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BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION

Business Management

TEXT BOOKS

TEXTBOOKS


Business Economics.

Business Economics.

Business Organization and Management.

Business Organization and Management.

Advertising and Salesmanship.

Marketing and Sales.

Trade and Commerce.

Trade and Business.

Transportation.

Transport.

Money, Banking and Insurance.

Finance, Banking, and Insurance.

Investments and Speculation.

Investing and Speculation.

Accounting.

Finance.

Auditing and Cost Accounting.

Auditing and Cost Accounting.

Business Law and Legal Forms.

Business Law and Legal Documents.

BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION

THEORY, PRACTICE AND APPLICATION

Theory, Practice, and Application


Editor-in-Chief

Walter D. Moody

General Manager, the Chicago Association of Commerce,
Author, “Men Who Sell Things.”

General Manager, Chicago Association of Commerce,
Author of “Men Who Sell Things.”

Editor-in-Chief

Samuel MacClintock, PhD

Editorial and Educational Director,
La Salle Extension University

Editorial and Educational Director,
La Salle Extension University


This work is especially designed to meet the practical every-day needs of the
active business man, and contains the fundamental and basic principles
upon which a successful business is founded, conducted and
maintained. To those looking forward to a business
career, this work forms the basis for a
practical and systematic course in
“Business Administration”

This work is designed to meet the daily needs of busy business professionals and includes the key principles that form the basis for starting, managing, and sustaining a successful business. For anyone looking to build a career in business, this resource provides a solid foundation for a practical and organized approach to “Business Administration.”

This work is especially designed to meet the practical every-day needs of the active business man, and contains the fundamental and basic principles upon which a successful business is founded, conducted and maintained. To those looking forward to a business career, this work forms the basis for a practical and systematic course in “Business Administration”

This book is designed to meet the daily needs of busy professionals and includes the key principles that are essential for building, managing, and sustaining a successful business. For those looking to pursue a career in business, this book provides a solid foundation for a practical and structured course in “Business Administration.”


PUBLISHED BY
LA SALLE EXTENSION UNIVERSITY
CHICAGO

PUBLISHED BY
LA SALLE EXTENSION UNIVERSITY
CHICAGO


Copyright, 1910,
LASALLE EXTENSION UNIVERSITY.

Copyright, 1910,
LASALLE EXTENSION UNIVERSITY.


BUSINESS ECONOMICS

Business Economics

¶ This treatise has been especially prepared by E. L. Bogart, Ph. D., Associate Professor of Economics, University of Illinois, and Author of Economic History of the United States; Hon. O. P. Austin, Chief of Bureau of Statistics, Department of Commerce and Labor; and John Bascom, D. D., LL. D., former President University of Wisconsin. It is supplemented by the writings of recognized experts in the production, preservation and distribution of wealth. The treatment is modern, popular and authoritative. The volume contains many timely and practical suggestions which can be applied with profit to any business. It is also arranged to serve as a quick reference work, and includes a complete table of contents, a comprehensive index and test questions.

¶ This document has been specially prepared by E. L. Bogart, Ph.D., Associate Professor of Economics at the University of Illinois and author of Economic History of the United States; Hon. O. P. Austin, Chief of the Bureau of Statistics at the Department of Commerce and Labor; and John Bascom, D.D., LL.D., former President of the University of Wisconsin. It includes contributions from recognized experts in the production, preservation, and distribution of wealth. The approach is modern, accessible, and authoritative. The book contains numerous timely and practical suggestions that can be beneficial for any business. It is also organized to function as a quick reference, featuring a complete table of contents, a comprehensive index, and test questions.

Walter D. Moody,
Editor-in-Chief.

Walter D. Moody,
Chief Editor.

INTRODUCTION TO BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION.

BY WALTER D. MOODY.

General Manager, The Chicago Association of Commerce.
Author of “Men Who Sell Things.”

General Manager, The Chicago Association of Commerce.
Author of “Men Who Sell Things.”

The recipe for perpetual ignorance is: Be satisfied with your own
opinion and content with your knowledge.

The recipe for lasting ignorance is: Be happy with your own
opinion and satisfied with your knowledge.

Business a contest of wits

Business is a battle of wits.

This is an era of the greatest commercial activity the world has ever known. The development of business is one of the marvels of the new century. A few years ago science, as a factor in commerce, was little known and less appreciated. The amazing advantages to business of intellectual attainments were utterly without recognition. Today, however, business has become a contest in which the quickest perception wins, thus transforming the counting room into a battle ground upon which brain matches brain for supremacy and success.

This is a time of the most extensive commercial activity the world has ever seen. The growth of business is one of the incredible features of the new century. Just a few years ago, science's role in commerce was barely acknowledged and not much valued. The incredible benefits that intellectual achievements bring to business were completely overlooked. However, today, business has turned into a competition where quick thinking determines the victor, turning the accounting office into a battleground where minds compete for dominance and success.

Success—educated enthusiasm

Success—knowledge-driven passion

Ah, that enchanting word, S-U-C-C-E-S-S. It does not require a magic key to unlock the door to business efficiency. There is nothing mystic, nothing mysterious in the applied method of the really resourceful men in this day of great successes, of marvelous achievements in business enterprise. The sum total is contained in two words, words that electrify, nevertheless. EDUCATED ENTHUSIASM.

Ah, that captivating word, S-U-C-C-E-S-S. It doesn’t need a magic key to open the door to business efficiency. There’s nothing mystical, nothing mysterious about the approach of the truly resourceful people in this era of great successes and incredible achievements in business. The answer is summed up in two words, words that inspire energy: EDUCATED ENTHUSIASM.

Changing conditions make opportunities

Changing conditions create opportunities

The most formidable barrier to progress has always been the senseless opposition of those to whom it would be of the greatest benefit. Changing conditions are the order of the day, for enlightenment has worked wonders. In olden times, a man of affairs was obliged to guard his property and his loved ones by building a moat around his house and posting sentinels in and around his estate. The time is not long past when, because of prejudice, perversity or ignorance, many men believed that opportunity knocked only once at any man’s door. Today, thanks to deeper insight, most men believe that life itself is opportunity; that the very air we breathe is opportunity; that each new day presents broader opportunities for accomplishing more because of better directed energy. This is not alone the accepted dogma of the man who is making his way in the world. It is the creed, doctrine, tenet or religion, whichever you may care to term it, of the great captains of industry everywhere.

The biggest obstacle to progress has always been the mindless resistance from those who would benefit the most. Changing circumstances are the norm now, as enlightenment has done wonders. In the past, a businessman had to protect his property and loved ones by digging a moat around his home and having guards watch over his estate. Not long ago, many people believed—due to prejudice, stubbornness, or ignorance—that opportunity only knocked once for each person. Today, thanks to a deeper understanding, most people view life itself as an opportunity; the very air we breathe is an opportunity; each new day offers greater chances for achievement due to better-focused effort. This isn't just the accepted belief of those making their way in the world; it's the ideology, doctrine, principle, or religion—whatever you choose to call it—of the top leaders in industry everywhere.

New ideas count

New ideas matter

The more successful the man, the more does he think, study, plan, as a part of his daily occupation in the development of the affairs in which he is interested. Newer and better ways to get things done is the business standard employed today by successful men in all lines. Only yesterday if a man of genius advanced a new idea, he found himself ridiculed and his innovation opposed on all sides because it was a new idea. Today, it is different. The man of ideas counts in the trend of affairs as he has never counted before.

The more successful a man is, the more he thinks, studies, and plans as part of his daily routine to advance the projects he cares about. Finding newer and better ways to get things done is the standard practice today among successful people in every field. Just yesterday, if a brilliant man proposed a new idea, he faced ridicule and opposition from all sides simply because it was new. Today, things have changed. The person with innovative ideas is more important in shaping the direction of affairs than ever before.

Must keep step with changing times

Must keep up with the changing times

Everything has a subjective reason. Progress is acting as a mighty dynamic force in changing men’s viewpoint of life and things. Suppose the stroke oar on a varsity crew, while in a race against an opposing crew from a competitive institution, should suddenly stop rowing in harmony with his associates and begin to row backwards—that crew would not get very far without trouble. Suppose a lawn mower should be reversed and forced to run backwards—there would not be much progress made in cutting grass on that lawn. Varsity crews and lawn mowers must move forward. Business men must advance with the times.

Everything has a personal reason. Progress is a powerful force that changes how people view life and things. Imagine if the stroke oar on a varsity crew, while racing against a rival crew from another school, suddenly stopped rowing in sync with the others and began rowing backwards— that crew wouldn’t get very far without facing problems. Now, think about a lawn mower that gets reversed and is made to run backwards—there won’t be much progress in cutting the grass on that lawn. Varsity crews and lawn mowers need to move forward. Businesspeople must keep up with the times.

A great merchant in Chicago tells a good story of his youth. He was a member of a state regiment of militia. On a certain occasion, his company was sent out on dress parade. An old maiden aunt, with considerable colonial blood in her veins, took much pride in her nephew and his company. While reviewing the parade, she was suddenly heard to exclaim: “Why, every single man in that company is out of step excepting my nephew.” Most men who fail to get on in the world do not realize that success lies in keeping step—in making progress with changing conditions. They generally make the mistake of thinking that the world and everything in it is out of harmony with themselves.

A successful merchant in Chicago shares an interesting story from his youth. He was part of a state militia regiment. One time, his company was called out for a dress parade. An old maiden aunt, who had a strong sense of her colonial heritage, was very proud of her nephew and his company. While watching the parade, she suddenly exclaimed, “Why, every single man in that company is out of step except my nephew.” Most people who struggle to succeed in life don’t realize that success comes from keeping in sync with changing circumstances. They often make the mistake of thinking that the world and everything in it is out of tune with themselves.

New ideas worth searching for

New ideas worth exploring

A business man of successful experience realizes that ideas—newer and better principles of conducting business—are of the greatest value, and he also knows that it pays him to search for them. The same old way of doing things cannot longer be successfully employed month after month and year after year as under the old regime. The business man must be modern, up-to-date. The physician or lawyer finds that to compete successfully he is compelled to search without ceasing in order that he may comprehend the advancement in treatments or procedures. “To the man who fails belong the excuses.”

A successful businessman understands that new and better ways to run a business are incredibly valuable, and he knows it's worth it to look for them. The same old methods can't be used effectively month after month and year after year like they used to. Businesspeople must be modern and current. A doctor or lawyer finds that to compete successfully, they have to constantly seek out the latest advancements in treatments or procedures. “Excuses belong to those who fail.”

Demand for trained men

Need for skilled workers

President James, of the University of Illinois, was asked if there was any demand from business houses for college-bred men. His reply was: “The demand has been far in excess of the supply since courses in business administration were established in our institution seven years ago. Each year has brought many more requests than we have men to recommend.” Ten years ago President James would have been ridiculed for advancing this new idea for the establishment of a school of commerce in connection with a university. Today, commercial schools are a part of the regularly established courses of nearly all of the great universities of our country. Men trained in the theory, practice and administration of business will always occupy the best positions and will always command the greatest salaries.

President James of the University of Illinois was asked if there was any demand from companies for graduates. His reply was: “The demand has been much higher than the supply since we started offering business administration courses at our institution seven years ago. Each year has brought us many more requests than we have graduates to recommend.” Ten years ago, President James would have been laughed at for suggesting the creation of a business school as part of a university. Today, business schools are a standard part of the curriculum at nearly all major universities in our country. Individuals trained in business theory, practice, and administration will always hold the top positions and earn the highest salaries.

Value of new ideas in business emergencies

Value of new ideas in business crises

All men fail at times in the accomplishment of satisfactory results in the various enterprises in which they are engaged, without being able to give an explanation. The principles that have been applied successfully for many years seem apparently to have counted for nothing. It is frequently evident that in such cases a very insignificant thing, a mere oversight perchance, has been the direct cause of the failure. To be able to put the finger on the precise cause of the lack of success in one’s method would locate the cause of the disaster. Then it is that a real appreciation of new ideas is fully realized.

All people fail at times to achieve satisfactory results in the various projects they take on, without being able to explain why. The principles that have worked effectively for many years seem to have had no impact at all. It often becomes clear that, in these instances, a very minor detail, perhaps just a small oversight, has been the main reason for the failure. Identifying the exact cause of the lack of success in one’s approach would pinpoint the source of the disaster. That's when a true understanding of new ideas becomes evident.

Men paid for what they know—not for what they do

Men are paid for what they know—not for what they do.

Failure is more often chargeable to a refusal to learn by mistakes how to avoid them than it is in making them. Experience is a good teacher, but who can deny the value to be gained in learning from the experience of others, for we cannot all have the same experience or the same view of similar experiences. There are many pathways to success, but the road of individual experience is narrow and rugged. It is a commonly accepted fact that for every ten dollars a high-salaried man draws, he receives nine dollars for what he knows and one dollar for what he does. On the same basis the successful business man, employing a large force of other men, realizes that his own greatest worth, as applied to his affairs, lies not so much in what he can do himself as how much he can encourage his employes to do. In either case, his own personal knowledge is the power behind the throne.

Failure is often due to a refusal to learn from mistakes and how to avoid them, rather than from making them. Experience is a great teacher, but who can deny the value of learning from the experiences of others? We can’t all have the same experiences or perspectives on similar situations. There are many paths to success, but the road of individual experience is narrow and tough. It’s a widely accepted fact that for every ten dollars a high-salaried person earns, nine dollars come from what they know and one dollar from what they do. Likewise, the successful businessperson, who employs many others, realizes that their greatest value in their work comes not so much from what they can do themselves but from how much they can inspire their employees to achieve. In either case, their personal knowledge is the driving force behind their success.

Knowledge in excess of present needs necessary

Knowledge beyond current needs is essential

The man who would secure the largest net return from his individual effort in the field of endeavor, and he who would realize the greatest possible advantage from the efforts of those under his command must, of necessity, possess knowledge—indispensable perception far in excess of the needs of the moment. Discernment, like a bank account, soon runs out if it is overdrawn or if it is not continually replenished. In business the “checking system” of knowledge is the sort of account that pays best—not the “savings account system.” Knowledge that is simply corked up and allowed to accumulate cobwebs and rust can avail nothing. The sharpest vinegar is procured by constantly replenishing the old stock with new.

The person who wants to get the most out of their individual efforts in their field, and those who want to gain the greatest advantage from the work of their team, must have knowledge—essential insight that goes well beyond just what's needed in the moment. Discernment, like a bank account, quickly depletes if it's overdrawn or not regularly replenished. In business, the “checking system” of knowledge is the type of account that yields the best returns—not the “savings account system.” Knowledge that is just stored away and left to gather dust and rust is useless. The best vinegar is made by constantly refreshing the old supply with new.

90% failures vs. 10% moneymakers

90% failures vs. 10% successes

Reliable statistics prove that only about ten per cent of all people who engage in business are successful and make money; the other ninety per cent become insolvent and fail. That is, they do not actually encounter the sheriff, or go into the hands of a receiver, but they fail nevertheless to succeed in the sense of making money, and what other possible reason can anyone have for engaging in business if not to accumulate money?

Reliable statistics show that only around ten percent of people in business achieve success and make money; the other ninety percent end up going bankrupt and failing. They might not directly face a sheriff or end up with a receiver, but they still don’t succeed in terms of making money, and what other reason could anyone have for going into business if not to make money?

Failures due to lack of intellectual capacity

Failures due to a lack of intelligence

Why do so many fail? Ask any credit man and he will tell you that it is not because of the lack of capital, or other material resources, but it is due primarily to a lack of intellectual capacity, the sort of brains that dig and work and sweat until they find a way to accomplish things; brains that go to the bottom of things; brains that are always looking for better results; brains that never abandon a problem until they have found a way to solve it. A friend once told me that he inquired of the manager of a house employing some three hundred traveling men how many salesmen they had. The manager replied, “Three.” My friend asked, “How’s that? I am told your force of traveling men numbers nearly three hundred.” “Ah, that is quite different,” replied the manager; “we have two hundred and ninety-seven traveling men, but only three salesmen.” Quite likely that manager’s estimate was intended to be taken figuratively rather than literally, but it serves to illustrate the fact that in this great United States there are millions of men, young, middle-aged and old, who are content to plod along in a mediocre sort of way, heedless or unmindful of the fact that opportunity, knowledge, possibilities, are calling, calling, calling to them to come up higher. There are hundreds of thousands of other men engaged in business who sit idly by while their trade, like the sands in the hour glass, slowly ebbs away, and eventually is absorbed by their more progressive business neighbors.

Why do so many people fail? Ask any credit professional, and they will tell you that it's not due to a lack of capital or other resources, but primarily because of a lack of intellectual ability—the kind of brains that dig in, work hard, and sweat it out until they find a way to achieve results; brains that get to the core of issues; brains that are always seeking better outcomes; brains that never give up on a problem until they've figured out how to solve it. A friend once asked the manager of a company with about three hundred salespeople how many actual salespeople they had. The manager replied, “Three.” My friend asked, “How is that possible? I heard you have nearly three hundred traveling salespeople.” “Ah, that's a different matter,” the manager responded; “we have two hundred and ninety-seven traveling salespeople, but only three true salespeople.” It's likely that the manager's estimate was meant to be figurative rather than literal, but it highlights the reality that in this vast United States, there are millions of men, young, middle-aged, and old, who are content to trudge along in a mediocre manner, unaware that opportunity, knowledge, and possibilities are calling them to rise up. There are hundreds of thousands of others in business who sit idly by while their trade, like the sands in an hourglass, slowly slips away and is eventually taken over by more proactive business neighbors.

Moneymaking and business literature

Business and finance books

There is still another vast army of business men—salesmen, clerks and wage-earners of all classes—who are beginning to catch a glimpse of the dawning of a new business era, the greatest the world has ever known, an era impregnated with possibilities and opportunities for those who are ready with wicks trimmed and oil in their lamps. To the earnest latter class which is really desirous of profiting by the experience of others, there is no need of elaborating the possibilities embodied in this course of reading in Business Administration. This set of books, containing valuable business data on many subjects, thousands of pages telling the story of success illustrated by trained men whose names are respected everywhere, is intended to reach all classes. There is absolutely nothing in print that can even approach or can begin to compare with it in value as a reference library for business men or excel it as a complete course of instruction for any man desirous of making the best of his possibilities and opportunities in the kaleidoscopic age through which the business world is now moving.

There is another huge group of business people—salespeople, clerks, and workers from all walks of life—who are starting to see the beginnings of a new business era, the greatest the world has ever experienced, filled with possibilities and opportunities for those who are prepared and ready to take action. For those who genuinely want to learn from the experiences of others, there’s no need to go into detail about the opportunities presented in this reading on Business Administration. This set of books, packed with valuable business information on various topics, offers thousands of pages that showcase stories of success from respected professionals. It aims to reach all kinds of people. There’s nothing else available that can come close to its value as a reference library for business professionals or surpass it as a complete course of instruction for anyone looking to make the most of their potential and seize the opportunities in this dynamic business age we’re currently in.

Practical ideas best

Best practical ideas

The more practical the ideas, the better the basis for good work. Not long since, business men generally pooh-poohed the idea of employing in the conduct of their business anything new, which was taken from the writings and experience of others, such as is contained in this remarkable series, contributed to by some of the brightest minds in the business world today. There is, however, in these days unmistakably a hungering and thirsting for just this new sort of literature. It fills a long-felt need—fills it exactly, completely, satisfactorily. Being the author of a work on salesmanship which has had a countrywide circulation, I have been literally besieged by business men everywhere asking me to recommend books treating of successful business methods, and have been chagrined to find how limited was the supply. The man who formerly was prejudiced against such sources of information must now step aside and make way for progress or unite with the popular demand for more education and better methods.

The more practical the ideas, the better the foundation for good work. Not long ago, business people generally dismissed the idea of using anything new in their operations that was drawn from the writings and experiences of others, such as what is found in this remarkable series, contributed by some of the brightest minds in today’s business world. However, these days there is clearly a strong desire for this new type of literature. It meets a long-felt need—completely and satisfactorily. As the author of a salesmanship book that has circulated nationwide, I have been overwhelmed by business people everywhere asking me to recommend books on successful business methods, and I’ve been disappointed to discover how limited the supply is. Those who were once biased against such information sources must now either step aside to allow progress or join the popular demand for more education and better methods.

Cannot afford vs. can afford

Can't afford vs. can afford

Show me the man who says he has no patience for such things, and I will show you a man, like the stroke oar and the lawn mower, who does not believe in moving forward in progress. Show me the man who says he has no time to read of new methods and principles, and I will show you the one who utterly fails to perceive that familiarity with business literature of this kind means pecuniary advancement. Show me the man who says he cannot afford to invest in such a set of books, and I will show you one who apparently CAN afford to waste his energy in misdirected effort—that energy and effort which are to every wage-earner and tradesman both his stock in trade and his invested capital.

Show me a guy who claims he has no patience for such things, and I’ll show you someone, like a rower and a lawn mower, who doesn’t believe in making progress. Show me a guy who says he has no time to read about new methods and principles, and I’ll show you someone who completely fails to realize that being familiar with this kind of business literature leads to financial growth. Show me a guy who says he can't afford to buy those books, and I’ll show you someone who clearly CAN waste his energy on unproductive efforts—those efforts and that energy which are, for every employee and tradesman, both their essential tools and their invested capital.

Failures unnecessary

Unnecessary failures

Someone has said, “There are three kinds of people in the world—the Can’ts, the Won’ts and the Wills. The first fail at everything; the second oppose everything; the third succeed at everything.” I would add a fourth kind—the largest class of all—the Don’t Trys, the “Oh-what’s-the-use,” “It-doesn’t-interest-me” sort of people. Their name is legion; their fault is lack of confidence. Knowledge is the greatest inspiration of confidence to be found on earth. You may not personally be held in the hope-paralyzing bondage that produces the “Oh-what’s-the-use,” or “I’m-not-interested” germ, but if you are not, you are exceptional. Most people are, and that is the reason that such persons are just about what luck, good fortune or chance make them, succeeding if fortune favors them, failing if they are left to depend upon their own resources. Result: Nine fail where one succeeds.

Someone once said, “There are three types of people in the world—the Can’ts, the Won’ts, and the Wills. The first group fails at everything; the second opposes everything; the third succeeds at everything.” I would add a fourth type—the largest group of all—the Don’t Trys, the “Oh, what’s the use,” “It doesn’t interest me” kind of people. Their numbers are vast, and their main issue is a lack of confidence. Knowledge is the greatest source of confidence available on earth. You may not personally be stuck in the hope-paralyzing mindset that creates the “Oh, what’s the use” or “I’m not interested” attitude, but if you’re not, you’re unusual. Most people are, which is why these individuals tend to end up just about where luck, good fortune, or chance leaves them, succeeding when luck is on their side and failing when they rely on their own abilities. As a result, nine fail for every one who succeeds.

It is very fortunate, indeed, for most men that so much of their happiness depends upon success. There is nothing on earth quite so terrible to think of as failure, especially that due to lack of effort, unless possibly it be the failure of a man who lacks the courage or initiative to try to make the most of himself, and thus lets his best opportunities escape him. And this last is really the most pitiful thing that can befall a man. It is well enough to plan opportunities, but if we had the wisdom to take advantage of such opportunities as naturally come to us, results would more often be found in the balance on the right side of the ledger. And so I am of the opinion that a clear explanation of why a very large class of people do not succeed is found in some of these expressions—“I don’t care,” “I can’t,” “It doesn’t interest me,” or “Oh, what’s the use.”

It’s really fortunate for most people that a lot of their happiness relies on success. There’s nothing worse to think about than failure, especially when it comes from not putting in effort. The only thing that might be worse is when someone lacks the courage or motivation to make the most of themselves and misses out on their best opportunities. That is truly the saddest thing that can happen to a person. It’s fine to plan for opportunities, but if we had the wisdom to seize the opportunities that naturally come our way, we would often see better results. So, I believe that a clear explanation for why a large number of people don’t succeed can be found in phrases like, “I don’t care,” “I can’t,” “It doesn’t interest me,” or “Oh, what’s the use?”

Basis of all business success

Foundation of all business success

One of the great objects set forth in this Business Administration series is to supply the positive energy which begets courage, confidence, initiative and success. We want to make you feel the necessity of doing some reading, a little plain thinking, and to make as clear as possible the important things that are involved in the serious but very fine game of business.

One of the main goals of this Business Administration series is to provide the positive energy that creates courage, confidence, initiative, and success. We want to encourage you to see the importance of reading, doing some straightforward thinking, and to clarify the key aspects involved in the serious yet rewarding game of business.

With business becoming with each succeeding day more and more of a science, it is high time to understand what is essential to it. Speaking of the subject of “Organized Business,” a great authority recently said, “It is time even for business men to understand business.” Again, the purpose of this course in Business Administration is, if possible, to measure the power and principles of business, to trace their ramifications, define their elements, get hold of their vital fundamentals, and so comprehend them, both in technical detail and as a mighty unit. And I am confident we have done all this. I find that at the foundation, the machinery of business is simple, but whether it is plain or complicated, all who would succeed must make every effort to comprehend it thoroughly. All I care to emphasize at present is the great truth that knowledge, established and classified, is the basis of all business success. This is clearly established in this course of reading, and I am trying to incite your imagination in writing of its merits just as I would endeavor to enable you to realize it if I could talk to you personally right across my desk. The observant man can see clearly the things I am talking about, but to most men the mind’s eye perceives not by observation, but only when the imagination is stimulated. So I would stir all men to look earnestly into these things, with a view to their personal betterment.

As business becomes more of a science every day, it’s crucial to grasp what’s essential to it. A prominent expert recently stated regarding “Organized Business,” “It’s time for even businesspeople to understand business.” The goal of this Business Administration course is to measure the dynamics and principles of business, explore their connections, define their components, grasp their fundamental concepts, and understand them both in detail and as a cohesive whole. I believe we have achieved this. At its core, the mechanics of business is straightforward, but whether it’s simple or complex, anyone aiming for success must strive to understand it thoroughly. The main point I want to emphasize right now is the essential truth that organized and classified knowledge is the foundation of all business success. This is clearly outlined in this reading course, and I hope to spark your imagination regarding its value, much like I would if I were discussing this with you in person across my desk. A keen observer can easily see what I’m talking about, but for many, the mind’s eye only perceives the truth when the imagination is engaged. Therefore, I encourage everyone to seriously explore these concepts for their personal growth.

Business axioms simple to understand

Business principles easy to grasp

Business is far more than business as it is commonly understood. It is a science, and it is the eager, practical minds of business men that we shall endeavor to convince first of that fact, and our reasons for addressing those principally concerned are especially good. Why? I have found that in writing about business whenever I was able to make the principles so plain that business men understood them, everybody else did, so it is to be expected that if business axioms can be made simple enough for business men to understand them, everyone will apprehend them. Everybody. And it is everybody that we are attempting to reach.

Business is much more than just what people commonly think. It's a science, and it's the eager, practical minds of businesspeople that we aim to convince of this fact first. Our reasons for addressing those directly involved are particularly strong. Why? Because I've noticed that whenever I write about business and manage to explain the principles clearly enough for businesspeople to grasp them, everyone else gets it too. So, it stands to reason that if we can simplify business concepts for businesspeople, everyone will understand them. Everyone. And it's everyone that we are trying to reach.

Knowledge is power

Knowledge is power.

For nearly thirty centuries men have recognized the concrete wisdom of Solomon’s proverb: “A wise man is strong; yea, a man of knowledge increaseth in strength.” Yet we have been slow in making its application universal to the race. But we are beginning to understand that the power inherent in knowledge applies as well to commercial and industrial as to scholastic, political and social life, as well to the counting room as to the pulpit, as well to the shop as to the university, as well to the farm as to the bar. Knowledge is power and is the only source of real intellectual sovereignty that the Creator has ever entrusted to men.

For almost thirty centuries, people have recognized the timeless wisdom of Solomon's proverb: "A wise man is strong; indeed, a person with knowledge gains strength." However, we've been slow to apply this universally across humanity. We're starting to realize that the power of knowledge is just as important in business and industry as it is in education, politics, and social life; it matters in the office as much as in the church, in the workshop as much as in the university, and on the farm just as much as in the courtroom. Knowledge is power and is the only true source of intellectual authority that the Creator has ever given to humanity.

In conclusion, I would say that these words are addressed to the business men of America, and this designation includes the banker and his clerks, the farmer and his sons, the lawyer and the law student, the financier and the man who sells bonds and stocks, the merchant and his clerk, the accountant and the bookkeeper, the manager and his assistants—the ambitious young men of the Twentieth Century type, contemplating the pursuit of any business, trade or occupation.

In conclusion, I would say that these words are directed at the business people of America, which includes bankers and their clerks, farmers and their sons, lawyers and law students, financiers and those who sell bonds and stocks, merchants and their clerks, accountants and bookkeepers, managers and their assistants—the ambitious young men of the 21st Century, considering the pursuit of any business, trade, or profession.

CONTENTS

BUSINESS ECONOMICS.
Practical Economics.
By Ernest Ludlow Bogart 1
I. The Modern Industrial System 1
The English Manor—​Institution of Private Property—​Competition Defined—​Development of Industrial Liberty—​Domestic System of Industry—​Factory System of Industry—​The State as a Regulator of Industrial Undertakings.
II. The Agricultural Resources of the United States 9
The Land Policy of the United States—​Irrigation—​Dry-Farming—​Farm Ownership—​Decline of the Agricultural Population—​Character of Agriculture in the United States—​Forest Resources—​Fisheries.
III. The Mineral Resources of the United States 19
The Problem Connected with our Mineral Resources—​Steps Taken to Remedy the Evil—​Coal—​Petroleum—​Iron—​Precious Metals—​Copper—​Water Power and Its Use.
IV. Capitalist Production 29
The Rapid Industrial Development and Its Causes—​Factory Defined—​Division of Labor—​Use of Labor-Saving Machinery—​Specialization and Localization of Industry—​Large-Scale Production—​System of Standardization.
V. Trusts and Monopolies 39
Phases of Combination for Fixing Prices—​Classes of Industrial Establishments—​The Trust Movement—​Causes and Effects of Industrial Combinations—​Evils of Combination—​Legislative Regulation.
VI. Speculation and Crises 51
Risks of Modern Business—​Function of the Speculator—​Legitimate and Illegitimate Speculation—​The Occasion of a Crisis—​“Hard Times”—​Theories as to the Causes of Crises.
VII. The Contemporary Pay System 60
Beneficial Results of the Factory System—​Abuses of the Factory System—​The Existence of a Wage-Earning Class—​The Wage System—​Historical Systems of Labor—​Modifications of Individualism—​The Bargain Between the Employer and the Laborer—​Necessity of Protective Legislation.
VIII. Union and Collective Bargaining 68
Growth of Labor Organizations in the United States—​Knights of Labor—​American Federation of Labor—​Objects and Methods of Labor Organizations—​Restrictions Limiting the Output of Labor—​Collective Bargaining—​Boards of Conciliation and Arbitration.
IX. Women and Kids at Work 80
Evils of Early Factory System—​Expansion of Woman Labor—​Why Women are Paid Lower Wages than Men—​Desirability of Employment of Women—​Child Labor—​Labor Legislation.
X. Unemployment and Benefits 90
Number of Unemployed in Modern Industry—​Classification of the Unemployed—​Causes of Unemployment—​Insurance against Accident, Sickness and Old Age in the United States; in Germany.
XI. Machinery and Industrial Productivity 101
Evils of Machinery—​Labor’s Complaint against Machinery—​Industrial Education in Germany; in England; in the United States—​Aids to Industrial Development in the United States.
XII. Profit Sharing and Collaboration 110
Methods of Profit-Sharing—​Economic Theory of Profit-Sharing—​Objections against Profit-Sharing—​Experiments in Profit-Sharing—​Co-Operation—​The Rochdale Society—​Producers’ Co-Operation—​Advantages and Defects of Co-Operation.
XIII. Distribution Issues 119
Functional Distribution—​Personal Distribution—​Forms of Distribution Proposed—​Questions Connected with Functional Distribution; with Personal Distribution.
XIV. Saving and Spending Money 127
Expenditures for Different Purposes—​Relation Between Saving and Spending—​Desirability of Work for its Own Sake—​Problem of Luxury—​Economy in Consumption—​Economic Evils of Intemperance.
XV. Finance and Banking 137
What Determines the Value of Money—​Bimetallism—​Monometallism—​Government Paper Money—​Kinds of Money in the United States—​Problems of the Banking System of the United States.
XVI. Transport and Communication 145
Consolidation in the Railroad World—​Question of Railroad Rates—​The Public Nature of Railroads—​Ownership of Railroads—​Electric Interurban Railways—​Express Companies—​The Telephone—​The Telegraph—​Inland and Ocean Water Transportation—​Our Canal System—​Our Merchant Marine.
XVII. Taxes and Duties 154
Consequences of Taxation—​Adam Smith’s Rules of Taxation—​Problems of Taxation—​Sources of Revenue in the United States—​The General Property Tax—​Inheritance Taxes—​The Question of the Tariff.
XVIII. The Roles of Government 163
Functions of a Modern State—​Anarchism—​Individualism—​Modified Individualism—​Culture State Theory—​State Socialism—​Socialism—​Municipalization of Local Public Utilities.
XIX. Economic Growth 172
Improvement in Rate of Wages and Hours or Labor—​Advances in the Field of Production—​Reasons Why Labor has not Profited More by the Great Increase in Wealth—​Reduction in the Cost of Semi-Luxuries—​Lines Along Which Reform is Needed.
Manufacturing.
By O. P. Austin 179
Intro 179
The Hand Method of Manufacturing—​The Factory Method—​Chief Producers by each Method—​Exchanges of the World—​Relation of Development of Manufactures to Commerce.
I. Modern Manufacturing Systems Around the World 185
Their Development During the Last Two Centuries—​The Waterfall as a Source of Power—​Development of Steam Power—​Enlargement of the Use of Machinery Following the Application of Power—​The Factory Town—​Results of the Application of Steam Power to Transportation—​Electricity as an Aid in Manufacturing.
II. The Use of Machines in Manufacturing 193
The Spinning Wheel—​The Loom—​Kay’s Flying Shuttle—​Hargreave’s Spinning Jenny—​Arkwright’s Water Frame—​Crompton’s Spinning Mule—​Machinery in the Iron and Steel Industry—​Growth in Manufacturing Following the Application of Machinery to the Leading Industries—​Effect of Machinery upon the Employment of Men—​Effect upon Employment of Capital—​Effect upon Prices of Labor, of Raw Materials, of Finished Products—​Effect upon Commerce—​Effect upon the Quality of Manufactures Produced.
III. Factory System Development 203
Growth of the Factory System in England—​Causes of the Recent Growth of the Manufacturing Industries in the United States—​Estimates of the Value of Manufactures in the Principal Countries of the World—​Net and Gross Valuations of Manufactures in the United States.
IV. Capital in Manufacturing 214
Capital a Growing Factor in Manufacturing Industries—​Manufacturing in Great Establishments and under Expert Management a Favorite Investment for Capital—​Effect of Increase in Gold Production—​Investments of Capital and Use of Machinery Increase more Rapidly than Employment of Labor—​United States Statistics of Investment and Production Superior to those of Other Countries.
V. Trusts and Mergers 222
Reasons for Co-Operation—​The Pooling System—​The Company—​The Corporation—​Trusts and Other Combinations—​Causes of the Transformation from the Company and the Corporation to the Trust—​Effect of Trusts upon Production, Prices, Wages and Employment.
VI. The Steel Industry 230
Pig Iron the Basis of all Iron and Steel Manufacturing—​Pig Iron Production of the World in 1800 Compared with 1907—​Fall in Prices of Iron and Steel a Result of the Application of Modern Methods of Manufacture—​History of Iron Manufacture; Development in England and Germany—​History of Iron-Making in the United States—​Transformation from the Charcoal Method to that of Coal and Coke—​The Earlier Methods of Manufacturing Steel Contrasted with those of Today—​Rival Claims of the English and the American Inventors, Bessemer and Kelly, to the Modern System of Steel Manufacturing—​Description of the Process of Manufacturing Steel under American Methods—​The Use of Powerful Machinery and Lessening Proportion of Work Performed by Man Power—​The Railway and Steamship in Relation to the Steel Industry—​Great Combinations of Iron and Steel Manufacturers—​Description of the Process of Transforming Iron into Steel by the Bessemer Process.
VII. The Fashion Industry 247
Growth of the Textile Industry from the Hand Industries to Use of Machinery and the Factory System—​Great Britain, the Greatest Cotton Manufacturing Country of the World in Proportion to Population—​The United States the World’s Greatest Producer of Raw Cotton—​Contrast of Manufacturing Methods in the United States and Europe—​Great Britain the World’s Principal Cotton Manufacturer for Exportation—​The United States a Large Manufacturer but Chiefly for her Own People—​Light Grades of Cotton Manufactured in Europe—​History of the Textile Industry—​Description of the Manufacture of Textiles—​Cotton Manufacturing has Outgrown that of Other Textiles—​History of its Manufacture in India, in Asia Minor, in America, and, in Recent Years, in Japan—​Other Oriental Countries Manufacture by the Hand Processes—​Growth of the Use of Machinery in Cotton Manufacturing, from the Spinning Wheel and Spinning Jenny to Modern Machine Methods—​The Textile Industry of the United States.
VIII. The Manufacturing Industries in the United States 263
The United States the World’s Greatest Manufacturer—​Its System Developed More Recently than that of Europe—​Has Utilized Modern Methods in Combination with Large Sums of Capital—​The United States the Only Nation Taking a Census of Manufactures—​The Gross and Net Value of Manufactures as Reported by the Census—​Relation of the Gross and Net Figures to Those of Other Countries—​Acceptance of the Lowest Estimate of Manufactures in the United States Places her Products Far in Excess of Those of any Other Nation—​Growth of Manufacturing has Outgrown Consuming Power of the People and Resulted in Rapid Growth in Exportation—​Manufactures Form a Growing Share of Exports—​Principal Manufactured Articles Exported and Principal Countries to which Sent.
IX. Manufacturing Statistics 289
Production of Manufacturers’ Materials—​Development of Transportation Facilities—​Distribution of Manufactures—​World’s Production of Gold, 1492 to 1908—​Enlargement of Capital Invested in Manufacturing—​The Various Classes of Manufactures Produced in the United States—​The Value of Each Group at Recurring Censuses from 1880 to 1905—​Distribution of the Manufacturing Industries in the Various Sections of the United States—​Share which Manufactures Form in the Imports and Exports of the United States—​Share which Manufactures Form in the Imports and Exports of the Principal Countries of Europe—​Estimated Value of Manufactures Produced in the Principal Countries of the World, 1780 to 1905—​Commerce of the World, 1780 to 1905—​Number of Persons Engaged in the Principal Manufacturing Industries of the United States—​Cotton Spindles of the World—​Cotton Production of the World—​Growth of Population, Commerce, Transportation Facilities, and in Production of Certain Articles Required in Manufacturing, 1800 to 1908.
Concrete and Steel.
By J.F. Springer 322
Chemistry and the Industries.
By Ben Ball Freud 341
The Close Relation of the Producer-Gas Power Plant to the Conservation of our Fuel Resources.
By Robert Heywood Fernald 352
Efficiency in Shop Operations.
By H.F. Stimpson 370
The Bridge Between Labor and Capital.
By John Mitchell 380
The Unemployed.
By John Bascom 384
Quiz Questions 403

[Pg 1] PRACTICAL ECONOMICS.

BY ERNEST LUDLOW BOGART, Ph. D.

BY ERNEST LUDLOW BOGART, Ph. D.

[Born Yonkers, N. Y., 1870; A. B., A. M., Princeton University, 1890, 1896; Ph. D., University of Halle, 1897; Graduate Student, University of Halle, 1894, 1896-7, University of Berlin, 1894-5, Princeton University (Fellow), 1895-6, Columbia University, 1897-8. Assistant Professor Economics and Social Science, Indiana University, 1898-1900; Professor Economics and Sociology, Oberlin College, 1900-1905; Assistant Professor Economics, History and Politics, Princeton University, 1905-9; Associate Professor Economics, University of Illinois, 1909. Author of Economic History of the United States (Longmans Green & Co., 3rd edition, 1909), and several monographs and periodical articles.]

[Born in Yonkers, NY, 1870; A.B., A.M., Princeton University, 1890, 1896; Ph.D., University of Halle, 1897; Graduate Student, University of Halle, 1894, 1896-7, University of Berlin, 1894-5, Princeton University (Fellow), 1895-6, Columbia University, 1897-8. Assistant Professor of Economics and Social Science, Indiana University, 1898-1900; Professor of Economics and Sociology, Oberlin College, 1900-1905; Assistant Professor of Economics, History, and Politics, Princeton University, 1905-9; Associate Professor of Economics, University of Illinois, 1909. Author of Economic History of the United States (Longmans Green & Co., 3rd edition, 1909), and several monographs and periodical articles.]

INTRODUCTION.

In the preparation of this text the author has endeavored to apply the principles of economic science to some of the more important problems of the modern industrial world, and especially those now confronting the people of the United States. He has attempted in doing this above all to make the text practical. The student or teacher of economics will recognize at once that the sections are arranged into groups corresponding with the traditional divisions of economic text-books into production and distribution (land, capital and organization, and labor), consumption, exchange, and the relation of the government to the individual. It is hoped that the text may not be without profit and interest to the general reader as well as the students of the La Salle Extension University.

In creating this text, the author has aimed to apply the principles of economic science to some of the key issues in today's industrial world, particularly those currently facing the people of the United States. His main goal has been to make the text practical. The student or teacher of economics will quickly notice that the sections are organized into groups that match the traditional divisions found in economic textbooks: production and distribution (land, capital and organization, and labor), consumption, exchange, and the government's relationship with individuals. It is hoped that this text will be valuable and engaging for both the general reader and the students of La Salle Extension University.

I. THE MODERN INDUSTRIAL SYSTEM.

We shall probably get the clearest idea of the complexity of our modern industrial society if we contrast it briefly with the simpler state of social organization which preceded it. For this purpose we may take the English manor of the eleventh century. At that time England [Pg 2] was a purely agricultural country, and the whole country was divided into manors, of which the lord was regarded as the owner, under feudal conditions, while those who cultivated the land were his tenants. These tenants—villeins and cotters—worked on the lord’s land two or three days in the week, and the rest of the time cultivated their own holdings. The whole of the land of the manor, both that of the lord and that of the tenants, was cultivated on an elaborate system of joint labor. The land was divided into strips of about half an acre each, and a man’s holding might consist of a dozen or more of these strips scattered about in different parts of the manor. This was done in order to secure equality in the fertility and location of each man’s land. At that time the prevailing method of agriculture was known as the three-field system, in which one field, comprising about one-third of the manor and containing a portion of the scattered strips of the lord and every tenant, was planted with wheat, a second field comprising another third of the cultivated land was planted with barley or oats, while the third field was left fallow. The second year saw the second stage of this three-year rotation, one-third of the manor lying fallow each year to recuperate from this exhausting method of cropping; artificial manures were unknown.

We will likely get the clearest picture of the complexity of our modern industrial society by briefly comparing it with the simpler social organization that came before it. For this, we can look at the English manor of the eleventh century. During that time, England was a purely agricultural country, and the entire country was divided into manors, where the lord was seen as the owner under feudal conditions, while those who farmed the land were his tenants. These tenants—villeins and cotters—worked on the lord’s land two or three days a week, and for the rest of the time, they managed their own holdings. The entire land of the manor, both that of the lord and that of the tenants, was farmed using a sophisticated system of collective labor. The land was divided into strips of about half an acre each, and a person's holding could consist of a dozen or more of these strips scattered across different areas of the manor. This was done to ensure fairness in the fertility and location of each person’s land. Back then, the main farming method was known as the three-field system, in which one field, covering about one-third of the manor and containing parts of the scattered strips of the lord and every tenant, was planted with wheat. A second field, also one-third of the cultivated land, was planted with barley or oats, while the third field was left fallow. The second year saw the next stage of this three-year rotation, with one-third of the manor left fallow each year to recover from this demanding cropping method; artificial fertilizers were unknown.

Now the significant characteristics of such a manorial society were three. First, it was economically self-sufficient, that is, practically everything that was needed or was consumed on the manor was produced there. There was no need of intercourse with the outside world and there was little contact with it. Salt, iron, and millstones were almost the only things that the inhabitants of such a manor had to buy from outsiders. Consequently there was no production of goods for a market, little money, and almost no trade. The few things that were purchased were paid for at prices fixed by custom. Secondly, agriculture was carried on under a system of joint labor, and [Pg 3] under customary methods which did not change from generation to generation. It is clear that as long as all the land of the manor was thrown together, for purposes of cultivation, into fields on which were planted wheat or barley or which lay fallow, no one individual could cultivate his land differently from his neighbors. Indeed, the holdings of the different tenants were not even separated by fences, but only by ridges of grass. On the land which lay fallow the cattle were turned out to graze; if any man had attempted to plant a new crop the third year, his neighbors’ cattle would have devoured it under such a system. Production was regulated absolutely by custom, and no opportunity was given for the development of the inventiveness or initiative of the progressive individual. Thirdly, the tenants were personally unfree, that is, they did not have the liberty of moving freely from place to place, but were bound to the soil which they cultivated. A man could not freely choose either his occupation or his residence. There was no mobility or freedom of movement. Labor was wholly or partly compulsory, and on terms rigidly fixed by custom or by superior authority.

Now, the key features of such a manorial society were three. First, it was economically self-sufficient, meaning that practically everything needed or consumed on the manor was produced there. There was no need for interaction with the outside world, and there was minimal contact with it. Salt, iron, and millstones were almost the only items the manor's inhabitants had to buy externally. As a result, there was no production of goods for a market, little money, and almost no trade. The few things that were bought were paid for at prices determined by custom. Secondly, agriculture was conducted through joint labor and traditional methods that did not change from generation to generation. It’s clear that as long as all the land on the manor was combined into fields for cultivation—where wheat or barley were planted or left fallow—no individual could farm his land differently than his neighbors. In fact, the separate holdings of different tenants weren’t even fenced off, but only divided by grass ridges. The land that lay fallow was used for grazing cattle; if someone tried to plant a new crop in the third year, the neighbors’ cattle would eat it under this system. Production was entirely regulated by custom, and there was no chance for the inventiveness or initiative of the more progressive individuals to develop. Thirdly, the tenants were personally unfree, meaning they couldn’t move about freely and were tied to the land they farmed. A person couldn’t freely choose his job or where to live. There was no mobility or freedom of movement. Labor was entirely or partially compulsory, and it was governed by terms that were strictly set by custom or higher authority.

Such a society differs from that of today in almost every point, and offers a startling proof of how far we have progressed in the past eight or nine hundred years. For many of these characteristics, however, we do not need to go back to the English mediaeval manor; the plantation of the South two generations ago, with its system of slave labor, furnishes an illustration more familiar to most of us. With such a condition of industrial development we may now profitably contrast our own of the twentieth century. The chief characteristics of the modern industrial system are the institutions of private property, of competition, and of personal liberty.

Such a society is different from today’s in almost every way and clearly shows how much we've progressed in the last eight or nine hundred years. However, we don’t need to look back to the English medieval manor for many of these characteristics; the Southern plantations from two generations ago, with their system of slave labor, provide a more recognizable example for most of us. We can now effectively compare this state of industrial development with our own in the twentieth century. The main features of the modern industrial system include private property, competition, and personal freedom.

The institution of private property is so familiar to us and so fundamental in modern economic life, that we commonly regard it as a natural right. Nevertheless, private [Pg 4] property, like most other economic institutions, is the result of a long evolution. Primitive man can hardly have had the conception of private property, and when it did begin to emerge, it was at first confined to movables. Indeed we may say that on the mediaeval English manor the private ownership of land did not yet exist in the modern sense. It was found however that, when each cultivator was permitted to fence in his holding and to call it his own, he cultivated it much more carefully and produced much more. Inclosure led to private property in land and to individual freedom in its use. Today in the United States the possession and transfer of landed property is almost as easy as that of movables. Private property must be justified on the ground of social utility, because under this method of control so much more is produced than under any system of commercial ownership yet tried. But there are not wanting objectors who contend that limits should be placed upon this institution, and that the right of use, of bequest, and possibly of unlimited acquisition should be brought under social control. The beneficence of private property turns largely upon the existence of competition and individual liberty and to these we must now turn.

The concept of private property is so familiar to us and so essential in today’s economic life that we often see it as a natural right. However, private property, like many other economic systems, has developed over a long period. Primitive humans likely didn’t have a concept of private property, and when it began to emerge, it was mostly limited to movable objects. In fact, we can say that on the medieval English manor, private land ownership didn’t exist in the modern sense. It was observed that when each farmer was allowed to fence in their plots and claim them as their own, they tended to take better care of them and produced much more. Enclosure led to private property in land and individual freedom in its use. Today, in the United States, owning and transferring land is almost as straightforward as dealing with movable possessions. Private property needs to be justified based on its social utility, as this system of control leads to much higher production than any other commercial ownership system tried so far. However, there are critics who argue that there should be limits on this institution and that the rights to use, bequeath, and possibly unrestrained acquisition should be subject to social oversight. The benefits of private property largely depend on the presence of competition and individual freedom, and we must now focus on these aspects.

Competition is defined as “the act of seeking or endeavoring to gain what another is endeavoring to gain at the same time.” But competition in modern industrial life is not merely a struggle to appropriate an existing good. The very contest, as over the control of a market, may and probably will lead to cheaper and larger production, and thus to the benefit of society. Competition is a selective process in our modern economic society, and through it we have the survival of the fittest. “Competition,” so runs the proverb, “is the soul of trade.” There is, to be sure, a dark side to the picture, for economic competition involves the defeat of the weaker party, but this does not necessarily mean his destruction, for his very [Pg 5] failure may sharpen his faculties and secure his ultimate success, or at worst he may find employment under his successful rival. But here again it is being urged that competition is brutal and that we should go back to the mediaeval method of regulation by custom, or resort to combination and monopoly. We are now witnessing experiments in both directions, but competition still remains the controlling force of modern economic society, and bids fair to continue so. It should however be the function of society to raise the ethical level of competition.

Competition is defined as "the act of seeking or trying to gain what someone else is also trying to gain at the same time." However, competition in today’s industrial world is more than just a fight for existing resources. The competition for market control can lead to cheaper and larger production, ultimately benefiting society. Competition is a selective process in our current economic landscape, allowing for the survival of the fittest. "Competition," as the saying goes, "is the soul of trade." There is, of course, a negative aspect, since economic competition can mean the defeat of the weaker party, but this doesn’t always lead to their downfall. Sometimes, that failure can enhance their skills and lead to future success, or, at the very least, they may find a job with their more successful competitor. Still, some argue that competition is harsh and advocate for a return to the old-fashioned ways of regulation through custom, or for adopting combinations and monopolies. We are currently seeing experiments in both approaches, but competition remains the dominant force in modern economic society and is likely to continue that way. However, it should be society's role to elevate the ethical standards of competition.

Industrial liberty has been developed even more slowly and painfully than the institution of private property, and has in some instances not yet been wholly won. Slavery and serfdom have given way before the higher and more beneficent conception of freedom or liberty. We believe today that a man generally knows what is best for him and will utilize his opportunities to the best advantage; that by giving him a maximum of freedom the welfare of society will at the same time be best promoted. Consequently, in our modern industrial society, a man is given not only social and religious liberty, but is free to move, to choose his occupation, to produce and to trade, to associate with his fellows, and to expend his income as he will. But here again, while the prevailing rule is liberty, society has found it necessary to lay restrictions upon the abuse of this liberty. It is not enough even to regard the industrial world as a great game in which each may act as he pleases provided only he observes the rules of the game. A higher conception of responsibility and duty must accompany freedom of action if we are to secure the best results.

Industrial freedom has developed even more slowly and painfully than private property, and in some cases, it hasn't been fully achieved yet. Slavery and serfdom have been replaced by a higher and more beneficial idea of freedom. We believe now that a person generally knows what's best for him and will make the most of his opportunities; that by providing him with maximum freedom, society's welfare will also be best served. As a result, in our modern industrial society, a person is granted not only social and religious freedom but also the ability to move around, choose his career, produce and trade, connect with others, and spend his income as he wishes. However, even though freedom is the predominant rule, society has found it necessary to impose certain restrictions to prevent the misuse of this freedom. It's not sufficient to view the industrial world as a big game where everyone can act freely as long as they follow the rules. A greater understanding of responsibility and duty must come with the freedom to act if we want to achieve the best outcomes.

The term “industrial society” has already been frequently used and needs a somewhat fuller explanation. About the year 1760 there took place in England what is usually called the Industrial Revolution. A number of inventions were made which rendered [Pg 6] it possible to use steam-driven machinery in the manufacture, first of textile and then of other goods. Manufactures were removed from the home, where they had hitherto been carried on, to the factory. Capital began to be used in large masses, machinery displaced hand tools, and the laborer ceased to own the implements with which he worked. Men, machines, and capital were massed in the factory and organized under the management of a new set of industrial organizers for the purpose of producing goods for a world market. The development of such an industrial society has been attended by the minute division of labor, by a growing separation of classes, by concentration of the population in urban centers, by the increasing cost and complexity of machinery, by the development of improved methods of transportation and of credit, by the combination of labor and of capital, by the enormous increase of production, and by the growing concentration of wealth.

The term “industrial society” has been used quite a bit and needs a more detailed explanation. Around the year 1760, England experienced what is commonly referred to as the Industrial Revolution. Several inventions made it possible to use steam-powered machinery for manufacturing, first in textiles and then in other products. Manufacturing moved from homes, where it had traditionally taken place, to factories. Large amounts of capital started to be invested, machines replaced hand tools, and workers no longer owned the tools they used. People, machines, and capital were gathered in factories and organized under a new group of industrial managers to produce goods for a global market. The growth of this industrial society has led to a detailed division of labor, an increasing separation of social classes, a concentration of the population in cities, rising costs and complexity of machinery, advancements in transportation and finance, the merging of labor and capital, a massive increase in production, and a growing concentration of wealth.

The introduction of power manufacture completely revolutionized industry. The independent workman with his own tools was superseded by the factory, the small producer has given way in turn to the trust. With the introduction of expensive machinery it became necessary to organize capital on a large scale. Corporations with limited liability were organized for the manufacture of goods, the exploitation of mines, the building of railroads, and the carrying on of trade. As methods of production improved industry became more and more concentrated, and finally huge trusts took over the operation of combined plants. The business unit has grown increasingly larger, and the need and power of capital have become increasingly important. Capital has played a role of growing significance and has become more and more powerful in modern economic life. Indeed the name “capitalistic production” has been applied to modern industry because of the predominant importance of capital in all lines of [Pg 7] wealth production. Impersonal, growing by sheer force of its own momentum, capital is often thought of as intensely selfish and even cruel. Abuses which have arisen in the development of modern capitalistic industry must be remedied, but attacks upon capital itself are misguided and rest upon a mistaken analysis of methods of production.

The rise of industrial power completely transformed industry. The independent worker with their own tools was replaced by factories, and small producers eventually gave way to large trusts. With the introduction of costly machinery, it became essential to organize capital on a large scale. Corporations with limited liability were established to produce goods, exploit mines, build railroads, and conduct trade. As production methods improved, industry became more concentrated, and ultimately large trusts took over the operation of combined facilities. The business unit has grown larger, and the need for and influence of capital have become increasingly significant. Capital has played a growing role and has gained more power in modern economic life. The term "capitalistic production" has been used to describe modern industry due to the critical importance of capital in all areas of wealth creation. Impersonal and growing by its own momentum, capital is often seen as intensely selfish and even cruel. While the abuses that have emerged in modern capitalistic industry need to be addressed, attacks on capital itself are misguided and based on a flawed understanding of production methods.

Before the introduction of the factory system, under the so-called “domestic” system of industry, the laborer carried on his work in his own home, where he provided the raw material, owned his own tools, furnished the motive power—his muscles—and was his own master. Today every one of these conditions is changed—the work is carried on in the factory, the raw material, the tools, the motive power are all provided by the capitalist, the laborer contributing only his own more or less skilled labor, while the conditions under which he carries on his work are largely determined for him. He is no longer his own master. To protect himself against the growing power of capital the worker has organized with his fellows into trade unions. These seek to meet the monopolistic power of capital by exerting a monopolistic control over labor. While they realize that modern productive processes cannot be carried on without capital, they also insist that labor is equally essential. They claim that capital has received more than its fair share of their joint production and has exploited labor; consequently they insist that labor must now demand its just reward and enforce the claim by strikes and by raising wages. To enforce their monopoly, the policy of the closed shop is often enforced. The interests of capital and labor have thus often been made to appear antagonistic instead of complementary to one another. Frequently in their struggles the interests of the consumer have been entirely lost sight of.

Before the factory system took over, in what was called the “domestic” system of industry, workers did their jobs at home. They provided their own raw materials, owned their tools, used their own strength as the power source, and were in control of their work. Today, that’s all changed—the work is done in factories, and the capitalist provides the raw materials, tools, and power, while the worker contributes mostly their skill without control over the working conditions. They’re no longer their own boss. To protect themselves from the growing power of capital, workers have come together to form trade unions. These unions aim to balance the monopolistic power of capital by exerting control over labor. They recognize that modern production needs capital, but they also emphasize that labor is just as crucial. They argue that capital has taken more than its fair share of the profits from their combined efforts and has exploited labor, so they believe it’s time for labor to demand fair compensation and enforce that through strikes and wage increases. To maintain their power, the closed shop policy is often used. As a result, the interests of capital and labor have frequently been seen as opposing instead of complementary. In their conflicts, the needs of consumers are often overlooked entirely.

These conflicts in the productive processes of modern economic society have led many people to look to the state [Pg 8] as the regulator of industry and to invoke state aid or state interference along many lines. Maladjustments in the labor contract, mistaken production, leading perhaps to speculation and financial panics, abuses of power by corporate interests, discriminations by railroads, and similar irregularities are made the excuse for an appeal to state authority. Some would even go so far as to have the state take over and manage all productive enterprises; but socialism is as yet a protest rather than a constructive force. In the last analysis the state is the regulator of all industrial undertakings, for they all concern society. The state must hold the balance even and see that fair play is given to all groups and all classes; but the greatest amount of freedom compatible with economic justice must be sought for. It is a difficult question how far the state must interfere in the conduct or management of industrial enterprises in order to secure social justice. There is a decided tendency at present to a strengthening of the regulative power of the state for the protection of the weaker classes of society. And yet on the whole the institution of private property, free competition, and a maximum of individual liberty remain the fundamental conditions of our economic life.

These conflicts in the production processes of modern economic society have led many people to turn to the government as the regulator of industry and to seek government aid or involvement in various ways. Mismanagement of labor contracts, poor production decisions that might lead to speculation and financial crises, abuses of power by corporations, unfair practices by railroads, and similar issues are used as reasons to call for government intervention. Some people even propose that the government should take over and run all productive businesses; however, socialism is still more of a reaction than a constructive solution. Ultimately, the government regulates all industrial activities because they affect society as a whole. The government must maintain balance and ensure fair treatment for all groups and classes, while also striving for the greatest amount of freedom possible that aligns with economic fairness. It's a complex issue how much the government should intervene in the management of industries to achieve social justice. Currently, there is a significant trend toward increasing the regulatory power of the government to protect the more vulnerable classes in society. Yet, overall, the principles of private property, free competition, and maximum individual freedom still serve as the fundamental foundations of our economic life.

But while under the system of individualism, industrial activities have been multiplied, wealth has been enormously increased, and human progress has been greatly advanced, many abuses and evils still remain. Many practical economic problems still await solution. Some of these have already been suggested in the preceding paragraphs; others remain to be presented. It is the purpose of this text to apply to some of the more important practical current problems of our modern industrial life the principles of economic science, and to endeavor to reach fair and just conclusions on controverted points.

But even though individualism has led to a rise in industrial activities, a significant increase in wealth, and impressive human progress, many issues and injustices still persist. Several practical economic problems still need to be solved. Some of these have already been mentioned in the previous paragraphs; others will be discussed later. This text aims to apply the principles of economic science to some of the more pressing practical issues in our modern industrial life and to strive for fair and just conclusions on debated topics.

[Pg 9] II. THE AGRICULTURAL RESOURCES OF THE UNITED STATES.

The land area of the United States, exclusive of Alaska and our island possessions, is a little less than 3,000,000 square miles, or an area somewhat less than the whole of Europe (3,700,000 square miles). Of this about 840,000 square miles, or a little more than one-fourth, still remains in the possession of the Federal Government and constitutes the public domain. The rest belonged to the original thirteen states, has been given to railways or to the states for educational purposes, or has been sold and given away to individual settlers. The policy of the Government in the disposition of the public domain has, on the whole, been to place it as rapidly as possible in the hands of cultivators, and also to use it as a fund to promote internal improvements and education. About 200,000,000 acres had been granted to railroads down to 1871, at which time land grants were discontinued, to secure their early construction. This policy has often been bitterly condemned, and it has been contended that the land should have been saved for actual settlers. It may however be said that without such grants the railroads would not have been built at as early a date as they actually were, and that without railroads the land was practically worthless, as it was too far removed from any navigable waterway to have access to a market. Moreover, the Federal Treasury lost nothing, for the sections of land alternating with those granted to the railroads were sold to settlers for $2.50 an acre instead of $1.25, the customary price for the public lands.

The land area of the United States, excluding Alaska and our island territories, is just under 3,000,000 square miles, which is a bit smaller than all of Europe (3,700,000 square miles). Of this, about 840,000 square miles, or just over one-fourth, is still owned by the Federal Government and makes up the public domain. The rest originally belonged to the thirteen states, has been given to railroads or to the states for educational purposes, or has been sold or given away to individual settlers. The government's policy regarding the public domain has largely been to transfer it quickly into the hands of farmers and to use it as a funding source to support infrastructure and education. By 1871, about 200,000,000 acres had been granted to railroads to ensure their early construction, after which land grants were stopped. This policy has often faced harsh criticism, with some arguing that the land should have been reserved for actual settlers. However, it's fair to say that without these land grants, the railroads wouldn't have been constructed as early as they were, and without railroads, the land was essentially useless as it was too far from any navigable waterways to reach a market. Additionally, the Federal Treasury didn't lose out because the sections of land that alternated with those given to the railroads were sold to settlers for $2.50 an acre instead of the usual $1.25 for public lands.

The grants of land for educational purposes have been generally approved. Upon such grants rests the establishment of our state agricultural colleges.

The land grants for educational purposes have mostly been approved. These grants are the foundation for establishing our state agricultural colleges.

The unique and characteristic feature of the land policy of the United States has been the granting of land to the settler upon actual residence and cultivation for five [Pg 10] years. Such a grant of 160 acres is called a “homestead,” and since 1862 has been made to any citizen who is the head of a family or above the age of twenty-one years. In this way over 230,000,000 acres have been placed without cost in the possession of the actual cultivators. The newer public land states are peopled by proprietors, and there has never grown up in the United States a large class of rich land owners whose land is cultivated by a tenant peasant class, such as exists in England and parts of Europe. For this we must thank not only our land policy, but also the vast extent of unoccupied land that might be had almost for the asking.

The unique and defining aspect of the land policy in the United States has been giving land to settlers who actually live on and cultivate it for five years. This 160-acre grant is known as a "homestead," and since 1862, it has been available to any citizen who is the head of a household or at least twenty-one years old. Through this policy, over 230 million acres have been granted at no cost to those who actually farm the land. The newer public land states are populated by landowners, and the U.S. has never developed a large class of wealthy landowners with a tenant farming class, like what exists in England and parts of Europe. For this, we owe thanks not only to our land policy but also to the vast amount of unoccupied land that was readily available.

Now, however, the public lands available for agriculture have been exhausted; practically all that remains is situated in the arid zone, and needs systematic irrigation before it can be made available for any use except that of grazing. There are still about 100,000,000 acres of choice land in Indian reservations, and as a consequence of the pressure upon this resource and also because of the unwisdom of the old reservation system, the policy has now been adopted of dividing these lands among the Indians in individual ownership, under careful safeguards, and of assimilating the Indians to the rest of the population.

Now, however, the public lands available for farming have run out; almost everything left is in arid areas and needs systematic irrigation before it can be used for anything other than grazing. There are still about 100 million acres of prime land in Indian reservations, and because of the demand for this resource and the shortcomings of the old reservation system, the new approach is to distribute these lands among the Indians as individual ownership, with careful protections, and to integrate the Indians into the broader population.

The exhaustion of the fertile and well-watered lands of the Mississippi Valley has forced the later comers to have recourse to the arid soils in the almost rainless region west of the one hundredth meridian of longitude. The character of farming under such climatic conditions must of necessity be very different from what it is in the rainy districts, and the versatility and adaptability of the American farmer is well illustrated by the development which has taken place there. The first effort at the solution of the problem was in irrigation, a method which had been early practised by the Pueblo Indians, and later and most successfully by the Mormon settlers in Utah. By 1900, according to the census, 7,539,545 acres were under [Pg 11] irrigation. While most of the work up to that time had been done by private initiative, a demand arose for irrigation at government expense, in response to which Congress in 1902 provided for the building of irrigation works out of the proceeds of the sales of public lands. Regulation and conservation of the limited water supply by governmental authority, either state or national, is indeed essential to the success of irrigation and will probably be the policy of the future.

The depletion of the rich and well-watered lands of the Mississippi Valley has compelled later settlers to turn to the dry soils in the nearly rainless area west of the one hundredth meridian. Farming in such climatic conditions is bound to be very different from that in the wetter regions, and the versatility and adaptability of the American farmer is clearly demonstrated by the progress made there. The initial attempt to tackle this issue was through irrigation, a method first used by the Pueblo Indians, and later successfully by the Mormon settlers in Utah. By 1900, according to the census, 7,539,545 acres were under irrigation. While most of the efforts up to that point were driven by private initiatives, a need arose for government-funded irrigation, leading Congress in 1902 to authorize the construction of irrigation projects funded by the sale of public lands. Oversight and management of the limited water supply by government authorities, whether state or federal, is indeed crucial for the success of irrigation and will likely be the approach in the future.

A second and even more interesting development of American agriculture is the so-called dry-farming which is being successfully introduced into the semi-arid regions. Carefully selected seeds and plants of crops especially adapted to these climatic conditions are used, and then a very careful and intensive method of tillage is followed. The soil is plowed deep and thoroughly pulverized so that the roots can strike down to the deeper levels and absorb all the moisture available. Extraordinary results have already been attained, and the region that the older geographies labeled “The Great American Desert” bids fair to become one of the most flourishing districts in the country.

A second and even more fascinating development in American agriculture is the so-called dry-farming, which is being successfully implemented in semi-arid areas. Carefully chosen seeds and plants specifically suited for these climatic conditions are used, and a very meticulous and intensive tillage method is followed. The soil is plowed deeply and thoroughly broken up so that the roots can reach deeper levels and absorb all available moisture. Remarkable results have already been achieved, and the region that earlier geographies referred to as “The Great American Desert” is likely to become one of the most prosperous areas in the country.

That part of the area of the United States which has already been reduced to private ownership is divided into 5,700,000 farms. As almost half of the land in these farms is uncultivated, being forest, waste land, or pasture, it is evident that there is still room for a great increase in the agricultural production of the United States without bringing additional land into the field. The average size of these farms is 146 acres, which looms large indeed when compared with the 20-acre farms of France and the 60-acre farms of Great Britain. The difference is of course due to the difference in the methods of agriculture and the character of the crops, the European conditions demanding intensive cultivation while our methods are still largely extensive.

That part of the United States that has already been privatized is divided into 5,700,000 farms. Since almost half of the land on these farms is uncultivated, consisting of forests, wasteland, or pasture, it's clear that there's still plenty of room for significant increases in agricultural production without needing to use more land. The average size of these farms is 146 acres, which is quite large compared to the 20-acre farms in France and the 60-acre farms in Great Britain. This difference is mainly due to the varying agricultural practices and types of crops, as European conditions require intensive farming while our methods are still mostly extensive.

[Pg 12] A more important question even than the number and size of farms, from an economic point of view, is that of ownership. In 1880, when for the first time the federal census collected the statistics of farm tenure, the gratifying result was announced that three-quarters (74.5 per cent) of the farms in the United States were cultivated by their owners. The last census however showed that the proportion had fallen to 64.7 per cent in 1900, and alarm has been expressed that our democratic conditions of land ownership are giving way to a system of tenantry, that the ownership of our farms is being concentrated in fewer hands, and that methods of large-scale production in agriculture are crushing out the independent farmer as effectively as they have crowded out the small manufacturer and retailer in other fields. Correctly interpreted, however, the statistics seem to indicate that the growth of the tenant class marks the endeavor of farm laborers and farmers’ sons to establish themselves as independent farmers rather than the fall of former owners to the rank of tenants. The great majority of the young men are laborers, the majority of those in middle life are tenants, while the older men are for the most part owners of farms. There seems to be a healthy progress upward in the advancement of wage laborers and farmers’ children, first to tenancy, and finally, with increased ability and capital, to farm ownership. Moreover most of the rented farms are hired by negroes, the change in whose status from slave to tenant marks a great advance.

[Pg 12] A more crucial question than the number and size of farms, from an economic perspective, is ownership. In 1880, when the federal census first collected statistics on farm tenure, it was encouraging to find that three-quarters (74.5 percent) of farms in the United States were operated by their owners. However, the latest census showed that this proportion had dropped to 64.7 percent in 1900, raising concerns that our democratic land ownership system is shifting toward a tenant model, that farm ownership is becoming concentrated in fewer hands, and that large-scale agricultural production methods are effectively pushing out independent farmers just as they have with small manufacturers and retailers in other industries. However, if interpreted correctly, the statistics seem to suggest that the rise in the tenant class reflects the efforts of farm laborers and farmers’ sons to establish themselves as independent farmers, rather than a decline of former owners into tenancy. The majority of young men are laborers, most middle-aged individuals are tenants, while older men are predominantly farm owners. There appears to be healthy progress upward for wage laborers and farmers’ children, moving from tenancy to eventually, with greater skills and resources, to farm ownership. Furthermore, most rented farms are occupied by African Americans, whose transition from slavery to tenancy represents a significant advancement.

Another change in our farming population that has been viewed with considerable misgiving is the movement from the farm to the city and the decline in the proportion of the agricultural population to the whole. Indeed the change has been startling, as the United States has passed from a primitive agricultural stage of development to a highly organized manufacturing and commercial stage. From 86.3 per cent of the population in 1820 the percentage [Pg 13] of those engaged in agriculture fell steadily until it reached 35.7 per cent in 1900. Many persons have thought that such a movement indicated the desertion of our farms owing to the greater attraction of the cities, and the disappearance of a healthy agricultural population. It has indicated rather a great improvement in the arts of agriculture, whereby one person today, working with improved machinery and better knowledge, can produce nearly three times as much as his grandfather did. The labor set free has gone to the cities—cities of over 8,000 inhabitants now contain one-third of our population as compared with one-thirtieth one hundred years ago—and there produces the thousand and one things which contribute to our modern well-being. A smaller number can now raise all the food necessary to feed the population; that the rest are free to do other things must certainly be counted again, though the conditions under which work in the factory and life in the city are at present constructed leave much to be desired.

Another change in our farming population that has been met with a lot of concern is the shift from rural areas to cities, leading to a decline in the percentage of the agricultural population compared to the total. This change has indeed been striking, as the United States has transitioned from a basic agricultural society to a highly organized manufacturing and commercial one. From 86.3 percent of the population in 1820, the proportion of those involved in agriculture steadily decreased until it reached 35.7 percent in 1900. Many people believe this trend shows that farmers are leaving for the allure of the cities, resulting in a decline of a healthy agricultural population. However, it actually reflects significant advancements in agricultural practices, where today one person, using modern machinery and better knowledge, can produce nearly three times as much as their grandfather did. The labor that has been freed up has moved to cities—cities with over 8,000 residents now house one-third of our population, compared to one-thirtieth a hundred years ago—and there, they create countless goods that contribute to our modern way of life. A smaller number of people can now grow all the food needed to feed the population, allowing the remainder the freedom to pursue other activities, although the current working conditions in factories and living situations in cities leave much to be desired.

Writing about 1865 an eminent English traveler, Sir S. Morton Pets, apologized for calling the United States an agricultural country; today he would be spared this worry, for the Census of 1900 gave the net value of products of the farm as $3,764,000,000 and of pure manufactures as $5,981,000,000. Indeed since 1890 the value of the manufactures of the country has been larger than of the farm products, and the United States now ranks as one of the leading manufacturing nations of the world. Nevertheless the value and amount of the agricultural products are stupendous; the United States leads all countries in the production of dairy products, corn, and wheat, and the greater part of the lumber, meats, tobacco, and cotton which enter into the world’s trade come from her forests and fields.

Writing in 1865, a noted English traveler, Sir S. Morton Pets, apologized for referring to the United States as an agricultural country; today he wouldn’t have to worry about that, as the Census of 1900 reported the net value of farm products at $3,764,000,000 and of manufactured goods at $5,981,000,000. In fact, since 1890, the value of the country’s manufactured goods has exceeded that of farm products, and the United States now stands as one of the top manufacturing nations in the world. Still, the value and quantity of agricultural products are immense; the United States leads all countries in producing dairy products, corn, and wheat, and a large portion of the lumber, meats, tobacco, and cotton that fuel global trade comes from its forests and fields.

While the territory of the United States is well adapted by nature to the cultivation of a great variety of agricultural [Pg 14] products, as a matter of fact only four branches of agriculture showed a total product in 1900 of more than one million dollars. These were the raising of live stock, and the production of hay and grain, cotton, and dairy produce. The regional distribution of these products was fairly well marked, over half of the live stock and of the hay and grain farms being situated in the North Central States, nearly half of the dairy farms being located in the North Atlantic division, while practically all the cotton is confined to the southern zone; the same may also be said of tobacco and sugar. The semi-arid region of the West is given over almost exclusively to stock-raising. Iowa and Illinois lead as agricultural states.

While the land of the United States is naturally suitable for growing a wide range of agricultural products, in reality, only four areas of agriculture reported a total output of over one million dollars in 1900. These were raising livestock, producing hay and grain, cotton, and dairy products. The distribution of these products across the regions was quite distinct, with more than half of the livestock and hay and grain farms located in the North Central States, nearly half of the dairy farms found in the North Atlantic region, and nearly all the cotton grown in the southern part of the country; the same goes for tobacco and sugar. The semi-arid region of the West is nearly entirely dedicated to livestock raising. Iowa and Illinois are the top agricultural states.

The character of agriculture in the United States, as in all new countries, has hitherto been extensive, that is, a small amount of labor and capital has been applied to a relatively large amount of land, and only the cream of the soil has been skimmed off, as it were. Where labor is dear and land is cheap this is the most economical method for the farmer; and, although European critics have severely criticized our system of “earth butchery,” whereby the fertility of the soil has been exhausted by constant cropping, with no effort to restore the exhausted properties by fertilizing, the practice has been justified by the conditions which produced it. Already the practical exhaustion of the free public domain has had the effect of raising the price of lands in the Middle West, and this in turn will cause a more careful and intensive system of cultivation. In other words, as our social and industrial conditions approach those of Europe more closely, we may expect our agricultural methods to do so also. One of the most serious practical problems now confronting the American farmer is the change from the old, wasteful, extensive methods to the new, careful, intensive methods of farming. Those who cannot make the change will complain of the unprofitableness of agriculture, but to those who successfully meet [Pg 15] the new conditions the future offers much greater rewards than even the era of free land could produce.

The nature of agriculture in the United States, like in all new countries, has usually been extensive. This means that a small amount of labor and capital has been used on a relatively large amount of land, and only the best parts of the soil have been utilized. When labor is expensive and land is cheap, this is the most cost-effective way for farmers. Although European critics have harshly condemned our practice of "earth butchery," where the soil's fertility has been drained by constant planting without efforts to restore it with fertilizers, this practice has been justified by the conditions that led to it. The current depletion of the free public land has already increased land prices in the Midwest, which will lead to a more careful and intensive approach to farming. In other words, as our social and industrial conditions become more similar to those in Europe, we can expect our agricultural methods to evolve in the same way. One of the major practical challenges facing American farmers right now is shifting from the old, wasteful extensive methods to the new, careful intensive methods of farming. Those who can’t adapt will complain about agriculture being unprofitable, but for those who successfully embrace the new conditions, the future holds much greater rewards than even the period of free land could offer.

It has been said that the year 1887 marked the beginning of a new stage of development in American agriculture—that of reorganization—because in that year Congress passed the Experiment Station Act. This marked the application of the principles of experimental science to agriculture on a more comprehensive and systematic scale than had ever been attempted before. Stimulated by the increased activity of the government experiment stations, the agricultural colleges have expanded their work. They are offering practical courses to the farmers, and in co-operation with the railroads, some of them have recently been sending out special lecturers, with moving laboratories, to bring the teachings of science as close home to the producers as possible. Finally, the wonderful work being done by Burbank and others in selecting and crossing, by travelers for the federal Agricultural Department in securing plants from all over the world suited to our varied climatic conditions, and by the experiment stations and agricultural colleges in spreading the new knowledge among the farmers and putting it into actual practice—all these departures promise to revolutionize agriculture, and to make it, as one writer has said, a learned profession.

It has been said that the year 1887 marked the start of a new phase in American agriculture—reorganization—because that’s when Congress passed the Experiment Station Act. This marked the application of experimental science principles to agriculture on a broader and more systematic scale than ever before. Encouraged by the growing activity of government experiment stations, agricultural colleges have expanded their work. They are offering practical courses to farmers, and in collaboration with railroads, some are now sending out special lecturers with mobile labs to bring scientific teachings as close to the producers as possible. Finally, the amazing work being done by Burbank and others in selecting and crossing plants, by federal Agricultural Department travelers in sourcing plants from around the globe suited to our various climates, and by the experiment stations and agricultural colleges in spreading this new knowledge among farmers and putting it into practice—all these efforts promise to revolutionize agriculture and make it, as one writer put it, a learned profession.

The production of cereals is the most important branch of agriculture, comprising corn, wheat, oats, barley, rye, buckwheat, and rice. Since the building of the trunk railroads, by which the western territory was given access to a market, the progress of cereal production has been extremely rapid, nor does there seem to be any observable slackening. With the introduction of improved varieties of spring wheat, cereal production is being pushed further up into British Canada and our own Northwest. The center of cereal production has moved steadily westward, from eastern Indiana in 1860 to eastern Iowa in 1900. With the practical exhaustion of unoccupied land suitable [Pg 16] for grain-raising in the United States, it is clear that the future extension of the industry depends rather upon improvements in the methods of agriculture than upon the addition of new lands. The very practical problem here presented to the American farmer if he wishes to maintain his supremacy in the world’s markets is being nobly and successfully met by the agricultural experiment stations. They are teaching the farmer how to increase his yield of wheat, for example, by scientific seed selection and more careful methods of tillage, from an average of 12.5 bushels per acre for the whole country in 1900 to treble that amount.

The production of cereals is the most important part of agriculture, including corn, wheat, oats, barley, rye, buckwheat, and rice. Since the construction of the main railroads that connected the western regions to the market, the growth of cereal production has been incredibly fast, and there doesn't seem to be any sign of slowing down. With the introduction of better varieties of spring wheat, cereal production is expanding further into British Canada and our own Northwest. The center of cereal production has steadily shifted westward, from eastern Indiana in 1860 to eastern Iowa in 1900. With the near exhaustion of available land suitable for grain farming in the United States, it's clear that the future growth of the industry depends more on improvements in agricultural methods than on acquiring new lands. The practical challenge this presents to the American farmer, if he wants to maintain his dominance in global markets, is being effectively addressed by agricultural experiment stations. They are teaching farmers how to increase their wheat yields, for example, through scientific seed selection and more careful farming techniques, increasing the average from 12.5 bushels per acre nationwide in 1900 to triple that amount.

Of the separate crops corn is by far the most important, representing 60 per cent of the total value of all cereals produced in 1900. Most of the corn is fed to stock throughout the so-called “corn belt” and comes to market in the form of pork and beef. Although corn is very nutritious and is a favorite article of diet in this country in various forms, astonishingly little of it is exported. The development of a foreign market still awaits the enterprise of the American farmer and food manufacturer.

Of all the different crops, corn is by far the most important, making up 60 percent of the total value of all cereals produced in 1900. Most of the corn is used as feed for livestock in the so-called “corn belt” and is sold in the form of pork and beef. Even though corn is highly nutritious and is a popular food item in this country in various forms, surprisingly little of it is exported. The growth of a foreign market is still waiting for the initiative of American farmers and food manufacturers.

The production of live stock is essentially a frontier industry, and while it will probably always be carried on in the semi-arid grazing districts of the West, which can be reclaimed for agriculture only at considerable expense, it already shows a relative decline. Owing to the great growth of the population the domestic demand now consumes almost all the meat produced and the exports are declining. This is one of the reasons for the recent rise in the price of meat. The industry is extensive. Quite the opposite is true of the dairy industry, which is intensive, being carried on for the most part in the vicinity of large cities where land is expensive. The changing character of agriculture and the fact that it is itself a business enterprise demanding a knowledge of market conditions and business methods is well illustrated by the nature of the [Pg 17] dairy industry. Dairies are inspected and must conform to certain standards, the milk must be sterilized and shipped, often by special trains, to the cities. Over a third of the butter and practically all of the cheese is now made in factories instead of on the farm, so that it is a question whether the latter at least should not be classified as a product of manufacture rather than of agriculture.

The production of livestock is essentially a frontier industry, and while it will likely always take place in the semi-arid grazing areas of the West, which can only be turned into agricultural land at a significant cost, it is already showing a relative decline. Due to the rapid population growth, domestic demand now consumes almost all the meat produced, and exports are dropping. This is one reason for the recent increase in meat prices. The industry is extensive. In contrast, the dairy industry is intensive, largely located near major cities where land is costly. The evolving nature of agriculture and the fact that it operates as a business requiring knowledge of market conditions and business practices is well illustrated by the dairy industry. Dairies are inspected and must meet certain standards; the milk must be sterilized and shipped, often by special trains, to the cities. More than a third of the butter and nearly all cheese is now produced in factories rather than on farms, raising the question of whether the latter should be considered a manufactured product instead of an agricultural one.

Of the last of the four important branches of agriculture, namely cotton-raising, there is not so much to be said. Owing to the intensive nature of its cultivation, machinery has never been applied on a large scale to its production, as was done in the case of hay and grain. The wasteful methods that prevailed before the Civil War in the South have been largely corrected, and the tendency to sterility of the soil has been met by the increased use of fertilizers. The statistics of cotton crops for the past thirty years do not indicate any decrease in productiveness, and show that the point of diminishing returns has not yet been reached. A peculiar and interesting feature about cotton production is that it is largely in the hands of tenants. The old slave plantations of the South have been broken up into small holdings and many of these are operated by tenants, negroes and whites, who are too poor or too improvident to buy the land outright. The main problems connected with cotton culture are labor problems; and the question has often been anxiously asked whether the free negro will produce as much as the former slave. This can now be confidently answered in the affirmative, though it yet remains to be seen whether he can be made as efficient a producer as his white competitor. Upon the answer to that question depends not merely the future of cotton production, but the economic salvation of the negro himself. The constantly expanding use of cotton goods assures a brilliant future to the cotton-growing states of the South, for not merely is there an assured market in America and Europe, but the primitive peoples of [Pg 18] Asia and Africa may be depended upon to absorb increasing quantities of cotton fabrics.

Of the last of the four main branches of agriculture, which is cotton production, there isn't a lot to discuss. Because of the intensive nature of its farming, machinery has not been widely used in its production like it has been for hay and grain. The inefficient methods that were common in the South before the Civil War have mostly been fixed, and the tendency for soil to become less fertile has been addressed by the increased use of fertilizers. Statistics on cotton crops over the past thirty years do not show any decline in productivity and indicate that we haven't yet reached the point of diminishing returns. A unique and interesting aspect of cotton production is that it is largely managed by tenants. The former slave plantations in the South have been divided into smaller plots, many of which are worked by tenants, both black and white, who are either too poor or unable to afford to buy the land outright. The main issues related to cotton farming are labor-related; and there has often been concern about whether free black individuals can produce as much as the former slaves. This can now be confidently answered with a yes, although it remains to be seen if they can be as efficient as their white counterparts. The answer to that question is crucial not just for the future of cotton production, but also for the economic well-being of black individuals themselves. The continually growing demand for cotton products guarantees a bright future for the cotton-producing states in the South, as there is not only a stable market in America and Europe, but also the developing populations in Asia and Africa are expected to increasingly consume cotton fabrics.

Hand in hand with the heedless extensive methods of agriculture in the past went wasteful use and even destruction of our forest resources. The annual cut of lumber in the United States is today about forty billion feet board measure; at this rate of consumption it is estimated that the present available supply will last only 35 to 50 years. It will doubtless surprise most readers to learn that about three-quarters of the annual wood cut is consumed as fuel, probably half of our population still depending upon wood instead of coal for fuel. The rapid exhaustion of our forest supplies, with the attendant effects upon moisture, floods, etc., has brought the question of forest preservation to the front as a practical economic problem. We have been squandering the heritage of our children and efforts are now being made to repair some of the loss before we are declared bankrupt. In 1898 the Federal Government began practical work in the introduction of forestry; this received a great stimulus in 1905 when the care of the national forest reserves, embracing over 60,000,000 acres, was put under the control of the Forest Service. Over 150 trained foresters are employed, who manage the forests on the public lands and co-operate with private owners in the introduction of scientific forestry. Several states have taken up the movement, and there is every indication that scientific methods of culture such as prevail in Prussia and other European states, will supplant our destructive denudation of the land. That it is high time to devote attention to the better conservation of this natural resource is made evident by the high and increasing price of lumber.

Hand in hand with the careless agricultural practices of the past came the wasteful use and even destruction of our forest resources. The annual timber harvest in the United States is currently about forty billion board feet; at this consumption rate, it's estimated that the existing supply will only last 35 to 50 years. Most readers will likely be surprised to learn that about three-quarters of the annual timber cut is used for fuel, with probably half of our population still relying on wood instead of coal for heating. The fast depletion of our forest resources, along with its effects on moisture levels, flooding, and more, has brought the issue of forest preservation to the forefront as a serious economic problem. We have been wasting the legacy of our children, and efforts are now being made to recover some of the loss before we face financial ruin. In 1898, the Federal Government began serious efforts in forestry; this gained traction in 1905 when the management of national forest reserves, covering over 60,000,000 acres, was assigned to the Forest Service. More than 150 trained foresters are employed to manage the forests on public lands and collaborate with private landowners to implement scientific forestry practices. Several states have joined this initiative, and there are clear signs that scientific methods of cultivation, similar to those used in Prussia and other European countries, will replace our destructive land practices. It's evident that we need to focus on better conservation of this natural resource, especially given the rising cost of lumber.

There is one other natural resource the conditions of whose supply resemble those of forestry and of agriculture in general; this is the fisheries. With careful use, providing for depreciation, and restoring the elements destroyed, [Pg 19] all of these should prove inexhaustible and should continue to furnish man with food and lumber for all time. But as in the case of the other two industries, so with the fisheries, we have been using up our capital and declaring enormous dividends at the expense of the future. The value of the annual catch of fish is $40,000,000, which is exceeded only by that of Great Britain. The problem of the better conservation of this resource has been taken in hand by the Federal Government, through the Fish Commission, and much has been done to repair our early prodigality by restocking lakes and streams with fish. More stringent fish and game laws have also been passed by most of the states, designed to prevent the extermination of the supply.

There’s another natural resource whose supply conditions are similar to those of forestry and agriculture in general: fisheries. With careful management, accounting for depletion, and restoring the lost elements, all of these resources should be sustainable and continue to provide food and wood for people indefinitely. However, just like with the other two industries, we have been depleting our capital and claiming huge profits at the cost of the future. The value of the annual fish catch is $40,000,000, exceeded only by Great Britain. The Federal Government, through the Fish Commission, has taken steps to improve the conservation of this resource, and a lot has been done to address our earlier wastefulness by reintroducing fish into lakes and streams. Most states have also passed stricter fish and game laws aimed at preventing the depletion of resources.

III. THE MINERAL RESOURCES OF THE UNITED STATES.

The natural resources of any country may be divided into two broad groups, which call for different treatment and give rise to very different problems. There are, on the one hand, resources which are exhaustible but which can be restored again; and on the other, resources which, once exhausted, can never be replaced again by human agency. Under the first head come the soil, the forests, the fisheries, and even the water power, for all of these can be made to yield steady returns to man for thousands of years, if used intelligently. Under the second head belong coal, petroleum, natural gas, and all the minerals; man may discover substitutes, he may economize in the use of these substances, but he can never augment their supply. In the previous section we considered some of the problems that arise in the use of the soil in agriculture, and those connected with our forests and fisheries. For the most part they had to do with the intelligent use of these agencies and the restoration or repair of the elements destroyed. In this section we are met by a very different [Pg 20] problem, namely, the conservation of a limited supply of resources and their most economical application to the needs of mankind.

The natural resources of any country can be grouped into two main categories that require different approaches and create very different challenges. On one side, there are resources that can be depleted but can be renewed; on the other side, there are resources that, once depleted, can never be replaced by human effort. The first category includes soil, forests, fisheries, and even water power—all of which can provide steady returns for thousands of years if managed wisely. The second category consists of coal, petroleum, natural gas, and all minerals; humans can find substitutes or use these resources more efficiently, but they can never increase their availability. In the previous section, we looked at some issues related to soil use in agriculture, as well as those concerning forests and fisheries. Most of these issues were about using these resources wisely and restoring or repairing what's been damaged. In this section, we face a very different problem: the conservation of a limited supply of resources and their most efficient use to meet human needs.

We can distinguish two contrasting answers to this problem, one careless and optimistic, and the other pessimistic and fearful of the future. According to the former point of view we should not borrow trouble of the future; man’s career has been one of constant progress; when he has been confronted with a difficulty he has invariably met it. Indeed necessity has been the most prolific mother of invention. If our coal supplies are exhausted, man will devise means of utilizing the heat of the sun, the force of the tides, the motion of the waves, the stores of electrical energy in the air, all of which will yield inexhaustible supplies of heat and energy. If our stores of iron should fail, some enterprising inventor would surely discover a practicable and commercially profitable method of extracting aluminum from clay. New sources of raw materials will undoubtedly be discovered before the old ones give out, and we may confidently expect that, while the material bases of a high civilization may shift somewhat, they will never crumble and fall.

We can see two very different responses to this issue: one that’s casual and hopeful, and another that’s negative and anxious about the future. The first perspective suggests we shouldn't worry about future troubles; humanity has always shown a path of continuous progress. Whenever faced with a challenge, we’ve consistently found a way to overcome it. In fact, necessity has always been a major driver of innovation. If we run out of coal, people will surely find ways to harness solar energy, tidal forces, ocean waves, and the electrical energy in the atmosphere, all of which can provide endless supplies of heat and energy. If our iron supplies deplete, an inventive mind will certainly come up with a viable and financially sound method to extract aluminum from clay. We can expect that new sources of raw materials will be found before the old ones run out, and while the foundation of a prosperous society may change somewhat, it will never completely collapse.

The other school has sounded a louder note of alarm. At the present rate of consumption the coal and iron deposits of Europe and America must soon be exhausted. The supplies of copper, lead, and other metals in favorable locations are also being consumed at an alarming rate, and no other known supplies are in sight. Within the past century scientific knowledge and engineering skill have combined to unlock the storehouses of the geologic ages, and now like prodigals we are dissipating our fortunes. To treat these exhaustible sources of supply as permanent sources of income, without regard for the future, is based upon unsound theory and must lead to reckless practice.

The other side has raised a louder alarm. At the current rate of use, the coal and iron deposits in Europe and America will likely run out soon. The supplies of copper, lead, and other metals in accessible locations are also being used up at an alarming pace, and there are no other known sources on the horizon. Over the last century, scientific knowledge and engineering expertise have come together to tap into the resources of the geological ages, and now, like spendthrifts, we are squandering our wealth. Treating these finite resources as if they were permanent sources of income, without considering the future, is based on flawed thinking and will inevitably lead to reckless behavior.

[Pg 21] As so often in opposing counsels, there is an element of truth in each of these contrasting points of view. But the safer plan is not to wait until we have exhausted our natural resources before remedying the evil, but to heed the warnings now. A long step in this direction was taken in May, 1908, when a conference of the governors of all the states, together with college and railroad presidents, business men and others, was held at the White House upon invitation of President Roosevelt. As a result of this gathering a National Conservation Commission was appointed, which will make an exhaustive investigation into the amount and rate of consumption of the natural resources of the country and suggest measures for their better utilization and preservation through national, state, and local action. In line with this movement two other commissions have been established, one on inland waterways and one on country life. As a result of the national awakening we may expect to see a more rational use made of the gifts of nature, and a better organization of our national life. Heretofore the ideal of our business men has been to exploit, one might almost say pillage, the stores of nature as rapidly as possible; it was a pioneer stage of industry, inevitable but wasteful. From now on the new conception must be the restoration where possible of exhausted elements, as of the soil and the forests, and the careful use of the non-renewable stores of wealth so that at least we shall not make them engines of destruction, as in the case of floods and devastation occasioned by careless hydraulic mining in the West. Let us now turn to a more detailed consideration of the separate items in our inventory of national wealth.

[Pg 21] As often happens with opposing arguments, there is some truth in each of these differing viewpoints. However, the wiser approach is to address the problem now rather than wait until our natural resources are depleted. We should pay attention to the warnings immediately. A significant step in this direction was taken in May 1908, when a conference of governors from all states, along with college presidents, railroad leaders, businesspeople, and others, convened at the White House at the invitation of President Roosevelt. As a result of this meeting, a National Conservation Commission was established to conduct a thorough investigation into the quantity and rate of consumption of our natural resources and to recommend ways for their improved use and preservation through national, state, and local efforts. In support of this initiative, two other commissions were formed, one focusing on inland waterways and the other on rural life. Thanks to this national awakening, we can expect a more sensible approach to utilizing nature’s gifts and a better organization of our national life. Until now, our business leaders have aimed to exploit, or even plunder, nature’s resources as quickly as possible; this was a pioneer stage of industry—inevitable but wasteful. Moving forward, we need to focus on restoring depleted resources like soil and forests and using non-renewable resources more carefully, ensuring they do not become sources of destruction, as seen with floods and devastation caused by careless hydraulic mining in the West. Let’s now take a closer look at the specific elements in our national wealth inventory.

Our modern civilization may be said to rest upon coal, for upon its possession depends man’s ability to utilize most of the other items of his wealth. Passing over its utility as a fuel to heat our houses, without coal it would be impossible to smelt the iron needed in all our industries, [Pg 22] to drive the machinery, to run our locomotives or steamboats, or in a word to carry on the manifold activities of our industrial life. According to the United States Geological Survey there are 335,000 square miles of coal-bearing strata in this country, but the larger part of it is too thin or impure to be useful for industrial purposes; it serves in many localities however as domestic fuel, as in the case of the lignite deposits of the Northwest. An estimate of Professor Tarr places the coal-producing area in the United States at not over 50,000 square miles. At the present rate of consumption—over 350,000,000 tons in 1905—it has been estimated that the anthracite coal deposits will last for only fifty years longer, while we have only enough bituminous coal for one hundred years.

Our modern society relies heavily on coal, as our ability to use most of our other resources depends on having it. Aside from its role as fuel for heating our homes, without coal, it would be impossible to smelt the iron needed in all our industries, power machinery, or run locomotives and steamboats, essentially supporting all the different activities of our industrial life. According to the United States Geological Survey, there are 335,000 square miles of coal-bearing land in this country, but most of it is too thin or impure to be useful for industrial purposes; however, it does serve as domestic fuel in many areas, like the lignite deposits in the Northwest. An estimate by Professor Tarr suggests the coal-producing area in the United States is not more than 50,000 square miles. At the current rate of consumption—over 350,000,000 tons in 1905—it's estimated that anthracite coal deposits will only last for about fifty more years, while we have enough bituminous coal for another hundred years.

The large deposits of coal in England and their early development gave that country a great advantage over Europe. But as long ago as 1861 Professor Jevons, a noted English economist, sounded a note of alarm: he prophesied that because of the superior size and character of the coal deposits of America, industrial supremacy must inevitably pass to this country. His prediction has already been verified in the case of coal and iron production, and will probably soon prove true of textiles also. The coal deposits of the United States are thirty-seven times as great as those of England, but at the present rate of mining are threatened with exhaustion at no distant date. It has been estimated that there are in China coal deposits capable of supplying the world with fuel for another thousand years. But such estimates are, in the present state of our knowledge about China, the merest guesses, and if true would seem to point rather to the future industrial supremacy of that country in the world’s markets.

The large coal deposits in England and their early development gave that country a significant advantage over Europe. However, as early as 1861, Professor Jevons, a well-known English economist, raised concerns: he predicted that due to the larger and better-quality coal deposits in America, industrial leadership would inevitably shift to that country. His prediction has already been confirmed in terms of coal and iron production, and it will likely soon be true for textiles as well. The coal deposits in the United States are thirty-seven times greater than those in England, but at the current mining rate, they are at risk of being exhausted in the near future. It is estimated that China has coal deposits capable of supplying the world with fuel for another thousand years. However, such estimates, based on our limited understanding of China today, are just guesses, and if accurate, they would indicate a potential future industrial dominance of that country in global markets.

Two-thirds of the coal mined in the United States is obtained from the Appalachian field, extending from New York to Alabama, Pennsylvania being the largest coal-producing state in the Union. In the iron and steel industries [Pg 23] most of the coal is coked, as it is better for blast-furnace use in this form, giving greater heat and containing less sulphur or other injurious substances than coal. Owing to the smaller bulk and cost of transporting ore, most of the iron and steel industries are situated in the vicinity of the coal supply, as in Pennsylvania, Ohio, Alabama, etc.

Two-thirds of the coal mined in the United States comes from the Appalachian region, which stretches from New York to Alabama, with Pennsylvania being the largest coal-producing state in the country. In the iron and steel industries, most of the coal is converted into coke, as this form is more effective for blast-furnace use, generating more heat and containing less sulfur or other harmful substances than regular coal. Because of the smaller volume and lower cost of transporting ore, many iron and steel industries are located near the coal supply, like in Pennsylvania, Ohio, Alabama, and so on. [Pg 23]

Petroleum or coal-oil is closely allied to coal in its origin and distribution and must be classed with it as a most important product, not only for industrial uses, but also because of the contributions it has made to the comforts of living. In its production the United States ranks first, being closely followed by Russia; together these two countries furnish over 90 per cent of the world’s supply of petroleum. Enormous economies have been effected in its production and distribution, which is done by piping the crude oil underground to the refineries. For illuminating purposes it is the cheapest form of artificial light; as a fuel it is supplanting coal, where the latter is dear or its cost of carriage high, as on ocean steamers. Finally, the construction of light and convenient gasoline motors has given it great importance as a source of motive power. Natural gas is closely related to petroleum, but the supply has been so reduced by rapid and reckless use that it has but a limited economic outlook and is of local significance only.

Petroleum, or coal oil, is closely related to coal in terms of its origin and distribution, and it should be categorized alongside it as a crucial product, not just for industrial applications but also for the ways it has improved quality of life. The United States is the leading producer, followed closely by Russia; together, these two countries provide over 90 percent of the world’s petroleum supply. There have been significant improvements in its production and distribution, mainly accomplished by piping crude oil underground to refineries. For lighting purposes, it is the most affordable form of artificial light; as fuel, it is replacing coal in areas where coal is expensive or where transportation costs are high, such as on ocean liners. Finally, the development of lightweight and convenient gasoline engines has made it a vital source of power. Natural gas is closely related to petroleum, but its supply has been drastically reduced due to rapid and careless usage, which limits its economic potential and makes it only locally significant.

Of all the metals iron must be considered the most useful for man, far surpassing the so-called precious metals in economic importance. Its great value is so evident that its production and use have often been taken as a criterion of the material progress of a community. Iron is the only metal that can be welded, and is accordingly of great significance, whether in making strong machinery, as the shafts of ocean steamships or the framework of a twenty-story building, or, in the form of steel, the most delicate surgical instruments or watch springs. Judged by the test [Pg 24] of iron ore production the United States ranks high, for it turns out about four-fifths of the world’s supply; all of this is used for domestic consumption, in its own blast furnaces, though much of it is afterwards exported in the form of pig iron or structural iron or steel. Though iron is universally distributed throughout creation, it must occur in large beds or deposits before it can be profitably mined. “The most favorable situation of an iron ore for profitable extraction is near good coking coal for smelting and limestone for a flux, as in the Birmingham district of Alabama; and in such a situation even low-grade ores can be worked profitably. Unless this is the case, iron ore cannot be extensively mined excepting under conditions of great abundance and economical methods of transportation, as in the Lake Superior district, where thick and remarkably uniform beds of good ore occur in such a position that water transportation to the market is possible. Where these conditions do not exist, iron-mining is feasible only on a small scale for the local market. Thus, in the Rocky Mountains there are almost inexhaustible supplies of iron, often of a high grade, which are at present of no value whatsoever.”[1]

Of all the metals, iron is considered the most useful for humans, far exceeding the so-called precious metals in economic importance. Its incredible value is so clear that its production and use have often been seen as a measure of a community's material progress. Iron is the only metal that can be welded, making it extremely significant, whether it’s for creating strong machinery, like the shafts of ocean-going steamships or the framework of a twenty-story building, or, as steel, for making delicate surgical instruments or watch springs. Judging by the production of iron ore, the United States ranks high, producing about four-fifths of the world’s supply; all of this is used for domestic consumption in its own blast furnaces, although much of it is later exported as pig iron or structural iron or steel. While iron is distributed widely throughout nature, it needs to be found in large beds or deposits to be mined profitably. “The best location for iron ore extraction is near high-quality coking coal for smelting and limestone for a flux, as seen in the Birmingham district of Alabama; in such a situation, even low-grade ores can be mined profitably. If this isn’t the case, iron ore can only be extensively mined under conditions of great abundance and efficient transportation methods, such as in the Lake Superior area, where thick and exceptionally uniform beds of good ore are situated to allow water transportation to the market. Without these conditions, iron mining can only be done on a small scale for local markets. Therefore, in the Rocky Mountains, there are almost limitless supplies of iron, often of high quality, which currently have no value at all.”[1]

The most wonderful iron-mining region in the United States and probably in the world lies in the northern part of Michigan and Minnesota, where five ranges or lines of hills contain immense deposits. These lie so near the surface that they can be dug out of open pits at a cost of from 10 to 50 cents a ton, against $1 a ton in a shaft or underground mine. Three-quarters of the iron ore produced in the United States is mined in this district. Its proximity to the lake ports makes possible its transportation to the iron and steel manufacturing centers at very low rates. Machinery has been applied on an immense scale to the work of mining, loading and unloading the ore. Steam [Pg 25] shovels scoop up the ore from the open pit, filling cars at the rate of almost one a minute; the work of loading this into the ore ships at the ports is equally expeditious, only about two hours being required to load an ore ship of 6,000 tons, while the work of unloading is performed for the most part by an endless chain of buckets and traveling cranes. By these means an ultra-intensive exploitation of these magnificent deposits is taking place and it is a question whether they will not soon be exhausted. “But the Americans,” writes Professor Leroy-Beaulieu, a friendly but keen critic of our industrial development, “relying on the constant good-will of nature, are confident that they will discover either new and productive ranges in this district, or rich deposits in other districts.”

The most incredible iron-mining region in the United States, and probably in the world, is located in the northern parts of Michigan and Minnesota, where five ranges of hills hold vast deposits. These deposits are so close to the surface that they can be mined from open pits at a cost of 10 to 50 cents per ton, compared to $1 per ton in a shaft or underground mine. Three-quarters of the iron ore produced in the United States comes from this area. Its proximity to lake ports allows for low-cost transportation to iron and steel manufacturing centers. Machinery has been extensively used for mining, loading, and unloading the ore. Steam shovels scoop up the ore from the open pit, filling cars at nearly one per minute; loading this into the ore ships at the ports is similarly quick, taking only about two hours to load a 6,000-ton ore ship, while unloading is mostly done by an endless chain of buckets and traveling cranes. This means that a very intensive extraction of these amazing deposits is happening, raising the question of whether they will be depleted soon. “But the Americans,” writes Professor Leroy-Beaulieu, a sympathetic yet critical observer of our industrial growth, “confident in nature’s ongoing generosity, believe they will either find new productive ranges in this area or locate rich deposits elsewhere.”

The precious metals have received more than their fair share of attention, for the industrial progress of the world is much less dependent upon their presence in large and easily obtained quantities than it is upon the more common metals. Nevertheless they are of importance both in the arts and especially because of their use as money. In their production the United States stands second, being surpassed in the output of gold by the Transvaal in Africa and in that of silver by Mexico. The production of these metals has always in the world’s history proceeded spasmodically, and a speculative spirit has usually been present. More recently, however, scientific geological knowledge and improved metallurgical methods are removing the industry of gold and silver mining from a gambling venture to a legitimate industry. The practical problem at present confronting American gold-mining companies is to reduce expenses, some of the principal bearings having for some years shown signs of exhaustion, as for instance in the Cripple Creek district of Colorado. There is always a chance however that new gold fields may be discovered to make good the exhaustion of the old. In the case of silver, on the other hand, the metal is found in [Pg 26] such abundance that the present rate of production seems almost indefinitely assured; a slight increase of the price or improvements in the art of extracting the metal will at any time bring enlarged supplies on the market. Africa, Australia, and the United States produce almost all the world’s supply of gold, Colorado being the leading state in the last-named country. Mexico and the United States together produce over two-thirds of the world’s silver, the leading rank in this country being held by Montana.

The precious metals have gotten a lot of attention, but the world's industrial progress relies more on the availability of more common metals than on these rare ones. Nonetheless, they are important in the arts and especially as currency. The United States ranks second in production, falling behind the Transvaal in Africa for gold output and Mexico for silver. Throughout history, the production of these metals has been inconsistent and often speculative. Recently, however, advancements in scientific geological knowledge and improved metallurgical methods are shifting gold and silver mining from a gamble to a legitimate industry. Right now, American gold-mining companies are focused on cutting costs, as some key areas have shown signs of depletion, like the Cripple Creek district in Colorado. However, there is always a possibility that new gold fields could be discovered to compensate for the depletion of the old ones. In contrast, silver is so abundant that its current production level seems almost guaranteed indefinitely; even a slight price increase or advancements in extraction methods can quickly boost the supply. Africa, Australia, and the United States account for nearly all the world’s gold supply, with Colorado being the leading state. Mexico and the United States together produce over two-thirds of the world’s silver, with Montana taking the lead in this country.

Among the other metals copper is by far the most important. In primitive civilizations, before the art of smelting iron had been discovered, copper was indispensable as it was so easily malleable; in Homeric times, for instance, armor, utensils, money, etc., were made of copper or alloys of copper (bronze and brass). After an eclipse of some centuries copper has again risen to the front rank by reason of its qualities as a conductor of electricity. The new use of electricity to transmit power and the development of electrical industries has greatly increased the demand for this metal and has caused a great expansion in its production. Here again the United States holds first rank, contributing over half of the world’s copper supply. As in the case of iron the northern peninsula of Michigan is the most important center of copper production, with Montana a close second and Arizona contributing most of the remainder. Like petroleum, copper production is controlled by a small number of operators, five mining companies alone furnishing one-half of the American supply. It is far from being monopolized, however, as petroleum is, for new and rich supplies lie just on the margin of profitable working and will always be brought into the market whenever the price is artificially raised. One reason for American pre-eminence, aside from the rich stores of the metal, lies in the progress made in the art of refining it by the electrolytic process, considerable foreign ore being brought here to be treated by this method.

Among other metals, copper is by far the most important. In early civilizations, before people discovered how to smelt iron, copper was essential because it was so easy to shape. For example, during the time of Homer, armor, utensils, money, and more were made from copper or copper alloys (like bronze and brass). After being less popular for several centuries, copper has come back into prominence due to its properties as an electrical conductor. The rise of electricity to transmit power and the growth of electrical industries have significantly boosted the demand for this metal and led to a major increase in its production. Once again, the United States ranks first, supplying over half of the world's copper. Similar to iron, Michigan's northern peninsula is the most important center for copper production, with Montana as a close second and Arizona contributing most of the rest. Like petroleum, copper production is controlled by a small number of companies, with just five mining companies providing half of the American supply. However, it is far from being monopolized like petroleum, as new and rich supplies exist right on the edge of profitable extraction and will always be brought to market whenever prices go up artificially. One reason for America's leading position, aside from its rich copper deposits, is the advancements made in refining it through the electrolytic process, with considerable foreign ore being brought here for treatment using this method.

[Pg 27] Nature has not blessed the United States so abundantly with the minor metals, lead, zinc, and aluminum, while almost all the tin used here has to be imported.

[Pg 27] Nature hasn’t gifted the United States generously with the minor metals like lead, zinc, and aluminum, while nearly all the tin used here has to be imported.

It is apparent from even this brief and hasty survey of the mineral resources of the United States, comprising those extractive industries which once exhausted can never be restored by man, that this country is wonderfully well equipped with the material means of civilization. Minerals and metals are remarkably abundant and accessible. The wonderful material progress of the United States during the nineteenth century is abundantly explained by this fact, though due credit must also be given to the enterprise, industry, and genius of those who developed these natural resources. The industrial supremacy of the American nation seems well assured, founded on such a stable material basis. We of this country have been rather inclined to boast of our industrial progress and our material bigness, whereas it must now be apparent that we owe much, if not most, to the bounty of nature. We should therefore see to it, in a proper spirit of humility and thoughtfulness, that we do not waste our heritage, but hand it on as nearly undiminished as possible to our children.

It's clear from this quick look at the mineral resources of the United States, which includes those industries that, once depleted, can't be restored by humans, that this country is incredibly well-equipped with the basic materials for civilization. Minerals and metals are very abundant and easy to access. The significant material progress of the United States in the nineteenth century can be largely explained by this fact, although we must also acknowledge the initiative, hard work, and creativity of those who developed these natural resources. The industrial dominance of the American nation seems well-established, based on such a solid material foundation. We in this country have often been proud of our industrial advancements and our material wealth, but it should now be clear that we owe a lot, if not most, to nature's generosity. Therefore, we should approach this with humility and thoughtfulness, ensuring that we do not waste our inheritance but pass it on to our children as intact as possible.

There is one other asset in our national wealth which has already contributed much to our progress, and is destined to play an even more important role in the future—and that is our water power. In colonial days, before the invention of the steam engine and the use of coal, this was of prime importance and determined the location of many a town, most of them being located at the “fall line” of the rivers, where water power was obtainable. With the invention of the steam engine and the use of steam as a motive power, industry became less dependent upon water power and moved away from the rivers to the vicinity of coal mines. Now again has come another swing of the pendulum, and with the rise of electricity as a motive power and the harnessing of our streams and waterfalls [Pg 28] for the creation of electrical energy, we are beginning to value more highly this source of power. Here again we find the United States wonderfully blessed as compared with other countries. “It is probable,” says Shaler, “that, measured in horse power or by manufactured products, the energy derived from the streams of this country is already more valuable than those of all other lands put together.” The total amount of direct water power used by manufacturing establishments in 1900 was 1,727,000 horsepower.

There’s another valuable resource in our national wealth that has already significantly contributed to our progress and is set to play an even bigger role in the future—and that’s our water power. Back in colonial times, before the invention of the steam engine and the use of coal, this resource was crucial and influenced where many towns were built, most of them situated at the “fall line” of rivers, where water power was available. With the advent of the steam engine and steam as a driving force, industries became less reliant on water power and shifted away from rivers to be closer to coal mines. Now, we’re witnessing another shift, as electricity has emerged as a primary power source and we are harnessing our streams and waterfalls for electrical energy; we are starting to appreciate this power source more. Once again, the United States is exceptionally blessed compared to other countries. “It is probable,” says Shaler, “that, measured in horsepower or by manufactured products, the energy derived from the streams of this country is already more valuable than those of all other lands combined.” The total amount of direct water power used by manufacturing facilities in 1900 was 1,727,000 horsepower.

Prior to 1890 the largest use of water power was in its direct application to machinery at the immediate point of development. Since that time, however, the use of electricity as an agency whereby the energy developed by falling water can be transformed and applied to the driving of machinery has entirely changed the conditions under which the power of our streams can be utilized. The practical possibility of transmitting electrical power over long distances—for example, over 200 miles from the Sierras to San Francisco—has removed the necessity of building factories immediately adjacent to water powers, but permits its utilization where most convenient and often where the lack of coal has made the use of steam power impracticable. The best-known example of the development and transmission of electrical energy for industrial purposes is the case of Niagara Falls, but more striking illustrations may be found on the Pacific coast, while the existence of enormous opportunities on the Atlantic seaboard give brilliant promise for the future of manufacturing in this region. So valuable indeed are these sources of power now seen to be that there is danger that their control may be monopolized by a few shrewd and far-sighted individuals before the general public awakes to a realization of their importance. It has recently been asserted in a reputable magazine that there is a “water power trust” already organized for this purpose. The opportunities for wealth-getting have hitherto been so great in this country, and the [Pg 29] great task of the American people has thus far been so exclusively the task of developing its wonderful natural resources, that we have grown careless of our common rights and have permitted the monopolization by private individuals of a number of limited resources of this character. One of the great practical problems of the future is that of securing the growing value of these natural monopolies to the whole people, without at the same time retarding the energy and industrial development of the American people.

Before 1890, the primary use of water power was in directly powering machinery at the site of development. However, since then, the introduction of electricity has transformed how we can harness the energy generated by falling water to run machines. The ability to transmit electrical power over long distances—like over 200 miles from the Sierras to San Francisco—has eliminated the need to build factories near water sources. This allows for electricity to be used where it's most convenient, especially in areas where coal availability makes steam power impractical. The best-known example of using and transmitting electrical energy for industrial purposes is Niagara Falls, but there are even more impressive examples on the Pacific coast. Additionally, the vast potential on the Atlantic coast holds great promise for the future of manufacturing in that area. These power sources are so valuable that there's a risk they could be controlled by a few clever and forward-thinking individuals before the general public fully understands their significance. A reputable magazine recently claimed that there is already a “water power trust” formed for this reason. The chances to acquire wealth in this country have been so substantial, and the American people's main focus has been on exploiting its incredible natural resources, that we’ve become neglectful of our collective rights and allowed private individuals to monopolize several limited resources of this type. One of the significant challenges ahead is ensuring that the increasing value of these natural monopolies benefits everyone while also not hindering the energy and industrial progress of the American populace.

IV. CAPITALISTIC PRODUCTION.

Modern production is usually called capitalistic because it involves in its processes the use of a large amount of capital. In a primitive stage of culture man appropriated directly from nature’s bounty the food and shelter which he required. But today man has adopted long and roundabout methods of producing goods, involving numerous steps between his first efforts and the turning out of the finished articles. He invents tools and machinery to assist him in his work, and while he multiplies the processes of production he also enormously increases the results. Capital has become absolutely indispensable in modern production and is yearly playing a more important role. At the same time various problems, born of the new conditions, have arisen, such as the growth of large-scale production, the elimination of the small producer and the independent artisan, the growth of trusts, the rhythmic recurrence of speculative periods and industrial crises, the relations of labor and capital, and others similar in character.

Modern production is often referred to as capitalistic because it relies heavily on a large amount of capital in its processes. In earlier stages of culture, humans directly gathered food and shelter from nature. Today, however, people have adopted complex and indirect methods to produce goods, involving many steps from initial efforts to the creation of finished products. They invent tools and machinery to help with their work, and as they expand the production processes, they also significantly increase the outcomes. Capital has become absolutely essential in modern production and is playing an increasingly important role each year. At the same time, various issues have emerged from these new conditions, such as the rise of large-scale production, the decline of small producers and independent artisans, the growth of monopolies, the regular swings of speculative booms and industrial crises, the relationship between labor and capital, and other similar concerns.

The most striking phenomenon of the nineteenth century was the great industrial progress of the more developed nations; this is best shown in a table taken from Mulhall’s “Industries and Wealth of Nations,” which follows:

The most remarkable event of the nineteenth century was the significant industrial advancement of the more developed nations; this is best illustrated in a table extracted from Mulhall’s “Industries and Wealth of Nations,” which is as follows:

[Pg 30] Growth of Manufactures in the Nineteenth Century.

[Pg 30] Growth of Manufacturing in the 19th Century.

Countries Millions of Dollars.
1820 1840 1860 1894
United Kingdom
1,411
1,883
2,808
4,263
France
1,168
1,606
2,092
2,900
Germany
900
1,484
1,995
3,357
Austria
511
852
1,129
1,596
Other States
1,654
2,516
3,455
5,236
Europe
5,644
8,341
11,479
17,352
United States
268
467
1,907
9,498
 Total
5,912
8,808
13,386
26,850

Extraordinary as has been this universal growth, the development of manufactures in the United States has been still more marvelous, both absolutely and in relation to other branches of industry Between 1850 and 1900 the population and the products of agriculture both trebled; but the value of manufactured products increased twelvefold and that of capital invested in manufactures nineteenfold The United States, though politically younger than the countries of Europe, is industrially one of the most advanced The application of labor-saving machinery and of improved and economical methods of production and distribution has probably proceeded further here than in any other place Nowhere can we study to better advantage, therefore, than in America the problems that have grown out of this advanced capitalism

As remarkable as this global growth has been, the expansion of manufacturing in the United States has been even more astonishing, both in absolute terms and in comparison to other industries. Between 1850 and 1900, the population and agricultural products both tripled; however, the value of manufactured goods increased twelve times, and the capital invested in manufacturing rose nineteen times. The United States, while politically younger than the countries of Europe, is industrially one of the most advanced. The use of labor-saving machinery and improved, efficient methods of production and distribution has likely progressed further here than anywhere else. Therefore, there’s no better place than America to examine the challenges that have arisen from this advanced capitalism.

The causes of this rapid industrial development are enumerated by the census report as five in number: the agricultural resources of the country, the mineral resources, the highly developed transportation facilities, the freedom of trade between states and territories, and the absence of inherited and over-conservative ideas We have already considered the wonderful agricultural and mineral resources of the country, and have seen how greatly the American people are indebted for their industrial prosperity [Pg 31] to the bounty of nature. The magnificent system of inland waterways, comprising over 18,000 miles of navigable rivers, and the railroad system, with over 200,000 miles of track, facilitate a rapid and cheap exchange of products. The enormous domestic market afforded the American manufacturer, larger in consuming capacity than that in any other country in the world, has permitted the economic production of goods on a large scale and a consequent reduction in cost. Foreigners have often asked the question why, if freedom from tariffs and trade restraints has been a good thing within the United States, freedom of trade with other countries would not prove equally advantageous. In answer to this, James G. Blaine, formerly Secretary of State, wrote, “It is the enjoyment of free trade and protection at the same time which has contributed to the unexampled development and marvelous prosperity of the United States.” Finally, the absence of tradition and of over-conservative ideas handed down from a former and more primitive system of industry has been a great boon. There have been developed traits of energy, inventiveness, and ingenuity, which, aided by a universal system of compulsory free education, have contributed greatly to the material progress of the people.

The reasons for this rapid industrial growth are listed in the census report as five: the country's agricultural resources, mineral resources, advanced transportation systems, free trade between states and territories, and the lack of inherited and overly conservative ideas. We have already looked at the impressive agricultural and mineral resources of the country and seen how much the American people owe their industrial success to nature’s abundance. The vast system of inland waterways, which includes over 18,000 miles of navigable rivers, and the railroad network, boasting over 200,000 miles of track, enable a quick and inexpensive exchange of products. The massive domestic market available to American manufacturers, larger in consuming capacity than any other country in the world, has allowed for the large-scale economic production of goods and a subsequent drop in costs. Foreigners often wonder why, if free trade and a lack of tariffs are beneficial within the United States, then free trade with other countries wouldn’t be equally beneficial. In response, James G. Blaine, a former Secretary of State, stated, “It is the enjoyment of free trade and protection at the same time which has contributed to the unexampled development and marvelous prosperity of the United States.” Finally, the lack of tradition and outdated ideas inherited from an older, more primitive industrial system has been a significant advantage. Traits of energy, inventiveness, and creativity have emerged, which, supported by a universal system of compulsory free education, have greatly contributed to the people’s material progress.

The system under which the production of wealth in a modern industrial nation is carried on is usually called the factory system, and to this we must now turn, for it is in the factory that the utilization of machinery and capital finds its greatest development. The term is not easily defined, but we may adopt the description given by the late Carroll D. Wright: “A factory is an establishment where several workmen are collected for the purpose of obtaining greater and cheaper conveniences of labor than they could procure in their own homes, for producing results by their combined efforts which they could not accomplish separately, and for preventing the loss occasioned by carrying articles from place to place during [Pg 32] the several necessary processes to complete their manufacture.” The essential elements in such a system are the minute division of labor, the large use of labor-saving machinery, the increasing specialization and localization of industry, and the concentration of production in fewer and larger establishments with consequent increase of product and reduction of cost.

The system used for producing wealth in a modern industrial country is usually referred to as the factory system, and we need to focus on this now, as it's in the factory where the use of machinery and capital is most advanced. The term isn't easy to define, but we can use the description by the late Carroll D. Wright: “A factory is a place where several workers come together to get greater and cheaper conveniences of labor than they would get at home, to achieve results through their combined efforts that they couldn't do alone, and to avoid the losses that happen when moving items from one place to another during the necessary processes to finish their production.” The key features of such a system include the detailed division of labor, the extensive use of labor-saving machinery, the growing specialization and localization of industries, and the concentration of production in fewer and larger facilities, which leads to an increase in output and a decrease in costs.

The division of labor may mean either the separation of occupation or the division of a process into minute parts. An illustration of separation of occupations may be found in the manufacture of a carriage: one factory produces hubs, another wheels, a third axles, a fourth the body, a fifth manufactures upholstery, a sixth the hardware, and a seventh (the carriage factory, so-called) assembles the parts and places the completed product on the market in the form of a carriage.

The division of labor can refer to either the separation of jobs or breaking down a process into smaller parts. An example of job separation can be seen in carriage manufacturing: one factory makes hubs, another makes wheels, a third produces axles, a fourth creates the body, a fifth fabricates upholstery, a sixth supplies the hardware, and a seventh (the carriage factory) puts all the parts together and sells the finished product as a carriage.

As an example of an extreme division of labor the slaughtering and meat-packing industry offers a classical example, though in this case the use of complex machinery is not involved. “It would be difficult,” writes Professor Commons,[2] “to find another industry where division of labor has been so ingeniously and microscopically worked out. The animal has been surveyed and laid off like a map; and the men have been classified in over thirty specialties and twenty rates of pay, from 16 cents to 50 cents an hour. The 50-cent man is restricted to using the knife on the most delicate parts of the hide (floorman) or to using the axe in splitting the backbone (splitter) and, wherever a less skilled man can be slipped in at 18 cents, 18½ cents, 20 cents, 21 cents, 22½ cents, 24 cents, 25 cents, and so on, a place is made for him, and an occupation mapped out. In working on the hide alone there are nine positions, at eight different rates of pay. A 20-cent man pulls off the tail, a 22½-cent man pounds off another part where the hide separates readily, and the knife of the 40-cent [Pg 33] man cuts a different texture and has a different ‘feel’ from that of the 50-cent man. Skill has become specialized to fit the anatomy.”

As a prime example of extreme division of labor, the slaughtering and meat-packing industry serves as a classic case, even though it doesn’t involve complex machinery. “It would be hard,” writes Professor Commons,[2] “to find another industry where division of labor has been so cleverly and meticulously organized. The animal is dissected and mapped out; the workers are classified into over thirty specialties with twenty different pay rates, ranging from 16 cents to 50 cents an hour. The 50-cent worker is limited to using the knife on the most delicate parts of the hide (floorman) or wielding the axe to split the backbone (splitter). Whenever a less skilled worker can be employed for 18 cents, 18½ cents, 20 cents, 21 cents, 22½ cents, 24 cents, 25 cents, and so on, a position is created for him, with a specific task assigned. In the process of working on the hide alone, there are nine different roles at eight varying pay rates. A 20-cent worker pulls off the tail, a 22½-cent worker pounds off another section where the hide separates easily, and the knife of the 40-cent worker cuts a different texture and has a different ‘feel’ compared to that of the 50-cent worker. Skill has been specialized to fit the anatomy.”

Usually, however, when the division of labor becomes as minute as that described, the routine-like process is handed over to a machine. Indeed Mr. John A. Hobson states as a law of machine industry the fact that as soon as a process becomes perfectly automatic and mechanical a machine is invented which can do the work better and more rapidly than human hands. Hand in hand, therefore, with the subdivision of labor goes the extension of labor-saving machinery. Labor becomes relatively of less importance than capital in the new methods of production, and man becomes a machine tender rather than an independent producer. There are practical benefits and disadvantages connected with this system. Many writers insist that the effect on the worker is narrowing in the extreme, but Professor Marshall points out that his labor as tender of a machine demands a higher order of intellectual development than that of a handicraftsman, and that he has more leisure, while the product of the present system is immeasurably greater than under the old hand methods. The manufacture of products by machinery has in turn required the making of machines by machinery, as the complex machines of today could not be turned out by hand methods. A characteristic feature of the modern factory system therefore has been the growth of the machine trades, which supply the equipment of the new industry.

Usually, when the division of labor gets as detailed as described, the routine-like process is taken over by a machine. In fact, Mr. John A. Hobson points out that it’s a rule of machine industry that as soon as a process becomes fully automatic and mechanical, a machine is created that can perform the work better and faster than human hands. Therefore, along with the subdivision of labor comes the increase of labor-saving machinery. Labor becomes relatively less important than capital in the new methods of production, and people become machine operators rather than independent producers. There are practical advantages and disadvantages connected with this system. Many writers argue that the effect on workers is extremely limiting, but Professor Marshall notes that their work as machine operators requires a higher level of intellectual skill than that of a craftsman and that they have more free time, while the output of the current system is vastly greater than under the old manual methods. The production of goods using machines has, in turn, led to the creation of machines by machines since today's complex machines could not be produced by manual methods. A defining characteristic of the modern factory system has been the growth of machine trades, which provide the equipment for the new industry.

With the growing specialization of industry there has gone on an increasing localization in some favored spot or locality. Thus most of the collars and cuffs (85 per cent) manufactured in the United States are made in Troy, N. Y.; 64 per cent of the oyster canning is carried on in Baltimore; 54 per cent of the gloves are made in Gloversville, N. Y.; 48 per cent of the coke in Connellsville, Pa.; 48 per [Pg 34] cent of the brassware in Waterbury, Conn.; and 46 per cent of the carpets in Philadelphia. While there are undoubted advantages in such localization and specialization in a particular industry, such as reputation, growth of special skill, etc., there are also offsetting disadvantages, as the complete prostration of the whole community if the particular trade upon which it depends is disastrously affected by trade depression or by a shifting of the industry to some other locality.

As industries have become more specialized, there's been a trend of increasing localization in certain areas. For example, about 85% of the collars and cuffs made in the United States are produced in Troy, N.Y.; 64% of oyster canning happens in Baltimore; 54% of gloves are manufactured in Gloversville, N.Y.; 48% of coke is produced in Connellsville, Pa.; 48% of brassware comes from Waterbury, Conn.; and 46% of carpets are made in Philadelphia. While this localization and specialization can bring benefits like reputation and the growth of specialized skills, there are also significant drawbacks. For instance, a community can be completely devastated if the industry it relies on faces a serious downturn or if the industry moves to another location.

More striking than the concentration of manufactures in particular places has been its concentration in a few large establishments and under the control of fewer individuals. Without entering into the discussion, as yet, of the trust problem, we may at this time take up the earlier and important tendency of industry to be conducted on a large scale. This concentration into a relatively smaller number of establishments has been going on pretty steadily since 1850 and shows no signs of abatement at this time. In the case of the iron and steel industries, cotton manufactures, and leather goods, the movement is positively startling, an actual decrease in the number of establishments having occurred in the half century. This is most marked in the monopolized industries. At the same time there has gone on an enormous increase in the size of the individual plant, in the capital employed, the number of men employed, and the value of the product. Almost the only industries which have not yet displayed this tendency are those which are essentially local in their nature, as grist mills, cheese and butter factories, etc. But in general it is characteristic of manufactures in the United States. The same tendency has been manifest in the countries of Europe, though there a system of well-developed and fairly vigorous hand trades has resisted the movement and made the development in this respect much less rapid than in this country.

More noticeable than the concentration of manufacturing in specific locations is the concentration in a few large companies and under the control of fewer individuals. Without diving into the trust issue just yet, we can acknowledge the earlier and significant trend of industries moving towards large-scale operations. This shift towards fewer establishments has been happening steadily since 1850 and shows no signs of slowing down. In sectors like iron and steel, cotton manufacturing, and leather goods, the drop in the number of establishments over the last fifty years is truly surprising. This trend is particularly evident in monopolized industries. Meanwhile, there has been a massive increase in the size of individual facilities, the capital invested, the number of employees, and the value of the products. Almost the only industries that haven't shown this trend are those that are primarily local, like grist mills, cheese, and butter factories. Overall, this pattern is typical of manufacturing in the United States. A similar trend has been observed in European countries, although there, a well-established and fairly strong system of craft trades has slowed down the movement, making the development in this area much less rapid than in the U.S.

[Pg 35] Large-scale production is more profitable than production on a small scale in all industries which are subject to increasing returns. By this is meant that the return in product for each additional dollar’s worth of labor and capital employed grows greater the larger the scale on which the enterprise is conducted. When this is true the big enterprise will be able to undersell the little enterprises and eventually to drive them out of business. This is true not only in the competitive industries, but also in those which enjoy a legal or a natural monopoly, as street railways, gas and water plants, etc., all of which show an irresistible tendency to consolidation. Before drawing any conclusions as to the desirability of such a movement, let us examine some of the economies of large-scale production. The most striking and the most important is the economy in fixed capital. Concentration is a result of machine production. As machinery becomes more expensive, the breaking up of the processes of manufacture into small parts requires more complex and detailed machinery; a larger outlay is requisite for an up-to-date plant. Thus the average amount of capital invested in each iron and steel establishment in the United States increased from $47,000 in 1850 to $858,000 in 1900. The head of a steel company in Pittsburg recently testified before the Industrial Commission that to build and equip a plant for the manufacture of iron and steel under modern conditions would call for an investment of from $20,000,000 to $30,000,000. It is clear that under such conditions of expensive machine methods a small plant would have little chance of existence. Steam railways afford another good illustration of an industry in which enormous economies are effected by the concentration of a number of small, independent lines under one unified control. Every machine is utilized to the utmost; there is no needless duplication of machinery such as would occur if several small plants divided up the business, while expensive machines to [Pg 36] carry on relatively small processes can be profitably installed.

[Pg 35] Large-scale production is more profitable than small-scale production in all industries that experience increasing returns. This means that the output gained from each additional dollar spent on labor and capital grows larger as the scale of the operation increases. When this is the case, larger enterprises can sell their products for less than smaller ones, eventually pushing them out of business. This applies not just to competitive industries, but also to those with a legal or natural monopoly, like street railways and utility companies, all of which tend to consolidate. Before making any judgments about whether this movement is desirable, let's look at some of the benefits of large-scale production. The most significant and notable benefit is the savings in fixed capital. Concentration arises from machine-based production. As machinery gets pricier, breaking down manufacturing processes into smaller parts requires more complex and detailed equipment; thus, a bigger investment is needed for a modern facility. For example, the average capital invested in each iron and steel facility in the United States rose from $47,000 in 1850 to $858,000 in 1900. Recently, a steel company executive in Pittsburgh testified before the Industrial Commission that setting up a modern facility for iron and steel production would require an investment of between $20,000,000 and $30,000,000. It's evident that in such expensive machine operations, a small facility would struggle to survive. Steam railways provide another good example of an industry where huge cost savings are realized by merging numerous small, independent lines under a single management. Every machine is used to its fullest; there's no unnecessary duplication of machinery that would occur if several small plants split the work, while costly machines to handle relatively small operations can be economically implemented. [Pg 36]

But other economies than those in the use of capital are present in large-scale production. A large concern can hire more expensive and better managers, can afford to experiment with new methods, can effect a more minute and economical division of labor, as for example in the slaughtering business above referred to. A striking economy can also be effected in the utilization of what were formerly waste products, and still are in small concerns. This has been carried furthest in the oil-refining and meat-packing industries; a recent statement of Swift and Co., for instance, alleged that the dividends on the stock were paid out of the by-products, such as neatsfoot oil, land fertilizer, glue, fats, etc. Owing, however, to the generally wasteful methods prevailing in the United States not so much attention has been given to this point as in England and Germany. A final economy may be mentioned that can be secured by a large business, namely, carrying on allied or subsidiary processes. Thus the Standard Oil Company builds its own pipe lines, makes its own barrels, tin cans, pumps, tanks, sulphuric acid, etc.

But other economies besides those related to capital exist in large-scale production. A big company can hire more experienced and skilled managers, can afford to try out new methods, and can implement a more detailed and efficient division of labor, like in the slaughtering industry mentioned earlier. Significant savings can also be achieved by using what were once considered waste products, which smaller companies still overlook. This has been taken the furthest in the oil-refining and meat-packing sectors; for example, a recent statement from Swift and Co. claimed that dividends on their stock were funded by by-products like neatsfoot oil, animal fertilizer, glue, fats, and more. However, due to generally wasteful practices in the United States, this issue hasn’t received as much attention as it has in England and Germany. Another way a large business can save is by carrying out related or subsidiary processes. For instance, the Standard Oil Company builds its own pipelines, makes its own barrels, tin cans, pumps, tanks, sulfuric acid, and so on.

Such an extension in the size of the single establishment would of course not have been possible if improvements in the arts of communication and transportation had not at the same time immensely widened the market. As long as the market was local, and a factory could afford to send its goods over only a limited territory there was of course a fixed limit to the expansion of that industry. Now, however, when markets are often world-wide and the demand for goods has so enormously increased, while the modern railway and steamship can transport goods cheaply and quickly half around the globe, enterprises can be expanded and carried on on a scale commensurate with the expanded market and improved methods. It is clear then that the tendency to production on a [Pg 37] large scale is the logical result of machine methods, that it secures great economies, and that in industries of increasing returns it is absolutely inevitable.

Such an increase in the size of a single operation would not have been possible without significant advancements in communication and transportation that have greatly expanded the market. As long as the market was local and a factory could only sell its products within a limited area, there was naturally a cap on the growth of that industry. Now, however, with markets often being global and the demand for products skyrocketing, and with modern railways and steamships able to transport goods quickly and affordably across vast distances, businesses can scale up in line with the larger market and improved techniques. It's clear that the shift towards large-scale production is a natural outcome of machine methods, it brings significant cost savings, and in industries with increasing returns, it is entirely unavoidable. [Pg 37]

But not only in manufacturing is this movement observable. More recently concentration in large establishments has revolutionized the retail trade. Department stores have supplanted the small shops because they can buy on better terms, get transportation cheaper, offer a greater variety to the customer at a lower price, and save time and trouble to the customer. The growing ease of communication with central shopping districts, the rapid changes in fashion with the consequent large variety which only a large establishment could afford to carry—all these factors have helped along the movement. There are limits to such a movement, for small tradesmen will always hold the repairing trades, and the sale of perishable goods; thus there are no businesses so scattered as the small stores of the “butchers and grocers.” But on the whole we may safely conclude that the small storekeeper is doomed now just as the small manufacturer was two or three decades ago. In the carrying trade country carriers and a few cabmen in the cities are the only survivals of the small independent business; the steam railroad and the electric railway have driven the small carrier out of business. In agriculture alone, where concentration is strictly limited by the necessity for intensive cultivation, and in professional and personal service, where the very nature of the business prevents it, is there little or no development in the direction of large-scale methods.

But this movement isn’t just happening in manufacturing. Recently, the rise of large retail establishments has completely changed the retail trade. Department stores have replaced small shops because they can negotiate better deals, get cheaper transportation, provide a wider selection to customers at lower prices, and save customers time and hassle. The easier communication with central shopping districts and the fast changes in fashion—which only large stores can afford to keep up with—have all contributed to this trend. However, there are limits to this movement, as small businesses will always dominate in repair trades and the sale of perishable goods; for instance, the small stores run by butchers and grocers are still very scattered. Overall, we can confidently say that small store owners are facing a similar fate to that of small manufacturers two or three decades ago. In the transportation sector, only a few local carriers and some cab drivers in cities remain as small independent businesses; steam railroads and electric railways have pushed out the small carriers. In agriculture, where large-scale operations are limited by the need for intensive cultivation, and in professional and personal services, where the nature of the business prevents it, there’s little to no movement toward large-scale methods.

The industrial and social effects of this development have been marked in all countries. In the United States the main attention has been given to the organization and development of machinery, and a wonderful industrial advance has followed the movement. The economic readjustments have consequently been made with comparative ease, and the labor set free by the invention of new machines [Pg 38] has been reabsorbed in the same or other industries. Consequently the social effects have not been so marked as to call for special emphasis; as the same question presents itself, however, in connection with the more recent trust movement we may profitably defer its discussion to the next section.

The industrial and social effects of this development have been significant in every country. In the United States, the focus has been on organizing and developing machinery, leading to a remarkable industrial advancement. Economic adjustments have been made relatively smoothly, and the labor freed up by the invention of new machines [Pg 38] has been taken back in the same or different industries. As a result, the social effects haven’t been so pronounced that they require special attention; however, since similar issues arise in relation to the more recent trust movement, we can defer that discussion to the next section.

There is one other characteristic feature of modern capitalistic machine industry which deserves special mention, especially as its development has been carried furthest in the United States. Reference is made to the system of standardization and of interchangeable parts. In no single feature is the contrast between modern machine methods and those of the old hand trades greater. By standardization is meant the production of so-called “standard products” according to some acceptable size, form, or shape. In the manufacture of screws or iron beams, or even ready-made clothing, for example, certain dimensions and sizes which are best adapted for general use, are selected as standard sizes and these are then turned out in large quantities by automatic machinery. The advantages of such a system, in cheapness, quickness of delivery, ability to replace a single broken part, etc., are numerous and manifest. “The possibilities of standardization are strikingly shown in a recent international incident. The Egyptian Government desired a bridge for the Atbara at the earliest possible moment; inquiry was made of the English bridgemakers, but no promise of prompt delivery could be secured. Within twenty-seven days after the tender of the contract was made to an American firm the bridge was ready for shipment. The feat, not a remarkable one, was due to the standardization of bridge material. This in itself was a guarantee of quick delivery and construction.”[3]

There is one other important feature of modern capitalistic machine industry that deserves special mention, especially since it has developed the most in the United States. This refers to the system of standardization and interchangeable parts. The difference between modern machine methods and those of traditional hand trades is most evident in this aspect. Standardization means producing so-called "standard products" according to certain accepted sizes, forms, or shapes. For instance, when manufacturing screws or iron beams, or even ready-made clothing, specific dimensions and sizes that are best suited for general use are chosen as standard sizes, and these are then produced in large quantities using automatic machinery. The benefits of this system, such as cost-effectiveness, quick delivery, and the ability to replace a single broken part, are numerous and clear. “The possibilities of standardization are strikingly shown in a recent international incident. The Egyptian Government wanted a bridge for the Atbara as quickly as possible; they reached out to English bridge manufacturers, but no promise of fast delivery could be secured. Within twenty-seven days after the contract was awarded to an American firm, the bridge was ready for shipment. This impressive achievement was made possible by the standardization of bridge materials. This alone ensured quick delivery and construction.”[3]

Standardization was followed by the system of interchangeable parts, according to which each part of an intricate [Pg 39] machine or product is made exactly like the same part in every other machine. The parts can thus be turned out in large quantities and “assembled” at a single operation. From the standpoint of the consumer or user of the machines thus made, the great merit of the system lies in the fact that he can quickly and at small expense duplicate any broken part. It is today applied to almost every product of large consumption, from agricultural implements and steam engines to watches and nails. By producing machinery on this plan it has been possible for American manufacturers to extend their trade very materially in foreign lands. It was recently reported in the newspapers that Mr. E. H. Harriman had expended $65,000,000 in standardizing the equipment on his railroad systems; while this sum is enormous, it will undoubtedly be justified by the increased economy of repairs and operation.

Standardization led to the system of interchangeable parts, where each component of a complex [Pg 39] machine or product is made exactly the same as the corresponding part in every other machine. This allows for large quantities to be produced and then “assembled” in one go. For consumers or users of these machines, the main benefit of this system is that they can quickly and cheaply replace any broken part. Today, it is applied to almost every widely used product, from farming tools and steam engines to watches and nails. By manufacturing machinery in this way, American companies have been able to significantly grow their business abroad. Recently, newspapers reported that Mr. E. H. Harriman spent $65,000,000 to standardize the equipment for his railroad systems; although this amount is huge, it will likely be offset by the savings in repairs and operations.

V. TRUSTS AND MONOPOLIES.

We have already seen how production upon a large scale has superseded production upon a small scale in most important branches of manufactures. We have now to inquire whether production upon a large scale is in turn to be supplanted by single consolidated enterprises, by those combinations of capital known as trusts. Under one of these three conditions industry must be carried on; few people wish to revert to the stage when production was carried on in small establishments, but warm controversy and difference of opinion still exist as to whether centralized management by a single company or combination offers superior advantages to production by independent competing establishments. The concentration of production in a few large establishments has been followed by the consolidation of these larger units into a single whole. Since the days of Adam Smith capital has tended to combine for the purpose of fixing prices, and [Pg 40] these combinations have passed through several phases. The earliest form is the agreement of independent concerns to fix prices, as was done by the American railroads in their early traffic agreements. The next step was to divide the field, as has been done by the French railways and the American express companies. A third phase of combination was the pool, which attempted to regulate the output rather than to fix the price or divide the field. Railway, whisky, beam, and other pools were organized for this purpose, but all broke down because of the difficulty of enforcing the agreement and the temptations to each member to break it secretly for the sake of the large profits obtainable. By this time it had become clear that if a real permanent consolidation of interests was to be secured by the competing enterprises some closer form of combination must be devised which could not be broken at will by any member. An industrial union and not a loose confederation must be attained. Accordingly the next step was taken in 1882 by the formation of the Standard Oil Trust, so called because the constituent concerns handed over their business to the complete control of a central board of trustees, receiving in return trust certificates which entitled them to dividends. Similar “trusts” were formed in the whisky, sugar, and other industries, but were speedily declared illegal by the federal Supreme Court. By this decision the form of combination was changed, but the movement was not at all checked. The next phase and the last was the establishment of holding corporations, which are organized to buy up and hold the stock of a number of individual corporations, which still retain their corporate existence. In this way unity of control is secured, to which is added a certain flexibility; but it is really the trust under another legal form. Where pooling and combination by means of holding companies have been forbidden by law, as in the case of railroad companies, actual consolidation has often taken place, [Pg 41] though when trusts are spoken of the other form of combination is more often meant. From the point of view of business organization the holding company is simply an extension of the principle of the corporation, and to a consideration of this we must therefore turn.

We’ve already looked at how large-scale production has taken over small-scale production in most key manufacturing sectors. Now, we need to explore whether large-scale production will be replaced by single, consolidated entities known as trusts. Industry must operate under one of these three conditions; few people want to go back to when production happened in small businesses, but there’s still a heated debate and differing opinions about whether centralized management by one company or group is more beneficial than production by independent competing businesses. The trend of concentrating production in a few major establishments has led to the merging of these larger units into one cohesive entity. Since Adam Smith's time, capital has moved towards combining efforts to set prices, and these combinations have gone through several stages. The first form was the agreement between independent companies to fix prices, as seen with the American railroads in their early traffic agreements. The next stage was dividing the market, as done by French railways and American express companies. A third stage involved pools, which aimed to manage output rather than set prices or divide markets. Pools for railways, whiskey, beams, and others were created for this purpose, but they all failed due to difficulties in enforcing agreements and the temptation for participants to secretly break them for higher profits. By then, it became evident that for a true and lasting consolidation of interests among competing businesses, a more solid form of combination was necessary—one that couldn't be easily broken by any individual member. It needed to be an industrial union rather than a loose alliance. So, the next major step was taken in 1882 with the creation of the Standard Oil Trust, named for the fact that the participating companies handed over their operations to a central board of trustees, receiving trust certificates in return that entitled them to dividends. Similar "trusts" formed in whiskey, sugar, and other industries, but these were quickly deemed illegal by the federal Supreme Court. This ruling changed the form of combination, but it didn’t stop the movement. The next and final phase was the establishment of holding companies, which are set up to purchase and hold stock in multiple individual corporations, which still exist as separate entities. This way, control is unified while maintaining some flexibility; however, it’s essentially the trust under a different legal structure. Where pooling and combinations through holding companies have been prohibited by law, as with railroad companies, actual consolidation has often happened, although when trusts are mentioned, the other form of combination is usually implied. From a business organization standpoint, the holding company is simply an extension of the corporate principle, and we need to consider this next.

There are three classes of establishments by which industry is carried on—those that are the property of an individual, those which belong to partnerships or firms of unlimited liability, and those belonging to corporations of limited liability. The usefulness of the individual system is of course limited to small undertakings, where but little capital and credit are necessary; this form of organization still dominates the field in agriculture, in the small retail trade, and in the repairing industries. The partnership is a joint undertaking by two or more individuals, and makes larger enterprises possible, but as each individual is liable for all obligations of the firm or his partners his personal liability is greatly increased. While it is well adapted to certain undertakings, as moderate mercantile establishments and professional firms, owing to a certain elasticity in the contractual relations of its members, it is not suited to large industrial ventures, both because of the excessive personal liability, and because of the necessity of dissolving the partnership upon the death, withdrawal, or insolvency of any member. The advantage of the corporation lies in the fact that it has a continuous existence, and that the liability of the shareholders is limited to the amount of capital actually contributed by each; it is well adapted to modern enterprise because it permits the summation of large amounts of capital from a number of small savers and centralizes the use of this capital in the most economical manner. There may thus be concentration of management without concentration of ownership. The federal census of manufactures in 1905 showed that, although less than one-quarter of the manufacturing establishments were organized as corporations, yet they produced [Pg 42] three-quarters of the total manufactures in money value. In the field of transportation, corporations are in almost exclusive control, most banks and insurance companies are organized under this form, while mercantile and industrial undertakings are being more and more generally organized as corporations. Not merely are most of our business enterprises being conducted under corporate form and organization, but most recently, as has been already pointed out, there has been a movement to combine individual corporations into larger concerns, or trusts. The trust is usually thought of as a monopoly and, while not necessarily so, it usually does exercise monopoly control; but for the present we shall consider the trust problem from the standpoint of business organization, deferring to the end of the section the discussion of monopoly.

There are three types of businesses through which industry operates—those owned by individuals, those owned by partnerships or firms with unlimited liability, and those owned by corporations with limited liability. The individual system is obviously limited to small operations, where only a little capital and credit are needed; this structure still leads in agriculture, small retail, and repair industries. A partnership is a joint venture between two or more people, allowing for larger projects, but since each person is responsible for all the firm's debts and obligations, their personal risk increases significantly. While it's suited for certain medium-scale businesses and professional firms due to its flexibility in member contracts, it's not ideal for large industrial ventures because of excessive personal liability and the need to dissolve the partnership upon the death, withdrawal, or insolvency of any member. The strength of a corporation lies in its continuous existence and the fact that shareholders are only liable for the amount they invested; it's well-suited for modern businesses because it allows for pooling large amounts of capital from many small investors and uses that capital in the most efficient way. This allows for centralized management without centralized ownership. The federal census of manufacturers in 1905 revealed that, although fewer than a quarter of manufacturing businesses were organized as corporations, they produced three-quarters of the total manufacturing output by monetary value. In transportation, corporations almost exclusively manage operations, most banks and insurance companies are structured this way, and more mercantile and industrial enterprises are being set up as corporations. Not only are most business ventures being run under corporate structures, but there’s also been a recent trend to merge individual corporations into larger entities or trusts. The trust is often seen as a monopoly and, while it doesn't have to be one, it typically maintains monopolistic control. However, for now, we'll examine the trust issue from a business organization perspective, postponing the discussion of monopoly until the end of the section.

The trust movement may be said to have begun with the formation of the Standard Oil Trust in 1882, but down to 1898 its progress was slow. Beginning with the revival of prosperity in 1898, however, there ensued a veritable stampede of business managers to enter into combinations. During the next three years 149 large combinations, with a capital of over $3,000,000,000, were formed. The movement spent most of its force by 1902, though it is by no means at an end yet, as the recent floating of the Dry Goods Trust indicates. A few figures from reliable authorities will make clear the extent of the movement. According to the New York Journal of Commerce, industrial (i.e., manufacturing and commercial) and gas trusts were organized in the United States between 1860 and 1900, not including combinations in banking, shipping, railroads, etc., as shown in the accompanying table.

The trust movement is said to have started with the creation of the Standard Oil Trust in 1882, but progress was slow until 1898. After the economic upswing in 1898, there was a rush of business leaders eager to form combinations. In the following three years, 149 large combinations with a capital of over $3 billion were established. The movement had largely spent its energy by 1902, but it isn’t completely over, as shown by the recent launch of the Dry Goods Trust. Some figures from trustworthy sources will clarify the scale of the movement. According to the New York Journal of Commerce, industrial (meaning manufacturing and commercial) and gas trusts were set up in the United States between 1860 and 1900, excluding combinations in banking, shipping, railroads, etc., as displayed in the accompanying table.

Another more recent list by John Moody[4] gives the number of “industrial” trusts organized down to Jan. 1, 1904, as 318; these have acquired or control 5,288 plants, [Pg 43] and have a total nominal capital of $7,246,342,533. A movement so general and widespread, and of such gigantic proportions, must have had some powerful and intelligible causes behind. For it was not confined to the United States, but was equally observable in such industrial diverse countries as England, France, Germany, Russia, and other European nations.

Another more recent list by John Moody[4] reports that there were 318 “industrial” trusts organized as of Jan. 1, 1904; these have acquired or control 5,288 plants, [Pg 43] and have a total nominal capital of $7,246,342,533. A movement this broad and extensive, and of such massive scale, must have had some strong and clear reasons behind it. This trend wasn't limited to the United States but was also noticeable in various industrial countries like England, France, Germany, Russia, and other European nations.

Decade. Number
Organized.
Total
Nominal Capital.
1860-69
2
$ 13,000,000
1870-79
4
135,000,000
1880-89
18
288,000,000
1890-99
157
3,150,000,000
Total, 40 years
181
$3,586,000,000

The most important and general cause was the desire to secure the legitimate economies of large-scale production. A combined or federated industry may secure even greater economies than a single large factory. These have been concisely stated as follows[5]: “The cost of management, amount of stock carried, advertising, cost of selling the product, may all be smaller per unit of product. A large aggregation can control credit better and escape loss from bad debts. By regulating and equalizing the output in the different localities, it can run more nearly full time. Being acquainted with the entire situation it can reduce the friction. A strong combination has advantages in shipment. It can have a clearing-house for orders and ship from the nearest source of supply. The least efficient factories can be first closed when demand falls off. Factories can be specialized to produce that for which each is best fitted. The magnitude of the industry and its presence in different localities strengthens its influence with the railroads. Its political as well as its economic power is increased.”

The main reason was the desire to achieve the legitimate efficiencies of large-scale production. A combined or federated industry can achieve even greater efficiencies than a single large factory. These benefits can be summarized as follows[5]: “The costs of management, inventory, advertising, and selling the product can all be lower per unit produced. A large organization can manage credit more effectively and minimize losses from bad debts. By regulating and standardizing output across different locations, it can operate more consistently. Being aware of the overall situation helps reduce friction. A strong alliance has advantages in shipping. It can have a central hub for orders and dispatch from the closest supply source. The least efficient factories can be shut down first when demand decreases. Factories can specialize in producing what each does best. The size of the industry and its presence in various locations enhances its leverage with railroads. Its political and economic power is also increased.”

[Pg 44] Many of these economies of production are not new to these trusts, but have been secured equally by large-scale manufacturing establishments. Some of the savings, especially in buying raw material and marketing their products, are peculiar to the trusts and mark a more efficient mode of organization than mere concentration of industry in single large establishments. Thus, it has been found possible to dispense with a great number of traveling salesmen, of whom it was said that 30,000 lost their positions in the year 1898 alone. When the whisky trust was formed only twelve of the eight distilleries entering into the combination were kept running, but as these were the largest, best located and best equipped, and were run at their full capacity, they were able to turn out as much as all had done before and at an immense economy. The saving of cross freights by having an order filled from the plant most conveniently located is considerable; Mr. Gates estimated the saving of the American Steel and Wire Company in this single point at $500,000 a year. Such an economy could not be secured by a single establishment, no matter how well organized or on how large a scale. The specialization of particular factories to do special processes is well illustrated by the organization of the United States Steel Corporation.

[Pg 44] Many of these production efficiencies aren't new to these trusts; they're also found in large-scale manufacturing companies. Some savings, especially in purchasing raw materials and marketing their products, are unique to the trusts and represent a more effective way of organizing than just concentrating industry in a few large companies. For example, it has been possible to eliminate a significant number of traveling salespeople; it was reported that 30,000 lost their jobs in 1898 alone. When the whisky trust was created, only twelve out of the eight distilleries that joined the trust remained operational. However, since these were the largest, best-located, and best-equipped, and they operated at full capacity, they could produce as much as all the distilleries combined used to, but at a much lower cost. The reduction in transportation costs from filling orders from the closest plant is substantial; Mr. Gates estimated that the American Steel and Wire Company saved $500,000 a year in this area alone. Such savings couldn't be achieved by a single company, no matter how well organized or large. The specialization of specific factories for particular processes is clearly shown in the structuring of the United States Steel Corporation.

The growth of this latter combination is an example not only of consolidation, but of the integration of industry, that is, the grouping together under one control of a whole series of industries. From the mining of the ore and coal, through the processes of carrying it to the furnaces, coking the coal and making the pig iron, manufacturing the latter into the finished forms of iron and steel products, and down to the marketing of the latter, every step is carried on under the control of the United States Steel Corporation. The assets of the company were stated as follows soon after its organization, and illustrate the magnitude and scope of its operations:

The growth of this latter combination is an example not just of consolidation, but of the integration of industry, meaning the grouping together under one management of a whole series of industries. From mining the ore and coal, through transporting it to the furnaces, coking the coal and producing pig iron, manufacturing it into finished iron and steel products, and all the way to marketing those products, every step is managed by the United States Steel Corporation. The company's assets were reported soon after its formation, showcasing the scale and scope of its operations:

[Pg 45]

[Pg 45]

Iron and Bessemer ore properties
$ 700,000,000
Plants, mills, machinery, etc.
300,000,000
Coal and coke fields
100,000,000
Railroads, ships, etc.
80,000,000
Blast furnaces
48,000,000
Natural gas fields
20,000,000
Limestone properties
4,000,000
Cash and cash assets
148,251,000
 Total $1,400,281,000

In addition to economies due to improvements in methods of organization, production and marketing, another cause for the sudden and vigorous outburst of trust promotion in the years 1898-1902 may be found in the profits to be secured by promoters and organizers. After the successful launching of the first few trusts, with their undoubted economies and advantages, the movement was taken in hand by professional promoters, who organized combinations, often with the help of underwriters, in every branch of industry where there was any promise of profit. That many of these were artificial or premature is evident from the financial results: of the 183 industrial combinations enumerated by the census in 1900, one-third paid no dividends whatever after their formation and another one-third paid no dividends to the holders of common stock. As an indication of the profits obtained by the successful trust promoter may be cited the testimony given before the Industrial Commission in the case of the Tin Plate Trust stating that this promoter realized from $2,000,000 to $3,000,000 profit from the undertaking. When to this is added the profit obtained by the owners of the constituent plants, which were usually taken over by the trust at an exorbitant valuation, it is clear that the stimulus of financial gain was probably stronger in many cases than that of economy in production. The bill was of course paid in most cases by the investing public, which absorbed large amounts of industrials in the years of their active promotion.

In addition to savings from better organization, production, and marketing methods, another reason for the sudden and strong rise in trust formation between 1898-1902 was the profits available to promoters and organizers. After the successful establishment of the first few trusts, which clearly showed economic benefits, professional promoters took over, forming combinations—often with the help of underwriters—in any industry that looked profitable. It's clear that many of these were artificial or premature when looking at the financial outcomes: of the 183 industrial combinations listed by the census in 1900, one-third paid no dividends at all after they were formed, and another one-third paid no dividends to common stockholders. An example of the profits reaped by successful trust promoters can be seen in the testimony before the Industrial Commission regarding the Tin Plate Trust, which stated that this promoter made between $2,000,000 and $3,000,000 in profit from the deal. When you add in the profits gained by the owners of the individual plants—often acquired by the trust at inflated prices—it’s clear that the financial motivation often outweighed the drive for production efficiency. Ultimately, the bill was typically footed by the investing public, which purchased large amounts of industrials during the peak of their promotion.

[Pg 46] Other causes have sometimes been adduced to explain the growth of combinations, such as the tariff and railroad freight discriminations, but these are too local in their influence to explain adequately the world-wide movement toward combination. Trusts exist in free-trade England, and in Germany where freight discriminations on the state-owned railroads are practically unknown. It is, however, true that in the United States both these factors have been of decisive importance in building up certain powerful trusts. “There can be no doubt,” said the conservative report of the Industrial Commission, “that in early times special favors from railroads were a prominent factor, probably the most important factor, in building up some of the largest combinations. The receipt of discriminating favors from railroads has been conceded repeatedly by representatives of the combinations themselves.” The Standard Oil, beef, coffee, steel, and other trusts may be cited as illustrations. In the matter of the tariff Mr. Havemeyer’s statement that “the mother of all trusts is the customs tariff law” may be set down as the rather peevish utterance of a disappointed beneficiary; but there is no doubt that combination has been made easier behind the tariff wall. Instance the sugar trust itself, the leather, steel, tin plate, and others.

[Pg 46] Other reasons have sometimes been suggested to explain the rise of combinations, like tariffs and railroad freight discrimination, but these factors are too localized to adequately account for the global trend toward combination. Trusts exist in free-trade England and in Germany, where freight discriminations on state-owned railroads are almost nonexistent. However, it's true that in the United States, both these factors have played a crucial role in creating certain powerful trusts. “There can be no doubt,” stated the conservative report from the Industrial Commission, “that in earlier times, preferential treatment from railroads was a significant factor, probably the most important factor, in the formation of some of the largest combinations. The receipt of preferential treatment from railroads has been acknowledged repeatedly by representatives of the combinations themselves.” Examples include Standard Oil, beef, coffee, steel, and other trusts. Regarding tariffs, Mr. Havemeyer’s comment that “the mother of all trusts is the customs tariff law” may be seen as the somewhat irritable remark of a disgruntled beneficiary; however, it is clear that combination has been facilitated behind the protective tariff. Take the sugar trust, for instance, along with leather, steel, tin plate, and others.

Let us now turn to some of the effects of industrial combinations, which we may classify according as they bear upon competitors and producers of raw materials, labor, and consumers. As the number of competitors is reduced the fierceness of competition among those remaining in the field is greatly increased, for the value of the prize to the successful enterprise is correspondingly greater. It is not surprising therefore that at times this rivalry should have assumed unethical if not actually illegal forms. The practice by some trusts of fixing prices below cost at some strategic point in order to crush out a troublesome competitor, and then correspondingly raising them elsewhere [Pg 47] so as not to sustain any loss, is serious because so subtle. Prof. John B. Clark regards this as so serious an evil that he would have the Constitution amended in order that power might be given the Federal Government to prevent it. The producers of raw materials, as cattlemen, crude oil and coal producers, sugar and tobacco growers, and others, complain that the prices at which they sell their products are dictated to them by the trusts, which are practically the sole purchasers of what they have produced. They claim that prices are depressed to the lowest point possible and that every gain from increase of demand goes into the pockets of the trust managers. It may of course be answered that the trust cannot depress prices below the point at which a living profit can be secured by the producer of the raw material or he will stop producing, but there is no doubt but that the monopoly power possessed by the trust in such cases will sometimes be used to the disadvantage of those whose product it alone buys.

Let’s now look at some effects of industry consolidations, which we can categorize based on their impact on competitors, producers of raw materials, labor, and consumers. As the number of competitors decreases, the intensity of competition among the remaining players significantly increases, because the reward for the successful business venture is that much greater. It’s not surprising that this competition sometimes leads to unethical, if not outright illegal, practices. Some trusts engage in setting prices below cost at strategic points to eliminate bothersome competitors and then raise prices elsewhere to avoid losses, which is a serious issue due to its subtlety. Professor John B. Clark considers this such a serious problem that he advocates for a constitutional amendment to give the federal government the authority to prevent it. Producers of raw materials, like cattle ranchers, crude oil and coal producers, sugar and tobacco growers, among others, argue that the prices for their products are set by the trusts, which are essentially the only buyers of what they produce. They contend that prices are pushed down to the lowest possible level, and any benefit from increased demand goes directly into the pockets of the trust managers. It could be argued that a trust cannot drop prices below the level that allows the raw material producer to make a living profit, or else they would stop producing, but it is clear that the monopoly power held by the trust can sometimes be used to the detriment of those whose products it buys exclusively.

The effects upon labor of the organization of capital in combined industries and under centralized control are more complex. As trusts have superseded single corporations because this mode of industrial organization was more economical, we must expect to find that one of the economies was the displacement of labor. The discharge of traveling salesmen has already been spoken of; with the consolidation of various plants under one control other high-priced men were let go—managers, superintendents, etc. The same thing was true at the other end of the industrial scale and thousands of workmen, usually the least efficient and capable, were deprived of work. The natural consequences of these combinations and economies were not clearly apparent at the time, because they were happily coincident with a period of business expansion and prosperity which reabsorbed into the industrial organism most of the displaced workers. Another phase of the relation between trusts and labor is that of their effect upon wages. [Pg 48] In general it may be said that there are only two sources out of which an increase of wages can be paid, and these are the profits of the business organizer and manager or the increased product of the business itself, and of these two only the latter can serve as a permanent source of higher wages. Now it is pretty evident that labor has not been in a position to force the trust magnates to forego their profits. On the other hand, wages in industries carried on by industrial combinations have risen, and it must therefore have been because there was more produced and consequently more to be divided. If the inefficient workers were discharged and only the best ones retained by the trusts, here is one explanation why they could afford to pay high wages—they paid more because they got more done. As yet labor has not admitted that it is unable to cope with these industrial combinations; it has however demanded that it be allowed to combine on a national scale and to bargain collectively for united labor with combined capital.

The impact on labor from the way capital is organized in combined industries and under centralized control is more complicated. As trusts have replaced individual corporations because this type of industrial organization is more cost-effective, we should expect that one of the efficiencies gained was the reduction of labor. The layoffs of traveling salesmen have already been mentioned; as various plants merged under one control, other highly paid employees—like managers and superintendents—were also let go. The same situation occurred at the other end of the industrial spectrum, where thousands of workers, often the least efficient and capable, lost their jobs. The immediate effects of these combinations and efficiencies weren’t obvious at the time, as they coincided with a period of business growth and prosperity, which absorbed most of the displaced workers back into the industrial workforce. Another aspect of the relationship between trusts and labor is their impact on wages. In general, there are only two sources from which wage increases can be funded: the profits of the business organizer and manager, or the increased output of the business itself, and only the latter can provide a lasting source of higher wages. It’s clear that labor hasn’t been in a position to compel trust leaders to give up their profits. However, wages in industries managed by these large combinations have risen, which suggests that this happened because production increased, and thus there was more to share. If the less efficient workers were let go and only the most capable remained, this provides a reason why they could afford to pay higher wages—they paid more because they achieved greater output. So far, labor hasn’t accepted that it can’t deal with these industrial combinations; instead, it has demanded to be allowed to organize on a national level and negotiate collectively as united labor against combined capital.

The discussion of the effects of trusts upon the consumer leads at once to the discussion of their effects upon prices, for it is through the agency of price that the trust touches the ordinary man. The advantages claimed by trust organizers are economies of production and lowered cost; but the vital question to the consumer is whether lowered cost increases profits or reduces prices. On this point the Industrial Commission reaches the following conclusion: “that in most cases the combination has exerted an appreciable power over prices, and in practically all cases it has increased the margin between raw materials and finished products. Since there is reason to believe that the cost of production over a period of years has lessened, the conclusion is inevitable that the combinations have been able to increase their profits.” Moreover the power over prices was greatest during certain periods when the control of the combinations was greatest. The problem [Pg 49] therefore resolves itself into the question, are trusts monopolies? While a categorical answer cannot be given to this, it may safely be affirmed that all trusts try to be monopolies. Nor is it necessary to control the production, sale, or purchase of a commodity absolutely in order to exercise monopoly power; the control of 50 or 60 per cent may suffice to secure virtual monopoly. The purpose of a monopoly is so to fix the price that it will obtain the maximum net profit. It is conceivable that this result may be attained by lowering the monopoly price below the point of the competitive price, but this is unusual. In general a monopoly price has meant a high price, and a high price has meant a restriction of the output. Where that has been the result of trust control, society has been injured, for not only has it not shared in the economies of production but it actually gets less and has to pay more than it would have done under competition. It may be said, however, that even in the case of the greatest monopoly there is always the specter of potential competition threatening its profits, while the possibility of substituting some other commodity for the monopolized article protects the consumer from too great extortion and keeps the price within limits. Absolute control over price is never exercised by any monopoly. Nevertheless, we may fairly conclude, in the words of Henry D. Lloyd, that “monopoly is business at the end of its journey,” control over prices is the object of combination.

The discussion about how trusts affect consumers naturally leads to a look at their impact on prices, since prices are how trusts affect everyday people. Trust organizers claim that their benefits include more efficient production and lower costs; however, the key question for consumers is whether lower costs lead to higher profits or lower prices. On this issue, the Industrial Commission concludes that “in most cases the combination has had a significant influence on prices, and in almost all cases, it has widened the gap between raw materials and finished products.” Given that there’s evidence production costs have decreased over the years, it’s clear that these combinations have managed to boost their profits. Additionally, their control over prices was strongest during the periods when their dominance was at its peak. Thus, the question arises: are trusts monopolies? While we can’t give a simple yes or no answer, it’s safe to say that all trusts attempt to act like monopolies. It’s also not necessary to have complete control over the production, sale, or purchase of a product to wield monopoly power; controlling 50 or 60 percent may be enough to achieve a near-monopoly. The goal of a monopoly is to set the price so that it maximizes profits. It’s possible to achieve this by lowering the monopoly price below the competitive price, but that’s rare. Typically, a monopoly price means a higher price, which leads to a reduction in output. When this happens under trust control, society suffers because it not only misses out on the benefits of efficient production but also ends up getting less and paying more than it would have in a competitive market. However, it’s worth noting that even in the case of the largest monopolies, potential competition always looms as a threat to their profits, and the option to switch to another product protects consumers from excessive price increases and keeps prices in check. No monopoly has absolute control over prices. Still, we can reasonably conclude, as Henry D. Lloyd put it, that “monopoly is business at the end of its journey,” and controlling prices is the ultimate goal of these combinations.

There remains to be considered another charge of monopoly which has been brought against the trust, the monopoly of opportunity or the suppression of individual initiative. It is no longer possible, it is claimed, for the man of small means, even with good talents, to engage in business for himself: he must accept some subordinate position in a corporation where his individuality is checked and his power of initiative does not find free play. So far as this is true it would seem to be the result not so much [Pg 50] of the trust movement as of large-scale production. We have seen that the tendency of machine production is to enlarge the business unit and to call for the investment of constantly larger amounts of capital in up-to-date establishments. Some writers even point out that the average business man who engages in business on his own account fails, and that he should therefore be grateful if more efficient producers offer him a remunerative and steady salaried position. Without insisting upon this point it may still fairly be noted that there are large fields of enterprise that lie outside the area of monopolistic control. “Large-scale production is best adapted to articles that can be turned out in large quantities according to uniform patterns and standards; individual initiative is still free in those lines of production that call for artistic ability or appeal to individual tastes, or which, like agriculture, are dependent upon variable conditions.”[6]

There is another accusation of monopoly against the trust, specifically regarding the monopoly of opportunity or the suppression of individual initiative. It is claimed that it is no longer possible for someone with modest means, even if they have good talents, to start a business on their own; instead, they have to take a lower position in a corporation where their uniqueness is stifled and their ability to take initiative is restricted. If this is true, it seems to stem more from large-scale production than from the trust movement itself. We’ve seen that the trend of machine production is to grow the business unit and require larger investments in modern facilities. Some experts even argue that the average entrepreneur who tries to start their own business ends up failing, and so they should be thankful if more efficient producers offer them a well-paying and stable job. Without dwelling on this point, it is still worth mentioning that there are many areas of business that are not under monopolistic control. “Large-scale production is best suited for products that can be made in large quantities with consistent patterns and standards; individual initiative is still allowed in those areas of production that require artistic skill or appeal to personal preferences, or in fields like agriculture, which are influenced by changing conditions.”

There are, however, other evils connected with trust organization and management that are more easily remediable and that call for legislative regulation. “The evils of combination, remedied by regulative legislation,” concludes the report of the Industrial Commission,[7] “come chiefly from two sources: (1) the more or less complete exercise of the power of monopoly; (2) deception of the public through secrecy or false information.” Various remedies have been suggested to meet the first class of evils, those of monopoly, generally in the direction of strengthening the powers of the Federal Government. We have however no lack of legislation on this subject already: thirty-four states and territories have passed anti-trust laws, and the federal Anti-Trust Law of 1890 explicitly provides that “every contract, combination in the form of a trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations, [Pg 51] is hereby declared illegal.” The severe restrictive measures of the states have been largely nullified by the loose legislation of three or four “charter granting” states, in which 95 per cent of all the trusts have accordingly been chartered, while the federal enactments have been found very difficult to enforce. It is not easy to define or to prove monopoly or conspiracy in restraint of trade. The second class of evils has been met by statutes requiring publicity and more definitely fixing the responsibility of corporation officials. Such measures of control must be the first step toward intelligent regulation, and are to be commended as thoroughly reasonable. The establishment of the federal Bureau of Corporations with power to “investigate” industrial corporations engaged in interstate commerce has already led to the publication of some valuable reports. We must first proceed along the lines of publicity and intelligent information before we attempt more drastic remedies.

There are, however, other issues related to trust organization and management that can be addressed more easily and need legislative action. “The problems of combinations, solved through regulatory legislation,” concludes the report of the Industrial Commission,[7] “primarily stem from two sources: (1) the complete exercise of monopoly power; (2) misleading the public through secrecy or false information.” Various solutions have been proposed to address the first issue of monopoly, typically aimed at strengthening the powers of the Federal Government. However, we already have plenty of legislation on this topic: thirty-four states and territories have enacted anti-trust laws, and the federal Anti-Trust Law of 1890 clearly states that “every contract, combination in the form of a trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared illegal.” The strict measures by the states have largely been undermined by the lax legislation of three or four “charter granting” states, which have issued charters for 95 percent of all trusts, while enforcing the federal laws has proven very challenging. It is difficult to define or prove monopoly or conspiracy in restraint of trade. The second issue has been addressed by laws requiring transparency and more clearly defining the accountability of corporate officials. These control measures should be the first step towards effective regulation and are entirely reasonable. The establishment of the federal Bureau of Corporations with the authority to “investigate” industrial corporations involved in interstate commerce has already resulted in some valuable reports. We must first focus on transparency and informed decision-making before we pursue more drastic solutions.

VI. SPECULATION AND CRISES.

An unavoidable element of risk enters into all modern business. In the old handicraft stage of industry goods were made upon order; demand preceded supply very definitely, and there was little possibility of mistakes in production. Nowadays, as we have seen, production is for a distant and often uncertain market. It is carried on by machine methods and roundabout processes; sometimes the result is a very remote one and the uncertainty of success is correspondingly great. Production is not based upon order, but upon a forecast of the possible demand, upon a future market. Chance and change are inseparable from productive enterprise—natural chances from the elements, political changes, as war or unfavorable legislation, industrial mistakes or sickness or death of oneself or others, and economic changes, as the invention of a new machine or a change in fashion. These are the unavoidable incidents [Pg 52] in industry and are not under the control of the individual business. Some of them, however, are so regularly recurrent that they can be foretold on a large scale for any industrial society, and can be guarded against by insurance. Everyone recognizes the desirability of having such risks as those of fire, shipwreck, lightning, death, etc., assumed by certain individuals or companies who make a business of such risk-taking. A small premium is paid by the individual for protection, and he is freed from anxiety from mischance and is able to devote his whole energies and capital to his business; the insurance company has specialized in this one department and by equalizing the chances over a wide field has practically eliminated them. In doing this it performs a service of recognized and undoubted social value.

All modern businesses face unavoidable risk. In the past, when goods were handmade, products were created based on orders; demand clearly came before supply, and there was little chance of production errors. Today, production targets distant and often uncertain markets. It relies on machine methods and complex processes; sometimes the outcomes are very indirect, and the likelihood of success is correspondingly high. Production is based not on orders, but on predictions of possible demand in the future market. Chance and change are inseparable from productive ventures—natural risks from the environment, political changes like war or unfavorable laws, industrial errors, or health issues affecting oneself or others, and economic shifts like new inventions or changing trends. These incidents are unavoidable in industry and are not under an individual business's control. However, some of these risks are common enough that they can be anticipated on a large scale for any industrial society and can be mitigated through insurance. Everyone understands the need to transfer risks like fire, shipwreck, lightning, death, etc., to those individuals or companies that specialize in risk management. A small fee is paid by individuals for this protection, allowing them to focus their full energy and capital on their business without the worry of unforeseen events; the insurance company specializes in this industry and, by spreading the risks over a wide area, effectively minimizes them. In doing so, it provides a service of recognized and undeniable social value.

There is another kind of risk-taking the social utility of which is not at first sight so clear. Among the chances of productive enterprise are those due to the rise and fall in the prices of the raw materials, the labor, and the finished product between the time when the process of production is begun and the time when it is completed. Every farmer, every manufacturer, every student even who invests capital in his own education, is to some extent a speculator. Along certain lines he can protect himself by insurance, but that is not possible in all. Is there no way, then, by which he can guard himself against price fluctuations and assure himself of the legitimate gains of his business? This, it may be answered, is the function of the speculator in modern business, and in performing this service he is benefiting society in much the same way that the insurance company does. We must, however, clearly distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate speculation; we are discussing only the former.

There’s another type of risk-taking whose social value isn’t immediately obvious. In productive ventures, there’s always the uncertainty of price changes for raw materials, labor, and finished products from the start to the end of production. Every farmer, manufacturer, and even every student investing in their education is, in some way, a speculator. In some areas, they can protect themselves with insurance, but that’s not possible everywhere. So, is there a way to shield themselves from price fluctuations and guarantee their business profits? The answer is that this is the role of the speculator in modern business, and by doing this, they benefit society similarly to how an insurance company does. However, we need to make a clear distinction between legitimate and illegitimate speculation; we are only discussing the former.

One way in which the speculative risk attaching to price fluctuations is reduced for the manufacturer and assumed by the speculator is by the establishment of a continuous [Pg 53] open market, as the stock and produce exchanges. If a miller, for instance, engages to deliver flour a year hence and expects to begin milling in six months, he must know at what price he can buy his wheat when he needs it, or his anticipated gain may be turned into a loss by an unexpected rise in the price of wheat. He is able, however, to buy a “future” in wheat on the produce exchange from some broker who makes a specialty of this business. He buys his needed wheat now for delivery six months hence, and on the basis of this price is able to accept an order for his flour a year from now, allowing himself a fair profit as a miller but wholly eliminating the speculative risk of price fluctuations. Or a building contractor, before making an estimate of the cost of erecting a structure, will secure options at definite prices from dealers on the materials he will require. So, too, in the iron and steel business it is customary for manufacturers to contract in advance for materials at the same time that they accept orders for the delivery of the finished products. In all these cases the business of dealing in futures is assumed by a particular class, who have developed a special skill and ability in forecasting price variations, and who can do so very accurately. It is not a matter of luck or chance, but the result of wide knowledge and careful study. “To foretell the price of wheat one must know the rainfall in India, the condition of the crop in Argentina, must be in touch as nearly as possible with every unit of supply that will come into the market.” Sometimes the speculators make mistakes, but they are certainly less apt to do so than men who are without their special talent and training.

One way the risk from price fluctuations is lessened for manufacturers and taken on by speculators is through the creation of a continuous open market, like stock and produce exchanges. For example, if a miller agrees to deliver flour a year from now and plans to start milling in six months, he needs to know the price he’ll pay for wheat when he needs it; otherwise, an unexpected price increase could turn his expected profit into a loss. However, he can purchase a "future" in wheat from a broker who specializes in this. He locks in the price for the wheat he needs six months from now, and based on that price, he's able to accept an order for his flour a year out, ensuring he makes a fair profit as a miller while completely eliminating the risk of price changes. Similarly, a building contractor will secure options at set prices from suppliers for the materials he’ll need before estimating the cost of a project. In the iron and steel industry, manufacturers often contract ahead for materials while they take orders for finished products. In all these instances, the business of trading in futures is handled by a specific group of people who have developed the expertise to predict price movements accurately. It's not just luck; it’s based on extensive knowledge and careful research. “To forecast the price of wheat, one must understand rainfall in India, the condition of crops in Argentina, and be as informed as possible about every source of supply entering the market.” Speculators might make mistakes occasionally, but they’re definitely less likely to do so than those without their specialized skills and training.

The social value of this service lies in the equalization of demand and supply between the present and future that is thereby effected. Let us take as an illustration the case of the miller cited above. If at the time he accepts the order for flour the price of wheat is high, he will be inclined to charge a high price. But the wheat broker, [Pg 54] foreseeing that there is going to be an abundant crop six months hence, engages to sell him his wheat for future delivery at a low price, and he is thereby enabled to sell his flour at a lower price. At the same time the price of the wheat on hand at the present time, instead of being held and sold at famine prices, is consumed for present needs at moderate prices. The operations of the wheat brokers in such a case have a very steadying influence on prices, preventing the oscillation between very high prices in times of scarcity and very low prices in times of glut. It must be admitted that dealings in futures are highly speculative; “but it must be remembered that it is not merely the dealings in futures, but the future itself, that is uncertain. If such dealings can be confined to the men most competent to make accurate predictions, their tendency will clearly be to lessen the uncertainties of business.”[8] But closely connected with legitimate speculation or risk-taking by a specialized and trained class, there is, as our stock and produce exchanges are actually conducted, a large amount of illegitimate speculation, and to this we may now turn for a brief consideration.

The social value of this service lies in balancing demand and supply between the present and the future. Let’s consider the example of the miller mentioned earlier. If he accepts the order for flour when the price of wheat is high, he will likely charge a high price. However, the wheat broker, anticipating an abundant crop in six months, agrees to sell him his wheat for future delivery at a lower price, which allows him to sell his flour at a lower price as well. Meanwhile, the wheat currently available, instead of being held and sold at inflated prices, is used to meet immediate needs at reasonable prices. In this scenario, the activities of the wheat brokers have a stabilizing effect on prices, preventing dramatic fluctuations between very high prices during shortages and very low prices during oversupply. It’s important to acknowledge that trading in futures is quite speculative; “but it should be noted that it’s not just futures trading that is uncertain, but the future itself. If such trading is limited to those most capable of making accurate forecasts, their impact will clearly be to reduce the uncertainties of business.” However, alongside legitimate speculation or risk-taking by a skilled and trained group, there is, as our stock and produce exchanges currently operate, a significant amount of illegitimate speculation, which we can now briefly discuss.

The facilities offered by the open markets on the exchanges and the practice of dealing in futures are taken advantage of by many who, without any special training or opportunities of knowing the market, simply bet on the price movements. Brokers are willing to buy and sell produce or stocks for their customers if the latter will put up with them a margin of about 10 per cent to protect them from loss. It is therefore possible for a person with little capital and no knowledge to speculate on a margin, buying what he does not want and selling what he does not own. In practice it is impossible to distinguish between those dealings in which actual delivery is intended (legitimate speculation) and those in which no such delivery is contemplated (gambling), and consequently most efforts to [Pg 55] regulate transactions on the exchanges have failed to accomplish their purpose. The purification of their methods would seem to lie with the members of such exchanges themselves. The contention has often been made that these fictitious transactions in such commodities as wheat or corn or cotton create an artificial reduction in prices, since the professional gambler usually sells short or “bears” the market, and that this injuriously affects the farmer. This is manifestly untenable, since every fictitious sale must be balanced by a fictitious purchase. What actually takes place is simply a bet between the two parties to such a transaction on the actual course of prices and of itself does not affect prices, except in the unusual case of a “corner.” There is, however, great possibility of evil in the presence of a crowd of uninformed speculators, for they can greatly increase the power of an unscrupulous operator who can persuade them to follow his lead. Their presence, too, increases the temptation to such a man to rig the market. Under present conditions the abuses of speculation are more in evidence than the economic advantages. How to confine speculation to the small group of risk-takers who have special training and aptitude for it, and to prevent gambling on the stock and produce exchanges is one of the economic problems of the day.

The facilities provided by open markets on exchanges and the practice of trading futures are exploited by many who, without any special training or understanding of the market, simply wager on price changes. Brokers are ready to buy and sell goods or stocks for their clients if those clients can provide a margin of about 10 percent to safeguard against losses. This means that someone with little capital and no knowledge can speculate on margin, buying things they don’t actually want and selling items they don’t own. In reality, it’s hard to tell the difference between transactions intended for actual delivery (legitimate speculation) and those where no delivery is expected (gambling), which is why most attempts to regulate exchange transactions have failed. Improving their methods seems to depend on the exchange members themselves. It’s often argued that these imaginary transactions for commodities like wheat, corn, or cotton create an artificial drop in prices, since professional gamblers often sell short or "bear" the market, which negatively impacts farmers. However, this argument doesn’t hold up because every fictitious sale must be matched by a fictitious purchase. What truly happens is just a bet between two parties regarding the actual price movements, which by itself doesn’t affect prices, except in rare cases of a “corner.” There is, however, a significant risk when a crowd of uninformed speculators is involved, as they can greatly amplify the influence of a dishonest operator who can manipulate them into following his direction. Their presence also increases the temptation for such individuals to manipulate the market. Under current conditions, the negative aspects of speculation are more noticeable than the economic benefits. Finding a way to limit speculation to a small group of risk-takers with the appropriate training and skills, and to curb gambling on stock and produce exchanges, is one of today’s economic challenges.

One of the most striking phenomena of modern industry is the frequent and violent convulsions of business known as crises. They are characteristic of all commercially advanced countries and are generally most marked in those countries which are most advanced. They are a product of modern methods of capitalistic production and are essentially a phenomenon of the nineteenth century. A crisis in its last analysis is the result of a lack of adjustment between production and consumption, due primarily to mistakes in production. It is significant that crises usually occur in periods of business prosperity when credit [Pg 56] is easy, prices high, and employment general. Such a period of business prosperity and rising credit may have been begun by a series of good harvests. The demand for manufactured commodities increases, prices rise, manufacturers enlarge their factories or engage in new enterprises, wages and profits go up. Many speculators, seeing the rise, and thinking it will continue, borrow money to buy goods with the expectation of selling again at a profit. Credit operations are expanded to a dangerous extent, and when at last a shock to confidence occurs the house of cards collapses and a painful liquidation and readjustment of industry ensues. The state of trade, in the words of Lord Overstone, “revolves apparently in an established cycle. First we find it in a state of quiescence—next improvement, growing confidence, prosperity, excitement, over-trading, convulsion, pressure, stagnation, distress, ending again in quiescence.”

One of the most notable aspects of modern industry is the frequent and intense disruptions in business known as crises. These crises are typical of all commercially developed countries and tend to be most pronounced in the most advanced nations. They arise from modern capitalistic production methods and are fundamentally a phenomenon of the nineteenth century. A crisis ultimately results from a mismatch between production and consumption, primarily due to production errors. It's significant that crises usually happen during times of business prosperity when credit is easy to obtain, prices are high, and employment is widespread. This period of business prosperity and increasing credit may begin with a series of good harvests. The demand for manufactured goods rises, prices go up, manufacturers expand their factories or take on new ventures, and wages and profits increase. Many speculators, seeing the rise and believing it will last, borrow money to purchase goods, expecting to sell them again for a profit. Credit operations are pushed to a risky level, and when a sudden loss of confidence hits, the fragile structure collapses, leading to a painful liquidation and readjustment in the industry. The state of trade, in the words of Lord Overstone, “appears to follow an established cycle. First, we observe a state of calm—then improvement, growing confidence, prosperity, excitement, overtrading, disruption, pressure, stagnation, hardship, ending again in calm.”

The immediate occasion of a crisis is always a shock to credit or confidence. Such a shock, begun perhaps by the failure of a bank or merchant, creates a demand for ready money. No one is sure that his neighbor will remain solvent. Everyone accordingly tries to secure himself against loss by enlarging his cash reserve and thus lessens the supply for others. Now modern industry is carried on by means of credit. There is at no one time enough money in the country to meet all obligations expressed in terms of money. Considerably over three-fourths of the larger commercial transactions in the United States are carried on by means of credit. If everyone tries at the same time to get actual cash, there is simply not enough money in the country to go around. This increase of demand and diminution in the supply of money forces up the interest rate on short-time loans. Money—actual cash—is needed by many people to meet immediate engagements and they are willing to pay almost any price for it. In the last panic the rates for call money went up to over [Pg 57] 100 per cent and in many cities in the United States clearing-house certificates and other substitutes for money were issued for use in ordinary retail trade. But even at high rates money can often not be borrowed. Many merchants and manufacturers are compelled to sell their goods at a sacrifice in order to obtain it. Vast quantities of goods and securities are thrown on the market just when investors and consumers feel least able to purchase. The result is a fall in prices. Such a fall in prices lowers profits. Enterprises have been started and engagements made on the supposition that prices would continue at the old high level. When they fall it is impossible to pay interest out of current earnings. Foreclosures and readjustments take place. There is a general liquidation and reorganization of industry. When interest contracts have been adjusted, then the effect on wages begins to be felt. As long as a manufacturer is struggling to maintain his credit he will keep his factory going, but when he has failed and perhaps been foreclosed, then the factory stops. Men are thrown out of work, and wages—the price of labor—fall. Labor troubles usually mark the end of such a period of readjustment.

The immediate cause of a crisis is always a jolt to credit or confidence. This jolt, perhaps triggered by a bank or merchant collapsing, creates a demand for cash. No one is sure if their neighbor will stay financially stable. As a result, everyone tries to protect themselves from loss by increasing their cash reserves, which reduces the supply for others. Nowadays, modern industry operates through credit. There is never enough money available in the country to cover all financial obligations. Over three-fourths of larger commercial transactions in the United States are conducted using credit. If everyone tries to access actual cash at the same time, there simply isn’t enough money available. This surge in demand and drop in cash supply drives up the interest rates on short-term loans. Many people need cash to meet immediate obligations and are willing to pay nearly any price for it. During the last panic, interest rates for call money soared to over 100 percent, and in many U.S. cities, clearing-house certificates and other money substitutes were issued for regular retail transactions. But even with high rates, money is often unavailable for borrowing. Many merchants and manufacturers are forced to sell their products at a loss to get cash. A huge amount of goods and securities flood the market just when investors and consumers feel least capable of buying. This leads to a drop in prices. Such price drops reduce profits. Businesses are started and commitments made with the assumption that prices would stay at their previous high level. When prices fall, it's impossible to cover interest with current earnings. Foreclosures and adjustments occur. There’s a widespread liquidation and reorganization of industry. Once interest contracts are adjusted, the impact on wages starts to be felt. As long as a manufacturer is fighting to keep their credit intact, they will keep their factory running, but when they fail and potentially face foreclosure, the factory shuts down. Workers lose their jobs, and wages—the cost of labor—fall. Labor disputes usually signal the end of such a readjustment period.

This stage marks the end of the crisis and the beginning of a period of depression or “hard times,” which continues for a longer or shorter period. The panic of 1893 was followed by a long-continued depression which lasted until 1897, a period which was marked by low prices and slack work. In 1898 began a revival of business and an era of marked prosperity set in which continued for almost ten years, interrupted only slightly by a “Wall Street panic” in 1903. In October, 1907, a severe crisis occurred, recovery from which, however, has been remarkably rapid. The periodicity which has attended crises in the past is so marked—occurring as they have at intervals of about ten years—that many writers consider them inevitable. As the easiest way to answer this question we [Pg 58] may take up three main theories as to the causes of crises.

This stage marks the end of the crisis and the start of a period of depression or “hard times,” which can last for a shorter or longer time. The panic of 1893 was followed by a prolonged downturn that lasted until 1897, a time characterized by low prices and limited job opportunities. In 1898, business began to pick up, and a significant period of prosperity began that lasted for almost ten years, only briefly interrupted by a “Wall Street panic” in 1903. In October 1907, a serious crisis happened, but recovery from it was surprisingly quick. The pattern of crises in the past is so clear—happening roughly every ten years—that many writers see them as unavoidable. To address this question most effectively, we can explore three main theories regarding the causes of crises.

A much quoted, but now generally discredited, theory is that of W. S. Jevons, a noted English economist, who ascribed crises to sun-spots. Every ten years and a fraction there occur outbursts of electrical and heat energy on the sun, which we call sun-spots. These result in increased heat waves, which affect the crops on the earth, causing enlarged harvests in Europe and the United States and drought and famine in India and the tropics. The large harvests and good prices start a wave of prosperity and speculation, which culminates inevitably in a panic and depression, until a recurrence of the heat phenomenon starts the cycle again. The theory states some undoubted facts, but no causal connection between sun-spots and crises can be traced, as the latter are too irregular and the two do not always coincide. Were this theory true crises would be beyond human control.

A frequently referenced, but now largely dismissed, theory is that of W. S. Jevons, a well-known English economist, who linked economic crises to sunspots. Every ten years or so, there are bursts of electrical and heat energy on the sun, which we call sunspots. These lead to increased heat waves, affecting crops on Earth, resulting in larger harvests in Europe and the United States while causing drought and famine in India and tropical regions. The abundant harvests and favorable prices trigger a wave of prosperity and speculation, which inevitably leads to a panic and depression, until the heat phenomenon recurs and restarts the cycle. The theory presents some undeniable facts, but no causal link between sunspots and economic crises can be established, as the crises are too irregular and do not always align. If this theory were accurate, crises would be entirely beyond human control.

A second theory, or group of theories, are those which attribute crises to over-production. Under modern conditions of industry a small group of men direct industry and determine what shall be produced. They try to estimate future demand and to adjust production to consumption, but they often make mistakes. They divert capital into unproductive industries, they produce the wrong things and create a comparative glut in certain lines, and when they cannot sell their goods at a profitable price they fail and precipitate a crisis. Industry must then be reorganized and frequently control be put in the hands of other men. A variation has been given this theory by the socialists, under the leadership of Rodbertus, who insist that the reason that there is over-production is because of the institution of private property. Since the capitalists own all the tools of production they pay the laborers only starvation wages. The latter cannot possibly buy all that is produced and commodities consequently heap up in the warehouses until they are thrown upon the market to be sold [Pg 59] at any price. Then a panic occurs and a readjustment of production.

A second theory, or group of theories, explains crises as a result of overproduction. In today’s industrial landscape, a small group of people controls industry and decides what gets produced. They try to forecast future demand and align production with consumption, but they often get it wrong. They invest capital in unproductive sectors, produce the wrong items, and create a surplus of certain goods. When they can’t sell their products at a good price, they fail and trigger a crisis. Industry must then be reorganized, often with control handed over to different individuals. Socialists, led by Rodbertus, have put a twist on this theory, arguing that overproduction happens because of private property. Since capitalists own all the production tools, they pay workers only enough to survive. The workers can't buy everything that’s produced, leading to stockpiles in warehouses until these goods are dumped on the market at any price. This results in panic and a need to readjust production. [Pg 59]

The last of these theories regards a crisis as essentially due to a failure of credit. It is seen that a large part of modern industry is carried on by borrowed capital, by roundabout processes and for a distant market and not upon order. That is, the success of a business depends upon its ability to sell its goods when produced. Now the aggregate volume of transactions that can be carried on in a year, so runs the theory, depends upon the efficiency of the credit system; that is, in general, upon the freedom with which banks are willing to loan money to people who engage to repay it in the future out of their ventures. If for any reason the banks reduce this accommodation the amount of business that can be transacted upon borrowed capital is lessened. Either some transactions must stop or prices must fall. Either of these events causes commercial disaster. The contraction of credit makes it impossible to get the goods into the right hands, and so we have the phenomena of over-production in a great many lines. As exchange and transportation have developed and markets widened, crises have become more universal. According to this theory, they are inseparably connected with the use of credit and can be controlled only by a more careful granting of credit by the banks to industrial managers. Another phase of the credit theory is presented by those who insist that the cause of crises is the rhythmic overestimation of the profits to be secured out of certain lines of production, or their over-capitalization. The new enterprises are financed by the banks on the basis of this mistaken over-capitalization, their organizers engage to pay rates of interest which they cannot earn, and the crash inevitably follows. This is often called the over-capitalization theory, and is essentially psychological in its character.

The last of these theories sees a crisis as primarily caused by a failure of credit. It's observed that much of modern industry relies on borrowed capital, using roundabout processes for a distant market rather than operating on orders. In other words, a business's success hinges on its ability to sell its products once they're made. According to this theory, the total volume of transactions that can happen in a year depends on how efficiently the credit system works; that is, it generally depends on how freely banks are willing to lend money to individuals who promise to pay it back later from their business profits. If banks cut back on their lending for any reason, the volume of business that can be done using borrowed capital decreases. This means some transactions must stop or prices must drop. Either situation leads to commercial disaster. A contraction in credit makes it hard to get goods to the right people, resulting in the phenomenon of over-production in many industries. As exchange and transportation have advanced and markets have expanded, crises have become more widespread. According to this theory, crises are closely tied to the use of credit and can only be managed through more careful lending practices by banks to business leaders. Another aspect of the credit theory is presented by those who argue that crises are caused by the repetitive overestimation of potential profits in certain production sectors, leading to over-capitalization. New ventures are financed by banks based on this erroneous over-capitalization, and those behind them commit to interest rates they can't realistically meet, resulting in an inevitable crash. This is often referred to as the over-capitalization theory and mainly stems from psychological factors.

There is no doubt as to the truth contained in this last theory. It helps to explain the rhythmic periodicity of [Pg 60] crises. After every period of business depression confidence revives and hope is renewed; overestimation of the success of new ventures is inevitable. Then follows a mistaken investment of capital in certain lines of production, as in railroads in 1884, and a relative over-production at profitable prices of certain commodities. The true explanation seems to be found in a combination of the over-production and over-capitalization theories.

There’s no doubt about the truth in this last theory. It helps explain the rhythmic cycles of crises. After every time of economic downturn, people regain their confidence and hope rises; it’s inevitable to overestimate the success of new ventures. This leads to poor investments in specific areas of production, like railroads in 1884, and a relative overproduction of certain goods at profitable prices. The real explanation seems to lie in a mix of the overproduction and overcapitalization theories.

The practical problem that presents itself in this connection is the question as to whether it is possible to prevent the recurrence of crises. In view of the explanation just given it would seem that they must be regarded as unpreventable as long as industry is carried on under the competitive capitalistic system of production and the modern credit system. Moreover, crops differ in amount from year to year and probably always will. Human production and human genius are unequal. Crises may be regarded as the price a progressive society pays for its advance, and they may be expected to recur pretty regularly at periodic intervals. Their disastrous effects may, however, be greatly lessened by wise currency legislation, by greater care in granting credit, and by greater wisdom in the direction of individual effort.

The practical problem in this context is whether we can prevent crises from happening again. Based on the previous explanation, it seems they are inevitable as long as we operate under a competitive capitalist system and the modern credit system. Additionally, crop yields vary from year to year and will likely continue to do so. Human production and creativity are inconsistent. Crises can be seen as the cost a progressive society pays for its growth, and we can expect them to happen fairly regularly at set intervals. However, their harmful effects can be significantly reduced through smart currency laws, careful credit practices, and more thoughtful individual efforts.

VII. THE MODERN WAGE SYSTEM.

We have already characterized the modern system of industry as capitalistic, that is, as involving the use of expensive and complex machinery in factories under the control of the capitalist managers of industry. As we have seen, such a system has caused an enormous increase in the production of wealth; it has also raised the general standard of comfort and the level of wages, and has relieved labor to a considerable extent of the deadly strain of hard manual toil that was characteristic of preceding systems. The factory system, under which capitalistic production is now carried on, may also fairly be credited [Pg 61] with other beneficial results: as steadiness and punctuality are essential, it has on the whole led to increased sobriety and temperance; the work in general is healthier, being performed under better sanitary conditions than under the old domestic system; the intellectual status of the workingman has been raised, as vastly more intelligence is required of a skilled machine operator than of the old-time hand laborer; and finally the general well-being of the working class has been improved, as they have shared in the larger production made possible by machine methods. But, on the other hand, the new processes and methods have been accompanied by great abuses, though never so great in this country as in England. Long hours, the employment of women and children, the weakened economic position of the laborer, fluctuations in production, liability to be without employment, industrial accidents, the abolition of personal ties between employer and employe, the crowding of workmen into a small space to work by day and their concentration in city tenements by night—these are some of the problems for which the factory system must be held responsible. The condition and position of labor have been vitally affected. So far we have considered mainly the problems connected with the organization and use of capital. We must now take up the various questions connected with the relation of labor to capital and to the capitalistic system of production.

We have already described the modern industrial system as capitalistic, which means it involves using expensive and complex machinery in factories managed by capitalist leaders. As we’ve seen, this system has led to a massive increase in wealth; it has also improved living standards and wages, and significantly reduced the harsh physical labor that was typical in earlier systems. The factory system, through which capitalistic production now occurs, can also be credited with other positive outcomes: since reliability and punctuality are essential, it has generally resulted in greater sobriety and temperance; the work itself is healthier, performed under better sanitary conditions than the old domestic system; the intellectual level of workers has risen, as much more skill is needed from a machine operator than from a traditional manual laborer; and finally, the overall well-being of the working class has improved, as they have benefited from the increased production made possible by machine methods. However, the new processes and methods have also led to serious issues, though these have never been as severe in this country as they have been in England. Long hours, the employment of women and children, the weakened economic status of workers, production fluctuations, the risk of unemployment, industrial accidents, the loss of personal relationships between employers and employees, and the overcrowding of workers in small spaces during the day while they stay in city tenements at night—these are some of the problems for which the factory system is responsible. The condition and status of labor have been deeply impacted. So far, we have mainly focused on issues related to the organization and use of capital. Now, we need to address the various questions related to the relationship between labor and capital, as well as the capitalistic system of production.

One of the most vital factors in the situation—which we must frankly admit at the start—is the existence in modern industrial society of a distinct wage-earning class. It is perfectly obvious that under present conditions of production great capital or great ability is necessary in order to become the manager of an industrial enterprise. Most laborers do not possess either the one or the other of these, and although there are fortunate examples of industrial leaders who have risen from the ranks, the general rule is, once a wage-earner always a wage-earner. [Pg 62] The number of those who can achieve industrial independence is moreover growing smaller as business becomes more specialized and centralized. The laborer therefore belongs to a class, which is rapidly developing what the German socialists call class-consciousness, that is, the feeling that he belongs to a distinct industrial group with interests different from and often antagonistic to those of other groups or classes. In his struggles with employers over wages this antagonism of immediate aims obscures the deeper mutuality and interdependence of their really complementary interests and not infrequently leads to a feeling of hostility, finding expression in strikes and labor agitation.

One of the most important factors in this situation—which we need to recognize from the outset—is the presence of a clear wage-earning class in modern industrial society. It's quite clear that under current production conditions, having significant capital or exceptional skills is necessary to become a manager of an industrial business. Most workers don't have either of these, and while there are some lucky examples of industrial leaders who rose from the ranks, the general rule is that once you're a wage-earner, you tend to stay a wage-earner. [Pg 62] Moreover, the number of people who can gain industrial independence is decreasing as businesses become more specialized and centralized. As a result, workers belong to a class that is rapidly developing what German socialists refer to as class-consciousness, meaning they feel they are part of a specific industrial group with interests that are different from—and often in conflict with—those of other groups or classes. In their struggles with employers over wages, the immediate clash of goals can obscure the deeper mutual benefits and interdependence of their actually complementary interests, often leading to feelings of animosity, which manifest in strikes and labor unrest.

In the transition to the factory system Mr. John A. Hobson[9] points out that the position of the laborer has been one of increasing dependence in the following five important points: (1) The ownership of material—at first the worker owned this and made it into the finished product, but now he has only a passing interest in a small part of the process of working it up. (2) Ownership of tools—he retained these up to the time of the introduction of machinery, but now seldom owns them. (3) Control of productive power—with the displacement of hand labor and muscular power by steam-driven machinery, he no longer owns even this. (4) Relations between workers and employers—they were formerly on an equality; under the guild system the master and the apprentice had the same social position; now the laborer has sunk in the scale, or the employer has risen, until the only bond between them is, as Carlyle said, the “cash nexus.” A case was recently instanced where a workingman who had been working in a factory met his employer for the first time at the end of seventeen years. (5) Workplace—until the establishment of the factory system this had always been the home; now [Pg 63] it is the factory, and there is a complete divorcement between work and the home.

In the shift to the factory system, Mr. John A. Hobson[9] highlights that the worker's position has increasingly become dependent in five key areas: (1) Ownership of materials—initially, the worker owned the materials and created the finished products, but now he only has a minimal interest in a small part of the production process. (2) Ownership of tools—he used to own his tools until machinery was introduced, but now he rarely owns them. (3) Control of productive power—with hand labor and physical effort replaced by steam-powered machinery, he no longer possesses this either. (4) Relations between workers and employers—these used to be equal; under the guild system, the master and the apprentice held the same social status; now the worker has diminished in rank, or the employer has elevated, until their only connection is, as Carlyle put it, the “cash nexus.” A recent example was cited where a factory worker met his employer for the first time after seventeen years. (5) Workplace—previously, this always took place at home; now it is in the factory, completely separating work from home life.

Another characteristic of modern industry from the labor point of view is the existence not merely of a wage-earning class, but, more fundamental, of the wage system. “It is characteristic of the modern industrial system,” writes President Hadley,[10] “that a laborer who owns no capital, though nominally free to do what he pleases, must actually find some property owner who will give him enough to keep him alive during the period which must elapse between the rendering of the labor and the sale of the finished product. Under such circumstances, the laborer almost inevitably submits to the direction of the property owner in deciding how his labor shall be applied. Laborers without capital must necessarily work on this basis; even those who have small amounts of capital habitually do so. Such advances of capital are known as wages.” Here we have the essence of the wage system in a nut shell. The laborer sells his labor to an employer for a stipulated wage. He has a commodity, his labor, consisting of a certain amount of strength and skill, which he is free to dispose of on the market to the best advantage, as the owner of any other commodity might do. Legally, labor is property. Owing, however, to the fact that all modern production requires capital, the only buyer of his labor is a capitalist, who directs the way in which the labor shall be applied. Such a condition, as well as some peculiarities of the commodity labor leave the laborer, indeed, only “nominally” free. In theory the labor contract is a perfectly free contract, entered into voluntarily by both employer and wage-earner, and the courts have generally insisted that this theoretical freedom must be maintained. In practice various modifications of the theory have taken place: legislation has been passed protecting [Pg 64] laborers from bargaining away their rights, and trade unions have been formed to bargain collectively for a group of laborers. In the last analysis, however, the laborer must support himself by the sale of his labor; society guarantees him neither a living nor even the right to work. He is a bargainer in a competitive industrial world and he must assume the responsibility of providing for himself and his family by securing work. Just what is involved in such a statement is perhaps best brought out by comparing the modern wage system with previous systems of labor.

Another feature of modern industry from the labor perspective is not just the presence of a wage-earning class, but, more fundamentally, the wage system. “It’s a characteristic of the modern industrial system,” writes President Hadley,[10] “that a worker who owns no capital, although technically free to do as they wish, must actually find a property owner who will provide them with enough to survive during the period that passes between their work and the sale of the finished product. Under these conditions, the worker almost inevitably submits to the direction of the property owner regarding how their labor should be used. Workers without capital must work on this basis; even those with small amounts of capital typically do. These advances of capital are known as wages.” Here we have the essence of the wage system summarized. The worker sells their labor to an employer for an agreed-upon wage. They have a commodity— their labor— made up of a certain amount of strength and skill, which they are free to sell on the market for the best advantage, just as the owner of any other commodity might do. Legally, labor is property. However, because all modern production requires capital, the only buyer of their labor is a capitalist, who decides how the labor will be applied. This condition, along with certain unique aspects of labor as a commodity, leaves the worker, indeed, only “nominally” free. In theory, the labor contract is a completely free agreement, entered into voluntarily by both the employer and the wage-earner, and the courts have generally insisted that this theoretical freedom must be upheld. In practice, various modifications of the theory have occurred: legislation has been enacted to protect workers from giving up their rights, and trade unions have been formed to negotiate collectively for groups of workers. Ultimately, however, the worker must sustain themselves through the sale of their labor; society guarantees them neither a livelihood nor even the right to work. They are a negotiator in a competitive industrial world and must take on the responsibility of providing for themselves and their family by finding work. What this statement entails is perhaps best illustrated by comparing the modern wage system with previous labor systems.

The first historical system of labor, aside from that in the family, was that of slaves. In this case the labor was forced, and being given under coercion was probably very inefficient; but the laborer was at least assured of a minimum of food, clothes and shelter. Slavery was the main source of manual labor in the ancient world, and did not disappear in England until the eleventh century. The feudal system of the Middle Ages was characterized by serfdom, according to which the laborer was bound to the soil and was compelled to render his lord certain services. Gradually serfdom was broken down and the wage system took its place, although remnants of serfdom remained in England until the eighteenth century. Four centuries before this, however, the disintegration of the feudal society had already begun, the serfdom of the agricultural laborer was commuted into regular money payments, and the artisan bought or otherwise secured his freedom from feudal exactions. In the towns industry was regulated by the guilds, and while at first they were distinctly beneficial, in time they became monopolistic and oppressive. Power was lodged in the hands of the wealthy traders and merchants and they legislated in their own behalf against the growing class of laborers, as did the wealthy land owners against the agricultural laborers. The Statute of Laborers and other acts sought to fix wages and to prevent the freedom [Pg 65] of the laborer in moving about or choosing his own occupation. Not indeed until the nineteenth century were the last of these old regulative laws repealed and the modern labor contract recognized in law and practice as a free contract. “The growth of labor,” says Brentano, has been “from the system of authority to the system of contract.” The system of authority, by which rates of wages, length of apprenticeship, and other details of industry were fixed by some superior authority, was found to be restrictive, uneconomic and unjust, and it gave way to the principle of economic freedom. According to the newer theory, first given effective voice by Adam Smith, in 1776, the individual should be left to himself, as he knows his own interest better than does the most enlightened government. The freest scope was given to the powers of individuals and each was to be the unlimited master of himself and his possessions.

The first historical system of labor, apart from that within families, was slavery. In this situation, labor was forced and likely very inefficient due to coercion, but at least the laborer was guaranteed a basic supply of food, clothing, and shelter. Slavery was the main source of manual labor in the ancient world, and it didn’t disappear in England until the eleventh century. The feudal system of the Middle Ages was marked by serfdom, where laborers were tied to the land and had to perform certain services for their lords. Over time, serfdom declined and was replaced by the wage system, although traces of serfdom lingered in England until the eighteenth century. Four centuries earlier, the disintegration of feudal society had already started, with the serfdom of agricultural laborers changing into regular monetary payments, and artisans either purchasing or otherwise gaining their freedom from feudal obligations. In towns, industry was controlled by guilds, which were beneficial at first but eventually became monopolistic and oppressive. Wealthy traders and merchants held all the power and enacted laws that favored themselves against the rising class of laborers, similar to how wealthy landowners acted against agricultural workers. The Statute of Laborers and other laws aimed to set wages and restrict laborers' freedom to move or choose their occupations. It wasn't until the nineteenth century that the last of these old regulatory laws were repealed, and modern labor contracts were legally recognized as free contracts. “The growth of labor,” says Brentano, has moved “from the system of authority to the system of contract.” The system of authority, which determined wage rates, apprenticeship length, and other industry details by some higher authority, was seen as limiting, uneconomic, and unjust, giving way to the principle of economic freedom. The newer theory, effectively articulated by Adam Smith in 1776, argued that individuals should be left to govern themselves, as they understand their own interests better than the most informed government. Individuals were granted maximum freedom to make their own choices and fully control their possessions.

It has since been found necessary, however, to modify both the theory and practice of this extreme individualism in order to protect the interests of various classes of society, especially the laborer. The legal theory still is that “today the labor contract is perfectly free: either side may make whatever contract he can get the other side to sign. Not only this, but either side may freely combine to demand any form of contract from the other side, as mere combinations alone are now made perfectly legal.”[11] In practice, however, this complete freedom has been greatly modified by factory acts, acts restricting the hours and conditions of employment of women and children, anti-truck acts, laws providing for weekly payments, guarding of machinery, limiting the hours of labor, and on the other hand prohibiting intimidation and molesting. For the most part these laws have applied to women and children, who are thought less capable of guarding their own interests, and [Pg 66] to a much less degree to labor contracts made by men, who have been considered better able to make equal contracts with employers. But concerning certain conditions of employment it has been realized that even adult males are not capable of securing equitable bargains, and along these lines the nominal freedom of the labor contract has been decidedly abridged. The attitude of the courts toward such legislation shows that they have declared many laws unconstitutional on the ground that they infringe upon the right of free contract, but in the long run seem inclined to uphold as much of this restrictive legislation as seems necessary to obviate the undoubtedly evil results that flow from this real inequality of employer and laborer.

It has since become necessary, however, to adjust both the theory and practice of this extreme individualism to protect the interests of different classes in society, especially workers. The legal theory still states that “today the labor contract is completely free: either side can create whatever contract they can get the other side to agree to. Not only that, but either side can freely band together to demand any form of contract from the other side, as mere associations have now been made fully legal.”[11] In practice, though, this total freedom has been significantly altered by labor laws, acts that limit the hours and conditions of employment for women and children, anti-truck regulations, laws ensuring weekly payments, machinery safety requirements, limits on working hours, and laws against intimidation and harassment. Mostly, these laws have been focused on women and children, who are seen as less capable of protecting their own interests, and to a much lesser extent on labor contracts made by men, who are viewed as better able to negotiate fair contracts with employers. However, regarding certain conditions of employment, it has been recognized that even adult men struggle to secure fair agreements, and because of this, the nominal freedom of the labor contract has been significantly reduced. The courts' stance on such legislation shows that they have ruled many laws unconstitutional on the grounds that they violate the right to free contract, but over time, they seem willing to support as much of this restrictive legislation as necessary to prevent the undeniably harmful outcomes that arise from the real inequality between employers and workers.

It is a very vital and important practical economic problem that presents itself in this connection. How far shall we carry this regulative principle, or how far shall we insist upon the principle of freedom? Many labor leaders are again asking for an effectual control of the labor contract, not by the action of trade unions, but by the direct legislation of the state. What shall be our attitude to this demand? Before we can fairly answer this question we must consider somewhat more fully the character of the bargain that takes place between an employer and an individual workman, and the nature of the commodity that the laborer has to sell.

It’s a really important and practical economic issue that comes up here. How far should we take this regulation principle, or how committed should we be to the principle of freedom? Many labor leaders are once again calling for effective control of labor contracts, not through trade unions, but through direct state legislation. What should our response be to this demand? Before we can answer that fairly, we need to take a closer look at the nature of the agreement between an employer and an individual worker, as well as what the worker is actually selling.

It has already been stated that the commodity which the laborer brings upon the market is his labor, that is, himself, his time, and his energies. But these wares are peculiar and differ in several important respects from ordinary marketable commodities. In the first place, labor is like a perishable commodity which must be sold at once if the owner is not to incur loss. The laborer has usually little if any capital by which to support himself in case he cannot find work, and may be compelled to make a forced sale of his labor, that is, to accept unduly low wages. In [Pg 67] this respect then he is at a disadvantage in bargaining with his employer. A second peculiarity of the sale of labor is that the laborer and his work are inseparable. The seller of an ordinary commodity disposes of it absolutely when he makes a sale. “It matters nothing to the seller of bricks whether they are to be used in building a palace or a sewer; but it matters a great deal to the seller of labor, who undertakes to perform a task of given difficulty, whether or not the place in which it is to be done is a wholesome and a pleasant one, or whether or not his associates will be such as he cares to have.” The person who buys this labor necessarily directs the application of it to the task in hand, and thus controls very largely the place, the sanitary and social conditions, the hours, the character, and safety of the work. In the third place, the superior knowledge and intelligence of the employers gives them an advantage in bargaining with their employes, while the reluctance of employers to “spoil the labor market” often prevents that freedom of competition which is supposed to secure to the laborer his full share of the product he helps to produce.

It has already been mentioned that the product the worker brings to the market is their labor, which means themselves, their time, and their energy. However, this product is unique and differs in several significant ways from regular market goods. First, labor is similar to a perishable good that must be sold right away to avoid loss. Workers usually have little to no savings to support themselves if they can’t find work, making them likely to be forced to sell their labor at unreasonably low wages. This puts them at a disadvantage when negotiating with their employers. A second unique aspect of labor sale is that the worker and their work are inherently linked. When someone sells a conventional product, they completely transfer ownership upon sale. For instance, it doesn’t matter to the seller of bricks whether they’re used to build a palace or a sewer; meanwhile, for the worker, it’s crucial whether the job site is safe and pleasant or if their coworkers will be people they want to work with. The buyer of labor effectively controls how it’s applied to the task at hand, heavily influencing the conditions of work, including the environment, health, hours, nature, and safety of the job. Finally, the greater knowledge and intelligence of employers give them an edge in negotiations with their employees, while employers' reluctance to “ruin the labor market” often stifles the kind of competition that would ensure workers receive their fair share of the products they help create.

In view of these facts we may fairly conclude that workmen are inferior to employers as bargainers and that protective legislation is necessary in order to put them on a real equality. “When laborers have to make a forced sale of their labor, their freedom of contract is more nominal than real. When women and children stand individually before the manager of hundreds of thousands of capital, it is possible that there may be little freedom and less equality in the contract by which they sell their services.”[12] It is clear that between two parties of such unequal knowledge, resources and ability as a laborer and his employer the labor contract cannot be entirely free and equal. While trade unions, by combining isolated workmen into formidable [Pg 68] and unified groups, have immeasurably increased their bargaining strength, yet legislation has also been found necessary to remedy the disadvantages already enumerated. It is realized that “there is no greater inequality than the equal treatment of unequals.” In the opening section of this text attention was called to the fact that economic freedom or liberty was one of the corner stones of our modern industrial society. But freedom can best be secured by securing equality and responsibility. Factory legislation and labor laws are designed to correct the inequalities imposed by nature or involved in the very nature of capitalistic production. Direct interference by the state in the freedom of contract is justified as leading to a more real and certain equality and liberty. But while we may thoroughly approve the principle of labor legislation it is difficult to know at what point we should stop. A leading American authority on the law of labor has stated[13] that “the industrial laborer at least is beginning to be a privileged class in the law.” On the other hand, it was possible for Disraeli to say as late as 1875, after the passage of the Employers and Workmen Act by the British Parliament, “for the first time in the history of this country employer and employed sit under equal laws”—so recently were the legal disabilities removed under which the English workmen had suffered up to this time.[14] The pendulum has swung so rapidly and so far in labor’s direction in the last generation that it is a fair question how far it will—or should—continue to go.

Given these facts, we can reasonably conclude that workers are at a disadvantage compared to employers when it comes to bargaining, and that protective laws are needed to level the playing field. “When laborers are forced to sell their labor, their freedom to negotiate is more symbolic than real. When women and children find themselves standing alone before the manager of large businesses, there’s likely to be little freedom and even less equality in the agreement by which they offer their services.”[12] It's clear that the labor contract can't be completely free and equal between two parties with such differing levels of knowledge, resources, and abilities as a worker and their employer. While trade unions have significantly boosted workers' bargaining power by uniting isolated individuals into strong and organized groups, legislation is also needed to address the previously mentioned disadvantages. It’s understood that “there’s no greater inequality than treating unequals equally.” In the opening section of this text, we noted that economic freedom or liberty is one of the cornerstones of our modern industrial society. However, freedom is best protected through securing equality and responsibility. Factory regulations and labor laws aim to correct the inequalities created by nature or inherent to capitalism. Government intervention in contract freedom is justified if it leads to a more genuine and certain equality and liberty. Yet, while we can fully support the principle of labor legislation, it’s challenging to pinpoint when it should end. A leading American expert on labor law has stated[13] that “industrial laborers are starting to become a privileged class under the law.” Conversely, Disraeli remarked as late as 1875, after the British Parliament enacted the Employers and Workmen Act, that “for the first time in this country, employers and employees are subject to equal laws”—such a short time ago that the legal barriers under which English workers had suffered were removed.[14] The balance has shifted so quickly and so far in labor's favor in the past generation that it raises the question of how far it will—or should—continue to go.

VIII. LABOR ORGANIZATIONS AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING.

As modern capitalistic production caused the growth of a distinct wage-earning class and brought about a sharp separation between employers and laborers, and as the latter [Pg 69] were thrown upon their own resources under the prevailing theories of free competition and free contract, it was inevitable that they should organize to secure their interests as a class. The growth of labor organizations has been greatest in those countries where the laborer has been forced to depend mostly upon his own efforts for protection and improvement, namely, in England and the United States. On the continent of Europe, on the other hand, where the individual has been accustomed to look to the government for the redress of industrial grievances, there has been a much less vigorous and spontaneous development of such organizations. They are a product of the nineteenth century and had their origin in modern machine production.

As modern capitalist production led to the rise of a distinct wage-earning class and created a clear divide between employers and workers, and as the latter were left to rely on their own resources under the dominant ideas of free competition and free contract, it was only natural that they would come together to protect their interests as a group. Labor organizations have grown the most in countries where workers have had to rely primarily on their own efforts for safety and improvement, particularly in England and the United States. In contrast, on the European continent, where individuals have been used to looking to the government for solutions to industrial issues, there has been much less vigorous and spontaneous development of such organizations. These groups emerged in the nineteenth century and originated from modern machine production.

The growth of labor organizations in the United States has proceeded hand in hand with the industrial development of this country, and has been especially rapid since the Civil War. Two distinct types of trade unions may be noted—the local and the national (or international) unions. The former, which comprises members who live and work in the same locality, is the primary unit, and dates back to the beginning of the century. Each local union, even when subordinate to a national organization, is a self-governing unit, and is absolutely democratic. Its relation to the national body has been well compared to that of one of our states to the United States. The first national union was not formed until 1850, but now these far surpass the locals in importance. Their government is representative, as they are made up of local unions. The great majority of the national trade unions are bound together in the powerful federal organization, the American Federation of Labor. The membership of this body numbers considerably over 1,000,000, while the railroad unions, which are not connected with it, claim about 125,000 more. Probably not far from 1,500,000 persons in the United States belong to labor organizations, which is about [Pg 70] 10 per cent of the total working population or about 15 per cent of those engaged in trade and transportation, manufacturing and mechanical pursuits. While this does not seem a very large proportion and is not as large as the membership of British trade unions, yet it must be remembered that they constitute on the whole the elite of the labor world and exercise an authority and power out of proportion to their numbers. Many other workmen, who do not themselves belong to the unions, follow their lead and are directly affected by their actions.

The growth of labor organizations in the United States has gone hand in hand with the country's industrial development, especially accelerating since the Civil War. There are two main types of trade unions: local and national (or international) unions. The local unions, made up of members who live and work in the same area, are the primary unit and have been around since the beginning of the century. Each local union, even when linked to a national organization, operates autonomously and is fully democratic. Its relationship with the national body is often compared to that of a state to the United States. The first national union was created in 1850, but now national unions far outnumber locals in significance. Their governance is representative since they consist of local unions. The majority of national trade unions are grouped in the strong federal organization, the American Federation of Labor. This organization has a membership of over 1,000,000, while the railroad unions not affiliated with it claim about another 125,000. Likely, around 1,500,000 individuals in the United States are part of labor organizations, representing about 10 percent of the total working population or around 15 percent of those engaged in trade and transportation, manufacturing, and mechanical jobs. While this may not seem like a large percentage, and is smaller than the membership of British trade unions, it’s important to remember that they represent the elite of the labor world and wield authority and influence that is disproportionate to their numbers. Many other workers who aren’t union members still follow their lead and are directly impacted by their actions.

Historically the two most important national organizations in this country have been the Knights of Labor and the American Federation of Labor, and they represent such different principles that it will be worth while to describe them. The Knights of Labor was organized in 1869 as a local union of seven garment cutters and had a meteoric career, counting a membership of 730,000 in 1886, the year of its greatest strength. It was a national amalgamation of mixed local assemblies composed of workers of all trades who lived in the same locality. It held the theory that the interests of all members of the laboring class are identical and must be cared for at the same time, if possible, by political action, by co-operation, and by education. In 1886, however, it entered upon a series of disastrous strikes; later it came into conflict with trade unions which had not joined its ranks and were opposed to its policies; and finally it became entangled in politics. As it lost in influence and strength its place was taken by the American Federation of Labor, which was its very opposite in organization and government. This latter body is a “confederation of trade and labor unions,” each trade being organized separately into local unions which are given great autonomy, these unions alone being represented in the national body. Only matters of general interest come before it, all local trade matters being left to the local unions. In 1903 it claimed a membership of 1,745,000.

Historically, the two most important national organizations in this country have been the Knights of Labor and the American Federation of Labor, and they represent such different principles that it’s worth describing them. The Knights of Labor was founded in 1869 as a local union of seven garment cutters and had a rapid rise, boasting a membership of 730,000 in 1886, its peak year. It was a national coalition of various local assemblies made up of workers from all trades living in the same area. It operated on the belief that the interests of all working-class members are the same and should be addressed simultaneously, if possible, through political action, cooperation, and education. However, in 1886, it began a series of disastrous strikes; later, it clashed with trade unions that had not joined and opposed its policies; and ultimately, it became entangled in politics. As it lost influence and strength, it was replaced by the American Federation of Labor, which was its complete opposite in structure and governance. This latter organization is a “confederation of trade and labor unions,” where each trade is organized separately into local unions that have significant autonomy, with only these unions being represented at the national level. Only matters of general interest are addressed by it, with all local trade issues managed by the local unions. In 1903, it claimed a membership of 1,745,000.

[Pg 71] More important than the history of labor organizations is a knowledge of their objects and methods. The primary purpose is of course to control the conditions of labor and to substitute the principle of collective bargaining for individual contract. As one of the most effective ways to secure this result they aim at a more or less complete monopoly of the labor market. This they may do by bringing all workers in a trade within the union or by preventing non-union men from working. The first of these is called the inclusive method,[15] and if successful makes the union the sole seller of the kind of labor controlled by its members. It is a monopoly of the laborers against the employers and is sought to be enforced by inducing men to join the union either by persuasion or coercion, the latter finding expression in the strikes against the employment of non-union men and the insistence upon the “closed shop.” The other form of monopoly consists in the exclusion of new members from the trade and in a control of employment; this is a monopoly of a small group against their fellow-workmen. It is enforced by regulating the entrance to the trade, making it difficult or expensive, or by limiting the number of apprentices. Sometimes, as in the Chicago Building Trades in 1900, they have united with their employers by means of “exclusive agreements” to raise wages and prices of the finished products at the same time, and thus jointly to mulct the public. Such efforts to monopolize the labor market have their counterparts in the organization of capital, as we have seen. In practice such a labor monopoly has sometimes been used to improve and elevate conditions, just as sometimes a capitalistic monopoly has reduced prices below the competitive point. In general, however, we must condemn monopoly on principle in the competitive field and insist that freedom and opportunity be given to all on as equal terms as possible. Of [Pg 72] the two forms of trade union monopoly, the former alone, which endeavors to make it all comprehensive and to enforce generally union conditions, can be economically justified.

[Pg 71] More important than the history of labor organizations is understanding their goals and methods. The main purpose is to manage labor conditions and replace individual contracts with collective bargaining. To achieve this, they aim for a near-complete monopoly of the labor market. They can do this by bringing all workers in a trade into the union or by preventing non-union workers from getting jobs. The first approach is known as the inclusive method,[15] and, if successful, makes the union the only provider of the type of labor that its members offer. It's a monopoly of workers against employers, and it’s enforced by persuading people to join the union, either through encouragement or pressure, the latter showing up in strikes against the employment of non-union workers and the insistence on a “closed shop.” The other type of monopoly involves excluding new members from the trade and controlling employment; this is a monopoly of a small group against their fellow workers. It’s enforced by regulating access to the trade, making it challenging or costly, or by limiting the number of apprentices. Sometimes, as in the Chicago Building Trades in 1900, they've teamed up with employers through “exclusive agreements” to simultaneously raise wages and the prices of finished products, effectively taking advantage of the public. Attempts to monopolize the labor market mirror the organization of capital, as we have seen. In practice, a labor monopoly has at times been used to improve conditions, just as a capitalistic monopoly has occasionally lowered prices below competitive levels. Generally, however, we should condemn monopolies in principle in competitive fields and advocate for freedom and opportunity for everyone on as equal terms as possible. Of the two types of trade union monopolies, only the first, which seeks to be all-encompassing and enforce union conditions broadly, can be economically justified. [Pg 72]

“The establishment of a standard rate of wages may perhaps be said to be the primary object of trade union policy. Without the standard rate the trade union, such as it is, could have no existence.”[16] The purpose of the union is to substitute collective bargaining for individual agreements and thereby to improve the condition of its members. But if a single bargain is to determine the pay of a large number of men, there must be a common standard. In every employment on a large scale the men are necessarily grouped together and their pay is determined by a common rule. This is true even in non-union shops. It is generally assumed that the standard rate of labor organizations means a uniform wage for each member, but this is not the case; it means rather a uniform rate of pay to all for the same performance. In the case of piece work, it could manifestly not mean anything else; but a large number of labor leaders object to piece work. They insist that a standard wage means a minimum wage, and that by the establishment of such a minimum the whole standard of efficiency and the plane of competition are raised, as the employers cannot then afford to hire any but competent workmen. The question immediately presents itself as to what is to become of the older or partially disabled men, who are no longer able to earn the standard or minimum wage? In England they are practically guaranteed a subsistence by the union; in this country the union not infrequently exempts them from the provisions as to the standard wage. When the rule is enforced there is certainly a real hardship for these men. But from the employers there comes the more serious [Pg 73] complaint that the effect of the standard wage is to reduce to a dead level the efficient and the inefficient; that it is a maximum wage and that the efficient and industrious are prevented from earning more than a fixed amount. There is undoubtedly a great deal of truth in this charge; the man who hastens the pace is said to be taking “blood money,” and sometimes a maximum wage is set which the members are forbidden to exceed. On the other hand, it may fairly be said that while the union regulation of wages does tend to produce greater uniformity, the union rate is usually higher than the competitive rate would be, that is, wages are leveled up, not down; and finally, that territorial variations make the local rate conform to local conditions.

“The establishment of a standard wage rate is probably the main goal of trade union policy. Without a standard rate, the trade union, as it exists, wouldn’t be able to function.”[16] The union’s purpose is to replace individual agreements with collective bargaining, thus improving the conditions for its members. However, if one agreement is going to set the pay for many people, there has to be a common standard. In large-scale jobs, workers are grouped together, and their pay follows a shared rule. This holds true even in non-union workplaces. It’s generally believed that the standard rate from labor organizations means a uniform wage for each member, but that’s not accurate; it actually refers to a consistent rate of pay for everyone performing the same task. In the case of piece work, it clearly can’t mean anything else, yet many labor leaders oppose piece work. They argue that a standard wage implies a minimum wage, and by establishing that minimum, the overall standard of efficiency and level of competition are raised, since employers can only afford to hire capable workers. A question immediately arises about what happens to older or partially disabled workers who can’t earn the standard or minimum wage anymore. In England, they’re basically guaranteed a basic living by the union; in this country, unions often exempt them from the rules regarding the standard wage. When the rule is enforced, it definitely creates a real hardship for these individuals. However, employers have a more significant complaint that the standard wage tends to flatten out the distinctions between the efficient and the inefficient; that it acts as a maximum wage, limiting diligent workers from earning more than a set amount. There is certainly a lot of truth to this accusation; workers who increase their pace are said to be earning “blood money,” and sometimes a maximum wage is established that members are not allowed to exceed. On the flip side, it can be argued that while union wage regulations do lead to more uniformity, the union rate is typically higher than what the competitive rate would be, meaning wages are raised, not lowered; and finally, that local variations adjust the local wage to fit local conditions.

A reduction in the hours of labor has been even more strenuously urged by progressive labor leaders in the United States than an increase in wages. “Organize and control your trade and shorten your hours,” is their contention, “and wages will take care of themselves.” Their arguments in favor of a general shortening of the working day are twofold. In the first place, owing to the intensity and strain of work under modern machine methods, the worker cannot work efficiently more than eight or nine hours a day. The work is too exacting and the strain on the attention too great; it is a noticeable fact that most of the accidents in industrial establishments occur in the last hour or two of the working day. Not only that, but the laborer is entitled to his share of industrial progress in the form of more leisure, giving him time for a better family and social life, affording opportunity for intellectual improvement, and permitting the development of more rational and higher wants. With the improvement in the condition of the laboring classes, will go the elevation of society as a whole.

A reduction in work hours has been strongly advocated by progressive labor leaders in the United States, even more than higher wages. “Organize and take control of your trade, and shorten your hours,” is their belief, “and wages will take care of themselves.” They make two key arguments for a general decrease in the working day. First, due to the intensity and demands of modern machine work, employees can’t work efficiently for more than eight or nine hours a day. The job is too demanding, and the strain on concentration is too high; it’s a clear fact that most workplace accidents happen in the last hour or two of the workday. Additionally, workers deserve their share of industrial progress in the form of more leisure time, allowing for better family and social lives, providing opportunities for intellectual growth, and enabling the pursuit of more rational and elevated desires. As the conditions for the working class improve, society as a whole will rise as well.

The second argument in favor of shorter hours put forward by the trade unionist, is economic rather than social. [Pg 74] He argues that a “reduction of hours will diminish the supply of labor in the market, and so will raise its price. It will make room for the unemployed, and so will remove the depressing influence of their competition.” There is involved in this contention the familiar lump-of-labor argument of the trade unionist: there is just so much work to be done, and if some men do each a little less there will be more for others. By shortening the hours of labor of everybody employment will be made more general, and the work will be better distributed. Now the economists in general have supported the trade unions in their demands for a shorter working day, but they have done so because they believed that the product of industry would not thereby be diminished. They have seen that when the hours of labor were reduced the laborer was less rapidly worn out physically, that he could work more rapidly for a short time, and that his increased leisure and pay, if rationally used, made him a more intelligent and efficient worker. In other words, a reduction in the hours of labor from 15 a day to 12, to 10, and even in some cases to 8, was not attended by a parallel reduction in the output, but the latter remained about the same. This is the great economic justification of the shorter working day, and as long as this can go on without materially affecting the product of industry it must be approved. If, however, the latter is decreased there will be less to divide and then the relative disadvantages of a smaller dividend must be weighed against the advantages of increased leisure. Of course the point to which the number of hours can be reduced without lessening the product can only be determined by experiment, and will differ in different trades, but it is inevitable that until this point is reached the pressure of the trade unions for shorter working days—or for more holidays or half-holidays—will not be successfully resisted.

The second argument for shorter working hours presented by the trade unionist is economic rather than social. [Pg 74] He argues that reducing hours will lessen the supply of labor in the market, which will increase its price. This will create opportunities for the unemployed, removing the negative impact of their competition. This argument involves the common lump-of-labor theory from trade unionists: there’s a finite amount of work available, and if some workers do a little less, there will be more available for others. By shortening everyone's working hours, employment will become more widespread, and the work will be better allocated. Generally, economists have supported trade unions in their push for a shorter workday, believing that industrial output wouldn't be reduced. They have observed that when working hours were cut, workers weren't physically exhausted as quickly, could work faster for a shorter period, and that their increased leisure and pay, if used wisely, made them more skilled and effective. In other words, reducing working hours from 15 to 12, to 10, and in some cases even to 8, didn’t lead to a significant drop in output, which remained roughly the same. This is the primary economic rationale for the shorter workday, and as long as this can continue without greatly impacting industrial output, it should be supported. However, if output does decrease, there will be less to distribute, and the disadvantages of a smaller share must be compared to the benefits of increased leisure. The specific point at which hours can be reduced without lowering output can only be determined through trials and will vary across different industries, but it's inevitable that until this point is reached, the trade unions' demand for shorter workdays—or more holidays or half-holidays—will continue to prevail.

[Pg 75] Turning now from theory to fact, we find that there has been a great improvement in the condition of labor in this respect. At the beginning of the nineteenth century the almost universal working day was, as McMaster tells us, from sun to sun. As factories grew up the habits of agricultural labor were carried over into industrial occupations, and working days of 16 and 18 hours were not uncommon. In 1903 the average length of the working day in the United States was 9.6 hours. This great reform may fairly be credited to the efforts of organized labor itself, for without their insistence and struggles it is unlikely that it would have been voluntarily granted by employers.

[Pg 75] Shifting from theory to reality, we see that there has been significant improvement in the working conditions. At the start of the nineteenth century, the typical workday, as McMaster points out, was from sunrise to sunset. As factories emerged, the working habits of agricultural laborers transitioned into industrial jobs, and workdays of 16 to 18 hours were common. By 1903, the average length of the workday in the United States was 9.6 hours. This major reform can largely be attributed to the efforts of organized labor itself; without their pressure and struggles, it's doubtful employers would have willingly made these changes.

The limitation of output results almost necessarily from the above-mentioned practices of the unions: reduction of hours, prohibition of piece work, and the standardization of wages all tend to restrict the output of the individual worker. But some of the unions have gone further and have directly limited the amount that could be produced during a given period by the laborer. This has been particularly true of British unions and is the subject of common complaint by English employers and writers, but illustrations may easily be found in the United States. Thus in Chicago in 1900 “the lathers limited a day’s work to twenty-five bundles of lath, for which they received $3; they had formerly done thirty-five bundles for a daily wage of $1.75. Plasterers were limited to thirty square yards a day; the steam fitters were permitted to lay only ninety feet of steam pipe per day; but the plumbers had the most objectionable rules and restricted materially the amount of work that could be done in a day.”[17] These rules were defended by the unions on the ground that they were necessary in order to secure careful work and to prevent the “rusher” for setting the pace for a fair day’s work. [Pg 76] The practice has not been uncommon, especially in the sweated trades, for an unscrupulous employer to pay a few particularly able workmen to put extra speed into their work and so set a pace that the other workmen would be compelled to maintain. This was especially objected to by the unions in the case of team work. They claimed that when all the workmen had come up to the new standard, particularly in piece work, the wages were reduced so that even by working at the higher rate of speed, they could only make a fair wage. One of the rules of the Chicago carpenters’ union provided that “any member guilty of excessive work or rushing on any job shall be reported and shall be subject to a fine of $5.” Whatever the excuse it is clear that such limitations cannot be economically justified. Not only does such dawdling undermine the industrial efficiency of the worker, but it is unfair to the employer. If the latter bargains for the union rate of wages and the normal working day, he is entitled to a full return of the laborer’s best efforts. Otherwise there is no fairness in collective bargaining. “So far as labor leaders are concerned,” said Mr. John Burns, the English trade unionist, “we are all strongly opposed to the restriction of production; we are all in favor of better and more conscientious work.”

The limitation of output results almost inevitably from the practices mentioned earlier by the unions: shorter hours, bans on piece work, and wage standardization all restrict the output of individual workers. Some unions have taken it further and directly limited the amount that a worker could produce in a given time. This has been particularly true with British unions, causing frequent complaints from English employers and writers, but similar examples can be found in the United States. For instance, in Chicago in 1900, “the lathers limited a day’s work to twenty-five bundles of lath, for which they received $3; they had previously completed thirty-five bundles for a daily wage of $1.75. Plasterers were capped at thirty square yards a day; steam fitters could lay only ninety feet of steam pipe each day; however, the plumbers had the most objectionable rules, significantly limiting how much work could be done in a day.”[17] These rules were defended by the unions on the grounds that they were necessary to ensure quality work and to prevent a “rusher” from dictating the pace for a fair day’s work. [Pg 76] It hasn’t been uncommon, especially in low-wage jobs, for unethical employers to pay a few particularly skilled workers to work faster, setting a pace that other workers felt pressured to maintain. Unions especially objected to this in team settings. They argued that once all workers reached the new standard, particularly in piece work, wages were reduced so even with increased productivity, they could only earn a fair wage. One of the rules of the Chicago carpenters’ union stated that “any member guilty of excessive work or rushing on any job shall be reported and shall be subject to a fine of $5.” Regardless of the reasoning, it’s clear that such limitations can’t be economically justified. Not only does this slowdown undermine the industrial efficiency of workers, but it’s also unfair to employers. If an employer agrees to the union wage and the normal working day, they deserve a full return on the worker’s best efforts. Otherwise, collective bargaining isn’t fair. “As far as labor leaders are concerned,” said Mr. John Burns, the English trade unionist, “we are all strongly opposed to production restrictions; we all support better and more conscientious work.”

Laboring men have never been quite able to divest themselves of their old antipathy to labor-saving machinery. They generally regard the introduction of a new machine as a displacer of men, a creator of unemployment, a depresser of wages. Some unions have successfully resisted the introduction of machinery into their trades, as the stone cutters in Chicago,[18] but in general they have recognized the impossibility of this attitude. In general they now demand that when machinery is introduced it shall be operated by union men and their wages shall be fixed [Pg 77] so as to give the workers a share of the increased production.

Working men have never really been able to shake off their old dislike for labor-saving machines. They typically see the arrival of a new machine as a threat to jobs, causing unemployment and lowering wages. Some unions have effectively fought against the use of machines in their industries, like the stone cutters in Chicago,[18] but overall they have come to accept that this mindset isn't feasible. Nowadays, they generally demand that when machines are brought in, they should be operated by union workers, and their wages should be set to ensure that the workers benefit from the increased production.

The policies and methods of the trade unions thus far discussed are those of a militant nature, but the fraternal objects of these associations, though less conspicuous, are none the less important. Labor organizations generally; have insurance and benefit features, by which sick, injured, or unemployed members are assisted. This is particularly true of the English organizations, which developed these features before the rise of the militant new unionism. They often possess large funds and have been rendered thereby more conservative and responsible. The educative effect of trade unionism among the members is marked; some of them possess libraries and all of them promote discussion and thought upon economic problems, while the administration of their affairs often gives valuable training. The older unions did much to encourage co-operation among their members, but today the tendency is to limit their activities to the essential one for which they are organized, namely, collective bargaining.

The policies and methods of the trade unions discussed so far are militant in nature, but the supportive purposes of these associations, while less noticeable, are just as important. Labor organizations generally provide insurance and benefits to help sick, injured, or unemployed members. This is especially true for English organizations, which developed these benefits before the rise of the militant new unionism. They often have large funds, making them more conservative and responsible. The educational impact of trade unionism among members is significant; some have libraries, and all promote discussion and critical thinking about economic issues, while managing their affairs often provides valuable training. The older unions did a lot to encourage cooperation among their members, but today the trend is to focus their activities on the main purpose for which they were established: collective bargaining.

Intelligent unionists realize that they can secure the various objects for which they strive only by substituting collective bargaining for contracts between employers and individual laborers. Where this plan is accepted by employers, representatives of the two sides agree upon wage scales, usually for a year; during this period the chief task of union officials is to see that the agreement is lived up to, and if possible to add to their membership and strengthen the union. In the United States relatively few trades have adopted this method as a general practice, the employers still being able to dictate wages and conditions of employment in most of them, while the unions are still struggling for recognition, if not for existence. Employers insist, in refusing to make collective bargains with the unions, that, as they run all the risks, they must be permitted to manage their business as they see fit and without interference [Pg 78] from the business agent of the union. In reply the unions insist that hours, wages, and conditions of employment are as much their business as that of the employer. The latter also urges that the trade unions as at present organized are too irresponsible and before they ask for collective bargaining should be incorporated, so that they could be sued for breach of contract if guilty of such. As yet, however, the unions have preferred their present position of irresponsibility and immunity and have almost invariably refused to be incorporated.

Intelligent union members understand that they can achieve their goals only by replacing individual contracts between employers and workers with collective bargaining. When employers agree to this approach, representatives from both sides negotiate wage scales, typically for one year. During this time, the main focus for union officials is ensuring the agreement is followed and, if possible, increasing their membership to strengthen the union. In the United States, relatively few industries have adopted this method broadly, as employers still have the upper hand in setting wages and working conditions in most cases, and unions continue to fight for recognition, if not survival. Employers argue that since they take on all the risks, they should be allowed to manage their businesses independently, without interference from union representatives. In response, unions claim that work hours, wages, and conditions are just as much their concern as they are for the employer. Employers also argue that the current structure of trade unions is too irresponsible and that unions should be incorporated before seeking collective bargaining so they could be held legally accountable for breaches of contract. However, the unions have so far chosen to maintain their current position of immunity and have almost always declined to incorporate.

“In the minds of a large section of the public,” writes President Hadley,[19] “labor unions are chiefly associated with strikes. It is believed by many who ought to know better, that such organizations exist for the purpose of striking, and that if the organizations were suppressed, industrial peace would be secured. The first of these ideas is a distorted one; the second is wholly unfounded.” Strikes are, however, a necessary concomitant of collective bargaining. If the representatives of a union cannot come to terms with an employer, they may compel their members to refuse to sell their commodity, labor; such a concerted refusal to work is a strike. The “right to quit work” has been regarded as a sacred one by trade unionists, but it involves social consequences of great importance. For the workingman, it means loss of wages and demoralizing idleness; to the employer, idle capital, loss of profits, and depreciation of plant; and to the consuming public, inconvenience and annoyance together with curtailed production. Quite aside from all acts of violence and lawlessness, by which they are too often accompanied, there is involved an enormous money waste. According to a report of the Department of Labor, losses from strikes and lockouts in the United States from 1881 to 1900 amounted to $449,342,000 or an average loss per establishment involved of about $3,500.

“In the minds of a large part of the public,” writes President Hadley,[19] “labor unions are mainly associated with strikes. Many people who should know better believe that these organizations exist solely to strike, and that eliminating them would achieve industrial peace. The first idea is misguided; the second is completely unfounded.” Strikes are, however, an essential part of collective bargaining. If union representatives can’t reach an agreement with an employer, they may urge their members to refuse to sell their labor; this collective refusal to work is a strike. Trade unionists have viewed the “right to quit work” as sacred, but it carries significant social consequences. For workers, it means losing wages and facing demoralizing idleness; for employers, it leads to idle capital, profit loss, and depreciation of equipment; and for consumers, it results in inconvenience, annoyance, and decreased production. Beyond the violence and lawlessness that often accompany them, there is a tremendous waste of money involved. According to a report from the Department of Labor, losses from strikes and lockouts in the United States from 1881 to 1900 totaled $449,342,000, averaging about $3,500 per establishment involved.

[Pg 79] The public is awakening to the realization that it suffers the greatest injury as the innocent third party to every industrial dispute, and is insisting that the industrial peace be kept or more reasonable methods of settling differences be found than a strike or lockout. Such a method is found in conciliation and arbitration. In the older and more strongly organized unions strikes are infrequent and methods of joint discussion and agreement are increasingly resorted to. Boards of conciliation are often provided for, which endeavor by means of conference and concession to prevent a dispute from arising; they succeed best where both employers and employes are organized. Should the dispute come to a head, however, provision is usually made for its reference to a board of arbitration, which may be selected by the disputants themselves or may be created by the state; in the latter case the acceptance of the award may be voluntary or compulsory. In the United States most of the successful boards have been those selected by the parties to the dispute; the state boards have usually the power only of investigating the causes of the trouble, but this in itself has proved of considerable value in more than one instance, notably in the case of the Anthracite Coal Commission. Compulsory arbitration is being given a thorough trial in Australasia and seems to be meeting with success there. In this country, however, the trade unions are strongly opposed to compulsory or enforced governmental arbitration. Writing of Great Britain, Mr. and Mrs. Webb assert that the principle of arbitration, having been found inconsistent with collective bargaining, is fast going out of favor. It would seem from the experience of both England and the United States that the chief virtue in these methods lies in the habit of joint conference and conciliation between the representatives of labor and capital.

[Pg 79] The public is starting to realize that it is the innocent bystander suffering the most in every industrial dispute, and there is growing insistence on maintaining industrial peace or finding more reasonable ways to resolve conflicts than through strikes or lockouts. One solution is through conciliation and arbitration. In well-established and organized unions, strikes are rare, and there’s a growing reliance on joint discussion and agreement. Conciliation boards are often set up to prevent disputes from occurring through conferences and compromises; they work best when both employers and employees are organized. If a dispute escalates, there is typically a process to refer it to an arbitration board, which can be chosen by the disputing parties or established by the state; in the latter case, accepting the ruling can be voluntary or mandatory. In the United States, most successful boards have been those selected by the parties involved; state boards generally only have the authority to investigate the underlying issues, which has proven to be quite valuable in several cases, particularly with the Anthracite Coal Commission. Compulsory arbitration is being thoroughly tested in Australasia and appears to be successful there. However, in this country, trade unions strongly oppose mandatory governmental arbitration. Commenting on Great Britain, Mr. and Mrs. Webb state that arbitration is losing favor as it is seen as incompatible with collective bargaining. It seems from the experiences of both England and the United States that the real benefit of these methods lies in the practice of joint meetings and conciliation between labor and management representatives.

[Pg 80] IX. WOMEN AND CHILDREN AT WORK.

While women and children have always assisted in the work of the home, it was not until the development of the factory system that they began to work for wages outside of the family. From the earliest days the preparation of food, spinning and weaving and making up of garments, and other branches of domestic economy had been the peculiar tasks of the housewife. With the removal of the textile industries from the home to the factory and the invention of light-running machinery, many women followed them and employment was found also for young children. Thus with the inception of the modern factory system and machine production there arose the problem of woman and child labor. In England the evils of the early factory system were incredibly bad. “The beginning of the present century,” wrote President Walker,[20] “found children of five, and even of three years of age, in England, working in factories and brickyards; women working underground in mines, harnessed with mules to carts, drawing heavy loads; found the hours of labor whatever the avarice of individual mill owners might exact, were it thirteen, or fourteen, or fifteen; found no guards about machinery to protect life and limb; found the air of the factory fouler than language can describe, even could human ears bear to hear the story.” Conditions were never so bad in this country as in England owing to the later development of the system and prompter legislation against its evils, and especially to the scarcity of labor which compelled employers to make the conditions of labor more attractive.

While women and children have always helped with home tasks, it wasn't until the factory system developed that they started earning wages outside the family. Traditionally, the preparation of food, spinning, weaving, making garments, and other domestic duties were the main responsibilities of housewives. As textile industries moved from homes to factories and light machinery was invented, many women followed these jobs, and young children also found work. This marked the beginning of the modern factory system and machine production, which brought about the issue of labor for women and children. In England, the problems of the early factory system were extremely severe. “The beginning of the present century,” wrote President Walker,[20] “found children of five, and even of three years of age, in England, working in factories and brickyards; women working underground in mines, harnessed with mules to carts, pulling heavy loads; workers dealt with whatever hours of labor the greed of individual mill owners required, whether it was thirteen, fourteen, or fifteen; there were no safety measures around machinery to protect lives and limbs; and the factory air was dirtier than words can convey, even if human ears could bear to hear the story.” Conditions were never as severe in this country as in England, thanks to the later development of the system and faster legislation against its abuses, particularly due to the labor shortage that forced employers to improve working conditions.

The field of employment for women has been a constantly expanding one. When Miss Harriet Martineau visited the United States in 1840 she found only seven occupations open to women, namely, teaching, needle-work, [Pg 81] keeping boarders, work in the cotton mills, type-setting, book-binding, and domestic service. Since that time the area has widened until there is scarcely an occupation in which women are not found except those closed to her by law or by physical inability. The number of females 10 years of age and over engaged in gainful occupations was 2,647,000 in 1880 or 14.7 per cent of the total female population; this number more than doubled in the next twenty years, being 5,319,000 in 1900 or 18.8 per cent of all. The largest number employed was in domestic and personal service, and next to that in manufacturing and mechanical pursuits, though even in that branch they were most numerous in the traditional branches of woman’s work, as dressmakers, seamstresses, etc. It is nevertheless in the manufacturing industries that the most serious evils connected with woman and child labor are found. The problems differ greatly in different sections of the United States: in the Atlantic states the greatest proportion of women as compared with men find employment and give rise to special problems of women’s work; in the South child labor is more conspicuous; while in the West both woman and child labor are of relatively small importance.

The job market for women has been constantly growing. When Miss Harriet Martineau visited the United States in 1840, she found only seven jobs available to women: teaching, needlework, keeping boarders, working in cotton mills, typesetting, bookbinding, and domestic service. Since then, the options have expanded to the point where there are hardly any jobs that women can't hold, except those restricted by law or physical limitations. In 1880, the number of women aged 10 and older engaged in paid work was 2,647,000, or 14.7% of the total female population; that number more than doubled in the next twenty years, reaching 5,319,000 in 1900, or 18.8% of all women. The largest group of employed women was in domestic and personal services, followed by manufacturing and mechanical jobs, although even in that sector, they were mainly found in traditional roles like dressmakers and seamstresses. However, the most serious issues related to women's and children's labor are present in manufacturing industries. The challenges vary significantly across different regions of the United States: in the Atlantic states, a larger proportion of women compared to men are employed, leading to unique challenges for women's work; in the South, child labor is more prominent, while in the West, both women's and children's labor are relatively less significant.

An interesting question suggests itself at this point: Is the increase in the employment of women at the expense of men? Are the women crowding the men out of their occupations and taking their places? At first inspection the statistics of occupations would seem to lead to an affirmative answer, for the percentage of women breadwinners increased from 13.5 per cent of all such in 1880 to 16.6 per cent in 1900, while that of the men fell from 80 to 77.3 per cent, and that of the children remained about the same. The cause of the change in the proportion of the sexes was not due, however, to any falling off in the number of men, but to the great influx of women into the ranks of wage-workers. In some lines of employment, like those of bookkeepers, stenographers, typewriters, [Pg 82] clerks, etc., there has undoubtedly been an encroachment and men have been displaced. But on the other hand, many occupations have been opened to men during the last fifty years that were unknown before. Such have been the expanding fields of railroad construction and operation, the steel industry, the utilization of electricity, and other similar lines. In most of these the muscular effort involved or the character of the work have kept women out, but in other lines where special rapidity or lightness of touch are required the women outnumber the men, as in the manufacture of cotton goods, hosiery, hats and caps, etc. The development and improvement of machinery has of course favored the employment of women. Mr. John A. Hobson[21] asserts that “in modern machinery a larger and larger amount of inventive skill is engaged in adjusting machine-tending to the physical and mental capacity of women and children.” He concludes that if the exploitation of these forms of cheap labor had not been prevented by factory legislation and by public disapproval, “the great mass of the textile factories of this country [England] would have been almost entirely worked by women and children.” As a matter of fact one of the reasons for the great expansion of woman labor in the United States as well as England is because it has been found cheaper than man’s labor. We are thus brought face to face with a fundamental question in the discussion of the problem—why are women paid lower wages than men?

An interesting question comes up at this point: Is the rise in women’s employment happening at the expense of men? Are women pushing men out of their jobs and taking their places? At first glance, the statistics on occupations seem to suggest a yes, as the percentage of women breadwinners increased from 13.5% of all such in 1880 to 16.6% in 1900, while the percentage of men dropped from 80% to 77.3%, with the children’s percentage staying about the same. However, the reason for the change in the gender ratio wasn’t because the number of men decreased, but due to the significant influx of women into the workforce. In some fields like bookkeeping, stenography, typing, clerking, etc., there has indeed been an overlap, and men have been displaced. On the other hand, many job opportunities have emerged for men over the last fifty years that didn’t exist before. These include growing sectors like railroad construction and operation, the steel industry, and the use of electricity, among others. In most of these areas, the physical demands of the work have kept women out, but in other sectors where speed or precision is key, women outnumber men, such as in cotton goods manufacturing, hosiery, hats, and caps. The development and improvement of machinery have clearly supported the employment of women. Mr. John A. Hobson asserts that “in modern machinery, more and more inventive skill is focused on adapting machine-tending to the physical and mental abilities of women and children.” He concludes that if the exploitation of these forms of cheap labor hadn’t been curbed by factory legislation and public disapproval, “the vast majority of textile factories in this country [England] would have been nearly entirely staffed by women and children.” In fact, one reason for the significant increase in women’s labor in both the United States and England is that it has been found to be cheaper than men’s labor. We are thus confronted with a fundamental question in this discussion—why are women paid lower wages than men?

As to the fact there is no doubt; one comparison taken from the Census of 1900 will be sufficient to illustrate it: the annual average earnings of men in mechanical and manufacturing industries were $490, and of women $272 per annum. The more important question is why this difference exists. A number of reasons suggest themselves at once. In the first place women are less efficient than men and [Pg 83] produce less; hence they are paid less. In some industries, particularly those requiring physical strength, women cannot compete successfully, and those are usually the highest paid employments. Other well-paid industries are regarded by men as essentially their own and social pressure is applied to keep women out. Then, too, woman’s ambition to attain industrial efficiency is not so great, owing to her expectation of marriage and release from industrial life. Women are more often absent from work owing to sickness and domestic claims upon their time; this irregularity of employment tends to reduce their efficiency. But even in employments where the efficiency of men and women are admittedly equal the women receive lower wages in the majority of cases. According to a report of the Bureau of Labor, out of 100 cases where the women did the same work as the men and did it as well, they received lower wages than the men in 80. This leads to the consideration of a second group of causes, which have to do with woman’s standard of living. One reason why she receives less is because she is able and willing to live on less. Physiologically, Dr. Atwater has said, man needs one-fifth more nutriment than woman. Women’s wages are less because of their somewhat lower cost of subsistence. But even aside from this fact, the frequent partial dependence of women upon other members of their family for support makes them willing to accept less and consequently reduces their wages. The average American workingwoman is young, only about twenty-two and a half years old, and after the age of twenty-five is reached the number declines rapidly. That is to say, working girls regard their employment as a temporary affair, remaining only about five years on the average in the store or factory; during this time they often live at home with their parents and are content to receive a wage much smaller than a man would require as head of a household.

There is no doubt about the facts; one comparison from the 1900 Census illustrates this well: the average annual earnings of men in mechanical and manufacturing industries were $490, while women earned $272 per year. The more important question is why this difference exists. Several reasons come to mind right away. First, women are generally less efficient than men and produce less, which is why they earn less. In some industries, particularly those that require physical strength, women cannot compete effectively, and those tend to be the highest-paying jobs. Additionally, many high-paying fields are viewed by men as their territory, and social pressure is used to keep women out. Furthermore, women's ambition to achieve industrial efficiency is often not as strong, given their expectation of getting married and leaving the workforce. Women also tend to miss work more frequently due to illness and domestic responsibilities, which affects their job stability and efficiency. However, even in jobs where men's and women's efficiency is equal, women still receive lower wages in most cases. According to a Bureau of Labor report, in 100 instances where women performed the same work as men equally well, they were paid less than men in 80 of those cases. This leads to another set of factors related to women's cost of living. One reason women earn less is that they can and will live on less. Physiologically, Dr. Atwater noted that men require about one-fifth more nutrition than women. Women’s wages are lower partly because of their somewhat lower living expenses. Moreover, the fact that many women rely on their families for financial support makes them more inclined to accept lower pay, which further drives their wages down. The average American working woman is young, around twenty-two and a half years old, and after she turns twenty-five, the numbers decline sharply. In other words, working girls see their jobs as temporary, typically staying in retail or manufacturing for about five years on average; during this time, they often live at home with their parents and are satisfied with a salary much less than what a man would need as the head of a household.

The third reason is, however, the most important, because [Pg 84] it explains at the same time the low economic position which woman occupies in the industrial world. The narrowing of the field within which women can readily find employment has the effect of greatly intensifying the competition within that field. There is also a great reserve army of potential women wage-earners, whom a slight increase of wages or force of circumstances—loss of employment by the male members of the family—will bring into the field as competitors. There is, in other words, a constant over-supply of labor in most women’s industries, which does not exist in any men’s industries except the most unskilled. Women exhibit, furthermore, a comparative lack of mobility from one industry to another, as well as from one locality to another. According to Professor Smart, women are so unready to leave home that their pay on one side of narrow Scotland is 50 per cent lower than on the other side. In the same way, the flow of labor from one occupation to another, which tends to equalize the advantages and rates of pay of different employments, is far feebler among women than among men. Finally, there is little organization among women. Their individualistic, almost jealous, attitude to one another prevents their combination and united action, while their submissive acceptance of what is offered leads to apathy. They have only infrequently formed unions and endeavored to substitute collective bargaining for individual action. Women are therefore industrially in much the same situation as unskilled, unorganized male laborers, and the remedy in both cases would seem to be the same—education and organization.

The third reason is, however, the most important because [Pg 84] it explains the low economic status that women hold in the industrial world. The limited range of jobs available for women intensifies competition significantly within that area. There is also a large pool of potential women workers, who a slight increase in wages or the loss of a male family member’s job could push into the workforce as competitors. In other words, there’s a constant oversupply of labor in most industries for women, which isn’t seen in men’s industries except for the least skilled jobs. Women also tend to move less between different industries or regions. According to Professor Smart, women are so reluctant to leave home that their pay on one side of narrow Scotland is 50 percent lower than on the other side. Similarly, the movement of workers from one job to another, which usually helps equalize pay rates and job benefits, is much weaker among women than among men. Lastly, there is minimal organization among women. Their individualistic and somewhat jealous attitude toward each other prevents them from joining together and taking collective action, while their passive acceptance of what’s offered leads to apathy. They have rarely formed unions or tried to replace individual action with collective bargaining. Therefore, women find themselves in a similar position to unskilled, unorganized male laborers, and the solution for both seems to be the same—education and organization.

The presence of a large supply of cheap woman labor undoubtedly has a depressing effect upon men’s wages, and consequently upon the standard of life of the whole laboring class. George Gunton[22] is authority for the statement that “in proportion as the wife and children contribute [Pg 85] to the support of the family the wages of the father are reduced.” The family wage tends to remain the same whether it is earned by the father alone, or by the father with the assistance of his wife and children. It is, however, not quite clear in most cases whether the men’s wages are low because the women and children work, or whether the women and children work because the men’s wages are low. It may fairly be concluded, however, that the evil effects of low wages for women are not confined to themselves but are felt by all with whom they come in competition.

The availability of a large number of low-paid women workers definitely has a negative impact on men's wages, and as a result, affects the overall quality of life for the entire working class. George Gunton[22] states that “as the wife and children contribute to the family's support, the father's wages are reduced.” The family income tends to stay the same whether it's earned solely by the father or with help from his wife and children. However, it's often unclear whether men's wages are low because women and children work or if women and children work because men's wages are low. Yet, it's reasonable to conclude that the negative consequences of low wages for women impact not just them but everyone else who competes with them.

What conclusion shall we draw then, in view of all these facts, as to the desirability of employment of women? The fact of their low wages and industrial dependence is not sufficient to lead one to condemn it. These are transitional phenomena and can be remedied. Women have always worked—on the farm, in the home, in making household supplies. When this work was taken over by the factory woman became a wage-worker in the modern sense. “The census records in respect to the labor of women, therefore, read in the light of collateral facts, are a history of industrial readjustment rather than a record of the relative extent of the employment of women, and it is impossible to say, so far as the census figures are concerned, whether a larger proportion of women are actively engaged in labor today than formerly or not. The one fact which is clear is that factory or shop work is displacing home work, and that this readjustment of industrial conditions is leading to the employment of women outside the home in constantly increasing numbers.”[23] The effect of this readjustment has been to increase greatly the production of wealth. The production of household supplies was removed from the family to the factory when it was handed over to machinery and done better and more cheaply. If the work of women thus released were expended for no useful purpose [Pg 86] society would gain only in the increased leisure of the women. But if these then took up other new lines or set men free from old employments so that they could turn to still different ones, then the production of goods could be greatly increased. “Without women’s help,” says Mr. George L. Bolen,[24] “their work in stores and offices would be done by men taken from other employment. The latter’s present work would have to be stopped to that extent, lessening the quantity of goods produced by men. The effect would be the same as if a farmer had to stop plowing two hours before noon to go to the house and cook his dinner.... Women behind the counter, and at the typewriter, release men for work that women cannot do.” From the standpoint of woman herself, industrial independence must be regarded as a great gain. Set free from the necessity of contracting marriage for the sake of a home, and of depending upon mere sex attraction to attain that end, she will develop her capacities more fully and when she does enter upon marriage will do so as a result of mutual attraction. The entrance of women into gainful occupations must be regarded as an essential step in their own progress and the improvement of society.

What conclusion should we reach, considering all these facts, about the value of employing women? The fact that they earn low wages and are dependent on industry doesn’t automatically mean we should reject it. These are temporary issues that can be fixed. Women have always worked—on farms, in homes, and making household supplies. When this work shifted to factories, women became wage earners in the modern sense. “The census data about women’s labor, therefore, when viewed alongside other facts, tells a story of industrial adjustment rather than simply showing how many women are employed, making it impossible to determine from the census figures whether a larger percentage of women are actively working today compared to the past. What is clear is that factory and shop work are replacing home-based work, leading to an increasing number of women working outside the home.”[23] This shift has significantly boosted wealth production. The creation of household supplies moved from families to factories when it became mechanized, allowing for better and cheaper production. If the work of women who were freed from these tasks served no purpose, society would only benefit from the increased free time of these women. However, if they engaged in new fields or released men from older jobs so that they could pursue different ones, overall production could increase greatly. “Without women’s contributions,” says Mr. George L. Bolen,[24] “the work in stores and offices would have to be done by men pulled from other jobs. This would mean that men’s current work would need to stop, reducing the total goods produced by men. The impact would be like a farmer having to stop plowing two hours before noon to go home and cook lunch... Women at the counter and using typewriters enable men to take on tasks that women can’t do.” From a woman’s perspective, achieving industrial independence is a significant benefit. Free from the need to get married for financial security and from relying solely on attraction to secure a partner, she can fully develop her abilities and enter marriage based on mutual connection. The inclusion of women in paid work is a crucial step for their advancement and the betterment of society.

Quite different must be our attitude towards child labor, which can only be condemned as a waste of labor power and as stunting the development of the children. The Census of 1870 stated for the first time the number of children at work in the United States; there were 739,164 between the ages of 10 and 15 years, of whom 114,628 were employed in manufactures. During the next decade the number increased over 58 per cent to 1,118,356 children at work in all occupations. The disclosure of such an undesirable tendency called forth restrictive legislation in most of the states and the number declined materially by 1890. Since 1890 however there has been a reversal of this tendency back to the conditions of 1880, owing chiefly to the [Pg 87] industrial development of the South, where almost no factory legislation exists as yet. In 1904 there were 1,752,187 children at work between the ages of 10 and 15 years, or almost one-fifth of all the children of those ages. The evils connected with child labor are the long hours—usually 11 or 12 hours a day where no restrictive legislation exists—and the exhausting and often dangerous work. The effect on the health of the children of monotonous and exhausting toil before their muscles are set and their frames knit up is thoroughly bad; they are stunted and deformed and prematurely aged. Many of the occupations, too, in which child laborers are most numerous, are dangerous or injurious, as tin can factories, saw mills, paper box factories, type foundries, and tobacco establishments. Second only to the physical effects of child labor is the mental and moral injury suffered not merely by the child but also by society in depriving these youthful laborers of a thorough education. While it is well that children should be kept busy, there is no compensating reward either in money wage or preparation for adult life in such monotonous, profitless drudgery. The influence of the competition of children upon wages is leveling, and their employment indicates either a willingness on the part of employers and parents to exploit this cheap and defenseless form of labor, or a backward state of civilization. Such an evil can be cured only by determined public opposition, by the passage of laws forbidding all labor by children under a certain age, say 15 (except possibly in agricultural or housework), compelling school attendance, and providing for careful inspection. Most of all is needed an aroused public conscience.

Our attitude towards child labor must be completely different; it's simply a waste of labor and hinders the development of children. The 1870 Census was the first to reveal the number of working children in the United States, with 739,164 between the ages of 10 and 15, of whom 114,628 were employed in manufacturing. Over the next decade, this number rose by more than 58%, reaching 1,118,356 working children across all occupations. This troubling trend prompted restrictive laws in many states, leading to a significant decline by 1890. However, since 1890, we've seen a return to the situation of 1880, largely due to the industrial growth in the South, where there’s almost no factory regulation. By 1904, there were 1,752,187 children working between the ages of 10 and 15, nearly one-fifth of all children in that age range. The issues linked to child labor include long hours—often 11 to 12 hours a day in places without labor laws—and exhausting, frequently dangerous work. The impact on the health of children from monotonous and grueling labor, before their bodies are fully developed, is severely harmful; they become stunted, deformed, and age prematurely. Many jobs with a high number of child laborers are also hazardous or harmful, such as tin can factories, saw mills, paper box factories, type foundries, and tobacco farms. The mental and moral damage caused by child labor is second only to its physical effects, not only harming the child but also society by depriving these young workers of a proper education. While it's good for children to stay busy, there’s no meaningful reward—either financially or in terms of preparation for adult life—from such monotonous, unfulfilling work. The competition from child workers affects wages, and their employment suggests either a willingness by employers and parents to exploit this cheap and defenseless labor or a primitive level of civilization. This problem can only be fixed through determined public resistance, the establishment of laws prohibiting all work for children under a certain age—perhaps 15, except in agriculture or housework—mandating school attendance, and ensuring proper inspections. Most importantly, we need a stimulated public conscience.

Labor legislation is the most effective method of improving the conditions of employment, and to a consideration of this subject we must devote the remainder of this section. We have already seen that the fundamental principle of our modern wage system is freedom of contract. [Pg 88] This is guaranteed in our federal and state constitutions as both a personal and a property right. As a result of this fact the courts have generally declared unconstitutional any legislation, designed to protect the interests of labor, that seemed to abrogate this freedom of contract or that savored of class legislation. Efforts to improve the condition of labor by legislation have therefore met with especial obstacles in this country. On the whole, however, means have been discovered of evading these constitutional restrictions when it has seemed clearly demanded by the welfare of society, and the history of labor legislation in this country is one of fairly steady progress. The early laws were practically confined to imprisonment for debt, mechanics’ liens, the hours of education of children employed in factories, and similar matters. Nothing noteworthy was accomplished until 1866 when Massachusetts passed an eight-hour child labor law for children under fourteen; in 1874 she passed a ten-hour law for women and children under eighteen, engaged in manufacturing establishments, and in 1877 enacted the first factory inspection act, which has since been copied in about twenty-four states, and without which mere legislation is of little avail.

Labor laws are the most effective way to improve working conditions, and we need to spend the rest of this section discussing this topic. We’ve already established that the core idea of our modern wage system is the freedom to negotiate contracts. This right is protected by our federal and state constitutions as both a personal and property right. Because of this, courts have generally ruled any labor protection laws that seem to undermine this freedom or appear to favor one class unconstitutional. Therefore, efforts to enhance labor conditions through legislation have faced significant challenges in this country. Overall, however, ways have been found to work around these constitutional limitations when society clearly demands it, and the history of labor laws in the U.S. shows relatively consistent progress. Early laws mainly addressed issues like debt imprisonment, mechanics’ liens, the education hours of children working in factories, and similar concerns. Significant progress didn't occur until 1866 when Massachusetts enacted an eight-hour workday law for children under fourteen. In 1874, the state passed a ten-hour law for women and children under eighteen working in manufacturing, and in 1877, it implemented the first factory inspection law, which has since been adopted by about twenty-four states, and without which mere legislation is largely ineffective.

The factory acts may be divided into two classes, those that endeavor to secure the safe or healthful manner of conducting a business, and those that attempt to limit the occupations, the hours, and the methods of payment of the workers. Under the first head come such matters as fire protection, ventilation, guarding of machinery, inspection of boilers and mines, etc. Such legislation and inspection have in many states been extended to churches, schoolhouses, hotels, theaters and public buildings. The second group includes those laws which are usually meant when factory acts are referred to. In England there has been a very steady development and extension of such legislation, beginning in 1802, when Peel’s Act tried to protect the health and morals of the pauper apprentices in the [Pg 89] cotton mills; this was extended to all young people in textile industries in 1833, to women in 1844, then to all large industries in 1864, and to smaller ones in 1867, and finally in 1878 these various provisions were codified into a complete factory act, regulating the health and safety of the laboring people generally. In the United States the movement was considerably later and has not been so uninterrupted. But today laws limiting the number of hours of labor to eight have been passed by the Federal Government and fifteen of the states for all those engaged on public works. Attempts to fix the hours of labor of adult male workers have usually been declared unconstitutional, for the reasons stated above, except in especially dangerous or unhealthful occupations, as bakeries, mines, smelters and similar lines. Consequently the men have been forced to rely largely upon their own efforts for the redress of industrial grievances; in this fact lies one explanation of the growth and strength of labor organizations in this country. On the other hand, legislation in behalf of women and especially children—wards of the state—has usually been held constitutional by the courts, and has had a more extended application. About twenty of the states have regulated the length of the working day for women and children. Special child labor laws limit the age below which employment is illegal, usually between ten and fourteen years of age; and provide for a minimum of education before a child can be employed. About half the states provide for factory inspection to see that the provisions of the various acts are lived up to. In general we may conclude that by the passage of such legislation society has definitely decided that there are some conditions of employment that cannot be safely left to free contract or to collective bargaining between employer and employe, but that they must be regulated by society itself on the broad grounds of social welfare.

The factory laws can be divided into two categories: those that aim to ensure a safe and healthy work environment and those that seek to limit the types of jobs, working hours, and payment methods for workers. The first category includes issues like fire safety, ventilation, machine guarding, and inspections of boilers and mines. In many states, this kind of regulation and inspection has also been applied to churches, schools, hotels, theaters, and other public buildings. The second category comprises the laws typically referred to when talking about factory acts. In England, there has been a steady growth and expansion of this legislation, starting in 1802 with Peel’s Act, which aimed to protect the health and morals of poor apprentices in cotton mills. This was broadened in 1833 to include all young people in textile industries, women in 1844, all large industries in 1864, smaller industries in 1867, and finally, in 1878, these various provisions were compiled into a comprehensive factory act to regulate the health and safety of all workers. In the United States, this movement started later and has not been as consistent. However, today, laws limiting working hours to eight have been enacted by the Federal Government and fifteen states for those working on public projects. Efforts to limit working hours for adult men have often been ruled unconstitutional, except in particularly dangerous or unhealthy jobs like bakeries, mines, and smelters. As a result, men have had to rely largely on their own efforts to address workplace issues, which helps explain the growth and strength of labor organizations in the country. Meanwhile, laws supporting women and especially children—who are considered wards of the state—have typically been upheld by courts and have been more widely implemented. About twenty states have set regulations on the length of the workday for women and children. Special child labor laws define the minimum age for employment, usually between ten and fourteen years, and require a minimum amount of education before a child can work. Around half the states have factory inspections to ensure compliance with these laws. Overall, the passage of such legislation shows that society has determined there are certain working conditions that should not be left to free contracts or negotiations between employers and employees, but must instead be regulated by society for the overall welfare of the community.

[Pg 90] X. UNEMPLOYMENT AND INSURANCE.

The greatest problem in modern industry as well as the greatest curse to the laboring classes, is unemployment. While unemployment has always existed under all systems of labor, it assumed added significance when the introduction of the wage system threw every worker upon his own resources and made him responsible for the care of himself and his family. Modern industry is sensitive and unstable and its delicate mechanism, very likely to get out of order; credit and fashion, to mention no others, are factors that make for instability, and these are essentially modern. Professor Marshall is of the opinion that the factory system has not increased inconstancy of employment, but has simply rendered it plainer by localizing it. But whether more or fewer than in earlier times, the number of the unemployed in modern industry is appallingly great. It is not easy to estimate correctly the extent and amount of this evil and we accordingly find considerable variations in the statistical presentations of fact. In 1885 two investigations of the amount of employment were made, one by Carroll D. Wright, in his report as United States Commissioner of Labor for 1886, and the other by the Massachusetts Bureau of Labor in its report for 1887. Mr. Wright defines the unemployed very narrowly as “those who under prosperous times would be fully employed, and who, during the time mentioned, were seeking employment”; using the term in this restricted sense he concluded that 7½ per cent of the working population engaged in manufacturing and mechanical pursuits, and trade and transportation were idle during the year, which moreover he considered one of extreme depression. The Massachusetts statistics, on the other hand, were presented as indicative of general conditions in normal years and may safely be regarded as such. According to this report, 30 per cent of the total number of [Pg 91] breadwinners in the state had been unemployed at their principal occupations on an average of 4.11 months in the year covered; some of these found work at other or secondary occupations. But the net result of the investigation was well put in the terse statement of the report, that “about one-third of the total persons engaged in remunerative labor were unemployed at their principal occupation for about one-third of the working time.” At the lowest estimate the whole working population lost on the average almost one-tenth of their working time. The loss of such a proportion of the community’s productive force, with all the demoralization attendant upon irregular or no labor, is evidence of a problem of grave import.

The biggest issue in today’s industry and a major burden for working-class people is unemployment. While unemployment has always existed in various labor systems, it became more significant with the wage system, which placed each worker solely on their own for their well-being and their family’s. Modern industry is sensitive and unstable, and its intricate system can easily break down; factors like credit and fashion contribute to this instability and are distinctly modern. Professor Marshall believes that the factory system hasn’t increased the unpredictability of jobs but has simply made it clearer by localizing it. Regardless of whether there are more or fewer unemployed people today compared to the past, the number of unemployed in modern industry is shockingly high. Accurately assessing the scope of this issue is challenging, leading to significant differences in statistical reports. In 1885, two studies on employment were conducted: one by Carroll D. Wright, in his 1886 report as United States Commissioner of Labor, and another by the Massachusetts Bureau of Labor in its 1887 report. Mr. Wright defined the unemployed narrowly as “those who, in prosperous times, would be fully employed and who, during the time in question, were seeking work.” Using this limited definition, he concluded that 7.5% of the working population involved in manufacturing, mechanical work, trade, and transportation were idle during what he considered an extremely depressed year. In contrast, the Massachusetts statistics were seen as reflective of typical conditions in normal years and should be treated as such. According to this report, 30% of the total breadwinners in the state were unemployed in their main jobs for an average of 4.11 months during the year examined; some found work in other or secondary jobs. However, the key takeaway from the investigation was clearly stated in the report: “about one-third of the total persons engaged in paid labor were unemployed at their main job for about one-third of the working time.” At the very least, the entire working population lost nearly one-tenth of their working hours on average. The loss of such a significant portion of the community’s productive capacity, along with the demoralization that comes from irregular or no work, highlights a serious problem.

Unemployment is such a broad term and covers so many different ideas that it will be well to classify the unemployed before proceeding further. They may be logically divided into the following classes: I. The temporarily unemployed, who comprise (a) those certain of work again, as efficient workmen who are temporarily out of work owing to seasonal variations, shut downs, etc.; (b) those without such prospect, a group which again divides into two groups, namely, (1) efficient and industrious workmen who have been thrown out of work by a change in fashion, the introduction of new machinery, foreign competition, a prolonged depression, etc., and (2) those whose work is essentially fluctuating and casual in its nature, as casual day laborers, charwomen, etc. II. The permanently unemployed, consisting in turn of (a) the “won’t-works,” as tramps, and (b) the “can’t-works,” or the defective and dependent classes generally. Such a classification renders much easier the analysis both of the causes and of the cure of unemployment.

Unemployment is a broad term that encompasses many different ideas, so it’s useful to classify the unemployed before moving forward. They can be logically divided into the following categories: I. The temporarily unemployed, which includes (a) those who are certain they will find work again, like skilled workers who are temporarily out of work due to seasonal changes, shutdowns, etc.; (b) those without such prospects, which is further divided into two groups: (1) skilled and hardworking workers who have lost their jobs due to changes in fashion, the introduction of new technology, foreign competition, a prolonged economic downturn, etc., and (2) those whose work is inherently unstable and casual, like day laborers and cleaners. II. The permanently unemployed, which is further divided into (a) the “won’t-works,” like vagrants, and (b) the “can’t-works,” or those who are unable to work due to disabilities or dependence. This classification makes it much easier to analyze both the causes and solutions for unemployment.

The first question that presents itself in any discussion of the causes of unemployment is whether it is due primarily to personal causes, as inefficiency or intemperance, or to industrial causes over which the individual has no [Pg 92] control. “Personal causes are those mental, moral, and physical defects which show themselves either in the inability and inefficiency of the workman or in his unwillingness to work. Here are included all the varieties of personal inaptitude, ranging from idiocy, intemperance, and vice to old age, sickness, and accident.”[25] Such a comprehensive definition includes many cases, of course, where no blame can be attached to the individual, and yet each one of these causes is personal, that is, it does not affect at the same time a whole group, as an industrial depression would do. Persons included in this group are always on the margin of employment; in bad times the first to be discharged, in good times they are the last to be employed. Nor is the cause of their lack of employment always easy to give; it may be itself the result of industrial accident or unhealthful occupation, or the result of heredity, evil habits and associations, and defective education. We may present two tables giving briefly the causes of poverty and unemployment. The first gives the causes of poverty ascribed by the charity organization societies of New York, Boston, and Baltimore to applicants for relief:

The first question that comes up in any discussion about the causes of unemployment is whether it is mainly due to personal issues, like inefficiency or bad behavior, or to industrial factors that the individual has no control over. “Personal causes refer to the mental, moral, and physical flaws that are evident in either the worker’s inability or inefficiency or in their unwillingness to work. This includes all kinds of personal incompetence, from idiocy, substance abuse, and vice to old age, illness, and accidents.” Such a broad definition covers many situations where it’s not fair to blame the individual, yet each of these causes is personal, meaning it doesn’t simultaneously affect an entire group, as an industrial downturn would. People in this category are always on the edge of employment; in tough times, they are the first to be let go, and in better times, they are the last to be hired. The reason for their unemployment isn’t always straightforward; it could stem from an industrial accident, an unhealthy job, hereditary factors, bad habits and associations, or inadequate education. We can present two tables that briefly outline the causes of poverty and unemployment. The first table presents the causes of poverty identified by the charity organization societies of New York, Boston, and Baltimore for those seeking assistance:

Causes of poverty: charity organization society records.[A]

Causes of poverty: records from charity organizations.[A]

Cause. Per cent.
Drink
13.7
Shiftlessness and inefficiency
7.5
Other moral defects
2.1
 Total, Character
23.3
No male support
5.0
Lack of other normal support
3.6
 Total, Support
8.6
Lack of employment
23.5
Insufficient employment
8.1
Poorly paid, etc.
3.3
 Total, Employment
34.9
Sickness and death in family
21.1
[Pg 93]
Insanity and physical defects
4.1
Old Age
3.9
Other incapacity
3.2
 Total, Incapacity
32.3
100.0 100.0

[A] Warner, American Charities, Rev. Ed., 53.

Warner, American Charities, Rev. Ed., 53.

The first group of causes indicates misconduct, as the last group indicates misfortune; the other two shade off into industrial causes, though lack of employment—the largest single cause—may in turn be ascribed to any one of several remoter causes according to the bias of the investigator. This table is a record of the causes of failure on the part of those who have fallen behind or dropped out altogether in the race of life. At the other end of the scale stand the members of labor organization, on the whole, the elite of the labor world. The following table gives the causes of unemployment of 31,339 cases at the end of September, 1900, as reported to the New York Bureau of Labor Statistics:

The first group of causes points to misconduct, while the last group points to bad luck; the other two categories relate to industrial reasons, although unemployment—the biggest single cause—can also be linked to various deeper issues depending on the researcher's perspective. This table documents the reasons for failure among those who have fallen behind or completely dropped out in the journey of life. On the other side, we have members of labor organizations, who, overall, represent the elite of the labor community. The following table lists the causes of unemployment for 31,339 cases reported to the New York Bureau of Labor Statistics at the end of September 1900:

Causes of idleness, members of trade unions, 1900.

Causes of idleness, members of trade unions, 1900.

Cause Per Cent
No work
75.5
Bad weather
.5
Strike or lockout
13.0
Sickness
4.7
Superannuation
1.6
Other causes
4.7
 Total
100.0

This table emphasizes very strongly the industrial causes of unemployment, three-fourths of which is ascribed to lack of work. In some cases, as the iron and steel [Pg 94] workers, where there is a regular two months’ shut-down to make repairs, and the building trades where the inclemency of the weather usually prevents work during the winter, the lack of employment may be regarded as a vacation rather than a hardship, for the rates of pay are high enough during the remaining months to offset those of idleness. In other cases, however, as in coal-mining, there is a large reserve army of workers on hand and employment is secured for only one-half to two-thirds the time. In 1900, when the average number of days of employment was larger than it had been in ten years, the bituminous miners were employed only 234 days and the anthracite miners only 166 days in the year. This indicates a very bad organization of the industry. The same thing was formerly true of the London dockyards, where there was a reserve army of some 4,000 surplus workers. Of course the effect of this is to depress wages. The clothing trade is subject to seasonal fluctuations and the caprice of fashion, and offers very irregular employment. Machinery and improved processes were frequently spoken of by witnesses before the Industrial Commission as the leading cause of unemployment. If the general conditions of business are good at the time of the first introduction of machinery the displaced laborer is reabsorbed again and the hardship is not so noticeable. But if it coincides with a period of business depression the introduction of machinery appears to be the cause of a large displacement of labor, which might more truly be ascribed to industrial depression. This last cause is responsible for enormous suffering among the laboring classes, for the method oftenest resorted to by industrial enterprises to reduce expenses is the wholesale discharge of laborers, who are thus made to bear the burden of industrial disorganization. This was well illustrated by the economies effected by the railroads in the year 1908, in their general reduction of the labor force and of wages. [Pg 95] But even in good years the inconstancy of employment is startling. In the four years 1897-1900 the men in trade unions in New York State lost 16.2 per cent of their time from unemployment, which is almost exactly one day in every week. And these, it must be remembered, were skilled and efficient workers in organized trades. Finally, strikes are given as a cause of unemployment in the table; these are a peculiar feature of modern industry, and do not call for further discussion, except to point out that they are not as important as often represented.

This table strongly highlights the industrial reasons for unemployment, with three-quarters attributed to a lack of work. In some cases, like with iron and steel workers, there’s a regular two-month shutdown for repairs, and in the construction trades, bad weather often halts work in winter. Here, the lack of employment can be seen more as a vacation than a hardship, since the pay during the busier months is high enough to compensate for the time off. However, in other sectors, such as coal mining, many workers are available, and jobs are only secured for half to two-thirds of the year. In 1900, when the average workdays were higher than in the previous decade, bituminous miners worked only 234 days, and anthracite miners only 166 days that year. This shows poor organization in the industry. The same used to be true for the London dockyards with a surplus of about 4,000 workers. Naturally, this situation drives down wages. The clothing industry experiences seasonal shifts and fashion trends, resulting in very irregular work. Witnesses before the Industrial Commission often cited machinery and improved processes as the main cause of unemployment. If business conditions are favorable when machinery is first introduced, the displaced workers can find new jobs easily, making the hardship less noticeable. However, if it happens during a business downturn, the introduction of machinery seems to cause significant job losses, which can actually be attributed to the economic slump. This situation leads to immense suffering among workers since one of the common methods companies use to cut costs is to lay off laborers, forcing them to bear the brunt of industrial disarray. This was clearly illustrated by the cost-cutting measures taken by railroads in 1908 when they reduced their workforce and wages. Yet, even in prosperous years, the inconsistency of employment is shocking. Between 1897 and 1900, trade union workers in New York State lost 16.2 percent of their time to unemployment, which averages to almost one day each week. And it’s important to note that these were skilled, efficient workers in organized trades. Lastly, strikes are listed as a cause of unemployment in the table; while they are a notable aspect of modern industry, they don't need further discussion, except to mention that they’re not as significant as often claimed.

The foregoing analysis of the causes of unemployment shows that they are deep-seated in the nature of modern industry, and that it would be unjust to the workingman to attribute them in any large measure to his incapacity or indisposition to labor. The care of the unemployable must of course be undertaken by society, and such persons prevented as far as possible from depressing the wages of competent labor by their competition. Exceptional periods of distress may and should be met by temporary relief measures. But what we may call the normal unemployment in modern industry, which amounts to 2-2½ per cent of the labor force, cannot be overcome by direct methods. The remedy for this lies “in a better organization of employers and employes, more steady expansion of trade, and greater stability of industry and of legislation affecting industry. These are not problems directly of unemployment, but rather of taxation, currency, monopoly, immigration, over-production, and technical advances in industry. Their treatment must be undertaken, not primarily as measures of providing for the unemployed, but as measures for improving the conditions of business.”[26] The problem of unemployment would thus seem to be a permanent one, bound up in the very nature of a dynamic society; it may be regarded as the price of progress. But the question may fairly be raised as to whether the laboring classes should [Pg 96] foot the bill, or whether the cost might not fairly be borne by society as a whole. This has suggested, as a solution of the problem, insurance of workingmen against unemployment, a discussion of which, however, must be deferred to the end of the section. Some methods of alleviation, if not of abolition, of the evils of unemployment may be suggested. Free public employment bureaus and agencies, national in scope and well integrated, would do much to secure a better adjustment of demand and supply in the labor market, and secure a better distribution of the labor force and greater mobility of labor. Better organization and mutual understanding on the part of both employers and employes is needed, to prevent the loss through strikes and lockouts. And finally, improved industrial and technical education is essential, whereby the loss in skill through the introduction of new inventions and machinery may be minimized, and the productivity of the laboring class be increased.

The previous analysis of the reasons for unemployment shows that these issues are deeply rooted in the nature of modern industry and that it would be unfair to blame workers for their inability or unwillingness to work. Society must take responsibility for those who can't work and try to prevent them from driving down wages for capable workers through competition. Exceptional periods of hardship can and should be addressed with temporary relief measures. However, what we consider normal unemployment in modern industry, which is about 2-2.5 percent of the workforce, cannot be resolved through direct actions. The solution lies in “a better organization of employers and employees, a more consistent expansion of trade, and greater stability in industry and the laws that affect it. These are not just unemployment issues but also involve taxation, currency, monopolies, immigration, overproduction, and technological advancements in industry. Their resolution must be approached, not primarily as ways to support the unemployed, but as strategies for improving business conditions.”[26] Unemployment seems to be a permanent issue, tied to the very nature of a dynamic society; it can be seen as the cost of progress. But it's worth considering whether the working class should bear this burden or if it should be shared by society as a whole. This leads to the idea of insuring workers against unemployment, though that discussion will be saved for later in this section. Some solutions to mitigate, if not eliminate, the issues of unemployment can be proposed. Nationwide public employment agencies that are well coordinated would greatly help balance labor supply and demand, ensuring a better distribution of the workforce and increasing labor mobility. Improved organization and mutual understanding between employers and employees is necessary to prevent losses due to strikes and lockouts. Lastly, enhancing industrial and technical education is crucial, as it can reduce the loss of skills from new inventions and machinery and boost the productivity of the working class.

Among the measures of relief for unemployment due to accident, sickness, and old age, none is more important or more deserving of a hearing in the United States than that of insurance against these evils. The earnings of the average male wage-earner are so small—half of the number earn annually less than $436, and half of the adult male factory workers earn less than $400 a year—that the unemployment, sickness, disablement, or old age of the breadwinner must throw a large proportion of families so afflicted into a condition of periodic poverty. Any remedies that will alleviate the miseries caused by fluctuations in employment, industrial accidents, diseases incident to industry, etc., deserve a respectful hearing.

Among the ways to provide relief for unemployment due to accidents, illness, and aging, nothing is more crucial or deserving of attention in the United States than insurance against these issues. The earnings of the average male worker are so low—half of them make less than $436 a year, and half of the adult male factory workers earn less than $400 annually—that the unemployment, sickness, disability, or old age of the primary income earner can push a large number of affected families into a state of ongoing poverty. Any solutions that can ease the hardships caused by changes in employment, industrial accidents, and work-related illnesses should be taken seriously.

No adequate statistics of industrial accidents exist in the United States, but a recent estimate by F. L. Hoffman[27] gave the number of fatal accidents among occupied males in 1908 as between 30,000 and 35,000. An analysis of the [Pg 97] reports of the New York Bureau of Labor Statistics from 1901 to 1906, shows that of the total number (39,244) of industrial accidents reported in that state a little over 2 per cent were fatal, almost 17 per cent resulted in permanent disablement, and 81 per cent resulted in temporary disablement. More than half of the accidents in industry are the result of machinery in motion. Mr. Hoffman calculates that “it should not be impossible to save at least one-third or perhaps one-half by intelligent and rational methods of factory inspection, legislation, and control.” Prevention of accidents rather than compensation to the workingman after they occur should be the aim of society, in order to avoid the wasteful loss of productive power, not to mention the suffering and misery entailed by such accidents. “Immunity, not compensation,” has been the demand of the British trade unions. Of first importance then is careful factory legislation, safeguarding of machinery, and factory inspection. But here we are interested primarily in the question of responsibility and compensation. In the United States, legislatures and the courts have taken the position that the workingman was responsible unless he could prove the employer responsible for his injury. How impossible such proof is and consequently how intenable such a position, is clear from the following table, compiled by the German Government for purposes of accident insurance:

No proper statistics on industrial accidents exist in the United States, but a recent estimate by F. L. Hoffman[27] suggested that the number of fatal accidents among working men in 1908 was between 30,000 and 35,000. An analysis of the reports from the New York Bureau of Labor Statistics from 1901 to 1906 shows that out of the total number (39,244) of industrial accidents reported in that state, just over 2 percent were fatal, almost 17 percent resulted in permanent disablement, and 81 percent resulted in temporary disablement. More than half of industrial accidents are caused by moving machinery. Mr. Hoffman estimates that “it should not be impossible to save at least one-third or perhaps one-half by intelligent and rational methods of factory inspection, legislation, and control.” The goal of society should be to prevent accidents rather than just compensate workers after they happen, to avoid the unnecessary loss of productive power, not to mention the suffering and misery caused by such accidents. “Immunity, not compensation,” has been the demand of British trade unions. Thus, the most important priorities are careful factory legislation, safeguarding of machinery, and factory inspection. However, we are primarily focused on the issue of responsibility and compensation. In the United States, legislatures and the courts have maintained that the worker was responsible unless he could prove that the employer was at fault for his injury. How difficult such proof is and, therefore, how untenable such a position is, becomes clear from the following table compiled by the German Government for accident insurance purposes:

Accidents in German industries traceable to different causes.

Accidents in German industries can be attributed to various causes.

Causes. Agriculture
(1891)
Industry
(1887)
Mining
(1887)
Fault of employer
18.2
19.8
1.3
Fault of injured workman
24.4
25.0
29.8
Fault of both
20.1
4.4
Fault of third person
2.8
3.3
4.3
Unavoidable or indeterminable
34.5
46.9
64.6
 Total
100.0
100.0
100.0

[Pg 98] Statistics from both Germany and Austria show that a full half or more of all industrial accidents are due to causes for which neither employers, injured workmen, nor fellow employes are responsible, but which are incidental to the nature of the industry itself. But besides the danger of injury from machinery, there are numerous specially dangerous or injurious trades, in which injury by poisoning, disease, etc., is almost unavoidable as trade processes are at present conducted. These have been classified as follows: trades in which lead is a poisonous element, trades which produce other chemical poisons, trades in which lockjaw is an incident, trades in which the danger arises from injurious particles in the air, or from dust, processes that require a sudden change from heat to cold and vice versa, and those that require artificial humidity, and trades in which accidents are so frequent as to demand special legislation. Before we try to decide who in justice should bear the cost of sickness or injury arising from these causes, let us inquire as to the practice in the United States and in other countries, so as to have the data necessary for a fair conclusion.

[Pg 98] Statistics from Germany and Austria show that half or more of all industrial accidents are caused by factors that neither employers, injured workers, nor colleagues are responsible for, but which are inherent to the nature of the industry itself. In addition to the risk of injury from machinery, there are several particularly hazardous trades where injuries from poisoning, disease, and so on are nearly unavoidable due to current work processes. These have been categorized as follows: trades that involve lead as a toxic element, trades that produce other chemical toxins, trades associated with lockjaw incidents, trades where danger arises from harmful particles in the air or from dust, processes that require abrupt changes from heat to cold and vice versa, those needing artificial humidity, and trades where accidents are so common that they require specific legislation. Before we determine who should fairly bear the cost of sickness or injury from these causes, let's look into the practices in the United States and other countries to gather the necessary information for a fair conclusion.

The original legal doctrine regarding liability for accident in England and America, which is still practically unmodified in the latter country, was based on the principle of individual responsibility for acts of negligence. Briefly stated the common law doctrine is that an employer must provide reasonably safe conditions of employment, and that then the employe assumes the risks incident to the occupation, or arising from the carelessness of fellow-servants; moreover, even if the employer has been remiss, the employe cannot collect damages if he has been guilty of contributory negligence. These three doctrines—assumption of risk, doctrine of the fellow-servant, and contributory negligence—have been used practically to free the employer from all responsibility in cases where injured employes have sought to secure damages. Moreover, as [Pg 99] has been shown above, many cases exist where it is impossible to fix the blame on either employer, employe, or a third party, and in such cases no compensation could be secured for injury under the law. The full rigor of the common law, which has worked out so unfairly for the workingman in modern machine production, has been modified in about twenty-seven states by statutes defining more exactly the duties of the employer, and repealing the fellow-servant doctrine in regard to railway employes and in a few states in regard to all mechanical industries. With these exceptions, however, the law of employers’ liability has not been changed, and compensation for industrial accidents must be sought by injured employes through a suit for damages against the employer. In 1906 and again in 1908 Congress passed a federal employers’ liability act, limited to common carriers, which, however, represents only development along the lines of negligence law. That is, we are still proceeding upon the assumption that in every accident which occurs somebody is to blame. We shall have to look to foreign countries for a practical application of the principle that the cost of accidents in modern industry should be made a charge upon the industry itself, and ultimately be incorporated in the higher price of the article produced.

The original legal doctrine concerning liability for accidents in England and America, which remains largely unchanged in the latter, was based on the idea of individual responsibility for negligent actions. In simple terms, the common law doctrine states that an employer must ensure reasonably safe working conditions. After that, employees take on the risks associated with their jobs or those arising from the negligence of their coworkers. Additionally, even if an employer has been careless, an employee cannot claim damages if they have also been contributively negligent. These three principles—assumption of risk, the fellow-servant doctrine, and contributory negligence—have essentially allowed employers to avoid responsibility in cases where injured employees seek damages. Furthermore, as [Pg 99] noted above, there are many instances where assigning blame to the employer, employee, or a third party is impossible, leaving no legal recourse for injury compensation. The strict nature of the common law has been unfair to workers in modern machine production but has been modified in around twenty-seven states by laws that clarify employer duties and eliminate the fellow-servant doctrine for railway workers, and in some states for all mechanical industries. Apart from these changes, however, the law on employers' liability has not altered, and injured employees must pursue compensation for industrial accidents through lawsuits against their employers. In 1906 and again in 1908, Congress enacted a federal employers’ liability act, limited to common carriers, which represents only an extension of negligence law. This means we still operate under the assumption that someone is at fault in every accident. We will need to turn to other countries for a practical application of the principle that the costs of accidents in modern industry should be borne by the industry itself and ultimately reflected in the higher price of the goods produced.

Germany was the first country to introduce the principle of compulsory accident insurance in 1884. Employers are there organized into associations and sections and are compelled to bear the expense of granting to injured workingmen compensation, which amounts to about two-thirds their average wages. England in 1897, by the passage of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, adopted the principle “that a workman is entitled for all accidents of occupation to a moderate and reasonable compensation.” Twenty-three countries, or practically all the advanced industrial nations of the world except the United States, have passed laws to compensate sufferers for all accidents [Pg 100] of industry, thus placing the burden of industrial accidents upon the industry as such and not upon the laborer.

Germany was the first country to implement compulsory accident insurance in 1884. Employers there are organized into associations and are required to cover the cost of providing injured workers with compensation, which is about two-thirds of their average wages. In 1897, England adopted the Workmen’s Compensation Act, establishing the principle “that a worker is entitled to reasonable compensation for all work-related accidents.” Twenty-three countries, nearly all of the advanced industrial nations except the United States, have enacted laws to compensate individuals for all industrial accidents, thereby placing the responsibility for these accidents on the industry rather than the workers. [Pg 100]

As we have seen, sickness and old age are still more usual causes of poverty and unemployment than accident. All the arguments for compulsory insurance therefore apply with redoubled force to these evils. Germany was again the pioneer in the establishment of these forms of insurance. In 1883 sickness insurance was organized, being made compulsory for all persons with incomes under $500; the expense is borne one-third by the workers and two-thirds by employers, the main purpose being to secure a sufficient relief—amounting to one-half the wage—for a period of thirteen weeks. In 1889 invalidity and old-age insurance was introduced for the same class; contributions are made in equal proportion by employe and employer, the state contributing about $12 a year to each annuity. Pensions are granted after thirty years of payment or to those over seventy. In 1908 Great Britain passed a still more comprehensive measure, providing for pensioning all citizens of seventy years or over, who have been residents for twenty years, in accordance with a sliding scale based upon private income, the pensions ranging from five shillings weekly down to one shilling. The pensions were expected to cost $35,000,000 the first year, but will probably entail double that amount. Finally, insurance against unemployment was tried in Switzerland in 1893 to 1897, but was finally abolished, owing to abuses and difficulty of administration.

As we've seen, illness and old age are still more common causes of poverty and unemployment than accidents. So, all the arguments for mandatory insurance apply even more strongly to these issues. Germany was again the leader in establishing these types of insurance. In 1883, sickness insurance was organized, made mandatory for all individuals earning under $500; the costs are shared one-third by workers and two-thirds by employers, with the main goal being to provide sufficient relief—equal to half the wage—for up to thirteen weeks. In 1889, disability and old-age insurance was introduced for the same group; contributions are made equally by employees and employers, with the state contributing about $12 a year to each annuity. Pensions are granted after thirty years of contributions or to those over seventy. In 1908, Great Britain passed an even more comprehensive measure that provides pensions for all citizens aged seventy and older who have been residents for twenty years, with amounts based on private income, ranging from five shillings weekly down to one shilling. The pensions were expected to cost $35 million in the first year but will likely end up costing double that. Lastly, unemployment insurance was tried in Switzerland from 1893 to 1897, but it was ultimately abolished due to abuses and administrative challenges.

There are probably no more important practical economic problems than those connected with unemployment and workingmen’s insurance. Slowly the conviction has spread that under present conditions of industry workingmen cannot fairly be held responsible for industrial accidents, and that with prevailing wages they cannot be expected to save enough to maintain themselves in sickness and old age. It therefore becomes the duty of society so [Pg 101] to organize industry and legislation that the terrors of accidents, sickness, and old age, shall be reduced to a minimum.

There are probably no more pressing practical economic issues than those related to unemployment and workers' insurance. Gradually, the understanding has emerged that, in today’s industrial landscape, workers shouldn’t be held accountable for workplace accidents, and that with current wages, they can’t be expected to save enough to support themselves during illness and in their later years. Therefore, it is society's responsibility to structure industry and legislation in a way that minimizes the fears of accidents, illness, and old age. [Pg 101]

XI. MACHINERY AND INDUSTRIAL EFFICIENCY.

So far in the discussion of modern capitalistic production and of the various labor problems to which it has given rise we have not treated in detail the question of machinery and its effects on labor. We cannot, however, leave this subject without taking up this phase of it with considerable care. The advantages of machinery have been more often emphasized than the evils, so that we may profitably begin with the darker side of the picture. President Hadley[28] enumerates three evils which are charged against machinery, as now managed and operated: “1. That it displaces a large amount of human labor, thus taking income away from employes and giving it to employers. 2. That when it does not actually drive human labor out of use, it employs it in circumstances unfavorable to efficiency, health, and morals. 3. That under the best conditions it deprives the workman of independence, making him a specialized machine instead of a broad-minded man.” We cannot do better than take up these points one by one.

So far in our discussion of modern capitalist production and the various labor issues it has created, we haven't examined the role of machinery and its impact on labor in detail. However, we can't ignore this topic and should address this aspect with care. The benefits of machinery are often highlighted more than its drawbacks, so it makes sense to start with the negative side of things. President Hadley[28] outlines three criticisms against machinery as it's currently managed and operated: “1. It displaces a significant amount of human labor, taking income away from workers and transferring it to employers. 2. When it doesn’t completely replace human labor, it often puts workers in conditions that are bad for efficiency, health, and morals. 3. Even under the best circumstances, it strips the worker of independence, turning them into a specialized machine rather than allowing them to be a well-rounded individual.” We should go through these points one at a time.

In answer to the first charge President Hadley flatly denies that machinery has displaced labor, but insists that “there has been a most conspicuous increase of employment in those lines where improvements in machinery have been greatest,” giving the expansion of railroads as an illustration. But it is not possible to generalize from this case without further analysis. The immediate effect of improved machinery, especially if suddenly introduced, is practically always to throw men out of employment. The extent to which this will occur depends on the suddenness and extensiveness of the change, but fortunately, as Professor Nicholson points out, new inventions seldom come suddenly or are introduced all at once on an extensive scale. It took almost a generation, for example, for American [Pg 102] machine methods to displace Swiss hand labor in the making of watches. But when such a change does occur it hits hardest the least efficient and older men, those just on the margin of employment, for a man past middle life can rarely learn a new trade. The effect of displacement in causing suffering will also depend somewhat upon the mobility of labor, both the knowledge of new opportunities and the capital to make possible a change of location or industry, and improvements in the means of transportation. It can easily be shown that as a general principle the lump-of-labor theory is erroneous, namely, that there is just so much work to be done and that if machinery is introduced there will be less work for men to do. But there is this element of truth in it, that the question whether men will be reabsorbed in the same industry depends upon the fact as to whether the market for the goods produced by the new machine can be expanded. If the demand is elastic, that is, can be largely extended because of the fall in price brought about by the cheaper production, as in the case of cotton goods, then the displaced laborers will probably be re-employed to produce an enlarged supply. If, however, the demand is inelastic, that is, will not be expanded by reason of a fall in price, as in the case of salt or coffins, then the displaced labor will not be reabsorbed in the same industry but must look elsewhere for employment.

In response to the first accusation, President Hadley firmly states that machinery has not replaced labor. He argues that “there has been a significant increase in jobs in areas where improvements in machinery have been greatest,” using the growth of railroads as an example. However, it isn’t possible to generalize from this situation without further examination. The immediate effect of improved machinery, especially when introduced suddenly, almost always results in job losses. The extent of this effect depends on how abrupt and widespread the change is, but thankfully, as Professor Nicholson notes, new inventions typically don’t come on the scene suddenly or are implemented all at once on a large scale. For instance, it took nearly a generation for American machine methods to replace Swiss hand labor in watchmaking. However, when such a change does happen, it tends to impact the least efficient workers and older employees the hardest, particularly those who are just on the edge of employment since someone past middle age often struggles to learn a new trade. The impact of displacement in causing hardship also varies based on labor mobility, which includes awareness of new opportunities and the resources needed to relocate or switch industries, as well as improvements in transportation. It’s clear that, as a general rule, the lump-of-labor theory is incorrect, that is, the idea that there is a fixed amount of work available and that introducing machinery will result in fewer jobs for people. However, there is some truth to the notion that whether workers will be absorbed back into the same industry depends on whether the market for the products created by the new machines can grow. If demand is elastic, meaning it can significantly increase due to lower prices from cheaper production, as seen with cotton goods, then displaced workers will likely be rehired to produce a larger supply. Conversely, if demand is inelastic, meaning it won't increase because of lower prices, such as with salt or coffins, then displaced workers will not find jobs in the same industry and will need to seek employment elsewhere.

The elaborate investigation of the Department of Labor in 1898 regarding the relative merits of hand and machine labor shows clearly the effect on the displacement of labor by the introduction of machinery. A few cases will serve as illustrations (see table on next page).

The detailed investigation by the Department of Labor in 1898 into the pros and cons of hand versus machine labor clearly illustrates the impact of machinery on the displacement of workers. A few examples will help clarify this (see table on next page).

[Pg 103] Hand and Machine Methods Compared.

[Pg 103] Comparing Hand and Machine Methods.

Year of production Article produced Different operations performed Different workmen employed Time worked. Labor
Cost
Hours Minutes
1829-30 Wheat (hand) 8 4 61 5 $3.55
1895-96 Wheat (machine) 5 6 3 19 .66
1859 Boots (hand) 83 2 1436 40 408.50
1895 Boots (machine) 122 113 154 5 35.40
1850 Carpet (hand) 15 18 4047 30 20.24
1895 Carpet (machine) 41 81 509 1 .29
1891 Loading ore (hand) 1 1 200 0 40.00
1896 Loading ore (machine) 3 10 2 51 .55
Year of
production
Article produced Different
operations
performed
Different
workmen
employed
1829-30 Wheat (hand)
8
4
1895-96 Wheat (machine)
5
6
1859 Boots (hand)
83
2
1895 Boots (machine)
122
113
1850 Carpet (hand)
15
18
1895 Carpet (machine)
41
81
1891 Loading ore (hand)
1
1
1896 Loading ore (machine)
3
10
Year of
production
Article produced Time worked. Labor
Cost
Hours Minutes
1829-30 Wheat (hand)
61
5
$ 3.55
1895-96 Wheat (machine)
3
19
.66
1859 Boots (hand)
1436
40
408.50
1895 Boots (machine)
154
5
35.40
1850 Carpet (hand)
4047
30
20.24
1895 Carpet (machine)
509
1
.29
1891 Loading ore (hand)
200
0
40.00
1896 Loading ore (machine)
2
51
.55

These cases, chosen at random, all show an increase in the number of different men employed, and an immense saving in time and in labor cost. Nothing is indicated however as to the total amount of employment. Optimistic writers like Carroll D. Wright claim that if machinery has displaced labor in one direction it has created more employment for them in others. He shows for instance[29] that the per capita consumption of cotton in this country in 1830 was 5.9 lbs., while in 1890 it was 19 lbs., and gives similar figures for iron and steel, and railroad traffic. It will be noticed that all of his examples are chosen from industries in which the demand is elastic. Mr. J. A. Hobson, a more careful and conservative writer, draws less optimistic conclusions from a study of Great Britain. He says: “First, so far as the aggregate of manufactures is concerned, the net result of the increased use of machinery has not been to offer an increased demand for labor in those industries commensurate with the growth of the working population. Second, an increased proportion of the manufacturing population is employed either in those branches of the large industries where machinery is least used, or in the smaller manufactures which are either subsidiary to the large industries, or are engaged in providing miscellaneous comforts and luxuries.”[30] It must be said, however, in modification of Mr. Hobson’s inferences, that it may be accounted as a social gain if the demand for manufactured commodities can be met by the labor of a [Pg 104] smaller proportion of the population, since the energies of the rest are then set free for professional or artistic or similar pursuits. A study of the census reports of Great Britain seems to show that this is what has happened in that country.

These randomly selected cases all demonstrate an increase in the number of different men employed, resulting in significant savings in time and labor costs. However, there’s no information provided about the total amount of employment. Optimistic writers like Carroll D. Wright argue that while machinery may have displaced labor in some areas, it has created more job opportunities in others. He points out that the per capita consumption of cotton in this country was 5.9 lbs. in 1830, compared to 19 lbs. in 1890, and provides similar statistics for iron and steel, as well as railroad traffic. It's worth noting that all his examples are from industries with elastic demand. Mr. J. A. Hobson, a more cautious and conservative writer, draws less hopeful conclusions from a study of Great Britain. He states, “First, regarding the overall manufacturing situation, the net result of increased machinery use has not created an increased demand for labor in those industries that matches the growth of the working population. Second, a larger share of the manufacturing workforce is employed in sectors of large industries where machinery is used less or in smaller manufacturing sites that either support the larger industries or focus on providing various comforts and luxuries.” It should be noted, however, that in response to Mr. Hobson’s findings, it could be considered a social benefit if the demand for manufactured goods can be satisfied by a smaller percentage of the population, as this allows the remaining individuals to pursue professional, artistic, or similar endeavors. An examination of census reports from Great Britain seems to indicate that this is indeed what has happened in that country.

The amount of labor is not the only factor to be considered; the regularity of employment, as we saw in the last section, is of hardly less importance. “Another danger of an entirely opposite kind,” says Professor Nicholson[31] , “lurks in this immense power of machinery, which is continually showing its reality and remedies for which will, it is to be feared, be the fruit of long years of tentative adaptation to the new environment. What all sensible workingmen desire, what the advocates of the trade unions say is their chief object, is to get a “steady sufficient wage,” but it has been proved inductively that great fluctuations in price occur in those commodities which require for their production a large proportion of fixed capital. These fluctuations in price are accompanied by corresponding fluctuations in wages and irregularity of employment. But fluctuations in wages and discontinuities in employment are two of the greatest evils which can befall the laboring classes.” We have already seen how modern capitalistic methods of production may lead to over-production and to a crisis. We now see how machine methods may cause unemployment or irregular employment. The men displaced directly by new machinery, those thrown out of work by industrial depression resulting from over-production in machine industries, and finally those irregularly employed in the new occupations supplying luxuries—all of these may fairly attribute their suffering in large measure to machine methods.

The amount of work isn't the only thing to consider; the stability of employment, as we discussed in the last section, is just as important. “Another risk of a completely different nature,” says Professor Nicholson[31], “comes from the massive power of machinery, which constantly reveals its reality, and the solutions for this will likely take many years of trying to adjust to the new environment. What all reasonable workers want, and what the proponents of trade unions claim is their main goal, is to secure a 'steady, sufficient wage.' However, it's been shown that there are significant fluctuations in price for those goods that need a large amount of fixed capital to produce. These price changes go hand in hand with changes in wages and job stability. But fluctuations in wages and inconsistencies in employment are two of the biggest problems that can affect the working class.” We’ve already seen how modern capitalist production methods can lead to overproduction and crises. Now we see how machine methods can cause unemployment or unstable work situations. The workers directly replaced by new machinery, those laid off due to industrial downturns caused by overproduction in machine industries, and finally, those working irregularly in new jobs that provide luxuries—all of them can largely attribute their struggles to machine methods.

“The second great charge made against the factory system is that it displaces a higher grade of labor by a lower [Pg 105] grade; sometimes substituting the work of women and children for that of men; sometimes substituting work under conditions physically or morally unhealthful, for work under healthful conditions; sometimes substituting specialized and mechanical work for diversified occupation which contributes to general intelligence.” The point as to the labor of women and children has already been discussed. The charge that factory labor is physically unhealthful may in general be denied. Mr. Wright, in an elaborate defense of the factory system in the Tenth Census, concluded that the conditions of work in the modern factory are much more conducive to good health than those under the preceding domestic system, while morally they are far superior. The qualities demanded by the machine production of the modern factory are punctuality, steadiness, reliability, and sobriety, and it therefore makes against intemperance and immorality. So far as these exist in factory towns, they are the result of town life rather than of manufacturing. It must, however, be said that while the factory system is not inherently unhealthful, the high pressure at which operatives of steam-driven machinery are compelled to work, particularly in this country, may and often does wear him out prematurely. This again is partially offset by a shortening of the hours of labor.

“The second major criticism of the factory system is that it replaces higher quality jobs with lower quality ones; sometimes replacing the work of men with that of women and children; sometimes replacing work under physically or morally unhealthy conditions with work under healthy conditions; sometimes replacing specialized and mechanical tasks with varied occupations that enhance overall intelligence.” The issue regarding the labor of women and children has already been addressed. The claim that factory work is physically unhealthy can generally be refuted. Mr. Wright, in a detailed defense of the factory system in the Tenth Census, concluded that working conditions in modern factories are much more conducive to good health than those of the previous domestic system, while also being morally far superior. The qualities required by machine production in modern factories are punctuality, consistency, reliability, and sobriety, thus discouraging intemperance and immorality. Where these issues do exist in factory towns, they stem from urban life rather than from manufacturing itself. However, it should be noted that while the factory system is not inherently unhealthy, the intense pressure that workers operating steam-driven machinery must endure, especially in this country, can and often does lead to premature exhaustion. This is somewhat balanced by reduced working hours.

The final charge against the factory system is monotony of work. Many writers, from Adam Smith down, take the view that it is more stupefying to make a small part of an article, say the sixty-fourth part of a shoe, than to make the whole article. Professor Marshall, who has considered the subject carefully[32] , concludes that while it takes away manual skill, it substitutes higher or more intellectual forms of skill. “The more delicate the machine’s power the greater is the judgment and carefulness which is called for from those who see after it.” But after all [Pg 106] there is less danger from monotony of work than from monotony of life, and the cure for this would seem to be in an increase of machinery rather than in its abolition.

The last criticism of the factory system is the monotony of work. Many writers, starting with Adam Smith, argue that it's more mind-numbing to produce just a small part of an item, like the sixty-fourth part of a shoe, than to create the entire item. Professor Marshall, who has looked into this topic thoroughly[32], concludes that while it reduces manual skill, it replaces it with higher or more intellectual forms of skill. “The more precise the machine's capabilities, the more judgment and care are required from those who oversee it.” But ultimately, there is less risk from the monotony of work than from the monotony of life, and the solution for this seems to lie in increasing machinery rather than getting rid of it.

Let us now try to summarize our conclusions on this intricate question. The first effects of the introduction of labor-saving machinery is to displace particular laborers; these suffer real injury, though they are often reabsorbed in the industrial organism. The social gain is undoubted, for the improved methods lead to lower prices and thus to an increase in the real wages of labor. To the improvement and wider use of machinery we must indeed look for the ultimate relief of the human race from exhausting toil. Says a socialist writer: “On mechanical slavery, on the slavery of the machine, the future of the world depends.... All unintellectual labor, all monotonous, dull labor, all labor that deals with dreadful things, and involves unpleasant conditions, must be done by machinery. Machinery must work for us in coal mines, and do all sanitary services, and be the stoker of steamers, and clean the streets, and run messages on wet days, and do anything that is tedious or distressing.” If labor today has a complaint to make against the use of machinery, it is that labor has not shared sufficiently in the improvements thus far effected. But the evil here is connected with the inequitable distribution of wealth, not with the methods of its production. In justice labor should share in the technical improvements which characterized the nineteenth century and will revolutionize to a still greater extent the industries of the twentieth. The practical question in this connection is as to the best method for labor to secure its claim to a share in the increased production. One answer, to which we will turn next, is by increasing its efficiency through better industrial education and training.

Let’s summarize our conclusions on this complex issue. The first impact of introducing labor-saving machinery is that it displaces certain workers; they experience real harm, although many are often reabsorbed into the workforce. The social benefits are clear, as improved methods lead to lower prices and, consequently, a rise in real wages for workers. We must indeed look to advancements and broader use of machinery for the ultimate relief of humanity from exhausting labor. As one socialist writer puts it: “The future of the world relies on mechanical freedom from machines.... All unskilled labor, all monotonous, dull work, and any job that deals with terrible realities and unpleasant conditions, must be handled by machines. Machinery should work in coal mines, manage all sanitation services, fuel steamers, clean streets, run errands on rainy days, and take care of anything that is tedious or distressing.” If workers today have a complaint about the use of machinery, it’s that they haven’t benefited enough from the improvements made so far. However, this issue is linked to the unfair distribution of wealth, not the ways wealth is produced. Fairly, workers should partake in the technical advancements that defined the nineteenth century and will further transform industries in the twentieth. The pressing question here is how workers can secure their rightful share of increased production. One solution, which we will examine next, is to enhance efficiency through better industrial education and training.

The subject of industrial education has recently been receiving considerable attention in the United States and the needs and shortcomings of our country in this regard [Pg 107] have been described. Under modern methods of production, with their extreme specialization of labor and extended use of machinery, it is practically impossible for a worker to secure an adequate knowledge of a trade in the actual practice of it. In former days boys acquired training in their trades by the system of apprenticeship under the immediate charge of a master of the craft. The system of apprenticeship has today almost disappeared; boys are taken into shops as helpers, not as apprentices, and receive practically no systematic instruction in their trade, especially in a modern large establishment. In consequence of these facts it is insisted that school instruction should be given to make good the absence of shop practice; that a general system of industrial education should be developed to give our workingmen systematic training in the various trades. The superiority of the opportunities for industrial education on the continent of Europe, especially in Germany, have been frequently emphasized, and their industrial advance has been credited in large measure to this fact. We can probably not approach the subject better than by explaining the systems in these other countries and then comparing them with that of the United States.

The topic of industrial education has recently gained significant attention in the United States, with discussions about the country's needs and shortcomings in this area. Under modern production methods, which involve extreme specialization of labor and widespread use of machinery, it's nearly impossible for a worker to gain sufficient knowledge of a trade through actual practice. In the past, boys learned their trades through apprenticeship under a master craftsman’s guidance. Today, the apprenticeship system has nearly vanished; boys are brought into shops as helpers rather than apprentices and receive almost no structured training in their trade, especially in large modern companies. Because of this, there's a push for schools to provide education that compensates for the lack of hands-on experience; a comprehensive industrial education system is needed to give workers systematic training in various trades. The advantages of industrial education opportunities in Europe, particularly in Germany, have often been highlighted, and their industrial progress has largely been attributed to this. We can approach this topic effectively by examining the systems in these other countries and comparing them to the system in the United States.

Beginning with Germany as the country in which industrial education has received the greatest attention, we find there three different kinds of schools, which we may call the lower, middle, and higher. The lower group includes artisan and specialized trade schools, and is intended to be a substitute for the apprenticeship system. While they have an important influence on the general industrial efficiency of the nation, they concern chiefly the small handicrafts. The middle group comprises the trade schools (gewerbeschulen), of which the most famous are the weaving and dyeing schools at Chemnitz; other branches taught are soap-boiling, milling, building, pottery, etc. These are the schools that provide technical instruction for [Pg 108] the large manufacturing industries, and are consequently of great importance; they train the foremen, superintendents, managers, and heads of establishments rather than the workingmen. The higher group is formed of the technical high schools or technological institutes, where are trained the scientific experts. The importance of the German system lies in the development of the last two groups rather than in provision for the training of the workmen. Germany’s recent industrial advance must be credited to the training of the officers, not the rank and file, in the industrial army, to the development of managerial ability rather than of manual skill.

Beginning with Germany as the country where industrial education has gotten the most attention, we see three different types of schools, which we can call lower, middle, and higher. The lower group includes artisan and specialized trade schools, serving as a substitute for the apprenticeship system. While they significantly impact the overall industrial efficiency of the nation, they primarily focus on small crafts. The middle group consists of trade schools (gewerbeschulen), with the most well-known being the weaving and dyeing schools in Chemnitz; other subjects taught include soap-making, milling, construction, pottery, etc. These schools provide technical training for large manufacturing industries and are therefore very important; they prepare foremen, supervisors, managers, and heads of businesses rather than the laborers. The higher group is made up of technical high schools or technological institutes, where scientific experts are trained. The strength of the German system lies in the development of the last two groups rather than in training for the workers. Germany’s recent industrial progress can be attributed to the training of its leaders, not the general workforce, focusing on managerial skills over manual skills.

In England the last twenty years have seen a marvelous development in industrial education, brought about in part by the “made in Germany” agitation. The English system differs from the German in educating working-class boys, while at work in the mill or at the forge, into foremen, managers, etc., mainly by means of evening classes in trade or technical schools. The German system, on the other hand, trained men who already had a superior general education. These schools are regarded as stepping stones for the more ambitious and intelligent young workingmen. They give a practical grasp of the subjects, but do not teach actual processes of manufacture, owing to trade union objections. They thus come between the lower and middle schools in Germany. The higher technical schools also exist and have recently been greatly expanded.

In England, the past twenty years have seen an impressive growth in industrial education, partly driven by the “made in Germany” campaign. The English system focuses on training working-class boys, while they're working in the mill or at the forge, to become foremen, managers, etc., mainly through evening classes in trade or technical schools. In contrast, the German system trains individuals who already have a strong general education. These schools are seen as stepping stones for more ambitious and capable young workers. They provide a practical understanding of subjects but don’t teach specific manufacturing processes due to trade union restrictions. They thus fill the gap between lower and middle schools in Germany. Higher technical schools also exist and have recently undergone significant expansion.

The system of industrial education in the United States may be said to resemble that of Germany more than England in that it supplies industries from above rather than from below, but it is in a very chaotic state as yet. The most important schools are institutes of technology and the technical departments of the universities, but these train men only for the highest positions. Provision for the industrial training of the workingman is almost lacking [Pg 109] except in a few manufacturing centers. Thus there are a few trade schools resembling somewhat those in the Middle German group, as the textile schools at Philadelphia, Lowell, and a few other cities. Lower trade schools are found in New York City, but hardly anywhere else. That there is a distinct need of and demand for instruction of this character is shown by the enormous expansion of correspondence schools, a peculiarly American institution, which endeavor to give the training afforded by the English schools to the more ambitious young artisans.

The system of industrial education in the United States is more similar to Germany's than England's because it feeds industries from the top down rather than the bottom up, but it's still quite disorganized. The main institutions are technology institutes and the technical departments of universities, but they only prepare people for the highest-level jobs. There’s almost no provision for industrial training for working-class individuals, except in a few manufacturing hubs. There are some trade schools that bear a resemblance to those in the Middle German group, like the textile schools in Philadelphia, Lowell, and a few other cities. Lower-level trade schools can be found in New York City, but they’re rare elsewhere. The clear need and demand for this type of instruction is evident in the massive growth of correspondence schools, a uniquely American concept, which aim to provide the same kind of training that English schools offer to more ambitious young tradespeople. [Pg 109]

So far in their industrial development the people of the United States have been immensely aided by two factors: the rich natural resources of the country, and the high quality of the labor. But as we have already seen, the natural resources are being either rapidly exhausted or monopolized. As to the character of the second factor, we may quote from the testimony of a recent careful observer, Dr. A. Shadwell[33] : “The American method of work in the industrial sphere is distinguished by the following features: enterprise, audacity, push, restlessness, eagerness for novelty, inventiveness, emulation, and cupidity. Employers and employed have exhibited the same qualities in their degree.”... But they suffer “from the national defect of want of thoroughness, which arises from the craving for short cuts.” Now that American industries are entering the markets of the world in international competition, it becomes important to correct any faults that will cause us to fall behind. So far the movement for better industrial education through the establishment of trade schools has met two obstacles in this country. The first is the hostility of the trade unions, which fear to see their control of the labor market disturbed by the annual turning out of hundreds or thousands of workers from the trade schools without any especial sympathy with trade union methods or policies. The [Pg 110] other difficulty lies in the satisfaction with prevailing methods, the belief that the American workman without training possesses skill superior to that of his European competitors, and a naïve national self-conceit in all things American. Now that we are for almost the first time in a hundred years measuring our industrial efficiency in foreign markets against our European competitors, we shall be compelled to take stock of all the items that make for industrial supremacy. There seems to be little doubt that when once this is fairly done, the need of a better system of industrial education will be recognized and met.

So far in their industrial development, the people of the United States have been greatly helped by two main factors: the country’s abundant natural resources and the quality of the labor force. However, as we've noted, the natural resources are either being quickly depleted or monopolized. Regarding the labor force, we can quote a recent observer, Dr. A. Shadwell[33]: “The American way of working in the industrial sector is marked by features like initiative, boldness, drive, restlessness, a desire for new experiences, creativity, competition, and greed. Both employers and employees show these traits to some extent.”... But they struggle “with the national flaw of a lack of thoroughness, stemming from a desire for shortcuts.” Now that American industries are competing on the global stage, it’s crucial to address any issues that could make us fall behind. So far, the push for improved industrial education through trade schools has faced two challenges in this country. The first is resistance from trade unions, which worry that training hundreds or thousands of workers in trade schools will disrupt their control over the labor market and these workers may not align with union methods or policies. The [Pg 110] second challenge is a complacency with current practices, the belief that American workers without formal training are more skilled than their European counterparts, and a naive national pride in everything American. Now that we are, for almost the first time in a hundred years, evaluating our industrial performance in foreign markets against European competitors, we will need to assess all the factors that contribute to industrial leadership. There seems to be little doubt that once this assessment is fairly conducted, the necessity for a better system of industrial education will be acknowledged and addressed.

XII. PROFIT-SHARING AND CO-OPERATION.

Among the reforms suggested for remedying some of the evils incident to the modern wage system those of profit-sharing and co-operation occupy a prominent place. The separation of the community into capitalists and laborers, classes different in conditions and ideals, constitutes a menace to the peace and progress of industrial society. The wage system moreover is thought by many to have broken down the former intimate relation of employer and worker, and some scheme is needed to correlate their interests again and to bind them together. To secure this result profit-sharing is advocated. As defined by the International Co-operative Congress in 1897 this is “the agreement, freely entered into, by which the employe receives a share, fixed in advance, of the profits.” It is not a change from the present wage system, but simply a modification of that system according to which the laborer receives a share in the profits in addition to his wages. The purpose is to identify the interests of the employes with those of their employer and thus to give him some of the same motives for energy, care, and thrift in the conduct of the business. Three principal methods of profit-sharing may be mentioned, though the variations are manifold. The favorite method in England and the United [Pg 111] States is the payment of a cash bonus at the end of a fixed period, as a year. A second plan, which is the rule in France, is a deferred participation by means of a savings bank deposit, provident fund, or annuity, for the purpose of providing for old age and disability. The third plan, which has recently grown in favor in this country, is the payment in shares of stock of the company.

Among the reforms suggested to address some of the issues related to the modern wage system, profit-sharing and cooperation are significant options. The split between capitalists and laborers, who differ in conditions and ideals, poses a threat to the peace and progress of industrial society. Many believe that the wage system has weakened the once-close relationship between employers and workers, and a strategy is needed to realign their interests and bring them together again. To achieve this, profit-sharing is promoted. As defined by the International Co-operative Congress in 1897, this is “the agreement, freely entered into, by which the employee receives a share, fixed in advance, of the profits.” It doesn’t replace the current wage system but rather modifies it so that the laborer gets a share of the profits in addition to their wages. The goal is to align the interests of employees with those of their employer, thereby motivating them to work with the same energy, care, and thrift in managing the business. Three main methods of profit-sharing can be noted, although there are many variations. The most popular method in England and the United States is paying a cash bonus at the end of a set period, such as a year. A second approach, which is common in France, allows for deferred participation through savings bank deposits, provident funds, or annuities aimed at supporting old age and disability. The third method, which has become more popular in this country recently, involves payment in company stock shares.

The economic theory of profit-sharing is that by inducing greater care and diligence on the part of the employe he will himself create the fund from which he is paid. It is claimed by its advocates that it increases both the quantity and the quality of the product and that it promotes greater care of implements and materials, thus reducing the cost at the same time that it increases the output. The classic example of this is the case of the original profit-sharing scheme, the Maison Leclaire, in Paris; the result of the first six years’ experiment was a dividend on wages of $3,753 a year, derived entirely from the increased economy and care of the workers. In some cases, however, the object of the employers is to secure immunity from strikes and other labor disturbances and a greater permanence of the labor force; and participation in profits is conditioned on the men abstaining from joining a trade union, or on uninterrupted service. In these cases the deferred participation plan is used. The advantages claimed for the system are not merely the increase in product already spoken of and the greatest efficiency of the worker, but also the improvement in his material and moral standards, and the promotion of industrial peace by lessening discontent and friction. The main basis for the system, since it is economic and not philanthropic in its nature, must of course be the increase in production brought about by its adoption.

The economic theory of profit-sharing suggests that by encouraging employees to be more careful and diligent, they will generate the funds from which they are paid. Supporters claim it boosts both the quantity and quality of the output and encourages better maintenance of tools and materials, thereby lowering costs while increasing production. A classic example of this is the original profit-sharing program at Maison Leclaire in Paris; the outcome of the first six years was a $3,753 annual dividend on wages, entirely resulting from the increased efficiency and care of the workers. However, in some situations, employers aim to minimize strikes and other labor issues, and to ensure a more stable workforce; thus, profit-sharing may depend on employees refraining from joining a trade union or maintaining continuous service. In these cases, a deferred profit-sharing plan is implemented. The benefits of this system go beyond just the increase in output and worker efficiency; they also include improvements in workers' material and moral standards, and fostering industrial peace by reducing dissatisfaction and conflict. Ultimately, since this system is rooted in economics rather than philanthropy, the primary rationale must be the enhanced production that results from its implementation.

More weighty, however, appear the objections against profit-sharing, which seem to have had sufficient force to cause the failure of a number of ventures in this direction. [Pg 112] In the first place, the relation between the increased effort of a single workman and the success of a general business is so remote, especially in our complicated modern industry, that it is unlikely to act as a very powerful stimulus. But even if it should, the savings thus effected might be swept away by the poor business management of the employer. “It is quite possible that the workman who, in the hope of earning ‘bonus to labor,’ has done work 10 per cent in excess of the normal standard, may, even under a liberal scheme, find that, instead of receiving an addition to his normal wages of, say, 7 per cent, the bad management of his employer has reduced his bonus to so low a level that he has to be content with a supplement equivalent to only 2 per cent on his wages, or that, as has been the case in a large proportion of the schemes ... no bonus whatever is forthcoming.”[34] It is undesirable to make the earnings of the laborer dependent in any way upon the fluctuations of business or the ability of the employer. The ordinary wage system has at least the merit that the reward of the laborer is made dependent only on his own efforts. The lot of the modern worker is too unstable and employment too unsteady to add a new element of uncertainty in wages. If the laborer has really earned the premium, say labor leaders, why not add it to his wages instead of adopting this roundabout method. The sliding scale, or a system of premiums or bonus payments for increased output, would be better than profit-sharing, and is rapidly spreading.

However, the objections to profit-sharing seem stronger, having been significant enough to lead to the failure of several attempts in this area. [Pg 112] First, the connection between the increased effort of one worker and the overall success of a business is so indirect, especially in our complex modern industry, that it’s unlikely to serve as a strong motivator. Even if it does, the savings achieved might be negated by the poor management of the employer. “It’s entirely possible that the worker who aims for a ‘bonus to labor’ by producing 10 percent more than the normal standard might, even under a generous plan, find that instead of getting a 7 percent raise to his usual pay, the employer's bad management has cut his bonus down to just 2 percent of his wages, or, as has happened in many schemes, he might not receive any bonus at all.”[34] It’s not ideal to make a laborer's earnings dependent on the ups and downs of business or the employer's skill. The standard wage system at least has the advantage of tying the laborer's reward solely to his own efforts. The modern worker's situation is too precarious and employment too inconsistent to introduce any new uncertainty into wages. If workers have genuinely earned the bonus, labor leaders argue, why not just add it to their wages instead of using this complicated approach? A sliding scale or a system of bonuses for increased output would be better than profit-sharing and is gaining popularity quickly.

This leads to the second objection, which is that profit-sharing paralyzes the efforts of the laborers to better their own conditions through trade unions, strikes or other methods. The trade union attitude was vigorously stated by President Gompers of the American Federation of Labor in his testimony before the Industrial Commission[35]: [Pg 113] “There have been few, if any, of these concerns which have been even comparatively fair to their employes.... They made the work harder, longer hours, and when the employes of other concerns in the same line of trade were enjoying increased wages, shorter hours of labor, and other improvements, tending to the material progress of the worker, the employes of the concern where so-called profit-sharing was the system at the end of the year found themselves receiving lower wages for harder work than were those who were not under that beneficent system.” As long as the system is viewed with suspicion by the laborer or used as a weapon in industrial bargaining by employers, the plan is foredoomed to failure. But even were it managed in the proper spirit, it is after all applicable to only a comparatively few industries, those, namely, in which labor makes up the largest part of the cost of production. In most modern industries capital plays such an important role as compared with labor that the field for this plan is comparatively limited.

This brings us to the second objection, which is that profit-sharing holds back workers from improving their own conditions through trade unions, strikes, or other methods. The trade union perspective was strongly expressed by President Gompers of the American Federation of Labor in his testimony before the Industrial Commission[35]: [Pg 113] “There have been few, if any, of these companies that have treated their employees fairly…. They made the work harder, extended the hours, and when the employees of other companies in the same trade were enjoying better wages, shorter hours, and other improvements that benefited them materially, the employees of the company implementing so-called profit-sharing ended up earning lower wages for harder work than those who weren’t under that supposedly beneficial system.” As long as workers view the system with skepticism or employers use it as a negotiating tool, the plan is destined to fail. Even if it were managed in good faith, it's only applicable to a relatively small number of industries—specifically, those where labor constitutes the largest portion of production costs. In most modern industries, capital is so crucial compared to labor that the potential for this plan is quite limited.

In the actual practice of profit-sharing there have been many interesting experiments, and not a few failures. It may be said to date from 1842, when M. Leclaire, a Parisian painter and house decorator, introduced it into his business, and has since spread over France and England; it has met with little success in the rest of Europe. In the United States the movement has also been more recent and of smaller proportions. The reason for this is suggested by President Hadley as follows[36]: “Where the laborers under the old wage system are not working up to a high standard of efficiency, there is more chance for the success of profit-sharing. This seems to be the reason why it works better on the Continent than in England, and better in England than in America.” It was estimated in 1900 that there had been in the entire world some 500 experiments in profit-sharing, [Pg 114] of which about 400 were still in existence: a more conservative estimate would place the latter number at about 300.

In actual profit-sharing practices, there have been many interesting experiments and quite a few failures. The concept started in 1842 when M. Leclaire, a painter and house decorator from Paris, introduced it into his business. Since then, it has spread across France and England but has seen little success elsewhere in Europe. In the United States, the movement has also been more recent and on a smaller scale. President Hadley suggests that this is because: “Where the laborers under the old wage system are not working up to a high standard of efficiency, there is more chance for the success of profit-sharing. This seems to be the reason why it works better on the Continent than in England, and better in England than in America.” In 1900, it was estimated that there had been around 500 profit-sharing experiments worldwide, of which about 400 were still active; a more conservative estimate would suggest this number is closer to 300.

More radical than profit-sharing, which involves only a change in the method of payment of wages, is co-operation, which involves a change of management as well. Its final goal, in the minds of its advocates, is the radical modification if not ultimate abolition of the present wage system. While profit-sharing is paternalistic and is directed to an increase of production, co-operation may be said to be democratic, and to aim at a more equitable distribution. Under this plan the laborers hope to divert to themselves the large amount of profits which they now see going into the possession of their employers. By eliminating the manager or enterpriser they hope to save his profits for themselves. Two different kinds of co-operation are usually distinguished—distributive or consumers’ co-operation, and producers’ co-operation—which we may profitably take up in turn.

More radical than profit-sharing, which only changes how wages are paid, is co-operation, which also changes management. Its ultimate goal, according to its supporters, is to significantly change or even completely eliminate the current wage system. While profit-sharing is somewhat paternalistic and focuses on boosting production, co-operation can be seen as democratic, aiming for a fairer distribution of wealth. With this approach, workers hope to claim a larger share of the profits that currently go to their employers. By removing the manager or entrepreneur, they aim to keep those profits for themselves. Typically, there are two main types of co-operation identified: distributive or consumers’ co-operation, and producers’ co-operation—which we can discuss in turn.

Successful consumers’ co-operation may be said to have originated in Great Britain when twenty-eight Rochdale workingmen founded their famous society of Equitable Pioneers. The success and growth of this remarkable experiment, starting with a capital of £28, to a great system of 8,000 members with a capital of £200,000 in 1874, is a most romantic story. It was largely imitated and retail co-operative stores sprang up all over England. In 1864 the English Co-operative Wholesale Society was started, for the purpose of the joint purchase of supplies for the retail co-operative stores on better terms than these could secure singly from ordinary wholesalers. It effected large economies and was successful from the beginning; by 1901 it had a capital of £2,500,000 and acted as purchaser for over 1,000 retail societies. From buying, the society soon passed to making its own goods and now manufactures directly a long list of commodities. In 1868 the Scottish [Pg 115] Wholesale Society was inaugurated upon practically the same plan. Consumers’ co-operation has met with considerable success in Europe also. In the United States, however, experiments of this kind have in general had only a brief existence. It is impossible to say how many such societies exist today as no adequate statistics on the subject exist. Trade union stores in New England, the grange stores of the Patrons of Husbandry and later similar ones of the Sovereigns of Industry, and a few sporadic movements since in different parts of the country, show what has been attempted. The reasons for the lack of success in this country are not hard to find. Co-operation requires a willingness to take considerable trouble for small economies, which American workingmen, with their generally high wages, have not yet been willing to take. It also requires a considerable degree of homogeneity in thought and interests on the part of a people, which is naturally less present in the United States with its large admixture of foreign population than in England or the countries of Europe.

Successful consumer cooperation can be traced back to Great Britain when twenty-eight Rochdale workingmen established their well-known society of Equitable Pioneers. The success and growth of this remarkable experiment, which started with a capital of £28, evolved into a large system with 8,000 members and a capital of £200,000 by 1874, is a fascinating story. It inspired many imitators, leading to the establishment of retail cooperative stores throughout England. In 1864, the English Co-operative Wholesale Society was formed to pool resources for purchasing supplies for retail cooperative stores at better prices than they could get individually from regular wholesalers. This approach resulted in significant savings and was successful from the start; by 1901, it had a capital of £2,500,000 and served as a buyer for over 1,000 retail societies. The society quickly transitioned from just buying to manufacturing its own products, and now it directly produces a wide range of goods. In 1868, the Scottish Wholesale Society was launched with a similar model. Consumer cooperation has also been quite successful in Europe. However, in the United States, such initiatives have generally had a short lifespan. It's difficult to determine how many of these societies currently exist, as there are no reliable statistics on the subject. Trade union stores in New England, the grange stores of the Patrons of Husbandry, and later similar ventures by the Sovereigns of Industry, along with a few sporadic movements in various parts of the country, demonstrate what has been attempted. The reasons for the lack of success in this country are apparent. Cooperation requires a willingness to invest effort for small savings, which American workers, typically enjoying higher wages, have not yet been inclined to do. It also demands a significant level of shared beliefs and interests among people, which is naturally less prevalent in the U.S. due to its diverse foreign population compared to England or other European countries.

The methods of the Rochdale Society will serve as an illustration of the way in which the savings effected by co-operation are distributed among the members. Any one might become a member upon payment of one shilling and was then entitled to trade at the store. The prices charged were those current in the town, but purity of goods was assured; cash payments were an essential feature. At the end of the year the profits were divided among the members in proportion to the amount of their purchases. On the other hand, it may be noted that no attempt was made to, introduce profit-sharing with the employes, who are paid ordinary but good wages only. Other forms of consumers’ co-operation are those which undertake to supply insurance, or credit, like the co-operative insurance companies, banks, and building and loan associations. The latter especially have had considerable success in the United [Pg 116] States and have helped many a laborer or man of small means to the ownership of a home.

The methods of the Rochdale Society illustrate how the savings achieved through cooperation are distributed among its members. Anyone could become a member by paying one shilling, which entitled them to shop at the store. The prices were in line with what was typical in town, but the quality of goods was guaranteed; cash payments were a key requirement. At the year's end, the profits were shared among members based on how much they had spent. However, it's worth noting that there was no effort to implement profit-sharing with employees, who were paid regular but decent wages only. Other forms of consumer cooperation include those that provide insurance or credit, such as cooperative insurance companies, banks, and building and loan associations. The latter, in particular, have been quite successful in the United States and have helped many workers or individuals with limited means achieve homeownership.

Producers’ co-operation differs from that just described in that it is a union on the part of laborers to do away with the employer and to secure for themselves the profits. The object of the first is to lower prices for the co-operators as consumers; the object of the second is rather to secure higher prices for themselves as producers by eliminating the profits of the industrial manager. They hope to perform his function by their collective effort, and to manage as well as labor; indeed, by diminishing friction and strikes they even hope to increase the profits. Examples of successful co-operation of this sort are not numerous, as it has great difficulties to contend with. Most of the experiments have failed, though recently it would seem that the movement is making substantial though slow progress, especially in France and England. Most of those in the latter country, however, seem to be of simple industries, as agriculture and dairy-farming. The most notable example of successful productive co-operation in the United States has been furnished by the coopers of Minneapolis, who organized a shop of their own in 1868 and have steadily increased their business since that time. Other instances often cited are the wood-workers in St. Louis and boot and shoe companies in Massachusetts. More recently there has been a considerable extension of co-operative creameries, cheese factories and similar businesses of a simple kind.

Producers’ cooperation is different from what was just described because it involves workers banding together to eliminate the employer and secure profits for themselves. The first type aims to lower prices for the co-operators as consumers; the second one focuses more on getting higher prices for themselves as producers by cutting out the industrial manager's profits. They intend to take on his role through their combined efforts, managing as well as working; in fact, by reducing friction and strikes, they even hope to boost their profits. There aren't many examples of successful cooperation like this, as it faces significant challenges. Most of the attempts have failed, though it seems the movement is making steady but slow progress lately, especially in France and England. However, most initiatives in England seem to involve simple industries like agriculture and dairy farming. The most notable example of successful productive cooperation in the United States is the coopers in Minneapolis, who set up their own shop in 1868 and have consistently grown their business since then. Other frequently mentioned cases include woodworkers in St. Louis and boot and shoe companies in Massachusetts. More recently, there has been significant growth in cooperative creameries, cheese factories, and similar simple businesses.

The advantages of co-operation are summed up as follows by President Walker.[37] From the laborer’s point of view: “First, to secure for the laboring class that large amount of wealth, which ... goes annually in profits to the employer. Second, to secure for the laborer the opportunity to produce independently of the will of an employer.... In addition to these, the political economist beholds in cooperation [Pg 117] three sources of advantage. First, co-operation would, by the very terms of the case, do away with strikes.... Second, the workman would be incited to greater industry and to greater carefulness in dealing with materials and with machinery. Third, in no small degree frugality would be encouraged.” To these may be added other advantages, mostly realizable, however, in consumers’ co-operation. Saving in store-room, clerk hire, advertising, book-keeping, etc., is effected, while above all, the practice of cash payments saves all loss from bad debts. The initial success of the Rochdale pioneers was in large part due to the economy in this line, as a system of long credits burdened the retail trade of England at the time they began. In this country the large department stores have introduced this system and have thus been able to give their customers lower prices, and by so much have lessened the motive for consumers’ co-operation. The educative effects of successful co-operation upon the participators in developing habits of thrift, careful management and a knowledge of business principles, is one of the chief advantages of the system. The ultimate ideal of enthusiastic co-operators does not, however, stop short of a mere saving in price. The goal is stated as follows by the Right Relationship League of America, which has several co-operative stores in the Northwest: Consumers’ co-operation is merely the first step which “will lead next to co-operative production, next to public ownership of natural resources and finally to complete industrial and economic equality, social and political right relationship—the Kingdom of God on Earth.”

The benefits of cooperation are summarized as follows by President Walker.[37] From the laborer's perspective: “First, to secure for the working class that significant wealth, which ... goes annually in profits to the employer. Second, to give the worker the chance to produce independently of an employer's control.... In addition to these, the political economist sees three key advantages in cooperation. First, cooperation would eliminate strikes by its very nature.... Second, workers would be motivated to work harder and be more careful with materials and machinery. Third, it would foster a degree of frugality.” Other advantages can be added, mostly achievable in consumer cooperation. Savings in storage, staff wages, advertising, bookkeeping, etc., are realized, while above all, the practice of cash payments avoids losses from bad debts. The initial success of the Rochdale pioneers was largely due to the efficiency in this area, as a system of long credits burdened England's retail trade at the time they started. In this country, major department stores have adopted this model and have thus been able to offer lower prices to their customers, reducing the incentive for consumer cooperation. The educational benefits of successful cooperation in fostering habits of thrift, careful management, and knowledge of business principles is one of the system's main advantages. However, the ultimate ideal of enthusiastic cooperators goes beyond just saving on prices. The goal is articulated by the Right Relationship League of America, which operates several cooperative stores in the Northwest: Consumer cooperation is merely the first step that “will lead to cooperative production, then to public ownership of natural resources, and finally to complete industrial and economic equality, social and political right relationship—the Kingdom of God on Earth.”

The defects of co-operation have already been suggested in the account of their failure. In the first place, the importance and need of intelligent and efficient management are usually underrated by workingmen. They are unwilling to pay high salaries and as a consequence lose the best men and secure inefficient service. Co-operation has therefore succeeded best in retail trade where the processes are [Pg 118] comparatively simple, or in those branches of production where industry counts for most and management for least. But even if it were possible to secure an efficient and progressive manager for a co-operative shop, it is found very difficult for a man chosen by the workmen to enforce discipline among them. A second disadvantage is the difficulty of securing capital. Where, as in many branches of large-scale manufacturing today, the average investment of capital amounts to more than $1,000 per employe, the impossibility of obtaining this by the contributions of the workers is obvious. Nor are capitalists usually willing to lend to such organizations, as the risks are too great. To meet this difficulty Ferdinand Lassalle, a German socialist, proposed that the state should advance the necessary capital to associations of workmen. But the experience so far with productive co-operation would seem to suggest that the social benefits would not equal the waste of public capital. There is danger also that if successful the co-operative associations would tend to become monopolies; they are profit-seeking societies and would probably not differ materially in their methods from ordinary joint stock enterprises.

The issues with cooperation have already been pointed out in the account of their failure. Firstly, the importance and need for smart and efficient management are often underestimated by workers. They are reluctant to pay high salaries, which leads them to lose the best people and end up with poor service. Therefore, cooperation has been most successful in retail, where the processes are relatively simple, or in areas of production where the actual work is more critical than management. Even if it were possible to find an effective and forward-thinking manager for a cooperative shop, it’s quite challenging for someone chosen by the workers to enforce discipline among them. Another problem is the challenge of raising capital. In many fields of large-scale manufacturing today, where the average capital investment exceeds $1,000 per employee, it’s clear that workers alone can’t provide this through their contributions. Additionally, investors usually aren’t willing to lend to these organizations due to the high risks involved. To address this issue, Ferdinand Lassalle, a German socialist, suggested that the state should provide the necessary capital to worker associations. However, past experiences with productive cooperation suggest that the social benefits may not justify the waste of public funds. There’s also the risk that if successful, these cooperative associations could become monopolies; they are profit-driven entities and are likely to operate similarly to regular joint stock companies.

It seems impossible, therefore, to expect from co-operation a final solution of the labor problem, such as John Stuart Mill, for instance, hoped for. Where successful, it has succeeded in distributing profits among a larger number of persons than would otherwise have received them. Its educative and moral effects, moreover, in the appeals which it makes to higher motives and to character, are of the highest value. But as an industrial system of enterprise it cannot supplant the present system as long as the manager of industry is needed. Today he performs a useful social service and profits are his pay therefor. If he is to be eliminated, society must first be raised to a higher plane of efficiency, intelligence, and morality. But just because it makes these high demands upon the members of [Pg 119] the laboring class, attempts at co-operation should receive all reasonable encouragement.

It seems unrealistic, therefore, to expect cooperation to provide a final solution to the labor problem, like John Stuart Mill hoped. Where it has been successful, it has managed to distribute profits among more people than would have received them otherwise. Its educational and moral impacts, especially in appealing to higher motives and character, are extremely valuable. However, as an industrial system of enterprise, it cannot replace the current system as long as a manager is needed. Today, they perform a valuable social service and profits are their compensation for that. If we are to eliminate them, society must first be elevated to a higher state of efficiency, intelligence, and morality. But precisely because it demands so much from the members of the laboring class, attempts at cooperation should receive all reasonable support.

XIII. PROBLEMS OF DISTRIBUTION.

So far we have discussed for the most part those economic problems that center round the production of wealth, such as the use of natural resources, large-scale production, trusts and monopolies, labor organizations, unemployment, industrial education and co-operation. Now we shall consider briefly a few of the problems that are connected with the distribution of wealth. Professor Blockmar[38] says that the three great problems of economic society are: “First, how to create the largest amount of utilities or wealth; second, how justly to divide this amount; and third, how to make the product minister to the permanent rather than to the transient well-being of society.” The first problem we have already discussed; the second forms the subject of the present section; while the third will be taken up in the next section. Within the last century the center of interest in the practical application of economic principles has decidedly shifted from production to distribution. The earlier writers in economics, as shown in the mercantile lists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, even Adam Smith, were chiefly interested in methods of increasing a nation’s wealth. With the introduction of the factory system and the opening up of vast natural resources by improvements in mining and transportation, the production of wealth has enormously increased, and now the question of the method of its distribution or division is felt to be more pressing.

So far, we've mainly talked about economic issues related to wealth production, like the use of natural resources, large-scale production, trusts and monopolies, labor unions, unemployment, industrial education, and cooperation. Now, let's briefly look at some of the problems related to wealth distribution. Professor Blockmar says that the three main problems of economic society are: “First, how to create the largest amount of utilities or wealth; second, how justly to divide this amount; and third, how to make the product benefit the long-term well-being of society rather than just the temporary.” We've already discussed the first problem; the second is the focus of this section, while the third will be addressed in the next section. Over the last century, interest in the practical application of economic principles has clearly shifted from production to distribution. Earlier economists, as seen in the mercantile writings of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, including Adam Smith, were mainly focused on ways to increase a nation’s wealth. With the rise of the factory system and the opening up of vast natural resources through mining and transportation improvements, the production of wealth has grown significantly, and now the issue of how to distribute or divide it feels more urgent.

Under the term distribution two different processes are included, which should be distinguished before going further. The first is called functional distribution, and concerns the distribution of the product of industry or the income of society, among the different factors of production. [Pg 120] That is to say, land, labor, capital and managerial ability have contributed in varying degrees to the production of a certain amount of current wealth, and the problem of functional distribution is to ascertain how the net product resulting from these joint efforts is divided. How much goes to rent, how much to wages, how much to interest and how much to profits? The second kind of distribution is the division of the wealth of society among individuals or families; this is personal distribution, and raises the question of poverty and great wealth. In discussing these problems, however, we must remember that wealth production and distribution takes place in modern society under conditions imposed by the social order in which we live; these were defined as competition, private property and personal liberty. If any modifications of the processes of distribution were desired, it would undoubtedly be necessary to alter these fundamental institutions.

Under the term distribution, two different processes are involved that should be distinguished before we proceed. The first is called functional distribution, which pertains to how the output of industry or society's income is shared among the various factors of production. That is to say, land, labor, capital, and managerial skills have contributed in different ways to producing a certain amount of current wealth, and the issue of functional distribution is figuring out how the net product resulting from these joint efforts is divided. How much goes to rent, how much to wages, how much to interest, and how much to profits? The second type of distribution is the division of society's wealth among individuals or families; this is personal distribution and brings up issues of poverty and extreme wealth. When discussing these matters, we must remember that wealth production and distribution in modern society occur under conditions set by the social order we live in, which are defined by competition, private property, and personal freedom. If any changes to the distribution processes were desired, it would certainly be necessary to change these fundamental institutions.

John Stuart Mill held that production was governed by natural laws, which could be ascertained and stated, but that distribution was artificial and hence that it was not possible to discover constant and certain laws governing it. Beginning mainly with Mill, the ethical question has been more and more asked as to what share each factor in production ought to get, not merely what he does receive. “Hence the question is rising more and more as to what should be the basis of division, and many proposals have been made. It is proposed that laborers combine to get a larger share. Hence we have trade unions, Knights of Labor, etc. It is proposed that capitalists and landlords give a larger proportion of the produce to the laborers than they are able to secure by mere private struggle. Hence we have proposals for profit-sharing and various charities. It is proposed that laborers combine to be their own capitalists and landlords; hence we have all sorts of co-operative and communistic experiments. It is asserted that the wealthy classes have so much power in their hands [Pg 121] that private co-operation cannot succeed in competing against them, and hence it is proposed that all the people, through government (municipal, state, and national), secure all the means of production (capital and land, so far at least as land is used for production), and operate them collectively for the equitable good of all, the people thus being their own employers, capitalists, and landlords. Hence we have municipalism, nationalism, socialism. It is claimed that capitalists and landlords have been able to secure, and are today able to maintain, their large share in distribution, only through the favoritism of the Government. Hence we have proposals for free trade, the single tax,... the extreme proposals of the very great minimizing of the state in individualism, or the abolition of the Government in anarchism.”[39] In view of this very imperfect list it is not too much to say that most of the economic problems that are stirring society today are connected with the distribution of wealth.

John Stuart Mill believed that production was governed by natural laws that could be identified and articulated, but that distribution was artificial, meaning there were no constant and certain laws that could regulate it. Starting with Mill, the ethical question of what share each contributor to production should receive—not just what they currently get—has increasingly come to the forefront. “Therefore, the question is becoming more prominent regarding what should be the basis for division, and many proposals have been made. It is suggested that workers unite to claim a larger share. This is why we have trade unions, Knights of Labor, etc. It is also suggested that capitalists and landlords should give a bigger portion of the profits to the workers than they can obtain through private struggles alone. This has led to proposals for profit-sharing and various charitable initiatives. Additionally, it’s proposed that workers band together to become their own capitalists and landlords; hence, we see various cooperative and communist experiments. It is argued that the wealthy have so much power that private cooperation can't effectively compete against them. Therefore, it is proposed that the people, through government (municipal, state, and national), should control all means of production (capital and land, at least as land is used for production) and operate them collectively for the fair benefit of everyone, making the people their own employers, capitalists, and landlords. This is where municipalism, nationalism, and socialism come in. It is claimed that capitalists and landlords have managed to secure, and continue to maintain, their large share in distribution only due to government favoritism. Thus, we have proposals for free trade, the single tax,... and extreme proposals pushing for minimal government involvement in individualism, or even the abolition of government in anarchism.”[39] Considering this rather incomplete list, it's fair to say that most of the economic issues affecting society today are related to the distribution of wealth.

The first question that suggests itself in the discussion of functional distribution is as to whether it is actually governed by natural law, so-called. It is observable that the amounts which go to rent, to wages, to interest, and to profits are regularly quite constant. What determines this? The socialists contend that natural distribution is the only just method and insist that the state should regulate this just distribution; they are not clear, however, as to what this natural method is. Henry George uses the same phrase when he says, “the just distribution of wealth is manifestly a natural distribution of wealth, and this is that which gives to him who makes it and secures to him who saves it.” All such statements beg the question for they all turn on the use of the word natural. Many modern economists are inclined to assert that the question of distribution is not an ethical one, not a question of what ought [Pg 122] to be but of what is. Thus Professor Tetter says[40] : “Distribution in economics is the seasoned explanation of the way in which the total product of a society is divided among its members. It is a logical question and not an ethical one.” And Professor Clark writes, “There is, in short, a deep-acting natural law at work amid the confusing struggles of the labor market.” It will not be possible, in the brief limits of this section, to take up all the theories as to the way in which this distribution is effected among the claimants to a share of the product, but a few of the more important practical results may be stated. We shall take up the four different factors in turn.

The first question that comes up in the discussion of functional distribution is whether it is actually governed by so-called natural law. It's noticeable that the amounts allocated to rent, wages, interest, and profits are usually quite consistent. What determines this? Socialists argue that natural distribution is the only fair approach and insist that the government should regulate this fair distribution; however, they aren’t clear on what this natural method actually is. Henry George uses the same term when he says, “the fair distribution of wealth is clearly a natural distribution of wealth, and this is what rewards those who create it and secures it for those who save it.” All such statements are problematic because they hinge on the use of the word natural. Many modern economists tend to assert that the issue of distribution is not an ethical one, not about what should be, but about what is. Thus, Professor Tetter states: “Distribution in economics is the clear explanation of how the total product of a society is divided among its members. It is a logical issue, not an ethical one.” And Professor Clark writes, “In short, there is a profound natural law at play amid the chaotic struggles of the labor market.” In the limited scope of this section, we won’t be able to address all the theories regarding how this distribution occurs among those seeking a share of the product, but we can highlight a few of the more significant practical outcomes. We will examine the four different factors one by one.

Rent is usually defined as the return for the use of natural objects and agencies. Rent has usually been low in the United States because of the large amount of land and other natural agents available. In general it may be said that when any factor of production is relatively abundant in comparison with the other factors, its share of the product will be small.[41] Henry George, however, argues that as the amount of land is limited and is now practically all taken up, the future will see a constantly increasing demand for land, and hence the landlords will absorb most of the future income of society. This is true of most of land and other natural agents especially in demand, as choice sites in our cities, anthracite coal mines, etc. The practical problem that suggests itself is, do we wish private property in land? The socialists answer no, but the individualists insist that the best use has been and can be made of land only by reducing it to private ownership. In practice, however, even in modern individualistic societies, the absolute and unregulated use of land by the owner is restricted in various ways.

Rent is usually defined as the payment for the use of natural resources and services. Rent has generally been low in the United States due to the abundance of land and other natural resources available. In general, it can be said that when any production factor is relatively plentiful compared to other factors, its share of the total output will be small.[41] However, Henry George argues that because the amount of land is limited and nearly all of it is currently claimed, the future will show a steadily increasing demand for land, causing landlords to capture most of society's future income. This holds true for many types of land and other natural resources, particularly for desirable locations in our cities, anthracite coal mines, and so on. The practical question that arises is whether we want private ownership of land. Socialists say no, but individualists claim that the best use of land has been and can only be achieved through private ownership. In practice, however, even in modern individualistic societies, the owner's unrestricted use of land is limited in various ways.

Interest is the amount paid for the use of capital. [Pg 123] From the time of the church fathers in the Middle Ages down to the present-day socialists, interest and the private ownership of productive capital have formed favorite objects of attack. The justification of interest lies in the fact that men prefer present goods to future goods—a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush—and interest is the difference in value between the two at the present moment; it is time value. The justification of private property, on the other hand, lies rather in its expediency than in any inherent and unalterable law of nature. It has developed with civilization and has been, without question, a fundamental cause of material progress. But moderate individualists even, as John Stuart Mill, have attacked the institution of inheritance while leaving the main edifice of private property untouched. They would limit absolutely the amount of bequest or, as President Roosevelt advocated, would use inheritance taxes as a means of breaking up large fortunes.

Interest is the amount paid for using capital. [Pg 123] Since the time of the church fathers in the Middle Ages up to today's socialists, interest and private ownership of productive capital have been common targets for criticism. The reasoning behind interest is that people prefer having goods now rather than later—a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush—and interest represents the difference in value between the two at the current time; it’s the time value. Private property, on the other hand, is justified more by its practicality than by any unchanging natural law. It has evolved with civilization and has undoubtedly been a key factor in material progress. However, even moderate individualists like John Stuart Mill have criticized the concept of inheritance while leaving the overall system of private property intact. They would completely limit the amount of inheritance, or as President Roosevelt suggested, use inheritance taxes to break up large fortunes.

Profits are the reward which the manager of a business receives for his services in organizing and superintending the business. This share of the social income was the last to be recognized by economists, and its rightfulness is even yet denied by the socialists. They insist that profits are really the earnings of labor which have been withheld from the laborer by the superior skill and economic strength of the capitalist manager; they are institutional robbery, the exploitation of labor. It is not possible to take up the arguments on this point, but it may be said in a word that the manager of business contributes a needed service to the work of society just as truly as the laborer does, and receives his earned reward in the form of profits.

Profits are the reward that a business manager earns for organizing and overseeing the business. This part of social income was the last to be acknowledged by economists, and socialists still question its legitimacy. They argue that profits are actually the wages of labor that have been withheld from workers due to the superior skills and economic power of the capitalist manager; they consider it institutional theft and the exploitation of labor. It's not possible to delve into all the arguments on this matter, but it can be said that the business manager provides a valuable service to society just as much as the worker does, and earns his profits as a reward for that service.

Wages are the reward of labor. It is often assumed that wages are lower than they should be, that the laborer in some way is deprived of a portion of what he has rightfully earned. It is worth while inquiring briefly how the [Pg 124] share of labor in the distribution of the social income is determined. Various theories have been developed to explain the distributive process, of which we may notice three. The oldest in point of time and the most pessimistic theory held that wages were fixed by competition and the growth of population at the bare subsistence minimum, a bare starvation level. If by some happy chance wages were raised above this point, then the population would speedily multiply and the increased competition thus brought about among the laborers would depress wages again to the lowest amount sufficient to support a family. Under the name of the “iron law of wages,” this theory is still put forth by the socialists as the explanation—together with the institution of private property—of wages. Historically, however, this theory has happily been proven untrue, as the advance in the standard of living among the working class during the past century testifies. It has now been almost wholly superseded by the so-called productivity theory,[42] which asserts that wages depend upon the productivity of labor; that the laborer gets what he produces, and that this share is assured him by the working out of the competitive process under free competition. If this theory is true, there can be no ethical question raised; if labor is dissatisfied with its share, then it must increase its productive efficiency. As a matter of fact wages have always been high in the United States because labor has been relatively scarce compared with land and capital, and consequently its marginal productivity has been high. The third theory says that wages are a result of bargaining, of competition in the labor market, a question of supply and demand. Under these circumstances it is largely a question of economic strength between labor and capital, and if labor is well-organized, alert, and able to drive a good bargain, then wages will be high; otherwise they will be low. While there is an element of truth in [Pg 125] the last theory, the second one seems the truest explanation of general wages; certain it is that no monopoly power of labor, however great, could permanently maintain wages at a level higher than the actual produce of labor. The element of truth in the first theory is that wages can never, for any length of time, fall below the cost of subsistence.

Wages are the reward for work. It's often believed that wages are lower than they should be, and that workers are somehow not getting their fair share of what they've earned. It's worth briefly looking into how the role of labor in sharing society's income is determined. Several theories have been developed to explain this distribution process, and we can highlight three of them. The oldest and most pessimistic theory suggests that wages are set by competition and population growth at a bare subsistence minimum, basically a starvation level. If by some fortunate chance wages were to rise above this level, the population would quickly increase, leading to more competition among workers which would then drive wages back down to the lowest amount necessary to support a family. Known as the "iron law of wages," this theory is still used by socialists to explain wages, along with the concept of private property. However, historically, this theory has been proven incorrect, as seen by the rise in living standards of the working class over the past century. This theory has largely been replaced by the so-called productivity theory, which asserts that wages are based on the productivity of labor; that workers earn what they produce, and this share is guaranteed to them through the competitive process in a free market. If this theory holds true, then there wouldn’t be any ethical issue; if workers are unhappy with their pay, they simply need to boost their productivity. In fact, wages have always been high in the United States because labor has been relatively scarce compared to land and capital, which has resulted in high marginal productivity. The third theory postulates that wages result from bargaining and the competition within the labor market, based on the dynamics of supply and demand. In this case, it largely depends on the economic power between labor and capital; if labor is well-organized, proactive, and can negotiate effectively, wages will be higher; if not, they will be lower. While there is some truth to this last theory, the second one seems to provide the most accurate explanation of overall wage levels. It's clear that no matter how powerful labor may become, it cannot permanently keep wages above the actual productivity of labor. The truth in the first theory is that wages can never stay below the cost of living for long.

Of more practical interest are questions connected with the personal distribution of wealth. In this connection arise such problems as the increase of large fortunes, the causes of poverty, and similar questions. The boast of our Republic has long been that here opportunity was open to all, that wealth was widely diffused, and that such inequalities of fortune as characterized the nations of the Old World were happily lacking. In the fifty-five years, 1850-1904, the per capita value of all property in the United States exactly quadrupled; how has this increase been distributed? Unfortunately we have no complete statistics on this point, yet reliable estimates by authoritative writers all tell the same story—of great concentration of wealth in the possession of a comparatively few rich families. In 1893 Mr. George K. Holmes concluded from a study of the statistics of farm and home ownership in the United States that “91 per cent of the families of the country own no more than about 29 per cent of the wealth, and 9 per cent of the families own about 71 per cent of the wealth.” A more accurate and satisfactory statement can be drawn from the income-tax returns for Prussia, which tells almost the same story with regard to income. The table on the following page is condensed from an article by Professor A. Wagner:

Of more practical interest are questions related to the personal distribution of wealth. In this context arise issues such as the rise of large fortunes, the reasons for poverty, and similar topics. The pride of our Republic has long been that here opportunity is available to everyone, that wealth is spread out, and that the inequalities of fortune seen in the nations of the Old World are thankfully absent. Over the fifty-five years from 1850 to 1904, the per capita value of all property in the United States exactly quadrupled; how has this increase been distributed? Unfortunately, we don’t have complete statistics on this, yet reliable estimates from credible sources all tell the same story—of significant wealth concentration in the hands of a relatively small number of wealthy families. In 1893, Mr. George K. Holmes concluded from his analysis of farm and home ownership statistics in the United States that “91 percent of the families in the country own no more than about 29 percent of the wealth, and 9 percent of the families own about 71 percent of the wealth.” A more accurate and satisfying representation can be gathered from the income tax returns for Prussia, which tells almost the same story regarding income. The table on the following page is condensed from an article by Professor A. Wagner:

[Pg 126] Distribution of Income in Prussia, 1902

[Pg 126] Income Distribution in Prussia, 1902

Income Per cent
of persons
Per cent
of income
Below $214
70.7
33.0
$214 to $714
25.8
34.9
Over $714
3.5
32.1

According to these figures over two-thirds of the persons—heads of families or single adults—had only one-third of the income, while 3½ per cent had another third. Another striking fact shown by the table is the large proportion of persons receiving incomes of less than $214 a year, the minimum taxable income. It shows the poverty of the mass of the people as well as the concentration of wealth among the few rich. In the United States, where the natural resources have been so much richer than in Germany, a similar table would probably show a much smaller proportion under the Prussian minimum, but on the other hand it would probably show a greater concentration of income in the hands of a few. Europe has as yet no billionaire. The great fortunes of the United States have been made possible by the unrivaled opportunities for the exploitation of rich natural resources, the appropriation of natural monopolies, and to special privileges and opportunities in manufactures and transportation. The importance of monopoly privileges in the distribution of wealth is well shown by the results of an investigation made in 1892 by the New York Tribune into the sources of the fortunes of millionaires. It was undertaken to show that protection was not the main cause; but while it proved this, it showed clearly that most of them were built up on monopoly. “Of the 4,047 millionaires reported, only 1,125, or 28 per cent, obtained their fortunes in protected industries.... About 78 per cent of the fortunes were derived from permanent monopoly privileges, and only 22 per cent from competitive industries unaided by natural and artificial monopolies.... Furthermore, if the size of fortunes is taken into account it will be found that perhaps 95 per cent of the total values represented by these millionaire fortunes is [Pg 127] due to those investments classed as land values and natural monopolies, and to competitive industries aided by such monopolies.”[43] It is essential to the stability of our democratic institutions that all special privileges be absolutely prohibited, and that monopoly be brought under strict government control and regulation. Improper methods of wealth accumulation should certainly be prevented.

According to these figures, over two-thirds of the people—heads of households or single adults—had only one-third of the income, while 3.5 percent had another third. Another striking fact shown by the table is the large number of people earning less than $214 a year, which is the minimum taxable income. This highlights the poverty of the majority as well as the concentration of wealth among a few affluent individuals. In the United States, where natural resources are far richer than in Germany, a similar table would likely show a much smaller proportion below the Prussian minimum, but would probably also reveal a greater concentration of income among the wealthy. Europe has yet to produce a billionaire. The vast fortunes in the United States have been made possible by unparalleled opportunities for exploiting rich natural resources, taking over natural monopolies, and benefiting from special privileges in manufacturing and transportation. The significance of monopoly privileges in wealth distribution is clearly illustrated by an investigation carried out in 1892 by the New York Tribune, which explored the sources of millionaires' fortunes. It was meant to demonstrate that protectionism was not the primary cause; however, while it did prove this, it also made it clear that most of these fortunes were built on monopoly. “Out of the 4,047 millionaires reported, only 1,125, or 28 percent, made their fortunes in protected industries.... About 78 percent of the fortunes came from permanent monopoly privileges, and only 22 percent from competitive industries without support from natural and artificial monopolies.... Furthermore, if we consider the size of these fortunes, it becomes evident that around 95 percent of the total value represented by these millionaire fortunes is due to investments classified as land values and natural monopolies, along with competitive industries supported by such monopolies.” It is crucial for the stability of our democratic institutions that all special privileges be strictly prohibited, and that monopolies be placed under rigorous government control and regulation. Unfair methods of accumulating wealth should certainly be prevented.

The opposite question of poverty has already been discussed and some of the causes of poverty pointed out. It will be sufficient here to try to answer the question which has often been asked: Are the rich growing richer and the poor poorer? Though the first part of the question has just been affirmed, the second part may be denied. The nineteenth century has witnessed a vast improvement in the condition of the laboring man, who has shared in the increasing wealth which he has helped to produce. Wages have steadily increased, the hours of labor have been reduced, and the material well-being of the wage-earner is greater today than it has ever been before. It has more than once been pointed out by writers on this subject that with an equal distribution of wealth no one would be well-to-do, while many others insist that inequality in itself is a desirable thing. Greater diffusion of wealth can come about only by very slow processes, and permanent plenty can be secured only by a great increase in the accumulations of capital and the efficiency of each worker. Any suggested reform, therefore, that would weaken the motives to thrift and industry must be rejected.

The opposite question about poverty has already been discussed, and some of the causes have been pointed out. It’s enough here to try to answer the question that’s often asked: Are the rich getting richer and the poor getting poorer? Although the first part of the question has been confirmed, the second part can be denied. The nineteenth century has seen a huge improvement in the lives of working people, who have benefited from the increasing wealth they helped create. Wages have steadily gone up, working hours have been reduced, and the material well-being of wage-earners is better today than ever before. It’s been pointed out by various writers on this topic that if wealth were distributed equally, no one would be financially comfortable, while many others argue that inequality is desirable. A broader distribution of wealth can only happen through very gradual changes, and lasting abundance can be achieved only through a significant increase in capital accumulation and worker efficiency. Therefore, any proposed reform that would undermine the incentives for savings and hard work must be rejected.

XIV. SAVING AND SPENDING.

The goal and purpose of all economic activities is the satisfaction of human wants. The object of production is consumption. We work because we desire and need various things which we can get only if we produce them or earn the money to buy them. In this section we take [Pg 128] up some of the problems connected with the rational use or consumption of the wealth which is continually being produced. We have seen something of the conditions under which it is produced, and the manner in which it is distributed; we must now study the not less important subject of its application to human needs and desires. The great question is, how can we get the largest and most rational return for a given expenditure? Before trying to answer this question, it will be helpful to present a summary statement of actual expenditures in different places:

The aim of all economic activities is to meet human needs. The purpose of production is consumption. We work because we want and need various things, which we can only obtain by producing them or earning money to buy them. In this section, we address some issues related to the rational use or consumption of the wealth that is constantly being produced. We have explored some of the conditions under which it is produced and how it is distributed; now we need to examine the equally important topic of how it is applied to human needs and desires. The key question is, how can we achieve the greatest and most sensible return for a given expenditure? Before attempting to answer this question, it will be useful to provide a summary of actual expenditures in different locations: [Pg 128]

Expenditures for Different Purposes.

Expenses for Various Purposes.

Items United
States
1903
New York
City
Great
Britain
Prussia Average
Food
43.1
43.4
51.4
55.0
48.2
Clothing
13.0
10.6
18.1
18.0
14.9
Rent
18.1
19.4
13.5
12.0
15.8
Fuel and light
5.7
5.1
3.5
5.0
4.8
Miscellaneous
20.1
21.5
13.5
10.0
16.3
 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Items United
States
1903
New
York
City
Great
Britain
Food
43.1
43.4
51.4
Clothing
13.0
10.6
18.1
Rent
18.1
19.4
13.5
Fuel and light
5.7
5.1
3.5
Miscellaneous
20.1
21.5
13.5
 Total
100.0
100.0
100.0
Items Prussia Average
Food
55.0
48.2
Clothing
18.0
14.9
Rent
12.0
15.8
Fuel and light
5.0
4.8
Miscellaneous
10.0
16.3
 Total
100.0
100.0

From this table it is seen that practically half of the income of average working-class families is expended for food, and five-sixths of it goes for the bare necessaries. It is therefore of the utmost importance that this be spent wisely. The remaining one-sixth, included here under the head “miscellaneous,” comprises such items as education, care of health, comfort, mental and bodily recreation, etc. It is manifest that this group can be expanded in only one of two ways: either by enlarging the total income, or by economizing on the other items by a wiser and better-ordered expenditure. The former question has already been discussed; here we are concerned only with the latter. Dr. Frederick Engel, a Prussian statistician, laid down certain laws with regard to consumption: as the income of a family increases a smaller percentage is spent for food [Pg 129] and a larger percentage for education, health, recreation, etc.; while the percentage spent for clothing, rent, fuel and light remains approximately the same. A higher civilization and culture for the mass of the people can only be secured by expanding the group of culture expenditures. As long as these remain unsatisfied for the ordinary family we cannot claim to have attained our economic goal. The author of a recent study of conditions in New York City, where the cost of living is high, concludes that a “fair living wage for a workingman’s family in New York City should be at least $728 a year, or a steady income of $14 a week.”[44] The actual earnings are certainly below this figure.

From this table, it's clear that nearly half of the income of average working-class families is spent on food, with five-sixths of that going for basic necessities. So, it's really important that this money is spent wisely. The remaining one-sixth, listed as “miscellaneous,” covers things like education, healthcare, comfort, and mental and physical recreation, among others. It's evident that this category can only grow in one of two ways: either by increasing total income or by cutting back on other expenses through smarter and more organized spending. We've already talked about the first option; now, we’ll focus on the second. Dr. Frederick Engel, a Prussian statistician, established certain principles regarding consumption: as a family's income increases, a smaller percentage goes towards food, while a larger percentage goes to education, healthcare, recreation, and so on; the percentage spent on clothing, rent, fuel, and light stays about the same. A higher level of civilization and culture for the majority of people can only be achieved by increasing culture-related spending. As long as these needs remain unmet for the average family, we can't claim to have reached our economic goal. The author of a recent study on conditions in New York City, where living costs are high, concludes that a “fair living wage for a working man’s family in New York City should be at least $728 a year, or $14 a week.” The actual earnings are certainly below this amount.

One of the problems which has often proved very puzzling is the relation between saving and spending. At what point should one stop spending in order to save? If the satisfaction of our wants is the object of production, why should we save at all? This is the point urged by the author of a specious little book called “The Fallacy of Saving.” The problem can be most easily solved by a more careful analysis of terms. In the popular view, saving involves the withdrawal of goods or money from use, while spending means putting them to immediate use. The spendthrift is proverbially popular. “If the rich do not spend, the poor die of hunger,” said Montesquieu. Saving may take the form of hoarding or withdrawing things from use, but nowadays this is practised only by misers; saving ordinarily takes the form of investment in some productive enterprise, either directly or through a bank. In this way a demand is created for goods just as truly as though the money had been spent for a dinner or a suit of clothes. Saving is spending, but it is spending for the future rather than the present; it usually causes the production of permanent material goods rather than transient or immaterial pleasures. Another cause of the confusion [Pg 130] of ideas on this subject is that we always speak of money and thus lose sight of the acts of production and consumption that lie back of the money transfer. We see that money is transferred by spending and think that it increases trade. Consequently, when a prodigal spends his money foolishly, it is excused on the ground that it makes employment and puts money in circulation. We forget that it would have been “put in circulation” just as effectively if he had not spent it, but had placed it in a bank. If we look back of the money transfer, we see that usually there has been a foolish or wasteful expenditure, sometimes an absolute destruction of wealth. A fire which burns down valuable buildings is an absolute social loss, even though employment be given to masons and carpenters in putting them up again.

One of the issues that often confuses people is the relationship between saving and spending. When should someone stop spending to save? If fulfilling our wants is the purpose of production, why should we save at all? This is the argument made in a misleading little book called “The Fallacy of Saving.” The problem can be easily resolved by analyzing the terms more carefully. In common understanding, saving means taking goods or money out of use, while spending means using them immediately. The spendthrift is typically admired. “If the rich don’t spend, the poor die of hunger,” said Montesquieu. Saving can look like hoarding or taking things out of use, but these days, that’s mainly seen in misers; saving usually involves investing in some productive venture, either directly or through a bank. This way, demand for goods is created just like if the money had been spent on a meal or a new suit. Saving is a form of spending, but it's spending for the future rather than the present; it typically leads to the creation of lasting material goods instead of fleeting or intangible pleasures. Another reason for the confusion around this issue is that we often talk about money and overlook the production and consumption activities behind the money transfer. We see money changing hands through spending and think it boosts trade. So, when a spendthrift wastes money, it’s often justified by the idea that it creates jobs and circulates money. We forget that it would have been “put in circulation” just as effectively if it had been saved in a bank. When we consider what happens beyond the money transfer, we usually find that there has been a foolish or wasteful expenditure, and sometimes even a total loss of wealth. A fire that destroys valuable buildings is a complete social loss, even if it creates work for builders and carpenters to reconstruct them.

A third confusion of ideas that exists in the popular mind is due to an over-emphasis of the desirability of work for its own sake. The man who “makes work” is thought to be doing a desirable thing, even though this results from the unnecessary destruction of useful things. Now the real goal of all rational economic endeavor is not production for its own sake, but consumption; not work, but the gratification of wants. Every destruction of durable commodities which lessens the power to gratify wants is a loss to a community and no juggling with words can make it anything else. If it gives employment to labor, that means that the labor has been diverted from the production of other things to which it would have been devoted. Edward Atkinson several years ago calculated that every year fires destroyed property in the United States to the amount $150,000,000.[45] That workmen are employed to reproduce the buildings, etc., can surely not be reckoned as a social gain. There is great danger in a commercial age like ours of forgetting that work is not an end in itself, but simply a means to an end. But it may be argued that [Pg 131] unless these men had been given employment of this sort, they would have starved. It is conceivable that during or after a revolution industry would be so interrupted that ordinary employments would not be open. But in ordinary times such a statement is simply an assertion of the fallacious lump-of-labor theory, that there is just so much work to be done and no more. New wants are continually pressing for satisfaction, waiting only for the prior ones to be satisfied before they urge their claims. So soon as the old ones are satisfied, additional employment is provided in meeting the newer desires. The aim of society is to expand continually the circle of gratified desires. As durable goods and agents are accumulated by the process of saving, this becomes increasingly possible in every progressive society. Useless destruction involves sheer waste and cannot be justified on any grounds.

A third misunderstanding that many people have is due to putting too much importance on work just for the sake of working. Someone who "creates work" is seen as doing something good, even if it means unnecessarily destroying useful things. The real aim of all thoughtful economic activity isn’t production for its own sake, but consumption; it's not about work, but fulfilling needs. Every time durable goods are destroyed, reducing the ability to meet needs, it is a loss for the community, and no amount of wordplay can change that. If this destruction creates jobs, it means that labor has been redirected from producing other useful things. A few years ago, Edward Atkinson estimated that fires destroyed $150,000,000 worth of property in the United States each year.[45] The fact that workers have to rebuild things after such destruction can’t really be considered a social benefit. In our commercial society, there's a significant risk of forgetting that work is not an end in itself but merely a means to achieve a goal. Some might argue that if these workers hadn't been given this kind of job, they would have gone hungry. It's possible that during or after a revolution, regular employment could be unavailable. But in normal circumstances, such claims just support the misleading lump-of-labor theory, which suggests there’s only a fixed amount of work available. New needs are always emerging, waiting for initial ones to be satisfied before bringing their demands forward. As soon as the previous needs are met, new jobs are created to satisfy these newer desires. Society’s goal is to continuously expand the range of satisfied desires. As durable goods and resources are accumulated through saving, this becomes increasingly feasible in any advancing society. Wasteful destruction is simply pointless and cannot be justified in any way.

On the other hand, saving is socially necessary in every industrially developed community in order to furnish the requisite capital for the continued production of wealth. Professor Marshall has estimated that every year one-fifth of the wealth of a nation is used up in the processes of manufacture and production; just to keep machines, factories, railroads, and other instruments of production up to the point of efficiency and restore loss and depreciation would therefore require considerable saving. If the nation is to grow wealthier and is to accumulate additional capital, manifestly still more must be saved. This is done in all progressive countries. Saving is carried on by individuals, however, and not by nations, and the motives that lead to it are personal. The most important is probably the desire to provide for wife and children or other relatives; next to that is the wish to lay by sufficient for one’s old age. In our individualistic society, where each family forms an independent unit and is assumed to be self-supporting, it is very desirable that habits of thrift and saving [Pg 132] be developed. Both from a social and a personal point of view therefore saving must be approved, though it is undesirable that it should proceed so far as to prevent spending for the gratification of essential present needs.

On the other hand, saving is socially necessary in every developed industrial community to provide the capital needed for ongoing wealth production. Professor Marshall estimates that every year, one-fifth of a nation's wealth is used up in manufacturing and production processes. Just to maintain the efficiency of machines, factories, railroads, and other production tools, as well as to cover wear and tear, requires significant saving. If a nation wants to become wealthier and accumulate more capital, even more needs to be saved. This is done in all progressive countries. However, saving is done by individuals rather than nations, and the reasons for saving are personal. The most important reason is likely the desire to support one’s spouse and children or other relatives; next is the wish to save enough for retirement. In our individualistic society, where each family is viewed as an independent unit and expected to be self-sufficient, it’s essential to cultivate habits of thrift and saving. From both a social and personal perspective, saving should be encouraged, although it shouldn't go so far that it prevents individuals from spending on essential present needs.

But what shall we say about expenditures for luxuries? Here the spending is for the gratification of a want, though it may be out of proportion to the results. What shall be our attitude to it? This question is not so easy to answer as the other. Three different schools have given as many answers to the problem of luxury: the first condemns it utterly; the second approves it wholly; and the third takes an intermediate position between the two extremes. Luxury is condemned by the first school from three points of view: as a question of individual morals, it is regarded as debasing and enervating, thus preventing the highest development of the human faculties; as a question of economics it is condemned as wasteful; and as a question of right and justice it is incompatible with an equitable distribution of wealth. It is upon this last point that the opponents of luxury lay the greatest emphasis. As the quantity of existing wealth is insufficient to satisfy even the primal wants of the large majority of our fellow-creatures, we should endeavor to increase this available store as much as we can, and should refrain from drawing upon it in a reckless manner in order to gratify superfluous wants. Furthermore, the productive powers that we can use are, as a matter of fact, limited; and therefore, if the wealthy classes divert a portion of these forces towards the production of articles of luxury, there will be so much the less available for the production of those staple articles that the masses require for their consumption. In the case of a Robinson Crusoe this would be perfectly clear: if he devoted several months to the polishing of a diamond for ornament, he would have to go without a house or other improvements he might have made in that time. Or, if he forced his man Friday to spend [Pg 133] half his time polishing diamonds for him, Friday might be compelled to go without sufficient clothing or food or housing. The same thing is true of organized society, only the truth is hidden by the phenomena of exchange. It has been estimated[46] that the annual consumption of wealth in the United States is divided somewhat as follows: necessaries, six billion dollars; luxuries, three and one-half billion (of which $900,000,000 go for liquor and $500,000,000 for tobacco); capitalistic uses, three and three-quarter billion. It is manifest that if the expenditure for luxuries was curtailed or abandoned, there would be more to devote to the other categories.

But what should we say about spending on luxuries? Here, the spending is for satisfying a desire, even if it might not match the actual benefits. What should our stance be on this? This question is not as straightforward as the other one. Three different viewpoints have emerged regarding luxury: the first completely opposes it; the second fully supports it; and the third occupies a middle ground between the two extremes. The first group condemns luxury for three reasons: from an individual moral perspective, it’s seen as degrading and weakening, hindering the highest development of human abilities; from an economic standpoint, it’s blamed for being wasteful; and from a rights and justice perspective, it conflicts with a fair distribution of wealth. The last point is where critics of luxury place their greatest focus. Since the amount of available wealth is not enough to meet even the basic needs of most people, we should aim to increase this available wealth as much as possible and avoid recklessly spending it to fulfill unnecessary desires. Furthermore, the productive resources we can utilize are, in reality, limited; therefore, if wealthy individuals allocate some of these resources to produce luxury items, there will be less available for creating the essential goods that the general population needs. This would be very clear in the case of a Robinson Crusoe scenario: if he spent several months polishing a diamond for decoration, he would have to go without building a house or making other improvements during that time. Alternatively, if he made his friend Friday spend half his time polishing diamonds for him, Friday might have to do without adequate clothing, food, or shelter. The same principle applies to organized society, though the reality is obscured by the dynamics of trade. It’s been estimated that the annual consumption of wealth in the United States breaks down as follows: necessities, six billion dollars; luxuries, three and a half billion (of which $900 million is spent on alcohol and $500 million on tobacco); and capitalistic uses, three and three-quarter billion. It’s clear that if spending on luxuries were reduced or eliminated, there would be more funds available for the other categories.

The opposite school replies to these arguments that luxury is an indispensable stimulus to progress; that really all economic progress is first manifested in the form of a need of luxury, and that luxury therefore is a necessary phase of its development. Since luxury is wholly relative, every want or need is, on its first appearance in the world, regarded as superfluous; first, because no one has hitherto wanted it, and secondly, because its production probably requires a considerable amount of labor, on account of man’s inexperience and the inevitable gropings in the dark that attend all beginnings. The decencies of life today and even the necessities were once regarded as luxuries—chimneys in houses, shoes, forks and knives, linen for the body, bath tubs, etc. If all luxury had always been sternly suppressed when it made its appearance, all the needs that constitute civilization would have been nipped in the bud, and we should still be in the condition of our ancestors of the Stone Age. Civilization depends on the multiplication of wants. Economic progress is a process of converting superfluities into conveniences, and conveniences into necessities.

The opposing viewpoint argues that luxury is a crucial driver of progress; that all economic growth initially shows up as a desire for luxury, making it an essential part of development. Since luxury is completely relative, any new want or need is seen as unnecessary at first; primarily because no one has wanted it before, and also because creating it likely involves a significant amount of labor due to people's lack of experience and the inevitable trial and error that come with new beginnings. Many aspects of daily life that are now considered basic needs were once viewed as luxuries—like chimneys in homes, shoes, forks and knives, linen for clothing, bathtubs, and so on. If all luxury had been strictly suppressed when it first appeared, many needs that form the foundation of civilization would have been stifled early on, and we would still be living like our Stone Age ancestors. The advancement of civilization relies on the increasing number of wants. Economic progress is all about transforming what seems superfluous into conveniences, and then turning those conveniences into necessities.

The attitude taken by practically all economists today is intermediate between these two extremes. Moderate [Pg 134] luxury is justified, but lavish and indiscriminate luxury is disapproved of. This justification of luxury rests upon purely economic grounds. In so far as personal consumption is the objective point of production, the prohibition of luxury would act as an impediment to enterprise. If the desire to enjoy luxuries stimulates the productive powers of economically important members of society, it is justifiable as a necessary motive force. The introduction of luxuries and the consequent raising of the standard of living seems often the only way to secure progress. If the mass of the people live on the minimum of cheap food, multiply as long as cheap food is to be had, and spend little for comforts and luxuries, then most of the labor of such a community must be spent in obtaining food for the masses. Such is the condition in India and China. But if a large part of the community has a higher standard of living, it will exercise self-restraint in the increase of its numbers, and the whole level of intelligence and comfort will be raised, as in France or Switzerland or New England. On the other hand, it is urged that “failure on the part of any family to secure the necessaries of life is injurious, not only to it, but to the whole community. Under-consumption means under-nutrition and loss in industrial efficiency. If permitted to continue it must inevitably undermine the standards which make a family self-supporting and self-sufficient and reduce its members to dependency. The general interest requires, therefore, acceptance of the maxim: the consumption of luxuries should be deferred until all are provided with necessaries.... This suggests that no one is justified in spending income for a luxury for himself or his family that will afford less happiness than would the same income spent for someone else.”[47]

The viewpoint held by nearly all economists today is somewhere between these two extremes. Moderate luxury is considered acceptable, but excessive and indiscriminate luxury is not. This acceptance of luxury is based purely on economic reasons. Since personal consumption is the main goal of production, banning luxury would hinder entrepreneurial efforts. If the desire for luxuries motivates the economically significant members of society, it is seen as a necessary driving force. Introducing luxuries and raising the standard of living often appears to be the only path to progress. If most people survive on minimal, inexpensive food, they will keep multiplying as long as cheap food is available and spend little on comforts and luxuries; thus, most of the community's labor will go towards securing food for the masses. This is currently the situation in India and China. However, when a large portion of the community enjoys a higher standard of living, they tend to practice self-restraint in population growth, elevating the overall level of intelligence and comfort, as seen in France, Switzerland, or New England. Conversely, it is argued that "if any family fails to secure the necessities of life, it harms not only itself but the entire community. Under-consumption leads to under-nutrition and diminished industrial efficiency. If this continues, it will inevitably weaken the standards that allow a family to be self-supporting and self-sufficient, forcing its members into dependency. Therefore, the general interest calls for the acceptance of the principle: luxuries should be postponed until everyone has their basic needs met.... This implies that no one should spend income on a luxury for themselves or their family if it brings less happiness than the same amount spent on someone else.”[47]

But the difficult question at once suggests itself: How can the surplus incomes of the rich be used so as to provide [Pg 135] for the needs of the poor, without undermining their independence or permanently lowering their earning power? It has been suggested that there should be a socialization of luxury; that the rich should use their wealth for the construction of public art galleries, libraries, parks, baths, etc., which would thus gratify as great a number as possible. The feeling is growing in the United States and in the world that wealth is a social trust, and that the ownership of wealth imposes upon a person certain moral obligations. While every man has a legal right to spend his surplus income as he pleases, he is morally bound to spend it in such a way as to increase the welfare of the whole community.

But the tough question immediately comes to mind: How can the excess income of the wealthy be used to meet the needs of the poor without compromising their independence or permanently diminishing their earning potential? There's a suggestion that luxury should be shared socially; that the rich should invest their wealth in building public art galleries, libraries, parks, baths, and so on, which would benefit as many people as possible. There’s a growing sentiment in the United States and around the world that wealth is a social responsibility, and that owning wealth carries certain moral obligations. While everyone has the legal right to spend their surplus income however they choose, they are morally obligated to spend it in a way that enhances the welfare of the entire community.

Let us now finally take up the problem of economy in consumption. It is said that an American family will waste enough food for a French family to live on. The farmer who leaves his implements out in the rain or his cattle without proper shelter, is guilty of waste. We all waste clothing by frequent changes in fashion. Such waste is as much due to a lack of knowledge and training as to carelessness. The single example of the consumption of food will illustrate this point. “If we place the average income of an American family at $500—and it will not greatly exceed that figure—then nearly $250 of this amount is expended each year for food. Waste occurs in any or all of the following ways: (1) needlessly expensive foods containing little real nutriment are used; (2) there is a failure to select the foods best suited to the needs of the family; (3) a great deal is thrown away which ought to be utilized; (4) bad preparation of the food causes it to lose much of the nutriment which it does contain; (5) badly constructed ovens diffuse heat, instead of confining it, and cause enormous loss of fuel. We shall state less than the truth if we estimate that fully one-fifth of the money expended for food is absolutely wasted, while the excessive [Pg 136] expenditure often fails to provide adequate nutrition.”[48] The remedy for such a waste as this clearly lies in the teaching of domestic science in our public schools to the daughters and future wives of the workingmen. As the ordinary household expenses, as shown above, absorb from 80 to 90 per cent of the ordinary income, the training of the housewife, under whose control they fall, is almost as imperative as that of the wage-earner.

Let’s finally discuss the issue of conserving consumption. It’s said that an American family wastes enough food to support a French family. A farmer who leaves his tools out in the rain or doesn’t provide proper shelter for his cattle is wasting resources. We all waste clothing because of constantly changing fashion trends. This waste is partly due to a lack of knowledge and training as well as carelessness. The example of food consumption illustrates this point well. “If we assume the average income of an American family is $500—which likely isn’t much higher—then nearly $250 of that goes towards food each year. Waste happens in any or all of the following ways: (1) unnecessarily expensive foods with little real nutrition are bought; (2) there’s a failure to choose foods that best fit the family’s needs; (3) a lot is thrown away that should be used; (4) poor food preparation causes it to lose much of its nutritional value; (5) badly designed ovens lose heat instead of keeping it, leading to massive fuel waste. We’d be underestimating if we said that at least one-fifth of the money spent on food is completely wasted, while excessive spending often fails to provide enough nutrition.”[48] The solution to such waste is clearly to teach domestic science in our public schools to the daughters and future wives of working men. Since typical household expenses, as mentioned earlier, take up 80 to 90 percent of the average income, training for the housewife—who manages these expenses—is just as crucial as training for the wage-earner.

The economic evils of intemperance have already been partially stated in the objections to luxury. There is, however, one additional objection to the excessive use of intoxicating liquor which is not true of most indulgences: it diminishes a man’s productive powers. It is harmful in its effects upon both consumption and production. Other items of consumption appear, however, not so clearly under the immediate control of the consumer. The housing accommodations in many of our large cities have often been unsanitary and unworthy of being called homes. Legislation has been necessary to compel the erection of better tenements and prevent the exploitation of helpless people. So too it has been found necessary to legislate against loan-sharks, in order to protect people against their own improvidence and ignorance. In addition to legislation against positive evils, we must of course look to education as the great remedy of waste in consumption.

The economic harms of excessive drinking have already been partially addressed in the criticisms of luxury. However, there's one more point about the overconsumption of alcohol that doesn't apply to most other indulgences: it reduces a person's ability to be productive. It negatively impacts both consumption and production. Other consumption items, on the other hand, often don't seem to be directly controlled by the consumer. In many of our large cities, housing has frequently been unsanitary and not fit to be called homes. Laws have been necessary to ensure the construction of better apartment buildings and to prevent the exploitation of vulnerable individuals. Similarly, legislation has also been needed to combat predatory lending, protecting people from their own irresponsibility and lack of knowledge. Beyond laws against clear societal problems, we must also rely on education as a key solution to the waste in consumption.

There is one other phase of the subject of consumption that may well be mentioned before leaving this subject. Owing to the constant pressure of the consuming public for cheap goods, many articles are produced under conditions dangerous to the health, morality and well-being of the operatives, as in the case of the “sweated trades.” To remedy these evils consumers’ leagues have been started in many places, the members of which pledge themselves not to buy goods or to trade in stores where the conditions of work are not up to certain prescribed standards. [Pg 137] They realize that as consumers they owe a duty to other members of society not to exploit them. While this method has proven a fairly effective method of protest in some cases, it cannot be looked to as a solution of this evil. But it emphasizes the fact that the interests of all members of society as producers and consumers are closely interdependent, and that the progress of society requires the improvement of the condition of all.

There’s one more aspect of consumption worth mentioning before we wrap up this topic. Because of the constant demand from consumers for cheaper products, many items are made under conditions that can harm the health, morality, and well-being of the workers, similar to what happens in “sweated trades.” To address these issues, consumer leagues have been formed in many areas, where members commit to not purchasing goods or shopping at stores that don’t meet certain working standards. They understand that, as consumers, they have a responsibility to avoid exploiting others in society. While this approach has been somewhat effective as a form of protest in certain instances, it can’t be seen as a complete solution to the problem. However, it highlights the reality that the interests of everyone in society, both as producers and consumers, are closely linked, and that societal progress depends on improving conditions for all.

XV. MONEY AND BANKING.

Probably on no subject has there been such confused thinking or have such widely varying views been held as on that of money. There is, however, substantial unanimity of opinion on the important points among economists today, though in practice there still remain many unsolved problems. The modern industrial system has already been characterized as one of capitalistic production, of large-scale enterprises with extended use of machinery. Not less fundamental are the processes of valuation and exchange made possible by the use of money and credit; and also by the machinery for the geographical distribution of goods, our railroads and steamship lines. The modern stage of economic development has been described by Hildebrand as one of “credit economy,” as opposed to those of barter and money economy, which preceded. It is inconceivable that the modern complex system of exchange could be maintained without the extended use of money and credit. Without attempting to define these terms or to trace their historical development, we may proceed at once to state some of the problems to which they have given rise.

Probably on no subject has there been such confused thinking or such a wide range of opinions as there is on money. However, there is substantial agreement among economists today on important points, even though many practical problems remain unsolved. The modern industrial system is now characterized by capitalistic production, large-scale enterprises, and extensive use of machinery. Equally fundamental are the processes of valuation and exchange made possible by money and credit, as well as the systems for the geographical distribution of goods, like our railroads and shipping lines. The current stage of economic development has been described by Hildebrand as a “credit economy,” contrasting with the earlier barter and money economies. It’s hard to imagine that the modern complex system of exchange could function without the widespread use of money and credit. Without trying to define these terms or outline their historical development, we can immediately state some of the problems they have created.

The first question that suggests itself is, what determines the value of money? The generally accepted answer may be briefly stated: it is, that the value of money depends, other things remaining the same, upon its quantity. According to the quantity theory an increase in the [Pg 138] supply of money will cause a fall in the value of each unit, just as an increase in the supply of wheat or cotton will cause a fall in the value of each bushel or bale. Conversely, a decrease in the quantity of money will cause a rise in the value of money. It is simply an application of the general law of value to money. The phrase “other things remaining the same” is however an important one, for it assumes that the amount of business and the methods by which it is conducted will remain substantially unchanged. Of course if an increase in the amount of money is accompanied by an equivalent expansion of trade, the one may offset the other and the value of money remain unchanged. Now, inasmuch as the prices of all goods and services are measured and expressed in terms of money, it is clear that a fall in the value of money means a rise of general prices; the value of each commodity is now expressed in terms of a larger number of less valuable units or dollars. Prices will be high if the quantity of money in circulation in a country is large; they will be low if the quantity is small. To the question, which is better for a country, high prices or low prices, it may be answered that it is a matter of indifference, provided only that there is enough money to do the work of exchange efficiently and that fluctuations are prevented. Just how much constitutes enough is, however, a matter of contention. In the undeveloped sections of our country, where capital is scarce and banking facilities undeveloped and where most of the people are debtors, there has always been a demand for cheap and abundant money. Capital and money have been confused and the need of one has led to a demand for the other.

The first question that comes to mind is, what determines the value of money? The generally accepted answer can be summed up briefly: the value of money depends, assuming other factors are constant, on its quantity. According to the quantity theory, an increase in the supply of money will cause a decrease in the value of each unit, just like an increase in the supply of wheat or cotton will reduce the value of each bushel or bale. On the other hand, a decrease in the amount of money will result in an increase in its value. This is simply an application of the general law of value to money. However, the phrase “assuming other factors are constant” is significant because it assumes that the level of business activity and the methods used to conduct it will remain relatively stable. Of course, if an increase in the money supply coincides with a similar expansion in trade, one may balance out the other, and the value of money could stay the same. Since prices for all goods and services are measured and represented in terms of money, it's clear that a decrease in the value of money means an increase in overall prices; the value of each commodity is now expressed in terms of a larger number of less valuable units or dollars. Prices will be high if there's a large amount of money in circulation in a country; they will be low if there's a small amount. When asked which is better for a country, high prices or low prices, the answer is that it doesn’t matter as long as there is enough money to facilitate efficient exchanges and fluctuations are prevented. However, the question of how much is "enough" is a matter of debate. In underdeveloped areas of our country, where capital is limited and banking services are not well-established, and where most people are in debt, there has always been a demand for cheap and plentiful money. Capital and money have often been confused, and the need for one has led to a demand for the other.

It is not a matter of indifference, however, whether prices be rising or falling, that is, whether inflation or contraction of the currency is taking place. A period of falling prices means hardship and injustice to debtors and producers of goods, as farmers, manufacturers, etc. Having [Pg 139] contracted obligations and engaged in the production of commodities with the expectation of a given price, they find their goods worth less when ready for the market and themselves confronted with a loss instead of the anticipated profit. Under such circumstances a contraction of the currency and falling prices means lessened production of wealth. Consequently many writers, and even so good an economist as President Walker, have urged that a slow steady inflation of the currency would promote trade and “give a fillip to industry.” The monetary history of the United States is filled with attempts to realize this in practice: colonial and revolutionary bills of credit were first issued; when these were forbidden by the new Constitution resort was had to issues by state banks. When the Federal Government began the issue of greenbacks and restricted the use of state bank notes, the inflationists looked to this source for assistance. After the defeat of the Greenback party, they turned finally to the coinage of silver, which was now falling in price, and the question of bimetallism in the United States was made a practical political issue.

It's important to recognize the impact of whether prices are going up or down—essentially whether there's inflation or a decrease in currency. A situation where prices are falling creates difficulties and unfairness for debtors and producers, such as farmers and manufacturers. They have taken on obligations and produced goods with the expectation of certain prices, only to find their products worth less when they are finally ready for sale, facing losses instead of the expected profits. In this scenario, a decrease in currency and falling prices leads to reduced wealth production. As a result, many writers, including notable economist President Walker, have argued that a gradual, consistent inflation of the currency would boost trade and “revitalize industry.” The monetary history of the United States is full of efforts to achieve this: colonial and revolutionary currency was first introduced; when this was banned by the new Constitution, state banks began issuing their own notes. When the Federal Government started issuing greenbacks and limited the use of state banknotes, proponents of inflation looked towards this avenue for help. After the Greenback party's defeat, they finally focused on silver coinage, which was experiencing a price drop, making the issue of bimetallism a significant political topic in the United States.

Down to 1870 practically all the nations of Europe and America had the system of bimetallism at ratios of 15½ or 16 to 1. About that date the great increase in the supply of gold and the fall in the value of silver led one country after another to abandon the latter and to adopt the system of gold monometallism. This was vigorously resisted by many persons and several fruitless efforts made to secure a system of international bimetallism. Failing that, the friends of silver in this country endeavored to secure independent action by the United States alone, and were ultimately successful in obtaining the purchase by the Federal Government of practically the entire silver output of the country during the years 1878-1893.

Up until 1870, nearly all the nations in Europe and America operated under a bimetallism system with ratios of 15½ or 16 to 1. Around that time, the significant increase in gold supply and the decrease in silver's value caused one country after another to drop silver and switch to gold monometallism. This change faced strong opposition from many people, and there were several unsuccessful attempts to establish a system of international bimetallism. When that didn’t work out, supporters of silver in the U.S. tried to push for independent action by the United States alone, and they eventually succeeded in getting the Federal Government to buy nearly all the silver produced in the country from 1878 to 1893.

Development of the Manufacturing Industries in the United States, 1800-1905.
Fiscal Year, ending June 30— Population
June 1.
Wealth. Production of wool.[B] Raw wool imported.
Total. Per capita.
Dollars. Dollars. Pounds. Pounds.
1800 5,308,483
1810 7,239,881
1820 9,638,453
1830 12,866,020 35,802,114 669,883
1840 17,069,453 52,516,959 9,898,740
1850 23,191,876 7,135,780,000
307.69
18,695,294
1851 23,995,000 32,607,315
1852 24,802,000 18,343,218
1853 25,615,000 21,616,035
1854 26,433,000 20,228,035
1855 27,256,000 18,599,784
1856 28,083,000 14,778,496
1857 28,916,000 16,505,216
1858 29,758,000
1859 30,596,000 60,264,913
1860 31,443,321 16,159,616,000
513.93
75,000,000
1861 32,064,000 90,000,000
1862 32,704,000 106,000,000 42,131,061
1863 33,365,000 123,000,000 73,931,944
1864 34,046,000 142,000,000 90,464,002
1865 34,748,000 155,000,000 43,877,408
1866 35,469,000 160,000,000 67,918,253
1867 36,211,000 168,000,000 16,558,046
1868 36,973,000 180,000,000 24,124,803
1869 37,756,000 162,000,000 39,275,926
1870 38,558,371 30,068,518,000
779.83
160,000,000 49,230,199
1871 39,555,000 150,000,000 68,058,028
1872 40,596,000 158,000,000 122,256,499
1873 41,677,000 170,000,000 85,496,049
1874 42,796,000 181,000,000 42,939,541
1875 43,951,000 192,000,000 54,901,760
1876 45,137,000 200,000,000 44,642,836
1877 46,353,000 208,250,000 42,171,192
1878 47,598,000 211,000,000 48,449,079
1879 48,866,000 232,500,000 39,005,155
1880 50,155,783 43,642,000,000
850.20
240,000,000 128,131,747
1881 51,316,000 272,000,000 55,964,236
1882 52,495,000 290,000,000 67,861,744
1883 53,693,000 300,000,000 70,575,478
1884 54,911,000 308,000,000 78,350,651
1885 56,148,000 302,000,000 70,596,170
1886 57,404,000 285,000,000 129,084,958
1887 58,680,000 269,000,000 114,038,030
1888 59,974,000 265,000,000 113,558,753
1889 61,289,000 276,000,000 126,487,729
1890 62,622,250 65,037,091,000 1,038.57 285,000,000 105,431,285
1891 63,844,000 294,000,000 129,303,648
1892 65,086,000 303,153,000 148,670,652
1893 66,349,000 298,057,384 172,433,838
1894 67,632,000 309,748,000 55,152,585
1895 68,934,000 77,000,000,000 1,117.01 272,474,708 206,033,906
1896 70,254,000 259,153,251 230,911,473
1897 71,592,000 266,720,684 350,852,026
1898 72,947,000 272,191,330 132,795,202
1899 74,318,000 288,636,621 76,736,209
1900 76,303,387 88,517,306,775 1,164.79 302,502,328 155,928,455
1901 79,003,000 287,450,000 166,576,966
1903 80,372,000 291,783,032 177,137,796
1904 81,752,000 107,104,211,917 1,310.11 295,488,438 173,742,834
1905 83,143,000 298,915,130 249,135,746
1906 84,216,433 298,294,750 201,688,668
1907 85,817,239 311,138,321 203,847,545
1908 87,189,392 125,980,524
Fiscal Year, ending June 30— Production
of cotton.[B]
(500-lb. bales,
gross weight.)
Manufactures of cotton.
Thousands of spindles in operation on Sept. 1st. Thousands of bales of domestic cotton taken by mills.
In Southern States. In Northern States. Total United States. In Southern States. In Northern States. Total United States
Number. Thou-
sands.
Thou-
sands.
Thou-
sands.
Thou-
sands.
Thou-
sands.
Thou-
sands.
1800 73,222
1810 177,824
1820 334,728
1830 732,218
1840 1,347,640 181 2,104 2,285 71 166 237
1850 2,136,083 265 3,733 3,998 78 497 575
1851 2,799,290 60 404 464
1852 3,130,338 111 588 699
1853 2,766,194 153 650 803
1854 2,708,082 145 592 737
1855 3,220,782 135 571 706
1856 3,873,680 138 633 771
1857 3,012,016 154 666 820
1858 3,758,273 143 452 595
1859 4,309,642 167 760 927
1860 3,841,416 324 4,912 5,236 94 751 845
1861 4,490,586 153 650 803
1862 1,596,653
1863 449,059
1864 299,372
1865 2,093,658
1866 1,948,077 127 541 668
1867 2,345,610 150 573 723
1868 2,198,141 168 800 968
1869 2,409,597 173 822 995
1870 4,024,527 328 6,804 7,132 69 728 797
1871 2,756,564 91 1,072 1,163
1872 3,650,932 120 977 1,097
1873 3,873,750 138 1,063 1,201
1874 3,528,276 128 1,192 1,320
1875 4,302,818 130 1,071 1,201
1876 4,118,390 134 1,220 1,354
1877 4,494,224 127 1,302 1,429
1878 4,745,078 151 1,345 1,496
1879 5,466,387 186 1,375 1,561
1880 6,356,998 561 10,092 10,653 189 1,382 1,570
1881 5,136,447 225 1,713 1,938
1882 6,833,442 287 1,677 1,964
1883 5,521,963 860 11,800 12,660 313 1,759 2,072
1884 5,477,448 1,050 12,250 13,300 340 1,537 1,877
1885 6,369,341 1,125 12,250 13,375 316 1,437 1,753
1886 6,314,561 1,150 12,250 13,400 381 1,781 2,162
1887 6,884,667 1,200 12,300 13,500 401 1,687 2,088
1888 6,923,775 1,250 12,300 13,550 456 1,805 2,261
1889 7,742,511 1,360 2,700 14,060 480 1,790 2,270
1890 8,562,089 1,570 12,814 14,384 539 1,979 2,518
1891 8,940,867 1,740 12,900 14,640 613 2,027 2,640
1892 6,658,313 1,950 13,250 15,200 684 2,172 2,856
1893 7,433.056 2,100 13,450 15,550 723 1,652 2,375
1894 10,025,534 2,200 13,500 15,700 711 1,580 2,291
1895 7,146,772 2,400 13,700 16,100 852 2,019 2,871
1896 8,515,640 2,850 13,800 16,650 900 1,605 2,505
1897 10,985,040 3,250 13,900 17,150 999 1,793 2,792
1898 11,435,368 3,550 13,900 17,450 1,254 2,211 3,465
1899 9,459,935 3,950 14,150 18,100 1,415 2,217 3,632
1900 10,266,527 4,368 15,104 19,472 1,523 2,350 3,873
1901 9,675,771 5,500 11,700 20,200 1,583 1,964 3,547
1902 10,827,168 6,400 15,000 21,400 2,017 2,066 4,083
1903 10,045,615 6,900 15,100 22,000 1,958 1,966 3,924
1904 13,679,954 7,650 15,200 22,850 1,889 2,046 3,935
1905 10,804,556 7,631 16,056 23,687 2,140 2,139 4,279
1906 13,595,498 8,995 16,255 25,250 2,373 2,536 4,909
1907 11,375,461 9,528 16,847 26,275 2,411 2,574 4,985
1908 13,587,306 10,201 17,304 27,505 2,187 2,352 4,539
Fiscal Year,
ending
June 30—
Exports.
(domestic)
Imports. Unmanufactured
silk imported.
Imports of
crude rubber.
Dollars. Dollars. Pounds. Pounds.
1800
1810
1820 7,812,326
1830 1,318,183 5,774,013
1840 3,549,607 6,504,104
1850 4,734,424 20,781,346
1851 7,241,205 22,164,442
1852 7,672,151 19,689,496
1853 8,768,894 27,731,363
1854 5,535,516 33,949,503
1855 5,857,181 17,757,112
1856 6,967,309 25,917,999
1857 6,115,177 28,685,726
1858 5,651,504 18,584,810
1859 8,316,222 26,976,381
1860 10,934,796 33,215,541
1861 7,957,038 25,271,382
1862 2,946,464 8,890,119 2,125,561
1863 2,906,411 14,121,589 5,104,650
1864 1,456,901 14,341,501 407,935
1865 3,451,561 9,223,686 288,286
1866 1,780,175 27,502,194 567,904
1867 4,608,235 19,302,005 491,983
1868 4,871,054 17,335,406 512,449 8,438,019
1869 5,874,222 20,481,312 720,045 7,813,134
1870 3,787,282 23,380,053 583,589 9,624,098
1871 3,558,236 29,876,640 1,100,281 11,031,939
1872 2,304,330 35,307,447 1,063,809 11,803,437
1873 2,947,528 35,201,324 1,159,420 14,536,978
1874 3,095,840 28,193,869 794,837 14,191,320
1875 4,071,882 27,738,401 1,101,681 12,035,909
1876 7,722,978 22,725,598 1,354,991 10,589,297
1877 10,235,843 18,923,614 1,186,170 13,821,109
1878 11,438,660 19,081,037 1,182,750 12,512,203
1879 10,853,950 19,928,310 1,889,776 14,878,584
1880 9,981,418 29,929,366 2,562,236 16,826,099
1881 13,571,387 31,219,329 2,790,413 20,015,176
1882 13,222,979 35,719,791 3,549,404 22,712,862
1883 12,951,145 38,036,044 4,731,106 21,646,320
1884 11,885,211 29,074,626 4,284,888 24,574,025
1885 11,836,591 27,197,241 4,308,908 24,208,148
1886 13,959,934 29,709,266 6,818,060 29,263,632
1887 14,929,342 28,940,353 6,028,091 28,649,446
1888 13,013,189 28,917,799 6,370,322 36,628,351
1889 10,212,644 26,805,942 6,645,124 32,339,503
1890 9,999,277 29,918,055 7,510,440 33,842,374
1891 13,604,857 29,712,624 6,266,629 33,712,089
1892 13,226,277 28,323,841 8,834,049 39,976,205
1893 11,809,355 33,560,293 8,497,477 41,547,680
1894 14,340,886 22,346,547 5,902,485 33,757,783
1895 13,789,810 33,196,625 9,316,460 39,741,607
1896 16,837,396 32,437,504 9,363,987 36,774,460
1897 21,037,678 34,429,363 7,993,444 35,574,449
1898 17,024,092 27,267,300 12,087,951 46,055,497
1899 23,566,914 32,054,434 11,250,383 51,063,066
1900 24,003,087 41,296,239 13,073,718 49,377,138
1901 20,272,418 40,246,935 10,405,555 55,275,529
1902 32,108,362 44,460,126 14,234,826 50,413,481
1903 32,216,304 52,462,755 15,270,859 55,010,571
1904 22,403,713 49,524,246 16,722,709 59,015,551
1905 49,666,080 48,919,936 22,357,307 67,234,256
1906 52,944,033 63,043,322 17,352,021 57,844,345
1907 32,305,412 73,704,636 18,743,904 76,963,838
1908 25,177,758 68,379,781 16,662,132 62,233,160
Fiscal
Year,
ending
June 30—
Population
June 1.
Wealth.
Total. Per capita.
Dollars. Dollars.
1800
5,308,483
1810
7,239,881
1820
9,638,453
1830 12,866,020
1840 17,069,453
1850 23,191,876
7,135,780,000
307.69
1851 23,995,000
1852 24,802,000
1853 25,615,000
1854 26,433,000
1855 27,256,000
1856 28,083,000
1857 28,916,000
1858 29,758,000
1859 30,596,000
1860 31,443,321
16,159,616,000
513.93
1861 32,064,000
1862 32,704,000
1863 33,365,000
1864 34,046,000
1865 34,748,000
1866 35,469,000
1867 36,211,000
1868 36,973,000
1869 37,756,000
1870 38,558,371
30,068,518,000
779.83
1871 39,555,000
1872 40,596,000
1873 41,677,000
1874 42,796,000
1875 43,951,000
1876 45,137,000
1877 46,353,000
1878 47,598,000
1879 48,866,000
1880 50,155,783
43,642,000,000
850.20
1881 51,316,000
1882 52,495,000
1883 53,693,000
1884 54,911,000
1885 56,148,000
1886 57,404,000
1887 58,680,000
1888 59,974,000
1889 61,289,000
1890 62,622,250
65,037,091,000
1,038.57
1891 63,844,000
1892 65,086,000
1893 66,349,000
1894 67,632,000
1895 68,934,000
77,000,000,000
1,117.01
1896 70,254,000
1897 71,592,000
1898 72,947,000
1899 74,318,000
1900 76,303,387
88,517,306,775
1,164.79
1901 79,003,000
1903 80,372,000
1904 81,752,000
107,104,211,917
1,310.11
1905 83,143,000
1906 84,216,433
1907 85,817,239
1908 87,189,392
Fiscal
Year,
ending
June 30—
Production
of wool.[B]
Raw wool
imported.
Pounds. Pounds.
1800
1810
1820
1830
35,802,114
669,883
1840
52,516,959
9,898,740
1850
18,695,294
1851
32,607,315
1852
18,343,218
1853
21,616,035
1854
20,228,035
1855
18,599,784
1856
14,778,496
1857
16,505,216
1858
1859
60,264,913
1860
75,000,000
1861
90,000,000
1862
106,000,000
42,131,061
1863
123,000,000
73,931,944
1864
142,000,000
90,464,002
1865
155,000,000
43,877,408
1866
160,000,000
67,918,253
1867
168,000,000
16,558,046
1868
180,000,000
24,124,803
1869
162,000,000
39,275,926
1870
160,000,000
49,230,199
1871
150,000,000
68,058,028
1872
158,000,000
122,256,499
1873
170,000,000
85,496,049
1874
181,000,000
42,939,541
1875
192,000,000
54,901,760
1876
200,000,000
44,642,836
1877
208,250,000
42,171,192
1878
211,000,000
48,449,079
1879
232,500,000
39,005,155
1880
240,000,000
128,131,747
1881
272,000,000
55,964,236
1882
290,000,000
67,861,744
1883
300,000,000
70,575,478
1884
308,000,000
78,350,651
1885
302,000,000
70,596,170
1886
285,000,000
129,084,958
1887
269,000,000
114,038,030
1888
265,000,000
113,558,753
1889
276,000,000
126,487,729
1890
285,000,000
105,431,285
1891
294,000,000
129,303,648
1892
303,153,000
148,670,652
1893
298,057,384
172,433,838
1894
309,748,000
55,152,585
1895
272,474,708
206,033,906
1896
259,153,251
230,911,473
1897
266,720,684
350,852,026
1898
272,191,330
132,795,202
1899
288,636,621
76,736,209
1900
302,502,328
155,928,455
1901
287,450,000
166,576,966
1903
291,783,032
177,137,796
1904
295,488,438
173,742,834
1905
298,915,130
249,135,746
1906
298,294,750
201,688,668
1907
311,138,321
203,847,545
1908
125,980,524
Fiscal
Year,
ending
June 30—
Production
of cotton.[B]
(500-lb. bales,
gross weight.)
Manufactures of cotton.
Thousands of spindles
in operation on Sept. 1st.
In
Southern
States.
In
Northern
States.
Total
United
States.
Number. Thou-
sands.
Thou-
sands.
Thou-
sands.
1800
73,222
1810
177,824
1820
334,728
1830
732,218
1840
1,347,640
181
2,104
2,285
1850
2,136,083
265
3,733
3,998
1851
2,799,290
1852
3,130,338
1853
2,766,194
1854
2,708,082
1855
3,220,782
1856
3,873,680
1857
3,012,016
1858
3,758,273
1859
4,309,642
1860
3,841,416
324
4,912
5,236
1861
4,490,586
1862
1,596,653
1863
449,059
1864
299,372
1865
2,093,658
1866
1,948,077
1867
2,345,610
1868
2,198,141
1869
2,409,597
1870
4,024,527
328
6,804
7,132
1871
2,756,564
1872
3,650,932
1873
3,873,750
1874
3,528,276
1875
4,302,818
1876
4,118,390
1877
4,494,224
1878
4,745,078
1879
5,466,387
1880
6,356,998
561
10,092
10,653
1881
5,136,447
1882
6,833,442
1883
5,521,963
860
11,800
12,660
1884
5,477,448
1,050
12,250
13,300
1885
6,369,341
1,125
12,250
13,375
1886
6,314,561
1,150
12,250
13,400
1887
6,884,667
1,200
12,300
13,500
1888
6,923,775
1,250
12,300
13,550
1889
7,742,511
1,360
12,700
14,060
1890
8,562,089
1,570
12,814
14,384
1891
8,940,867
1,740
12,900
14,640
1892
6,658,313
1,950
13,250
15,200
1893
7,433,056
2,100
13,450
15,550
1894
10,025,534
2,200
13,500
15,700
1895
7,146,772
2,400
13,700
16,100
1896
8,515,640
2,850
13,800
16,650
1897
10,985,040
3,250
13,900
17,150
1898
11,435,368
3,550
13,900
17,450
1899
9,459,935
3,950
14,150
18,100
1900
10,266,527
4,368
15,104
19,472
1901
9,675,771
5,500
11,700
20,200
1902
10,827,168
6,400
15,000
21,400
1903
10,045,615
6,900
15,100
22,000
1904
13,679,954
7,650
15,200
22,850
1905
10,804,556
7,631
16,056
23,687
1906
13,595,498
8,995
16,255
25,250
1907
11,375,461
9,528
16,847
26,275
1908
13,587,306
10,201
17,304
27,505
Fiscal
Year,
ending
June 30—
Manufactures of cotton.
Thousands of bales of domestic cotton taken by mills.
In Southern States. In Northern States. Total United States
Thou-
sands.
Thou-
sands.
Thou-
sands.
1800
1810
1820
1830
1840
71
166
237
1850
78
497
575
1851
60
404
464
1852
111
588
699
1853
153
650
803
1854
145
592
737
1855
135
571
706
1856
138
633
771
1857
154
666
820
1858
143
452
595
1859
167
760
927
1860
94
751
845
1861
153
650
803
1862
1863
1864
1865
1866
127
541
668
1867
150
573
723
1868
168
800
968
1869
173
822
995
1870
69
728
797
1871
91
1,072
1,163
1872
120
977
1,097
1873
138
1,063
1,201
1874
128
1,192
1,320
1875
130
1,071
1,201
1876
134
1,220
1,354
1877
127
1,302
1,429
1878
151
1,345
1,496
1879
186
1,375
1,561
1880
189
1,382
1,570
1881
225
1,713
1,938
1882
287
1,677
1,964
1883
313
1,759
2,072
1884
340
1,537
1,877
1885
316
1,437
1,753
1886
381
1,781
2,162
1887
401
1,687
2,088
1888
456
1,805
2,261
1889
480
1,790
2,270
1890
539
1,979
2,518
1891
613
2,027
2,640
1892
684
2,172
2,856
1893
723
1,652
2,375
1894
711
1,580
2,291
1895
852
2,019
2,871
1896
900
1,605
2,505
1897
999
1,793
2,792
1898
1,254
2,211
3,465
1899
1,415
2,217
3,632
1900
1,523
2,350
3,873
1901
1,583
1,964
3,547
1902
2,017
2,066
4,083
1903
1,958
1,966
3,924
1904
1,889
2,046
3,935
1905
2,140
2,139
4,279
1906
2,373
2,536
4,909
1907
2,411
2,574
4,985
1908
2,187
2,352
4,539
Fiscal Year,
ending
June 30—
Exports.
(domestic)
Imports.
Dollars. Dollars.
1800
1810
1820
7,812,326
1830
1,318,183
5,774,013
1840
3,549,607
6,504,104
1850
4,734,424
20,781,346
1851
7,241,205
22,164,442
1852
7,672,151
19,689,496
1853
8,768,894
27,731,363
1854
5,535,516
33,949,503
1855
5,857,181
17,757,112
1856
6,967,309
25,917,999
1857
6,115,177
28,685,726
1858
5,651,504
18,584,810
1859
8,316,222
26,976,381
1860
10,934,796
33,215,541
1861
7,957,038
25,271,382
1862
2,946,464
8,890,119
1863
2,906,411
14,121,589
1864
1,456,901
14,341,501
1865
3,451,561
9,223,686
1866
1,780,175
27,502,194
1867
4,608,235
19,302,005
1868
4,871,054
17,335,406
1869
5,874,222
20,481,312
1870
3,787,282
23,380,053
1871
3,558,236
29,876,640
1872
2,304,330
35,307,447
1873
2,947,528
35,201,324
1874
3,095,840
28,193,869
1875
4,071,882
27,738,401
1876
7,722,978
22,725,598
1877
10,235,843
18,923,614
1878
11,438,660
19,081,037
1879
10,853,950
19,928,310
1880
9,981,418
29,929,366
1881
13,571,387
31,219,329
1882
13,222,979
35,719,791
1883
12,951,145
38,036,044
1884
11,885,211
29,074,626
1885
11,836,591
27,197,241
1886
13,959,934
29,709,266
1887
14,929,342
28,940,353
1888
13,013,189
28,917,799
1889
10,212,644
26,805,942
1890
9,999,277
29,918,055
1891
13,604,857
29,712,624
1892
13,226,277
28,323,841
1893
11,809,355
33,560,293
1894
14,340,886
22,346,547
1895
13,789,810
33,196,625
1896
16,837,396
32,437,504
1897
21,037,678
34,429,363
1898
17,024,092
27,267,300
1899
23,566,914
32,054,434
1900
24,003,087
41,296,239
1901
20,272,418
40,246,935
1902
32,108,362
44,460,126
1903
32,216,304
52,462,755
1904
22,403,713
49,524,246
1905
49,666,080
48,919,936
1906
52,944,033
63,043,322
1907
32,305,412
73,704,636
1908
25,177,758
68,379,781
Fiscal Year,
ending
June 30—
Unmanu-
factured
silk imported.
Imports of
crude rubber.
Pounds. Pounds.
1800
1810
1820
1830
1840
1850
1851
1852
1853
1854
1855
1856
1857
1858
1859
1860
1861
1862
2,125,561
1863
5,104,650
1864
407,935
1865
288,286
1866
567,904
1867
491,983
1868
512,449
8,438,019
1869
720,045
7,813,134
1870
583,589
9,624,098
1871
1,100,281
11,031,939
1872
1,063,809
11,803,437
1873
1,159,420
14,536,978
1874
794,837
14,191,320
1875
1,101,681
12,035,909
1876
1,354,991
10,589,297
1877
1,186,170
13,821,109
1878
1,182,750
12,512,203
1879
1,889,776
14,878,584
1880
2,562,236
16,826,099
1881
2,790,413
20,015,176
1882
3,549,404
22,712,862
1883
4,731,106
21,646,320
1884
4,284,888
24,574,025
1885
4,308,908
24,208,148
1886
6,818,060
29,263,632
1887
6,028,091
28,649,446
1888
6,370,322
36,628,351
1889
6,645,124
32,339,503
1890
7,510,440
33,842,374
1891
6,266,629
33,712,089
1892
8,834,049
39,976,205
1893
8,497,477
41,547,680
1894
5,902,485
33,757,783
1895
9,316,460
39,741,607
1896
9,363,987
36,774,460
1897
7,993,444
35,574,449
1898
12,087,951
46,055,497
1899
11,250,383
51,063,066
1900
13,073,718
49,377,138
1901
10,405,555
55,275,529
1902
14,234,826
50,413,481
1903
15,270,859
55,010,571
1904
16,722,709
59,015,551
1905
22,357,307
67,234,256
1906
17,352,021
57,844,345
1907
18,743,904
76,963,838
1908
16,662,132
62,233,160

[B] Calendar years.

Calendar years.

Development of the Manufacturing Industries in the United States, 1800-1905—Continued.
Year. Production of Exports of
domestic
copper &
manufactures
of.
Coal.[C] Copper.[C]
Long tons. Long tons. Dollars.
1800
1810
20
17,426
1820
3,080
18,547
1830
285,779
36,601
1840
1,848,249
100
86,954
1850
6,266,233
650
105,060
1851
7,798,683
900
91,871
1852
8,764,879
1,100
103,039
1853
9,437,757
2,000
108,205
1854
10,698,841
2,250
91,984
1855
11,541,672
3,000
690,766
1856
12,095,469
4,000
534,846
1857
11,910,883
4,800
607,054
1858
12,477,213
5,500
1,985,223
1859
13,958,192
6,300
1,048,246
1860
13,044,680
7,200
1,664,122
1861
14,721,439
7,500
2,375,029
1862
15,612,353
9,000
1,098,546
1863
19,034,877
8,500
1,026,038
1864
21,076,003
8,000
251,272
1865
21,243,012
8,500
991,746
1866
25,896,056
8,900
143,761
1867
27,432,520
10,000
474,110
1868
29,341,036
11,600
479,488
1869
29,378,893
12,500
355,274
1870
29,496,054
12,600
504,741
1871
41,861,679
13,000
188,218
1872
45,940,535
12,500
185,983
1873
51,430,786
15,500
88,711
1874
46,969,571
17,500
356,758
1875
46,739,571
18,000
1,085,688
1876
47,571,429
19,000
3,441,939
1877
54,019,429
21,000
2,913,943
1878
51,728,214
21,500
2,319,901
1879
60,808,749
23,000
2,831,053
1880
63,822,830
27,000
793,455
1881
76,679,491
32,000
824,896
1882
92,456,419
40,467
658,941
1883 103,310,290
51,574
1,404,243
1884 107,281,742
64,708
2,664,964
1885
99,250,263
74,052
5,447,423
1886 101,500,381
70,430
2,602,869
1887 116,652,242
81,017
2,033,523
1888 132,731,837 101,054
3,812,798
1889 126,097,779 101,239
2,348,954
1890 140,866,931 115,966
2,349,392
1891 150,505,954 126,839
4,614,597
1892 160,115,242 154,018
7,226,392
1893 162,814,977 147,033
4,525,573
1894 152,447,791 158,120
19,697,140
1895 172,426,366 169,917
14,468,703
1896 171,416,390 205,384
19,720,104
1897 178,776,070 220,571
31,621,125
1898 196,407,381 235,050
32,180,872
1899 226,554,636 253,870
35,983,529
1900 240,789,310 270,588
57,852,960
1901 261,874,836 268,782
43,267,021
1902 269,277,178 294,423
41,218,373
1903 319,068,229 311,627
39,667,196
1904 314,121,784 362,739
57,142,081
1905 350,820,840 402,637
86,225,291
1906 369,783,284 409,735
81,282,664
1907 428,895,914 387,945
94,762,110
1908
104,064,580
Year. Production of Iron and steel Manufactures.
Natural gas.[C] Iron ore.[C] Pig iron.[C] Steel.[C] Imports. Exports
(domestic)
Dollars. Long tons. Long tons. Long tons. Dollars. Dollars.
1800 52,144
1810 53,908 91,914
1820 20,000 46,552
1830 165,000 6,346,287 322,747
1840 286,903 8,157,923 1,127,877
1850 563,755 20,145,067 1,953,702
1851 22,439,297 2,336,587
1852 23,568,649 2,368,384
1853 34,944,002 2,541,554
1855 700,159 28,693,979 3,803,706
1856 788,515 29,050,101 4,256,613
1857 712,640 30,743,649 4,959,238
1858 629,548 20,171,007 4,843,592
1859 750,560 22,379,743 5,577,748
1860 821,223 26,158,235 5,870,114
1861 653,164 21,160,235 6,039,149
1862 703,270 11,451,707 4,732,348
1863 846,075 16,152,843 6,681,417
1864 1,014,282 23,822,876 7,541,967
1865 831,770 16,660,991 11,227,294
1866 1,205,663 25,598,147 4,006,180
1867 1,305,023 19,643 31,630,519 9,351,062
1868 1,431,250 26,786 30,346,768 10,950,275
1869 1,711,287 31,250 38,213,717 10,938,492
1870 3,031,891 1,665,179 68,750 40,273,682 13,483,163
1871 1,706,793 73,214 53,024,075 21,189,692
1872 2,548,713 142,954 67,852,616 11,463,880
1873 2,560,963 198,796 74,302,102 13,655,087
1874 2,023,733 389,799 31,432,380 19,534,215
1876 1,868,961 533,191 23,197,417 15,449,846
1877 2,066,594 569,618 19,320,927 16,501,638
1878 2,301,215 731,977 18,987,130 16,053,571
1879 2,741,853 935,273 19,594,608 15,133,493
1880 7,120,362 3,835,191 1,247,335 71,266,699 14,716,524
1881 4,144,254 1,588,314 60,604,477 16,608,767
1882 215,000 4,623,323 1,736,692 67,976,897 20,748,206
1883 475,000 4,595,510 1,673,535 58,495,246 22,826,528
1884 1,460,000 4,097,868 1,550,879 40,147,053 21,909,881
1885 4,857,200 4,044,526 1,711,920 33,610,093 16,592,155
1886 10,012,000 5,683,329 2,562,503 37,534,078 15,745,569
1887 15,817,500 6,417,148 3,339,071 49,203,164 15,958,502
1888 22,629,875 6,489,738 2,899,440 48,992,757 17,763,034
1889 21,097,099 14,518,041 7,603,642 3,385,732 42,377,793 21,156,077
1890 18,792,725 16,036,043 9,202,703 4,277,071 41,679,591 25,542,208
1891 15,500,084 14,591,178 8,279,876 3,904,240 53,544,372 28,909,614
1892 14,870,714 16,296,666 9,157,000 4,927,581 28,928,103 28,800,930
1893 14,346,250 11,587,629 7,124,502 4,019,995 34,937,974 30,106,482
1894 13,954,400 11,879,679 6,657,888 4,412,032 20,925,769 29,220,264
1895 13,006,650 15,957,614 9,446,308 6,114,834 23,048,515 32,000,989
1896 13,002,512 16,005,449 8,623,127 5,281,689 25,338,103 41,160,877
1897 13,826,422 17,518,046 9,652,680 7,156,957 16,094,557 57,497,872
1898 15,296,813 19,433,716 11,773,934 8,932,857 12,626,431 70,406,885
1899 20,074,873 24,683,173 13,620,703 10,639,857 12,100,440 93,716,031
1900 23,698,674 27,553,161 13,789,242 10,188,329 20,478,728 121,913,548
1901 27,066,077 28,887,479 15,878,354 13,473,595 17,874,789 117,319,320
1902 30,867,863 35,554,135 17,821,307 14,947,250 27,180,247 98,552,562
1903 35,807,860 35,019,308 18,009,252 14,534,978 51,617,312 96,642,467
1904 38,496,760 27,644,330 16,497,033 13,859,887 27,028,312 111,948,586
1905 41,562,855 42,526,133 22,992,380 20,023,947 23,510,164 134,728,363
1906 46,873,932 47,749,728 25,307,191 23,398,136 29,053,987 160,984,985
1907 52,866,835 51,720,619 25,781,361 23,362,594 40,587,865 181,530,871
1908 15,936,018 27,607,909 183,982,182
Year. Prices of staple commodities.
Per ton.[C] Middling
cotton
per pound.[C]
Standard
sheetings
per yard.[C]
Washed Ohio
fleece wool,
per lb.,
in eastern
m’k’ts,
July 1.
Medium.
Pig iron
No. 1,
foundry.
Steel rails,
standard
sections
Dollars. Dollars. Cents. Cents. Cents.
1800
1810
1820
1830 50.0
1840
27.88
39.0
1850
20.88
12.34
7.87
37.0
1851
21.38
12.14
7.08
42.0
1852
22.63
.50
6.96
38.0
1853
36.13
11.02
7.92
53.0
1854
36.88
10.97
7.96
37.0
1855
27.75
10.39
7.64
40.0
1856
27.18
10.30
7.50
42.0
1857
26.34
13.51
8.90
50.0
1858
22.19
12.23
8.25
37.0
1859
23.33
12.08
8.50
40.0
1860
22.70
11.00
8.73
50.0
1861
20.26
13.01
10.00
30.0
1862
23.92
31.29
18.55
47.0
1863
35.24
67.21
36.04
70.0
1864
59.22
101.50
52.07
100.0
1865
46.08
83.38
38.04
73.0
1866
46.84
43.20
24.31
67.0
1867
44.08
166.00
31.59
18.28
49.0
1868
39.25
158.46
24.85
16.79
45.0
1869
40.61
132.19
29.01
16.19
48.0
1870
33.23
106.79
23.98
14.58
45.0
1871
35.08
102.52
16.95
13.00
60.0
1872
48.94
111.94
22.19
14.27
70.0
1873
42.79
120.58
20.14
13.31
48.0
1874
30.19
94.28
17.95
11.42
53.0
1875
25.53
68.75
15.46
10.41
49.0
1876
22.19
59.25
12.98
8.85
35.0
1877
18.92
45.58
11.82
8.46
44.0
1878
17.67
42.21
11.22
7.80
36.0
1879
21.72
48.21
10.84
7.97
38.0
1880
28.48
67.52
11.51
8.51
48.0
1881
25.17
61.08
12.03
8.51
44.0
1882
25.77
48.50
11.56
8.45
45.0
1883
22.42
37.75
11.88
8.32
41.0
1884
19.81
30.75
10.88
7.28
34.0
1885
17.99
28.52
10.45
6.75
31.0
1886
18.71
34.52
9.28
6.75
33.0
1887
20.93
37.08
10.21
7.15
37.0
1888
18.88
29.83
10.03
7.00
39.0
1889
17.76
29.25
10.65
7.00
39.0
1890
18.41
31.78
11.07
7.00
37.0
1891
17.52
29.92
8.60
6.83
35.0
1892
15.75
30.00
7.71
6.50
34.0
1893
14.52
28.12
8.56
5.90
26.0
1894
12.66
24.00
6.94
5.11
21.0
1895
13.10
24.33
7.44
5.74
21.0
1896
12.95
28.00
7.93
5.45
18.0
1897
12.10
18.75
7.00
4.73
23½
1898
11.66
17.62
5.94
4.20
29.0
1899
19.36
28.12
6.88
5.28
31½
1900
19.98
32.29
9.25
6.05
31½
1901
15.87
27.33
8.75
5.54
26.0
1902
22.19
28.00
9.00
5.48
26¾
1903
19.92
28.00
11.18
6.25
31½
1904
15.57
28.00
11.75
7.13
32½
1905
17.88
28.00
9.80
7.00
39.0
1906
20.98
28.00
11.50
7.25
37.0
1907
23.89
28.00
12.10
7.62
36.0
1908
17.70
28.00
10.62
6.75
38.0
Year. Production of
Natural gas.[C] Iron ore.[C]
Dollars. Long tons.
1800
1810
1820
1830
1840
1850
1851
1852
1853
1855
1856
1857
1858
1859
1860
1861
1862
1863
1864
1865
1866
1867
1868
1869
1870
3,031,891
1871
1872
1873
1874
1876
1877
1878
1879
1880
7,120,362
1881
1882
215,000
1883
475,000
1884
1,460,000
1885
4,857,200
1886
10,012,000
1887
15,817,500
1888
22,629,875
1889
21,097,099
14,518,041
1890
18,792,725
16,036,043
1891
15,500,084
14,591,178
1892
14,870,714
16,296,666
1893
14,346,250
11,587,629
1894
13,954,400
11,879,679
1895
13,006,650
15,957,614
1896
13,002,512
16,005,449
1897
13,826,422
17,518,046
1898
15,296,813
19,433,716
1899
20,074,873
24,683,173
1900
23,698,674
27,553,161
1901
27,066,077
28,887,479
1902
30,867,863
35,554,135
1903
35,807,860
35,019,308
1904
38,496,760
27,644,330
1905
41,562,855
42,526,133
1906
46,873,932
47,749,728
1907
52,866,835
51,720,619
1908
Year. Production of
Pig iron.[C] Steel.[C]
Long tons. Long tons.
1800
1810
53,908
1820
20,000
1830
165,000
1840
286,903
1850
563,755
1851
1852
1853
1855
700,159
1856
788,515
1857
712,640
1858
629,548
1859
750,560
1860
821,223
1861
653,164
1862
703,270
1863
846,075
1864
1,014,282
1865
831,770
1866
1,205,663
1867
1,305,023
19,643
1868
1,431,250
26,786
1869
1,711,287
31,250
1870
1,665,179
68,750
1871
1,706,793
73,214
1872
2,548,713
142,954
1873
2,560,963
198,796
1874
2,023,733
389,799
1876
1,868,961
533,191
1877
2,066,594
569,618
1878
2,301,215
731,977
1879
2,741,853
935,273
1880
3,835,191
1,247,335
1881
4,144,254
1,588,314
1882
4,623,323
1,736,692
1883
4,595,510
1,673,535
1884
4,097,868
1,550,879
1885
4,044,526
1,711,920
1886
5,683,329
2,562,503
1887
6,417,148
3,339,071
1888
6,489,738
2,899,440
1889
7,603,642
3,385,732
1890
9,202,703
4,277,071
1891
8,279,876
3,904,240
1892
9,157,000
4,927,581
1893
7,124,502
4,019,995
1894
6,657,888
4,412,032
1895
9,446,308
6,114,834
1896
8,623,127
5,281,689
1897
9,652,680
7,156,957
1898
11,773,934
8,932,857
1899
13,620,703
10,639,857
1900
13,789,242
10,188,329
1901
15,878,354
13,473,595
1902
17,821,307
14,947,250
1903
18,009,252
14,534,978
1904
16,497,033
13,859,887
1905
22,992,380
20,023,947
1906
25,307,191
23,398,136
1907
25,781,361
23,362,594
1908
15,936,018
Year. Iron and steel Manufactures.
Imports. Exports
(domestic)
Dollars. Dollars.
1800
52,144
1810
91,914
1820
46,552
1830
6,346,287
322,747
1840
8,157,923
1,127,877
1850
20,145,067
1,953,702
1851
22,439,297
2,336,587
1852
23,568,649
2,368,384
1853
34,944,002
2,541,554
1855
28,693,979
3,803,706
1856
29,050,101
4,256,613
1857
30,743,649
4,959,238
1858
20,171,007
4,843,592
1859
22,379,743
5,577,748
1860
26,158,235
5,870,114
1861
21,160,235
6,039,149
1862
11,451,707
4,732,348
1863
16,152,843
6,681,417
1864
23,822,876
7,541,967
1865
16,660,991
11,227,294
1866
25,598,147
4,006,180
1867
31,630,519
9,351,062
1868
30,346,768
10,950,275
1869
38,213,717
10,938,492
1870
40,273,682
13,483,163
1871
53,024,075
21,189,692
1872
67,852,616
11,463,880
1873
74,302,102
13,655,087
1874
31,432,380
19,534,215
1876
23,197,417
15,449,846
1877
19,320,927
16,501,638
1878
18,987,130
16,053,571
1879
19,594,608
15,133,493
1880
71,266,699
14,716,524
1881
60,604,477
16,608,767
1882
67,976,897
20,748,206
1883
40,147,053
21,909,881
1885
33,610,093
16,592,155
1886
37,534,078
15,745,569
1887
49,203,164
15,958,502
1888
48,992,757
17,763,034
1889
42,377,793
21,156,077
1890
41,679,591
25,542,208
1891
53,544,372
28,909,614
1892
28,928,103
28,800,930
1893
34,937,974
30,106,482
1894
20,925,769
29,220,264
1895
23,048,515
32,000,989
1896
25,338,103
41,160,877
1897
16,094,557
57,497,872
1898
12,626,431
70,406,885
1899
12,100,440
93,716,031
1900
20,478,728
121,913,548
1901
17,874,789
117,319,320
1902
27,180,247
98,552,562
1903
51,617,312
96,642,467
1904
27,028,312
111,948,586
1905
23,510,164
134,728,363
1906
29,053,987
160,984,985
1907
40,587,865
181,530,871
1908
27,607,909
183,982,182
Year. Prices of staple commodities.
Per ton.[C]
Pig iron
No. 1,
foundry.
Steel rails,
standard
sections
Dollars. Dollars.
1800
1810
1820
1830
1840
27.88
1850
20.88
1851
21.38
1852
22.63
1853
36.13
1854
36.88
1855
27.75
1856
27.18
1857
26.34
1858
22.19
1859
23.33
1860
22.70
1861
20.26
1862
23.92
1863
35.24
1864
59.22
1865
46.08
1866
46.84
1867
44.08
166.00
1868
39.25
158.46
1869
40.61
132.19
1870
33.23
106.79
1871
35.08
102.52
1872
48.94
111.94
1873
42.79
120.58
1874
30.19
94.28
1875
25.53
68.75
1876
22.19
59.25
1877
18.92
45.58
1878
17.67
42.21
1879
21.72
48.21
1880
28.48
67.52
1881
25.17
61.08
1882
25.77
48.50
1883
22.42
37.75
1884
19.81
30.75
1885
17.99
28.52
1886
18.71
34.52
1887
20.93
37.08
1888
18.88
29.83
1889
17.76
29.25
1890
18.41
31.78
1891
17.52
29.92
1892
15.75
30.00
1893
14.52
28.12
1894
12.66
24.00
1895
13.10
24.33
1896
12.95
28.00
1897
12.10
18.75
1898
11.66
17.62
1899
19.36
28.12
1900
19.98
32.29
1901
15.87
27.33
1902
22.19
28.00
1903
19.92
28.00
1904
15.57
28.00
1905
17.88
28.00
1906
20.98
28.00
1907
23.89
28.00
1908
17.70
28.00
Year. Prices of staple commodities.
Middling
cotton
per pound.[C]
Standard
sheetings
per yard.[C]
Washed Ohio
fleece wool,
per lb.,
in eastern
m’k’ts,
July 1.
Medium.
Cents. Cents. Cents.
1800
1810
1820
1830
50..0
1840
39..0
1850
12.34
7.87
37..0
1851
12.14
7.08
42..0
1852
.50
6.96
38..0
1853
11.02
7.92
53..0
1854
10.97
7.96
37..0
1855
10.39
7.64
40..0
1856
10.30
7.50
42..0
1857
13.51
8.90
50..0
1858
12.23
8.25
37..0
1859
12.08
8.50
40..0
1860
11.00
8.73
50..0
1861
13.01
10.00
30..0
1862
31.29
18.55
47..0
1863
67.21
36.04
70..0
1864
101.50
52.07
100..0
1865
83.38
38.04
73..0
1866
43.20
24.31
67..0
1867
31.59
18.28
49..0
1868
24.85
16.79
45..0
1869
29.01
16.19
48..0
1870
23.98
14.58
45..0
1871
16.95
13.00
60..0
1872
22.19
14.27
70..0
1873
20.14
13.31
48..0
1874
17.95
11.42
53..0
1875
15.46
10.41
49..0
1876
12.98
8.85
35..0
1877
11.82
8.46
44..0
1878
11.22
7.80
36..0
1879
10.84
7.97
38..0
1880
11.51
8.51
48..0
1881
12.03
8.51
44..0
1882
11.56
8.45
45..0
1883
11.88
8.32
41..0
1884
10.88
7.28
34..0
1885
10.45
6.75
31..0
1886
9.28
6.75
33..0
1887
10.21
7.15
37..0
1888
10.03
7.00
39..0
1889
10.65
7.00
39..0
1890
11.07
7.00
37..0
1891
8.60
6.83
35..0
1892
7.71
6.50
34..0
1893
8.56
5.90
26..0
1894
6.94
5.11
21..0
1895
7.44
5.74
21..0
1896
7.93
5.45
18..0
1897
7.00
4.73
23½
1898
5.94
4.20
29..0
1899
6.88
5.28
31½
1900
9.25
6.05
31½
1901
8.75
5.54
26..0
1902
9.00
5.48
26¾
1903
11.18
6.25
31½
1904
11.75
7.13
32½
1905
9.80
7.00
39..0
1906
11.50
7.25
37..0
1907
12.10
7.62
36..0
1908
10.62
6.75
38..0

[C] Calendar year.

Calendar year.

The arguments in favor of bimetallism are as various as the motives of its advocates, but two or three of the more [Pg 140] important ones may be briefly stated. It is urged because it would give a more stable measure of value than either silver or gold alone could do; and the evil effects of fluctuations in the value of gold since 1873 are pointed out to illustrate this contention. Monometallists answer this by asserting that most of the price changes can be accounted for by improvements in production; that even if they were caused by a contraction of the currency, this was simply one of the risks of business; and finally, that the evil effects of falling prices are offset by a corresponding reduction in interest rates. A second argument of the bimetallists was the alleged insufficiency of gold on which to do the world’s business. As this has been practically met by the phenomenal increase in gold production in the last decade, especially since the gold discoveries in Alaska, it is not necessary to dwell upon this argument. On February 1, 1909, the per capita circulation of money in the United States reached $35.00, the highest point in our history. A final argument of the bimetallists concerns foreign trade: it would facilitate this by establishing a fixed par-of-exchange between all countries. While the weight of this may be admitted, it has been practically deprived of all force by the adoption of the gold standard by virtually all the industrially developed nations of the world. This last fact shows that the question has now been actually settled by the logic of events and today the issue of bimetallism has only an academic interest.

The reasons in support of bimetallism are as varied as the motivations of its supporters, but a few key points can be highlighted. One argument is that it would provide a more stable measure of value than either silver or gold alone; the negative effects of gold value fluctuations since 1873 illustrate this point. Monometallists counter this by claiming that most price changes can be explained by production improvements; that even if they're caused by a decrease in currency, it's just a business risk; and finally, that the negative effects of falling prices are balanced out by lower interest rates. Another argument from the bimetallists is the claimed inadequacy of gold to support global commerce. This concern has largely been addressed by the significant increase in gold production over the past decade, particularly following the gold discoveries in Alaska, so it's not necessary to elaborate on this point. On February 1, 1909, the per capita money circulation in the United States reached $35.00, the highest in our history. A final argument from the bimetallists relates to foreign trade: it would make it easier by establishing a fixed exchange rate between all countries. While this point may have some merit, it has largely lost its impact due to the widespread adoption of the gold standard by nearly all industrialized nations. This fact indicates that the issue has effectively been settled by the course of events, and today, the topic of bimetallism is mostly of academic interest.

Another problem connected with money which has been removed from the arena of oratory to that of calm discussion is that of government paper money. It is urged, with much truth, that if a nation issued paper money instead of gold or silver, it would save all the expense of mining these metals. It would resemble, as Adam Smith said, the discovery of wagon roads through the air in the realm of transportation. Another argument advanced in favor of government paper money is that it would be possible [Pg 141] by a scientific adjustment of the issues to regulate the amount of money in circulation and so to prevent all fluctuations in prices. Both contraction and inflation would be prevented and a cheap and yet ideal system of money would exist. Still others see in this form of money an instrument for the creation of wealth; this last argument simply results from a confusion of ideas and need not be dealt with. A sufficient answer to the other two is an appeal to the lesson of history: no government which has embarked upon the issue of paper money has ever been able to restrict the issues within reasonable limits; often it has led to national bankruptcy and the repudiation of the entire issues. The experience of the United States with the greenbacks has been more fortunate than that of many countries, but does not tempt to further experiment.

Another issue related to money that has shifted from being debated to calm discussion is government-issued paper money. It's often argued, quite truthfully, that if a nation used paper money instead of gold or silver, it would save on the costs of mining these metals. It would be similar, as Adam Smith noted, to discovering airways for transportation. Another point made in favor of government paper money is that, through a scientific approach to managing its supply, it could regulate the money in circulation and prevent price fluctuations. This way, both deflation and inflation could be avoided, leading to an ideal, cost-effective monetary system. Additionally, some believe this type of money could be a tool for creating wealth; however, this argument stems from a misunderstanding and does not require further exploration. A strong counterargument to the other points is to look at historical lessons: no government that has issued paper money has successfully kept its issuance within reasonable limits; this often results in national bankruptcy and a total loss of that money. The experience of the United States with greenbacks has been more fortunate than that of many other countries, but it does not encourage further experimentation.

The monetary situation in the United States today may be regarded as fairly well settled. Although we have a very heterogeneous assortment of different kinds of money, a fairly distinct sphere is allotted to each, and as the basis for all, the gold standard has been definitely established by law. Money of large denominations consists of gold and gold certificates (lowest denomination, $20), of greenbacks and national bank notes (lowest denomination, $10, though one-third of bank notes may be $5); the needs of retail trade are met by the issue of silver certificates and silver dollars, and of fractional currency. The system would be much simplified by the retirement and destruction of the $346,000,000 in greenbacks, but as there is now a fifty-per cent reserve in gold back of them, little danger need be apprehended from their presence. Many people have regarded the existence of some $500,000,000 worth of silver dollars as a menace to the goodness of our money supply, but as the amount of gold in circulation increases the silver will form a constantly smaller percentage of the whole. It is a cumbersome and not very [Pg 142] valuable asset of the Government, but is now almost powerless for good or ill.

The monetary situation in the United States today is fairly stable. While we have a diverse range of different types of money, each has its own clear role, and the gold standard has been officially established as the foundation for all. Large denomination money consists of gold and gold certificates (with the lowest denomination being $20), greenbacks, and national banknotes (with the lowest denomination being $10, though one-third of banknotes can be $5); the needs of retail trade are addressed by the issuance of silver certificates, silver dollars, and fractional currency. The system would be much simpler if the $346,000,000 in greenbacks were retired and destroyed, but since there is now a fifty percent gold reserve backing them, there’s little risk posed by their existence. Many people view the $500,000,000 worth of silver dollars as a threat to the quality of our money supply, but as the amount of gold in circulation increases, silver will make up an increasingly smaller percentage of the total. It's a bulky and not very useful asset for the government, but it's now nearly powerless to have either a positive or negative impact.

Important as is the subject of money and essential as is the need of a standard of undoubted goodness, it is overshadowed in practical significance by the problems of banking and credit. An investigation by the Comptroller of the Currency some years ago showed that over 90 per cent of the receipts of the national banks consisted of credit instruments, while probably 60 per cent of the trade of the country was carried on by credit rather than by cash transactions. A credit transaction is a transfer of goods or money for a future equivalent; the element of time is introduced. This makes possible an enormous increase in the number of exchanges and obviates the necessity, to a large extent, of using money. Most of us enjoy personal credit, which is limited only by our ability to persuade other people to trust in us. But this power of purchasing things without immediate payment must be made readily available if the ordinary business man is to make use of it. This is done through the medium of a bank, whose business it is to discount the notes of its customers, which in turn is based upon confidence in their prospective earnings. The bank credit thus obtained may be transferred by means of checks to other persons and to other banks. It is the most fluid and volatile means of payment yet devised, and is subject to dangers and abuses. In the last analysis business based upon such a system of credit rests upon confidence in the honesty of individuals and in the enforcement of the law governing contracts, and also in the ability of those who have pledged themselves to future payment to make good their obligations. In times of panic credit fails and resort is had to money.

As important as money is and as essential as having a reliable standard, its practical significance is overshadowed by the challenges of banking and credit. A study by the Comptroller of the Currency a few years ago revealed that over 90% of national banks' receipts came from credit instruments, while around 60% of the country’s trade was conducted through credit instead of cash transactions. A credit transaction involves exchanging goods or money for a promise of future payment, adding the element of time. This allows for a huge increase in the number of exchanges and significantly reduces the need to use cash. Most of us benefit from personal credit, which is mainly limited by our ability to convince others to trust us. However, this ability to buy things without immediate payment needs to be easily accessible for ordinary business people to utilize it. This access is provided through banks, which discount the notes of their customers based on the trust in their future earnings. The bank credit obtained can then be transferred through checks to other people and banks. It’s the most fluid and flexible method of payment ever created, but it comes with its own risks and potential for abuse. Ultimately, business that relies on this credit system depends on trust in people’s honesty, the enforcement of contract laws, and the capability of those who promise future payments to fulfill their commitments. During times of panic, credit collapses, and people turn to cash.

The fundamental institution in our credit economy is the bank, and it is therefore essential that it be thoroughly safe and responsive to the needs of the business world. [Pg 143] A bank may furnish its customers with the ready means of payment they need in exchange for their future promises either in the form of bank notes or bank credit. The former are more largely used on the continent of Europe and in rural districts in this country, the latter by England and the United States, especially in the cities. The preference for one or the other seems to be a matter of geography. The issue of bank notes has been very carefully safeguarded since the establishment of the national banking system in 1863. They are based upon the purchase of government bonds and are absolutely safe. They lack, however, one essential quality of good bank money in that they are quite inelastic. That is to say, the amount of bank notes in circulation does not vary according to the needs of business, increasing to meet an increased demand, and then declining again when the demand has passed. Being based upon government bonds and not upon the value of business assets, they vary in amount only with the price of the former and not at all with the volume of the latter.

The bank is the key institution in our credit economy, so it’s crucial that it is completely secure and responsive to the needs of the business world. [Pg 143] A bank can provide its customers with the quick payment options they need in exchange for their future promises, either as banknotes or bank credit. Banknotes are more commonly used in continental Europe and in rural areas of this country, while bank credit is preferred in England and the United States, particularly in urban centers. The choice between the two seems to depend on geographical factors. Since the national banking system was established in 1863, the issuance of banknotes has been carefully controlled. They are backed by the purchase of government bonds and are completely safe. However, they lack one critical characteristic of good bank money: they are not flexible. This means that the amount of banknotes in circulation does not change based on business needs—it doesn’t increase during times of higher demand or decrease when demand falls. Instead, the supply is influenced solely by the price of government bonds and not by the value of business assets.

The main practical problem connected with our banking system is, therefore, to find some other basis for the issue of bank notes, especially as it is not desirable to maintain a permanent bonded indebtedness solely for this purpose. Various suggestions have been made, as the establishment of a central bank with sole power of issue, like the government banks in European countries. This is a favorite proposal with the big bankers, but is unlikely to be adopted as it is directly contrary to the spirit of the existing system. The Canadian system is held up as a model, with its system of branch banking and 5 per cent safety fund for the redemption of the notes of failed banks. Curiously enough this was copied after the system in operation in New York State, which was nipped in the bud by some early mistakes and by the development of the national banking system. It works admirably in Canada [Pg 144] and is well worth careful study. The plan of asset currency is another suggestion, according to which bank notes should be issued up to a certain percentage of the resources of the bank, but without pledging any specific property for their redemption as is done in the case of the national banks at present. It has finally been urged that our present bond deposit system should be modified by substituting state, municipal, railroad, or industrial bonds for those of the Federal Government, but that in other respects the system should be left intact. We may look for legislation along one or another of these lines in the next few years, as the subject is an urgent one whose solution cannot long be postponed.

The main practical issue with our banking system is finding a different basis for issuing bank notes, especially since it’s not ideal to keep a permanent bonded debt just for this reason. Several suggestions have been made, such as establishing a central bank with exclusive issuance power, similar to government banks in European countries. This proposal is popular among big bankers, but it’s unlikely to be accepted as it goes against the current system’s principles. The Canadian banking system is often seen as a model, featuring branch banking and a 5 percent safety fund to redeem notes from failed banks. Interestingly, this was adapted from a system that was in place in New York State but was cut short due to some early mistakes and the rise of the national banking system. It operates very effectively in Canada and is definitely worth a closer look. Another suggestion is the asset currency plan, where bank notes would be issued based on a certain percentage of the bank’s resources, without tying specific assets to them for redemption like national banks do now. Lastly, it has been proposed that our current bond deposit system be changed by replacing federal government bonds with state, municipal, railroad, or industrial bonds, but otherwise keeping the system as is. We can expect legislation along one of these lines in the coming years, as this is a pressing issue that cannot be delayed much longer.

Another problem is connected with the money reserves that the banks are required by law to keep on hand in order to meet demand liabilities. Under the national system in the United States the country banks may deposit three-fifths of their lawful reserves with banks in reserve cities, and these banks in turn may deposit one-half of their reserves in banks in central reserve cities (New York, Chicago, and St. Louis). Thus there is a massing, under this system, of the bank reserves of the country in the city of New York, and within that city in some twenty banks. While there is great economy in such a system the concentration of reserves is certainly attended by great dangers, not the least of which is its use by speculative influences in the New York money market, as a great part of it is loaned out to speculators on call.

Another issue is related to the money reserves that banks must legally hold to meet withdrawal demands. In the United States, under the national system, local banks can deposit three-fifths of their required reserves with banks in reserve cities. These reserve banks can then deposit half of their reserves with banks in central reserve cities (New York, Chicago, and St. Louis). This results in the concentration of the nation's bank reserves in New York City, specifically within about twenty banks. While this system is very efficient, the concentration of reserves carries significant risks, not least of which is its exploitation by speculative influences in the New York money market, since a large portion of these reserves is lent out to speculators on demand.

Still another practical problem connected with the monetary and banking system of the United States is that of the independent treasury system. The Federal Government is to a large extent its own banker; it collects, disburses its revenue and keeps its money in its own vaults; it even, as we have seen, issues paper money and keeps a reserve therefor. By its action in withdrawing large amounts of money from use, or on the other hand making [Pg 145] large disbursements, it can and does affect the money market vitally and sometimes disastrously. While it is permitted to deposit funds in selected national banks and has recently made increasing use of this privilege, thus correlating in a measure the reserves of the Government and the needs of the business community, it is held by most students that the independent treasury system should be abolished, and that the banks should act as the intermediaries between the Government and the people in the collection and expenditure of its funds.

Another practical issue related to the monetary and banking system of the United States is the independent treasury system. The Federal Government largely acts as its own banker; it collects and distributes its revenue and keeps its money in its own vaults. It even, as we've seen, issues paper money and maintains a reserve for it. By withdrawing large amounts of money from circulation or, on the flip side, making significant expenditures, it can and does have a major impact on the money market, sometimes in harmful ways. While it can deposit funds in chosen national banks and has recently utilized this option more, which helps connect the Government's reserves with the needs of the business community, most experts believe that the independent treasury system should be eliminated, and that banks should serve as intermediaries between the Government and the public in the collection and spending of its funds.

So far we have been discussing commercial banks, but there is another kind of institution which goes by the same name but serves quite a different purpose, namely, the savings bank. The essential and almost the only requirement of such an institution is safety. As we have seen, it is not only desirable for personal reasons to inculcate habits of saving and thrift in individuals, but it is also necessary to secure the accumulation of capital needed in modern industry. It is therefore important that such institutions should be widespread, accessible, and thoroughly trusted. These requirements seem to be best fulfilled by the postal savings banks in England and elsewhere, which have led to a great increase in savings on the part of the people. The introduction of such a system in the United States is greatly to be desired.

So far, we've been talking about commercial banks, but there's another type of institution with the same name that serves a very different purpose: the savings bank. The main and almost only requirement for such an institution is safety. As we've seen, it's not just important for personal reasons to promote saving and frugality among individuals, but it's also necessary to ensure the accumulation of capital needed in modern industry. Therefore, it's crucial that these institutions are widespread, accessible, and completely trustworthy. These needs seem to be best met by the postal savings banks in England and other places, which have led to a significant increase in savings among the public. The introduction of such a system in the United States is highly desirable.

XVI. TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATION.

Almost as important for the conduct of modern industry as machine methods and credit are the rapid means of transportation and communication furnished by our railroad, steamship, express, post office, telegraph and telephone systems. Indeed the development of industry on a national scale and its integration under centralized control has been made possible only by these improvements. But not only have these businesses rendered the centralization of industry possible; they themselves exhibit on a national [Pg 146] scale concentration of control. They are all industries of increasing returns and lend themselves naturally to monopolistic control. At the very beginning of railroad construction one of the most far-sighted managers enunciated the doctrine that “where combination is possible competition is impossible.” For years competition was regarded as the regulator of rates, pooling between railroads was forbidden, canals were advocated as competitors, and by every possible device it was sought to stimulate it. We are at last beginning to recognize the monopoly character of the railroad industry and to regulate it accordingly.

Almost as important for running modern industry as machine methods and credit are the fast transportation and communication options provided by our railroads, steamships, express services, post offices, telegraphs, and telephone systems. In fact, the growth of industry on a national level and its management under centralized control has only been made possible by these advancements. But these businesses haven't just enabled the centralization of industry; they themselves show a concentration of control on a national scale. They are all industries that benefit from increasing returns and naturally lend themselves to monopolistic control. At the start of railroad construction, one of the most forward-thinking managers stated the idea that “where combination is possible, competition is impossible.” For years, competition was seen as the way to regulate rates, pooling between railroads was banned, canals were promoted as competitors, and every possible method was used to encourage it. We are finally starting to acknowledge the monopolistic nature of the railroad industry and to regulate it accordingly.

Consolidation in the railroad world is not a new phenomenon nor is it confined to that industry, but it has proceeded further there than in any other line of business. The first form which combination took was that of pooling, according to which the traffic was “pooled” and the earnings then divided among the companies entering into the pool according to some previous agreement. This was forbidden by the Interstate Commerce Act in 1887 and even more stringently by the Anti-Trust Act of 1890, and accordingly railroad managers next resorted to actual consolidation of competing lines. Where this has not been possible or desirable, virtual combination has been secured by the so-called “community of interests” arrangements, based on the acquisition by one road of enough stock in competing lines to secure representation on their boards of directors. Today some eight or nine groups of capitalists control over two-thirds of the railway mileage of the United States, and according to a recent widely-published statement the late Mr. E. H. Harriman was credited with controlling, directly or indirectly, a system aggregating over 67,000 miles. These great consolidations have followed mainly the territorial groupings of railroads; the United States has now been districted out by a few large transportation companies, much as France, Italy, England and other [Pg 147] European countries had previously been divided up. Consolidation has in many instances resulted in increased convenience to the public and in economies in management and operation, but it places a dangerous amount of power in the hands of a few men, which has not infrequently been abused, and should clearly be under strict government control.

Consolidation in the railroad industry isn’t a new trend, nor is it limited to that sector, but it has gone further there than in any other business. The initial form of combination was pooling, where traffic was “pooled” and the earnings were divided among the companies involved based on a prior agreement. This was banned by the Interstate Commerce Act in 1887 and even more strictly by the Anti-Trust Act of 1890. As a result, railroad managers turned to actual consolidation of competing lines. When this hasn’t been possible or desirable, a virtual combination has been achieved through “community of interests” arrangements, where one railroad buys enough stock in competing lines to gain representation on their boards of directors. Today, around eight or nine groups of investors control over two-thirds of the railway mileage in the United States, and according to a recently published report, the late Mr. E. H. Harriman was said to control, directly or indirectly, a system totaling over 67,000 miles. These large consolidations have mainly followed the territorial groupings of railroads; the United States is now divided by a few major transportation companies, much like France, Italy, England, and other European countries were previously split up. Consolidation has often led to greater convenience for the public and cost savings in management and operations, but it puts a dangerous amount of power in the hands of a few individuals, which has often been misused, and should definitely be under strict government oversight.

The primary economic problem connected with railways is always the question of rates. This has been called in a recent book “the heart of the railroad problem.” The first fact that strikes the student of the subject is the great reduction in rates and fares in the past twenty-five years, especially in freight rates. From 1.24 cents in 1882 the average revenue per ton mile received by railroads in the United States has decreased to .748 cents in 1906. Freight rates, especially through rates for bulky traffic, are considerably lower in this country, and passenger fares somewhat higher, than in Europe. But the vital problem connected with rates is not as to their relative cheapness or extortionateness; it concerns rather the granting of discriminating rates. Discriminations may be of three kinds: those between different classes of goods, those between localities, and those between persons. The first group is based upon the classification of freight and rests upon differences in cost of shipment, in bulk, in risk, etc. If reasonably employed, this kind of discrimination is justifiable. Local discriminations, that is, charging different rates to different localities for substantially the same service, is not only unwarranted in most cases, but is short-sighted as well. Where superior facilities or especially keen competition exists, lower rates may be permitted for favored localities, but the arbitrary exercise of such powers by railway officials is thoroughly unjustifiable. Even less defensible is the practice, now happily less frequent, of granting discriminatory rates to favored individuals or corporations. They have been given by [Pg 148] means of secret rates and rebates, by under-billing and under-classification, by free passes, etc. Both of these latter evils have been forbidden or greatly restricted by the passage of the Interstate Commerce Act in 1887 and subsequent legislation.

The main economic issue related to railways is always the question of rates. A recent book referred to this as “the heart of the railroad problem.” The first thing that stands out to anyone studying the topic is the significant drop in rates and fares over the past twenty-five years, especially in freight rates. From 1.24 cents in 1882, the average revenue per ton mile received by railroads in the United States fell to .748 cents in 1906. Freight rates, particularly for bulky shipments, are much lower in this country, while passenger fares are slightly higher than in Europe. However, the crucial issue regarding rates isn't about their relative affordability or unfairness; it’s more about the granting of discriminatory rates. Discriminations can fall into three categories: differences between various classes of goods, between locations, and between individuals. The first category is based on freight classification and relies on differences in shipping costs, volume, risk, etc. If used appropriately, this type of discrimination is defensible. Local discrimination, which means charging different rates to various areas for essentially the same service, is generally unwarranted and also shortsighted. Where better facilities or intense competition exist, lower rates might be acceptable for preferred areas, but whimsically exercising such powers by railway officials is completely unjustified. Even less defensible is the now less common practice of granting discriminatory rates to favored individuals or companies. These have been provided through secret rates and rebates, under-billing and under-classification, and free passes, among other methods. Both of these latter issues have been banned or heavily restricted by the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 and later legislation.

The public nature of railroads is now fairly well recognized in our law and is beginning to be understood by the people at large. Railroads enjoy peculiar privileges in the grant of corporate franchises and charters, in the right of eminent domain, and in enormous grants of land and money which have been made to them in this country. Moreover in the functions they perform the social character of their duties is emphasized, and they are under the necessity of maintaining a constant service open to all. Though they are owned by private investors and managed as private enterprises, they are essentially public enterprises as to their privileges, functions, and duties. Consequently most of the states have now undertaken, through commissions, to regulate the railroads in the public interest. Some thirty-one have appointed commissions, which probably control four-fifths of the traffic originating and ending in a single state. These state commissions differ in power, those of the Mississippi Valley and the South usually having mandatory powers, that is, power to prescribe and enforce maximum rates. In the eastern and central states commissions with supervisory powers merely, of investigation and report, have been created. The only exceptions are found in the Far West where the need of improved transportation facilities is more pressing than regulation, and in five eastern states whose legislatures are controlled by the railroad interests. While the state commissions have done and are doing valuable service, it is clear that the growth of giant railroad combinations which traverse several states necessitates federal control. The appointment of the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1887 established the principle of federal regulation, but [Pg 149] the application of the principle in active practice has been slow and has been impeded by the courts. The final control of rates has not yet been given to the Commission.

The public nature of railroads is now well recognized in our laws and is starting to be understood by the general public. Railroads have special privileges when it comes to corporate franchises and charters, the right of eminent domain, and large grants of land and money that have been given to them in this country. Additionally, the social aspect of their responsibilities is highlighted in the functions they perform, and they are required to maintain a constant service that is open to everyone. Even though they are owned by private investors and run as private businesses, they are fundamentally public enterprises regarding their privileges, functions, and duties. As a result, most states have now taken action, through commissions, to regulate the railroads in the public interest. About thirty-one states have set up commissions that likely oversee four-fifths of the traffic that starts and ends in a single state. These state commissions vary in power; those in the Mississippi Valley and the South often have mandatory powers, meaning they can set and enforce maximum rates. In the eastern and central states, commissions with only supervisory powers—focused on investigation and reporting—have been formed. The only exceptions are in the Far West, where the need for better transportation facilities is more urgent than regulation, and in five eastern states where the railroad interests dominate the legislatures. While state commissions have provided and continue to provide valuable service, it is evident that the growth of large railroad combinations that cross several states requires federal control. The establishment of the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1887 set the foundation for federal regulation, but the actual implementation of this principle has been slow and has faced obstacles from the courts. The final authority over rates has not yet been granted to the Commission.

Owing to the individualistic character of our institutions and law, public ownership of railroads does not exist in the United States, which thus forms, together with England, almost the sole important exception to the world’s practice in this regard. On the continent of Europe government ownership is the rule. Public control through either ownership or regulation by commission is essential to secure an equitable adjustment of public and private rights and to prevent the abuse of monopoly power inherent in the very nature of railroads. Public ownership has many advantages and has given satisfactory results in Europe. But for the United States the principle of private ownership with stricter governmental regulation has been definitely laid down; the problem of the future is simply how far that control shall go.

Due to the individualistic nature of our institutions and laws, public ownership of railroads doesn’t exist in the United States, making it, along with England, almost the only significant exception in the world. In continental Europe, government ownership is the norm. Public control through either ownership or regulation by commission is crucial to ensure a fair balance between public and private rights and to prevent the misuse of monopoly power that is inherent in railroads. Public ownership has many benefits and has shown positive results in Europe. However, in the United States, the principle of private ownership with stricter government regulation has been firmly established; the future challenge is simply how much that control should extend.

The discussion of our steam railroads does not exhaust the subject of transportation. A recent and important development is the growth of electric interurban railways, which are opening up districts untouched by the more expensive steam roads and exercising a marked influence in rural districts upon business and social life. A more significant problem, both because of its close relations to the railroads and its monopoly character, is offered by the express companies. Organized at a time when railroads were new and undeveloped they took over the safe and expeditious delivery of small and valuable articles. They have since grown in importance and power; six large companies now control over 90 per cent of the business. Since they are generally in the form of partnerships and not of corporations it has not been possible to bring them under legal control, and their rates are extremely high—three or four times as much as freight rates. In some cases the railroads, in order to gain the profits from these high rates, [Pg 150] have themselves organized express companies to operate over their lines, immune from interference by the Interstate Commerce Commission. Even where that is not done, the express companies are performing a service which could as well be performed by the railroads themselves and at lower rates. These facts have lent great strength to the demand for the establishment by the Federal Government in connection with the post office of a parcels post, such as exists in England and in most European countries. By the extension of the maximum limit of mail packages to ten or fifteen pounds the usefulness of the post office could be immensely increased without any loss in rates. So far, however, the express companies have been strong enough to resist the introduction of this reform, though it is warmly advocated by the present Postmaster-General. A recent important improvement in our postal service has been the extension of rural free delivery to the farming districts, thereby breaking down to a great extent the isolation of country districts. This and the rural telephone have been of great social value.

The discussion about our steam railroads doesn't cover all aspects of transportation. A recent and noteworthy development is the rise of electric interurban railways, which are reaching areas that the more expensive steam railroads haven't touched and having a noticeable impact on business and social life in rural areas. An even more significant issue, due to its close connection to the railroads and its monopolistic nature, involves express companies. Established when railroads were still new and evolving, they took on the reliable and fast delivery of small and valuable items. Their importance and power have since increased; six major companies currently control over 90 percent of the market. Since they usually operate as partnerships rather than corporations, it's been hard to regulate them legally, and their rates are exceptionally high—three to four times the freight rates. In some instances, railroads have created their own express companies to take advantage of these high rates, operating on their lines without federal regulation from the Interstate Commerce Commission. Even when that's not the case, express companies are providing a service that could easily be handled by the railroads themselves at lower rates. These issues have heightened the demand for the Federal Government, in conjunction with the post office, to establish a parcels post similar to what exists in England and most European countries. By raising the maximum weight limit for mail packages to ten or fifteen pounds, the post office's effectiveness could be significantly improved without raising rates. So far, however, the express companies have been powerful enough to block this reform, although it is strongly supported by the current Postmaster-General. A recent significant upgrade in our postal service has been the expansion of rural free delivery to farming areas, which has greatly reduced the isolation of country districts. This, along with rural telephone service, has been very beneficial socially.

The importance of the telephone and telegraph in our modern industrial life cannot be overestimated. As means of transmitting intelligence they have served to bring the most distant parts of the world into almost instant touch, and have made possible the modern centralization of business. Both offer the same problems of monopoly that we have seen exist in other parts of this field, the telegraph business being completely monopolized by two large companies, the telephone business by one, all strongly entrenched behind patents. The desirability of public ownership of these utilities rests upon stronger grounds than in the case of railroads and is strongly urged by many conservative writers.

The significance of the telephone and telegraph in our modern industrial life can't be overstated. As tools for transmitting information, they've connected the most distant parts of the world almost instantly and enabled the centralization of business we see today. Both present the same monopoly issues we've observed in other areas, with the telegraph industry fully controlled by two major companies and the telephone industry dominated by one, all heavily protected by patents. The call for public ownership of these utilities is based on even stronger reasons than for railroads, and it's a position supported by many conservative authors.

Although attention has usually been centered upon the railroads in any discussion of the transportation question in the United States, there are important practical problems [Pg 151] connected with both the inland and the ocean water transportation. The questions of constructing artificial inland waterways and of subsidizing our foreign merchant marine are vital political and industrial issues. The United States is probably better provided with internal navigable natural waterways than any other country. Her navigable rivers comprise some 18,000 miles. Affording access to the very heart of the continent both from the Atlantic coast and from the Gulf. They form a cheap and convenient means of transportation, especially for bulky and cheap articles; 30,000,000 tons a year are carried on the streams of the Mississippi Valley alone, though much of the former traffic has been diverted to the railroads. On the northern border of the country the Great Lakes form an unrivaled series of inland seas. The traffic on these shows a great increase every year, amounting now to over 60,000,000 tons annually. The Federal Government has performed useful service in improving the conditions of navigation along these natural waterways, and is now considering a comprehensive scheme for their further improvement.

Although discussions about transportation in the United States usually focus on railroads, there are significant practical issues related to both inland and ocean water transportation. The topics of building artificial inland waterways and subsidizing our foreign merchant marine are crucial political and industrial matters. The United States likely has more navigable natural waterways than any other country. Its navigable rivers stretch approximately 18,000 miles, providing access to the center of the continent from both the Atlantic coast and the Gulf. These waterways offer a cost-effective and convenient transportation option, especially for large and low-cost items; around 30 million tons are transported on the streams of the Mississippi Valley alone, though much of the previous traffic has shifted to railroads. Along the northern border, the Great Lakes create an unmatched series of inland seas. The traffic here has been steadily increasing every year, now exceeding 60 million tons annually. The Federal Government has made valuable contributions to improving navigation along these natural waterways and is currently considering a comprehensive plan for further enhancements.

A very different problem is offered by our canal system. During the period 1820-1840 many canals were constructed by the states to connect existing waterways and provide an outlet for produce from the interior. The best examples of these were the Erie and the Ohio canals. After the development of the railway, however, traffic began to be steadily and then rapidly diverted from the canals to these quicker avenues of transportation. Many of the canals were bought up by their rivals and permitted to fall into disuse, while those retained by the state governments remained mere shallow ditches, unimproved and ill-adapted to modern needs. The recent appropriation by the people of New York State of over $100,000,000 for the improvement of the Erie Canal, and the construction of the Panama Canal by the Federal Government have [Pg 152] brought the question of the rehabilitation of our neglected canal system to the front again. It seems wasteful not to connect the separate links in the magnificent system of natural waterways already provided by nature, and this will probably be the first step taken. And indeed a beginning has already been made by the construction of the Hennepin Canal, the Des Plaines Canal, and others, and a company has been formed to connect Pittsburg with Lake Erie and to cut through Cape Cod. It must, however, be borne in mind that there are two distinct types of canal: those which are simply short connecting links between navigable waterways and which permit the passage of vessels used on those waters; and those canals which are shallow, have extensive lockage, and permit the use of only small boats, thus necessitating the transshipment of freight. One might well advocate the construction and enlargement of the first type, and yet hesitate to approve of the second. As yet, however, owing in part to the opposition and clamor of railroad interests, the question of canals has not received the attention it deserves in the United States.

A very different issue is presented by our canal system. During the years 1820-1840, many states built canals to connect existing waterways and create an outlet for goods from the interior. The best examples were the Erie and Ohio canals. However, after railways were developed, traffic began shifting steadily and then rapidly from the canals to these faster transport options. Many canals were bought by their competitors and allowed to fall into disuse, while those kept by state governments became mere shallow ditches, unimproved and poorly suited to modern needs. The recent allocation by New York State of over $100,000,000 for the improvement of the Erie Canal, along with the Federal Government's construction of the Panama Canal, has brought the issue of reviving our neglected canal system back into the spotlight. It seems wasteful not to link the separate parts of the magnificent system of natural waterways that nature has already provided, and this will probably be the first step taken. Indeed, a start has already been made with the construction of the Hennepin Canal, the Des Plaines Canal, and others, and a company has been formed to connect Pittsburgh with Lake Erie and to cut through Cape Cod. However, it must be noted that there are two distinct types of canals: those that are simply short connecting links between navigable waterways, allowing the passage of vessels used on those waters; and those that are shallow, have extensive locks, and only permit the use of small boats, requiring goods to be transferred. One might support the construction and expansion of the first type while being hesitant to approve of the second. So far, though, partly due to the opposition and outcry from railroad interests, the issue of canals has not received the attention it deserves in the United States.

The ocean merchant marine comprises two widely different branches, the coastwise and the foreign trade. The former is open only to vessels flying the American flag, and has shown a very steady growth; five-sixths of our ocean merchant marine today is engaged in this branch of commerce. Coal, lumber, cotton, and similar bulky commodities constitute the chief items entering into the coastwise trade. The tonnage of American vessels engaged in the foreign trade, on the other hand, has shown a steady decline ever since the outbreak of the Civil War. Foreign vessels today carry fully 90 per cent of the foreign commerce of the United States. The causes of this decline are economic rather than political, for American legislation has on the whole been very liberal to the shipping interests. At the time the western part of our country began to be opened up and its great resources exploited, [Pg 153] our merchant marine was one of the best in the world. But now the other opportunities for the investment of capital were so profitable and alluring, and the need of it so great, that all the available labor and capital of the American people began to be devoted to the development of their internal resources. A nation cannot do everything with equal advantage at the same time any more than an individual can. Accordingly we began to withdraw our capital from shipping and devote it to agriculture, mining, manufacturing, transportation, and similar more profitable enterprises. Foreigners could build vessels and run them more cheaply than we could and it paid us to hire them to do it. Recently, however, and especially since the recent awakening of a national consciousness after the Spanish-American War, the patriotism of many individuals has been hurt by the thought that we had to depend upon foreign vessels for the carriage of our foreign commerce, while in the minds of others a comprehensive naval program demanded the building up of a native merchant marine. Two questions suggest themselves here: Do we wish to stimulate this growth artificially? And, if we do, what means shall we adopt? On the second point the Merchant Marine Commission of 1904 recommended for the United States a general bounty on all shipping, such as France has, and the subvention of certain lines of steamers over ten specified routes, following the example of Great Britain, Germany, and Japan. Without committing ourselves on this point, it may be suggested that on political, geographical, and economic grounds we may expect in the near future to see the natural development of an American merchant marine. With the growth of our foreign trade, the accumulation of capital at home, and the building up of a strong navy, the conditions for American shipbuilding and shipping will become steadily more favorable, and we may expect to see American enterprise [Pg 154] engage in this as in other lines of industry. Eventually we are destined to become a maritime nation.

The ocean merchant marine consists of two very different sectors: the coastwise trade and the foreign trade. The coastwise trade is only open to ships with an American flag and has experienced steady growth; currently, five-sixths of our ocean merchant marine is involved in this sector. Coal, lumber, cotton, and other bulky goods are the main products in the coastwise trade. In contrast, the tonnage of American vessels in the foreign trade has been steadily declining since the Civil War began. Today, foreign ships handle about 90 percent of the United States’ foreign trade. The reasons for this decline are more economic than political, as American laws have generally been quite supportive of shipping interests. When the western part of our country started to open up and its vast resources were being developed, our merchant marine was one of the best in the world. However, attractive investment opportunities in other areas drew labor and capital away, causing a shift towards the development of internal resources. Just as individuals can’t do everything equally well at once, neither can a nation. As a result, we began pulling our investments from shipping to focus on agriculture, mining, manufacturing, and transportation, which were seen as more profitable ventures. Foreigners could build and operate ships more cheaply than we could, making it financially sensible for us to hire them. Recently, especially after the renewed national pride following the Spanish-American War, many people have felt a sense of disappointment that we have to rely on foreign ships for our international trade. This sentiment has also led to a belief that a strong naval program requires building up our own merchant marine. Two questions arise: Should we artificially boost this growth? And if we choose to do so, what methods should we use? Regarding the latter, the Merchant Marine Commission of 1904 suggested that the United States implement a general bounty on all shipping, akin to what France has, and subsidize certain lines of steamers on ten specific routes, following the examples set by Great Britain, Germany, and Japan. Without taking a position on this, it seems reasonable to expect that, for political, geographical, and economic reasons, we will soon see the natural growth of an American merchant marine. As our foreign trade expands, capital accumulates domestically, and we strengthen our navy, the conditions for American shipbuilding and shipping will continue to improve, leading us to engage in maritime activities along with other industries. Ultimately, we are on a path to becoming a maritime nation.

XVII. TAXATION AND TARIFF.

In no way does the State affect the interests of its citizens more vitally than in the sphere of taxation. The State in modern society is the people organized for certain collective purposes, as for the public defense, the preservation of domestic peace, and the furtherance of the social and industrial welfare. To carry out these objects money is needed and the State has therefore to collect from its citizens sufficient revenue to defray its expenditures. John Fiske has tersely defined taxes as “portions of private property taken for public purposes.” Taxation thus implies a certain degree of compulsion; by it the Government interferes with the free choice of the individual and expends a part at least of his income for him in ways that he himself might not have chosen. The social and industrial consequences of a system of taxation may also be far-reaching and important. As Professor R. T. Ely says: “Taxation may create monopolies, or it may prevent them; it may diffuse wealth, or it may control it; it may promote labor or equality of rights, or it may tend to the establishment of tyranny and despotism; it may be used to bring about reform, or it may be used to aggravate existing grievances and foster dissensions between classes.” It is evident therefore that the utmost care should be exercised in framing a system of taxation.

In no way does the government impact its citizens' interests more significantly than in the realm of taxation. The government in today's society is made up of people organized for specific collective goals, such as public defense, maintaining peace at home, and promoting social and economic welfare. To achieve these goals, money is necessary, so the government must collect enough revenue from its citizens to cover its expenses. John Fiske has succinctly described taxes as “portions of private property taken for public purposes.” Taxation inherently involves some level of compulsion; it means the government interferes with individual freedom and spends part of a person's income in ways they may not have personally chosen. The social and economic impacts of a taxation system can also be significant and far-reaching. As Professor R. T. Ely states: “Taxation may create monopolies, or it may prevent them; it may distribute wealth, or it may control it; it may encourage labor or equal rights, or it may lead to tyranny and oppression; it may be used to bring about reform, or it may worsen existing grievances and increase tensions between classes.” It is clear, therefore, that careful consideration should be taken when developing a taxation system.

Certain canons or rules of taxation were laid down by Adam Smith over a hundred years ago and have been generally endorsed by economists ever since. One was that taxes ought to be certain and not arbitrary, as to amount, time and manner of payment; another was that taxes ought to be levied in the manner most convenient to the tax-payer; and a third, that taxes ought to take as little as possible out of the pockets of the tax-payer over [Pg 155] and above what is paid into the public treasury. These three maxims—certainty, convenience, and economy—have been generally accepted, but less general agreement exists in regard to the fourth, which states that the subjects of every state ought to contribute to the support of the Government as nearly as possible in proportion to their respective abilities. This rule has given rise to two problems: first, is ability the most just basis of taxation; and secondly, if so, how is ability to be measured? The theory of justice generally accepted by legal writers and by the American courts is expressed in the maxim that taxes should be proportioned to benefits received. The benefit theory affords a good rule in the assessment of local property taxes, but fails utterly in the domain of national and state affairs. Who can measure the benefits to each individual of an appropriation for a new war ship or for a state penitentiary or for the public school system? Probably the benefits are in inverse proportion to the income or wealth of the individual, and the heaviest taxes would then have to be apportioned to those least able to pay. Most economists today agree that taxes should be apportioned according to “faculty” or ability to pay. It satisfies better our sense of fairness and is more readily applicable than the benefit theory. In the last analysis, of course, it may be said that taxation in general must confer real benefits upon society or it will not be tolerated. Here, however, we are concerned with a rule of apportionment.

Certain principles or rules of taxation were established by Adam Smith over a hundred years ago and have been widely supported by economists ever since. One principle is that taxes should be definite and not arbitrary regarding the amount, timing, and method of payment; another is that taxes should be collected in the way that is most convenient for the taxpayer; and a third is that taxes should take as little as possible from the taxpayer beyond what goes into the public treasury. These three maxims—certainty, convenience, and economy—are generally accepted, but there is less consensus on the fourth principle, which states that every person should contribute to government support as closely as possible in proportion to their abilities. This principle brings up two questions: first, is ability the fairest basis for taxation; and second, if so, how is ability measured? The theory of justice that is commonly accepted by legal scholars and American courts is captured in the idea that taxes should be proportionate to the benefits received. The benefit theory offers a reasonable guideline for local property tax assessments but fails completely when it comes to national and state issues. Who can measure the benefits each individual receives from spending on a new warship, a state penitentiary, or the public school system? Likely, the benefits are inversely related to an individual’s income or wealth, meaning the heaviest taxes would fall on those least able to pay. Most economists today agree that taxes should be based on “faculty” or the ability to pay. It aligns better with our sense of fairness and is more easily applied than the benefit theory. Ultimately, it can be said that taxation, in general, must provide real benefits to society; otherwise, it won’t be accepted. However, here we are focused on a rule for how taxes should be distributed.

The second practical problem encountered is when we attempt to apply the faculty principle in practice; how is ability to be measured? Three measures have been suggested: expenditure, income, and property. Expenditure is open to the objection that it would place an unduly large proportion of the tax burdens on the poor, whose expenditures are larger in proportion to their means than those of other classes of society. Property is objected to [Pg 156] because large classes of society, including professional men with large incomes, would then escape taxation largely or altogether. Income on the surface seems the fairest measure of ability, but is objected to because the incomes of different individuals, both on account of source and size, really indicate unequal and not similar abilities. In practice, however, all three methods are employed in all advanced states, so it is not necessary to decide which is theoretically the fairest.

The second practical problem we face is when we try to put the ability principle into action; how do we measure ability? Three methods have been suggested: spending, income, and property. Spending faces criticism because it would unfairly place a larger share of the tax burden on the poor, whose spending is proportionally greater than that of other social classes. Property is also challenged because many groups, including professionals with high incomes, would largely avoid or completely escape taxation. Income seems to be the most fair measure of ability at first glance, but it has its drawbacks because the incomes of different people, due to their sources and amounts, really reflect unequal and not comparable abilities. In practice, though, all three methods are used in all developed states, so it’s not necessary to determine which one is theoretically the fairest.

Still another practical question confronts us after we adopt the ability theory: Shall the rate of taxation be the same no matter what the amount of the property or income, or shall it increase as the amount grows larger? In other words, shall taxation be proportional or progressive? In general the advocates of the ability theory also support progression, though there are many exceptions to this statement. Three main arguments have been urged in support of this method. First, progression is advocated in order to secure equality of sacrifice; it is argued that each dollar of a $10,000 income affords less gratification to the owner than each dollar of a $1,000 income, and that consequently in order to equalize the sacrifices of the two individuals a larger proportion of the first income should be taken than of the second. Objection is made to this, that wants expand even more rapidly than incomes and therefore the initial assumption is untrue. Progression is urged, in the second place, by those who desire to use taxation as a method of introducing social reforms or of bringing about a more equitable distribution of wealth, as by the breaking up of large fortunes. It seems inadvisable, however, to use the machinery of taxation for such purposes. Other writers urge that the ability to earn or produce wealth increases at an accelerating rate, and that taxation should therefore keep pace with it. “It is the first thousand that counts.” The objection is made here that it would penalize ability and energy. [Pg 157] In general, while the arguments are not conclusive, progression certainly secures a nearer approach to the ideal of the ability theory than does proportional taxation. The practical application, after we accept it, is still a difficult matter. It should be applied to the revenue system as a whole by the careful selection of special taxes. As a matter of fact we have just the opposite system in the United States, for the poor man undoubtedly pays out a larger proportion of his income in taxes—principally on articles of consumption—than do his wealthy neighbors.

Another practical question arises after we adopt the ability theory: Should the tax rate be the same regardless of the amount of property or income, or should it increase as the amount grows? In other words, should taxation be proportional or progressive? Generally, proponents of the ability theory also support a progressive tax system, though there are many exceptions to this. Three main arguments have been made in favor of this method. First, progression is argued to ensure equality of sacrifice; it is claimed that each dollar of a $10,000 income provides less satisfaction to the owner than each dollar of a $1,000 income. Thus, to equalize the sacrifices of the two individuals, a larger portion of the first income should be taxed compared to the second. However, some object that wants grow even faster than incomes, making the initial assumption false. The second argument for progression comes from those who wish to use taxation to introduce social reforms or achieve a more equitable distribution of wealth, such as breaking up large fortunes. However, it seems unwise to use the tax system for these purposes. Additionally, some writers argue that the ability to earn or create wealth increases at an accelerating rate, and therefore taxation should keep up with that growth. “It is the first thousand that counts.” The counterargument is that this approach would penalize ability and hard work. [Pg 157] Overall, while the arguments aren't conclusive, a progressive tax system certainly aligns more closely with the ideals of the ability theory than a proportional tax. The practical application of this concept, once accepted, remains challenging. It should be integrated into the overall revenue system through careful selection of special taxes. In fact, we have the opposite system in the United States, where the poor pay a larger proportion of their income in taxes—primarily on consumption items—than their wealthier neighbors.

In the main there has been a clear division in the United States between the sources of income of the Federal Government on the one hand and those of the state and local governments on the other. The Federal Treasury has derived its revenue almost entirely from indirect taxes—excise and customs—while the other governments have depended chiefly upon direct taxes upon persons, property, business, corporations, and inheritances. The division rests upon the constitutional allotment of powers, but it also corresponds very closely to the industrial and political functions of each in their relations to the individual citizens. The chief duty of the Federal Government is that of national defense and foreign intercourse, relations which are national in extent but which affect the individual only remotely; so, too, its taxing area is national and its exactions are felt only distantly. Few persons, it has been said, taste the tax in their tea or their whisky, yet over one-third of all the taxes collected in the United States are derived from either customs or excise duties. Whisky and tobacco contribute most of the internal revenue, while import duties are levied on practically everything brought into the country which could compete with any home product. These two sources yield over $500,000,000 a year to the Federal Treasury. During the Civil War these sources of revenue were supplemented by a federal income tax, but as such a tax was later declared unconstitutional by [Pg 158] the Supreme Court, further recourse to this in the near future seems improbable. From a purely economic and financial point of view this is very regrettable, for the Federal Government should unquestionably have at its command the means of quickly raising large additional revenue with as little disturbance to industry as possible. Such a means would be afforded by the income tax, which moreover can be administered only by the Federal Government, as it must be national in its operations to be fair.

In general, there's been a clear divide in the United States between how the Federal Government earns its income and how state and local governments do. The Federal Treasury gets most of its revenue from indirect taxes—like excise and customs—while other governments mainly rely on direct taxes on individuals, property, businesses, corporations, and inheritances. This division is based on the constitutional distribution of powers, but it also closely aligns with the industrial and political roles of each in relation to individual citizens. The primary responsibility of the Federal Government is national defense and foreign relations, which are national issues but only affect individuals indirectly; likewise, its taxing authority is national, and its taxes are felt at a distance. It's been said that few people notice tax in their tea or whisky, yet over one-third of all taxes collected in the United States come from customs or excise duties. Whisky and tobacco contribute the most to internal revenue, while import duties are imposed on almost everything brought into the country that could compete with local products. These two sources generate over $500,000,000 a year for the Federal Treasury. During the Civil War, these revenue sources were supplemented by a federal income tax, but since that tax was later ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, it's unlikely there will be further attempts to implement it soon. From an economic and financial perspective, this is quite unfortunate, as the Federal Government should indeed have the capability to quickly raise significant additional revenue with minimal disruption to industry. An income tax would provide such a means, and it can only be administered fairly by the Federal Government since it needs to operate on a national level.

The main reliance of the state and local governments in this country is the general property tax, which amounted in 1902 to over $700,000,000 or almost half of all the taxes collected. This really consists of two very distinct parts, which present quite different problems, namely, the tax on real property and that on personal property. Under our peculiar system, by which property is assessed locally, and upon the basis of that assessment its share of the state taxes distributed to each locality, there is every incentive offered to the local assessor to under-value the land in his jurisdiction, thereby escaping part of the state burdens. This evil of inequality between localities could be obviated by the simple expedient of relieving real estate of all state taxes and leaving it solely to the counties and cities for purposes of taxation. In the case of personal property the great evil is evasion. Much of our modern wealth exists in the form of securities, stocks, bonds, mortgages, etc., and this is practically undiscoverable by assessors except by the voluntary declaration of the tax-payer, which is only truthfully made by trustees and a few conscientious persons. Most of our laws have been directed to the discovery of this intangible property, as it is called, but without avail. In a few of the most progressive states the effort has at last been recognized as futile, and the attempt is now being made to reach these sources of income indirectly, by taxes on corporations, on business, franchises and other tangible evidences of wealth.

The main source of funding for state and local governments in this country is the general property tax, which in 1902 totaled over $700 million, or nearly half of all taxes collected. This tax actually has two very different components, which create distinct challenges: the tax on real property and the tax on personal property. Under our unique system, where property is assessed locally and the state taxes are allocated to each local area based on those assessments, local assessors have every incentive to undervalue land in their jurisdiction to reduce their share of state taxes. This issue of inequality between localities could be solved simply by eliminating state taxes on real estate, leaving taxation entirely to counties and cities. When it comes to personal property, the major problem is tax evasion. Much of our current wealth is in the form of securities, stocks, bonds, mortgages, etc., and assessors often can't identify this wealth unless taxpayers voluntarily declare it, which is usually only done truthfully by trustees and a few honest individuals. Most of our laws aim to uncover this intangible property, but they've largely been ineffective. In some of the most progressive states, the futility of these efforts has finally been acknowledged, and there's now a move to target these income sources indirectly through taxes on corporations, businesses, franchises, and other tangible forms of wealth.

[Pg 159] Not only are corporation, business, license and similar taxes being developed, but increasing resort is had to inheritance taxes, over thirty states now making use of this form of taxation. They are more frequently imposed on collateral than direct inheritances, and in many states are progressive, both as to amount and as to nearness of relationship. Thus in Wisconsin the rates advance from one per cent for bequests under $25,000 to husband, wife, or lineal relation, to 15 per cent for sums over $500,000 to very distant relatives or strangers. These various forms of taxation are necessary to secure the needed revenues for the state governments, especially if these forego further resort to taxation of realty. The tendency is now sufficiently marked to make it possible to indicate with some certainty the future of taxation in this country. To a certain extent, however, this must be regarded as the expression of an ideal rather than the description of an existing system. The Federal Government should have customs and excise duties, supplemented by an income tax. The state governments should have corporation and inheritance taxes. The cities and minor civil divisions should have taxes on realty, and license and franchise taxes. Such a division is logical and avoids duplication of taxation of the same source by two or more grades of government. In view of the pre-emption of the field of corporation taxation by the states, it is therefore doubly regrettable that the Federal Government should now (August, 1909) have adopted a tax on income of corporations for federal purposes.

[Pg 159] Not only are taxes on corporations, businesses, licenses, and similar things being developed, but many states are also increasingly relying on inheritance taxes, with over thirty states now implementing this type of tax. These taxes are more often placed on collateral inheritances than direct ones, and in many states, they are progressive—both in terms of the amount and the closeness of the relationship. For example, in Wisconsin, the rates start at one percent for bequests under $25,000 to a spouse, partner, or direct relative, and go up to 15 percent for amounts over $500,000 to very distant relatives or strangers. These different types of taxation are essential to secure the needed revenue for state governments, especially if they avoid further taxing real estate. The direction is now clear enough to suggest with some certainty what the future of taxation in this country will look like. However, this must be seen more as an ideal than a description of an existing system. The Federal Government should have customs and excise taxes, along with an income tax. State governments should utilize corporation and inheritance taxes. Cities and smaller civil divisions should implement taxes on real estate, along with license and franchise taxes. This approach is logical and prevents multiple levels of government from taxing the same source. Given that states have taken the lead on corporate taxation, it is particularly unfortunate that the Federal Government has now (August 1909) established a tax on corporate income for federal purposes.

Other problems connected with finance are suggested in connection with the universal tendency to increase in governmental expenditures and in public debts. The former is an expression of the growth and expansion of state functions, which will be discussed in the next section. The latter is due in part to this same fact, in part also to the development of credit and the creation of a market for [Pg 160] the sale of public and other securities, and finally to the growth of constitutional government, which has made the people willing to entrust their capital to a government which they themselves as citizens really control.

Other financial issues are connected to the common trend of rising government spending and increasing public debt. The first reflects the growth and expansion of government functions, which will be covered in the next section. The latter is partly due to this same issue, but also to the development of credit and the establishment of a market for the sale of public and other securities, and finally to the rise of constitutional government, which has led people to trust their money to a government that they control as citizens.

The question of the tariff involves such important economic as well as financial consideration that it seems best to discuss this form of taxation somewhat more fully. For it has been used not merely as a means of raising revenue but also as an instrument to develop particular industries and prevent foreign competition. Any detailed discussion of this subject therefore involves a statement of the pros and cons of protection and free trade. It should be said, however, in advance that the real issue is not free trade, for that is demanded by only a few doctrinaires, but freer trade through an intelligent revision of the tariff downward. The system of protection has prevailed in the United States for virtually one hundred years, and could not be suddenly changed and abolished if one would. From the financial standpoint, too, import duties are absolutely essential to the support of our Federal Government; the question here is not absolutely free trade, but the choice of articles for revenue purposes. Shall they be those which are not produced in this country or those which enter into competition with domestic products? If financial considerations alone prevailed, the former would undoubtedly be selected as the more convenient, certain, and economical. But in the determination of the tariff policies of the United States economic considerations have been paramount and to an examination of these we must now turn.

The issue of tariffs involves significant economic and financial considerations, so it's best to discuss this form of taxation in more detail. It's not just used to generate revenue but also to nurture specific industries and limit foreign competition. Any in-depth discussion on this topic requires weighing the advantages and disadvantages of protectionism versus free trade. However, it's important to point out that the real issue isn't free trade, as that's only advocated by a few purists, but rather promoting freer trade through a smart downward revision of tariffs. The protectionist system has been in place in the United States for almost a century, and it couldn't be abruptly changed or eliminated if we wanted to. From a financial perspective, import duties are crucial for supporting our Federal Government; the real question isn't about having completely free trade, but rather which items should be taxed for revenue. Should we tax goods that aren’t produced domestically or those that compete with local products? If we were considering only financial factors, we would likely choose the former as it’s more straightforward, reliable, and economical. However, when determining the tariff policies of the United States, economic factors have taken precedence, and we now need to examine these.

Historically the following arguments have played the main role in support of protection at different times in the United States. The infant industries argument was advanced by Hamilton in his celebrated Report on Manufactures in 1791 and has always been important until recently when the infants had grown to be so lusty that it was evident that other reasons for protecting them must [Pg 161] be discovered. This was found in the plea for diversified production, which was necessary for a well-rounded economic development; the need of creating a strong national government and national spirit also played their part. In order to win over the farmers the home market argument was early urged; this has taken various forms. In the first place it was urged that the building up of manufacturing centers and the consequent increase in population would give the farmers a better market than the fluctuating foreign one. As set forth by Carey, it would keep within the country the elements taken from the soil. It would also save the freights on the transportation of goods back and forth across the ocean. Each of these arguments has lost force with the development of the country and the decrease in the cost of transportation. More important today is the wages argument; at first protection was urged because wages were high in the United States and the manufacturer needed to be protected against his foreign competitor who employed cheap labor. Today it is argued that protection has raised wages and must be continued in order to protect the laborer against the pauper labor of Europe. Curiously enough, in France protection is urged for French workmen against the highly paid and efficient American. The effect of the tariff on wages has been greatly exaggerated; wages are high in the United States because the productivity of labor is high. Indeed so far as the tariff raises prices it may be argued that the real wages of labor are lowered. More generally accepted as defensible grounds for protection are the political arguments that a nation should be able to produce its own military armaments and supplies, and that it should be able to use the tariff as a retaliatory measure. Recently this latter has received considerable force from the practice of “dumping,” by which is meant the occasional sale of products abroad at prices lower than those charged at home. Domestic manufacturers in the country thus treated [Pg 162] are of course seriously injured and have insisted upon protection against this procedure which has been authorized in Canada.

Historically, the following arguments have been key in supporting protectionism at different times in the United States. The infant industries argument was put forward by Hamilton in his famous Report on Manufactures in 1791 and has always been significant until recently, when those industries have grown so strong that it was clear other reasons for protecting them needed to be found. This led to the argument for diversified production, which is essential for balanced economic development; the need to create a strong national government and a national spirit also contributed. To gain the support of farmers, the home market argument was promoted early on, taking various forms. Initially, it was argued that building manufacturing centers and the resulting population increase would provide farmers with a more stable market than the unpredictable foreign one. As Carey explained, this would keep the resources extracted from the land within the country. It would also save on shipping costs for transporting goods across the ocean. Each of these arguments has weakened with the growth of the country and the reduction in transportation costs. Today, the wage argument is more prominent; initially, protection was advocated because wages were high in the United States and manufacturers needed protection from foreign competitors using cheap labor. Now, it's argued that protection has increased wages and must continue to safeguard workers against low-paid labor from Europe. Interestingly, in France, protection is advocated for French workers against the well-paid and efficient American labor. The impact of tariffs on wages has been greatly overstated; wages in the United States are high because of high labor productivity. In fact, if tariffs raise prices, it could be argued that the real wages of workers are actually reduced. More widely accepted justifications for protection now include political arguments that a nation should be able to produce its own military weapons and supplies, and that it should be able to use tariffs as retaliatory measures. Recently, this latter argument has gained traction due to the practice of “dumping,” where products are occasionally sold abroad at lower prices than those in the domestic market. Domestic manufacturers affected by this are understandably harmed and have demanded protection against this practice, which has been allowed in Canada.

In answer to these various arguments the free traders, or those desiring a modification of present high rates, make their main appeal to the doctrine of comparative costs. Briefly stated this asserts that nations, like individuals, can do some things better than others. Like the individual lawyer therefore who pays to have his boots blacked while he devotes himself to the law, the nation should produce the things it is best fitted for and pay others to produce other things which it can do less well. In this way each will obtain the largest possible return. Protection, which interferes with this natural international division of labor, simply diverts labor and capital from more into less profitable industries. Practically, this purely abstract economic argument has had little influence on the commercial policy of nations, which have been moved more by political and industrial considerations. Today, however, there is no question but that the freer movement of capital and industry throughout the world would be advantageous. In answer to the home market argument it is pointed out that with the growth of large-scale production the profitable area of manufacture has greatly widened and now in many cases transcends national boundaries. As home producers seek foreign markets, as they are beginning to do, they themselves will demand a reduction of the tariff, especially in the matter of raw materials. Free traders also deny the need of artificially diversifying industry in a country as large and varied as the United States, or of building up infant industries. Indeed, on the latter point, they urge that many of our trusts are the result of the tariff, and that the attempt to grant legislative favors has resulted only in wholesale demoralization and a debauching of our national politics.

In response to these various arguments, free traders—those advocating for a change in the current high rates—primarily appeal to the concept of comparative costs. In simple terms, this idea suggests that nations, similar to individuals, excel at certain tasks more than others. Just like a lawyer who pays to have his shoes polished while focusing on his legal work, a nation should focus on producing the goods it is best suited for and pay others to produce the items it can make less efficiently. This way, everyone can achieve the highest possible return. Protectionism, which disrupts this natural international division of labor, merely shifts labor and capital from more profitable industries to less profitable ones. In practice, this theoretical economic argument has had little impact on the commercial policies of nations, which have been driven more by political and industrial factors. However, today, it's clear that allowing capital and trade to flow more freely across the globe would be beneficial. In response to the argument for prioritizing the home market, it’s highlighted that as large-scale production has increased, the profitable scope of manufacturing has expanded significantly, often surpassing national borders. As domestic producers search for foreign markets, which they are starting to do, they will themselves call for lower tariffs, particularly concerning raw materials. Free traders also argue against the need for artificially diversifying industries in a country as large and diverse as the United States, or for nurturing "infant" industries. In fact, regarding the latter point, they claim that many of our trusts are a byproduct of the tariff, and that efforts to grant legislative favors have only led to widespread corruption and a deterioration of our national politics.

[Pg 163] In conclusion it may be said that under certain conditions the policy of protection is relatively defensible; that it has undoubtedly hastened the industrial development of the United States, though it has not caused it; and that, on the other hand, it is responsible for not a few evils in our political and industrial life. The struggle of particular interests during the framing of the Payne bill shows the impossibility of deciding this issue upon academic grounds. It may be prophesied, however, that as our manufacturers reach out more seriously after the foreign markets the tariff will be modified so as to make this possible; but he would be a rash prophet who should predict a sudden or great change in our tariff policy within the present generation.

[Pg 163] In conclusion, we can say that under certain circumstances, the policy of protection is somewhat justifiable; it has certainly sped up the industrial growth of the United States, even though it didn't cause it outright; and, on the flip side, it contributes to several issues in our political and industrial spheres. The battle among specific interests during the creation of the Payne bill illustrates the difficulty of resolving this issue purely on theoretical grounds. However, it's fair to predict that as our manufacturers increasingly pursue foreign markets, the tariff will be adjusted to facilitate this; but anyone who claims a sudden or significant change in our tariff policy in the coming generation would be overly optimistic.

XVIII. THE FUNCTIONS OF GOVERNMENT.

In the course of the preceding pages we have repeatedly referred to the necessity or desirability of governmental action, and have emphasized the important part which it plays in our economic life today. Every practical economic problem that confronts us calls in some degree for the exercise of state activity. It is necessary for us then, if we are to render sound judgment on these questions, to have a clear opinion as to the proper sphere of government action, as to how far the State should interfere in the economic activities of private individuals. We cannot do better than to state first the main functions of a modern state. The modern industrial system, as we saw in the first section, is based upon certain fundamental institutions—personal liberty, competition, and private property. The first function of government is to guarantee to every individual the rights of freedom, property, and contract; this involves the maintenance of peace and order. These are often spoken of as “natural rights”; rather they are rational rights, based upon expediency and human welfare, and are created and maintained by society. Without the constant [Pg 164] support and intervention of government they would possess little reality or significance. But in addition to guaranteeing these fundamental institutions, modern governments grant individuals certain privileges, as patents, copyrights, trade-marks, franchises, etc., designed to stimulate the economic activity of individuals.

In the previous pages, we've repeatedly mentioned the need or the importance of government action and highlighted the significant role it plays in our economy today. Every practical economic issue we face requires some level of government involvement. Therefore, to make sound judgments on these matters, we need a clear understanding of the appropriate scope of government action and how much the state should interfere in the economic activities of individuals. Let's begin by outlining the main functions of a modern state. The modern industrial system, as discussed in the first section, relies on certain fundamental institutions—personal freedom, competition, and private property. The primary role of government is to ensure that every individual has the rights to freedom, property, and contracts; this involves maintaining peace and order. These rights are often referred to as "natural rights"; however, they are more accurately described as rational rights, rooted in practicality and human welfare, and are established and upheld by society. Without the ongoing support and intervention of government, these rights would hold little reality or importance. Additionally, modern governments provide individuals with certain privileges, such as patents, copyrights, trademarks, and franchises, aimed at encouraging individual economic activity.

A second group of functions undertaken by the modern state is regulative. As we have seen, laws are made regulating the freedom of contract, the conditions of labor, the conduct of business, methods of banking and transportation, etc. The terms under which competitive business may be conducted are laid down, and while freedom of industry prevails for every individual it is only on condition that he conforms to the rules of the game thus prescribed. But the conditions are not merely restrictive; sometimes they are designed to promote enterprise, as in the case of gifts, subsidies, protective duties, etc. In all these ways the State interferes with the action of perfectly free competition for the purpose of securing better or more equitable conditions. A third group of functions embraces the direct participation in industry by the Government itself, as the post-office, gas, electric, and water works, canals, roads, sewers, parks, etc. In other countries, when the functions of government are more extended than in the United States, it conducts railroads, telegraph and telephone systems, tenements, pawn shops, theaters, industrial insurance, or various other activities. The line which divides public from private enterprise varies greatly in different countries.

A second group of functions carried out by the modern state is regulatory. As we've seen, laws are created to govern the freedom of contract, labor conditions, business practices, banking methods, transportation, and more. The rules for how competitive business can operate are established, and while everyone has the freedom to engage in industry, they can only do so if they follow the prescribed rules. However, these regulations aren’t just limiting; sometimes they aim to encourage enterprise, as seen with grants, subsidies, protective tariffs, and so on. In all these instances, the state intervenes in the completely free market to achieve better or fairer conditions. A third group of functions includes the government’s direct involvement in industries like postal services, gas, electricity, waterworks, canals, roads, sewers, parks, and more. In other countries, where government roles are more extensive than in the United States, it operates railroads, telegraph and telephone systems, apartment buildings, pawn shops, theaters, industrial insurance, and various other activities. The boundary between public and private enterprise differs significantly across countries.

This raises the general question, how far is it desirable that the economic functions of government should extend? As to the necessity of state activity in some form there can be no doubt. Production, exchange, distribution, and to a smaller extent consumption, are all social processes; they concern the whole of society, and must be brought under social control. Montesquieu laid down the proposition [Pg 165] in the middle of the eighteenth century that taxes invariably increase with the growth of liberty. Historically this has been verified: the development of freedom in government and industry has meant the realization of self-restraint by the imposition of regulative law. But the modern State has gone further than this: it has realized the necessity of taking an active part in modern industrial life, for the equalization of the terms of competition, the redress of grievances, and the furnishing of utilities, either because it could do it better or because it was the only agency capable of acting. The standpoint of this treatise has been one of moderate individualism, believing in free competition and individual initiative, but not frightened off by the bogey of socialism, if at any point the interference of government seemed desirable or necessary. To present the matter clearly it will be well to state briefly the main theories that have been held as to the proper function of government, arranging them in their logical, though not in their historical, order.

This brings up the general question: how far should the government's economic functions extend? There's no doubt that some form of state activity is necessary. Production, exchange, distribution, and to a lesser degree, consumption, are all social processes; they involve society as a whole and must be under social control. Montesquieu stated in the mid-eighteenth century that taxes always increase with the growth of liberty. Historically, this has been proven true: the development of freedom in government and industry has led to self-restraint through regulatory laws. However, the modern State has gone beyond this; it has recognized the need to actively participate in contemporary industrial life to level the playing field, address grievances, and provide utilities, either because it can do it better or because it’s the only entity capable of taking action. The perspective of this treatise leans towards moderate individualism, supporting free competition and individual initiative, but not deterred by the fear of socialism when government intervention seems necessary or beneficial. To present the matter clearly, it would be useful to briefly outline the main theories regarding the proper function of government, arranged in their logical order, though not necessarily their historical sequence.

At one extreme stands anarchism, which must be thought of not as anarchy and riot, but as a philosophical theory of society. Scientific anarchism contemplates an ideal state of perfect freedom, in which the State, the coercive exercise of authority by man over man, would not exist. According to this theory only the individual has rights; there is no more divinity of right in a majority than there is in kings. Government is an invasion of the right of the individual to do as he will, and should be abolished; with its abolition would vanish the various moral, social, and industrial evils to which it has given rise, and human society would develop on a higher plane. Stated in its extreme form anarchism is evidently too ideal for frail human nature as at present constituted. Of more practical importance has been the theory of extreme individualism as set forth by Herbert Spencer—a view designated by Huxley as the night-watchman theory of the [Pg 166] State. According to this the functions of government should be limited to the protection of life and property and the enforcement of contracts, but should not include such things as education, regulation of industry, local improvements, charities, coinage, etc. Private initiative and competition are trusted to supply these things, while the economic harmony of the interests of each individual with those of society will prevent any wrong from being done. The keynote of the whole theory lies in the view that government is an evil, though a necessary one, and should consequently be restricted. Adam Smith’s system of “national liberty” went somewhat further, as it added to the three functions named above, the construction of public works and buildings, etc.; but it excluded such activities as education and the civil courts, which we regard as most suited to government management. This theory had its origin in the reaction against the undue interference with industry by the Government under mercantilism and had thus a historic justification and value.

At one end of the spectrum is anarchism, which should not be seen as chaos and disorder, but rather as a philosophical theory about society. Scientific anarchism envisions an ideal state of complete freedom, where the State, defined as the coercive use of authority by one person over another, does not exist. According to this theory, only individuals have rights; there is no divine right in the majority any more than there is in kings. Government is seen as an infringement on an individual’s right to act freely and should be eliminated; with its removal, the various moral, social, and industrial issues it has caused would disappear, allowing human society to evolve on a higher level. However, stated in its most extreme form, anarchism is clearly too idealistic for the fragile nature of humanity as it currently exists. A more practical view has been the theory of extreme individualism put forward by Herbert Spencer—a perspective referred to by Huxley as the night-watchman theory of the [Pg 166] State. According to this theory, government functions should be limited to protecting life and property and enforcing contracts, but should not encompass areas like education, industry regulation, local improvements, charities, coinage, etc. It is believed that private initiative and competition will take care of these needs, while the economic harmony between individual interests and those of society will prevent any harm from occurring. The central idea of this theory is that government is an evil, albeit a necessary one, and should therefore be limited. Adam Smith’s concept of “national liberty” took this further by adding the construction of public works and buildings to the functions mentioned above; however, it excluded areas such as education and civil courts, which we consider best handled by government. This theory arose as a response to the excessive interference in industry by the government during mercantilism, giving it historical justification and significance.

The theory most generally held by economists and writers in the United States is probably the modified individualism set forth by John Stuart Mill. According to him, freedom of industry or “laissez faire should be the general practice; every departure from it, unless required by some great good, is a certain evil.” Industry, he said, should be left to individuals and the Government should never interfere unless there is an antagonism between social and private interests. Individuals following their own interests will always conduct business better than the Government, which is inefficient, corrupt, and can fall back on taxation to cover its mistakes. Individualism should therefore be the rule and governmental action the exception. But Mill himself admitted that there was no theoretical limit to the extension of governmental functions, and in so doing is said to have opened the door to socialism. Nevertheless, the basic idea is still that government [Pg 167] is an evil and an extension of its activities is on the whole undesirable.

The theory mostly accepted by economists and writers in the United States is likely the modified individualism proposed by John Stuart Mill. He believed that freedom of industry, or “laissez-faire”, should be the standard approach; any deviation from this, unless necessary for a significant benefit, is considered a definite negative. He argued that industry should be left to individuals, and the government should only intervene when there's a conflict between social and private interests. Individuals pursuing their own interests will always manage business more effectively than the government, which tends to be inefficient, corrupt, and relies on taxes to fix its errors. Therefore, individualism should be the norm, while government action should be the rarity. However, Mill himself acknowledged that there was no theoretical limit to how far government functions could extend, and in doing so, he is said to have paved the way for socialism. Still, the fundamental idea remains that government is an evil, and expanding its activities is generally undesirable.

Opposed to this view is the culture state theory, enunciated by Roscher and very generally held in Germany, which regards the State as a beneficent, positive and constructive force in our industrial life. The advocates of this theory point out that the functions of the Government change with progress, and that in our complex modern industrial life it should seek to improve conditions positively, and not leave the people to the mercies of a blind competitive struggle; practically, it should regulate industry, conditions of work, housing, etc., and should manage all public utilities which affect the life or well-being of the citizens, as railroads, telegraphs, industrial insurance, etc. Still further in the same direction goes the view known as state socialism, of whom the best-known advocate is Professor Wagner. This advocates individualism, but insists that it is responsible for many injustices and evils, which it is consequently the duty of the State to redress. For instance, the State should correct the inequalities of wealth brought about by the distribution of the social income under the present competitive system; this should be done by the progressive taxation of inheritances and incomes, the limitation of inheritance and bequest, the government ownership of public utilities, as railroads, telegraph, telephone, coal mines, etc. This theory stops just short of socialism, but enlarges the functions of the State to the largest degree compatible with individualism. Beyond this, and at the farthest extreme from anarchism, stands socialism, which, however, demands a more careful examination than the other views have received because of its present prominence.

Opposed to this view is the culture state theory, explained by Roscher and widely accepted in Germany, which sees the State as a positive and constructive force in our industrial life. Supporters of this theory argue that the functions of the Government change with progress, and that in our complex modern industrial society, it should work to improve conditions proactively, instead of leaving people to the whims of a blind competitive struggle; essentially, it should regulate industry, working conditions, housing, and more, and should manage all public utilities that impact the life or well-being of citizens, such as railroads, telegraphs, and industrial insurance. Taking this idea even further is the view known as state socialism, championed by Professor Wagner. This perspective supports individualism but insists that it leads to many injustices and problems that the State has a duty to address. For instance, the State should correct the wealth inequalities caused by the way social income is distributed under the current competitive system; this could be accomplished through progressive taxation on inheritances and incomes, limiting inheritance and bequests, and government ownership of public utilities, including railroads, telegraphs, telephones, coal mines, and more. This theory stops just short of socialism but broadens the functions of the State to the greatest extent possible while still supporting individualism. Beyond this, and at the farthest extreme from anarchism, lies socialism, which, however, requires a more thorough examination due to its current significance.

Socialism may be briefly defined in the words of Professor Ely[49] as “that contemplated system of industrial society which proposes the abolition of private property [Pg 168] in the great material instruments of production, and the substitution therefor of collective property; and advocates the collective management of production, together with the distribution of social income by society, and private property in the larger proportion of this social income.” Four features are involved in this definition, namely, common ownership, production, distribution, and private incomes. The cardinal and distinctive element in socialism is the collective or social ownership of the means of production, that is, of the land and capital. Instead of having these owned privately as today, they would be owned by the people as a whole, by the State, and used by them for production. Socialists do not oppose capital, as is often said, but only the private ownership of capital. But under such a system private business as we know it today, individual enterprise for the sake of profit, could not exist. It is often urged that socialism means a “grand divide,” and that in such an event the shrewder and more thrifty would shortly have the wealth of the idle or stupid members of society. But just that is guarded against under socialism, for there would be no private ownership of capital, and hence no one could get his neighbor’s share; it would all be held under collective ownership. With the abolition of private capital, there would disappear of course all the economic institutions that have grown up around it, as credit, banking, lease, hire, the stock and produce exchanges, etc.

Socialism can be briefly defined by Professor Ely[49] as “a proposed system of industrial society that aims to eliminate private property in major material means of production and replace it with collective ownership; it supports collective management of production, along with the distribution of social income by society, and allows for private ownership of a larger portion of this social income.” Four key features are included in this definition: common ownership, production, distribution, and private incomes. The main and unique aspect of socialism is the collective or social ownership of the means of production, meaning the land and capital. Instead of being privately owned like today, these would be owned by the community as a whole, or by the State, and utilized for production. Socialists don’t oppose capital itself, as is often claimed, but rather the private ownership of capital. However, in such a system, private businesses as we know them today, where individuals operate for profit, wouldn’t be possible. It’s often argued that socialism leads to a “great divide,” where the more cunning and frugal would quickly amass the wealth of the less capable members of society. But this is specifically prevented under socialism, as there would be no private ownership of capital, meaning no one could claim their neighbor’s share; everything would be held under collective ownership. With the end of private capital, all the economic institutions that have developed around it—such as credit, banking, leasing, hiring, stock, and produce exchanges—would also disappear.

Socialism also means the collective or social organization and management of industry. Socialists criticise severely our present methods of production, which they call planless and wasteful. They point to the constant recurrence of crises as an evidence of mistakes of the competitive system, which they say could be obviated under a well-organized comprehensive scheme. They also urge the wastes of modern capitalism, in the duplication of plants, advertising (which amounts to $500,000,000 a year [Pg 169] in the United States and serves little useful purpose), traveling salesmen, multiplication of small stores, etc. Finally, an artificial disharmony between the interests of society and private individuals is promoted by our system of private property and profit: a coal trust limits the supply, farmers rejoice over small crops, and planters burn part of their cotton, in short the bounty of nature is regarded as a calamity. Some truth may be admitted in these criticisms, but in answer it may be said that some of them are being corrected under individualism, while as to those that remain the remedy offered is worse than the disease. The first and fundamental question is the effect of socialism on the amount produced, for as we have seen any diminution would mean a worse economic condition of society, even though it were offset by a more equal distribution. Under individualism the appeal to industry and thrift is the self-interest of the individual, and under the stimulus of this motive the production of wealth has been increased enormously. It is doubtful whether the motives of altruism, desire for social approbation, and similar ones suggested by the socialists would promote industrial activity as efficiently as the individualistic desire for pecuniary gain.

Socialism also refers to the collective or social organization and management of industry. Socialists harshly criticize our current production methods, calling them erratic and wasteful. They highlight the frequent crises as proof of the flaws in the competitive system, claiming these could be avoided with a well-organized, comprehensive plan. They also point out the wastefulness of modern capitalism, including the duplication of facilities, advertising (which costs $500,000,000 a year in the United States and serves little useful purpose), traveling salesmen, and the proliferation of small stores, among other things. Ultimately, our system of private property and profit creates an artificial discord between the interests of society and individuals: a coal trust restricts supply, farmers celebrate small harvests, and planters burn part of their cotton; in short, nature’s abundance is seen as a disaster. While there may be some truth to these criticisms, it's worth noting that some issues are being addressed under individualism, and for the remaining problems, the solutions proposed might be worse than the original issues. The primary question is how socialism would affect production levels, because, as we've seen, any decrease would lead to worse economic conditions for society, even if it were offset by a more equitable distribution of resources. Under individualism, the motivation for industry and thrift comes from individuals’ self-interest, and this drive has significantly increased wealth production. It’s uncertain if the motivations of altruism, the desire for social approval, and similar incentives suggested by socialists would stimulate industrial activity as effectively as the individualistic pursuit of financial gain.

Moreover the difficulties of organizing and managing all industries would be enormous. According to the socialist plan, statistics of consumption would be gathered in advance, the idle changes of fashion would of course disappear, and production could be accurately calculated. But aside from the problem of securing an honest and efficient administration, the work of organizing industry from a centralized bureau would probably prove insurmountable. The distribution of the labor force among various employments suggests another difficulty. Under individualism the necessary distribution takes place through the agency of wage payments and the choice of an occupation is left free to the individual. As the wage-system would disappear [Pg 170] with the abolition of private capital, some other means would have to be devised, as allotment by the Government. But more important would be the selection of the managers of industry; competition provides a process whereby the inefficient are eliminated and the able put in charge. As socialism would be an industrial democracy the selection of the captains of industry under that system would probably be made by election. Is it likely that the voters would place over themselves the ablest, that is the strictest, most economical, and most energetic man? Taking men as we find them today, this may well be doubted.

Moreover, the challenges of organizing and managing all industries would be huge. According to the socialist plan, consumption statistics would be collected in advance, the constant shifts in fashion would obviously disappear, and production could be accurately estimated. But aside from the issue of securing honest and efficient administration, trying to organize industry from a centralized bureau would likely be impossible. The distribution of the workforce among various jobs poses another challenge. Under individualism, the necessary distribution occurs through wage payments, and individuals are free to choose their occupation. As the wage system would vanish with the abolition of private capital, some other method would need to be created, such as government allocation. However, even more significant would be the selection of industry managers; competition allows for the removal of the inefficient and the promotion of the capable. Since socialism would be an industrial democracy, this selection would probably happen through elections. Is it reasonable to think that voters would choose the most capable, meaning the strictest, most economical, and most energetic person to lead them? Considering people as we see them today, this is certainly questionable.

But it is as a scheme of distribution that socialism has been most warmly urged. The inequalities and injustices of present methods are pointed out and a more just system demanded. Socialists themselves, however, are not agreed as to what constitutes justice. Needs and merits have both been urged as bases of distribution, but suffer from vagueness and difficulty in administration; most socialists today agree that equality of income would best meet the requirements of justice. They claim that talented persons have been endowed by nature with their abilities and should use them as a trust for society and not expect greater rewards than their less talented brothers. To this individualists answer that the practical question is, how to secure the greatest exercise of these gifts, and that is now done by appealing to the motive of self-interest. Some writers even go further and assert that the desire for inequality is the chief stimulus to invention and enterprise. A crucial point in every socialistic scheme is the determination of value under such a system; most socialists follow Marx and say that this should be determined by the “socially necessary labor time” required for the production of an article. Such a measure leaves out of account entirely the aspect of utility or demand, and would clearly be inadequate. Prices would be fixed by the State and would be calculated in labor time, which would probably [Pg 171] be represented by labor checks, which would constitute the media of exchange of the socialistic society.

But socialism has been most strongly advocated as a way to distribute resources. People point out the inequalities and injustices of current systems and demand a fairer approach. However, socialists themselves don't all agree on what justice means. Some argue for needs and others for merits as the basis for distribution, but both options are vague and tough to manage; most socialists today agree that equal income would best meet the standards of justice. They argue that talented individuals are naturally endowed with abilities and should use them as a trust for society, rather than expecting bigger rewards than those who are less talented. Individualists respond that the real issue is how to maximize the use of these abilities, which is currently achieved by appealing to self-interest. Some writers even go further to claim that the desire for inequality is the main driver of invention and entrepreneurship. A key issue in every socialist plan is figuring out how to determine value in such a system; most socialists follow Marx and contend that it should be based on the “socially necessary labor time” needed to produce an item. This approach completely ignores the aspects of utility or demand, and would clearly fall short. Prices would be set by the State and calculated in labor time, which would likely be represented by labor checks, serving as the currency in a socialist society.

Finally, in the definition given above, it was stated that private property would exist in the larger proportion of the social income after it was divided. There is no reason why this should not be true, for, though private capital would be abolished, the State would not interfere with the individual in the use of his income after it was earned. If one man preferred fine clothes and another pictures and books, it would be possible for the latter person to accumulate such articles of enjoyment or consumption. He could even have tools for private carpentering or a horse for riding, but under no circumstances would he be permitted to use these for production or as instruments of private gain. Socialism must stand or fall as a system of production and distribution; it is not necessary to criticise minor points. On these broad grounds it must be rejected, although it may fairly be admitted that socialists have often proved themselves keen and useful critics of existing institutions.

Finally, in the definition given above, it was stated that private property would exist in a larger share of social income after it was divided. There's no reason this shouldn't be the case, because even though private capital would be eliminated, the State wouldn't interfere with individuals using their income after it was earned. If one person preferred nice clothes and another wanted art and books, the latter could accumulate such items for enjoyment or personal use. They could even possess tools for woodworking or a horse for riding, but under no circumstances would they be allowed to use these for production or personal profit. Socialism must succeed or fail as a system of production and distribution; it’s not necessary to criticize minor details. On these broad grounds, it must be rejected, although it's fair to acknowledge that socialists have often shown themselves to be sharp and helpful critics of existing institutions.

Many persons in this and other countries, who do not approve of socialism, nevertheless believe in the extension of state ownership or activity along particular lines. Thus Henry George, though in other respects an individualist, did not believe in the private ownership of land. Land is limited in quantity and yields, because of its monopoly character, an “unearned increment” or rent, quite apart from the return due the owner for improvements. He proposed that the Government should confiscate this unearned increment by levying a single tax on all land equal to it. He thought that this would provide revenue sufficient for all government needs without resorting to other forms of taxation; in this he was undoubtedly mistaken, but the main interest in the scheme for us is economic, and not financial. The reason for the scheme was that land, being a limited monopoly, would be increasingly in [Pg 172] demand as society progressed, and that consequently the landlords would absorb in their increased rents most of the enlarged production of the future. This assumes that rents always increase and never decrease, which is historically untrue. Nor does the growth and progress of society necessarily increase the demand for land; it may be directed to other things, while improvements in the arts of agriculture may actually decrease this demand. We must, however, admit that there are many instances of unearned increments, not only in the case of ground rents, but also of monopoly profits from various sources; these might very properly be secured to society by means of special and heavy taxes.

Many people in this and other countries, who don't support socialism, still believe in increasing government ownership or activity in specific areas. For example, Henry George, who was an individualist in many ways, did not support private land ownership. Land is limited in supply and, due to its monopolistic nature, generates an "unearned increment" or rent, separate from the profits earned by the owner for improvements. He suggested that the government should take this unearned increment by implementing a single tax on all land equivalent to that amount. He believed this would generate enough revenue for all government needs without needing other forms of taxation; while he was likely mistaken in this belief, the key interest in the proposal for us is economic, not financial. The rationale behind the proposal was that land, being a limited monopoly, would become more sought after as society advanced, meaning landlords would capture most of the increased output through higher rents. This idea assumes that rents always go up and never go down, which isn't true historically. Additionally, society's growth and progress do not automatically increase the demand for land; it could shift toward other resources, and advancements in agricultural techniques might actually reduce that demand. However, we must acknowledge that there are many examples of unearned increments, not just with ground rents, but also from various sources of monopoly profits; these should rightly be secured for society through special and significant taxes.

The municipalization of local public utilities has been advocated by many persons who are not socialists, except in so far as they desire an extension of governmental activity along these lines. They urge this because the utilities in question—gas, water, electricity, telephone, street railways, etc.—are by their very nature monopolies, and because under private control they are often inefficiently or dishonestly managed. A less drastic remedy for these abuses might of course be found in regulation. Unrestricted private control of municipal monopolies is advocated by few; the real issue is between public regulation and public management. And this issue will depend in the last analysis upon the question which can give the best results to society.

The push for municipalities to take over local public utilities has been supported by many people who aren't socialists, except to the extent that they want more government involvement in these areas. They argue for this because the utilities in question—gas, water, electricity, telephone, streetcars, etc.—are inherently monopolies, and under private management, they are often run inefficiently or dishonestly. A less extreme solution to these problems could be regulation. Very few people advocate for unrestricted private control of municipal monopolies; the actual debate is between public regulation and public management. Ultimately, this debate will hinge on which option can deliver the best results for society.

XIX. ECONOMIC PROGRESS.

At the conclusion of a study of this character we are inevitably led to summarize our conclusions and to try to answer the question as to what the lessons of the past have taught us. In what direction are the forces of economic life taking us? The conclusion of this text is that they are making for economic progress, and it will be worth while to justify as far as possible this belief. It [Pg 173] is, however, impossible to do this except in very general terms, for definite data for measuring this improvement do not exist, and economic progress itself is a somewhat vague conception. Even such comparatively simple facts as the rate of wages or the hours of labor can be stated only very generally. But both of these show a decided improvement in the condition of the working class. A careful investigation for Great Britain by Mr. A. L. Bowley[50] shows that if wages for the decade 1890-1900 be represented as 100 then the course of wages during the nineteenth century would have run somewhat as follows:

At the end of studying this character, we naturally need to summarize our findings and attempt to answer the question of what lessons we have learned from the past. In what direction are the forces of economic life pushing us? The conclusion of this text is that they are leading us towards economic progress, and it’s important to support this belief as best as we can. It’s impossible to do this except in very broad terms, as there isn’t enough concrete data to measure this improvement, and economic progress itself is a somewhat unclear idea. Even relatively simple facts like wage rates or working hours can only be described very generally. However, both of these indicate a significant improvement in the conditions of the working class. A careful study for Great Britain by Mr. A. L. Bowley[50] shows that if wages for the decade 1890-1900 are set at 100, then the trend of wages during the nineteenth century would have looked something like this:

Decade Relative
Wages
1800-10
55-65
1810-20
65-70
1820-30
65
1830-40
60
1840-50
60
1850-60
65
1860-70
75
1870-80
95
1880-90
90
1890-1900
100

Without investigating the validity of the figures too closely, it may safely be affirmed that the movement of wages has been distinctly upward, and that the rise was certainly not less than 50 per cent. For the United States the increase has not been so great, probably because wages started at a higher level. According to the Aldrich report, if wages and prices in 1860 in the United States be taken as 100, relative wages in 1840 were 82.5 and relative prices 98.5; in 1880, they were respectively 143 and 103.4; in 1903, they were 187 and 103. That is to say, relative wages showed a marked advance and real wages, owing to the fact that general prices remained almost stationary, an even greater improvement. So, too, the hours of labor appear to have been shortened in Great Britain about two hours a day (from 10 to 14 hours to 8 to 12), and in the United States probably as much, the average length of the working [Pg 174] day in certain employments decreasing from 10.3 hours in 1880 to 9.6 hours in 1903.

Without closely examining the accuracy of the numbers, it can be confidently stated that wages have definitely gone up, with an increase of at least 50 percent. In the United States, the rise hasn't been as significant, likely because wages started higher. The Aldrich report indicates that if wages and prices in 1860 in the United States are set at 100, then relative wages in 1840 were 82.5, and relative prices were 98.5; in 1880, they were 143 and 103.4, respectively; and in 1903, they were 187 and 103. This means that relative wages have significantly increased, and real wages have improved even more since overall prices stayed nearly the same. Additionally, it seems that the workday has been reduced in Great Britain by about two hours (from 10-14 hours down to 8-12), and in the United States, it has likely decreased by a similar amount, with the average length of the workday in some jobs dropping from 10.3 hours in 1880 to 9.6 hours in 1903.

In the field of production the most dramatic and striking advances have been achieved. The application of steam and more recently of electricity as the motive power for the newly invented and constantly improved machinery has permitted an enormous expansion of production, which has been made still greater by the opening up of new mines and new lands and improvements in the machinery of transportation and exchange and in the organization of business. Especially in the United States where the natural resources were especially rich and the people energetic and ingenious, has the growth of wealth been marvelous. And yet almost a century after the beginning of the Industrial Revolution in England, Mill alleged that labor-saving inventions had not lightened the toil of any human being; they have only enabled a greater number to live the same life of drudgery and imprisonment. What answer can we make to this indictment today? Why is it that the working class still has so little of this vast increase of wealth and still lives so close to the border line of poverty?

In the production industry, the most dramatic and impressive advancements have been made. The use of steam, and more recently electricity, as the power source for newly invented and constantly improving machinery has allowed for a massive increase in production, which has been further boosted by the discovery of new mines, new lands, advancements in transportation and exchange, and improvements in business organization. This has been especially true in the United States, where natural resources were abundant and the people were energetic and innovative, leading to remarkable wealth growth. Yet, nearly a century after the start of the Industrial Revolution in England, Mill claimed that labor-saving inventions hadn't actually reduced the workload for anyone; they simply allowed more people to endure the same life of hard labor and confinement. What can we say in response to this accusation today? Why does the working class still receive so little of this enormous wealth increase and continue to live so close to the poverty line?

To answer this question thoroughly would require an analysis of the subject of distribution, but a few reasons may be briefly suggested.[51] While the social income has been greatly increased by these improvements the amount paid in rent to owners of land, water powers, etc., has also grown. If we approve of private property in land as best adapted to stimulate its use for society, then we must admit the justice of rent, and of its payment to present land owners. Similarly, too, the payment of interest to the owners of capital has absorbed a large part of the increased income of society, though the proportion going to this factor is probably growing smaller owing to the fall in the rate of interest. But as we have seen, modern industry [Pg 175] is essentially capitalistic, that is, it depends upon the use of capital for its operations. Since we allow private property in capital and believe that to be the best method yet devised for securing its accumulation, we must justify interest. Profits in general are fairly earned by industrial organizers and others who manage our businesses, and are necessary to enlist their services. Probably in most cases society does not overpay these leaders of industry. But some forms of profit, as those derived solely from monopoly, especially from the monopoly of limited natural resources, are both too large and socially unearned. These society should clearly control and absorb.

To answer this question in detail would take an examination of the topic of distribution, but a few points can be briefly highlighted.[51] While social income has significantly increased due to these improvements, the amount paid in rent to landowners, water power owners, etc., has also risen. If we consider private property in land to be the best way to encourage its productive use for society, then we must accept that rent is justified, and that it should be paid to current landowners. Similarly, the interest paid to capital owners has taken a significant share of society’s increased income, although the percentage going to this factor is likely getting smaller due to the drop in interest rates. However, as we've observed, modern industry is fundamentally capitalistic, meaning it relies on capital for its operations. Since we accept private property in capital and believe it to be the best approach for ensuring its accumulation, we must validate interest. In general, profits are fairly earned by industrial organizers and others who run our businesses, and are necessary to attract their services. In most instances, society likely does not overcompensate these industry leaders. However, certain types of profit, such as those originating solely from monopoly, especially from the monopoly of limited natural resources, are both excessive and not fairly earned by society. These should clearly be controlled and absorbed by society.

One reason then why labor has not profited more by the great increase in wealth is that the other factors in production have laid claim to their shares also. There is good reason for believing, however, that the share of labor has been steadily growing greater all the time, and that it today gets a larger proportion of the social income than ever before. This fact is obscured by the great growth in population, which has more than doubled in the last hundred years in Europe and has shown a twentyfold increase in the United States. The larger income is divided among more people, and though each today gets more than his grandfather, there is not yet enough produced to make all rich. Indeed, if the wealth of the United States were divided equally, it would not provide a competence for anybody. The difficulty is not merely that there is inequality in distribution, but that the need of a much greater production of wealth must also be met. Inequalities may be adjusted by such measures as progressive inheritance taxes, but resort to this or similar methods must not be so severe as to weaken the motives for the accumulation of capital. That must form one of the strongest reasons for rejecting the drastic proposals of socialism.

One reason labor hasn't benefited more from the huge increase in wealth is that other factors of production have also claimed their shares. However, there's good reason to believe that labor’s share has been steadily increasing, and today it receives a larger portion of the total income than ever before. This fact is obscured by the significant population growth, which has more than doubled in Europe over the last hundred years and increased twentyfold in the United States. The larger income is split among more people, and even though each person today earns more than their grandfather did, there's still not enough wealth to make everyone rich. In fact, if the wealth of the United States were divided equally, it wouldn’t provide a decent living for anyone. The issue isn’t just the inequality in distribution; we also need to meet the demand for much greater wealth production. Inequalities can be adjusted through measures like progressive inheritance taxes, but these methods shouldn’t be so severe that they diminish the incentives for capital accumulation. That’s one of the main reasons to reject the extreme proposals of socialism.

Improvements in production have, however, not merely increased the total output; they have greatly reduced the [Pg 176] cost of many articles and have brought within the reach of the poorest consumers others which a century ago would have been unattainable. Improvements in transportation have served to bring an ever-increasing variety of products to market. The material progress of a people can be gaged fairly well by their consumption of certain semi-luxuries, such as tea, coffee, sugar, tobacco, beer, etc.; these show a steady increase during the past century. “Thus in the United States between 1871 and 1903 inclusive, the per capita consumption of coffee increased from 7.91 to 10.79 pounds, that of sugar from 36.2 pounds to 71.1 pounds, that of malt liquors from 6.1 gallons to 18.04 gallons, that of wheat and flour from 4.69 bushels to 5.81 bushels.”[52] A similar investigation for Great Britain shows an average increase in a considerably larger list of the same character of 40 per cent between 1860-64 and 1895-96. It must be admitted that there is much lack of economy in present consumption; there is often wasteful and positively injurious consumption, an illustration of which would be found by many persons in the increased consumption of malt liquors cited above. From a purely economic standpoint the enormous waste of war and the burdensome cost of military and naval armament must also be condemned.

Improvements in production have not only increased total output; they've significantly lowered the cost of many items and made products that were once out of reach for the poorest consumers accessible. Advancements in transportation have also made a wider variety of products available in the market. The material progress of a society can be gauged quite well by its consumption of certain semi-luxuries, like tea, coffee, sugar, tobacco, and beer; these items have seen a steady rise in consumption over the past century. For example, in the United States, between 1871 and 1903, per capita coffee consumption went up from 7.91 to 10.79 pounds, sugar consumption increased from 36.2 to 71.1 pounds, consumption of malt liquors rose from 6.1 gallons to 18.04 gallons, and wheat and flour consumption grew from 4.69 bushels to 5.81 bushels. A similar study for Great Britain shows an average increase of about 40 percent in a larger list of similar products between 1860-64 and 1895-96. It's important to acknowledge that there's a lot of wastefulness in current consumption; often, it becomes wasteful and even harmful. A good example of this can be seen in the increased consumption of malt liquors mentioned earlier. From a purely economic perspective, the tremendous waste of war and the heavy costs of military and naval armament need to be criticized.

The task of prophecy is usually a fruitless one, but at least it is now possible for us to indicate some of the lines along which reform is needed, and the goal towards which the future of progress will probably move. The natural resources of the nation must be more carefully conserved and reckless destruction prevented; at the same time the monopolization of limited resources by private individuals or corporations must be rigidly restricted. The growth of trusts seems but the last step in a steady growth in size of the business unit and may be accepted as an economical method of industrial organization, but the evils of corporate financial management must be carefully guarded [Pg 177] against. The growth of labor organizations, on the other hand, must be admitted to be equally logical and desirable. While they often display monopolistic tendencies, yet our main reliance must be placed upon these agencies to secure bargains for laborers on terms of equality with their employers. But on behalf of wage-earners not easily organized we must resort to state interference by means of factory and labor legislation in order to secure equitable labor contracts. Free competition which exposes women and children to the greed of unscrupulous employers is defended by no one today, and it is clearly recognized that legislation along these lines must be further extended, as for instance in the direction of industrial insurance, old age pensions, adequate care for the unemployable, etc.

The task of predicting the future is often a pointless one, but at least we can now point out some areas where reform is needed and the direction progress will likely take. The country's natural resources must be conserved more responsibly, and reckless destruction must be stopped; at the same time, the monopolization of limited resources by individuals or corporations must be strictly limited. The rise of trusts seems to be the latest step in the ongoing trend towards larger business units and may be seen as an efficient way to organize industries, but we must be vigilant against the downsides of corporate financial management. On the other hand, the growth of labor organizations is also logical and beneficial. While they sometimes show monopolistic behavior, we must primarily rely on these groups to negotiate fair deals for workers on equal footing with their employers. However, for workers who aren’t easily organized, we need government intervention through factory and labor laws to ensure fair labor contracts. Today, no one defends free competition that exposes women and children to the exploitation of greedy employers, and it is widely acknowledged that laws in these areas must be expanded, such as in the case of industrial insurance, old-age pensions, and proper care for those unable to work, etc. [Pg 177]

Reforms in our banking and currency laws, an extension of banking facilities to the working classes, the more careful regulation of railroad rates, reforms in methods of taxation, and a reduction in the tariff—all are called for by the development and readjustment of industry. On the other hand, much remains to be done in the education of the mass of the people to habits of rational living and enjoyment. In the great cities housing conditions should be effectively regulated, sweatshops suppressed, intemperance discouraged, and where possible a love of art and outdoor life promoted. A more rational use of income would increase the material well-being of the people considerably. Problems of distribution are still more insistent. No one who has the welfare of the laboring classes or of our democratic society at heart can view with approval the existence of widely separated classes, with disproportionate political and economic power. Greater equality in fortunes—a leveling up of incomes—must certainly be regarded as a sound social ideal. On the other hand, we have seen reason to reject the drastic remedies of socialism as a cure for the injustices of present methods of distribution or production. Improvement must come by conservative [Pg 178] reform along the lines of our past development. In the last analysis all attempts to improve conditions permanently depend upon the character and capacity of the individual. Because of this fact education assumes great importance—education not merely in the art of production but also in that supreme art, the art of living.

Reforms in our banking and currency laws, increasing banking access for the working class, better regulation of railroad rates, updates to taxation methods, and a reduction in tariffs are all necessary due to the evolution and adjustment of industry. However, there is still a lot to do in educating the general public about rational living and enjoyment. In major cities, housing conditions need effective regulation, sweatshops should be eliminated, excessive drinking discouraged, and opportunities for appreciating art and enjoying nature promoted wherever possible. A more sensible use of income could significantly enhance people's material well-being. Distribution issues are even more pressing. Anyone who cares about the welfare of the working class or our democratic society cannot support the existence of widely separated classes with unequal political and economic power. Greater financial equality—a leveling up of incomes—should be seen as a worthwhile social goal. On the other hand, we have found that extreme socialist measures are not a viable solution for the injustices of current distribution or production methods. Improvement must occur through conservative reform that aligns with our historical development. Ultimately, all efforts to make lasting improvements depend on the character and abilities of individuals. Because of this, education is crucial—not just in production skills, but also in the essential skill of living well.

[1] Tarr, Economic Geology of the U. S., pp. 7, 119.

[1] Tarr, Economic Geology of the U. S., pp. 7, 119.

[2] In Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. XIX, p. 3.

[2] In the Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. XIX, p. 3.

[3] McVey, Modern Industrialism, p. 145.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ McVey, Modern Industrialism, p. 145.

[4] The Truth About the Trusts, p. 469.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ The Truth About the Trusts, p. 469.

[5] Tetter, Principles of Economics, p. 321.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Tetter, Principles of Economics, p. 321.

[6] Bogart, Economic History of the U. S., p. 412.

[6] Bogart, Economic History of the U. S., p. 412.

[7] XIX, 645.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ XIX, 645.

[8] Seager, Introduction to Economics, 176.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Seager, Intro to Economics, 176.

[9] Evolution of Modern Capitalism, 35.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Evolution of Modern Capitalism, 35.

[10] Economics, 121.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Economics, 121.

[11] F. J. Stimson, Labor in its Relation to Law, 51.

[11] F. J. Stimson, Labor in its Relation to Law, 51.

[12] Bullock, Introduction to the Study of Economics, 428.

[12] Bullock, Introduction to the Study of Economics, 428.

[13] Stimson, op. cit., 71.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Stimson, cited earlier, 71.

[14] A. H. Ruegg, Law of Employer & Workman in England, 99.

[14] A. H. Ruegg, Law of Employer & Worker in England, 99.

[15] Rep. of U. S. Ind. Com., XVII. 1.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Rep. of U.S. Ind. Com., XVII. 1.

[16] Rep. Ind. Com., XVII, xlii.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Ind. Com. Rep., XVII, xlii.

[17] E. L. Bogart, The Chicago Building Trades Dispute, in Pol. Sci. Quart., XVI., 134; also in Commons, Trade Unionism & Labor Problems, p. 107.

[17] E. L. Bogart, The Chicago Building Trades Dispute, in Pol. Sci. Quart., XVI., 134; also in Commons, Trade Unionism & Labor Problems, p. 107.

[18] Bogart, op. cit., p. 137.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Bogart, cited earlier, p. 137.

[19] Economics, 353.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Economics, 353.

[20] Political Economy, 381.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Political Economy, 381.

[21] Evolution of Modern Capitalism, 297.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Evolution of Modern Capitalism, 297.

[22] Wealth & Progress, 171.

Wealth & Progress, 171.

[23] Report Industrial Commission, XIX, 926.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Report Industrial Commission, XIX, 926.

[24] Getting a Living, 475.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Making a Living, 475.

[25] Report Industrial Commission, XIX, 746.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Report Industrial Commission, 19, 746.

[26] Ind. Com., Rep: XIX, 757.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Ind. Com., Rep: XIX, 757.

[27] Bull. of U. S. Bur. of Lab., Sept., 1908, p. 418.

[27] Bull. of U. S. Bur. of Lab., Sept., 1908, p. 418.

[28] Economics, 337.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Economics, 337.

[29] Industrial Evolution of the United States, ch. 28.

[29] Industrial Evolution of the United States, ch. 28.

[30] Evol. of Mod. Cap., 229.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Evol. of Mod. Cap., 229.

[31] The Effects of Machinery on Wages, 65.

[31] The Impact of Machines on Wages, 65.

[32] Principles of Economics, I, 315.

Principles of Economics, I, 315.

[33] Industrial Efficiency, II, 451.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Industrial Efficiency, II, 451.

[34] Schloss, Methods of Industrial Remuneration, 305.

[34] Schloss, Methods of Industrial Compensation, 305.

[35] Report, VII, 644.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Report, VII, 644.

[36] Economics, 377.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Economics, 377.

[37] Political Economy, 344, 345.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Political Economy, 344, 345.

[38] Economics, 133.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Economics, 133.

[39] Bliss, Encyclopedia of Social Reform, art. Distribution, p. 501.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Bliss, Encyclopedia of Social Reform, art. Distribution, p. 501.

[40] Economics, 360.

Economics, 360.

[41] Stated technically, its marginal productivity is small and hence its reward is also small.

[41] To put it simply, its marginal productivity is low, so its reward is also low.

[42] More truly, the marginal productivity theory.

[42] More accurately, the theory of marginal productivity.

[43] J. R Commons, the Distribution of Wealth, 252.

[43] J. R Commons, the Distribution of Wealth, 252.

[44] More, Wage-earners’ Budgets, 269.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ More, Workers' Budgets, 269.

[45] Today the loss is probably double this sum.

[45] Today, the loss is likely twice this amount.

[46] Gide, Political Economy, Rev. Ed., 663.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Gide, Political Economy, Rev. Ed., 663.

[47] Seager, Introduction to Economics, 73.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Seager, Intro to Economics, 73.

[48] Bullock, Introduction to Study of Economics, 106.

[48] Bullock, Introduction to Study of Economics, 106.

[49] Socialism and Social Reform, 19.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Socialism and Social Reform, 19.

[50] Wages in the United Kingdom in the Nineteenth Century.

[50] Wages in the UK in the 19th Century.

[51] Acknowledgment should be made at this point of indebtedness to the excellent final chapter in Prof. H. R. Seager’s Introduction to Economics.

[51] It's important to acknowledge the valuable final chapter in Prof. H. R. Seager’s Introduction to Economics.

[52] Adams and Sumner, Labor Problems, 523.

[52] Adams and Sumner, Labor Problems, 523.

[Pg 179] MANUFACTURING.

BY O. P. AUSTIN.

BY O. P. AUSTIN.

[Chief of Bureau of Statistics, Department of Commerce and Labor. Native of Illinois. Engaged in newspaper work on arriving at manhood, and so continued in Chicago, Cincinnati and Washington, as reporter, editor and Washington correspondent, until appointed Chief of the Bureau of Statistics in 1898. Author of many official monographs, including: “Commercial Orient,” “Commercial Porto Rico, Hawaii and Philippine Islands,” “Commercial Alaska,” “American Commerce,” “Submarine and Land Telegraphs of the World,” “Transportation Routes and Systems of the World,” “National Debts of the World,” “Great Canals of the World,” “Colonies of the World and Their Government,” “Colonial Administration,” “Territorial Expansion of the United States,” etc., etc. Also author of publications for instruction of youth in national and international affairs. Member of American Academy of Political and Social Science, American Association of Geographers, American Economic Association, International Union for Comparative Jurisprudence and Political Economy, Central Statistical Commission of Belgium, Associate Editor National Geographic Magazine; Lecturer.]

[Chief of the Bureau of Statistics, Department of Commerce and Labor. Native of Illinois. Started working in newspapers as an adult and continued this in Chicago, Cincinnati, and Washington as a reporter, editor, and Washington correspondent, until being appointed Chief of the Bureau of Statistics in 1898. Author of many official reports, including: “Commercial Orient,” “Commercial Puerto Rico, Hawaii, and the Philippines,” “Commercial Alaska,” “American Commerce,” “Submarine and Land Telegraphs of the World,” “Transportation Routes and Systems of the World,” “National Debts of the World,” “Great Canals of the World,” “Colonies of the World and Their Government,” “Colonial Administration,” “Territorial Expansion of the United States,” etc. Also wrote publications to educate young people about national and international issues. Member of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, American Association of Geographers, American Economic Association, International Union for Comparative Jurisprudence and Political Economy, Central Statistical Commission of Belgium, Associate Editor of National Geographic Magazine; Lecturer.]

INTRODUCTION.

The production of manufactures for the requirements of the world’s population is conducted in a comparatively small section of its land surface. Just as the manager of a great estate devotes one section of his estate to the production of certain articles, and other sections to certain other articles, so the great business instinct which rules the business of the world carries on in its various sections the varied industries best suited to the physical, ethnological and financial conditions of its various sections.

The production of goods for the needs of the world's population happens in a relatively small area of its land. Just like a manager of a large estate dedicates one part of the estate to producing certain products and other parts to different ones, the strong business instincts that govern the world's economy operate in different areas, managing the diverse industries that best fit the physical, ethnic, and financial conditions of those regions.

The people of western Europe and eastern United States are, for various reasons better able to produce the manufactures required by the world than are those of South America, Africa or the Orient; while, on the other hand, the people of South America, the Orient, Australia, Canada, the western part of the United States or the eastern part of Europe are better able, for various reasons, to produce the raw materials of manufacturing and the food supplies required by those engaged in the manufacturing industry than are the people of western Europe or eastern United States. South America and Australia produce wool in large quantities; Africa and the Amazon Valley produce the chief supply of india rubber; the Malayan peninsula and adjacent islands produce the bulk of the world’s tin; India produces jute; the Philippines, Manila hemp; Mexico, [Pg 180] sisal; China and Japan, the bulk of the world’s silk; Egypt, India and the United States, the world’s cotton; Russia, Austria-Hungary, India, Australasia, South America, Canada, the central and western parts of the United States produce the bulk of the world’s wheat, corn and meats, at least the bulk of that in excess of the requirements for local consumption; Europe, the West Indies, the East Indies and the tropical sections of India, China and Central and South America produce the bulk of the world’s sugar.

The people of Western Europe and the Eastern United States are, for various reasons, better positioned to produce the goods that the world needs compared to those in South America, Africa, or the East. On the flip side, the people of South America, the East, Australia, Canada, the western U.S., and Eastern Europe are, for various reasons, better equipped to supply the raw materials and food needed by those in the manufacturing sector than the people of Western Europe or the Eastern U.S. South America and Australia produce a lot of wool; Africa and the Amazon Valley provide most of the world’s rubber; the Malay Peninsula and nearby islands produce the majority of the world’s tin; India produces jute; the Philippines provide Manila hemp; Mexico supplies sisal; and China and Japan contribute most of the world’s silk. Egypt, India, and the United States produce cotton; while Russia, Austria-Hungary, India, Australasia, South America, Canada, and the central and western parts of the United States grow most of the world’s wheat, corn, and meat, particularly the surplus beyond local needs. Europe, the West Indies, the East Indies, and the tropical regions of India, China, and Central and South America produce the majority of the world’s sugar.

The manufacturing industries of the world—confining this term for the moment to those industries in which the great proportion of the work is performed by machinery—are conducted chiefly in, it might almost be said confined to, western Europe and eastern United States. True, the exclusive application of the word “manufactures” to that portion of the world’s product of this character made by the use of machinery in conjunction with large sums of capital—the factory method—carries one beyond the original meaning of the word “manufactures,” which primarily meant, of course, made by the hand (from manus, the hand; and facere, to make); but the industrial habits of the world have also passed beyond that stage in which manufacturing for the masses is carried on by hand methods.

The manufacturing industries of the world—limiting this term for now to those where most of the work is done by machines—are mainly located in, and you could almost say limited to, Western Europe and the Eastern United States. It’s true that using the term “manufactures” to refer only to that part of the world’s output created through machinery and large amounts of capital—the factory method—goes beyond the original meaning of “manufactures,” which initially referred to things made by hand (from manus, meaning hand; and facere, meaning to make). However, the industrial practices of the world have also moved beyond the era where manufacturing for the masses is done by hand.

It must not be understood from this that all of the world’s manufactures are produced in western Europe and eastern United States, or produced by modern machine methods in conjunction with the investment of great sums of money—the factory system. On the contrary, large quantities of manufactures are still produced by hand in various parts of the world other than those in which manufactures by modern machine methods are a leading characteristic of the occupations of the people. Nor must it be assumed that the areas designated as the non-manufacturing sections are entirely dependent upon the manufacturing sections for their manufactures. On the contrary, [Pg 181] large quantities of manufactures are still produced in the Orient, in Africa, South America, Australia and the islands of the sea by those simple processes which prevailed in Europe and the United States prior to the development of the modern methods less than two centuries ago. The industrious population of China, of India, of Japan, the millions of people in Africa, in South America and in the islands of the sea produce by simple methods large quantities, and in many cases a large proportion, of the simple manufactures which they require for their daily life. The cloth with which they cover their bodies, the simple requirements of household life and of agriculture are, in many cases, largely of their own production and made in keeping with the original meaning of the word “manufacture”—made by hand.

It shouldn't be assumed that all manufacturing in the world happens in Western Europe and the Eastern United States, or that it all relies on modern machinery and large investments—the factory system. On the contrary, many products are still made by hand in various parts of the world where modern manufacturing methods aren't the main focus. It's also not true that the areas labeled as non-manufacturing completely rely on manufacturing areas for their products. In fact, a significant amount of manufacturing still takes place in the Orient, Africa, South America, Australia, and island nations, using the simple techniques that were common in Europe and the United States before the modern methods were developed less than two centuries ago. The hardworking populations of China, India, Japan, the millions in Africa, South America, and the islands create large quantities of the basic goods they need for everyday life using simple methods. The cloth they wear, their basic household necessities, and agricultural products are often produced locally and align with the original meaning of the word “manufacture”—made by hand.

But the statement is still true, that the great manufacturing areas of the world—the areas which give their chief attention, or the continuous attention of a large part of their population, to the production of those requirements of man other than the natural products and do this through the application of power, machinery and capital, and the operations thereof under the factory system, are western Europe and the eastern part of the United States, though the systems which prevail there are gradually extending to other parts of the world—eastern Europe, central, southern and western United States, Japan, India, Australia, Canada and South America.

But it’s still true that the major manufacturing regions of the world—those that focus heavily or consistently on producing the essential goods for humans beyond natural resources—rely on power, machinery, and capital, all operating within the factory system. These regions are western Europe and the eastern United States, although the systems used there are gradually spreading to other parts of the world, including eastern Europe, central, southern, and western United States, Japan, India, Australia, Canada, and South America.

As to the relative share of the world’s manufactures now produced by the use of machinery, power and capital—the factory method—and by the hand process, respectively, no exact statement can be made; nor are there facilities for even offering an intelligent estimate of the relative production by these two methods. There is reason to believe that two-thirds of the cotton cloth consumed in China is still made by the hand process, and if this be true it may be estimated that perhaps two-thirds of the [Pg 182] other manufactures consumed in that country are still made by hand; while in those other sections of the world in which railroads and the other methods which the people of the Occident are pleased to term “modern” do not yet prevail, a large proportion of the simple manufactures of the people, are still those produced by hand methods. The fact, however, that the sections which produce manufactures by modern methods are also supplied with modern facilities of transportation—the railroad and the steamship; and of communication—the telegraph, and also supplied with ample sums of capital and that other important quality born of long experience and the energy supplied by a temperate zone climate and the judicious admixture of the most energetic populations of the world—Europe and the United States—has enabled them to distribute their factory products in great quantities to those sections not producing by the factory method, and whose peoples are willing to exchange their natural products, food and raw materials, for the finished products of the factory.

As for the share of the world's manufacturing produced by machinery, power, and capital—the factory method—compared to hand production, no precise figures can be given. There's also a lack of resources for making an informed estimate about the output from these two methods. It's believed that about two-thirds of the cotton cloth used in China is still made by hand, suggesting that perhaps two-thirds of other products consumed in that country are also hand-made. In other parts of the world where railroads and what people in Western countries call "modern" methods aren't common, a significant amount of simple goods is still produced using hand methods. However, the regions that use modern manufacturing methods also have modern transportation—like railroads and steamships—and communication systems such as telegraphs. They also have substantial financial resources and the benefits of extensive experience, boosted by a temperate climate and a mix of some of the most dynamic populations in the world—Europe and the United States. This has allowed them to distribute factory-made products in large quantities to areas that don’t produce goods this way, where people are keen to trade their natural products, food, and raw materials for finished goods from factories.

This brings us to a consideration of the exchanges of the world—the exchanges of natural products for the products of the factory. This exchange, as already intimated, occurs chiefly in the requirements of the manufacturing section—raw materials and food—for manufactures. Western Europe, the great manufacturing section of that grand division, does not produce cotton, jute, or a sufficient supply of wool, silk, or hemp. For its india rubber, its tin, its copper and the numerous articles of tropical production required for manufacturing, it is dependent wholly or chiefly upon other parts of the world. The United States, while producing a large share of the world’s cotton and copper and iron, and a considerable supply of wool, must rely upon other parts of the world for its hemp and jute and sisal and india rubber and silk and many other of its tropical requirements. As a result the Orient exchanges its raw silk, its jute, its Manila hemp, its tin, [Pg 183] and numerous less important articles, for the factory products of Europe and the United States. Australia exchanges its wool, its meats and its gold for the products of the manufacturing sections. Africa sends its india rubber, its ostrich feathers, its gold and diamonds in exchange for factory products of those sections in which the manufacturing system has developed. South America offers as its exchangeable products wool, wheat, corn, meats, coffee and india rubber. Canada gives in exchange for her factory requirements timber, ores, wheat and other agricultural products.

This brings us to a look at the global exchanges—trading natural products for factory-made goods. This exchange, as mentioned earlier, mainly happens in the needs of the manufacturing sector—raw materials and food—in return for manufactured items. Western Europe, being a major manufacturing hub, doesn't grow cotton, jute, or enough wool, silk, or hemp. For rubber, tin, copper, and many tropical goods needed for manufacturing, it relies mostly on other regions. The United States, while producing a significant amount of the world's cotton, copper, and iron, as well as a decent supply of wool, still depends on other parts of the world for hemp, jute, sisal, rubber, silk, and many tropical goods. As a result, the East trades its raw silk, jute, Manila hemp, tin, and numerous other lesser items for the factory products of Europe and the United States. Australia trades its wool, meats, and gold for manufactured goods from the industrial regions. Africa sends its rubber, ostrich feathers, gold, and diamonds in exchange for factory products from the areas where manufacturing has flourished. South America offers wool, wheat, corn, meats, coffee, and rubber as its exchangeable goods. Canada trades timber, ores, wheat, and other agricultural products in return for its manufacturing needs.

Thus the business intelligence that rules the world, adapting one to another those various conditions which prevail in its varying sections, has built up in certain sections of its great area—Europe and the United States—a great factory system, operated by the great supplies of power (coal) which there exist in conjunction with the wealth, the intelligence, the climatic conditions and the quality of population, which system, besides supplying its own six hundred millions of people with their own requirements, sends to the other ten hundred millions of people in other parts of the world its surplus products and takes in exchange the natural products, the manufacturing material and food required by its own people and its own industries.

So, the business intelligence that drives the world, adjusting to the different conditions present in its various regions, has created in certain areas—Europe and the United States—a large factory system powered by the abundant coal supply that exists there, along with the wealth, knowledge, climate, and quality of the population. This system not only meets the needs of its own six hundred million people but also exports surplus products to another one billion people in other parts of the world, in exchange for natural resources, raw materials, and food necessary for its own population and industries.

George J. Chisholm, in the Introduction to Bartholomew’s Atlas of the World’s Commerce, outlines the history of the development of manufactures and the relation thereof to commerce as follows:

George J. Chisholm, in the Introduction to Bartholomew’s Atlas of the World’s Commerce, outlines the history of the development of manufacturing and its relationship to commerce as follows:

“In the latter part of the eighteenth century there took place in England a number of inventions which have brought about a change in the conditions of manufacturing industry and of commerce, and an acceleration of the rate of the economic development of the world, to which all previous history presents no parallel or approach to a parallel. It is a change that has affected the entire world, [Pg 184] bringing about an entirely new trade with the New World and the antipodes, and completely altering the character of the trade with the East, depriving spices of the peculiar value which they held in commerce for so many centuries, and developing a trade of incomparably greater magnitude with the East than was at one time ever dreamt of, and largely in commodities of a bulky character yielding comparatively little profit on small quantities. The revolution was inaugurated by the inventions in connection with the cotton industry between 1769 and 1785 and the concurrent improvements in the steam engine by James Watt, who thereby first made this a generally serviceable machine. These were followed by the introduction of steam locomotion by land and water in the first quarter, and the rapid extension of these modes of transport in the remainder of the nineteenth century. The result of these inventions was to give a new value to the stores of coal and iron in the United Kingdom, and ultimately a new value to undeveloped land in new countries. It was railways that first made it possible to fill great ships with bulky produce like grain drawn from the far interior. The remarkable expansion of commerce thus brought about greatly increased the commercial advantages of Great Britain due to its situation and local facilities for shipping. In so far, however, as the unexampled development of British manufacturing industry and commerce in the period immediately following the Industrial Revolution was due not to geographical conditions but merely to the fact that the great inventions originated there and consequently the resources of Great Britain for carrying on manufactures by the new methods were developed first, the expansion of British manufactures and commerce was bound to be affected by the development of similar resources elsewhere; and the more rapid growth of manufactures in some rival countries resulting from this cause, and partly, it may be, from other causes, has been one of the marked features of recent economic history.”

“In the late eighteenth century, England saw a series of inventions that transformed manufacturing and commerce, speeding up the economic development of the world in a way that has no historical comparison. This change impacted the entire globe, creating entirely new trade routes with the New World and distant lands, significantly altering trade with the East. Spices lost the unique value they held in commerce for centuries, while a trade of far greater scale developed with the East, focusing on bulk goods that offered relatively low profits on small quantities. The revolution started with advancements in the cotton industry between 1769 and 1785, along with improvements in the steam engine by James Watt, making it a widely useful machine. This was followed by the introduction of steam transportation on land and water in the early part of the nineteenth century, which expanded rapidly later on. As a result of these inventions, the value of coal and iron reserves in the UK increased, ultimately enhancing the value of undeveloped land in new countries. Railways made it possible to load large ships with bulk goods like grain from the interior. This significant growth in commerce greatly enhanced Great Britain's commercial advantages due to its location and shipping facilities. However, the unprecedented growth of British manufacturing and commerce immediately following the Industrial Revolution stemmed not from geographical advantages, but from the fact that these key inventions originated there, allowing Britain to develop new manufacturing methods first. Consequently, the growth of British manufacturing and commerce was destined to be influenced by the development of similar resources elsewhere. The faster growth of manufacturing in some rival countries, arising from this and possibly other factors, has been a notable trend in recent economic history. [Pg 184]

[Pg 185] I. MODERN MANUFACTURING SYSTEMS OF THE WORLD.

The manufacturing systems of the world have developed from mere hand and household industries to those of the machine and factory in less than two centuries. For thousands of years the simple requirements of men—of clothing, of domestic life, of agriculture and of transportation—were met with articles produced by hand labor, performed for the greatest part in the household or in simple workshops adjacent thereto. Then, in the latter half of the eighteenth century, man discovered that he could harness the power of the waterfall and, by making the wheels which it turned turn other wheels, could utilize that power in performing many tasks which he had hitherto performed laboriously by hand. The turning wheels twisted the wool and flax and cotton into threads stronger and finer and better than his wife had been accustomed to twist with the spinning wheel and distaff, and produced in a single day as much of this yarn as a hundred industrious women could produce in a week or a fortnight. By gearing the wheels to operate a loom he could weave the yarn into cloth with a small fraction of the labor and time which had been required to weave it by the hand loom and obtain better results.

The world's manufacturing systems have transformed from simple handcraft and home-based industries to machine and factory operations in less than two centuries. For thousands of years, the basic needs of people—clothing, household goods, agriculture, and transportation—were met by items produced through manual labor, primarily done at home or in small workshops nearby. Then, in the late eighteenth century, people discovered they could harness the power of waterfalls, and by making the wheels they turned operate other wheels, could use that energy to accomplish many tasks that had previously required significant manual effort. These turning wheels twisted wool, flax, and cotton into threads that were stronger, finer, and superior to what his wife had traditionally spun with a spinning wheel and distaff, producing in one day as much yarn as a hundred hardworking women could make in a week or two. By connecting the wheels to operate a loom, he could weave the yarn into cloth with a fraction of the labor and time that was once needed to do it by hand, achieving better results.

Thus arose the custom of manufacturing by machinery operated by the power of the waterfall the cloth which had hitherto been manufactured by hand labor in the household; this was the beginning of the modern manufacturing industry.

Thus arose the practice of using machines powered by waterfalls to produce cloth, which had previously been made by hand at home; this marked the start of the modern manufacturing industry.

To do this, however, it was necessary to plant the machines beside the waterfall and bring to them the raw material and the persons necessary to operate them, for the machine was unable to perform its task unless assisted by the intelligent labor and guidance of experienced men and women. Thus arose the system of performing in a [Pg 186] single workshop, with the aid of a considerable number of people and machines, the manufacturing which had been hitherto performed by many people in many households and with many machines of simpler form and operated by human power—the factory system.

To do this, however, it was necessary to set up the machines next to the waterfall and bring in the raw materials and the people needed to operate them, because the machine couldn’t do its job without the skilled labor and guidance of experienced men and women. This led to the creation of a system where everything was done in one workshop, with the help of a considerable number of people and machines, manufacturing what had previously been done by many individuals in various households using simpler machines powered by human strength—the factory system. [Pg 186]

This new system developed new occupations. The buildings in which the work was carried on must be constructed. The machinery required for operating the factory must be made and kept in repair, and new machines made to take the place of those worn out. So there came occupation for mechanics and skilled machinists in manufacturing and repairing the machines, and for others skilled in operating them. The material used in manufacturing the cloth must be transported to the factory, instead of being used at the place where it was grown as formerly; and the cloth must again be transported to the consumer; and thus there were new occupations for man and beast in transportation and in constructing and maintaining the roads over which the material was transported. Still another, and equally important, industry developed was that of supplying the food and other requirements of the men and women engaged in the factory, and this gave new activity to the agricultural industries near the factory and further occupation to those engaged in transportation.

This new system created new jobs. The buildings where the work was done had to be built. The machinery needed to run the factory had to be manufactured and kept in good condition, and new machines had to be made to replace those that were worn out. This led to jobs for mechanics and skilled machinists in manufacturing and repairing the machines, as well as for others trained in operating them. The materials used to make the cloth had to be transported to the factory instead of being used at the location where they were grown as before; and the cloth also had to be transported to the consumers. This created new jobs for people and animals in transportation and in building and maintaining the roads used to move the materials. Additionally, there was another equally important industry that developed: supplying food and other needs for the men and women working in the factory. This boosted activity in the agricultural industries near the factory and created more jobs for those involved in transportation.

To supply the wants of those employed in the factories, who were so busily engaged that they could not find time to grow their own food, or make their own clothing, other enterprising men and women established themselves near the factory to sell the required food and household supplies, to supply the fuel with which they cooked their daily food, to buy small portions of the cloth made in the factory and turn it into clothing to sell to the operatives, to shave their rough beards and occasionally trim their hair—and thus arose the factory town.

To meet the needs of those working in the factories, who were so busy that they couldn't find time to grow their own food or make their own clothing, other enterprising individuals set up shop near the factory to sell the necessary food and household supplies, provide the fuel they needed to cook their daily meals, buy small amounts of fabric produced in the factory and turn it into clothing for the workers, and offer services like shaving their rough beards and occasionally trimming their hair—and that's how the factory town came to be.

[Pg 187] So the factory system, which at first threatened to take away the occupation of thousands who had formerly devoted their time to making yarn and cloth by hand labor, developed new occupations and new industries, and brought portions of the hitherto scattered people into groups, and these groups in time developed better accommodations for themselves and their families in homes, in comforts of life, in educational facilities, and in hours of labor; and in doing this they also supplied the masses with cloth at a less cost of labor than they had formerly expended in obtaining it.

[Pg 187] The factory system, which initially seemed like it would take away jobs from thousands who used to spend their time making yarn and cloth by hand, ended up creating new jobs and industries. It brought together people who had been spread out, allowing these groups to eventually build better living conditions for themselves and their families, improving homes, quality of life, education, and work hours. At the same time, they made cloth more affordable than what people used to pay for it.

Meantime man was learning another important lesson, one which was to develop even more rapidly the art of manufacturing. He found through a long series of experiments that power could be generated by heating water until it turned into an expansive vapor which he called steam, and that this expansive force could be controlled in such manner as to put in operation a machine which he called the steam engine, which could in turn transmit its power to that machinery formerly operated exclusively by the power of the waterfall.

Meantime, humans were learning another important lesson, one that would quickly advance the art of manufacturing. They discovered through a long series of experiments that power could be generated by heating water until it turned into steam, an expansive vapor. This force could be controlled to operate a machine called the steam engine, which could then power machinery that had previously relied solely on the energy of waterfalls.

This discovery again revolutionized the manufacturing industry, which had hitherto been limited in the scope of its operations by the supply of water power so located that the raw material could be transported to it and the finished products in turn transported thence to market. With this new force, steam, by which the manufacturing machinery could be made entirely independent of the waterfall, the factories were located at points convenient to the natural supply of fuel and manufacturing material or to the market for the finished products. Where this was not practicable the factories were located at places to which the materials could be readily and cheaply carried by water transportation, either on some navigable stream or the sea-coast.

This discovery transformed the manufacturing industry once again, which had previously been limited by the availability of water power, restricting the location of operations to places where raw materials could be easily transported to them and finished products shipped out to markets. With the introduction of steam power, manufacturing machinery could now operate independently of waterfalls, allowing factories to be set up in locations that were convenient to natural fuel sources and raw materials or closer to the market for finished products. When that wasn’t feasible, factories were established in areas where materials could be easily and cost-effectively transported by water, whether on navigable rivers or along the coast.

[Pg 188] Another important contribution made by steam power to the development of the manufacturing industry was the decrease in cost of transportation. Before the development of the railway and the steamship the material of manufacture, unless produced within a short distance of some navigable water, canals, rivers, lakes or oceans, was of comparatively little value. It was not always practicable to plant the factory in the section which most readily produced the wool or cotton or flax or hemp or silk, or to place it alongside the iron or copper mine; and even if this were done the manufactured material was valueless unless it could be transported to those requiring it. Even the lighter articles of manufacture, such as wool or cotton or fibers or silk, could not be transported any considerable distance without greatly increasing the cost to the manufacturer, and thus proportionately advancing the cost of the manufactured article. But when, in the middle of the nineteenth century, the railways began to penetrate the continents and the steamships began to cross the ocean and extend their tours to the commercially undeveloped sections of the world, the manufacturers found new sources of supply open to them and quantities of raw material reaching them from distant lands at such comparatively low cost as to enable them to enlarge their output, increase the variety of their productions and reduce the cost of both the necessities and conveniences and luxuries which they were offering to the public. The railways of the world grew from 25,000 miles in 1850 to 500,000 miles in 1900 and 600,000 in 1909. The tonnage of steam vessels on the navigable waters of the world grew from less than one million tons in 1850 to 24 million in 1909; and the carrying power of the sail and steam vessels of the world, measured in sail tons, grew from 15 million tons in 1850 to 100 million in 1909. The general reduction in freight rates meantime is illustrated by the fact that the price of transporting wheat from Chicago to New York by rail [Pg 189] fell from 33½ cents per bushel in 1872 to 10 cents per bushel in 1900, and the charge for transporting wheat from New York to Liverpool fell from 17 cents per bushel in 1875 to 3 cents per bushel in 1905; and similar reductions were made in the charges for transporting manufacturers’ materials.

[Pg 188] Another significant contribution of steam power to the growth of the manufacturing industry was the reduction in transportation costs. Before railways and steamships were developed, manufacturing materials that weren’t produced near navigable waters like canals, rivers, lakes, or oceans had very little value. It wasn’t always practical to set up factories in areas where wool, cotton, flax, hemp, or silk were produced, or to place them right next to iron or copper mines; and even if they did, the manufactured goods were worthless unless they could be shipped to where they were needed. Even lighter manufactured items like wool, cotton, fibers, or silk were hard to transport over long distances without significantly raising costs for manufacturers, which in turn increased the prices of these products. However, in the mid-nineteenth century, as railways began to spread across continents and steamships started crossing oceans and reaching economically undeveloped regions, manufacturers discovered new sources of supply and received raw materials from far-off places at such relatively low costs that they could boost production, broaden their product range, and lower the prices of the essentials as well as luxuries they offered to the public. The global railway network expanded from 25,000 miles in 1850 to 500,000 miles in 1900 and 600,000 miles in 1909. The tonnage of steam vessels on the world's navigable waters increased from less than one million tons in 1850 to 24 million tons in 1909; and the carrying capacity of sailing and steam vessels, measured in sail tons, grew from 15 million tons in 1850 to 100 million tons in 1909. The overall decrease in freight rates is highlighted by the fact that the cost of transporting wheat from Chicago to New York by rail dropped from 33½ cents per bushel in 1872 to 10 cents per bushel in 1900, and the charge for shipping wheat from New York to Liverpool decreased from 17 cents per bushel in 1875 to 3 cents per bushel in 1905; similar reductions were seen in the costs for transporting manufacturing materials.

Thus the application of steam to manufacturing and transportation multiplied the power of production. The area over which it could be performed was greatly enlarged, the cost of materials was reduced through cheaper transportation, new devices and processes were developed as a result of the competition, cheaper raw material was obtained from countries where plentiful supplies and cheap labor give low prices, and the opportunity of locating the factory near the place of production or at some convenient meeting point between the various places of production—all these contributed to reduction of cost and increase of supplies of material of manufacture. The great iron and steel works of western Pennsylvania, and northern Ohio, Indiana and Illinois, for example, are located not at the iron mines or the coal fields, but at places between these two fields to which these materials can be cheaply carried from their respective places of production. The iron ore is chiefly produced in the Lake Superior region and carried at a very low cost by vessels especially constructed for this purpose to the southern shores of Lake Erie. The coal is chiefly produced in western Pennsylvania and central Ohio, Indiana and Illinois. The cost of transporting the coal from the mine to the lake shore, or the ore from the lake shore to the mine, or both coal and ore to some mutually convenient meeting point by river or canal or railroads constructed for this purpose across a comparatively level country, is extremely small, less in many cases than that of carrying material to the waterfall which is not infrequently located at places difficult of access. The vessels carrying the manufactures of the United States [Pg 190] or the manufacturing countries of Europe to South America, Africa and the Orient, bring back at a very low cost the india rubber, the tin, the fibers, the wool, the silk, the Egyptian cotton of those distant countries; and the manufacturer who a century ago was limited in his supply of raw materials to the immediate vicinity of his factory may now bring his material from all parts of the world, while the area in which he may sell his products has been correspondingly enlarged.

Thus, using steam for manufacturing and transportation greatly increased production power. The areas where this could happen expanded significantly, costs for materials dropped due to cheaper transportation, new tools and methods emerged from competition, and cheaper raw materials were sourced from countries with abundant supplies and low labor costs. This allowed factories to be located near production sites or at convenient spots between various production locations—all contributing to lower costs and increased supplies of manufacturing materials. For example, the large iron and steel plants in western Pennsylvania, northern Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois are not positioned at the iron mines or coal fields, but at locations that allow for cheap transport of these materials from their respective sources. The iron ore comes mainly from the Lake Superior region and is transported at a low cost by specially designed vessels to the southern shores of Lake Erie. The coal primarily comes from western Pennsylvania and central Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois. The expenses for moving coal from the mine to the lakeshore, ore from the lakeshore to the mine, or both coal and ore to a convenient meeting point via river, canal, or railroads built across a relatively flat area, are very low—often less than transporting materials to waterfalls, which can be hard to access. The vessels transporting U.S. manufactured goods or those from European manufacturing countries to South America, Africa, and the Orient bring back a wide range of products like rubber, tin, fibers, wool, silk, and Egyptian cotton at minimal costs. A manufacturer who, a century ago, was limited to raw materials from nearby can now source materials globally, while the market for selling his products has expanded just as much.

One very recent contribution to the convenience and cheapness of manufacture is found in the transmission of power in the form of electricity. Formerly the machines of the factory were operated by power obtained from the steam engine or the water wheel through lines of shafting, gearing, belts, friction pulleys, etc. This made it necessary that the factory operated by water power be placed alongside the waterfall, or at least within a comparatively short distance of the source of power. Recent inventions have made it possible to transform power into electricity, carry that electricity hundreds of miles on a wire, and transform it back into power for the operation of the machinery of the factory or the transportation of the raw material or the finished product. This has increased greatly the value of the world’s water power in its relation to manufacturing. Formerly only a small part of the waterfalls of the world were used at all, largely because of their comparative inaccessibility and the cost of transporting the raw material to them and the finished product from them. Now that power, generated at any point, however inaccessible for freight handling, may be transmitted in the form of electricity on a simple piece of wire to any convenient point within a hundred or even two hundred miles of the place of production, and by a simple process applied to the operations of machines small or large, simple or complex, the possibilities of the waterfall in supplying power for the manufacturer are greatly enlarged.

One recent improvement in convenience and affordability of manufacturing is the use of electricity for power transmission. In the past, factory machines were powered by steam engines or water wheels through systems of shafts, gears, belts, and pulleys. This meant that water-powered factories had to be located right next to waterfalls or at least close to the power source. Recent inventions allow us to convert power into electricity, send it hundreds of miles through wires, and convert it back into power for running factory machinery or transporting raw materials and finished products. This has significantly increased the value of the world's water power in manufacturing. Previously, only a small fraction of the world's waterfalls were utilized, mainly due to their inaccessibility and the cost of moving raw materials and finished goods to and from them. Now, power generated anywhere—even from hard-to-reach locations—can be transmitted as electricity on a simple wire to a convenient location within 100 or even 200 miles. By using straightforward processes, this electricity can power machines of any size and complexity, greatly expanding the potential of waterfalls to provide power for manufacturers.

[Pg 191] Not only is this true of the waterfalls now in existence but of those which may be brought into existence, for now that man has found a way to use the power thus generated he may readily increase the number of waterfalls by constructing dams at many places, and using the water over and over again in its flow from the place of origin to the ocean level. The great quantities of water stored up in the form of snow and ice in the mountain ranges of the world, and gradually liberated by melting may supply almost untold quantities of power as they flow down the mountain sides used not merely once but many times. The manufacturing power of Italy, Switzerland and southern France is now being greatly augmented by this process.

[Pg 191] This is true not only for the waterfalls that currently exist but also for those that can be created. Now that humans have discovered how to harness the power generated by waterfalls, they can easily create more by building dams in various locations and reusing the water as it flows from its source to the ocean. The large amounts of water stored as snow and ice in the world's mountain ranges can provide an almost limitless source of power as it melts and flows down the mountains, being used multiple times rather than just once. The manufacturing capabilities of Italy, Switzerland, and southern France are currently being greatly enhanced by this method.

Another possibility of the use of this new distributor of power, electricity, is the multiplying of workshops and the return in some instances and certain articles to household or small shop manufacture. It is now so easy to introduce the electric wire and a small electric motor into the household or the shop adjoining the household and to so operate small machines for the various processes in many of the manufacturing industries, that this new use of electricity for the transmission of power is already making visible changes in the factory systems of the world, and promises still greater changes. In many lines of manufacture in which the machinery occupies small space and requires little power and the quantity of material handled is not great, such as watch and clock making, the manufacture of clothing, boots and shoes, toys, etc., a part or all of the work can now be performed in the household or small shop through the power generated miles away and brought into the workman’s home on a simple piece of wire.

Another possibility for using this new power distributor, electricity, is the increase in workshops and the return, in some cases and for certain items, to home or small shop manufacturing. It's now so easy to install electric wiring and a small motor in homes or in shops next to homes, allowing small machines to operate for various processes in many manufacturing industries. This new use of electricity for power transmission is already bringing noticeable changes to factory systems around the world and promises even more significant transformations. In many manufacturing areas where machinery takes up little space, requires minimal power, and where the amount of material handled isn’t large—like watch and clock making, clothing production, footwear, toys, etc.—some or all of the work can now be done at home or in small shops through power generated miles away and delivered to the worker’s home via a simple wire.

On the other hand the use of electricity in the great factory or manufacturing establishment is equally important. Instead of transmitting the power of the engine to the various classes of machinery by belts, shafting and [Pg 192] gearing, much of it is now transmitted and applied in the form of electricity. Great cranes which handle many tons of material are operated by the electric motor without the intervention of the costly shafting, belting and gearing; and the great magnet, made such by electricity, picks up its ton of steel rails with the same ease that the toy magnet picks up the needle, and is managed with no greater physical exertion than the other.

On the other hand, using electricity in large factories or manufacturing facilities is just as crucial. Instead of transferring engine power to different types of machinery using belts, shafts, and gears, a lot of it is now transmitted and applied as electricity. Large cranes that lift tons of material are operated by electric motors without the need for expensive shafts, belts, and gears. The powerful magnet, made possible by electricity, picks up a ton of steel rails just as easily as a toy magnet picks up a needle, and it requires no more physical effort than the other does.

Cassier’s Magazine, an accepted authority on engineering matters, publishes with favorable editorial comment, in its issue of September, 1909, a statement by Sylvester Stewart that “we could take out in regions where water power is needed at least a hundred times as much water power as is now employed, furnishing a safer and cleaner power than steam, at a lower cost, and thus prolong the existence of our coal fields. * * * A running stream may be compared to an endless driving belt only awaiting connection to the machinery it is capable of driving, but it has not been appreciated because we have become so familiar with it; if it had suddenly been discovered, doubtless it would have been harnessed immediately. Coal is passing away, but water flows continuously. A hundred thousand horsepower may be taken from a river and its place is still filled, but the coal vein once emptied is emptied forever.” Mr. Stewart adds that probably not one-thousandth part of the water power of the world is now utilized, and that while the greater part of this power is not at present available, because of its existence in out-of-the-way places, or in rivers so deep and sluggish that the energy obtainable from them would cost more than steam power, at least a hundred times as much water power as is now used could be, under present conditions, utilized in a manner to supply it at less than the cost of coal at present prices.

Cassier’s Magazine, a well-respected source on engineering topics, published in its September 1909 issue a comment from Sylvester Stewart stating that “we could harness at least a hundred times more water power where it is needed than what is currently being used, providing a safer and cleaner energy source than steam at a lower cost, thus extending the life of our coal reserves. * * * A flowing stream can be likened to an endless driving belt just waiting to be connected to the machinery it could power, but it hasn’t been fully appreciated because we’ve become so used to it; if it had been discovered suddenly, it would likely have been harnessed right away. Coal is running out, but water keeps flowing. We can extract a hundred thousand horsepower from a river, and it will still be there, but once a coal seam is depleted, it’s gone for good.” Mr. Stewart adds that likely not even one-thousandth of the world’s water power is being used right now, and while much of this power is currently unavailable due to being located in remote areas or in rivers that are too deep and slow-moving for the energy to be cost-effective compared to steam power, at least a hundred times more water power than what is now utilized could be effectively harnessed under current conditions to provide energy at a lower cost than coal at today’s prices.

[Pg 193] II. THE USE OF MACHINERY IN MANUFACTURING.

The statements made in this discussion that the great expansion in the production of manufactures came with the adoption of machinery for manufacturing must not be understood as meaning that no machinery was used in manufacturing prior to the period of expansion. Machines have been used in manufacturing for many centuries.

The statements made in this discussion that the significant growth in manufacturing came with the adoption of machinery should not be taken to mean that no machinery was used in manufacturing before this period of growth. Machines have been used in manufacturing for many centuries.

The spinning wheel, used many hundred years ago, was a machine, and so was the hand loom, by which the threads spun by the wheel were woven into cloth. Flax and wool were originally turned into thread by the use of the distaff, a stick to which the spinner attached a small portion of the fiber, and by revolving the stick against his body twisted the fibers into a thread. Then by letting the end of the stick drop downward he drew out the thread, and with another roll of the stick against his body again twisted the fibers and lengthened the thread, which he then wound around the distaff. After many years of this process it occurred to somebody that by setting the distaff in a frame and passing a cord or a piece of rawhide around it and also around a large wheel and turning the wheel he could get a much more rapid and regular revolution of the distaff. This was the beginning of the use of the “machine” in the making of yarn, for the spinning wheel was a machine, of a crude type, to be sure, but a machine. This served many generations of men and women for the manufacture of thread and yarn, from flax, from wool and from cotton.

The spinning wheel, used many hundreds of years ago, was a machine, and so was the hand loom, which turned the threads spun by the wheel into cloth. Flax and wool were originally made into thread using a distaff, a stick where the spinner attached a small amount of fiber. By spinning the stick against their body, they twisted the fibers into thread. Then, by letting the end of the stick drop down, they pulled out the thread and twisted the fibers again by rolling the stick against their body, lengthening the thread before winding it around the distaff. After many years of this process, someone came up with the idea of placing the distaff in a frame, passing a cord or a rawhide strap around it and a large wheel, turning the wheel to get a much faster and more consistent rotation of the distaff. This was the start of using a “machine” for yarn production, as the spinning wheel was a machine—albeit a primitive one. It served generations of men and women in making thread and yarn from flax, wool, and cotton.

To turn this thread or yarn into cloth another “machine” was used, the loom, which, by fixing the thread on certain frames and passing other threads back and forth as the frames were raised or lowered, formed the cloth. But this “machine,” the loom, was operated by human power, as was that other machine, the spinning wheel. The women and children spun the thread or yarn, the father [Pg 194] and sons operated the loom, chiefly in the winter months in which they had no occupation in the fields. If a man chose to give his time to weaving and became a weaver by trade he lightened his heavy labors at times by attention to the garden surrounding his workshop, performing the necessary work for the production of his food supply. “The workshop of the weaver,” says Ure in his History of the Cotton Manufactures, “was a rural cottage from which, when he was tired of the sedentary labor, he could sally forth into his little garden and with the spade or hoe attend to his culinary products. The cotton which was to form his weft was picked clean by the fingers of his younger children and was carded and spun by the older girls assisted by his wife, and the yarn was woven by himself assisted by his sons.” In the manufacture of woolen goods conditions were similar. “The work,” says James in his History of the Worsted Manufactures, “was entirely domestic, and its different branches widely scattered over the country. The manufacturer had to travel on horseback to purchase his wool among the farmers or at the great fairs or markets, and the wool, after being sorted and combed, was distributed among the peasantry and received back as yarn. The machine used by them was still the old one-thread spinning wheel, and in summer weather on many a village green might be seen the housewives plying their busy trade. Returning with his yarn the manufacturer had to seek out his weavers, who ultimately delivered to him his camelets or russells or calimancoes ready for sale to the merchant or delivery to the dyer.”

To turn this thread or yarn into cloth, another “machine” was used: the loom. This machine worked by securing the thread on specific frames and passing other threads back and forth as the frames were raised or lowered to create the cloth. However, the loom was operated by human power, just like the spinning wheel. Women and children spun the thread or yarn while fathers and sons operated the loom, primarily during the winter months when they weren’t busy in the fields. If a man decided to focus on weaving as a trade, he would often ease his heavy workload by tending to the garden around his workshop, growing his own food supply. “The workshop of the weaver,” says Ure in his History of the Cotton Manufactures, “was a rural cottage from which, when he grew tired of sitting and working, he could step into his little garden and use his spade or hoe to tend to his vegetables. The cotton for his weft was picked clean by his younger children and carded and spun by the older girls with help from his wife, while he wove the yarn himself with assistance from his sons.” The process of making woolen goods was similar. “The work,” says James in his History of the Worsted Manufactures, “was entirely domestic, with different tasks spread across the country. The manufacturer had to travel on horseback to buy wool from farmers or at large fairs or markets, and after sorting and combing the wool, it was distributed among the peasantry and returned as yarn. They still used the old one-thread spinning wheel, and on many summer days, you could see housewives working in their villages. After returning with his yarn, the manufacturer had to find his weavers, who ultimately delivered his camelets, russells, or calimancoes ready for sale to merchants or for delivery to the dyer.”

These are pictures of the manufacturing industry in England as late as 1770. “Machines” were in use, but of the simplest type, and all operated by the power of the man or woman using them, or at the best by human or animal power, and in most cases the work was performed in the household or a small shop adjoining the household.

These are pictures of the manufacturing industry in England as late as 1770. “Machines” were in use, but they were very basic, and all were powered by the people using them, or at best by human or animal strength. Most of the work took place in the home or a small shop next to the home.

[Pg 195] The transformation to the “machine method” or factory system began when some power greater than that of man or beast was applied to the operation of the machines, and the machines themselves were so enlarged as to multiply their producing power. “In tracing the effect of the application of modern machinery to English industry,” says Hobson in his Evolution of Modern Capitalism, “there appear two prominent factors, the growth of improved mechanical apparatus, and the evolution of extra-human motor power. We speak of the industry which has prevailed since the middle of the eighteenth century as ‘machine production’ not because there were no machines before that time but, firstly, because a vast acceleration in the invention of complex machinery applied to almost all industrial arts dates from that period, and secondly, because the application upon an extended scale of non-human motor powers manifested itself then for the first time.” “The water frame, the carding engine, and the other machines which Arkwright brought out, in a finished state,” says Cooke Taylor in his History of the Factory System, “required both more space than could be found in a cottage and more power than could be applied by the human arm. Their weight required them to be placed in strongly built walls, and they could not be advantageously turned by any power then known but that of water. Further, the use of machinery was accompanied by a greater division of labor, and therefore a greater co-operation was necessary to bring all the processes under a central supervision.”

[Pg 195] The shift to the "machine method" or factory system started when a force beyond human or animal power was used to run the machines, and those machines were designed to greatly increase their production capacity. "When exploring the impact of modern machinery on English industry," Hobson states in his Evolution of Modern Capitalism, "two main factors stand out: the rise of improved mechanical equipment, and the development of non-human motor power. We refer to the industry that has dominated since the mid-eighteenth century as 'machine production' not because machines didn't exist before then, but first, because a significant surge in the invention of advanced machinery for nearly all industrial crafts began in that era, and second, because the large-scale use of non-human power made its appearance for the first time at that point." “The water frame, the carding engine, and other machines that Arkwright introduced in their finished form,” Cooke Taylor notes in his History of the Factory System, “needed more space than what could be found in a cottage and required more power than could be supplied by human effort. Their heaviness meant they had to be placed in sturdily constructed buildings, and they could only be effectively operated using the power of water at that time. Additionally, the use of machinery led to a greater division of labor, necessitating more cooperation to manage all processes under centralized oversight.”

The new and enlarged machines which were thus operated by water power and brought together in factories had been invented chiefly during the eighteenth century. John Kay, in 1738, invented what was known as the flying shuttle, which doubled the amount of weaving which could be performed by one man in a given time. Hargreaves, in [Pg 196] 1764, invented the spinning jenny, a machine which operated a number of spindles for spinning yarn, and so did many times as much as one spinner with a spinning wheel could do. Arkwright, a few years later, devised the water frame, by which the spinning jenny could be operated by water power. Crompton, a little later developed the “spinning mule,” which combined the important qualities of the spinning jenny and the water frame. Before the end of the century the steam engine began to supply power and was utilized in many cases where water power was not available. Then, in 1792, came Whitney’s cotton gin, by which the seeds were readily extracted from the cotton, and that valuable fiber rendered much more available for manufacturing purposes.

The new and larger machines powered by water and assembled in factories were mostly invented during the eighteenth century. John Kay invented the flying shuttle in 1738, which doubled the amount of weaving that one person could do in a given time. In 1764, Hargreaves invented the spinning jenny, a machine that operated several spindles for spinning yarn, producing much more than one spinner with a spinning wheel could achieve. A few years later, Arkwright created the water frame, which allowed the spinning jenny to be powered by water. Crompton then developed the "spinning mule," which combined the key features of the spinning jenny and the water frame. By the end of the century, steam engines began to provide power and were used in many situations where water power wasn’t feasible. Then, in 1792, Whitney invented the cotton gin, which efficiently removed seeds from cotton, making that valuable fiber much more accessible for manufacturing.

The effect of the development of the machine and factory system, through the devices of these thoughtful men, enormously increased the manufacturing industries of England and later of the other parts of the world. The importations of cotton into England prior to the invention of the spinning jenny averaged less than 2 million pounds per annum. With the invention of the spinning jenny and the water frame the importation of cotton and cotton manufacture quickly doubled and trebled and then grew at such rapid rate that by 1800 the importation was about 40 million pounds, by 1830, 260 million pounds and by 1840 over 400 million pounds. The importation of wool grew from less than 2 million pounds in the latter part of the eighteenth century to 150 million pounds in 1860 and over 700 million pounds in 1890, though in this article of manufacture the growth in importation was less strongly marked than in cotton because of the fact that much of the wool used in manufacture was produced at home, while all of the cotton used was imported.

The impact of developing the machine and factory system, thanks to the efforts of these innovative individuals, significantly boosted the manufacturing industries in England and later across the globe. Before the invention of the spinning jenny, cotton imports into England averaged less than 2 million pounds a year. After the spinning jenny and the water frame were developed, cotton imports and cotton manufacturing quickly doubled and tripled, accelerating to such a degree that by 1800 imports reached about 40 million pounds, by 1830, 260 million pounds, and by 1840 over 400 million pounds. Wool imports rose from less than 2 million pounds in the late eighteenth century to 150 million pounds in 1860 and over 700 million pounds in 1890, although growth in wool imports was not as pronounced as in cotton since much of the wool used in manufacturing was sourced domestically, while all of the cotton used had to be imported.

In the iron and steel industry the growth in the use of machinery was even more closely connected with the great development of recent years than in that of textiles. [Pg 197] It was quite natural that man should seek the use of machinery in the iron and steel industry. The material to be handled was of such great weight that it could not be handled in quantities without the aid of extra-human power, and the fact that it must be manipulated while at an intense heat necessitated the use of devices of some sort for its handling. Yet a long time, a very long time, elapsed after the beginning of the manufacture of iron and steel before men developed the machinery which has resulted in such a wonderful development in the manufacture. The slow rate of growth in the earlier centuries, and the rapid rate in the past century may be measured in some degree by the world’s production of pig iron, the basis of all iron and steel manufactures. Mulhall estimates the world’s production of pig iron in the year 1500 at 60,000 tons, in 1700 at 100,000 tons, and in 1800 at 460,000 tons. Then the increase began to be more sharply defined, the production reaching 1 million tons in 1820, 2½ million in 1840, 7 million in 1860, 18 million in 1880, 40 million in 1900 and nearly 60 million in 1907. The increase in the eighteenth century was about one third of a million tons, and that of the nineteenth century was 39½ million tons, or more than 100 times as much as that of the eighteenth century. The great development in the transformation of iron into steel did not come until the second half of the nineteenth century, the world’s production of steel in 1850 being, according to Mulhall, 71,000 tons, in 1870, 540,000 tons, in 1880, 4 million tons, in 1890,12 million, in 1900, approximately 20 million, and in 1907 about 40 million. The growth in production of pig iron and steel was more rapid in Europe than in the United States in the earlier part of the nineteenth century, but in the latter part of that century the United States outstripped all her rivals, and her production of iron and steel is now more than that of any other two countries of the world.

In the iron and steel industry, the rise in machinery use was even more closely linked to the significant developments of recent years than in textiles. [Pg 197] It made sense for humans to want to use machinery in the iron and steel industry. The materials involved were so heavy that they couldn't be managed in large amounts without additional power, and since they had to be handled at extremely high temperatures, there was a need for some sort of equipment to assist. However, a very long time passed after the start of iron and steel production before the machinery needed for such remarkable advancements was developed. The slow growth in the earlier centuries, compared to the rapid expansion in the last century, can be partially gauged by the world's pig iron production, which is the foundation of all iron and steel products. Mulhall estimates the world's pig iron production in 1500 at 60,000 tons, in 1700 at 100,000 tons, and in 1800 at 460,000 tons. Then, the increase became more pronounced, with production reaching 1 million tons in 1820, 2.5 million in 1840, 7 million in 1860, 18 million in 1880, 40 million in 1900, and nearly 60 million in 1907. The increase in the eighteenth century was about one-third of a million tons, while the nineteenth century saw an increase of 39.5 million tons, over 100 times more than that of the eighteenth century. Significant progress in transforming iron into steel didn't occur until the second half of the nineteenth century, with the world’s steel production in 1850 being, according to Mulhall, 71,000 tons; in 1870, 540,000 tons; in 1880, 4 million tons; in 1890, 12 million tons; in 1900, around 20 million tons; and in 1907, about 40 million tons. The production growth of pig iron and steel was faster in Europe than in the United States in the early part of the nineteenth century, but by the later part of that century, the United States surpassed all its competitors, and now its production of iron and steel exceeds that of any other two countries combined.

[Pg 198] These wonderful developments in the production of iron and steel were even more dependent upon the development of machinery for transporting the material and handling it in the factory than was the case with the textiles. Pig iron cannot be made without having in immediate conjunction three natural materials, iron ore, limestone and some material to produce intense heat. The iron is only found in the form of “ore,” being iron mixed with rocks, earth or other matter which must be removed in order to use the iron. To do this the ore must be heated. Formerly this was done by placing small quantities of charcoal in a hole in the ground and placing the iron on top of it, and then more charcoal on top of the ore. By fanning the burning charcoal or blowing the fire from the lungs through a reed the heat was increased and the ore was softened, and by hammering it while hot the useless material was worked out. Then by further heatings it could be hammered into such form as desired. After a while it occurred to men to build a wall of stones and mud and place the ore and charcoal in this, and to make a bellows of the skin of some animal (the prototype of those which blacksmiths and other workers in metals now use), and so force the air into the bottom of the mass of charcoal and iron. With this the iron could be so heated that it actually melted and ran to the bottom of the furnace, and when cooled was ready for the finer processes by which it was made into the desired articles. After a time the walls of the furnace were built higher and if it could be located near to a waterfall the shaft of the water wheel was so adjusted as to operate the bellows and keep the stream of air flowing into the fire, for the heat of the burning charcoal was not sufficient to melt the iron without this forced draft.

[Pg 198] These amazing advancements in iron and steel production relied even more on the machinery for transporting and handling materials in factories than those used for textiles. Pig iron can’t be produced without three natural resources: iron ore, limestone, and a substance to generate intense heat. Iron is only found as “ore,” which is iron combined with rocks, dirt, or other materials that need to be removed to access the iron. To extract it, the ore must be heated. In the past, this was done by digging a hole in the ground, placing a small amount of charcoal at the bottom, adding the iron on top, and then covering it with more charcoal. By fanning the burning charcoal or blowing air through a reed, the heat was increased, softening the ore, which was then hammered while hot to remove the useless material. With further heating, it could be shaped as desired. Eventually, people thought to build a wall of stones and mud, placing the ore and charcoal inside. They created a bellows from the skin of an animal (the early version of those still used by blacksmiths and metalworkers today) to force air into the bottom of the mixture of charcoal and iron. This allowed the iron to be heated enough to actually melt and run to the bottom of the furnace, ready for the more refined processes to create the desired products. Over time, the walls of the furnace were built higher, and if located near a waterfall, the water wheel could be adjusted to operate the bellows, maintaining a steady stream of air into the fire, as the heat from the burning charcoal alone wasn’t enough to melt the iron without this forced airflow.

This was the process by which men made iron for many generations. But it was a very expensive process, for the quantity of wood which must be used to produce [Pg 199] the charcoal was so great that the forests were soon depleted, especially in England, where iron making became active. Efforts were made to use coal instead of charcoal, but the weight of the iron ore was so great that it crushed out the fire in the coal which softened as it burned. Then after a time it occurred to somebody to treat the coal in a manner somewhat similar to that by which the wood had been transformed into charcoal, and coke was produced and successfully substituted for charcoal in heating the iron ore and making iron.

This was how people made iron for many generations. However, it was a very costly process because the amount of wood needed to produce the charcoal was so large that the forests were quickly depleted, especially in England, where ironmaking became prevalent. Attempts were made to use coal instead of charcoal, but the weight of the iron ore was so heavy that it extinguished the fire in the coal as it burned. Eventually, someone came up with the idea of processing the coal in a way that's somewhat similar to how wood is turned into charcoal, leading to the production of coke, which successfully replaced charcoal for heating the iron ore and making iron.

In the United States the charcoal process was used until a period much later than that of its abandonment in England, for the supplies of timber were very great and men who were clearing the land for use in agriculture were glad to turn the wood into charcoal and find a market for it. The simple charcoal furnace and forced draft by a simple process furnished the iron-making systems of the world until the early part of the nineteenth century. As a result there were hundreds of small furnaces, simply operated, and turning out small quantities of iron, in various sections of the United States. Meantime somebody discovered that if the air which was forced into the furnace was heated before being sent into the fire it would greatly increase the heat-giving power of a given quantity of charcoal or coke, and the hot blast became a part of the larger furnaces. Then it was found that the anthracite coal of the United States was hard enough to bear the weight of the ore and would produce a heat sufficiently intense to melt it; and so a great iron industry developed in the anthracite region of the United States. Then it was found that certain bituminous coal in western Pennsylvania would make excellent coke for the manufacture of iron, and the Connellsville coke became a successful competitor of anthracite coal, and later other cokes were also used. Later came the natural gas discoveries and they contributed to iron making and working. Meantime railways were [Pg 200] built to carry the ore to the coal or the coal to the ore or both the ore and coal to some convenient meeting point, and machinery began to be introduced for handling the ore and the coal along the railway and at the furnace. This led to the devising of other machinery for handling the iron after it left the furnace and of rollers for rolling the iron into bars and for giving it the sort of manipulation that the hammer of the earlier iron maker had given it when produced in the primitive furnaces. Then great deposits of iron ore, the richest known to the world, were discovered in the Lake Superior regions; and steam-driven machinery was devised to scoop it up from the beds in which it was found, place it in cars, which in turn carried it to the water’s edge, and dumped it into great receptacles from which it could run by the force of gravity into the hold of the steamer. Then other machinery operated by steam was devised to take it from the hold of the steamer and load it again on the cars which transported it to the furnace where it met the coal or the coke, produced, transported and handled by similar machine processes, and was turned into iron to also be handled by great machines.

In the United States, the charcoal process was in use much longer than it was in England, because there was an abundance of timber. People clearing land for agriculture were happy to convert the wood into charcoal and sell it. The basic charcoal furnace and forced air system powered the world's iron-making operations until the early 1800s. As a result, there were hundreds of small furnaces operating across various parts of the United States, producing small amounts of iron. Meanwhile, someone discovered that if the air forced into the furnace was heated first, it significantly increased the heating power of the charcoal or coke, leading to the adoption of the hot blast in larger furnaces. It was then found that anthracite coal in the United States was strong enough to support the weight of the ore and could generate enough heat to melt it, giving rise to a strong iron industry in the anthracite region. Later, certain types of bituminous coal from western Pennsylvania were shown to make excellent coke for iron manufacturing, and Connellsville coke emerged as a successful competitor to anthracite coal, with additional types of coke being utilized later on. Discoveries of natural gas also played a role in iron production. At the same time, railroads were built to transport ore to coal, coal to ore, or both to a convenient location, and machinery began to be introduced for handling ore and coal along the railways and at the furnaces. This innovation led to the development of machines to manage iron after it left the furnace and equipment for rolling iron into bars, replicating the work previously done by hammers in primitive furnaces. Eventually, vast deposits of the richest iron ore known were discovered in the Lake Superior region, and steam-powered machinery was created to scoop it out, load it into cars, transport it to the water's edge, and dump it into large containers that allowed it to flow by gravity into the holds of ships. Other steam-operated machinery was then developed to remove the ore from the ships' holds and load it back onto the cars that took it to the furnace, where it met the coal or coke, all produced, transported, and handled through similar mechanical processes, ultimately turning it into iron that would also be processed by large machines.

While all this was happening—indeed long before the later happenings above mentioned—workers in iron had found that the pig iron coming from the furnaces contained so much carbon that it could not be successfully worked. So they managed to get rid of the carbon, by melting the iron in an open hearth and passing flames over it, and as the carbon is combustible it was gradually burned out. This made soft malleable iron, but not of the consistency to have the required strength or serve the purposes that are now served by steel. To bring it to the proper condition it was necessary to reintroduce a very small quantity of carbon so evenly that both the quantity and the distribution could be determined. This was done for many years by placing the bars of iron in a crucible or other [Pg 201] closed receptacle surrounded by charcoal, and subjecting them to intense heat for several hours or days. So the making of steel was a slow and expensive process until about the middle of the nineteenth century. Then Sir Henry Bessemer, an Englishman, discovered that by forcing air into the bottom of a great retort containing molten iron the oxygen of the air would combine with the carbon of the iron and in a few minutes the objectionable carbon would be all burned out, and that by then reintroducing in this molten mass of pure iron the required amount of carbon in the form of spiegel iron or ferro manganese, steel could be made much more cheaply and quickly than before. William Kelly, an American, also devised a similar process about the same time. Thus began the process of modern steel making, which has in a single half century increased tenfold the world’s consumption of steel and thus of iron, for a very large proportion of the iron now utilized in the world is transformed into steel before being applied to the service which it is to perform for men.

While all this was happening—and even long before the later events mentioned—ironworkers discovered that the pig iron from the furnaces had so much carbon in it that it couldn't be effectively worked. They found a way to remove the carbon by melting the iron in an open hearth and passing flames over it, which gradually burned off the combustible carbon. This produced soft, malleable iron, but it wasn't strong enough to fulfill the roles that steel now does. To make it suitable, they needed to carefully reintroduce a very small amount of carbon so that both the amount and distribution were precise. For many years, this was achieved by placing iron bars in a crucible or other closed container surrounded by charcoal and exposing them to intense heat for several hours or even days. As a result, steel production was a slow and costly process until about the middle of the nineteenth century. Then, Sir Henry Bessemer, an Englishman, discovered that by forcing air into the bottom of a large retort filled with molten iron, the oxygen from the air would react with the carbon in the iron, burning off the unwanted carbon in just a few minutes. Following that, by adding the necessary amount of carbon back into this pure molten iron using spiegel iron or ferro manganese, steel could be produced much more cheaply and quickly than before. Around the same time, William Kelly, an American, created a similar process. This marked the beginning of modern steel manufacturing, which over the past fifty years has increased global steel consumption tenfold. Now, a large portion of the iron used worldwide is converted into steel before it's put to use.

In all the processes by which iron and steel making have been transformed from the simple methods of a century or two centuries ago to the present system by which a single establishment may now make in a week or month or year as much iron or steel as the whole world then made in an equal length of time, machinery and capital have been the great causes of the development—machinery for digging iron and coal, for transporting them to the place of manufacture, for handling the material in the natural state, for handling it in the furnace, for handling it in the molten state, for rolling and shaping it after it passes from the molten state to that in which it begins to take the form of the finished product, and capital to purchase this machinery and the great quantities of material required. “The very richness of our resources,” says J. Russell Smith in The Story of Iron and Steel, “has made such a wealth of opportunity for occupation in the United States [Pg 202] that labor is and has been scarce. As a consequence the American iron industry has been driven over to a machine basis, and its very success has arisen from the fact that a scarcity of labor has compelled the introduction of machinery which has surpassed the dreams of its inventors. In the iron and steel industry of America man does little more than touch levers, while the balance is done by steam and electricity. Four large Bessemer converters, holding 15 or 20 tons of molten iron do their work by an air blast driven through the molten material by the force of an engine. The electric cranes swing the 20-ton charges and the heavy converters as easily as a schoolboy swings his dinner pail, and pours the new made steel into a metal mold which stands on a tram ready to take it to the hydraulic machine which draws the mold off the red-hot ingot. The manless way in which this great steel ingot is turned into a useful piece of steel never ceases to be a marvel. The great machines are seen but the plant seems to be deserted. Then there arises a rumble and roaring noise and the great piece of red-hot metal is seen to travel with all the independence of a serpent across a lot of black rollers and dive into the jaws of the rollers which squeeze it into flatter shape. Then it stops, turns over and dives again through the same rollers, which flatten it still more. After this has been repeated a few times you discover, standing on a high platform, a man or two pulling the levers which start the machinery of the six or seven thousand horsepower engines that drive the knowing rollers which are crushing and rolling the ingot into the shapes which man can use.”

In all the ways that iron and steel production have evolved from the basic techniques of a century or two ago to the current systems where one facility can produce in a week, month, or year as much iron or steel as the entire world did in the same time frame, machinery and capital have played pivotal roles in this development—machinery for extracting iron and coal, for transporting them to manufacturing sites, for handling materials in their raw form, for processing them in the furnace, for working with them while molten, and for rolling and shaping them once they start to take on the final product's shape. Capital is needed to buy this machinery and the large amounts of raw materials required. “The very richness of our resources,” says J. Russell Smith in The Story of Iron and Steel, “has created such a wealth of job opportunities in the United States that labor is and has been scarce. As a result, the American iron industry has moved to a machine-based system, and its success has come from the fact that a lack of labor has forced the adoption of machinery that has exceeded the visions of its creators. In the American iron and steel industry, workers mainly pull levers while steam and electricity handle the rest. Four large Bessemer converters, each holding 15 to 20 tons of molten iron, operate using an air blast driven through the molten material by an engine. Electric cranes lift 20-ton loads and the heavy converters as easily as a schoolboy swings his lunchbox, pouring the newly made steel into a metal mold on a track ready for the hydraulic machine that removes the mold from the red-hot ingot. The way this massive steel ingot is transformed into a useful piece of steel is always fascinating. The big machines are visible, but the facility seems empty. Then suddenly, a rumble and roaring noise occur, and the large piece of red-hot metal is seen moving like a serpent across a series of black rollers, diving into the rollers that compress it into a flatter shape. Then it stops, flips over, and dives again through the same rollers, further flattening it. After repeating this several times, you notice, standing on a high platform, a man or two pulling the levers that start the machinery of the six or seven thousand horsepower engines that drive the skilled rollers, which are crushing and shaping the ingot into forms that can be used by people.”

“Perhaps the greatest difference between English and American steel works,” said an English writer on this subject, “is the absence of laborers in the American mills. The large and growing employment of propelling and directing machinery is responsible for this. In a mill rolling three thousand tons of rails in a day not a dozen men [Pg 203] are to be seen on the mill floor. To witness in such a mill the conversion in a half hour of a red-hot steel ingot weighing several tons into finished stamped steel rails ninety feet long, and all this perfectly, by the agency of unseen hands, is to gain new ideas of the possibilities of mechanism, of the subservience of matter to mind.”

“Maybe the biggest difference between English and American steel mills,” said an English writer on this topic, “is the lack of workers in the American facilities. The extensive use of machines for operation and control is what causes this. In a mill that processes three thousand tons of rails a day, you can hardly see a dozen men on the production floor. Watching a mill transform a red-hot steel ingot weighing several tons into finished stamped steel rails that are ninety feet long in just half an hour, all done flawlessly by unseen machines, really changes your perspective on what technology can achieve and how matter can be controlled by human ingenuity.”

These are some of the steps by which the systems of the manufacturing world have been, in the past 150 years, transformed from household work, or that of the small shop, into that of the factory—and the factory developed into enormous establishments through the investment of great sums of money in the purchase and installation of ever-improving machinery, more ingenious, more productive, more costly, but turning out more and better of the finished product with each new device and new investment of capital.

These are some of the steps that have changed the manufacturing systems over the past 150 years, moving from home-based work or small shops to factories—and those factories have grown into massive establishments through large investments in purchasing and installing increasingly advanced machinery that is more innovative, more productive, and more expensive, but also produces more and better end products with each new device and investment of capital.

III. DEVELOPMENT OF THE FACTORY SYSTEM.

The inventions by which the manufacturing of the world was transformed from the household and the workshop to the great factory were the result of years, generations indeed, of study of conditions one by one as they arose. “No one of the inventions which were greatest in their effect,” says Hobson, “was in the main attributable to the effort or ability of a single man: each represented in its successful shape the addition of many successive increments of discovery; in most cases the successful invention was the slightly superior survivor of many similar attempts. This is the history of most inventions. The pressure of industrial circumstances directs the intelligence of many minds toward the comprehension of some single point of difficulty, the common knowledge of the age induces many to reach similar solutions, that solution which is slightly better adapted to the facts comes out victorious, and the inventor, purveyor or in some cases the robber is crowned as a great inventive genius.”

The inventions that transformed global manufacturing from homes and workshops to large factories were the result of years—indeed, generations—of studying conditions as they came up. “None of the inventions that had the greatest impact,” Hobson says, “can primarily be credited to the effort or talent of one individual: each one, in its successful form, resulted from many continuous discoveries; in most cases, the successful invention was just a slightly better version among many similar attempts. This is the story of most inventions. The demands of industry focus the attention of many minds on understanding some specific problem, the shared knowledge of the time leads many to find similar solutions, and the one that is just a bit more suited to the facts emerges as the winner, with the inventor, creator, or sometimes even a thief being celebrated as a great innovator.”

[Pg 204] England was the earliest scene of the development of the factory system, the bringing together of great buildings and centers of great masses of machinery operated by water or steam power and manned by great numbers of people—for however ingenious the machine a certain amount of human intelligence is necessary for its management and the conduct of the work which it is to perform. The reasons for the earlier development in England are not difficult to find. It had its colonies in all parts of the world, from which to draw the raw material and in which to market the manufactures, for it for many years discouraged or prohibited manufacture in the colonies; it had great shipping facilities for transporting its products to all parts of the world, and to bring raw material and food supplies to its workers at home; the ownership of its lands in great estates had a tendency to send to the cities and manufacturing centers that part of the population which under other circumstances would have employed itself in agriculture; the laboring population yielded more readily to the methods of the manufacturing interests than in other countries where trade guilds determined more definitely the occupations and methods of occupation of the working classes; and the comparative freedom from wars permitted a more rapid growth than that of other countries in which disturbances of this character were more frequent and more liable to frequency than in an insular country, England. “When Crompton’s mule, Cartwright’s power loom and Watt’s engines were transforming the industry of England,” says Hobson, “her continental rivals had all their energies absorbed in wars and political revolutions.”

[Pg 204] England was the first place to develop the factory system, bringing together large buildings and massive machinery powered by water or steam, operated by many people. Even though machines are clever, they still need human intelligence to manage them and oversee the work they do. The reasons for England's early development are easy to identify. It had colonies across the globe to source raw materials and sell its manufactured goods, as it had long discouraged or banned manufacturing in those colonies. England also had excellent shipping capabilities to transport its products worldwide and bring raw materials and food supplies to its workers at home. The ownership of land in large estates often pushed people from rural areas to cities and manufacturing centers, who otherwise would have worked in agriculture. The working population adapted more easily to the manufacturing methods than in other countries, where trade guilds had a stronger hold on job types and practices. Additionally, England's relative absence of wars allowed for faster growth compared to other nations that faced more frequent disruptions. “When Crompton’s mule, Cartwright’s power loom, and Watt’s engines were transforming the industry of England,” Hobson states, “her continental rivals were consumed by wars and political revolutions.”

Much of the wool and flax required in the English industries was produced at home. The colonies supplied the other fibers; the ships returning from their voyages to the colonies brought the raw silk; the absence of mountains to separate the country and the people into districts and classes enabled the interchange of labor and materials; the [Pg 205] early development of rivers and canals gave cheap transportation; the plentiful supply of coal encouraged the development of steam power; and the proximity of iron ore and coal aided in developing that other great manufacturing industry, iron and steel. Mr. Mulhall, the celebrated statistician, estimates the value of the manufactures of the United Kingdom in 1780 at 177 million pounds sterling, France 147 million, Germany 50 million, Austria 30 million, Russia, Italy and Spain 10 million each, and the United States 15 million. In 1896 he estimated the value of the manufactures of the same countries as follows: United Kingdom, 876 million pounds sterling; France, 596 million; Germany, 690 million; Austria, 328 million; Russia, 380 million; Italy, 190 million; Spain, 121 million; and the United States, 1,980 million. According to his estimate the gain in the 116 years, from 1780 to 1896, was: United Kingdom, from 191 to 876 million pounds sterling; France, from 115 to 596 million; Germany, from 50 to 690 million; Austria, from 30 to 328 million; Russia, from 10 to 380 million; and the United States, from 15 to 1,980 million. Mr. Mulhall’s estimates put the total value of the manufactures of continental Europe in 1780 at about 1½ times those of the United Kingdom; in 1896 at about 3 times those of the United Kingdom. His estimates put the value of manufactures in the United States in 1870 at about 3⅓ per cent that of all Europe; in 1896 at about 55 per cent that of all Europe.

Much of the wool and flax needed in English industries was produced locally. The colonies provided other fibers; ships returning from their journeys to the colonies brought back raw silk. The lack of mountains separating the country and its people into different regions and classes allowed for the exchange of labor and materials. The early development of rivers and canals offered cheap transportation, the abundant supply of coal promoted the use of steam power, and the nearby presence of iron ore and coal helped grow the iron and steel manufacturing industry. Mr. Mulhall, the well-known statistician, estimates the value of the UK's manufacturing in 1780 at 177 million pounds sterling, France at 147 million, Germany at 50 million, Austria at 30 million, and Russia, Italy, and Spain each at 10 million, with the United States at 15 million. In 1896, he estimated the value of manufacturing in the same countries as follows: United Kingdom, 876 million pounds sterling; France, 596 million; Germany, 690 million; Austria, 328 million; Russia, 380 million; Italy, 190 million; Spain, 121 million; and the United States, 1,980 million. By his estimates, the increase over the 116 years from 1780 to 1896 was as follows: United Kingdom, from 191 to 876 million pounds sterling; France, from 115 to 596 million; Germany, from 50 to 690 million; Austria, from 30 to 328 million; Russia, from 10 to 380 million; and the United States, from 15 to 1,980 million. Mr. Mulhall’s estimates indicate that the total value of manufacturing in continental Europe in 1780 was about 1½ times that of the United Kingdom; by 1896, it was about 3 times that of the United Kingdom. His estimates assessed the value of manufacturing in the United States in 1870 at around 3⅓ percent of the total for all of Europe; in 1896, this increased to about 55 percent of that total.

It must not be supposed, however, that this transformation was, by any means, instantaneous. It was, in fact, a matter of slow growth, even in the older countries, and still more so in those countries which had not yet developed their natural products or their agricultural industries. In the case of the United States, for example, the transformation from the hand to the machine methods did not come until many years after that of the leading countries of Europe. The reason for this slow movement on [Pg 206] the part of the United States is not difficult to understand. Her people were chiefly engaged in agriculture, in felling the trees and clearing the lands in the eastern part of the country, and in opening farms on the prairies of the great West. Those who had capital to invest in enterprises other than that of agriculture gave their attention to the construction of methods of transportation, first, toll roads, stage coaches and pack trains, then, canals, and finally railways. This occupied the attention of the people of this new country for a generation after the people of Europe and especially England were engaged in developing their manufacturing industries.

It shouldn't be assumed, however, that this change was instantaneous. In fact, it was a gradual process, even in the older countries, and even more so in those countries that hadn't yet developed their natural resources or agricultural industries. For instance, in the United States, the shift from manual to machine methods didn't happen until many years after it did in the leading countries of Europe. The reason for this slow progress in the United States is easy to see. Most people were focused on agriculture, cutting down trees and clearing land in the eastern part of the country, and starting farms on the prairies of the West. Those with money to invest in ventures beyond agriculture concentrated on building transportation systems—first toll roads, stagecoaches, and pack trains, then canals, and finally railways. This kept the attention of the people in this new country occupied for a generation, while the people in Europe, especially England, were busy developing their manufacturing industries.

So it is not surprising to see that Mr. Mulhall’s figures show that English manufactures in 1820 were nearly 6 times as much as those of the United States, and in 1840, 4 times as much as those of this country; and even in 1860, considerably exceeded our own. But in the next twenty-year period there came a great change. The Civil War in the United States, with the home demands in the manufacturing section, the North, rapidly developed the manufacturing industries, and the development thus created continued after the close of that unhappy period. So his figures indicate that in 1888, the next date which his table touches, that our manufactures were 1¾ times as much as those of the United Kingdom, and in 1896, 2¼ times as much in value as those of the United Kingdom and half as great as those of all Europe. Accepting the figures of Eugene Parsons, elsewhere referred to, for the European countries in 1904, and accepting the official figures of the United States for that same year, we find that the figures of the value of manufactures in the United States are nearly 3 times those accredited to the United Kingdom and but little less than those of all Europe.

So it’s not surprising that Mr. Mulhall’s statistics show that English manufacturing in 1820 was nearly 6 times that of the United States, and in 1840, it was 4 times higher than that of this country; even in 1860, it was significantly more. However, a major shift occurred in the next twenty years. The Civil War in the United States, along with the domestic demands in the manufacturing sector of the North, quickly boosted the manufacturing industries, and this development continued even after the end of that unfortunate time. His figures suggest that by 1888, the next date his table covers, manufacturers in the U.S. were 1¾ times as much as those in the United Kingdom, and by 1896, they were 2¼ times more valuable than those in the United Kingdom and half as much as all of Europe combined. If we take the figures from Eugene Parsons, mentioned elsewhere, for the European countries in 1904, along with the official figures from the United States for that same year, we find that the value of U.S. manufacturing is nearly 3 times that attributed to the United Kingdom and just slightly less than that of all Europe.

It is proper to say, however, that these statements, whether of Mulhall, Parsons, or other authorities on this subject, are liable to be extremely misleading unless carefully [Pg 207] and intelligently considered. The reason of this is found chiefly in the fact that the official figures of the United States are made up on a materially different basis from those of the other countries in question. To be sure, the figures of the United States are official and therefore may be considered reliable as to the facts which they purport to show, but in fact some of the things which they purport to show are presumably quite different from those quoted for the other countries included in these estimates—for they can be only estimates for the other countries, since no country other than the United States takes a census of manufactures (England is taking one as this text is being issued, but has not yet completed it), and the figures quoted regarding their manufactures are necessarily estimates. Generally speaking, it may be said that the census of the United States includes certain articles which are not usually classified as manufactures in other countries, such as products of slaughtering, canning, the milling industry, etc. Aside from this it must also be remembered that the usually quoted figures of the United States’ manufactures include many duplications, due, as elsewhere explained, to the fact that the total so quoted is merely an aggregation of the product of all factories; and as the product of one factory often becomes the manufacturing material of another, its value is again reported by the manufacturer who reports merely the total value of his products. These duplications are so numerous and prevail in such important and costly articles that the census estimates the net or true value of our manufactures at but about two-thirds as much as the usually quoted figures of gross products. It would appear, therefore, that the usually quoted figures of “manufactures in the United States,” when compared with the estimate of manufacturing in other countries, should be reduced about one-third to make them properly comparable with those usually quoted for the other countries of the world. Even [Pg 208] if this were done, however, it would show the value of the United States’ manufactures probably about twice as great as those of the United Kingdom and probably little less than those of continental Europe.

It’s important to note that the statements made by Mulhall, Parsons, or other experts on this topic can be very misleading unless they are carefully and thoughtfully examined. This is mainly because the official statistics from the United States are based on a significantly different methodology compared to those from other countries. While the U.S. figures are official and are generally reliable regarding the facts they represent, some of what they claim to show is likely quite different from the data reported for other countries included in these estimates. This is because estimates are the only data available for those countries, as no other nation besides the United States conducts a census of manufacturing (England is conducting one as this text is published, but it hasn't been completed yet), so the numbers for their manufacturing are necessarily approximations. In general, the U.S. census includes certain items that aren’t typically categorized as manufacturing in other countries, like slaughtering and canning products, as well as outputs from the milling industry. Additionally, it should be noted that the commonly cited figures for U.S. manufacturing often include a lot of overlaps, as explained earlier. This is because the total reported is simply an aggregation of all factory outputs. Since the product from one factory frequently becomes the raw material for another, its value is counted again by the manufacturer reporting just the total value of their outputs. These overlaps are so numerous and prevalent in significant, costly products that the census estimates the actual or net value of our manufacturing to be only about two-thirds of the commonly cited gross product figures. Thus, it seems that the standard figures for "manufacturing in the United States," when compared to manufacturing estimates from other countries, should be reduced by about one-third to make them appropriately comparable with the figures usually quoted from other parts of the world. Even with this adjustment, it would likely still show that the value of U.S. manufacturing is approximately double that of the United Kingdom and likely just slightly less than that of continental Europe.

Taking Mulhall’s figures for the other countries which he includes, as presented in a table on another page of this text, it will be seen that the chief growth in manufacturing during the 116 years covered by the table under consideration has occurred in the last third of the period. English manufactures, he says, grew from 177 million pounds sterling to 290 million in the 40-year period from 1780 to 1820; from 290 to 577 million in the next 40 years, from 1820 to 1860; and from 577 to 976 million in the 36 years from 1860 to 1896—a growth of 113 million pounds sterling in the first 40 years, of 287 million in the second 40 years, and of 400 million in the third period of 36 years. Germany showed a more rapid growth in the third period; the growth in the first 40-year period being from 50 million pounds sterling to 85 million; in the second 40-year period, from 85 to 310 million; and in the third period, of 36 years only, from 310 to 690 million. France has not made as rapid a gain as Germany, the figures showing her products in 1780, 147 million pounds sterling; in 1840, 220 million; in 1860, 380 million; and in 1896, 596 million.

Taking Mulhall’s figures for the other countries he includes, as shown in a table on another page of this text, it’s clear that the main growth in manufacturing during the 116 years covered by the table has happened in the last third of the period. According to him, English manufacturing increased from 177 million pounds sterling to 290 million over the 40-year span from 1780 to 1820; then from 290 to 577 million in the following 40 years, from 1820 to 1860; and from 577 to 976 million in the 36 years from 1860 to 1896—a growth of 113 million pounds sterling in the first 40 years, 287 million in the second 40 years, and 400 million in the final 36-year period. Germany experienced faster growth in the third period; its growth in the first 40-year period was from 50 million pounds sterling to 85 million; in the second 40-year period, it rose from 85 to 310 million; and in the 36-year third period, it went from 310 to 690 million. France hasn’t seen growth as quick as Germany, with her figures showing 147 million pounds sterling in 1780; 220 million in 1840; 380 million in 1860; and 596 million in 1896.

The total of Mulhall’s table, including the somewhat over-estimated figures of the United States, and relating chiefly to the products of Europe and the United States, show total manufactures of all the countries named, in 1780, 480 million pounds sterling; in 1820, 865 million; in 1860, 2,404 million; and in 1896, 5,710 million, again indicating that the chief growth has occurred in the last third of the period under consideration, the period of transformation from the hand industries to those of machine production in conjunction with vast sums of capital and plentiful transportation facilities for collecting the raw material and distributing the finished product.

The total in Mulhall’s table, which includes the slightly over-estimated figures from the United States and focuses mainly on the products from Europe and the U.S., shows total manufacturing across all the countries listed as follows: in 1780, 480 million pounds sterling; in 1820, 865 million; in 1860, 2,404 million; and in 1896, 5,710 million. This again highlights that most of the growth occurred in the last third of the period being examined, marking the shift from manual industries to machine production, alongside significant amounts of capital and ample transportation options for collecting raw materials and distributing finished products.

[Pg 209] When we consider nations or groups of people and their use of modern methods of manufacturing, we may properly say that the principal manufacturing sections of the world are western Europe and the United States, and that, as above indicated, the bulk of the world’s manufactures by the factory process are now produced in those two sections of the world. Manufacturing by machinery may perhaps be said to have originated in England, spreading thence to France, to Germany, and westward to the United States. More recently it has extended in a somewhat limited form into Canada in the west and India and Japan at the extreme east. India has utilized modern methods of manufacture, especially in cottons and certain other industries, for more than a score of years, while the one other country of the Orient which has as yet entered the field of machine manufacture, Japan, though somewhat later in adopting machine methods, has been more active and extended modern manufacturing to a much greater variety of industries than have the people of India.

[Pg 209] When we look at countries or groups of people and how they use modern manufacturing methods, we can reasonably say that the main manufacturing regions in the world are Western Europe and the United States. As mentioned earlier, most of the world’s manufactured goods produced in factories now come from these two areas. Machinery-based manufacturing likely started in England and then spread to France, Germany, and further west to the United States. Recently, it has also made its way, though in a limited capacity, into Canada in the west and India and Japan in the far east. India has been using modern manufacturing techniques, especially in cotton and a few other industries, for over twenty years, while Japan, the only other Eastern country to venture into machine manufacturing, although adopting these methods a bit later, has been more proactive and has broadened modern manufacturing to a wider range of industries than India has.

While certain of the European countries were earlier in the manufacturing field than the United States, the larger population, the greater supply of natural materials, the larger supplies of fuel for cheap power, the ingenuity of the American workman, and the enormous domestic demand of an active and prosperous people, have brought the United States clearly to the head of the list of manufacturing nations. It may safely be said that the value of manufactures produced in the United States is approximately twice as great as that of any other manufacturing nation, and that the stated value of our manufactures is nearly as great as the estimated value of the manufactures of all Europe. The latest official figures on the value of the manufactures of the United States are those of the Census Bureau, which put the value of manufactures produced in the calendar year 1904, as recorded by the Census of 1905, at 16,867 million dollars, including in this an [Pg 210] estimate of a little more than 2 billion dollars’ worth of manufactures classed as “mechanical and neighborhood industries,” which were included in all former census reports, but not recorded by the Census of 1905, which was by law merely a census of manufactures produced under “the factory system.”

While some European countries were ahead in manufacturing compared to the United States, the larger population, greater availability of natural resources, ample supplies of cheap fuel, the creativity of American workers, and the huge domestic demand from an active and prosperous population have placed the United States at the top of the manufacturing nations list. It's safe to say that the value of goods produced in the United States is about twice that of any other manufacturing country, and the reported value of our products is nearly equal to the estimated value of all goods produced in Europe. The most recent official figures from the Census Bureau indicate that the value of goods produced in the United States in the calendar year 1904, as noted in the Census of 1905, was 16,867 million dollars. This figure includes an estimate of just over 2 billion dollars for goods categorized as "mechanical and neighborhood industries," which were included in all previous census reports but not recorded in the Census of 1905, which was legally limited to a census of goods produced under "the factory system." [Pg 210]

No other country than the United States takes a periodic census of its manufactures. The United Kingdom is at the present time about taking for the first time a census of its manufactures, but no figures with reference thereto are as yet available. As a consequence all statements regarding the value of manufactures of European countries, or indeed of any country other than the United States, are estimates and estimates only. True, they are based upon certain known facts of quantities of raw materials consumed in manufacturing, values of manufactures exported, and the estimated proportion which these form of the total manufactures; but in no other country than the United States are there available official statements of the total value of manufactures produced in the country in question. Therefore the estimates of the value of the manufactures produced by European countries which are quoted from time to time and which are presented elsewhere in this text, must be accepted as merely estimates. A comparatively recent estimate, and one which has been given wide publicity, and appears to have been generally accepted, is that of William J. Clark, published in The Engineering Magazine in 1904, which put the value of the manufactures of the United Kingdom at 5 billion dollars, Germany 4,600 million, France 3,450 million, Austria-Hungary 2 billion, Russia 1,980 million, Italy 1,700 million, Belgium 750 million. These estimates, if accepted, would bring the value of the manufactures of the countries enumerated to a figure slightly in excess of that officially reported by the Census Office as the value of the product of all manufacturing establishments of the United States in [Pg 211] 1904. The figures above quoted for certain European countries present however no estimate of the value of the product of Switzerland, Spain, Holland and the Scandinavian countries, so that it probably might be said with greater accuracy that the stated value of the manufactures of the United States is about equal to the estimated value of continental Europe, and about three times as great as the estimated value of the manufactures of the United Kingdom.

No other country besides the United States conducts a regular census of its manufacturing. The United Kingdom is currently preparing to take its first manufacturing census, but no data on this has been released yet. As a result, all statements about the value of manufacturing in European countries, or any country other than the United States, are only estimates. These estimates are based on known facts like the amount of raw materials used in production, the value of exports, and the estimated share these represent of total manufacturing; however, no official data on the overall value of manufacturing exists for countries other than the United States. Therefore, the estimates of manufacturing value from European countries that are referenced from time to time and presented in this text must be regarded as rough estimates. A relatively recent estimate that has received widespread attention and is generally accepted is from William J. Clark, published in The Engineering Magazine in 1904, which estimated the value of UK manufacturing at 5 billion dollars, Germany at 4.6 billion, France at 3.45 billion, Austria-Hungary at 2 billion, Russia at 1.98 billion, Italy at 1.7 billion, and Belgium at 750 million. If accepted, these estimates would put the total value of manufacturing in these countries slightly above the figure officially reported by the Census Office for all manufacturing in the United States in 1904. However, the figures quoted for certain European countries do not include estimates for Switzerland, Spain, the Netherlands, and the Scandinavian countries, so it may be more accurate to say that the stated value of manufacturing in the United States is roughly equal to the estimated value for continental Europe and about three times that of the estimated value of UK manufacturing.

It is proper, however, before leaving this question of the relative value of the manufactures of the various countries, to again call attention to the fact that the official figures of the value of manufactures produced in the United States include certain articles not classed in certain other countries as manufactures, and in addition to this contain many duplications due to the fact that the products of one manufacturer frequently become the raw material of another, and thus the grand totals which merely combine the stated value of the product of each manufacturer necessarily include a second and in some cases a third valuation of the products thus utilized. The manufacturer of yarn, for example, reports to the Census Office the full value of the product of his factory. The manufacturer of cloth, who utilized that yarn, also reports the full value of the product of his factory, and thus includes in that valuation the value of the yarn purchased by him but already reported by the manufacturer of yarn. The manufacturer of clothing, in stating the value of the product of his factory, includes the sums which he paid for the cloth already reported by the manufacturer of clothing and included in his statement. Thus many duplications occur in our census statement of the gross value of the products of the manufacturing industries of the United States. “This gross value,” says the Census Report of 1900, page cxxxix, “does not represent the final value of the manufactured products of the country. It does fairly represent [Pg 212] the total value of commercial transactions involved in manufacturing enterprises.... As the finished products of one branch of manufacture are constantly used as materials in other branches, in the ascending scale of modern industry, it follows that they are counted over and over again, swelling in this manner the gross total value of products. Thus in cotton manufacture, the product of the yarn mill, manufacturing yarn for sale as the material of the cloth mill, and the product of the cloth mill as the material for the manufacturer, so that by the time the aggregate is made the value of the yarn has been counted three times and the value of the cloth twice.... Duplications and re-duplications of this sort run all through the total value of products as reported by this (the Census) office. * * * The net or true value of the products is found by subtracting from the gross value the cost of all materials purchased in a partially manufactured form. In 1900 the cost of these manufactures was $4,633,804,967 and” (subtracting this sum from the gross value, $13,004,400,143), “the net value of products was therefore $8,370,595,176.”

It is important, however, before we wrap up this discussion about the relative value of manufacturing in different countries, to point out again that the official figures for the value of manufacturing in the United States include certain items that aren’t categorized as manufacturing in some other countries. Additionally, these figures often include duplicates because the products from one manufacturer frequently become the raw materials for another manufacturer. Therefore, the total values that simply add up the reported value of each manufacturer usually count some products multiple times, sometimes two or even three times. For instance, a yarn manufacturer reports the full value of what they produce to the Census Office. The cloth manufacturer who uses that yarn also reports the full value of their product, which includes the value of the yarn bought from the yarn manufacturer, who has already reported it. Similarly, when the clothing manufacturer states the value of what they make, they include the amount spent on the cloth, which has already been reported by the cloth manufacturer. This results in numerous duplications in the census report regarding the gross value of U.S. manufacturing products. “This gross value,” the Census Report of 1900 states on page cxxxix, “does not represent the final value of the manufactured products of the country. It does fairly represent the total value of commercial transactions involved in manufacturing enterprises.... As the finished products from one manufacturing branch are constantly used as materials in other branches, in the advancing hierarchy of modern industry, it follows that they get counted repeatedly, thereby inflating the gross total value of products. For example, in cotton manufacturing, the yarn mill's output, which produces yarn for sale to the cloth mill, and the cloth mill's output, which is used to make clothing, results in the value of yarn being counted three times and the value of cloth twice by the time the totals are calculated.... Such duplications and re-duplications permeate the total product value reported by this (the Census) office. * * * The actual or true value of the products is determined by subtracting the cost of all materials bought in a partially manufactured state from the gross value. In 1900, the cost of these manufactured materials was $4,633,804,967, and” (when this amount is subtracted from the gross value of $13,004,400,143), “the net value of the products was therefore $8,370,595,176.”

When it is further considered that the Census of Manufactures in the United States includes in its list of manufactures all products of slaughtering and meat-packing establishments wholesale, valued in 1905 at 112 million dollars, the product of printing and publishing newspapers and periodicals only, valued at 309 million, and the product of canning and preserving fish, oysters and vegetables, valued at over 100 million—it will be seen that an effort to determine even approximately the share of the world’s manufactures produced by the United States or by the various manufacturing nations of the world is a difficult—an impossible—task.

When we consider that the Census of Manufactures in the United States includes all products from slaughtering and meat-packing operations, which were valued at 112 million dollars in 1905, alongside the printing and publishing of newspapers and periodicals, valued at 309 million, and the canning and preserving of fish, oysters, and vegetables, valued at over 100 million, it becomes clear that trying to determine even roughly how much of the world's manufacturing is done by the United States or other manufacturing countries around the globe is a challenging — if not impossible — task.

It may safely be asserted, however, that the United States is the world’s greatest manufacturing nation, and that the value of our manufactures exceeds those of any other country. This is due, as already indicated, to the [Pg 213] fact that our supply of raw materials is greater than that of any other country, our supply of materials for producing power also greater than that of any other country, our use of machinery for manufacturing far in advance of that of any other nation, the activity of our inventors and the skill of our workmen quite equal to those of any other part of the world, and the demands of our home population upon our own manufacturers far in excess of those of any other country, both by reason of the large population and high purchasing power of a people prosperous and active in all lines of industry—agriculture, transportation, manufacture. The country which produces three-fourths of the world’s cotton, twice as much iron and steel as any other single nation, as much copper as all of the remainder of the world combined, more of wood suitable for use in manufacturing than any other country, more wool than any other of the manufacturing nations, and a population much larger than that of any other country actively engaged in the manufacturing industries, has quite naturally and almost necessarily become the leading manufacturer of the world.

It can confidently be said that the United States is the world’s top manufacturing nation, and the value of our products surpasses that of any other country. This is largely because our supply of raw materials is greater than that of any other nation, our resources for generating power are also unmatched, our use of manufacturing machinery is significantly ahead of others, and the creativity of our inventors and the skills of our workers are on par with those from anywhere else in the world. Additionally, the demand from our domestic population for our products far exceeds that of any other country, driven by a large population and high purchasing power of a prosperous and dynamic workforce across various sectors—agriculture, transportation, and manufacturing. The country that produces three-fourths of the world’s cotton, twice as much iron and steel as any other nation, as much copper as all other countries combined, more usable wood for manufacturing than any other, more wool than any other manufacturing country, and has a population significantly larger than that of other manufacturing nations, has naturally and almost inevitably become the leading manufacturer in the world.

The growth of the manufacturing industry in the United States has been phenomenal. Stated in the methods of valuation followed by the census above referred to—the gross valuation—the value of manufactures produced in the United States has been, speaking in round terms, in 1850, 1 billion dollars, in 1860, a little less than 2 billion, in 1870, 4¼ billion, in 1880, 5⅓ billion, in 1890, 9⅓ billion, in 1900, 13 billion, and in 1905, a little less than 17 billion, though the figures usually quoted for 1905 are 14.8 billion, owing to the fact that the Census of 1905 only included factory products, and added parenthetically an estimate of 2 billion as the probable value of the “mechanical and neighborhood industries,” thus bringing up to nearly 17 billion the total properly comparable with [Pg 214] the totals of earlier periods, which in all cases included the mechanical and neighborhood industries.

The growth of the manufacturing industry in the United States has been incredible. According to the valuation methods used by the census mentioned earlier—the gross valuation—the value of manufactured goods produced in the U.S. has been, roughly speaking, 1 billion dollars in 1850, just under 2 billion in 1860, 4¼ billion in 1870, 5⅓ billion in 1880, 9⅓ billion in 1890, 13 billion in 1900, and just under 17 billion in 1905. However, the figures typically cited for 1905 are 14.8 billion because the Census of 1905 only included factory products and added an estimate of 2 billion for the likely value of “mechanical and neighborhood industries.” This brings the total close to 17 billion, making it comparable to totals from earlier periods, which all included mechanical and neighborhood industries. [Pg 214]

That this rapid growth in the value of manufactures has been far in excess of the consuming capacity of the home population is evidenced by the growth in exportation of manufactures, which aggregated in 1880, 122 million dollars, in 1890, 179 million, in 1900, 484 million, and in 1908, 750 million. Manufactures formed in 1880 but 15 per cent of the total exports, in 1890, 23 per cent, in 1900, 35 per cent, and in 1908, 41 per cent of the total merchandise exported from the United States.

The rapid increase in the value of manufactured goods has significantly outpaced the home population's ability to consume, as shown by the rise in exports of these products, which totaled $122 million in 1880, $179 million in 1890, $484 million in 1900, and $750 million in 1908. In 1880, manufactured goods made up only 15 percent of total exports; by 1890, this rose to 23 percent; in 1900, it reached 35 percent; and by 1908, it was 41 percent of all merchandise exported from the United States.

IV. CAPITAL IN MANUFACTURING.

Another factor which entered into the modern system of production, and a very important one, was that of capital. The factory could not be established or operated without considerable amounts of money or its equivalent, credit. The machinery which transformed the raw material into the finished product, the material itself, the very buildings in which the work was performed, the payment for the transportation which brought it together, the wages of the men and women engaged in the work, all required capital, and in large sums. The accumulation of this capital, its management, the keeping of accounts of cost of material and labor and of the finished product, required financial skill and acquaintance in the markets in which this capital could be obtained; for often the sums required were in excess of the quantity possessed by the individual who had invested his all in the buildings and machinery, and must needs borrow of some other capitalist the additional sums required for purchasing material and paying the wages of his workmen. Sometimes the owner of the capital preferred to supply it and take a proportionate share in the earnings of the factory, and thus developed the company. Then, as the business grew and the investments of various men in a single establishment increased, [Pg 215] it became necessary for them to take an active share in the management either in person or by representatives who became known as the “directors” of the work.

Another important factor that influenced the modern production system was capital. Establishing and running a factory required substantial amounts of money or credit. The machinery that changed raw materials into finished products, the materials themselves, the buildings where the work was done, the costs of transportation that brought everything together, and the wages for the workers all demanded significant capital. Accumulating this capital, managing it, and keeping track of the costs of materials, labor, and the final product required financial expertise and knowledge of the markets where this capital could be sourced. Often, the amount needed exceeded what the individual who invested everything in the buildings and machinery could afford and they had to borrow from another investor to secure the extra funds needed for buying materials and paying workers. Sometimes, the capital owner preferred to provide the funds and receive a share of the factory's profits, leading to the development of companies. As the business expanded and multiple investors put money into a single operation, it became essential for them to take an active role in management, either personally or through representatives known as "directors" of the operation.

Thus arose the successors of the individual manufacturer, the company, and the corporation. Man must die and the death of an individual manufacturer, or the manager of a manufacturing firm or partnership, must affect disadvantageously the interests of the factory and its employes. Thus the importance of organizations which would continue unchanged in form and general management in case of the absence or death of any individual. This was one of the reasons for the establishment of the corporation. More important than this was the facility which it offered to holders of capital in sums large or small to invest their money in manufacturing without being compelled to give their individual attention to the industry in which the money was invested. The board of directors, which the investors might choose, managed the business either by personal attention or by the selection of competent and experienced persons for that service, and the investor felt assured that his money would be properly managed by the competent business men forming the board of directors and the experts whom these directors might employ to manage the details. Hence the corporation, under which the manufacturing establishments grew to enormous proportions, employing thousands and tens of thousands of people, and bringing material from the places in which it could be most cheaply obtained, investing money if need be in facilities for transporting and even producing the raw material, and cheapening the cost of production.

Thus came the successors of the individual manufacturer: the company and the corporation. People die, and the death of an individual manufacturer or the manager of a manufacturing firm or partnership can negatively impact the interests of the factory and its employees. This highlighted the need for organizations that would remain unchanged in structure and general management in case any individual was absent or passed away. This was one of the reasons for creating the corporation. More importantly, it provided a way for capital holders, whether their investments were large or small, to invest their money in manufacturing without having to manage the industry themselves. The board of directors, which investors could choose, managed the business either through direct involvement or by selecting qualified and experienced individuals for that role. Investors felt confident that their money would be well-managed by the capable business people on the board and the experts these directors might hire to handle the details. As a result, the corporation enabled manufacturing establishments to grow to huge sizes, employing thousands and tens of thousands of people, sourcing materials from the cheapest locations, and investing money when necessary in transportation facilities and even in producing raw materials, all to reduce production costs.

Another step which increased the importance of capital as a factor in the great manufacturing industries of the world came in more recent combinations of great corporations, in which a number of great manufacturing establishments agree to operate under one general management, [Pg 216] thus adjusting production in the various lines of manufacture to the general demand, existing supply and prospective consuming power of the markets, establishing systematic methods for exploiting and selling the finished product, and so further minimizing cost of production and distribution. This last combination, the corporation of corporations, is generally known as the “trust” or “combine,” and under it the great manufacturing industries of the world have reached their greatest development, the cost of production has been minimized, the field for the selection of the materials has been enlarged, and the area in which the products are offered for sale also greatly extended.

Another step that increased the importance of capital as a factor in the major manufacturing industries of the world occurred with the more recent merging of large corporations, where several major manufacturing facilities agree to operate under one overall management, [Pg 216] which aligns production across different lines with the overall demand, current supply, and potential buying power of the markets. This creates systematic methods for promoting and selling the finished products, further reducing production and distribution costs. This latest merger, known as the “trust” or “combine,” has allowed the major manufacturing industries worldwide to reach their peak development, minimizing production costs, expanding material selection, and significantly broadening the areas where the products are sold.

While these great organizations, made up by placing under one general management a number of great establishments manufacturing articles of like character, are doubtless able to reduce the cost of production and distribution and prevent production in excess of probable demand, it is also true that they are in many cases able to exercise a greater control over prices of labor, of material and of finished product than when operating singly.

While these large organizations, formed by bringing together several major companies that produce similar products under one management, can undoubtedly lower production and distribution costs and avoid overproduction, it's also true that they can often exert more control over the prices of labor, materials, and finished goods than when operating independently.

Meantime the world’s supply of money for investing in manufacturing, and the industries which contribute thereto, greatly increased. The world’s gold production in the decade ending with 1840 averaged but 13½ million dollars per annum. Then, owing to the gold discoveries in California and a little later in Australia, the production so much increased that the annual average in the decade ending with 1860 was 135 million dollars per annum, or ten times as much as on the average in the decade ending with 1840. For the next 35 years the production averaged about 125 million per annum. Then, suddenly, through the discoveries of great gold deposits in Africa and Alaska, the production began to exceed 200 million per annum, then 300 million, and in 1906, 1907, 1908 and 1909 averaged [Pg 217] more than 400 million per annum, or as much in a single year as in the 40 years from 1800 to 1840.

Meanwhile, the world’s supply of money for investing in manufacturing and the industries that support it significantly increased. The world’s gold production in the decade ending in 1840 averaged only $13.5 million per year. Then, due to the gold discoveries in California and later in Australia, production rose dramatically, with an annual average of $135 million in the decade ending in 1860, or ten times more than the average in the decade ending in 1840. For the next 35 years, production averaged around $125 million per year. Then, suddenly, with the discoveries of large gold deposits in Africa and Alaska, production began to exceed $200 million per year, then $300 million, and from 1906 to 1909, it averaged more than $400 million per year, or as much in a single year as in the 40 years from 1800 to 1840.

Gold, unlike most other productions prized by man, is not consumed. It has enduring qualities; and the facility with which it can be transformed without material loss from one form for use to any other required form enables man to retain and accumulate a large part of the products of a long period. The wheat produced in one year is eaten before the next year is ended. The cotton crop of one summer is turned into clothing and worn to rags by the time another crop is ready for the factory and workshop. But the gold is conserved and utilized as money or the basis of money, and the accumulations of the recurring years merely increase the stock of that generally accepted medium of exchange. To be sure a small share, perhaps one-fifth, is used in manufacturing and the arts, and a small percentage lost in various ways; but probably three-fourths of the gold product enters circulation in the form of money or its equivalent, and thus increases very rapidly the world’s money supply.

Gold, unlike most other things people value, doesn’t get consumed. It lasts a long time, and it can easily be reshaped without losing any material, allowing people to hold onto and accumulate a significant portion of what they’ve produced over time. The wheat harvested in one year is eaten before the next year is over. The cotton grown in one summer is made into clothes and worn out by the time the next harvest is ready for factories and workshops. But gold is preserved and used as money or as the basis for money, and the accumulations over the years simply add to the supply of this widely accepted medium of exchange. Of course, a small portion—about one-fifth—is used in manufacturing and the arts, and a small percentage is lost in various ways; however, probably three-quarters of the gold produced goes into circulation as money or its equivalent, significantly increasing the world’s money supply.

Meantime the systems built up in the business world by which business is performed with mere pieces of paper which represent the gold and silver accumulations have greatly multiplied the available stock of money; and the ease with which it may be transferred from place to place, from country to country, and from continent to continent also adds to its availability and frequency of use in the world’s transactions. The supply of that article which the manufacturing and business world terms “money,” whether in the form of gold, silver, paper, credits, instruments of exchange, or otherwise, has increased beyond accurate computation. The world’s stock of gold has, according to the estimates of experts, doubled in the last 25 years; and it is probable that the supplies of other forms of currency; which serve as money; have increased quite as rapidly.

In the meantime, the systems established in the business world that allow transactions to be carried out with simple pieces of paper representing gold and silver have significantly increased the available supply of money. The ease of transferring this money from one place to another, from country to country, and from continent to continent enhances its availability and frequency of use in global transactions. The supply of what the manufacturing and business world calls "money," whether it’s gold, silver, paper, credits, or other exchange instruments, has grown beyond precise measurement. Experts estimate that the world’s gold reserves have doubled in the last 25 years, and it’s likely that the supplies of other forms of currency that function as money have increased just as quickly.

[Pg 218] All of this increase in the world’s supply of money has increased the amount available for investment in manufacturing, and the increased use of machinery meantime in that industry has required great increases in the investment. While there are no ways of accurately measuring the world’s investments in manufacturing, it is practicable to do so in the case of the United States, the only country which regularly takes a census of its manufacturing industries. Its figures for the census years from 1850 to 1905, as to number of establishments, persons employed, wages paid, capital invested and value of product, are as follows:

[Pg 218] The rise in the world's money supply has increased the funds available for investment in manufacturing, and the greater reliance on machinery in that sector has necessitated significant investments. While there are no precise ways to measure global investments in manufacturing, it's feasible to do so for the United States, the only country that regularly conducts a census of its manufacturing industries. The statistics for the census years from 1850 to 1905, regarding the number of businesses, people employed, wages paid, capital invested, and product value, are as follows:

Census
year.
Establish-
ments,
number.
Capital,
million
dollars.
Wage-
earners,
number.
Wages
Paid,
million
dollars.
Cost of
Material,
million
dollars.
Value of
Product,
million
dollars.
1850 123,025 533 957,059 237 555 1,019
1860 140,433 1,010 1,311,246 379 1,032 1,886
1870 252,148 2,118 2,053,996 776 2,488 4,232
1880 253,852 2,790 2,732,595 948 3,397 5,370
1890 355,415 6,525 4,251,613 1,891 5,162 9,372
1900 512,254 9,817 5,308,406 2,322 7,345 13,004
1905 533,769 13,872 6,157,751 3,017 9,498 16,867
Census
year.
Establish-
ments,
number.
Capital,
million
dollars.
Wage-
earners,
number.
1850
123,025
533
957,059
1860
140,433
1,010
1,311,246
1870
252,148
2,118
2,053,996
1880
253,852
2,790
2,732,595
1890
355,415
6,525
4,251,613
1900
512,254
9,817
5,308,406
1905
533,769
13,872
6,157,751
Census
year.
Wages
Paid,
million
dollars.
Cost of
Material,
million
dollars.
Value of
Product,
million
dollars.
1850
237
555
1,019
1860
379
1,032
1,886
1870
776
2,488
4,232
1880
948
3,397
5,370
1890
1,891
5,162
9,372
1900
2,322
7,345
13,004
1905
3,017
9,498
16,867

It will be seen from a study of this statement, which compares conditions in the manufacturing industries at each recurring census from 1850 to 1905, that while the number of establishments in 1905 was four and one-third times as many as in 1850 the number of wage-earners was six and one-half times as many, the wages paid twelve and one-third times as much, the value of the product sixteen and one-half times as much and the capital employed twenty-six times as much.

It can be seen from examining this statement, which compares conditions in the manufacturing industries at each census from 1850 to 1905, that while the number of establishments in 1905 was four and a third times greater than in 1850, the number of wage-earners was six and a half times greater, the wages paid were twelve and a third times higher, the value of the product was sixteen and a half times greater, and the capital used was twenty-six times more.

This gives at least a suggestion as to the growth of investment in manufacturing. So far as relates to the United States, the only country for which we have statistics on this subject, the enormous increase in the use of costly machinery in manufacturing has increased the sums required for carrying on the industry, and machinery has in a marked degree been substituted for man in the [Pg 219] factory operations. The number of wage-earners employed increased, it will be seen, a little more than fivefold while the capital employed increased twenty-fivefold. The tendency to bring the manufacturing industries into large establishments is also shown in some degree in the fact that while the number of establishments increased but about threefold the number of employes increased fivefold and the value of the manufactures turned out increased twelvefold.

This provides at least an indication of the growth of investment in manufacturing. Regarding the United States, the only country for which we have statistics on this topic, the significant rise in the use of expensive machinery in manufacturing has raised the amounts needed to operate the industry, and machinery has largely replaced human labor in the [Pg 219] factory operations. As we can see, the number of wage-earners employed increased by a little more than five times, while the capital employed grew twenty-five times. The trend towards consolidating the manufacturing industries into large facilities is also reflected in the fact that, while the number of establishments increased about three times, the number of employees grew five times and the value of manufactured goods produced increased twelve times.

Even these figures do not, however, give a complete view of the relative growth in the number of large manufacturing establishments, the capital invested and the product turned out, because of the fact that the census enumeration of “manufacturing establishments” includes hand and household industries, such as blacksmith shops, wheelwright and wagon repair shops, boot and shoe repairers, harness makers, tailor shops, dress making, millinery, carpenter shops, custom, saw and gristmills, etc., etc., in all of which the capital invested or the product per establishment at this time averages probably little more than formerly. It is in the greater establishments, the factories, that the increase in investment and in producing power per factory has occurred. The Census of 1905, which was by law confined to manufacturing establishments conducted under the factory system, and that exclusive of neighborhood and mechanical industries, found that the number of establishments manufacturing for the general market and not merely for local orders or neighborhood consumption, and which could thus be considered as manufacturing establishments conducted under the factory system, was but 216,262, while under the former method of including hand and neighborhood industries the number of establishments would, it is estimated by the census, have been in 1905, 533,769. The 216,262 establishments enumerated as “conducted under the factory system” employed $12,686,000,000 capital and 5,470,321 wage-earners, [Pg 220] or an average of 25 each, and turned out $14,802,000,000 worth of manufactures; while the 317,506 smaller establishments, the “hand and neighborhood industries” formerly included in the general census returns, are estimated as having employed $1,186,000,000 of capital and 687,430 wage-earners, or an average of about 2 employes each, and turned out $2,066,000,000 worth of manufactures.

Even these numbers, however, don’t provide a complete picture of the relative growth in the number of large manufacturing businesses, the capital invested, and the products produced. This is because the census classification of “manufacturing establishments” includes hand and household industries, like blacksmith shops, wheelwright and wagon repair shops, shoe repairers, harness makers, tailor shops, dressmaking, millinery, carpenter shops, and custom, saw, and gristmills, among others, where the capital invested or the output per establishment likely averages not much more than before. The major growth in investment and production capacity has occurred in larger establishments, the factories. The Census of 1905, which was legally limited to manufacturing establishments operated under the factory system and excluded neighborhood and mechanical industries, found that the number of establishments providing for the general market, rather than just local orders or neighborhood consumption, which could thus be seen as operating under the factory system, was only 216,262. Under the previous method that included hand and neighborhood industries, it is estimated that the number of establishments in 1905 would have been 533,769. The 216,262 establishments categorized as “under the factory system” employed $12,686,000,000 in capital and 5,470,321 wage-earners, averaging about 25 each, and produced goods worth $14,802,000,000. Meanwhile, the 317,506 smaller establishments, the “hand and neighborhood industries” previously included in the overall census counts, are estimated to have employed $1,186,000,000 in capital and 687,430 wage-earners, averaging around 2 employees each, and produced goods worth $2,066,000,000.

It will thus be seen that the larger manufacturing establishments, those “conducted under the factory system producing articles for the general market as distinguished from the product made upon order for a customer,” are those proper to be included in a study of the development, capital invested, persons employed, wages paid, material used and value of the product turned out. Unfortunately a study in this form cannot be extended over any considerable term of years, because of the fact that the United States census only began in 1905 to make this distinction or separation of the true “factory” from the great mass of establishments turning out manufactured products. It did, however, present in 1905 an estimate for the year 1900 of the number of establishments properly comparable with those enumerated in the factory census of 1905. This estimate puts the total number of “establishments conducted under the factory system” in 1900 at 207,562, and in 1905 at 216,262, an increase of but 4.2 per cent in the number, while the capital employed in 1900 was $8,979,000,000, and in 1905, $12,686,000,000, an increase of 41.3 per cent; the wage-earners in 1900, 4,715,023, and in 1905, 5,470,321, an increase of 16 per cent; wages paid in 1900, $1,736,000,000, and in 1905, $2,266,000,000, an increase of 30.5 per cent; materials used in 1900, $6,578,000,000, and in 1905, $8,504,000,000, an increase of 29.3 per cent; value of product in 1900, $11,411,000,000, and in 1905, $14,802,000,000, an increase of 29.7 per cent.

It can be seen that the larger manufacturing businesses, those “operating under the factory system, producing goods for the general market as opposed to products made on request for a customer,” are the ones relevant for a study on development, capital invested, workforce employed, wages paid, materials used, and the value of the products produced. Unfortunately, such a study cannot be extended over a lengthy period, because the United States census only started distinguishing or separating the true “factory” from the larger group of establishments producing manufactured goods in 1905. However, it did provide in 1905 an estimate for the year 1900 of the number of establishments that can be accurately compared with those listed in the 1905 factory census. This estimate counts the total number of “establishments operating under the factory system” in 1900 at 207,562, and in 1905 at 216,262, which is just a 4.2 percent increase in number. Meanwhile, the capital used in 1900 was $8,979,000,000, and in 1905 it rose to $12,686,000,000, a 41.3 percent increase; the number of wage-earners in 1900 was 4,715,023, and in 1905 it increased to 5,470,321, a 16 percent rise; wages paid in 1900 were $1,736,000,000, and in 1905 reached $2,266,000,000, a 30.5 percent increase; materials used in 1900 totaled $6,578,000,000, and in 1905, $8,504,000,000, reflecting a 29.3 percent rise; the value of products in 1900 was $11,411,000,000, and in 1905 it was $14,802,000,000, marking a 29.7 percent increase.

It will thus be seen that even in the recent period, 1900 to 1905, the percentage of growth in “capital invested” [Pg 221] was greater than in any other important branches of the industry, the increases being: in capital 41.3 per cent, in wages paid 30.5 per cent, in value of product 29.7 per cent, and in number of wage-earners 16 per cent, while the number of establishments increased meantime but 4.2 per cent. It is thus apparent that although the tendency of the past thirty years has been distinctly toward an enlargement of the factory through the increase in capitalization rather than an increase in the number of establishments, that tendency still continues as the most distinctly marked characteristic of the development of the period 1900 to 1905.

It can be observed that even in the recent years, from 1900 to 1905, the growth rate of “capital invested” [Pg 221] was higher than in any other significant areas of the industry, with increases of 41.3 percent in capital, 30.5 percent in wages paid, 29.7 percent in product value, and 16 percent in the number of wage-earners, while the number of establishments only grew by 4.2 percent during this time. It’s clear that even though the trend over the past thirty years has leaned strongly towards expanding factories through increased investment rather than adding more establishments, this trend remains the most notable characteristic of the development between 1900 and 1905.

Unfortunately the facilities for comparing the capitalization, product, etc., in 1905 with that of earlier years only extends, in its relation to all the factory industries, to the Census of 1900. In a few of the important industries, however, it is possible to compare conditions in 1900 with those of earlier censuses. The Census of 1900 shows that the number of boot and shoe factories in the United States fell from 1,959 in 1880 to 1,600 in the year 1900, while the capitalization increased from an average of $21,957 per factory to $63,622 per factory, the number of wage-earners from 57 to 89 per factory, the wages paid from $21,951 to $36,985 per factory, and the value of the year’s product turned out from $84,763 per factory to $163,142 per factory. In cotton goods the number of establishments in 1880 was 1,005, and in 1900, 1,055, the capital per establishment in 1880, $218,412, and in 1900, $442,882, the number of wage-earners in 1880, 185 per establishment, and in 1900, 287, the wages paid in 1880, $45,387 per establishment, and in 1900, $80,180, the value of product in 1880, $209,901 per establishment, and in 1900, $362,349. In iron and steel the number of establishments was in 1880, 699, and in 1900, 668, average capital per establishment in 1880, $294,652, and in 1900, $858,371, wage-earners per establishment in 1880, 197, and in 1900, 333, wages paid per [Pg 222] establishment in 1880, $78,020, and in 1900, $180,869, value of product turned out per establishment in 1880, $418,583, and in 1900, $1,203,545. In woolen goods the number of factories fell from 1,990 in 1880 to 1,035 in 1900, the capital per establishment increased from $48,289 in 1880 to $120,180 in 1900, and the value of the product increased from $53,755 per establishment in 1880 to $114,425 in 1900.

Unfortunately, the ability to compare the capitalization, production, etc., in 1905 with earlier years only applies to factory industries up to the Census of 1900. However, in a few key industries, it is possible to compare conditions in 1900 with previous censuses. The Census of 1900 reveals that the number of boot and shoe factories in the United States dropped from 1,959 in 1880 to 1,600 in 1900, while the capitalization rose from an average of $21,957 per factory to $63,622 per factory. The number of wage-earners grew from 57 to 89 per factory, wages paid increased from $21,951 to $36,985 per factory, and the value of the year's production jumped from $84,763 per factory to $163,142 per factory. In cotton goods, there were 1,005 establishments in 1880 and 1,055 in 1900. The capital per establishment was $218,412 in 1880 and $442,882 in 1900. The number of wage-earners increased from 185 per establishment in 1880 to 287 in 1900. Wages paid went from $45,387 per establishment in 1880 to $80,180 in 1900, and the value of the product rose from $209,901 per establishment in 1880 to $362,349 in 1900. In iron and steel, the number of establishments was 699 in 1880 and 668 in 1900. Average capital per establishment grew from $294,652 in 1880 to $858,371 in 1900. The number of wage-earners per establishment rose from 197 in 1880 to 333 in 1900, with wages paid per establishment increasing from $78,020 in 1880 to $180,869 in 1900. The value of the product per establishment went from $418,583 in 1880 to $1,203,545 in 1900. In woolen goods, the number of factories decreased from 1,990 in 1880 to 1,035 in 1900, capital per establishment increased from $48,289 in 1880 to $120,180 in 1900, and the value of the product rose from $53,755 per establishment in 1880 to $114,425 in 1900.

It will be seen from the figures above presented that in these four great industries the tendency from 1880 to 1900 was distinctly in the direction of reduction of the number of factories, and a greater increase in capitalization than in that of persons employed, wages paid or in value of product turned out; while the figures covering the operations of the entire factory system for the period 1900 to 1905 also show a continuation of this same tendency toward a greater growth in capital than in persons employed, wages paid or value of product turned out.

It can be seen from the figures above that in these four major industries, from 1880 to 1900, there was a clear trend of reducing the number of factories, while capitalization grew more significantly than the number of people employed, wages paid, or the value of products produced. The figures covering the entire factory system from 1900 to 1905 also indicate that this trend continued, with capital growing more than the number of people employed, wages paid, or the value of products produced.

V. TRUSTS AND COMBINATIONS.

The great increase in the size of the manufacturing establishment and of the capital invested in the manufacturing industry which necessarily followed the adoption of expensive machinery for manufacturing purposes was followed by a tendency toward co-operation and mutual agreements among the great organizations engaged in similar lines of work, the purpose being to reduce expenses, increase profits and control prices. Originally the persons, firms or companies engaged in manufacturing disposed of their products as best they could and in direct competition with others in their own line of manufacture. If the market for their product was good they demanded higher prices. If there was an oversupply they sold for whatever profit they could get, or if necessary at cost or even lower than cost, in order to prevent accumulations of stocks or the closing of their factories. The competition thus grew intense. In order to dispose of their goods they must put [Pg 223] many salesmen into the field, they must advertise freely, and often their orders came from such distances that the cost of delivery formed a large percentage of the cost of the goods by the time they reached the purchaser.

The significant growth in the size of manufacturing businesses and the capital invested in the manufacturing sector, which came as a result of adopting costly machinery, led to a shift towards cooperation and agreements among major organizations working in similar fields. The aim was to cut costs, boost profits, and regulate prices. Initially, the individuals, firms, or companies involved in manufacturing sold their products as best they could, directly competing with others in the same line of work. When market demand was high, they would raise their prices. If there was an excess supply, they would sell for whatever profit they could manage, or if needed, at cost or even below cost, to avoid stockpiling or shutting down their factories. This intensified competition. To sell their goods, they had to deploy many salespeople, advertise extensively, and often their orders came from such faraway places that the delivery costs made up a significant portion of the product's total price by the time it reached the buyer. [Pg 223]

This competition of one manufacturer with another making the same line of goods was not only expensive but resulted in working at cross purposes in many ways, and in loss of energy and money. So certain of the companies or corporations engaged in like industries began to make agreements among themselves by which they could co-operate in distributing their supplies to a given field and reduce the expenses of supplying that field. It was argued that the people of any section would only use a given amount of any standard product, and that the expense which the various manufacturers were incurring in competing among themselves for their respective shares in that trade might be materially reduced by an agreement through which the extraordinary efforts to sell in competition with each other should be abandoned and each manufacturer receive the share of the sales to which his proportion of production would entitle him. Not only would this reduce unnecessary expenses but it would in some degree render possible the maintenance of prices as they might be mutually agreed upon.

This competition among different manufacturers producing the same types of products was not only costly but also led to conflicting efforts in various ways, resulting in wasted energy and money. So, certain companies or corporations involved in similar industries began to form agreements among themselves to collaborate on distributing their products in a specific market and lower the costs of supplying that market. They argued that people in any region would only purchase a limited amount of any standard product and that the costs incurred by the various manufacturers competing for their share of that market could be significantly reduced through an agreement. This would allow them to stop the extra efforts spent on competing against one another, with each manufacturer receiving a share of sales proportional to their production. Not only would this cut unnecessary costs, but it would also help maintain prices at levels they could mutually agree upon.

The first steps in combinations or agreements of this sort are known as “pools.” “This form of agreement,” says J. Russell Smith, “provides that each of the makers of a certain material for a certain territory should make a stipulated proportion of the product to be sold at an agreed price. If a factory made more than its share the owner made a cash payment to the pool and the money went to some manufacturer who had made less than his share. The weak spot of these pools was their absolute lack of power of coercion and that no member had faith in the others.” Often members took advantage of technicalities to violate the spirit of the agreement, and the agreements were short-lived. [Pg 224] The system, while it is still working satisfactorily in Germany under the name of the “cartel,” failed to give satisfactory results in the United States, and also met with disaster in the fact that the courts held it to be a combination in restraint of trade and therefore unlawful.

The first steps in agreements like these are called “pools.” “This type of agreement,” says J. Russell Smith, “states that each creator of a specific product for a certain area is supposed to produce a set percentage of the product to be sold at a predetermined price. If a factory produced more than its share, the owner had to pay cash to the pool, and that money would go to a manufacturer who produced less than their share. The weak point of these pools was their complete lack of enforcement power and that no member trusted the others.” Often, members exploited loopholes to undermine the agreement's intent, and the agreements didn’t last long. [Pg 224] The system, while still functioning well in Germany under the name “cartel,” didn’t produce satisfactory outcomes in the United States and also faced setbacks because the courts deemed it a combination that restrained trade and, therefore, illegal.

To overcome these defects and create a system of division of production, control of prices and distribution of profits in proportion to the value of the plants co-operating, a new form of agreement was devised. It provided that the companies or corporations entering the agreement for mutual operation and proportionate distribution of profits should transfer the shares of their respective properties to a new corporation with full powers to manage the same, receiving in lieu thereof certificates which should entitle the holder to his proportionate share of the net earnings of the new corporation. “Under this form of organization,” says the Universal Encyclopedia, “the stockholders of each of the separate companies assigned their stock to a few trustees, giving thus an irrevocable power of attorney. In lieu of the stock assigned the trustees issued stock certificates to the stockholders of the separate companies and upon these trust certificates profits were divided. All of the earnings of the different members of the company were pooled and each manufacturer received his proportionate share as evidenced by the certificates, regardless of the question whether his establishment was running or closed. The trustees, having in their hands the voting power of all the stockholders, elected whatever persons seemed to them best as officers of the separate companies. In this way the management was absolutely unified and the interests of all parties concerned became as one. The courts finally holding that this trust agreement was illegal, the plan was later adopted of organizing a new company which should buy up all of the separate plants of the different companies entering the combination, so that in this way a unified management was secured within the law. In order [Pg 225] that a more convenient form of handling the properties of the different companies might be secured, a third form of organization was later adopted in which a new company is organized as a stockholding company. This company then buys up all, or a large proportion of, the stock of each of the companies coming into the organization and controls these stocks. The officers of the central organization are thus in a position, by voting the stocks of different companies, to elect the directors and officers of those companies and thus control their policy.”

To fix these issues and create a system for dividing production, controlling prices, and distributing profits based on the contributions of cooperating companies, a new type of agreement was created. It stated that the companies or corporations signing the agreement for mutual operation and fair profit distribution would transfer their shares to a new corporation with full authority to manage them, receiving certificates in return that would grant them their share of the new corporation's net earnings. “Under this setup,” says the Universal Encyclopedia, “the shareholders of each individual company assigned their stock to a few trustees, giving them irrevocable power of attorney. In exchange for the stock assigned, the trustees issued stock certificates to the shareholders of the individual companies, and profits were distributed based on these trust certificates. All the earnings from the various members of the company were pooled, and each manufacturer received their proportional share as shown by the certificates, regardless of whether their operation was active or closed. The trustees, holding the voting power from all shareholders, elected whoever they deemed best as officers for the individual companies. This way, management was completely unified, and the interests of all involved parties became aligned. Eventually, the courts determined that this trust agreement was illegal, so the plan shifted to forming a new company that would acquire all the separate plants from the various companies in the combination, ensuring unified management within legal boundaries. Later, to create a more efficient method of managing the properties of different companies, a third type of organization was adopted where a new holding company was created. This company would then buy up all, or a significant portion of, the stocks of each company joining the organization, thus controlling these shares. The officers of the central organization would then have the power, by voting the stocks of different companies, to elect the directors and officers of those companies and control their policies.”

The advantages of this combination over competition are summed up by the Encyclopedia Britannica, in its 1902 edition, as follows: (1) The cost of selling may be greatly lessened; (2) the salaries of commercial travelers and their traveling expenses can be largely reduced; (3) if different manufacturing establishments, scattered throughout the country, are brought under one management it will be possible for orders for goods to be distributed so that goods can be dispatched to customers in each case from the nearest establishment and freight expenses reduced; (4) when several establishments are combined the most skillful of the managers can be selected for the general manager; (5) each business manager is likely to have some special excellence in his methods of management, and by combining the establishments it is possible to so distribute this managerial skill as to give to each branch of the work the man best suited to its conduct; (6) it is also possible to distribute the various branches of the manufacturing to the various mills or factories of the combination best suited for that particular branch of the work; (7) the advantages of unifying in one establishment the machinery of selling the product of all; (8) the ability of an establishment to fill large orders on short notice gains and retains business; (9) the great financial and business strength and skill of the combined organization gives it special facilities for pushing its goods into foreign markets, as is shown by the success [Pg 226] abroad of the Standard Oil Company, and the American Tobacco Company; (10) better facilities for dealing with credits and thus aiding the business community.

The benefits of this combination over competitors are summarized by the Encyclopedia Britannica in its 1902 edition as follows: (1) Selling costs can be significantly reduced; (2) the salaries and travel expenses of salespeople can be greatly minimized; (3) if different manufacturing plants spread across the country are managed together, orders can be allocated so that products can be shipped to customers from the closest facility, cutting down on shipping costs; (4) when multiple facilities are merged, the best managers can be chosen for the overall management role; (5) each business manager is likely to excel in specific management techniques, and by combining the operations, we can assign this managerial expertise to ensure each part of the business has the right leader; (6) it's also possible to allocate different manufacturing tasks to the factories or mills within the group that are most suited for those specific tasks; (7) the benefits of consolidating the sales machinery into one entity to promote all products; (8) the capability of a business to fulfill large orders quickly helps acquire and retain customers; (9) the substantial financial strength and expertise of the merged organization provides excellent opportunities for expanding its products into international markets, as demonstrated by the success of the Standard Oil Company and the American Tobacco Company overseas; (10) improved resources for managing credits, which supports the broader business community.

Whether trusts, through their control of prices of the particular commodities which they manufacture, have actually advanced the selling price to the consumer, has been and is still the subject of much discussion. It has been urged that the mere reduction of the cost of production and distribution which results from the combinations would enable them to realize larger profits than formerly, even if the manufactures are sold at former prices, and that although their profits have doubtless been large it has not been accomplished through an actual advance in prices to the public, but rather through economies of production and sale. Nelson’s Encyclopedia, issued in 1908, discussing this subject, says, “The weight of evidence indicates that, judged from the margin between price and finished product and cost of raw materials, prices are increased somewhat by the existence of trusts. It is a fair conclusion that the actual prices of goods have as a rule been somewhat increased by trusts, although not in the measure that was anticipated at the inception of the trust movement.” The Encyclopedia Britannica of 1902 in discussing this subject says, “Experience seems to show beyond question that whenever the combinations are powerful enough to secure a monopolistic control it has usually been the policy to increase the prices above those obtained during the period of competition which preceded the formation of the combination.”

Whether trusts, by controlling the prices of the specific goods they produce, have actually raised the selling price for consumers has been widely debated. It's been argued that the simple reduction in production and distribution costs resulting from these combinations allows them to earn larger profits than before, even if they sell the products at previous prices. While their profits have undoubtedly been substantial, this doesn't seem to stem from a rise in prices for the public but rather from efficiencies in production and sales. Nelson's Encyclopedia, published in 1908, discusses this topic and states, “The substantial evidence suggests that, based on the gap between price and the cost of finished products and raw materials, prices are slightly elevated by the presence of trusts. It's reasonable to conclude that, as a general rule, actual goods prices have been somewhat raised by trusts, though not to the extent initially expected when the trust movement began.” The Encyclopedia Britannica from 1902 also addresses this matter, noting, “Experience seems to show without a doubt that whenever the combinations are strong enough to achieve monopolistic control, they typically adopt a policy of raising prices above those prevailing during the competitive period that came before the formation of the combination.”

As to the effect of trusts upon wages it may be said that up to the present time no very strongly marked change is perceptible in the matter of rates of wages paid by the trusts as compared with other employers in the same line. Doubtless the combinations of numerous establishments under one general management have reduced the numbers of employes in certain lines, but in those lines in [Pg 227] which the trusts require labor for the carrying on of their work no marked changes in the rates of wages have been developed as a result of the combinations. In steadiness of employment for the men and women engaged in the work of the establishments it seems probable that the trusts or great combinations of this character offer certain advantages, since their business is less liable to fluctuations than that of the smaller, and even in the absence of orders they are more likely to continue work accumulating stocks for future use than is the small manufacturer with limited capital or credits. In the matter of relations with the labor organizations certain of the trusts have made long time agreements with the labor organizations, thus adding to the steadiness of employment, though in some cases the trusts have declined to recognize the demands of labor organizations.

As for the impact of trusts on wages, it can be said that so far, there hasn't been a noticeable change in the wage rates paid by trusts compared to other employers in the same industry. It’s true that the consolidation of multiple businesses under one management has reduced the number of employees in certain areas, but in those sectors where trusts need labor to operate, there haven't been significant changes in wage rates due to these consolidations. In terms of job stability for the men and women working in these businesses, it seems likely that trusts or large combinations of this kind provide certain benefits, as their operations are less subject to fluctuations compared to smaller companies. Even during slow periods, they are more likely to keep working to build up inventory for future use than a small manufacturer with limited resources or credit. Regarding their relationships with labor organizations, some trusts have established long-term agreements with these organizations, which helps ensure job stability. However, in some instances, trusts have chosen not to meet the demands of labor organizations.

An example of the causes and methods of the combination of kindred manufacturing interests under one general central organization is found in the United States Steel Corporation as described by J. Russell Smith, in his “The Story of Iron and Steel.” No industry, he says, is naturally so uncertain and consequently so competitive as the steel industry. The demand for the product is fitful and uncertain because most of it goes into new constructions and new enterprises, and these are notorious for the spurts and depressions of demand which affect them.... The uncontrolled iron and steel market can make wild rises unknown to many commodities, because it is difficult to suddenly increase the amount of manufactures in response to sudden demand. A wave of prosperity sends a thousand industries which must have iron and steel clamoring, begging for steel. When the industrial sky darkens purchases of iron and steel cease as suddenly as they began and the price must tumble if the output is sold. These were the normal conditions through which all steel makers lived down to the depression of 1893-98. The numerous independent [Pg 228] manufacturers thought that if they could get together and agree upon prices they could improve their condition. Attempts to achieve this in the form of pools provided that each of the makers of a certain material should make a stipulated proportion of the product to be sold at an agreed price, and if a factory made more than its share, the owner made a cash payment to the pool. The weak part of these pools was their absolute lack of power of coercion, and the further fact that no member had faith in the other.

An example of the reasons and methods for combining related manufacturing interests under one central organization can be seen in the United States Steel Corporation, as described by J. Russell Smith in his “The Story of Iron and Steel.” He states that no industry is inherently as uncertain and, thus, as competitive as the steel industry. The demand for steel is inconsistent and unpredictable because most of it is used in new construction and new projects, which are well-known for their fluctuations in demand... The unregulated iron and steel market can experience wild price spikes that are not seen in many other commodities, since it's challenging to quickly ramp up production in response to sudden demand. A boom in the economy prompts numerous industries that require iron and steel to compete fiercely for supplies. However, when the economy takes a downturn, purchases of iron and steel come to a halt just as quickly, causing prices to plummet if the excess output is to be sold. These were the typical conditions that all steel manufacturers faced until the depression of 1893-98. Many independent manufacturers believed that if they could come together and agree on pricing, they could improve their situation. Their attempts to form pools required each maker of a specific material to produce a set portion of the total amount to be sold at an agreed-upon price. If a factory exceeded its quota, the owner would pay cash to the pool. The weak point of these pools was their complete lack of coercive power, and the fact that no member trusted the others.

The failures in the attempt at price control resulted in the consolidation of many companies, formerly rivals, under one control. The chief companies which later became members of the United States Steel Corporation formed two distinct groups, each group classified according to the product. One group included the manufacturers of unfinished steel, such as ingots, billets, plates and slabs, and included the Carnegie Steel Company, the Federal Steel Company, and the National Steel Company. Other companies which purchased the product of these manufacturers of unfinished steel and turned it into the finished state included the American Tin Plate Company, the National Tube Company, the American Steel and Wire Company and others. The first thought which came to the minds of this finishing group when hard times compelled them to cut down costs was to cheapen their raw material (such as pig iron, steel ingots, billets, etc.) by becoming manufacturers of their own pig iron. The Carnegie Steel Company had already done this and had obtained facilities for transporting the ore to the coal fields of Ohio and Pennsylvania and facilities for transforming the ore into the classes of material which it supplied. The Carnegie Steel Company thus became independent of other companies in the supply of its fuel, its ore, and the transportation of the same, and all of the requirements of operation. When the finishing companies announced their purpose to also [Pg 229] supply themselves with the same facilities for producing their own raw material through the ownership of ore lands, transportation, facilities for smelting, manufacture of pig iron and the steel which they themselves required, the raw materials group could not view this operation with unconcern. It meant the loss of their market and necessity of seeking new markets in the United States or in foreign countries. As a consequence, the companies designated as the raw materials group, making pig iron, steel billets, etc., announced that they would establish their own finishing plants and thus compete directly with the group of companies which had formerly occupied the field without interference by the great organizations transforming the ore into the earlier processes of pig iron and steel billets. Mr. Carnegie announced that he would build a finishing mill in northern Ohio at the end of his ore railway which would eclipse anything that the world had ever seen and would be in equipment without a rival in the world. The Federal Steel Company increased its holdings of ore and coal, of upper-lake railways, and of lake steamers, and prepared to establish its plants for turning out finished products. Thus was threatened a doubling of the capacity of production of iron and steel in all of its stages, a capacity already far beyond that of the markets of the United States. Pools had failed, and the earlier trusts, aiming at monopolizing each line of the iron trade, had in the first temporary depression come face to face with the immediate prospect of ruinous competition among themselves. Then came the supreme effort at controlling prices through the creation of the most stupendous corporation that man has yet dared to launch—the United States Steel Corporation. This combination included most of the companies of both groups referred to—the producers of unfinished steel and those transforming the same into the finished product. The combination formed under the leadership [Pg 230] of Mr. J. Pierpont Morgan controlled two-thirds of the steel output of the country.

The failures in trying to control prices led to the merger of many companies that were once competitors under a single ownership. The main companies that later joined the United States Steel Corporation divided into two distinct groups based on their products. One group included manufacturers of unfinished steel, like ingots, billets, plates, and slabs, and consisted of the Carnegie Steel Company, the Federal Steel Company, and the National Steel Company. The other group was made up of companies that bought these manufacturers' unfinished steel and turned it into finished products, including the American Tin Plate Company, the National Tube Company, and the American Steel and Wire Company, among others. When challenging times forced this finishing group to cut costs, their first instinct was to lower their expenses for raw materials (such as pig iron and steel ingots) by producing their own pig iron. The Carnegie Steel Company had already done this, securing facilities to transport ore to the coal fields in Ohio and Pennsylvania, and converting that ore into the materials they supplied. This made Carnegie Steel independent from other companies for their fuel supply, ore, and transportation, covering all their operational needs. When the finishing companies announced their plans to gain the same capabilities for producing raw materials by acquiring ore land, transportation means, and smelting facilities for pig iron and steel, the raw materials group couldn’t ignore this move. It signified a loss of market for them and the need to look for new markets in the U.S. or abroad. As a result, the companies making pig iron and steel billets from the raw materials group declared their intentions to build their own finishing plants and compete directly with the companies that previously dominated the field without any interference from the large organizations processing the ore into pig iron and steel billets. Mr. Carnegie announced plans to construct a finishing mill in northern Ohio at the end of his ore railway, which would surpass anything previously seen and feature equipment unmatched worldwide. The Federal Steel Company expanded its holdings of ore and coal, upper-lake railroads, and lake steamers, preparing to set up its plants to produce finished products. This posed a threat to double the production capacity of iron and steel at all stages, a capacity already exceeding the demand in U.S. markets. Pools had failed, and earlier trusts aimed at monopolizing the iron trade faced the imminent risk of ruinous competition within themselves during the first signs of a downturn. Then came the ultimate effort to control prices through the creation of the largest corporation ever attempted—the United States Steel Corporation. This merger included most of the companies from both groups mentioned—the producers of unfinished steel and those turning it into finished products. The combination, led by Mr. J. Pierpont Morgan, controlled two-thirds of the country's steel output.

The new company began business in April, 1901, and a comparison of prices since that date with those of earlier years shows regularity and steadiness of prices rather than any marked decline or advance. “This price-steadying,” says J. Russell Smith, “is of incalculable benefit to the independent manufacturer (as well as to the combinations) even when it limits the heights to which a price spurt will go. Rapidly rising prices start a feverish, intoxicated condition of the market very pleasant while it lasts, but followed by a more unpleasant reaction; therefore the Trust tries to keep sober and keep its little brothers sober also, and all are profiting by the new temperance.... Despite its efforts at control, the Trust is not as near monopoly as it was the day it began. The four full years of its operation, 1902-1905, inclusive, did not indicate any increased share of production. The bulletin of the American Iron and Steel Association shows that during these four years there was an almost universal decline in the percentages of iron and steel products made by the Trust.”

The new company started its operations in April 1901, and comparing prices since then with those of previous years shows consistent pricing rather than significant increases or decreases. "This price stabilization," says J. Russell Smith, "is incredibly beneficial for the independent manufacturers (as well as for the larger companies), even if it restricts how high prices can soar. Rapidly rising prices create a frenzied, euphoric market that feels great while it lasts, but it’s usually followed by an unpleasant downturn; hence the Trust tries to stay grounded and keep its smaller counterparts grounded too, and everyone is benefiting from this new approach to moderation.... Despite its control efforts, the Trust isn't as close to being a monopoly as it was on the day it started. The four full years of its operation, from 1902 to 1905, didn’t show any increase in production share. The bulletin from the American Iron and Steel Association indicates that during these four years, there was a nearly universal decline in the percentage of iron and steel products made by the Trust.”

VI. THE IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRY.

The history of the iron and steel industry of the world forms an excellent example of the recent advance in manufacturing. The manufacture of iron and steel has made perhaps a more rapid advance than have many others, and its development is due in such a marked degree to the use of machinery and the investment of large sums of capital in the industry that a detailed study of the history and causes of its development seems justified.

The history of the iron and steel industry worldwide provides a great example of the recent progress in manufacturing. The production of iron and steel has advanced more rapidly than many other sectors, and this development is significantly attributed to the use of machinery and the investment of large amounts of capital in the industry. Therefore, a detailed examination of the history and reasons for its growth seems warranted.

Pig iron is the basis of all iron and steel manufacturing, in whatever form, and the record of production of this single article gives at least a suggestion of the growth in the other lines of the industry, the growth in production [Pg 231] of the finished articles ready for consumption. The pig iron production of the world in 1800 is estimated at 460,000 tons; in 1850, 4,422,000 tons; in 1895, 29,300,000 tons, and in 1903, 46,381,000 tons. The product of 1850 was thus nearly ten times as much as in 1800, that of 1895, 63 times as much, and that of 1903, 100 times as much as in 1800, while the figures for the year 1907, give a total of 50 million tons or 109 times as much as in 1800.

Pig iron is the foundation of all iron and steel production in any form, and the production record of this single item suggests the growth in other areas of the industry and the increase in the production of finished goods ready for consumption. The global production of pig iron in 1800 is estimated to be 460,000 tons; in 1850, it was 4,422,000 tons; in 1895, 29,300,000 tons, and in 1903, 46,381,000 tons. The output for 1850 was nearly ten times that of 1800, in 1895 it was 63 times more, and in 1903, it was 100 times higher than in 1800, while the figures for 1907 show a total of 50 million tons, which is 109 times as much as in 1800.

Great Britain was the world’s greatest pig iron producer in 1800 and in 1850. In 1800 she produced 41 per cent of the world’s pig iron, and in 1850, 50 per cent. By 1895, however, she had begun to take second place, the United States standing at the head of the list of pig iron-producing countries at that time, the product of Great Britain forming 27 per cent of the world’s total and that of the United States 32 per cent. In 1903 the United States showed a still greater lead in this industry, producing in that year 39 per cent of the world’s total product; while Germany, which held a low rank as a producer in 1800 and 1850, actually exceeded Great Britain in 1903, producing 22 per cent of the world’s total, while Great Britain produced but 19 per cent of the total. Great Britain’s production grew from 190,000 tons in 1800 to 8,935,000 tons in 1903; Germany, from 40,000 tons to 10,085,000 tons; the United States, from 40,000 tons to 18,009,000 tons; and all other countries, from 190,000 tons to 9,352,000 tons. In 1800 the United States produced but 9 per cent of the world’s pig iron; in 1903, 38 per cent; and in 1907, 41 per cent.

Great Britain was the world’s largest pig iron producer in 1800 and 1850. In 1800, it accounted for 41 percent of the global pig iron production, and by 1850, that figure had increased to 50 percent. However, by 1895, she started to lose her leading position, with the United States taking the top spot among pig iron-producing countries. At that time, Great Britain's share of the world’s total was 27 percent, while the United States made up 32 percent. In 1903, the United States expanded its lead in this industry, producing 39 percent of the total global output that year; meanwhile, Germany, which ranked low in production in 1800 and 1850, surpassed Great Britain in 1903 with 22 percent of the world’s total, while Great Britain produced only 19 percent. Great Britain's production rose from 190,000 tons in 1800 to 8,935,000 tons in 1903; Germany’s output increased from 40,000 tons to 10,085,000 tons; the United States went from 40,000 tons to 18,009,000 tons; and all other countries grew from 190,000 tons to 9,352,000 tons. In 1800, the United States produced just 9 percent of the world’s pig iron; by 1903, that figure was 38 percent, and in 1907, it rose to 41 percent.

It will be seen from these figures that the greatest growth in the world’s pig iron production has occurred in the United States.

It can be seen from these figures that the largest growth in the world’s pig iron production has taken place in the United States.

Turning from the comparison of growth in pig iron production in the leading iron-producing countries of the world and comparing the growth of the iron industry in the United States with that of other manufacturing industries, [Pg 232] we find that the development in this line has been greater than that of other leading industries. The census figures show that the value of the product of the blast furnaces, steel works and rolling mills of the United States, combined, grew from 297 million dollars in 1880 to 906 million in 1905, having thus more than trebled in value in that period, while the value of the cotton manufactures grew from 211 million to 250 million, having little more than doubled; that of the woolen and worsted manufactures, from 194 million to 308 million; lumber and timber products, from 234 million to 580 million; boots and shoes, from 166 million to 320 million; leather, from 200 million to 253 million; and flour and gristmill products, from 505 million to 713 million in the same time. In the various branches of iron and steel manufacturing there was also a remarkable growth. Foundry and modern ship products grew in value from 215 million dollars in 1880 to 800 million in 1905; structural iron work, from 3½ million to 91 million; and wire and wire work, from 19 million to 71 million.

Turning from the comparison of growth in pig iron production in the leading iron-producing countries of the world and comparing the growth of the iron industry in the United States with that of other manufacturing industries, [Pg 232] we find that the development in this area has outpaced that of other major industries. Census figures show that the value of the products from the blast furnaces, steel mills, and rolling mills in the United States combined grew from $297 million in 1880 to $906 million in 1905, more than tripling in value during that time. In contrast, the value of cotton manufacturing grew from $211 million to $250 million, which is just over double; woolen and worsted manufacturing grew from $194 million to $308 million; lumber and timber products increased from $234 million to $580 million; boots and shoes went from $166 million to $320 million; leather rose from $200 million to $253 million; and flour and gristmill products grew from $505 million to $713 million in the same period. The various branches of iron and steel manufacturing also experienced significant growth. Foundry and modern ship products increased in value from $215 million in 1880 to $800 million in 1905; structural iron work rose from $3.5 million to $91 million; and wire and wire products went from $19 million to $71 million.

This increase in value of the various classes of iron and steel products does not by any means show the actual increase in quantity produced, because of the fall in prices meantime. Practically all of the important classes of iron and steel products have fallen greatly in price as the quantity produced has increased. Pig iron, for example, averaged $33 per ton in 1870, and $18 per ton in 1908; steel rails, $107 per ton in 1870 and $28 per ton in 1908; bar iron, rolled, $79 per ton in 1870 and $38 per ton in 1908; and cut nails, 4.4 cents per pound in 1870 and 2.2 cents in 1908. The iron ore production in the United States grew from 3 million tons in 1870 to 52 million in 1907; pig iron, from 1.6 million tons to 26 million; and from 69 thousand tons in 1870 to 23 million tons in 1907.

This increase in value of the different types of iron and steel products doesn’t actually reflect the real increase in production quantity, due to the decline in prices during that time. Almost all significant categories of iron and steel products have seen a significant drop in price as production levels have risen. For instance, pig iron averaged $33 per ton in 1870 and $18 per ton in 1908; steel rails were $107 per ton in 1870 and $28 per ton in 1908; rolled bar iron went from $79 per ton in 1870 to $38 per ton in 1908; and cut nails decreased from 4.4 cents per pound in 1870 to 2.2 cents in 1908. Iron ore production in the United States increased from 3 million tons in 1870 to 52 million in 1907; pig iron rose from 1.6 million tons to 26 million; and from 69 thousand tons in 1870 to 23 million tons in 1907.

[Pg 233] Another characteristic of modern manufacturing is exemplified in the study of the iron and steel industry and the relation of capital, labor and product, as is also the concentration of industries into great establishments and groups of establishments. As has already been noted, the value of the product of the iron and steel blast furnaces, steel works and rolling mills grew from 297 million in 1880 to 906 million in 1905, having thus a little more than trebled in that time. In the same period the capital invested in these same establishments increased from 231 million dollars to 936 million; the capital having quadrupled while the product was trebling in value. During the same time the same establishments increased the number of their employes from 140,978 to 242,640, the number of employes having therefore increased but about 75 per cent while the capital was increasing 300 per cent and the value of the product about 200 per cent. The wages paid to the employes increased from 55 million dollars in 1880 to 141 million in 1905; the total wages paid having increased 156 per cent while the number of employes increased 73 per cent, indicating a marked increase in wages paid per individual.

[Pg 233] Another feature of modern manufacturing is shown in the study of the iron and steel industry and the relationship between capital, labor, and product, as well as the consolidation of industries into large companies and groups of companies. As previously mentioned, the value of the output from the iron and steel blast furnaces, steel mills, and rolling mills rose from $297 million in 1880 to $906 million in 1905, more than tripling in that time. During the same period, the capital invested in these establishments grew from $231 million to $936 million; the capital increased fourfold while the product's value tripled. Meanwhile, the number of employees in these establishments rose from 140,978 to 242,640, an increase of about 75 percent while capital grew by 300 percent and product value increased by around 200 percent. The wages paid to employees increased from $55 million in 1880 to $141 million in 1905; total wages rose by 156 percent while the number of employees grew by 73 percent, indicating a substantial increase in wages per individual.

The tendency to concentrate the production of manufactures into great establishments is also strikingly shown in the record of the iron and steel industry in the past few years. The census figures show the number of establishments in the United States in the group, “Iron and steel, including blast furnaces, steel works and rolling mills” at 1,005 in 1880, 645 in 1890, 668 in 1900, and 605 in 1905. The 1,005 establishments in 1880 produced 297 million dollars’ worth of the product; the 645 establishments in 1890 produced 431 million dollars’ worth; the 668 establishments in 1900 produced 804 million dollars’ worth; and the 605 establishments in 1905 produced 906 million dollars’ worth of the product. Thus the average production per establishment was, in round terms, in 1880, $296,000 worth; in [Pg 234] 1890, $668,000 worth; in 1900, $1,200,000 worth, and in 1905, practically $1,500,000 worth. This gives an average product in 1905 of 5 times as much value per establishment as in 1880, while the fact that prices of 1905 were less than those of 1880 indicates that the growth in product per establishment was even greater than the above figures of value would suggest. Prices of pig iron, for example, which averaged for “No. 1 foundry” $28.48 per ton at Philadelphia in 1880, averaged but $17.88 per ton in 1905; bar iron, rolled, $62.04 in 1880 and $38.49 in 1905; steel rails, $67.52 per ton in 1880 and $28.00 per ton in 1905; and cut nails, $3.68 per keg of 100 pounds in 1880 and $2.00 per keg in 1905. It will be seen from these figures that prices in 1905 were little more than half as much as in 1880 and that the figures which give an average of five times as much value of product per establishment in 1905 as in 1880 therefore really indicate an average product of probably ten times as much in quantity per establishment in 1905 as in 1880.

The trend of concentrating manufacturing in large facilities is clearly evident in the iron and steel industry over the past few years. Census data reveals the number of establishments in the United States under the category “Iron and steel, including blast furnaces, steel works, and rolling mills” was 1,005 in 1880, 645 in 1890, 668 in 1900, and 605 in 1905. The 1,005 establishments in 1880 generated products worth 297 million dollars; the 645 establishments in 1890 produced goods worth 431 million dollars; the 668 establishments in 1900 generated 804 million dollars’ worth; and the 605 establishments in 1905 produced products valued at 906 million dollars. This means the average production per establishment was approximately $296,000 in 1880, $668,000 in 1890, $1,200,000 in 1900, and nearly $1,500,000 in 1905. This indicates that in 1905, establishments produced on average five times more value than in 1880. Additionally, since prices in 1905 were lower than in 1880, the actual increase in production per establishment was likely even greater than the value figures suggest. For instance, the average price of pig iron for “No. 1 foundry” was $28.48 per ton in Philadelphia in 1880 and $17.88 per ton in 1905; rolled bar iron was $62.04 in 1880 and $38.49 in 1905; steel rails were $67.52 per ton in 1880 and $28.00 per ton in 1905; and cut nails were $3.68 per keg of 100 pounds in 1880, dropping to $2.00 per keg in 1905. These prices show that by 1905, they were just over half of what they were in 1880, meaning that the average product value per establishment in 1905 likely corresponds to about ten times more in quantity than in 1880.

That the iron and steel industry is especially suited to production in large establishments is indicated by the fact that the value of the product of the steel works and rolling mills of the United States in 1905 averaged nearly four times as much per establishment as that of those engaged in cotton manufacturing.

That the iron and steel industry is particularly well-suited for production in large facilities is shown by the fact that the value of the output from the steel mills and rolling mills in the United States in 1905 averaged almost four times more per facility than those involved in cotton manufacturing.

Even these figures of value of product per establishment at the various dates and in the various industries do not, by any means, measure the degree of concentration of the industry which has come in recent years, because of the fact that under the most recent methods, many of the establishments are managed in groups, many large mills or factories which were considered by the census as separate establishments being, in fact, combined under one management, as is shown in another part of this work in which trusts and combinations are discussed.

Even these numbers showing the value of products per establishment at different times and across various industries don’t fully capture the extent of industry concentration that has developed in recent years. This is because, with the latest management methods, many of these establishments are run as groups. Many large mills or factories that the census regarded as separate entities are actually combined under a single management, as discussed elsewhere in this work regarding trusts and combinations.

[Pg 235] This tremendous growth of the iron and steel industry of the United States—of the world, in fact, but more especially of the United States, seems to justify a somewhat detailed historical and descriptive account of iron and steel making, ancient and modern.

[Pg 235] The massive growth of the iron and steel industry in the United States—indeed, across the globe, but particularly in the U.S.—calls for a more detailed history and description of iron and steel production, both ancient and modern.

The manufacture of iron and steel is older than history. The material is so widely distributed over the surface of the globe that man in every part of the world and in nearly every stage of civilization long since learned its value. There is evidence that it was known to the Egyptians, the Assyrians, the Chaldeans, the Babylonians, the Israelites, the Greeks, the Persians, the Romans. Caesar found the Britons in possession of iron weapons which they had made, and the Scandinavians of that period were also acquainted with its manufacture. The people of Spain seem to have been early and successful workers in iron and steel, if the wonderful stories about the swords and other weapons of the early history of that country are to be believed.

The production of iron and steel goes back further than recorded history. This material is so commonly found around the world that people in nearly every region and at almost every stage of civilization have recognized its value for a long time. Evidence shows that it was known to the Egyptians, Assyrians, Chaldeans, Babylonians, Israelites, Greeks, Persians, and Romans. Caesar discovered that the Britons had created their own iron weapons, and the Scandinavians of that time were also familiar with its production. The people of Spain appear to have been early and skilled workers in iron and steel, if we believe the incredible tales about the swords and other weapons from the early history of that country.

Iron, wherever found in the native condition, is so mixed with rock, dirt and other foreign matter that it can only be utilized by heating and hammering or rolling until the pure iron is separated from the foreign substances. Originally the method seems to have been to heat the ore in fires built on the ground until it became softened, and by hammering it in this condition work out the foreign substances. Then man found that by building the fire in a hole at the top of a hill and leaving an opening at the bottom so that air could be forced into it, the heat could be intensified. Then he learned to build up a wall of mud and stones with an opening at the bottom, and by placing in it alternate layers of charcoal and iron ore and forcing in air at the bottom with rude bellows similar to those now used by blacksmiths, he was able to heat the ore until the iron melted and ran together into a mass which he worked into the steel with which the famous “Toledo [Pg 236] blades” and other weapons of that early day were made. Later, the Germans, by building the walls higher and getting a greater mass of the fuel and ore, were able to melt it so that it ran in liquid form into little ditches at the bottom of the furnace. This furnace, which came to be known as the “stuckofen” and “blow oven,” was the precursor of the blast furnace. Meantime the English were developing the process, and before the year 1700 were manufacturing considerable quantities of iron in furnaces in which charcoal supplied heat sufficient, when a blast of air was introduced, to melt the iron. This method of manufacturing iron continued in the European countries during all of the seventeenth century and until the early part of the eighteenth century. Meantime the forests of England were being rapidly destroyed in the sections which produced the iron ore. Prior to that time it had not been found practicable to use coal in smelting the ore, because the weight of the ore was so great that the fire was extinguished as the coal grew soft from the heat. Then, in the early part of the eighteenth century, somebody tried the experiment of treating the coal in a manner similar to that by which wood is turned into charcoal, and coke was produced and found available for smelting the iron ore, the coke being substituted for charcoal. And so the manufacture of iron in Europe went on, developing most rapidly in England which had ore, timber from which to make charcoal, and coal from which to make coke.

Iron, wherever it’s found in its natural state, is so mixed with rock, dirt, and other impurities that it can only be used by heating and hammering or rolling it until the pure iron separates from the unwanted materials. Originally, the method was to heat the ore in fires built on the ground until it got soft, then hammer it to work out the impurities. Eventually, people discovered that if they built the fire in a hole at the top of a hill and left an opening at the bottom for air to be forced in, the heat could be increased. They learned to stack mud and stone walls with a bottom opening, alternating layers of charcoal and iron ore, and by pushing air in at the bottom with simple bellows like those used by blacksmiths. This allowed them to heat the ore until the iron melted and formed a mass, which they shaped into the steel used for the famous “Toledo blades” and other weapons of that time. Later, the Germans raised the walls and used more fuel and ore, allowing them to melt it so it flowed in liquid form into channels at the base of the furnace. This furnace, known as the “stuckofen” and “blow oven,” was an early version of the blast furnace. Meanwhile, the English were improving the process, and by 1700, they were producing significant amounts of iron in furnaces where charcoal provided enough heat, especially when air was blown in, to melt the iron. This iron-making method persisted in European countries throughout the 17th century and into the early 18th century. Meanwhile, the forests of England were quickly being depleted in the areas where the iron ore was extracted. Before this time, it had not been practical to use coal for smelting the ore because the ore's weight would extinguish the fire as the coal softened from the heat. Then, in the early 18th century, someone experimented with treating coal in a way similar to how wood is converted to charcoal, producing coke, which was found to be suitable for smelting iron ore, substituting coke for charcoal. Thus, the manufacture of iron in Europe continued, developing rapidly in England, which had the necessary ore, timber for charcoal, and coal for coke.

Meantime the making of iron began to develop in the United States. The early colonists found ore in Virginia and New England. Small quantities of pig iron were made in Virginia within a few years after the settlement of Jamestown, and in the latter half of the century New England began manufacturing iron from bog ore and charcoal made in the forests which were then so plentiful. Most of these early iron furnaces were “bloomaries,” merely heating the iron so that it formed a lump of 100 to 200 [Pg 237] pounds weight at the bottom of the furnace, called a “bloom,” though there were some furnaces which heated the ore until the iron ran into little channels at the bottom and became “pig iron.” Before the year 1800 the State of Massachusetts alone had some 75 iron works, chiefly furnaces, making small quantities of iron. A little later there was built in that state a furnace then declared to be “the finest in America,” having two bellows twenty feet in length and operated by a water wheel. During the next century the size of the furnaces grew slowly and before the year 1800 there were furnaces capable of making two to three tons of iron per day each.

Meanwhile, iron production started to take off in the United States. The early colonists discovered ore in Virginia and New England. Small amounts of pig iron were produced in Virginia just a few years after the Jamestown settlement, and in the latter half of the century, New England began manufacturing iron using bog ore and charcoal sourced from the abundant forests. Most of these early iron furnaces were “bloomaries,” simply heating the iron to form a lump weighing 100 to 200 pounds at the bottom of the furnace, known as a “bloom.” However, some furnaces heated the ore until the iron flowed into small channels at the bottom, creating “pig iron.” Before 1800, the State of Massachusetts had around 75 iron works, mainly furnaces, producing small quantities of iron. Soon after, a furnace was built in that state, considered “the finest in America,” featuring two bellows that were twenty feet long and powered by a water wheel. Over the next century, the size of the furnaces gradually increased, and by 1800, there were furnaces capable of producing two to three tons of iron per day each.

The history of the early iron industry in Massachusetts is not materially different from that of others of the colonies and early settlements. Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Delaware, Virginia, and the Carolinas all had numbers of small furnaces capable of making from a half ton to two or three tons of iron per day. They used charcoal altogether as the fuel, and it was estimated in Virginia and Maryland that for one furnace of average size four square miles of woodland and 100 slaves were required. The fact that there were then no means of transportation other than pack trains and that iron was too heavy to transport any considerable distances, encouraged every neighborhood to sustain its furnace and forge, and from these local factories of pig iron and iron bars the local blacksmith and others who aided him in supplying local wants drew their supplies. It is probable that the number of furnaces and forges in the United States at the beginning of the nineteenth century was much greater than at the end of the century, though the product of 1800 was but 40,000 tons of pig iron, against 14,000,000 tons in 1900 and 26,000,000 tons in 1907.

The history of the early iron industry in Massachusetts isn’t much different from that of other colonies and early settlements. Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Delaware, Virginia, and the Carolinas all had several small furnaces that could produce between half a ton and two or three tons of iron daily. They relied entirely on charcoal as fuel, and it was estimated that in Virginia and Maryland, an average-sized furnace required four square miles of forest and 100 slaves. The absence of transportation options aside from pack trains and the heaviness of iron, which made it impractical to transport over long distances, encouraged each community to maintain its own furnace and forge. Local blacksmiths and others relied on these local factories for pig iron and iron bars to meet their needs. It's likely that the number of furnaces and forges in the United States at the start of the nineteenth century was much higher than at the end of the century, although the output in 1800 was only 40,000 tons of pig iron compared to 14,000,000 tons in 1900 and 26,000,000 tons in 1907.

Meantime the English iron manufacturers had learned to smelt the ore with coke instead of charcoal. The quantity of wood required to make charcoal for smelting the ore [Pg 238] had been so great that the forests of England were being rapidly destroyed, and a series of experiments had developed the fact that by heating coal in a pit or oven, in a manner similar to that by which charcoal was produced from wood, the charred coal, called coke, could be used as a substitute for charcoal in iron furnaces. This substitute for charcoal did not come into use in the United States until much later, however, for the reason that the people of the eastern part of the United States were still anxious to get the timber off their lands to use them for agricultural purposes, and so were glad to turn it into charcoal and dispose of it to the iron furnaces at a low cost. In time, however, the supply of charcoal began to run low and the Americans began to cast about for a substitute. After a series of experiments it became evident that the anthracite coal of Pennsylvania could be used for iron smelting, as it was hard enough to bear the weight of the iron ore piled upon it, and also made a much more intense heat than did the bituminous coal which grew soft as it was heated and was useless in the furnace. By 1840 the making of pig iron with anthracite coal became an established industry and by 1854 the quantity of iron made by the use of anthracite was as great as that from charcoal, about 350,000 tons for each. But as the supply of anthracite was limited to a comparatively small area, those sections which had no anthracite and had run short of the timber supply for making charcoal began to cast about for a substitute, and hearing of the success of the English, with “charred coal,” or coke, began its use in the United States; and by 1856 there were more than a score of furnaces making pig iron by the use of coke. It was also found that if the air which was forced into the furnace was heated before entering a much more intense heat could be obtained and the use of the hot blast was soon established.

Meanwhile, the English iron manufacturers had figured out how to smelt ore using coke instead of charcoal. The amount of wood needed to create charcoal for smelting had been so high that England's forests were being quickly depleted. A series of experiments showed that by heating coal in a pit or oven, similar to how charcoal was made from wood, the resulting charred coal, known as coke, could replace charcoal in iron furnaces. However, this replacement for charcoal didn't catch on in the United States until much later because people in the eastern part of the country were still eager to clear their lands of timber to farm, and they were happy to turn it into charcoal and sell it to iron furnaces for cheap. Eventually, though, the supply of charcoal started to decline, and Americans began looking for alternatives. After conducting several experiments, they discovered that Pennsylvania's anthracite coal could be used for iron smelting, as it was strong enough to support the weight of the iron ore on top of it and produced much more heat than bituminous coal, which softened when heated and became useless in the furnace. By 1840, producing pig iron with anthracite coal had become a well-established industry, and by 1854, the amount of iron made with anthracite was equal to that made with charcoal, at about 350,000 tons each. However, since the supply of anthracite was limited to a relatively small area, regions without anthracite that had run low on timber for charcoal began searching for a substitute. Learning of the success of the English with "charred coal," or coke, they started using it in the United States, and by 1856, there were over twenty furnaces producing pig iron using coke. It was also discovered that heating the air before it entered the furnace produced a much more intense heat, leading to the widespread adoption of the hot blast method.

With iron being made by the use of anthracite coal and coke made from bituminous coal, the people began to realize [Pg 239] that the destruction of the forests to produce charcoal should not continue longer, and the making of charcoal iron rapidly decreased. Meantime the railways began to develop and were able to carry coal and coke to the places where the ore could be easily obtained, or to which it could be easily brought. Such a place was Pittsburg, for example. Iron ore was produced in certain parts of Pennsylvania and on the northern shores of the Great Lakes. Coal of a suitable quality for making excellent coke was produced at Connellsville, in western Pennsylvania. Limestone is required in great quantities in smelting iron ore, as the alkaline quality of the limestone neutralizes the acid of the waste matter forming a part of the iron ore and makes it melt at a lower temperature, the melted limestone also carrying off the impurities in the form of “slag,” and limestone was also plentiful near Pittsburg. Some of these materials could be floated down the rivers or on the Great Lakes, at least a part of the way from the place of production to the place at which they were combined, and for the remainder of the distance railways carried them over comparatively level or down-grade routes at small cost.

With iron being produced using anthracite coal and coke made from bituminous coal, people started to realize that cutting down forests to create charcoal couldn't go on any longer, and the production of charcoal iron quickly declined. Meanwhile, the railroads were expanding, making it possible to transport coal and coke to areas where ore could be easily found or brought in. One such place was Pittsburgh. Iron ore was mined in certain regions of Pennsylvania and along the northern shores of the Great Lakes. High-quality coal for making excellent coke came from Connellsville in western Pennsylvania. Limestone is needed in large amounts for smelting iron ore, as its alkaline properties neutralize the acidity of the waste within the iron ore and allow it to melt at a lower temperature. The melted limestone also helps remove impurities as “slag,” and there was plenty of limestone near Pittsburgh. Some of these materials could be transported down rivers or across the Great Lakes for at least part of the journey from where they were produced to where they were processed, and for the rest of the distance, railways could carry them over relatively flat or downhill routes at low cost.

So, with the advent of the railway and the steamship the methods of iron making changed. The railway and the river or lake steamer could carry the finished product at such low cost that it was no longer necessary that each county should make its own iron, and more than that, they could carry the ore and the limestone and the coal or coke to any place convenient for assembling these necessary materials and distributing the finished product.

So, with the arrival of the railway and the steamship, the way iron was made changed. The railway and the river or lake steamer could transport the finished product at such a low cost that it was no longer essential for each county to produce its own iron. Moreover, they could transport the ore, limestone, and coal or coke to any location that was convenient for gathering these essential materials and distributing the finished product.

This combination of the raw materials and the manufacture of the iron in a few great establishments instead of many small ones encouraged the use of machinery in manufacturing. Machines were wanted for handling the ore, for handling the coal, for handling the limestone, for handling the molten material which issued from the furnace, and for turning it into the finished form, sometimes [Pg 240] accomplishing this without allowing the material to grow cold and harden at any point between the time it trickles from the blast furnace and its completion as a steel billet, a rail for the railway, or a roll of barbed wire for the ranchero of South America.

This mix of raw materials and the production of iron in a few large facilities instead of many small ones promoted the use of machinery in manufacturing. Machines were needed for handling the ore, coal, limestone, and molten material that came out of the furnace, as well as for turning it into a finished product, sometimes [Pg 240]doing this without letting the material cool and harden at any stage between when it flows from the blast furnace and when it’s completed as a steel billet, a rail for the railway, or a roll of barbed wire for the rancher in South America.

The iron as it leaves the blast furnace is not in a condition in which it can be used for manufacturing. It contains so much carbon and other impurities that it is brittle and breaks easily. This condition is similar to that of the “blooms,” or chunks of metal which came from the early furnaces and which had to be refined by laborious processes of reheating and hammering until the impurities were worked out.

The iron that comes out of the blast furnace isn't ready for manufacturing. It has too much carbon and other impurities, making it brittle and prone to breaking. This is similar to the “blooms,” or chunks of metal, that were produced by the early furnaces, which had to be refined through a tough process of reheating and hammering until the impurities were removed.

Before the year 1800 it had occurred to somebody in England that if flames could be forced across the surface of the molten iron and the iron kept in a state of constant agitation the flames would burn out the carbon. This was accomplished by making an open hearth to contain the molten material and “puddling” the iron as the flames were forced across the surface. Then a series of grooved rollers was devised, between which pieces of partially cooled iron could be passed and repassed, and this machine process worked out the “slag” and other impurities which had been formerly worked out with hammers. This puddling and rolling began in England before the year 1800 and “the puddle and the grooved roll,” says J. Russell Smith, “closed the era of the blacksmith’s supremacy and opened the era of machine manufacture.” It was an adaptation of these methods and combination of them with the concentration of the material at convenient centers that proved the beginning of the machine-manufacturing methods in the United States at a considerably later period than in England.

Before 1800, someone in England realized that if flames could be directed over the surface of molten iron while keeping the iron constantly stirred, the flames would burn out the carbon. This was achieved by creating an open hearth to hold the molten material and "puddling" the iron as the flames were applied. Then, a series of grooved rollers was designed to allow pieces of partially cooled iron to be passed back and forth, which removed the "slag" and other impurities that had previously been cleared with hammers. This puddling and rolling started in England before 1800, and as J. Russell Smith notes, “the puddle and the grooved roll” marked the end of the blacksmith's dominance and the start of machine manufacturing. It was the adaptation of these techniques, along with the consolidation of materials at convenient locations, that laid the groundwork for machine manufacturing methods in the United States, which came about significantly later than in England.

The most notable step in developing the use of iron, however, was that by which it was quickly and cheaply turned into the reliable form known as “steel.” As already explained, [Pg 241] the iron when it leaves the blast furnace contains such quantities of carbon, silicon, sulphur, phosphorus, and other impurities that it is brittle and unreliable as to tensile strength, flexibility, or the qualities which make it available for edged tools. The puddling process already described deprived it of the carbon and sulphur, but left it too soft for immediate use. It required a small and fixed amount of carbon to give it the qualities of steel and this was replaced by reheating it in air-tight receptacles in combination with powdered charcoal. By this process steel was made, but it was a slow and expensive process. About the middle of the last century, William Kelly, of Pittsburg, conceived the idea that by forcing air through the molten iron as it came from the furnace the oxygen of the air would combine with the carbon of the iron and burn out the carbon, leaving the remainder pure iron. A series of experiments proved the accuracy of his theory, and he made steel by this process. About the same time Sir Henry Bessemer, of England, devised a similar process and it was put into practical operation in England and later in the United States. By this process, developed almost simultaneously in America and England by these two men, the transformation of iron into steel in a brief space of time and at a small cost was established, and the manufacture of steel developed with wonderful rapidity. The quantity of steel manufactured in the United States in 1870 was but 69,000 tons; in 1880, 1,247,000 tons; in 1890, 4,277,000 tons; in 1900, 10,188,000 tons; and in 1907, 23,363,000 tons. With this great development in manufacturing came a great development in the use of machinery for handling not only the finished steel itself but the pig iron from which it was manufactured, the iron ore from which it was produced and the coal and limestone used in its production. With this growing use of machinery in the manufacture and the great increase in the quantity used in the industries of the world have come the enlargement of [Pg 242] the establishments and the increase in the capital invested described at the opening of this section.

The biggest breakthrough in using iron was how it was quickly and cheaply transformed into the dependable form known as “steel.” As mentioned earlier, [Pg 241] iron coming straight from the blast furnace is filled with carbon, silicon, sulfur, phosphorus, and other impurities that make it brittle and unreliable in terms of tensile strength, flexibility, or qualities needed for sharp tools. The puddling process removed the carbon and sulfur but left the iron too soft for immediate use. A precise and minimal amount of carbon needed to be added to give the iron steel-like qualities, which was achieved by reheating in airtight containers along with powdered charcoal. This method produced steel, but it was slow and costly. Around the middle of the last century, William Kelly from Pittsburgh came up with the idea that blowing air through molten iron from the furnace would cause the oxygen to react with the carbon and burn it off, leaving behind pure iron. His experiments confirmed his theory, and he successfully made steel using this process. At the same time, Sir Henry Bessemer from England developed a similar method, which was put into action in England and later in the United States. This near-simultaneous innovation by both men allowed iron to be converted into steel rapidly and inexpensively, leading to an impressive growth in steel manufacturing. In 1870, the United States produced only 69,000 tons of steel; by 1880, it jumped to 1,247,000 tons; in 1890, it reached 4,277,000 tons; by 1900, it was 10,188,000 tons; and in 1907, it skyrocketed to 23,363,000 tons. This significant growth in manufacturing also brought about an increased use of machinery, not just for handling the finished steel, but also for managing the pig iron used to make it, the iron ore from which it was derived, and the coal and limestone necessary for its production. This rise in machinery use in manufacturing and the corresponding surge in quantities used across industries worldwide led to the expansion of facilities and an increase in the capital investment noted at the beginning of this section.

This process of burning out the carbon and other impurities from the molten iron by forcing air and thus combining the oxygen of the air with the carbon of the iron, although it seems to have been devised almost simultaneously by Kelly in the United States and Bessemer in England, is usually denominated the “Bessemer process,” and while Kelly obtained certain patents and a half million dollars for his invention, Bessemer also obtained other patents and it is said ten millions of dollars for his.

This method of removing carbon and other impurities from molten iron by blowing in air to combine the oxygen with the carbon in the iron, although it seems to have been developed almost simultaneously by Kelly in the United States and Bessemer in England, is commonly known as the “Bessemer process.” While Kelly secured certain patents and made about half a million dollars from his invention, Bessemer also gained additional patents and is reported to have made ten million dollars from his.

The process of transforming iron into steel by the Bessemer process is described by Herbert N. Casson in “The Romance of Steel,” as follows:

The process of turning iron into steel using the Bessemer process is described by Herbert N. Casson in “The Romance of Steel,” like this:

“A converter is a huge iron pot twice as high as a man. It is swung on an axle, so that it can be tilted up and down. Although it weighs as much as a battalion of five hundred men, it can be handled by a boy. About thirty thousand pounds of molten iron are poured into it; and then, from two hundred little holes in the bottom, a strong blast of air is turned on, rushing like a tornado through the metal. Millions of red and yellow sparks fly a hundred feet into the air.

“A converter is a massive iron pot that's twice the height of a person. It’s mounted on an axle, allowing it to be tilted up and down. Even though it weighs as much as a battalion of five hundred men, a kid can manage it. Around thirty thousand pounds of molten iron are poured into it; then, from two hundred small holes in the bottom, a powerful blast of air is activated, rushing like a tornado through the metal. Millions of red and yellow sparks shoot a hundred feet into the air."

“The converter roars like a volcano in eruption. It is the fiercest and most strenuous of all the inventions of man. The impurities in the iron—the phosphorus, sulphur, silicon and carbon—are being hurled out of the metal in this paroxysm of fury. The sparks change from red to yellow; then suddenly they become white.

“The converter roars like a volcano erupting. It is the most powerful and intense of all human inventions. The impurities in the iron—the phosphorus, sulfur, silicon, and carbon—are being forced out of the metal in this explosion of energy. The sparks shift from red to yellow; then suddenly, they become white.”

“‘All right!’ shouts the grimy workman in charge.

“‘All right!’ shouts the dirty worker in charge.

“The great pot is tilted sideways, gasping and coughing like a monster in pain. A workman feeds it with several hundred pounds of a carbon mixture, to restore a necessary element that has been blown out. Then it is tilted still farther; its lake of white fire is poured into a swinging ladle and slopped from the ladle into a train of huge clay pots, [Pg 243] pushed into place by a little locomotive. The converter then swings up and receives another fifteen tons of molten metal, the whole process having taken only a quarter of an hour.... Today there are more than a hundred Bessemer converters in the United States, breathing iron into steel at the rate of eighteen billion pounds a year. It is well worth a visit to Pittsburg to see one of these tamed Etnas in full blast. Nothing else in the world is like it.”

“The big pot is tilted sideways, gasping and coughing like a monster in pain. A worker feeds it with several hundred pounds of a carbon mixture to restore a necessary element that has been blown out. Then it is tilted even more; its lake of white fire is poured into a swinging ladle and slopped from the ladle into a line of huge clay pots, [Pg 243] pushed into place by a small locomotive. The converter then swings up and receives another fifteen tons of molten metal, the whole process taking only a quarter of an hour... Today, there are more than a hundred Bessemer converters in the United States, producing steel at the rate of eighteen billion pounds a year. It's definitely worth a visit to Pittsburgh to see one of these tame volcanoes in action. Nothing else in the world is like it.”

Discussing the importance of the discovery of the method by which common iron is thus cheaply and quickly transformed into steel, J. Russell Smith, in his “The Story of Iron and Steel,” says:

Discussing the significance of discovering the method that allows common iron to be transformed into steel quickly and cheaply, J. Russell Smith, in his “The Story of Iron and Steel,” states:

“Archaeologists and ethnologists agree that before the dawn of datable history a milestone of progress was marked when our ancestors had, at enormous cost, won a pound or so of iron per capita and begun the iron age. The keen analyst of the present, seeing our railways, our ships, our cannon, our sky scrapers, has erected another milestone, and this he calls the Age of Steel.

“Archaeologists and ethnologists agree that before recorded history began, a significant milestone was reached when our ancestors, at great expense, managed to produce about a pound of iron per person and entered the Iron Age. The sharp observer of today, witnessing our railways, ships, cannons, and skyscrapers, has established another milestone, which he refers to as the Age of Steel.”

“The close of the Civil War found the iron-making world in full possession of the Bessemer process of converting that metal into steel.... The variety of uses for this metal is absolutely beyond enumeration.... Within the space of a generation we have increased our iron consumption fourfold.... This is the age of power. Man has changed his economic and social conditions in that he has harnessed the forces of nature to make them do his work. Our main dependence, thus far, has been upon fuel, chiefly coal. The power in the form of the steam generated in the boiler is kept imprisoned in iron pipes until released in the steel cylinder, where a steel piston drives forward a steel rod, which communicates the force to a steel fly wheel, turning on a steel shaft, and sending the power away to various places where man wishes to use it.

“The end of the Civil War saw the iron-making industry fully adopting the Bessemer process to turn that metal into steel. The range of applications for this metal is truly endless. In just one generation, we've boosted our iron consumption four times. This is the era of power. Humanity has transformed its economic and social conditions by harnessing nature's forces to do work for us. So far, our main reliance has been on fuel, primarily coal. The steam created in the boiler is contained in iron pipes until it’s released in the steel cylinder, where a steel piston pushes a steel rod, transferring the force to a steel flywheel, which spins on a steel shaft, directing the power to different locations where people want to use it.”

“Portable engines, entirely made of iron and steel, are drawn about the country, or move themselves and carry [Pg 244] loads.... The dynamo rests upon a heavy iron frame and swings its iron arms and iron magnets through space, whence it mysteriously winds out power.... The second of the great iron uses is to be found in the machines driven by the power that man has learned to harness.... Transport is the third member of the mechanical trinity which goes with power and machines to make the present epoch. For a long time the railways consumed half of man’s total iron product. The street railway of the city is also a heavy consumer. The elevated railway is nothing but a bridge spanning the city in all directions, and the subway, its latest rival, is but a steel tunnel burrowing beneath the ground. In the country, the erection of the trolley lines is now giving us a second set of railways, and even the poles are coming to be made of iron. Half a century ago iron ships began to be common, a quarter of a century ago the ship-builder turned to steel, and now there is almost nothing else afloat upon the high seas.... Our structures are becoming more and more dependent upon the products of the blast furnace and the steel mills. Our fathers contented themselves with brick and stone and wood. The limitation of wooden beams and the cheapness of Bessemer steel caused that material to be used in heavy structures in a limited way, and as wood increased in value and knowledge of the use of steel increased, we now see the modern sky scraper in which wood is eliminated and steel the absolute essential....

“Portable engines, made entirely of iron and steel, are transported across the country or move on their own while carrying loads.... The dynamo sits on a heavy iron frame and swings its iron arms and magnets through space, mysteriously generating power.... The second major use of iron is in the machines powered by the energy that humans have learned to harness.... Transport is the third element of the mechanical triad that, along with power and machinery, defines our current era. For a long time, railways consumed half of all the iron produced by mankind. The city's streetcars are also significant consumers. The elevated railway is simply a bridge extending across the city in all directions, and the subway, its newest competitor, is just a steel tunnel digging beneath the ground. In rural areas, the construction of trolley lines is now providing us with a second set of railways, and even the poles are increasingly made of iron. Half a century ago, iron ships became common, and twenty-five years ago, shipbuilders began using steel, so now there’s almost nothing afloat on the high seas that isn't made of it.... Our buildings are becoming more reliant on products from blast furnaces and steel mills. Our ancestors were satisfied with brick, stone, and wood. The limits of wooden beams and the low cost of Bessemer steel led to its limited use in heavy constructions; as wood became pricier and our understanding of steel advanced, we now see the modern skyscraper, where wood is absent and steel is absolutely essential....

“It is therefore natural to expect that the blast furnace should be among the most thoroughly organized and most highly developed pieces of mechanism yet devised. It is certainly the most fearful of all man’s creations, and considering the character of the process which goes on within it and its unapproachable heat, it is under a wonderful degree of control. At the present time, the blast furnaces are a hundred feet high, consist of a great iron stack lined with some nonfusible material, and when in operation are filled [Pg 245] from top to bottom with roaring fire. Into their fiery throats are fed alternately small carloads of coke and iron and limestone, and from the bottom there flows away at intervals two molten streams—one the precious iron upon which our civilization rests; the other the useless slag, to be got rid of in the cheapest possible way.... The burning of this modern furnace takes place under a forced draught of air blast from eight to twenty pounds per square inch. This pressure serves to drive the air upward through the hundred-foot mass which burns within the furnace. Otherwise, the fire would smother. The gas which results from the imperfect combustion within the furnace is a most valuable by-product and serves a valuable purpose in promoting the furnace operation, and sometimes leaves a product to sell. A part of the gas is taken to the boilers, where it generates power for the blowing engines. Another part of it is used in the so-called stoves to heat the air blast on its way to the furnaces.”

“It’s natural to expect that the blast furnace is one of the most organized and advanced pieces of machinery ever created. It’s definitely the most formidable of all human inventions, and given the intense processes happening inside and its extreme heat, it’s remarkably well-controlled. Today, blast furnaces stand a hundred feet tall, made of a large iron structure lined with non-fusible material, and when they're in operation, they are filled from top to bottom with roaring fire. Alternately, small carloads of coke, iron, and limestone are fed into their fiery openings, and from the bottom, two streams flow away at intervals—one being the valuable iron that underpins our civilization, and the other the useless slag, which is disposed of as cheaply as possible.... The operation of this modern furnace occurs under a forced air draft, with pressures ranging from eight to twenty pounds per square inch. This pressure pushes the air upward through the hundred-foot mass that burns inside the furnace. Without it, the fire would suffocate. The gas produced from the incomplete combustion inside the furnace is a highly valuable by-product, aiding in the furnace's operation and sometimes yielding a product for sale. Part of the gas is directed to the boilers to generate power for the blowing engines, while another part is used in the so-called stoves to heat the air blast as it travels to the furnaces.”

The iron obtained by this Bessemer process, by which the carbon and other impurities are burned out, is, when it leaves the converter and cools, merely soft, malleable iron, and to transform it into steel there must be re-inserted a small but fixed and definitely determined amount of carbon. “Steel,” says J. Russell Smith, “is simply a mixture of iron with a small amount of carbon, very intimately and evenly associated in its mass. The carbon content of steel varies from .40 per cent to 1.50 per cent. Steel making is, therefore, a process of mixing carbon and iron in proper proportions. Inasmuch as it cannot be made satisfactorily in a puddling furnace, by reducing the carbon to a proper point and then stopping the furnace, it has been found necessary to burn the carbon all out, making wrought iron, and then working it back to steel by recarbonizing under such conditions that the carbon can be controlled. The iron, after having all of its carbon and other impurities burned out by the Bessemer process, is raised to steel by having thrown into it spiegel [Pg 246] iron or ferro manganese. Both are rich in manganese and carbon. As the iron content of the Bessemer converter is known and the content of the spiegel iron is known, the carbon in the steel is under perfect control. The workman watching the flames cuts off the blast at the moment when the changing color tells him the carbon is gone. The carbon of the added material makes steel, and the manganese gives to the steel a toughness needed to make it stand the strain of being rolled into desired shapes while red-hot, without breaking....

The iron produced by the Bessemer process, which burns out carbon and other impurities, is just soft, malleable iron when it leaves the converter and cools down. To turn it into steel, a specific amount of carbon must be added back in. “Steel,” as J. Russell Smith states, “is simply a mix of iron with a small amount of carbon, very closely and evenly combined in its structure. The carbon content of steel ranges from 0.40 percent to 1.50 percent. Thus, steelmaking is about combining carbon and iron in the right ratios. Since it can't be effectively made in a puddling furnace by just adjusting the carbon level and then stopping the process, it’s necessary to burn out all the carbon, producing wrought iron, and then convert it back to steel by recarbonizing in a way that allows for control of the carbon content. After the Bessemer process has removed all carbon and other impurities, the iron is converted to steel by adding spiegel iron or ferro manganese, both of which are high in manganese and carbon. Since the iron content in the Bessemer converter is known along with that of the spiegel iron, the carbon level in the steel can be precisely managed. The worker monitoring the flames stops the blast at the moment the changing color indicates that the carbon is gone. The carbon from the added materials creates steel, while the manganese provides the toughness needed to withstand the strain of being shaped while hot without breaking....

“The steel for the greater industries is shaped in a rolling mill. It comes from the Bessemer or open-hearth converter molded into a great billet like a piece of a large wooden beam, and this billet is carried red-hot to a so-called soaking pit, where the tongues of a flame from a gas-fire keep it heated until it is ready to start on its journey through the mills. This soaking pit is the starting point of many roads through the mill. It goes off in one direction, and successive rollers squeeze it, crush it, and lengthen it into steel rails, in which form it emerges a thousand feet away. Other sets of rolls make the billet into flat beams for bridges or elevated railways. A third set of rolls, also starting near the soaking pits, send the product out of the distant door of the steel mill in the form of great flat plates to make the boiler of a locomotive, or a marine engine, or the sides of a steamship, and yet other sets of rollers will make square rods which finally pass under heavy shears and are chopped into pieces called billets or blooms. These pieces of steel are the raw material for other mills which may make wire, nails, or manufacture steel of any other of a thousand forms. Some billets are as big as cord wood, some no larger than lead pencils—thus it passes out into the manifold world of manufacture.”

"The steel for larger industries is shaped in a rolling mill. It comes from the Bessemer or open-hearth converter, molded into a large billet resembling a piece of a big wooden beam. This billet is carried in red-hot to a soaking pit, where flames from a gas fire keep it heated until it's ready to begin its journey through the mills. This soaking pit is the starting point of many paths through the mill. It goes off in one direction, and successive rollers squeeze, crush, and stretch it into steel rails, which come out a thousand feet away. Other types of rollers turn the billet into flat beams for bridges or elevated railways. A third set of rollers, also starting near the soaking pits, sends the product out of the far door of the steel mill as large flat plates used to make locomotive boilers, marine engines, or the sides of steamships. Additionally, other roller sets will create square rods, which are then sent under heavy shears and chopped into pieces called billets or blooms. These pieces of steel serve as raw material for other mills that may produce wire, nails, or transform steel into countless other forms. Some billets are as large as firewood, while others are no bigger than lead pencils—this is how they enter the diverse world of manufacturing."

[Pg 247] VII. THE TEXTILE INDUSTRY.

Cotton manufacturing is an important illustration of the growth in the textile industries of the world during the period in which the use of machinery has multiplied the producing power of man in the industrial lines. In all lines of textile manufacture the growth has been rapid, but especially so in cotton, which has made greater gains in the work of supplying man with the necessary requirements of life, in clothing for his body and the comforts of life, than other branches of the textile industries and than many other branches of manufacture. Mulhall estimates the consumption of cotton by all nations at 303 million pounds in 1800 and 5,900 million pounds in 1896; wool, 460 million pounds in 1800 and 2,400 million pounds in 1896; flax, 600 million pounds in 1800 and 200 million pounds in 1896; silk, 30 million pounds in 1800 and 50 million pounds in 1897. It will be seen from these estimates that the growth in consumption of cotton has been far in excess of that of any other of the important fibers. Cotton consumption in 1896 was, according to these figures, 5,900 million pounds, against 303 million in 1800, or practically 20 times as much in 1896 as in 1800, while wool consumption is set down at 2,400 million pounds in 1896, against 460 million in 1800, or only about 5 times as much in 1896 as in 1800; while in the other materials used in textile manufactures the growth has been much less than that of cotton.

Cotton manufacturing is a key example of the growth in the textile industries around the world during a time when machinery has significantly increased human productivity in manufacturing. The expansion in all areas of textile production has been rapid, but cotton has seen the most progress in meeting people's basic needs for clothing and everyday comforts, outpacing other textile sectors and many other types of manufacturing. Mulhall estimates that cotton consumption worldwide was 303 million pounds in 1800 and skyrocketed to 5,900 million pounds by 1896; wool consumption was 460 million pounds in 1800 and increased to 2,400 million pounds in 1896; flax was 600 million pounds in 1800 but dropped to 200 million pounds in 1896; and silk consumption grew from 30 million pounds in 1800 to 50 million pounds in 1897. These estimates reveal that the rise in cotton consumption has greatly surpassed that of other major fibers. According to these figures, cotton consumption in 1896 was 5,900 million pounds compared to just 303 million in 1800, meaning it was nearly 20 times higher in 1896 than in 1800. In contrast, wool consumption in 1896 was 2,400 million pounds, up from 460 million in 1800, which is only about 5 times more in 1896 than in 1800, while the growth in other textile materials has been much less than that of cotton.

Before entering upon a discussion of the growth in cotton manufacturing and the causes thereof, it is proper to say that the value of all textile manufactures in the principal countries of Europe has, according to Mulhall, grown from £96,000,000 in 1800 to £660,000,000 in 1896, and in the United States, from £3,000,000 in 1800 to £188,000,000 in 1896, the value of textile manufactures produced in Europe having thus increased about sixfold in the period in question, and in the United States about sixtyfold. It is apparent [Pg 248] from these figures that the growth in the manufacture of cotton during the last century has far outstripped that of any other of the textiles. It is also quite apparent that the capital invested in cotton manufacturing is much greater than that in other textiles. The United States Census reports the capital invested in the manufacture of cotton goods in 1880 at 320 million dollars; in 1905, 613 million; the value of the products of these manufacturing establishments in 1880, 211 million dollars, and in 1905, 450 million dollars. Even these figures of increased production—from 211 million dollars’ value in 1880 to 450 million in 1905--do not fully indicate the increase in quantity of products, since prices in 1905 were materially less than those of 1880. The average price of standard sheetings in the New York markets was quoted at 8½ cents per yard in 1880 and 7 cents per yard in 1905; of standard drillings, 8½ cents per yard in 1880 and 7 cents per yard in 1905; of New York mills bleached shirtings, 12¾ cents per yard in 1880 and 9 cents per yard in 1905; of standard prints, 7.4 cents per yard in 1880 and 4¾ cents per yard in 1905; and of 64 by 64 printing cloths, 4½ cents per yard in 1880 and 3.6 cents per yard 1905. This indicates that the increased valuation in cotton products from 211 million dollars in 1880 to 450 million dollars in 1905, fails to fully reflect the increased quantity produced in 1905, and suggests that the quantity produced in 1905 was probably approximately three times as great as in 1880.

Before discussing the growth of cotton manufacturing and its causes, it's important to note that, according to Mulhall, the value of all textile manufacturing in the major countries of Europe increased from £96,000,000 in 1800 to £660,000,000 in 1896. In the United States, the value rose from £3,000,000 in 1800 to £188,000,000 in 1896. This shows that the value of textile manufacturing in Europe grew about sixfold during this period, while in the United States, it increased about sixtyfold. These figures clearly show that cotton manufacturing's growth over the last century has surpassed that of any other textiles. It's also evident that the capital invested in cotton manufacturing is significantly higher than in other textiles. The United States Census reports that the capital invested in cotton goods manufacturing was 320 million dollars in 1880 and 613 million in 1905. The value of products from these manufacturing facilities was 211 million dollars in 1880 and 450 million dollars in 1905. Even with this rise in production—from 211 million dollars' worth in 1880 to 450 million in 1905—these figures don’t completely reflect the increase in the quantity of products, as prices in 1905 were considerably lower than in 1880. The average price of standard sheetings in New York was 8½ cents per yard in 1880 and 7 cents per yard in 1905; standard drillings were priced the same; New York mills bleached shirtings were 12¾ cents per yard in 1880 and 9 cents per yard in 1905; standard prints were 7.4 cents per yard in 1880 and 4¾ cents per yard in 1905; and 64 by 64 printing cloths were priced at 4½ cents per yard in 1880 and 3.6 cents per yard in 1905. This indicates that the increase in cotton product valuation from 211 million dollars in 1880 to 450 million dollars in 1905 does not fully capture the actual increase in quantity produced, suggesting that the quantity produced in 1905 was likely about three times greater than in 1880.

The disposition to increase production through enlargements of existing factories rather than by the establishment of new ones, or the combination of existing factories as an offset to the establishment of new ones, is indicated by the fact that the total number of establishments, which was reported in 1880 at 1,005, was, in 1905, but 1,154, an increase of about 12 per cent in the number of establishments, while capital was increasing nearly 200 per cent, the value [Pg 249] of product more than 100 per cent, and quantity of product probably nearly 200 per cent.

The tendency to boost production by expanding existing factories instead of building new ones, or by merging current factories to avoid starting new ones, is shown by the fact that the total number of factories reported in 1880 was 1,005, and by 1905, it had only risen to 1,154, which is about a 12 percent increase. Meanwhile, the investment was increasing by nearly 200 percent, the value of the products rose by more than 100 percent, and the quantity of products likely increased by nearly 200 percent. [Pg 249]

Great Britain is in proportion to population the greatest cotton-manufacturing country of the world. She was earliest in the field as a manufacturer, developing that industry while the countries of continental Europe were engaged in wars and while the United States, now the leading producer of cotton, was developing her agricultural industries and had scarcely as yet entered upon the development of her manufacturing possibilities. The United States, by far the largest producer of raw cotton, ranks second as a manufacturer of cotton goods.

Great Britain has the largest cotton-manufacturing industry in the world relative to its population. It was the first to establish this industry while countries in mainland Europe were caught up in wars and when the United States, now the top cotton producer, was still focused on developing its agricultural sector and had just started to explore its manufacturing potential. The United States, being the biggest producer of raw cotton, comes in second in manufacturing cotton goods.

Accurate estimates of the relative standing of the various countries in the manufacture of cotton are difficult, almost impossible, especially in view of the fact that no country other than the United States takes a periodic census of its industries. There are, however, three ways by which the production of cotton manufactures in the various countries can be approximately measured: first, by the number of spindles in cotton mills; second, by the quantity of cotton used; and, third, a method which has been suggested in some quarters, a measurement of the quantity or value of cotton goods exported. This, however, would not give at all an accurate picture of the quantity produced, since the population of the cotton-manufacturing countries varies so greatly and, what is more important, the habits of life, the climatic conditions, and therefore the quantities of cotton cloths and cotton manufactures of various sorts used by their respective populations renders the third method of estimate of little value. Even the first and second methods mentioned—the determination of the number of spindles and the determination of the quantity of cotton used—do not, by any means, give an accurate picture of the relative quantity or value of cotton goods manufactured. In the United States, where cotton is plentiful, much larger quantities of cotton are used per [Pg 250] spindle than in the European countries, and greater quantities of cotton are also used for each 100 yards of cotton manufactured than is the case in other countries. This is due, in part, to the fact that the manufacturers of the United States are producing cotton goods for their home population, living in a temperate zone climate and requiring, therefore, heavy cottons; while many of the factories of Europe are manufacturing for exportation to tropical countries, where cottons of very light weight are required. As a consequence, the European manufacturers use a less quantity of cotton per spindle and a less quantity of cotton per square yard of product than is the case with the manufacturers of the United States. The number of spindles in cotton mills in Great Britain is estimated at 44½ million in the season 1896-7 and 52 million in 1906-7, an increase of 16¾ per cent; in continental Europe, 30⅓ million in 1896-7 and 35¾ million in 1906-7, an increase of 18 per cent; in the United States, 17¼ million in 1896-7 and 25¾ million in 1906-7, an increase of 50 per cent; and in India, 4 million in 1896-7, and 5⅓ million in 1906-7, an increase of 33 per cent. The annual consumption of cotton in cotton mills is estimated, in Great Britain, 3¼ million bales of 500 pounds net in 1896-7, and 3-9⁄10 million bales in 1906-7, an increase of 21 per cent; in continental Europe, 4⅓ million bales in 1896-7, and 5½ million bales in 1906-7, an increase of 44 per cent; in the United States, 2¾ million bales in 1896-7, and 4-5⁄6 million bales in 1906-7, an increase of 77 per cent; and in India, 1 million bales in 1896-7, and 1½ million bales in 1906-7, an increase of 50 per cent.

Accurate estimates of how different countries rank in cotton manufacturing are tough, nearly impossible, especially since no country besides the United States conducts regular industry censuses. However, there are three ways to roughly gauge cotton production in these countries: first, by counting the number of spindles in cotton mills; second, by measuring the amount of cotton used; and third, a method some have proposed, which is measuring the amount or value of cotton goods exported. However, this last method wouldn't accurately reflect the quantity produced, because the populations of cotton-manufacturing countries vary significantly, and more importantly, the lifestyle habits, climate conditions, and the different amounts of cotton fabrics and products used by their populations make this third method of estimation quite unreliable. Even the first two methods mentioned—the count of spindles and the quantity of cotton used—don't provide a clear view of the relative quantity or value of manufactured cotton goods. In the United States, where cotton is abundant, much larger amounts of cotton are used per spindle compared to European countries, and greater amounts are also utilized for every 100 yards of cotton produced than in other nations. This is partly because U.S. manufacturers are producing cotton goods for a home population living in a temperate climate, thus requiring heavier cotton, while many European factories are producing for export to tropical countries, where lighter cottons are needed. As a result, European manufacturers use less cotton per spindle and less cotton per square yard of output compared to their U.S. counterparts. The estimated number of spindles in cotton mills in Great Britain was 44.5 million in 1896-97 and 52 million in 1906-07, an increase of 16.75 percent; in continental Europe, it was 30.3 million in 1896-97 and 35.75 million in 1906-07, an increase of 18 percent; in the United States, it was 17.25 million in 1896-97 and 25.75 million in 1906-07, an increase of 50 percent; and in India, it was 4 million in 1896-97 and 5.3 million in 1906-07, an increase of 33 percent. The annual cotton consumption in mills is estimated to be 3.25 million bales of 500 pounds net in Great Britain for 1896-97, and 3.9 million bales in 1906-07, an increase of 21 percent; in continental Europe, 4.3 million bales in 1896-97 and 5.5 million bales in 1906-07, an increase of 44 percent; in the United States, 2.75 million bales in 1896-97 and 4.83 million bales in 1906-07, an increase of 77 percent; and in India, 1 million bales in 1896-97 and 1.5 million bales in 1906-07, an increase of 50 percent.

It will be noted that although the number of spindles in the cotton mills in the United States was but 25¾ million, against 52 million in Great Britain, or about half as many in the United States as in Great Britain, the quantity of cotton used in the United States was greater than [Pg 251] in Great Britain, being 4,822,000 bales, against 3,915,000 bales in Great Britain.

It’s important to note that while the number of spindles in the cotton mills in the United States was only 25.75 million, compared to 52 million in Great Britain—about half as many as in Great Britain—the amount of cotton used in the United States was higher, totaling 4,822,000 bales, compared to 3,915,000 bales in Great Britain. [Pg 251]

The textile industry of the United States, according to census reports, represented in 1900 investments amounting to 1,043 million dollars, employed 661,000 wage-earners, paid 209 million dollars per annum of wages, used 521 million dollars’ worth of materials, and turned out products valued at 931 million dollars. The number of establishments was 4,312. Cotton manufactures formed a larger share of these enormous totals, both as to investment, wages paid, and value of products, than did any other of the manufacturing industries included under the general term of textiles. The value of cotton manufactures in 1900 was 339 million dollars, while that of wool manufactures was 297 million; silk manufactures, 107 million; hosiery; and knit goods, 95 million; and flax, hemp and jute manufactures, 48 million. Adding to this 45 million for dyeing and finishing of textiles, the value of the combined textiles in 1900 is set down at $931,494,566.

The textile industry in the United States, according to census reports, had investments totaling $1.043 billion in 1900, employed 661,000 workers, paid out $209 million in wages annually, used $521 million worth of materials, and produced goods valued at $931 million. There were 4,312 businesses in this sector. Cotton products made up a larger portion of these significant totals in terms of investment, wages paid, and product value compared to any other manufacturing industries categorized under textiles. The value of cotton products in 1900 was $339 million, while wool products were valued at $297 million, silk products at $107 million, hosiery and knit goods at $95 million, and flax, hemp, and jute products at $48 million. Adding $45 million for dyeing and finishing textiles, the total value of textiles in 1900 was recorded at $931,494,566.

“Textiles,” or “textile fabrics,” may be properly described as stuffs made by weaving together of threads of any sort to produce a material with a nearly solid surface. “A fishing net,” says the Encyclopedia Americana, “is not a textile, because the cords which compose it are not woven together but merely cross one another at equally distant intervals and are strongly knotted at those points. But mosquito-netting is a textile, although very open, because the threads are merely held by their own friction.” Textiles in the usual sense are made of the twisted fibers spun into thread of flax or linen, cotton, hemp, jute, silk or wool, woven together by the use of a loom. “The general nature of a loom,” says the above quoted authority, “is that the threads of the warp are divided into two sets, one of which is thrown upward, while the other is thrown down, and at the same moment a shuttle carrying a thread of the woof is driven through between the two sets of warp [Pg 252] threads. The next movement of the loom reverses the two sets of warp threads, throwing the upper one down and the lower one up, compressing and drawing tight the woof thread into the loops which show on the surface of the stuff and go to form the surface, and the shuttle is driven through again in the opposite direction. The constant repetition of this forward and backward movement of the shuttle gives a strip of woven fabric which constantly grows: and as each movement of the shuttle is made, an appliance drives the last thread of the woof back against the others, so that this growing strip of woven stuff is kept at a uniform state of firmness and solidity. It is in this way that the simplest fabrics of linens and cottons are made. If it be desired to produce a somewhat more elaborate weave, this is done by raising two threads of the warp and dropping one; or by raising three threads of the warp and dropping one, and so on. In this way the threads of the woof are seen lying in loops, or what seems to be stitches longer than those of the simplest weave.... If we take a step further and use three or four warp threads, say, of red, while the rest remain white, and do the same thing with the woof threads, we produce stripes and where these stripes cross one another there will be a little square of the solid color of the three or four threads, while the stripes elsewhere remain of the half-way tint.... In such weaving of patterns it is here assumed that the threads are dyed before the weaving is begun. The matter of printing colors upon calico, thin silk, or the like, is entirely apart from consideration of the textile fabric. Printing is done from blocks (or rolls) with color almost exactly as if the material receiving the pattern were paper instead of a woven stuff.”

“Textiles,” or “textile fabrics,” can be properly described as materials made by weaving threads of any kind together to create a nearly solid surface. “A fishing net,” says the Encyclopedia Americana, “is not a textile because the cords that make it are not woven together; they merely cross each other at regular intervals and are tightly knotted at those points. However, mosquito-netting is considered a textile, even though it's quite open, because the threads are simply held in place by their own friction.” Textiles, in the common sense, are made from twisted fibers spun into thread from flax or linen, cotton, hemp, jute, silk, or wool, woven together using a loom. “The basic function of a loom,” according to the aforementioned source, “is that the warp threads are divided into two sets, one of which is lifted, while the other is lowered, and simultaneously, a shuttle carrying a thread of weft is passed between the two sets of warp threads. The next movement of the loom reverses the two sets of warp threads, dropping the upper one and raising the lower one, tightening the weft thread into the loops that form the surface of the fabric, and the shuttle is passed through again in the opposite direction. The continuous back-and-forth motion of the shuttle creates a strip of woven fabric that constantly expands: and with each shuttle movement, a mechanism pushes the last weft thread back against the others, ensuring this growing strip of woven material remains consistently firm and solid. This is how the simplest fabrics like linen and cotton are made. If a more complex weave is desired, it can be achieved by lifting two warp threads and dropping one, or lifting three warp threads and dropping one, and so on. This technique allows the weft threads to form loops or appear as longer stitches compared to the simplest weave. If we go a step further and use three or four red warp threads while keeping the others white, and do the same with the weft threads, we create stripes, and where these stripes intersect, there will be little squares of solid color from the three or four threads, while the stripes in other areas maintain a blended color. In this type of patterned weaving, it is assumed that the threads are dyed before the weaving begins. The process of printing colors onto calico, thin silk, or similar materials is entirely different from the consideration of the textile fabric itself. Printing is done from blocks (or rolls) with color almost exactly as if the material receiving the pattern were paper instead of a woven fabric.”

The above description of the method of producing textiles is sufficiently elaborate for a study of this character. The methods of producing brocades, satins, velvets and other elaborately figured textiles of any sort may be studied [Pg 253] more in detail by reference to any standard encyclopedia or work of this character.

The description of how textiles are made above is detailed enough for this kind of study. You can look into the production methods for brocades, satins, velvets, and other intricately designed fabrics in more detail by checking a standard encyclopedia or a relevant work. [Pg 253]

The fact that cotton is, as has been already shown, the most important of the textile industries, utilizing larger sums of capital, turning out greater values of product, distributing its products over a wider area and to a larger number of people than any other of the textiles, justifies a somewhat more elaborate discussion of this industry and its development during the period in which the manufacturing industries of the world have been transferred from hand labor to that of machines, and in which capital has come to form so important a factor in production.

The fact that cotton is, as has been already shown, the most important of the textile industries, using more capital, producing greater value in products, and distributing these products over a wider area and to more people than any other textile, justifies a more detailed discussion of this industry and its development during the time when manufacturing industries around the world have transitioned from hand labor to machines, and when capital has become such a crucial factor in production.

The manufacture of textiles from cotton is, like that of iron and steel, “older than written history.” The art of cotton spinning and weaving is believed to have been practised in India, still a great cotton-producing section of the world, from 20 to 30 centuries ago. From India the production of cotton and manufacture of cotton goods moved westward into Persia, thence to the area immediately east of the Mediterranean, then to Egypt, and even southern Europe. The Moors are said to have introduced the cultivation and manufacture of cotton into Spain during their control of that section of Europe, but the cotton-manufacturing industry which existed at Seville, Cordova and Grenada fell into decay after their expulsion from Spain and was only resumed after the British, followed by the French and Germans, had developed the art of manufacturing cotton goods by machine methods. While the manufacture of yarn or threads from cotton declined in Spain, it later made its appearance in Italy in the fourteenth century and in Germany, Prussia, the Netherlands and England in the sixteenth century, and France in the seventeenth century, but it was not thought practicable to manufacture cloth exclusively from cotton until toward the close of the eighteenth century, the cotton yarn being used only for woof, while the warp used in conjunction therewith [Pg 254] was either wool, flax, or silk. The so-called “Manchester cottons” of earlier date were composed in part of cotton and in part of wool or linen. The first acquaintance of western Europe with cloths made entirely from cotton seems to have been in those brought from Calcutta, India (and therefore called calicoes); but the calicoes made in Europe at that time and for more than a century after were made, in part at least, of wool or linen.

The production of textiles from cotton is, like iron and steel, "older than written history." Cotton spinning and weaving is believed to have been practiced in India, still a major cotton-producing region, from 2,000 to 3,000 years ago. From India, cotton production and the making of cotton goods spread west to Persia, then to the area just east of the Mediterranean, followed by Egypt, and even southern Europe. The Moors are said to have introduced cotton cultivation and manufacturing to Spain during their rule in that part of Europe, but the cotton industry in Seville, Cordova, and Grenada declined after their expulsion and didn’t really pick up again until the British, followed by the French and Germans, advanced machine manufacturing techniques. While cotton yarn production fell off in Spain, it later emerged in Italy in the fourteenth century and in Germany, Prussia, the Netherlands, and England in the sixteenth century, with France following in the seventeenth century. However, it wasn't considered feasible to make cloth solely from cotton until toward the end of the eighteenth century; cotton yarn was primarily used for weft, while the warp was either wool, flax, or silk. The early “Manchester cottons” were made partly from cotton and partly from wool or linen. Western Europe’s first encounter with fabrics made entirely from cotton seems to have come from ones brought from Calcutta, India (hence called calicoes); however, the calicoes produced in Europe at that time and for over a century afterward were at least partially made from wool or linen.

Prior to the latter part of the eighteenth century all cloths, whether of wool, cotton, silk, or flax, were manufactured by hand labor. The natural fabrics were, as described elsewhere in this work, spun into threads by the use of the simple spinning wheel, chiefly by the labor of women who were termed “Spinsters.” The threads thus obtained were made into cloth by the use of a loom upon the general principles above described, but of extremely simple design and operated solely by human power. Up to this time the making of threads or yarn and their transformation into cloth by the weavers, chiefly men, kept pace fairly with one another, the supply of thread or yarn being about equal to the demand by the weavers. “One good weaver,” says Dr. Ure, “could keep three active women at work spinning weft. In operating the loom, the shuttle which carried the thread back and forth between the raised and lowered sections of the warp was thrown back and forth with the hand, which required a constant extension of the hands to each side of the warp. In 1738 John Kay, an Englishman, devised a system by which the shuttle was thrown back and forth by means of strings attached at opposite ends of the lathe in which the shuttles ran, enabling a weaver to double the amount of cloth which he could manufacture within a given space of time, thus making the demand for yarn in excess of the supply.” “It was no uncommon thing,” says a writer on that subject, “for a weaver to walk three or four miles in a morning, and call on four or five spinners, before he [Pg 255] could collect weft to serve him for the remainder of the day.”

Before the late eighteenth century, all fabrics—whether made from wool, cotton, silk, or flax—were produced by hand. These natural fibers were, as mentioned elsewhere in this work, spun into threads using simple spinning wheels, mostly by women called “Spinsters.” The resulting threads were woven into cloth on looms that followed basic principles but were very simple in design and operated entirely by human power. Until then, the production of thread and yarn and their conversion into cloth by weavers, typically men, progressed at a similar rate, with the supply of thread being roughly equal to what the weavers needed. “One good weaver,” Dr. Ure notes, “could keep three active women busy spinning weft.” When weaving, the loom's shuttle, which carried the thread back and forth between the raised and lowered sections of the warp, was moved manually, requiring the weaver to extend their hands to either side of the warp continuously. In 1738, John Kay, an Englishman, created a system that allowed the shuttle to be propelled back and forth using strings attached to opposite ends of the lathe where the shuttles operated, enabling a weaver to double the amount of cloth produced in a given timeframe, therefore increasing the demand for yarn beyond its supply. “It was not uncommon,” a writer on this subject states, “for a weaver to walk three or four miles in the morning and visit four or five spinners before gathering enough weft to last him for the rest of the day.”

This stimulated active minds in those industries to devise some method for increasing the facilities for turning the wool or cotton or flax into the needed yarn, and James Hargreaves, a weaver, devised about 1764 a machine which he called the “spinning jenny,” in which were set eight spindles in a frame put in motion by a single wheel, and by moving backward and forward a moveable carriage containing a horizontal clasp to hold the material being twisted into threads, the quantity of yarn which one person could produce in a given length of time was greatly increased. Subsequently the number of spindles in the frame was increased to 20 or 30, and in time to more than 1,000. Hargreaves kept this invention secret for a time, using it merely to manufacture yarn for his own weaving, but it finally became known and the spinners of the neighborhood, believing that it would throw many out of employment, broke into his establishment and destroyed the machine. He, however, retired to Nottingham, erected a small mill and took out a patent for the “spinning jenny,” and in time it became to be an established method of manufacturing yarn and in a more elaborate form is the principal factor in the manufacture of cotton yarns in the great factories today, the number of spindles which a modern machine of this character now uses being often in excess of 1,000, instead of the 8 utilized by the original spinning jenny.

This sparked creative thinking among people in those industries to come up with ways to improve the process of turning wool, cotton, or flax into the yarn that was needed. Around 1764, James Hargreaves, a weaver, invented a machine he called the “spinning jenny,” which had eight spindles attached to a frame powered by a single wheel. By moving a carriage back and forth that held the material being spun into threads, the amount of yarn that one person could produce in a given time was significantly increased. Over time, the number of spindles in the frame was boosted to 20 or 30, and eventually to over 1,000. Hargreaves kept his invention secret for a while, using it just to produce yarn for his own weaving, but eventually word got out. Local spinners, fearing it would lead to job losses, broke into his workshop and destroyed the machine. Nevertheless, he moved to Nottingham, set up a small mill, and patented the “spinning jenny.” Eventually, it became a standard method for producing yarn, and in a more advanced form, it is now a key component in the production of cotton yarn in large factories today, with modern machines often using more than 1,000 spindles instead of the original 8.

Meantime another method was being utilized and brought into operation, by which a stronger yarn could be produced. It seems to have been originally devised by John Wyatt, of Birmingham, England, and operated upon a system entirely different from that of the jenny. “The method adopted,” says Ellison, in his “Cotton Trade of Great Britain,” “was to pass the cotton through pairs of small grooved rollers placed horizontally, the upper and [Pg 256] lower roller of each pair revolving in contact, the sliver of cotton, after passing through these rollers, being caught by another pair of rollers placed immediately in front which revolve with three, four, or five times the velocity of the first pair and therefore draw out the sliver of cotton into three, four, or five times its former length and degree of fineness. After passing through this second pair of rollers it was attached to a spindle, the rapid revolutions of which twisted it into a thread and at the same time wound it upon a bobbin.” This method, devised by Wyatt in 1730 and patented in 1738, was perfected by Arkwright 30 years later and was known as the “spinning frame,” but since it was operated by water power, received the name of the “water frame.” By the use of this process the cotton yarn was made of sufficient strength to permit its use for the warp as well as for the woof, and thus, for the first time, the making of cloth entirely from cotton became practicable.

Meanwhile, another method was being used and implemented, allowing for the production of a stronger yarn. This method seems to have been originally created by John Wyatt from Birmingham, England, and it functioned using a system completely different from the jenny. “The method adopted,” says Ellison in his “Cotton Trade of Great Britain,” “was to pass the cotton through pairs of small grooved rollers arranged horizontally, with the upper and lower rollers of each pair turning in contact. After passing through these rollers, the cotton sliver was caught by another pair of rollers placed right in front that spun at three, four, or five times the speed of the first pair, thus drawing out the cotton sliver to three, four, or five times its previous length and fineness. After this second pair of rollers, it was attached to a spindle, which, through rapid spinning, twisted it into thread while simultaneously winding it onto a bobbin.” This method, which Wyatt devised in 1730 and patented in 1738, was refined by Arkwright 30 years later and was called the “spinning frame,” but since it was driven by water power, it became known as the “water frame.” Thanks to this process, the cotton yarn was made strong enough for use in both the warp and the weft, making it possible for the first time to create cloth entirely from cotton.

“With the invention of the jenny and water frame,” says Ellison, “commenced a new era in the history of the cotton trade; in fact, so far as Europe is concerned, it may be said that the history of the cotton manufacture, as a separate and distinct industry, began with the invention of these two machines; for until the introduction of Arkwright’s contrivance for spinning by rollers, it was impossible to produce a piece of cloth composed wholly of cotton.”

“With the invention of the jenny and water frame,” says Ellison, “a new era began in the history of the cotton trade; in fact, as far as Europe is concerned, we can say that the history of cotton manufacturing as a separate and distinct industry started with the invention of these two machines; before Arkwright’s rolling spinning device was introduced, it was impossible to produce a piece of cloth made entirely of cotton.”

Still another important device for use in the manufacture of cotton cloths was the “carding machine.” Originally the raw cotton was prepared for spinning by the use of brushes made of short pieces of wire instead of bristles, the wire being stuck into a sheet of leather at a certain angle, the cotton being spread upon one piece and combed with another until the fibers were laid straight, when it was ready for the use of the spinner. In 1748 a carding machine was devised to supersede the hand process, [Pg 257] but it was not until toward the close of the century that carding machines took such form as to become an important factor in the cotton-manufacturing industry. Even in the closing quarter of the eighteenth century the prejudice on the part of hand laborers against machines was so great that for several miles around Blackwell every spinning jenny containing more than 20 spindles was destroyed, while a mill erected by Arkwright near Chorley was destroyed by a mob. A little later another machine was invented by Samuel Crompton, which he designated the “spinning mule,” which combined the drawing rollers of Arkwright and the jenny of Hargreaves; and it was looked upon as an improvement upon the machines of Arkwright and Hargreaves. These devices—the spinning jenny of Hargreaves, the water frame of Arkwright, and the combination of those principles in the spinning mule of Crompton—revolutionized the cotton-manufacturing industry and the principles thus embodied are still the chief factors in the great cotton-manufacturing establishments of the world today.

Another key device used in making cotton fabrics was the “carding machine.” Initially, raw cotton was prepared for spinning with brushes made of short pieces of wire rather than bristles. The wire was inserted into a sheet of leather at a specific angle, with the cotton spread over one piece and combed with another until the fibers were aligned and ready for the spinner. In 1748, a carding machine was invented to replace this manual process, but it wasn't until the late 1700s that carding machines evolved into a significant part of the cotton manufacturing industry. Even in the last quarter of the eighteenth century, there remained strong resistance among manual laborers against machines; for several miles around Blackwell, any spinning jenny with more than 20 spindles was destroyed, and a mill built by Arkwright near Chorley was attacked by a mob. Shortly after, Samuel Crompton invented another machine called the “spinning mule,” which combined the drawing rollers of Arkwright and the jenny of Hargreaves. This was seen as an improvement over the machines made by Arkwright and Hargreaves. These inventions—the spinning jenny by Hargreaves, Arkwright’s water frame, and Crompton’s spinning mule—transformed the cotton manufacturing industry, and the principles they introduced remain central to the large-scale cotton manufacturing operations around the world today.

Another device which added greatly to the manufacturing possibilities with reference to cotton was the invention by Eli Whitney in America of the cotton gin, a machine for stripping the cotton fiber from the seeds and technically called the “gin,” probably a contraction of the word engine. It performs its work through the operation of a series of revolving saws which come in contact with the cotton through openings sufficiently narrow to prevent the passing of the seeds but permitting the fibers torn therefrom to pass downward into a receptacle, while the seeds, freed from the fiber, pass through another opening and are subsequently utilized in the manufacture of oil; though this utilization of the seeds did not develop until long after the cotton gin had become an important factor in the cotton-manufacturing industries of the world.

Another device that greatly expanded manufacturing possibilities for cotton was the invention by Eli Whitney in America of the cotton gin, a machine designed to separate the cotton fiber from the seeds and technically referred to as the “gin,” likely a shortened form of the word engine. It operates using a series of revolving saws that come into contact with the cotton through openings narrow enough to keep the seeds from passing through, but allowing the fibers to be pulled down into a receptacle, while the seeds, now free of fiber, move through another opening and are later used to produce oil; however, this use of the seeds didn’t fully develop until long after the cotton gin had become a crucial element in the global cotton-manufacturing industries.

[Pg 258] Through the application of these machines—the spinning jenny, the water frame, the spinning mule, and the cotton gin, driven by power generated by water or steam, and in more recent years applied, in some cases in the form of electricity—the cotton manufacturing of the world has been transferred from hand work to that of machines, and the world’s consumption of cotton today is many times as much as that of the period in which these machines were being perfected, while the quantity of cotton goods produced from a given amount of cotton is, through the refinement of machine processes, much greater than formerly. The quantity of cotton cloth produced at the present time through the development of machinery and the encouragement which its use has given to production of cotton and consumption of cotton goods multiplies many times that of the period in which the transformation from hand to machine production began, and has made cotton the leading textile material of the world.

[Pg 258] With the use of machines like the spinning jenny, water frame, spinning mule, and cotton gin, powered by water, steam, or even electricity in recent years, cotton manufacturing has shifted from manual labor to machinery. Today, the world consumes cotton at a rate that far exceeds that of the time when these machines were developed, and the amount of cotton goods produced from a specific quantity of cotton has significantly increased due to advancements in machine processes. The current production of cotton cloth, driven by machinery and the boost it has given to cotton production and the demand for cotton products, is multiplied many times compared to the era when the change from hand production to machine production began, establishing cotton as the world's primary textile material.

True, other branches of the textile industry have also benefited by the application of machine methods of spinning and weaving similar to those above described; but no other important textile has seen such a remarkable growth under the stimulus of machine production as has cotton. Even as late as 1830 the cotton consumed by those sections of the world for which statistics are available only amounted to about 500 million pounds, against 8,500 million in 1907, while, as already indicated, a pound of cotton under present conditions of manufacture produces probably twice as much of a given line of manufactures as a century ago. When it is remembered that the population of the world has only doubled since 1830 and the consumption of cotton is 17 times as great as at that time, the relative growth of cotton consumption to population will be seen to have been very great.

True, other parts of the textile industry have also benefited from machine methods of spinning and weaving similar to what was described above; but no other significant textile has experienced such remarkable growth due to machine production as cotton has. Even as late as 1830, the amount of cotton used in the parts of the world for which we have statistics was only about 500 million pounds, compared to 8,500 million in 1907. Moreover, as previously mentioned, a pound of cotton produced under current manufacturing conditions probably yields about twice as much of a specific line of products as it did a century ago. Considering that the world’s population has only doubled since 1830, while cotton consumption has increased 17 times since then, it’s clear that the relative growth of cotton consumption compared to the population has been very significant.

The above figures relating to consumption of cotton and to comparison of present consumption with that of a [Pg 259] century ago relate chiefly to Europe and the United States. Statistics of consumption are available, in addition to Europe and the United States, for India and Japan, and a few communities in which the consumption is small, such as Canada, Mexico and Australia. In addition to this, however, it must be remembered that large quantities of cotton goods are still being manufactured in certain parts of the world by the crude processes which prevailed in Europe and the United States before the adoption of the machine methods above described. In China, for example, large quantities of cotton are turned into yarn by hand spinning, and into cloth by hand weaving, and there is reason to believe that the quantity of cotton cloth manufactured in China by hand weaving, partly from yarns spun by hand and partly from yarns manufactured by machine methods, is greater than that manufactured by modern machinery. In many of the oriental countries, in large portions of South America, in large sections of Africa, and in the islands of the Pacific, millions, hundreds of millions of people are still clothed with textiles—cotton, wool, silk, or fibers—manufactured by hand processes or by simple machines operated by man power. In Europe and the United States, however, the system has been completely transformed, and machinery and money, in combination with a steadily decreasing percentage of human labor, now manufacture the cotton goods worn not only by their own people, but by large sections of the inhabitants of the oriental countries and the continents of Africa, South America and Australia.

The figures mentioned above regarding cotton consumption and the comparison of current consumption with that of a century ago primarily focus on Europe and the United States. In addition to Europe and the United States, statistics are available for cotton consumption in India and Japan, as well as a few smaller regions like Canada, Mexico, and Australia. It’s important to note, however, that significant amounts of cotton products are still being produced in some parts of the world using the basic methods that were common in Europe and the United States before machine methods were adopted. For instance, in China, a large quantity of cotton is processed into yarn through hand spinning and into fabric through hand weaving. There's reason to believe that the amount of cotton cloth produced in China by hand weaving, which uses both hand-spun yarn and machine-made yarn, is greater than that produced by modern machinery. In many Asian countries, large parts of South America, vast areas of Africa, and the Pacific Islands, millions, even hundreds of millions of people still wear textiles—cotton, wool, silk, or fibers—made by hand or using simple machines powered by human labor. In contrast, Europe and the United States have completely transformed their systems, where machinery and capital, combined with a continually decreasing level of human labor, now produce cotton goods not only for their own populations but also for large numbers of people in Asian countries and the continents of Africa, South America, and Australia.

The relative growth in the manufacture of cotton in recent years by the principal countries in which this industry has developed is indicated by the fact that the quantity of cotton consumed in Great Britain in 1887 was 2,955,000 bales and in 1907, 3,900,000 bales; that of the continent of Europe, in 1887, 2,912,000 bales, in 1907, 5,460,000 bales; in the United States, in 1887, 1,939,000 bales, [Pg 260] in 1907, 4,950,000 bales; in India, in 1887, 569,000 bales, in 1907, 1,600,000 bales; in Japan, in 1892, the first year for which statistics are available, 99,000 bales, and in 1907, 925,000 bales; and in all other countries for which figures are available, in 1891, 106,000 bales, and in 1907, 171,000 bales.

The growth in cotton production in recent years by the main countries where this industry has developed is reflected in the fact that the amount of cotton consumed in Great Britain in 1887 was 2,955,000 bales and in 1907, 3,900,000 bales; in continental Europe, in 1887, 2,912,000 bales, and in 1907, 5,460,000 bales; in the United States, in 1887, 1,939,000 bales, and in 1907, 4,950,000 bales; in India, in 1887, 569,000 bales, and in 1907, 1,600,000 bales; in Japan, in 1892, the first year for which statistics are available, 99,000 bales, and in 1907, 925,000 bales; and in all other countries for which figures exist, in 1891, 106,000 bales, and in 1907, 171,000 bales.

With this elaborate use of machinery and increase of cotton production, manufacture and consumption, has come great reduction in cost of production and in prices. “In the last half of the nineteenth century,” says S. N. D. North, late Director of the Census, in the Encyclopedia Americana, “there was an increase in value of textile products in the United States of about six times and not less than ten times if it were possible to measure this product by quantity instead of by value. Even the largest figures convey an inadequate idea of the relative importance of our textile mills in the industrial economy of the nation, for those mills supply the materials for a great group of subsidiary factory industries, such as the wholesale clothing manufacture, etc. When we aggregate these, and add to them the value of the products of the linen, jute, hemp, and bagging mills of the country, we find that the product of our textile mills is larger in value than that of any single line of related industries, iron and steel excepted. The decrease in the cost of goods during the last half of the century has been one of the most striking phases of the development. This decrease is due—in some measure, of course, to the decreased price of the raw materials, but in even larger measure to the remarkable advance in methods of manufacture—to the new and more perfect machinery employed, in the invention of which American mechanical genius has contributed certainly as much as that of any other people, and perhaps more. All the fundamental inventions in spinning-machinery were of English origin. The French and Germans have also done much in the invention of labor-saving textile machinery, [Pg 261] but the American record may be shown to have surpassed them all. The wool-carding machinery of all countries owes its chief improvement over the machines of a century ago to the invention of John Goulding, of Worcester, Mass. The modern cotton spindle, making 10,000 revolutions a minute, is an evolution of our own mechanics, and the saving effected by new forms of spindles invented and adopted in the United States since 1870, when 5,000 revolutions per minute was the average speed, has been more than equal to the capacity of all the warp-spinning machinery in use in this country in that year. In structural equipment, the modern American mill,” continues Mr. North, “is, in some respects, superior to the average foreign mill. It is not so massive a structure, nor so solidly built, brick being used here while the English usually use stone; and in the lightness and airiness of its rooms, in economy of arrangement and general completeness of equipment and care for the comfort and convenience of the operatives, it is usually superior. While many parts of the machinery required for the equipment of our textile mills are still necessarily imported from England because not made, or less perfectly made, in the United States, our machine manufacturers have been advancing as rapidly in recent years as the textile mills themselves, and the time cannot now be far distant when every new mill built in America will be equipped throughout with American-made machinery. The American textile mills now supply practically every variety of fabric made in the world, with the exception of linens and the very finest grades of other fabrics.”

With the complex use of machinery and the boost in cotton production, manufacturing, and consumption, there has been a significant drop in production costs and prices. “In the last half of the nineteenth century,” says S. N. D. North, former Director of the Census, in the Encyclopedia Americana, “the value of textile products in the United States increased by about six times, and if measured by quantity instead of value, it would be at least ten times. Even the largest figures don't fully convey just how important our textile mills are to the nation's industrial economy, as these mills provide materials for a wide range of related factory industries, like wholesale clothing manufacturing, among others. When we sum these up, along with the value of products from linen, jute, hemp, and bagging mills across the country, we find that the output of our textile mills has a higher value than any single line of related industries, with the exception of iron and steel. The drop in goods' costs over the last half-century has been one of the most remarkable aspects of this growth. This drop is partly due to lower raw material prices, but even more so to incredible advancements in manufacturing methods—thanks to new and more efficient machinery, in which American mechanical innovation has certainly matched that of any other nation, and perhaps surpassed it. All the fundamental inventions in spinning machinery originated in England. The French and Germans have also contributed significantly to the invention of labor-saving textile machinery, but American innovation has proven to surpass all of them. The improvements in wool-carding machinery worldwide trace their main advances back to the invention of John Goulding from Worcester, Mass. The modern cotton spindle, which spins at 10,000 revolutions per minute, is a result of American mechanics evolution, and the efficiency gained from the new types of spindles created and adopted in the United States since 1870, when the average speed was 5,000 revolutions per minute, has far exceeded the capacity of all the warp-spinning machinery used in this country that year. In terms of structural equipment, the modern American mill,” continues Mr. North, “is, in some respects, better than the average foreign mill. It isn’t as massive or as solidly built, using brick while the English typically use stone; and it usually excels in the lightness and spaciousness of its rooms, in the smart arrangement, and in the overall completeness of equipment and consideration for the comfort and convenience of workers. While many parts of the machinery necessary for our textile mills are still imported from England because they are not produced, or are less effectively made, in the United States, our machinery manufacturers have been advancing quickly in recent years, just like the textile mills themselves. It won’t be long before every new mill built in America is fully equipped with American-made machinery. The American textile mills now supply nearly every type of fabric made in the world, except for linens and the very finest grades of other fabrics.”

The Census of 1905 shows the value of cotton manufactures of the United States in 1850, 62 million dollars; in 1860, 115 million; in 1880, 192 million; in 1900, 331 million; and in 1905, 442 million; the capital invested in 1850, 75 million dollars; and in 1905, 605 million; the wages paid in 1860 (no figures for 1850), 24 million dollars; in 1905, 94 [Pg 262] million; the number of wage-earners in 1850, 122,000; in 1905, 310,000; the number of spindles, in 1860, 5¼ million; in 1905, 23 million; the number of looms, in 1860, 126,313; in 1905, 540,910; the cotton consumed, in 1860, 423 million pounds; in 1905, 1,873 million pounds.

The Census of 1905 reveals the value of cotton manufacturing in the United States with figures from various years: in 1850, it was 62 million dollars; in 1860, 115 million; in 1880, 192 million; in 1900, 331 million; and in 1905, 442 million. The capital invested was 75 million dollars in 1850, rising to 605 million in 1905. Wages paid in 1860 (there are no figures for 1850) amounted to 24 million dollars, while in 1905, it increased to 94 million. The number of wage-earners was 122,000 in 1850 and grew to 310,000 by 1905. The number of spindles was 5¼ million in 1860 and increased to 23 million in 1905. The count of looms went from 126,313 in 1860 to 540,910 in 1905. Cotton consumption was 423 million pounds in 1860 and soared to 1,873 million pounds by 1905.

A marked characteristic of the cotton industry of the United States in recent years has been the gradual movement of the industry away from New England, where it was originally established, toward the cotton-producing section, the South. The number of cotton-manufacturing establishments in the New England States fell from 439 in 1880 to 308 in 1905, while those in the South increased from 161 to 550 in the same time. The number of spindles as shown by the Bureau of Statistics of the Department of Commerce and Labor, in the Northern States as a whole, increased from 10 million in 1880 to 17⅓ million in 1908, while those in the Southern States increased from a little over a half million in 1880 to over 10 million in 1908. In the principal cotton-manufacturing countries of the world the increase in spindles during the last decade has been as follows: Great Britain, from 44½ million in 1897 to 52 million in 1907; continental Europe, from 30⅓ million in 1897 to 36 million in 1907; the United States, from 17 million to 25¾ million; India, from 4 million to 5⅓ million; and Japan, from a half million to a little over 1½ million. The 36 million cotton spindles in continental Europe are, according to Ellison, distributed as follows: Germany, 9 million; Russia and Poland, 7 million; France, 6 million; Austria-Hungary, 3¾ million; Italy, 3 million; Spain, 2¾ million; Switzerland, 1½ million; Belgium, 1⅓ million, and the remainder distributed among Switzerland, Holland, Portugal and Greece.

A noticeable trend in the U.S. cotton industry in recent years has been the gradual shift of the industry from New England, where it was originally founded, to the cotton-producing region in the South. The number of cotton-manufacturing facilities in the New England States dropped from 439 in 1880 to 308 in 1905, while the South saw an increase from 161 to 550 during the same period. According to the Bureau of Statistics of the Department of Commerce and Labor, the total number of spindles in the Northern States rose from 10 million in 1880 to 17.3 million in 1908, while the Southern States jumped from just over half a million in 1880 to more than 10 million in 1908. In the leading cotton-manufacturing countries of the world, the increase in spindles over the last decade has been as follows: Great Britain, from 44.5 million in 1897 to 52 million in 1907; continental Europe, from 30.3 million in 1897 to 36 million in 1907; the United States, from 17 million to 25.75 million; India, from 4 million to 5.3 million; and Japan, from half a million to just over 1.5 million. The 36 million cotton spindles in continental Europe are, according to Ellison, distributed as follows: Germany, 9 million; Russia and Poland, 7 million; France, 6 million; Austria-Hungary, 3.75 million; Italy, 3 million; Spain, 2.75 million; Switzerland, 1.5 million; Belgium, 1.33 million; and the rest spread among Switzerland, Holland, Portugal, and Greece.

[Pg 263] VIII. THE MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES OF THE UNITED STATES.

The fact that this story of the world’s manufactures is intended primarily for the information of people of the United States, coupled with the further fact that the United States is itself the world’s largest producer of manufactures, seems to justify a somewhat detailed study of the manufactures of this country, the growth of the manufacturing industry, and especially the part which they bear in our foreign commerce. Originally the United States, like all new countries, devoted its attention chiefly to agriculture. The products of the soil are man’s first requirements. He must have food. When he obtains food his next thought is of clothing, but that he can obtain temporarily from the skins of the beasts whose bodies supply him with food. So the production of manufactures was of secondary importance in the early development of that part of the North American Continent which is now known as the United States. The eastern part of the area being densely wooded, the work of the first and second and third generations of our forefathers was to fell the trees and prepare the ground for agriculture for the production of the wheat and corn and other foodstuffs which they must have to sustain life. If there came as a result a given quantity of potash and pearlash and leather and other manufactures of this crude type which could be utilized by the people or exported to foreign countries they accepted this thankfully, but made no special effort to develop the manufacturing industry. During the colonial days little effort was made in the development of manufacturing, except to supply the household requirements. The housewife spun and wove the wool and flax into threads and cloth, and a large part of the population was clothed in “linsey-woolsey,” produced in this manner. Even during the period of the Confederation, which immediately [Pg 264] followed the Revolutionary War, conditions in the manufacturing industries did not materially change and nobody seems to have thought them of sufficient importance to justify any governmental attention or action. Shortly after the adoption of the Constitution, however, Alexander Hamilton, the first Secretary of the Treasury, submitted to the Congress of the United States, in 1791, a “Report on Manufactures,” which pictured manufacturing conditions in this country at that day. He enumerated some 17 industries which had “grown up and flourished with a rapidity which surprises, affording an assurance of success in future attempts.” These 17 industries were as follows:

The fact that this story about the world's manufacturing is mainly for the people of the United States, along with the reality that the United States is the largest producer of manufactured goods globally, justifies a detailed look at the country's manufacturing sector, its growth, and especially its role in our foreign trade. At first, like all new countries, the United States focused mainly on agriculture. People need food as their primary need. Once they have food, their next concern is clothing, which they can temporarily get from the skins of animals they hunt for food. Thus, manufacturing was not a priority in the early development of what is now the United States. The eastern part of the continent was heavily forested, so the first generations of settlers spent their time cutting down trees and preparing land for farming to grow wheat, corn, and other essential food items for survival. If they managed to produce some quantity of potash, pearlash, leather, and other basic manufactured goods that could be used by the local population or exported, they were grateful, but they didn’t make much effort to grow the manufacturing industry. During colonial times, there was little focus on developing manufacturing beyond household needs. Households spun and wove wool and flax into thread and fabric, and many people wore clothing made from “linsey-woolsey.” Even during the Confederation period right after the Revolutionary War, there were no significant changes in the manufacturing industry, and it didn’t seem important enough for the government to pay attention to. However, shortly after the Constitution was adopted, Alexander Hamilton, the first Secretary of the Treasury, presented a “Report on Manufactures” to Congress in 1791, which described the manufacturing conditions at that time. He listed 17 industries that had “grown up and flourished with a rapidity that surprises, offering assurances of future success.” These 17 industries were as follows:

1. Skins.—Tanned and tawed leather, dressed skins, shoes, boots and slippers, harness and saddlery of all kinds, portmanteaus and trunks, leather breeches, gloves, muffs and tippets, parchment and glue.

1. Skins.—Tanned and treated leather, dressed skins, shoes, boots, and slippers, all types of harness and saddlery, suitcases and trunks, leather pants, gloves, muffs, and scarves, parchment, and glue.

2. Iron.—Bar and sheet iron, steel, nail rods and nails, implements of husbandry, stoves, pots and other household utensils, the steel and iron work of carriages, and for shipbuilding, anchors, scale beams and weights, and various tools of artificers, arms of different kinds; though the manufacture of these last has diminished for want of a demand.

2. Iron.—Bar and sheet iron, steel, nail rods and nails, farming tools, stoves, pots and other kitchen utensils, steel and iron parts for carriages, shipbuilding, anchors, scales and weights, and various tools for craftsmen, as well as different types of weapons; although the production of the latter has decreased due to a lack of demand.

3. Wood.—Ships, cabinet wares and turnery, wool and cotton cards and other machinery for manufacture and husbandry, mathematical instruments, coopers’ wares of every kind.

3. Wood.—Ships, furniture, and turnery, wool and cotton cards, and other machinery for manufacturing and farming, mathematical instruments, and a variety of coopers' goods.

4. Flax and hemp.—Cables, sail cloth, cordage, twine and pack thread.

4. Flax and hemp.—Ropes, sail material, string, twine, and packing thread.

5. Bricks and coarse tiles and potters’ wares.

5. Bricks, rough tiles, and pottery.

6. Ardent spirits and malt liquors.

6. Strong alcoholic drinks and beer.

7. Writing and printing paper, sheathing and wrapping paper, pasteboard, fullers’ or press papers, paper hangings.

7. Writing and printing paper, sheathing and wrapping paper, pasteboard, fullers' or press papers, paper wallpaper.

[Pg 265] 8. Hats of fur and wool and mixture of both, women’s stuff and silk shoes.

[Pg 265] 8. Fur and wool hats, a mix of both, women's clothing, and silk shoes.

9. Refined sugars.

Refined sugars.

10. Oils of animals and seeds, soap, spermaceti and tallow candles.

10. Animal oils, seed oils, soap, spermaceti, and tallow candles.

11. Copper and brass wires, particularly utensils for distillers, sugar refiners and brewers; andirons and other articles for household use, philosophical apparatus.

11. Copper and brass wires, especially tools for distillers, sugar refiners, and brewers; fireplace tools and other household items, scientific equipment.

12. Tinware for most purposes of ordinary use.

12. Tinware for general everyday use.

13. Carriages of all kinds.

All types of carriages.

14. Snuff, chewing and smoking tobacco.

14. Snuff, chewing, and smoking tobacco.

15. Starch and hair powder.

Starch and hair powder.

16. Lampblack and other painters’ colors.

16. Lampblack and other paint colors.

17. Gunpowder.

17. Black powder.

In addition to the industries above enumerated, which were carried on as regular trades in many localities, Mr. Hamilton went on to describe—“a vast scene of household manufacturing, which contributes more largely to the supply of the community than could be imagined without having made it an object of particular inquiry—” and he continues—

In addition to the industries listed above, which were common trades in many areas, Mr. Hamilton went on to describe—“a huge landscape of household manufacturing, which adds more to the community's supply than one might think without looking into it—” and he continues—

“Great quantities of coarse cloths, coatings, serges and flannels, linsey-woolseys; hosiery of wool, cotton and thread; coarse fustians, jeans and muslins; checked and striped cotton and linen goods; bed ticks, coverlets and counterpanes; tow linens; coarse shirtings, sheetings, toweling and table-linen, and various mixtures of wool and cotton, and of cotton and flax are made in the household way and, in many instances, to an extent not only sufficient for the supply of the families in which they are made, but for sale, and even, in some cases, for exportation. It is computed in a number of districts that two-thirds, three-fourths and even four-fifths of all the clothing of the inhabitants are made by themselves. The importance of so great a progress as appears to have been made in family [Pg 266] manufactures within a few years, both in a moral and political view, renders the fact highly interesting. Neither does the above enumeration comprehend all the articles that are manufactured as regular trades. Many others occur, which are equally well established, but which, not being of equal importance, have been omitted. And there are many attempts, still in their infancy, which, though attended with very favorable appearances, could not have been properly comprised in an enumeration of manufactories already established. There are other articles, also, of great importance, which, though, strictly speaking, manufactures, are omitted as being immediately connected with husbandry, such as flour, pot and pearl ashes, pitch, tar, turpentine and the like.”

“Large amounts of coarse fabrics, coatings, serges, and flannels, linsey-woolseys; hosiery made from wool, cotton, and thread; heavy fustians, jeans, and muslins; checked and striped cotton and linen products; bed ticks, coverlets, and comforters; tow linens; coarse shirtings, sheetings, towels, and table linens, along with various blends of wool and cotton, and cotton and flax, are produced domestically and often in quantities not only sufficient for the families that make them but also for sale, and in some cases, for export. It's estimated in many areas that two-thirds, three-fourths, or even four-fifths of all the clothing worn by residents is self-made. The significant progress that seems to have been made in home manufacturing over the last few years is intriguing from both moral and political perspectives. Moreover, the list provided doesn't cover all the items produced as regular trades. Many other well-established goods have been left out due to their lesser importance. There are also several emerging efforts that, while showing promising signs, have not been appropriately included in a list of already established industries. Additionally, there are other essential products that, although strictly speaking are manufactures, have been omitted because they are closely related to agriculture, such as flour, pot and pearl ashes, pitch, tar, turpentine, and similar items.”

The “manufactories carried on as regular trades,” and included in Mr. Hamilton’s category, says the U. S. Census Report of 1900, comprised such as would naturally spring up in a new country to supply the immediate necessities of the inhabitants, together with those whose materials were most abundant and inviting. Agricultural implements and other tools of industry were made in quantities fully equal to the demand. Firearms were also made. The dressing of skins, especially tanning, had become an important industry, and was carried on both in establishments exclusively devoted to the purpose, and by many shoemakers and farmers as a subsidiary occupation. The number of brewers and distillers was remarkable, and nearly the entire domestic demand for beverages was supplied by home production. Sawmills, gristmills, brick kilns, wool-carding mills, and fulling mills existed in great number, but always on a small scale, supplying only local needs. The manufacture of paper, which had been a successful colonial industry, also supplied the domestic requirements, and several glass works existed. “Iron works have greatly increased in the United States,” said Mr. Hamilton, “and are prosecuted with much more advantage than formerly.” [Pg 267] The shipbuilding industry was particularly well developed and widespread. In 1793 the tonnage of the United States exceeded that of every other nation except England. In the main, however, the people had confined themselves to such manufactures as could not be imported to advantage. Foreign goods, chiefly textiles, were largely imported in exchange for agricultural products.

The “manufacturers operating as regular trades,” included in Mr. Hamilton’s category, according to the U.S. Census Report of 1900, consisted of those that would naturally emerge in a new country to meet the immediate needs of the people, along with those that relied on readily available resources. Agricultural tools and other industrial equipment were produced in quantities that fully met the demand. Firearms were also manufactured. The processing of hides, especially tanning, had become a significant industry, carried out both in dedicated facilities and by many shoemakers and farmers as a side job. The number of brewers and distillers was noteworthy, with nearly the entire domestic demand for beverages met by local production. Sawmills, gristmills, brick kilns, wool-carding mills, and fulling mills were numerous, but always on a small scale, catering only to local needs. The production of paper, which had been a successful colonial industry, continued to meet domestic requirements, and there were several glassworks. “Ironworks have greatly increased in the United States,” said Mr. Hamilton, “and are being operated with much more efficiency than before.” [Pg 267] The shipbuilding industry was particularly well-developed and widespread. In 1793, the total tonnage of the United States surpassed that of every other country except England. However, the people primarily focused on manufacturing goods that couldn't be imported easily. Foreign products, mainly textiles, were largely imported in exchange for agricultural goods.

Such was the general condition of our manufactures at the opening of the nineteenth century. Although some progress in this direction has been made, the occupations of the people were chiefly agricultural; commerce was becoming a factor of constantly increasing importance in the development of the industrial resources of the country, while manufactures occupied the third and subordinate position.

Such was the overall state of our industries at the start of the nineteenth century. While there has been some progress in this area, most people were primarily working in agriculture; commerce was increasingly important for developing the country’s industrial resources, while manufacturing held a third and lesser position.

In 1810 Albert Gallatin, Secretary of the Treasury, in response to a resolution of the House of Representatives of June 7, 1908, made a report which is an admirable summary of the condition of American manufactures at that date. Secretary Gallatin estimated that in 1809 the value of the products of American manufactures exceeded $120,000,000. Tench Coxe’s estimate, based upon the returns obtained at the Census of 1810, was $198,613,471. The censuses of 1810, 1820, 1830 and 1840 gave certain figures on the manufacturing industries of the United States, but they did not approach the completeness of the censuses of recent years, and the figures of those earlier records must be accepted only with this view of their incompleteness. Tench Coxe, as already shown, estimated the real value of the manufactures of 1810 at a little less than 200 million. The censuses of 1820 and 1830 were confessedly incomplete and their showing of manufactures does not compare favorably with the Coxe estimate for 1810. In 1840 the value of the manufactures was put at about 500 million dollars; in 1850, at one billion; in 1860, a little less than 2 billion; in 1870, 4¼ billion; in 1880, 3⅓ billion; in [Pg 268] 1890, 9⅓ billion; in 1900, 13 billion; and in 1905, 16 billion—a sum three times the estimated value of manufactures of the next great manufacturing nation, the United Kingdom.

In 1810, Albert Gallatin, the Secretary of the Treasury, responded to a resolution from the House of Representatives dated June 7, 1908, with a report that provided an excellent summary of American manufacturing conditions at that time. Secretary Gallatin estimated that in 1809, the value of American manufactured products was over $120 million. Tench Coxe's estimate, based on data from the 1810 Census, was $198,613,471. The censuses from 1810, 1820, 1830, and 1840 offered some information about the manufacturing industries in the United States, but they weren't nearly as comprehensive as more recent censuses, so those earlier figures should be viewed with a sense of their limitations. As previously mentioned, Tench Coxe estimated the actual value of manufacturing in 1810 to be just under 200 million. The censuses from 1820 and 1830 were acknowledged to be incomplete, and their manufacturing figures do not stack up well against Coxe's 1810 estimate. By 1840, the value of manufacturing was estimated at about 500 million dollars; in 1850, it reached one billion; in 1860, it was just under 2 billion; in 1870, it hit 4¼ billion; in 1880, it was 3⅓ billion; in 1890, it rose to 9⅓ billion; in 1900, it reached 13 billion; and by 1905, it had climbed to 16 billion—an amount three times the estimated value of manufacturing in the next biggest manufacturing nation, the United Kingdom.

It must be remembered, however, that these figures of the value of the manufactures of the United States are “gross values,” or, in other words, contain many duplications, as explained elsewhere, and that the net or real value of the manufactures of the country was but two-thirds of the figures above named. Even this estimate which puts the net or true value of the manufactures of the country at about two-thirds of the census gross valuation still leaves the United States so far in the lead that there can be no doubt that it is the greatest manufacturing nation of the world. Tables printed elsewhere in this text show that her production of manufactures is, even under an acceptance of the “net” value and an exclusion of certain articles not classed as manufactures by other countries, far in excess of that of any other country.

It should be noted, though, that the figures representing the value of manufacturing in the United States are "gross values," which means they include a lot of duplicates, as explained elsewhere. The actual or net value of the country's manufacturing is only about two-thirds of the numbers mentioned above. Even with this estimate, which places the net or true value of manufacturing at around two-thirds of the census gross valuation, the United States remains so far ahead that there’s no doubt it is the largest manufacturing nation in the world. Tables printed elsewhere in this text show that its manufacturing output is still significantly higher than that of any other country, even when accepting the "net" value and excluding certain items not categorized as manufactures by other nations.

The growth by industries cannot be shown in detail in a work of this character. Suffice to say that every line of manufactures is now produced in the United States, save only those in which the work is wholly, or chiefly, performed by hand labor. The growth of the more important industries, such as iron and steel, textiles, etc., is pictured in sections devoted to those industries, and an outline of the growth in the principal articles is shown in the table on another page which presents official figures of the number of factories, persons employed, capital invested and product turned out in the principal manufacturing industries of the country in 1880, 1890, 1900, and 1905.

The growth of industries can't be detailed in a work like this. It's enough to say that every type of manufacturing is now done in the United States, except for those tasks that are entirely or mostly done by hand. The growth of major industries like iron and steel, textiles, and others is illustrated in sections dedicated to those fields, and a summary of the growth in key products is shown in a table on another page, which presents official data on the number of factories, employees, capital invested, and output in the main manufacturing sectors of the country for the years 1880, 1890, 1900, and 1905.

The increase in the production of manufactures in the United States, far in excess of home requirements, has forced our manufacturers to seek markets in other parts of the world for their surplus product. The result has been a rapid increase in the exportation of manufactures. [Pg 269] The total value of manufactures exported from the United States has grown from less than 8 million dollars in 1820 to 23 million dollars in 1850, 48½ million in 1860, 70 million in 1870, 122 million in 1880, 179 million in 1890, and 485 million in 1900, since which time the annual total has not fallen below the 400-million-dollar line, while in the year 1908 the total exceeded 750 million dollars. In the fiscal year 1908, the latest period for which detailed figures of the exports by countries are available, the exports of manufactures were valued at 750 million dollars, of which 368 million dollars’ worth went to Europe, 188 million to North America, 72 million to South America, and 71 million to Asia, while the remainder was divided between Oceania and Africa.

The rise in manufacturing in the United States, far surpassing domestic needs, has led our manufacturers to look for markets around the world for their excess products. This has resulted in a rapid increase in the export of manufactured goods. [Pg 269] The total value of manufactured exports from the United States has climbed from less than 8 million dollars in 1820 to 23 million dollars in 1850, 48.5 million in 1860, 70 million in 1870, 122 million in 1880, 179 million in 1890, and 485 million in 1900. Since then, the annual total has not dropped below 400 million dollars, with exports exceeding 750 million dollars in 1908. In the fiscal year 1908, the most recent period for which detailed export figures by country are available, the exports of manufactured goods were valued at 750 million dollars, of which 368 million dollars went to Europe, 188 million to North America, 72 million to South America, and 71 million to Asia, while the rest was distributed between Oceania and Africa.

That this growth has been especially marked in recent years is shown by the fact that the actual increase by decades in exports of manufactures has been as follows: During the decade ending with 1830, 1.8 millions; 1840, 5.8 millions; 1850, 7.8 millions; 1860, 25.2 millions; 1870, 21.6 millions; 1880, 51.8 millions; 1890, 57.2 millions; 1900, 305.9 millions; and during the eight years ending with 1906, 265 millions. Thus the growth of exports of manufactures in the eighteen years following 1890 was practically three times as great as that of the entire seventy years preceding that year.

That this growth has been especially noticeable in recent years is demonstrated by the fact that the actual increase in manufactured exports by decade has been as follows: During the decade ending in 1830, 1.8 million; in 1840, 5.8 million; in 1850, 7.8 million; in 1860, 25.2 million; in 1870, 21.6 million; in 1880, 51.8 million; in 1890, 57.2 million; in 1900, 305.9 million; and during the eight years ending in 1906, 265 million. Thus, the growth of manufactured exports in the eighteen years following 1890 was nearly three times as great as that of the entire seventy years before that year.

Exports of manufactures from the United States now exceed 750 million dollars per annum and have doubled in value in a single decade. Not only has the exportation of manufactures doubled in a decade, but the share which products of the factory form of the total exports is steadily increasing. In 1880 manufactures formed but 15 per cent of the total exports of domestic products; in 1890 they formed 21 per cent, in 1900, 35 per cent, and in 1908, 41 per cent.

Exports of manufactured goods from the United States now exceed $750 million a year and have doubled in value over the past decade. Not only has the export of manufactured goods doubled in ten years, but their share of total exports is steadily increasing. In 1880, manufactured goods made up only 15 percent of total domestic exports; in 1890, they accounted for 21 percent, in 1900, 35 percent, and in 1908, 41 percent.

With the rapid increase of population in the United States, and therefore of the consumption of natural products, [Pg 270] the quantity of food and raw materials remaining for distribution to other parts of the world has not increased proportionately; and with the development of manufacturing facilities and the trend of population to the manufacturing centers, production of manufactures has rapidly increased, and the surplus of these manufactures which may be spared for foreign markets has also increased. Foodstuffs, which in 1890 formed 42 per cent of the total exports of domestic products, formed in 1908 but 28 per cent of the total; articles in a crude condition for use in manufacturing, which in 1890 formed 36 per cent of the totals, formed in 1908 but 30 per cent; while manufactures, as already indicated, increased their share in the exports from 21 per cent in 1890 to 41 per cent in 1908.

With the rapid growth of the population in the United States, and thus the increased consumption of natural resources, [Pg 270] the amount of food and raw materials available for distribution to other parts of the world hasn't grown at the same rate. Meanwhile, with the expansion of manufacturing facilities and the movement of people to manufacturing hubs, the production of manufactured goods has surged, leading to a rise in the surplus of these products available for international markets. Food items, which made up 42 percent of total domestic exports in 1890, dropped to just 28 percent in 1908; raw materials used in manufacturing decreased from 36 percent in 1890 to 30 percent in 1908; while manufactured goods saw their share of exports rise from 21 percent in 1890 to 41 percent in 1908.

In the decade ending with 1905 exports of manufactures from the United States increased 198 per cent, while those from Germany increased 75 per cent, those from the United Kingdom 40 per cent, and those from France 25 per cent. This rapid increase in the exports of manufactures from the United States has brought her to the third rank in the list of the world’s exporters of manufactures. The four greatest producers of manufactures for exportation and the value of manufactures exported by each of them in 1906 are as follows: The United Kingdom, 1,400 million dollars; Germany, 1,000 million; the United States, 700 million; and France, 500 million.

In the decade ending in 1905, exports of manufactured goods from the United States rose by 198 percent, while those from Germany increased by 75 percent, the United Kingdom by 40 percent, and France by 25 percent. This rapid growth in U.S. manufactured exports has positioned the country as the third largest exporter of manufactured goods in the world. The four leading producers of manufactured goods for export and the value of their exports in 1906 are as follows: the United Kingdom, $1.4 billion; Germany, $1 billion; the United States, $700 million; and France, $500 million.

To Europe the exports of manufactures from the United States in 1892 was 76 million dollars, in 1901, 213 million, and in 1908, 368 million. To North America the exports of manufactures from the United States in 1892 were 33 million dollars, in 1908, 189 million; to Asia and Oceania the total was 25 million dollars in 1892 and 112 million in 1908; to Africa, in 1892, less than 4 million dollars, in 1908, more than 10 million; to South America, in 1892, 17 million, in 1908, 72 million. Considering the distribution by principal countries, it may be said that the total [Pg 271] exports of manufactures from the United States to the United Kingdom was, in 1892, 40 million dollars, in 1902, 100 million; to British North America, in 1892, less than 10 million, in 1902, over 54 million; to Germany, in 1892, 14 million, in 1902, 30 million; to Mexico, in 1892, less than 8 million, in 1902, over 26 million; to British Australasia, in 1892, less than 9 million, in 1902, over 23 million; and to China, in 1892, 5½ million, in 1902, more than 23 million.

To Europe, the exports of manufactured goods from the United States were 76 million dollars in 1892, 213 million in 1901, and 368 million in 1908. To North America, the exports of manufactured goods from the United States were 33 million dollars in 1892 and 189 million in 1908; to Asia and Oceania, the total was 25 million dollars in 1892 and 112 million in 1908; to Africa, it was less than 4 million dollars in 1892 and more than 10 million in 1908; to South America, it was 17 million in 1892 and 72 million in 1908. Looking at the exports by major countries, we see that the total exports of manufactured goods from the United States to the United Kingdom were 40 million dollars in 1892 and 100 million in 1902; to British North America, it was less than 10 million in 1892 and over 54 million in 1902; to Germany, 14 million in 1892 and 30 million in 1902; to Mexico, less than 8 million in 1892 and over 26 million in 1902; to British Australasia, less than 9 million in 1892 and over 23 million in 1902; and to China, it was 5½ million in 1892 and more than 23 million in 1902.

Considering the exports by great articles or groups of articles, it may be said that manufactures of iron and steel as a group form the largest item in the exports of manufactures, having grown from 52 thousand dollars in 1800 to 322 thousand in 1830, 1 million dollars in 1850, about 6 million in 1860, 13 million in 1870, 25 million in 1890, 121 million in 1900, and 184 million in 1908. Mineral oils form the second largest item among the groups of manufactures, having grown from 30 million in 1870 to 98 million in 1908. Copper manufactures rank third, the total exports having grown from 1½ million dollars in 1860 to 2⅓ million in 1890 and 104 million in 1908. Leather and its manufactures have increased their exportations from 1½ million in 1860 to 6¾ million in 1880, 12 million in 1890, 27 million in 1900, and 41 million in 1908. Exports of agricultural implements have grown from 1 million dollars in 1870 to 4 million in 1890, 16 million in 1900, and 24 million in 1908. Thirty articles or groups of articles exceeded 1 million dollars in the value of their respective exports in the fiscal year 1908. Of these thirty groups now exceeding 1 million dollars each in value annually, not one aggregated as much as a million dollars in 1820, and only three groups exceeded 1 million in 1850; in 1860 eight groups exceeded each 1 million; in 1880 the number of groups exceeding 1 million in value was 13; in 1890, 20; and in 1908, as already indicated, 30 exceeded 1 million each in the value of their annual exportations.

Considering the exports of significant items or categories, it can be noted that iron and steel products make up the largest portion of manufactured exports. Their value increased from $52,000 in 1800 to $322,000 in 1830, $1 million in 1850, about $6 million in 1860, $13 million in 1870, $25 million in 1890, $121 million in 1900, and $184 million in 1908. Mineral oils represent the second largest category of manufactured exports, rising from $30 million in 1870 to $98 million in 1908. Copper products rank third, with exports growing from $1.5 million in 1860 to $2.3 million in 1890, and reaching $104 million in 1908. Leather and its products also saw an increase in their exports, growing from $1.5 million in 1860 to $6.75 million in 1880, $12 million in 1890, $27 million in 1900, and $41 million in 1908. Exports of agricultural tools rose from $1 million in 1870 to $4 million in 1890, $16 million in 1900, and $24 million in 1908. Thirty items or categories had exports exceeding $1 million in the fiscal year 1908. Of these thirty categories that now exceed $1 million each annually, none reached that figure in 1820, and only three surpassed $1 million in 1850; in 1860, eight categories exceeded $1 million each; in 1880, 13 categories; in 1890, 20; and in 1908, as mentioned, 30 exceeded $1 million each in their annual exports.

[Pg 272] The causes of the rapid growth in the exports of manufactures from the United States are not difficult to determine. The growth as already indicated, has occurred chiefly since 1880, and especially in the last decade. From 1790 to 1880 the growth was a hundred million in ninety years’ time. This was a period which was devoted to the development of the agricultural resources of the country and to the construction of railroads. The value of agricultural products exported grew in this period from 19 million dollars to 686 million, an increase of 667 million, while exports of manufactures were increasing 100 million. From 1880 to 1900 agricultural exports showed a gain of 206 million dollars and those of manufactures 330 million. Thus the development of domestic exports from the United States has occurred in definitely rounded periods: The first, a long period of growth of agricultural products; the second, a shorter and more recent period, in which the largest growth, and especially the largest proportionate growth, has been in exports of manufactures.

[Pg 272] It's not hard to figure out why exports of manufactured goods from the United States have grown so rapidly. As mentioned earlier, this growth has primarily happened since 1880, especially in the last decade. Between 1790 and 1880, exports increased by a hundred million over ninety years. During this time, the focus was on developing the country’s agricultural resources and building railroads. The value of agricultural products exported grew from 19 million dollars to 686 million, an increase of 667 million, while exports of manufactured goods saw a rise of only 100 million. From 1880 to 1900, agricultural exports gained 206 million dollars, while manufactured exports gained 330 million. Thus, the growth of domestic exports from the United States has happened in distinct phases: the first being a long period of growth in agricultural products, and the second, a shorter and more recent period, where the largest growth—and particularly the largest proportional growth—has been in manufactured exports.

A study of the production in the United States of a few of the great articles which form the basis of manufactures and the manufacturing industries offers ready explanation of the great increase in the production of manufactures and the consequent marked increase in the exportation of manufactures. Six great articles supply the principal requisites for manufacturing, viz, iron, copper, wood, cotton, wool, and coal as the material which supplies the power by which they are first assembled and afterwards converted into manufactures. The production of pig iron in the United States which up to 1880 had never reached 4 million tons, was by 1890, 9 million; in 1900, 13½ million, and in 1907, 25 million. Of steel, the production in the United States in 1880 for the first time exceeded 1 million tons; in 1890 it exceeded 4 million tons; in 1900, more than 10 million, and in 1907, more than 23 million. Of copper, for which the demands of the world are now [Pg 273] great, the United States produced in 1880, 27 thousand tons, in 1890, 116 thousand tons, and in 1906, 409 thousand tons. The total value of the mineral products of the United States was in 1880, 369 million dollars; in 1890, 619 million, and in 1908, 2,069 million, or 5½ times that of 1880. The cotton production of the United States was in 1880, 5½ million bales, in 1890, 7½ million, and in 1908, over 13½ million. In 1880, American mills took 31 per cent of the total American production of cotton, and in 1907 they took 32 per cent of the greatly increased total. Of wool, the production of 1880 was 232½ million pounds; of 1890, 276 million, and that of 1908, 311 million. Of coal, which has an important relation to manufactures, both in supplying the motive power for the assembling of materials and heat for smelting ores and other features of manufacturing work, as well as the power for operating the machinery of manufacture, the production in 1880 was 64 million tons; in 1890, 141 million; in 1900, 241 million; and in 1907, 428 million.

A study of production in the United States of a few key products that serve as the foundation for manufacturing industries clearly explains the significant increase in manufacturing output and the resulting rise in exports. Six major products provide the essential materials for manufacturing: iron, copper, wood, cotton, wool, and coal, which provides the power needed to first assemble these materials and then turn them into finished goods. The production of pig iron in the United States, which hadn’t surpassed 4 million tons until 1880, reached 9 million tons by 1890, 13.5 million tons in 1900, and 25 million tons in 1907. For steel, production in the U.S. first exceeded 1 million tons in 1880; it surpassed 4 million tons in 1890, over 10 million tons in 1900, and exceeded 23 million tons in 1907. The demand for copper has surged globally, with U.S. production standing at 27,000 tons in 1880, 116,000 tons in 1890, and 409,000 tons in 1906. The total value of mineral products in the U.S. was $369 million in 1880, $619 million in 1890, and $2,069 million in 1908, which is 5.5 times the value from 1880. Cotton production in the United States was 5.5 million bales in 1880, 7.5 million in 1890, and over 13.5 million in 1908. In 1880, American mills processed 31% of the total cotton production, and by 1907, they handled 32% of the significantly increased total. Wool production was 232.5 million pounds in 1880, 276 million pounds in 1890, and 311 million pounds in 1908. For coal, which is crucial for manufacturing both as a power source for material assembly and for smelting ores as well as operating machinery, production was 64 million tons in 1880; 141 million tons in 1890; 241 million tons in 1900; and 428 million tons in 1907.

Of the six great articles here enumerated as the chief requisites of manufacturing, the United States is the world’s largest producer of all except wool. Of cotton, the United States produces three-fourths of the world’s entire supply; of copper, fully one-half; of pig iron and steel, the United States produces 40 per cent of the world’s entire supply; and in 1907 produced more than Germany, the United Kingdom, and Belgium combined, these three countries being, in the order named, the world’s next largest producers of pig iron. Of timber and wood suitable for use in manufacturing, the United States is the world’s largest producer at the present time. Of wool, the United States is only exceeded in its production by Australasia, Argentina and Russia, its total product being in 1901, 302 million pounds against 360 million in Russia, including Poland, Argentina, 370 million, and Australasia, 510 million.

Of the six major items listed as essential for manufacturing, the United States is the largest producer of all except wool. The U.S. produces three-quarters of the world's cotton supply; half of the world's copper; and 40 percent of the global supply of pig iron and steel. In 1907, the U.S. produced more pig iron than Germany, the United Kingdom, and Belgium combined, which are the next largest producers in that order. Currently, the U.S. is the world's top producer of timber and wood suitable for manufacturing. For wool, the U.S. ranks behind Australasia, Argentina, and Russia, with a total production in 1901 of 302 million pounds compared to Russia's 360 million (including Poland), Argentina's 370 million, and Australasia's 510 million.

[Pg 274] In transportation, for assembling these great natural products for use in manufacturing, the facilities in the United States by far surpass those of any other country. The railroads have grown from 30 thousand miles in 1860 to 53 thousand miles in 1870, 93 thousand miles in 1880, 166 thousand miles in 1890, and 240 thousand miles in 1908, giving to the United States two-fifths of the entire railway mileage of the world; while in transportation upon the Great Lakes the registered tonnage of vessels passing through the Sault Ste. Marie Canal alone in 1907 was 44 million tons, or practically three times as much as the tonnage passing through the Suez Canal in the same year.

[Pg 274] In terms of transportation, the infrastructure for gathering these vast natural resources for manufacturing in the United States is unmatched by any other country. The railroad network expanded from 30,000 miles in 1860 to 53,000 miles in 1870, 93,000 miles in 1880, 166,000 miles in 1890, and 240,000 miles in 1908, giving the United States two-fifths of the total railway mileage in the world. Additionally, the registered tonnage of vessels passing through the Sault Ste. Marie Canal alone in 1907 was 44 million tons, which is nearly three times the tonnage that passed through the Suez Canal in the same year.

Proportionately the growth in exports of manufactures has been even greater than that in production of manufactures. The census figures show that the gross value of manufactures produced in 1850 was, in round terms, 1 billion dollars, and in 1905, nearly 17 billion, so that the product of 1905 may be said to be about seventeen times as great as that of 1850; while the exportation of manufactures, which in 1850 was $17,580,456, was in 1908, $750,000,000, or forty-two times as great as in 1850, indicating that the percentage of growth in exportation has been more than twice as great as that in the production of manufactures.

Proportionately, the growth in manufactured exports has been even greater than the growth in manufacturing production. Census data shows that the total value of manufactured goods produced in 1850 was about 1 billion dollars, and by 1905, it had risen to nearly 17 billion, meaning the output in 1905 was roughly seventeen times greater than in 1850. Meanwhile, the export of manufactured goods, which was $17,580,456 in 1850, skyrocketed to $750,000,000 in 1908, making it forty-two times what it was in 1850. This indicates that the percentage growth in exports has been more than double that of manufacturing production.

Of the articles which form the great and growing export trade of the United States, those grouped under the term “manufactures” number over two hundred distinct articles, though many of these are included within the special groupings, such as agricultural implements, iron and steel manufactures, mineral oils, leather and its manufactures, etc. The group agricultural implements, for example, is subdivided into mowers and reapers, plows and cultivators, and “all other,” the latter term including numerous articles which are not of sufficient value to justify at present a separate statement. The group cotton manufactures includes cloths colored and uncolored, wearing apparel, [Pg 275] waste cotton, and all other. The group iron and steel includes pig iron, bar iron, wire rods, billets, ingots and blooms, hoop, band and scroll iron, rails for railways, tin plates, structural iron and steel, wire, locks, hinges, saws and tools, car wheels, castings, table cutlery, firearms, cash registers, electrical machinery, laundry machinery, metal-working machinery, printing presses, pumps and pumping machinery, shoe machinery, locomotives (stationary and railway), typewriters, nails (cut and wire), pipes, safes, scales, stoves and ranges, each of which is separately stated, and following these a class “all other,” which includes the less important articles not separately enumerated. Under the group leather and its manufactures are included sole leather, glazed, kid, patent, split, and other upper leather, boots and shoes, harness and saddles. Under the general title of refined or manufactured mineral oils are included naphthas, illuminating oil, and lubricating and heavy paraffin oil. Under the general title of musical instruments are included organs, pianos, and all other. Paper and its manufactures include paper hangings, printing paper, writing paper, envelopes, and all other. Manufactures of tobacco include cigars and cigarettes, plug tobacco, and all other. Wood manufactures include doors, sash and blinds; furniture; hogsheads and barrels; trimmings, moldings and other house finishings; woodenware, wood pulp, and all other. Wool manufactures include carpets, dress goods, flannels and blankets, wearing apparel, separately stated, and all other.

Of the items that make up the huge and growing export trade of the United States, those categorized as “manufactures” include over two hundred different items, although many fall into specific categories like agricultural tools, iron and steel products, mineral oils, leather and its products, etc. For instance, the agricultural tools category is divided into mowers and reapers, plows and cultivators, and “all other,” the latter term covering many items not valuable enough to warrant a separate listing right now. The cotton manufactures category includes both colored and uncolored fabrics, clothing, waste cotton, and others. The iron and steel category covers pig iron, bar iron, wire rods, billets, ingots and blooms, hoop, band and scroll iron, railway rails, tin plates, structural iron and steel, wire, locks, hinges, saws and tools, car wheels, castings, table cutlery, firearms, cash registers, electrical machinery, laundry machinery, metal-working machinery, printing presses, pumps and pumping machinery, shoe machinery, locomotives (both stationary and railway), typewriters, nails (cut and wire), pipes, safes, scales, stoves and ranges, each listed separately, and following these is a class “all other,” which includes less significant items not listed individually. The leather and its products category encompasses sole leather, glazed leather, kid leather, patent leather, split leather, and other types of upper leather, as well as boots and shoes, harnesses, and saddles. Under the general heading of refined or manufactured mineral oils are naphthas, illuminating oil, and lubricating and heavy paraffin oil. The category for musical instruments includes organs, pianos, and others. Paper and its products include wallpaper, printing paper, writing paper, envelopes, and all other items. Tobacco products consist of cigars and cigarettes, plug tobacco, and more. The wood products category includes doors, sashes, and blinds; furniture; hogsheads and barrels; trimmings, moldings, and other house finishings; wooden items, wood pulp, and others. Wool products feature carpets, dress fabrics, flannels and blankets, clothing, listed separately, and all other items.

Taking up the various groups or classes, and with them the articles which are not subdivided, it may be said that thirty general articles show a total exceeding $1,000,000 in the exports of recent years. Exports of iron and steel manufactures as a whole amounted in 1908 to 184 million dollars; manufactured or refined mineral oils, 99 million; copper manufactures, 100 million; cotton manufactures, 25 million; leather and its manufactures, 27 million; [Pg 276] agricultural implements, 24 million; chemicals, drugs and dyes, 21 million; cars and carriages, 22 million; paraffin, 8 million; paper and its manufactures, 8 million; tobacco manufactures, 5 million; scientific instruments, 11 million; fiber manufactures, 5 million; india-rubber manufactures, 7½ million; books, maps and engravings, 6 million.

Taking into account the various groups or categories, along with the items that aren't further divided, it's estimated that thirty general items account for over $1,000,000 in exports in recent years. The exports of iron and steel products totaled $184 million in 1908; manufactured or refined mineral oils, $99 million; copper products, $100 million; cotton products, $25 million; leather and leather goods, $27 million; agricultural equipment, $24 million; chemicals, drugs, and dyes, $21 million; vehicles and carriages, $22 million; paraffin, $8 million; paper and paper products, $8 million; tobacco products, $5 million; scientific instruments, $11 million; fiber products, $5 million; rubber products, $7.5 million; and books, maps, and engravings, $6 million.

Tracing the more important of these articles through the period from 1790 to 1908 it may be said that iron and steel manufactures, which began their record in 1790 with a total exportation of $117,060, did not reach $1,000,000 until 1840, when the total export was $1,127,877. Even in 1850 it was only $1,953,702, but by 1860 was $5,870,114; in 1870, $13,483,163; in 1880, $14,716,524; in 1890, $25,542,208, and in the decade from 1890 to 1900 it increased nearly fourfold, the total for 1908 being $183,982,182 against $25,542,208 in 1890. The growth in the exportation of manufactures of iron and steel has been more strongly marked than that in any other important article of export except copper. It has been coincidental with the development of the great iron mines of the United States and the production of pig iron and steel.

Tracing the key articles from 1790 to 1908, we see that iron and steel manufacturing started in 1790 with total exports of $117,060. It didn't hit $1,000,000 until 1840, when total exports were $1,127,877. By 1850, it was $1,953,702, but by 1860, it jumped to $5,870,114; in 1870, it was $13,483,163; in 1880, it reached $14,716,524; in 1890, it climbed to $25,542,208, and during the decade from 1890 to 1900, it almost quadrupled, with total exports for 1908 at $183,982,182 compared to $25,542,208 in 1890. The rise in iron and steel exports has outpaced that of any other significant export category, except for copper. This trend has coincided with the expansion of major iron mines in the United States and the production of pig iron and steel.

The next article in the order of its magnitude in our exportations is refined mineral oil, which only became an article of export after the great oil discoveries in the decade 1860-1870. Its first appearance in the list of exports was in 1864, in which year the total amounted to $6,918,502, the small quantities exported in preceding years not having separately enumerated in the list of articles exported. The value of the exportations of mineral oil increased very rapidly, the total for 1864 being slightly less than 7 millions; for 1865, nearly 10 millions; 1866, over 18 millions; 1867, 22 millions; 1870, 30 millions; 1880, 34 millions; 1890, 44 millions; 1900, 68 millions, and 1908, 99 millions.

The next item on our list of exports is refined mineral oil, which only became an export product after the major oil discoveries in the 1860s. It first showed up in the export list in 1864, with a total of $6,918,502. The small amounts exported in previous years weren't listed separately. The value of mineral oil exports grew very quickly, starting at just under 7 million in 1864; nearly 10 million in 1865; over 18 million in 1866; 22 million in 1867; 30 million in 1870; 34 million in 1880; 44 million in 1890; 68 million in 1900, and reaching 99 million in 1908.

[Pg 277] Copper, which forms the third article in rank in the exports of manufactures, is of recent date as an article of importance in the export trade. The existence of large copper deposits in the United States had been known for many years, but it was only upon the greatly increased demand for copper owing to the developments in the use of electricity as a motive power that the world began to demand copper in greatly increased quantities; and to this demand the mines of the United States promptly responded. The copper production of the United States had never reached as much as 20,000 tons prior to 1877. By 1887 it was 81,000 tons; by 1897, 220,000 tons; and in 1907, 410,000 tons. The most strongly marked increase occurred during the period of 1890-1907, the production of 1890 being 115,000 tons, and in 1907, 410,000 tons. The growth in exportation was coincidental with the growth in production. The value of copper manufactures exported in 1890 was but $2,349,392; in 1891, it was $4,614,597; in 1892, $7,226,392; in 1895, $14,468,703; in 1896, $19,720,104; in 1897, $31,621,125; and in 1908, $104,064,580 or nearly fifty times as much in 1908 as in 1890.

[Pg 277] Copper, ranking third in manufactured exports, has only recently become crucial in international trade. While the existence of vast copper deposits in the United States has been known for many years, it wasn’t until the significant rise in demand for copper due to the advancements in electrical power that the global demand for copper surged dramatically; the mines in the United States quickly responded to this demand. Prior to 1877, copper production in the United States never exceeded 20,000 tons. By 1887, it increased to 81,000 tons; by 1897, it reached 220,000 tons; and in 1907, it hit 410,000 tons. The most notable rise happened between 1890 and 1907, where production went from 115,000 tons in 1890 to 410,000 tons in 1907. The rise in exports happened alongside the increase in production. The value of copper exports in 1890 was just $2,349,392; in 1891, it rose to $4,614,597; in 1892, to $7,226,392; in 1895, it climbed to $14,468,703; in 1896, it reached $19,720,104; in 1897, it was $31,621,125; and by 1908, it soared to $104,064,580, nearly fifty times more than in 1890.

Leather and manufactures thereof grew from 1½ million in 1860 to 6½ million in 1880, 12½ million in 1890, 27 million in 1900, practically 30 million in 1902, and 42 million in 1909. Agricultural implements have also shown a rapid increase in exportation. In 1870 they amounted to only 1 million dollars in value; in 1880, to a little over 2 million; in 1890, nearly 4 million; in 1900, 16 million; and in 1902, 16¼ million.

Leather and its products increased from 1.5 million in 1860 to 6.5 million in 1880, 12.5 million in 1890, 27 million in 1900, nearly 30 million in 1902, and 42 million in 1909. Agricultural tools also saw a significant rise in exports. In 1870, their value was just 1 million dollars; by 1880, it was just over 2 million; in 1890, it was nearly 4 million; in 1900, 16 million; and in 1902, 16.25 million.

Chemicals, drugs, dyes, etc., formed the largest single item of exports in 1790, pot and pearl ashes being then the principal article in the list, and have slowly but steadily increased, reaching a million dollars in 1830, 2½ million in 1870, 5½ million in 1890, 12 million in 1902, and 21 million in 1908. It is proper to add that in the later years patent medicines, which are included under this general [Pg 278] classification of chemicals, etc., have formed a considerable proportion of this increase, the total value of patent medicines exported being in 1902, 3 million dollars out of the total of 12 million. The chemical industry of the United States has not made as rapid gains either in the relative value of its products, in the supply of the home market, or in the distribution of exports as accomplished by many other industries. The total value of the chemical productions of the country, according to the census, was in 1880, $38,640,458; in 1890, $59,352,548; and in 1900, $62,676,730, having less than doubled the value of the product from 1880 to 1900, the increase being but 60 per cent, while manufactures as a whole increased 142 per cent.

Chemicals, drugs, dyes, and similar items were the largest category of exports in 1790, with pot and pearl ashes being the main products. They have gradually increased over the years, reaching a million dollars in 1830, 2.5 million in 1870, 5.5 million in 1890, 12 million in 1902, and 21 million in 1908. It's important to note that in the more recent years, patent medicines, which are included in this broad category of chemicals, have made up a significant part of this growth, with the total value of exported patent medicines being 3 million dollars out of the overall 12 million in 1902. The chemical industry in the United States hasn't experienced as rapid growth in the relative value of its products, the supply for the domestic market, or the distribution of exports as many other industries have. According to the census, the total value of the country's chemical production was $38,640,458 in 1880, $59,352,548 in 1890, and $62,676,730 in 1900, indicating that it barely doubled in value from 1880 to 1900, with only a 60 percent increase, while overall manufacturing grew by 142 percent.

Considering the grand divisions and countries to which we send this $750,000,000 worth of manufactures exported from the United States, it may be said that literally every country of the world is a purchaser of American manufactures. In each grand division and in every country of the world the manufactured products of the United States are being consumed in steadily increasing quantities and varieties; and this consumption of the products of the manufacturing establishments of the United States by other parts of the world is a voluntary one, and not an “invasion” in the ordinarily accepted sense of the term. The growth in the consumption of American manufactures in other parts of the world is quite as voluntary as is the consumption of American flour, or meat, or cotton. This is illustrated by the fact that, while the iron and steel manufacturing establishments have been unable to meet the orders of the home consumers, and, therefore, have made little effort to “invade” other markets, more than $184,000,000 worth of iron and steel manufactures was exported in 1908, presumably, in most cases, to fill orders from other parts of the world. The fact that the home demand for iron and steel manufactures was in 1907 so great as to more than double the importation of iron and steel manufactures [Pg 279] in a single year, shows clearly that the condition of a home market was such that the iron and steel manufactures of the United States needed make no effort to “invade” the markets of other parts of the world, and that whatever sales they made in those lines outside of the United States were, as a rule, in response to calls from the countries to which these classes of merchandise are sent. The exportations of iron and steel manufactures from the United States in the fiscal year 1908, were: To Europe, 47 million dollars; North America, 72 million; Oceania, 14 million; South America, 22 million; Asia, 25 million; and Africa, 3 million. Of American copper the purchases by Europe were, in 1891, $4,433,015 in value, and in 1908, $97,324,230. For agricultural implements the home demand is large and active, yet the exportation of agricultural implements, presumably all or nearly all orders, was in 1908, to Europe, 13 million dollars; to North America, 2½ million; to South America, 5 million; to Oceania, over 1 million; and to Asia and Africa, 13 million. The railroads of the United States were in 1906 and 7, according to repeated statements, unable to obtain cars in sufficient number to meet their requirements, yet the exportation of cars for steam railways in the fiscal year 1908 amounted to about $5,000,000.

Considering the major regions and countries we supply with the $750,000,000 worth of manufactured goods exported from the United States, it's accurate to say that practically every country in the world buys American products. In every region and in every country, the manufactured goods from the United States are being consumed in increasing amounts and variety; this demand for American products by other parts of the world is voluntary and shouldn't be seen as an "invasion" in the usual sense of the term. The rise in the consumption of American manufactured goods globally is as voluntary as the consumption of American flour, meat, or cotton. This is evident because, even though the iron and steel manufacturers couldn't keep up with the domestic demand and therefore made little effort to "invade" other markets, over $184,000,000 worth of iron and steel products were exported in 1908, mostly to fulfill orders from other regions. The fact that the domestic demand for iron and steel products in 1907 was so high that it more than doubled imports of iron and steel in a single year clearly indicates that the domestic market was strong enough that American iron and steel did not need to try to "invade" other global markets, and most sales abroad were typically in response to requests from those countries. In the fiscal year 1908, iron and steel exports from the United States totaled: $47 million to Europe; $72 million to North America; $14 million to Oceania; $22 million to South America; $25 million to Asia; and $3 million to Africa. Europe's purchases of American copper rose from $4,433,015 in 1891 to $97,324,230 in 1908. The domestic demand for agricultural implements is also significant, yet in 1908, exports of agricultural implements—presumably fulfilling all or nearly all orders—were: $13 million to Europe; $2½ million to North America; $5 million to South America; over $1 million to Oceania; and $13 million to Asia and Africa. According to repeated reports, U.S. railroads in 1906 and 1907 were unable to get enough cars to meet their needs, yet exports of railway cars in the fiscal year 1908 amounted to about $5,000,000.

The large share which manufactures form in the exports of the United States is shown by an analysis by the Bureau of Statistics of the Department of Commerce and Labor of the trade, by articles and groups of articles, with every country and grand division of the world. These figures show that manufactures formed 86 per cent of exports to South America in 1906, 85 per cent of the exports to Oceania, 75 per cent of the exports to Asia, 66 per cent of the exports to Africa, 62 per cent of the exports to North America, while even to Europe manufactures formed 27 per cent of the total domestic merchandise sent in the fiscal year 1906.

The significant portion that manufactured goods represent in the exports of the United States is highlighted by an analysis from the Bureau of Statistics of the Department of Commerce and Labor, which looked at trade by articles and groups of articles with every country and major region in the world. These figures indicate that manufactured goods made up 86% of exports to South America in 1906, 85% of exports to Oceania, 75% of exports to Asia, 66% of exports to Africa, 62% of exports to North America, while even to Europe, manufactured goods constituted 27% of the total domestic merchandise shipped during the fiscal year 1906.

[Pg 280] This general group, “manufactures,” upon which the above percentages are based, includes both manufactures ready for consumption and manufactures for further use in manufacturing. The first group includes all manufactures in the fully completed form and ready for immediate use. The second is made up chiefly of chemicals, leather, naval stores, lumber, copper in pigs, bars, and ingots, and various grades of iron and steel which have passed through a process of manufacture but are to be further used in manufacturing, such as steel bars, billets, ingots, blooms, sheets and plates, tin plate, wire rods, and pig iron.

[Pg 280] This general category, “manufactures,” which the percentages mentioned earlier are based on, includes both finished products ready for use and products that are intended for further processing in manufacturing. The first group consists of all completed items that are ready for immediate use. The second group mainly includes chemicals, leather, naval supplies, lumber, copper in various forms, and different types of iron and steel that have undergone manufacturing but will be further processed, such as steel bars, billets, ingots, blooms, sheets and plates, tin plate, wire rods, and pig iron.

Of the 75 million dollars’ worth sent to South America, 72.4 per cent was manufactures ready for consumption and 14.02 per cent manufactures for further use in manufacturing. Of the 105 million dollars’ worth sent to Asia, 65.79 was manufactures ready for consumption and 9.14 per cent manufactures for further use in manufacturing. Of the 35 million dollars’ worth sent to Oceania, 72.97 per cent was manufactures ready for consumption and 11.78 per cent manufactures for further use in manufacturing. Of the 20 million dollars’ worth sent to Africa, 58.79 per cent was manufactures ready for consumption and 6.85 per cent manufactures for further use in manufacturing. Of the 295 million dollars’ worth exported to North America, 50.46 per cent was manufactures ready for consumption and 11.37 per cent manufactures for further use in manufacturing. Of the 1,189 million dollars’ worth of domestic merchandise sent from the United States to Europe in 1906, 12.72 per cent was manufactures ready for consumption and 14.06 per cent manufactures for further use in manufacturing.

Of the $75 million worth sent to South America, 72.4% was finished goods ready for consumption, and 14.02% was goods for further manufacturing use. Of the $105 million sent to Asia, 65.79% was finished goods ready for consumption, and 9.14% was goods for further manufacturing use. Of the $35 million sent to Oceania, 72.97% was finished goods ready for consumption, and 11.78% was goods for further manufacturing use. Of the $20 million sent to Africa, 58.79% was finished goods ready for consumption, and 6.85% was goods for further manufacturing use. Of the $295 million exported to North America, 50.46% was finished goods ready for consumption, and 11.37% was goods for further manufacturing use. Of the $1,189 million worth of domestic merchandise sent from the United States to Europe in 1906, 12.72% was finished goods ready for consumption, and 14.06% was goods for further manufacturing use.

Thus, more than one-half of the domestic merchandise sent out of the United States to each grand division except Europe goes in the fully manufactured form, ready for consumption; in the case of South America and Oceania practically three-fourths, in the case of Asia practically two-thirds, [Pg 281] and in the case of North America practically one-half goes in the fully manufactured form.

Thus, more than half of the goods shipped from the United States to every major region except Europe are sent in fully manufactured form, ready for consumption; in the case of South America and Oceania, nearly three-quarters, in the case of Asia about two-thirds, and in the case of North America nearly half are sent as fully manufactured products. [Pg 281]

Taking up the principal countries, the figures of the Bureau of Statistics show that 11.85 per cent of the exports of the United Kingdom was manufactures ready for consumption and 11.22 per cent manufactures for further use in manufacturing. Of the exports to Germany, 10.98 per cent was manufactures ready for consumption and 12.96 per cent manufactures for further use in manufacturing. To France, 12.67 per cent of the exports was manufactures ready for consumption and 18.44 per cent manufactures for further use in manufacturing. To Canada, 48.8 per cent of the exports was manufactures ready for consumption and 13.1 per cent manufactures for further use in manufacturing. To Mexico, 58.77 per cent was manufactures ready for consumption and 11.61 per cent manufactures for further use in manufacturing. To Cuba, 45.94 per cent of the exports was manufactures ready for consumption and 9.31 per cent manufactures for further use in manufacturing. To Argentina, 79.93 per cent of the exports was manufactures ready for consumption and 18.67 per cent manufactures for further use in manufacturing. To Brazil, 72.9 per cent of the exports was manufactures ready for consumption and 10.24 per cent manufactures for further use in manufacturing. To Chile, 74.82 per cent of the exports was manufactures ready for consumption and 10.71 per cent manufactures for further use in manufacturing. To China, 85.12 per cent was manufactures ready for consumption and 10.65 per cent manufactures for further use in manufacturing. To Japan, 45.89 per cent of the exports was manufactures ready for consumption and 10.28 per cent manufactures for further use in manufacturing. To the Philippine Islands, 59.75 per cent of the shipments was manufactures ready for consumption and 9.13 per cent manufactures for further use in manufacturing. To Australia, 76.48 per cent of the exports was manufactures ready for consumption [Pg 282] and 12.26 per cent manufactures for further use in manufacturing.

Taking into account the main countries, the statistics from the Bureau show that 11.85% of the UK's exports consisted of ready-to-consume goods, while 11.22% were goods intended for further manufacturing. For exports to Germany, 10.98% were ready for consumption, and 12.96% were for further manufacturing. For France, 12.67% of exports were ready for consumption, and 18.44% were for further use in manufacturing. To Canada, 48.8% of exports were ready for consumption, and 13.1% were manufactured for further use. To Mexico, 58.77% were ready for consumption, and 11.61% were manufactured for further use. To Cuba, 45.94% of the exports were ready for consumption, and 9.31% were for further use in manufacturing. To Argentina, 79.93% of exports were ready for consumption, and 18.67% were for further use in manufacturing. To Brazil, 72.9% of exports were ready for consumption, and 10.24% were for further use. To Chile, 74.82% of exports were ready for consumption, and 10.71% were for further use in manufacturing. To China, 85.12% were ready for consumption, and 10.65% were for further use in manufacturing. To Japan, 45.89% of exports were ready for consumption, and 10.28% were for further use in manufacturing. To the Philippine Islands, 59.75% of shipments were ready for consumption, and 9.13% were for further use in manufacturing. To Australia, 76.48% of exports were ready for consumption [Pg 282] and 12.26% were for further use in manufacturing.

Foodstuffs and manufacturers’ material form the larger share of the merchandise sent to Europe and a considerable percentage of that sent to North America, while to the other grand divisions neither foodstuffs nor raw material for manufacturing form any considerable per cent of the total. To Europe, foodstuffs (chiefly wheat flour, corn and meats) formed 36.3 per cent of the total merchandise sent in 1906, while raw materials for use in manufacturing (chiefly cotton) formed 36.83 per cent of the total, the remainder being, as above indicated, manufactures ready for consumption or manufactures for further use in manufacturing. To North America, foodstuffs formed 20.23 per cent of the total and manufacturers’ raw material 16.12 per cent. To South America, foodstuffs formed 13.32 per cent of the total and manufacturers’ raw material less than 1 per cent. To Asia, foodstuffs formed 13.83 per cent and manufacturers’ raw material 11.2 per cent, this larger percentage of the raw material being due chiefly to sales of raw cotton to Japan. To Oceania, foodstuffs formed 9.65 per cent of the total and manufacturers’ raw material 4.96 per cent. To Africa, foodstuffs formed 28.39 per cent of the total exports and manufacturers’ raw material 5.86 per cent.

Food items and materials for manufacturing make up the majority of the goods sent to Europe and a significant portion of what's sent to North America. In contrast, these categories account for a small percentage of the total shipments to other major regions. In 1906, food items (mainly wheat flour, corn, and meats) made up 36.3 percent of the total exports to Europe, while raw materials for manufacturing (primarily cotton) contributed 36.83 percent. The rest consisted of finished goods ready for consumption or goods meant for further manufacturing. To North America, food items represented 20.23 percent of the total, and raw materials for manufacturing accounted for 16.12 percent. In South America, food items comprised 13.32 percent of the total, and raw materials for manufacturing were less than 1 percent. In Asia, food items made up 13.83 percent, and raw materials for manufacturing were 11.2 percent, with the higher percentage of raw materials largely due to raw cotton sales to Japan. In Oceania, food items were 9.65 percent of the total, while raw materials for manufacturing were 4.96 percent. In Africa, food items constituted 28.39 percent of total exports, and raw materials for manufacturing made up 5.86 percent.

Taking up the analysis of exports to other parts of the world, the figures show that of the exports to the United Kingdom 34.07 per cent was crude materials for use in manufacturing; 27.29 per cent foodstuffs partly or wholly manufactured, including in this group flour, meats, dried and preserved fruits, etc.; 15.46 per cent foodstuffs in a crude condition, and food animals; 13.1 per cent manufactures for further use in manufacturing, and 11.85 per cent manufactures ready for consumption. Of the exports to Germany, 48.28 per cent was crude materials for use in manufacturing; 19 per cent foodstuffs partly or wholly manufactured; 8.65 per cent foodstuffs in a crude condition, including [Pg 283] food animals; 12.96 per cent manufactures for further use in manufacturing, and 10.98 per cent manufactures ready for consumption. In the case of France, 55.38 per cent of the total was crude materials for use in manufacturing; 5.52 per cent foodstuffs partly or wholly manufactured; 7.96 per cent foodstuffs in a crude condition; 18.44 per cent manufactures for further use in manufacturing, and 12.67 per cent manufactures ready for consumption. In the case of Canada, 24.39 per cent was raw materials for use in manufacturing; 4.74 per cent foodstuffs partly or wholly manufactured; 6.23 per cent foodstuffs in a crude condition, and food animals; 13.1 per cent manufactures for further use in manufacturing and 48.8 per cent manufactures ready for consumption.

Analyzing exports to other parts of the world, the data shows that for exports to the United Kingdom, 34.07% were crude materials used in manufacturing; 27.29% were food products that were partly or fully processed, including flour, meats, dried, and preserved fruits, etc.; 15.46% were food products in a raw state, including food animals; 13.1% were manufactured goods intended for further manufacturing, and 11.85% were finished goods ready for consumption. For exports to Germany, 48.28% were crude materials for manufacturing; 19% were food products that were partly or fully processed; 8.65% were food products in a raw state, including food animals; 12.96% were manufactured goods for further manufacturing, and 10.98% were finished goods ready for consumption. In the case of France, 55.38% of the total exports were crude materials for manufacturing; 5.52% were food products that were partly or fully processed; 7.96% were food products in a raw state; 18.44% were manufactured goods for further manufacturing, and 12.67% were finished goods ready for consumption. For Canada, 24.39% were raw materials for manufacturing; 4.74% were food products that were partly or fully processed; 6.23% were food products in a raw state, including food animals; 13.1% were manufactured goods for further manufacturing, and 48.8% were finished goods ready for consumption.

Summing up this study of the share which manufactures formed of the exports of the United States to the principal countries and grand divisions in 1906, the figures show that 151 million dollars’ worth of manufactures ready for consumption went to Europe, 149 million dollars’ worth to North America, 69 million dollars’ worth to Asia, 54 million dollars’ worth to South America, 26 million dollars’ worth to Oceania, and 11 million dollars’ worth to Africa; while of the manufactures for further use in manufacturing 167 million dollars’ worth went to Europe, 33 million to North America, 10 million to South America, 10 million to Asia, 4 million to Oceania, and a little over 1 million dollars’ worth to Africa. Thus while manufactures formed but a comparatively small percentage of the exports to Europe because of the large quantities of foodstuffs and raw material demanded by that country, they actually aggregated a greater sum than the manufactures sent to any other of the grand divisions, though in the other cases the percentage which manufactures formed of the total was much larger than in the trade with Europe.

Summarizing this study of the share of manufactured goods in the exports of the United States to the main countries and regions in 1906, the data shows that $151 million worth of manufactured goods ready for use were sent to Europe, $149 million to North America, $69 million to Asia, $54 million to South America, $26 million to Oceania, and $11 million to Africa. Meanwhile, for manufactured goods meant for further processing, $167 million went to Europe, $33 million to North America, $10 million to South America, $10 million to Asia, $4 million to Oceania, and just over $1 million to Africa. While manufactured goods made up a relatively small percentage of exports to Europe due to the high demand for food and raw materials from that region, they actually accounted for a larger total amount than the manufactured goods sent to any other regions, even though the percentage of manufactured goods in the total exports was much higher in trade with other regions.

Even with this large production of manufactures in the United States it may safely be said that less than one-tenth [Pg 284] of our manufactures are exported, while those imported equal in stated value about one-twentieth that of the home product. This statement is the result of a comparison of the figures of production, exportation, and importation of manufactures in the United States presented by the Statistical Abstract of the United States, issued by the Bureau of Statistics of the Department of Commerce and Labor.

Even with the high level of manufacturing in the United States, it's safe to say that less than ten percent of our manufactured goods are exported, while the value of imported goods is about five percent of the domestic production. This information comes from a comparison of the production, export, and import figures for U.S. manufacturing as reported in the Statistical Abstract of the United States, published by the Bureau of Statistics of the Department of Commerce and Labor.

The Census of 1905 shows the gross value of the factory product of manufactures in 1904 at 14,802 million dollars, and estimates the value of all other manufactures, mechanical and neighborhood, at about 2 billion, making the gross value of all manufactures produced in the United States in 1904, 16,867 million dollars. This gross valuation, however, includes many duplications, because the products reported by one manufacturer often become the manufacturing material of another, who also includes their cost in the report of the value of the products of his factory. By deducting from the gross valuation the value of this manufacturing material used in a partly manufactured form, the Census Office states the net or true value of the manufactures of the country in the census year. This process reduced the valuation of the factory product of 1904 from the gross figure of 14,802 million, to a net valuation of 9,821 million; and an application of the same method of reduction to the non-factory manufactures would place the net value of all manufactures in 1904 at 10,892 million dollars. The Census of 1900, which reported the gross value of all manufactures in 1899 at 13,014 million dollars, places the net value for that year at 8,371 million.

The Census of 1905 shows the total value of factory-produced goods in 1904 was 14,802 million dollars, and estimates the value of all other manufacturing, both mechanical and local, at around 2 billion, bringing the total value of all manufacturing in the United States for 1904 to 16,867 million dollars. However, this total includes a lot of duplications, as the products reported by one manufacturer often become the materials for another manufacturer, who also includes their cost in the value of their own factory's products. By subtracting the value of these materials used in a partially finished form from the total value, the Census Office calculates the net or actual value of the country's manufacturing for that census year. This process reduced the factory product value for 1904 from the total figure of 14,802 million to a net value of 9,821 million; and applying the same method to non-factory manufacturing would bring the net value of all goods in 1904 to 10,892 million dollars. The Census of 1900 reported the total value of all manufacturing in 1899 at 13,014 million dollars, with the net value for that year at 8,371 million.

The Bureau of Statistics’ figures show that the exportation in the year ending June 30, 1905, of all articles classed by the census as manufactures, amounted in value to 895 million dollars, a sum which equals 8.2 per cent of the 10,892 million estimated as the net value of all manufactures [Pg 285] in 1904. The imports in the year ended June 30, 1905, of all articles similar to those classed by the census as manufactures, were valued at 576 million dollars, which equals 5.3 per cent of the net value of the domestic manufactures of 1904.

The Bureau of Statistics' data shows that the value of exports for all items categorized as manufactured goods in the year ending June 30, 1905, was 895 million dollars, which represents 8.2 percent of the 10,892 million estimated as the net value of all manufactured goods in 1904. Meanwhile, the imports for the year ending June 30, 1905, of all items similar to those classified as manufactured goods were valued at 576 million dollars, or 5.3 percent of the net value of domestic manufacturing in 1904. [Pg 285]

Even these figures, which show that the valuation of manufactures exported equals 8.2 per cent of the valuation of the manufactures produced, and that the valuation of the manufactures imported equals 5.3 per cent of the valuation of the manufactures produced, are, however, only approximate, in an attempt to determine the true relation of imports or exports of manufactures to the home production. The valuation of manufactures, supplied to the Census Office, by the various manufacturers, states the value of the product at the place of production; while the Bureau of Statistics’ figures of exportations state the wholesale market value of the article at the port from which exported. Thus the stated values of the articles exported are doubtless in most cases higher than the stated values of the same articles at the place of production since the cost of transportation and dealers’ profits are presumably added in the valuations at which the domestic merchandise in question is wholesaled at the various ports whose current prices determine the valuation placed upon the articles when exported. On the other hand, the values of the imported articles quoted by the Bureau of Statistics are by law “the actual market values or wholesale prices of such merchandise in the principal markets of the country whence imported,” and if freights and profits are added to this figure the valuation at the point where it actually enters the United States would be somewhat in excess of that quoted. Thus the value of manufactures produced are those of the place of production, the figures of exports are those of the wholesale markets of the port from which exported, and those of importation are those of the wholesale market of the country [Pg 286] whence imported. Could production, exports, and imports be brought to a common basis of valuation, the percentage which exports bear to the total production would be slightly reduced and that which imports bear to the total production be slightly increased; and the percentages which exports and imports, respectively, bear to the total production would become more nearly identical than those above quoted, of 8.2 per cent on the export side and 5.3 per cent on the import side.

Even these numbers, which show that the value of exported manufactured goods is 8.2 percent of the total value of manufactured goods produced, and that the value of imported manufactured goods is 5.3 percent of the total value of manufactured goods produced, are still only rough estimates when trying to figure out the actual relationship between imports or exports of manufactured goods and domestic production. The value of manufactured goods reported to the Census Office by various manufacturers reflects the value of the products at their production site, while the Bureau of Statistics’ export figures indicate the wholesale market value of the items at the port from which they are exported. This means that the reported values of exported items are usually higher than the values of those same items at the production site, because transportation costs and dealer profits are likely included in the values at which the domestic goods are wholesaled at the different ports that determine the valuation of exported items. On the flip side, the values of imported items reported by the Bureau of Statistics are legally defined as “the actual market values or wholesale prices of such merchandise in the principal markets of the country from which imported,” so if freight and profit margins are added to this number, the value at the point where the goods actually enter the United States would be slightly higher than what’s quoted. Therefore, the values of manufactured goods produced reflect the production site, the export figures reflect the wholesale markets at the export ports, and the import values reflect the wholesale market of the country from which they are imported. If production, exports, and imports could be standardized for valuation, the percentage of exports relative to total production would decrease slightly, while the percentage of imports relative to total production would increase slightly; thus, the percentages of exports and imports would become more similar than the previously quoted figures of 8.2 percent for exports and 5.3 percent for imports.

The share exported of the manufactures of the country seems to have slowly but steadily increased. The gross valuation of manufactures produced was, speaking in very round terms, in 1850, 1 billion dollars; in 1860, 1¾ billion; in 1870, 4¼ billion; in 1880, 5⅓ billion; in 1890, 9⅓% billion; in 1900, 13 billion; and in 1905, 16¾ billion. Reducing these gross valuations to net value at the same ratio as that indicated by the census reduction of 1900, the net value of manufactures in 1850 would stand at ⅔ of 1 billion dollars, in 1860 at 1¼ billion, in 1870 at 2¾ billion, in 1880 at 3½ billion, in 1890 at 6 billion, in 1900 at 8⅓ billion, and in 1905 at a little less than 11 billion. The exportation of all articles now classed by the census as manufactures was in 1850, 43 million dollars; in 1860, 87 million; in 1870, 160 million (currency values); in 1880, 315 million; in 1890, 404 million; in 1900, 803 million; and in 1905, 895 million. These figures of net products and exports, when compared statistically, show that the exports equalled in 1850, 6.6 per cent of the figures of net production; in 1860, 7.2 per cent; in 1870, 5.9 per cent; in 1880, 9.1 per cent; in 1890, 6.7 per cent; in 1900, 9.6 per cent; and in 1905, 8.2 per cent. That the exportation has grown even more rapidly than the production is also apparent from a comparison of the figures of 1905 with those of 1850, since the production of manufactures in 1905 was practically seventeen times as great as that of 1850, while [Pg 287] the exportation of manufactures in 1905 was twenty-one times as great as in 1850.

The share of manufactured goods exported from the country seems to have gradually but consistently increased. The total value of manufactured products was, in very round figures, 1 billion dollars in 1850; 1.75 billion in 1860; 4.25 billion in 1870; 5.33 billion in 1880; 9.33 billion in 1890; 13 billion in 1900; and 16.75 billion in 1905. If we adjust these total valuations to net value using the same ratio indicated by the 1900 census reduction, the net value of manufactured goods in 1850 would be about 0.67 billion dollars, in 1860 it would be 1.25 billion, in 1870 it would be 2.75 billion, in 1880 it would be 3.5 billion, in 1890 it would be 6 billion, in 1900 it would be 8.33 billion, and in 1905 it would be just under 11 billion. The total exports of all items currently classified by the census as manufactured goods were 43 million dollars in 1850; 87 million in 1860; 160 million in 1870 (in currency values); 315 million in 1880; 404 million in 1890; 803 million in 1900; and 895 million in 1905. Comparing these figures of net products and exports statistically shows that exports were 6.6 percent of net production in 1850; 7.2 percent in 1860; 5.9 percent in 1870; 9.1 percent in 1880; 6.7 percent in 1890; 9.6 percent in 1900; and 8.2 percent in 1905. It’s clear that exports have grown even faster than production, as evidenced by comparing the 1905 figures to those of 1850, since the production of manufactured goods in 1905 was almost seventeen times greater than in 1850, while the exportation of manufactured goods in 1905 was twenty-one times greater than in 1850.

On the import side the ratio of imports of manufactures to production has steadily fallen. Imports of all articles now included by the census classification of manufactures amounted in 1850 to 143 million dollars, in 1860 to 267 million, in 1870 to 433 million (currency values), in 1880 to 426 million, in 1890 to 481 million, in 1900 to 470 million, and in 1905 to 576 million. The percentage which imports of manufactures bore to production of manufactures was, in 1850, 21.8 per cent; in 1860, 22 per cent; in 1870, 15.9 per cent; in 1880, 12.3 per cent; in 1890, 8 per cent; in 1900, 5.6 per cent; and in 1905, 5.3 per cent.

On the import side, the ratio of manufactured imports to production has consistently decreased. Imports of all items categorized as manufactures by the census totaled 143 million dollars in 1850, 267 million in 1860, 433 million in 1870, 426 million in 1880, 481 million in 1890, 470 million in 1900, and 576 million in 1905 (currency values). The percentage that manufactured imports represented compared to manufactured production was 21.8% in 1850, 22% in 1860, 15.9% in 1870, 12.3% in 1880, 8% in 1890, 5.6% in 1900, and 5.3% in 1905.

It is proper to add that the figures above cited as representing the exportation of articles classed by the census as manufactures do not coincide with the usual statement of “Manufactures Exported,” as issued by the Bureau of Statistics from month to month and year to year, but includes many articles classed as manufactures by the census, but ordinarily classed by the Bureau of Statistics as “Foodstuffs Partly or Wholly Manufactured.” The Bureau of Statistics in its import and export statements groups under one title of “Manufactures Ready for Consumption” all articles completely manufactured and ready for use, such as boots and shoes, cars and carriages, and illuminating oil; under another head, “Articles for Further Use in Manufacturing,” all articles in a partially manufactured state, but requiring further processes before ready for final use, such as pig copper, pig iron, pig tin, lumber, etc.; while the group “Foodstuffs Partly or Wholly Manufactured” includes food articles which have undergone certain processes of preparation for use, such as salted meats, canned fruit and vegetables, dried fruits, flour, sugar, and other articles usually classed by the great importing and exporting nations under the general title of foodstuffs. The two groups, “Manufactures Ready for Use,” and [Pg 288] “Manufactures for Further Use in Manufacturing,” are usually included by the bureau in its statements of exports of manufactures, while the third group, “Foodstuffs Partly or Wholly Manufactured,” is not usually so classed. In the above statement, however, in which the attempt is made to compare imports and exports with the census figures of manufactures, the third group, “Foodstuffs Partly or Wholly Manufactured,” is included under the general title of manufactures, in order to make the import and export figures comparable with the census figures of production.

It's important to note that the figures mentioned earlier for the export of items classified by the census as manufactured goods don’t match the usual report of “Manufactures Exported” released by the Bureau of Statistics monthly and annually. This is because it includes many items considered manufactured by the census but typically categorized by the Bureau of Statistics as “Foodstuffs Partly or Wholly Manufactured.” The Bureau of Statistics organizes its import and export reports into one category called “Manufactures Ready for Consumption,” which covers all items that are fully manufactured and ready to use, such as boots and shoes, cars and carriages, and illuminating oil. Another category, “Articles for Further Use in Manufacturing,” includes items that are partially manufactured but need additional processing before they can be used, like pig copper, pig iron, pig tin, lumber, and so on. The category “Foodstuffs Partly or Wholly Manufactured” encompasses food items that have undergone some processing for use, like salted meats, canned fruits and vegetables, dried fruits, flour, sugar, and other items typically classified by major importing and exporting countries as foodstuffs. The two categories, “Manufactures Ready for Use” and “Manufactures for Further Use in Manufacturing,” are generally included in the Bureau's export statements for manufactured goods, while the third category, “Foodstuffs Partly or Wholly Manufactured,” usually isn’t classified that way. However, in the statement above, which attempts to compare imports and exports with the census figures for manufactured goods, the third category, “Foodstuffs Partly or Wholly Manufactured,” is included under the general title of manufactures to make the import and export figures comparable with the census production figures.

Turning to the individual articles forming the great mass of manufactures produced or exported, the percentage of the product exported varies greatly with the various articles or groups of articles. Comparing the Bureau of Statistics’ figures of exports for the fiscal year 1905 with the census figures of production in the calendar year 1904, the percentage which the export figures bear to those of production are, in the case of agricultural implements 18.5 per cent, bicycles and tricycles 26.8 per cent, cash registers 20.6 per cent, sewing machines 29.3 per cent, and typewriters 44.6 per cent; while in a large proportion of articles the percentage is very much less—boots and shoes 2.5 per cent, carriages and wagons 2.7 per cent, structural iron 4 per cent, furniture of wood 2.6 per cent, flour and gristmill products 5.6 per cent, and automobiles 8.3 per cent.

Turning to the individual articles that make up the large number of manufactured goods produced or exported, the percentage of each product that is exported varies significantly across different items or groups of items. Comparing the Bureau of Statistics’ export figures for the fiscal year 1905 with the census production figures for the calendar year 1904, the percentages of exports in relation to production are as follows: agricultural implements at 18.5 percent, bicycles and tricycles at 26.8 percent, cash registers at 20.6 percent, sewing machines at 29.3 percent, and typewriters at 44.6 percent. In contrast, a large number of items show much lower percentages—boots and shoes at 2.5 percent, carriages and wagons at 2.7 percent, structural iron at 4 percent, wooden furniture at 2.6 percent, flour and gristmill products at 5.6 percent, and automobiles at 8.3 percent.

[Pg 289] IX. STATISTICS OF MANUFACTURING.

Approximate Annual Value of Manufactures Produced in the Principal Manufacturing Countries at dates named, 1780 to 1900.
Countries. 1780. 1800. 1820. 1840. 1860. 1888. 1896. 1900.
Millions of Dollars.
United Kingdom 861 1,119 1,411 1,883 2,808 3,991 4,263 5,000
Germany 243 292 414 730 1,509 2,837 3,358 4,601
France 715 925 1,071 1,285 1,849 2,360 2,900 3,450
Austria-Hungary 146 243 389 691 973 1,231 1,596 2,000
Russia 49 73 97 195 754 1,767 1,849 1,980
Italy 49 73 122 195 389 589 925 1,700
Belgium .... .... .... 292 438 496 574 750
Spain 49 97 146 219 292 414 589 615
United States 73 122 268 467 1,908 7,022 9,636 13,004
Various 151 219 292 438 779 1,767 2,097 2,317
 Total 2,336 3,163 4,210 6,395 11,699 22,474 27,787 35,417
Countries. 1780. 1800. 1820. 1840.
Millions of Dollars.
United Kingdom
861
1,119
1,411
1,883
Germany
243
292
414
730
France
715
925
1,071
1,285
Austria-Hungary
146
243
389
691
Russia
49
73
97
195
Italy
49
73
122
195
Belgium .... .... ....
292
Spain
49
97
146
219
United States
73
122
268
467
Various
151
219
292
438
 Total
2,336
3,163
4,210
6,395
Countries. 1860. 1888. 1896. 1900.
Millions of Dollars.
United Kingdom
2,808
3,991
4,263
5,000
Germany
1,509
2,837
3,358
4,601
France
1,849
2,360
2,900
3,450
Austria-Hungary
973
1,231
1,596
2,000
Russia
754
1,767
1,849
1,980
Italy
389
589
925
1,700
Belgium
438
496
574
750
Spain
292
414
589
615
United States
1,908
7,022
9,636
13,004
Various
779
1,767
2,097
2,317
 Total
11,699
22,474
27,787
35,417

Note.—The figures (Mulhall’s estimates prior to 1900) here given for the United States are those of gross values. The relation of “gross” to “net” value of the manufactures of the United States is explained at page 211.

Note.—The figures (Mulhall’s estimates before 1900) provided here for the United States represent gross values. The relationship between "gross" and "net" value of U.S. manufacturing is explained at page 211.

Approximate Annual Value of Manufactures Produced In the Principal Manufacturing Countries at dates named, 1780 to 1900.
Countries. 1780. 1800. 1820. 1840. 1860. 1888. 1896. 1900.
Millions of Dollars.
United Kingdom 861 1,119 1,411 1,883 2,808 3,991 4,263 5,000
Germany 213 292 414 730 1,509 2,837 3,358 4,601
France 715 925 1,071 1,285 1,849 2,360 2,900 3,450
Austria-Hungary 146 243 389 691 973 1,231 1,596 2,000
Russia 49 73 97 195 754 1,767 1,849 1,980
Italy 49 73 122 195 389 589 925 1,700
Belgium .... .... .... 292 438 496 574 750
Spain 49 97 146 219 292 414 589 615
United States 48 81 179 311 1,272 4,681 6,426 8,371
Various 151 219 292 438 779 1,767 2,097 2,317
 Total 2,311 3,122 4,121 6,239 10,063 20,133 24,577 30,784
Countries. 1780. 1800. 1820. 1840.
Millions of Dollars.
United Kingdom
861
1,119
1,411
1,883
Germany
213
292
414
730
France
715
925
1,071
1,285
Austria-Hungary
146
243
389
691
Russia
49
73
97
195
Italy
49
73
122
195
Belgium .... .... ....
292
Spain
49
97
146
219
United States
48
81
179
311
Various
151
219
292
438
 Total
2,311
3,122
4,121
6,239
Countries. 1860. 1888. 1896. 1900.
Millions of Dollars.
United Kingdom
2,808
3,991
4,263
5,000
Germany
1,509
2,837
3,358
4,601
France
1,849
2,360
2,900
3,450
Austria-Hungary
973
1,231
1,596
2,000
Russia
754
1,767
1,849
1,980
Italy
389
589
925
1,700
Belgium
438
496
574
750
Spain
292
414
589
615
United States
1,272
4,681
6,426
8,371
Various
779
1,767
2,097
2,317
 Total
10,063
20,133
24,577
30,784

Note.—Figures are those of Mulhall, except for 1900, the figures of gross manufactures for the United States having been reduced to net on the basis of net equal to 66⅔ per cent of gross; figures for 1900, estimate of Wm. J. Clark, in Engineering Magazine, May, 1904.

Note.—Figures are those of Mulhall, except for 1900, where the gross manufacturing figures for the United States have been adjusted to net, based on net being 66⅔ percent of gross; figures for 1900 are an estimate by Wm. J. Clark, in Engineering Magazine, May 1904.

Importation of Manufactures into United Kingdom and United States, respectively, at quinquennial years, 1870 to 1908.

[From official statistics of the respective governments.]

[From official statistics of the respective governments.]

Year[D] Into the United
Kingdom.
Millions dollars.
Into the United
States.
Millions dollars.
1870 277 229
1875 354 241
1880 405 307
1885 406 261
1890 478 348
1895 483 296
1900 630 337
1905 707 430
1907 754 638
1908 696 528

[D] For United States, fiscal years; for United Kingdom, calendar years.

[D] For the United States, fiscal years; for the United Kingdom, calendar years.

[Pg 290]

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Commerce of the United States, the United Kingdom and Germany, from 1875 to 1908. Showing exports of domestic merchandise, and exports of domestic manufacture from each country named.
Imports of merchandise.
Year. United
Kingdom.
Germany.[E] United
States.[F]
Dollars. Dollars. Dollars.
1875
1,819,779,000
839,590,000
533,005,000
1880
2,001,251,000
670,945,000
667,955,000
1885
1,805,316,000
699,067,000
577,527,000
1890
2,047,298,000
990,023,000
789,310,000
1895
2,027,822,000
980,719,000
731,970,000
1900
2,545,544,000
1,372,216,000
849,941,000
1901
2,540,264,000
1,290,254,000
823,172,000
1902
2,571,416,000
1,340,178,000
903,321,000
1903
2,642,054,050
1,424,080,000
1,025,719,000
1904
2,681,629,000
1,514,660,000
991,087,000
1905
2,749,669,000
1,696,660,000
1,117,513,000
1906
2,958,289,000
1,909,210,000
1,226,562,000
1907
3,143,293,000
2,046,187,000
1,434,421,000
1908
1,194,342,000
Exports of domestic merchandise.
Year. United
Kingdom.
Germany. United
States.[F]
Dollars. Dollars. Dollars.
1875
1,087,497,000
593,052,000
499,284,100
1880
1,085,521,000
688,500,000
823,946,353
1885
1,037,124,000
680,551,000
726,682,946
1890
1,282,472,000
791,717,000
845,293,828
1895
1,100,453,000
789,660,000
793,392,599
1900
1,417,086,000
1,097,509,000
1,370,763,571
1901
1,362,729,000
1,054,685,000
1,460,462,806
1902
1,379,283,000
1,111,008,000
1,355,481,861
1903
1,415,179,000
1,113,313,000
1,392,231,302
1904
1,463,412,000
1,242,987,000
1,435,179,000
1905
1,605,053,000
1,364,131,000
1,491,745,000
1906
1,827,737,000
1,513,449,000
1,171,953,000
1907
2,074,125,000
1,634,803,000
1,853,718,000
1908
1,834,786,000
Exports of domestic manufactures.
Year. United
Kingdom.
Germany. United
States.[F]
Dollars. Dollars. Dollars.
1875
978,886,000
....
101,962,000
1880
970,681,000
460,279,000
121,818,000
1885
913,353,000
504,623,000
150,256,000
1890
1,118,657,000
511,096,000
178,982,000
1895
953,800,000
518,723,000
205,058,000
1900
1,142,603,000
709,806,000
484,846,000
1901
1,110,131,000
688,409,000
465,778,000
1902
1,127,606,000
735,182,000
453,865,000
1903
1,163,812,000
780,925,000
467,898,000
1904
1,204,359,000
819,196,000
523,320,000
1905
1,322,851,000
910,017,000
611,426,000
1906
1,523,699,000
1,046,938,000
686,023,000
1907
1,690,038,000
No data.
740,123,000
1908
750,576,000

[E] Imports for consumption.

Imports for use.

[F] Years ending June 30.

Years ending June 30.

[Pg 291]

[Pg 291]

Exportation of Manufactures from United Kingdom and United States, respectively, at quinquennial years, 1870 to 1908.

[From official statistics of the respective governments.]

[From official statistics of the respective governments.]

Year[G] From the United
Kingdom.
Millions dollars.
From the United
States.
Millions dollars.
1870
888
70
1875
979
102
1880
965
122
1885
915
150
1890
1,112
179
1895
941
205
1900
1,126
485
1905
1,329
611
1907
1,694
740
1908
1,445
751

[G] For United States, fiscal years; for United Kingdom, calendar years.

[G] For the United States, fiscal years; for the United Kingdom, calendar years.

Coal Production of the World by Principal Countries, at quinquennial periods from 1870 to 1895 and annually since that date.

[From reports of the United States Geological Survey.]

[From reports of the United States Geological Survey.]

Year. United
States.
Great
Britain.
Germany. France. Total production
of the world.
Per cent
of U. S.
Short tons. Short tons. Short tons. Short tons. Short tons.
1870 33,035,580 123,682,935 37,488,312 14,530,716 34,850,088 14.07
1875 52,348,320 149,303,263 52,703,970 18,694,916 308,479,177 16.97
1880 71,481,570 164,605,738 65,177,634 21,346,124 369,413,780 20.62
1885 111,160,295 178,473,588 81,227,255 21,510,359 447,783,802 24.82
1890 157,770,963 203,408,003 98,398,500 28,756,638 563,693,232 27.99
1895 193,117,530 212,320,725 114,561,318 30,877,922 644,177,076 29.98
1896 191,986,357 218,804,611 123,943,159 32,167,270 664,001,718 28.92
1897 200,229,199 226,385,523 132,762,882 33,938,987 697,213,515 28.72
1898 219,976,267 226,301,058 144,283,196 35,656,426 738,129,608 29.80
1899 253,741,192 246,506,155 149,719,766 36,215,026 801,976,021 31.63
1900 269,684,027 252,203,056 164,805,202 36,811,536 846,041,848 31.88
1901 293,299,816 245,332,578 168,217,082 35,596,536 870,711,044 33.69
1902 301,590,439 254,346,447 165,826,496 33,286,146 888,453,950 33.95
1903 357,356,416 257,974,605 179,076,630 38,466,873 972,195,531 36.76
1904 351,816,398 260,319,665 186,785,378 37,663,349 983,527,562 35.78
1905 392,722,635 264,464,408 191,576,074 38,951,360 1,034,156,604 37.98
1906 414,157,278 281,195,743 222,350,526 37,828,931 [H]1,106,478,707 37.43
Year. United
States.
Great
Britain.
Germany.
Short tons. Short tons. Short tons.
1870
33,035,580
123,682,935
37,488,312
1875
52,348,320
149,303,263
52,703,970
1880
71,481,570
164,605,738
65,177,634
1885
111,160,295
178,473,588
81,227,255
1890
157,770,963
203,408,003
98,398,500
1895
193,117,530
212,320,725
114,561,318
1896
191,986,357
218,804,611
123,943,159
1897
200,229,199
226,385,523
132,762,882
1898
219,976,267
226,301,058
144,283,196
1899
253,741,192
246,506,155
149,719,766
1900
269,684,027
252,203,056
164,805,202
1901
293,299,816
245,332,578
168,217,082
1902
301,590,439
254,346,447
165,826,496
1903
357,356,416
257,974,605
179,076,630
1904
351,816,398
260,319,665
186,785,378
1905
392,722,635
264,464,408
191,576,074
1906
414,157,278
281,195,743
222,350,526
Year. France. Total production
of the world.
Per cent
of U. S.
Short tons. Short tons.
1870
14,530,716
34,850,088
14.07
1875
18,694,916
308,479,177
16.97
1880
21,346,124
369,413,780
20.62
1885
21,510,359
447,783,802
24.82
1890
28,756,638
563,693,232
27.99
1895
30,877,922
644,177,076
29.98
1896
32,167,270
664,001,718
28.92
1897
33,938,987
697,213,515
28.72
1898
35,656,426
738,129,608
29.80
1899
36,215,026
801,976,021
31.63
1900
36,811,536
846,041,848
31.88
1901
35,596,536
870,711,044
33.69
1902
33,286,146
888,453,950
33.95
1903
38,466,873
972,195,531
36.76
1904
37,663,349
983,527,562
35.78
1905
38,951,360
1,034,156,604
37.98
1906
37,828,931
[H]1,106,478,707
37.43

[H] Latest available figures are used in making up totals for 1906.

[H] The most recent available figures are used to calculate the totals for 1906.

Note. The use of coal for the production of power for use in manufacturing has such an important relation to that industry that the presentation of this table in this study seems justifiable.

Note. The use of coal for generating power in manufacturing is so closely related to that industry that including this table in this study seems justified.

World’s Production of Cotton.

[From Latham, Alexander & Co.’s “Cotton Movement & Fluctuation,” 1902-7.]

[From Latham, Alexander & Co.’s “Cotton Movement & Fluctuation,” 1902-7.]

Countries. 1902-3. 1903-4. 1904-5. 1905-6. 1906-7.
Bales. Bales. Bales. Bales. Bales.
United States 10,511,020 9,841,671 13,420,440 11,048,000 13,346,000
East Indies[I] 2,737,577 2,734,400 2,952,720 2,983,370 3,482,000
Egypt 1,148,700 1,275,754 1,244,968 1,152,516 1,350,000
Brazil[J] 329,390 307,516 325,928 476,667 400,000
 Total 14,726,687 14,159,341 17,944,056 15,660,553 18,578,000
Countries. 1902-3. 1903-4.
Bales. Bales.
United States
10,511,020
9,841,671
East Indies[I]
2,737,577
2,734,400
Egypt
1,148,700
1,275,754
Brazil[J]
329,390
307,516
 Total
14,726,687
14,159,341
Countries. 1904-5. 1905-6. 1906-7.
Bales. Bales. Bales.
United States
13,420,440
11,048,000
13,346,000
East Indies[I]
2,952,720
2,983,370
3,482,000
Egypt
1,244,968
1,152,516
1,350,000
Brazil[J]
325,928
476,667
400,000
 Total
17,944,056
15,660,553
18,578,000

[I] Includes India’s exports to Europe, America and Japan, and mill consumption in India increased or decreased by excess or loss of stock at Bombay.

[I] Includes India’s exports to Europe, America, and Japan, and mill consumption in India increased or decreased based on excess or loss of stock in Bombay.

[J] Receipts into Europe from Brazil, Smyrna, Peru, West Indies, etc., and Japan and China cotton used in Japanese mills.

[J] Receipts into Europe from Brazil, Smyrna, Peru, the West Indies, etc., and Japanese cotton and Chinese cotton used in Japanese mills.

[Pg 292]

[Pg 292]

Estimated Number of Cotton Spindles at Work on the Continent of Europe, Sept. 30, 1907.

[From Alfred B. Shepperson’s “Cotton Facts,” December, 1907.]

[From Alfred B. Shepperson’s “Cotton Facts,” December, 1907.]

Russia and Poland
7,000,000
Germany
9,000,000
Austria
3,700,000
France
6,200,000
Spain
2,800,000
Switzerland
1,550,000
Italy
3,000,000
Belgium
1,300,000
Sweden, Norway, etc.
550,000
Holland
420,000
Portugal
210,000
Greece
70,000
 Total
35,800,000
Annual Consumption of Cotton in Cotton Mills.

[From Alfred B. Shepperson’s “Cotton Facts,” December, 1907.]

[From Alfred B. Shepperson’s “Cotton Facts,” December, 1907.]

Season of Great Britain. Continent Europe. Northern States of
U. S.
Southern States of
U. S.
Total of
United
States.
India.
In bales of 500 pounds net.
1896-7 3,224,000 4,368,000 1,771,000 946,000 2,717,000 1,041,000
1897-8 3,432,000 4,628,000 1,771,000 1,151,000 2,922,000 1,185,000
1898-9 3,519,000 4,784,000 2,218,000 1,364,000 3,582,000 1,340,000
1899- 3,334,000 4,576,000 2,163,000 1,524,000 3,687,000 1,162,000
1900-1 3,269,000 4,576,000 1,909,000 1,526,000 3,435,000 1,087,000
1901-2 3,253,000 4,836,000 1,996,000 1,912,000 3,908,000 1,384,000
1902-3 3,185,000 5,148,000 1,980,000 1,910,000 3,890,000 1,362,000
1903-4 2,977,000 5,148,000 1,980,000 1,795,000 3,775,000 1,368,000
1904-5 3,572,000 5,148,000 2,112,000 2,063,000 4,175,000 1,473,000
1905-6 3,766,000 5,244,000 2,364,000 2,239,000 4,603,000 1,587,000
1906-7 3,915,000 5,444,000 2,460,000 2,362,000 4,822,000 1,562,000
Season of Great Britain. Continent
Europe.
Northern States
of U. S.
In bales of 500 pounds net.
1896-7
3,224,000
4,368,000
1,771,000
1897-8
3,432,000
4,628,000
1,771,000
1898-9
3,519,000
4,784,000
2,218,000
1899-
3,334,000
4,576,000
2,163,000
1900-1
3,269,000
4,576,000
1,909,000
1901-2
3,253,000
4,836,000
1,996,000
1902-3
3,185,000
5,148,000
1,980,000
1903-4
2,977,000
5,148,000
1,980,000
1904-5
3,572,000
5,148,000
2,112,000
1905-6
3,766,000
5,244,000
2,364,000
1906-7
3,915,000
5,444,000
2,460,000
Season of Southern
States
of U. S.
Total of
United
States.
India.
In bales of 500 pounds net.
1896-7
946,000
2,717,000
1,041,000
1897-8
1,151,000
2,922,000
1,185,000
1898-9
1,364,000
3,582,000
1,340,000
1899-
1,524,000
3,687,000
1,162,000
1900-1
1,526,000
3,435,000
1,087,000
1901-2
1,912,000
3,908,000
1,384,000
1902-3
1,910,000
3,890,000
1,362,000
1903-4
1,795,000
3,775,000
1,368,000
1904-5
2,063,000
4,175,000
1,473,000
1905-6
2,239,000
4,603,000
1,587,000
1906-7
2,362,000
4,822,000
1,562,000
World’s Supply and Distribution of Cotton.

[From Latham, Alexander & Co.’s “Cotton Movement & Fluctuation,” 1902-7.]

[From Latham, Alexander & Co.’s “Cotton Movement & Fluctuation,” 1902-7.]

Year. Visible and Invisible Supply at beginning of year. Crops. Total Actual Consumption. Balance of Supply End of year.
United States All Others. Total. Visible. Invisible.
Bales of 500 pounds each.
1884-5 1,550,000 5,136,000 2,101,000 7,237,000 7,444,000 984,000 359,000
1885-6 1,343,000 5,984,000 2,234,000 8,218,000 8,120,000 968,000 473,000
1886-7 1,441,000 5,960,000 2,577,000 8,537,000 8,505,000 999,000 474,000
1887-8 1,473,000 6,400,000 2,309,000 8,709,000 8,891,000 772,000 519,000
1888-9 1,291,000 6,463,000 2,632,000 9,095,000 9,267,000 682,000 437,000
1889-90 1,119,000 6,820,000 2,933,000 9,753,000 9,795,000 846,000 231,000
1890-1 1,077,000 8,137,000 3,039,000 11,176,000 10,511,000 1,315,000 427,000
1891-2 1,742,000 8,640,000 3,001,000 11,641,000 10,565,000 2,310,000 508,000
1892-3 2,818,000 6,435,000 3,296,000 9,731,000 10,291,000 1,903,000 355,000
1893-4 2,258,000 7,136,000 3,314,000 10,450,000 10,580,000 1,792,000 336,000
1894-5 2,128,000 9,640,000 2,978,000 12,618,000 11,543,000 2,185,000 1,018,000
1895-6 3,203,000 6,912,000 3,421,000 10,333,000 11,605,000 1,231,000 700,000
1896-7 1,931,000 8,435,868 3,438,000 11,873,868 11,880,332 1,295,636 628,000
1897-8 1,923,636 10,890,000 3,316,290 14,206,290 12,888,768 1,905,158 1,336,000
1898-9 3,241,158 11,078,000 3,694,934 14,772,934 14,014,728 2,371,364 1,628,000
1899-1900 3,999,364 9,137,000 3,092,897 12,229,897 13,772,772 1,071,489 1,385,000
1900-1 2,456,489 10,218,000 3,414,454 13,632,454 13,415,916 1,549,027 1,124,000
1901-2 2,673,027 10,380,380 4,038,569 14,413,949 14,414,908 1,306,068 1,366,000
1902-3 2,672,068 10,511,020 4,215,661 14,726,687 14,477,694 1,177,677 1,743,384
1903-4 2,921,061 9,841,671 4,317,670 14,159,341 14,310,158 1,085,237 1,735,007
1904-5 2,770,244 13,420,440 4,524,000 17,944,056 15,541,667 2,501,469 2,671,164
1905-6 5,172,638 11,048,000 4,612,553 15,660,553 16,328,804 1,702,485 2,801,897
1906-7 4,504,382 13,346,000 5,232,000 18,578,000 17,005,640 2,215,497 3,861,245
Year. Visible
and
Invisible
Supply at
beginning
of year.
Bales of 500
pounds each.
1884-5 1,550,000
1885-6 1,343,000
1886-7 1,441,000
1887-8 1,473,000
1888-9 1,291,000
1889-90 1,119,000
1890-1 1,077,000
1891-2 1,742,000
1892-3 2,818,000
1893-4 2,258,000
1894-5 2,128,000
1895-6 3,203,000
1896-7 1,931,000
1897-8 1,923,636
1898-9 3,241,158
1899-1900 3,999,364
1900-1 2,456,489
1901-2 2,673,027
1902-3 2,672,068
1903-4 2,921,061
1904-5 2,770,244
1905-6 5,172,638
1906-7 4,504,382
Year. Crops.
United States All Others. Total.
Bales of 500 pounds each.
1884-5
5,136,000
2,101,000
7,237,000
1885-6
5,984,000
2,234,000
8,218,000
1886-7
5,960,000
2,577,000
8,537,000
1887-8
6,400,000
2,309,000
8,709,000
1888-9
6,463,000
2,632,000
9,095,000
1889-90
6,820,000
2,933,000
9,753,000
1890-1
8,137,000
3,039,000
11,176,000
1891-2
8,640,000
3,001,000
11,641,000
1892-3
6,435,000
3,296,000
9,731,000
1893-4
7,136,000
3,314,000
10,450,000
1894-5
9,640,000
2,978,000
12,618,000
1895-6
6,912,000
3,421,000
10,333,000
1896-7
8,435,868
3,438,000
11,873,868
1897-8
10,890,000
3,316,290
14,206,290
1898-9
11,078,000
3,694,934
14,772,934
1899-1900
9,137,000
3,092,897
12,229,897
1900-1
10,218,000
3,414,454
13,632,454
1901-2
10,380,380
4,038,569
14,413,949
1902-3
10,511,020
4,215,661
14,726,687
1903-4
9,841,671
4,317,670
14,159,341
1904-5
13,420,440
4,524,000
17,944,056
1905-6
11,048,000
4,612,553
15,660,553
1906-7
13,346,000
5,232,000
18,578,000
Year. Total
Actual
Consumption.
Balance of Supply End of year.
Visible. Invisible.
Bales of 500 pounds each.
1884-5
7,444,000
984,000
359,000
1885-6
8,120,000
968,000
473,000
1886-7
8,505,000
999,000
474,000
1887-8
8,891,000
772,000
519,000
1888-9
9,267,000
682,000
437,000
1889-90
9,795,000
846,000
231,000
1890-1
10,511,000
1,315,000
427,000
1891-2
10,565,000
2,310,000
508,000
1892-3
10,291,000
1,903,000
355,000
1893-4
10,580,000
1,792,000
336,000
1894-5
11,543,000
2,185,000
1,018,000
1895-6
11,605,000
1,231,000
700,000
1896-7
11,880,332
1,295,636
628,000
1897-8
12,888,768
1,905,158
1,336,000
1898-9
14,014,728
2,371,364
1,628,000
1899-1900
13,772,772
1,071,489
1,385,000
1900-1
13,415,916
1,549,027
1,124,000
1901-2
14,414,908
1,306,068
1,366,000
1902-3
14,477,694
1,177,677
1,743,384
1903-4
14,310,158
1,085,237
1,735,007
1904-5
15,541,667
2,501,469
2,671,164
1905-6
16,328,804
1,702,485
2,801,897
1906-7
17,005,640
2,215,497
3,861,245

[Pg 293]

[Pg 293]

Stocks of Money in Thirteen Principal Countries of the World in 1873, 1896 and 1906.

Relative increase in use of gold, silver and paper money illustrated.

Relative increase in the use of gold, silver, and paper money illustrated.

Countries. Stock of Gold.
1873. 1896. 1906.
United States
$135,000,000
$696,300,000
$1,593,300,000
Great Britain
160,000,000
584,000,000
486,700,000
France
450,000,000
772,000,000
926,400,000
Germany
160,200,000
654,500,000
1,030,300,000
Russia
149,100,000
586,900,000
939,400,000
Italy
20,000,000
96,900,000
215,500,000
Belgium
25,000,000
35,000,000
31,100,000
Netherlands
12,000,000
21,900,000
45,900,000
Austria-Hungary
35,000,000
178,500,000
306,400,000
Australasia
50,000,000
132,100,000
125,000,000
Denmark
4,100,000
15,400,000
22,600,000
Sweden
1,800,000
10,600,000
22,600,000
Norway
7,600,000
7,500,000
8,300,000
 Total
1,209,800,000
2,791,600,000
5,753,500,000
Countries. Stock of Silver.
1873. 1896. 1906.
United States
$ 6,150,000
$364,500,000
$698,700,000
Great Britain
95,000,000
121,700,000
116,800,000
France
500,000,000
443,900,000
411,100,000
Germany
306,235,000
212,800,000
219,700,000
Russia
18,600,000
74,200,000
77,900,000
Italy
23,000,000
45,400,000
31,700,000
Belgium
15,000,000
57,000,000
24,700,000
Netherlands
37,300,000
56,100,000
52,600,000
Austria-Hungary
40,000,000
63,700,000
105,300,000
Australasia
3,000,000
7,000,000
10,000,000
Denmark
7,500,000
5,400,000
6,100,000
Sweden
4,300,000
4,900,000
7,700,000
Norway
1,600,000
2,000,000
3,100,000
 Total
1,057,685,000
1,728,600,000
1,765,400,000
Countries. Uncovered paper.
1873. 1896. 1906.
United States
$749,445,000
$397,000,000
$610,800,000
Great Britain
59,800,000
112,100,000
116,800,000
France
385,300,000
119,200,000
269,200,000
Germany
90,800,000
123,800,000
267,100,000
Russia
618,400,000
467,200,000
No data.
Italy
87,800,000
161,000,000
150,600,000
Belgium
35,100,000
72,500,000
125,800,000
Netherlands
15,300,000
37,900,000
57,800,000
Austria-Hungary
265,800,000
177,600,000
119,300,000
Australasia ....
22,500,000
No data.
Denmark
6,500,000
6,400,000
10,700,000
Sweden
6,000,000
19,000,000
34,800,000
Norway
2,300,000
3,800,000
7,000,000
 Total
2,322,545,000
1,720,000,000
1,769,900,000
Countries. Total money in countries named.
1873. 1896. 1906.
United States
$890,595,000
$1,727,800,000
$2,902,800,000
Great Britain
314,800,000
817,800,000
720,300,000
France
1,335,300,000
1,335,100,000
1,606,700,000
Germany
557,235,000
991,100,000
1,517,100,000
Russia
786,100,000
1,128,300,000
[K]1,017,300,000
Italy
130,800,000
303,300,000
397,800,000
Belgium
75,100,000
164,500,000
181,600,000
Netherlands
64,600,000
115,900,000
156,300,000
Austria-Hungary
340,800,000
419,800,000
531,000,000
Australasia
[K]53,000,000
161,600,000
[K]135,000,000
Denmark
18,100,000
27,200,000
39,400,000
Sweden
12,100,000
34,500,000
65,100,000
Norway
11,500,000
13,300,000
18,400,000
 Total
4,590,030,000
7,240,200,000
9,288,800,000

[K] Exclusive of uncovered paper, for which no data is available.

[K] Excluding uncovered paper, for which there's no data available.

Note.—The great increase in the use of capital in the manufacturing industries in recent years seems to justify the presentation of this table showing the general growth of money in the manufacturing countries.

Note.—The significant rise in the use of capital in manufacturing industries in recent years seems to warrant presenting this table showing the overall growth of money in manufacturing countries.

[Pg 294]

[Pg 294]

Annual Average Gold Production of the World.
Period. Gold—
million
dollars.
1493 to 1700
5.4
1701 to 1850
13.1
1851 to 1890
120.2
1891 to 1900
210.1
1901 to 1905
322.1
1906
400.3
1907
410.0
(estim.) 1908
444.0
The World’s Production of Pig Iron from 1800 to 1907.

[In gross tons of 2240 lbs.]

[In gross tons of 2240 lbs.]

Year. United States. Great Britain. Germany. France. Various. Total.
Tons. Tons. Tons. Tons. Tons. Tons.
1800 40,000 190,000 40,000 60,000 130,000 460,000
1810 55,000 250,000 46,000 85,000 180,000 616,000
1820 20,000 400,000 90,000 140,000 385,000 1,570,000
1830 165,000 680,000 120,000 220,000 480,000 2,677,000
1840 287,000 1,390,000 170,000 350,000 640,000 4,426,000
1850 564,000 2,250,000 402,000 570,000 270,000 920,000
1860 820,000 3,830,000 530,000 900,000 1,100,000 7,180,000
1870 1,665,000 5,960,000 1,390,000 1,180,000 1,710,000 11,905,000
1880 3,835,000 7,750,000 2,730,000 1,730,000 2,090,000 18,135,000
1885 4,050,000 7,420,000 2,690,000 1,630,000 2,310,000 18,100,000
1889 7,603,000 8,250,000 4,530,000 1,720,000 3,060,000 25,163,000
1895 9,446,000 7,703,000 5,465,000 2,006,000 4,247,000 28,867,000
1896 8,623,000 8,660,000 6,271,000 2,302,000 5,001,000 30,857,000
1897 9,652,000 8,796,000 6,771,000 2,444,000 5,267,000 32,930,000
1898 11,773,000 8,610,000 7,196,000 2,485,000 5,808,000 35,872,000
1899 13,620,000 9,421,000 8,013,000 2,537,000 6,464,000 40,055,000
1900 13,789,000 8,960,000 8,384,000 2,671,000 6,686,000 40,490,000
1901 15,878,000 7,929,000 7,754,000 2,351,000 6,886,000 40,798,000
1902 17,821,000 8,680,000 8,395,000 2,367,000 6,876,000 44,139,000
1903 18,009,000 8,935,000 9,860.000 2,796,000 6,677,000 46,277,000
1904 16,497,000 8,694,000 9,899,000 2,927,000 7,322,000 45,339,000
1905 22,992,000 9,608,000 10,703,000 3,028,000 7,569,000 53,900,000
1906 25,307,000 10,109,000 12,099,000 3,267,000 7,360,000 58,142,000
1907 25,781,000 9,924,000 12,672,000 3,532,000 7,591,000 [L]59,500,000
Year. United
States.
Great
Britain.
Germany.
Tons. Tons. Tons.
1800
40,000
190,000
40,000
1810
55,000
250,000
46,000
1820
20,000
400,000
90,000
1830
165,000
680,000
120,000
1840
287,000
1,390,000
170,000
1850
564,000
2,250,000
402,000
1860
820,000
3,830,000
530,000
1870
1,665,000
5,960,000
1,390,000
1880
3,835,000
7,750,000
2,730,000
1885
4,050,000
7,420,000
2,690,000
1889
7,603,000
8,250,000
4,530,000
1895
9,446,000
7,703,000
5,465,000
1896
8,623,000
8,660,000
6,271,000
1897
9,652,000
8,796,000
6,771,000
1898
11,773,000
8,610,000
7,196,000
1899
13,620,000
9,421,000
8,013,000
1900
13,789,000
8,960,000
8,384,000
1901
15,878,000
7,929,000
7,754,000
1902
17,821,000
8,680,000
8,395,000
1903
18,009,000
8,935,000
9,860.000
1904
16,497,000
8,694,000
9,899,000
1905
22,992,000
9,608,000
10,703,000
1906
25,307,000
10,109,000
12,099,000
1907
25,781,000
9,924,000
12,672,000
Year. France. Various. Total.
Tons. Tons. Tons.
1800
60,000
130,000
460,000
1810
85,000
180,000
616,000
1820
140,000
385,000
1,570,000
1830
220,000
480,000
2,677,000
1840
350,000
640,000
4,426,000
1850
570,000
270,000
920,000
1860
900,000
1,100,000
7,180,000
1870
1,180,000
1,710,000
11,905,000
1880
1,730,000
2,090,000
18,135,000
1885
1,630,000
2,310,000
18,100,000
1889
1,720,000
3,060,000
25,163,000
1895
2,006,000
4,247,000
28,867,000
1896
2,302,000
5,001,000
30,857,000
1897
2,444,000
5,267,000
32,930,000
1898
2,485,000
5,808,000
35,872,000
1899
2,537,000
6,464,000
40,055,000
1900
2,671,000
6,686,000
40,490,000
1901
2,351,000
6,886,000
40,798,000
1902
2,367,000
6,876,000
44,139,000
1903
2,796,000
6,677,000
46,277,000
1904
2,927,000
7,322,000
45,339,000
1905
3,028,000
7,569,000
53,900,000
1906
3,267,000
7,360,000
58,142,000
1907
3,532,000
7,591,000
[L]59,500,000

[L] Preliminary estimate.

Preliminary estimate.

Note.—Official figures of the respective national statistical offices of the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany and France. Figures for all other countries taken from the French and Swedish Mineral Statistics.

Note.—Official figures from the national statistical offices of the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and France. Figures for all other countries are sourced from the French and Swedish Mineral Statistics.

Commerce of the World since 1830.

[Aggregate of imports for consumption and domestic exports in millions of dollars.—Mulhall’s figures prior to 1890.]

[Aggregate of imports for consumption and domestic exports in millions of bucks.—Mulhall’s figures before 1890.]

Country. 1830. 1840. 1850. 1860. 1870. 1880. 1890. 1897. 1903. 1907.
United Kingdom 422 547 811 1,800 2,625 3,350 3,552 3,389 4,056 5,217
France 197 317 456 801 1,089 1,627 1,493 1,450 1,747 2,237
Germany 220 249 336 624 1,017 1,411 1,761 1,996 2,621 3,681
Russia 134 158 192 230 494 629 566 618 867 [M][N]834
Austria-Hungary 72 105 139 225 398 513 441 609 813 949
Italy 96 144 182 249 317 437 451 438 652 [M]821
Spain 33 48 53 120 197 240 283 301 257 [M]325
Portugal 14 19 24 38 48 67 86 73 97 [O]100
Holland and Belgium 144 216 293 413 653 1,137 1,488 1,915 2,614 [M]3,010
United States 105 197 297 653 702 1,478 1,536 1,815 2,453 3,318
Spanish America 168 230 336 451 648 768 797 826 965 1,802
India 48 96 144 249 408 518 629 440 761 [M]913
British colonies, other 43 101 211 494 614 974 1,430 1,550 2,292 [O]2,169
Other countries 264 323 326 853 1,200 1,351 2,287 3,020 2,866 [P]3,733
 The world 1,960 2,750 3,800 7,200 10,500 14,500 16,800 18,500 23,061 29,109
Country. 1830. 1840. 1850. 1860. 1870.
United Kingdom
422
547
811
1,800
2,625
France
197
317
456
801
1,089
Germany
220
249
336
624
1,017
Russia
134
158
192
230
494
Austria-Hungary
72
105
139
225
398
Italy
96
144
182
249
317
Spain
33
48
53
120
197
Portugal
14
19
24
38
48
Holland and Belgium
144
216
293
413
653
United States
105
197
297
653
702
Spanish America
168
230
336
451
648
India
48
96
144
249
408
British colonies, other
43
101
211
494
614
Other countries
264
323
326
853
1,200
 The world
1,960
2,750
3,800
7,200
10,500
Country. 1880. 1890. 1897. 1903. 1907.
United Kingdom
3,350
3,552
3,389
4,056
5,217
France
1,627
1,493
1,450
1,747
2,237
Germany
1,411
1,761
1,996
2,621
3,681
Russia
629
566
618
867
Austria-Hungary
513
441
609
813
949
Italy
437
451
438
652
[M]821
Spain
240
283
301
257
[M]325
Portugal
67
86
73
97
[O]100
Holland and Belgium
1,137
1,488
1,915
2,614
[M]3,010
United States
1,478
1,536
1,815
2,453
3,318
Spanish America
768
797
826
965
1,802
India
518
629
440
761
[M]913
British colonies, other
974
1,430
1,550
2,292
[O]2,169
Other countries
1,351
2,287
3,020
2,866
[P]3,733
 The world
14,500
16,800
18,500
23,061
29,109

[M] 1906.

1906.

[N] Trade over the European frontier only.

[N] Trade only across the European border.

[O] 1904.

1904.

[P] Various years, 1904 to 1906.

Various years, 1904–1906.

[Pg 295]

[Pg 295]

Imports and Exports of Manufactures into and from the Principal Countries of the World and the Share Which Manufactures Formed of their Total Commerce.

The Bureau of Statistics of the Department of Commerce and Labor published in 1903 a series of tables showing the imports and exports of manufactures of the principal countries of the world and the share which manufactures formed, respectively, of the imports and exports of each of the countries named. The following is a summarization of that table:

The Bureau of Statistics from the Department of Commerce and Labor released a set of tables in 1903 that displayed the imports and exports of manufactured goods from major countries around the world, along with the proportion of manufactured goods in the total imports and exports for each country listed. Here’s a summary of that table:

Countries. Iron and Steel. Textiles. Other Manufactures.
Import. Export. Import. Export. Import. Export.
Austria-Hungary (1901) $13,942,000 $10,667,000 $34,696,000 $27,659,000 $65,350,000 $149,038,000
Belgium (1902) 19,083,000 46,144,000 21,652,000 41,722,000 63,475,000 90,974,000
Denmark (1901) 9,415,000 1,711,000 12,699,000 245,000 17,741,000 1,926,000
France (1902) 31,336,000 42,238,000 44,611,000 188,338,000 136,645,000 278,227,000
Germany (1901) 42,186,000 207,951,000 65,290,000 204,789,000 259,193,000 411,311,000
Italy (1901) 31,318,000 1,523,000 17,116,000 36,399,000 53,305,000 37,451,000
Netherlands (1901) 92,446,000 58,045,000 41,172,000 29,668,000 108,121,000 143,797,000
Portugal (1902) 6,431,000 249,000 7,253,000 1,171,000 10,302,000 1,946,000
Russia-European frontier (1901) 48,538,000 818,000 23,728,000 9,942,000 85,900,000 45,309,000
Spain (1902) 19,448,000 955,000 11,032,000 6,977,000 27,463,000 33,398,000
Sweden (1902) 11,916,000 15,402,000 13,306,000 796,000 26,613,000 23,221,000
Norway (1901) 11,672,000 963,000 8,886,000 257,000 13,037,000 10,863,000
Switzerland (1902) 17,366,000 10,704,000 27,205,000 76,447,000 48,478,000 47,960,000
United Kingdom (1902) 74,685,000 298,945,000 175,194,000 547,325,000 478,821,000 294,861,000
United States (1903) 51,617,000 96,642,000 146,202,000 39,641,000 369,310,000 654,860,000
Canada (1902) 34,727,000 10,060,000 67,719,000 18,076,000
Mexico (1901) 18,457,000 10,294,000 18,170,000 9,178,000
Argentina (1902) 18,343,000 28,700,000 20,674,000 704,000
Brazil (1901) 7,034,000 14,032,000 21,954,000 43,000
China (1902) 4,721,000 79,580,000 56,239,000
Japan (1902) 13,878,000 15,380,000 31,729,000 39,637,000 28,173,000
India (1902) 54,302,000 125,356,000 74,123,000
Australia (1901) 36,066,000 54,540,000 65,598.000 13,754,000
New Zealand (1900) 12,088,000 12,821,000 16,732,000 970,000
Countries. Total Manufactures. Percent which
manufactures
form of total.
Import. Export. Import. Export.
Austria-Hungary (1901) $113,988,000 $187,364,000
32.63
48.35
Belgium (1902) 104,210,000 178,840,000
23.72
49.89
Denmark (1901) 39,855,000 3,882,000
37.47
4.96
France (1902) 212,592,000 508,803,000
24.95
62.22
Germany (1901) 366,669,000 824,051,000
28.42
78.13
Italy (1901) 101,739,000 75,373,000
30.68
28.50
Netherlands (1901) 241,739,000 231,510,000
29.54
33.27
Portugal (1902) 23,986,000 3,366,000
39.96
10.96
Russia-European
frontier (1901)
158,166,000 56,069,000
56.37
14.45
Spain (1902) 57,943,000 41,330,000
37.60
29.04
Sweden (1902) 51,835,000 39,419,000
42.08
41.61
Norway (1901) 33,595,000 12,083,000
43.46
28.78
Switzerland (1902) 93,049,000 135,111,000
42.72
80.07
United Kingdom
(1902)
728,700,000 1141,131,000
27.92
82.70
United States (1903) 570,129,000 791,143,000
55.58
56.83
Canada (1902) 112,506,000 18,076,000
57.26
10.47
Mexico (1901) 46,921,000 9,178,000
75.11
27.78
Argentina (1902) 67,717,000 704,000
68.13
.41
Brazil (1901) 43,020,000 43,000
44.87
China (1902) 140,540,000
71.36
Japan (1902) 69,895,000 59,902,000
51.73
47.05
India (1902) 253,781,000
88.15
Australia (1901) 156,204,000 13,754,000
76.35
10.23
New Zealand (1900) 41,641,000 970,000
83.82
1.72
Countries. Iron and Steel.
Import. Export.
Austria-Hungary (1901)
$13,942,000
$ 10,667,000
Belgium (1902)
19,083,000
46,144,000
Denmark (1901)
9,415,000
1,711,000
France (1902)
31,336,000
42,238,000
Germany (1901)
42,186,000
207,951,000
Italy (1901)
31,318,000
1,523,000
Netherlands (1901)
92,446,000
58,045,000
Portugal (1902)
6,431,000
249,000
Russia-European frontier (1901)
48,538,000
818,000
Spain (1902)
19,448,000
955,000
Sweden (1902)
11,916,000
15,402,000
Norway (1901)
11,672,000
963,000
Switzerland (1902)
17,366,000
10,704,000
United Kingdom (1902)
74,685,000
298,945,000
United States (1903)
51,617,000
96,642,000
Canada (1902)
34,727,000
Mexico (1901)
18,457,000
Argentina (1902)
18,343,000
Brazil (1901)
7,034,000
China (1902)
4,721,000
Japan (1902)
13,878,000
India (1902)
54,302,000
Australia (1901)
36,066,000
New Zealand (1900)
12,088,000
Countries. Textiles.
Import. Export.
Austria-Hungary (1901)
$ 34,696,000
$ 27,659,000
Belgium (1902)
21,652,000
41,722,000
Denmark (1901)
12,699,000
245,000
France (1902)
44,611,000
188,338,000
Germany (1901)
65,290,000
204,789,000
Italy (1901)
17,116,000
36,399,000
Netherlands (1901)
41,172,000
29,668,000
Portugal (1902)
7,253,000
1,171,000
Russia-European frontier (1901)
23,728,000
9,942,000
Spain (1902)
11,032,000
6,977,000
Sweden (1902)
13,306,000
796,000
Norway (1901)
8,886,000
257,000
Switzerland (1902)
27,205,000
76,447,000
United Kingdom (1902)
175,194,000
547,325,000
United States (1903)
146,202,000
39,641,000
Canada (1902)
10,060,000
Mexico (1901)
10,294,000
Argentina (1902)
28,700,000
Brazil (1901)
14,032,000
China (1902)
79,580,000
Japan (1902)
15,380,000
31,729,000
India (1902)
125,356,000
Australia (1901)
54,540,000
New Zealand (1900)
12,821,000
Countries. Other Manufactures.
Import. Export.
Austria-Hungary (1901)
$ 5,350,000
$149,038,000
Belgium (1902)
63,475,000
90,974,000
Denmark (1901)
17,741,000
1,926,000
France (1902)
136,645,000
278,227,000
Germany (1901)
259,193,000
411,311,000
Italy (1901)
53,305,000
37,451,000
Netherlands (1901)
108,121,000
143,797,000
Portugal (1902)
10,302,000
1,946,000
Russia-European frontier (1901)
85,900,000
45,309,000
Spain (1902)
27,463,000
33,398,000
Sweden (1902)
26,613,000
23,221,000
Norway (1901)
13,037,000
10,863,000
Switzerland (1902)
48,478,000
47,960,000
United Kingdom (1902)
478,821,000
294,861,000
United States (1903)
369,310,000
654,860,000
Canada (1902)
67,719,000
18,076,000
Mexico (1901)
18,170,000
9,178,000
Argentina (1902)
20,674,000
704,000
Brazil (1901)
21,954,000
43,000
China (1902)
56,239,000
Japan (1902)
39,637,000
28,173,000
India (1902)
74,123,000
Australia (1901)
65,598.000
13,754,000
New Zealand (1900)
16,732,000
970,000
Countries. Total Manufactures.
Import. Export.
Austria-Hungary (1901)
$113,988,000
$ 187,364,000
Belgium (1902)
104,210,000
178,840,000
Denmark (1901)
39,855,000
3,882,000
France (1902)
212,592,000
508,803,000
Germany (1901)
366,669,000
824,051,000
Italy (1901)
101,739,000
75,373,000
Netherlands (1901)
241,739,000
231,510,000
Portugal (1902)
23,986,000
3,366,000
Russia-European
frontier (1901)
158,166,000
56,069,000
Spain (1902)
57,943,000
41,330,000
Sweden (1902)
51,835,000
39,419,000
Norway (1901)
33,595,000
12,083,000
Switzerland (1902)
93,049,000
135,111,000
United Kingdom
(1902)
728,700,000
1141,131,000
United States (1903)
570,129,000
791,143,000
Canada (1902)
112,506,000
18,076,000
Mexico (1901)
46,921,000
9,178,000
Argentina (1902)
67,717,000
704,000
Brazil (1901)
43,020,000
43,000
China (1902)
140,540,000
Japan (1902)
69,895,000
59,902,000
India (1902)
253,781,000
Australia (1901)
156,204,000
13,754,000
New Zealand (1900)
41,641,000
970,000
Countries. Percent which
manufactures
form of total.
Import. Export.
Austria-Hungary (1901)
32.63
48.35
Belgium (1902)
23.72
49.89
Denmark (1901)
37.47
4.96
France (1902)
24.95
62.22
Germany (1901)
28.42
78.13
Italy (1901)
30.68
28.50
Netherlands (1901)
29.54
33.27
Portugal (1902)
39.96
10.96
Russia-European
frontier (1901)
56.37
14.45
Spain (1902)
37.60
29.04
Sweden (1902)
42.08
41.61
Norway (1901)
43.46
28.78
Switzerland (1902)
42.72
80.07
United Kingdom
(1902)
27.92
82.70
United States (1903)
55.58
56.83
Canada (1902)
57.26
10.47
Mexico (1901)
75.11
27.78
Argentina (1902)
68.13
.41
Brazil (1901)
44.87
China (1902)
71.36
Japan (1902)
51.73
47.05
India (1902)
88.15
Australia (1901)
76.35
10.23
New Zealand (1900)
83.82
1.72

[Pg 296]

[Pg 296]

The Manufacturing Industry of the United States, 1850 to 1905, showing Value of Product, Capital Invested, Wage-Earners Employed, Wages Paid, and Number of Establishments in each census year in the period under consideration.

[From official records of the United States Census Office.]

[From official records of the United States Census Office.]

Date of Census.
1850 1860 1870 1880
Number of
establishments
123,025 140,433 252,148 253,852
Capital $533,245,351 $1,009,855,715 $2,118,208,769 $2,790,272,606
Salaried officials,
clerks, etc., Number
[S] [S] [S] [S]
Salaries [S] [S] [S] [S]
Wage-earners,
average number
957,059 1,311,246 2,053,996 2,732,595
Total wages $236,755,464 $378,878,966 $775,584,343 $947,953,795
 Men, 16 years
 and over
731,137 1,040,349 1,615,598 2,019,035
  Wages [S] [S] [S] [S]
 Women, 16 years
 and over
2,225,922 270,897 323,770 531,639
  Wages [S] [S] [S] [S]
 Children, under
16 years
[S] [S] 114,628 181,921
  Wages [S] [S] [S] [S]
Miscellaneous expenses [U] [U] [U] [U]
Cost of materials used $555,123,822 $1,031,605,092 $2,488,427,242 $3,396,823,549
Value of products,
including custom
work and repairing.
$1,019,106,616 $1,885,861,676 $4,232,325,442 $5,369,579,191
Date of Census.
1890 1900.[Q] 1905.
Number of establishments 355,475 512,254 588,769
Capital $6,525,156,486 $9,817,434,799 $13,872,035,371
Salaried officials, clerks, etc.,
 Number
461,609[R] 396,759 566,175
Salaries $391,988,208[R] $403,711,233 $609,200,251
Wage-earners, average number 4,251,613 5,308,406 6,152,443
Total wages $1,891,228,321 $2,322,333,877 $3,014,389,372
 Men, 16 years and over 3,327,042 4,110,527 4,792,874
  Wages $1,659,234,483 $2,016,677,789 $2,629,747,837
 Women, 16 years and over 803,686 1,029,296 1,194,083
  Wages $215,367,976 $279,994,396 $356,992,855
 Children, under 16 years 120,885 168,583 167,066
  Wages $16,625,862 $25,661,692 $29,228,667
Miscellaneous expenses $631,225,035 $1,027,775,778 $1,651,603,535
Cost of materials used $5,162,044,076 $7,345,413,651 $9,497,619,851
Value of products,
including custom
work and repairing.
$9,372,437,283 $13,004,400,143 $16,866,706,985
Per cent of Increase.
1850
to
1860
1860
to
1870
1870
to
1880
1880
to
1890
1890
to
1900
1900
to
1905
Number of establishments
14.1
79.6
0.7
40.0
44.1
4.2
Capital
89.4
109.3
31.7
133.9
50.5
41.3
Salaried officials, clerks, etc.,
Number
13.9[T] 42.7
Salaries
3.0
50.9
Wage-earners, average number
37.0
56.6
33.0
55.6
24.9
15.9
Total wages
60.0
104.7
22.2
99.5
22.8
29.8
 Men, 16 years and over
42.3
55.3
25.0
64.8
23.5
16.6
  Wages
21.5
30.4
 Women, 16 years and over
19.9
19.5
64.2
51.2
28.1
16.0
  Wages
30.0
27.5
 Children, under 16 years
58.7
33.6[T]
39.5
0.9
  Wages
54.3
13.9
Miscellaneous expenses
62.8
60.7
Cost of materials used
85.8
141.2
36.5
52.0
42.3
29.3
Value of products,
including custom
work and repairing.
85.1
124.4
26.9
74.5
38.8
29.7
Date of Census.
1850 1860
Number of
establishments
123,025
140,433
Capital
$533,245,351
$1,009,855,715
Salaried officials,
clerks, etc., Number
[S] [S]
Salaries [S] [S]
Wage-earners,
average number
957,059
1,311,246
Total wages
$236,755,464
$378,878,966
 Men, 16 years
 and over
731,137
1,040,349
  Wages [S] [S]
 Women, 16 years
 and over
2,225,922
270,897
  Wages [S] [S]
 Children, under
16 years
[S] [S]
  Wages [S] [S]
Miscellaneous expenses [U] [U]
Cost of materials used
$555,123,822
$1,031,605,092
Value of products,
including custom
work and repairing.
$1,019,106,616
$1,885,861,676
Date of Census.
1870 1880
Number of
establishments
252,148
253,852
Capital
$2,118,208,769
$2,790,272,606
Salaried officials,
clerks, etc., Number
[S] [S]
Salaries [S] [S]
Wage-earners,
average number
2,053,996
2,732,595
Total wages
$775,584,343
$947,953,795
 Men, 16 years
 and over
1,615,598
2,019,035
  Wages [S] [S]
 Women, 16 years
 and over
323,770
531,639
  Wages [S] [S]
 Children, under
16 years
114,628
181,921
  Wages [S] [S]
Miscellaneous expenses [U] [U]
Cost of materials used
$2,488,427,242
$3,396,823,549
Value of products,
including custom
work and repairing.
$4,232,325,442
$5,369,579,191
Date of Census.
1890 1900.[Q]
Number of establishments
355,475
512,254
Capital
$6,525,156,486
$9,817,434,799
Salaried officials, clerks, etc.,
 Number
461,609[R]
396,759
Salaries
$391,988,208[R]
$403,711,233
Wage-earners, average number
4,251,613
5,308,406
Total wages
$1,891,228,321
$2,322,333,877
 Men, 16 years and over
3,327,042
4,110,527
  Wages
$1,659,234,483
$2,016,677,789
 Women, 16 years and over
803,686
1,029,296
  Wages
$215,367,976
$279,994,396
 Children, under 16 years
120,885
168,583
  Wages
$16,625,862
$25,661,692
Miscellaneous expenses
$631,225,035
$1,027,775,778
Cost of materials used
$5,162,044,076
$7,345,413,651
Value of products,
including custom
work and repairing.
$9,372,437,283
$13,004,400,143
Date of Census.
1905.
Number of establishments
588,769
Capital
$13,872,035,371
Salaried officials, clerks, etc.,
 Number
566,175
Salaries
$609,200,251
Wage-earners, average number
6,152,443
Total wages
$3,014,389,372
 Men, 16 years and over
4,792,874
  Wages
$2,629,747,837
 Women, 16 years and over
1,194,083
  Wages
$356,992,855
 Children, under 16 years
167,066
  Wages
$29,228,667
Miscellaneous expenses
$1,651,603,535
Cost of materials used
$9,497,619,851
Value of products,
including custom
work and repairing.
$16,866,706,985
Per cent of Increase.
1850
to
1860
1860
to
1870
1870
to
1880
Number of establishments
14.1
79.6
0.7
Capital
89.4
109.3
31.7
Salaried officials, clerks, etc.,
Number
Salaries
Wage-earners, average number
37.0
56.6
33.0
Total wages
60.0
104.7
22.2
 Men, 16 years and over
42.3
55.3
25.0
  Wages
 Women, 16 years and over
19.9
19.5
64.2
  Wages
 Children, under 16 years
58.7
  Wages
Miscellaneous expenses
Cost of materials used
85.8
141.2
36.5
Value of products,
including custom
work and repairing.
85.1
124.4
26.9
Per cent of Increase.
1880
to
1890
1890
to
1900
1900
to
1905
Number of establishments
40.0
44.1
4.2
Capital
133.9
50.5
41.3
Salaried officials, clerks, etc.,
Number
13.9[T]
42.7
Salaries
3.0
50.9
Wage-earners, average number
55.6
24.9
15.9
Total wages
99.5
22.8
29.8
 Men, 16 years and over
64.8
23.5
16.6
  Wages
21.5
30.4
 Women, 16 years and over
51.2
28.1
16.0
  Wages
30.0
27.5
 Children, under 16 years 33.6[T]
39.5
0.9
  Wages
54.3
13.9
Miscellaneous expenses
62.8
60.7
Cost of materials used
52.0
42.3
29.3
Value of products,
including custom
work and repairing.
74.5
38.8
29.7

[Q] Includes, for comparative purposes, 85 governmental establishments in the District of Columbia having products valued at $9,887,355, the statistics of such establishments for 1890 not being separable. Totals for 1900 and 1905 are exclusive of statistics for governmental establishments and for Hawaii.

[Q] For comparison, this includes 85 government agencies in Washington, D.C. with products valued at $9,887,355. The statistics for these agencies from 1890 are not available separately. The totals for 1900 and 1905 do not include statistics for government agencies or Hawaii.

[R] Includes proprietors and firm members, with their salaries; number only reported in 1900, but not included in this table.

[R] Includes owners and company members, along with their salaries; figures were only reported in 1900, but are not included in this table.

[S] Not reported separately.

Not reported separately.

[T] Decrease.

Lower.

[U] Not reported.

Not reported.

[Pg 297]

[Pg 297]

Manufactures in the U. S.: Gross and Net Values of Products, Census Years 1900 and 1905, by Industry Groups.

The gross value of manufactures as reported by the census contains many duplications because the finished products of some factories frequently become the material for other factories. In this way not only one but several duplications of the cost of materials often occur. The net value of productions eliminates these duplications by deducting from the gross value the cost of all materials which have undergone any process of manufacture covered by the census reports on manufactures. For further explanation of the relation of “gross” and “net” values, see page 211.

The gross value of products reported by the census has a lot of duplications because the finished goods from some factories often serve as raw materials for other factories. This can lead to multiple duplications of material costs. The net value of production removes these duplications by subtracting the cost of all materials that have gone through any manufacturing process included in the census reports on manufacturing from the gross value. For more details on the relationship between "gross" and "net" values, see page 211.

[From reports of the Bureau of the Census, Department of Commerce and Labor.]

[From reports of the Census Bureau, Department of Commerce and Labor.]

Group. 1900.[V]
Gross. Net.
Value.
Dollars.
Rank. Value.
Dollars.
Rank.
Food and kindred products 2,273,880,874 1 1,750,811,817 1
Textiles 1,637,484,484 3 1,081,961,248 2
Iron and steel and their products 1,793,490,908 2 983,821,918 3
Lumber and its remanufactures 1,030,695,350 5 547,227,860 6
Leather and its finished products 583,731,046 9 329,614,996 11
Paper and printing 606,317,768 8 419,798,101 7
Liquors and beverages 425,504,167 12 349,157,618 10
Chemicals and allied products 552,797,877 10 372,538,857 8
Clay, glass, and stone products 293,564,235 13 245,447,118 14
Metals and metal products, other than iron & steel 748,795,464 7 371,154,446 9
Tobacco 283,076,546 14 264,052,573 12
Vehicles for land transportation 508,524,510 11 250,622,377 13
Shipbuilding 74,578,158 15 42,492,518 15
Miscellaneous industries 1,004,092,294 6 638,191,538 5
Hand trades 1,183,615,478 4 721,104,859 4
 Total 13,000,149,159 8,367,997,844
Group. 1905.
Gross. Net.
Value.
Dollars.
Rank. Value.
Dollars.
Rank.
Food and kindred products 2,845,234,900 1 2,176,489,626 1
Textiles 2,147,441,418 3 1,397,009,940 2
Iron and steel and their products 2,176,739,726 2 1,239,490,273 3
Lumber and its remanufactures 1,223,730,336 4 805,315,333 4
Leather and its finished products 705,747,470 9 401,011,414 10
Paper and printing 857,112,256 8 596,872,350 7
Liquors and beverages 501,266,605 11 431,735,208 9
Chemicals and allied products 1,031,965,263 5 714,489,549 5
Clay, glass, and stone products 391,230,422 12 334,971,057 11
Metals and metal products, other than iron & steel 922,262,456 7 442,912,699 8
Tobacco 331,117,681 13 307,100,175 13
Vehicles for land transportation 643,924,442 10 324,109,901 12
Shipbuilding 82,769,239 14 46,707,258 14
Miscellaneous industries 941,604,873 6 602,990,604 6
Hand trades [W] [W] [W] [W]
 Total 14,802,147,087 9,821,205,387
Group. 1900.[V]
Gross.
Value.
Dollars.
Rank.
Food and kindred products
2,273,880,874
1
Textiles
1,637,484,484
3
Iron and steel and their products
1,793,490,908
2
Lumber and its remanufactures
1,030,695,350
5
Leather and its finished products
583,731,046
9
Paper and printing
606,317,768
8
Liquors and beverages
425,504,167
12
Chemicals and allied products
552,797,877
10
Clay, glass, and stone products
293,564,235
13
Metals and metal products, other than iron & steel
748,795,464
7
Tobacco
283,076,546
14
Vehicles for land transportation
508,524,510
11
Shipbuilding
74,578,158
15
Miscellaneous industries
1,004,092,294
6
Hand trades
1,183,615,478
4
 Total
13,000,149,159
Group. 1900.[V]
Net.
Value.
Dollars.
Rank.
Food and kindred products
1,750,811,817
1
Textiles
1,081,961,248
2
Iron and steel and their products
983,821,918
3
Lumber and its remanufactures
547,227,860
6
Leather and its finished products
329,614,996
11
Paper and printing
419,798,101
7
Liquors and beverages
349,157,618
10
Chemicals and allied products
372,538,857
8
Clay, glass, and stone products
245,447,118
14
Metals and metal products, other than iron & steel
371,154,446
9
Tobacco
264,052,573
12
Vehicles for land transportation
250,622,377
13
Shipbuilding
42,492,518
15
Miscellaneous industries
638,191,538
5
Hand trades
721,104,859
4
 Total
8,367,997,844
Group. 1905.
Gross.
Value.
Dollars.
Rank.
Food and kindred products
2,845,234,900
1
Textiles
2,147,441,418
3
Iron and steel and their products
2,176,739,726
2
Lumber and its remanufactures
1,223,730,336
4
Leather and its finished products
705,747,470
9
Paper and printing
857,112,256
8
Liquors and beverages
501,266,605
11
Chemicals and allied products
1,031,965,263
5
Clay, glass, and stone products
391,230,422
12
Metals and metal products, other than iron & steel
922,262,456
7
Tobacco
331,117,681
13
Vehicles for land transportation
643,924,442
10
Shipbuilding
82,769,239
14
Miscellaneous industries
941,604,873
6
Hand trades [W] [W]
 Total
14,802,147,087
Group. 1905.
Net.
Value.
Dollars.
Rank.
Food and kindred products
2,176,489,626
1
Textiles
1,397,009,940
2
Iron and steel and their products
1,239,490,273
3
Lumber and its remanufactures
805,315,333
4
Leather and its finished products
401,011,414
10
Paper and printing
596,872,350
7
Liquors and beverages
431,735,208
9
Chemicals and allied products
714,489,549
5
Clay, glass, and stone products
334,971,057
11
Metals and metal products, other than iron & steel
442,912,699
8
Tobacco
307,100,175
13
Vehicles for land transportation
324,109,901
12
Shipbuilding
46,707,258
14
Miscellaneous industries
4,715,023
624
Hand trades [W] [W]
 Total
9,821,205,387

[V] The figures of production for 1900 exclude 10 lumber establishments reported for Alaska with products valued at $4,250,984.

[V] The production figures for 1900 do not include 10 lumber businesses reported in Alaska, which had products worth $4,250,984.

[W] “Hand trades” not included in the Census of 1905.

[W] “Hand trades” were not counted in the 1905 Census.

[Pg 298]

[Pg 298]

Manufactures: Percentage Distribution, by Groups of States, Census Years 1850 to 1905.

[From reports of the Bureau of the Census, Department of Commerce and Labor.]

[From reports of the Census Bureau, Department of Commerce and Labor.]

Group of States and
census years.[X]
Establish-
ments
Capital. Wage-earners
Average
number.
Wages.
Per cent. Per cent. Per cent. Per cent.
New England States:
 1850
18.3
31.1
32.7
31.8
 1860
14.7
25.5
29.9
27.5
 1870
12.8
23.1
25.7
27.2
 1880
12.4
22.4
23.7
23.9
 1890
13.6
18.0
19.3
19.0
 1900
10.9
16.8
18.1
18.3
 1905
10.3
14.7
17.2
16.8
Middle States:
 1850
43.9
44.2
43.9
44.3
 1860
37.9
43.1
41.6
40.2
 1870
34.7
42.7
39.2
41.4
 1880
35.3
42.1
41.7
42.8
 1890
35.2
39.2
38.5
40.8
 1900
34.1
40.7
36.6
38.4
 1905
33.6
39.5
36.7
37.3
Southern States:
 1850
16.7
12.6
11.5
9.5
 1860
17.2
11.5
10.1
9.2
 1870
15.4
6.6
9.1
5.8
 1880
14.6
6.9
8.2
5.6
 1890
13.1
7.8
9.7
7.1
 1900
15.1
9.0
13.3
9.2
 1905
15.3
11.0
14.0
10.7
Central States:
 1850
20.2
11.8
11.5
12.7
 1860
23.4
17.1
14.2
14.9
 1870
33.5
24.4
23.8
22.6
 1880
32.3
25.1
23.6
24.1
 1890
31.8
29.7
28.2
27.6
 1900
32.0
27.8
27.4
28.3
 1905
31.3
28.2
27.0
28.4
Western States:
 1850 [Y] [Y] [Y] [Y]
 1860
.5
.4
.3
.4
 1870
1.5
1.0
.8
1.1
 1880
2.6
1.0
1.0
1.1
 1890
3.2
2.0
1.8
2.2
 1900
3.9
2.9
2.0
2.5
 1905
4.2
3.2
2.1
2.7
Pacific States:
 1850
.9
.3
.4
1.7
 1860
6.3
2.4
3.9
7.8
 1870
2.1
2.2
1.4
1.9
 1880
2.8
2.5
1.8
2.5
 1890
3.1
3.3
2.5
3.3
 1900
4.0
2.1
2.6
3.2
 1905
5.2
3.3
3.0
4.1
Alaska:
 1890 [Y] [Y] [Y] [Y]
 1900 [Y]
.1
[Y]
.1
 1905
.1
.1
[Y] [Y]
Group of States and
census years.[X]
Miscel-
laneous
expenses.
Cost of
materials
used.
Value of
products.
Per cent. Per cent. Per cent.
New England States:
 1850
27.6
27.8
 1860
23.8
24.8
 1870
24.3
23.8
 1880
19.4
20.6
 1890
15.7
15.3
16.0
 1900
12.2
13.8
14.6
 1905
11.5
13.1
13.7
Middle States:
 1850
47.9
46.4
 1860
43.1
42.5
 1870
41.7
41.8
 1880
41.1
41.3
 1890
36.3
38.1
38.9
 1900
39.1
37.6
38.1
 1905
38.7
37.0
37.3
Southern States:
 1850
9.5
9.9
 1860
10.6
10.3
 1870
6.5
6.6
 1880
6.3
6.3
 1890
8.2
7.4
7.5
 1900
9.1
8.6
8.9
 1905
10.1
10.2
10.5
Central States:
 1850
14.5
14.3
 1860
19.5
18.1
 1870
24.9
24.9
 1880
29.4
28.0
 1890
34.7
32.5
31.4
 1900
35.6
31.4
30.9
 1905
34.3
30.7
30.5
Western States:
 1850
.1
.1
 1860
.2
.4
 1870
1.0
1.1
 1880
1.4
1.4
 1890
2.4
3.6
3.0
 1900
1.9
5.2
4.3
 1905
2.4
5.3
4.3
Pacific States:
 1850
.4
1.5
 1860
2.8
3.9
 1870
1.6
1.8
 1880
2.4
2.4
 1890
2.7
3.1
3.2
 1900
2.1
3.4
3.2
 1905
2.9
3.7
3.7
Alaska:
 1890 [Y] [Y] [Y]
 1900 [Y] [Y] [Y]
 1905
.1
[Y] [Y]

[X] New England States: Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut. Middle States: New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, District of Columbia. Southern States: Virginia, West Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, Louisiana, Indian Territory, Oklahoma, Texas. Central States: Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri. Western States: Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Nevada, Utah, Colorado, Kansas, Arizona, New Mexico. Pacific States: Washington, Oregon, California.

[X] New England States: Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut. Middle States: New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, District of Columbia. Southern States: Virginia, West Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, Louisiana, Indian Territory, Oklahoma, Texas. Central States: Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri. Western States: Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Nevada, Utah, Colorado, Kansas, Arizona, New Mexico. Pacific States: Washington, Oregon, California.

[Y] Less than one-tenth of 1 per cent.

Less than 0.1%.

[Pg 299]

[Pg 299]

Summary of Manufactures in the U. S., by States and Territories, Census Years 1900 and 1905.

[From reports of the Bureau of the Census, Department of Commerce and Labor.]

[From reports of the Bureau of the Census, Department of Commerce and Labor.]

State or Territory. Census
year.
Number of
establish-
ments.
Capital. Wage-earners.
Average-
number.
Total wages.
Dollars. Dollars.
United States 1900 207,562 8,978,825,200 4,715,023 2,009,735,799
1905 216,262 12,686,265,673 5,470,321 2,611,540,532
Alabama 1900 2,000 60,165,904 52,711 14,911,683
1905 1,882 105,382,859 62,173 21,878,451
Alaska 1900 48 3,568,704 2,260 1,374,680
1905 82 10,684,799 1,938 1,095,579
Arizona 1900 154 9,517,578 3,126 2,287,352
1905 169 14,395,654 4,793 3,969,248
Arkansas 1900 1,746 25,384,636 31,525 10,184,154
1905 1,907 46,306,116 33,089 14,543,635
California 1900 4,997 175,467,806 77,224 39,889,997
1905 6,839 282,647,201 100,355 64,656,686
Colorado 1900 1,323 58,172,865 19,498 11,707,566
1905 1,606 107,663,500 21,813 15,100,365
Connecticut 1900 3,382 299,206,925 159,733 73,394,062
1905 3,477 373,283,580 181,605 87,942,628
Delaware 1900 633 38,791,402 20,562 8,457,003
1905 631 50,925,630 18,475 8,158,203
Dist. of Columbia 1900 491 17,960,498 6,155 3,022,906
1905 482 20,199,783 6,299 3,658,370
Florida 1900 1,275 25,682,171 35,471 10,916,443
1905 1,413 32,971,982 42,091 15,767,182
Georgia 1900 3,015 79,303,316 83,336 19,958,153
1905 3,219 135,211,551 92,749 27,392,442
Idaho 1900 287 2,130,112 1,552 818,239
1905 364 9,689,445 3,061 2,059,391
Illinois 1900 14,374 732,829,771 332,871 159,104,179
1905 14,921 975,844,799 379,436 208,405,468
Indian Territory 1900 179 1,591,953 1,087 379,188
1905 466 5,016,654 2,257 1,144,078
Indiana 1900 7,128 219,321,080 139,017 59,280,131
1905 7,044 312,071,234 154,174 72,058,099
Iowa 1900 4,828 85,667,334 44,420 18,020,653
1905 4,785 111,427,429 49,481 22,997,053
Kansas 1900 2,299 59,458,256 27,119 12,802,096
1905 2,475 88,680,117 35,570 18,883,071
Kentucky 1900 3,648 87,995,822 51,735 18,454,252
1905 3,734 147,282,478 59,794 24,438,684
Louisiana 1900 1,826 100,874,729 40,878 14,725,437
1905 2,091 150,810,608 55,859 25,315,750
Maine 1900 2,878 114,007,715 69,914 25,730,735
1905 3,145 143,707,750 74,958 32,691,759
Maryland 1900 3,886 149,155,313 94,170 32,414,429
1905 3,852 201,877,966 94,174 36,144,244
Massachusetts 1900 10,929 781,867,715 438,234 195,278,276
1905 10,723 965,948,887 488,399 232,388,946
Michigan 1900 7,310 246,996,529 155,800 62,531,812
1905 7,446 337,894,102 175,229 81,278,837
Minnesota 1900 4,096 133,076,669 64,557 29,029,190
1905 4,756 184,903,271 69,636 35,843,145
Mississippi 1900 1,294 22,712,186 26,799 7,909,607
1905 1,520 50,256,309 38,690 14,819,034
Missouri 1900 6,853 223,781,088 107,704 46,713,734
1905 6,464 379,368,827 133,167 66,644,126
Montana 1900 395 38,224,915 9,854 7,376,822
1905 382 52,589,810 8,957 8,652,217
Nebraska 1900 1,695 65,906,052 18,669 8,842,429
1905 1,819 80,235,310 20,260 11,022,149
Nevada 1900 99 1,251,208 504 352,606
1905 115 2,891,997 802 693,407
New Hampshire 1900 1,771 92,146,025 67,646 25,849,631
1905 1,618 109,495,072 65,366 27,693,203
New Jersey 1900 6,415 477,301,565 213,975 95,164,913
1905 7,010 715,060,174 266,336 128,168,801
New Mexico 1900 174 2,160,718 2,490 1,199,496
1905 199 4,638,248 3,478 2,153,068
New York 1900 35,957 1,523,502,651 726,909 337,323,585
1905 37,194 2,031,459,515 856,947 430,014,851
North Carolina 1900 3,465 68,283,005 72,322 14,051,784
1905 3,272 141,000,639 85,339 21,375,294
North Dakota 1900 337 3,511,968 1,358 671,321
1905 507 5,703,837 1,755 1,031,307
Ohio 1900 13,868 570,908,968 308,109 136,427,579
1905 13,785 856,988,830 364,298 182,429,425
Oklahoma 1900 316 2,462,438 1,294 514,879
1905 657 11,107,763 3,199 1,655,324
Oregon 1900 1,406 28,359,089 14,459 6,822,011
1905 1,602 44,023,548 18,523 11,443,512
Pennsylvania 1900 23,462 1,449,814,740 663,960 296,875,548
1905 23,495 1,995,836,988 763,282 367,960,890
Rhode Island 1900 1,678 176,901,606 88,197 35,995,101
1905 1,617 215,901,375 97,318 43,112,637
South Carolina 1900 1,369 62,750,027 47,025 9,130,269
1905 1,399 113,422,224 59,441 13,868,950
South Dakota 1900 624 6,051,288 2,224 1,129,787
1905 686 7,585,142 2,492 1,421,680
Tennessee 1900 3,116 63,140,657 45,963 14,727,506
1905 3,175 102,439,481 60,572 22,805,628
Texas 1900 3,107 63,655,616 38,604 16,911,681
1905 3,158 115,664,871 49,066 24,468,942
Utah 1900 575 13,219,039 5,413 2,762,522
1905 606 26,004,011 8,052 5,157,400
Vermont 1900 1,938 43,499,633 28,179 11,426,548
1905 1,699 62,658,741 33,106 15,221,059
Virginia 1900 3,186 92,299,589 66,223 20,273,889
1905 3,187 147,989,182 80,285 27,943,058
Washington 1900 1,926 41,574,744 31,523 17,065,140
1905 2,751 96,952,621 45,199 30,087,287
West Virginia 1900 1,824 49,103,138 33,080 12,639,856
1905 2,109 86,820,823 43,758 21,153,042
Wisconsin 1900 7,841 286,060,566 137,525 55,695,816
1905 8,558 412,647,051 151,391 71,471,805
Wyoming 1900 139 2,047,883 2,060 1,209,123
1905 169 2,695,889 1,834 1,261,122
State or Territory. Census
year.
Cost of
materials used.
Value of products,
including custom
work and
repairing.
Dollars. Dollars.
United States 1900 6,577,614,074 11,411,121,122
1905 8,503,949,756 14,802,147,087
Alabama 1900 37,998,233 72,109,929
1905 60,458,368 109,169,922
Alaska 1900 1,762,583 4,194,421
1905 3,741,946 8,244,524
Arizona 1900 7,876,542 20,438,987
1905 14,595,057 28,083,192
Arkansas 1900 18,288,045 39,887,578
1905 21,799,346 53,864,394
California 1900 164,894,269 257,385,521
1905 215,726,414 367,218,494
Colorado 1900 60,750,784 89,067,879
1905 63,114,397 100,143,999
Connecticut 1900 169,671,648 315,106,150
1905 191,801,881 369,082,091
Delaware 1900 24,725,317 41,321,061
1905 24,883,806 41,160,276
Dist. of Columbia 1900 7,475,216 16,426,408
1905 7,731,971 18,359,159
Florida 1900 12,847,187 34,183,509
1905 16,532,439 50,298,290
Georgia 1900 49,356,296 94,532,368
1905 83,624,504 151,040,455
Idaho 1900 1,438,868 3,001,442
1905 4,068,523 8,768,743
Illinois 1900 681,450,122 1,120,868,308
1905 840,057,316 1,410,342,129
Indian Territory 1900 1,697,829 2,629,067
1905 4,848,646 7,909,451
Indiana 1900 195,162,566 337,071,630
1905 220,507,007 393,954,405
Iowa 1900 85,778,867 132,870,865
1905 102,843,892 160,572,313
Kansas 1900 120,737,677 154,008,544
1905 156,509,949 198,244,992
Kentucky 1900 67,406,202 126,508,660
1905 86,545,464 159,753,968
Louisiana 1900 75,403,937 111,397,919
1905 117,035,305 186,379,592
Maine 1900 61,210,327 112,959,098
1905 80,042,090 144,020,197
Maryland 1900 129,354,412 211,076,143
1905 150,024,066 243,375,996
Massachusetts 1900 498,655,033 907,626,439
1905 626,410,431 1,124,092,051
Michigan 1900 175,966,128 319,691,856
1905 230,080,931 429,120,060
Minnesota 1900 150,299,277 223,692,922
1905 210,553,949 307,858,073
Mississippi 1900 16,543,029 33,718,517
1905 25,800,885 57,451,445
Missouri 1900 184,189,030 316,304,095
1905 252,258,417 439,548,957
Montana 1900 30,068,101 52,744,997
1905 40,930,060 66,415,452
Nebraska 1900 95,925,178 130,302,453
1905 124,051,628 154,918,220
Nevada 1900 662,284 1,261,005
1905 1,627,776 3,096,274
New Hampshire 1900 60,163,380 107,590,803
1905 73,216,387 123,610,904
New Jersey 1900 334,726,094 553,005,684
1905 470,449,176 774,369,025
New Mexico 1900 1,998,593 4,060,924
1905 2,235,934 5,705,880
New York 1900 1,018,377,186 1,871,830,872
1905 1,348,603,286 2,488,345,579
North Carolina 1900 44,854,224 85,274,083
1905 79,268,004 142,520,776
North Dakota 1900 4,150,860 6,259,840
1905 7,095,986 10,217,914
Ohio 1900 409,302,501 748,670,855
1905 527,636,585 960,811,857
Oklahoma 1900 3,732,618 5,504,869
1905 11,545,306 16,549,656
Oregon 1900 20,788,833 36,592,714
1905 30,596,763 55,525,123
Pennsylvania 1900 958,301,272 1,649,882,380
1905 1,142,942,707 1,955,551,332
Rhode Island 1900 87,951,780 165,550,382
1905 112,872,261 202,109,583
South Carolina 1900 30,485,861 53,335,811
1905 49,968,626 79,376,262
South Dakota 1900 6,483,677 9,529,946
1905 8,696,831 13,085,333
Tennessee 1900 54,559,039 92,749,129
1905 79,351,746 137,960,476
Texas 1900 54,388,303 92,894,433
1905 91,603,630 150,528,389
Utah 1900 11,440,250 17,981,648
1905 24,939,827 38,926,464
Vermont 1900 26,384,812 51,515,228
1905 32,429,852 63,083,611
Virginia 1900 59,359,484 108,644,150
1905 83,649,149 148,856,525
Washington 1900 38,276,944 70,831,345
1905 66,166,165 128,821,667
West Virginia 1900 37,228,253 67,006,822
1905 54,419,206 99,040,676
Wisconsin 1900 185,695,393 326,752,878
1905 227,255,092 411,139,681
Wyoming 1900 1,369,730 3,268,555
1905 1,300,773 3,523,260
State or Territory. Census year. Number of
establish-
ments.
Capital.
Dollars.
United States 1900
207,562
8,978,825,200
1905
216,262
12,686,265,673
Alabama 1900
2,000
60,165,904
1905
1,882
105,382,859
Alaska 1900
48
3,568,704
1905
82
10,684,799
Arizona 1900
154
9,517,578
1905
169
14,395,654
Arkansas 1900
1,746
25,384,636
1905
1,907
46,306,116
California 1900
4,997
175,467,806
1905
6,839
282,647,201
Colorado 1900
1,323
58,172,865
1905
1,606
107,663,500
Connecticut 1900
3,382
299,206,925
1905
3,477
373,283,580
Delaware 1900
633
38,791,402
1905
631
50,925,630
Dist. of Columbia 1900
491
17,960,498
1905
482
20,199,783
Florida 1900
1,275
25,682,171
1905
1,413
32,971,982
Georgia 1900
3,015
79,303,316
1905
3,219
135,211,551
Idaho 1900
287
2,130,112
1905
364
9,689,445
Illinois 1900
14,374
732,829,771
1905
14,921
975,844,799
Indian Territory 1900
179
1,591,953
1905
466
5,016,654
Indiana 1900
7,128
219,321,080
1905
7,044
312,071,234
Iowa 1900
4,828
85,667,334
1905
4,785
111,427,429
Kansas 1900
2,299
59,458,256
1905
2,475
88,680,117
Kentucky 1900
3,648
87,995,822
1905
3,734
147,282,478
Louisiana 1900
1,826
100,874,729
1905
2,091
150,810,608
Maine 1900
2,878
114,007,715
1905
3,145
143,707,750
Maryland 1900
3,886
149,155,313
1905
3,852
201,877,966
Massachusetts 1900
10,929
781,867,715
1905
10,723
965,948,887
Michigan 1900
7,310
246,996,529
1905
7,446
337,894,102
Minnesota 1900
4,096
133,076,669
1905
4,756
184,903,271
Mississippi 1900
1,294
22,712,186
1905
1,520
50,256,309
Missouri 1900
6,853
223,781,088
1905
6,464
379,368,827
Montana 1900
395
38,224,915
1905
382
52,589,810
Nebraska 1900
1,695
65,906,052
1905
1,819
80,235,310
Nevada 1900
99
1,251,208
1905
115
2,891,997
New Hampshire 1900
1,771
92,146,025
1905
1,618
109,495,072
New Jersey 1900
6,415
477,301,565
1905
7,010
715,060,174
New Mexico 1900
174
2,160,718
1905
199
4,638,248
New York 1900
35,957
1,523,502,651
1905
37,194
2,031,459,515
North Carolina 1900
3,465
68,283,005
1905
3,272
141,000,639
North Dakota 1900
337
3,511,968
1905
507
5,703,837
Ohio 1900
13,868
570,908,968
1905
13,785
856,988,830
Oklahoma 1900
316
2,462,438
1905
657
11,107,763
Oregon 1900
1,406
28,359,089
1905
1,602
44,023,548
Pennsylvania 1900
23,462
1,449,814,740
1905
23,495
1,995,836,988
Rhode Island 1900
1,678
176,901,606
1905
1,617
215,901,375
South Carolina 1900
1,369
62,750,027
1905
1,399
113,422,224
South Dakota 1900
624
6,051,288
1905
686
7,585,142
Tennessee 1900
3,116
63,140,657
1905
3,175
102,439,481
Texas 1900
3,107
63,655,616
1905
3,158
115,664,871
Utah 1900
575
13,219,039
1905
606
26,004,011
Vermont 1900
1,938
43,499,633
1905
1,699
62,658,741
Virginia 1900
3,186
92,299,589
1905
3,187
147,989,182
Washington 1900
1,926
41,574,744
1905
2,751
96,952,621
West Virginia 1900
1,824
49,103,138
1905
2,109
86,820,823
Wisconsin 1900
7,841
286,060,566
1905
8,558
412,647,051
Wyoming 1900
139
2,047,883
1905
169
2,695,889
State or Territory. Census year. Wage-earners.
Average number. Total wages.
Dollars.
United States 1900
4,715,023
2,009,735,799
1905
5,470,321
2,611,540,532
Alabama 1900
52,711
14,911,683
1905
62,173
21,878,451
Alaska 1900
2,260
1,374,680
1905
1,938
1,095,579
Arizona 1900
3,126
2,287,352
1905
4,793
3,969,248
Arkansas 1900
31,525
10,184,154
1905
33,089
14,543,635
California 1900
77,224
39,889,997
1905
100,355
64,656,686
Colorado 1900
19,498
11,707,566
1905
21,813
15,100,365
Connecticut 1900
159,733
73,394,062
1905
181,605
87,942,628
Delaware 1900
20,562
8,457,003
1905
18,475
8,158,203
Dist. of Columbia 1900
6,155
3,022,906
1905
6,299
3,658,370
Florida 1900
35,471
10,916,443
1905
42,091
15,767,182
Georgia 1900
83,336
19,958,153
1905
92,749
27,392,442
Idaho 1900
1,552
818,239
1905
3,061
2,059,391
Illinois 1900
332,871
159,104,179
1905
379,436
208,405,468
Indian Territory 1900
1,087
379,188
1905
2,257
1,144,078
Indiana 1900
139,017
59,280,131
1905
154,174
72,058,099
Iowa 1900
44,420
18,020,653
1905
49,481
22,997,053
Kansas 1900
27,119
12,802,096
1905
35,570
18,883,071
Kentucky 1900
51,735
18,454,252
1905
59,794
24,438,684
Louisiana 1900
40,878
14,725,437
1905
55,859
25,315,750
Maine 1900
69,914
25,730,735
1905
74,958
32,691,759
Maryland 1900
94,170
32,414,429
1905
94,174
36,144,244
Massachusetts 1900
438,234
195,278,276
1905
488,399
232,388,946
Michigan 1900
155,800
62,531,812
1905
175,229
81,278,837
Minnesota 1900
64,557
29,029,190
1905
69,636
35,843,145
Mississippi 1900
26,799
7,909,607
1905
38,690
14,819,034
Missouri 1900
107,704
46,713,734
1905
133,167
66,644,126
Montana 1900
9,854
7,376,822
1905
8,957
8,652,217
Nebraska 1900
18,669
8,842,429
1905
20,260
11,022,149
Nevada 1900
504
352,606
1905
802
693,407
New Hampshire 1900
67,646
25,849,631
1905
65,366
27,693,203
New Jersey 1900
213,975
95,164,913
1905
266,336
128,168,801
New Mexico 1900
2,490
1,199,496
1905
3,478
2,153,068
New York 1900
726,909
337,323,585
1905
856,947
430,014,851
North Carolina 1900
72,322
14,051,784
1905
85,339
21,375,294
North Dakota 1900
1,358
671,321
1905
1,755
1,031,307
Ohio 1900
308,109
136,427,579
1905
364,298
182,429,425
Oklahoma 1900
1,294
514,879
1905
3,199
1,655,324
Oregon 1900
14,459
6,822,011
1905
18,523
11,443,512
Pennsylvania 1900
663,960
296,875,548
1905
763,282
367,960,890
Rhode Island 1900
88,197
35,995,101
1905
97,318
43,112,637
South Carolina 1900
47,025
9,130,269
1905
59,441
13,868,950
South Dakota 1900
2,224
1,129,787
1905
2,492
1,421,680
Tennessee 1900
45,963
14,727,506
1905
60,572
22,805,628
Texas 1900
38,604
16,911,681
1905
49,066
24,468,942
Utah 1900
5,413
2,762,522
1905
8,052
5,157,400
Vermont 1900
28,179
11,426,548
1905
33,106
15,221,059
Virginia 1900
66,223
20,273,889
1905
80,285
27,943,058
Washington 1900
31,523
17,065,140
1905
45,199
30,087,287
West Virginia 1900
33,080
12,639,856
1905
43,758
21,153,042
Wisconsin 1900
137,525
55,695,816
1905
151,391
71,471,805
Wyoming 1900
2,060
1,209,123
1905
1,834
1,261,122
State or Territory. Census year. Cost of
materials used.
Dollars.
United States 1900
6,577,614,074
1905
8,503,949,756
Alabama 1900
37,998,233
1905
60,458,368
Alaska 1900
1,762,583
1905
3,741,946
Arizona 1900
7,876,542
1905
14,595,057
Arkansas 1900
18,288,045
1905
21,799,346
California 1900
164,894,269
1905
215,726,414
Colorado 1900
60,750,784
1905
63,114,397
Connecticut 1900
169,671,648
1905
191,801,881
Delaware 1900
24,725,317
1905
24,883,806
Dist. of Columbia 1900
7,475,216
1905
7,731,971
Florida 1900
12,847,187
1905
16,532,439
Georgia 1900
49,356,296
1905
83,624,504
Idaho 1900
1,438,868
1905
4,068,523
Illinois 1900
681,450,122
1905
840,057,316
Indian Territory 1900
1,697,829
1905
4,848,646
Indiana 1900
195,162,566
1905
220,507,007
Iowa 1900
85,778,867
1905
102,843,892
Kansas 1900
120,737,677
1905
156,509,949
Kentucky 1900
67,406,202
1905
86,545,464
Louisiana 1900
75,403,937
1905
117,035,305
Maine 1900
61,210,327
1905
80,042,090
Maryland 1900
129,354,412
1905
150,024,066
Massachusetts 1900
498,655,033
1905
626,410,431
Michigan 1900
175,966,128
1905
230,080,931
Minnesota 1900
150,299,277
1905
210,553,949
Mississippi 1900
16,543,029
1905
25,800,885
Missouri 1900
184,189,030
1905
252,258,417
Montana 1900
30,068,101
1905
40,930,060
Nebraska 1900
95,925,178
1905
124,051,628
Nevada 1900
662,284
1905
1,627,776
New Hampshire 1900
60,163,380
1905
73,216,387
New Jersey 1900
334,726,094
1905
470,449,176
New Mexico 1900
1,998,593
1905
2,235,934
New York 1900
1,018,377,186
1905
1,348,603,286
North Carolina 1900
44,854,224
1905
79,268,004
North Dakota 1900
4,150,860
1905
7,095,986
Ohio 1900
409,302,501
1905
527,636,585
Oklahoma 1900
3,732,618
1905
11,545,306
Oregon 1900
20,788,833
1905
30,596,763
Pennsylvania 1900
958,301,272
1905
1,142,942,707
Rhode Island 1900
87,951,780
1905
112,872,261
South Carolina 1900
30,485,861
1905
49,968,626
South Dakota 1900
6,483,677
1905
8,696,831
Tennessee 1900
54,559,039
1905
79,351,746
Texas 1900
54,388,303
1905
91,603,630
Utah 1900
11,440,250
1905
24,939,827
Vermont 1900
26,384,812
1905
32,429,852
Virginia 1900
59,359,484
1905
83,649,149
Washington 1900
38,276,944
1905
66,166,165
West Virginia 1900
37,228,253
1905
54,419,206
Wisconsin 1900
185,695,393
1905
227,255,092
Wyoming 1900
1,369,730
1905
1,300,773
State or Territory. Census year. Value of products,
including custom
work and
repairing.
Dollars.
United States 1900
11,411,121,122
1905
14,802,147,087
Alabama 1900
72,109,929
1905
109,169,922
Alaska 1900
4,194,421
1905
8,244,524
Arizona 1900
20,438,987
1905
28,083,192
Arkansas 1900
39,887,578
1905
53,864,394
California 1900
257,385,521
1905
367,218,494
Colorado 1900
89,067,879
1905
100,143,999
Connecticut 1900
315,106,150
1905
369,082,091
Delaware 1900
41,321,061
1905
41,160,276
Dist. of Columbia 1900
16,426,408
1905
18,359,159
Florida 1900
34,183,509
1905
50,298,290
Georgia 1900
94,532,368
1905
151,040,455
Idaho 1900
3,001,442
1905
8,768,743
Illinois 1900
1,120,868,308
1905
1,410,342,129
Indian Territory 1900
2,629,067
1905
7,909,451
Indiana 1900
337,071,630
1905
393,954,405
Iowa 1900
132,870,865
1905
160,572,313
Kansas 1900
154,008,544
1905
198,244,992
Kentucky 1900
126,508,660
1905
159,753,968
Louisiana 1900
111,397,919
1905
186,379,592
Maine 1900
112,959,098
1905
144,020,197
Maryland 1900
211,076,143
1905
243,375,996
Massachusetts 1900
907,626,439
1905
1,124,092,051
Michigan 1900
319,691,856
1905
429,120,060
Minnesota 1900
223,692,922
1905
307,858,073
Mississippi 1900
33,718,517
1905
57,451,445
Missouri 1900
316,304,095
1905
439,548,957
Montana 1900
52,744,997
1905
66,415,452
Nebraska 1900
130,302,453
1905
154,918,220
Nevada 1900
1,261,005
1905
3,096,274
New Hampshire 1900
107,590,803
1905
123,610,904
New Jersey 1900
553,005,684
1905
774,369,025
New Mexico 1900
4,060,924
1905
5,705,880
New York 1900
1,871,830,872
1905
2,488,345,579
North Carolina 1900
85,274,083
1905
142,520,776
North Dakota 1900
6,259,840
1905
10,217,914
Ohio 1900
748,670,855
1905
960,811,857
Oklahoma 1900
5,504,869
1905
16,549,656
Oregon 1900
36,592,714
1905
55,525,123
Pennsylvania 1900
1,649,882,380
1905
1,955,551,332
Rhode Island 1900
165,550,382
1905
202,109,583
South Carolina 1900
53,335,811
1905
79,376,262
South Dakota 1900
9,529,946
1905
13,085,333
Tennessee 1900
92,749,129
1905
137,960,476
Texas 1900
92,894,433
1905
150,528,389
Utah 1900
17,981,648
1905
38,926,464
Vermont 1900
51,515,228
1905
63,083,611
Virginia 1900
108,644,150
1905
148,856,525
Washington 1900
70,831,345
1905
128,821,667
West Virginia 1900
67,006,822
1905
99,040,676
Wisconsin 1900
326,752,878
1905
411,139,681
Wyoming 1900
3,268,555
1905
3,523,260

[Pg 301]

[Pg 301]

Chief Manufacturing Industries of the United States, Showing Sums Paid in Wages, Number of Employes, Capital Invested and Value of Product, 1880 to 1905.

[From reports of the Bureau of the Census, Department of Commerce and Labor.]

[From reports of the Census Bureau, Department of Commerce and Labor.]

Industry. Census year. Number of estab-
lish-
ments.
Capital. Wage-earners. Value of
products,
including
custom
work and
repairing.
Average
number
Total wages.
Dollars. Dollars. Dollars.
Agricultural 1880 1,943 62,109,668 39,580 15,359,610 68,640,486
 implements 1890 910 145,313,997 38,827 18,107,094 81,271,651
1900 715 157,707,951 46,582 22,450,880 101,207,428
1905 648 196,740,700 47,394 25,002,650 112,007,344
Boots and shoes 1880 1,959 42,994,028 111,152 43,001,438 166,050,354
1890 2,082 95,282,311 133,690 60,667,145 220,649,358
1900 1,599 99,819,233 141,830 58,440,883 258,969,580
1905 1,316 122,526,093 149,924 69,059,680 320,107,458
Bread and other 1880 6,396 19,155,286 22,488 9,411,328 65,824,806
 bakery products 1890 10,484 45,758,489 38,841 19,120,529 128,421,535
1900 14,836 80,901,926 60,192 27,864,024 175,368,682
1905 18,227 122,363,327 81,284 43,179,822 269,609,061
Carriages and 1880 3,841 37,973,493 45,394 18,988,615 64,951,617
 wagons 1890 4,572 93,455,257 56,525 28,972,401 102,680,341
1900 6,204 109,875,885 58,425 27,578,046 113,234,590
1905 4,956 126,320,604 60,722 30,878,229 125,332,976
Cars, shop construction 1890 716 76,192,477 106,632 60,213,433 129,461,698
 and repairs by 1900 1,293 119,580,273 173,652 96,062,329 218,238,277
 steam railroad companies 1905 1,141 146,943,729 236,900 142,188,336 309,863,499
Cars, shop construction 1890 78 2,351,162 2,009 1,411,205 2,966,347
 and repairs by steam 1900 108 10,781,939 7,025 4,404,593 9,370,811
 street railway companies 1905 86 12,905,853 11,052 7,012,798 13,437,121
Cars, steam and 1880 130 9,272,680 14,232 6,507,753 27,997,591
 street railroad, not 1890 88 46,109,625 33,139 17,168,099 73,385,852
 including operations 1900 85 95,939,249 37,038 18,938,170 97,815,648
 of railway companies 1905 87 101,154,750 38,788 23,087,400 122,019,506
Cheese, butter and 1880 3,932 9,604,803 7,903 1,548,495 25,742,510
 condensed milk 1890 4,552 16,016,573 12,219 4,248,854 60,635,705
1900 9,242 36,303,164 12,799 6,145,561 130,783,349
1905 8,926 47,255,556 15,557 8,412,937 168,182,789
Chemicals 1880 595 28,983,458 9,724 4,222,663 38,640,458
1890 563 55,032,452 15,038 7,308,411 59,352,548
1900 433 89,069,450 19,020 9,393,236 62,637,008
1905 448 119,890,193 24,525 13,361,972 92,088,378
Clothing, men’s 1880 6,166 79,861,696 160,813 45,940,353 209,548,460
1890 4,867 128,253,547 144,926 51,075,837 251,019,609
1900 5,729 120,547,851 120,927 45,496,728 276,717,357
1905 4,504 153,177,500 137,190 57,225,506 355,796,571
Clothing, women’s 1880 562 8,207,273 25,192 6,661,005 32,004,794
1890 1,224 21,259,528 39,149 15,428,272 68,164,019
1900 2,701 48,431,544 83,739 32,586,101 159,339,539
1905 3,351 73,947,823 115,705 51,180,193 247,661,560
Confectionery 1880 1,450 8,486,874 9,801 3,242,852 25,637,033
1890 2,921 23,326,799 21,724 7,783,007 55,997,101
1900 962 26,319,195 26,866 8,020,453 60,643,946
1905 1,348 43,125,408 36,239 11,699,257 87,087,253
Cooperage 1880 3,898 12,178,726 25,973 8,992,603 33,714,770
1890 2,652 17,806,554 22,555 10,056,249 38,617,956
1900 1,694 21,777,636 22,117 8,786,428 38,439,745
1905 1,517 29,532,614 21,149 9,485,455 49,424,394
Cordage and twine 1880 165 7,140,475 5,435 1,558,676 12,492,171
1890 150 23,351,883 12,385 3,976,232 38,812,559
1900 105 29,275,470 13,114 4,113,112 37,849,651
1905 102 37,110,521 14,614 5,338,178 48,017,139
Cotton goods 1880 1,005 219,504,794 185,472 45,614,419 210,950,383
1890 905 354,020,843 218,876 66,024,538 267,981,724
1900 1,055 467,240,157 302,861 86,689,752 339,200,820
1905 1,154 613,110,655 315,874 96,205,796 450,467,704
Electrical 1880 76 1,509,758 1,271 683,164 2,655,036
 machinery, 1890 189 18,997,337 8,802 4,517,050 19,114,714
 apparatus 1900 581 83,659,924 42,013 20,579,194 92,434,435
 and supplies 1905 784 174,066,026 60,466 31,841,521 140,809,369
Flour and gristmill 1880 24,338 177,361,878 58,407 17,422,316 505,185,712
 products 1890 18,470 208,473,500 47,403 18,138,402 513,971,474
1900 9,476 189,281,330 32,226 16,285,163 501,896,304
1905 10,051 265,117,434 39,110 19,822,196 713,033,395
Foundry and 1880 4,984 155,021,734 145,650 66,093,920 215,442,011
 machine shop 1890 6,500 383,257,473 231,331 129,282,263 413,197,118
 products 1900 9,316 663,414,323 350,103 182,096,007 644,456,216
1905 9,428 936,416,978 402,914 229,869,297 799,862,588
Furnishing goods, 1880 161 3,724,664 11,174 2,644,155 11,506,357
 men’s 1890 586 12,299,011 20,773 6,078,036 29,870,946
1900 457 20,575,961 30,322 9,730,066 44,346,482
1905 547 28,043,584 27,185 8,760,108 49,031,582 [Pg 302]
Furniture 1880 5,227 44,946,128 59,304 23,695,080 77,845,725
1890 1,919 80,780,939 72,869 35,068,979 111,743,080
1900 1,814 104,484,394 87,262 35,632,523 125,315,986
1905 2,482 152,712,732 110,133 49,883,235 170,446,825
Glass 1880 169 18,804,599 24,177 9,144,100 21,154,571
1890 294 40,966,850 44,892 20,885,961 41,051,004
1900 355 61,423,903 52,818 27,084,710 56,539,712
1905 399 89,389,151 63,969 37,288,148 79,607,998
Hardware 1880 492 15,363,551 16,801 6,846,913 22,653,693
1890 350 26,271,840 18,495 8,656,067 26,726,463
1900 381 39,311,745 26,463 11,422,758 35,846,656
1905 445 52,884,078 31,713 14,580,589 45,770,171
Jewelry 1880 739 11,431,164 12,697 6,441,688 22,201,621
1890 783 22,246,508 13,880 8,038,327 34,761,458
1900 851 27,871,924 20,468 10,643,887 46,128,659
1905 1,023 39,678,956 22,080 12,592,846 53,225,681
Leather, tanned, 1880 5,628 73,383,911 40,282 16,503,828 200,264,944
 curried, 1890 1,787 98,088,698 42,392 21,249,989 172,136,092
 and finished 1900 1,306 173,977,421 52,109 22,591,091 204,038,127
1905 1,049 242,584,254 57,239 27,049,152 252,620,986
Liquors, malt 1880 2,191 91,208,224 26,220 12,198,053 101,058,385
1890 1,248 232,471,290 30,257 20,713,383 182,731,622
1900 1,507 413,767,233 39,459 25,776,468 236,914,914
1905 1,531 515,636,792 48,139 34,542,897 298,358,732
Lumber and 1880 25,758 181,465,392 148,290 31,893,098 233,608,886
 timber products 1890 22,617 557,881,054 311,964 87,934,284 437,957,382
1900 23,053 400,857,337 413,335 148,007,845 555,197,271
1905 19,127 517,224,128 404,626 183,021,519 580,022,690
Lumber, planing- 1880 2,491 38,070,593 37,187 14,431,654 73,424,681
 mill products, 1890 3,670 120,271,440 79,923 42,221,856 183,681,552
 including sash, doors, 1900 4,198 118,948,556 73,510 32,621,704 167,786,122
 and blinds 1905 5,009 177,145,734 97,674 50,713,607 247,441,956
Marble and 1880 2,846 16,498,221 21,471 10,238,885 31,415,150
 stone work 1890 1,321 24,041,961 21,950 15,314,598 41,924,264
1900 1,655 39,559,146 30,641 16,328,174 42,230,457
1905 1,642 66,526,724 40,905 25,032,725 63,059,842
Paper and wood 1880 742 48,139,652 25,631 8,970,133 57,366,860
 pulp 1890 649 89,829,548 31,050 13,204,828 78,937,184
1900 763 167,507,713 49,646 20,746,426 127,326,162
1905 761 277,444,471 65,964 32,019,212 188,715,189
Petroleum, refining 1890 94 77,416,296 11,403 5,872,467 85,001,198
1900 67 95,327,892 12,199 6,717,087 123,929,384
1905 98 136,280,541 16,770 9,989,367 175,005,320
Silk and silk goods 1880 382 19,125,300 31,337 9,146,705 41,033,045
1890 472 51,007,537 49,382 17,762,441 87,298,454
1900 483 81,082,201 65,416 20,982,194 107,256,258
1905 624 109,556,621 79,601 26,767,943 133,288,072
Slaughtering and 1880 872 49,419,213 27,297 10,508,530 303,562,413
 meat packing, 1890 611 98,190,766 37,502 20,304,029 433,252,315
 wholesale 1900 557 173,866,377 64,681 31,033,850 697,056,065
1905 559 219,818,627 69,593 37,090,399 801,757,137
Slaughtering, wholesale, 1890 507 18,696,738 6,473 4,000,947 128,359,353
 not including 1900 325 14,933,804 3,705 2,358,403 86,723,126
 meat packing 1905 370 17,896,063 4,541 3,236,573 112,157,487
Smelting and 1900 47 53,063,395 11,324 8,529,021 165,131,670
 refining, copper 1905 40 76,824,640 12,752 10,827,043 240,780,216
Smelting and 1900 39 72,148,933 8,319 5,088,684 175,466,304
 refining, lead 1905 32 63,822,810 7,573 5,374,691 185,826,839
Structural 1880 220 1,400,197 1,934 844,614 3,410,086
 ironwork 1890 724 21,968,172 17,158 10,235,701 37,745,294
1900 697 43,442,877 24,903 13,588,779 66,927,305
1905 775 76,598,507 34,276 19,760,210 90,944,697
Sugar and 1880 49 27,432,500 5,857 2,875,032 155,484,915
 molasses, 1890 393 24,013,008 7,043 2,385,654 123,118,259
 refining 1900 657 184,033,304 14,129 6,917,829 239,711,011
1905 344 165,468,320 13,549 7,575,650 277,285,449
Tinware, copper- 1880 7,693 23,167,392 27,116 11,243,276 50,183,811
 smithing, and 1890 7,002 38,434,900 31,377 15,610,265 66,653,746
 sheet iron 1900 1,846 35,724,739 28,315 13,193,307 63,812,787
 working 1905 2,366 124,500,133 39,475 20,608,179 97,974,838
Tobacco, chewing 1880 477 17,207,401 32,756 6,419,024 52,793,056
 and smoking, 1890 395 30,841,316 29,790 6,947,158 65,843,587
 and snuff 1900 437 43,856,570 29,161 7,109,821 103,754,362
1905 433 178,847,556 23,990 6,775,325 116,767,630
Tobacco, cigars 1880 7,145 21,698,549 63,297 18,464,562 63,979,575
 and cigarettes 1890 10,956 59,517,827 87,000 36,475,060 129,693,275
1900 14,522 67,660,748 103,365 40,865,510 159,958,811
1905 16,395 145,135,945 135,418 55,864,978 214,350,051
Woolen goods 1880 1,990 96,095,564 86,504 25,836,392 160,606,721
1890 1,811 130,989,940 76,915 26,139,194 133,577,977
1900 1,035 124,386,262 68,893 24,757,006 118,430,158
1905 792 140,302,488 72,747 28,827,556 142,196,658
Worsted goods 1880 76 20,374,043 18,803 5,683,027 33,549,942
1890 143 68,085,116 42,978 14,944,966 79,194,652
1900 186 132,168,110 57,008 20,092,738 120,314,344
1905 226 162,464,929 69,251 26,269,787 165,745,052
Industry. Census
year.
Number
of
establish-
ments.
Capital.
Dollars.
Agricultural implements 1880
1,943
62,109,668
1890
910
145,313,997
1900
715
157,707,951
1905
648
196,740,700
Boots and shoes 1880
1,959
42,994,028
1890
2,082
95,282,311
1900
1,599
99,819,233
1905
1,316
122,526,093
Bread and other bakery products 1880
6,396
19,155,286
1890
10,484
45,758,489
1900
14,836
80,901,926
1905
18,227
122,363,327
Carriages and wagons 1880
3,841
37,973,493
1890
4,572
93,455,257
1900
6,204
109,875,885
1905
4,956
126,320,604
Cars, shop construction and repairs 1890
716
76,192,477
 by steam railroad companies 1900
1,293
119,580,273
1905
1,141
146,943,729
Cars, shop construction and repairs 1890
78
2,351,162
 by street railway companies 1900
108
10,781,939
1905
86
12,905,853
Cars, steam and street railroad, not 1880
130
9,272,680
 including operations of railway 1890
88
46,109,625
 companies 1900
85
95,939,249
1905
87
101,154,750
Cheese, butter and condensed milk 1880
3,932
9,604,803
1890
4,552
16,016,573
1900
9,242
36,303,164
1905
8,926
47,255,556
Chemicals 1880
595
28,983,458
1890
563
55,032,452
1900
433
89,069,450
1905
448
119,890,193
Clothing, men’s 1880
6,166
79,861,696
1890
4,867
128,253,547
1900
5,729
120,547,851
1905
4,504
153,177,500
Clothing, women’s 1880
562
8,207,273
1890
1,224
21,259,528
1900
2,701
48,431,544
1905
3,351
73,947,823
Confectionery 1880
1,450
8,486,874
1890
2,921
23,326,799
1900
962
26,319,195
1905
1,348
43,125,408
Cooperage 1880
3,898
12,178,726
1890
2,652
17,806,554
1900
1,694
21,777,636
1905
1,517
29,532,614
Cordage and twine 1880
165
7,140,475
1890
150
23,351,883
1900
105
29,275,470
1905
102
37,110,521
Cotton goods 1880
1,005
219,504,794
1890
905
354,020,843
1900
1,055
467,240,157
1905
1,154
613,110,655
Electrical machinery, apparatus 1880
76
1,509,758
 and supplies 1890
189
18,997,337
1900
581
83,659,924
1905
784
174,066,026
Flour and gristmill products 1880
24,338
177,361,878
1890
18,470
208,473,500
1900
9,476
189,281,330
1905
10,051
265,117,434
Foundry and machine shop products 1880
4,984
155,021,734
1890
6,500
383,257,473
1900
9,316
663,414,323
1905
9,428
936,416,978
Furnishing goods, men’s 1880
161
3,724,664
1890
586
12,299,011
1900
457
20,575,961
1905
547
28,043,584
[Pg 302]
Furniture 1880
5,227
44,946,128
1890
1,919
80,780,939
1900
1,814
104,484,394
1905
2,482
152,712,732
Glass 1880
169
18,804,599
1890
294
40,966,850
1900
355
61,423,903
1905
399
89,389,151
Hardware 1880
492
15,363,551
1890
350
26,271,840
1900
381
39,311,745
1905
445
52,884,078
Jewelry 1880
739
11,431,164
1890
783
22,246,508
1900
851
27,871,924
1905
1,023
39,678,956
Leather, tanned, curried, 1880
5,628
73,383,911
 and finished 1890
1,787
98,088,698
1900
1,306
173,977,421
1905
1,049
242,584,254
Liquors, malt 1880
2,191
91,208,224
1890
1,248
232,471,290
1900
1,507
413,767,233
1905
1,531
515,636,792
Lumber and timber products 1880
25,758
181,465,392
1890
22,617
557,881,054
1900
23,053
400,857,337
1905
19,127
517,224,128
Lumber, planing-mill products, 1880
2,491
38,070,593
 including sash, doors, and blinds 1890
3,670
120,271,440
1900
4,198
118,948,556
1905
5,009
177,145,734
Marble and stone work 1880
2,846
16,498,221
1890
1,321
24,041,961
1900
1,655
39,559,146
1905
1,642
66,526,724
Paper and wood pulp 1880
742
48,139,652
1890
649
89,829,548
1900
763
167,507,713
1905
761
277,444,471
Petroleum, refining 1890
94
77,416,296
1900
67
95,327,892
1905
98
136,280,541
Silk and silk goods 1880
382
19,125,300
1890
472
51,007,537
1900
483
81,082,201
1905
624
109,556,621
Slaughtering and meat packing, 1880
872
49,419,213
 wholesale 1890
611
98,190,766
1900
557
173,866,377
1905
559
219,818,627
Slaughtering, wholesale, not 1890
507
18,696,738
 including meat packing 1900
325
14,933,804
1905
370
17,896,063
Smelting and refining, copper 1900
47
53,063,395
1905
40
76,824,640
Smelting and refining, lead 1900
39
72,148,933
1905
32
63,822,810
Structural ironwork 1880
220
1,400,197
1890
724
21,968,172
1900
697
43,442,877
1905
775
76,598,507
Sugar and molasses, refining 1880
49
27,432,500
1890
393
24,013,008
1900
657
184,033,304
1905
344
165,468,320
Tinware, copper-smithing, 1880
7,693
23,167,392
 and sheet iron working 1890
7,002
38,434,900
1900
1,846
35,724,739
1905
2,366
124,500,133
Tobacco, chewing and smoking, 1880
477
17,207,401
 and snuff 1890
395
30,841,316
1900
437
43,856,570
1905
433
178,847,556
Tobacco, cigars and cigarettes 1880
7,145
21,698,549
1890
10,956
59,517,827
1900
14,522
67,660,748
1905
16,395
145,135,945
Woolen goods 1880
1,990
96,095,564
1890
1,811
130,989,940
1900
1,035
124,386,262
1905
792
140,302,488
Worsted goods 1880
76
20,374,043
1890
143
68,085,116
1900
186
132,168,110
1905
226
162,464,929
Industry. Census
year.
Wage-earners.
Average
number.
Total
wages.
Dollars.
Agricultural implements 1880
39,580
15,359,610
1890
38,827
18,107,094
1900
46,582
22,450,880
1905
47,394
25,002,650
Boots and shoes 1880
111,152
43,001,438
1890
133,690
60,667,145
1900
141,830
58,440,883
1905
149,924
69,059,680
Bread and other 1880
22,488
9,411,328
 bakery products 1890
38,841
19,120,529
1900
60,192
27,864,024
1905
81,284
43,179,822
Carriages and wagons 1880
45,394
18,988,615
1890
56,525
28,972,401
1900
58,425
27,578,046
1905
60,722
30,878,229
Cars, shop construction 1890
106,632
60,213,433
 and repairs by steam 1900
173,652
96,062,329
 railroad companies 1905
236,900
142,188,336
Cars, shop construction 1890
2,009
1,411,205
 and repairs by street 1900
7,025
4,404,593
 railway companies 1905
11,052
7,012,798
Cars, steam and street 1880
14,232
6,507,753
 railroad, not including 1890
33,139
17,168,099
 operations of 1900
37,038
18,938,170
 railway companies 1905
38,788
23,087,400
Cheese, butter 1880
7,903
1,548,495
 and condensed milk 1890
12,219
4,248,854
1900
12,799
6,145,561
1905
15,557
8,412,937
Chemicals 1880
9,724
4,222,663
1890
15,038
7,308,411
1900
19,020
9,393,236
1905
24,525
13,361,972
Clothing, men’s 1880
160,813
45,940,353
1890
144,926
51,075,837
1900
120,927
45,496,728
1905
137,190
57,225,506
Clothing, women’s 1880
25,192
6,661,005
1890
39,149
15,428,272
1900
83,739
32,586,101
1905
115,705
51,180,193
Confectionery 1880
9,801
3,242,852
1890
21,724
7,783,007
1900
26,866
8,020,453
1905
36,239
11,699,257
Cooperage 1880
25,973
8,992,603
1890
22,555
10,056,249
1900
22,117
8,786,428
1905
21,149
9,485,455
Cordage and twine 1880
5,435
1,558,676
1890
12,385
3,976,232
1900
13,114
4,113,112
1905
14,614
5,338,178
Cotton goods 1880
185,472
45,614,419
1890
218,876
66,024,538
1900
302,861
86,689,752
1905
315,874
96,205,796
Electrical machinery, 1880
1,271
683,164
 apparatus and supplies 1890
8,802
4,517,050
1900
42,013
20,579,194
1905
60,466
31,841,521
Flour and gristmill 1880
58,407
17,422,316
 products 1890
47,403
18,138,402
1900
32,226
16,285,163
1905
39,110
19,822,196
Foundry and machine 1880
145,650
66,093,920
 shop products 1890
231,331
129,282,263
1900
350,103
182,096,007
1905
402,914
229,869,297
Furnishing goods, men’s 1880
11,174
2,644,155
1890
20,773
6,078,036
1900
30,322
9,730,066
1905
27,185
8,760,108
Furniture 1880
59,304
23,695,080
1890
72,869
35,068,979
1900
87,262
35,632,523
1905
110,133
49,883,235
Glass 1880
24,177
9,144,100
1890
44,892
20,885,961
1900
52,818
27,084,710
1905
63,969
37,288,148
Hardware 1880
16,801
6,846,913
1890
18,495
8,656,067
1900
26,463
11,422,758
1905
31,713
14,580,589
Jewelry 1880
12,697
6,441,688
1890
13,880
8,038,327
1900
20,468
10,643,887
1905
22,080
12,592,846
Leather, tanned, 1880
40,282
16,503,828
 curried, and finished 1890
42,392
21,249,989
1900
52,109
22,591,091
1905
57,239
27,049,152
Liquors, malt 1880
26,220
12,198,053
1890
30,257
20,713,383
1900
39,459
25,776,468
1905
48,139
34,542,897
Lumber and 1880
148,290
31,893,098
 timber products 1890
311,964
87,934,284
1900
413,335
148,007,845
1905
404,626
183,021,519
Lumber, planing- 1880
37,187
14,431,654
 mill products, 1890
79,923
42,221,856
 including sash, 1900
73,510
32,621,704
 doors, and blinds 1905
97,674
50,713,607
Marble and stone work 1880
21,471
10,238,885
1890
21,950
15,314,598
1900
30,641
16,328,174
1905
40,905
25,032,725
Paper and wood pulp 1880
25,631
8,970,133
1890
31,050
13,204,828
1900
49,646
20,746,426
1905
65,964
32,019,212
Petroleum, refining 1890
11,403
5,872,467
1900
12,199
6,717,087
1905
16,770
9,989,367
Silk and silk goods 1880
31,337
9,146,705
1890
49,382
17,762,441
1900
65,416
20,982,194
1905
79,601
26,767,943
Slaughtering and 1880
27,297
10,508,530
 meat packing, 1890
37,502
20,304,029
 wholesale 1900
64,681
31,033,850
1905
69,593
37,090,399
Slaughtering, wholesale, 1890
6,473
4,000,947
 not including 1900
3,705
2,358,403
 meat packing 1905
4,541
3,236,573
Smelting and 1900
11,324
8,529,021
 refining, copper 1905
12,752
10,827,043
Smelting and 1900
8,319
5,088,684
 refining, lead 1905
7,573
5,374,691
Structural ironwork 1880
1,934
844,614
1890
17,158
10,235,701
1900
24,903
13,588,779
1905
34,276
19,760,210
Sugar and molasses, 1880
5,857
2,875,032
 refining 1890
7,043
2,385,654
1900
14,129
6,917,829
1905
13,549
7,575,650
Tinware, 1880
27,116
11,243,276
 copper-smithing, 1890
31,377
15,610,265
 and sheet 1900
28,315
13,193,307
 iron working 1905
39,475
20,608,179
Tobacco, chewing 1880
32,756
6,419,024
 and smoking, 1890
29,790
6,947,158
 and snuff 1900
29,161
7,109,821
1905
23,990
6,775,325
Tobacco, cigars 1880
63,297
18,464,562
 and cigarettes 1890
87,000
36,475,060
1900
103,365
40,865,510
1905
135,418
55,864,978
Woolen goods 1880
86,504
25,836,392
1890
76,915
26,139,194
1900
68,893
24,757,006
1905
72,747
28,827,556
Worsted goods 1880
18,803
5,683,027
1890
42,978
14,944,966
1900
57,008
20,092,738
1905
69,251
26,269,787
Industry. Census
year.
Value of
products,
including
custom
work and
repairing.
Dollars.
Agricultural implements 1880
68,640,486
1890
81,271,651
1900
101,207,428
1905
112,007,344
Boots and shoes 1880
166,050,354
1890
220,649,358
1900
258,969,580
1905
320,107,458
Bread and other 1880
65,824,806
 bakery products 1890
128,421,535
1900
175,368,682
1905
269,609,061
Carriages and wagons 1880
64,951,617
1890
102,680,341
1900
113,234,590
1905
125,332,976
Cars, shop construction 1890
129,461,698
 and repairs by steam 1900
218,238,277
 railroad companies 1905
309,863,499
Cars, shop construction 1890
2,966,347
 and repairs by street 1900
9,370,811
 railway companies 1905
13,437,121
Cars, steam and street 1880
27,997,591
 railroad, not including 1890
73,385,852
 operations of 1900
97,815,648
 railway companies 1905
122,019,506
Cheese, butter 1880
25,742,510
 and condensed milk 1890
60,635,705
1900
130,783,349
1905
168,182,789
Chemicals 1880
38,640,458
1890
59,352,548
1900
62,637,008
1905
92,088,378
Clothing, men’s 1880
209,548,460
1890
251,019,609
1900
276,717,357
1905
355,796,571
Clothing, women’s 1880
32,004,794
1890
68,164,019
1900
159,339,539
1905
247,661,560
Confectionery 1880
25,637,033
1890
55,997,101
1900
60,643,946
1905
87,087,253
Cooperage 1880
33,714,770
1890
38,617,956
1900
38,439,745
1905
49,424,394
Cordage and twine 1880
12,492,171
1890
38,812,559
1900
37,849,651
1905
48,017,139
Cotton goods 1880
210,950,383
1890
267,981,724
1900
339,200,820
1905
450,467,704
Electrical machinery, 1880
2,655,036
 apparatus and supplies 1890
19,114,714
1900
92,434,435
1905
140,809,369
Flour and gristmill 1880
505,185,712
 products 1890
513,971,474
1900
501,896,304
1905
713,033,395
Foundry and machine 1880
215,442,011
 shop products 1890
413,197,118
1900
644,456,216
1905
799,862,588
Furnishing goods, men’s 1880
11,506,357
1890
29,870,946
1900
44,346,482
1905
49,031,582
Furniture 1880
77,845,725
1890
111,743,080
1900
125,315,986
1905
170,446,825
Glass 1880
21,154,571
1890
41,051,004
1900
56,539,712
1905
79,607,998
Hardware 1880
22,653,693
1890
26,726,463
1900
35,846,656
1905
45,770,171
Jewelry 1880
22,201,621
1890
34,761,458
1900
46,128,659
1905
53,225,681
Leather, tanned, 1880
200,264,944
 curried, and finished 1890
172,136,092
1900
204,038,127
1905
252,620,986
Liquors, malt 1880
101,058,385
1890
182,731,622
1900
236,914,914
1905
298,358,732
Lumber and 1880
233,608,886
 timber products 1890
437,957,382
1900
555,197,271
1905
580,022,690
Lumber, planing- 1880
73,424,681
 mill products, 1890
183,681,552
 including sash, 1900
167,786,122
 doors, and blinds 1905
247,441,956
Marble and stone work 1880
31,415,150
1890
41,924,264
1900
42,230,457
1905
63,059,842
Paper and wood pulp 1880
57,366,860
1890
78,937,184
1900
127,326,162
1905
188,715,189
Petroleum, refining 1890
85,001,198
1900
123,929,384
1905
175,005,320
Silk and silk goods 1880
41,033,045
1890
87,298,454
1900
107,256,258
1905
133,288,072
Slaughtering and 1880
303,562,413
 meat packing, 1890
433,252,315
 wholesale 1900
697,056,065
1905
801,757,137
Slaughtering, wholesale, 1890
128,359,353
 not including 1900
86,723,126
 meat packing 1905
112,157,487
Smelting and 1900
165,131,670
 refining, copper 1905
240,780,216
Smelting and 1900
175,466,304
 refining, lead 1905
185,826,839
Structural ironwork 1880
3,410,086
1890
37,745,294
1900
66,927,305
1905
90,944,697
Sugar and molasses, 1880
155,484,915
 refining 1890
123,118,259
1900
239,711,011
1905
277,285,449
Tinware, 1880
50,183,811
 copper-smithing, 1890
66,653,746
 and sheet 1900
63,812,787
 iron working 1905
97,974,838
Tobacco, chewing 1880
52,793,056
 and smoking, 1890
65,843,587
 and snuff 1900
103,754,362
1905
116,767,630
Tobacco, cigars 1880
63,979,575
 and cigarettes 1890
129,693,275
1900
159,958,811
1905
214,350,051
Woolen goods 1880
160,606,721
1890
133,577,977
1900
118,430,158
1905
142,196,658
Worsted goods 1880
33,549,942
1890
79,194,652
1900
120,314,344
1905
165,745,052

[Pg 303]

[Pg 303]

The Textile Industries of the United States at Decennial Periods, 1850 to 1900.

[Compiled from Census Reports.]

[Compiled from Census Reports.]

Year. Number of establish-ments. Capital. Number
of wage-earners.
Wages. Cost of materials. Value of
products.
Wool 1850 1,760 $ 32,516,366 47,763 $29,246,696 $ 49,636,881
 manufacture[Z] 1860 1,673 42,849,932 59,522 $13,361,602 46,649,365 80,734,606
1870 3,456 132,382,319 119,859 40,357,235 134,154,615 217,668,826
1880 2,689 159,091,869 161,557 47,389,087 164,371,551 267,252,913
1890 2,489 296,494,481 213,859 70,917,894 203,095,572 337,768,524
1900 2,335 392,040,353 242,495 82,292,444 232,230,986 392,473,050
1905 2,292 477,525,222 283,691 102,333,548 319,154,878 517,492,142
Cotton 1850 1,094 74,500,931 92,286 34,835,056 61,869,184
 manufacture[AA] 1860 1,091 98,585,269 122,028 23,940,108 57,285,534 115,681,774
1870 956 140,706,291 135,369 39,044,132 111,736,936 177,489,789
1880 756 208,280,346 174,659 42,040,510 102,206,347 192,090,110
1890 905 354,020,842 218,876 66,024,538 154,912,979 267,981,724
1900 1,055 467,240,157 802,861 86,689,752 176,551,527 339,200,320
1905 1,154 613,110,655 315,874 96,205,796 286,255,303 450,467,704
Silk manufacture 1850 67 678,300 1,743 1,093,866 1,809,476
1860 139 2,926,980 5,435 1,050,224 3,901,777 6,607,771
1870 86 6,231,130 6,649 1,942,286 7,817,559 12,210,662
1880 382 19,125,300 31,337 9,146,705 22,467,701 41,033,045
1890 472 51,007,537 49,382 17,762,441 51,004,425 87,298,454
1900 483 81,082,201 65,416 20,982,194 62,406,665 107,256,258
1905 624 109,556,621 79,601 26,767,943 75,861,188 188,288,072
Dyeing and 1850 104 4,818,350 5,105 11,540,347 15,454,430
 finishing textiles 1860 124 5,718,671 7,097 2,001,528 5,005,435 11,716,463
1870 292 18,374,503 13,066 5,221,538 99,539,992 113,017,537
1880 191 26,223,981 16,698 6,474,364 13,664,295 32,297,420
1890 248 38,450,800 19,601 8,911,720 12,385,220 28,900,460
1900 298 60,643,104 29,776 12,726,316 17,958,137 44,963,331
1905 360 88,708,576 35,563 15,469,205 19,621,253 50,849,545
Flax, hemp and jute 1890 162 27,731,649 15,519 4,872,389 26,148,344 37,313,021
1900 141 41,991,762 20,903 6,331,741 32,197,885 47,601,607
1905 133 54,423,531 24,508 8,580,785 44,890,546 62,939,329
Combined textiles 1850 3,025 112,513,947 146,877 76,715,959 128,769,971
1860 3,027 150,080,852 194,082 40,353,462 112,842,111 214,740,614
1870 4,790 297,694,243 274,943 86,565,191 353,249,102 520,386,764
1880 4,018 412,721,496 384,251 105,050,666 302,709,894 532,673,488
1890 4,276 767,705,310 517,237 168,488,982 447,546,540 759,262,283
1900 4,312 1,042,997,577 661,451 209,022,447 521,345,200 931,494,566
1905 4,563 1,343,324,605 739,239 249,357,277 745,783,168
1,215,036,792
Year. Number
of
establish
-ments.
Capital.
Wool 1850
1,760
$ 32,516,366
 manu- 1860
1,673
42,849,932
 facture[Z] 1870
3,456
132,382
1880
2,689
159,091
1890
2,489
296,494
1900
2,335
392,040
1905
2,292
477,525
Cotton 1850
1,094
74,500,931
 manu- 1860
1,091
98,585,269
 facture[AA] 1870
956
140,706
1880
756
208,280
1890
905
354,020
1900
1,055
467,240
1905
1,154
613,110
Silk manu- 1850
67
678,300
 -facture 1860
139
2,926,980
1870
86
6,231,130
1880
382
19,125,300
1890
472
51,007,537
1900
483
81,082,201
1905
624
109,556
Dyeing and 1850
104
4,818,350
 finishing 1860
124
5,718,671
 textiles 1870
292
18,374,503
1880
191
26,223,981
1890
248
38,450,800
1900
298
60,643,104
1905
360
88,708,576
Flax, hemp 1890
162
27,731,649
 and jute 1900
141
41,991,762
1905
133
54,423,531
Combined 1850
3,025
112,513
 textiles 1860
3,027
150,080
1870
4,790
297,694
1880
4,018
412,721
1890
4,276
767,705
1900
4,312
1,042,997,577
1905
4,563
1,343,324,605
Year. Number
of
wage-
earners.
Wages.
Wool 1850
47,763
 manu- 1860
59,522
$ 13,361,602
 facture[Z] 1870
119,859
40,357
1880
161,557
47,389
1890
213,859
70,917
1900
242,495
82,292
1905
283,691
102,333,548
Cotton 1850
92,286
 manu- 1860
122,028
23,940
 facture[AA] 1870
135,369
39,044
1880
174,659
42,040
1890
218,876
66,024
1900
802,861
86,689
1905
315,874
96,205
Silk 1850
1,743
 manufacture 1860
5,435
1,050
1870
6,649
1,942
1880
31,337
9,146
1890
49,382
17,762
1900
65,416
20,982
1905
79,601
26,767
Dyeing and 1850
5,105
 finishing 1860
7,097
2,001
 textiles 1870
13,066
5,221
1880
16,698
6,474
1890
19,601
8,911
1900
29,776
12,726
1905
35,563
15,469
Flax, hemp 1890
15,519
4,872
 and jute 1900
20,903
6,331
1905
24,508
8,580
Combined 1850
146,877
 textiles 1860
194,082
40,353
1870
274,943
86,565
1880
384,251
105,050,666
1890
517,237
168,488,982
1900
661,451
209,022,447
1905
739,239
249,357,277
Year. Cost of
materials.
Value of
products.
Wool 1850
$29,246,696
$ 49,636,881
 manu- 1860
46,649,365
80,734,606
 facture[Z] 1870
134,154,615
217,668,826
1880
164,371,551
267,252,913
1890
203,095,572
337,768,524
1900
232,230,986
392,473,050
1905
319,154,878
517,492,142
Cotton 1850
34,835,056
61,869,184
 manu- 1860
57,285,534
115,681,774
 facture[AA] 1870
111,736,936
177,489,789
1880
102,206,347
192,090,110
1890
154,912,979
267,981,724
1900
176,551,527
339,200,320
1905
286,255,303
450,467,704
Silk 1850
1,093,866
1,809,476
 manufacture 1860
3,901,777
6,607,771
1870
7,817,559
12,210,662
1880
22,467,701
41,033,045
1890
51,004,425
87,298,454
1900
62,406,665
107,256,258
1905
75,861,188
188,288,072
Dyeing and 1850
11,540,347
15,454,430
 finishing 1860
5,005,435
11,716,463
 textiles 1870
99,539,992
113,017,537
1880
13,664,295
32,297,420
1890
12,385,220
28,900,460
1900
17,958,137
44,963,331
1905
19,621,253
50,849,545
Flax, hemp 1890
26,148,344
37,313,021
 and jute 1900
32,197,885
47,601,607
1905
44,890,546
62,939,329
Combined 1850
76,715,959
128,769,971
 textiles 1860
112,842,111
214,740,614
1870
353,249,102
520,386,764
1880
302,709,894
532,673,488
1890
447,546,540
759,262,283
1900
521,345,200
931,494,566
1905
745,783,168
1,215,036,792

[Z] Includes hosiery and knit goods.

Includes tights and knitwear.

[AA] Includes cotton small wares.

Includes cotton goods.

[Pg 304]

[Pg 304]

Cotton Manufactures in the United States, 1870 to 1905.

[From official reports of the United States Census Office.]

[From official reports of the United States Census Office.]

1870. 1880. 1890. 1900. 1905.
Number of
establishments
956 756 905 973 1,077
Capital $140,706,291 $208,280,346 $354,020,843 $460,842,772 $605,100,164
Wage-earners, average number 135,369 174,659 218,876 297,929 310,458
Total wages $39,044,132 $42,040,510 $66,024,538 $85,126,310 $94,377,696
Cost of materials used $111,736,936 $102,206,347 $154,912,979 $178,441,390 $282,047,648
Value of
products
$177,489,739 $192,090,110 $267,981,724 $332,806,156 $442,451,218
Active spindles, number 7,132,415 10,653,435 14,188,103 19,008,352 23,155,613
Looms, number 157,310 225,759 324,866 450,682 640,910
Cotton consumed, bales 1,570,344 2,261,600 3,639,495 3,743,089
Cotton consumed, pounds 398,308,257 759,343,981 1,117,945,776 1,814,002,512 1,873,074,716
1870. 1880.
Number of establishments
956
756
Capital
$140,706,291
$208,280,346
Wage-earners, average number
135,369
174,659
Total wages
$39,044,132
$42,040,510
Cost of materials used
$111,736,936
$102,206,347
Value of
products
$177,489,739
$192,090,110
Active spindles, number
7,132,415
10,653,435
Looms, number
157,310
225,759
Cotton consumed, bales
1,570,344
Cotton consumed, pounds
398,308,257
759,343,981
1890.
Number of establishments
905
Capital
$354,020,843
Wage-earners, average number
218,876
Total wages
$66,024,538
Cost of materials used
$154,912,979
Value of
products
$267,981,724
Active spindles, number
14,188,103
Looms, number
324,866
Cotton consumed, bales
2,261,600
Cotton consumed, pounds
1,117,945,776
1900. 1905.
Number of establishments
973
1,077
Capital
$460,842,772
$605,100,164
Wage-earners, average number
297,929
310,458
Total wages
$85,126,310
$94,377,696
Cost of materials used
$178,441,390
$282,047,648
Value of products
$332,806,156
$442,451,218
Active spindles, number
19,008,352
23,155,613
Looms, number
450,682
640,910
Cotton consumed, bales
3,639,495
3,743,089
Cotton consumed, pounds
1,814,002,512
1,873,074,716
Silk Manufactures in the United States, 1870 to 1905.

[From official reports of the United States Census Office.]

[From official reports of the United States Census Office.]

1870. 1880. 1890. 1900. 1905.
Number of
establishments
86 382 472 483 624
Capital $6,231,180 $19,125,300 $51,007,537 $81,082,201 $109,556,621
Wage-earners, average number 6,649 31,337 49,382 65,416 79,601
Total wages $1,942,286 $9,146,705 $17,762,441 $20,982,194 $26,767,943
Cost of materials used $7,817,559 $22,467,701 $51,004,425 $62,406,665 $75,861,188
Value of products $12,210,662 $41,033,045 $87,298,454 $107,256,258 $133,288,072
Raw silk used, pounds 684,488 2,690,482 6,376,881 9,760,770 11,572,783
1870. 1880.
Number of establishments
86
382
Capital
$6,231,180
$19,125,300
Wage-earners, average number
6,649
31,337
Total wages
$1,942,286
$9,146,705
Cost of materials used
$7,817,559
$22,467,701
Value of products
$12,210,662
$41,033,045
Raw silk used, pounds
684,488
2,690,482
1890.
Number of establishments
472
Capital
$51,007,537
Wage-earners, average number
49,382
Total wages
$17,762,441
Cost of materials used
$51,004,425
Value of products
$87,298,454
Raw silk used, pounds
6,376,881
1900. 1905.
Number of establishments
483
624
Capital
$81,082,201
$109,556,621
Wage-earners, average number
65,416
79,601
Total wages
$20,982,194
$26,767,943
Cost of materials used
$62,406,665
$75,861,188
Value of products
$107,256,258
$133,288,072
Raw silk used, pounds
9,760,770
11,572,783
Cotton Production and Manufacturing in the United States, also Imports and Exports of Cotton Manufactures.

[From the Statistical Abstract of the United States.]

[From the Statistical Abstract of the United States.]

Total commercial crop. Taken for home consumption. Raw cotton imported. Exports of manufactures of cotton. Imports of manufactures of cotton.
By Northern mills. By South-ern mills. Total.
In thousands of bales. Pounds. Dollars. Dollars.
1884 5,713 1,537 340 1,877 7,019,492 11,885,211 29,074,626
1885 5,706 1,437 316 1,753 5,115,680 11,836,591 27,197,241
1886 6,575 1,781 381 2,162 5,072,334 13,959,934 29,709,266
1887 6,499 1,687 401 2,088 3,924,531 14,929,342 28,940,353
1888 7,047 1,805 456 2,261 5,497,592 13,013,189 28,917,799
1889 6,939 1,790 480 2,270 7,973,039 10,212,644 26,805,942
1890 7,297 1,780 545 2,325 8,606,049 9,999,277 29,918,055
1891 8,674 2,027 613 2,640 20,908,817 13,604,857 29,712,624
1892 9,018 2,172 684 2,856 28,663,769 13,226,277 28,323,841
1893 6,664 1,652 723 2,375 43,367,952 11,809,355 33,560,293
1894 7,532 1,580 711 2,291 27,705,949 14,340,886 22,346,547
1895 9,837 2,019 852 2,871 49,332,022 13,789,810 33,196,625
1896 7,147 1,605 900 2,605 55,350,520 16,837,396 32,437,504
1897 8,706 1,793 999 2,792 51,898,926 21,037,678 34,429,363
1898 11,216 2,211 1,254 3,465 52,660,363 17,024,092 27,267,300
1899 11,256 2,217 1,415 3,632 50,158,158 23,566,914 32,054,434
1900 9,422 2,047 1,597 3,644 67,398,521 24,003,087 41,296,239
1901 10,839 1,964 1,583 3,647 46,631,283 20,272,418 40,246,935
1902 10,768 2,066 2,017 4,083 98,715,680 32,108,362 44,460,126
1903 10,674 1,966 1,958 3,924 74,874,426 32,216,304 52,462,755
1904 10,002 2,046 1,889 3,935 48,840,590 22,403,718 49,524,246
1905 13,654 2,292 2,270 4,562 60,508,548 49,668,080 48,919,986
1906 11,234 2,335 2,292 4,627 70,963,633 52,944,038 63,043,322
1907 13,540 2,510 2,495 5,005 104,791,784 32,305,412 73,704,636
Total
commercial
crop.
Taken for home consumption.
By
North-
ern
mills.
By
South
-ern
mills.
Total.
In thousands of bales.
1884
5,713
1,537
340
1,877
1885
5,706
1,437
316
1,753
1886
6,575
1,781
381
2,162
1887
6,499
1,687
401
2,088
1888
7,047
1,805
456
2,261
1889
6,939
1,790
480
2,270
1890
7,297
1,780
545
2,325
1891
8,674
2,027
613
2,640
1892
9,018
2,172
684
2,856
1893
6,664
1,652
723
2,375
1894
7,532
1,580
711
2,291
1895
9,837
2,019
852
2,871
1896
7,147
1,605
900
2,605
1897
8,706
1,793
999
2,792
1898
11,216
2,211
1,254
3,465
1899
11,256
2,217
1,415
3,632
1900
9,422
2,047
1,597
3,644
1901
10,839
1,964
1,583
3,647
1902
10,768
2,066
2,017
4,083
1903
10,674
1,966
1,958
3,924
1904
10,002
2,046
1,889
3,935
1905
13,654
2,292
2,270
4,562
1906
11,234
2,335
2,292
4,627
1907
13,540
2,510
2,495
5,005
Raw cotton
imported.
Exports of
manufactures
of cotton.
Imports of
manufactures
of cotton.
Pounds. Dollars. Dollars.
1884
7,019,492
11,885,211
29,074,626
1885
5,115,680
11,836,591
27,197,241
1886
5,072,334
13,959,934
29,709,266
1887
3,924,531
14,929,342
28,940,353
1888
5,497,592
13,013,189
28,917,799
1889
7,973,039
10,212,644
26,805,942
1890
8,606,049
9,999,277
29,918,055
1891
20,908,817
13,604,857
29,712,624
1892
28,663,769
13,226,277
28,323,841
1893
43,367,952
11,809,355
33,560,293
1894
27,705,949
14,340,886
22,346,547
1895
49,332,022
13,789,810
33,196,625
1896
55,350,520
16,837,396
32,437,504
1897
51,898,926
21,037,678
34,429,363
1898
52,660,363
17,024,092
27,267,300
1899
50,158,158
23,566,914
32,054,434
1900
67,398,521
24,003,087
41,296,239
1901
46,631,283
20,272,418
40,246,935
1902
98,715,680
32,108,362
44,460,126
1903
74,874,426
32,216,304
52,462,755
1904
48,840,590
22,403,718
49,524,246
1905
60,508,548
49,668,080
48,919,986
1906
70,963,633
52,944,038
63,043,322
1907
104,791,784
32,305,412
73,704,636

[Pg 305]

Below is a short piece of text (5 words or fewer). Modernize it into contemporary English if there's enough context, but do not add or omit any information. If context is insufficient, return it unchanged. Do not add commentary, and do not modify any placeholders. If you see placeholders of the form __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_x__, you must keep them exactly as-is so they can be replaced with links. [Pg 305]

Iron and Steel Manufacturing in the U. S.: Comparative Summary, 1870 to 1905, with per cent of increase for each decade.[BB]

[From the United States Census.]

[From the U.S. Census.]

Date of census.
1870.[CC] 1880.[CC] 1890. 1900. 1905.
Number of establishments 808 792 719 669 606
Capital $121,722,704 $209,904,965 [DD]$414,044,844 $590,530,484 $948,689,840
Salaried officials, clerks, etc., number [EE] [EE] 4,325 9,217 16,566
Salaries [EE] [EE] $6,462,236 $11,741,788 $20,758,412
Wage-earners, average number 77,555 140,798 171,181 222,607 242,740
Total wages $40,514,981 $55,451,510 $89,273,956 $120,836,338 $141,439,906
Men, 16 years and over 75,037 133,023 168,943 219,635 239,383
Wages [EE] [EE] $88,840,642 $120,157,007 $140,545,610
Women, 16 years and over 82 45 58 1,071 1,455
Wages [EE] [EE] $17,106 $266,888 $441,967
Children, under 16 years 2,436 7,730 2,180 1,901 1,902
 Wages [EE] [EE] $416,208 $412,443 $452,329
Miscellaneous expenses [FF] [FF] $18,214,948 $32,274,100 $47,164,970
Cost of materials used $135,526,132 $191,271,150 $327,272,845 $522,431,701 $620,171,881
Value of products $207,208,696 $296,557,685 $478,687,519 $804,034,918 $905,854,152
Tons of products (2,240 pounds each) 3,263,585 6,486,733 16,264,478 29,507,860 34,844,933
Per cent of increase.
1870 to 1880. 1880 to 1890. 1890 to 1900. 1900 to 1905.
Number of establishments [DD]2.0 [DD]9.2 [DD]7.0 9.4
Capital 72.4 97.3 42.6 60.7
Salaried officials, clerks, etc., number 113.1 79.7
Salaries 81.7 76.8
Wage-earners, average number 81.5 21.6 30.0 9.0
Total wages 36.9 61.0 35.4 17.1
Men, 16 years and over 77.3 27.0 30.0 9.0
Wages 35.3 17.0
Women, 16 years and over [DD]45.1 28.9 1,746.6 35.9
Wages 1,460.2 65.6
Children, under 16 years 217.3 [DD]71.8 [DD]12.8 0.1
 Wages [DD]0.9 9.7
Miscellaneous expenses
77.2
46.1
Cost of materials used 41.1 71.1 59.6 18.7
Value of products 43.1 61.4 68.0 12.7
Tons of products (2,240 pounds each) 98.8 150.7 81.4 18.1
Date of census.
1870.[CC] 1880.[CC]
Number of establishments
808
792
Capital
$121,722,704
$209,904,965
Salaried officials, clerks, etc., number [EE] [EE]
Salaries [EE] [EE]
Wage-earners, average number
77,555
140,798
Total wages
$40,514,981
$55,451,510
Men, 16 years and over
75,037
133,023
Wages [EE] [EE]
Women, 16 years and over
82
45
Wages [EE] [EE]
Children, under 16 years
2,436
7,730
 Wages [EE] [EE]
Miscellaneous expenses [FF] [FF]
Cost of materials used
$135,526,132
$191,271,150
Value of products
$207,208,696
$296,557,685
Tons of products (2,240 pounds each)
3,263,585
6,486,733
Date of census.
1890.
Number of establishments
719
Capital
[DD]$414,044,844
Salaried officials, clerks, etc., number
4,325
Salaries
$6,462,236
Wage-earners, average number
171,181
Total wages
$89,273,956
Men, 16 years and over
168,943
Wages
$88,840,642
Women, 16 years and over
58
Wages
$17,106
Children, under 16 years
2,180
 Wages
$416,208
Miscellaneous expenses
$18,214,948
Cost of materials used
$327,272,845
Value of products
$478,687,519
Tons of products (2,240 pounds each)
16,264,478
Date of census.
1900. 1905.
Number of establishments
669
606
Capital
$590,530,484
$948,689,840
Salaried officials, clerks, etc., number
9,217
16,566
Salaries
$11,741,788
$20,758,412
Wage-earners, average number
222,607
242,740
Total wages
$120,836,338
$141,439,906
Men, 16 years and over
219,635
239,383
Wages
$120,157,007
$140,545,610
Women, 16 years and over
1,071
1,455
Wages
$266,888
$441,967
Children, under 16 years
1,901
1,902
 Wages
$412,443
$452,329
Miscellaneous expenses
$32,274,100
$47,164,970
Cost of materials used
$522,431,701
$620,171,881
Value of products
$804,034,918
$905,854,152
Tons of products (2,240 pounds each)
29,507,860
34,844,933
Per cent of increase.
1870 to 1880. 1880 to 1890.
Number of establishments [DD]2.0 [DD]9.2
Capital
72.4
97.3
Salaried officials, clerks, etc., number
Salaries
Wage-earners, average number
81.5
21.6
Total wages
36.9
61.0
Men, 16 years and over
77.3
27.0
Wages
Women, 16 years and over
[DD]45.1
28.9
Wages
Children, under 16 years
217.3
[DD]71.8
 Wages
Miscellaneous expenses
Cost of materials used
41.1
71.1
Value of products
43.1
61.4
Tons of products (2,240 pounds each)
98.8
150.7
Per cent of increase.
1890 to 1900. 1900 to 1905.
Number of establishments
[DD]7.0
9.4
Capital
42.6
60.7
Salaried officials, clerks, etc., number
113.1
79.7
Salaries
81.7
76.8
Wage-earners, average number
30.0
9.0
Total wages
35.4
17.1
Men, 16 years and over
30.0
9.0
Wages
35.3
17.0
Women, 16 years and over
1,746.6
35.9
Wages
1,460.2
65.6
Children, under 16 years
[DD]12.8
0.1
 Wages
[DD]0.9
9.7
Miscellaneous expenses
77.2
46.1
Cost of materials used
59.6
18.7
Value of products
68.0
12.7
Tons of products (2,240 pounds each)
81.4
18.1

[BB] This summary includes only active establishments for 1880, 1890, and 1900; such establishments were not reported separately in 1870. The 669 establishments in 1900 and the 606 establishments in 1905 include in each case 1 penal institution, the figures for which are not included in Parts I and II of the Report on Manufactures.

[BB] This summary includes only active establishments for 1880, 1890, and 1900; these establishments weren't reported separately in 1870. The 669 establishments in 1900 and the 606 establishments in 1905 each include 1 penal institution, the numbers for which are not included in Parts I and II of the Report on Manufactures.

[CC] For explanation of the apparent discrepancies in the data for 1870 and 1880, see remarks, page 2, Part I, Manufacturing Industries, 1890, in regard to the depreciated currency in 1870; and in regard to the inclusion of capital, employes, and wages relating to mining and other operations in the figures for 1880, see page 745, Statistics of Manufactures, 1880.

[CC] For an explanation of the noticeable differences in the data for 1870 and 1880, refer to the comments on page 2, Part I, Manufacturing Industries, 1890, regarding the devalued currency in 1870; and for information on the inclusion of capital, employees, and wages related to mining and other activities in the figures for 1880, see page 745, Statistics of Manufactures, 1880.

[DD] Decrease.

Lower.

[EE] Not reported separately.

Not reported separately.

[FF] Not reported.

Not reported.

[Pg 306]

[Pg 306]

Production of Pig Iron and of Crude Steel in the United States, 1880 to 1907, and relation of same to Imports and Exports of Iron and Steel Manufactures; also Prices of Representative Iron and Steel Products during the period named.

[From official reports of Bureau of Statistics.]

[From official reports of the Bureau of Statistics.]

Year. Pig iron produced in United States. Crude steel produced in United States. Per cent of domestic iron used in home industries (fiscal year). Price per ton of pig iron, No. 1 foundry.[GG] Price of steel rails per ton. Wire nails, price per keg of 100 lbs. Imports of manu- factures of iron and steel. Exports of domestic manu-factures of iron and steel.
Tons. Tons.
1880 3,835,191 1,247,335
78.44
$28.48
$67.52
$71,266,699 $14,716,524
1881 4,144,254 1,588,314
90.23
25.17
61.08
60,604,477 16,604,767
1882 4,623,323 1,736,692
89.36
25.77
48.50
67,976,897 20,748,206
1883 4,595,510 1,673,535
91.44
22.42
37.75
58,495,246 22,826,528
1884 4,097,868 1,550,879
94.20
19.81
30.75
40,147,053 21,909,881
1885 4,044,526 1,711,920
96.43
17.99
28.52
33,610,093 16,592,155
1886 5,683,329 2,562,503
93.92
18.71
34.52
$3.51
37,534,078 15,745,569
1887 6,417,148 3,339,071
93.13
20.93
37.08
3.15
49,203,164 15,958,502
1888 6,489,738 2,899,440
95.17
18.88
29.83
2.55
48,992,757 17,763,034
1889 7,603,642 3,385,732
97.35
17.76
29.25
2.49
42,377,793 21,156,077
1890 9,202,703 4,277,071
98.10
18.41
31.78
2.51
41,679,591 25,542,208
1891 8,279,870 3,904,240
99.12
17.52
29.92
2.04
53,544,372 28,909,614
1892 9,157,000 4,927,581
99.01
15.75
30.00
1.70
28,928,103 28,800,930
1893[HH] 7,124,502 4,019,995
99.39
14.52
28.12
1.49
34,937,974 30,106,482
1894[HH] 6,657,388 4,412,032
99.64
12.66
24.00
1.11
20,925,769 29,220,264
1895[HH] 9,446,308 6,114,834
99.79
13.10
24.33
1.69
23,048,515 32,000,989
1896[HH] 8,623,127 5,281,689
99.07
12.95
28.00
2.54
25,338,103 41,160,877
1897 9,652,680 7,156,957
99.77
12.10
18.75
1.46
16,094,557 57,497,872
1898 11,773,934 8,932,857
99.79
11.66
17.62
1.45
12,626,431 70,406,885
1899 13,620,703 10,639,857
99.80
19.36
28.12
2.60
12,100,440 93,716,031
1900 13,789,242 10,188,329
98.55
19.98
32.29
2.76
20,478,728 121,913,548
1901 15,878,354 13,473,595
99.71
15.87
27.33
2.41
17,874,789 117,319,320
1902 17,821,307 14,947,250
99.01
22.19
28.00
2.15
27,180,247 98,552,562
1903 18,009,252 14,534,978
94.92
19.92
28.00
2.13
51,617,312 96,642,467
1904 16,497,033 13,859,887
98.95
15.57
28.00
1.96
27,028,312 111,948,586
1905 22,992,380 20,023,947
99.27
17.88
28.00
1.93
23,510,164 134,728,363
1906 25,307,191 23,398,136
98.94
20.98
28.00
1.98
29,053,987 160,984,985
1907 25,781,361 [II]23,360,000
97.83
23.89
28.00
2.18
40,587,865 181,530,871
Year. Pig iron produced in United States. Crude steel produced in United States. Per cent of domestic iron used in home industries (fiscal year).
Tons. Tons.
1880
3,835,191
1,247,335
78.44
1881
4,144,254
1,588,314
90.23
1882
4,623,323
1,736,692
89.36
1883
4,595,510
1,673,535
91.44
1884
4,097,868
1,550,879
94.20
1885
4,044,526
1,711,920
96.43
1886
5,683,329
2,562,503
93.92
1887
6,417,148
3,339,071
93.13
1888
6,489,738
2,899,440
95.17
1889
7,603,642
3,385,732
97.35
1890
9,202,703
4,277,071
98.10
1891
8,279,870
3,904,240
99.12
1892
9,157,000
4,927,581
99.01
1893[HH]
7,124,502
4,019,995
99.39
1894[HH]
6,657,388
4,412,032
99.64
1895[HH]
9,446,308
6,114,834
99.79
1896[HH]
8,623,127
5,281,689
99.07
1897
9,652,680
7,156,957
99.77
1898
11,773,934
8,932,857
99.79
1899
13,620,703
10,639,857
99.80
1900
13,789,242
10,188,329
98.55
1901
15,878,354
13,473,595
99.71
1902
17,821,307
14,947,250
99.01
1903
18,009,252
14,534,978
94.92
1904
16,497,033
13,859,887
98.95
1905
22,992,380
20,023,947
99.27
1906
25,307,191
23,398,136
98.94
1907
25,781,361
[II]23,360,000
97.83
Year. Price per ton of pig iron, No. 1 foundry.[GG] Price of steel rails per ton. Wire nails, price per keg of 100 lbs.
1880
$28.48
$67.52
1881
25.17
61.08
1882
25.77
48.50
1883
22.42
37.75
1884
19.81
30.75
1885
17.99
28.52
1886
18.71
34.52
$3.51
1887
20.93
37.08
3.15
1888
18.88
29.83
2.55
1889
17.76
29.25
2.49
1890
18.41
31.78
2.51
1891
17.52
29.92
2.04
1892
15.75
30.00
1.70
1893[HH]
14.52
28.12
1.49
1894[HH]
12.66
24.00
1.11
1895[HH]
13.10
24.33
1.69
1896[HH]
12.95
28.00
2.54
1897
12.10
18.75
1.46
1898
11.66
17.62
1.45
1899
19.36
28.12
2.60
1900
19.98
32.29
2.76
1901
15.87
27.33
2.41
1902
22.19
28.00
2.15
1903
19.92
28.00
2.13
1904
15.57
28.00
1.96
1905
17.88
28.00
1.93
1906
20.98
28.00
1.98
1907
23.89
28.00
2.18
Year. Imports of manufactures of iron and steel. Exports of domestic manufactures of iron and steel.
1880
$71,266,699
$14,716,524
1881
60,604,477
16,604,767
1882
67,976,897
20,748,206
1883
58,495,246
22,826,528
1884
40,147,053
21,909,881
1885
33,610,093
16,592,155
1886
37,534,078
15,745,569
1887
49,203,164
15,958,502
1888
48,992,757
17,763,034
1889
42,377,793
21,156,077
1890
41,679,591
25,542,208
1891
53,544,372
28,909,614
1892
28,928,103
28,800,930
1893[HH]
34,937,974
30,106,482
1894[HH]
20,925,769
29,220,264
1895[HH]
23,048,515
32,000,989
1896[HH]
25,338,103
41,160,877
1897
16,094,557
57,497,872
1898
12,626,431
70,406,885
1899
12,100,440
93,716,031
1900
20,478,728
121,913,548
1901
17,874,789
117,319,320
1902
27,180,247
98,552,562
1903
51,617,312
96,642,467
1904
27,028,312
111,948,586
1905
23,510,164
134,728,363
1906
29,053,987
160,984,985
1907
40,587,865
181,530,871

[GG] Not made in commercial quantities in the United States before 1887.

[GG] Not produced in large amounts in the United States before 1887.

[HH] Democratic and low-tariff years.

Democratic and low-tariff era.

[II] Preliminary figures.

Preliminary data.

[Pg 307]

[Pg 307]

Annual Production of Bessemer Steel Rails in the United States from 1867 to 1907, and their Average Annual Price at the Works in Pennsylvania.
Years. Gross tons. Price.
1867
2,277
$166.00
1868
6,451
158.46
1869
8,616
132.19
1870
30,357
106.79
1871
34,152
102.52
1872
83,991
111.94
1873
115,192
120.58
1874
129,414
94.28
1875
259,699
68.75
1876
368,269
59.25
1877
385,865
45.58
1878
491,427
42.21
1879
610,682
48.21
1880
852,196
67.52
1881
1,187,770
61.08
1882
1,284,067
48.50
1883
1,148,709
87.75
1884
996,983
30.75
1885
959,471
28.52
1886
1,574,703
34.52
1887
2,101,904
37.08
1888
1,386,277
29.83
1889
1,510,057
29.25
1890
1,867,837
31.78
1891
1,293,053
29.92
1892
1,537,588
30.00
1893
1,129,400
28.12
1894
1,016,013
24.00
1895
1,299,628
24.33
1896
1,116,958
28.00
1897
1,644,520
18.75
1898
1,976,702
17.62
1899
2,270,585
28.12
1900
2,383,654
32.29
1901
2,870,816
27.33
1902
2,985,892
28.00
1903
2,946,756
28.00
1904
2,137,957
28.00
1905
3,192,347
28.00
1906
3,791,459
28.00
1907
3,380,025
28.00
Production of Tin Plates in and Importation of Tin Plates into the United States, 1891 to 1908, in long tons.
Calendar
Year.
Production,
Long tons.
Importation,
Long tons.
1891
552
327,882
1892
18,803
268,472
1893
55,182
253,155
1894
74,260
215,068
1895
113,666
219,545
1896
160,862
119,171
1897
256,598
83,851
1898
326,915
67,222
1899
397,767
58,915
1900
302,665
60,386
1901
399,291
77,395
1902
366,000
60,115
1903
480,000
47,360
1904
458,000
70,652
1905
493,500
65,740
1906
577,562
56,983
1907
514,777
57,773
1908
58,490

[Pg 308]

[Pg 308]

Commerce of the United States by Great Groups and Share which Manufactures and Raw Material Formed of the Total, 1820 to 1909.
Imports.
Year ending June 30— Foodstuffs in crude condition and food animals. Foodstuffs partly or wholly manufactured. Crude materials for use in manufacturing. Manufactures for further use in manufacturing.
Dollars. Percent of Total Dollars. Percent of Total Dollars. Percent of Total Dollars. Percent of Total
1820 6,081,641 11.15 10,820,814 19.85 1,983,706 3.64 4,079,064 7.48
1830 7,382,274 11.77 9,653,971 15.39 4,214,825 6.72 5,152,486 8.22
1840 15,273,321 15.54 15,188,845 15.46 11,510,245 11.71 11,356,196 11.56
1850 18,011,659 10.38 21,465,776 12.37 11,711,266 6.75 26,163,152 15.08
1860 35,743,826 10.11 53,771,067 15.21 37,073,022 10.49 23,613,395 6.67
1870 53,981,838 12.38 96,253,561 22.08 53,118,022 12.18 54,545,306 12.51
1875 90,018,885 16.89 113,145,852 21.23 78,891,769 14.80 63,411,606 11.89
1880 .100,297,040 15.01 118,125,216 17.69 131,861,617 19.74 110,779,516 16.59
1881 .102,486,852 15.95 123,380,388 19.20 114,244,631 17.77 87,790,890 13.66
1882 .104,947,672 14.49 139,438,506 19.24 131,356,113 18.13 98,623,766 13.61
1883 93,091,358 12.87 142,127,926 19.65 133,612,450 18.48 98,755,423 13.66
1884 .103,010,830 15.43 130,778,286 19.59 119,150,641 17.84 94,698,249 14.18
1885 93,345,583 16.16 102,937,933 17.82 106,774,553 18.49 78,254,677 13.55
1886 91,588,644 14.41 112,771,436 17.75 128,434,759 20.22 91,539,244 14.40
1887 .106,362,234 15.36 111,714,382 16.14 143,361,050 20.71 120,079,754 17.34
1888 .116,087,107 16.03 111,048,075 15.34 155,057,432 21.42 121,605,094 16.80
1889 .123,130,984 16.53 122,254,266 16.41 163,548,106 21.94 115,079,918 15.44
1890 .128,480,142 16.28 133,332,031 16.89 170,637,250 21.62 116,924,080 14.81
1891 .150,639,399 17.83 147,721,884 17.48 184,175,197 21.80 136,446,309 16.15
1892 .175,558,861 21.22 139,794,773 16.89 188,317,595 22.76 112,729,303 13.63
1893 .131,663,968 15.19 153,739,181 17.75 209,277,112 24.16 135,608,418 15.65
1894 .133,309,989 20.35 155,348,824 23.72 130,086,011 19.86 82,894,732 12.65
1895 .141,377,238 19.31 107,026,180 14.63 180,939,902 24.72 96,486,622 13.18
1896 .130,002,310 16.67 118,805,703 15.24 197,646,852 25.35 101,070,937 12.96
1897 .128,379,785 16.79 129,244,951 16.90 196,159,371 25.66 88,490,406 11.57
1898 .103,984,608 16.88 86,091,010 13.97 189,322,244 30.73 79,288,417 12.88
1899 98,933,256 14.19 123,448,135 17.71 208,565,691 29.91 91,953,914 13.19
1900 97,916,293 11.52 133,027,374 15.65 276,241,152 32.50 134,222,045 15.79
1901 .110,385,208 13.43 125,540,654 15.25 248,006,751 30.13 127,576,924 15.49
1902 .120,280,302 13.31 95,350,256 10.56 303,001,868 33.55 147,656,292 16.34
1903 .119,202,674 11.62 116,620,623 11.37 330,491,084 32.22 195,750,847 19.08
1904 .132,223,895 13.34 118,222,862 11.93 320,794,431 32.37 160,233,890 16.17
1905 .146,130,903 13.08 145,355,839 13.01 389,160,658 34.82 177,827,960 15.91
1906 .134,315,448 10.95 140,358,114 11.44 414,687,999 33.81 220,298,751 17.96
1907 .149,747,693 10.44 158,656,263 11.06 477,027,174 33.25 274,096,464 19.11
1908 .145,577,427 12.19 147,008,870 12.31 363,482,258 30.43 196,248,409 16.43
1909 .163,921,598 12.49 165,028,764 12.58 453,319,751 34.55 222,580,277 16.97
Year ending June 30— Manufactures ready for consumption. Miscellaneous. Total.
Dollars. Percent
of Total
Dollars. Percent
of Total
Dollars.
1820 30,998,900 56.86 556,709 1.02 54,520,834
1830 35,734,837 56.97 582,563 .93 62,720,956
1840 44,300,005 45.09 630,094 .64 98,258,706
1850 95,312,499 54.93 845,174 .49 173,509,526
1860 199,878,690 56.52 3,536,119 1.00 353,616,119
1870 173,034,847 39.69 5,024,834 1.16 435,958,408
1875 177,891,440 33.38 9,645,884 1.81 533,005,436
1880 196,587,405 29.43 10,303,952 1.54 667,954,746
1881 203,725,925 31.70 11,035,942 1.72 642,664,628
1882 238,716,691 32.94 11,556,826 1.59 724,639,574
1883 242,945,562 33.59 12,648,195 1.75 723,180,914
1884 207,771,072 31.12 12,288,615 1.84 667,697,693
1885 182,543,076 31.61 13,671,507 2.37 577,527,329
1886 194,791,568 30.65 16,310,485 2.57 635,436,136
1887 202,800,073 29.29 8,002,275 1.16 692,319,768
1888 211,218,652 29.17 8,940,754 1.24 723,957,114
1889 212,482,518 28.52 8,635,860 1.16 745,131,652
1890 230,685,581 29.23 9,251,325 1.17 789,310,409
1891 217,577,775 25.75 8,355,632 .99 844,916,196
1892 204,543,857 24.72 6,458,073 .78 827,402,462
1893 228,764,866 26.40 7,347,377 .85 866,400,922
1894 148,798,021 22.72 4,557,045 .70 654,994,622
1895 199,543,108 27.26 6,596,915 .90 731,969,965
1896 226,639,759 29.07 5,559,113 .71 779,724,674
1897 217,843,918 28.48 4,611,981 .60 764,730,412
1898 153,025,210 24.84 4,338,165 .70 616,049,654
1899 169,516,630 24.32 4,730,863 .68 697,148,489
1900 203,126,341 23.90 5,407,979 .64 849,941,184
1901 205,505,580 24.96 6,157,048 .74 823,172,165
1902 231,420,820 25.62 5,611,410 .62 903,320,948
1903 257,757,184 25.13 5,896,825 .58 1,025,719,237
1904 252,857,673 25.51 6,754,620 .68 991,087,371
1905 252,372,650 22.58 6,665,061 .60 1,117,513,071
1906 307,801,154 25.10 9,100,980 .74 1,226,562,446
1907 364,192,884 25.39 10,700,947 .75 1,434,421,425
1908 331,617,926 27.77 10,406,902 .87 1,194,341,792
1909 297,617,739 22.69 9,452,095 .72 1,311,920,224
Year ending June 30— Foodstuffs in crude condition and food animals.
Dollars. Percent
of
Total
1820
6,081,641
11.15
1830
7,382,274
11.77
1840
15,273,321
15.54
1850
18,011,659
10.38
1860
35,743,826
10.11
1870
53,981,838
12.38
1875
90,018,885
16.89
1880
100,297,040
15.01
1881
102,486,852
15.95
1882
104,947,672
14.49
1883
93,091,358
12.87
1884
103,010,830
15.43
1885
93,345,583
16.16
1886
91,588,644
14.41
1887
106,362,234
15.36
1888
116,087,107
16.03
1889
123,130,984
16.53
1890
128,480,142
16.28
1891
150,639,399
17.83
1892
175,558,861
21.22
1893
131,663,968
15.19
1894
133,309,989
20.35
1895
141,377,238
19.31
1896
130,002,310
16.67
1897
128,379,785
16.79
1898
103,984,608
16.88
1899
98,933,256
14.19
1900
97,916,293
11.52
1901
110,385,208
13.43
1902
120,280,302
13.31
1903
119,202,674
11.62
1904
132,223,895
13.34
1905
146,130,903
13.08
1906
134,315,448
10.95
1907
149,747,693
10.44
1908
145,577,427
12.19
1909
163,921,598
12.49
Year ending June 30— Foodstuffs partly or wholly manufactured.
Dollars. Percent
of
Total
1820
10,820,814
19.85
1830
9,653,971
15.39
1840
15,188,845
15.46
1850
21,465,776
12.37
1860
53,771,067
15.21
1870
96,253,561
22.08
1875
113,145,852
21.23
1880
118,125,216
17.69
1881
123,380,388
19.20
1882
139,438,506
19.24
1883
142,127,926
19.65
1884
130,778,286
19.59
1885
102,937,933
17.82
1886
112,771,436
17.75
1887
111,714,382
16.14
1888
111,048,075
15.34
1889
122,254,266
16.41
1890
133,332,031
16.89
1891
147,721,884
17.48
1892
139,794,773
16.89
1893
153,739,181
17.75
1894
155,348,824
23.72
1895
107,026,180
14.63
1896
118,805,703
15.24
1897
129,244,951
16.90
1898
86,091,010
13.97
1899
123,448,135
17.71
1900
133,027,374
15.65
1901
125,540,654
15.25
1902
95,350,256
10.56
1903
116,620,623
11.37
1904
118,222,862
11.93
1905
145,355,839
13.01
1906
140,358,114
11.44
1907
158,656,263
11.06
1908
147,008,870
12.31
1909
165,028,764
12.58
Year ending June 30— Crude materials for use in manufacturing.
Dollars. Percent
of
Total
1820
1,983,706
3.64
1830
4,214,825
6.72
1840
11,510,245
11.71
1850
11,711,266
6.75
1860
37,073,022
10.49
1870
53,118,022
12.18
1875
78,891,769
14.80
1880
131,861,617
19.74
1881
114,244,631
17.77
1882
131,356,113
18.13
1883
133,612,450
18.48
1884
119,150,641
17.84
1885
106,774,553
18.49
1886
128,434,759
20.22
1887
143,361,050
20.71
1888
155,057,432
21.42
1889
163,548,106
21.94
1890
170,637,250
21.62
1891
184,175,197
21.80
1892
188,317,595
22.76
1893
209,277,112
24.16
1894
130,086,011
19.86
1895
180,939,902
24.72
1896
197,646,852
25.35
1897
196,159,371
25.66
1898
189,322,244
30.73
1899
208,565,691
29.91
1900
276,241,152
32.50
1901
248,006,751
30.13
1902
303,001,868
33.55
1903
330,491,084
32.22
1904
389,160,658
34.82
1906
414,687,999
33.81
1907
477,027,174
33.25
1908
363,482,258
30.43
1909
453,319,751
34.55
Year ending June 30— Manufactures for further use in manufacturing.
Dollars. Percent
of
Total
1820
4,079,064
7.48
1830
5,152,486
8.22
1840
11,356,196
11.56
1850
26,163,152
15.08
1860
23,613,395
6.67
1870
54,545,306
12.51
1875
63,411,606
11.89
1880
110,779,516
16.59
1881
87,790,890
13.66
1882
98,623,766
13.61
1883
98,755,423
13.66
1884
94,698,249
14.18
1885
78,254,677
13.55
1886
91,539,244
14.40
1887
120,079,754
17.34
1888
121,605,094
16.80
1889
115,079,918
15.44
1890
116,924,080
14.81
1891
136,446,309
16.15
1892
112,729,303
13.63
1893
135,608,418
15.65
1894
82,894,732
12.65
1895
96,486,622
13.18
1896
101,070,937
12.96
1897
88,490,406
11.57
1898
79,288,417
12.88
1899
91,953,914
13.19
1900
134,222,045
15.79
1901
127,576,924
15.49
1902
147,656,292
16.34
1903
195,750,847
19.08
1904
177,827,960
15.91
1906
220,298,751
17.96
1907
274,096,464
19.11
1908
196,248,409
16.43
1909
222,580,277
16.97
Year ending
June 30—
Manufactures ready
for consumption.
Dollars. Percent
of
Total
1820
30,998,900
56.86
1830
35,734,837
56.97
1840
44,300,005
45.09
1850
95,312,499
54.93
1860
199,878,690
56.52
1870
173,034,847
39.69
1875
177,891,440
33.38
1880
196,587,405
29.43
1881
203,725,925
31.70
1882
238,716,691
32.94
1883
242,945,562
33.59
1884
207,771,072
31.12
1885
182,543,076
31.61
1886
194,791,568
30.65
1887
202,800,073
29.29
1888
211,218,652
29.17
1889
212,482,518
28.52
1890
230,685,581
29.23
1891
217,577,775
25.75
1892
204,543,857
24.72
1893
228,764,866
26.40
1894
148,798,021
22.72
1895
199,543,108
27.26
1896
226,639,759
29.07
1897
217,843,918
28.48
1898
153,025,210
24.84
1899
169,516,630
24.32
1900
203,126,341
23.90
1901
205,505,580
24.96
1902
231,420,820
25.62
1903
257,757,184
25.13
1904
252,857,673
25.51
1905
252,372,650
22.58
1906
307,801,154
25.10
1907
364,192,884
25.39
1908
331,617,926
27.77
1909
297,617,739
22.69
Year ending
June 30—
Miscellaneous. Total.
Dollars. Percent
of
Total
Dollars.
1820
556,709
1.02
54,520,834
1830
582,563
.93
62,720,956
1840
630,094
.64
98,258,706
1850
845,174
.49
173,509,526
1860
3,536,119
1.00
353,616,119
1870
5,024,834
1.16
435,958,408
1875
9,645,884
1.81
533,005,436
1880
10,303,952
1.54
667,954,746
1881
11,035,942
1.72
642,664,628
1882
11,556,826
1.59
724,639,574
1883
12,648,195
1.75
723,180,924
1884
12,288,615
1.84
667,697,693
1885
13,671,507
2.37
577,527,329
1886
16,310,485
2.57
635,436,136
1887
8,002,275
1.16
692,319,768
1888
8,940,754
1.24
723,957,114
1889
8,635,860
1.16
745,131,652
1890
9,251,325
1.17
789,310,409
1891
8,355,632
.99
844,916,196
1892
6,458,073
.78
827,402,462
1893
7,347,377
.85
866,400,922
1894
4,557,045
.70
654,994,622
1895
6,596,915
.90
731,969,965
1896
5,559,113
.71
779,724,674
1897
4,611,981
.60
764,730,412
1898
4,338,165
.70
616,049,654
1899
4,730,863
.68
697,148,489
1900
5,407,979
.64
849,941,184
1901
6,157,048
.74
823,172,165
1902
5,611,410
.62
903,320,948
1903
5,896,825
.58
1,025,719,237
1904
6,754,620
.68
991,087,371
1905
6,665,061
.60
1,117,513,071
1906
9,100,980
.74
1,226,562,446
1907
10,700,947
.75
1,434,421,425
1908
10,406,902
.87
1,194,341,792
1909
9,452,095
.72
1,311,920,224

[Pg 309]

[Pg 309]

Commerce of the United States by Great Groups, 1820 to 1909.

Exports (domestic).

Domestic Exports.

Year ending June 30— Foodstuffs in crude condition and food animals. Foodstuffs partly or wholly prepared. Crude materials for use in manufacturing. Manufactures for further use in manufacturing.
Dollars. Percent of Total Dollars. Percent of Total Dollars. Percent of Total Dollars. Percent of Total
1820 2,474,822
4.79
10,085,366
19.51
31,246,382
60.46
4,867,379
9.42
1830 2,724,181
4.65
9,556,992
16.32
36,482,266
62.34
4,117,606
7.04
1840 4,564,532
4.09
15,936,108
14.27
75,488,421
67.61
4,841,101
4.34
1850 7,535,764
5.59
20,017,162
14.84
83,984,707
62.26
6,060,900
4.49
1860 12,166,447
3.85
38,624,949
12.21
216,009,648
68.31
12,641,625
3.99
1870 41,852,630
11.12
50,919,666
13.53
213,439,991
56.64
13,711,708
3.66
1875 79,077,679
15.84
110,292,780
22.09
206,271,795
41.31
27,458,054
5.50
1880 266,108,950
32.30
193,352,723
23.47
238,787,934
28.98
29,044,159
3.52
1881 241,641,847
27.34
226,386,821
25.62
278,918,722
31.55
32,820,713
3.71
1882 155,008,497
21.14
178,002,738
24.28
233,294,072
31.82
37,164,800
5.07
1883 163,196,443
20.29
186,392,822
23.18
288,841,684
35.92
37,996,198
4.72
1884 130,395,872
17.99
194,703,245
26.86
239,510,224
33.04
37,800,437
5.21
1885 123,326,867
16.97
201,800,801
27.77
248,611,181
34.22
39,437,313
5.42
1886 100,799,692
15.13
162,689,021
24.43
254,409,407
38.21
34,037,715
5.11
1887 125,453,686
17.85
175,784,781
25.00
250,236,436
35.60
36,732,490
5.22
1888 86,368,408
12.63
169,872,314
24.84
271,275,629
39.67
40,176,023
5.88
1889 98,847,455
13.54
174,504,227
23.90
286,235,227
39.19
42,712,932
5.85
1890 132,073,183
15.62
224,756,580
26.59
304,566,922
36.03
46,454,992
5.50
1891 106,155,721
12.17
226,448,303
25.96
346,848,321
39.77
47,961,372
5.49
1892 262,455,846
25.84
250,438,545
24.66
315,096,548
31.02
50,284,241
4.95
1893 153,277,859
18.43
247,075,061
29.73
247,289,240
29.75
49,070,703
5.94
1894 133,196,928
15.30
249,846,142
28.77
276,068,989
31.70
67,145,189
7.72
1895 99,051,108
12.49
219,125,531
27.62
264,194,679
33.30
61,812,896
7.78
1896 128,550,669
14.90
219,413,574
25.41
251,817,571
29.17
76,219,728
8.85
1897 181,420,814
17.58
235,051,930
22.79
296,834,858
28.76
98,284,243
9.52
1898 305,108,915
25.21
284,879,827
23.54
286,311,334
23.66
101,990,563
8.43
1899 232,903,066
19.35
304,754,736
25.31
277,723,374
23.07
117,730,260
9.78
1900 227,347,193
16.59
318,126,502
23.28
325,589,000
23.75
152,890,591
11.15
1901 246,394,140
16.88
336,605,378
23.05
397,767,463
27.24
148,013,625
10.12
1902 184,786,389
13.63
328,831,350
24.27
373,595,243
27.56
131,918,311
9.73
1903 185,308,064
13.31
323,244,251
23.22
408,679,699
29.35
140,415,620
10.09
1904 135,747,224
9.46
308,835,694
21.52
461,716,328
32.17
174,574,136
12.17
1905 118,185,098
7.92
283,064,680
18.98
472,665,309
31.69
209,361,544
14.03
1906 177,216,467
10.32
347,385,462
20.22
500,536,700
29.13
226,210,513
13.17
1907 167,348,227
9.03
345,706,609
18.65
593,145,135
32.00
259,414,784
13.99
1908 189,051,824
10.30
331,961,663
18.10
556,681,462
30.33
261,105,883
14.23
1909 135,663,625
8.28
302,457,444
18.46
520,768,631
31.78
229,937,155
14.04
Year ending June 30— Manufactures ready for consumption. Miscellaneous. Total.
Dollars. Percent
of Total
Dollars. Percent
of Total
Dollars.
1820 2,925,165
5.66
84,526
0.16
51,683,640
1830 5,461,589
9.34
182,244 .31 58,524,878
1840 10,584,079
9.47
246,320 .22 111,660,561
1850 17,162,206
12.72
139,494 .10 134,900,233
1860 35,811,383
11.33
988,371 .31 316,242,423
1870 56,329,137
14.96
363,341 .09 376,616,473
1875 74,503,493
14.92
1,680,299 .34 499,284,100
1880 92,774,139
11.26
3,878,448 .47 823,946,353
1881 102,458,449
11.59
1,699,395 .19 883,925,947
1882 124,835,385
17.02
4,934,240 .67 733,239,732
1883 122,448,549
15.23
5,347,936 .66 804,223,632
1884 118,172,882
16.30
4,382,192 .60 724,964,852
1885 110,818,865
15.25
2,687,919 .37 726,682,946
1886 111,627,312
16.76
2,401,382 .36 665,964,529
1887 112,417,839
15.99
2,397,691 .34 703,022,923
1888 113,892,689
16.65
2,277,041 .33 683,862,104
1889 123,183,883
16.87
4,798,885 .65 730,282,609
1890 132,527,050
15.68
4,915,101 .58 845,293,828
1891 140,349,741
16.09
4,506,825 .52 872,270,283
1892 132,792,441
13.07
4,664,390 .46 1,015,732,011
1893 129,938,284
15.63
4,379,638 .52 831,030,785
1894 135,659,274
15.61
7,288,415 .84 869,204,937
1895 143,244,969
18.06
5,963,407 .75 793,392,590
1896 181,789,157
21.04
5,409,788 .63 863,200,487
1897 212,959,122
20.63
7,456,636 .72 1,032,007,603
1898 222,537,358
18.38
9,463,916 .78 1,210,291,913
1899 262,656,583
21.81
8,163,203 .68 1,203,931,222
1900 331,955,684
24.15
14,854,601
1.08
1,370,763,571
1901 317,764,367
21.76
13,917,833 .95 1,460,462,806
1902 321,946,540
23.75
14,404,028
1.06
1,355,481,861
1903 327,489,757
23.52
7,100,911 .51 1,392,231,302
1904 348,745,843
24.30
5,559,792 .38 1,435,179,017
1905 402,064,030
26.95
6,403,980 .43 1,491,744,641
1906 459,812,656
26.76
6,791,584 .40 1,717,953,382
1907 480,708,667
25.93
7,394,612 .40 1,853,718,034
1908 489,469,958
26.68
6,515,567 .36 1,834,786,357
1909 441,820,754
26.97
7,707,984 .47 1,638,355,593
Year ending June 30— Foodstuffs in crude condition and food animals.
Dollars. Percent
of
Total
1820
2,474,822
4.79
1830
2,724,181
4.65
1840
4,564,532
4.09
1850
7,535,764
5.59
1860
12,166,447
3.85
1870
41,852,630
11.12
1875
79,077,679
15.84
1880
266,108,950
32.30
1881
241,641,847
27.34
1882
155,008,497
21.14
1883
163,196,443
20.29
1884
130,395,872
17.99
1885
123,326,867
16.97
1886
100,799,692
15.13
1887
125,453,686
17.85
1888
86,368,408
12.63
1889
98,847,455
13.54
1890
132,073,183
15.62
1891
106,155,721
12.17
1892
262,455,846
25.84
1893
153,277,859
18.43
1894
133,196,928
15.30
1895
99,051,108
12.49
1896
128,550,669
14.90
1897
181,420,814
17.58
1898
305,108,915
25.21
1899
232,903,066
19.35
1900
227,347,193
16.59
1901
246,394,140
16.88
1902
184,786,389
13.63
1903
185,308,064
13.31
1904
135,747,224
9.46
1905
118,185,098
7.92
1906
177,216,467
10.32
1907
167,348,227
9.03
1908
189,051,824
10.30
1909
135,663,625
8.28
Year ending June 30— Foodstuffs partly or wholly prepared.
Dollars. Percent
of
Total
1820
10,085,366
19.51
1830
9,556,992
16.32
1840
15,936,108
14.27
1850
20,017,162
14.84
1860
38,624,949
12.21
1870
50,919,666
13.53
1875
110,292,780
22.09
1880
193,352,723
23.47
1881
226,386,821
25.62
1882
178,002,738
24.28
1883
186,392,822
23.18
1884
194,703,245
26.86
1885
201,800,801
27.77
1886
162,689,021
24.43
1887
175,784,781
25.00
1888
169,872,314
24.84
1889
174,504,227
23.90
1890
224,756,580
26.59
1891
226,448,303
25.96
1892
250,438,545
24.66
1893
247,075,061
29.73
1894
249,846,142
28.77
1895
219,125,531
27.62
1896
219,413,574
25.41
1897
235,051,930
22.79
1898
284,879,827
23.54
1899
304,754,736
25.31
1900
318,126,502
23.28
1901
336,605,378
23.05
1902
328,831,350
24.27
1903
323,244,251
23.22
1904
308,835,694
21.52
1905
283,064,680
18.98
1906
347,385,462
20.22
1907
345,706,609
18.65
1908
331,961,663
18.10
1909
302,457,444
18.46
Year ending June 30— Crude materials for use in manufacturing.
Dollars. Percent
of
Total
1820
31,246,382
60.46
1830
36,482,266
62.34
1840
75,488,421
67.61
1850
83,984,707
62.26
1860
216,009,648
68.31
1870
213,439,991
56.64
1875
206,271,795
41.31
1880
238,787,934
28.98
1881
278,918,722
31.55
1882
233,294,072
31.82
1883
288,841,684
35.92
1884
239,510,224
33.04
1885
248,611,181
34.22
1886
254,409,407
38.21
1887
250,236,436
35.60
1888
271,275,629
39.67
1889
286,235,227
39.19
1890
304,566,922
36.03
1891
346,848,321
39.77
1892
315,096,548
31.02
1893
247,289,240
29.75
1894
276,068,989
31.70
1895
264,194,679
33.30
1896
251,817,571
29.17
1897
296,834,858
28.76
1898
286,311,334
23.66
1899
277,723,374
23.07
1900
325,589,000
23.75
1901
397,767,463
27.24
1902
373,595,243
27.56
1903
408,679,699
29.35
1904
461,716,328
32.17
1905
472,665,309
31.69
1906
500,536,700
29.13
1907
593,145,135
32.00
1908
556,681,462
30.33
1909
520,768,631
31.78
Year ending June 30— Manufactures for further use in manufacturing.
Dollars. Percent
of
Total
1820
4,867,379
9.42
1830
4,117,606
7.04
1840
4,841,101
4.34
1850
6,060,900
4.49
1860
12,641,625
3.99
1870
13,711,708
3.66
1875
27,458,054
5.50
1880
29,044,159
3.52
1881
32,820,713
3.71
1882
37,164,800
5.07
1883
37,996,198
4.72
1884
37,800,437
5.21
1885
39,437,313
5.42
1886
34,037,715
5.11
1887
36,732,490
5.22
1888
40,176,023
5.88
1889
42,712,932
5.85
1890
46,454,992
5.50
1891
47,961,372
5.49
1892
50,284,241
4.95
1893
49,070,703
5.94
1894
67,145,189
7.72
1895
61,812,896
7.78
1896
76,219,728
8.85
1897
98,284,243
9.52
1898
101,990,563
8.43
1899
117,730,260
9.78
1900
152,890,591
11.15
1901
148,013,625
10.12
1902
131,918,311
9.73
1903
140,415,620
10.09
1904
174,574,136
12.17
1905
209,361,544
14.03
1906
226,210,513
13.17
1907
259,414,784
13.99
1908
261,105,883
14.23
1909
229,937,155
14.04
Year ending
June 30—
Manufactures ready
for consumption.
Dollars. Percent
of
Total
1820
2,925,165
5.66
1830
5,461,589
9.34
1840
10,584,079
9.47
1850
17,162,206
12.72
1860
35,811,383
11.33
1870
56,329,137
14.96
1875
74,503,493
14.92
1880
92,774,139
11.26
1881
102,458,449
11.59
1882
124,835,385
17.02
1883
122,448,549
15.23
1884
118,172,882
16.30
1885
110,818,865
15.25
1886
111,627,312
16.76
1887
112,417,839
15.99
1888
113,892,689
16.65
1889
123,183,883
16.87
1890
132,527,050
15.68
1891
140,349,741
16.09
1892
132,792,441
13.07
1893
129,938,284
15.63
1894
135,659,274
15.61
1895
143,244,969
18.06
1896
181,789,157
21.04
1897
212,959,122
20.63
1898
222,537,358
18.38
1899
262,656,583
21.81
1900
331,955,684
24.15
1901
317,764,367
21.76
1902
321,946,540
23.75
1903
327,489,757
23.52
1904
348,745,843
24.30
1905
402,064,030
26.95
1906
459,812,656
26.76
1907
480,708,667
25.93
1908
489,469,958
26.68
1909
441,820,754
26.97
Year ending
June 30—
Miscellaneous. Total.
Dollars. Percent
of
Total
Dollars.
1820
84,526
0.16
51,683,640
1830
182,244
.31
58,524,878
1840
246,320
.22
111,660,561
1850
139,494
.10
134,900,233
1860
988,371
.31
316,242,423
1870
363,341
.09
376,616,473
1875
1,680,299
.34
499,284,100
1880
3,878,448
.47
823,946,353
1881
1,699,395
.19
883,925,947
1882
4,934,240
.67
733,239,732
1883
5,347,936
.66
804,223,632
1884
4,382,192
.60
724,964,852
1885
2,687,919
.37
726,682,946
1886
2,401,382
.36
665,964,529
1887
2,397,691
.34
703,022,923
1888
2,277,041
.33
683,862,104
1889
4,798,885
.65
730,282,609
1890
4,915,101
.58
845,293,828
1891
4,506,825
.52
872,270,283
1892
4,664,390
.46
1,015,732,011
1893
4,379,638
.52
831,030,785
1894
7,288,415
.84
869,204,937
1895
5,963,407
.75
793,392,590
1896
5,409,788
.63
863,200,487
1897
7,456,636
.72
1,032,007,603
1898
9,463,916
.78
1,210,291,913
1899
8,163,203
.68
1,203,931,222
1900
14,854,601
1.08
1,370,763,571
1901
13,917,833
.95
1,460,462,806
1902
14,404,028
1.06
1,355,481,861
1903
7,100,911
.51
1,392,231,302
1904
5,559,792
.38
1,435,179,017
1905
6,403,980
.43
1,491,744,641
1906
6,791,584
.40
1,717,953,382
1907
7,394,612
.40
1,853,718,034
1908
6,515,567
.36
1,834,786,357
1909
7,707,984
.47
1,638,355,593

[Pg 310]

[Pg 310]

Population of the United States 10 Years of Age and Upward, Engaged in Manufacturing and Other Gainful Occupations, Census Year 1900, by Sex.

[From reports of the Bureau of the Census, Department of Commerce and Labor.]

[From reports of the Census Bureau, Department of Commerce and Labor.]

OCCUPATION. 1900.
Male. Female. Total.
AGRICULTURAL PURSUITS 9,404,429 977,336 10,381,765
PROFESSIONAL SERVICE 827,941 430,597 1,258,538
DOMESTIC AND PERSONAL SERVICE 3,485,208 2,095,449 5,580,657
TRADE AND TRANSPORTATION 4,263,617 503,347 4,766,964
MANUFACTURING AND
MECHANICAL PURSUITS
5,772,641 1,312,668 7,085,309

Building trades.
Carpenters and joiners 599,707 545 600,252
Masons (brick and stone) 160,638 167 160,805
Painters, glaziers, and varnishers 275,782 1,759 277,541
Paper hangers 21,749 241 21,990
Plasterers 35,649 45 35,694
Plumbers and gas and steam fitters 97,659 126 97,785
Roofers and slaters 9,065 2 9,067
Mechanics (not otherwise specified) 9,351 27 9,378

Chemicals and allied products.
Oil well and oil works employes 24,573 53 24,626
Other chemical workers 12,035 2,688 14,723

Clay, glass, and stone products.
Brick and tile makers, etc. 49,455 478 49,933
Glassworkers 47,377 2,621 49,998
Marble and stone cutters 54,317 143 54,460
Potters 13,200 2,940 16,140

Fishing and mining.
Fishermen and oystermen 68,478 462 68,940
Miners and quarrymen 562,417 989 563,406

Food and kindred products.
Bakers 74,860 4,328 79,188
Butchers 112,815 378 113,193
Butter and cheese makers 18,593 648 19,241
Confectioners 21,980 9,214 31,194
Millers 40,362 186 40,548
Other food preparers 23,640 5,142 28,782

Iron and steel and their products.
Blacksmiths 226,284 193 226,477
Iron and steel workers 287,241 3,297 290,538
Machinists 282,574 571 283,145
Steam boiler makers 33,038 8 33,046
Stove, furnace, and grate makers 12,430 43 12,473
Tool and cutlery makers 27,376 746 28,122
Wheelwrights 13,495 10 13,505
Wireworkers 16,701 1,786 18,487

Leather and its finished products.
Boot and shoe makers and repairers 169,393 39,510 208,903
Harness and saddle makers and repairers 39,506 595 40,101
Leather curriers and tanners 40,917 1,754 42,671
Trunk and leather-case makers, etc. 5,472 1,579 7,051

Liquors and beverages.
Bottlers and soda water makers, etc. 9,725 794 10,519
Brewers and maltsters 20,687 275 20,962
Distillers and rectifiers 3,114 30 3,144

Lumber and its remanufactures.
Cabinetmakers 35,552 67 35,619
Coopers 37,087 113 37,200
Saw and planing mill employes 161,251 373 161,624
Other woodworkers 104,791 6,805 111,596 [Pg 311]

Metals and metal products other than iron and steel.
Brassworkers 25,870 890 26,760
Clock and watch makers and repairers 19,305 4,815 24,120
Gold and silver workers 19,732 6,380 26,112
Tin plate and tinware makers 68,730 1,775 70,505
Other metal workers 54,282 2,320 56,602

Paper and printing.
Bookbinders 14,646 15,632 30,278
Box makers (paper) 3,796 17,302 21,098
Engravers 10,698 453 11,151
Paper and pulp mill operatives 26,904 9,424 36,328
Printers, lithographers, and pressmen 139,166 15,981 155,147

Textiles.
Bleachery and dye works operatives 20,493 1,785 22,278
Carpet factory operatives 10,371 9,001 19,372
Cotton mill operatives 125,788 120,603 246,391
Hosiery and knitting mill operatives 12,630 34,490 47,120
Silk mill operatives 22,023 32,437 54,460
Woolen mill operatives 42,566 30,630 73,196
Other textile mill operatives 53,437 51,182 104,619
Dressmakers 2,090 344,794 346,884
Hat and cap makers 15,110 7,623 22,733
Milliners 1,739 86,120 87,859
Seamstresses 4,837 146,105 150,942
Shirt, collar, and cuff makers 8,491 30,941 39,432
Tailors and tailoresses 160,714 68,935 229,649
Other textile workers 8,862 20,671 29,533

Miscellaneous industries.
Broom and brush makers 8,643 1,577 10,220
Charcoal, coke, and lime burners 14,405 31 14,436
Engineers and firemen (not locomotive) 223,318 177 223,495
Glovemakers 4,503 7,768 12,271
Manufacturers and officials, etc. 239,649 3,360 243,009
Model and pattern makers 14,869 204 15,073
Photographers 23,361 3,580 26,941
Rubber factory operatives 14,492 7,374 21,866
Tobacco and cigar factory operatives 87,955 43,497 131,452
Upholsterers 28,663 2,158 30,821
Other miscellaneous industries 380,167 90,922 471,089
 Total manufacturing and mechanical pursuits 5,772,641 1,312,668 7,085,309
  Grand total 23,753,836 5,319,397 29,073,233
OCCUPATION. 1900.
Male. Female.
AGRICULTURAL PURSUITS
9,404,429
977,336
PROFESSIONAL SERVICE
827,941
430,597
DOMESTIC AND PERSONAL SERVICE
3,485,208
2,095,449
TRADE AND TRANSPORTATION
4,263,617
503,347
MANUFACTURING AND
MECHANICAL PURSUITS
5,772,641
1,312,668

Building trades.
Carpenters and joiners
599,707
545
Masons (brick and stone)
160,638
167
Painters, glaziers, and varnishers
275,782
1,759
Paper hangers
21,749
241
Plasterers
35,649
45
Plumbers and gas and steam fitters
97,659
126
Roofers and slaters
9,065
2
Mechanics (not otherwise specified)
9,351
27

Chemicals and allied products.
Oil well and oil works employes
24,573
53
Other chemical workers
12,035
2,688

Clay, glass, and stone products.
Brick and tile makers, etc.
49,455
478
Glassworkers
47,377
2,621
Marble and stone cutters
54,317
143
Potters
13,200
2,940

Fishing and mining.
Fishermen and oystermen
68,478
462
Miners and quarrymen
562,417
989

Food and kindred products.
Bakers
74,860
4,328
Butchers
112,815
378
Butter and cheese makers
18,593
648
Confectioners
21,980
9,214
Millers
40,362
186
Other food preparers
23,640
5,142

Iron and steel and their products.
Blacksmiths
226,284
193
Iron and steel workers
287,241
3,297
Machinists
282,574
571
Steam boiler makers
33,038
8
Stove, furnace, and grate makers
12,430
43
Tool and cutlery makers
27,376
746
Wheelwrights
13,495
10
Wireworkers
16,701
1,786

Leather and its finished products.
Boot and shoe makers and repairers
169,393
39,510
Harness and saddle makers and repairers
39,506
595
Leather curriers and tanners
40,917
1,754
Trunk and leather-case makers, etc.
5,472
1,579

Liquors and beverages.
Bottlers and soda water makers, etc.
9,725
794
Brewers and maltsters
20,687
275
Distillers and rectifiers
3,114
30

Lumber and its remanufactures.
Cabinetmakers
35,552
67
Coopers
37,087
113
Saw and planing mill employes
161,251
373
Other woodworkers
104,791
6,805

Metals and metal products other than iron and steel.
Brassworkers
25,870
890
Clock and watch makers and repairers
19,305
4,815
Gold and silver workers
19,732
6,380
Tin plate and tinware makers
68,730
1,775
Other metal workers
54,282
2,320

Paper and printing.
Bookbinders
14,646
15,632
Box makers (paper)
3,796
17,302
Engravers
10,698
453
Paper and pulp mill operatives
26,904
9,424
Printers, lithographers, and pressmen
139,166
15,981

Textiles.
Bleachery and dye works operatives
20,493
1,785
Carpet factory operatives
10,371
9,001
Cotton mill operatives
125,788
120,603
Hosiery and knitting mill operatives
12,630
34,490
Silk mill operatives
22,023
32,437
Woolen mill operatives
42,566
30,630
Other textile mill operatives
53,437
51,182
Dressmakers
2,090
344,794
Hat and cap makers
15,110
7,623
Milliners
1,739
86,120
Seamstresses
4,837
146,105
Shirt, collar, and cuff makers
8,491
30,941
Tailors and tailoresses
160,714
68,935
Other textile workers
8,862
20,671

Miscellaneous industries.
Broom and brush makers
8,643
1,577
Charcoal, coke, and lime burners
14,405
31
Engineers and firemen (not locomotive)
223,318
177
Glovemakers
4,503
7,768
Manufacturers and officials, etc.
239,649
3,360
Model and pattern makers
14,869
204
Photographers
23,361
3,580
Rubber factory operatives
14,492
7,374
Tobacco and cigar factory operatives
87,955
43,497
Upholsterers
28,663
2,158
Other miscellaneous industries
380,167
90,922
 Total manufacturing and mechanical pursuits
5,772,641
1,312,668
  Grand total
23,753,836
5,319,397
OCCUPATION. 1900.
Total.
AGRICULTURAL PURSUITS
10,381,765
PROFESSIONAL SERVICE
1,258,538
DOMESTIC AND PERSONAL SERVICE
5,580,657
TRADE AND TRANSPORTATION
4,766,964
MANUFACTURING AND
MECHANICAL PURSUITS
7,085,309

Building trades.
Carpenters and joiners
600,252
Masons (brick and stone)
160,805
Painters, glaziers, and varnishers
277,541
Paper hangers
21,990
Plasterers
35,694
Plumbers and gas and steam fitters
97,785
Roofers and slaters
9,067
Mechanics (not otherwise specified)
9,378

Chemicals and allied products.
Oil well and oil works employes
24,626
Other chemical workers
14,723

Clay, glass, and stone products.
Brick and tile makers, etc.
49,933
Glassworkers
49,998
Marble and stone cutters
54,460
Potters
16,140

Fishing and mining.
Fishermen and oystermen
68,940
Miners and quarrymen
563,406

Food and kindred products.
Bakers
79,188
Butchers
113,193
Butter and cheese makers
19,241
Confectioners
31,194
Millers
40,548
Other food preparers
28,782

Iron and steel and their products.
Blacksmiths
226,477
Iron and steel workers
290,538
Machinists
283,145
Steam boiler makers
33,046
Stove, furnace, and grate makers
12,473
Tool and cutlery makers
28,122
Wheelwrights
13,505
Wireworkers
18,487

Leather and its finished products.
Boot and shoe makers and repairers
208,903
Harness and saddle makers and repairers
40,101
Leather curriers and tanners
42,671
Trunk and leather-case makers, etc.
7,051

Liquors and beverages.
Bottlers and soda water makers, etc.
10,519
Brewers and maltsters
20,962
Distillers and rectifiers
3,144

Lumber and its remanufactures.
Cabinetmakers
35,619
Coopers
37,200
Saw and planing mill employes
161,624
Other woodworkers
111,596

Metals and metal products other than iron and steel.
Brassworkers
26,760
Clock and watch makers and repairers
24,120
Gold and silver workers
26,112
Tin plate and tinware makers
70,505
Other metal workers
56,602

Paper and printing.
Bookbinders
30,278
Box makers (paper)
21,098
Engravers
11,151
Paper and pulp mill operatives
36,328
Printers, lithographers, and pressmen
155,147

Textiles.
Bleachery and dye works operatives
22,278
Carpet factory operatives
19,372
Cotton mill operatives
246,391
Hosiery and knitting mill operatives
47,120
Silk mill operatives
54,460
Woolen mill operatives
73,196
Other textile mill operatives
104,619
Dressmakers
346,884
Hat and cap makers
22,733
Milliners
87,859
Seamstresses
150,942
Shirt, collar, and cuff makers
39,432
Tailors and tailoresses
229,649
Other textile workers
29,533

Miscellaneous industries.
Broom and brush makers
10,220
Charcoal, coke, and lime burners
14,436
Engineers and firemen (not locomotive)
223,495
Glovemakers
12,271
Manufacturers and officials, etc.
243,009
Model and pattern makers
15,073
Photographers
26,941
Rubber factory operatives
21,866
Tobacco and cigar factory operatives
131,452
Upholsterers
30,821
Other miscellaneous industries
471,089
 Total manufacturing and mechanical pursuits
7,085,309
  Grand total
29,073,233

[Pg 312]

[Pg 312]

World’s Development of Carrying Power, Production, and Commerce, 1800-1907.

[From “Transportation Systems of the World,” issued by the Bureau of Statistics, Department of Commerce and Labor.]

[From “Transportation Systems of the World,” issued by the Bureau of Statistics, Department of Commerce and Labor.]

Year. Population. Commerce. Carrying Power.
Total. Per capita. Sail. Steam. Total.
Millions. Millions of dollars. Dollars. Thousand tons.[JJ] Thousand tons.[JJ] Thousand tons.[JJ][KK]
1800[MM] 640 1,479 2.31 4,026 4,026
1820[NN] 780 1,659 2.13 5,814 0.023 5,894
1830[NN] 847 1,981 2.34 7,100 .111 7,528
1840[OO] 950 2,789 2.93 9,012 .372 10,482
1850[OO] 1,075 4,049 3.76 11,470 .864 14,902
1860[OO] 1,205 7,246 6.01 14,890 1.723 21,730
1870[PP] 1,310 10,663 8.14 12,900 3.012 25,100
1880[QQ] 1,439 14,761 10.26 14,400 5.901 37,900
1890[RR] 1,488 17,519 11.80 12,640 8.295 47,800
1900 1,543 20,105 13.02 8,119 13.856 63,543
1906 1,600 26,500 16.50 5,469 21.094 89,845
1907 5,200 22.140 93,760
Year. Railways. Telegraphs. Cables. Production of Cotton, Coal, and Pig iron.
Cotton. Coal. Pig iron.
Thousand miles.[JJ] Thousand miles. Thousand miles. Million pounds.[JJ] Million
tons.
Million tons.[JJ]
1800[MM] 520 11.6 0.5
1820[NN] 630 17.2 1.0
1830[NN] 0.2 820 25.1 1.6
1840[OO] 5.4 1,310 44.8 2.7
1850[OO] 24.0 5 1/40 1,435 81.4 4.4
1860[OO] 67.4 100 1½  2,551 142.3 7.2
1870[PP] 139.9 281 151.5 2,775 213.4 11.9
1880[QQ] 224.9 440 491.5 3,601 340.0 18.1
1890[RR] 390.0 768 1321.5 5,600 466.0 25.2
1900 500.0 1,180 2001.5 6,247 800.0 41.4
1906 [SS]562.8 1,200 2001.5 [TT]9,971 [12]987.9 [13]58.1
1907 595.8 [TT]8,256 [UU]1,079.6 [VV]59.7
Year. Population. Commerce.
Total. Per capita.
Millions. Millions of dollars. Dollars.
1800[MM]
640
1,479
2.31
1820[NN]
780
1,659
2.13
1830[NN]
847
1,981
2.34
1840[OO]
950
2,789
2.93
1850[OO]
1,075
4,049
3.76
1860[OO]
1,205
7,246
6.01
1870[PP]
1,310
10,663
8.14
1880[QQ]
1,439
14,761
10.26
1890[RR]
1,488
17,519
11.80
1900
1,543
20,105
13.02
1906
1,600
26,500
16.50
1907
Year. Carrying Power.
Sail. Steam. Total.
Thousand tons.[JJ] Thousand tons.[JJ] Thousand tons.[JJ][KK]
1800[MM]
4,026
4,026
1820[NN]
5,814
0.023
5,894
1830[NN]
7,100
.111
7,528
1840[OO]
9,012
.372
10,482
1850[OO]
11,470
.864
14,902
1860[OO]
14,890
1.723
21,730
1870[PP]
12,900
3.012
25,100
1880[QQ]
14,400
5.901
37,900
1890[RR]
12,640
8.295
47,800
1900
8,119
13.856
63,543
1906
5,469
21.094
89,845
1907
5,200
22.140
93,760
Year. Railways. Telegraphs. Cables.
Thousand miles.[JJ] Thousand miles. Thousand miles.
1800[MM]
1820[NN]
1830[NN]
0.2
1840[OO]
5.4
1850[OO]
24.0
5
1/40
1860[OO]
67.4
100
1½ 
1870[PP]
139.9
281
15.0
1880[QQ]
224.9
440
49.0
1890[RR]
390.0
768
132.0
1900
500.0
1,180
200.0
1906 [SS]562.8
1,200
200.0
1907
595.8
Year. Production of Cotton, Coal, and Pig iron.
Cotton. Coal. Pig iron.
Million pounds.[JJ] Million
tons.
Million tons.[JJ]
1800[MM]
520
11.6
0.5
1820[NN]
630
17.2
1.0
1830[NN]
820
25.1
1.6
1840[OO]
1,310
44.8
2.7
1850[OO]
1,435
81.4
4.4
1860[OO]
2,551
142.3
7.2
1870[PP]
2,775
213.4
11.9
1880[QQ]
3,601
340.0
18.1
1890[RR]
5,600
466.0
25.2
1900
6,247
800.0
41.4
1906
[TT]9,971
[12]987.9
[13]58.1
1907
[TT]8,256
[UU]1,079.6
[VV]59.7
Year. Area
cultivated.
Gold
production,
decade
ending
year
named.
Million
acres.[JJ]
Million
dollars.[LL]
1800[MM]
360
128.5
1820[NN]
402
76.1
1830[NN]
94.5
1840[OO]
492
134.8
1850[OO]
363.9
1860[OO]
583
1,334.0
1870[PP]
1,263.0
1880[QQ]
749
1,150.8
1890[RR]
807
1,060.1
1900
875
2,100.0
1906
900
3,095.0
1907
3,259.5

[JJ] Mulhall’s estimate, except 1830, 1890, 1900, 1906, and 1907.

[JJ] Mulhall’s estimate, excluding 1830, 1890, 1900, 1906, and 1907.

[KK] Steam tonnage reduced to sail by multiplying by 4.

[KK] Steam tonnage reduced for sailing by multiplying by 4.

[LL] Soetbeer’s estimates prior to 1860.

Soetbeer’s estimates before 1860.

[MM] Malte-Brun’s estimate for 1804.

Malte-Brun’s estimate from 1804.

[NN] Based on Balbi’s estimate for 1828.

[NN] According to Balbi's estimate from 1828.

[OO] Based on Michelet’s estimate for 1845.

[OO] According to Michelet’s estimate for 1845.

[PP] Based on Behm-Wagner estimate for 1874.

[PP] Based on the Behm-Wagner estimate from 1874.

[QQ] Levasseur’s estimate for 1878.

Levasseur's estimate for 1878.

[RR] Royal Geographic Society estimate.

Royal Geographical Society estimate.

[SS] Estimates of the Archiv für Eisenbahnwesen.

Estimates of the Archiv für Eisenbahnwesen.

[TT] Estimates of the United States Census Office.

[TT] Estimates from the United States Census Bureau.

[UU] Estimates of the United States Geological Survey.

[UU] Estimates from the United States Geological Survey.

[VV] Estimates of the “Mineral Industry.”

Estimates of the "Mineral Industry."

[Pg 313]

[Pg 313]

1. CAPITAL INVESTED IN MANUFACTURING AT EACH CENSUS:
1850 TO 1900

1. CAPITAL INVESTED IN MANUFACTURING AT EACH CENSUS:
1850 TO 1900

Illustration: CAPITAL INVESTED

2. AVERAGE NUMBER OF WAGE-EARNERS EMPLOYED IN MANUFACTURES AT EACH CENSUS: 1850 TO 1900

2. AVERAGE NUMBER OF WAGE-EARNERS EMPLOYED IN MANUFACTURES AT EACH CENSUS: 1850 TO 1900

Illustration: AVERAGE NUMBER OF WAGE-EARNERS

3. VALUE OF PRODUCTS AT EACH CENSUS: 1850 TO 1900

3. VALUE OF PRODUCTS AT EACH CENSUS: 1850 TO 1900

Illustration: VALUE OF PRODUCTS

4. PROPORTION WHICH AVERAGE NUMBER OF WAGE-EARNERS EMPLOYED IN MANUFACTURES BEAR TO POPULATION AT EACH CENSUS: 1850 TO 1900

4. PROPORTION OF AVERAGE NUMBER OF WAGE EARNERS EMPLOYED IN MANUFACTURING TO POPULATION AT EACH CENSUS: 1850 TO 1900

Illustration: AVERAGE NUMBER OF WAGE-EARNERS EMPLOYED

[Pg 314]

[Pg 314]

1. CAPITAL INVESTED IN MANUFACTURING IN EACH STATE AND TERRITORY: 1900

1. CAPITAL INVESTED IN MANUFACTURING IN EACH STATE AND TERRITORY: 1900

Illustration: CAPITAL INVESTED IN MANUFACTURING
Illustration: CAPITAL INVESTED IN MANUFACTURING

2. CAPITAL INVESTED BY STATE GROUPS

2. CAPITAL INVESTED BY STATE GROUPS

Illustration: CAPITAL INVESTED BY STATE GROUPS

[Pg 315]

[Pg 315]

1. AVERAGE NUMBER OF WAGE-EARNERS EMPLOYED IN MANUFACTURES: 1900.

1. AVERAGE NUMBER OF WAGE-EARNERS EMPLOYED IN MANUFACTURES: 1900.

Illustration: AVERAGE NUMBER OF WAGE-EARNERS
Illustration: AVERAGE NUMBER OF WAGE-EARNERS

2. AVERAGE NUMBER OF WAGE EARNERS EMPLOYED IN MANUFACTURES BY STATE GROUPS

2. AVERAGE NUMBER OF WAGE EARNERS EMPLOYED IN MANUFACTURES BY STATE GROUPS

Illustration: Wage Earners by State Groups

[Pg 316]

[Pg 316]

VALUE OF PRODUCTS OF CERTAIN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES: 1850 TO 1900

VALUE OF PRODUCTS OF CERTAIN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES: 1850 TO 1900

MILLIONS OF DOLLARS

MILLIONS OF DOLLARS

Illustration: Iron and Steel Illustration: Slaughtering Meat Packing Illustration: Lumber Timber Illustration: Flour Grist Mills Illustration: Clothing Illustration: Liqurs Illustration: Cotton Goods Illustration: Cars_Steam RR Illustration: Wool Manufacturers Illustration: Leather Illustration: Paper Wood Pulp Illustration: Silk Illustration: Agricultural Implements Illustration: Clay Products Illustration: Hosiery and Knit Goods Illustration: Glass

[Pg 317]

[Pg 317]

VALUE OF ALL MANUFACTURED PRODUCTS IN THE U. S., AND PROPORTIONAL VALUE OF EACH GROUP: 1880 TO 1900

VALUE OF ALL MANUFACTURED PRODUCTS IN THE U.S., AND PROPORTIONAL VALUE OF EACH GROUP: 1880 TO 1900

Illustration: Value of All Manufactured Products

[Pg 318]

[Pg 318]

VALUE OF PRODUCTS OF MANUFACTURES PER SQUARE MILE: 1900

VALUE OF PRODUCTS OF MANUFACTURERS PER SQUARE MILE: 1900

Illustration: Products per square mile-2
[Pg 319] Illustration: Manufactures per square mile-3
[Pg 320] Illustration: Manufactures per square mile-4
[Pg 321] Illustration: Manufactures per square mile-5 Illustration: Key code to maps

[Pg 322] CONCRETE AND STEEL.

BY J. F. SPRINGER.

BY J.F. SPRINGER.

[New York author of articles in Applied Science.]

[New York author of articles in Applied Science.]

The life of properly made concrete is not known. However, specimens from the times of the Romans are yet in good condition. This material has very considerable ability to resist compression; it is practically fireproof and teredo proof; when properly protected it is probably but little deteriorated by weather changes; and, if properly made, it is probably inappreciably subject to chemical disintegration when submerged. But there is one palpable fault—it is weak when subjected to tensile stresses. On the other hand—steel has great tensile resistivity and is strong under transverse stress. These two materials—concrete and steel—supplement each other in valuable qualities. The possibility of using them in combination depends largely upon the fact that their co-efficients of expansion are practically the same for moderate thermal fluctuations. Steel is easily corroded. Nor is it strictly fireproof, as temperatures which are not excessive will induce bending and buckling. When it is surrounded by concrete, steel is protected against both fire and corrosion.

The lifespan of well-made concrete isn't known. However, samples from Roman times are still in good shape. This material has a significant ability to resist compression; it’s almost fireproof and resistant to marine borer attacks; when adequately protected, it likely suffers minimal deterioration from weather changes; and if made correctly, it’s probably very little affected by chemical breakdown when submerged. But there is one obvious drawback—it’s weak under tensile stresses. On the flip side, steel has great tensile strength and is strong under transverse stress. These two materials—concrete and steel—complement each other’s valuable qualities. The possibility of using them together largely depends on their coefficients of expansion being almost the same for moderate temperature changes. Steel is prone to corrosion and isn’t entirely fireproof, as even moderate temperatures can cause bending and buckling. When surrounded by concrete, steel is shielded from both fire and corrosion.

In many situations, steel would not alone supply the best material of construction. And the same remark applies to concrete. A striking instance is the case of the six new docks in Baltimore. Three of these had already been constructed of wood and stone, when it became evident that the building of the remaining three and of the long bulkhead which was part of the scheme along the same lines would entail a larger expense than the use of reinforced concrete construction. Steel by itself would have been impossible of consideration because of its susceptibility [Pg 323] to corrosion. Concrete alone could not be used because of the excessive cost of the increased amount of Portland cement. It is said, that a retaining wall of all concrete would have cost about $600 per linear foot. Reinforced concrete costs about $58 per foot.

In many cases, steel alone isn't the best construction material. The same is true for concrete. A clear example can be seen with the six new docks in Baltimore. Three had already been built using wood and stone, when it became clear that constructing the remaining three, along with the long bulkhead that was part of the project, would cost more than using reinforced concrete. Steel by itself wasn't a viable option because it rusts easily. Concrete couldn't be used alone due to the high cost of the extra Portland cement. It's said that a retaining wall made entirely of concrete would cost around $600 per linear foot, while reinforced concrete costs about $58 per foot.

Steel is used, not merely as a reinforcement, but as the material of forms. Used thus, it may, at times, not only retain the concrete in position but also prevent the action of the surrounding soil or water. The possibility of using steel for forms depends largely upon the fact that many applications of concrete are becoming standardized rapidly. Thus is permitted a re-use of the steel form that justifies the expense. But the employment of steel forms sometimes involves the use of steel in the handling of them. A further use, although perhaps more remote, is in connection with the arrangements for the handling of the mixed concrete and of the raw materials. Still more remote, but still a necessary application, is the use of steel and iron in the crushing mills and the like. When we look at the question and inform ourselves of the ramifications, it is not difficult to see that concrete and steel are materials whose engineering applications are mutually involved. Concrete is certainly replacing steel in some applications. But, notwithstanding this, these two are to be regarded as unopposed to each other on the whole.

Steel is used not just for reinforcement but also as the material for forms. When used this way, it can sometimes not only keep the concrete in place but also stop the surrounding soil or water from acting on it. The ability to use steel for forms is mainly due to the fact that many concrete applications are quickly becoming standardized. This allows for the reuse of steel forms, making the cost worthwhile. However, using steel forms can sometimes require steel for handling them. A further use, though perhaps less direct, relates to the systems for managing the mixed concrete and raw materials. Even more indirect, but still essential, is the use of steel and iron in crushing mills and similar equipment. When we examine the issue and understand the connections, it’s clear that concrete and steel are materials whose engineering uses are closely linked. Concrete is definitely taking over some functions that steel used to fill. However, despite this, these two materials should be seen as largely complementary.

When concrete is cast about steel, an adhesive bond ensues. But this is scarcely to be regarded as sufficient to enable the two to act as one under tensile stresses. A mechanical bond should be employed. This is the explanation of the somewhat complicated forms of standard reinforcement bars.

When concrete is poured around steel, an adhesive bond forms. However, this is hardly enough to make the two work together under tension. A mechanical bond should be used. This explains the somewhat complex shapes of standard reinforcement bars.

Concrete properly reinforced is an admirable material for factory construction. It permits of rapid erection, is fireproof, has a long life, is adapted to weather conditions, and is economical. The floors of concrete buildings are easily cleaned and do not develop splinters.

Concrete that is properly reinforced is a great material for building factories. It allows for quick construction, is fire-resistant, lasts a long time, can handle different weather conditions, and is cost-effective. The floors in concrete buildings are easy to clean and don’t splinter.

[Pg 324] One of the large automobile factories—that of the Geo. N. Pierce Company at Buffalo, N. Y.—is a good instance of the rapidity with which reinforced concrete buildings may be erected. Within seven months of the date of signing the contract with the Trussed Concrete Steel Company, Detroit, Mich., which employs the Kahn system of reinforcement, certain large structures were ready for use. The floor space here is 325,000 square feet. It was necessary to provide a number of large areas unbroken by supports. It was found possible to use girders having spans of 55 and 61 feet. When subjected to a load, a girder develops compressive strains above and tensile ones below. The concrete is well adapted to withstand the one, but not the other. In an ordinary bridge truss, there may be diagonals that are also under tensile stress. In the Kahn system of reinforcement, a horizontal bar from which rigidly attached diagonals extend upward and outward is provided with a view of enabling the girder to withstand the tensile stress. In accordance with this design the long girders were constructed. Girders providing runways for 3-ton cranes were also constructed. A load of 14 tons placed upon one of the reinforced concrete girders having a span of 25 feet induced a deflection of only 116 inch. This girder is 12 inches wide and 22 inches deep and its reinforcement consists of three 1 x 3 in. Kahn bars. Hollow tile was largely employed here in connection with the concrete.

[Pg 324] One of the big auto factories—Geo. N. Pierce Company in Buffalo, NY—is a great example of how quickly reinforced concrete buildings can go up. Within seven months after signing the contract with the Trussed Concrete Steel Company in Detroit, MI, which uses the Kahn system of reinforcement, several large structures were ready for use. The floor space is 325,000 square feet, and it was necessary to create large areas without supports. They managed to use girders with spans of 55 and 61 feet. When a girder bears weight, it experiences compressive strains on top and tensile strains on the bottom. Concrete handles the compressive strain well but struggles with tensile strain. In a typical bridge truss, there are diagonals that also face tensile stress. The Kahn system addresses this by incorporating a horizontal bar with rigidly attached diagonals extending upward and outward to help the girder handle tensile stress. Following this design, the long girders were built. Girders for 3-ton cranes were also constructed. A load of 14 tons placed on one of the reinforced concrete girders with a 25-foot span caused only a deflection of 116 inch. This girder is 12 inches wide and 22 inches deep, reinforced with three 1 x 3 inch Kahn bars. Hollow tile was also heavily used in conjunction with the concrete.

What is known in the trade as the corrugated bar, supplied by the Corrugated Steel Bar Company is a steel reinforcing rod which provides shoulders by means of which the concrete is mechanically engaged. This general type of reinforcement is, however, not confined to this concern. By means of this style of bar, the engineer is able to secure the desired mechanical interlock. As the concrete and steel expand and contract they do so together—unless the temperature change is excessive—and so the relation between the two is maintained. Such standard [Pg 325] types of reinforcing bars are applicable to multitudes of construction. An interesting example is the railroad bridge over the Vermilion River near Danville, Illinois. There are three arches, the central one of which has a span of 100 feet. About 130 tons of corrugated bars were employed in the construction of this beautiful bridge.

What’s known in the industry as the corrugated bar, provided by the Corrugated Steel Bar Company, is a steel reinforcing rod that features shoulders for mechanical engagement with concrete. However, this type of reinforcement isn't exclusive to this company. This style of bar allows engineers to achieve the necessary mechanical interlock. As the concrete and steel expand and contract, they do so together—unless there’s an extreme temperature change—ensuring that their relationship is maintained. These standard types of reinforcing bars are used in many construction projects. An interesting example is the railroad bridge over the Vermilion River near Danville, Illinois. It has three arches, with the central one spanning 100 feet. About 130 tons of corrugated bars were used in constructing this beautiful bridge.

Another good example of bridge construction is the bridge over the Maumee River near Waterville, Ohio. This structure follows the designs of the National Bridge Company. It has a width of 16 feet between copings and crosses the river at a point where it is 1,000 feet wide. It is said that this reinforced bridge will carry a load of 5 tons per linear foot. The arches are 12 in number, the longest having a span of 90 feet, and the shortest, one of 75 feet. The loading of a bridge arch produces a lateral thrust upon the piers. If the next arch is not loaded, then this thrust is unbalanced and must be cared for. This was done in this case by employing part of the 100 tons of reinforcement in a vertical position. This bridge having a very long expectation of life was built at a cost of $77,000. The total amount of concrete was about 9,200 cubic yards.

Another great example of bridge construction is the bridge over the Maumee River near Waterville, Ohio. This structure was designed by the National Bridge Company. It is 16 feet wide between the edges and spans the river at a point where it's 1,000 feet wide. This reinforced bridge is said to support a load of 5 tons per linear foot. There are 12 arches, with the longest spanning 90 feet and the shortest at 75 feet. The weight on a bridge arch creates a sideways pressure on the piers. If the next arch isn't loaded, then this pressure is unbalanced and needs to be addressed. In this case, some of the 100 tons of reinforcement was positioned vertically to handle this. This bridge, expected to last a very long time, was built for $77,000. It required about 9,200 cubic yards of concrete.

The city of Philadelphia has gone into the construction of city bridges of concrete in rather an extensive way. Among a total of 30 or more is the reinforced bridge across Poquessing Creek, having a span of 71 feet. This bridge is rather flat, having a rise of but 9½ feet. The reinforcement employed here consisted in part of angle bars placed in pairs to form a kind of T-bar. The principal reinforcement here was the arch ribs. These were each composed of two of the T-bars arranged one above the other in such manner that their points of nearest approach were at the crown. These were latticed together. Such ribs were placed 4 feet apart. Transversely disposed steel rods held the whole together. The mechanical interlock here depended upon was due, no doubt, to the mutual disposition of the various rods, etc.

The city of Philadelphia has significantly invested in constructing concrete city bridges. Among more than 30, there is a reinforced bridge over Poquessing Creek, which spans 71 feet. This bridge is relatively flat, rising only 9½ feet. The reinforcement used here included angle bars arranged in pairs to create a sort of T-bar. The main reinforcement was the arch ribs, each made of two T-bars stacked on top of each other so that their closest points met at the top. These were interconnected with latticework. The ribs were placed 4 feet apart. Steel rods arranged transversely held everything together. The mechanical interlock relied on the arrangement of the various rods and components.

[Pg 326] A railway viaduct, one-half mile or more in length is another example of the Kahn methods. This structure belongs to the Richmond & Chesapeake Railway and is located at Richmond, Va. There is a span of 70 feet which has girders nearly 6 feet deep. At another span the girders, probably of about the same depth, sagged but ⅛ inch upon removal of the falsework.

[Pg 326] A railway viaduct that’s at least half a mile long is another example of Kahn's methods. This structure is part of the Richmond & Chesapeake Railway and is located in Richmond, VA. One of the spans measures 70 feet and features girders that are nearly 6 feet deep. In another span, the girders, likely of similar depth, sagged by just ⅛ inch after the falsework was removed.

A style of reinforcement much used consists of a net-like fabric of metal. This is employed largely in floors to bind the whole mass together. In the manufacture of this netting, a Canadian company has found it desirable to repair the inevitable breakages of strands in manufacture by the use of the Davis-Bournonville Company’s oxyacetylene torch. It is said that welds can be made on the average of one in two minutes in the case of an ordinary weight of the fabric. This netting is made by expanding sheets of perforated metal from a narrow to a considerable width. It is during this expansion that the strands sometimes break.

A commonly used type of reinforcement is a net-like fabric made of metal. This is primarily used in floors to hold everything together. In the production of this netting, a Canadian company has found it useful to fix the unavoidable breaks in strands during manufacturing using the Davis-Bournonville Company’s oxyacetylene torch. It's reported that welds can be made about once every two minutes for a standard weight of the fabric. This netting is created by stretching sheets of perforated metal from a narrow width to a much wider one. It’s during this stretching process that the strands sometimes break.

Another style of floor reinforcement is the fabric made from wire. That floors properly reinforced are quite substantial may be judged from the case of the United States Fidelity & Guarantee Company. Their building in Baltimore was exposed to intense heat in the great fire of 1904. In fact, a considerable part of the side walls and the front fell, leaving floors of concrete. A load of brick giving a pressure of 300 pounds per square foot was arranged on one of the floors to a distance of 5 feet to each side of one of the girders. The deflection amounted to ⅛ inch. This was about 1⁄20 of 1 per cent of the span. This is an example of Hennibique construction.

Another method of reinforcing floors is with wire fabric. You can see how strong properly reinforced floors are by looking at the case of the United States Fidelity & Guarantee Company. Their building in Baltimore faced extreme heat during the great fire of 1904. In fact, a significant part of the side walls and the front collapsed, leaving behind concrete floors. A load of bricks, putting pressure of 300 pounds per square foot, was placed on one of the floors extending 5 feet to each side of one of the girders. The deflection measured ⅛ inch. This is about 1/20 of 1 percent of the span. This example showcases Hennibique construction.

Reference has already been made to the Kahn truss reinforcement. With the same general object in view, the Hennibique truss has been designed. There are two horizontal bars, one above the other. The upper is, however, not perfectly horizontal except near the center. Towards [Pg 327] either side, this bar rises as it recedes from the center. These two bars are enveloped by loose stirrups arranged vertically and at intervals. These are open at the top and closed below.

Reference has already been made to the Kahn truss reinforcement. With the same general goal in mind, the Hennibique truss has been designed. There are two horizontal bars, one above the other. However, the upper bar is not perfectly horizontal except near the center. Towards either side, this bar rises as it moves away from the center. These two bars are surrounded by loose stirrups arranged vertically and at intervals. These stirrups are open at the top and closed at the bottom.

There are two varieties of piles—the bearing pile and the sheet pile. Their duties are quite different. One sustains a compressive load, the other withstands a transverse thrust. But concrete has been used for both kinds. In the case of the bearing pile, its own intrinsic qualities are eminently suitable. It has good compressive resistance; it is teredo proof, and has the prospect of long life whether conditions are wet, dry or a mixture of the two. Wood makes an admirable bearing pile, if constantly submerged, but it is a prey to the teredo. The necessity for constant submergence limits the usefulness of the wood pile. It must be cut off below the hydraulic level, and this necessitates carrying the foundation footings to a lower level than would otherwise ordinarily be the case. With the concrete bearing pile, on the contrary, the footings may be constructed at any level desired as the pile itself may be partly submerged and partly in the dry. However, the concrete pile may be subjected to other than compressive stresses, especially during its placement. And so, some reinforce it. Some, no doubt, have in view a possible buckling when in the ground, particularly if the surrounding soil is yielding. Reinforcement both longitudinal and transverse is employed. Longitudinal bars are arranged at intervals around and within the periphery. These may be bound together by separate hoops disposed along the length or by wire wound about the longitudinals in spirals. In the case of concrete sheet piling, the concrete supplies a surface and forms a protective covering to the imbedded reinforcement which is here a vital matter and consequently indispensable. In the dock improvements at Baltimore, to which reference has already been made, reinforced concrete sheet piling was largely used. The steel sheet pile [Pg 328] could not well have been used here because of its susceptibility to corrosion. The concrete slabs, 12 × 18 inches in cross-section perform the duty of retaining masses of earth in place both above and below the water line. There were certain other concrete constructional elements of an auxiliary character. The total reinforcement amounted to about 1,200 tons.

There are two types of piles—the bearing pile and the sheet pile. They have very different roles. One supports a compressive load, while the other resists lateral pressure. However, both types can be made from concrete. For bearing piles, the material’s natural properties are very suitable. It has good compressive strength; it’s resistant to teredo worms, and it can last a long time in both wet and dry conditions. Wood can be a great choice for bearing piles when it’s always submerged, but it is vulnerable to teredo. The need for constant submersion limits the effectiveness of wood piles. They need to be cut off below the water level, which requires the foundation footings to be placed lower than would usually be necessary. In contrast, concrete bearing piles allow the footings to be built at any desired level since the pile itself can be partly submerged and partly above water. However, concrete piles can face other stresses besides compression, especially during installation, so some are reinforced. Some people are likely concerned about potential buckling once they’re in the ground, particularly if the surrounding soil moves. Both longitudinal and transverse reinforcement is used. Longitudinal bars are placed at intervals around and within the outer edge, and these can be tied together with separate hoops along the length or with wire spiraled around the longitudinal bars. For concrete sheet piling, the concrete provides a surface and protects the embedded reinforcement, which is crucial and necessary. In the dock improvements in Baltimore, previously mentioned, a lot of reinforced concrete sheet piling was used. Steel sheet piles couldn’t be used there because they corrode easily. The concrete slabs, measuring 12 × 18 inches in cross-section, hold back large amounts of earth above and below the water line. There were some additional concrete elements for support as well. The total amount of reinforcement was about 1,200 tons.

With regard to its fireproof qualities, an eloquent testimonial arises from the fact that the immense Marlborough-Blenheim Hotel at Atlantic City, a concrete and tile structure, is said to enjoy a saving of $18,000 per year in fire insurance premiums. The insurance is based on $600,000. This structure is 560 feet in length and has a width varying from 60 to 200 feet.

With its fireproof features, a compelling example can be seen in the large Marlborough-Blenheim Hotel in Atlantic City, which is made of concrete and tile. It reportedly saves $18,000 a year on fire insurance premiums, which are based on $600,000. The building is 560 feet long and ranges in width from 60 to 200 feet.

Reference has been made to the close identity of the co-efficients of expansion for steel and concrete for moderate intervals of temperature. While this is so, if the thermal range is considerable, the concrete and the steel cannot be expected to expand and contract together. In most engineering construction, the range is small, say 150 degrees F., but there are exceptions. One of these relates to the material used in tall chimneys. The hot gases which pass up these give rise to rather high temperatures. In fact, it is well-recognized practice to build a large part of such chimneys double, one shell enveloping another, with an air space between. Some four or five years ago what is, perhaps, the very tallest concrete chimney in the United States was built for the Colusa Parrot Mining & Smelting Company, Butte, Montana. It is 352½ feet high and has a flue 18 feet in diameter. A solid wall 1½ feet thick constitutes the base of 21 feet in height. Above this level, an air space 4 inches wide radially is arranged between two shells of 5 and 9 inches thick. The inner one is the thinner. The steel reinforcements used were T-bars. The footing is of reinforced concrete and rests upon a fill 18 feet deep. A further important factor which has to be [Pg 329] considered is the serious effect of repeated stresses. Partly because of this, it is recommended that a large factor of safety be adopted. Further, the best practice would seem to be in the direction of a complete divorce between the inner and outer shells all the way up and of a uniformity in wall thickness from bottom to top. Vertical cracks have been noted in some chimneys. This would indicate the advisability of strong circular reinforcement. It is thought that a tone concrete following the formula 1:2:2 is better for the outer shell than a cement mortar. It is said to be stronger, denser and more impervious to water than a mortar following the formula 1:3. In order to secure adhesion between layers, the fresh concrete should be applied wet and the old should perhaps be resurfaced by tooling.

Reference has been made to the similar expansion coefficients for steel and concrete at moderate temperature ranges. While this is true, if the temperature changes are significant, concrete and steel won't expand and contract at the same rate. In most engineering projects, the temperature range is small, around 150 degrees F, but there are exceptions. One notable case involves tall chimneys. The hot gases that rise through these chimneys generate quite high temperatures. It’s common practice to build these chimneys with a double-walled structure, where one shell surrounds another with an air gap in between. About four or five years ago, what might be the tallest concrete chimney in the United States was constructed for the Colusa Parrot Mining & Smelting Company in Butte, Montana. It stands at 352½ feet tall and has a flue with an 18-foot diameter. The base, which is 21 feet high, has a solid wall that is 1½ feet thick. Above that, there’s a 4-inch air space between two shells that are 5 inches and 9 inches thick, respectively, with the inner shell being the thinner one. The steel reinforcements used were T-bars. The footing is made of reinforced concrete and is supported by an 18-foot deep fill. Another important factor to consider is the significant impact of repeated stresses. Because of this, it’s advisable to adopt a large safety factor. Additionally, the best approach seems to be to completely separate the inner and outer shells throughout their height and to maintain a consistent wall thickness from bottom to top. Vertical cracks have been observed in some chimneys, suggesting that strong circular reinforcement is advisable. It is believed that a concrete mix using the formula 1:2:2 is preferable for the outer shell compared to a cement mortar. This mix is said to be stronger, denser, and more water-resistant than mortar made with a 1:3 ratio. To ensure proper adhesion between layers, fresh concrete should be applied while it's still wet, and the older surfaces may need to be resurfaced with tooling.

The compressive resistivity of the usual concretes is considerable. However, in certain bridge construction in New York City, a need was felt for a concrete which should have a very high compressive resistance. And so experiments were made with a concrete formed by substituting wire nails for the crushed stone. About 60 tests were made with concrete following the formula 1:2:2⅔. The resulting material was quite heavy. A cubic foot weighed 196 pounds as compared with 130 to 160 pounds for ordinary concretes. Eighty-eight pounds of nails were used in one cubic foot bringing the cost to about $2.30. This was certainly very expensive material. But where extraordinary qualities are desired, we have to spend money. Cubes were cast measuring 6 inches on a side. These were tested to destruction at different stages of maturity. After the lapse of one week, the lowest crushing resistance obtained was 2,770 pounds per square inch and the highest 3,330 pounds. After one month, the minimum crushing strength was 3,050 pounds, the maximum 8,340 pounds, while the average was 5,645 pounds. When a year had gone by, it was found that four cubes gave an average [Pg 330] of 10,410 pounds. However, the average resistance of 17,235 pounds was obtained in the case of cubes 15 months old.

The compressive strength of regular concrete is significant. However, for certain bridge constructions in New York City, there was a need for concrete with very high compressive strength. So, experiments were conducted using a concrete mix that replaced crushed stone with wire nails. About 60 tests were performed using a concrete formula of 1:2:2⅔. The resulting material was quite heavy, weighing 196 pounds per cubic foot compared to the usual 130 to 160 pounds for standard concrete. Each cubic foot contained eighty-eight pounds of nails, bringing the cost to approximately $2.30. This was certainly expensive material, but when exceptional qualities are needed, spending money is necessary. Cubes measuring 6 inches on each side were cast and tested for failure at various stages of maturity. After one week, the lowest compressive strength recorded was 2,770 pounds per square inch, while the highest was 3,330 pounds. After one month, the minimum compressive strength was 3,050 pounds, the maximum was 8,340 pounds, and the average was 5,645 pounds. After a year, four cubes showed an average strength of 10,410 pounds. However, the average strength rose to 17,235 pounds for cubes that were 15 months old.

Since concrete is but little affected by water and by fluctuations between wet and dry conditions, it is not at all remarkable that it has been employed for sewer and water tower construction. In the United States a high standpipe has been constructed at Attleboro, Massachusetts. This is 118 feet high and has an internal diameter of 50 feet. The wall varies from 18 inches in thickness at the bottom to 8 inches at the top. The concrete was made according to the formula 1:2:4. There is another tower 110 feet high and having an external diameter of about 35 feet. At Anaheim, California, a large tank together with its substructure has been constructed entirely of reinforced concrete. The floor of the tank is about 60 feet above the surface. The tank itself is 38 feet in height and 30 feet in diameter and has a wall varying in thickness from 5 to 3 inches. The reinforcement employed was the twisted steel bar.

Since concrete is minimally affected by water and by changes between wet and dry conditions, it's not surprising that it has been used for building sewers and water towers. In the United States, a tall standpipe has been built in Attleboro, Massachusetts. This standpipe is 118 feet high and has an internal diameter of 50 feet. The wall thickness ranges from 18 inches at the bottom to 8 inches at the top. The concrete was made using the 1:2:4 formula. There's another tower that stands 110 feet high and has an external diameter of about 35 feet. In Anaheim, California, a large tank and its supporting structure have been built entirely out of reinforced concrete. The floor of the tank is about 60 feet above ground. The tank itself is 38 feet tall and 30 feet in diameter, with wall thickness varying from 5 to 3 inches. The reinforcement used was twisted steel bars.

In order to prevent corrosion of the reinforcement, it is thought necessary to guard against water entering and dissolving away the caustic lime contacting with the steel. One way would be to give the concrete itself a very dense character. Another is to fill the external pores with a bituminous or oleo-resinous paint. Or, an insoluble substance suited to fill the pores may be one of the ingredients when the concrete is mixed. Finally a flexible waterproof coating may be employed where conditions permit. As to the steel itself—it is desirable to have it uniform, as then reliance may be placed upon calculations. For this reason, one of the great concrete construction companies recommends mild steel as opposed to high carbon steel.

To prevent corrosion of the reinforcement, it's necessary to protect against water getting in and dissolving the caustic lime that comes into contact with the steel. One approach is to make the concrete itself very dense. Another is to fill the outer pores with a bituminous or oleo-resinous paint. Alternatively, an insoluble substance that can fill the pores might be included in the concrete mix. Lastly, a flexible waterproof coating can be used where conditions allow. Regarding the steel itself, it's important for it to be uniform, as this ensures reliability in calculations. For this reason, one of the leading concrete construction companies suggests using mild steel instead of high carbon steel.

One of the great recommendations of concrete is that it permits wonderful rapidity of construction. We had an [Pg 331] example of this in the case of the Geo. N. Pierce automobile factory. Another was in connection with the construction of junction caissons for certain subsurface tubes of the tunnel of the Hudson Companies. These caissons were three in number and were located on the Jersey shore opposite New York City. These structures were quite large, being about 100 feet in length and having a width of about 45 feet. These caissons, one or two of which were put under air pressure, were constructed of concrete with steel reinforcement. The use of concrete in the tunnel system and in the Terminal Building has been very extensive. To complete the concrete construction, about half a million barrels of Portland cement, so it is thought, must be consumed. The Gatun Locks at Panama will require only about four times this amount. The twisted steel bars of the reinforcement have been used in large quantity.

One of the best things about concrete is that it allows for very fast construction. We saw this with the Geo. N. Pierce automobile factory. Another example was the construction of junction caissons for certain underground tubes in the Hudson Companies' tunnel. There were three of these caissons located on the Jersey shore opposite New York City. They were quite large, about 100 feet long and 45 feet wide. Some of these caissons were placed under air pressure and were made of concrete with steel reinforcement. The use of concrete in the tunnel system and in the Terminal Building has been extensive. To finish the concrete construction, it's estimated that about half a million barrels of Portland cement will be needed. The Gatun Locks in Panama will require about four times this amount. A large quantity of twisted steel bars for reinforcement has been used.

The work on the water front at Baltimore to which reference has already been made involved a considerable variety of reinforced concrete construction. For retaining walls sheet piles were employed. These ordinarily had a face of 18 inches and a thickness of 12 inches and a length of 27 feet. As it was not necessary to retain the soil by an impervious bulkhead, these piles did not interlock. However, they had to resist a horizontal thrust, and so wales were strung along the outside at the top. These wales were themselves of concrete reinforced by means of imbedded lattice girders of steel. In position, the girders lay flat and thus gave their chief strength to the horizontal thrust. The wales were supported, in part, by concrete piers. These were placed by means of steel caissons. These cofferdams were of sheet steel 27 feet deep and were sunk by open air methods. When in place, the concrete was put in and the pier thus formed. An upward surface of the pier provides a means of absorbing the horizontal thrust of the wales. The piers themselves are, some of them, mutually tied together across the dock; [Pg 332] others are tied to reinforced concrete piles sunk in the body of the dock. The ties are themselves of reinforced concrete. The steel of the caissons served only as a mold. It is now a matter apparently of but little importance how soon it corrodes. The extensive concrete work at Baltimore was done by the Raymond Concrete Pile Company.

The construction work on the waterfront in Baltimore that we mentioned earlier included a significant amount of reinforced concrete work. For the retaining walls, sheet piles were used. These typically had a width of 18 inches, a thickness of 12 inches, and a length of 27 feet. Since it wasn't necessary to hold back the soil with a solid bulkhead, these piles didn't interlock. However, they needed to withstand a horizontal force, so concrete wales were placed along the top outside edge. These wales were reinforced with embedded steel lattice girders. When positioned, the girders lay flat, providing their main strength to handle the horizontal force. The wales were also supported by concrete piers, which were installed using steel caissons. These cofferdams were 27 feet deep and made of sheet steel, and they were sunk using open air methods. Once set, concrete was poured to form the piers. The top surface of the pier helps absorb the horizontal force from the wales. Some of the piers are connected together across the dock; others connect to reinforced concrete piles driven into the dock. The ties themselves are made of reinforced concrete. The steel from the caissons was only used as a mold, so its corrosion over time is not a significant concern. The extensive concrete work in Baltimore was carried out by the Raymond Concrete Pile Company.

While the question of the teredo seems to have been a factor at Baltimore because of the probability of its presence in the harbor when certain sewerage improvements are carried out, this matter was really an insistent thing in connection with a wharf constructed by the United Fruit Company at Bocas del Toro in the Republic of Panama. This wharf is itself of reinforced concrete. But the bearing piles are what interest us. The native wooden piling, so it seems, would at this general location become seriously damaged by the teredo within a year. Some kinds of timber might be expected to have a longer life. The service of creosoted piles has been estimated as about 15 years. Besides, piles 70 feet in length were desired. This requirement put the ordinary reinforced concrete piles out of consideration. What was actually done was to use an untreated timber pile and then to encase it where it passed through the water in a reinforced concrete shell. This shell was made of such size as to allow a space between it and the enclosed wooden pile. A rich concrete was put in this space at the bottom and thus excluded the external water. Upon pumping out the retained water, the major portion of the space was filled with a lean concrete and a top layer of rich concrete then added in which the column reinforcement was placed. The steel used for reinforcement was in the main round bars of mild steel. The piles averaged 58 feet in length; the shells, 18.4 feet. The cost of these shells was $1.78 per linear foot. It is said that the cost of the untreated wooden pile together with its protective coating was not greater than what would have been the expense for a creosoted pile.

While the issue of teredo seems to have been a concern in Baltimore due to its likely presence in the harbor with certain sewage improvements, this matter was actually pressing in relation to a wharf built by the United Fruit Company in Bocas del Toro, Panama. This wharf is made of reinforced concrete. However, the bearing piles are what we’re focused on. The native wooden piles, it appears, would suffer significant damage from teredo within a year at this general site. Some types of wood might be expected to last longer. The lifespan for creosoted piles has been estimated at about 15 years. Furthermore, piles 70 feet long were needed. This requirement ruled out typical reinforced concrete piles. What was done instead was to use an untreated timber pile and encase it in a reinforced concrete shell where it passed through the water. This shell was sized to create a space between it and the wooden pile. A rich concrete was placed in this space at the bottom to keep out external water. After pumping out the retained water, the majority of the space was filled with a lean concrete, and then a top layer of rich concrete was added where the column reinforcement would go. The steel used for reinforcement mainly consisted of round mild steel bars. The piles averaged 58 feet in length; the shells were 18.4 feet. The cost of these shells was $1.78 per linear foot. It’s reported that the cost of the untreated wooden pile and its protective coating was not more than what a creosoted pile would have cost.

[Pg 333] At both the Baltimore docks and the wharf in the tropics, concrete is exposed to the action of sea water. But there is no violence in this action. However, a very large application of concrete construction has been recently carried out in a very much exposed maritime situation off the coast of Florida. It is 156 miles from the mainland to the island of Key West. Scattered along this interval are a number of islands, so that in reality the total linear amount of intervening land is about one-half the distance. Some of the water passages are only a few hundred feet in width; one is about 2½ miles wide. The greater portion of the aqueous route is of a shallow depth. But for about 6 miles the water reached depths up to 30 feet; and this in connection with an exposed situation. Reinforced concrete viaducts have been built to accommodate trains and resist the storms. A quarter million barrels of cement and about 5,700 tons of steel went into these works.

[Pg 333] At both the Baltimore docks and the wharf in the tropics, concrete is exposed to the action of seawater. But this action isn’t violent. Recently, a significant amount of concrete construction has been undertaken in a highly exposed maritime area off the coast of Florida. It’s 156 miles from the mainland to the island of Key West. Along this stretch, there are several islands, so the total linear distance of land in between is about half that distance. Some of the water passages are only a few hundred feet wide; one measures about 2½ miles across. Most of the water route is quite shallow, but for about 6 miles, the water reaches depths of up to 30 feet, which is particularly concerning given the exposed situation. Reinforced concrete viaducts have been constructed to support trains and withstand storms. A quarter million barrels of cement and around 5,700 tons of steel were used in these projects.

The viaduct from Long Key is 2 miles long and passed through water having a depth ranging from 13 to 20 feet. The floor of the Gulf is of coral. To construct a pier, about 30 piles would be driven in with their tops projecting up from the floor. A cofferdam would be sunk to include them and a seal of concrete 1 yard thick be placed. The water could now be pumped out and the form concreted. The reinforcement would, of course, be put in place before depositing this concrete. The pier would then be allowed 3 weeks to mature. The concrete was mixed with fresh water to avoid the effect of sea water on the steel. Corrugated bars were used in reinforcing the walls and the 184 arches. High water is 31 feet below the top of this structure, so that the track is well protected from the waves.

The viaduct from Long Key is 2 miles long and goes through water that’s between 13 and 20 feet deep. The floor of the Gulf is made of coral. To build a pier, about 30 piles would be driven into the ground with their tops sticking up from the bottom. A cofferdam would be sunk around them, and a concrete seal 1 yard thick would be placed. The water could then be pumped out, and the form would be filled with concrete. The reinforcement would be put in place before pouring the concrete, of course. The pier would then be allowed to cure for 3 weeks. The concrete was mixed with fresh water to prevent sea water from affecting the steel. Corrugated bars were used to reinforce the walls and the 184 arches. High water is 31 feet below the top of this structure, so the track is well protected from the waves.

It may surprise some, but concrete has actually been used as the chief material in the construction of boats. A reinforced concrete boat was built thirteen years ago for use on the River Tiber in Italy. Not only the hull [Pg 334] but posts and roof of the structure above deck were of concrete. This house boat was 67 by 21 feet. Another Italian boat is the Liguria, a barge in actual service. It is 57 by 18 feet and is rated at 150 tons. The Gretchen is an American example of the stone boat. She has sailed over long distances on the Atlantic and was reputed as comparatively a rapid sailer in a heavy sea. Her reinforcement was a multitude of small rods. This boat drew 14 feet of water and was 65 feet long and had a beam measurement of 16 feet.

It might surprise some, but concrete has actually been the main material used in building boats. A reinforced concrete boat was constructed thirteen years ago for use on the River Tiber in Italy. Not just the hull, but the posts and the roof of the structure above deck were made of concrete. This houseboat measured 67 by 21 feet. Another Italian boat is the Liguria, a barge currently in operation. It measures 57 by 18 feet and has a capacity of 150 tons. The Gretchen is an American example of a concrete boat. She has sailed long distances across the Atlantic and was known to be relatively fast in rough seas. Her reinforcement consisted of many small rods. This boat drew 14 feet of water, was 65 feet long, and had a beam of 16 feet.

Concrete is an obvious material for coal pockets, especially because of its fireproof character. A further advantage is the avoidance of a large maintenance charge. At Charlestown (Boston), the Lehigh & Wilkes-Barre Coal Company had been expending about $1,000 yearly on repairs upon a coal pocket. This has now been replaced by a concrete structure having a capacity of 10,000 tons. It has a depth of 24 feet, and has a length of 182 feet and a width of 92 feet. It is founded upon 750 Simplex concrete piles. If wooden piling had been used, the amount of excavation thus necessitated would have been very considerable because it would have been necessary to cut them off 10 feet below the surface in conformity with the building laws. Moreover, about 2,000 wooden piles would have been required because of the limit of ten tons’ bearing capacity per pile. With the concrete piles, however, the footings for the columns were constructed with but little excavation. The columns, side walls, girders, beams, floors—pretty much everything except the roof—were of reinforced concrete. When a full load of coal is filled in on the floor, the weight per square yard is 18 tons.

Concrete is a clear choice for coal storage, mainly because it's fireproof. Another plus is that it cuts down on maintenance costs. In Charlestown (Boston), the Lehigh & Wilkes-Barre Coal Company used to spend around $1,000 a year on repairs for a coal pocket. This has now been replaced by a concrete structure that holds 10,000 tons. It measures 24 feet deep, 182 feet long, and 92 feet wide. It's built on 750 Simplex concrete piles. If wooden piles had been used, the excavation needed would have been significant since they would have to be cut off 10 feet below the surface to meet building regulations. Additionally, around 2,000 wooden piles would have been necessary due to the limitation of ten tons bearing capacity per pile. With the concrete piles, though, the footings for the columns were made with minimal excavation. The columns, side walls, girders, beams, and floors—pretty much everything except the roof—were made of reinforced concrete. When the coal is fully loaded on the floor, the weight per square yard is 18 tons.

A similar application is to the construction of grain elevators. Reinforced concrete has been used at Baltimore in two important buildings of this kind and also in the case of a third at Buffalo. The question of fire is here very important. The grain elevator of the Pennsylvania [Pg 335] Railroad at Baltimore is the largest of the three and is constructed to hold 1,000,000 bushels. There are 53 cylindrical bins having a common height of 79 feet. There are four rows of eight each. The remaining twenty-one bins occupy spaces in between, three rows seven in a row. The set of 32 have the larger size and measure 24.2 feet in internal diameter. The walls are 8 inches thick and have both vertical and circumferential reinforcement. The vertical reinforcement is round bars of 1⅜-inch diameter. The circumferential reinforcement consists of interlaced flat bars. By a patented device the bins were cast in sections. This mold would be attached to the heavier vertical reinforcement and jacked up as needed.

A similar application is in the construction of grain elevators. Reinforced concrete has been used in Baltimore for two important buildings of this kind and also for a third one in Buffalo. The issue of fire is very important here. The grain elevator of the Pennsylvania Railroad in Baltimore is the largest of the three and can hold 1,000,000 bushels. There are 53 cylindrical bins, all with a height of 79 feet. There are four rows of eight bins each. The remaining twenty-one bins fill the spaces in between, arranged in three rows of seven bins each. The set of 32 larger bins has a measurement of 24.2 feet in internal diameter. The walls are 8 inches thick and have both vertical and circumferential reinforcement. The vertical reinforcement consists of round bars measuring 1⅜ inches in diameter. The circumferential reinforcement is made up of interlaced flat bars. Using a patented device, the bins were cast in sections. This mold was attached to the heavier vertical reinforcement and raised as needed.

It is unnecessary to emphasize the fact that concrete while economical is not cheap. So that when large masses are used, it is advisable to reduce the expense by using what may be called “pudding stones.” At McCalls Ferry a large dam and adjoining power house span the Susquehanna River. This is a tremendous application of concrete. However, pudding stones were very properly employed in the construction of the great dam. Here steel was employed not so much to reinforce but to supply frames for the molding surfaces. Great pelican cranes of steel were also employed to handle the concrete, etc. The face of the dam is a double curve and thus required a precise mold. Sections of the dam, 40 feet in length, would be constructed to alternate with open spaces of the same length. When it was desired to close such open spaces, a great steel apron would be let down on the upstream face. Concrete could then be laid in the open space.

It’s important to point out that concrete, while cost-effective, isn’t cheap. Therefore, when using it in large quantities, it’s wise to cut costs by using what could be called “pudding stones.” At McCalls Ferry, a large dam and nearby power house span the Susquehanna River. This is an impressive use of concrete. However, pudding stones were wisely used in building the massive dam. Here, steel was used not so much for reinforcement but to create frames for the molding surfaces. Large steel pelican cranes were also used to handle the concrete, among other tasks. The face of the dam has a double curve, which required a precise mold. Sections of the dam, each 40 feet long, were built to alternate with open spaces of the same length. When it was necessary to fill those open spaces, a large steel apron would be lowered on the upstream face, allowing concrete to be poured into the gap.

In all the applications of reinforced concrete with which our attention has so far been occupied, the case has either been one of well-recognized practice or closely related to such practice—with the possible exception of concrete barges. There are two other lines of engineering [Pg 336] application in which it is very desirable to employ concrete, but where we are scarcely entitled to regard its use as anything more than experimental. Reference is made to telegraph poles and cross-ties. If a concrete pole really proves adapted to its service, then we may expect a great reduction in maintenance expense. It is estimated that renewals of wooden poles in the United States cost yearly $13,000,000. The prospect of getting a pole which will not need renewal for a long period is certainly attractive. But the actual service is severe. This is due not so much to the load which must be carried as to the horizontal movements under wind pressure. But by using proper reinforcement, it is thought by some, the pole may be made to withstand the horizontal thrusts. Some experiments have been made of a type of pole recommended by the American Concrete Pole Company, Richmond, Indiana. Four vertical rods bound together by wire constitute the reinforcement. Such a pole 7 x 7 inches at the top and 12 x 12 inches at the bottom was tested to destruction. This pole was 30 feet long and had its butt end sunk 5 feet into the ground. The vertical rods were ⅝ inch in diameter and were bound with No. 9 wire. A horizontal thrust or pull at the top of 840 pounds accomplished a deflection of 6 inches. When this was increased to 1,780 pounds, the deflection amounted to 17 inches. When 2,800 pounds pressure was employed, the deflection was 30 inches accompanied by a slight cracking. A deflection of a full yard together with cracking at the ground line resulted from a pressure of 3,640 pounds. When 7,200 pounds pressure was employed, the cracking became bad and the deflection amounted to 60 inches. A cedar pole of the same size was deflected 11 inches by a pull of 840 pounds. With 1,780 pounds, the deflection was nearly a yard (33 inches); and with 2,200 pounds the pole broke about 3 feet from the ground. The problem of the [Pg 337] telegraph pole will probably be solved, if this has not already been done.

In all the uses of reinforced concrete we've discussed so far, the situation has either involved well-established practices or practices closely linked to them—except for concrete barges. There are two more areas of engineering application where using concrete is highly desirable, but we can only consider its use as experimental. These are telegraph poles and cross-ties. If it turns out that a concrete pole is suitable for its purpose, we can expect a significant drop in maintenance costs. It's estimated that replacing wooden poles in the United States costs around $13,000,000 each year. The idea of having a pole that doesn’t need replacing for a long time is definitely appealing. However, the actual service conditions are challenging. This is largely because of the horizontal movements caused by wind pressure rather than the weight that must be supported. By using proper reinforcement, some believe that the pole can handle these horizontal forces. Some experiments have been conducted with a type of pole suggested by the American Concrete Pole Company in Richmond, Indiana. The reinforcement consists of four vertical rods bound together with wire. A pole measuring 7 x 7 inches at the top and 12 x 12 inches at the bottom was tested to destruction. This pole was 30 feet long, with its base sunk 5 feet into the ground. The vertical rods were ⅝ inch in diameter and were bound using No. 9 wire. A horizontal push or pull of 840 pounds resulted in a 6-inch deflection. When this was increased to 1,780 pounds, the deflection reached 17 inches. At 2,800 pounds, the deflection was 30 inches, accompanied by slight cracking. A deflection of a full yard and cracking at the ground line occurred under a pressure of 3,640 pounds. With 7,200 pounds of pressure, the cracking worsened and the deflection reached 60 inches. A cedar pole of the same size was deflected by 11 inches with an 840-pound pull. With 1,780 pounds, the deflection was nearly a yard (33 inches), and with 2,200 pounds, the pole broke about 3 feet from the ground. The issue with the telegraph pole will likely be resolved, if it hasn’t been already.

With regard to the cross-tie the case is more difficult. Plain concrete slabs or beams cannot be used after the manner of the wooden tie because of their want of elasticity. What is called “center binding” would be disastrous to plain concrete. The rocking action of the passing load is also a factor which enters. One method of dealing with center binding is to divide the tie into two parts, connecting them with steel rods. The Corell tie is an example of this. In the Percival tie, the under part of the concrete block is given a sharpened edge. Beneath the rail itself, the cross-section is a kind of oval. There is longitudinal reinforcement in the form of four rods, three arranged at the top and one near the bottom. Three rods are bound with wire. There is a cushion block of wood which absorbs and distributes the shocks from the bottom of the rail. Screw spikes and metallic sockets are employed. Some three or more years ago a hundred such ties were put in service in a Texas railway. In June, 1909, seven only were found to have received serious injury. It is thought that this damage was scarcely chargeable to the ties themselves as when in position they were between wooden ones whose deterioration might easily have been the cause of undue disturbance being thrown on the concrete ties.

Regarding the cross-tie, the situation is more complicated. Plain concrete slabs or beams can't be used like wooden ties because they lack flexibility. What’s known as “center binding” would be disastrous for plain concrete. The rocking motion caused by passing loads is also a factor to consider. One way to address center binding is to split the tie into two parts, connecting them with steel rods. The Corell tie is an example of this. In the Percival tie, the bottom of the concrete block has a sharpened edge. Under the rail itself, the cross-section is oval-shaped. There’s longitudinal reinforcement using four rods, with three positioned at the top and one near the bottom. Three rods are bound with wire. A cushioning wooden block absorbs and distributes the shocks from the bottom of the rail. Screw spikes and metal sockets are used. About three years ago, a hundred of these ties were installed in a Texas railway. In June 1909, only seven were found to have sustained serious damage. It's believed that this damage was not primarily due to the ties themselves, as they were positioned between wooden ties that may have deteriorated and caused excessive stress on the concrete ties.

We have considered to a slight extent the use of steel as the material of concrete forms. This line of application, however, promises to become a very large one. Two notable constructions are now under way in which the steel form plays a large part. These are the great Gatun Locks of the Panama Canal and the Catskill Aqueduct. The three double locks at Gatun will require about 2,000,000 cubic yards of concrete. Each pair of locks is on a separate level and has three longitudinal walls. One separates the lock chambers. This central wall is 60 feet in width. It [Pg 338] is not solid as so much concrete would not be required as the water level is approached. Consequently, there is a kind of V-section which traverses it longitudinally. This is filled in except for three galleries—one for drainage, one for the electric wires and one for the men. There is a longitudinal culvert arranged below the fill in the body of the concrete wall. In the side walls of the lock chambers are other longitudinal culverts. From the central supply culvert transverse distributing culverts run off beneath the floors of the adjacent lock chambers. These have vertical outlets into the lock chambers themselves. Similarly, but for purposes of emptying the locks, the longitudinal culverts arranged along the outside are connected by transverse culverts and vertical openings with the lock chambers. The members of the two systems of transverse culverts alternate with each other. The main supply culvert has a diameter of 22 feet part of the way and of 18 feet part of the way. Now these many culverts, various in form and size, are to be molded in the mass concrete by means of steel forms. As originally announced, there would be 12 forms of open hearth boiler steel for the main supply culvert. Each of these weighs 177,000 pounds. One hundred forms were to be required. The two main outlet culverts of similar dimensions to the main supply culvert were thought to require 21 forms, each 12 feet in length and having a weight of 300,000 pounds. The transverse culverts were to require 100 forms, each having a length of 10 feet and a weight of 217,000 pounds. There were thus to be 133 forms having an aggregate weight of 15,000 tons. It is possible that there may be some modifications of this plan in minor particulars. The side walls of the lock chambers are to be mainly vertical planes having a height of, say, 81 feet. To retain the fresh concrete in place, 12 face plates, constructed of sheet steel are to be used. These are 7½ inches in thickness, having face dimensions 78 x 36 feet. Steel towers running on [Pg 339] suitable tracks control these face plates. It is estimated that towers and plates will have an aggregate weight of 26,000 tons. So that, quite apart from any possible reinforcement application, steel to the total of about 41,000 tons is to be used for forms and immediate accessories. But this 41,000 tons is not all. The concrete is to be cast in great monoliths and to retain the ends of these while the concrete is fresh, steel girders 6 feet high are to be employed. If these locks were to be of stone then steel would have played a rather subordinate part.

We have looked into the use of steel for concrete forms to some extent. This application is expected to expand significantly. Two major constructions currently underway are the Gatun Locks of the Panama Canal and the Catskill Aqueduct. The three double locks at Gatun will need around 2,000,000 cubic yards of concrete. Each pair of locks is at a different level and features three longitudinal walls. One wall separates the lock chambers, and this central wall measures 60 feet in width. It’s not solid since that much concrete isn’t necessary as the water level approaches. Therefore, it has a V-section that runs along its length. This is filled except for three galleries—one for drainage, one for the electric wires, and one for the workers. There’s a longitudinal culvert located beneath the fill in the concrete wall. The side walls of the lock chambers have additional longitudinal culverts. From the central supply culvert, transverse distributing culverts extend beneath the floors of the neighboring lock chambers, leading to vertical outlets in the lock chambers themselves. Likewise, for emptying the locks, the longitudinal culverts on the outside connect with the lock chambers through transverse culverts and vertical openings. The members of these two systems of transverse culverts alternate. The main supply culvert has a diameter of 22 feet for part of its length and 18 feet for the remaining section. All these different culverts, varying in shape and size, will be molded into the mass concrete using steel forms. Initially, there were plans for 12 forms made of open hearth boiler steel for the main supply culvert, each weighing 177,000 pounds. A total of 100 forms were planned. The two main outlet culverts, similar in size to the supply culvert, were expected to need 21 forms, each 12 feet long and weighing 300,000 pounds. The transverse culverts were projected to require 100 forms, each 10 feet long and weighing 217,000 pounds. This amounts to 133 forms with a total weight of 15,000 tons. There may be some minor adjustments to this plan. The side walls of the lock chambers will mainly be vertical, approximately 81 feet high. To hold the fresh concrete in place, 12 face plates will be used, made of sheet steel and measuring 7½ inches thick with dimensions of 78 x 36 feet. Steel towers that run on suitable tracks will control these face plates. The total estimated weight of the towers and plates will be about 26,000 tons. Therefore, independently of any potential reinforcement, around 41,000 tons of steel will be used for forms and immediate accessories. But that 41,000 tons isn’t all. The concrete will be cast in large monoliths, and to hold the ends of these while the concrete sets, 6-foot high steel girders will be used. If these locks were constructed of stone, steel would have played a much lesser role.

The Blaw Collapsible Steel Centering Company are engaged at Panama, but they are also applying their systems of molding concrete to the great aqueduct which is to supply New York City with water from the Catskill Mountain region on the other side of the Hudson River. A steel centering is used to give form to the interior. Steel forms are also employed to shape the upper part of the external surface. At Baltimore, more than three miles of sewer construction was carried out in accordance with the system of the same company. The centering used for one portion where the height was 11 feet and the width 12¼ feet (inside) was employed in 50-foot lengths. In 2 hours, 6 men could remove such a 50-foot section together with its falsework and have it in readiness for a repetition of its service. A typical half-round Blaw center consists of one or more steel plates bent to conform to a cross-section of a semi-circle. Turnbuckles retain this shell in position. If we are going to employ this form in sewer construction, we first dig out our trench to such dimensions and form as to furnish the mold for the outside surface of the lower part of the concrete sewer. We then lay concrete in a longitudinal strip along the bottom, giving the upper surface the form of a shallow gutter. When this is sufficiently hardened, the semi-circular center may be slid along it to suitable position. The center has its concavity opening upwards. The concrete of the invert of the sewer is now [Pg 340] placed. The same or a duplicate center may now be used to mold the interior of the upper part of the sewer.

The Blaw Collapsible Steel Centering Company is currently working in Panama, but they are also using their concrete molding systems for the massive aqueduct that will supply New York City with water from the Catskill Mountains across the Hudson River. A steel centering is utilized to shape the interior. Steel forms are also used to define the upper part of the outer surface. In Baltimore, over three miles of sewer construction was completed using the same company's system. The centering used for one section that was 11 feet high and 12¼ feet wide on the inside was made in 50-foot lengths. In just 2 hours, 6 workers could remove a 50-foot section along with its falsework and get it ready for use again. A typical half-round Blaw center consists of one or more steel plates bent to create a semi-circle shape. Turnbuckles hold this shell in place. To use this form in sewer construction, we first dig our trench to the required dimensions to provide the mold for the outer surface of the lower part of the concrete sewer. We then pour concrete in a long strip along the bottom, creating a shallow gutter shape on the top. Once this has set enough, the semi-circular center can be slid into position on it, with the concave side facing up. The concrete for the invert of the sewer is now placed. The same or a duplicate center can now be used to mold the interior of the upper part of the sewer.

Portland cement has been in use for a long time. But reinforced concrete is so modern that in some important lines of engineering application the fundamental data underlying practice are not fully determined. In what may be regarded as the first decade (1870-1880) of the considerable manufacture of Portland cement in the United States, the total amount produced was only 42,000 barrels. Fifty years and more would be required for the production of enough cement to construct the Gatun Locks. Over a decade would be necessary to yield enough cement for the operations of the Hudson Companies. The price at this period was about $3.00 per barrel. In 1908 it was 85 cents. But the production in this year was more than 1,200 times that in 1880. The value per year of the present output is about $50,000,000.

Portland cement has been around for a long time. However, reinforced concrete is so new that, in some key areas of engineering, the basic data supporting practices aren't fully established. During what can be considered the first decade (1870-1880) of significant Portland cement production in the United States, only 42,000 barrels were made. It would take over fifty years to produce enough cement to build the Gatun Locks. More than a decade would be needed to generate enough cement for the Hudson Companies' operations. Back then, the price was around $3.00 per barrel. By 1908, it dropped to 85 cents. Yet, production that year was more than 1,200 times what it was in 1880. The annual value of the current output is about $50,000,000.

[Pg 341]

[Pg 341]

CHEMISTRY AND THE INDUSTRIES.

BY BENJAMIN BALL FREUD, B. S.

BY BENJAMIN BALL FREUD, B. S.

[Assistant Professor of Analytical and Organic Chemistry, Armour Institute of Technology.]

[Assistant Professor of Analytical and Organic Chemistry, Armour Institute of Technology.]

Chemistry has always been a utilitarian science, a science whose direct applications to our every-day interests has been on every side recognized. Even in the days of alchemy, that fantastic forerunner of our present science, her devotees were concerned with the changing of the base metals into the noble ones, of lead into silver, and of copper into gold, and also with the search for the philosopher’s stone, that mysterious something which would give perpetual youth.

Chemistry has always been a practical science, one whose direct applications to our everyday lives have been widely acknowledged. Even in the days of alchemy, that fantastical precursor to our modern science, its followers were focused on transforming base metals into noble ones, like turning lead into silver and copper into gold, as well as searching for the philosopher’s stone, that elusive substance believed to grant eternal youth.

From these workers arose in the course of the years, the facts and the theories which were incorporated into the science of chemistry. But it is not entirely to the alchemists that chemistry owes its development. By far the greater number of facts, if not of theories, came down to us through the traditional knowledge of the chemical industries. Numerous animal and vegetable products, such as sugar, starch, the oils, gums and resins, had been familiar commodities as long back as history records. And the ancients were informed in such typically chemical industries as that of dyeing with vegetable dyes, pigment manufacture, varnish making, soap making, paper making and the fermentation industries. In fact the science of chemistry as we have it today owes much more to these unknown workers in the industries who transmitted their chemical facts from father to son, than it does to the creations of the imaginations of those picturesque, if not so truthful, alchemists.

From these workers, over the years, the facts and theories that became part of chemistry emerged. However, chemistry's development isn't solely due to the alchemists. Most of the facts, if not all the theories, came to us through traditional knowledge from chemical industries. Various animal and plant products, like sugar, starch, oils, gums, and resins, have been common goods since long before recorded history. The ancients were skilled in various chemical industries, such as dyeing with natural dyes, making pigments, varnishes, soaps, paper, and engaging in fermentation. In fact, the chemistry we have today owes much more to these unknown workers who passed down their chemical knowledge from generation to generation than to the imaginative, yet often misleading, alchemists.

[Pg 342] It is entirely impossible to divorce the science of chemistry from its industrial applications. The science owes much to the industries. The industries owe even more to the science. And if that relationship has been very close in the past, it is much closer now than it ever was; and it is getting closer all the while. The utilitarianism of our age makes it absolutely necessary that the two shall be so united that the utmost of good shall result from the union.

[Pg 342] It's impossible to separate the science of chemistry from its industrial uses. The science has greatly benefited from the industries, and the industries have benefited even more from the science. While their relationship has been strong in the past, it's even stronger now and continues to grow closer. The practical needs of our time make it essential for these two to work together in a way that maximizes the benefits of their partnership.

The application of science in general, and of chemistry in particular, to the industries has this one general result. It takes that industry out of the “rule of thumb” class, and places it firmly on a sound basis. It is no longer conducted in a haphazard manner, but according to intelligent design, based on the most accurate scientific information. Of course the fierceness of business competition has ordered this change, more than any other factor. The pure science of chemistry would have developed without industrial applications, because there are investigators who are seeking the truth regardless of any of its immediate applications. But in the industries, it is a matter of dollars and cents. The most efficient is the winner. And the most efficient is the one who utilizes in his business all the scientific information that can be brought to bear on the subject, and who is always looking for new facts that can be applied.

The use of science in general, and chemistry in particular, in industries leads to one main outcome. It transforms those industries from relying on “trial and error” to being firmly grounded in solid principles. It’s no longer done in a random way, but instead follows a thoughtful strategy based on the most accurate scientific data. Obviously, the intensity of business competition has driven this change more than anything else. The field of pure chemistry would have evolved without industrial use because there are researchers who pursue knowledge without considering its immediate applications. But in industries, it’s all about making money. The most efficient businesses succeed. And the most efficient ones are those that leverage all available scientific knowledge relevant to their field and continually seek out new information that can be applied.

Chemistry, then, is applied to the industries in two distinct ways, the first in discovery, in finding a new substance which can be used, or a new process by which some useful or necessary substance can be made; the second in improvement, in making a certain product better, or cheaper, in utilizing wastes, or in starting from cheaper raw materials.

Chemistry is applied in industries in two main ways: first, in discovery, where it finds new substances that can be used or new processes to create useful or essential materials; second, in improvement, where it makes existing products better or cheaper, utilizes waste, or starts with less expensive raw materials.

There are but two kinds of industries: (a) Those which are based on processes which change the form of matter, such as the manufacture of furniture for example, and (b) those which are based on processes which change the composition of matter, such as the manufacture of Portland [Pg 343] cement from clay and limestone. Now group “b” comprises by far the greatest number of industries, and since the science of chemistry concerns itself with just those changes in the composition of matter, it is evident that most of our industries are chemical in their nature. We have but recently come to realize this. A list of such industries and operations which are essentially chemical would be found to include almost every industry that we can think of. I need only make mention of the subject of fuels, gas and coke, of cement, mortars, brick and other building materials; of petroleum and its products; of asphalt; of the products of the destructive distillation of wood; of cellulose and of paper; of pigments, resins, varnishes; of rubber; of soap, fats and the fatty oils; of gums; of sugar and of starch; of the textile industries and of the dyes; of leather and glue; of explosives; of the heavy chemical industries, the manufacture of acids, alkalies and salts; of the manufacture of glass and the ceramic industries; of the fermentation industries; of the manufacture and standardization of medicines; of the subject of soils and artificial fertilization; of the subject of foods, and of nutrition; of the subject of water, sewage and sanitation; of photography; of all the electro-chemical industries and processes; of the production of steel, of copper, of lead and of all the other metals. I need only mention this formidable array of subjects and industries to convince the most sceptical one that chemistry does in fact, concern us, directly or indirectly, in all of our activities.

There are two types of industries: (a) those that change the form of matter, like furniture manufacturing, and (b) those that change the composition of matter, such as making Portland cement from clay and limestone. Group "b" includes by far the majority of industries, and since chemistry focuses on the changes in matter's composition, it's clear that most of our industries are fundamentally chemical. We have only recently come to recognize this. A list of industries and processes that are primarily chemical would practically include every industry we can think of. Just consider fuels, gas and coke, cement, mortars, bricks, and other building materials; petroleum and its products; asphalt; products from the destructive distillation of wood; cellulose and paper; pigments, resins, varnishes; rubber; soap, fats, and fatty oils; gums; sugar and starch; textile industries and dyes; leather and glue; explosives; heavy chemical industries that manufacture acids, alkalis, and salts; glass and ceramic manufacturing; fermentation industries; the production and standardization of medicines; soil and artificial fertilization; food and nutrition; water, sewage, and sanitation; photography; all the electro-chemical industries and processes; and the production of steel, copper, lead, and all other metals. Mentioning this impressive range of subjects and industries is enough to convince even the most skeptical that chemistry truly impacts us, directly or indirectly, in all of our activities.

As I have said previously, chemistry influences industry in two distinct ways: First, in the discovery of new substances and new processes; secondly, in the perfection of known substances and known processes. In either of these fields the chemist is proud of his record. The conquests are so numerous that he is at a loss as to how or where to begin if he would tell of them. The whole field of industrial chemistry is one succession of chemical achievements, [Pg 344] mammoth industries that had their humble birth in the chemist’s test tube, his beaker, or his retort; the wealth of by-products saved to the world from what was a few years ago sheer waste; and above all increased efficiency in the manufacture of all products. The chemist does not claim more than his due when he points out that his activity covers the whole field of our daily experiences, and that his activity has always been for the lessening of waste, for greater efficiency, in a word, for the development of civilization. To illustrate the points which have already been brought out, the story of the soda industry, the beginning of the modern chemical industries, can be used. The beginning is far back in another century, so intimately is the development of the soda industry bound up with the advance of civilization.

As I mentioned before, chemistry impacts industry in two distinct ways: First, through the discovery of new substances and processes; second, by improving existing substances and processes. Chemists take pride in their achievements in both areas. The successes are so numerous that it can be overwhelming to figure out where to start when sharing them. The entire realm of industrial chemistry is a continuous stream of chemical breakthroughs, from large industries that originated in a chemist's test tube, beaker, or retort; to the valuable by-products salvaged from what was once considered waste; and, most importantly, the increased efficiency in manufacturing all products. Chemists aren't asking for more than they deserve when they highlight that their work influences all aspects of our daily lives, focusing on reducing waste and enhancing efficiency—essentially, contributing to the development of civilization. To illustrate these points, we can look at the history of the soda industry, which marks the beginning of modern chemical industries. Its origins date back to another century, closely intertwined with the progress of civilization.

The value of what we now call the alkalies as detergent substances, was known from the earliest times. The first alkali recorded in history is burned lime, and was called “caustic” on account of its characteristic property. Caustic lime is but slightly soluble in water, hence its use is greatly limited. History fails to tell who it was who first solved the problem of making a more soluble alkali, but some one, early in the Middle Ages, discovered that by the action of caustic lime on the so-called potashes, the ashes which remained on burning wood, a very soluble caustic was formed. And to this, the long since forgotten chemist gave the name “caustic potash.” The chemistry of the discovery is as follows: All plants take potassium, a very light metal, in some form or other from the soil, to form the so-called mineral, or bony structure, in other words the skeleton, of the plant. When these plants are burned the potassium in the form of a salt, chiefly potassium carbonate, is formed in the ash. These potassium salts can be extracted by water, and recovered on the evaporation of the water. These potassium salts, the so-called “potashes,” were extensively used in the industries of the time, for example, in making [Pg 345] soap, in making glass, in dyeing and in a score of other minor ways. But even as our forests cannot now meet the demand for timber, so they could not then meet the demand for the “potashes,” for it requires a large amount of wood to give a comparatively small amount of potashes, the percentage of potassium salts in wood being very small indeed. Simultaneously with all this, in northern Spain, on the seacoast, a number of towns were engaged in burning sea weeds. It was found that the ashes of sea weeds while not the same as potashes, nevertheless could be substituted for them. This is historically recorded as the “barilla” industry. Barilla consisted of 5 per cent of carbonate of sodium, a metal very similar to potassium. Sodium does for sea plants just what potassium does for land plants. Barilla was merely a substitute for potashes, and a very poor substitute at that. But it was destined to offer the key that solved the whole problem. The chemists of that time showed the chemical similarity between the active ingredient of potashes, carbonate of potassium, and the active ingredient of barilla, carbonate of sodium. The demand for these alkalies made by the industries was incessant and ever-increasing. The chemists realized that the direct natural sources of the two, namely, the wood of the forest and the weeds of the sea, were and always would be, inadequate to meet the enormously growing demands of the industries. They saw that some other source would have to be discovered, or the bodies would have to be prepared artificially. They realized that while potashes were better than barilla, nevertheless potassium salts, the ingredients of potashes, were much less widely distributed in nature than the sodium salts, the ingredients of barilla. So they set out with the definite object of preparing sodium carbonate. In 1791 LeBlanc took out a patent for his now famous process. He was not the only one who worked on the problem; he happened to be the successful one.

The value of what we now refer to as alkalies as cleaning agents has been recognized since ancient times. The first alkali noted in history is burned lime, which was called “caustic” because of its unique properties. Caustic lime is only slightly soluble in water, which limits its use. History doesn’t tell us who first figured out how to create a more soluble alkali, but someone, early in the Middle Ages, discovered that by reacting caustic lime with potashes, the ashes left from burning wood, a very soluble caustic was produced. This long-forgotten chemist named it “caustic potash.” The chemistry behind this discovery is as follows: All plants absorb potassium, a very light metal, in various forms from the soil to create their mineral structure or “skeleton.” When these plants are burned, potassium forms a salt, primarily potassium carbonate, in the ash. These potassium salts can be extracted with water and collected when the water evaporates. These potassium salts, known as “potashes,” were widely used in industries of the time, such as in soap making, glass production, dyeing, and many other minor applications. However, just as our forests can’t meet the current demand for timber, they also couldn’t satisfy the demand for potashes since it takes a large amount of wood to produce a comparatively small amount of potashes, as the percentage of potassium salts in wood is quite small. At the same time, in northern Spain along the coast, several towns were burning seaweeds. It was discovered that the ashes of seaweeds, while not identical to potashes, could be used as a substitute. This became known as the “barilla” industry. Barilla contained 5 percent sodium carbonate, a metal very similar to potassium. Sodium fulfills the same role for sea plants that potassium does for land plants. Barilla was simply a stand-in for potashes, and a poor substitute at that. But it was key to solving the entire issue. Chemists of the time identified the chemical similarity between the active ingredient of potashes, potassium carbonate, and the active ingredient of barilla, sodium carbonate. The growing demand for these alkalies in various industries was constant and increasing. Chemists realized that the natural sources of these two—forest wood and seaweed—would never be enough to satisfy the rapidly growing industrial needs. They understood that a different source would need to be discovered, or the chemicals would have to be manufactured artificially. They also acknowledged that while potashes were superior to barilla, potassium salts were much less abundant in nature than sodium salts. So, they aimed to create sodium carbonate. In 1791, LeBlanc obtained a patent for his now-famous process. He wasn’t the only one working on this issue; he just happened to be the successful one.

[Pg 346] This was the first of the great triumphs of chemistry in the industrial field. The significant point in this story of soda, is that those industries which were using the alkalies had reached the limit of their development, because the supply of the alkalies was so limited. Remember, also, that those industries were fundamental ones. Some historian has said that you can measure the civilization of a people by the amount of soap it uses. And here, we see the soap industry of Europe, the seat of our present civilization, crippled for want of an alkali. The position of the chemist, his responsibility to society, is the significant thing in the story. Here was a crisis in the development of civilization, as important to us as the crisis of the battle of Marathon. Because the problem was solved in the retort, instead of on the battle plain, because the battle was fought by the quiet hand of the chemist, instead of by the fighting men of Greece, we do not hear so much of it. But it was a triumph, and the credit belongs to the chemist. To us, as much depended upon the result of the battle of the molecules in the retort, as upon the defeat of the great Darius.

[Pg 346] This was the first major success of chemistry in industry. The key point in this story about soda is that the industries using alkalis had hit their limits because the supply of alkalis was so restricted. It's also important to note that these industries were essential. Some historians have claimed that you can gauge a civilization's progress by how much soap it consumes. Here, we observe the soap industry in Europe, the center of our current civilization, struggling due to a lack of alkali. The role of the chemist and their responsibility to society is the most crucial aspect of this narrative. This was a pivotal moment in the advancement of civilization, as significant to us as the crisis during the battle of Marathon. Because the solution came from a retort rather than a battlefield, and the battle was fought by the steady hand of the chemist instead of the warriors of Greece, it hasn't received as much recognition. But it was indeed a victory, and the credit goes to the chemist. For us, as much relied on the outcome of the molecular battle in the retort as on the defeat of the great Darius.

Nor was this battle in the retort a tame one. LeBlanc’s method is an extremely complicated one. To conduct the process at all requires chemical knowledge of the most varied kind. And to apply the improvements that have been worked out in the laboratory, and to carry into practice the many subsidiary manufactures that have sprung from this main industry, demands so much technical ability that it has been said that this manufacture is not merely the foundation of the immense chemical industries of today, but is also the guiding spirit in them.

Nor was this battle in the retort an easy one. LeBlanc’s method is very complex. To even carry out the process requires a wide range of chemical knowledge. Additionally, applying the improvements developed in the lab and implementing the numerous related manufacturing processes that have emerged from this main industry demands such a high level of technical skill that it's been said this manufacturing process is not only the backbone of today’s vast chemical industries but also the driving force behind them.

LeBlanc, of course, could not foretell the enormous development his industry was to attain. Nor could he conceive of the ramifications running from it into countless other activities of our present civilization. The manufacture of sulphuric acid, one of the most important products of modern industry, is intimately bound up with that of [Pg 347] soda. And, in the manufacture of sulphuric acid, nitric acid is required, and must be made. Hydrochloric acid is a by-product of the soda process, and was for a long time permitted to go to waste. Now it is one of the most valuable products of the LeBlanc soda process. It is used to make bleaching powder, potassium chlorate, and otherwise in the industries. Also, the alkaline waste from the soda process is rich in sulphur. This sulphur is now recovered and put on the market as such, helping to meet the demand for sulphur that the Sicilian mines cannot supply.

LeBlanc obviously couldn't predict the massive growth his industry would achieve. He also couldn't imagine the many ways it would connect to countless other fields in our modern world. The production of sulfuric acid, one of the key products of contemporary industry, is closely linked to soda. To produce sulfuric acid, nitric acid is needed and must be created. Hydrochloric acid is a by-product of the soda-making process and was wasted for a long time. Now, it’s considered one of the most valuable outputs of the LeBlanc soda process. It's used to create bleaching powder, potassium chlorate, and various other industrial products. Additionally, the alkaline waste from the soda process is rich in sulfur. This sulfur is now extracted and sold, helping to satisfy the demand that the Sicilian mines can't meet.

All those varied industries that were either created or fostered by the soda industry have made possible the almost fabulously complicated processes that are now carried out in the manufacture of the aniline dyes, the artificial odors, like vanillin whose complexity can be gathered from its formula, C6H3OHOCH3CHO, which tells many things to the chemist, but not much to the layman, and the artificial febrifuges like antipyrin, whose formula is C11H12N2O. All these chemical industries that are the outgrowth of the soda industry, and that are so dove-tailed with our civilization, have been built up on the science of chemistry, and worked out by chemists. I have selected this story of soda to show the commanding position held by the science of chemistry in directing the course of civilization. It shows, too, how the entire structure of that civilization is built around the contributions of the chemist.

All those different industries that were either started or supported by the soda industry have enabled the incredibly complex processes involved in producing aniline dyes, artificial scents like vanillin—whose complexity can be seen in its formula, C6H3OHOCH3CHO, which means a lot to chemists but not much to non-experts—and synthetic fever reducers like antipyrin, which has the formula C11H12N2O. All these chemical industries that have emerged from the soda industry and are deeply integrated into our society have been developed based on the science of chemistry, thanks to chemists. I chose this story about soda to highlight the significant role chemistry plays in shaping the course of civilization. It also illustrates how the entire foundation of our society is built upon the contributions of chemists.

As has been already said, it is impossible to separate chemistry from industry. The farther we go and the more we develop and the more complex our civilization becomes, the closer become the ties uniting science and industry. And as everything that deals with the change in composition of matter is chemistry, it is evident that chemistry is omnipresent. In the light of what it has accomplished, who shall say that it is not omnipotent?

As has already been said, it's impossible to separate chemistry from industry. The further we progress and develop, and the more complex our civilization becomes, the closer the connection between science and industry gets. Since everything that involves changes in the composition of matter is chemistry, it’s clear that chemistry is everywhere. Given what it has achieved, who can say it isn’t all-powerful?

The story of soda is a beautiful example of how industry and the need of civilization can act as a beacon light [Pg 348] for the science of chemistry. This illustration will show how the pure science has created new industries and opened up new activities for civilization. In 1838 in England, there was born a boy who afterwards was to be known as Sir Wm. Perkin. He came of a very intelligent family. Besides, he was gifted with a natural aptitude for chemistry. More than that, he was put under the direction of Professor Hofmann, one of the most brilliant of chemists. Perkin would have been called by any one, an ideal bit of raw material. Hofmann, like many others of those German chemists, had a faculty of instilling that enthusiasm that is necessary in the performance of an epoch-making advancement. Perkin caught that enthusiasm. He rigged up a laboratory in his house and worked at night and in his vacations on those interesting problems that Hofmann discussed in his lectures. During one of these vacations, he was trying to build up, artificially, the substance called quinine, which was up to that time a purely natural product. His work took an unexpected turn. Instead of building up quinine, he built what chemists call now phenyl-sufranine, or mauvëine. This was a new substance with properties that rendered it an excellent dye. Perkin established a factory in which the new substance could be prepared on a large scale; and within a year of its discovery, he had it on the market. This discovery of Mauve, the first of the artificial dyes, gave a great impetus to the study of coal tar, from which it was made. Coal tar, up to that time, was a waste product, made in the process of heating coal for the manufacture of gas. This coal tar is the raw material which is used in that enormous chemical industry, the manufacture of the derivatives of tri-phenyl methane, the so-called aniline dyes. There is invested in this industry alone, $750,000,000; and the whole structure, complex as it is, is built on the foundation of a pure chemical research that was undertaken merely to gratify the investigative desires of [Pg 349] a true scientist, with no thought of its financial results. This achievement of Perkin stands out as one of the great discoveries of chemistry. And the story of Mauve shows how science has led the way for industry, just as the story of soda shows how industry has pointed out the way for science.

The story of soda is a great example of how industry and civilization's needs can guide the field of chemistry. This illustration will show how pure science has created new industries and opened up new opportunities for society. In 1838 in England, a boy was born who would later be known as Sir Wm. Perkin. He came from a very intelligent family and had a natural talent for chemistry. Furthermore, he was mentored by Professor Hofmann, one of the brightest chemists of his time. Perkin was what anyone would consider an ideal candidate for scientific potential. Hofmann, like many other German chemists, had a knack for instilling the enthusiasm necessary for groundbreaking innovations. Perkin caught that enthusiasm. He set up a lab in his house and worked at night and during his vacations on the interesting problems Hofmann discussed in his lectures. During one of these vacations, he was attempting to artificially create quinine, which until then had been a purely natural product. His work took an unexpected turn. Instead of creating quinine, he produced what chemists now call phenyl-sufranine, or mauveine. This was a new substance with properties that made it an excellent dye. Perkin established a factory to produce this new substance on a large scale, and within a year of its discovery, he had it on the market. The discovery of Mauve, the first synthetic dye, significantly boosted the study of coal tar, from which it was made. Until that point, coal tar was a waste product generated during the heating of coal for gas production. This coal tar is the raw material used in the vast chemical industry associated with the production of tri-phenyl methane derivatives, known as aniline dyes. This industry alone has an investment of $750,000,000; and the entire intricate structure is built on the foundation of pure chemical research conducted merely to satisfy the curiosity of a true scientist, with no regard for its financial implications. Perkin's achievement stands as one of the great discoveries in chemistry. And the story of Mauve illustrates how science has paved the way for industry, just as the story of soda demonstrates how industry has highlighted the path for science.

Many more stories of the victories of scientific industry could be told. Much has been done. But the chemist does not live in the glory of the past. He lives in the possibilities of the future. Every advancement of the past has opened up many fields of possibilities. If much has been done, much more remains to be done. And the work of the future will require the services of the scientist more than did the work of the past. Those problems whose answers were obvious, have all been solved. The problems of today are deep ones; they require all the ingenuity, all the ability that the trained chemist can bring to bear upon the problems. And they will all tend to increased efficiency.

Many more stories about the achievements of scientific progress could be shared. A lot has been accomplished. But the chemist doesn’t dwell on past glories. They focus on future possibilities. Every breakthrough from the past has opened up numerous opportunities. If a lot has been done, even more is still ahead. The work of the future will demand the expertise of scientists even more than the work of the past did. The problems with obvious solutions have all been addressed. Today's challenges are complex; they require all the creativity and skill that a trained chemist can apply. And they will all aim for greater efficiency.

While chemistry is a fundamental science, while it covers such a variety of subjects, while the total amount of its established facts is indeed enormous, nevertheless, it must be said with frankness that this vastness is made up for the most part by details and more or less isolated facts and ideas. Chemistry can boast of remarkable achievements. But the greatest achievements are yet before it. And the reason is this: Chemistry is not yet a really unified science. The real fundamentals which will string together all of the isolated facts and ideas, material of which the chemist has, indeed, reason to feel proud, are for the most part lacking. That is why the future is so much larger than the past. And that is why the world can expect from the chemists much greater achievements in the future than it has seen accomplished in the past, great as they have been.

While chemistry is a core science that encompasses a wide range of topics and has an enormous amount of established facts, it must be honestly noted that this vastness is primarily made up of details and various isolated facts and ideas. Chemistry has many impressive accomplishments, but the biggest breakthroughs are still ahead. The reason is this: Chemistry isn’t yet a fully unified science. The true foundational principles that will connect all the separate facts and ideas, which chemists can rightfully take pride in, are mostly missing. That’s why the future holds so much more potential than the past. This is why the world can expect even greater achievements from chemists in the future than it has seen in the past, no matter how significant those achievements have been.

In the most fundamental terms, chemistry concerns itself with the changes which the different kinds of energy [Pg 350] produce upon matter. Chemistry concerns itself with two things, energy and matter. And yet chemistry must admit that it does not know the nature of matter or the nature of energy. And not knowing, it cannot appreciate.

In simple terms, chemistry is all about how different types of energy affect matter. Chemistry focuses on two things: energy and matter. However, chemistry has to acknowledge that it doesn’t truly understand what matter or energy are. Without this understanding, it can't fully appreciate them.

In this direction lie the achievements of the chemistry of the future. As the nature of matter and the nature of energy gradually unfold themselves to the advances of chemical investigation, remarkable possibilities for future development are disclosed. We are beginning to see how really wasteful we have been. The frightful wastes which the movement toward the conservation of our natural resources has called to our attention, sink into utter insignificance when we consider what we have lost on account of our ignorance. We are just beginning to appreciate our wastefulness of chemical energy. A piece of coal, for example, has in it the possibility of doing ten times as much work as it is doing now. A piece of radium has stored in it an almost infinite amount of energy. How to change this internal or chemical energy into the other forms of energy with which we are familiar, into heat, or electricity, or ordinary mechanical energy, that is the problem of the future. The utilization of this vast amount of potential energy that is stored up in all forms of matter, the harnessing of it in the service of humanity, this is the problem which confronts the chemist. It goes down to the very fundamentals of his science.

In this direction lie the achievements of the future of chemistry. As we gradually understand more about the nature of matter and energy through advances in chemical research, we uncover amazing possibilities for future development. We're starting to realize how wasteful we have truly been. The significant losses highlighted by the push to conserve our natural resources become trivial when we think about what we've lost due to our ignorance. We're just beginning to grasp how much chemical energy we've wasted. For instance, a piece of coal has the potential to do ten times more work than it currently does. A piece of radium contains almost limitless energy. The challenge for the future is figuring out how to convert this internal or chemical energy into other familiar forms of energy, like heat, electricity, or mechanical energy. Utilizing the vast potential energy stored in all forms of matter and harnessing it for the benefit of humanity is the problem that chemists face. It goes to the very core of their science.

But the start has been made. The point of the wedge has already found entrance. The discovery of radium, and the study of its decompositions, has opened wide our field of vision. The problem must yield, as the blows of chemical investigation fall upon the wedge and drive it home.

But the beginning has been made. The tip of the wedge has already entered. The discovery of radium and the study of its decay have greatly expanded our perspective. The problem will give way as the efforts of chemical research strike the wedge and push it deeper.

Chemistry has always been a utilitarian science. Its results have always been at the service of humanity. And if we can judge the future by the past, even discounting for the enthusiasm of the chemist, we can forsee improved [Pg 351] processes which will reduce our present wasteful methods; we can see new processes making for us such things as india rubber from starch, for which we must now depend upon the bounty of nature; and we can dimly see the time when we shall be able to utilize some of that energy which is hidden away in the recesses of matter, and whose vastness we have just begun to appreciate.

Chemistry has always been a practical science. Its outcomes have consistently benefited humanity. If we judge the future by the past, even setting aside a chemist's enthusiasm, we can expect improved processes that will reduce our current wasteful methods; we can envision new processes that will allow us to create items like rubber from starch, which we currently rely on nature to provide; and we can vaguely foresee the day when we'll be able to harness some of the energy that's stored within matter, the scale of which we've only just begun to understand. [Pg 351]

[Pg 352] THE CLOSE RELATION OF THE PRODUCER-GAS POWER PLANT TO THE CONSERVATION OF OUR FUEL RESOURCES.

BY ROBERT HEYWOOD FERNALD.

BY ROBERT HEYWOOD FERNALD.

[Professor of Mechanical Engineering, Case School of Applied Science.]

[Professor of Mechanical Engineering, Case School of Applied Science.]

Official reports show that the coal placed on the market amounts annually to between 450,000,000 and 500,000,000 short tons in the United States alone. These figures, however, are somewhat misleading as they do not in any way show the tremendous wastes that are going on due to our present methods of mining and restrictions in qualities of coal that can be transported and placed on the market at a reasonable profit. Careful investigation has shown that the coal wasted or left in the mines in such form as to be inaccessible to future generations amounts each year to practically 100 per cent of that placed on the market, or in other words, at the present time some 450,000,000 tons are annually lost as far as commercial value is concerned.

Official reports indicate that the amount of coal available on the market ranges from 450,000,000 to 500,000,000 short tons each year in the United States alone. However, these numbers can be somewhat misleading as they do not reflect the significant waste occurring due to our current mining methods and the restrictions on the types of coal that can be transported and sold at a reasonable profit. Thorough investigations have revealed that the coal wasted or left in the mines in a form that future generations cannot access totals nearly 100% of what is put on the market each year. In other words, about 450,000,000 tons are effectively lost annually in terms of commercial value.

If this condition is allowed to continue it is estimated by the United States Geological Survey that our available supply of bituminous coal will be exhausted within the next two hundred years.

If this situation continues, the United States Geological Survey estimates that our supply of bituminous coal will run out within the next two hundred years.

A realization of the seriousness of this situation has led to a careful and systematic study of the present lack of efficiency in the utilization of fuels for both power and metallurgical purposes, to investigations into more efficient use of the present marketable grades of fuel, and to a consideration of methods of using the so-called low-grade fuels, lignites and peats.

Acknowledging the seriousness of this situation has prompted a thorough and organized investigation into the current inefficiencies in using fuels for both power and metal production. This includes researching more effective ways to utilize existing fuel grades available on the market and exploring methods for using so-called low-grade fuels, like lignites and peats.

The United States Geological Survey has for several years been investigating the economic value of coals and lignites as gas-producer fuel. This work, begun with tests [Pg 353] of coal and lignite at the coal-testing plant erected at the Louisiana Purchase Exposition, St. Louis, Mo., in 1904, was continued at St. Louis and at Norfolk, Va., and is now being carried on by the Survey at the fuel-testing plant in Pittsburg, Pa. The tests were undertaken because it was evidently desirable to determine the value of the gas producer as a means of increasing efficiency in the use of the coal supplies of the United States. The early tests proved decidedly encouraging, demonstrating that many coals now wasted or not mined because they are not satisfactory fuel for steam-power plants can, by conversion into producer-gas, be made to do from two to three times as much work as can be done by the best grades of steam coal burned in a boiler plant. In consequence, the making of producer-gas tests and the study of the processes that take place within the gas producer now form an essential part of the fuel investigations conducted at the Pittsburg plant under the provisions made by Congress for the analyzing and testing of mineral fuels.

The United States Geological Survey has been looking into the economic value of coal and lignite as fuel for gas production for several years. This work started with tests at the coal-testing facility set up during the Louisiana Purchase Exposition in St. Louis, Missouri, in 1904, and continued in St. Louis and Norfolk, Virginia. It's currently ongoing at the fuel-testing facility in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. These tests were necessary to determine how valuable the gas producer could be in improving the efficiency of coal usage in the United States. The early results were very promising, showing that many types of coal that are currently wasted or not mined due to their unsuitability for steam-power plants can be converted into producer gas, allowing them to perform two to three times more work than the best grades of steam coal when burned in a boiler. As a result, conducting producer-gas tests and studying the processes occurring in the gas producer have become vital parts of the fuel research being carried out at the Pittsburgh plant, as mandated by Congress for analyzing and testing mineral fuels.

Rapid Development of the Gas Engine.

It was not until late in the nineteenth century that the gas engine came into common use, and although many types have been devised within the last twenty or thirty years it is only within eight or nine years that large gas engines have been constructed. This development started eleven or twelve years ago in Germany, Belgium, and England, but marked progress has been limited to the last eight years.

It wasn't until the late 1800s that gas engines became popular, and while various types have been created in the last twenty to thirty years, it has only been in the past eight or nine years that large gas engines have been built. This advancement began around eleven or twelve years ago in Germany, Belgium, and England, but significant progress has only happened in the last eight years.

For a long time the natural fuel of these internal-combustion engines was city gas, but this was too expensive except for engines of small capacity. It was seldom found economical to operate units of more than 75 horsepower with this fuel. Cheap gas was essential for the development of the gas engine, but the early attempts to produce cheap gas were somewhat discouraging, and for a [Pg 354] time it seemed very unlikely that the gas engine would encroach to any extent on the field occupied by the steam engine. The theoretical possibilities of the internal-combustion engine operating with cheap fuel promised so much, however, that the practical difficulties were rapidly overcome, with the result that the internal-combustion engine has become a serious rival of the steam engine in many of its applications.

For a long time, city gas was the primary fuel for internal-combustion engines, but it was too expensive for all but small engines. It was rarely cost-effective to run units with more than 75 horsepower on this fuel. Affordable gas was crucial for the development of gas engines, but early efforts to produce low-cost gas were somewhat discouraging, and for a while, it seemed unlikely that gas engines would significantly challenge steam engines. However, the theoretical potential of internal-combustion engines using cheap fuel was so promising that the practical challenges were quickly addressed, leading to internal-combustion engines becoming a strong competitor to steam engines in many applications.

The development of the large gas engine within the last few years has been exceedingly rapid. It was only ten years ago that a 600-horsepower engine exhibited at the Paris Exposition was regarded as a wonder, but today four-cycle, twin-tandem, double-acting engines of 2,000 to 3,500 horsepower can be found in nearly all up-to-date steel plants, and there are installations in this country containing several units rated at 5,400 horsepower each.

The development of large gas engines in the past few years has been incredibly fast. Just ten years ago, a 600-horsepower engine showcased at the Paris Exposition was seen as a marvel, but today, four-cycle, twin-tandem, double-acting engines with 2,000 to 3,500 horsepower are found in almost all modern steel plants. There are even facilities in this country with multiple units rated at 5,400 horsepower each.

Development of the Gas Producer for Power Purposes.

The rapid advance of the large gas engine was made possible by improvements in the production of cheap gas directly from fuel by means of the gas producer. An early form of producer introduced in Europe, and now in general use both abroad and in the United States, is known as the suction producer, a name suggested by the fact that the engine develops its charge of gas in the producer by means of its own suction stroke. Although many producers of this type are now used, most of them are small, seldom exceeding 200 horsepower. A serious limitation to the utility of the suction producer has been the fact that, owing to the manner of generating the gas, no tarry fuels could be used, a restriction that prevented the use of bituminous coals, lignites, peats, and other like fuels. The fuels in most common use for producers of this type are charcoal, coke, and anthracite coal, although attempts are being made so to construct plants that they can be operated with bituminous or tarry coals.

The quick development of large gas engines was made possible by advancements in producing inexpensive gas directly from fuel through gas producers. A common type of producer that was introduced in Europe and is now widely used both overseas and in the United States is called the suction producer. This name comes from the fact that the engine generates its gas charge in the producer through its own suction stroke. While many producers of this kind are currently in use, most of them are small, usually not exceeding 200 horsepower. A significant limitation of the suction producer has been that, due to the method of gas generation, no tarry fuels could be used, which limited the use of bituminous coals, lignites, peats, and similar fuels. The fuels most commonly used for producers of this type are charcoal, coke, and anthracite coal, although efforts are underway to design plants that can operate using bituminous or tarry coals.

[Pg 355] To meet the demand for the concentration of power in large units, instead of operating a large number of separate installations of small power capacity, the pressure producer was devised. This producer develops its gas under a slight pressure due to the introduction of an air and steam blast, and the gas is stored in a holder until it is required by the engine. As the gas may thus be stored before passing to the engine, and as its generation does not depend on the suction stroke of the engine, tar and other impurities may be removed from it by suitable devices, and the use of bituminous coal, lignite, and peat thus permitted.

[Pg 355] To meet the demand for concentrating power in large units instead of operating many separate installations with small power capacity, the pressure producer was created. This producer generates gas under slight pressure by using an air and steam blast, and the gas is stored in a holder until needed by the engine. Since the gas can be stored before it goes to the engine and its production isn’t reliant on the engine's suction stroke, impurities like tar can be removed with appropriate devices, allowing for the use of bituminous coal, lignite, and peat.

The pressure producer was closely followed in the course of development by the down-draft producer, which fixes the tar as a permanent gas and therefore completely uses the volatile hydrocarbons in bituminous coal, lignite, and peat.

The pressure producer was closely followed during development by the down-draft producer, which converts the tar into a permanent gas and fully utilizes the volatile hydrocarbons in bituminous coal, lignite, and peat.

A few scattered producer-gas plants were installed for power purposes in the United States before 1900, but the application of this type of power in any general sense has been developed since that date. During the first few years of this period of development anthracite coal, coke, and charcoal were used almost exclusively, although occasionally pressure and down-draft plants ventured to use a well-tried bituminous coal known to be especially free from sulphur and caking difficulties and low in both ash and tar making compounds. The rapid development of the anthracite plant was to be expected, but it remained for the United States Geological Survey in its testing plants at St. Louis and Norfolk to demonstrate the possibility of using in such plants practically all grades of fuel of any commercial value, without reference to the amount of sulphur or tarry matter which they contain. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the very rapid increase in the number of installations and in the total horsepower of the plants operating with bituminous coal and lignite since the beginning [Pg 356] of these investigations by the Geological Survey in 1904.

A few scattered producer-gas plants were set up for power purposes in the United States before 1900, but the broader use of this power type has developed since then. In the early years of this development, anthracite coal, coke, and charcoal were used almost exclusively, although some pressure and down-draft plants occasionally experimented with a well-known type of bituminous coal that was particularly low in sulfur and prone to caking issues, as well as low in ash and tar-producing compounds. The quick growth of anthracite plants was to be anticipated, but it was the United States Geological Survey, through its testing facilities in St. Louis and Norfolk, that showed the potential for using nearly all grades of commercially viable fuel in these plants, regardless of their sulfur or tar content. Figures 1 and 2 show the rapid increase in the number of installations and the total horsepower of the plants operating with bituminous coal and lignite since the start of these investigations by the Geological Survey in 1904. [Pg 356]

Owing to the fact that the dates of installation of many plants are not ascertainable, it is impossible to present the exact growth either in number of installations or in horsepower. The relative rate is, however, approximately shown by Figures 1 and 2, the data for which were secured from 375 installations. The points for the year 1909 are estimated from the returns for the first five months. These points have been checked by two or three methods and indicate only the normal increase established by the rate of development before the business depression of 1908. It is probable that the actual figures for the entire year may exceed those indicated.

Because the installation dates of many plants are unclear, it's impossible to provide the exact growth in either the number of installations or horsepower. The relative rate is roughly shown by Figures 1 and 2, which are based on data from 375 installations. The figures for 1909 are estimated from returns for the first five months. These estimates have been verified using two or three methods and only reflect the typical increase that occurred before the business downturn of 1908. It's likely that the actual figures for the entire year could be higher than what’s indicated.

Relative Results of Steam and Producer-Gas Tests.

In considering the relation between the economic results of plants of the two types under discussion, namely steam and producer-gas, the fact should be remembered that today, in the ordinary manufacturing plant operated by steam power, less than 5 per cent of the total energy in the fuel consumed is available for useful work at the machine.

In looking at the connection between the economic outcomes of the two types of plants being discussed, steam and producer-gas, it's important to note that today, in a typical manufacturing plant powered by steam, less than 5 percent of the total energy from the fuel used is available for useful work at the machines.

In this connection it is of interest and value to glance at the possibilities of the best-designed and most skilfully operated commercial plant now in use. The data concerning the steam plant selected for this determination are derived from a table prepared by Mr. Stott, superintendent of motive power, Interborough Rapid Transit Company, New York City, which, as Mr. Stott says, shows “the losses found in a year’s operation of what is probably one of the most efficient plants in existence today, and, therefore, typical of the present state of the art.”

In this context, it's interesting and valuable to look at the potential of the best-designed and most efficiently run commercial plants in operation today. The information about the steam plant chosen for this analysis comes from a table created by Mr. Stott, the superintendent of motive power at the Interborough Rapid Transit Company in New York City. As Mr. Stott notes, this table illustrates “the losses experienced over a year of operating what is likely one of the most efficient plants in existence today, and, therefore, representative of the current state of the art.”

[Pg 357]

[Pg 357]

Figure 1.--Annual increase in number of producer-gas power plants in the United States.

Figure 1.--Yearly growth in the number of producer-gas power plants in the United States.

Illustration: Number of producer-gas power plants

[Pg 358]

[Pg 358]

Figure 2.--Annual increase in the total horsepower of producer-gas power plants in the United States.

Figure 2.--Yearly growth in the total horsepower of producer-gas power plants in the United States.

Illustration: increase in the total horsepower

[Pg 359]

[Pg 359]

Average losses in steam plant of the Interborough Company in converting 1 pound of coal, containing 12,500 British thermal units, into electricity.
British
thermal
units.
Per cent.
Loss by friction
138
1.1
Loss in exhaust
7,513
60.1
Loss in pipes and auxiliaries
275
2.2
Loss in boiler
1,000
8.0
Loss in stack
1,987
15.9
Loss in ashes
300
2.4
 Total losses
11,213
89.7
Energy utilized
1,287
10.3
12,500
100.0

Mr. Stott further presents a table showing the thermal efficiency of producer-gas plants, concerning which he says:

Mr. Stott also presents a table showing the thermal efficiency of producer-gas plants, about which he says:

The following heat balance is believed to represent the best results obtained in Europe and the United States up to date in the formation and utilization of producer gas.

The following heat balance is thought to show the best results achieved in Europe and the United States so far in the creation and use of producer gas.

Average losses in a producer-gas plant in the conversion of 1 pound of coal, containing 12,500 British thermal units, into electricity.
British
thermal
units.
Per cent.
Loss in gas producer and auxiliaries
2,500
20.0
Loss in cooling water in jackets
2,375
19.0
Loss in exhaust gases
3,750
30.0
Loss in engine friction
813
6.5
Loss in electric generator
62
.5
 Total losses
9,500
76.0
Converted into electric energy
3,000
24.0
12,500
100.0

The thermal efficiency of such plants, as given by different writers, runs as high as 33, 36, and 38.5 per cent, and for some plants figures as extravagant as “above 40” are boldly published. Although the present aim has been to give the figures for a producer-gas plant that may compare favorably with those of the steam plant of the Interborough Company, an effort has been made to keep well [Pg 360] within obtainable efficiencies. Attention is also directed to the fact that the producer-gas plant considered should be large enough to compare favorably with the steam plant. This precludes comparisons with suction plants, which are relatively small but give higher proportional efficiencies than the larger pressure and down-draft plants, for these require more or less auxiliary apparatus.

The thermal efficiency of such plants, according to various authors, ranges from 33%, 36%, to 38.5%, and some sources even claim figures as outrageous as “over 40%.” While the goal has been to provide efficiency figures for a producer-gas plant that can compete with those of the steam plant operated by the Interborough Company, there has been an effort to stay within achievable efficiency levels. It's also important to note that the producer-gas plant in question should be large enough to meaningfully compare with the steam plant. This rules out comparisons with suction plants, which are relatively small but achieve higher proportional efficiencies than the larger pressure and downdraft plants, as these require additional equipment. [Pg 360]

Mr. Stott seems ready to accept a thermal efficiency of 24 per cent for the best producer-gas plants for comparison with 10.3 per cent efficiency for his steam plant, but a careful study of the problem has led to a more conservative estimate for the producer-gas plant, namely, 21.5 per cent.

Mr. Stott appears willing to accept a thermal efficiency of 24 percent for the best producer-gas plants to compare with the 10.3 percent efficiency of his steam plant, but a thorough examination of the issue has led to a more cautious estimate for the producer-gas plant, which is 21.5 percent.

The tables just given show the comparative efficiencies reached in plants of the best type, both steam and producer-gas, but these are seldom realized in common practice. The results obtained in the government plant at St. Louis are probably more nearly representative of the ordinary type of apparatus. These results are as follows:

The tables provided show the efficiency comparisons achieved in top-performing plants, both steam and producer-gas, but these are rarely seen in everyday practice. The results from the government plant in St. Louis are likely a better reflection of typical equipment. These results are as follows:

Relative economies of steam and gas power plants at St Louis in the conversion of 1 pound of coal, containing 12,500 British thermal units, into electricity.
Steam Power. Gas Power.
British
thermal
units.
Per cent. British
thermal
units.
Per cent.
Losses in exhaust, friction, etc.
11,892
95.14
10,812
86.5
Converted into electric energy
608
4.86
1,688
13.5
12,500
100.00
12,500
100.0

The ratios of the total fuel per brake-horsepower hour required by the steam plant and producer-gas plant, under full load, not counting stand-by losses, are presented below as derived from 75 coals, 6 lignites, and 1 peat (Florida).

The ratios of the total fuel per brake-horsepower hour needed by the steam plant and producer-gas plant, under full load, excluding stand-by losses, are shown below based on 75 coals, 6 lignites, and 1 peat (Florida).

The curves in Figure 3 show graphically the great economy secured with the producer-gas plant. The figures [Pg 361] for the producer-gas tests include not only the coal consumed in the gas producer, but also the coal used in the auxiliary boiler for generating the steam necessary for the pressure blast—that is, the figures given include the total coal required by the producer-gas plant.

The curves in Figure 3 illustrate the significant savings achieved with the producer-gas plant. The numbers [Pg 361] for the producer-gas tests account for not only the coal used in the gas producer but also the coal needed for the auxiliary boiler to generate the steam required for the pressure blast—that is, the figures provided include all the coal necessary for the producer-gas plant.

Ratios of fuel used in steam and gas plants.
Average ratio, coal as fired per brake-horsepower hour under boiler to coal as fired per brake-horsepower hour in producer 2.7
Maximum ratio, coal as fired per brake-horsepower hour under boiler to coal as fired per brake-horsepower hour in producer 3.7
Minimum ratio, coal as fired per brake-horsepower hour under boiler to coal as fired per brake-horsepower hour in producer 1.8
Average ratio, lignite and subbituminous coal as fired per brake-horsepower hour under boiler to lignite as fired per brake-horsepower hour in producer 2.7
Maximum ratio, lignite and subbituminous coal as fired per brake-horsepower hour under boiler to lignite as fired per brake-horsepower hour in producer 2.9
Minimum ratio, lignite and subbituminous coal as fired per brake-horsepower hour under boiler to lignite as fired per brake-horsepower hour in producer 2.2
Average ratio, peat as fired per brake-horsepower hour under boiler to peat as fired per brake-horsepower hour in producer 2.3

In considering the possible increase in efficiency of the steam tests with a compound engine, as compared with the simple engine used, the fact should not be overlooked that a corresponding increase in the efficiency of the producer-gas tests may be brought about under corresponding favorable conditions. Not only is the producer passing through a transitional period, but the gas engine must still be regarded in the same light. In the larger sizes the vertical single-acting engine is being replaced by the horizontal double-acting engine. Other changes and improvements are constantly being made which tend to increase the efficiency of the gas engine, as compounding and tripling the expansions have already increased the efficiency of the steam engine.

In looking at the potential improvement in efficiency from steam tests using a compound engine compared to the simple engine, we shouldn't ignore that a similar boost in efficiency for the producer-gas tests might occur under the right conditions. The producer is currently in a transitional phase, and the gas engine is still in a similar situation. In larger models, the vertical single-acting engine is being replaced by the horizontal double-acting engine. Ongoing changes and enhancements are consistently being implemented that aim to boost the efficiency of the gas engine, just as compounding and tripling expansions have already improved the efficiency of the steam engine.

As has already been stated, the gas engine used in the tests here reported is of a type that is rapidly becoming obsolete for this size, namely, the vertical, three-cylinder, single-acting.

As mentioned earlier, the gas engine used in the tests reported here is of a type that is quickly becoming outdated for this size, specifically the vertical, three-cylinder, single-acting.

[Pg 362] A brief consideration of these points will lead at once to the conclusions that a comparison of the producer-gas plant and steam plant used in these tests is very favorable to the former, and that any increase in efficiency in the steam tests that might result from using a compound engine can be offset by the introduction of a gas engine of more modern type and a producer plant designed to handle the special kinds of fuel used.

[Pg 362] Taking a moment to think about these points will quickly show that comparing the producer-gas plant to the steam plant used in these tests is very much in favor of the former. Any gains in efficiency from using a compound engine in the steam tests can be negated by implementing a newer type of gas engine along with a producer plant specifically designed for the types of fuel used.

Illustration: Comparative service of coals

Figure 3.—Comparative service of coals and lignites in gas-producer and steam-boiler plants.

Figure 3.—Comparison of the performance of coals and lignites in gas-producer and steam-boiler plants.

It should be noted that many fuels which give poor results under steam boilers have been used with great ease and efficiency in the gas producer, which thus makes it possible to utilize low-grade coals and lignites that have [Pg 363] heretofore been regarded as practically useless. Several of the poorest grades of bituminous coals have shown remarkable efficiency in the gas producer, and lignites and peat have been used with great facility, thus opening the way to the introduction of cheap power into large districts that have thus far been commercially unimportant owing to lack of industrial opportunities. Experiments with “bone,” a refuse product in bituminous-coal mining, have given excellent results, showing an efficiency in the producer equal to that reached by good steam coal under boilers. Recent investigations with other low-grade fuels, such as mine roof slabs, culm, and washery refuse, have also demonstrated the possibility of using such material to advantage in the producer under proper commercial conditions.

It's important to note that many fuels that don’t perform well in steam boilers have been used effectively in gas producers. This allows for the use of low-grade coals and lignites that were previously considered nearly useless. Several of the lowest grades of bituminous coals have shown impressive efficiency in gas production, and lignites and peat have been easily utilized, paving the way for the introduction of affordable power in large areas that have been commercially insignificant due to a lack of industrial opportunities. Experiments with “bone,” a waste product from bituminous coal mining, have yielded excellent results, showing an efficiency in the producer comparable to that of good steam coal in boilers. Recent studies on other low-grade fuels, such as mine roof slabs, culm, and washery waste, have also shown that such materials can be beneficially used in the producer under suitable commercial conditions.

Number and Class of Plants.

A list of producer-gas power plants recently secured indicates that at present there are over 500 such plants [Pg 364] in operation in the United States, ranging in size from 15 to 6,000 horsepower.

A recent list of producer-gas power plants shows that there are currently over 500 of these plants in operation in the United States, with sizes ranging from 15 to 6,000 horsepower.[Pg 364]

Figure 4.—Summarized data of producer-gas power plants in United States.
No. of plants. Horsepower. Per cent of total number. Per cent of total horse-power.
Total. Average. Minimum. Maximum.
Anthracite coal:
 Over 500 horsepower 8 7,550 950 600 1,500
 500 horsepower or less 407 40,550 100 15 500
415 48,100 116 15 1,500 88 43
Bituminous coal:
 Over 500 horsepower 20 49,000 2,450 750 6,000
 500 horsepower or less 17 5,150 300 35 500
37 54,150 1,460 35 6,000 8 49
Lignite:
 Over 500 horsepower 3 7,275 2,430 525 3,750
 500 horsepower or less 19 1,725 90 25 250
22 9,000 410 25 3,750 4 8
All plants 474 111,250 235 15 6,000 100 100
No. of plants. Horsepower.
Total. Average.
Anthracite coal:
 Over 500 horsepower
8
7,550
950
 500 horsepower or less
407
40,550
100
415
48,100
116
Bituminous coal:
 Over 500 horsepower
20
49,000
2,450
 500 horsepower or less
17
5,150
300
37
54,150
1,460
Lignite:
 Over 500 horsepower
3
7,275
2,430
 500 horsepower or less
19
1,725
90
22
9,000
410
All plants
474
111,250
235
Horsepower. Per cent
of total
number.
Per cent
of total
horse-
power.
Mini-
mum.
Maxi-
mum.
Anthracite coal:
 Over 500 horsepower
600
1,500
 500 horsepower or less
15
500
15
1,500
88
43
Bituminous coal:
 Over 500 horsepower
750
6,000
 500 horsepower or less
35
500
35
6,000
8
49
Lignite:
 Over 500 horsepower
525
3,750
 500 horsepower or less
25
250
25
3,750
4
8
All plants
15
6,000
100
100

Data secured from this list are summarized in the table on the previous page according to the type of fuel used, and separately for all plants above 500 horsepower and for those not exceeding 500 horsepower.

Data collected from this list are summarized in the table on the previous page based on the type of fuel used, and separately for all plants over 500 horsepower and for those not exceeding 500 horsepower.

It will be observed from this table that about 88 per cent of the total number of installations in this country are operating on anthracite coal (a few using charcoal or coke), and that bituminous coal and lignite are used in the remaining 12 per cent. Of the total horsepower approximately 57 per cent is derived from bituminous coal and lignite and 43 per cent from anthracite coal, charcoal, and coke. In point of size it will be noted that the bituminous plants average 12½ times the size of the anthracite plants.

It can be seen from this table that around 88 percent of the total installations in this country run on anthracite coal (with a few using charcoal or coke), while bituminous coal and lignite make up the remaining 12 percent. Out of the total horsepower, about 57 percent comes from bituminous coal and lignite, and 43 percent from anthracite coal, charcoal, and coke. In terms of size, it's noted that the bituminous plants are, on average, 12½ times larger than the anthracite plants.

In 1906 a large number of these plants were carefully inspected in order to secure definite information from the owners and operators regarding the more or less successful operation of such installations. Similar inspections were made in 1908.

In 1906, many of these plants were thoroughly checked to gather clear information from the owners and operators about how well these installations were working. Similar inspections took place in 1908.

Deductions from Visits of Inspection.

The deductions made from the visits in 1906 were as follows:

The conclusions drawn from the visits in 1906 were as follows:

1. The plants as a whole are giving remarkable satisfaction considering the very brief period of development that has passed since the introduction of this type of power.

1. Overall, the plants are providing incredible satisfaction given the short amount of time that has passed since this type of power was introduced.

2. The most serious difficulty seems to arise from the lack of competent operators to run the plants rather than from defects or troubles in the plants themselves.

2. The biggest challenge appears to come from the shortage of skilled operators to manage the plants, rather than from issues or problems within the plants themselves.

3. Incompetent salesmen are undoubtedly to blame for serious misrepresentations and misunderstandings.

3. Incompetent salespeople are definitely responsible for serious misrepresentations and misunderstandings.

4. The neglect shown by some manufacturers in respect to their plants after they are installed and paid for has not been farsighted, and the failure of the manufacturers [Pg 365] to give the purchasers or operators of plants full information regarding their construction and method of operating has certainly been detrimental to the business.

4. The disregard shown by some manufacturers towards their plants after they're installed and paid for has not been wise, and the manufacturers' failure to provide purchasers or operators with complete information about the construction and operation of the plants has definitely harmed the business. [Pg 365]

At the present time (1910) the following modifications might be advantageously made to the above statements:

At this time (1910), the following changes could be beneficially made to the statements above:

1. Unchanged.

Unchanged.

2. This situation still prevails, although there are many more competent operators today than three years ago. Time will eliminate this difficulty.

2. This situation is still happening, although there are many more skilled operators today than there were three years ago. Time will resolve this issue.

3. With stronger companies this situation is greatly improved.

3. This situation is much better with stronger companies.

4. Experience has shown that such neglect produces serious troubles and financial loss to the manufacturer, and a very decided change for the better has developed in the last few years. There are, however, a few small concerns still operating in the producer field on what may be considered a false basis.

4. Experience has shown that ignoring this leads to serious problems and financial loss for the manufacturer, and there has been a noticeable improvement in the last few years. However, there are still a few small businesses operating in the production sector on what could be seen as a misguided foundation.

Centralization of Power Development and Distribution.

Central stations for power and lighting are springing up all over the country. Electric lights are now in general use in towns numbering their population by hundreds only. Electric transmission for street-railway service is practically universal and electric power for shop drive is in great demand. The substitution of the electric locomotive for the steam locomotive for terminal service and even for line duty by several leading railway systems is no longer a mere expectation but is an every-day working reality.

Central power and lighting stations are popping up all over the country. Electric lights are now common in towns with only a few hundred people. Electric transmission for streetcar services is now almost everywhere, and there's a strong demand for electric power to run factories. The replacement of steam locomotives with electric ones for terminal service and even for regular line duties by several major railway systems is no longer just a possibility—it's a routine reality.

These changes and developments in every section are, to a large extent, tending to do away with the individual small steam equipment, whether stationary or locomotive, and are bringing to the front the central power station, ranging in size from lighting and pumping plants of less than 100 horsepower in the smaller towns to those of 100,000 [Pg 366] horsepower or more required to meet metropolitan demands.

These changes and developments in every area are largely eliminating individual small steam equipment, whether it's stationary or locomotive, and are highlighting the importance of central power stations. These range in size from lighting and pumping plants with less than 100 horsepower in smaller towns to those with 100,000 horsepower or more that are necessary to meet the demands of large cities. [Pg 366]

European Examples of Advantageous Location.

In the development of central power plants and the reduction of the cost of power, the producer-gas power plant is an important factor. In this connection the question of locating such plants directly at the mines is well worth careful and unbiased attention in the engineering profession. The advantages to be derived from such a location have already attracted the commercial interests of Europe. As examples worthy of thoughtful consideration, the general conditions of operation of three typical European installations are here described:

In the development of central power plants and the reduction of power costs, the producer-gas power plant plays a crucial role. In this context, the idea of positioning these plants directly at the mines deserves careful and impartial attention from the engineering profession. The benefits of such a location have already caught the commercial interests of Europe. To illustrate, we will describe the operational conditions of three typical European installations as examples worth considering:

Plant A.—This plant, although not situated directly at the mines, is but a short distance away, and the company owning the plant also owns the mines from which the fuel is secured. The plant is of the Mond by-product type and consists of eight pressure producers of 2,500 horsepower each. The fuel used is a run-of-mine bituminous coal said to contain 8 to 9 per cent ash and 1 to 2 per cent sulphur. This would indicate that they are utilizing the best grades of coal from their own mine in the local gas plant and allowing the lower grades to remain unmined, a fact which I verified before leaving the plant.

Plant A.—This plant, while not located directly at the mines, is just a short distance away, and the company that owns the plant also owns the mines where the fuel is sourced. The plant is a Mond by-product type and has eight pressure producers, each with a capacity of 2,500 horsepower. The fuel used is run-of-mine bituminous coal, which is reported to contain 8 to 9 percent ash and 1 to 2 percent sulfur. This suggests that they are using the best grades of coal from their own mine in the local gas plant and leaving the lower grades unmined, a fact I confirmed before leaving the plant.

The plant is designed for the recovery of the sulphate of ammonia and for supplying gas to the neighboring towns for both metallurgical and power purposes. As one unit is always held in reserve, the plant is called 16,000 horsepower. The main distributing line is 3 feet in diameter, and at the time of my visit there were 37 miles of main, the longest single run being 6½ miles. Each producer gasifies, on an average, 20 tons of coal per twenty-four hours. The report of the engineer in charge indicates that the plant had been in operation twenty-four hours a day, seven [Pg 367] days a week, for two and one-half years without a shut down.

The plant is designed to recover ammonia sulfate and provide gas to nearby towns for both metallurgical and power needs. One unit is always kept in reserve, so the plant is rated at 16,000 horsepower. The main distribution line is 3 feet wide, and when I visited, there were 37 miles of main, with the longest single run being 6½ miles. Each producer processes an average of 20 tons of coal every twenty-four hours. The engineer in charge reported that the plant had been operating twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, for two and a half years without any shutdowns.

Plant B.—This plant, which is located in the center of a peat bog, proved of especial interest. It has a capacity of 300 horsepower only, and is about 3 miles from the town to which the electric current is supplied. One-half of the plant (150 horsepower) was installed in 1904 and the remainder in 1906. This is probably the first as well as the smallest producer-gas installation to be located at the mine and transmit high-voltage current to a point some distance away. This installation, in 1909, consisted of two suction producers (special peat type) rated at 150 horsepower each, and two horizontal twin single-acting four-cycle gas engines of 150 horsepower each, direct connected to alternating-current three-phase generators, which were running splendidly in parallel at the time of my visit. The 3,000-volt current is transmitted to the town, where it is used during the day for lighting shops and for shop motors. At night the plant supplies the lights for the streets and residences. The charge for residence light is 9 cents per kilowatt hour. Both units are in operation from 5:30 a. m. to 6 p. m., and one continues to 11 p. m. each day.

Plant B.—This plant, located in the middle of a peat bog, was particularly interesting. It has a capacity of only 300 horsepower and is about 3 miles from the town getting the electric current. Half of the plant (150 horsepower) was installed in 1904 and the rest in 1906. This is likely the first and smallest producer-gas setup to be located at a mine and send high-voltage current a distance away. By 1909, this setup included two suction producers (special peat type) rated at 150 horsepower each, and two horizontal twin single-acting four-cycle gas engines of 150 horsepower each, directly connected to alternating-current three-phase generators, which were running smoothly in parallel during my visit. The 3,000-volt current is sent to the town, where it's used during the day for lighting shops and powering shop motors. At night, the plant provides lighting for the streets and homes. The charge for residential lighting is 9 cents per kilowatt hour. Both units operate from 5:30 a.m. to 6 p.m., and one continues until 11 p.m. each day.

A 35-horsepower peat machine is used for preparing the fuel. This is driven by an electric motor supplied with current from the power plant on the bog. As only 750 tons of dry peat are required per year there is no attempt to work the plant to its maximum. Local farmers are employed and they work as little or as much as they please, as there is no difficulty in getting out all the peat needed for a year during the working season, which in this locality is from April 15 to September 1. As a result 14 men are employed more or less of their time. They receive about 50 cents per day each and get out about 20 tons of peat per day.

A 35-horsepower peat machine is used for preparing the fuel. This is powered by an electric motor supplied with electricity from the power plant on the bog. Since only 750 tons of dry peat are needed per year, there's no effort to operate the plant at full capacity. Local farmers are hired and they work as little or as much as they want, as there’s no issue in extracting all the peat required for the year during the working season, which in this area runs from April 15 to September 1. As a result, 14 men are employed for varying amounts of time. They earn about 50 cents per day each and collect around 20 tons of peat per day.

[Pg 368] Coal at this point in Europe costs $3.75 per ton. The dry peat delivered on the operating platform of the producer plant costs only 80 cents per ton.

[Pg 368] Right now in Europe, coal costs $3.75 per ton. The dry peat that’s delivered to the producer plant costs just 80 cents per ton.

Plant C.—This plant is installed at the collieries. At the time of my visit it was under full operation, using roof slabs that gave little indication, on casual inspection, of containing any combustible material. It was claimed that this fuel averaged over 60 per cent ash—a claim which seemed entirely reasonable. At the time of this visit (1908) the producers were not only supplying a number of furnaces with gas, but were also operating a 1,000-horsepower and a 250-horsepower gas engine. A 500-horsepower engine was being added to the equipment. The engines in use were direct connected to electric generators. The 10,000-volt current is used for operating the local mine machinery and also for furnishing lights for neighboring towns and power for a street railroad. The plant was reported to be using over 100 tons of this low-grade fuel per day.

Plant C.—This plant is located at the coal mines. When I visited, it was running at full capacity, using roof slabs that didn’t seem to have any flammable material on a casual glance. It was said that this fuel had an average of over 60 percent ash—which seemed quite believable. During my visit (1908), the producers were not only supplying several furnaces with gas but were also operating a 1,000-horsepower and a 250-horsepower gas engine. A 500-horsepower engine was being added to the setup. The engines in use were directly connected to electric generators. The 10,000-volt current was used to run the local mine machinery and also to provide lights for nearby towns and power for a streetcar line. The plant was reported to be consuming over 100 tons of this low-quality fuel each day.

Favorable Conditions in the United States.

In the United States cheaper power is constantly sought. The water-power possibilities of the country are being realized and the hydro-electric power plant is a wholesome cause of competition. The supply of fuel of marketable grades is not unlimited. Prices for such fuel must necessarily increase. The cost of transporting coal from the mines is high, and the possibility of obtaining a sufficient supply of cars to handle low-grade fuels is questionable. The power demands of the country are increasing, and this power must be developed at a reasonable cost. The time is approaching when the cheapest fuel obtainable must be used to the best economic advantage in order to develop power at a unit cost consistent with commercial progress.

In the United States, there's always a push for cheaper energy. The country's potential for water power is being tapped into, and hydroelectric power plants are fostering healthy competition. The availability of fuel that meets market standards isn’t endless. Prices for such fuel are bound to rise. Transporting coal from mines is expensive, and there are doubts about securing enough cars to handle lower-grade fuels. The country's energy demands are growing, and we need to develop this energy affordably. The moment is coming when we’ll have to use the most cost-effective fuel wisely to generate power at a price that supports commercial growth.

[Pg 369] Consideration of the conditions indicates that in order to keep the price of power developed from fuel down to a consistent figure—

[Pg 369] Looking at the conditions, it's clear that to maintain a stable price for power generated from fuel—

(a) Grades of fuel which warrant transportation, or which may be defined as “marketable,” should be used with the greatest possible practicable economy.

(a) Grades of fuel that require transportation, or that can be described as “marketable,” should be used with the utmost practical efficiency.

(b) The very large percentage of coal of so-called low grade which today is left at or in the mine must be utilized.

(b) The large amount of low-quality coal that remains at or in the mine today needs to be used.

(c) Advantage must be taken of the large deposits of lignite and peat which are found in many sections of the country.

(c) We need to take advantage of the large deposits of lignite and peat that are found in many parts of the country.

It is undoubtedly true that in general, under conditions which do not require the use of steam for other than power purposes, the producer-gas power plant meets the requirements of (a).

It is definitely true that generally, in situations where steam is not needed for anything other than power generation, the producer-gas power plant fulfills the requirements of (a).

At present the only method of advantageously handling the fuels mentioned in (b) and (c) is in the gas producer, and the utilization of these lower grades of fuel on an extensive scale demands concentration of the power plants within close proximity to the fuel supply.

At the moment, the only effective way to use the fuels mentioned in (b) and (c) is in the gas producer, and making use of these lower-grade fuels on a large scale requires power plants to be located near the fuel supply.

The logical conclusion from a careful study of the producer-gas power situation is that the time is not distant when financial interests in power production will be directed toward the centralization of the producer-gas power plant at the mines and the distribution of the energy developed either by high-voltage long-distance electrical transmission or by pipe systems for conveying the gas.

The clear outcome from a thorough examination of the producer-gas power scenario is that it won't be long before financial interests in power production focus on centralizing producer-gas power plants at the mines, along with distributing the generated energy either through high-voltage long-distance electrical transmission or via pipeline systems for transporting the gas.

[Pg 370] EFFICIENCY IN SHOP OPERATIONS.

BY H. F. STIMPSON.

BY H. F. STIMPSON.

[Consulting Efficiency Engineer, New York. Published in The Iron Age, Jan. 6, 1910, and reproduced by special arrangement.]

[Consulting Efficiency Engineer, New York. Published in The Iron Age, Jan. 6, 1910, and reproduced by special arrangement.]

Managers of industrial enterprises will undoubtedly agree that there are few qualities which are more to be desired in equipment, methods and men than that of efficiency. From an extensive study of this subject in various parts of the country, together with interviews and correspondence with several hundred concerns, the writer has become convinced that there is a general lack of definite comprehension of what efficiency is, whence it springs, how it may be measured and developed and the results which its cultivation will produce. The object of this monograph is an endeavor to throw some light upon these things and to afford a new viewpoint from which to study industrial operations.

Managers of industrial companies will definitely agree that efficiency is one of the most sought-after qualities in equipment, methods, and personnel. Through extensive research on this topic across different regions and discussions with several hundred businesses, the writer has become convinced that there is a widespread lack of clear understanding of what efficiency really is, where it comes from, how it can be measured and improved, and the outcomes that fostering it can achieve. The purpose of this monograph is to shed some light on these aspects and provide a fresh perspective for examining industrial operations.

The Evolution of Industrial Management.

In the first place we must realize that the management of industrial enterprises is in a state of evolution. The tremendous growth of the past few years has caused certain previously satisfactory methods to become inadequate to present needs. Many details which in the days of smaller affairs could be absorbed by personal inspection and mentally stored for use when needed must now, because of their very volume, be made matters of record.

In the first place, we need to understand that managing industrial businesses is changing. The significant growth over the past few years has made some previously effective methods no longer suitable for current demands. Many details that could once be handled through personal oversight and memorized for future use now, due to their sheer quantity, need to be documented.

The character of these records has much to do with their value. Because financial records are so ancient they have exerted an undue influence upon the character of all other records. While under our present civilization, the ultimate object of industrial operations is to create financial profits, there are many highly important records which [Pg 371] cannot be adequately expressed in terms of money. The business of manufacturing consists of a repetition of mechanical operations. Mechanical operations necessarily involve considerations of weight, distance, time and effort, but not of money.

The nature of these records greatly impacts their significance. Since financial records are so old, they've had an outsized effect on the nature of all other records. Although in our current society, the main goal of industrial activities is to generate financial profit, there are many crucial records that [Pg 371] cannot be fully described in monetary terms. The manufacturing process involves repeating mechanical tasks. Mechanical tasks naturally consider factors like weight, distance, time, and effort, but not money.

The reason for the failure of so many cost systems to serve the desired end is that they are based upon a wrong unit. These systems become useful only beyond a certain point. Other systems have been the result of a blind craving for aid, but being without broad underlying principles and not properly tied together and simply, in many cases, disjointed attempts to improve isolated details, they too have failed. The result is that attempts by specialists to improve industrial conditions have been often looked upon with suspicion and this is not altogether without reason. These very failures, however, have drawn the attention of men in certain lines of engineering to the rapidly developing needs of manufacturers. They have attempted to solve the problems by the use of engineering instead of by accounting methods, and the results which have been attained prove conclusively that a material advance has been made.

The reason so many cost systems fail to achieve their intended purpose is that they’re built on the wrong unit. These systems only become useful up to a certain point. Other systems have emerged from a desperate need for help, but lacking strong foundational principles and often being disconnected attempts to improve specific details, they too have fallen short. As a result, specialists trying to enhance industrial conditions are frequently viewed with skepticism, and there's good reason for that mistrust. However, these failures have sparked the interest of engineers in certain fields, who have recognized the urgent needs of manufacturers. They’ve tried to address these problems using engineering rather than accounting methods, and the outcomes have clearly shown that significant progress has been made.

What Is Efficiency?

With this understanding of the present conditions, let us consider what efficiency really is. It has been defined as “the ability to produce certain results,” and this at the very outset necessitates the existence or creation of a standard of measurement. Our perception of efficiency, therefore, is correct only in proportion to the precision of the standard, which must be accurately developed from data which are not only exact, but complete. A machinist, believed to be operating at high efficiency, was observed while turning a shaft. His cut, feed and speed seemed to be beyond criticism. When the shaft was finished, however, he had to spend half as much time in hunting up a chain [Pg 372] and pad to remove the shaft from the lathe, as he had taken in turning it. This cut his actual efficiency from 100 per cent down to 87 per cent, yet the man was not at fault. His normal work was to operate a lathe and not to hunt for things which should have been provided for him. The points to be observed here are not only the importance of using the right standard of measurement, but that the efficiency of the man depended very largely upon his surrounding conditions over which he had no control. These conditions depend upon the efficiency of the management in securing proper equipment from the owners. This in turn depends upon the efficiency of the management’s records in enabling it to state clearly and accurately what increase in output and consequently in profits will result from improving the conditions—thus justifying the expenditure required. We see from this that the true standard is not the possibility under existing conditions, but that which can be obtained under other and more desirable conditions.

With this understanding of the current situation, let’s explore what efficiency actually means. It’s been defined as “the ability to produce specific results,” which right from the start requires us to have a standard for measurement. Our view of efficiency is only accurate to the extent that the standard is precise, and it must be developed from data that are not only accurate but also complete. A machinist, thought to be working at high efficiency, was seen while turning a shaft. His cut, feed, and speed seemed perfect. However, when the shaft was completed, he spent just as much time looking for a chain and pad to remove the shaft from the lathe as he did turning it. This dropped his actual efficiency from 100 percent down to 87 percent, yet he wasn’t at fault. His main job was to operate a lathe, not to search for tools that should have been provided. What’s important here is not just the need for the right measurement standard, but that the machinist's efficiency was heavily influenced by his surrounding conditions, which he couldn’t control. These conditions rely on the management’s ability to secure proper equipment from the owners. This, in turn, depends on how effectively management's records can clarify the potential increase in output and thus profits from improving conditions—justifying the necessary expenses. We see from this that the true standard isn’t what’s possible under current conditions, but what can be achieved under better, more favorable conditions.

Managerial Opposition to Change.

The management, which immediately controls the records and conditions should be the prime source of efforts towards the increase of efficiency throughout the plant. The opposition of managers to progress in this respect is exceedingly great, yet not altogether surprising for these reasons:

The management, which directly oversees the records and conditions, should be the main driver of efforts to boost efficiency across the plant. The resistance from managers to progress in this area is quite significant, but not entirely unexpected for the following reasons:

1. There is a widespread fallacy that so-called practical experience in the manual operations or technical processes of a business is the chief essential to success in its management. This is due to the fact that perfection of workmanship, of which he knows much, is more important in the eyes of the artisan than the actual cost of the operation, of which he knows little, or than the cause of this cost, of which he knows less.

1. There's a common misconception that hands-on experience in the manual tasks or technical processes of a business is the most important factor for successful management. This stems from the idea that the quality of the work, which the worker knows a lot about, is valued more by the craftsman than the actual costs involved, which he knows little about, or the reasons behind these costs, which he knows even less.

[Pg 373] 2. It is only recently that educational institutions have afforded any opportunity for adequate instruction in the art of management, pure and simple, a principal feature of which is the intelligent regulation of cost.

[Pg 373] 2. It’s only recently that schools and universities have provided real opportunities for proper training in management, which primarily involves effectively controlling costs.

3. There has been, and now is, as a result of these two things, a failure to appreciate the necessity and value of exact data, in proper terms, of refined and scientific methods of collecting and using it and of logical reasoning in the solution of industrial problems.

3. Because of these two factors, there has been, and still is, a lack of understanding about the importance and value of accurate data, the use of refined and scientific methods for collecting and using it, and logical reasoning in solving industrial problems.

The highest degree of efficiency, therefore, is only to be realized in a shop where executive methods have reached a high stage of efficiency, for in these is unquestionably its source.

The greatest level of efficiency can only be achieved in a shop where management practices have reached a high level of effectiveness, as this is undoubtedly where it comes from.

Time Measurement Important.

The first step is to recognize the necessity and value of a proper measurement of time, as a guide not only to the executive but to the workman. A man was observed during 8 successive repetitions of the operation of making a machine mold in a foundry. The unit times varied 5.2 to 23.6 minutes, the total time for the eight being 104 minutes. Under the method of timekeeping in use at that shop it was only ascertained that the eight operations took 1¾ hours or an “average” of 13 minutes each, and the labor cost and distribution of burden were made on that basis. Because of the absence of any standard time whatsoever it was not realized that had the man done each of the eight in 5.2 minutes, they would have been completed in 41.6 minutes, resulting in a saving of over 60 per cent of the total time. Had the man received a proper work ticket bearing this standard time, before he began the work, there is no doubt that he could have easily performed the work in the shorter time and a marked difference in proportionate burden and cost would have resulted. Under the existing methods the management could not know of the waste, and so was helpless to prevent or cure it.

The first step is to recognize the need and importance of accurately measuring time, as a guide not only for managers but also for workers. A man was observed during eight consecutive attempts to make a machine mold in a foundry. The time for each attempt varied from 5.2 to 23.6 minutes, with the total time for all eight being 104 minutes. Under the current timekeeping method in use at that shop, it was only noted that the eight operations took 1¾ hours or an "average" of 13 minutes each, and labor costs and workload distribution were calculated based on that average. Because there was no standard time established, it wasn't understood that if the man had completed each of the eight in 5.2 minutes, the total time would have only been 41.6 minutes, resulting in a savings of over 60% of the total time. If the man had received a proper work ticket that included this standard time before starting the job, there’s no doubt he could have easily finished the work in the shorter time, leading to significant differences in workload and costs. With the current methods, management was unaware of the waste, leaving them unable to prevent or address it.

[Pg 374] Every item of time, therefore, is capable of division into two parts: A standard or necessary time and a (more or less) preventable waste, which latter is the easier thing of the two to determine.

[Pg 374] Every moment of time can be split into two parts: essential time that we need and a (more or less) avoidable waste, which is typically easier to identify.

An Example of Increased Efficiency in Riveting.

A gang of four were engaged in riveting some steel plates. By the use of a stop-watch it was found that a large proportion of the total time of the riveter and bucker-up was not utilized; yet some one was always at work. The reason was that the men proceeded along the work in such a way that the bucker-up covered with his body the holes as yet unfilled by rivets, he moving from left to right. When, therefore, a rivet was driven, these two men had to stand aside until another rivet was placed by the rivet passer. Upon the instruction of the engineer, they reversed the direction of their movements so as to cover only the filled holes, thus enabling the passer always to have a rivet ready for them and making their speed in driving the real gauge of the speed of the operation. Furthermore, when they encountered a hole that needed reaming (as was sometimes the case, until the fault was located with the fitters and remedied), the riveter would lay down the gun, pick up the reamer, ream the hole, lay down the reamer, pick up the gun and drive the rivet. When persuaded to test consecutively ten or more holes after driving the first rivet in a seam to anchor the plates and then to drive the ten consecutively, they progressed faster with less effort. These men, receiving not only a standard from the engineer, but kindly instruction as to how to attain it, and being stimulated, not by abuse, but by a scientifically determined bonus—increased their output over 150 per cent beyond the original amount.

A group of four was busy riveting some steel plates. Using a stopwatch, it was discovered that a large portion of the riveter and bucker-up's total time was wasted; yet someone was always working. The issue was that the men worked in a way where the bucker-up covered the unfilled holes with his body as he moved from left to right. Therefore, when a rivet was driven, both had to step aside until the rivet passer placed another rivet. Following the engineer's advice, they changed their movement direction to cover only the filled holes, allowing the passer to always have a rivet ready for them, making their speed a true measure of the operation's pace. Additionally, if they encountered a hole that needed reaming (which sometimes happened until the issue was fixed by the fitters), the riveter would set down the gun, pick up the reamer, ream the hole, lay down the reamer, grab the gun, and drive the rivet. When they were encouraged to test ten or more holes consecutively after driving the first rivet in a seam to secure the plates and then to drive the remaining ten one after the other, they moved faster with less effort. These men, given not just a standard from the engineer but also helpful guidance on how to meet it, and motivated not by criticism but by a scientifically calculated bonus, increased their output by over 150 percent compared to their original rate.

In this plant, by the use of these methods, and in about seven months, the general increase in efficiency of the men was such that the force was reduced 67 per cent without [Pg 375] reduction in volume of output, but with a great reduction in net total unit cost, even after paying the bonus alluded to and the cost of the expert services which alone produced this result.

In this facility, using these methods, and in about seven months, the overall efficiency of the workers improved so much that the workforce was cut by 67 percent without any decrease in output volume. This led to a significant drop in the total unit cost, even after accounting for the bonus mentioned and the costs of the expert services that achieved this outcome.

The Use of Bonuses.

It is proper to say a word here on the subject of bonus as a means of increasing efficiency. The principal merit of this motive lies in the fact that immediate personal gain is the strongest incentive to immediate personal effort. It operates just as strongly on the employe as on the employer. Hope of promotion is too vague and the actual chances too limited to exert much pressure, but an extra sum in the pay envelope—or better still, in a separate one—for the disposal of the “old man himself,” will do wonders. To be most effectual a bonus must not begin at the point of standard efficiency, but at the point when average efficiency ceases and extra effort begins; and it should increase on a curve faster and faster as the point of standard efficiency is neared, because the accompanying effort will be correspondingly greater.

It’s worth discussing bonuses as a way to boost performance. The main advantage of this approach is that immediate personal gain is the strongest motivation for quick personal effort. It affects both employees and employers equally. The hope for a promotion is too uncertain and the actual opportunities too limited to create much urgency, but an extra amount in the paycheck—or even better, in a separate one for the boss himself—can work wonders. For a bonus to be most effective, it shouldn’t start at the level of standard performance, but rather at the point where average performance ends and extra effort begins; and it should increase at a faster rate as employees get closer to the standard performance level, because the effort needed will also be greater.

Efficiency Methods and Department Heads.

So much for the individual operator. And now for the executives. From foreman up to and including the highest official the same methods can and should be applied. Under ordinary circumstances, the workman in need of material, tools or instruction keeps his skirts clear by a more or less indefinite and unintelligible request to the foreman. He thinks it the foreman’s duty to look after him, but that if he does not do so it’s no business of his. Put that man on standard time and bonus and if there is anything he thinks the foreman should do or get for him he speaks loudly and directly. This the foreman does not resent—as would ordinarily be the case—for his efficiency is determined by the combined efficiency of his men and [Pg 376] upon this his bonus depends. Anything, therefore, that interferes with the progress of the men touches him closely, and he will move heaven and earth to eliminate it. All kinds of defects which were previously hidden from the superintendent are now brought to his attention, and he welcomes them for exactly the same reason that actuated the foreman. Thus the change that comes over a shop when efficiency is accurately measured and adequately rewarded is often astounding.

So much for the individual worker. Now let's talk about the executives. From foreman to the highest-ranking official, the same methods can and should be applied. Normally, when a worker needs materials, tools, or guidance, he keeps his requests vague and unclear to the foreman. He assumes it’s the foreman’s job to take care of him, but if the foreman doesn’t, he feels it’s not his concern. Put that worker on standard time and a bonus system, and if he thinks there’s something the foreman should do or get for him, he will speak up loudly and directly. The foreman won’t mind this—unlike in the usual case—because his effectiveness is based on the combined performance of his workers, and his bonus relies on this. Anything that disrupts the workers’ progress is very important to him, and he will do whatever it takes to resolve it. All sorts of problems that previously went unnoticed by the superintendent are now brought to his attention, and he appreciates them for the same reason the foreman does. Therefore, the transformation that occurs in a shop when efficiency is accurately measured and properly rewarded is often remarkable.

But this is not all. The possession of exact data as to standard and actual times makes possible a certain great improvement in, and addition to, the executive staff and a material increase in the efficiency of the foreman and department heads. By this is meant the installation of a planning department, by which the apportionment of the time of men and machines is controlled. The advantage, indeed, the positive necessity, of the services of engineers and draughtsmen in apportioning the different parts of the product is well understood. The requirements of each part, the strains to which it will be subjected, the kind, quality and quantity of material required to resist these strains, the shapes of the pieces, their relations to each other and many other things are all given most careful attention. The value of fully constructing the design on paper, as a means of discovering possible errors or difficulties, and of correcting or overcoming them before large expense for material and workmanship has been incurred, are too well realized to need more than a simple statement for their acceptance. No sane executive would expect his department heads to take a copy of his customer’s order and individually work out the details with which they are particularly concerned and expect the parts to fit. Yet this is just exactly what is being done as regards the apportionment of productive time; and a tumult of broken promises of delivery, excessive cost of production, enormous [Pg 377] wastes of time in changing jobs, etc., is the immediate and unavoidable result.

But that’s not all. Having accurate data on standard and actual times allows for a significant improvement in the management team and a substantial boost in the efficiency of the foreman and department heads. This means setting up a planning department that controls how time is allocated for both workers and machines. It is well recognized how essential engineers and draftsmen are in dividing the different parts of the product. The needs of each part, the stresses it will endure, the type, quality, and amount of materials required to withstand those stresses, the shapes of the pieces, their relationships to one another, and many other factors are all given careful consideration. The importance of fully constructing the design on paper to identify potential errors or challenges and to fix or address them before incurring significant costs for materials and labor is well understood and doesn’t require further explanation. No reasonable executive would expect his department heads to take a copy of a customer’s order and individually figure out the necessary details for their specific areas and expect the parts to fit together. Yet, this is exactly what is happening with the allocation of production time; and the immediate and unavoidable results are a chaos of broken delivery promises, excessive production costs, and significant time wasted in switching jobs, among other issues.

What Can Be Done.

It is perfectly possible, but only to one trained in the particular art, to schedule the different operations on all of the different parts of the product; to plot the productive times required, so that each may begin at such a time in relation to the others that all will arrive at the point of assembly at the proper time and in the proper sequence; to combine these studies of the different productive orders on a chart which will show the disposition to be made of all the men and machinery; to prepare advance programs for each man and machine engaged in productive labor; and thus to give to the superintendent and foremen the advantage of the same predisposition of time that they now have of material.

It’s completely feasible, but only for someone skilled in the specific craft, to plan out the various tasks for all the different components of the product; to map out the required production times, so that each task can start at the right time in relation to the others, ensuring everything arrives at the assembly point on schedule and in the right order; to integrate these studies of the different production sequences into a chart that outlines how all the workers and machines will be organized; to create advance plans for each worker and machine involved in production; and ultimately to provide the supervisor and foremen with the same time management advantages they currently have for materials.

As it is now, the time of these persons is entirely too much occupied with this problem of the disposition of time for which they are only partly equipped, having, it is true, much of the necessary information, but no training in the scientific handling of it. They are, therefore, unable to devote the time they should to the immediate study of the operations and the provision of tools, material and instruction to the men. They try to be all over the shop at once and they depend on getting their information at first hand, and consequently fail more or less clearly to cover the ground. Having such schedules and programs as are above described, and with the proper work tickets distributed on a dispatching board, each one in the division representing the work upon which a man or machine is engaged, having the time of commencement and the standard time thereon, the foreman can see at a glance without leaving his office what men will shortly finish their work and what steps must be taken to see that the drawings, tools and materials for their next work are ready for them [Pg 378] in time. Having seen to this he has some leisure to give his attention to matters immediately requiring it, knowing, if anything is obstructing the other men, that their anxiety to earn their bonus will cause them promptly to bring such matters to his attention. Having this schedule, moreover, the foremen are enabled to order material, etc., ahead and to do so intelligently, thus making the work of the shop transportation department much simpler. In one case by this means 25 men were able to handle the intra-shop transportation in a more satisfactory manner than 75 men had previously been able to do.

As it stands, these individuals are completely overwhelmed with managing their time, which they are only semi-prepared for. They have a lot of the necessary information but lack the training to handle it scientifically. Because of this, they can’t dedicate enough time to directly focus on operations and provide the tools, materials, and instruction that the workers need. They try to be everywhere at once and rely on getting information firsthand, which leads to them missing various aspects of the tasks. With the schedules and programs mentioned earlier, and proper work tickets assigned on a dispatch board—where each ticket represents the work a person or machine is doing, including start times and standard times—the foreman can quickly see from his office which workers will finish soon and what steps he needs to take to ensure the drawings, tools, and materials for their next tasks are ready on time. Once this is sorted, he can focus on pressing issues, knowing that if any other workers are facing obstacles, their eagerness to earn their bonuses will prompt them to inform him right away. Furthermore, having this schedule allows the foremen to order materials in advance and make more informed decisions, which simplifies the work for the shop's transportation department. In one instance, this approach allowed 25 men to manage intra-shop transportation more effectively than 75 men had been able to do before.

The planning department also greatly aids and is in turn aided by the purchasing department, for the times when material must or can be got can intelligently be determined to their mutual advantage. The sales department, too, when it once gets the idea that the shop is not working miracles, but has its limitations, can make delivery promises which really mean something and can be kept, and this is a trump card of no small importance when the fact becomes realized among the customers of the concern.

The planning department supports and is supported by the purchasing department, as they can figure out the best times to acquire materials for their mutual benefit. The sales department, once it understands that the shop isn’t performing miracles but has its limitations, can make delivery promises that are realistic and achievable. This is a significant advantage when customers start to recognize this fact about the company.

Responsibility of the Management.

In the opinion of those whose opportunities have enabled them to get at the facts, the inefficiency in manufacturing, which undoubtedly generally exists today, in spite of the prevailing impression to the contrary, is only about one-fourth due to the things over which the employes have control and three-fourths to conditions imposed upon them by the management. The methods outlined above have achieved results whenever they have been faithfully and honestly tried, with proper co-operation by the management and under the direction of skilled specialists, and the results have continued and will continue as long as the methods are followed. The effect upon the men is that [Pg 379] from being often listless, indifferent and antagonistic, they become energetic, ambitious and loyal friends.

In the view of those who have had the chance to investigate the facts, the inefficiency in manufacturing that definitely exists today, despite the common belief to the contrary, is about one-fourth due to factors within the employees' control and three-fourths due to conditions set by management. The approaches mentioned earlier have produced positive results whenever they have been implemented sincerely and with the right cooperation from management and guidance from skilled experts, and these results have persisted and will keep going as long as the methods are maintained. The impact on the workers is that, instead of often being disengaged, indifferent, and resistant, they become enthusiastic, motivated, and loyal allies.

One thing more: Much has been done and overdone in the line of so-called welfare work. It is a highly creditable and necessary line of effort, when confined to attempts to remove from the path of the employe any obstacle which prevents him from developing his skill and efficiency to the highest degree. An uncomfortable, unhappy person cannot be efficient. But as steam is necessary to the engine, so is incentive necessary to the worker to get him to make the best use of the facilities provided for him. Under our present civilization, the same incentive which pushes on the master will push on the man, and that is direct personal gain in dollars and cents, not for itself, but for and what that gain will bring. It must come to him quickly after the exertion which its expectation calls forth, for if long delayed, the effect is lost. It must also come to him separately from his regular wage that its amount may be the more readily realized.

One more thing: A lot has been done and overdone in the area of so-called welfare work. It's a commendable and necessary effort, as long as it focuses on removing any barriers that prevent employees from developing their skills and efficiency to the fullest. An uncomfortable, unhappy person can't be efficient. But just like steam is essential for an engine, incentive is crucial for a worker to make the best use of the resources available to them. In our current society, the same motivation that drives the boss will also drive the employee, and that motivation is direct personal gain in dollars and cents—not just for the sake of it, but for what that gain can provide. It needs to come to them quickly after the effort they put in, because if there's too much delay, the impact is lost. It also has to be separate from their regular paycheck so its value can be more easily recognized.

Moreover, the results of efficiency methods, within the writer’s knowledge, are sufficient to convince him that their general adoption would so increase the purchasing power of the employe, by increasing his wages and decreasing the cost production, as to have a markedly beneficial and steadying effect upon the business of the country.

Moreover, the results of efficiency methods, to the best of the writer’s knowledge, are enough to convince him that their widespread use would significantly boost the purchasing power of employees by raising their wages and lowering production costs, leading to a clearly positive and stabilizing impact on the country's economy.

Efficiency methods, however, cannot be successfully designed or installed by those trained in other lines and prejudiced by other associations. After these methods have been scientifically developed to suit the existing conditions and actually put into operation by those skilled in the art, they may gradually be relinquished into the control of those who have been educated in the process of installation, with some hope of success for their future operation.

Efficiency methods, however, can't be successfully created or implemented by people trained in different fields and influenced by other associations. Once these methods have been scientifically developed to fit the current conditions and actually put into use by skilled professionals, they can gradually be handed over to those who have been educated in the installation process, with some hope for their future success.

[Pg 380] THE BRIDGE BETWEEN LABOR AND CAPITAL.

BY JOHN MITCHELL.

BY JOHN MITCHELL.

[Former President United Mine Workers of America.]

[Former President United Mine Workers of America.]

If the interests of labor and capital were identical—as some contend—there would be no chasm between them to bridge; and if the interests of labor and capital were irreconcilable—as others contend—any effort to unite them would be futile. From an experience extending over a considerable period, I am quite convinced that neither of the foregoing propositions will stand the test of close analysis. My judgment is that the interests of labor and capital, though divergent in some respects, are nevertheless reciprocal and inter-dependent.

If the interests of workers and employers were the same—as some argue—there wouldn't be a gap to close; and if the interests of workers and employers were completely opposed—as others argue—any attempt to bring them together would be pointless. From my experience over a long time, I'm convinced that neither of these ideas holds up under close scrutiny. I believe that the interests of workers and employers, while different in some ways, are still interconnected and dependent on each other.

To elucidate in a practical way the subject of the proper relationship between employer and employe, it is necessary to review the activities of these two factors in the field in which their interests are common and to mark the point at which they diverge. The employer and the employe are mutually interested in the successful conduct of industry; the profits of the one and the wages of the other obviously are contingent upon it, as both profits and wages must be paid from the earnings of the enterprise in which the capital of the one and the labor of the other are jointly invested. This being true, the workman and the employer are equally concerned in the character of the product which is manufactured and sold by them, just as they are interested equally in good markets and regularity of employment. Having worked in co-operation up to the point of turning out an article that commands a wide and profitable sale, the question of dividing the earnings of their joint efforts presents itself. It is the failure of the attempt to adjust satisfactorily this controversy [Pg 381] that gives rise to the differences between employers and workmen and is the basis of the labor problem as we have it today. True, there are many questions of discord apart from those of wages and profits, which result in serious industrial conflicts, but followed back to their source, it will be found that these issues are inseparably related to those of wages and profits. In other words, the demand for a shorter workday, for healthful, sanitary surroundings, has its origin in the irrepressible desire of the working people for a progressive improvement in their conditions of life and labor.

To clearly explain the proper relationship between employers and employees, we need to look at how both parties work together where their interests align and identify where they differ. Employers and employees both want the industry to succeed; their profits and wages depend on it, since both profits and wages come from the earnings of the business where capital from one and labor from the other are combined. With that in mind, both the worker and the employer care about the quality of the products they produce and sell, as well as maintaining good markets and consistent employment. Once they collaborate to create a product that sells well and makes a profit, the issue of how to share those earnings arises. The difficulties in resolving this issue lead to the conflicts between employers and workers and form the basis of today's labor problem. It's true that there are many other sources of conflict besides wages and profits that cause serious industrial disputes, but if we trace them back to their roots, we'll see they're closely tied to those issues. In other words, demands for shorter work hours and better working conditions stem from the constant desire of workers for improved living and working conditions.

In ancient and mediaeval times when the structure of society was simple and each family consumed all the things it produced; or even at a later period when the master and the journeyman worked together side by side, and when the master had been a journeyman and the journeyman expected to become a master, there was little cause for controversy, and the problem of labor was not difficult of solution. It was not until the invention of machinery, the advent of the factory system, the use of steam, and the application of new processes that the question of the relationship of employer and employed grew so complex and impersonal that new methods became necessary in the proper adjustment of industrial affairs. As step by step industry developed from the stage of the privately owned factory to the firm and corporation, to the combination and the trust, the real employer was removed further and ever further from personal contact with his employes. As a consequence of this transition, the salaried manager took the place once held by the actual employer, and the simple and friendly relations of early days gave way to the intricate and complex industrial life of this generation.

In ancient and medieval times, when society was structured simply and each family produced and consumed everything they made; or even later, when the master and the journeyman worked side by side, with the master having been a journeyman and the journeyman expecting to become a master, there was little reason for conflict, and the labor issues were straightforward. It wasn’t until the invention of machinery, the rise of the factory system, the use of steam power, and the introduction of new processes that the relationship between employers and employees became so complicated and impersonal that new methods were needed to manage industrial affairs effectively. As industry evolved from privately owned factories to firms and corporations, to combinations and trusts, the actual employer became increasingly removed from personal interactions with their employees. As a result of this shift, the salaried manager took the place once held by the real employer, and the straightforward, friendly relationships of earlier times gave way to the complex industrial landscape we see today.

Coincident with the development of industry which has revolutionized the whole life and history of our people and our civilization, have come the local, the district, the national, and finally the international organizations of [Pg 382] labor. These gigantic associations and federations of workmen are the logical and the inevitable consequence of an industrial development which threatened the subjugation of the individual workman and forced him, in self-defense, to merge his interests and his identity with those of his fellow workmen. The momentous change in the status of the workman which accompanied the revolution of industrial processes, transformed the whole problem of labor from the question of production to that of distribution, and it is the effort to find an equitable adjustment of the problem of distribution that is taxing to the utmost the ingenuity of economists, philosophers, and statesmen.

Along with the rise of industry that has changed the entire life and history of our people and our civilization, local, district, national, and eventually international labor organizations have emerged. These massive unions and federations of workers are the natural and unavoidable result of industrial growth, which threatened to enslave individual workers and pushed them, out of necessity, to join together with their fellow workers. The significant shift in the status of workers that came with the industrial revolution turned the labor issue from one about production to one focused on distribution. Now, the challenge of finding a fair solution to the distribution problem is stretching the creativity of economists, philosophers, and politicians to their limits.

In the search for a panacea to heal the industrial ills against which society so justly complains, many suggestions are made and innumerable remedies proposed. On the one hand are found forces that would deny to labor the right of organization and combination, although exercising and enjoying the benefit of these rights themselves; on the other hand are forces at work advocating and demanding the abolition of the whole competitive system; between these extremes stands a great army of workmen and employers earnestly striving to find grounds of mutual agreement upon which the rights and obligations of each may be defined and brought into harmony. With all due respect to the opinions of others, I submit that the path of safety, progress, and justice lies in the middle course—in the recognition of the right of organization on the part of both labor and capital, by which and through which these factors in our industrial progress may work out their inevitable destiny, contracting freely each with the other upon all questions of mutual concern.

In the quest for a solution to the problems of industry that society rightfully complains about, many ideas are shared and countless remedies suggested. On one side, there are forces that would deny workers the right to organize and unite, even while they themselves enjoy these rights; on the other side, there are advocates pushing for the complete elimination of the competitive system. Between these extremes is a large group of workers and employers who are genuinely trying to find common ground to define and harmonize each party's rights and responsibilities. With all due respect to others’ views, I believe the safe, progressive, and fair way forward lies in the middle ground—acknowledging the right of both labor and capital to organize, so that these elements of our industrial advancement can work out their inevitable futures, freely negotiating with each other on all matters of shared interest.

The trade agreement is the bridge between labor and capital. It restores, so far as it is possible to do so, the personal relationship, the mutual interest which existed prior to the advent of the factory system. It is an acknowledgment of the inter-dependence of labor and capital, [Pg 383] a recognition of the reciprocal interest of employer and employe. When the right of organization among workmen and employers is fully recognized and freely conceded, and when these forces adopt and practice the policy of collective bargaining, the day of the strike and the lockout, of the boycott and the blacklist, with their attendant evils, losses, and hardships, will have largely passed away.

The trade agreement acts as a link between workers and employers. It restores, as much as possible, the personal connection and mutual interest that existed before the factory system took over. It acknowledges how labor and capital depend on each other, recognizing the shared interests of employers and employees. When workers and employers fully recognize and support the right to organize, and when these groups embrace collective bargaining, the era of strikes, lockouts, boycotts, and blacklists—along with their accompanying issues, losses, and struggles—will largely be a thing of the past. [Pg 383]

[Pg 384] THE UNEMPLOYED.

BY JOHN BASCOM, D. D., LL. D.

BY JOHN BASCOM, D. D., LL. D.

[Formerly President University of Wisconsin.]

[Former President of University of Wisconsin.]

A striking feature of the industrial world and one well fitted to occasion alarm is the large number of persons thrown, from time to time, out of employment. We are forced by it to accept one or other of two conclusions; that the economic world is mismade, incapable of a quiet and successful run, or that our handling of it has been in some way unskillful and misapplied. This fact of unemployment has become very conspicuous, and to those who suffer from it, and to those who sympathize with them, exceedingly grevious. A certain portion of the human family, and that in the most progressive nations, find themselves superfluous, out of connection with the means of living though others are obtaining support, comfort and luxury. They have nothing to do but to die in their tracks. Like the feeble ones in a forced march through an enemy’s country they first fall behind and then perish. This state of the case does not arise by accident and then pass away, it has periods of severity which frequently return, and stands among those constant dangers which may at any time overtake a few. This evil comes especially to industrious countries, like England, and to portions of our own country, like Pittsburg, noted for their enlarged production. The causes and remedies of this state of things become, therefore, subjects of anxious inquiry. We may assert that the want of employment is due in a general way, to the deficiencies and vices of men, but this assertion does not sufficiently point out the immediate occasion of the difficulty, nor furnish us its remedies.

A striking feature of the industrial world, and one that justifiably raises concern, is the large number of people periodically thrown out of work. We are compelled to accept one of two conclusions: either the economic system is fundamentally flawed and unable to operate smoothly, or that we've managed it in some unskillful and misapplied way. This issue of unemployment has become very prominent and is extremely painful for those affected, as well as for those who sympathize with them. A certain segment of humanity, particularly in the most advanced countries, finds themselves unnecessary and disconnected from the means of making a living, even as others enjoy support, comfort, and luxury. Their only option seems to be to wither away. Similar to the weak in a forced march through hostile territory, they first lag behind and then ultimately succumb. This situation doesn't occur by chance and simply go away; it has severe periods that frequently return and stands among the persistent dangers that can strike at any moment. This issue particularly affects industrious countries, like England, and areas in our own nation, like Pittsburgh, known for their extensive production. The causes and solutions to this problem thus become a source of urgent concern. We can claim that the lack of employment is generally caused by human shortcomings and flaws, but this statement doesn’t adequately identify the immediate cause of the problem or provide us with solutions.

[Pg 385] Failure of the means of livelihood arises from indolence, ignorance, vice and unfavorable conditions on the part of those who suffer from it, conditions often of the nature of accident. But while the recipients of this disaster are plainly recognized, the disaster itself comes to them in a measure independent of their failures. We need to know not only those who are likely to suffer from a given disease, but how the disease itself arises. The central and most productive cause in this series of provocations is indolence; the others accompany indolence and more or less arise from it. By indolence we mean a want of life and hence a weakness of all the functions of life. We may mean physical inactivity or intellectual sluggishness or moral indifference, or may mean them all blended in one or other of the various ways in which a weak and perverted life manifests itself. The tramp is physically indolent, he hates work. This indolence readily extends to intellectual activity; the indolent person is ignorant of the value of success, of its motives and of its means. The world reveals few incentives to him and makes few appeals. This indolence and ignorance do not wholly arrest the wants and desires of men, and hence vice, as in the case of the thief, enters as the most ready and immediate means of gratification. The torpid nature of the moral judgment lends itself to this result, and nothing but fear, itself weak and vacillating, stands between the indolent man and habits of gross indulgence, inconsistent with personal and with social welfare.

[Pg 385] The failure to make a living comes from laziness, ignorance, bad choices, and unfortunate circumstances faced by those affected, often caused by unexpected events. While we can see who suffers from this misfortune, the disaster strikes them somewhat independently of their shortcomings. We need to understand not just who might get sick from a particular condition but also how that condition develops. The main and most significant cause in this chain of issues is laziness; the other factors often arise from it and accompany it. By laziness, we mean a lack of vitality, leading to a weakness in all life functions. This can refer to physical inactivity, mental sluggishness, moral apathy, or a combination of these, reflecting the various ways a weak and misguided life can show itself. The vagrant is physically lazy and dislikes work. This laziness easily spills over into intellectual pursuits; a lazy person is unaware of the importance of success, its motivations, and how to achieve it. The world offers him few incentives and makes limited appeals to him. However, this laziness and ignorance do not completely stop people's wants and desires, so vice, like that of a thief, becomes the quickest way to satisfy those cravings. The sluggishness of moral judgment contributes to this situation, and only fear—weak and wavering—stands between the lazy person and habits of excessive indulgence that are harmful to individual and societal well-being.

The accidents, misjudgments and disappointments which are liable to overtake us all owe the injury which they inflict to the weak personality on which they fall, and so misfortune seems to follow and persecute those who are least able to bear it. The indolent, passive mood is a good medium for the accumulation and transfer of every form of disaster. The class of the helpless is much enlarged by [Pg 386] this flow of every form of evil to these low places in conduct and character.

The accidents, poor choices, and letdowns that can happen to anyone are more damaging to those with weaker personalities. It seems like bad luck targets and troubles those who can least handle it. A lazy, passive attitude is a perfect way for all kinds of disasters to pile up and affect you. The number of people feeling helpless grows significantly because of this influx of negativity towards these lower standards of behavior and character. [Pg 386]

We may clearly recognize these facts and suppose them a sufficient explanation of the farther fact, that so many are thrown out of employment and find themselves the waifs of society with no secure attachment to it. They do, indeed, make conspicuous the failure of occupation and determine the direction it will take. Their numbers are seriously increased by it, and their very presence gives the conditions of its recurrence. They are both causes and effects. They stand on terms of action and reaction with all the embarrassments of production. They help to reduce wages, and when wages are reduced, they are the first to be driven out of employment. They are the symptoms of the disease, the product of the disease and the means by which it is carried farther. All failures in the productive process extend, in their worst results, to this class of defectives. They are the recipients of past evils, of present and of coming evils. They arise in connection with a false form of production, must be treated with it and removed with it. They are a composite product, their faults not being wholly their own but in part the faults of the economic system with which they are associated. They are not the scapegoat on whose head the sins of the people may be laid and then be borne into the wilderness.

We can clearly see these facts and consider them a sufficient explanation for the further issue that so many people are out of work and become the outcasts of society with no stable connection to it. They highlight the failure of employment and influence the direction it will take. Their numbers grow significantly because of it, and their very existence creates the conditions for this to happen again. They are both causes and effects. They interact with all the challenges of production. They contribute to lowering wages, and when wages drop, they’re the first to lose their jobs. They are the signs of the problem, the outcomes of the problem, and the means by which it continues. All failures in the production process ultimately impact this vulnerable group the most. They are burdened by past mistakes, present struggles, and future challenges. They emerge from a flawed production system, need to be addressed with it, and must be eliminated along with it. They are a mixed outcome, their problems not solely their own but also partly the faults of the economic system they are part of. They are not the scapegoat onto whom society's failings can be placed and then sent away.

In discussing the causes and remedies of unemployment, we shall see how far and in what way these feeblest workers are involved in it. We cannot improve society by simply striking off the evils that have been developed under it. Healthy growth alone can rid itself of failures. It often happens in physical disease that what is accepted as a remedy in the end aggravates the difficulty.

In discussing the causes and solutions to unemployment, we’ll explore how these most vulnerable workers are affected. We can’t improve society just by eliminating the problems that arise within it. Only healthy growth can overcome failures. Often, in physical illness, what’s thought to be a remedy can actually make the situation worse.

One dislikes to use the word pauper, it so frequently carries with it an unreasonable and cruel contempt. Yet there are paupers in the human household, and when the temper is once present it is most difficult of removal. It is [Pg 387] a form of leprosy that eats out all vital power. The pauper temper indicates a disposition to secure immediate ease with no reference to the comfort of others. It accepts any advantage that offers without the slightest wish to return it. Yet even this spirit may offer some excuses for itself. The evils of society which may have originated far off in the action of the leaders of men, are apt to go booming downward till they reach, in their most distinctive form, the pauper class, or those but little above it. Diligence, thrift, skill, ward off the blow and escape with only a partial loss. Those who are always in the way of it are the weak ones, to whom prosperity brings but little and adversity occasions immediate overthrow. When those who at best are but partially occupied, find that labor is altogether failing them, the question of relief becomes most difficult. There is no profitable labor at disposal, and to provide labor means farther loss; it is charity in its most disguised, expensive and unrequited form. The worst lesson we can teach those already inclined to negligence is that a form of labor may be put in the place of real labor, and that the question of adequacy is one to be answered by society, not by the needy, recipient of favor. Whatever we may do for men of feeble productive power we are not to lead them still farther on in the direction of indolence and worthlessness. Actions are not to be separated from their normal results. We may frequently be called on to bear the injury which proceeds from another man’s wrongs, but we are never called on to disguise the wrong itself. A portion of the wrong is our own; that we should correct. While the evils are in the process of infliction we are to bear them sympathetically, but not in a form which disguises their true character.

One doesn't like to use the word pauper because it often comes with an unreasonable and harsh contempt. Still, there are paupers in society, and once that attitude sets in, it's really hard to get rid of. It's like a disease that destroys all vital energy. The pauper mindset shows a tendency to seek immediate comfort without considering the well-being of others. It takes any advantage that comes its way without any desire to give back. However, even this attitude might try to justify itself. The problems in society that start with powerful leaders often trickle down to the pauper class or those just above it. Hard work, saving, and skill can help fend off adversity, but those who are constantly in its path suffer the most; prosperity offers them little, and hardship brings quick downfall. When those who are only somewhat engaged in work find that jobs are scarce, the issue of aid becomes very complicated. There's no available work, and creating jobs leads to further losses; it's charity in its most hidden, costly, and unreciprocated form. The worst thing we can do for those already prone to laziness is to suggest that some kind of busywork can substitute for real work, and that the issue of what’s sufficient should be decided by society, not by the people receiving help. No matter what we do for those with limited ability to produce, we should not encourage them to slide further into laziness and uselessness. Actions cannot be separated from their natural consequences. We may often need to endure the harm caused by someone else's wrongs, but we're never justified in masking those wrongs themselves. Part of the wrong is ours to fix. While these issues are happening, we should empathize with the situation but not in a way that conceals its true nature.

Something of the same danger inheres in old-age pensions. Workmen of usual diligence should receive a return for their labor which would enable them to provide [Pg 388] for age. As long as workmen, reaching the age of three score, generally become dependent on the public, it is perfectly plain that their wages are too low, that the returns of production are not fairly distributed. A pension acknowledges the evil, but does not remove it, it tends rather to confirm it. That the losses which accompany industrial accidents should be divided between workmen, managers and the community at large is plainly just, and is no temptation to remissness. The accident is not the fault of any one person or class of persons. If it falls upon a large number, it is more readily borne and increases the motives to care. Our machinery is operated for the benefit of the entire community, and it is only fair that the entire community should help to bear the increased dangers. That injuries should be still left with the workmen on whom they have accidentally fallen is another proof of the slight hold they have on the public mind.

There's a similar risk with old-age pensions. Hardworking individuals should earn enough from their labor to support themselves in their later years. As long as workers around the age of sixty generally rely on public assistance, it’s clear that their wages are too low and the profits from production aren’t shared fairly. Pensions acknowledge the problem but don’t solve it; instead, they tend to reinforce it. It’s only fair that the costs of industrial accidents are shared among workers, managers, and the community as a whole, and this doesn't encourage negligence. Accidents aren’t the fault of any single individual or group. When the burden is spread across many, it is easier to manage and encourages greater care. Our machinery benefits everyone, so it’s only right that the whole community shares the risk that comes with it. Leaving the burden of injuries solely on the workers affected is further evidence of how little importance this issue holds in the public consciousness.

Any remedy for the lack of employment which is prompted simply by compassion and still leaves the evil to overtake the workman is not social hygiene; is not a recognition of the partiality and disproportion which still inhere in our productive methods. Labor should be successful and rewardful when left to its own development. It is bad to create a pauper temper and most difficult to contend with it when it has once been called out. Men should be subject to their own incentives of hope and fear, success and failure, as far as possible. The same discipline which comes to the active, is the natural spring of action in the sluggish. Any compassion which reduces the motives of effort that should come to the entire community, or which leaves the community satisfied with a maladjustment of duties, can never provide an adequate correction of bad distribution. We are placed between a narrow and a wide humanity, between an immediate reduction of suffering and a removing of its conditions. The final result is the test of our wisdom and good will.

Any solution for unemployment that is driven purely by compassion and still allows the issues to overwhelm workers isn't effective social policy; it fails to recognize the biases and imbalances that exist in our methods of production. Work should be rewarding and successful when allowed to develop naturally. It's harmful to create a mindset of dependency, and it's tough to address once it's been established. People should be motivated by their own hopes and fears, successes and failures, as much as possible. The same discipline that benefits the active also inspires action in those who are less engaged. Any compassion that undermines the incentives for effort that should be available to the whole community, or that leaves the community complacent with poorly assigned responsibilities, won't effectively fix the issue of inadequate resource distribution. We find ourselves caught between addressing immediate suffering and changing its underlying causes. The ultimate outcome is the measure of our wisdom and goodwill.

[Pg 389] There are partial remedies of the failure of employment which are fitted to give relief without endangering the future or disturbing the general conditions of employment. Occupations especially irregular, like that of the stevedore, may receive especial attention, or may be united to other forms of labor so as to secure greater uniformity. In these occupations the employer may frequently have but little motive to correct an evil from which he prospers by reduced wages. Excess and deficiency in the various branches of work should be made, as far as possible, to correct each other. Workmen are often not in a position to meet successfully these evils. They accept the drift of the labor market with small power to control it.

[Pg 389] There are some partial solutions to the issues of job loss that can provide help without threatening the future or disrupting overall employment conditions. Jobs that are particularly unstable, like that of the stevedore, may deserve special focus or may be combined with other types of work to achieve more consistency. In these roles, employers often have little motivation to fix a problem that benefits them through lower wages. Surpluses and shortages in different areas of work should, whenever possible, balance one another out. Workers frequently lack the ability to effectively address these issues. They tend to go along with market changes, with little power to influence them.

Bureaus of intelligence should be established so that the variable demands for labor of different localities may be quickly met. This is a public service, and should have the ease and certainty of such service. The same reasons which lead the Government to take the direction of immigrants should lead it to render similar aid to workmen. Workmen are often ignorant of the extent and character of the employment offered in the distance, and are subject to the exactions which arise in connection with this want of knowledge. The greater one’s want the more difficult is the change of locality. Quickness of response demands both intelligence and nobility.

Bureaus of intelligence should be set up so that the changing labor demands in different areas can be quickly met. This is a public service and should have the efficiency and reliability of such a service. The same reasons that drive the government to manage immigration should also motivate it to provide similar support to workers. Workers often don't know about the range and types of job opportunities available elsewhere and are vulnerable to the challenges that come with this lack of knowledge. The greater the need, the harder it is to relocate. A quick response requires both insight and integrity.

Savings banks and insurance, while not directly affecting the demand for labor, tend to equalize and reduce the losses which accompany variability. They also tend strongly to call out that forecast of evil and preparation for it which belong to thoughtfulness. The strokes of fortune lose something of their unexpected and injurious character, and men are put on voluntary and better terms with the world.

Savings banks and insurance, although they don't directly impact the demand for labor, help to balance out and lessen the losses that come with unpredictability. They also encourage people to anticipate problems and prepare for them, which shows consideration. The hardships of life become less surprising and damaging, allowing people to have a more positive and proactive relationship with the world.

We are not, however, to look on these reductions of danger as covering the whole problem. Life has its accidents and we can greatly reduce the evil results of them [Pg 390] by patience and prudence, but there still remains the more thoroughgoing effort by which the evil is anticipated and turned aside.

We shouldn't view these risk reductions as the entire solution. Life has its unexpected events, and while we can significantly lessen their negative outcomes through patience and caution, there's still a need for a more proactive approach to prevent and divert the harm entirely.

There should be that general harmony of effort, that proportion of its several parts to each other, that recognition of the common welfare, which fortify us against disaster, and force it in the background when it comes. There is a wise method in production, and a just relation of its agents to each other, which should greatly reduce the liability of a want of labor, and should ultimately remove it altogether. A true democracy should be exempt from this general failure in the results of activity. Much of our political economy has rested on inferences drawn from a faulty state of society, as if it and the conclusions contained in it expressed the real laws of our being. Society, in its most civilized forms, has always developed a proletariat, it has suffered drainage, and we have come to think this a sort of necessity, a natural result of social growth. With this starting point and expectation we are ready for periods of unemployment, and look at the misery which arises from them as a corrective. Superfluous lives cannot be gotten rid of on cheaper terms. We might as well suppose that disease is an inevitable attachment of physical life and must be left to go with it. Society never has too many workers, and when they are not wanted it is because they have been in some way misdirected. Strong men, industrious and intelligent men, are the wealth of society. There is never a time in which there is little or nothing to do in the world; if we think so it is because we cannot see, or see falsely. Our intelligence determines what is to be done and our diligence performs it. The world is never deficient in occasions for labor, no matter how defective we may be in performing it. Nor is well-devised labor wanting in its returns; intelligence and diligence, in full exercise, always contradict the notion. The world could not be the home of man on any other terms. [Pg 391] Human life begins to be superfluous the moment labor miscarries, and the miscarriage sinks down to those who have the least intelligence and industry. The constitutional disease of society, that which it has propagated with most show of knowledge, is ignorance and indolence. When we reach this stratum we are always in difficulty; the more in difficulty because we come to it in a sluggish rather than in a corrective temper.

There should be a general harmony of effort, a balance among its various parts, and an understanding of the common good that protects us from disaster and pushes it to the background when it happens. There is a smart way to produce things and a fair relationship among its workers that should significantly lower the chance of a labor shortage and eventually eliminate it altogether. A true democracy should be free from this widespread failure in the outcomes of our actions. Much of our political economy has been based on assumptions drawn from a flawed state of society, as if this and the conclusions we’ve reached truly reflect the real laws of our existence. Society, in its most advanced forms, has always created a working class, it has faced challenges, and we’ve come to accept this as a kind of necessity, a natural consequence of social development. With this mindset, we brace ourselves for periods of unemployment and view the suffering that comes from it as a form of correction. We can’t just dispose of redundant lives at a low cost. We might as well assume that illness is an unavoidable part of physical existence and must coexist with it. Society never has too many workers, and when they aren't needed, it's usually because they’ve been misallocated in some way. Strong, hardworking, and intelligent individuals are the true wealth of society. There is never a time when there are no tasks to be done in the world; if we believe that, it's because we either can’t see or we’re seeing it wrong. Our intelligence decides what needs to be done, and our effort carries it out. The world is never short of opportunities for work, regardless of how inadequate we might be in doing it. Well-planned work always provides returns; when intelligence and effort are fully engaged, it disproves that idea. The world couldn't be a home for humanity under any other conditions. [Pg 391] Human life becomes unnecessary the moment work fails, with that failure affecting those who are least intelligent and hardest working. The fundamental issue within society, which it has propagated under the guise of knowledge, is ignorance and laziness. When we reach this low point, we always face challenges, and it’s even harder because we approach it with a slow rather than a corrective mindset.

Incident to indolence and ignorance are those vices of temper by which we wish to reach results without labor, or to reach them by the labor of others rather than by our own labor. As long as these vices are prevalent among men, whether in the upper or the lower strata of society, or, as is sure to be the case, in both, periods of arrest will come. Men will be baffled in their narrow aims, and will have no broader, more generous ones to put in their place. For a time they will lie idle till the customary impulses revive and once more set them in action. Industrial inactivity is like a financial panic. It is the result of the transient suspension of habitual feelings, and does not relax till men return to their usual frame of mind. These distrustful and apprehensive periods are liable to return as long as men are not pursuing sound purposes in a sober way. Any deficiency in fairness, integrity and mutual confidence divides society against itself, and renders a portion of its efforts futile. This is the more true as the division and subdivision of labor increases, and the final adjustment of returns is made by complicated exchanges. When a portion of the community finds its share of good things much reduced, when in the distribution of the rewards of labor, custom or cunning or force has robbed them of a reasonable portion, the motives of labor are greatly lessened, the means of exchange are lessened and the sense of unity and integrity of society is lost. There is in civilized society a large body of just and honest production which goes far to sustain the mind in renewed effort, and [Pg 392] keep firm the ties which bind men together. Yet the element of distrust, as in a financial crisis, extends through the community and weakens the points of life.

Due to laziness and ignorance, there are certain character flaws that make us want to achieve results without putting in the effort ourselves or prefer for others to do the work instead. As long as these flaws are widespread among people, regardless of whether they are in the upper or lower classes, or both, periods of stagnation will occur. People will get stuck in their limited goals, with no broader, more generous aspirations to replace them. They may remain inactive until their usual motivations return and push them back into action. Being idle in work is similar to a financial crisis; it's caused by a temporary halt in typical emotions and only resolves when people regain their usual mindset. Distrustful and anxious times are likely to reoccur as long as people aren't pursuing sound goals in a sensible way. Any lack of fairness, integrity, and mutual trust fragments society and makes some of its efforts ineffective. This is especially true as the division and specialization of labor increases, with the final distribution of rewards being handled through complex exchanges. When part of the community finds its share of benefits significantly reduced, whether due to tradition, trickery, or force, the motivation for work decreases, opportunities for exchange shrink, and the feeling of community and cohesion is lost. In civilized society, there is a substantial amount of fair and honest production that helps sustain motivation for renewed effort and maintains the bonds that connect people. Yet, the feeling of distrust, much like during a financial crisis, permeates the community and weakens its foundations.

The first condition of social, economic strength is that all the members of society shall find suitable occupation and by means of it become the givers and receivers of aid. This plain, simple fact has been much obscured by accepting competition, often in an unethical and unsocial form, as the general law of economic activity. This law it is not; and it needs at all times to be held in check by ethical impulses and by the welfare of the community. It is this welfare which is the supreme law. Labor owes much of its degradation to a rigid and unreasonable application of competition. As we go down in the scale of occupations, and in efficiency in those occupations, the greater is the injustice and injury that attend on competition till we reach a point at which large numbers are pressed by it to the very verge of life. Then comes in that mischievous generalization which tends to make human degradation a permanent product of nature. The increase of human life is said to be geometrical, the increase of the means of life arithmetical, and so the two tendencies grind eternally against each other. Our best sympathy is expressed in letting this collision come to the quickest, shortest results. Some of this crushing process obtains between ill-trained and sluggish, well-trained and active men. Let it have way.

The first condition for social and economic strength is that everyone in society should find a suitable job and, through that, become both givers and receivers of support. This straightforward fact has often been overlooked by viewing competition, frequently in unethical and antisocial ways, as the main rule of economic activity. It is not; it always needs to be balanced by ethical values and the well-being of the community. This well-being is the highest priority. The degradation of labor is largely due to a strict and unreasonable focus on competition. As we descend the ladder of jobs and efficiency in those roles, the greater the injustice and harm caused by competition until we reach a point where many people are pushed to the brink of survival. Then, we encounter that harmful generalization that suggests human degradation is a natural state of affairs. It's said that the increase of human life is exponential while the increase in resources to support that life is linear, and so these two forces are in constant conflict. Our best response is to allow this clash to produce the quickest and most immediate outcomes. Some of this crushing effect occurs between poorly trained and slow individuals and those who are well-trained and dynamic. Let it unfold.

Yet the agricultural products of the world have not only never given out, they have never been brought near a maximum. Food, raiment and shelter are most varied in kind and abundant in quantity where men are most numerous. The Algonquin Indian wandered in the forest in the winter, unfed and unsheltered. The foundation of his trouble was his indolence and ignorance. The inhabitants of India may perish by famine in large numbers. The distress arises not from the fact that the people have [Pg 393] outstripped the productive power of the world, but because they have outstripped their wisdom in handling those powers.

Yet the agricultural products of the world have not only never run out, but they have never come close to a maximum. Food, clothing, and shelter are diverse in type and plentiful in amount where people are most numerous. The Algonquin Indian wandered the forest in winter, without food and shelter. His problems stemmed from his laziness and lack of knowledge. The people of India may face famine in large numbers. The suffering doesn’t come from the fact that the population has exceeded the world’s productive capacity, but because they have exceeded their wisdom in managing those resources.

Let men covet wealth, and at the same time use narrowly and competitively the means of attaining it, and the two strata of society, upper and lower, will shape between them a human life in which want will stand over against luxury, hatred over against contempt, and the two classes, oppressed by spiritual destitution and physical poverty, will wage with each a variable and hopeless warfare such as wisdom and good will can alone leave behind us.

Let people desire wealth and, at the same time, pursue it in a selfish and competitive way, and the gap between the rich and poor will create a life where need contrasts with excess, resentment opposes disdain, and the two classes, burdened by spiritual emptiness and material poverty, will engage in an endless and futile struggle that only wisdom and goodwill can help us overcome.

A first remedy for unemployment is to make employment remunerative; so remunerative that the workman shall be the buyer of many things as well as the seller of one thing. When his single sale of labor stands in equipoise over against his many purchases, we shall have buyers as well as sellers and our production and traffic will never cease. We have in trade-unions a first step in the adjustment of exchange. Workmen strive to escape the competition of the incompetent and shiftless, to redirect distribution in ways more just and equal, and by this means to be able to play their own part in economic life more advantageously for themselves and for all. This effort is new in its breadth of application, but has never been new with the wise and thrifty. Personal skill and professional attainments have always lifted themselves above the storm-swept plain of competition, and gathered about themselves a prosperity and comfort resting on special and superior exertion. So long as we subject ourselves to the fortunes of the indolent and set up our standards of life at the very foot of the slope, we shall have a competition like that of the Chinese to contend with. We shall march so near the verge of the precipice that many will be pushed over it, and the least flurry will be disastrous. A sufficient return for diligence is the first claim and the [Pg 394] safety of labor; it enhances its motives and fortifies it in the possession of what it holds.

A primary solution for unemployment is to make jobs well-paying enough that workers can afford to buy many things as well as sell their labor. When a worker's single job balances out against their multiple purchases, we’ll have both buyers and sellers, and our production and trade will keep moving. Trade unions represent an initial step toward improving exchanges. Workers work to escape competing with the incompetent and lazy, aiming to make distribution more fair and equal, which allows them to participate in economic life in a way that benefits themselves and everyone else. While this effort is new in its wide reach, it isn't new to the wise and hardworking. Personal skills and professional qualifications have always allowed some to rise above the rough competition and achieve prosperity and comfort through dedicated effort. As long as we align ourselves with the fortunes of the lazy and set our living standards at the lowest point, we’ll face competition similar to that of the Chinese. We’ll be teetering on the edge of disaster, and just a slight disturbance could lead to serious consequences. A reasonable reward for hard work is the fundamental right and security of labor; it strengthens its motivation and secures what it has. [Pg 394]

With paucity of pay on the one side goes the superabundance of profits on the other side. The returns of management should be more moderate, more uniform, more consonant with the general welfare. We can hardly doubt that an industrial community, well-organized, with a fair share of intelligence, diligence and honesty, will commend reasonable prosperity extending to all its members. Indeed this is what actually takes place in the midway forms of effort. The very poor and the very rich complement each other. Healthy and wholesome activity is as possible to the community as to the individual. The chief difference lies in the increased complexity of communal action and the ease with which results are misunderstood and misinterpreted. The instinctive and voluntary life of the individual is replaced in the community by divided counsels. Men shape opinion and interpret results in view of their own interests rather than in view of the public welfare. The public welfare is as much within the scope of human thought, when attention is directed to it, as is individual well-being. Indeed the universal and stable prosperity of economic society is as much dependent on the diligence and sobriety of its members as is individual welfare on well-ordered labor. The qualities which enhance success in the one direction are much the same as those which cause it in the other direction. Extreme and intemperate action work the same mischief in the one field as in the other. Society is sufficient unto itself when its purposes and methods are truly social. A sudden suspension of labor, a large number out of employment, are the result of disturbing causes which have found their way into the ordinary processes of production. These causes are an unreasonable accumulation of power in single hands, speculative ventures and a social philosophy which holds in light esteem the immediate interests of [Pg 395] the mass of the community. I have in mind a peculiar manufacture which had provided the needed buildings, and surrounded itself with the homes and help called for. There came a combination of those engaged in this industry. The works, comparatively new, were discontinued. Production sought a new center and the old community was left to suffer the loss of slow dispersion.

With low pay on one side comes a huge amount of profits on the other. Management's returns should be more reasonable, consistent, and aligned with the overall good. It's hard to doubt that a well-organized industrial community, with a fair amount of intelligence, hard work, and honesty, will foster reasonable prosperity for all its members. This is exactly what happens in balanced efforts. The very poor and the very rich balance each other out. Healthy and productive activity is as achievable for the community as it is for individuals. The main difference lies in the increased complexity of collective actions and how easily results can be misunderstood or misinterpreted. The instinctive and voluntary actions of individuals are replaced in the community by divided opinions. People shape their views and interpret outcomes based on their own interests rather than the public good. The public good is just as much within human understanding, when focused on, as individual well-being. In fact, the overall and stable prosperity of the economy depends on the hard work and discipline of its members just as much as individual welfare relies on organized labor. The qualities that boost success in one area are mostly the same as those that lead to success in the other. Extreme and reckless actions cause problems in both contexts. Society can support itself when its goals and methods are truly social. A sudden halt in work, with many people out of jobs, results from disruptive factors that have entered regular production processes. These factors include an unreasonable concentration of power in a few hands, speculative ventures, and a social philosophy that undervalues the immediate needs of the broader community. I'm thinking of a specific manufacturing company that had built the necessary facilities and surrounded itself with the homes and support it required. Then, a group of those working in this industry combined efforts. The relatively new plant shut down. Production sought a new location, leaving the old community to suffer the consequences of gradual decline.

We are protected against theft and criminal violence, but we are not protected against the unprovoked losses which come to us from the speculative aims of the adventuresome capitalist, though these losses may greatly exceed those of robbery. The stability of labor and the returns of labor are often affected in the great centers of production by opportunities, fanciful or real, which offer themselves to a few of achieving large wealth; opportunities not so much of creating wealth as of raking it together. The mass of men do not so much as conceive that they have any ground of complaint of operations which sweep out from under them the supports of well-devised industry. Wealth which in its making and use tends to break up the ordinary methods of industry, to throw off the minds of men from the familiar reconciliations of industry and, above all, to weaken the sense of responsibility which lies between labor and capital, must, from time to time, issue in industrial disaster to the confusion and loss of labor. Do the best we may and we cannot anticipate every disturbance, but we are inexcusable for overlooking the disasters we bring upon others who are working with us. Much of what is called enterprise renders those engaged in it almost wholly negligent of the incidental injuries which fall to those about them. The equilibrium of labor is dependent on the equilibrium of productive enterprises, and when these accept no restraints the disturbance will reappear here and there in the productive world very much at random. Labor presses at one point and is relaxed at another, subject to the speculative schemes of capital. Extreme wealth in the [Pg 396] hands of a few lacks the economic and social and moral motives which make it a calculable and reliable means in the hands of many. When it is in the process of accumulation it is lawless; when it is accumulated it sinks into indolence.

We’re shielded from theft and violent crime, but we’re not protected from the unexpected losses that arise from the risky pursuits of adventurous investors, even though those losses can be much greater than theft. The stability of jobs and the rewards of work are often influenced in major production centers by opportunities, whether they’re real or imaginary, that a few people have to gain significant wealth; these opportunities aren’t really about creating wealth but more about gathering it. Most people don’t even realize they have a reason to complain about actions that undermine the foundations of well-planned businesses. Wealth that disrupts the normal ways of working, distracts people from familiar business practices, and, most importantly, weakens the sense of responsibility between labor and capital will inevitably lead to industrial disasters that harm workers. No matter how hard we try, we can’t predict every disruption, but it’s inexcusable to ignore the disasters we cause for those working alongside us. Much of what is called entrepreneurship makes those involved largely indifferent to the unintended harm that affects those around them. The balance of labor relies on the balance of productive enterprises, and when these are unregulated, disturbances will randomly pop up in the production world. Labor may be pushed in one direction and eased in another, subject to the speculative plans of investors. Extreme wealth in the hands of a few lacks the economic, social, and moral incentives that allow it to be a dependable and useful resource for many. During the accumulation process, it operates without rules; once it’s accumulated, it falls into laziness.

While some gains are pretty sure to accompany the acquisition of great wealth, once acquired, it disturbs the even flow of economic forces, and may easily give rise to irregular occupation that brings serious disturbance to those whose daily wants are to be supplied by labor. It may be thought that these fluctuations in production arise from its very nature, and that if we leave men of very different degrees of intelligence to contend with each other for the prizes of industry, great inequalities of prosperity are sure to appear. We can escape them only by forcing back enterprise and making the moderate, medium men the standards of achievement. This presentation seems plausible, and will always be urged by those who are willing or eager to take large risks. Men of large productive power are easily stimulated, and their resources are kept, in reference to the community at large, in the most fruitful form when they are compelled to moderate their efforts, and are not left to the extreme and eccentric ways normal to them. The community is interested in habitual lines of industry more than in those which disturb the minds by sudden profits which cannot be emulated or repeated. Men will separate themselves from their fellows in the rivalries of production. Only thus is the power of intelligence fully disclosed, yet the ordinary arrangements of society, its privileges and opportunities, should be made as equal as possible; no unfair advantage should be given to one or another form of production; nor methods be allowed to the successful in achieving wealth which are not admissible in the community at large. The laws of the game should be wisely framed and firmly preserved. It is the able and ambitious who bring the most strain to safe restrictions, [Pg 397] and for whom they are chiefly made. Equality of opportunity is the cardinal principle, and cannot be sacrificed in favor of enterprise. The enterprise that is wholesome keeps within this law. It may also be thought that this rigid restraint would deprive the community of some of the most prevalent means of welfare as well as of some of the most illustrious agents in prosperity, and that those great and efficient combinations which we have come to designate as trusts would be lost to us; that as the result of this loss we should quickly settle down into a sluggish routine, mediocre ideas ruling the public mind, and so miss that very prosperity of which we are in search. Industrial corporations are most efficient agents in wealth-making. We cannot for a moment think of throwing any real obstacle in the way of their formation. But while we need their aid, we should also remember the evils which are liable to come with them. They are the creatures of law, and the law in giving birth to them should assign them the form and restrictions which are most consistent with the public welfare. They are not to be allowed to fall into speculative hands, an instrument of unrestrained power.

While some benefits are definitely associated with gaining wealth, once it’s obtained, it disrupts the balance of economic forces and can easily lead to inconsistent jobs that cause serious issues for those who depend on labor to meet their daily needs. It might seem that these ups and downs in production stem from its very nature, and if we allow people with very different levels of intelligence to compete for the rewards of industry, significant inequalities in prosperity are bound to emerge. We can only avoid this by restraining enterprise and making the average workers the standard for success. This idea sounds reasonable and will always be promoted by those willing or eager to take big risks. Individuals with great productive capacity are easily motivated, and their resources are kept in the best condition for society when they are encouraged to temper their efforts, rather than being left to pursue their extreme and unconventional tendencies. The community benefits more from consistent industries than from those that unsettle minds with sudden, unattainable profits. People will distance themselves from each other in the competition of production. Only in this way can the full potential of intelligence be revealed, yet society's normal structures, privileges, and opportunities should be made as equal as possible; no unfair advantage should be given to any particular method of production, nor should successful wealth-building practices be allowed that are not acceptable to the community as a whole. The rules of the game should be carefully designed and strictly maintained. It is the capable and ambitious who most test the limits of sensible restrictions, and these restrictions are primarily made for them. Equality of opportunity is the fundamental principle and must not be compromised for the sake of enterprise. Healthy enterprise operates within this framework. However, it may also be believed that such strict limitations would deprive the community of some vital means of welfare and some of the most outstanding contributors to prosperity, and that we would lose those significant and effective organizations we refer to as trusts; resulting in a quick descent into a stagnant routine, with mediocre ideas dominating public thought, therefore missing out on the very prosperity we seek. Industrial corporations are highly effective in generating wealth. We cannot entertain the idea of imposing any real barriers to their formation. But while we require their support, we must also be mindful of the potential harms they could bring. They are products of law, and the law, in creating them, should give them a structure and restrictions that best serve the public good. They should not be allowed to fall into speculative hands, becoming instruments of unchecked power.

Industrial corporations afford ready means by which small capital and moderate men are compacted into a service quite beyond the range of individual producers. The difficulty has been that much dishonesty has entered into the formation of corporations, and that unreasonable power has been exercised by those who have had them in charge. The responsibility of a corporation to the community, expressed in a sound financial organization and in the relation of its officers to its stockholders, would in no way restrain the usefulness of these industrial agencies, and would make them wholly consistent with extended and equal opportunities in production. Immense wealth has often been acquired in connection with corporations whose usefulness to the public has been thereby restricted and the profits of stockholders disregarded. Nowhere is the eagerness of personal [Pg 398] enterprise so tempted, nowhere does it display itself more disadvantageously than in the large and oftentimes obscure undertakings of corporations. It is not in reduction of these agencies, but in behalf of their safe and profitable use, that the claim arises for uniform and well-regulated action. In large corporations, as in insurance companies, when the business itself has fallen into routine, extravagant salaries have been resorted to as a means of increasing the returns of officers. Oftentimes the plea for raising salaries is one which is self-propagating. Expenses have been greatly enlarged and the remuneration must keep pace with them. Yes, but will not this very increase lead to increased expenditure? Industrial corporations have been, in the present generation, a conspicuous means of production, but they have also conspicuously promoted a bad distribution of wealth, and so helped to promote irregularity and ultimate suspension in the productive process. There may never come a time in which the adventuresome capitalist will not magnify his own usefulness to the community, but there may come a time in which men shall see that the wealth of a few may be purchased at the expense of that general comfort which is the proper return of industry.

Industrial corporations provide effective ways for small investors and average individuals to come together to create services that go beyond what solo producers can achieve. The problem has been that dishonesty has often characterized the formation of these corporations, and unreasonable power has been exercised by their leaders. A corporation's responsibility to the community, shown through solid financial organization and the relationship between its officers and stockholders, would not hinder the usefulness of these industrial entities and would ensure they align with broader and equal opportunities in production. Massive wealth has frequently been built in connection with corporations while limiting their public usefulness and disregarding stockholder profits. Nowhere is the eagerness of personal enterprise more tempted, or where it shows itself more disadvantageously, than in the large, often obscure ventures of corporations. The call for consistent and well-regulated action arises not to reduce these agencies but to ensure their safe and productive use. In large corporations, as seen in insurance companies, when business operations become routine, excessive salaries have been used to boost returns for officers. Often, the argument for increasing salaries becomes self-perpetuating. Expenses have grown significantly, so compensation must follow suit. Yes, but doesn't this increase lead to more spending? Industrial corporations have been a prominent means of production in recent times, but they have also notably contributed to a poor distribution of wealth, helping to create irregularities and eventual halts in productive processes. There may never be a time when bold capitalists don’t emphasize their own value to society, but there may come a time when people recognize that the wealth of a few can come at the expense of the overall comfort that should be the rightful reward of industry.

A possible rapidity in the acquisition of wealth inflames the speculative temper. We mean by the speculative temper, purchase and sale, not in reference to production but with the hope of making large profits independently of production. Speculation is an expression of a venturesome spirit which, in its impatience, lays light emphasis on the usually slow methods of increase, and promises itself a rapid road to success. This hope is often disappointed, and when disappointed carries with it a more or less extended retardation of business. When the annual losses by bankruptcy in the United States reach $200,000,000, the distress of those whose means of livelihood have been involved in this overthrow must become a very sensible [Pg 399] factor. Such a sum would, in its successful use, provide for many households.

The potential for quickly gaining wealth stirs up a speculative mindset. By speculative mindset, we mean buying and selling not in relation to production but with the hope of making big profits without the need for production. Speculation reflects a bold spirit that, in its impatience, downplays the traditionally slow ways of growing wealth and hopes for a quick path to success. This hope often leads to disappointment, and when it does, it can significantly slow down business. When annual bankruptcy losses in the United States hit $200,000,000, the hardship faced by those whose livelihoods have been affected by these failures must become a significant concern. Such an amount, if used wisely, could support many families.

The temper which goes with sanguine and unscrupulous methods is a careless, and often a cruel, one. The democratic notion of equality is overridden, is pushed aside as of no significance in the business world. The same persons who insist on an open shop, and give free play to competition when it depresses labor, regarding it as a familiar and convenient principle in determining wages, may combine with each other to control products and enhance profits. The general welfare, which is the controlling idea, is lost sight of or readily forgotten. They have one standard when they look out on the community at large, and another standard when they are preparing the way to make and hold fast their own gains. The directors of business come easily to think that the welfare of the community is identical with their own welfare, and that the enterprise with which they sustain their own affairs is identical with that on which the public prosperity depends. They readily come to the conclusion that their activity, so essential to the community, should be cherished by the community. How possibly can production progress without them. Discrimination in their favor is a short cut to the common prosperity. Men of comfortable means and the poor even owe what they have to the enterprise which scatters wealth everywhere. There is sufficient truth in this feeling, when not too boldly put, to hide its failures. The expenditures of the very rich in the purchases and exchanges they involve do carry a measure of advantage to all, but they also bear with them an unjust distribution, a luxury and a poverty, which weaken the unity and sap the strength of society. It is the very gist of democracy that each man shall count one; that in spite of the diversities and the advantages among men they shall still remain units of the same value in the freedom and propagating power by which the gains of the race are stored. It is [Pg 400] neither identity nor arbitrary difference that is admissible, but every man and every class of men carry with them the potentialities, the social and spiritual possibilities, which are the germs of historic development. This is the principle with which all petty social distinctions and all civic tyrannies have been at war.

The attitude that comes with carefree and ruthless methods is often careless and cruel. The democratic idea of equality is ignored and brushed aside as unimportant in the business world. The same people who push for an open shop and support competition when it drives down labor costs, treating it as a familiar and convenient principle for setting wages, can also join forces to control products and boost profits. The overall welfare, which should be the main focus, is often overlooked or quickly forgotten. They have one standard when they look at the larger community and another when they are trying to secure and maintain their own wealth. Business leaders easily come to believe that the well-being of the community is the same as their own well-being and that the business activities supporting their interests are the same as those that contribute to public prosperity. They quickly conclude that their role, which they consider vital to the community, should be valued by the community. How can production advance without them? Favoritism towards them is seen as a shortcut to shared prosperity. Those with comfortable means and the poor owe what they have to the business that spreads wealth around. There’s enough truth in this sentiment, when not overstated, to mask its failures. The spending of the wealthy in their transactions does provide some benefits for everyone, but it also leads to unfair distribution, luxury, and poverty that weaken social unity and undermine society's strength. At the heart of democracy is the idea that everyone counts equally; despite differences and advantages among individuals, they should still be seen as equal in value within the freedom and potential that underpins societal progress. It’s not about identity or arbitrary differences; every person and every group carries with them the potential, social, and spiritual possibilities that fuel historical development. This principle has long been at odds with all trivial social divisions and civic oppression.

While, therefore, the evil of monopolies may appear in various forms and be met in different ways, they cannot be permanently removed except by social conditions which equalize opportunities and compel wealth and power, in all their activity, to conform to general safety. Production in all its forms and in all its agents must be subject to that temper of fairness, and come under those principles of equal rights, which bind the parts of the community together, and make them one producing and one enjoying agency. Every assertion of settled superiority in persons, classes and races must be set aside, and the world in its physical, intellectual and spiritual wealth be left open to all. Thus history has treated men, and is more and more treating them, in their claims to consideration. This birthright of men is not to be denied or stolen; for they who steal it have nothing more than this same birthright to plead in extenuation, the combinations which look to the defense and extension of these original gifts are in order, and all combinations which carry them beyond the bounds of their own territory are another outbreak of anarchy.

While the issue of monopolies may show up in different ways and be addressed in various manners, they cannot be fully eliminated without social conditions that create equal opportunities and ensure that wealth and power align with public safety. All forms of production and all agents involved must operate with fairness and adhere to the principles of equal rights, which unite the members of the community and create a collective force for production and enjoyment. Any claim of superiority based on individuals, classes, or races must be disregarded, allowing the world's physical, intellectual, and spiritual resources to be accessible to everyone. History has treated individuals this way and continues to do so regarding their rights to consideration. This fundamental right of all people cannot be denied or taken away; those who attempt to take it have nothing but this same right to justify their actions. Efforts aimed at defending and enhancing these inherent rights are valid, while any attempts to extend those rights beyond their own boundaries represent a new form of chaos.

The soundness of this assertion has been recently exemplified in the history of Pittsburg. Pittsburg is the center of an industry which has come, perhaps more than any other, under the domination of a few leading men. In the Homestead strike they succeeded in dealing a heavy blow to workmen in their efforts to secure something like a fair hold on production. A little inquiry into a community built up for a few and ordered by them discloses conditions quite at war with general well-being. Wages are kept down by the constant presence of the unemployed: [Pg 401] the accidents of a dangerous occupation are left to fall upon workmen; the health of the community suffers great neglect, the remonstrances of workmen are met with the response, If they do not like the method let them quit; and the general good order and comfort of citizens receive but little attention. Here is an object lesson in which work, sure, skilful and unflinching; wealth, eager, unscrupulous and unsympathetic, have divided the world between them; no right gained, no power lost. Men may make wealth under these conditions, withdrawing it from the fitting returns of labor, but they cannot, wise as they may be or generous as they may seem to be, restore that wealth to the community in a form in which it will subserve the same living purpose it might have subserved if it had never been withdrawn. The life of a community is achieved where its activity is most intense and constant. Failing in our service at these vital centers, no extraneous effort will cover our fault. We might as well draw sap from a tree and then pour it out on its roots.

The truth of this statement has been recently shown in the story of Pittsburgh. Pittsburgh is at the heart of an industry that has, more than any other, come under the control of a few key figures. During the Homestead strike, they managed to deal a serious blow to workers trying to gain a fair stake in production. A bit of investigation into a community designed for a select few reveals conditions that are detrimental to the overall well-being. Wages are kept low due to the constant presence of unemployed individuals; the dangers of the job fall solely on the workers; the health of the community is largely ignored, and when workers voice their concerns, the response is simply, if they don't like it, they can leave; and the general order and comfort of citizens receive minimal attention. This serves as a clear example where hard, skillful, and relentless work; and wealth that is eager, ruthless, and indifferent, have taken control of the world; no rights were gained, and no power was lost. People can generate wealth under these circumstances by taking it away from the rightful returns of labor, but no matter how wise or generous they might appear, they cannot return that wealth to the community in a way that serves the same living purpose it would have if it had never been taken away. The life of a community thrives where its activity is the most intense and consistent. If we fail to serve those vital centers, no outside effort can compensate for our shortcomings. It’s like tapping a tree for sap and then pouring it out at its roots.

We have now given three constitutional remedies for the want of employment. The first is a more equal distribution of the rewards of production, thus making the demand for products as extended and uniform as their production. The second is increased restraints, especially in connection with corporations, in the action of the leaders of industry, rendering them more amenable to the wants of the community to which they belong. The third, arising from the other two and supporting them, is more unity, more harmony between the several agents of production.

We’ve now proposed three constitutional solutions for the issue of unemployment. The first is a fairer distribution of the rewards from production, making the demand for products as widespread and consistent as their production. The second involves tighter regulations, particularly regarding corporations, urging industry leaders to be more responsive to the needs of the community they serve. The third, which stems from the first two and reinforces them, is more unity and harmony among the various production agents.

There was a report not long since in England of an industrial commission, which had given protracted attention to the irregular demand for labor. The remedies offered were chiefly palliative. It may be thought that this form of cure is all within our reach; that what is here offered as constitutional correctives are beyond our power. [Pg 402] There is some truth in the feeling, and would be much truth in it, were not the actions and the sentiments now enforced under urgent consideration for reasons of public welfare, not directly involved in unemployment. We cannot expect to remove so grave an evil as this, the wavering demand for labor, short of some important change in the organization of society. Society is a structure of so many and such delicate dependencies that its perfect action must include the general integrity of the current relations between men. Unwholesome results of frequent recurrence are the most direct proof of an unsound system. Palliatives may soften the evil but cannot overcome it. We should aim immediately to reduce the difficulty and ultimately to remove its causes.

Not long ago, there was a report in England from an industrial commission that focused on the irregular demand for labor. The solutions they suggested were mainly temporary fixes. Some might think that these so-called solutions are easy to implement, while the constitutional changes proposed are out of our reach. [Pg 402] There is some truth to this feeling, and it would hold even more weight if the actions and concerns currently being addressed for public welfare were not directly linked to unemployment. We can't expect to tackle a serious issue like the fluctuating demand for labor without making significant changes to the structure of society. Society is built on many delicate connections, and its proper functioning relies on maintaining healthy relationships among people. The frequent and troubling consequences we see are clear evidence of a flawed system. Temporary fixes may ease the problem but won't eliminate it. We should focus on reducing the challenges right away and ultimately finding ways to eliminate their root causes.

[Pg 403] QUESTIONS IN BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION.

BUSINESS ECONOMICS.

Business Economics.

The Modern Industrial System.
1. Describe the three-field system of agriculture. Page 2.
2. What were the significant characteristics of a manorial society? Page 2.
3. What is said to justify the institution of private property? Page 4.
4. What is competition in modern industrial life? Page 4.
5. Why has the name “capitalistic production” been applied to modern industry? Page 6.
6. Compare the domestic system of industry with the factory system. Page 7.
7. What are the fundamental conditions of our economic life? Page 8.
The Agricultural Resources of the United States.
1. What has been the policy of the Government in its disposition of the public domain? Illustrate. Page 9.
2. What has been the unique and characteristic feature of the land policy of the United States? Page 9.
3. What has been the result of the land policy of the United States? Page 10.
4. What was the first effort toward the solution of farming in the arid soils of the West? Page 10.
5. Explain what is meant by dry-farming. Page 11.
6. How do the farms of the United States compare in size with those of European countries? To what is this difference due? Page 11. [Pg 404]
7. What does the movement of the population from the farm to the city indicate? Page 13.
8. What change in method is agriculture undergoing in the United States? Give the reason for this change. Page 14.
9. Discuss the cereal production of the United States. Page 15.
10. Upon what question does the future of the cotton production depend? Page 17.
11. What movement is now put forth to aid in the preservation of our forests? Page 18.
The Mineral Resources of the United States.
1. Into what groups may the natural resources of a country be divided? Illustrate. Page 19.
2. What two answers are given to the problem of the conservation of a limited supply of resources? Page 20.
3. What steps have been taken towards stopping the devastation of our resources? Page 21.
4. What estimates are given as to the amount of coal in the United States and as to how long this supply will last? Page 22.
5. What is the most favorable situation for iron deposits? State reasons. Page 24.
6. Where is the most wonderful iron-mining region in the United States? What makes it such a remarkable region? Page 24.
7. Of what importance are the precious metals? What is the practical problem confronting American gold-mining companies at present? Page 25.
8. To what use was copper put in Homeric times? What has caused it to rise to the front rank in recent years? Page 26. [Pg 405]
9. How does the present-day application of water power to machinery differ from its application prior to 1890? Page 28.
Capitalistic Production.
1. What five causes does the census report give for the rapid industrial development in the United States? Page 30.
2. Give Carroll D. Wright’s definition of a factory. Page 31.
3. Illustrate the two meanings which “division of labor” may indicate. Page 32.
4. Show how the subdivision of labor brings about the extension of labor-saving machinery. Page 33.
5. Name the economies of a large-scale production. Page 36.
6. What improvements have made large-scale production possible? Page 36.
7. In what lines of business is there little or no development toward large-scale methods? State the reasons. Page 37.
8. What is meant by standardization? What are the advantages of such a system? Page 38.
Trusts and Monopolies.
1. Enumerate the phases through which combinations for the purpose of fixing prices, have passed. Page 40.
2. What is the advantage of the corporation? Page 41.
3. Give a brief history of the trust movement. Page 42.
4. What economies are secured by a combined or federated industry? Page 43.
5. Name some of the savings which are peculiar to trusts. Page 44.
6. Give an illustration showing the profits of a successful trust promoter. Page 45. [Pg 406]
7. What is the effect of industrial combinations upon competitors? Upon producers of raw material? Page 46.
8. Explain the two phases of the relation between trusts and labor. Page 47.
9. What conclusion as to the power of the combination over prices, does the Industrial Commission reach? Page 48.
10. From what two sources do the evils of combination come? What remedies have been suggested to meet both classes of evils? Page 50.
Speculation and Crises.
1. How does the speculator reduce for the merchant the speculative risk attaching to price fluctuations? Illustrate. Page 52.
2. What social value lies in the service of the speculator? Illustrate. Page 53.
3. Explain the difference between legitimate speculation and illegitimate speculation (gambling). Page 54.
4. What is a crisis? Page 55.
5. Discuss the immediate occasion of a crisis. Page 56.
6. What is W. S. Jevons’ theory as to the causes of crises? Page 58.
7. Explain the over-production theory which is given as a cause for crises. Page 58.
8. What is the credit theory of the cause of a crisis? Page 59.
9. Where is the true explanation of a crisis to be found? Page 60.
10. Is it possible to prevent the recurrence of crises? Page 60.
The Modern Wage System. [Pg 407]
1. Give some beneficial results and some abuses of the factory system. Page 61.
2. Name five points which Mr. Hobson gives to show that, in the transition to the factory system, the position of the laborer has been one of increasing dependence. Page 62.
3. How does President Hadley define wages? Page 63.
4. Describe the systems of labor which preceded the modern wage system. Page 64.
5. How has the extreme individualism of Adam Smith’s theory been modified? Page 65.
6. What are the three peculiarities of the sale of labor? Page 66.
Labor Organizations and Collective Bargaining.
1. Why have labor organizations grown more rapidly in the United States and England than on the Continent of Europe? Page 69.
2. What are the two types of trade unions in the United States? Page 69.
3. Describe the two most important national organizations which have been in this country. Page 70.
4. What are the methods by which labor organizations monopolize the labor market? Page 71.
5. Why do labor leaders object to piece work? Page 72.
6. What are the two arguments in favor of shorter hours put forth by the trade unionist? Page 73.
7. What is the economic justification of the shorter working day? Page 74.
8. Give illustrations where unions have directly limited the amount of output. Page 75.
9. What is the attitude of the majority of the employers in the United States toward collective bargaining? Page 77.
10. What erroneous ideas exist as to the purpose of labor organizations? Page 78. [Pg 408]
11. Describe the method of settling an industrial dispute by conciliation. Why is the principle of arbitration fast going out of favor? Page 79.
Women and Children at Work.
1. Describe the evils of the early factory system in England. Page 80.
2. Are the women crowding the men out of their occupations and taking their places? Page 81.
3. What is the most important reason for the low economic position which woman occupies in the industrial world? Page 83.
4. How does George L. Bolen justify the employment of women? Page 86.
5. How can the evil arising from child labor be cured? Page 87.
6. What obstacles have been in the way of efforts to improve labor conditions by legislation? Page 88.
7. Name, and give examples of, the two classes into which the factory acts may be divided. Page 88.
8. What has been accomplished in the United States in the way of labor legislation? Page 89.
Unemployment and Insurance.
1. Classify the unemployed. Page 91.
2. What are personal causes of unemployment? Page 92.
3. Name some industrial causes of unemployment. Page 93.
4. In what does the remedy for the normal unemployment in modern industry lie? Page 95.
5. Suggest some methods of alleviation of the evils of unemployment. Page 96.
6. State briefly the common law doctrine regarding liability for accident. Page 98. [Pg 409]
7. What have foreign countries done toward placing the burden of industrial accidents upon the industry itself and not upon the laborer? Page 99.
8. Describe the establishment of compulsory insurance against sickness and old age in Germany; in Great Britain. Page 100.
Machinery and Industrial Efficiency.
1. What three evils are charged against machinery? Page 101.
2. How does the reabsorption of labor displaced by machinery depend upon the demand for an article? Page 102.
3. How may machine methods cause irregularities in wages and employment? Page 104.
4. Show the need of a system of industrial education in the United States. Page 107.
5. Describe the system of industrial education which exists in Germany. Page 107.
6. How does the English system of industrial education differ from the German? Page 108.
7. What is the character of the industrial schools of the United States? Page 108.
8. How have the people of the United States been aided in their industrial development? Page 109.
9. What two obstacles have been met by the movement for better industrial education in the United States? Page 109.
Profit-Sharing and Co-Operation.
1. Name the three principal methods of profit-sharing. Page 110.
2. What is the economic theory of profit-sharing? Page 111.
3. What are the objections against the profit-sharing system? Page 112. [Pg 410]
4. Why is the system of profit-sharing comparatively limited? Page 113.
5. According to President Hadley, where is there more chance for the success of profit-sharing? Page 113.
6. How does co-operation differ from profit-sharing? Page 114.
7. What are the reasons for the lack of success of co-operation in this country? Page 115.
8. Describe the methods of the Rochdale Society. Page 115.
9. How does producers’ co-operation differ from consumers’ co-operation? Page 116.
10. Give three examples of successful productive co-operation in the United States. Page 116.
11. Enumerate the advantages of co-operation. Page 116.
12. What is the ultimate ideal of enthusiastic co-operators? Page 117.
13. Discuss the defects of co-operation. Page 117.
Problems of Distribution.
1. What are the three great problems of economic society? Page 119.
2. Define functional distribution; personal distribution. Page 119.
3. What views are given as to whether functional distribution is actually governed by natural law? Page 121.
4. Discuss briefly the distribution of rent. Page 122.
5. What is the socialists’ idea as to the profits which a business manager receives for his services? Page 123.
6. State three theories which have been developed to explain the distribution of wages. Page 124.
7. How was the wealth of the United States distributed in 1893? Page 125.
8. Are the poor becoming poorer? Page 127. [Pg 411]
Saving and Spending.
1. What is the relation between saving and spending? Page 129.
2. What is the real goal of all rational economic endeavor? Page 130.
3. Give the arguments which are put forth condemning luxury. Page 132.
4. What arguments are put forth to show that luxury is an indispensable stimulus to progress? Page 133.
5. What is the attitude toward luxury taken by economists? Page 133.
6. What is meant by “a socialization of luxury”? Page 135.
7. Give an illustration of a waste in consumption due to lack of knowledge and training. Page 135.
Money and Banking.
1. What determines the value of money? Page 137.
2. Give the attempts made in the United States to create a slow, steady inflation. Page 139.
3. State three arguments in favor of bimetallism. Page 139.
4. Where can we find a sufficient answer to the arguments in favor of government paper money? State the answer. Page 141.
5. Of what does the money of the United States consist? Page 141.
6. What essential quality of good bank money do bank notes lack? Explain. Page 143.
7. Enumerate the suggestions which have been made as to a new basis for the issue of bank notes. Page 143.
8. Name two other problems connected with the banking system of the United States. Page 144.
Transportation and Communication. [Pg 412]
1. Describe the three kinds of discrimination. Page 147.
2. How do the state commissions differ in power? Page 148.
3. Explain the monopoly character of express companies. Page 149.
4. Show the importance of the internal natural waterways of the United States. Page 151.
5. What problem is offered by our canal system? Page 151.
6. Show why the causes for the decline in tonnage of American vessels are economic rather than political. Page 152.
Taxation and Tariff.
1. What is John Fiske’s definition of taxes? Page 154.
2. What rules of taxation were laid down by Adam Smith? Page 154.
3. What is the benefit theory of taxation? How does this theory fail? Page 155.
4. What is the faculty principle of taxation? Page 155.
5. What measures have been suggested as to how to measure ability? Give the objection to each. Page 155.
6. What are the arguments supporting progressive taxation? Page 156.
7. Where does the Federal Treasury derive its revenue? Page 157.
8. What tax is the main reliance of the state and local governments? Page 158.
9. Describe an ideal system of taxation for the United States. What is the advantage of such a system? Page 159.
10. What is the character of the considerations in determining tariff policies? Page 160.
11. Explain the home market argument in support of protection; the wages argument. Page 161. [Pg 413]
12. What is the doctrine of comparative costs? Page 162.
13. How do free traders answer the home market argument? The infant industries argument? Page 162.
The Functions of the Government.
1. Name the economic functions of the Government. Page 163.
2. What is the theory of anarchism? Page 165.
3. Explain Herbert Spencer’s theory of extreme individualism. Page 165.
4. What is the theory of government most generally held by economists and writers in the United States? Page 166.
5. In what country is the culture state theory very generally held? Explain the theory. Page 167.
6. What does the view known as state socialism advocate? Page 167.
7. Give Professor Ely’s definition of socialism. Page 167.
8. Explain the cardinal and distinctive element of socialism. Page 168.
9. Enumerate the socialists’ criticisms of our present methods of production. Page 168.
10. What do socialists urge as bases of distribution? What basis do socialists of today agree is the best one to meet the requirements of justice? Page 170.
11. What were Henry George’s arguments against private ownership of lands? Page 171.
12. What is the real issue as to the municipalization of local public utilities? Page 172.
Economic Progress.
1. What improvement has been made in the condition of the working class in the United States? In Great Britain? Page 173.
2. What factors have aided in the enormous expansion of production? Page 174. [Pg 414]
3. Give two reasons why labor has not profited more by the great increase of wealth. Page 175.
4. State some lines along which reform is needed. Page 176.
Manufacturing.
1. How does the word “manufactures” as it is ordinarily used today differ from its original meaning? Page 180.
2. What conditions have made western Europe and the eastern part of the United States great manufacturing sections? Page 183.
Modern Manufacturing Systems.
1. What new occupations did the factory system develop? Page 186.
2. How did the use of steam affect the location of factories? Page 187.
3. What factors made the price of silk so high before the nineteenth century? Page 188.
4. Why is Gary, Indiana, an advantageous location for a manufacturing center? Page 189.
5. How is it possible to operate by water power, a factory located a hundred miles from a waterfall? Give two examples. Page 190.
6. Illustrate the use of electricity in a typical modern factory. Page 192.
Use of Machinery in Manufacturing.
1. Describe the first machine used in the making of yarn. Page 193.
2. Enumerate some of the machines invented in the eighteenth century. Page 195.
3. How did the invention of machinery affect the importation of cotton? Page 196.
4. Show the need of machinery in the iron and steel industry. Page 197. [Pg 415]
5. Describe the earliest process of making pig iron. Page 198.
6. What is the Bessemer process of making steel? Page 201.
7. What have been the causes of the great development of the iron and steel industry? Page 201.
8. What is the difference between English and American steel works? Page 202.
Development of the Factory System.
1. State reasons for the early development of the factory system in England. Page 204.
2. Why was the United States slow about developing manufacturing industries? Page 205.
3. Why is any comparison of the value of the manufactures of the United States with that of other countries defective? Page 210.
4. Name an article which is the product of one factory but which becomes the manufacturing material of another. Page 211.
5. What factors have contributed toward making the United States the world’s greatest manufacturing nation? Page 212.
6. How can it be judged as to whether the value of manufactures of a country is in excess of the consuming capacity? Page 214.
Capital in Manufacturing.
1. Show the part capital plays in building up a company. Page 214.
2. What are the advantages gained by having a business in the hands of a company or corporation? Page 215.
3. Compare the durability of gold with that of other products. Page 217.
4. What was the amount of capital employed in manufacturing industries in 1850? In 1905? Page 218. [Pg 416]
5. How did the Census of 1905 differ from previous censuses in the matter of manufacturing establishments? Page 219.
6. How does the growth in capitalization rank with that of the other important branches of manufacturing? Page 220.
Trusts and Combinations.
1. What principle was the cause of the origin of the modern company or corporation? Page 222.
2. Explain the provisions of a pool. Page 223.
3. How were the defects of the pool overcome? Page 224.
4. What are the advantages of a trust or combination? Page 225.
5. What has been the effect of trusts on prices? On wages? Page 226.
6. Name and classify according to product the companies of which the United States Steel Corporation was formed. Page 228.
The Iron and Steel Industry.
1. What was the number of establishments for the iron and steel industry in the United States in 1880? In 1905? What does this show? Page 233.
2. What method was used by the early Germans for extracting the iron from the ore? By the English in 1700? By the early American colonists? Page 236.
3. Why was coke used in the smelting of iron ore in England much earlier than in America? Page 238.
4. How did the development of railways aid in the preservation of our forests? Page 239.
5. What is the puddling process? Why is it necessary? Page 240.
6. What process took the place of the puddling process? Page 241.
7. What is steel? How is iron obtained by the Bessemer process made into steel? Page 245. [Pg 417]
The Textile Industry.
1. What is the most important of the textile industries? Page 247.
2. Compare the value of textile manufactures in the principal countries of Europe during the period from 1800 to 1896, inclusive, with that of the United States during the same period. Page 247.
3. Define textiles. How are they made? Page 251.
4. What were the so-called “Manchester cottons”? Page 254.
5. Who invented the spinning jenny? What was its use? Page 255.
6. Up until the invention of the water frame, why was the making of cloth entirely from cotton impracticable? Page 256.
7. What was the spinning mule? By whom was it invented? Page 257.
8. What is the purpose of the cotton gin? Page 257.
9. What factors have made cotton the most important textile? Page 258.
10. Why is the cotton industry moving toward the South? Page 262.
Manufacturing Industries of the United States.
1. Why was manufacturing neglected by the early settlers of the United States? Page 263.
2. What manufactories sprang up in the nineteenth century? Page 266.
3. Name the four greatest producers of manufactures for exportation. Page 270.
4. When was the largest growth of agricultural exports in the United States? Of exports of manufactures? Page 272.
5. What articles are the chief requisites of manufacturing? Page 272. [Pg 418]
6. How do you account for the rapid growth of copper as an export of manufacture? Page 277.
7. Illustrate the fact that the United States does not need to invade foreign markets with its manufactures. Page 278.
8. Distinguish between the gross value of the factory product of manufactures and the net value of the same. Page 284.
9. Compare the growth of the exportation of manufactures with that of the production. Page 286.
10. Under what head does the Bureau of Statistics classify boots and shoes; flour; salted meats; illuminating oil; pig iron. Page 287.
Concrete and Steel.
1. How do concrete and steel supplement each other? Page 322.
2. Of what is the standardization of concrete applications indicative? Page 323.
3. What is a corrugated bar? Page 324.
4. Give an example showing the durability of the Hennibique construction. Page 326.
5. What advantages over the wooden bearing pile has the concrete bearing pile? Page 327.
6. How may the resistivity of usual concretes be reinforced? Page 329.
7. Explain the use of wales in reinforcing a water front. Page 331.
8. How are the bearing piles of a wharf in the tropics made? Page 332.
9. Enumerate various uses to which concrete has been put in construction. Pages 333, 334.
10. What is the problem of the concrete telegraph pole? How may this be overcome? Page 336.
11. How is the Corell tie made? The Percival tie? Page 337. [Pg 419]
12. What part does steel play in the construction of the Gatun Locks of the Panama Canal? Page 337.
13. Give an illustration of the use of steel for molding concrete. Page 339.
Chemistry and the Industries.
1. Why has it been necessary to put industry on a scientific basis? Page 342.
2. Why is chemistry so closely related to the industries? Page 343.
3. Tell in your own words the story of the development of the soda industry. Page 344.
4. Name three important industries which grew out of the soda industry. Page 346.
5. Give an example of how science has led the way for industry. Page 348.
6. What are the great achievements before the chemistry of the future? Page 350.
The Producer-Gas Power Plant.
1. What was the drawback to the early development of the gas engine? Page 353.
2. Why was the suction producer not practical? Page 354.
3. What led to the introduction of the pressure producer? Page 355.
4. What is the advantage of the down-draft producer? Page 355.
5. What is the ideal relative efficiency of the producer-gas plant and the steam plant? The actual relative efficiency? Page 360.
6. What defects in producer-gas plants were learned from the inspection in 1908? Page 364.
7. Where are the producer-gas plants of England located? Page 366.
8. How can the price of power developed from fuel be kept down? Page 369. [Pg 420]
Efficiency in Shop Operations.
1. What is the reason for the failure of many cost systems? Page 371.
2. Upon what does the efficiency of a workman depend? Page 372.
3. What should be used as a standard for the measurement of time? Page 373.
4. When should a bonus begin? Page 375.
5. What effect does the giving of bonuses have on the efficiency of the foreman? Page 375.
6. What advantages are gained from having proper time cards for the workmen of a concern? Page 377.
7. To be successful, how should efficiency methods be introduced? Page 379.
The Bridge between Labor and Capital.
1. What is the chief cause at the bottom of all labor disputes? Page 380.
2. When and how was the labor problem brought about? Page 381.
3. What three methods of solution are proposed for the present problem of distribution? Page 382.
4. In your opinion which method is the best?
The Unemployed.
1. What is the central cause of the want of employment? Page 385.
2. Show the evil effect of ill-advised charity upon the unemployed. Page 387.
3. What does the practice of giving old-age pensions indicate as to the fairness of the distribution of the returns of production? Page 387.
4. Name three ways in which the problem of the unemployed can be reduced. Page 389. [Pg 421]
5. What are the effects of ignorance and indolence upon society? Page 391.
6. If employment were remunerative, what would be the results? Page 393.
7. What lines of industry should society court? Page 396.
8. What are the evils connected with industrial corporations? Page 397.
9. Summarize the remedies for the want of employment. Page 401.

[Pg 423] INDEX

BUSINESS ECONOMICS

Business Economics

  • ACTS—
  • AGRICULTURE—
    • character of, in U. S., 14.
    • most important branch of, 15.
    • reorganization of, 15.
  • ANARCHISM—
    • theory of, 165.
  • AREA—
    • land, of U. S., 9.
  • BANKING, 142-145.
  • BAR—
    • corrugated, 324.
  • BARGAINING—
    • collective, 77.
  • BESSEMER—
  • BIMETALLISM—
    • arguments in favor of, 139, 140.
  • BOARD—
    • of arbitration, 79.
    • of conciliation, 79.
  • BONUS—
  • BRIDGES—
    • construction of, 324-326.
  • CAPITAL—
    • and labor, bridge between (article), 380-383.
    • in manufacturing, 214-222.
  • CEMENT—
    • Portland, 340.
  • CEREALS—
    • production of, in U. S., 15.
  • CHEMISTRY—
    • and the industries (article), 341-351.
    • a utilitarian science, 341.
    • how it creates industries, 348.
    • how it influences industries, 342.
  • CHILDREN—
    • at work, 86-89.
  • CLASS—
    • wage-earning, 61.
  • COAL—
    • waste of, 352.
  • COMBINATION—
    • advantages of, 43, 225.
    • causes of, illustrated, 227-230.
    • effects of, 46-49, 226.
      • upon competitors, 46.
      • upon consumers, 48, 226.
      • upon labor, 47.
      • upon opportunity, 49.
      • upon wages, 226.
    • forms of, 223-225.
    • in the railroad world, 146.
    • methods of, illustrated, 227-230.
    • phases of, 39, 40.
  • COMMISSION—
    • mandatory, 148.
    • supervisory, 148.
  • COMPANIES—
    • express, monopoly character of, 149.
  • COMPETITION—
    • defined, 4.
    • in modern industrial life, 4, 5.
  • CONCRETE—
    • and steel (article), 322-340.
    • applications of, 324-339.
    • as material of construction, 322.
    • chimneys of, 328.
    • effect of water on, 330, 333.
    • rapidity of construction of, 330.
    • resistivity of, 329.
  • CONSUMPTION—
  • CORN—
    • production of, in U. S., 16.
  • CORPORATION—
    • advantages of, to industry, 41, 215.
    • industrial, 397.
    • United States Steel, 44, 227-230.
  • COTTON—
    • gin, 257.
    • manufacturing of, 247-262.
    • production of, in U. S., 17, 304.
    • world’s production of, 291.
  • CRISES—
    • credit theory of, 59.
    • defined, 55.
    • immediate cause of, 56.
    • must be regarded as unpreventable, 60.
    • over-production theory of, 38.
    • periodicity of, 57, 58.
  • DISCRIMINATION—
    • kinds of, 147.
  • DISTRIBUTION—
    • of interest, 122, 123.
    • of profits, 123.
    • of rent, 122.
    • of wages, 123, 124.
    • of wealth, functional, 119-121.
    • of wealth, personal, 120, 125-127.
  • DOMAIN—
    • public, 9.
  • DRY-FARMING, 11.
  • ECONOMICS—
    • practical (article), 1-178.
    • progress in, 172-178.
  • EDUCATION—
    • industrial, 106-110.
  • EFFICIENCY—
    • application of, to department heads, 375-377.
    • defined, 371.
    • increased, illustrated, 374.
    • in shop operation (article), 370-379.
  • ELECTRICITY—
    • applied to manufacturing, 190-192.
  • ENGINE—
    • gas, development of, 353-356.
  • EXCHANGES—
    • of natural products, 182.
  • EXPORTS—
    • from U. S., 269-288.
  • FACTORY—
    • acts, 88, 89.
    • described, 31.
    • system. (See System.)
    • town, rise of, 186.
  • FARMS—
    • number and size of, 11.
  • FISHERIES—
    • wasteful use of, 18, 19.
  • FREE TRADERS—
    • arguments of, 162.
  • GOLD—
  • GOVERNMENT—
    • functions of, 163-172.
  • HOMESTEAD—
    • defined, 9, 10.
  • INDIVIDUALISM—
  • INDUSTRY—
    • causes of rapid development in, 30.
    • cotton, 247-262.
    • how carried on, 41.
    • iron and steel, growth of, 198-202, 230-246.
    • localization of, 33.
    • manufacturing. (See Manufacturing.)
    • relation between chemistry and, 341-351.
    • soda, 344-346.
    • specialization of, 32, 33.
    • textile, 247-262.
  • INSURANCE—
    • against sickness and old age, 100.
    • compulsory accident, 99, 100.
  • IRON—
    • processes of making, 198-201, 235-246.
  • IRRIGATION, 10, 11.
  • LABOR—
    • American Federation of, 70.
    • and capital, bridge between (article), 380-383.
    • child, 80, 86-89.
    • division of, 32, 33.
    • Knights of, 70.
    • legislation, purpose of, 68.
    • organizations, 68-77.
    • previous systems of, compared with modern wage system, 64.
    • sale of, peculiarities of, 66, 67.
    • woman, 80-86.
  • LEGISLATION—
    • factory, 97.
    • labor, purpose of, 68.
    • of child labor, 87-89.
  • LIBERTY—
    • industrial, 5.
    • natural, theory of, 166.
  • LIVE STOCK—
    • production of, in U. S., 16.
  • LUXURY—
    • attitudes toward, 132-134.
    • socialization of, 135.
  • MACHINERY—
    • evils of, 101-106.
    • in iron and steel industry, 196-201.
    • in textile industry, 196.
  • MACHINES—
    • carding, 256.
    • early forms of, 193-196.
  • MANOR—
    • English, 1-3.
    • characteristics of, 2, 3.
  • MANUFACTURES—
    • census of, 207-211.
    • concentration of, 33, 34.
    • exported from U. S., 269-272.
    • growth of, 30, 205-214.
    • growth of investment in, 218-222.
    • statistics of, 229-321.
  • MANUFACTURING—
    • application of electricity to, 190-192.
    • application of steam to, 187-189.
    • areas of the world, 181.
    • (article), 179-320.
    • capital in, 214-222.
    • cotton, 247-262.
    • establishments, 219-222, 233.
    • growth of, 205-214.
    • growth of investment in, 218-222.
    • industries of the U. S., 263-288.
    • machinery in, 193-203.
    • statistics of, 229-321.
    • systems of the world, 185-192.
  • MARINE—
    • merchant, 152-154.
  • MONEY—
    • government paper, 140, 141.
    • kinds of, in U. S., 141, 217.
    • value of, how determined, 137, 138.
  • MOVEMENT—
    • trust, 42.
  • OPERATIONS—
    • change in, opposition to, 372.
    • shop, efficiency in, (article), 370-379.
  • ORGANIZATIONS—
    • forms of, 223-225.
    • labor, 68-77.
      • growth of, 69.
      • objects and methods of, 71-77.
  • PARTNERSHIP, 41.
  • PENSIONS—
    • old-age, danger in, 387.
  • PILES—
  • POLICY—
    • land, of U. S., 9, 10.
  • POPULATION—
    • agricultural, decline in, 12, 13.
  • POWER—
    • water, of U. S., 27, 28.
  • POWER PLANT—
    • producer-gas, 352-369.
      • conditions favorable to, in U. S., 368, 369.
        • location of European, 366-368.
      • number and class of, 363.
      • relation of, to conservation of fuel resources, 352-369.
      • relative results of steam plant and, 356-363.
  • PRODUCTION—
    • capitalistic, 6, 29-39.
    • concentration of, 34.
    • large-scale, 35-37.
      • economics of, 35, 36.
        • peculiar to trusts, 44.
      • industrial effects of, 37.
      • in manufacturing, 36.
      • in retail trade, 37.
      • social effects of, 38.
    • of cotton, 291.
    • of cotton in U. S., 17, 304.
    • pig-iron, 230, 231.
  • PROFITS—
    • of promoters, 45.
  • PROFIT SHARING—
    • defined, 110.
    • economic theory of, 111.
    • methods of, 110, 111.
    • objections against, 111, 113.
    • origin of, 113.
    • purpose of, 110.
  • PROPERTY—
    • private, 3, 4.
  • PROTECTION—
    • arguments in support of, 160-162.
  • RAILROADS—
    • public nature of, 148.
    • public ownership of, 149.
    • rates, 147.
  • RATES—
    • railroad, 147.
  • REGULATION—
    • legislative, of trust evils, 50, 51.
  • RESOURCES—
    • agricultural, of U. S., 9-19.
    • forest, destruction of, 18.
    • mineral, of U. S., 19-29.
      • alarming condition of, 20-22.
  • REVENUE—
    • sources of, 157-159.
  • REVOLUTION—
    • industrial, 5, 6.
  • ROTATION—
    • three-year, 2.
  • SAVING—
    • relation of, to spending, 129, 130.
    • why necessary, 131.
  • SERVICE—
    • Forest, work of, 18.
  • SOCIALISM—
    • as a scheme of distribution, 170.
    • defined, 167, 168.
    • difficulties of establishing, 169.
    • state, 167.
  • SOCIETY—
    • industrial, 1-8.
    • Rochdale, 115.
  • SPECULATION, 51-55.
  • SPECULATOR—
    • social value of, 53.
  • SPENDING—
    • relation of, to saving, 129, 130.
  • STANDARDIZATION—
    • system of, 38.
  • STANDARD OIL TRUST—
    • when formed, 42.
  • STATE—
    • as a regulator of industry, 7, 8.
    • culture, theory, 167.
    • ownership, 171, 172.
  • STATISTICS—
    • accidents in German industries traceable to different causes, 97.
    • cause of idleness, members of trade unions (1900), 93.
    • cause of poverty, 92.
    • course of wages during 19th century, 173.
    • expenditures for different purposes in different places, 128.
    • growth of manufactures in 19th century, 30.
    • hand and machine methods compared, 103.
    • industrial and commercial gas trusts in U. S., (1860-1900), 42, 43.
    • of commerce in U. S., 308, 309.
    • of manufactures, 229-321.
      • annual value of, 289.
      • capital invested, 313, 314.
      • exportation of, 291.
      • importation of, 289.
      • summary of, in U. S., 299.
      • value of products of, 318-321.
      • wage-earners employed (1900), 315.
    • of population engaged in manufacturing in U. S., 310.
  • STEEL—
    • and concrete (article), 322-340.
    • as material of construction, 322.
    • re-inforcement, styles of, 324-326.
  • STRIKE—
    • defined, 78.
    • losses from, in U. S., 78.
  • SYSTEM—
    • canal, 151, 152.
    • domestic, 7.
    • factory,
      • beneficial results of, 60, 61.
      • development of, 203-214.
      • evils of early, 80, 101-106.
      • origin of, 185.
    • independent treasury, 144.
    • industrial, modern, 1-8.
      • characteristics of, 3.
    • of interchangeable parts, 38, 39.
    • of standardization, 38.
    • three-field, 2.
    • wage, modern, 60-68.
  • TAX—
    • defined, 154.
    • general property, 158.
    • inheritance, 159.
  • TEXTILES—
    • described, 251, 252.
    • manufacturing of, 247-262.
  • TRADE UNIONS—
    • local, 69.
    • national, 69.
    • object and methods of, 71-77.
  • TRANSPORTATION, 145-154.
    • inland water, 151.
    • ocean water, 151.
  • TRUSTS—
    • advantages of, 225.
    • and combinations, 222-230.
    • defined, 216.
    • economics of production peculiar to, 44.
    • effects of,
      • upon competitors, 46.
      • upon consumers, 48, 226.
      • upon labor, 47.
      • upon opportunity, 49.
      • upon wages, 226.
    • evils of, remedied by legislative regulation, 50, 51.
    • industrial and gas, organized in U. S. (1860-1900), 42, 43.
    • reasons for growth of, 43, 45, 46.
  • UNEMPLOYED—
    • classified, 91.
    • the (article), 384-402.
  • UNEMPLOYMENT—
    • a permanent problem, 95.
    • cause of, 91-95, 384-386.
    • extent of, 90.
    • remedies for, 95, 387-390, 393-401.
  • WAGES—
    • iron law of, 124.
  • WATER FRAME, 256.
  • WEALTH—
    • functional distribution of, 119-121.
    • personal distribution of, 120, 125-127.
  • WOMEN—
    • at work, 80-86.
    • economic position of, 84.

Transcriber’s Note

Obvious printing errors, such as backwards, upside down, or partially printed letters, were corrected. The last two lines of the Table of Contents, printed in reverse order, were corrected. Final stops unprinted at the end of sentences were added.

Obvious printing mistakes, like letters being backward, upside down, or only partially printed, were fixed. The last two lines of the Table of Contents, which were printed in reverse order, were corrected. Missing periods at the end of sentences were added.

Dialect, obsolete and alternative spellings were left unchanged. Pittsburgh (PA) is spelled without the final “h” throughout the book. Omitted words were not added to the text.

Dialect, outdated and alternative spellings were left unchanged. Pittsburgh (PA) is spelled without the final “h” throughout the book. Omitted words were not added to the text.

Footnotes in the text were renumbered sequentially and moved to the end of the article in which the anchor occurs. Footnotes within tables were changed to letters and were moved to follow the table in which the anchor occurs. In some tables, a footnote may have more than one anchor; consequently, no link is provided from table footnotes to any anchor.

Footnotes in the text were renumbered in order and moved to the end of the article where the reference appears. Footnotes in tables were changed to letters and placed after the table where the reference is found. In some tables, a footnote may have multiple references; therefore, no link is provided from table footnotes to any reference.

Wide tables were split for easier viewing on small screens.

Wide tables were resized for better viewing on small screens.

The following items were changed:
Bimettalism to Bimetallism
Added space between Ph. D. for Ernest Ludlow Bogard byline
whch to which
1880 to 1800
hamp to hemp
million to millions
manfactures to manufactures
guns to gums
ultilitarianism to utilitarianism
guns to gums
grinding to guiding
lead to led
notions to notion
lead to led
added comma to index entry: STRIKES losses from, in U. S., 78.

The following items were changed:
Bimetallism to Bimetallism
Added space between Ph. D. for Ernest Ludlow Bogard byline
which to which
1880 to 1800
hamp to hemp
million to millions
manufactures to manufactures
guns to gums
utilitarianism to utilitarianism
guns to gums
grinding to guiding
lead to led
notions to notion
lead to led
added comma to index entry: STRIKES losses from, in U. S., 78.

 

 


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