the big men misused politics. The riffraff, catching the smell of corruption, rushed into the Municipal Assembly, drove out the remaining respectable men, and sold the city—its streets, its wharves, its markets, and all that it had—to the now greedy business men and bribers. In other words, when the leading men began to devour their own city, the herd rushed into the trough and fed also.
31Around 1890, public franchises and privileges were pursued not just for legitimate profit and public good, but for personal gain. The powerful figures, showing little genuine interest in the community, exploited politics for their own benefit. Sensing the corruption, the lower-class individuals surged into the Municipal Assembly, ousting the few remaining decent leaders, and effectively sold the city—its streets, wharves, markets, and everything else—to the now greedy business people and bribers. In other words, when the prominent figures started to take advantage of their own city, the crowd jumped in to benefit as well.
So gradually has this occurred that these same citizens hardly realize it. Go to St. Louis and you will find the habit of civic pride in them; they still boast. The visitor is told of the wealth of the residents, of the financial strength of the banks, and of the growing importance of the industries, yet he sees poorly paved, refuse-burdened streets, and dusty or mud-covered alleys; he passes a ramshackle fire-trap crowded with the sick, and learns that it is the City Hospital; he enters the “Four Courts,” and his nostrils are greeted by the odor of formaldehyde used as a disinfectant, and insect powder spread to destroy vermin; he calls at the new City Hall, and finds half the entrance boarded with pine planks to cover up the 32unfinished interior. Finally, he turns a tap in the hotel, to see liquid mud flow into wash-basin or bath-tub.
So gradually has this happened that these same citizens hardly notice it. Go to St. Louis and you’ll find a sense of civic pride among them; they still brag about it. Visitors hear about the wealth of the residents, the financial strength of the banks, and the growing importance of the industries, yet they see poorly paved streets filled with trash and dusty or muddy alleys. They pass a rundown building crowded with the sick and discover that it’s the City Hospital. They step into the “Four Courts” and are hit with the smell of formaldehyde used as a disinfectant and insect powder spread to get rid of pests. They visit the new City Hall and find half of the entrance boarded up with pine planks to hide the unfinished interior. Finally, they turn on the tap in the hotel and watch mud flow into the washbasin or bathtub.
The St. Louis charter vests legislative power of great scope in a Municipal Assembly, which is composed of a council and a House of Delegates. Here is a description of the latter by one of Mr. Folk’s grand juries:
The St. Louis charter gives extensive legislative authority to a Municipal Assembly, which consists of a council and a House of Delegates. Below is a description of the latter from one of Mr. Folk's grand juries:
“We have had before us many of those who have been, and most of those who are now, members of the House of Delegates. We found a number of these utterly illiterate and lacking in ordinary intelligence, unable to give a better reason for favoring or opposing a measure than a desire to act with the majority. In some, no trace of mentality or morality could be found; in others, a low order of training appeared, united with base cunning, groveling instincts, and sordid desires. Unqualified to respond to the ordinary requirements of life, they are utterly incapable of comprehending the significance of an ordinance, and are incapacitated, both by nature and training, to be the makers of laws. The choosing of such men to be legislators makes a travesty of justice, sets a premium on incompetency, and deliberately poisons the very source of the law.”
“We have had many members of the House of Delegates in front of us, both past and present. We found several of them completely uneducated and lacking basic intelligence, unable to provide a better reason for supporting or opposing a measure than simply wanting to go along with the majority. In some, there was no sign of intelligence or morals; in others, there was a low level of education combined with cunning behavior, submissive instincts, and selfish desires. They are unfit to meet the basic demands of life and are completely unable to understand the importance of a law, made incapable by both their nature and their education to create laws. Electing such individuals as lawmakers undermines justice, rewards incompetence, and intentionally corrupts the foundations of the law.”
These creatures were well organized. They had 33a “combine”—legislative institution—which the grand jury described as follows:
These creatures were well organized. They had 33 a "combine"—a legislative institution—which the grand jury described as follows:
“Our investigation, covering more or less fully a period of ten years, shows that, with few exceptions, no ordinance has been passed wherein valuable privileges or franchises are granted until those interested have paid the legislators the money demanded for action in the particular case. Combines in both branches of the Municipal Assembly are formed by members sufficient in number to control legislation. To one member of this combine is delegated the authority to act for the combine, and to receive and to distribute to each member the money agreed upon as the price of his vote in support of, or opposition to, a pending measure. So long has this practice existed that such members have come to regard the receipt of money for action on pending measures as a legitimate perquisite of a legislator.”
“Our investigation, which covers about ten years, shows that, with a few exceptions, no law has been passed that grants valuable privileges or franchises until those involved have paid the legislators the money requested for action on the specific case. Groups in both branches of the Municipal Assembly are formed by enough members to control legislation. One member of this group is given the authority to act on behalf of the group, and to receive and distribute to each member the agreed-upon money as the price for their vote in support of, or against, a pending measure. This practice has been around for so long that these members have come to see receiving money for action on pending measures as a legitimate benefit of being a legislator.”
One legislator consulted a lawyer with the intention of suing a firm to recover an unpaid balance on a fee for the grant of a switch-way. Such difficulties rarely occurred, however. In order to insure a regular and indisputable revenue, the combine of each house drew up a schedule of bribery prices for all possible sorts of grants, just such a list as a commercial traveler takes out on the road with him. There was a price for a grain 34elevator, a price for a short switch; side tracks were charged for by the linear foot, but at rates which varied according to the nature of the ground taken; a street improvement cost so much; wharf space was classified and precisely rated. As there was a scale for favorable legislation, so there was one for defeating bills. It made a difference in the price if there was opposition, and it made a difference whether the privilege asked was legitimate or not. But nothing was passed free of charge. Many of the legislators were saloon-keepers—it was in St. Louis that a practical joker nearly emptied the House of Delegates by tipping a boy to rush into a session and call out, “Mister, your saloon is on fire,”—but even the saloon-keepers of a neighborhood had to pay to keep in their inconvenient locality a market which public interest would have moved.
One lawmaker talked to a lawyer about suing a company to get back an unpaid fee for a switchway grant. However, these problems rarely happened. To ensure a consistent and undeniable revenue, the group from each house created a price list for bribery for all kinds of grants, similar to what a salesman takes on the road with them. There was a price for a grain elevator, a price for a short switch; side tracks were charged by the linear foot, with rates varying based on the type of land involved; street improvements cost a specific amount; wharf space was categorized and precisely priced. Just like there was a scale for favorable legislation, there was also one for blocking bills. The price changed if there was opposition, and it also depended on whether the requested privilege was legitimate. But nothing was done without a fee. Many of the lawmakers were bar owners—there was even an incident in St. Louis where a prankster nearly cleared out the House of Delegates by hiring a boy to rush in during a session and shout, “Mister, your bar is on fire”—but even local bar owners had to pay to keep a market in their troublesome area that public interest would have moved.
From the Assembly, bribery spread into other departments. Men empowered to issue peddlers’ licenses and permits to citizens who wished to erect awnings or use a portion of the sidewalk for storage purposes charged an amount in excess of the prices stipulated by law, and pocketed the difference. The city’s money was loaned at interest, and the interest was converted into private bank accounts. City carriages were used by the wives and children of city officials. Supplies for public 35institutions found their way to private tables; one itemized account of food furnished the poorhouse included California jellies, imported cheeses, and French wines! A member of the Assembly caused the incorporation of a grocery company, with his sons and daughters the ostensible stockholders, and succeeded in having his bid for city supplies accepted although the figures were in excess of his competitors’. In return for the favor thus shown, he indorsed a measure to award the contract for city printing to another member, and these two voted aye on a bill granting to a third the exclusive right to furnish city dispensaries with drugs.
From the Assembly, corruption spread to other departments. Those in charge of issuing peddler licenses and permits for citizens wanting to set up awnings or use part of the sidewalk for storage charged more than the legally required rates, pocketing the extra cash. The city's funds were lent out at interest, with the earnings funneled into private bank accounts. City carriages were frequently used by the wives and children of city officials. Supplies meant for public institutions ended up at private homes; one detailed account of food provided to the poorhouse included California jellies, imported cheeses, and French wines! A member of the Assembly facilitated the creation of a grocery company, with his kids listed as the official stockholders, and managed to have his bid for city supplies accepted even though it was higher than his competitors. In exchange for this favor, he supported a measure to give the contract for city printing to another member, and these two voted in favor of a bill granting a third member the exclusive right to supply the city dispensaries with drugs.
Men ran into debt to the extent of thousands of dollars for the sake of election to either branch of the Assembly. One night, on a street car going to the City Hall, a new member remarked that the nickel he handed the conductor was his last. The next day he deposited $5,000 in a savings bank. A member of the House of Delegates admitted to the Grand Jury that his dividends from the combine netted $25,000 in one year; a Councilman stated that he was paid $50,000 for his vote on a single measure.
Men went into debt for thousands of dollars just to get elected to either branch of the Assembly. One night, on a streetcar heading to City Hall, a new member said the nickel he gave to the conductor was his last. The next day, he deposited $5,000 in a savings bank. A member of the House of Delegates told the Grand Jury that his earnings from the combine totaled $25,000 in one year; a Councilman claimed he received $50,000 for his vote on a single measure.
Bribery was a joke. A newspaper reporter overheard this conversation one evening in the corridor of the City Hall:
Bribery was a joke. A newspaper reporter overheard this conversation one evening in the hallway of City Hall:
36“Ah there, my boodler!” said Mr. Delegate.
36“Hey there, my buddy!” said Mr. Delegate.
“Stay there, my grafter!” replied Mr. Councilman. “Can you lend me a hundred for a day or two?”
“Stay there, my friend!” replied Mr. Councilman. “Can you lend me a hundred for a day or two?”
“Not at present. But I can spare it if the Z—— bill goes through to-night. Meet me at F——‘s later.”
“Not right now. But I can manage it if the Z—— bill gets approved tonight. Meet me at F——’s later.”
“All right, my jailbird; I’ll be there.”
“Okay, my inmate; I’ll be there.”
The blackest years were 1898, 1899, and 1900. Foreign corporations came into the city to share in its despoliation, and home industries were driven out by blackmail. Franchises worth millions were granted without one cent of cash to the city, and with provision for only the smallest future payment; several companies which refused to pay blackmail had to leave; citizens were robbed more and more boldly; pay-rolls were padded with the names of non-existent persons; work on public improvements was neglected, while money for them went to the boodlers.
The darkest years were 1898, 1899, and 1900. Foreign companies moved into the city to take part in its plunder, and local businesses were forced out through extortion. Franchises worth millions were handed out without any cash going to the city and only a minimal future payment required; several companies that refused to pay off the corrupt officials had to leave; citizens were increasingly and openly robbed; paychecks included names of people who didn’t exist; work on public projects was ignored, while the funds meant for them ended up with the crooks.
Some of the newspapers protested, disinterested citizens were alarmed, and the shrewder men gave warnings, but none dared make an effective stand. Behind the corruptionists were men of wealth and social standing, who, because of special privileges granted them, felt bound to support and defend the looters. Independent victims of the 37far-reaching conspiracy submitted in silence, through fear of injury to their business. Men whose integrity was never questioned, who held high positions of trust, who were church members and teachers of Bible classes, contributed to the support of the dynasty,—became blackmailers, in fact,—and their excuse was that others did the same, and that if they proved the exception it would work their ruin. The system became loose through license and plenty till it was as wild and weak as that of Tweed in New York.
Some newspapers protested, indifferent citizens were worried, and the smarter individuals gave warnings, but no one dared to take a real stand. Behind the corrupt officials were wealthy and socially prominent people who, due to special privileges they received, felt obligated to support and defend the thieves. Independent victims of the extensive conspiracy remained silent, fearing harm to their businesses. People whose honesty was never questioned, who held important positions of trust, who were churchgoers and taught Bible classes, contributed to the support of the regime—essentially becoming blackmailers—and their excuse was that others were doing the same, and if they were the only ones who didn't, it would lead to their downfall. The system became loose through excess and abundance until it was as chaotic and weak as that of Tweed in New York.
Then the unexpected happened—an accident. There was no uprising of the people, but they were restive; and the Democratic party leaders, thinking to gain some independent votes, decided to raise the cry “reform” and put up a ticket of candidates different enough from the usual offerings of political parties to give color to their platform. These leaders were not in earnest. There was little difference between the two parties in the city; but the rascals that were in had been getting the greater share of the spoils, and the “outs” wanted more than was given to them. “Boodle” was not the issue, no exposures were made or threatened, and the bosses expected to control their men if elected. Simply as part of the game, the Democrats raised the slogan, “reform” and “no more Ziegenheinism.”
Then the unexpected happened—an accident. There wasn’t a rebellion from the people, but they were restless; and the Democratic party leaders, hoping to attract some independent voters, decided to champion the cause of “reform” and present a group of candidates that were different enough from the usual political offerings to lend credibility to their platform. These leaders weren’t serious about it. There was hardly any distinction between the two parties in the city; but the crooks in power had been seizing most of the benefits, and the “outs” wanted more than what they were getting. “Boodle” wasn’t the issue, no scandals were revealed or threatened, and the bosses planned to keep control over their supporters if they were elected. Simply as part of the game, the Democrats shouted the slogan, “reform” and “no more Ziegenheinism.”
38Mayor Ziegenhein, called “Uncle Henry,” was a “good fellow,” “one of the boys,” and though it was during his administration that the city grew ripe and went to rot, his opponents talked only of incompetence and neglect, and repeated such stories as that of his famous reply to some citizens who complained because certain street lights were put out: “You have the moon yet—ain’t it?”
38Mayor Ziegenhein, known as “Uncle Henry,” was a “good guy,” “one of the gang,” and even though his time in office saw the city decline, his critics only focused on his incompetence and neglect, often retelling the story of his famous response to some residents who complained about the streetlights being out: “You still have the moon, don’t you?”
When somebody mentioned Joseph W. Folk for Circuit Attorney the leaders were ready to accept him. They didn’t know much about him. He was a young man from Tennessee; had been President of the Jefferson Club, and arbitrated the railroad strike of 1898. But Folk did not want the place. He was a civil lawyer, had had no practice at the criminal bar, cared little about it, and a lucrative business as counsel for corporations was interesting him. He rejected the invitation. The committee called again and again, urging his duty to his party, and the city, etc.
When someone brought up Joseph W. Folk for Circuit Attorney, the leaders were quick to support him. They didn’t know much about him. He was a young guy from Tennessee, had been the President of the Jefferson Club, and had mediated the railroad strike of 1898. But Folk wasn't interested in the position. He was a civil lawyer, had no experience in criminal law, wasn’t particularly interested in it, and was focused on a profitable career as corporate counsel. He turned down the offer. The committee kept reaching out, urging him to fulfill his responsibility to his party and the city, and so on.
“Very well,” he said, at last, “I will accept the nomination, but if elected I will do my duty. There must be no attempt to influence my actions when I am called upon to punish lawbreakers.”
“Okay,” he finally said, “I’ll accept the nomination, but if I get elected, I’ll do my job. There shouldn’t be any attempts to sway my decisions when it comes to punishing lawbreakers.”
The committeemen took such statements as the conventional platitudes of candidates. They nominated him, the Democratic ticket was elected, and 39Folk became Circuit Attorney for the Eighth Missouri District.
The committee members viewed those statements as the typical clichés from candidates. They nominated him, the Democratic ticket won, and 39 Folk became the Circuit Attorney for the Eighth Missouri District.
Three weeks after taking the oath of office his campaign pledges were put to the test. A number of arrests had been made in connection with the recent election, and charges of illegal registration were preferred against men of both parties. Mr. Folk took them up like routine cases of ordinary crime. Political bosses rushed to the rescue. Mr. Folk was reminded of his duty to his party, and told that he was expected to construe the law in such a manner that repeaters and other election criminals who had hoisted Democracy’s flag and helped elect him might be either discharged or receive the minimum punishment. The nature of the young lawyer’s reply can best be inferred from the words of that veteran political leader, Colonel Ed Butler, who, after a visit to Mr. Folk, wrathfully exclaimed, “D—n Joe! he thinks he’s the whole thing as Circuit Attorney.”
Three weeks after taking office, his campaign promises were tested. Several arrests had been made related to the recent election, with accusations of illegal registration against members from both parties. Mr. Folk approached these cases as if they were routine crimes. Political leaders hurried to intervene. Mr. Folk was reminded of his obligation to his party and told that he should interpret the law in a way that repeat offenders and other election wrongdoers—who had rallied behind Democracy's banner and helped elect him—could either be let off or receive minimal punishment. The nature of the young lawyer's response can best be understood from the words of veteran political leader Colonel Ed Butler, who, after visiting Mr. Folk, angrily exclaimed, “D—n Joe! he thinks he’s the whole thing as Circuit Attorney.”
The election cases were passed through the courts with astonishing rapidity; no more mercy was shown Democrats than Republicans, and before winter came a number of ward heelers and old-time party workers were behind the bars in Jefferson City. He next turned his attention to grafters and straw bondsmen with whom the courts were infested, and several of these leeches 40are in the penitentiary to-day. The business was broken up because of his activity. But Mr. Folk had made little more than the beginning.
The election cases moved through the courts at an incredible speed; no more mercy was shown to Democrats than to Republicans, and by the time winter arrived, several ward heelers and veteran party workers were behind bars in Jefferson City. He then focused on corrupt individuals and fake bondsmen who were rampant in the courts, and several of these parasites are in prison today. His efforts disrupted their operations. However, Mr. Folk had only just begun.
One afternoon, late in January, 1903, a newspaper reporter, known as “Red” Galvin, called Mr. Folk’s attention to a ten-line newspaper item to the effect that a large sum of money had been placed in a bank for the purpose of bribing certain Assemblymen to secure the passage of a street railroad ordinance. No names were mentioned, but Mr. Galvin surmised that the bill referred to was one introduced on behalf of the Suburban Railway Company. An hour later Mr. Folk sent the names of nearly one hundred persons to the sheriff, with instructions to subpœna them before the grand jury at once. The list included Councilmen, members of the House of Delegates, officers and directors of the Suburban Railway, bank presidents and cashiers. In three days the investigation was being pushed with vigor, but St. Louis was laughing at the “huge joke.” Such things had been attempted before. The men who had been ordered to appear before the grand jury jested as they chatted in the anterooms, and newspaper accounts of these preliminary examinations were written in the spirit of burlesque.
One afternoon, late in January 1903, a newspaper reporter known as “Red” Galvin pointed out to Mr. Folk a brief article that said a large amount of money had been deposited in a bank to bribe certain Assembly members for the passage of a street railroad ordinance. No names were given, but Mr. Galvin speculated that the bill in question was one brought forward by the Suburban Railway Company. An hour later, Mr. Folk sent the names of nearly one hundred individuals to the sheriff, instructing him to subpoena them before the grand jury immediately. The list included Council members, members of the House of Delegates, officers and directors of the Suburban Railway, and bank presidents and cashiers. Within three days, the investigation was being conducted vigorously, but St. Louis was laughing at the “big joke.” Similar attempts had been made before. The individuals summoned to appear before the grand jury joked together in the waiting rooms, and newspaper coverage of these initial hearings was written in a mocking tone.
It has developed since that Circuit Attorney Folk knew nothing, and was not able to learn 41much more during the first few days; but he says he saw here and there puffs of smoke and he determined to find the fire. It was not an easy job. The first break into such a system is always difficult. Mr. Folk began with nothing but courage and a strong personal conviction. He caused peremptory summons to be issued, for the immediate attendance in the grand jury room of Charles H. Turner, president of the Suburban Railway, and Philip Stock, a representative of brewers’ interests, who, he had reason to believe, was the legislative agent in this deal.
It started when Circuit Attorney Folk knew very little and couldn’t learn much more in the first few days; however, he noticed some puffs of smoke here and there, and he decided to find the source. It wasn’t an easy task. The first break into such a system is always tough. Mr. Folk began with nothing but courage and a strong personal belief. He ordered immediate summons for Charles H. Turner, president of the Suburban Railway, and Philip Stock, a representative of brewing interests, who he believed was the legislative agent involved in this deal, to appear in the grand jury room.
“Gentlemen,” said Mr. Folk, “I have secured sufficient evidence to warrant the return of indictments against you for bribery, and I shall prosecute you to the full extent of the law and send you to the penitentiary unless you tell to this grand jury the complete history of the corruptionist methods employed by you to secure the passage of Ordinance No. 44. I shall give you three days to consider the matter. At the end of that time, if you have not returned here and given us the information demanded, warrants will be issued for your arrest.”
“Gentlemen,” Mr. Folk said, “I have gathered enough evidence to press charges against you for bribery, and I will prosecute you to the fullest extent of the law and send you to prison unless you provide this grand jury with a complete account of the corrupt methods you used to secure the passage of Ordinance No. 44. You have three days to think it over. If you don’t return and give us the information we need by then, warrants will be issued for your arrest.”
They looked at the audacious young prosecutor and left the Four Courts building without uttering a word. He waited. Two days later, ex-Lieutenant Governor Charles P. Johnson, the veteran 42criminal lawyer, called, and said that his client, Mr. Stock, was in such poor health that he would be unable to appear before the grand jury.
They stared at the bold young prosecutor and walked out of the Four Courts building without saying a word. He waited. Two days later, former Lieutenant Governor Charles P. Johnson, the seasoned criminal lawyer, called and said that his client, Mr. Stock, was in such bad health that he wouldn’t be able to appear before the grand jury.
“I am truly sorry that Mr. Stock is ill,” replied Mr. Folk, “for his presence here is imperative, and if he fails to appear he will be arrested before sundown.”
“I’m really sorry to hear that Mr. Stock is unwell,” Mr. Folk replied, “because his presence here is essential, and if he doesn’t show up, he’ll be arrested before sunset.”
That evening a conference was held in Governor Johnson’s office, and the next day this story was told in the grand jury room by Charles H. Turner, millionaire president of the Suburban Railway, and corroborated by Philip Stock, man-about-town and a good fellow: The Suburban, anxious to sell out at a large profit to its only competitor, the St. Louis Transit Co., caused to be drafted the measure known as House Bill No. 44. So sweeping were its grants that Mr. Turner, who planned and executed the document, told the directors in his confidence that its enactment into law would enhance the value of the property from three to six million dollars. The bill introduced, Mr. Turner visited Colonel Butler, who had long been known as a legislative agent, and asked his price for securing the passage of the measure. “One hundred and forty-five thousand dollars will be my fee,” was the reply. The railway president demurred. He would think the matter over, he said, and he hired a 43cheaper man, Mr. Stock. Stock conferred with the representative of the combine in the House of Delegates and reported that $75,000 would be necessary in this branch of the Assembly. Mr. Turner presented a note indorsed by two of the directors whom he could trust, and secured a loan from the German American Savings Bank.
That evening, a meeting took place in Governor Johnson’s office, and the next day, this story was shared in the grand jury room by Charles H. Turner, the wealthy president of the Suburban Railway, and confirmed by Philip Stock, a well-connected and likable guy: The Suburban, eager to sell out at a big profit to its only rival, the St. Louis Transit Co., had House Bill No. 44 drafted. The grants were so extensive that Mr. Turner, who was responsible for creating the document, told the directors in confidence that getting it passed into law would boost the property's value from three to six million dollars. Once the bill was introduced, Mr. Turner approached Colonel Butler, a known legislative agent, and asked how much he would charge to get the bill passed. “My fee will be one hundred and forty-five thousand dollars,” was the response. The railway president hesitated. He said he would think it over and instead hired a cheaper option, Mr. Stock. Stock talked with the combine’s representative in the House of Delegates and reported that $75,000 would be needed in this part of the Assembly. Mr. Turner provided a note endorsed by two trustworthy directors and secured a loan from the German American Savings Bank.
Bribe funds in pocket, the legislative agent telephoned John Murrell, at that time a representative of the House combine, to meet him in the office of the Lincoln Trust Company. There the two rented a safe-deposit box. Mr. Stock placed in the drawer the roll of $75,000, and each subscribed to an agreement that the box should not be opened unless both were present. Of course the conditions spread upon the bank’s daybook made no reference to the purpose for which this fund had been deposited, but an agreement entered into by Messrs. Stock and Murrell was to the effect that the $75,000 should be given Mr. Murrell as soon as the bill became an ordinance, and by him distributed to the members of the combine. Stock turned to the Council, and upon his report a further sum of $60,000 was secured. These bills were placed in a safe-deposit box of the Mississippi Valley Trust Co., and the man who held the key as representative of the Council combine was Charles H. Kratz.
With the bribe money in hand, the legislative agent called John Murrell, who was then a representative of the House coalition, to meet him at the Lincoln Trust Company office. There, they rented a safe-deposit box. Mr. Stock placed a roll of $75,000 in the drawer, and they both agreed that the box should not be opened unless they were both present. Naturally, the conditions recorded in the bank’s daybook made no mention of the reason for this deposit, but the agreement between Stock and Murrell stated that the $75,000 would be given to Murrell as soon as the bill became an ordinance, to be distributed among the members of the coalition. Stock reported to the Council, and based on his report, an additional $60,000 was obtained. These bills were placed in a safe-deposit box at the Mississippi Valley Trust Co., with the key held by Charles H. Kratz, representing the Council coalition.
44All seemed well, but a few weeks after placing these funds in escrow, Mr. Stock reported to his employer that there was an unexpected hitch due to the action of Emil Meysenburg, who, as a member of the Council Committee on Railroads, was holding up the report on the bill. Mr. Stock said that Mr. Meysenburg held some worthless shares in a defunct corporation and wanted Mr. Stock to purchase this paper at its par value of $9,000. Mr. Turner gave Mr. Stock the money with which to buy the shares.
44Everything seemed fine, but a few weeks after putting these funds in escrow, Mr. Stock informed his employer that there was an unexpected issue caused by Emil Meysenburg. As a member of the Council Committee on Railroads, he was stalling the report on the bill. Mr. Stock mentioned that Mr. Meysenburg owned some worthless shares in a bankrupt company and wanted Mr. Stock to buy these shares at their face value of $9,000. Mr. Turner gave Mr. Stock the money to purchase the shares.
Thus the passage of House Bill 44 promised to cost the Suburban Railway Co. $144,000, only one thousand dollars less than that originally named by the political boss to whom Mr. Turner had first applied. The bill, however, passed both houses of the Assembly. The sworn servants of the city had done their work and held out their hands for the bribe money.
Thus, the passage of House Bill 44 was set to cost the Suburban Railway Co. $144,000, just one thousand dollars less than what the political boss originally quoted to Mr. Turner. However, the bill passed both houses of the Assembly. The sworn officials of the city had done their work and reached out for the bribe money.
Then came a court mandate which prevented the Suburban Railway Co. from reaping the benefit of the vote-buying, and Charles H. Turner, angered at the check, issued orders that the money in safe-deposit boxes should not be touched. War was declared between bribe-givers and bribe-takers, and the latter resorted to tactics which they hoped would frighten the Suburban people into submission—such as making enough of the story public 45to cause rumors of impending prosecution. It was that first item which Mr. Folk saw and acted upon.
Then came a court order that stopped the Suburban Railway Co. from benefiting from the vote-buying, and Charles H. Turner, furious about the setback, instructed that the money in safe-deposit boxes should remain untouched. A battle broke out between those giving bribes and those taking them, and the latter used tactics they thought would intimidate the Suburban people into submission—like making enough of the story public to spark rumors of looming prosecution. It was that first piece of information that Mr. Folk noticed and acted on. 45
When Messrs. Turner and Stock unfolded in the grand jury room the details of their bribery plot, Circuit Attorney Folk found himself in possession of verbal evidence of a great crime; he needed as material exhibits the two large sums of money in safe-deposit vaults of two of the largest banking institutions of the West. Had this money been withdrawn? Could he get it if it was there? Lock-boxes had always been considered sacred and beyond the power of the law to open. “I’ve always held,” said Mr. Folk, “that the fact that a thing never had been done was no reason for thinking it couldn’t be done.” He decided in this case that the magnitude of the interests involved warranted unusual action, so he selected a committee of grand jurors and visited one of the banks. He told the president, a personal friend, the facts that had come into his possession, and asked permission to search for the fund.
When Mr. Turner and Mr. Stock revealed the details of their bribery scheme in the grand jury room, Circuit Attorney Folk found himself with verbal evidence of a serious crime; he needed the two large amounts of money held in safe deposit vaults at two of the biggest banks in the West. Had this money been taken out? Could he access it if it was still there? Lockboxes had always been seen as sacred and off-limits for the law to open. “I’ve always believed,” Mr. Folk said, “that just because something has never been done doesn’t mean it can’t be done.” He decided that the importance of the matter justified extraordinary measures, so he chose a committee of grand jurors and went to one of the banks. He informed the president, a personal friend, of the facts he had learned and requested permission to search for the funds.
“Impossible,” was the reply. “Our rules deny anyone the right.”
“Impossible,” was the response. “Our rules don't allow anyone that right.”
“Mr.——,” said Mr. Folk, “a crime has been committed, and you hold concealed the principal evidence thereto. In the name of the State of Missouri I demand that you cause the box to be 46opened. If you refuse, I shall cause a warrant to be issued, charging you as an accessory.”
“Mr.——,” said Mr. Folk, “a crime has been committed, and you are hiding the main evidence. In the name of the State of Missouri, I demand that you open the box. If you refuse, I will have a warrant issued, charging you as an accessory.”
For a minute not a word was spoken by anyone in the room; then the banker said in almost inaudible tones:
For a minute, no one in the room said a word; then the banker spoke in a voice that was almost too quiet to hear:
“Give me a little time, gentlemen. I must consult with our legal adviser before taking such a step.”
“Give me a moment, gentlemen. I need to talk to our lawyer before making such a move.”
“We will wait ten minutes,” said the Circuit Attorney. “By that time we must have access to the vault or a warrant will be applied for.”
“We will wait ten minutes,” said the Circuit Attorney. “By then, we need to have access to the vault, or we will apply for a warrant.”
At the expiration of that time a solemn procession wended its way from the president’s office to the vaults in the sub-cellar—the president, the cashier, and the corporation’s lawyer, the grand jurors, and the Circuit Attorney. All bent eagerly forward as the key was inserted in the lock. The iron drawer yielded, and a roll of something wrapped in brown paper was brought to light. The Circuit Attorney removed the rubber bands, and national bank notes of large denomination spread out flat before them. The money was counted, and the sum was $75,000!
At the end of that time, a formal procession made its way from the president’s office to the vaults in the sub-cellar—the president, the cashier, the corporation’s lawyer, the grand jurors, and the Circuit Attorney. Everyone leaned in eagerly as the key was put into the lock. The metal drawer opened, and a roll of something wrapped in brown paper was revealed. The Circuit Attorney took off the rubber bands, and large national banknotes spread out flat in front of them. The money was counted, and the total came to $75,000!
The boodle fund was returned to its repository, officers of the bank were told they would be held responsible for it until the courts could act. The investigators visited the other financial institution. They met with more resistance there. The threat 47to procure a warrant had no effect until Mr. Folk left the building and set off in the direction of the Four Courts. Then a messenger called him back, and the second box was opened. In this was found $60,000. The chain of evidence was complete.
The money was put back in its place, and bank officials were informed they’d be held accountable for it until the courts took action. The investigators went to another financial institution, where they faced more pushback. The warning of getting a warrant didn’t have any impact until Mr. Folk left the building heading towards the Four Courts. Then a messenger called him back, and the second box was opened. Inside, they found $60,000. The chain of evidence was solid.
From that moment events moved rapidly. Charles Kratz and John K. Murrell, alleged representatives of Council and House combines, were arrested on bench warrants and placed under heavy bonds. Kratz was brought into court from a meeting at which plans were being formed for his election to the National Congress. Murrell was taken from his undertaking establishment. Emil Meysenburg, millionaire broker, was seated in his office when a sheriff’s deputy entered and read a document that charged him with bribery. The summons reached Henry Nicolaus while he was seated at his desk, and the wealthy brewer was compelled to send for a bondsman to avoid passing a night in jail. The cable flashed the news to Cairo, Egypt, that Ellis Wainwright, many times a millionaire, proprietor of the St. Louis brewery that bears this name, had been indicted. Julius Lehmann, one of the members of the House of Delegates, who had joked while waiting in the grand jury’s anteroom, had his laughter cut short by the hand of a deputy sheriff on his shoulder and the words, “You are charged with perjury.” He 48was joined at the bar of the criminal court by Harry Faulkner, another jolly good fellow.
From that moment on, things started happening quickly. Charles Kratz and John K. Murrell, supposed representatives of the Council and House groups, were arrested on bench warrants and required to post heavy bonds. Kratz was brought into court from a meeting where plans were being made for his election to the National Congress. Murrell was taken from his funeral home. Emil Meysenburg, a wealthy broker, was sitting in his office when a sheriff’s deputy came in and read him a document accusing him of bribery. The summons reached Henry Nicolaus while he was at his desk, and the rich brewer had to call for a bondsman to avoid spending the night in jail. The news flashed to Cairo, Egypt, that Ellis Wainwright, a multi-millionaire and owner of the St. Louis brewery, had been indicted. Julius Lehmann, a member of the House of Delegates who had been joking while waiting in the grand jury’s anteroom, had his laughter interrupted by a deputy sheriff’s hand on his shoulder and the words, “You are charged with perjury.” He was joined at the bar of the criminal court by Harry Faulkner, another cheerful companion.
Consternation spread among the boodle gang. Some of the men took night trains for other States and foreign countries; the majority remained and counseled together. Within twenty-four hours after the first indictments were returned, a meeting of bribe-givers and bribe-takers was held in South St. Louis. The total wealth of those in attendance was $30,000,000, and their combined political influence sufficient to carry any municipal election under normal conditions.
Consternation spread among the corrupt group. Some of the guys took overnight trains to other states and countries; most stayed and talked things over. Within twenty-four hours after the first indictments were announced, a meeting of those who gave and took bribes was held in South St. Louis. The total wealth of the attendees was $30,000,000, and their combined political influence was enough to win any local election under normal circumstances.
This great power was aligned in opposition to one man, who still was alone. It was not until many indictments had been returned that a citizens’ committee was formed to furnish funds, and even then most of the contributors concealed their identity. Mr. James L. Blair, the treasurer, testified in court that they were afraid to be known lest “it ruin their business.”
This powerful group was set against one man, who remained isolated. It wasn’t until many charges had been filed that a citizens’ committee was created to provide funding, and even then, most of the donors kept their identities secret. Mr. James L. Blair, the treasurer, testified in court that they were scared to be known because it could “ruin their business.”
At the meeting of corruptionists three courses were decided upon. Political leaders were to work on the Circuit Attorney by promise of future reward, or by threats. Detectives were to ferret out of the young lawyer’s past anything that could be used against him. Witnesses would be sent out of town and provided with money to remain away until the adjournment of the grand jury.
At the meeting of corrupt officials, they agreed on three plans. Political leaders were to influence the Circuit Attorney with promises of future rewards or through intimidation. Detectives were to dig into the young lawyer's past for anything they could use against him. Witnesses would be sent out of town and given money to stay away until the grand jury was done.
49Mr. Folk at once felt the pressure, and it was of a character to startle one. Statesmen, lawyers, merchants, clubmen, churchmen—in fact, men prominent in all walks of life—visited him at his office and at his home, and urged that he cease such activity against his fellow-townspeople. Political preferment was promised if he would yield; a political grave if he persisted. Threatening letters came, warning him of plots to murder, to disfigure, and to blackguard. Word came from Tennessee that detectives were investigating every act of his life. Mr. Folk told the politicians that he was not seeking political favors, and not looking forward to another office; the others he defied. Meantime he probed the deeper into the municipal sore. With his first successes for prestige and aided by the panic among the boodlers, he soon had them suspicious of one another, exchanging charges of betrayal, and ready to “squeal” or run at the slightest sign of danger. One member of the House of Delegates became so frightened while under the inquisitorial cross-fire that he was seized with a nervous chill; his false teeth fell to the floor, and the rattle so increased his alarm that he rushed from the room without stopping to pick up his teeth, and boarded the next train.
49Mr. Folk immediately felt the pressure, and it was shocking. Statesmen, lawyers, merchants, club members, church leaders—in fact, prominent people from all walks of life—visited him at his office and home, urging him to stop his actions against his fellow townspeople. They promised him political favors if he complied, or a political downfall if he didn't. He received threatening letters warning him of plots to kill him, disfigure him, and smear his reputation. Word came from Tennessee that detectives were looking into every aspect of his life. Mr. Folk told the politicians that he wasn’t seeking political favors and had no interest in another office; he challenged the others. Meanwhile, he delved deeper into the municipal corruption. With his initial successes boosting his reputation and fueled by panic among the corrupt officials, he quickly got them suspicious of each other, exchanging accusations of betrayal, and primed to "squeal" or run at the first sign of trouble. One member of the House of Delegates became so terrified during the intense questioning that he experienced a nervous attack; his false teeth fell to the floor, and the noise heightened his panic, causing him to flee the room without picking them up and catch the next train.
It was not long before Mr. Folk had dug up the intimate history of ten years of corruption, 50especially of the business of the North and South and the Central Traction franchise grants, the last-named being even more iniquitous than the Suburban.
It didn't take long for Mr. Folk to uncover a decade's worth of corruption, 50 particularly regarding the North and South and the Central Traction franchise grants, the latter of which was even more unethical than the Suburban.
Early in 1898 a “promoter” rented a bridal suite at the Planters’ Hotel, and having stocked the rooms with wines, liquors, and cigars until they resembled a candidate’s headquarters during a convention, sought introduction to members of the Assembly and to such political bosses as had influence with the city fathers. Two weeks after his arrival the Central Traction bill was introduced “by request” in the Council. The measure was a blanket franchise, granting rights of way which had not been given to old-established companies, and permitting the beneficiaries to parallel any track in the city. It passed both Houses despite the protests of every newspaper in the city, save one, and was vetoed by the mayor. The cost to the promoter was $145,000.
Early in 1898, a "promoter" rented a bridal suite at the Planters’ Hotel and stocked the rooms with wines, liquors, and cigars until they looked like a candidate's headquarters during a convention. He sought introductions to members of the Assembly and influential political leaders with the city officials. Two weeks after he arrived, the Central Traction bill was introduced “by request” in the Council. The bill was a blanket franchise that granted rights of way not given to older established companies and allowed the beneficiaries to parallel any track in the city. It passed both Houses despite objections from every newspaper in the city except one, and the mayor vetoed it. The promoter's expenses totaled $145,000.
Preparations were made to pass the bill over the executive’s veto. The bridal suite was restocked, larger sums of money were placed on deposit in the banks, and the services of three legislative agents were engaged. Evidence now in the possession of the St. Louis courts tells in detail the disposition of $250,000 of bribe money. Sworn statements prove that $75,000 was spent in the 51House of Delegates. The remainder of the $250,000 was distributed in the Council, whose members, though few in number, appraised their honor at a higher figure on account of their higher positions in the business and social world. Finally, but one vote was needed to complete the necessary two-thirds in the upper Chamber. To secure this a councilman of reputed integrity was paid $50,000 in consideration that he vote aye when the ordinance should come up for final passage. But the promoter did not dare risk all upon the vote of one man, and he made this novel proposition to another honored member, who accepted it:
Preparations were made to override the executive's veto. The bridal suite was restocked, larger amounts of money were deposited in the banks, and the services of three legislative agents were hired. Evidence currently held by the St. Louis courts details how $250,000 of bribe money was handled. Sworn statements confirm that $75,000 was used in the 51House of Delegates. The rest of the $250,000 was given out in the Council, with its members, despite being few in number, considering their honor to be worth more due to their influential positions in the business and social scene. Finally, only one vote was needed to achieve the required two-thirds in the upper Chamber. To secure this, a councilman with a good reputation was paid $50,000 with the understanding that he would vote yes when the ordinance came up for final approval. However, the promoter didn't want to gamble everything on one person's vote, so he made a unique proposition to another respected member, who agreed to it:
“You will vote on roll call after Mr. ——. I will place $45,000 in the hands of your son, which amount will become yours, if you have to vote for the measure because of Mr. ——‘s not keeping his promise. But if he stands out for it you can vote against it, and the money shall revert to me.”
“You will vote after Mr. ——. I will give $45,000 to your son, which will be yours if you have to vote for the measure because Mr. —— didn’t keep his promise. But if he refuses it, you can vote against it, and the money will come back to me.”
On the evening when the bill was read for final passage the City Hall was crowded with ward heelers and lesser politicians. These men had been engaged by the promoter, at five and ten dollars a head, to cheer on the boodling Assemblymen. The bill passed the House with a rush, and all crowded into the Council Chamber. While the roll was being called the silence was profound, for all knew 52that some men in the Chamber whose reputations had been free from blemish, were under promise and pay to part with honor that night. When the clerk was two-thirds down the list those who had kept count knew that but one vote was needed. One more name was called. The man addressed turned red, then white, and after a moment’s hesitation he whispered “aye”! The silence was so death-like that his vote was heard throughout the room, and those near enough heard also the sigh of relief that escaped from the member who could now vote “no” and save his reputation.
On the night when the bill was set for final approval, City Hall was packed with political backers and lesser officials. These men had been hired by the promoter, at five to ten dollars each, to cheer on the corrupt Assembly members. The bill quickly passed the House, and everyone rushed into the Council Chamber. As the roll call began, there was a heavy silence, as everyone realized that some respected members in the room were prepared to sell their integrity that night. When the clerk got two-thirds through the list, those keeping track knew that only one more vote was needed. One more name was called. The man addressed turned red, then pale, and after a brief hesitation, he whispered “aye”! The silence was so intense that his vote echoed throughout the room, and those close enough also caught the sigh of relief from the member who could now vote “no” and protect his reputation.
The Central Franchise bill was a law, passed over the mayor’s veto. The promoter had expended nearly $300,000 in securing the legislation, but within a week he sold his rights of way to “Eastern capitalists” for $1,250,000. The United Railways Company was formed, and without owning an inch of steel rail, or a plank in a car, was able to compel every street railroad in St. Louis, with the exception of the Suburban, to part with stock and right of way and agree to a merger. Out of this grew the St. Louis Transit Company of to-day.
The Central Franchise bill was a law passed despite the mayor's veto. The promoter had spent almost $300,000 to secure the legislation, but within a week, he sold his rights of way to “Eastern investors” for $1,250,000. The United Railways Company was created, and without owning any rail or cars, was able to force every street railroad in St. Louis, except for the Suburban, to hand over stock and rights of way and agree to a merger. This led to the development of the St. Louis Transit Company as we know it today.
Several incidents followed this legislative session. After the Assembly had adjourned, a promoter entertained the $50,000 councilman at a downtown restaurant. During the supper the host 53remarked to his guest, “I wish you would lend me that $50,000 until to-morrow. There are some of the boys outside whom I haven’t paid.” The money changed hands. The next day, having waited in vain for the promoter, Mr. Councilman armed himself with a revolver and began a search of the hotels. The hunt in St. Louis proved fruitless, but the irate legislator kept on the trail until he came face to face with the lobbyist in the corridor of the Waldorf-Astoria. The New Yorker, seeing the danger, seized the St. Louisan by the arm and said soothingly, “There, there; don’t take on so. I was called away suddenly. Come to supper with me; I will give you the money.”
Several incidents followed this legislative session. After the Assembly had wrapped up, a promoter treated the $50,000 councilman to dinner at a downtown restaurant. During the meal, the host said to his guest, “I wish you would lend me that $50,000 until tomorrow. There are some guys outside I haven’t paid.” The money changed hands. The next day, after waiting in vain for the promoter, Mr. Councilman armed himself with a handgun and started searching the hotels. The search in St. Louis was unsuccessful, but the angry legislator kept looking until he ran into the lobbyist in the hallway of the Waldorf-Astoria. The New Yorker, realizing the trouble, grabbed the St. Louisan by the arm and said reassuringly, “There, there; don’t get so worked up. I was called away unexpectedly. Come to dinner with me; I’ll give you the money.”
The invitation was accepted, and champagne soon was flowing. When the man from the West had become sufficiently maudlin the promoter passed over to him a letter, which he had dictated to a typewriter while away from the table for a few minutes. The statement denied all knowledge of bribery.
The invitation was accepted, and champagne soon started flowing. Once the man from the West got a bit too sentimental, the promoter handed him a letter that he had typed out while stepping away from the table for a few minutes. The letter denied any knowledge of bribery.
“You sign that and I will pay you $5,000. Refuse, and you don’t get a cent,” said the promoter. The St. Louisan returned home carrying the $5,000, and that was all.
“You sign this, and I'll give you $5,000. Refuse, and you won’t get anything,” said the promoter. The person from St. Louis went home with the $5,000, and that was it.
Meanwhile the promoter had not fared so well with other spoilsmen. By the terms of the ante-legislation 54agreement referred to above, the son of one councilman was pledged to return $45,000 if his father was saved the necessity of voting for the bill. The next day the New Yorker sought out this young man and asked for the money.
Meanwhile, the promoter hadn't had as much luck with other benefactors. According to the agreement mentioned earlier, the son of one councilman had promised to return $45,000 if his dad didn't have to vote for the bill. The next day, the New Yorker sought out this young man and asked for the money.
“I am not going to give it to you,” was the cool rejoinder. “My mamma says that it is bribe money and that it would be wrong to give it to either you or father, so I shall keep it myself.” And he did. When summoned before the grand jury this young man asked to be relieved from answering questions. “I am afraid I might commit perjury,” he said. He was advised to “Tell the truth and there will be no risk.”
“I’m not going to give it to you,” was the cool response. “My mom says it’s bribe money and that it would be wrong to give it to either you or Dad, so I’ll keep it myself.” And he did. When he was called before the grand jury, this young man requested to be excused from answering questions. “I’m afraid I might lie under oath,” he said. He was advised to “Just tell the truth and there won’t be any risk.”
“It would be all right,” said the son, “if Mr. Folk would tell me what the other fellows have testified to. Please have him do that.”
“It would be fine,” said the son, “if Mr. Folk could tell me what the other guys have said. Please ask him to do that.”
Two indictments were found as the result of this Central Traction bill, and bench warrants were served on Robert M. Snyder and George J. Kobusch. The State charged the former with being one of the promoters of the bill, the definite allegation being bribery. Mr. Kobusch, who is president of a street car manufacturing company, was charged with perjury.
Two indictments were issued as a result of this Central Traction bill, and bench warrants were served on Robert M. Snyder and George J. Kobusch. The State accused Snyder of being one of the bill's promoters, specifically alleging bribery. Mr. Kobusch, who is the president of a streetcar manufacturing company, was charged with perjury.
The first case tried was that of Emil Meysenburg, the millionaire who compelled the Suburban people to purchase his worthless stock. He was 55defended by three attorneys of high repute in criminal jurisprudence, but the young Circuit Attorney proved equal to the emergency, and a conviction was secured. Three years in the penitentiary was the sentence. Charles Kratz, the Congressional candidate, forfeited $40,000 by flight, and John K. Murrell also disappeared. Mr. Folk traced Murrell to Mexico, caused his arrest in Guadalajara, negotiated with the authorities for his surrender, and when this failed, arranged for his return home to confess, and his evidence brought about the indictment, on September 8, of eighteen members of the municipal legislature. The second case was that of Julius Lehmann. Two years at hard labor was the sentence, and the man who had led the jokers in the grand jury anteroom would have fallen when he heard it, had not a friend been standing near.
The first case tried was that of Emil Meysenburg, the millionaire who forced the Suburban people to buy his worthless stock. He was defended by three well-known criminal defense attorneys, but the young Circuit Attorney rose to the occasion, and a conviction was achieved. He received a three-year sentence in prison. Charles Kratz, the Congressional candidate, lost $40,000 by fleeing, and John K. Murrell also vanished. Mr. Folk tracked Murrell to Mexico, had him arrested in Guadalajara, negotiated with the authorities for his return, and when that didn't work, arranged for his return home to confess. His testimony led to the indictment of eighteen members of the municipal legislature on September 8. The second case was of Julius Lehmann. He received a two-year sentence of hard labor, and the man who had led the jokers in the grand jury waiting room would have collapsed upon hearing it if a friend hadn't been nearby.
Besides the convictions of these and other men of good standing in the community, and the flight of many more, partnerships were dissolved, companies had to be reorganized, business houses were closed because their proprietors were absent, but Mr. Folk, deterred as little by success as by failure, moved right on; he was not elated; he was not sorrowful. The man proceeded with his work quickly, surely, smilingly, without fear or pity. The terror spread, and the rout was complete.
Besides the convictions of these and other respected men in the community, and the flight of many more, partnerships were broken, companies needed to be reorganized, and businesses were closed because their owners were missing. But Mr. Folk, undeterred by either success or failure, kept moving forward; he wasn’t excited, and he wasn’t upset. The man went about his work quickly, confidently, and with a smile, without fear or compassion. The fear spread, and the chaos was total.
56When another grand jury was sworn and proceeded to take testimony there were scores of men who threw up their hands and crying “Mea culpa!” begged to be permitted to tell all they knew and not be prosecuted. The inquiry broadened. The son of a former mayor was indicted for misconduct in office while serving as his father’s private secretary, and the grand jury recommended that the ex-mayor be sued in the civil courts, to recover interests on public money which he had placed in his own pocket. A true bill fell on a former City Register, and more Assemblymen were arrested, charged with making illegal contracts with the city. At last the ax struck upon the trunk of the greatest oak of the forest. Colonel Butler, the boss who has controlled elections in St. Louis for many years, the millionaire who had risen from bellows-boy in a blacksmith’s shop to be the maker and guide of the Governors of Missouri, one of the men who helped nominate and elect Folk—he also was indicted on two counts charging attempted bribery. That Butler has controlled legislation in St. Louis had long been known. It was generally understood that he owned Assemblymen before they ever took the oath of office, and that he did not have to pay for votes. And yet open bribery was the allegation now. Two members of the Board of Health 57stood ready to swear that he offered them $2,500 for their approval of a garbage contract.
56When another grand jury was sworn in and started taking testimony, a lot of men raised their hands and cried, “My bad!” begging to share everything they knew without facing prosecution. The investigation expanded. The son of a former mayor was charged with misconduct while serving as his father’s private secretary, and the grand jury suggested that the ex-mayor should be sued in civil court to recover interest on public money he had pocketed. A true bill was filed against a former City Register, and more Assemblymen were arrested, accused of illegal contracts with the city. Finally, the biggest figure in the scheme came under scrutiny. Colonel Butler, the political boss who had controlled elections in St. Louis for many years, the millionaire who started as a bellows-boy in a blacksmith’s shop and became a key player in the politics of Missouri, one of the men who helped nominate and elect Folk—he was also indicted on two counts of attempted bribery. It had long been known that Butler had significant control over legislation in St. Louis. It was common knowledge that he owned Assemblymen before they took their oaths of office, and that he didn't need to pay for their votes. Yet now, he faced allegations of open bribery. Two members of the Board of Health were ready to testify that he offered them $2,500 for their approval of a garbage contract. 57
Pitiful? Yes, but typical. Other cities are to-day in the same condition as St. Louis before Mr. Folk was invited in to see its rottenness. Chicago is cleaning itself up just now, so is Minneapolis, and Pittsburg recently had a bribery scandal; Boston is at peace, Cincinnati and St. Paul are satisfied, while Philadelphia is happy with the worst government in the world. As for the small towns and the villages, many of these are busy as bees at the loot.
Pitiful? Yes, but typical. Other cities today are in the same condition as St. Louis was before Mr. Folk was invited in to see its corruption. Chicago is cleaning itself up right now, so is Minneapolis, and Pittsburgh recently had a bribery scandal; Boston is at peace, Cincinnati and St. Paul are content, while Philadelphia is dealing with the worst government in the world. As for the small towns and villages, many of them are just as busy as ever with the corruption.
St. Louis, indeed, in its disgrace, has a great advantage. It was exposed late; it has not been reformed and caught again and again, until its citizens are reconciled to corruption. But, best of all, the man who has turned St. Louis inside out, turned it, as it were, upside down, too. In all cities, the better classes—the business men—are the sources of corruption; but they are so rarely pursued and caught that we do not fully realize whence the trouble comes. Thus most cities blame the politicians and the ignorant and vicious poor.
St. Louis, despite its shame, has a significant advantage. It was exposed late; it hasn’t been fixed and has been caught multiple times, leading its citizens to accept corruption. But best of all, the person who has completely exposed St. Louis has flipped it upside down as well. In every city, the more privileged classes—the business people—are the root of corruption; however, they are so rarely held accountable that we don’t fully grasp where the problem originates. As a result, most cities place the blame on politicians and the uneducated and immoral poor.
Mr. Folk has shown St. Louis that its bankers, brokers, corporation officers,—its business men are the sources of evil, so that from the start 58it will know the municipal problem in its true light. With a tradition for public spirit, it may drop Butler and its runaway bankers, brokers, and brewers, and pushing aside the scruples of the hundreds of men down in blue book, and red book, and church register, who are lying hidden behind the statutes of limitations, the city may restore good government. Otherwise the exposures by Mr. Folk will result only in the perfection of the corrupt system. For the corrupt can learn a lesson when the good citizens cannot. The Tweed régime in New York taught Tammany to organize its boodle business; the police exposure taught it to improve its method of collecting blackmail. And both now are almost perfect and safe. The rascals of St. Louis will learn in like manner; they will concentrate the control of their bribery system, excluding from the profit-sharing the great mass of weak rascals, and carrying on the business as a business in the interest of a trustworthy few. District Attorney Jerome cannot catch the Tammany men, and Circuit Attorney Folk will not be able another time to break the St. Louis ring. This is St. Louis’ one great chance.
Mr. Folk has shown St. Louis that its bankers, brokers, and corporate leaders—its business people—are the sources of corruption, so from the outset, the city will understand the municipal problem in its true light. With a legacy of public spirit, it may turn away from Butler and its escaping bankers, brokers, and brewers, while pushing aside the ethical concerns of the hundreds of people recorded in blue books, red books, and church registers, who are hidden behind the statutes of limitations, allowing the city to restore good governance. Otherwise, Mr. Folk’s revelations will only perfect the corrupt system. The corrupt can learn lessons when the honest citizens cannot. The Tweed regime in New York showed Tammany how to organize its corrupt practices; police scandals taught it to refine its methods of extortion. And both are now almost flawless and secure. The wrongdoers in St. Louis will learn in the same way; they will streamline their bribery operations, excluding the majority of weaker crooks, and manage their business in the interests of a reliable few. District Attorney Jerome can’t catch the Tammany members, and Circuit Attorney Folk won’t be able to break the St. Louis ring again. This is St. Louis’ one major opportunity.
But, for the rest of us, it does not matter about St. Louis any more than it matters about Colonel Butler et al. The point is, that what went on in 59St. Louis is going on in most of our cities, towns, and villages. The problem of municipal government in America has not been solved. The people may be tired of it, but they cannot give it up—not yet.
But for the rest of us, St. Louis matters no more than Colonel Butler and others The important thing is that what happened in St. Louis is happening in most of our cities, towns, and villages. The issue of city government in America hasn’t been resolved. People might be fed up with it, but they can’t let it go—not yet.
THE SHAME OF MINNEAPOLIS
Whenever anything extraordinary is done in American municipal politics, whether for good or for evil, you can trace it almost invariably to one man. The people do not do it. Neither do the “gangs,” “combines,” or political parties. These are but instruments by which bosses (not leaders; we Americans are not led, but driven) rule the people, and commonly sell them out. But there are at least two forms of the autocracy which has supplanted the democracy here as it has everywhere democracy has been tried. One is that of the organized majority by which, as with the Republican machine in Philadelphia, the boss has normal control of more than half the voters. The other is that of the adroitly managed minority. The “good people” are herded into parties and stupefied with convictions and a name, Republican or Democrat; while the “bad people” are so organized or interested by the boss that he can wield their votes to enforce terms with party managers and decide elections. St. Louis is a conspicuous example of this form. Minneapolis is another. 64Colonel Ed Butler is the unscrupulous opportunist who handled the non-partisan minority which turned St. Louis into a “boodle town.” In Minneapolis “Doc” Ames was the man.
Whenever something unusual happens in American local politics, whether it's good or bad, you can typically trace it back to one person. The public doesn't do it. Neither do the "gangs," "combines," or political parties. These are just tools through which bosses (not leaders; we Americans are not led, but pushed) control the people and often betray them. There are at least two types of autocracy that have replaced democracy here, as they have in every place democracy has been attempted. One is the organized majority, like the Republican machine in Philadelphia, where the boss typically controls more than half the voters. The other is the skillfully managed minority. The "good people" are lumped into parties and numbed by their beliefs and labels, Republican or Democrat, while the "bad people" are organized or influenced by the boss to use their votes to pressure party leaders and sway elections. St. Louis is a clear example of this approach. Minneapolis is another. 64Colonel Ed Butler is the ruthless opportunist who directed the non-partisan minority that turned St. Louis into a "boodle town." In Minneapolis, "Doc" Ames was the key figure.
Minneapolis is a New England town on the upper Mississippi. The metropolis of the Northwest, it is the metropolis also of Norway and Sweden in America. Indeed, it is the second largest Scandinavian city in the world. But Yankees, straight from Down East, settled the town, and their New England spirit predominates. They had Bayard Taylor lecture there in the early days of the settlement; they made it the seat of the University of Minnesota. Yet even now, when the town has grown to a population of more than 200,000, you feel that there is something Western about it too—a Yankee with a round Puritan head, an open prairie heart, and a great, big Scandinavian body. The “Roundhead” takes the “Squarehead” out into the woods, and they cut lumber by forests, or they go out on the prairies and raise wheat and mill it into fleet-cargoes of flour. They work hard, they make money, they are sober, satisfied, busy with their own affairs. There isn’t much time for public business. Taken together, Miles, Hans, and Ole are very American. Miles insists upon strict laws, Ole and Hans want one or two Scandinavians on their ticket. These things 65granted, they go off on raft or reaper, leaving whoso will to enforce the lawn and run the city.
Minneapolis is a New England town on the upper Mississippi. It's the major city of the Northwest and also the heart of Norway and Sweden in America. In fact, it’s the second-largest Scandinavian city in the world. However, Yankees, fresh from Down East, settled the town, and their New England spirit dominates. They had Bayard Taylor speak there during the early days of the settlement and made it the home of the University of Minnesota. Even now, with a population of more than 200,000, there’s still a hint of the West about it—a Yankee with a round Puritan head, an open prairie heart, and a big Scandinavian body. The “Roundhead” takes the “Squarehead” into the woods to cut lumber from the forests, or they venture out onto the prairies to grow wheat and turn it into bulk cargoes of flour. They work hard, make money, stay sober, and are happy, focused on their own lives. There isn’t much time for public business. Together, Miles, Hans, and Ole are very American. Miles pushes for strict laws, while Ole and Hans want to include a couple of Scandinavians on their ticket. With those things taken care of, they set off on a raft or reaper, leaving whoever will to enforce the laws and run the city.
The people who were left to govern the city hated above all things strict laws. They were the loafers, saloon keepers, gamblers, criminals, and the thriftless poor of all nationalities. Resenting the sobriety of a staid, industrious community, and having no Irish to boss them, they delighted to follow the jovial pioneer doctor, Albert Alonzo Ames. He was the “good fellow”—a genial, generous reprobate. Devery, Tweed, and many more have exposed in vain this amiable type. “Doc” Ames, tall, straight, and cheerful, attracted men, and they gave him votes for his smiles. He stood for license. There was nothing of the Puritan about him. His father, the sturdy old pioneer, Dr. Alfred Elisha Ames, had a strong strain of it in him, but he moved on with his family of six sons from Garden Prairie, Ill., to Fort Snelling reservation, in 1851, before Minneapolis was founded, and young Albert Alonzo, who then was ten years old, grew up free, easy, and tolerant. He was sent to school, then to college in Chicago, and he returned home a doctor of medicine before he was twenty-one. As the town waxed soberer and richer, “Doc” grew gayer and more and more generous. Skillful as a surgeon, devoted as a physician, and as a man kindly, he increased 66his practice till he was the best-loved man in the community. He was especially good to the poor. Anybody could summon “Doc” Ames at any hour to any distance. He went, and he gave not only his professional service, but sympathy, and often charity. “Richer men than you will pay your bill,” he told the destitute. So there was a basis for his “good-fellowship.” There always is; these good fellows are not frauds—not in the beginning.
The people left in charge of the city really disliked strict laws above all. They were the slackers, bar owners, gamblers, criminals, and the struggling poor from all backgrounds. Resenting the seriousness of a stable, hardworking community and lacking any Irish to take charge, they loved to follow the fun-loving pioneer doctor, Albert Alonzo Ames. He was the "good guy"—a friendly, generous troublemaker. Devery, Tweed, and many others have tried to expose this likable character in vain. “Doc” Ames, tall, straight, and cheerful, drew people in, and they voted for him just for his smiles. He stood for freedom. There was nothing Puritanical about him. His father, the tough old pioneer, Dr. Alfred Elisha Ames, had some of that in him, but he moved with his family of six sons from Garden Prairie, Ill., to the Fort Snelling reservation in 1851, before Minneapolis was founded. Young Albert Alonzo, who was ten at the time, grew up free-spirited and open-minded. He went to school, then to college in Chicago, and returned home as a doctor of medicine before turning twenty-one. As the town became more serious and wealthy, “Doc” got happier and more generous. Skilled as a surgeon, dedicated as a physician, and kind as a man, he grew his practice until he became the best-loved person in the community. He was especially kind to the poor. Anyone could call “Doc” Ames at any time, no matter how far. He would go, providing not only his professional services but also sympathy and often help. “Richer men than you will pay your bill,” he told those in need. So there was a foundation for his “good-guy” persona. There always is; these good guys aren’t fakes—not at first.
But there is another side to them sometimes. Ames was sunshine not to the sick and destitute only. To the vicious and the depraved also he was a comfort. If a man was a hard drinker, the good Doctor cheered him with another drink; if he had stolen something, the Doctor helped to get him off. He was naturally vain; popularity developed his love of approbation. His loose life brought disapproval only from the good people, so gradually the Doctor came to enjoy best the society of the barroom and the streets. This society, flattered in turn, worshiped the good Doctor, and, active in politics always, put its physician into the arena.
But there's another side to them sometimes. Ames wasn't just a source of light for the sick and poor; he was also a comfort to the wicked and corrupt. If a guy was a heavy drinker, the good Doctor would cheer him on with another drink; if he'd stolen something, the Doctor would help him get off the hook. He was naturally vain, and his popularity fueled his desire for approval. His carefree lifestyle only drew criticism from the decent folks, so over time, the Doctor found he preferred hanging out with people from the bar and the streets. This crowd, in turn, flattered him and worshiped the good Doctor, and since he was always involved in politics, they pushed their physician into the spotlight.
Had he been wise or even shrewd, he might have made himself a real power. But he wasn’t calculating, only light and frivolous, so he did not organize his forces and run men for office. He 67sought office himself from the start, and he got most of the small places he wanted by changing his party to seize the opportunity. His floating minority, added to the regular partisan vote, was sufficient ordinarily for his useless victories. As time went on he rose from smaller offices to be a Republican mayor, then twice at intervals to be a Democratic mayor. He was a candidate once for Congress; he stood for governor once on a sort of Populist-Democrat ticket. Ames could not get anything outside of his own town, however, and after his third term as mayor it was thought he was out of politics altogether. He was getting old, and he was getting worse.
If he had been wise or even clever, he could have become a real power. But he wasn't strategic, just carefree and superficial, so he didn't organize his supporters or run anyone for office. He aimed for office himself from the beginning and secured most of the minor positions he wanted by changing his party to take advantage of opportunities. His shifting minority, combined with the usual partisan vote, was usually enough for his pointless victories. As time went on, he moved up from smaller positions to become a Republican mayor, then served twice as a Democratic mayor. He ran for Congress once and once for governor on a sort of Populist-Democrat ticket. However, Ames couldn't achieve anything outside of his own town, and after his third term as mayor, it was believed he was done with politics. He was getting older, and things were getting worse for him.
Like many a “good fellow” with hosts of miscellaneous friends downtown to whom he was devoted, the good Doctor neglected his own family. From neglect he went on openly to separation from his wife and a second establishment. The climax came not long before the election of 1900. His wife died. The family would not have the father at the funeral, but he appeared,—not at the house, but in a carriage on the street. He sat across the way, with his feet up and a cigar in his mouth, till the funeral moved; then he circled around, crossing it and meeting it, and making altogether a scene which might well close any man’s career.
Like many "good guys" with a bunch of various friends downtown whom he cared about, the good Doctor neglected his own family. His neglect eventually led to him openly separating from his wife and starting a new life. The peak of it all came just before the election of 1900. His wife passed away. The family didn't want the father at the funeral, but he showed up—not at the house, but in a carriage on the street. He sat across the street, with his feet up and a cigar in his mouth, until the funeral procession began; then he drove around, crossing paths with it, creating a scene that could easily ruin any man's reputation.
68It didn’t end his. The people had just secured the passage of a new primary law to establish direct popular government. There were to be no more nominations by convention. The voters were to ballot for their party candidates. By a slip of some sort, the laws did not specify that Republicans only should vote for Republican candidates, and only Democrats for Democratic candidates. Any voter could vote at either primary. Ames, in disrepute with his own party, the Democratic, bade his followers vote for his nomination for mayor on the Republican ticket. They all voted; not all the Republicans did. He was nominated. Nomination is far from election, and you would say that the trick would not help him. But that was a Presidential year, so the people of Minneapolis had to vote for Ames, the Republican candidate for mayor. Besides, Ames said he was going to reform; that he was getting old, and wanted to close his career with a good administration. The effective argument, however, was that, since McKinley had to be elected to save the country, Ames must be supported for mayor of Minneapolis. Why? The great American people cannot be trusted to scratch a ticket.
68It didn’t end his. The people had just passed a new primary law to create direct popular government. There would be no more nominations by convention. Voters would choose their party candidates on the ballot. Due to some oversight, the laws didn’t specify that only Republicans should vote for Republican candidates, and only Democrats for Democratic candidates. Any voter could participate in either primary. Ames, who was not in good standing with his own party, the Democrats, urged his supporters to vote for his nomination for mayor on the Republican ticket. They all voted; not all the Republicans did. He was nominated. Nomination is far from election, and one might argue that the trick wouldn’t help him. But that was a Presidential year, so the people of Minneapolis had to vote for Ames, the Republican candidate for mayor. Moreover, Ames claimed he was going to reform; that he was getting old and wanted to finish his career with a good administration. The convincing argument, however, was that since McKinley had to be elected to save the country, Ames must be supported for mayor of Minneapolis. Why? The great American public can’t be trusted to just mark a ticket.
Well, Minneapolis got its old mayor back, and he was indeed “reformed.” Up to this time Ames had not been very venal personally. He was a 69“spender,” not a “grafter,” and he was guilty of corruption chiefly by proxy; he took the honors and left the spoils to his followers. His administrations were no worse than the worst. Now, however, he set out upon a career of corruption which for deliberateness, invention, and avarice has never been equaled. It was as if he had made up his mind that he had been careless long enough, and meant to enrich his last years. He began promptly.
Well, Minneapolis got its former mayor back, and he had definitely changed. Up until now, Ames hadn’t been very corrupt personally. He was a “spender,” not a “grafter,” and he was mainly guilty of corruption through his associates; he took the accolades and left the profits to his supporters. His administrations weren’t worse than the worst. Now, however, he embarked on a path of corruption that, for its thoughtfulness, creativity, and greed, has never been matched. It was as if he had decided he had been too careless for too long and aimed to secure his wealth in his later years. He started right away.
Immediately upon his election, before he took office (on January 7, 1901), he organized a cabinet and laid plans to turn the city over to outlaws who were to work under police direction for the profit of his administration. He chose for chief his brother, Colonel Fred W. Ames, who had recently returned under a cloud from service in the Philippines. But he was a weak vessel for chief of police, and the mayor picked for chief of detectives an abler man, who was to direct the more difficult operations. This was Norman W. King, a former gambler, who knew the criminals needed in the business ahead. King was to invite to Minneapolis thieves, confidence men, pickpockets and gamblers, and release some that were in the local jail. They were to be organized into groups, according to their profession, and detectives were assigned to assist and direct 70them. The head of the gambling syndicate was to have charge of the gambling, making the terms and collecting the “graft,” just as King and a Captain Hill were to collect from the thieves. The collector for women of the town was to be Irwin A. Gardner, a medical student in the Doctor’s office, who was made a special policeman for the purpose. These men looked over the force, selected those men who could be trusted, charged them a price for their retention, and marked for dismissal 107 men out of 225, the 107 being the best policemen in the department from the point of view of the citizens who afterward reorganized the force. John Fitchette, better known as “Coffee John,” a Virginian (who served on the Jefferson Davis jury), the keeper of a notorious coffee-house, was to be a captain of police, with no duties except to sell places on the police force.
Immediately after he was elected, before he took office (on January 7, 1901), he put together a cabinet and made plans to hand control of the city over to criminals who were to operate under police supervision for the benefit of his administration. He appointed his brother, Colonel Fred W. Ames, as chief, who had recently returned home under questionable circumstances after serving in the Philippines. However, he was not strong enough to be chief of police, so the mayor chose a more capable person, Norman W. King, a former gambler, as chief of detectives to manage the more challenging tasks. King was set to invite thieves, con artists, pickpockets, and gamblers to Minneapolis and release some who were locked up in the local jail. They were to be organized into groups based on their professions, with detectives assigned to help and guide them. The leader of the gambling operation was to oversee the gambling activities, setting the terms and collecting the “graft,” just as King and a Captain Hill were to collect from the thieves. The person in charge of the ladies of the town was to be Irwin A. Gardner, a medical student in the doctor’s office, who was made a special policeman for this purpose. These men reviewed the police force, picked out those they could rely on, charged them a fee for their positions, and planned to dismiss 107 out of 225 officers, with those 107 being the best policemen from the community's perspective, who would later help to reorganize the force. John Fitchette, better known as “Coffee John,” a Virginian (who served on the Jefferson Davis jury), and owner of a notorious coffee house, was to become a police captain with no responsibilities other than selling positions on the police force.
And they did these things that they planned—all and more. The administration opened with the revolution on the police force. The thieves in the local jail were liberated, and it was made known to the Under World generally that “things were doing” in Minneapolis. The incoming swindlers reported to King or his staff for instructions, and went to work, turning the “swag” over to the detectives in charge. Gambling went on openly, and disorderly houses multiplied under the fostering 71care of Gardner, the medical student. But all this was not enough. Ames dared to break openly into the municipal system of vice protection.
And they followed through with their plans—all of them and more. The administration kicked off by shaking up the police force. The criminals in the local jail were set free, and it was announced throughout the Underworld that “things were happening” in Minneapolis. The incoming con artists checked in with King or his team for instructions, and got to work, handing over the stolen goods to the detectives in charge. Gambling was happening out in the open, and brothels multiplied with the support of Gardner, the medical student. But that still wasn't enough. Ames boldly decided to disrupt the city’s system of protecting vice.
There was such a thing. Minneapolis, strict in its laws, forbade vices which are inevitable, then regularly permitted them under certain conditions. Legal limits, called “patrol lines,” were prescribed, within which saloons might be opened. These ran along the river front, out through part of the business section, with long arms reaching into the Scandinavian quarters, north and south. Gambling also was confined, but more narrowly. And there were limits, also arbitrary, but not always identical with those for gambling, within which the social evil was allowed. But the novel feature of this scheme was that disorderly houses were practically licensed by the city, the women appearing before the clerk of the Municipal Court each month to pay a “fine” of $100. Unable at first to get this “graft,” Ames’s man Gardner persuaded women to start houses, apartments, and, of all things, candy stores, which sold sweets to children and tobacco to the “lumber Jacks” in front, while a nefarious traffic was carried on in the rear. But they paid Ames, not the city, and that was all this “reform” administration cared about.
There was indeed such a thing. Minneapolis, with its strict laws, banned vices that are inevitable, yet routinely allowed them under certain conditions. Legal limits, known as “patrol lines,” were set, within which saloons could operate. These lines extended along the riverfront, through part of the business district, and had long arms reaching into the Scandinavian neighborhoods, both north and south. Gambling was also restricted, but more tightly. There were also arbitrary limits, not always the same as those for gambling, within which the social problems were tolerated. However, the unusual aspect of this arrangement was that disorderly houses were practically licensed by the city. The women would show up before the clerk of the Municipal Court each month to pay a “fine” of $100. Initially unable to collect this “graft,” Ames’s associate Gardner convinced women to open houses, apartments, and, of all things, candy stores, which sold sweets to children in front while tobacco was sold to the “lumberjacks” nearby, all while shady activities took place in the back. But they paid Ames, not the city, and that was all this “reform” administration cared about.
The revenue from all these sources must have 72been large. It only whetted the avarice of the mayor and his Cabinet. They let gambling privileges without restriction as to location or “squareness”; the syndicate could cheat and rob as it would. Peddlers and pawnbrokers, formerly licensed by the city, bought permits now instead from the mayor’s agent in this field. Some two hundred slot machines were installed in various parts of the town, with owner’s agent and mayor’s agent watching and collecting from them enough to pay the mayor $15,000 a year as his share. Auction frauds were instituted. Opium joints and unlicensed saloons, called “blind pigs,” were protected. Gardner even had a police baseball team, for whose games tickets were sold to people who had to buy them. But the women were the easiest “graft.” They were compelled to buy illustrated biographies of the city officials; they had to give presents of money, jewelry, and gold stars to police officers. But the money they still paid direct to the city in fines, some $35,000 a year, fretted the mayor, and at last he reached for it. He came out with a declaration, in his old character as friend of the oppressed, that $100 a month was too much for these women to pay. They should be required to pay the city fine only once in two months. This puzzled the town till it became generally known that Gardner collected the other month for the mayor. The final outrage in this department, however, was an order of the mayor for the periodic visits to disorderly houses, by the city’s physicians, at from $5 to $20 per visit. The two physicians he appointed called when they willed, and more and more frequently, till toward the end the calls became a pure formality, with the collections as the one and only object.
The revenue from all these sources must have been significant. It only fueled the greed of the mayor and his Cabinet. They allowed gambling without limits on location or fair play; the syndicate could cheat and steal freely. Peddlers and pawnbrokers, who had previously been licensed by the city, now bought permits from the mayor’s agent instead. About two hundred slot machines were set up around town, with the owner's agent and the mayor's agent monitoring them, collecting enough to pay the mayor $15,000 a year as his cut. Auction scams were put in place. Opium dens and unlicensed bars, known as “blind pigs,” were given protection. Gardner even had a police baseball team, with tickets sold to people who had to buy them. But the women were the easiest target for corruption. They were forced to buy illustrated bios of the city officials and had to give money, jewelry, and gold stars to police officers. However, the $35,000 a year they still paid directly to the city in fines irritated the mayor, and eventually, he sought to get his hands on it. He made a statement, playing the role of a friend of the oppressed, claiming that $100 a month was too high for these women to pay. They should only have to pay the city fine once every two months. This confused the town until it became widely known that Gardner collected the other month for the mayor. The final scandal in this area was the mayor's order for city doctors to make regular visits to disorderly houses, charging between $5 and $20 per visit. The two doctors he appointed called whenever they wanted, and more frequently, until towards the end, the visits became mere formalities, with the collections being the only real goal.

FACSIMILE OF THE FIRST PAGE OF “THE BIG MITT LEDGER”
FACSIMILE OF THE FIRST PAGE OF “THE BIG MITT LEDGER”
74In a general way all this business was known. It did not arouse the citizens, but it did attract criminals, and more and more thieves and swindlers came hurrying to Minneapolis. Some of them saw the police, and made terms. Some were seen by the police and invited to go to work. There was room for all. This astonishing fact that the government of a city asked criminals to rob the people is fully established. The police and the criminals confessed it separately. Their statements agree in detail. Detective Norbeck made the arrangements, and introduced the swindlers to Gardner, who, over King’s head, took the money from them. Here is the story “Billy” Edwards, a “big mitt” man, told under oath of his reception in Minneapolis:
74Generally, everyone knew about this situation. It didn’t stir up the citizens, but it did attract criminals, and more and more thieves and con artists rushed to Minneapolis. Some of them encountered the police and made deals. Others were spotted by the police and invited to join in. There was space for everyone. This shocking reality that the city’s government asked criminals to rob its citizens is well-documented. Both the police and the criminals admitted it independently. Their accounts match in detail. Detective Norbeck arranged everything and introduced the con artists to Gardner, who, over King’s head, took their money. Here is the story “Billy” Edwards, a “big mitt” man, shared under oath about how he was received in Minneapolis:

PAGE FROM “THE BIG MITT LEDGER”
This shows an item concerning the check for $775, which
the “sucker” Meix (here spelled Mix) wished not to have
honored.
PAGE FROM “THE BIG MITT LEDGER”
This shows an item about the check for $775, which the “sucker” Meix (here spelled Mix) did not want to have honored.
76“I had been out to the Coast, and hadn’t seen Norbeck for some time. After I returned I boarded a Minneapolis car one evening to go down to South Minneapolis to visit a friend. Norbeck and Detective DeLaittre were on the car. When Norbeck saw me he came up and shook hands, and said, ‘Hullo, Billy, how goes it?’ I said, ‘Not very well.’ Then he says, ‘Things have changed since you went away. Me and Gardner are the whole thing now. Before you left they thought I didn’t know anything, but I turned a few tricks, and now I’m It.’ ‘I’m glad of that, Chris,’ I said. He says, ‘I’ve got great things for you. I’m going to fix up a joint for you.’ ‘That’s good,’ I said, ‘but I don’t believe you can do it.’ ‘Oh, yes, I can,’ he replied. ‘I’m It now—Gardner and me.’ ‘Well, if you can do it,’ says I, ‘there’s money in it.’ ‘How much can you pay?’ he asked. ‘Oh, $150 or $200 a week,’ says I. ‘That settles it,’ he said; ‘I’ll take you down to see Gardner, and we’ll fix it up.’ Then he made an appointment to meet me the next night, and we went down to Gardner’s house together.”
76“I had been out to the Coast and hadn’t seen Norbeck in a while. After I got back, I hopped on a Minneapolis streetcar one evening to head down to South Minneapolis to visit a friend. Norbeck and Detective DeLaittre were on the same car. When Norbeck spotted me, he came over, shook my hand, and said, ‘Hey, Billy, how’s it going?’ I replied, ‘Not too well.’ Then he said, ‘Things have changed since you left. Gardner and I are running the show now. Before you went away, they thought I didn’t know anything, but I pulled off a few tricks, and now I’m the guy.’ ‘I’m happy to hear that, Chris,’ I said. He replied, ‘I’ve got big plans for you. I’m going to set you up with a place.’ ‘That sounds good,’ I said, ‘but I really don’t think you can pull it off.’ ‘Oh, yes, I can,’ he insisted. ‘I’m the guy now—Gardner and me.’ ‘Well, if you can make it happen,’ I said, ‘there’s money in it.’ ‘How much can you pay?’ he asked. ‘Oh, $150 or $200 a week,’ I said. ‘That settles it,’ he responded; ‘I’ll take you to see Gardner, and we’ll make it happen.’ Then he set up a meeting for the next night, and we went down to Gardner’s house together.”
There Gardner talked business in general, showed his drawer full of bills, and jokingly asked how Edwards would like to have them. Edwards says:
There, Gardner discussed business in general, showed his drawer full of bills, and jokingly asked how Edwards would like to have them. Edwards says:
“I said, ‘That looks pretty good to me,’ and Gardner told us that he had ‘collected’ the money from the women he had on his staff, and that he was going to pay it over to the ‘old man’ when he got back from his hunting trip next morning. Afterward he told me that the mayor had been much pleased with our $500, and that he said everything was all right, and for us to go ahead.”
“I said, ‘That looks good to me,’ and Gardner told us he had ‘collected’ the money from the women on his staff, and that he was going to give it to the ‘old man’ when he got back from his hunting trip the next morning. Later, he told me the mayor was really happy with our $500 and said everything was fine, and for us to move forward.”

PAGE FROM “THE BIG MITT LEDGER”
This shows the accounts for a week of small transactions.
PAGE FROM “THE BIG MITT LEDGER”
This displays the accounts for a week of minor transactions.
78“Link” Crossman, another confidence man who was with Edwards, said that Gardner demanded $1,000 at first, but compromised on $500 for the mayor, $50 for Gardner, and $50 for Norbeck. To the chief, Fred Ames, they gave tips now and then of $25 or $50. “The first week we ran,” said Crossman, “I gave Fred $15. Norbeck took me down there. We shook hands, and I handed him an envelope with $15. He pulled out a list of steerers we had sent him, and said he wanted to go over them with me. He asked where the joint was located. At another time I slipped $25 into his hand as he was standing in the hallway of City Hall.” But these smaller payments, after the first “opening, $500,” are all down on the pages of the “big mitt” ledger, photographs of which illuminate this article. This notorious book, which was kept by Charlie Howard, one of the “big mitt” men, was much talked of at the subsequent trials, but was kept hidden to await the trial of the mayor himself.
78 “Link” Crossman, another con artist who was with Edwards, said that Gardner initially asked for $1,000 but came down to $500 for the mayor, $50 for Gardner, and $50 for Norbeck. For the chief, Fred Ames, they occasionally gave tips of $25 or $50. “In the first week we operated,” Crossman recalled, “I gave Fred $15. Norbeck took me down there. We shook hands, and I handed him an envelope with $15. He pulled out a list of steerers we had sent him and said he wanted to go through them with me. He asked where the place was located. Another time, I slipped $25 into his hand while he was standing in the hallway of City Hall.” But these smaller payments, after the initial “opening, $500,” are all documented in the pages of the “big mitt” ledger, photographs of which illuminate this article. This infamous book, maintained by Charlie Howard, one of the “big mitt” men, was widely discussed at the subsequent trials but was kept hidden to wait for the trial of the mayor himself.
The “big mitt” game was swindling by means of a stacked hand at stud poker. “Steerers” and “boosters” met “suckers” on the street, at 79hotels, and railway stations, won their confidence, and led them to the “joint.” Usually the “sucker” was called, by the amount of his loss, “the $102-man” or “the $35-man.” Roman Meix alone had the distinction among all the Minneapolis victims of going by his own name. Having lost $775, he became known for his persistent complainings. But they all “kicked” some. To Detective Norbeck at the street door was assigned the duty of hearing their complaints, and “throwing a scare into them.” “Oh, so you’ve been gambling,” he would say. “Have you got a license? Well, then, you better get right out of this town.” Sometimes he accompanied them to the station and saw them off. If they were not to be put off thus, he directed them to the chief of police. Fred Ames tried to wear them out by keeping them waiting in the anteroom. If they outlasted him, he saw them and frightened them with threats of all sorts of trouble for gambling without a license. Meix wanted to have payment on his check stopped. Ames, who had been a bank clerk, told him of his banking experience, and then had the effrontery to say that payment on such a check could not be stopped.
The “big mitt” game involved cheating players with a rigged hand at stud poker. “Steerers” and “boosters” would meet “suckers” on the street, at hotels, and train stations, earn their trust, and lead them to the “joint.” Usually, the “sucker” was referred to by the amount of money they lost, such as “the $102-man” or “the $35-man.” Roman Meix was unique among all the Minneapolis victims in that he was known by his own name. After losing $775, he became notorious for his constant complaints. But they all had their grievances. Detective Norbeck was tasked with listening to their complaints at the street door and intimidating them. “Oh, so you’ve been gambling,” he would say. “Do you have a license? Well, you better get out of this town.” Sometimes he would escort them to the station and see them off. If they didn’t leave easily, he would send them to the chief of police. Fred Ames tried to tire them out by making them wait in the anteroom. If they managed to wait him out, he would see them and scare them with threats of all sorts of trouble for gambling without a license. Meix wanted to stop the payment on his check. Ames, who used to be a bank clerk, mentioned his banking experience and then had the audacity to say that the payment on such a check couldn’t be stopped.
Burglaries were common. How many the police planned may never be known. Charles F. Brackett and Fred Malone, police captains and detectives, 80were active, and one well-established crime of theirs is the robbery of the Pabst Brewing Company office. They persuaded two men, one an employee, to learn the combination of the safe, open and clean it out one night, while the two officers stood guard outside.
Burglaries were common. The exact number the police were preparing for may never be revealed. Charles F. Brackett and Fred Malone, police captains and detectives, 80 were active, and one of their well-known crimes is the robbery of the Pabst Brewing Company office. They convinced two men, one of whom was an employee, to find out the safe's combination, open it, and empty it one night while the two officers kept watch outside.
The excesses of the municipal administration became so notorious that some of the members of it remonstrated with the others, and certain county officers were genuinely alarmed. No restraint followed their warnings. Sheriff Megaarden, no Puritan himself, felt constrained to interfere, and he made some arrests of gamblers. The Ames people turned upon him in a fury; they accused him of making overcharges in his accounts with the county for fees, and, laying the evidence before Governor Van Sant, they had Megaarden removed from office. Ames offered bribes to two county commissioners to appoint Gardner sheriff, so as to be sure of no more trouble in that quarter. This move failed, but the lesson taught Megaarden served to clear the atmosphere, and the spoliation went on as recklessly as ever. It became impossible.
The excesses of the city administration became so well-known that some of its members protested to the others, and certain county officials were genuinely concerned. Their warnings went unheeded. Sheriff Megaarden, who wasn't a Puritan by any means, felt pressured to step in, and he made some arrests of gamblers. The Ames community lashed out at him in anger; they accused him of inflating his accounts with the county for fees, and, presenting the evidence to Governor Van Sant, they had Megaarden removed from office. Ames offered bribes to two county commissioners to appoint Gardner as sheriff to ensure there wouldn't be any more trouble in that area. This attempt failed, but the lesson learned by Megaarden helped to clear the atmosphere, and the looting continued just as recklessly as before. It became impossible.
Even lawlessness must be regulated. Dr. Ames, never an organizer, attempted no control, and his followers began to quarrel among themselves. They deceived one another; they robbed the 81thieves; they robbed Ames himself. His brother became dissatisfied with his share of the spoils, and formed cabals with captains who plotted against the administration and set up disorderly houses, “panel games,” and all sorts of “grafts” of their own.
Even lawlessness needs some rules. Dr. Ames, who was never one to organize, didn’t try to control things, and his followers started to fight among themselves. They tricked each other; they stole from the thieves; they even stole from Ames himself. His brother became unhappy with his cut of the profits and started making secret plans with leaders who plotted against the administration, creating disorderly places, “panel games,” and all kinds of “grafts” of their own.
The one man loyal to the mayor was Gardner; and Fred Ames, Captain King, and their pals plotted the fall of the favorite. Now anybody could get anything from the Doctor, if he could have him alone. The Fred Ames clique chose a time when the mayor was at West Baden; they filled him with suspicion of Gardner and the fear of exposure, and induced him to let a creature named “Reddy” Cohen, instead of Gardner, do the collecting, and pay over all the moneys, not directly, but through Fred. Gardner made a touching appeal. “I have been honest. I have paid you all,” he said to the mayor. “Fred and the rest will rob you.” This was true, but it was of no avail.
The one person loyal to the mayor was Gardner; and Fred Ames, Captain King, and their friends plotted to bring down the favorite. Now anyone could get anything from the Doctor if they could have him alone. The Fred Ames group picked a time when the mayor was at West Baden; they filled him with distrust of Gardner and the fear of being exposed, and convinced him to let someone named “Reddy” Cohen, instead of Gardner, handle the collections and pay all the money, not directly, but through Fred. Gardner made a heartfelt plea. “I have been honest. I have paid you everything,” he told the mayor. “Fred and the others will steal from you.” This was true, but it didn't help.
Fred Ames was in charge at last, and he himself went about giving notice of the change. Three detectives were with him when he visited the women, and here is the women’s story, in the words of one, as it was told again and again in court: “Colonel Ames came in with the detectives. He stepped into a side room and asked me if I had been 82paying Gardner. I told him I had, and he told me not to pay no more, but to come to his office later, and he would let me know what to do. I went to the City Hall in about three weeks, after Cohen had called and said he was ‘the party.’ I asked the chief if it was all right to pay Cohen, and he said it was.”
Fred Ames was finally in charge, and he personally went around informing everyone about the change. He was accompanied by three detectives when he met with the women, and here’s the women’s account, as told by one of them, repeated in court: “Colonel Ames came in with the detectives. He walked into a side room and asked me if I had been paying Gardner. I said I had, and he told me to stop paying him and to come to his office later, where he would tell me what to do. About three weeks later, after Cohen had called and identified himself, I went to City Hall. I asked the chief if it was okay to pay Cohen, and he said it was.”
The new arrangement did not work so smoothly as the old. Cohen was an oppressive collector, and Fred Ames, appealed to, was weak and lenient. He had no sure hold on the force. His captains, free of Gardner, were undermining the chief. They increased their private operations. Some of the detectives began to drink hard and neglect their work. Norbeck so worried the “big mitt” men by staying away from the joint, that they complained to Fred about him. The chief rebuked Norbeck, and he promised to “do better,” but thereafter he was paid, not by the week, but by piece work—so much for each “trimmed sucker” that he ran out of town. Protected swindlers were arrested for operating in the street by “Coffee John’s” new policemen, who took the places of the negligent detectives. Fred let the indignant prisoners go when they were brought before him, but the arrests were annoying, inconvenient, and disturbed business. The whole system became so demoralized that every man was for himself. There 83was not left even the traditional honor among thieves.
The new setup didn’t go as smoothly as the old one. Cohen was a harsh enforcer, and Fred Ames, when asked, was weak and too lenient. He didn’t have a solid grip on the force. His captains, now free from Gardner, were undermining the chief. They started ramping up their own side gigs. Some of the detectives began to drink heavily and slack off on their duties. Norbeck worried the “big mitt” guys by not showing up at the joint, so they complained to Fred about him. The chief scolded Norbeck, who promised to “do better,” but from then on he was paid not weekly, but per job—so much for each “trimmed sucker” he kicked out of town. Protected con artists were arrested for working the streets by “Coffee John’s” new cops, who replaced the careless detectives. Fred let the outraged prisoners go when they were brought to him, but the arrests were bothersome, inconvenient, and disrupted business. The entire system became so chaotic that everyone was looking out for themselves. There 83 wasn’t even the usual code of honor among thieves.
It was at this juncture, in April, 1902, that the grand jury for the summer term was drawn. An ordinary body of unselected citizens, it received no special instructions from the bench; the county prosecutor offered it only routine work to do. But there was a man among them who was a fighter—the foreman, Hovey C. Clarke. He was of an old New England family. Coming to Minneapolis when a young man, seventeen years before, he had fought for employment, fought with his employers for position, fought with his employees, the lumber Jacks, for command, fought for his company against competitors; and he had won always, till now he had the habit of command, the impatient, imperious manner of the master, and the assurance of success which begets it. He did not want to be a grand juryman, he did not want to be a foreman; but since he was both, he wanted to accomplish something.
It was in April 1902 that the grand jury for the summer term was selected. An ordinary group of random citizens, they received no special instructions from the judge; the county prosecutor gave them only routine tasks. But there was a man among them who was a fighter—the foreman, Hovey C. Clarke. He came from an old New England family. Moving to Minneapolis when he was young, seventeen years ago, he had fought for a job, battled with his employers for promotions, competed with his employees, the lumberjacks, for authority, and stood against competitors for his company; and he had always emerged victorious. By now, he had developed a commanding presence, the impatient, dominant demeanor of a leader, and the confidence in success that often comes with it. He didn’t want to be a grand juror, he didn’t want to be a foreman; but since he was both, he wanted to achieve something.
Why not rip up the Ames gang? Heads shook, hands went up; it was useless to try. The discouragement fired Clarke. That was just what he would do, he said, and he took stock of his jury. Two or three were men with backbone; that he knew, and he quickly had them with 84him. The rest were all sorts of men. Mr. Clarke won over each man to himself, and interested them all. Then he called for the county prosecutor. The prosecutor was a politician; he knew the Ames crowd; they were too powerful to attack.
Why not take down the Ames gang? Heads shook, hands went up; it was pointless to try. The discouragement motivated Clarke. That was exactly what he would do, he said, and he assessed his jury. Two or three were strong men; he knew that, and he quickly got them on his side. The rest were a mixed bag. Mr. Clarke won each man over and got their interest. Then he called for the county prosecutor. The prosecutor was a politician; he was familiar with the Ames crowd; they were too powerful to go after.
“You are excused,” said the foreman.
"You're excused," said the boss.
There was a scene; the prosecutor knew his rights.
There was a scene; the prosecutor knew his rights.
“Do you think, Mr. Clarke,” he cried, “that you can run the grand jury and my office, too?”
“Do you really think, Mr. Clarke,” he shouted, “that you can manage both the grand jury and my office?”
“Yes,” said Clarke, “I will run your office if I want to; and I want to. You’re excused.”
“Yeah,” said Clarke, “I’ll run your office if I want to; and I do want to. You’re off the hook.”
Mr. Clarke does not talk much about his doings that summer; he isn’t the talking sort. But he does say that all he did was to apply simple business methods to his problem. In action, however, these turned out to be the most approved police methods. He hired a lot of local detectives who, he knew, would talk about what they were doing, and thus would be watched by the police. Having thus thrown a false scent, he hired some other detectives whom nobody knew about. This was expensive; so were many of the other things he did; but he was bound to win, so he paid the price, drawing freely on his own and his colleagues’ pockets. (The total cost to the county for a long summer’s 85work by this grand jury was $259.) With his detectives out, he himself went to the jail to get tips from the inside, from criminals who, being there, must have grievances. He made the acquaintance of the jailer, Captain Alexander, and Alexander was a friend of Sheriff Megaarden. Yes, he had some men there who were “sore” and might want to get even.
Mr. Clarke doesn’t say much about what he did that summer; he’s not the chatty type. But he mentions that all he did was use straightforward business methods to tackle his issue. In practice, these methods turned out to be the most trusted police strategies. He brought on a bunch of local detectives who he knew would share what they were doing, which would put them under police scrutiny. By creating this diversion, he also hired some other detectives who operated in secrecy. This was costly; many of the other things he did were too; but he was determined to succeed, so he covered the expenses, tapping into his own funds and those of his colleagues. (The total cost to the county for a lengthy summer’s 85 work by this grand jury was $259.) With his detectives out, he personally went to the jail to gather insights from inside, talking to criminals who, being locked up, surely had grievances. He got to know the jailer, Captain Alexander, who was friends with Sheriff Megaarden. Yes, he had some inmates there who were “sore” and might be looking for a chance to get back at someone.
Now two of these were “big mitt” men who had worked for Gardner. One was “Billy” Edwards, the other “Cheerful Charlie” Howard. I heard too many explanations of their plight to choose any one; this general account will cover the ground: In the Ames mêlée, either by mistake, neglect, or for spite growing out of the network of conflicting interests and gangs, they were arrested and arraigned, not before Fred Ames, but before a judge, and held in bail too high for them to furnish. They had paid for an unexpired period of protection, yet could get neither protection nor bail. They were forgotten. “We got the double cross all right,” they said, and they bled with their grievance; but squeal, no, sir!—that was “another deal.”
Now two of these guys were “big mitt” men who had worked for Gardner. One was “Billy” Edwards, and the other was “Cheerful Charlie” Howard. I heard too many explanations of their situation to pick just one; this general account will cover everything: In the Ames mess, either by mistake, negligence, or out of spite due to the tangled web of conflicting interests and gangs, they were arrested and taken to court, not before Fred Ames, but before a judge, and held on bail too high for them to pay. They had already paid for an unexpired period of protection, yet they couldn’t get either protection or bail. They were forgotten. “We got the double cross for sure,” they said, and they were upset about it; but complain? No way!—that was “another deal.”
But Mr. Clarke had their story, and he was bound to force them to tell it under oath on the stand. If they did, Gardner and Norbeck would be indicted, tried, and probably convicted. In 86themselves, these men were of no great importance; but they were the key to the situation, and a way up to the mayor. It was worth trying. Mr. Clarke went into the jail with Messrs. Lester Elwood and Willard J. Hield, grand jurors on whom he relied most for delicate work. They stood by while the foreman talked. And the foreman’s way of talking was to smile, swear, threaten, and cajole. “Billy” Edwards told me afterwards that he and Howard were finally persuaded to turn State’s evidence, because they believed that Mr. Clarke was the kind of a man to keep his promises and fulfill his threats. “We,” he said, meaning criminals generally, “are always stacking up against juries and lawyers who want us to holler. We don’t, because we see they ain’t wise, and won’t get there. They’re quitters; they can be pulled off. Clarke has a hard eye. I know men. It’s my business to size ‘em up, and I took him for a winner, and I played in with him against that whole big bunch of easy things that was running things on the bum.” The grand jury was ready at the end of three weeks of hard work to find bills. A prosecutor was needed. The public prosecutor was being ignored, but his first assistant and friend, Al J. Smith, was taken in hand by Mr. Clarke. Smith hesitated; he knew better even than the foreman 87the power and resources of the Ames gang. But he came to believe in Mr. Clarke, just as Edwards had; he was sure the foreman would win; so he went over to his side, and, having once decided, he led the open fighting, and, alone in court, won cases against men who had the best lawyers in the State to defend them. His court record is extraordinary. Moreover, he took over the negotiations with criminals for evidence, Messrs. Clarke, Hield, Elwood, and the other jurors providing means and moral support. These were needed. Bribes were offered to Smith; he was threatened; he was called a fool. But so was Clarke, to whom $28,000 was offered to quit, and for whose slaughter a slugger was hired to come from Chicago. What startled the jury most, however, was the character of the citizens who were sent to them to dissuade them from their course. No reform I ever studied has failed to bring out this phenomenon of virtuous cowardice, the baseness of the decent citizen.
But Mr. Clarke had their story, and he was determined to get them to share it under oath in court. If they did, Gardner and Norbeck would be indicted, tried, and likely convicted. These men themselves weren't particularly important; however, they held the key to the situation and a way to the mayor. It was worth a shot. Mr. Clarke entered the jail with Messrs. Lester Elwood and Willard J. Hield, grand jurors he relied on for sensitive tasks. They observed while the foreman spoke. The foreman’s approach was to smile, swear, threaten, and flatter. “Billy” Edwards later told me that he and Howard eventually agreed to turn State’s evidence because they figured Mr. Clarke was someone who would keep his promises and follow through on his threats. “We,” he said, referring to criminals in general, “are always up against juries and lawyers who want us to yell. We don’t, because we see they aren’t smart and won’t succeed. They’re quitters; they can be swayed. Clarke has a steely gaze. I know people. It’s my job to size them up, and I took him for a winner, and I decided to side with him against that whole big group of corrupt players.” The grand jury was ready, after three weeks of hard work, to find charges. A prosecutor was needed. The public prosecutor was being sidelined, but his first assistant and friend, Al J. Smith, was approached by Mr. Clarke. Smith hesitated; he understood better than even the foreman the power and resources of the Ames gang. But he started to trust Mr. Clarke, just like Edwards had; he believed the foreman would prevail; so he switched sides, and once he did, he led the charge in court, winning cases against men who had the top lawyers in the State defending them. His court record is remarkable. Furthermore, he took over the negotiations with criminals for evidence, with Messrs. Clarke, Hield, Elwood, and the other jurors providing the means and moral support. These were necessary. Smith faced bribes; he was threatened; he was called foolish. But so was Clarke, who was offered $28,000 to back off, and for whose assassination a hitman was hired to come from Chicago. What shocked the jury the most, though, was the character of the citizens sent to persuade them to change their minds. No reform movement I've studied has failed to reveal this pattern of virtuous cowardice, the degradation of the decent citizen.
Nothing stopped this jury, however. They had courage. They indicted Gardner, Norbeck, Fred Ames, and many lesser persons. But the gang had courage, too, and raised a defense fund to fight Clarke. Mayor Ames was defiant. Once, when Mr. Clarke called at the City Hall, the mayor met and challenged him. The mayor’s 88heelers were all about him, but Clarke faced him.
Nothing stopped this jury, though. They had guts. They indicted Gardner, Norbeck, Fred Ames, and several lesser individuals. But the gang had guts too and set up a defense fund to take on Clarke. Mayor Ames was unyielding. Once, when Mr. Clarke visited City Hall, the mayor confronted him. The mayor’s followers were all around him, but Clarke stood his ground.
“Yes, Doc Ames, I’m after you,” he said. “I’ve been in this town for seventeen years, and all that time you’ve been a moral leper. I hear you were rotten during the ten years before that. Now I’m going to put you where all contagious things are put—where you cannot contaminate anybody else.”
“Yes, Doc Ames, I’m coming for you,” he said. “I’ve been in this town for seventeen years, and all that time you’ve been an outcast. I hear you were terrible during the ten years before that. Now I’m going to put you where all dangerous things are put—where you can’t harm anyone else.”
The trial of Gardner came on. Efforts had been made to persuade him to surrender the mayor, but the young man was paid $15,000 “to stand pat,” and he went to trial and conviction silent. Other trials followed fast—Norbeck’s, Fred Ames’s, Chief of Detectives King’s. Witnesses who were out of the State were needed, and true testimony from women. There was no county money for extradition, so the grand jurors paid these costs also. They had Meix followed from Michigan down to Mexico and back to Idaho, where they got him, and he was presented in court one day at the trial of Norbeck, who had “steered” him out of town. Norbeck thought Meix was a thousand miles away, and had been bold before. At the sight of him in court he started to his feet, and that night ran away. The jury spent more money in his pursuit, and they caught him. He confessed, but his evidence was 89not accepted. He was sentenced to three years in State’s prison. Men caved all around, but the women were firm, and the first trial of Fred Ames failed. To break the women’s faith in the ring, Mayor Ames was indicted for offering the bribe to have Gardner made sheriff—a genuine, but not the best case against him. It brought the women down to the truth, and Fred Ames, retried, was convicted and sentenced to six and a half years in State’s prison. King was tried for accessory to felony (helping in the theft of a diamond, which he afterward stole from the thieves), and sentenced to three and a half years in prison. And still the indictments came, with trials following fast. Al Smith resigned with the consent and thanks of the grand jury; his chief, who was to run for the same office again, wanted to try the rest of the cases, and he did very well.
The trial of Gardner began. Efforts had been made to convince him to turn over the mayor, but the young man was paid $15,000 “to stay loyal,” and he went to trial and was convicted in silence. Other trials followed quickly—Norbeck’s, Fred Ames’s, Chief of Detectives King’s. They needed witnesses who were out of state and reliable testimony from women. There was no county budget for extradition, so the grand jurors covered those costs as well. They tracked Meix from Michigan down to Mexico and back to Idaho, where they arrested him, and he was brought to court one day during Norbeck's trial, who had “helped” him leave town. Norbeck thought Meix was a thousand miles away and had acted confidently before. Upon seeing him in court, he jumped to his feet and fled that night. The jury spent more money searching for him, and they captured him. He confessed, but his testimony wasn't accepted. He was sentenced to three years in state prison. Men crumbled under pressure, but the women remained steadfast, and the first trial of Fred Ames failed. To undermine the women’s trust in the ring, Mayor Ames was indicted for trying to bribe someone to make Gardner sheriff—a solid, but not the strongest case against him. This revelation brought the women to the truth, and Fred Ames was retried, found guilty, and sentenced to six and a half years in state prison. King was tried as an accessory to felony (for helping in the theft of a diamond, which he later pilfered from the thieves) and sentenced to three and a half years in prison. And still, the indictments kept coming, with trials happening rapidly. Al Smith resigned with the approval and gratitude of the grand jury; his chief, who was running for the same office again, wanted to handle the remaining cases, and he performed very well.
All men were now on the side of law and order. The panic among the “grafters” was laughable, in spite of its hideous significance. Two heads of departments against whom nothing had been shown suddenly ran away, and thus suggested to the grand jury an inquiry which revealed another source of “graft,” in the sale of supplies to public institutions and the diversion of great quantities of provisions to the private residences of the mayor and other officials. Mayor Ames, 90under indictment and heavy bonds for extortion, conspiracy, and bribe-offering, left the State on a night train; a gentleman who knew him by sight saw him sitting up at eleven o’clock in the smoking-room of the sleeping-car, an unlighted cigar in his mouth, his face ashen and drawn, and at six o’clock the next morning he still was sitting there, his cigar still unlighted. He went to West Baden, a health resort in Indiana, a sick and broken man, aging years in a month. The city was without a mayor, the ring was without a leader; cliques ruled, and they pictured one another hanging about the grand-jury room begging leave to turn State’s evidence. Tom Brown, the mayor’s secretary, was in the mayor’s chair; across the hall sat Fred Ames, the chief of police, balancing Brown’s light weight. Both were busy forming cliques within the ring. Brown had on his side Coffee John and Police Captain Hill. Ames had Captain “Norm” King (though he had been convicted and had resigned), Captain Krumweide, and Ernest Wheelock, the chief’s secretary. Alderman D. Percy Jones, the president of the council, an honorable man, should have taken the chair, but he was in the East; so this unstable equilibrium was all the city had by way of a government.
All the men were now on the side of law and order. The panic among the “crooks” was laughable, despite its serious implications. Two department heads, who had not been accused of anything, suddenly fled, which prompted the grand jury to investigate and uncover another source of corruption in the sale of supplies to public institutions and the redirection of large amounts of food to the homes of the mayor and other officials. Mayor Ames, 90facing indictment and hefty bail for extortion, conspiracy, and bribery, left the state on a night train; someone who recognized him saw him sitting up at eleven o’clock in the smoking car, an unlit cigar in his mouth, his face pale and drawn, and by six o’clock the next morning, he was still there, his cigar untouched. He went to West Baden, a health resort in Indiana, a sick and broken man, aging years in a month. The city was without a mayor, and the corrupt group was without a leader; cliques fought for control, all picturing each other hanging around the grand jury room pleading to turn state’s evidence. Tom Brown, the mayor's secretary, was in the mayor's chair; across the hall sat Fred Ames, the chief of police, balancing Brown’s weak authority. Both were busy forming factions within the corrupt group. Brown had Coffee John and Police Captain Hill on his side. Ames had Captain “Norm” King (even though he had been convicted and resigned), Captain Krumweide, and Ernest Wheelock, the chief’s secretary. Alderman D. Percy Jones, the council president, an honorable man, should have taken the chair, but he was in the East; so this fragile balance was all the city had by way of government.
Then Fred Ames disappeared. The Tom 91Brown clique had full sway, and took over the police department. This was a shock to everybody, to none more than to the King clique, which joined in the search for Ames. An alderman, Fred M. Powers, who was to run for mayor on the Republican ticket, took charge of the mayor’s office, but he was not sure of his authority or clear as to his policy. The grand jury was the real power behind him, and the foreman was telegraphing for Alderman Jones. Meanwhile the cliques were making appeals to Mayor Ames, in West Baden, and each side that saw him received authority to do its will. The Coffee John clique, denied admission to the grand-jury room, turned to Alderman Powers, and were beginning to feel secure, when they heard that Fred Ames was coming back. They rushed around, and obtained an assurance from the exiled mayor that Fred was returning only to resign. Fred—now under conviction—returned, but he did not resign; supported by his friends, he took charge again of the police force. Coffee John besought Alderman Powers to remove the chief, and when the acting mayor proved himself too timid, Coffee John, Tom Brown, and Captain Hill laid a deep plot. They would ask Mayor Ames to remove his brother. This they felt sure they could persuade the “old man” to do. The difficulty was to 92keep him from changing his mind when the other side should reach his ear. They hit upon a bold expedient. They would urge the “old man” to remove Fred, and then resign himself, so that he could not undo the deed that they wanted done. Coffee John and Captain Hill slipped out of town one night; they reached West Baden on one train and they left for home on the next, with a demand for Fred’s resignation in one hand and the mayor’s own in the other. Fred Ames did resign, and though the mayor’s resignation was laid aside for a while, to avoid the expense of a special election, all looked well for Coffee John and his clique. They had Fred out, and Alderman Powers was to make them great. But Mr. Powers wabbled. No doubt the grand jury spoke to him. At any rate he turned most unexpectedly on both cliques together. He turned out Tom Brown, but he turned out also Coffee John, and he did not make their man chief of police, but another of someone else’s selection. A number of resignations was the result, and these the acting mayor accepted, making a clearing of astonished rascals which was very gratifying to the grand jury and to the nervous citizens of Minneapolis.
Then Fred Ames disappeared. The Tom Brown group took over the police department. This shocked everyone, especially the King group, which joined in the search for Ames. An alderman, Fred M. Powers, who was running for mayor as a Republican, took charge of the mayor’s office, but he was unsure of his authority and unclear about his policy. The grand jury was the real power behind him, and the foreman was in contact with Alderman Jones. Meanwhile, the groups were making appeals to Mayor Ames in West Baden, and whichever side saw him got the authority to act. The Coffee John group, denied access to the grand jury room, turned to Alderman Powers and began to feel secure when they heard Fred Ames was coming back. They quickly got an assurance from the exiled mayor that Fred was returning only to resign. Fred—now convinced—returned, but he did not resign; with the support of his friends, he took charge of the police force again. Coffee John urged Alderman Powers to remove the chief, and when the acting mayor showed himself to be too timid, Coffee John, Tom Brown, and Captain Hill devised a cunning plan. They would ask Mayor Ames to remove his brother, believing they could persuade the “old man” to do it. The challenge was ensuring he wouldn’t change his mind when the other side reached him. They came up with a bold idea. They would convince the “old man” to remove Fred and then resign himself, making it impossible for him to undo their plan. Coffee John and Captain Hill snuck out of town one night; they arrived in West Baden on one train and left for home on the next, with a demand for Fred’s resignation in one hand and the mayor’s own in the other. Fred Ames did resign, and although the mayor’s resignation was set aside for a while to avoid the cost of a special election, things looked good for Coffee John and his group. They had ousted Fred, and Alderman Powers was set to elevate them. But Mr. Powers wavered. No doubt the grand jury talked to him. In any case, he unexpectedly turned against both groups. He removed Tom Brown, but he also got rid of Coffee John, and instead of appointing their candidate as chief of police, he chose someone else. This led to a number of resignations, which the acting mayor accepted, resulting in a surprising purge of rascals that was very satisfying to the grand jury and to the anxious citizens of Minneapolis.
But the town was not yet easy. The grand jury, which was the actual head of the government, was 93about to be discharged, and, besides, their work was destructive. A constructive force was now needed, and Alderman Jones was pelted with telegrams from home bidding him hurry back. He did hurry, and when he arrived, the situation was instantly in control. The grand jury prepared to report, for the city had a mind and a will of its own once more. The criminals found it out last.
But the town was still in turmoil. The grand jury, which was really in charge of the government, was about to be disbanded, and their work was causing more harm than good. A positive change was needed, and Alderman Jones was bombarded with telegrams from home urging him to return quickly. He did rush back, and when he got there, the situation was immediately under control. The grand jury was ready to report, as the city had regained its sense of identity and determination. The criminals realized that too late.
Percy Jones, as his friends call him, is of the second generation of his family in Minneapolis. His father started him well-to-do, and he went on from where he was started. College graduate and business man, he has a conscience which, however, he has brains enough to question. He is not the fighter, but the slow, sure executive. As an alderman he is the result of a movement begun several years ago by some young men who were convinced by an exposure of a corrupt municipal council that they should go into politics. A few did go in; Jones was one of these few.
Percy Jones, as his friends call him, is part of the second generation of his family in Minneapolis. His father set him up well, and he built on that foundation. A college graduate and businessman, he has a conscience that he’s smart enough to question. He isn’t a fighter but a careful, steady executive. As an alderman, he represents a movement started a few years back by some young men who, after seeing the corruption in the city council, felt compelled to get involved in politics. A few actually did, and Jones was one of them.
The acting mayor was confronted at once with all the hardest problems of municipal government. Vice rose right up to tempt or to fight him. He studied the situation deliberately, and by and by began to settle it point by point, slowly but finally, against all sorts of opposition. One of his first acts was to remove all the proved rascals 94on the force, putting in their places men who had been removed by Mayor Ames. Another important step was the appointment of a church deacon and personal friend to be chief of police, this on the theory that he wanted at the head of his police a man who could have no sympathy with crime, a man whom he could implicitly trust. Disorderly houses, forbidden by law, were permitted, but only within certain patrol lines, and they were to pay nothing, in either blackmail or “fines.” The number and the standing and the point of view of the “good people” who opposed this order was a lesson to Mr. Jones in practical government. One very prominent citizen and church member threatened him for driving women out of two flats owned by him; the rent was the surest means of “support for his wife and children.” Mr. Jones enforced his order.
The acting mayor immediately faced all the toughest issues of city governance. Temptation and resistance came at him from all sides. He took a careful look at the situation and gradually started addressing each challenge, slowly but surely, despite various objections. One of his first actions was to fire all the confirmed wrongdoers in the police force and replace them with officers who had been dismissed by Mayor Ames. Another key move was appointing a church deacon and personal friend as the chief of police, based on the belief that he needed someone at the helm who wouldn’t sympathize with crime and whom he could fully trust. Illegal establishments were allowed, but only within certain patrol boundaries, and they were not to pay any bribes or "fines." The number, reputation, and perspective of the "good people" who opposed this decision was a lesson for Mr. Jones in real governance. One well-known citizen and church member threatened him for evicting women from two apartments he owned, claiming that the rent was the only way to support his wife and kids. Mr. Jones upheld his order.
Other interests—saloon-keepers, brewers, etc.—gave him trouble enough, but all these were trifles in comparison with his experience with the gamblers. They represented organized crime, and they asked for a hearing. Mr. Jones gave them some six weeks for negotiations. They proposed a solution. They said that if he would let them (a syndicate) open four gambling places downtown, they would see that no others ran in any part of the city. Mr. Jones pondered and shook his head, 95drawing them on. They went away, and came back with a better promise. Though they were not the associates of criminals, they knew that class and their plans. No honest police force, unaided, could deal with crime. Thieves would soon be at work again, and what could Mr. Jones do against them with a police force headed by a church deacon? The gamblers offered to control the criminals for the city.
Other interests—bar owners, brewers, etc.—caused him enough trouble, but all of that was minor compared to his dealings with the gamblers. They represented organized crime and wanted a meeting. Mr. Jones allowed them about six weeks for negotiations. They came up with a proposal. They said that if he would permit them (a syndicate) to open four gambling venues downtown, they would ensure that no other operations would run anywhere in the city. Mr. Jones thought it over and shook his head, 95encouraging them to continue. They left and returned with a better offer. Although they weren't involved with criminals directly, they were familiar with that crowd and their strategies. No honest police force, without support, could effectively handle crime. Thieves would quickly return, and what could Mr. Jones possibly do against them with a police force led by a church deacon? The gamblers offered to manage the criminal element for the city.
Mr. Jones, deeply interested, declared he did not believe there was any danger of fresh crimes. The gamblers smiled and went away. By an odd coincidence there happened just after that what the papers called “an epidemic of crime.” They were petty thefts, but they occupied the mind of the acting mayor. He wondered at their opportuneness. He wondered how the news of them got out.
Mr. Jones, highly intrigued, stated that he didn't think there was any risk of new crimes. The gamblers smiled and left. Coincidentally, right after that, the newspapers reported what they labeled as “an epidemic of crime.” These were minor thefts, but they consumed the thoughts of the acting mayor. He was puzzled by how timely they seemed. He also wondered how the news made its way out.
The gamblers soon reappeared. Hadn’t they told Mr. Jones crime would soon be prevalent in town again? They had, indeed, but the mayor was unmoved; “porch climbers” could not frighten him. But this was only the beginning, the gamblers said: the larger crimes would come next. And they went away again. Sure enough, the large crimes came. One, two, three burglaries of jewelry in the houses of well-known people occurred; then there was a fourth, and the fourth was in the 96house of a relative of the acting mayor. He was seriously amused. The papers had the news promptly, and not from the police.
The gamblers soon returned. Hadn’t they warned Mr. Jones that crime would soon rise in town again? They had, but the mayor remained unfazed; “porch climbers” didn’t scare him. However, this was just the beginning, the gamblers claimed: bigger crimes would follow. And they left once more. Sure enough, the major crimes did come. One, two, three burglaries of jewelry in the homes of well-known people happened; then there was a fourth, and the fourth occurred in the 96house of a relative of the acting mayor. He found it quite amusing. The newspapers reported the news quickly, and not from the police.
The gamblers called again. If they could have the exclusive control of gambling in Minneapolis, they would do all that they had promised before, and, if any large burglaries occurred, they would undertake to recover the “swag,” and sometimes catch the thief. Mr. Jones was skeptical of their ability to do all this. The gamblers offered to prove it. How? They would get back for Mr. Jones the jewelry recently reported stolen from four houses in town. Mr. Jones expressed a curiosity to see this done, and the gamblers went away. After a few days the stolen jewelry, parcel by parcel, began to return; with all due police-criminal mystery it was delivered to the chief of police.
The gamblers reached out again. If they could have exclusive control over gambling in Minneapolis, they would fulfill all their previous promises, and if any major burglaries happened, they would take responsibility for recovering the stolen goods and sometimes even catch the thief. Mr. Jones was doubtful about their capability to do all of this. The gamblers offered to prove themselves. How? They would return the jewelry that had recently been reported stolen from four homes in town to Mr. Jones. Mr. Jones showed interest in seeing this happen, and the gamblers left. After a few days, the stolen jewelry started coming back, piece by piece, delivered to the chief of police with all the usual police-criminal intrigue.
When the gamblers called again, they found the acting mayor ready to give his decision on their propositions. It was this: There should be no gambling, with police connivance, in the city of Minneapolis during his term of office.
When the gamblers called again, they found the acting mayor ready to give his decision on their proposals. It was this: There would be no gambling, with police complicity, in the city of Minneapolis during his term in office.
Mr. Jones told me that if he had before him a long term, he certainly would reconsider this answer. He believed he would decide again as he had already, but he would at least give studious reflection to the question—Can a city be governed 97without any alliance with crime? It was an open question. He had closed it only for the four months of his emergency administration. Minneapolis should be clean and sweet for a little while at least, and the new administration should begin with a clear deck.
Mr. Jones told me that if he had a longer term, he would definitely rethink his decision. He thought he would decide the same way he already had, but he would at least seriously consider the question—Can a city be run without any connection to crime? It was an open question. He had only closed it for the four months of his emergency administration. Minneapolis should be clean and pleasant for at least a little while, and the new administration should start with a fresh start. 97
THE SHAMELESSNESS OF ST. LOUIS
Tweed’s classic question, “What are you going to do about it?” is the most humiliating challenge ever delivered by the One Man to the Many. But it was pertinent. It was the question then; it is the question now. Will the people rule? That is what it means. Is democracy possible? The accounts of financial corruption in St. Louis and of police corruption in Minneapolis raised the same question. They were inquiries into American municipal democracy, and, so far as they went, they were pretty complete answers. The people wouldn’t rule. They would have flown to arms to resist a czar or a king, but they let a “mucker” oppress and disgrace and sell them out. “Neglect,” so they describe their impotence. But when their shame was laid bare, what did they do then? That is what Tweed, the tyrant, wanted to know, and that is what the democracy of this country needs to know.
Tweed’s classic question, “What are you going to do about it?” is the most humiliating challenge ever thrown at the Many by the One. But it was relevant. It was the question back then; it’s the question now. Will the people govern? That’s what it means. Is democracy possible? The stories of financial corruption in St. Louis and police corruption in Minneapolis raised the same question. They were investigations into American city democracy, and, as far as they went, they provided pretty complete answers. The people wouldn’t govern. They would have taken up arms to resist a czar or a king, but they let a “mucker” oppress, disgrace, and sell them out. “Neglect,” they call their powerlessness. But when their shame was exposed, what did they do then? That’s what Tweed, the tyrant, wanted to know, and that’s what the democracy of this country needs to know.
Minneapolis answered Tweed. With Mayor Ames a fugitive, the city was reformed, and when he was brought back he was tried and convicted. 102No city ever profited so promptly by the lesson of its shame. The people had nothing to do with the exposure—that was an accident—nor with the reconstruction. Hovey C. Clarke, who attacked the Ames ring, tore it all to pieces; and D. Percy Jones, who re-established the city government, built a well-nigh perfect thing. There was little left for the people to do but choose at the next regular election between two candidates for mayor, one obviously better than the other, but that they did do. They scratched some ten thousand ballots to do their small part decisively and well. So much by way of revolt. The future will bring Minneapolis up to the real test. The men who saved the city this time have organized to keep it safe, and make the memory of “Doc” Ames a civic treasure, and Minneapolis a city without reproach.
Minneapolis responded to Tweed. With Mayor Ames on the run, the city underwent a transformation, and when he returned, he was tried and found guilty. 102 No city ever learned so quickly from its disgrace. The people weren’t involved in the exposure—it was just a fluke—nor in the rebuilding. Hovey C. Clarke, who took on the Ames administration, dismantled it completely; and D. Percy Jones, who restored the city government, created something almost perfect. The people had little to do but choose between two candidates for mayor in the next regular election, one clearly better than the other, and they did just that. They cast around ten thousand ballots to do their part decisively and effectively. That was their small act of rebellion. The future will truly test Minneapolis. The men who saved the city this time have come together to protect it, aiming to make the memory of “Doc” Ames a civic lesson and Minneapolis a city beyond reproach.
Minneapolis may fail, as New York has failed; but at least these two cities could be moved by shame. Not so St. Louis. Joseph W. Folk, the Circuit Attorney, who began alone, is going right on alone, indicting, trying, convicting boodlers, high and low, following the workings of the combine through all of its startling ramifications, and spreading before the people, in the form of testimony given under oath, the confessions by the boodlers themselves of the whole wretched story. St. Louis is unmoved and unashamed. St. Louis 103seems to me to be something new in the history of the government of the people, by the rascals, for the rich.
Minneapolis might fail, just like New York has; but at least these two cities could be stirred by shame. Not St. Louis, though. Joseph W. Folk, the Circuit Attorney, who started out alone, continues to work alone, indicting, trying, and convicting corrupt officials, both high and low. He’s tracing the operations of the corrupt network through all its shocking details and presenting to the people, as sworn testimony, the confessions from the corrupt officials themselves about the whole miserable situation. St. Louis remains indifferent and unashamed. St. Louis seems to me to represent something new in the history of government: by the crooks, for the wealthy.
“Tweed Days in St. Louis” did not tell half that the St. Louisans know of the condition of the city. That article described how in 1898, 1899, and 1900, under the administration of Mayor Ziegenhein, boodling developed into the only real business of the city government. Since that article was written, fourteen men have been tried, and half a score have confessed, so that some measure of the magnitude of the business and of the importance of the interests concerned has been given. Then it was related that “combines” of municipal legislators sold rights, privileges, and public franchises for their own individual profit, and at regular schedule rates. Now the free narratives of convicted boodlers have developed the inside history of the combines, with their unfulfilled plans. Then we understood that these combines did the boodling. Now we know that they had a leader, a boss, who, a rich man himself, represented the financial district and prompted the boodling till the system burst. We knew then how Mr. Folk, a man little known, was nominated against his will for Circuit Attorney; how he warned the politicians who named him; how he proceeded against these same men as against ordinary 104criminals. Now we have these men convicted.
“Tweed Days in St. Louis” didn’t capture half of what St. Louis residents know about the state of the city. The article explained how in 1898, 1899, and 1900, under Mayor Ziegenhein’s leadership, corruption became the primary function of the city government. Since that article was published, fourteen men have been tried, and several have confessed, giving us a sense of the scale of corruption and the significance of the interests involved. It once pointed out that “combines” of city lawmakers sold rights, privileges, and public franchises for their personal gain at set prices. Now, the candid accounts of convicted corrupt officials have revealed the inner workings of the combines, along with their unfulfilled schemes. Back then, we understood that these combines were engaging in corruption. Now we know they had a leader, a boss, who, being wealthy himself, represented the financial sector and pushed the corruption until the system collapsed. We previously learned how Mr. Folk, an unknown figure, was reluctantly nominated for Circuit Attorney; how he warned the politicians who chose him; and how he took action against these same men as if they were ordinary criminals. Now, we see these men have been convicted.
We saw Charles H. Turner, the president of the Suburban Railway Co., and Philip H. Stock, the secretary of the St. Louis Brewing Co., the first to “peach,” telling to the grand jury the story of their bribe fund of $144,000, put into safe-deposit vaults, to be paid to the legislators when the Suburban franchise was granted. St. Louis has seen these two men dashing forth “like fire horses,” the one (Mr. Turner) from the presidency of the Commonwealth Trust Company, the other from his brewing company secretaryship, to recite again and again in the criminal courts their miserable story, and count over and over for the jury the dirty bills of that bribe fund. And when they had given their testimony, and the boodlers one after another were convicted, these witnesses have hurried back to their places of business and the convicts to their seats in the municipal assembly. This is literally true. In the House of Delegates sit, under sentence, as follows: Charles F. Kelly, two years; Charles J. Denny, three years and five years; Henry A. Faulkner, two years; E. E. Murrell, State’s witness, but not tried.[1] Nay, this House, with such a membership, had the audacity last fall to refuse to pass an appropriation 105to enable Mr. Folk to go on with his investigation and prosecution of boodling.
We saw Charles H. Turner, the president of the Suburban Railway Co., and Philip H. Stock, the secretary of the St. Louis Brewing Co., the first to "rat," telling the grand jury about their bribe fund of $144,000, which was kept in safe-deposit vaults, set to be paid to legislators when the Suburban franchise was approved. St. Louis has watched these two men rush in "like fire trucks," one (Mr. Turner) from the presidency of the Commonwealth Trust Company, the other from his brewing company role, to repeatedly recount their pathetic tale in criminal courts and repeatedly count the dirty bills from that bribe fund for the jury. And once they had given their testimony and the corrupt officials were convicted one after another, these witnesses hurried back to their jobs while the convicts returned to their seats in the municipal assembly. This is literally true. In the House of Delegates sit, under sentence, as follows: Charles F. Kelly, two years; Charles J. Denny, three years and five years; Henry A. Faulkner, two years; E. E. Murrell, State’s witness, but not tried.[1] Nay, this House, with such a membership, had the nerve last fall to refuse to pass an appropriation 105 to allow Mr. Folk to continue his investigation and prosecution of corruption.
1. See Post Scriptum, end of chapter.
__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__. See Post Scriptum, chapter conclusion.
Right here is the point. In other cities mere exposure has been sufficient to overthrow a corrupt régime. In St. Louis the conviction of the boodlers leaves the felons in control, the system intact, and the people—spectators. It is these people who are interesting—these people, and the system they have made possible.
Right here is the key point. In other cities, just being exposed has been enough to bring down a corrupt regime. In St. Louis, the conviction of the corrupt officials still leaves the criminals in power, the system unchanged, and the people as bystanders. It's these people who are intriguing—these people, and the system they have allowed to exist.
The convicted boodlers have described the system to me. There was no politics in it—only business. The city of St. Louis is normally Republican. Founded on the home-rule principle, the corporation is a distinct political entity, with no county to confuse it. The State of Missouri, however, is normally Democratic, and the legislature has taken political possession of the city by giving to the Governor the appointment of the Police and Election Boards. With a defective election law, the Democratic boss in the city became its absolute ruler.
The convicted criminals have explained the system to me. There was no politics involved—just business. The city of St. Louis is typically Republican. Based on the home-rule principle, the corporation operates as a separate political entity, without a county to complicate things. However, the State of Missouri generally leans Democratic, and the legislature has taken control of the city by allowing the Governor to appoint the Police and Election Boards. With a flawed election law, the Democratic boss in the city became its ultimate ruler.
This boss is Edward R. Butler, better known as “Colonel Ed,” or “Colonel Butler,” or just “Boss.” He is an Irishman by birth, a master horseshoer by trade, a good fellow—by nature, at first, then by profession. Along in the seventies, when he still wore the apron of his trade, and bossed his tough ward, he secured the agency for a 106certain patent horseshoe which the city railways liked and bought. Useful also as a politician, they gave him a blanket contract to keep all their mules and horses shod. Butler’s farrieries glowed all about the town, and his political influence spread with his business; for everywhere big Ed Butler went there went a smile also, and encouragement for your weakness, no matter what it was. Like “Doc” Ames, of Minneapolis—like the “good fellow” everywhere—Butler won men by helping them to wreck themselves. A priest, the Rev. James Coffey, once denounced Butler from the pulpit as a corrupter of youth; at another time a mother knelt in the aisle of a church, and during service audibly called upon Heaven for a visitation of affliction upon Butler for having ruined her son. These and similar incidents increased his power by advertising it. He grew bolder. He has been known to walk out of a voting-place and call across a cordon of police to a group of men at the curb, “Are there any more repeaters out here that want to vote again?”
This boss is Edward R. Butler, better known as “Colonel Ed,” “Colonel Butler,” or just “Boss.” He's an Irishman by birth, a master horseshoer by trade, and a good guy—by nature at first, then by profession. Back in the seventies, when he still wore the apron of his trade and managed his tough district, he got the agency for a certain patent horseshoe that the city railways liked and bought. They found him useful as a politician too, so they gave him a blanket contract to keep all their mules and horses shod. Butler’s farrier shops lit up across the town, and his political influence grew alongside his business; wherever big Ed Butler went, there was also a smile and encouragement for your weaknesses, no matter what they were. Like “Doc” Ames, from Minneapolis—like the “good guy” everywhere—Butler won people over by helping them sabotage themselves. A priest, the Rev. James Coffey, once condemned Butler from the pulpit as a corrupter of youth; another time, a mother knelt in the aisle of a church, loudly calling upon Heaven for punishment on Butler for having ruined her son during the service. These and similar incidents boosted his power by publicizing it. He became bolder. He has been known to walk out of a polling place and shout across a line of police to a group of men on the curb, “Are there any more repeaters out here who want to vote again?”
They will tell you in St. Louis that Butler never did have much real power, that his boldness and the clamor against him made him seem great. Public protest is part of the power of every boss. So far, however, as I can gather, Butler was the leader of his organization, but only so long as he 107was a partisan politician; as he became a “boodler” pure and simple, he grew careless about his machine, and did his boodle business with the aid of the worst element of both parties. At any rate, the boodlers, and others as well, say that in later years he had about equal power with both parties, and he certainly was the ruler of St. Louis during the Republican administration of Ziegenhein, which was the worst in the history of the city. His method was to dictate enough of the candidates on both tickets to enable him, by selecting the worst from each, to elect the sort of men he required in his business. In other words, while honest Democrats and Republicans were “loyal to party” (a point of great pride with the idiots) and “voted straight,” the Democratic boss and his Republican lieutenants decided what part of each ticket should be elected; then they sent around Butler’s “Indians” (repeaters) by the vanload to scratch ballots and “repeat” their votes, till the worst had made sure of the government by the worst, and Butler was in a position to do business.
They’ll tell you in St. Louis that Butler never really had much power, and that his boldness and the noise against him made him seem important. Public protest is part of the influence of every leader. From what I understand, Butler was the leader of his organization, but only as long as he was a partisan politician. Once he became just a straightforward “boodler,” he became careless about his machine and conducted his shady dealings with help from the worst elements of both parties. Regardless, the boodlers and others claim that in later years he had about equal power over both parties, and he was definitely in charge of St. Louis during the terrible Republican administration of Ziegenhein, which was the worst in the city’s history. His strategy was to influence enough candidates on both sides to allow him to choose the worst from each, ensuring the election of the men he needed for his operations. In other words, while honest Democrats and Republicans were being “loyal to party” (a badge of honor for the foolish) and “voted straight,” the Democratic boss and his Republican allies decided which parts of each ticket would get elected. Then they sent Butler’s “Indians” (repeaters) in by the truckload to tamper with ballots and “repeat” their votes, until the worst secured control of the government, enabling Butler to conduct his business.
His business was boodling, which is a more refined and a more dangerous form of corruption than the police blackmail of Minneapolis. It involves, not thieves, gamblers, and common women, but influential citizens, capitalists, and great corporations. 108For the stock-in-trade of the boodler is the rights, privileges, franchises, and real property of the city, and his source of corruption is the top, not the bottom, of society. Butler, thrown early in his career into contact with corporation managers, proved so useful to them that they introduced him to other financiers, and the scandal of his services attracted to him in due course all men who wanted things the city had to give. The boodlers told me that, according to the tradition of their combine, there “always was boodling in St. Louis.”
His business was boodling, which is a more refined and dangerous form of corruption than police blackmail in Minneapolis. It doesn't involve thieves, gamblers, and prostitutes, but rather influential citizens, capitalists, and large corporations. 108 The boodler's stock-in-trade consists of the rights, privileges, franchises, and real estate of the city, with the source of corruption coming from the top, not the bottom, of society. Butler, who was exposed to corporation managers early in his career, proved so valuable to them that they connected him with other financiers, and the scandal around his services eventually attracted all men who wanted something the city had to offer. The boodlers told me that, according to the tradition of their group, there “always was boodling in St. Louis.”
Butler organized and systematized and developed it into a regular financial institution, and made it an integral part of the business community. He had for clients, regular or occasional, bankers and promoters; and the statements of boodlers, not yet on record, allege that every transportation and public convenience company that touches St. Louis had dealings with Butler’s combine. And my best information is that these interests were not victims. Blackmail came in time, but in the beginning they originated the schemes of loot and started Butler on his career. Some interests paid him a regular salary, others a fee, and again he was a partner in the enterprise, with a special “rake-off” for his influence. “Fee” and “present” are his terms, 109and he has spoken openly of taking and giving them. I verily believe he regarded his charges as legitimate (he is the Croker type); but he knew that some people thought his services wrong. He once said that, when he had received his fee for a piece of legislation, he “went home and prayed that the measure might pass,” and, he added facetiously, that “usually his prayers were answered.”
Butler organized, systematized, and developed it into a standard financial institution, making it a key part of the business community. He had both regular and occasional clients, including bankers and promoters; and reports from unscrupulous individuals, not yet documented, claim that every transportation and public convenience company that connects to St. Louis dealt with Butler’s group. From what I gather, these parties were not victims. Blackmail came later, but initially, they were the ones who devised the schemes for profit and launched Butler’s career. Some interests paid him a steady salary, others a fee, and sometimes he was a partner in the venture, receiving a special cut for his influence. “Fee” and “present” are his terms, and he has openly discussed accepting and giving them. I genuinely believe he viewed his charges as legitimate (he’s the Croker type); however, he was aware that some people thought his services were wrong. He once said that after he received his fee for a piece of legislation, he “went home and prayed that the measure might pass,” and he humorously added that “usually his prayers were answered.” 109
His prayers were “usually answered” by the Municipal Assembly. This legislative body is divided into two houses—the upper, called the Council, consisting of thirteen members, elected at large; the lower, called the House of Delegates, with twenty-eight members, elected by wards; and each member of these bodies is paid twenty-five dollars a month salary by the city. With the mayor, this Assembly has practically complete control of all public property and valuable rights. Though Butler sometimes could rent or own the mayor, he preferred to be independent of him, so he formed in each part of the legislature a two-thirds majority—in the Council nine, in the House nineteen—which could pass bills over a veto. These were the “combines.” They were regularly organized, and did their business under parliamentary rules. Each “combine” elected its chairman, who was elected chairman also of the legal bodies 110where he appointed the committees, naming to each a majority of combine members.
His prayers were “usually answered” by the Municipal Assembly. This legislative body is divided into two houses—the upper one called the Council, made up of thirteen members elected at large; the lower one called the House of Delegates, which consists of twenty-eight members elected by districts; and each member of these bodies receives a monthly salary of twenty-five dollars from the city. Together with the mayor, this Assembly has nearly complete control over all public property and valuable rights. Although Butler could sometimes sway the mayor, he preferred to maintain his independence, so he built a two-thirds majority in each part of the legislature—nine in the Council, nineteen in the House—that could pass bills even if the mayor vetoed them. These were the “combines.” They were regularly organized and conducted their activities according to parliamentary rules. Each “combine” elected its own chairperson, who also served as the chairperson of the legal bodies where they appointed the committees, ensuring that a majority of the committee members were from the combine. 110
In the early history of the combines, Butler’s control was complete, because it was political. He picked the men who were to be legislators; they did as he bade them do, and the boodling was noiseless, safe, and moderate in price. Only wrongful acts were charged for, and a right once sold was good; for Butler kept his word. The definition of an honest man as one who will stay bought, fitted him. But it takes a very strong man to control himself and others when the money lust grows big, and it certainly grew big in St. Louis. Butler used to watch the downtown districts. He knew everybody, and when a railroad wanted a switch, or a financial house a franchise, Butler learned of it early. Sometimes he discovered the need and suggested it. Naming the regular price, say $10,000, he would tell the “boys” what was coming, and that there would be $1,000 to divide. He kept the rest, and the city got nothing. The bill was introduced and held up till Butler gave the word that the money was in hand; then it passed. As the business grew, however, not only illegitimate, but legitimate permissions were charged for, and at gradually increasing rates. Citizens who asked leave to make excavations in streets for any purpose, neighborhoods 111that had to have street lamps—all had to pay, and they did pay. In later years there was no other way. Business men who complained felt a certain pressure brought to bear on them from most unexpected quarters downtown.
In the early days of the combines, Butler was completely in control because it was political. He chose the people who would be lawmakers; they did what he told them to do, and the bribery was quiet, secure, and reasonably priced. Only wrongful acts had a fee, and once a right was sold, it was solid because Butler kept his promises. The definition of an honest man as someone who stays bought fit him perfectly. But it takes a very strong person to manage themselves and others when the desire for money becomes overwhelming, which it definitely did in St. Louis. Butler kept an eye on the downtown areas. He knew everyone, and when a railroad needed a switch or a financial institution wanted a franchise, Butler found out early. Sometimes he even identified the need himself and suggested it. Naming the usual price—say $10,000—he would inform the “boys” of what was coming and that there would be $1,000 to share. He took the rest, and the city got nothing. The bill would be introduced and held up until Butler signaled that the money was secured; then it would pass. As business expanded, not just illegitimate, but legitimate permits also came with fees, which gradually increased. Citizens who wanted permission to dig in the streets for any reason, neighborhoods that needed streetlights—all had to pay, and they did pay. In later years, there was no other option. Business owners who complained felt unexpected pressure from corners of downtown they never anticipated.
A business man told me that a railroad which had a branch near his factory suggested that he go to the Municipal Legislature and get permission to have a switch run into his yard. He liked the idea, but when he found it would cost him eight or ten thousand dollars, he gave it up. Then the railroad became slow about handling his freight. He understood, and, being a fighter, he ferried the goods across the river to another road. That brought him the switch; and when he asked about it, the railroad man said:
A businessman told me that a railroad with a branch close to his factory suggested he go to the city government and get permission to have a switch put into his yard. He liked the idea, but when he found out it would cost him eight or ten thousand dollars, he dropped it. Then the railroad started to delay handling his freight. He got the hint, and being determined, he transported the goods across the river to another line. That got him the switch; and when he inquired about it, the railroad guy said:
“Oh, we got it done. You see, we pay a regular salary to some of those fellows, and they did it for us for nothing.”
“Oh, we got it done. You see, we pay some of those guys a regular salary, and they did it for us for free.”
“Then why in the deuce did you send me to them?” asked the manufacturer.
“Then why on earth did you send me to them?” asked the manufacturer.
“Well, you see,” was the answer, “we like to keep in with them, and when we can throw them a little outside business we do.”
“Well, you see,” was the reply, “we like to stay on good terms with them, and when we can give them a little extra work, we do.”
In other words, a great railway corporation, not content with paying bribe salaries to these boodle aldermen, was ready, further to oblige them, to help coerce a manufacturer and a customer to 112go also and be blackmailed by the boodlers. “How can you buck a game like that?” this man asked me.
In other words, a huge railway company, not satisfied with paying off these corrupt city officials, was also willing to pressure a manufacturer and a customer to be extorted by the crooks. “How can you fight against a system like that?” this man asked me.
Very few tried to. Blackmail was all in the ordinary course of business, and the habit of submission became fixed—a habit of mind. The city itself was kept in darkness for weeks, pending the payment of $175,000 in bribes on the lighting contract, and complaining citizens went for light where Mayor Ziegenhein told them to go—to the moon.
Very few attempted to. Blackmail was just part of the usual way of doing business, and the mindset of submission became ingrained—a habitual way of thinking. The city itself was left in the dark for weeks while waiting for the payment of $175,000 in bribes for the lighting contract, and frustrated citizens were directed by Mayor Ziegenhein to seek light where he suggested—on the moon.
Boodling was safe, and boodling was fat. Butler became rich and greedy, and neglectful of politics. Outside capital came in, and finding Butler bought, went over his head to the boodle combines. These creatures learned thus the value of franchises, and that Butler had been giving them an unduly small share of the boodle.
Boodling was secure, and boodling was profitable. Butler got rich and greedy, and he started ignoring politics. Outside investors came in and, realizing Butler was bought off, went over his head to the boodle combines. These people figured out the worth of franchises and that Butler had been giving them a way too small cut of the profits.
Then began a struggle, enormous in its vile melodrama, for control of corruption—Butler to squeeze the municipal legislators and save his profits, they to wring from him their “fair share.” Combines were formed within the old combines to make him pay more; and although he still was the legislative agent of the inner ring, he had to keep in his secret pay men who would argue for low rates, while the combine members, suspicious of one another, appointed their own legislative 113agent to meet Butler. Not sure even then, the cliques appointed “trailers” to follow their agent, watch him enter Butler’s house, and then follow him to the place where the money was to be distributed. Charles A. Gutke and John K. Murrell represented Butler in the House of Delegates, Charles Kratz and Fred G. Uthoff in the Council. The other members suspected that these men got “something big on the side,” so Butler had to hire a third to betray the combine to him. In the House, Robertson was the man. When Gutke had notified the chairman that a deal was on, and a meeting was called, the chairman would say:
Then began a huge struggle, full of drama, for control of corruption—Butler trying to pressure the city lawmakers to protect his profits, while they aimed to extract their “fair share” from him. Alliances formed within the existing groups to force him to pay more; and even though he still was the legislative agent of the inner circle, he had to secretly pay men who would advocate for lower rates, while the alliance members, suspicious of one another, hired their own legislative agent to negotiate with Butler. Unsure of each other, they even assigned “trailers” to follow their agent, watch him enter Butler’s house, and then trail him to where the money was to be handed out. Charles A. Gutke and John K. Murrell represented Butler in the House of Delegates, while Charles Kratz and Fred G. Uthoff did so in the Council. The other members suspected that these men got “something big on the side,” so Butler had to enlist a third person to betray the alliance to him. In the House, that person was Robertson. When Gutke had informed the chairman that a deal was in the works and a meeting was scheduled, the chairman would say:
“Gentlemen, the business before us to-night is [say] the Suburban Railway Bill. How much shall we ask for it?”
“Gentlemen, the matter we have to discuss tonight is the Suburban Railway Bill. How much should we request for it?”
Gutke would move that “the price be $40,000.” Some member of the outer ring would move $100,000 as fair boodle. The debate often waxed hot, and you hear of the drawing of revolvers. In this case (of the Suburban Railway) Robertson rose and moved a compromise of $75,000, urging moderation, lest they get nothing, and his price was carried. Then they would lobby over the appointment of the agent. They did not want Gutke, or anyone Butler owned, so they chose some other; and having adjourned, the outer ring would send 114a “trailer” to watch the agent, and sometimes a second “trailer” to watch the first.
Gutke proposed that "the price be $40,000." Someone from the outer circle suggested $100,000 as a reasonable amount. The discussion often got heated, and there were talks of drawing guns. In this situation (of the Suburban Railway), Robertson stood up and suggested a compromise of $75,000, advocating for moderation so they wouldn’t end up with nothing, and his proposal was accepted. Then they would lobby over who got to be the agent. They didn't want Gutke or anyone associated with Butler, so they picked someone else; after adjourning, the outer circle would send a “trailer” to keep an eye on the agent, and sometimes even a second “trailer” to keep an eye on the first one.
They began to work up business on their own account, and, all decency gone, they sold out sometimes to both sides of a fight. The Central Traction deal in 1898 was an instance of this. Robert M. Snyder, a capitalist and promoter, of New York and Kansas City, came into St. Louis with a traction proposition inimical to the city railway interests. These felt secure. Through Butler they were paying seven members of the Council $5,000 a year each, but as a precaution John Scullin, Butler’s associate, and one of the ablest capitalists of St. Louis, paid Councilman Uthoff a special retainer of $25,000 to watch the salaried boodlers. When Snyder found Butler and the combines against him, he set about buying the members individually, and, opening wine at his headquarters, began bidding for votes. This was the first break from Butler in a big deal, and caused great agitation among the boodlers. They did not go right over to Snyder; they saw Butler, and with Snyder’s valuation of the franchise before them, made the boss go up to $175,000. Then the Council combine called a meeting in Gast’s Garden to see if they could not agree on a price. Butler sent Uthoff there with instructions to cause a disagreement, or fix a price so high that Snyder would refuse 115to pay it. Uthoff obeyed, and, suggesting $250,000, persuaded some members to hold out for it, till the meeting broke up in a row. Then it was each man for himself, and all hurried to see Butler, and to see Snyder too. In the scramble various prices were paid. Four councilmen got from Snyder $10,000 each, one got $15,000, another $17,500, and one $50,000; twenty-five members of the House of Delegates got $3,000 each from him. In all, Snyder paid $250,000 for the franchise, and since Butler and his backers paid only $175,000 to beat it, the franchise was passed. Snyder turned around and sold it to his old opponents for $1,250,000. It was worth twice as much.
They started doing business on their own, and without any sense of decency, they sometimes sold out to both sides of a conflict. The Central Traction deal in 1898 was an example of this. Robert M. Snyder, a businessman and promoter from New York and Kansas City, came to St. Louis with a tramway proposal that threatened the city’s railway interests. They felt safe. Through Butler, they were paying seven members of the Council $5,000 each per year, but as a precaution, John Scullin, Butler’s partner and one of the smartest capitalists in St. Louis, paid Councilman Uthoff a special retainer of $25,000 to keep an eye on the bribed officials. When Snyder realized Butler and the alliances were against him, he started buying off the members one by one, opened some wine at his headquarters, and began soliciting votes. This was the first major split from Butler in a big deal, which caused a lot of panic among the corrupt officials. They didn’t immediately side with Snyder; instead, they consulted with Butler, and with Snyder’s estimated value of the franchise in mind, they made Butler increase his offer to $175,000. Then the Council alliance arranged a meeting at Gast’s Garden to see if they could agree on a price. Butler sent Uthoff there with instructions to cause a disagreement or set a price so high that Snyder wouldn’t agree to it. Uthoff followed through, suggesting $250,000 and convincing some members to hold out for that amount until the meeting ended in chaos. Then it became every man for himself, and everyone rushed to talk to Butler and also Snyder. In the chaos, different amounts were accepted. Four councilmen each received $10,000 from Snyder, one got $15,000, another got $17,500, and one received $50,000; twenty-five members of the House of Delegates received $3,000 each from him. In total, Snyder paid $250,000 for the franchise, and since Butler and his supporters only paid $175,000 to counter it, the franchise was approved. Snyder then turned around and sold it to his former opponents for $1,250,000. It was worth twice that amount.
The man who received $50,000 from Snyder was the same Uthoff who had taken $25,000 from John Scullin, and his story as he has told it since on the stand is the most comical incident of the exposure. He says Snyder, with his “overcoat full of money,” came out to his house to see him. They sat together on a sofa, and when Snyder was gone Uthoff found beside him a parcel containing $50,000. This he returned to the promoter, with the statement that he could not accept it, since he had already taken $25,000 from the other side; but he intimated that he could take $100,000. This Snyder promised, so Uthoff voted for the franchise.
The man who got $50,000 from Snyder was the same Uthoff who had taken $25,000 from John Scullin. His story, as he recounted it later in court, is the funniest part of the whole situation. He said Snyder, with his “overcoat full of cash,” came to his house to meet him. They sat together on a sofa, and when Snyder left, Uthoff found a package next to him containing $50,000. He returned it to the promoter, saying he couldn't accept it since he had already taken $25,000 from the other side, but he hinted that he could accept $100,000. Snyder agreed to this, so Uthoff voted for the franchise.
116The next day Butler called at Uthoff’s house. Uthoff spoke first.
116 The next day, Butler visited Uthoff's house. Uthoff was the first to speak.
“I want to return this,” he said, handing Butler the package of $25,000.
“I want to return this,” he said, giving Butler the package with $25,000.
“That’s what I came after,” said Butler.
"That's what I came for," said Butler.
When Uthoff told this in the trial of Snyder, Snyder’s counsel asked why he returned this $25,000.
When Uthoff said this during Snyder's trial, Snyder's lawyer asked why he gave back the $25,000.
“Because it wasn’t mine,” exclaimed Uthoff, flushing with anger. “I hadn’t earned it.”
“Because it wasn’t mine,” Uthoff shouted, his face red with anger. “I didn’t earn it.”
But he believed he had earned the $100,000, and he besought Snyder for that sum, or, anyway, the $50,000. Snyder made him drink, and gave him just $5,000, taking by way of receipt a signed statement that the reports of bribery in connection with the Central Traction deal were utterly false; that “I [Uthoff] know you [Snyder] to be as far above offering a bribe as I am of taking one.”
But he thought he had earned the $100,000, and he pleaded with Snyder for that amount, or at least the $50,000. Snyder got him to drink and gave him only $5,000, taking a signed statement as a receipt that the allegations of bribery related to the Central Traction deal were completely false; that "I [Uthoff] know you [Snyder] to be as far above offering a bribe as I am of accepting one."
Irregular as all this was, however, the legislators kept up a pretense of partisanship and decency. In the debates arranged for in the combine caucus, a member or two were told off to make partisan speeches. Sometimes they were instructed to attack the combine, and one or two of the rascals used to take delight in arraigning their friends on the floor of the House, charging them with the exact facts.
Irregular as all this was, the lawmakers still maintained a facade of partisanship and decency. In the debates organized by the coalition caucus, one or two members were assigned to deliver partisan speeches. Sometimes they were directed to criticize the coalition, and a couple of the troublemakers enjoyed calling out their colleagues on the floor of the House, accusing them with the precise facts.
117But for the serious work no one knew his party. Butler had with him Republicans and Democrats, and there were Republicans and Democrats among those against him. He could trust none not in his special pay. He was the chief boodle broker and the legislature’s best client; his political influence began to depend upon his boodling instead of the reverse.
117But for the serious work, no one knew his party. Butler had Republicans and Democrats on his side, and there were also Republicans and Democrats among his opponents. He couldn't trust anyone who wasn't on his payroll. He was the top bribery broker and the legislature's best client; his political influence started to rely on his bribery instead of the other way around.
He is a millionaire two or three times over now, but it is related that to someone who advised him to quit in time he replied that it wasn’t a matter of money alone with him; he liked the business, and would rather make fifty dollars out of a switch than $500 in stocks. He enjoyed buying franchises cheap and selling them dear. In the lighting deal of 1899 Butler received $150,000, and paid out only $85,000—$47,500 to the House, $37,500 to the Council—and the haggling with the House combine caused those weeks of total darkness in the city. He had Gutke tell this combine that he could divide only $20,000 among them. They voted the measure, but, suspecting Butler of “holding out on them,” moved to reconsider.
He’s a millionaire two or three times over now, but it’s said that when someone advised him to quit while he was ahead, he replied that it wasn’t just about the money for him; he enjoyed the business and would prefer to make fifty dollars from a switch than $500 from stocks. He liked buying franchises for cheap and selling them for a profit. In the lighting deal of 1899, Butler made $150,000 but only paid out $85,000—$47,500 to the House, $37,500 to the Council—and the back-and-forth with the House combine led to those weeks of total darkness in the city. He had Gutke tell this combine that he could only distribute $20,000 among them. They approved the measure, but, suspecting Butler of “holding out on them,” decided to reconsider.
The citizens were furious, and a crowd went with ropes to the City Hall the night the motion to reconsider came up; but the combine was determined. Butler was there in person. He was more frightened than the delegates, and the sweat rolled 118down his face as he bargained with them. With the whole crowd looking on, and reporters so near that a delegate told me he expected to see the conversation in the papers the next morning, Butler threatened and pleaded, but finally promised to divide $47,500. That was an occasion for a burst of eloquence. The orators, indicating the citizens with ropes, declared that since it was plain the people wanted light, they would vote them light. And no doubt the people thought they had won, for it was not known till much later that the votes were bought by Butler, and that the citizens only hastened a corrupt bargain.
The citizens were furious, and a crowd showed up with ropes at City Hall the night the motion to reconsider was discussed; but the coalition was set on their plan. Butler was there in person. He was more scared than the delegates, and sweat dripped down his face as he tried to negotiate with them. With the whole crowd watching, and reporters so close that a delegate told me he expected to see the conversation in the papers the next morning, Butler threatened and pleaded, but eventually promised to split $47,500. That was a moment for some passionate speeches. The speakers, pointing to the citizens with ropes, declared that since it was clear the people wanted light, they would vote to give it to them. And no doubt the people thought they had won, because it wasn't revealed until much later that the votes were bought by Butler, and that the citizens had only rushed into a corrupt deal.
The next big boodle measure that Butler missed was the Suburban Traction, the same that led long after to disaster. This is the story Turner and Stock have been telling over and over in the boodle trials. Turner and his friends in the St. Louis Suburban Railway Company sought a franchise, for which they were willing to pay large bribes. Turner spoke about it to Butler, who said it would cost $145,000. This seemed too much, and Turner asked Stock to lobby the measure through. Stock managed it, but it cost him $144,000—$135,000 for the combine, $9,000 extra for Meysenburg—and then, before the money was paid over and the company in possession of its privilege, an injunction put a stop to all proceedings. The money 119was in safe-deposit vaults—$75,000 for the House combine in one, $60,000 for the Council combine in the other—and when the legislature adjourned, a long fight for the money ensued. Butler chuckled over the bungling. He is said to have drawn from it the lesson that “when you want a franchise, don’t go to a novice for it; pay an expert, and he’ll deliver the goods.”
The next major bribery scheme that Butler overlooked was the Suburban Traction, which eventually led to disaster. This is the story that Turner and Stock have been repeating throughout the bribery trials. Turner and his associates at the St. Louis Suburban Railway Company wanted a franchise and were willing to pay significant bribes for it. Turner discussed it with Butler, who estimated it would cost $145,000. This seemed excessive, so Turner asked Stock to lobby for the measure instead. Stock managed to push it through, but it ended up costing him $144,000—$135,000 for the coalition and $9,000 extra for Meysenburg. Just before the money was transferred and the company secured its privileges, an injunction halted all proceedings. The money was held in safe-deposit vaults—$75,000 for the House coalition and $60,000 for the Council coalition—and when the legislature adjourned, a lengthy battle over the money began. Butler found the situation amusing. It’s said he learned from it that “when you want a franchise, don’t go to a rookie for it; hire an expert, and he’ll get the job done.”
But the combine drew their own conclusions from it, and their moral was, that though boodling was a business by itself, it was a good business, and so easy that anybody could learn it by study. And study it they did. Two of them told me repeatedly that they traveled about the country looking up the business, and that a fellowship had grown up among boodling alderman of the leading cities in the United States. Committees from Chicago would come to St. Louis to find out what “new games” the St. Louis boodlers had, and they gave the St. Louisans hints as to how they “did the business” in Chicago. So the Chicago and St. Louis boodlers used to visit Cleveland and Pittsburg and all the other cities, or, if the distance was too great, they got their ideas by those mysterious channels which run all through the “World of Graft.” The meeting place in St. Louis was Decker’s stable, and ideas unfolded there were developed into plans which, the boodlers say to-day, are only 120in abeyance. In Decker’s stable the idea was born to sell the Union Market; and though the deal did not go through, the boodlers, when they saw it failing, made the market men pay $10,000 for killing it. This scheme is laid aside for the future. Another that failed was to sell the court-house, and this was well under way when it was discovered that the ground on which this public building stands was given to the city on condition that it was to be used for a court-house and nothing else.
But the politicians came to their own conclusions from it, and their takeaway was that while corrupt practices were a business by themselves, it was a profitable endeavor, and so easy that anyone could learn it with some study. And study it they did. Two of them told me multiple times that they traveled around the country exploring the business, and that a network had formed among corrupt aldermen from major cities in the United States. Committees from Chicago would come to St. Louis to find out what “new tricks” the St. Louis politicians had, and they shared tips on how they “did business” in Chicago. So, the Chicago and St. Louis politicians would visit Cleveland, Pittsburgh, and other cities, or if the distance was too far, they got their ideas through those mysterious connections that run throughout the “World of Graft.” The meeting spot in St. Louis was Decker’s stable, and the ideas discussed there were turned into plans that, according to the politicians today, are just on hold. At Decker’s stable, the idea was conceived to sell the Union Market; and although the deal didn't go through, the politicians, seeing it fail, made the market vendors pay $10,000 for ruining it. This plan is set aside for the future. Another plan that fell through was to sell the courthouse, and this was well underway when it was discovered that the land on which this public building stands was given to the city with the stipulation that it be used as a courthouse and nothing else.
But the grandest idea of all came from Philadelphia. In that city the gas-works were sold out to a private concern, and the water-works were to be sold next. The St. Louis fellows have been trying ever since to find a purchaser for their water-works. The plant is worth at least $40,000,000. But the boodlers thought they could let it go at $15,000,000, and get $1,000,000 or so themselves for the bargain. “The scheme was to do it and skip,” said one of the boodlers who told me about it, “and if you could mix it all up with some filtering scheme it could be done; only some of us thought we could make more than $1,000,000 out of it—a fortune apiece. It will be done some day.”
But the best idea of all came from Philadelphia. In that city, the gas works were sold to a private company, and the water works were set to be sold next. The guys from St. Louis have been trying ever since to find a buyer for their water works. The facility is worth at least $40 million. But the schemers thought they could sell it for $15 million and pocket about $1 million for themselves from the deal. “The plan was to do it and run,” said one of the schemers who told me about it, “and if you could mix it all up with some filtering project, it could work; only some of us thought we could make more than $1 million off it—a fortune each. It will happen one day.”
Such, then, is the boodling system as we see it in St. Louis. Everything the city owned was for sale by the officers elected by the people. The purchasers 121might be willing or unwilling takers; they might be citizens or outsiders; it was all one to the city government. So long as the members of the combines got the proceeds they would sell out the town. Would? They did and they will. If a city treasurer runs away with $50,000 there is a great halloo about it. In St. Louis the regularly organized thieves who rule have sold $50,000,000 worth of franchises and other valuable municipal assets. This is the estimate made for me by a banker, who said that the boodlers got not one-tenth of the value of the things they sold, but were content because they got it all themselves. And as to the future, my boodling informants said that all the possessions of the city were listed for future sale, that the list was in existence, and that the sale of these properties was only postponed on account of accident—the occurrence of Mr. Folk.
This is how the boodling system operates in St. Louis. Everything the city owned was up for grabs by the officials elected by the people. The buyers could be willing or unwilling, locals or outsiders; it didn't matter to the city government. As long as the members of the combines got their cut, they would sell out the city. Did they? They did, and they will continue to do so. If a city treasurer runs off with $50,000, there’s a huge outcry about it. In St. Louis, the well-organized criminals in charge have sold $50,000,000 worth of franchises and other valuable city assets. This estimate was given to me by a banker, who said the boodlers received less than one-tenth of the actual value of the things they sold but were satisfied because they got to keep it all themselves. As for the future, my sources on boodling mentioned that all the city’s assets were on a list for future sale, that this list exists, and that the sale of these properties was only delayed due to an unexpected event—the coming of Mr. Folk.
Preposterous? It certainly would seem so; but watch the people of St. Louis as I have, and as the boodlers have—then judge.
Preposterous? It definitely seems that way; but watch the people of St. Louis like I have, and like the frauds have—then make your call.
And remember, first, that Mr. Folk really was an accident. St. Louis knew in a general way, as other cities to-day know, what was going on, but there was no popular movement. Politicians named and elected him, and they expected no trouble from him. The moment he took office, on January 1, 1901, Butler called on him to appoint 122an organization man first assistant. When Folk refused, Butler could not understand it. Going away angry, he was back in three days to have his man appointed second assistant. The refusal of this also had some effect. The boodlers say Butler came out and bade them “look out; I can’t do anything with Folk, and I wouldn’t wonder if he got after you.” They took the warning; Butler did not. It seems never to have occurred to him that Mr. Folk would “get after” him.
And remember, first, that Mr. Folk was really just an accident. St. Louis, like other cities today, generally knew what was happening, but there was no widespread movement. Politicians nominated and elected him, and they didn’t expect any trouble from him. The moment he took office on January 1, 1901, Butler asked him to appoint an organization man as the first assistant. When Folk refused, Butler couldn't understand it. He left angry but returned three days later to have his man appointed as the second assistant. Folk's refusal of this request also had an impact. The corrupt politicians said Butler warned them, “Be careful; I can’t control Folk, and I wouldn’t be surprised if he came after you.” They took the hint; Butler did not. It never seemed to occur to him that Mr. Folk would come after him.
What Butler felt, the public felt. When Mr. Folk took up, as he did immediately, election fraud cases, Butler called on him again, and told him which men he might not prosecute in earnest. The town laughed. When Butler was sent about his business, and Folk proceeded in earnest against the repeaters of both parties, even those who “had helped elect him,” there was a sensation. But the stir was due to the novelty and the incomprehensibility of such non-partisan conduct in public office. Incredulous of honesty, St. Louis manifested the first signs of that faith in evil which is so characteristic of it. “Why didn’t Mr. Folk take up boodling?” was the cynical challenge. “What do a few miserable repeaters amount to?”
What Butler felt, the public felt. When Mr. Folk immediately took on election fraud cases, Butler called on him again and told him who he shouldn’t seriously prosecute. The town found it amusing. When Butler was dismissed, and Folk genuinely went after the repeat offenders from both parties, even those who "had helped elect him," it caused quite a sensation. But the buzz was mainly because of how unusual and confusing it was to see such non-partisan behavior in public office. Skeptical of honesty, St. Louis showed the first signs of that belief in evil that it's known for. “Why didn’t Mr. Folk go after the bribery?” was the cynical challenge. “What do a few pathetic repeaters really matter?”
Mr. Folk is a man of remarkable equanimity. When he has laid a course, he steers by it truly, and nothing can excite or divert him. He had said 123he would “do his duty,” not that he would expose corruption or reform St. Louis; and beyond watching developments, he did nothing for a year to answer the public challenge. But he was making preparations. A civil lawyer, he was studying criminal law; and when, on January 23, 1902, he saw in the St. Louis Star a paragraph about the Suburban bribe fund in bank, he was ready. He sent out summonses by the wholesale for bankers, Suburban Railway officials and directors, legislators and politicians, and before the grand jury he examined them by the hour for days and days. Nobody knew anything; and though Mr. Folk was known to be “after the boodlers,” those fellows and their friends were not alarmed and the public was not satisfied.
Mr. Folk is a man of remarkable calm. When he sets a course, he sticks to it, and nothing can shake or distract him. He had stated he would “do his duty,” but he didn’t mean he’d expose corruption or fix St. Louis; aside from keeping an eye on things, he didn’t do much for a year to respond to the public challenge. But he was getting ready. As a civil lawyer, he was studying criminal law; and when, on January 23, 1902, he saw a piece in the St. Louis Star about the Suburban bribe fund in the bank, he was prepared. He sent out numerous summonses for bankers, Suburban Railway officials and directors, legislators, and politicians, and for hours on end, he questioned them before the grand jury for days. No one had any information; and although Mr. Folk was known to be pursuing the corrupt, those guys and their associates weren’t worried, and the public remained dissatisfied.
“Get indictments,” was the challenge now. It was a “bluff”; but Mr. Folk took it up, and by a “bluff” he “got an indictment.” And this is the way of it: the old row between the Suburban people and the boodle combine was going on in secret, but in a very bitter spirit. The money, lying in the safe-deposit vaults, in cash, was claimed by both parties. The boodlers said it was theirs because they had done their part by voting the franchise; the Suburban people said it was theirs because they had not obtained the franchise. The boodlers answered that the injunction against the franchise 124was not theirs, and they threatened to take the dispute before the grand jury. It was they who gave to a reporter a paragraph about the “boodle fund,” and they meant to have it scare Turner and Stock. Stock really was “scared.” When Mr. Folk’s summons was served on him, he believed the boodlers had “squealed,” and he fainted. The deputy who saw the effect of the summons told Mr. Folk, who, seeing in it only evidence of weakness and guilt, sent for the lawyer who represented Stock and Turner, and boldly gave him the choice for his clients of being witnesses or defendants. The lawyer was firm, but Folk advised him to consult his clients, and their choice was to be witnesses. Their confession and the seizure of the bribe fund in escrow gave Folk the whole inside story of the Suburban deal, and evidence in plenty for indictments. He took seven, and the reputation and standing of the first culprits showed right away not only the fearlessness of the prosecution, but the variety and power and wealth of the St. Louis species of boodler. There was Charles Kratz, agent of the Council combine; John K. Murrell, agent of the House combine; Emil A. Meysenburg, councilman and “good citizen”—all for taking bribes; Ellis Wainwright and Henry Nicolaus, millionaire brewers, and directors of the Suburban Railway Company for bribery; and Julius Lehmann and 125Henry A. Faulkner, of the House combine, for perjury. This news caused consternation; but the ring rallied, held together, and the cynics said, “They never will be tried.”
“Get indictments,” was the challenge now. It was a “bluff”; but Mr. Folk accepted it, and through “bluff” he “got an indictment.” Here’s what happened: the old conflict between the Suburban people and the corrupt group continued in secret, but it was very intense. Both sides claimed the money stored in the safe-deposit vaults. The corrupt group said it was theirs because they had voted for the franchise; the Suburban people insisted it was theirs because they hadn’t received the franchise. The corrupt group argued that the injunction against the franchise didn’t involve them, and they threatened to take the issue to the grand jury. They were the ones who leaked information to a reporter about the “boodle fund,” intending to intimidate Turner and Stock. Stock actually was “scared.” When Mr. Folk’s summons was delivered to him, he thought the corrupt group had “squealed,” and he fainted. The deputy who witnessed the impact of the summons informed Mr. Folk, who interpreted it as a sign of weakness and guilt, so he contacted the lawyer representing Stock and Turner, boldly giving him the option of having his clients be witnesses or defendants. The lawyer was resolute, but Folk recommended he consult his clients, and they chose to be witnesses. Their confession and the seizure of the bribe fund in escrow provided Folk with the entire inside story of the Suburban deal, along with plenty of evidence for indictments. He took seven indictments, and the reputation and status of the first offenders showed right away not only the fearlessness of the prosecution but also the variety, power, and wealth of the corrupt type from St. Louis. There was Charles Kratz, agent of the Council group; John K. Murrell, agent of the House group; Emil A. Meysenburg, councilman and “good citizen”—all for accepting bribes; Ellis Wainwright and Henry Nicolaus, millionaire brewers and directors of the Suburban Railway Company for bribery; and Julius Lehmann and Henry A. Faulkner, of the House group, for perjury. This news created panic; however, the ring regrouped, stayed united, and the skeptics said, “They will never be tried.”
The outlook was stormy. Mr. Folk felt now in full force the powerful interests that opposed him. The standing of some of the prisoners was one thing; another was the character of the men who went on their bail bond—Butler for the bribe takers, other millionaires for the bribers. But most serious was the flow of persons who went to Mr. Folk privately and besought or bade him desist; they were not alone politicians, but solid, innocent business men, eminent lawyers, and good friends. Hardly a man he knew but came to him at one time or another, in one way or another, to plead for some rascal or other. Threats of assassination and political ruin, offers of political promotion and of remunerative and legitimate partnerships, veiled bribes—everything he might fear was held up on one side, everything he might want on the other. “When you are doing a thing like this,” he says now, “you cannot listen to anybody; you have to think for yourself and rely on yourself alone. I knew I simply had to succeed; and, success or failure, I felt that a political future was not to be considered, so I shut out all idea of it.”
The outlook was grim. Mr. Folk now fully felt the powerful interests that were against him. The status of some of the prisoners was one issue; another was the character of the people who backed their bail—Butler for the bribe-takers, other millionaires for the bribers. But what was most alarming was the number of people who approached Mr. Folk privately, urging or telling him to back off; they weren’t just politicians, but solid, innocent business people, prominent lawyers, and good friends. Hardly a man he knew didn’t come to him at some point, in one way or another, to advocate for some scoundrel or another. He faced threats of assassination and political ruin, offers of political advancement, and profitable and legitimate partnerships—everything he might fear was presented on one side, everything he might want on the other. “When you’re doing something like this,” he says now, “you can’t listen to anyone; you have to think for yourself and rely on yourself alone. I knew I just had to succeed; and, whether I succeeded or failed, I felt that a political future wasn’t worth considering, so I shut out all thoughts of it.”
So he went on silently but surely; how surely 126may be inferred from the fact that in all his dealings with witnesses who turned State’s evidence he has not made one misstep; there have been no misunderstandings, and no charges against him of foul play. While the pressure from behind never ceased, and the defiance before him was bold, “Go higher up” was the challenge. He was going higher up. With confessions of Turner and Stock, and the indictments for perjury for examples, he re-examined witnesses; and though the big men were furnishing the little boodlers with legal advice and drilling them in their stories, there were breaks here and there. The story of the Central Traction deal began to develop, and that went higher up, straight into the group of millionaires led by Butler.
So he moved forward quietly but confidently; how confidently can be seen from the fact that in all his interactions with witnesses who turned State’s evidence, he didn’t make a single mistake; there were no misunderstandings, and no accusations against him of wrongdoing. Despite the constant pressure from behind and the bold defiance in front of him, the challenge was, “Go higher up.” He was going higher up. With confessions from Turner and Stock, along with the indictments for perjury as examples, he re-examined witnesses; even though the powerful figures were giving the minor corrupt officials legal advice and coaching them on their stories, there were gaps here and there. The narrative of the Central Traction deal started to unfold, and that went higher up, directly into the group of millionaires led by Butler.
But there was an impassable barrier in the law on bribery. American legislators do not legislate harshly against their chief vice. The State of Missouri limits the liability of a briber to three years, and the Traction deal was outlawed for most of the principals in it. But the law excepted non-residents, and Mr. Folk found that in moments of vanity Robert M. Snyder had described himself as “of New York,” so he had Snyder indicted for bribery, and George J. Kobusch, president of the St. Louis Car Company, for perjury, Kobusch having sworn that he knew of no bribery for the 127Central Traction franchise, when he himself had paid out money. Kobusch turned State’s witness against Snyder.
But there was a major hurdle in the law regarding bribery. American lawmakers don’t impose strict penalties on their biggest flaw. In Missouri, the law limits the liability of a briber to three years, and the Traction deal was illegal for most of the key players involved. However, the law made exceptions for non-residents, and Mr. Folk discovered that in moments of pride, Robert M. Snyder had called himself “from New York,” so he had Snyder charged with bribery, and George J. Kobusch, president of the St. Louis Car Company, charged with perjury, since Kobusch had claimed he knew nothing about bribery related to the Central Traction franchise, even though he had paid out money. Kobusch became a witness for the state against Snyder.
High as these indictments were, the cry for Butler persisted, and the skeptical tone of it made it plain that to break up the ring Mr. Folk had to catch the boss. And he did catch him. Saved by missing the Suburban business, saved by the law in the Central Traction affair, Butler lost by his temerity; he went on boodling after Mr. Folk was in office. He offered “presents” of $2,500 each to the two medical members of the Health Board for their approval of a garbage contract which was to net him $232,500. So the “Old Man,” the head of the boodlers, and the legislative agent of the financial district, was indicted.
As serious as these charges were, the demand for Butler continued, and the doubt in people's voices clearly showed that to dismantle the ring, Mr. Folk needed to catch the boss. And he did catch him. Butler was let off due to the failure of the Suburban operations and the legal issues in the Central Traction case, but he ultimately lost because of his arrogance; he kept engaging in corrupt practices even after Mr. Folk took office. He offered “gifts” of $2,500 each to the two medical members of the Health Board to get their approval for a garbage contract that would earn him $232,500. So the “Old Man,” the leader of the corrupt officials, and the legislative agent from the financial district, was indicted.
But the ring did not part, and the public faith in evil remained steadfast. No one had been tried. The trials were approaching, and the understanding was that the first of them was to be made a test. A defeat might stop Mr. Folk, and he realized the moral effect such a result would have. But he was sure of his cases against Murrell and Kratz, and if he convicted them the way was open to both combines and to the big men behind them. To all appearances these men also were confident, and with the lawyers engaged for them they might well have been. Suddenly it was decided that Murrell was 128weak, and might “cave.” He ran away. The shock of this to the community is hard to realize now. It was the first public proof of guilt, and the first break in the ring of little boodlers. To Mr. Folk it was the first serious check, for he could not now indict the House combine. Then, too, Kratz was in Florida, and the Circuit Attorney saw himself going into court with the weakest of his early cases, that of Meysenburg. In genuine alarm he moved heavy increases in the bail bonds. All the lawyers in all the cases combined to defeat this move, and the fight lasted for days; but Mr. Folk won. Kratz returned in a rage to find bail. With his connections and his property he could give any amount, he boasted, and he offered $100,000. In spite of the protest of the counsel engaged for him, he insisted upon furnishing $20,000, and he denounced the effort to discredit him with the insinuation that such as he would avoid trial. He even asked to be tried first, but wiser heads on his side chose the Meysenburg case.
But the ring didn't break, and public belief in evil stayed strong. No one had faced trial. The trials were coming, and it was understood that the first one would serve as a test. A loss might stop Mr. Folk, and he was aware of the moral impact such an outcome would have. However, he felt confident about his cases against Murrell and Kratz, and if he convicted them, it would clear the way for both combines and the powerful figures supporting them. To everyone’s eyes, these men seemed confident too, especially with the lawyers they had hired. Suddenly, it was decided that Murrell was vulnerable and might “cave.” He fled. The shock of this to the community is hard to grasp now. It marked the first public proof of guilt and the initial crack in the ring of small-time corrupt officials. For Mr. Folk, it was his first serious setback, as he could no longer indict the House combine. Plus, Kratz was in Florida, and the Circuit Attorney realized he was headed to court with the weakest of his early cases, the one against Meysenburg. In genuine alarm, he raised the bail amounts significantly. All the lawyers in all the cases came together to fight this move, and the battle lasted for days; but Mr. Folk prevailed. Kratz returned in a fury to secure bail. With his connections and wealth, he claimed he could provide any amount, and he offered $100,000. Despite the objections from his lawyers, he insisted on posting $20,000 and blasted the suggestion that someone like him would avoid trial. He even requested to be tried first, but more sensible minds on his side opted for the Meysenburg case.
The weakness of this case lay in the indirection of the bribe. Meysenburg, a business man of repute, took for his vote on the Suburban franchise, not money; he sold for $9,000 some two hundred shares of worthless stock. This might be made to look like a regular business transaction, and half a dozen of the best lawyers in the State appeared to 129press that view. Mr. Folk, however, met these lawyers point by point, and point by point he beat them all, displaying a knowledge of law which astounded them, and an attitude toward the prisoner which won the jury, and might well reform the methods of haranguing prosecutors all over this country. Naturally without malice, he is impersonal; he did not attack the prisoner. He was not there for that purpose. He was defending the State, not prosecuting the individual. “The defendant is a mere atom,” he tells his juries; “if we could enforce the law without punishing individuals, we should not be here; but we cannot. Only by making an example of the criminal can we prevent crime. And as to the prisoner, he cannot complain, because his own deeds are his doomsmen.” At one stage of the Faulkner trial, when ex-Governor Johnson was talking about the rights of the prisoner, Mr. Folk remarked that the State had rights also. “Oh, d—— the rights of the State!” was the retort, and the jury heard it. Many juries have heard this view. One of the permanent services Mr. Folk has rendered is to impress upon the minds, not only of juries, but of the people generally, and in particular upon the Courts of Appeal (which often forget it), that while the criminal law has been developed into a great machine to preserve the rights, and much more, of the 130criminal, the rights of the State also should be guarded.
The weakness of this case was in the indirect nature of the bribe. Meysenburg, a well-respected businessman, didn't take money for his vote on the Suburban franchise; instead, he sold about two hundred shares of worthless stock for $9,000. This could be passed off as a normal business deal, and several of the top lawyers in the State argued that perspective. However, Mr. Folk countered each lawyer's argument and consistently outsmarted them, showcasing a knowledge of law that amazed them, along with an approach toward the defendant that won over the jury and could easily change how prosecutors handle their arguments across the country. Naturally, without any personal vendetta, he remained objective; he didn’t attack the defendant. That wasn't his goal. He was representing the State, not going after the individual. “The defendant is just a small part,” he tells the juries; “if we could enforce the law without penalizing individuals, we wouldn’t need to be here; but we can’t. The only way to deter crime is to make an example out of the criminal. And as for the defendant, he can’t complain because his own actions condemn him.” At one point during the Faulkner trial, when former Governor Johnson was discussing the rights of the defendant, Mr. Folk pointed out that the State has rights too. “Oh, forget the rights of the State!” was the response, and the jury caught that remark. Many juries have heard this viewpoint. One of the lasting impacts Mr. Folk has made is to remind not only juries but also the general public—and particularly the Courts of Appeal (which often overlook this fact)—that while criminal law has been shaped into a powerful system designed to protect the rights, and even more, of the criminal, the rights of the State also need to be safeguarded.
Meysenburg was found guilty and sentenced to three years. The man was shocked limp, and the ring broke. Kratz ran away. He was advised to go, and, like Murrell, he had promises of plenty of money; unlike Murrell, however, Kratz stood on the order of his going. He made the big fellows give him a large sum of cash, and for the fulfillment of their promise of more he waited menacingly in New Orleans. Supplied there with all he demanded, this Council leader stepped across into Mexico, and has gone into business there on a large scale. With Kratz safely away, the ring was nerved up again, and Meysenburg appeared in court with five well-known millionaires to give an appeal bond of $25,000. “I could have got more,” he told the reporters, “but I guess that’s enough.”
Meysenburg was found guilty and sentenced to three years. The man was shocked and numb, and the ring fell apart. Kratz ran away. He was told to leave, and, like Murrell, he had offers of plenty of cash; unlike Murrell, though, Kratz insisted on the terms of his departure. He made the big guys give him a large sum of money, and for the promise of more, he waited threateningly in New Orleans. There, he got everything he asked for, and this leader of the Council crossed over into Mexico, where he started a large business. With Kratz safely gone, the ring was revitalized, and Meysenburg showed up in court with five well-known millionaires to secure an appeal bond of $25,000. "I could have gotten more," he told the reporters, "but I think that’s enough."
With the way to both boodle combines closed thus by the flight of their go-betweens, Mr. Folk might well have been stayed; but he wasn’t. He proceeded with his examination of witnesses, and to loosen their tongues he brought on the trials of Lehmann and Faulkner for perjury. They were well defended, but against them appeared, as against Meysenburg, President Turner, of the Suburban Railway, and Philip Stock, the brewery 131secretary. The perjurers were found guilty. Meanwhile Mr. Folk was trying through both Washington and Jefferson City to have Murrell and Kratz brought back. These regular channels failing, he applied to his sources of information in Murrell’s (the House) combine, and he soon learned that the fugitive was ill, without money, and unable to communicate with his wife or friends. Money that had been raised for him to flee with had been taken by others, and another fund sent to him by a fellow-boodler did not reach him. The fellow-boodler did, but he failed to deliver the money. Murrell wanted to come home, and Mr. Folk, glad to welcome him, let him come as far as a small town just outside of St. Louis. There he was held till Mr. Folk could arrange a coup and make sure of a witness to corroborate what Murrell should say; for, secure in the absence of Murrell, the whole House combine was denying everything. One day (in September, 1902) Mr. Folk called one of them, George F. Robertson, into his office.
With both sides of the bribery case shut down due to the actions of their intermediaries, Mr. Folk could have backed off; but he didn’t. He continued questioning witnesses, and to get them to talk, he initiated the trials of Lehmann and Faulkner for perjury. They had good defenses, but they were up against President Turner of the Suburban Railway and Philip Stock, the brewery secretary, just like Meysenburg. The perjurers were found guilty. Meanwhile, Mr. Folk was reaching out through both Washington and Jefferson City to get Murrell and Kratz brought back. When those usual routes didn’t work, he contacted his informants in Murrell’s (the House) organization, and he quickly learned that the fugitive was sick, broke, and unable to reach his wife or friends. The money that had been raised for him to escape had been taken by others, and another sum sent to him by a fellow conspirator never arrived. While the fellow conspirator made it to Murrell, he failed to deliver the cash. Murrell wanted to return home, and Mr. Folk, eager to welcome him, allowed him to come as far as a small town just outside St. Louis. There, he was held until Mr. Folk could arrange a plan and ensure a witness to back up what Murrell had to say; because, confident in Murrell’s absence, the entire House organization was denying everything. One day (in September 1902), Mr. Folk called one of them, George F. Robertson, into his office.
They had a long talk together, and Mr. Folk asked him, as he had time and again, to tell what he knew about the Suburban deal.
They had a lengthy discussion, and Mr. Folk asked him, as he had many times before, to share what he knew about the Suburban deal.
“I have told you many times, Mr. Folk,” said Robertson, “that I know nothing about that.”
“I’ve told you multiple times, Mr. Folk,” said Robertson, “that I don’t know anything about that.”
132“What would you say if you should see Murrell here?” Mr. Folk asked.
132“What would you say if you saw Murrell here?” Mr. Folk asked.
“Murrell!” exclaimed Robertson. “That’s good, that is. Why, yes, I’d like to see Murrell.”
“Murrell!” exclaimed Robertson. “That’s great, that is. Why, yes, I’d love to see Murrell.”
He was laughing as Mr. Folk went to the door and called, “Murrell.” Murrell walked in. Robertson’s smile passed. He gripped his seat, and arose like a man lifted by an electric shock. Once on his feet, he stood there staring as at a ghost.
He was laughing as Mr. Folk went to the door and called, “Murrell.” Murrell walked in. Robertson’s smile faded. He grabbed his seat and stood up like someone jolted by a sudden shock. Once on his feet, he just stood there staring as if he were seeing a ghost.
“Murrell,” said Mr. Folk quietly, “the jig is up, isn’t it?”
“Murrell,” Mr. Folk said quietly, “the jig is up, isn’t it?”
“Yes,” said Murrell, “it’s all up.”
“Yes,” said Murrell, “it’s all over.”
“You’ve told everything?”
“Did you say everything?”
“Everything.”
“Everything.”
Robertson sank into his chair. When he had time to recover his self-control, Mr. Folk asked him if he was ready to talk about the Suburban deal.
Robertson settled into his chair. Once he had a moment to regain his composure, Mr. Folk asked him if he was ready to discuss the Suburban deal.
“Well, I don’t see what else I can do, Mr. Folk; you’ve got me.”
“Well, I don’t see what else I can do, Mr. Folk; you’ve got me.”
Robertson told all, and, with Murrell and Turner and Stock and the rolls of money to support him, Mr. Folk indicted for bribery or perjury, or both, the remaining members of the House combine, sixteen men at one swoop. Some escaped. One, Charles Kelly, a leading witness in another case, fled to Europe with more money than anyone believed he owned, and he returned after 133a high time with plenty left. A leading financier of Missouri went away at about the same time, and when he got back, at about the same time with Kelly, the statute of limitation in the financier’s case covered them both.
Robertson revealed everything, and with Murrell, Turner, Stock, and stacks of cash backing him up, Mr. Folk indicted for bribery or perjury, or both, the other members of the House came together, hitting sixteen men at once. Some managed to escape. One of them, Charles Kelly, a key witness in another case, ran away to Europe with more money than anyone thought he had, and returned after a wild time with plenty still in hand. A prominent financier from Missouri left around the same time, and when he came back, coinciding with Kelly’s return, the statute of limitations on his case covered them both.
With all his success these losses were made the most of; it was remarked that Mr. Folk had not yet convicted a very rich man. The Snyder case was coming up, and with it a chance to show that even the power of money was not irresistible. Snyder, now a banker in Kansas City, did not deny or attempt to disprove the charges of bribery; he made his defense his claim to continuous residence in the State. Mr. Folk was not taken unawares; he proved the bribery and he proved the non-residence too, and the banker was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment.
Despite all his success, these losses were capitalized on; it was noted that Mr. Folk had yet to convict a really wealthy man. The Snyder case was on the horizon, presenting an opportunity to demonstrate that even the influence of money could be challenged. Snyder, now a banker in Kansas City, didn’t deny or try to refute the bribery charges; he based his defense on his claim of continuous residency in the state. Mr. Folk was prepared; he proved the bribery and also established the non-residency, leading to the banker being sentenced to five years in prison.
One other trial intervened, that of Edmund Bersch of the House combine, and he was convicted of bribery and perjury. But all interest centered now in the trial of Edward Butler, the boss, who, the people said, would not be indicted; who, indicted, they said, would never be tried. Now they were saying he would never be convicted.
One other trial came up, that of Edmund Bersch from the House combine, and he was found guilty of bribery and perjury. But all the focus was now on the trial of Edward Butler, the boss, whom people said wouldn't be indicted; and if he was indicted, they believed he would never be tried. Now, they were claiming he would never be convicted.
When Boss Tweed was tried in New York, his power was broken, his machine smashed, his money spent, and the people were worked up to a fury 134against him. The most eminent members of the New York bar prosecuted him. The most eminent members of the St. Louis Bar were engaged to defend Butler. He was still the boss, he had millions of his own, and back of him were the resources, financial and political, of the leading men of St. Louis. That the people were against him appeared in only one sign, that of the special juries, carefully chosen to keep out men privately known to be implicated. These juries had invariably convicted the boodlers. Butler asked to be tried in some other town. Mr. Folk suggested Columbia, the university town of the State of Missouri.
When Boss Tweed was put on trial in New York, his power was shattered, his operation dismantled, his money depleted, and the public was incited to rage against him. The most prominent members of the New York bar were assigned to prosecute him. The top lawyers from St. Louis were brought in to defend Butler. He still held the title of boss, had millions of his own, and behind him were the financial and political resources of the leading figures in St. Louis. The fact that the people opposed him showed up in one clear way: the special juries, carefully picked to exclude anyone known to be involved. These juries consistently convicted the corrupt officials. Butler requested to be tried in another town. Mr. Folk suggested Columbia, the university town in the State of Missouri.
Columbia was chosen, and Butler’s sons went up there with their heelers to “fix the town.” They spent money freely, and because the loafers drank with them plentifully, the Butlerites thought they “had the town right.” But they did not know Columbia; neither did Butler. When he stepped off the train, he asked genially what the business of the town was.
Columbia was picked, and Butler’s sons went up there with their crew to "set things straight." They spent money generously, and since the locals drank with them a lot, the Butlerites believed they "had the town under control." But they didn’t really understand Columbia; neither did Butler. When he got off the train, he casually asked what business the town was involved in.
“Education,” was the answer.
"Education," was the reply.
“Education!” he blurted. “That’s a h—l of a business!” And he conducted himself as if he did not understand what it meant. His friends having prepared the way for a “good fellow,” Butler set about proving himself such, and his 135reception in the bar-rooms and streets was so flattering that it was predicted in his crowd that Folk would never leave Columbia alive. But Mr. Folk understood the people better. Stanch as the leading interests of St. Louis were against him, he always held that his unflinching juries meant that the silent people of St. Louis were against boodlers and out in the State he felt still surer of this. He was right. There was no demonstration for him. He was welcomed, but in decorous fashion; and all he saw by way of prejudice was the friendly look out of kind eyes that went with the warm pressure of strange hands. When the jury was drawn, every man on it proved to be a Democrat, and three were members of the Democratic County Committee. Mr. Folk was urged to challenge these, for, after all, Colonel Butler was at the head of their machine. He accepted them. He might as well have objected to the judge, John A. Hockaday, who also was a Democrat. “No, sir,” said Mr. Folk; “I am a Democrat, and I will try Butler before a Democratic judge and a Democratic jury.”
"Education!” he blurted out. “That’s quite a business!” And he acted as if he couldn’t grasp what it meant. His friends had set the stage for a “good guy,” so Butler set out to prove he was one, and his reception in the bars and streets was so positive that his group predicted Folk would never make it out of Columbia alive. But Mr. Folk understood the people better. Even though the key players in St. Louis were against him, he believed that his dependable juries meant that the quiet people of St. Louis were opposed to corruption, and out in the State, he felt even more certain of this. He was right. There was no big show of support for him. He was welcomed, but in a respectful way, and the only prejudice he noticed was the friendly glances from kind eyes that accompanied the warm shake of unfamiliar hands. When the jury was selected, every member was a Democrat, and three of them were part of the Democratic County Committee. Mr. Folk was encouraged to challenge these jurors since Colonel Butler was at the top of their organization. He chose not to. He might as well have objected to the judge, John A. Hockaday, who was also a Democrat. “No, sir,” said Mr. Folk; “I’m a Democrat, and I’ll stand trial with Butler before a Democratic judge and a Democratic jury.”
The trial was a scene to save out of all the hideousness before and after it. The little old court-house headed one end of a short main street, the university the other; farmers’ mule teams were hitched all along between. From far and near 136people came to see this trial, and, with the significance of it in mind, men halted to read over the entrance to the court these words, chiseled long ago: “Oh, Justice, when driven from other habitations, make this thy dwelling-place.” You could see the appropriateness of that legend take hold of men, and in the spirit of it they passed into the dingy courtroom. There the rows of intent faces seemed to express that same sentiment. The jury looked, the judge personified it. He alone was cold, but he was attentive, deliberate, and reasonable; you were sure of his common sense; you understood his rulings; and of his uprightness you were convinced by the way he seemed to lean, just a little, toward the prisoner. I don’t believe they will find any errors, however trivial, on which to reverse John A. Hockaday.[2] Even the prosecutor was fair. It was not Edward Butler who was on trial, it was the State; and never before did Mr. Folk plead so earnestly for this conception of his work. Outside, in the churches, prayer-meetings were held. These were private and undemonstrative; the praying citizens did not tell even Mr. Folk that they were asking their God to give him strength. Indirectly it came to him, and, first fine sign as it was of approval from his client, the people, it moved him deeply. And 137when, the plain case plainly stated, he made his final appeal to the jury, the address was a statement of the impersonal significance of the evidence, and of the State’s need of patriotic service and defense. “Missouri, Missouri,” he said softly, with simple, convincing sincerity, “I am pleading for thee, pleading for thee.” And the jury understood. The judge was only clear and fair, but the twelve men took his instructions out with them, and when they came back their verdict was, “Guilty; three years.”
The trial was a moment to remember amidst all the chaos before and after it. The small, old courthouse stood at one end of a short main street, with the university at the other end; farmers’ mule teams were tied up all along the way. People came from all around to witness this trial, and with its importance in mind, men paused to read the words chiseled above the entrance to the court: “Oh, Justice, when driven from other homes, make this your dwelling place.” You could see how that statement resonated with people, and in that spirit, they entered the dingy courtroom. The rows of focused faces seemed to reflect that same feeling. The jury looked on, and the judge embodied it. He was the only one who was cold, but he was attentive, deliberate, and reasonable; you trusted his common sense; you understood his decisions; and his integrity was clear in the slight lean he seemed to have toward the prisoner. I doubt they will find any errors, no matter how minor, to reverse John A. Hockaday. Even the prosecutor was fair. It wasn’t Edward Butler who was on trial; it was the State itself. Mr. Folk had never advocated so passionately for this understanding of his role. Outside, in the churches, prayer meetings were held. These were private and understated; the citizens praying didn’t even tell Mr. Folk that they were asking their God to give him strength. Indirectly, he felt it, and as the first sign of approval from his client, the people, it touched him deeply. And when he clearly laid out the straightforward case, his final appeal to the jury was a statement about the broader significance of the evidence and the State’s need for patriotic service and defense. “Missouri, Missouri,” he said softly, with simple, convincing sincerity, “I am pleading for you, pleading for you.” And the jury understood. The judge was only clear and fair, but the twelve men took his instructions with them, and when they returned, their verdict was, “Guilty; three years.”
2. See Post Scriptum, end of chapter.
__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__. See Post Script, end of chapter.
That was Missouri. What of St. Louis? Some years ago, when Butler was young in corruption, he was caught gambling, and with the charge pending against him St. Louis rose to challenge him. Meetings were held all over the city—one in the Exchange downtown—to denounce the political leader, who, an offense always, had dared commit the felony of gambling. Now, when he was caught and convicted and sentenced for bribery, what did St. Louis do? The first comment I heard in the streets when we all got back that day was that “Butler would never wear the stripes.” I heard it time and again, and you can hear it from banker and barber there to-day. Butler himself behaved decently. He stayed indoors for a few weeks—till a committee of citizens from the best residence section called upon him 138to come forth and put through the House of Delegates a bill for the improvement of a street in their neighborhood; and Butler had this done!
That was Missouri. What about St. Louis? A few years back, when Butler was just starting his shady dealings, he got caught gambling, and while charges were still out against him, St. Louis decided to take him on. There were meetings all over the city—one in the Exchange downtown—to publicly criticize the political leader, who, as always, had committed the crime of gambling. So what happened when he was caught, convicted, and sentenced for bribery? The first thing I heard people saying in the streets when we all returned that day was that "Butler would never wear the stripes." I heard it over and over again, and you can still hear it from bankers and barbers there today. Butler himself acted appropriately. He stayed out of sight for a few weeks—until a committee of citizens from the nicer part of town came to him asking to push through a bill in the House of Delegates for a street improvement in their area; and Butler got it done!
One of the first greetings to Mr. Folk was a warning from a high source that now at length he had gone far enough, and on the heels of this came an order from the Police Department that hereafter all communications from him to the police should be made in writing. This meant slow arrests; it meant that the fight was to go on. Well, Mr. Folk had meant to go on, anyway.
One of the first messages to Mr. Folk was a warning from a top authority that he had reached his limit, and right after that came an order from the Police Department stating that from now on, all communications from him to the police should be in writing. This meant slower arrests; it meant that the struggle would continue. Well, Mr. Folk intended to keep going, regardless.
“Officer,” he said to the man who brought the message, “go back to the man who sent you, and say to him that I understand him, and that hereafter all my communications with his department will be in the form of indictments.”
“Officer,” he said to the man who brought the message, “go back to the man who sent you and tell him that I understand him, and that from now on, all my communications with his department will be in the form of indictments.”
That department retreated in haste, explaining and apologizing, and offering all possible facilities. Mr. Folk went on with his business. He put on trial Henry Nicolaus, the brewer, accused of bribery. Mr. Nicolaus pleaded that he did not know what was to be the use of a note for $140,000 which he had endorsed. And on this the judge took the case away from the jury and directed a verdict of not guilty. It was the first case Mr. Folk had lost. He won the next eight, all boodle legislators, making his record fourteen 139against one. But the Supreme Court, technical and slow, is the last stand for such criminals, and they won their first fight there.[3] The Meysenburg case was sent back for retrial.
The department quickly backed off, explaining and apologizing while offering all possible help. Mr. Folk continued with his work. He put Henry Nicolaus, the brewer, on trial for bribery. Mr. Nicolaus claimed he didn’t understand the purpose of a $140,000 note he had endorsed. Because of this, the judge removed the case from the jury and declared a verdict of not guilty. This was the first case Mr. Folk had lost. He went on to win the next eight, all involving corrupt legislators, bringing his record to fourteen 139 wins against one loss. But the Supreme Court, being technical and slow, serves as the final barrier for such criminals, and they won their first battle there. The Meysenburg case was sent back for retrial.
3. See Post Scriptum, end of chapter.
__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__. See Post Scriptum, chapter finale.
Mr. Folk has work ahead of him for the two years remaining of his term, and he is the man to carry it all through. But where is it all to end? There are more men to be indicted, many more to be tried, and there is much more corruption to be disclosed. But the people of St. Louis know enough. What are they going to do about it?
Mr. Folk has a lot of work ahead of him for the remaining two years of his term, and he's the right person to see it through. But where is it all going to end? More people need to be indicted, many more need to be tried, and there's a lot more corruption to uncover. But the people of St. Louis know enough. What are they going to do about it?
They have had one opportunity already to act. In November (1902), just before the Butler verdict, but after the trial was begun, there was an election. Some of the offices to be filled might have to do with boodling cases. Mr. Folk and boodling were the natural issue, but the politicians avoided it. Neither party “claimed” Mr. Folk. Both parties took counsel of Butler in making up their tickets, and they satisfied him. The Democrats did not mention Folk’s name in the platform, and they nominated Butler’s son for the seat in Congress from which he had repeatedly been ousted for fraud at the polls.
They had one chance already to take action. In November (1902), right before the Butler verdict but after the trial had started, there was an election. Some of the positions up for grabs could be linked to bribery cases. Mr. Folk and bribery were the obvious topics, but the politicians steered clear of discussing them. Neither party “claimed” Mr. Folk. Both parties consulted Butler when putting together their tickets, and they satisfied him. The Democrats didn’t mention Folk’s name in their platform, and they nominated Butler’s son for the congressional seat from which he had been repeatedly removed for election fraud.
“Why?” I asked a Democratic leader, who said he controlled all but four districts in his organization.
“Why?” I asked a Democratic leader who said he was in charge of all but four districts in his organization.
140“Because I needed those Butler districts,” he answered.
140“Because I needed those Butler districts,” he replied.
“But isn’t there enough anti-boodling sentiment in this town to offset those districts?”
“But isn’t there enough opposition to boodling in this town to balance out those districts?”
“I don’t think so.”
“Not a chance.”
Perhaps he was right. And yet those juries and those prayers must mean something.
Maybe he was right. Still, those juries and those prayers have to mean something.
Mr. Folk says, “Ninety-nine per cent. of the people are honest; only one per cent. is dishonest. But the one per cent. is perniciously active.” In other words, the people are sound, but without leaders. Another official, of irreproachable character himself, said that the trouble was there was “no one fit to throw the first stone.”
Mr. Folk says, “Ninety-nine percent of people are honest; only one percent is dishonest. But that one percent is really active.” In other words, the people are good, but they lack leadership. Another official, whose character is beyond reproach, said that the problem is there’s “no one fit to throw the first stone.”
However, this may be, here are the facts:
However this may be, here are the facts:
In the midst of all these sensations, and this obvious, obstinate political rottenness, the innocent citizens, who must be at least a decisive minority, did not register last fall. Butler, the papers said, had great furniture vans going about with men who were said to be repeaters, and yet the registration was the lowest in many years. When the Butlerized tickets were announced, there was no audible protest. It was the time for an independent movement. A third ticket might not have won, but it would have shown the politicians (whether they counted them in or out) how many honest votes there were in the city, and what they 141would have to reckon with in the force of public sentiment. Nothing of the sort was done. St. Louis, rich, dirty, and despoiled, was busy with business.
In the midst of all these feelings, and this clear, stubborn political corruption, the innocent citizens, who should at least be a significant minority, didn’t register last fall. The papers said Butler had large moving trucks going around with people rumored to be repeat voters, yet the registration was the lowest in many years. When the Butler-backed tickets were announced, there was no audible backlash. It was the perfect time for an independent movement. A third ticket might not have won, but it would have shown the politicians (whether they acknowledged them or not) how many honest votes were in the city, and what they would have to confront regarding public sentiment. Nothing like that happened. St. Louis, wealthy, dirty, and exploited, was focused on business.
Another opportunity is coming soon. In April the city votes for municipal legislators, and since the municipal assembly has been the scene of most of the corruption, you would think boodling would surely be an issue then. I doubt it. When I was there in January (1903), the politicians were planning to keep it out, and their ingenious scheme was to combine on one ticket; that is to say, each group of leaders would name half the nominees, who were to be put on identical tickets, making no contest at all. And to avoid suspicion, these nominations were to be exceptionally, yes, “remarkably good.”[4]
Another opportunity is coming soon. In April, the city will vote for local legislators, and since the city council has been the center of most of the corruption, you would think shady dealings would definitely be an issue then. I doubt it. When I was there in January (1903), the politicians were planning to keep it off the agenda, and their clever plan was to run on a single ticket; that is to say, each group of leaders would choose half the nominees, who would be placed on identical tickets, making it a non-contest. And to avoid any suspicion, these nominations were supposed to be exceptionally, yes, "remarkably good."[4]
4. See Post Scriptum, end of chapter.
__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__. See Post Scriptum, chapter conclusion.
That is the old Butler non-partisan or bi-partisan system. It emanates now from the rich men back of the ring, but it means that the ring is intact, alert, and hopeful. They are “playing for time.” The convicts sitting in the municipal assembly, the convicts appealing to the higher courts, the rich men abroad, the bankers down town—all are waiting for something. What are they waiting for?
That’s the old Butler non-partisan or bi-partisan system. It comes from the wealthy men behind the ring, but it means the ring is still there, active, and optimistic. They are “playing for time.” The convicts in the city council, the convicts going to the higher courts, the wealthy men overseas, the bankers in the city—all are waiting for something. What are they waiting for?
Charles Kratz, the ex-president of the Council, 142head and go-between of the Council combine, the fugitive from justice, who, by his flight, blocks the way to the exposure and conviction of the rich and influential men who are holding the people of Missouri in check and keeping boodling from going before the people as a political issue, this criminal exile, thus backed, was asked this question in Mexico, and here is the answer he returned:
Charles Kratz, the former president of the Council, 142leader and intermediary of the Council group, the fugitive from justice, who, by running away, obstructs the exposure and prosecution of the wealthy and powerful men who are keeping the people of Missouri under control and preventing corruption from becoming a political issue, this criminal in exile, with this support, was asked a question in Mexico, and here’s the answer he gave:
“I am waiting for Joe Folk’s term to expire. Then I am going home to run for Governor of Missouri and vindication.”
“I’m waiting for Joe Folk’s term to end. Then I'm going home to run for Governor of Missouri and get my chance at vindication.”
Post Scriptum, December, 1904.—The tickets were not “remarkably good.” “Boodle” was not in the platform, nor “reform.” The bi-partisan boodlers, with reformers and “respectable” business men for backers, faced it out, and Boss Butler reorganized the new House of Delegates with his man for Speaker and the superintendent of his garbage plant (in the interest of which he offered the bribes for which he was convicted) for chairman of the Sanitary Committee.
P.S., December, 1904.—The tickets were not “really good.” “Boodle” wasn’t present on the platform, nor was “reform.” The bipartisan corrupt officials, backed by reformers and “respectable” business people, stood their ground, and Boss Butler reshaped the new House of Delegates with his guy as Speaker and the supervisor of his garbage facility (for which he offered the bribes he was convicted of) as chair of the Sanitary Committee.
And the Supreme Court of Missouri reversed his case and all the other boodle cases one by one, then by wholesale. The whole machinery of justice broke down under the strain of boodle pull.
And the Supreme Court of Missouri overturned his case and all the other corruption cases one by one, then all at once. The entire system of justice collapsed under the pressure of corruption.
143Meanwhile, however, Mr. Folk uncovered corruption in the State and, announcing himself a candidate for Governor, has appealed from the Court to the People, from the City of St. Louis to the State of Missouri.
143Meanwhile, Mr. Folk discovered corruption in the state and, declaring his candidacy for Governor, appealed from the court to the people, from the city of St. Louis to the state of Missouri.
PITTSBURG: A CITY ASHAMED
Minneapolis was an example of police corruption; St. Louis of financial corruption. Pittsburg is an example of both police and financial corruption. The two other cities have found each an official who has exposed them. Pittsburg has had no such man and no exposure. The city has been described physically as “Hell with the lid off”; politically it is hell with the lid on. I am not going to lift the lid. The exposition of what the people know and stand is the purpose of these articles, not the exposure of corruption, and the exposure of Pittsburg is not necessary. There are earnest men in the town who declare it must blow up of itself soon. I doubt that; but even if it does burst, the people of Pittsburg will learn little more than they know now. It is not ignorance that keeps American citizens subservient; neither is it indifference. The Pittsburgers know, and a strong minority of them care; they have risen against their ring and beaten it, only to look about and find another ring around them. Angry and ashamed, Pittsburg is a type of the city that has tried to be free and failed.
Minneapolis showed police corruption, St. Louis showed financial corruption, and Pittsburgh is an example of both. The other two cities have found officials who have exposed their issues. Pittsburgh has had no one like that, and nothing has been revealed. The city has been described as “Hell with the lid off”; politically, it feels like hell with the lid on. I’m not going to lift the lid. The goal of these articles is to show what the people know and stand for, not to expose corruption, and exposing Pittsburgh isn't necessary. There are serious people in town who claim it will implode on its own soon. I doubt that; but even if it does explode, the people of Pittsburgh will learn little more than they know now. It's not ignorance that keeps American citizens submissive; it’s not indifference either. The people in Pittsburgh know what's happening, and a strong minority of them care; they've risen against their corrupt leaders and defeated them, only to find another group of corrupt leaders surrounding them. Angry and ashamed, Pittsburgh is a symbol of a city that has tried to be free but has failed.
148A sturdy city it is, too, the second in Pennsylvania. Two rivers flow past it to make a third, the Ohio, in front, and all around and beneath it are natural gas and coal which feed a thousand furnaces that smoke all day and flame all night to make Pittsburg the Birmingham of America. Rich in natural resources, it is richest in the quality of its population. Six days and six nights these people labor, molding iron and forging steel, and they are not tired; on the seventh day they rest, because that is the Sabbath. They are Scotch Presbyterians and Protestant Irish. This stock had an actual majority not many years ago, and now, though the population has grown to 354,000 in Pittsburg proper (counting Allegheny across the river, 130,000, and other communities, politically separate, but essentially integral parts of the proposed Greater Pittsburg, the total is 750,000), the Scotch and Scotch-Irish still predominate, and their clean, strong faces characterize the crowds in the streets. Canny, busy, and brave, they built up their city almost in secret, making millions and hardly mentioning it. Not till outsiders came in to buy some of them out did the world (and Pittsburg and some of the millionaires in it) discover that the Iron City had been making not only steel and glass, but multimillionaires. A banker told a business man as a 149secret one day about three years ago that within six months a “bunch of about a hundred new millionaires would be born in Pittsburg,” and the births happened on time. And more beside. But even the bloom of millions did not hurt the city. Pittsburg is an unpretentious, prosperous city of tremendous industry and healthy, steady men.
148Pittsburgh is a strong city, the second largest in Pennsylvania. Two rivers flow past it to form a third—the Ohio—while natural gas and coal surround and lie beneath it, fueling a thousand furnaces that smoke all day and blaze all night, making Pittsburgh the Birmingham of America. Rich in natural resources, it is even richer in the quality of its people. For six days and nights, these workers labor, shaping iron and forging steel, and they never tire; on the seventh day, they rest because it's the Sabbath. They are Scottish Presbyterians and Protestant Irish. This group held an actual majority not long ago, and now, even though the population has risen to 354,000 in Pittsburgh proper (including Allegheny across the river, with 130,000, and other communities that are politically separate but essentially parts of the planned Greater Pittsburgh, the total reaches 750,000), the Scottish and Scottish-Irish still dominate, and their clean, strong faces fill the streets. Smart, hardworking, and courageous, they built their city almost in secret, making millions without much fanfare. It wasn’t until outsiders came in to buy them out that the world (and Pittsburgh along with some of its millionaires) discovered that the Iron City had been producing not only steel and glass, but also multimillionaires. About three years ago, a banker confided to a businessman that within six months, “about a hundred new millionaires would emerge in Pittsburgh,” and it happened right on schedule. And more than that. Yet even the influx of millions did not harm the city. Pittsburgh is a humble, thriving city of immense industry and hardworking, steady people.
Superior as it is in some other respects, however, Scotch-Irish Pittsburg, politically, is no better than Irish New York or Scandinavian Minneapolis, and little better than German St. Louis. These people, like any other strain of the free American, have despoiled the government—despoiled it, let it be despoiled, and bowed to the despoiling boss. There is nothing in the un-American excuse that this or that foreign nationality has prostituted “our great and glorious institutions.” We all do it, all breeds alike. And there is nothing in the complaint that the lower elements of our city populations are the source of our disgrace. In St. Louis corruption came from the top, in Minneapolis from the bottom. In Pittsburg it comes from both extremities, but it began above.
As impressive as it may be in other ways, Scotch-Irish Pittsburgh is no better politically than Irish New York or Scandinavian Minneapolis, and only slightly better than German St. Louis. These people, like any other group of free Americans, have exploited the government—made it vulnerable, allowed it to be vulnerable, and submitted to the corrupting boss. There's no validity in the un-American excuse that this or that foreign nationality has exploited “our great and glorious institutions.” We all do it, regardless of our background. And the claim that the lower classes in our cities are the source of our shame doesn’t hold up. In St. Louis, corruption came from the top; in Minneapolis, it came from the bottom. In Pittsburgh, it originates from both ends, but it started at the top.
The railroads began the corruption of this city. There “always was some dishonesty,” as the oldest public men I talked with said, but it was occasional and criminal till the first great corporation 150made it businesslike and respectable. The municipality issued bonds to help the infant railroads to develop the city, and, as in so many American cities, the roads repudiated the debt and interest, and went into politics. The Pennsylvania Railroad was in the system from the start, and, as the other roads came in and found the city government bought up by those before them, they purchased their rights of way by outbribing the older roads, then joined the ring to acquire more rights for themselves and to keep belated rivals out. As corporations multiplied and capital branched out corruption increased naturally, but the notable characteristic of the “Pittsburg plan” of misgovernment was that it was not a haphazard growth, but a deliberate, intelligent organization. It was conceived in one mind, built up by one will, and this master spirit ruled, not like Croker in New York, a solid majority; nor like Butler in St. Louis, a bi-partisan minority; but the whole town—financial, commercial, and political. The boss of Pittsburg was Christopher L. Magee, a great man, and when he died he was regarded by many of the strongest men in Pittsburg as their leading citizen.
The railroads started the corruption of this city. There "always was some dishonesty," as the oldest public officials I spoke with said, but it was infrequent and criminal until the first big corporation made it seem normal and respectable. The city issued bonds to help the fledgling railroads develop the area, and, like in so many American cities, the railroads ignored the debt and interest and got involved in politics. The Pennsylvania Railroad was part of the system from the beginning, and as other railroads came in and found the city government already bought off, they bought their way in by outbribing the older railroads, then joined the corrupt network to gain more rights for themselves and keep latecomers out. As corporations multiplied and capital spread, corruption naturally increased, but the standout feature of the "Pittsburg plan" of misgovernment was that it wasn't random but a deliberate, organized effort. It originated in one mind, developed by one will, and this dominant figure ruled, not like Croker in New York, with a solid majority; nor like Butler in St. Louis, with a bipartisan minority; but over the entire town—financially, commercially, and politically. The boss of Pittsburgh was Christopher L. Magee, a significant figure, and when he died, many of the most influential people in Pittsburgh regarded him as their leading citizen.
“Chris,” as he was called, was a charming character. I have seen Pittsburgers grow black in the face denouncing his ring, but when I asked, 151“What kind of a man was Magee?” they would cool and say, “Chris? Chris was one of the best men God ever made.” If I smiled, they would say, “That is all right. You smile, and you can go ahead and show up the ring. You may describe this town as the worst in the country. But you get Magee wrong and you’ll have all Pittsburg up in arms.” Then they would tell me that “Magee robbed the town,” or, perhaps, they would speak of the fund raising to erect a monument to the dead boss.
“Chris,” as he was known, was a charismatic guy. I’ve seen people from Pittsburgh get really angry when talking about his group, but when I asked, 151 “What kind of guy was Magee?” they would calm down and say, “Chris? Chris was one of the best men God ever made.” If I smiled, they’d say, “That’s fine. You smile, and you can go ahead and criticize the group. You can call this town the worst in the country. But if you get Magee wrong, you’ll have all of Pittsburgh ready to fight.” Then they would tell me that “Magee robbed the town,” or they might bring up the fundraising to build a monument for the deceased boss.
So I must be careful. And, to begin with, Magee did not, technically speaking, rob the town. That was not his way, and it would be a carelessly unnecessary way in Pennsylvania. But surely he does not deserve a monument.
So I have to be careful. And, to start with, Magee didn’t, strictly speaking, rob the town. That wasn't his style, and it would have been a foolishly unnecessary thing to do in Pennsylvania. But he definitely doesn’t deserve a monument.
Magee was an American. His paternal great-grandfather served in the Revolution, and settled in Pittsburg at the close of the war. Christopher was born on Good Friday, April 14, 1848. He was sent to school till he was fifteen years old. Then his father died, and “Squire” or “Tommy” Steele, his uncle, a boss of that day, gave him his start in life with a place in the City Treasury. When just twenty-one, he made him cashier, and two years later Chris had himself elected City Treasurer by a majority of 1100 on a ticket the head of which was beaten by 1500 votes.
Magee was an American. His paternal great-grandfather fought in the Revolution and settled in Pittsburgh at the end of the war. Christopher was born on Good Friday, April 14, 1848. He attended school until he was fifteen years old. Then his father passed away, and “Squire” or “Tommy” Steele, his uncle and a prominent figure of that time, gave him his start in life with a job in the City Treasury. When he turned twenty-one, his uncle made him the cashier, and two years later Chris got himself elected City Treasurer by a margin of 1,100 votes, even though the candidate at the top of his ticket lost by 1,500 votes.
152Such was his popularity; and, though he systematized and capitalized it, it lasted to the end, for the foundation thereof was goodness of heart and personal charm. Magee was tall, strong, and gracefully built. His hair was dark till it turned gray, then his short mustache and his eyebrows held black, and his face expressed easily sure power and genial, hearty kindness. But he was ambitious for power, and all his goodness of heart was directed by a shrewd mind.
152He was really popular, and even though he organized and made the most of it, it lasted until the end because it was built on genuine kindness and personal appeal. Magee was tall, strong, and had a graceful figure. His hair was dark until it turned gray, but his short mustache and eyebrows remained black, and his face easily showed a confident strength along with warm, friendly kindness. However, he was also ambitious for power, and all his kindness was guided by a clever mind.
When Chris saw the natural following gathering about him he realized, young as he was, the use of it, and he retired from office (holding only a fire commissionership) with the avowed purpose of becoming a boss. Determined to make his ring perfect, he went to Philadelphia to study the plan in operation there. Later, when the Tweed ring was broken, he spent months in New York looking into Tammany’s machine methods and the mistakes which had led to its exposure and disruption. With that cheerful candor which softens indignation he told a fellow-townsman (who told me) what he was doing in New York; and when Magee returned he reported that a ring could be made as safe as a bank. He had, to start with, a growing town too busy for self-government; two not very unequal parties, neither of them well organized; a clear field in his own, 153the majority party in the city, county, and State. There was boodle, but it was loosely shared by too many persons. The governing instrument was the old charter of 1816, which lodged all the powers—legislative, administrative, and executive—in the councils, common and select. The mayor was a peace officer, with no responsible power. Indeed, there was no responsibility anywhere. There were no departments. Committees of councils did the work usually done by departments, and the councilmen, unsalaried and unanswerable individually, were organized into what might have become a combine had not Magee set about establishing the one-man power there.
When Chris noticed the crowd gathering around him, he realized, despite his youth, how useful it was, so he stepped down from his position (only holding a fire commissioner role) with the clear intention of becoming a boss. Eager to perfect his own operation, he went to Philadelphia to observe the plan in action. Later, when the Tweed ring fell apart, he spent months in New York analyzing Tammany’s tactics and the errors that led to its downfall. With a light-hearted honesty that softened his outrage, he told a fellow townsman (who later shared it with me) what he was doing in New York; and when Magee came back, he said that a ring could be as secure as a bank. To begin with, he had a growing town that was too busy for self-governance; two fairly equal parties, neither well organized; and a clear advantage in his own party, the majority in the city, county, and state. There was money to be made, but it was spread too thin among too many people. The governing structure was based on an old charter from 1816, which granted all powers—legislative, administrative, and executive—to the councils, both common and select. The mayor was merely a peace officer with no real authority. In fact, there was no accountability anywhere. There were no departments. Committees of councils handled the tasks typically managed by departments, and the council members, unpaid and not individually accountable, were loosely organized into what could have become a coalition if Magee hadn’t started working towards establishing the one-man rule there.
To control councils Magee had to organize the wards, and he was managing this successfully at the primaries, when a new and an important figure appeared on the scene—William Flinn. Flinn was Irish, a Protestant of Catholic stock, a boss contractor, and a natural politician. He beat one of Magee’s brothers in his ward. Magee laughed, inquired, and, finding him a man of opposite or complementary disposition and talents, took him into a partnership. A happy, profitable combination, it lasted for life. Magee wanted power, Flinn wealth. Each got both these things; but Magee spent his wealth for more power, and Flinn spent his power for more wealth. 154Magee was the sower, Flinn the reaper. In dealing with men they came to be necessary to each other, these two. Magee attracted followers, Flinn employed them. The men Magee won Flinn compelled to obey, and those he lost Magee won back. When the councils were first under his control Magee stood in the lobby to direct them, always by suggestions and requests, which sometimes a mean and ungrateful fellow would say he could not heed. Magee told him it was all right, which saved the man, but lost the vote. So Flinn took the lobby post, and he said: “Here, you go and vote aye.” If they disobeyed the plain order Flinn punished them, and so harshly that they would run to Magee to complain. He comforted them. “Never mind Flinn,” he would say sympathetically; “he gives me no end of trouble, too. But I’d like to have you do what he asked. Go and do it for me, and let me attend to Flinn. I’ll fix him.”
To control the councils, Magee had to organize the wards, and he was doing this successfully at the primaries when a new and significant figure emerged—William Flinn. Flinn was Irish, a Protestant from a Catholic background, a powerful contractor, and a savvy politician. He defeated one of Magee’s brothers in his ward. Magee laughed, inquired about him, and after realizing they had opposite yet complementary personalities and skills, brought him into a partnership. This turned out to be a happy and profitable combination that lasted their entire lives. Magee sought power, while Flinn pursued wealth. They both achieved what they wanted; however, Magee used his wealth to gain more power, and Flinn used his power to accumulate more wealth. 154Magee was the one who sowed, and Flinn was the one who reaped. In their dealings with people, they became essential to one another. Magee attracted followers, and Flinn employed them. The men Magee brought in Flinn made obey, and those who left Magee he managed to win back. When the councils were first under Magee’s control, he would stand in the lobby to guide them, often with suggestions and requests, which some ungrateful individuals would ignore. Magee would reassure them, saying it was fine, but this sometimes cost him the vote. So Flinn took over the lobby position and told them, “Just go in and vote yes.” If anyone disobeyed his clear orders, Flinn punished them severely enough that they ran to Magee to complain. He would comfort them, saying, “Don’t worry about Flinn; he gives me plenty of trouble too. But I’d really appreciate it if you could do what he asked. Go ahead and do it for me, and I’ll handle Flinn. I’ll take care of him.”
Magee could command, too, and fight and punish. If he had been alone he probably would have hardened with years. And so Flinn, after Magee died, softened with time, but too late. He was useful to Magee, Magee was indispensable to him. Molasses and vinegar, diplomacy and force, mind and will, they were well mated. But Magee was the genius. It was 155Magee that laid the plans they worked out together.
Magee could lead, fight, and impose discipline. If he’d been on his own, he likely would have become tough over the years. After Magee passed away, Flinn softened with time, but it was too late. Flinn was valuable to Magee, and Magee was crucial to him. They were a perfect mix of molasses and vinegar, diplomacy and force, intellect and determination. But Magee was the mastermind. It was 155Magee who mapped out the plans they executed together.
Boss Magee’s idea was not to corrupt the city government, but to be it; not to hire votes in councils, but to own councilmen; and so, having seized control of his organization, he nominated cheap or dependent men for the select and common councils. Relatives and friends were his first recourse, then came bartenders, saloon-keepers, liquor dealers, and others allied to the vices, who were subject to police regulation and dependent in a business way upon the maladministration of law. For the rest he preferred men who had no visible means of support, and to maintain them he used the usual means—patronage. And to make his dependents secure he took over the county government. Pittsburg is in Allegheny County, which has always been more strongly Republican than the city. No matter what happened in the city, the county pay-roll was always Magee’s, and he made the county part of the city government.
Boss Magee’s plan wasn’t to corrupt the city government, but to become it; not to buy votes in the councils, but to control the council members. So, after taking charge of his organization, he nominated cheap or dependent individuals for the select and common councils. His first choice was relatives and friends, followed by bartenders, saloon owners, liquor sellers, and others connected to the vices, who were under police regulation and financially reliant on the poor management of the law. For the rest, he preferred people without visible sources of income, and to support them he used the usual methods—patronage. To ensure his supporters were secure, he took control of the county government. Pittsburgh is in Allegheny County, which has always leaned more Republican than the city. Regardless of what happened in the city, the county payroll was always Magee’s, and he made the county part of the city government.
With all this city and county patronage at his command, Magee went deliberately about undermining the Democratic party. The minority organization is useful to a majority leader; it saves him trouble and worry in ordinary times; in party crises he can use it to whip his own followers 156into line; and when the people of a city rise in revolt it is essential for absolute rule that you have the power not only to prevent the minority leaders from combining with the good citizens, but to unite the two organizations to whip the community into shape. Moreover, the existence of a supposed opposition party splits the independent vote and helps to keep alive that sentiment, “loyalty to party,” which is one of the best holds the boss has on his unruly subjects. All bosses, as we have seen in Minneapolis and St. Louis, rise above partisan bias. Magee, the wisest of them, was also the most generous, and he liked to win over opponents who were useful to him. Whenever he heard of an able Democratic worker in a ward, he sent for his own Republican leader. “So-and-so is a good man, isn’t he?” he would ask. “Going to give you a run, isn’t he? Find out what he wants, and we’ll see what we can do. We must have him.” Thus the able Democrat achieved office for himself or his friend, and the city or the county paid. At one time, I was told, nearly one-quarter of the places on the pay-roll were held by Democrats, who were, of course, grateful to Chris Magee, and enabled him in emergencies to wield their influence against revolting Republicans. Many a time a subservient Democrat got Republican votes 157to beat a “dangerous” Republican, and when Magee, toward the end of his career, wished to go to the State Senate, both parties united in his nomination and elected him unanimously.
With all the city and county support at his disposal, Magee set out to purposely undermine the Democratic party. The minority organization is helpful to a majority leader; it saves him hassle and worries during ordinary times; in crises, he can use it to rally his own followers into line; and when the citizens of a city rise up, it's crucial for complete control that he can not only prevent the minority leaders from teaming up with the good citizens but also unite both organizations to get the community in line. Additionally, having a so-called opposition party divides the independent vote and keeps that sentiment of “loyalty to party” alive, which is one of the best ways the boss maintains his hold over his unruly subjects. All bosses, as we’ve seen in Minneapolis and St. Louis, rise above party lines. Magee, the smartest of them, was also the most generous, and he liked to win over opponents who could be useful. Whenever he learned of a capable Democratic worker in a ward, he called for his Republican leader. “So-and-so is a good man, right?” he’d ask. “Going to give you a challenge, isn’t he? Find out what he wants, and we’ll see what we can do. We need him.” This way, the capable Democrat landed a position for himself or his friend, and the city or county picked up the tab. At one point, I was told, nearly a quarter of the jobs on the payroll were held by Democrats, who were, of course, grateful to Chris Magee and allowed him to use their influence against rebellious Republicans in tough situations. Many times, a compliant Democrat secured Republican votes to defeat a “dangerous” Republican, and when Magee, toward the end of his career, wanted to go to the State Senate, both parties came together to nominate him and elected him unanimously.
Business men came almost as cheap as politicians, and they came also at the city’s expense. Magee had control of public funds and the choice of depositories. That is enough for the average banker—not only for him that is chosen, but for him also that may some day hope to be chosen—and Magee dealt with the best of those in Pittsburg. This service, moreover, not only kept them docile, but gave him and Flinn credit at their banks. Then, too, Flinn and Magee’s operations soon developed on a scale which made their business attractive to the largest financial institutions for the profits on their loans, and thus enabled them to distribute and share in the golden opportunities of big deals. There are ring banks in Pittsburg, ring trust companies, and ring brokers. The manufacturers and the merchants were kept well in hand by many little municipal grants and privileges, such as switches, wharf rights, and street and alley vacations. These street vacations are a tremendous power in most cities. A foundry occupies a block, spreads to the next block, and wants the street between. In St. Louis the business man boodled for his street. In Pittsburg 158he went to Magee, and I have heard such a man praise Chris, “because when I called on him his outer office was filled with waiting politicians, but he knew I was a business man and in a hurry; he called me in first, and he gave me the street without any fuss. I tell you it was a sad day for Pittsburg when Chris Magee died.” This business man, the typical American merchant everywhere, cares no more for his city’s interest than the politician does, and there is more light on American political corruption in such a speech than in the most sensational exposure of details. The business men of Pittsburg paid for their little favors in “contributions to the campaign fund,” plus the loss of their self-respect, the liberty of the citizens generally, and (this may appeal to their mean souls) in higher taxes.
Businessmen came almost as cheap as politicians, and they did so at the city's expense. Magee controlled public funds and decided where they would be held. That's enough for the average banker—not just for the one who gets selected, but also for anyone who hopes to be chosen someday—and Magee worked with the best in Pittsburgh. This arrangement kept them compliant and also gave him and Flinn credit at their banks. Flinn and Magee's business soon expanded to a scale that attracted the largest financial institutions because of the profits from their loans, allowing them to share in the big deals. There are ring banks, ring trust companies, and ring brokers in Pittsburgh. Manufacturers and merchants were kept in check by various small municipal grants and privileges, like switches, wharf rights, and street and alley vacations. These street vacations hold a lot of power in most cities. A factory takes over one block, spreads to the next block, and wants the street in between. In St. Louis, a businessman would bribe for his street. In Pittsburgh, he went to Magee, and I’ve heard one such man praise Chris, saying, “When I met with him, his outer office was filled with waiting politicians, but he knew I was a businessman and in a hurry; he called me in first, and he gave me the street without any fuss. I tell you it was a sad day for Pittsburgh when Chris Magee died.” This businessman, the typical American merchant everywhere, cares no more for his city's interests than the politician does, and there is more insight into American political corruption in that kind of speech than in the most sensational exposé of details. The businessmen of Pittsburgh paid for their little favors in “contributions to the campaign fund,” plus the loss of their self-respect, the freedom of the citizens in general, and (which might resonate with their less admirable traits) in higher taxes.
As for the railroads, they did not have to be bought or driven in; they came, and promptly, too. The Pennsylvania appeared early, just behind Magee, who handled their passes and looked out for their interest in councils and afterwards at the State Legislature. The Pennsylvania passes, especially those to Atlantic City and Harrisburg, have always been a “great graft” in Pittsburg. For the sort of men Magee had to control a pass had a value above the price of a ticket; to “flash” one is to show a badge of power 159and relationship to the ring. The big ringsters, of course, got from the railroads financial help when cornered in business deals—stock tips, shares in speculative and other financial turns, and political support. The Pennsylvania Railroad is a power in Pennsylvania politics, it is part of the State ring, and part also of the Pittsburg ring. The city paid in all sorts of rights and privileges, streets, bridges, etc., and in certain periods the business interests of the city were sacrificed to leave the Pennsylvania Road in exclusive control of a freight traffic it could not handle alone.
As for the railroads, they didn’t need to be purchased or forced in; they arrived on their own, and quickly, too. The Pennsylvania came in early, just behind Magee, who managed their passes and looked out for their interests in meetings and later at the State Legislature. The Pennsylvania passes, especially those for Atlantic City and Harrisburg, have always been a “great scam” in Pittsburgh. For the type of men Magee had to manage, a pass was worth more than the price of a ticket; to “flash” one is to show a badge of power and connection to the inner circle. The major players, of course, received financial assistance from the railroads when they were in tough business situations—stock tips, shares in speculative ventures, and political backing. The Pennsylvania Railroad is a significant force in Pennsylvania politics; it is part of the State network and also part of the Pittsburgh group. The city paid through various rights and privileges, including streets and bridges, and at certain times the business interests of the city were sacrificed to allow the Pennsylvania Railroad exclusive control over freight traffic it couldn't manage alone.
With the city, the county, the Republican and Democratic organizations, the railroads and other corporations, the financiers and the business men, all well under control, Magee needed only the State to make his rule absolute. And he was entitled to it. In a State like New York, where one party controls the Legislature and another the city, the people in the cities may expect some protection from party opposition. In Pennsylvania, where the Republicans have an overwhelming majority, the Legislature at Harrisburg is an essential part of the government of Pennsylvania cities, and that is ruled by a State ring. Magee’s ring was a link in the State ring, and it was no more than right that the State ring should become a link in his ring. The arrangement 160was easily made. One man, Matthew S. Quay, had received from the people all the power in the State, and Magee saw Quay. They came to an understanding without the least trouble. Flinn was to be in the Senate, Magee in the lobby, and they were to give unto Quay political support for his business in the State in return for his surrender to them of the State’s functions of legislation for the city of Pittsburg.
With the city, the county, the Republican and Democratic organizations, the railroads and other corporations, the financiers and businesspeople, all under control, Magee only needed the State to solidify his power. And he deserved it. In a State like New York, where one party controls the Legislature and another controls the city, people in urban areas can expect some protection from party opposition. In Pennsylvania, where the Republicans hold a significant majority, the Legislature in Harrisburg is a crucial part of the governance of Pennsylvania's cities, controlled by a State ring. Magee’s ring was a part of the State ring, and it only made sense for the State ring to become a part of his ring. The arrangement was easy to make. One man, Matthew S. Quay, held all the power in the State, and Magee met with Quay. They reached an agreement without any hassle. Flinn was to be in the Senate, Magee in the lobby, and they were to provide Quay with political support for his business in the State in exchange for him granting them control over the State's legislative functions for the city of Pittsburgh.
Now such understandings are common in our politics, but they are verbal usually and pretty well kept, and this of Magee and Quay was also founded in secret good faith. But Quay, in crises, has a way of straining points to win, and there were no limits to Magee’s ambition for power. Quay and Magee quarreled constantly over the division of powers and spoils, so after a few years of squabbling they reduced their agreement to writing. This precious instrument has never been published. But the agreement was broken in a great row once, and when William Flinn and J. O. Brown undertook to settle the differences and renew the bond, Flinn wrote out in pencil in his own hand an amended duplicate which he submitted to Quay, whose son subsequently gave it out for publication. A facsimile of one page is reproduced in this article. Here is the whole contract, with all the unconscious humor of the “party of the first part” and “said party of the second part,” a political-legal-commercial insult to a people boastful of self-government:
Now, these kinds of understandings are common in our politics, but they usually stay verbal and pretty well concealed, and the one between Magee and Quay was also based on secret goodwill. However, Quay tends to stretch things to win during crises, and there were no limits to Magee’s ambition for power. Quay and Magee constantly argued over the division of powers and rewards, so after a few years of bickering, they wrote down their agreement. This valuable document has never been published. But the agreement was broken during a major dispute once, and when William Flinn and J. O. Brown tried to resolve the problems and renew the agreement, Flinn wrote out an updated copy in pencil by hand and submitted it to Quay, whose son later made it public. A facsimile of one page is included in this article. Here’s the entire contract, with all the unintentional humor of the “party of the first part” and “said party of the second part,” a political-legal-commercial insult to a people proud of self-governance:

FACSIMILE OF THE FAMOUS QUAY-FLINN “MUTUAL POLITICAL AND BUSINESS ADVANTAGE AGREEMENT.”
FACSIMILE OF THE FAMOUS QUAY-FLINN “MUTUAL POLITICAL AND BUSINESS ADVANTAGE AGREEMENT.”
162“Memorandum and agreement between M. S. Quay of the first part and J. O. Brown and William Flinn of the second part, the consideration of this agreement being the mutual political and business advantage which may result therefrom.
162“Memorandum and agreement between M. S. Quay (the first party) and J. O. Brown and William Flinn (the second party), with the purpose of this agreement being the mutual political and business benefits that may come from it.
“First—The said M. S. Quay is to have the benefit of the influence in all matters in state and national politics of the said parties of the second part, the said parties agreeing that they will secure the election of delegates to the state and national convention, who will be guided in all matters by the wishes of the said party of the first part, and who will also secure the election of members of the state senate from the Forty-third, Forty-fourth, and Forty-fifth senatorial districts, and also secure the election of members of the house of representatives south of the Monongahela and Ohio rivers in the county of Allegheny, who will be guided by the wishes and request of the said party of the first part during the continuance of this agreement upon all political matters. The different candidates for the various positions mentioned shall be selected by the parties of the second part, and all the positions of state and national appointments made in this territory mentioned shall be satisfactory to and secure the indorsement of the party of the second part, when the appointment is made either by or through the party of the first part, or his friends or political associates. All legislation affecting the parties of the second part, affecting cities of the second class, shall receive the hearty co-operation and assistance of the party of the first part, and legislation which may affect their business shall likewise receive the hearty co-operation and help of the 163party of the first part. It bring distinctly understood that at the approaching national convention, to be held at St. Louis, the delegates front the Twenty-second congressional district shall neither by voice nor vote do other than what is satisfactory to the party of the first part. The party of the first part agrees to use his influence and secure the support of his friends and political associates to support the Republican county and city ticket, when nominated, both in the city of Pittsburg and Allegheny, and the county of Allegheny, and that he will discountenance the factional fighting by his friends and associates for county offices during the continuation of this agreement. This agreement is not to be binding upon the parties of the second part when a candidate for any office who [sic] shall reside in Allegheny county, and shall only be binding if the party of the first part is a candidate for United States senator to succeed himself so far as this office is concerned. In the Forty-third senatorial district a new senator shall be elected to succeed Senator Upperman. In the Forty-fifth senatorial district the party of the first part shall secure the withdrawal of Dr. A. J. Barchfeld, and the parties of the second part shall withdraw as a candidate Senator Steel, and the parties of the second part shall secure the election of some party satisfactory to themselves. In the Twenty-second congressional district the candidates for congress shall be selected by the party of the second part. The term of this agreement to be for —— years from the signing thereof, and shall be binding upon all parties when signed by C. L. Magee.”
“First—M. S. Quay will benefit from the influence of the second parties in all matters of state and national politics. The second parties agree to ensure the election of delegates to the state and national convention who will follow the preferences of the first party and will also work to elect members of the state senate from the Forty-third, Forty-fourth, and Forty-fifth senatorial districts. Additionally, they will help elect members of the house of representatives south of the Monongahela and Ohio rivers in Allegheny County, who will adhere to the wishes and requests of the first party throughout the duration of this agreement on all political matters. The second parties will choose candidates for the positions mentioned, and all state and national appointments in the specified territory must be acceptable to and endorsed by the second party when made by or through the first party or his friends or political associates. The first party will fully cooperate with and assist in any legislation affecting the second parties or second-class cities, as well as any legislation impacting their business. It should be clearly understood that at the upcoming national convention in St. Louis, the delegates from the Twenty-second congressional district will act solely in a way that is agreeable to the first party. The first party agrees to use his influence to secure support from his friends and political associates for the Republican county and city ticket when nominated in the city of Pittsburgh, in Allegheny, and that he will discourage factional disputes among his friends and associates for county offices during this agreement. This agreement is not binding on the second parties when a candidate resides in Allegheny County and will only be binding if the first party is a candidate for United States senator to succeed himself regarding that office. In the Forty-third senatorial district, a new senator will be elected to replace Senator Upperman. In the Forty-fifth senatorial district, the first party will ensure Dr. A. J. Barchfeld withdraws, and the second parties will also withdraw their support for Senator Steel, ensuring the election of a candidate acceptable to them. In the Twenty-second congressional district, the second party will select the candidates for congress. The term of this agreement will last for —— years from the signing and will be binding on all parties when signed by C. L. Magee.”
Thus was the city of Pittsburg turned over by the State to an individual to do with as he pleased. Magee’s ring was complete. He was the city, Flinn was the councils, the county was theirs, and now they had the State Legislature so far as 164Pittsburg was concerned. Magee and Flinn were the government and the law. How could they commit a crime? If they wanted something from the city they passed an ordinance granting it, and if some other ordinance was in conflict it was repealed or amended. If the laws in the State stood in the way, so much the worse for the laws of the State; they were amended. If the constitution of the State proved a barrier, as it did to all special legislation, the Legislature enacted a law for cities of the second class (which was Pittsburg alone) and the courts upheld the Legislature. If there were opposition on the side of public opinion, there was a use for that also.
So, the city of Pittsburgh was handed over by the State to an individual who could do whatever he wanted with it. Magee’s control was total. He was the city; Flinn represented the councils; the county belonged to them; and now they had the State Legislature in their pocket as far as Pittsburgh was concerned. Magee and Flinn were the government and the law. How could they break the law? If they wanted something from the city, they simply passed an ordinance granting it, and if another ordinance conflicted, it was either repealed or changed. If state laws got in their way, tough luck for those laws; they were altered. If the state constitution posed a problem, as it did for all special legislation, the Legislature created a law specifically for cities of the second class (which meant just Pittsburgh), and the courts backed the Legislature. If public opinion opposed them, they found a way to use that too.
The new charter which David D. Bruce fought through councils in 1886–87 was an example of the way Magee and, after him, Quay and other Pennsylvania bosses employed popular movements. As his machine grew Magee found council committees unwieldy in some respects, and he wanted a change. He took up Bruce’s charter, which centered all executive and administrative power and responsibility in the mayor and heads of departments, passed it through the Legislature, but so amended that the heads of departments were not to be appointed by the mayor, but elected by councils. These elections were by expiring councils, so that the department chiefs 165held over, and with their patronage insured the re-election of the councilmen who elected them. The Magee-Flinn machine, perfect before, was made self-perpetuating. I know of nothing like it in any other city. Tammany in comparison is a plaything, and in the management of a city Croker was a child beside Chris Magee.
The new charter that David D. Bruce pushed through councils in 1886–87 was an example of how Magee and, later, Quay and other Pennsylvania leaders used popular movements. As his political machine expanded, Magee found the council committees cumbersome in some ways, and he wanted to change that. He adopted Bruce’s charter, which concentrated all executive and administrative power and accountability in the mayor and department heads, got it passed through the Legislature, but amended it so that the department heads were not appointed by the mayor but elected by the councils. These elections were held by retiring councils, allowing the department chiefs to keep their positions and ensuring the re-election of the councilmen who chose them. The Magee-Flinn machine, already solid, became self-sustaining. I can't think of anything like it in any other city. Tammany, in comparison, seems trivial, and Croker was inexperienced compared to Chris Magee in running a city.
The graft of Pittsburg falls conveniently into four classes: franchises, public contracts, vice, and public funds. There was, besides these, a lot of miscellaneous loot—public supplies, public lighting, and the water supply. You hear of second-class fire-engines taken at first-class prices, water rents from the public works kept up because a private concern that supplied the South Side could charge no more than the city, a gas contract to supply the city lightly availed of. But I cannot go into these. Neither can I stop for the details of the system by which public funds were left at no interest with favored depositories from which the city borrowed at a high rate, or the removal of funds to a bank in which the ringsters were shareholders. All these things were managed well within the law, and that was the great principle underlying the Pittsburg plan.
The corruption in Pittsburgh conveniently breaks down into four categories: franchises, public contracts, vice, and public funds. On top of that, there was plenty of other loot—public supplies, street lighting, and the water supply. You hear about second-rate fire engines sold at top-dollar prices, water fees from public works maintained because a private company serving the South Side couldn't charge more than the city, and a gas contract to supply the city that was barely utilized. But I can't get into those details. I also can’t elaborate on the system where public funds were left interest-free with preferred banks that the city borrowed from at high rates, or the transfer of funds to a bank where the insiders were shareholders. All of this was done within legal boundaries, and that was the key principle behind the Pittsburgh scheme.
The vice graft, for example, was not blackmail as it is in New York and most other cities. It is a legitimate business, conducted, not by the police, 166but in an orderly fashion by syndicates, and the chairman of one of the parties at the last election said it was worth $250,000 a year. I saw a man who was laughed at for offering $17,500 for the slot-machine concession; he was told that it was let for much more. “Speak-easies” (unlicensed drinking places) pay so well that when they earn $500 or more in twenty-four hours their proprietors often make a bare living. Disorderly houses are managed by ward syndicates. Permission is had from the syndicate real estate agent, who alone can rent them. The syndicate hires a house from the owners at, say, $35 a month, and he lets it to a woman at from $35 to $50 a week. For furniture the tenant must go to the “official furniture man,” who delivers $1000 worth of “fixings” for a note for $3000, on which high interest must be paid. For beer the tenant must go to the “official bottler,” and pay $2 for a one-dollar case of beer; for wines and liquors to the “official liquor commissioner,” who charges $10 for five dollars’ worth; for clothes to the “official wrapper maker.” These women may not buy shoes, hats, jewelry, or any other luxury or necessity except from the official concessionaries, and then only at the official, monopoly prices. If the victims have anything left, a police or some other city official is said to call and get it (there 167are rich ex-police officials in Pittsburg). But this is blackmail and outside the system, which is well understood in the community. Many men, in various walks of life, told me separately the names of the official bottlers, jewelers, and furnishers; they are notorious, but they are safe. They do nothing illegal. Oppressive, wretched, what you please, the Pittsburg system is safe.
The vice trade, for example, wasn't blackmail like it is in New York and most other cities. It’s a legit business, run not by the police, but in an orderly way by syndicates. The chairman of one of the parties at the last election said it was worth $250,000 a year. I saw a guy who was mocked for offering $17,500 for the slot-machine concession; he was told it was leased for much more. Speak-easies (unlicensed bars) make so much money that when they pull in $500 or more in twenty-four hours, their owners often just scrape by. Disorderly houses are run by ward syndicates. They get permission from the syndicate real estate agent, who is the only one who can rent them out. The syndicate rents a house from the owners for about $35 a month, and then rents it to a woman for $35 to $50 a week. For furniture, the tenant has to go to the “official furniture man,” who delivers $1,000 worth of “fixings” for a note of $3,000, which requires paying high interest. For beer, the tenant must go to the “official bottler,” and pay $2 for a one-dollar case of beer; for wines and liquors to the “official liquor commissioner,” who charges $10 for what’s worth five dollars; for clothes to the “official wrapper maker.” These women can’t buy shoes, hats, jewelry, or any other luxury or necessity except from the official suppliers, and then only at the monopoly prices set by them. If the victims have anything left, a police officer or some other city official is said to show up and take it (there are wealthy former police officials in Pittsburgh). But that’s blackmail and outside the system, which is well known in the community. Many men from different walks of life told me separately the names of the official bottlers, jewelers, and suppliers; they are infamous, but they are untouchable. They don’t do anything illegal. Oppressive, miserable, whatever you want to call it, the Pittsburgh system is secure.
That was the keynote of the Flinn-Magee plan, but this vice graft was not their business. They are credited with the suppression of disorder and decent superficial regulations of vice, which is a characteristic of Pittsburg. I know it is said that under the Philadelphia and Pittsburg plans, which are much alike, “all graft and all patronage go across one table,” but if any “dirty money” reached the Pittsburg bosses it was, so far as I could prove, in the form of contributions to the party fund, and came from the vice dealers only as it did from other business men.
That was the main point of the Flinn-Magee plan, but dealing with vice was not their focus. They are recognized for reducing disorder and implementing decent superficial regulations of vice, which is typical of Pittsburgh. I know people say that under the Philadelphia and Pittsburgh plans, which are quite similar, “all graft and all patronage go across one table,” but if any “dirty money” got to the Pittsburgh bosses, it was, as far as I can prove, in the form of contributions to the party fund, and it came from the vice dealers just like it did from other business people.
Magee and Flinn, owners of Pittsburg, made Pittsburg their business, and, monopolists in the technical economic sense of the word, they prepared to exploit it as if it were their private property. For convenience they divided it between them. Magee took the financial and corporate branch, turning the streets to his uses, delivering to himself franchises, and building and 168running railways. Flinn went in for public contracts for his firm, Booth & Flinn, Limited, and his branch boomed. Old streets were repaved, new ones laid out; whole districts were improved, parks made, and buildings erected. The improvement of their city went on at a great rate for years, with only one period of cessation, and the period of economy was when Magee was building so many traction lines that Booth & Flinn, Ltd., had all they could do with this work. It was said that no other contractors had an adequate “plant” to supplement properly the work of Booth & Flinn, Ltd. Perhaps that was why this firm had to do such a large proportion of the public work always. Flinn’s Director of Public Works was E. M. Bigelow, a cousin of Chris Magee and another nephew of old Squire Steele. Bigelow, called the Extravagant, drew the specifications; he made the awards to the lowest responsible bidders, and he inspected and approved the work while in progress and when done.
Magee and Flinn, the owners of Pittsburg, turned it into their business and, in the economic sense of monopolists, treated it like their personal property. For convenience, they split the responsibilities. Magee handled the financial and corporate side, using the streets for his purposes, granting himself franchises, and building and operating railways. Flinn focused on public contracts through his firm, Booth & Flinn, Limited, and his sector thrived. Old streets were repaved, new ones created; entire neighborhoods were improved, parks developed, and buildings constructed. The city's progress continued rapidly for years, with only one pause during which Magee was busy building many traction lines, leaving Booth & Flinn, Ltd. with all the work they could handle. It was said that no other contractors had the necessary resources to adequately support Booth & Flinn, Ltd.'s work. That might explain why this firm consistently handled such a large share of public projects. Flinn’s Director of Public Works was E. M. Bigelow, a cousin of Chris Magee and another nephew of the old Squire Steele. Bigelow, known as the Extravagant, wrote the specifications, awarded contracts to the lowest responsible bidders, and oversaw and approved the work both during construction and upon completion.
Flinn had a quarry, the stone of which was specified for public buildings; he obtained the monopoly of a certain kind of asphalt, and that kind was specified. Nor was this all. If the official contractor had done his work well and at reasonable prices the city would not have suffered 169directly; but his methods were so oppressive upon property holders that they caused a scandal. No action was taken, however, till Oliver McClintock, a merchant, in rare civic wrath, contested the contracts and fought them through the courts. This single citizen’s long, brave fight is one of the finest stories in the history of municipal government. The frowns and warnings of cowardly fellow-citizens did not move him, nor the boycott of other business men, the threats of the ring, and the ridicule of ring organs. George W. Guthrie joined him later, and though they fought on undaunted, they were beaten again and again. The Director of Public Works controlled the initiative in court proceedings; he chose the judge who appointed the Viewers, with the result, Mr. McClintock reported, that the Department prepared the Viewers’ reports. Knowing no defeat, Mr. McClintock photographed Flinn’s pavements at places where they were torn up to show that “large stones, as they were excavated from sewer trenches, brick bats, and the débris of old coal-tar sidewalks were promiscuously dumped in to make foundations, with the result of an uneven settling of the foundation, and the sunken and worn places so conspicuous everywhere in the pavements of the East End.” One outside asphalt company tried to break the 170monopoly, but was easily beaten in 1889, withdrew, and after that one of its officers said, “We all gave Pittsburg a wide berth, recognizing the uselessness of offering competition so long as the door of the Department of Public Works is locked against us, and Booth & Flinn are permitted to carry the key.” The monopoly caused not only high prices on short guarantee, but carried with it all the contingent work. Curbing and grading might have been let separately, but they were not. In one contract Mr. McClintock cites, Booth & Flinn bid 50 cents for 44,000 yards of grading. E. H. Bochman offered a bid of 15 cents for the grading as a separate contract, and his bid was rejected. A property-owner on Shady Lane, who was assessed for curbing at 80 cents a foot, contracted privately at the same time for 800 feet of the same standard curbing, from the same quarry, and set in place in the same manner, at 40 cents a foot!
Flinn had a quarry that provided stone for public buildings; he secured the exclusive rights to a specific type of asphalt, which was also designated for use. That wasn’t all. If the official contractor had done a decent job at reasonable prices, the city wouldn’t have faced direct problems; however, his approach was so harsh on property owners that it sparked a scandal. No action was taken until Oliver McClintock, a merchant, in a rare display of civic anger, contested the contracts and took the fight to the courts. This one citizen's lengthy and courageous battle is one of the most remarkable stories in the history of local government. The disapproval and warnings from cowardly neighbors did not sway him, nor did the boycott from other businesspeople, threats from the powerful group, or mockery from their supporters. George W. Guthrie joined him later, and even though they faced setbacks repeatedly, they remained undeterred. The Director of Public Works controlled the legal proceedings; he selected the judge who appointed the Viewers, which led to the Department allegedly preparing the Viewers’ reports, according to Mr. McClintock. Undeterred by defeat, Mr. McClintock took pictures of Flinn’s pavements in places where they were torn up to demonstrate that “large stones, as they were dug up from sewer trenches, broken bricks, and debris from old coal-tar sidewalks were carelessly dumped in to create foundations, resulting in uneven settling and the noticeable sunken and worn areas in the pavements of the East End.” An outside asphalt company attempted to challenge the monopoly but was easily defeated in 1889 and withdrew. After that, one of its officers said, “We all gave Pittsburgh a wide berth, recognizing the futility of competing as long as the door to the Department of Public Works is closed to us, and Booth & Flinn are allowed to hold the key.” The monopoly not only led to high prices with short guarantees but also included all the extra work. Curbing and grading could have been contracted separately, but they weren’t. In one contract Mr. McClintock mentions, Booth & Flinn bid 50 cents for 44,000 yards of grading. E. H. Bochman submitted a bid of 15 cents for grading as a separate contract, but his bid was rejected. A property owner on Shady Lane, assessed for curbing at 80 cents a foot, privately contracted at the same time for 800 feet of the same curbing standard from the same quarry, installed in the same way, for 40 cents a foot!
“During the nine years succeeding the adoption of the charter of 1887,” says Mr. Oliver McClintock in a report to the National Municipal League, “one firm [Flinn’s] received practically all the asphalt-paving contracts at prices ranging from $1 to $1.80 per square yard higher than the average price paid in neighboring cities. Out of the entire amount of asphalt pavements 171laid during these nine years, represented by 193 contracts, and costing $3,551,131, only nine street blocks paved in 1896, and costing $33,400, were not laid by this firm.”
“During the nine years following the adoption of the charter in 1887,” Mr. Oliver McClintock states in a report to the National Municipal League, “one company [Flinn’s] received almost all the asphalt-paving contracts at prices that were between $1 and $1.80 per square yard higher than the average price in neighboring cities. Out of the total amount of asphalt pavements 171laid during these nine years, represented by 193 contracts and costing $3,551,131, only nine street blocks paved in 1896, costing $33,400, were not done by this firm.”
The building of bridges in this city of bridges, the repairing of pavements, park-making, and real estate deals in anticipation of city improvements were all causes of scandal to some citizens, sources of profit to others who were “let in on the ground floor.” There is no space for these here. Another exposure came in 1897 over the contracts for a new Public Safety Building. J. O. Brown was Director of Public Safety. A newspaper, the Leader, called attention to a deal for this work, and George W. Guthrie and William B. Rogers, leading members of the Pittsburg bar, who followed up the subject, discovered as queer a set of specifications for the building itself as any city has on record. Favored contractors were named or their wares described all through, and a letter to the architect from J. O. Brown contained specifications for such favoritism, as, for example: “Specify the Westinghouse electric-light plant and engines straight.” “Describe the Van Horn Iron Co.’s cells as close as possible.” The stone clause was Flinn’s, and that is the one that raised the rumpus. Flinn’s quarry produced Ligonier block, and Ligonier block was specified. There was a letter 172from Booth & Flinn, Ltd., telling the architect that the price was to be specified at $31,500. A local contractor offered to provide Tennessee granite set up, a more expensive material, on which the freight is higher, at $19,880; but that did not matter. When another local contracting firm, however, offered to furnish Ligonier block set up at $18,000, a change was necessary, and J. O. Brown directed the architect to “specify that the Ligonier block shall be of a bluish tint rather than a gray variety.” Flinn’s quarry had the bluish tint, the other people’s “the gray variety.” It was shown also that Flinn wrote to the architect on June 24, 1895, saying: “I have seen Director Brown and Comptroller Gourley to-day, and they have agreed to let us start on the working plans and get some stone out for the new building. Please arrange that we may get the tracings by Wednesday....” The tracings were furnished him, and thus before the advertisements for bids were out he began preparing the bluish tint stone. The charges were heard by a packed committee of councils, and nothing came of them; and, besides, they were directed against the Director of Public Works, not William Flinn.
The construction of bridges in this city known for its bridges, the repair of sidewalks, the creation of parks, and real estate transactions in anticipation of city improvements caused scandals for some citizens and profits for others who were “in on the ground floor.” There isn't space for those details here. Another scandal broke out in 1897 regarding the contracts for a new Public Safety Building. J. O. Brown was the Director of Public Safety. A newspaper, the Leader, highlighted a deal related to this project, and George W. Guthrie and William B. Rogers, prominent members of the Pittsburgh bar, looked into it and found a rather strange set of specifications for the building itself, unlike any other city has on record. Specific contractors were mentioned or their products described throughout, and a letter to the architect from J. O. Brown included specifications that showed favoritism, such as: “Specify the Westinghouse electric-light plant and engines straight.” “Describe the Van Horn Iron Co.’s cells as closely as possible.” The stone clause was Flinn’s, and it was the one that caused a commotion. Flinn’s quarry produced Ligonier block, and Ligonier block was specified. There was a letter from Booth & Flinn, Ltd., informing the architect that the price was to be set at $31,500. A local contractor offered to supply Tennessee granite installed, which was a more expensive material with higher freight costs, for $19,880; but that didn't matter. However, when another local contracting company proposed to provide Ligonier block installed for $18,000, a change was needed, and J. O. Brown instructed the architect to “specify that the Ligonier block shall be of a bluish tint rather than a gray variety.” Flinn’s quarry had the bluish tint, while the others had “the gray variety.” It was also revealed that Flinn wrote to the architect on June 24, 1895, saying: “I met with Director Brown and Comptroller Gourley today, and they agreed to let us start on the working plans and get some stone out for the new building. Please arrange for us to get the tracings by Wednesday....” The tracings were provided to him, and thus before the advertisements for bids were published, he started preparing the bluish tint stone. The charges were heard by a packed committee of councils, and nothing came of it; moreover, they were directed against the Director of Public Works, not William Flinn.
The boss was not an official, and not responsible. The only time Flinn was in danger was on a suit that grew out of the conviction of the City Attorney, 173W. C. Moreland, and L. H. House, his assistant, for the embezzlement of public funds. These officials were found to be short about $300,000. One of them pleaded guilty, and both went to prison without telling where the money went, and that information did not develop till later. J. B. Connelly, of the Leader, discovered in the City Attorney’s office stubs of checks indicating that some $118,000 of it had gone to Flinn or to Booth & Flinn, Ltd. When Flinn was first asked about it by a reporter he said that the items were correct, that he got them, but that he had explained it all to the Comptroller and had satisfied him. This answer indicated a belief that the money belonged to the city. When he was sued by the city he said that he did not know it was city money. He thought it was personal loans from House. Now House was not a well-to-do man, and his city salary was but $2,500 a year. Moreover, the checks, two of which are reproduced here, are signed by the City Attorney, W. C. Moreland, and are for amounts ranging from five to fifteen thousand dollars. But where was the money? Flinn testified that he had paid it back to House. Then where were the receipts? Flinn said they had been burned in a fire that had occurred in Booth & Flinn’s office. The judge found for Flinn, holding that it had not been proven that Flinn knew the checks 174were for public money, nor that he had not repaid the amount.
The boss wasn't an official and didn't have any responsibility. Flinn was only in danger because of a lawsuit that arose from the conviction of the City Attorney, W. C. Moreland, and his assistant, L. H. House, for embezzling public funds. These officials were found to be about $300,000 short. One of them pleaded guilty, and both went to prison without revealing where the money had gone, which didn't come to light until later. J. B. Connelly from the Leader found stubs of checks in the City Attorney's office showing that around $118,000 of it had gone to Flinn or Booth & Flinn, Ltd. When a reporter first asked Flinn about it, he confirmed the items were accurate, that he received them, but claimed he had explained everything to the Comptroller and satisfied him. This response suggested he believed the money belonged to the city. When the city sued him, he said he didn't know it was city money. He thought it was personal loans from House. However, House wasn't wealthy, and his city salary was only $2,500 a year. Additionally, the checks, two of which are included here, were signed by City Attorney W. C. Moreland and were for amounts between five and fifteen thousand dollars. But where was the money? Flinn testified that he had paid it back to House. So where were the receipts? Flinn claimed they were burned in a fire that occurred in the Booth & Flinn office. The judge ruled in favor of Flinn, stating it hadn't been proven that he knew the checks were for public money or that he hadn't repaid the amount.

FACSIMILES OF CHECKS SHOWING THAT PUBLIC MONEY, EMBEZZLED BY PUBLIC OFFICIALS, WENT TO BOSS FLINN, WHO EXPLAINED THAT HE DID NOT KNOW THE CHECKS WERE FOR CITY MONEY.
FACSIMILES OF CHECKS SHOWING THAT PUBLIC FUNDS, STOLEN BY PUBLIC OFFICIALS, WENT TO BOSS FLINN, WHO CLAIMED THAT HE DID NOT REALIZE THE CHECKS WERE FROM CITY MONEY.
176As I have said before, however, unlawful acts were exceptional and unnecessary in Pittsburg. Magee did not steal franchises and sell them. His councils gave them to him. He and the busy Flinn took them, built railways, which Magee sold and bought and financed and conducted, like any other man whose successful career is held up as an example for young men. His railways, combined into the Consolidated Traction Company, were capitalized at $30,000,000. The public debt of Pittsburg is about $18,000,000, and the profit on the railway building of Chris Magee would have wiped out the debt. “But you must remember,” they say in the Pittsburg banks, “that Magee took risks, and his profits are the just reward of enterprise.” This is business. But politically speaking it was an abuse of the powers of a popular ruler for Boss Magee to give to Promoter Magee all the streets he wanted in Pittsburg at his own terms: forever, and nothing to pay. There was scandal in Chicago over the granting of charters for twenty-eight and fifty years. Magee’s read: “for 950 years,” “for 999 years,” “said Charter is to exist a thousand years,” “said Charter is to exist perpetually,” and the councils gave franchises for the “life of the Charter.” There is a legend that Fred Magee, a waggish brother of Chris, put these phrases into these grants for fun, and no doubt the genial Chris saw the fun of it. I asked if the same joker put in the car tax, which is the only compensation the city gets for the use forever of its streets; but it was explained that that was an oversight. The car tax was put upon the old horse-cars, and came down upon the trolley because, having been left unpaid, it was forgotten. This car tax on $30,000,000 of property amounts to less than $15,000 a year, and the companies have until lately been slow about paying it. During the twelve years succeeding 1885 all the traction companies together paid the city $60,000. While the horse vehicles in 1897 paid $47,000, and bicycles $7,000, the Consolidated Traction Company[5] (C. L. Magee, President) paid $9,600. The speed of bicycles and horse vehicles is limited by law, that of the trolley is unregulated. The only requirement of the law upon them is that the traction company shall keep in repair the pavement 177between and a foot outside of the tracks. This they don’t do, and they make the city furnish twenty policemen as guards for crossings of their lines at a cost of $20,000 a year in wages.
176As I mentioned earlier, unlawful acts were rare and unnecessary in Pittsburgh. Magee didn’t steal franchises; his councils handed them to him. He and the busy Flinn accepted these franchises, built railways that Magee sold, financed, and managed, just like any other person whose successful career is showcased as a role model for young men. His railways, merged into the Consolidated Traction Company, were valued at $30,000,000. Pittsburgh's public debt is around $18,000,000, and the profits from Chris Magee's railway construction could have eliminated that debt. “But you have to keep in mind,” they say in the Pittsburgh banks, “that Magee took risks, and his profits are the rightful reward for his initiative.” This is business. Politically, though, it was an abuse of power for Boss Magee to grant Promoter Magee all the streets he wanted in Pittsburgh on his terms: indefinitely, with nothing to pay. There was a scandal in Chicago about granting charters for twenty-eight or fifty years. Magee’s charters read: “for 950 years,” “for 999 years,” “this charter is to exist for a thousand years,” “this charter is to exist perpetually,” and the councils offered franchises for the “life of the charter.” There’s a legend that Fred Magee, Chris’s humorous brother, included those phrases in the grants for fun, and surely Chris found it amusing too. I asked if the same jokester included the car tax, which is the only payment the city receives for permanently using its streets; it was explained that this was just an oversight. The car tax was originally imposed on the old horse-cars and was applied to the trolley because it was forgotten. This car tax on $30,000,000 worth of property amounts to less than $15,000 a year, and the companies were slow to pay it until recently. In the twelve years after 1885, all the traction companies together paid the city $60,000. While horse vehicles in 1897 paid $47,000, and bicycles $7,000, the Consolidated Traction Company[5] (C. L. Magee, President) paid $9,600. The speed of bicycles and horse vehicles is capped by law, while trolley speed is unregulated. The only legal requirement for them is that the traction company must maintain the pavement between and a foot outside their tracks. They don’t do this, and they make the city provide twenty policemen as guards at their crossings, costing $20,000 a year in wages.
5. All the street railways terminating in the city of Pittsburg were in 1901 consolidated into the Pittsburg Railways Company, operating 404 miles of track, under an approximate capitalization of $84,000,000. In their statement, issued July 1, 1902, they report gross earnings for 1901 as $7,081,452.82. Out of this they paid a car tax for 1902 to the city of Pittsburg of $20,099.94. At the ordinary rate of 5 per cent. on gross earnings the tax would have been $354,072.60.
__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.In 1901, all the streetcar lines in Pittsburg were merged into the Pittsburg Railways Company, which operated 404 miles of track and had a capitalization of around $84 million. In their report released on July 1, 1902, they stated that their gross earnings for 1901 were $7,081,452.82. From this amount, they paid a car tax to the city of Pittsburg of $20,099.94 for 1902. If they had paid the usual tax rate of 5 percent on gross earnings, the tax would have totaled $354,072.60.
Not content with the gift of the streets, the ring made the city work for the railways. The building of bridges is one function of the municipality as a servant of the traction company. Pittsburg is a city of many bridges, and many of them were built for ordinary traffic. When the Magee railways went over them some of them had to be rebuilt. The company asked the city to do it, and despite the protests of citizens and newspapers, the city rebuilt iron bridges in good condition and of recent construction to accommodate the tracks. Once some citizens applied for a franchise to build a connecting line along what is now part of the Bloomfield route, and by way of compensation offered to build a bridge across the Pennsylvania tracks for free city use, they only to have the right to run their cars on it. They did not get their franchise. Not long after Chris Magee (and Flinn) got it, and they got it for nothing; and the city built this bridge, rebuilt three other bridges over the Pennsylvania tracks, and one over the Junction Railroad—five bridges in all, at a cost of $160,000!
Not satisfied with just using the streets, the ring made the city support the railways. Building bridges is one of the roles of the municipality as a helper to the traction company. Pittsburgh is a city with many bridges, and many of them were built for regular traffic. When the Magee railways started using them, some had to be rebuilt. The company asked the city to handle it, and despite protests from citizens and newspapers, the city rebuilt iron bridges that were in good condition and relatively new to accommodate the tracks. At one point, some citizens applied for a franchise to create a connecting line along what is now part of the Bloomfield route and offered to build a bridge across the Pennsylvania tracks for free city use, provided they could run their cars on it. They didn't get their franchise. Shortly after, Chris Magee (and Flinn) obtained it for free, and the city built this bridge, rebuilt three other bridges over the Pennsylvania tracks, and one over the Junction Railroad—five bridges in total, costing $160,000!
Canny Scots as they were, the Pittsburgers submitted 178to all this for a quarter of a century, and some $34,000 has been subscribed toward the monument to Chris Magee. This sounds like any other well-broken American city; but to the credit of Pittsburg be it said that there never was a time when some few individuals were not fighting the ring. David D. Bruce was standing for good government way back in the ‘fifties. Oliver McClintock and George W. Guthrie we have had glimpses of, struggling, like John Hampden, against their tyrants; but always for mere justice and in the courts, and all in vain, till in 1895 their exposures began to bring forth signs of public feeling, and they ventured to appeal to the voters, the sources of the bosses’ power. They enlisted the venerable Mr. Bruce and a few other brave men, and together called a mass-meeting. A crowd gathered. There were not many prominent men there, but evidently the people were with them, and they then and there formed the Municipal League, and launched it upon a campaign to beat the ring at the February election, 1896.
Canny Scots that they were, the people of Pittsburgh put up with all of this for 25 years, and about $34,000 was raised toward the monument for Chris Magee. This sounds like any other well-established American city, but to Pittsburgh's credit, there was never a time when a few individuals weren't fighting against the corrupt system. David D. Bruce was advocating for good government way back in the 1850s. We caught glimpses of Oliver McClintock and George W. Guthrie, struggling like John Hampden against their oppressors; but always for basic justice and in the courts, and all in vain, until 1895 when their efforts began to stir public sentiment, and they bravely decided to appeal to the voters, the source of the bosses’ power. They rallied the respected Mr. Bruce and a few other courageous men, and together they called a mass meeting. A crowd showed up. There weren’t many notable figures present, but it was clear the people were with them, and they formed the Municipal League right there, launching a campaign to defeat the corrupt system in the February election of 1896.
A committee of five was put in charge—Bruce, McClintock, George K. Stevenson, Dr. Pollock, and Otto Heeren—who combined with Mr. Guthrie’s sterling remnant of the Democratic party on an independent ticket, with Mr. Guthrie at the head for mayor. It was a daring thing to do, and 179they discovered then what we have discovered in St. Louis and Minneapolis. Mr. Bruce told me that, after their mass-meeting, men who should have come out openly for the movement approached him by stealth and whispered that he could count on them for money if he would keep secret their names. “Outside of those at the meeting,” he said, “but one man of all those that subscribed would let his name appear. And men who gave me information to use against the ring spoke themselves for the ring on the platform.” Mr. McClintock in a paper read before a committee of the National Municipal League says: “By far the most disheartening discovery, however, was that of the apathetic indifference of many representative citizens—men who from every other point of view are deservedly looked upon as model members of society. We found that prominent merchants and contractors who were ‘on the inside,’ manufacturers enjoying special municipal privileges, wealthy capitalists, brokers, and others who were holders of the securities of traction and other corporations, had their mouths stopped, their convictions of duty strangled, and their influence before and votes on election day preempted against us. In still another direction we found that the financial and political support of the great steam railroads and largest manufacturing 180corporations, controlling as far as they were able the suffrages of their thousands of employees, were thrown against us, for the simple reason, as was frankly explained by one of them, that it was much easier to deal with a boss in promoting their corporate interests than to deal directly with the people’s representatives in the municipal legislature. We even found the directors of many banks in an attitude of cold neutrality, if not of active hostility, toward any movement for municipal reform. As one of them put it, ‘if you want to be anybody, or make money in Pittsburg, it is necessary to be in the political swim and on the side of the city ring.’”
A committee of five was formed—Bruce, McClintock, George K. Stevenson, Dr. Pollock, and Otto Heeren—who teamed up with Mr. Guthrie’s loyal group from the Democratic party on an independent ticket, with Mr. Guthrie running for mayor. It was a bold move, and 179 they realized then what we've seen happen in St. Louis and Minneapolis. Mr. Bruce told me that after their mass meeting, men who should have openly supported the movement approached him quietly and whispered that he could count on their financial backing if he kept their names confidential. “Aside from those at the meeting,” he said, “only one person of all those who contributed would let his name be known. And men who provided me with information to use against the ring spoke for the ring from the stage.” Mr. McClintock, in a paper presented to a committee of the National Municipal League, states: “The most discouraging realization, however, was the apathetic indifference of many respected citizens—individuals who are otherwise viewed as exemplary members of society. We discovered that prominent merchants and contractors who were ‘in the know,’ manufacturers with special municipal privileges, wealthy investors, brokers, and others holding securities of transit and other companies were silenced, their sense of duty stifled, and their influence before and votes on election day swayed against us. Additionally, we found that the financial and political backing of the major railroads and largest manufacturing 180 corporations, which controlled the votes of their thousands of employees as much as they could, were against us, simply because, as one of them candidly explained, it was much easier to deal with a boss in advancing their corporate interests than to engage directly with the people’s representatives in the city government. We even found the directors of several banks adopting a stance of cold neutrality, if not outright hostility, towards any movement for municipal reform. As one of them put it, ‘if you want to be somebody or make money in Pittsburgh, it is essential to be in the political mix and on the side of the city ring.’”
This is corruption, but it is called “good business,” and it is worse than politics.
This is corruption, but it's referred to as “good business,” and it's even worse than politics.
It was a quarrel among the grafters of Minneapolis that gave the grand jury a chance there. It was a low row among the grafters of St. Louis that gave Joseph W. Folk his opening. And so in Pittsburg it was in a fight between Quay and Magee that the Municipal League saw its opportunity.
It was a conflict among the corrupt officials of Minneapolis that gave the grand jury an opportunity there. It was a petty dispute among the corrupt officials of St. Louis that gave Joseph W. Folk his break. Likewise, in Pittsburgh, it was a clash between Quay and Magee that the Municipal League recognized as its chance.
To Quay it was the other way around. The rising of the people of Pittsburg was an opportunity for him. He and Magee had never got along well together, and they were falling out and having their differences adjusted by Flinn and 181others every few years. The “mutual business advantage” agreement was to have closed one of these rows. The fight of 1895–96 was an especially bitter one, and it did not close with the “harmony” that was patched up. Magee and Flinn and Boss Martin of Philadelphia set out to kill Quay politically, and he, driven thus into one of those “fights for his life” which make his career so interesting, hearing the grumbling in Philadelphia and seeing the revolt of the citizens of Pittsburg, stepped boldly forth upon a platform for reform, especially to stop the “use of money for the corruption of our cities.” From Quay this was comical, but the Pittsburgers were too serious to laugh. They were fighting for their life, too, so to speak, and the sight of a boss on their side must have encouraged those business men who “found it easier to deal with a boss than with the people’s representatives.” However that may be, a majority of the ballots cast in the municipal election of Pittsburg in February, 1896, were against the ring.
To Quay, it was the opposite. The uprising of the people of Pittsburgh was an opportunity for him. He and Magee had never really gotten along, and they would frequently have conflicts that Flinn and others would mediate every few years. The “mutual business advantage” agreement was supposed to resolve one of these disputes. The conflict of 1895–96 was particularly intense, and it didn’t end with the “harmony” that was patched up. Magee, Flinn, and Boss Martin from Philadelphia aimed to eliminate Quay politically, and he, pushed into one of those "fights for his life" that make his career so fascinating, noticed the dissatisfaction in Philadelphia and the rebellion of the citizens of Pittsburgh. He boldly stepped onto a platform for reform, especially to stop the “use of money for the corruption of our cities.” This was humorous coming from Quay, but the people of Pittsburgh were too serious to laugh. They were fighting for their survival, so to speak, and seeing a boss on their side must have motivated those business people who “found it easier to deal with a boss than with the representatives of the people.” Whatever the case may be, a majority of the votes cast in the municipal election of Pittsburgh in February 1896 were against the corrupt ring.
This isn’t history. According to the records the reform ticket was defeated by about 1000 votes. The returns up to one o’clock on the morning after election showed George W. Guthrie far ahead for mayor; then all returns ceased suddenly, and when the count came in officially, a few days later, the ring had won. But besides the prima facie evidence 182of fraud, the ringsters afterward told in confidence not only that Mr. Guthrie was counted out, but how it was done. Mr. Guthrie’s appeal to the courts, however, for a recount was denied. The courts held that the secret ballot law forbade the opening of the ballot boxes.
This isn’t history. According to the records, the reform ticket lost by about 1,000 votes. The returns up to one o’clock in the morning after the election showed George W. Guthrie way ahead for mayor; then all returns suddenly stopped, and when the official count came in a few days later, the corrupt group had won. But in addition to the at first glance evidence of fraud, the insiders later confided not only that Mr. Guthrie was counted out, but also how it was done. However, Mr. Guthrie's request for a recount in the courts was denied. The courts stated that the secret ballot law prevented the opening of the ballot boxes.
Thus the ring held Pittsburg—but not the Pittsburgers. They saw Quay in control of the Legislature, Quay the reformer, who would help them. So they drew a charter for Pittsburg which would restore the city to the people. Quay saw the instrument, and he approved it; he promised to have it passed. The League, the Chamber of Commerce, and other representative bodies, all encouraged by the outlook for victory, sent to Harrisburg committees to urge their charter, and their orators poured forth upon the Magee-Flinn ring a flood of, not invective, but facts, specifications of outrage, and the abuse of absolute power. Their charter went booming along through its first and second readings, Quay and the Magee-Flinn crowd fighting inch by inch. All looked well, when suddenly there was silence. Quay was dealing with his enemies, and the charter was his club. He wanted to go back to the Senate, and he went. The Pittsburgers saw him elected, saw him go, but their charter they saw no more. And such is the State of Pennsylvania that this man who did this 183thing to Pittsburg, and has done the like again and again to all cities and all interests—even politicians—he is the boss of Pennsylvania to-day!
Thus the ring controlled Pittsburgh—but not the people of Pittsburgh. They saw Quay in charge of the Legislature, Quay the reformer, who would help them. So they created a charter for Pittsburgh that would return the city to the people. Quay saw the document and approved it; he promised to get it passed. The League, the Chamber of Commerce, and other representative groups, all encouraged by the prospects of victory, sent committees to Harrisburg to advocate for their charter, and their speakers unleashed a torrent of facts, detailing the outrage and abuse of absolute power by the Magee-Flinn ring. Their charter moved swiftly through its first and second readings, with Quay and the Magee-Flinn crowd fighting every step of the way. Everything seemed promising, when suddenly there was silence. Quay was dealing with his adversaries, and the charter was his tool. He wanted to return to the Senate, and he did. The people of Pittsburgh saw him elected and leave, but they never saw their charter again. And such is the state of Pennsylvania that this man who did this to Pittsburgh, and has done similar things over and over to all cities and interests—even politicians—he is the boss of Pennsylvania today!
The good men of Pittsburg gave up, and for four years the essential story of the government of the city is a mere thread in the personal history of the quarrels of the bosses in State politics. Magee wanted to go to the United States Senate, and he had with him Boss Martin and John Wanamaker of Philadelphia, as well as his own Flinn. Quay turned on the city bosses, and, undermining their power, soon had Martin beaten in Philadelphia. To overthrow Magee was a harder task, and Quay might never have accomplished it had not Magee’s health failed, causing him to be much away. Pittsburg was left to Flinn, and his masterfulness, unmitigated by Magee, made trouble. The crisis came out of a row Flinn had with his Director of Public Works, E. M. Bigelow, a man as dictatorial as Flinn himself. Bigelow threw open to competition certain contracts. Flinn, in exasperation, had the councils throw out the director and put in his place a man who restored the old specifications.
The good people of Pittsburgh gave up, and for four years, the main story of the city's government was just a minor part of the personal conflicts among the powerful figures in state politics. Magee wanted to become a U.S. Senator, and he had support from Boss Martin and John Wanamaker of Philadelphia, as well as his own ally Flinn. Quay turned against the city bosses, and by undermining their influence, he quickly managed to defeat Martin in Philadelphia. Overthrowing Magee was more challenging, and Quay might not have succeeded if Magee hadn't suffered health issues that kept him away frequently. Pittsburgh was left under Flinn's control, and his domineering nature, unchecked by Magee, led to problems. The turning point came from a dispute Flinn had with his Director of Public Works, E. M. Bigelow, who was just as authoritarian as Flinn. Bigelow opened up certain contracts to competition. Frustrated, Flinn had the councils dismiss the director and replaced him with someone who reinstated the old specifications.
This enraged Thomas Steele Bigelow, E. M. Bigelow’s brother, and another nephew of old Squire Steele. Tom had an old grudge against Magee, dating from the early days of traction 184deals. He was rich, he knew something of politics, and he believed in the power of money in the game. Going straight to Harrisburg, he took charge of Quay’s fight for Senator, spent his own money and won; and he beat Magee, which was his first purpose.
This made Thomas Steele Bigelow, E. M. Bigelow’s brother and another nephew of old Squire Steele, very angry. Tom had a longstanding grudge against Magee that went back to the early days of traction deals. He was wealthy, had some knowledge of politics, and believed in the influence of money in the game. He went straight to Harrisburg, took control of Quay’s campaign for Senator, invested his own money, and succeeded; plus, he defeated Magee, which was his main goal.
But he was not satisfied yet. The Pittsburgers, aroused to fresh hope by the new fight of the bosses, were encouraged also by the news that the census of 1900 put a second city, Scranton, into “cities of the second class.” New laws had to be drawn for both. Pittsburg saw a chance for a good charter. Tom Bigelow saw a chance to finish the Magee-Flinn ring, and he had William B. Rogers, a man whom the city trusted, draw the famous “Ripper Bill”! This was originally a good charter, concentrating power in the mayor, but changes were introduced into it to enable the Governor to remove and appoint mayors, or recorders, as they were to be called, at will until April, 1903, when the first elected recorder was to take office. This was Bigelow’s device to rid Pittsburg of the ring office holders. But Magee was not dead yet. He and Flinn saw Governor Stone, and when the Governor ripped out the ring mayor, he appointed as recorder Major A. M. Brown, a lawyer well thought of in Pittsburg.
But he still wasn’t satisfied. The people of Pittsburgh, inspired by the new battle among the leaders, were also boosted by the news that the 1900 census classified a second city, Scranton, as a “city of the second class.” New laws needed to be created for both cities. Pittsburgh saw an opportunity for a solid charter. Tom Bigelow saw a chance to dismantle the Magee-Flinn ring, and he had William B. Rogers, a man trusted by the city, draft the infamous “Ripper Bill”! This started as a solid charter that focused power in the mayor, but modifications were made to allow the Governor to remove and appoint mayors, or recorders, as they would be called, at will until April 1903, when the first elected recorder would take office. This was Bigelow’s plan to free Pittsburgh from the ring officeholders. But Magee wasn’t out of the game yet. He and Flinn met with Governor Stone, and when the Governor removed the ring mayor, he appointed Major A. M. Brown, a well-respected lawyer in Pittsburgh, as recorder.
185Major Brown, however, kept all but one of the ring heads of the departments. This disappointed the people; it was a defeat for Bigelow; for the ring it was a triumph. Without Magee, however, Flinn could not hold his fellows in their joy, and they went to excesses which exasperated Major Brown and gave Bigelow an excuse for urging him to action. Major Brown suddenly removed the heads of the ring and began a thorough reorganization of the government. This reversed emotions, but not for long. The ring leaders saw Governor Stone again, and he ripped out Bigelow’s Brown and appointed in his place a ring Brown. Thus the ring was restored to full control under a charter which increased their power.
185Major Brown, however, kept all but one of the department heads tied to the political ring. This disappointed the public; it was a setback for Bigelow; for the ring, it was a win. Without Magee, though, Flinn couldn't control his associates in their celebrations, and they indulged in behaviors that irritated Major Brown and gave Bigelow a reason to push for action. Major Brown quickly removed the ring leaders and started a complete overhaul of the government. This shifted emotions, but not for long. The ring leaders met with Governor Stone again, and he ousted Bigelow’s choice for Brown and appointed another ring member in his place. This returned the ring to full authority under a charter that increased their power.
But the outrageous abuse of the Governor’s unusual power over the city incensed the people of Pittsburg. A postscript which Governor Stone added to his announcement of the appointment of the new recorder did not help matters; it was a denial that he had been bribed. The Pittsburgers had not heard of any bribery, but the postscript gave currency to a definite report that the ring—its banks, its corporations, and its bosses—had raised an enormous fund to pay the Governor for his interference in the city, and this pointed the intense feelings of the citizens. They prepared to beat the ring at an 186election to be held in February, 1902, for Comptroller and half of the councils. A Citizens’ party was organized. The campaign was an excited one; both sides did their best, and the vote polled was the largest ever known in Pittsburg. Even the ring made a record. The citizens won, however, and by a majority of 8,000.
But the shocking misuse of the Governor’s unusual power over the city angered the people of Pittsburgh. A postscript that Governor Stone added to his announcement about the new recorder didn’t help; it was a denial that he had been bribed. The people of Pittsburgh hadn’t heard any rumors of bribery, but the postscript spread a clear report that the ring—its banks, corporations, and leaders—had raised a massive fund to pay the Governor for his meddling in the city, which fueled the citizens' strong emotions. They got ready to take down the ring at an election scheduled for February 1902, for Comptroller and half of the councils. A Citizens’ party was formed. The campaign was very intense; both sides put in their best effort, and the turnout was the largest ever seen in Pittsburgh. Even the ring set a record. However, the citizens won by a majority of 8,000.
This showed the people what they could do when they tried, and they were so elated that they went into the next election and carried the county—the stronghold of the ring. But they now had a party to look out for, and they did not look out for it. They neglected it just as they had the city. Tom Bigelow knew the value of a majority party; he had appreciated the Citizens’ from the start. Indeed he may have started it. All the reformers know is that the committee which called the Citizens’ Party into existence was made up of twenty-five men—five old Municipal Leaguers, the rest a “miscellaneous lot.” They did not bother then about that. They knew Tom Bigelow, but he did not show himself, and the new party went on confidently with its passionate work.
This showed people what they could achieve when they put in the effort, and they were so excited that they entered the next election and won the county—the stronghold of the establishment. But now, they had a party to protect, and they didn’t prioritize it. They neglected it just like they had the city. Tom Bigelow understood the importance of a majority party; he had valued the Citizens’ Party from the beginning. In fact, he might have been the one who started it. All the reformers know is that the committee that created the Citizens’ Party was made up of twenty-five men—five former Municipal Leaguers, and the rest a “miscellaneous group.” They didn’t worry about that back then. They knew Tom Bigelow, but he didn’t make an appearance, and the new party moved forward confidently with its passionate work.
When the time came for the great election, that for recorder this year (1903), the citizens woke up one day and found Tom Bigelow the boss of their party. How he came there they did not exactly know; but there he was in full possession, 187and there with him was the “miscellaneous lot” on the committee. Moreover, Bigelow was applying with vigor regular machine methods. It was all very astonishing, but very significant. Magee was dead; Flinn’s end was in sight; but there was the Boss, the everlasting American Boss, as large as life. The good citizens were shocked; their dilemma was ridiculous, but it was serious too. Helpless, they watched. Bigelow nominated for recorder a man they never would have chosen. Flinn put up a better man, hoping to catch the citizens, and when these said they could see Flinn behind his candidate, he said, “No; I am out of politics. When Magee died I died politically, too.” Nobody would believe him. The decent Democrats hoped to retrieve their party and offer a way out, but Bigelow went into their convention with his money and the wretched old organization sold out. The smell of money on the Citizens’ side attracted to it the grafters, the rats from Flinn’s sinking ship; many of the corporations went over, and pretty soon it was understood that the railroads had come to a settlement among themselves and with the new boss, on the basis of an agreement said to contain five specifications of grants from the city. The temptation to vote for Flinn’s man was strong, but the old reformers seemed to feel that the only thing to do was to finish Flinn 188now and take care of Tom Bigelow later. This view prevailed and Tom Bigelow won. This is the way the best men in Pittsburg put it: “We have smashed a ring and we have wound another around us. Now we have got to smash that.”
When the big election came around, the one for recorder this year (1903), the citizens woke up one day and found Tom Bigelow in charge of their party. They weren’t exactly sure how he got there, but there he was, fully in control, and with him was the “miscellaneous lot” on the committee. Plus, Bigelow was actively using standard machine tactics. It was all very surprising but quite telling. Magee was gone; Flinn was on his way out; but the Boss was there, the ever-present American Boss, as bold as ever. The good citizens were shocked; their situation was silly, but it was also serious. Powerless, they watched. Bigelow nominated a man they would never have picked. Flinn proposed a better candidate, hoping to win over the citizens, and when they pointed out they saw Flinn behind his choice, he said, “No; I’m out of politics. When Magee died, I died politically too.” Nobody believed him. The decent Democrats aimed to take back their party and provide an alternative, but Bigelow entered their convention with his money, and the miserable old organization sold out. The lure of money on the Citizens’ side attracted the corrupt, the opportunists fleeing from Flinn’s faltering ship; many corporations switched sides, and soon it became clear that the railroads had reached an agreement among themselves and with the new boss, based on a deal said to include five terms of grants from the city. The temptation to vote for Flinn’s candidate was strong, but the old reformers seemed to agree that the only choice was to finish off Flinn first and deal with Tom Bigelow later. This perspective won out, and Tom Bigelow emerged victorious. This is how the best men in Pittsburgh described it: “We’ve broken a ring and now we’ve got another one around us. Now we have to break that one too.”
There is the spirit of this city as I understand it. Craven as it was for years, corrupted high and low, Pittsburg did rise; it shook off the superstition of partisanship in municipal politics; beaten, it rose again; and now, when it might have boasted of a triumph, it saw straight: a defeat. The old fighters, undeceived and undeceiving, humiliated but undaunted, said simply: “All we have got to do is to begin all over again.” Meanwhile, however, Pittsburg has developed some young men, and with an inheritance of this same spirit, they are going to try out in their own way. The older men undertook to save the city with a majority party and they lost the party. The younger men have formed a Voters’ Civic League, which proposes to swing from one party to another that minority of disinterested citizens which is always willing to be led, and thus raise the standard of candidates and improve the character of regular party government. Tom Bigelow intended to capture the old Flinn organization, combine it with his Citizens’ party, and rule as Magee did with one party, a union of all parties. If he should 189do this, the young reformers would have no two parties to choose between; but there stand the old fighters ready to rebuild a Citizens’ party under that or any other name. Whatever course is taken, however, something will be done in Pittsburg, or tried, at least, for good government, and after the cowardice and corruption shamelessly displayed in other cities, the effort of Pittsburg, pitiful as it is, is a spectacle good for American self-respect, and its sturdiness is a promise for poor old Pennsylvania.
This is the spirit of this city as I see it. After being weak for years and dealing with corruption at every level, Pittsburgh has risen. It shook off the superstition of party loyalty in local politics; defeated, it stood up again; and now, instead of celebrating a victory, it's facing a setback. The old fighters, clear-eyed and honest, humiliated but not discouraged, simply said: “All we have to do is start over.” Meanwhile, Pittsburgh has developed some young leaders, who, with the same spirit, are going to make their own attempt. The older leaders tried to save the city with a majority party and ended up losing it. The younger leaders have formed a Voters’ Civic League, which aims to move between parties to engage that minority of disinterested citizens who are always willing to follow, thus raising the quality of candidates and improving the integrity of regular party governance. Tom Bigelow planned to take over the old Flinn organization, combine it with his Citizens’ party, and govern like Magee did with a unified party, a coalition of all parties. If he succeeds, the young reformers will have no two parties to choose from; however, the old fighters are ready to rebuild a Citizens’ party under that or any other name. Whatever path is chosen, something will happen in Pittsburgh, or at least be attempted, for better governance, and after the cowardice and corruption disgracefully shown in other cities, Pittsburgh's effort, though sad, is a display worthy of American self-respect, and its determination is a hopeful sign for struggling Pennsylvania.
PHILADELPHIA: CORRUPT AND CONTENTED
Other American cities, no matter how bad their own condition may be, all point with scorn to Philadelphia as worse—“the worst-governed city in the country.” St. Louis, Minneapolis, Pittsburg submit with some patience to the jibes of any other community; the most friendly suggestion from Philadelphia is rejected with contempt. The Philadelphians are “supine,” “asleep”; hopelessly ring-ruled, they are “complacent.” “Politically benighted,” Philadelphia is supposed to have no light to throw upon a state of things that is almost universal.
Other American cities, no matter how bad their own situations might be, all look down on Philadelphia as the worst—“the worst-governed city in the country.” St. Louis, Minneapolis, and Pittsburg put up with the jokes from any other place; even the friendliest advice from Philadelphia is met with disdain. The people of Philadelphia are called “lazy,” “asleep”; they are seen as hopelessly set in their ways, “self-satisfied.” “Politically clueless,” Philadelphia is thought to lack any insight into a situation that is nearly everywhere.
This is not fair. Philadelphia is, indeed, corrupt; but it is not without significance. Every city and town in the country can learn something from the typical political experience of this great representative city. New York is excused for many of its ills because it is the metropolis, Chicago because of its forced development; Philadelphia is our “third largest” city and its growth has been gradual and natural. Immigration has been blamed 194for our municipal conditions; Philadelphia, with 47 per cent. of its population native-born of native-born parents, is the most American of our greater cities. It is “good,” too, and intelligent. I don’t know just how to measure the intelligence of a community, but a Pennsylvania college professor who declared to me his belief in education for the masses as a way out of political corruption, himself justified the “rake-off” of preferred contractors on public works on the ground of a “fair business profit.” Another plea we have made is that we are too busy to attend to public business, and we have promised, when we come to wealth and leisure, to do better. Philadelphia has long enjoyed great and widely distributed prosperity; it is the city of homes; there is a dwelling house for every five persons,—men, women, and children,—of the population; and the people give one a sense of more leisure and repose than any community I ever dwelt in. Some Philadelphians account for their political state on the ground of their ease and comfort. There is another class of optimists whose hope is in an “aristocracy” that is to come by and by; Philadelphia is surer that it has a “real aristocracy” than any other place in the world, but its aristocrats, with few exceptions, are in the ring, with it, or of no political use. Then we hear that we are a young people and that when we are 195older and “have traditions,” like some of the old countries, we also will be honest. Philadelphia is one of the oldest of our cities and treasures for us scenes and relics of some of the noblest traditions of “our fair land.” Yet I was told how once, “for a joke,” a party of boodlers counted out the “divvy” of their graft in unison with the ancient chime of Independence Hall.
This isn't fair. Philadelphia is definitely corrupt, but it does matter. Every city and town in the country can learn something from the political situation in this representative city. New York gets a pass for many of its problems because it's the metropolis, Chicago due to its rapid development; Philadelphia is our “third largest” city, and its growth has been gradual and natural. Immigration has been blamed for our city’s issues; however, with 47 percent of its population being native-born of native-born parents, Philadelphia is the most American of our major cities. It’s also “good” and educated. I’m not sure how to measure a community's intelligence, but a Pennsylvania college professor once told me that he believes education for the masses is the solution to political corruption, while he himself defended the profits of favored contractors on public works as a “fair business profit.” Another point we've raised is that we’re too busy to focus on public matters and have promised that once we achieve wealth and leisure, we will do better. Philadelphia has long enjoyed significant and widespread prosperity; it is the city of homes, with a dwelling for every five people—men, women, and children. The people here have a greater sense of leisure and relaxation than any community I’ve ever lived in. Some Philadelphians explain their political situation by citing their comfort and ease. There’s another group of optimists who believe in an “aristocracy” that will emerge eventually; Philadelphia is more convinced than anywhere else that it has a “real aristocracy,” but most of its aristocrats are either in on the corruption or serve no political purpose. Then there’s the narrative that we are a young people, and that as we mature and “develop traditions,” like some of the older countries, we will also become honest. Philadelphia is one of the oldest of our cities, preserving scenes and relics of some of the noblest traditions of “our fair land.” Yet, I was told how once, “as a joke,” a group of corrupt politicians counted out their share from their graft in sync with the historic chime of Independence Hall.
Philadelphia is representative. This very “joke,” told, as it was, with a laugh, is typical. All our municipal governments are more or less bad, and all our people are optimists. Philadelphia is simply the most corrupt and the most contented. Minneapolis has cleaned up, Pittsburg has tried to, New York fights every other election, Chicago fights all the time. Even St. Louis has begun to stir (since the elections are over), and at the worst was only shameless. Philadelphia is proud; good people there defend corruption and boast of their machine. My college professor, with his philosophic view of “rake-offs,” is one Philadelphia type. Another is the man, who, driven to bay with his local pride, says: “At least you must admit that our machine is the best you have ever seen.”
Philadelphia is a classic example. This very “joke,” told with a laugh, is pretty typical. All our city governments are generally bad, yet our people remain optimistic. Philadelphia is just the most corrupt and the most content with it. Minneapolis has cleaned up, Pittsburgh has made an effort, New York has battles in almost every other election, and Chicago is always in a fight. Even St. Louis has started to make changes (now that the elections are done), and at its worst, it was only unapologetic. Philadelphia takes pride; good people there defend corruption and brag about their political machine. My college professor, with his philosophical perspective on “kickbacks,” is one type of Philadelphian. Another is the person who, fueled by local pride, argues, “You have to admit, our machine is the best you’ve ever seen.”
Disgraceful? Other cities say so. But I say that if Philadelphia is a disgrace, it is a disgrace not to itself alone, nor to Pennsylvania, but to the United States and to American character. For 196this great city, so highly representative in other respects, is not behind in political experience, but ahead, with New York. Philadelphia is a city that has had its reforms. Having passed through all the typical stages of corruption, Philadelphia reached the period of miscellaneous loot with a boss for chief thief, under James McManes and the Gas Ring ‘way back in the late sixties and seventies. This is the Tweed stage of corruption from which St. Louis, for example, is just emerging. Philadelphia, in two inspiring popular revolts, attacked the Gas Ring, broke it, and in 1885 achieved that dream of American cities—a good charter. The present condition of Philadelphia, therefore, is not that which precedes, but that which follows reform, and in this distinction lies its startling general significance. What has happened since the Bullitt Law or charter went into effect in Philadelphia may happen in any American city “after reform is over.”
Disgraceful? Other cities think so. But I believe that if Philadelphia is a disgrace, it's not just a disgrace to itself or to Pennsylvania, but to the United States and to American values. This great city, which represents many things well, is actually ahead in political experience, right alongside New York. Philadelphia is a city that has gone through its reforms. After experiencing typical corruption stages, it reached a point of widespread misappropriation with a boss as the main thief, under James McManes and the Gas Ring back in the late sixties and seventies. This was the Tweed stage of corruption that St. Louis, for instance, is just starting to overcome. Philadelphia, through two inspiring popular uprisings, targeted the Gas Ring, dismantled it, and in 1885 achieved what many American cities aspire to—a solid charter. Thus, the current state of Philadelphia is not what comes before reform, but what comes after it, and in this distinction lies its profound significance. What has occurred since the Bullitt Law or charter was enacted in Philadelphia could happen in any American city “after reform is over.”
For reform with us is usually revolt, not government, and is soon over. Our people do not seek, they avoid self-rule, and “reforms” are spasmodic efforts to punish bad rulers and get somebody that will give us good government or something that will make it. A self-acting form of government is an ancient superstition. We are an inventive people, and we all think that we shall devise some 197day a legal machine that will turn out good government automatically. The Philadelphians have treasured this belief longer than the rest of us and have tried it more often. Throughout their history they have sought this wonderful charter and they thought they had it when they got the Bullitt Law, which concentrates in the mayor ample power, executive and political, and complete responsibility. Moreover, it calls for very little thought and action on the part of the people. All they expected to have to do when the Bullitt Law went into effect was to elect as mayor a good business man, who, with his probity and common sense, would give them that good business administration which is the ideal of many reformers.
For us, reform usually means revolt, not governance, and it doesn't last long. Our people don’t really seek self-rule; they actually avoid it. "Reforms" are just sporadic attempts to punish bad leaders and find someone who will give us good governance or something that will create it. The idea of an automatic government is an old superstition. We are a creative people, and we all believe that one day we'll come up with some legal system that will produce good governance automatically. The people in Philadelphia have held onto this belief longer than anyone else and have tried it more often. Throughout their history, they've searched for this magical charter and thought they had it with the Bullitt Law, which gives the mayor a lot of power—both executive and political—and complete responsibility. Plus, it requires very little thought or action from the people. When the Bullitt Law was implemented, they expected all they had to do was elect a good businessman as mayor, who, with his integrity and common sense, would provide them with the good business management that many reformers idealize.
The Bullitt Law went into effect in 1887. A committee of twelve—four men from the Union League, four from business organizations, and four from the bosses—picked out the first man to run under it on the Republican ticket, Edwin H. Fitler, an able, upright business man, and he was elected. Strange to say, his administration was satisfactory to the citizens, who speak well of it to this day, and to the politicians also; Boss McManes (the ring was broken, not the boss) took to the next national convention from Philadelphia a delegation solid for Fitler for President of the United States. It was a farce, but it pleased Mr. Fitler, so Matthew S. 198Quay, the State boss, let him have a complimentary vote on the first ballot. The politicians “fooled” Mr. Fitler, and they “fooled” also the next business mayor, Edwin S. Stuart, likewise a most estimable gentleman. Under these two administrations the foundation was laid for the present government of Philadelphia, the corruption to which Philadelphians seem so reconciled, and the machine which is “at least the best you have ever seen.”
The Bullitt Law went into effect in 1887. A committee of twelve—four men from the Union League, four from business organizations, and four from the bosses—selected the first candidate to run under it on the Republican ticket, Edwin H. Fitler, a competent and honest businessman, who was elected. Surprisingly, his administration was satisfactory to the citizens, who still speak highly of it today, as well as to the politicians; Boss McManes (the ring was broken, but not the boss) brought a delegation solid for Fitler for President of the United States to the next national convention from Philadelphia. It was a joke, but it pleased Mr. Fitler, so Matthew S. 198Quay, the State boss, allowed him to have a complimentary vote on the first ballot. The politicians “played” Mr. Fitler, and they “played” the next business mayor, Edwin S. Stuart, who was also a very respectable gentleman. Under these two administrations, the foundation was laid for the current government of Philadelphia, the corruption to which Philadelphians seem so accustomed, and the machine that is “at least the best you’ve ever seen.”
The Philadelphia machine isn’t the best. It isn’t sound, and I doubt if it would stand in New York or Chicago. The enduring strength of the typical American political machine is that it is a natural growth—a sucker, but deep-rooted in the people. The New Yorkers vote for Tammany Hall. The Philadelphians do not vote; they are disfranchised, and their disfranchisement is one anchor of the foundation of the Philadelphia organization.
The Philadelphia machine isn’t the best. It’s not reliable, and I doubt it would hold up in New York or Chicago. The lasting strength of the typical American political machine comes from its natural development—it’s a parasite, but it's deeply rooted in the people. New Yorkers vote for Tammany Hall. Philadelphians don’t vote; they’re disenfranchised, and their disenfranchisement is one of the main supports of the Philadelphia organization.
This is no figure of speech. The honest citizens of Philadelphia have no more rights at the polls than the negroes down South. Nor do they fight very hard for this basic privilege. You can arouse their Republican ire by talking about the black Republican votes lost in the Southern States by white Democratic intimidation, but if you remind the average Philadelphian that he is in the same position, he will look startled, then say, “That’s 199so, that’s literally true, only I never thought of it in just that way.” And it is literally true.
This is no exaggeration. The honest citizens of Philadelphia have no more rights at the polls than the black people down South. They also don’t fight very hard for this basic privilege. You can stir up their Republican anger by discussing the black Republican votes lost in the Southern states due to white Democratic intimidation, but if you remind the average Philadelphian that he is in the same situation, he will look surprised, then say, “That’s 199 true, I just never thought of it that way.” And it is true.
The machine controls the whole process of voting, and practices fraud at every stage. The assessor’s list is the voting list, and the assessor is the machine’s man. “The assessor of a division kept a disorderly house; he padded his lists with fraudulent names registered from his house; two of these names were used by election officers.... The constable of the division kept a disreputable house; a policeman was assessed as living there.... The election was held in the disorderly house maintained by the assessor.... The man named as judge had a criminal charge for a life offense pending against him.... Two hundred and fifty-two votes were returned in a division that had less than one hundred legal votes within its boundaries.” These extracts from a report of the Municipal League suggest the election methods. The assessor pads the list with the names of dead dogs, children, and non-existent persons. One newspaper printed the picture of a dog, another that of a little four-year-old negro boy, down on such a list. A ring orator in a speech resenting sneers at his ward as “low down” reminded his hearers that that was the ward of Independence Hall, and, naming over signers of the Declaration of Independence, he closed his highest flight of eloquence with 200the statement that “these men, the fathers of American liberty, voted down here once. And,” he added, with a catching grin, “they vote here yet.” Rudolph Blankenburg, a persistent fighter for the right and the use of the right to vote (and, by the way, an immigrant), sent out just before one election a registered letter to each voter on the rolls of a certain selected division. Sixty-three per cent. were returned marked “not at,” “removed,” “deceased,” etc. From one four-story house where forty-four voters were addressed, eighteen letters came back undelivered; from another of forty-eight voters, came back forty-one letters; from another sixty-one out of sixty-two; from another, forty-four out of forty-seven. Six houses in one division were assessed at one hundred and seventy-two voters, more than the votes cast in the previous election in any one of two hundred entire divisions.
The machine controls the entire voting process and commits fraud at every stage. The assessor’s list becomes the voting list, and the assessor is the machine's accomplice. “The assessor of a division ran a disorderly establishment; he filled his lists with fake names registered from his place; two of these names were used by election officials.... The constable of the division had a shady operation; a police officer was registered as living there.... The election took place in the disorderly establishment owned by the assessor.... The person listed as judge had an ongoing criminal charge for a serious offense.... Two hundred and fifty-two votes were counted in a division that had fewer than one hundred legitimate votes within its borders.” These excerpts from a report by the Municipal League indicate the methods used in the election. The assessor inflates the list with the names of deceased pets, children, and non-existent individuals. One newspaper published a picture of a dog, while another featured a photo of a little four-year-old Black boy appearing on such a list. A ring leader, in a speech responding to criticism of his ward as “low down,” reminded his audience that this was the ward of Independence Hall, and, while listing the signers of the Declaration of Independence, he ended his most passionate statement with the remark that “these men, the founders of American liberty, voted down here once. And,” he added with a smirk, “they vote here still.” Rudolph Blankenburg, a dedicated advocate for the right to vote (and also an immigrant), sent out a registered letter to each voter on the rolls of a specific division just before one election. Sixty-three percent were returned marked “not at home,” “moved,” “deceased,” etc. From one four-story building where forty-four voters were contacted, eighteen letters were returned undelivered; from another with forty-eight voters, forty-one letters bounced back; from another, sixty-one out of sixty-two were undelivered; and from another, forty-four out of forty-seven. Six houses in one division were recorded to have one hundred seventy-two voters, exceeding the votes cast in the previous election in any one of two hundred divisions.
The repeating is done boldly, for the machine controls the election officers, often choosing them from among the fraudulent names; and when no one appears to serve, assigning the heeler ready for the expected vacancy. The police are forbidden by law to stand within thirty feet of the polls, but they are at the box and they are there to see that the machine’s orders are obeyed and that repeaters whom they help to furnish are permitted to vote 201without “intimidation” on the names they, the police, have supplied. The editor of an anti-machine paper who was looking about for himself once told me that a ward leader who knew him well asked him into a polling place. “I’ll show you how it’s done,” he said, and he had the repeaters go round and round voting again and again on the names handed them on slips. “But,” as the editor said, “that isn’t the way it’s done.” The repeaters go from one polling place to another, voting on slips, and on their return rounds change coats, hats, etc. The business proceeds with very few hitches; there is more jesting than fighting. Violence in the past has had its effect; and is not often necessary nowadays, but if it is needed the police are there to apply it. Several citizens told me that they had seen the police help to beat citizens or election officers who were trying to do their duty, then arrest the victim; and Mr. Clinton Rogers Woodruff, the executive counsel of the Municipal League, has published a booklet of such cases. But an official statement of the case is at hand in an announcement by John Weaver, the new machine mayor of Philadelphia, that he is going to keep the police out of politics and away from the polls. “I shall see,” he added, “that every voter enjoys the full right of suffrage and that ballots may be placed in the ballot box without fear of intimidation.”
The rigging is done openly, as the machine controls the election officials, often selecting them from among fake names; when no one shows up to serve, they assign a person ready to fill the expected vacancy. The police are legally prohibited from standing within thirty feet of the polls, but they are at the ballot box to ensure that the machine’s orders are followed and that the repeaters, whom they help supply, are allowed to vote 201without “intimidation” under the names supplied by the police. An editor of an anti-machine newspaper, while observing the process, once shared that a ward leader who recognized him invited him into a polling place. “Let me show you how it’s done,” he said, and he had the repeaters go round in circles, voting repeatedly on the names given to them on slips. “But,” as the editor pointed out, “that’s not how it’s really done.” The repeaters move from one polling place to another, voting with slips, and during their return trips, they change coats, hats, etc. The operation continues with very few issues; there’s more joking than fighting. Past violence has made an impact and is not often necessary these days, but if needed, the police are ready to enforce it. Several citizens told me they witnessed police helping to assault citizens or election officials trying to perform their duties, then arresting the victim; Mr. Clinton Rogers Woodruff, the executive counsel of the Municipal League, has published a booklet detailing such incidents. However, there is an official statement available through an announcement by John Weaver, the new machine mayor of Philadelphia, stating that he will keep the police out of politics and away from the polls. “I will ensure,” he added, “that every voter has the full right to vote and that ballots can be cast without fear of intimidation.”
202But many Philadelphians do not try to vote. They leave everything to the machine, and the machine casts their ballots for them. It is estimated that 150,000 voters did not go to the polls at the last election. Yet the machine rolled up a majority of 130,000 for Weaver, with a fraudulent vote estimated all the way from forty to eighty thousand, and this in a campaign so machine-made that it was called “no contest.” Francis Fisher Kane, the Democrat, got 32,000 votes out of some 204,000. “What is the use of voting?” these stay-at-homes ask. A friend of mine told me he was on the lists in the three wards in which he had successively dwelt. He votes personally in none, but the leader of his present ward tells him how he has been voted. Mr. J. C. Reynolds, the proprietor of the St. James Hotel, went to the polls at eleven o’clock last election day, only to be told that he had been voted. He asked how many others from his house had voted. An election officer took up a list, checked off twelve names, two down twice, and handed it to him. When Mr. Reynolds got home he learned that one of these had voted, the others had been voted. Another man said he rarely attempted to vote, but when he did, the officers let him, even though his name had already been voted on; and then the negro repeaters would ask if his “brother was coming ‘round to-day.” They were 203going to vote him, as they vote all good-natured citizens who stay away. “When this kind of man turns out,” said a leader to me, “we simply have two repeaters extra—one to balance him and one more to the good.” If necessary, after all this, the machine counts the vote “right,” and there is little use appealing to the courts, since they have held, except in one case, that the ballot box is secret and cannot be opened. The only legal remedy lies in the purging of the assessor’s lists, and when the Municipal League had this done in 1899, they reported that there was “wholesale voting on the very names stricken off.”
202But many people in Philadelphia don’t make the effort to vote. They rely on the machine, which casts their ballots for them. It's estimated that 150,000 voters didn’t show up at the polls during the last election. Yet, the machine still managed to tally a majority of 130,000 for Weaver, with fraudulent votes estimated to be anywhere from forty to eighty thousand, in a campaign so controlled by the machine that it was dubbed “no contest.” Francis Fisher Kane, the Democrat, received 32,000 votes out of about 204,000. “What’s the point of voting?” these non-voters wonder. A friend of mine mentioned that he’s on the voter lists in three different wards where he has lived. He doesn’t personally vote in any of them, but the leader of his current ward tells him how he’s been voted. Mr. J. C. Reynolds, the owner of the St. James Hotel, went to the polls at eleven o’clock on election day, only to be informed that he had already been voted. He inquired about how many others from his hotel had voted. An election officer pulled up a list, checked off twelve names, two of which were repeated, and handed it to him. When Mr. Reynolds got home, he found out that only one of those listed had actually voted; the others had just been marked as voted. Another man said he rarely tried to vote, but when he did, the officers still let him, even though his name had already been cast. Then the repeaters would ask if his “brother was coming ‘round today.” They were planning to vote him, just like they do with all the good-natured citizens who stay away. “When this type of person shows up,” a leader told me, “we just need two extra repeaters—one to balance him out and one more for our advantage.” If needed, after all this, the machine ensures the vote is counted “correctly,” and there’s little use in appealing to the courts since they have ruled, except in one case, that the ballot box is secret and cannot be opened. The only legal solution lies in cleaning up the assessor’s lists, and when the Municipal League did this in 1899, they reported that there was “mass voting using the very names that had been removed.”
Deprived of self-government, the Philadelphians haven’t even self-governing machine government. They have their own boss, but he and his machine are subject to the State ring, and take their orders from the State boss, Matthew S. Quay, who is the proprietor of Pennsylvania and the real ruler of Philadelphia, just as William Penn, the Great Proprietor, was. Philadelphians, especially the local bosses, dislike this description of their government, and they point for refutation to their charter. But this very Bullitt Law was passed by Quay, and he put it through the Legislature, not for reform reasons, but at the instance of David H. Lane, his Philadelphia lieutenant, as a check upon the power of Boss McManes. Later, when McManes proved 204hopelessly insubordinate, Quay decided to have done with him forever. He chose David Martin for boss, and from his seat in the United States Senate, Penn’s successor raised up his man and set him over the people. Croker, who rose by his own strength to the head of Tammany Hall, has tried twice to appoint a successor; no one else could, and he failed. The boss of Tammany Hall is a growth. So Croker has attempted to appoint district leaders and failed; a Tammany district leader is a growth. Boss Martin, picked up and set down from above, was accepted by Philadelphia and the Philadelphia machine, and he removed old ward leaders and appointed new ones. Some leaders in Philadelphia own their wards, of course, but Martin and, after him, Durham have sent men into a ward to lead it, and they have led it.
Deprived of self-governance, the people of Philadelphia don’t even have a self-governing administration. They have their own leader, but he and his team answer to the state’s political machine and take orders from the state leader, Matthew S. Quay, who owns Pennsylvania and is the true ruler of Philadelphia, just like William Penn, the original Proprietor. Philadelphians, particularly the local leaders, dislike this portrayal of their government and point to their charter as proof otherwise. However, this very Bullitt Law was created by Quay, and he pushed it through the Legislature, not for reform, but at the request of David H. Lane, his lieutenant in Philadelphia, to rein in Boss McManes' power. Later, when McManes proved to be uncontrollable, Quay decided to get rid of him for good. He selected David Martin as the new boss, and from his position in the United States Senate, Penn’s successor elevated his man and put him in charge of the people. Croker, who rose through his own efforts to lead Tammany Hall, has tried twice to appoint a successor; no one else could, and he failed. The boss of Tammany Hall develops from within. So Croker attempted to appoint district leaders and failed; a Tammany district leader emerges from the ground up. Boss Martin, brought in from above, was accepted by Philadelphia and the Philadelphia machine, and he replaced old ward leaders with new ones. Some leaders in Philadelphia own their wards, but Martin and, after him, Durham have sent people into a ward to lead it, and they have successfully led it.
The Philadelphia organization is upside down. It has its root in the air, or, rather, like the banyan tree, it sends its roots from the center out both up and down and all around, and there lies its peculiar strength. For when I said it was dependent and not sound, I did not mean that it was weak. It is dependent as a municipal machine, but the organization that rules Philadelphia is, as we have seen, not a mere municipal machine, but a city, State, and national organization. The people of Philadelphia are Republicans in a Republican city in a 205Republican State in a Republican nation, and they are bound ring on ring on ring. The President of the United States and his patronage; the National Cabinet and their patronage; the Congress and the patronage of the Senators and the Congressmen from Pennsylvania; the Governor of the State and the State legislature with their powers and patronage; and all that the mayor and city councils have of power and patronage—all these bear down upon Philadelphia to keep it in the control of Quay’s boss and his little ring. This is the ideal of party organization, and, possibly, is the end toward which our democratic republic is tending. If it is, the end is absolutism. Nothing but a revolution could overthrow this oligarchy, and there is its danger. With no outlet at the polls for public feeling, the machine cannot be taught anything it does not know except at the cost of annihilation.
The Philadelphia organization is turned on its head. It has its roots in the air, or rather, like a banyan tree, it sends its roots out from the center, both up and down and all around, and that's where its unique strength lies. When I said it was dependent and not stable, I didn't mean it was weak. It is dependent as a municipal machine, but the organization that controls Philadelphia is, as we've seen, not just a simple municipal machine, but a city, state, and national organization. The people of Philadelphia are Republicans in a Republican city in a Republican state in a Republican nation, and they are bound ring by ring by ring. The President of the United States and his patronage; the National Cabinet and their patronage; Congress and the patronage of the Senators and Congress members from Pennsylvania; the Governor of the State and the State legislature with their powers and patronage; and all the power and patronage of the mayor and city councils—these all weigh down on Philadelphia to keep it under the control of Quay’s boss and his small group. This is the ideal of party organization and may be the direction our democratic republic is heading. If it is, the outcome is absolutism. Only a revolution could topple this oligarchy, and therein lies its danger. With no outlet for public sentiment at the polls, the machine cannot learn anything new except at the cost of total destruction.
But the Philadelphia machine-leaders know their business. As I said in “Tweed Days in St. Louis,” the politicians will learn, if the people won’t, from exposure and reform. The Pennsylvania bosses learned the “uses of reform”; we have seen Quay applying it to discipline McManes, and he since has turned reformer himself, to punish local bosses. The bosses have learned also the danger of combination between citizens and the Democrats. To prevent this, Quay and his friends 206have spread sedulously the doctrine of “reform within the party,” and, from the Committee of One Hundred on, the reformers have stuck pretty faithfully to this principle. But lest the citizens should commit such a sin against their party, Martin formed a permanent combination of the Democratic with the Republican organization, using to that end a goodly share of the Federal and county patronage. Thus the people of Philadelphia were “fixed” so that they couldn’t vote if they wanted to, and if they should want to, they couldn’t vote for a Democrat, except of Republican or independent choosing. In other words, having taken away their ballot, the bosses took away also the choice of parties.
But the leaders of the Philadelphia political machine know what they're doing. As I mentioned in “Tweed Days in St. Louis,” politicians will learn, even if the public won’t, from scrutiny and reform. The Pennsylvania bosses realized the "advantages of reform"; we've seen Quay using it to keep McManes in check, and he has since become a reformer himself to discipline local bosses. The bosses also understand the risk of an alliance between citizens and the Democrats. To stop this, Quay and his associates have actively promoted the idea of “reform within the party,” and since the Committee of One Hundred, reformers have largely adhered to this principle. But to deter the citizens from straying from their party loyalty, Martin created a lasting coalition between the Democratic and Republican organizations, utilizing a significant portion of federal and county patronage for this purpose. As a result, the people of Philadelphia were essentially “fixed” so they couldn’t vote if they wanted to, and if they did want to, they could only vote for a Democrat chosen by Republicans or independents. In other words, after removing their ballots, the bosses also stripped them of the ability to choose their party.
But the greatest lesson learned and applied was that of conciliation and “good government.” The people must not want to vote or rebel against the ring. This ring, like any other, was formed for the exploitation of the city for private profit, and the cementing force is the “cohesive power of public plunder.” But McManes and Tweed had proved that miscellaneous larceny was dangerous, and why should a lot of cheap politicians get so much and the people nothing at all? The people had been taught to expect but little from their rulers: good water, good light, clean streets well paved, fair transportation, the decent repression of 207vice, public order and public safety, and no scandalous or open corruption, would more than satisfy them. It would be good business and good politics to give them these things. Like Chris Magee, who studied out the problem with him, Martin took away from the rank and file of the party and from the ward leaders and office holders the privilege of theft, and he formed companies and groups to handle the legitimate public business of the city. It was all graft, but it was to be all lawful, and, in the main, it was. Public franchises, public works, and public contracts were the principal branches of the business, and Martin adopted the dual boss idea, which we have seen worked out by Magee and Flinn in Pittsburg. In Philadelphia it was Martin and Porter, and just as Flinn had a firm, Booth & Flinn, Ltd., so Porter was Filbert and Porter.
But the biggest lesson learned and put into practice was about making peace and “good governance.” The people shouldn’t want to vote against or rebel against the political machine. This machine, like any other, was created to exploit the city for personal gain, and the strong bond that held it together was the “cohesive power of public plunder.” However, McManes and Tweed showed that random theft was risky, so why should a handful of petty politicians benefit while the public gets nothing? The people had been conditioned to expect very little from their leaders: clean water, good lighting, well-maintained streets, decent transportation, proper control of vice, public order and safety, and no outrageous or blatant corruption would satisfy them. Providing these things would be good business and good politics. Like Chris Magee, who analyzed the issue alongside him, Martin took away the right to steal from the regular members of the party and the ward leaders and officeholders, and instead formed companies and groups to manage the legitimate public affairs of the city. It was all graft, but it was meant to be all legal, and for the most part, it was. Public franchises, public works, and public contracts were the main areas of business, and Martin embraced the dual boss concept, which we’ve seen implemented by Magee and Flinn in Pittsburgh. In Philadelphia, it was Martin and Porter, and just as Flinn had a firm, Booth & Flinn, Ltd., Porter was Filbert and Porter.
Filbert and Porter got all the public contracts they could handle, and the rest went to other contractors friendly to them and to the ring. Sometimes the preferred contractor was the lowest bidder, but he did not have to be. The law allowed awards to be the “lowest and best,” and the courts held that this gave the officials discretion. But since public criticism was to be considered, the ring, to keep up appearances, resorted to many tricks. One was to have fake bids made above the favorite. Another was to have the favorite bid 208high, but set an impossible time limit; the department of the city councils could extend the time afterwards. Still another was to arrange for specifications which would make outsiders bid high, then either openly alter the plans or let the ring firm perform work not up to requirements.
Filbert and Porter landed all the public contracts they could handle, and the rest went to other contractors who were in good with them and the group. Sometimes the preferred contractor was the lowest bidder, but that wasn’t always necessary. The law allowed for awards to go to the “lowest and best,” and the courts agreed that this gave officials some leeway. However, since public criticism had to be taken into account, the group pulled a lot of tricks to keep up appearances. One was to get fake bids that were higher than their favorite. Another was to have their preferred contractor bid high but set an impossible deadline; the city council could extend the deadline later. Yet another tactic was to create specifications that would cause outsiders to bid high, then either change the plans openly or let the favored contractor do work that didn’t meet the requirements.
Many of Martin’s deals and jobs were scandals, but they were safe; they were in the direction of public service; and the great mass of the business was done quietly. Moreover, the public was getting something for its money,—not full value, but a good percentage. In other words, there was a limit to the “rake-off,” and some insiders have told me that it had been laid down as a principle with the ring that the people should have in value (that is, in work or benefit, including a fair profit) ninety-five cents out of every dollar. In some of the deals I have investigated, the “rake-off” over and above profit was as high as twenty-five per cent. Still, even at this, there was “a limit,” and the public was getting, as one of the leaders told me, “a run for its money.” Cynical as it all sounds, this view is taken by many Philadelphians almost if not quite as intelligent as my college professor.
Many of Martin’s deals and jobs were scandals, but they were safe; they were aimed at serving the public; and most of the business was conducted quietly. Plus, the public was getting something for its money—not full value, but a decent return. In other words, there was a cap on the “rake-off,” and some insiders have told me that it was established as a principle within the group that the people should receive in value (that is, in work or benefit, including a fair profit) ninety-five cents out of every dollar. In some of the deals I’ve looked into, the “rake-off” over and above profit was as high as twenty-five percent. Still, even then, there was “a limit,” and the public was getting, as one of the leaders put it, “a run for its money.” Cynical as it may sound, many Philadelphians view it this way, nearly as intelligently as my college professor.
But there was another element in the policy of conciliation which is a potent factor in the contentment of Philadelphia, and I regard it as the key to that “apathy” which has made the community 209notorious. We have seen how Quay had with him the Federal resources and those of the State, and the State ring, and we have seen how Martin, having the city, mayor, and councils, won over the Democratic city leaders. Here they had under pay in office at least 15,000 men and women. But each of these 15,000 persons was selected for office because he could deliver votes, either by organizations, by parties, or by families. These must represent pretty near a majority of the city’s voters. But this is by no means the end of the ring’s reach. In the State ring are the great corporations, the Standard Oil Company, Cramp’s Shipyard, and the steel companies, with the Pennsylvania Railroad at their head, and all the local transportation and other public utility companies following after. They get franchises, privileges, exemptions, etc.; they have helped finance Quay through deals: the Pennsylvania paid Martin, Quay said once, a large yearly salary; the Cramps get contracts to build United States ships, and for years have been begging for a subsidy on home-made ships. The officers, directors, and stockholders of these companies, with their friends, their bankers, and their employees, are of the organization. Better still, one of the local bosses of Philadelphia told me he could always give a worker a job with these companies, just as he could in a city department, or in the 210mint, or post-office. Then there are the bankers who enjoy, or may some day enjoy, public deposits; those that profit on loans to finance political financial deals; the promoting capitalists who share with the bosses on franchises; and the brokers who deal in ring securities and speculate upon ring tips. Through the exchange the ring financiers reach the investing public, which is a large and influential body. The traction companies, which bought their way from beginning to end by corruption, which have always been in the ring, and whose financiers have usually shared in other big ring deals, adopted early the policy of bribing the people with “small blocks of stock.” Dr. Frederick Speirs, in his “The Street Railway System of Philadelphia,” came upon transactions which “indicate clearly that it is the policy of the Union Company to get the securities into the hands of a large number of small holders, the plain inference being that a wide distribution of securities will fortify the company against possible attacks by the public.” In 1895 he found a director saying: “Our critics have engaged the Academy of Music, and are to call an assemblage of people opposed to the street railways as now managed. It would take eight Academies of Music to hold the stockholders of the Union Traction Company.”
But there was another part of the policy of conciliation that plays a key role in keeping Philadelphia content, and I see it as the reason for the “apathy” that has made the community infamous. We’ve seen how Quay had the Federal resources and those of the State, along with the State ring, and how Martin, controlling the city, the mayor, and councils, won over the Democratic city leaders. They had at least 15,000 men and women on the payroll. Each of these 15,000 individuals was chosen for their position because they could deliver votes, either through organizations, political parties, or their families. Together, they probably represent a significant majority of the city’s voters. But the influence of the ring doesn’t stop there. In the State ring are major corporations like the Standard Oil Company, Cramp’s Shipyard, and the steel companies, led by the Pennsylvania Railroad, along with all the local transportation and public utility companies. They obtain franchises, privileges, exemptions, etc.; they have financially supported Quay through various deals. Quay once mentioned that Pennsylvania paid Martin a hefty annual salary; the Cramps receive contracts to build ships for the United States and have been lobbying for a subsidy on domestically made ships for years. The officers, directors, and shareholders of these companies, along with their friends, bankers, and employees, are part of the organization. Even better, a local boss in Philadelphia told me he could always get a worker a job with these companies, just as easily as in a city department, the mint, or the post office. Then there are bankers who currently have or may someday have public deposits; those who profit from loans meant to finance political deals; promoting capitalists who benefit alongside the bosses from franchises; and brokers who trade in ring securities and speculate on insider information from the ring. Through the exchange, the ring’s financiers connect with the investing public, a large and influential group. The traction companies, which have built their way up using corruption, have always been part of the ring, and their financiers have usually been involved in other significant ring deals. They early on adopted the strategy of bribing the public with “small blocks of stock.” Dr. Frederick Speirs, in his work “The Street Railway System of Philadelphia,” discovered transactions that “clearly indicate that it is the policy of the Union Company to get the securities into the hands of a large number of small holders, suggesting that a wide distribution of securities will protect the company against potential public backlash.” In 1895, he found a director stating: “Our critics have booked the Academy of Music and are planning to gather a crowd opposed to the street railways as they are currently managed. It would take eight Academies of Music to accommodate all the stockholders of the Union Traction Company.”
But we are not yet through. Quay has made a 211specialty all his life of reformers, and he and his local bosses have won over so many that the list of former reformers is very, very long. Martin drove down his roots through race and religion, too. Philadelphia was one of the hot-beds of “know-nothingism.” Martin recognized the Catholic, and the Irish-Irish, and so drew off into the Republican party the great natural supply of the Democrats; and his successors have given high places to representative Jews. “Surely this isn’t corruption!” No, and neither is that corruption which makes the heads of great educational and charity institutions “go along,” as they say in Pennsylvania, in order to get appropriations for their institutions from the State and land from the city. They know what is going on, but they do not join reform movements. The provost of the University of Pennsylvania declined to join in a revolt because, he said, it might impair his usefulness to the University. And so it is with others, and with clergymen who have favorite charities; with Sabbath associations and City Beautiful clubs; with lawyers who want briefs; with real estate dealers who like to know in advance about public improvements, and real estate owners who appreciate light assessments; with shop-keepers who don’t want to be bothered with strict inspections.
But we’re not finished yet. Quay has spent his whole life dealing with reformers, and he and his local leaders have persuaded so many that the list of former reformers is extremely long. Martin established his influence through race and religion as well. Philadelphia was one of the centers of “know-nothingism.” Martin acknowledged the Catholics and Irish immigrants, which allowed him to pull a large part of the Democrats into the Republican party; his successors have elevated representative Jews to prominent positions. “Surely this isn’t corruption!” No, and neither is the kind of corruption that causes the heads of major educational and charity institutions to “go along,” as they say in Pennsylvania, to secure funding from the State and land from the city. They are aware of what's happening, but they don’t get involved in reform movements. The provost of the University of Pennsylvania refused to participate in a revolt because he felt it might reduce his effectiveness for the University. The same goes for others, including clergy members who have preferred charities; with Sabbath associations and City Beautiful clubs; with lawyers seeking cases; with real estate agents who want to be informed about public projects in advance, and property owners who appreciate lower taxes; with shopkeepers who don’t want to deal with strict inspections.
If there is no other hold for the ring on a man 212there always is the protective tariff. “I don’t care,” said a manufacturer. “What if they do plunder and rob us, it can’t hurt me unless they raise the tax rates, and even that won’t ruin me. Our party keeps up the tariff. If they should reduce that, my business would be ruined.”
If there’s no other reason for a man to keep the ring, there's always the protective tariff. “I don’t care,” said a manufacturer. “So what if they plunder and rob us? It won’t hurt me unless they raise the tax rates, and even then, it won’t ruin me. Our party maintains the tariff. If they were to reduce it, my business would be finished.”
Such, then, are the ramifications of this machine, such is its strength. No wonder Martin could break his own rules, as he did, and commit excesses. Philadelphia is not merely corrupt, it is corrupted. Martin’s doom was proclaimed not in Philadelphia, but in the United States Senate, and his offense was none of this business of his, but his failure to nominate as successor to Mayor Stuart the man, Boise Penrose, whom Matt Quay chose for that place. Martin had consented, but at the last moment he ordered the nomination of Charles F. Warwick instead. The day that happened Mr. Quay arose on the floor of the Senate and, in a speech so irrelevant to the measure under consideration that nobody out of Pennsylvania understood it, said that there was in his town a man who had given as his reason for not doing what he had promised to do, the excuse that he was “under a heavy salary from a great corporation (the Pennsylvania Railroad) and was compelled to do what the corporation wished him to do. And,” added Senator Quay, “men in such a position with high power for good 213or evil ought ... to go about ... with the dollar mark of the corporation on their foreheads.” Quay named an the new boss Israel W. Durham, a ward leader under Martin.
Such are the consequences of this machine, such is its power. No wonder Martin could break his own rules and go overboard. Philadelphia isn’t just corrupt; it is deeply corrupted. Martin's downfall was announced not in Philadelphia, but in the United States Senate, and his wrongdoing had nothing to do with his own business, but rather with his failure to nominate Boise Penrose, the man Matt Quay had chosen to succeed Mayor Stuart. Martin had agreed, but at the last minute, he decided to nominate Charles F. Warwick instead. When that happened, Mr. Quay stood up in the Senate and, in a speech so off-topic that no one outside of Pennsylvania really got it, mentioned that in his town, a man had given the excuse for not keeping his promise that he was “under a heavy salary from a great corporation (the Pennsylvania Railroad) and felt forced to do what the corporation wanted him to do.” And,” Senator Quay added, “men in such positions, with significant power for good or evil, should ... go around ... with the dollar sign of the corporation on their foreheads.” Quay named the new boss as Israel W. Durham, a ward leader under Martin.
Martin having the city through Mayor Warwick fought Quay in the State, with Chris Magee for an ally, but Quay beat them both there, and then prepared to beat them in their own cities. His cry was Reform, and he soon had the people shouting for it.
Martin had the city through Mayor Warwick and fought Quay in the State, with Chris Magee as an ally, but Quay defeated them both there, and then got ready to take them down in their own cities. His rallying cry was Reform, and he quickly had the people chanting for it.
Quay responded with a Legislative committee to investigate abuses in the cities, but this so-called “Lexow” was called off before it amounted to much more than a momentary embarrassment to Martin. Martin’s friends, on the other hand, caught Quay and nearly sent him to prison. The People’s Bank, James McManes, president, failed. The cashier, John S. Hopkins, had been speculating and letting Quay and other politicians have bank funds without collateral for stock gambling. In return Quay and the State Treasurer left heavy State deposits with the bank. Hopkins lost his nerve and shot himself. McManes happened to call in friends of Martin to advise him, and these suggested a Martin man for receiver. They found among the items money lent to Quay without security, except the State funds, and telegrams asking Hopkins to buy “1000 Met” (Metropolitan) 214and promising in return to “shake the plum tree.” Quay, his son, Richard R., and Benjamin J. Haywood, the State Treasurer, were indicted for conspiracy, and every effort was made to have the trial precede the next election for the Legislature which was to elect a successor to Quay in the United States Senate; but Quay got stays and postponements in the hopes that a more friendly District Attorney could be put in that office. Martin secured the election of Peter F. Rothermel, who was eager to try the case, and Quay had to depend on other resources. The trial came in due course, and failed; Judge Biddle ruled out the essential evidence on the ground that it was excluded by the statute of limitation. Rothermel went on with the trial, but it was hopeless; Quay was acquitted and the other cases were abandoned.
Quay responded with a legislative committee to look into abuses in the cities, but this so-called "Lexow" was called off before it turned into much more than a brief embarrassment for Martin. On the other hand, Martin's allies nearly had Quay prosecuted and sent to prison. The People's Bank, led by president James McManes, collapsed. The cashier, John S. Hopkins, had been taking risks by allowing Quay and other politicians to use bank funds without collateral for stock trading. In return, Quay and the State Treasurer left large state deposits with the bank. When Hopkins lost his nerve, he shot himself. McManes happened to bring in some of Martin's friends for advice, and they suggested appointing a Martin associate as the receiver. While going through the bank's records, they discovered money lent to Quay without security, except for the state funds, and telegrams instructing Hopkins to buy "1000 Met" (Metropolitan) and promising to "shake the plum tree" in return. Quay, his son Richard R., and State Treasurer Benjamin J. Haywood were indicted for conspiracy, and every effort was made to have the trial take place before the upcoming election for the Legislature, which was supposed to choose Quay's successor in the United States Senate. However, Quay managed to secure delays and postponements, hoping to get a more sympathetic District Attorney in office. Martin succeeded in electing Peter F. Rothermel, who was eager to pursue the case, leaving Quay to rely on other resources. The trial eventually took place but was unsuccessful; Judge Biddle ruled out the key evidence on the grounds that it was barred by the statute of limitations. Rothermel continued with the trial, but it was futile; Quay was acquitted and the other cases were dropped.
Popular feeling was excited by this exposure of Quay, but there was no action till the factional fighting suggested a use for it. Quay had refused the second United States Senatorship to John Wanamaker, and Wanamaker led through the State and in Philadelphia a fight against the boss, which has never ceased. It took the form of a reform campaign, and Quay’s methods were made plain, but the boss beat Wanamaker at every point, had Penrose made Senator, and through Penrose and Durham was gradually getting possession of 215Philadelphia. The final triumph came with the election of Samuel H. Ashbridge as mayor.
Public sentiment was stirred up by this exposure of Quay, but there was no action until the factional fighting created an opportunity. Quay had turned down the second United States Senatorship that John Wanamaker wanted, and Wanamaker led a fight against the boss throughout the state and in Philadelphia that hasn’t stopped since. It took the shape of a reform campaign where Quay’s methods were made clear, but the boss defeated Wanamaker at every turn, got Penrose elected as Senator, and through Penrose and Durham was slowly gaining control of 215Philadelphia. The final victory came with the election of Samuel H. Ashbridge as mayor.
“Stars-and-Stripes Sam,” as Ashbridge is sometimes called, was a speech-maker and a “joiner.” That is to say, he made a practice of going to lodges, associations, brotherhoods, Sunday-schools, and all sorts of public and private meetings, joining some, but making at all speeches patriotic and sentimental. He was very popular. Under the Bullitt Law, as I have said, all that is necessary to a good administration and complete, though temporary reform, is a good mayor. The politicians feel that they must nominate a man in whom the people as well as themselves have faith. They had had faith in Warwick, both the ring and the people, and Warwick had found it impossible to satisfy two such masters. Now they put their faith in Ashbridge, and so did Durham, and so did Martin. All interests accepted him, therefore, and all watched him with hope and more or less assurance; none more than the good people. And, indeed, no man could have promised more or better public service than Ashbridge. The result, however, was distracting.
“Stars-and-Stripes Sam,” as Ashbridge is sometimes called, was a speaker and a socializer. In other words, he made it a habit to attend lodges, associations, brotherhoods, Sunday schools, and all kinds of public and private meetings, joining some, but always delivering speeches that were patriotic and sentimental. He was very popular. Under the Bullitt Law, as I mentioned, all that is needed for a good administration and complete, though temporary, reform is a good mayor. Politicians feel they must nominate a person who has faith from both the people and themselves. They had faith in Warwick, both from the political insiders and the public, and Warwick found it impossible to satisfy such conflicting demands. Now they placed their faith in Ashbridge, as did Durham and Martin. All interests accepted him, and everyone watched him with hope and varying degrees of confidence; none more than the good citizens. Indeed, no one could have promised more or better public service than Ashbridge. The outcome, however, was troubling.
Mr. Ashbridge “threw down” Martin, and he recognized Quay’s man, “Is” Durham, as the political boss. Durham is a high type of boss, candid, but of few words; generous, but businesslike; 216complete master of himself, and a genius at organization. For Pennsylvania politics he is a conservative leader, and there would have been no excesses under him, as there have been few “rows.” But Mr. Durham has not been the master of the Philadelphia situation. He bowed to Quay, and he could not hold Ashbridge. Philadelphians say that if it should come to a fight, Durham could beat Quay in Philadelphia, but it doesn’t come to a fight. Another thing Philadelphians say is that he “keeps his word,” yet he broke it (with notice) when Quay asked him to stand for Pennypacker for Governor. As I said before, however, Philadelphia is so constituted that it apparently cannot have self-government, not even its own boss, so that the allegiance paid to Quay is comprehensible. But the submission of the boss to the mayor was extraordinary, and it seemed to some sagacious politicians dangerous.
Mr. Ashbridge took down Martin, and he recognized Quay's guy, "Is" Durham, as the political boss. Durham is a high-caliber boss, straightforward but not very talkative; generous yet practical; fully in control of himself and a whiz at organizing. In Pennsylvania politics, he's a conservative leader, and there wouldn’t have been any excesses under his watch, as there have been few conflicts. However, Mr. Durham hasn’t been in control of the situation in Philadelphia. He bowed to Quay and couldn’t keep Ashbridge in check. People in Philadelphia say that if it came to a showdown, Durham could outmatch Quay in Philadelphia, but it never gets to that point. Another thing Philadelphians mention is that he “keeps his word,” but he broke it (with a warning) when Quay asked him to support Pennypacker for Governor. As I said before, though, Philadelphia is set up in such a way that it seemingly can’t have self-governance, not even its own boss, which makes the loyalty to Quay understandable. But the way the boss submitted to the mayor was unusual, and some clever politicians found it concerning.
For Mr. Ashbridge broke through all the principles of moderate grafting developed by Martin. Durham formed his ring—taking in James P. McNichol as co-ruler and preferred contractor; John M. Mack as promoter and financier; and he widened the inside circle to include more individuals. But while he was more liberal toward his leaders, and not inclined “to grab off everything for himself,” as one leader told me, he maintained the principle 217of concentration and strict control as good politics and good business. So, too, he adopted Martin’s programme of public improvements, the filtration, boulevards, etc., and he added to it. When Ashbridge was well settled in office, these schemes were all started, and the mayor pushed them with a will. According to the “Philadelphia Plan,” the mayor should not be in the ring. He should be an ambitious man, and his reward promotion, not riches. If he is “out for the stuff,” he is likely to be hurried by the fretful thought that his term is limited to four years, and since he cannot succeed himself as mayor, his interest in the future of the machine is less than that of a boss, who goes on forever.
For Mr. Ashbridge broke through all the principles of moderate grafting developed by Martin. Durham built his network—bringing in James P. McNichol as co-leader and preferred contractor; John M. Mack as promoter and financier; and he expanded the inner circle to include more people. However, while he was more generous towards his leaders and not inclined "to grab everything for himself," as one leader told me, he stuck to the idea of concentration and strict control as both good politics and good business. He also adopted Martin's plan for public improvements like filtration, boulevards, and so on, and added to it. Once Ashbridge was firmly established in office, these projects were all initiated, and the mayor promoted them with enthusiasm. According to the “Philadelphia Plan,” the mayor shouldn't be part of the network. He should be an ambitious person, with his reward being promotion, not wealth. If he’s "after the money," he might be anxious thinking that his term is limited to four years, and since he can't run again as mayor, his interest in the future of the organization is less than that of a boss, who stays in power indefinitely. 217
When he was nominated, Ashbridge had debts of record amounting to some $40,000. Before he was elected these were satisfied. Soon after he took office he declared himself to former Postmaster Thomas L. Hicks. Here is Mr. Hicks’s account of the incident:
When he was nominated, Ashbridge had record debts totaling about $40,000. Before he was elected, these were cleared. Shortly after he took office, he spoke to former Postmaster Thomas L. Hicks. Here is Mr. Hicks’s account of the incident:
“At one of the early interviews I had with the mayor in his office, he said to me: ‘Tom, I have been elected mayor of Philadelphia. I have four years to serve. I have no further ambitions. I want no other office when I am out of this one, and I shall get out of this office all there is in it for Samuel H. Ashbridge.’
“At one of the early interviews I had with the mayor in his office, he said to me: ‘Tom, I’ve been elected mayor of Philadelphia. I have four years to serve. I have no further ambitions. I don’t want any other office when I leave this one, and I plan to get everything I can out of this office for Samuel H. Ashbridge.’”
“I remarked that this was a very foolish thing 218to say. ‘Think how that could be construed,’ I said.
“I pointed out that this was a really foolish thing to say. ‘Think about how that could be interpreted,’ I said.”
“‘I don’t care anything about that,’ he declared. ‘I mean to get out of this office everything there is in it for Samuel H. Ashbridge.’”
“‘I don’t care about any of that,’ he said. ‘I intend to get everything out of this office for Samuel H. Ashbridge.’”
When he retired from office last April, he became the president of a bank, and was reputed to be rich. Here is the summary published by the Municipal League at the close of his labors:
When he stepped down from his position last April, he became the president of a bank and was known to be wealthy. Here is the summary released by the Municipal League at the end of his work:
“The four years of the Ashbridge administration have passed into history, leaving behind them a scar on the fame and reputation of our city which will be a long time healing. Never before, and let us hope never again, will there be such brazen defiance of public opinion, such flagrant disregard of public interest, such abuse of powers and responsibilities for private ends. These are not generalizations, but each statement can be abundantly proved by numerous instances.”
“The four years of the Ashbridge administration have become a part of history, leaving a mark on our city’s reputation that will take a long time to heal. Never before, and let’s hope never again, will there be such open defiance of public opinion, such blatant neglect of public interest, and such abuse of power and responsibilities for personal gain. These aren’t just general statements; each one can be proven with plenty of examples.”
These “numerous instances” are notorious in Philadelphia; some of them were reported all over the country. One of them was the attempted intimidation of John Wanamaker. Thomas B. Wanamaker, John Wanamaker’s son, bought the North American, a newspaper which had been, and still is, exposing the abuses and corruption of the political ring. Abraham L. English, Mr. Ashbridge’s Director of the Department of Public 219Safety, called on Mr. John Wanamaker, said he had been having him watched, and was finally in a position to demand that the newspaper stop the attacks. The merchant exposed the whole thing, and a committee appointed to investigate reported that: “Mr. English has practically admitted that he attempted to intimidate a reputable citizen and unlawfully threatened him in an effort to silence criticism of a public newspaper; that from the mayor’s refusal to order an investigation of the conduct of Mr. English on the request of a town meeting of representative citizens, the community is justified in regarding him as aiding and abetting Mr. English in the corrupt act committed, and that the mayor is therefore to be equally censured by the community.”
These “numerous instances” are well-known in Philadelphia; some were reported all over the country. One of them was the attempted intimidation of John Wanamaker. Thomas B. Wanamaker, John Wanamaker’s son, purchased the North American, a newspaper that had been exposing the abuses and corruption of the political establishment, and continues to do so. Abraham L. English, Mr. Ashbridge’s Director of the Department of Public 219Safety, visited Mr. John Wanamaker, stated that he had been monitoring him, and was finally in a position to demand that the newspaper cease its criticisms. The merchant uncovered the entire situation, and a committee appointed to investigate reported that: “Mr. English has essentially admitted that he tried to intimidate a reputable citizen and unlawfully threatened him in an attempt to silence criticism of a public newspaper; that due to the mayor’s refusal to order an investigation into Mr. English's actions upon the request of a town meeting of representative citizens, the community is justified in viewing him as aiding and abetting Mr. English in the corrupt act committed, and that the mayor should therefore also be equally censured by the community.”
The other “instances of brazen abuse of power” were the increase of protected vice—the importation from New York of the “white slavery system of prostitution,” the growth of “speak-easies,” and the spread of gambling and of policy-playing until it took in the school children. This last the North American exposed, but in vain till it named police officers who had refused when asked to interfere. Then a judge summoned the editors and reporters of the paper, the mayor, Director English, school children, and police officers to appear before him. The mayor’s personal attorney 220spoke for the police during the inquiry, and it looked black for the newspaper till the children began to tell their stories. When the hearing was over the judge said:
The other “instances of blatant abuse of power” were the rise of protected vices—the importation from New York of the “white slavery system of prostitution,” the growth of “speak-easies,” and the spread of gambling and policy-playing that even involved school children. The North American uncovered this, but it was in vain until they named police officers who had refused to act when asked. Then a judge called the editors and reporters of the paper, the mayor, Director English, school children, and police officers to appear before him. The mayor’s personal attorney 220 spoke for the police during the inquiry, and things looked bad for the newspaper until the children began to share their stories. When the hearing was over, the judge said:
“The evidence shows conclusively that our public school system in this city is in danger of being corrupted at its fountain; that in one of the schools over a hundred and fifty children were buyers of policy, as were also a large number of scholars in other schools. It was first discovered about eighteen months ago, and for about one year has been in full operation.” The police officers were not punished, however.
“The evidence clearly shows that our public school system in this city is at risk of being compromised at its core; that in one of the schools, more than one hundred and fifty children were involved in purchasing policies, as were many students in other schools. It was first uncovered about eighteen months ago, and has been fully operational for about a year now.” The police officers were not held accountable, however.
That corruption had reached the public schools and was spreading rapidly through the system, was discovered by the exposure and conviction of three school directors of the twenty-eighth ward. It was known before that teachers and principals, like any other office holders, had to have a “pull” and pay assessments for election expenses. “Voluntary contributions” was the term used, but over the notices in blue pencil was written “2 per cent.,” and teachers who asked directors and ward bosses what to do, were advised that they would “better pay.” Those that sent less than the amount suggested, got receipts: “check received; shall we hold for balance or enter on account?” But the exposure in the twenty-eighth ward brought it 221home to the parents of the children that the teachers were not chosen for fitness, but for political reasons, and that the political reasons had become cash.
Corruption had infiltrated the public schools and was quickly spreading through the system, which was revealed by the arrest and conviction of three school directors from the twenty-eighth ward. It was already known that teachers and principals, like any other officials, had to have connections and pay fees for campaign costs. The phrase “voluntary contributions” was used, but above the notices in blue pencil was written “2 percent,” and teachers who asked directors and ward leaders what to do were told they should “better pay.” Those who contributed less than the suggested amount received receipts: “check received; should we hold for balance or enter on account?” But the scandal in the twenty-eighth ward made it clear to the parents of the students that teachers were not selected based on their abilities, but for political reasons, and that these political reasons had turned into a money issue.
Miss Rena A. Haydock testified as follows: “I went to see Mr. Travis, who was a friend of mine, in reference to getting a teacher’s certificate. He advised me to see all of the directors, especially Mr. Brown. They told me that it would be necessary for me to pay $120 to get the place. They told me of one girl who had offered $250, and her application had been rejected. That was before they broached the subject of money to me. I said that I didn’t have $120 to pay, and they replied that it was customary for teachers to pay $40 a month out of their first three months’ salary. The salary was $47. They told me they didn’t want the money for themselves, but that it was necessary to buy the other faction. Finally I agreed to the proposition, and they told me that I must be careful not to mention it to anybody or it would injure my reputation. I went with my brother to pay the money to Mr. Johnson. He held out a hat, and when my brother handed the money to him he took it behind the hat.”
Miss Rena A. Haydock testified as follows: “I went to see Mr. Travis, who was a friend of mine, about getting a teacher’s certificate. He advised me to talk to all of the directors, especially Mr. Brown. They told me that I would need to pay $120 to get the position. They mentioned one girl who had offered $250, but her application was rejected. That was before they brought up the topic of money with me. I said that I didn’t have $120 to pay, and they replied that it was common for teachers to pay $40 a month from their first three months’ salary. The salary was $47. They said they didn’t want the money for themselves, but it was necessary to buy off the other side. Eventually, I agreed to the deal, and they told me I needed to be careful not to mention it to anyone or it would harm my reputation. I went with my brother to give the money to Mr. Johnson. He held out a hat, and when my brother handed him the money, he took it behind the hat.”
The regular business of the ring was like that of Pittsburg, but more extensive. I have space only for one incident of one phase of it: Widener and 222Elkins, the national franchise buyers, are Philadelphians, and they were in the old Martin ring. They had combined all the street railways of the city before 1900, and they were withdrawing from politics, with their traction system. But the Pennsylvania rings will not let corporations that have risen in corruption reform and retire, and, besides, it was charged that in the Martin-Quay fight, the street railways had put up money to beat Quay for the United States Senate. At any rate, plans were laid to “mace” the street railways.
The regular business of the ring was similar to that in Pittsburgh, but on a larger scale. I can only share one incident from one part of it: Widener and Elkins, the national franchise buyers, are from Philadelphia, and they were part of the old Martin ring. They had combined all the street railways in the city before 1900, and they were pulling out of politics along with their traction system. However, the Pennsylvania rings won’t allow corporations that have emerged from corruption to reform and step back, and besides, it was alleged that during the Martin-Quay fight, the street railways had funded efforts to defeat Quay for the United States Senate. In any case, plans were made to "mace" the street railways.
“Macing” is a form of high blackmail. When they have sold out all they have, the politicians form a competing company and compel the old concern to buy out or sell out. While Widener and Elkins were at sea, bound for Europe, in 1901, the Philadelphia ring went to the Legislature and had introduced there two bills, granting a charter to practically all the streets and alleys not covered by tracks in Philadelphia, and to run short stretches of the old companies’ tracks to make connections. Clinton Rogers Woodruff, who was an Assemblyman, has told the story. Without notice the bills were introduced at 3 P. M. on Monday, May 29; they were reported from committee in five minutes; by 8.50 P. M. they were printed and on the members’ desk, and by 9 P. M. were passed on first reading. The bills passed second reading the next 223day, Memorial Day, and on the third day were passed from the Senate to the House, where they were “jammed through” with similar haste and worse trickery. In six legislative days the measures were before Governor Stone, who signed them June 7, at midnight, in the presence of Quay, Penrose, Congressman Foerderer, Mayor Ashbridge’s banker, James P. McNichol, John M. Mack and other capitalists and politicians. Under the laws, one hundred charters were applied for the next morning—thirteen for Philadelphia. The charters were granted on June 5, and that same day a special meeting of the Philadelphia Select Council was called for Monday. There the citizens of Philadelphia met the oncoming charters, but their hearing was brief. The charters went through without a hitch, and were sent to Mayor Ashbridge on June 13.
“Macing” is a type of extreme blackmail. Once they’ve sold everything they own, the politicians start a competing company and pressure the original company to buy or sell out. While Widener and Elkins were at sea on their way to Europe in 1901, the Philadelphia ring approached the Legislature and introduced two bills that granted charters for almost all the streets and alleys not covered by tracks in Philadelphia, allowing them to run short stretches of the old companies’ tracks to make connections. Clinton Rogers Woodruff, an Assemblyman, recounted the events. Without any notice, the bills were introduced at 3 P.M. on Monday, May 29; they were reported from committee in five minutes; by 8:50 P.M., they were printed and on the members’ desks, and by 9 P.M., they passed the first reading. The bills passed a second reading the next 223 day, Memorial Day, and on the third day, they moved from the Senate to the House, where they were “jammed through” with similar speed and even worse deceit. In just six legislative days, the measures reached Governor Stone, who signed them at midnight on June 7, in front of Quay, Penrose, Congressman Foerderer, Mayor Ashbridge’s banker James P. McNichol, John M. Mack, and other businesspeople and politicians. The following morning, a hundred charters were requested—thirteen specifically for Philadelphia. The charters were granted on June 5, and on that same day, a special meeting of the Philadelphia Select Council was called for Monday. There, the citizens of Philadelphia confronted the upcoming charters, but their hearing was short. The charters went through smoothly and were sent to Mayor Ashbridge on June 13.
The mayor’s secretary stated authoritatively in the morning that the mayor would not sign that day. But he did. An unexpected incident forced his hand. John Wanamaker sent him an offer of $2,500,000 for the franchises about to be given away. Ashbridge threw the letter into the street unread. Mr. Wanamaker had deposited $250,000 as a guarantee of good faith and his action was becoming known. The ordinances were signed by midnight, and the city lost at least two 224and one-half millions of dollars; but the ring made it and much more. When Mr. Wanamaker’s letter was published, Congressman Foerderer, an incorporator of the company, answered for the machine. He said the offer was an advertisement; that it was late, and that they were sorry they hadn’t had a chance to “call the bluff.” Mr. Wanamaker responded with a renewal of the offer of $2,500,000 to the city, and, he said, “I will add $500,000 as a bonus to yourself and your associates personally for the conveyance of the grants and corporate privileges you now possess.” That ended the controversy.
The mayor’s secretary firmly announced in the morning that the mayor wouldn’t sign that day. But he did. An unexpected event changed his mind. John Wanamaker sent him an offer of $2,500,000 for the franchises that were about to be handed out. Ashbridge tossed the letter into the street without reading it. Mr. Wanamaker had put down $250,000 as a good faith deposit, and word of his action was spreading. The ordinances were signed by midnight, costing the city at least two and a half million dollars; but the ring benefited and made much more. When Mr. Wanamaker’s letter was published, Congressman Foerderer, one of the company’s incorporators, spoke for the machine. He claimed the offer was just a publicity stunt; that it came too late, and they regretted not having the opportunity to “call the bluff.” Mr. Wanamaker responded by renewing his offer of $2,500,000 to the city, and he added, “I will throw in an extra $500,000 as a bonus for you and your associates personally for transferring the grants and corporate privileges you currently hold.” That settled the dispute.
But the deal went on. Two more bills, called “Trolley Chasers,” were put through, to finish off the legislation, too hurriedly done to be perfect. One was to give the company the right to build either elevated or underground, or both; the second to forbid all further such grants without a hearing before a board consisting of the Governor, the Secretary of the Commonwealth, and the Attorney-General. With all these franchises and exclusive privileges, the new company made the old one lease their plant in operation to the company which had nothing but “rights,” or, in Pennsylvania slang, a “good, husky mace.”
But the deal continued. Two more bills, called “Trolley Chasers,” were passed to wrap up the legislation, rushed through without being perfect. One bill gave the company the right to build either elevated or underground, or both; the second bill prohibited any further grants without a hearing before a board made up of the Governor, the Secretary of the Commonwealth, and the Attorney-General. With all these franchises and exclusive privileges, the new company made the old one lease their operating plant to the company that only had “rights,” or, in Pennsylvania slang, a “good, husky mace.”
Ashbridgeism put Philadelphia and the Philadelphia machine to a test which candid ring 225leaders did not think it would stand. What did the Philadelphians do? Nothing. They have their reformers: they have men like Francis B. Reeves, who fought with every straight reform movement from the days of the Committee of One Hundred; they have men like Rudolph Blankenburg, who have fought with every reform that promised any kind of relief; there are the Municipal League, with an organization by wards, the Citizens’ Municipal League, the Allied Reform League, and the Law and Order Society; there are young men and veterans; there are disappointed politicians and ambitious men who are not advanced fast enough by the machine. There is discontent in a good many hearts, and some men are ashamed. But “the people” won’t follow. One would think the Philadelphians would follow any leader; what should they care whether he is pure white or only gray? But they do care. “The people” seem to prefer to be ruled by a known thief than an ambitious reformer. They will make you convict their Tweeds, McManeses, Butlers, and Shepherds, and even then they may forgive them and talk of monuments to their precious memory, but they take delight in the defeat of John Wanamaker because they suspect that he is a hypocrite and wants to go to the United States Senate.
Ashbridgeism challenged Philadelphia and its political machine in a way that candid leaders didn’t expect it would survive. So, what did the people of Philadelphia do? Nothing. They have their reformers: men like Francis B. Reeves, who have fought for every serious reform movement since the Committee of One Hundred; men like Rudolph Blankenburg, who have battled for every reform that offered any relief; there’s the Municipal League, organized by wards, the Citizens’ Municipal League, the Allied Reform League, and the Law and Order Society; there are young activists and seasoned veterans; there are frustrated politicians and ambitious individuals who feel like the machine isn’t promoting them quickly enough. There’s a lot of discontent among many, and some are embarrassed. But “the people” won’t follow. You’d think the Philadelphians would rally behind any leader; why should it matter whether he’s completely clean or just somewhat tarnished? But it does matter. “The people” seem to prefer being governed by a known crook rather than an ambitious reformer. They’ll convict their Tweeds, McManeses, Butlers, and Shepherds, and even then, they might forgive them and talk about monuments for their beloved memories, but they take pleasure in the failures of John Wanamaker because they suspect he’s a hypocrite with aspirations for the United States Senate.
All the stout-hearted reformers had made a campaign 226to re-elect Rothermel, the District Attorney who had dared to try Quay. Surely there was an official to support! But no, Quay was against him. The reformers used money, some $250,000, I believe,—fighting the devil with fire,—but the machine used more money, $700,000, from the teachers, “speak-easies,” office holders, bankers, and corporations. The machine handled the ballots. Rothermel was beaten by John Weaver. There have been other campaigns, before and since, led by the Municipal League, which is managed with political sense, but each successive defeat was by a larger majority for the machine.
All the determined reformers launched a campaign to re-elect Rothermel, the District Attorney who had dared to go after Quay. Surely there was someone to support! But no, Quay opposed him. The reformers raised about $250,000, fighting fire with fire, but the political machine spent even more—$700,000—from teachers, “speak-easies,” officeholders, bankers, and corporations. The machine managed the ballots. Rothermel lost to John Weaver. There have been other campaigns, both before and after, led by the Municipal League, which is run with political savvy, but each successive defeat was by an even larger margin for the machine.
There is no check upon this machine excepting the chance of a mistake, the imminent fear of treachery, and the remote danger of revolt. To meet this last, the machine, as a State organization, has set about throttling public criticism. Ashbridge found that blackmail was ineffective. Durham, Quay, and Governor Pennypacker have passed a libel law which meant to muzzle the press. The Governor was actuated apparently only by his sufferings from cartoons and comments during his campaign; the Philadelphia ring has boodling plans ahead which exposure might make exasperating to the people. The Philadelphia Press, the leading Republican organ in the State, puts it right: “The Governor wanted it [the law] 227in the hope of escaping from the unescapable cartoon. The gang wanted it in hope of muzzling the opposition to jobs.... The act is distinctly designed to gag the press in the interest of the plunderers and against the interest of the people.”
There’s no control over this machine except for the possibility of a mistake, the constant fear of betrayal, and the distant threat of rebellion. To address this last concern, the machine, acting as a State organization, has started to stifle public criticism. Ashbridge found that blackmail didn’t work. Durham, Quay, and Governor Pennypacker have introduced a libel law meant to silence the press. The Governor seems to have been driven by his frustration with cartoons and comments during his campaign; the Philadelphia ring has corrupt plans that exposure could make infuriating to the public. The Philadelphia Press, the main Republican newspaper in the State, sums it up well: “The Governor wanted it [the law] in the hope of escaping the inevitable cartoon. The gang wanted it in the hope of silencing the opposition to their jobs.... The act is clearly intended to gag the press in favor of the thieves and against the interests of the people.”
Disfranchised, without a choice of parties; denied, so the Municipal League declares, the ancient right of petition; and now to lose “free speech,”—is there no hope for Philadelphia? Yes, the Philadelphians have a very present hope. It is in their new mayor, John Weaver. There is nothing in his record to inspire faith in an outsider. He speaks himself of two notorious “miscarriages of justice” during his term as District Attorney; he was the nominee of the ring; and the ring men have confidence in him. But so have the people, and Mr. Weaver makes fair promises. So did Ashbridge. There is this difference, however: Mr. Weaver has made a good start. He compromised with the machine on his appointments, but he declared against the protection of vice, for free voting, and he stopped some “wholesale grabs” or “maces” that appeared in the Legislature, just before he took office.
Disenfranchised and without a party to choose from; denied, according to the Municipal League, the ancient right of petition; and now to lose “free speech”—is there no hope for Philadelphia? Yes, the people of Philadelphia have a current hope. It's in their new mayor, John Weaver. There's nothing in his background that inspires trust from an outsider. He himself mentions two infamous “miscarriages of justice” during his time as District Attorney; he was the choice of the political machine; and the machine's members have faith in him. But so do the citizens, and Mr. Weaver makes reasonable promises. So did Ashbridge. However, there is one key difference: Mr. Weaver has made a solid start. He made compromises with the political machine regarding his appointments, but he spoke out against the protection of vice, in favor of fair voting, and he halted some “wholesale grabs” or “maces” that cropped up in the Legislature just before he took office.
One was a bill to enable (ring) companies to “appropriate, take, and use all water within this commonwealth and belonging either to public or 228to private persons as it may require for its private purposes.” This was a scheme to sell out the water works of Philadelphia, and all other such plants in the State. Another bill was to open the way to a seizure of the light and power of the city and of the State. Martin and Warwick “leased” the city gas works. Durham and his crowd wanted a whack at it. “It shall be lawful,” the bill read, “for any city, town, or borough owning any gas works or electric light plant for supplying light, heat, and power, to sell, lease, or otherwise dispose of the same to individuals or corporations, and in order to obtain the best possible returns therefor, such municipal body may ... vest in the lessees or purchasers the exclusive right, both as against such municipal corporations and against any and all other persons and corporations, to supply gas or electricity....” As in St. Louis, the public property of the city is to be sold off. These schemes are to go through later, I am told, but on Mr. Weaver’s declarations that he would not “stand for them,” they were laid over.
One bill aimed to allow companies to "appropriately, take, and use all water within this state, whether it belongs to the public or private individuals, as they require for their own purposes." This was a plan to sell the waterworks of Philadelphia and other similar plants in the state. Another bill sought to pave the way for taking control of the city and state’s electricity and power. Martin and Warwick "leased" the city gas works. Durham and his group wanted their shot at it. "It shall be lawful," the bill stated, "for any city, town, or borough that owns gas works or electric plants supplying light, heat, and power to sell, lease, or otherwise dispose of them to individuals or corporations. To get the best possible returns, such municipal bodies may... grant the lessees or purchasers the exclusive rights against those municipal corporations and all other individuals and corporations to supply gas or electricity..." Just like in St. Louis, the city's public property is set to be sold off. I've been told these plans will be pushed through later, but because Mr. Weaver declared he wouldn’t “accept them,” they were postponed.
It looks as if the Philadelphians were right about Mr. Weaver, but what if they are? Think of a city putting its whole faith in one man, in the hope that John Weaver, an Englishman by birth, will give them good government! And 229why should he do that? Why should he serve the people and not the ring? The ring can make or break him; the people of Philadelphia can neither reward nor punish him. For even if he restores to them their ballots and proves himself a good mayor, he cannot succeed himself; the good charter forbids more than one term.
It seems like the people of Philadelphia were right about Mr. Weaver, but what if they are? Imagine a city putting all its trust in one person, hoping that John Weaver, an Englishman by birth, will provide them with good government! And why would he do that? Why would he choose to serve the people instead of the political machine? The machine can either make or break him; the people of Philadelphia can't really reward or punish him. Even if he gives them back their right to vote and proves he's a good mayor, he can't get re-elected; the good charter only allows for one term.
CHICAGO: HALF FREE AND FIGHTING ON
While these articles on municipal corruption were appearing, readers of them were writing to the magazine asking what they, as citizens, were to do about it all. As if I knew; as if “we” knew; as if there were any one way to deal with this problem in all places under any circumstances. There isn’t, and if I had gone around with a ready-made reform scheme in the back of my head, it would have served only to keep me from seeing straight the facts that would not support my theory. The only editorial scheme we had was to study a few choice examples of bad city government and tell how the bad was accomplished, then seek out, here and abroad, some typical good governments and explain how the good was done;—not how to do it, mind you, but how it had been done. Though the bad government series was not yet complete, since so many good men apparently want to go to work right off, it was decided to pause for an instance on the reform side. I have chosen the best I have found. Political grafters have been cheerful enough to tell me 234they have “got lots of pointers” from the corruption articles. I trust the reformers will pick up some “pointers” from—Chicago.
While these articles on municipal corruption were being published, readers were writing to the magazine, asking what they, as citizens, could do about it all. As if I knew; as if “we” knew; as if there was any one way to tackle this issue in every place under any circumstances. There isn’t, and if I had gone around with a ready-made reform plan in my head, it would have only blinded me to the facts that didn’t fit my theory. Our only editorial approach was to examine a few select examples of poor city governance and explain how the bad was achieved, then look for examples of effective governance both locally and abroad and explain how the good was done;—not how to do it, mind you, but how it had been done. Although the series on bad governance wasn’t yet complete, since so many good people seemed eager to start right away, we decided to take a moment to focus on the reform side. I have chosen the best example I could find. Political crooks have been more than happy to tell me they have “got lots of tips” from the corruption articles. I hope the reformers will pick up some “tips” from—Chicago.
Yes, Chicago. First in violence, deepest in dirt; loud, lawless, unlovely, ill-smelling, irreverent, new; an overgrown gawk of a village, the “tough” among cities, a spectacle for the nation;—I give Chicago no quarter and Chicago asks for none. “Good,” they cheer, when you find fault; “give us the gaff. We deserve it and it does us good.” They do deserve it. Lying low beside a great lake of pure, cold water, the city has neither enough nor good enough water. With the ingenuity and will to turn their sewer, the Chicago River, and make it run backwards and upwards out of the Lake, the city cannot solve the smoke nuisance. With resources for a magnificent system of public parking, it is too poor to pave and clean the streets. They can balance high buildings on rafts floating in mud, but they can’t quench the stench of the stockyards. The enterprise which carried through a World’s Fair to a world’s triumph is satisfied with two thousand five hundred policemen for two million inhabitants and one hundred and ninety-six square miles of territory, a force so insufficient (and inefficient) that it cannot protect itself, to say nothing of handling mobs, riotous strikers, and the rest of that lawlessness which disgraces Chicago. 235Though the city has an extra-legal system of controlling vice and crime, which is so effective that the mayor has been able to stop any practices against which he has turned his face—the “panel game,” the “hat game,” “wine rooms,” “safe blowing”;—though gambling is limited, regulated, and fair, and prostitution orderly; though, in short, through the power of certain political and criminal leaders—the mayor has been able to make Chicago, criminally speaking, “honest”—burglary and cruel hold-ups are tolerated. As government, all this is preposterous.
Yes, Chicago. First in violence, deepest in dirt; loud, lawless, unappealing, smelly, irreverent, and new; an overgrown mess of a village, the "tough" among cities, a spectacle for the nation;—I give Chicago no break and Chicago asks for none. “Good,” they cheer, when you criticize; “give us the truth. We deserve it and it helps us.” They do deserve it. Lying low beside a great lake of pure, cold water, the city has neither enough nor good quality water. With the creativity and determination to turn their sewer, the Chicago River, and make it flow backward and upward out of the Lake, the city can’t solve the smoke problem. With resources for a fantastic public parking system, it is too broke to pave and clean the streets. They can balance tall buildings on rafts floating in mud, but they can’t eliminate the stink of the stockyards. The city that hosted a World’s Fair with worldwide success is satisfied with two thousand five hundred police officers for two million residents and one hundred and ninety-six square miles of land, a force so inadequate (and ineffective) that it can’t even protect itself, let alone manage mobs, violent strikers, and the other chaos that discredits Chicago. 235 Though the city has an unofficial system for controlling vice and crime, which is so effective that the mayor has been able to stop any practices he's opposed to—the “panel game,” the “hat game,” “wine rooms,” “safe blowing”;—even though gambling is limited, regulated, and fair, and prostitution is orderly; in short, thanks to certain political and criminal leaders—the mayor has managed to make Chicago, criminally speaking, “honest”—burglary and brutal hold-ups are tolerated. As a form of government, all this is absurd.
But I do not cite Chicago as an example of good municipal government, nor yet of good American municipal government; New York has, for the moment, a much better administration. But neither is Chicago a good example of bad government. There is grafting there, but after St. Louis it seems petty and after Philadelphia most unprofessional. Chicago is interesting for the things it has “fixed.” What is wrong there is ridiculous. Politically and morally speaking, Chicago should be celebrated among American cities for reform, real reform, not moral fits and political uprisings, not reform waves that wash the “best people” into office to make fools of themselves and subside leaving the machine stronger than ever,—none of these aristocratic 236disappointments of popular government,—but reform that reforms, slow, sure, political, democratic reform, by the people, for the people. That is what Chicago has. It has found a way. I don’t know that it is the way. All that I am sure of is that Chicago has something to teach every city and town in the country—including Chicago.
But I don't mention Chicago as an example of good city governance, nor of good American city governance; New York currently has a much better administration. However, Chicago isn't a great example of bad government either. There's corruption there, but after St. Louis, it seems petty, and after Philadelphia, it's almost unprofessional. Chicago is fascinating for the issues it has “fixed.” What's wrong there is ridiculous. Politically and morally, Chicago should be recognized among American cities for real reform, not just moral panic or political chaos, not reform movements that bring the “best people” into office only for them to embarrass themselves and disappear, leaving the machine stronger than ever—none of these aristocratic letdowns of democracy—but reform that actually brings change, slow and steady, political, democratic reform by the people, for the people. That's what Chicago has. It has found a way. I’m not sure it’s the way. All I know for sure is that Chicago has lessons to offer every city and town in the country—including Chicago.
For Chicago is reformed only in spots. A political map of the city would show a central circle of white with a few white dots and dashes on a background of black, gray, and yellow. But the city once was pretty solid black. Criminally it was wide open; commercially it was brazen; socially it was thoughtless and raw; it was a settlement of individuals and groups and interests with no common city sense and no political conscience. Everybody was for himself, none was for Chicago. There were political parties, but the organizations were controlled by rings, which in turn were parts of State rings, which in turn were backed and used by leading business interests through which this corrupt and corrupting system reached with its ramifications far and high and low into the social organization. The grafting was miscellaneous and very general; but the most open corruption was that which centered in the City Council. It never was well organized and orderly. The aldermen had “combines,” leaders, and prices, 237but, a lot of good-natured honest thieves, they were independent of party bosses and “the organizations,” which were busy at their own graft. They were so unbusinesslike that business men went into the City Council to reduce the festival of blackmail to decent and systematic bribery. These men helped matters some, but the happy-go-lucky spirit persisted until the advent of Charles T. Yerkes from Philadelphia, who, with his large experience of Pennsylvania methods, first made boodling a serious business. He had to go right into politics himself to get anything done. But he did get things done. The aldermanic combine was fast selling out the city to its “best citizens,” when some decent men spoke up and called upon the people to stop it, the people who alone can stop such things.
Chicago has been reformed only in parts. A political map of the city would show a central area of white with some white dots and dashes against a backdrop of black, gray, and yellow. But the city used to be mostly black. It was wide open to crime; commerce was bold; socially it was careless and rough; it was a mix of individuals, groups, and interests with no shared sense of the city and no political responsibility. Everyone looked out for themselves, with no one caring for Chicago. There were political parties, but the organizations were controlled by rings, which were part of State rings, supported and manipulated by leading business interests, creating a corrupt system with wide-ranging effects throughout the social structure. The bribery was varied and widespread; however, the most blatant corruption was found within the City Council. It was never very organized or orderly. The aldermen had “combines,” leaders, and prices, but, being mostly good-natured dishonest politicians, they operated independently of party bosses and “the organizations,” which were preoccupied with their own corrupt dealings. They were so unprofessional that business people entered the City Council to turn the chaos of extortion into proper and systematic bribery. These individuals made some improvements, but the carefree attitude remained until Charles T. Yerkes arrived from Philadelphia, who, with his extensive experience in Pennsylvania methods, made corrupt practices a serious business. He had to get directly involved in politics to accomplish anything. But he did get things done. The aldermanic combine was quickly selling the city to its “best citizens” when some decent people spoke up and urged the public to put a stop to it, as it is the people who ultimately have the power to end such issues.
And the people of Chicago stopped it; they have beaten boodling. That is about all they have done so far, but that is about all they have tried deliberately and systematically to do, and the way they have done that proves that they can do anything they set out to do. They worry about the rest; half free, they are not half satisfied and not half done. But boodling, with its backing of “big men” and “big interests,” is the hardest evil a democracy has to fight, and a people who can beat it can beat anything.
And the people of Chicago stopped it; they’ve beaten corruption. That’s pretty much all they’ve done so far, but it’s also the only thing they’ve intentionally and systematically set out to accomplish, and the way they’ve gone about it shows they can achieve anything they aim for. They’re concerned about other issues; being half free, they’re not half satisfied and they’re not halfway done. But corruption, with its support from “big players” and “big interests,” is the toughest challenge a democracy has to face, and a people who can overcome it can conquer anything.
238Every community, city, town, village, State—the United States itself—has a certain number of men who are willing, if it doesn’t cost anything, to vote right. They don’t want to “hurt their business”; they “can’t afford the time to go to the primaries”; they don’t care to think much. But they will vote. This may not be much, but it is enough. All that this independent, non-partisan vote wants is leadership, and that is what the Chicago reformers furnished.
238Every community, city, town, village, and state—the United States as a whole—has some people who are willing to vote the right way if it doesn’t cost them anything. They don’t want to jeopardize their business; they “can’t afford the time to go to the primaries”; they don’t really want to think too much about it. But they will vote. It might not seem like much, but it’s enough. All that this independent, non-partisan vote wants is leadership, and that’s exactly what the Chicago reformers provided.
They had no such definite idea when they began. They had no theory at all—nothing but wrath, experience, common Chicago sense, and newspapers ready to back reform, not for the news, but for the common good. Theories they had tried; and exposures, celebrated trials, even some convictions of boodlers. They had gone in for a civil-service reform law, and, by the way, they got a good one, probably the best in any city in the country. But exposés are good only for one election; court trials may punish individuals, but even convictions do not break up a corrupt system; and a “reform law” without reform citizenship is like a ship without a crew. With all their “reforms,” bad government persisted. There was that bear garden—the City Council; something ought to be done to that. Men like William Kent, John H. Hamline, W. R. Manierre, A. W. 239Maltby, and James R. Mann had gone in there from their “respectable” wards, and their presence proved that they could get there; their speeches were public protests, and their votes, “no,” “no,” “no,” were plain indicators of wrong. But all this was not enough. The Civic Federation, a respectable but inefficient universal reforming association, met without plans in 1895. It called together two hundred representative men, with Lyman J. Gage at their head, to “do something.” The two hundred appointed a committee of fifteen to “find something to do.” One of the fifteen drew forth a fully drawn plan for a new municipal party, the old, old scheme. “That won’t do,” said Edwin Burritt Smith to Mr. Gage, who sat beside him. “No, that won’t do,” said Gage. But they didn’t know what to do. To gain time Mr. Smith moved a sub-committee. The sub-committee reported back to the fifteen, the fifteen to the two hundred. And so, as Mr. Smith said, they “fumbled.”
They didn’t have a clear idea when they started. They didn't have a theory—just anger, experience, common sense from Chicago, and newspapers eager to support reform, not for headlines, but for the greater good. They had tried theories, exposed corruption, held high-profile trials, even secured some convictions of corrupt officials. They had pushed for a civil-service reform law and, by the way, they ended up with a solid one, probably the best in any city in the country. But exposés only work for one election; court trials can penalize individuals, but even convictions don't dismantle a corrupt system; and a “reform law” without reform-minded citizens is like a ship without a crew. Despite all their “reforms,” bad governance continued. There was that circus—City Council; something needed to change. People like William Kent, John H. Hamline, W. R. Manierre, A. W. Maltby, and James R. Mann had come from their “respectable” neighborhoods, proving they could get in; their speeches were public protests, and their votes of “no,” “no,” “no,” clearly indicated wrongdoings. But that wasn’t enough. The Civic Federation, a respectable but ineffective universal reform group, gathered without a specific plan in 1895. They brought together two hundred representatives, with Lyman J. Gage leading, to “do something.” The two hundred appointed a committee of fifteen to “find something to do.” One of the fifteen proposed a detailed plan for a new municipal party, the same old idea. “That won’t work,” Edwin Burritt Smith told Mr. Gage, who was sitting next to him. “No, that won’t work,” Gage agreed. But they had no idea what to do instead. To buy some time, Mr. Smith suggested they form a sub-committee. The sub-committee reported back to the fifteen, and then the fifteen reported back to the two hundred. So, as Mr. Smith put it, they “fumbled.”
But notice what they didn’t do. Fumblers as they were, they didn’t talk of more exposures. “Heavens, we know enough,” said one. They didn’t go to the Legislature for a new charter. They needed one, they need one to-day, and badly, too, but the men who didn’t know what, but did know what not to do, wouldn’t let them commit 240the folly of asking one corrupt legislature to legislate another corrupt legislature out of existence. And they didn’t wait till the next mayoralty election to elect a “business mayor” who should give them good government.
But notice what they didn’t do. Clumsy as they were, they didn’t talk about needing more exposures. “Goodness, we know enough,” said one. They didn’t go to the Legislature for a new charter. They needed one, they need one today, and really, they do, but the people who didn’t know what to do, but did know what not to do, wouldn’t let them make the mistake of asking one corrupt legislature to get rid of another corrupt legislature. And they didn’t wait until the next mayoral election to elect a “business mayor” who would provide them with good government.
They were bound to accept the situation just as it was—the laws, the conditions, the political circumstances, all exactly as they were—and, just as a politician would, go into the next fight whatever it was and fight. All they needed was a fighter. So it was moved to find a man, one man, and let this man find eight other men, who should organize the “Municipal Voters’ League.” There were no instructions; the very name was chosen because it meant nothing and might mean anything.
They had no choice but to accept things as they were—the laws, the conditions, the political situation—exactly how they stood—and just like a politician, head into the next battle, whatever it was, and fight. All they needed was a fighter. So it was decided to find one man, and let that man find eight others to form the “Municipal Voters’ League.” There were no guidelines; the name was picked because it didn’t mean anything specific and could mean anything at all.
But the man! That was the problem. There were men, a few, but the one man is always hard to find. There was William Kent, rich, young, afraid of nothing and always ready, but he was an alderman, and the wise ones declared that the Nine must not only be disinterested, but must appear so. William Kent wouldn’t do. Others were suggested; none that would do.
But the man! That was the issue. There were a few men, but finding the right man is always tough. There was William Kent, wealthy, young, fearless, and always prepared, but he was an alderman, and the wise folks said that the Nine had to be not only impartial but also seem that way. William Kent wouldn’t work. Others were proposed; none of them were suitable.
“How about George E. Cole?”
"What about George E. Cole?"
“Just the man,” said Mr. Gage, and all knew the thought was an inspiration.
“Just the man,” said Mr. Gage, and everyone knew that the idea was brilliant.
George E. Cole described himself to me as a 241“second-class business man.” Standing about five feet high, he knows he is no taller; but he knows that that is tall enough. Cole is a fighter. Nobody discovered it, perhaps, till he was past his fiftieth year. Then one Martin B. Madden found it out. Madden, a prominent citizen, president of the Western Stone Company, and a man of tremendous political power, was one of the business men who went into the Council to bring order out of the chaos of corruption. He was a Yerkes leader. Madden lived in Cole’s ward. His house was in sight of Cole’s house. “The sight of it made me hot,” said Cole, “for I knew what it represented.” Cole had set out to defeat Madden, and he made a campaign which attracted the attention of the whole town. Madden was re-elected, but Cole had proved himself, and that was what made Lyman J. Gage say that Cole was “just the man.”
George E. Cole referred to himself as a “second-class businessman.” He stands about five feet tall, and he knows that’s how tall he is; but he also knows that it's tall enough. Cole is a fighter. Nobody realized it, maybe, until he was past his fifties. Then, Martin B. Madden discovered it. Madden, a well-known figure, president of the Western Stone Company, and a man with significant political influence, was one of the business leaders who entered the Council to bring order out of the chaos of corruption. He was a Yerkes leader. Madden lived in Cole’s ward. His house was visible from Cole’s house. “Seeing it made me angry,” said Cole, “because I knew what it stood for.” Cole set out to defeat Madden, launching a campaign that caught the attention of the entire town. Madden was re-elected, but Cole had proven himself, and that’s what made Lyman J. Gage say that Cole was “just the man.”
“You come to me as a Hobson’s choice,” said Mr. Cole to the committee, “as a sort of forlorn hope. All right,” he added, “as a last chance, I’ll take it.”
“You’re giving me a Hobson’s choice,” Mr. Cole said to the committee, “like a kind of desperate hope. Fine,” he added, “as a final opportunity, I’ll go for it.”
Cole went out to make up the Nine. He chose William H. Colvin, a wealthy business man, retired; Edwin Burritt Smith, publicist and lawyer; M. J. Carroll, ex-labor leader, ex-typesetter, an editorial writer on a trade journal; Frank Wells, 242a well-known real estate man; R. R. Donnelly, the head of one of the greatest printing establishments in the city; and Hoyt King, a young lawyer who turned out to be a natural investigator. These made, with Cole himself, only seven, but he had the help and counsel of Kent, Allen B. Pond, the architect, Judge Murray F. Tuley, Francis Lackner, and Graham Taylor. “We were just a few commonplace, ordinary men,” said one of them to me, “and there is your encouragement for other commonplace, ordinary men.” These men were selected for what they could do, however, not for what they “represented.” The One Hundred, which the Nine were to complete, was to do the representing. But the One Hundred never was completed, and the ward committee, a feature of the first campaign, was abandoned later on. “The boss and the ring” was the model of the Nine, only they did not know it. They were not thinking of principles and methods. Work was their instinct and the fighting has always been thick. The next election was to be held in April, and by the time they were ready February was half over. Since it was to be an election of aldermen, they went right out after the aldermen. There were sixty-eight in all—fifty-seven of them “thieves,” as the League reported promptly and plainly. Of the sixty-eight, the terms of thirty-four 243were expiring, and these all were likely to come up for re-election.
Cole went out to form the Nine. He picked William H. Colvin, a wealthy retired businessman; Edwin Burritt Smith, a publicist and lawyer; M. J. Carroll, a former labor leader and typesetter, who was now an editorial writer for a trade journal; Frank Wells, a well-known real estate agent; R. R. Donnelly, the head of one of the largest printing companies in the city; and Hoyt King, a young lawyer who turned out to be a natural investigator. This brought the total to seven, but he also had the support and advice of Kent, architect Allen B. Pond, Judge Murray F. Tuley, Francis Lackner, and Graham Taylor. “We were just a few regular, ordinary guys,” one of them told me, “and that’s your inspiration for other regular, ordinary people.” These men were chosen for what they could accomplish, not for what they “represented.” The One Hundred, which the Nine were meant to finish, was supposed to do the representing. But the One Hundred was never completed, and the ward committee, which was part of the first campaign, was later dropped. “The boss and the ring” was the model for the Nine, though they didn’t realize it. They weren’t focused on principles and methods. Work was their instinct, and the fighting had always been intense. The next election was set for April, and by the time they were ready, February was already halfway over. Since this was an election for aldermen, they immediately went after the aldermen. There were sixty-eight in total—fifty-seven of them labeled “thieves,” according to the League’s prompt and straightforward report. Of the sixty-eight, the terms of thirty-four were expiring, and all of these were likely to come up for re-election.
The thing to do was to beat the rascals. But how? Mr. Cole and his committee were pioneers; they had to blaze the way, and, without plans, they set about it directly. Seeking votes, and honest votes, with no organization to depend upon, they had to have publicity. “We had first to let people know we were there,” said Cole, so he stepped “out into the lime-light” and, with his short legs apart, his weak eyes blinking, he talked. The League was out to beat the boodlers up for re-election, he said, with much picturesque English. Now Chicago is willing to have anybody try to do anything worth while in Chicago; no matter who you are or where you come from, Chicago will give you a cheer and a first boost. When, therefore, George E. Cole stood up and said he and a quiet little committee were going to beat some politicians at the game of politics, the good-natured town said: “All right, go ahead and beat ‘em; but how?” Cole was ready with his answer. “We’re going to publish the records of the thieves who want to get back at the trough.” Alderman Kent and his decent colleagues produced the records of their indecent colleagues, and the League announced that of the thirty-four retiring aldermen, twenty-six were rogues. Hoyt 244King and a staff of briefless young lawyers looked up ward records, and “these also we will publish,” said Cole. And they did; the Chicago newspapers, long on the right side and ever ready, printed them, and they were “mighty interesting reading.” Edwin Burritt Smith stated the facts; Cole added “ginger,” and Kent “pepper and salt and vinegar.” They soon had publicity. Some of the committee shrank from the worst of it, but Cole stood out and took it. He became a character in the town. He was photographed and caricatured; he was “Boss Cole” and “Old King Cole,” but all was grist to this reform mill. Some of the retiring aldermen retired at once. Others were retired. If information turned up by Hoyt King was too private for publication, the committee was, and is to-day, capable of sending for the candidate and advising him to get off the ticket. This was called “blackmail,” and I will call it that, if the word will help anybody to appreciate how hard these reform politicians played and play the game.
The goal was to take down the crooks. But how? Mr. Cole and his committee were trailblazers; they had to forge a path, and without any plans, they got right to it. In search of votes—honest votes, without any organization to lean on—they needed publicity. “First, we had to let people know we were here,” Cole said, so he stepped “into the spotlight” and, with his short legs apart and his weak eyes blinking, he spoke. The League aimed to take on the corrupt politicians running for re-election, he said, using some colorful language. Chicago welcomes anyone trying to do something meaningful; no matter who you are or where you come from, Chicago will cheer you on and give you a boost. So, when George E. Cole stood up and announced that he and a quiet little committee were going to outsmart some politicians at their own game, the friendly town responded: “Okay, go for it; but how?” Cole had his answer ready. “We’re going to publicize the records of the thieves trying to get back to the trough.” Alderman Kent and his respectable colleagues revealed the records of their shady counterparts, and the League claimed that out of the thirty-four retiring aldermen, twenty-six were corrupt. Hoyt King and a team of inexperienced young lawyers dug into public records, and “we will publish these too,” Cole said. And they did; the Chicago newspapers, always on the right side and ready to help, printed them, and they were “really interesting to read.” Edwin Burritt Smith laid out the facts; Cole added some “spice,” and Kent brought in “seasoning.” They quickly gained publicity. Some committee members were uncomfortable with the harsh realities, but Cole embraced it. He became a local figure. He was photographed and caricatured; he was called “Boss Cole” and “Old King Cole,” but it all fueled the reform movement. Some of the retiring aldermen left immediately. Others were pushed out. If information unearthed by Hoyt King was too sensitive for public release, the committee was, and still is today, capable of calling the candidate in and advising him to withdraw from the race. This was labeled “blackmail,” and I’ll refer to it that way if it helps anyone understand just how fiercely these reform politicians played the game.
While they were talking, however, they were working, and their work was done in the wards. Each ward was separately studied, the politics of each was separately understood, and separately each ward was fought. Declaring only for “aggressive honesty” at first, not competence, they 245did not stick even to that. They wanted to beat the rascals that were in, and, if necessary, if they couldn’t hope to elect an honest man, they helped a likely rascal to beat the rascal that was in and known. They drew up a pledge of loyalty to public interest, but they didn’t insist on it in some cases. Like the politicians, they were opportunists. Like the politicians, too, they were non-partisans. They played off one party against another, or, if the two organizations hung together, they put up an independent. They broke many a cherished reform principle, but few rules of practical politics. Thus, while they had some of their own sort of men nominated, they did not attempt, they did not think of running “respectable” or “business” candidates as such. Neither were they afraid to dicker with ward leaders and “corrupt politicians.” They went down into the ward, urged the minority organization leader to name a “good man,” on promise of independent support, then campaigned against the majority nominee with circulars, house-to-house canvassers, mass-meetings, bands, speakers, and parades. I should say that the basic unstated principle of this reform movement, struck out early in the practice of the Nine, was to let the politicians rule, but through better and better men whom the Nine forced upon them with public opinion. But again 246I want to emphasize the fact that they had no finespun theories and no definite principles beyond that of being always for the best available man. They were with the Democrats in one ward, with the Republicans in another, but in none were they respecters of persons.
While they were talking, they were also working, and their work was done in the wards. Each ward was studied on its own, the politics of each were understood individually, and battles were fought for each ward separately. Initially, they only declared for “aggressive honesty,” not competence, but they didn’t even stick to that. Their goal was to defeat the current rascals, and if they couldn't get an honest candidate elected, they supported a likely rascal to beat the known rascal in power. They created a pledge of loyalty to public interest but didn’t always enforce it. Like politicians, they were opportunists and non-partisan. They played one party against another, or if both parties joined forces, they put up an independent candidate. They broke many cherished reform principles but very few practical politics rules. While they nominated some of their own kind, they didn't consider running “respectable” or “business” candidates. They weren’t afraid to negotiate with ward leaders and “corrupt politicians.” They went into the wards, encouraged minority organization leaders to propose a “good man” in exchange for independent support, and then campaigned against the majority nominee with pamphlets, door-to-door canvassing, mass meetings, bands, speakers, and parades. The underlying, unstated principle of this reform movement, which was established early on by the Nine, was to let politicians rule but through better and better men whom the Nine pushed forward with public opinion. But again, I want to emphasize that they had no intricate theories or definite principles beyond always supporting the best available candidate. They aligned with Democrats in one ward and Republicans in another, but they didn't favor anyone because of who they were.
Right here appeared that insidious influence which we have seen defeating or opposing reform in other cities—the interference of respectable men to save their friends. In the Twenty-second Ward the Democrats nominated a director (now deceased) of the First National Bank and a prominent man socially and financially. John Colvin, one of the “Big Four,” a politician who had gone away rich to Europe and was returning to go back into politics, also was running. The League preferred John Maynard Harlan, a son of Justice Harlan, and they elected him. The bank of which the respectable Democratic candidate was a director was the bank of which Lyman J. Gage, of the League, was president. All that the League had against this man was that he was the proprietor of a house leased for questionable purposes, and his friends, including Mr. Gage, were highly indignant. Mr. Gage pleaded and protested. The committee was “sick of pulls” and they made short work of this most “respectable” pull. They had “turned down” politicians on 247no better excuse, and they declared they were not going to overlook in the friend of their friends what they condemned in some poor devil who had no friends.
Right here was that sneaky influence we’ve seen undermining or resisting reform in other cities—the interference of respectable people trying to protect their friends. In the Twenty-second Ward, the Democrats nominated a director (now deceased) of the First National Bank, a well-known figure socially and financially. John Colvin, one of the “Big Four,” a politician who had gotten rich and moved to Europe, was trying to get back into politics. The League preferred John Maynard Harlan, the son of Justice Harlan, and they elected him. The bank where the respectable Democratic candidate was a director was the same bank where Lyman J. Gage from the League was president. The only issue the League had with this man was that he owned a property leased for questionable activities, and his friends, including Mr. Gage, were very upset about it. Mr. Gage argued and protested. The committee was “sick of pulls,” and they dealt quickly with this so-called “respectable” influence. They had rejected politicians for even less reason before, and they stated they wouldn’t overlook in a friend of their friends what they condemned in some unfortunate person who had no allies.
There were many such cases, then and later; this sort of thing has never ceased and it never will cease; reform must always “go too far,” if it is to go at all, for it is up there in the “too far” that corruption has its source. The League, by meeting it early, and “spotting it,” as Mr. Cole said, not only discouraged such interference, but fixed its own character and won public confidence. For everything in those days was open. The League works more quietly now, but then Cole was talking it all out, plain to the verge of brutality, forcible to the limit of language, and honest to utter ruthlessness. He blundered and they all made mistakes, but their blundering only helped them, for while the errors were plain errors, the fairness of mind that rejected an Edward M. Stanwood, for example, was plain too. Stanwood, a respectable business man, had served as alderman, but his re-election was advised against by the League because he had “voted with the gang.” A high public official, three judges, and several other prominent men interceded on the ground that “in every instance where he is charged with having voted for a so-called boodle ordinance, it 248was not done corruptly, but that he might secure votes for some meritorious measure.” The League answered in this style: “We regard this defense, which is put forward with confidence by men of your standing, as painful evidence of the low standard by which the public conduct of city officials has come to be measured by good citizens. Do you not know that this is one of the most insidious and common forms of legislative corruption?” Mr. Stanwood was defeated.
There were many cases like this, both then and later; this kind of thing has never stopped and never will stop. Reform always has to “go too far” if it’s going to happen at all, because it’s in that “too far” where corruption begins. The League, by addressing it early and “spotting it,” as Mr. Cole said, not only discouraged such interference but also established its own integrity and gained public trust. Everything was transparent back then. The League operates more quietly now, but Cole was very straightforward, almost brutally honest, pushing the limits of language with his candor. He made mistakes, and so did they all, but their errors actually helped them because, while the mistakes were clear mistakes, the fairness that led to rejecting an Edward M. Stanwood, for instance, was obvious as well. Stanwood, a respectable businessman who had served as an alderman, was not recommended for re-election by the League because he had “voted with the gang.” A high public official, three judges, and several other prominent figures intervened, arguing that “in every case where he is accused of voting for a so-called boodle ordinance, it was not done corruptly but to secure votes for some worthy legislation.” The League responded like this: “We view this defense, confidently presented by men of your stature, as painful evidence of the low standard to which the public conduct of city officials has fallen according to good citizens. Don’t you realize this is one of the most deceptive and common forms of legislative corruption?” Mr. Stanwood was defeated.
The League “made good.” Of the twenty-six outgoing aldermen with bad records, sixteen were not renominated. Of the ten who were, four were beaten at the polls. The League’s recommendations were followed in twenty-five wards; they were disregarded in five; in some wards no fight was made.
The League "came through." Out of the twenty-six outgoing aldermen with poor records, sixteen were not re-nominated. Of the ten who were, four lost at the polls. The League's suggestions were followed in twenty-five wards; they were ignored in five; in some wards, there was no contest at all.
A victory so extraordinary would have satisfied some reformers. Others would have been inflated by it and ruined. These men became canny. They chose this propitious moment to get rid of the committee of One Hundred respectables. Such a body is all very well to launch a reform, when no one knows that it is going to do serious work; but, as the Cole committee had learned, representative men with many interests can be reached. The little committee incorporated the League, then called together the big committee, 249congratulated it, and proposed a constitution and by-laws which would throw all the work—and all the power—to the little committee. The little committee was to call on the big committee only as money or some “really important” help was needed. The big committee approved, swelled up, adjourned, and that is the last time it has ever met.
A victory this remarkable would have pleased some reformers. Others would have become overconfident and self-destructive. These men became shrewd. They picked this favorable moment to dismantle the committee of One Hundred respectable individuals. Such a group is useful for starting a reform, especially when no one expects it to engage in serious work; but, as the Cole committee discovered, influential people with various interests can be influenced. The small committee formed the League, then brought together the larger committee, congratulated it, and suggested a constitution and by-laws that would assign all the work—and all the power—to the small committee. The small committee would only rely on the larger committee for funding or some “really important” assistance. The larger committee agreed, inflated its ego, adjourned, and that’s the last time it ever gathered.
Thus free of “pulls,” gentlemanly pulls, but pulls just the same, the “nine” became nine by adding two—Allen B. Pond and Francis Lackner—and prepared for the next campaign. Their aldermen, the “reform crowd,” in the City Council were too few to do anything alone, but they could protest, and they did. They adopted the system of William Kent, which was to find out what was going on and tell it in Council meetings.
Thus free of "influences," gentlemanly influences, but influences just the same, the "nine" became nine by adding two—Allen B. Pond and Francis Lackner—and got ready for the next campaign. Their aldermen, the "reform crowd," in the City Council were too few to do anything alone, but they could protest, and they did. They adopted the system of William Kent, which was to find out what was happening and report it in Council meetings.
“If you go on giving away the people’s franchises like this,” Alderman Harlan would say, “you may wake up some morning to find street lamps are useful for other purposes than lighting the streets.” Or, “Some night the citizens, who are watching you, may come down here from the galleries with pieces of hemp in their hands.” Then he would picture an imagined scene of the galleries rising and coming down upon the floor. He made his descriptions so vivid and creepy that they made some aldermen fidget. “I don’t like dis 250business all about street lamps and hemp—vot dot is?” said a German boodler one night. “We don’t come here for no such a business.”
“If you keep handing out the people’s rights like this,” Alderman Harlan would say, “you might find yourself waking up one morning to realize that street lamps can be used for more than just lighting the streets.” Or, “One night, the citizens who are watching you might come down from the galleries with pieces of rope in their hands.” Then he would vividly imagine the scene of the galleries rising and coming down to the floor. His descriptions were so intense and unsettling that they made some aldermen squirm. “I don’t like this whole thing about street lamps and rope—what’s that all about?” a German boodler said one night. “We didn’t come here for that kind of business.”
“We meant only to make head-lines for the papers,” said one of the reform aldermen. “If we could keep the attention of the public upon the Council we could make clear what was going on there, and that would put meaning into our next campaign. And we certainly did fill the galleries and the newspapers.”
“We just wanted to grab headlines for the papers,” said one of the reform aldermen. “If we could keep the public’s attention on the Council, we could clarify what was happening there, and that would give purpose to our next campaign. And we definitely packed the galleries and the newspapers.”
As a matter of fact, however, they did much more. They developed in that year the issue which has dominated Chicago local politics ever since—the proper compensation to the city for public franchises. These valuable rights should not be given away, they declared, and they repeated it for good measures as well as bad. Not only must the city be paid, but public convenience and interest must be safeguarded. The boodlers boodled and the franchises went off; the protestation hurried the rotten business; but even that haste helped the cause. For the sight, week after week, of the boodle raids by rapacious capital fixed public opinion, and if the cry raised then for municipal ownership ever becomes a fact in Chicago, capital can go back to those days and blame itself.
Actually, they did a lot more than that. That year, they focused on the issue that has shaped Chicago's local politics ever since—the fair payment to the city for public franchises. They insisted that these valuable rights shouldn’t just be handed out for free, and they repeated this point, both to reinforce their argument and to highlight the negative consequences. Not only should the city receive compensation, but the needs and interests of the public must also be protected. The corrupt officials engaged in their shady dealings, and the franchises were taken away; the protests only sped up the corrupt activities. However, that urgency ended up benefiting the cause. After all, witnessing the ongoing exploitation by greedy capitalists week after week shaped public opinion. If the push for municipal ownership ever becomes a reality in Chicago, capital can look back to those days and hold itself accountable.
Most of the early Chicago street railway franchises 251were limited, carelessly, to twenty-five years—the first one in 1858. In 1883, when the earliest franchises might have been terminated, the Council ventured to pass only a blanket extension for twenty years—till July 30, 1903. This was well enough for Chicago financiers, but in 1886–87, when Yerkes appeared, with Widener and Elkins behind him, and bought up the West and North Side companies, he applied Pennsylvania methods. He pushed bills through the Legislature, saw them vetoed by Governor Altgeld, set about having his own Governor next time, and in 1897 got, not all that he wanted (for the people of Illinois are not like the people of Pennsylvania), but the Allen bill, which would do—if the Chicago City Council of 1897 would give it force.
Most of the early streetcar franchises in Chicago were carelessly set for just twenty-five years, starting with the first one in 1858. By 1883, when the earliest franchises could have ended, the City Council only passed a blanket extension for an additional twenty years—until July 30, 1903. This worked fine for Chicago's investors, but in 1886–87, when Yerkes came along with Widener and Elkins backing him, he used strategies from Pennsylvania. He pushed legislation through the state legislature, saw them vetoed by Governor Altgeld, and aimed to install his own governor next time. By 1897, he got the Allen bill, which wasn’t everything he wanted (since the people of Illinois don’t behave like those in Pennsylvania), but it was enough—if the City Council of Chicago in 1897 would enforce it.
The Municipal Voters’ League had begun its second campaign in December, 1896, with the publication of the records of the retiring aldermen, the second half of the old body, and, though this was before the Allen bill was passed, Yerkes was active, and his men were particularized. As the campaign progressed the legislation at Springfield gave it point and local developments gave it breadth. It was a mayoralty year, and Alderman John Maynard Harlan had himself nominated on an independent, non-partisan ticket. “Bobbie” Burke, the Democratic boss, brought 252forward Carter H. Harrison, and the Republicans nominated Judge Nathaniel C. Sears. Harrison at that time was known only as the son of his father. Sears was a fine man; but neither of these had seized the street railway issue. Mr. Harlan stood on that, and he made a campaign which is talked about to this day in Chicago. It was brilliant. He had had the ear of the town through the newspaper reports of his tirades in the Council, and the people went to hear him now as night after night he arraigned, not the bribed legislators, but the rich bribers. Once he called the roll of street railway directors and asked each what he was doing while his business was being boodled through the State Legislature. Earnest, eloquent, honest, he was witty too. Yerkes called him an ass. “If Yerkes will consult his Bible,” said Harlan, “he will learn that great things have been done with the jaw-bone of an ass.” This young man had no organization (the League confined itself to the aldermen); it was a speaking campaign; but he caught the spirit of Chicago, and in the last week men say you could feel the drift of sentiment to him. Though he was defeated, he got 70,000 votes, 10,000 more than the regular Republican candidate, and elected Harrison. And his campaign not only phrased the traction issue in men’s minds; it is said to have 253taught young Mayor Harrison the use of it. At any rate, Harrison and Chicago have been safe on the city’s side of it ever since.
The Municipal Voters’ League kicked off its second campaign in December 1896 by publishing the records of the outgoing aldermen, the latter half of the previous administration. Although this was before the Allen bill passed, Yerkes was active, and his associates were highlighted. As the campaign continued, legislation in Springfield sharpened its focus, and local events broadened its scope. It was a mayoral election year, and Alderman John Maynard Harlan was nominated on an independent, non-partisan ticket. Democratic boss “Bobbie” Burke put forward Carter H. Harrison, while the Republicans nominated Judge Nathaniel C. Sears. At that time, Harrison was mainly known as his father's son. Sears was a good man, but neither candidate tackled the street railway issue. Harlan focused on that and ran a campaign that is still talked about in Chicago today. It was impressive. He had the town’s attention through media coverage of his speeches in the Council, and people came to hear him as he passionately criticized not just the bribed politicians, but the wealthy bribers. At one point, he called out the names of street railway directors and asked each what they were doing while their business was being corrupted in the State Legislature. He was earnest, eloquent, honest, and witty. Yerkes called him a fool. “If Yerkes will consult his Bible,” Harlan said, “he will find that great things have been accomplished with the jawbone of an ass.” This young man lacked an organization (the League focused only on aldermen); it was a speaking campaign, but he captured the spirit of Chicago, and in the final week, many said you could feel public opinion shifting in his favor. Although he lost, he garnered 70,000 votes, 10,000 more than the standard Republican candidate, and elected Harrison. His campaign not only framed the traction issue in people’s minds; it reportedly taught young Mayor Harrison how to leverage it. In any case, Harrison and Chicago have remained secure on the city’s side of that issue ever since.
The League also won on it. They gave bad records to twenty-seven of the thirty-four outgoing aldermen. Fifteen were not renominated. Of the twelve who ran again, nine were beaten. This victory gave them a solid third of the Council. The reform crowd combined with Mayor Harrison, the President of the Council, and his followers, and defeated ordinances introduced to give effect to Yerkes’s odious Allen law.
The League also had a win. They issued poor ratings for twenty-seven of the thirty-four outgoing aldermen. Fifteen were not renominated. Among the twelve who ran again, nine lost. This win secured them a solid third of the Council. The reform group teamed up with Mayor Harrison, the President of the Council, and his supporters, and they defeated the ordinances aimed at enforcing Yerkes’s unpopular Allen law.
Here again the League might have retired in glory, but these “commonplace, ordinary men” proposed instead that they go ahead and get a majority, organize the Council on a non-partisan basis, and pass from a negative, anti-boodling policy to one of positive, constructive legislation. This meant also to advance from “beating bad men” to the “election of good men,” and as for the good men, the standard was to be raised from mere honesty to honesty and efficiency too. With such high purposes in view, the Nine went into their third campaign. They had to condemn men they had recommended in their first year, but “we are always ready to eat dirt,” they say. They pointed to the franchise issue, called for men capable of coping with the railways, and with 254bands playing, orators shouting, and Cole roaring like a sea-captain, they made the campaign of 1898 the hottest in their history. It nearly killed some of them, but they “won out”; the League had a nominal majority of the City Council.
Once again, the League could have stepped back in triumph, but these “ordinary, everyday people” decided instead to push forward and secure a majority, organize the Council in a non-partisan way, and shift from a negative, anti-corruption stance to one of positive, constructive legislation. This also meant moving from “punishing bad leaders” to “electing good leaders,” and as for those good leaders, the standard would go up from just honesty to include both honesty and effectiveness. With such lofty goals in mind, the Nine launched into their third campaign. They had to criticize some of the individuals they had endorsed in their first year, but “we are always ready to take the heat,” they said. They highlighted the voting rights issue, called for capable candidates who could handle the railroads, and amidst bands playing, speakers shouting, and Cole bellowing like a ship captain, they made the 1898 campaign the most intense in their history. It nearly exhausted some of them, but they “pulled through”; the League ended up with a nominal majority in the City Council.
Then came their first bitter disappointment. They failed to organize the aldermen. They tried, and were on the verge of success, when defeat came, a most significant defeat. The League had brought into political life some new men, shop-keepers and small business men, all with perfect records, or none. They were men who meant well, but business is no training for politics; the shop-keepers who knew how to resist the temptations of trade were untried in those of politics, and the boodle gang “bowled them over like little tin soldiers.” They were persuaded that it was no more than right to “let the dominant party make up committees and run the Council”; that was “usage,” and, what with bribery, sophistry, and flattery, the League was beaten by its weak friends. The real crisis in the League had come.
Then came their first big disappointment. They couldn't get the aldermen organized. They tried and were close to succeeding when they faced a significant defeat. The League had brought some new people into politics—shopkeepers and small businesspeople, all with clean records, or none at all. They meant well, but experience in business doesn't prepare you for politics. The shopkeepers who could resist the temptations of trade were inexperienced in the political arena, and the corrupt gang took them out easily. They were convinced that it was only right to let the dominant party make up committees and run the Council; that was just the way things were done. Through bribery, deceit, and flattery, the League was defeated by its weakest allies. The real crisis for the League had begun.
Mr. Cole resigned. He took the view that the League work was done; it could do no more; his health was suffering and his business was going to the dogs. The big corporations, the railroads, great business houses and their friends, had taken their business away from him. But this boycott 255had begun in the first campaign and Cole had met it with the declaration that he didn’t “care a d—n.” “I have a wife and a boy,” he said. “I want their respect. The rest can all go to h—l.” Cole has organized since a league to reform the legislature, but after the 1898 campaign the Nine were tired, disappointed, and Cole was temporarily used up.
Mr. Cole resigned. He believed that the League's work was complete; it couldn't achieve anything more; his health was suffering, and his business was going downhill. The large corporations, the railroads, and major businesses had taken their business away from him. But this boycott had started during the first campaign, and Cole had faced it by declaring that he didn’t “care a damn.” “I have a wife and a boy,” he said. “I want their respect. The rest can all go to hell.” Cole has since organized a league to reform the legislature, but after the 1898 campaign, the Nine were worn out, disappointed, and Cole was temporarily spent. 255
The Nine had to let Cole and Hoyt King go. But they wouldn’t let the League go. They had no successor for Cole. None on the committee would take his place; they all declined it in turn. They looked outside for a man, finding nobody. The prospect was dark. Then William Kent spoke up. Kent had time and money, but he wouldn’t do anything anyone else could be persuaded to do. He was not strong physically, and his physicians had warned him that to live he must work little and play much. At that moment he was under orders to go West and shoot. But when he saw what was happening, he said:
The Nine had to let Cole and Hoyt King go. But they weren’t going to let the League go. They didn’t have a successor for Cole. No one on the committee was willing to take his place; they all turned it down one by one. They searched outside for a man but found no one. The situation looked bleak. Then William Kent spoke up. Kent had both time and money, but he wouldn’t do anything that anyone else could be convinced to do. He wasn’t physically strong, and his doctors had warned him that to stay alive, he needed to work less and play more. At that moment, he was supposed to go West to hunt. But when he saw what was going on, he said:
“I’m not the man for this job; I’m no organizer. I can smash more things in a minute than I can build up in a hundred years. But the League has got to go on, so I’ll take Cole’s place if you’ll give me a hard-working, able man for secretary, an organizer and a master of detail.”
“I’m not the right person for this job; I’m not an organizer. I can destroy more things in a minute than I can create in a hundred years. But the League has to continue, so I’ll take Cole’s spot if you can provide me with a hard-working, capable person for secretary, someone who can organize and pay attention to details.”
Such a secretary was hard to find, but Allen B. 256Pond, the architect, a man made for fine work, took this rough-and-tumble task. And these two with the committee strengthened and active, not only held their own, they not only met the receding wave of reactionary sentiment against reform, but they made progress. In 1899 they won a clear majority of the Council, pledged their men before election to a non-partisan organization of the Council, and were in shape for constructive legislation. In 1900 they increased their majority, but they did not think it necessary to bind candidates before the election to the non-partisan-committees plan, and the Republicans organized the house. This party maintained the standard of the committees; there was no falling off there, but that was not the point. Parties were recognized in the Council, and the League had hoped for only one line of demarcation: special interests versus the interests of the city. During the time of Kent and Pond, however, the power for good of the League was established, the question of its permanency settled, and the use of able, conscientious aldermen recognized. The public opinion it developed and pointed held the Council so steady that, with Mayor Harrison and his personal following among the Democrats on that side, the aldermen refused to do anything for the street railway companies until the Allen bill was repealed. 257And, all ready to pass anything at Springfield, Yerkes had to permit the repeal, and he soon after closed up his business in Chicago and went away to London, where he is said to be happy and prosperous.
Finding such a secretary was tough, but Allen B. Pond, the architect, a guy perfect for quality work, took on this challenging job. Together with the committee, they not only held their ground against the growing wave of conservative backlash against reform, but they also made progress. In 1899, they secured a clear majority in the Council, with candidates promising before the election to support a non-partisan Council organization, setting the stage for constructive legislation. By 1900, they expanded their majority, but they felt no need to tie candidates to the non-partisan committee plan before the election, and the Republicans took control of the house. This party upheld the committees' standards without any decline, but that wasn’t the main issue. Parties were acknowledged in the Council, and the League had only hoped for a single dividing line: special interests versus the city's interests. However, during Kent and Pond's time, the League's positive influence was established, its long-term viability was confirmed, and the efficacy of capable, dedicated aldermen was appreciated. The public opinion it fostered was so strong that, with Mayor Harrison and his supporters among the Democrats, the aldermen refused to do anything for the street railway companies until the Allen bill was repealed. With everything ready to be passed at Springfield, Yerkes had to allow the repeal, and shortly after, he closed his business in Chicago and moved to London, where he is said to be happy and thriving.
The first time I went to Chicago, to see what form of corruption they had, I found there was something the matter with the political machinery. There was the normal plan of government for a city, rings with bosses, and grafting business interests behind. Philadelphia, Pittsburg, St. Louis, are all governed on such a plan. But in Chicago it didn’t work. “Business” was at a standstill and business was suffering. What was the matter? I beleaguered the political leaders with questions: “Why didn’t the politicians control? What was wrong with the machines?” The “boss” defended the organizations, blaming the people. “But the people could be fooled by any capable politician,” I demurred. The boss blamed the reformers. “Reformers!” I exclaimed. “I’ve seen some of your reformers. They aren’t different from reformers elsewhere, are they?” “No,” he said, well pleased. But when I concluded that it must then be the weakness of the Chicago bosses, his pride cried out. “Say,” he said, “have you seen that blankety-blank Fisher?”
The first time I went to Chicago to check out the local corruption, I noticed something was off with the political system. There was the usual city government setup, with powerful rings and shady business interests behind the scenes. Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, and St. Louis all operated that way. But in Chicago, it wasn't functioning. Business was at a standstill, and the economy was struggling. What was going on? I bombarded the political leaders with questions: “Why aren’t the politicians in control? What’s wrong with the system?” The “boss” defended the organizations, putting the blame on the people. “But the people can be fooled by any skilled politician,” I countered. The boss pointed fingers at the reformers. “Reformers!” I said. “I’ve seen some of your reformers. They’re not different from reformers anywhere else, are they?” “No,” he replied, clearly pleased. But when I concluded that it must be the weakness of the Chicago bosses, his pride flared up. “Hey,” he said, “have you seen that blankety-blank Fisher?”
258I hadn’t, I said. “Well, you want to,” he said, and I went straightway and saw Fisher—Mr. Walter L. Fisher, secretary of the Municipal Voters’ League. Then it was that I began to understand the Chicago political situation. Fisher was a reformer: an able young lawyer of independent means, a mind ripe with high purposes and ideals, self-confident, high-minded, conclusive. He showed me an orderly bureau of indexed information, such as I had seen before. He outlined the scheme of the Municipal Voters’ League, all in a bored, polite, familiar way. There was no light in him nor anything new or vital in his reform as he described it. It was all incomprehensible till I asked him how he carried the Seventeenth Ward, a mixed and normally Democratic ward, in one year for a Republican by some 1300 plurality, the next year for a Democrat by some 1800, the third for a Republican again. His face lighted up, a keen, shrewd look came into his eyes, and he said: “I did not carry that ward; its own people did it, but I’ll tell you how it was managed.” And he told me a story that was politics. I asked about another ward, and he told me the story of that. It was entirely different, but it, too, was politics. Fisher is a politician—with the education, associations, and the idealism of the reformers who fail, this man has cunning, courage, tact, and, rarer 259still, faith in the people. In short, reform in Chicago has such a leader as corruption alone usually has; a first-class executive mind and a natural manager of men.
258I hadn’t, I said. “Well, you should,” he replied, and I went right away to see Fisher—Mr. Walter L. Fisher, secretary of the Municipal Voters’ League. That’s when I started to grasp the Chicago political scene. Fisher was a reformer: a skilled young lawyer with independent means, filled with high aspirations and ideals, self-assured, principled, and decisive. He showed me a well-organized office of indexed information, similar to what I had seen before. He explained the Municipal Voters’ League's plan in a bored, polite, familiar tone. There was nothing enlightening or fresh in his reform as he described it—everything seemed confusing until I asked him how he managed to win the Seventeenth Ward, a mixed and typically Democratic area, one year for a Republican by about 1,300 votes, then the next year for a Democrat by roughly 1,800 votes, and back to a Republican the following year. His face brightened, a sharp, shrewd look sparked in his eyes, and he said: “I didn’t carry that ward; its own people did it, but I’ll tell you how it was organized.” And he told me a story that was all about politics. I inquired about another ward, and he shared its story. It was completely different, but again, it was about politics. Fisher is a politician—though he has the education, connections, and idealism of the reformers who often fail, this man has shrewdness, bravery, tact, and, even more rarely, faith in the people. In short, reform in Chicago has a leader similar to what corruption typically has: a top-notch executive mind and a natural ability to manage people. 259
When, after the aldermanic campaign of 1900, Messrs. Kent and Pond resigned as president and secretary of the League’s executive committee, Charles R. Crane and Mr. Fisher succeeded in their places. Mr. Crane is a man with an international business, which takes him often to Russia, but he comes back for the Chicago aldermanic campaigns. He leaves the game to Mr. Fisher, and says Fisher is the man, but Crane is a backer of great force and of persistent though quiet activity. These two, with a picked committee of experienced and sensible men—Pond, Kent, Smith, Frank H. Scott, Graham Taylor, Sigmund Zeisler, and Lessing Rosenthal—took the League as an established institution, perfected its system, opened a headquarters for work the year around; and this force, Mr. Fisher, with his political genius, has made a factor of the first rank in practical politics. Fisher made fights in the “hopeless” wards, and won them. He has raised the reform majority in the City Council to two-thirds; he has lifted the standard of aldermen from honesty to a gradually rising scale of ability, and in his first year the Council was organized on a non-partisan basis. 260This feature of municipal reform is established now, by the satisfaction of the aldermen themselves with the way it works. And a most important feature it is, too. “We have four shots at every man headed for the Council,” said one of the League—“one with his record when his term expires; another when he is up for the nomination; a third when he is running as a candidate; the fourth when the committees are formed. If he is bad he is put on a minority in a strong committee; if he is doubtful, with a weak or doubtful majority on an important committee with a strong minority—a minority so strong that they can let him show his hand, then beat him with a minority report.” Careful not to interfere in legislation, the League keeps a watch on every move in the Council. Cole started this. He used to sit in the gallery every meeting night, but under Crane and Fisher, an assistant secretary—first Henry B. Chamberlain, now George C. Sikes—has followed the daily routine of committee work as well as the final meetings.
When, after the aldermanic campaign of 1900, Messrs. Kent and Pond stepped down as president and secretary of the League’s executive committee, Charles R. Crane and Mr. Fisher took over their roles. Mr. Crane runs an international business that often takes him to Russia, but he returns for the Chicago aldermanic campaigns. He leaves the political strategy to Mr. Fisher, whom he considers the key player, while Crane provides significant and consistent support behind the scenes. Together with a carefully chosen committee of experienced and sensible individuals—Pond, Kent, Smith, Frank H. Scott, Graham Taylor, Sigmund Zeisler, and Lessing Rosenthal—they took the League as an established institution, improved its structure, and opened a year-round headquarters for operations; this force, led by Mr. Fisher’s political savvy, has become a top player in practical politics. Fisher tackled the so-called “hopeless” wards and won. He has increased the reform majority in the City Council to two-thirds; he has elevated the caliber of aldermen from honesty to a progressively rising standard of competence, and within his first year, the Council operated on a non-partisan basis. 260 This aspect of municipal reform is now firmly established, as evidenced by the aldermen's satisfaction with its operation. It’s a crucial element, too. “We have four chances with every candidate headed for the Council,” said one member of the League—“one during his term when it ends; another when he's up for nomination; a third when he's running for office; and the fourth when the committees are formed. If he’s bad, he’s placed on a minority in a strong committee; if he's questionable, he’s with a weak or uncertain majority on a key committee, backed by a strong minority—a minority so strong that they can let him reveal his stance, then defeat him with a minority report.” Being careful not to interfere with legislation, the League monitors every action in the Council. Cole initiated this practice. He used to sit in the gallery every meeting night, but under Crane and Fisher, an assistant secretary—first Henry B. Chamberlain, now George C. Sikes—has kept track of the daily routine of committee work as well as the final meetings.
Fisher has carried the early practice of meeting politicians on their own ground to a very practical extreme. When tact and good humor failed, he applied force. Thus, when he set about preparing a year ahead for his fights in unpromising wards, he sent to the ward leaders on both 261sides for their lists of captains, lieutenants, and heelers. They refused, with expressions of astonishment at his “gall.” Mr. Chamberlain directed a most searching investigation of the wards, precinct by precinct, block by block, and not only gathered a rich fund of information, but so frightened the politicians who heard of the inquiries that many of them came around and gave up their lists. Whether these helped or not, however, the wards were studied, and it was by such information and undermining political work, combined with skill and a fearless appeal to the people of the ward, that Fisher beat out with Hubert W. Butler the notorious Henry Wulff, an ex-State Treasurer, in the ward convention of Wulff’s own party, and then defeated Wulff, who ran as an independent, at the polls.
Fisher took the early practice of meeting politicians on their own turf to a very practical level. When charm and good humor didn’t work, he resorted to force. So, when he started preparing a year in advance for his battles in challenging neighborhoods, he reached out to the ward leaders on both sides for their lists of captains, lieutenants, and foot soldiers. They refused, expressing their shock at his “nerve.” Mr. Chamberlain ordered a thorough investigation of the wards, looking at each precinct, block by block, and not only gathered a wealth of information but also scared the politicians who learned about the inquiries so much that many of them came forward and handed over their lists. Whether those lists were helpful or not, the wards were analyzed, and it was through such information and behind-the-scenes political maneuvering, combined with skill and a bold appeal to the people in the ward, that Fisher, alongside Hubert W. Butler, defeated the infamous Henry Wulff, a former State Treasurer, in the ward convention of Wulff’s own party, and then beat Wulff, who was running as an independent, at the polls.
Such experience won the respect of the politicians, as well as their fear, and in 1902 and 1903 the worst of them, or the best, came personally to Fisher to see what they could do. He was their equal in “the game of talk,” they found, and their superior in tactics, for when he could not persuade them to put up good men and “play fair,” he measured himself with them in strategy. Thus one day “Billy” Loeffler, the Democratic leader in the Democratic Ninth Ward, asked Mr. Fisher if the League did not want to name the 262Democratic candidate for alderman in his ward. Loeffler’s business partner, “Hot Stove” Brenner, was running on the Republican ticket and Fisher knew that the Democratic organization would pull for Brenner. But Fisher accepted what was a challenge to political play and suggested Michael J. Preib. Loeffler was dazed at the name; it was new to him, but he accepted the man and nominated him. The Ninth is a strong Hebrew ward. To draw off the Republican and Jewish vote from Brenner, Fisher procured the nomination as an independent of Jacob Diamond, a popular young Hebrew, and he backed him too, intending, as he told both Preib and Diamond, to prefer in the end the one that should develop the greater strength. Meanwhile the League watched Loeffler. He was quietly throwing his support from Preib to Brenner. Five days before election it was clear that, though Diamond had developed unexpected strength, Preib was stronger. Fisher went to Loeffler and accused him of not doing all he could for Preib. Loeffler declared he was. Fisher proposed a letter from Loeffler to his personal friends asking them to vote for Preib. Loeffler hesitated, but he signed one that Fisher dictated. Loeffler advised the publication of the statement in the Jewish papers, and, though he consented to have it mailed to voters, he thought it “an unnecessary 263expense.” When Fisher got back to the League headquarters, he rushed off copies of the letter through the mails to all the voters in the ward. By the time Loeffler heard of this it was too late to do anything; he tried, but he never caught up with those letters. His partner, Brenner, was defeated.
Such experience earned the respect and fear of the politicians, and in 1902 and 1903, the worst of them, or the best, came personally to Fisher to see what they could do. They found him their equal in "the game of talk" and superior in tactics, because when he couldn't convince them to support good candidates and “play fair,” he matched their strategy. One day "Billy" Loeffler, the Democratic leader in the Democratic Ninth Ward, asked Mr. Fisher if the League wanted to name the Democratic candidate for alderman in his ward. Loeffler’s business partner, "Hot Stove" Brenner, was running on the Republican ticket, and Fisher knew that the Democratic organization would support Brenner. But Fisher took on what was a challenge in the political game and suggested Michael J. Preib. Loeffler was surprised by the name; it was new to him, but he accepted him and nominated him. The Ninth is a strong Jewish ward. To draw the Republican and Jewish vote away from Brenner, Fisher arranged for Jacob Diamond, a popular young Jewish man, to run as an independent, and he supported him too, intending, as he told both Preib and Diamond, to ultimately back the one who showed the most strength. Meanwhile, the League kept an eye on Loeffler. He was quietly shifting his support from Preib to Brenner. Five days before the election, it became clear that, though Diamond had gained unexpected strength, Preib was stronger. Fisher confronted Loeffler and accused him of not doing everything he could for Preib. Loeffler insisted he was doing his part. Fisher suggested Loeffler write a letter to his friends asking them to vote for Preib. Loeffler hesitated but signed a letter that Fisher dictated. Loeffler recommended publishing the statement in Jewish newspapers, and while he agreed to have it mailed to voters, he thought it was "an unnecessary expense." When Fisher returned to the League headquarters, he quickly sent copies of the letter through the mail to all the voters in the ward. By the time Loeffler learned about this, it was too late to do anything; he tried but never caught up with those letters. His partner, Brenner, lost the election.
A politician? A boss. Chicago has in Walter L. Fisher a reform boss, and in the Nine of the Municipal Voters’ League, with their associated editors and able finance and advisory committees, a reform ring. They have no machine, no patronage, no power that they can abuse. They haven’t even a list of their voters. All they have is the confidence of the anonymous honest men of Chicago who care more for Chicago than for anything else. This they have won by a long record of good judgments, honest, obvious devotion to the public good, and a disinterestedness which has avoided even individual credit; not a hundred men in the city could name the Committee of Nine.
A politician? A leader. Chicago has in Walter L. Fisher a reform leader, and in the Nine of the Municipal Voters’ League, along with their connected editors and skilled finance and advisory committees, a reform group. They have no political machine, no patronage, no power to misuse. They don’t even have a list of their voters. What they do have is the trust of the anonymous honest citizens of Chicago who care more for the city than anything else. They have earned this through a long history of sound judgments, genuine dedication to the public good, and a selflessness that avoids individual recognition; not even a hundred people in the city could name the Committee of Nine.
Working wide open at first, when it was necessary, they have withdrawn more and more ever since, and their policy now is one of dignified silence except when a plain statement of facts is required; then they speak as the League, simply, directly, but with human feeling, and leave their following 264of voters to act with or against them as they please. I have laid great stress on the technical, political skill of Fisher and the Nine, not because that is their chief reliance; it isn’t: the study and the enlightenment of public opinion is their great function and force. But other reform organizations have tried this way. These reformers have, with the newspapers and the aldermen, not only done it thoroughly and persistently; they have not only developed an educated citizenship; they have made it an effective force, effective in legislation and in practical politics. In short: political reform, politically conducted, has produced reform politicians working for the reform of the city with the methods of politics. They do everything that a politician does, except buy votes and sell them. They play politics in the interest of the city.
At first, they were very open when it mattered, but since then, they've pulled back more and more. Now, their approach is mainly one of dignified silence, only speaking up when a straightforward explanation of the facts is needed. When they do speak, they do so as the League, simply and directly, while still showing human feelings, allowing their supporters to decide how to respond. I've emphasized the political skills of Fisher and the Nine, not because that's their main strength—it isn't. Their primary role is to study and enlighten public opinion. Other reform groups have tried this approach too. These reformers, along with the newspapers and local officials, have not only done this thoroughly and consistently, but they've also fostered an educated citizenry, making it a powerful force in legislation and practical politics. In short, political reform that is actively managed has led to reform politicians working towards changing the city using political methods. They do everything a politician typically does, except buy and sell votes. They engage in politics for the benefit of the city.
And what has the city got out of it? Many things, but at least one great spectacle to show the world, the political spectacle of the year, and it is still going on. The properly accredited representatives of two American city railway companies are meeting in the open with a regular committee of an American board of aldermen, and they are negotiating for the continuance of certain street railway franchises on terms fair both to the city and to the corporations, without a whisper of bribery, with composure, reasonableness, 265knowledge (on the aldermen’s part, long-studied information and almost expert knowledge); with an eye to the future, to the just profit of the railways, and the convenience of the people of the city. This in an American city—in Chicago!
And what has the city gained from it? A lot, but at least one major event to showcase to the world, the political event of the year, which is still ongoing. The officially recognized representatives of two American city railway companies are meeting publicly with a regular committee of an American board of aldermen. They are negotiating the continuation of certain street railway franchises on terms that are fair to both the city and the corporations, without any hint of bribery, with calmness, reasonableness, and knowledge (on the aldermen’s part, well-studied information and nearly expert knowledge); keeping the future in mind, ensuring fair profits for the railways, and the convenience of the city's residents. This is happening in an American city—in Chicago!
Those franchises which Yerkes tried to “fix” expired on July 30. There was a dispute about that, and the railways were prepared to fight. One is a Chicago corporation held by Chicago capital, and the men in it knew the conditions. The other belongs to New York and Philadelphia capitalists, whom Yerkes got to hold it when he gave up and went away; they couldn’t understand. This “foreign” capital sent picked men out to Chicago to “fight.” One of the items said to have been put in their bill of appropriation was “For use in Chicago—$1,000,000.” Their local officers and directors and friends warned them to “go slow.”
The franchises that Yerkes tried to “fix” expired on July 30. There was a disagreement about that, and the railways were ready to fight. One is a Chicago corporation funded by Chicago investors, and the people involved were familiar with the conditions. The other is owned by investors from New York and Philadelphia, whom Yerkes managed to convince to take it over when he quit and left; they didn’t understand the situation. This “foreign” capital sent their top people to Chicago to “fight.” One of the items reportedly included in their budget request was “For use in Chicago—$1,000,000.” Their local officers, directors, and supporters advised them to “proceed with caution.”
“Do you mean to tell us,” said the Easterners, “that we can’t do in Chicago what we have done in Philadelphia, New York, and——”
“Are you seriously telling us,” said the Easterners, “that we can’t do in Chicago what we have done in Philadelphia, New York, and——”
“That’s exactly what we mean,” was the answer.
"That’s exactly what we mean," was the response.
Incredulous, they did do some such “work.” They had the broken rings with them, and the “busted bosses,” and they had the city on the hip in one particular. Though the franchises expired, the city had no authority in law to take over 266the railways and had to get it from Springfield. The Republican ring, with some Democratic following, had organized the Legislature on an explicit arrangement that “no traction legislation should pass in 1903.” The railways knew they couldn’t get any; all they asked was that the city shouldn’t have any either. It was a political game, but Chicago was sure that two could play at it. Harrison was up for re-election; he was right on traction. The Republicans nominated a business man, Graeme Stewart, who also pledged himself. Then they all went to Springfield, and, with the whole city and State looking on, the city’s reform politicians beat the regulars. The city’s bill was buried in committee, but to make a showing for Stewart the Republican ring had to pass some sort of a bill. They offered a poor substitute. With the city against it, the Speaker “gaveled it through” amid a scene of the wildest excitement. He passed the bill, but he was driven from his chair, and the scandal compelled him and the ring to reconsider that bill and pass the city’s own enabling act.
In disbelief, they did actually put in some “work.” They had the broken rings with them, and the “busted bosses,” and they had the city in a bind in one specific way. Even though the franchises had expired, the city had no legal authority to take over the railways and had to get that from Springfield. The Republican group, with some Democratic support, had organized the Legislature with a clear plan that “no traction legislation should pass in 1903.” The railways knew they couldn’t get any; all they requested was that the city shouldn’t get any either. It was a political game, but Chicago was confident that two could play it. Harrison was running for re-election; he was focused on traction issues. The Republicans nominated a businessman, Graeme Stewart, who also made a commitment. Then they all went to Springfield, and, with the entire city and State watching, the city’s reform politicians defeated the regulars. The city’s bill was buried in committee, but to show support for Stewart, the Republican group had to pass some kind of bill. They put forward a poor alternative. With the city opposing it, the Speaker “gaveled it through” amid the most intense excitement. He passed the bill, but was ousted from his chair, and the scandal forced him and the group to rethink that bill and approve the city’s own enabling act.
Both the traction companies had been interested in this Springfield fiasco; they had been working together, but the local capitalists did not like the business. They soon offered to settle separately, and went into session with the city’s lawyers, 267Edwin Burritt Smith, of the League, and John C. Mathis. The Easterners’ representatives, headed by a “brilliant” New York lawyer, had to negotiate too. Their brilliant lawyer undertook to “talk sense” into the aldermanic committee. This committee had been out visiting all the large Eastern cities, studying the traction situations everywhere; on their own account they had had drawn for them one of the most complete reports ever made for a city by an expert. Moreover, they knew the law and the finances of the traction companies, better far than the New York lawyers. When, therefore, the brilliant legal light had made one of his smooth, elaborate speeches, some hard-headed alderman would get up and say that he “gathered and gleaned” thus and so from the last speaker; he wasn’t quite sure, but if thus and so was what the gentleman from New York had said, then it looked to him like tommy rot. Then the lawyer would spin another web, only to have some other commonplace-looking alderman tear it to pieces. Those lawyers were dumfounded. They were advised to see Fisher. They saw Fisher.
Both traction companies were interested in the Springfield mess; they had been collaborating, but the local investors weren’t on board with it. They quickly proposed to settle independently and met with the city's lawyers, 267Edwin Burritt Smith from the League and John C. Mathis. The representatives from the East, led by a “brilliant” lawyer from New York, also had to negotiate. This sharp lawyer aimed to “make sense” to the aldermanic committee. The committee had been visiting major Eastern cities to study their traction situations; they had even commissioned one of the most detailed reports ever produced for a city by an expert. Furthermore, they understood the law and the finances of the traction companies much better than the New York lawyers did. So, when the brilliant lawyer delivered one of his polished, lengthy speeches, a practical alderman would stand up and say he “gathered and gleaned” certain points from the last speaker; he wasn’t entirely sure, but if that’s what the gentleman from New York had said, then it sounded like nonsense to him. The lawyer would then try again, only to have another seemingly ordinary alderman dismantle his argument. Those lawyers were left speechless. They were advised to consult Fisher. They met with Fisher.
“You are welcome, if you wish,” he is said to have said, “to talk foolishness, but I advise you to stop it. I do not speak for the Council, but I think I know what it will say when it 268speaks for itself. Those aldermen know their business. They know sense and they know nonsense. They can’t be fooled. If you go at them with reason they will go a long way toward helping you. However, you shall do as you please about this. But let me burn this one thing in upon your consciousness: Don’t try money on them or anybody else. They will listen to your nonsense with patience, but if we hear of you trying to bribe anybody—an alderman or a politician or a newspaper or a reporter—all negotiations will cease instantly. And nobody will attempt to blackmail you, no one.”
“You’re welcome to talk nonsense if you want,” he said, “but I suggest you stop. I don’t speak for the Council, but I think I know what they will say when they finally do speak for themselves. Those aldermen know their stuff. They can tell the difference between sense and nonsense. They can’t be tricked. If you approach them with reason, they’ll be willing to help you. However, you can do what you want about this. But let me make one thing clear to you: Don’t try to bribe them or anyone else. They might listen to your nonsense patiently, but if we hear you’ve tried to bribe anyone—an alderman, a politician, a newspaper, or a reporter—all negotiations will stop immediately. And no one will attempt to blackmail you, absolutely no one.”
This seems to me to be the highest peak of reform. Here is a gentleman, speaking with the authority of absolute faith and knowledge, assuring the representatives of a corporation that it can have all that is due it from a body of aldermen by the expenditure of nothing more than reason. I have heard many a business man say such a condition of things would be hailed by his kind with rejoicing. How do they like it in Chicago? They don’t like it at all. I spent one whole forenoon calling on the presidents of banks, great business men, and financiers interested in public utility companies. With all the evidence I had had in other places that these men are the chief sources of corruption, I was unprepared for the sensation of 269that day. Those financial leaders of Chicago were “mad.” All but one of them became so enraged as they talked that they could not behave decently. They rose up, purple in the face, and cursed reform. They said it had hurt business; it had hurt the town. “Anarchy,” they called it; “socialism.” They named corporations that had left the city; they named others that had planned to come there and had gone elsewhere. They offered me facts and figures to prove that the city was damaged.
This seems to me to be the pinnacle of reform. Here’s a guy, speaking with total confidence and expertise, telling the representatives of a corporation that they can get everything they deserve from a group of aldermen just by using reason. I've heard plenty of business people say that such a situation would be celebrated by their peers. But how do they feel about it in Chicago? They don’t like it at all. I spent an entire morning meeting with bank presidents, major business figures, and financiers involved in public utility companies. Despite having seen evidence that these guys are often the main sources of corruption in other places, I wasn’t ready for the reactions that day. Those financial leaders of Chicago were “furious.” Almost all of them got so angry while talking that they couldn’t keep their composure. They stood up, red in the face, and slammed reform. They said it had harmed business and the city. They called it “anarchy” and “socialism.” They mentioned companies that had left the city and others that had planned to come but chose to go elsewhere. They threw facts and figures at me to prove that the city was suffering.
“But isn’t the reform council honest?” I asked.
“But isn’t the reform council trustworthy?” I asked.
“Honest! Yes, but—oh, h—l!”
"Seriously! Yes, but—oh, hell!"
“And do you realize that all you say means that you regret the passing of boodle and would prefer to have back the old corrupt Council?”
“And do you realize that everything you’re saying means that you regret the loss of the money and would rather have the old corrupt Council back?”
That brought a curse, or a shrewd smile, or a cynical laugh, but that they regretted the passing of the boodle régime is the fact, bitter, astonishing,—but natural enough. We have seen those interests at their bribery in Philadelphia and St. Louis; we have seen them opposing reforms in every city. Here in Chicago we have them cursing reform triumphant, for, though reform may have been a benefit to the city as a community of freemen, it is really bad; it has hurt their business!
That brought a curse, a sly smile, or a sarcastic laugh, but the fact that they regretted the end of the corruption era is bitter, surprising—but understandable. We've seen those interests engaging in bribery in Philadelphia and St. Louis; we've witnessed them fighting against reforms in every city. Here in Chicago, we see them cursing the success of reform because, while reform may have been good for the city as a community of free people, it has really hurt their business!
Chicago has paid dearly for its reform, and reformers 270elsewhere might as well realize that if they succeed, their city will pay, too, at first. Capital will boycott it and capital will give it a bad name. The bankers who offered me proof of their losses were offering me material to write down the city. And has Chicago had conspicuous credit for reform? No, it is in ill-repute, “anarchistic,” “socialistic” (a commercial term for municipal ownership); it is “unfriendly to capital.” But Chicago knows what it is after and it knows the cost. There are business men there who are willing to pay; they told me so. There are business men on the executive and finance committees of the League and others helping outside who are among the leaders of Chicago’s business and its bar. Moreover, there are promoters who expect to like an honest Council. One such told me that he meant to apply for franchises shortly, and he believed that, though it would take longer than bribery to negotiate fair terms with aldermen who were keen to safeguard the city’s interests, yet business could be done on that basis. “Those reform aldermen are slow, but they are fair,” he said.
Chicago has paid a heavy price for its reform, and reformers in other places should understand that if they succeed, their city will face the same consequences at first. Investors will avoid it, and it will gain a bad reputation. The bankers who showed me their losses were essentially giving me evidence to criticize the city. Has Chicago received any recognition for its reforms? No, it's viewed negatively—“anarchistic,” “socialistic” (a business term for municipal ownership); it’s seen as “unfriendly to investors.” But Chicago knows what it wants and understands the cost involved. There are businesspeople there who are willing to invest; they’ve told me so. Some business leaders are on the executive and finance committees of the League, along with others outside, and they are at the forefront of Chicago's business community and its legal sector. Additionally, there are promoters who are hopeful about an honest City Council. One of them told me he planned to apply for franchises soon, believing that while it would take longer than bribing officials to negotiate fair terms with aldermen who are committed to protecting the city's interests, business could still be done that way. “Those reform-minded aldermen are slow, but they are fair,” he said.
The aldermen are fair. Exasperated as they have been by the trifling, the trickery, and past boodling of the street railways, inconvenienced by bad service, beset by corporation temptations, they are fairer to-day than the corporations. They have 271the street railways now in a corner. The negotiations are on, and they could squeeze them with a vengeance. What is the spirit of those aldermen? “Well,” said one to me, “I’ll tell you how we feel. We’ve got to get the city’s interests well protected. That’s first. But we’ve got more to do than that. They’re shy of us; these capitalists don’t know how to handle us. They are not up to the new, reform, on-the-level way of doing business. We’ve got to show capital that we will give them all that is coming to them, and just a little more—a little more, just to get them used to being honest.” This was said without a bit of humor, with some anxiety but no bitterness, and not a word about socialism or “confiscating municipal ownership”; that’s a “capitalistic” bugaboo. Again, one Saturday night a personal friend of mine who had lost a half-holiday at a conference with some of the leading aldermen, complained of their “preciseness.” “First,” he said, “they had to have every trivial interest of the city protected, then, when we seemed to be done, they turned around and argued like corporation lawyers for the protection of the corporation.”
The aldermen are fair. Frustrated by the petty issues, deception, and past corruption of the street railways—bothered by poor service and tempted by corporate interests—they're more fair today than the corporations. They have the street railways on the ropes now. Negotiations are underway, and they could really squeeze them. What’s the attitude of those aldermen? “Well,” one told me, “I’ll explain how we feel. We need to protect the city’s interests first and foremost. But we have more to do than that. They’re wary of us; these capitalists don’t know how to deal with us. They aren’t ready for the new, reform-minded, straightforward way of doing business. We have to show capital that we’ll give them everything they’re owed, and just a little more—a little more, just to get them accustomed to being honest.” This was said without any humor, with some concern but no bitterness, and not a word about socialism or “confiscating municipal ownership”; that’s just a capitalist scare tactic. Then, one Saturday night, a personal friend of mine who had lost a half-holiday meeting with some of the leading aldermen complained about their “exactness.” “First,” he said, “they insisted on protecting every small interest of the city, and then, when it seemed like we were finished, they turned around and argued like corporate lawyers for the protection of the corporation.”
Those Chicago aldermen are an honor to the country! Men like Jackson and Mavor, Herrmann and Werno, would be a credit to any legislative body in the land, but there is no such body in the 272land where they could do more good or win more honor. I believe capital will some day prefer to do business with them than with blackmailers and boodlers anywhere.
Those Chicago aldermen are a source of pride for the country! Men like Jackson and Mavor, Herrmann and Werno, would be an asset to any legislative body in the nation, but there's no other place where they could do more good or gain more respect. I believe that, one day, businesses will choose to work with them instead of with blackmailers and corrupt politicians anywhere.
When that day comes the aldermen will share the credit with the Municipal Voters’ League, but all the character and all the ability of both Council and League will not explain the reform of Chicago. The citizens of that city will take most of the glory. They will have done it, as they have done it so far.
When that day arrives, the aldermen will take credit alongside the Municipal Voters’ League, but all the character and capabilities of both the Council and the League won't fully explain the reform of Chicago. The citizens of that city will earn most of the recognition. They will have accomplished it, just as they have up to now.
Some of my critics have declared they could not believe there was so much difference in the character of communities as I have described. How can they account, then, for Chicago? The people there have political parties, they are partisans. But they know how to vote. Before the League was started, the records show them shifting their vote to the confusion of well-laid political plans. So they have always had bosses, and they have them now, but these bosses admit that they “can’t boss Chicago.” I think this is partly their fault. William Lorimer, the dominant Republican boss, with whom I talked for an hour one day, certainly does not make the impression, either as a man or as a politician, that Croker makes, or Durham of Philadelphia. But an outsider may easily go wrong on a point like this, and we may leave the credit where 273they lay it, with the people of Chicago. Fisher is a more forceful man than any of the regulars, and, as a politician, compares with well-known leaders in any city; but Fisher’s power is the people’s. His leadership may have done much, but there is something else deeper and bigger behind him. At the last aldermanic election, when he discovered on the Saturday before election that the League was recommending, against a bad Democrat, a worse Republican, he advised the people of that ward to vote for the Socialist; and the people did vote for the Socialist, and they elected him. Again, there is the press, the best in any of our large cities. There are several newspapers in Chicago which have served always the public interest, and their advice is taken by their readers. These editors wield, as they wielded before the League came, that old-fashioned power of the press which is supposed to have passed away. Indeed, one of the finest exhibitions of disinterestedness in this whole reform story was that of these newspapers giving up the individual power and credit which their influence on public opinion gave them, to the League, behind which they stepped to get together and gain for the city what they lost themselves. But this paid them. They did not do it with that motive; they did it for the city, but the city has recognized the service, as another fact shows: There are bad papers in Chicago—papers 274that serve special interests—and these don’t pay.
Some of my critics have said they can’t believe there’s such a difference in the character of communities as I’ve described. So how do they explain Chicago? The people there have political parties; they are partisans. But they know how to vote. Before the League was created, records show they would shift their votes, throwing off well-laid political plans. They’ve always had bosses, and they still do, but these bosses admit they “can’t boss Chicago.” I think that’s partly their fault. William Lorimer, the main Republican boss, whom I spoke with for an hour one day, doesn’t leave the same impression as Croker or Durham from Philadelphia, either as a person or a politician. But an outsider can easily get this kind of thing wrong, so we might as well give credit where it’s due, to the people of Chicago. Fisher is a more impactful figure than any of the regulars, and as a politician, he stands up to well-known leaders in any city; but Fisher’s power comes from the people. His leadership may have contributed a lot, but there’s something deeper and larger backing him. In the last alderman election, when he found out the Saturday before that the League was recommending a worse Republican against a bad Democrat, he told the people in that ward to vote for the Socialist; they did, and they elected him. Then there’s the press, the best among our large cities. There are several newspapers in Chicago that have always served the public interest, and their readers value their advice. These editors maintain that classic power of the press that supposedly faded away. In fact, one of the finest examples of selflessness in this entire reform story was these newspapers giving up the individual influence and credit that their ability to shape public opinion gave them, in favor of the League, rallying together to gain for the city what they surrendered. And it paid off for them. They didn’t do it for that reason; they did it for the city, but the city has recognized their service, as another fact shows: There are bad papers in Chicago—papers that serve special interests—and those don’t thrive.
The agents of reform have been many and efficient, but back of them all was an intelligent, determined people, and they have decided. The city of Chicago is ruled by the citizens of Chicago. Then why are the citizens of Chicago satisfied with half-reform? Why have they reformed the Council and left the administrative side of government so far behind? “One thing at a time,” they will tell you out there, and it is wonderful to see them patient after seven years of steadfast, fighting reform.
The reformers have been numerous and effective, but behind them all is a smart, determined population, and they have made their choice. The city of Chicago is governed by the people of Chicago. So why are the people of Chicago okay with only partial reform? Why have they changed the Council but left the administrative side of government lagging? “One thing at a time,” they’ll say, and it’s impressive to see them remaining patient after seven years of relentless, fighting reform.
But that is not the reason. The administration has been improved. It is absurdly backward and uneven; the fire department is excellent, the police is a disgrace, the law department is expert, the health bureau is corrupt, and the street cleaning is hardly worth mention. All this is Carter H. Harrison. He is an honest man personally, but indolent; a shrewd politician, and a character with reserve power, but he has no initial energy. Without ideals, he does only what is demanded of him. He does not seem to know wrong is wrong, till he is taught; nor to care, till criticism arouses his political sense of popular requirement. That sense is keen, but think of it: Every time Chicago wants to go ahead a foot, it has first to push its mayor up 275inch by inch. In brief, Chicago is a city that wants to be led, and Carter Harrison, with all his political ambition, honest willingness, and obstinate independence, simply follows it. The League leads, and its leaders understand their people. Then why does the League submit to Harrison? Why doesn’t the League recommend mayors as well as aldermen? It may some day; but, setting out by accident to clean the Council, stop the boodling, and settle the city railway troubles, they have been content with Mayor Harrison because he had learned his lesson on that. And, I think, as they say the mayor thinks, that when the people of Chicago get the city railways running with enough cars and power; when they have put a stop to boodling forever; they will take up the administrative side of the government. A people who can support for seven years one movement toward reform, should be able to go on forever. With the big boodle beaten, petty political grafting can easily be stopped. All that will be needed then will be a mayor who understands and represents the city; he will be able to make Chicago as rare an example of good government as it is now of reform; which will be an advertisement; good business; it will pay.
But that’s not the issue. The administration has improved. It's ridiculously outdated and inconsistent; the fire department is great, the police are a disgrace, the law department is skilled, the health bureau is corrupt, and the street cleaning is hardly worth mentioning. All of this reflects on Carter H. Harrison. Personally, he’s an honest man, but lazy; a clever politician, and someone with underlying influence, but he lacks initial drive. Without ideals, he only does what’s required of him. He doesn’t seem to recognize that wrong is wrong until someone tells him; nor does he care until criticism prompts his political awareness of what the public wants. That awareness is sharp, but think about it: every time Chicago wants to make progress, it first has to push its mayor forward inch by inch. In short, Chicago is a city that needs direction, and Carter Harrison, with all his political ambition, honesty, and stubborn independence, simply follows the city. The League takes the lead, and its leaders understand their constituents. So why does the League tolerate Harrison? Why doesn’t the League recommend mayors as well as aldermen? They might someday; but in their initial aim to clean the Council, eliminate corruption, and resolve city railway issues, they’ve been content with Mayor Harrison because he had learned about those matters. And I believe, just as they say the mayor believes, that once the people of Chicago get the city railways running smoothly with enough cars and power; when they permanently put an end to corruption; they will tackle the administration side of the government. A populace that can sustain a reform movement for seven years should be capable of continuing indefinitely. With major corruption defeated, minor political grafting can easily be eliminated. All that will be needed then is a mayor who understands and represents the city; he’ll be able to make Chicago as exceptional for good governance as it is now for reform; that will be a selling point; good business; it will pay.
Post Scriptum, December, 1903.—Chicago has taken up since administrative graft. The Council 276is conducting an investigation which is showing the city government to have been a second Minneapolis. Mayor Harrison is helping, and the citizens are interested. There is little doubt that Chicago will be cleaned up.
P.S., December, 1903.—Chicago has been dealing with administrative corruption. The Council 276is carrying out an investigation that is revealing the city government to be just as corrupt as Minneapolis. Mayor Harrison is cooperating, and the citizens are engaged. There is little doubt that Chicago will be cleaned up.
NEW YORK: GOOD GOVERNMENT TO THE TEST
Just about the time this article will appear, Greater New York will be holding a local election on what has come to be a national question—good government. No doubt there will be other “issues.” At this writing (September 15) the candidates were not named nor the platforms written, but the regular politicians hate the main issue, and they have a pretty trick of confusing the honest mind and splitting the honest vote by raising “local issues” which would settle themselves under prolonged honest government. So, too, there will probably be some talk about the effect this election might have upon the next Presidential election; another clever fraud which seldom fails to work to the advantage of rings and grafters, and to the humiliation and despair of good citizenship. We have nothing to do with these deceptions. They may count in New York, they may determine the result, but let them. They are common moves in the corruptionist’s game, and, therefore, fair tests of citizenship, for honesty 280is not the sole qualification for an honest voter; intelligence has to play a part, too, and a little intelligence would defeat all such tricks. Anyhow, they cannot disturb us. I am writing too far ahead, and my readers, for the most part, will be reading too far away to know or care anything about them. We can grasp firmly the essential issues involved and then watch with equanimity the returns for the answer, plain yes or no, which New York will give to the only questions that concern us all:[6]
Just about the time this article is published, Greater New York will be holding a local election on what has become a national issue—good government. There will likely be other “issues” as well. As of now (September 15), the candidates haven't been announced and the platforms aren't finalized, but the usual politicians dislike the main issue. They have a way of confusing clear thinking and splitting honest votes by bringing up “local issues” that would resolve themselves under consistent, honest governance. There will probably also be some discussion about how this election might impact the next Presidential election; another clever trick that often benefits corrupt groups and those who exploit the system, causing disappointment and despair for good citizens. We don’t have to engage with these deceptions. They might count in New York and decide the outcome, but let them. These are standard moves in the corruptionist’s playbook, and thus, fair tests of citizenship, because honesty isn't the only requirement for a trustworthy voter; intelligence plays a role too, and a little intelligence could outsmart all such tricks. In any case, they can’t disrupt us. I’m writing too far ahead, and my readers, for the most part, will be reading from too far away to know or care about them. We can firmly grasp the essential issues at play and then calmly watch the results for the clear yes or no that New York will provide to the only questions that matter to us all:
6. Tammany tried to introduce national issues, but failed, and “good government” was practically the only question raised.
__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.Tammany attempted to bring up national issues, but was unsuccessful, and “good government” was pretty much the only topic discussed.
Do we Americans really want good government? Do we know it when we see it? Are we capable of that sustained good citizenship which alone can make democracy a success? Or, to save our pride, one other: Is the New York way the right road to permanent reform?
Do we Americans really want a good government? Do we recognize it when we see it? Are we capable of the ongoing good citizenship that is essential for democracy to succeed? Or, to save face, let me ask this: Is the New York way the best path to lasting reform?
For New York has good government, or, to be more precise, it has a good administration. It is not a question there of turning the rascals out and putting the honest men into their places. The honest men are in, and this election is to decide whether they are to be kept in, which is a very different matter. Any people is capable of rising in wrath to overthrow 281bad rulers. Philadelphia has done that in its day. New York has done it several times. With fresh and present outrages to avenge, particular villains to punish, and the mob sense of common anger to excite, it is an emotional gratification to go out with the crowd and “smash something.” This is nothing but revolt, and even monarchies have uprisings to the credit of their subjects. But revolt is not reform, and one revolutionary administration is not good government. That we free Americans are capable of such assertions of our sovereign power, we have proven; our lynchers are demonstrating it every day. That we can go forth singly also, and, without passion, with nothing but mild approval and dull duty to impel us, vote intelligently to sustain a fairly good municipal government, remains to be shown. And that is what New York has the chance to show; New York, the leading exponent of the great American anti-bad government movement for good government.
New York has a good government, or more accurately, it has a good administration. It's not just about getting rid of the bad guys and replacing them with honest people. The honest people are already in place, and this election is about deciding if they should stay, which is a very different issue. Any group of people can rise up in anger to get rid of bad leaders. Philadelphia has done it in the past. New York has done it a few times as well. With fresh injustices to address, specific wrongdoers to hold accountable, and a shared sense of anger to stir up, it's emotionally satisfying to join the crowd and “smash something.” But that's just revolt, and even monarchies have had uprisings credited to their people. However, revolt isn't the same as reform, and one revolutionary government doesn’t equal good governance. We've proven that we, as free Americans, can assert our power; our lynchers show that every day. What remains to be seen is whether we can also go out individually, without passion, driven only by calm approval and a sense of duty, to vote wisely and support a reasonably good local government. And that's what New York has the opportunity to demonstrate; New York, the leading advocate of the great American movement for good government against bad governance.
According to this, the standard course of municipal reform, the politicians are permitted to organize a party on national lines, take over the government, corrupt and deceive the people, and run things for the private profit of the boss and his ring, till the corruption becomes rampant and a scandal. Then the reformers combine the opposition: 282the corrupt and unsatisfied minority, the disgruntled groups of the majority, the reform organizations; they nominate a mixed ticket, headed by a “good business man” for mayor, make a “hot campaign” against the government with “Stop, thief!” for the cry, and make a “clean sweep.” Usually, this effects only the disciplining of the reckless grafters and the improvement of the graft system of corrupt government. The good mayor turns out to be weak or foolish or “not so good.” The politicians “come it over him,” as they did over the business mayors who followed the “Gas Ring” revolt in Philadelphia, or the people become disgusted as they did with Mayor Strong, who was carried into office by the anti-Tammany rebellion in New York after the Lexow exposures. Philadelphia gave up after its disappointment, and that is what most cities do. The repeated failures of revolutionary reform to accomplish more than the strengthening of the machine have so discredited this method that wide-awake reformers in several cities—Pittsburg, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Detroit, Minneapolis, and others—are following the lead of Chicago.
According to this, the typical process of city reform allows politicians to create a party based on national interests, take control of the government, manipulate and mislead the public, and operate for the personal gain of the boss and his network, until the corruption becomes widespread and turns into a scandal. Then the reformers unite the opposition: 282the corrupt and discontented minority, the dissatisfied groups within the majority, and the reform organizations; they put together a mixed ticket led by a “good business person” for mayor, launch an aggressive campaign against the government with cries of “Stop, thief!”, and aim for a “clean sweep.” Usually, this just results in disciplining the reckless fraudsters and refining the graft system of corrupt governance. The good mayor often ends up being weak or naive or “not so good.” The politicians “outsmart him,” just as they did with the business-friendly mayors who followed the “Gas Ring” scandal in Philadelphia, or the public becomes disillusioned as was the case with Mayor Strong, who was elected through the anti-Tammany uprising in New York after the Lexow investigations. Philadelphia gave up after its letdown, and that’s what most cities tend to do. The ongoing failures of revolutionary reform to achieve anything more than bolstering the political machine have so discredited this approach that alert reformers in several cities—Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Detroit, Minneapolis, and others—are now following in Chicago's footsteps.
The Chicago plan does not depend for success upon any one man or any one year’s work, nor upon excitement or any sort of bad government. 283The reformers there have no ward organizations, no machine at all; their appeal is solely to the intelligence of the voter and their power rests upon that. This is democratic and political, not bourgeois and business reform, and it is interesting to note that whereas reformers elsewhere are forever seeking to concentrate all the powers in the mayor, those of Chicago talk of stripping the mayor to a figurehead and giving his powers to the aldermen who directly represent the people, and who change year by year.
The Chicago plan doesn’t rely on any one person or any single year’s work, nor on excitement or poor governance. 283The reformers there don’t have ward organizations or any kind of political machine; their appeal is based solely on the intelligence of the voters, and their power comes from that. This approach is democratic and political, not bourgeois or business reform. It's interesting to see that while reformers in other places are always trying to concentrate power in the mayor, those in Chicago talk about reducing the mayor to a figurehead and giving his powers to the aldermen, who directly represent the people and change from year to year.
The Chicago way is but one way, however, and a new one, and it must be remembered that this plan has not yet produced a good administration. New York has that. Chicago, after seven years’ steady work, has a body of aldermen honest enough and competent to defend the city’s interests against boodle capital, but that is about all; it has a wretched administration. New York has stuck to the old way. Provincial and self-centered, it hardly knows there is any other. Chicago laughs and other cities wonder, but never mind, New York, by persistence, has at last achieved a good administration. Will the New Yorkers continue it? That is the question. What Chicago has, it has secure. Its independent citizenship is trained to vote every time and to vote for uninteresting, good aldermen. New York has 284an independent vote of 100,000, a decisive minority, but the voters have been taught to vote only once in a long while, only when excited by picturesque leadership and sensational exposures, only against. New York has been so far an anti-bad government, anti-Tammany, not a good-government town. Can it vote, without Tammany in to incite it, for a good mayor? I think this election, which will answer this question, should decide other cities how to go about reform.
The Chicago way is just one way, and it’s new. It’s important to remember that this plan hasn’t yet led to a good administration. New York has managed that. After seven years of consistent effort, Chicago has a group of aldermen who are honest enough and capable of protecting the city’s interests against corrupt money, but that’s about it; the administration is terrible. New York has stuck to the old ways. Insular and focused on itself, it barely recognizes that there’s any other approach. Chicago laughs while other cities watch in disbelief, but never mind, New York has finally achieved a good administration through persistence. Will New Yorkers keep it going? That’s the question. Chicago’s independent citizens consistently show up to vote and they support decent, albeit unexciting, aldermen. New York has an independent voting bloc of 100,000, a significant minority, but its voters have been trained to vote only rarely, and usually only when stirred by charismatic leaders and shocking scandals, and only against things. For now, New York has mostly acted as a town against bad government, against Tammany, not as a place for good governance. Can it vote for a good mayor without Tammany to motivate it? I believe this election, which will answer this question, should set an example for other cities on how to pursue reform.
The administration of Mayor Seth Low may not have been perfect, not in the best European sense: not expert, not co-ordinated, certainly not wise. Nevertheless, for an American city, it has been not only honest, but able, undeniably one of the best in the whole country. Some of the departments have been dishonest; others have been so inefficient that they made the whole administration ridiculous. But what of that? Corruption also is clumsy and makes absurd mistakes when it is new and untrained. The “oaths” and ceremonies and much of the boodling of the St. Louis ring seemed laughable to my corrupt friends in Philadelphia and Tammany Hall, and New York’s own Tweed régime was “no joke,” only because it was so general, and so expensive—to New York. It took time to perfect the “Philadelphia plan” of misgovernment, and it 285took time to educate Croker and develop his Tammany Hall. It will take time to evolve masters of the (in America) unstudied art of municipal government—time and demand. So far there has been no market for municipal experts in this country. All we are clamoring for to-day in our meek, weak-hearted way, is that mean, rudimentary virtue miscalled “common honesty.” Do we really want it? Certainly Mayor Low is pecuniarily honest. He is more; he is conscientious and experienced and personally efficient. Bred to business, he rose above it, adding to the training he acquired in the conduct of an international commercial house, two terms as mayor of Brooklyn, and to that again a very effective administration, as president, of the business of Columbia University. He began his mayoralty with a study of the affairs of New York; he has said himself that he devoted eight months to its finances: and he mastered this department and is admitted to be the master in detail of every department which has engaged his attention. In other words, Mr. Low has learned the business of New York; he is just about competent now to become the mayor of a great city. Is there a demand for Mr. Low?
The administration of Mayor Seth Low may not have been perfect, not in the best European way: not skilled, not coordinated, and definitely not wise. Still, for an American city, it has been not only honest but also capable, undeniably one of the best in the country. Some departments have been dishonest; others have been so inefficient that they made the whole administration look ridiculous. But so what? Corruption is also clumsy and makes absurd mistakes when it's new and inexperienced. The "oaths" and ceremonies and much of the graft of the St. Louis ring seemed laughable to my corrupt friends in Philadelphia and Tammany Hall, and New York’s own Tweed regime was “no joke” only because it was so widespread and so costly—for New York. It took time to perfect the “Philadelphia plan” of misgovernment, and it took time to educate Croker and develop his Tammany Hall. It will take time to create experts in the (in America) under-studied art of municipal government—time and demand. So far, there hasn't been much of a market for municipal experts in this country. All we are quietly asking for today in our humble, half-hearted way is that basic, rudimentary quality miscalled “common honesty.” Do we really want it? Certainly, Mayor Low is financially honest. He is more; he is conscientious, experienced, and personally efficient. Raised in business, he rose above it, adding to his training from running an international commercial company, two terms as mayor of Brooklyn, and then a very effective administration as president of Columbia University’s operations. He started his time as mayor by studying New York's affairs; he has said he spent eight months on its finances: he mastered this area and is recognized as the expert in detail of every department he's focused on. In other words, Mr. Low has learned the ins and outs of New York; he is nearly qualified to become the mayor of a major city. Is there a demand for Mr. Low?
No. When I made my inquiries—before the lying had begun—the Fusion leaders of the anti-Tammany 286forces, who nominated Mr. Low, said they might renominate him. “Who else was there?” they asked. And they thought he “might” be re-elected. The alternative was Richard Croker or Charles F. Murphy, his man, for no matter who Tammany’s candidate for mayor was, if Tammany won, Tammany’s boss would rule. The personal issue was plain enough. Yet was there no assurance for Mr. Low.
No. When I asked around—before the lying started—the Fusion leaders of the anti-Tammany forces, who nominated Mr. Low, said they might nominate him again. “Who else was there?” they asked. And they thought he “might” get re-elected. The other options were Richard Croker or Charles F. Murphy, his guy, because no matter who Tammany’s candidate for mayor was, if Tammany won, Tammany’s boss would be in charge. The personal issue was clear enough. Yet there was no guarantee for Mr. Low.
Why? There are many forms of the answer given, but they nearly all reduce themselves to one—the man’s personality. It is not very engaging. Mr. Low has many respectable qualities, but these never are amiable. “Did you ever see his smile?” said a politician who was trying to account for his instinctive dislike for the mayor. I had; there is no laughter back of it, no humor, and no sense thereof. The appealing human element is lacking all through. His good abilities are self-sufficient; his dignity is smug; his courtesy seems not kind; his self-reliance is called obstinacy because, though he listens, he seems not to care; though he understands, he shows no sympathy, and when he decides, his reasoning is private. His most useful virtues—probity, intelligence, and conscientiousness—in action are often an irritation; they are so contented. Mr. Low is the bourgeois reformer type. 287Even where he compromises he gets no credit, his concessions make the impression of surrenders. A politician can say “no” and make a friend, where Mr. Low will lose one by saying “yes.” Cold and impersonal, he cools even his heads of departments. Loyal public service they give, because his taste is for men who would do their duty for their own sake, not for his, and that excellent service the city has had. But members of Mr. Low’s administration helped me to characterize him; they could not help it. Mr. Low’s is not a lovable character.
Why? There are many different answers to that question, but they all boil down to one thing—the man’s personality. It’s not very appealing. Mr. Low has many respectable qualities, but they’re not friendly. “Have you ever seen his smile?” asked a politician trying to explain his instinctive dislike for the mayor. I had; there’s no laughter behind it, no humor, and no sense of it. The warm, human touch is completely absent. His good qualities are self-sufficient; his dignity feels smug; his courtesy doesn’t seem genuine; his self-reliance comes off as stubbornness because, even though he listens, he seems indifferent; even though he understands, he shows no empathy, and when he makes decisions, his reasoning is private. His best traits—integrity, intelligence, and conscientiousness—often come off as irritating because they’re so self-satisfied. Mr. Low is the typical middle-class reformer. 287Even when he compromises, he doesn’t get any credit; his concessions feel more like giving in. A politician can say “no” and make a friend, but Mr. Low loses one by saying “yes.” Cold and impersonal, he even detaches his department heads. They give loyal public service because he prefers people who will do their job for its own sake, not for his, and the city has benefited from that excellent service. But members of Mr. Low’s administration helped me describe him; they couldn’t help it. Mr. Low is not a lovable character.
But what of that? Why should his colleagues love him? Why should anybody like him? Why should he seek to charm, win affection, and make friends? He was elected to attend to the business of his office and to appoint subordinates who should attend to the business of their offices, not to make “political strength” and win elections. William Travers Jerome, the picturesque District Attorney, whose sincerity and intellectual honesty made sure the election of Mr. Low two years ago, detests him as a bourgeois, but the mayoralty is held in New York to be a bourgeois office. Mr. Low is the ideal product of the New York theory that municipal government is business, not politics, and that a business man who would manage the city as he would a business 288corporation, would solve for us all our troubles. Chicago reformers think we have got to solve our own problems; that government is political business; that men brought up in politics and experienced in public office will make the best administrators. They have refused to turn from their politician mayor, Carter H. Harrison, for the most ideal business candidate, and I have heard them say that when Chicago was ripe for a better mayor they would prefer a candidate chosen from among their well-tried aldermen. Again, I say, however, that this is only one way, and New York has another, and this other is the standard American way.
But what does it matter? Why should his coworkers like him? Why should anyone care for him? Why should he try to charm people, gain their affection, and make friends? He was elected to handle the duties of his position and to appoint subordinates to take care of their responsibilities, not to build “political strength” and win elections. William Travers Jerome, the colorful District Attorney, whose honesty and intellectual integrity helped Mr. Low get elected two years ago, despises him as a middle-class person, but the mayor's position in New York is seen as a middle-class role. Mr. Low embodies the New York belief that city government is just a business, not politics, and that a businessman who manages the city like he would a company can solve all our issues. Chicago reformers believe that we need to address our own challenges; that government is a political endeavor; and that those raised in politics and experienced in public office will be the best leaders. They have refused to replace their political mayor, Carter H. Harrison, with the most ideal business candidate, and I’ve heard them say that when Chicago is ready for a better mayor, they would prefer a candidate picked from their trusted aldermen. Still, I maintain that this is just one approach, while New York has another, and that alternative is the standard American way. 288
But again I say, also, that the New York way is on trial, for New York has what the whole country has been looking for in all municipal crises—the non-political ruler. Mr. Low’s very faults, which I have emphasized for the purpose, emphasize the point. They make it impossible for him to be a politician even if he should wish to be. As for his selfishness, his lack of tact, his coldness—these are of no consequence. He has done his duty all the better for them. Admit that he is uninteresting; what does that matter? He has served the city. Will the city not vote for him because it does not like the way he smiles? Absurd as it sounds, that is what all I have heard 289against Low amounts to. But to reduce the situation to a further absurdity, let us eliminate altogether the personality of Mr. Low. Let us suppose he has no smile, no courtesy, no dignity, no efficiency, no personality at all; suppose he were an It and had not given New York a good administration, but had only honestly tried. What then?
But let me say again that the New York way is being tested, as New York has what the whole country has been searching for in all municipal crises—the non-political leader. Mr. Low’s very shortcomings, which I highlighted for a reason, prove this point. They make it impossible for him to be a politician even if he wanted to be. As for his selfishness, lack of tact, and coldness—these are irrelevant. He has done his job even better because of them. Admit that he is boring; what does that matter? He has served the city. Will the city not vote for him just because they don’t like his smile? Absurd as it sounds, that's all I’ve heard against Low. But to take this to another level of absurdity, let's completely ignore Mr. Low's personality. Let's assume he has no smile, no courtesy, no dignity, no efficiency, and no personality at all; let's say he was just a nobody and had only honestly tried to give New York a good administration. What then?
Tammany Hall? That is the alternative. The Tammany politicians see it just as clear as that, and they are not in the habit of deceiving themselves. They say “it is a Tammany year,” “Tammany’s turn.” They say it and they believe it. They study the people, and they know it is all a matter of citizenship; they admit that they cannot win unless a goodly part of the independent vote goes to them; and still they say they can beat Mr. Low or any other man the anti-Tammany forces may nominate. So we are safe in eliminating Mr. Low and reducing the issue to plain Tammany.
Tammany Hall? That's the alternative. The Tammany politicians see it clearly, and they don’t fool themselves. They say, “It’s a Tammany year,” “Tammany’s turn.” They say it and they believe it. They analyze the people, and they know it’s all about citizenship; they acknowledge they can’t win unless a significant portion of the independent vote goes to them; yet they still claim they can beat Mr. Low or anyone else the anti-Tammany forces might nominate. So we can safely eliminate Mr. Low and focus the issue solely on Tammany.
Tammany is bad government; not inefficient, but dishonest; not a party, not a delusion and a snare, hardly known by its party name—Democracy; having little standing in the national councils of the party and caring little for influence outside of the city. Tammany is Tammany, the embodiment of corruption. All the world knows 290and all the world may know what it is and what it is after. For hypocrisy is not a Tammany vice. Tammany is for Tammany, and the Tammany men say so. Other rings proclaim lies and make pretensions; other rogues talk about the tariff and imperialism. Tammany is honestly dishonest. Time and time again, in private and in public, the leaders, big and little, have said they are out for themselves and their own; not for the public, but for “me and my friends”; not for New York, but for Tammany. Richard Croker said under oath once that he worked for his own pockets all the time, and Tom Grady, the Tammany orator, has brought his crowds to their feet cheering sentiments as primitive, stated with candor as brutal.
Tammany is bad government; it’s not just inefficient, but dishonest. It’s not a political party, not a delusion or a trap, and is barely recognized by its party name—Democracy. It has little influence in the national party and doesn’t care much about its standing outside the city. Tammany is Tammany, the very definition of corruption. The whole world knows what it is and what it wants. Hypocrisy isn’t a vice of Tammany. Tammany is for Tammany, and its members make that clear. Other groups spread lies and put on façades; other crooks talk about tariffs and imperialism. Tammany is openly dishonest. Over and over, in private and in public, leaders—big and small—have stated that they’re looking out for themselves and their friends, not the public, but for “me and my buddies”; not for New York, but for Tammany. Richard Croker once testified under oath that he was always working for his own benefit, and Tom Grady, the Tammany speaker, has rallied crowds with sentiments that are as basic and brutally honest.
The man from Mars would say that such an organization, so self-confessed, could not be very dangerous to an intelligent people. Foreigners marvel at it and at us, and even Americans—Pennsylvanians, for example—cannot understand why we New Yorkers regard Tammany as so formidable. I think I can explain it. Tammany is corruption with consent; it is bad government founded on the suffrages of the people. The Philadelphia machine is more powerful. It rules Philadelphia by fraud and force and does not require the votes of the people. The Philadelphians 291do not vote for their machine; their machine votes for them. Tammany used to stuff the ballot boxes and intimidate voters; to-day there is practically none of that. Tammany rules, when it rules, by right of the votes of the people of New York.
The man from Mars would say that an organization that openly admits its faults can't be too dangerous to smart people. Foreigners are amazed by it and by us, and even Americans—like those from Pennsylvania—can't figure out why we New Yorkers see Tammany as such a major threat. I think I can explain. Tammany represents corruption with public approval; it's bad governance built on the people's votes. The Philadelphia machine is stronger. It controls Philadelphia through fraud and force without needing the people's votes. The people of Philadelphia don't vote for their machine; their machine votes for them. Tammany used to stuff ballot boxes and scare voters; today, that's practically extinct. Tammany governs, when it does, based on the votes of the people of New York.
Tammany corruption is democratic corruption. That of the Philadelphia ring is rooted in special interests. Tammany, too, is allied with “vested interests”—but Tammany labors under disadvantages not known in Philadelphia. The Philadelphia ring is of the same party that rules the State and the nation, and the local ring forms a living chain with the State and national rings. Tammany is a purely local concern. With a majority only in old New York, it has not only to buy what it wants from the Republican majority in the State, but must trade to get the whole city. Big business everywhere is the chief source of political corruption, and it is one source in New York; but most of the big businesses represented in New York have no plants there. Offices there are, and head offices, of many trusts and railways, for example, but that is all. There are but two railway terminals in the city, and but three railways use them. These have to do more with Albany than New York. So with Wall Street. Philadelphia’s stock exchange deals 292largely in Pennsylvania securities, New York’s in those of the whole United States. There is a small Wall Street group that specializes in local corporations, and they are active and give Tammany a Wall Street connection, but the biggest and the majority of our financial leaders, bribers though they may be in other cities and even in New York State, are independent of Tammany Hall, and can be honest citizens at home. From this class, indeed, New York can, and often does, draw some of its reformers. Not so Philadelphia. That bourgeois opposition which has persisted for thirty years in the fight against Tammany corruption was squelched in Philadelphia after its first great uprising. Matt Quay, through the banks, railways, and other business interests, was able to reach it. A large part of his power is negative; there is no opposition. Tammany’s power is positive. Tammany cannot reach all the largest interests and its hold is upon the people.
Tammany corruption is democratic corruption. The Philadelphia ring's corruption is tied to special interests. Tammany is also connected to "vested interests"—but it faces challenges that are not present in Philadelphia. The Philadelphia ring is part of the same party that controls the state and the country, and the local ring is connected to the state and national rings. Tammany is strictly a local organization. With a majority only in old New York, it has to buy what it needs from the Republican majority in the state and must negotiate to control the entire city. Big business is the main source of political corruption everywhere, and it's one source in New York; however, most of the big businesses represented in New York don't have operations there. There are offices and headquarters for many trusts and railways, for example, but that's about it. There are only two railway terminals in the city, and only three railways use them. These railways are more connected to Albany than New York. The same goes for Wall Street. Philadelphia’s stock exchange mainly deals in Pennsylvania securities, while New York’s trades in those from all over the United States. There is a small Wall Street group that focuses on local corporations, which maintains a connection with Tammany, but most of our financial leaders, even if they are bribers in other cities and even in New York State, are independent of Tammany Hall and can be honest citizens elsewhere. In fact, New York can, and often does, draw some of its reformers from this group. Not so in Philadelphia. The bourgeois opposition that has fought against Tammany corruption for thirty years was crushed in Philadelphia after its first major rebellion. Matt Quay, through banks, railways, and other business interests, was able to control it. A large part of his power is negative; there is no opposition. Tammany’s power is positive. Tammany can't reach all the biggest interests, but its influence is over the people.
Tammany’s democratic corruption rests upon the corruption of the people, the plain people, and there lies its great significance; its grafting system is one in which more individuals share than any I have studied. The people themselves get very little; they come cheap, but they are interested. Divided into districts, the organization subdivides them into precincts or neighborhoods, 293and their sovereign power, in the form of votes, is bought up by kindness and petty privileges. They are forced to a surrender, when necessary, by intimidation, but the leader and his captains have their hold because they take care of their own. They speak pleasant words, smile friendly smiles, notice the baby, give picnics up the River or the Sound, or a slap on the back; find jobs, most of them at the city’s expense, but they have also news-stands, peddling privileges, railroad and other business places to dispense; they permit violations of the law, and, if a man has broken the law without permission, see him through the court. Though a blow in the face is as readily given as a shake of the hand, Tammany kindness is real kindness, and will go far, remember long, and take infinite trouble for a friend.
Tammany's democratic corruption relies on the corruption of the people, the everyday folks, and that’s where its significance lies; its graft system involves more individuals than any I've studied. The people themselves receive very little; they are inexpensive, but they are engaged. Divided into districts, the organization breaks them down further into precincts or neighborhoods, 293 and their power, represented by their votes, is manipulated through kindness and small favors. They are coerced into compliance when needed, through intimidation, yet the leader and his captains maintain their grip because they take care of their own. They offer friendly words, friendly smiles, acknowledge the baby, organize picnics by the river or sound, or give a supportive pat on the back; they help find jobs, most at the city's expense, but they also have newsstands, selling privileges, railroad and other businesses to manage; they allow law violations, and if someone breaks the law without permission, they help him navigate the court system. While a punch to the face can come as easily as a handshake, Tammany's kindness is genuine kindness, can go a long way, be remembered for a long time, and go to great lengths for a friend.
The power that is gathered up thus cheaply, like garbage, in the districts is concentrated in the district leader, who in turn passes it on through a general committee to the boss. This is a form of living government, extra-legal, but very actual, and, though the beginnings of it are purely democratic, it develops at each stage into an autocracy. In Philadelphia the boss appoints a district leader and gives him power. Tammany has done that in two or three notable instances, but never without causing a bitter 294fight which lasts often for years. In Philadelphia the State boss designates the city boss. In New York, Croker has failed signally to maintain vice-bosses whom he appointed. The boss of Tammany Hall is a growth, and just as Croker grew, so has Charles F. Murphy grown up to Croker’s place. Again, whereas in Philadelphia the boss and his ring handle and keep almost all of the graft, leaving little to the district leaders, in New York the district leaders share handsomely in the spoils.
The power that accumulates so easily, like trash, in the neighborhoods is concentrated in the district leader, who then relays it through a general committee to the boss. This is a kind of living government, outside the law, but very real, and while its origins are purely democratic, it evolves into an autocracy at every stage. In Philadelphia, the boss appoints a district leader and grants him power. Tammany has done this in a couple of notable cases, but it has invariably led to a fierce struggle that can last for years. In Philadelphia, the State boss designates the city boss. In New York, Croker has failed miserably to keep the vice-bosses he appointed. The boss of Tammany Hall is a progression, and just as Croker rose, so has Charles F. Murphy ascended to Croker’s position. Moreover, while in Philadelphia the boss and his clique handle and retain almost all the graft, leaving little for the district leaders, in New York, the district leaders receive a significant share of the spoils.
There is more to share in New York. It is impossible to estimate the amount of it, not only for me, but for anybody. No Tammany man knows it all. Police friends of mine say that the Tammany leaders never knew how rich police corruption was till the Lexow committee exposed it, and that the politicians who had been content with small presents, contributions, and influence, “did not butt in” for their share till they saw by the testimony of frightened police grafters that the department was worth from four to five millions a year. The items are so incredible that I hesitate to print them. Devery told a friend once that in one year the police graft was “something over $3,000,000.” Afterward the syndicate which divided the graft under Devery took in for thirty-six months $400,000 a month from 295gambling and poolrooms alone. Saloon bribers, disorderly house blackmail, policy, etc., etc., bring this total up to amazing proportions.
There’s a lot more happening in New York. It’s impossible to gauge just how much, not just for me, but for anyone. No Tammany politician knows everything. My cop friends say that the Tammany leaders had no idea how lucrative police corruption was until the Lexow committee revealed it, and that the politicians who were satisfied with small gifts, donations, and influence “didn’t get involved” for their cut until they realized, through the scared testimonies of corrupt cops, that the department was raking in between four and five million dollars a year. The figures are so unbelievable that I hesitate to write them down. Devery once told a friend that in one year, police graft was “over $3,000,000.” Later, the syndicate that split the graft under Devery pulled in $400,000 a month for thirty-six months just from gambling and poolrooms. Bribes from bars, blackmail from brothels, policy games, and so on push this total to staggering amounts.
Yet this was but one department, and a department that was overlooked by Tammany for years. The annual budget of the city is about $100,000,000, and though the power that comes of the expenditure of that amount is enormous and the opportunities for rake-offs infinite, this sum is not one-half of the resources of Tammany when it is in power. Her resources are the resources of the city as a business, as a political, as a social power. If Tammany could be incorporated, and all its earnings, both legitimate and illegitimate, gathered up and paid over in dividends, the stockholders would get more than the New York Central bond and stock holders, more than the Standard Oil stockholders, and the controlling clique would wield a power equal to that of the United States Steel Company. Tammany, when in control of New York, takes out of the city unbelievable millions of dollars a year.
Yet this was just one department, and one that Tammany had ignored for years. The city’s annual budget is around $100 million, and while the power that comes from spending that amount is huge and the chances for kickbacks are endless, this sum is not even half of Tammany's resources when it is in control. Its resources are the resources of the city as a business, as a political force, and as a social entity. If Tammany could be treated like a corporation, and all its earnings, both legal and illegal, were collected and distributed as dividends, the shareholders would receive more than those of the New York Central and more than those of Standard Oil, and the ruling group would have a power equal to that of U.S. Steel. When Tammany is in charge of New York, it pulls out unbelievable millions of dollars from the city each year.
No wonder the leaders are all rich; no wonder so many more Tammany men are rich than are the leaders in any other town; no wonder Tammany is liberal in its division of the graft. Croker took the best and the safest of it, and he accepted shares in others. He was “in on the 296Wall Street end,” and the Tammany clique of financiers have knocked down and bought up at low prices Manhattan Railway stock by threats of the city’s power over the road; they have been let in on Metropolitan deals and on the Third Avenue Railroad grab; the Ice trust is a Tammany trust; they have banks and trust companies, and through the New York Realty Company are forcing alliances with such financial groups as that of the Standard Oil Company. Croker shared in these deals and businesses. He sold judgeships, taking his pay in the form of contributions to the Tammany campaign fund, of which he was treasurer, and he had the judges take from the regular real estate exchange all the enormous real estate business that passed through the courts, and give it to an exchange connected with the real estate business of his firm, Peter F. Meyer & Co. This alone would maintain a ducal estate in England. But his real estate business was greater than that. It had extraordinary legal facilities, the free advertising of abuse, the prestige of political privilege, all of which brought in trade; and it had advance information and followed, with profitable deals, great public improvements.
It’s no surprise that the leaders are all wealthy; it’s no surprise that so many more Tammany members are rich compared to leaders in any other city; it’s no surprise that Tammany is generous in how it shares the graft. Croker took the best and safest cut, and he accepted shares in others. He was “in on the 296 Wall Street end,” and the Tammany group of financiers has bought up Manhattan Railway stock at low prices through threats of the city’s influence over the line; they’ve been involved in Metropolitan deals and the Third Avenue Railroad acquisition; the Ice trust is a Tammany trust; they have banks and trust companies, and through the New York Realty Company, they are forming partnerships with major financial players like the Standard Oil Company. Croker benefited from these deals and businesses. He sold judgeships, accepting payment through contributions to the Tammany campaign fund, where he served as treasurer, and he had the judges direct all the massive real estate transactions that went through the courts away from the regular real estate exchange and toward an exchange linked to his firm, Peter F. Meyer & Co. This alone could sustain a noble estate in England. But his real estate business was even bigger than that. It had remarkable legal advantages, the free promotion of negative publicity, the prestige of political connections, all of which attracted business; and it had insider information and pursued profitable deals involving significant public projects.
Though Croker said he worked for his own pockets all the time, and did take the best of 297the graft, he was not “hoggish.” Some of the richest graft in the city is in the Department of Buildings: $100,000,000 a year goes into building operations in New York. All of this, from out-houses to sky-scrapers, is subject to very precise laws and regulations, most of them wise, some impossible. The Building Department has the enforcement of these; it passes upon all construction, private and public, at all stages, from plan-making to actual completion; and can cause not only “unavoidable delay,” but can wink at most profitable violations. Architects and builders had to stand in with the department. They called on the right man and they settled on a scale which was not fixed, but which generally was on the basis of the department’s estimate of a fair half of the value of the saving in time or bad material. This brought in at least a banker’s percentage on one hundred millions a year. Croker, so far as I can make out, took none of this! it was let out to other leaders and was their own graft.
Though Croker claimed he was always looking out for himself and profited from the best of the graft, he wasn't greedy. Some of the biggest graft in the city happens in the Department of Buildings: $100 million a year is funneled into construction projects in New York. Everything from small bathrooms to skyscrapers falls under strict laws and regulations, most of which are sensible, while some are impossible to follow. The Building Department is responsible for enforcing these rules; it reviews all construction, both private and public, at every stage, from planning to completion; and it can create “unavoidable delays” or ignore many profitable violations. Architects and builders had to collaborate with the department. They would approach the right person and negotiate a deal that wasn't fixed but typically based on the department’s estimation of half the value of the time saved or the poor materials used. This scheme generated at least a banker’s percentage on a hundred million dollars a year. As far as I can tell, Croker didn’t take any of this! It was given out to other leaders and was their own graft.
District Attorney William Travers Jerome has looked into the Dock Department, and he knows things which he yet may prove. This is an important investigation for two reasons. It is very large graft, and the new Tammany leader, Charlie Murphy, had it. New York wants to know 298more about Murphy, and it should want to know about the management of its docks, since, just as other cities have their corrupt dealings with railways and their terminals, so New York’s great terminal business is with steamships and docks. These docks should pay the city handsomely. Mr. Murphy says they shouldn’t; he is wise, as Croker was before he became old and garrulous, and, as Tammany men put it, “keeps his mouth shut,” but he did say that the docks should not be run for revenue to the city, but for their own improvement. The Dock Board has exclusive and private and secret control of the expenditure of $10,000,000 a year. No wonder Murphy chose it.
District Attorney William Travers Jerome has investigated the Dock Department and knows things he might prove later. This is a significant investigation for two reasons. It involves a large amount of corruption, and the new Tammany leader, Charlie Murphy, was involved. New Yorkers want to know more about Murphy, and they should also be concerned about how their docks are managed, since, just like other cities deal with corruption involving railways and terminals, New York's major terminal operations revolve around steamships and docks. These docks should be profitable for the city. Mr. Murphy argues they shouldn’t; he’s clever, like Croker was before he got old and talkative, and, as Tammany men say, “keeps his mouth shut,” but he did claim that the docks shouldn’t be run for the city's revenue, but rather for their own improvement. The Dock Board has exclusive, private, and secret control over the spending of $10,000,000 a year. It’s no surprise that Murphy chose it.
It is impossible to follow all New York graft from its source to its final destination. It is impossible to follow here the course of that which is well known to New Yorkers. There are public works for Tammany contractors. There are private works for Tammany contractors, and corporations and individuals find it expedient to let it go to Tammany contractors. Tammany has a very good system of grafting on public works; I mean that it is “good” from the criminal point of view—and so it has for the furnishing of supplies. Low bids and short deliveries, generally speaking (and that is the only way I can speak 299here), is the method. But the Tammany system, as a whole, is weak.
It’s impossible to trace all the corruption in New York from its beginnings to its end. It’s also hard to cover what’s well-known to New Yorkers. There are public projects for Tammany contractors. There are private projects for Tammany contractors, and businesses and individuals often find it easier to go with Tammany contractors. Tammany has a solid system for profiting from public projects; I mean "solid" from a criminal perspective—and they also have a system for supplying materials. Generally speaking, low bids and incomplete deliveries (and that’s the only way I can put it 299 here) are the way to go. But overall, the Tammany system is weak.
Tammany men as grafters have a confidence in their methods and system, which, in the light of such perfection as that of Philadelphia, is amusing, and the average New Yorker takes in “the organization” a queer sort of pride, which is ignorant and provincial. Tammany is ‘way behind the times. It is growing; it has improved. In Tweed’s day the politicians stole from the city treasury, divided the money on the steps of the City Hall, and, not only the leaders, big and little, but heelers and outsiders; not only Tweed, but ward carpenters robbed the city; not only politicians, but newspapers and citizens were “in on the divvy.” New York, not Tammany alone, was corrupt. When the exposure came, and Tweed asked his famous question, “What are you going to do about it?” the ring mayor, A. Oakey Hall, asked another as significant. It was reported that suit was to be brought against the ring to recover stolen funds. “Who is going to sue?” said Mayor Hall, who could not think of anybody of importance sufficiently without sin to throw the first stone. Stealing was stopped and grafting was made more businesslike, but still it was too general, and the boodling for the Broadway street railway franchise prompted a 300still closer grip on the business. The organization since then has been gradually concentrating the control of graft. Croker did not proceed so far along the line as the Philadelphia ring has, as the police scandals showed. After the Lexow exposures, Tammany took over that graft, but still let it go practically by districts, and the police captains still got a third. After the Mazet exposures, Devery became Chief, and the police graft was so concentrated that the division was reduced to fourteen parts. Again, later, it was reduced to a syndicate of four or five men, with a dribble of miscellaneous graft for the police. In Philadelphia the police have nothing to do with the police graft; a policeman may collect it, but he acts for a politician, who in turn passes it up to a small ring. That is the drift in New York. Under Devery the police officers got comparatively little, and the rank and file themselves were blackmailed for transfers and promotions, for remittances of fines, and in a dozen other petty ways.
Tammany men have a certain confidence in their methods and system, which, when compared to the efficiency of Philadelphia, is quite amusing. The average New Yorker feels a strange sense of pride in “the organization,” which comes off as naive and provincial. Tammany is way behind the times. It is growing and has improved. Back in Tweed’s era, politicians stole directly from the city treasury, splitting the money right on the steps of City Hall. This wasn’t just the leaders, big and small, but also foot soldiers and outsiders; not just Tweed, but ward carpenters were robbing the city. It involved not only politicians but also newspapers and citizens who were “in on the divvy.” New York as a whole, not just Tammany, was corrupt. When the scandal broke, and Tweed asked his famous question, “What are you going to do about it?” the ring's mayor, A. Oakey Hall, posed another insightful question. When it was reported that a lawsuit was going to be initiated against the ring to reclaim the stolen funds, Mayor Hall asked, “Who is going to sue?” because he couldn’t think of anyone important enough who was innocent enough to throw the first stone. While stealing may have decreased and grafting became more organized, it still was widespread, and the greed surrounding the Broadway street railway franchise led to even tighter control over the operations. Since then, the organization has gradually centralized control of graft. Croker didn’t go as far as the Philadelphia ring, as shown by the police scandals. After the Lexow investigations, Tammany took over that graft but allowed it to remain mostly district-based, with police captains still taking a third. After the Mazet investigations, Devery became Chief, and police graft was so concentrated that division was cut down to fourteen parts. Eventually, it was even narrowed down to a syndicate of four or five men, with a trickle of minor graft for the police. In Philadelphia, police have no part in police graft; an officer may collect it, but he does so for a politician, who then channels it up to a small ring. That’s the trend in New York. Under Devery, police officers received comparatively little, and the rank and file were extorted for transfers and promotions, fines remittances, and in various other petty ways.
Philadelphia is the end toward which New York under Tammany is driving as fast as the lower intelligence and higher conceit of its leaders will let it. In Philadelphia one very small ring gets everything, dividing the whole as it pleases, and not all those in the inner ring are politicians. 301Trusting few individuals, they are safe from exposure, more powerful, more deliberate, and they are wise as politicians. When, as in New York, the number of grafters is large, this delicate business is in some hands that are rapacious. The police grafters, for example, in Devery’s day, were not content with the amounts collected from the big vices. They cultivated minor vices, like policy, to such an extent that the Policy King was caught and sent to prison, and Devery’s ward-man, Glennon, was pushed into so tight a hole that there was danger that District Attorney Jerome would get past Glennon to Devery and the syndicate. The murder of a witness the night he was in the Tenderloin police station served to save the day. But, worst of all, Tammany, the “friend of the people,” permitted the organization of a band of so-called Cadets, who made a business, under the protection of the police, of ruining the daughters of the tenements and even of catching and imprisoning in disorderly houses the wives of poor men. This horrid traffic never was exposed; it could not and cannot be. Vicious women were “planted” in tenement houses and (I know this personally) the children of decent parents counted the customers, witnessed their transactions with these creatures, and, as a father told with shame and tears, reported totals at the family table.
Philadelphia is where New York, under Tammany, is heading as fast as its leaders' low intelligence and high self-importance allow. In Philadelphia, a very small group controls everything, dividing the spoils as they see fit, and not all those in this inner circle are politicians. 301 By trusting only a few individuals, they avoid exposure, becoming more powerful, more intentional, and shrewder than politicians. In contrast, when the number of corrupt officials is large, as in New York, this delicate operation falls into the hands of greed-driven people. For instance, during Devery’s time, the corrupt police officers weren’t satisfied with the money from major vices. They delved into smaller vices, like illegal gambling, to such an extent that the Policy King ended up in prison, and Devery’s associate, Glennon, was pushed into a corner so tight that it seemed District Attorney Jerome might reach Glennon, then Devery, and the whole syndicate. The murder of a witness the very night he was at the Tenderloin police station saved the day. But, most troubling of all, Tammany, the so-called “friend of the people,” allowed a group of so-called Cadets to form, who, protected by the police, made it their business to exploit the daughters of the tenements and even capture and imprison the wives of poor men in illegal brothels. This appalling activity was never brought to light; it couldn’t be and still can’t be. Corrupted women were “placed” in tenement buildings, and I know this for a fact: the children of decent families counted the clients, witnessed their interactions with these women, and, as a father recounted with shame and tears, shared what they observed at the family dinner table.
302Tammany leaders are usually the natural leaders of the people in these districts, and they are originally good-natured, kindly men. No one has a more sincere liking than I for some of those common but generous fellows; their charity is real, at first. But they sell out their own people. They do give them coal and help them in their private troubles, but, as they grow rich and powerful, the kindness goes out of the charity and they not only collect at their saloons or in rents—cash for their “goodness”; they not only ruin fathers and sons and cause the troubles they relieve; they sacrifice the children in the schools; let the Health Department neglect the tenements, and, worst of all, plant vice in the neighborhood and in the homes of the poor.
302Tammany leaders are typically the natural leaders of the people in these neighborhoods, and they start off as good-natured, kind men. No one appreciates some of those ordinary but generous guys more than I do; their charity is genuine at first. But they end up selling out their own people. They do provide coal and assist with personal problems, but as they become wealthy and influential, their kindness fades from their generosity. They not only collect money at their bars or through rents—cash for their “goodness”; they also ruin fathers and sons and create the issues they claim to solve; they sacrifice children in schools; allow the Health Department to neglect the tenements, and, worst of all, spread vice in the community and in the homes of the poor.
This is not only bad; it is bad politics; it has defeated Tammany. Woe to New York when Tammany learns better. Honest fools talk of the reform of Tammany Hall. It is an old hope, this, and twice it has been disappointed, but it is not vain. That is the real danger ahead. The reform of a corrupt ring means, as I have said before, the reform of its system of grafting and a wise consideration of certain features of good government. Croker turned his “best chief of police,” William S. Devery, out of Tammany Hall, and, slow and old as he was, Croker learned what clean streets were 303from Colonel Waring, and gave them. Now there is a new boss, a young man, Charles F. Murphy, and unknown to New Yorkers. He looks dense, but he acts with force, decision, and skill. The new mayor will be his man. He may divide with Croker and leave to the “old man” all his accustomed graft, but Charlie Murphy will rule Tammany and, if Tammany is elected, New York also. Lewis Nixon is urging Murphy publicly, as I write, to declare against the police scandals and all the worst practices of Tammany. Lewis Nixon is an honest man, but he was one of the men Croker tried to appoint leader of Tammany Hall. And when he resigned Mr. Nixon said that he found that a man could not keep that leadership and his self-respect. Yet Mr. Nixon is a type of the man who thinks Tammany would be fit to rule New York if the organization would “reform.”
This isn't just bad; it's bad politics; it has defeated Tammany. Woe to New York when Tammany wises up. Naive optimists talk about reforming Tammany Hall. It’s an old hope—one that’s been dashed twice before—but it’s not pointless. That’s the real danger ahead. Reforming a corrupt group means, as I've said before, changing its grafting system and thoughtfully addressing certain elements of good governance. Croker kicked his “best chief of police,” William S. Devery, out of Tammany Hall, and although he was slow and old, Croker learned about clean streets from Colonel Waring and provided them. Now there’s a new boss, a young guy named Charles F. Murphy, who is unknown to New Yorkers. He may seem dense, but he acts with strength, decisiveness, and skill. The new mayor will likely be his guy. He might share power with Croker and let the “old man” keep his usual graft, but Charlie Murphy will be in charge of Tammany, and if Tammany wins, so does New York. Lewis Nixon is publicly urging Murphy, as I write this, to take a stand against the police scandals and all the worst practices of Tammany. Lewis Nixon is an honest man, but he was one of the people Croker tried to make leader of Tammany Hall. When he resigned, Mr. Nixon said he discovered that a person couldn’t keep that leadership and his self-respect. Yet Mr. Nixon represents the kind of person who believes Tammany would be fit to govern New York if the organization were to “reform.”
As a New Yorker, I fear Murphy will prove sagacious enough to do just that: stop the scandal, put all the graft in the hands of a few tried and true men, and give the city what it would call good government. Murphy says he will nominate for mayor a man so “good” that his goodness will astonish New York. I don’t fear a bad Tammany mayor; I dread the election of a good one. For I have been to Philadelphia.
As a New Yorker, I'm worried Murphy will be smart enough to actually pull it off: end the scandal, hand all the corruption over to a few reliable guys, and give the city what it would consider good governance. Murphy claims he will nominate a man for mayor who is so “good” that his goodness will amaze New York. I'm not afraid of a bad Tammany mayor; I'm terrified of a good one. Because I've been to Philadelphia.
304Philadelphia had a bad ring mayor, a man who promoted the graft and caused scandal after scandal. The leaders there, the wisest political grafters in this country, learned a great lesson from that. As one of them said to me:
304Philadelphia had a corrupt mayor, a guy who encouraged bribery and created scandal after scandal. The leaders there, the smartest political hustlers in this country, learned a valuable lesson from that. As one of them said to me:
“The American people don’t mind grafting, but they hate scandals. They don’t kick so much on a jiggered public contract for a boulevard, but they want the boulevard and no fuss and no dust. We want to give them that. We want to give them what they really want, a quiet Sabbath, safe streets, orderly nights, and homes secure. They let us have the police graft. But this mayor was a hog. You see, he had but one term and he could get his share only on what was made in his term. He not only took a hog’s share off what was coming, but he wanted everything to come in his term. So I’m down on grafting mayors and grafting office holders. I tell you it’s good politics to have honest men in office. I mean men that are personally honest.”
“The American people aren't against corruption, but they really dislike scandals. They don't get too bothered by a rigged public contract for a road, but they expect the road without any drama or mess. We want to deliver that. We want to provide what they truly desire: peaceful Sundays, safe streets, orderly nights, and secure homes. They’ve tolerated police corruption. But this mayor was greedy. You see, he only had one term and could only benefit from what was earned during that time. He not only took more than his fair share from what came in, but he also wanted everything that came during his term. So I'm against corrupt mayors and corrupt officials. I’m telling you, it's smart politics to have honest people in office. I mean truly honest individuals.”
So they got John Weaver for mayor, and honest John Weaver is checking corruption, restoring order, and doing a great many good things, which it is “good politics” to do. For he is satisfying the people, soothing their ruffled pride, and reconciling them to machine rule. I have letters from friends of mine there, honest men, who wish me to 305bear witness to the goodness of Mayor Weaver. I do. And I believe that if the Philadelphia machine leaders are as careful with Mayor Weaver as they have been and let him continue to give to the end as good government as he has given so far, the “Philadelphia plan” of graft will last and Philadelphia will never again be a free American city.
So they got John Weaver elected as mayor, and honest John Weaver is fighting corruption, restoring order, and doing a lot of good things, which is “good politics.” He’s pleasing the people, calming their upset feelings, and helping them accept machine rule. I have letters from friends there, honest people, who want me to bear witness to Mayor Weaver’s goodness. I do. I believe that if the Philadelphia machine leaders treat Mayor Weaver carefully like they have and let him keep delivering the good government he has provided so far, the “Philadelphia plan” of corruption will endure, and Philadelphia will never again be a truly free American city.
Philadelphia and New York began about the same time, some thirty years ago, to reform their city governments. Philadelphia got “good government”—what the Philadelphians call good—from a corrupt ring and quit, satisfied to be a scandal to the nation and a disgrace to democracy. New York has gone on fighting, advancing and retreating, for thirty years, till now it has achieved the beginnings, under Mayor Low, of a government for the people. Do the New Yorkers know it? Do they care? They are Americans, mixed and typical; do we Americans really want good government? Or, as I said at starting, have they worked for thirty years along the wrong road—crowded with unhappy American cities—the road to Philadelphia and despair?
Philadelphia and New York started around the same time, about thirty years ago, to reform their city governments. Philadelphia settled for "good government"—what the people there consider good—coming from a corrupt group, and they stopped, content to be a disgrace to the nation and a failure of democracy. New York, on the other hand, has been battling, making progress and setbacks for thirty years, and has just started, under Mayor Low, to create a government for the people. Do the people in New York realize this? Do they even care? They are a mix of typical Americans; do we really want good government? Or, as I mentioned at the beginning, have they spent thirty years on the wrong path—filled with troubled American cities—the path to Philadelphia and despair?
Post Scriptum: Mayor Low was nominated on the Fusion ticket. Tammany nominated George B. McClellan. The local corporations contributed 306heavily to the Tammany campaign fund and the people of New York elected the Tammany ticket by a decisive majority of 62,696. The vote was: McClellan, 314,782; Low, 252,086.
P.S.: Mayor Low was nominated on the Fusion ticket. Tammany nominated George B. McClellan. The local corporations donated significantly to the Tammany campaign fund, and the people of New York elected the Tammany ticket with a decisive majority of 62,696 votes. The final tally was: McClellan, 314,782; Low, 252,086.

No novel of New York City has ever portrayed so faithfully or so vividly our new world Gotham—the seething, rushing New York of to-day, to which all the world looks with such curious interest. Mr. Townsend, gives us not a picture, but the bustling, nerve-racking pageant itself. The titan struggles in the world of finance, the huge hoaxes in sensational newspaperdom, the gay life of the theatre, opera, and restaurant, and then the calmer and comforting domestic scenes of wholesome living, pass, as actualities, before our very eyes. In this turbulent maelstrom of ambition, he finds room for love and romance also.
No novel about New York City has ever captured so accurately or so vividly our modern Gotham—the vibrant, fast-paced New York of today, which draws the curiosity of the entire world. Mr. Townsend doesn’t just provide a picture; he presents the lively, nerve-wracking spectacle itself. The fierce battles in the finance world, the massive scams in sensational journalism, the lively atmosphere of theaters, operas, and restaurants, along with the calmer, comforting domestic scenes of healthy living, all unfold before our eyes as real experiences. Amid this chaotic whirlwind of ambition, he also makes space for love and romance.
There is a bountiful array of characters, admirably drawn, and especially delightful are the two emotional and excitable lovers, young Bannister and Gertrude Carr. The book is unlike Mr. Townsend’s “Chimmie Fadden” in everything but its intimate knowledge of New York life.
There is a rich variety of characters, skillfully portrayed, and particularly charming are the two passionate and enthusiastic lovers, young Bannister and Gertrude Carr. The book is different from Mr. Townsend’s “Chimmie Fadden” in every way except for its deep understanding of New York life.

Stories of the remarkable adventures of a Brigadier in Napoleon’s army. In Etienne Gerard, Conan Doyle has added to his already famous gallery of characters one worthy to stand beside the notable Sherlock Holmes. Many and thrilling are Gerard’s adventures, as related by himself, for he takes part in nearly every one of Napoleon’s campaigns. In Venice he has an interesting romantic escapade which causes him the loss of an ear. With the utmost bravery and cunning he captures the Spanish city of Saragossa; in Portugal he saves the army; in Russia he feeds the starving soldiers by supplies obtained at Minsk, after a wonderful ride. Everywhere else he is just as marvelous, and at Waterloo he is the center of the whole battle.
Stories of the incredible adventures of a Brigadier in Napoleon’s army. In Etienne Gerard, Conan Doyle introduces another character worthy of standing alongside the legendary Sherlock Holmes. Gerard shares many thrilling stories as he participates in nearly all of Napoleon’s campaigns. In Venice, he experiences an intriguing romantic escapade that costs him an ear. With immense bravery and cleverness, he captures the Spanish city of Saragossa; in Portugal, he saves the army; in Russia, he feeds the starving soldiers with supplies he secures in Minsk, after an astonishing ride. Everywhere else, he is just as remarkable, and at Waterloo, he is at the heart of the entire battle.
For all his lumbering vanity he is a genial old soul and a remarkably vivid story-teller.
For all his clumsy arrogance, he’s a friendly old guy and an incredibly vivid storyteller.
Illustrated by W. B. Wollen.
Illustrated by W.B. Wollen.

Geneva in the early days of the 17th century; a ruffling young theologue new to the city; a beautiful and innocent girl, suspected of witchcraft; a crafty scholar and metaphysician seeking to give over the city into the hands of the Savoyards; a stern and powerful syndic whom the scholar beguiles to betray his office by promises of an elixir which shall save him from his fatal illness; a brutal soldier of fortune; these are the elements of which Weyman has composed the most brilliant and thrilling of his romances. Claude Mercier, the student, seeing the plot in which the girl he loves is involved, yet helpless to divulge it, finds at last his opportunity when the treacherous men of Savoy are admitted within Geneva’s walls, and in a night of whirlwind fighting saves the city by his courage and address. For fire and spirit there are few chapters in modern literature such as those which picture the splendid defence of Geneva, by the staid, churchly, heroic burghers, fighting in their own blood under the divided leadership of the fat Syndic, Baudichon, and the bandy-legged sailor, Jehan Brosse, winning the battle against the armed and armored forces of the invaders.
Geneva in the early 17th century; a young theologian, new to the city; a beautiful and innocent girl suspected of witchcraft; a cunning scholar and metaphysician trying to hand the city over to the Savoyards; a stern and powerful syndic whom the scholar tricks into betraying his position with promises of an elixir that will save him from his deadly illness; a brutal mercenary; these are the elements that Weyman has woven into one of his most brilliant and thrilling romances. Claude Mercier, the student, observing the danger the girl he loves is in but feeling powerless to reveal it, finally finds his chance when the treacherous Savoyard forces breach Geneva’s walls. In a night of fierce fighting, he saves the city with his bravery and skill. For passion and intensity, there are few chapters in modern literature like those that depict the splendid defense of Geneva, by the serious, religious, heroic citizens, fighting with their own blood under the divided leadership of the overweight syndic, Baudichon, and the bow-legged sailor, Jehan Brosse, as they win the battle against the heavily armed invaders.
Illustrated by Solomon J. Solomon.
Illustrated by Solomon J. Solomon.

The story is set in those desperate days when the ebbing tide of Napoleon’s fortunes swept Europe with desolation. Barlasch—“Papa Barlasch of the Guard, Italy, Egypt, the Danube”—a veteran in the Little Corporal’s service—is the dominant figure of the story. Quartered on a distinguished family in the historic town of Dantzig, he gives his life to the romance of Desirée, the daughter of the family, and Louis d’ Arragon, whose cousin she has married and parted with at the church door. Louis’s search with Barlasch for the missing Charles gives an unforgettable picture of the terrible retreat from Russia; and as a companion picture there is the heroic defence of Dantzig by Rapp and his little army of sick and starving. At the last Barlasch, learning of the death of Charles, plans and executes the escape of Desirée from the beleaguered town to join Louis.
The story takes place during those desperate days when Napoleon’s declining power left Europe in ruins. Barlasch—“Papa Barlasch of the Guard, Italy, Egypt, the Danube”—a veteran who served under the Little Corporal—is the main character. Residing with a prominent family in the historic town of Dantzig, he devotes his life to the romance of Desirée, the family’s daughter, and Louis d’Arragon, her cousin whom she has married and then left at the church entrance. Louis’s quest with Barlasch to find the missing Charles creates an unforgettable depiction of the horrific retreat from Russia; alongside this, there is the heroic defense of Dantzig by Rapp and his small army of sick and starving soldiers. In the end, Barlasch learns about Charles's death and schemes to help Desirée escape from the besieged town to reunite with Louis.
Illustrated by the Kinneys.
Illustrated by the Kinneys.

Everything that has ever delighted you in Mr. Harland’s work is to be found at its best in My Friend Prospero. Mr. Harland introduces us again to the lovers’ Italy of blue skies and marvelous landscapes. The story takes place in a magnificent Austrian castle in northern Italy, and the hero, whose real name is John, is an Englishman—such a witty, charming Englishman as only Mr. Harland can create. The heroine is the beautiful Maria Dolores, an Austrian Princess, who is quite John’s match in joyous fancy and quaintness of wit. The dialogue is contagious in its dainty humor, and the book ripples with laughter from beginning to end.
Everything that has ever made you happy in Mr. Harland’s work shines at its best in My Friend Prospero. Mr. Harland once again takes us to the romantic Italy of blue skies and stunning landscapes. The story unfolds in a magnificent Austrian castle in northern Italy, featuring the hero, whose real name is John, an Englishman—an exceptionally witty and charming character that only Mr. Harland can craft. The heroine is the beautiful Maria Dolores, an Austrian princess, who is just as lively and quirky as John. The dialogue is infectious with its delicate humor, and the book is filled with laughter from start to finish.
Radiant in literary style.... The book must be read in order to appreciate the author’s delicacy in recording the prayer and wit of love in conversation.... In this novel we have the lovers’ Italy.—New York Evening Post.
Radiant in literary style.... The book needs to be read to truly appreciate the author's sensitivity in capturing the prayer and humor of love in conversation.... In this novel, we experience the lovers’ Italy.—New York Evening Post.
As continuously and unflaggingly witty as anything that has appeared in a long time.—Philadelphia Record.
As consistently and tirelessly witty as anything that's come out in a long time.—Philadelphia Record.
Frontispiece in tint by Louis Loeb. Autograph portrait edition bound in Japanese vellum, $3.00. Regular edition, $1.50.
Frontispiece in color by Louis Loeb. Signed portrait edition bound in Japanese vellum, $3.00. Standard edition, $1.50.

A study in the tyranny of wealth. James Galloway founds his fortune on a fraud. He ruins the man who has befriended him and steals away his business. Vast railroad operations next claim his attention. He becomes a bird of prey in the financial world. One by one he forsakes his principles; he becomes a hypocrite, posing, even to himself. With the degeneration of his moral character come domestic troubles. His wife grows to despise him. One of his sons becomes a spendthrift; the other a forger. His daughter, Helen, alone retains any affection for him. His attempts to force his family into the most exclusive circles subject him and them to mortifying rebuffs, for all his millions cannot overcome the ill-repute of his name. At last, with his hundred millions won, his house the finest in America, his name a name to conjure with in the financial world, he realizes that the goal he has reached was not worth the race. Still he clings to his old ways, and dies in a fit of anger, haggling over his daughter’s dowry.
A story about the tyranny of wealth. James Galloway builds his fortune on deceit. He destroys the man who has been his friend and takes over his business. Next, he focuses on massive railroad projects. He becomes a predator in the financial realm. One by one, he abandons his principles; he turns into a hypocrite, even fooling himself. As his moral character declines, his home life suffers. His wife starts to loathe him. One son becomes a wasteful spender; the other turns into a forger. His daughter, Helen, is the only one who still cares for him. His efforts to push his family into the most elite social circles lead to humiliating setbacks, as all his wealth can't erase the bad reputation of his name. Eventually, with his hundred million earned, his house being the finest in America, and his name prestigious in the financial world, he realizes that the achievement he has reached wasn't worth the struggle. Yet he clings to his old ways and dies in a fit of rage, arguing over his daughter’s marriage dowry.
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