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CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT
By John Stuart Mill
Author Of "A System Of Logic, Ratiocinative And Inductive"
CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Preface
Those who have done me the honor of reading my previous writings will probably receive no strong impression of novelty from the present volume; for the principles are those to which I have been working up during the greater part of my life, and most of the practical suggestions have been anticipated by others or by myself. There is novelty, however, in the fact of bringing them together, and exhibiting them in their connection, and also, I believe, in much that is brought forward in their support. Several of the opinions at all events, if not new, are for the present as little likely to meet with general acceptance as if they were.
Those who have taken the time to read my earlier works will probably not find anything particularly new in this book; the principles here are those I’ve been developing throughout much of my life, and many of the practical ideas have already been put forward by others or by me before. However, there is something fresh about bringing them all together, showing how they connect, and I believe there’s also a lot of new support for them. Several of the opinions, in any case, even if not new, are currently just as unlikely to be widely accepted as if they were.
It seems to me, however, from various indications, and from none more than the recent debates on Reform of Parliament, that both Conservatives and Liberals (if I may continue to call them what they still call themselves) have lost confidence in the political creeds which they nominally profess, while neither side appears to have made any progress in providing itself with a better. Yet such a better doctrine must be possible; not a mere compromise, by splitting the difference between the two, but something wider than either, which, in virtue of its superior comprehensiveness, might be adopted by either Liberal or Conservative without renouncing any thing which he really feels to be valuable in his own creed. When so many feel obscurely the want of such a doctrine, and so few even flatter themselves that they have attained it, any one may without presumption, offer what his own thoughts, and the best that he knows of those of others, are able to contribute towards its formation.
However, it seems to me, based on various signs and especially the recent debates on Parliamentary Reform, that both Conservatives and Liberals (if I can keep calling them what they call themselves) have lost faith in the political beliefs they claim to uphold, while neither side seems to be moving toward a better alternative. Yet, a better doctrine must be possible; not just a compromise by finding a middle ground between the two, but something broader than either, which, because of its greater inclusiveness, could be accepted by either Liberals or Conservatives without giving up anything they truly value in their own beliefs. When so many people feel a vague need for such a doctrine, and so few even kid themselves that they have found it, anyone can fairly offer their thoughts and the best insights they've gathered from others towards its creation.
Chapter I—To What Extent Forms of Government are a Matter of Choice.
All speculations concerning forms of government bear the impress, more or less exclusive, of two conflicting theories respecting political institutions; or, to speak more properly, conflicting conceptions of what political institutions are.
All theories about types of government reflect, to varying degrees, two opposing ideas about political institutions; or, more accurately, opposing views on what political institutions really are.
By some minds, government is conceived as strictly a practical art, giving rise to no questions but those of means and an end. Forms of government are assimilated to any other expedients for the attainment of human objects. They are regarded as wholly an affair of invention and contrivance. Being made by man, it is assumed that man has the choice either to make them or not, and how or on what pattern they shall be made. Government, according to this conception, is a problem, to be worked like any other question of business. The first step is to define the purposes which governments are required to promote. The next, is to inquire what form of government is best fitted to fulfill those purposes. Having satisfied ourselves on these two points, and ascertained the form of government which combines the greatest amount of good with the least of evil, what further remains is to obtain the concurrence of our countrymen, or those for whom the institutions are intended, in the opinion which we have privately arrived at. To find the best form of government; to persuade others that it is the best; and, having done so, to stir them up to insist on having it, is the order of ideas in the minds of those who adopt this view of political philosophy. They look upon a constitution in the same light (difference of scale being allowed for) as they would upon a steam plow, or a threshing machine.
Some people see government purely as a practical skill, focusing only on the methods and outcomes. They treat different forms of government like any other tools for achieving human goals, viewing them as entirely a matter of creativity and design. Since governments are created by people, it’s assumed that people have the option to create them or not, and determine the design and structure. In this view, government is a problem to be tackled like any business challenge. The first step is to clarify the objectives that governments need to achieve. Next, we need to explore which form of government is best suited to meet those objectives. Once we’ve settled on these two elements and identified the government form that delivers the most good with the least harm, the remaining task is to get the agreement of our fellow citizens or those for whom the institutions are meant, on the conclusion we’ve personally reached. Finding the best form of government, convincing others that it is indeed the best, and then motivating them to demand it, is the way of thinking for those who embrace this perspective on political philosophy. They view a constitution similarly (with some differences in scale) to how they would view a steam plow or a threshing machine.
To these stand opposed another kind of political reasoners, who are so far from assimilating a form of government to a machine, that they regard it as a sort of spontaneous product, and the science of government as a branch (so to speak) of natural history. According to them, forms of government are not a matter of choice. We must take them, in the main, as we find them. Governments can not be constructed by premeditated design. They "are not made, but grow." Our business with them, as with the other facts of the universe, is to acquaint ourselves with their natural properties, and adapt ourselves to them. The fundamental political institutions of a people are considered by this school as a sort of organic growth from the nature and life of that people; a product of their habits, instincts, and unconscious wants and desires, scarcely at all of their deliberate purposes. Their will has had no part in the matter but that of meeting the necessities of the moment by the contrivances of the moment, which contrivances, if in sufficient conformity to the national feelings and character, commonly last, and, by successive aggregation, constitute a polity suited to the people who possess it, but which it would be vain to attempt to superinduce upon any people whose nature and circumstances had not spontaneously evolved it.
Opposed to this perspective are another group of political thinkers who, rather than comparing a government to a machine, see it as a natural outcome and view the study of government as a branch of natural history. They believe that forms of government aren't simply a matter of choice; we mostly have to accept them as they are. Governments can't be created through careful planning. They "aren't made, but grow." Our task, like with other realities in the universe, is to understand their inherent properties and adjust to them. This group sees a society’s basic political institutions as something that organically develops from the nature and life of its people; they are shaped by their habits, instincts, and unspoken needs and desires, rather than their conscious intentions. Their will plays no significant role, except in responding to immediate needs through solutions that arise at that moment. If these solutions align well with the national sentiments and character, they typically endure and accumulate over time to form a political system that fits the people who have it. However, trying to impose such a system on any society whose nature and conditions have not naturally fostered it would be futile.
It is difficult to decide which of these doctrines would be the most absurd, if we could suppose either of them held as an exclusive theory. But the principles which men profess, on any controverted subject, are usually a very incomplete exponent of the opinions they really hold. No one believes that every people is capable of working every sort of institution. Carry the analogy of mechanical contrivances as far as we will, a man does not choose even an instrument of timber and iron on the sole ground that it is in itself the best. He considers whether he possesses the other requisites which must be combined with it to render its employment advantageous, and, in particular whether those by whom it will have to be worked possess the knowledge and skill necessary for its management. On the other hand, neither are those who speak of institutions as if they were a kind of living organisms really the political fatalists they give themselves out to be. They do not pretend that mankind have absolutely no range of choice as to the government they will live under, or that a consideration of the consequences which flow from different forms of polity is no element at all in deciding which of them should be preferred. But, though each side greatly exaggerates its own theory, out of opposition to the other, and no one holds without modification to either, the two doctrines correspond to a deep-seated difference between two modes of thought; and though it is evident that neither of these is entirely in the right, yet it being equally evident that neither is wholly in the wrong, we must endeavour to get down to what is at the root of each, and avail ourselves of the amount of truth which exists in either.
It's tough to figure out which of these beliefs is the most ridiculous if we imagined either of them taken as the sole perspective. However, the principles that people claim to believe about any disputed topic are usually only a partial reflection of their actual views. No one thinks that every society can successfully manage every type of institution. Just like with mechanical tools, a person doesn’t choose an instrument made of wood and metal just because it’s the best option on its own. They think about whether they have the other necessary factors to make its use beneficial, particularly whether the people who will use it have the knowledge and skills needed to operate it effectively. Likewise, those who talk about institutions as if they’re living beings aren’t truly the political determinists they pretend to be. They don’t claim that humans have absolutely no choice regarding the government they live under, nor do they ignore the importance of considering the outcomes of different political systems when deciding which one is preferable. Although each side tends to exaggerate its own position in contrast to the other, and no one strictly adheres to either view without any modifications, these two beliefs reflect a fundamental difference in thinking. While it’s clear that neither is entirely correct, it’s equally clear that neither is completely wrong, so we should try to understand the root of each and take advantage of the truths present in both.
Let us remember, then, in the first place, that political institutions (however the proposition may be at times ignored) are the work of men—owe their origin and their whole existence to human will. Men did not wake on a summer morning and find them sprung up. Neither do they resemble trees, which, once planted, "are aye growing" while men "are sleeping." In every stage of their existence they are made what they are by human voluntary agency. Like all things, therefore, which are made by men, they may be either well or ill made; judgment and skill may have been exercised in their production, or the reverse of these. And again, if a people have omitted, or from outward pressure have not had it in their power to give themselves a constitution by the tentative process of applying a corrective to each evil as it arose, or as the sufferers gained strength to resist it, this retardation of political progress is no doubt a great disadvantage to them, but it does not prove that what has been found good for others would not have been good also for them, and will not be so still when they think fit to adopt it.
Let's remember, first of all, that political institutions (no matter how often this idea is overlooked) are created by people—they originate and exist because of human choice. People didn’t just wake up one summer morning to find them in place. They aren’t like trees that, once planted, "keep growing" while people "are sleeping." At every stage of their existence, they are shaped by human action. Like everything made by humans, they can be made well or poorly; judgment and skill may have been used in their creation, or the opposite. Furthermore, if a society has failed to create a constitution by gradually addressing each problem as it arose, or as the people gathered the strength to confront it, this delay in political development is certainly a disadvantage, but it doesn't prove that what has worked well for others wouldn't have worked well for them too, and it won't be any less viable when they decide to adopt it.
On the other hand, it is also to be borne in mind that political machinery does not act of itself. As it is first made, so it has to be worked, by men, and even by ordinary men. It needs, not their simple acquiescence, but their active participation; and must be adjusted to the capacities and qualities of such men as are available. This implies three conditions. The people for whom the form of government is intended must be willing to accept it, or, at least not so unwilling as to oppose an insurmountable obstacle to its establishment. They must be willing and able to do what is necessary to keep it standing. And they must be willing and able to do what it requires of them to enable it to fulfill its purposes. The word "do" is to be understood as including forbearances as well as acts. They must be capable of fulfilling the conditions of action and the conditions of self-restraint, which are necessary either for keeping the established polity in existence, or for enabling it to achieve the ends, its conduciveness to which forms its recommendation.
On the other hand, it's important to remember that political systems don't just run on their own. They need to be operated by people, even regular folks. It requires not just their passive agreement, but their active involvement; and it has to be tailored to the abilities and qualities of the people available. This means three things. The citizens for whom the government is designed must be willing to accept it, or at least not so opposed that they create an insurmountable barrier to its establishment. They must be ready and able to do what’s necessary to maintain it. And they must be prepared and capable of doing what it requires from them to help it achieve its goals. The term "do" should be understood to include both actions and restraint. They must be able to fulfill the demands of taking action and the demands of self-restraint, which are essential for either maintaining the established system or enabling it to achieve its intended benefits.
The failure of any of these conditions renders a form of government, whatever favorable promise it may otherwise hold out, unsuitable to the particular case.
The failure of any of these conditions makes a form of government, no matter how promising it might seem, unsuitable for the specific situation.
The first obstacle, the repugnance of the people to the particular form of government, needs little illustration, because it never can in theory have been overlooked. The case is of perpetual occurrence. Nothing but foreign force would induce a tribe of North American Indians to submit to the restraints of a regular and civilized government. The same might have been said, though somewhat less absolutely, of the barbarians who overran the Roman Empire. It required centuries of time, and an entire change of circumstances, to discipline them into regular obedience even to their own leaders, when not actually serving under their banner. There are nations who will not voluntarily submit to any government but that of certain families, which have from time immemorial had the privilege of supplying them with chiefs. Some nations could not, except by foreign conquest, be made to endure a monarchy; others are equally averse to a republic. The hindrance often amounts, for the time being, to impracticability.
The first hurdle, the people's resistance to a specific type of government, needs little explanation because it has always been clear in theory. This happens all the time. Only foreign force could compel a tribe of North American Indians to accept the restrictions of a regular and civilized government. The same could be said, though less definitively, about the barbarians who invaded the Roman Empire. It took centuries and a complete shift in circumstances to train them to follow their own leaders reliably, even when they weren't actually fighting under their flag. There are nations that will only accept a government led by certain families that have had the right to choose their leaders for generations. Some nations cannot tolerate a monarchy unless it is imposed by foreign conquest; others feel the same way about a republic. This resistance often makes it practically impossible to implement such governance for the time being.
But there are also cases in which, though not averse to a form of government—possibly even desiring it—a people may be unwilling or unable to fulfill its conditions. They may be incapable of fulfilling such of them as are necessary to keep the government even in nominal existence. Thus a people may prefer a free government; but if, from indolence, or carelessness, or cowardice, or want of public spirit, they are unequal to the exertions necessary for preserving it; if they will not fight for it when it is directly attacked; if they can be deluded by the artifices used to cheat them out of it; if, by momentary discouragement, or temporary panic, or a fit of enthusiasm for an individual, they can be induced to lay their liberties at the feet even of a great man, or trust him with powers which enable him to subvert their institutions—in all these cases they are more or less unfit for liberty; and though it may be for their good to have had it even for a short time, they are unlikely long to enjoy it. Again, a people may be unwilling or unable to fulfill the duties which a particular form of government requires of them. A rude people, though in some degree alive to the benefits of civilized society, may be unable to practice the forbearances which it demands; their passions may be too violent, or their personal pride too exacting, to forego private conflict, and leave to the laws the avenging of their real or supposed wrongs. In such a case, a civilized government, to be really advantageous to them, will require to be in a considerable degree despotic; one over which they do not themselves exercise control, and which imposes a great amount of forcible restraint upon their actions. Again, a people must be considered unfit for more than a limited and qualified freedom who will not co-operate actively with the law and the public authorities in the repression of evil-doers. A people who are more disposed to shelter a criminal than to apprehend him; who, like the Hindoos, will perjure themselves to screen the man who has robbed them, rather than take trouble or expose themselves to vindictiveness by giving evidence against him; who, like some nations of Europe down to a recent date, if a man poniards another in the public street, pass by on the other side, because it is the business of the police to look to the matter, and it is safer not to interfere in what does not concern them; a people who are revolted by an execution, but not shocked at an assassination—require that the public authorities should be armed with much sterner powers of repression than elsewhere, since the first indispensable requisites of civilized life have nothing else to rest on. These deplorable states of feeling, in any people who have emerged from savage life, are, no doubt, usually the consequence of previous bad government, which has taught them to regard the law as made for other ends than their good, and its administrators as worse enemies than those who openly violate it. But, however little blame may be due to those in whom these mental habits have grown up, and however the habits may be ultimately conquerable by better government, yet, while they exist, a people so disposed can not be governed with as little power exercised over them as a people whose sympathies are on the side of the law, and who are willing to give active assistance in its enforcement. Again, representative institutions are of little value, and may be a mere instrument of tyranny or intrigue, when the generality of electors are not sufficiently interested in their own government to give their vote, or, if they vote at all, do not bestow their suffrages on public grounds, but sell them for money, or vote at the beck of some one who has control over them, or whom for private reasons they desire to propitiate. Popular election thus practiced, instead of a security against misgovernment, is but an additional wheel in its machinery.
But there are also situations where, although a group may not be against a type of government—perhaps even wanting it—they might be unwilling or unable to meet its requirements. They might not be able to fulfill the necessary conditions to maintain the government, even in name. For example, a group may prefer a free government, but if they are too lazy, careless, fearful, or lack public spirit, and are not prepared to make the efforts needed to preserve it; if they won’t defend it when it’s under attack; if they can be tricked into losing it; or if they can be swayed by temporary discouragement, sudden panic, or a fleeting admiration for an individual, leading them to surrender their liberties to even a great leader or trust him with powers that could undermine their institutions—in all these cases, they are more or less unfit for liberty. Even though having liberty for a short time might be beneficial for them, they are unlikely to enjoy it for long. Again, a group might be unwilling or unable to meet the responsibilities that a certain government form requires from them. A rough group, even if somewhat aware of the benefits of modern society, might struggle with the self-restraint it demands; their emotions might be too intense, or their pride too demanding, to avoid personal conflicts and leave the resolution of their real or perceived grievances to the law. In such cases, for a civilized government to truly benefit them, it will need to be somewhat despotic; one they don’t control and that imposes significant restrictions on their actions. Moreover, a group should be seen as unfit for more than limited and regulated freedom if they are not willing to actively cooperate with the law and public authorities to stop wrongdoers. A group that is more inclined to protect a criminal than to report him; who, like the Hindoos, would lie to shield a person who has harmed them, instead of taking action or risking retaliation by providing evidence against him; who, like some European nations until recently, would walk by if someone is stabbed in the street, believing it is the police's job to handle it and it’s safer not to get involved; a group that is outraged by an execution but not disturbed by an assassination—needs the public authorities to have much stronger powers to enforce the law than in other places since the essential requirements of civilized life rest upon this. These unfortunate feelings in any group that has moved beyond savage existence are often the result of previous poor governance, which has led them to see the law as serving purposes other than their own good and its administrators as worse enemies than those who blatantly break it. However little blame may be assigned to those who have developed these mental patterns, and however these habits can ultimately be overcome by better governance, while they persist, a group with such tendencies cannot be governed with as little authority over them as a group that supports the law and is willing to help enforce it. Again, representative institutions hold little value and can merely become tools of tyranny or manipulation when most voters are not genuinely invested in their own governance to cast their votes, or, if they do vote, do not do so on public principles but instead sell their votes for money or vote under someone else's influence, or for personal reasons to avoid upsetting someone. Such practices of popular election, instead of being a safeguard against misgovernment, simply contribute another cog to its machinery.
Besides these moral hindrances, mechanical difficulties are often an insuperable impediment to forms of government. In the ancient world, though there might be, and often was, great individual or local independence, there could be nothing like a regulated popular government beyond the bounds of a single city-community; because there did not exist the physical conditions for the formation and propagation of a public opinion, except among those who could be brought together to discuss public matters in the same agora. This obstacle is generally thought to have ceased by the adoption of the representative system. But to surmount it completely, required the press, and even the newspaper press, the real equivalent, though not in all respects an adequate one, of the Pnyx and the Forum. There have been states of society in which even a monarchy of any great territorial extent could not subsist, but unavoidably broke up into petty principalities, either mutually independent, or held together by a loose tie like the feudal: because the machinery of authority was not perfect enough to carry orders into effect at a great distance from the person of the ruler. He depended mainly upon voluntary fidelity for the obedience even of his army, nor did there exist the means of making the people pay an amount of taxes sufficient for keeping up the force necessary to compel obedience throughout a large territory. In these and all similar cases, it must be understood that the amount of the hindrance may be either greater or less. It may be so great as to make the form of government work very ill, without absolutely precluding its existence, or hindering it from being practically preferable to any other which can be had. This last question mainly depends upon a consideration which we have not yet arrived at—the tendencies of different forms of government to promote Progress.
Aside from these moral obstacles, practical challenges often pose a significant barrier to forms of government. In the ancient world, although there could be considerable individual or local independence, a well-regulated popular government couldn't exist beyond a single city-community. This was due to the lack of physical conditions needed for forming and spreading public opinion, except among those who could gather to discuss public issues in the same agora. Many believe that this obstacle was lifted with the introduction of the representative system. However, fully overcoming it required the press, especially the newspaper press, which served as a real, though not entirely equivalent, counterpart to the Pnyx and the Forum. There have been times in society when even a monarchy with a large territory couldn't survive and inevitably broke into small principalities, either completely independent or loosely connected like in feudalism. This happened because the mechanisms of authority weren't advanced enough to enforce orders far from the ruler. The ruler relied heavily on voluntary loyalty for the obedience of even his army, and there weren’t effective means of collecting a sufficient amount of taxes to maintain the necessary force for enforcing compliance across a large area. In these and similar situations, it should be understood that the severity of the hindrance can vary. It can be significant enough to make the form of government function poorly, without completely ruling out its existence, or preventing it from being practically better than any alternative available. This last point mainly depends on a consideration we haven’t discussed yet—the tendency of different forms of government to foster progress.
We have now examined the three fundamental conditions of the adaptation of forms of government to the people who are to be governed by them. If the supporters of what may be termed the naturalistic theory of politics, mean but to insist on the necessity of these three conditions; if they only mean that no government can permanently exist which does not fulfill the first and second conditions, and, in some considerable measure, the third; their doctrine, thus limited, is incontestable. Whatever they mean more than this appears to me untenable. All that we are told about the necessity of an historical basis for institutions, of their being in harmony with the national usages and character, and the like, means either this, or nothing to the purpose. There is a great quantity of mere sentimentality connected with these and similar phrases, over and above the amount of rational meaning contained in them. But, considered practically, these alleged requisites of political institutions are merely so many facilities for realising the three conditions. When an institution, or a set of institutions, has the way prepared for it by the opinions, tastes, and habits of the people, they are not only more easily induced to accept it, but will more easily learn, and will be, from the beginning, better disposed, to do what is required of them both for the preservation of the institutions, and for bringing them into such action as enables them to produce their best results. It would be a great mistake in any legislator not to shape his measures so as to take advantage of such pre-existing habits and feelings when available. On the other hand, it is an exaggeration to elevate these mere aids and facilities into necessary conditions. People are more easily induced to do, and do more easily, what they are already used to; but people also learn to do things new to them. Familiarity is a great help; but much dwelling on an idea will make it familiar, even when strange at first. There are abundant instances in which a whole people have been eager for untried things. The amount of capacity which a people possess for doing new things, and adapting themselves to new circumstances; is itself one of the elements of the question. It is a quality in which different nations, and different stages of civilization, differ much from one another. The capability of any given people for fulfilling the conditions of a given form of government can not be pronounced on by any sweeping rule. Knowledge of the particular people, and general practical judgment and sagacity, must be the guides.
We have now looked at the three essential conditions for adapting forms of government to the people they govern. If the advocates of what might be called the naturalistic theory of politics are simply emphasizing the need for these three conditions; if they only assert that no government can last without meeting the first two conditions and, to some extent, the third; then their argument, as limited as it is, stands strong. Anything they suggest beyond this seems to be unreasonable. Everything we hear about the need for a historical basis for institutions, their alignment with national customs and character, and similar ideas either means this or doesn’t serve the purpose at all. There’s a lot of sentimentality tied to these phrases, which adds little rational meaning. Practically speaking, these supposed requirements of political institutions are just various means to fulfill the three conditions. When an institution or a set of institutions has support from the opinions, preferences, and habits of the people, they are not only more likely to accept it, but they will also learn more quickly and be more inclined from the start to meet the demands for both sustaining the institutions and putting them into action to achieve their best outcomes. It would be a huge mistake for any lawmaker not to design their policies in a way that leverages existing habits and sentiments when possible. Conversely, it’s an exaggeration to turn these mere aids and supports into essential conditions. People are more easily motivated to do what they’re already familiar with; however, they can also learn to do new things. Familiarity is a major advantage, but thinking about an idea for a while can make it familiar, even if it seems strange initially. There are plenty of examples where whole populations have been eager to try new things. The ability of a people to embrace new tasks and adapt to new situations is itself a crucial factor. This capability varies significantly between different nations and stages of civilization. The ability of any specific people to meet the requirements of a particular form of government cannot be judged by a simple rule. Knowledge of the specific people, along with practical judgment and wisdom, must guide the assessment.
There is also another consideration not to be lost sight of. A people may be unprepared for good institutions; but to kindle a desire for them is a necessary part of the preparation. To recommend and advocate a particular institution or form of government, and set its advantages in the strongest light, is one of the modes, often the only mode within reach, of educating the mind of the nation not only for accepting or claiming, but also for working, the institution. What means had Italian patriots, during the last and present generation, of preparing the Italian people for freedom in unity, but by inciting them to demand it? Those, however, who undertake such a task, need to be duly impressed, not solely with the benefits of the institution or polity which they recommend, but also with the capacities, moral, intellectual, and active, required for working it; that they may avoid, if possible, stirring up a desire too much in advance of the capacity.
There's also another point to keep in mind. A society might not be ready for good systems, but sparking a desire for them is a crucial part of getting ready. Advocating for a specific system or type of government and highlighting its benefits in the best possible way is often the only way to educate the nation’s mindset—not just to accept or demand it, but also to effectively implement it. How did Italian patriots, in the recent past and today, prepare the Italian people for freedom and unity? They inspired them to demand it. However, those who take on such a task need to be clearly aware, not just of the advantages of the system or governance they promote, but also of the moral, intellectual, and active capabilities needed to make it work. This way, they can try to avoid igniting a desire that outpaces the society's readiness.
The result of what has been said is, that, within the limits set by the three conditions so often adverted to, institutions and forms of government are a matter of choice. To inquire into the best form of government in the abstract (as it is called) is not a chimerical, but a highly practical employment of scientific intellect; and to introduce into any country the best institutions which, in the existing state of that country, are capable of, in any tolerable degree, fulfilling the conditions, is one of the most rational objects to which practical effort can address itself. Every thing which can be said by way of disparaging the efficacy of human will and purpose in matters of government might be said of it in every other of its applications. In all things there are very strict limits to human power. It can only act by wielding some one or more of the forces of nature. Forces, therefore, that can be applied to the desired use must exist; and will only act according to their own laws. We can not make the river run backwards; but we do not therefore say that watermills "are not made, but grow." In politics, as in mechanics, the power which is to keep the engine going must be sought for outside the machinery; and if it is not forthcoming, or is insufficient to surmount the obstacles which may reasonably be expected, the contrivance will fail. This is no peculiarity of the political art; and amounts only to saying that it is subject to the same limitations and conditions as all other arts.
The outcome of what has been discussed is that, within the boundaries set by the three conditions that have been frequently mentioned, institutions and forms of government are a matter of choice. Investigating the best form of government in theory is not unrealistic; rather, it’s a very practical use of scientific thinking. Introducing the best institutions into a country that can reasonably meet these conditions is one of the most sensible goals for practical efforts to pursue. Any criticism of the effectiveness of human will and intention in governance could also be applied to every other area of human endeavor. In all things, there are strict limits to what humanity can achieve. We can only act by using one or more of the forces of nature. Therefore, the forces that can be put to the intended use must be present and will only work according to their own laws. We cannot make a river flow backwards, but we wouldn’t say that watermills “aren't made, but grow.” In politics, just as in mechanics, the power needed to keep the system functioning must be sought outside the machinery itself; and if it isn't available or isn't enough to overcome the challenges that can reasonably be anticipated, the system will fail. This isn't a unique aspect of political skill; it merely indicates that it operates under the same limitations and conditions as all other skills.
At this point we are met by another objection, or the same objection in a different form. The forces, it is contended, on which the greater political phenomena depend, are not amenable to the direction of politicians or philosophers. The government of a country, it is affirmed, is, in all substantial respects, fixed and determined beforehand by the state of the country in regard to the distribution of the elements of social power. Whatever is the strongest power in society will obtain the governing authority; and a change in the political constitution can not be durable unless preceded or accompanied by an altered distribution of power in society itself. A nation, therefore, can not choose its form of government. The mere details, and practical organization, it may choose; but the essence of the whole, the seat of the supreme power, is determined for it by social circumstances.
At this point, we encounter another objection, or the same objection presented in a different way. It is argued that the forces driving major political events are not under the control of politicians or philosophers. It's claimed that the government of a country, in all significant ways, is predetermined by the country's social power distribution. The dominant power in society will hold the governing authority, and any change in the political system won't last unless it's preceded or accompanied by a shift in the distribution of power within society itself. Therefore, a nation cannot choose its form of government. It may select the specific details and practical organization, but the core essence, the location of supreme power, is determined by social circumstances.
That there is a portion of truth in this doctrine I at once admit; but to make it of any use, it must be reduced to a distinct expression and proper limits. When it is said that the strongest power in society will make itself strongest in the government, what is meant by power? Not thews and sinews; otherwise pure democracy would be the only form of polity that could exist. To mere muscular strength, add two other elements, property and intelligence, and we are nearer the truth, but far from having yet reached it. Not only is a greater number often kept down by a less, but the greater number may have a preponderance in property, and individually in intelligence, and may yet be held in subjection, forcibly or otherwise, by a minority in both respects inferior to it. To make these various elements of power politically influential they must be organized; and the advantage in organization is necessarily with those who are in possession of the government. A much weaker party in all other elements of power may greatly preponderate when the powers of government are thrown into the scale; and may long retain its predominance through this alone: though, no doubt, a government so situated is in the condition called in mechanics unstable equilibrium, like a thing balanced on its smaller end, which, if once disturbed, tends more and more to depart from, instead of reverting to, its previous state.
I admit that there’s some truth in this idea, but to make it useful, we need to clarify it and set proper boundaries. When it’s said that the strongest force in society will also become the strongest in government, what exactly do we mean by power? It’s not just physical strength; otherwise, pure democracy would be the only possible form of government. If we add two more factors—wealth and intelligence—we get closer to the truth, but we still haven’t fully captured it. A larger group can often be oppressed by a smaller one, and even if the larger group has more wealth and intelligence, they can still be dominated, either forcefully or otherwise, by a minority that is, in both aspects, inferior. To make these various elements of power politically significant, they need to be organized; and those who hold the government have an inherent advantage in this organization. A much weaker group in all other aspects of power can dominate when government power is involved, and they can maintain this dominance for a long time just based on that: although, certainly, a government in this situation is in what mechanics calls unstable equilibrium, like an object balanced on a narrow point, which, if disturbed, tends to move further away from its original position instead of returning to it.
But there are still stronger objections to this theory of government in the terms in which it is usually stated. The power in society which has any tendency to convert itself into political power is not power quiescent, power merely passive, but active power; in other words, power actually exerted; that is to say, a very small portion of all the power in existence. Politically speaking, a great part of all power consists in will. How is it possible, then, to compute the elements of political power, while we omit from the computation any thing which acts on the will? To think that, because those who wield the power in society wield in the end that of government, therefore it is of no use to attempt to influence the constitution of the government by acting on opinion, is to forget that opinion is itself one of the greatest active social forces. One person with a belief is a social power equal to ninety-nine who have only interests. They who can succeed in creating a general persuasion that a certain form of government, or social fact of any kind, deserves to be preferred, have made nearly the most important step which can possibly be taken toward ranging the powers of society on its side. On the day when the protomartyr was stoned to death at Jerusalem, while he who was to be the Apostle of the Gentiles stood by "consenting unto his death," would any one have supposed that the party of that stoned man were then and there the strongest power in society? And has not the event proved that they were so? Because theirs was the most powerful of then existing beliefs. The same element made a monk of Wittenberg, at the meeting of the Diet of Worms, a more powerful social force than the Emperor Charles the Fifth, and all the princes there assembled. But these, it may be said, are cases in which religion was concerned, and religious convictions are something peculiar in their strength. Then let us take a case purely political, where religion, if concerned at all, was chiefly on the losing side. If any one requires to be convinced that speculative thought is one of the chief elements of social power, let him bethink himself of the age in which there was scarcely a throne in Europe which was not filled by a liberal and reforming king, a liberal and reforming emperor, or, strangest of all, a liberal and reforming pope; the age of Frederic the Great, of Catherine the Second, of Joseph the Second, of Peter Leopold, of Benedict XIV., of Ganganelli, of Pombal, of D'Aranda; when the very Bourbons of Naples were liberals and reformers, and all the active minds among the noblesse of France were filled with the ideas which were soon after to cost them so dear. Surely a conclusive example how far mere physical and economic power is from being the whole of social power. It was not by any change in the distribution of material interests, but by the spread of moral convictions, that negro slavery has been put an end to in the British Empire and elsewhere. The serfs in Russia owe their emancipation, if not to a sentiment of duty, at least to the growth of a more enlightened opinion respecting the true interest of the state. It is what men think that determines how they act; and though the persuasions and convictions of average men are in a much greater degree determined by their personal position than by reason, no little power is exercised over them by the persuasions and convictions of those whose personal position is different, and by the united authority of the instructed. When, therefore, the instructed in general can be brought to recognize one social arrangement, or political or other institution, as good, and another as bad—one as desirable, another as condemnable, very much has been done towards giving to the one, or withdrawing from the other, that preponderance of social force which enables it to subsist. And the maxim, that the government of a country is what the social forces in existence compel it to be, is true only in the sense in which it favors, instead of discouraging, the attempt to exercise, among all forms of government practicable in the existing condition of society, a rational choice.
But there are still stronger objections to this theory of government as it’s usually expressed. The power in society that has any tendency to become political power isn't just quiet or passive; it's active power, meaning power that is actually used; that is, a very small part of all the power that exists. Politically, a large portion of all power is about will. So, how can we measure the factors of political power if we ignore anything that influences will? To think that those who hold power in society ultimately control the government, and therefore it's pointless to try to influence the government's structure by shaping opinion, is to overlook that opinion is one of the most significant active social forces. One person with a belief has social power equal to ninety-nine who only have interests. Those who can generate a widespread belief that a certain form of government or social fact deserves preference have taken one of the most crucial steps toward aligning society's powers with their cause. On the day when the first martyr was stoned to death in Jerusalem, while he who would become the Apostle of the Gentiles stood by "consenting to his death," would anyone have thought that the followers of that stoned man were at that moment the strongest power in society? Yet hasn't history shown that they were? Because they held the most powerful beliefs of that time. The same dynamic made a monk from Wittenberg, during the Diet of Worms, a stronger social force than Emperor Charles the Fifth and all the assembled princes. However, one might argue these are cases involving religion, and religious convictions have a unique strength. Let's consider a purely political example where religion, if involved at all, was mainly on the losing side. If anyone needs convincing that speculative thought is one of the main sources of social power, they should reflect on the time when there was hardly a throne in Europe not occupied by a liberal and reforming king, a liberal and reforming emperor, or, strangely enough, a liberal and reforming pope; the era of Frederick the Great, Catherine the Second, Joseph the Second, Peter Leopold, Benedict XIV, Ganganelli, Pombal, and D'Aranda; when even the Bourbons of Naples were liberals and reformers, and all the active minds among the French nobility were filled with ideas that would soon cost them dearly. This is clearly an example of how far mere physical and economic power is from encapsulating all social power. The end of black slavery in the British Empire and elsewhere wasn't due to any changes in the distribution of material interests, but rather to the spread of moral convictions. The serfs in Russia achieved their freedom not only due to a sense of duty but also from the rise of more enlightened opinions about the true interests of the state. What people think drives how they act; even though the beliefs and convictions of average people are largely shaped by their personal situations rather than reason, significant influence is held over them by the beliefs and convictions of those in different positions and by the collective authority of the informed. Therefore, when the informed can generally agree on one social arrangement, or political institution being good, and another as bad—one as desirable, another as condemnable—much has been accomplished in tipping the balance of social force toward one or away from the other, enabling its existence. The principle that a country's government is shaped by the prevailing social forces is true only in a way that encourages, rather than discourages, the effort to make a rational choice among all forms of government feasible in the current societal conditions.
Chapter II—The Criterion of a Good Form of Government.
The form of government for any given country being (within certain definite conditions) amenable to choice, it is now to be considered by what test the choice should be directed; what are the distinctive characteristics of the form of government best fitted to promote the interests of any given society.
The type of government for any country can be chosen (under certain conditions), so we need to think about what criteria should guide that choice; what are the key features of the type of government that is most likely to benefit any society.
Before entering into this inquiry, it may seem necessary to decide what are the proper functions of government; for, government altogether being only a means, the eligibility of the means must depend on their adaptation to the end. But this mode of stating the problem gives less aid to its investigation than might be supposed, and does not even bring the whole of the question into view. For, in the first place, the proper functions of a government are not a fixed thing, but different in different states of society; much more extensive in a backward than in an advanced state. And, secondly, the character of a government or set of political institutions can not be sufficiently estimated while we confine our attention to the legitimate sphere of governmental functions; for, though the goodness of a government is necessarily circumscribed within that sphere, its badness unhappily is not. Every kind and degree of evil of which mankind are susceptible may be inflicted on them by their government, and none of the good which social existence is capable of can be any further realized than as the constitution of the government is compatible with, and allows scope for, its attainment. Not to speak of indirect effects, the direct meddling of the public authorities has no necessary limits but those of human life, and the influence of government on the well-being of society can be considered or estimated in reference to nothing less than the whole of the interests of humanity.
Before diving into this inquiry, it seems necessary to determine the proper functions of government; since government is simply a means, the suitability of that means depends on how well it serves its purpose. However, framing the problem this way offers less help for investigation than one might think and doesn't fully capture the entire question. First, the proper functions of government are not fixed; they vary depending on the state of society—much broader in less developed societies than in advanced ones. Second, we can't accurately evaluate a government or political institutions by only looking at the legitimate areas of governmental functions. While the goodness of a government is contained within that sphere, its negative aspects unfortunately are not. Any kind of harm that humanity can suffer can be inflicted by their government, and no societal good can be realized further than what the government allows and supports. Not to mention indirect effects, the direct involvement of public authorities has no inherent limits other than those of human life, and the impact of government on societal well-being can be considered only in relation to the entire spectrum of human interests.
Being thus obliged to place before ourselves, as the test of good and bad government, so complex an object as the aggregate interests of society, we would willingly attempt some kind of classification of those interests, which, bringing them before the mind in definite groups, might give indication of the qualities by which a form of government is fitted to promote those various interests respectively. It would be a great facility if we could say the good of society consists of such and such elements; one of these elements requires such conditions, another such others; the government, then, which unites in the greatest degree all these conditions, must be the best. The theory of government would thus be built up from the separate theorems of the elements which compose a good state of society.
Being forced to evaluate the complex interests of society as the measure of good and bad government, we would like to attempt some sort of classification of these interests, which, by presenting them in clear groups, might show the qualities that a form of government needs to effectively support those various interests. It would be greatly helpful if we could say that the well-being of society consists of specific elements; one of these elements requires certain conditions, while another necessitates different ones; therefore, the government that best combines all these conditions must be the most effective. The theory of government would be constructed from the individual principles of the elements that make up a healthy society.
Unfortunately, to enumerate and classify the constituents of social well-being, so as to admit of the formation of such theorems is no easy task. Most of those who, in the last or present generation, have applied themselves to the philosophy of politics in any comprehensive spirit, have felt the importance of such a classification, but the attempts which have been made toward it are as yet limited, so far as I am aware, to a single step. The classification begins and ends with a partition of the exigencies of society between the two heads of Order and Progress (in the phraseology of French thinkers); Permanence and Progression, in the words of Coleridge. This division is plausible and seductive, from the apparently clean-cut opposition between its two members, and the remarkable difference between the sentiments to which they appeal. But I apprehend that (however admissible for purposes of popular discourse) the distinction between Order, or Permanence and Progress, employed to define the qualities necessary in a government, is unscientific and incorrect.
Unfortunately, listing and categorizing the elements of social well-being to develop such theories is not an easy task. Most of those who have engaged with political philosophy in a thoughtful way, either in the last generation or this one, have recognized the importance of such classification. However, the efforts made so far seem to be limited to just one step. This classification starts and ends with dividing social needs into two categories: Order and Progress (in the terms used by French thinkers); Permanence and Progression, as Coleridge puts it. This division appears convincing and attractive due to the clear contrast between its two parts and the significant difference in the feelings they evoke. However, I believe that although this distinction between Order, or Permanence, and Progress might be acceptable for general discussion, it is unscientific and inaccurate when defining the qualities necessary in a government.
For, first, what are Order and Progress? Concerning Progress there is no difficulty, or none which is apparent at first sight. When Progress is spoken of as one of the wants of human society, it may be supposed to mean Improvement. That is a tolerably distinct idea. But what is Order? Sometimes it means more, sometimes less, but hardly ever the whole of what human society needs except improvement.
For starters, what do we mean by Order and Progress? When it comes to Progress, there’s no confusion, or at least none that’s obvious at first glance. When people talk about Progress as something human society needs, it’s usually understood to mean Improvement. That’s a pretty clear concept. But what about Order? Sometimes it refers to more, sometimes to less, but it rarely encompasses everything that human society requires beyond improvement.
In its narrowest acceptation, Order means Obedience. A government is said to preserve order if it succeeds in getting itself obeyed. But there are different degrees of obedience, and it is not every degree that is commendable. Only an unmitigated despotism demands that the individual citizen shall obey unconditionally every mandate of persons in authority. We must at least limit the definition to such mandates as are general, and issued in the deliberate form of laws. Order, thus understood, expresses, doubtless, an indispensable attribute of government. Those who are unable to make their ordinances obeyed, can not be said to govern. But, though a necessary condition, this is not the object of government. That it should make itself obeyed is requisite, in order that it may accomplish some other purpose. We are still to seek what is this other purpose, which government ought to fulfill abstractedly from the idea of improvement, and which has to be fulfilled in every society, whether stationary or progressive.
In its simplest sense, Order means Obedience. A government is considered to maintain order if it manages to get people to comply. However, there are different levels of obedience, and not every level is praiseworthy. Only a totalitarian regime insists that every individual must follow every command from those in power without question. We should at least limit this definition to commands that are general and issued in the formal way of laws. Order, understood this way, certainly represents a necessary quality of government. Those who cannot enforce their laws cannot really be called a government. But while this is a necessary condition, it isn’t the main goal of government. It needs to be obeyed so that it can achieve some other purpose. We still need to identify what this other purpose is that government should fulfill, apart from the idea of improvement, and which must be achieved in every society, whether it is stable or evolving.
In a sense somewhat more enlarged, Order means the preservation of peace by the cessation of private violence. Order is said to exist where the people of the country have, as a general rule, ceased to prosecute their quarrels by private force, and acquired the habit of referring the decision of their disputes and the redress of their injuries to the public authorities. But in this larger use of the term, as well as in the former narrow one, Order expresses rather one of the conditions of government, than either its purpose or the criterion of its excellence; for the habit may be well established of submitting to the government, and referring all disputed matters to its authority, and yet the manner in which the government deals with those disputed matters, and with the other things about which it concerns itself, may differ by the whole interval which divides the best from the worst possible.
In a broader sense, Order refers to maintaining peace by stopping private violence. Order is considered to exist when the people of a country generally stop settling their disputes through personal conflict and instead develop the practice of turning to public authorities for resolving their issues and addressing their grievances. However, in this broader meaning, just like in the narrower sense, Order reflects a condition of governance rather than its purpose or a measure of its quality. It's possible for people to be accustomed to submitting to the government and seeking its authority for all disputes, but the way the government handles those disputes and other matters can vary greatly, spanning the gap between the best and worst possible approaches.
If we intend to comprise in the idea of Order all that society requires from its government which is not included in the idea of Progress, we must define Order as the preservation of all kinds and amounts of good which already exist, and Progress as consisting in the increase of them. This distinction does comprehend in one or the other section every thing which a government can be required to promote. But, thus understood, it affords no basis for a philosophy of government. We can not say that, in constituting a polity, certain provisions ought to be made for Order and certain others for Progress, since the conditions of Order, in the sense now indicated, and those of Progress, are not opposite, but the same. The agencies which tend to preserve the social good which already exists are the very same which promote the increase of it, and vice versâ, the sole difference being, that a greater degree of those agencies is required for the latter purpose than for the former.
If we want to include in the idea of Order everything society expects from its government that isn't part of Progress, we need to define Order as the maintenance of all types and amounts of good that already exist, and define Progress as the growth of those good things. This distinction covers everything a government can be asked to support. However, understood this way, it doesn't provide a foundation for a philosophy of government. We can't say that when forming a political system, some measures should be taken for Order and different ones for Progress, because the conditions for Order, as described here, and those for Progress are not opposite but the same. The efforts that help maintain the social good that already exists are the same ones that encourage its growth, and the only difference is that a greater level of those efforts is needed for the latter than for the former.
What, for example, are the qualities in the citizens individually which conduce most to keep up the amount of good conduct, of good management, of success and prosperity, which already exist in society? Every body will agree that those qualities are industry, integrity, justice, and prudence. But are not these, of all qualities, the most conducive to improvement? and is not any growth of these virtues in the community in itself the greatest of improvements? If so, whatever qualities in the government are promotive of industry, integrity, justice, and prudence, conduce alike to permanence and to progression, only there is needed more of those qualities to make the society decidedly progressive than merely to keep it permanent.
What, for instance, are the individual qualities in citizens that help maintain the levels of good behavior, effective management, success, and prosperity already present in society? Everyone would agree that those qualities are hard work, honesty, fairness, and wisdom. But aren’t these qualities also the most important for improvement? And doesn’t any increase in these virtues within the community represent the biggest improvement? If that’s the case, then any qualities in the government that encourage hard work, honesty, fairness, and wisdom contribute to both stability and progress; it just requires more of these qualities to make society truly progressive rather than just maintaining its stability.
What, again, are the particular attributes in human beings which seem to have a more especial reference to Progress, and do not so directly suggest the ideas of Order and Preservation? They are chiefly the qualities of mental activity, enterprise, and courage. But are not all these qualities fully as much required for preserving the good we have as for adding to it? If there is any thing certain in human affairs, it is that valuable acquisitions are only to be retained by the continuation of the same energies which gained them. Things left to take care of themselves inevitably decay. Those whom success induces to relax their habits of care and thoughtfulness, and their willingness to encounter disagreeables, seldom long retain their good fortune at its height. The mental attribute which seems exclusively dedicated to Progress, and is the culmination of the tendencies to it, is Originality, or Invention. Yet this is no less necessary for Permanence, since, in the inevitable changes of human affairs, new inconveniences and dangers continually grow up, which must be encountered by new resources and contrivances, in order to keep things going on even only as well as they did before. Whatever qualities, therefore, in a government, tend to encourage activity, energy, courage, originality, are requisites of Permanence as well as of Progress, only a somewhat less degree of them will, on the average, suffice for the former purpose than for the latter.
What are the specific traits in humans that seem to relate more to Progress and don't directly imply Order and Preservation? They are mainly the qualities of mental activity, initiative, and bravery. But aren’t all these qualities just as necessary for keeping what we have as they are for adding to it? If there's one thing that's certain in human affairs, it's that valuable gains can only be maintained by the same efforts that achieved them. Things left to their own devices inevitably decline. Those who let success make them lax in their care and mindfulness, and who avoid facing challenges, typically don’t maintain their good fortune for long. The mental trait that seems solely dedicated to Progress, and represents its peak, is Originality, or Invention. Yet, this is just as essential for Stability, since in the constant changes of human affairs, new issues and dangers continuously emerge, which must be tackled with new resources and solutions to keep things going at least as well as they did before. Therefore, any qualities in a government that promote activity, energy, courage, and originality are essential for both Stability and Progress, only a slightly lower level of these attributes will generally be enough for the former than for the latter.
To pass now from the mental to the outward and objective requisites of society: it is impossible to point out any contrivance in politics, or arrangement of social affairs, which conduces to Order only, or to Progress only; whatever tends to either promotes both. Take, for instance, the common institution of a police. Order is the object which seems most immediately interested in the efficiency of this part of the social organization. Yet, if it is effectual to promote Order, that is, if it represses crime, and enables every one to feel his person and property secure, can any state of things be more conducive to Progress? The greater security of property is one of the main conditions and causes of greater production, which is Progress in its most familiar and vulgarest aspect. The better repression of crime represses the dispositions which tend to crime, and this is Progress in a somewhat higher sense. The release of the individual from the cares and anxieties of a state of imperfect protection sets his faculties free to be employed in any new effort for improving his own state and that of others, while the same cause, by attaching him to social existence, and making him no longer see present or prospective enemies in his fellow creatures, fosters all those feelings of kindness and fellowship towards others, and interest in the general well-being of the community, which are such important parts of social improvement.
To move from the mental aspects to the external and tangible requirements of society: it's impossible to identify any political system or social arrangement that supports only Order or only Progress; whatever benefits one also encourages the other. For example, consider the typical police system. Order appears to be the primary focus when it comes to the effectiveness of this part of social organization. However, if it successfully promotes Order—meaning it prevents crime and allows everyone to feel secure in their person and property—can anything be more beneficial for Progress? Greater security of property is a key condition and cause of increased production, which represents Progress in its simplest form. Effectively controlling crime also diminishes the tendencies that lead to criminal behavior, which is Progress in a more advanced sense. Releasing individuals from the worries and stress of inadequate protection allows them to use their abilities for new efforts to improve their own situation and that of others. At the same time, this connection to social life, by helping them see fellow human beings as allies rather than threats, encourages feelings of kindness and community well-being—essential elements of social improvement.
Take, again, such a familiar case as that of a good system of taxation and finance. This would generally be classed as belonging to the province of Order. Yet what can be more conducive to Progress? A financial system which promotes the one, conduces, by the very same excellences, to the other. Economy, for example, equally preserves the existing stock of national wealth, and favors the creation of more. A just distribution of burdens, by holding up to every citizen an example of morality and good conscience applied to difficult adjustments, and an evidence of the value which the highest authorities attach to them, tends in an eminent degree to educate the moral sentiments of the community, both in respect of strength and of discrimination. Such a mode of levying the taxes as does not impede the industry, or unnecessarily interfere with the liberty of the citizen, promotes, not the preservation only, but the increase of the national wealth, and encourages a more active use of the individual faculties. And vice versâ, all errors in finance and taxation which obstruct the improvement of the people in wealth and morals, tend also, if of sufficiently serious amount, positively to impoverish and demoralize them. It holds, in short, universally, that when Order and Permanence are taken in their widest sense for the stability of existing advantages, the requisites of Progress are but the requisites of Order in a greater degree; those of Permanence merely those of Progress in a somewhat smaller measure.
Take, for example, a familiar situation like a good system of taxation and finance. This is usually seen as part of Order. But what could be more beneficial to Progress? A financial system that supports one also fosters the other through the same strengths. For instance, efficiency not only preserves the existing national wealth but also encourages the creation of more. A fair distribution of burdens serves as a moral example and reflects the value that the highest authorities place on them, significantly educating the community's moral values in terms of both strength and discernment. A tax system that doesn't hinder industry or unnecessarily restrict citizens' freedom promotes not just the maintenance of national wealth but also its growth, inspiring individuals to use their abilities more actively. Conversely, any significant errors in finance and taxation that hinder people's improvement in wealth and morals can lead to actual impoverishment and demoralization. Essentially, when Order and Permanence are viewed broadly as the stability of current benefits, the requirements for Progress are simply higher standards of Order, while those for Permanence are somewhat lesser standards of Progress.
In support of the position that Order is intrinsically different from Progress, and that preservation of existing and acquisition of additional good are sufficiently distinct to afford the basis of a fundamental classification, we shall perhaps be reminded that Progress may be at the expense of Order; that while we are acquiring, or striving to acquire, good of one kind, we may be losing ground in respect to others; thus there may be progress in wealth, while there is deterioration in virtue. Granting this, what it proves is, not that Progress is generically a different thing from Permanence, but that wealth is a different thing from virtue. Progress is permanence and something more; and it is no answer to this to say that Progress in one thing does not imply Permanence in every thing. No more does Progress in one thing imply Progress in every thing. Progress of any kind includes Permanence in that same kind: whenever Permanence is sacrificed to some particular kind of Progress, other Progress is still more sacrificed to it; and if it be not worth the sacrifice, not the interest of Permanence alone has been disregarded, but the general interest of Progress has been mistaken.
In support of the idea that Order is fundamentally different from Progress, and that maintaining what exists and gaining more good are distinct enough to create a basic classification, we might consider that Progress can come at the cost of Order; while we’re gaining, or trying to gain, good in one area, we could be losing out in others. For instance, we might see progress in wealth while virtue declines. Accepting this, what it demonstrates is not that Progress is inherently different from Permanence, but that wealth is separate from virtue. Progress is maintaining a state and achieving something more; it doesn’t help to argue that Progress in one area doesn’t mean Permanence in every area. Similarly, Progress in one area doesn’t guarantee Progress in all others. Any kind of Progress involves Permanence within that same area: whenever Permanence is sacrificed for a specific type of Progress, other types of Progress are even more compromised; and if that sacrifice isn’t justified, then it’s not just the interest of Permanence that’s been overlooked, but also the broader interest of Progress itself has been misunderstood.
If these improperly contrasted ideas are to be used at all in the attempt to give a first commencement of scientific precision to the notion of good government, it would be more philosophically correct to leave out of the definition the word Order, and to say that the best government is that which is most conducive to Progress. For Progress includes Order, but Order does not include Progress. Progress is a greater degree of that of which Order is a less. Order, in any other sense, stands only for a part of the prerequisites of good government, not for its idea and essence. Order would find a more suitable place among the conditions of Progress, since, if we would increase our sum of good, nothing is more indispensable than to take due care of what we already have. If we are endeavouring after more riches, our very first rule should be, not to squander uselessly our existing means. Order, thus considered, is not an additional end to be reconciled with Progress, but a part and means of Progress itself. If a gain in one respect is purchased by a more than equivalent loss in the same or in any other, there is not Progress. Conduciveness to Progress, thus understood, includes the whole excellence of a government.
If we're going to use these poorly defined ideas to start giving a clearer definition of good government, it’s more accurate to leave the word Order out and say that the best government is the one that promotes Progress the most. Progress includes Order, but Order doesn’t guarantee Progress. Progress is a more advanced form of what Order represents in a lesser way. In any other context, Order only represents a part of what makes good government, not its core idea and essence. Order would fit better among the conditions for Progress, because to enhance our overall well-being, it’s crucial to take good care of what we already have. If we’re aiming for more wealth, our first principle should be to avoid wasting what we currently possess. Viewed this way, Order isn’t an extra goal to balance with Progress, but rather a component and a means of Progress itself. If a gain in one area comes at the cost of an even larger loss in the same or another area, then that isn’t Progress. So, when we understand conduciveness to Progress in this way, it encompasses the full excellence of a government.
But, though metaphysically defensible, this definition of the criterion of good government is not appropriate, because, though it contains the whole of the truth, it recalls only a part. What is suggested by the term Progress is the idea of moving onward, whereas the meaning of it here is quite as much the prevention of falling back. The very same social causes—the same beliefs, feelings, institutions, and practices—are as much required to prevent society from retrograding as to produce a further advance. Were there no improvement to be hoped for, life would not be the less an unceasing struggle against causes of deterioration, as it even now is. Politics, as conceived by the ancients, consisted wholly in this. The natural tendency of men and their works was to degenerate, which tendency, however, by good institutions virtuously administered, it might be possible for an indefinite length of time to counteract. Though we no longer hold this opinion; though most men in the present age profess the contrary creed, believing that the tendency of things, on the whole, is toward improvement, we ought not to forget that there is an incessant and ever-flowing current of human affairs toward the worse, consisting of all the follies, all the vices, all the negligences, indolences, and supinenesses of mankind, which is only controlled, and kept from sweeping all before it, by the exertions which some persons constantly, and others by fits, put forth in the direction of good and worthy objects. It gives a very insufficient idea of the importance of the strivings which take place to improve and elevate human nature and life to suppose that their chief value consists in the amount of actual improvement realized by their means, and that the consequence of their cessation would merely be that we should remain as we are. A very small diminution of those exertions would not only put a stop to improvement, but would turn the general tendency of things toward deterioration, which, once begun, would proceed with increasingly rapidity, and become more and more difficult to check, until it reached a state often seen in history, and in which many large portions of mankind even now grovel; when hardly any thing short of superhuman power seems sufficient to turn the tide, and give a fresh commencement to the upward movement.
But even though this definition of what good government means is philosophically sound, it’s not quite right because, while it captures some of the truth, it only reflects part of it. The idea suggested by the term Progress involves moving forward, but in this context, it also includes preventing a fallback. The same social factors—the same beliefs, emotions, institutions, and practices—are just as essential to stopping society from slipping backward as they are for making further progress. If there were no hope for improvement, life would still be an ongoing battle against forces that cause decline, just as it is now. Politics, as the ancients understood it, was entirely about this. The natural inclination of people and their creations is to decline, although good institutions, when managed well, could potentially counteract this for an indefinite period. Even though we don’t believe this anymore and most people today actually think the opposite—that things generally trend toward improvement—we shouldn’t forget that there is a constant and relentless flow in human affairs toward the worse, made up of all the foolishness, all the vices, all the negligence, laziness, and complacency of humanity. This negative current is only kept at bay, and prevented from overwhelming everything, by the efforts that some people consistently and others sporadically make toward good and worthy causes. It underestimates the significance of the efforts made to improve and elevate human nature and life to think that their main value lies in the actual improvements they achieve and that stopping these efforts would simply mean we stay as we are. Even a minor reduction in these efforts would not only halt improvement but would also shift the overall direction toward decline. Once this decline starts, it would accelerate rapidly and become more and more difficult to stop, leading to a state often observed in history, where many large groups of people still suffer. In such a state, only superhuman power seems adequate to change the course and initiate a new upward movement.
These reasons make the word Progress as unapt as the terms Order and Permanence to become the basis for a classification of the requisites of a form of government. The fundamental antithesis which these words express does not lie in the things themselves, so much as in the types of human character which answer to them. There are, we know, some minds in which caution, and others in which boldness, predominates; in some, the desire to avoid imperilling what is already possessed is a stronger sentiment than that which prompts to improve the old and acquire new advantages; while there are others who lean the contrary way, and are more eager for future than careful of present good. The road to the ends of both is the same; but they are liable to wander from it in opposite directions. This consideration is of importance in composing the personnel of any political body: persons of both types ought to be included in it, that the tendencies of each may be tempered, in so far as they are excessive, by a due proportion of the other. There needs no express provision to insure this object, provided care is taken to admit nothing inconsistent with it. The natural and spontaneous admixture of the old and the young, of those whose position and reputation are made and those who have them still to make, will in general sufficiently answer the purpose, if only this natural balance is not disturbed by artificial regulation.
These reasons make the word "Progress" just as unsuitable as the terms "Order" and "Permanence" for classifying the requirements of a government. The main contrast expressed by these words isn’t really about the things themselves, but rather about the types of human character that relate to them. Some people naturally tend to be cautious, while others are more bold; in some individuals, the drive to protect what they already have is stronger than the urge to improve the old and gain new benefits, while others are more focused on the future than careful about the present advantages they hold. The path to achieve both goals is the same, but they can easily veer off it in opposite directions. This idea is important when forming any political group: it’s essential to include people from both types so that the strengths of each can moderate the extremes of the other. There’s no need for specific rules to ensure this, as long as nothing inconsistent with it is allowed. The natural and spontaneous mix of the old and the young, of those whose status and reputation are established and those who are still building them, will generally suffice, as long as this natural balance isn’t disrupted by artificial means.
Since the distinction most commonly adopted for the classification of social exigencies does not possess the properties needful for that use, we have to seek for some other leading distinction better adapted to the purpose. Such a distinction would seem to be indicated by the considerations to which I now proceed.
Since the most commonly used classification for social needs isn't effective for that purpose, we need to find a better distinction that suits our needs. Such a distinction seems to be suggested by the considerations I will discuss next.
If we ask ourselves on what causes and conditions good government in all its senses, from the humblest to the most exalted, depends, we find that the principal of them, the one which transcends all others, is the qualities of the human beings composing the society over which the government is exercised.
If we think about what factors and conditions good government, in all its forms, from the simplest to the most complex, relies on, we realize that the most important one, the one that stands above all others, is the qualities of the people making up the society governed.
We may take, as a first instance, the administration of justice; with the more propriety, since there is no part of public business in which the mere machinery, the rules and contrivances for conducting the details of the operation, are of such vital consequence. Yet even these yield in importance to the qualities of the human agents employed. Of what efficacy are rules of procedure in securing the ends of justice if the moral condition of the people is such that the witnesses generally lie, and the judges and their subordinates take bribes? Again, how can institutions provide a good municipal administration if there exists such indifference to the subject that those who would administer honestly and capably can not be induced to serve, and the duties are left to those who undertake them because they have some private interest to be promoted? Of what avail is the most broadly popular representative system if the electors do not care to choose the best member of Parliament, but choose him who will spend most money to be elected? How can a representative assembly work for good if its members can be bought, or if their excitability of temperament, uncorrected by public discipline or private self-control, makes them incapable of calm deliberation, and they resort to manual violence on the floor of the House, or shoot at one another with rifles? How, again, can government, or any joint concern, be carried on in a tolerable manner by people so envious that, if one among them seems likely to succeed in any thing, those who ought to cooperate with him form a tacit combination to make him fail? Whenever the general disposition of the people is such that each individual regards those only of his interests which are selfish, and does not dwell on, or concern himself for, his share of the general interest, in such a state of things good government is impossible. The influence of defects of intelligence in obstructing all the elements of good government requires no illustration. Government consists of acts done by human beings; and if the agents, or those who choose the agents, or those to whom the agents are responsible, or the lookers-on whose opinion ought to influence and check all these, are mere masses of ignorance, stupidity, and baleful prejudice, every operation of government will go wrong; while, in proportion as the men rise above this standard, so will the government improve in quality up to the point of excellence, attainable but nowhere attained, where the officers of government, themselves persons of superior virtue and intellect, are surrounded by the atmosphere of a virtuous and enlightened public opinion.
Let's consider the administration of justice first, especially since there's no area of public business where the mechanics—the rules and methods for running operations—are so crucial. However, these mechanics are less important than the qualities of the people involved. What good are procedural rules for ensuring justice if the moral state of the community is such that witnesses often lie and judges, along with their staff, accept bribes? Moreover, how can institutions maintain good local governance if there's so much indifference that those who would serve honestly and effectively refuse to take on the roles, leaving the responsibilities to those who pursue personal interests? What good is a widely accepted representative system if voters aren't interested in electing the best Parliament member but instead choose the one who spends the most money to win? How can a representative assembly function effectively if its members can be bought, or if their impulsive behavior, unchecked by public discipline or personal self-control, prevents them from reasonable discussion, leading to physical fights in the chamber or shooting at each other? Additionally, how can any government or collective effort be run reasonably by people who are so envious that, if one of them seems likely to succeed, others will silently band together to ensure he fails? When the general attitude of the people is that each person only cares about their selfish interests and ignores their role in the broader community, effective governance becomes impossible. The impact of lacking intelligence on hindering good government needs no further explanation. Government is made up of actions taken by people; if the agents, those who choose the agents, those who hold the agents accountable, or the observers whose opinions should shape and regulate all these are just ignorant masses, then government will fail. But as people move beyond this level, the quality of governance will improve, ideally reaching a point of excellence that is never fully realized, where government officials, themselves of superior character and intellect, operate within an atmosphere of virtuous and informed public opinion.
The first element of good government, therefore, being the virtue and intelligence of the human beings composing the community, the most important point of excellence which any form of government can possess is to promote the virtue and intelligence of the people themselves. The first question in respect to any political institutions is how far they tend to foster in the members of the community the various desirable qualities, moral and intellectual, or rather (following Bentham's more complete classification) moral, intellectual, and active. The government which does this the best has every likelihood of being the best in all other respects, since it is on these qualities, so far as they exist in the people, that all possibility of goodness in the practical operations of the government depends.
The first element of good government is the character and intelligence of the people in the community. The most important quality that any government can have is its ability to promote the virtue and intelligence of its citizens. The first question regarding any political institution is to what extent it encourages the desirable moral, intellectual, and active qualities in its members. The government that excels in this area is likely to excel in all other ways as well, since the quality of the government’s practical functions relies on these qualities as they exist among the people.
We may consider, then, as one criterion of the goodness of a government, the degree in which it tends to increase the sum of good qualities in the governed, collectively and individually, since, besides that their well-being is the sole object of government, their good qualities supply the moving force which works the machinery. This leaves, as the other constituent element of the merit of a government, the quality of the machinery itself; that is, the degree in which it is adapted to take advantage of the amount of good qualities which may at any time exist, and make them instrumental to the right purposes. Let us again take the subject of judicature as an example and illustration. The judicial system being given, the goodness of the administration of justice is in the compound ratio of the worth of the men composing the tribunals, and the worth of the public opinion which influences or controls them. But all the difference between a good and a bad system of judicature lies in the contrivances adopted for bringing whatever moral and intellectual worth exists in the community to bear upon the administration of justice, and making it duly operative on the result. The arrangements for rendering the choice of the judges such as to obtain the highest average of virtue and intelligence; the salutary forms of procedure; the publicity which allows observation and criticism of whatever is amiss; the liberty of discussion and cinsure through the press; the mode of taking evidence, according as it is well or ill adapted to elicit truth; the facilities, whatever be their amount, for obtaining access to the tribunals; the arrangements for detecting crimes and apprehending offenders-all these things are not the power, but the machinery for bringing the power into contact with the obstacle; and the machinery has no action of itself, but without it the power, let it be ever so ample, would be wasted and of no effect. A similar distinction exists in regard to the constitution of the executive departments of administration. Their machinery is good, when the proper tests are prescribed for the qualifications of officers, the proper rules for their promotion; when the business is conveniently distributed among those who are to transact it, a convenient and methodical order established for its transaction, a correct and intelligible record kept of it after being transacted; when each individual knows for what he is responsible, and is known to others as responsible for it; when the best-contrived checks are provided against negligence, favoritism, or jobbery in any of the acts of the department. But political checks will no more act of themselves than a bridle will direct a horse without a rider. If the checking functionaries are as corrupt or as negligent as those whom they ought to check, and if the public, the mainspring of the whole checking machinery, are too ignorant, too passive, or too careless and inattentive to do their part, little benefit will be derived from the best administrative apparatus. Yet a good apparatus is always preferable to a bad. It enables such insufficient moving or checking power as exists to act at the greatest advantage; and without it, no amount of moving or checking power would be sufficient. Publicity, for instance, is no impediment to evil, nor stimulus to good, if the public will not look at what is done; but without publicity, how could they either check or encourage what they were not permitted to see? The ideally perfect constitution of a public office is that in which the interest of the functionary is entirely coincident with his duty. No mere system will make it so, but still less can it be made so without a system, aptly devised for the purpose.
We can think of one way to judge the quality of a government by how well it boosts the overall good qualities of the people, both collectively and individually. After all, the well-being of the people is the main goal of government, and their good qualities provide the energy needed to make it work. This leads us to another important factor in evaluating a government: the effectiveness of its systems. This means looking at how well these systems utilize the good qualities that exist at any given time and turn them into a force for good. For example, let's consider the judicial system. The quality of justice depends on the combined worth of the judges and the influence of public opinion over them. The difference between a good and a bad judicial system comes down to how well the community's moral and intellectual strengths are brought to bear on justice and how effective they are in achieving results. The processes used to select judges need to ensure the best mix of virtue and intelligence; there should be procedures that are fair and transparent; public scrutiny should be encouraged to identify issues; freedom of discussion and criticism through the media must exist; the methods of gathering evidence should be effective in revealing the truth; access to courts should be facilitated in any way possible; and systems must be in place to detect crimes and catch criminals. All these elements do not wield power themselves; they are the systems that connect power to obstacles. Without these systems, even abundant power would go unused and ineffective. A similar principle applies to how executive departments are organized. Their systems work well when proper qualifications for officers are established, fair promotion rules are in place, tasks are distributed logically, there’s an organized method for performing these tasks, and there are accurate records kept afterward. Each individual should know their responsibilities and be recognized by others for them, and the best safeguards should be implemented to prevent laziness, favoritism, or corruption in any department actions. However, political checks won't enforce themselves any more than a bridle can control a horse without a rider. If those in charge of checks are as corrupt or negligent as the people they oversee, or if the public—the main driving force behind these checks—is too ignorant, passive, or careless, even the most sophisticated administrative systems won't be effective. Still, a good system is always better than a bad one. It allows whatever energy or checking power exists to work to its fullest potential, and without it, no amount of power would be effective. For example, publicity doesn't stop wrongdoing or encourage good actions if the public isn’t paying attention to what’s happening; but without publicity, how could they check or support actions they’re not allowed to see? The ideal setup for a public office is one where the personal interests of the official completely align with their responsibilities. No mere system can create this, but it’s even less likely to happen without a carefully designed system to support it.
What we have said of the arrangements for the detailed administration of the government is still more evidently true of its general constitution. All government which aims at being good is an organization of some part of the good qualities existing in the individual members of the community for the conduct of its collective affairs. A representative constitution is a means of bringing the general standard of intelligence and honesty existing in the community, and the individual intellect and virtue of its wisest members, more directly to bear upon the government, and investing them with greater influence in it than they would have under any other mode of organization; though, under any, such influence as they do have is the source of all good that there is in the government, and the hindrance of every evil that there is not. The greater the amount of these good qualities which the institutions of a country succeed in organizing, and the better the mode of organization, the better will be the government.
What we've said about the arrangements for running the government is even more obviously true for its overall structure. Any government that aspires to be good is an organization of some of the good qualities found in the individual members of the community for managing its collective affairs. A representative constitution helps to align the general level of intelligence and honesty present in the community, along with the individual intellect and virtue of its most insightful members, more directly with the government and gives them more influence than they would have in any other setup. Still, in any case, the influence they do have is the source of all the good in the government and reduces every evil that isn't there. The greater the amount of these good qualities that a country's institutions can organize effectively, the better the government will be.
We have now, therefore, obtained a foundation for a twofold division of the merit which any set of political institutions can possess. It consists partly of the degree in which they promote the general mental advancement of the community, including under that phrase advancement in intellect, in virtue, and in practical activity and efficiency, and partly of the degree of perfection with which they organize the moral, intellectual, and active worth already existing, so as to operate with the greatest effect on public affairs. A government is to be judged by its action upon men and by its action upon things; by what it makes of the citizens, and what it does with them; its tendency to improve or deteriorate the people themselves, and the goodness or badness of the work it performs for them, and by means of them. Government is at once a great influence acting on the human mind, and a set of organized arrangements for public business: in the first capacity its beneficial action is chiefly indirect, but not therefore less vital, while its mischievous action may be direct.
We have now established a basis for a twofold classification of the merit that any political system can have. It includes, on one hand, how much they promote the overall intellectual growth of the community, which encompasses growth in knowledge, morality, and practicality. On the other hand, it involves how well they organize the existing moral, intellectual, and practical strengths to have the greatest impact on public matters. A government should be evaluated based on its effects on people and its impact on circumstances; by what it creates in its citizens and how it interacts with them; by its ability to improve or harm the people themselves, and the quality of the work it does for them and through them. Government is both a major influence on human thought and a structure for managing public affairs: in the first role, its positive impact is mainly indirect but still crucial, while its negative effects can be direct.
The difference between these two functions of a government is not, like that between Order and Progress, a difference merely in degree, but in kind. We must not, however, suppose that they have no intimate connection with one another. The institutions which insure the best management of public affairs practicable in the existing state of cultivation tend by this alone to the further improvement of that state. A people which had the most just laws, the purest and most efficient judicature, the most enlightened administration, the most equitable and least onerous system of finance, compatible with the stage it had attained in moral and intellectual advancement, would be in a fair way to pass rapidly into a higher stage. Nor is there any mode in which political institutions can contribute more effectually to the improvement of the people than by doing their more direct work well. And reversely, if their machinery is so badly constructed that they do their own particular business ill, the effect is felt in a thousand ways in lowering the morality and deadening the intelligence and activity of the people. But the distinction is nevertheless real, because this is only one of the means by which political institutions improve or deteriorate the human mind, and the causes and modes of that beneficial or injurious influence remain a distinct and much wider subject of study.
The difference between these two functions of government isn't just a matter of degree, like the difference between Order and Progress; it's a difference in kind. However, we shouldn't assume that they aren't closely connected. The institutions that ensure the best management of public affairs possible at the current level of development also tend to promote further improvement of that level. A society with fair laws, a pure and effective judicial system, an informed administration, and a fair and manageable financial system—aligned with its moral and intellectual progress—would be well on its way to advancing quickly to a higher stage. There's no better way for political institutions to help improve the people than by performing their core functions effectively. Conversely, if their setup is so poorly designed that they can't do their specific tasks well, the repercussions are felt in countless ways, diminishing the morality, intelligence, and activity of the people. Yet, the distinction is still meaningful because this is just one of the ways political institutions influence the human mind, and the causes and methods of that beneficial or harmful influence remain a distinct and much broader area for study.
Of the two modes of operation by which a form of government or set of political institutions affects the welfare of the community—its operation as an agency of national education, and its arrangements for conducting the collective affairs of the community in the state of education in which they already are, the last evidently varies much less, from difference of country and state of civilization, than the first. It has also much less to do with the fundamental constitution of the government. The mode of conducting the practical business of government, which is best under a free constitution, would generally be best also in an absolute monarchy, only an absolute monarchy is not so likely to practice it. The laws of property, for example; the principles of evidence and judicial procedure; the system of taxation and of financial administration, need not necessarily be different in different forms of government. Each of these matters has principles and rules of its own, which are a subject of separate study. General jurisprudence, civil and penal legislation, financial and commercial policy, are sciences in themselves, or, rather, separate members of the comprehensive science or art of government; and the most enlightened doctrines on all these subjects, though not equally likely to be understood and acted on under all forms of government, yet, if understood and acted on, would in general be equally beneficial under them all. It is true that these doctrines could not be applied without some modifications to all states of society and of the human mind; nevertheless, by far the greater number of them would require modifications solely of detail to adapt them to any state of society sufficiently advanced to possess rulers capable of understanding them. A government to which they would be wholly unsuitable must be one so bad in itself, or so opposed to public feeling, as to be unable to maintain itself in existence by honest means.
Of the two ways a government or political system impacts the community's welfare—its role as a national educational agency and its methods for managing the community's collective affairs within their current state of education—the latter varies much less across different countries and levels of civilization than the former. It also has less to do with the government's basic structure. The way practical government business is handled that works best under a free constitution would typically also be effective in an absolute monarchy, although an absolute monarchy is less likely to implement it. For instance, laws about property, principles of evidence and judicial procedures, and systems of taxation and financial administration don’t necessarily need to differ between various government forms. Each of these areas has its own principles and rules, which deserve individual study. General jurisprudence, civil and criminal laws, and financial and commercial policies are sciences in their own right, or, more accurately, distinct components of the broader science or art of governance. The most informed theories on all these topics, while not equally likely to be understood and applied across all government types, would generally be equally beneficial if they were. It’s true that these theories would need some adjustments to fit different societies and mentalities; however, the vast majority would only require minor tweaks to align with any society advanced enough to have leaders who can grasp them. A government where these theories would be entirely inappropriate must be fundamentally flawed or so out of touch with public sentiment that it couldn’t sustain itself through honest means.
It is otherwise with that portion of the interests of the community which relate to the better or worse training of the people themselves. Considered as instrumental to this, institutions need to be radically different, according to the stage of advancement already reached. The recognition of this truth, though for the most part empirically rather than philosophically, may be regarded as the main point of superiority in the political theories of the present above those of the last age, in which it was customary to claim representative democracy for England or France by arguments which would equally have proved it the only fit form of government for Bedouins or Malays. The state of different communities, in point of culture and development, ranges downwards to a condition very little above the highest of the beasts. The upward range, too, is considerable, and the future possible extension vastly greater. A community can only be developed out of one of these states into a higher by a concourse of influences, among the principal of which is the government to which they are subject. In all states of human improvement ever yet attained, the nature and degree of authority exercised over individuals, the distribution of power, and the conditions of command and obedience, are the most powerful of the influences, except their religious belief, which make them what they are, and enable them to become what they can be. They may be stopped short at any point in their progress by defective adaptation of their government to that particular stage of advancement. And the one indispensable merit of a government, in favor of which it may be forgiven almost any amount of other demerit compatible with progress, is that its operation on the people is favorable, or not unfavorable, to the next step which it is necessary for them to take in order to raise themselves to a higher level.
It’s different when it comes to the interests of the community that involve the better or worse education of the people themselves. Institutions should be radically different depending on how advanced they are. Recognizing this truth—which is mostly based on experience rather than philosophy—can be seen as a key advantage of current political theories compared to those from the past. In the past, it was common to argue that representative democracy was the only appropriate form of government for places like England or France, using reasoning that would also apply to Bedouins or Malays. Different communities have varying levels of culture and development, some barely above the highest animals. There is also significant potential for growth in these communities, with even greater possibilities for the future. A community can only advance from its current state to a higher one through a mix of influences, with government being one of the most important. In all the levels of human progress achieved so far, the type and degree of authority over individuals, how power is distributed, and the conditions of command and obedience are the strongest influences on what makes them who they are and what they can become—except for their religious beliefs. Communities can be held back in their progress if their government doesn’t fit well with their level of advancement. The one essential quality of a government, for which it might be excused for many other faults as long as it supports progress, is that its impact on the people is positive or at least not negative regarding the next step they need to take to elevate themselves to a higher level.
Thus (to repeat a former example), a people in a state of savage independence, in which every one lives for himself, exempt, unless by fits, from any external control, is practically incapable of making any progress in civilization until it has learned to obey. The indispensable virtue, therefore, in a government which establishes itself over a people of this sort is that it make itself obeyed. To enable it to do this, the constitution of the government must be nearly, or quite despotic. A constitution in any degree popular, dependent on the voluntary surrender by the different members of the community of their individual freedom of action, would fail to enforce the first lesson which the pupils, in this stage of their progress, require. Accordingly, the civilization of such tribes, when not the result of juxtaposition with others already civilized, is almost always the work of an absolute ruler, deriving his power either from religion or military prowess—very often from foreign arms.
So, to reiterate a previous example, a group of people living in complete independence, where everyone looks out for themselves and isn’t really controlled by anything unless it’s by chance, really struggles to make any progress in civilization until they learn to follow rules. The essential quality needed in a government that takes charge of such a group is that it ensures obedience. To do this effectively, the government’s structure must be mostly, if not entirely, authoritarian. A system that’s even slightly democratic, relying on the voluntary giving up of individual freedoms by its members, wouldn’t be able to teach the crucial lesson that these individuals need at this stage. As a result, the advancement of such groups, unless influenced by contact with already civilized societies, is usually brought about by a strong leader who gains power through either religion or military strength—often with the help of foreign troops.
Again, uncivilized races, and the bravest and most energetic still more than the rest, are averse to continuous labor of an unexciting kind. Yet all real civilization is at this price; without such labor, neither can the mind be disciplined into the habits required by civilized society, nor the material world prepared to receive it. There needs a rare concurrence of circumstances, and for that reason often a vast length of time, to reconcile such a people to industry, unless they are for a while compelled to it. Hence even personal slavery, by giving a commencement to industrial life, and enforcing it as the exclusive occupation of the most numerous portion of the community, may accelerate the transition to a better freedom than that of fighting and rapine. It is almost needless to say that this excuse for slavery is only available in a very early state of society. A civilized people have far other means of imparting civilization to those under their influence; and slavery is, in all its details, so repugnant to that government of law, which is the foundation of all modern life, and so corrupting to the master-class when they have once come under civilized influences, that its adoption under any circumstances whatever in modern society is a relapse into worse than barbarism.
Again, uncivilized groups, especially the bravest and most energetic among them, tend to avoid continuous, monotonous work. However, real civilization demands this kind of effort; without it, neither can the mind be trained in the habits needed for civilized society, nor can the physical world be prepared to support it. Achieving a rare combination of circumstances often requires a significant amount of time to get such a people accustomed to working, unless they are forced into it for a while. Therefore, even personal slavery, by initiating industrial life and making it the primary focus of the majority, might speed up the shift to a better form of freedom than that of violence and plunder. It's almost unnecessary to mention that this justification for slavery only applies in very early stages of society. A civilized society has many other ways to share civilization with those under their influence; slavery, in all its aspects, is so incompatible with the rule of law, which is the foundation of all modern life, and so corrupting to the ruling class once they have embraced civilized practices, that its existence in any form in modern society represents a regression to a state worse than barbarism.
At some period, however, of their history, almost every people, now civilized, have consisted, in majority, of slaves. A people in that condition require to raise them out of it a very different polity from a nation of savages. If they are energetic by nature, and especially if there be associated with them in the same community an industrious class who are neither slaves nor slave-owners (as was the case in Greece), they need, probably, no more to insure their improvement than to make them free: when freed, they may often be fit, like Roman freedmen, to be admitted at once to the full rights of citizenship. This, however, is not the normal condition of slavery, and is generally a sign that it is becoming obsolete. A slave, properly so called, is a being who has not learned to help himself. He is, no doubt, one step in advance of a savage. He has not the first lesson of political society still to acquire. He has learned to obey. But what he obeys is only a direct command. It is the characteristic of born slaves to be incapable of conforming their conduct to a rule or law. They can only do what they are ordered, and only when they are ordered to do it. If a man whom they fear is standing over them and threatening them with punishment, they obey; but when his back is turned, the work remains undone. The motive determining them must appeal, not to their interests, but to their instincts; immediate hope or immediate terror. A despotism, which may tame the savage, will, in so far as it is a despotism, only confirm the slaves in their incapacities. Yet a government under their own control would be entirely unmanageable by them. Their improvement can not come from themselves, but must be superinduced from without. The step which they have to take, and their only path to improvement, is to be raised from a government of will to one of law. They have to be taught self-government, and this, in its initial stage, means the capacity to act on general instructions. What they require is not a government of force, but one of guidance. Being, however, in too low a state to yield to the guidance of any but those to whom they look up as the possessors of force, the sort of government fittest for them is one which possesses force, but seldom uses it; a parental despotism or aristocracy, resembling the St. Simonian form of Socialism; maintaining a general superintendence over all the operations of society, so as to keep before each the sense of a present force sufficient to compel his obedience to the rule laid down, but which, owing to the impossibility of descending to regulate all the minutiæ of industry and life, necessarily leaves and induces individuals to do much of themselves. This, which may be termed the government of leading-strings, seems to be the one required to carry such a people the most rapidly through the next necessary step in social progress. Such appears to have been the idea of the government of the Incas of Peru, and such was that of the Jesuits of Paraguay. I need scarcely remark that leading-strings are only admissible as a means of gradually training the people to walk alone.
At some point in their history, nearly every now-civilized society was predominantly made up of slaves. A society in that situation needs a very different form of governance compared to a society of savages. If they are naturally energetic, especially if there’s an industrious class in the same community that is neither slaves nor slave-owners (as was the case in Greece), they probably just need to be made free to ensure their improvement: once freed, they might be ready, like Roman freedmen, to gain full citizenship rights immediately. However, this isn’t the typical state of slavery and often indicates that it’s becoming outdated. A true slave is someone who hasn’t learned to help themselves. While they are a step above a savage, they still haven’t grasped the basic lessons of political society. They have learned to obey, but their obedience is limited to direct commands. Born slaves can’t adapt their behavior to a rule or law; they can only do what they are told when they are told to do it. They will comply when someone they fear stands over them threatening punishment, but as soon as that person turns away, the work remains unfinished. Their motivation must come from immediate hope or terror, not their interests. A despotism can subdue the savage, but in doing so, it will only reinforce the slaves' incapacities. Yet a government that they control would be completely unmanageable for them. Their improvement can’t come from within but must be imposed from outside. They need to shift from a government of will to one of law. They must be taught self-governance, which initially means being able to act based on general instructions. What they need is guidance, not a government based on force. However, being in too low a state to respond to anyone except those they see as powerful, the best form of government for them is one that has power but rarely uses it; a kind of paternal despotism or aristocracy, similar to the St. Simonian model of Socialism. This would involve overseeing all societal operations to instill a sense of enough present force to ensure obedience to established rules while still allowing individuals to manage many aspects of their lives. This, which could be called a government of leading-strings, seems to be necessary for quickly advancing such a society to the next stage of social progress. This appears to have been the concept behind the governance of the Incas of Peru and the Jesuits of Paraguay. It’s important to note that leading-strings should only be used as a gradual way to train people to stand on their own.
It would be out of place to carry the illustration further. To attempt to investigate what kind of government is suited to every known state of society would be to compose a treatise, not on representative government, but on political science at large. For our more limited purpose we borrow from political philosophy only its general principles. To determine the form of government most suited to any particular people, we must be able, among the defects and shortcomings which belong to that people, to distinguish those that are the immediate impediment to progress—to discover what it is which (as it were) stops the way. The best government for them is the one which tends most to give them that for want of which they can not advance, or advance only in a lame and lopsided manner. We must not, however, forget the reservation necessary in all things which have for their object improvement or Progress, namely, that in seeking the good which is needed, no damage, or as little as possible, be done to that already possessed. A people of savages should be taught obedience, but not in such a manner as to convert them into a people of slaves. And (to give the observation a higher generality) the form of government which is most effectual for carrying a people through the next stage of progress will still be very improper for them if it does this in such a manner as to obstruct, or positively unfit them for, the step next beyond. Such cases are frequent, and are among the most melancholy facts in history. The Egyptian hierarchy, the paternal despotism of China, were very fit instruments for carrying those nations up to the point of civilization which they attained. But having reached that point, they were brought to a permanent halt for want of mental liberty and individuality—requisites of improvement which the institutions that had carried them thus far entirely incapacitated them from acquiring—and as the institutions did not break down and give place to others, further improvement stopped. In contrast with these nations, let us consider the example of an opposite character afforded by another and a comparatively insignificant Oriental people—the Jews. They, too, had an absolute monarchy and a hierarchy, and their organized institutions were as obviously of sacerdotal origin as those of the Hindoos. These did for them what was done for other Oriental races by their institutions—subdued them to industry and order, and gave them a national life. But neither their kings nor their priests ever obtained, as in those other countries, the exclusive moulding of their character. Their religion, which enabled persons of genius and a high religious tone to be regarded and to regard themselves as inspired from heaven, gave existence to an inestimably precious unorganized institution—the Order (if it may be so termed) of Prophets. Under the protection, generally though not always effectual, of their sacred character, the Prophets were a power in the nation, often more than a match for kings and priests, and kept up, in that little corner of the earth, the antagonism of influences which is the only real security for continued progress. Religion, consequently, was not there what it has been in so many other places—a consecration of all that was once established, and a barrier against further improvement. The remark of a distinguished Hebrew, M. Salvador, that the Prophets were, in Church and State, the equivalent of the modern liberty of the press, gives a just but not an adequate conception of the part fulfilled in national and universal history by this great element of Jewish life; by means of which, the canon of inspiration never being complete, the persons most eminent in genius and moral feeling could not only denounce and reprobate, with the direct authority of the Almighty, whatever appeared to them deserving of such treatment, but could give forth better and higher interpretations of the national religion, which thenceforth became part of the religion. Accordingly, whoever can divest himself of the habit of reading the Bible as if it was one book, which until lately was equally inveterate in Christians and in unbelievers, sees with admiration the vast interval between the morality and religion of the Pentateuch, or even of the historical books (the unmistakable work of Hebrew Conservatives of the sacerdotal order), and the morality and religion of the prophecies—a distance as wide as between these last and the Gospels. Conditions more favorable to Progress could not easily exist; accordingly, the Jews, instead of being stationary like other Asiatics, were, next to the Greeks, the most progressive people of antiquity, and, jointly with them, have been the starting-point and main propelling agency of modern cultivation.
It wouldn’t make sense to carry this illustration any further. Trying to figure out what type of government is suitable for every society would turn into a comprehensive study, not just about representative government, but about political science overall. For our more specific focus, we’ll only take the general principles from political philosophy. To determine the best form of government for any specific group, we have to identify which defects and limitations are directly blocking progress—essentially, what is hindering them. The ideal government for them is the one that helps them gain what they lack, which is necessary for them to move forward rather than limping along. However, we shouldn’t forget the important consideration in any efforts toward improvement or progress: in striving for what is needed, we should minimize any harm to what already exists. A group of savages should be taught to obey, but not in a way that turns them into slaves. And to broaden this point, the type of government that effectively supports a group in advancing to the next stage of progress might still be very inappropriate if it limits or disqualifies them for the stage that follows. These situations happen often and frequently represent some of the saddest truths in history. The Egyptian hierarchy and the paternal despotism of China were very effective in bringing those nations up to their level of civilization. But once they reached that point, they got permanently stuck due to a lack of mental freedom and individuality—essential requirements for improvement that the systems that carried them this far completely prevented them from attaining. Since these systems did not break down and give way to others, further advancement ceased. In contrast to these nations, let’s look at the example of a different and relatively minor Eastern people—the Jews. They, too, had an absolute monarchy and a hierarchy, and their established institutions were clearly of religious origin, similar to those of the Hindoos. These institutions helped them in the same way they did for other Eastern societies—forced them into industry and order, and gave them a national existence. But unlike those other countries, their kings and priests never gained exclusive control over their character. Their religion allowed people of talent and strong spiritual conviction to see themselves and be seen as divinely inspired, leading to the creation of an invaluable unstructured institution—the Order of Prophets. Under what was often but not always an effective cover of their sacred role, the Prophets held power in the nation, frequently standing up to kings and priests, and maintained a tension of influences that is the only true safeguard for ongoing progress. Thus, religion in this context was not what it has been in so many other places—a confirmation of the status quo and a roadblock to further development. A notable Hebrew, M. Salvador, remarked that the Prophets were the equivalent of today’s freedom of the press in both Church and State, which conveys a valid but not completely adequate understanding of the role this significant element of Jewish life played in national and global history. Because of this, as the canon of inspiration was never fully settled, those most distinguished in talent and moral insight could not only denounce and reject anything they deemed unworthy with the direct backing of the Almighty, but they could also offer better and elevated interpretations of the national faith, which thereafter became part of that faith. Therefore, anyone who can shake off the tendency to read the Bible as if it were a single book, which until recently was common among both Christians and non-believers, can marvel at the vast chasm between the morality and religion of the Pentateuch, or even the historical books (clearly the work of Hebrew conservatives from the priestly class), and the morality and religion of the prophecies—a gap as wide as that between the latter and the Gospels. Conditions more conducive to progress could hardly be found; as a result, the Jews, instead of remaining stagnant like other Asians, became, after the Greeks, the most progressive people of ancient times, and together with them, have been the foundation and driving force behind modern culture.
It is, then, impossible to understand the question of the adaptation of forms of government to states of society, without taking into account not only the next step, but all the steps which society has yet to make; both those which can be foreseen, and the far wider indefinite range which is at present out of sight. It follows, that to judge of the merits of forms of government, an ideal must be constructed of the form of government most eligible in itself, that is, which, if the necessary conditions existed for giving effect to its beneficial tendencies, would, more than all others, favor and promote, not some one improvement, but all forms and degrees of it. This having been done, we must consider what are the mental conditions of all sorts necessary to enable this government to realize its tendencies, and what, therefore, are the various defects by which a people is made incapable of reaping its benefits. It would then be possible to construct a theorem of the circumstances in which that form of government may wisely be introduced; and also to judge, in cases in which it had better not be introduced, what inferior forms of polity will best carry those communities through the intermediate stages which they must traverse before they can become fit for the best form of government.
It is, therefore, impossible to understand the issue of how forms of government can adapt to social conditions without considering not just the next step, but all the steps society still needs to take; both those that can be anticipated and the much broader, unpredictable range that is currently out of view. Consequently, to evaluate the merits of different forms of government, we need to create an ideal model of the most suitable government type in itself, which, if the necessary conditions were in place to enable its beneficial effects, would support and encourage not just one particular improvement, but every possible form and degree of it. Once this is established, we must examine the mental conditions required for all types of people to enable this government to realize its potential, and thus identify the various shortcomings that prevent a population from benefiting from it. This analysis would then allow us to outline the circumstances under which this form of government can be wisely implemented; and also to assess, in situations where it should not be introduced, which lesser forms of government can best guide those communities through the necessary transitional phases before they are ready for the ideal government.
Of these inquiries, the last does not concern us here, but the first is an essential part of our subject; for we may, without rashness, at once enunciate a proposition, the proofs and illustrations of which will present themselves in the ensuing pages, that this ideally best form of government will be found in some one or other variety of the Representative System.
Of these questions, the last isn't relevant to us here, but the first is a crucial part of our topic; because we can, without hesitation, state a proposition, the evidence and examples of which will be presented in the following pages, that this ideal form of government will be found in one variety or another of the Representative System.
Chapter III—That the ideally best Form of Government is Representative Government.
It has long (perhaps throughout the entire duration of British freedom) been a common form of speech, that if a good despot could be insured, despotic monarchy would be the best form of government. I look upon this as a radical and most pernicious misconception of what good government is, which, until it can be got rid of, will fatally vitiate all our speculations on government.
It has long been a common idea that if we could guarantee a good dictator, a dictatorial monarchy would be the best form of government. I see this as a fundamental and harmful misunderstanding of what good governance really is, which, until we can overcome it, will seriously distort all our thoughts on government.
The supposition is, that absolute power, in the hands of an eminent individual, would insure a virtuous and intelligent performance of all the duties of government. Good laws would be established and enforced, bad laws would be reformed; the best men would be placed in all situations of trust; justice would be as well administered, the public burdens would be as light and as judiciously imposed, every branch of administration would be as purely and as intelligently conducted as the circumstances of the country and its degree of intellectual and moral cultivation would admit. I am willing, for the sake of the argument, to concede all this, but I must point out how great the concession is, how much more is needed to produce even an approximation to these results than is conveyed in the simple expression, a good despot. Their realization would in fact imply, not merely a good monarch, but an all-seeing one. He must be at all times informed correctly, in considerable detail, of the conduct and working of every branch of administration, in every district of the country, and must be able, in the twenty-four hours per day, which are all that is granted to a king as to the humblest laborer, to give an effective share of attention and superintendence to all parts of this vast field; or he must at least be capable of discerning and choosing out, from among the mass of his subjects, not only a large abundance of honest and able men, fit to conduct every branch of public administration under supervision and control, but also the small number of men of eminent virtues and talents who can be trusted not only to do without that supervision, but to exercise it themselves over others. So extraordinary are the faculties and energies required for performing this task in any supportable manner, that the good despot whom we are supposing can hardly be imagined as consenting to undertake it unless as a refuge from intolerable evils, and a transitional preparation for something beyond. But the argument can do without even this immense item in the account. Suppose the difficulty vanquished. What should we then have? One man of superhuman mental activity managing the entire affairs of a mentally passive people. Their passivity is implied in the very idea of absolute power. The nation as a whole, and every individual composing it, are without any potential voice in their own destiny. They exercise no will in respect to their collective interests. All is decided for them by a will not their own, which it is legally a crime for them to disobey. What sort of human beings can be formed under such a regimen? What development can either their thinking or their active faculties attain under it? On matters of pure theory they might perhaps be allowed to speculate, so long as their speculations either did not approach politics, or had not the remotest connection with its practice. On practical affairs they could at most be only suffered to suggest; and even under the most moderate of despots, none but persons of already admitted or reputed superiority could hope that their suggestions would be known to, much less regarded by, those who had the management of affairs. A person must have a very unusual taste for intellectual exercise in and for itself who will put himself to the trouble of thought when it is to have no outward effect, or qualify himself for functions which he has no chance of being allowed to exercise. The only sufficient incitement to mental exertion, in any but a few minds in a generation, is the prospect of some practical use to be made of its results. It does not follow that the nation will be wholly destitute of intellectual power. The common business of life, which must necessarily be performed by each individual or family for themselves, will call forth some amount of intelligence and practical ability, within a certain narrow range of ideas. There may be a select class of savants who cultivate science with a view to its physical uses or for the pleasure of the pursuit. There will be a bureaucracy, and persons in training for the bureaucracy, who will be taught at least some empirical maxims of government and public administration. There may be, and often has been, a systematic organization of the best mental power in the country in some special direction (commonly military) to promote the grandeur of the despot. But the public at large remain without information and without interest on all greater matters of practice; or, if they have any knowledge of them, it is but a dilettante knowledge, like that which people have of the mechanical arts who have never handled a tool. Nor is it only in their intelligence that they suffer. Their moral capacities are equally stunted. Wherever the sphere of action of human beings is artificially circumscribed, their sentiments are narrowed and dwarfed in the same proportion. The food of feeling is action; even domestic affection lives upon voluntary good offices. Let a person have nothing to do for his country, and he will not care for it. It has been said of old that in a despotism there is at most but one patriot, the despot himself; and the saying rests on a just appreciation of the effects of absolute subjection even to a good and wise master. Religion remains; and here, at least, it may be thought, is an agency that may be relied on for lifting men's eyes and minds above the dust at their feet. But religion, even supposing it to escape perversion for the purposes of despotism, ceases in these circumstances to be a social concern, and narrows into a personal affair between an individual and his Maker, in which the issue at stake is but his private salvation. Religion in this shape is quite consistent with the most selfish and contracted egoism, and identifies the votary as little in feeling with the rest of his kind as sensuality itself.
The idea is that having absolute power in the hands of a notable individual would ensure that all government duties are carried out with virtue and intelligence. Good laws would be created and enforced, bad laws would be changed; the best people would be put in positions of trust; justice would be fairly administered, public burdens would be light and wisely distributed, and every part of administration would be managed as purely and as intelligently as the country's circumstances and its level of intellectual and moral development allow. I’m willing, for the sake of the argument, to agree with this, but I must point out how significant the agreement is and how much more is needed to achieve even a semblance of these outcomes than is implied by simply saying "a good despot." Achieving these results would require not just a good monarch but one who is all-seeing. He must always be accurately informed, in considerable detail, about the conduct and functioning of every branch of administration in every region of the country and must be able, within the twenty-four hours granted to a king just like to any ordinary worker, to effectively supervise and pay attention to all aspects of this vast area; or he must at least be capable of identifying and selecting a large number of honest and competent individuals among his subjects, suitable to manage every part of public administration under supervision and control, as well as the few exceptionally virtuous and talented people who can be trusted to manage without oversight and oversee others themselves. The extraordinary abilities and energy required to carry out this task in any reasonable manner are such that the good despot we’re imagining could hardly agree to take it on unless as a way to escape unbearable evils and a stepping stone to something greater. But even without this huge factor in the equation, let’s say the difficulty is overcome. What would we end up with? One person with superhuman mental capacity running the affairs of a largely passive populace. Their passivity is implied in the very concept of absolute power. The nation as a whole, and each individual within it, lacks a voice in their own fate. They exercise no will over their collective interests. Everything is decided for them by a will that is not their own, which it is legally considered a crime to disobey. What kind of people can be developed under such a system? What growth can their thinking or their active capacities achieve under it? On purely theoretical issues, they might be allowed to think, as long as their thoughts didn’t touch politics or had no connection to its practice. In practical matters, they could at most only be allowed to suggest; and even under the most lenient despots, only those already recognized or assumed to be superior might hope that their suggestions would reach, let alone be valued by, those in charge of the affairs. A person must have an unusual passion for intellectual challenges for its own sake to bother thinking when it will have no external impact or to prepare himself for roles he has no chance of ever being allowed to take on. The only adequate motivation for mental effort, for all but a few minds in a generation, is the prospect of practical use for its results. It doesn't mean that the nation will lack intellectual capacity entirely. The daily business of life, which each individual or family must handle themselves, will require some level of intelligence and practical skill, albeit within a very limited range of ideas. There might be an elite class of experts who pursue science either for its physical applications or for the enjoyment of exploration. There will be a bureaucracy, and people being trained for the bureaucracy, who will learn at least some practical principles of government and public management. There may also be, and often has been, a systematic organization of the best intellects in the country focused on certain areas (usually military) to enhance the despot's power. But the general public remains uninformed and uninterested in all significant practical matters; or if they do know anything about them, it’s only a superficial knowledge, much like people understand mechanical arts without ever using a tool. Their intelligence isn’t the only thing stunted; their moral capacities are equally diminished. Whenever the opportunities for action are artificially limited, people's feelings and sentiments also shrink accordingly. Action is the source of feeling; even domestic love thrives on voluntary kind acts. If someone has nothing to do for their country, they will not care about it. It has been said in the past that in a despotism, there is at most one patriot—the despot himself; and this saying rightly reflects the effects of absolute subjection, even under a good and wise ruler. Religion remains; and it can be thought that this is an agency that might help raise people's eyes and minds above their mundane concerns. But even if religion escapes manipulation for the purposes of despotism, it gradually becomes a personal matter between an individual and their Maker, where the stakes are solely about personal salvation. In this form, religion is compatible with the most selfish and narrow-minded egoism and separates the follower from feeling connected to their fellow human beings, just like base desires do.
A good despotism means a government in which, so far as depends on the despot, there is no positive oppression by officers of state, but in which all the collective interests of the people are managed for them, all the thinking that has relation to collective interests done for them, and in which their minds are formed by, and consenting to, this abdication of their own energies. Leaving things to the government, like leaving them to Providence, is synonymous with caring nothing about them, and accepting their results, when disagreeable, as visitations of Nature. With the exception, therefore, of a few studious men who take an intellectual interest in speculation for its own sake, the intelligence and sentiments of the whole people are given up to the material interests, and when these are provided for, to the amusement and ornamentation of private life. But to say this is to say, if the whole testimony of history is worth any thing, that the era of national decline has arrived; that is, if the nation had ever attained any thing to decline from. If it has never risen above the condition of an Oriental people, in that condition it continues to stagnate; but if, like Greece or Rome, it had realized any thing higher, through the energy, patriotism, and enlargement of mind, which, as national qualities, are the fruits solely of freedom, it relapses in a few generations into the Oriental state. And that state does not mean stupid tranquillity, with security against change for the worse; it often means being overrun, conquered, and reduced to domestic slavery either by a stronger despot, or by the nearest barbarous people who retain along with their savage rudeness the energies of freedom.
A good form of despotism is a government where, as far as the despot is concerned, there’s no active oppression by government officials. In this system, all the collective interests of the people are managed on their behalf, with all the thinking related to those collective interests done for them. Their minds are shaped by this approach, leading them to accept this surrender of their own energies. Relying on the government, much like depending on fate, often means disinterest in those matters, resulting in a passive acceptance of outcomes, even when undesirable, as if they’re just natural occurrences. Aside from a few dedicated thinkers who value speculation for its own sake, the general intelligence and feelings of the populace focus solely on material interests, and after those are taken care of, they turn to entertainment and the embellishment of private life. However, this reality suggests, if history holds any truth, that the nation has entered a period of decline; that is, if it ever reached a height to decline from. If it has never progressed beyond an Eastern state, then it remains stagnant in that state. But if, like Greece or Rome, it achieved something greater through the energy, patriotism, and broad-mindedness that are the results of true freedom, it quickly regresses into an Eastern state within a few generations. This state doesn’t equate to a dull peace with security against worsening conditions; it often leads to being overrun, conquered, and reduced to a form of domestic slavery, either by a stronger despot or by neighboring barbaric peoples who, despite their roughness, possess the vigor of freedom.
Such are not merely the natural tendencies, but the inherent necessities of despotic government; from which there is no outlet, unless in so far as the despotism consents not to be despotism; in so far as the supposed good despot abstains from exercising his power, and, though holding it in reserve, allows the general business of government to go on as if the people really governed themselves. However little probable it may be, we may imagine a despot observing many of the rules and restraints of constitutional government. He might allow such freedom of the press and of discussion as would enable a public opinion to form and express itself on national affairs. He might suffer local interests to be managed, without the interference of authority, by the people themselves. He might even surround himself with a council or councils of government, freely chosen by the whole or some portion of the nation, retaining in his own hands the power of taxation, and the supreme legislative as well as executive authority. Were he to act thus, and so far abdicate as a despot, he would do away with a considerable part of the evils characteristic of despotism. Political activity and capacity for public affairs would no longer be prevented from growing up in the body of the nation, and a public opinion would form itself, not the mere echo of the government. But such improvement would be the beginning of new difficulties. This public opinion, independent of the monarch's dictation, must be either with him or against him; if not the one, it will be the other. All governments must displease many persons, and these having now regular organs, and being able to express their sentiments, opinions adverse to the measures of government would often be expressed. What is the monarch to do when these unfavorable opinions happen to be in the majority? Is he to alter his course? Is he to defer to the nation? If so, he is no longer a despot, but a constitutional king; an organ or first minister of the people, distinguished only by being irremovable. If not, he must either put down opposition by his despotic power, or there will arise a permanent antagonism between the people and one man, which can have but one possible ending. Not even a religious principle of passive obedience and "right divine" would long ward off the natural consequences of such a position. The monarch would have to succumb, and conform to the conditions of constitutional royalty, or give place to some one who would. The despotism, being thus chiefly nominal, would possess few of the advantages supposed to belong to absolute monarchy, while it would realize in a very imperfect degree those of a free government, since, however great an amount of liberty the citizens might practically enjoy, they could never forget that they held it on sufferance, and by a concession which, under the existing constitution of the state might at any moment be resumed; that they were legally slaves, though of a prudent or indulgent master.
These are not just the natural tendencies, but the essential needs of a tyrannical government; there's no escape from it unless the tyrant chooses to stop being a tyrant. If the so-called benevolent despot refrains from using his power and allows government affairs to function as if the people truly governed themselves, then there’s a different scenario. Although it seems unlikely, we can picture a despot following many of the rules and limitations of a constitutional government. He might permit a free press and open discussions that could help public opinion take shape and express itself regarding national issues. He might let local matters be handled by the people without interference from authority. He might even surround himself with a council or councils chosen freely by part or all of the nation, while keeping the power to tax and the highest legislative and executive authority for himself. If he were to act this way, semi-abdicating his despotism, he would eliminate a substantial part of the troubles typical of tyranny. Political engagement and the capacity for public affairs would no longer be stifled within the nation, allowing public opinion to develop independently rather than just echoing the government. However, such progress would lead to new challenges. This public opinion, not controlled by the monarch, would either support him or oppose him; it can't be both. All governments displease some people, and now that these people have regular channels to express their views, dissent against the government's measures would frequently surface. What should the monarch do when these negative opinions are in the majority? Should he change his approach? Should he yield to the nation? If he does, he ceases to be a despot and instead becomes a constitutional king, functioning as an agent or chief minister of the people, only distinguished by his permanent position. If not, he must either suppress dissent with his tyrannical power, or face a lasting conflict between the people and one individual, which can only end in one way. Not even a religious principle of passive obedience and divine right would be able to resist the inevitable outcomes of such a situation for long. The monarch would have to either adapt and comply with the principles of constitutional monarchy or be replaced by someone who would. The despotism would then mostly be nominal, lacking most of the supposed benefits of absolute monarchy, while only imperfectly achieving the advantages of a free government. Even if citizens enjoyed significant freedom, they would always remember that they held it at the ruler’s mercy, a concession that could be taken back at any moment under the current state structure; they would remain legally enslaved, albeit to a cautious or lenient master.
It is not much to be wondered at if impatient or disappointed reformers, groaning under the impediments opposed to the most salutary public improvements by the ignorance, the indifference, the untractableness, the perverse obstinacy of a people, and the corrupt combinations of selfish private interests, armed with the powerful weapons afforded by free institutions, should at times sigh for a strong hand to bear down all these obstacles, and compel a recalcitrant people to be better governed. But (setting aside the fact that for one despot who now and then reforms an abuse, there are ninety-nine who do nothing but create them) those who look in any such direction for the realization of their hopes leave out of the idea of good government its principal element, the improvement of the people themselves. One of the benefits of freedom is that under it the ruler can not pass by the people's minds, and amend their affairs for them without amending them. If it were possible for the people to be well governed in spite of themselves, their good government would last no longer than the freedom of a people usually lasts who have been liberated by foreign arms without their own co-operation. It is true, a despot may educate the people, and to do so really would be the best apology for his despotism. But any education which aims at making human beings other than machines, in the long run makes them claim to have the control of their own actions. The leaders of French philosophy in the eighteenth century had been educated by the Jesuits. Even Jesuit education, it seems, was sufficiently real to call forth the appetite for freedom. Whatever invigorates the faculties, in however small a measure, creates an increased desire for their more unimpeded exercise; and a popular education is a failure if it educates the people for any state but that which it will certainly induce them to desire, and most probably to demand.
It's not surprising that frustrated or disappointed reformers, burdened by the obstacles to necessary public improvements due to the ignorance, indifference, stubbornness, and willful obstinacy of the people, as well as the corrupt alliances formed by selfish interests, sometimes long for a strong authority to push these obstacles aside and force an unwilling populace to accept better governance. However, aside from the fact that for every one dictator who may reform a problem, there are ninety-nine who only create new ones, those who look to such extremes for their hopes overlook the crucial aspect of good government: the improvement of the people themselves. One of the advantages of freedom is that a ruler cannot simply bypass the people's mindset and fix their issues without also transforming them. If it were possible for the people to be well governed against their will, that good governance would last only as long as the freedom of a people generally lasts after being liberated by foreign forces without their own involvement. It’s true that a dictator can educate the populace, and doing so would indeed be the best justification for his tyranny. But any education that aims to make humans more than just machines ultimately leads them to assert control over their own actions. The leading French philosophers of the eighteenth century were educated by the Jesuits, and it seems even Jesuit education was sufficiently impactful to spark a desire for freedom. Anything that stimulates the mind, even a little, increases the urge for more freedom in its exercise; and a public education fails if it prepares people for any state other than the one they will undoubtedly yearn for and likely demand.
I am far from condemning, in cases of extreme exigency, the assumption of absolute power in the form of a temporary dictatorship. Free nations have, in times of old, conferred such power by their own choice, as a necessary medicine for diseases of the body politic which could not be got rid of by less violent means. But its acceptance, even for a time strictly limited, can only be excused, if, like Solon or Pittacus, the dictator employs the whole power he assumes in removing the obstacles which debar the nation from the enjoyment of freedom. A good despotism is an altogether false ideal, which practically (except as a means to some temporary purpose) becomes the most senseless and dangerous of chimeras. Evil for evil, a good despotism, in a country at all advanced in civilization, is more noxious than a bad one, for it is far more relaxing and enervating to the thoughts, feelings, and energies of the people. The despotism of Augustus prepared the Romans for Tiberius. If the whole tone of their character had not first been prostrated by nearly two generations of that mild slavery, they would probably have had spirit enough left to rebel against the more odious one.
I’m not completely against the idea of taking on absolute power in emergencies in the form of a temporary dictatorship. In the past, free nations have willingly given such power, seeing it as a necessary solution for serious issues that couldn't be solved by less drastic measures. However, accepting such power—even for a strictly limited time—can only be justified if the dictator, like Solon or Pittacus, uses that power to remove the barriers preventing the nation from enjoying freedom. The idea of a good dictatorship is a misleading fantasy that, apart from serving some temporary purpose, tends to become one of the most senseless and dangerous illusions. In a society that is somewhat advanced, a good dictatorship is actually more harmful than a bad one because it is far more debilitating and weakening to the thoughts, feelings, and energies of the people. The dictatorship of Augustus made the Romans vulnerable to Tiberius. If their character hadn't been weakened by nearly two generations of that mild oppression, they might have had enough spirit left to rise up against the more oppressive regime.
There is no difficulty in showing that the ideally best form of government is that in which the sovereignty, or supreme controlling power in the last resort, is vested in the entire aggregate of the community, every citizen not only having a voice in the exercise of that ultimate sovereignty, but being, at least occasionally, called on to take an actual part in the government by the personal discharge of some public function, local or general.
It’s easy to see that the best form of government is one where sovereignty, or the ultimate power, rests with the entire community. Every citizen should not only have a say in how that power is used but should also, at least sometimes, be required to take an active role in the government by carrying out some public duty, whether local or general.
To test this proposition, it has to be examined in reference to the two branches into which, as pointed out in the last chapter, the inquiry into the goodness of a government conveniently divides itself, namely, how far it promotes the good management of the affairs of society by means of the existing faculties, moral, intellectual, and active, of its various members, and what is its effect in improving or deteriorating those faculties.
To examine this idea, we need to look at the two ways the investigation into the effectiveness of a government divides itself, as mentioned in the last chapter. These are: how well it supports the effective management of society's issues using the current moral, intellectual, and active abilities of its members, and how it impacts the improvement or decline of those abilities.
The ideally best form of government, it is scarcely necessary to say, does not mean one which is practicable or eligible in all states of civilization, but the one which, in the circumstances in which it is practicable and eligible, is attended with the greatest amount of beneficial consequences, immediate and prospective. A completely popular government is the only polity which can make out any claim to this character. It is pre-eminent in both the departments between which the excellence of a political Constitution is divided. It is both more favorable to present good government, and promotes a better and higher form of national character than any other polity whatsoever.
The best type of government, it's hardly necessary to say, isn't one that works everywhere, but rather one that, in the situations where it can work, leads to the most positive outcomes, both now and in the future. A truly democratic government is the only system that can claim this status. It stands out in both areas that determine the quality of a political constitution. It's more conducive to effective governance today and encourages a better and more elevated national character than any other system.
Its superiority in reference to present well-being rests upon two principles, of as universal truth and applicability as any general propositions which can be laid down respecting human affairs. The first is, that the rights and interests of every or any person are only secure from being disregarded when the person interested is himself able, and habitually disposed to stand up for them. The second is, that the general prosperity attains a greater height, and is more widely diffused, in proportion to the amount and variety of the personal energies enlisted in promoting it.
Its advantage concerning current well-being relies on two principles that are as universally true and applicable as any general statements that can be made about human affairs. The first is that the rights and interests of any person are only protected from being overlooked when that person is capable and usually willing to defend them. The second is that overall prosperity reaches a greater level and is more broadly shared in relation to the quantity and diversity of individual efforts involved in promoting it.
Putting these two propositions into a shape more special to their present application—human beings are only secure from evil at the hands of others in proportion as they have the power of being, and are, self-protecting; and they only achieve a high degree of success in their struggle with Nature in proportion as they are self-dependent, relying on what they themselves can do, either separately or in concert, rather than on what others do for them.
Putting these two ideas into a form that fits their current application—people are only safe from harm by others to the extent that they have the ability to be, and are, self-protecting; and they only achieve a significant level of success in their battle with Nature to the degree that they are self-dependent, depending on what they can do themselves, whether individually or together, instead of relying on what others do for them.
The former proposition—that each is the only safe guardian of his own rights and interests—is one of those elementary maxims of prudence which every person capable of conducting his own affairs implicitly acts upon wherever he himself is interested. Many, indeed, have a great dislike to it as a political doctrine, and are fond of holding it up to obloquy as a doctrine of universal selfishness. To which we may answer, that whenever it ceases to be true that mankind, as a rule, prefer themselves to others, and those nearest to them to those more remote, from that moment Communism is not only practicable, but the only defensible form of society, and will, when that time arrives, be assuredly carried into effect. For my own part, not believing in universal selfishness, I have no difficulty in admitting that Communism would even now be practicable among the élite of mankind, and may become so among the rest. But as this opinion is any thing but popular with those defenders of existing institutions who find fault with the doctrine of the general predominance of self-interest, I am inclined to think they do in reality believe that most men consider themselves before other people. It is not, however, necessary to affirm even thus much in order to support the claim of all to participate in the sovereign power. We need not suppose that when power resides in an exclusive class, that class will knowingly and deliberately sacrifice the other classes to themselves: it suffices that, in the absence of its natural defenders, the interest of the excluded is always in danger of being overlooked; and, when looked at, is seen with very different eyes from those of the persons whom it directly concerns. In this country, for example, what are called the working-classes may be considered as excluded from all direct participation in the government. I do not believe that the classes who do participate in it have in general any intention of sacrificing the working classes to themselves. They once had that intention; witness the persevering attempts so long made to keep down wages by law. But in the present day, their ordinary disposition is the very opposite: they willingly make considerable sacrifices, especially of their pecuniary interest, for the benefit of the working classes, and err rather by too lavish and indiscriminating beneficence; nor do I believe that any rulers in history have been actuated by a more sincere desire to do their duty towards the poorer portion of their countrymen. Yet does Parliament, or almost any of the members composing it, ever for an instant look at any question with the eyes of a working man? When a subject arises in which the laborers as such have an interest, is it regarded from any point of view but that of the employers of labor? I do not say that the working men's view of these questions is in general nearer to the truth than the other, but it is sometimes quite as near; and in any case it ought to be respectfully listened to, instead of being, as it is, not merely turned away from, but ignored. On the question of strikes, for instance, it is doubtful if there is so much as one among the leading members of either House who is not firmly convinced that the reason of the matter is unqualifiedly on the side of the masters, and that the men's view of it is simply absurd. Those who have studied the question know well how far this is from being the case, and in how different, and how infinitely less superficial a manner the point would have to be argued, if the classes who strike were able to make themselves heard in Parliament.
The previous idea—that each person is the best protector of their own rights and interests—is one of those basic principles of caution that everyone who knows how to manage their own affairs naturally follows when their own interests are at stake. Many people really dislike it as a political belief and enjoy criticizing it as a doctrine of universal selfishness. To that, we can say that as soon as it’s no longer true that people generally prioritize themselves over others, and those who are closest to them over those who are farther away, then Communism isn't just possible, it would be the only justifiable form of society, and when that time comes, it will definitely be implemented. Personally, I don’t believe in universal selfishness, and I can easily accept that Communism could currently be feasible among the elite of society, and may become so among others as well. However, since this view is not very popular with those who uphold current institutions and criticize the idea of self-interest being dominant, I suspect they truly believe that most people do prioritize themselves over others. It’s not necessary, though, to even claim that in order to support the right of everyone to share in government power. We don't need to assume that when power is held by a specific class, that class will intentionally and knowingly sacrifice the other classes for their benefit: it’s enough that, without their usual protectors, the interests of those excluded are always at risk of being overlooked; and when considered, they are often seen through very different perspectives than those of the people directly involved. In this country, for instance, the so-called working class can be seen as excluded from any direct role in government. I don't believe that the classes who do engage in it generally intend to exploit the working class. They once did have that intention; just look at the ongoing efforts made to suppress wages by law. But nowadays, their usual tendency is just the opposite: they willingly make significant sacrifices, especially financial ones, for the benefit of the working class, and err more on the side of being too generous and indiscriminate. I also don’t believe that any leaders in history have had a more genuine desire to fulfill their responsibilities toward the poorer parts of society. Yet, does Parliament, or really any of its members, ever consider any issue from a working person's perspective? When a topic comes up that affects laborers, is it examined from any viewpoint other than that of the employers? I’m not saying that the working class perspective is necessarily more accurate than the others, but sometimes it’s just as valid; and in any case, it should be heard with respect instead of being, as it is, dismissed and ignored. Take the issue of strikes, for example; it’s doubtful that even one of the leading members in either House doesn’t firmly believe that the argument is overwhelmingly in favor of the employers and that the workers' perspective is simply ridiculous. Those who have studied this issue know well how far from the truth that is, and how differently—and with much greater depth—this topic would need to be discussed if the striking classes could have their voices heard in Parliament.
It is an adherent condition of human affairs that no intention, however sincere, of protecting the interests of others can make it safe or salutary to tie up their own hands. Still more obviously true is it that by their own hands only can any positive and durable improvement of their circumstances in life be worked out. Through the joint influence of these two principles, all free communities have both been more exempt from social injustice and crime, and have attained more brilliant prosperity than any others, or than they themselves after they lost their freedom. Contrast the free states of the world, while their freedom lasted, with the cotemporary subjects of monarchical or oligarchical despotism: the Greek cities with the Persian satrapies; the Italian republics and the free towns of Flanders and Germany, with the feudal monarchies of Europe; Switzerland, Holland, and England, with Austria or ante-revolutionary France. Their superior prosperity was too obvious ever to have been gainsayed; while their superiority in good government and social relations is proved by the prosperity, and is manifest besides in every page of history. If we compare, not one age with another, but the different governments which coexisted in the same age, no amount of disorder which exaggeration itself can pretend to have existed amidst the publicity of the free states can be compared for a moment with the contemptuous trampling upon the mass of the people which pervaded the whole life of the monarchical countries, or the disgusting individual tyranny which was of more than daily occurrence under the systems of plunder which they called fiscal arrangements, and in the secrecy of their frightful courts of justice.
It’s a basic truth of human affairs that no matter how sincere the intention to protect others’ interests is, it’s never safe or beneficial to restrict their own freedom. Even more clearly, any real and lasting improvement in their lives can only be achieved by their own efforts. Thanks to these two principles, all free societies have experienced both less social injustice and crime, and have achieved more impressive prosperity than any others, or than they themselves did after losing their freedom. Compare the free states of the world, during their time of freedom, with the contemporary subjects of monarchical or oligarchical rule: the Greek cities versus the Persian satrapies; the Italian republics and the free towns of Flanders and Germany versus the feudal monarchies of Europe; Switzerland, Holland, and England versus Austria or pre-revolutionary France. Their greater prosperity was too obvious to deny, while their better governance and social relations are evident in their success and throughout every page of history. If we look not at different ages but at the various governments existing in the same period, no amount of disorder that exaggeration could claim existed in the free states can be compared, even for a moment, to the contemptuous disregard for the masses that was widespread in the monarchical countries, or the outrageous individual tyranny that occurred more than daily under the exploitative systems they called fiscal arrangements, and in the secrecy of their terrifying courts of justice.
It must be acknowledged that the benefits of freedom, so far as they have hitherto been enjoyed, were obtained by the extension of its privileges to a part only of the community; and that a government in which they are extended impartially to all is a desideratum still unrealized. But, though every approach to this has an independent value, and in many cases more than an approach could not, in the existing state of general improvement, be made, the participation of all in these benefits is the ideally perfect conception of free government. In proportion as any, no matter who, are excluded from it, the interests of the excluded are left without the guaranty accorded to the rest, and they themselves have less scope and encouragement than they might otherwise have to that exertion of their energies for the good of themselves and of the community, to which the general prosperity is always proportioned.
It must be recognized that the benefits of freedom, as we've experienced them so far, have only been granted to part of the community; and a government that offers these benefits fairly to everyone is still something we haven't achieved. However, while any step toward this goal has its own worth, and in many cases it's all we can do given the current level of general progress, the full participation of everyone in these benefits represents the ideal vision of a free government. As long as anyone, regardless of who they are, is excluded, their interests lack the protection afforded to others, and they themselves have less opportunity and motivation to put their energies toward improving their lives and the community, which is essential for overall prosperity.
Thus stands the case as regards present well-being—the good management of the affairs of the existing generation. If we now pass to the influence of the form of government upon character, we shall find the superiority of popular government over every other to be, if possible, still more decided and indisputable.
Thus stands the case regarding current well-being—the effective management of the issues facing today's generation. If we now turn to the impact of the type of government on character, we will find that the advantage of popular government over all others is, if anything, even more clear and undeniable.
This question really depends upon a still more fundamental one, viz., which of two common types of character, for the general good of humanity, it is most desirable should predominate—the active or the passive type; that which struggles against evils, or that which endures them; that which bends to circumstances, or that which endeavours to make circumstances bend to itself.
This question really comes down to a more fundamental one: which of the two common types of character is better for the overall good of humanity—the active type or the passive type? The one that fights against problems, or the one that puts up with them? The one that adapts to circumstances, or the one that tries to change circumstances to suit itself?
The commonplaces of moralists and the general sympathies of mankind are in favor of the passive type. Energetic characters may be admired, but the acquiescent and submissive are those which most men personally prefer. The passiveness of our neighbors increases our sense of security, and plays into the hands of our wilfulness. Passive characters, if we do not happen to need their activity, seem an obstruction the less in our own path. A contented character is not a dangerous rival. Yet nothing is more certain than that improvement in human affairs is wholly the work of the uncontented characters; and, moreover, that it is much easier for an active mind to acquire the virtues of patience, than for a passive one to assume those of energy.
The common beliefs of moralists and the general feelings of people favor the passive type. Energetic individuals might be admired, but most people personally prefer those who are compliant and submissive. The passiveness of those around us boosts our sense of security and caters to our own desires. Passive individuals, as long as we don’t need their action, don’t seem to block our own progress. A content person isn't a threat. Yet, it's undeniable that progress in human affairs is entirely driven by those who are discontent. Moreover, it's much easier for an active mind to develop patience than for a passive one to adopt the qualities of energy.
Of the three varieties of mental excellence, intellectual, practical, and moral, there never could be any doubt in regard to the first two, which side had the advantage. All intellectual superiority is the fruit of active effort. Enterprise, the desire to keep moving, to be trying and accomplishing new things for our own benefit or that of others, is the parent even of speculative, and much more of practical, talent. The intellectual culture compatible with the other type is of that feeble and vague description which belongs to a mind that stops at amusement or at simple contemplation. The test of real and vigorous thinking, the thinking which ascertains truths instead of dreaming dreams, is successful application to practice. Where that purpose does not exist, to give definiteness, precision, and an intelligible meaning to thought, it generates nothing better than the mystical metaphysics of the Pythagoreans or the Veds. With respect to practical improvement, the case is still more evident. The character which improves human life is that which struggles with natural powers and tendencies, not that which gives way to them. The self-benefiting qualities are all on the side of the active and energetic character, and the habits and conduct which promote the advantage of each individual member of the community must be at least a part of those which conduce most in the end to the advancement of the community as a whole.
Among the three types of mental excellence—intellectual, practical, and moral—there’s never been any doubt about which of the first two has the edge. All intellectual superiority comes from active effort. The drive to keep moving, to try and achieve new things for our own benefit or that of others, is what leads to both speculative and especially practical talent. The type of intellectual culture that can coexist with the other is weak and vague, typical of a mind that stops at mere amusement or simple contemplation. The true test of strong, effective thinking—the kind that identifies truths instead of just dreaming—is its successful application in practice. Without that focus, which gives clarity, precision, and understandable meaning to thoughts, it produces nothing better than the mystical metaphysics of the Pythagoreans or the Vedas. When it comes to practical improvement, the situation is even clearer. The character that truly enhances human life is the one that challenges natural powers and tendencies, not the one that simply yields to them. The qualities that benefit oneself are all associated with an active and energetic character, and the habits and behaviors that promote the interests of each individual in the community must ultimately contribute to the advancement of the community as a whole.
But on the point of moral preferability, there seems at first sight to be room for doubt. I am not referring to the religious feeling which has so generally existed in favor of the inactive character, as being more in harmony with the submission due to the divine will. Christianity, as well as other religions, has fostered this sentiment; but it is the prerogative of Christianity, as regards this and many other perversions, that it is able to throw them off. Abstractedly from religious considerations, a passive character, which yields to obstacles instead of striving to overcome them, may not indeed be very useful to others, no more than to itself, but it might be expected to be at least inoffensive. Contentment is always counted among the moral virtues. But it is a complete error to suppose that contentment is necessarily or naturally attendant on passivity of character; and useless it is, the moral consequences are mischievous. Where there exists a desire for advantages not possessed, the mind which does not potentially possess them by means of its own energies is apt to look with hatred and malice on those who do. The person bestirring himself with hopeful prospects to improve his circumstances is the one who feels good-will towards others engaged in, or who have succeeded in the same pursuit. And where the majority are so engaged, those who do not attain the object have had the tone given to their feelings by the general habit of the country, and ascribe their failure to want of effort or opportunity, or to their personal ill luck. But those who, while desiring what others possess, put no energy into striving for it, are either incessantly grumbling that fortune does not do for them what they do not attempt to do for themselves, or overflowing with envy and ill-will towards those who possess what they would like to have.
But when it comes to the moral implications, there seems to be some uncertainty at first glance. I’m not talking about the common religious belief that being inactive aligns better with submitting to divine will. Christianity, like many other religions, has encouraged this view, but Christianity has the unique ability to overcome this and several other distortions. If we look at it independently of religious views, a passive person who gives in to challenges instead of working to overcome them might not be very helpful to others or themselves, but you would think they could at least be harmless. Contentment is usually seen as a moral virtue. However, it's completely incorrect to think that contentment naturally comes from a passive character; in fact, it can be harmful. When there's a desire for things that one doesn't have, a mind that lacks the drive to achieve them may end up feeling hatred and malice towards those who do. The person who actively works towards improving their situation is the one who is likely to feel goodwill towards others who are doing the same or who have succeeded. In a society where most people are pursuing their goals, those who don’t reach theirs typically feel their disappointment is due to a lack of effort, opportunity, or just bad luck. But those who desire what others have without putting in the effort to achieve it often find themselves either constantly complaining that fortune isn't giving them what they don't even try to earn for themselves or feeling overwhelmed by envy and resentment towards those who have what they wish they could have.
In proportion as success in life is seen or believed to be the fruit of fatality or accident and not of exertion in that same ratio does envy develop itself as a point of national character. The most envious of all mankind are the Orientals. In Oriental moralists, in Oriental tales, the envious man is remarkably prominent. In real life, he is the terror of all who possess any thing desirable, be it a palace, a handsome child, or even good health and spirits: the supposed effect of his mere look constitutes the all-pervading superstition of the evil eye. Next to Orientals in envy, as in activity, are some of the Southern Europeans. The Spaniards pursued all their great men with it, embittered their lives, and generally succeeded in putting an early stop to their successes. [1] With the French, who are essentially a Southern people, the double education of despotism and Catholicism has, in spite of their impulsive temperament, made submission and endurance the common character of the people, and their most received notion of wisdom and excellence; and if envy of one another, and of all superiority, is not more rife among them than it is, the circumstance must be ascribed to the many valuable counteracting elements in the French character, and most of all to the great individual energy which, though less persistent and more intermittent than in the self-helping and struggling Anglo-Saxons, has nevertheless manifested itself among the French in nearly every direction in which the operation of their institutions has been favorable to it.
As people start to see or believe that success in life comes from fate or chance rather than hard work, envy grows as a part of national identity. The most envious people are in the East. In Eastern moral teachings and stories, the envious person stands out prominently. In real life, he becomes a nightmare for anyone who has something desirable, whether it's a beautiful home, an attractive child, or even good health and happiness: the supposed impact of his mere gaze fuels the widespread superstition of the evil eye. Following the Easterners in envy—and in activity—are some Southern Europeans. The Spaniards have historically targeted their great figures with envy, making their lives miserable and often cutting their success short. [1] The French, who are fundamentally a Southern people, have experienced a kind of double education through despotism and Catholicism. Despite their impulsive nature, this has instilled submission and endurance as common traits and influenced their understanding of wisdom and excellence. If envy isn't more prevalent among them, it's likely due to the many positive counteracting traits in the French character, especially the remarkable individual energy that, while less consistent and more sporadic than that of the self-sufficient and striving Anglo-Saxons, has still shown up in various areas wherever their institutions have been supportive.
There are, no doubt, in all countries, really contented characters, who not merely do not seek, but do not desire, what they do not already possess, and these naturally bear no ill-will towards such as have apparently a more favored lot. But the great mass of seeming contentment is real discontent, combined with indolence or self-indulgence, which, while taking no legitimate means of raising itself, delights in bringing others down to its own level. And if we look narrowly even at the cases of innocent contentment, we perceive that they only win our admiration when the indifference is solely to improvement in outward circumstances, and there is a striving for perpetual advancement in spiritual worth, or at least a disinterested zeal to benefit others. The contented man, or the contented family, who have no ambition to make any one else happier, to promote the good of their country or their neighborhood, or to improve themselves in moral excellence, excite in us neither admiration nor approval. We rightly ascribe this sort of contentment to mere unmanliness and want of spirit. The content which we approve is an ability to do cheerfully without what can not be had, a just appreciation of the comparative value of different objects of desire, and a willing renunciation of the less when incompatible with the greater. These, however, are excellences more natural to the character, in proportion as it is actively engaged in the attempt to improve its own or some other lot. He who is continually measuring his energy against difficulties, learns what are the difficulties insuperable to him, and what are those which, though he might overcome, the success is not worth the cost. He whose thoughts and activities are all needed for, and habitually employed in, practicable and useful enterprises, is the person of all others least likely to let his mind dwell with brooding discontent upon things either not worth attaining, or which are not so to him. Thus the active, self-helping character is not only intrinsically the best, but is the likeliest to acquire all that is really excellent or desirable in the opposite type.
Without a doubt, there are genuinely content people in every country who not only don’t seek but also don’t desire what they don’t already have, and they don’t begrudge those who seem to have a better situation. However, the majority of what looks like contentment is actually real discontent mixed with laziness or self-indulgence, which, lacking any legitimate means to improve itself, takes pleasure in dragging others down to its level. Even in cases of genuine contentment, we notice that they only earn our admiration when their indifference is limited to external circumstances, while they strive for continuous personal growth or at least show a genuine desire to help others. A contented person or family that has no ambition to make anyone else happier, to contribute to their community or society, or to improve themselves morally doesn’t inspire admiration or approval in us. We rightly see this type of contentment as a lack of courage and spirit. The contentment we admire is being able to cheerfully accept what can’t be had, having a realistic appreciation for the value of different desires, and willingly letting go of the lesser when it conflicts with the greater. These qualities, however, are more naturally found in a character that is actively trying to improve its own situation or that of others. Those who constantly measure their efforts against challenges learn which obstacles they can’t overcome and which are not worth the effort despite being conquerable. A person whose thoughts and actions are focused on practical and useful endeavors is the least likely to dwell on discontent about things that are either not worth pursuing or that don’t matter to them. Therefore, an active, self-reliant character is not only inherently the best but also the most likely to gain everything that is genuinely excellent or desirable compared to the opposite type.
The striving, go-ahead character of England and the United States is only a fit subject of disapproving criticism on account of the very secondary objects on which it commonly expends its strength. In itself it is the foundation of the best hopes for the general improvement of mankind. It has been acutely remarked that whenever any thing goes amiss, the habitual impulse of French people is to say, "Il faut de la patience;" and of English people, "What a shame!" The people who think it a shame when any thing goes wrong—who rush to the conclusion that the evil could and ought to have been prevented, are those who, in the long run, do most to make the world better. If the desires are low placed, if they extend to little beyond physical comfort, and the show of riches, the immediate results of the energy will not be much more than the continual extension of man's power over material objects; but even this makes room, and prepares the mechanical appliances for the greatest intellectual and social achievements; and while the energy is there, some persons will apply it, and it will be applied more and more, to the perfecting, not of outward circumstances alone, but of man's inward nature. Inactivity, unaspiringness, absence of desire, are a more fatal hindrance to improvement than any misdirection of energy, and is that through which alone, when existing in the mass, any very formidable misdirection by an energetic few becomes possible. It is this, mainly, which retains in a savage or semi-savage state the great majority of the human race.
The ambitious, forward-thinking nature of England and the United States is often subject to negative criticism because it usually focuses on relatively trivial goals. However, this characteristic lays the groundwork for our greatest hopes for the overall betterment of humanity. It has been keenly observed that when something goes wrong, the typical French response is "Il faut de la patience" ("one must have patience"), while the English often say, "What a shame!" Those who feel it's a shame when things go awry — who quickly assume that the problem could and should have been avoided — are the ones who ultimately contribute the most to making the world a better place. If aspirations are set low, mainly focused on mere physical comfort and the display of wealth, then the immediate outcomes of this drive will mostly lead to an ongoing increase in human control over material things. Even so, this paves the way and creates the necessary tools for significant intellectual and social progress. While this energy exists, some individuals will harness it, and it will increasingly be used not just to improve external conditions but also to enhance human character. Inaction, lack of ambition, and a desire for improvement are far more detrimental obstacles to progress than any misallocation of energy. These traits enable significant misdirection by a few energetic individuals to thrive in a passive majority. This is primarily what keeps the vast majority of humanity in a primitive or semi-primitive state.
Now there can be no kind of doubt that the passive type of character is favored by the government of one or a few, and the active self-helping type by that of the many. Irresponsible rulers need the quiescence of the ruled more than they need any activity but that which they can compel. Submissiveness to the prescriptions of men as necessities of nature is the lesson inculcated by all governments upon those who are wholly without participation in them. The will of superiors, and the law as the will of superiors, must be passively yielded to. But no men are mere instruments or materials in the hands of their rulers who have will, or spirit, or a spring of internal activity in the rest of their proceedings, and any manifestation of these qualities, instead of receiving encouragement from despots, has to get itself forgiven by them. Even when irresponsible rulers are not sufficiently conscious of danger from the mental activity of their subjects to be desirous of repressing it, the position itself is a repression. Endeavour is even more effectually restrained by the certainty of its impotence than by any positive discouragement. Between subjection to the will of others and the virtues of self-help and self-government there is a natural incompatibility. This is more or less complete according as the bondage is strained or relaxed. Rulers differ very much in the length to which they carry the control of the free agency of their subjects, or the supersession of it by managing their business for them. But the difference is in degree, not in principle; and the best despots often go the greatest lengths in chaining up the free agency of their subjects. A bad despot, when his own personal indulgences have been provided for, may sometimes be willing to let the people alone; but a good despot insists on doing them good by making them do their own business in a better way than they themselves know of. The regulations which restricted to fixed processes all the leading branches of French manufactures were the work of the great Colbert.
Now there's no doubt that a passive character type is favored by governments ruled by one or a few, while an active, self-reliant character type is favored by the majority. Irresponsible rulers need the compliance of the ruled more than they need any activity that they can't force. Submitting to the demands of those in power as if they were natural laws is the lesson that all governments teach those who have no say in them. The will of those in charge, and the law as the expression of that will, must be accepted passively. However, no one is just a tool or resource for their rulers if they possess will, spirit, or any internal drive in their actions, and any display of these traits, instead of being encouraged by tyrants, must be tolerated by them. Even when irresponsible rulers don't perceive a threat from the mental engagement of their subjects and don't actively try to suppress it, the very situation itself acts as a form of oppression. The pursuit of effort is more effectively stifled by the certainty of its futility than by any explicit discouragement. There is a natural conflict between being subjected to the will of others and the virtues of self-reliance and self-governance. This incompatibility varies in intensity depending on whether the bondage is tight or loose. Rulers differ significantly in how far they go in controlling the autonomy of their subjects or in taking over their responsibilities. However, the difference lies in degree, not in principle; even the best tyrants often go to great lengths to restrict the freedom of their subjects. A bad tyrant, once he has satisfied his own desires, may sometimes leave the people alone, but a good tyrant insists on helping them by forcing them to manage their own affairs in a better way than they know how. The regulations that confined the leading sectors of French manufacturing to fixed processes were established by the great Colbert.
Very different is the state of the human faculties where a human being feels himself under no other external restraint than the necessities of nature, or mandates of society which he has his share in imposing, and which it is open to him, if he thinks them wrong, publicly to dissent from, and exert himself actively to get altered. No doubt, under a government partially popular, this freedom may be exercised even by those who are not partakers in the full privileges of citizenship; but it is a great additional stimulus to any one's self-help and self-reliance when he starts from even ground, and has not to feel that his success depends on the impression he can make upon the sentiments and dispositions of a body of whom he is not one. It is a great discouragement to an individual, and a still greater one to a class, to be left out of the constitution; to be reduced to plead from outside the door to the arbiters of their destiny, not taken into consultation within. The maximum of the invigorating effect of freedom upon the character is only obtained when the person acted on either is, or is looking forward to becoming, a citizen as fully privileged as any other. What is still more important than even this matter of feeling is the practical discipline which the character obtains from the occasional demand made upon the citizens to exercise, for a time and in their turn, some social function. It is not sufficiently considered how little there is in most men's ordinary life to give any largeness either to their conceptions or to their sentiments. Their work is a routine; not a labor of love, but of self-interest in the most elementary form, the satisfaction of daily wants; neither the thing done, nor the process of doing it, introduces the mind to thoughts or feelings extending beyond individuals; if instructive books are within their reach, there is no stimulus to read them; and, in most cases, the individual has no access to any person of cultivation much superior to his own. Giving him something to do for the public supplies, in a measure, all these deficiencies. If circumstances allow the amount of public duty assigned him to be considerable, it makes him an educated man. Notwithstanding the defects of the social system and moral ideas of antiquity, the practice of the dicastery and the ecclesia raised the intellectual standard of an average Athenian citizen far beyond any thing of which there is yet an example in any other mass of men, ancient or modern. The proofs of this are apparent in every page of our great historian of Greece; but we need scarcely look further than to the high quality of the addresses which their great orators deemed best calculated to act with effect on their understanding and will. A benefit of the same kind, though far less in degree, is produced on Englishmen of the lower middle class by their liability to be placed on juries and to serve parish offices, which, though it does not occur to so many, nor is so continuous, nor introduces them to so great a variety of elevated considerations as to admit of comparison with the public education which every citizen of Athens obtained from her democratic institutions, makes them nevertheless very different beings, in range of ideas and development of faculties, from those who have done nothing in their lives but drive a quill, or sell goods over a counter. Still more salutary is the moral part of the instruction afforded by the participation of the private citizen, if even rarely, in public functions. He is called upon, while so engaged, to weigh interests not his own; to be guided, in case of conflicting claims, by another rule than his private partialities; to apply, at every turn, principles and maxims which have for their reason of existence the general good; and he usually finds associated with him in the same work minds more familiarized than his own with these ideas and operations, whose study it will be to supply reasons to his understanding, and stimulation to his feeling for the general interest. He is made to feel himself one of the public, and whatever is their interest to be his interest. Where this school of public spirit does not exist, scarcely any sense is entertained that private persons, in no eminent social situation, owe any duties to society except to obey the laws and submit to the government. There is no unselfish sentiment of identification with the public. Every thought or feeling, either of interest or of duty, is absorbed in the individual and in the family. The man never thinks of any collective interest, of any objects to be pursued jointly with others, but only in competition with them, and in some measure at their expense. A neighbor, not being an ally or an associate, since he is never engaged in any common undertaking for joint benefit, is therefore only a rival. Thus even private morality suffers, while public is actually extinct. Were this the universal and only possible state of things, the utmost aspirations of the lawgiver or the moralist could only stretch to make the bulk of the community a flock of sheep innocently nibbling the grass side by side.
The situation for human abilities is very different when a person feels they are only limited by nature or societal rules they help create, which they can publicly disagree with and work to change if they believe they are wrong. Certainly, in a partially democratic government, this freedom can be exercised by those who don’t have full citizenship rights; however, it greatly boosts anyone's self-help and confidence when they start on equal footing and don't have to worry that their success depends on the opinions of those outside their group. It’s very discouraging for an individual, and even more so for a group, to be excluded from the system; to have to appeal to those deciding their fate from outside rather than being consulted. The full energizing effect of freedom on a person's character is only felt when that person is, or expects to become, a fully privileged citizen like anyone else. More importantly than this emotional aspect is the practical experience gained when citizens are expected to perform some public role, even if only occasionally. Many people's daily lives lack the breadth to expand their thoughts or feelings. Their work tends to be routine, driven by basic self-interest to meet daily needs, and neither the activity itself nor its context exposes them to ideas or emotions that go beyond the individual. Even if educational books are available to them, there’s little motivation to read them, and often, they don’t meet people who are significantly more educated than themselves. Giving them a public role addresses many of these shortcomings. If their public duties are substantial, it helps educate them. Despite the flaws in the social and moral systems of the past, the practices of the courts and assembly significantly raised the intellectual level of the average Athenian citizen beyond anything seen in other groups, whether ancient or modern. This is evident in every page of our great Greek historian, but we can see it just by looking at the high quality of speeches their leading orators believed would most effectively influence their audience’s thoughts and decisions. A similar, though lesser, benefit can be seen among English lower-middle-class individuals through their responsibilities on juries and in local government roles, which, although less frequent and varied, still significantly differentiate them in ideas and capabilities from those who have only ever worked in mundane jobs. The moral benefits from participating, even occasionally, in public roles are even greater. During these experiences, individuals are encouraged to consider interests beyond their own, to be guided by principles other than personal biases in the case of conflicts, to apply rules focused on the common good, and to work alongside more knowledgeable individuals who can provide insights and inspire a commitment to the common interest. They start to feel part of the community, with the public interest becoming their own. Where this opportunity for civic engagement is absent, few people perceive that those without a prominent social position owe anything to society beyond obeying the laws and submitting to the government. There’s no selfless feeling of being connected to the community. Every thought or feeling about interests or responsibilities is consumed by individual and family concerns. People think less of collective interests or shared goals and focus more on competing with others, often at their expense. A neighbor is not seen as an ally but as a rival, since they don’t engage in any mutual efforts for shared benefit. Consequently, private morality declines while public morality disappears. If this was the only state of affairs, the highest goals of lawmakers or moral thinkers would only aim to keep the majority of the community as a herd of sheep, grazing side by side without thought.
From these accumulated considerations, it is evident that the only government which can fully satisfy all the exigencies of the social state is one in which the whole people participate; that any participation, even in the smallest public function, is useful; that the participation should every where be as great as the general degree of improvement of the community will allow; and that nothing less can be ultimately desirable than the admission of all to a share in the sovereign power of the state. But since all can not, in a community exceeding a single small town, participate personally in any but some very minor portions of the public business, it follows that the ideal type of a perfect government must be representative.
From these accumulated thoughts, it's clear that the only government that can truly meet all the needs of society is one where everyone is involved; that any level of participation, even in the smallest public role, is beneficial; that participation should be as broad as the overall level of community improvement allows; and that nothing less than including everyone in the power of the state is ultimately desirable. However, since not everyone can personally participate in the public affairs of a community larger than a small town, it follows that the ideal form of a perfect government must be representative.
Chapter IV—Under what Social Conditions Representative Government is Inapplicable.
We have recognized in representative government the ideal type of the most perfect polity for which, in consequence, any portion of mankind are better adapted in proportion to their degree of general improvement. As they range lower and lower in development, that form of government will be, generally speaking, less suitable to them, though this is not true universally; for the adaptation of a people to representative government does not depend so much upon the place they occupy in the general scale of humanity as upon the degree in which they possess certain special requisites; requisites, however, so closely connected with their degree of general advancement, that any variation between the two is rather the exception than the rule. Let us examine at what point in the descending series representative government ceases altogether to be admissible, either through its own unfitness or the superior fitness of some other regimen.
We recognize that representative government is the ideal form of governance for which any group of people is best suited, depending on their level of overall improvement. As people develop less, this type of government generally becomes less suitable for them, although this isn’t universally true; the fitness of a population for representative government depends more on specific qualities they possess than on where they fall on the general scale of humanity. However, these qualities are so closely linked to their overall advancement that any differences between the two are more of an exception than the norm. Let’s explore the point at which representative government is no longer appropriate, either due to its own inadequacies or because another system is better suited.
First, then, representative, like any other government, must be unsuitable in any case in which it can not permanently subsist—i.e., in which it does not fulfill the three fundamental conditions enumerated in the first chapter. These were, 1. That the people should be willing to receive it. 2. That they should be willing and able to do what is necessary for its preservation. 3. That they should be willing and able to fulfill the duties and discharge the functions which it imposes on them.
First, then, a representative government, like any other government, can’t be effective if it can’t permanently exist—i.e., if it doesn’t meet the three basic conditions mentioned in the first chapter. These were: 1. The people should want to accept it. 2. They should be willing and able to do what’s necessary to maintain it. 3. They should be willing and able to fulfill the responsibilities and perform the functions it requires of them.
The willingness of the people to accept representative government only becomes a practical question when an enlightened ruler, or a foreign nation or nations who have gained power over the country, are disposed to offer it the boon. To individual reformers the question is almost irrelevant, since, if no other objection can be made to their enterprise than that the opinion of the nation is not yet on their side, they have the ready and proper answer, that to bring it over to their side is the very end they aim at. When opinion is really adverse, its hostility is usually to the fact of change rather than to representative government in itself. The contrary case is not indeed unexampled; there has sometimes been a religious repugnance to any limitation of the power of a particular line of rulers; but, in general, the doctrine of passive obedience meant only submission to the will of the powers that be, whether monarchical or popular. In any case in which the attempt to introduce representative government is at all likely to be made, indifference to it, and inability to understand its processes and requirements, rather than positive opposition, are the obstacles to be expected. These, however, are as fatal, and may be as hard to be got rid of as actual aversion; it being easier, in most cases, to change the direction of an active feeling than to create one in a state previously passive. When a people have no sufficient value for, and attachment to, a representative constitution, they have next to no chance of retaining it. In every country, the executive is the branch of the government which wields the immediate power, and is in direct contact with the public; to it, principally, the hopes and fears of individuals are directed, and by it both the benefits, and the terrors, and prestige of government are mainly represented to the public eye. Unless, therefore, the authorities whose office it is to check the executive are backed by an effective opinion and feeling in the country, the executive has always the means of setting them aside or compelling them to subservience, and is sure to be well supported in doing so. Representative institutions necessarily depend for permanence upon the readiness of the people to fight for them in case of their being endangered. If too little valued for this, they seldom obtain a footing at all, and if they do, are almost sure to be overthrown as soon as the head of the government, or any party leader who can muster force for a coup de main, is willing to run some small risk for absolute power.
The willingness of the people to accept representative government only becomes a real issue when an enlightened ruler or a foreign nation that has taken control of the country is willing to offer it. For individual reformers, this question is nearly irrelevant, since if the only objection to their efforts is that the nation doesn’t support them yet, their straightforward answer is that winning the nation over is precisely their goal. When public opinion is truly against it, the opposition is often more about resisting change than about rejecting representative government itself. There are instances where a religious objection exists to limiting the power of a specific ruling family, but generally, the idea of passive obedience just means submitting to those in power, whether they are monarchs or representatives. In situations where introducing representative government is even a possibility, apathy toward it and a lack of understanding of its processes and needs are more likely to be the main challenges, rather than outright opposition. However, these challenges can be just as harmful and difficult to overcome as actual dislike; it’s often easier to change someone’s active feelings than to create a feeling where none existed before. When a populace doesn't value or feel connected to a representative constitution, their chances of keeping it are slim. In every country, the executive branch of government holds immediate power and interacts directly with the public; individuals direct their hopes and fears toward it, and it mainly represents the benefits, fears, and prestige of the government to the public. Therefore, unless the officials responsible for checking the executive branch have strong support from public opinion, the executive can always find ways to ignore them or force them into submission, and it will be backed in doing so. Representative institutions depend on the people’s willingness to fight for them if they are threatened. If they aren’t valued enough for this, they rarely gain a solid foothold, and if they do, they are likely to be toppled as soon as the head of the government or any party leader with the strength for a quick takeover is willing to take a small risk for total power.
These considerations relate to the first two causes of failure in a representative government. The third is when the people want either the will or the capacity to fulfill the part which belongs to them in a representative constitution. When nobody, or only some small fraction, feels the degree of interest in the general affairs of the state necessary to the formation of a public opinion, the electors will seldom make any use of the right of suffrage but to serve their private interest, or the interest of their locality, or of some one with whom they are connected as adherents or dependents. The small class who, in this state of public feeling, gain the command of the representative body, for the most part use it solely as a means of seeking their fortune. If the executive is weak, the country is distracted by mere struggles for place; if strong, it makes itself despotic, at the cheap price of appeasing the representatives, or such of them as are capable of giving trouble, by a share of the spoil; and the only fruit produced by national representation is, that in addition to those who really govern, there is an assembly quartered on the public, and no abuse in which a portion of the assembly are interested is at all likely to be removed. When, however, the evil stops here, the price may be worth paying for the publicity and discussion which, though not an invariable, are a natural accompaniment of any, even nominal, representation. In the modern kingdom of Greece, for example, it can hardly be doubted, that the place-hunters who chiefly compose the representative assembly, though they contribute little or nothing directly to good government, nor even much temper the arbitrary power of the executive, yet keep up the idea of popular rights, and conduce greatly to the real liberty of the press which exists in that country. This benefit, however, is entirely dependent on the coexistence with the popular body of an hereditary king. If, instead of struggling for the favors of the chief ruler, these selfish and sordid factions struggled for the chief place itself, they would certainly, as in Spanish America, keep the country in a state of chronic revolution and civil war. A despotism, not even legal, but of illegal violence, would be alternately exercised by a succession of political adventurers, and the name and forms of representation would have no effect but to prevent despotism from attaining the stability and security by which alone its evils can be mitigated or its few advantages realized.
These points relate to the first two reasons for failure in a representative government. The third reason is when the people lack either the will or the ability to play their part in a representative system. When hardly anyone, or just a small number, cares about the general affairs of the state enough to form public opinion, voters will rarely use their right to vote for anything beyond their own interests, their local concerns, or for someone they are connected to as supporters or dependents. The small group that, in this scenario, gains control of the representative body usually uses it just to advance their own fortunes. If the executive branch is weak, the country gets caught up in constant struggles for power; if it’s strong, it becomes oppressive, trying to placate the representatives, or those who might cause trouble, by sharing some of the spoils. The only result of national representation is that, alongside those truly in charge, there’s a group burdening the public, and no abuses that benefit part of the assembly are likely to be addressed. However, when the problem stops there, the cost may be worth paying for the transparency and discussions that, while not guaranteed, typically accompany any form of representation. In modern Greece, for example, it’s clear that the place-seekers who mainly make up the representative assembly, while contributing little to good governance or even tempering the executive's arbitrary power, still uphold the idea of popular rights and significantly promote the real freedom of the press in the country. This benefit, though, completely relies on the existence of an hereditary king alongside the popular body. If these self-serving factions instead fought for the top position itself, they would likely, as seen in Spanish America, keep the country in a state of ongoing revolution and civil war. A despotism, not backed by law but driven by illegal force, would be alternately wielded by a series of political opportunists, and the name and structures of representation would only serve to prevent despotism from gaining the stability and security needed to mitigate its harms or realize its limited benefits.
The preceding are the cases in which representative government can not permanently exist. There are others in which it possibly might exist, but in which some other form of government would be preferable. These are principally when the people, in order to advance in civilization, have some lesson to learn, some habit not yet acquired, to the acquisition of which representative government is likely to be an impediment.
The above are the situations where representative government cannot last long-term. There are also cases where it might exist, but another type of government would be better. These mainly occur when the people, in order to progress in civilization, have some lessons to learn or habits they haven't developed yet, and representative government is likely to get in the way of that development.
The most obvious of these cases is the one already considered, in which the people have still to learn the first lesson of civilization, that of obedience. A race who have been trained in energy and courage by struggles with Nature and their neighbors, but who have not yet settled down into permanent obedience to any common superior, would be little likely to acquire this habit under the collective government of their own body. A representative assembly drawn from among themselves would simply reflect their own turbulent insubordination. It would refuse its authority to all proceedings which would impose, on their savage independence, any improving restraint. The mode in which such tribes are usually brought to submit to the primary conditions of civilized society is through the necessities of warfare, and the despotic authority indispensable to military command. A military leader is the only superior to whom they will submit, except occasionally some prophet supposed to be inspired from above, or conjurer regarded as possessing miraculous power. These may exercise a temporary ascendancy, but as it is merely personal, it rarely effects any change in the general habits of the people, unless the prophet, like Mohammed, is also a military chief, and goes forth the armed apostle of a new religion; or unless the military chiefs ally themselves with his influence, and turn it into a prop for their own government.
The most obvious example of this is the situation we've already discussed, where the people still need to learn the basic lesson of civilization: obedience. A group that has been shaped by struggles with nature and their neighbors, but hasn't yet settled into a lasting obedience to any common authority, is unlikely to develop this habit under a government of their own design. A representative assembly formed from within would simply mirror their own chaotic disobedience. It would reject authority over any decisions that would impose restrictions on their wild independence. Typically, tribes are brought to accept the basic requirements of civilized society through the demands of warfare and the strict authority necessary for military leadership. A military leader is the only authority they will consistently follow, apart from occasional prophets believed to be divinely inspired or shamans thought to have miraculous abilities. These figures may wield temporary influence, but since it's usually personal, it seldom changes the overall behavior of the people, unless the prophet, like Mohammed, is also a military leader who actively spreads a new faith; or unless military leaders align themselves with his influence to strengthen their own rule.
A people are no less unfitted for representative government by the contrary fault to that last specified—by extreme passiveness, and ready submission to tyranny. If a people thus prostrated by character and circumstances could obtain representative institutions, they would inevitably choose their tyrants as their representatives, and the yoke would be made heavier on them by the contrivance which primâ facie might be expected to lighten it. On the contrary, many a people has gradually emerged from this condition by the aid of a central authority, whose position has made it the rival, and has ended by making it the master, of the local despots, and which, above all, has been single. French history, from Hugh Capet to Richelieu and Louis XIV., is a continued example of this course of things. Even when the king was scarcely so powerful as many of his chief feudatories, the great advantage which he derived from being but one has been recognized by French historians. To him the eyes of all the locally oppressed were turned; he was the object of hope and reliance throughout the kingdom, while each local potentate was only powerful within a more or less confined space. At his hands, refuge and protection were sought from every part of the country against first one, then another of the immediate oppressors. His progress to ascendancy was slow; but it resulted from successively taking advantage of opportunities which offered themselves only to him. It was, therefore, sure; and, in proportion as it was accomplished, it abated, in the oppressed portion of the community, the habit of submitting to oppression. The king's interest lay in encouraging all partial attempts on the part of the serfs to emancipate themselves from their masters, and place themselves in immediate subordination to himself. Under his protection numerous communities were formed which knew no one above them but the king. Obedience to a distant monarch is liberty itself compared with the dominion of the lord of the neighboring castle; and the monarch was long compelled by necessities of position to exert his authority as the ally rather than the master of the classes whom he had aided in affecting their liberation. In this manner a central power, despotic in principle, though generally much restricted in practice, was mainly instrumental in carrying the people through a necessary stage of improvement, which representative government, if real, would most likely have prevented them from entering upon. There are parts of Europe where the same work is still to be done, and no prospect of its being done by any other means. Nothing short of despotic rule or a general massacre could effect the emancipation of the serfs in the Russian Empire.
A population isn't any less unfit for representative government due to the opposite issue mentioned earlier—extreme passivity and easy acceptance of tyranny. If such a demoralized group, affected by their character and circumstances, were to gain representative institutions, they would inevitably choose tyrants as their representatives, and their burden would be made heavier by the very system that was expected to lighten it. On the other hand, many groups have gradually risen from this state with the help of a central authority, which has positioned itself as a rival to, and ultimately a master over, local despots, and has, above all, remained singular. French history, from Hugh Capet to Richelieu and Louis XIV, provides ongoing examples of this trend. Even when the king was not as powerful as many of his main feudal lords, French historians have noted the significant advantage he held by being the only one. All the locally oppressed turned their hopes and trust towards him; he was seen as the source of hope across the kingdom, while each local lord had power only within a more or less limited area. People sought refuge and protection from him against various local oppressors. His rise to power was gradual, but it was built on seizing opportunities that only he could take. Therefore, it was certain, and as it progressed, it diminished the tendency among the oppressed to accept their oppression. The king's interest lay in encouraging the serfs' attempts to free themselves from their masters and place themselves directly under his authority. Under his protection, many communities emerged that recognized only the king above them. Obedience to a distant monarch is true freedom compared to the control of the lord from the nearby castle; and for a long time, the monarch had to act as an ally rather than a master to the classes he helped liberate. In this way, a central power, theoretically despotic but usually quite limited in practice, played a key role in guiding the people through a necessary phase of improvement that true representative government would likely have prevented them from entering. There are parts of Europe where this same work still needs to be done, and no other means seem possible. Nothing short of tyrannical rule or a widespread massacre could achieve the emancipation of the serfs in the Russian Empire.
The same passages of history forcibly illustrate another mode in which unlimited monarchy overcomes obstacles to the progress of civilization which representative government would have had a decided tendency to aggravate. One of the strongest hindrances to improvement, up to a rather advanced stage, is an inveterate spirit of locality. Portions of mankind, in many other respects capable of, and prepared for freedom, may be unqualified for amalgamating into even the smallest nation. Not only may jealousies and antipathies repel them from one another, and bar all possibility of voluntary union, but they may not yet have acquired any of the feelings or habits which would make the union real, supposing it to be nominally accomplished. They may, like the citizens of an ancient community, or those of an Asiatic village, have had considerable practice in exercising their faculties on village or town interests, and have even realized a tolerably effective popular government on that restricted scale, and may yet have but slender sympathies with any thing beyond, and no habit or capacity of dealing with interests common to many such communities. I am not aware that history furnishes any example in which a number of these political atoms or corpuscles have coalesced into a body, and learned to feel themselves one people, except through previous subjection to a central authority common to all. [2] It is through the habit of deferring to that authority, entering into its plans and subserving its purposes, that a people such as we have supposed receive into their minds the conception of large interests common to a considerable geographical extent. Such interests, on the contrary, are necessarily the predominant consideration in the mind of the central ruler; and through the relations, more or less intimate, which he progressively establishes with the localities, they become familiar to the general mind. The most favorable concurrence of circumstances under which this step in improvement could be made would be one which should raise up representative institutions without representative government; a representative body or bodies, drawn from the localities, making itself the auxiliary and instrument of the central power, but seldom attempting to thwart or control it. The people being thus taken, as it were, into council, though not sharing the supreme power, the political education given by the central authority is carried home, much more effectually than it could otherwise be, to the local chiefs and to the population generally, while, at the same time, a tradition is kept up of government by general consent, or at least, the sanction of tradition is not given to government without it, which, when consecrated by custom, has so often put a bad end to a good beginning, and is one of the most frequent causes of the sad fatality which in most countries has stopped improvement in so early a stage, because the work of some one period has been so done as to bar the needful work of the ages following. Meanwhile, it may be laid down as a political truth, that by irresponsible monarchy rather than by representative government can a multitude of insignificant political units be welded into a people, with common feelings of cohesion, power enough to protect itself against conquest or foreign aggression, and affairs sufficiently various and considerable of its own to occupy worthily and expand to fit proportions the social and political intelligence of the population.
The same historical examples clearly show another way that unlimited monarchy can overcome challenges to the advancement of civilization, which representative government would likely make worse. One of the biggest obstacles to progress, up to a fairly advanced stage, is a deep-rooted sense of local identity. Parts of humanity, though otherwise capable of and ready for freedom, may not be suited for merging into even the smallest nation. Not only can rivalries and hostilities keep them apart and block any chance of voluntary union, but they may also lack the feelings or habits needed to make the union real, even if it looks good on paper. They might, like the citizens of an ancient society or those in an Asian village, have had a lot of experience dealing with local interests and may have even established a somewhat effective local government on a small scale, yet still have little sympathy for anything beyond that and no experience with common interests shared by many such communities. I'm not aware of any historical example where a number of these political fragments have come together to form a united people, except through prior subjugation to a shared central authority. [2] It's through the habit of submitting to that authority, engaging with its plans, and serving its goals that such a people come to understand the idea of broader interests spanning a large geographical area. In contrast, those large interests are always the primary focus for the central ruler; and through the relationships, more or less close, that he gradually establishes with the localities, they become known to the general public. The best conditions for this improvement to occur would be ones that create representative institutions without representative government; a representative assembly selected from the local areas that acts as a support and tool for the central power, but rarely tries to oppose or control it. By involving the people in discussions, even if they don’t hold supreme power, the political education provided by the central authority reaches local leaders and the general population much more effectively than it otherwise would. At the same time, a tradition of government by general consent is maintained, or at least, the approval of tradition isn’t granted to government without it. This, once solidified by custom, has often led to undesirable endings for what originally started out well and is one of the most common reasons for the unfortunate stagnation of progress in many countries, as the work of one era has been done in such a way as to block the necessary work of subsequent ages. Meanwhile, it can be stated as a political truth that a responsible monarchy, rather than representative government, can unite a multitude of small political units into a cohesive people, with shared feelings of solidarity, enough strength to defend itself against conquest or foreign aggression, and significant and diverse issues to adequately occupy and grow the social and political awareness of the population.
For these several reasons, kingly government, free from the control (though perhaps strengthened by the support) of representative institutions, is the most suitable form of polity for the earliest stages of any community, not excepting a city community like those of ancient Greece; where, accordingly, the government of kings, under some real, but no ostensible or constitutional control by public opinion, did historically precede by an unknown and probably great duration all free institutions, and gave place at last, during a considerable lapse of time, to oligarchies of a few families.
For these reasons, monarchy, while not controlled by representative institutions (though possibly supported by them), is the most appropriate type of government for the early stages of any community, including city communities like those of ancient Greece. In those cases, the rule of kings, which had some real yet not visible or constitutional oversight by public opinion, historically came before all free institutions for an unknown but likely long period, eventually giving way over time to oligarchies made up of a few families.
A hundred other infirmities or shortcomings in a people might be pointed out which pro tanto disqualify them from making the best use of representative government; but in regard to these it is not equally obvious that the government of One or a Few would have any tendency to cure or alleviate the evil. Strong prejudices of any kind; obstinate adherence to old habits; positive defects of national character, or mere ignorance, and deficiency of mental cultivation, if prevalent in a people, will be in general faithfully reflected in their representative assemblies; and should it happen that the executive administration, the direct management of public affairs, is in the hands of persons comparatively free from these defects, more good would frequently be done by them when not hampered by the necessity of carrying with them the voluntary assent of such bodies. But the mere position of the rulers does not in these, as it does in the other cases which we have examined, of itself invest them with interests and tendencies operating in the beneficial direction. From the general weaknesses of the people or of the state of civilization, the One and his councillors, or the Few, are not likely to be habitually exempt; except in the case of their being foreigners, belonging to a superior people or a more advanced state of society. Then, indeed, the rulers may be, to almost any extent, superior in civilization to those over whom they rule; and subjection to a foreign government of this description, notwithstanding its inevitable evils, is often of the greatest advantage to a people, carrying them rapidly through several stages of progress, and clearing away obstacles to improvement which might have lasted indefinitely if the subject population had been left unassisted to its native tendencies and chances. In a country not under the dominion of foreigners, the only cause adequate to producing similar benefits is the rare accident of a monarch of extraordinary genius. There have been in history a few of these who, happily for humanity, have reigned long enough to render some of their improvements permanent, by leaving them under the guardianship of a generation which had grown up under their influence. Charlemagne may be cited as one instance; Peter the Great is another. Such examples however are so unfrequent that they can only be classed with the happy accidents which have so often decided at a critical moment whether some leading portion of humanity should make a sudden start, or sink back towards barbarism—chances like the existence of Themistocles at the time of the Persian invasion, or of the first or third William of Orange. It would be absurd to construct institutions for the mere purpose of taking advantage of such possibilities, especially as men of this calibre, in any distinguished position, do not require despotic power to enable them to exert great influence, as is evidenced by the three last mentioned. The case most requiring consideration in reference to institutions is the not very uncommon one in which a small but leading portion of the population, from difference of race, more civilized origin, or other peculiarities of circumstance, are markedly superior in civilization and general character to the remainder. Under those conditions, government by the representatives of the mass would stand a chance of depriving them of much of the benefit they might derive from the greater civilization of the superior ranks, while government by the representatives of those ranks would probably rivet the degradation of the multitude, and leave them no hope of decent treatment except by ridding themselves of one of the most valuable elements of future advancement. The best prospect of improvement for a people thus composed lies in the existence of a constitutionally unlimited, or at least a practically preponderant authority in the chief ruler of the dominant class. He alone has by his position an interest in raising and improving the mass, of whom he is not jealous, as a counterpoise to his associates, of whom he is; and if fortunate circumstances place beside him, not as controllers but as subordinates, a body representative of the superior caste, which, by its objections and questionings, and by its occasional outbreaks of spirit, keeps alive habits of collective resistance, and may admit of being, in time and by degrees, expanded into a really national representation (which is in substance the history of the English Parliament), the nation has then the most favorable prospects of improvement which can well occur to a community thus circumstanced and constituted.
A hundred other weaknesses or shortcomings in a population could be identified that would make them less capable of effectively using representative government; however, it's not as clear that having a government led by one person or a few would help solve or lessen these issues. Strong biases of any kind, stubborn attachment to old ways, negative aspects of national character, or simple ignorance and lack of education, if widespread in a population, will generally be reflected in their representative assemblies. If it happens that the executive branch, which manages public affairs directly, is run by people relatively free from these flaws, they could achieve more good when not held back by the need to gain the approval of such bodies. But just being in power doesn't automatically give the rulers beneficial interests or tendencies. The overall weaknesses of the people or state of civilization are unlikely to spare the One and their advisors, unless they are foreigners from a more advanced society. In that case, the rulers might indeed be significantly more advanced in civilization than those they govern; and while ruling under such a foreign government has its inevitable drawbacks, it often benefits the population by rapidly moving them through stages of progress and removing obstacles to improvement that might have lingered indefinitely if left to their own instincts. In a nation not under foreign control, the only way to produce similar benefits is by the rare occurrence of an extraordinary monarch. History has seen a few of these who, happily for humanity, ruled long enough to make some improvements last by placing them under the care of a generation that grew up influenced by them. Charlemagne is one example; Peter the Great is another. However, such instances are so infrequent that they should be regarded as lucky breaks that have often determined whether a major part of humanity would take a sudden leap forward or slide back into barbarism—like the fortunate existence of Themistocles during the Persian invasion or William of Orange. It would be foolish to create institutions merely to exploit such possibilities, especially since individuals of this caliber don't need absolute power to wield great influence, as evidenced by the last three mentioned. The situation that requires the most careful consideration regarding institutions is when a small but influential segment of the population, due to differences in race, more civilized origins, or other unique circumstances, is notably superior in civilization and character to the rest. In such cases, governance by representatives of the majority could risk denying the superior group many of the benefits they might gain from their higher level of civilization, while governance by representatives of that higher class might further entrench the lower group's disadvantages, leaving them with no hope of decent treatment except by discarding one of the most valuable elements of future progress. The best chance for improvement for such a population lies in having a leader from the dominant class who has constitutionally unlimited power or, at the very least, has considerable authority. This leader is inherently interested in elevating the mass they govern, without resentment towards them, as a balance to their own peers, of whom they may feel jealous. If fortunate circumstances provide them with a body that represents the upper class—not as controllers, but as subordinates—this group can keep alive a spirit of collective resistance through its challenges and occasional displays of independence, which could gradually evolve into a truly national representation (similar to the history of the English Parliament). Then, the nation may have the most favorable prospects for improvement that can occur for a community in such a situation.
Among the tendencies which, without absolutely rendering a people unfit for representative government, seriously incapacitate them from reaping the full benefit of it, one deserves particular notice. There are two states of the inclinations, intrinsically very different, but which have something in common, by virtue of which they often coincide in the direction they give to the efforts of individuals and of nations; one is, the desire to exercise power over others; the other is disinclination to have power exercised over themselves. The difference between different portions of mankind in the relative strength of these two dispositions is one of the most important elements in their history. There are nations in whom the passion for governing others is so much stronger than the desire of personal independence, that for the mere shadow of the one they are found ready to sacrifice the whole of the other. Each one of their number is willing, like the private soldier in an army, to abdicate his personal freedom of action into the hands of his general, provided the army is triumphant and victorious, and he is able to flatter himself that he is one of a conquering host, though the notion that he has himself any share in the domination exercised over the conquered is an illusion. A government strictly limited in its powers and attributions, required to hold its hands from overmeddling, and to let most things go on without its assuming the part of guardian or director, is not to the taste of such a people; in their eyes the possessors of authority can hardly take too much upon themselves, provided the authority itself is open to general competition. An average individual among them prefers the chance, however distant or improbable, of wielding some share of power over his fellow-citizens, above the certainty, to himself and others, of having no unnecessary power exercised over them. These are the elements of a people of place-hunters, in whom the course of politics is mainly determined by place-hunting; where equality alone is cared for, but not liberty; where the contests of political parties are but struggles to decide whether the power of meddling in every thing shall belong to one class or another, perhaps merely to one knot of public men or another; where the idea entertained of democracy is merely that of opening offices to the competition of all instead of a few; where, the more popular the institutions, the more innumerable are the places created, and the more monstrous the overgovernment exercised by all over each, and by the executive over all. It would be as unjust as it would be ungenerous to offer this, or any thing approaching to it, as an unexaggerated picture of the French people; yet the degree in which they do participate in this type of character has caused representative government by a limited class to break down by excess of corruption, and the attempt at representative government by the whole male population to end in giving one man the power of consigning any number of the rest, without trial, to Lambessa or Cayenne, provided he allows all of them to think themselves not excluded from the possibility of sharing his favors. The point of character which, beyond any other, fits the people of this country for representative government, is that they have almost universally the contrary characteristic. They are very jealous of any attempt to exercise power over them not sanctioned by long usage and by their own opinion of right; but they in general care very little for the exercise of power over others. Not having the smallest sympathy with the passion for governing, while they are but too well acquainted with the motives of private interest from which that office is sought, they prefer that it should be performed by those to whom it comes without seeking, as a consequence of social position. If foreigners understood this, it would account to them for some of the apparent contradictions in the political feelings of Englishmen; their unhesitating readiness to let themselves be governed by the higher classes, coupled with so little personal subservience to them, that no people are so fond of resisting authority when it oversteps certain prescribed limits, or so determined to make their rulers always remember that they will only be governed in the way they themselves like best. Place-hunting, accordingly, is a form of ambition to which the English, considered nationally, are almost strangers. If we except the few families or connections of whom official employment lies directly in the way, Englishmen's views of advancement in life take an altogether different direction—that of success in business or in a profession. They have the strongest distaste for any mere struggle for office by political parties or individuals; and there are few things to which they have a greater aversion than to the multiplication of public employments; a thing, on the contrary, always popular with the bureaucracy-ridden nations of the Continent, who would rather pay higher taxes than diminish, by the smallest fraction, their individual chances of a place for themselves or their relatives, and among whom a cry for retrenchment never means abolition of offices, but the reduction of the salaries of those which are too considerable for the ordinary citizen to have any chance of being appointed to them.
Among the trends that don't completely disqualify a group from having a representative government but seriously hinder them from maximizing its benefits, one stands out. There are two fundamentally different attitudes, yet they share a common link that often guides individuals and nations in similar ways: one is the desire to control others, and the other is the reluctance to be controlled. The variance in strength of these two tendencies among different groups of people significantly shapes their history. Some nations have such a strong desire to govern others that they are willing to sacrifice their own personal independence for the mere illusion of that power. Each person in such a nation may willingly surrender their individual freedoms to a leader, as long as the group is victorious, believing they are part of a conquering force, even though the idea that they have any real influence over the defeated is a delusion. A government that is strictly limited in its powers and required to refrain from excessive involvement, allowing most matters to proceed without intervention, is not appealing to such a society. For them, those in authority can hardly take on too much responsibility, as long as that authority is accessible to competition among the populace. An average individual in such a society would rather have the chance, no matter how slim, to control a portion of power over their fellow citizens than to have the certainty of having no unnecessary power imposed upon them. These tendencies create a society focused on political favors, where political dynamics are largely influenced by individuals seeking positions, where equality is valued over liberty, and political battles are simply efforts to determine which group will hold the power to interfere in everything—be it one class or another, or just a select group of politicians. The concept of democracy here is merely about opening positions to competition from all instead of a select few; the more popular the institutions, the more numerous the positions created, leading to excessive interference exerted by everyone over each individual, and by the government over everyone. To depict this accurately for the French people would be both unjust and unkind; however, the degree to which they embody these characteristics has caused representative government by a limited class to fail due to excessive corruption, and attempts at universal male suffrage have led to giving one man the authority to send many others, without trial, to remote places, as long as he allows them to believe they have a chance of receiving his favors. In stark contrast, what mainly qualifies the people of this country for representative government is their general aversion to unauthorized power over them, which is not backed by tradition or their own sense of justice; however, they typically care very little about exerting power over others. Lacking any passion for governance, and being all too familiar with the self-serving motives behind such desires, they prefer that those in positions of authority be those who accept these roles by virtue of their social status. If outsiders understood this, it would clarify some apparent contradictions in the political attitudes of English people; their willingness to be governed by the upper classes, combined with a distinct lack of servitude towards them, reveals that no other group is as keen to resist authority when it exceeds certain boundaries or as determined to ensure that their rulers remember to govern in the manner they prefer. Thus, position-seeking is a form of ambition with which the English, as a nation, are largely unfamiliar. Aside from a few families directly benefiting from official roles, English people aim for advancement in life through success in business or profession. They have a strong aversion to mere competition for positions among political parties or individuals; few things repel them as much as the expansion of public employment, which is entirely the opposite of what is accepted in many bureaucratic nations on the Continent. There, people would rather pay higher taxes than reduce even slightly their personal chances for a position for themselves or their families, and a call for cuts in government spending rarely means eliminating positions but rather lowering the salaries of those roles that ordinary citizens have no real chance of securing.
Chapter V—Of the Proper Functions of Representative Bodies.
In treating of representative government, it is above all necessary to keep in view the distinction between its idea or essence, and the particular forms in which the idea has been clothed by accidental historical developments, or by the notions current at some particular period.
When discussing representative government, it's essential to recognize the difference between its core idea or essence and the specific forms it has taken on due to chance historical events or the prevailing ideas of a certain time.
The meaning of representative government is, that the whole people, or some numerous portion of them, exercise through deputies periodically elected by themselves the ultimate controlling power, which, in every constitution, must reside somewhere. This ultimate power they must possess in all its completeness. They must be masters, whenever they please, of all the operations of government. There is no need that the constitutional law should itself give them this mastery. It does not in the British Constitution. But what it does give practically amounts to this: the power of final control is as essentially single, in a mixed and balanced government, as in a pure monarchy or democracy. This is the portion of truth in the opinion of the ancients, revived by great authorities in our own time, that a balanced constitution is impossible. There is almost always a balance, but the scales never hang exactly even. Which of them preponderates is not always apparent on the face of the political institutions. In the British Constitution, each of the three co-ordinate members of the sovereignty is invested with powers which, if fully exercised, would enable it to stop all the machinery of government. Nominally, therefore, each is invested with equal power of thwarting and obstructing the others; and if, by exerting that power, any of the three could hope to better its position, the ordinary course of human affairs forbids us to doubt that the power would be exercised. There can be no question that the full powers of each would be employed defensively if it found itself assailed by one or both of the others. What, then, prevents the same powers from being exerted aggressively? The unwritten maxims of the Constitution—in other words, the positive political morality of the country; and this positive political morality is what we must look to if we would know in whom the really supreme power in the Constitution resides.
The idea of representative government is that the entire population, or a significant portion of it, exercises ultimate control through representatives they elect periodically. This ultimate power has to rest somewhere within any constitution. The people must have complete authority. They should be in charge of all government functions whenever they choose. There's no requirement for the constitution to explicitly grant them this authority; it doesn't in the British Constitution. However, in practice, it amounts to this: the power of ultimate control is as singular in a mixed and balanced government as it is in a pure monarchy or democracy. This reflects a truth recognized by ancient thinkers and reaffirmed by leading thinkers today: a balanced constitution is not truly feasible. There is usually a balance, but the scales are seldom perfectly even. Which side is dominant isn't always immediately obvious in the political institutions. In the British Constitution, each of the three equal branches of sovereignty has powers that, if fully utilized, could halt all government operations. So, nominally, each has equal power to hinder and obstruct the others; if any of the three believes it could improve its situation by using that power, human nature suggests we shouldn't doubt it would be exercised. Each would undoubtedly use its full powers defensively if it were under attack from one or both of the others. So, what stops them from using those powers offensively? The unwritten principles of the Constitution—in other words, the country's positive political morality; this political morality is what we need to examine to determine where the true supreme power in the Constitution lies.
By constitutional law, the crown can refuse its assent to any act of Parliament, and can appoint to office and maintain in it any minister, in opposition to the remonstrances of Parliament. But the constitutional morality of the country nullifies these powers, preventing them from being ever used; and, by requiring that the head of the administration should always be virtually appointed by the House of Commons, makes that body the real sovereign of the state.
According to constitutional law, the crown can deny approval for any act of Parliament and can appoint and keep any minister in office, even against the objections of Parliament. However, the constitutional norms of the country render these powers ineffective, ensuring they are never exercised. By requiring that the head of the administration is essentially appointed by the House of Commons, it effectively makes that body the true sovereign of the state.
These unwritten rules, which limit the use of lawful powers, are, however, only effectual, and maintain themselves in existence on condition of harmonising with the actual distribution of real political strength. There is in every constitution a strongest power—one which would gain the victory if the compromises by which the Constitution habitually works were suspended, and there came a trial of strength. Constitutional maxims are adhered to, and are practically operative, so long as they give the predominance in the Constitution to that one of the powers which has the preponderance of active power out of doors. This, in England, is the popular power. If, therefore, the legal provisions of the British Constitution, together with the unwritten maxims by which the conduct of the different political authorities is in fact regulated, did not give to the popular element in the Constitution that substantial supremacy over every department of the government which corresponds to its real power in the country, the Constitution would not possess the stability which characterizes it; either the laws or the unwritten maxims would soon have to be changed. The British government is thus a representative government in the correct sense of the term; and the powers which it leaves in hands not directly accountable to the people can only be considered as precautions which the ruling power is willing should be taken against its own errors. Such precautions have existed in all well-constructed democracies. The Athenian Constitution had many such provisions, and so has that of the United States.
These unwritten rules, which limit the use of legal powers, are only effective and continue to exist as long as they align with the actual distribution of real political strength. In every constitution, there is a dominant power—one that would win if the compromises that usually govern the Constitution were put aside and there was a real test of strength. Constitutional principles are followed and have practical impact as long as they favor the power that holds the most active influence outside of politics. In England, this power is the people's power. Therefore, if the legal provisions of the British Constitution, along with the unwritten principles that actually guide the actions of different political authorities, did not give the popular element in the Constitution the significant authority over every part of the government that matches its real power in the country, the Constitution would lack the stability it is known for; either the laws or the unwritten principles would soon have to be revised. The British government is thus a representative government in the true sense of the term; and the powers it leaves in hands that are not directly accountable to the people can only be seen as safeguards that the ruling power is willing to implement against its own mistakes. Such safeguards have existed in all well-structured democracies. The Athenian Constitution had many such provisions, and so does that of the United States.
But while it is essential to representative government that the practical supremacy in the state should reside in the representatives of the people, it is an open question what actual functions, what precise part in the machinery of government, shall be directly and personally discharged by the representative body. Great varieties in this respect are compatible with the essence of representative government, provided the functions are such as secure to the representative body the control of every thing in the last resort.
But while it's crucial for representative government that the real power in the state lies with the representatives of the people, it's still debatable what specific roles and responsibilities the representative body should directly handle within the government. There can be many different arrangements in this regard that still align with the core idea of representative government, as long as those roles ensure that the representative body ultimately has control over everything.
There is a radical distinction between controlling the business of government and actually doing it. The same person or body may be able to control every thing, but can not possibly do every thing; and in many cases its control over every thing will be more perfect the less it personally attempts to do. The commander of an army could not direct its movements effectually if he himself fought in the ranks or led an assault. It is the same with bodies of men. Some things can not be done except by bodies; other things can not be well done by them. It is one question, therefore, what a popular assembly should control, another what it should itself do. It should, as we have already seen, control all the operations of government. But, in order to determine through what channel this general control may most expediently be exercised, and what portion of the business of government the representative assembly should hold in its own hands, it is necessary to consider what kinds of business a numerous body is competent to perform properly. That alone which it can do well it ought to take personally upon itself. With regard to the rest, its proper province is not to do it, but to take means for having it well done by others.
There’s a clear difference between overseeing the business of government and actually running it. The same person or group may be capable of managing everything, but they can’t possibly do everything themselves; in many cases, their control will be more effective if they do less personally. An army commander couldn’t effectively direct troop movements if they were fighting on the front lines or leading an attack. It’s the same for groups of people. Some tasks can only be done by groups, while others can’t be done well by them. So, there’s one question about what a popular assembly should oversee and another about what it should do itself. As we've already noted, it should oversee all government operations. However, to figure out the best way to exercise this overall control and what part of the government’s business the representative assembly should manage directly, it's necessary to think about what types of tasks a large group can handle effectively. They should only take on tasks they can do well. For everything else, their role isn’t to do it but to ensure it’s done well by others.
For example, the duty which is considered as belonging more peculiarly than any other to an assembly representative of the people is that of voting the taxes. Nevertheless, in no country does the representative body undertake, by itself or its delegated officers, to prepare the estimates. Though the supplies can only be voted by the House of Commons, and though the sanction of the House is also required for the appropriation of the revenues to the different items of the public expenditure, it is the maxim and the uniform practice of the Constitution that money can be granted only on the proposition of the crown. It has, no doubt, been felt that moderation as to the amount, and care and judgment in the detail of its application, can only be expected when the executive government, through whose hands it is to pass, is made responsible for the plans and calculations on which the disbursements are grounded. Parliament, accordingly, is not expected, nor even permitted, to originate directly either taxation or expenditure. All it is asked for is its consent, and the sole power it possesses is that of refusal.
For instance, the responsibility that is regarded as specifically belonging to a legislative body representing the people is the authority to vote on taxes. However, in no country does the legislative body, by itself or through its appointed officials, prepare the budget estimates. Although the House of Commons can only vote on the funds and its approval is necessary for allocating the revenues to various public spending items, it is a fundamental principle and consistent practice of the Constitution that money can only be granted based on a proposal from the crown. It is clear that a certain level of moderation regarding the amount, along with careful consideration of how the funds are used, can only be anticipated when the executive government, which manages the disbursement, is held accountable for the plans and estimates underlying the expenditures. Therefore, Parliament is neither expected nor even allowed to directly initiate taxation or spending. All that is requested from it is its approval, and the only power it has is the ability to refuse.
The principles which are involved and recognized in this constitutional doctrine, if followed as far as they will go, are a guide to the limitation and definition of the general functions of representative assemblies. In the first place, it is admitted in all countries in which the representative system is practically understood, that numerous representative bodies ought not to administer. The maxim is grounded not only on the most essential principles of good government, but on those of the successful conduct of business of any description. No body of men, unless organized and under command, is fit for action, in the proper sense. Even a select board, composed of few members, and these specially conversant with the business to be done, is always an inferior instrument to some one individual who could be found among them, and would be improved in character if that one person were made the chief, and all the others reduced to subordinates. What can be done better by a body than by any individual is deliberation. When it is necessary or important to secure hearing and consideration to many conflicting opinions, a deliberative body is indispensable. Those bodies, therefore, are frequently useful, even for administrative business, but in general only as advisers; such business being, as a rule, better conducted under the responsibility of one. Even a joint-stock company has always in practice, if not in theory, a managing director; its good or bad management depends essentially on some one person's qualifications, and the remaining directors, when of any use, are so by their suggestions to him, or by the power they possess of watching him, and restraining or removing him in case of misconduct. That they are ostensibly equal shares with him in the management is no advantage, but a considerable set-off against any good which they are capable of doing: it weakens greatly the sense in his own mind, and in those of other people, of that individual responsibility in which he should stand forth personally and undividedly.
The principles involved in this constitutional doctrine, if followed to the extent possible, guide the limitation and definition of the general functions of representative assemblies. First, it is acknowledged in all countries where the representative system is well understood that numerous representative bodies should not be in charge of administration. This principle is based not only on the fundamental tenets of good governance but also on those of effective business operations of any kind. No group of people, unless organized and structured, is suitable for action in the proper sense. Even a small, select board made up of a few members who are knowledgeable about the task at hand is always less effective than a single individual who could be chosen from among them. The situation would improve if that one person were designated as the leader, with the others acting as subordinates. What a group can do better than an individual is deliberation. When it is crucial or important to hear and consider various conflicting opinions, a deliberative body is essential. Such bodies are often useful, even for administrative tasks, but typically only as advisers; these tasks are generally better handled with the responsibility resting on one person. Even a joint-stock company usually has, in practice if not in theory, a managing director; the effectiveness of its management largely depends on the qualifications of that individual. The other directors contribute by offering suggestions or by having the power to monitor and, if necessary, restrain or remove the managing director in case of wrongdoing. Their equal shares in the management do not provide any real advantage; instead, they significantly diminish the sense of individual responsibility that should clearly rest on one person.
But a popular assembly is still less fitted to administer, or to dictate in detail to those who have the charge of administration. Even when honestly meant, the interference is almost always injurious. Every branch of public administration is a skilled business, which has its own peculiar principles and traditional rules, many of them not even known in any effectual way, except to those who have at some time had a hand in carrying on the business, and none of them likely to be duly appreciated by persons not practically acquainted with the department. I do not mean that the transaction of public business has esoteric mysteries, only to be understood by the initiated. Its principles are all intelligible to any person of good sense, who has in his mind a true picture of the circumstances and conditions to be dealt with; but to have this he must know those circumstances and conditions; and the knowledge does not come by intuition. There are many rules of the greatest importance in every branch of public business (as there are in every private occupation), of which a person fresh to the subject neither knows the reason or even suspects the existence, because they are intended to meet dangers or provide against inconveniences which never entered into his thoughts. I have known public men, ministers of more than ordinary natural capacity, who, on their first introduction to a department of business new to them, have excited the mirth of their inferiors by the air with which they announced as a truth hitherto set at nought, and brought to light by themselves, something which was probably the first thought of every body who ever looked at the subject, given up as soon as he had got on to a second. It is true that a great statesman is he who knows when to depart from traditions, as well as when to adhere to them; but it is a great mistake to suppose that he will do this better for being ignorant of the traditions. No one who does not thoroughly know the modes of action which common experience has sanctioned is capable of judging of the circumstances which require a departure from those ordinary modes of action. The interests dependent on the acts done by a public department, the consequences liable to follow from any particular mode of conducting it, require for weighing and estimating them a kind of knowledge, and of specially exercised judgment, almost as rarely found in those not bred to it, as the capacity to reform the law in those who have not professionally studied it. All these difficulties are sure to be ignored by a representative assembly which attempts to decide on special acts of administration. At its best, it is inexperience sitting in judgment on experience, ignorance on knowledge; ignorance which, never suspecting the existence of what it does not know, is equally careless and supercilious, making light of, if not resenting, all pretensions to have a judgment better worth attending to than its own. Thus it is when no interested motives intervene; but when they do, the result is jobbery more unblushing and audacious than the worst corruption which can well take place in a public office under a government of publicity. It is not necessary that the interested bias should extend to the majority of the assembly. In any particular case it is of ten enough that it affects two or three of their number. Those two or three will have a greater interest in misleading the body than any other of its members are likely to have in putting it right. The bulk of the assembly may keep their hands clean, but they can not keep their minds vigilant or their judgments discerning in matters they know nothing about; and an indolent majority, like an indolent individual, belongs to the person who takes most pains with it. The bad measures or bad appointments of a minister may be checked by Parliament; and the interest of ministers in defending, and of rival partisans in attacking, secures a tolerably equal discussion; but quis custodiet custodes? who shall check the Parliament? A minister, a head of an office, feels himself under some responsibility. An assembly in such cases feels under no responsibility at all; for when did any member of Parliament lose his seat for the vote he gave on any detail of administration? To a minister, or the head of an office, it is of more importance what will be thought of his proceedings some time hence, than what is thought of them at the instant; but an assembly, if the cry of the moment goes with it, however hastily raised or artificially stirred up, thinks itself and is thought by every body, to be completely exculpated, however disastrous may be the consequences. Besides, an assembly never personally experiences the inconveniences of its bad measures until they have reached the dimensions of national evils. Ministers and administrators see them approaching, and have to bear all the annoyance and trouble of attempting to ward them off.
But a popular assembly is even less suited to manage or guide in detail those responsible for administration. Even when the interference is well-intentioned, it almost always causes harm. Every aspect of public administration is a skilled profession, with its own unique principles and traditional rules, many of which are only truly understood by those who have experience in the field. Those outside the department are unlikely to appreciate them properly. I don't mean to suggest that managing public affairs involves secret mysteries only understood by a select few. The principles are clear to anyone with common sense who has a true grasp of the circumstances and conditions at hand; however, to do this, one must be informed about those circumstances and conditions, and that knowledge doesn’t just come naturally. There are many crucial rules in every area of public business (just like in any private job) that someone new to the subject may not understand the reasons for or even be aware of their existence, because they address risks or prevent problems that never crossed their mind. I have seen public figures, even those with considerable natural ability, who on their first encounter with a new department have amused their subordinates by confidently declaring as a groundbreaking insight something that was probably the first thought of anyone who ever considered the issue, which they abandoned as soon as they moved on to a second thought. It’s true that a great statesman knows when to break from traditions and when to stick with them; but it’s a big mistake to think that he will do this better by being unaware of the traditions. No one who does not thoroughly understand the established practices that common experience has validated can accurately judge situations that warrant a departure from those norms. The interests tied to actions taken by a public department and the potential consequences of any specific approach require a kind of knowledge and specialized judgment that are almost as rarely found outside the profession as the ability to reform the law is in those who haven’t studied it. All these challenges are likely to be overlooked by a representative assembly trying to decide on specific administrative actions. At its best, it’s inexperience judging experience, ignorance considering knowledge; an ignorance that, failing to suspect what it doesn’t know, is both careless and arrogant, often dismissing or even resenting any claims of having a better judgment than its own. This is true when no personal interests interfere; but when they do, the result can be more brazen and audacious misconduct than anything that could occur in a public office under a transparent government. It’s not necessary for the interested bias to affect the majority of the assembly. Sometimes it’s enough that it impacts just two or three members. Those few will have a stronger incentive to mislead the group than the others will have to correct it. The majority may keep their hands clean, but they can’t maintain their awareness or discerning judgment on issues they know nothing about; and a complacent majority, much like a lazy individual, will follow the one who puts in the most effort. The poor decisions or appointments from a minister can be checked by Parliament; and the interest of ministers in defending their actions, along with rival partisans in critiquing them, ensures a relatively balanced discussion; but quis custodiet custodes? who watches the watchmen? A minister or head of an office feels some responsibility. An assembly in such situations feels none at all; after all, when has any member of Parliament lost their seat for a vote they cast on a specific aspect of administration? To a minister or head of an office, what people think about their actions down the line is more important than what is thought of them in the moment; whereas an assembly, if it rides the wave of public sentiment, no matter how hastily stirred up, believes itself and is seen by everyone as completely cleared of blame, regardless of how disastrous the outcomes may be. Moreover, an assembly does not personally face the consequences of its poor decisions until those problems escalate to national crises. Ministers and administrators see them on the horizon and bear all the annoyance and trouble of trying to prevent them.
The proper duty of a representative assembly in regard to matters of administration is not to decide them by its own vote, but to take care that the persons who have to decide them shall be the proper persons. Even this they can not advantageously do by nominating the individuals. There is no act which more imperatively requires to be performed under a strong sense of individual responsibility than the nomination to employments. The experience of every person conversant with public affairs bears out the assertion that there is scarcely any act respecting which the conscience of an average man is less sensitive; scarcely any case in which less consideration is paid to qualifications, partly because men do not know, and partly because they do not care for, the difference in qualifications between one person and another. When a minister makes what is meant to be an honest appointment, that is, when he does not actually job it for his personal connections or his party, an ignorant person might suppose that he would try to give it to the person best qualified. No such thing. An ordinary minister thinks himself a miracle of virtue if he gives it to a person of merit, or who has a claim on the public on any account, though the claim or the merit may be of the most opposite description to that required. Il fallait un calculateur, ce fut un danseur qui l'obtint, is hardly more of a caricature than in the days of Figaro; and the minister doubtless thinks himself not only blameless, but meritorious, if the man dances well. Besides, the qualifications which fit special individuals for special duties can only be recognized by those who know the individuals, or who make it their business to examine and judge of persons from what they have done, or from the evidence of those who are in a position to judge. When these conscientious obligations are so little regarded by great public officers who can be made responsible for their appointments, how must it be with assemblies who can not? Even now, the worst appointments are those which are made for the sake of gaining support or disarming opposition in the representative body; what might we expect if they were made by the body itself? Numerous bodies never regard special qualifications at all. Unless a man is fit for the gallows, he is thought to be about as fit as other people for almost any thing for which he can offer himself as a candidate. When appointments made by a public body are not decided, as they almost always are, by party connection or private jobbing, a man is appointed either because he has a reputation, often quite undeserved, for general ability, or oftener for no better reason than that he is personally popular.
The main responsibility of a representative assembly regarding administrative matters isn't to vote on them directly, but to ensure that the right people are making those decisions. Even this can't be done effectively by just naming individuals. There's no task that demands a strong sense of personal accountability more than selecting candidates for jobs. Anyone familiar with public affairs knows that there's hardly any action about which the average person's conscience is less aware; there's barely any situation where qualifications are seriously taken into account, partly because people don't know the differences in qualifications between individuals, and partly because they simply don't care. When a minister intends to make an honest appointment—meaning he isn't just choosing someone due to personal ties or party loyalty—an uninformed person might think he would select the most qualified candidate. That's not the case. A typical minister considers himself remarkably virtuous if he chooses someone qualified or someone who has any claim to the public’s favor, even if that claim or merit is completely unrelated to what’s truly needed. Il fallait un calculateur, ce fut un danseur qui l'obtint is hardly more exaggerated than in Figaro's time; and the minister probably believes he is not only innocent but also admirable if the person he selects can dance well. Additionally, the qualifications that make certain individuals suitable for specific roles can only be identified by those who know them or who take the time to assess and judge individuals based on their actions or the insights of those qualified to judge. When high-ranking public officials who can be held accountable for their appointments show so little regard for these responsibilities, how can we expect assemblies that aren’t accountable to do better? Even now, the worst appointments are often made to gain support or neutralize opposition within the representative body; what could we expect if the body itself made those choices? Many groups completely disregard specific qualifications. Unless a person is unfit for the gallows, he’s often deemed just as qualified as anyone else for nearly any role he seeks. When appointments made by a public body aren’t determined—almost always by party connections or personal favors—a candidate is chosen either because of a reputation, often unearned, for general ability or, more commonly, simply because he is personally liked.
It has never been thought desirable that Parliament should itself nominate even the members of a cabinet. It is enough that it virtually decides who shall be prime minister, or who shall be the two or three individuals from whom the prime minister shall be chosen. In doing this, it merely recognizes the fact that a certain person is the candidate of the party whose general policy commands its support. In reality, the only thing which Parliament decides is, which of two, or at most three, parties or bodies of men shall furnish the executive government: the opinion of the party itself decides which of its members is fittest to be placed at the head. According to the existing practice of the British Constitution, these things seem to be on as good a footing as they can be. Parliament does not nominate any minister, but the crown appoints the head of the administration in conformity to the general wishes and inclinations manifested by Parliament, and the other ministers on the recommendation of the chief; while every minister has the undivided moral responsibility of appointing fit persons to the other offices of administration which are not permanent. In a republic, some other arrangement would be necessary; but the nearer it approached in practice to that which has long existed in England, the more likely it would be to work well. Either, as in the American republic, the head of the executive must be elected by some agency entirely independent of the representative body; or the body must content itself with naming the prime minister, and making him responsible for the choice of his associates and subordinates. In all these considerations, at least theoretically, I fully anticipate a general assent; though, practically, the tendency is strong in representative bodies to interfere more and more in the details of administration, by virtue of the general law, that whoever has the strongest power is more and more tempted to make an excessive use of it; and this is one of the practical dangers to which the futurity of representative governments will be exposed.
It's never been seen as a good idea for Parliament to directly nominate cabinet members. It's enough that it basically determines who will be the prime minister or who the prime minister will choose from a couple of candidates. In doing this, it just acknowledges that a certain person is the candidate from the party whose overall policies it supports. In reality, all Parliament does is decide which of two or three parties or groups of people will provide the executive government: the party itself determines which of its members is best suited to lead. According to the current practices of the British Constitution, this setup seems as effective as it can be. Parliament does not nominate any ministers, but the crown appoints the head of the administration based on the general wishes expressed by Parliament, and the other ministers are appointed on the chief's recommendation; each minister, however, has the full moral responsibility to appoint suitable people to the other non-permanent administrative positions. In a republic, a different arrangement would be necessary; however, the closer it aligns with the long-standing practices in England, the more likely it is to function effectively. Either, like in the American republic, the head of the executive must be elected by a body completely separate from the representative assembly; or the assembly must settle for naming the prime minister and holding him accountable for choosing his associates and subordinates. In all these points, at least in theory, I expect general agreement; yet, in practice, there is a strong tendency in representative bodies to increasingly interfere in the details of administration, due to the general principle that whoever holds the most power is more likely to use it excessively; and this is one of the practical dangers that representative governments will face in the future.
But it is equally true, though only of late and slowly beginning to be acknowledged, that a numerous assembly is as little fitted for the direct business of legislation as for that of administration. There is hardly any kind of intellectual work which so much needs to be done not only by experienced and exercised minds, but by minds trained to the task through long and laborious study, as the business of making laws. This is a sufficient reason, were there no other, why they can never be well made but by a committee of very few persons. A reason no less conclusive is, that every provision of a law requires to be framed with the most accurate and long-sighted perception of its effect on all the other provisions; and the law when made should be capable of fitting into a consistent whole with the previously existing laws. It is impossible that these conditions should be in any degree fulfilled when laws are voted clause by clause in a miscellaneous assembly. The incongruity of such a mode of legislating would strike all minds, were it not that our laws are already, as to form and construction, such a chaos, that the confusion and contradiction seem incapable of being made greater by any addition to the mass. Yet even now, the utter unfitness of our legislative machinery for its purpose is making itself practically felt every year more and more. The mere time necessarily occupied in getting through bills, renders Parliament more and more incapable of passing any, except on detached and narrow points. If a bill is prepared which even attempts to deal with the whole of any subject (and it is impossible to legislate properly on any part without having the whole present to the mind), it hangs over from session to session through sheer impossibility of finding time to dispose of it. It matters not though the bill may have been deliberately drawn up by the authority deemed the best qualified, with all appliances and means to boot; or by a select commission, chosen for their conversancy with the subject, and having employed years in considering and digesting the particular measure: it can not be passed, because the House of Commons will not forego the precious privilege of tinkering it with their clumsy hands. The custom has of late been to some extent introduced, when the principle of a bill has been affirmed on the second reading, of referring it for consideration in detail to a select committee; but it has not been found that this practice causes much less time to be lost afterwards in carrying it through the committee of the whole House: the opinions or private crotchets which have been overruled by knowledge always insist on giving themselves a second chance before the tribunal of ignorance. Indeed, the practice itself has been adopted principally by the House of Lords, the members of which are less busy and fond of meddling, and less jealous of the importance of their individual voices, than those of the elective House. And when a bill of many clauses does succeed in getting itself discussed in detail, what can depict the state in which it comes out of committee! Clauses omitted which are essential to the working of the rest; incongruous ones inserted to conciliate some private interest, or some crotchety member who threatens to delay the bill; articles foisted in on the motion of some sciolist with a mere smattering of the subject, leading to consequences which the member who introduced or those who supported the bill did not at the moment foresee, and which need an amending act in the next session to correct their mischiefs. It is one of the evils of the present mode of managing these things, that the explaining and defending of a bill, and of its various provisions, is scarcely ever performed by the person from whose mind they emanated, who probably has not a seat in the House. Their defense rests upon some minister or member of Parliament who did not frame them, who is dependent on cramming for all his arguments but those which are perfectly obvious, who does not know the full strength of his case, nor the best reasons by which to support it, and is wholly incapable of meeting unforeseen objections. This evil, as far as government bills are concerned, admits of remedy, and has been remedied in some representative constitutions, by allowing the government to be represented in either House by persons in its confidence, having a right to speak, though not to vote.
But it's also true, though only recently and slowly starting to be recognized, that a large group is just as ill-suited for direct legislation as it is for administration. There’s hardly any type of intellectual work that requires not just experienced and practiced minds, but minds trained through extensive and diligent study, as much as the task of making laws. This alone is a valid reason, if no others exist, why laws can only be well-crafted by a small committee. Another compelling reason is that every part of a law needs to be designed with a careful and far-sighted understanding of how it will affect all other parts; once created, the law should align seamlessly with existing laws. Such conditions cannot be met when laws are voted on clause by clause in a random assembly. The absurdity of this way of legislating would be clear to everyone if our laws weren't already such a chaotic mix in terms of form and structure, making the confusion seem impossible to worsen with any additions. Yet even now, the complete inadequacy of our legislative system is increasingly evident each year. The sheer amount of time required to handle bills makes Parliament less and less capable of passing any except for isolated, narrow issues. If a bill is prepared that attempts to address an entire topic (which is necessary because you can’t legislate properly on a part without considering the whole), it gets postponed from session to session simply because there's no time to deal with it. It doesn’t matter if the bill was carefully crafted by the regarded authority with all the necessary resources or by a select commission with expertise, having spent years shaping and refining the measure: it won’t get passed because the House of Commons won’t give up the precious privilege of meddling with it themselves. Recently, there has been some movement towards referring a bill for detailed consideration by a select committee once its principle is approved on the second reading; however, this practice hasn’t significantly reduced the time spent getting it through the committee of the whole House. Opinions or personal biases that were set aside during deliberation always want a second chance before the court of public ignorance. Indeed, this practice has primarily been adopted by the House of Lords, whose members tend to be less busy, less intrusive, and less concerned about the significance of their individual votes than those in the elected House. And when a lengthy bill does manage to get detailed discussion, what state does it emerge from the committee? Essential clauses are omitted that are critical to the rest, incongruous clauses are added to appease some private interest or an irritable member threatening to stall the bill, and articles are slipped in at the suggestion of someone with only a superficial grasp of the topic, leading to consequences that those who introduced or supported the bill didn’t foresee, necessitating a correcting act in the next session. One of the downsides of the current way of handling these matters is that explaining and defending a bill and its various provisions is rarely done by the person who originally conceived them, who likely doesn’t have a seat in the House. Their defense falls to some minister or member of Parliament who didn’t create them, relying on hastily prepared arguments aside from the obvious ones, lacking a full understanding of their case, the best reasons to support it, and utterly unprepared to tackle unexpected objections. This issue, at least for government bills, can be fixed and has been addressed in some representative governments by allowing the government to be represented in either House by confident members who have the right to speak but not to vote.
If that, as yet considerable, majority of the House of Commons who never desire to move an amendment or make a speech would no longer leave the whole regulation of business to those who do; if they would bethink themselves that better qualifications for legislation exist, and may be found if sought for, than a fluent tongue, and the faculty of getting elected by a constituency, it would soon be recognized that, in legislation as well as administration, the only task to which a representative assembly can possibly be competent is not that of doing the work, but of causing it to be done; of determining to whom or to what sort of people it shall be confided, and giving or withholding the national sanction to it when performed. Any government fit for a high state of civilization would have as one of its fundamental elements a small body, not exceeding in number the members of a cabinet, who should act as a Commission of Legislation, having for its appointed office to make the laws. If the laws of this country were, as surely they will soon be, revised and put into a connected form, the Commission of Codification by which this is effected should remain as a permanent institution, to watch over the work, protect it from deterioration, and make further improvements as often as required. No one would wish that this body should of itself have any power of enacting laws; the Commission would only embody the element of intelligence in their construction; Parliament would represent that of will. No measure would become a law until expressly sanctioned by Parliament; and Parliament, or either house, would have the power not only of rejecting but of sending back a bill to the commission for reconsideration or improvement. Either house might also exercise its initiative by referring any subject to the commission, with directions to prepare a law. The commission, of course, would have no power of refusing its instrumentality to any legislation which the country desired. Instructions, concurred in by both houses, to draw up a bill which should effect a particular purpose, would be imperative on the commissioners, unless they preferred to resign their office. Once framed, however, Parliament should have no power to alter the measure, but solely to pass or reject it; or, if partially disapproved of, remit it to the commission for reconsideration. The commissioners should be appointed by the crown, but should hold their offices for a time certain, say five years, unless removed on an address from the two Houses of Parliament, grounded either on personal misconduct (as in the case of judges), or on refusal to draw up a bill in obedience to the demands of Parliament. At the expiration of the five years a member should cease to hold office unless reappointed, in order to provide a convenient mode of getting rid of those who had not been found equal to their duties, and of infusing new and younger blood into the body.
If the significant majority of the House of Commons, who usually don't propose amendments or speak up, would stop leaving the regulation of business to those who do, and realize that there are better qualifications for making laws than just being articulate and getting elected, it would soon become clear that in both legislation and administration, the only role a representative assembly can effectively take on is not doing the work itself, but ensuring it gets done; deciding who or what kind of people should handle it, and giving or withholding national approval once it's completed. Any government suitable for a high state of civilization would have, as one of its core principles, a small group, no larger than a cabinet, acting as a Legislative Commission, tasked with creating laws. If the laws of this country were, as they will be soon, revised and compiled in a cohesive format, the Codification Commission responsible for this should remain a permanent body, overseeing the work, safeguarding it from decline, and making further improvements as needed. No one would want this body to have the power to create laws on its own; the Commission would simply provide the intellectual framework for their construction, while Parliament would embody the will of the people. No law would take effect until explicitly approved by Parliament, and either house would have the authority not only to reject but also to send a bill back to the commission for further review or enhancement. Each house could also initiate discussions by sending any topic to the commission with instructions to draft a law. The commission would have no power to refuse its assistance for any legislation the country sought. Instructions agreed upon by both houses to draft a bill for a specific purpose would be mandatory for the commissioners, unless they chose to resign. Once drafted, however, Parliament would have no power to modify the measure, only to accept or reject it, or if only partially disapproved, send it back for reconsideration. The commissioners should be appointed by the crown but would serve a fixed term of five years, unless removed by both Houses of Parliament for either personal misconduct (as with judges) or for refusing to draft a bill as directed by Parliament. At the end of the five years, a commissioner would lose their position unless reappointed, providing a way to remove those who were not fulfilling their responsibilities and to introduce new and younger members into the group.
The necessity of some provision corresponding to this was felt even in the Athenian Democracy, where, in the time of its most complete ascendancy, the popular Ecclesia could pass psephisms (mostly decrees on single matters of policy), but laws, so called, could only be made or altered by a different and less numerous body, renewed annually, called the Nomothetæ, whose duty it also was to revise the whole of the laws, and keep them consistent with one another. In the English Constitution there is great difficulty in introducing any arrangement which is new both in form and in substance, but comparatively little repugnance is felt to the attainment of new purposes by an adaptation of existing forms and traditions. It appears to me that the means might be devised of enriching the Constitution with this great improvement through the machinery of the House of Lords. A commission for preparing bills would in itself be no more an innovation on the Constitution than the Board for the administration of the Poor Laws, or the Inclosure Commission. If, in consideration of the great importance and dignity of the trust, it were made a rule that every person appointed a member of the Legislative Commission, unless removed from office on an address from Parliament, should be a peer for life, it is probable that the same good sense and taste which leave the judicial functions of the peerage practically to the exclusive care of the law lords would leave the business of legislation, except on questions involving political principles and interests, to the professional legislators; that bills originating in the Upper House would always be drawn up by them; that the government would devolve on them the framing of all its bills; and that private members of the House of Commons would gradually find it convenient, and likely to facilitate the passing of their measures through the two houses, if, instead of bringing in a bill and submitting it directly to the house, they obtained leave to introduce it and have it referred to the Legislative Commission; for it would, of course, be open to the House to refer for the consideration of that body not a subject merely, but any specific proposal, or a Draft of a Bill in extenso, when any member thought himself capable of preparing one such as ought to pass; and the House would doubtless refer every such draft to the commission, if only as materials, and for the benefit of the suggestions it might contain, as they would, in like manner, refer every amendment or objection which might be proposed in writing by any member of the House after a measure had left the commissioners' hands. The alteration of bills by a committee of the whole House would cease, not by formal abolition, but by desuetude; the right not being abandoned, but laid up in the same armoury with the royal veto, the right of withholding the supplies, and other ancient instruments of political warfare, which no one desires to see used, but no one likes to part with, lest they should any time be found to be still needed in an extraordinary emergency. By such arrangements as these, legislation would assume its proper place as a work of skilled labor and special study and experience; while the most important liberty of the nation, that of being governed only by laws assented to by its elected representatives, would be fully preserved, and made more valuable by being detached from the serious, but by no means unavoidable drawbacks which now accompany it in the form of ignorant and ill-considered legislation.
The need for some provision like this was acknowledged even in Athenian Democracy, where, at its peak, the popular Ecclesia could pass decisions (mostly decrees on single issues), but laws could only be made or changed by a different, smaller group that was renewed annually, called the Nomothetæ. This group's job was also to review all the laws and keep them consistent with one another. In the English Constitution, it's challenging to introduce any arrangement that is both new in form and substance, but people are generally more open to achieving new goals by adapting existing forms and traditions. I believe methods could be developed to enhance the Constitution with this significant improvement using the House of Lords. A commission for preparing bills wouldn't be any more of an innovation than the Board for managing the Poor Laws or the Inclosure Commission. If it were decided that every person appointed to the Legislative Commission, unless removed by Parliament, should be a peer for life, it’s likely that the same common sense and judgment that currently assign the judicial roles of the peerage to the law lords would also leave the legislative work, except on matters of political principles and interests, to professional legislators. Bills from the Upper House would always be drafted by them; the government would assign them to create all its bills, and private members of the House of Commons would likely find it easier to get their measures through both houses if they sought permission to introduce a bill and have it referred to the Legislative Commission. The House could refer not only a subject but also any specific proposal, or a full Draft of a Bill, when a member felt capable of preparing one that deserved to pass. The House would certainly send every such draft to the commission for their input and suggestions, just as they would refer any amendments or objections proposed in writing by any member after a measure was handed over to the commissioners. The practice of altering bills by a committee of the whole House would cease, not through formal abolition, but through lack of use; the right would not be given up but kept in reserve alongside the royal veto, the right to withhold supplies, and other traditional instruments of political conflict, which no one wants to see used, but no one wants to give up in case they become necessary in an extraordinary emergency. With arrangements like these, legislation would take its rightful place as a task requiring specialized skills, study, and experience; while the most important freedom of the nation—the right to be governed only by laws agreed upon by its elected representatives—would be fully maintained and made more valuable by separating it from the serious, but not unavoidable, issues that currently accompany it in the form of poorly considered and uninformed legislation.
Instead of the function of governing, for which it is radically unfit, the proper office of a representative assembly is to watch and control the government; to throw the light of publicity on its acts; to compel a full exposition and justification of all of them which any one considers questionable; to cinsure them if found condemnable, and, if the men who compose the government abuse their trust, or fulfill it in a manner which conflicts with the deliberate sense of the nation, to expel them from office, and either expressly or virtually appoint their successors. This is surely ample power, and security enough for the liberty of the nation. In addition to this, the Parliament has an office not inferior even to this in importance; to be at once the nation's Committee of Grievances and its Congress of Opinions; an arena in which not only the general opinion of the nation, but that of every section of it, and, as far as possible, of every eminent individual whom it contains, can produce itself in full light and challenge discussion; where every person in the country may count upon finding somebody who speaks his mind as well or better than he could speak it himself—not to friends and partisans exclusively, but in the face of opponents, to be tested by adverse controversy; where those whose opinion is overruled, feel satisfied that it is heard, and set aside not by a mere act of will, but for what are thought superior reasons, and commend themselves as such to the representatives of the majority of the nation; where every party or opinion in the country can muster its strength, and be cured of any illusion concerning the number or power of its adherents; where the opinion which prevails in the nation makes itself manifest as prevailing, and marshals its hosts in the presence of the government, which is thus enabled and compelled to give way to it on the mere manifestation, without the actual employment of its strength; where statesmen can assure themselves, far more certainly than by any other signs, what elements of opinion and power are growing and what declining, and are enabled to shape their measures with some regard not solely to present exigencies, but to tendencies in progress. Representative assemblies are often taunted by their enemies with being places of mere talk and bavardage. There has seldom been more misplaced derision. I know not how a representative assembly can more usefully employ itself than in talk, when the subject of talk is the great public interests of the country, and every sentence of it represents the opinion either of some important body of persons in the nation, or of an individual in whom some such body have reposed their confidence. A place where every interest and shade of opinion in the country can have its cause even passionately pleaded, in the face of the government and of all other interests and opinions, can compel them to listen, and either comply, or state clearly why they do not, is in itself, if it answered no other purpose, one of the most important political institutions that can exist any where, and one of the foremost benefits of free government. Such "talking" would never be looked upon with disparagement if it were not allowed to stop "doing"; which it never would, if assemblies knew and acknowledged that talking and discussion are their proper business, while doing, as the result of discussion, is the task not of a miscellaneous body, but of individuals specially trained to it; that the fit office of an assembly is to see that those individuals are honestly and intelligently chosen, and to interfere no further with them, except by unlimited latitude of suggestion and criticism, and by applying or withholding the final seal of national assent. It is for want of this judicious reserve that popular assemblies attempt to do what they can not do well—to govern and legislate—and provide no machinery but their own for much of it, when of course every hour spent in talk is an hour withdrawn from actual business. But the very fact which most unfits such bodies for a council of legislation, qualifies them the more for their other office—namely, that they are not a selection of the greatest political minds in the country, from whose opinions little could with certainty be inferred concerning those of the nation, but are, when properly constituted, a fair sample of every grade of intellect among the people which is at all entitled to a voice in public affairs. Their part is to indicate wants, to be an organ for popular demands, and a place of adverse discussion for all opinions relating to public matters, both great and small; and, along with this, to check by criticism, and eventually by withdrawing their support, those high public officers who really conduct the public business, or who appoint those by whom it is conducted. Nothing but the restriction of the function of representative bodies within these rational limits will enable the benefits of popular control to be enjoyed in conjunction with the no less important requisites (growing ever more important as human affairs increase in scale and in complexity) of skilled legislation and administration. There are no means of combining these benefits except by separating the functions which guaranty the one from those which essentially require the other; by disjoining the office of control and criticism from the actual conduct of affairs, and devolving the former on the representatives of the Many, while securing for the latter, under strict responsibility to the nation, the acquired knowledge and practiced intelligence of a specially trained and experienced Few.
Instead of governing, which they are fundamentally unfit for, the main role of a representative assembly is to monitor and oversee the government; to expose its actions to public scrutiny; to demand a thorough explanation and justification of any actions that people find questionable; to hold them accountable if deemed unacceptable, and if the individuals in government misuse their power or act against the clear will of the nation, to remove them from office and appoint their successors, either explicitly or implicitly. This certainly provides ample power and protection for the nation’s liberty. Additionally, Parliament has a role that is equally important; it serves as the nation's Committee of Grievances and Congress of Opinions; a space where not only the general opinion of the nation but also the views from every segment of it, and ideally, every notable individual it contains, can emerge in full view and invite discussion; where anyone in the country can expect to find someone who can express their thoughts as well or better than they could themselves—not just to friends and supporters, but openly to opponents, to be tested through debate; where those whose opinions are overruled can feel assured that their views are heard and dismissed only for reasons believed to be superior, gaining approval from the representatives of the majority; where every party or opinion in the country can gauge its influence and dispel any delusions about the size or power of its supporters; where the prevailing national opinion reveals itself as dominant, showcasing its strength before the government, which is thus enabled and pressured to yield to it upon mere expression, without actually deploying its power; where statesmen can more confidently assess which opinions and power structures are rising and which are falling, and can shape their policies with consideration not just for present needs, but for ongoing trends. Representative assemblies are often mocked by their critics as just places for empty talk. This criticism is usually misplaced. I can't think of a more productive way for a representative assembly to operate than through discussion when the topic is the significant public interests of the country, where every statement reflects either the opinion of a significant group in the nation or of an individual who has earned the trust of such a group. A setting where every interest and viewpoint can be passionately argued in the presence of the government and other interests, compelling them to listen and either comply or clearly explain why they don’t, is, in itself, one of the most vital political institutions possible, and one of the greatest advantages of free government. Such "talk" would never be looked down upon if it were never allowed to interrupt "action"; which it wouldn’t, if assemblies understood and accepted that discussion is their primary responsibility, while "doing," as a result of that discussion, is the job of individuals specifically trained for it; that the proper role of an assembly is to ensure that these individuals are chosen honestly and intelligently, and to refrain from interfering otherwise, apart from giving unlimited suggestions and criticism, and providing or withholding the final approval of the nation. It is the lack of this thoughtful restraint that causes popular assemblies to try to do what they cannot do effectively—govern and legislate—and to rely solely on their own mechanisms for much of it, meaning that every hour spent talking is an hour taken away from real work. However, the very aspect that makes such bodies unsuitable for legislation also makes them even more appropriate for their other role—namely, they are not a selection of the most brilliant political minds in the country, from whom little could be reliably inferred about the broader public opinion, but are, when properly composed, a fair representation of various levels of intellect among the people entitled to participate in governance. Their job is to highlight needs, serve as a voice for popular demands, and provide a forum for opposing views on public matters, large and small; and additionally, to critique and ultimately withdraw support from those high public officials who actually manage public business, or who appoint those who do. Only by restricting the functions of representative bodies to these rational limits can the benefits of popular control be enjoyed alongside the equally crucial aspects (growing ever more vital as human affairs expand and become more complex) of skilled legislation and administration. There are no ways to combine these advantages unless we separate the functions that guarantee one from those that essentially require the other; by distinguishing the roles of oversight and critique from the actual execution of affairs, and assigning the former to the representatives of the Many, while ensuring that the latter relies on the acquired knowledge and practiced expertise of a specially trained and experienced Few.
The preceding discussion of the functions which ought to devolve on the sovereign representative assembly of the nation would require to be followed by an inquiry into those properly vested in the minor representative bodies, which ought to exist for purposes that regard only localities. And such an inquiry forms an essential part of the present treatise; but many reasons require its postponement, until we have considered the most proper composition of the great representative body, destined to control as sovereign the enactment of laws and the administration of the general affairs of the nation.
The earlier discussion about the roles that should belong to the national representative assembly needs to be followed by an examination of the functions assigned to smaller representative bodies, which should exist for local purposes only. This investigation is an important part of this work; however, there are many reasons to delay it until we’ve looked at the best structure for the larger representative body, which is meant to oversee the creation of laws and the management of the nation’s overall affairs.
Chapter VI—Of the Infirmities and Dangers to which Representative Government is Liable.
The defects of any form of government may be either negative or positive. It is negatively defective if it does not concentrate in the hands of the authorities power sufficient to fulfill the necessary offices of a government, or if it does not sufficiently develop by exercise the active capacities and social feelings of the individual citizens. On neither of these points is it necessary that much should be said at this stage of our inquiry.
The flaws of any type of government can be either negative or positive. It is negatively flawed if it doesn’t give the authorities enough power to perform the essential duties of government, or if it doesn’t adequately nurture the active abilities and social emotions of individual citizens. At this stage of our investigation, there’s no need to elaborate much on either of these issues.
The want of an amount power in the government adequate to preserve order and allow of progress in the people is incident rather to a wild and rude state of society generally than to any particular form of political union. When the people are too much attached to savage independence to be tolerant of the amount of power to which it is for their good that they should be subject, the state of society (as already observed) is not yet ripe for representative government. When the time for that government has arrived, sufficient power for all needful purposes is sure to reside in the sovereign assembly; and if enough of it is not intrusted to the executive, this can only arise from a jealous feeling on the part of the assembly toward the administration, never likely to exist but where the constitutional power of the assembly to turn them out of office has not yet sufficiently established itself. Wherever that constitutional right is admitted in principle and fully operative in practice, there is no fear that the assembly will not be willing to trust its own ministers with any amount of power really desirable; the danger is, on the contrary, lest they should grant it too ungrudgingly, and too indefinite in extent, since the power of the minister is the power of the body who make and who keep him so. It is, however, very likely, and is one of the dangers of a controlling assembly, that it may be lavish of powers, but afterwards interfere with their exercise; may give power by wholesale, and take it back in detail, by multiplied single acts of interference in the business of administration. The evils arising from this assumption of the actual function of governing, in lieu of that of criticising and checking those who govern, have been sufficiently dwelt upon in the preceding chapter. No safeguard can in the nature of things be provided against this improper meddling, except a strong and general conviction of its injurious character.
The lack of sufficient power in the government to maintain order and support progress in society is more a sign of a rough and chaotic state of society than of any specific political system. When the population is too focused on their wild independence to tolerate the level of authority necessary for their benefit, the society (as noted before) is not ready for representative government. Once the time for such a government arrives, the necessary power for all essential functions is sure to be held by the governing body; and if enough power isn’t delegated to the executive, it’s usually due to the assembly’s distrust of the administration, which tends to happen when the assembly hasn’t yet firmly established its constitutional right to remove them from office. Wherever this constitutional right is recognized in principle and actively practiced, there is little concern that the assembly won’t be willing to empower its ministers with the necessary authority; rather, the risk is that they may grant it too generously and without clear boundaries, since a minister's power comes from those who appoint and retain them. However, it’s quite probable, and a risk of a controlling assembly, that it may be overly generous with power but then interfere with its use; it might hand out authority broadly, only to reclaim it bit by bit through numerous instances of interference in the administration’s affairs. The problems that arise from this assumption of the actual role of governing, instead of merely overseeing and checking those who govern, have been thoroughly discussed in the previous chapter. No safeguard can truly be established against this inappropriate interference, except for a strong and common understanding of its harmful nature.
The other negative defect which may reside in a government, that of not bringing into sufficient exercise the individual faculties, moral, intellectual, and active, of the people, has been exhibited generally in setting forth the distinctive mischiefs of despotism. As between one form of popular government and another, the advantage in this respect lies with that which most widely diffuses the exercise of public functions; on the one hand, by excluding fewest from the suffrage; on the other, by opening to all classes of private citizens, so far as is consistent with other equally important objects, the widest participation in the details of judicial and administrative business; as by jury-trial, admission to municipal offices, and, above all, by the utmost possible publicity and liberty of discussion, whereby not merely a few individuals in succession, but the whole public, are made, to a certain extent, participants in the government, and sharers in the instruction and mental exercise derived from it. The further illustration of these benefits, as well as of the limitations under which they must be aimed at, will be better deferred until we come to speak of the details of administration.
The other major flaw that can exist in a government is its failure to fully engage the individual moral, intellectual, and active abilities of the people. This issue is commonly associated with the various harms of despotism. When comparing different forms of popular government, the one that does better in this respect is the one that most broadly promotes the exercise of public responsibilities. This is achieved by allowing the fewest people to be excluded from voting and by enabling all classes of private citizens, as long as it aligns with other important goals, to participate widely in the details of judicial and administrative work. This includes things like jury trials, eligibility for municipal positions, and, most importantly, ensuring maximum publicity and freedom of discussion. This way, not just a few individuals but the entire public can be involved in the government to some degree, gaining knowledge and mental engagement from the experience. We will discuss these benefits further, as well as the limitations that must be considered, when we cover the details of administration.
The positive evils and dangers of the representative, as of every other form of government, may be reduced to two heads: first, general ignorance and incapacity, or, to speak more moderately, insufficient mental qualifications, in the controlling body; secondly, the danger of its being under the influence of interests not identical with the general welfare of the community.
The positive evils and dangers of representative government, like any other form of government, can be broken down into two main issues: first, widespread ignorance and incapacity, or more mildly, inadequate mental qualifications within the governing body; second, the risk of being influenced by interests that do not align with the overall well-being of the community.
The former of these evils, deficiency in high mental qualifications, is one to which it is generally supposed that popular government is liable in a greater degree than any other. The energy of a monarch, the steadiness and prudence of an aristocracy, are thought to contrast most favorably with the vacillation and shortsightedness of even the most qualified democracy. These propositions, however, are not by any means so well founded as they at first sight appear.
The first of these issues, lack of strong mental abilities, is generally believed to be more common in popular governments than in others. The vigor of a monarch and the stability and wisdom of an aristocracy are seen as contrasting positively with the indecisiveness and shortsightedness of even the best-qualified democracies. However, these claims are not as solidly based as they might seem at first glance.
Compared with simple monarchy, representative government is in these respects at no disadvantage. Except in a rude age, hereditary monarchy, when it is really such, and not aristocracy in disguise, far surpasses democracy in all the forms of incapacity supposed to be characteristic of the last. I say, except in a rude age, because in a really rude state of society there is a considerable guaranty for the intellectual and active capacities of the sovereign. His personal will is constantly encountering obstacles from the willfulness of his subjects, and of powerful individuals among their number. The circumstances of society do not afford him much temptation to mere luxurious self-indulgence; mental and bodily activity, especially political and military, are his principal excitements; and among turbulent chiefs and lawless followers he has little authority, and is seldom long secure even of his throne, unless he possesses a considerable amount of personal daring, dexterity, and energy. The reason why the average of talent is so high among the Henries and Edwards of our history may be read in the tragical fate of the second Edward and the second Richard, and the civil wars and disturbances of the reigns of John and his incapable successor. The troubled period of the Reformation also produced several eminent hereditary monarchs—Elizabeth, Henri Quatre, Gustavus Adolphus; but they were mostly bred up in adversity, succeeded to the throne by the unexpected failure of nearer heirs, or had to contend with great difficulties in the commencement of their reign. Since European life assumed a settled aspect, any thing above mediocrity in an hereditary king has become extremely rare, while the general average has been even below mediocrity, both in talent and in vigor of character. A monarchy constitutionally absolute now only maintains itself in existence (except temporarily in the hands of some active-minded usurper) through the mental qualifications of a permanent bureaucracy. The Russian and Austrian governments, and even the French government in its normal condition, are oligarchies of officials, of whom the head of the state does little more than select the chiefs. I am speaking of the regular course of their administration; for the will of the master of course determines many of their particular acts.
Compared to simple monarchy, representative government isn't at a disadvantage in these ways. Except in a primitive era, hereditary monarchy, when it's truly that and not just a disguised aristocracy, far exceeds democracy in the supposed incapacity associated with the latter. I mention "except in a primitive era" because, in a truly primitive society, there's a significant guarantee for the intellectual and active abilities of the ruler. The ruler's personal will constantly faces challenges from the stubbornness of his subjects and from powerful individuals among them. The social conditions don’t offer much temptation for mere indulgence; mental and physical activity, particularly in politics and the military, are his main sources of excitement. Among chaotic leaders and unruly followers, he has little authority and is rarely secure on his throne for long unless he has a considerable amount of courage, skill, and energy. The reason why talent tends to be high among Henrys and Edwards in our history can be seen in the tragic outcomes of Edward II and Richard II, as well as the civil wars and unrest during John’s reign and that of his ineffective successor. The tumultuous period of the Reformation also produced several notable hereditary monarchs—Elizabeth, Henry IV, Gustavus Adolphus; however, they were mostly raised in hardship, came to the throne unexpectedly due to the failure of closer heirs, or faced significant challenges at the start of their reigns. Since European society became more stable, exceptional ability in hereditary kings has become exceedingly rare, while the general average has been below mediocrity in both talent and character strength. A constitutionally absolute monarchy now only survives (except temporarily in the hands of some enterprising usurper) through the capabilities of a permanent bureaucracy. The Russian and Austrian governments, and even the French government in its typical state, are oligarchies of officials, where the head of state mainly just selects the leaders. I'm referring to the usual course of their administration; the ruler's will, of course, influences many of their specific actions.
The governments which have been remarkable in history for sustained mental ability and vigor in the conduct of affairs have generally been aristocracies. But they have been, without any exception, aristocracies of public functionaries. The ruling bodies have been so narrow, that each member, or at least each influential member of the body, was able to make, and did make, public business an active profession, and the principal occupation of his life. The only aristocracies which have manifested high governing capacities, and acted on steady maxims of policy through many generations, are those of Rome and Venice. But, at Venice, though the privileged order was numerous, the actual management of affairs was rigidly concentrated in a small oligarchy within the oligarchy, whose whole lives were devoted to the study and conduct of the affairs of the state. The Roman government partook more of the character of an open aristocracy like our own. But the really governing body, the Senate, was in exclusively composed of persons who had exercised public functions, and had either already filled, or were looking forward to fill the highest offices of the state, at the peril of a severe responsibility in case of incapacity and failure. When once members of the Senate, their lives were pledged to the conduct of public affairs; they were not permitted even to leave Italy except in the discharge of some public trust; and unless turned out of the Senate by the censors for character or conduct deemed disgraceful, they retained their powers and responsibilities to the end of life. In an aristocracy thus constituted, every member felt his personal importance entirely bound up with the dignity and estimation of the commonwealth which he administered, and with the part he was able to play in its councils. This dignity and estimation were quite different things from the prosperity or happiness of the general body of the citizens, and were often wholly incompatible with it. But they were closely linked with the external success and aggrandisement of the state; and it was, consequently, in the pursuit of that object almost exclusively, that either the Roman or the Venetian aristocracies manifested the systematically wise collective policy and the great individual capacities for government for which history has deservedly given them credit.
The governments that have stood out in history for their sustained intelligence and energy in managing affairs have typically been aristocracies. However, they have always been aristocracies made up of public officials. The ruling bodies were so small that each member, or at least each influential member, could make public business a full-time profession and the primary focus of their lives. The only aristocracies that showed strong governing abilities and consistently followed solid policy principles over many generations are those of Rome and Venice. In Venice, even though the privileged class was large, the actual management of affairs was strictly controlled by a small oligarchy within the larger group, whose entire lives were dedicated to understanding and managing state affairs. The Roman government was more like an open aristocracy similar to ours. However, the governing body, the Senate, was exclusively made up of individuals who had held public positions and had either already held or were aspiring to the highest offices of the state, fully aware of the severe consequences of failure. Once they became Senators, their lives were dedicated to overseeing public affairs; they weren't allowed to leave Italy unless fulfilling some public duty, and unless expelled from the Senate by the censors for misconduct, they kept their powers and responsibilities for life. In such an aristocracy, every member felt their personal importance tied to the dignity and reputation of the commonwealth they managed, as well as their role in its decision-making. This dignity and reputation were quite different from the overall prosperity or happiness of the citizens, and were often at odds with it. However, they were closely linked to the external success and expansion of the state; thus, both the Roman and Venetian aristocracies mostly focused on achieving that goal, which is why history credits them with wise collective policies and significant individual governance skills.
It thus appears that the only governments, not representative, in which high political skill and ability have been other than exceptional, whether under monarchical or aristocratic forms, have been essentially bureaucracies. The work of government has been in the hands of governors by profession, which is the essence and meaning of bureaucracy. Whether the work is done by them because they have been trained to it, or they are trained to it because it is to be done by them, makes a great difference in many respects, but none at all as to the essential character of the rule. Aristocracies, on the other hand, like that of England, in which the class who possessed the power derived it merely from their social position, without being specially trained or devoting themselves exclusively to it (and in which, therefore, the power was not exercised directly, but through representative institutions oligarchically constituted), have been, in respect to intellectual endowments, much on a par with democracies; that is, they have manifested such qualities in any considerable degree only during the temporary ascendancy which great and popular talents, united with a distinguished position, have given to some one man. Themistocles and Pericles, Washington and Jefferson, were not more completely exceptions in their several democracies, and were assuredly much more splendid exceptions, than the Chathams and Peels of the representative aristocracy of Great Britain, or even the Sullys and Colberts of the aristocratic monarchy of France. A great minister, in the aristocratic governments of modern Europe, is almost as rare a phenomenon as a great king.
It seems that the only non-representative governments where exceptional political skill and ability are more common, whether under monarchies or aristocracies, have been mainly bureaucracies. The governance has been handled by professional governors, which is the essence of bureaucracy. Whether they perform their roles because of their training or they receive training specifically for this role makes a significant difference in many ways, but doesn't alter the essential nature of the rule. Aristocracies, like that of England, where those in power gained it solely from their social status without being specially trained or dedicated to it (and where power was therefore not exercised directly, but through oligarchically constituted representative institutions), have shown intellectual capabilities comparable to democracies; that is, they’ve exhibited such qualities significantly only during periods when great and popular talents combined with high status have elevated one individual. Themistocles and Pericles, Washington and Jefferson, were no more complete exceptions in their respective democracies, and were certainly much more remarkable exceptions, than the Chathams and Peels of Britain’s representative aristocracy, or even the Sullys and Colberts of France’s aristocratic monarchy. A great minister in the aristocratic governments of modern Europe is almost as rare as a great king.
The comparison, therefore, as to the intellectual attributes of a government has to be made between a representative democracy and a bureaucracy; all other governments may be left out of the account. And here it must be acknowledged that a bureaucratic government has, in some important respects, greatly the advantage. It accumulates experience, acquires well-tried and well-considered traditional maxims, and makes provision for appropriate practical knowledge in those who have the actual conduct of affairs. But it is not equally favorable to individual energy of mind. The disease which afflicts bureaucratic governments, and which they usually die of, is routine. They perish by the immutability of their maxims, and, still more, by the universal law that whatever becomes a routine loses its vital principle, and, having no longer a mind acting within it, goes on revolving mechanically, though the work it is intended to do remains undone. A bureaucracy always tends to become a pedantocracy. When the bureaucracy is the real government, the spirit of the corps (as with the Jesuits) bears down the individuality of its more distinguished members. In the profession of government, as in other professions, the sole idea of the majority is to do what they have been taught; and it requires a popular government to enable the conceptions of the man of original genius among them to prevail over the obstructive spirit of trained mediocrity. Only in a popular government (setting apart the accident of a highly intelligent despot) could Sir Rowland Hill have been victorious over the Post-office. A popular government installed him in the Post-office, and made the body, in spite of itself, obey the impulse given by the man who united special knowledge with individual vigor and originality. That the Roman aristocracy escaped this characteristic disease of a bureaucracy was evidently owing to its popular element. All special offices, both those which gave a seat in the Senate and those which were sought by senators, were conferred by popular election. The Russian government is a characteristic exemplification of both the good and bad side of bureaucracy: its fixed maxims, directed with Roman perseverance to the same unflinchingly-pursued ends from age to age; the remarkable skill with which those ends are generally pursued; the frightful internal corruption, and the permanent organized hostility to improvements from without, which even the autocratic power of a vigorous-minded emperor is seldom or never sufficient to overcome; the patient obstructiveness of the body being in the long run more than a match for the fitful energy of one man. The Chinese government, a bureaucracy of Mandarins, is, as far as known to us, another apparent example of the same qualities and defects.
The comparison, then, regarding the intellectual qualities of a government needs to be made between a representative democracy and a bureaucracy; we can disregard all other types of governments. Here, it must be recognized that a bureaucratic government has, in some significant ways, notable advantages. It gathers experience, adopts time-tested and well-thought-out traditional principles, and ensures that those who actually manage affairs possess the right practical knowledge. However, it does not equally support individual mental initiative. The issue that plagues bureaucratic governments, ultimately leading to their downfall, is routine. They decline due to the rigidity of their principles and even more so because of the universal truth that anything that becomes routine loses its essential life force, and without a mind actively engaging in it, it continues to operate mechanically while the intended work remains unfinished. A bureaucracy tends to evolve into a pedantocracy. When the bureaucracy is in charge, the collective spirit (like with the Jesuits) stifles the individuality of its most distinguished members. In the field of governance, as in other professions, the primary goal of most is simply to follow what they’ve been taught; it takes a popular government to allow the ideas of those with original genius among them to rise above the obstructive mindset of trained mediocrity. Only in a popular government (setting aside the chance of a highly intelligent despot) could Sir Rowland Hill have succeeded at the Post-office. A popular government placed him in the Post-office and, despite itself, made the institution follow the direction set by someone who combined specialized knowledge with personal drive and creativity. The Roman aristocracy managed to avoid this common bureaucratic issue, largely because of its popular element. All special offices, including those that granted a seat in the Senate and those sought by senators, were filled through popular election. The Russian government serves as a clear example of both the strengths and weaknesses of bureaucracy: its steadfast principles, pursued with Roman determination toward the same unwavering objectives over the ages; the impressive skill with which those goals are generally chased; the alarming internal corruption, and the ongoing organized resistance to external improvements, which even the autocratic power of a strong-minded emperor rarely or never manages to overcome; the persistent obstruction of the bureaucracy ultimately outlasting the sporadic efforts of any one individual. The Chinese government, a bureaucracy of Mandarins, is, as far as we know, another clear illustration of these same strengths and weaknesses.
In all human affairs, conflicting influences are required to keep one another alive and efficient even for their own proper uses; and the exclusive pursuit of one good object, apart from some other which should accompany it, ends not in excess of one and defect of the other, but in the decay and loss even of that which has been exclusively cared for. Government by trained officials can not do for a country the things which can be done by a free government, but it might be supposed capable of doing some things which free government of itself can not do. We find, however, that an outside element of freedom is necessary to enable it to do effectually or permanently even its own business. And so, also, freedom can not produce its best effects, and often breaks down altogether, unless means can be found of combining it with trained and skilled administration. There could not be a moment's hesitation between representative government, among a people in any degree ripe for it, and the most perfect imaginable bureaucracy. But it is, at the same time, one of the most important ends of political institutions, to attain as many of the qualities of the one as are consistent with the other; to secure, as far as they can be made compatible, the great advantage of the conduct of affairs by skilled persons, bred to it as an intellectual profession, along with that of a general control vested in, and seriously exercised by, bodies representative of the entire people. Much would be done towards this end by recognizing the line of separation, discussed in the preceding chapter, between the work of government properly so called, which can only be well performed after special cultivation, and that of selecting, watching, and, when needful, controlling the governors, which in this case, as in all others, properly devolves, not on those who do the work, but on those for whose benefit it ought to be done. No progress at all can be made towards obtaining a skilled democracy, unless the democracy are willing that the work which requires skill should be done by those who possess it. A democracy has enough to do in providing itself with an amount of mental competency sufficient for its own proper work, that of superintendence and check.
In all human activities, different influences are needed to keep each other alive and effective for their own proper purposes. Pursuing just one good thing without another to go along with it often leads to an excess of one and a shortage of the other, resulting in the decline and loss of even the thing that was solely focused on. Government run by trained officials can’t accomplish what a free government can, but it might handle certain tasks that a free government on its own cannot. However, we find that an outside element of freedom is essential for it to effectively or permanently manage its own business. Similarly, freedom can't achieve its best outcomes and often completely fails unless there are ways to combine it with trained and skilled administration. There should be no doubt between choosing representative government, where the people are somewhat prepared for it, and the most perfect bureaucracy imaginable. But it’s also crucial for political institutions to gain as many qualities of one as can coexist with the other; to ensure, as much as possible, the benefits of having skilled individuals run affairs as an intellectual profession, alongside general oversight by bodies that represent the entire population. Much can be achieved by recognizing the separation discussed in the previous chapter between the work of government, which requires special training, and the work of selecting, monitoring, and controlling the governors. This responsibility should lie not with those who perform the work, but with those for whose benefit it’s done. A skilled democracy can't progress unless the democracy agrees that skilled tasks should be undertaken by those who are capable. A democracy has enough to manage in ensuring it has the mental competence needed for its own main job, which is oversight and accountability.
How to obtain and secure this amount is one of the questions to taken into consideration in judging of the proper constitution of a representative body. In proportion as its composition fails to secure this amount, the assembly will encroach, by special acts, on the province of the executive; it will expel a good, or elevate and uphold a bad ministry; it will connive at, or overlook in them, abuses of trust, will be deluded by their false pretenses, or will withhold support from those who endeavour to fulfill their trust conscientiously; it will countenance or impose a selfish, a capricious and impulsive, a short-sighted, ignorant, and prejudiced general policy, foreign and domestic; it will abrogate good laws, or enact bad ones; let in new evils, or cling with perverse obstinacy to old; it will even, perhaps, under misleading impulses, momentary or permanent, emanating from itself or from its constituents, tolerate or connive at proceedings which set law aside altogether, in cases where equal justice would not be agreeable to popular feeling. Such are among the dangers of representative government, arising from a constitution of the representation which does not secure an adequate amount of intelligence and knowledge in the representative assembly.
How to obtain and secure this amount is one of the questions to consider when assessing the proper structure of a representative body. As its composition fails to secure this amount, the assembly will overstep its bounds, by special acts, into the executive's territory; it will remove a capable ministry or support a bad one; it will ignore or overlook their abuses of trust, be fooled by their false claims, or deny support to those who try to fulfill their duties honestly; it will endorse or impose a selfish, erratic, impulsive, short-sighted, uninformed, and biased overall policy, both foreign and domestic; it will repeal good laws or create bad ones; allow new problems to arise or stubbornly cling to old ones; it may even, driven by misleading forces—whether temporary or lasting, from itself or its constituents—tolerate or overlook actions that completely disregard the law, especially in situations where fair justice doesn’t align with public sentiment. These are some of the risks of representative government that stem from a representation structure that does not ensure an adequate level of intelligence and knowledge in the representative assembly.
We next proceed to the evils arising from the prevalence of modes of action in the representative body, dictated by sinister interests (to employ the useful phrase introduced by Bentham), that is, interests conflicting more or less with the general good of the community.
We now move on to the problems caused by the ways of acting in the representative body, driven by self-serving interests (to use the helpful term coined by Bentham), meaning interests that are more or less at odds with the overall well-being of the community.
It is universally admitted that, of the evils incident to monarchical and aristocratic governments, a large proportion arise from this cause. The interest of the monarch, or the interest of the aristocracy, either collective or that of its individual members, is promoted, or they themselves think that it will be promoted, by conduct opposed to that which the general interest of the community requires. The interest, for example, of the government is to tax heavily; that of the community is to be as little taxed as the necessary expenses of good government permit. The interest of the king and of the governing aristocracy is to possess and exercise unlimited power over the people; to enforce, on their part, complete conformity to the will and preferences of the rulers. The interest of the people is to have as little control exercised over them in any respect as is consistent with attaining the legitimate ends of government. The interest, or apparent and supposed interest of the king or aristocracy, is to permit no censure of themselves, at least in any form which they may consider either to threaten their power or seriously to interfere with their free agency. The interest of the people is that there should be full liberty of censure on every public officer, and on every public act or measure. The interest of a ruling class, whether in an aristocracy or an aristocratic monarchy, is to assume to themselves an endless variety of unjust privileges, sometimes benefiting their pockets at the expense of the people, sometimes merely tending to exalt them above others, or, what is the same thing in different words, to degrade others below themselves. If the people are disaffected, which under such a government they are very likely to be, it is the interest of the king or aristocracy to keep them at a low level of intelligence and education, foment dissensions among them, and even prevent them from being too well off, lest they should "wax fat, and kick," agreeably to the maxim of Cardinal Richelieu in his celebrated "Testament Politique." All these things are for the interest of a king or aristocracy, in a purely selfish point of view, unless a sufficiently strong counter-interest is created by the fear of provoking resistance. All these evils have been, and many of them still are, produced by the sinister interests of kings and aristocracies, where their power is sufficient to raise them above the opinion of the rest of the community; nor is it rational to expect, as a consequence of such a position, any other conduct.
It’s widely accepted that many problems associated with monarchies and aristocracies stem from this issue. The interests of the monarch or the aristocracy, whether as a group or as individuals, are often advanced by actions that go against what the community at large needs. For instance, the government’s interest is to impose heavy taxes, while the community's interest is to be taxed as little as possible, only covering the necessary costs of good governance. The interests of the king and the ruling aristocracy lie in having and exercising unchecked power over the people, and they want total compliance with their desires. Conversely, the people’s interest is to have minimal control imposed on them, as long as it aligns with achieving the rightful goals of government. The interests—or what the king or aristocracy perceives as their interests—include preventing any criticism of themselves, especially in ways they view as threats to their power or freedom. The people, on the other hand, want the freedom to criticize public officials and any governmental actions or policies. The ruling class, whether in an aristocracy or a monarchy, tends to claim numerous unjust privileges, which sometimes enrich them at the people's expense, elevate them above others, or, in different terms, lower others in status. If the populace becomes dissatisfied, which is likely in such a system, the king or aristocracy has a vested interest in keeping them less informed and educated, stirring up divisions among them, and even ensuring they don’t become too comfortable, fearing they might get too empowered, as Cardinal Richelieu famously noted in his "Testament Politique." All these actions serve the self-interests of a king or aristocracy unless a strong opposing force arises from the fear of resistance. These problems have arisen, and many persist, due to the self-serving interests of kings and aristocracies, especially where they hold enough power to dismiss the opinions of the broader community; thus, it’s unrealistic to anticipate different behavior in such situations.
These things are superabundantly evident in the case of a monarchy or an aristocracy; but it is sometimes rather gratuitously assumed that the same kind of injurious influences do not operate in a democracy. Looking at democracy in the way in which it is commonly conceived, as the rule of the numerical majority, it is surely possible that the ruling power may be under the dominion of sectional or class interests, pointing to conduct different from that which would be dictated by impartial regard for the interest of all. Suppose the majority to be whites, the minority negroes, or vice versâ: is it likely that the majority would allow equal justice to the minority? Suppose the majority Catholics, the minority Protestants, or the reverse; will there not be the same danger? Or let the majority be English, the minority Irish, or the contrary: is there not a great probability of similar evil? In all countries there is a majority of poor, a minority who, in contradistinction, may be called rich. Between these two classes, on many questions, there is complete opposition of apparent interest. We will suppose the majority sufficiently intelligent to be aware that it is not for their advantage to weaken the security of property, and that it would be weakened by any act of arbitrary spoliation. But is there not a considerable danger lest they should throw upon the possessors of what is called realized property, and upon the larger incomes, an unfair share, or even the whole, of the burden of taxation, and having done so, add to the amount without scruple, expending the proceeds in modes supposed to conduce to the profit and advantage of the laboring class? Suppose, again, a minority of skilled laborers, a majority of unskilled: the experience of many Trade Unions, unless they are greatly calumniated, justifies the apprehension that equality of earnings might be imposed as an obligation, and that piecework, and all practices which enable superior industry or abilities to gain a superior reward, might be put down. Legislative attempts to raise wages, limitation of competition in the labor market, taxes or restrictions on machinery, and on improvements of all kinds tending to dispense with any of the existing labor—even, perhaps, protection of the home producer against foreign industry—are very natural (I do not venture to say whether probable) results of a feeling of class interest in a governing majority of manual laborers.
These issues are extremely clear in a monarchy or an aristocracy, but it's often assumed, somewhat unfairly, that these harmful influences don’t exist in a democracy. When we think about democracy as simply the rule of the numerical majority, it's certainly possible that those in power may be driven by sectional or class interests, leading to behavior that doesn’t reflect a fair consideration for the well-being of everyone. If we assume the majority are white and the minority are black, or vice versa, would the majority likely grant equal justice to the minority? If the majority are Catholics and the minority are Protestants, or the other way around, wouldn’t there be the same risk? Or if the majority are English and the minority are Irish, or the reverse, is there not a good chance of similar issues arising? In every country, there’s a majority of poor people and a minority who can be labeled as rich. Between these two groups, there is often a stark conflict of interests. Let’s say the majority are knowledgeable enough to understand that it wouldn't benefit them to undermine property rights, as that could jeopardize their own security. However, wouldn’t there be a significant risk that they might place an unfair burden of taxation on those who own what is referred to as real property, and on those with higher incomes? They could impose this burden without hesitation, spending the revenue on initiatives believed to benefit the working class. Now, imagine a scenario where there’s a minority of skilled workers and a majority of unskilled ones: the experiences of many trade unions, if they aren’t greatly misrepresented, support the concern that equal pay could be enforced as a requirement, and that systems rewarding higher productivity or talent could be eliminated. Legislative efforts to raise wages, limit competition in the labor market, impose taxes or restrictions on machinery, and limit improvements that could reduce the need for labor—even possibly protecting domestic producers from foreign competition—are all likely (though I won’t claim they are certain) outcomes of a majority of manual laborers acting in what they see as their class interest.
It will be said that none of these things are for the real interest of the most numerous class: to which I answer, that if the conduct of human beings was determined by no other interested considerations than those which constitute their "real" interest, neither monarchy nor oligarchy would be such bad governments as they are; for assuredly very strong arguments may be, and often have been, adduced to show that either a king or a governing senate are in much the most enviable position when ruling justly and vigilantly over an active, wealthy, enlightened, and high-minded people. But a king only now and then, and an oligarchy in no known instance, have taken this exalted view of their self-interest; and why should we expect a loftier mode of thinking from the laboring classes? It is not what their interest is, but what they suppose it to be, that is the important consideration with respect to their conduct; and it is quite conclusive against any theory of government that it assumes the numerical majority to do habitually what is never done, nor expected to be done, save in very exceptional cases, by any other depositaries of power—namely, to direct their conduct by their real ultimate interest, in opposition to their immediate and apparent interest. No one, surely, can doubt that many of the pernicious measures above enumerated, and many others as bad, would be for the immediate interest of the general body of unskilled laborers. It is quite possible that they would be for the selfish interest of the whole existing generation of the class. The relaxation of industry and activity, and diminished encouragement to saving which would be their ultimate consequence, might perhaps be little felt by the class of unskilled laborers in the space of a single lifetime. Some of the most fatal changes in human affairs have been, as to their more manifest immediate effects, beneficial. The establishment of the despotism of the Cæsars was a great benefit to the entire generation in which it took place. It put a stop to civil war, abated a vast amount of malversation and tyranny by prætors and proconsuls; it fostered many of the graces of life, and intellectual cultivation in all departments not political; it produced monuments of literary genius dazzling to the imaginations of shallow readers of history, who do not reflect that the men to whom the despotism of Augustus (as well as of Lorenzo de' Medici and of Louis XIV.) owes its brilliancy were all formed in the generation preceding. The accumulated riches, and the mental energy and activity produced by centuries of freedom, remained for the benefit of the first generation of slaves. Yet this was the commencement of a régime by whose gradual operation all the civilization which had been gained insensibly faded away, until the empire, which had conquered and embraced the world in its grasp so completely lost even its military efficiency that invaders whom three or four legions had always sufficed to coerce were able to overrun and occupy nearly the whole of its vast territory. The fresh impulse given by Christianity came but just in time to save arts and letters from perishing, and the human race from sinking back into perhaps endless night.
It might be said that none of this serves the *real* interest of the largest group of people. To that, I respond that if human behavior was only driven by the interests that represent their "real" needs, neither monarchy nor oligarchy would be as poor in governance as they are. After all, strong arguments exist, and have often been made, claiming that a king or a ruling senate would be in a much better position when they govern fairly and attentively over an active, wealthy, educated, and principled population. Yet, a king only occasionally, and an oligarchy never, have taken this noble perspective on their self-interest. So why should we expect a higher level of thinking from the working class? What matters is not what their true interests are, but what they believe them to be, when it comes to their actions. It's quite telling against any government theory that expects the majority to regularly act in a way that no other holders of power—such as kings or senates—ever do, except in very rare cases: that is, to guide their behavior by their true long-term interests instead of their immediate and obvious benefits. Surely, no one can doubt that many of the harmful policies mentioned earlier, along with many others equally bad, would be in the immediate interest of unskilled laborers. It's entirely possible that they would serve the selfish interest of the current generation in that class. The reduction in work and less incentive to save that would ultimately result from these policies might not be felt much by unskilled laborers within a single lifetime. Some of the most devastating changes in human history have initially appeared beneficial. The rise of the Cæsars' despotism was a significant advantage to the generation that experienced it. It ended civil wars, reduced a lot of corruption and oppression from governors, and encouraged the development of cultural and intellectual pursuits outside the political realm. It created amazing works of literary brilliance that impress superficial readers of history, who fail to realize that the individuals responsible for the glory of Augustus's despotism (as well as that of Lorenzo de' Medici and Louis XIV) were mostly raised in the preceding generation. The wealth and intellectual vitality accumulated over centuries of freedom were left to the first generation of slaves. Yet this marked the beginning of a regime that, through its gradual effects, caused all the civilization that had been achieved to subtly fade away, until the empire that had conquered and controlled the world so thoroughly lost even its military strength, allowing invaders that could have been stopped by three or four legions to overrun and occupy nearly its entire territory. The revitalization brought on by Christianity arrived just in time to rescue the arts and letters from extinction, and humanity from potentially slipping into an endless night.
When we talk of the interest of a body of men, or even of an individual man, as a principle determining their actions, the question what would be considered their interest by an unprejudiced observer is one of the least important parts of the whole matter. As Coleridge observes, the man makes the motive, not the motive the man. What it is the man's interest to do or refrain from depends less on any outward circumstances than upon what sort of man he is. If you wish to know what is practically a man's interest, you must know the cast of his habitual feelings and thoughts. Every body has two kinds of interests—interests which he cares for and interests which he does not care for. Every body has selfish and unselfish interests, and a selfish man has cultivated the habit of caring for the former and not caring for the latter. Every one has present and distant interests, and the improvident man is he who cares for the present interests and does not care for the distant. It matters little that on any correct calculation the latter may be the more considerable, if the habits of his mind lead him to fix his thoughts and wishes solely on the former. It would be vain to attempt to persuade a man who beats his wife and ill-treats his children that he would be happier if he lived in love and kindness with them. He would be happier if he were the kind of person who could so live; but he is not, and it is probably too late for him to become that kind of person. Being what he is, the gratification of his love of domineering and the indulgence of his ferocious temper are to his perceptions a greater good to himself than he would be capable of deriving from the pleasure and affection of those dependent on him. He has no pleasure in their pleasure, and does not care for their affection. His neighbor, who does, is probably a happier man than he; but could he be persuaded of this, the persuasion would, most likely, only still further exasperate his malignity or his irritability. On the average, a person who cares for other people, for his country, or for mankind, is a happier man than one who does not; but of what use is it to preach this doctrine to a man who cares for nothing but his own ease or his own pocket? He can not care for other people if he would. It is like preaching to the worm who crawls on the ground how much better it would be for him if he were an eagle.
When we talk about the interests of a group of people, or even just one person, as a factor in their actions, the question of what an unbiased observer would see as their interest is one of the least important aspects of the whole situation. As Coleridge points out, a person shapes their motivations, not the motivations shaping the person. What a person finds in their best interest depends less on external factors and more on what kind of person they are. If you want to understand what a person's real interest is, you need to know their typical feelings and thoughts. Everyone has two kinds of interests—those they care about and those they don’t. Everyone has self-serving and selfless interests, and a self-serving person has developed a pattern of caring about the former while ignoring the latter. Everyone has immediate and long-term interests, and an imprudent person is someone who focuses only on immediate interests, ignoring the long-term ones. It doesn’t matter much that, according to any accurate calculation, the long-term interests might be more significant if their mindset leads them to concentrate solely on the immediate ones. It would be pointless to try to convince a man who abuses his wife and mistreats his children that he would be happier living with love and kindness toward them. He would indeed be happier if he were the kind of person who could live that way; however, he isn’t, and it’s likely too late for him to change. As he is, satisfying his need to dominate and indulging his angry temperament appears to him to be more beneficial than any joy or affection he could receive from those who rely on him. He finds no joy in their happiness and doesn’t care about their love. His neighbor, who does care, is probably a happier person than he is; but if he could be convinced of this, it would most likely only make his bitterness or irritability even worse. On average, a person who cares for others, his community, or humanity is happier than someone who doesn’t; but what good does it do to preach this idea to someone who cares only about their own comfort or finances? They can’t care for others even if they wanted to. It’s like telling a worm on the ground how much better it would be for it if it were an eagle.
Now it is a universally observed fact that the two evil dispositions in question, the disposition to prefer a man's selfish interests to those which he shares with other people, and his immediate and direct interests to those which are indirect and remote, are characteristics most especially called forth and fostered by the possession of power. The moment a man, or a class of men, find themselves with power in their hands, the man's individual interest, or the class's separate interest, acquires an entirely new degree of importance in their eyes. Finding themselves worshipped by others, they become worshippers of themselves, and think themselves entitled to be counted at a hundred times the value of other people, while the facility they acquire of doing as they like without regard to consequences insensibly weakens the habits which make men look forward even to such consequences as affect themselves. This is the meaning of the universal tradition, grounded on universal experience, of men's being corrupted by power. Every one knows how absurd it would be to infer from what a man is or does when in a private station, that he will be and do exactly the like when a despot on a throne; where the bad parts of his human nature, instead of being restrained and kept in subordination by every circumstance of his life and by every person surrounding him, are courted by all persons, and ministered to by all circumstances. It would be quite as absurd to entertain a similar expectation in regard to a class of men; the Demos, or any other. Let them be ever so modest and amenable to reason while there is a power over them stronger than they, we ought to expect a total change in this respect when they themselves become the strongest power.
Now it’s a well-known fact that the two negative traits in question—the tendency to prioritize one’s own selfish interests over those shared with others, and to value immediate and direct interests over indirect and distant ones—are especially triggered and nurtured by the possession of power. The moment a person, or a group of people, finds themselves holding power, their individual or group interests take on an entirely new level of importance. When they see themselves being admired by others, they start to idolize themselves, believing they deserve to be valued far more than others, while their ability to act without considering the consequences gradually undermines the habits that normally encourage people to think about outcomes, even those that affect them. This explains the widespread belief, rooted in common experience, that power corrupts people. Everyone knows how ridiculous it would be to assume that a person’s behavior when they’re in a private position will be exactly the same when they’re a tyrant on a throne, where the negative aspects of their nature, instead of being restrained and kept in check by their circumstances and the people around them, are actually encouraged by everyone and supported by all situations. It would be just as absurd to have similar expectations regarding any group of people, whether it’s the masses or anyone else. No matter how reasonable and humble they may be when under a stronger power, we should anticipate a complete transformation in this regard when they themselves become the dominant power.
Governments must be made for human beings as they are, or as they are capable of speedily becoming; and in any state of cultivation which mankind, or any class among them, have yet attained, or are likely soon to attain, the interests by which they will be led, when they are thinking only of self-interest, will be almost exclusively those which are obvious at first sight, and which operate on their present condition. It is only a disinterested regard for others, and especially for what comes after them, for the idea of posterity, of their country, or of mankind, whether grounded on sympathy or on a conscientious feeling, which ever directs the minds and purposes of classes or bodies of men towards distant or unobvious interests; and it can not be maintained that any form of government would be rational which required as a condition that these exalted principles of action should be the guiding and master motives in the conduct of average human beings. A certain amount of conscience and of disinterested public spirit may fairly be calculated on in the citizens of any community ripe for representative government. But it would be ridiculous to expect such a degree of it, combined with such intellectual discernment, as would be proof against any plausible fallacy tending to make that which was for their class interest appear the dictate of justice and of the general good. We all know what specious fallacies may be urged in defense of every act of injustice yet proposed for the imaginary benefit of the mass. We know how many, not otherwise fools or bad men, have thought it justifiable to repudiate the national debt. We know how many, not destitute of ability and of considerable popular influence, think it fair to throw the whole burden of taxation upon savings, under the name of realized property, allowing those whose progenitors and themselves have always spent all they received, to remain, as a reward for such exemplary conduct, wholly untaxed. We know what powerful arguments, the more dangerous because there is a portion of truth in them, may be brought against all inheritance, against the power of bequest, against every advantage which one person seems to have over another. We know how easily the uselessness of almost every branch of knowledge may be proved to the complete satisfaction of those who do not possess it. How many, not altogether stupid men, think the scientific study of languages useless, think ancient literature useless, all erudition useless, logic and metaphysics useless, poetry and the fine arts idle and frivolous, political economy purely mischievous? Even history has been pronounced useless and mischievous by able men. Nothing but that acquaintance with external nature, empirically acquired, which serves directly for the production of objects necessary to existence or agreeable to the senses, would get its utility recognized if people had the least encouragement to disbelieve it. Is it reasonable to think that even much more cultivated minds than those of the numerical majority can be expected to be, will have so delicate a conscience, and so just an appreciation of what is against their own apparent interest, that they will reject these and the innumerable other fallacies which will press in upon them from all quarters as soon as they come into power, to induce them to follow their own selfish inclinations and short-sighted notions of their own good, in opposition to justice, at the expense of all other classes and of posterity?
Governments should be designed for people as they are or as they can quickly become. In any state of development that humanity, or any group within it, has reached or is likely to reach soon, the motivations that will guide them when thinking about their own interests will mostly be those that are immediately clear and relevant to their current situation. Only a selfless concern for others—especially for what comes after them, for the future generations, their country, or humanity as a whole, whether based on empathy or a sense of duty—can truly lead groups of people to consider long-term or less obvious interests. It can’t be argued that any form of government would be reasonable if it required these noble principles to be the main driving forces in the behavior of ordinary people. A reasonable level of conscience and unselfish civic spirit can be expected from citizens in any community ready for representative government. However, it would be absurd to expect such a level combined with the intellectual insight necessary to be immune to any convincing argument that frames their class interests as matters of justice and the common good. We all know how misleading arguments can be made to justify acts of injustice that are proposed for the supposed benefit of the majority. Many, who aren’t otherwise foolish or malicious, have found it justifiable to reject the national debt. Many capable individuals with significant public influence think it fair to shift the entire tax burden onto accumulated savings, labeling it as "realized property," while letting those who have always spent everything they earned remain entirely untaxed as a reward for their behavior. We see strong arguments—more dangerous because they contain some truth—against any form of inheritance, against the right to bequeath, and against advantages that some possess over others. We know how easily one can argue that almost any area of knowledge is pointless to those who don't have it. Many, who are not completely foolish, consider the scientific study of languages to be useless, view ancient literature as unimportant, see all scholarship as unnecessary, dismiss logic and metaphysics as irrelevant, and regard poetry and the fine arts as trivial and frivolous, while deeming political economy purely harmful. Even history has been labeled as useless and harmful by capable people. Only knowledge of the external world, acquired through experience and useful for creating essentials or providing sensory pleasure, would be recognized for its value if people had any encouragement to doubt it. Is it reasonable to assume that even much more educated minds than those of the numerical majority will have such a refined conscience and a fair understanding of what harms their apparent interests, that they will reject these and countless other arguments that will press in on them from all sides as soon as they gain power, attempting to lead them to prioritize their selfish desires and short-sighted views of their own well-being at the expense of justice and the welfare of others and future generations?
One of the greatest dangers, therefore, of democracy, as of all other forms of government, lies in the sinister interest of the holders of power: it is the danger of class legislation, of government intended for (whether really effecting it or not) the immediate benefit of the dominant class, to the lasting detriment of the whole. And one of the most important questions demanding consideration in determining the best constitution of a representative government is how to provide efficacious securities against this evil.
One of the biggest threats of democracy, like any other form of government, is the harmful interests of those in power: it's the threat of laws that benefit a specific class, whether or not they actually achieve this, to the long-term harm of everyone else. A key question that needs to be addressed when figuring out the best setup for a representative government is how to effectively protect against this issue.
If we consider as a class, politically speaking, any number of persons who have the same sinister interest—that is, whose direct and apparent interest points towards the same description of bad measures—the desirable object would be that no class, and no combination of classes likely to combine, shall be able to exercise a preponderant influence in the government. A modern community, not divided within itself by strong antipathies of race, language, or nationality, may be considered as in the main divisible into two sections, which, in spite of partial variations, correspond on the whole with two divergent directions of apparent interest. Let us call them (in brief general terms) laborers on the one hand, employers of labor on the other; including, however, along with employers of labor not only retired capitalists and the possessors of inherited wealth, but all that highly paid description of laborers (such as the professions) whose education and way of life assimilate them with the rich, and whose prospect and ambition it is to raise themselves into that class. With the laborers, on the other hand, may be ranked those smaller employers of labor who by interests, habits, and educational impressions are assimilated in wishes, tastes, and objects to the laboring classes, comprehending a large proportion of petty tradesmen. In a state of society thus composed, if the representative system could be made ideally perfect, and if it were possible to maintain it in that state, its organization must be such that these two classes, manual laborers and their affinities on one side, employers of labor and their affinities on the other, should be, in the arrangement of the representative system, equally balanced, each influencing about an equal number of votes in Parliament; since, assuming that the majority of each class, in any difference between them, would be mainly governed by their class interests, there would be a minority of each in whom that consideration would be subordinate to reason, justice, and the good of the whole; and this minority of either, joining with the whole of the other, would turn the scale against any demands of their own majority which were not such as ought to prevail. The reason why, in any tolerable constituted society, justice and the general interest mostly in the end carry their point, is that the separate and selfish interests of mankind are almost always divided; some are interested in what is wrong, but some, also, have their private interest on the side of what is right; and those who are governed by higher considerations, though too few and weak to prevail alone, usually, after sufficient discussion and agitation, become strong enough to turn the balance in favor of the body of private interests which is on the same side with them. The representative system ought to be so constituted as to maintain this state of things; it ought not to allow any of the various sectional interests to be so powerful as to be capable of prevailing against truth and justice, and the other sectional interests combined. There ought always to be such a balance preserved among personal interests as may render any one of them dependent for its successes on carrying with it at least a large proportion of those who act on higher motives, and more comprehensive and distant views.
If we look at groups of people politically, we can define a class as any group sharing the same harmful interest—essentially, those whose direct and obvious concerns lead them to support the same negative actions. Ideally, we want no class, or any potential combination of classes, to have overwhelming power in government. A modern society, which isn't deeply divided by major racial, linguistic, or national conflicts, generally breaks down into two main groups. Despite minor differences, these two groups usually represent opposing interests. Let’s simply refer to them as laborers on one side and employers of labor on the other. This includes not only wealthy retirees and those with inherited wealth but also well-paid professionals whose education and lifestyle align them with the rich and whose goal is to join that class. On the laborers' side, we can include smaller employers who, due to their interests, habits, and education, share desires, tastes, and goals with the working class, which includes many small business owners. In such a society, if we could make the representative system perfectly effective and maintain it that way, it would need to be structured so that these two classes—laborers and their allies on one side, employers and their allies on the other—are equally represented in Parliament, each influencing about the same number of votes. This is because, generally, the majority from each group would be driven by their class interests, but there would be a minority in each group whose views lean toward reason, justice, and the overall good. When these minorities from each side combine, they can counter the demands of their own majorities when those demands are unjustifiable. The reason justice and the common interest usually win out in a reasonably structured society is that individual selfish interests are often divided. Some people benefit from wrong actions, but others have personal stakes in what is right. Those guided by higher values, despite often being too few to win alone, typically gain the strength to sway the balance towards the collective interests aligned with those values after enough debate and effort. The representative system should be designed to uphold this state of affairs; no particular interest group should be so dominant that it can overcome truth, justice, and coalitions of other interest groups. There needs to be a balance among personal interests, ensuring that the success of any one interest depends on gaining widespread support from those motivated by broader and more altruistic goals.
Chapter VII—Of True and False Democracy; Representation of All, and Representation of the Majority only.
It has been seen that the dangers incident to a representative democracy are of two kinds: danger of a low grade of intelligence in the representative body, and in the popular opinion which controls it; and danger of class legislation on the part of the numerical majority, these being all composed of the same class. We have next to consider how far it is possible so to organize the democracy as, without interfering materially with the characteristic benefits of democratic government, to do away with these two great evils, or at least to abate them in the utmost degree attainable by human contrivance.
It has been observed that the risks associated with a representative democracy fall into two categories: the risk of low intelligence among the representatives and the public opinion that influences them, and the risk of class-based legislation by the majority, who are all from the same social group. Next, we need to explore how we can organize democracy in a way that minimizes these two significant issues without significantly compromising the essential advantages of democratic governance.
The common mode of attempting this is by limiting the democratic character of the representation through a more or less restricted suffrage. But there is a previous consideration which, duly kept in view, considerably modifies the circumstances which are supposed to render such a restriction necessary. A completely equal democracy, in a nation in which a single class composes the numerical majority, can not be divested of certain evils; but those evils are greatly aggravated by the fact that the democracies which at present exist are not equal, but systematically unequal in favor of the predominant class. Two very different ideas are usually confounded under the name democracy. The pure idea of democracy, according to its definition, is the government of the whole people by the whole people, equally represented. Democracy, as commonly conceived and hitherto practiced, is the government of the whole people by a mere majority of the people exclusively represented. The former is synonymous with the equality of all citizens; the latter, strangely confounded with it, is a government of privilege in favor of the numerical majority, who alone possess practically any voice in the state. This is the inevitable consequence of the manner in which the votes are now taken, to the complete disfranchisement of minorities.
The usual way to approach this is by limiting the democratic nature of representation through some form of restricted voting rights. However, there’s an important consideration that, when taken into account, significantly changes the situation that makes such restrictions seem necessary. A fully equal democracy in a country where one class makes up the numerical majority can't escape certain problems, but these issues are made much worse by the fact that the democracies we have today are not equal; they are systematically biased in favor of the dominant class. The term democracy often combines two very different concepts. The pure concept of democracy, by its definition, is the government of all the people by all the people, represented equally. In contrast, democracy as most people understand and practice it today is the government of all the people by just a majority of the people who are exclusively represented. The first represents the equality of all citizens; the second, which is confusingly mixed up with the first, is a government of privilege favoring the numerical majority, who are the only ones with a real say in governance. This is the unavoidable result of how votes are currently counted, completely disenfranchising minority groups.
The confusion of ideas here is great, but it is so easily cleared up that one would suppose the slightest indication would be sufficient to place the matter in its true light before any mind of average intelligence. It would be so but for the power of habit; owing to which, the simplest idea, if unfamiliar, has as great difficulty in making its way to the mind as a far more complicated one. That the minority must yield to the majority, the smaller number to the greater, is a familiar idea; and accordingly, men think there is no necessity for using their minds any further, and it does not occur to them that there is any medium between allowing the smaller number to be equally powerful with the greater, and blotting out the smaller number altogether. In a representative body actually deliberating, the minority must of course be overruled; and in an equal democracy (since the opinions of the constituents, when they insist on them, determine those of the representative body), the majority of the people, through their representatives, will outvote and prevail over the minority and their representatives. But does it follow that the minority should have no representatives at all? Because the majority ought to prevail over the minority, must the majority have all the votes, the minority none? Is it necessary that the minority should not even be heard? Nothing but habit and old association can reconcile any reasonable being to the needless injustice. In a really equal democracy, every or any section would be represented, not disproportionately, but proportionately. A majority of the electors would always have a majority of the representatives, but a minority of the electors would always have a minority of the representatives. Man for man, they would be as fully represented as the majority. Unless they are, there is not equal government, but a government of inequality and privilege: one part of the people rule over the rest: there is a part whose fair and equal share of influence in the representation is withheld from them, contrary to all just government, but, above all, contrary to the principle of democracy, which professes equality as its very root and foundation.
The confusion of ideas here is significant, but it's so easy to clarify that you would think even a small hint would be enough to present the issue clearly to anyone of average intelligence. It would be if not for the power of habit; because of that, even the simplest idea can struggle to be understood if it's unfamiliar, just like a more complex one. The idea that the minority must yield to the majority is well-known; as a result, people often think there's no need to engage their minds further, and they fail to realize there’s an alternative between allowing the smaller group to have equal power with the larger one and completely disregarding the smaller group. In a representative assembly where discussions are happening, the minority will, of course, be outvoted; and in a true democracy (since the views of the constituents, when they push for them, shape those of the representative body), the majority will always outvote and dominate the minority and their representatives. But does that mean the minority should have no representatives at all? Just because the majority should dominate the minority, does that mean the majority gets all the votes while the minority gets none? Is it necessary for the minority to not even be heard? Only habit and outdated beliefs can convince a reasonable person to accept such unfairness. In a truly equal democracy, every group would be represented fairly, not disproportionately but proportionately. A majority of voters would always have a majority of the representatives, but a minority of voters would also always have a minority of the representatives. Each individual would be just as fully represented as the majority. If they’re not, then there’s no equal governance, but rather a government of inequality and privilege: a portion of the people ruling over the rest, with some being denied their fair share of influence in representation, which goes against all just governance, and especially against the principle of democracy, which claims equality as its core foundation.
The injustice and violation of principle are not less flagrant because those who suffer by them are a minority, for there is not equal suffrage where every single individual does not count for as much as any other single individual in the community. But it is not only a minority who suffer. Democracy, thus constituted, does not even attain its ostensible object, that of giving the powers of government in all cases to the numerical majority. It does something very different; it gives them to a majority of the majority, who may be, and often are, but a minority of the whole. All principles are most effectually tested by extreme cases. Suppose, then, that, in a country governed by equal and universal suffrage, there is a contested election in every constituency, and every election is carried by a small majority. The Parliament thus brought together represents little more than a bare majority of the people. This Parliament proceeds to legislate, and adopts important measures by a bare majority of itself. What guaranty is there that these measures accord with the wishes of a majority of the people? Nearly half the electors, having been outvoted at the hustings, have had no influence at all in the decision; and the whole of these may be, a majority of them probably are, hostile to the measures, having voted against those by whom they have been carried. Of the remaining electors, nearly half have chosen representatives who, by supposition, have voted against the measures. It is possible, therefore, and even probable, that the opinion which has prevailed was agreeable only to a minority of the nation, though a majority of that portion of it whom the institutions of the country have erected into a ruling class. If democracy means the certain ascendancy of the majority, there are no means of insuring that, but by allowing every individual figure to tell equally in the summing up. Any minority left out, either purposely or by the play of the machinery, gives the power not to the majority, but to a minority in some other part of the scale.
The injustice and violation of principles are no less outrageous just because the people affected are a minority. Equal voting can't exist if every person doesn’t count equally in the community. However, it’s not just a minority that suffers. This form of democracy doesn’t even achieve its supposed goal of giving power to the numerical majority. Instead, it hands power over to a majority of the majority, which can often be just a minority of the entire population. All principles are best tested in extreme situations. Imagine that in a country with equal and universal voting rights, every constituency has a contested election, and all elections are won by a slim majority. The Parliament formed this way represents barely more than half of the people. This Parliament goes on to legislate and passes important measures with a bare majority. What guarantee is there that these decisions reflect the wishes of most people? Nearly half the voters, having lost at the polls, have had no say in the matter at all, and many of them might actually oppose the measures that passed. Among the remaining voters, almost half have supported representatives who, by assumption, voted against those measures. Therefore, it’s possible, and likely, that the prevailing opinion only reflects a minority of the nation, even though it represents a majority of the group that has been established as the ruling class by the country’s institutions. If democracy truly means the certain dominance of the majority, the only way to ensure that is by allowing every individual vote to count equally in the final tally. Any minority that is excluded, whether intentionally or through the system, hands power not to the majority but to another minority somewhere else in the process.
The only answer which can possibly be made to this reasoning is, that as different opinions predominate in different localities, the opinion which is in a minority in some places has a majority in others, and on the whole every opinion which exists in the constituencies obtains its fair share of voices in the representation. And this is roughly true in the present state of the constituency; if it were not, the discordance of the House with the general sentiment of the country would soon become evident. But it would be no longer true if the present constituency were much enlarged, still less if made co-extensive with the whole population; for in that case the majority in every locality would consist of manual laborers; and when there was any question pending on which these classes were at issue with the rest of the community, no other class could succeed in getting represented any where. Even now, is it not a great grievance that in every Parliament a very numerous portion of the electors, willing and anxious to be represented, have no member in the House for whom they have voted? Is it just that every elector of Marylebone is obliged to be represented by two nominees of the vestries, every elector of Finsbury or Lambeth by those (as is generally believed) of the publicans? The constituencies to which most of the highly educated and public spirited persons in the country belong, those of the large towns, are now, in great part, either unrepresented or misrepresented. The electors who are on a different side in party politics from the local majority are unrepresented. Of those who are on the same side, a large proportion are misrepresented; having been obliged to accept the man who had the greatest number of supporters in their political party, though his opinions may differ from theirs on every other point. The state of things is, in some respects, even worse than if the minority were not allowed to vote at all; for then, at least, the majority might have a member who would represent their own best mind; while now, the necessity of not dividing the party, for fear of letting in its opponents, induces all to vote either for the first person who presents himself wearing their colors, or for the one brought forward by their local leaders; and these, if we pay them the compliment, which they very seldom deserve, of supposing their choice to be unbiassed by their personal interests, are compelled, that they may be sure of mustering their whole strength, to bring forward a candidate whom none of the party will strongly object to—that is, a man without any distinctive peculiarity, any known opinions except the shibboleth of the party. This is strikingly exemplified in the United States; where, at the election of President, the strongest party never dares put forward any of its strongest men, because every one of these, from the mere fact that he has been long in the public eye, has made himself objectionable to some portion or other of the party, and is therefore not so sure a card for rallying all their votes as a person who has never been heard of by the public at all until he is produced as the candidate. Thus, the man who is chosen, even by the strongest party, represents perhaps the real wishes only of the narrow margin by which that party outnumbers the other. Any section whose support is necessary to success possesses a veto on the candidate. Any section which holds out more obstinately than the rest can compel all the others to adopt its nominee; and this superior pertinacity is unhappily more likely to be found among those who are holding out for their own interest than for that of the public. Speaking generally, the choice of the majority is determined by that portion of the body who are the most timid, the most narrow-minded and prejudiced, or who cling most tenaciously to the exclusive class-interest; and the electoral rights of the minority, while useless for the purposes for which votes are given, serve only for compelling the majority to accept the candidate of the weakest or worst portion of themselves.
The only response to this reasoning is that, since different opinions prevail in different areas, an opinion that is a minority in some places has a majority in others. Overall, every opinion that exists in the constituencies gets its fair share of representation. This is roughly true in the current state of the constituency; if it weren't, the disconnect between the House and the general sentiment of the country would quickly become clear. However, this wouldn't hold true if the current constituency were significantly expanded, let alone if it encompassed the entire population; in that case, the majority in each locality would be made up of manual laborers. When any issue arises where these classes clash with the rest of the community, no other class would successfully get represented anywhere. Even now, isn’t it a major issue that in every Parliament, a large segment of the voters, eager to be represented, has no member in the House for whom they've voted? Is it fair that every voter in Marylebone must be represented by two nominees from the vestries, while each voter in Finsbury or Lambeth must be represented by those believed to be aligned with the publicans? The constituencies where most of the highly educated and civic-minded individuals in the country live, especially in large towns, are now largely either unrepresented or misrepresented. Voters who hold different political views from the local majority are unrepresented. Among those who share the same views, many are misrepresented; they have to support the candidate with the most backing in their political party, even if his opinions differ from theirs on other issues. In some ways, the situation is even worse than if the minority were not allowed to vote at all; at least then, the majority could have a member representing their true interests. Now, the need to maintain party unity out of fear of allowing opponents to gain ground leads everyone to vote for either the first person who shows up wearing their party's colors or for the one put forward by local leaders. These leaders, if we give them the rare credit of assuming their choice isn’t swayed by personal interests, must ensure they have majority support by selecting a candidate who won’t strongly upset any party members; that is, a person without any distinctive traits or known opinions beyond the party line. This is clearly illustrated in the United States, where the strongest party never dares to nominate any of its strongest members for president because each of these candidates, having been in the public eye for a long time, has likely become unappealing to some part of the party. Therefore, they’re not as reliable for capturing all the votes as someone who has never been heard of before being announced as the candidate. Consequently, even the candidate chosen by the strongest party may reflect the true wishes only of the narrow margin by which that party outnumbers the opposition. Any group whose support is crucial for success has a veto power over the candidate. Any group that holds out more stubbornly than the others can force everyone else to accept its nominee; unfortunately, this stubbornness is often more prevalent among those pursuing their self-interests than the public's. Overall, the majority's choice is often influenced by those who are most timid, narrow-minded, and prejudiced, or who cling tightly to their exclusive class interests. The electoral rights of the minority, while ineffective for the purposes of voting, only serve to compel the majority to accept the candidate who is the weakest or worst representation of themselves.
That, while recognizing these evils, many should consider them as the necessary price paid for a free government, is in no way surprising; it was the opinion of all the friends of freedom up to a recent period. But the habit of passing them over as irremediable has become so inveterate, that many persons seem to have lost the capacity of looking at them as things which they would be glad to remedy if they could. From despairing of a cure, there is too often but one step to denying the disease; and from this follows dislike to having a remedy proposed, as if the proposer were creating a mischief instead of offering relief from one. People are so inured to the evils that they feel as if it were unreasonable, if not wrong, to complain of them. Yet, avoidable or not, he must be a purblind lover of liberty on whose mind they do not weigh; who would not rejoice at the discovery that they could be dispensed with. Now, nothing is more certain than that the virtual blotting out of the minority is no necessary or natural consequence of freedom; that, far from having any connection with democracy, it is diametrically opposed to the first principle of democracy, representation in proportion to numbers. It is an essential part of democracy that minorities should be adequately represented. No real democracy, nothing but a false show of democracy, is possible without it.
While recognizing these issues, it's not surprising that many view them as the necessary cost of a free government; this was the belief of all freedom advocates until recently. However, the tendency to see them as unchangeable has become so ingrained that many people seem to have lost the ability to view them as problems they would want to fix if they could. When people give up on finding a solution, it’s often just a small step to denying the problem itself; this leads to a reluctance to hear about potential solutions, as if the person suggesting them is creating a problem instead of offering a way out. People have become so accustomed to these issues that they feel it’s unreasonable, if not wrong, to complain about them. Yet, whether they are avoidable or not, anyone who loves freedom and isn’t weighed down by these problems must rejoice at the possibility of eliminating them. It's very clear that the effective elimination of minority voices is not a necessary or natural outcome of freedom; rather, it is completely opposed to the fundamental idea of democracy, which is representation based on numbers. A true democracy requires that minorities are adequately represented. Without this representation, what we have is not real democracy, just a false appearance of it.
Those who have seen and felt, in some degree, the force of these considerations, have proposed various expedients by which the evil may be, in a greater or less degree, mitigated. Lord John Russell, in one of his Reform Bills, introduced a provision that certain constituencies should return three members, and that in these each elector should be allowed to vote only for two; and Mr. Disraeli, in the recent debates, revived the memory of the fact by reproaching him for it, being of opinion, apparently, that it befits a Conservative statesman to regard only means, and to disown scornfully all fellow-feeling with any one who is betrayed, even once, into thinking of ends. [3] Others have proposed that each elector should be allowed to vote only for one. By either of these plans, a minority equalling or exceeding a third of the local constituency, would be able, if it attempted no more, to return one out of three members. The same result might be attained in a still better way if, as proposed in an able pamphlet by Mr. James Garth Marshall, the elector retained his three votes, but was at liberty to bestow them all upon the same candidate. These schemes, though infinitely better than none at all, are yet but makeshifts, and attain the end in a very imperfect manner, since all local minorities of less than a third, and all minorities, however numerous, which are made up from several constituencies, would remain unrepresented. It is much to be lamented, however, that none of these plans have been carried into effect, as any of them would have recognized the right principle, and prepared the way for its more complete application. But real equality of representation is not obtained unless any set of electors amounting to the average number of a constituency, wherever in the country they happen to reside, have the power of combining with one another to return a representative. This degree of perfection in representation appeared impracticable until a man of great capacity, fitted alike for large general views and for the contrivance of practical details—Mr. Thomas Hare—had proved its possibility by drawing up a scheme for its accomplishment, embodied in a Draft of an Act of Parliament; a scheme which has the almost unparalleled merit of carrying out a great principle of government in a manner approaching to ideal perfection as regards the special object in view, while it attains incidentally several other ends of scarcely inferior importance.
Those who have experienced the impact of these considerations have suggested various ways to address the issue, albeit to varying degrees. Lord John Russell, in one of his Reform Bills, introduced a provision allowing certain constituencies to elect three members, with each voter permitted to cast their vote for only two. Mr. Disraeli, during recent debates, reminded everyone of this, apparently believing that it's appropriate for a Conservative politician to focus only on methods and to dismiss any empathy for those who, even once, consider the outcomes. [3] Others have suggested allowing each voter to vote for just one candidate. With either of these proposals, a minority that makes up one-third or more of the local constituency could, at a minimum, elect one out of three members. A more effective approach could be taken if, as proposed in a well-thought-out pamphlet by Mr. James Garth Marshall, voters kept their three votes but were allowed to give all of them to a single candidate. While these ideas are much better than having no proposals at all, they still fall short and do not fully solve the issue, as local minorities representing less than a third and all minor groups made up from different constituencies would remain unrepresented. It is unfortunate that none of these plans have been implemented, as any of them would have acknowledged the right principle and paved the way for its broader application. True equality in representation is not achieved unless any group of voters that meets the average constituency size, regardless of where they live in the country, can come together to elect a representative. This level of ideal representation seemed unattainable until a highly capable individual, Mr. Thomas Hare, demonstrated its feasibility by drafting a proposal for its realization in a Bill for Parliament; a plan that exceptionally fulfills a significant governance principle in a nearly perfect manner concerning its specific goals, while also incidentally achieving several other important objectives.
According to this plan, the unit of representation, the quota of electors who would be entitled to have a member to themselves, would be ascertained by the ordinary process of taking averages, the number of voters being divided by the number of seats in the House; and every candidate who obtained that quota would be returned, from however great a number of local constituencies it might be gathered. The votes would, as at present, be given locally; but any elector would be at liberty to vote for any candidate, in whatever part of the country he might offer himself. Those electors, therefore, who did not wish to be represented by any of the local candidates, might aid by their vote in the return of the person they liked best among all those throughout the country who had expressed a willingness to be chosen. This would so far give reality to the electoral rights of the otherwise virtually disfranchised minority. But it is important that not those alone who refuse to vote for any of the local candidates, but those also who vote for one of them and are defeated, should be enabled to find elsewhere the representation which they have not succeeded in obtaining in their own district. It is therefore provided that an elector may deliver a voting paper containing other names in addition to the one which stands foremost in his preference. His vote would only be counted for one candidate; but if the object of his first choice failed to be returned, from not having obtained the quota, his second perhaps might be more fortunate. He may extend his list to a greater number in the order of his preference, so that if the names which stand near the top of the list either can not make up the quota, or are able to make it up without his vote, the vote may still be used for some one whom it may assist in returning. To obtain the full number of members required to complete the House, as well as to prevent very popular candidates from engrossing nearly all the suffrages, it is necessary, however many votes a candidate may obtain, that no more of them than the quota should be counted for his return; the remainder of those who voted for him would have their votes counted for the next person on their respective lists who needed them, and could by their aid complete the quota. To determine which of a candidate's votes should be used for his return, and which set free for others, several methods are proposed, into which we shall not here enter. He would, of course, retain the votes of all those who would not otherwise be represented; and for the remainder, drawing lots, in default of better, would be an unobjectionable expedient. The voting papers would be conveyed to a central office, where the votes would be counted, the number of first, second, third, and other votes given for each candidate ascertained, and the quota would be allotted to every one who could make it up, until the number of the House was complete; first votes being preferred to second, second to third, and so forth. The voting papers, and all the elements of the calculation, would be placed in public repositories, accessible to all whom they concerned; and if any one who had obtained the quota was not duly returned, it would be in his power easily to prove it.
According to this plan, the unit of representation, which is the number of voters needed to elect a member, would be determined using the usual method of averages; that is, the total number of voters would be divided by the number of seats in the House. Every candidate who meets that quota would be elected, regardless of how many local constituencies their support came from. Votes would still be cast locally, but any voter could vote for any candidate from anywhere in the country. This means that voters who didn’t want to support local candidates could still help elect the person they preferred from among all those nationwide who wanted to be chosen. This would provide real representation for those minority voters who might otherwise feel disenfranchised. However, it is crucial that not only those who refuse to vote for local candidates but also those who vote for a local candidate but lose should have the opportunity to find representation elsewhere if their candidate doesn’t win in their district. Therefore, voters would be allowed to submit a voting paper that includes additional names besides their top choice. Although their vote would count for only one candidate, if their first choice doesn’t meet the quota, their second choice might have better luck. Voters could list more candidates in order of preference so that if those nearer the top don’t reach the quota or succeed without their vote, their vote could still help someone else. To ensure the House is filled completely and to prevent extremely popular candidates from taking nearly all the votes, it’s necessary that no candidate can count more votes than the quota needed for their election. Votes exceeding this quota would be allocated to the next candidate on the voters' lists who needed them, helping to fill the quota. There are several proposed methods for deciding which of a candidate's votes count towards their election and which remain available for others, but we won’t discuss those here. A candidate would keep the votes of all voters who wouldn't be represented otherwise, and for the rest, drawing lots would be an acceptable method in the absence of a better one. The voting papers would be sent to a central office, where all votes would be counted, with the number of first, second, third, and additional votes for each candidate recorded, and the quota assigned to anyone who could meet it until the House is fully constituted; first votes would be prioritized over second, second over third, and so on. The voting papers and all calculation details would be placed in public repositories accessible to anyone concerned; if a candidate who met the quota was not properly elected, they would easily be able to prove it.
These are the main provisions of the scheme. For a more minute knowledge of its very simple machinery, I must refer to Mr. Hare's "Treatise on the Election of Representatives" (a small volume Published in 1859), and to a pamphlet by Mr. Henry Fawcett, published in 1860, and entitled "Mr. Hare's Reform Bill simplified and explained." This last is a very clear and concise exposition of the plan, reduced to its simplest elements by the omission of some of Mr. Hare's original provisions, which, though in themselves beneficial, we're thought to take more from the simplicity of the scheme than they added to its practical advantages. The more these works are studied, the stronger, I venture to predict, will be the impression of the perfect feasibility of the scheme and its transcendant advantages. Such and so numerous are these, that, in my conviction, they place Mr. Hare's plan among the very greatest improvements yet made in the theory and practice of government.
These are the main points of the plan. For a deeper understanding of its very simple mechanics, I recommend checking out Mr. Hare's "Treatise on the Election of Representatives" (a small book published in 1859) and a pamphlet by Mr. Henry Fawcett published in 1860 called "Mr. Hare's Reform Bill Simplified and Explained." The latter offers a clear and concise overview of the plan, simplifying it by omitting some of Mr. Hare's original elements, which, while beneficial, were seen as complicating the simplicity of the plan without significantly adding to its practical benefits. The more these works are examined, the more I believe the impression will grow that the plan is completely feasible and has outstanding advantages. These benefits are so numerous that I firmly believe they position Mr. Hare's plan among the greatest advancements in the theory and practice of government.
In the first place, it secures a representation, in proportion to numbers, of every division of the electoral body: not two great parties alone, with perhaps a few large sectional minorities in particular places, but every minority in the whole nation, consisting of a sufficiently large number to be, on principles of equal justice, entitled to a representative. Secondly, no elector would, as at present, be nominally represented by some one whom he had not chosen. Every member of the House would be the representative of a unanimous constituency. He would represent a thousand electors, or two thousand, or five thousand, or ten thousand, as the quota might be, every one of whom would have not only voted for him, but selected him from the whole country; not merely from the assortment of two or three perhaps rotten oranges, which may be the only choice offered to him in his local market. Under this relation the tie between the elector and the representative would be of a strength and a value of which at present we have no experience. Every one of the electors would be personally identified with his representative, and the representative with his constituents. Every elector who voted for him would have done so either because he is the person, in the whole list of candidates for Parliament, who best expresses the voter's own opinions, or because he is one of those whose abilities and character the voter most respects, and whom he most willingly trusts to think for him. The member would represent persons, not the mere bricks and mortar of the town—the voters themselves, not a few vestrymen or parish notabilities merely. All, however, that is worth preserving in the representation of places would be preserved. Though the Parliament of the nation ought to have as little as possible to do with purely local affairs, yet, while it has to do with them, there ought to be members specially commissioned to look after the interests of every important locality; and these there would still be. In every locality which contained many more voters than the quota (and there probably ought to be no local consitituency which does not), the majority would generally prefer to be represented by one of themselves; by a person of local knowledge, and residing in the locality, if there is any such person to be found among the candidates, who is otherwise eligible as their representative. It would be the minorities chiefly, who, being unable to return the local member, would look out elsewhere for a candidate likely to obtain other votes in addition to their own.
First of all, it ensures that every group within the electorate is represented in proportion to their numbers. It’s not just about two major parties and maybe a few large regional minorities, but about every minority across the nation that has enough members to justly deserve representation. Secondly, no voter would be represented by someone they didn’t choose, as is the case now. Every member of the House would represent a completely supportive constituency. They would represent a thousand voters, or two thousand, or five thousand, or ten thousand, depending on the quota, each of whom would not only have voted for them but also selected them from the entire country, rather than being limited to a few subpar options available locally. This would strengthen the connection between the voter and their representative in a way we can’t currently imagine. Each voter would be personally linked to their representative, and the representative to their constituents. Any voter who cast their ballot for them did so because they are the candidate who most closely aligns with their opinions, or because they respect the candidate’s skills and character, trusting them to represent their interests. The member would represent real people, not just the physical structure of the town — the voters themselves, not just a few local officials or notable figures. Nonetheless, everything valuable in local representation would be maintained. Even though the national Parliament should have minimal involvement in purely local issues, there should still be members specifically tasked with looking after the interests of significant localities. In localities with significantly more voters than the quota (and ideally, there shouldn't be any local constituency that doesn't meet this), the majority would typically prefer to be represented by someone from their area, someone with local knowledge living in that community, if such a candidate exists and is otherwise qualified. It would mainly be the minorities who, unable to elect their local member, would seek a candidate elsewhere who can attract additional votes beyond their own.
Of all modes in which a national representation can possibly be constituted, this one affords the best security for the intellectual qualifications desirable in the representatives. At present, by universal admission, it is becoming more and more difficult for any one who has only talents and character to gain admission into the House of Commons. The only persons who can get elected are those who possess local influence, or make their way by lavish expenditure, or who, on the invitation of three or four tradesmen or attorneys, are sent down by one of the two great parties from their London clubs, as men whose votes the party can depend on under all circumstances. On Mr. Hare's system, those who did not like the local candidates would fill up their voting papers by a selection from all the persons of national reputation on the list of candidates with whose general political principles they were in sympathy. Almost every person, therefore, who had made himself in any way honorably distinguished, though devoid of local influence, and having sworn allegiance to no political party, would have a fair chance of making up the quota, and with this encouragement such persons might be expected to offer themselves in numbers hitherto undreamed of. Hundreds of able men of independent thought, who would have no chance whatever of being chosen by the majority of any existing constituency, have by their writings, or their exertions in some field of public usefulness, made themselves known and approved by a few persons in almost every district of the kingdom; and if every vote that would be given for them in every place could be counted for their election, they might be able to complete the number of the quota. In no other way which it seems possible to suggest would Parliament be so certain of containing the very élite of the country.
Of all the ways a national representation can be formed, this one offers the best guarantee for the intellectual qualifications needed in representatives. Right now, everyone agrees that it's becoming increasingly difficult for someone with just talent and character to get into the House of Commons. The only people who can get elected are those with local influence, those who spend a lot of money, or those who, at the request of a few tradespeople or lawyers, are sent by one of the two major parties from their London clubs, as individuals whose votes the party can count on no matter what. With Mr. Hare's system, those who weren't fond of the local candidates could fill out their ballots by choosing from all the well-known people on the candidate list whose general political views aligned with theirs. Therefore, almost anyone who has made a name for themselves honorably, even without local influence, and who hasn't pledged loyalty to any political party, would have a fair shot at making up the quota. With this encouragement, such individuals might be expected to step forward in numbers previously unimagined. Hundreds of capable, independent thinkers, who wouldn't stand a chance of being chosen by the majority of any current constituency, have made themselves known and appreciated by a few people in almost every district of the country through their writing or public service efforts. If every vote cast for them in every place could be counted for their election, they might be able to meet the quota. In no other suggested way would Parliament be so likely to include the very élite of the country.
And it is not solely through the votes of minorities that this system of election would raise the intellectual standard of the House of Commons. Majorities would be compelled to look out for members of a much higher calibre. When the individuals composing the majority would no longer be reduced to Hobson's choice, of either voting for the person brought forward by their local leaders, or not voting at all; when the nominee of the leaders would have to encounter the competition not solely of the candidate of the minority, but of all the men of established reputation in the country who were willing to serve, it would be impossible any longer to foist upon the electors the first person who presents himself with the catchwords of the party in his mouth, and three or four thousand pounds in his pocket. The majority would insist on having a candidate worthy of their choice, or they would carry their votes somewhere else, and the minority would prevail. The slavery of the majority to the least estimable portion of their numbers would be at an end; the very best and most capable of the local notabilities would be put forward by preference; if possible, such as were known in some advantageous way beyond the locality, that their local strength might have a chance of being fortified by stray votes from elsewhere. Constituencies would become competitors for the best candidates, and would vie with one another in selecting from among the men of local knowledge and connections those who were most distinguished in every other respect.
And it's not just the votes of minorities that would raise the intellectual standard of the House of Commons through this election system. Majorities would be forced to seek out members of much higher quality. When the people in the majority no longer had to choose between voting for the candidate put forward by their local leaders or not voting at all; when the leaders' nominee had to face competition not only from the minority candidate but from all respected individuals in the country willing to serve, it would be impossible to simply push the first person who comes along with party slogans and a few thousand pounds into the election. The majority would demand a candidate worthy of their support, or they would take their votes elsewhere, allowing the minority to succeed. The majority's reliance on the least admirable part of their group would come to an end; the top local figures would be prioritized as candidates, ideally those known for their reputation beyond the locality, so that their local support could be bolstered by additional votes from elsewhere. Constituencies would compete for the best candidates and strive to select those among the locally knowledgeable and connected individuals who stood out in every other way.
The natural tendency of representative government, as of modern civilization, is towards collective mediocrity: and this tendency is increased by all reductions and extensions of the franchise, their effect being to place the principal power in the hands of classes more and more below the highest level of instruction in the community. But, though the superior intellects and characters will necessarily be outnumbered, it makes a great difference whether or not they are heard. In the false democracy which, instead of giving representation to all, gives it only to the local majorities, the voice of the instructed minority may have no organs at all in the representative body. It is an admitted fact that in the American democracy, which is constructed on this faulty model, the highly-cultivated members of the community, except such of them as are willing to sacrifice their own opinions and modes of judgment, and become the servile mouthpieces of their inferiors in knowledge, do not even offer themselves for Congress or the State Legislatures, so certain is it that they would have no chance of being returned. Had a plan like Mr. Hare's by good fortune suggested itself to the enlightened and disinterested founders of the American Republic, the federal and state assemblies would have contained many of these distinguished men, and democracy would have been spared its greatest reproach and one of its most formidable evils. Against this evil the system of personal representation proposed by Mr. Hare is almost a specific. The minority of instructed minds scattered through the local constituencies would unite to return a number, proportioned to their own numbers, of the very ablest men the country contains. They would be under the strongest inducement to choose such men, since in no other mode could they make their small numerical strength tell for any thing considerable. The representatives of the majority, besides that they would themselves be improved in quality by the operation of the system, would no longer have the whole field to themselves. They would indeed outnumber the others, as much as the one class of electors outnumbers the other in the country: they could always outvote them, but they would speak and vote in their presence, and subject to their criticism. When any difference arose, they would have to meet the arguments of the instructed few by reasons, at least apparently, as cogent; and since they could not, as those do who are speaking to persons already unanimous, simply assume that they are in the right, it would occasionally happen to them to become convinced that they were in the wrong. As they would in general be well-meaning (for thus much may reasonably be expected from a fairly-chosen national representation), their own minds would be insensibly raised by the influence of the minds with which they were in contact, or even in conflict. The champions of unpopular doctrines would not put forth their arguments merely in books and periodicals, read only by their own side; the opposing ranks would meet face to face and hand to hand, and there would be a fair comparison of their intellectual strength in the presence of the country. It would then be found out whether the opinion which prevailed by counting votes would also prevail if the votes were weighed as well as counted. The multitude have often a true instinct for distinguishing an able man when he has the means of displaying his ability in a fair field before them. If such a man fails to obtain any portion of his just weight, it is through institutions or usages which keep him out of sight. In the old democracies there were no means of keeping out of sight any able man: the bema was open to him; he needed nobody's consent to become a public adviser. It is not so in a representative government; and the best friends of representative democracy can hardly be without misgivings that the Themistocles or Demosthenes whose councils would have saved the nation, might be unable during his whole life ever to obtain a seat. But if the presence in the representative assembly can be insured of even a few of the first minds in the country, though the remainder consist only of average minds, the influence of these leading spirits is sure to make itself insensibly felt in the general deliberations, even though they be known to be, in many respects, opposed to the tone of popular opinion and feeling. I am unable to conceive any mode by which the presence of such minds can be so positively insured as by that proposed by Mr. Hare.
The natural tendency of representative government, like modern society, leans towards mediocrity as a group. This tendency grows stronger with any changes to voting rights, as these changes often put power in the hands of less educated groups. However, even though the smarter and stronger individuals may be outnumbered, it matters a lot whether they get to be heard. In a false democracy that represents only local majorities instead of everyone, the voices of educated minorities might not even have a presence in the representative body. It’s well-known that in American democracy, which follows this flawed model, well-educated citizens, unless they are willing to compromise their own views and become the obedient representatives of those who know less, usually don’t even run for Congress or state legislatures, knowing they wouldn’t stand a chance of being elected. If a plan like Mr. Hare's had been proposed by the enlightened founders of the American Republic, federal and state assemblies would have included many distinguished individuals, saving democracy from one of its biggest shortcomings and most serious issues. Mr. Hare’s system of personal representation is almost a solution to this problem. The educated minorities spread across local districts would come together to elect a number, proportional to their size, of the most capable individuals in the country. They would be highly motivated to choose such individuals since it would be the only way their smaller numbers could make a significant impact. The majority representatives, besides improving their own quality through the system, would no longer control the entire field. They would definitely outnumber the others, just as one class of voters outnumbers the other in the country: they could always outvote them, but they would have to speak and vote in front of them, subject to their scrutiny. Whenever a difference arises, they would have to address the arguments of the educated few with reasons that are at least apparently sound; and since they couldn’t simply assume they’re right like those addressing a unanimous crowd, it would sometimes lead them to realize they were wrong. As they would generally mean well (which is reasonable to expect from a decently elected national representation), their thinking would improve through the influence of the minds they interacted with. The advocates of unpopular ideas wouldn’t just present their arguments in books and journals that only their supporters read; the opposing sides would face each other directly, allowing for a fair evaluation of their intellectual strength in front of the public. It would then be revealed whether the opinion that wins by counting votes would also win if the votes were measured as well as counted. The general public often has a good instinct for recognizing a capable person when they can showcase their abilities in a fair setting. If such a person fails to get the recognition they deserve, it’s due to systems or customs that keep them hidden. In ancient democracies, no one could keep a talented person out of sight: the platform was open to them; they didn’t need anyone’s permission to be a public advisor. That’s not the case in representative government; even the strongest supporters of representative democracy can’t help but worry that a Themistocles or Demosthenes, whose guidance could have saved a nation, might never gain a seat in their lifetime. However, if the presence of even a few of the top minds in the country can be ensured in the representative assembly, even if the rest are just average, the influence of these leading figures will undoubtedly be felt during discussions, even if their views often clash with popular opinion. I can’t think of any way to ensure the presence of such minds as effectively as the method proposed by Mr. Hare.
This portion of the assembly would also be the appropriate organ of a great social function, for which there is no provision in any existing democracy, but which in no government can remain permanently unfulfilled without condemning that government to infallible degeneracy and decay. This may be called the function of Antagonism. In every government there is some power stronger than all the rest; and the power which is strongest tends perpetually to become the sole power. Partly by intention and partly unconsciously, it is ever striving to make all other things bend to itself, and is not content while there is any thing which makes permanent head against it, any influence not in agreement with its spirit. Yet, if it succeeds in suppressing all rival influences, and moulding every thing after its own model, improvement, in that country, is at an end, and decline commences. Human improvement is a product of many factors, and no power ever yet constituted among mankind includes them all: even the most beneficent power only contains in itself some of the requisites of good, and the remainder, if progress is to continue, must be derived from some other source. No community has ever long continued progressive but while a conflict was going on between the strongest power in the community and some rival power; between the spiritual and temporal authorities; the military or territorial and the industrious classes; the king and the people; the orthodox and religious reformers. When the victory on either side was so complete as to put an end to the strife, and no other conflict took its place, first stagnation followed, and then decay. The ascendancy of the numerical majority is less unjust, and, on the whole, less mischievous than many others, but it is attended with the very same kind of dangers, and even more certainly; for when the government is in the hands of One or a Few, the Many are always existent as a rival power, which may not be strong enough ever to control the other, but whose opinion and sentiment are a moral, and even a social support to all who, either from conviction or contrariety of interest, are opposed to any of the tendencies of the ruling authority. But when the democracy is supreme, there is no One or Few strong enough for dissentient opinions and injured or menaced interests to lean upon. The great difficulty of democratic government has hitherto seemed to be, how to provide in a democratic society—what circumstances have provided hitherto in all the societies which have maintained themselves ahead of others—a social support, a point d'appui, for individual resistance to the tendencies of the ruling power; a protection, a rallying-point, for opinions and interests which the ascendant public opinion views with disfavor. For want of such a point d'appui, the older societies, and all but a few modern ones, either fell into dissolution or became stationary (which means slow deterioration) through the exclusive predominance of a part only of the conditions of social and mental well-being.
This part of the assembly would also be the right place for a significant social function that’s missing in every current democracy, but which no government can ignore if it wants to avoid inevitable decline and decay. This function can be called the function of Antagonism. In every government, there is some power that is stronger than all the others, and the strongest power always tends to become the only power. Partly intentionally and partly unconsciously, it constantly tries to make everything else submit to it and is never satisfied while anything persists against it or any influence does not align with its goals. However, if it successfully suppresses all competing influences and shapes everything to fit its own model, progress in that country comes to a halt and decline begins. Human progress relies on many factors, and no power among humanity has ever encompassed them all: even the most benevolent power only includes some of the necessary elements for good, and the rest, if progress is to continue, must come from elsewhere. No community has ever maintained progress for long without some kind of conflict between the strongest power and a rival power; between spiritual and temporal authorities; between military or landowners and the working classes; between the king and the people; between traditionalists and religious reformers. When either side wins so completely that the conflict ends and no other struggle arises, stagnation follows, and then decay sets in. The dominance of the numerical majority is less unjust, and generally less harmful than many other forms of power, but it carries the same kinds of dangers, and even more certainly; for when government is held by One or a Few, the Many always exist as a rival power, which may not be strong enough to control the others, but whose opinions and sentiments provide a moral and even social backing to all who, for either conviction or conflicting interests, oppose the ruling authority. But when democracy is in charge, there is no One or Few strong enough for alternate opinions and affected or threatened interests to rely on. The significant challenge of democratic government has so far been how to establish in a democratic society—what circumstances have established in all societies that have outlasted others—a social support, a point d'appui, for individual resistance to the ruling power’s tendencies; a protection, a gathering point, for opinions and interests not favored by dominant public opinion. Due to the lack of such a point d'appui, the older societies, and nearly all modern ones except a few, either fell into chaos or became stagnant (which leads to gradual deterioration) due to the sole dominance of only part of the conditions necessary for social and mental well-being.
Now, this great want the system of Personal Representation is fitted to supply in the most perfect manner which the circumstances of modern society admit of. The only quarter in which to look for a supplement, or completing corrective to the instincts of a democratic majority, is the instructed minority; but, in the ordinary mode of constituting democracy, this minority has no organ: Mr. Hare's system provides one. The representatives who would be returned to Parliament by the aggregate of minorities would afford that organ in its greatest perfection. A separate organization of the instructed classes, even if practicable, would be invidious, and could only escape from being offensive by being totally without influence. But if the élite of these classes formed part of the Parliament, by the same title as any other of its members—by representing the same number of citizens, the same numerical fraction of the national will—their presence could give umbrage to nobody, while they would be in the position of highest vantage, both for making their opinions and councils heard on all important subjects, and for taking an active part in public business. Their abilities would probably draw to them more than their numerical share of the actual administration of government; as the Athenians did not confide responsible public functions to Cleon or Hyperbolus (the employment of Cleon at Pylos and Amphipolis was purely exceptional), but Nicias, and Theramenes, and Alcibiades were in constant employment both at home and abroad, though known to sympathize more with oligarchy than with democracy. The instructed minority would, in the actual voting, count only for their numbers, but as a moral power they would count for much more, in virtue of their knowledge, and of the influence it would give them over the rest. An arrangement better adapted to keep popular opinion within reason and justice, and to guard it from the various deteriorating influences which assail the weak side of democracy, could scarcely by human ingenuity be devised. A democratic people would in this way be provided with what in any other way it would almost certainly miss—leaders of a higher grade of intellect and character than itself. Modern democracy would have its occasional Pericles, and its habitual group of superior and guiding minds.
Now, the system of Personal Representation is perfectly suited to address this significant need within modern society. The only place to look for a supplement or correction to the instincts of a democratic majority is the educated minority; however, in the typical setup of democracy, this minority lacks a voice. Mr. Hare's system offers that voice. The representatives elected by the combined minorities would provide that voice in its best form. A separate organization for the educated classes, even if possible, would be seen as unfair, and could only avoid being problematic by having no real influence. But if the best of these classes were part of Parliament, as equal members alongside others—representing the same number of citizens and reflecting the same fraction of the national will—their presence wouldn't offend anyone. They would be in the best position to share their opinions on important matters and actively participate in public affairs. Their skills would likely lead them to take on more than their fair share of government roles, much as the Athenians didn’t entrust significant public responsibilities to Cleon or Hyperbolus (Cleon’s roles at Pylos and Amphipolis were exceptions), but did employ Nicias, Theramenes, and Alcibiades regularly both at home and abroad, even though they leaned more towards oligarchy than democracy. In actual voting, the educated minority would only count for their numbers, but as a moral force, they would hold much more weight due to their knowledge and the influence it provides over others. A setup better suited to keep public opinion reasonable and just, while protecting it from the various negative influences that target the weak points of democracy, could hardly be devised by human ingenuity. In this way, a democratic people would be provided with what they would almost certainly lack otherwise—leaders with a higher level of intellect and character than the average citizen. Modern democracy would thus have its occasional Pericles and a consistent group of superior and guiding minds.
With all this array of reasons, of the most fundamental character, on the affirmative side of the question, what is there on the negative? Nothing that will sustain examination, when people can once be induced to bestow any real examination upon a new thing. Those indeed, if any such there be, who, under pretense of equal justice, aim only at substituting the class ascendancy of the poor for that of the rich, will of course be unfavorable to a scheme which places both on a level. But I do not believe that any such wish exists at present among the working classes of this country, though I would not answer for the effect which opportunity and demagogic artifices may hereafter have in exciting it. In the United States, where the numerical majority have long been in full possession of collective despotism, they would probably be as unwilling to part with it as a single despot or an aristocracy. But I believe that the English democracy would as yet be content with protection against the class legislation of others, without claiming the power to exercise it in their turn.
Given all these fundamental reasons supporting the positive side of the question, what opposition is there? Nothing substantial that can stand up to scrutiny, especially when people are encouraged to truly examine a new idea. Those who, under the guise of equal justice, simply want to replace the dominance of the rich with that of the poor will, of course, oppose a plan that aims to level the playing field. However, I don’t believe there’s a desire for that among the working classes in this country right now, though I can’t rule out the influence that opportunity and demagogic manipulation might have in the future. In the United States, where the majority has long held collective power, they would likely be just as reluctant to give it up as a single tyrant or an aristocracy would be. But I think that the English democracy would currently be satisfied with protection against the class legislation of others, without wanting to wield that power themselves in return.
Among the ostensible objectors to Mr. Hare's scheme, some profess to think the plan unworkable; but these, it will be found, are generally people who have barely heard of it, or have given it a very slight and cursory examination. Others are unable to reconcile themselves to the loss of what they term the local character of the representation. A nation does not seem to them to consist of persons, but of artificial units, the creation of geography and statistics. Parliament must represent towns and counties, not human beings. But no one seeks to annihilate towns and counties. Towns and counties, it may be presumed, are represented when the human beings who inhabit them are represented. Local feelings can not exist without somebody who feels them, nor local interests without somebody interested in them. If the human beings whose feelings and interests these are have their proper share of representation, these feelings and interests are represented in common with all other feelings and interests of those persons. But I can not see why the feelings and interests which arrange mankind according to localities should be the only one thought worthy of being represented; or why people who have other feelings and interests, which they value more than they do their geographical ones, should be restricted to these as the sole principle of their political classification. The notion that Yorkshire and Middlesex have rights apart from those of their inhabitants, or that Liverpool and Exeter are the proper objects of the legislator's care, in contradistinction the population of those places, is a curious specimen of delusion produced by words.
Among those who claim to dislike Mr. Hare's plan, some believe it's impractical; however, these individuals often have only a vague understanding of it or have barely looked into it. Others struggle to accept the notion of losing what they call the local character of representation. To them, a nation seems to be made up of artificial units shaped by geography and statistics, rather than real people. Parliament should represent towns and counties, not individuals. Yet, no one is trying to erase towns and counties. It can be assumed that towns and counties are represented when the people living in them are represented. Local emotions can't exist without someone feeling them, nor can local interests exist without someone being interested in them. If the people whose feelings and interests are involved receive their fair share of representation, those feelings and interests will be represented along with all the other feelings and interests of those individuals. However, I don't understand why the feelings and interests that categorize people by location should be the only ones considered worthy of representation, or why people who have other feelings and interests that they value more than their geographic ones should be limited to these as the only basis for their political identity. The idea that Yorkshire and Middlesex have rights separate from those of their residents, or that Liverpool and Exeter should be the focus of lawmakers instead of the people living in those places, is an interesting example of a misconception created by language.
In general, however, objectors cut the matter short by affirming that the people of England will never consent to such a system. What the people of England are likely to think of those who pass such a summary sentence on their capacity of understanding and judgment, deeming it superfluous to consider whether a thing is right or wrong before affirming that they are certain to reject it, I will not undertake to say. For my own part, I do not think that the people of England have deserved to be, without trial, stigmatized as insurmountably prejudiced against any thing which can be proved to be good either for themselves or for others. It also appears to me that when prejudices persist obstinately, it is the fault of nobody so much as of those who make a point of proclaiming them insuperable, as an excuse to themselves for never joining in an attempt to remove them. Any prejudice whatever will be insurmountable if those who do not share it themselves truckle to it, and flatter it, and accept it as a law of nature. I believe, however, that of prejudice, properly speaking, there is in this case none except on the lips of those who talk about it, and that there is in general, among those who have yet heard of the proposition, no other hostility to it than the natural and healthy distrust attaching to all novelties which have not been sufficiently canvassed to make generally manifest all the pros and cons of the question. The only serious obstacle is the unfamiliarity: this, indeed, is a formidable one, for the imagination much more easily reconciles itself to a great alteration in substance than to a very small one in names and forms. But unfamiliarity is a disadvantage which, when there is any real value in an idea, it only requires time to remove; and in these days of discussion and generally awakened interest in improvement, what formerly was the work of centuries often requires only years.
In general, though, critics cut the conversation short by claiming that the people of England will never agree to such a system. I won't speculate on what the people of England might think about those who quickly judge their ability to understand and decide, assuming it's unnecessary to determine whether something is right or wrong before declaring they will surely reject it. Personally, I don't believe the people of England should be unfairly labeled as hopelessly biased against anything that can be shown to be good for themselves or others without even being given a chance. It also seems to me that when biases stick around stubbornly, it's largely the fault of those who insist on declaring them insurmountable, using that as an excuse not to contribute to removing them. Any bias will seem unbreakable if those who don’t share it cater to it, praise it, and accept it as a natural law. However, I believe that there isn't really any prejudice in this case, except from those who discuss it, and that there is generally, among those who have heard of the idea, no hostility other than the natural and healthy skepticism that comes with all new things that haven't been thoroughly examined to reveal all the pros and cons. The only real barrier is the unfamiliarity: it is indeed a significant one, since the imagination finds it easier to accept a major change in substance than a minor one in names and forms. But unfamiliarity is a hurdle that time can often overcome when an idea holds real value; in these days of discussion and growing interest in improvement, what used to take centuries can often be achieved in just a few years.
Chapter VIII—Of the Extension of the Suffrage.
Such a representative democracy as has now been sketched—representative of all, and not solely of the majority—in which the interests, the opinions, the grades of intellect which are outnumbered would nevertheless be heard, and would have a chance of obtaining by weight of character and strength of argument an influence which would not belong to their numerical force—this democracy, which is alone equal, alone impartial, alone the government of all by all, the only true type of democracy, would be free from the greatest evils of the falsely-called democracies which now prevail, and from which the current idea of democracy is exclusively derived. But even in this democracy, absolute power, if they chose to exercise it, would rest with the numerical majority, and these would be composed exclusively of a single class, alike in biases, prepossessions, and general modes of thinking, and a class, to say no more, not the most highly cultivated. The constitution would therefore still be liable to the characteristic evils of class government; in a far less degree, assuredly, than that exclusive government by a class which now usurps the name of democracy, but still under no effective restraint except what might be found in the good sense, moderation, and forbearance of the class itself. If checks of this description are sufficient, the philosophy of constitutional government is but solemn trifling. All trust in constitutions is grounded on the assurance they may afford, not that the depositaries of power will not, but that they can not misemploy it. Democracy is not the ideally best form of government unless this weak side of it can be strengthened; unless it can be so organized that no class, not even the most numerous, shall be able to reduce all but itself to political insignificance, and direct the course of legislation and administration by its exclusive class interest. The problem is to find the means of preventing this abuse without sacrificing the characteristic advantages of popular government.
A representative democracy, like the one described here—representative of everyone, not just the majority—where the interests, opinions, and intellects that are in the minority would still be heard and could gain influence through character and strong arguments rather than just through their numbers—this democracy, the only true form of equal and impartial governance of all by all, would avoid the major issues found in the so-called democracies that currently exist and from which the common understanding of democracy is derived. However, even in this democracy, absolute power would still rest with the numerical majority, which would consist solely of one class that shares similar biases, assumptions, and overall ways of thinking, and let’s be honest, it wouldn’t be the most educated class. Therefore, the constitution would still be vulnerable to the typical problems of class governance; to a lesser extent, for sure, than the exclusive rule by a class that currently misuses the term democracy, but there would still be no real checks in place except for the good sense, moderation, and patience of that class itself. If these kinds of checks are deemed sufficient, then the philosophy of constitutional government is merely a serious joke. All faith in constitutions is based on the hope that those in power may not misuse it, but that they cannot. Democracy is not the best form of government unless this vulnerability can be strengthened; unless it can be organized in a way that prevents any class, even the largest one, from diminishing everyone else to political irrelevance and controlling legislation and administration through its own class interests. The challenge is to find a way to prevent this abuse without losing the key benefits of popular governance.
These twofold requisites are not fulfilled by the expedient of a limitation of the suffrage, involving the compulsory exclusion of any portion of the citizens from a voice in the representation. Among the foremost benefits of free government is that education of the intelligence and of the sentiments which is carried down to the very lowest ranks of the people when they are called to take a part in acts which directly affect the great interests of their country. On this topic I have already dwelt so emphatically that I only return to it because there are few who seem to attach to this effect of popular institutions all the importance to which it is entitled. People think it fanciful to expect so much from what seems so slight a cause—to recognize a potent instrument of mental improvement in the exercise of political franchises by manual laborers. Yet, unless substantial mental cultivation in the mass of mankind is to be a mere vision, this is the road by which it must come. If any one supposes that this road will not bring it, I call to witness the entire contents of M. de Tocqueville's great work, and especially his estimate of the Americans. Almost all travelers are struck by the fact that every American is in some sense both a patriot and a person of cultivated intelligence; and M. de Tocqueville has shown how close the connection is between these qualities and their democratic institutions. No such wide diffusion of the ideas, tastes, and sentiments of educated minds has ever been seen elsewhere, or even conceived as attainable. Yet this is nothing to what we might look for in a government equally democratic in its unexclusiveness, but better organized in other important points. For political life is indeed in America a most valuable school, but it is a school from which the ablest teachers are excluded; the first minds in the country being as effectually shut out from the national representation, and from public functions generally, as if they were under a formal disqualification. The Demos, too, being in America the one source of power, all the selfish ambition of the country gravitates towards it, as it does in despotic countries towards the monarch; the People, like the despot, is pursued with adulation and sycophancy, and the corrupting effects of power fully keep pace with its improving and ennobling influences. If, even with this alloy, democratic institutions produce so marked a superiority of mental development in the lowest class of Americans, compared with the corresponding classes in England and elsewhere, what would it be if the good portion of the influence could be retained without the bad? And this, to a certain extent, may be done, but not by excluding that portion of the people who have fewest intellectual stimuli of other kinds from so inestimable an introduction to large, distant, and complicated interests as is afforded by the attention they may be induced to bestow on political affairs. It is by political discussion that the manual laborer, whose employment is a routine, and whose way of life brings him in contact with no variety of impressions, circumstances, or ideas, is taught that remote causes, and events which take place far off, have a most sensible effect even on his personal interests; and it is from political discussion and collective political action that one whose daily occupations concentrate his interests in a small circle round himself, learns to feel for and with his fellow-citizens, and becomes consciously a member of a great community. But political discussions fly over the heads of those who have no votes, and are not endeavouring to acquire them. Their position, in comparison with the electors, is that of the audience in a court of justice compared with the twelve men in the jury-box. It is not their suffrages that are asked, it is not their opinion that is sought to be influenced; the appeals are made, the arguments addressed, to others than them; nothing depends on the decision they may arrive at, and there is no necessity and very little inducement to them to come to any. Whoever, in an otherwise popular government, has no vote, and no prospect of obtaining it, will either be a permanent malcontent, or will feel as one whom the general affairs of society do not concern; for whom they are to be managed by others; who "has no business with the laws except to obey them," nor with public interests and concerns except as a looker-on. What he will know or care about them from this position may partly be measured by what an average woman of the middle class knows and cares about politics compared with her husband or brothers.
These two requirements aren't met by limiting the right to vote, which forces some citizens to be excluded from having a say in representation. One of the main benefits of free government is that it educates people's minds and feelings down to the very lowest levels of society when they are involved in decisions that directly impact the important interests of their country. I've discussed this topic so thoroughly that I mention it again only because few seem to recognize how significant this effect of popular institutions truly is. People think it's unrealistic to expect so much from what appears to be a minor factor—to see a powerful tool for mental improvement in the political involvement of manual laborers. However, if substantial mental growth among the masses isn't just a dream, this is the path it must take. If anyone believes this path won't lead to it, I point to the entirety of M. de Tocqueville's influential work, especially his views on Americans. Almost all travelers notice that every American is, to some extent, both a patriot and a person of cultivated intelligence; and M. de Tocqueville has demonstrated how closely linked these traits are to their democratic institutions. No other place has ever experienced such widespread distribution of the ideas, tastes, and feelings of educated minds, nor has it even been imagined as possible. Yet this is nothing compared to what we could expect from a government that is equally democratic in its inclusiveness but better organized in other crucial aspects. Political life in America serves as a valuable school, but it's one where the most capable educators are shut out; the best minds in the country are effectively excluded from national representation and public positions, as if they were formally disqualified. The populace, being the sole source of power in America, attracts all the selfish ambitions of the country, similar to how it concentrates towards a monarch in authoritarian regimes; the People, like a despot, are showered with flattery and sycophancy, and the corrupting effects of power develop in tandem with its uplifting influences. If, despite this corruption, democratic institutions create a notable advantage in mental development among the lowest class of Americans compared to similar classes in England and elsewhere, imagine how much better it could be if the positive influences could be maintained without the negative. This can be achieved to some extent, but not by excluding those who receive the fewest intellectual stimuli from such an invaluable introduction to broad, distant, and complex interests as the attention they might be encouraged to pay to political matters. Through political discussions, the manual laborer, whose job is repetitive and whose lifestyle offers little diversity, learns that distant causes and events occurring far away significantly affect his personal interests; and it is through political discussions and collective political actions that he, whose daily routine focuses his concerns in a small circle around himself, begins to empathize with his fellow citizens and becomes consciously aware of being part of a larger community. But political discussions are out of reach for those who have no votes and aren't trying to obtain them. Their position is like that of the audience in a courtroom compared to the twelve jurors; it is not their votes that matter, nor is it their opinions that anyone seeks to influence; the arguments are directed at others, and nothing relies on the decision they may reach, resulting in little motivation for them to make any at all. In a mainly popular government, anyone without a vote and without hope of getting one will either be a constant discontent or feel that the broader social issues do not concern them, as if they're mere spectators, only to obey the laws and indifferent to public interests and issues. What they know or care about these matters can be somewhat gauged by comparing the average middle-class woman's understanding of politics to that of her husband or brothers.
Independently of all these considerations, it is a personal injustice to withhold from any one, unless for the prevention of greater evils, the ordinary privilege of having his voice reckoned in the disposal of affairs in which he has the same interest as other people. If he is compelled to pay, if he may be compelled to fight, if he is required implicitly to obey, he should be legally entitled to be told what for; to have his consent asked, and his opinion counted at its worth, though not at more than its worth. There ought to be no pariahs in a full-grown and civilized nation; no persons disqualified except through their own default. Every one is degraded, whether aware of it or not, when other people, without consulting him, take upon themselves unlimited power to regulate his destiny. And even in a much more improved state than the human mind has ever yet reached, it is not in nature that they who are thus disposed of should meet with as fair play as those who have a voice. Rulers and ruling classes are under a necessity of considering the interests and wishes of those who have the suffrage; but of those who are excluded, it is in their option whether they will do so or not; and, however honestly disposed, they are, in general, too fully occupied with things which they must attend to to have much room in their thoughts for any thing which they can with impunity disregard. No arrangement of the suffrage, therefore, can be permanently satisfactory in which any person or class is peremptorily excluded—in which the electoral privilege is not open to all persons of full age who desire to obtain it.
Regardless of all these considerations, it's an injustice to deny anyone, unless to prevent greater harms, the basic right to have their voice counted in decisions that affect them like everyone else. If someone has to pay, might be forced to fight, or is required to obey without question, they should have the legal right to know why; they should have their consent sought, and their opinion valued, though not more than it deserves. There shouldn't be any outcasts in a mature and civilized society; no one should be disqualified unless it's due to their own actions. Everyone is diminished, whether they realize it or not, when others unilaterally take on the power to shape their future without consulting them. And even in a much more advanced state than humanity has ever achieved, it's not natural for those who are sidelined to receive as fair treatment as those who do have a say. Leaders and those in power have to consider the interests and desires of voters, but for those who are excluded, it's up to them whether they take those interests into account; and, no matter how well-meaning they are, they are usually too busy with matters they must address to have much mental space for anything they can ignore without consequences. Therefore, no arrangement of voting rights can be permanently satisfying if any individual or group is completely excluded—from which the right to vote is not accessible to all adults who wish to obtain it.
There are, however, certain exclusions, required by positive reasons, which do not conflict with this principle, and which, though an evil in themselves, are only to be got rid of by the cessation of the state of things which requires them. I regard it as wholly inadmissible that any person should participate in the suffrage without being able to read, write, and, I will add, perform the common operations of arithmetic. Justice demands, even when the suffrage does not depend on it, that the means of attaining these elementary acquirements should be within the reach of every person, either gratuitously, or at an expense not exceeding what the poorest, who can earn their own living, can afford. If this were really the case, people would no more think of giving the suffrage to a man who could not read, than of giving it to a child who could not speak; and it would not be society that would exclude him, but his own laziness. When society has not performed its duty by rendering this amount of instruction accessible to all, there is some hardship in the case, but it is a hardship that ought to be borne. If society has neglected to discharge two solemn obligations, the more important and more fundamental of the two must be fulfilled first; universal teaching must precede universal enfranchisement. No one but those in whom an à priori theory has silenced common sense will maintain that power over others, over the whole community, should be imparted to people who have not acquired the commonest and most essential requisities for taking care of themselves—for pursuing intelligently their own interests, and those of the persons most nearly allied to them. This argument, doubtless, might be pressed further, and made to prove much more. It would be eminently desirable that other things besides reading, writing, and arithmetic could be made necessary to the suffrage; that some knowledge of the conformation of the earth, its natural and political divisions, the elements of general history, and of the history and institutions of their own country, could be required from all electors. But these kinds of knowledge, however indispensable to an intelligent use of the suffrage, are not, in this country, nor probably any where save in the Northern United States, accessible to the whole people, nor does there exist any trustworthy machinery for ascertaining whether they have been acquired or not. The attempt, at present, would lead to partiality, chicanery, and every kind of fraud. It is better that the suffrage should be conferred indiscriminately, or even withheld indiscriminately, than that it should be given to one and withheld from another at the discretion of a public officer. In regard, however, to reading, writing, and calculating, there need be no difficulty. It would be easy to require from every one who presented himself for registry that he should, in the presence of the registrar, copy a sentence from an English book, and perform a sum in the rule of three; and to secure, by fixed rules and complete publicity, the honest application of so very simple a test. This condition, therefore, should in all cases accompany universal suffrage; and it would, after a few years, exclude none but those who cared so little for the privilege, that their vote, if given, would not in general be an indication of any real political opinion.
There are, however, certain exceptions, based on practical reasons, that don't conflict with this principle. While they are negative in themselves, they can only be eliminated by changing the circumstances that necessitate them. I believe it is completely unacceptable for anyone to have the right to vote without being able to read, write, and, I would add, perform basic arithmetic. Justice demands that, even if voting rights don't depend on it, everyone should have access to the resources needed to learn these essential skills, either for free or at a cost affordable to the poorest who can support themselves. If this were truly the case, people wouldn't think of giving the vote to someone who can't read any more than they would consider giving it to a child who can't speak; the reason would not be society's exclusion but the individual’s own laziness. When society fails to provide this basic education to everyone, there is some unfairness, but it's a hardship that should be accepted. If society has failed to meet two significant obligations, the more important one must be addressed first; universal education must come before universal voting rights. No one but those whose preconceived notions override common sense would argue that authority over others, over the community as a whole, should be given to people who haven't learned the most basic skills to take care of themselves—to pursue their own interests and those of their close connections. This argument could certainly be expanded further. It would be highly beneficial if, in addition to reading, writing, and arithmetic, knowledge of geography, political divisions, basic history, and an understanding of their own country's history and institutions were also required of all voters. However, this kind of knowledge, while crucial for a meaningful exercise of the vote, is not accessible to everyone in this country, nor likely anywhere else except in the Northern United States, and there is no reliable system to assess whether individuals possess it. Attempting this now would lead to bias, deception, and various forms of fraud. It's better to grant voting rights indiscriminately, or even withhold them indiscriminately, than to award them to some while denying them to others based on a public official's judgment. In terms of reading, writing, and arithmetic, there should be no issue. It would be simple to require anyone registering to copy a sentence from an English book and solve a basic math problem in front of the registrar, ensuring that such a straightforward test is applied fairly with clear rules and transparency. Therefore, this requirement should always accompany universal suffrage; it would, after a few years, only exclude those who were so indifferent to the privilege that their vote, if given, would not reflect any genuine political belief.
It is also important, that the assembly which votes the taxes, either general or local, should be elected exclusively by those who pay something towards the taxes imposed. Those who pay no taxes, disposing by their votes of other people's money, have every motive to be lavish and none to economize. As far as money matters are concerned, any power of voting possessed by them is a violation of the fundamental principle of free government, a severance of the power of control from the interest in its beneficial exercise. It amounts to allowing them to put their hands into other people's pockets for any purpose which they think fit to call a public one, which, in the great towns of the United States, is known to have produced a scale of local taxation onerous beyond example, and wholly borne by the wealthier classes. That representation should be coextensive with taxation, not stopping short of it, but also not going beyond it, is in accordance with the theory of British institutions. But to reconcile this, as a condition annexed to the representation, with universality, it is essential, as it is on many other accounts desirable, that taxation, in a visible shape, should descend to the poorest class. In this country, and in most others, there is probably no laboring family which does not contribute to the indirect taxes, by the purchase of tea, coffee, sugar, not to mention narcotics or stimulants. But this mode of defraying a share of the public expenses is hardly felt: the payer, unless a person of education and reflection, does not identify his interest with a low scale of public expenditure as closely as when money for its support is demanded directly from himself; and even supposing him to do so, he would doubtless take care that, however lavish an expenditure he might, by his vote, assist in imposing upon the government, it should not be defrayed by any additional taxes on the articles which he himself consumes. It would be better that a direct tax, in the simple form of a capitation, should be levied on every grown person in the community; or that every such person should be admitted an elector on allowing himself to be rated extra ordinem to the assessed taxes; or that a small annual payment, rising and falling with the gross expenditure of the country, should be required from every registered elector, that so every one might feel that the money which he assisted in voting was partly his own, and that he was interested in keeping down its amount.
It’s also important that the assembly responsible for voting on taxes, whether general or local, should be elected only by those who actually pay taxes. Those who don’t pay taxes but can vote on how to spend other people’s money have every incentive to overspend and none to save. In terms of finances, any voting power they have contradicts the fundamental principle of a free government, disconnecting the ability to control from the interest in using that control wisely. It essentially allows them to reach into other people's pockets for anything they deem as a public need, which, in many major cities in the United States, has led to a level of local taxation that’s excessively burdensome, primarily affecting wealthier classes. The idea that representation should align with taxation—without exceeding it—follows the theory of British institutions. However, to make this link a prerequisite for representation while still ensuring universal participation, it’s crucial (and, for many reasons, preferable) that taxation, in a clear form, extends to the poorest class. In this country and in most others, it's likely that no working-class family is exempt from contributing to indirect taxes through purchases of tea, coffee, sugar, and even narcotics or stimulants. But this indirect way of covering a share of public expenses is hardly noticeable: the person paying, unless they are well-educated and reflective, doesn’t connect their interests with a low level of public spending as closely when the money is demanded directly from them. Even assuming they do recognize this connection, they would definitely want to ensure that any extravagant spending they help vote for doesn’t come from added taxes on the things they buy. It would be better if a direct tax, like a head tax, was charged to every adult in the community; or if every adult could vote by agreeing to be taxed according to the assessed taxes; or if a small annual fee, increasing and decreasing with the overall expenditure of the country, was required from every registered voter, so that everyone would realize that the money they’re voting on partly comes from their own pockets, and that they have a stake in keeping it under control.
However this may be, I regard it as required by first principles that the receipt of parish relief should be a peremptory disqualification for the franchise. He who can not by his labor suffice for his own support, has no claim to the privilege of helping himself to the money of others. By becoming dependent on the remaining members of the community for actual subsistence, he abdicates his claim to equal rights with them in other respects. Those to whom he is indebted for the continuance of his very existence may justly claim the exclusive management of those common concerns to which he now brings nothing, or less than he takes away. As a condition of the franchise, a term should be fixed, say five years previous to the registry, during which the applicant's name has not been on the parish books as a recipient of relief. To be an uncertificated bankrupt, or to have taken the benefit of the Insolvent Act, should disqualify for the franchise until the person has paid his debts, or at least proved that he is not now, and has not for some long period been, dependent on eleemosynary support. Non-payment of taxes, when so long persisted in that it can not have arisen from inadvertence, should disqualify while it lasts. These exclusions are not in their nature permanent. They exact such conditions only as all are able, or ought to be able, to fulfill if they choose. They leave the suffrage accessible to all who are in the normal condition of a human being; and if any one has to forego it, he either does not care sufficiently for it to do for its sake what he is already bound to do, or he is in a general condition of depression and degradation in which this slight addition, necessary for the security of others, would be unfelt, and on emerging from which this mark of inferiority would disappear with the rest.
Regardless of the situation, I believe it’s essential that receiving parish assistance disqualifies someone from voting. If a person can’t support themselves through their own work, they don’t have the right to take money from others. By depending on the other members of the community for survival, they give up their claim to equal rights in other areas. Those who help sustain their existence have a legitimate right to manage the communal resources that this person contributes little to or takes more from. To qualify for voting, there should be a requirement—perhaps five years—before registration during which the applicant's name hasn’t appeared on parish records as a recipient of aid. Being an uncertificated bankrupt or having benefited from the Insolvent Act should disqualify someone from voting until they’ve settled their debts or at least demonstrated that they aren’t currently and haven’t been for a significant time reliant on charitable support. Ongoing failure to pay taxes, when it has gone on long enough that it clearly isn’t an oversight, should also result in disqualification until resolved. These exclusions aren’t intended to be permanent. They demand conditions that everyone should be able to meet if they want to. They keep voting accessible to all who are in a normal state as a human being; and if someone has to give it up, they either don’t care enough to do what they should already be doing for that right, or they’re in a general state of decline and hardship where this additional requirement, necessary for the protection of others, wouldn’t even be felt. When they move past this state, this mark of inferiority would disappear along with everything else.
In the long run, therefore (supposing no restrictions to exist but those of which we have now treated), we might expect that all, except that (it is to be hoped) progressively diminishing class, the recipients of parish relief, would be in possession of votes, so that the suffrage would be, with that slight abatement, universal. That it should be thus widely expanded is, as we have seen, absolutely necessary to an enlarged and elevated conception of good government. Yet in this state of things, the great majority of voters in most countries, and emphatically in this, would be manual laborers, and the twofold danger, that of too low a standard of political intelligence, and that of class legislation, would still exist in a very perilous degree. It remains to be seen whether any means exist by which these evils can be obviated.
In the long run, assuming there are no restrictions except for those we've already discussed, we can expect that everyone, except for that hopefully shrinking group of people receiving public assistance, will have the right to vote, making suffrage nearly universal. As we've noted, this broad expansion is crucial for a better understanding of good governance. However, in this situation, the vast majority of voters in most countries, especially in this one, would be manual laborers, which presents a dual threat: a low level of political awareness and the risk of legislation favoring specific classes. It remains to be seen whether there are any solutions to prevent these problems.
They are capable of being obviated if men sincerely wish it; not by any artificial contrivance, but by carrying out the natural order of human life, which recommends itself to every one in things in which he has no interest or traditional opinion running counter to it. In all human affairs, every person directly interested, and not under positive tutelage, has an admitted claim to a voice, and when his exercise of it is not inconsistent with the safety of the whole, can not justly be excluded from it. But (though every one ought to have a voice) that every one should have an equal voice is a totally different proposition. When two persons who have a joint interest in any business differ in opinion, does justice require that both opinions should be held of exactly equal value? If with equal virtue, one is superior to the other in knowledge and intelligence—or if with equal intelligence, one excels the other in virtue—the opinion, the judgment of the higher moral or intellectual being is worth more than that of the inferior; and if the institutions of the country virtually assert that they are of the same value, they assert a thing which is not. One of the two, as the wiser or better man, has a claim to superior weight: the difficulty is in ascertaining which of the two it is; a thing impossible as between individuals, but, taking men in bodies and in numbers, it can be done with a certain approach to accuracy. There would be no pretense for applying this doctrine to any case which can with reason be considered as one of individual and private right. In an affair which concerns only one of two persons, that one is entitled to follow his own opinion, however much wiser the other may be than himself. But we are speaking of things which equally concern them both; where, if the more ignorant does not yield his share of the matter to the guidance of the wiser man, the wiser man must resign his to that of the more ignorant. Which of these modes of getting over the difficulty is most for the interest of both, and most conformable to the general fitness of things? If it be deemed unjust that either should have to give way, which injustice is greatest? that the better judgment should give way to the worse, or the worse to the better?
They can be avoided if people genuinely want to; not through any artificial means, but by following the natural order of human life, which appeals to everyone in situations where they have no personal interest or traditional beliefs against it. In all human affairs, everyone directly involved, who is not under strict supervision, has a recognized right to have a say. When using that right doesn't clash with the safety of everyone, they shouldn't be unjustly excluded from it. However, while everyone should have a voice, the idea that everyone should have an equal voice is a completely different matter. When two people who have a shared interest disagree, does fairness really require that both opinions be considered equally valid? If one person has equal virtue but more knowledge and intelligence, or if both are equally knowledgeable but one is more virtuous, then the opinion and judgment of the more morally or intellectually capable person carries more weight than that of the less capable. If the country's institutions suggest that both opinions are equally valuable, they claim something false. One of the two, the wiser or better individual, deserves more influence; the challenge lies in determining which one that is. This is impossible on an individual level, but when considering groups of people, it can be approximated with some accuracy. There would be no justification for applying this idea to situations that can reasonably be seen as matters of individual and private rights. In a situation affecting just one of two people, that person is entitled to follow their own opinion, no matter how much wiser the other might be. But we’re talking about matters that concern both; if the less knowledgeable person doesn’t defer to the judgment of the wiser person, then the wiser person must yield to the less knowledgeable. Which approach is best for both parties and aligns with the overall harmony of things? If it seems unfair for either to have to give ground, which is the greater injustice? That the better judgment submits to the worse, or the worse submits to the better?
Now national affairs are exactly such a joint concern, with the difference that no one needs ever be called upon for a complete sacrifice of his own opinion. It can always be taken into the calculation, and counted at a certain figure, a higher figure being assigned to the suffrages of those whose opinion is entitled to greater weight. There is not in this arrangement any thing necessarily invidious to those to whom it assigns the lower degrees of influence. Entire exclusion from a voice in the common concerns is one thing: the concession to others of a more potential voice, on the ground of greater capacity for the management of the joint interests, is another. The two things are not merely different, they are incommensurable. Every one has a right to feel insulted by being made a nobody, and stamped as of no account at all. No one but a fool, and only a fool of a peculiar description, feels offended by the acknowledgment that there are others whose opinion, and even whose wish, is entitled to a greater amount of consideration than his. To have no voice in what are partly his own concerns is a thing which nobody willingly submits to; but when what is partly his concern is also partly another's, and he feels the other to understand the subject better than himself, that the other's opinion should be counted for more than his own accords with his expectations, and with the course of things which in all other affairs of life he is accustomed to acquiese in. It is only necessary that this superior influence should be assigned on grounds which he can comprehend, and of which he is able to perceive the justice.
Now, national issues are definitely a shared responsibility, but the difference is that no one is ever required to completely give up their own opinion. It can always be taken into account and assigned a certain value, with a higher value given to the opinions of those whose views carry more weight. There’s nothing necessarily unfair in this arrangement for those who are given less influence. Being completely excluded from having a say in common matters is one thing; granting others a stronger voice based on their greater ability to manage shared interests is another. These two situations are not just different; they are completely incomparable. Everyone has the right to feel insulted if they are made to feel insignificant and dismissed. Only a fool, and a particular kind of fool at that, would be offended by the recognition that there are others whose opinions and wishes deserve more consideration than their own. Nobody willingly accepts having no voice in matters that partly concern them; however, when those matters also involve someone else and they believe that the other person understands the topic better, it makes sense for the other’s opinion to carry more weight than theirs. All that’s needed is for this greater influence to be based on reasons that the individual can understand and which seem fair to them.
I hasten to say that I consider it entirely inadmissible, unless as a temporary makeshift, that the superiority of influence should be conferred in consideration of property. I do not deny that property is a kind of test; education, in most countries, though any thing but proportional to riches, is on the average better in the richer half of society than in the poorer. But the criterion is so imperfect; accident has so much more to do than merit with enabling men to rise in the world; and it is so impossible for any one, by acquiring any amount of instruction, to make sure of the corresponding rise in station, that this foundation of electoral privilege is always, and will continue to be, supremely odious. To connect plurality of votes with any pecuniary qualification would be not only objectionable in itself, but a sure mode of compromising the principle, and making its permanent maintenance impracticable. The democracy, at least of this country, are not at present jealous of personal superiority, but they are naturally and must justly so of that which is grounded on mere pecuniary circumstances. The only thing which can justify reckoning one person's opinion as equivalent to more than one is individual mental superiority, and what is wanted is some approximate means of ascertaining that. If there existed such a thing as a really national education or a trustworthy system of general examination, education might be tested directly. In the absence of these, the nature of a person's occupation is some test. An employer of labor is on the average more intelligent than a laborer; for he must labor with his head, and not solely with his hands. A foreman is generally more intelligent than an ordinary laborer, and a laborer in the skilled trades than in the unskilled. A banker, merchant, or manufacturer is likely to be more intelligent than a tradesman, because he has larger and more complicated interests to manage. In all these cases it is not the having merely undertaken the superior function, but the successful performance of it, that tests the qualifications; for which reason, as well as to prevent persons from engaging nominally in an occupation for the sake of the vote, it would be proper to require that the occupation should have been persevered in for some length of time (say three years). Subject to some such condition, two or more votes might be allowed to every person who exercises any of these superior functions. The liberal professions, when really and not nominally practiced, imply, of course, a still higher degree of instruction; and wherever a sufficient examination, or any serious conditions of education, are required before entering on a profession, its members could be admitted at once to a plurality of votes. The same rule might be applied to graduates of universities; and even to those who bring satisfactory certificates of having passed through the course of study required by any school at which the higher branches of knowledge are taught, under proper securities that the teaching is real, and not a mere pretense. The "local" or "middle class" examination for the degree of associate, so laudably and public-spiritedly established by the University of Oxford, and any similar ones which may be instituted by other competent bodies (provided they are fairly open to all comers), afford a ground on which plurality of votes might with great advantage be accorded to those who have passed the test. All these suggestions are open to much discussion in the detail, and to objections which it is of no use to anticipate. The time is not come for giving to such plans a practical shape, nor should I wish to be bound by the particular proposals which I have made. But it is to me evident that in this direction lies the true ideal of representative government; and that to work towards it by the best practical contrivances which can be found is the path of real political improvement.
I want to say right away that I believe it's completely unacceptable, unless it's just a temporary fix, for influence to be granted based on wealth. I acknowledge that wealth can be a rough indicator; education, in most countries, although not proportional to riches, tends to be better in the wealthier half of society on average. However, that measure is so flawed; chance plays a much larger role than ability in allowing people to gain status, and it's virtually impossible for anyone to ensure a rise in rank just by getting a certain level of education, which makes the idea of electoral privilege based on wealth extremely distasteful. Linking the number of votes to any financial qualification would not only be objectionable on its own but would also risk undermining the principle and making its long-term maintenance impossible. The democracy in this country doesn't currently resent personal superiority, but rightfully feels uneasy about distinctions based solely on wealth. The only thing that can justify considering one person's opinion as worth more than another's is individual intelligence, and what we need is a reasonable way to measure that. If there were a truly national education system or a reliable method for general examinations, we could assess education directly. In its absence, the nature of a person's job serves as some indicator. An employer typically has more intelligence than a laborer because an employer needs to think strategically, not just work with their hands. A supervisor tends to be more intelligent than a regular laborer, and a skilled laborer is usually smarter than an unskilled one. A banker, merchant, or manufacturer is likely to be more intelligent than a tradesman since they manage larger and more complex interests. In all these cases, it's not just taking on the higher role, but successfully performing it that determines the qualifications. Therefore, to prevent individuals from merely pretending to engage in a job for the sake of voting, it would be appropriate to require that they have been genuinely involved in the role for a certain period (like three years). Following such a condition, individuals holding these higher roles could be allowed multiple votes. The professions requiring significant expertise, when genuinely practiced, imply an even higher level of education; where a rigorous exam or serious educational conditions are needed before entering a profession, its members could then qualify for multiple votes. This same approach could apply to university graduates and to those who provide satisfactory proof of completing a course of study at any school that teaches advanced subjects, with assurance that the education received is legitimate and not just superficial. The "local" or "middle class" examination for the associate degree, commendably established by the University of Oxford, along with similar ones created by other capable institutions (as long as they are reasonably open to everyone), provide a basis for granting additional votes to those who pass the test. All these ideas are subject to considerable discussion and will likely face objections that are unnecessary to predict. The time hasn't come to put such plans into action, nor would I want to be tied to the specific proposals I've laid out. However, it seems clear to me that this is the true ideal of representative government; and working toward it with the best practical solutions we can find is the way to achieve real political progress.
If it be asked to what length the principle admits of being carried, or how many votes might be accorded to an individual on the ground of superior qualifications, I answer, that this is not in itself very material, provided the distinctions and gradations are not made arbitrarily, but are such as can be understood and accepted by the general conscience and understanding. But it is an absolute condition not to overpass the limit prescribed by the fundamental principle laid down in a former chapter as the condition of excellence in the constitution of a representative system. The plurality of votes must on no account be carried so far that those who are privileged by it, or the class (if any) to which they mainly belong, shall outweigh by means of it all the rest of the community. The distinction in favor of education, right in itself, is farther and strongly recommended by its preserving the educated from the class legislation of the uneducated; but it must stop short of enabling them to practice class legislation on their own account. Let me add, that I consider it an absolutely necessary part of the plurality scheme that it be open to the poorest individual in the community to claim its privileges, if he can prove that, in spite of all difficulties and obstacles, he is, in point of intelligence, entitled to them. There ought to be voluntary examinations at which any person whatever might present himself, might prove that he came up to the standard of knowledge and ability laid down as sufficient, and be admitted, in consequence, to the plurality of votes. A privilege which is not refused to any one who can show that he has realized the conditions on which in theory and principle it is dependent, would not necessarily be repugnant to any one's sentiment of justice; but it would certainly be so if, while conferred on general presumptions not always infallible, it were denied to direct proof.
If someone asks how far the principle can go or how many votes a person might receive based on their superior qualifications, I would say that this isn't very significant as long as the distinctions and levels are not made arbitrarily but are understandable and accepted by the general conscience. However, it is essential not to exceed the limits set by the fundamental principle outlined in an earlier chapter regarding the conditions for excellence in a representative system. The number of votes must never be so high that those who benefit from it, or any class they may belong to, can outweigh the rest of the community. The distinction in favor of education is valid and is further advocated because it protects the educated from the class-based legislation of the uneducated; however, it should not allow them to enact class legislation for themselves. I also believe that it is essential for the plurality system to allow even the poorest individual in the community to claim its privileges if they can demonstrate that, despite all difficulties, they have the intelligence required. There should be voluntary exams where anyone can come forward, prove they meet the established standards of knowledge and ability, and be granted the plurality of votes. A privilege that is not denied to anyone who can show they meet the necessary criteria would not generally conflict with anyone's sense of justice; however, it would certainly be unjust if it were granted on general assumptions, which are not always reliable, but denied based on direct evidence.
Plural voting, though practiced in vestry elections and those of poor-law guardians, is so unfamiliar in elections to Parliament that it is not likely to be soon or willingly adopted; but as the time will certainly arrive when the only choice will be between this and equal universal suffrage, whoever does not desire the last can not too soon begin to reconcile himself to the former. In the mean time, though the suggestion, for the present, may not be a practical one, it will serve to mark what is best in principle, and enable us to judge of the eligibility of any indirect means, either existing or capable of being adopted, which may promote in a less perfect manner the same end. A person may have a double vote by other means than that of tendering two votes at the same hustings; he may have a vote in each of two different constituencies; and though this exceptional privilege at present belongs rather to superiority of means than of intelligence, I would not abolish it where it exists, since, until a truer test of education is adopted, it would be unwise to dispense with even so imperfect a one as is afforded by pecuniary circumstances. Means might be found of giving a farther extension to the privilege, which would connect it in a more direct manner with superior education. In any future Reform Bill which lowers greatly the pecuniary conditions of the suffrage, it might be a wise provision to allow all graduates of universities, all persons who have passed creditably through the higher schools, all members of the liberal professions, and perhaps some others, to be registered specifically in those characters, and to give their votes as such in any constituency in which they choose to register; retaining, in addition, their votes as simple citizens in the localities in which they reside.
Plural voting, while common in vestry elections and those for poor-law guardians, is so uncommon in parliamentary elections that it's unlikely to be adopted anytime soon or willingly. However, the day will definitely come when the only options will be this or equal universal suffrage, so anyone who doesn't want the latter should start getting used to the former. In the meantime, although the idea may not be practical right now, it will help highlight what is best in principle and allow us to evaluate the value of any indirect methods, whether currently available or possible to implement, that might promote the same objective in a less ideal way. A person can effectively have a double vote through means other than casting two votes at the same polling place; they could have a vote in two different constituencies. While this special privilege currently tends to favor those with more resources rather than intelligence, I wouldn’t want to eliminate it where it exists, since it would be unwise to discard even such a flawed measure as financial circumstances until a better standard of education is established. There could be ways to further expand this privilege in a manner more closely tied to superior education. In any future Reform Bill that significantly lowers the financial qualifications for voting, it might be wise to allow all university graduates, all individuals who have successfully completed advanced schooling, all members of the liberal professions, and perhaps some others, to be registered specifically as such and to cast their votes in any constituency where they register; they would also keep their votes as regular citizens in their local areas.
Until there shall have been devised, and until opinion is willing to accept, some mode of plural voting which may assign to education as such the degree of superior influence due to it, and sufficient as a counterpoise to the numerical weight of the least educated class, for so long the benefits of completely universal suffrage can not be obtained without bringing with them, as it appears to me, more than equivalent evils. It is possible, indeed (and this is perhaps one of the transitions through which we may have to pass in our progress to a really good representative system), that the barriers which restrict the suffrage might be entirely leveled in some particular constituencies, whose members, consequently, would be returned principally by manual laborers; the existing electoral qualification being maintained elsewhere, or any alteration in it being accompanied by such a grouping of the constituencies as to prevent the laboring class from becoming preponderant in Parliament. By such a compromise, the anomalies in the representation would not only be retained, but augmented; this, however, is not a conclusive objection; for if the country does not choose to pursue the right ends by a regular system directly leading to them, it must be content with an irregular makeshift, as being greatly preferable to a system free from irregularities, but regularly adapted to wrong ends, or in which some ends equally necessary with the others have been left out. It is a far graver objection, that this adjustment is incompatible with the intercommunity of local constituencies which Mr. Hare's plan requires; that under it every voter would remain imprisoned within the one or more constituencies in which his name is registered, and, unless willing to be represented by one of the candidates for those localities, would not be represented at all.
Until we come up with a way for plural voting that can properly reflect the level of influence education should have, and until people are ready to accept it, the benefits of universal suffrage will be overshadowed by serious issues. It’s possible, and this might be one of the steps we need to take to achieve a better representative system, that we could relax voting restrictions in certain areas where the electorate would mainly consist of manual laborers, while keeping existing voting qualifications in place in other areas. Any changes would need to be structured in a way that prevents the laboring class from dominating Parliament. This kind of compromise would not only maintain existing discrepancies in representation but could actually make them worse. However, this isn't a definitive concern; if the country doesn’t want to pursue the right goals through a consistent system, it must accept a makeshift approach that’s still much better than a system that, despite being regular, is aimed at the wrong objectives, or one that ignores equally important goals. A more serious problem is that this arrangement goes against the local community connection that Mr. Hare’s plan requires; under this system, every voter would be stuck in the one or more constituencies where they are registered, and unless they are willing to vote for one of the candidates in those local areas, they wouldn’t be represented at all.
So much importance do I attach to the emancipation of those who already have votes, but whose votes are useless, because always outnumbered—so much should I hope from the natural influence of truth and reason, if only secured a hearing and a competent advocacy, that I should not despair of the operation even of equal and universal suffrage, if made real by the proportional representation of all minorities, on Mr. Hare's principle. But if the best hopes which can be formed on this subject were certainties, I should still contend for the principle of plural voting. I do not propose the plurality as a thing in itself undesirable, which, like the exclusion of part of the community from the suffrage, may be temporarily tolerated while necessary to prevent greater evils. I do not look upon equal voting as among the things which are good in themselves, provided they can be guarded against inconveniences. I look upon it as only relatively good; less objectionable than inequality of privilege grounded on irrelevant or adventitious circumstances, but in principle wrong, because recognizing a wrong standard, and exercising a bad influence on the voter's mind. It is not useful, but hurtful, that the constitution of the country should declare ignorance to be entitled to as much political power as knowledge. The national institutions should place all things that they are concerned with before the mind of the citizen in the light in which it is for his good that he should regard them; and as it is for his good that he should think that every one is entitled to some influence, but the better and wiser to more than others, it is important that this conviction should be professed by the state, and embodied in the national institutions. Such things constitute the spirit of the institutions of a country; that portion of their influence which is least regarded by common, and especially by English thinkers, though the institutions of every country, not under great positive oppression, produce more effect by their spirit than by any of their direct provisions, since by it they shape the national character. The American institutions have imprinted strongly on the American mind that any one man (with a white skin) is as good as any other; and it is felt that this false creed is nearly connected with some of the more unfavorable points in American character. It is not small mischief that the constitution of any country should sanction this creed; for the belief in it, whether express or tacit, is almost as detrimental to moral and intellectual excellence any effect which most forms of government can produce.
I place a lot of importance on freeing those who already have votes, but whose votes don’t count because they’re always outnumbered. I have hope in the natural power of truth and reason, if they can just be heard and advocated for competently. I wouldn’t lose faith even in the idea of equal and universal suffrage if it truly represented all minorities, following Mr. Hare's principle. However, even if the best hopes regarding this were guaranteed, I would still argue for plural voting. I don’t see plural voting as something inherently undesirable, which, like excluding part of the community from voting, might be temporarily accepted to prevent bigger problems. I don’t think equal voting is one of those things that is good in itself, as long as it can avoid complications. I see it as relatively good; less problematic than unequal privilege based on irrelevant or accidental factors, but still fundamentally wrong because it uses a flawed standard and negatively impacts the voter’s mindset. It harms the country’s constitution to state that ignorance should have the same political power as knowledge. National institutions should present everything they deal with to citizens in a way that benefits them. While it’s good for everyone to feel they have some influence, it’s even better for the more knowledgeable and wise to have more. This belief should be supported by the state and integrated into national institutions. These elements make up the spirit of a country's institutions; that aspect of their influence which is often overlooked by everyday people, especially in England, even though institutions in any country, not suffering from severe oppression, have a greater impact through their spirit than through direct rules, as this spirit shapes national character. American institutions have strongly imprinted on the American mindset that any one man (who is white) is just as good as another, and this false belief is tied to some of the less favorable traits of American character. It’s a significant issue that the constitution of any country would endorse this belief, as holding onto it, whether openly or silently, is almost as harmful to moral and intellectual excellence as any negative effect most types of government can create.
It may, perhaps, be said, that a constitution which gives equal influence, man for man, to the most and to the least instructed, is nevertheless conducive to progress, because the appeals constantly made to the less instructed classes, the exercise given to their mental powers, and the exertions which the more instructed are obliged to make for enlightening their judgment and ridding them of errors and prejudices, are powerful stimulants to their advance in intelligence. That this most desirable effect really attends the admission of the less educated classes to some, and even to a large share of power, I admit, and have already strenuously maintained. But theory and experience alike prove that a counter current sets in when they are made the possessors of all power. Those who are supreme over every thing, whether they be One, or Few, or Many, have no longer need of the arms of reason; they can make their mere will prevail; and those who can not be resisted are usually far too well satisfied with their own opinions to be willing to change them, or listen without impatience to any one who tells them that they are in the wrong. The position which gives the strongest stimulus to the growth of intelligence is that of rising into power, not that of having achieved it; and of all resting-points, temporary or permanent, in the way to ascendancy, the one which develops the best and highest qualities is the position of those who are strong enough to make reason prevail, but not strong enough to prevail against reason. This is the position in which, according to the principles we have laid down, the rich and the poor, the much and the little educated, and all the other classes and denominations which divide society between them, ought as far as practicable to be placed; and by combining this principle with the otherwise just one of allowing superiority of weight to superiority of mental qualities, a political constitution would realize that kind of relative perfection which is alone compatible with the complicated nature of human affairs.
It could be argued that a constitution that gives equal power to everyone, regardless of their level of education, is still beneficial for progress. This is because the constant appeals made to less educated groups, the opportunities for them to use their mental abilities, and the efforts required from the more educated to help them make better judgments and overcome mistakes and biases serve as strong motivators for their intellectual growth. I acknowledge and have strongly defended the idea that allowing less educated groups a share of power has this positive effect. However, both theory and experience show that problems arise when they hold all the power. Those who are in complete control, whether it's one person, a few, or many, no longer rely on reasoning; they can impose their will at will. Those who cannot be challenged often become too comfortable with their views to change them or to listen patiently to anyone suggesting they might be wrong. The most effective way to encourage intellectual growth is to be on the rise to power, not to have already secured it. Among all the stops—temporary or permanent—on the path to gaining power, the most beneficial position is that of those who are strong enough to make reason triumph but not strong enough to ignore it. This is where, according to our principles, the wealthy and the poor, as well as the highly educated and the less educated, along with all the other groups dividing society, should be placed as much as possible. By combining this idea with the fair principle of giving more influence to those with superior mental abilities, a political constitution could achieve a form of relative perfection that aligns with the complex nature of human affairs.
In the preceding argument for universal but graduated suffrage, I have taken no account of difference of sex. I consider it to be as entirely irrelevant to political rights as difference in height or in the color of the hair. All human beings have the same interest in good government; the welfare of all is alike affected by it, and they have equal need of a voice in it to secure their share of its benefits. If there be any difference, women require it more than men, since, being physically weaker, they are more dependent on law and society for protection. Mankind have long since abandoned the only premises which will support the conclusion that women ought not to have votes. No one now holds that women should be in personal servitude; that they should have no thought, wish, or occupation but to be the domestic drudges of husbands, fathers, or brothers. It is allowed to unmarried, and wants but little of being conceded to married women to hold property, and have pecuniary and business interests in the same manner as men. It is considered suitable and proper that women should think, and write, and be teachers. As soon as these things are admitted, the political disqualification has no principle to rest on. The whole mode of thought of the modern world is, with increasing emphasis, pronouncing against the claim of society to decide for individuals what they are and are not fit for, and what they shall and shall not be allowed to attempt. If the principles of modern politics and political economy are good for any thing, it is for proving that these points can only be rightly judged of by the individuals themselves; and that, under complete freedom of choice, wherever there are real diversities of aptitude, the greater number will apply themselves to the things for which they are on the average fittest, and the exceptional course will only be taken by the exceptions. Either the whole tendency of modern social improvements has been wrong, or it ought to be carried out to the total abolition of all exclusions and disabilities which close any honest employment to a human being.
In the previous discussion about universal but graduated suffrage, I didn't consider the difference in gender. I believe it is completely irrelevant to political rights, just like height or hair color. All people have the same interest in good governance; everyone is equally affected by it, and they all need a voice to secure their share of its benefits. If there’s any difference, women actually need it more than men, since they are physically weaker and more dependent on laws and society for protection. Society has long moved past the old reasoning that women shouldn't have the right to vote. No one believes anymore that women should be in personal servitude or limited to being the domestic caretakers of their husbands, fathers, or brothers. Unmarried women can hold property, and there’s very little stopping married women from having financial and business interests just like men. It's now seen as appropriate for women to think, write, and teach. Once this idea is accepted, there’s no principle left to support political exclusion. The modern mindset increasingly rejects the notion that society can dictate what individuals are capable of or what they can attempt. If the principles of modern politics and economics have any value, it's in proving that these matters can only be rightly judged by the individuals themselves; and that, when given complete freedom of choice, most will pursue what they are best suited for while only a few will take the unconventional path. Either the entire trend of modern social progress has been misguided, or it should lead to the complete removal of all exclusions and barriers that prevent any person from honest work.
But it is not even necessary to maintain so much in order to prove that women should have the suffrage. Were it as right as it is wrong that they should be a subordinate class, confined to domestic occupations and subject to domestic authority, they would not the less require the protection of the suffrage to secure them from the abuse of that authority. Men, as well as women, do not need political rights in order that they may govern, but in order that they may not be misgoverned. The majority of the male sex are, and will be all their lives, nothing else than laborers in corn-fields or manufactories; but this does not render the suffrage less desirable for them, nor their claim to it less irresistible, when not likely to make a bad use of it. Nobody pretends to think that woman would make a bad use of the suffrage. The worst that is said is that they would vote as mere dependents, the bidding of their male relations. If it be so, so let it be. If they think for themselves, great good will be done; and if they do not, no harm. It is a benefit to human beings to take off their fetters, even if they do not desire to walk. It would already be a great improvement in the moral position of women to be no longer declared by law incapable of an opinion, and not entitled to a preference, respecting the most important concerns of humanity. There would be some benefit to them individually in having something to bestow which their male relatives can not exact, and are yet desirous to have. It would also be no small matter that the husband would necessarily discuss the matter with his wife, and that the vote would not be his exclusive affair, but a joint concern. People do not sufficiently consider how markedly the fact that she is able to have some action on the outward world independently of him, raises her dignity and value in a vulgar man's eyes, and makes her the object of a respect which no personal qualities would ever obtain for one whose social existence he can entirely appropriate. The vote itself, too, would be improved in quality. The man would often be obliged to find honest reasons for his vote, such as might induce a more upright and impartial character to serve with him under the same banner. The wife's influence would often keep him true to his own sincere opinion. Often, indeed, it would be used, not on the side of public principle, but of the personal interest or worldly vanity of the family. But, wherever this would be the tendency of the wife's influence, it is exerted to the full already in that bad direction, and with the more certainty, since under the present law and custom she is generally too utter a stranger to politics in any sense in which they involve principle to be able to realize to herself that there is a point of honor in them; and most people have as little sympathy in the point of honor of others, when their own is not placed in the same thing, as they have in the religious feelings of those whose religion differs from theirs. Give the woman a vote, and she comes under the operation of the political point of honor. She learns to look on politics as a thing on which she is allowed to have an opinion, and in which, if one has an opinion, it ought to be acted upon; she acquires a sense of personal accountability in the matter, and will no longer feel, as she does at present, that whatever amount of bad influence she may exercise, if the man can but be persuaded, all is right, and his responsibility covers all. It is only by being herself encouraged to form an opinion, and obtain an intelligent comprehension of the reasons which ought to prevail with the conscience against the temptations of personal or family interest, that she can ever cease to act as a disturbing force on the political conscience of the man. Her indirect agency can only be prevented from being politically mischievous by being exchanged for direct.
But it's not even necessary to argue too hard to prove that women should have the right to vote. Even if it were as right as it is wrong for them to be a subordinate class, stuck in domestic roles and under domestic authority, they would still need the protection of voting rights to shield them from the abuse of that authority. Men, just like women, don't need political rights so they can govern, but to ensure they aren’t misgoverned. Most men are, and will be for their entire lives, nothing more than laborers in fields or factories; but that doesn’t make voting rights less valuable for them, nor their claim to it any less compelling, especially since they're not likely to misuse it. No one seriously argues that women would misuse their voting rights. The worst claim is that they would vote as mere dependents, following the wishes of their male relatives. If that’s the case, so be it. If they think for themselves, that would be great; and if they don’t, it won’t harm anyone. It's beneficial for people to be freed from their constraints, even if they don’t want to move. It would already be a huge improvement for women to no longer be legally declared incapable of forming an opinion or have a say in the most important matters of humanity. They would gain individually from having something to give that their male relatives can’t demand but still want. It would also matter a lot that a husband would have to discuss these issues with his wife, making the vote a shared concern and not just his. People don’t consider enough how much a woman being able to act in the outside world independently of her husband elevates her worth in the eyes of a common man, earning her respect that no personal qualities could garner for someone whose social existence he could completely control. The quality of the vote itself would also improve. A man would often need to find honest reasons for his choices, leading to a more upright and fair character working alongside him. The wife's influence would often keep him aligned with his genuine beliefs. Sometimes, it would be directed not at public principles but rather at family interests or the pride of the household. However, wherever this negative influence from the wife might occur, it’s already fully exerted in that bad direction, especially since, under current laws and customs, she is mostly unfamiliar with politics, preventing her from understanding their principled nature. Most people lack empathy for the points of honor of others when their own interests aren’t involved, much like they may feel indifferent about the religious beliefs of others. If a woman is given a vote, she becomes part of the political point of honor. She starts to see politics as an area where she is allowed to have an opinion, and if she has one, it should be acted upon; she develops a sense of personal responsibility in this matter, and will no longer feel, as she does now, that whatever negative influence she might have can be overridden by persuading a man, as if his responsibility absolves her of her own. It's only through being encouraged to form her own opinions and understand the justifications that should guide her conscience against the pull of personal or family interests that she can stop acting disruptively on the political consciousness of men. Her indirect influence can only be turned from being politically harmful by being transformed into a direct one.
I have supposed the right of suffrage to depend, as in a good state of things it would, on personal conditions. Where it depends, as in this and most other countries, on conditions of property, the contradiction is even more flagrant. There something more than ordinarily irrational in the fact that when a woman can give all the guarantees required from a male elector, independent circumstances, the position of a householder and head of a family, payment of taxes, or whatever may be the conditions imposed, the very principle and system of a representation based on property is set aside, and an exceptionally personal disqualification is created for the mere purpose of excluding her. When it is added that in the country where this is done a woman now reigns, and that the most glorious ruler whom that country ever had was a woman, the picture of unreason and scarcely disguised injustice is complete. Let us hope that as the work proceeds of pulling down, one after another, the remains of the mouldering fabric of monopoly and tyranny, this one will not be the last to disappear; that the opinion of Bentham, of Mr. Samuel Bailey, of Mr. Hare, and many other of the most powerful political thinkers of this age and country (not to speak of others), will make its way to all minds not rendered obdurate by selfishness or inveterate prejudice; and that, before the lapse another generation, the accident of sex, no more than the accident of skin, will be deemed a sufficient justification for depriving its possessor of the equal protection and just privileges of a citizen.
I believe the right to vote should rely, as it should in a good society, on personal qualifications. However, in this and most other countries, it depends on property conditions, which is even more glaringly contradictory. It’s utterly irrational that when a woman meets all the requirements expected of a male voter—like being a householder, head of a family, or paying taxes—the entire principle of representation based on property is ignored, and a specific personal disqualification is enforced just to exclude her. Adding to this absurdity is the fact that in the country enforcing this rule, a woman currently reigns and that the most outstanding ruler in its history was also a woman. This completes a picture of unreasonable and hardly concealed injustice. Let's hope that as we continue to dismantle the decaying structures of monopoly and tyranny, this issue won't be the last to vanish. I hope the views of Bentham, Mr. Samuel Bailey, Mr. Hare, and many other significant political thinkers of our time (not to mention others) will reach all minds unclouded by selfishness or deep-seated bias. Before the next generation passes, the accident of a person's sex—just like the accident of their skin color—should not be seen as a valid reason to deny them the equal protection and rightful privileges of citizenship.
Chapter IX—Should there be Two Stages of Election?
In some representative constitutions, the plan has been adopted of choosing the members of the representative body by a double process, the primary electors only choosing other electors, and these electing the member of Parliament. This contrivance was probably intended as a slight impediment to the full sweep of popular feeling, giving the suffrage, and with it the complete ultimate power, to the Many, but compelling them to exercise it through the agency of a comparatively few, who, it was supposed, would be less moved than the Demos by the gusts of popular passion; and as the electors, being already a select body, might be expected to exceed in intellect and character the common level of their constituents, the choice made by them was thought likely to be more careful and enlightened, and would, in any case, be made under a greater feeling of responsibility than election by the masses themselves. This plan of filtering, as it were, the popular suffrage through an intermediate body admits of a very plausible defense; since it may be said, with great appearance of reason, that less intellect and instruction are required for judging who among our neighbors can be most safely trusted to choose a member of Parliament than who is himself fittest to be one.
In some representative constitutions, there's a system in place where the members of the representative body are chosen through a two-step process: the primary voters select other voters, and these voters then elect the member of Parliament. This mechanism was likely meant to slightly limit the full impact of popular sentiment, granting the right to vote—and with it, ultimate power—to the Many, but requiring them to exercise that power through a small group who were thought to be less swayed by the fluctuations of public emotion. Since the electors are already a select group, they were expected to be more intelligent and capable than the average constituents, making their choices more thoughtful and informed, and being more accountable than if the masses voted directly. This method of filtering popular votes through an intermediary group can be justified convincingly; after all, it may be argued that it requires less knowledge and understanding to determine who among our peers can be trusted to select a member of Parliament than to decide who is best suited to be one.
In the first place, however, if the dangers incident to popular power may be thought to be in some degree lessened by this indirect management, so also are its benefits; and the latter effect is much more certain than the former. To enable the system to work as desired, it must be carried into effect in the spirit in which it is planned; the electors must use the suffrage in the manner supposed by the theory, that is, each of them must not ask himself who the member of Parliament should be, but only whom he would best like to choose one for him. It is evident that the advantages which indirect is supposed to have over direct election require this disposition of mind in the voter, and will only be realized by his taking the doctrine au serieux, that his sole business is to choose the choosers, not the member himself. The supposition must be, that he will not occupy his thoughts with political opinions and measures or political men, but will be guided by his personal respect for some private individual, to whom he will give a general power of attorney to act for him. Now if the primary electors adopt this view of their position, one of the principal uses of giving them a vote at all is defeated; the political function to which they are called fails of developing public spirit and political intelligence, of making public affairs an object of interest to their feelings and of exercise to their faculties. The supposition, moreover, involves inconsistent conditions; for if the voter feels no interest in the final result, how or why can he be expected to feel any in the process which leads to it? To wish to have a particular individual for his representative in Parliament is possible to a person of a very moderate degree of virtue and intelligence, and to wish to choose an elector who will elect that individual is a natural consequence; but for a person who does not care who is elected, or feels bound to put that consideration in abeyance, to take any interest whatever in merely naming the worthiest person to elect another according to his own judgment, implies a zeal for what is right in the abstract, an habitual principle of duty for the sake of duty, which is possible only to persons of a rather high grade of cultivation, who, by the very possession of it, show that they may be, and deserve to be, trusted with political power in a more direct shape. Of all public functions which it is possible to confer on the poorer members of the community, this surely is the least calculated to kindle their feelings, and holds out least natural inducement to care for it, other than a virtuous determination to discharge conscientiously whatever duty one has to perform; and if the mass of electors cared enough about political affairs to set any value on so limited a participation in them, they would not be likely to be satisfied without one much more extensive.
In the first place, while the dangers associated with popular power might be thought to be somewhat reduced by this indirect management, so are its benefits, and the latter is much more certain than the former. For the system to work as intended, it must be implemented in the spirit it was designed; voters need to use their votes in the way the theory suggests, meaning they should not ask themselves who the member of Parliament should be, but rather whom they would prefer to choose someone on their behalf. It is clear that the advantages of indirect election over direct election depend on this mindset from the voter and will only be achieved if they take the idea seriously that their main role is to choose the choosers, not the member itself. The assumption is that they won’t focus on political opinions, issues, or candidates but will instead be guided by their personal respect for some individual to whom they will give general authority to act for them. Now, if the primary voters adopt this viewpoint of their role, one of the main reasons for giving them a vote at all is undermined; the political function they are meant to fulfill fails to foster civic spirit and political intelligence, making public affairs something that engages their feelings and exercises their skills. Furthermore, this assumption includes contradictory conditions; if the voter has no interest in the final outcome, how can they be expected to care about the process that leads to it? Wanting a particular person to represent them in Parliament may be feasible for someone with a moderate level of virtue and intelligence, and wanting to choose an elector who will select that individual is a natural extension of that desire. However, for someone who doesn't care who is elected or feels they must set that consideration aside to take any interest in simply naming the best person to elect another according to their own judgment shows an abstract commitment to what is right, a consistent principle of duty for duty's sake, which is only achievable by individuals of a fairly high level of education, who, by having this quality, demonstrate that they may be, and deserve to be, trusted with political power more directly. Of all the public functions that can be given to the less affluent members of society, this is certainly the least likely to ignite their passions and provides the least natural incentive to care about it, aside from a virtuous determination to fulfill any duty that they have to perform; and if the majority of voters cared enough about political matters to value such a limited involvement in them, they would likely not be content without a much broader role.
In the next place, admitting that a person who, from his narrow range of cultivation, can not judge well of the qualifications of a candidate for Parliament, may be a sufficient judge of the honesty and general capacity of somebody whom he may depute to choose a member of Parliament for him, I may remark, that if the voter acquiesces in this estimate of his capabilities, and really wishes to have the choice made for him by a person in whom he places reliance, there is no need of any constitutional provision for the purpose; he has only to ask this confidential person privately what candidate he had better vote for. In that case the two modes of election coincide in their result, and every advantage of indirect election is obtained under direct. The systems only diverge in their operation if we suppose that the voter would prefer to use his own judgment in the choice of a representative, and only lets another choose for him because the law does not allow him a more direct mode of action. But if this be his state of mind; if his will does not go along with the limitation which the law imposes, and he desires to make a direct choice, he can do so notwithstanding the law. He has only to choose as elector a known partisan of the candidate he prefers, or some one who will pledge himself to vote for that candidate. And this is so much the natural working of election by two stages, that, except in a condition of complete political indifference, it can scarcely be expected to act otherwise. It is in this way that the election of the President of the United States practically operates. Nominally, the election is indirect; the population at large does not vote for the President; it votes for electors who choose the President. But the electors are always chosen under an express engagement to vote for a particular candidate; nor does a citizen ever vote for an elector because of any preference for the man; he votes for the Breckinridge ticket or the Lincoln ticket. It must be remembered that the electors are not chosen in order that they may search the country and find the fittest person in it to be President or to be a member of Parliament. There would be something to be said for the practice if this were so; but it is not so, nor ever will be, until mankind in general are of opinion, with Plato, that the proper person to be intrusted with power is the person most unwilling to accept it. The electors are to make choice of one of those who have offered themselves as candidates, and those who choose the electors already know who these are. If there is any political activity in the country, all electors who care to vote at all have made up their minds which of these candidates they would like to have, and will make that the sole consideration in giving their vote. The partisans of each candidate will have their list of electors ready, all pledged to vote for that individual; and the only question practically asked of the primary elector will be, which of these lists he will support.
Next, let’s consider that someone who has limited experience may not be able to accurately judge the qualifications of a candidate for Parliament, yet might still be a good judge of the honesty and overall capability of someone they trust to choose a member for them. I should point out that if the voter agrees with this assessment of their abilities and genuinely wants someone they trust to make the choice for them, there’s no need for any constitutional provision in that case; they just have to privately ask this trusted person who they should vote for. In that situation, the two methods of election yield the same result, and all the benefits of indirect election are achieved through direct election. The systems only differ in how they operate if we assume that the voter would rather use their own judgment when selecting a representative but only lets someone else decide because the law doesn’t permit a more direct approach. However, if this is the voter’s mindset—if they don’t agree with the limitation imposed by the law and want to make a direct choice—they can still do so despite the law. They only need to choose as their elector someone who is already known as a supporter of the candidate they prefer or someone who will promise to vote for that candidate. This is so naturally the way election by two stages works that, except in cases of complete political apathy, it’s hard to expect it to function otherwise. This is how the election of the President of the United States effectively takes place. Officially, the election is indirect; the general public doesn’t vote for the President; they vote for electors who then choose the President. But the electors are always picked with a clear commitment to vote for a specific candidate, and a voter never chooses an elector because they prefer that person; they vote for the Breckinridge ticket or the Lincoln ticket. It's important to note that electors aren’t selected to find the best person in the country to be President or a member of Parliament. There’d be some merit to this practice if that were the case, but it’s not, and it likely won’t be until people generally believe, like Plato does, that the right person to hold power is the one who least wants it. Electors are meant to pick one of the candidates who have put themselves forward, and those who choose the electors already know who those candidates are. If there’s any political engagement in the country, all voters who care enough to vote have already decided which candidate they prefer and will base their vote solely on that. Supporters of each candidate will have their list of electors ready, all committed to voting for that individual, and the main question a primary elector will face is which of these lists they plan to support.
The case in which election by two stages answers well in practice is when the electors are not chosen solely as electors, but have other important functions to discharge, which precludes their being selected solely as delegates to give a particular vote. This combination of circumstances exemplifies itself in another American institution, the Senate of the United States. That assembly, the Upper House, as it were, of Congress, is considered to represent not the people directly, but the States as such, and to be the guardian of that portion of their sovereign rights which they have not alienated. As the internal sovereignty of each state is, by the nature of an equal federation, equally sacred whatever be the size or importance of the state, each returns to the Senate the same number of members (two), whether it be little Delaware or the "Empire State" of New York. These members are not chosen by the population, but by the State Legislatures, themselves elected by the people of each state; but as the whole ordinary business of a legislative assembly, internal legislation and the control of the executive, devolves upon these bodies, they are elected with a view to those objects more than to the other; and in naming two persons to represent the state in the federal Senate they for the most part exercise their own judgment, with only that general reference to public opinion necessary in all acts of the government of a democracy. The elections thus made have proved eminently successful, and are conspicuously the best of all the elections in the United States, the Senate invariably consisting of the most distinguished men among those who have made themselves sufficiently known in public life. After such an example, it can not be said that indirect popular election is never advantageous. Under certain conditions it is the very best system that can be adopted. But those conditions are hardly to be obtained in practice except in a federal government like that of the United States, where the election can be intrusted to local bodies whose other functions extend to the most important concerns of the nation. The only bodies in any analogous position which exist, or are likely to exist, in this country, are the municipalities, or any other boards which have been or may be created for similar local purposes. Few persons, however, would think it any improvement in our Parliamentary constitution if the members for the City of London were chosen by the aldermen and Common Council, and those for the borough of Marylebone avowedly, as they already are virtually, by the vestries of the component parishes. Even if those bodies, considered merely as local boards, were far less objectionable than they are, the qualities that would fit them for the limited and peculiar duties of municipal or parochial ædileship are no guaranty of any special fitness to judge of the comparative qualifications of candidates for a seat in Parliament. They probably would not fulfill this duty any better than it is fulfilled by the inhabitants voting directly; while, on the other hand, if fitness for electing members of Parliament had to be taken into consideration in selecting persons for the office of vestrymen or town councillors, many of those who are fittest for that more limited duty would inevitably be excluded from it, if only by the necessity there would be of choosing persons whose sentiments in general politics agreed with those of the voters who elected them. The mere indirect political influence of town-councils has already led to a considerable perversion of municipal elections from their intended purpose, by making them a matter of party politics. If it were part of the duty of a man's book-keeper or steward to choose his physician, he would not be likely to have a better medical attendant than if he chose one for himself, while he would be restricted in his choice of a steward or book-keeper to such as might, without too great danger to his health, be intrusted with the other office.
The case where using a two-stage election process works well in practice is when the electors are not just selected as electors but also have other significant responsibilities that prevent them from being chosen solely as delegates to cast a specific vote. This situation is illustrated by another American institution, the Senate of the United States. This assembly, the Upper House of Congress, is viewed as representing not the people directly, but the States, and acts as a protector of the portion of their sovereign rights that they have not given up. Since each state's internal sovereignty is equally important in a federal system, each state sends the same number of senators (two), regardless of its size or significance, whether it’s small Delaware or the major state of New York. These senators are not elected by the population but by the State Legislatures, which are elected by the people of each state. However, since the core duties of a legislative assembly—internal legislation and overseeing the executive—are handled by these bodies, they are elected with those goals in mind more than others. When they choose two people to represent the state in the federal Senate, they mostly rely on their own judgment, with only a general consideration of public opinion needed in all democratic government actions. These elections have been notably successful and stand out as the best elections in the United States, consistently producing the most distinguished individuals known in public life. After such an example, it cannot be said that indirect popular election is never beneficial. Under certain conditions, it can be the best system to adopt. But those conditions are hard to find in practice except in a federal government like that of the United States, where the election can be entrusted to local bodies whose other functions cover the most crucial concerns of the nation. The only groups in any similar position that exist, or are likely to exist, in this country, are municipalities or any other boards created for similar local purposes. However, few would consider it an improvement in our Parliamentary system if members for the City of London were chosen by the aldermen and Common Council, or if those for the borough of Marylebone were openly, as they virtually are, chosen by the vestries of the local parishes. Even if those groups, seen just as local boards, were much less problematic than they are now, the qualities that would make them suitable for the limited and specific duties of municipal or parochial roles do not ensure any special ability to evaluate the qualifications of candidates for Parliament. They probably wouldn’t perform this duty any better than when residents vote directly; on the other hand, if the ability to elect Parliament members were considered when selecting vestrymen or town councillors, many of the most suitable for that more specific role would likely be excluded, simply because they would have to choose people whose general political views align with those of the voters. The mere indirect political influence of town councils has already led to a significant distortion of municipal elections from their intended purpose by making them a matter of party politics. If it were a duty of a person's bookkeeper or steward to select their physician, they probably wouldn’t have a better medical provider than if they chose one themselves, while their choice for a steward or bookkeeper would be limited to those who could be trusted with the other role without too much risk to their health.
It appears, therefore, that every benefit of indirect election which is attainable at all is attainable under direct; that such of the benefits expected from it as would not be obtained under direct election will just as much fail to be obtained under indirect; while the latter has considerable disadvantages peculiar to itself. The mere fact that it is an additional and superfluous wheel in the machinery is no trifling objection. Its decided inferiority as a means of cultivating public spirit and political intelligence has already been dwelt upon; and if it had any effective operation at all—that is, if the primary electors did to any extent leave to their nominees the selection of their Parliamentary representative, the voter would be prevented from identifying himself with his member of Parliament, and the member would feel a much less active sense of responsibility to his constituents. In addition to all this, the comparatively small number of persons in whose hands, at last, the election of a member of Parliament would reside, could not but afford great additional facilities to intrigue, and to every form of corruption compatible with the station in life of the electors. The constituencies would universally be reduced, in point of conveniences for bribery, to the condition of the small boroughs at present. It would be sufficient to gain over a small number of persons to be certain of being returned. If it be said that the electors would be responsible to those who elected them, the answer is obvious, that, holding no permanent office or position in the public eye, they would risk nothing by a corrupt vote except what they would care little for, not to be appointed electors again: and the main reliance must still be on the penalties for bribery, the insufficiency of which reliance, in small constituencies, experience has made notorious to all the world. The evil would be exactly proportional to the amount of discretion left to the chosen electors. The only case in which they would probably be afraid to employ their vote for the promotion of their personal interest would be when they were elected under an express pledge, as mere delegates, to carry, as it were, the votes of their constituents to the hustings. The moment the double stage of election began to have any effect, it would begin to have a bad effect. And this we shall find true of the principle of indirect election however applied, except in circumstances similar to those of the election of senators in the United States.
It seems that every advantage of indirect election that can be achieved is also achievable through direct election; the benefits expected from it that wouldn't be obtained under direct election will similarly fail to materialize under indirect election, which has significant disadvantages of its own. The fact that it acts as an extra and unnecessary component in the system is a serious concern. Its clear inadequacy as a method for fostering public engagement and political awareness has already been discussed; and if it had any real impact—meaning if the primary voters delegated the choice of their Parliamentary representative to their nominees, the voters would struggle to connect with their MP, and the MP would feel much less accountable to their constituents. Additionally, the relatively small number of people ultimately controlling the election of an MP would inevitably encourage manipulation and every type of corruption suited to the voters' social standing. Constituencies would generally become as easy to bribe as the small boroughs are today. It would only take winning over a few individuals to ensure election. If it's argued that the voters would be accountable to those who elected them, the clear answer is that, with no permanent role or visibility, they would risk little from a corrupt vote other than the chance of not being selected as electors again; therefore, the main reliance must remain on penalties for bribery, whose inadequacy in small constituencies has been notorious throughout history. The harm would increase in direct relation to the level of discretion given to the chosen electors. The only situation where they would likely hesitate to vote for their personal gain would be if they were elected with a clear commitment, acting merely as delegates to carry their constituents' votes to the polling place. The moment the two-tier election process started to show any impact, it would begin to have negative consequences. This principle of indirect election will hold true regardless of how it’s applied, except in conditions similar to those found in the election of senators in the United States.
It is unnecessary, as far as England is concerned, to say more in opposition to a scheme which has no foundation in any of the national traditions. An apology may even be expected for saying so much against a political expedient which perhaps could not, in this country, muster a single adherent. But a conception so plausible at the first glance, and for which there are so many precedents in history, might perhaps, in the general chaos of political opinions, rise again to the surface, and be brought forward on occasions when it might be seductive to some minds; and it could not, therefore, even if English readers were alone to be considered, be passed altogether in silence.
It’s unnecessary, as far as England is concerned, to say more against a plan that has no basis in any national traditions. One might even expect an apology for criticizing a political strategy that likely couldn’t find a single supporter in this country. However, a concept that seems so reasonable at first glance, and has so many historical precedents, might resurface in the chaotic mix of political opinions and be presented during times when it might appeal to some people. Therefore, even if we were only considering English readers, it can’t be ignored completely.
Chapter X—Of the Mode of Voting.
The question of greatest moment in regard to modes of voting is that of secrecy or publicity, and to this we will at once address ourselves.
The most important issue regarding voting methods is whether they should be private or public, and that’s what we will focus on right now.
It would be a great mistake to make the discussion turn on sentimentalities about skulking or cowardice. Secrecy is justifiable in many cases, imperative in some, and it is not cowardice to seek protection against evils which are honestly avoidable. Nor can it be reasonably maintained that no cases are conceivable in which secret voting is preferable to public; but I must contend that these cases, in affairs of a political character, are the exception, not the rule.
It would be a big mistake to let the discussion focus on feelings about sneaking around or being cowardly. Keeping things secret is justified in many instances, necessary in some, and it’s not cowardice to seek protection from dangers that can genuinely be avoided. It can't be reasonably argued that there aren’t situations where secret voting is better than public voting; however, I must argue that these situations, in political matters, are the exception rather than the norm.
The present is one of the many instances in which, as I have already had occasion to remark, the spirit of an institution, the impression it makes on the mind of the citizen, is one of the most important parts of its operation. The spirit of vote by ballot—the interpretation likely to be put on it in the mind of an elector, is that the suffrage is given to him for himself—for his particular use and benefit, and not as a trust for the public. For if it is indeed a trust, if the public are entitled to his vote, are not they entitled to know his vote? This false and pernicious impression may well be made on the generality, since it has been made on most of those who of late years have been conspicuous advocates of the ballot. The doctrine was not so understood by its earlier promoters; but the effect of a doctrine on the mind is best shown, not in those who form it, but in those who are formed by it. Mr. Bright and his school of democrats think themselves greatly concerned in maintaining that the franchise is what they term a right, not a trust. Now this one idea, taking root in the general mind, does a moral mischief outweighing all the good that the ballot could do, at the highest possible estimate of it. In whatever way we define or understand the idea of a right, no person can have a right (except in the purely legal sense) to power over others: every such power, which he is allowed to possess is morally, in the fullest force of the term, a trust. But the exercise of any political function, either as an elector or as a representative, is power over others. Those who say that the suffrage is not a trust, but a right, will scarcely accept the conclusions to which their doctrine leads. If it is a right, if it belongs to the voter for his own sake, on what ground can we blame him for selling it, or using it to recommend himself to any one whom it is his interest to please? A person is not expected to consult exclusively the public benefit in the use he makes of his house, or his three per cent. stock, or any thing else to which he really has a right. The suffrage is indeed due to him, among other reasons, as a means to his own protection, but only against treatment from which he is equally bound, so far as depends on his vote, to protect every one of his fellow-citizens. His vote is not a thing in which he has an option; it has no more to do with his personal wishes than the verdict of a juryman. It is strictly a matter of duty; he is bound to give it according to his best and most conscientious opinion of the public good. Whoever has any other idea of it is unfit to have the suffrage; its effect on him is to pervert, not to elevate his mind. Instead of opening his heart to an exalted patriotism and the obligation of public duty, it awakens and nourishes in him the disposition to use a public function for his own interest, pleasure, or caprice; the same feelings and purposes, on a humbler scale, which actuate a despot and oppressor. Now an ordinary citizen in any public position, or on whom there devolves any social function, is certain to think and feel, respecting the obligations it imposes on him, exactly what society appears to think and feel in conferring it. What seems to be expected from him by society forms a standard which he may fall below, but which he will seldom rise above. And the interpretation which he is almost sure to put upon secret voting is that he is not bound to give his vote with any reference to those who are not allowed to know how he gives it; but may bestow it simply as he feels inclined.
The present is one of the many instances in which, as I have already noted, the spirit of an institution—how it impacts the citizen—is one of its most important aspects. The spirit of voting by ballot leads voters to believe that the vote is given to them for their own use and benefit, not as a responsibility to the public. If it is indeed a responsibility, if the public has a right to his vote, then shouldn't they also have the right to know how he votes? This misleading and harmful notion has likely taken hold among many, especially those who have recently championed the ballot. The original advocates didn’t see it this way; the effect of a belief is best revealed not in its creators but in those influenced by it. Mr. Bright and his group of democrats strongly assert that voting is a right, not a responsibility. However, this one idea, once it takes hold in the general mindset, produces moral harm that outweighs any potential benefit of the ballot, even at its highest estimation. No matter how we define or understand the notion of a right, no one can have a right (except in a strictly legal sense) to control others: every such power granted to an individual is morally a trust. The exercise of any political function, whether as a voter or as a representative, involves power over others. Those who claim that voting is not a trust, but a right, will likely refuse to accept the implications of their belief. If it is a right, if it belongs to the voter for his personal benefit, on what grounds can we criticize him for selling it or using it to gain favor with someone he wants to please? One is not expected to prioritize public benefit when using his home, or his three percent stock, or anything else he rightfully owns. Voting is certainly granted to him, among other reasons, as a means of his own protection, but only against treatment that he is also obligated, by the power of his vote, to protect every one of his fellow citizens from. His vote is not a personal choice; it is as detached from his personal wishes as the verdict of a juror. It is purely a matter of duty; he must cast it according to his best and most sincere judgment of the public good. Whoever holds any other view is unfit to vote; the effect on him is corruptive, not enlightening. Instead of inspiring a lofty patriotism and a sense of public duty, it encourages him to exploit a public function for his own gain, pleasure, or whims—the same motivations, on a smaller scale, that drive a tyrant or oppressor. An ordinary citizen in any public role, or with any social responsibility, is likely to think and feel about the obligations it imposes on him exactly what society seems to expect from him in granting that role. The expectations of society create a standard he may fall below, but rarely will he exceed. He is almost certain to interpret secret voting as a freedom to vote without regard for those who cannot know how he votes but may simply cast it as he likes.
This is the decisive reason why the argument does not hold, from the use of the ballot in clubs and private societies to its adoption in parliamentary elections. A member of a club is really, what the elector falsely believes himself to be, under no obligation to consider the wishes or interests of any one else. He declares nothing by his vote but that he is or is not willing to associate, in a manner more or less close, with a particular person. This is a matter on which, by universal admission, his own pleasure or inclination is entitled to decide; and that he should be able so to decide it without risking a quarrel is best for every body, the rejected person included. An additional reason rendering the ballot unobjectionable in these cases is that it does not necessarily or naturally lead to lying. The persons concerned are of the same class or rank, and it would be considered improper in one of them to press another with questions as to how he had voted. It is far otherwise in Parliamentary elections, and is likely to remain so as long as the social relations exist which produce the demand for the ballot—as long as one person is sufficiently the superior of another to think himself entitled to dictate his vote. And while this is the case, silence or an evasive answer is certain to be construed as proof that the vote given has not been that which was desired.
This is the main reason why the argument doesn't hold up, from using the ballot in clubs and private groups to its use in parliamentary elections. A club member is truly what an elector mistakenly thinks he is—under no obligation to consider anyone else's wishes or interests. His vote simply shows whether he is willing or not to associate, more or less closely, with a certain person. This is a matter where, everyone agrees, his own preference or inclination should decide; that he can make this decision without risking a fight is best for everyone, including the person being turned down. Another reason why the ballot is acceptable in these cases is that it doesn’t necessarily lead to dishonesty. The people involved are of the same class or status, and it would be seen as inappropriate for one to press another with questions about how he voted. It’s quite the opposite in parliamentary elections, and it’s likely to stay that way as long as the social dynamics exist that create the need for the ballot—as long as one person feels superior enough to think he can dictate another's vote. And while this is true, silence or a vague response will definitely be seen as evidence that the vote cast wasn’t what was wanted.
In any political election, even by universal suffrage (and still more obviously in the case of a restricted suffrage), the voter is under an absolute moral obligation to consider the interest of the public, not his private advantage, and give his vote, to the best of his judgment, exactly as he would be bound to do if he were the sole voter, and the election depended upon him alone. This being admitted, it is at least a primâ facie consequence that the duty of voting, like any other public duty, should be performed under the eye and criticism of the public; every one of whom has not only an interest in its performance, but a good title to consider himself wronged if it is performed otherwise than honestly and carefully. Undoubtedly neither this nor any other maxim of political morality is absolutely inviolable; it may be overruled by still more cogent considerations. But its weight is such that the cases which admit of a departure from it must be of a strikingly exceptional character.
In any political election, even with universal voting rights (and even more so when voting rights are limited), voters have a clear moral obligation to consider the public's interest over their own personal gain. They should cast their votes based on their best judgment, just as they would if they were the only voter and the election depended solely on them. With this in mind, it follows that the duty to vote, like any other public responsibility, should be carried out under public scrutiny and assessment; everyone has not only a stake in how it's done but also a rightful reason to feel wronged if it's not done honestly and thoughtfully. Of course, this principle, like any other rule of political ethics, isn't unbreakable; it can be overridden by more compelling reasons. However, its significance is such that situations that justify moving away from it must be truly exceptional.
It may unquestionably be the fact, that if we attempt, by publicity, to make the voter responsible to the public for his vote, he will practically be made responsible for it to some powerful individual, whose interest is more opposed to the general interest of the community than that of the voter himself would be, if, by the shield of secrecy, he were released from responsibility altogether. When this is the condition, in a high degree, of a large proportion of the voters, the ballot may be the smaller evil. When the voters are slaves, any thing may be tolerated which enables them to throw off the yoke. The strongest case for the ballot is when the mischievous power of the Few over the Many is increasing. In the decline of the Roman republic, the reasons for the ballot were irresistible. The oligarchy was yearly becoming richer and more tyrannical, the people poorer and more dependent, and it was necessary to erect stronger and stronger barriers against such abuse of the franchise as rendered it but an instrument the more in the hands of unprincipled persons of consequence. As little can it be doubted that the ballot, so far as it existed, had a beneficial operation in the Athenian constitution. Even in the least unstable of the Grecian commonwealths, freedom might be for the time destroyed by a single unfairly obtained popular vote; and though the Athenian voter was not sufficiently dependent to be habitually coerced, he might have been bribed or intimidated by the lawless outrages of some knot of individuals, such as were not uncommon even at Athens among the youth of rank and fortune. The ballot was in these cases a valuable instrument of order, and conduced to the Eunomia by which Athens was distinguished among the ancient commonwealths.
It’s definitely true that if we try to hold voters accountable to the public for their votes through transparency, they might end up being accountable instead to some powerful individual whose interests conflict with the broader interests of the community more than the voter’s own would, especially if the secrecy of the ballot allows them to escape responsibility altogether. When this is the case for a large number of voters, the ballot might actually be the lesser evil. When voters are oppressed, anything that helps them break free from that oppression can be justified. The strongest argument for the ballot comes when the harmful influence of a few over the many is growing. During the decline of the Roman Republic, the reasons for adopting the ballot were overwhelming. The oligarchs were becoming wealthier and more tyrannical every year, while the people grew poorer and more reliant, making it necessary to put up increasingly stronger barriers against the misuse of the franchise, which was turning into a tool for ruthless individuals of influence. It’s also hard to deny that, wherever it was used, the ballot had a positive impact on the Athenian system. Even in the most stable of the Greek city-states, freedom could be destroyed by a single unjustly acquired popular vote; while the Athenian voter wasn’t usually dependent enough to be pressured habitually, they could still be bribed or intimidated by the illegal actions of a group of individuals, which were not rare even in Athens among the elite youth. In these situations, the ballot served as a valuable tool for maintaining order and contributed to the Eunomia that set Athens apart among ancient city-states.
But in the more advanced states of modern Europe, and especially in this country, the power of coercing voters has declined and is declining; and bad voting is now less to be apprehended from the influences to which the voter is subject at the hands of others, than from the sinister interests and discreditable feelings which belong to himself, either individually or as a member of a class. To secure him against the first, at the cost of removing all restraint from the last, would be to exchange a smaller and a diminishing evil for a greater and increasing one. On this topic, and on the question generally as applicable to England at the present date, I have, in a pamphlet on Parliamentary Reform, expressed myself in terms which, as I do not feel that I can improve upon, I will venture here to transcribe.
But in the more developed parts of modern Europe, especially in this country, the ability to pressure voters has decreased and continues to decline; and poor voting behavior is now less likely to stem from outside influences and more from the questionable interests and disreputable feelings that voters have themselves, either as individuals or as part of a group. Protecting them from external pressures while ignoring internal issues would simply replace a smaller, diminishing problem with a larger, growing one. Regarding this subject, and the broader question as it relates to England today, I have expressed my thoughts in a pamphlet on Parliamentary Reform, and since I don’t think I can improve upon those words, I'll go ahead and share them here.
"Thirty years ago it was still true that in the election of members of Parliament the main evil to be guarded against was that which the ballot would exclude—coercion by landlords, employers, and customers. At present, I conceive, a much greater source of evil is the selfishness, or the selfish partialities of the voter himself. A base and mischievous vote is now, I am convinced, much oftener given from the voter's personal interest, or class interest, or some mean feeling in his own mind, than from any fear of consequences at the hands of others; and to these influences the ballot would enable him to yield himself up, free from all sense of shame or responsibility.
"Thirty years ago, it was still true that in the election of Parliament members, the main issue to guard against was what the ballot would prevent—coercion by landlords, employers, and customers. Nowadays, I believe that a much bigger problem is the selfishness or biased preferences of the voters themselves. I’m convinced that a corrupt and harmful vote is now much more often cast out of the voter's personal interest, class interest, or some petty feeling, rather than from any fear of repercussions from others; and the ballot allows them to give in to these influences without any sense of shame or accountability."
"In times not long gone by, the higher and richer classes were in complete possession of the government. Their power was the master grievance of the country. The habit of voting at the bidding of an employer or of a landlord was so firmly established that hardly any thing was capable of shaking it but a strong popular enthusiasm, seldom known to exist but in a good cause. A vote given in opposition to those influences was therefore, in general, an honest, a public-spirited vote; but in any case, and by whatever motive dictated, it was almost sure to be a good vote, for it was a vote against the monster evil, the overruling influence of oligarchy. Could the voter at that time have been enabled, with safety to himself, to exercise his privilege freely, even though neither honestly nor intelligently, it would have been a great gain to reform, for it would have broken the yoke of the then ruling power in the country—the power which had created and which maintained all that was bad in the institutions and the administration of the state—the power of landlords and boroughmongers.
"Not too long ago, the wealthy and elite classes completely controlled the government. Their influence was the main issue for the country. The practice of voting under the direction of an employer or landlord was so ingrained that only a strong public enthusiasm, which was rarely seen except in a good cause, could challenge it. A vote cast against these pressures was generally an honest and civic-minded choice; in any case, and for whatever reason, it was likely to be a positive vote, as it represented opposition to the significant problem of oligarchic influence. If voters at that time had been able to exercise their rights freely without fear for their safety, even if their choices weren't entirely honest or informed, it would have been a significant step towards reform, as it would have broken the grip of the ruling power in the country—the power that created and upheld the negative aspects of the state's institutions and administration—the power of landlords and boroughmongers."
"The ballot was not adopted; but the progress of circumstances has done and is doing more and more, in this respect, the work of the ballot. Both the political and the social state of the country, as they affect this question, have greatly changed, and are changing every day. The higher classes are not now masters of the country. A person must be blind to all the signs of the times who could think that the middle classes are as subservient to the higher, or the working classes as dependent on the higher and middle, as they were a quarter of a century ago. The events of that quarter of a century have not only taught each class to know its own collective strength, but have put the individuals of a lower class in a condition to show a much bolder front to those of a higher. In a majority of cases, the vote of the electors, whether in opposition to or in accordance with the wishes of their superiors, is not now the effect of coercion, which there are no longer the same means of applying, but the expression of their own personal or political partialities. The very vices of the present electoral system are a proof of this. The growth of bribery, so loudly complained of, and the spread of the contagion to places formerly free from it, are evidence that the local influences are no longer paramount; that the electors now vote to please themselves, and not other people. There is, no doubt, in counties and in the smaller boroughs, a large amount of servile dependence still remaining; but the temper of the times is adverse to it, and the force of events is constantly tending to diminish it. A good tenant can now feel that he is as valuable to his landlord as his landlord is to him; a prosperous tradesman can afford to feel independent of any particular customer. At every election the votes are more and more the voter's own. It is their minds, far more than their personal circumstances, that now require to be emancipated. They are no longer passive instruments of other men's will—mere organs for putting power into the hands of a controlling oligarchy. The electors themselves are becoming the oligarchy.
The ballot wasn’t adopted, but the changing circumstances have effectively taken its place. Both the political and social dynamics in the country have changed a lot and continue to shift every day. The upper classes are no longer in control. Anyone who thinks that the middle classes still submit to the upper classes, or that the working classes depend on them, as they did twenty-five years ago, is missing all the signs of the times. Over the past quarter-century, events have taught each class to recognize its own collective strength and have empowered individuals from lower classes to stand up more confidently to those in higher classes. Nowadays, the votes of electors, whether they go against or align with their superiors' wishes, aren’t coerced in the same ways anymore; they reflect the voters' own personal or political preferences. The very flaws of the current electoral system prove this point. The increase in bribery, which has been widely criticized, and its spread to places that were previously unaffected indicate that local influences are no longer dominant; electors now vote for their own satisfaction rather than to appease others. Certainly, there’s still a significant amount of dependence in counties and smaller boroughs, but the current mood is against it, and the course of events is consistently working to reduce it. A responsible tenant now understands that he is just as valuable to his landlord as the landlord is to him; a successful tradesperson can feel independent from any single customer. With every election, voters are taking more ownership of their votes. It’s their thoughts that now need to be freed, much more than their personal situations. They are no longer just instruments of others’ will—merely tools for empowering a controlling oligarchy. The electors themselves are becoming the new oligarchy.
"Exactly in proportion as the vote of the elector is determined by his own will, and not by that of somebody who is his master, his position is similar to that of a member of Parliament, and publicity is indispensable. So long as any portion of the community are unrepresented, the argument of the Chartists against ballot in conjunction with a restricted suffrage is unassailable. The present electors, and the bulk of those whom any probable Reform Bill would add to the number, are the middle class, and have as much a class interest, distinct from the working classes, as landlords or great manufacturers. Were the suffrage extended to all skilled laborers, even these would, or might, still have a class interest distinct from the unskilled. Suppose it extended to all men—suppose that what was formerly called by the misapplied name of universal suffrage, and now by the silly title of manhood suffrage, became the law; the voters would still have a class interest as distinguished from women. Suppose that there were a question before the Legislature specially affecting women—as whether women should be allowed to graduate at universities; whether the mild penalties inflicted on ruffians who beat their wives daily almost to death's door should be exchanged for something more effectual; or suppose that any one should propose in the British Parliament what one state after another in America is enacting, not by a mere law, but by a provision of their revised Constitutions; that married women should have a right to their own property—are not a man's wife and daughters entitled to know whether he votes for or against a candidate who will support these propositions?
"To the extent that a voter's choice is based on their own decision and not influenced by someone in power over them, their situation is comparable to that of a member of Parliament, and transparency is essential. As long as any part of the community lacks representation, the Chartists' argument against using a ballot along with limited voting rights remains valid. The current voters, along with most of those who would be added by any likely Reform Bill, are from the middle class and have as much of a class interest, distinct from the working classes, as landlords or large manufacturers. If suffrage were extended to all skilled workers, they might still have a different class interest compared to unskilled workers. If it were extended to all men—if what was once misguidedly called universal suffrage, and is now foolishly termed manhood suffrage, became law—the voters would still have a class interest that distinguishes them from women. Imagine there was a matter before the Legislature that specifically impacted women—like whether women should be allowed to graduate from universities; whether the light penalties given to men who violently abuse their wives should be replaced with more effective measures; or imagine if someone proposed in the British Parliament what various American states are implementing, not just through law, but as a part of their revised Constitutions: that married women should have rights to their own property—don’t a man's wife and daughters have the right to know whether he votes for or against a candidate who supports these issues?"
"It will of course be objected that these arguments' derive all their weight from the supposition of an unjust state of the suffrage: that if the opinion of the non-electors is likely to make the elector vote more honestly or more beneficially than he would vote if left to himself, they are more fit to be electors than he is, and ought to have the franchise; that whoever is fit to influence electors is fit to be an elector; that those to whom voters ought to be responsible should be themselves voters, and, being such, should have the safeguard of the ballot, to shield them from the undue influence of powerful individuals or classes to whom they ought not to be responsible.
It will certainly be argued that these points only hold weight based on the assumption of an unfair voting system: that if the views of those who cannot vote are likely to lead the voters to make choices that are more honest or beneficial than what they would decide on their own, then those non-voters are more qualified to be voters than the current electors and should have the right to vote; that whoever is capable of influencing voters should also be allowed to vote; that those to whom voters should be accountable ought to be voters themselves, and, as such, should have the protection of the ballot to guard against the undue influence of powerful individuals or groups to whom they should not be accountable.
"This argument is specious, and I once thought it conclusive. It now appears to me fallacious. All who are fit to influence electors are not, for that reason, fit to be themselves electors. This last is a much greater power than the former, and those may be ripe for the minor political function who could not as yet be safely trusted with the superior. The opinions and wishes of the poorest and rudest class of laborers may be very useful as one influence among others on the minds of the voters, as well as on those of the Legislature, and yet it might be highly mischievous to give them the preponderant influence, by admitting them, in their present state of morals and intelligence, to the full exercise of the suffrage. It is precisely this indirect influence of those who have not the suffrage over those who have, which, by its progressive growth, softens the transition to every fresh extension of the franchise, and is the means by which, when the time is ripe, the extension is peacefully brought about. But there is another and a still deeper consideration, which should never be left out of the account in political speculations. The notion is itself unfounded that publicity, and the sense of being answerable to the public, are of no use unless the public are qualified to form a sound judgment. It is a very superficial view of the utility of public opinion to suppose that it does good only when it succeeds in enforcing a servile conformity to itself. To be under the eyes of others—to have to defend oneself to others—is never more important than to those who act in opposition to the opinion of others, for it obliges them to have sure ground of their own. Nothing has so steadying an influence as working against pressure. Unless when under the temporary sway of passionate excitement, no one will do that which he expects to be greatly blamed for, unless from a preconceived and fixed purpose of his own, which is always evidence of a thoughtful and deliberate character, and, except in radically bad men, generally proceeds from sincere and strong personal convictions. Even the bare fact of having to give an account of their conduct is a powerful inducement to adhere to conduct of which at least some decent account can be given. If any one thinks that the mere obligation of preserving decency is not a very considerable check on the abuse of power, he has never had his attention called to the conduct of those who do not feel under the necessity of observing that restraint. Publicity is inappreciable, even when it does no more than prevent that which can by no possibility be plausibly defended—than compel deliberation, and force every one to determine, before he acts, what he shall say if called to account for his actions.
"This argument is misleading, and I once thought it convincing. It now seems flawed to me. Not everyone who is capable of influencing voters is necessarily fit to be a voter themselves. The power of being a voter is much greater than the ability to influence others. Some people may be ready for the smaller role in politics without being trusted with the larger responsibility. The opinions and wishes of the poorest and least educated laborers can be valuable influences on voters and lawmakers, but it would be dangerous to give them dominant power by allowing them unrestricted voting rights in their current state of morals and knowledge. It is this indirect influence of those without voting rights over those who do have them that gradually makes it easier for each new extension of voting rights to happen peacefully when the time is right. However, there is another, deeper point that should always be considered in political discussions. The idea that public scrutiny and the awareness of being accountable to the public are useless unless the public can make sound judgments is unfounded. It's a narrow view to think that public opinion is useful only when it enforces strict conformity. Being observed by others and having to justify one’s actions is especially important for those who oppose popular opinion, as it forces them to develop solid arguments. There’s nothing more stabilizing than pushing back against pressure. Unless someone is caught up in strong emotions, no one will act in a way they expect to be heavily criticized unless they have a well-considered plan, which usually indicates a thoughtful and deliberate nature. Aside from fundamentally bad individuals, this often comes from genuine and strong personal beliefs. Just the fact that one has to explain their actions is a compelling reason to behave in a way that can at least be justified. If someone believes that the mere responsibility of maintaining decency isn’t a significant check on the abuse of power, they have not considered how those who don’t feel bound by that restraint behave. Public scrutiny is invaluable, even if it only achieves the prevention of actions that cannot be defended and forces everyone to think about what they will say if questioned about their actions before they act."
"But, if not now (it may be said), at least hereafter, when all are fit to have votes, and when all men and women are admitted to vote in virtue of their fitness, then there can no longer be danger of class legislation; then the electors, being the nation, can have no interest apart from the general interest: even if individuals still vote according to private or class inducements, the majority will have no such inducement; and as there will then be no non-electors to whom they ought to be responsible, the effect of the ballot, excluding none but the sinister influences, will be wholly beneficial.
"But, if not now, at least in the future, when everyone is qualified to vote, and when all men and women can vote based on their qualifications, then there will be no risk of class-based legislation; then the voters, representing the whole nation, will have no interests separate from the common good: even if individuals still vote based on personal or class motivations, the majority won’t have those motivations; and since there will be no non-voters they need to be accountable to, the outcome of the vote, eliminating only harmful influences, will be entirely positive."
"Even in this I do not agree. I can not think that even if the people were fit for, and had obtained universal suffrage, the ballot would be desirable. First, because it could not, in such circumstances, be supposed to be needful. Let us only conceive the state of things which the hypothesis implies: a people universally educated, and every grown-up human being possessed of a vote. If, even when only a small proportion are electors, and the majority of the population almost uneducated, public opinion is already, as every one now sees that it is, the ruling power in the last resort, it is a chimera to suppose that over a community who all read, and who all have votes, any power could be exercised by landlords and rich people against their own inclination, which it would be at all difficult for them to throw off. But, though the protection of secrecy would then be needless, the control of publicity would be as needful as ever. The universal observation of mankind has been very fallacious, if the mere fact of being one of the community, and not being in a position of pronounced contrariety of interest to the public at large, is enough to insure the performance of a public duty, without either the stimulus or the restraint derived from the opinion of our fellow-creatures. A man's own particular share of the public interest, even though he may have no private interest drawing him in the opposite direction, is not, as a general rule, found sufficient to make him do his duty to the public without other external inducements. Neither can it be admitted that, even if all had votes, they would give their votes as honestly in secret as in public.
"Even in this, I disagree. I can't believe that even if people were qualified for and had attained universal suffrage, the ballot would be a good idea. First, because it wouldn't be necessary in such circumstances. Let's imagine the situation that this hypothesis suggests: a fully educated population, and every adult person has a vote. If, even when only a small fraction are voters and most people are uneducated, public opinion is already, as everyone can see, the ultimate power, it’s unrealistic to think that in a community where everyone reads and votes, landlords and wealthy individuals could wield power against the common will that they couldn't easily shake off. However, while the confidentiality of the vote would then be unnecessary, public oversight would still be as crucial as ever. The universal human observation has been misleading if simply being part of the community and not having a position that sharply opposes the public interest is sufficient for someone to fulfill a civic duty without needing the motivation or accountability of social opinion. A person's own stake in the public good, even if they have no conflicting personal interests, is generally not enough to compel them to act in the public’s interest without other external motivators. Additionally, it can't be assumed that even if everyone had a vote, they would cast their votes as honestly in private as in public."
"The proposition that the electors, when they compose the whole of the community, can not have an interest in voting against the interest of the community, will be found, on examination, to have more sound than meaning in it. Though the community, as a whole, can have (as the terms imply) no other interest than its collective interest, any or every individual in it may. A man's interest consists of whatever he takes an interest in. Every body has as many different interests as he has feelings; likings or dislikings, either of a selfish or of a better kind. It can not be said that any of these, taken by itself, constitutes 'his interest:' he is a good man or a bad according as he prefers one class of his interests or another. A man who is a tyrant at home will be apt to sympathize with tyranny (when not exercised over himself); he will be almost certain not to sympathize with resistance to tyranny. An envious man will vote against Aristides because he is called the Just. A selfish man will prefer even a trifling individual benefit to his share of the advantage which his country would derive from a good law, because interests peculiar to himself are those which the habits of his mind both dispose him to dwell on and make him best able to estimate. A great number of the electors will have two sets of preferences—those on private and those on public grounds. The last are the only ones which the elector would like to avow. The best side of their character is that which people are anxious to show, even to those who are no better than themselves. People will give dishonest or mean votes from lucre, from malice, from pique, from personal rivalry, even from the interests or prejudices of class or sect, more readily in secret than in public. And cases exist—they may come to be more frequent—in which almost the only restraint upon a majority of knaves consists in their involuntary respect for the opinion of an honest minority. In such a case as that of the repudiating states of North America, is there not some check to the unprincipled voter in the shame of looking an honest man in the face? Since all this good would be sacrificed by the ballot, even in the circumstances most favorable to it, a much stronger case is requisite than can now be made out for its necessity (and the case is continually becoming still weaker) to make its adoption desirable." [4]
"The idea that voters, when they represent the entire community, can’t have an interest in voting against the community’s interest will turn out to have more logic than actual meaning. While the community as a whole can have no interest other than its collective benefit, any individual within it may have different interests. A person's interests consist of whatever they care about. Everyone has as many different interests as they have feelings; preferences or aversions, which can be either selfish or altruistic. It can’t be said that any of these, on their own, define 'his interest:' a person is considered good or bad depending on which set of interests they prioritize. A tyrant at home is likely to support tyranny (as long as it isn’t directed at him); he will almost certainly not support resistance to tyranny. An envious person will vote against Aristides just because he’s called the Just. A selfish person will favor even a minor personal gain over the benefits that good laws would bring to their country, because personal interests are what their mindset focuses on and what they are most capable of evaluating. Many voters will have two kinds of preferences—those based on personal interests and those based on public interests. The latter are the ones the voter would prefer to acknowledge. The better aspects of their character are what people want to display, even to those who are equally flawed. People will vote dishonestly or unkindly out of greed, malice, spite, or personal rivalry, and even because of the interests or prejudices tied to their class or group, more easily in private than in public. There are instances—likely to become more frequent—where the only restraint on a majority of dishonest individuals is their instinctive respect for the opinion of an honest minority. In cases like the repudiating states of North America, isn’t there some check on unprincipled voters from the shame of having to face an honest person? Since all this goodwill would be lost with the ballot, even in the most favorable conditions, a much stronger argument is needed than what can currently be presented for its necessity (and this argument is continually getting weaker) to make its adoption appealing." [4]
On the other debateable points connected with the mode of voting, it is not necessary to expend so many words. The system of personal representation, as organized by Mr. Hare, renders necessary the employment of voting papers. But it appears to me indispensable that the signature of the elector should be affixed to the paper at a public polling-place, or if there be no such place conveniently accessible, at some office open to all the world, and in the presence of a responsible public officer. The proposal which has been thrown out of allowing the voting papers to be filled up at the voter's own residence, and sent by the post, or called for by a public officer, I should regard as fatal. The act would be done in the absence of the salutary and the presence of all the pernicious influences. The briber might, in the shelter of privacy, behold with his own eyes his bargain fulfilled, and the intimidator could see the extorted obedience rendered irrevocably on the spot; while the beneficent counter-influence of the presence of those who knew the voter's real sentiments, and the inspiring effect of the sympathy of those of his own party or opinion, would be shut out. [5]
On the other debatable points related to the voting process, there's no need to spend too many words. The system of personal representation, as designed by Mr. Hare, requires the use of voting papers. However, I believe it's essential for the elector's signature to be added to the paper at a public polling place, or if there's no conveniently accessible location, at an office that's open to everyone, and in front of a responsible public officer. The suggestion that voters should fill out their papers at home and send them by mail, or have them picked up by a public officer, is something I would see as detrimental. This act would take place without the beneficial influences and in the presence of all the harmful ones. The briber could, in the safety of privacy, witness his deal being executed, and the intimidator could see the coerced compliance done right there; meanwhile, the positive counter-influence of those who understood the voter's true feelings, and the uplifting effect of support from those of his own party or views, would be completely absent. [5]
The polling places should be so numerous as to be within easy reach of every voter, and no expenses of conveyance, at the cost of the candidate, should be tolerated under any pretext. The infirm, and they only on medical certificate, should have the right of claiming suitable carriage conveyance at the cost of the state or of the locality. Hustings, poll clerks, and all the necessary machinery of elections, should be at the public charge. Not only the candidate should not be required, he should not be permitted to incur any but a limited and trifling expense for his election. Mr. Hare thinks it desirable that a sum of £50 should be required from every one who places his name on the list of candidates, to prevent persons who have no chance of success, and no real intention of attempting it, from becoming candidates in wantonness or from mere love of notoriety, and perhaps carrying off a few votes which are needed for the return of more serious aspirants. There is one expense which a candidate or his supporters can not help incurring, and which it can hardly be expected that the public should defray for every one who may choose to demand it—that of making his claims known to the electors, by advertisements, placards, and circulars. For all necessary expenses of this kind the £50 proposed by Mr. Hare, if allowed to be drawn upon for these purposes (it might be made £100 if requisite), ought to be sufficient. If the friends of the candidate choose to go to expense for committees and canvassing, there are no means of preventing them; but such expenses out of the candidates's own pocket, or any expenses whatever beyond the deposit of £50 (or £100), should be illegal and punishable. If there appeared any likelihood that opinion would refuse to connive at falsehood, a declaration on oath or honor should be required from every member, on taking his seat, that he had not expended, nor would expend, money or money's worth beyond the £50, directly or indirectly, for the purposes of his election; and if the assertion were proved to be false or the pledge to have been broken, he should be liable to the penalties of perjury. It is probable that those penalties, by showing that the Legislature was in earnest, would turn the course of opinion in the same direction, and would hinder it from regarding, as has hitherto done, this most serious crime against society as a venial peccadillo. When once this effect has been produced, there need be no doubt that the declaration on oath or honor would be considered binding. [6] "Opinion tolerates a false disclaimer only when it already tolerates the thing disclaimed." This is notoriously the case with regard to electoral corruption. There has never yet been, among political men, any real and serious attempt to prevent bribery, because there has been no real desire that elections should not be costly. Their costliness is an advantage to those who can afford the expense by excluding a multitude of competitors; and any thing, however noxious, is cherished as having a conservative tendency, if it limits the access to Parliament to rich men. This is a rooted feeling among our legislators of both political parties, and is almost the only point on which I believe them to be really ill-intentioned. They care comparatively little who votes, as long as they feel assured that none but persons of their own class can be voted for. They know that they can rely on the fellow-feeling of one of their class with another, while the subservience of nouveaux enrichis who are knocking at the door of the class is a still surer reliance; and that nothing very hostile to the class interests or feelings of the rich need be apprehended under the most democratic suffrage, as long as democratic persons can be prevented from being elected to Parliament. But, even from their own point of view, this balancing of evil by evil, instead of combining good with good, is a wretched policy. The object should be to bring together the best members of both classes, under such a tenure as shall induce them to lay aside their class preferences, and pursue jointly the path traced by the common interest, instead of allowing the class feelings of the Many to have full swing in the constituencies, subject to the impediment of having to act through persons imbued with the class feelings of the Few.
The polling places should be numerous enough to be easily accessible for every voter, and no transportation costs should be covered by the candidate under any circumstance. Only the elderly or infirm, with a medical certificate, should be allowed to claim transportation at the expense of the state or local authority. Election venues, poll workers, and all necessary election infrastructure should be funded by the public. Not only should candidates not be forced to incur any costs, they should also not be allowed to spend more than a minimal amount on their election. Mr. Hare believes that a deposit of £50 should be required from anyone running for office to prevent people without a genuine chance of winning, or any serious intention, from being candidates just for the sake of it or to gain notoriety, which could take votes away from more serious contenders. One unavoidable expense for a candidate or their supporters is advertising their campaign through ads, flyers, and mailings. The £50 proposed by Mr. Hare, if permitted for these purposes (which could be raised to £100 if needed), should be adequate. If a candidate's supporters wish to spend money on committees and canvassing, there’s no way to stop them; however, any expenses beyond the £50 (or £100) deposit should be illegal and punishable. If there were any indication that public opinion would not tolerate dishonesty, a declaration on oath or honor should be required from every member taking their seat, confirming they have not spent, and will not spend, any money beyond the £50 for their election, either directly or indirectly; if proven false, they should face perjury charges. It's likely that enforcing these penalties, by showing the Legislature is serious, would shift public opinion and help stop viewing this serious crime against society as a minor offense. Once this change occurs, the declaration on oath or honor is likely to be seen as binding. [6] "Public opinion only tolerates a false disclaimer when it also tolerates the behavior being disclaimed." This is clearly true regarding electoral corruption. Up to now, there hasn't been a genuine attempt among politicians to stop bribery because there's little desire to make elections less expensive. High costs benefit those who can afford them by limiting competition, and anything, no matter how harmful, is supported if it keeps Parliament accessible only to the wealthy. This sentiment is deeply rooted among our legislators from both parties and is, I believe, the only area where they genuinely have bad intentions. They care little about who votes as long as they are sure that only people from their own class can be elected. They know they can count on solidarity among their peers, while the subservience of newly wealthy individuals eager to join their ranks is an even safer bet; nothing that threatens the interests or feelings of the wealthy is likely to arise under a democratic voting system as long as truly democratic individuals are kept from being elected to Parliament. However, even from their standpoint, this method of balancing one evil with another, instead of combining good with good, is a poor strategy. The goal should be to unite the best members from both classes in a way that encourages them to set aside their class biases and work together for the common good, rather than letting the interests of the majority be driven by the class feelings of the minority.
There is scarcely any mode in which political institutions are more morally mischievous—work greater evil through their spirit—than by representing political functions as a favor to be conferred, a thing which the depositary is to ask for as desiring it for himself, and even pay for as if it were designed for his pecuniary benefit. Men are not fond of paying large sums for leave to perform a laborious duty. Plato had a much juster view of the conditions of good government when he asserted that the persons who should be sought out to be invested with political power are those who are personally most averse to it, and that the only motive which can be relied on for inducing the fittest men to take upon themselves the toils of government is the fear of being governed by worse men. What must an elector think when he sees three or four gentlemen, none of them previously observed to be lavish of their money on projects of disinterested beneficence, vying with one another in the sums they expend to be enabled to write M.P. after their names? Is it likely he will suppose that it is for his interest they incur all this cost? And if he form an uncomplimentary opinion of their part in the affair, what moral obligation is he likely to feel as to his own? Politicians are fond of treating it as the dream of enthusiasts that the electoral body will ever be uncorrupt: truly enough, until they are willing to become so themselves; for the electors, assuredly, will take their moral tone from the candidates. So long as the elected member, in any shape or manner, pays for his seat, all endeavours will fail to make the business of election any thing but a selfish bargain on all sides. "So long as the candidate himself, and the customs of the world, seem to regard the function of a member of Parliament less as a duty to be discharged than a personal favor to be solicited, no effort will avail to implant in an ordinary voter the feeling that the election of a member of Parliament is also a matter of duty, and that he is not at liberty to bestow his vote on any other consideration than that of personal fitness."
There’s almost no way political institutions can be more morally harmful—causing greater damage through their ethos—than by treating political roles as favors to be granted, as something that the person holding authority should ask for as if it were something beneficial just for themselves, and even pay for as if it were meant for their financial gain. People don’t like paying large amounts just for the privilege of doing a demanding job. Plato had a more accurate perspective on good governance when he claimed that the people worth selecting for political power are those who least want it, and that the only motivation that can be counted on to persuade the right individuals to take on the burdens of government is the fear of being ruled by worse leaders. What must a voter think when they see three or four men, none of whom have previously been known to generously donate to selfless causes, competing to spend large amounts to be able to call themselves M.P.? Is it likely they will think it’s for their benefit that these men are incurring all this expense? And if they form a negative opinion about their actions, what moral responsibility will they feel regarding their own? Politicians often dismiss the idea that voters will ever be honest as a naive fantasy: that holds true until they themselves are willing to be; the voters will definitely take their moral cues from the candidates. As long as the elected official, in any form, pays for their position, all efforts will fail to make the election process anything but a self-serving transaction on all sides. "As long as the candidate, along with societal norms, appears to view the role of an MP less as a duty to fulfill and more as a personal favor to petition for, no effort will succeed in instilling in the average voter the belief that electing an MP is also a duty, and that they shouldn’t cast their vote based on anything other than personal merit."
The same principle which demands that no payment of money for election purposes should be either required or tolerated on the part of the person elected, dictates another conclusion, apparently of contrary tendency, but really directed to the same object. It negatives what has often been proposed as a means of rendering Parliament accessible to persons of all ranks and circumstances—the payment of members of Parliament. If, as in some of our colonies, there are scarcely any fit persons who can afford to attend to an unpaid occupation, the payment should be an indemnity for loss of time or money, not a salary. The greater latitude of choice which a salary would give is an illusory advantage. No remuneration which any one would think of attaching to the post would attract to it those who were seriously engaged in other lucrative professions, with a prospect of succeeding in them. The occupation of a member of Parliament would therefore become an occupation in itself, carried on, like other professions, with a view chiefly to its pecuniary returns, and under the demoralizing influences of an occupation essentially precarious. It would become an object of desire to adventurers of a low class; and 658 persons in possession, with ten or twenty times as many in expectancy, would be incessantly bidding to attract or retain the suffrages of the electors, by promising all things, honest or dishonest, possible or impossible, and rivaling each other in pandering to the meanest feelings and most ignorant prejudices of the vulgarest part of the crowd. The auction between Cleon and the sausage-seller in Aristophanes is a fair caricature of what would be always going on. Such an institution would be a perpetual blister applied to the most peccant parts of human nature. It amounts to offering 658 prizes for the most successful flatterer, the most adroit misleader of a body of his fellow-countrymen. Under no despotism has there been such an organized system of tillage for raising a rich crop of vicious courtiership. [7] When, by reason of pre-eminent qualifications (as may at any time happen to be the case), it is desirable that a person entirely without independent means, either derived from property or from a trade or profession, should be brought into Parliament to render services which no other person accessible can render as well, there is the resource of a public subscription; he may be supported while in Parliament, like Andrew Marvel, by the contributions of his constituents. This mode is unobjectionable for such an honor will never be paid to mere subserviency: bodies of men do not care so much for the difference between one sycophant and another as to go to the expense of his maintenance in order to be flattered by that particular individual. Such a support will only be given in consideration of striking and impressive personal qualities, which, though no absolute proof of fitness to be a national representative, are some presumption of it, and, at all events, some guaranty for the possession of an independent opinion and will.
The same principle that says no one should have to pay money for election purposes, nor should it be accepted from the elected candidate, leads to another conclusion that seems contrary but actually aims at the same goal. It dismisses the idea that paying members of Parliament would make it accessible to people of all backgrounds. If there are hardly any capable individuals who can afford to take on an unpaid role, any payment should just compensate for lost time or income, not serve as a salary. The increased options a salary would provide is a deceptive benefit. No amount of pay would entice those committed to more lucrative careers with prospects of success. Being a member of Parliament would then become a job in itself, pursued like other professions primarily for monetary gain, influenced by the precarious nature of the role. It would attract low-quality individuals; those already in and many hoping to get in would constantly compete to win the voters' favor by making all sorts of promises, honest or dishonest, possible or impossible, while trying to pander to the basest feelings and the ignorance of the crowd. The competition between Cleon and the sausage-seller in Aristophanes is a fitting caricature of what would be a constant reality. Such an institution would be a constant irritation to the worst aspects of human nature. It effectively offers prizes for the best flatterer, the most skillful misleader of fellow countrymen. No regime has had such a structured system aimed at cultivating a rich crop of corrupt sycophancy. [7] When a person with exceptional qualifications needs to be brought into Parliament but lacks independent means from wealth or a profession, there is the option of a public subscription; they can be supported while in Parliament, like Andrew Marvell, by community contributions. This approach is acceptable because such support will never go to mere subservience: groups of people aren't concerned enough to distinguish between one flatterer and another to pay for the upkeep of one specific individual. Such support will only be given based on striking and impressive personal qualities, which, while not absolute proof of being a suitable national representative, do suggest some likelihood of it, and at least guarantee an independent opinion and will.
Chapter XI—Of the Duration of Parliaments.
After how long a term should members of Parliament be subject to re-election? The principles involved are here very obvious; the difficulty lies in their application. On the one hand, the member ought not to have so long a tenure of his seat as to make him forget his responsibility, take his duties easily, conduct them with a view to his own personal advantage, or neglect those free and public conferences with his constituents which, whether he agrees or differs with them, are one of the benefits of representative government. On the other hand, he should have such a term of office to look forward to as will enable him to be judged, not by a single act, but by his course of action. It is important that he should have the greatest latitude of individual opinion and discretion compatible with the popular control essential to free government; and for this purpose it is necessary that the control should be exercised, as in any case it is best exercised, after sufficient time has been given him to show all the qualities he possesses, and to prove that there is some other way than that of a mere obedient voter and advocate of their opinions, by which he can render himself, in the eyes of his constituents, a desirable and creditable representative. It is impossible to fix, by any universal rule, the boundary between these principles. Where the democratic power in the constitution is weak or over-passive, and requires stimulation; where the representative, on leaving his constituents, enters at once into a courtly or aristocratic atmosphere, whose influences all tend to deflect his course into a different direction from the popular one, to tone down any democratic feelings which he may have brought with him, and make him forget the wishes and grow cool to the interests of those who chose him, the obligation of a frequent return to them for a renewal of his commission is indispensable to keeping his temper and character up to the right mark. Even three years, in such circumstances, are almost too long a period, and any longer term is absolutely inadmissible. Where, on the contrary, democracy is the ascendant power, and still tends to increase, requiring rather to be moderated in its exercise than encouraged to any abnormal activity; where unbounded publicity, and an ever-present newspaper press give the representative assurance that his every act will be immediately known, discussed, and judged by his constituents, and that he is always either gaining or losing ground in the estimation, while, by the same means, the influence of their sentiments, and all other democratic influences, are kept constantly alive and active in his own mind, less than five years would hardly be a sufficient period to prevent timid subserviency. The change which has taken place in English politics as to all these features explains why annual Parliaments, which forty years ago stood prominently in front of the creed of the more advanced reformers, are so little cared for and so seldom heard of at present. It deserves consideration that, whether the term is short or long, during the last year of it the members are in position in which they would always be if Parliaments were annual; so that, if the term were very brief, there would virtually be annual Parliaments during a great proportion of all time. As things now are, the period of seven years, though of unnecessary length, is hardly worth altering for any benefit likely to be produced, especially since the possibility, always impending, of an earlier dissolution keeps the motives for standing well with constituents always before the member's eyes.
How long should members of Parliament serve before facing re-election? The underlying principles are clear, but applying them is challenging. On one hand, a member shouldn't hold their seat for too long, allowing them to forget their responsibilities, take their role lightly, prioritize personal gain, or ignore the essential dialogues with their constituents—even if they don't always agree. On the other hand, they should have enough time in office to be evaluated based on their overall performance rather than a single action. It's crucial that they have enough freedom for individual opinions and judgment while still being accountable to the public, which can only happen if there’s adequate time for them to demonstrate their qualities and show that they can be a good representative in ways beyond just acting as a compliant voter or mouthpiece for their constituents. There’s no universal rule to determine the balance between these principles. When democratic power in the government is weak or passive and needs a boost, when a representative, after leaving their constituents, immediately enters a more aristocratic environment that may sway them away from their democratic ideals, the obligation to return frequently for re-election is vital to keeping them aligned with their responsibilities. Even a three-year term in such cases may be too long, and anything longer is unacceptable. Conversely, when democracy is the dominant force and is likely growing, needing moderation rather than excessive stimulation—where constant publicity and a vigilant press ensure the representative knows their actions are always being scrutinized by constituents—then a term of less than five years might not be enough to prevent them from becoming overly submissive. The shift in English politics regarding these issues explains why annual Parliaments, once a primary goal for reformers four decades ago, are now largely ignored and seldom mentioned. It’s worth noting that whether the term is brief or long, during the final year, members act as if elections were annual; thus, if terms were very short, it would essentially mean annual elections for much of the time. Currently, the seven-year term, while unnecessarily lengthy, is hardly worth changing for any potential benefit, especially since the constant possibility of an earlier dissolution keeps the incentives to maintain good relations with constituents in the member's view.
Whatever may be the term most eligible for the duration of the mandate, it might seem natural that the individual member should vacate his seat at the expiration of that term from the day of his election, and that there should be no general renewal of the whole House. A great deal might be said for this system if there were any practical object in recommending it. But it is condemned by much stronger reasons than can be alleged in its support. One is, that there would be no means of promptly getting rid of a majority which had pursued a course offensive to the nation. The certainty of a general election after a limited, which would often be a nearly expired period, and the possibility of it at any time when the minister either desires it for his own sake, or thinks that it would make him popular with the country, tend to prevent that wide divergence between the feelings of the assembly and those of the constituency, which might subsist indefinitely if the majority of the House had always several years of their term still to run—if it received new infusions drop by drop, which would be more likely to assume than to modify the qualities of the mass they were joined to. It is as essential that the general sense of the House should accord in the main with that of the nation as is that distinguished individuals should be able, without forfeiting their seats, to give free utterance to the most unpopular sentiments. There is another reason, of much weight, against the gradual and partial renewal of a representative assembly. It is useful that there should be a periodical general muster of opposing forces to gauge the state of the national mind, and ascertain, beyond dispute, the relative strength of different parties and opinions. This is not done conclusively by any partial renewal, even where, as in some of the French constitutions, a large fraction—a fifth or a third—go out at once.
No matter what term is best for the length of the mandate, it seems reasonable that an individual member should leave their position at the end of that term from the day they were elected, and that there shouldn’t be a complete overhaul of the entire House. There’s a lot to say in favor of this system if there were a practical purpose for recommending it. However, it’s opposed for much stronger reasons than can be argued in its favor. One reason is that there would be no way to quickly remove a majority that had taken a path that upset the nation. The certainty of a general election after a limited term, which would often be nearing its end, and the potential for one at any time that the minister wants for their own benefit or thinks would make them popular, helps avoid a significant gap between the assembly’s views and those of the public, which could last indefinitely if the majority of the House always had several years left in their term—if they received new members gradually, which would likely add to rather than change the overall character of the group they joined. It’s just as crucial that the overall sentiment of the House aligns mainly with that of the nation as it is that prominent individuals can express unpopular opinions without losing their seats. There’s another compelling reason against the gradual and partial renewal of a representative assembly. It’s important to have a periodic general gathering of opposing forces to assess the state of public opinion and determine, without doubt, the relative strength of different parties and beliefs. This isn’t effectively achieved through any partial renewal, even where, as in some French constitutions, a significant portion—a fifth or a third—leaves at once.
The reasons for allowing to the executive the power of dissolution will be considered in a subsequent chapter, relating to the constitution and functions of the executive in a representative government.
The reasons for giving the executive the power to dissolve will be discussed in a later chapter that focuses on the constitution and roles of the executive in a representative government.
Chapter XII—Ought Pledges to be Required from Members of Parliament?
Should a member of the legislature be bound by the instructions of his constituents? Should he be the organ of their sentiments, or of his own? their ambassador to a congress, or their professional agent, empowered not only to act for them, but to judge for them what ought to be done? These two theories of the duty of a legislator in a representative government have each its supporters, and each is the recognized doctrine of some representative governments. In the Dutch United Provinces, the members of the States-General were mere delegates; and to such a length was the doctrine carried, that when any important question arose which had not been provided for in their instructions, they had to refer back to their constituents, exactly as an ambassador does to the government from which he is accredited. In this and most other countries which possess representative constitutions, law and custom warrant a member of Parliament in voting according to his opinion of right, however different from that of his constituents; but there is a floating notion of the opposite kind, which has considerable practical operation on many minds, even of members of Parliament, and often makes them, independently of desire for popularity or concern for their re-election, feel bound in conscience to let their conduct on questions on which their constituents have a decided opinion be the expression of that opinion rather than of their own. Abstractedly from positive law, and from the historical traditions of any particular people, which of these notions of the duty of a representative is the true one?
Should a member of the legislature be required to follow the instructions of their constituents? Should they represent the views of their constituents or their own? Are they their representatives in a meeting, or are they professionals empowered not just to act for them but also to decide what should be done? These two theories about a legislator's responsibility in a representative government have their supporters, and both are recognized doctrines in some representative governments. In the Dutch United Provinces, the members of the States-General were simply delegates; the doctrine was taken so far that when any significant issue arose that wasn’t included in their instructions, they had to refer back to their constituents, just like an ambassador does with the government he represents. In this and most other countries with representative constitutions, law and tradition allow a member of Parliament to vote based on their own sense of right, even if it conflicts with the views of their constituents. However, there is a prevailing notion, which affects many minds, including those of Parliament members, that often compels them, irrespective of a desire for popularity or concern for re-election, to align their actions on issues where their constituents have a strong opinion with that opinion rather than their own. Without considering positive law or the historical traditions of any specific people, which of these ideas about a representative's duty is the correct one?
Unlike the questions which we have hitherto treated, this is not a question of constitutional legislation, but of what may more properly be called constitutional morality—the ethics of representative government. It does not so much concern institutions as the temper of mind which the electors ought to bring to the discharge of their functions, the ideas which should prevail as to the moral duties of an elector; for, let the system of representation be what it may, it will be converted into one of mere delegation if the electors so choose. As long as they are free not to vote, and free to vote as they like, they can not be prevented from making their vote depend on any condition they think fit to annex to it. By refusing to elect any one who will not pledge himself to all their opinions, and even, if they please, to consult with them before voting on any important subject not foreseen, they can reduce their representative to their mere mouthpiece, or compel him in honor, when no longer willing to act in that capacity, to resign his seat. And since they have the power of doing this, the theory of the Constitution ought to suppose that they will wish to do it, since the very principle of constitutional government requires it to be assumed that political power will be abused to promote the particular purposes of the holder; not because it always is so, but because such is the natural tendency of things, to guard against which is the especial use of free institutions. However wrong, therefore, or however foolish, we may think it in the electors to convert their representative into a delegate, that stretch of the electoral privilege being a natural and not improbable one, the same precautions ought to be taken as if it were certain. We may hope that the electors will not act on this notion of the use of the suffrage; but a representative government needs to be so framed that even if they do, they shall not be able to effect what ought not to be in the power of any body of persons—class legislation for their own benefit.
Unlike the questions we've discussed so far, this issue isn’t about constitutional laws, but rather what we can call constitutional morality—the ethics of representative government. It’s less about the systems in place and more about the mindset that voters should have when fulfilling their roles, and the moral responsibilities that should guide them. No matter how representation is structured, it can easily become a matter of simple delegation if the voters choose that route. Since they have the freedom to abstain from voting and can vote however they want, they can decide to attach any conditions to their vote that they find appropriate. By refusing to elect anyone who won't commit to all their opinions, and even choosing to consult them before voting on any significant issues that weren't anticipated, they can turn their representative into nothing more than a mouthpiece, or force them to resign if they’re no longer willing to act in that role. Because voters have the power to do this, the Constitution should be based on the assumption that they’ll want to, acknowledging that the very principle of constitutional government suggests political power is likely to be misused for the specific goals of its holder; not because this happens all the time, but because that is a natural tendency. The need for free institutions arises from the need to guard against this tendency. Therefore, even if we think it’s misguided or foolish for voters to treat their representative as just a delegate, since that extension of electoral privilege is both natural and not unlikely, we should take the same precautions as if it were certain. We can hope that voters won’t adopt this perspective on their voting rights, but any representative government should be designed so that, even if they do, it will prevent them from enacting something that should never be within the power of any group—class legislation for their own benefit.
When it is said that the question is only one of political morality, this does not extenuate its importance. Questions of constitutional morality are of no less practical moment than those relating to the constitution itself. The very existence of some governments, and all that renders others endurable, rests on the practical observance of doctrines of constitutional morality; traditional notions in the minds of the several constituted authorities, which modify the use that might otherwise be made of their powers. In unbalanced governments—pure monarchy, pure aristocracy, pure democracy—such maxims are the only barrier which restrains the government from the utmost excesses in the direction of its characteristic tendency. In imperfectly balanced governments, where some attempt is made to set constitutional limits to the impulses of the strongest power, but where that power is strong enough to overstep them with at least temporary impunity, it is only by doctrines of constitutional morality, recognized and sustained by opinion, that any regard at all is preserved for the checks and limitations of the constitution. In well-balanced governments, in which the supreme power is divided, and each sharer is protected against the usurpations of the others in the only manner possible, namely, by being armed for defense with weapons as strong as the others can wield for attack, the government can only be carried on by forbearance on all sides to exercise those extreme powers, unless provoked by conduct equally extreme on the part of some other sharer of power; and in this case we may truly say that only by the regard paid to maxims of constitutional morality is the constitution kept in existence. The question of pledges is not one of those which vitally concern the existence of representative governments, but it is very material to their beneficial operation. The laws can not prescribe to the electors the principles by which they shall direct their choice, but it makes a great practical difference by what principles they think they ought to direct it; and the whole of that great question is involved in the inquiry whether they should make it a condition that the representative shall adhere to certain opinions laid down for him by his constituents.
When people say that the issue is just about political morality, it doesn't diminish its significance. Questions of constitutional morality are just as crucial as those concerning the constitution itself. The very survival of some governments, and the reason others remain tolerable, depends on the practical application of constitutional morality; traditional beliefs held by various authorities influence how they wield their powers. In unstable governments—pure monarchy, pure aristocracy, pure democracy—these principles are the only safeguard against the government overstepping its bounds. In imperfectly balanced governments, where there are attempts to impose constitutional limits on the dominant power, but that power is still strong enough to occasionally ignore those limits without serious consequences, it is only through acknowledged and supported principles of constitutional morality that respect for constitutional checks and limitations is maintained. In well-balanced governments, where supreme power is divided and each party is protected against the encroachments of the others by being equally armed, the government can only function through mutual restraint in exercising those extreme powers unless provoked by similarly extreme behavior from another power holder; and in this situation, it can be accurately stated that the adherence to principles of constitutional morality is what keeps the constitution alive. The issue of promises is not one that directly affects the existence of representative governments, but it is very important for their effective operation. Laws cannot dictate to voters the principles by which they should make their choices, but it does matter significantly what principles they believe they should follow; and this entire important question is tied to whether they should require that the representative stick to specific opinions set out for them by their constituents.
No reader of this treatise can doubt what conclusion, as to this matter, results from the general principles which it professes. We have from the first affirmed, and unvaryingly kept in view, the coequal importance of two great requisites of government—responsibility to those for whose benefit political power ought to be, and always professes to be, employed; and jointly therewith, to obtain, in the greatest measure possible, for the function of government, the benefits of superior intellect, trained by long meditation and practical discipline to that special task. If this second purpose is worth attaining, it is worth the necessary price. Superior powers of mind and profound study are of no use, if they do not sometimes lead a person to different conclusions from those which are formed by ordinary powers of mind without study; and if it be an object to possess representatives in any intellectual respect superior to average electors, it must be counted upon that the representative will sometimes differ in opinion from the majority of his constituents, and that when he does, his opinion will be the oftenest right of the two. It follows that the electors will not do wisely if they insist on absolute conformity to their opinions as the condition of his retaining his seat.
No reader of this treatise can doubt the conclusion that arises from the general principles it discusses. From the beginning, we have affirmed and consistently highlighted the equal importance of two key elements of government—responsibility to those who should benefit from political power, as it is supposed to be used; and, alongside this, to gain, as much as possible, the advantages of superior intellect, shaped by extensive reflection and practical experience for this specific purpose. If this second goal is worth pursuing, it’s worth paying the necessary cost. Superior mental abilities and deep study are pointless if they don’t sometimes lead to different conclusions than those reached by ordinary minds without study; and if the aim is to have representatives who are intellectually superior to the average voters, it must be expected that the representative will sometimes disagree with the majority of their constituents and that, when they do, their opinion will often be the more correct one. Therefore, it would not be wise for voters to demand complete agreement with their views as a condition for the representative to keep their position.
The principle is thus far obvious; but there are real difficulties in its application, and we will begin by stating them in their greatest force. If it is important that the electors should choose a representative more highly instructed than themselves, it is no less necessary that this wiser man should be responsible to them; in other words, they are the judges of the manner in which he fulfils his trust; and how are they to judge, except by the standard of their own opinions? How are they even to select him in the first instance but by the same standard? It will not do to choose by mere brilliancy—by superiority of showy talent. The tests by which an ordinary man can judge beforehand of mere ability are very imperfect; such as they are, they have almost exclusive reference to the arts of expression, and little or none to the worth of what is expressed. The latter can not be inferred from the former; and if the electors are to put their own opinions in abeyance, what criterion remains to them of the ability to govern well? Neither, if they could ascertain, even infallibly, the ablest man, ought they to allow him altogether to judge for them, without any reference to their own opinions. The ablest candidate may be a Tory, and the electors Liberals; or a Liberal, and they may be Tories. The political questions of the day may be Church questions, and he may be a High-Churchman or a Rationalist, while they may be Dissenters or Evangelicals, and vice versâ. His abilities, in these cases, might only enable him to go greater lengths, and act with greater effect, in what they may conscientiously believe to be a wrong course; and they may be bound, by their sincere convictions, to think it more important that their representative should be kept, on these points, to what they deem the dictate of duty, than that they should be represented by a person of more than average abilities. They may also have to consider, not solely how they can be most ably represented, but how their particular moral position and mental point of view shall be represented at all. The influence of every mode of thinking which is shared by numbers ought to be felt in the Legislature; and the Constitution being supposed to have made due provision that other and conflicting modes of thinking shall be represented likewise, to secure the proper representation for their own mode may be the most important matter which the electors on the particular occasion have to attend to. In some cases, too, it may be necessary that the representative should have his hands tied to keep him true to their interest, or rather to the public interest as they conceive it. This would not be needful under a political system which assured them an indefinite choice of honest and unprejudiced candidates; but under the existing system, in which the electors are almost always obliged, by the expenses of election and the general circumstances of society, to select their representative from persons of a station in life widely different from theirs, and having a different class interest, who will affirm that they ought to abandon themselves to his discretion? Can we blame an elector of the poorer classes, who has only the choice among two or three rich men, for requiring from the one he votes for a pledge to those measures which he considers as a test of emancipation from the class interests of the rich? It will, moreover, always happens to some members of the electoral body to be obliged to accept the representative selected by a majority of their own side. But, though a candidate of their own choosing would have no chance, their votes may be necessary to the success of the one chosen for them, and their only means of exerting their share of influence on his subsequent conduct may be to make their support of him dependent on his pledging himself to certain conditions.
The principle is pretty clear so far; however, there are significant challenges when it comes to applying it, and we'll start by outlining these challenges in their strongest form. If it’s crucial for voters to select a representative who is more knowledgeable than they are, it’s equally important that this wiser person is accountable to them. In other words, they are the judges of how well he fulfills his duties; but how can they judge that, other than by their own opinions? How can they even choose him in the first place except through that same lens? It's not enough to select someone based solely on impressive talent or charisma. The ways an average person can judge someone's ability in advance are quite flawed; they mostly relate to communication skills and say little about the value of what is being communicated. One can't measure the value of a representative's actions simply by their ability to express themselves. If voters are expected to set their own views aside, what criteria do they have left to evaluate someone’s capability to govern effectively? Moreover, even if they could definitely identify the best candidate, they shouldn’t let that person make decisions without considering their own views. The most capable candidate might be a conservative while the voters are progressives, or vice versa. Current political issues might involve debates about religion, and he could be a staunch believer while they are more liberal or vice versa. His skills in those situations might just enable him to pursue actions they honestly believe to be wrong; they might feel that it’s more important for their representative to align with what they see as their duty than to be represented by someone who's exceptionally capable. They might also need to think not only about how to be represented well but how their specific moral views and perspectives can be represented at all. The influence of any widely held viewpoints should be felt in the legislature, and if the system is designed to ensure that diverse and opposing viewpoints are also represented, protecting their own views may be the most pressing concern for voters at that time. In some cases, it might be necessary for the representative to have restrictions placed on them to ensure they stay true to what they see as the public interest. This wouldn't be necessary in a political system that provided them with countless honest, unbiased candidates; but under the current system, where voters often need to choose their representative from people in very different social classes with different interests, who would trust them to simply act on their discretion? Can we really fault a voter from a lower-income background who only has two or three wealthy candidates to choose from for wanting the one they vote for to commit to policies they see as essential for freeing themselves from the interests of the wealthy? Also, there will always be some voters who must accept the representative chosen by the majority of their group. Even if their preferred candidate isn’t viable, their votes might still be crucial for the success of the one chosen for them. Their only way to influence how he acts afterward might be to make their support contingent on him agreeing to certain conditions.
These considerations and counter-considerations are so intimately interwoven with one another; it is so important that the electors should choose as their representatives wiser men than themselves, and should consent to be governed according to that superior wisdom, while it is impossible that conformity to their own opinions, when they have opinions, should not enter largely into their judgment as to who possesses the wisdom, and how far its presumed possessor has verified the presumption by his conduct, that it seems quite impracticable to lay down for the elector any positive rule of duty; and the result will depend less on any exact prescription or authoritative doctrine of political morality than on the general tone of mind of the electoral body in respect to the important requisite of deference to mental superiority. Individuals and peoples who are acutely sensible of the value of superior wisdom are likely to recognize it, where it exists, by other signs than thinking exactly as they do, and even in spite of considerable differences of opinion; and when they have recognized it they will be far too desirous to secure it, at any admissible cost, to be prone to impose their own opinion as a law upon persons whom they look up to as wiser than themselves. On the other hand, there is a character of mind which does not look up to any one; which thinks no other person's opinion much better than its own, or nearly so good as that of a hundred or a thousand persons like itself. Where this is the turn of mind of the electors, they will elect no one who is not, or at least who does not profess to be, the image of their own sentiments, and will continue him no longer than while he reflects those sentiments in his conduct; and all aspirants to political honors will endeavour, as Plato says in the Gorgias, to fashion themselves after the model of the Demos, and make themselves as like to it as possible. It can not be denied that a complete democracy has a strong tendency to cast the sentiments of the electors in this mould. Democracy is not favorable to the reverential spirit. That it destroys reverence for mere social position must be counted among the good, not the bad part of its influences, though by doing this it closes the principal school of reverence (as to merely human relations) which exists in society. But also democracy, in its very essence, insists so much more forcibly on the things in which all are entitled to be considered equally than on those in which one person is entitled to more consideration than another, that respect for even personal superiority is likely to be below the mark. It is for this, among other reasons, I hold it of so much importance that the institutions of the country should stamp the opinions of persons of a more educated class as entitled to greater weight than those of the less educated; and I should still contend for assigning plurality of votes to authenticated superiority of education were it only to give the tone to public feeling, irrespective of any direct political consequences.
These considerations and counter-considerations are so closely intertwined; it's crucial that voters choose representatives who are wiser than themselves and agree to be governed by that superior wisdom. However, the voters' own opinions inevitably play a significant role in determining whom they believe has that wisdom and how far that supposed wisdom is proven through actions. This makes it impractical to lay down any strict rules of duty for voters. The outcome will depend less on specific guidelines or authoritative political ethics than on the overall mindset of the electoral body regarding the essential requirement of respecting intellectual superiority. People who truly value superior wisdom are likely to recognize it through other signs, even if they have differing views. Once they recognize it, they will be eager to secure it, willing to accept some costs, and unlikely to impose their opinions as law on those they regard as wiser. Conversely, some individuals and groups do not look up to anyone; they consider no one else's opinion significantly better than their own or that of a hundred or a thousand others like themselves. When this attitude prevails among voters, they will choose candidates who reflect their own views and will only keep them in office as long as their actions align with those views. Aspiring politicians will, as Plato says in the Gorgias, try to mold themselves into the image of the masses, making themselves as similar to the voters as possible. It's undeniable that a complete democracy tends to shape the sentiments of voters in this way. Democracy does not encourage a spirit of reverence. The fact that it diminishes respect for mere social status should be viewed as a positive influence, even though it also erases a primary school of reverence concerning human relationships in society. Furthermore, democracy inherently emphasizes equality among all over the instances where one person deserves more consideration than another, which can lead to a lack of respect for personal superiority. For this and other reasons, I believe it's very important that the country's institutions regard the opinions of those with higher education as deserving more weight than those of the less educated. I would still argue for giving more votes to those with verified educational superiority solely to influence public sentiment, regardless of any direct political outcomes.
When there does exist in the electoral body an adequate sense of the extraordinary difference in value between one person and another, they will not lack signs by which to distinguish the persons whose worth for their purposes is the greatest. Actual public services will naturally be the foremost indication: to have filled posts of magnitude, and done important things in them, of which the wisdom has been justified by the results; to have been the author of measures which appear from their effects to have been wisely planned; to have made predictions which have been of verified by the event, seldom or never falsified by it; to have given advice, which when taken has been followed by good consequences—when neglected, by bad. There is doubtless a large portion of uncertainty in these signs of wisdom; but we are seeking for such as can be applied by persons of ordinary discernment. They will do well not to rely much on any one indication, unless corroborated by the rest, and, in their estimation of the success or merit of any practical effort, to lay great stress on the general opinion of disinterested persons conversant with the subject matter. The tests which I have spoken of are only applicable to tried men, among whom must be reckoned those who, though untried practically, have been tried speculatively; who, in public speech or in print, have discussed public affairs in a manner which proves that they have given serious study to them. Such persons may, in the mere character of political thinkers, have exhibited a considerable amount of the same titles to confidence as those who have been proved in the position of practical statesmen. When it is necessary to choose persons wholly untried, the best criteria are, reputation for ability among those who personally know them, and the confidence placed and recommendations given by persons already looked up to. By tests like these, constituencies who sufficiently value mental ability, and eagerly seek for it, will generally succeed in obtaining men beyond mediocrity, and often men whom they can trust to carry on public affairs according to their unfettered judgment; to whom it would be an affront to require that they should give up that judgment at the behest of their inferiors in knowledge. If such persons, honestly sought, are not to be found, then indeed the electors are justified in taking other precautions, for they can not be expected to postpone their particular opinions, unless in order that they may be served by a person of superior knowledge to their own. They would do well, indeed, even then, to remember that when once chosen, the representative, if he devotes himself to his duty, has greater opportunities of correcting an original false judgment than fall to the lot of most of his constituents; a consideration which generally ought to prevent them (unless compelled by necessity to choose some one whose impartiality they do not fully trust) from exacting a pledge not to change his opinion, or, if he does, to resign his seat. But when an unknown person, not certified in unmistakable terms by some high authority, is elected for the first time, the elector can not be expected not to make conformity to his own sentiments the primary requisite. It is enough if he does not regard a subsequent change of those sentiments, honestly avowed, with its grounds undisguisedly stated, as a peremptory reason for withdrawing his confidence.
When the voting public has a clear understanding of the significant differences in value between individuals, they will have plenty of ways to identify the people whose worth is greatest for their goals. Actual public service will naturally be the primary indicator: having held significant positions and accomplished important tasks in them, with the wisdom of their actions validated by the outcomes; having created policies that, based on their results, appear to have been well thought out; having made predictions that have been confirmed by events and rarely proven wrong; having offered advice that led to good results when followed and poor ones when ignored. There is definitely a fair amount of uncertainty in these signs of wisdom, but we are looking for those that can be assessed by individuals with average insight. They should not rely heavily on any single sign unless it's backed up by others and should place substantial importance on the general opinions of unbiased people familiar with the subject matter when evaluating the success or merit of any practical effort. The assessments I've mentioned apply only to tested individuals, including those who, while not practically experienced, have intellectually engaged in public affairs through speeches or writings that demonstrate they have studied these topics seriously. Such individuals, as political thinkers, may possess a considerable degree of trustworthiness similar to that of proven practical statesmen. When it's necessary to select completely untested individuals, the best criteria are their reputation for ability among those who personally know them and the trust and recommendations provided by already respected figures. Using these types of assessments, communities that truly value intelligence and actively seek it will generally succeed in finding individuals who exceed mediocrity and often those who can be trusted to manage public affairs based on their own judgment; it would be an insult to expect them to abandon that judgment at the request of those less knowledgeable. If such individuals, sought after in good faith, cannot be found, then the voters are indeed justified in taking alternative measures, as they cannot be expected to set aside their specific opinions unless it is to be served by someone more knowledgeable than themselves. Even in those circumstances, they should keep in mind that once chosen, a representative who commits to their role has more opportunities to rectify any initial misjudgment than most of their constituents do; this consideration should generally dissuade them (unless forced by necessity to choose someone whose impartiality they don't fully trust) from demanding a commitment not to change his opinion or to resign if he does. However, when an unknown person, not clearly endorsed by a reputable authority, is elected for the first time, voters cannot be blamed for prioritizing alignment with their own views. It's sufficient if they do not see a later change of those views, honestly expressed with clear reasoning, as an absolute reason to withdraw their support.
Even supposing the most tried ability and acknowledged eminence of character in the representative, the private opinions of the electors are not to be placed entirely in abeyance. Deference to mental superiority is not to go the length of self-annihilation—abnegation of any personal opinion. But when the difference does not relate to the fundamentals of politics, however decided the elector may be in his own sentiments, he ought to consider that when an able man differs from him there is at least a considerable chance of his being in the wrong, and that even if otherwise, it is worth while to give up his opinion in things not absolutely essential, for the sake of the inestimable advantage of having an able man to act for him in the many matters in which he himself is not qualified to form a judgment. In such cases he often endeavours to reconcile both wishes by inducing the able man to sacrifice his own opinion on the points of difference; but for the able man to lend himself to this compromise is treason against his especial office—abdication of the peculiar duties of mental supremacy, of which it is one of the most sacred not to desert the cause which has the clamor against it, nor to deprive of his services those of his opinions which need them the most. A man of conscience and known ability should insist on full freedom to act as he in his own judgment deems best, and should not consent to serve on any other terms. But the electors are entitled to know how he means to act; what opinions, on all things which concern his public duty, he intends should guide his conduct. If some of these are unacceptable to them, it is for him to satisfy them that he nevertheless deserves to be their representative; and if they are wise, they will overlook, in favor of his general value, many and great differences between his opinions and their own. There are some differences, however, which they can not be expected to overlook. Whoever feels the amount of interest in the government of his country which befits a freeman, has some convictions on national affairs which are like his life-blood; which the strength of his belief in their truth, together with the importance he attaches to them, forbid him to make a subject of compromise, or postpone to the judgment of any person, however greatly his superior. Such convictions, when they exist in a people, or in any appreciable portion of one, are entitled to influence in virtue of their mere existence, and not solely in that of the probability of their being grounded in truth. A people can not be well governed in opposition to their primary notions of right, even though these may be in some points erroneous. A correct estimate of the relation which should subsist between governors and governed does not require the electors to consent to be represented by one who intends to govern them in opposition to their fundamental convictions. If they avail themselves of his capacities of useful service in other respects at a time when the points on which he is vitally at issue with them are not likely to be mooted, they are justified in dismissing him at the first moment when a question arises involving these, and on which there is not so assured a majority for what they deem right as to make the dissenting voice of that particular individual unimportant. Thus (I mention names to illustrate my meaning, not for any personal application) the opinions supposed to be entertained by Mr. Cobden and Mr. Bright on resistance to foreign aggression might be overlooked during the Crimean war, when there was an overwhelming national feeling on the contrary side, and might yet very properly lead to their rejection by the electors at the time of the Chinese quarrel (though in itself a more doubtful question), because it was then for some time a moot point whether their view of the case might not prevail.
Even if a representative has proven skills and a well-regarded character, the private opinions of the voters can't be completely ignored. Respect for intelligence shouldn't lead to total self-denial or giving up personal opinions. However, when the disagreement doesn't touch on fundamental political issues, voters should remember that if a capable person disagrees, there's a fair chance they might be wrong. Even if they are right, it might be better to set aside their views on non-essential matters for the invaluable benefit of having a skilled person represent them in areas where they themselves lack the expertise. In such instances, voters might try to persuade the capable person to compromise on their differences, but for that person to agree is a betrayal of their role—it's abandoning the special responsibilities that come with their expertise, especially the duty to support those whose views are under attack and to help those who need their insight the most. A person of integrity and known capability should demand the freedom to act according to their own judgment and shouldn’t agree to serve under any other conditions. However, voters have the right to know how that person plans to act and what opinions will guide their public responsibilities. If some of these opinions don’t sit well with the voters, it's up to the representative to prove that they still deserve to be their representative; and if the voters are wise, they will overlook significant differences in opinion for the sake of the individual's overall value. There are, however, some differences that voters cannot simply ignore. Anyone with a genuine interest in their country's governance will have convictions about national issues that are vital to them—strong beliefs that are important enough to not be up for compromise or left to someone else’s judgment, no matter how skilled. When these beliefs exist in a society or a significant part of it, they naturally deserve consideration simply because they exist, and not just because they might be true. A society can't be effectively governed against its fundamental ideas of right, even if some of those ideas may be flawed. A proper understanding of the relationship between those in power and citizens doesn’t require voters to accept representation from someone who plans to govern against their core beliefs. If voters utilize the representative's abilities for other purposes when their main disagreements aren't being addressed, they are justified in dismissing that representative at the first sign of conflict on those critical issues, especially if there’s not a strong enough majority for what they believe is right to make that representative's dissent seem insignificant. For example, the views thought to be held by Mr. Cobden and Mr. Bright regarding foreign aggression might have been overlooked during the Crimean War, when there was overwhelming national sentiment against them, but could reasonably result in their rejection by voters during the Chinese conflict, which was more debatable, because there was uncertainty about whether their perspective could gain traction.
As the general result of what precedes, we may affirm that actual pledges should not be required unless, from unfavorable social circumstances or family institutions, the electors are so narrowed in their choice as to be compelled to fix it on a person presumptively under the influence of partialities hostile to their interest: That they are entitled to a full knowledge of the political opinions and sentiments of the candidate; and not only entitled, but often bound to reject one who differs from themselves on the few articles which are the foundation of their political belief: that, in proportion to the opinion they entertain of the mental superiority of a candidate, they ought to put up with his expressing and acting on opinions different from theirs on any number of things not included in their fundamental articles of belief: that they ought to be unremitting in their search for a representative of such calibre as to be intrusted with full power of obeying the dictates of his own judgment: that they should consider it a duty which they owe to their fellow-countrymen, to do their utmost toward placing men of this quality in the Legislature, and that it is of much greater importance to themselves to be represented by such a man than by one who professes agreement in a greater number of their opinions; for the benefits of his ability are certain, while the hypothesis of his being wrong and their being right on the points of difference is a very doubtful one.
As a general conclusion from what’s been discussed, we can say that actual pledges shouldn’t be necessary unless, due to negative social situations or family pressures, voters feel so limited in their choices that they have to choose someone who is likely biased against their interests: They have a right to fully understand the political views and feelings of the candidate; not only is this their right, but they’re often obligated to reject anyone who disagrees with them on the few key issues that form the basis of their political beliefs: that, the more they respect a candidate's intellectual abilities, the more they should be willing to accept that candidate expressing and acting on opinions that differ from their own on matters that don’t impact their core beliefs: that they should tirelessly seek out a representative of such quality that he can be trusted to fully follow his own judgment: that they should view it as their duty to their fellow citizens to make every effort to elect people of this caliber to the Legislature, and that it's much more important for them to be represented by such a person than by someone who merely claims to share more of their opinions; because the benefits of that person’s abilities are certain, while the assumption that he could be wrong while they are right on the points of disagreement is highly questionable.
I have discussed this question on the assumption that the electoral system, in all that depends on positive institution, conforms to the principles laid down in the preceding chapters. Even on this hypothesis, the delegation theory of representation seems to me false, and its practical operation hurtful, though the mischief would in that case be confined within certain bounds. But if the securities by which I have endeavoured to guard the representative principle are not recognized by the Constitution; if provision is not made for the representation of minorities, nor any difference admitted in the numerical value of votes, according to some criterion of the amount of education possessed by the voters—in that case, no words can exaggerate the importance in principle of leaving an unfettered discretion to the representative; for it would then be the only chance, under universal suffrage, for any other opinions than those of the majority to be heard in Parliament. In that falsely called democracy which is really the exclusive rule of the operative classes, all others being unrepresented and unheard, the only escape from class legislation in its narrowest, and political ignorance in its most dangerous form, would lie in such disposition as the uneducated might have to choose educated representatives, and to defer to their opinions. Some willingness to do this might reasonably be expected, and every thing would depend upon cultivating it to the highest point. But, once invested with political omnipotence, if the operative classes voluntarily concurred in imposing in this or any other manner any considerable limitation upon their self-opinion and self-will, they would prove themselves wiser than any class possessed of absolute power has shown itself, or, we may venture to say, is ever likely to show itself under that corrupting influence.
I’ve talked about this issue assuming that the electoral system, in everything related to positive institutions, follows the principles outlined in the previous chapters. Even with that assumption, I believe the delegation theory of representation is flawed, and its practical implementation is harmful, although in that case, the damage would be limited. However, if the safeguards I’ve tried to establish for the representative principle aren’t recognized by the Constitution; if there’s no provision for representing minorities, and if there’s no variation in the value of votes depending on some criterion of the voters’ education level—then it’s essential to leave a representative with complete discretion. Doing so would allow any dissenting opinions, apart from the majority’s, a chance to be heard in Parliament under universal suffrage. In that wrongly labeled democracy, which is actually just the exclusive control by the working class, leaving others unrepresented and unheard, the only way to escape narrow class legislation and the most dangerous form of political ignorance would be for the uneducated to choose educated representatives and trust their opinions. Some willingness to do this could be reasonably expected, and everything would hinge on fostering that attitude to its fullest extent. But once the working class gains political power, if they willingly place any significant limitations on their own opinions and desires, they would be showing more wisdom than any class that has absolute power has demonstrated, or is likely to demonstrate, under that corrupting influence.
Chapter XIII—Of a Second Chamber.
Of all topics relating to the theory of representative government, none have been the subject of more discussion, especially on the Continent, than what is known as the question of the Two Chambers. It has occupied a greater amount of the attention of thinkers than many questions of ten times its importance, and has been regarded as a sort of touchstone which distinguishes the partisans of limited from those of uncontrolled democracy. For my own part, I set little value on any check which a Second Chamber can apply to a democracy otherwise unchecked; and I am inclined to think that if all other constitutional questions are rightly decided, it is of comparatively little importance whether the Parliament consists of two Chambers or only of one.
Of all the topics related to the theory of representative government, none has sparked more discussion, especially in Europe, than what's known as the question of the Two Chambers. It has drawn more attention from thinkers than many issues that are far more important and has been seen as a kind of test that separates supporters of limited democracy from those in favor of unchecked democracy. Personally, I don’t think much of any limits that a Second Chamber can place on a democracy that isn't otherwise checked; and I tend to believe that if all other constitutional issues are resolved correctly, it doesn’t really matter whether Parliament has one Chamber or two.
If there are two chambers, they may either be of similar or of dissimilar composition. If of similar, both will obey the same influences, and whatever has a majority in one of the houses will be likely to have it in the other. It is true that the necessity of obtaining the consent of both to the passing of any measure may at times be a material obstacle to improvement, since, assuming both the houses to be representative and equal in their numbers, a number slightly exceeding a fourth of the entire representation may prevent the passing of a bill; while, if there is but one house, a bill is secure of passing if it has a bare majority. But the case supposed is rather abstractedly possible than likely to occur in practice. It will not often happen that, of two houses similarly composed, one will be almost unanimous, and the other nearly equally divided; if a majority in one rejects a measure, there will generally have been a large minority unfavorable to it in the other; any improvement, therefore, which could be thus impeded, would in almost all cases be one which had not much more than a simple majority in the entire body, and the worst consequence that could ensue would be to delay for a short time the passing of the measure, or give rise to a fresh appeal to the electors to ascertain if the small majority in Parliament corresponded to an effective one in the country. The inconvenience of delay, and the advantages of the appeal to the nation, might be regarded in this case as about equally balanced.
If there are two chambers, they can either be similar or different in makeup. If they're similar, both will be influenced by the same factors, and whatever has a majority in one chamber is likely to have it in the other. It's true that needing the approval of both to pass any measure can sometimes be a real obstacle to progress, since, if both chambers are representative and equal in numbers, just over a quarter of the entire representation can block a bill; however, if there’s only one chamber, a bill can pass with just a simple majority. But this hypothetical situation is more theoretical than likely to happen in reality. It's not common for two similarly composed chambers to have one nearly unanimous while the other is closely divided; if a majority in one rejects a measure, there’s usually been a considerable minority against it in the other. Any improvement that could be hindered would almost always be one that barely had a simple majority in the entire body, and the worst result would be a brief delay in passing the measure or prompting a new appeal to voters to see if the small majority in Parliament reflects a larger one in the country. The inconvenience of delay and the benefits of appealing to the public could be seen as roughly equal in this case.
I attach little weight to the argument oftenest urged for having two Chambers—to prevent precipitancy, and compel a second deliberation; for it must be a very ill-constituted representative assembly in which the established forms of business do not require many more than two deliberations. The consideration which tells most, in my judgment, in favor of two Chambers (and this I do regard as of some moment), is the evil effect produced upon the mind of any holder of power, whether an individual or an assembly, by the consciousness of having only themselves to consult. It is important that no set of persons should be able, even temporarily, to make their sic volo prevail without asking any one else for his consent. A majority in a single assembly, when it has assumed a permanent character—when composed of the same persons habitually acting together, and always assured of victory in their own House—easily becomes despotic and overweening if released from the necessity of considering whether its acts will be concurred in by another constituted authority. The same reason which induced the Romans to have two consuls makes it desirable there should be two Chambers—that neither of them may be exposed to the corrupting influence of undivided power even for the space of a single year. One of the most indispensable requisites in the practical conduct of politics, especially in the management of free institutions, is conciliation; a readiness to compromise; a willingness to concede something to opponents, and to shape good measures so as to be as little offensive as possible to persons of opposite views; and of this salutary habit, the mutual give and take (as it has been called) between two houses is a perpetual school—useful as such even now, and its utility would probably be even more felt in a more democratic constitution of the Legislature.
I don’t put much stock in the common argument for having two Chambers—to avoid hasty decisions and force a second round of deliberation; because a poorly structured representative assembly wouldn’t need much more than two discussions. The main reason I believe having two Chambers is important (and I do see this as significant) is the negative impact on anyone in power, whether an individual or a group, when they only consult themselves. It’s crucial that no group of people can impose their will without considering the input of others. A majority in a single assembly, once it becomes a permanent fixture—made up of the same people regularly working together and always confident of winning in their own body—can easily become tyrannical and arrogant if they don’t have to think about whether their actions will be approved by another governing authority. The same reasoning that led the Romans to have two consuls supports the idea of two Chambers—so neither can fall victim to the corrupting influence of unchecked power, even for just a year. One of the essential requirements in effective politics, especially in managing free institutions, is compromise; a readiness to negotiate; a willingness to yield something to opponents and to design effective solutions in a way that minimizes offense to those with different views; and this beneficial practice, the ongoing exchange (as it’s often called) between two houses is a continuous training ground—valuable in itself even today, and its significance would likely be even greater in a more democratic legislative system.
But the houses need not both be of the same composition; they may be intended as a check on one another. One being supposed democratic, the other will naturally be constituted with a view to its being some restraint upon the democracy. But its efficacy in this respect wholly depends on the social support which it can command outside the House. An assembly which does not rest on the basis of some great power in the country is ineffectual against one which does. An aristocratic House is only powerful in an aristocratic state of society. The House of Lords was once the strongest power in our Constitution, and the Commons only a checking body; but this was when the barons were almost the only power out of doors. I can not believe that, in a really democratic state of society, the House of Lords would be of any practical value as a moderator of democracy. When the force on one side is feeble in comparison with that on the other, the way to give it effect is not to draw both out in line, and muster their strength in open field over against one another. Such tactics would insure the utter defeat of the less powerful. It can only act to advantage by not holding itself apart, and compelling every one to declare himself either with or against it, but taking a position among the crowd rather than in opposition to it, and drawing to itself the elements most capable of allying themselves with it on any given point; not appearing at all as an antagonist body, to provoke a general rally against it, but working as one of the elements in a mixed mass, infusing its leaven, and often making what would be the weaker part the stronger, by the addition of its influence. The really moderating power in a democratic constitution must act in and through the democratic House.
But the houses don’t have to be made of the same elements; they can be designed to check each other. If one is democratic, the other will naturally be set up to restrain that democracy. However, its effectiveness in this role depends entirely on the social support it can garner outside the House. An assembly that lacks significant power in the country is ineffective against one that has it. An aristocratic House is only powerful in a society structured around aristocracy. The House of Lords used to be the strongest power in our Constitution, with the Commons serving only as a checking body, but that was when the barons were almost the only power outside. I can’t believe that, in a truly democratic society, the House of Lords would be practically valuable as a moderator of democracy. When the strength on one side is weak compared to the other, the way to make it effective isn’t to line them up against each other in open confrontation; that would ensure the total defeat of the less powerful. It can only be advantageous by not isolating itself and forcing everyone to declare whether they are with or against it, but by standing among the crowd rather than opposing it and bringing together those most capable of aligning with it on specific issues; not appearing as an antagonistic body that would cause a general uprising against it, but operating as one element in a mixed group, infusing its influence, and often making what would be the weaker part stronger through its presence. The true moderating force in a democratic constitution must work within and through the democratic House.
That there should be, in every polity, a centre of resistance to the predominant power in the Constitution—and in a democratic constitution, therefore, a nucleus of resistance to the democracy—I have already maintained; and I regard it as a fundamental maxim of government. If any people who possess a democratic representation are, from their historical antecedents, more willing to tolerate such a centre of resistance in the form of a Second Chamber or House of Lords than in any other shape, this constitutes a stronger reason for having it in that shape. But it does not appear to me the best shape in itself, nor by any means the most efficacious for its object. If there are two houses, one considered to represent the people, the other to represent only a class, or not to be representative at all, I can not think that, where democracy is the ruling power in society, the second House would have any real ability to resist even the aberrations of the first. It might be suffered to exist in deference to habit and association, but not as an effective check. If it exercised an independent will, it would be required to do so in the same general spirit as the other House; to be equally democratic with it, and to content itself with correcting the accidental oversights of the more popular branch of the Legislature, or competing with it in popular measures.
There should be, in every political system, a center of resistance to the dominant power in the Constitution—and in a democratic constitution, this means a core of resistance to the democracy itself—I have already argued; and I see this as a fundamental principle of government. If a people with democratic representation are, due to their historical background, more inclined to accept such a center of resistance in the form of a Second Chamber or House of Lords rather than any other form, this provides a stronger reason to have it in that form. However, I don’t think it's the best form on its own, nor the most effective for its purpose. If there are two houses, one considered to represent the people and the other representing only a certain class or not being representative at all, I can’t believe that, when democracy is the dominant force in society, the second House would truly have the power to resist even the mistakes of the first. It might be allowed to exist out of respect for tradition and familiarity, but not as an effective check. If it were to exercise independent judgment, it would need to do so in the same general spirit as the other House; to be just as democratic, and to limit itself to correcting the occasional oversights of the more popular branch of the Legislature, or competing with it on popular measures.
The practicability of any real check to the ascendancy of the majority depends henceforth on the distribution of strength in the most popular branch of the governing body; and I have indicated the mode in which, to the best of my judgment, a balance of forces might most advantageously be established there. I have also pointed out that, even if the numerical majority were allowed to exercise complete predominance by means of a corresponding majority in Parliament, yet if minorities also are permitted to enjoy the equal right due to them on strictly democratic principles, of being represented proportionally to their numbers, this provision will insure the perpetual presence in the House, by the same popular title as its other members, of so many of the first intellects in the country, that without being in any way banded apart, or invested with any invidious prerogative, this portion of the national representation will have a personal weight much more than in proportion to its numerical strength, and will afford, in a most effective form, the moral centre of resistance which is needed. A second Chamber, therefore, is not required for this purpose, and would not contribute to it, but might even, in some degree, tend to compromise it. If, however, for the other reasons already mentioned, the decision were taken that there should be such a Chamber, it is desirable that it should be composed of elements which, without being open to the imputation of class interests adverse to the majority, would incline it to oppose itself to the class interests of the majority, and qualify it to raise its voice with authority against their errors and weaknesses. These conditions evidently are not found in a body constituted in the manner of our House of Lords. So soon as conventional rank and individual riches no longer overawe the democracy, a House of Lords becomes insignificant.
The feasibility of any real check on the power of the majority depends on how strength is distributed in the most popular branch of the government. I’ve suggested a way to establish a balance of power that I believe would work best. I’ve also noted that even if the numerical majority is allowed to hold total sway through a corresponding majority in Parliament, if minorities are permitted their equal right to be represented proportionally to their numbers based on democratic principles, this will ensure that many of the brightest minds in the country remain present in the House, recognized in the same way as other members. This portion of the national representation will carry a personal weight much greater than what you would expect from its size, providing a crucial moral counterbalance that is needed. Therefore, a second Chamber isn’t needed for this purpose, and it wouldn’t help, and might even somewhat undermine it. However, if the decision is made, for other reasons previously mentioned, to have such a Chamber, it should be composed of individuals who, without being accused of representing class interests against the majority, would be inclined to stand against the class interests of the majority and be in a position to speak authoritatively against their mistakes and shortcomings. Clearly, these conditions are not met in a body structured like our House of Lords. Once traditional rank and personal wealth no longer intimidate the democracy, a House of Lords becomes irrelevant.
Of all principles on which a wisely conservative body, destined to moderate and regulate democratic ascendancy, could possibly be constructed, the best seems to be that exemplified in the Roman Senate, itself the most consistently prudent and sagacious body that ever administered public affairs. The deficiencies of a democratic assembly, which represents the general public, are the deficiencies of the public itself, want of special training and knowledge. The appropriate corrective is to associate with it a body of which special training and knowledge should be the characteristics. If one House represents popular feeling, the other should represent personal merit, tested and guaranteed by actual public service, and fortified by practical experience. If one is the People's Chamber, the other should be the Chamber of Statesmen—a council composed of all living public men who have passed through important political office or employment. Such a Chamber would be fitted for much more than to be a merely moderating body. It would not be exclusively a check, but also an impelling force. In its hands, the power of holding the people back would be vested in those most competent, and who would then be most inclined to lead them forward in any right course. The council to whom the task would be intrusted of rectifying the people's mistakes would not represent a class believed to be opposed to their interest, but would consist of their own natural leaders in the path of progress. No mode of composition could approach to this in giving weight and efficacy to their function of moderators. It would be impossible to cry down a body always foremost in promoting improvements as a mere obstructive body, whatever amount of mischief it might obstruct.
Of all the principles that a wisely conservative group, meant to moderate and regulate democratic power, could be based on, the best seems to be the example set by the Roman Senate, which was the most consistently prudent and wise group to ever handle public matters. The shortcomings of a democratic assembly, which reflects the general public, are simply the shortcomings of the public itself—lack of specialized training and knowledge. The right solution is to pair it with a group that has those specialized skills and knowledge. If one House reflects popular opinion, the other should reflect personal merit, tested and proven through actual public service and bolstered by practical experience. If one is the People's Chamber, the other should be the Chamber of Statesmen—a council made up of all current public figures who have held significant political office or roles. Such a Chamber would be capable of much more than just being a moderating body. It wouldn’t just act as a check, but also as a driving force. It would have the authority to hold back the people, vested in those most qualified to lead them forward in the right direction. The council tasked with correcting the people's mistakes wouldn’t represent a class thought to be opposed to their interests but would consist of their own natural leaders on the path to progress. No other way of organizing this could compare in terms of giving weight and effectiveness to their role as moderators. It would be impossible to dismiss a group that consistently supports improvements as merely obstructive, regardless of how much harm it may prevent.
Were the place vacant in England for such a Senate (I need scarcely say that this is a mere hypothesis), it might be composed of some such elements as the following: All who were or had been members of the Legislative Commission described in a former chapter, and which I regard as an indispensable ingredient in a well constituted popular government. All who were or had been chief justices, or heads of any of the superior courts of law or equity. All who had for five years filled the office of puisne judge. All who had held for two years any cabinet office; but these should also be eligible to the House of Commons, and, if elected members of it, their peerage or senatorial office should be held in suspense. The condition of time is needed to prevent persons from being named cabinet ministers merely to give them a seat in the Senate; and the period of two years is suggested, that the same term which qualifies them for a pension might entitle them to a senatorship. All who had filled the office of commander-in-chief; and all who, having commanded an army or a fleet, had been thanked by Parliament for military or naval successes. All governors general of India or British America, and all who had held for ten years any colonial governorships. The permanent civil service should also be represented; all should be senators who had filled, during ten years, the important offices of under-secretary to the Treasury, permanent under-secretary of State, or any others equally high and responsible. The functions conferring the senatorial dignity should be limited to those of a legal, political, or military or naval character. Scientific and literary eminence are too indefinite and disputable: they imply a power of selection, whereas the other qualifications speak for themselves; if the writings by which reputation has been gained are unconnected with politics, they are no evidence of the special qualities required, while, if political, they would enable successive ministries to deluge the House with party tools.
If there were a need for a Senate in England (which is just a hypothetical situation), it could be made up of people like the following: everyone who has been or is a member of the Legislative Commission mentioned in a previous chapter, which I see as an essential part of a well-functioning democratic government. This would include all former or current chief justices or heads of any high courts. Anyone who has served as a junior judge for five years would also qualify. Additionally, those who have held a cabinet position for two years should be eligible, but they should also be able to run for the House of Commons, and if they are elected, their peerage or senatorial role should be put on hold. This time requirement is necessary to avoid appointing cabinet ministers solely to secure them a seat in the Senate, and the two-year period is suggested so that the time qualifying them for a pension would also make them eligible for a Senate position. This group would also include anyone who has been commander-in-chief, and those who led an army or navy and received thanks from Parliament for their military or naval achievements. Governors-general of India or British America, along with anyone who has held any colonial governorship for ten years, would also be included. The permanent civil service should also have representation; all who have served for ten years in significant roles such as under-secretary to the Treasury, permanent under-secretary of State, or other similarly high and responsible positions should be senatorial candidates. The roles that grant senatorial status should be limited to those that are legal, political, or military in nature. Scientific and literary accomplishments are too vague and subjective; they require a selection process, whereas the other qualifications are clear and self-evident. If someone's reputation is based on works unrelated to politics, that doesn't demonstrate the specific qualities needed; conversely, if their works are political, it allows each successive government to fill the House with party loyalists.
The historical antecedents of England render it all but certain that, unless in the improbable case of a violent subversion of the existing Constitution, any second Chamber which could possibly exist would have to be built on the foundation of the House of Lords. It is out of the question to think practically of abolishing that assembly, to replace it by such a Senate as I have sketched or by any other; but there might not be the same insuperable difficulty in aggregating the classes or categories just spoken of to the existing body in the character of peers for life. An ulterior, and perhaps, on this supposition, a necessary step, might be, that the hereditary peerage should be present in the House by their representatives instead of personally: a practice already established in the case of the Scotch and Irish peers, and which the mere multiplication of the order will probably at some time or other render inevitable. An easy adaptation of Mr. Hare's plan would prevent the representative peers from representing exclusively the party which has the majority in the peerage. If, for example, one representative were allowed for every ten peers, any ten might be admitted to choose a representative, and the peers might be free to group themselves for that purpose as they pleased. The election might be thus conducted: All peers who were candidates for the representation of their order should be required to declare themselves such, and enter their names in a list. A day and place should be appointed at which peers desirous of voting should be present, either in person, or, in the usual Parliamentary manner, by their proxies. The votes should be taken, each peer voting for only one. Every candidate who had as many as ten votes should be declared elected. If any one had more, all but ten should be allowed to withdraw their votes, or ten of the number should be selected by lot. These ten would form his constituency, and the remainder of his voters would be set free to give their votes over again for some one else. This process should be repeated until (so far as possible) every peer present either personally or by proxy was represented. When a number less than ten remained over, if amounting to five they might still be allowed to agree on a representative; if fewer than five, their votes must be lost, or they might be permitted to record them in favor of somebody already elected. With this inconsiderable exception, every representative peer would represent ten members of the peerage, all of whom had not only voted for him, but selected him as the one, among all open to their choice, by whom they were most desirous to be represented. As a compensation to the peers who were not chosen representatives of their order, they should be eligible to the House of Commons; a justice now refused to Scotch peers, and to Irish peers in their own part of the kingdom, while the representation in the House of Lords of any but the most numerous party in the peerage is denied equally to both.
The history of England makes it clear that, unless there’s an unlikely violent overthrow of the current Constitution, any second Chamber that may exist will likely have to be based on the structure of the House of Lords. It's not practical to consider getting rid of that assembly in favor of a Senate like the one I described or any other; however, it might not be as impossible to integrate the classes or categories mentioned earlier into the existing body as life peers. A further, and perhaps necessary step under this assumption, could be having hereditary peers present in the House through their representatives rather than in person: a practice already in place for Scottish and Irish peers, and one that the growing number of peers will likely make necessary at some point. A straightforward adjustment of Mr. Hare's plan could ensure that the representative peers don’t only represent the majority party in the peerage. For example, if one representative is allowed for every ten peers, any group of ten could choose a representative, and the peers could freely organize themselves for that purpose. The election could proceed as follows: all peers who want to run for representation should declare their candidacy and add their names to a list. A specific day and location should be set for peers who wish to vote to gather, either in person or, as is typical in Parliament, by proxy. Votes would be cast, with each peer voting for only one candidate. Any candidate receiving ten votes would be declared elected. If someone received more than ten votes, all except ten would be allowed to withdraw their votes, or ten would be randomly selected. Those ten would become his constituency, and the remaining voters would be free to cast their votes again for another candidate. This process would continue until (as much as possible) every peer present, either in person or by proxy, was represented. If fewer than ten remained, those numbering five could agree on a representative; if there were fewer than five, their votes would be lost, or they could choose to support someone already elected. With this small exception, every representative peer would represent ten members of the peerage, all of whom not only voted for him but chose him as the person they most wanted to represent them. To make it fair for those peers who weren’t elected as representatives of their order, they should be eligible to join the House of Commons; a right that is currently denied to Scottish and Irish peers in their respective regions, while representation in the House of Lords is also denied to any party in the peerage that isn’t the majority.
The mode of composing a Senate which has been here advocated not only seems the best in itself, but is that for which historical precedent and actual brilliant success can to the greatest extent be pleaded. It is not however the only feasible plan that might be proposed. Another possible mode of forming a Second Chamber would be to have it elected by the First; subject to the restriction that they should not nominate any of their own members. Such an assembly, emanating, like the American Senate, from popular choice only once removed, would not be considered to clash with democratic institutions, and would probably acquire considerable popular influence. From the mode of its nomination, it would be peculiarly unlikely to excite the jealousy of, or to come into hostile collision with the popular House. It would, moreover (due provision being made for the representation of the minority), be almost sure to be well composed, and to comprise many of that class of highly capable men who, either from accident or for want of showy qualities, had been unwilling to seek, or unable to obtain, the suffrages of a popular constituency.
The way of forming a Senate that has been suggested not only appears to be the best option, but it also has strong historical support and actual impressive success. However, it isn’t the only viable option that could be proposed. Another way to create a Second Chamber could be to have it elected by the First Chamber, with the condition that they cannot nominate any of their own members. This type of assembly, like the American Senate, would be chosen by popular vote just one step away, which wouldn't conflict with democratic institutions and would likely gain substantial public influence. Because of how it is appointed, it would likely avoid provoking jealousy from or clashing with the popularly elected House. Additionally, if steps are taken to ensure minority representation, it would almost certainly be well-structured and would include many capable individuals who, whether due to circumstances or lacking flashy qualities, had been hesitant to run for or unable to win the support of a popular electorate.
The best constitution of a Second Chamber is that which embodies the greatest number of elements exempt from the class interests and prejudices of the majority, but having in themselves nothing offensive to democratic feeling. I repeat, however, that the main reliance for tempering the ascendancy of the majority can be placed in a Second Chamber of any kind. The character of a representative government is fixed by the constitution of the popular House. Compared with this, all other questions relating to the form of government are insignificant.
The ideal structure for a Second Chamber is one that includes the most elements free from the class interests and biases of the majority, but doesn’t contradict democratic values. However, I emphasize that we can significantly depend on a Second Chamber of any type to balance the power of the majority. The nature of a representative government is determined by the structure of the popular House. In comparison, all other issues regarding the form of government are trivial.
Chapter XIV—Of the Executive in a Representative Government.
It would be out of place in this treatise to discuss the question into what departments or branches the executive business of government may most conveniently be divided. In this respect the exigencies of different governments are different; and there is little probability that any great mistake will be made in the classification of the duties when men are willing to begin at the beginning, and do not hold themselves bound by the series of accidents which, in an old government like ours, has produced the existing division of the public business. It may be sufficient to say that the classification of functionaries should correspond to that of subjects, and that there should not be several departments independent of one another, to superintend different parts of the same natural whole, as in our own military administration down to a recent period, and in a less degree even at present. Where the object to be attained is single (such as that of having an efficient army), the authority commissioned to attend to it should be single likewise. The entire aggregate of means provided for one end should be under one and the same control and responsibility. If they are divided among independent authorities, the means with each of those authorities become ends, and it is the business of nobody except the head of the government, who has probably no departmental experience, to take care of the real end. The different classes of means are not combined and adapted to one another under the guidance of any leading idea; and while every department pushes forward its own requirements, regardless of those of the rest, the purpose of the work is perpetually sacrificed to the work itself.
It wouldn’t be appropriate in this discussion to delve into how government operations can best be divided into different departments or branches. The needs of different governments vary, and it’s unlikely that any significant errors will occur in defining these responsibilities as long as people are open to starting fresh and are not constrained by the historical circumstances that have shaped our current public administration. It's enough to say that the classification of officials should align with the classification of issues, and there shouldn’t be multiple departments operating independently when overseeing different aspects of a unified whole, like how our military was managed until recently and still somewhat today. When the goal is singular (like maintaining an effective army), the authority designated to oversee it should also be singular. All resources allocated for that purpose should be managed under one control and held accountable to one authority. If resources are split among different independent entities, each of those entities may start pursuing its own agenda, and it becomes the responsibility of the head of the government, who likely lacks hands-on experience in that area, to focus on the ultimate goal. The various resources are not coordinated or tailored to one another under a central guiding principle; instead, as each department prioritizes its own needs without regard for others, the overall purpose is constantly compromised for the sake of the tasks at hand.
As a general rule, every executive function, whether superior or subordinate, should be the appointed duty of some given individual. It should be apparent to all the world who did every thing, and through whose default any thing was left undone. Responsibility is null when nobody knows who is responsible; nor, even when real, can it be divided without being weakened. To maintain it at its highest, there must be one person who receives the whole praise of what is well done, the whole blame of what is ill. There are, however, two modes of sharing responsibility; by one it is only enfeebled, by the other absolutely destroyed. It is enfeebled when the concurrence of more than one functionary is required to the same act. Each one among them has still a real responsibility; if a wrong has been done, none of them can say he did not do it; he is as much a participant as an accomplice is in an offense: if there has been legal criminality, they may all be punished legally, and their punishment needs not be less severe than if there had been only one person concerned. But it is not so with the penalties any more than with the rewards of opinion; these are always diminished by being shared. Where there has been no definite legal offense, no corruption or malversation, only an error or an imprudence, or what may pass for such, every participator has an excuse to himself and to the world in the fact that other persons are jointly involved with him. There is hardly any thing, even to pecuniary dishonesty, for which men will not feel themselves almost absolved, if those whose duty it was to resist and remonstrate have failed to do it, still more if they have given a formal assent.
As a general rule, every executive function, whether superior or subordinate, should be assigned to a specific individual. It should be clear to everyone who is responsible for each task and who failed to complete anything. Accountability doesn’t exist when no one knows who is in charge; even when it is real, it can’t be divided without being weakened. To keep accountability at its strongest, there needs to be one person who gets all the credit for what is done well and all the blame for what goes wrong. However, there are two ways to share responsibility; one weakens it, while the other completely destroys it. It is weakened when more than one person is required to complete the same action. Each person involved still has real accountability; if a mistake was made, no one can say they weren’t involved—each one is as much a participant as an accomplice is in a crime: if there’s legal wrongdoing, they can all face legal punishment, which doesn’t have to be any less severe than if only one person was involved. But it’s not the same with the consequences or rewards of public opinion; those are always diminished when shared. Where there is no clear legal violation, no corruption or misconduct, just an error or a misjudgment, or something that can be seen as such, every participant can justify themselves to themselves and to others by pointing out that other people were also involved. There’s hardly anything, even financial dishonesty, for which people won’t feel somewhat absolved if those who were supposed to resist and raise objections didn’t do so, especially if they even formally agreed.
In this case, however, though responsibility is weakened, there still is responsibility: every one of those implicated has in his individual capacity assented to, and joined in the act. Things are much worse when the act itself is only that of a majority—a board deliberating with closed doors, nobody knowing, or, except in some extreme case, being ever likely to know, whether an individual member voted for the act or against it. Responsibility in this case is a mere name. "Boards," it is happily said by Bentham, "are screens." What "the Board" does is the act of nobody, and nobody can be made to answer for it. The Board suffers, even in reputation, only in its collective character; and no individual member feels this further than his disposition leads him to identify his own estimation with that of the body—a feeling often very strong when the body is a permanent one, and he is wedded to it for better for worse; but the fluctuations of a modern official career give no time for the formation of such an esprit de corps, which, if it exists at all, exists only in the obscure ranks of the permanent subordinates. Boards, therefore, are not a fit instrument for executive business, and are only admissible in it when, for other reasons, to give full discretionary power to a single minister would be worse.
In this situation, even though responsibility is diminished, there is still responsibility: each person involved has individually agreed to and participated in the act. It gets much worse when the action is solely that of a majority—a board meeting behind closed doors, with no one knowing, and except in particularly extreme cases, unlikely to find out whether a specific member voted for or against the act. Responsibility here is just a label. "Boards," as Bentham wisely noted, "are screens." What "the Board" does is the action of no one, and no one can be held accountable for it. The Board suffers, even concerning its reputation, only as a whole, and no individual member feels this more than how much they link their own reputation to that of the board—a connection that can be very strong when the board is permanent, and they're committed to it for better or worse. However, the ups and downs of a modern official career don’t allow enough time to create such a sense of camaraderie, which, if it exists at all, is usually only found among the lower ranks of permanent staff. Therefore, boards are not suitable for executive tasks and should only be used in these situations when giving full discretion to a single minister would be worse.
On the other hand, it is also a maxim of experience that in the multitude of councillors there is wisdom, and that a man seldom judges right, even in his own concerns, still less in those of the public, when he makes habitual use of no knowledge but his own, or that of some single adviser. There is no necessary incompatibility between this principle and the other. It is easy to give the effective power and the full responsibility to one, providing him when necessary with advisers, each of whom is responsible only for the opinion he gives.
On the other hand, experience teaches us that wisdom comes from having many advisers, and a person rarely makes the right judgment, even in their own matters, let alone in public issues, if they rely solely on their own knowledge or that of just one adviser. There’s no fundamental conflict between this idea and the other one. It's straightforward to give full power and responsibility to one person while providing them with advisers when needed, where each adviser is only accountable for the opinion they share.
In general, the head of a department of the executive government is a mere politician. He may be a good politician, and a man of merit; and, unless this is usually the case, the government is bad. But his general capacity, and the knowledge he ought to possess of the general interests of the country, will not, unless by occasional accident, be accompanied by adequate, and what may be called professional knowledge of the department over which he is called to preside. Professional advisers must therefore be provided for him. Wherever mere experience and attainments are sufficient—wherever the qualities required in a professional adviser may possibly be united in a single well-selected individual (as in the case, for example, of a law officer), one such person for general purposes, and a staff of clerks to supply knowledge of details, meet the demands of the case. But, more frequently, it is not sufficient that the minister should consult some one competent person, and, when himself not conversant with the subject, act implicitly on that person's advice. It is often necessary that he should, not only occasionally, but habitually, listen to a variety of opinions, and inform his judgment by the discussions among a body of advisers. This, for example, is emphatically necessary in military and naval affairs. The military and naval ministers, therefore, and probably several others, should be provided with a Council, composed, at least in those two departments, of able and experienced professional men. As a means of obtaining the best men for the purpose under every change of administration, they ought to be permanent; by which I mean that they ought not, like the Lords of the Admiralty, to be expected to resign with the ministry by whom they were appointed; but it is a good rule that all who hold high appointments to which they have risen by selection, and not by the ordinary course of promotion, should retain their office only for a fixed term, unless reappointed, as is now the rule with staff appointments in the British army. This rule renders appointments somewhat less likely to be jobbed, not being a provision for life, and the same time affords a means, without affront to any one, of getting rid of those who are least worth keeping, and bringing in highly qualified persons of younger standing, for whom there might never be room if death vacancies, or voluntary resignations were waited for.
In general, the head of a government department is just a politician. They might be a good politician and a person of merit; if that's not usually the case, the government will struggle. However, their overall ability and understanding of the country's interests won't typically come with the necessary professional knowledge of the department they're in charge of, unless by chance. Therefore, they need professional advisers. When experience and qualifications are enough—wherever the skills needed in a professional adviser can potentially be found in a single well-chosen individual (like a legal officer), one such person for general purposes, along with a team of clerks to handle the details, can meet the needs of the situation. But often, it’s not enough for the minister to just consult one qualified person and rely solely on their advice when they aren’t familiar with the topic. They often need to consistently listen to a range of opinions and shape their judgment based on discussions with a group of advisers. This is especially necessary in military and naval matters. Therefore, military and naval ministers, as well as probably several others, should have a Council made up of skilled and experienced professionals in those fields. To ensure they always have the best people regardless of administrative changes, these advisers should be permanent; meaning they shouldn’t be expected to resign when the ministry that appointed them leaves office. However, a good practice is that those who hold high positions gained through selection rather than the usual promotion track should keep their roles only for a set term unless they are reappointed, as is the current rule for staff roles in the British army. This rule makes appointments less likely to be manipulated for favoritism, as they aren’t life-long positions, and it also provides a way to let go of those who are less valuable without creating any offense, allowing for younger, highly qualified individuals to step in—people who might not have openings if we only waited for deaths or voluntary resignations.
The councils should be consultative merely, in this sense, that the ultimate decision should rest undividedly with the minister himself; but neither ought they to be looked upon, or to look upon themselves as ciphers, or as capable of being reduced to such at his pleasure. The advisers attached to a powerful and perhaps self-willed man ought to be placed under conditions which make it impossible for them, without discredit, not to express an opinion, and impossible for him not to listen to and consider their recommendations, whether he adopts them or not. The relation which ought to exist between a chief and this description of advisers is very accurately hit by the constitution of the Council of the Governor General and those of the different Presidencies in India. These councils are composed of persons who have professional knowledge of Indian affairs, which the governor general and governors usually lack, and which it would not be desirable to require of them. As a rule, every member of council is expected to give an opinion, which is of course very often a simple acquiescence; but if there is a difference of sentiment, it is at the option of every member, and is the invariable practice, to record the reasons of his opinion, the governor general, or governor, doing the same. In ordinary cases the decision is according to the sense of the majority; the council, therefore, has a substantial part in the government; but if the governor general, or governor, thinks fit, he may set aside even their unanimous opinion, recording his reasons. The result is, that the chief is individually and effectively responsible for every act of the government. The members of council have only the responsibility of advisers; but it is always known, from documents capable of being produced, and which, if called for by Parliament or public opinion always are produced, what each has advised, and what reasons he gave for his advice; while, from their dignified position, and ostensible participation in all acts of government, they have nearly as strong motives to apply themselves to the public business, and to form and express a well-considered opinion on every part of it, as if the whole responsibility rested with themselves.
The councils should serve mainly as a consultative body, meaning that the final decision rests solely with the minister. However, they shouldn’t be seen as insignificant or treated as if they can be dismissed at his discretion. The advisors to a powerful and possibly strong-willed individual must be in a situation where they cannot avoid expressing their opinions without facing disgrace, and it should be impossible for the minister not to hear and consider their recommendations, regardless of whether he chooses to implement them. The relationship between a leader and these types of advisors is well represented by the structure of the Council of the Governor-General and those of the various Presidencies in India. These councils consist of individuals who have professional expertise in Indian affairs, knowledge that the governor-general and governors typically lack and shouldn’t be required to have. Generally, every council member is expected to share their opinion, which is often just agreement; however, if there is a difference of opinion, every member has the option—and it is customary—to state the reasons for their view, with the governor-general or governor doing the same. In ordinary matters, decisions are made based on the majority opinion; thus, the council plays a significant role in governance. Still, if the governor-general or governor chooses, they can override even a unanimous council decision while noting their reasons. This setup ensures that the leader is individually and fully accountable for every government action. Council members are only responsible as advisors; however, it is always clear, through documents that can be produced when requested by Parliament or public opinion, what each member has advised and the rationale behind their advice. Due to their respected positions and visible involvement in all government actions, they have strong incentives to engage diligently with public business and to form and articulate well-considered opinions on all aspects, as if the entire responsibility were theirs.
This mode of conducting the highest class of administrative business is one of the most successful instances of the adaptation of means to ends which political history, not hitherto very prolific in works of skill and contrivance, has yet to show. It is one of the acquisitions with which the art of politics has been enriched by the experience of the East India Company's rule; and, like most of the other wise contrivances by which India has been preserved to this country, and an amount of good government produced which is truly wonderful considering the circumstances and the materials, it is probably destined to perish in the general holocaust which the traditions of Indian government seem fated to undergo since they have been placed at the mercy of public ignorance and the presumptuous vanity of political men. Already an outcry is raised for abolishing the councils as a superfluous and expensive clog on the wheels of government; while the clamor has long been urgent, and is daily obtaining more countenance in the highest quarters, for the abrogation of the professional civil service, which breeds the men that compose the councils, and the existence of which is the sole guaranty for their being of any value.
This way of managing the highest level of administrative tasks is one of the most successful examples of effectively aligning resources with goals that political history, which hasn't been very rich in skilled and clever solutions, has demonstrated. It's one of the benefits that the art of politics has gained from the experiences of the East India Company's governance. Like many of the other smart ideas that have helped keep India connected to this country and created an impressive level of good governance given the circumstances and available resources, it seems likely to fade away in the broader destruction of traditions in Indian governance, as they fall victim to public ignorance and the overconfident arrogance of political figures. There’s already a push to eliminate the councils as unnecessary and costly obstacles to effective government; meanwhile, there has long been a strong call, growing daily in the highest circles, to dismantle the professional civil service that produces the members of these councils, and whose existence is the only guarantee of their value.
A most important principle of good government in a popular constitution is that no executive functionaries should be appointed by popular election, neither by the votes of the people themselves, nor by those of their representatives. The entire business of government is skilled employment; the qualifications for the discharge of it are of that special and professional kind which can not be properly judged of except by persons who have themselves some share of those qualifications, or some practical experience of them. The business of finding the fittest persons to fill public employments—not merely selecting the best who offer, but looking out for the absolutely best, and taking note of all fit persons who are met with, that they may be found when wanted—is very laborious, and requires a delicate as well as highly conscientious discernment; and as there is no public duty which is in general so badly performed, so there is none for which it is of greater importance to enforce the utmost practicable amount of personal responsibility, by imposing it as a special obligation on high functionaries in the several departments. All subordinate public officers who are not appointed by some mode of public competition should be selected on the direct responsibility of the minister under whom they serve. The ministers, all but the chief, will naturally be selected by the chief; and the chief himself, though really designated by Parliament, should be, in a regal government, officially appointed by the crown. The functionary who appoints should be the sole person empowered to remove any subordinate officer who is liable to removal, which the far greater number ought not to be, except for personal misconduct, since it would be vain to expect that the body of persons by whom the whole detail of the public business is transacted, and whose qualifications are generally of much more importance to the public than those of the minister himself, will devote themselves to their profession, and acquire the knowledge and skill on which the minister must often place entire dependence, if they are liable at any moment to be turned adrift for no fault, that the minister may gratify himself, or promote his political interest, by appointing somebody else.
An important principle of good government in a democratic system is that no executive officials should be chosen through popular election, whether by the votes of the people themselves or their representatives. The entire process of governance is a specialized task; the qualifications needed for carrying it out can only be properly assessed by people who possess some of those qualifications or have relevant experience. Identifying the most suitable individuals for public positions—not just picking the best among those who apply, but actively seeking out the absolute best and keeping track of all qualified candidates—is a demanding job that requires careful and responsible judgment. Since this crucial duty is often poorly executed, it’s vital to ensure that high-ranking officials in various departments are held personally accountable. All lower-level public officials who aren’t selected through some form of public competition should be chosen based on the direct responsibility of the minister they work under. The ministers, apart from the head minister, will be generally chosen by the head minister, who should officially be appointed by the crown in a royal government, even though Parliament designates him. The person who appoints should be the only one with the authority to remove any subordinate official eligible for dismissal, although most shouldn't be, except for personal misconduct. It's unrealistic to expect the individuals handling the day-to-day public work—whose qualifications are often far more essential than those of the minister—to dedicate themselves to their jobs and gain the necessary knowledge and skills if they can be dismissed at any time for no reason, just so the minister can appoint someone they prefer or further their political agenda.
To the principle which condemns the appointment of executive officers by popular suffrage, ought the chief of the executive, in a republican government, to be an exception? Is it a good rule which, in the American Constitution, provides for the election of the President once in every four years by the entire people? The question is not free from difficulty. There is unquestionably some advantage, in a country like America, where no apprehension needs be entertained of a coup d'état, in making the chief minister constitutionally independent of the legislative body, and rendering the two great branches of the government, while equally popular both in their origin and in their responsibility, an effective check on one another. The plan is in accordance with that sedulous avoidance of the concentration of great masses of power in the same hands, which is a marked characteristic of the American federal Constitution. But the advantage, in this instance, is purchased at a price above all reasonable estimates of its value. It seems far better that the chief magistrate in a republic should be appointed avowedly, as the chief minister in a constitutional monarchy is virtually, by the representative body. In the first place, he is certain, when thus appointed, to be a more eminent man. The party which has the majority in Parliament would then, as a rule, appoint its own leader, who is always one of the foremost, and often the very foremost person in political life; while the President of the United States, since the last survivor of the founders of the republic disappeared from the scene, is almost always either an obscure man, or one who has gained any reputation he may possess in some other field than politics. And this, as I have before observed, is no accident, but the natural effect of the situation. The eminent men of a party, in an election extending to the whole country, are never its most available candidates. All eminent men have made personal enemies, or, have done something, or at the lowest, professed some opinion obnoxious to some local or other considerable division of the community, and likely to tell with fatal effect upon the number of votes; whereas a man without antecedents, of whom nothing is known but that he professes the creed of the party, is readily voted for by its entire strength. Another important consideration is the great mischief of unintermitted electioneering. When the highest dignity in the state is to be conferred by popular election once in every few years, the whole intervening time is spent in what is virtually a canvass. President, ministers, chiefs of parties, and their followers, are all electioneerers: the whole community is kept intent on the mere personalities of politics, and every public question is discussed and decided with less reference to its merits than to its expected bearing on the presidential election. If a system had been devised to make party spirit the ruling principle of action in all public affairs, and create an inducement not only to make every question a party question, but to raise questions for the purpose of founding parties upon them, it would have been difficult to contrive any means better adapted to the purpose.
To the principle that opposes the election of executive officers by popular vote, should the head of the executive in a republican government be any different? Is it a good idea, as stated in the American Constitution, for the entire population to elect the President every four years? The question isn’t without its challenges. There is surely some benefit in a country like America, where there is no fear of a coup, in having the chief minister constitutionally independent from the legislative body, allowing the two major branches of government, both equally popular in their origins and accountability, to effectively check each other. This approach aligns with the careful avoidance of concentrating large amounts of power in one place, which is a defining feature of the American federal Constitution. However, the benefit in this case comes at a cost well beyond reasonable value. It seems much better for the chief leader in a republic to be appointed, as the chief minister in a constitutional monarchy effectively is, by the representative body. For one, this method ensures that the appointee is usually a more prominent individual. The majority party in Parliament would typically appoint its own leader, who is often one of the most significant and well-known figures in political life; on the other hand, the President of the United States, since the last of the republic's founders left, tends to be either an unknown figure or someone whose reputation was built in a field other than politics. This, as I have previously mentioned, is no coincidence, but a natural outcome of the situation. The prominent members of a party, during a nationwide election, are seldom its most viable candidates. All well-known individuals have made personal enemies or have expressed opinions that might offend a substantial local or national demographic, which could drastically impact their chances of winning votes. In contrast, an individual with no past, known only for aligning with the party's ideology, is easily supported by its entire base. Another significant issue is the continuous campaign efforts. When the highest office in the state is awarded through popular vote every few years, the entire time in between is consumed by what amounts to a campaign. Presidents, ministers, party leaders, and their supporters are all continuously campaigning; the entire community becomes fixated on political personalities, and every public issue is discussed and decided with less focus on its actual merits and more on its potential impact on the presidential election. If a system were designed to make party loyalty the driving force behind all public affairs, creating incentives to turn every question into a party issue and even invent issues to found parties around, it would be hard to find a better approach to achieve that goal.
I will not affirm that it would at all times and places be desirable that the head of the executive should be so completely dependent upon the votes of a representative assembly as the prime minister is in England, and is without inconvenience. If it were thought best to avoid this, he might, though appointed by Parliament, hold his office for a fixed period, independent of a Parliamentary vote, which would be the American system minus the popular election and its evils. There is another mode of giving the head of the administration as much independence of the Legislature as is at all compatible with the essentials of free government. He never could be unduly dependent on a vote of Parliament if he had, as the British prime minister practically has, the power to dissolve the House and appeal to the people; if, instead of being turned out of office by a hostile vote, he could only be reduced by it to the alternative of resignation or dissolution. The power of dissolving Parliament is one which I think it desirable he should possess, even under the system by which his own tenure of office is secured to him for a fixed period. There ought not to be any possibility of that deadlock in politics which would ensue on a quarrel breaking out between a president and an assembly, neither of whom, during an interval which might amount to years, would have any legal means of ridding itself of the other. To get through such a period without a coup d'état being attempted, on either side or on both, requires such a combination of the love of liberty and the habit of self-restraint as very few nations have yet shown themselves capable of; and though this extremity were avoided, to expect that the two authorities would not paralyze each other's operations is to suppose that the political life of the country will always be pervaded by a spirit of mutual forbearance and compromise, imperturbable by the passions and excitements of the keenest party struggles. Such a spirit may exist, but even where it does there is imprudence in trying it too far.
I won’t say that it’s always a good idea for the head of the executive to be completely dependent on the votes of a representative assembly, as the prime minister is in England, and that works without issue. If it seems better to avoid this, he might still be appointed by Parliament but could hold his office for a fixed term, independent of a Parliamentary vote; this would be the American system but without the popular election and its drawbacks. There’s another way to give the head of the administration some independence from the Legislature while still keeping the fundamentals of free government. He wouldn’t be overly reliant on a Parliamentary vote if he had, as the British prime minister effectively does, the power to dissolve the House and appeal to the public. Instead of being ousted by a hostile vote, he could only be faced with the choice of resigning or dissolving Parliament. I believe it’s essential for him to have the power to dissolve Parliament, even under a system that guarantees his position for a fixed term. There shouldn’t be any chance of a political deadlock arising from a quarrel between a president and an assembly, where neither could legally free themselves of the other for what could be years. Getting through such a period without an attempted coup from either side would require an unusual combination of love for liberty and self-restraint that very few nations have demonstrated they can manage. Even if this extreme situation is avoided, to expect that the two authorities wouldn’t hinder each other’s operations is to believe that the political life of the country will always be characterized by a spirit of mutual respect and compromise, untouched by the intense passions of partisan struggles. Such a spirit may exist, but even where it does, it’s unwise to push it too far.
Other reasons make it desirable that some power in the state (which can only be the executive) should have the liberty of at any time, and at discretion, calling a new Parliament. When there is a real doubt which of two contending parties has the strongest following, it is important that there should exist a constitutional means of immediately testing the point and setting it at rest. No other political topic has a chance of being properly attended to while this is undecided; and such an interval is mostly an interregnum for purposes of legislative or administrative improvement, neither party having sufficient confidence in its strength to attempt things likely to provoke opposition in any quarter that has either direct or indirect influence in the pending struggle.
Other reasons make it necessary for some authority in the government (which can only be the executive) to have the freedom to call a new Parliament whenever they want. When there’s real uncertainty about which of the two competing parties has the stronger support, it’s crucial to have a constitutional way to quickly assess the situation and resolve it. No other political issue can be effectively addressed while this remains unresolved; during this time, it mostly turns into a sort of pause for any legislative or administrative progress, as neither party has enough confidence in their own strength to take actions that might provoke opposition from any group that has a direct or indirect stake in the ongoing conflict.
I have not taken account of the case in which the vast power centralized in the chief magistrate, and the insufficient attachment of the mass of the people to free institutions, give him a chance of success in an attempt to subvert the Constitution, and usurp sovereign power. Where such peril exists, no first magistrate is admissible whom the Parliament can not, by a single vote, reduce to a private station. In a state of things holding out any encouragement to that most audacious and profligate of all breaches of trust, even this entireness of constitutional dependence is but a weak protection.
I haven't considered the situation where the immense power concentrated in the chief executive, along with the lack of strong attachment from the general public to democratic institutions, gives him a chance to succeed in undermining the Constitution and taking over sovereign power. When such a threat exists, no chief executive should be allowed to serve if Parliament cannot, with just one vote, remove him from office. In circumstances that encourage such a bold and reckless betrayal of trust, even complete constitutional reliance offers only weak protection.
Of all officers of government, those in whose appointment any participation of popular suffrage is the most objectionable are judicial officers. While there are no functionaries whose special and professional qualifications the popular judgment is less fitted to estimate, there are none in whose case absolute impartiality, and freedom from connection with politicians or sections of politicians, are of any thing like equal importance. Some thinkers, among others Mr. Bentham, have been of opinion that, although it is better that judges should not be appointed by popular election, the people of their district ought to have the power, after sufficient experience, of removing them from their trust. It can not be denied that the irremovability of any public officer to whom great interests are intrusted is in itself an evil. It is far from desirable that there should be no means of getting rid of a bad or incompetent judge, unless for such misconduct as he can be made to answer for in a criminal court, and that a functionary on whom so much depends should have the feeling of being free from responsibility except to opinion and his own conscience. The question however is, whether, in the peculiar position of a judge, and supposing that all practicable securities have been taken for an honest appointment, irresponsibility, except to his own and the public conscience, has not, on the whole, less tendency to pervert his conduct than responsibility to the government or to a popular vote. Experience has long decided this point in the affirmative as regards responsibility to the executive, and the case is quite equally strong when the responsibility sought to be enforced is to the suffrages of electors. Among the good qualities of a popular constituency, those peculiarly incumbent upon a judge, calmness and impartiality, are not numbered. Happily, in that intervention of popular suffrage which is essential to freedom they are not the qualities required. Even the quality of justice, though necessary to all human beings, and therefore to all electors, is not the inducement which decides any popular election. Justice and impartiality are as little wanted for electing a member of Parliament as they can be in any transaction of men. The electors have not to award something which either candidate has a right to, nor to pass judgment on the general merits of the competitors, but to declare which of them has most of their personal confidence, or best represents their political convictions. A judge is bound to treat his political friend, or the person best known to him, exactly as he treats other people; but it would be a breach of duty, as well as an absurdity, if an elector did so. No argument can be grounded on the beneficial effect produced on judges, as on all other functionaries, by the moral jurisdiction of opinion; for even in this respect, that which really exercises a useful control over the proceedings of a judge, when fit for the judicial office, is not (except sometimes in political cases) the opinion of the community generally, but that of the only public by whom his conduct or qualifications can be duly estimated, the bar of his own court. I must not be understood to say that the participation of the general public in the administration of justice is of no importance; it is of the greatest; but in what manner? By the actual discharge of a part of the judicial office in the capacity of jurymen. This is one of the few cases in politics in which it is better that the people should act directly and personally than through their representatives, being almost the only case in which the errors that a person exercising authority may commit can be better borne than the consequences of making him responsible for them. If a judge could be removed from office by a popular vote, whoever was desirous of supplanting him would make capital for that purpose out of all his judicial decisions; would carry all of them, as far as he found practicable, by irregular appeal before a public opinion wholly incompetent, for want of having heard the case, or from having heard it without either the precautions or the impartiality belonging to a judicial hearing; would play upon popular passion and prejudice where they existed, and take pains to arouse them where they did not. And in this, if the case were interesting, and he took sufficient trouble, he would infallibly be successful, unless the judge or his friends descended into the arena, and made equally powerful appeals on the other side. Judges would end by feeling that they risked their office upon every decision they gave in a case susceptible of general interest, and that it was less essential for them to consider what decision was just, than what would be most applauded by the public, or would least admit of insidious misrepresentation. The practice introduced by some of the new or revised State Constitutions in America, of submitting judicial officers to periodical popular re-election, will be found, I apprehend, to be one of the most dangerous errors ever yet committed by democracy; and, were it not that the practical good sense which never totally deserts the people of the United States is said to be producing a reaction, likely in no long time to lead to the retraction of the error, it might with reason be regarded as the first great downward step in the degeneration of modern democratic government.
Of all government officials, those whose appointment involves any input from popular voting are the most problematic, especially judges. There are no other officials whose specialized skills and qualifications are harder for the public to evaluate, and there are none for whom complete impartiality and a lack of ties to politicians or political factions are as crucial. Some thinkers, like Mr. Bentham, believe that while judges shouldn’t be elected by popular vote, the people in their district should have the ability to remove them after a reasonable period of observation. It’s undeniable that the inability to remove a public official with significant responsibilities is itself a problem. It's not ideal that there aren’t ways to dismiss a bad or incompetent judge unless they commit a crime that can be prosecuted, while a public official whose actions are so impactful feels they’re free from accountability beyond public opinion and their own conscience. The real question is whether a judge's unique position, assuming all viable safeguards for an honest appointment are in place, makes being unaccountable to anything but personal and public conscience less likely to corrupt their behavior than being accountable to the government or to popular vote. Experience has long proven this to be true regarding accountability to the executive, and the argument holds equally strong for accountability to the voters. Among the qualities that a good public constituency possesses, the calmness and impartiality required of a judge are not included. Thankfully, in the realm of public voting essential to freedom, those are not the traits needed. Even the quality of justice, while necessary for all individuals and thus all voters, isn’t what drives popular elections. Justice and impartiality are just as irrelevant for electing a member of Parliament as they can be in any human interaction. Voters don’t have to award anything to either candidate, nor do they need to pass judgment on their overall merits; they simply express which candidate they trust the most or who aligns best with their political views. A judge must treat their political friends or anyone they know just like everyone else; it would be inappropriate, not to mention absurd, for a voter to do so. You can’t argue that the moral authority of public opinion positively impacts judges, as it does with other officials; in this situation, the only opinion that truly influences a judge's behavior, provided they are fit for the role, is not the general public's opinion but that of the bar associated with their court. I’m not saying the public's role in the justice system is unimportant; it’s extremely important, but in what way? By serving as jurors. This is one of the rare instances in politics where it’s better for the public to act directly rather than through representatives, as it’s almost the only situation where the mistakes made by someone in authority can be handled better than making them accountable for those mistakes. If judges could be removed from office via a popular vote, anyone wanting to replace them would turn all their judicial decisions into ammunition for that cause; they would challenge those decisions through informal appeals to a public that would be ill-equipped to judge them accurately, whether due to not having heard the case at all or having done so without the safeguards or neutrality of a court hearing; they would exploit popular emotions and prejudices, stirring them up whether they existed or not. If the case were compelling and the challenger put in enough effort, they would probably succeed unless the judge or their allies stepped up and made equally persuasive arguments on the opposite side. Judges would ultimately feel that their positions were at risk with every ruling they made on a matter of broad interest and that it mattered less to consider what decision was just than what would gain public approval or be least vulnerable to distortion. The practice established by some new or updated State Constitutions in America to submit judges to regular popular re-elections will likely turn out to be one of the most dangerous mistakes made by democracies. If it weren’t for the practical common sense that usually prevails among the people of the United States, which may soon lead to a reversal of this mistake, it could reasonably be seen as the first significant decline in the quality of modern democratic government.
With regard to that large and important body which constitutes the permanent strength of the public service, those who do not change with changes of politics, but remain to aid every minister by their experience and traditions, inform him by their knowledge of business, and conduct official details under his general control—those, in short, who form the class of professional public servants, entering their profession as others do while young, in the hope of rising progressively to its higher grades as they advance in life—it is evidently inadmissible that these should be liable to be turned out, and deprived of the whole benefit of their previous service, except for positive, proved, and serious misconduct. Not, of course, such delinquency only as makes them amenable to the law, but voluntary neglect of duty, or conduct implying untrustworthiness for the purposes for which their trust is given them. Since, therefore, unless in case of personal culpability, there is no way of getting rid of them except by quartering them on the public as pensioners, it is of the greatest importance that the appointments should be well made in the first instance; and it remains to be considered by what mode of appointment this purpose can best be attained.
Regarding the large and important group that makes up the permanent backbone of public service, those who remain unchanged by political shifts but continue to support every minister with their experience and traditions, provide insight through their knowledge of the job, and handle official tasks under his overall direction—essentially, those who are professional public servants, entering their profession young with hopes of gradually moving up to higher positions as they grow older—it is clearly unacceptable for them to be dismissed and lose all the benefits of their past service, except for confirmed, serious misconduct. This doesn’t just include actions that break the law, but also includes willful neglect of duty or behavior that shows they can’t be trusted with the responsibilities they’ve been given. Therefore, unless there is personal wrongdoing, the only way to remove them is to essentially make them public pensioners, which highlights the critical importance of making the right appointments from the start. It’s essential to determine the best method for achieving this goal.
In making first appointments, little danger is to be apprehended from want of special skill and knowledge in the choosers, but much from partiality, and private or political interest. Being all appointed at the commencement of manhood, not as having learned, but in order that they may learn, their profession, the only thing by which the best candidates can be discriminated is proficiency in the ordinary branches of liberal education; and this can be ascertained without difficulty, provided there be the requisite pains and the requisite impartiality in those who are appointed to inquire into it. Neither the one nor the other can reasonably be expected from a minister, who must rely wholly on recommendations, and, however disinterested as to his personal wishes, never will be proof against the solicitations of persons who have the power of influencing his own election, or whose political adherence is important to the ministry to which he belongs. These considerations have introduced the practice of submitting all candidates for first appointments to a public examination, conducted by persons not engaged in politics, and of the same class and quality with the examiners for honors at the Universities. This would probably be the best plan under any system; and under our Parliamentary government it is the only one which affords a chance, I do not say of honest appointment, but even of abstinence from such as are manifestly and flagrantly profligate.
In making initial appointments, there's little risk from the lack of special skills and knowledge among those choosing, but there’s a significant risk from favoritism and personal or political interests. Since everyone is appointed at the start of their adulthood not because they have already learned, but so they can learn their profession, the best way to differentiate the strongest candidates is through their proficiency in the basic subjects of liberal education. This can be easily determined if those tasked with the assessment show the necessary effort and impartiality. However, neither of these qualities can reasonably be expected from a minister, who has to rely entirely on recommendations and, even if unbiased in his personal interests, will likely be swayed by those who can influence his own election or whose political loyalty is vital to the ministry he belongs to. These factors have led to the practice of requiring all candidates for initial appointments to undergo a public examination, overseen by individuals not involved in politics and of the same class and quality as the examiners for honors at the universities. This is likely the best approach under any system; and in our parliamentary government, it's the only method that provides a chance, not just for fair appointments, but even to avoid those that are clearly and outrageously corrupt.
It is also absolutely necessary that the examinations should be competitive, and the appointments given to those who are most successful. A mere pass examination never, in the long run, does more than exclude absolute dunces. When the question, in the mind of an examiner, lies between blighting the prospects of an individual and performing a duty to the public which, in the particular instance, seldom appears of first rate importance, and when he is sure to be bitterly reproached for doing the first, while in general no one will either know or care whether he has done the latter, the balance, unless he is a man of very unusual stamp, inclines to the side of good-nature. A relaxation in one instance establishes a claim to it in others, which every repetition of indulgence makes it more difficult to resist; each of these, in succession, becomes a precedent for more, until the standard of proficiency sinks gradually to something almost contemptible. Examinations for degrees at the two great Universities have generally been as slender in their requirements as those for honors are trying and serious. Where there is no inducement to exceed a certain minimum, the minimum comes to be the maximum: it becomes the general practice not to aim at more; and as in every thing there are some who do not attain all they aim at, however low the standard may be pitched, there are always several who fall short of it. When, on the contrary, the appointments are given to those, among a great number of candidates, who most distinguish themselves, and where the successful competitors are classed in order of merit, not only each is stimulated to do his very utmost, but the influence is felt in every place of liberal education throughout the country. It becomes with every schoolmaster an object of ambition and an avenue to success to have furnished pupils who have gained a high place in these competitions, and there is hardly any other mode in which the state can do so much to raise the quality of educational institutions throughout the country. Though the principle of competitive examinations for public employment is of such recent introduction in this country, and is still so imperfectly carried out, the Indian service being as yet nearly the only case in which it exists in its completeness, a sensible effect has already begun to be produced on the places of middle-class education, notwithstanding the difficulties which the principle has encountered from the disgracefully low existing state of education in the country, which these very examinations have brought into strong light. So contemptible has the standard of acquirement been found to be, among the youths who obtain the nomination from the minister, which entitles them to offer themselves as candidates, that the competition of such candidates produces almost a poorer result than would be obtained from a mere pass examination; for no one would think of fixing the conditions of a pass examination so low as is actually found sufficient to enable a young man to surpass his fellow-candidates. Accordingly, it is said that successive years show on the whole a decline of attainments, less effort being made, because the results of former examinations have proved that the exertions then used were greater than would have been sufficient to attain the object. Partly from this decrease of effort, and partly because, even at the examinations which do not require a previous nomination, conscious ignorance reduces the number of competitors to a mere handful, it has so happened that though there have always been a few instances of great proficiency, the lower part of the list of successful candidates represents but a very moderate amount of acquirement; and we have it on the word of the commissioners that nearly all who have been unsuccessful have owed their failure to ignorance, not of the higher branches of instruction, but of its very humblest elements—spelling and arithmetic.
It’s also really important that exams are competitive, and that positions are given to those who do best. An exam that just requires a passing grade only keeps out total morons. When an examiner has to choose between ruining someone’s future and fulfilling a duty to the public—which usually doesn't seem urgent—they are likely to lean towards being lenient, especially if they know they’ll be criticized for choosing the former, while the latter won’t be noticed by most people. One lenient decision creates an expectation for more leniency, making it harder to say no each time; this pattern gradually lowers the standard of achievement to something almost pathetic. Examinations for degrees at the two main universities have often had low requirements, while those for honors are demanding. If there’s no reason to exceed a basic minimum, that minimum becomes the maximum. People generally don’t aim higher, and as with anything, some will fail to reach even the low standard set. However, when appointments are given to the most outstanding candidates from a large group, and those who succeed are ranked by merit, it encourages everyone to put in their best effort, and this motivation spreads to every institution of higher learning across the country. For every teacher, it becomes a goal and a pathway to success to have students who rank highly in these competitions, and there’s hardly a better way for the state to improve the quality of education nationwide. Although competitive exams for government jobs are relatively new in this country and are still not fully developed—with the Indian service being nearly the only complete example—a noticeable impact has already started on middle-class education, despite the challenges posed by the shockingly low current standards that these exams have highlighted. The level of knowledge among youths who get ministerial nominations to become candidates has been found so lacking that the competition among them often yields worse results than a simple pass exam would; because nobody would set the bar for a pass exam as low as what’s currently enough for a young man to outscore his peers. Consequently, it's been noted that each year shows a general decline in knowledge, with less effort being put in, as previous exam results indicate that the efforts made were more than necessary to achieve success. Due in part to this drop in effort, and also because even exams that don't require prior nominations see very few competitors due to a lack of awareness, there have always been a few cases of exceptional skill, but the lower end of the successful candidates’ list shows only a modest level of knowledge. According to the commissioners, nearly all those who fail do so because of ignorance—not in advanced subjects, but in the most basic skills like spelling and arithmetic.
The outcries which continue to be made against these examinations by some of the organs of opinion are often, I regret to say, as little creditable to the good faith as to the good sense of the assailants. They proceed partly by misrepresentation of the kind of ignorance which, as a matter of fact, actually leads to failure in the examinations. They quote with emphasis the most recondite questions [8] which can be shown to have been ever asked, and make it appear as if unexceptionable answers to all these were made the sine quâ non of success. Yet it has been repeated to satiety that such questions are not put because it is expected of every one that he should answer them, but in order that whoever is able to do so may have the means of proving and availing himself of that portion of his knowledge. It is not as a ground of rejection, but as an additional means of success, that this opportunity is given. We are then asked whether the kind of knowledge supposed in this, that, or the other question, is calculated to be of any use to the candidate after he has attained his object. People differ greatly in opinion as to what knowledge is useful. There are persons in existence, and a late Foreign Secretary of State is one of them, who think English spelling a useless accomplishment in a diplomatic attaché or a clerk in a government office. About one thing the objectors seem to be unanimous, that general mental cultivation is not useful in these employments, whatever else may be so. If, however (as I presume to think), it is useful, or if any education at all is useful, it must be tested by the tests most likely to show whether the candidate possesses it or not. To ascertain whether he has been well educated, he must be interrogated in the things which he is likely to know if he has been well educated, even though not directly pertinent to the work to which he is to be appointed. Will those who object to his being questioned in classics and mathematics, tell us what they would have him questioned in? There seems, however, to be equal objection to examining him in these, and to examining him in any thing but these. If the Commissioners—anxious to open a door of admission to those who have not gone through the routine of a grammar-school, or who make up for the smallness of their knowledge of what is there taught by greater knowledge of something else—allow marks to be gained by proficiency in any other subject of real utility, they are reproached for that too. Nothing will satisfy the objectors but free admission of total ignorance.
The criticisms directed at these exams by some opinion leaders are, unfortunately, not very credible in terms of either sincerity or common sense. They often misrepresent the type of ignorance that actually leads to failure in the exams. They highlight the most obscure questions [8] that have ever been asked, suggesting that having perfect answers to all of them is essential for success. However, it has been stated repeatedly that such questions are not included with the expectation that everyone will answer them, but rather so that those who can answer them can demonstrate that knowledge. This is not a reason for rejection, but rather an additional opportunity for success. We are then asked whether the knowledge implied in various questions is actually useful for the candidate after they achieve their goals. Opinions on what knowledge is useful vary widely. There are people, including a recent Foreign Secretary of State, who believe that knowing English spelling is unnecessary for a diplomatic attaché or a government office clerk. One thing the critics seem to agree on is that general mental development is not beneficial in these roles, regardless of what else might be useful. However, if (as I believe) education is valuable, or if any education is beneficial at all, it must be assessed by tests that are most likely to indicate whether the candidate has it. To determine if someone has been well educated, they must be questioned on subjects they would typically know if they had a good education, even if those topics are not directly related to the job for which they are being considered. Those who object to questioning about classics and mathematics should clarify what subjects they would prefer instead. It appears there is equal resistance to assessing them in these areas as well as in anything else. If the Commissioners, eager to provide opportunities for those who haven’t attended grammar school or who may compensate for a lack of that education with knowledge in other fields, allow marks for proficiency in any other genuinely useful subject, they face criticism for that as well. Nothing seems to satisfy the critics except for the unrestricted acceptance of complete ignorance.
We are triumphantly told that neither Clive nor Wellington could have passed the test which is prescribed for an aspirant to an engineer cadetship; as if, because Clive and Wellington did not do what was not required of them, they could not have done it if it had been required. If it be only meant to inform us that it is possible to be a great general without these things, so it is without many other things which are very useful to great generals. Alexander the Great had never heard of Vauban's rules, nor could Julius Cæsar speak French. We are next informed that book-worms, a term which seems to be held applicable to whoever has the smallest tincture of book-knowledge, may not be good at bodily exercises, or have the habits of gentlemen. This is a very common line of remark with dunces of condition; but, whatever the dunces may think, they have no monopoly of either gentlemanly habits or bodily activity. Wherever these are needed, let them be inquired into and separately provided for, not to the exclusion of mental qualifications, but in addition. Meanwhile, I am credibly informed that in the Military Academy at Woolwich the competition cadets are as superior to those admitted on the old system of nomination in these respects as in all others; that they learn even their drill more quickly, as indeed might be expected, for an intelligent person learns all things sooner than a stupid one; and that in general demeanor they contrast so favorably with their predecessors, that the authorities of the institutions are impatient for the day to arrive when the last remains of the old leaven shall have disappeared from the place. If this be so, and it is easy to ascertain whether it is so, it is to be hoped we shall soon have heard for the last time that ignorance is a better qualification than knowledge for the military, and, à fortiori, for every other profession, or that any one good quality, however little apparently connected with liberal education, is at all likely to be promoted by going without it.
We are proudly told that neither Clive nor Wellington could have met the requirements for becoming an engineering cadet; as if, just because they didn’t do something that wasn’t asked of them, they wouldn’t have been able to do it if it had been required. If this is just to inform us that it’s possible to be a great general without these specific qualifications, then it’s true for many other things that are also very useful to great generals. Alexander the Great had never heard of Vauban's rules, nor could Julius Caesar speak French. Next, we hear that those who love books, a term that seems to apply to anyone with even a hint of book knowledge, might not be good at physical activities or have the manners of gentlemen. This is a common viewpoint among less knowledgeable people; however, regardless of what they think, they don’t have a monopoly on gentlemanly behavior or physical aptitude. Wherever these qualities are needed, let them be sought out and provided for separately, not as a replacement for mental skills, but as an addition. In the meantime, I’ve been reliably informed that at the Military Academy in Woolwich, the cadets competing now are superior to those admitted through the old nomination system in every way; they even pick up their drills faster, which is expected since an intelligent person learns things quicker than a dull one; and in general behavior they stand out so much compared to their predecessors that the institution's authorities are eager for the day when the last remnants of the old system are gone. If this is true, and it's easy to find out if it is, we can only hope we’ll soon no longer hear that ignorance is a better qualification than knowledge in the military, and even more so, in every other profession, or that any single good quality, no matter how unrelated it seems to a well-rounded education, is likely to benefit from the absence of it.
Though the first admission to government employment be decided by competitive examination, it would in most cases be impossible that subsequent promotion should be so decided; and it seems proper that this should take place, as it usually does at present, on a mixed system of seniority and selection. Those whose duties are of a routine character should rise by seniority to the highest point to which duties merely of that description can carry them, while those to whom functions of particular trust, and requiring special capacity, are confided, should be selected from the body on the discretion of the chief of the office. And this selection will generally be made honestly by him if the original appointments take place by open competition, for under that system his establishment will generally consist of individuals to whom, but for the official connection, he would have been a stranger. If among them there be any in whom he, or his political friends and supporters, take an interest, it will be but occasionally, and only when to this advantage of connection is added, as far as the initiatory examination could test it, at least equality of real merit; and, except when there is a very strong motive to job these appointments, there is always a strong one to appoint the fittest person, being the one who gives to his chief the most useful assistance, saves him most trouble, and helps most to build up that reputation for good management of public business which necessarily and properly redound to the credit of the minister, however much the qualities to which it is immediately owing may be those of his subordinates.
Although the initial entry into government jobs is determined through competitive exams, it would usually be impractical for subsequent promotions to be decided in the same way. It makes sense that, as is commonly done now, promotions occur through a combination of seniority and selection. Those with routine duties should advance by seniority to the highest level their tasks allow, while individuals entrusted with specific responsibilities that require special abilities should be chosen at the discretion of the office head. This selection process will typically be conducted fairly if the initial appointments are made through open competition, as this ensures that the staff will consist of individuals the office head would not have been acquainted with otherwise. If there are any among them who catch the interest of the chief or his political associates, it will generally be rare and only when those individuals, in addition to their connection, have at least an equal level of genuine merit, as determined by the initial examination. Furthermore, unless there’s a strong incentive to favor certain appointments, there’s usually a compelling reason to choose the most suitable person—someone who provides valuable support to their superior, minimizes their workload, and contributes to building the reputation for effective public management that rightfully reflects on the minister, even if the actual skills responsible for that success lie with their subordinates.
Chapter XV—Of Local Representative Bodies.
It is but a small portion of the public business of a country which can be well done or safely attempted by the central authorities; and even in our own government, the least centralized in Europe, the legislative portion at least of the governing body busies itself far too much with local affairs, employing the supreme power of the State in cutting small knots which there ought to be other and better means of untying. The enormous amount of private business which takes up the time of Parliament and the thoughts of its individual members, distracting them from the proper occupations of the great council of the nation, is felt by all thinkers and observers as a serious evil, and, what is worse, an increasing one.
Only a small part of a country's public affairs can be effectively handled or safely managed by the central authorities. Even in our own government, which is the least centralized in Europe, the legislative branch tends to get overly involved in local issues, using the state's authority to tackle minor problems that should be resolved through better methods. The huge amount of private business that occupies Parliament's time and the attention of its members distracts them from their main responsibilities as the national governing body. This is recognized by all thoughtful people and observers as a significant problem, and even more troubling, one that is growing worse.
It would not be appropriate to the limited design of this treatise to discuss at large the great question, in no way peculiar to representative government, of the proper limits of governmental action. I have said elsewhere [9] what seemed to me most essential respecting the principles by which the extent of that action ought to be determined. But after subtracting from the functions performed by most European governments those which ought not to be undertaken by public authorities at all, there still remains so great and various an aggregate of duties, that, if only on the principle of division of labor, it is indispensable to share them between central and local authorities. Not solely are separate executive officers required for purely local duties (an amount of separation which exists under all governments), but the popular control over those officers can only be advantageously exerted through a separate organ. Their original appointment, the function of watching and checking them, the duty of providing or the discretion of withholding the supplies necessary for their operations, should rest, not with the national Parliament or the national executive, but with the people of the locality. That the people should exercise these functions directly and personally is evidently inadmissable. Administration by the assembled people is a relic of barbarism opposed to the whole spirit of modern life; yet so much has the course of English institutions depended on accident, that this primitive mode of local government remained the general rule in parochial matters up to the present generation; and, having never been legally abolished, probably subsists unaltered in many rural parishes even now. There remains the plan of representative sub-Parliaments for local affairs, and these must henceforth be considered as one of the fundamental institutions of a free government. They exist in England but very incompletely, and with great irregularity and want of system; in some other countries much less popularly governed, their constitution is far more rational. In England there has always been more liberty but worse organization, while in other countries there is better organization but less liberty. It is necessary, then, that, in addition to the national representation, there should be municipal and provisional representations; and the two questions which remain to be resolved are, how the local representative bodies should be constituted, and what should be the extent of their functions.
It wouldn't be fitting for the limited scope of this paper to fully discuss the important issue, which isn't unique to representative government, of the appropriate limits of government action. I've mentioned elsewhere [9] what I believe is most crucial regarding the principles that should determine the extent of that action. However, after removing from the functions of most European governments those that shouldn't be handled by public authorities at all, there still remains a large and diverse set of duties. Based on the principle of division of labor, it's essential to distribute these responsibilities between central and local authorities. Not only are separate executive officials needed for purely local tasks (a degree of separation that exists in all governments), but the public's oversight of these officials can only be effectively exercised through a distinct body. Their initial appointment, the role of monitoring and evaluating them, and the responsibility of providing or withholding the resources necessary for their work should rest, not with the national Parliament or national executive, but with the local people. It’s clear that it’s unacceptable for people to carry out these functions directly and personally. Governance by a gathering of people is an outdated practice that contrasts with the essence of modern life; yet, the evolution of English institutions has been so reliant on chance that this primitive form of local government has remained the norm in community matters up to the present generation. Since it has never been legally abolished, it likely still exists unchanged in many rural parishes even now. The alternative is to establish representative sub-Parliaments for local issues, which must henceforth be regarded as a fundamental aspect of a free government. While they exist in England, they are quite incomplete, irregular, and lacking a systematic approach; in some less popularly governed countries, their structure is much more rational. England has historically enjoyed more freedom but has struggled with organization, while other countries have better organization but less freedom. Therefore, in addition to national representation, there should also be municipal and provisional representations; the two issues that remain to be addressed are how these local representative bodies should be formed and the scope of their responsibilities.
In considering these questions, two points require an equal degree of our attention: how the local business itself can be best done, and how its transaction can be made most instrumental to the nourishment of public spirit and the development of intelligence. In an earlier part of this inquiry I have dwelt in strong language—hardly any language is strong enough to express the strength of my conviction—on the importance of that portion of the operation of free institutions which may be called the public education of the citizens. Now of this operation the local administrative institutions are the chief instrument. Except by the part they may take as jurymen in the administration of justice, the mass of the population have very little opportunity of sharing personally in the conduct of the general affairs of the community. Reading newspapers, and perhaps writing to them, public meetings, and solicitations of different sorts addressed to the political authorities, are the extent of the participation of private citizens in general politics during the interval between one Parliamentary election and another. Though it is impossible to exaggerate the importance of these various liberties, both as securities for freedom and as means of general cultivation, the practice which they give is more in thinking than in action, and in thinking without the responsibilities of action, which with most people amounts to little more than passively receiving the thoughts of some one else. But in the case of local bodies, besides the function of electing, many citizens in turn have the chance of being elected, and many, either by selection or by rotation, fill one or other of the numerous local executive offices. In these positions they have to act for public interests, as well as to think and to speak, and the thinking can not all be done by proxy. It may be added that these local functions, not being in general sought by the higher ranks, carry down the important political education which they are the means of conferring to a much lower grade in society. The mental discipline being thus a more important feature in local concerns than in the general affairs of the state, while there are not such vital interests dependent on the quality of the administration, a greater weight may be given to the former consideration, and the latter admits much more frequently of being postponed to it than in matters of general legislation and the conduct of imperial affairs.
When we think about these questions, two points need our equal attention: how to run the local business effectively and how to make its operations contribute to building public spirit and fostering intelligence. Earlier in this discussion, I emphasized—there's hardly a strong enough way to express how strongly I feel—how crucial the public education of citizens is within free institutions. Local administrative bodies are the main tools for this effort. Apart from serving as jurors in the justice system, most people rarely have the chance to participate directly in the community's broader affairs. Engaging with newspapers, possibly writing to them, attending public meetings, and making various requests to political authorities are the limits of private citizens' involvement in politics between Parliamentary elections. While it’s impossible to overstate the significance of these freedoms both as safeguards for liberty and as means of general development, the practice they offer leans more toward thinking than doing, and thinking without the responsibilities that come with action often leads people to simply absorb ideas from others. However, with local bodies, in addition to voting, many citizens can also be elected, and many either by selection or rotation take on various local executive roles. In these positions, they need to act in the public interest, as well as think and speak, and this thinking cannot all be done through others. It's worth noting that these local roles, often not pursued by those in higher social classes, bring essential political education down to a much broader segment of society. Therefore, the intellectual training is a more significant aspect of local issues than of general state matters, and while the stakes may not be as high for the quality of administration, this allows greater emphasis on local concerns, often deferring broader legislative matters and imperial affairs.
The proper constitution of local representative bodies does not present much difficulty. The principles which apply to it do not differ in any respect from those applicable to the national representation. The same obligation exists, as in the case of the more important function, for making the bodies elective; and the same reasons operate as in that case, but with still greater force, for giving them a widely democratic basis; the dangers being less, and the advantages, in point of popular education and cultivation, in some respects even greater. As the principal duty of the local bodies consists of the imposition and expenditure of local taxation, the electoral franchise should vest in all who contribute to the local rates, to the exclusion of all who do not. I assume that there is no indirect taxation, no octroi duties, or that, if there are, they are supplementary only, those on whom their burden falls being also rated to a direct assessment. The representation of minorities should be provided for in the same manner as in the national Parliament, and there are the same strong reasons for plurality of votes; only there is not so decisive an objection, in the inferior as in the higher body, to making the plural voting depend (as in some of the local elections of our own country) on a mere money qualification; for the honest and frugal dispensation of money forms so much larger a part of the business of the local than of the national body, that there is more justice as well as policy in allowing a greater proportional influence to those who have a larger money interest at stake.
The proper structure of local representative bodies isn't particularly challenging. The principles that apply to them are the same as those for national representation. There’s a similar obligation to make these bodies elective, and the same reasons apply, but with even more emphasis on establishing a broadly democratic foundation; the risks are lower, and the benefits in terms of public education and development are, in some ways, even greater. Since the main responsibility of local bodies involves collecting and spending local taxes, the right to vote should be granted to everyone who contributes to local taxes, excluding those who don’t. I assume there's no indirect taxation, no octroi duties, or that if there are, they only supplement those who are also part of a direct tax assessment. Minority representation should be handled the same way as in the national Parliament, and there are just as strong arguments for having multiple votes; however, there isn't as strong an objection in the local context as there is in national elections against basing multiple voting on simple financial qualifications. This is because responsible and efficient financial management is a much larger part of what local bodies do compared to national ones, making it more just and sensible to give greater influence to those with a larger financial stake.
In the most recently established of our local representative institutions, the Boards of Guardians, the justices of peace of the district sit ex officio along with the elected members, in number limited by law to a third of the whole. In the peculiar constitution of English society, I have no doubt of the beneficial effect of this provision. It secures the presence in these bodies of a more educated class than it would perhaps be practicable to attract thither on any other terms; and while the limitation in number of the ex officio members precludes them from acquiring predominance by mere numerical strength, they, as a virtual representation of another class, having sometimes a different interest from the rest, are a check upon the class interests of the farmers or petty shopkeepers who form the bulk of the elected guardians. A similar commendation can not be given to the constitution of the only provincial boards we possess, the Quarter Sessions, consisting of the justices of peace alone, on whom, over and above their judicial duties, some of the most important parts of the administrative business of the country depend for their performance. The mode of formation of these bodies is most anomalous, they being neither elected, nor, in any proper sense of the term, nominated, but holding their important functions, like the feudal lords to whom they succeeded, virtually by right of their acres; the appointment vested in the crown (or, speaking practically, in one of themselves, the lord lieutenant) being made use of only as a means of excluding any one who it is thought would do discredit to the body, or, now and then, one who is on the wrong side in politics. The institution is the most aristocratic in principle which now remains in England; far more so than the House of Lords, for it grants public money and disposes of important public interests, not in conjunction with a popular assembly, but alone. It is clung to with proportionate tenacity by our aristocratic classes, but is obviously at variance with all the principles which are the foundation of representative government. In a County Board there is not the same justification as in Boards of Guardians for even an admixture of ex officio with elected members, since the business of a county being on a sufficiently large scale to be an object of interest and attraction to country gentlemen, they would have no more difficulty in getting themselves elected to the Board than they have in being returned to Parliament as county members.
In the most recently established local representative institution, the Boards of Guardians, the justices of the peace in the district sit ex officio along with the elected members, with their numbers limited by law to a third of the total. Considering the unique structure of English society, I believe this arrangement is beneficial. It ensures that a more educated class is present in these bodies than might normally be attracted by other means; and while the limit on the number of ex officio members prevents them from overwhelming the group simply through numbers, they serve as a virtual representation of another class, which sometimes has different interests from the majority, thereby serving as a check on the interests of the farmers or small shopkeepers who make up most of the elected guardians. A similar praise cannot be given to the structure of our only provincial boards, the Quarter Sessions, which consist solely of justices of the peace. These justices are responsible for performing some of the most crucial aspects of the country’s administrative business, in addition to their judicial duties. The way these bodies are formed is quite unusual, as they are not elected nor, in the proper sense, nominated; they hold their significant roles almost by right of their land, just like the feudal lords they replaced. The appointment is in the hands of the crown (or, practically, one of their own, the lord lieutenant) and is typically used only to exclude those deemed unfit or occasionally someone on the opposing political side. This institution is the most aristocratic in principle that still exists in England, much more so than the House of Lords, as it allocates public money and manages important public interests without a popular assembly, doing so independently. The aristocratic classes hold onto it tightly, but it clearly contradicts all the principles that form the basis of representative government. In a County Board, there is less justification for mixing ex officio members with elected ones, since the activities of a county are sufficiently large to attract interest from country gentlemen, who would find it just as easy to get elected to the Board as they do to Parliament as county members.
In regard to the proper circumscription of the constituencies which elect the local representative bodies, the principle which, when applied as an exclusive and unbending rule to Parliamentary representation, is inappropriate, namely community of local interests, is here the only just and applicable one. The very object of having a local representation is in order that those who have any interest in common which they do not share with the general body of their countrymen may manage that joint interest by themselves, and the purpose is contradicted if the distribution of the local representation follows any other rule than the grouping of those joint interests. There are local interests peculiar to every town, whether great or small, and common to all its inhabitants; every town, therefore, without distinction of size, ought to have its municipal council. It is equally obvious that every town ought to have but one. The different quarters of the same town have seldom or never any material diversities of local interest; they all require to have the same things done, the same expenses incurred; and, except as to their churches, which it is probably desirable to leave under simply parochial management, the same arrangements may be made to serve for all. Paving, lighting, water supply, drainage, port and market regulations, can not, without great waste and inconvenience, be different for different quarters of the same town. The subdivision of London into six or seven independent districts, each with its separate arrangements for local business (several of them without unity of administration even within themselves), prevents the possibility of consecutive or well-regulated co-operation for common objects, precludes any uniform principle for the discharge of local duties, compels the general government to take things upon itself which would be best left to local authorities if there were any whose authority extended to the entire metropolis, and answers no purpose but to keep up the fantastical trappings of that union of modern jobbing and antiquated foppery, the Corporation of the City of London.
When it comes to defining the boundaries of the areas that elect local representative bodies, the principle of shared local interests, which is usually seen as unsuitable for Parliamentary representation, is actually the only fair and relevant approach here. The main reason for having local representation is so that people who have common interests that don’t align with the broader population can manage those interests themselves. If the distribution of local representation follows any other principle than grouping those shared interests, this purpose is undermined. Every town, regardless of its size, has unique local interests that are relevant to all its residents; therefore, each town should have its own municipal council. It’s also clear that each town should have only one council. Different areas within the same town rarely have significant differences in local interests; they typically need the same services and incur the same expenses. Aside from churches, which probably make sense to manage at the parish level, the same organizational setups can serve all areas. Services like paving, lighting, water supply, drainage, and market regulations cannot be effectively divided among different sections of the same town without causing waste and inconvenience. The division of London into six or seven independent districts, each with its own local business arrangements (and some lacking even internal administration cohesion), hinders effective cooperation for shared goals, eliminates any consistent approach to local responsibilities, forces the general government to take over tasks best left to local authorities if such authorities existed for the whole city, and serves no purpose other than to maintain the outdated trappings of the City of London Corporation’s mix of modern politics and old-fashioned pursuits.
Another equally important principle is, that in each local circumscription there should be but one elective body for all local business, not different bodies for different parts of it. Division of labor does not mean cutting up every business into minute fractions; it means the union of such operations as are fit to be performed by the same persons, and the separation of such as can be better performed by different persons. The executive duties of the locality do indeed require to be divided into departments for the same reason as those of the state—because they are of divers kinds, each requiring knowledge peculiar to itself, and needing, for its due performance, the undivided attention of a specially qualified functionary. But the reasons for subdivision which apply to the execution do not apply to the control. The business of the elective body is not to do the work, but to see that it is properly done, and that nothing necessary is left undone. This function can be fulfilled for all departments by the same superintending body, and by a collective and comprehensive far better than by a minute and microscopic view. It is as absurd in public affairs as it would be in private, that every workman should be looked after by a superintendent to himself. The government of the crown consists of many departments, and there are many ministers to conduct them, but those ministers have not a Parliament apiece to keep them to their duty. The local, like the national Parliament, has for its proper business to consider the interest of the locality as a whole, composed of parts all of which must be adapted to one another, and attended to in the order and ratio of their importance. There is another very weighty reason for uniting the control of all the business of a locality under one body. The greatest imperfection of popular local institutions, and the chief cause of the failure which so often attends them, is the low calibre of the men by whom they are almost always carried on. That these should be of a very miscellaneous character is, indeed, part of the usefulness of the institution; it is that circumstance chiefly which renders it a school of political capacity and general intelligence. But a school supposes teachers as well as scholars: the utility of the instruction greatly depends on its bringing inferior minds into contact with superior, a contact which in the ordinary course of life is altogether exceptional, and the want of which contributes more than any thing else to keep the generality of mankind on one level of contented ignorance. The school, moreover, is worthless, and a school of evil instead of good, if, through the want of due surveillance, and of the presence within itself of a higher order of characters, the action of the body is allowed, as it so often is, to degenerate into an equally unscrupulous and stupid pursuit of the self-interest of its members. Now it is quite hopeless to induce persons of a high class, either socially or intellectually, to take a share of local administration in a corner by piecemeal, as members of a Paving Board or a Drainage Commission. The entire local business of their town is not more than a sufficient object to induce men whose tastes incline them, and whose knowledge qualifies them for national affairs, to become members of a mere local body, and devote to it the time and study which are necessary to render their presence any thing more than a screen for the jobbing of inferior persons, under the shelter of their responsibility. A mere Board of Works, though it comprehend the entire metropolis, is sure to be composed of the same class of persons as the vestries of the London parishes; nor is it practicable, or even desirable, that such should not form the majority; but it is important for every purpose which local bodies are designed to serve, whether it be the enlightened and honest performance of their special duties, or the cultivation of the political intelligence of the nation, that every such body should contain a portion of the very best minds of the locality, who are thus brought into perpetual contact, of the most useful kind, with minds of a lower grade, receiving from them what local or professional knowledge they have to give, and, in return, inspiring them with a portion of their own more enlarged ideas, and higher and more enlightened purposes.
Another important principle is that there should only be one elected body for all local matters within each area, not separate bodies for different aspects. Division of labor doesn't mean splitting every task into tiny parts; it means combining those tasks best performed by the same people while separating those better handled by different individuals. The local executive responsibilities do need to be organized into departments, just like those at the state level, because they vary in nature, each requiring specific knowledge and focused attention from specialized individuals. However, the reasons for breaking down tasks into departments don't apply to oversight. The role of the elected body isn't to do the work but to ensure that it's done correctly and that nothing necessary is overlooked. This responsibility can be managed by a single overseeing body much more effectively as a whole rather than by a detailed, narrow approach. It's as unreasonable in public matters as it would be in private if every worker had to be supervised by their own manager. The crown's government has many departments, each led by various ministers, but those ministers aren't overseen by a separate Parliament each to enforce their duties. Similarly, the local Parliament, like the national one, should focus on the interests of the area as a whole, recognizing that it's made up of interconnected parts that need to be addressed in order of importance. There's another significant reason for centralizing control of all local issues under one body. The biggest flaw in popular local institutions, and the main reason they often fail, is the lack of quality in the individuals managing them. While it's beneficial for these individuals to come from diverse backgrounds, which adds to the institution's value, it’s essential to have both teachers and learners. The effectiveness of learning greatly relies on exposing lesser minds to greater ones, a rare interaction in everyday life that prevents most people from rising above a basic level of ignorance. Furthermore, if the organization lacks proper oversight and elevating characters, it can devolve into a ruthless chase for the self-interest of its members, becoming a negative force instead of a constructive one. It is quite unrealistic to expect high-caliber individuals, either socially or intellectually, to engage in local governance bit by bit, as members of a Paving Board or a Drainage Commission. The entire local business isn't enticing enough to draw those whose skills and knowledge are suited for national issues to join a simple local body and dedicate the time and effort needed to make their involvement anything more than a facade for the less capable individuals to operate under their guise. A simple Board of Works, no matter how large, will likely consist of the same level of individuals as the vestries of London’s parishes; while it's not practical or even desirable for them not to be the majority, it's crucial for local bodies to fulfill their intended purposes—whether that involves honest performance of their specific duties or fostering the political awareness of the nation—that each such body includes some of the best minds from the area. This allows for valuable ongoing engagement between strong and less experienced minds, where the former share local or professional insights while the latter inspire wider perspectives and more enlightened goals.
A mere village has no claim to a municipal representation. By a village I mean a place whose inhabitants are not markedly distinguished by occupation or social relations from those of the rural districts adjoining, and for whose local wants the arrangements made for the surrounding territory will suffice. Such small places have rarely a sufficient public to furnish a tolerable municipal council: if they contain any talent or knowledge applicable to public business, it is apt to be all concentrated in some one man, who thereby becomes the dominator of the place. It is better that such places should be merged in a larger circumscription. The local representation of rural districts will naturally be determined by geographical considerations, with due regard to those sympathies of feeling by which human beings are so much aided to act in concert, and which partly follow historical boundaries, such as those of counties or provinces, and partly community of interest and occupation, as in agriculture, maritime, manufacturing, or mining districts. Different kinds of local business require different areas of representation. The Unions of parishes have been fixed on as the most appropriate basis for the representative bodies which superintend the relief of indigence; while, for the proper regulation of highways, or prisons, or police, a large extent, like that of an average county, is not more than sufficient. In these large districts, therefore, the maxim, that an elective body constituted in any locality should have authority over all the local concerns common to the locality, requires modification from another principle, as well as from the competing consideration of the importance of obtaining for the discharge of the local duties the highest qualifications possible. For example, if it be necessary (as I believe it to be) for the proper administration of the poor-laws that the area of rating should not be more extensive than most of the present Unions, a principle which requires a Board of Guardians for each Union, yet, as a much more highly qualified class of persons is likely to be obtainable for a County Board than those who compose an average Board of Guardians, it may, on that ground, be expedient to reserve for the County Boards some higher descriptions of local business, which might otherwise have been conveniently managed within itself by each separate Union.
A small village should not expect to have its own municipal representation. By village, I mean a place where the people don’t differ much in occupation or social connections from those in the surrounding rural areas, and for which the local needs can be met by the arrangements made for the surrounding territory. These small places usually don’t have enough people to form a decent municipal council: if they have any talent or knowledge relevant to public affairs, it tends to be concentrated in one person, who then becomes the dominant figure in the village. It’s better for these areas to be included in a larger jurisdiction. Local representation in rural areas should naturally be based on geographical factors, while also considering the shared sentiments that help people work together, which often align with historical boundaries, like those of counties or provinces, as well as common interests and occupations, such as in agriculture, maritime activities, manufacturing, or mining areas. Different types of local responsibilities need different areas for representation. Parish Unions have been established as the best basis for the representative bodies that oversee assistance for the needy; meanwhile, proper management of roads, prisons, or police requires a larger area, roughly that of an average county. In these larger districts, therefore, the idea that an elected body in any locality should manage all local matters needs to be adjusted based on another principle and the need to ensure the highest qualifications for carrying out local duties. For instance, if it’s necessary (as I believe) for the effective management of welfare laws that the area of taxation should not be broader than most current Unions—a principle that necessitates a Board of Guardians for each Union—then it might be practical to reserve some higher types of local tasks for County Boards. These may be better executed by a more qualified group than what is typically available for an average Board of Guardians, even if they could have been managed by each individual Union.
Besides the controlling council or local sub-Parliament, local business has its executive department. With respect to this, the same questions arise as with respect to the executive authorities in the state, and they may, for the most part, be answered in the same manner. The principles applicable to all public trusts are in substance the same. In the first place, each executive officer should be single, and singly responsible for the whole of the duty committed to his charge. In the next place, he should be nominated, not elected. It is ridiculous that a surveyor, or a health officer, or even a collector of rates should be appointed by popular suffrage. The popular choice usually depends on interest with a few local leaders, who, as they are not supposed to make the appointment, are not responsible for it; or on an appeal to sympathy, founded on having twelve children, and having been a rate-payer in the parish for thirty years. If, in cases of this description, election by the population is a farce, appointment by the local representative body is little less objectionable. Such bodies have a perpetual tendency to become joint-stock associations for carrying into effect the private jobs of their various members. Appointments should be made on the individual responsibility of the chairman of the body, let him be called mayor, chairman of Quarter Sessions, or by whatever other title. He occupies in the locality a position analogous to that of the prime minister in the state, and under a well organized system the appointment and watching of the local officers would be the most important part of his duty; he himself being appointed by the council from its own number, subject either to annual re-election, or to removal by a vote of the body.
Besides the controlling council or local sub-Parliament, local business has its own executive department. The same questions arise regarding this as with the executive authorities at the state level, and they can mostly be answered in a similar way. The principles that apply to all public trusts are essentially the same. First, each executive officer should be one person, and solely responsible for all the duties assigned to them. Secondly, they should be nominated, not elected. It's absurd for a surveyor, health officer, or even a tax collector to be chosen by popular vote. The public's choice typically relies on the interests of a few local leaders, who, because they aren’t supposed to be making the appointment, aren't held accountable for it; or it relies on emotional appeals, like having twelve kids and being a ratepayer in the area for thirty years. If election by the community in these cases is a joke, then appointment by the local representative body is not much better. Such bodies frequently turn into joint-stock associations for fulfilling the private interests of their members. Appointments should be made at the individual responsibility of the chairman of the body, whether they are called mayor, chairman of Quarter Sessions, or something else. They hold a local position similar to that of a prime minister in the state, and under a well-organized system, appointing and overseeing the local officers would be a key part of their job; they themselves are appointed by the council from its own members, subject to annual re-election or removal by a vote of the body.
From the constitution of the local bodies, I now pass to the equally important and more difficult subject of their proper attributions. This question divides itself into two parts: what should be their duties, and whether they should have full authority within the sphere of those duties, or should be liable to any, and what, interference on the part of the central government.
From the setup of local organizations, I now move on to the equally important and more challenging topic of their appropriate responsibilities. This question breaks down into two parts: what their duties should be, and whether they should have complete authority within those duties, or if they should be subject to any, and what kind of, interference from the central government.
It is obvious, to begin with, that all business purely local—all which concerns only a single locality—should devolve upon the local authorities. The paving, lighting, and cleansing of the streets of a town, and, in ordinary circumstances, the draining of its houses, are of little consequence to any but its inhabitants. The nation at large is interested in them in no other way than that in which it is interested in the private well-being of all its individual citizens. But among the duties classed as local, or performed by local functionaries, there are many which might with equal propriety be termed national, being the share belonging to the locality of some branch of the public administration in the efficiency of which the whole nation is alike interested: the jails, for instance, most of which in this country are under county management; the local police; the local administration of justice, much of which, especially in corporate towns, is performed by officers elected by the locality, and paid from local funds. None of these can be said to be matters of local, as distinguished from national importance. It would not be a matter personally indifferent to the rest of the country if any part of it became a nest of robbers or a focus of demoralization, owing to the maladministration of its police; or if, through the bad regulations of its jail, the punishment which the courts of justice intended to inflict on the criminals confined therein (who might have come from, or committed their offenses in, any other district) might be doubled in intensity or lowered to practical impunity. The points, moreover, which constitute good management of these things are the same every where; there is no good reason why police, or jails, or the administration of justice should be differently managed in one part of the kingdom and in another, while there is great peril that in things so important, and to which the most instructed minds available to the state are not more than adequate, the lower average of capacities which alone can be counted on for the service of the localities might commit errors of such magnitude as to be a serious blot upon the general administration of the country. Security of person and property, and equal justice between individuals, are the first needs of society and the primary ends of government: if these things can be left to any responsibility below the highest, there is nothing except war and treaties which requires a general government at all. Whatever are the best arrangements for securing these primary objects should be made universally obligatory, and, to secure their enforcement, should be placed under central superintendence. It is often useful, and with the institutions of our own country even necessary, from the scarcity, in the localities, of officers representing the general government, that the execution of duties imposed by the central authority should be intrusted to functionaries appointed for local purposes by the locality. But experience is daily forcing upon the public a conviction of the necessity of having at least inspectors appointed by the general government to see that the local officers do their duty. If prisons are under local management, the central government appoints inspectors of prisons, to take care that the rules laid down by Parliament are observed, and to suggest others if the state of the jails shows them to be requisite, as there are inspectors of factories and inspectors of schools, to watch over the observance of the Acts of Parliament relating to the first, and the fulfillment of the conditions on which state assistance is granted to the latter.
It’s clear, to start with, that all business that is purely local—all matters that only affect a single area—should be managed by local authorities. The paving, lighting, and cleaning of a town’s streets, and, under normal conditions, the drainage of its buildings, are mainly concerns for its residents. The broader nation is only interested in them in the same way it concerns itself with the well-being of its individual citizens. However, among the duties categorized as local or carried out by local officials, there are many that could equally be labeled as national, since they involve some aspect of public administration that the entire nation cares about: for example, jails, most of which in this country are managed at the county level; local police; the local judicial system, much of which, especially in city areas, is handled by officers elected by the locality and paid with local funds. None of these can be considered purely local in a way that is separate from national significance. It wouldn’t be irrelevant to the rest of the country if any area turned into a haven for criminals or a center of moral decay due to poorly managed police; or if, because of bad jail regulations, the punishment intended by the courts for criminals held there (who may have come from or committed their crimes in different areas) could either be intensified or become nearly meaningless. Furthermore, the principles that define good management in these areas are consistent everywhere; there’s no valid reason for the police, jails, or judicial administration to be handled differently in one region compared to another. There’s a significant risk that, in areas of such importance—where the most capable individuals the state can provide may not be adequate—the lower average abilities typically available for local service could make mistakes substantial enough to significantly harm the overall administration of the country. Personal safety, property security, and equal justice for individuals are the main needs of society and the primary goals of government: if these responsibilities can be assigned to anyone below the highest level, there’s no reason for a central government except for issues like war and treaties. Whatever the best systems are for achieving these main objectives should be made mandatory across the board, and to ensure they’re properly enforced, they should be overseen by a central authority. It’s often useful, and even necessary in our country’s system due to the lack of local representatives of the central government, for responsibilities assigned by the central authority to be given to officials appointed locally. However, it’s becoming increasingly clear that there’s a need for inspectors appointed by the central government to ensure that local officials fulfill their duties. If prisons are under local control, the central government appoints prison inspectors to ensure that the regulations set by Parliament are followed, and to suggest changes if the conditions of the jails indicate a need, similar to factory inspectors and school inspectors who monitor compliance with the relevant Acts of Parliament concerning both.
But if the administration of justice, police and jails included, is both so universal a concern, and so much a matter of general science, independent of local peculiarities, that it may be, and ought to be, uniformly regulated throughout the country, and its regulation enforced by more trained and skillful hands than those of purely local authorities, there is also business, such as the administration of the poor-laws, sanitary regulation, and others, which, while really interesting to the whole country, can not, consistently with the very purposes of local administration, be managed otherwise than by the localities. In regard to such duties, the question arises how far the local authorities ought to be trusted with discretionary power, free from any superintendence or control of the state.
But if the administration of justice, including police and prisons, is such a widespread concern and a matter of general science, independent of local specifics, it can and should be uniformly regulated across the country, enforced by more trained and skilled professionals than just local authorities. However, there are areas like managing the poor laws, health regulations, and others that, while genuinely important to the entire country, cannot be managed in a way that's consistent with the very goals of local administration without involving the local authorities. In relation to these responsibilities, the question arises of how much discretion local authorities should be given without any oversight or control from the state.
To decide this question, it is essential to consider what is the comparative position of the central and the local authorities as capacity for the work, and security against negligence or abuse. In the first place, the local representative bodies and their officers are almost certain to be of a much lower grade of intelligence and knowledge than Parliament and the national executive. Secondly, besides being themselves of inferior qualifications, they are watched by, and accountable to an inferior public opinion. The public under whose eyes they act, and by whom they are criticized, is both more limited in extent and generally far less enlightened than that which surrounds and admonishes the highest authorities at the capital, while the comparative smallness of the interests involved causes even that inferior public to direct its thoughts to the subject less intently and with less solicitude. Far less interference is exercised by the press and by public discussion, and that which is exercised may with much more impunity be disregarded in the proceedings of local than in those of national authorities. Thus far, the advantage seems wholly on the side of management by the central government; but, when we look more closely, these motives of preference are found to be balanced by others fully as substantial. If the local authorities and public are inferior to the central ones in knowledge of the principles of administration, they have the compensatory advantage of a far more direct interest in the result. A man's neighbors or his landlord may be much cleverer than himself, and not without an indirect interest in his prosperity, but, for all that, his interests will be better attended to in his own keeping than in theirs. It is further to be remembered that, even supposing the central government to administer through its own officers, its officers do not act at the centre, but in the locality; and however inferior the local public may be to the central, it is the local public alone which has any opportunity of watching them, and it is the local opinion alone which either acts directly upon their own conduct, or calls the attention of the government to the points in which they may require correction. It is but in extreme cases that the general opinion of the country is brought to bear at all upon details of local administration, and still more rarely has it the means of deciding upon them with any just appreciation of the case. Now the local opinion necessarily acts far more forcibly upon purely local administrators. They, in the natural course of things, are permanent residents, not expecting to be withdrawn from the place when they cease to exercise authority in it; and their authority itself depends, by supposition, on the will of the local public. I need not dwell on the deficiencies of the central authority in detailed knowledge of local persons and things, and the too great engrossment of its time and thoughts by other concerns to admit of its acquiring the quantity and quality of local knowledge necessary even for deciding on complaints, and enforcing responsibility from so great a number of local agents. In the details of management, therefore, the local bodies will generally have the advantage, but in comprehension of the principles even of purely local management, the superiority of the central government, when rightly constituted, ought to be prodigious, not only by reason of the probably great personal superiority of the individuals composing it, and the multitude of thinkers and writers who are at all times engaged in pressing useful ideas upon their notice, but also because the knowledge and experience of any local authority is but local knowledge and experience, confined to their own part of the country and its modes of management, whereas the central government has the means of knowing all that is to be learned from the united experience of the whole kingdom, with the addition of easy access to that of foreign countries.
To answer this question, we need to look at the relative positions of central and local authorities in terms of their capacity for work and their protection against negligence or abuse. First, local representative bodies and their officers are likely to have much less intelligence and knowledge than Parliament and the national executive. Second, these local officials not only have lower qualifications but are also monitored by and accountable to a less sophisticated public opinion. The public they operate under and who criticizes them is more limited in scope and generally far less informed than the one that surrounds and advises the highest authorities in the capital. The smaller nature of the interests involved means that even this less informed public tends to pay less attention to the issues at hand, resulting in less interference from the press and public discussions. When there is interference, local authorities can usually ignore it with greater ease than national authorities can. Up to this point, it appears that central government management holds all the advantages, but upon closer examination, these preferences are counterbalanced by equally significant factors. While local authorities and the public may lack the central government's knowledge of administrative principles, they benefit from a much more direct interest in the outcome. A person’s neighbors or landlord might be smarter, and even have an indirect interest in that person's success, but ultimately, a person's own interests are better served when managed personally rather than by others. Moreover, it’s important to note that even if the central government oversees operations through its own officers, those officers work in the local areas, not at the center. No matter how superior the central public may be, it’s the local public that can actually observe these officials, and it’s local opinion that directly influences their actions or alerts the government to areas needing correction. Typically, the general opinion of the country only influences local administration in extreme cases, and even then, it rarely has the means to fairly assess the situation. Local opinion, however, has a much stronger impact on local administrators. These administrators are generally permanent residents who don’t expect to leave when they’re no longer in authority, and their power is assumed to depend on the local public's will. I won’t go into detail about the central authority's lack of specific knowledge about local people and issues, or how its attention is often diverted to other matters, preventing it from accumulating the amount and depth of local knowledge needed to address complaints and hold local agents accountable. Therefore, in terms of management details, local bodies typically have the upper hand, but when it comes to understanding the principles of even purely local management, a well-structured central government should have a significant advantage. This is due to the likely greater personal competence of its members, the many thinkers and writers who consistently push useful ideas to their attention, and the fact that a local authority’s knowledge is limited to its specific area and management practices. In contrast, the central government has access to the collective experience of the entire country, along with easy access to lessons from foreign nations.
The practical conclusion from these premises is not difficult to draw. The authority which is most conversant with principles should be supreme over principles, while that which is most competent in details should have the details left to it. The principal business of the central authority should be to give instruction, of the local authority to apply it. Power may be localized, but knowledge, to be most useful, must be centralized; there must be somewhere a focus at which all its scattered rays are collected, that the broken and colored lights which exist elsewhere may find there what is necessary to complete and purify them. To every branch of local administration which affects the general interest there should be a corresponding central organ, either a minister, or some specially appointed functionary under him, even if that functionary does no more than collect information from all quarters, and bring the experience acquired in one locality to the knowledge of another where it is wanted. But there is also something more than this for the central authority to do. It ought to keep open a perpetual communication with the localities—informing itself by their experience, and them by its own; giving advice freely when asked, volunteering it when seen to be required; compelling publicity and recordation of proceedings, and enforcing obedience to every general law which the Legislature has laid down on the subject of local management. That some such laws ought to be laid down few are likely to deny. The localities may be allowed to mismanage their own interests, but not to prejudice those of others, nor violate those principles of justice between one person and another of which it is the duty of the state to maintain the rigid observance. If the local majority attempts to oppress the minority, or one class another, the state is bound to interpose. For example, all local rates ought to be voted exclusively by the local representative body; but that body, though elected solely by rate-payers, may raise its revenues by imposts of such a kind, or assess them in such a manner, as to throw an unjust share of the burden on the poor, the rich, or some particular class of the population: it is the duty, therefore, of the Legislature, while leaving the mere amount of the local taxes to the discretion of the local body, to lay down authoritatively the mode of taxation and rules of assessment which alone the localities shall be permitted to use. Again, in the administration of public charity, the industry and morality of the whole laboring population depends, to a most serious extent, upon adherence to certain fixed principles in awarding relief. Though it belongs essentially to the local functionaries to determine who, according to those principles, is entitled to be relieved, the national Parliament is the proper authority to prescribe the principles themselves; and it would neglect a most important part of its duty if it did not, in a matter of such grave national concern, lay down imperative rules, and make effectual provision that those rules should not be departed from. What power of actual interference with the local administrators it may be necessary to retain, for the due enforcement of the laws, is a question of detail into which it would be useless to enter. The laws themselves will naturally define the penalties, and fix the mode of their enforcement. It may be requisite, to meet extreme cases, that the power of the central authority should extend to dissolving the local representative council or dismissing the local executive, but not to making new appointments or suspending the local institutions. Where Parliament has not interfered, neither ought any branch of the executive to interfere with authority; but as an adviser and critic, an enforcer of the laws, and a denouncer to Parliament or the local constituencies of conduct which it deems condemnable, the functions of the executive are of the greatest possible value.
The practical conclusion from these ideas is easy to see. The authority most knowledgeable about principles should have the ultimate power over those principles, while the authority most skilled in details should handle the details. The main role of the central authority should be to provide guidance, while the local authority's role is to implement it. Power can be localized, but to be most effective, knowledge needs to be centralized; there must be a central point where all the scattered information comes together, so that the various insights available elsewhere can find what's needed to complete and enhance them. Each local administrative branch that impacts the general interest should correspond with a central body, whether it's a minister or a specifically appointed official under them, even if that official's role is just to gather information and share experiences gained in one area with others where it's needed. However, the central authority has more responsibilities. It should maintain constant communication with local areas—learning from their experiences and sharing its own; offering advice when requested, and providing it when necessary; ensuring transparency and documentation of actions, and enforcing compliance with any overall laws established by the Legislature regarding local management. Most would agree that some laws should be established. Local areas may be allowed to manage their own affairs poorly, but they shouldn't harm others or violate principles of fairness, which it’s the state’s responsibility to uphold. If a local majority tries to oppress a minority or one group over another, the state must intervene. For example, all local taxes should be voted on solely by the local governing body; however, that body, while elected only by taxpayers, could impose taxes in such a way that unfairly burdens the poor, the wealthy, or a specific group of people. Therefore, the Legislature's duty is to leave the total local tax amounts to the local governing body but to formally lay out the methods of taxation and assessment rules that localities can use. Furthermore, when it comes to public welfare, the well-being and ethics of the entire working population significantly depends on adhering to specific principles in providing aid. While it's the job of local officials to decide who qualifies for aid based on these principles, it's the national Parliament that should set those principles; it would be neglectful of a vital part of its duty not to establish clear rules and ensure they are followed in such an important matter. The extent of actual intervention needed by the central authority to enforce laws is a detail we don’t need to elaborate on here. The laws will define the penalties and ways to enforce them. In extreme cases, it may be necessary for the central authority to have the ability to dissolve the local governing council or dismiss the local administration, but not to make new appointments or suspend local institutions. Where Parliament hasn’t intervened, no part of the executive should interfere with authority; however, as an advisor and critic, an enforcer of laws, and a whistleblower to Parliament or local constituencies about conduct it finds unacceptable, the executive plays an incredibly valuable role.
Some may think that, however much the central authority surpasses the local in knowledge of the principles of administration, the great object which has been so much insisted on, the social and political education of the citizens, requires that they should be left to manage these matters by their own, however imperfect lights. To this it might be answered that the education of the citizens is not the only thing to be considered; government and administration do not exist for that alone, great as its importance is. But the objection shows a very imperfect understanding of the function of popular institutions as a means of political instruction. It is but a poor education that associates ignorance with ignorance, and leaves them, if they care for knowledge, to grope their way to it without help, and to do without it if they do not. What is wanted is the means of making ignorance aware of itself, and able to profit by knowledge; accustoming minds which know only routine to act upon, and feel the value of principles; teaching them to compare different modes of action, and learn, by the use of their reason, to distinguish the best. When we desire to have a good school, we do not eliminate the teacher. The old remark, "As the schoolmaster is, so will be the school," is as true of the indirect schooling of grown people by public business as of the schooling of youth in academies and colleges. A government which attempts to do every thing is aptly compared by M. Charles de Rémusat to a schoolmaster who does all the pupils' tasks for them; he may be very popular with the pupils, but he will teach them little. A government, on the other hand, which neither does any thing itself that can possibly be done by any one else, nor shows any one else how to do any thing, is like a school in which there is no schoolmaster, but only pupil-teachers who have never themselves been taught.
Some might believe that, regardless of how much the central authority knows about administration, the crucial goal of social and political education for citizens requires that they be allowed to handle these issues on their own, even if their understanding is limited. In response, it can be pointed out that citizen education is not the only aspect to consider; government and administration exist for more than just that, as important as it is. However, this objection reflects a flawed understanding of how popular institutions serve as tools for political education. It's ineffective to have ignorance paired with ignorance, leaving individuals to figure things out alone if they seek knowledge, and without it if they don't. What is needed is a way to make ignorance recognize itself and benefit from knowledge; training minds accustomed only to routine to act on and appreciate the value of principles; teaching them to compare different approaches and use reasoning to identify the best option. When we aim for a quality school, we don't remove the teacher. The saying, "As the schoolmaster is, so will be the school," applies just as much to the indirect education of adults through public affairs as it does to the education of youth in schools and universities. A government that tries to do everything can be likened by M. Charles de Rémusat to a teacher who completes all the students' assignments; while this may make him popular among the students, he will teach them little. Conversely, a government that neither does anything itself that someone else could do nor guides anyone on how to do anything is similar to a school without a teacher, only having student-teachers who have never actually been taught.
Chapter XVI—Of Nationality, as connected with Representative Government.
A portion of mankind may be said to constitute a nationality if they are united among themselves by common sympathies which do not exist between them and any others—which make them co-operate with each other more willingly than with other people, desire to be under the same government, and desire that it should be government by themselves, or a portion of themselves, exclusively. This feeling of nationality may have been generated by various causes. Sometimes it is the effect of identity of race and descent. Community of language and community of religion greatly contribute to it. Geographical limits are one of its causes. But the strongest of all is identity of political antecedents; the possession of a national history, and consequent community of recollections; collective pride and humiliation, pleasure and regret, connected with the same incidents in the past. None of these circumstances, however, are either indispensable or necessarily sufficient by themselves. Switzerland has a strong sentiment of nationality, though the cantons are of different races, different languages, and different religions. Sicily has hitherto felt itself quite distinct in nationality from Naples, notwithstanding identity of religion, almost identity of language, and a considerable amount of common historical antecedents. The Flemish and the Walloon provinces of Belgium, notwithstanding diversity of race and language, have a much greater feeling of common nationality than the former have with Holland, or the latter with France. Yet in general the national feeling is proportionally weakened by the failure of any of the causes which contribute to it. Identity of language, literature, and, to some extent, of race and recollections, have maintained the feeling of nationality in considerable strength among the different portions of the German name, though they have at no time been really united under the same government; but the feeling has never reached to making the separate states desire to get rid of their autonomy. Among Italians, an identity far from complete of language and literature, combined with a geographical position which separates them by a distinct line from other countries, and, perhaps more than every thing else, the possession of a common name, which makes them all glory in the past achievements in arts, arms, politics, religious primacy, science, and literature, of any who share the same designation, give rise to an amount of national feeling in the population which, though still imperfect, has been sufficient to produce the great events now passing before us, notwithstanding a great mixture of races, and although they have never, in either ancient or modern history, been under the same government, except while that government extended or was extending itself over the greater part of the known world.
A group of people can be considered a nationality if they are connected by shared feelings that don't exist with others. This connection leads them to work together more willingly than with others, want to be governed together, and wish for that government to be led by themselves or some of their own people exclusively. The sense of nationality can arise from various factors. Often, it stems from shared race and ancestry. Common language and religion also play significant roles. Geographic boundaries contribute to this feeling. However, the strongest factor is having a shared political history; a collective memory tied to national events that produces shared pride and shame, joy and sorrow linked to similar experiences in the past. Nevertheless, none of these factors are essential or sufficient on their own. Switzerland has a strong sense of nationality, even though its cantons are made up of different races, languages, and religions. Sicily has historically considered itself separate in nationality from Naples, despite shared religion, nearly identical language, and considerable common historical ties. The Flemish and Walloon provinces of Belgium, despite their differences in race and language, have a much stronger sense of shared nationality than either has with Holland or France. Generally, the feeling of nationalism diminishes when any contributing factor is lacking. Shared language, literature, and to some degree, race and memories have kept the sense of nationality alive among different groups in Germany, even though they have never truly been united under one government; yet, this sentiment has never led these states to seek to lose their autonomy. For Italians, a somewhat incomplete shared language and literature, combined with geography that distinctly separates them from other countries, and perhaps more than anything else, a common identity that allows them to take pride in past achievements in arts, military, politics, religious leadership, science, and literature, fosters a sense of national identity that, while still imperfect, has been strong enough to spark significant events happening around us today, despite a blend of races and never having been governed collectively in either ancient or modern history, except during periods when that government was expansive over much of the known world.
Where the sentiment of nationality exists in any force, there is a primâ facie case for uniting all the members of the nationality under the same government, and a government to themselves apart. This is merely saying that the question of government ought to be decided by the governed. One hardly knows what any division of the human race should be free to do if not to determine with which of the various collective bodies of human beings they choose to associate themselves. But, when a people are ripe for free institutions, there is a still more vital consideration. Free institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of different nationalities. Among a people without fellow-feeling, especially if they read and speak different languages, the united public opinion necessary to the working of representative government can not exist. The influences which form opinions and decide political acts are different in the different sections of the country. An altogether different set of leaders have the confidence of one part of the country and of another. The same books, newspapers, pamphlets, speeches, do not reach them. One section does not know what opinions or what instigations are circulating in another. The same incidents, the same acts, the same system of government, affect them in different ways, and each fears more injury to itself from the other nationalities than from the common arbiter, the state. Their mutual antipathies are generally much stronger than jealousy of the government. That any one of them feels aggrieved by the policy of the common ruler is sufficient to determine another to support that policy. Even if all are aggrieved, none feel that they can rely on the others for fidelity in a joint resistance; the strength of none is sufficient to resist alone, and each may reasonably think that it consults its own advantage most by bidding for the favor of the government against the rest. Above all, the grand and only reliable security in the last resort against the despotism of the government is in that case wanting—the sympathy of the army with the people. The military are the part of every community in whom, from the nature of the case, the distinction between their fellow-countrymen and foreigners is the deepest and strongest. To the rest of the people foreigners are merely strangers; to the soldier, they are men against whom he may be called, at a week's notice, to fight for life or death. The difference to him is that between friends and enemies—we may almost say between fellow-men and another kind of animals; for, as respects the enemy, the only law is that of force, and the only mitigation the same as in the case of other animals—that of simple humanity. Soldiers to whose feelings half or three fourths of the subjects of the same government are foreigners will have no more scruple in mowing them down, and no more desire to ask the reason why, than they would have in doing the same thing against declared enemies. An army composed of various nationalities has no other patriotism than devotion to the flag. Such armies have been the executioners of liberty through the whole duration of modern history. The sole bond which holds them together is their officers and the government which they serve, and their only idea, if they have any, of public duty, is obedience to orders. A government thus supported, by keeping its Hungarian regiments in Italy and its Italian in Hungary, can long continue to rule in both places with the iron rod of foreign conquerors.
Where there is strong sentiment for nationality, there’s a clear case for uniting all members of that nationality under the same government, independent from others. This simply means that the question of governance should be determined by those being governed. It’s hard to understand what division among humanity should have the freedom to do if not to choose which groups of people they want to associate with. However, when a population is ready for free institutions, there’s an even more crucial factor to consider. Free institutions are nearly impossible in a country made up of different nationalities. Among people who lack a sense of community, especially if they speak different languages, the united public opinion necessary for representative government cannot exist. The influences that shape opinions and dictate political actions vary across different regions of the country. Different sets of leaders gain the trust of different areas. The same books, newspapers, pamphlets, and speeches do not reach everyone. One region often has no idea what opinions or provocations are circulating in another. The same events, actions, and government systems impact them differently, and each fears greater harm from other nationalities than from the state as a whole. Their mutual dislikes are usually much stronger than any jealousy towards the government. If one group feels wronged by the policies of the common ruler, that’s enough to motivate another group to support those policies. Even if everyone feels wronged, no one believes they can count on the others for loyalty in a joint resistance; no single group is strong enough to resist alone, and each may think it’s best to seek favor from the government against the others. Most importantly, the key and reliable safeguard against government tyranny is lacking in this case—the army's sympathy with the people. The military represents the part of society where, by nature, the distinction between fellow citizens and foreigners is the strongest. For everyone else, foreigners are just strangers; for the soldier, they are people he may be ordered to fight against at a moment’s notice. The difference for him is between friends and enemies—we might even say between fellow humans and a different kind of being; because for enemies, the only rule is force, and the only moderation is the same as for other creatures—that of basic humanity. Soldiers who see half or three-quarters of their fellow subjects as foreigners will not hesitate to attack them any more than they would against declared enemies. An army made up of various nationalities has no other patriotism than loyalty to the flag. Such armies have historically been the oppressors of freedom throughout modern history. The only bond that holds them together is their leaders and the government they serve, and their only understanding of public duty, if they even have one, is to follow orders. A government supported in this way, by keeping its Hungarian regiments in Italy and its Italian regiments in Hungary, can continue to rule both places with the harsh control of foreign conquerors.
If it be said that so broadly-marked a distinction between what is due to a fellow-countryman and what is due merely to a human creature is more worthy of savages than of civilized beings, and ought, with the utmost energy, to be contended against, no one holds that opinion more strongly than myself. But this object, one of the worthiest to which human endeavour can be directed, can never, in the present state of civilization, be promoted by keeping different nationalities of any thing like equivalent strength under the same government. In a barbarous state of society the case is sometimes different. The government may then be interested in softening the antipathies of the races, that peace may be preserved and the country more easily governed. But when there are either free institutions, or a desire for them, in any of the peoples artificially tied together, the interest of the government lies in an exactly opposite direction. It is then interested in keeping up and envenoming their antipathies, that they may be prevented from coalescing, and it may be enabled to use some of them as tools for the enslavement of others. The Austrian court has now for a whole generation made these tactics its principal means of government, with what fatal success, at the time of the Vienna insurrection and the Hungarian contest the world knows too well. Happily there are now signs that improvement is too far advanced to permit this policy to be any longer successful.
If it’s said that such a clear distinction between what is owed to a fellow countryman and what is owed merely to a human being is more fitting for savages than for civilized people, and that it should be vigorously opposed, no one agrees with that view more strongly than I do. However, this goal, one of the most valuable to which human effort can be directed, can never be achieved in our current state of civilization by keeping different nationalities of even comparable strength under the same government. In a primitive society, the situation can be different. The government may then be motivated to ease the conflicts between races to maintain peace and govern more easily. But when there are free institutions, or a desire for them, among any of the peoples artificially bound together, the government’s interests lie in the exact opposite direction. It becomes interested in inflaming and perpetuating their conflicts to prevent them from uniting, which allows it to use some as tools to oppress others. The Austrian court has now relied on these tactics for an entire generation as its main method of governance, with tragic results, as the world knows all too well from the Vienna uprising and the Hungarian struggle. Fortunately, there are now signs that progress has advanced too far for this policy to continue to succeed.
For the preceding reasons, it is in general a necessary condition of free institutions that the boundaries of governments should coincide in the main with those of nationalities. But several considerations are liable to conflict in practice with this general principle. In the first place, its application is often precluded by geographical hindrances. There are parts even of Europe in which different nationalities are so locally intermingled that it is not practicable for them to be under separate governments. The population of Hungary is composed of Magyars, Slovaks, Croats, Serbs, Roumans, and in some districts Germans, so mixed up as to be incapable of local separation; and there is no course open to them but to make a virtue of necessity, and reconcile themselves to living together under equal rights and laws. Their community of servitude, which dates only from the destruction of Hungarian independence in 1849, seems to be ripening and disposing them for such an equal union. The German colony of East Prussia is cut off from Germany by part of the ancient Poland, and being too weak to maintain separate independence, must, if geographical continuity is to be maintained, be either under a non-German government, or the intervening Polish territory must be under a German one. Another considerable region in which the dominant element of the population is German, the provinces of Courland, Esthonia, and Livonia, is condemned by its local situation to form part of a Slavonian state. In Eastern Germany itself there is a large Slavonic population; Bohemia is principally Slavonic, Silesia and other districts partially so. The most united country in Europe, France, is far from being homogeneous: independently of the fragments of foreign nationalities at its remote extremities, it consists, as language and history prove, of two portions, one occupied almost exclusively by a Gallo-Roman population, while in the other the Frankish, Burgundian, and other Teutonic races form a considerable ingredient.
For the reasons stated above, it's generally necessary for free institutions that the borders of governments align closely with those of nationalities. However, several factors can conflict with this principle in practice. First, geographical challenges often prevent its application. In some parts of Europe, different nationalities are so intertwined that it's impractical for them to have separate governments. The population of Hungary consists of Magyars, Slovaks, Croats, Serbs, Roumans, and in some areas, Germans, all mixed together to the point where local separation isn't possible. They have no choice but to accept living together under equal rights and laws. Their shared experience of oppression, which began with the loss of Hungarian independence in 1849, seems to be bringing them closer to an equal union. The German community in East Prussia is separated from Germany by part of what used to be Poland, and since they are too weak to maintain independence, they must either be governed by a non-German authority to preserve geographical continuity, or the Polish territory in between must fall under German control. Another significant area where the major population is German—Courland, Esthonia, and Livonia—must, due to its location, be part of a Slavic state. In Eastern Germany itself, there is a large Slavic population; Bohemia is primarily Slavic, and Silesia and other areas are partially so. Even the most unified country in Europe, France, is far from homogeneous: aside from the pockets of foreign nationalities at its edges, it is historically and linguistically divided into two main parts, one mostly inhabited by a Gallo-Roman population and the other containing a substantial mix of Frankish, Burgundian, and other Germanic groups.
When proper allowance has been made for geographical exigencies, another more purely moral and social consideration offers itself. Experience proves that it is possible for one nationality to merge and be absorbed in another; and when it was originally an inferior and more backward portion of the human race, the absorption is greatly to its advantage. Nobody can suppose that it is not more beneficial to a Breton, or a Basque of French Navarre, to be brought into the current of the ideas and feelings of a highly civilized and cultivated people—to be a member of the French nationality, admitted on equal terms to all the privileges of French citizenship, sharing the advantages of French protection, and the dignity and prestige of French power—than to sulk on his own rocks, the half-savage relic of past times, revolving in his own little mental orbit, without participation or interest in the general movement of the world. The same remark applies to the Welshman or the Scottish Highlander as members of the British nation.
When proper consideration is given to geographical factors, another moral and social point comes into play. Experience shows that one nationality can merge and be absorbed by another; when the group in question was originally less developed, this absorption is often to their benefit. No one can argue that it isn’t more advantageous for a Breton or a Basque from French Navarre to be integrated into the ideas and emotions of a highly civilized and cultured society—to be part of the French nationality, granted equal access to all the privileges of French citizenship, enjoying the benefits of French protection, and the dignity and prestige of French influence—rather than to isolate themselves on their own rocky shores, a half-savage remnant of the past, stuck in their own small mental universe, detached and uninterested in the broader movements of the world. The same applies to the Welsh or the Scottish Highlander as members of the British nation.
Whatever really tends to the admixture of nationalities, and the blending of their attributes and peculiarities in a common union, is a benefit to the human race. Not by extinguishing types, of which, in these cases, sufficient examples are sure to remain, but by softening their extreme forms, and filling up the intervals between them. The united people, like a crossed breed of animals (but in a still greater degree, because the influences in operation are moral as well as physical), inherits the special aptitudes and excellences of all its progenitors, protected by the admixture from being exaggerated into the neighboring vices. But, to render this admixture possible, there must be peculiar conditions. The combinations of circumstances which occur, and which effect the result, are various.
Anything that promotes the mixing of nationalities and the blending of their traits and characteristics in a shared community is a positive thing for humanity. This doesn't mean eliminating distinct types, of which there will always be plenty of examples, but rather smoothing out their extremes and bridging the gaps between them. A united group of people, much like a hybrid breed of animals (but even more so, since the influences at play are both moral and physical), inherits the unique strengths and qualities of all its ancestors, safeguarded from distortion into neighboring flaws. However, for this mixing to happen, certain specific conditions need to be met. The various combinations of circumstances that lead to this outcome are numerous.
The nationalities brought together under the same government may be about equal in numbers and strength, or they may be very unequal. If unequal, the least numerous of the two may either be the superior in civilization, or the inferior. Supposing it to be superior, it may either, through that superiority, be able to acquire ascendancy over the other, or it may be overcome by brute strength and reduced to subjection. This last is a sheer mischief to the human race, and one which civilized humanity with one accord should rise in arms to prevent. The absorption of Greece by Macedonia was one of the greatest misfortunes which ever happened to the world; that of any of the principal countries of Europe by Russia would be a similar one.
The nationalities combined under the same government might be roughly equal in numbers and strength, or they might be very unequal. If they are unequal, the smaller group may be either more advanced in civilization or less so. If the smaller group is more advanced, it might be able to assert dominance over the other due to that superiority, or it could be overpowered by sheer force and pushed into submission. The latter is a real harm to humanity, and civilized societies should unite to prevent it. The takeover of Greece by Macedonia was one of the greatest tragedies the world has faced; the annexation of any major European country by Russia would be just as disastrous.
If the smaller nationality, supposed to be the more advanced in improvement, is able to overcome the greater, as the Macedonians, re-enforced by the Greeks, did Asia, and the English India, there is often a gain to civilization, but the conquerors and the conquered can not in this case live together under the same free institutions. The absorption of the conquerors in the less advanced people would be an evil: these must be governed as subjects, and the state of things is either a benefit or a misfortune, according as the subjugated people have or have not reached the state in which it is an injury not to be under a free government, and according as the conquerors do or do not use their superiority in a manner calculated to fit the conquered for a higher stage of improvement. This topic will be particularly treated of in a subsequent chapter.
If a smaller nation, believed to be more advanced, can defeat a larger one, like the Macedonians with the help of the Greeks against Asia, and the English in India, it often benefits civilization. However, the conquerors and the conquered can't live together under the same free institutions. It would be a problem if the conquerors were absorbed by the less advanced people; instead, they must be governed as subjects. Whether this situation becomes a benefit or a misfortune depends on whether the subjugated people are in a state where not having a free government is damaging, and on whether the conquerors use their superiority to prepare the conquered for a higher level of advancement. This topic will be discussed in detail in a later chapter.
When the nationality which succeeds in overpowering the other is both the most numerous and the most improved, and especially if the subdued nationality is small, and has no hope of reasserting its independence, then, if it is governed with any tolerable justice, and if the members of the more powerful nationality are not made odious by being invested with exclusive privileges, the smaller nationality is gradually reconciled to its position, and becomes amalgamated with the larger. No Bas-Breton, nor even any Alsatian, has the smallest wish at the present day to be separated from France. If all Irishmen have not yet arrived at the same disposition towards England, it is partly because they are sufficiently numerous to be capable of constituting a respectable nationality by themselves, but principally because, until of late years, they had been so atrociously governed that all their best feelings combined with their bad ones in rousing bitter resentment against the Saxon rule. This disgrace to England and calamity to the whole empire has, it may be truly said, completely ceased for nearly a generation. No Irishman is now less free than an Anglo-Saxon, nor has a less share of every benefit either to his country or to his individual fortunes than if he were sprung from any other portion of the British dominions. The only remaining real grievance of Ireland, that of the State Church, is one which half, or nearly half the people of the larger island have in common with them. There is now next to nothing, except the memory of the past, and the difference in the predominant religion, to keep apart two races perhaps the most fitted of any two in the world to be the completing counterpart of one another. The consciousness of being at last treated not only with equal justice, but with equal consideration, is making such rapid way in the Irish nation as to be wearing off all feelings that could make them insensible to the benefits which the less numerous and less wealthy people must necessarily derive from being fellow-citizens instead of foreigners to those who are not only their nearest neighbors, but the wealthiest, and one of the freest, as well as most civilized and powerful nations of the earth.
When a nationality manages to overpower another and is both the most populous and the most advanced, especially if the defeated nationality is small and has no hope of regaining its independence, then, if governed with fair justice and if the members of the dominant nationality are not made disliked by having exclusive privileges, the smaller nationality gradually accepts its position and blends in with the larger one. Today, no Bas-Breton or even Alsatian wants to separate from France. If not all Irish people feel the same way about England yet, it's partly because they are numerous enough to form a respectable nationality on their own, but mainly because, until recently, they were so poorly governed that their best feelings mixed with their worst ones to stir up deep resentment against British rule. This disgrace to England and misfortune to the entire empire has, it can be honestly said, mostly ended for nearly a generation. No Irish person is now less free than an Anglo-Saxon or has any fewer benefits from their country or personal fortunes than someone from any other part of the British Isles. The only significant remaining grievance for Ireland, the issue with the State Church, is one that about half, or nearly half, of the people on the larger island share with them. There’s now next to nothing, except for memories of the past and the difference in their main religion, keeping apart two groups that are perhaps among the most compatible in the world. The awareness of finally being treated not just with equal justice but with equal respect is spreading quickly throughout the Irish nation, diminishing any feelings that could make them indifferent to the benefits that the less numerous and less wealthy people should naturally gain from being fellow citizens rather than foreigners to those who are not only their closest neighbors but also the wealthiest and one of the freest, most civilized, and powerful nations on earth.
The cases in which the greatest practical obstacles exist to the blending of nationalities are when the nationalities which have been bound together are nearly equal in numbers and in the other elements of power. In such cases, each, confiding in its strength, and feeling itself capable of maintaining an equal struggle with any of the others, is unwilling to be merged in it; each cultivates with party obstinacy its distinctive peculiarities; obsolete customs, and even declining languages, are revived, to deepen the separation; each deems itself tyrannized over if any authority is exercised within itself by functionaries of a rival race; and whatever is given to one of the conflicting nationalities is considered to be taken from all the rest. When nations thus divided are under a despotic government which is a stranger to all of them, or which, though sprung from one, yet feeling greater interest in its own power than in any sympathies of nationality, assigns no privilege to either nation, and chooses its instruments indifferently from all, in the course of a few generations identity of situation often produces harmony of feeling, and the different races come to feel towards each other as fellow-countrymen, particularly if they are dispersed over the same tract of country. But if the era of aspiration to free government arrives before this fusion has been effected, the opportunity has gone by for effecting it. From that time, if the unreconciled nationalities are geographically separate, and especially if their local position is such that there is no natural fitness or convenience in their being under the same government (as in the case of an Italian province under a French or German yoke), there is not only an obvious propriety, but, if either freedom or concord is cared for, a necessity for breaking the connection altogether. There may be cases in which the provinces, after separation, might usefully remain united by a federal tie; but it generally happens that if they are willing to forego complete independence, and become members of a federation, each of them has other neighbors with whom it would prefer to connect itself, having more sympathies in common, if not also greater community of interest.
The biggest practical challenges to blending different nationalities happen when those nationalities are nearly equal in numbers and other power elements. In these situations, each group, confident in its strength and believing it can hold its own against the others, is reluctant to merge. Each group stubbornly maintains its unique traits; outdated customs and even declining languages are revived to strengthen the division. Each group feels oppressed if any authority is exercised within it by officials from a competing race, and whatever benefits one group receives are seen as coming at the expense of the others. When such divided nations are ruled by a despotic government that doesn't favor any of them, or one that, while originating from one nationality, prioritizes its power over any national sympathies and treats all groups equally, over a few generations, shared circumstances often lead to a sense of unity, and the different races begin to feel like fellow countrymen, especially if they share the same territory. However, if the desire for self-governance emerges before this unity is achieved, the opportunity for it is lost. At that point, if the divided nationalities are geographically separated, especially if their locations make it impractical for them to be governed together (like an Italian province under French or German control), there's not only an obvious case for separation, but, if either freedom or harmony is valued, a necessity for ending the connection entirely. There may be instances where the provinces could remain helpfully united through a federal arrangement after separation; however, it often occurs that if they are willing to give up complete independence to join a federation, each one prefers to align with neighboring groups with which it shares more common sympathies and interests.
Chapter XVII—Of Federal Representative Governments.
Portions of mankind who are not fitted or not disposed to live under the same internal government may often, with advantage, be federally united as to their relations with foreigners, both to prevent wars among themselves, and for the sake of more effectual protection against the aggression of powerful states.
Parts of humanity that aren't suited or willing to live under the same internal government can often benefit from coming together federally in their dealings with others, both to avoid conflicts among themselves and to ensure better protection against the attacks of stronger nations.
To render a federation advisable several conditions are necessary. The first is that there should be a sufficient amount of mutual sympathy among the populations. The federation binds them always to fight on the same side; and if they have such feelings toward one another, or such diversity of feeling toward their neighbors that they would generally prefer to fight on opposite sides, the federal tie is neither likely to be of long duration, nor to be well observed while it subsists. The sympathies available for the purpose are those of race, language, religion, and, above all, of political institutions, as conducing most to a feeling of identity of political interest. When a few free states, separately insufficient for their own defense, are hemmed in on all sides by military or feudal monarchs, who hate and despise freedom even in a neighbor, those states have no chance for preserving liberty and its blessings but by a federal union. The common interest arising from this cause has in Switzerland, for several centuries, been found adequate to maintain efficiently the federal bond, in spite not only of difference of religion when religion was the grand source of irreconcilable political enmity throughout Europe, but also in spite of great weakness in the constitution of the federation itself. In America, where all the conditions for the maintenance of union existed at the highest point, with the sole drawback of difference of institutions in the single but most important article of slavery, this one difference goes so far in alienating from each other's sympathies the two divisions of the Union as to be now actually effecting the disruption of a tie of so much value to them both.
To make a federation advisable, several conditions are necessary. The first is that there should be a sufficient amount of mutual sympathy among the populations. The federation requires them to always fight on the same side; if they have such feelings toward one another, or such differing feelings toward their neighbors that they generally prefer to fight on opposite sides, the federal bond is unlikely to last long or be respected while it does. The sources of sympathy for this purpose are race, language, religion, and, above all, political institutions, as they most contribute to a shared sense of political interest. When a few free states, individually unable to defend themselves, are surrounded by military or feudal monarchs who hate and despise freedom even in their neighbors, those states have no opportunity to preserve liberty and its benefits except through a federal union. The common interest arising from this situation has been shown in Switzerland, for several centuries, to be strong enough to maintain the federal bond, despite differences in religion when religion was a major source of irreconcilable political hostility throughout Europe, and despite significant weaknesses in the federation's constitution itself. In America, where all the conditions for maintaining union existed at their highest level, with the only drawback being differing institutions on the key issue of slavery, this one difference has significantly alienated the sympathies of the two divisions of the Union to the point of actually causing the disruption of a bond that holds great value for both.
A second condition of the stability of a federal government is that the separate states be not so powerful as to be able to rely for protection against foreign encroachment on their individual strength. If they are, they will be apt to think that they do not gain, by union with others, the equivalent of what they sacrifice in their own liberty of action; and consequently, whenever the policy of the confederation, in things reserved to its cognizance, is different from that which any one of its members would separately pursue, the internal and sectional breach will, through absence of sufficient anxiety to preserve the Union, be in danger of going so far as to dissolve it.
A second requirement for a stable federal government is that the individual states shouldn't be so powerful that they can depend on their own strength for protection against foreign threats. If they can, they may feel they aren't benefiting from joining together and are losing their own freedom to act. As a result, whenever the confederation's policies conflict with what any member state would choose to do on its own, the lack of enough concern for maintaining the Union might lead to internal divisions that could threaten to break it apart.
A third condition, not less important than the two others, is that there be not a very marked inequality of strength among the several contracting states. They can not, indeed, be exactly equal in resources; in all federations there will be a gradation of power among the members; some will be more populous, rich, and civilized than others. There is a wide difference in wealth and population between New York and Rhode Island; between Berne, and Zug or Glaris. The essential is, that there should not be any one state so much more powerful than the rest as to be capable of vying in strength with many of them combined. If there be such a one, and only one, it will insist on being master of the joint deliberations; if there be two, they will be irresistible when they agree; and whenever they differ, every thing will be decided by a struggle for ascendancy between the rivals. This cause is alone enough to reduce the German Bund to almost a nullity, independently of its wretched internal constitution. It effects none of the real purposes of a confederation. It has never bestowed on Germany a uniform system of customs, nor so much as a uniform coinage, and has served only to give Austria and Prussia a legal right of pouring in their troops to assist the local sovereigns in keeping their subjects obedient to despotism, while, in regard to external concerns, the Bund would make all Germany a dependency of Prussia if there were no Austria, and of Austria if there were no Prussia; and, in the mean time, each petty prince has little choice but to be a partisan of one or the other, or to intrigue with foreign governments against both.
A third condition, equally important as the other two, is that there shouldn't be a significant imbalance of strength among the various contracting states. They can't be exactly equal in resources; all federations will have a range of power among their members; some will be more populous, wealthy, and advanced than others. There's a notable difference in wealth and population between New York and Rhode Island, and between Berne and Zug or Glaris. The key is that no single state should be so much more powerful than the others that it can compete in strength with many of them combined. If there is such a state, it will demand to dominate the joint discussions; if there are two, they will be unstoppable when they agree, and whenever they disagree, everything will be determined by a power struggle between the two rivals. This alone is enough to render the German Bund nearly ineffective, regardless of its poor internal structure. It fails to achieve any real goals of a confederation. It has never provided Germany with a uniform customs system or even a standardized currency and has only served to give Austria and Prussia the legal right to send their troops to help local rulers keep their subjects submissive to tyranny. Meanwhile, in terms of external matters, the Bund would make all of Germany a dependency of Prussia if there were no Austria, and of Austria if there were no Prussia; in the meantime, each small prince has little choice but to align with one or the other, or to plot with foreign governments against both.
There are two different modes of organizing a federal union. The federal authorities may represent the governments solely, and their acts may be obligatory only on the governments as such, or they may have the power of enacting laws and issuing orders which are binding directly on individual citizens. The former is the plan of the German so-called Confederation, and of the Swiss Constitution previous to 1847. It was tried in America for a few years immediately following the War of Independence. The other principle is that of the existing Constitution of the United States, and has been adopted within the last dozen years by the Swiss Confederacy. The Federal Congress of the American Union is a substantive part of the government of every individual state. Within the limits of its attributions, it makes laws which are obeyed by every citizen individually, executes them through its own officers, and enforces them by its own tribunals. This is the only principle which has been found, or which is ever likely to produce an effective federal government. A union between the governments only is a mere alliance, and subject to all the contingencies which render alliances precarious. If the acts of the President and of Congress were binding solely on the governments of New York, Virginia, or Pennsylvania, and could only be carried into effect through orders issued by those governments to officers appointed by them, under responsibility to their own courts of justice, no mandates of the federal government which were disagreeable to a local majority would ever be executed. Requisitions issued to a government have no other sanction or means of enforcement than war, and a federal army would have to be always in readiness to enforce the decrees of the federation against any recalcitrant state, subject to the probability that other states, sympathizing with the recusant, and perhaps sharing its sentiments on the particular point in dispute, would withhold their contingents, if not send them to fight in the ranks of the disobedient State. Such a federation is more likely to be a cause than a preventive of internal wars; and if such was not its effect in Switzerland until the events of the years immediately preceding 1847, it was only because the federal government felt its weakness so strongly that it hardly ever attempted to exercise any real authority. In America, the experiment of a federation on this principle broke down in the first few years of its existence, happily while the men of enlarged knowledge and acquired ascendancy who founded the independence of the Republic were still alive to guide it through the difficult transition. The "Federalist," a collection of papers by three of these eminent men, written in explanation and defense of the new federal Constitution while still awaiting the national acceptance, is even now the most instructive treatise we possess on federal government. In Germany, the more imperfect kind of federation, as all know, has not even answered the purpose of maintaining an alliance. It has never, in any European war, prevented single members of the confederation from allying themselves with foreign powers against the rest. Yet this is the only federation which seems possible among monarchical states. A king, who holds his power by inheritance, not by delegation, and who can not be deprived of it, nor made responsible to any one for its use, is not likely to renounce having a separate army, or to brook the exercise of sovereign authority over his own subjects, not through him, but directly by another power. To enable two or more countries under kingly government to be joined together in an effectual confederation, it seems necessary that they should all be under the same king. England and Scotland were a federation of this description during the interval of about a century between the union of the crowns and that of the Parliaments. Even this was effective, not through federal institutions, for none existed, but because the regal power in both Constitutions was so nearly absolute as to enable the foreign policy of both to be shaped according to a single will.
There are two ways to set up a federal union. The federal authorities can represent just the governments, making their actions binding only on those governments, or they can have the power to create laws and orders that apply directly to individual citizens. The first approach was used by the German Confederation and the Swiss Constitution before 1847. It was attempted in America for a few years right after the War of Independence. The second approach is what the current Constitution of the United States uses, and it has been adopted in the last twelve years by the Swiss Confederacy. The Federal Congress of the American Union is a key part of the government in each state. Within its powers, it creates laws that every citizen must follow, enforces them through its own officials, and manages them using its own courts. This is the only principle proven to create an effective federal government. A union limited to governments only is simply an alliance, vulnerable to all the uncertainties that make alliances unstable. If the actions of the President and Congress only applied to the governments of New York, Virginia, or Pennsylvania, and could only be enforced through orders from those governments to their own officers, using their own judicial system, no directives from the federal government that locals disagreed with would ever be implemented. Requests made to a government have no real enforcement mechanism apart from military action, meaning a federal army would always need to be prepared to uphold the federation's decisions against any noncompliant state, with the risk that other states might sympathize with the dissenting state and might not provide their support, or even might send their forces to assist the noncompliant state. Such a federation is more likely to cause internal conflicts than to prevent them; and if this wasn't the case in Switzerland until just before 1847, it was mainly because the federal government was very aware of its own weakness and seldom attempted to exert real authority. In America, the attempt at a federation based on this principle failed within the first few years, luckily while the knowledgeable and influential founders of the Republic were still around to navigate the challenging transition. The "Federalist," a collection of essays by three of these prominent figures, written to explain and defend the new federal Constitution while it awaited national approval, is still the most informative work we have on federal government. In Germany, the less effective type of federation has not even succeeded in maintaining a reliable alliance. It has never, in any European war, stopped individual members of the confederation from forming alliances with foreign powers against the others. Yet, this is the only kind of federation that seems feasible among monarchical states. A king, who inherits his power and cannot be removed from it or held accountable for how he uses it, is unlikely to give up having his own army or accept that another power could exercise authority over his subjects without him. To successfully unite two or more countries under monarchical rule in a strong confederation, they all need to be under the same king. England and Scotland were a federation like this for about a century between the union of the crowns and that of the Parliaments. Even this worked not because there were federal institutions—there weren't any—but because the royal powers in both systems were so nearly absolute that they allowed the foreign policies of both to be directed by a single will.
Under the more perfect mode of federation, where every citizen of each particular state owes obedience to two governments, that of his own state and that of the federation, it is evidently necessary not only that the constitutional limits of the authority of each should be precisely and clearly defined, but that the power to decide between them in any case of dispute should not reside in either of the governments, or in any functionary subject to it, but in an umpire independent of both. There must be a Supreme Court of Justice, and a system of subordinate courts in every state of the Union, before whom such questions shall be carried, and whose judgment on them, in the last stage of appeal, shall be final. Every state of the Union, and the federal government itself, as well as every functionary of each, must be liable to be sued in those courts for exceeding their powers, or for non-performance of their federal duties, and must in general be obliged to employ those courts as the instrument for enforcing their federal rights. This involves the remarkable consequence, actually realized in the United States, that a court of justice, the highest federal tribunal, is supreme over the various governments, both state and federal, having the right to declare that any law made, or act done by them, exceeds the powers assigned to them by the federal Constitution, and, in consequence, has no legal validity. It was natural to feel strong doubts, before trial had been made, how such a provision would work; whether the tribunal would have the courage to exercise its constitutional power; if it did, whether it would exercise it wisely, and whether the governments would consent to submit peaceably to its decision. The discussions on the American Constitution, before its final adoption, give evidence that these natural apprehensions were strongly felt; but they are now entirely quieted, since, during the two generations and more which have subsequently elapsed, nothing has occurred to verify them, though there have at times been disputes of considerable acrimony, and which became the badges of parties, respecting the limits of the authority of the federal and state governments. The eminently beneficial working of so singular a provision is probably, as M. de Tocqueville remarks, in a great measure attributable to the peculiarity inherent in a court of justice acting as such—namely, that it does not declare the law eo nomine and in the abstract, but waits until a case between man and man is brought before it judicially, involving the point in dispute; from which arises the happy effect that its declarations are not made in a very early stage of the controversy; that much popular discussion usually precedes them; that the Court decides after hearing the point fully argued on both sides by lawyers of reputation; decides only as much of the question at a time as is required by the case before it, and its decision, instead of being volunteered for political purposes, is drawn from it by the duty which it can not refuse to fulfil, of dispensing justice impartially between adverse litigants. Even these grounds of confidence would not have sufficed to produce the respectful submission with which all authorities have yielded to the decisions of the Supreme Court on the interpretation of the Constitution, were it not that complete reliance has been felt, not only on the intellectual pre-eminence of the judges composing that exalted tribunal, but on their entire superiority over either private or sectional partialities. This reliance has been in the main justified; but there is nothing which more vitally imports the American people than to guard with the most watchful solicitude against every thing which has the remotest tendency to produce deterioration in the quality of this great national institution. The confidence on which depends the stability of federal institutions has been for the first time impaired by the judgment declaring slavery to be of common right, and consequently lawful in the Territories while not yet constituted as states, even against the will of a majority of their inhabitants. The main pillar of the American Constitution is scarcely strong enough to bear many more such shocks.
Under a more effective system of federalism, where every citizen of each state follows the rules of two governments—his own state government and the federal government—it’s clear that not only should the constitutional limits of each authority be explicitly defined, but also that the power to resolve disputes between them shouldn’t lie with either government or any official connected to it, but with an independent arbiter. There has to be a Supreme Court of Justice and a system of lower courts in every state of the Union to address these questions, whose final decisions must be binding. Every state in the Union and the federal government, along with every official of each, must be able to be sued in those courts for overstepping their authority or failing to fulfill their federal responsibilities, and must generally use those courts to enforce their federal rights. This leads to the notable consequence, which is realized in the United States, that a court of law, the highest federal court, is supreme over both state and federal governments and has the authority to declare that any law or action taken by them exceeds the powers granted by the federal Constitution, and thus is not legally valid. It was natural to have strong doubts before it was tested about how this arrangement would function; whether the court would have the courage to use its constitutional power; and if it did, whether it would do so wisely, and whether the governments would peacefully accept its decisions. The debates over the American Constitution, prior to its final approval, show that these concerns were significant; but those worries have largely faded since, in the more than two generations that have followed, nothing has happened to confirm them, even though there have been times of intense disputes that became defining issues for parties regarding the powers of federal and state governments. The notably positive functioning of such a unique provision is probably, as M. de Tocqueville points out, largely due to the nature of a court of justice acting in its role—namely, that it doesn’t declare the law explicitly and in the abstract but waits for a specific case involving real parties to be brought before it; this results in the beneficial effect that its declarations are not made too early in the dispute; that there is usually considerable public discussion before them; that the Court decides only after fully hearing arguments from respected attorneys on both sides; that it decides only as much of the issue as is necessary for the case at hand, and its decisions, instead of being made for political reasons, arise from the obligation it cannot refuse to fulfill, which is to administer justice fairly between opposing parties. Even these reasons for confidence wouldn't be enough to ensure the respect with which all authorities have accepted the decisions of the Supreme Court regarding the interpretation of the Constitution if there wasn’t also complete trust in both the intellectual brilliance of the judges on that esteemed court and their total lack of bias towards private or sectional interests. This trust has mostly been justified; however, nothing is more crucial for the American people than to vigilantly protect against anything that could lead to a decline in the quality of this important national institution. The confidence that underpins the stability of federal institutions has been compromised for the first time by the ruling that declared slavery to be a common right and therefore legal in the Territories that are not yet states, even against the wishes of the majority of their residents. The main support of the American Constitution is barely strong enough to withstand many more such shocks.
The tribunals which act as umpires between the federal and the state governments naturally also decide all disputes between two states, or between a citizen of one state and the government of another. The usual remedies between nations, war and diplomacy, being precluded by the federal union, it is necessary that a judicial remedy should supply their place. The Supreme Court of the federation dispenses international law, and is the first great example of what is now one of the most prominent wants of civilized society, a real international tribunal.
The courts that serve as referees between the federal and state governments also resolve any disputes between two states or between a citizen of one state and the government of another. Since the typical ways nations resolve conflicts, like war and diplomacy, are not options due to the federal union, it's essential to have a legal remedy to take their place. The Supreme Court of the federation applies international law and is the first significant example of what is now one of the most necessary elements of modern society: a genuine international tribunal.
The powers of a federal government naturally extend not only to peace and war, and all questions which arise between the country and foreign governments, but to making any other arrangements which are, in the opinion of the states, necessary to their enjoyment of the full benefits of union. For example, it is a great advantage to them that their mutual commerce should be free, without the impediment of frontier duties and custom-houses. But this internal freedom can not exist if each state has the power of fixing the duties on interchange of commodities between itself and foreign countries, since every foreign product let in by one state would be let into all the rest; and hence all custom duties and trade regulations in the United States are made or repealed by the federal government exclusively. Again, it is a great convenience to the states to have but one coinage, and but one system of weights and measures, which can only be insured if the regulation of these matters is intrusted to the federal government. The certainty and celerity of post-office communication is impeded, and its expense increased, if a letter has to pass through half a dozen sets of public offices, subject to different supreme authorities: it is convenient, therefore, that all post-offices should be under the federal government; but on such questions the feelings of different communities are liable to be different. One of the American states, under the guidance of a man who has displayed powers as a speculative political thinker superior to any who has appeared in American politics since the authors of the "Federalist," [10] claimed a veto for each state on the custom laws of the federal Congress; and that statesman, in a posthumous work of great ability, which has been printed and widely circulated by the Legislature of South Carolina, vindicated this pretension on the general principle of limiting the tyranny of the majority, and protecting minorities by admitting them to a substantial participation in political power. One of the most disputed topics in American politics during the early part of this century was whether the power of the federal government ought to extend, and whether by the Constitution it did extend, to making roads and canals at the cost of the Union. It is only in transactions with foreign powers that the authority of the federal government is of necessity complete. On every other subject the question depends on how closely the people in general wish to draw the federal tie; what portion of their local freedom of action they are willing to surrender, in order to enjoy more fully the benefit of being one nation.
The powers of the federal government naturally cover not just issues of peace and war, and all matters that come up between the country and foreign governments, but also involve creating any other agreements that the states feel are necessary for them to fully enjoy the benefits of union. For example, it is a significant advantage for them that their mutual trade is free, without the burden of border duties and customs offices. However, this internal freedom can't exist if each state can set duties on the exchange of goods between itself and foreign countries, since any foreign product allowed in by one state would also be allowed in by all the others; therefore, all customs duties and trade regulations in the United States are solely determined by the federal government. Additionally, it is very convenient for the states to have a single currency and a uniform system of weights and measures, which can only be guaranteed if these matters are managed by the federal government. The reliability and speed of postal communication suffer, and costs increase, if a letter has to go through multiple sets of public offices, each governed by different authorities: it is therefore practical for all post offices to be under the federal government; however, opinions on these issues can differ among various communities. One of the American states, guided by a man recognized for his exceptional abilities as a political thinker since the authors of the "Federalist," [10] claimed that each state should have a veto on the customs laws of the federal Congress; this statesman, in a posthumous work of great merit, which has been published and widely disseminated by the Legislature of South Carolina, defended this claim on the general principle of limiting the tyranny of the majority and protecting minorities by granting them a meaningful role in political power. One of the most debated topics in American politics during the early years of this century was whether the federal government should have the power to build roads and canals at the expense of the Union, and whether the Constitution granted it that power. The federal government's authority is only definitively complete in dealings with foreign powers. In every other area, the question hinges on how closely the public wishes to maintain the federal connection, and what part of their local freedom they are willing to give up in order to fully benefit from being one nation.
Respecting the fitting constitution of a federal government within itself, much need not be said. It of course consists of a legislative branch and an executive, and the constitution of each is amenable to the same principles as that of representative governments generally. As regards the mode of adapting these general principles to a federal government, the provision of the American Constitution seems exceedingly judicious, that Congress should consist of two houses, and that while one of them is constituted according to population, each state being entitled to representatives in the ratio of the number of its inhabitants, the other should represent not the citizens, but the state governments, and every state, whether large or small, should be represented in it by the same number of members. This provision precludes any undue power from being exercised by the more powerful states over the rest, and guarantees the reserved rights of the state governments by making it impossible, as far as the mode of representation can prevent, that any measure should pass Congress unless approved not only by a majority of the citizens, but by a majority of the states. I have before adverted to the further incidental advantage obtained of raising the standard of qualifications in one of the houses. Being nominated by select bodies, the Legislatures of the various states, whose choice, for reasons already indicated, is more likely to fall on eminent men than any popular election—who have not only the power of electing such, but a strong motive to do so, because the influence of their state in the general deliberations must be materially affected by the personal weight and abilities of its representatives—the Senate of the United States, thus chosen, has always contained nearly all the political men of established and high reputation in the Union; while the Lower House of Congress has, in the opinion of competent observers, been generally as remarkable for the absence of conspicuous personal merit, as the Upper House for its presence.
When it comes to the proper structure of a federal government, not much needs to be said. It obviously includes a legislative branch and an executive, and the structure of each follows the same principles as representative governments in general. Regarding how to apply these general principles to a federal government, the provision in the American Constitution is quite sensible: Congress should have two houses. One house is based on population, with each state getting representatives according to their population size, while the other house represents the state governments, ensuring that every state, no matter how big or small, has the same number of representatives. This setup prevents more powerful states from dominating the others and protects the reserved rights of state governments by making it unlikely, as far as representation goes, that any measure can pass Congress without being approved by both a majority of citizens and a majority of states. I previously mentioned the added benefit of raising the qualification standards in one of the houses. Since members are nominated by select bodies, the legislatures of the various states are more likely to choose distinguished individuals than through any popular vote—these bodies have not just the power to elect such individuals, but a strong incentive to do so, as the influence of their state in discussions depends significantly on the reputation and skills of its representatives. Consequently, the Senate of the United States, chosen this way, has consistently included nearly all of the notable political figures with established reputations in the country, while the Lower House of Congress has, according to informed observers, often been characterized by a lack of notable personal merit compared to the Upper House.
When the conditions exist for the formation of efficient and durable federal unions, the multiplication of them is always a benefit to the world. It has the same salutary effect as any other extension of the practice of co-operation, through which the weak, by uniting, can meet on equal terms with the strong. By diminishing the number of those petty states which are not equal to their own defense, it weakens the temptations to an aggressive policy, whether working directly by arms, or through the prestige of superior power. It of course puts an end to war and diplomatic quarrels, and usually also to restrictions on commerce, between the states composing the Union; while, in reference to neighboring nations, the increased military strength conferred by it is of a kind to be almost exclusively available for defensive, scarcely at all for aggressive purposes. A federal government has not a sufficiently concentrated authority to conduct with much efficiency any war but one of self-defense, in which it can rely on the voluntary co-operation of every citizen; nor is there any thing very flattering to national vanity or ambition in acquiring, by a successful war, not subjects, nor even fellow-citizens, but only new, and perhaps troublesome independent members of the confederation. The warlike proceedings of the Americans in Mexico was purely exceptional, having been carried on principally by volunteers, under the influence of the migratory propensity which prompts individual Americans to possess themselves of unoccupied land, and stimulated, if by any public motive, not by that of national aggrandizement, but by the purely sectional purpose of extending slavery. There are few signs in the proceedings of Americans, nationally or individually, that the desire of territorial acquisition for their country as such has any considerable power over them. Their hankering after Cuba is, in the same manner, merely sectional, and the Northern States, those opposed to slavery, have never in any way favored it.
When the right conditions are in place for creating effective and lasting federal unions, increasing their number is always good for the world. It has the same positive impact as any other form of cooperation, allowing the weak to come together and stand on equal ground with the strong. By reducing the number of small states that can’t defend themselves, it lessens the temptation for aggressive actions, whether through military force or the perceived power of superiority. It naturally puts an end to wars and diplomatic disputes, and usually lifts trade restrictions among the states within the Union; regarding neighboring nations, the extra military strength it provides is mostly used for defense, hardly ever for offensive reasons. A federal government doesn’t have enough centralized power to effectively engage in any war except for self-defense, where it can count on the voluntary support of its citizens; moreover, there’s not much that flatters national pride or ambition in winning a war that gains not subjects or fellow citizens, but merely new and potentially troublesome independent members of the confederation. The American military actions in Mexico were quite exceptional, mainly carried out by volunteers influenced by the desire to claim unoccupied land, and if public motivations played a role, they were not driven by national expansion but by the specific aim of spreading slavery. There are few signs from the actions of Americans, both collectively and individually, that the desire for territorial acquisition for their country holds much sway over them. Their longing for Cuba is similarly localized, and the Northern States, which oppose slavery, have never supported it in any way.
The question may present itself (as in Italy at its present uprising) whether a country which is determined to be united should form a complete or a merely federal union. The point is sometimes necessarily decided by the mere territorial magnitude of the united whole. There is a limit to the extent of country which can advantageously be governed, or even whose government can be conveniently superintended from a single centre. There are vast countries so governed; but they, or at least their distant provinces, are in general deplorably ill administered, and it is only when the inhabitants are almost savages that they could not manage their affairs better separately. This obstacle does not exist in the case of Italy, the size of which does not come up to that of several very efficiently governed single states in past and present times. The question then is, whether the different parts of the nation require to be governed in a way so essentially different that it is not probable the same Legislature, and the same ministry or administrative body, will give satisfaction to them all. Unless this be the case, which is a question of fact, it is better for them to be completely united. That a totally different system of laws and very different administrative institutions may exist in two portions of a country without being any obstacle to legislative unity, is proved by the case of England and Scotland. Perhaps, however, this undisturbed coexistence of two legal systems under one united Legislature, making different laws for the two sections of the country in adaptation to the previous differences, might not be so well preserved, or the same confidence might not be felt in its preservation, in a country whose legislators are more possessed (as is apt to be the case on the Continent) with the mania for uniformity. A people having that unbounded toleration which is characteristic of this country for every description of anomaly, so long as those whose interests it concerns do not feel aggrieved by it, afforded an exceptionally advantageous field for trying this difficult experiment. In most countries, if it was an object to retain different systems of law, it might probably be necessary to retain distinct legislatures as guardians of them, which is perfectly compatible with a national Parliament and king, or a national Parliament without a king, supreme over the external relations of all the members of the body.
The question might arise (as in Italy with its current uprising) whether a country that wants to be united should form a complete union or just a federal one. Sometimes, this decision is influenced by the sheer size of the area being united. There’s a limit to how large a country can be effectively governed from a single center. Some vast nations are governed this way, but usually, their far-flung regions are poorly managed, and it’s only when the people are nearly savage that they couldn’t run their affairs better on their own. This isn’t an issue for Italy, whose size doesn’t match that of several well-managed single states, both past and present. The real question is whether the different parts of the nation need to be governed in such fundamentally different ways that it’s unlikely the same Legislature and the same administration will satisfy everyone. Unless that’s the case—which is a factual question—it’s better for them to be completely united. The existence of completely different legal systems and administrative structures in two areas of a country doesn’t prevent legislative unity, as demonstrated by England and Scotland. However, this coexistence of two legal systems under one united Legislature, creating different laws for the two regions based on their existing differences, might not be as effectively maintained, nor would there be as much trust in its maintenance, in a country where lawmakers (as often happens on the Continent) are more fixated on uniformity. A society with the kind of wide tolerance that characterizes this country for all kinds of anomalies, as long as those affected don’t feel wronged, provides a uniquely favorable environment for experimenting with this complex issue. In most countries, if there’s a goal of keeping different legal systems, it would likely be necessary to keep separate legislatures to oversee them, which can easily coexist with a national Parliament and king, or a national Parliament without a king, that holds supreme authority over the external relations of all the members of the nation.
Whenever it is not deemed necessary to maintain permanently, in the different provinces, different systems of jurisprudence, and fundamental institutions grounded on different principles, it is always practicable to reconcile minor diversities with the maintenance of unity of government. All that is needful is to give a sufficiently large sphere of action to the local authorities. Under one and the same central government there may be local governors, and provincial assemblies for local purposes. It may happen, for instance, that the people of different provinces may have preferences in favor of different modes of taxation. If the general Legislature could not be depended on for being guided by the members for each province in modifying the general system of taxation to suit that province, the Constitution might provide that as many of the expenses of the government as could by any possibility be made local should be defrayed by local rates imposed by the provincial assemblies, and that those which must of necessity be general, such as the support of an army and navy, should, in the estimates for the year, be apportioned among the different provinces according to some general estimate of their resources, the amount assigned to each being levied by the local assembly on the principles most acceptable to the locality, and paid en bloc into the national treasury. A practice approaching to this existed even in the old French monarchy, so far as regarded the pays d'états, each of which, having consented or been required to furnish a fixed sum, was left to assess it upon the inhabitants by its own officers, thus escaping the grinding despotism of the royal intendants and subdélégués; and this privilege is always mentioned as one of the advantages which mainly contributed to render them, as some of them were, the most flourishing provinces of France.
Whenever it isn't necessary to permanently maintain different systems of law and foundational institutions based on varying principles in the different provinces, it's always possible to reconcile minor differences while keeping a unified government. All that's needed is to allow local authorities a sufficiently large area of responsibility. Under one central government, there can be local governors and provincial assemblies for local matters. For example, people in different provinces may prefer different methods of taxation. If the general Legislature cannot be relied upon to be guided by representatives from each province in adjusting the overall taxation system to meet local needs, the Constitution could allow for as many government expenses as possible to be covered by local rates set by the provincial assemblies. Those expenses that must be shared, like supporting an army and navy, should be divided among the provinces based on a general assessment of their resources, with the amount allocated to each being collected by the local assembly in ways most suitable to the community, and then paid in full into the national treasury. A similar practice existed even in the old French monarchy for the pays d'états, each of which, having agreed or been required to provide a fixed amount, was allowed to assess it on the inhabitants through its own officials, thereby avoiding the harsh rule of royal intendants and subdelegates; and this privilege is always cited as one of the key advantages that helped make some of them the most prosperous provinces of France.
Identity of central government is compatible with many different degrees of centralisation, not only administrative, but even legislative. A people may have the desire and the capacity for a closer union than one merely federal, while yet their local peculiarities and antecedents render considerable diversities desirable in the details of their government. But if there is a real desire on all hands to make the experiment successful, there needs seldom be any difficulty in not only preserving these diversities, but giving them the guaranty of a constitutional provision against any attempt at assimilation except by the voluntary act of those who would be affected by the change.
The identity of the central government can align with various levels of centralization, not just in terms of administration but also legislation. A society may want and have the ability for a closer union than just a federal system, while their local differences and histories might make it necessary to have significant variety in their governance details. However, if there is a genuine desire from everyone involved to make the experiment work, there is usually no issue with maintaining these differences and ensuring they are protected by constitutional provisions that prevent any attempts at uniformity unless done voluntarily by those impacted by the change.
Chapter XVIII—Of the Government of Dependencies by a Free State.
Free states, like all others, may possess dependencies, acquired either by conquest or by colonization, and our own is the greatest instance of the kind in modern history. It is a most important question how such dependencies ought to be governed.
Free states, like any others, can have dependencies obtained either through conquest or colonization, and ours is the largest example of this in modern history. It's a very important question how such dependencies should be governed.
It is unnecessary to discuss the case of small posts, like Gibraltar, Aden, or Heligoland, which are held only as naval or military positions. The military or naval object is in this case paramount, and the inhabitants can not, consistently with it, be admitted to the government of the place, though they ought to be allowed all liberties and privileges compatible with that restriction, including the free management of municipal affairs, and, as a compensation for being locally sacrificed to the convenience of the governing state, should be admitted to equal rights with its native subjects in all other parts of the empire.
It's not necessary to talk about small posts like Gibraltar, Aden, or Heligoland, which are maintained solely as naval or military bases. In this situation, the military or naval purpose is the priority, and the local people can't be included in the governance of the area. However, they should have all the freedoms and privileges that are compatible with that limitation, including the ability to manage their local affairs. As a compensation for being locally sacrificed for the convenience of the governing state, they should also be granted equal rights as native subjects in all other parts of the empire.
Outlying territories of some size and population, which are held as dependencies, that is, which are subject, more or less, to acts of sovereign power on the part of the paramount country, without being equally represented (if represented at all) in its Legislature, may be divided into two classes. Some are composed of people of similar civilization to the ruling country, capable of, and ripe for, representative government, such as the British possessions in America and Australia. Others, like India, are still at a great distance from that state.
Outlying areas that have a significant size and population, which are considered dependencies—that is, which are subject to varying degrees of authority from the dominant country, without being adequately represented (if at all) in its legislative body—can be classified into two categories. Some consist of people whose civilization is similar to that of the ruling country, who are ready for and capable of representative government, such as the British territories in America and Australia. Others, like India, are still far from achieving that status.
In the case of dependencies of the former class, this country has at length realized, in rare completeness, the true principle of government. England has always felt under a certain degree of obligation to bestow on such of her outlying populations as were of her own blood and language, and on some who were not, representative institutions formed in imitation of her own; but, until the present generation, she has been on the same bad level with other countries as to the amount of self-government which she allowed them to exercise through the representative institutions that she conceded to them. She claimed to be the supreme arbiter even of their purely internal concerns, according to her own, not their ideas of how those concerns could be best regulated. This practice was a natural corollary from the vicious theory of colonial policy—once common to all Europe, and not yet completely relinquished by any other people—which regarded colonies as valuable by affording markets for our commodities that could be kept entirely to ourselves; a privilege we valued so highly that we thought it worth purchasing by allowing to the colonies the same monopoly of our market for their own productions which we claimed for our commodities in theirs. This notable plan for enriching them and ourselves by making each pay enormous sums to the other, dropping the greatest part by the way, has been for some time abandoned. But the bad habit of meddling in the internal government of the colonies did not at once die out when we relinquished the idea of making any profit by it. We continued to torment them, not for any benefit to ourselves, but for that of a section or faction among the colonists; and this persistence in domineering cost us a Canadian rebellion before we had the happy thought of giving it up. England was like an ill brought-up elder brother, who persists in tyrannizing over the younger ones from mere habit, till one of them, by a spirited resistance, though with unequal strength, gives him notice to desist. We were wise enough not to require a second warning. A new era in the colonial policy of nations began with Lord Durham's Report; the imperishable memorial of that nobleman's courage, patriotism, and enlightened liberality, and of the intellect and practical sagacity of its joint authors, Mr. Wakefield and the lamented Charles Buller. [11]
In the case of dependencies of the former class, this country has finally grasped, with remarkable clarity, the true principle of governance. England has always felt some obligation to provide representative institutions, inspired by her own, to outlying populations that were of her blood and language, and even to some that were not. However, until the current generation, she allowed these populations a limited amount of self-governance through the representative institutions she granted them, putting her on the same poor level as other countries. She claimed to be the ultimate authority on their internal matters, dictating solutions based on her own views rather than theirs. This approach was a natural outcome of the flawed colonial policy that once prevailed across Europe and remains somewhat in practice by others today, which saw colonies primarily as markets for our goods that we aimed to keep to ourselves. We valued this privilege so highly that we thought it was worth paying for by granting the colonies a similar monopoly of our market for their products that we claimed for our goods. This questionable method of enriching both parties by making each pay substantial fees to the other, with most of the money lost along the way, has been set aside for some time. However, the unhealthy habit of interfering in the internal affairs of the colonies didn’t immediately disappear when we abandoned the profit motive. We continued to meddle, not for our own benefit, but for the sake of a particular group or faction among the colonists; this stubborn behavior led to a Canadian rebellion before we had the good sense to stop. England was like an overbearing older brother, who unwittingly bullied the younger siblings out of habit until one of them stood up to him, despite the odds, telling him to back off. We were smart enough not to need a second warning. A new era in colonial policy began with Lord Durham's Report, which stands as a lasting tribute to that noble man's courage, patriotism, and enlightened generosity, as well as the intellect and practical wisdom of its co-authors, Mr. Wakefield and the sadly missed Charles Buller. [11]
It is now a fixed principle of the policy of Great Britain, professed in theory and faithfully adhered to in practice, that her colonies of European race, equally with the parent country, possess the fullest measure of internal self-government. They have been allowed to make their own free representative constitutions by altering in any manner they thought fit the already very popular constitutions which we had given them. Each is governed by its own Legislature and executive, constituted on highly democratic principles. The veto of the crown and of Parliament, though nominally reserved, is only exercised (and that very rarely) on questions which concern the empire, and not solely the particular colony. How liberal a construction has been given to the distinction between imperial and colonial questions is shown by the fact that the whole of the unappropriated lands in the regions behind our American and Australian colonies have been given up to the uncontrolled disposal of the colonial communities, though they might, without injustice, have been kept in the hands of the imperial government, to be administered for the greatest advantage of future emigrants from all parts of the empire. Every colony has thus as full power over its own affairs as it could have if it were a member of even the loosest federation, and much fuller than would belong to it under the Constitution of the United States, being free even to tax at its pleasure the commodities imported from the mother country. Their union with Great Britain is the slightest kind of federal union; but not a strictly equal federation, the mother country retaining to itself the powers of a federal government, though reduced in practice to their very narrowest limits. This inequality is, of course, as far as it goes, a disadvantage to the dependencies, which have no voice in foreign policy, but are bound by the decisions of the superior country. They are compelled to join England in war without being in any way consulted previous to engaging in it.
It is now a well-established principle of Great Britain's policy, stated in theory and consistently followed in practice, that her colonies of European descent, just like the mother country, have complete internal self-government. They have been permitted to create their own representative constitutions by modifying the already popular ones we provided them. Each colony is governed by its own legislature and executive, set up on very democratic principles. The crown's and Parliament's veto, although officially retained, is rarely used on matters of the empire rather than just the individual colony. How broadly the distinction between imperial and colonial matters has been interpreted is evident in the fact that all unclaimed land in the areas behind our American and Australian colonies has been given over to the full control of the colonial communities, even though it could have justifiably remained with the imperial government to be managed for the benefit of future emigrants from across the empire. Each colony thus has as much power over its own affairs as it would have if it were part of even the loosest federation, and much more than it would have under the United States Constitution, being free to tax imports from the mother country as it wishes. Their relationship with Great Britain resembles a very minimal federal union; however, it is not a fully equal federation, as the mother country retains the powers of a federal government, even if in practice these powers are limited. This imbalance is a disadvantage for the colonies, as they have no say in foreign policy and are bound by the decisions made by the mother country. They are forced to support England in war without any consultation beforehand.
Those (now happily not a few) who think that justice is as binding on communities as it is on individuals, and that men are not warranted in doing to other countries, for the supposed benefit of their own country, what they would not be justified in doing to other men for their own benefit, feel even this limited amount of constitutional subordination on the part of the colonies to be a violation of principle, and have often occupied themselves in looking out for means by which it may be avoided. With this view it has been proposed by some that the colonies should return representatives to the British Legislature, and by others that the powers of our own, as well as of their Parliaments, should be confined to internal policy, and that there should be another representative body for foreign and imperial concerns, in which last the dependencies of Great Britain should be represented in the same manner, and with the same completeness as Great Britain itself. On this system there would be a perfectly equal federation between the mother country and her colonies, then no longer dependencies.
Those who believe that justice is just as important for communities as it is for individuals, and that people shouldn't do things to other countries for their own benefit that they wouldn't do to other individuals for the same reason, see even this limited submission of the colonies to the crown as a violation of principle. They often look for ways to avoid it. Some have suggested that the colonies should send representatives to the British Legislature, while others argue that both our Parliament and theirs should focus only on local matters. There should be a separate body to handle foreign and imperial issues, where Britain's colonies are represented just as fully as Britain itself. This way, there would be a completely equal federation between the mother country and her colonies, which would no longer be considered dependencies.
The feelings of equity and conceptions of public morality from which these suggestions emanate are worthy of all praise, but the suggestions themselves are so inconsistent with rational principles of government that it is doubtful if they have been seriously accepted as a possibility by any reasonable thinker. Countries separated by half the globe do not present the natural conditions for being under one government, or even members of one federation. If they had sufficiently the same interests, they have not, and never can have, a sufficient habit of taking council together. They are not part of the same public; they do not discuss and deliberate in the same arena, but apart, and have only a most imperfect knowledge of what passes in the minds of one another. They neither know each other's objects, nor have confidence in each other's principles of conduct. Let any Englishman ask himself how he should like his destinies to depend on an assembly of which one third was British American, and another third South African and Australian. Yet to this it must come if there were any thing like fair or equal representation; and would not every one feel that the representatives of Canada and Australia, even in matters of an imperial character, could not know or feel any sufficient concern for the interests, opinions, or wishes of English, Irish, and Scotch? Even for strictly federative purposes the conditions do not exist which we have seen to be essential to a federation. England is sufficient for her own protection without the colonies, and would be in a much stronger, as well as more dignified position, if separated from them, than when reduced to be a single member of an American, African, and Australian confederation. Over and above the commerce which she might equally enjoy after separation, England derives little advantage, except in prestige, from her dependencies, and the little she does derive is quite outweighed by the expense they cost her, and the dissemination they necessitate of her naval and military force, which, in case of war, or any real apprehension of it, requires to be double or treble what would be needed for the defense of this country alone.
The sense of fairness and ideas about public morality that inspire these suggestions are commendable, but the suggestions themselves are so out of sync with sound government principles that it's hard to believe any reasonable person would seriously consider them possible. Countries separated by half the globe don’t have the natural conditions to be governed together or even to be part of one federation. While they may share some common interests, they lack a strong enough practice of coming together to discuss them. They are not part of the same public; they don’t talk and deliberate in the same space but separately, and they have only a very limited understanding of each other’s thoughts. They don’t know each other’s goals or trust each other’s principles. Any Englishman should ask themselves how they would feel if their future depended on an assembly with one third British American and another third South African and Australian. This is what would happen if there were any notion of fair or equal representation; and wouldn’t everyone feel that the representatives from Canada and Australia, even on imperial matters, could not have enough concern for the interests, views, or wishes of the English, Irish, and Scots? Even for strictly federal purposes, the necessary conditions for a federation don’t exist. England can protect herself without the colonies, and she would be in a much stronger and more dignified position if she were separate from them rather than being just one part of an American, African, and Australian federation. Besides the trade she could still enjoy after separation, England gains little, apart from prestige, from her colonies, and the little she does gain is far outweighed by the costs they incur and the need to spread her naval and military forces, which, in case of war or any real fear of it, would need to be doubled or tripled compared to what would be required for the defense of England alone.
But, though Great Britain could do perfectly well without her colonies, and though, on every principle of morality and justice, she ought to consent to their separation, should the time come when, after full trial of the best form of union, they deliberately desire to be dissevered, there are strong reasons for maintaining the present slight bond of connection so long as not disagreeable to the feelings of either party. It is a step, as far as it goes, towards universal peace and general friendly co-operation among nations. It renders war impossible among a large number of otherwise independent communities, and, moreover, hinders any of them from being absorbed into a foreign state, and becoming a source of additional aggressive strength to some rival power, either more despotic or closer at hand, which might not always be so unambitious or so pacific as Great Britain. It at least keeps the markets of the different countries open to one another, and prevents that mutual exclusion by hostile tariffs which none of the great communities of mankind except England have yet outgrown. And in the case of the British possessions it has the advantage, especially valuable at the present time, of adding to the moral influence and weight in the councils of the world of the power which, of all in existence, best understands liberty—and, whatever may have been its errors in the past, has attained to more of conscience and moral principle in its dealings with foreigners than any other great nation seems either to conceive as possible or recognize as desirable. Since, then, the union can only continue, while it does continue, on the footing of an unequal federation, it is important to consider by what means this small amount of inequality can be prevented from being either onerous or humiliating to the communities occupying the less exalted position.
But even though Great Britain could manage perfectly well without her colonies, and although, on every moral and just principle, she should agree to their separation if they genuinely wish to be independent after trying out the best kind of union, there are solid reasons to keep the current weak connection as long as it isn’t uncomfortable for either side. This connection represents a step, however small, towards global peace and general cooperation among nations. It makes war impossible among many otherwise independent communities and prevents any of them from being absorbed by a foreign state, which could enhance the aggressive power of a rival that might not always be as peaceful or unobtrusive as Great Britain. At the very least, it keeps the markets of these countries open to each other and stops mutual exclusion through hostile tariffs, which none of the major communities, besides England, have truly outgrown. Additionally, in regards to British territories, it adds to the moral influence and standing in global discussions of the power that, more than any other, best understands liberty—and despite any past mistakes, has shown more conscience and moral principle in dealing with other nations than any other major country seems to realize is possible or desirable. Therefore, since the union can only persist, while it lasts, as an unequal federation, it’s crucial to think about how to ensure this slight inequality doesn’t become burdensome or humiliating for the communities in the less privileged position.
The only inferiority necessarily inherent in the case is that the mother country decides, both for the colonies and for herself, on questions of peace and war. They gain, in return, the obligation on the mother country to repel aggressions directed against them; but, except when the minor community is so weak that the protection of a stronger power is indispensable to it, reciprocity of obligation is not a full equivalent for non-admission to a voice in the deliberations. It is essential, therefore, that in all wars, save those which, like the Caffre or New Zealand wars, are incurred for the sake of the particular colony, the colonists should not (without their own voluntary request) be called on to contribute any thing to the expense except what may be required for the specific local defense of their ports, shores, and frontiers against invasion. Moreover, as the mother country claims the privilege, at her sole discretion, of taking measures or pursuing a policy which may expose them to attack, it is just that she should undertake a considerable portion of the cost of their military defense even in time of peace; the whole of it, so far as it depends upon a standing army.
The only inferiority that comes with this situation is that the mother country decides on issues of peace and war for both the colonies and itself. In return, they gain the obligation from the mother country to defend them against attacks; however, unless the smaller community is so weak that it needs protection from a stronger power, this mutual obligation doesn’t really make up for not having a say in decisions. Therefore, in all wars, except those like the Caffre or New Zealand wars, which are fought specifically for the colony’s sake, colonists shouldn’t be asked to contribute anything to the costs unless they voluntarily choose to, apart from what’s needed for the local defense of their ports, shores, and borders against invasion. Moreover, since the mother country claims the right to take actions or follow policies that might put them at risk, it's fair that she should cover a significant portion of their military defense costs, even during peacetime; this includes all expenses related to maintaining a standing army.
But there is a means, still more effectual than these, by which, and in general by which alone, a full equivalent can be given to a smaller community for sinking its individuality, as a substantive power among nations, in the greater individuality of a wide and powerful empire. This one indispensable, and, at the same time, sufficient expedient, which meets at once the demands of justice and the growing exigencies of policy, is to open the service of government in all its departments, and in every part of the empire, on perfectly equal terms, to the inhabitants of the colonies. Why does no one ever hear a breath of disloyalty from the Islands in the British Channel? By race, religion, and geographical position they belong less to England than to France; but, while they enjoy, like Canada and New South Wales, complete control over their internal affairs and their taxation, every office or dignity in the gift of the crown is freely open to the native of Guernsey or Jersey. Generals, admirals, peers of the United Kingdom are made, and there is nothing which hinders prime ministers to be made from those insignificant islands. The same system was commenced in reference to the colonies generally by an enlightened colonial secretary, too early lost, Sir William Molesworth, when he appointed Mr. Hinckes, a leading Canadian politician, to a West Indian government. It is a very shallow view of the springs of political action in a community which thinks such things unimportant because the number of those in a position actually to profit by the concession might not be very considerable. That limited number would be composed precisely of those who have most moral power over the rest; and men are not so destitute of the sense of collective degradation as not to feel the withholding of an advantage from even one person, because of a circumstance which they all have in common with him, an affront to all. If we prevent the leading men of a community from standing forth to the world as its chiefs and representatives in the general councils of mankind, we owe it both to their legitimate ambition and to the just pride of the community to give them in return an equal chance of occupying the same prominent position in a nation of greater power and importance. Were the whole service of the British crown opened to the natives of the Ionian Islands, we should hear no more of the desire for union with Greece. Such a union is not desirable for the people, to whom it would be a step backward in civilization; but it is no wonder if Corfu, which has given a minister of European reputation to the Russian Empire, and a president to Greece itself before the arrival of the Bavarians, should feel it a grievance that its people are not admissable to the highest posts in some government or other.
But there's a more effective way to give a smaller community a full equivalent for losing its individuality and status among nations by merging into a larger, powerful empire. This essential and sufficient solution, which addresses both justice and the needs of policy, is to open government services across all departments and parts of the empire to the inhabitants of the colonies on completely equal terms. Why don't we ever hear any disloyalty from the Islands in the British Channel? By race, religion, and geography, they have more in common with France than with England; yet, like Canada and New South Wales, they have complete control over their internal matters and taxation, while every position or honor given by the crown is available to the natives of Guernsey or Jersey. Generals, admirals, and peers of the United Kingdom come from these small islands, and nothing prevents the appointment of prime ministers from there. This approach began with the colonies, thanks to the enlightened colonial secretary, Sir William Molesworth, who was unfortunately lost too soon, when he appointed Mr. Hinckes, a prominent Canadian politician, to a West Indian government. It’s a narrow perspective to dismiss such matters as unimportant simply because the number of those who could benefit from this concession might not be large. That limited group consists precisely of those who hold the most moral influence over the others; people aren't blind to collective humiliation and can feel that denying an opportunity to even one person, based on something that they all share, is an insult to everyone. If we prevent the leaders of a community from stepping forward as its representatives in global discussions, we owe it to their rightful ambition and the community's pride to provide them an equal chance to assume similar positions in a more powerful and important nation. If the British crown's entire service were available to the natives of the Ionian Islands, we wouldn't hear any more talk about wanting to join Greece. Such a union isn’t in the best interest of the people, as it would take them backward in terms of civilization; but it's understandable that Corfu, which has produced a minister of European stature for the Russian Empire and a president for Greece before the arrival of the Bavarians, would feel it unfair that its citizens can't hold the highest positions in any government.
Thus far of the dependencies whose population is in a sufficiently advanced state to be fitted for representative government; but there are others which have not attained that state, and which, if held at all, must be governed by the dominant country, or by persons delegated for that purpose by it. This mode of government is as legitimate as any other, if it is the one which in the existing state of civilization of the subject people most facilitates their transition to a higher stage of improvement. There are, as we have already seen, conditions of society in which a vigorous despotism is in itself the best mode of government for training the people in what is specifically wanting to render them capable of a higher civilization. There are others, in which the mere fact of despotism has indeed no beneficial effect, the lessons which it teaches having already been only too completely learned, but in which, there being no spring of spontaneous improvement in the people themselves, their almost only hope of making any steps in advance depends on the chances of a good despot. Under a native despotism, a good despot is a rare and transitory accident; but when the dominion they are under is that of a more civilized people, that people ought to be able to supply it constantly. The ruling country ought to be able to do for its subjects all that could be done by a succession of absolute monarchs, guaranteed by irresistible force against the precariousness of tenure attendant on barbarous despotisms, and qualified by their genius to anticipate all that experience has taught to the more advanced nation. Such is the ideal rule of a free people over a barbarous or semi-barbarous one. We need not expect to see that ideal realized; but, unless some approach to it is, the rulers are guilty of a dereliction of the highest moral trust which can devolve upon a nation; and if they do not even aim at it, they are selfish usurpers, on a par in criminality with any of those whose ambition and rapacity have sported from age to age with the destiny of masses of mankind.
So far, the dependencies with populations that are advanced enough for representative government have been discussed; however, there are others that haven’t reached this level and must be governed by the dominant country or by appointed representatives. This form of governance is just as valid as any other if it helps the people transition to a higher level of development in their current state of civilization. As we’ve seen, there are societal conditions where strong dictatorship can be the best way to prepare the people for the skills they need to achieve a higher civilization. In other cases, simply having a dictatorship doesn't provide any benefits, as the lessons it teaches have already been learned, and the people lack the initiative for self-improvement, making their progress contingent on the presence of a competent dictator. Under local dictatorship, a good dictator is a rare and fleeting occurrence; however, when the ruling authority is a more advanced civilization, that civilization should be able to provide consistent leadership. The ruling country should be able to fulfill all that could be achieved by a series of absolute monarchs, secured by overwhelming force against the instability of barbaric despotisms, and equipped with the insight gained from the experiences of more developed nations. This represents the ideal leadership of a free people over a less developed one. While we shouldn’t expect this ideal to be fully realized, if there isn’t some movement towards it, the rulers are neglecting the highest moral duty that a nation can have. If they don’t even strive for this ideal, they are selfish usurpers, equally as culpable as those whose greed and ambition have historically jeopardized the fate of large groups of people.
As it is already a common, and is rapidly tending to become the universal condition of the more backward populations to be either held in direct subjection by the more advanced, or to be under their complete political ascendancy, there are in this age of the world few more important problems than how to organize this rule, so as to make it a good instead of an evil to the subject people, providing them with the best attainable present government, and with the conditions most favorable to future permanent improvement. But the mode of fitting the government for this purpose is by no means so well understood as the conditions of good government in a people capable of governing themselves. We may even say that it is not understood at all.
Since it's becoming increasingly common for less developed populations to be either directly controlled by more advanced ones or to be completely dominated by them, one of the most crucial issues today is how to structure this authority in a way that benefits, rather than harms, the subject people. This means providing them with the best possible government for now and creating conditions that will lead to lasting improvements in the future. However, the methods for properly organizing this kind of governance aren't nearly as well understood as the requirements for good government among people who can govern themselves. In fact, we could argue that it's not understood at all.
The thing appears perfectly easy to superficial observers. If India (for example) is not fit to govern itself, all that seems to them required is that there should be a minister to govern it, and that this minister, like all other British ministers, should be responsible to the British Parliament. Unfortunately this, though the simplest mode of attempting to govern a dependency, is about the worst, and betrays in its advocates a total want of comprehension of the conditions of good government. To govern a country under responsibility to the people of that country, and to govern one country under responsibility to the people of another, are two very different things. What makes the excellence of the first is, that freedom is preferable to despotism: but the last is despotism. The only choice the case admits is a choice of despotisms, and it is not certain that the despotism of twenty millions is necessarily better than that of a few or of one; but it is quite certain that the despotism of those who neither hear, nor see, nor know any thing about their subjects, has many chances of being worse than that of those who do. It is not usually thought that the immediate agents of authority govern better because they govern in the name of an absent master, and of one who has a thousand more pressing interests to attend to. The master may hold them to a strict responsibility, enforced by heavy penalties, but it is very questionable if those penalties will often fall in the right place.
The situation seems really simple to casual onlookers. If India (for instance) isn't capable of self-governance, all they think is needed is for a minister to run it, and this minister, like any other British minister, should be accountable to the British Parliament. Unfortunately, while this might seem like the easiest way to manage a territory, it’s actually one of the worst approaches, showing a complete lack of understanding of what good governance requires. Governing a country with accountability to its own people is very different from governing one country with accountability to the people of another. The strength of the former lies in the fact that freedom is better than oppression, while the latter is oppression. The only option here is to choose between forms of oppression, and it’s not clear that the rule of twenty million people is necessarily better than that of a few or one; however, it's certainly true that the rule of those who don’t see, hear, or understand their subjects is likely to be worse than that of those who do. It’s generally not believed that those who directly exercise authority are more effective just because they do so in the name of a distant leader, especially one with many more urgent matters to deal with. The leader might demand strict accountability from them, backed by severe penalties, but it’s very uncertain if those penalties will actually be applied where they’re needed.
It is always under great difficulties, and very imperfectly, that a country can be governed by foreigners, even when there is no extreme disparity in habits and ideas between the rulers and the ruled. Foreigners do not feel with the people. They can not judge, by the light in which a thing appears to their own minds, or the manner in which it affects their feelings, how it will affect the feelings or appear to the minds of the subject population. What a native of the country, of average practical ability, knows as it were by instinct, they have to learn slowly, and, after all, imperfectly, by study and experience. The laws, the customs, the social relations for which they have to legislate, instead of being familiar to them from childhood, are all strange to them. For most of their detailed knowledge they must depend on the information of natives, and it is difficult for them to know whom to trust. They are feared, suspected, probably disliked by the population; seldom sought by them except for interested purposes; and they are prone to think that the servilely submissive are the trustworthy. Their danger is of despising the natives; that of the natives is, of disbelieving that any thing the strangers do can be intended for their good. These are but a part of the difficulties that any rulers have to struggle with, who honestly attempt to govern well a country in which they are foreigners. To overcome these difficulties in any degree will always be a work of much labor, requiring a very superior degree of capacity in the chief administrators, and a high average among the subordinates; and the best organization of such a government is that which will best insure the labor, develop the capacity, and place the highest specimens of it in the situations of greatest trust. Responsibility to an authority which has gone through none of the labor, acquired none of the capacity, and for the most part is not even aware that either, in any peculiar degree, is required, can not be regarded as a very effectual expedient for accomplishing these ends.
It's always very challenging, and not done well, for a country to be governed by outsiders, even when there's not a huge difference in customs and beliefs between those in power and the local people. Foreigners don't connect with the locals. They can't understand, based on their own perspectives or feelings, how something will resonate with the thoughts or emotions of the native population. What a local with average practical skills knows instinctively, outsiders must learn slowly and still imperfectly through study and experience. The laws, customs, and social dynamics they need to govern are all unfamiliar to them. For most of their detailed knowledge, they rely on information from locals, but it’s hard for them to know whom to trust. They are often feared, suspiciously regarded, and likely disliked by the people; they are rarely approached unless for selfish reasons and tend to think that those who seem submissive are trustworthy. The risk for them is underestimating the locals, while the local people often doubt that anything the outsiders do could be for their benefit. These are just some of the challenges that any rulers face when they genuinely try to govern well in a country where they are outsiders. Overcoming these obstacles to any degree will always require a lot of effort, a high level of skill from the main administrators, and above-average capability among their subordinates; the best setup for such a government is one that ensures productivity, nurtures talent, and places the most capable individuals in positions of significant responsibility. Being accountable to an authority that hasn't done the work or developed the required skills, and mostly doesn't even realize that either is necessary, cannot be seen as a very effective way to achieve these goals.
The government of a people by itself has a meaning and a reality, but such a thing as government of one people by another does not and can not exist. One people may keep another as a warren or preserve for its own use, a place to make money in, a human-cattle farm to be worked for the profit of its own inhabitants; but if the good of the governed is the proper business of a government, it is utterly impossible that a people should directly attend to it. The utmost they can do is to give some of their best men a commission to look after it, to whom the opinion of their own country can neither be much of a guide in the performance of their duty, nor a competent judge of the mode in which it has been performed. Let any one consider how the English themselves would be governed if they knew and cared no more about their own affairs than they know and care about the affairs of the Hindoos. Even this comparison gives no adequate idea of the state of the case; for a people thus indifferent to politics altogether would probably be simply acquiescent, and let the government alone; whereas in the case of India, a politically active people like the English, amid habitual acquiescence, are every now and then interfering, and almost always in the wrong place. The real causes which determine the prosperity or wretchedness, the improvement or deterioration of the Hindoos, are too far off to be within their ken. They have not the knowledge necessary for suspecting the existence of those causes, much less for judging of their operation. The most essential interests of the country may be well administered without obtaining any of their approbation, or mismanaged to almost any excess without attracting their notice. The purposes for which they are principally tempted to interfere, and control the proceedings of their delegates, are of two kinds. One is to force English ideas down the throats of the natives; for instance, by measures of proselytism, or acts intentionally or unintentionally offensive to the religious feelings of the people. This misdirection of opinion in the ruling country is instructively exemplified (the more so, because nothing is meant but justice and fairness, and as much impartiality as can be expected from persons really convinced) by the demand now so general in England for having the Bible taught, at the option of pupils or of their parents, in the government schools. From the European point of view nothing can wear a fairer aspect, or seem less open to objection on the score of religious freedom. To Asiatic eyes it is quite another thing. No Asiatic people ever believes that a government puts its paid officers and official machinery into motion unless it is bent upon an object; and when bent on an object, no Asiatic believes that any government, except a feeble and contemptible one, pursues it by halves. If government schools and schoolmasters taught Christianity, whatever pledges might be given of teaching it only to those who spontaneously sought it, no amount of evidence would ever persuade the parents that improper means were not used to make their children Christians, or, at all events, outcasts from Hindooism. If they could, in the end, be convinced of the contrary, it would only be by the entire failure of the schools, so conducted, to make any converts. If the teaching had the smallest effect in promoting its object, it would compromise not only the utility and even existence of the government education, but perhaps the safety of the government itself. An English Protestant would not be easily induced, by disclaimers of proselytism, to place his children in a Roman Catholic seminary; Irish Catholics will not send their children to schools in which they can be made Protestants; and we expect that Hindoos, who believe that the privileges of Hindooism can be forfeited by a merely physical act, will expose theirs to the danger of being made Christians!
The government of a people has its own meaning and reality, but the idea of one people governing another does not exist and cannot exist. One group may keep another as a resource for its own benefit, a place to profit from, essentially a human-cattle farm worked for the gain of its own people; but if the welfare of the governed is the main purpose of a government, it is completely impossible for one group to genuinely take care of that. The most they can do is delegate the task to some of their best individuals, who will find the opinion of their own nation offers little guidance in actually carrying out their duties, nor serve as a competent judge of how well those duties are performed. Imagine how the English would be governed if they were as indifferent to their own affairs as they are to those of the Hindoos. This comparison doesn't fully capture the reality; a people completely indifferent to politics would likely just accept things as they are and leave the government alone; yet in India, a politically engaged group like the English often interferes, and usually in the wrong way. The actual factors that influence the well-being or suffering, progress or decline of the Hindoos are too distant for their understanding. They lack the insight to even suspect those factors exist, let alone judge how they operate. The crucial interests of the country may be effectively managed without any input from them, or poorly handled to an extreme without them even noticing. The main reasons they are tempted to get involved and oversee their representatives revolve around two things. One is to impose English ideas on the natives; for example, through proselytizing or actions that may unintentionally offend the religious sentiments of the people. This misguidance of opinion from the governing country is clearly shown by the current widespread demand in England for the Bible to be taught, at the choice of students or their parents, in government schools. From a European perspective, this seems fair and unobjectionable in terms of religious freedom. But from an Asian perspective, it's a completely different story. No Asian believes that a government mobilizes its paid officials and machinery without a purpose; and when a government has a purpose, no Asian trusts that a weak and despised one would pursue it only halfway. If government schools and teachers were to teach Christianity, regardless of promises to only teach it to those who actively seek it, no evidence would ever convince parents that improper means were not used to convert their children into Christians or, at the very least, cause them to become outcasts from Hinduism. If they were eventually convinced otherwise, it would only be because the schools failed to produce any converts. If the teaching had even the slightest effect in furthering its objective, it would not only jeopardize the effectiveness and existence of government education but might also threaten the safety of the government itself. An English Protestant wouldn’t easily be persuaded, through claims of no conversion intent, to send their children to a Roman Catholic school; Irish Catholics won’t let their kids attend schools where they could be turned into Protestants; and we expect that the Hindoos, who think the rights of Hinduism can be lost through mere physical acts, will risk their children being made Christians!
Such is one of the modes in which the opinion of the dominant country tends to act more injuriously than beneficially on the conduct of its deputed governors. In other respects, its interference is likely to be oftenest exercised where it will be most pertinaciously demanded, and that is, on behalf of some interest of the English settlers. English settlers have friends at home, have organs, have access to the public; they have a common language, and common ideas with their countrymen; any complaint by an Englishman is more sympathetically heard, even if no unjust preference is intentionally accorded to it. Now if there be a fact to which all experience testifies, it is that, when a country holds another in subjection, the individuals of the ruling people who resort to the foreign country to make their fortunes are of all others those who most need to be held under powerful restraint. They are always one of the chief difficulties of the government. Armed with the prestige and filled with the scornful overbearingness of the conquering nation, they have the feelings inspired by absolute power without its sense of responsibility. Among a people like that of India, the utmost efforts of the public authorities are not enough for the effectual protection of the weak against the strong; and of all the strong, the European settlers are the strongest. Wherever the demoralizing effect of the situation is not in a most remarkable degree corrected by the personal character of the individual, they think the people of the country mere dirt under their feet: it seems to them monstrous that any rights of the natives should stand in the way of their smallest pretensions; the simplest act of protection to the inhabitants against any act of power on their part which they may consider useful to their commercial objects they denounce, and sincerely regard as an injury. So natural is this state of feeling in a situation like theirs, that, even under the discouragement which it has hitherto met with from the ruling authorities, it is impossible that more or less of the spirit should not perpetually break out. The government, itself free from this spirit, is never able sufficiently to keep it down in the young and raw even of its own civil and military officers, over whom it has so much more control than over the independent residents. As it is with the English in India, so, according to trustworthy testimony, it is with the French in Algiers; so with the Americans in the countries conquered from Mexico; so it seems to be with the Europeans in China, and already even in Japan: there is no necessity to recall how it was with the Spaniards in South America. In all these cases, the government to which these private adventurers are subject is better than they, and does the most it can to protect the natives against them. Even the Spanish government did this, sincerely and earnestly, though ineffectually, as is known to every reader of Mr. Helps' instructive history. Had the Spanish government been directly accountable to Spanish opinion, we may question if it would have made the attempt, for the Spaniards, doubtless, would have taken part with their Christian friends and relations rather than with pagans. The settlers, not the natives, have the ear of the public at home; it is they whose representations are likely to pass for truth, because they alone have both the means and the motive to press them perseveringly upon the inattentive and uninterested public mind. The distrustful criticism with which Englishmen, more than any other people, are in the habit of scanning the conduct of their country towards foreigners, they usually reserve for the proceedings of the public authorities. In all questions between a government and an individual, the presumption in every Englishman's mind is that the government is in the wrong. And when the resident English bring the batteries of English political action to bear upon any of the bulwarks erected to protect the natives against their encroachments, the executive, with their real but faint velleities of something better, generally find it safer to their Parliamentary interest, and, at any rate, less troublesome, to give up the disputed position than to defend it.
One of the ways the dominant country’s opinion influences its appointed governors more negatively than positively is through this dynamic. Its interference usually happens where it’s most vehemently demanded: to support the interests of English settlers. These settlers have allies back home, they have media, and they can reach the public. They share a language and common ideas with their fellow countrymen; any grievance from an Englishman tends to receive more sympathy, even if there’s no intentional bias. History shows that when one country controls another, those from the ruling nation who go to the occupied territory to make a living often require stricter oversight than anyone else. They typically present significant challenges for governance. Armed with the prestige of their conquering nation and filled with a sense of superiority, they feel empowered without bearing the accompanying sense of responsibility. Among a population like India’s, even the most diligent efforts of officials aren’t enough to protect the vulnerable from the powerful; and of all those powerful individuals, the European settlers are the strongest. Where the negative impacts of this situation aren't significantly mitigated by a person’s character, settlers often view the local population as beneath them: they find it outrageous that any rights of the natives should obstruct their smallest desires; any basic act of protection for the locals against their potentially harmful actions—actions they might see as beneficial for their business—they criticize and genuinely consider harmful. This mindset is so common in their circumstances that, despite the discouragement they've faced from the authorities, some form of this attitude is bound to resurface continually. The government, which is free from this mindset, struggles to keep it in check amongst its own inexperienced civil and military officials, over whom it has much greater authority than over independent residents. Just as it is for the English in India, trustworthy accounts suggest the same is true for the French in Algeria, the Americans in the territories taken from Mexico, and similarly for Europeans in China and even in Japan; there’s no need to recall how it played out for the Spaniards in South America. In all these situations, the government supervising these private operators is better than they are, and does its utmost to protect the natives from them. Even the Spanish government made honest, albeit ultimately ineffective, attempts at this, as those familiar with Mr. Helps' insightful history understand. If the Spanish government had been directly accountable to Spanish public opinion, one might wonder if it would have even tried, since Spaniards would likely side with their Christian friends and family over non-Christians. It’s the settlers, not the natives, who garner public attention back home; they are the ones whose claims are likely to be accepted as truth, because they alone have the means and the drive to push them persistently upon an uninterested public. The critical scrutiny with which the English, more than anyone else, examine their country’s actions toward foreigners is usually reserved for the behavior of the public authorities. In any conflict between a government and an individual, most English people assume the government is at fault. When the resident English leverage British political pressure against any protections set up for the natives, the government, with its genuine but weak intentions for improvement, often decides it’s safer for their political interests—and certainly less troublesome—to concede the contested position rather than defend it.
What makes matters worse is that, when the public mind is invoked (as, to its credit, the English mind is extremely open to be) in the name of justice and philanthropy in behalf of the subject community or race, there is the same probability of its missing the mark; for in the subject community also there are oppressors and oppressed—powerful individuals or classes, and slaves prostrate before them; and it is the former, not the latter, who have the means of access to the English public. A tyrant or sensualist who has been deprived of the power he had abused, and, instead of punishment, is supported in as great wealth and splendor as he ever enjoyed; a knot of privileged landholders, who demand that the state should relinquish to them its reserved right to a rent from their lands, or who resent as a wrong any attempt to protect the masses from their extortion—these have no difficulty in procuring interested or sentimental advocacy in the British Parliament and press. The silent myriads obtain none.
What makes things even worse is that when the public is called upon (as, to its credit, the English public is quite receptive) in the name of justice and charity for the subject community or race, there's still a good chance it will miss the target. Within the subject community, there are also oppressors and the oppressed—powerful individuals or classes, and those who are powerless before them. It's the former, not the latter, who can reach the English public. A tyrant or hedonist who has lost the power they misused, instead of facing punishment, enjoys as much wealth and luxury as they ever did; a group of privileged landowners who insist that the government should give up its right to collect rent from their lands, or who view any attempt to protect the masses from their exploitation as an injustice—these people easily find self-interested or emotional support in the British Parliament and media. The silent masses receive none.
The preceding observations exemplify the operation of a principle—which might be called an obvious one, were it not that scarcely anybody seems to be aware of it—that, while responsibility to the governed is the greatest of all securities for good government, responsibility to somebody else not only has no such tendency, but is as likely to produce evil as good. The responsibility of the British rulers of India to the British nation is chiefly useful because, when any acts of the government are called in question, it insures publicity and discussion; the utility of which does not require that the public at large should comprehend the point at issue, provided there are any individuals among them who do; for a merely moral responsibility not being responsibility to the collective people, but to every separate person among them who forms a judgment, opinions may be weighed as well as counted, and the approbation or disapprobation of one person well versed in the subject may outweigh that of thousands who know nothing about it at all. It is doubtless a useful restraint upon the immediate rulers that they can be put upon their defense, and that one or two of the jury will form an opinion worth having about their conduct, though that of the remainder will probably be several degrees worse than none. Such as it is, this is the amount of benefit to India from the control exercised over the Indian government by the British Parliament and people.
The previous observations illustrate a principle—one that might seem obvious if only more people were aware of it—that while being accountable to the people is the best guarantee for good governance, being accountable to someone else does not have the same effect and can often lead to negative outcomes as much as positive ones. The responsibility of the British rulers in India to the British nation is mostly beneficial because it ensures that when government actions are questioned, there is publicity and discussion; this is useful even if the general public does not fully grasp the issue at hand, as long as there are some individuals who do. A moral responsibility does not hold the collective people accountable, but rather every individual among them who forms a judgment, meaning opinions can be assessed as well as counted. The approval or disapproval from one knowledgeable person can hold more weight than the opinions of thousands who know nothing about the matter. It certainly serves as a useful check on the immediate rulers, as they can be called to defend themselves, and one or two jurors might form a worthwhile opinion on their actions, even if the views of the rest are likely less than helpful. This is the extent of the benefit to India from the oversight of the Indian government by the British Parliament and the public.
It is not by attempting to rule directly a country like India, but by giving it good rulers, that the English people can do their duty to that country; and they can scarcely give it a worse one than an English cabinet minister, who is thinking of English, not Indian politics; who does not remains long enough in office to acquire an intelligent interest in so complicated a subject; upon whom the factitious public opinion got up in Parliament, consisting of two or three fluent speakers, acts with as much force as if it were genuine; while he is under none of the influences of training and position which would lead or qualify him to form an honest opinion of his own. A free country which attempts to govern a distant dependency, inhabited by a dissimilar people, by means of a branch of its own executive, will almost inevitably fail. The only mode which has any chance of tolerable success is to govern through a delegated body of a comparatively permanent character, allowing only a right of inspection and a negative voice to the changeable administration of the state. Such a body did exist in the case of India; and I fear that both India and England will pay a severe penalty for the shortsighted policy by which this intermediate instrument of government was done away with.
It's not by trying to directly rule a country like India, but by providing it with good leaders, that the English people can fulfill their responsibility to that country. They can hardly offer a worse leader than an English cabinet minister who focuses on British, not Indian politics; who doesn't stay in office long enough to gain a real understanding of such a complex issue; who is swayed by the artificial public opinion created in Parliament by a few persuasive speakers, as if it were real; and who lacks the training and background needed to form an honest opinion of his own. A free country that tries to govern a distant territory, populated by a different people, using its own executive branch is almost guaranteed to fail. The only approach that has any chance of moderate success is to govern through a delegated body of a relatively stable nature, giving only the right to oversee and a veto power to the ever-changing state administration. Such a body did exist in the case of India, and I fear that both India and England will face serious consequences for the shortsighted policy that led to the elimination of this intermediary governing body.
It is of no avail to say that such a delegated body can not have all the requisites of good government; above all, can not have that complete and over-operative identity of interest with the governed which it is so difficult to obtain even where the people to be ruled are in some degree qualified to look after their own affairs. Real good government is not compatible with the conditions of the case. There is but a choice of imperfections. The problem is, so to construct the governing body that, under the difficulties of the position, it shall have as much interest as possible in good government, and as little in bad. Now these conditions are best found in an intermediate body. A delegated administration has always this advantage over a direct one, that it has, at all events, no duty to perform except to the governed. It has no interests to consider except theirs. Its own power of deriving profit from misgovernment may be reduced—in the latest Constitution of the East India Company it was reduced—to a singularly small amount; and it can be kept entirely clear of bias from the individual or class interests of any one else. When the home government and Parliament are swayed by such partial influences in the exercise of the power reserved to them in the last resort, the intermediate body is the certain advocate and champion of the dependency before the imperial tribunal. The intermediate body, moreover, is, in the natural course of things, chiefly composed of persons who have acquired professional knowledge of this part of their country's concerns; who have been trained to it in the place itself, and have made its administration the main occupation of their lives. Furnished with these qualifications, and not being liable to lose their office from the accidents of home politics, they identify their character and consideration with their special trust, and have a much more permanent interest in the success of their administration, and in the prosperity of the country which they administer, than a member of a cabinet under a representative constitution can possibly have in the good government of any country except the one which he serves. So far as the choice of those who carry on the management on the spot devolves upon this body, their appointment is kept out of the vortex of party and Parliamentary jobbing, and freed from the influence of those motives to the abuse of patronage for the reward of adherents, or to buy off those who would otherwise be opponents, which are always stronger with statesmen of average honesty than a conscientious sense of the duty of appointing the fittest man. To put this one class of appointments as far as possible out of harm's way is of more consequence than the worst which can happen to all other offices in the state; for, in every other department, if the officer is unqualified, the general opinion of the community directs him in a certain degree what to do; but in the position of the administrators of a dependency where the people are not fit to have the control in their own hands, the character of the government entirely depends on the qualifications, moral and intellectual, of the individual functionaries.
It's pointless to argue that such a delegated body can meet all the requirements of good governance; most importantly, it can't have that complete alignment of interests with the governed, which is hard to achieve even when the people being ruled are somewhat capable of managing their own affairs. Genuine good government just isn't compatible with these conditions. We can only choose between imperfections. The challenge is to create a governing body that, given the difficulties of the situation, has the highest possible interest in good governance and the least interest in bad governance. These conditions are best found in an intermediate body. A delegated administration has this advantage over a direct one: it has no obligations except to the governed. It only considers their interests. The potential for it to benefit from misgovernment can be minimized—in the most recent Constitution of the East India Company, it was reduced to a surprisingly small amount—allowing it to remain unbiased from the individual or class interests of anyone else. When the home government and Parliament are affected by such narrow influences in their reserved power, the intermediate body acts as a clear advocate and supporter of the dependent territory before the imperial authority. Furthermore, over time, this intermediate body is mainly made up of individuals who have gained professional expertise in this area of national concern, who have been trained on the ground, and have made local administration their life's work. Equipped with these qualifications, and not at risk of losing their positions due to domestic political shifts, they align their roles and reputations with their specific responsibilities, giving them a much more lasting interest in the success of their administration and the well-being of the territory they manage than any cabinet member in a representative government has in the good governance of any nation other than the one they represent. As far as the selection of those managing local affairs falls to this body, their appointments are kept clear of the chaos of party politics and Parliamentary maneuvering, free from the incentives to misuse patronage to reward supporters or silence opponents, which are usually stronger for politicians of average integrity than a genuine sense of duty to appoint the best person. Ensuring this particular set of appointments is as safe as possible is more important than the worst outcomes that could occur for any other positions in the government; in every other sector, if an officer isn't qualified, public opinion somewhat guides them on what to do. However, in the case of administrators managing a dependent territory where the people aren't capable of taking control themselves, the nature of the government entirely relies on the moral and intellectual qualifications of the individual officials.
It can not be too often repeated that, in a country like India, every thing depends on the personal qualities and capacities of the agents of government. This truth is the cardinal principle of Indian administration. The day when it comes to be thought that the appointment of persons to situations of trust from motives of convenience, already so criminal in England, can be practiced with impunity in India, will be the beginning of the decline and fall of our empire there. Even with a sincere intention of preferring the best candidate, it will not do to rely on chance for supplying fit persons. The system must be calculated to form them. It has done this hitherto; and because it has done so, our rule in India has lasted, and been one of constant, if not very rapid improvement in prosperity and good administration. As much bitterness is now manifested against this system, and as much eagerness displayed to overthrow it, as if educating and training the officers of government for their work were a thing utterly unreasonable and indefensible, an unjustifiable interference with the rights of ignorance and inexperience. There is a tacit conspiracy between those who would like to job in first-rate Indian offices for their connections here, and those who, being already in India, claim to be promoted from the indigo factory or the attorney's office to administer justice or fix the payments due to government from millions of people. The "monopoly" of the civil service, so much inveighed against, is like the monopoly of judicial offices by the bar; and its abolition would be like opening the bench in Westminster Hall to the first comer whose friends certify that he has now and then looked into Blackstone. Were the course ever adopted of sending men from this country, or encouraging them in going out, to get themselves put into high appointments without having learned their business by passing through the lower ones, the most important offices would be thrown to Scotch cousins and adventurers, connected by no professional feeling with the country or the work, held to no previous knowledge, and eager only to make money rapidly and return home. The safety of the country is, that those by whom it is administered be sent out in youth, as candidates only, to begin at the bottom of the ladder, and ascend higher or not, as, after a proper interval, they are proved qualified. The defect of the East India Company's system was that, though the best men were carefully sought out for the most important posts, yet, if an officer remained in the service, promotion, though it might be delayed, came at last in some shape or other, to the least as well as to the most competent. Even the inferior in qualifications among such a corps of functionaries consisted, it must be remembered, of men who had been brought up to their duties, and had fulfilled them for many years, at lowest without disgrace, under the eye and authority of a superior. But, though this diminished the evil, it was nevertheless considerable. A man who never becomes fit for more than an assistant's duty should remain an assistant all his life, and his juniors should be promoted over him. With this exception, I am not aware of any real defect in the old system of Indian appointments. It had already received the greatest other improvement it was susceptible of, the choice of the original candidates by competitive examination, which, besides the advantage of recruiting from a higher grade of industry and capacity, has the recommendation that under it, unless by accident, there are no personal ties between the candidates for offices and those who have a voice in conferring them.
It can't be said enough that in a country like India, everything relies on the personal qualities and abilities of government officials. This principle is central to Indian administration. The day it’s thought that appointing people to positions of trust based on convenience—already a serious issue in England—can happen without consequence in India will mark the start of our empire's decline there. Even with the sincere intention of choosing the best candidate, we can't just rely on luck to find suitable individuals. The system needs to be designed to develop them. It has done this until now, and because of that, our rule in India has endured and improved steadily, if not rapidly, in terms of prosperity and good governance. At present, there's much resentment toward this system, and people are eager to dismantle it, as if training and preparing government officials for their roles is completely unreasonable and an unjustified interference with the rights of those who lack experience. There’s an unspoken agreement between those looking to secure top Indian positions for their connections back home and those already in India who want promotions from positions like indigo factory workers or attorneys to roles that involve administering justice or managing government payments from millions of people. The "monopoly" of the civil service, which gets criticized so heavily, is comparable to the monopoly of judicial positions by the legal profession; abolishing it would be like allowing anyone into the bench at Westminster Hall just because their friends say they've occasionally read Blackstone. If we ever started sending people from this country or encouraged them to come and secure high positions without first learning their trade by working through the lower ranks, the most important roles would end up going to Scottish relatives and opportunists who have no real connection to the country or its work, with no foundational knowledge, and only a desire to make quick money and return home. To ensure the country's safety, the individuals who manage it need to come out as young candidates and start at the bottom of the ladder, moving up based on their qualifications after a reasonable period. The flaw in the East India Company's system was that while the best individuals were carefully selected for the most crucial positions, promotion was almost guaranteed if an officer remained in service, regardless of their capabilities. Even the less qualified individuals within this group were people who had been trained for their roles and had performed them for many years, usually without disgrace, under the guidance and authority of a superior. However, while this helped mitigate the issue, it was still significant. A person who is only fit for an assistant's role should remain an assistant throughout their career, with their subordinates being promoted over them. Aside from this, I’m not aware of any true shortcomings in the old system of Indian appointments. It had already benefitted from the greatest possible improvement—selecting original candidates through competitive exams, which not only helped recruit from a higher caliber of talent but also ensured that, unless by chance, there were no personal connections between candidates for positions and those who decide on appointments.
It is in no way unjust that public officers thus selected and trained should be exclusively eligible to offices which require specially Indian knowledge and experience. If any door to the higher appointments, without passing through the lower, be opened even for occasional use, there will be such incessant knocking at it by persons of influence that it will be impossible ever to keep it closed. The only excepted appointment should be the highest one of all. The Viceroy of British India should be a person selected from all Englishmen for his great general capacity for government. If he have this, he will be able to distinguish in others, and turn to his own use, that special knowledge and judgment in local affairs which he has not himself had the opportunity of acquiring. There are good reasons why the viceroy should not be a member of the regular service. All services have, more or less, their class prejudices, from which the supreme ruler ought to be exempt. Neither are men, however able and experienced, who have passed their lives in Asia, so likely to possess the most advanced European ideas in general statesmanship, which the chief ruler should carry out with him, and blend with the results of Indian experience. Again, being of a different class, and especially if chosen by a different authority, he will seldom have any personal partialities to warp his appointments to office. This great security for honest bestowal of patronage existed in rare perfection under the mixed government of the crown and the East India Company. The supreme dispensers of office—the governor general and governors—were appointed, in fact though not formally, by the crown, that is, by the general government, not by the intermediate body, and a great officer of the crown probably had not a single personal or political connection in the local service, while the delegated body, most of whom had themselves served in the country, had, and were likely to have, such connections. This guaranty for impartiality would be much impaired if the civil servants of government, even though sent out in boyhood as mere candidates for employment, should come to be furnished, in any considerable proportion, by the class of society which supplies viceroys and governors. Even the initiatory competitive examination would then be an insufficient security. It would exclude mere ignorance and incapacity; it would compel youths of family to start in the race with the same amount of instruction and ability as other people; the stupidest son could not be put into the Indian service, as he can be into the Church; but there would be nothing to prevent undue preference afterwards. No longer, all equally unknown and unheard of by the arbiter of their lot, a portion of the service would be personally, and a still greater number politically, in close relation with him. Members of certain families, and of the higher classes and influential connections generally, would rise more rapidly than their competitors, and be often kept in situations for which they were unfit, or placed in those for which others were fitter. The same influences would be brought into play which affect promotions in the army; and those alone, if such miracles of simplicity there be, who believe that these are impartial, would expect impartiality in those of India. This evil is, I fear, irremediable by any general measures which can be taken under the present system. No such will afford a degree of security comparable to that which once flowed spontaneously from the so-called double government.
It's not unfair that public officials who are specifically selected and trained should be the only ones eligible for positions that require specialized knowledge and experience about India. If any path to higher positions is opened up without having to go through lower ones, even if just occasionally, there will be constant pressure from influential people trying to get in, making it impossible to keep that door shut. The only exception should be the highest position: the Viceroy of British India should be chosen from all Englishmen for their exceptional overall ability to govern. If a Viceroy has that ability, they will be able to recognize and utilize the local knowledge and judgment that they may not have personally acquired. There are good reasons for the Viceroy not to be part of the regular service. All services tend to have their own biases, and the supreme leader should be free from them. Additionally, even the most capable and experienced individuals who have spent their lives in Asia are not as likely to possess the most advanced European ideas in general governance, which the chief ruler should combine with Indian experience. Being from a different class, particularly if chosen by a different authority, means the Viceroy is less likely to have personal biases when making appointments. This level of assurance for fair appointments was notably effective during the combined governance of the crown and the East India Company. The top officials—the Governor-General and governors—were essentially, although not formally, appointed by the crown, meaning the overall government rather than the intermediate entity. A senior crown officer probably had no personal or political ties within the local service, while the appointed body, most of whom had served in the country, did have those connections. This guarantee of impartiality would be greatly weakened if government civil servants, even if sent out as young candidates for employment, came from the same social class that supplies viceroys and governors. Even the initial competitive exam wouldn't ensure fairness. While it would eliminate ignorance and incompetence, it would require well-connected youths to enter the competition with the same level of education and ability as others; the most inept child wouldn’t be able to join the Indian service as they could with the Church. However, there would be nothing to stop favoritism afterward. No longer would everyone be equally unknown to the decision-maker; some in the service would be personally, and even more politically, connected to them. Members of certain families and the higher classes would advance more quickly than their peers and could be kept in positions for which they were unqualified or assigned to roles better suited for others. The same pressures influencing promotions in the military would come into play, and only those naive enough to think promotions are impartial would expect fairness in India. Unfortunately, I believe this issue cannot be fixed by any general measures under the current system. Nothing will provide a level of assurance comparable to what once existed under the so-called double government.
What is accounted so great an advantage in the case of the English system of government at home has been its misfortune in India—that it grew up of itself, not from preconceived design, but by successive expedients, and by the adaptation of machinery originally created for a different purpose. As the country on which its maintenance depended was not the one out of whose necessities it grew, its practical benefits did not come home to the mind of that country, and it would have required theoretic recommendations to render it acceptable. Unfortunately, these were exactly what it seemed to be destitute of; and undoubtedly the common theories of government did not furnish it with such, framed as those theories have been for states of circumstances differing in all the most important features from the case concerned. But in government as in other departments of human agency, almost all principles which have been durable were first suggested by observation of some particular case, in which the general laws of nature acted in some new or previously unnoticed combination of circumstances. The institutions of Great Britain, and those of the United States, have the distinction of suggesting most of the theories of government which, through good and evil fortune, are now, in the course of generations, reawakening political life in the nations of Europe. It has been the destiny of the government of the East India Company to suggest the true theory of the government of a semi-barbarous dependency by a civilized country, and after having done this, to perish. It would be a singular fortune if, at the end of two or three more generations, this speculative result should be the only remaining fruit of our ascendancy in India; if posterity should say of us that, having stumbled accidentally upon better arrangements than our wisdom would ever have devised, the first use we made of our awakened reason was to destroy them, and allow the good which had been in course of being realized to fall through and be lost from ignorance of the principles on which it depended. Dî meliora; but if a fate so disgraceful to England and to civilization can be averted, it must be through far wider political conceptions than merely English or European practice can supply, and through a much more profound study of Indian experience and of the conditions of Indian government than either English politicians, or those who supply the English public with opinions, have hitherto shown any willingness to undertake.
What is considered a significant advantage of the English system of government at home has been a misfortune in India—it developed organically, not from a planned design, but through a series of makeshift solutions and by adapting systems originally created for different purposes. Since the country that relied on it was not the one from whose needs it originated, its practical benefits didn’t resonate with that country, and theoretical endorsements would have been necessary to make it acceptable. Unfortunately, those theoretical recommendations were exactly what it lacked; and indeed, conventional theories of government didn't provide it with any, as those theories were crafted for states with circumstances vastly different from this one. However, just like in other areas of human endeavor, most of the enduring principles have been proposed from observing specific cases where the general laws of nature acted in unique or previously unnoticed combinations. The institutions of Great Britain and the United States have notably inspired many of the government theories that, despite fluctuating fortunes, are currently reviving political life in European nations. The government of the East India Company has had the fate of suggesting the true theory for governing a semi-barbarous dependency by a civilized nation, and after doing so, it has perished. It would be quite ironic if, in two or three generations, this speculative result were the only lasting outcome of our dominance in India; if future generations were to say that, having accidentally discovered better arrangements than we could have ever devised, the first thing we did with our newfound understanding was to destroy them, allowing the good that was being realized to slip away due to ignorance of the principles it relied on. Dî meliora; but if a fate so shameful for England and civilization is to be avoided, it must come from a much broader political vision than what merely English or European practices can provide, along with a much more in-depth analysis of Indian experiences and the conditions of Indian governance than either English politicians or those who share opinions with the English public have shown willingness to undertake so far.
The End
The End
Footnotes:
1 (return)
[ I limit the expression to
past time, because I would say nothing derogatory of a great, and now at
last a free, people, who are entering into the general movement of
European progress with a vigor which bids fair to make up rapidly the
ground they have lost. No one can doubt what Spanish intellect and energy
are capable of; and their faults as a people are chiefly those for which
freedom and industrial ardor are a real specific.]
1 (return)
[ I focus on the past because I don't want to say anything negative about a remarkable, now free, people who are actively participating in the broader movement of European progress with a determination that promises to quickly recover the ground they've lost. No one can question the capabilities of Spanish intellect and energy; their main flaws as a nation are mostly those that can be addressed by freedom and a strong desire for industry.]
2 (return)
[ Italy, which alone can be
quoted as an exception, is only so in regard to the final stage of its
transformation. The more difficult previous advance from the city
isolation of Florence, Pisa, or Milan, to the provincial unity of Tuscany
or Lombardy, took place in the usual manner.]
2 (return)
[ Italy, which can be considered an exception, only stands out regarding the final stage of its transformation. The harder earlier transition from the city isolation of Florence, Pisa, or Milan to the provincial unity of Tuscany or Lombardy happened in the usual way.]
3 (return)
[ This blunder of Mr.
Disraeli (from which, greatly to his credit, Sir John Pakington took an
opportunity soon after of separating himself) is a speaking instance,
among many, how little the Conservative leaders understand Conservative
principles. Without presuming to require from political parties such an
amount of virtue and discernment as that they should comprehend, and know
when to apply, the principles of their opponents, we may yet say that it
would be a great improvement if each party understood and acted upon its
own. Well would it be for England if Conservatives voted consistently for
every thing conservative, and Liberals for every thing liberal. We should
not then have to wait long for things which, like the present and many
other great measures, are eminently both the one and the other. The
Conservatives, as being by the law of their existence the stupidest party,
have much the greatest sins of this description to answer for; and it is a
melancholy truth, that if any measure were proposed on any subject truly,
largely, and far-sightedly conservative, even if Liberals were willing to
vote for it, the great bulk of the Conservative party would rush blindly
in and prevent it from being carried.]
3 (return)
[ This mistake by Mr. Disraeli (from which, to his credit, Sir John Pakington quickly distanced himself) is a clear example, among many, of how poorly the Conservative leaders grasp Conservative principles. Without expecting political parties to possess such a level of integrity and insight that they fully understand and know when to apply their opponents' principles, we can still say it would be a significant improvement if each party acknowledged and acted on its own beliefs. It would greatly benefit England if Conservatives consistently voted for everything conservative and Liberals for everything liberal. We wouldn't have to wait long for matters that, like the current situation and many other important issues, are clearly both. The Conservatives, due to their nature as the least intelligent party, bear the brunt of these kinds of mistakes; and it’s a sad reality that if any truly thoughtful, broad-minded, and forward-thinking conservative measure were proposed, even if Liberals were willing to support it, the majority of the Conservative party would mindlessly rush in and block it.]
4 (return)
[ "Thoughts on Parliamentary
Reform," 2nd ed. p. 32-36.]
4 (return)
[ "Thoughts on Parliamentary Reform," 2nd ed. p. 32-36.]
5 (return)
[ "This expedient has been
recommended both on the score of saving expense and on that of obtaining
the votes of many electors who otherwise would not vote, and who are
regarded by the advocates of the plan as a particularly desirable class of
voters. The scheme has been carried into practice in the election of
poor-law guardians, and its success in that instance is appealed to in
favor of adopting it in the more important case of voting for a member of
the Legislature. But the two cases appear to me to differ in the point on
which the benefits of the expedient depend. In a local election for a
special kind of administrative business, which consists mainly in the
dispensation of a public fund, it is an object to prevent the choice from
being exclusively in the hands of those who actively concern themselves
about it; for the public interest which attaches to the election being of
a limited kind, and in most cases not very great in degree, the
disposition to make themselves busy in the matter is apt to be in a great
measure confined to persons who hope to turn their activity to their own
private advantage; and it may be very desirable to render the intervention
of other people as little onerous to them as possible, if only for the
purpose of swamping these private interests. But when the matter in hand
is the great business of national government, in which every one must take
an interest who cares for any thing out of himself, or who cares even for
himself intelligently, it is much rather an object to prevent those from
voting who are indifferent to the subject, than to induce them to vote by
any other means than that of awakening their dormant minds. The voter who
does not care enough about the election to go to the poll is the very man
who, if he can vote without that small trouble, will give his vote to the
first person who asks for it, or on the most trifling or frivolous
inducement. A man who does not care whether he votes is not likely to care
much which way he votes; and he who is in that state of mind has no moral
right to vote at all; since, if he does so, a vote which is not the
expression of a conviction, counts for as much, and goes as far in
determining the result as one which represents the thoughts and purposes
of a life."—Thoughts, etc., p. 39.]
5 (return)
[ "This approach has been suggested both to save money and to get the votes of many electors who might not vote otherwise, and who are considered a particularly desirable group of voters by supporters of the plan. This method has been implemented in the election of poor-law guardians, and its success there is used as an argument for applying it in the more significant situation of voting for a member of the Legislature. However, these two situations seem to differ in the way the advantages of this approach rely on differing factors. In a local election focused on a specific kind of administrative role, mostly revolving around managing a public fund, it’s important to avoid letting the choice be solely in the hands of those who are actively involved; since the public interest tied to this election is limited and often not very strong, those who engage in it are mostly individuals hoping to gain personal benefits. It might be essential to make it as easy as possible for other people to get involved, just to counteract these private interests. But when it comes to the major business of national government, which should concern everyone who cares about anything beyond themselves, or even about themselves in a thoughtful way, it’s much more important to keep indifferent people from voting than to try to get them to vote through any means other than awakening their latent interest. A voter who doesn’t care enough about the election to show up at the polls is exactly the kind of person who, if they can vote without any effort, will give their vote to the first person who approaches them, or based on the most trivial reasons. A person who doesn’t care about voting is unlikely to care much about how they vote; and someone in that mindset has no moral right to vote at all; because, if they do, a vote that doesn’t express a genuine belief counts just as much and influences the outcome just as significantly as one that reflects the thoughts and intentions of a meaningful life."—Thoughts, etc., p. 39.]
6 (return)
[ Several of the witnesses
before the Committee of the House of Commons in 1860, on the operation of
the Corrupt Practices Prevention Act, some of them of great practical
experience in election matters, were favorable (either absolutely or as a
last resort) to the principle of requiring a declaration from members of
Parliament, and were of opinion that, if supported by penalties, it would
be, to a great degree, effectual. (Evidence, pp. 46, 54-7, 67, 123,
198-202, 208.) The chief commissioner of the Wakefield Inquiry said (in
reference certainly to a different proposal), "If they see that the
Legislature is earnest upon the subject, the machinery will work.... I am
quite sure that if some personal stigma were applied upon conviction of
bribery, it would change the current of public opinion" (pp. 26 and 32). A
distinguished member of the committee (and of the present cabinet) seemed
to think it very objectionable to attach the penalties of perjury to a
merely promissory as distinguished from an assertory oath; but he was
reminded that the oath taken by a witness in a court of justice is a
promissory oath; and the rejoinder (that the witness's promise relates to
an act to be done at once, while the member's would be a promise for all
future time) would only be to the purpose if it could be supposed that the
swearer might forget the obligation he had entered into, or could possibly
violate it unawares: contingencies which, in a case like the present, are
out of the question.
6 (return)
[ Several witnesses who appeared before the House of Commons Committee in 1860 regarding the Corrupt Practices Prevention Act, many of whom had significant practical experience in elections, supported (either fully or as a last option) the idea of needing a declaration from Parliament members. They believed that, if backed by penalties, it could be quite effective. (Evidence, pp. 46, 54-7, 67, 123, 198-202, 208.) The chief commissioner of the Wakefield Inquiry stated (referring to a different proposal), "If they see that the Legislature is serious about the issue, the system will function... I am confident that if a personal stigma were attached to a bribery conviction, it would shift public opinion" (pp. 26 and 32). A notable committee member (and current cabinet member) found it very concerning to impose perjury penalties on a mere promise as opposed to an assertive oath; however, he was reminded that the oath taken by a witness in court is a promise. The counterargument (that the witness's promise is for an immediate action while the member's promise is for the future) would only be relevant if it were assumed that the person swearing could forget their obligation or unintentionally violate it: scenarios that are unlikely in this context.
A more substantial difficulty is, that one of the forms most frequently assumed by election expenditure is that of subscriptions to local charities or other local objects; and it would be a strong measure to enact that money should not be given in charity within a place by the member for it. When such subscriptions are bonâ fide, the popularity which may be derived from them is an advantage which it seems hardly possible to deny to superior riches. But the greatest part of the mischief consists in the fact that money so contributed is employed in bribery, under the euphonious name of keeping up the member's interest. To guard against this, it should be part of the member's promissory declaration that all sums expended by him in the place, or for any purpose connected with it or with any of its inhabitants (with the exception perhaps of his own hotel expenses) should pass through the hands of the election auditor, and be by him (and not by the member himself or his friends) applied to its declared purpose.
A bigger issue is that one of the most common ways election spending happens is through donations to local charities or other local causes. It would be quite a drastic move to say that a member shouldn't donate to charity in their own area. When these donations are genuine, the popularity that comes from them is an advantage that it’s hard to deny goes to wealthier individuals. But most of the harm comes from the fact that money donated is often used for bribery, disguised as maintaining the member's interests. To prevent this, it should be part of the member's official promise that all amounts they spend in the area, or for any purpose related to it or its residents (except maybe for their hotel expenses), should go through the election auditor, who would then allocate them to the stated purpose, not the member or their friends.
The principle of making all lawful expenses of a charge, not upon the candidate, but upon the locality, was upheld by two of the best witnesses (pp. 20, 65-70, 277).]
The idea of covering all legal expenses for a charge, not by the candidate but by the community, was supported by two of the most credible witnesses (pp. 20, 65-70, 277).
7 (return)
[ "As Mr. Lorimer remarks, by
creating a pecuniary inducement to persons of the lowest class to devote
themselves to public affairs, the calling of the demagogue would be
formally inaugurated. Nothing is more to be deprecated than making it the
private interest of a number of active persons to urge the form of
government in the direction of its natural perversion. The indications
which either a multitude or an individual can give when merely left to
their own weaknesses, afford but a faint idea of what those weaknesses
would become when played upon by a thousand flatterers. If there were 658
places of certain, however moderate emolument, to be gained by persuading
the multitude that ignorance is as good as knowledge, and better, it is
terrible odds that they would believe and act upon the lesson."—(Article
in Fraser's Magazine for April, 1859, headed "Recent Writers on
Reform.")]
7 (return)
[ "As Mr. Lorimer points out, creating financial incentives for people at the bottom of the social ladder to get involved in public affairs would officially kick off the era of the demagogue. There's nothing worse than encouraging a group of active individuals to steer the government toward its natural distortion for their own gain. The signals that a crowd or an individual can show when left to their own weaknesses give only a subtle hint of how those weaknesses would be amplified by a thousand sycophants. If there were 658 positions available with a guarantee of even a modest salary for convincing the masses that ignorance is just as good as knowledge, if not better, it’s likely they would buy into that idea and act on it."—(Article in Fraser's Magazine for April, 1859, headed "Recent Writers on Reform.")]
8 (return)
[ Not always, however, the
most recondite; for one of the latest denouncers of competitive
examination in the House of Commons had the näiveté to produce a
set of almost elementary questions in algebra, history, and geography, as
a proof of the exorbitant amount of high scientific attainment which the
Commissioners were so wild as to exact.]
8 (return)
[ Not always, however, the most obscure; for one of the latest critics of competitive exams in the House of Commons had the naivety to present a set of nearly basic questions in algebra, history, and geography, as evidence of the unreasonable level of advanced knowledge that the Commissioners were supposedly demanding.]
9 (return)
[ On Liberty, concluding
chapter; and, at greater length, in the final chapter of "Principles of
Political Economy."]
9 (return)
[ On Liberty, concluding chapter; and, in more detail, in the final chapter of "Principles of Political Economy."]
10 (return)
[ Mr. Calhoun.]
10 (__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__)
[ Mr. Calhoun.]
11 (return)
[ I am speaking here of the
adoption of this improved policy, not, of course, of its original
suggestion. The honor of having been its earliest champion belongs
unquestionably to Mr. Roebuck.]
11 (return)
[ I'm referring to the adoption of this improved policy, not its original proposal. The credit for being its earliest supporter definitely goes to Mr. Roebuck.]
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