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BOHN’S CLASSICAL LIBRARY

Bohn's Classics Library

DIOGENES LAËRTIUS

Dio state of Laërtius


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THE LIVES AND OPINIONS OF
EMINENT PHILOSOPHERS

THE LIVES AND OPINIONS OF
EMINENT PHILOSOPHERS

BY
DIOGENES LAËRTIUS.

DIOGENES LAËRTIUS.

LITERALLY TRANSLATED
By C. D. YONGE, M.A.,
Fellow of the Royal University of London; Regius Professor of English
Literature and Modern History, Queen’s College, Belfast.

LITERALLY TRANSLATED
By C. D. YONGE, M.A.,
Fellow at the Royal University of London; Regius Professor of English Literature and Modern History, Queen's College, Belfast.

Imprimatur of G. Bell and Sons, Ltd

LONDON
G. BELL AND SONS, LTD
1915

LONDON
G. BELL AND SONS, LTD
1915

[Reprinted from Stereotype plates.]

[Reprinted from stereotype plates.]


CONTENTS.

PAGE.
Introduction 1
BOOK I.
Intro 3
Thales 14
Solon 23
Chill 32
Pittacus 35
Prejudice 38
Cleobulus 41
Periander 43
Anacharsis, the Scythian 46
Myson 49
Epimenides 50
Pherecides 53
BOOK II.
Anaximander 57
[vi]Anaximenes 57
Archelaus 62
Socrates 63
Xenophon 75
Aeschines 79
Aristippus 81
Phaedo 96
Euclid 97
Stilpo 100
Crito 103
Simon 104
Glauco 104
Simian 105
Cebes 105
Menedemus 105
BOOK III.
Plato 113
BOOK IV.
Speusippus 152
Xenocrates 154
Polemo 158
Boxes 160
Crantor 161
Arcesilaus 163
Bion 171
Lacydes 176
Carneades 177
[vii]Clitomachus 178
BOOK V.
Aristotle 181
Theophrastus 194
Stratosphere 202
Lycon 205
Demetrius 209
Heraclides 213
BOOK VI.
Antisthenes 217
Diogenes the Cynic 224
Monimus 248
Onesicritus 249
Boxes 249
Metrocles 253
Hipparchia 254
Menippus 256
Menedemus 257
BOOK VII.
Zeno 259
Ariston 318
Herillus 320
Dionysus 321
Cleanthes 322
Sphærus 326
[viii]Chrysippus 327
BOOK VIII.
Pythagoras 338
Empedocles 359
Epicharmus 368
Archytas 369
Alcmaeon 371
Hippasus 371
Philolaus 372
Eudoxus 372
BOOK IX.
Heraclitus 376
Xenophanes 382
Parmenides 384
Melissus 386
Zeno, the Eleatic philosopher 386
Leucippus 388
Democritus 390
Protagoras 397
Diogenes of Apollonia 400
Anaxarchus 400
Pyrrho 402
Timon 420
BOOK X.
Epicurus 424

PREFACE.

Diogenes, the author of the following work, was a native (as is generally believed) of Laërte, in Cilicia, from which circumstance he derived the cognomen of Laërtius. Little is known of him personally, nor is even the age in which he lived very clearly ascertained. But as Plutarch, Sextus Empiricus, and Saturninus are among the writers whom he quotes, he is generally believed to have lived near the end of the second century of our era: although some place him in the time of Alexander Severus, and others as late as Constantine. His work consists of ten books, variously called: The Lives of Philosophers, A History of Philosophy, and The Lives of Sophists. From internal evidence (iii. 47, 29), we learn that he wrote it for a noble lady (according to some, Arria; according to others, Julia, the Empress of Severus), who occupied herself with the study of philosophy, and especially of Plato.

Diogenes, the writer of this work, is believed to have been from Laërte in Cilicia, which is where he got the nickname Laërtius. There's not much information about him personally, and his exact time period isn't clearly known. However, since he cites writers like Plutarch, Sextus Empiricus, and Saturninus, he's generally thought to have lived towards the end of the second century AD, although some place him during the reign of Alexander Severus and others as late as Constantine. His work consists of ten books, which are variously titled: The Lives of Philosophers, A History of Philosophy, and The Lives of Sophists. From what we can gather (iii. 47, 29), he wrote it for a noblewoman (some say Arria; others say Julia, the Empress of Severus), who was interested in studying philosophy, especially Plato.

Diogenes Laërtius divides the philosophy of the Greeks into the Ionic, beginning with Anaximander, and ending with Theophrastus (in which class, he includes the Socratic philosophy and all its various ramifications); and the Italian, beginning with Pythagoras, and ending with Epicurus, in which he includes the Eleatics, as also Heraclitus and the Sceptics. From the minute consideration which he devotes to Epicurus and his system, it has been supposed that he himself belonged to that school.

Diogenes Laërtius classifies Greek philosophy into two main categories: the Ionic, which starts with Anaximander and ends with Theophrastus (including Socratic philosophy and its many offshoots), and the Italian, which begins with Pythagoras and concludes with Epicurus, encompassing the Eleatics, Heraclitus, and the Sceptics. Because he pays close attention to Epicurus and his ideas, many believe that he was part of that school.

His work is the chief source of information we possess[2] concerning the history of Greek philosophy, and is the foundation of nearly all the modern treatises on that subject; some of the most important of which are little more than translations or amplifications of it. It is valuable, as containing a copious collection of anecdotes illustrative of the life and manners of the Greeks; but he has not always been very careful in his selection, and in some parts there is a confusion in his statements that makes them scarcely intelligible. These faults have led some critics to consider the work as it now exists merely a mutilated abridgment of the original. Breslæus, who in the thirteenth century, wrote a Treatise on the Lives and Manners of the Philosophers, quotes many anecdotes and sayings, which seem to be derived from Diogenes, but which are not to be found in our present text; whence Schneider concludes that he had a very different and far more complete copy than has come down to us.

His work is the main source of information we have[2] about the history of Greek philosophy and serves as the basis for nearly all modern writings on the topic; many of the most significant of these are little more than translations or expansions of his work. It's valuable for its extensive collection of anecdotes that highlight the lives and customs of the Greeks; however, he hasn’t always been very careful in his choices, and in some sections, his statements are confused, making them almost impossible to understand. These issues have led some critics to view the work as it currently exists as merely a shortened version of the original. Breslæus, who wrote a Treatise on the Lives and Manners of the Philosophers in the thirteenth century, quotes many anecdotes and sayings that appear to come from Diogenes, but aren’t found in our current text; from this, Schneider concludes that he had a much different and more complete version than what has survived to us.

The text used in the following translation is chiefly that of Huebner, as published at Leipsic, A.D. 1828.

The text used in the following translation mostly comes from Huebner, as published in Leipzig, in 1828.


LIVES AND OPINIONS OF EMINENT PHILOSOPHERS.

BOOK I.

INTRODUCTION.

I. Some say that the study of philosophy originated with the barbarians. In that among the Persians there existed the Magi,[1] and among the Babylonians or Assyrians the Chaldæi,[2] among the Indians the Gymnosophistæ,[3] and among the Celts and Gauls men who were called Druids[4] and[4] Semnothei, as Aristotle relates in his book on Magic, and Sotion in the twenty-third book of his Succession of Philosophers. Besides those men there were the Phœnician Ochus, the Thracian Zamolxis,[5] and the Libyan Atlas. For the[5] Egyptians say that Vulcan was the son of Nilus, and that he was the author of philosophy, in which those who were especially eminent were called his priests and prophets.

I. Some people argue that the study of philosophy began with the so-called barbarians. Among the Persians, there were the Magi,[1] among the Babylonians or Assyrians the Chaldæi,[2] among the Indians the Gymnosophists,[3] and among the Celts and Gauls were individuals known as Druids[4] and Semnothei, as Aristotle mentions in his book on Magic, and Sotion in the twenty-third book of his Succession of Philosophers. In addition to these figures, there were the Phoenician Ochus, the Thracian Zamolxis,[5] and the Libyan Atlas. The Egyptians claim that Vulcan was the son of Nilus and that he was the founder of philosophy, where those who were particularly distinguished were referred to as his priests and prophets.

II. From his age to that of Alexander, king of the Macedonians were forty-eight thousand eight hundred and sixty-three years, and during this time there were three hundred and seventy-three eclipses of the sun, and eight hundred and thirty-two eclipses of the moon.

II. From his age to that of Alexander, king of the Macedonians, there were forty-eight thousand eight hundred and sixty-three years, and during this time, there were three hundred seventy-three solar eclipses and eight hundred thirty-two lunar eclipses.

Again, from the time of the Magi, the first of whom was Zoroaster the Persian, to that of the fall of Troy, Hermodorus the Platonic philosopher, in his treatise on Mathematics, calculates that fifteen thousand years elapsed. But Xanthus the Lydian says that the passage of the Hellespont by Xerxes took place six thousand years after the time of Zoroaster,[6] and that after him there was a regular succession[6] of Magi under the names of Ostanes and Astrampsychos and Gobryas and Pazatas, until the destruction of the Persian empire by Alexander.

Again, from the time of the Magi, the first of whom was Zoroaster the Persian, to the fall of Troy, Hermodorus the Platonic philosopher calculates in his treatise on Mathematics that fifteen thousand years passed. But Xanthus the Lydian states that Xerxes' crossing of the Hellespont occurred six thousand years after Zoroaster,[6] and that after him, there was a continuous line of Magi under the names of Ostanes, Astrampsychos, Gobryas, and Pazatas, until the Persian empire was destroyed by Alexander.

III. But those who say this, ignorantly impute to the barbarians the merits of the Greeks, from whom not only all philosophy, but even the whole human race in reality originated. For Musæus was born among the Athenians, and Linus among the Thebans; and they say that the former, who was the son of Eumolpus, was the first person who taught the system of the genealogy of the gods, and who invented the spheres; and that he taught that all things originated in one thing, and when dissolved returned to that same thing; and that he died at Phalerum, and that this epitaph was inscribed on his tomb:—

III. But those who say this mistakenly credit the barbarians with the achievements of the Greeks, from whom not only all philosophy but the entire human race actually came. Musæus was born among the Athenians, and Linus among the Thebans; and they say that Musæus, the son of Eumolpus, was the first to teach the system of the genealogy of the gods and invented the spheres. He taught that everything originated from one source and, when it dissolved, returned to that same source. They say he died at Phalerum, and this epitaph was inscribed on his tomb:—

Phalerum’s soil beneath this tomb contains
Musæus dead, Eumolpus’ darling son.

And it is from the father of Musæus that the family called Eumolpidæ among the Athenians derive their name. They say too that Linus was the son of Mercury and the Muse Urania; and that he invented a system of Cosmogony, and of the motions of the sun and moon, and of the generation of animals and fruits; and the following is the beginning of his poem,

And the family known as the Eumolpidæ among the Athenians gets their name from the father of Musæus. They also say that Linus was the son of Mercury and the Muse Urania; he created a system of Cosmogony, explaining the movements of the sun and moon, as well as the generation of animals and fruits. Here’s the beginning of his poem,

There was a time when all the present world
Uprose at once.

From which Anaxagoras derived his theory, when he said that[7] all things had been produced at the same time, and that then intellect had come and arranged them all in order.

From which Anaxagoras got his theory, when he stated that[7] all things were created at the same time, and then intellect came along and organized them all.

They say, moreover, that Linus died in Eubœa, having been shot with an arrow by Apollo, and that this epitaph was set over him:—

They also say that Linus died in Euboea, shot with an arrow by Apollo, and that this epitaph was placed over him:—

The Theban Linus sleeps beneath this ground,
Urania’s son with fairest garlands crown’d.

IV. And thus did philosophy arise among the Greeks, and indeed its very name shows that it has no connection with the barbarians. But those who attribute its origin to them, introduce Orpheus the Thracian, and say that he was a philosopher, and the most ancient one of all. But if one ought to call a man who has said such things about the gods as he has said, a philosopher, I do not know what name one ought to give to him who has not scrupled to attribute all sorts of human feelings to the gods, and even such discreditable actions as are but rarely spoken of among men; and tradition relates that he was murdered by women;[7] but there is an inscription at Dium in Macedonia, saying that he was killed by lightning, and it runs thus:—

IV. And so philosophy came about among the Greeks, and its very name indicates that it has no ties to the barbarians. However, some people credit its origins to them and introduce Orpheus the Thracian, claiming he was a philosopher, the very first of all. But if we’re supposed to call someone a philosopher based on what he said about the gods, then I’m not sure what to call someone who has no hesitation in attributing all kinds of human emotions to the gods, including those shameful actions rarely mentioned among people; and tradition says he was killed by women;[7] but there is an inscription at Dium in Macedonia stating that he was struck down by lightning, and it reads as follows:—

Here the bard buried by the Muses lies,
The Thracian Orpheus of the golden lyre;
Whom mighty Jove, the Sovereign of the skies,
Removed from earth by his dread lightn’ng’s fire.

V. But they who say that philosophy had its rise among the barbarians, give also an account of the different systems prevailing among the various tribes. And they say that the Gymnosophists and the Druids philosophize, delivering their apophthegms in enigmatical language, bidding men worship the gods and do no evil, and practise manly virtue.

V. But those who claim that philosophy started among the barbarians also describe the different systems that existed among the various tribes. They say that the Gymnosophists and the Druids engage in philosophical thinking, sharing their teachings in mysterious language, urging people to worship the gods, avoid wrongdoing, and embody strong virtues.

VI. Accordingly Clitarchus, in his twelfth book, says that the Gymnosophists despise death, and that the Chaldæans study astronomy and the science of soothsaying—that the Magi occupy themselves about the service to be paid to the gods, and about sacrifices and prayers, as if they were the only people to whom the deities listen: and that they deliver accounts of the existence and generation of the gods, saying that they are fire, and earth, and water; and they condemn the use of images, and above all things do they condemn those who say that the gods are male and female; they speak much of justice, and think it impious to destroy the bodies of the dead by fire; they allow men to marry their mothers or their daughters, as Sotion tells us in his twenty-third book; they study the arts of soothsaying and divination, and assert that the gods reveal their will to them by those sciences. They teach also that the air is full of phantoms, which, by emanation and a sort of evaporation, glide into the sight of those who have a clear perception; they forbid any extravagance of ornament, and the use of gold; their garments are white, their beds are made of leaves, and vegetables are their food, with cheese and coarse bread; they use a rush for a staff, the top of which they run into the cheese, and so taking up a piece of it they eat it. Of all kinds of magical divination they are ignorant, as Aristotle asserts in his book on Magic, and Dinon in the fifth book of his Histories. And this writer says, that the name of Zoroaster being interpreted means, a sacrifice to the stars; and Hermodorus makes the same statement. But Aristotle, in the first book of his Treatise on Philosophy, says, that the Magi are more ancient than the Egyptians; and that according to them there are two principles, a good demon and an evil demon, and that the name of the one is Jupiter or Oromasdes, and that of the other Pluto or Arimanius. And Hermippus gives the same account in the first book of his History of the Magi; and so does Eudoxus in his Period; and so does Theopompus in the eighth book of his History of the Affairs of Philip; and this last writer tells us also, that according to the Magi men will have a resurrection and be immortal, and that what exists now will exist hereafter under its own present name; and Eudemus of Rhodes coincides in this statement. But Hecatæus says, that according to their doctrines the gods also are beings who have been born. But Clearchus the Solensian, in his Treatise on[9] Education says, that the Gymnosophists are descendants of the Magi; and some say that the Jews also are derived from them. Moreover, those who have written on the subject of the Magi condemn Herodotus; for they say that Xerxes would never have shot arrows against the sun, or have put fetters on the sea, as both sun and sea have been handed down by the Magi as gods, but that it was quite consistent for Xerxes to destroy the images of the gods.

VI. Clitarchus, in his twelfth book, states that the Gymnosophists have no fear of death, and the Chaldæans study astronomy and divination. The Magi focus on rituals to honor the gods, including sacrifices and prayers, believing they are the only ones to whom the deities listen. They offer accounts of the existence and creation of the gods, claiming they are composed of fire, earth, and water. They reject the use of images and especially condemn the notion that the gods have male and female forms. They frequently discuss justice and consider it immoral to burn the bodies of the dead. They permit men to marry their mothers or daughters, as Sotion notes in his twenty-third book. They engage in divination and claim that the gods communicate their will through these practices. They also teach that the air is filled with spirits that can be perceived by those who possess clarity of vision. They prohibit excessive ornamentation and the use of gold; their clothing is white, their beds are made from leaves, and they subsist on vegetables, cheese, and coarse bread. They use a rush for a staff, poking it into cheese to eat. They are unaware of any forms of magical divination, as Aristotle mentions in his book on Magic, and Dinon confirms in the fifth book of his Histories. This writer also explains that the name Zoroaster means “a sacrifice to the stars,” a claim echoed by Hermodorus. Aristotle, in the first book of his Treatise on Philosophy, asserts that the Magi predate the Egyptians and that they believe in two principles: a good spirit and an evil spirit, named Jupiter or Oromasdes and Pluto or Arimanius, respectively. Hermippus recounts the same in the first book of his History of the Magi, as does Eudoxus in his Period, and Theopompus in the eighth book of his History of the Affairs of Philip. This last writer also tells us that the Magi believe in the resurrection and immortality of humans, asserting that what exists now will persist in the future under its current name. Eudemus of Rhodes agrees with this view. Hecatæus notes that, according to their beliefs, the gods are also beings that have been born. Clearchus the Solensian, in his Treatise on Education, states that the Gymnosophists are descendants of the Magi, and some claim the Jews also originate from them. Furthermore, those who have written about the Magi criticize Herodotus, arguing that Xerxes would never have shot arrows at the sun or shackled the sea, both of which the Magi regard as gods; however, it was entirely consistent for Xerxes to destroy the images of the gods.

VII. The following is the account that authors give of the philosophy of the Egyptians, as bearing on the gods and on justice. They say that the first principle is matter; then that the four elements were formed out of matter and divided, and that some animals were created, and that the sun and moon are gods, of whom the former is called Osiris and the latter Isis, and they are symbolised under the names of beetles and dragons, and hawks, and other animals, as Manetho tells us in his abridged account of Natural Philosophy, and Hecatæus confirms the statement in the first book of his History of the Philosophy of the Egyptians. They also make images of the gods, and assign them temples because they do not know the form of God. They consider that the world had a beginning and will have an end, and that it is a sphere; they think that the stars are fire, and that it is by a combination of them that the things on earth are generated; that the moon is eclipsed when it falls into the shadow of the earth; that the soul is eternal and migratory; that rain is caused by the changes of the atmosphere; and they enter into other speculations on points of natural history, as Hecatæus and Aristagoras inform us.

VII. Here’s the account that authors give about Egyptian philosophy regarding the gods and justice. They say that the first principle is matter; then the four elements were formed from matter and separated, leading to the creation of some animals, and that the sun and moon are gods, with the sun being called Osiris and the moon Isis. They are represented by symbols like beetles, dragons, hawks, and other animals, as Manetho explains in his summary of Natural Philosophy, which Hecatæus also supports in the first book of his History of the Philosophy of the Egyptians. They create images of the gods and build temples for them because they don’t know the true form of God. They believe that the world had a beginning and will have an end, and that it is spherical; they think that the stars are fire, and that it’s through a combination of these that things on Earth come to be. They believe the moon is eclipsed when it falls into the earth's shadow; that the soul is eternal and migratory; that rain happens due to changes in the atmosphere; and they explore other ideas about natural history, as Hecatæus and Aristagoras inform us.

They also have made laws about justice, which they attribute to Mercury, and they consider those animals which are useful to be gods. They claim to themselves the merit of having been the inventors of geometry, and astrology, and arithmetic. So much then for the subject of invention.

They have also created laws about justice, which they attribute to Mercury, and they consider animals that are useful to be gods. They take credit for being the inventors of geometry, astrology, and arithmetic. That’s all for the topic of invention.

VIII. But Pythagoras was the first person who invented the term Philosophy, and who called himself a philosopher; when he was conversing at Sicyon with Leon, who was tyrant of the Sicyonians or of the Phliasians (as Heraclides Ponticus relates in the book which he wrote about a dead woman); for he said that no man ought to be called wise, but only God. For formerly what is now called philosophy (φιλοσοφία) was called[10] wisdom (σοφία), and they who professed it were called wise men (σοφοὶ), as being endowed with great acuteness and accuracy of mind; but now he who embraces wisdom is called a philosopher (φιλόσοφος).

VIII. But Pythagoras was the first person to come up with the term Philosophy and to call himself a philosopher. He was having a conversation in Sicyon with Leon, who was the ruler of the Sicyonians or the Phliasians (as Heraclides Ponticus mentions in his book about a dead woman); he stated that no one should be called wise except for God. In the past, what we now call philosophy (φιλοσοφία) was referred to as wisdom (σοφία), and those who practiced it were seen as wise men (σοφοὶ), known for their keen insight and precision of thought; but now, anyone who seeks wisdom is called a philosopher (φιλόσοφος).

But the wise men were also called Sophists. And not only they, but poets also were called Sophists: as Cratinus in his Archilochi calls Homer and Hesiod, while praising them highly.

But the wise men were also called Sophists. And not just them, poets were also referred to as Sophists: as Cratinus in his Archilochi calls Homer and Hesiod while giving them high praise.

IX. Now these were they who were accounted wise men. Thales, Solon, Periander, Cleobulus, Chilo, Bias, Pittacus. To these men add Anacharsis the Scythian, Myson the Chenean, Pherecydes the Syrian, and Epimenides the Cretan; and some add, Pisistratus, the tyrant: These then are they who were called the wise men.

IX. These were the individuals recognized as wise men: Thales, Solon, Periander, Cleobulus, Chilo, Bias, Pittacus. To this list, add Anacharsis the Scythian, Myson the Chenean, Pherecydes the Syrian, and Epimenides the Cretan; some also include Pisistratus, the tyrant. These are the ones who were referred to as the wise men.

X. But of Philosophy there arose two schools. One derived from Anaximander, the other from Pythagoras. Now, Thales had been the preceptor of Anaximander, and Pherecydes of Pythagoras. And the one school was called the Ionian, because Thales, being an Ionian (for he was a native of Miletus), had been the tutor of Anaximander;—but the other was called the Italian from Pythagoras, because he spent the chief part of his life in Italy. And the Ionic school ends with Clitomachus, and Chrysippus, and Theophrastus; and the Italian one with Epicurus; for Anaximander succeeded Thales, and he was succeeded again by Anaximenes, and he by Anaxagoras, and he by Archelaus, who was the master of Socrates, who was the originator of moral philosophy. And he was the master of the sect of the Socratic philosophers, and of Plato, who was the founder of the old Academy; and Plato’s pupils were Speusippus and Xenocrates; and Polemo was the pupil of Xenocrates, and Crantor and Crates of Polemo. Crates again was the master of Arcesilaus, the founder of the Middle Academy, and his pupil was Lacydes, who gave the new Academy its distinctive principles. His pupil was Carneades, and he in his turn was the master of Clitomachus. And this school ends in this way with Clitomachus and Chrysippus.

X. But two schools of Philosophy emerged. One came from Anaximander, and the other from Pythagoras. Thales had been Anaximander’s teacher, while Pherecydes taught Pythagoras. The first school was called the Ionian because Thales, being an Ionian (as he was from Miletus), was Anaximander’s mentor; the other was named the Italian from Pythagoras, who spent most of his life in Italy. The Ionian school concluded with Clitomachus, Chrysippus, and Theophrastus; while the Italian school ended with Epicurus. Anaximander followed Thales, and was succeeded by Anaximenes, then Anaxagoras, and Archelaus, who taught Socrates, the founder of moral philosophy. Socrates led the group of Socratic philosophers, including Plato, who established the old Academy. Plato’s students were Speusippus and Xenocrates; Polemo was a student of Xenocrates, while Crantor and Crates studied under Polemo. Crates then taught Arcesilaus, who founded the Middle Academy, and his student was Lacydes, who developed the new Academy’s distinctive principles. His student was Carneades, who in turn mentored Clitomachus. This school concludes with Clitomachus and Chrysippus.

Antisthenes was the pupil of Socrates, and the master of Diogenes the Cynic; and the pupil of Diogenes was Crates the Theban; Zeno the Cittiæan was his; Cleanthes was his; Chrysippus was his. Again it ends with Theophrastus in the following manner:—

Antisthenes was a student of Socrates and the teacher of Diogenes the Cynic; Diogenes then taught Crates the Theban; Zeno the Cittiæan was his student; Cleanthes was his student; and Chrysippus was his. It then concludes with Theophrastus in the following way:—

Aristotle was the pupil of Plato, Theophrastus the pupil of Aristotle; and in this way the Ionian school comes to an end.

Aristotle was a student of Plato, and Theophrastus was a student of Aristotle; this marks the end of the Ionian school.

Now the Italian school was carried on in this way. Pythagoras was the pupil of Pherecydes; his pupil was Telauges his son; he was the master of Xenophanes, and he of Parmenides; Parmenides of Zeno the Eleatic, he of Leucippus, he of Democritus: Democritus had many disciples, the most eminent of whom were Nausiphanes and Nausicydes, and they were the masters of Epicurus.

Now the Italian school was conducted like this. Pythagoras was a student of Pherecydes; his student was Telauges, his son; he taught Xenophanes, and Xenophanes taught Parmenides; Parmenides taught Zeno the Eleatic, who taught Leucippus, who in turn taught Democritus: Democritus had many followers, the most notable of whom were Nausiphanes and Nausicydes, and they were the teachers of Epicurus.

XI. Now, of Philosophers some were dogmatic, and others were inclined to suspend their opinions. By dogmatic, I mean those who explain their opinions about matters, as if they could be comprehended. By those who suspend their opinions, I mean those who give no positive judgment, thinking that these things cannot be comprehended. And the former class have left many memorials of themselves; but the others have never written a line; as for instance, according to some people, Socrates, and Stilpo, and Philippus, and Menedemus, and Pyrrho, and Theodorus, and Carneades, and Bryson; and, as some people say, Pythagoras, and Aristo of Chios, except that he wrote a few letters. There are some men too who have written one work only, Melissus, Parmenides, and Anaxagoras; but Zeno wrote many works, Xenophanes still more; Democritus more, Aristotle more, Epicurus more, and Chrysippus more.

XI. Some philosophers were dogmatic, while others preferred to hold off on their opinions. By dogmatic, I mean those who expressed their views on subjects as if they could be fully understood. By those who suspend their opinions, I refer to those who don’t make definite judgments, believing these matters are not truly comprehensible. The first group has left behind many records of their thoughts; however, the second group has never written anything down. For example, Socrates, Stilpo, Philippus, Menedemus, Pyrrho, Theodorus, Carneades, and Bryson are considered part of this group, as well as Pythagoras and Aristo of Chios, aside from a few letters he wrote. There are also some who have only produced a single work, like Melissus, Parmenides, and Anaxagoras; but Zeno wrote many works, Xenophanes even more, Democritus more than that, Aristotle even more, Epicurus more still, and Chrysippus the most.

XII. Again, of philosophers some derived a surname from cities, as, the Elians, and Megaric sect, the Eretrians, and the Cyrenaics. Some from the places which they frequented, as the Academics and Stoics. Some from accidental circumstances, as the Peripatetics; or, from jests, as the Cynics. Some again from their dispositions, as the Eudæmonics; some from an opinion, as the Elenctic, and Analogical schools. Some from their masters, as the Socratic and Epicurean philosophers; and so on. The Natural Philosophers were so called from their study of nature; the Ethical philosophers from their investigation of questions of morals (περὶ τὰ ἔθη). The Dialecticians are they who devote themselves to quibbling on words.

XII. Some philosophers got their names from the cities they were from, like the Elians, the Megarians, the Eretrians, and the Cyrenaics. Others took their names from the places they often visited, like the Academics and Stoics. Some were named after random circumstances, like the Peripatetics, or from jokes, like the Cynics. Some were named based on their attitudes, like the Eudæmonics; others from their beliefs, like the Elenctic and Analogical schools. Some were named after their teachers, such as the Socratic and Epicurean philosophers; and so on. The Natural Philosophers were named for their focus on nature, while the Ethical philosophers were known for their exploration of moral questions (περὶ τὰ ἔθη). The Dialecticians are those who focus on arguing about words.

XIII. Now there are three divisions of philosophy. Natural, Ethical, and Dialectic. Natural philosophy occupies[12] itself about the world and the things in it; Ethical philosophy about life, and the things which concern us; Dialectics are conversant with the arguments by which both the others are supported.

XIII. Now there are three branches of philosophy: Natural, Ethical, and Dialectic. Natural philosophy focuses on the world and everything in it; Ethical philosophy deals with life and the things that matter to us; Dialectics examine the arguments that support both of the other branches.

Natural philosophy prevailed till the time of Archelaus; but after the time of Socrates, Ethical philosophy was predominant; and after the time of Zeno the Eleatic, Dialectic philosophy got the upper hand.

Natural philosophy was dominant until the time of Archelaus; but after Socrates, Ethical philosophy took over; and after Zeno the Eleatic, Dialectic philosophy became the leading thought.

Ethical philosophy was subdivided into ten sects; the Academic, the Cyrenaic, the Elian, the Megaric, the Cynic, the Eretrian, the Dialectic, the Peripatetic, the Stoic, and the Epicurean. Of the old Academic school Plato was the president; of the middle, Arcesilaus; and of the New, Lacydes:—the Cyrenaic school was founded by Aristippus the Cyrenian; the Elian, by Phædo, of Elis; the Megaric, by Euclid, of Megara; the Cynic, by Antisthenes, the Athenian; the Eretrian, by Menedemus, of Eretria; the Dialectic by Clitomachus, the Carthaginian; the Peripatetic, by Aristotle, the Stagirite; the Stoic, by Zeno, the Cittiæan; the Epicurean school derives its name from Epicurus, its founder.

Ethical philosophy was divided into ten schools: the Academic, the Cyrenaic, the Elian, the Megaric, the Cynic, the Eretrian, the Dialectic, the Peripatetic, the Stoic, and the Epicurean. The old Academic school was led by Plato; the middle one by Arcesilaus; and the New Academy by Lacydes. The Cyrenaic school was founded by Aristippus from Cyrene; the Elian by Phaedo from Elis; the Megaric by Euclid from Megara; the Cynic by Antisthenes from Athens; the Eretrian by Menedemus from Eretria; the Dialectic by Clitomachus from Carthage; the Peripatetic by Aristotle from Stagira; the Stoic by Zeno from Citium; and the Epicurean school takes its name from its founder, Epicurus.

But Hippobotus, in his Treatise on Sects, says that there are nine sects and schools: first, the Megaric; secondly, the Eretrian; thirdly, the Cyrenaic; fourthly, the Epicurean; fifthly, the Annicerean; sixthly, the Theodorean; seventhly, the sect of Zeno and the Stoics; eighthly, that of the Old Academy; and ninthly, the Peripatetic;—not counting either the Cynic, or the Eliac, or the Dialectic school. That also which is called the Pyrrhonean is repudiated by many writers, on account of the obscurity of its principles. But others consider that in some particulars it is a distinct sect, and in others not. For it does appear to be a sect—for what we call a sect, say they, is one which follows, or appears to follow, a principle which appears to it to be the true one; on which principle we correctly call the Sceptics a sect. But if by the name sect we understand those who incline to rules which are consistent with the principles which they profess, then the Pyrrhonean cannot be called a sect, for they have no rules or principles.

But Hippobotus, in his Treatise on Sects, states that there are nine sects and schools: first, the Megaric; second, the Eretrian; third, the Cyrenaic; fourth, the Epicurean; fifth, the Annicerean; sixth, the Theodorean; seventh, the sect of Zeno and the Stoics; eighth, that of the Old Academy; and ninth, the Peripatetic—not including the Cynic, the Eliac, or the Dialectic school. The Pyrrhonean sect is also rejected by many writers because its principles are unclear. However, some believe it is a distinct sect in certain aspects and not in others. They argue that it is a sect because what we call a sect is one that follows, or seems to follow, a principle it believes to be true; thus, the Sceptics can be correctly classified as a sect. But if we define a sect as those who adhere to rules that align with their professed principles, then the Pyrrhonean cannot be considered a sect since they have no rules or principles.

These, then, are the beginnings, these are the successive masters, these are the divisions, and schools of philosophy.

These are the beginnings, these are the successive teachers, these are the branches, and schools of philosophy.

XIV. Moreover, it is not long ago, that a new Eclectic[13] school was set up by Potamo, of Alexandria, who picked out of the doctrines of each school what pleased him most. And as he himself says, in his Elementary Instruction, he thinks that there are certain criteria of truth: first of all the faculty which judges, and this is the superior one; the other that which is the foundation of the judgment, being a most exact appearance of the objects. And the first principles of everything he calls matter, and the agent, and the quality, and the place. For they show out of what, and by what, and how, and where anything is done. The end is that to which everything is referred; namely, a life made perfect with every virtue, not without the natural and external qualities of the body.

XIV. Not long ago, a new Eclectic[13] school was established by Potamo from Alexandria, who selected the aspects of each school's teachings that he liked best. In his Elementary Instruction, he states that he believes there are certain criteria for truth: first, the faculty that judges, which is the higher one; and second, the foundation of judgment, which is a very accurate perception of the objects. He refers to the basic principles of everything as matter, the agent, quality, and place. These principles explain what something is made from, how it is done, and where it occurs. The ultimate goal is what everything aims for: a life completed with every virtue, incorporating both the natural and external qualities of the body.

But we must now speak of the men themselves; and first of all about Thales.

But we now need to talk about the men themselves, starting with Thales.

LIFE OF THALES.

I. Thales, then, as Herodotus and Duris and Democritus say, was the son of Euxamius and Cleobule; of the family of the Thelidæ, who are Phœnicians by descent, among the most noble of all the descendants of Cadmus and Agenor, as Plato testifies. And he was the first man to whom the name of Wise was given, when Damasius was Archon at Athens, in whose time also the seven wise men had that title given to them, as Demetrius Phalereus records in his Catalogue of the Archons. He was enrolled as a citizen at Miletus when he came thither with Neleus, who had been banished from Phœnicia; but a more common statement is that he was a native Milesian, of noble extraction.

I. Thales, according to Herodotus, Duris, and Democritus, was the son of Euxamius and Cleobule; he belonged to the Thelidæ family, who are of Phoenician descent and among the most distinguished of all the descendants of Cadmus and Agenor, as noted by Plato. He was the first person to be called Wise when Damasius was Archon in Athens; during this time, the title was also given to the seven wise men, as recorded by Demetrius Phalereus in his Catalogue of the Archons. He became a citizen of Miletus after arriving there with Neleus, who had been exiled from Phoenicia; however, it's more commonly reported that he was a native of Miletus from a noble background.

II. After having been immersed in state affairs he applied himself to speculations in natural philosophy; though, as some people state, he left no writings behind him. For the book on Naval Astronomy, which is attributed to him is said in reality to be the work of Phocus the Samian. But Callimachus was aware that he was the discoverer of the Lesser Bear; for in his Iambics he speaks of him thus:

II. After being involved in government matters, he focused on exploring natural philosophy; although, according to some, he didn’t leave any written works. The book on Naval Astronomy that’s credited to him is actually believed to be by Phocus the Samian. However, Callimachus knew that he was the one who discovered the Lesser Bear; he mentions him in his Iambics like this:

And, he, ’tis said, did first compute the stars
Which beam in Charles’s wain, and guide the bark
Of the Phœnician sailor o’er the sea.

According to others he wrote two books, and no more, about the solstice and the equinox; thinking that everything else was easily to be comprehended. According to other statements, he is said to have been the first who studied astronomy, and who foretold the eclipses and motions of the sun, as Eudemus relates in his history of the discoveries made in astronomy; on which account Xenophanes and Herodotus praise him greatly; and Heraclitus and Democritus confirm this statement.

According to some, he wrote two books, and nothing else, about the solstice and the equinox, believing that everything else was easy to understand. Other sources say he was the first to study astronomy and predict eclipses and the movements of the sun, as Eudemus mentions in his history of astronomical discoveries. For this reason, Xenophanes and Herodotus greatly praise him, and Heraclitus and Democritus support this claim.

III. Some again (one of whom is Chœrilus the poet) say that he was the first person who affirmed that the souls of men were immortal; and he was the first person, too, who[15] discovered the path of the sun from one end of the ecliptic to the other: and who, as one account tells us, defined the magnitude of the sun as being seven hundred and twenty times as great as that of the moon. He was also the first person who called the last day of the month the thirtieth. And likewise the first to converse about natural philosophy, as some say. But Aristotle and Hippias say that he attributed souls also to lifeless things, forming his conjecture from the nature of the magnet, and of amber. And Pamphile relates that he, having learnt geometry from the Egyptians, was the first person to describe a right-angled triangle in a circle, and that he sacrificed an ox in honour of his discovery. But others, among whom is Apollodorus the calculator, say that it was Pythagoras who made this discovery. It was Thales also who carried to their greatest point of advancement the discoveries which Callimachus in his iambics says were first made by Euphebus the Phrygian, such as those of the scalene angle, and of the triangle, and of other things which relate to investigations about lines. He seems also to have been a man of the greatest wisdom in political matters. For when Crœsus sent to the Milesians to invite them to an alliance, he prevented them from agreeing to it, which step of his, as Cyrus got the victory, proved the salvation of the city. But Clytus relates, as Heraclides assures us, that he was attached to a solitary and recluse life.

III. Some, including the poet Chœrilus, claim that he was the first to declare that human souls are immortal. He was also the first to map the sun's path across the ecliptic from one end to the other and, according to one account, calculated the sun's size as being seven hundred and twenty times larger than the moon's. Additionally, he was the first to refer to the last day of the month as the thirtieth. Some also say he was the first to discuss natural philosophy. However, Aristotle and Hippias argue that he believed lifeless objects also have souls, basing his theory on the properties of magnets and amber. Pamphile notes that he learned geometry from the Egyptians and was the first to describe a right-angled triangle within a circle, even sacrificing an ox to celebrate his discovery. Others, including Apollodorus the calculator, contend that Pythagoras was the one who made this discovery. Thales also advanced the findings that, as Callimachus mentions in his iambics, were originally made by Euphebus the Phrygian, such as those regarding the scalene angle, triangle, and other aspects concerning line investigations. He also appeared to be extremely wise in political matters. When Crœsus reached out to the Milesians to propose an alliance, Thales discouraged them from agreeing, and since Cyrus emerged victorious, this decision ultimately saved the city. However, Clytus, as Heraclides confirms, states that he preferred a solitary and reclusive lifestyle.

IV. Some assert that he was married, and that he had a son named Cibissus; others, on the contrary, say that he never had a wife, but that he adopted the son of his sister; and that once being asked why he did not himself become a father, he answered, that it was because he was fond of children. They say, too, that when his mother exhorted him to marry, he said, “No, by Jove, it is not yet time.” And afterwards, when he was past his youth, and she was again pressing him earnestly, he said, “It is no longer time.”

IV. Some claim that he was married and had a son named Cibissus; others, however, insist that he never had a wife and that he adopted his sister’s son. When asked why he didn’t become a father himself, he replied that it was because he loved children. They also say that when his mother urged him to marry, he said, “No, by Jove, it’s not yet time.” Later, when he had passed his youth and she was pressing him again, he said, “It’s no longer time.”

V. Hieronymus, of Rhodes, also tells us, in the second book of his Miscellaneous Memoranda, that when he was desirous to show that it was easy to get rich, he, foreseeing that there would be a great crop of olives, took some large plantations of olive trees, and so made a great deal of money.

V. Hieronymus of Rhodes also mentions in the second book of his Miscellaneous Memoranda that when he wanted to prove how easy it was to get rich, he predicted a big olive harvest, took over some large olive tree plantations, and made a lot of money.

VI. He asserted water to be the principle of all things,[16] and that the world had life, and was full of dæmons: they say, too, that he was the original definer of the seasons of the year, and that it was he who divided the year into three hundred and sixty-five days. And he never had any teacher except during the time that he went to Egypt, and associated with the priests. Hieronymus also says that he measured the Pyramids: watching their shadow, and calculating when they were of the same size as that was. He lived with Thrasybulus the tyrant of Miletus, as we are informed by Minyas.

VI. He claimed that water is the foundation of everything,[16] and believed that the world was alive and populated with spirits. It’s also said that he was the first to define the seasons and that he divided the year into three hundred and sixty-five days. He had no teachers except during his time in Egypt, where he worked with the priests. Hieronymus also mentions that he measured the Pyramids by observing their shadows and calculating when they matched their actual size. He lived with Thrasybulus, the tyrant of Miletus, as noted by Minyas.

VII. Now it is known to every one what happened with respect to the tripod that was found by the fishermen and sent to the wise men by the people of the Milesians. For they say that some Ionian youths bought a cast of their net from some Milesian fishermen. And when the tripod was drawn up in the net there was a dispute about it; until the Milesians sent to Delphi: and the God gave them the following answer:—

VII. Now everyone knows what happened with the tripod that was discovered by the fishermen and sent to the wise men by the people of Miletus. It’s said that some Ionian youths bought a cast of their net from some Milesian fishermen. When the tripod was pulled up in the net, there was a disagreement about it; until the Milesians sent a message to Delphi, and the God gave them the following answer:—

You ask about the tripod, to whom you shall present it;
’Tis for the wisest, I reply, that fortune surely meant it.

Accordingly they gave it to Thales, and he gave it to some one, who again handed it over to another, till it came to Solon. But he said that it was the God himself who was the first in wisdom; and so he sent it to Delphi. But Callimachus gives a different account of this in his Iambics, taking the tradition which he mentions from Leander the Milesian; for he says that a certain Arcadian of the name of Bathycles, when dying, left a goblet behind him with an injunction that it should be given to the first of the wise men. And it was given to Thales, and went the whole circle till it came back to Thales, on which he sent it to Apollo Didymæus, adding (according to Callimachus,) the following distich:—

Accordingly, they handed it to Thales, who passed it on to someone else, and it continued to be traded until it reached Solon. However, he claimed that it was the God himself who was the wisest of all, so he sent it to Delphi. Callimachus tells a different story in his Iambics, referring to a tradition from Leander the Milesian. He says that an Arcadian named Bathycles, when he was dying, left behind a goblet with instructions that it should be given to the wisest man. It was given to Thales and traveled all the way back around until it returned to Thales, who then sent it to Apollo Didymæus, adding (according to Callimachus) the following couplet:—

Thales, who’s twice received me as a prize,
Gives me to him who rules the race of Neleus.

And the prose inscription runs thus:—

And the written inscription goes like this:—

Thales the son of Examius, a Milesian, offers this to Apollo Didymæus, having twice received it from the Greeks as the reward for virtue.

Thales, the son of Examius from Miletus, presents this to Apollo Didymæus, having received it twice from the Greeks as a reward for his virtue.

And the name of the son of Bathycles who carried the goblet[17] about from one to the other, was Thyrion, as Eleusis tells us in his History of Achilles. And Alexander the Myndian agrees with him in the ninth book of his Traditions. But Eudoxus of Cnidos, and Evanthes of Miletus, say that one of the friends of Crœsus received from the king a golden goblet, for the purpose of giving it to the wisest of the Greeks; and that he gave it to Thales, and that it came round to Chilo, and that he inquired of the God at Delphi who was wiser than himself; and that the God replied, Myson, whom we shall mention hereafter. (He is the man whom Eudoxus places among the seven wise men instead of Cleobulus; but Plato inserts his name instead of Periander.) The God accordingly made this reply concerning him:—

And the name of the son of Bathycles, who passed the goblet[17] from one person to another, was Thyrion, as Eleusis tells us in his History of Achilles. Alexander the Myndian also agrees with him in the ninth book of his Traditions. However, Eudoxus of Cnidos and Evanthes of Miletus say that a friend of Crœsus received a golden goblet from the king to give to the wisest of the Greeks; and that he gave it to Thales, who then passed it to Chilo. Chilo inquired of the God at Delphi who was wiser than he was, and the God replied, Myson, whom we will mention later. (He is the person Eudoxus includes among the seven wise men instead of Cleobulus, but Plato places his name instead of Periander.) The God therefore made this statement about him:—

I say that Myson, the Œtæan sage,
The citizen of Chen, is wiser far
In his deep mind than you.

The person who went to the temple to ask the question was Anacharsis; but again Dædacus, the Platonic philosopher, and Clearchus, state that the goblet was sent by Crœsus to Pittacus, and so was carried round to the different men. But Andron, in his book called The Tripod, says that the Argives offered the tripod as a prize for excellence to the wisest of the Greeks; and that Aristodemus, a Spartan, was judged to deserve it, but that he yielded the palm to Chilo; and Alcæus mentions Aristodemus in these lines:—

The person who went to the temple to ask the question was Anacharsis; however, Dædacus, the Platonic philosopher, and Clearchus state that the goblet was sent by Crœsus to Pittacus, and was then passed around to various individuals. But Andron, in his book titled The Tripod, claims that the Argives offered the tripod as a prize for excellence to the wisest of the Greeks; and that Aristodemus, a Spartan, was deemed worthy of it, but he gave the honor to Chilo; and Alcæus mentions Aristodemus in these lines:—

And so they say Aristodemus once
Uttered a truthful speech in noble Sparta:
’Tis money makes the man; and he who’s none,
Is counted neither good nor honourable.

But some say that a vessel fully loaded was sent by Periander to Thrasybulus the tyrant of the Milesians; and that as the ship was wrecked in the sea, near the island of Cos, this tripod was afterwards found by some fishermen. Phanodicus says that it was found in the sea near Athens, and so brought into the city; and then, after an assembly had been held to decide on the disposal, it was sent to Bias—and the reason why we will mention in our account of Bias. Others say that this goblet had been made by Vulcan, and presented by the Gods to Pelops, on his marriage; and that subsequently it came into the possession of Menelaus, and was taken away by Paris[18] when he carried off Helen, and was thrown into the sea near Cos by her, as she said that it would become a cause of battle. And after some time, some of the citizens of Lebedos having bought a net, this tripod was brought up in it; and as they quarrelled with the fishermen about it, they went to Cos; and not being able to get the matter settled there, they laid it before the Milesians, as Miletus was their metropolis; and they sent ambassadors, who were treated with neglect, on which account they made war on the Coans; and after each side had met with many revolutions of fortune, an oracle directed that the tripod should be given to the wisest; and then both parties agreed that it belonged to Thales: and he, after it had gone the circuit of all the wise men, presented it to the Didymæan Apollo. Now, the assignation of the oracle was given to the Coans in the following words:—

But some say that a fully loaded ship was sent by Periander to Thrasybulus, the tyrant of the Milesians; and when the ship was wrecked at sea near the island of Cos, some fishermen later found this tripod. Phanodicus claims it was discovered in the waters near Athens and brought into the city; then, after an assembly was held to decide what to do with it, it was sent to Bias—and we'll explain why in our account of Bias. Others say that this goblet was made by Vulcan and given to Pelops by the Gods on his wedding day; later, it came into the possession of Menelaus and was taken by Paris when he abducted Helen, and she threw it into the sea near Cos, saying it would start a war. After some time, a few citizens of Lebedos bought a net, and this tripod was caught in it; when they argued with the fishermen over it, they went to Cos, and since they couldn’t settle the issue there, they brought it before the Milesians, as Miletus was their home city. They sent ambassadors, who were treated with disrespect, which led them to wage war against the Coans. After both sides faced many ups and downs, an oracle declared that the tripod should be given to the wisest; then both groups agreed it belonged to Thales, who, after it had been seen by all the wise men, offered it to the Didymæan Apollo. Now, the oracle's message was given to the Coans in the following words:—

The war between the brave Ionian race
And the proud Meropes will never cease,
Till the rich golden tripod which the God,
Its maker, cast beneath the briny waves,
Is from your city sent, and justly given
To that wise being who knows all present things,
And all that’s past, and all that is to come.

And the reply given to the Milesians was—

And the response given to the Milesians was—

You ask about the tripod:

and so on, as I have related it before. And now we have said enough on this subject.

and so on, as I have mentioned before. Now we've covered enough on this topic.

But Hermippus, in his Lives, refers to Thales what has been by some people reported of Socrates; for he recites that he used to say that he thanked fortune for three things:—first of all, that he had been born a man and not a beast; secondly, that he was a man and not a woman; and thirdly, that he was a Greek and not a barbarian.

But Hermippus, in his Lives, attributes to Thales something that some people have said about Socrates; he mentions that Socrates used to say he was grateful to fortune for three things: first, that he was born a man and not an animal; second, that he was a man and not a woman; and third, that he was a Greek and not a barbarian.

VIII. It is said that once he was led out of his house by an old woman for the purpose of observing the stars, and he fell into a ditch and bewailed himself, on which the old woman said to him—“Do you, O Thales, who cannot see what is under your feet, think that you shall understand what is in heaven?” Timon also knew that he was an astronomer, and in his Silli he praises him, saying:—

VIII. It is said that once an old woman took him out of his house to look at the stars, and he fell into a ditch and lamented about it. The old woman said to him, “Do you, Thales, who can't see what's right under your feet, really think you can understand what's in the sky?” Timon also recognized him as an astronomer and praised him in his Silli, saying:—

Like Thales, wisest of the seven sages,
That great astronomer.

And Lobon of Argos, says, that which was written by him extends to about two hundred verses; and that the following inscription is engraved upon his statue:—

And Lobon of Argos says that what he wrote is about two hundred verses long, and that the following inscription is engraved on his statue:—

Miletus, fairest of Ionian cities,
Gave birth to Thales, great astronomer,
Wisest of mortals in all kinds of knowledge.

IX. And these are quoted as some of his lines:—

IX. And these are quoted as some of his lines:—

It is not many words that real wisdom proves;
Breathe rather one wise thought,
Select one worthy object,
So shall you best the endless prate of silly men reprove.—

And the following are quoted as sayings of his:—“God is the most ancient of all things, for he had no birth: the world is the most beautiful of things, for it is the work of God: place is the greatest of things, for it contains all things: intellect is the swiftest of things, for it runs through everything: necessity is the strongest of things, for it rules everything: time is the wisest of things, for it finds out everything.”

And here are some of his sayings: “God is the oldest of all things because He had no beginning: the world is the most beautiful because it’s the work of God: space is the greatest because it holds everything: intellect is the fastest because it penetrates everything: necessity is the strongest because it governs everything: time is the wisest because it reveals everything.”

He said also that there was no difference between life and death. “Why, then,” said some one to him, “do not you die?” “Because,” said he, “it does make no difference.” A man asked him which was made first, night or day, and he replied, “Night was made first by one day.” Another man asked him whether a man who did wrong, could escape the notice of the Gods. “No, not even if he thinks wrong,” said he. An adulterer inquired of him whether he should swear that he had not committed adultery. “Perjury,” said he, “is no worse than adultery.” When he was asked what was very difficult, he said, “To know one’s self.” And what was easy, “To advise another.” What was most pleasant? “To be successful.” To the question, “What is the divinity?” he replied, “That which has neither beginning nor end.” When asked what hard thing he had seen, he said, “An old man a tyrant.” When the question was put to him how a man might most easily endure misfortune, he said, “If he saw his enemies more unfortunate still.” When asked how men might live most virtuously and most justly, he said, “If we never do ourselves what we blame in others.” To the question, “Who was[20] happy?” he made answer. “He who is healthy in his body, easy in his circumstances, and well-instructed as to his mind.” He said that men ought to remember those friends who were absent as well as those who were present, and not to care about adorning their faces, but to be beautified by their studies. “Do not,” said he, “get rich by evil actions, and let not any one ever be able to reproach you with speaking against those who partake of your friendship. All the assistance that you give to your parents, the same you have a right to expect from your children.” He said that the reason of the Nile overflowing was, that its streams were beaten back by the Etesian winds blowing in a contrary direction.

He also said that there was no difference between life and death. “Then why,” someone asked him, “don’t you die?” “Because,” he replied, “it doesn’t make a difference.” A man asked him which came first, night or day, and he answered, “Night was created first by one day.” Another man asked whether someone who did wrong could escape the notice of the gods. “No, not even if he thinks wrong,” he said. An adulterer asked him if he should swear that he hadn’t committed adultery. “Lying under oath,” he said, “is no worse than adultery.” When he was asked what was very difficult, he said, “To know oneself.” And what was easy? “To advise others.” What was the most pleasant? “To be successful.” When asked, “What is divinity?” he replied, “That which has neither beginning nor end.” When asked what hard thing he had seen, he said, “An old man who is a tyrant.” When someone asked him how a person could most easily endure misfortune, he said, “By seeing his enemies even more unfortunate.” When asked how people could live most virtuously and most justly, he said, “If we never do ourselves what we criticize in others.” To the question, “Who is happy?” he replied, “He who is healthy in body, comfortable in circumstances, and well-informed in mind.” He said that people should remember their friends who are absent as well as those who are present, and not focus on adorning their faces, but rather be beautified by their studies. “Do not,” he said, “gain wealth through wrongdoing, and let no one ever be able to accuse you of speaking against those who share your friendship. All the support you give to your parents, you have the right to expect from your children.” He explained that the reason the Nile overflows is that its streams are pushed back by the Etesian winds blowing in the opposite direction.

X. Apollodorus, in his Chronicles, says, that Thales was born in the first year of the thirty-fifth Olympiad; and he died at the age of seventy-eight years, or according to the statement of Sosicrates, at the age of ninety, for he died in the fifty-eighth Olympiad, having lived in the time of Crœsus, to whom he promised that he would enable him to pass the Halys without a bridge, by turning the course of the river.

X. Apollodorus, in his Chronicles, states that Thales was born in the first year of the thirty-fifth Olympiad. He died at the age of seventy-eight, although according to Sosicrates, he died at ninety. He passed away in the fifty-eighth Olympiad and lived during the time of Crœsus, to whom he promised that he could help him cross the Halys River without a bridge by redirecting its flow.

XI. There have also been other men of the name of Thales, as Demetrius of Magnesia says, in his Treatise on People and Things of the same name; of whom five are particularly mentioned, an orator of Calatia of a very affected style of eloquence; a painter of Sicyon, a great man; the third was one who lived in very ancient times, in the age of Homer and Hesiod and Lycurgus; the fourth is a man who is mentioned by Duris in his work on Painting; the fifth is a more modern person, of no great reputation, who is mentioned by Dionysius in his Criticisms.

XI. There have also been other men named Thales, as Demetrius of Magnesia states in his Treatise on People and Things of the same name. Five of them are specifically noted: one is an orator from Calatia known for a very affected style of speaking; the second is a renowned painter from Sicyon; the third lived in ancient times, during the era of Homer, Hesiod, and Lycurgus; the fourth is mentioned by Duris in his work on Painting; the fifth is a more modern figure of little reputation, mentioned by Dionysius in his Criticisms.

XII. But this wise Thales died while present as a spectator at a gymnastic contest, being worn out with heat and thirst and weakness, for he was very old, and the following inscription was placed on his tomb:—

XII. But this wise Thales died while watching a gymnastic contest, worn out from heat, thirst, and weakness, as he was very old, and the following inscription was placed on his tomb:—

You see this tomb is small—but recollect,
The fame of Thales reaches to the skies.

I have also myself composed this epigram on him in the first book of my epigrams or poems in various metres:—

I have also written this epigram about him in the first book of my epigrams or poems in different forms:—

O mighty sun, our wisest Thales sat
Spectator of the games, when you did seize upon him;
But you were right to take him near yourself,
Now that his aged sight could scarcely reach to heaven.

XIII. The apophthegm, “know yourself.” is his; though Antisthenes in his Successions, says that it belongs to Phemonoe, but that Chilo appropriated it as his own.

XIII. The saying, “know yourself,” is his; although Antisthenes in his Successions claims that it belongs to Phemonoe, but that Chilo took it for himself.

XIV. Now concerning the seven, (for it is well here to speak of them all together,) the following traditions are handed down. Damon the Cyrenæan, who wrote about the philosophers, reproaches them all, but most especially the seven. And Anaximenes says, that they all applied themselves to poetry. But Dicæarchus says, that they were neither wise men nor philosophers, but merely shrewd men, who had studied legislation. And Archetimus, the Syracusian, wrote an account of their having a meeting at the palace of Cypselus, at which he says that he himself was present. Ephorus says that they all except Thales met at the court of Crœsus. And some say that they also met at the Pandionium,[8] and at Corinth, and at Delphi. There is a good deal of disagreement between different writers with respect to their apophthegms, as the same one is attributed by them to various authors. For instance there is the epigram:—

XIV. Now about the seven (since it’s good to discuss them all together), the following traditions have been passed down. Damon the Cyrenaean, who wrote about the philosophers, criticizes all of them, but especially the seven. Anaximenes says that they all focused on poetry. However, Dicæarchus claims that they were neither wise nor philosophers, but just clever individuals who studied legislation. Archetimus from Syracuse wrote about a meeting they had at the palace of Cypselus, which he states he attended. Ephorus notes that all of them, except Thales, met at the court of Crœsus. Some say they also gathered at the Pandionium,[8], in Corinth, and at Delphi. There’s quite a bit of disagreement among different writers regarding their sayings, as the same saying is attributed to various authors. For example, there’s the epigram:—

Chilo, the Spartan sage, this sentence said:
Seek no excess—all timely things are good.

There is also a difference of opinion with respect to their number. Leander inserts in the number instead of Cleobulus and Myson, Leophantus Gorsias, a native of either Lebedos or Ephesus; and Epimenides, the Cretan; Plato, in his Protagoras, reckons Myson among them instead of Periander. And Ephorus mentions Anacharsis in the place of Myson; some also add Pythagoras to the number. Dicæarchus speaks of four, as universally agreed upon, Thales, Bias, Pittacus, and Solon; and then enumerates six more, of whom we are to select three, namely, Aristodemus, Pamphilus, Chilo the Lacedæmonian, Cleobulus, Anacharsis, and Periander. Some add Acusilaus of Argos, the son of Cabas, or Scabras. But Hermippus, in his Treatise on the Wise Men says that there were altogether seventeen, out of whom different authors selected different individuals to make up the seven. These seventeen were Solon, Thales, Pittacus, Bias, Chilo, Myson,[22] Cleobulus, Periander, Anacharsis, Acusilaus, Epimenides, Leophantus, Pherecydes, Aristodemus, Pythagoras, Lasus the son of Charmantides, or Sisymbrinus, or as Aristoxenus calls him the son of Chabrinus, a citizen of Hermione, and Anaxagoras. But Hippobotus in his Description of the Philosophers enumerates among them Orpheus, Linus, Solon, Periander, Anacharsis, Cleobulus, Myson, Thales, Bias, Pittacus, Epicharmus, and Pythagoras.

There’s also a disagreement about their number. Leander includes Leophantus Gorsias, a resident of either Lebedos or Ephesus, instead of Cleobulus and Myson; and Epimenides, the Cretan; Plato, in his Protagoras, lists Myson among them instead of Periander. Ephorus mentions Anacharsis in place of Myson; some also add Pythagoras to the list. Dicæarchus notes four that everyone agrees on: Thales, Bias, Pittacus, and Solon; then he lists six more, from which we should choose three: Aristodemus, Pamphilus, Chilo the Lacedæmonian, Cleobulus, Anacharsis, and Periander. Some include Acusilaus of Argos, the son of Cabas or Scabras. However, Hermippus, in his Treatise on the Wise Men, claims there were seventeen total, from which different authors picked various individuals to form the seven. These seventeen were Solon, Thales, Pittacus, Bias, Chilo, Myson,[22] Cleobulus, Periander, Anacharsis, Acusilaus, Epimenides, Leophantus, Pherecydes, Aristodemus, Pythagoras, Lasus the son of Charmantides, or Sisymbrinus, or as Aristoxenus refers to him, the son of Chabrinus, a citizen of Hermione, and Anaxagoras. But Hippobotus, in his Description of the Philosophers, lists Orpheus, Linus, Solon, Periander, Anacharsis, Cleobulus, Myson, Thales, Bias, Pittacus, Epicharmus, and Pythagoras among them.

XV. The following letters are preserved as having been written by Thales:—

XV. The following letters are kept as having been written by Thales:—

THALES TO PHERECYDES.

I hear that you are disposed, as no other Ionian has been, to discourse to the Greeks about divine things, and perhaps it will be wiser of you to reserve for your own friends what you write rather than to entrust it to any chance people, without any advantage. If therefore it is agreeable to you, I should be glad to become a pupil of yours as to the matters about which you write; and if you invite me I will come to you to Syros; for Solon the Athenian and I must be out of our senses if we sailed to Crete to investigate the history of that country, and to Egypt for the purpose of conferring with the priests and astronomers who are to be found there, and yet are unwilling to make a voyage to you; for Solon will come too, if you will give him leave, for as you are fond of your present habitation you are not likely to come to Ionia, nor are you desirous of seeing strangers; but you rather, as I hope, devote yourself wholly to the occupation of writing. We, on the other hand, who write nothing, travel over all Greece and Asia.

I hear that you're willing, unlike any other Ionian, to talk to the Greeks about divine matters, and it might be smarter for you to share what you write only with your close friends instead of random people without any benefit. So, if you're okay with it, I’d love to be your student regarding the topics you write about; and if you invite me, I’ll come to you in Syros. Solon, the Athenian, and I must be out of our minds if we sail to Crete to explore that country’s history and to Egypt to meet the priests and astronomers there, yet we're unwilling to make a trip to see you; Solon will join me too if you allow it, because while you seem to love your current place, you're probably not interested in coming to Ionia or meeting new people; instead, I hope you fully focus on your writing. Meanwhile, we, who write nothing, travel all over Greece and Asia.

THALES TO SOLON.

XVI. If you should leave Athens it appears to me that you would find a home at Miletus among the colonists of Athens more suitably than anywhere else, for here there are no annoyances of any kind. And if you are indignant because we Milesians are governed by a tyrant, (for you yourself hate all despotic rulers), still at all events you will find it pleasant to live with us for your companions. Bias has also written to invite you to Priene, and if you prefer taking up your abode[23] in the city of the Prieneans, then we ourselves will come thither and settle near you.

XVI. If you decide to leave Athens, I think you would find a better home in Miletus among the Athenian colonists than anywhere else, because here you won't face any annoyances. And even if you're upset that we Milesians are ruled by a tyrant (since you dislike all despotic leaders), you'll still enjoy living with us as your companions. Bias has also written to invite you to Priene, and if you prefer to make your home in the city of the Prieneans, we’ll come there and settle close to you.

LIFE OF SOLON.

I. Solon the son of Execestides, a native of Salamis, was the first person who introduced among the Athenians, an ordinance for the lowering[9] of debts; for this was the name given to the release of the bodies and possessions of the debtors. For men used to borrow on the security of their own persons, and many became slaves in consequence of their inability to pay; and as seven talents were owed to him as a part of his paternal inheritance when he succeeded to it, he was the first person who made a composition with his debtors, and who exhorted the other men who had money owing to them to do likewise, and this ordinance was called σεισάχθεια; and the reason why is plain. After that he enacted his other laws, which it would take a long time to enumerate; and he wrote them on wooden revolving tablets.

I. Solon, the son of Execestides, from Salamis, was the first to introduce a law among the Athenians to reduce debts; this was the process of freeing debtors from their obligations to repay. People used to borrow money against themselves, and many ended up becoming slaves because they couldn't repay their loans. He owed seven talents as part of his inheritance when he took it over, and he was the first to reach an agreement with his debtors. He encouraged others who were owed money to do the same, and this law was called σεισάχθεια; the reason for this is clear. After that, he created other laws, which would take a long time to list, and he wrote them on wooden rotating tablets.

II. But what was his most important act of all was, when there had been a great dispute about his native land Salamis, between the Athenians and Megarians, and when the Athenians had met with many disasters in war, and had passed a decree that if any one proposed to the people to go to war for the sake of Salamis he should be punished with death, he then pretended to be mad and putting on a crown rushed into the market place, and there he recited to the Athenians by the agency of a crier, the elegies which he had composed, and which were all directed to the subject of Salamis, and by these means he excited them; and so they made war again upon the Megarians and conquered them by means of Solon. And the elegies which had the greatest influence on the Athenians were these:—

II. But his most significant action was when there was a major conflict over his hometown Salamis, between the Athenians and the Megarians. The Athenians had suffered several defeats in battle and had passed a law stating that anyone who suggested going to war for Salamis would be punished by death. He then pretended to be crazy, put on a crown, and ran into the marketplace. There, he used a public crier to share the elegies he had written, all focused on Salamis, which stirred the Athenians. As a result, they went to war again against the Megarians and triumphed with Solon’s help. The elegies that had the biggest impact on the Athenians were these:—

Would that I were a man of Pholegandros,[10]
Or small Sicinna,[11] rather than of Athens:
[24]
For soon this will a common proverb be,
That’s an Athenian who won’t fight for Salamis.

And another was:—

And another was:—

Let’s go and fight for lovely Salamis,
And wipe off this our present infamy.

He also persuaded them to take possession of the Thracian Chersonesus, and in order that it might appear that the Athenians had got possession of Salamis not by force alone, but also with justice, he opened some tombs, and showed that the corpses buried in them were all turned towards the east, according to the Athenian fashion of sepulture; likewise the tombs themselves all looked east, and the titles of the boroughs to which the dead belonged were inscribed on them, which was a custom peculiar to the Athenians. Some also say that it was he who added to the catalogue of Homer, after the lines:—

He also convinced them to take control of the Thracian Chersonesus, and to make it seem like the Athenians had gained possession of Salamis not just through force, but also with fairness, he opened some tombs and pointed out that the bodies buried there were all facing east, following the Athenian burial tradition. The tombs themselves were also oriented east, and the names of the boroughs where the deceased were from were inscribed on them, which was a tradition unique to the Athenians. Some also say that he was the one who added to Homer's catalog, after the lines:—

With these appear the Salaminian bands,
Whom Telamon’s gigantic son commands—

These other verses:—

These other lines:—

In twelve black ships to Troy they steer their course,
And with the great Athenians join their force.[12]

III. And ever after this time the people was willingly obedient to him, and was contented to be governed by him; but he did not choose to be their ruler, and moreover, as Sosicrates relates, he, as far as in him lay, hindered also his relative Pisistratus from being so, when he saw that he was inclined to such a step. Rushing into one of the assemblies armed with a spear and shield, he forewarned the people of the design of Pisistratus, and not only that but told them that he was prepared to assist them; and these were his words: “Ye men of Athens, I am wiser than some of you, and braver than others. Wiser than those of you who do not perceive the treachery of Pisistratus; and braver than those who are aware of it, but out of fear hold their peace.” But the council, being in the interest of Pisistratus, said that he was mad, on which he spoke as follows:—

III. From that point on, the people willingly obeyed him and were happy to be governed by him; however, he didn't want to be their ruler. Furthermore, as Sosicrates mentions, he did everything he could to stop his relative Pisistratus from taking power when he noticed that he was leaning towards that direction. Charging into one of the assemblies armed with a spear and shield, he warned the people about Pisistratus’s plan and offered to help them. He said, “Men of Athens, I am wiser than some of you and braver than others. Wiser than those of you who don’t see the treachery of Pisistratus; and braver than those who know it but are too afraid to speak up.” But the council, siding with Pisistratus, declared that he was mad, to which he responded:—

A short time will to all my madness prove,
When stern reality presents itself.

And these elegiac verses were written by him about the tyranny of Pisistratus, which he foretold,

And he wrote these mournful lines about the tyranny of Pisistratus, which he predicted,

Fierce snow and hail are from the clouds borne down,
And thunder after brilliant lightning roars;
And by its own great men a city falls,
The ignorant mob becoming slaves to kings.

IV. And when Pisistratus had obtained the supreme power, he, as he would not influence him, laid down his arms before the chief council-house, and said, “O my country, I have stood by you in word and deed.” And then he sailed away to Egypt, and Cyprus, and came to Crœsus. And while at his court being asked by him, “Who appears to you to be happy?”[13] He replied, “Tellus the Athenian, and Cleobis and Biton,” and enumerated other commonly spoken of instances. But some people say, that once Crœsus adorned himself in every possible manner, and took his seat upon his throne, and then asked Solon whether he had ever seen a more beautiful sight. But he said, “Yes, I have seen cocks and pheasants, and peacocks; for they are adorned with natural colours, and such as are ten thousand times more beautiful.” Afterwards leaving Sardis he went to Cilicia, and there he founded a city which he called Soli after his own name; and he placed in it a few Athenians as colonists, who in time departed from the strict use of their native language, and were said to speak Solecisms; and the inhabitants of that city are called Solensians; but those of Soli in Cyprus are called Solians.

IV. When Pisistratus gained absolute power, he chose not to use it to manipulate anyone. He laid down his arms in front of the main council house and declared, “Oh my country, I have supported you in both word and deed.” He then sailed off to Egypt and Cyprus, where he met Crœsus. While at Crœsus's court, when asked, “Who do you think is happy?”[13] he answered, “Tellus the Athenian, and Cleobis and Biton,” along with other well-known examples. However, some say that Crœsus once dressed himself in every possible way, sat on his throne, and asked Solon if he had ever seen anything more beautiful. Solon replied, “Yes, I have seen roosters, pheasants, and peacocks; they are adorned with natural colors that are a thousand times more stunning.” Later, he left Sardis and went to Cilicia, where he established a city named Soli after himself. He settled a few Athenians there, but over time they strayed from their native language and were said to speak Solecisms; the people of that city were called Solensians, while those from Soli in Cyprus were known as Solians.

V. And when he learnt that Pisistratus continued to rule in Athens as a tyrant, he wrote these verses on the Athenians:—

V. And when he found out that Pisistratus was still ruling as a tyrant in Athens, he wrote these lines about the Athenians:—

If through your vices you afflicted are,
Lay not the blame of your distress on God;
You made your rulers mighty, gave them guards,
So now you groan ’neath slavery’s heavy rod—
Each one of you now treads in foxes’ steps,
Bearing a weak, inconstant, faithless mind,
Trusting the tongue and slippery speech of man;
Though in his acts alone you truth can find.

This, then, he said to them.

This, he told them.

VI. But Pisistratus, when he was leaving Athens, wrote him a letter in the following terms:—

VI. But Pisistratus, when he was leaving Athens, wrote him a letter with the following message:—

PISISTRATUS TO SOLON.

I am not the only one of the Greeks who has seized the sovereignty of his country, nor am I one who had no right whatever to do so, since I am of the race of Codrus; for I have only recovered what the Athenians swore that they would give to Codrus and all his family, and what they afterwards deprived them of. And in all other respects I sin neither against men nor against gods, but I allow the Athenians to live under the laws which you established amongst them, and they are now living in a better manner than they would if they were under a democracy; for I allow no one to behave with violence: and I, though I am the tyrant, derive no other advantage beyond my superiority in rank and honour, being content with the fixed honours which belonged to the former kings. And every one of the Athenians brings the tithe of his possessions, not to me, but to the proper place in order that it may be devoted to the public sacrifices of the city; and for any other public purposes, or for any emergencies of war which may arise.

I’m not the only Greek who has taken control of my country, nor do I lack any right to do so, since I’m a descendant of Codrus. I’ve just reclaimed what the Athenians promised to give to Codrus and his family, and what they later denied them. In every other way, I don’t wrong either people or gods; I let the Athenians live by the laws you set up for them, and they’re currently doing better than they would under a democracy. I don’t allow anyone to act violently. Even though I’m the tyrant, I don’t gain anything beyond my higher status and honor; I’m satisfied with the established honors that belonged to the previous kings. Every Athenian contributes a tenth of their possessions, not to me, but to the appropriate place to be used for the city’s public sacrifices and for any other public needs or war emergencies that may arise.

But I do not blame you for laying open my plans, for I know that you did so out of regard for the city rather than out of dislike to me; and also because you did not know what sort of government I was about to establish; since, if you had been acquainted with it, you would have been content to live under it and would not have fled. Now, therefore, return home again; believing me even without my swearing to you that Solon shall never receive any harm at the hands of Pisistratus; know also that none of my enemies have suffered any evil from me; and if you will consent to be one of my friends, you shall be among the first; for I know that there is no treachery or faithlessness in you. Or if you wish to live at Athens in any other manner, you shall be allowed to do so; only do not deprive yourself of your country because of my actions.

But I don’t blame you for exposing my plans, because I know you did it out of concern for the city rather than out of dislike for me; and also because you didn’t know what kind of government I was about to put in place; if you had known, you would have been fine with living under it and wouldn’t have run away. So now, please go back home; trust me, even without me swearing that Solon will never be harmed by Pisistratus; also understand that none of my enemies have been wronged by me; and if you agree to be one of my friends, you’ll be among the first, because I know you are not treacherous or untrustworthy. Or if you prefer to live in Athens in a different way, you can do that too; just don’t cut yourself off from your country because of my actions.

Thus wrote Pisistratus.

So wrote Pisistratus.

VII. Solon also said, that the limit of human life was seventy years, and he appears to have been a most excellent lawgiver, for he enjoined, “that if any one did not support his parents he should be accounted infamous; and that the man who squandered his patrimony should be equally so, and the inactive man was liable to prosecution by any one who choose to impeach him.” But Lysias, in his speech against Nicias,[27] says that Draco first proposed this law, but that it was Solon who enacted it. He also prohibited all who lived in debauchery from ascending the tribunal; and he diminished the honours paid to Athletes who were victorious in the games, fixing the prize for a victor at Olympia at five hundred drachmæ,[14] and for one who conquered at the Isthmian games at one hundred; and in the same proportion did he fix the prizes for the other games, for he said, that it was absurd to give such great honours to those men as ought to be reserved for those only who died in the wars; and their sons he ordered to be educated and bred up at the public expense. And owing to this encouragement, the Athenians behave themselves nobly and valiantly in war; as for instance, Polyzelus, and Cynægirus, and Callimachus, and all the soldiers who fought at Marathon, and Harmodius, and Aristogiton, and Miltiades, and numberless other heroes.

VII. Solon also stated that the lifespan of a human was capped at seventy years. He seems to have been an exceptional lawmaker because he decreed that anyone who didn’t support their parents should be considered shameful. He also declared that a person who wasted their inheritance should face the same judgment, and an inactive person could be prosecuted by anyone willing to accuse them. However, Lysias, in his speech against Nicias,[27] claims that it was Draco who first put forward this law, but it was Solon who made it official. He also prohibited anyone living a life of excess from holding positions in court and reduced the honors given to athletes who won competitions, setting the prize for a victor at Olympia to five hundred drachmæ,[14] and for one who triumphed at the Isthmian games to one hundred. He established similar prize amounts for other games, arguing that it was ridiculous to give such high honors to athletes when those should be reserved for those who died in battle. He ordered that their sons be educated and raised at public expense. Thanks to this encouragement, the Athenians conduct themselves bravely and honorably in war, as seen with figures like Polyzelus, Cynægirus, Callimachus, and all the soldiers who fought at Marathon, along with Harmodius, Aristogiton, Miltiades, and countless other heroes.

But as for the Athletes, their training is very expensive, and their victories injurious, and they are crowned rather as conquerors of their country than of their antagonists, and when they become old, as Euripides says:—

But for the athletes, their training is really costly, and their victories can be harmful. They are celebrated more as conquerors of their nation than as opponents, and when they grow old, as Euripides says:—

They’re like old cloaks worn to the very woof.

IX. So Solon, appreciating these facts, treated them with moderation. This also was an admirable regulation of his, that a guardian of orphans should not live with their mother, and that no one should be appointed a guardian, to whom the orphans’ property would come if they died. Another excellent law was, that a seal engraver might not keep an impression of any ring which had been sold by him, and that if a person struck out the eye of a man who had but one, he should lose both his own, and that no one should claim what he had not deposited, otherwise death should be his punishment. If an archon was detected being drunk, that too was a capital crime. And he compiled the poems of Homer, so that they might be recited by different bards, taking the cue from one another, so that where one had left off the next one might take him up, so that it was Solon rather than Pisistratus who brought Homer to light, as Dieuchidas says, in the fifth book of his History of Megara, and the most celebrated of his verses were:—

IX. So Solon, recognizing these facts, handled them with restraint. One of his great regulations was that a guardian of orphans should not live with their mother, and that no one could be appointed as a guardian if they would inherit the orphans’ property upon their death. Another outstanding law was that a seal engraver could not keep a copy of any ring he had sold, and if someone injured a man with only one eye, they would lose both of their own. Additionally, no one should claim what they had not deposited; otherwise, death would be the punishment. If an archon was caught drunk, that was also a serious offense. He compiled the poems of Homer so they could be recited by different bards, allowing them to take turns picking up where one left off. Thus, it was Solon rather than Pisistratus who revived Homer, as Dieuchidas notes in the fifth book of his History of Megara, and the most famous of his lines were:—

Full fifty more from Athens stem the main.

And the rest of that passage—“And Solon was the first person who called the thirtieth day of the month ἔνη καὶ νέα.”[15] He was the first person also who assembled the nine archons together to deliver their opinions, as Apollodorus tells us in the second book of his Treatise on Lawgivers. And once, when there was a sedition in the city, he took part neither with the citizens, nor with the inhabitants of the plain, nor with the men of the sea-coast.

And the rest of that passage—“And Solon was the first person who called the thirtieth day of the month ἔνη καὶ νέα.”[15] He was also the first person to bring together the nine archons to share their opinions, as Apollodorus explains in the second book of his Treatise on Lawgivers. And once, during a conflict in the city, he didn’t side with the citizens, the people in the plains, or the coastal residents.

X. He used to say, too, that speech was the image of actions, and that the king was the mightiest man as to his power; but that laws were like cobwebs—for that if any trifling or powerless thing fell into them, they held it fast; but if a thing of any size fell into them, it broke the meshes and escaped. He used also to say that discourse ought to be sealed by silence, and silence by opportunity. It was also a saying of his, that those who had influence with tyrants, were like the pebbles which are used in making calculations; for that every one of those pebbles were sometimes worth more, and sometimes less, and so that the tyrants sometimes made each of these men of consequence, and sometimes neglected them. Being asked why he had made no law concerning parricides, he made answer, that he did not expect that any such person would exist. When he was asked how men could be most effectually deterred from committing injustice, he said, “If those who are not injured feel as much indignation as those who are.” Another apophthegm of his was, that satiety was generated by wealth, and insolence by satiety.

X. He used to say that speech reflects actions, and that the king was the most powerful man; however, laws were like cobwebs—if a trivial or weak thing got caught in them, they held it tight, but if something substantial fell into them, it would break through and escape. He also believed that discussions should be sealed by silence, and silence should be guided by opportunity. He often remarked that those who had sway with tyrants were like counting stones because each stone could be worth more or less at different times, and the tyrants would sometimes give importance to these individuals and sometimes overlook them. When asked why he hadn’t created a law against parricides, he replied that he didn’t expect such a person to exist. When inquired about how to deter people from committing injustices effectively, he said, “If those who aren’t harmed feel as much outrage as those who are.” Another one of his sayings was that wealth breeds excess, and excess breeds arrogance.

XI. He it was who taught the Athenians to regulate their days by the course of the moon; and he also forbade Thespis to perform and represent his tragedies, on the ground of falsehood being unprofitable; and when Pisistratus wounded himself, he said it all came of Thespis’s tragedies.

XI. He was the one who taught the Athenians to organize their days by the moon's cycle; he also stopped Thespis from performing and presenting his tragedies because he believed falsehood was not beneficial. When Pisistratus injured himself, he claimed it was all due to Thespis’s tragedies.

XII. He gave the following advice, as is recorded by Apollodorus in his Treatise on the Sects of Philosophers:—“Consider your honour, as a gentleman, of more weight than an oath.—Never speak falsely.—Pay attention to matters of importance.—Be not hasty in making friends; and do not cast off those whom you have made.—Rule, after you have first learnt to submit to rule.—Advise not what is most agreeable, but what is best.—Make reason your guide.—Do not associate with the wicked.—Honour the gods; respect your parents.”

XII. He gave the following advice, as recorded by Apollodorus in his Treatise on the Sects of Philosophers: “Value your reputation as a gentleman more than an oath. Never lie. Focus on important matters. Don't rush into friendships, and don't abandon those you've made. Learn to follow rules before trying to lead. Offer advice that is best, not just what people want to hear. Let reason guide you. Avoid the wicked. Honor the gods; respect your parents.”

XIII. They say also that when Mimnermus had written:—

XIII. They also say that when Mimnermus had written:—

Happy’s the man who ’scapes disease and care,
And dies contented in his sixtieth year

Solon rebuked him, and said:—

Solon scolded him and said:—

Be guided now by me, erase this verse,
Nor envy me if I’m more wise than you.
If you write thus, your wish would not be worse,
May I be eighty ere death lays me low.

The following are some lines out of his poems:—

The following are some lines from his poems:—

Watch well each separate citizen,
Lest having in his heart of hearts
A secret spear, one still may come
Saluting you with cheerful face,
And utter with a double tongue
The feigned good wishes of his wary mind.

As for his having made laws, that is notorious; he also composed speeches to the people, and a book of suggestions to himself, and some elegiac poems, and five thousand verses about Salamis and the constitution of the Athenians; and some iambics and epodes.

As for the laws he created, that's well-known; he also wrote speeches for the public, a personal book of advice, some elegiac poems, and five thousand lines about Salamis and the Athenian constitution; as well as some iambics and epodes.

XV. And on his statue is the following inscription—

XV. And on his statue is the following inscription—

Salamis that checked the Persian insolence,
Brought forth this holy lawgiver, wise Solon.

He flourished about the forty-sixth Olympiad, in the third year of which he was archon at Athens, as Sosicrates records; and it was in this year that he enacted his laws; and he died in Cyprus, after he had lived eighty years, having given charge to his relations to carry his bones to Salamis, and there to burn them to ashes, and to scatter the ashes on the ground. In reference[30] to which Cratinus in his Chiron represents him as speaking thus:—

He thrived during the forty-sixth Olympiad, in the third year of which he served as archon in Athens, as Sosicrates notes. It was that year he established his laws. He died in Cyprus at the age of eighty, having instructed his family to take his bones to Salamis, burn them to ashes, and scatter the ashes on the ground. In this regard, Cratinus in his Chiron portrays him speaking like this:—

And as men say, I still this isle inhabit,
Sown o’er the whole of Ajax’ famous city.

There is also an epigram in the before mentioned collection of poems, in various metres, in which I have made a collection of notices of all the illustrious men that have ever died, in every kind of metre and rhythm, in epigrams and odes. And it runs thus:—

There is also an epigram in the previously mentioned collection of poems, in different meters, where I have compiled observations about all the notable men who have ever died, in every type of meter and rhythm, in epigrams and odes. And it goes like this:—

The Cyprian flame devour’d great Solon’s corpse
Far in a foreign land; but Salamis
Retains his bones, whose dust is turned to corn.
The tablets of his laws do bear aloft
His mind to heaven. Such a burden light
Are these immortal rules to th’ happy wood.

XVI. He also, as some say, was the author of the apophthegm—“Seek excess in nothing.” And Dioscorides, in his Commentaries, says, that, when he was lamenting his son, who was dead (with whose name I am not acquainted), and when some one said to him, “You do no good by weeping,” he replied, “But that is the very reason why I weep, because I do no good.”

XVI. He is also said to have coined the phrase, “Seek excess in nothing.” Additionally, Dioscorides, in his Commentaries, mentions that when he was grieving for his deceased son (whose name I don’t know), and someone told him, “You’re not helping by crying,” he responded, “Exactly why I cry is because I’m not helping.”

XVII. The following letters also are attributed to him:—

XVII. The following letters are also credited to him:—

SOLON TO PERIANDER.

You send me word that many people are plotting against you; but if you were to think of putting everyone of them out of the way, you would do no good; but some one whom you do not suspect would still plot against you, partly because he would fear for himself, and partly out of dislike to you for fearing all sorts of things; and he would think, too, that he would make the city grateful to him, even if you were not suspected. It is better, therefore, to abstain from the tyranny, in order to escape from blame. But if you absolutely must be a tyrant, then you had better provide for having a foreign force in the city superior to that of the citizens; and then no one need be formidable to you, nor need you put any one out of the way.

You've told me that a lot of people are plotting against you; but if you think you can just eliminate all of them, it won't solve anything. There will always be someone you don't suspect still scheming against you, partly out of self-preservation and partly because they resent you for always being afraid of various things. They might also think that taking you down would earn them gratitude from the city, even if you weren't directly suspected. It's better to avoid being a tyrant to prevent being blamed. But if you absolutely have to be a tyrant, you should ensure that you have a stronger foreign force in the city than the citizens; that way, no one will really pose a threat to you, and you won't need to eliminate anyone.

SOLON TO EPIMENIDES.

XVIII. My laws were not destined to be long of service[31] to the Athenians, nor have you done any great good by purifying the city. For neither can the Deity nor lawgivers do much good to cities by themselves; but these people rather give this power, who, from time to time, can lead the people in any opinions they choose; so also the Deity and the laws, when the citizens are well governed, are useful; but when they are ill governed, they are no good. Nor are my laws or all the enactments that I made, any better; but those who were in power transgressed them, and did great injury to the commonwealth, inasmuch as they did not hinder Pisistratus from usurping the tyranny. Nor did they believe me when I gave them warning beforehand. But he obtained more credit than I did, who flattered the Athenians while I told him the truth: but I, placing my arms before the principal council-house, being wiser than they, told those who had no suspicion of it, that Pisistratus was desirous to make himself a tyrant; and I showed myself more valiant than those who hesitated to defend the state against him. But they condemned the madness of Solon. But at last I spoke loudly—“O, my country, I, Solon, here am ready to defend you by word and deed; but to these men I seem to be mad. So I will depart from you, being the only antagonist of Pisistratus; and let these men be his guards if they please.” For you know the man, my friend, and how cleverly he seized upon the tyranny. He first began by being a demagogue; then, having inflicted wounds on himself, he came to the Heliæa, crying out, and saying, “That he had been treated in this way by his enemies.” And he entreated the people to assign him as guards four hundred young men; and they, disregarding my advice, gave them to him. And they were all armed with bludgeons. And after that he put down the democracy. They in vain hoped to deliver the poor from their state of slavery, and so now they are all of them slaves to Pisistratus.

XVIII. My laws weren't meant to last long for the Athenians, nor did you really achieve much by trying to clean up the city. A higher power and lawmakers can’t do a lot for cities on their own; it’s the people who can sway public opinion whenever they want. The higher power and laws only help when citizens are well-governed, but they’re useless when things are run poorly. My laws, like all the rules I set, didn’t hold up either; those in power broke them and harmed the community by not stopping Pisistratus from taking control. They didn’t believe me when I warned them in advance. He gained more trust than I did because he flattered the Athenians while I told them the truth. I, standing ready at the main council house, wiser than they were, warned those who were unsuspecting that Pisistratus wanted to become a tyrant; I showed more courage than those who hesitated to stand up against him. But they dismissed me as foolish. Finally, I cried out, “Oh, my country, I, Solon, am here to defend you with words and actions; yet these men think I am crazy. So, I will leave you, the only one opposing Pisistratus; let these men be his guards if they want.” You know the guy well, my friend, and how skillfully he took power. He started as a demagogue; then, after injuring himself, he showed up at the Heliæa, claiming he had been mistreated by his enemies. He begged the people to give him four hundred young men as guards, and they, ignoring my advice, granted his request. All of them were armed with clubs. After that, he dismantled the democracy. They hoped in vain to free the poor from their slavery, but now they’re all enslaved to Pisistratus.

SOLON TO PISISTRATUS.

I am well assured that I should suffer no evil at your hands. For before your assumption of the tyranny I was a friend of yours, and now my case is not different from that of any other Athenian who is not pleased with tyranny. And whether it is better for them to be governed by one individual, or to live under a democracy, that each person may decide[32] according to his own sentiments. And I admit that of all tyrants you are the best. But I do not judge it to be good for me to return to Athens, lest any one should blame me, for, after having established equality of civil rights among the Athenians, and after having refused to be a tyrant myself when it was in my power, returning now and acquiescing in what you are doing.

I’m quite confident that I won’t face any harm from you. Before you took over as a tyrant, I was your friend, and my situation is no different from any other Athenian who opposes tyranny. It’s up to each person to decide whether it’s better to be ruled by one person or to live in a democracy, based on their own feelings. I acknowledge that you’re the best of all tyrants. However, I don’t think it’s wise for me to go back to Athens, as I wouldn’t want anyone to criticize me for establishing equality of civil rights among the Athenians and for refusing to become a tyrant myself when I had the chance, only to now return and accept what you’re doing.

SOLON TO CRŒSUS.

XX. I thank you for your goodwill towards me. And, by Minerva, if I did not think it precious above everything to live in a democracy, I would willingly prefer living in your palace with you to living at Athens, since Pisistratus has made himself tyrant by force. But life is more pleasant to me where justice and equality prevail universally. However, I will come and see you, being anxious to enjoy your hospitality for a season.

XX. I appreciate your kindness toward me. And, by Minerva, if I didn't value living in a democracy above all else, I would gladly choose to live with you in your palace instead of staying in Athens, especially now that Pisistratus has taken power through force. But I find life more enjoyable where justice and equality are upheld for everyone. However, I will come and visit you, eager to enjoy your hospitality for a while.

LIFE OF CHILO.

I. Chilo was a Lacedæmonian, the son of Damagetus. He composed verses in elegiac metre to the number of two hundred: and it was a saying of his that a foresight of future events, such as could be arrived at by consideration was the virtue of a man. He also said once to his brother, who was indignant at not being an ephor, while he himself was one, “The reason is because I know how to bear injustice; but you do not.” And he was made ephor in the fifty-fifth Olympiad; but Pamphila says that it was in the fifty-sixth. And he was made first ephor in the year of the archonship of Euthydemus, as we are told by Sosicrates. Chilo was also the first person who introduced the custom of joining the ephors to the kings as their counsellors: though Satyrus attributes this institution to Lycurgus. He, as Herodotus says in his first book, when Hippocrates was sacrificing at Olympia, and the cauldrons began to boil of their own accord, advised him either to marry, or, if he were married already, to discard his wife, and disown his children.

I. Chilo was from Sparta, the son of Damagetus. He wrote 200 elegiac verses and believed that the ability to foresee future events through careful thought was a key quality of a man. He once told his brother, who was upset about not being an ephor while Chilo was, “The reason is that I know how to handle injustice, but you don’t.” He became an ephor in the fifty-fifth Olympiad, although Pamphila claims it was the fifty-sixth. He was the first ephor during the archonship of Euthydemus, according to Sosicrates. Chilo was also the first to introduce the practice of having ephors as advisors to the kings, although Satyrus credits this idea to Lycurgus. As Herodotus mentions in his first book, when Hippocrates was sacrificing at Olympia and the cauldrons started boiling on their own, he advised Hippocrates to marry, or if he was already married, to divorce his wife and abandon his children.

II. They tell a story, also, of his having asked Æsop what Jupiter was doing, and that Æsop replied, “He is lowering what is high, and exalting what is low.” Being asked in what educated men differed from those who were illiterate, he said, “In good hopes.” Having had the question put to him, What was difficult, he said, “To be silent about secrets; to make good use of one’s leisure, and to be able to submit to injustice.” And besides these three things he added further, “To rule one’s tongue, especially at a banquet, and not to speak ill of one’s neighbours; for if one does so one is sure to hear what one will not like.” He advised, moreover, “To threaten no one; for that is a womanly trick. To be more prompt to go to one’s friends in adversity than in prosperity. To make but a moderate display at one’s marriage. Not to speak evil of the dead. To honour old age.—To keep a watch upon one’s self.—To prefer punishment to disgraceful gain; for the one is painful but once, but the other for one’s whole life.—Not to laugh at a person in misfortune.—If one is strong to be also merciful, so that one’s neighbours may respect one rather than fear one.—To learn how to regulate one’s own house well.—Not to let one’s tongue outrun one’s sense.—To restrain anger.—Not to dislike divination.—Not to desire what is impossible.—Not to make too much haste on one’s road.—When speaking not to gesticulate with the hand; for that is like a madman.—To obey the laws.—To love quiet.”

II. They tell a story about how he asked Æsop what Jupiter was up to, and Æsop replied, “He is bringing down the high and lifting up the low.” When asked how educated people differ from the illiterate, he said, “In good hopes.” When questioned about what was difficult, he stated, “To keep quiet about secrets; to make good use of one’s free time, and to be able to tolerate injustice.” In addition to these three things, he added, “To control one’s tongue, especially at a banquet, and not to speak poorly of one’s neighbors; because if you do, you’ll surely hear things you won’t like.” He also advised, “Don’t threaten anyone; that’s a cowardly move. Be quicker to support your friends in tough times than in good times. Keep your wedding modest. Don’t speak ill of the dead. Respect the elderly. Keep an eye on yourself. Prefer punishment over shameful gain; because one hurts for a moment, but the other lasts a lifetime. Don’t laugh at someone who’s going through a rough time. If you’re strong, be merciful, so that your neighbors will respect you rather than fear you. Learn to manage your own household well. Don’t let your words outrun your wisdom. Control your anger. Don’t dislike fortune-telling. Don’t wish for the impossible. Don’t rush on your path. When speaking, don’t gesture wildly with your hands; that looks crazy. Follow the laws. Enjoy peace and quiet.”

And of all his songs this one was the most approved:—

And out of all his songs, this one was the most popular:—

Gold is best tested by a whetstone hard,
Which gives a certain proof of purity;
And gold itself acts as the test of men,
By which we know the temper of their minds.

III. They say, too, that when he was old he said, that he was not conscious of having ever done an unjust action in his life; but that he doubted about one thing. For that once when judging in a friend’s cause he had voted himself in accordance with the law, but had persuaded a friend to vote for his acquittal, in order that so he might maintain the law, and yet save his friend.

III. They also say that when he got older, he claimed he never realized he had done anything unjust in his life; however, he had doubts about one thing. Once, while judging a friend's case, he voted according to the law, but he convinced a friend to vote for his acquittal so that he could uphold the law while still helping his friend.

IV. But he was most especially celebrated among the Greeks for having delivered an early opinion about Cythera, an island belonging to Laconia. For having become acquainted[34] with its nature, he said, “I wish it had never existed, or that, as it does exist, it were sunk at the bottom of the sea.” And his foresight was proved afterwards. For when Demaratus was banished by the Lacedæmonians, he advised Xerxes to keep his ships at that island: and Greece would have been subdued, if Xerxes had taken the advice. And afterwards Nicias, having reduced the island at the time of the Peloponnesian war, placed in it a garrison of Athenians, and did a great deal of harm to the Lacedæmonians.

IV. He was particularly famous among the Greeks for his early opinion about Cythera, an island that belongs to Laconia. After learning about its nature, he said, “I wish it had never existed, or that it were at the bottom of the sea.” His insight was proven right later on. When Demaratus was exiled by the Lacedæmonians, he advised Xerxes to station his ships at that island, and Greece would have fallen if Xerxes had followed that advice. Later, Nicias, having captured the island during the Peloponnesian War, established a garrison of Athenians there, causing significant damage to the Lacedæmonians.

V. He was very brief in his speech. On which account Aristagoras, the Milesian, calls such conciseness, the Chilonean fashion; and says that it was adopted by Branchus, who built the temple among the Branchidæ. Chilo was an old man, about the fifty-second Olympiad, when Æsop, the fable writer, flourished. And he died, as Hermippus says, at Pisa, after embracing his son, who had gained the victory in boxing at the Olympic games. The cause of his death was excess of joy, and weakness caused by extreme old age. All the spectators who were present at the games attended his funeral, paying him the highest honours. And we have written the following epigram on him:—

V. He was very brief in his speech. For this reason, Aristagoras, the Milesian, calls such conciseness the Chilonean style and says that it was adopted by Branchus, who built the temple among the Branchidae. Chilo was an old man, around the time of the fifty-second Olympiad, when Æsop, the fable writer, was active. He died, according to Hermippus, in Pisa, after embracing his son, who had won the boxing match at the Olympic games. His death was caused by overwhelming joy and the frailty of extreme old age. All the spectators present at the games attended his funeral, giving him the highest honors. We have written the following epigram about him:—

I thank you, brightest Pollux, that the son
Of Chilo wears the wreath of victory;
Nor need we grieve if at the glorious sight
His father died. May such my last end be!

And the following inscription is engraved on his statue:—

And the following message is carved on his statue:—

The warlike Sparta called this Chilo son,
The wisest man of all the seven sages.

One of his sayings was, “Suretyship, and then destruction.” The following letter of his is also extant:—

One of his sayings was, “Guaranteeing someone else’s debt leads to ruin.” The following letter of his is still available:—

CHILO TO PERIANDER.

You desire me to abandon the expedition against the emigrants, as you yourself will go forth. But I think that a sole governor is in a slippery position at home; and I consider that tyrant a fortunate man who dies a natural death in his own house.

You want me to give up the mission against the emigrants since you’re planning to go instead. But I believe that a solo leader is in a risky spot at home; and I see that tyrants who die a natural death in their own homes are quite lucky.

LIFE OF PITTACUS.

I. Pittacus was a native of Mitylene, and son of Hyrradius. But Duris says, that his father was a Thracian. He, in union with the brothers of Alcæus, put down Melanchrus the tyrant of Lesbos. And in the battle which took place between the Athenians and Mitylenæans on the subject of the district of Achilis, he was the Mitylenæan general; the Athenian commander being Phrynon, a Pancratiast, who had gained the victory at Olympia. Pittacus agreed to meet him in single combat, and having a net under his shield, he entangled Phrynon without his being aware of it beforehand, and so, having killed him, he preserved the district in dispute to his countrymen. But Apollodorus, in his Chronicles, says, that subsequently, the Athenians had a trial with the Mitylenæans about the district, and that the cause was submitted to Periander, who decided it in favour of the Athenians.

I. Pittacus was from Mitylene, and his father was Hyrradius. However, Duris claims that his father was Thracian. Along with Alcæus's brothers, he took down Melanchrus, the tyrant of Lesbos. During the battle between the Athenians and Mitylenians over the Achilis region, he served as the Mitylenian general, while Phrynon, a Pancratiast who had won at Olympia, led the Athenians. Pittacus agreed to fight him one-on-one, and with a net hidden under his shield, he caught Phrynon off guard. He killed him, thus securing the contested area for his people. But according to Apollodorus in his Chronicles, later on, the Athenians had a legal dispute with the Mitylenians about the region, which was presented to Periander, who ruled in favor of the Athenians.

II. In consequence of this victory the Mitylenæans held Pittacus in the greatest honour, and committed the supreme power into his hands. And he held it for ten years, and then, when he had brought the city and constitution into good order, he resigned the government. And he lived ten years after that, and the Mitylenæans assigned him an estate, which he consecrated to the God, and to this day it is called the Pittacian land. But Sosicrates says that he cut off a small portion of it, saying that half was more than the whole; and when Crœsus offered him some money he would not accept it, as he said that he had already twice as much as he wanted; for that he had succeeded to the inheritance of his brother, who had died without children.

II. As a result of this victory, the Mitylenians honored Pittacus greatly and gave him total control. He held this power for ten years, and when he had organized the city and government well, he stepped down. He lived for another ten years after that, and the Mitylenians gave him a piece of land, which he dedicated to the God, and to this day it is known as the Pittacian land. However, Sosicrates states that he took a small part of it, claiming that half was more than the whole; and when Croesus offered him some money, he turned it down, saying he already had twice as much as he needed since he had inherited from his brother, who had passed away without kids.

III. But Pamphila says, in the second book of her Commentaries, that he had a son named Tyrrhæus, who was killed while sitting in a barber’s shop, at Cyma, by a brazier, who threw an axe at him; and that the Cymæans sent the murderer to Pittacus, who when he had learnt what had been done, dismissed the man, saying, “Pardon is better than repentance.” But Heraclitus says that the true story is, that he had got Alcæus into his power, and that he released him, saying, “Pardon is better than punishment.” He was also a lawgiver;[36] and he made a law that if a man committed a crime while drunk, he should have double punishment; in the hope of deterring men from getting drunk, as wine was very plentiful in the island.

III. But Pamphila says in the second book of her Commentaries that he had a son named Tyrrhæus, who was killed while sitting in a barber's shop in Cyma by a brazier who threw an axe at him. The Cymæans sent the murderer to Pittacus, who, after learning what happened, let the man go, saying, "Pardon is better than repentance." However, Heraclitus claims the real story is that he had Alcæus in his power and released him, saying, "Pardon is better than punishment." He was also a lawmaker;[36] and he established a law that if a man committed a crime while drunk, he would receive double the punishment, hoping to deter people from getting drunk, since wine was very abundant on the island.

IV. It was a saying of his that it was a hard thing to be good, and this apophthegm is quoted by Simonides, who says, “It was a saying of Pittacus, that it is a hard thing to be really a good man.” Plato also mentions it in his Protagoras. Another of his sayings was, “Even the Gods cannot strive against necessity.” Another was, “Power shows the man.” Being once asked what was best, he replied, “To do what one is doing at the moment well.” When Crœsus put the question to him, “What is the greatest power?” “The power,” he replied, “of the variegated wood,” meaning the wooden tablets of the laws. He used to say too, that there were some victories without bloodshed. He said once to a man of Phocæa, who was saying that we ought to seek out a virtuous man, “But if you seek ever so much you will not find one.” Some people once asked him what thing was very grateful? and he replied, “Time.”—What was uncertain? “The future.”—What was trusty? “The land.”—What was treacherous? “The sea.” Another saying of his was, that it was the part of wise men, before difficult circumstances arose, to provide for their not arising; but that it was the part of brave men to make the best of existing circumstances. He used to say too, “Do not say before hand what you are going to do; for if you fail, you will be laughed at.” “Do not reproach a man with his misfortunes, fearing lest Nemesis may overtake you.” “If you have received a deposit, restore it.” “Forbear to speak evil not only of your friends, but also of your enemies.” “Practise piety, with temperance.” “Cultivate truth, good faith, experience, cleverness, sociability, and industry.”

IV. He often said that being good is a tough challenge, and Simonides quotes him, noting that Pittacus also said it’s hard to truly be a good man. Plato mentions it in his Protagoras too. One of his other sayings was, “Even the Gods can’t fight against necessity.” Another was, “Power reveals a man’s character.” When someone asked him what the best thing was, he answered, “To do whatever you’re doing right now well.” When Crœsus asked him, “What is the greatest power?” he replied, “The power of the varied wood,” referring to the wooden tablets of the laws. He also claimed that some victories can happen without bloodshed. Once, when a man from Phocæa said we should look for a virtuous person, he replied, “But if you look for one, you won’t find it.” Some people asked him what was very valuable, and he answered, “Time.” — What was uncertain? “The future.” — What was reliable? “The land.” — What was treacherous? “The sea.” Another of his sayings was that wise people prepare for difficulties before they come up, while brave people make the best of the situations they’re in. He also said, “Don’t talk about what you’re going to do beforehand; if you fail, you’ll be ridiculed.” “Don’t blame someone for their misfortunes, or you might find yourself facing Nemesis.” “If you’ve been given something to keep safe, return it.” “Don’t speak ill of your friends or your enemies.” “Practice piety with moderation.” “Cultivate truth, trustworthiness, experience, cleverness, sociability, and hard work.”

V. He wrote also some songs, of which the following is the most celebrated one:—

V. He also wrote a few songs, and the following is the most famous one:—

The wise will only face the wicked man,
With bow in hand well bent,
And quiver full of arrows—
For such a tongue as his says nothing true,
Prompted by a wily heart
To utter double speeches.

He also composed six hundred verses in elegiac metre; and[37] he wrote a treatise in prose, on Laws, addressed to his countrymen.

He also wrote six hundred lines in elegiac meter; and[37] he wrote a prose treatise on Laws, directed to his fellow citizens.

VI. He flourished about the forty-second Olympiad; and he died when Aristomenes was Archon, in the third year of the fifty-second Olympiad; having lived more than seventy years, being a very old man. And on his tomb is this inscription:—

VI. He thrived around the forty-second Olympiad; and he died when Aristomenes was Archon, in the third year of the fifty-second Olympiad; having lived for over seventy years, he was quite elderly. And on his tomb is this inscription:—

Lesbos who bore him here, with tears doth bury
Hyrradius’ worthy son, wise Pittacus.

Another saying of his was, “Watch your opportunity.”

Another thing he said was, “Keep an eye out for your chance.”

VII. There was also another Pittacus, a lawgiver, as Phavorinus tells us in the first book of his Commentaries; and Demetrius says so too, in his Essay on Men and Things of the same name. And that other Pittacus was called Pittacus the less.

VII. There was another Pittacus, a lawmaker, as Phavorinus mentions in the first book of his Commentaries; Demetrius also says this in his Essay on Men and Things of the same name. This other Pittacus was called Pittacus the Lesser.

VIII. But it is said that the wise Pittacus once, when a young man consulted him on the subject of marriage, made him the following answer, which is thus given by Callimachus in his Epigrams.

VIII. But it’s said that the wise Pittacus, when a young man asked him about marriage, gave him the following answer, which Callimachus presents in his Epigrams.

Hyrradius’ prudent son, old Pittacus
The pride of Mitylene, once was asked
By an Atarnean stranger; “Tell me, sage,
I have two marriages proposed to me;
One maid my equal is in birth and riches;
The other’s far above me;—which is best?
Advise me now which shall I take to wife?”
Thus spoke the stranger; but the aged prince,
Raising his old man’s staff before his face,
Said, “These will tell you all you want to know;”
And pointed to some boys, who with quick lashes
Were driving whipping tops along the street.
“Follow their steps,” said he; so he went near them
And heard them say, “Let each now mind his own.”—
So when the stranger heard the boys speak thus,
He pondered on their words, and laid aside
Ambitious thoughts of an unequal marriage.
As then he took to shame the poorer bride,
So too do you, O reader, mind thy own.

And it seems that he may have here spoken from experience, for his own wife was of more noble birth than himself, since she was the sister of Draco, the son of Penthilus; and she gave herself great airs, and tyrannized over him.

And it seems like he might have spoken from experience here, because his own wife was of higher nobility than he was, since she was the sister of Draco, the son of Penthilus; and she acted very superior and dominated him.

IX. Alcæus calls Pittacus σαράπους and σάραπος, because he was splay-footed, and used to drag his feet in walking, he also called him χειροπόδης, because he had scars on his feet which were called χειράδες. And γαύρηξ, implying that he gave himself airs without reason. And φύσκων and γάστρων, because he was fat. He also called him ζοφοδορπίδας, because he had weak eyes, and ἀγάσυρτος, because he was lazy and dirty. He used to grind corn for the sake of exercise, as Clearchus, the philosopher, relates.

IX. Alcæus calls Pittacus "splay-foot" and "dragfoot" because he walked with a splay foot and dragged his feet. He also called him "hand-binding" because he had scars on his feet that were known as "hand marks." Additionally, he referred to him as "pretentious" to suggest he acted superior for no good reason. He called him "rounded" and "stomach," indicating he was overweight. He also referred to him as "gloomy-eyed" because he had weak eyesight, and "lazy and filthy" since he was seen as dirty and idle. He used to grind grain for exercise, as noted by Clearchus, the philosopher.

X. There is a letter of his extant, which runs thus:—

X. There is a letter of his still in existence, which says the following:—

PITTACUS TO CRŒSUS.

You invite me to come to Lydia in order that I may see your riches; but I, even without seeing them, do not doubt that the son of Alyattes is the richest of monarchs. But I should get no good by going to Sardis; for I do not want gold myself, but what I have is sufficient for myself and my companions. Still, I will come, in order to become acquainted with you as a hospitable man.

You invite me to visit Lydia so I can see your wealth; but even without seeing it, I have no doubt that the son of Alyattes is the wealthiest of kings. However, I wouldn't gain anything by going to Sardis; I don’t want gold for myself, as what I have is enough for me and my friends. Still, I will come to get to know you as a generous host.

LIFE OF BIAS.

I. Bias was a citizen of Priene, and the son of Teutamus, and by Satyrus he is put at the head of the seven wise men. Some writers affirm that he was one of the richest men of the city; but others say that he was only a settler. And Phanodicus says, that he ransomed some Messenian maidens who had been taken prisoners, and educated them as his own daughters, and gave them dowries, and then sent them back to Messina to their fathers. And when, as has been mentioned before, the tripod was found near Athens by some fishermen, the brazen tripod I mean, which bore the inscription—“For the Wise;” then Satyrus says that the damsels (but others, such as Phanodicus, say that it was their father,) came into the assembly, and said that Bias was the wise man—recounting what he had done to them: and so the tripod was sent to him. But Bias, when he saw it, said that it was Apollo who was “the Wise,” and would not receive the tripod.

I. Bias was a citizen of Priene and the son of Teutamus, and according to Satyrus, he was considered one of the seven wise men. Some writers claim he was among the wealthiest in the city, while others argue he was just a settler. Phanodicus states that he ransomed some Messenian maidens who had been captured, raised them as his own daughters, provided them with dowries, and then sent them back to Messina to their families. When the bronze tripod, with the inscription “For the Wise,” was found near Athens by some fishermen, Satyrus mentions that the maidens (although others, like Phanodicus, say it was their father) came to the assembly and stated that Bias was the wise man, recounting what he had done for them; thus, the tripod was sent to him. However, when Bias saw it, he declared that it was Apollo who was “the Wise” and refused to accept the tripod.

II. But others say that he consecrated it at Thebes to Hercules, because he himself was a descendant of the Thebans, who had sent a colony to Priene, as Phanodicus relates. It is said also that when Alyattes was besieging Priene, Bias fattened up two mules, and drove them into his camp; and that the king, seeing the condition that the mules were in, was astonished at their being able to spare food to keep the brute beasts so well, and so he desired to make peace with them, and sent an ambassador to them. On this Bias, having made some heaps of sand, and put corn on the top, showed them to the convoy; and Alyattes, hearing from him what he had seen, made peace with the people of Priene; and then, when he sent to Bias, desiring him to come quickly to him, “Tell Alyattes, from me” he replied, “to eat onions;”—which is the same as if he had said, “go and weep.”

II. But others claim that he dedicated it at Thebes to Hercules because he was himself a descendant of the Thebans, who had sent a colony to Priene, as Phanodicus notes. It’s also said that when Alyattes was besieging Priene, Bias fattened up two mules and drove them into his camp; and when the king saw how well-fed the mules were, he was amazed at how they could spare food to keep the animals so well. As a result, he wanted to make peace with them and sent an ambassador. In response, Bias made some piles of sand and put grain on top to show the envoy; and Alyattes, hearing from him what he had seen, made peace with the people of Priene. Then, when he sent for Bias, asking him to come quickly, Bias replied, “Tell Alyattes, from me, to eat onions”—which is basically the same as saying “go and weep.”

III. It is said that he was very energetic and eloquent when pleading causes; but that he always reserved his talents for the right side. In reference to which Demodicus of Alerius uttered the following enigmatical saying—“If you are a judge, give a Prienian decision.” And Hipponax says, “More excellent in his decisions than Bias of Priene.” Now he died in this manner:—

III. It's said that he was very passionate and articulate when representing cases; however, he always used his skills for the right cause. In this regard, Demodicus of Alerius made a puzzling statement—“If you are a judge, make a Prienian decision.” And Hipponax claims, “Better in his judgments than Bias of Priene.” He died in this way:—

IV. Having pleaded a cause for some one when he was exceedingly old, after he had finished speaking, he leaned back with his head on the bosom of his daughter’s son; and after the advocate on the opposite side had spoken, and the judges had given their decision in favour of Bias’s client, when the court broke up he was found dead on his grandson’s bosom. And the city buried him in the greatest magnificence, and put over him this inscription—

IV. After defending a case for someone when he was very old, he leaned back with his head resting on his grandson's chest after finishing his speech. Once the opposing lawyer had spoken and the judges ruled in favor of Bias's client, the court session ended, and he was found dead on his grandson's chest. The city honored him with a grand burial and placed this inscription over him—

Beneath this stone lies Bias, who was born
In the illustrious Prienian land,
The glory of the whole Ionian race.

And we ourselves have also written an epigram on him—

And we've also written a short poem about him—

Here Bias lies, whom, when the hoary snow
Had crowned his aged temples, Mercury
Unpitying led to Pluto’s darken’d realms.
He pleaded his friend’s cause, and then reclin’d
In his child’s arms, repos’d in lasting sleep.

V. He also wrote about two thousand verses on Ionia, to[40] show in what matter a man might best arrive at happiness; and of all his poetical sayings these have the greatest reputation:—

V. He also wrote about two thousand verses on Ionia, to[40] show how a person might best achieve happiness; and of all his poetic sayings, these have the highest reputation:—

Seek to please all the citizens, even though
Your house may be in an ungracious city.
For such a course will favour win from all:
But haughty manners oft produce destruction.

And this one too:—

And this one too:—

Great strength of body is the gift of nature;
But to be able to advise whate’er
Is most expedient for one’s country’s good,
Is the peculiar work of sense and wisdom.

Another is:—

Another one is:—

Great riches come to many men by chance.

He used also to say that that man was unfortunate who could not support misfortune; and that it is a disease of the mind to desire what was impossible, and to have no regard for the misfortunes of others. Being asked what was difficult, he said—“To bear a change of fortune for the worse with magnanimity.” Once he was on a voyage with some impious men, and the vessel was overtaken by a storm; so they began to invoke the assistance of the Gods; on which he said, “Hold your tongues, lest they should find out that you are in this ship.” When he was asked by an impious man what piety was, he made no reply; and when his questioner demanded the reason of his silence, he said, “I am silent because you are putting questions about things with which you have no concern.” Being asked what was pleasant to men, he replied, “Hope.” It was a saying of his that it was more agreeable to decide between enemies than between friends; for that of friends, one was sure to become an enemy to him; but that of enemies, one was sure to become a friend. When the question was put to him, what a man derived pleasure while he was doing, he said, “While acquiring gain.” He used to say, too, that men ought to calculate life both as if they were fated to live a long and a short time: and that they ought to love one another as if at a future time they would come to hate one another; for that most men were wicked. He used also to give the following pieces of advice:—“Choose the course which you adopt with deliberation; but when you have adopted it, then persevere in[41] it with firmness.—Do not speak fast, for that shows folly.—Love prudence.—Speak of the Gods as they are.—Do not praise an undeserving man because of his riches.—Accept of things, having procured them by persuasion, not by force.—Whatever good fortune befalls you, attribute it to the gods.—Cherish wisdom as a means of travelling from youth to old age, for it is more lasting than any other possession.”

He also used to say that a man is unfortunate if he can't handle misfortune; and that it's a mental illness to want what’s impossible, ignoring the hardships of others. When asked what was difficult, he replied, “To endure a change in fortune for the worse with dignity.” Once, while on a voyage with some reckless men, their ship was caught in a storm, and they started calling out to the gods for help. He said, “Be quiet, or they might realize you’re on this ship.” When an irreverent man asked him what piety was, he didn’t respond; and when the man pressed for an answer, he said, “I’m silent because you’re asking about things that don’t concern you.” When asked what was pleasant for people, he replied, “Hope.” He used to say that it’s easier to make decisions between enemies than between friends; because with friends, one is bound to become an enemy, but with enemies, one has the potential to become a friend. When questioned about what brings joy while a person is engaged in it, he said, “While making a profit.” He also stated that people should approach life as if they could live a long time or a short time: and that they should love each other while also being ready to hate each other later on; because most people are wicked. He used to give the following advice:—“Choose your path thoughtfully; but once you’ve chosen it, stick to it with determination.—Don’t speak quickly, as that shows foolishness.—Value wisdom.—Talk about the gods as they truly are.—Don’t praise someone unworthy just because they’re rich.—Accept things that you’ve gained through persuasion, not force.—Whatever good fortune comes your way, attribute it to the gods.—Treasure wisdom as a way to journey from youth to old age, for it lasts longer than any other possession.”

VI. Hipponax also mentions Bias, as has been said before; and Heraclitus too, a man who was not easily pleased, has praised him; saying, in Priene there lived Bias the son of Teutamus, whose reputation is higher than that of the others; and the Prienians consecrated a temple to him which is called the Teutamium. A saying of his was, “Most men are wicked.”

VI. Hipponax also talks about Bias, as mentioned earlier; and Heraclitus, a man who was hard to please, has praised him too, saying that in Priene there lived Bias the son of Teutamus, whose reputation is greater than that of others; and the people of Priene dedicated a temple to him called the Teutamium. One of his sayings was, “Most men are wicked.”

LIFE OF CLEOBULUS.

I. Cleobulus was a native of Lindus, and the son of Evagoras; but according to Duris he was a Carian; others again trace his family back to Hercules. He is reported to have been eminent for personal strength and beauty, and to have studied philosophy in Egypt; he had a daughter named Cleobulina, who used to compose enigmas in hexameter verse, and she is mentioned by Cratinus in his play of the same name, except that the title is written in the plural number. They say also that he restored the temple of Minerva which had been built by Danaus.

I. Cleobulus was from Lindus and the son of Evagoras; however, according to Duris, he was a Carian. Others trace his family lineage back to Hercules. He is said to have been remarkable for his physical strength and beauty, and he studied philosophy in Egypt. He had a daughter named Cleobulina, who would write riddles in hexameter verse, and she is mentioned by Cratinus in his play of the same name, although the title is written in the plural. They also say that he restored the temple of Minerva that had been built by Danaus.

II. Cleobulus composed songs and obscure sayings in verse to the number of three thousand lines, and some say that it was he who composed the epigram on Midas.

II. Cleobulus wrote songs and cryptic sayings in verse totaling three thousand lines, and some say it was he who wrote the epigram about Midas.

I am a brazen maiden lying here
Upon the tomb of Midas. And as long
As water flows, as trees are green with leaves
As the sun shines and eke the silver moon,
As long as rivers flow, and billows roar,
So long will I upon this much wept tomb,
Tell passers by, “Midas lies buried here.”

And as an evidence of this epigram being by him they quote a song of Simonides, which runs thus:—

And as proof that this epigram is by him, they reference a song by Simonides that goes like this:—

What men possessed of sense
Would ever praise the Lindian Cleobulus?
Who could compare a statue made by man
To everflowing streams,
To blushing flowers of spring,
To the sun’s rays, to beams o’ the golden morn,
And to the ceaseless waves of mighty Ocean?
All things are trifling when compared to God.
While men beneath their hands can crush a stone;
So that such sentiments can only come from fools.

And the epigram cannot possibly be by Homer, for he lived many years, as it is said, before Midas.

And the saying can't possibly be by Homer, since he lived many years, as people say, before Midas.

III. There is also the following enigma quoted in the Commentaries of Pamphila, as the work of Cleobulus:—

III. There's also this riddle mentioned in the Commentaries of Pamphila, attributed to Cleobulus:—

There was one father and he had twelve daughters,
Each of his daughters had twice thirty children.
But most unlike in figure and complexion;
For some were white, and others black to view,
And though immortal they all taste of death.

And the solution is, “the year.”

And the answer is, “the year.”

IV. Of his apophthegms, the following are the most celebrated. Ignorance and talkativeness bear the chief sway among men. Opportunity will be the most powerful. Cherish not a thought. Do not be fickle, or ungrateful. He used to say too, that men ought to give their daughters in marriage while they were girls in age, but women in sense; as indicating by this that girls ought to be well educated. Another of his sayings was, that one ought to serve a friend that he may become a greater friend; and an enemy, to make him a friend. And that one ought to guard against giving one’s friends occasion to blame one, and one’s enemies opportunity of plotting against one. Also, when a man goes out of his house, he should consider what he is going to do: and when he comes home again he should consider what he has done. He used also to advise men to keep their bodies in health by exercise.—To be fond of hearing rather than of talking.—To be fond of learning rather than unwilling to learn.—To speak well of people.—To seek virtue and eschew vice.—To avoid injustice.—To give the best advice in one’s power to one’s country.—To be superior to pleasure.—To do nothing by force.—To instruct one’s children.—To[43] be ready for reconciliation after quarrels.—Not to caress one’s wife, nor to quarrel with her when strangers are present, for that to do the one is a sign of folly, and to do the latter is downright madness.—Not to chastise a servant while elated with drink, for so doing one will appear to be drunk one’s self.—To marry from among one’s equals, for if one takes a wife of a higher rank than one’s self, one will have one’s connexions for one’s masters.—Not to laugh at those who are being reproved, for so one will be detested by them.—Be not haughty when prosperous.—Be not desponding when in difficulties.—Learn to bear the changes of fortune with magnanimity.

IV. Among his famous sayings, the following are the most notable. Ignorance and excessive talking hold the most power among people. Opportunity will be the strongest force. Do not nurture a single thought. Avoid being fickle or ungrateful. He also used to say that men should marry off their daughters while they are still girls in age, but women in wisdom; this indicated that girls should be well educated. Another of his sayings was that one should serve a friend so that he may become a better friend, and an enemy to turn him into a friend. Also, one should be careful not to give friends a reason to criticize, and enemies a chance to conspire against oneself. Additionally, when someone leaves their house, they should think about what they are going to do, and when they return, they should reflect on what they have done. He also advised people to maintain their health through exercise— To prefer listening over talking— To enjoy learning rather than resist it— To speak positively about others— To pursue virtue and avoid vice— To steer clear of injustice— To offer the best advice possible to one’s country— To rise above pleasure— To avoid doing anything by force— To educate one’s children— To be open to reconciliation after disputes— Not to be affectionate towards one’s wife, nor argue with her in front of others, as showing affection is foolish, and arguing is sheer madness— Not to punish a servant while they are drunk, as it will only make one seem drunk as well— To marry someone of equal status, because marrying someone of a higher rank means having their relatives as your superiors— Not to laugh at those being reprimanded, as you will just end up being despised by them— Do not be arrogant during prosperous times— Do not lose hope during tough times— Learn to face changes in fortune with dignity.

V And he died at a great age, having lived seventy years, and this inscription was put over him:—

V And he died at an old age, having lived seventy years, and this inscription was placed over him:—

His country, Lindus, this fair sea-girt city
Bewails wise Cleobulus here entombed.

VI. One of his sayings was, “Moderation is the best thing.” He also wrote a letter to Solon in these terms:—

VI. One of his sayings was, “Moderation is the best thing.” He also wrote a letter to Solon that said:—

CLEOBULUS TO SOLON.

You have many friends, and a home everywhere, but yet I think that Lindus will be the most agreeable habitation for Solon, since it enjoys a democratic government, and it is a maritime island, and whoever dwells in it has nothing to fear from Pisistratus, and you will have friends flock to you from all quarters.

You have plenty of friends and a place to stay anywhere, but I believe Lindus would be the best place for Solon. It has a democratic government, it's an island, and anyone living there doesn't have to worry about Pisistratus. Plus, you'll have friends coming to see you from all directions.

LIFE OF PERIANDER.

I. Periander was a Corinthian, the son of Cypselus, of the family of the Heraclidæ. He married Lyside (whom he himself called Melissa), the daughter of Procles the tyrant of Epidaurus, and of Eristhenea the daughter of Aristocrates, and sister of Aristodemus, who governed nearly all Arcadia, as Heraclides Ponticus says in his Treatise on Dominion and had by her two sons Cypselus and Lycophron, the younger of whom was clever boy, but the elder was deficient in intellect. At a subsequent period he in a rage either kicked or threw his wife down stairs when she was pregnant, and so killed her, being wrought[44] upon by the false accusations of his concubines, whom he afterwards burnt alive. And the child, whose name was Lycophron, he sent away to Corcyra because he grieved for his mother.

I. Periander was from Corinth, the son of Cypselus and part of the Heraclid family. He married Lyside (whom he himself called Melissa), the daughter of Procles, the tyrant of Epidaurus, and Eristhenea, the daughter of Aristocrates, and sister of Aristodemus, who ruled nearly all of Arcadia, as Heraclides Ponticus mentions in his Treatise on Dominion. They had two sons, Cypselus and Lycophron, the younger of whom was a clever boy, but the older one struggled with understanding. Later, in a fit of rage, he either kicked or shoved his pregnant wife down the stairs, killing her, influenced by the false accusations of his concubines, whom he later burned alive. The child, named Lycophron, was sent away to Corcyra because he was mourning for his mother.

II. But afterwards, when he was now extremely old, he sent for him back again, in order that he might succeed to the tyranny. But the Corcyreans, anticipating his intention, put him to death, at which he was greatly enraged, and sent their children to Corcyra to be made eunuchs of; and when the ship came near to Samos, the youths, having made supplications to Juno, were saved by the Samians. And he fell into despondency and died, being eighty years old. Sosicrates says that he died forty-one years before Crœsus, in the last year of the forty-eighth Olympiad. Herodotus, in the first book of his History, says that he was connected by ties of hospitality with Thrasybulus the tyrant of Miletus. And Aristippus, in the first book of his Treatise on Ancient Luxury, tells the following story of him; that his mother Cratea fell in love with him, and introduced herself secretly into his bed; and he was delighted; but when the truth was discovered he became very oppressive to all his subjects, because he was grieved at the discovery. Ephorus relates that he made a vow that, if he gained the victory at Olympia in the chariot race, he would dedicate a golden statue to the God. Accordingly he gained the victory; but being in want of gold, and seeing the women at some national festival beautifully adorned, he took away their golden ornaments, and then sent the offering which he had vowed.

II. Later, when he was very old, he called for him to come back, hoping he would take over the rule. But the people of Corcyra, anticipating his plan, killed him, which made him extremely angry. He sent their children to Corcyra to be turned into eunuchs; however, when the ship got close to Samos, the young men prayed to Juno and were saved by the Samians. He then fell into deep despair and died at the age of eighty. Sosicrates claims he died forty-one years before Crœsus, in the last year of the forty-eighth Olympiad. Herodotus, in the first book of his History, mentions that he had a relationship of hospitality with Thrasybulus, the tyrant of Miletus. Additionally, Aristippus, in the first book of his Treatise on Ancient Luxury, tells a story about him: his mother, Cratea, fell in love with him and secretly climbed into his bed; he was pleased, but once the truth came out, he became harsh toward all his subjects because he was upset about being discovered. Ephorus notes that he vowed that if he won the chariot race at Olympia, he would dedicate a golden statue to the God. He won the race; however, short on gold, he noticed women at a national festival wearing beautiful decorations, so he took their gold ornaments and then sent the offering he had promised.

III. But some writers say that he was anxious that his tomb should not be known, and that with that object he adopted the following contrivance. He ordered two young men to go out by night, indicating a particular road by which they were to go, and to kill the first man they met, and bury him; after them he sent out four other men who were to kill and bury them. Again he sent out a still greater number against these four, with similar instructions. And in this manner he put himself in the way of the first pair, and was slain, and the Corinthians erected a cenotaph over him with the following inscription:—

III. But some writers say that he was worried that his tomb would be discovered, and to prevent this, he came up with the following plan. He sent two young men out at night, instructing them to take a specific route and to kill the first man they encountered and bury him. After that, he sent out four other men who were assigned to kill and bury those two. Again, he sent out even more people after these four, with the same instructions. In this way, he put himself in the path of the first pair, was killed, and the Corinthians built a cenotaph for him with the following inscription:—

The sea-beat land of Corinth in her bosom,
Doth here embrace her ruler Periander,
Greatest of all men for his wealth and wisdom.

We ourselves have also written an epigram upon him:—

We’ve also written a short poem about him:—

Grieve not when disappointed of a wish,
But be content with what the Gods may give you—
For the great Periander died unhappy,
At failing in an object he desired.

IV. It was a saying of his that we ought not to do anything for the sake of money; for that we ought only to acquire such gains as are allowable. He composed apophthegms in verse to the number of two thousand lines; and said that those who wished to wield absolute power in safety, should be guarded by the good will of their countrymen, and not by arms. And once being asked why he assumed tyrannical power, he replied, “Because, to abdicate it voluntarily, and to have it taken from one, are both dangerous.” The following sayings also belong him:—Tranquillity is a good thing.—Rashness is dangerous.—Gain is disgraceful.—Democracy is better than tyranny.—Pleasures are transitory, but honour is immortal.—Be moderate when prosperous, but prudent when unfortunate.—Be the same to your friends when they are prosperous, and when they are unfortunate.—Whatever you agree to do, observe.—Do not divulge secrets.—Punish not only those who do wrong, but those who intend to do so.

IV. He used to say that we shouldn’t do anything just for money; we should only earn what’s acceptable. He wrote about two thousand lines of maxims in verse and stated that those who want to have absolute power safely should rely on the goodwill of their fellow citizens, not on weapons. When he was asked why he took on tyrannical power, he answered, “Because it’s risky to voluntarily step down or have it taken away from you.” His other sayings include: Tranquility is valuable. Impulsiveness is dangerous. Gaining wealth is shameful. Democracy is better than tyranny. Pleasures are temporary, but honor lasts forever. Be moderate when you’re doing well, but careful when times are tough. Treat your friends the same way when they are both doing well and struggling. Keep your promises. Don’t reveal secrets. Punish not just those who do wrong, but also those who plan to do so.

V. This prince was the first who had body-guards, and who changed a legitimate power into a tyranny; and he would not allow any one who chose to live in his city, as Euphorus and Aristotle tell us.

V. This prince was the first to have bodyguards and transformed legitimate power into tyranny, and he wouldn’t allow anyone to live in his city if they chose to, as Euphorus and Aristotle tell us.

VI. And he flourished about the thirty-eighth Olympiad, and enjoyed absolute power for forty years. But Sotion, and Heraclides, and Pamphila, in the fifth book of her Commentaries, says that there were two Perianders; the one a tyrant, and the other a wise man, and a native of Ambracia. And Neanthes of Cyzicus makes the same assertion, adding, that the two men were cousins to one another. And Aristotle says, that it was the Corinthian Periander who was the wise one; but Plato contradicts him. The saying—“Practice does everything,” is his. He it was, also, who proposed to cut through the Isthmus.

VI. He was prominent during the thirty-eighth Olympiad and held absolute power for forty years. However, Sotion, Heraclides, and Pamphila, in the fifth book of her Commentaries, state that there were two Perianders: one was a tyrant, and the other was a wise man from Ambracia. Neanthes of Cyzicus makes the same claim, adding that the two men were cousins. Aristotle states that the Corinthian Periander was the wise one, but Plato disagrees. The saying, “Practice does everything,” is attributed to him. He also proposed cutting through the Isthmus.

VII. The following letter of his is quoted:—

VII. Here’s a quote from one of his letters:—

PERIANDER TO THE WISE MEN.

I give great thanks to Apollo of Delphi that my letters are[46] able to determine you all to meet together at Corinth; and I will receive you all, as you may be well assured, in a manner that becomes free citizens. I hear also that last year you met at Sardis, at the court of the King of Lydia. So now do not hesitate to come to me, who am the tyrant of Corinth; for the Corinthians will all be delighted to see you come to the house of Periander.

I’m really grateful to Apollo of Delphi that my letters can bring you all together in Corinth. I promise to welcome you all in a way that’s fitting for free citizens. I also heard that last year you gathered in Sardis, at the court of the King of Lydia. So now, don’t hesitate to come to me, the ruler of Corinth; the people of Corinth will be thrilled to see you at Periander’s house.

VIII. There is this letter too:—

VIII. There’s also this letter:—

PERIANDER TO PROCLES.

The injury of my wife was unintended by me; and you have done wrong in alienating from me the mind of my child. I desire you, therefore, either to restore me to my place in his affections, or I will revenge myself on you; for I have myself made atonement for the death of your daughter, by burning in her tomb the clothes of all the Corinthian women.[16]

The injury to my wife wasn't my fault, and you've made a mistake by turning my child against me. So, I ask you to either help me regain my child's affection or I will take revenge on you; because I have already made amends for your daughter's death by burning the clothes of all the Corinthian women in her tomb.[16]

IX. Thrasybulus also wrote him a letter in the following terms:—

IX. Thrasybulus also sent him a letter that said:—

I have given no answer to your messenger; but having taken him into a field, I struck with my walking-stick all the highest ears of corn, and cut off their tops, while he was walking with me. And he will report to you, if you ask him, everything which he heard or saw while with me; and do you act accordingly if you wish to preserve your power safely, taking off the most eminent of the citizens, whether he seems an enemy to you or not, as even his companions are deservedly objects of suspicion to a man possessed of supreme power.

I haven’t replied to your messenger yet; but I took him out into a field and struck down all the tallest ears of corn with my walking stick, cutting off their tops while we walked together. He will tell you everything he heard or saw while he was with me if you ask him. So, act accordingly if you want to keep your power safe by getting rid of the most prominent citizens, whether they seem like enemies or not, since even their friends are justifiably seen as suspicious by someone in a position of supreme power.

LIFE OF ANACHARSIS, THE SCYTHIAN.

I. Anacharsis the Scythian was the son of Gnurus, and the brother of Caduides the king of the Scythians; but his mother was a Grecian woman; owing to which circumstance he understood both languages.

I. Anacharsis the Scythian was the son of Gnurus and the brother of Caduides, the king of the Scythians; however, his mother was a Greek woman, which is why he was fluent in both languages.

II. He wrote about the laws existing among the Scythians, and also about those in force among the Greeks, urging men[47] to adopt a temperate course of life; and he wrote also about war, his works being in verse, and amounting to eight hundred lines. He gave occasion for a proverb, because he used great freedom of speech, so that people called such freedom the Scythian conversation.

II. He wrote about the laws that the Scythians followed, as well as those that the Greeks had in place, encouraging people[47] to live a balanced lifestyle. He also wrote about war, with his works being in verse and totaling eight hundred lines. He became the source of a proverb because of his candid expression, leading people to refer to such openness as the Scythian conversation.

III. But Sosicrates says that he came to Athens in the forty-seventh Olympiad, in the archonship of Eucrates. And Hermippus asserts that he came to Solon’s house, and ordered one of the servants to go and tell his master that Anacharsis was come to visit him, and was desirous to see him, and, if possible, to enter into relations of hospitality with him. But when the servant had given the message, he was ordered by Solon to reply him that, “Men generally limited such alliances to their own countrymen.” In reply to this Anacharsis entered the house, and told the servant that now he was in Solon’s country, and that it was quite consistent for them to become connected with one another in this way. On this, Solon admired the readiness of the man, and admitted him, and made him one of his greatest friends.

III. However, Sosicrates claims that he arrived in Athens during the forty-seventh Olympiad, when Eucrates was archon. Hermippus states that he went to Solon’s house and instructed one of the servants to tell his master that Anacharsis had come to visit and was eager to see him, hoping to establish a relationship of hospitality. When the servant delivered the message, Solon instructed him to reply that “men generally limited such alliances to their own countrymen.” In response, Anacharsis entered the house and told the servant that now he was in Solon’s territory, and it was entirely reasonable for them to connect in this way. Hearing this, Solon admired the man's quick thinking, welcomed him in, and made him one of his closest friends.

IV. But after some time, when he had returned to Scythia, and shown a purpose to abrogate the existing institutions of his country, being exceedingly earnest, in his fondness for Grecian customs, he was shot by his brother while he was out hunting, and so he died, saying, “That he was saved on account of the sense and eloquence which he had brought from Greece, but slain in consequence of envy in his own family.” Some, however, relate that he was slain while performing some Grecian sacrificatory rites. And we have written this epigram on him:—

IV. After a while, when he had returned to Scythia and was determined to change the established customs of his country, being very passionate about Grecian traditions, he was shot by his brother while he was out hunting, and thus he died, stating, “I was saved because of the knowledge and eloquence I gained from Greece, but I was killed due to envy within my own family.” Some, however, say that he was killed while performing some Greek sacrificial rituals. And we have written this epigram about him:—

When Anacharsis to his land returned,
His mind was turn’d, so that he wished to make
His countrymen all live in Grecian fashion—
So, ere his words had well escaped his lips,
A winged arrow bore him to the Gods.

V. He said that a vine bore three bunches of grapes. The first the bunch of pleasure; the second, that of drunkenness; the third, that of disgust. He also said that he marvelled that among the Greeks, those who were skilful in a thing contend together; but those who have no such skill act as judges of the contest. Being once asked how a person might be made not fond of drinking, he said, “If he always keeps in view the indecorous actions of drunken men.” He used also to say,[48] that he marvelled how the Greeks, who make laws against those who behave with insolence, honour Athletæ because of their beating one another. When he had been informed that the sides of a ship were four fingers thick, he said, “That those who sailed in one were removed by just that distance from death.” He used to say that oil was a provocative of madness, “because Athletæ, when anointed in the oil, attacked one another with mad fury.”

V. He said that a vine had three bunches of grapes. The first was the bunch of pleasure; the second, the bunch of drunkenness; the third, the bunch of disgust. He also expressed his amazement that among the Greeks, those skilled in something compete against each other, while those without such skills act as judges of the contest. When asked how someone might stop enjoying drinking, he said, “If they always remember the shameful actions of drunk people.” He also remarked,[48] that he was astonished how the Greeks, who make laws against people behaving badly, honor athletes for beating each other up. When he learned that the sides of a ship were four fingers thick, he said, “That means those sailing in one are just that distance away from death.” He used to say that oil could drive people mad, “because athletes, when covered in oil, attacked each other with wild fury.”

“How is it,” he used to say, “that those who forbid men to speak falsely, tell lies openly in their vintners’ shops?” It was a saying of his, that he “marvelled why the Greeks, at the beginning of a banquet, drink out of small cups, but when they have drunk a good deal, then they turn to large goblets.” And this inscription is on his statues—“Restrain your tongues, your appetites, and your passions.” He was once asked if the flute was known among the Scythians; and he said, “No, nor the vine either.” At another time, the question was put to him, which was the safest kind of vessel? and he said, “That which is brought into dock.” He said, too, that the strangest things that he had seen among the Greeks was, that “They left the smoke[17] in the mountains, and carried the wood down to their cities.” Once, when he was asked, which were the more numerous, the living or the dead? he said, “Under which head do you class those who are at sea.” Being reproached by an Athenian for being a Scythian, he said, “Well, my country is a disgrace to me, but you are a disgrace to your country.” When he was asked what there was among men which was both good and bad, he replied, “The tongue.” He used to say “That it was better to have one friend of great value, than many friends who were good for nothing.” Another saying of his was, that “The forum was an established place for men to cheat one another, and behave covetously.” Being once insulted by a young man at a drinking party, he said, “O, young man, if now that you are young you cannot bear wine, when you are old you will have to bear water.”

“How is it,” he used to say, “that those who tell men not to lie are the ones who openly lie in their wine shops?” He often wondered why the Greeks, at the start of a feast, drink from small cups, but after they’ve had enough, they switch to large goblets. He had this inscription on his statues: “Control your words, your desires, and your emotions.” When someone asked him if the flute was known among the Scythians, he replied, “No, nor the vine either.” At another time, when asked which type of container was the safest, he said, “The one that is brought into dock.” He also remarked that the strangest thing he had seen among the Greeks was that “They left the smoke in the mountains and brought the wood down to their cities.” Once, when asked whether the living or the dead were more numerous, he replied, “Which category do those at sea fall into?” When an Athenian criticized him for being a Scythian, he responded, “Well, my country may be a disgrace to me, but you are a disgrace to your country.” When asked what was both good and bad among people, he answered, “The tongue.” He believed that “It’s better to have one valuable friend than many friends who are worthless.” He also said, “The marketplace is a designated space for men to deceive each other and act greedily.” Once, when a young man insulted him at a drinking party, he said, “Oh, young man, if you can’t handle wine now that you’re young, when you’re old, you’ll have to deal with water.”

VI. Of things which are of use in life, he is said to have been the inventor of the anchor, and of the potter’s wheel.

VI. Regarding useful things in life, he is said to have invented the anchor and the potter’s wheel.

VII. The following letter of his is extant:—

VII. The following letter of his still exists:—

ANACHARSIS TO CRŒSUS

O king of the Lydians, I am come to the country of the Greeks, in order to become acquainted with their customs and institutions; but I have no need of gold, and shall be quite contented if I return to Scythia a better man than I left it. However I will come to Sardis, as I think it very desirable to become a friend of yours.

O king of the Lydians, I have come to the land of the Greeks to learn about their customs and way of life; however, I don't need gold and would be happy if I return to Scythia a better person than when I arrived. Still, I will visit Sardis, as I think it would be great to become your friend.

LIFE OF MYSON.

I. Myson, the son of Strymon, as Sosicrates states, quoting Hermippus as his authority, a Chenean by birth, of some Œtæan or Laconian village, is reckoned one of the seven wise men, and they say that his father was tyrant of his country. It is said by some writers that, when Anacharsis inquired if any one was wiser than he, the priestess at Delphi gave the answer which has been already quoted in the life of Thales in reference to Chilo:—

I. Myson, the son of Strymon, as Sosicrates mentions while citing Hermippus as his source, was born in Chios and comes from either an Œtæan or Laconian village. He is considered one of the seven wise men, and it is said that his father was a tyrant in his homeland. Some writers recount that when Anacharsis asked if anyone was wiser than he, the priestess at Delphi gave the same answer that has already been quoted in the life of Thales regarding Chilo:—

I say that Myson the Œtæan sage,
The citizen of Chen, is wiser far
In his deep mind than you.

And that he, having taken a great deal of trouble, came to the village, and found him in the summer season fitting a handle to a plough, and he addressed him, “O Myson, this is not now the season for the plough.” “Indeed,” said he, “it is a capital season for preparing one;” but others say, that the words of the oracle are the Etean sage, and they raise the question, what the word Etean means. So Parmenides says, that it is a borough of Laconia, of which Myson was a native; but Sosicrates, in his Successions says, that he was an Etean on his father’s side, and a Chenean by his mother’s. But Euthyphron, the son of Heraclides Ponticus, says that he was a Cretan, for that Etea was a city of Crete.

And he, after putting in a lot of effort, arrived at the village and found him during the summer season attaching a handle to a plow. He said to him, “Hey Myson, this isn’t the time for plowing.” “Actually,” he replied, “it’s a great time to prepare one.” However, others mention that the oracle refers to the Etean sage, raising the question of what Etean means. Parmenides claims it’s a town in Laconia, where Myson was from; but Sosicrates, in his Successions, states that he was Etean on his father’s side and a Chenean on his mother’s. Meanwhile, Euthyphron, the son of Heraclides Ponticus, argues that he was Cretan because Etea was a city in Crete.

II. And Anaxilaus says that he was an Arcadian. Hipponax also mentions him, saying, “And Myson, whom Apollo stated[50] to be the most prudent of all men.” But Aristoxenus, in his Miscellanies, says that his habits were not very different from those of Timon and Apemantus, for that he was a misanthrope. And that accordingly he was one day found in Lacedæmon laughing by himself in a solitary place, and when some one came up to him on a sudden and asked him why he laughed when he was by himself, he said, “For that very reason.” Aristoxenus also says that he was not thought much of, because he was not a native of any city, but only of a village, and that too one of no great note; and according to him, it is on account of this obscurity of his that some people attribute his sayings and doings to Pisistratus the tyrant, but he excepts Plato the philosopher, for he mentions Myson in his Protagoras, placing him among the wise men instead of Periander.

II. Anaxilaus claims that he was from Arcadia. Hipponax also refers to him, stating, “And Myson, whom Apollo declared[50] to be the wisest of all men.” However, Aristoxenus, in his Miscellanies, notes that his behavior was quite similar to that of Timon and Apemantus, as he was a misanthrope. One day, he was found in Laconia laughing alone in a secluded spot, and when someone approached him unexpectedly and asked why he was laughing by himself, he replied, “For that very reason.” Aristoxenus also mentions that he was not highly regarded because he was not from any city, but just from a small village of little importance; due to this obscurity, some people attribute his sayings and actions to the tyrant Pisistratus. However, he does exclude Plato the philosopher, as Plato mentions Myson in his Protagoras, placing him among the wise instead of Periander.

III. It used to be a common saying of his that men ought not to seek for things in words, but for words in things; for that things are not made on account of words, but that words are put together for the sake of things.

III. He often said that people shouldn't look for things in words, but rather look for words in things; because things aren't created for the sake of words, but words are formed to represent things.

IV. He died when he had lived ninety-seven years.

IV. He died at the age of ninety-seven.

LIFE OF EPIMENIDES.

I. Epimenides, as Theopompus and many other writers tell us, was the son of a man named Phædrus, but some call him the son of Dosiadas; and others of Agesarchus. He was a Cretan by birth, of the city of Gnossus; but because he let his hair grow long, he did not look like a Cretan.

I. Epimenides, as Theopompus and many other writers tell us, was the son of a man named Phædrus, but some say he was the son of Dosiadas, and others say Agesarchus. He was born in Crete, from the city of Gnossus; but because he let his hair grow long, he didn't look like a typical Cretan.

II. He once, when he was sent by his father into the fields to look for a sheep, turned out of the road at mid-day and lay down in a certain cave and fell asleep, and slept there fifty-seven years; and after that, when he awoke, he went on looking for the sheep, thinking that he had been taking a short nap; but as he could not find it he went on to the field and there he found everything changed, and the estate in another person’s possession, and so he came back again to the city in great perplexity, and as he was going into his own house he met some people who asked him who he was, until at last he found[51] his younger brother who had now become an old man, and from him he learnt all the truth.

II. Once, when he was sent by his father to look for a sheep in the fields, he stepped off the path at midday, lay down in a cave, and fell asleep. He ended up sleeping there for fifty-seven years. When he finally woke up, he continued his search for the sheep, thinking he had just taken a short nap. But as he looked, he noticed everything had changed; the estate was now in someone else's hands. So, he returned to the city, feeling confused. As he entered his own house, he ran into some people who asked him who he was. Eventually, he found his younger brother, who was now an old man, and from him, he learned the whole story.

III. And when he was recognized he was considered by the Greeks as a person especially beloved by the Gods, on which account when the Athenians were afflicted by a plague, and the priestess at Delphi enjoined them to purify their city, they sent a ship and Nicias the son of Niceratus to Crete, to invite Epimenides to Athens; and he, coming there in the forty-sixth Olympiad, purified the city and eradicated the plague for that time; he took some black sheep and some white ones and led them up to the Areopagus, and from thence he let them wherever they chose, having ordered the attendants to follow them, and wherever any one of them lay down they were to sacrifice him to the God who was the patron of the spot, and so the evil was stayed; and owing to this one may even now find in the different boroughs of the Athenians altars without names, which are a sort of memorial of the propitiation of the Gods that then took place. Some said that the cause of the plague was the pollution contracted by the city in the matter of Cylon, and that Epimenides pointed out to the Athenians how to get rid of it, and that in consequence they put to death two young men, Cratinus and Ctesibius, and that thus the pestilence was put an end to.

III. When he was recognized, the Greeks regarded him as someone especially favored by the Gods. Because of this, when the Athenians were struck by a plague and the priestess at Delphi instructed them to purify their city, they sent a ship and Nicias the son of Niceratus to Crete to invite Epimenides to Athens. He arrived in the forty-sixth Olympiad, purified the city, and eliminated the plague at that time. He took some black sheep and some white ones and led them up to the Areopagus. From there, he released them wherever they wanted, instructing the attendants to follow them. Wherever any of the sheep lay down, they would sacrifice that one to the God who was the protector of that spot, which ultimately stopped the plague. As a result, even today, you can find altars without names in the different boroughs of Athens, serving as memorials to the appeasement of the Gods that occurred then. Some believed that the plague was a result of the pollution caused by the city regarding Cylon, and that Epimenides showed the Athenians how to cleanse it. Consequently, they executed two young men, Cratinus and Ctesibius, and thus the pestilence was ended.

III. And the Athenians passed a vote to give him a talent and a ship to convey him back to Crete, but he would not accept the money, but made a treaty of friendship and alliance between the Gnossians and Athenians.

III. The Athenians voted to give him a talent and a ship to take him back to Crete, but he refused the money and instead established a friendship and alliance between the Gnossians and Athenians.

IV. And not long after he had returned home he died, as Phlegon relates in his book on long-lived people, after he had lived a hundred and fifty-seven years; but as the Cretans report he had lived two hundred and ninety-nine; but as Xenophones the Colophonian, states that he had heard it reported, he was a hundred and fifty-four years old when he died.

IV. Not long after he got back home, he died, as Phlegon mentions in his book about long-lived people, having lived for one hundred fifty-seven years. However, the Cretans claim he lived for two hundred ninety-nine years. According to Xenophones from Colophon, who said he heard it reported, he was one hundred fifty-four years old when he died.

V. He wrote a poem of five thousand verses on the Generation and Theogony of the Curetes and Corybantes, and another poem of six thousand five hundred verses on the building of the Argo and the expedition of Jason to Colchis.

V. He wrote a poem of five thousand lines about the creation and origins of the Curetes and Corybantes, and another poem of six thousand five hundred lines about the construction of the Argo and Jason's journey to Colchis.

VI. He also wrote a treatise in prose on the Sacrifices in Crete, and the Cretan Constitution, and on Minos and Rhadamanthus, occupying four thousand lines.

VI. He also wrote a prose essay on the sacrifices in Crete, the Cretan Constitution, and on Minos and Rhadamanthus, which spans four thousand lines.

VI. Likewise he built at Athens the temple which is there dedicated to the venerable goddesses, as Lobon the Augur says in his book on Poets; and he is said to have been the first person who purified houses and lands, and who built temples.

VI. He also built the temple in Athens that's dedicated to the respected goddesses, as Lobon the Augur mentions in his book about Poets; and he is said to be the first person who purified homes and land, and who constructed temples.

VII. There are some people who assert that he did not sleep for the length of time that has been mentioned above, but that he was absent from his country for a considerable period, occupying himself with the anatomisation and examination of roots.

VII. Some people claim that he didn't sleep for as long as mentioned above, but that he was away from his homeland for a significant amount of time, focusing on the dissection and study of roots.

VIII. A letter of his is quoted, addressed to Solon the lawgiver, in which he discusses the constitution which Minos gave the Cretans. But Demetrius the Magnesian, in his treatise on Poets and Prose writers of the same name as one another, attempts to prove that the letter is a modern one, and is not written in the Cretan but in the Attic dialect, and the new Attic too.

VIII. A letter of his is quoted, addressed to Solon the lawmaker, where he talks about the constitution that Minos gave to the Cretans. However, Demetrius the Magnesian, in his writing on Poets and Prose writers who share the same name, tries to argue that the letter is modern and is not written in the Cretan dialect but in the Attic dialect, and in the newer Attic style as well.

IX. But I have also discovered another letter of his which runs thus:—

IX. But I also found another letter of his that says:—

EPIMENIDES TO SOLON.

Be of good cheer, my friend; for if Pisistratus had imposed his laws on the Athenians, they being habituated to slavery and not accustomed to good laws previously, he would have maintained his dominion for ever, succeeding easily in enslaving his fellow countrymen; but as it is, he is lording it over men who are no cowards, but who remember the precepts of Solon and are indignant at their bonds, and who will not endure the supremacy of a tyrant. But if Pisistratus does possess the city to-day, still I have no expectation that the supreme power will ever descend to his children. For it is impossible that men who have lived in freedom and in the enjoyment of most excellent laws should be slaves permanently; but as for yourself, do not you go wandering about at random, but come and visit me, for here there is no supreme ruler to be formidable to you; but if while you are wandering about any of the friends of Pisistratus should fall in with you, I fear you might suffer some misfortune.

Stay positive, my friend; because if Pisistratus had established his laws on the Athenians, who were used to oppression and unfamiliar with good laws before, he could have easily kept control forever and succeeded in subjugating his fellow citizens. But as it stands, he rules over people who are not cowards, who remember Solon’s teachings, feel anger at their chains, and will not tolerate a tyrant’s rule. Even though Pisistratus has control of the city today, I don’t believe the ultimate power will ever pass to his children. It’s impossible for people who have lived in freedom and benefitted from great laws to remain slaves forever. But you, don’t wander around aimlessly; come and see me, because here there’s no tyrant to intimidate you. If you happen to run into any of Pisistratus's friends while wandering, I worry something bad might happen to you.

He then wrote thus:—

He then wrote this:—

X. But Demetrius says that some writers report that he used to receive food from the nymphs and keep it in a bullock’s hoof; and that eating it in small quantities he never[53] required any evacuations, and was never seen eating. And Timæus mentions him in his second book.

X. But Demetrius says that some writers report that he used to get his food from the nymphs and kept it in a bull's hoof; and that by eating it in small amounts, he never[53] needed to relieve himself and was never seen actually eating. And Timæus mentions him in his second book.

XI. Some authors say also that the Cretans sacrifice to him as a god, for they say that he was the wisest of men: and accordingly, that when he saw the port of Munychia,[18] at Athens, he said that the Athenians did not know how many evils that place would bring upon them: since, if they did, they would tear it to pieces with their teeth; and he said this a long time before the event to which he alluded. It is said also, that he at first called himself Æacus; and that he foretold to the Lacedæmonians the defeat which they should suffer from the Arcadians; and that he pretended that he had lived several times. But Theopompus, in his Strange Stories, says that when he was building the temple of the Nymphs, a voice burst forth from heaven;—“Oh! Epimenides, build this temple, not for the Nymphs but for Jupiter.” He also foretold to the Cretans the defeat of the Lacedæmonians by the Arcadians, as has been said before. And, indeed, they were beaten at Orchomenos.

XI. Some authors also claim that the Cretans worship him as a god, believing he was the wisest of all men. They say that when he looked at the port of Munychia,[18] in Athens, he remarked that the Athenians were unaware of the many troubles that place would bring them; if they were, they would tear it apart with their teeth. He made this prediction long before the event he was referencing. It is also said that he initially called himself Æacus, and he predicted to the Lacedæmonians the defeat they would face at the hands of the Arcadians. He claimed to have lived several times. However, Theopompus, in his Strange Stories, mentions that while he was constructing the temple of the Nymphs, a voice came from heaven, saying, “Oh! Epimenides, build this temple, not for the Nymphs but for Jupiter.” He also predicted the Cretans' defeat of the Lacedæmonians by the Arcadians, as mentioned earlier. Indeed, they were defeated at Orchomenos.

XII. He pretended also, that he grew old rapidly, in the same number of days as he had been years asleep; at least, so Theopompus says. But Mysonianus, in his Coincidences, says, that the Cretans call him one of the Curetes. And the Lacedæmonians preserve his body among them, in obedience to some oracle, as Sosibius the Lacedæmonian says.

XII. He also acted as if he aged quickly, in the same number of days as the years he had been asleep; at least, that's what Theopompus says. But Mysonianus, in his Coincidences, states that the Cretans refer to him as one of the Curetes. And the Spartans keep his body among them, following some oracle, as Sosibius the Spartan mentions.

XIII. There were also two other Epimenides, one the genealogist; the other, the man who wrote a history of Rhodes in the Doric dialect.

XIII. There were also two other Epimenides, one the genealogist; the other, the person who wrote a history of Rhodes in the Doric dialect.

LIFE OF PHERECYDES.

I. Pherecydes was a Syrian, the son of Babys, and, as Alexander says, in his Successions, he had been a pupil of Pittacus.

I. Pherecydes was a Syrian, the son of Babys, and, as Alexander says in his Successions, he had been a student of Pittacus.

II. Theopompus says that he was the first person who ever wrote among the Greeks on the subject of Natural Philosophy and the Gods. And there are many marvellous stories told of him. For it is said that he was walking along the sea-shore at Samos, and that seeing a ship sailing by with a fair wind, he said that it would soon sink; and presently it sank before their eyes. At another time he was drinking some water which had been drawn up out of a well, and he foretold that within three days there would be an earthquake; and there was one. And as he was going up to Olympia, and had arrived at Messene, he advised his entertainer, Perilaus, to migrate from the city with all his family, but that Perilaus would not be guided by him; and afterwards Messene was taken.

II. Theopompus claims that he was the first person among the Greeks to write about Natural Philosophy and the Gods. There are many amazing stories about him. It's said that while he was walking along the beach at Samos and saw a ship sailing by with a good wind, he predicted that it would sink; and then it did, right before their eyes. At another time, he was drinking water drawn from a well and predicted that there would be an earthquake within three days; and it happened. While heading to Olympia and having arrived at Messene, he advised his host, Perilaus, to leave the city with his entire family, but Perilaus ignored his advice; later, Messene was captured.

III. And he is said to have told the Lacedæmonians to honour neither gold nor silver, as Theopompus says in his Marvels; and it is reported that Hercules laid this injunction on him in a dream, and that the same night he appeared also to the kings of Sparta, and enjoined them to be guided by Pherecydes; but some attribute these stories to Pythagoras.

III. He is said to have told the Spartans not to value gold or silver, as Theopompus mentions in his Marvels. It's reported that Hercules gave him this message in a dream, and that the same night he also appeared to the kings of Sparta and instructed them to follow Pherecydes; however, some credit these tales to Pythagoras.

IV. And Hermippus relates that when there was a war between the Ephesians and Magnesians, he, wishing the Ephesians to conquer, asked some one, who was passing by, from whence he came? and when he said, “From Ephesus,” “Drag me now,” said he, “by the legs, and place me in the territory of the Magnesians, and tell your fellow countrymen to bury me there after they have got the victory;” and that he went and reported that Pherecydes had given him this order. And so they went forth the next day and defeated the Magnesians; and as Pherecydes was dead, they buried him there, and paid him very splendid honours.

IV. Hermippus tells that during a war between the Ephesians and Magnesians, he wanted the Ephesians to win. He asked someone passing by where they were from, and when the person replied, “From Ephesus,” he said, “Drag me by the legs and take me to the Magnesians' land, and tell your fellow countrymen to bury me there after they win.” The person went and told them that Pherecydes had given this order. The next day, they went out and defeated the Magnesians, and since Pherecydes had passed away, they buried him there with great honors.

V. But some writers say that he went to Delphi, and threw himself down from the Corycian hill; Aristoxenus, in his History of Pythagoras and his Friends, says that Pherecydes fell sick and died, and was buried by Pythagoras in Delos; But others say that he died of the lousy disease; and when Pythagoras came to see him, and asked him how he was, he put his finger through the door, and said, “You may see by my skin.” And from this circumstance that expression passed into a proverb among the philosophers, when affairs are going on badly; and those who apply it to affairs that are going on well, make a blunder. He used to say, also, that the Gods call their table θυωρὸς.

V. But some writers say he went to Delphi and threw himself off the Corycian hill; Aristoxenus, in his History of Pythagoras and his Friends, claims that Pherecydes got sick and died, and that Pythagoras buried him in Delos. Others say he died from a contagious disease; when Pythagoras came to see him and asked how he was, he stuck his finger through the door and said, “You can see by my skin.” This situation led to that expression becoming a proverb among philosophers for when things are going poorly, and those who use it for situations that are going well make a mistake. He also used to say that the Gods call their table θυωρὸς.

VI. But Andron, the Ephesian, says that there were two men of the name of Pherecydes, both Syrians: one an astronomer and the other a writer on God and the Divine Nature; and that this last was the son of Babys, who was also the master of Pythagoras. But Eratosthenes asserts that there was but one, who was a Syrian; and that the other Pherecydes was an Athenian, a genealogist; and the work of the Syrian Pherecydes is preserved, and it begins thus:—“Jupiter, and Time, and Chthon existed externally.” And the name of Cthonia became Tellus, after Jupiter gave it to her as a reward. A sun-dial is also preserved, in the island of Syra, of his making.

VI. But Andron from Ephesus claims that there were two men named Pherecydes, both from Syria: one was an astronomer and the other wrote about God and the Divine Nature; the latter was the son of Babys, who was also Pythagoras's teacher. However, Eratosthenes insists there was only one Pherecydes who was Syrian, while the other was an Athenian genealogist. The work of the Syrian Pherecydes is still preserved, and it begins like this: "Jupiter, Time, and Chthon existed eternally." After that, the name Cthonia became Tellus when Jupiter gave it to her as a reward. There is also a sun-dial made by him that is still preserved on the island of Syra.

VII. But Duris, in the second book of his Boundaries, says that this epigram was written upon him:—

VII. But Duris, in the second book of his Boundaries, says that this poem was written about him:—

The limit of all wisdom is in me;
And would be, were it larger. But report
To my Pythagoras that he’s the first
Of all the men that tread the Grecian soil;
I shall not speak a falsehood, saying this.

And Ion, the Chian, says of him:—

And Ion, the Chian, talks about him:—

Adorned with valour while alive, and modesty,
Now that he’s dead he still exists in peace;
For, like the wise Pythagoras, he studied
The manners and the minds of many nations.

And I myself have composed an epigram on him in the Pherecratean metre:—

And I wrote a short poem about him in the Pherecratean style:—

The story is reported,
That noble Pherecydes
Whom Syros calls her own,
Was eaten up by lice;
And so he bade his friends,
Convey his corpse away
To the Magnesian land,
That he might victory give
To holy Ephesus.
For well the God had said,
(Though he alone did know
Th’ oracular prediction),
That this was fate’s decree.
So in that land he lies.
This then is surely true,
That those who’re really wise
Are useful while alive,
And e’en when breath has left them.

VIII. And he flourished about the fifty-ninth Olympiad. There is a letter of his extant in the following terms:—

VIII. He thrived during the fifty-ninth Olympiad. There is a surviving letter of his that states:—

PHERECYDES TO THALES.

May you die happily when fate overtakes you. Disease has seized upon me at the same time that I received your letter. I am all over lice, and suffering likewise under a low fever. Accordingly, I have charged my servants to convey this book of mine to you, after they have buried me. And do you, if you think fit, after consulting with the other wise men, publish it; but if you do not approve of doing so, then keep it unpublished, for I am not entirely pleased with it myself. The subject is not one about which there is any certain knowledge, nor do I undertake to say that I have arrived at the truth; but I have advanced arguments, from which any one who occupies himself with speculations on the divine nature, may make a selection; and as to other points, he must exercise his intellect, for I speak obscurely throughout. I, myself, as I am afflicted more severely by this disease every day, no longer admit any physicians, or any of my friends. But when they stand at the door, and ask me how I am, I put out my finger to them through the opening of the door, and show them how I am eaten up with the evil; and I desired them to come to-morrow to the funeral of Pherecydes.

May you pass away peacefully when your time comes. I’ve fallen ill just as I received your letter. I’m covered in lice and dealing with a low fever as well. So, I’ve asked my servants to deliver this book of mine to you once they’ve buried me. And you, if you think it’s a good idea after discussing it with the other wise men, can publish it; but if you don’t feel that way, then keep it to yourself, because I’m not completely happy with it either. The topic isn’t one with guaranteed knowledge, and I can’t claim to have found the truth; however, I’ve presented arguments that anyone interested in the divine nature can pick from, and on other matters, they’ll need to use their own judgment, as I speak in a vague manner throughout. I, myself, as my illness worsens each day, no longer allow any doctors or friends to visit me. When they stand at the door and ask how I’m doing, I just stretch out my finger through the door opening to show them how much I’m suffering; and I asked them to come tomorrow for Pherecydes’ funeral.

These, then, are they who were called wise men; to which list some writers add the name of Pisistratus. But we must also speak of the philosophers. And we will begin first with the Ionic philosophy, the founder of which school was Thales, who was the master of Anaximander.

These are the ones referred to as wise men; some writers even include Pisistratus in this group. However, we should also discuss the philosophers. Let's start with Ionic philosophy, founded by Thales, who was the teacher of Anaximander.


BOOK II.

LIFE OF ANAXIMANDER.

I. Anaximander, the son of Praxiadas, was a citizen of Miletus.

I. Anaximander, the son of Praxiadas, was a resident of Miletus.

II. He used to assert that the principle and primary element of all things was the Infinity, giving no exact definition as to whether he meant air or water, or anything else. And he said that the parts were susceptible of change, but that the whole was unchangeable; and that the earth lay in the middle, being placed there as a sort of centre, of a spherical shape. The moon, he said, had a borrowed light, and borrowed it from the sun; and the sun he affirmed to be not less than the earth, and the purest possible fire.

II. He used to claim that the main principle and fundamental element of everything was Infinity, without clearly defining whether he meant air, water, or something else. He argued that the parts could change, but the whole remained unchangeable; and that the earth was situated in the center, like a sort of middle point, in a spherical shape. He noted that the moon reflected light, which it got from the sun; and he insisted that the sun was at least as large as the earth, and the purest form of fire.

III. He also was the first discoverer of the gnomon; and he placed some in Lacedæmon on the sun-dials there, as Phavorinus says in his Universal History, and they showed the solstices and the equinoxes; he also made clocks. He was the first person, too, who drew a map of the earth and sea, and he also made a globe; and he published a concise statement of whatever opinions he embraced or entertained; and this treatise was met with by Apollodorus, the Athenian.

III. He was also the first to discover the gnomon, and he placed a few in Laconia on the sundials there, as Phavorinus mentions in his Universal History, which indicated the solstices and equinoxes; he also invented clocks. He was the first person to create a map of the land and sea, and he also made a globe; he published a brief summary of all the ideas he believed in or considered; and this work was encountered by Apollodorus, the Athenian.

IV. And Apollodorus, in his Chronicles, states, that in the second year of the fifty-eighth Olympiad, he was sixty-four years old. And soon after he died, having flourished much about the same time as Polycrates, the tyrant, of Samos. They say that when he sang, the children laughed; and that he, hearing of this, said, “We must then sing better for the sake of the children.”

IV. Apollodorus, in his Chronicles, mentions that in the second year of the fifty-eighth Olympiad, he was sixty-four years old. Shortly after that, he died, having been prominent around the same time as Polycrates, the tyrant of Samos. It’s said that when he sang, the children laughed; and upon hearing this, he said, “We need to sing better for the sake of the children.”

V. There was also another Anaximander, a historian; and he too was a Milesian, and wrote in the Ionic dialect.

V. There was another Anaximander, a historian; he was also from Miletus and wrote in the Ionic dialect.

LIFE OF ANAXIMENES.

I. Anaximenes, the son of Eurystratus, a Milesian, was a pupil of Anaximander; but some say that he was also a pupil of Parmenides. He said that the principles of everything[58] were the air, and the Infinite; and that the stars moved not under the earth, but around the earth. He wrote in the pure unmixed Ionian dialect. And he lived, according to the statements of Apollodorus, in the sixty-third Olympiad, and died about the time of the taking of Sardis.

I. Anaximenes, the son of Eurystratus and a native of Miletus, was a student of Anaximander; however, some claim he also studied under Parmenides. He believed that the fundamental elements of everything[58] were air and the Infinite, and that the stars didn't rotate under the earth but around it. He wrote in the pure, unaltered Ionian dialect. According to Apollodorus, he lived during the sixty-third Olympiad and died around the time Sardis was captured.

II. There were also two other persons of the name of Anaximenes, both citizens of Lampsacus; one an orator and the other a historian, who was the son of the sister of the orator, and who wrote an account of the exploits of Alexander.

II. There were also two other people named Anaximenes, both from Lampsacus; one was an orator and the other was a historian, the son of the orator's sister, who wrote a record of Alexander's achievements.

III. And this philosopher wrote the following letters:—

III. And this philosopher wrote the following letters:—

ANAXIMENES TO PYTHAGORAS.

Thales, the son of Euxamias, has died in his old age, by an unfortunate accident. In the evening, as he was accustomed to do, he went forth out of the vestibule of his house with his maid-servant, to observe the stars: and (for he had forgotten the existence of the place) while he was looking up towards the skies, he fell down a precipitous place. So now, the astronomer of Miletus has met with this end. But we who were his pupils cherish the recollection of the man, and so do our children and our own pupils: and we will lecture on his principles. At all events, the beginning of all wisdom ought to be attributed to Thales.

Thales, the son of Euxamias, has passed away in his old age due to an unfortunate accident. In the evening, as was his custom, he stepped out of his house with his maid to look at the stars. While gazing up at the sky, he forgot about the surrounding area and fell into a steep place. So now, the astronomer from Miletus has met this fate. But we, his students, hold his memory dear, as do our children and our own students, and we will continue to teach his principles. In any case, the foundation of all wisdom should be credited to Thales.

IV. And again he writes:—

IV. And again he writes:—

ANAXIMENES TO PYTHAGORAS.

You are more prudent than we, in that you have migrated from Samos to Crotona, and live there in peace. For the descendants of Æacus commit unheard-of crimes, and tyrants never cease to oppress the Milesians. The king of the Medes too is formidable to us: unless, indeed, we choose to become tributary to him. But the Ionians are on the point of engaging in war with the Medes in the cause of universal freedom. For if we remain quiet there is no longer any hope of safety for us. How then can Anaximenes apply his mind to the contemplation of the skies, while he is in perpetual fear of death or slavery? But you are beloved by the people of Crotona, and by all the rest of the Italians; and pupils flock to you, even from Sicily.

You’re smarter than we are because you’ve moved from Samos to Crotona and live there in peace. The descendants of Æacus are committing terrible crimes, and the tyrants keep oppressing the Milesians. The king of the Medes is also a serious threat to us, unless we decide to pay him tribute. But the Ionians are about to go to war with the Medes for the sake of freedom for everyone. If we stay quiet, we’ve got no hope for safety. So how can Anaximenes focus on studying the skies when he’s always afraid of death or slavery? But you’re loved by the people of Crotona and by all the other Italians, and students come to you from as far away as Sicily.

LIFE OF ANAXAGORAS.

I. Anaxagoras, the son of Hegesibulus, or Eubulus, was a citizen of Clazomenæ. He was a pupil of Anaximenes, and was the first philosopher who attributed mind to matter, beginning his treatise on the subject in the following manner (and the whole treatise is written in a most beautiful and magnificent style): “All things were mixed up together; then Mind came and arranged them all in distinct order.” On which account he himself got the same name of Mind. And Timon speaks thus of him in his Silli:—

I. Anaxagoras, the son of Hegesibulus or Eubulus, was a citizen of Clazomenae. He studied under Anaximenes and was the first philosopher to associate mind with matter, starting his work on the topic with these words (and the entire treatise is written in a beautifully elegant style): “All things were mixed together; then Mind came and organized them into distinct order.” For this reason, he himself became known as Mind. Timon mentions him in his Silli:—

They say too that wise Anaxagoras
Deserves immortal fame; they call him Mind,
Because, as he doth teach, Mind came in season,
Arranging all which was confus’d before.

II. He was eminent for his noble birth and for his riches, and still more so for his magnanimity, inasmuch as he gave up all his patrimony to his relations; and being blamed by them for his neglect of his estate, “Why, then,” said he, “do not you take care of it?” And at last he abandoned it entirely, and devoted himself to the contemplation of subjects of natural philosophy, disregarding politics. So that once when some said to him, “You have no affection for your country,” “Be silent,” said he, “for I have the greatest affection for my country,” pointing up to heaven.

II. He was well-known for his noble background and wealth, but even more for his generosity, as he gave up all his inheritance to his family. When they criticized him for neglecting his estate, he replied, “Then why don’t you take care of it?” Eventually, he completely abandoned it and focused on studying natural philosophy, ignoring politics. So when someone said to him, “You don’t care about your country,” he replied, “Be quiet, for I have the greatest love for my country,” pointing up to heaven.

III. It is said, that at the time of the passage of the Hellespont by Xerxes, he was twenty years old, and that he lived to the age of seventy-two. But Apollodorus, in his Chronicles says that he flourished in the seventieth Olympiad, and that he died in the first year of the seventy-eighth. And he began to study philosophy at Athens, in the archonship of Callias, being twenty years of age, as Demetrius Phalereus tells us in his Catalogue of the Archons, and they say that he remained at Athens thirty years.

III. It's said that when Xerxes crossed the Hellespont, he was twenty years old and that he lived to be seventy-two. However, Apollodorus, in his Chronicles, states that he was active during the seventieth Olympiad and died in the first year of the seventy-eighth. He started studying philosophy in Athens during the archonship of Callias at the age of twenty, as Demetrius Phalereus mentions in his Catalogue of the Archons, and it's said that he stayed in Athens for thirty years.

IV. He asserted that the sun was a mass of burning iron, greater than Peloponnesus; (that some attribute this doctrine to Tantalus), and that the moon contained houses, and also, hills and ravines: and that the primary elements of everything were similarities of parts; for as we say that gold consists of a quantity of grains combined together, so too is the universe formed of a number of small bodies of similar[60] parts. He further taught that Mind was the principle of motion: and that of bodies the heavy ones, such as the earth, occupied the lower situations; and the light ones, such as fire, occupied the higher places, and that the middle spaces were assigned to water and air. And thus that the sea rested upon the earth, which was broad, the moisture being all evaporated by the sun. And he said that the stars originally moved about in irregular confusion, so that at first the pole star, which is continually visible, always appeared in the zenith, but that afterwards it acquired a certain declination. And that the milky way was a reflection of the light of the sun when the stars did not appear. The comets he considered to be a concourse of planets emitting rays: and the shooting stars he thought were sparks as it were leaping from the firmament. The winds he thought were caused by the rarification of the atmosphere, which was produced by the sun. Thunder, he said, was produced by the collision of the clouds; and lightning by the rubbing together of the clouds. Earthquakes, he said, were produced by the return of the air into the earth. All animals he considered were originally generated out of moisture, and heat, and earthy particles: and subsequently from one another. And males he considered were derived from those on the right hand, and females from those on the left.

IV. He argued that the sun was a massive ball of burning iron, larger than the Peloponnesus; (some say this idea comes from Tantalus), and that the moon had houses, along with hills and valleys. He believed that the basic elements of everything were like parts that resembled each other; just as we say that gold is made up of many grains combined together, the universe is made up of many small bodies that are similar[60]. He also taught that Mind was the driving force behind movement: heavy bodies, like the earth, settled in the lower regions, while lighter ones, like fire, rose to the higher places, and that water and air occupied the middle spaces. This meant that the sea rested on the broad earth, with moisture completely evaporated by the sun. He said the stars initially moved around in chaotic patterns, so at first, the pole star, which is always visible, seemed to be directly overhead, but later it settled into a specific position. He described the Milky Way as the sun's light reflected when stars were not visible. He thought comets were clusters of planets giving off light, and shooting stars were like sparks leaping from the sky. He believed winds were caused by the thinning of the atmosphere created by the sun. Thunder resulted from clouds colliding, and lightning came from the friction between clouds. He said earthquakes happened when air returned into the earth. He thought all animals were originally formed from moisture, heat, and earthy particles, and then subsequently from one another. He believed that males came from those on the right side and females from those on the left.

V. They say, also, that he predicted a fall of the stones which fell near Ægospotami, and which he said would fall from the sun: on which account Euripides, who was a disciple of his, said in his Phaethon that the sun was a golden clod of earth. He went once to Olympia wrapped in a leathern cloak as if it were going to rain; and it did rain. And they say that he once replied to a man who asked him whether the mountains at Lampsacus would ever become sea, “Yes, if time lasts long enough.”

V. They also say that he predicted the fall of the stones that landed near Ægospotami, claiming they would come from the sun. Because of this, Euripides, who was his student, mentioned in his Phaethon that the sun was a golden lump of earth. He once went to Olympia wearing a leather cloak as if it were going to rain, and it did rain. They also say he once answered a man who asked if the mountains at Lampsacus would ever turn into sea, “Yes, if time lasts long enough.”

VI. Being once asked for what end he had been born, he said, “For the contemplation of the sun, and moon, and heaven.” A man once said to him, “You have lost the Athenians;” “No,” said he, “they have lost me.” When he beheld the tomb of Mausolus, he said, “A costly tomb is an image of a petrified estate.” And he comforted a man who was grieving because he was dying in a foreign land, by telling him, “The descent to hell is the same from every place.”

VI. When he was once asked why he was born, he said, “To contemplate the sun, moon, and sky.” A man once told him, “You’ve lost the Athenians;” he replied, “No, they’ve lost me.” When he saw the tomb of Mausolus, he remarked, “An expensive tomb is just a symbol of a frozen estate.” He consoled a man who was upset about dying in a foreign land by saying, “The journey to the underworld is the same from anywhere.”

VII. He appears to have been the first person (according to the account given by Phavorinus in his Universal History), who said that the Poem of Homer was composed in praise of virtue and justice: and Metrodorus, of Lampsacus, who was a friend of his, adopted this opinion, and advocated it energetically, and Metrodorus was the first who seriously studied the natural philosophy developed in the writings of the great poet.

VII. He seems to have been the first person (based on the account by Phavorinus in his Universal History) to say that Homer's poem was written to honor virtue and justice. Metrodorus from Lampsacus, who was his friend, embraced this view and strongly promoted it. Metrodorus was also the first to seriously explore the natural philosophy found in the works of the great poet.

VIII. Anaxagoras was also the first man who ever wrote a work in prose; and Silenus, in the first book of his Histories, says, that in the archonship of Lysanias a large stone fell from heaven; and that in reference to this event Anaxagoras said, that the whole heaven was composed of stones, and that by its rapid revolutions they were all held together; and when those revolutions get slower, they fall down.

VIII. Anaxagoras was also the first person to write a work in prose; and Silenus, in the first book of his Histories, mentions that during Lysanias's time as archon, a large stone fell from the sky. In relation to this event, Anaxagoras claimed that the entire sky was made up of stones, and that they were all kept together by its fast rotations; when those rotations slow down, the stones fall down.

IX. Of his trial there are different accounts given. For Sotion, in his Succession of the Philosophers, says, that he was persecuted for impiety by Cleon, because he said that the sun was a fiery ball of iron. And though Pericles, who had been his pupil, defended him, he was, nevertheless, fined five talents and banished. But Satyrus, in his Lives, says that it was Thucydides by whom he was impeached, as Thucydides was of the opposite party to Pericles; and that he was prosecuted not only for impiety, but also for Medism; and that he was condemned to death in his absence. And when news was brought him of two misfortunes—his condemnation, and the death of his children; concerning the condemnation he said, “Nature has long since condemned both them and me.” But about his children, he said, “I knew that I had become the father of mortals.” Some, however, attribute this saying to Solon, and others to Xenophon. And Demetrius Phalereus, in his treatise on Old Age, says that Anaxagoras buried them with his own hands. But Hermippus, in his Lives, says that he was thrown into prison for the purpose of being put to death: but that Pericles came forward and inquired if any one brought any accusation against him respecting his course of life. And as no one alleged anything against him: “I then,” said he, “am his disciple: do not you then be led away by calumnies to put this man to death; but be guided by me, and release him.” And he was released. But, as he was indignant at the insult which had been offered to him, he left the city.

IX. There are different accounts of his trial. Sotion, in his *Succession of the Philosophers*, says he was persecuted for impiety by Cleon because he claimed the sun was a fiery ball of iron. Even though Pericles, who had been his student, defended him, he was still fined five talents and banished. However, Satyrus, in his *Lives*, claims it was Thucydides who brought the charges against him, as Thucydides was opposed to Pericles. He was prosecuted not only for impiety but also for siding with the Medes, and he was sentenced to death in absentia. When he heard about two tragedies—his sentencing and the death of his children—regarding the sentencing he said, “Nature has long since condemned both them and me.” But concerning his children, he remarked, “I knew that I had become the father of mortals.” Some attribute this saying to Solon and others to Xenophon. Demetrius Phalereus, in his work on Old Age, says Anaxagoras buried them himself. Yet Hermippus, in his *Lives*, states he was imprisoned to be executed, but Pericles intervened, asking if anyone had any accusations against him related to his way of life. When no one could provide any evidence against him, Pericles said, “I am his student; do not let slander lead you to kill this man; instead, listen to me and set him free.” And he was freed. However, feeling insulted by the treatment he received, he left the city.

But Hieronymus, in the second book of his Miscellaneous Commentaries, says that Pericles produced him before the court, tottering and emaciated by disease, so that he was released rather out of pity, than by any deliberate decision on the merits of his case. And thus much may be said about his trial. Some people have fancied that he was very hostile to Democritus, because he did not succeed in getting admission to him for the purposes of conversation.

But Hieronymus, in the second book of his Miscellaneous Commentaries, says that Pericles brought him before the court, weak and frail from illness, so he was let go more out of pity than from any careful consideration of his case. And that’s about all that can be said about his trial. Some people have thought he was very antagonistic toward Democritus because he wasn’t able to get a chance to speak with him.

X. And at last, having gone to Lampsacus, he died in that city. And it is said, that when the governors of the city asked him what he would like to have done for him, he replied, “That they would allow the children to play every year during the month in which he died.” And this custom is kept up even now. And when he was dead, the citizens of Lampsacus buried him with great honours, and wrote this epitaph on him:—

X. Finally, after going to Lampsacus, he died in that city. It's said that when the city's leaders asked him what he wanted done for him, he replied, “That they would let the children play every year during the month of my death.” This tradition is still observed today. When he passed away, the people of Lampsacus buried him with great honors and wrote this epitaph for him:—

Here Anaxagoras lies, who reached of truth
The farthest bounds in heavenly speculations.

We ourselves also have written an epigram on him:—

We’ve also written a short poem about him:—

Wise Anaxagoras did call the sun
A mass of glowing iron; and for this
Death was to be his fate. But Pericles
Then saved his friend; but afterwards he died
A victim of a weak philosophy.

XI. There were also three other people of the name of Anaxagoras; none of whom combined all kinds of knowledge; But one was an orator and a pupil of Isocrates; another was a statuary, who is mentioned by Antigonus; another is a grammarian, a pupil of Zenodotus.

XI. There were also three other people named Anaxagoras; none of them had all-encompassing knowledge. One was an orator and a student of Isocrates; another was a sculptor mentioned by Antigonus; the last was a grammarian who studied under Zenodotus.

LIFE OF ARCHELAUS.

I. Archelaus was a citizen of either Athens or Miletus, and his father’s name was Apollodorus; but, as some say, Mydon. He was a pupil of Anaxagoras, and the master of Socrates.

I. Archelaus was a resident of either Athens or Miletus, and his father's name was Apollodorus; some say it was Mydon. He studied under Anaxagoras and was the teacher of Socrates.

II. He was the first person who imported the study of natural philosophy from Ionia to Athens, and he was called the Natural Philosopher, because natural philosophy terminated with him, as Socrates introduced ethical philosophy. And it seems probable that Archelaus too meddled in some degree[63] with moral philosophy; for in his philosophical speculations he discussed laws and what was honourable and just. And Socrates borrowed from him; and because he enlarged his principles, he was thought to be the inventor of them.

II. He was the first person to bring the study of natural philosophy from Ionia to Athens, and he was known as the Natural Philosopher, because natural philosophy ended with him, just as Socrates started ethical philosophy. It seems likely that Archelaus also dabbled a bit in moral philosophy; in his philosophical ideas, he talked about laws and what was honorable and just. Socrates borrowed from him, and because he expanded on those ideas, he was considered the one who invented them.[63]

III. He used to say that there were two primary causes of generation, heat and cold; and that all animals were generated out of mud: and that what are accounted just and disgraceful are not so by nature, but only by law. And his reasoning proceeds in this way. He says, that water being melted by heat, when it is submitted to the action of fire, by which it is solidified, becomes earth; and when it is liquefied, becomes air. And, therefore, the earth is surrounded by air and influenced by it, and so is the air by the revolutions of fire. And he says that animals are generated out of hot earth, which sends up a thick mud something like milk for their food. So too he says that it produced men.

III. He used to say that there are two main causes of creation: heat and cold; and that all animals come from mud. He believed that what we consider just and disgraceful isn’t so by nature, but only by law. His reasoning goes like this: he claims that when water is heated, it melts, and when it's exposed to fire, it solidifies into earth; when it liquefies, it becomes air. Therefore, the earth is surrounded by air and affected by it, just as the air is influenced by the cycles of fire. He also states that animals are created from hot earth, which produces a thick mud similar to milk for their nourishment. He even suggests that this process also created humans.

And he was the first person who said that sound is produced by the percussion of the air; and that the sea is filtered in the hollows of the earth in its passage, and so is condensed; and that the sun is the greatest of the stars, and that the universe is boundless.

And he was the first person to say that sound is made by the vibration of air; that the sea gets filtered through the earth's cavities as it moves, and that's how it gets condensed; that the sun is the biggest of the stars; and that the universe is infinite.

IV. But there were three other people of the name of Archelaus: one, a geographer, who described the countries traversed by Alexander; the second, a man who wrote a poem on objects which have two natures; and the third, an orator, who wrote a book containing the precepts of his art.

IV. But there were three other people named Archelaus: one was a geographer who wrote about the countries Alexander traveled through; the second was a poet who composed a poem about things with dual natures; and the third was an orator who authored a book outlining the principles of his craft.

LIFE OF SOCRATES.

I. Socrates was the son of Sophroniscus, a statuary, and of Phænarete, a midwife; as Plato records in his Theætetus, he was a citizen of Athens, of the borough of Alopece.

I. Socrates was the son of Sophroniscus, a sculptor, and Phænarete, a midwife; as Plato mentions in his Theætetus, he was a citizen of Athens, from the neighborhood of Alopece.

II. Some people believed that he assisted Euripides in his poems; in reference to which idea, Mnesimachus speaks as follows:—

II. Some people thought that he helped Euripides with his poems; about this idea, Mnesimachus says the following:—

The Phrygians are a new play of Euripides,
But Socrates has laid the main foundation.[19]

And again he says:—

And he says again:—

Euripides: patched up by Socrates.

And Callias, in his Captives, says:—

And Callias, in his Captives, says:—

A. Are you so proud, giving yourself such airs?
B. And well I may, for Socrates is the cause.

And Aristophanes says, in his Clouds:—

And Aristophanes says in his Clouds:—

This is Euripides, who doth compose
Those argumentative wise tragedies.

III. But, having been a pupil of Anaxagoras, as some people say, but of Damon as the other story goes, related by Alexander in his Successions, after the condemnation of Anaxagoras, he became a disciple of Archelaus, the natural philosopher. And, indeed, Aristoxenus says that he was very intimate with him.

III. However, some people say he was a student of Anaxagoras, while others, as Alexander mentions in his Successions, claim he was taught by Damon. After Anaxagoras was condemned, he became a student of Archelaus, the natural philosopher. In fact, Aristoxenus states that he was very close to him.

IV. But Duris says that he was a slave, and employed in carving stones. And some say that the Graces in the Acropolis are his work; and they are clothed figures. And that it is in reference to this that Timon says, in his Silli:—

IV. But Duris says that he was a slave and worked in carving stones. Some claim that the Graces in the Acropolis are his creations, and they are figures with clothing. Timon references this in his Silli:—

From them proceeded the stone polisher,
The reasoning legislator, the enchanter
Of all the Greeks, making them subtle arguers,
A cunning pedant, a shrewd Attic quibbler.

V. For he was very clever in all rhetorical exercises, as Idomeneus also assures us. But the thirty tyrants forbade him to give lessons in the art of speaking and arguing, as Xenophon tells us. And Aristophanes turns him into ridicule in his Comedies, as making the worse appear the better reason. For he was the first man, as Phavorinus says in his Universal History, who, in conjunction with his disciple Æschines, taught men how to become orators. And Idomeneus makes the same assertion in his essay on the Socratic School. He, likewise, was the first person who conversed about human life; and was also the first philosopher who was condemned to death and executed. And Aristoxenus, the son of Spintharas, says that he lent money in usury; and that he collected the interest and principal together, and then, when he had got the interest, he lent it out again. And Demetrius, of Byzantium, says that it was Criton who made him leave[65] his workshop and instruct men, out of the admiration which he conceived for his abilities.

V. He was very skilled in all forms of rhetoric, as Idomeneus also confirms. However, the thirty tyrants prohibited him from teaching speaking and debating skills, as Xenophon states. Aristophanes mocks him in his Comedies for making the weaker argument seem stronger. As Phavorinus mentions in his Universal History, he was the first person, along with his student Æschines, to teach people how to become orators. Idomeneus supports this claim in his essay on the Socratic School. He was also the first to discuss human life in depth and the first philosopher to be sentenced to death and executed. Aristoxenus, son of Spintharas, claims that he practiced usury, collecting both the interest and principal, and then lent out the interest again. Demetrius of Byzantium states that it was Criton who convinced him to leave his workshop to teach others, inspired by the admiration he had for his skills.

VI. He then, perceiving that natural philosophy had no immediate bearing on our interests, began to enter upon moral speculations, both in his workshop and in the market-place. And he said that the objects of his search were—

VI. He then, noticing that natural philosophy didn’t have a direct impact on our interests, started to explore moral ideas, both in his workshop and in the marketplace. And he stated that the things he was looking for were—

Whatever good or harm can man befall
In his own house.

And very often, while arguing and discussing points that arose, he was treated with great violence and beaten, and pulled about, and laughed at and ridiculed by the multitude. But he bore all this with great equanimity. So that once, when he had been kicked and buffeted about, and had borne it all patiently, and some one expressed his surprise, he said, “Suppose an ass had kicked me, would you have had me bring an action against him?” And this is the account of Demetrius.

And very often, while debating and discussing the issues that came up, he was treated with a lot of hostility, beaten, dragged around, laughed at, and mocked by the crowd. But he took it all with great composure. So once, after he had been kicked and pushed around and had handled it patiently, when someone expressed their surprise, he said, “If an ass kicked me, would you want me to sue it?” And this is the story of Demetrius.

VII. But he had no need of travelling (though most philosophers did travel), except when he was bound to serve in the army. But all the rest of his life he remained in the same place, and in an argumentative spirit he used to dispute with all who would converse with him, not with the purpose of taking away their opinions from them, so much as of learning the truth, as far as he could do so, himself. And they say that Euripides gave him a small work of Heraclitus to read, and asked him afterwards what he thought of it, and he replied, “What I have understood is good; and so, I think, what I have not understood is; only the book requires a Delian diver to get at the meaning of it.” He paid great attention also to the training of the body, and was always in excellent condition himself. Accordingly, he joined in the expedition to Amphipolis, and he it was who took up and saved Xenophon in the battle of Delium, when he had fallen from his horse; for when all the Athenians had fled, he retreated quietly, turning round slowly, and watching to repel any one who attacked him. He also joined in the expedition to Potidæa, which was undertaken by sea; for it was impossible to get there by land, as the war impeded the communication. And they say that on this occasion he remained the whole night in one place; and that though he had deserved the prize[66] of pre-eminent valour, he yielded it to Alcibiades, to whom Aristippus, in the fourth book of his treatise on the Luxury of the Ancients, says that he was greatly attached. But Ion, of Chios, says, that while he was a very young man he left Athens, and went to Samos with Archelaus. And Aristotle says, that he went to Delphi; and Phavorinus also, in the first book of his Commentaries, says that he went to the Isthmus.

VII. But he didn’t need to travel (even though most philosophers did), except when he had to serve in the army. For the rest of his life, he stayed in the same place and engaged in discussions with anyone willing to talk to him, not to change their opinions, but to learn the truth as much as he could. They say Euripides gave him a small piece of work by Heraclitus to read and later asked him what he thought of it. He replied, “What I understand is good; and so, I believe what I don’t understand is good too; it just needs a Delian diver to uncover its meaning.” He also paid a lot of attention to physical training and always kept himself in excellent shape. As a result, he participated in the campaign to Amphipolis, and he was the one who picked up and rescued Xenophon during the battle of Delium when he had fallen off his horse. As all the Athenians fled, he retreated calmly, turning slowly and keeping an eye out to defend against anyone attacking him. He also took part in the sea expedition to Potidæa, as it wasn’t possible to reach there by land due to the war blocking the routes. They say that during this time he stayed in one spot all night; and although he deserved the prize for outstanding bravery, he gave it up for Alcibiades, whom Aristippus mentions in the fourth book of his work on the Luxury of the Ancients as being very fond of. But Ion of Chios says that when he was a very young man, he left Athens and went to Samos with Archelaus. And Aristotle states that he went to Delphi; Phavorinus also mentions in the first book of his Commentaries that he traveled to the Isthmus.

VIII. He was a man of great firmness of mind, and very much attached to the democracy, as was plain from his not submitting to Critias, when he ordered him to bring Leon of Salamis, a very rich man, before the thirty, for the purpose of being murdered. And he alone voted for the acquittal of the ten generals;[20] and when it was in his power to escape out of prison he would not do it; and he reproved those who bewailed his fate, and even while in prison, he delivered those beautiful discourses which we still possess.

VIII. He was a man of strong will and deeply committed to democracy, as shown by his refusal to obey Critias when he ordered him to bring Leon of Salamis, a very wealthy man, before the thirty for execution. He was the only one who voted for the acquittal of the ten generals;[20] and even when he had the chance to escape from prison, he chose not to. He scolded those who mourned his situation, and even while imprisoned, he delivered those remarkable speeches that we still have today.

IX. He was a contented and venerable man. And once, as Pamphila says, in the seventh book of her Commentaries, when Alcibiades offered him a large piece of ground to build a house upon, he said, “But if I wanted shoes, and you had given me a piece of leather to make myself shoes, I should be laughed at if I took it.” And often, when he beheld the multitude of things which were being sold, he would say to himself, “How many things are there which I do not want.” And he was continually repeating these iambics:—

IX. He was a happy and respected man. And once, as Pamphila mentions in the seventh book of her Commentaries, when Alcibiades offered him a large piece of land to build a house on, he replied, “But if I wanted shoes, and you gave me a piece of leather to make them, I would be laughed at if I took it.” Often, when he saw the many things for sale, he would say to himself, “How many things do I not want.” And he kept repeating these lines:—

For silver plate and purple useful are
For actors on the stage, but not for men.

And he showed his scorn of Archelaus the Macedonian, and Scopas the Cranonian, and Eurylochus of Larissa, when he refused to accept their money, and to go and visit them. And he was so regular in his way of living, that it happened more than once when there was a plague at Athens, that he was the only person who did not catch it.

And he expressed his disdain for Archelaus the Macedonian, Scopas the Cranonian, and Eurylochus of Larissa, when he turned down their money and refused to visit them. He stuck to his routine so closely that during a plague in Athens, he was the only one who didn’t get sick.

X. Aristotle says, that he had two wives. The first was Xanthippe, by whom he had a son named Lamprocles; the second was Myrto, the daughter of Aristides the Just; and he took her without any dowry, and by her he had two sons, Sophroniscus and Menexenus. But some say that Myrto was[67] his first wife. And some, among whom are Satyrus, and Hieronymus, of Rhodes, say that he had them both at the same time. For they say that the Athenians, on account of the scarcity of men, passed a vote, with the view of increasing the population, that a man might marry one citizen, and might also have children by another who should be legitimate; on which account Socrates did so.

X. Aristotle mentions that he had two wives. The first was Xanthippe, with whom he had a son named Lamprocles; the second was Myrto, the daughter of Aristides the Just. He married her without any dowry, and they had two sons, Sophroniscus and Menexenus. However, some say that Myrto was his first wife. Others, including Satyrus and Hieronymus of Rhodes, claim that he had both of them at the same time. They note that the Athenians, due to a shortage of men, voted to allow a man to marry one citizen and have children with another legitimate woman; this is why Socrates did so.

XI. And he was a man able to look down upon any who mocked him. And he prided himself upon the simplicity of his way of life; and never exacted any pay from his pupils. And he used to say, that the man who ate with the greatest appetite, had the least need of delicacies; and that he who drank with the greatest appetite, was the least inclined to look for a draught which is not at hand; and that those who want fewest things are nearest to the Gods. And thus much, indeed, one may learn from the comic poets; who, without perceiving it, praise him in the very matters for which they ridicule him. Aristophanes speaks thus:—

XI. He was a man who could look down on anyone who mocked him. He took pride in his simple way of life and never charged his students. He used to say that the person who ate with the biggest appetite needed the least in terms of delicacies and that someone who drank with great thirst was the least likely to search for a drink that wasn't available. He believed that those who wanted the fewest things were closest to the Gods. One can certainly learn this from the comic poets, who, without realizing it, praise him in the same things they mock him for. Aristophanes says:—

Prudent man, who thus with justice long for mighty wisdom,
Happiness will be your lot in Athens, and all Greece too;
For you’ve a noble memory, and plenty of invention,
And patience dwells within your mind, and you are never tired,
Whether you’re standing still or walking; and you care not for cold,
Nor do you long for breakfast time, nor e’er give in to hunger;
But wine and gluttony you shun, and all such kind of follies.

And Ameipsias introduces him on the stage in a cloak, and speaks thus of him:—

And Ameipsias brings him on stage wearing a cloak and says this about him:—

O Socrates, among few men the best,
And among many vainest; here at last
You come to us courageously—but where,
Where did you get that cloak? so strange a garment,
Some leather cutter must have given you
By way of joke: and yet this worthy man,
Though ne’er so hungry, never flatters any one.

Aristophanes too, exposes his contemptuous and arrogant disposition, speaking thus:—

Aristophanes also shows his disdainful and proud attitude by saying this:—

You strut along the streets, and look around you proudly,
And barefoot many ills endure, and hold your head above us.

And yet, sometimes he adapted himself to the occasion and dressed handsomely. As, for instance, in the banquet of Plato, where he is represented as going to find Agathon.

And yet, sometimes he adjusted to the situation and dressed nicely. For example, at Plato's banquet, where he is depicted as going to find Agathon.

XII. He was a man of great ability, both in exhorting men to, and dissuading them from, any course; as, for instance having discoursed with Theætetus on the subject of knowledge, he sent him away almost inspired, as Plato says. And when Euthyphron had commenced a prosecution against his father for having killed a foreigner, he conversed with him on the subject of piety, and turned him from his purpose: and by his exhortations he made Lysis a most moral man. For he was very ingenious at deriving arguments from existing circumstances. And so he mollified his son Lamprocles when he was very angry with his mother, as Xenophon mentions somewhere in his works; and he wrought upon Glaucon, the brother of Plato, who was desirous to meddle with affairs of state, and induced him to abandon his purpose, because of his want of experience in such matters, as Xenophon relates. And, on the contrary, he persuaded Charmidas to devote himself to politics, because he was a man very well calculated for such business. He also inspired Iphicrates, the general, with courage, by showing him the gamecocks of Midias the barber, pluming themselves against those of Callias; and Glauconides said, that the state ought to keep him carefully, as if he were a pheasant or a peacock. He used also to say, that it was a strange thing that every one could easily tell what property he had, but was not able to name all his friends, or even to tell their number; so careless were men on that subject. Once when he saw Euclid exceedingly anxious about some dialectic arguments, he said to him, “O Euclid, you will acquire a power of managing sophists, but not of governing men.” For he thought that subtle hair-splitting on those subjects was quite useless; as Plato also records in the Euthydemus.

XII. He was a highly skilled individual, capable of encouraging people to take one path or convincing them to avoid another. For example, after discussing the concept of knowledge with Theætetus, he sent him off feeling almost inspired, as Plato puts it. When Euthyphron started a legal case against his father for killing a foreigner, he talked with him about piety and changed his mind. His guidance also helped Lysis become a very virtuous person. He had a knack for crafting arguments based on the circumstances at hand. He calmed his son Lamprocles when he was very upset with his mother, as Xenophon mentions in his writings. He also persuaded Glaucon, Plato’s brother, who wanted to get involved in politics, to reconsider because he lacked experience in such matters, as Xenophon recounts. Conversely, he encouraged Charmidas to engage in politics since he was well-suited for it. He inspired the general Iphicrates with confidence by pointing out the gamecocks of Midias the barber, preening themselves against those of Callias; and Glauconides remarked that the state should take care of him as if he were a prized bird. He would also comment on the oddity that while everyone could easily list their possessions, most couldn't name all their friends or even count them, showing how careless people were about that topic. Once, when he saw Euclid very worried about some dialectical arguments, he said, “Oh Euclid, you’ll gain the ability to manage sophists, but not to govern people.” He believed that getting caught up in intricate debates on those issues was pretty pointless, as Plato also records in the Euthydemus.

XIII. And when Charmidas offered him some slaves, with the view to his making a profit of them, he would not have them; and, as some people say, he paid no regard to the beauty of Alcibiades.

XIII. And when Charmidas offered him some slaves, hoping he would profit from them, he refused; and, as some people say, he didn’t care about Alcibiades’ beauty.

XIV. He used to praise leisure as the most valuable of possessions, as Xenophon tells us in his Banquet. And it was a saying of his that there was one only good, namely, knowledge; and one only evil, namely, ignorance; that riches and high birth had nothing estimable in them, but that, on the contrary, they were wholly evil. Accordingly, when some one told him[69] that the mother of Antisthenes was a Thracian woman, “Did you suppose,” said he, “that so noble a man must be born of two Athenians?” And when Phædo was reduced to a state of slavery, he ordered Crito to ransom him, and taught him, and made him a philosopher.

XIV. He used to praise leisure as the most valuable possession, as Xenophon tells us in his Banquet. He said that there was only one good, which is knowledge, and only one evil, which is ignorance; that wealth and noble birth had no real value, but were, in fact, entirely negative. So, when someone told him[69] that Antisthenes' mother was a Thracian, he replied, “Did you really think such a noble person had to be born of two Athenians?” And when Phædo ended up in slavery, he instructed Crito to buy his freedom, educated him, and turned him into a philosopher.

XV. And, moreover, he used to learn to play on the lyre when he had time, saying, that it was not absurd to learn anything that one did not know; and further, he used frequently to dance, thinking such an exercise good for the health of the body, as Xenophon relates in his Banquet.

XV. He also took time to learn how to play the lyre, believing it wasn't silly to learn something he didn't know. Additionally, he often danced, considering that exercise beneficial for his health, as Xenophon mentions in his Banquet.

XVI. He used also to say that the dæmon foretold the future to him;[21] and that to begin well was not a trifling thing, but yet not far from a trifling thing; and that he knew nothing, except the fact of his ignorance. Another saying of his was, that those who bought things out of season, at an extravagant price, expected never to live till the proper season for them. Once, when he was asked what was the virtue of a young man, he said, “To avoid excess in everything.” And he used to say, that it was necessary to learn geometry only so far as might enable a man to measure land for the purposes of buying and selling. And when Euripides, in his Auge, had spoken thus of virtue:—

XVI. He often said that his inner voice predicted the future for him;[21] and that starting off well wasn't a trivial matter, but also not far from being trivial; and that he knew nothing, except for his own ignorance. Another thing he mentioned was that those who bought items out of season at an outrageous price were unlikely to see the right time for them. Once, when someone asked him what made a young man virtuous, he replied, “To avoid going to extremes in everything.” He also mentioned that it was necessary to learn geometry only to the extent that it allowed someone to measure land for buying and selling. And when Euripides, in his Auge, spoke about virtue like this:—

’Tis best to leave these subjects undisturbed;

he rose up and left the theatre, saying that it was an absurdity to think it right to seek for a slave if one could not find him, but to let virtue be altogether disregarded. The question was once put to him by a man whether he would advise him to marry or not? And he replied, “Whichever you do, you will repent it.” He often said, that he wondered at those who made stone statues, when he saw how careful they were that the stone should be like the man it was intended to represent, but how careless they were of themselves, as to guarding against being like the stone. He used also to recommend young men to be constantly looking in the glass, in order that, if they were handsome, they might be worthy of their beauty; and if they were ugly, they[70] might conceal their unsightly appearance by their accomplishments. He once invited some rich men to dinner, and when Xanthippe was ashamed of their insufficient appointments, he said, “Be of good cheer; for if our guests are sensible men, they will bear with us; and if they are not, we need not care about them.” He used to say, “That other men lived to eat, but that he ate to live.” Another saying of his was, “That to have a regard for the worthless multitude, was like the case of a man who refused to take one piece of money of four drachmas as if it were bad, and then took a heap of such coins and admitted them to be good.” When Æschines said, “I am a poor man, and have nothing else, but I give you myself;” “Do you not,” he replied, “perceive that you are giving me what is of the greatest value?” He said to some one, who was expressing indignation at being overlooked when the thirty had seized on the supreme power, “Do you, then, repent of not being a tyrant too?” A man said to him, “The Athenians have condemned you to death.” “And nature,” he replied, “has condemned them.” But some attribute this answer to Anaxagoras. When his wife said to him, “You die undeservedly.” “Would you, then,” he rejoined, “have had me deserve death?” He thought once that some one appeared to him in a dream, and said:—

He got up and left the theater, saying it was ridiculous to think it was right to look for a slave if you couldn't find him, while completely ignoring virtue. A man once asked him if he would advise him to marry or not, and he replied, “Whichever you choose, you'll regret it.” He often remarked that he was amazed by those who made stone statues, noticing how careful they were to ensure the stone looked like the person it represented, yet how careless they were about making sure they didn't resemble the stone themselves. He also advised young men to constantly look in the mirror so that if they were handsome, they could be worthy of their beauty; and if they were ugly, they might hide their unattractive appearance with their skills. He once invited some wealthy men to dinner, and when Xanthippe felt embarrassed by their insufficient preparations, he said, “Don't worry; if our guests are sensible, they'll understand; if they’re not, we shouldn't care about them.” He would say, “Other people live to eat, but I eat to live.” Another saying of his was, “Caring about the worthless crowd is like a man refusing to take a single four-drachma coin because it seems bad, yet accepting a pile of the same coins as good.” When Aeschines said, “I am a poor man with nothing else, but I give you myself,” he replied, “Don’t you realize you’re giving me something of the greatest value?” He said to someone who was upset about being overlooked when the thirty seized power, “Do you regret not being a tyrant too?” A man told him, “The Athenians have condemned you to death.” He replied, “And nature has condemned them.” Some attribute this response to Anaxagoras. When his wife told him, “You die undeservedly,” he answered, “Would you have wanted me to deserve death?” He once thought that someone appeared to him in a dream and said:—

On the third day you’ll come to lovely Phthia.

And so he said to Æschines, “In three days I shall die.” And when he was about to drink the hemlock, Apollodorus presented him with a handsome robe, that he might expire in it; and he said, “Why was my own dress good enough to live in, and not good enough to die in?” When a person said to him, “Such an one speaks ill of you;” “To be sure,” said he, “for he has never learnt to speak well.” When Antisthenes turned the ragged side of his cloak to the light, he said, “I see your silly vanity through the holes in your cloak.” When some one said to him, “Does not that man abuse you?” “No,” said he, “for that does not apply to me.” It was a saying of his, too, “That it is a good thing for a man to offer himself cheerfully to the attacks of the comic writers; for then, if they say anything worth hearing, one will be able to mend; and if they do not, then all they say is unimportant.”

And so he said to Æschines, “I’m going to die in three days.” When he was about to drink the hemlock, Apollodorus gave him a nice robe so he could die in it; and he replied, “Why was my own clothes good enough to live in, but not good enough to die in?” When someone told him, “So-and-so is speaking badly about you,” he said, “Well, of course, because he’s never learned to speak well.” When Antisthenes showed the ragged side of his cloak to the light, he said, “I can see your foolish vanity through the holes in your cloak.” When someone asked him, “Isn’t that man insulting you?” he responded, “No, because that doesn’t apply to me.” He also said, “It’s a good thing for a person to willingly face criticism from comedians; because if they say something worth listening to, you can improve from it; and if they don’t, then whatever they say isn’t important.”

XVII. He said once to Xanthippe, who first abused him[71] and then threw water at him, “Did I not say that Xanthippe was thundering now, and would soon rain?” When Alcibiades said to him, “The abusive temper of Xanthippe is intolerable;” “But I,” he rejoined, “am used to it, just as I should be if I were always hearing the noise of a pulley; and you yourself endure to hear geese cackling.” To which Alcibiades answered, “Yes, but they bring me eggs and goslings.” “Well,” rejoined Socrates, “and Xanthippe brings me children.” Once, she attacked him in the market-place, and tore his cloak off; his friends advised him to keep her off with his hands; “Yes, by Jove,” said he, “that while we are boxing you may all cry out, ‘Well done, Socrates, well done, Xanthippe.’” And he used to say, that one ought to live with a restive woman, just as horsemen manage violent-tempered horses; “and as they,” said he, “when they have once mastered them, are easily able to manage all others; so I, after managing Xanthippe, can easily live with any one else whatever.”

XVII. He once told Xanthippe, who first yelled at him and then splashed water on him, “Didn’t I say that Xanthippe was making a scene and would soon unleash a storm?” When Alcibiades said to him, “Xanthippe's awful temper is unbearable,” he replied, “I’ve gotten used to it, just like I would if I were always hearing the sound of a pulley; and you yourself put up with the noise of geese cackling.” Alcibiades responded, “Yes, but they give me eggs and goslings.” Socrates came back with, “Well, Xanthippe gives me children.” Once, she attacked him in the marketplace and tore his cloak off; his friends suggested he fend her off with his hands. “Sure,” he said, “so while we’re fighting, you can all shout, ‘Well done, Socrates, well done, Xanthippe.’” He would say that living with a difficult woman is like how horsemen handle feisty horses; “and just like they,” he said, “once they have them under control, they can manage any horse. So, after dealing with Xanthippe, I can easily get along with anyone else.”

XVIII. And it was in consequence of such sayings and actions as these, that the priestess at Delphi was witness in his favour, when she gave Chærephon this answer, which is so universally known:—

XVIII. And it was because of statements and actions like these that the priestess at Delphi spoke in his favor when she gave Chærephon this well-known answer:—

Socrates of all mortals is the wisest.

In consequence of which answer, he incurred great envy; and he brought envy also on himself, by convicting men who gave themselves airs of folly and ignorance, as undoubtedly he did to Anytus; and as is shown in Plato’s Meno. For he, not being able to bear Socrates’ jesting, first of all set Aristophanes to attack him, and then persuaded Meletus to institute a prosecution against him, on the ground of impiety and of corrupting the youth of the city. Accordingly Meletus did institute the prosecution; and Polyeuctus pronounced the sentence, as Phavorinus records in his Universal History. And Polycrates, the sophist, wrote the speech which was delivered, as Hermippus says, not Anytus, as others say. And Lycon, the demagogue, prepared everything necessary to support the impeachment; but Antisthenes in his Successions of the Philosophers, and Plato in his Apology, say that these men brought the accusation:—Anytus, and Lycon, and Meletus; Anytus, acting against him on behalf of the magistrates, and[72] because of his political principles; Lycon, on behalf of the orators; and Meletus on behalf of the poets, all of whom Socrates used to pull to pieces. But Phavorinus, in the first book of his Commentaries, says, that the speech of Polycrates against Socrates is not the genuine one; for in it there is mention made of the walls having been restored by Conon, which took place six years after the death of Socrates; and certainly this is true.

As a result of that response, he attracted a lot of envy; and he also brought it upon himself by exposing the foolishness and ignorance of certain men, like he did with Anytus, as shown in Plato’s Meno. Unable to tolerate Socrates’ teasing, Anytus first used Aristophanes to attack him and then convinced Meletus to prosecute him for impiety and for corrupting the city's youth. So, Meletus did bring the prosecution, and Polyeuctus handed down the sentence, as Phavorinus notes in his Universal History. Polycrates, the sophist, wrote the speech that was delivered, according to Hermippus, not Anytus, as others claim. Lycon, the demagogue, took care of everything needed to support the accusation; however, Antisthenes in his Successions of the Philosophers and Plato in his Apology state that the accusers were Anytus, Lycon, and Meletus: Anytus acting on behalf of the officials due to his political beliefs; Lycon on behalf of the orators; and Meletus on behalf of the poets, all of whom Socrates used to criticize. But Phavorinus, in the first book of his Commentaries, argues that Polycrates’ speech against Socrates is not the authentic one, as it mentions the walls being rebuilt by Conon, which happened six years after Socrates’ death; and this is certainly true.

XIX. But the sworn informations, on which the trial proceeded, were drawn up in this fashion; for they are preserved to this day, says Phavorinus, in the temple of Cybele:—“Meletus, the son of Meletus, of Pithus, impeaches Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus, of Alopece: Socrates is guilty, inasmuch as he does not believe in the Gods whom the city worships, but introduces other strange deities; he is also guilty, inasmuch as he corrupts the young men, and the punishment he has incurred is death.”

XIX. The sworn statements on which the trial was based were put together like this; they are still kept today, according to Phavorinus, in the temple of Cybele:—“Meletus, son of Meletus, from Pithus, accuses Socrates, son of Sophroniscus, from Alopece: Socrates is guilty because he does not believe in the Gods that the city worships, but promotes other unfamiliar deities; he is also guilty because he corrupts the youth, and the punishment he faces is death.”

XX. But the philosopher, after Lysias had prepared a defence for him, read it through, and said—“It is a very fine speech, Lysias, but is not suitable for me; for it was manifestly the speech of a lawyer, rather than of a philosopher.” And when Lysias replied, “How is it possible, that if it is a good speech, it should not be suitable to you?” he said, “Just as fine clothes and handsome shoes would not be suitable to me.” And when the trial was proceeding, Justus, of Tiberias, in his Garland, says that Plato ascended the tribune and said, “I, men of Athens, being the youngest of all those who have mounted the tribune …” and that he was interrupted by the judges, who cried out καταβάντων, that is to say, ‘Come down.’

XX. But the philosopher, after Lysias had prepared a defense for him, read it through and said, “This is a really great speech, Lysias, but it's not suitable for me; it clearly sounds more like a lawyer's speech than a philosopher's.” When Lysias asked, “How can it be a good speech if it’s not suitable for you?” he replied, “Just like fancy clothes and nice shoes wouldn’t be suitable for me.” And when the trial was going on, Justus from Tiberias, in his Garland, says that Plato went up to speak and said, “I, men of Athens, being the youngest of all those who have spoken…” and that he was interrupted by the judges, who shouted καταβάντων, which means ‘Come down.’

XXI. So when he had been condemned by two hundred and eighty-one votes, being six more than were given in his favour, and when the judges were making an estimate of what punishment or fine should be inflicted on him, he said that he ought to be fined five and twenty drachmas; but Eubulides says that he admitted that he deserved a fine of one hundred. And when the judges raised an outcry at this proposition, he said, “My real opinion is, that as a return for what has been done by me, I deserve a maintenance in the Prytaneum for the rest of my life.” So they condemned him to death, by eighty votes more than they had originally found him guilty. And he was put into prison, and a few days afterwards he drank the hemlock,[73] having held many admirable conversations in the meantime, which Plato has recorded in the Phædo.

XXI. After being condemned by two hundred and eighty-one votes, which was six more than those in his favor, and while the judges were discussing what punishment or fine to impose, he suggested he should be fined twenty-five drachmas. However, Eubulides claims he acknowledged he deserved a fine of one hundred. When the judges reacted strongly to this suggestion, he replied, “Honestly, I think I deserve to be given a lifetime maintenance in the Prytaneum for what I have done.” Ultimately, they sentenced him to death, with eighty more votes than those that declared him guilty initially. He was imprisoned, and a few days later, he drank the hemlock,[73] having engaged in many remarkable conversations in the meantime, which Plato recorded in the Phædo.

XXII. He also, according to some accounts, composed a pæan which begins—

XXII. He also, according to some sources, wrote a song of praise that starts—

Hail Apollo, King of Delos,
Hail Diana, Leto’s child.

But Dionysidorus says that this pæan is not his. He also composed a fable, in the style of Æsop, not very artistically, and it begins—

But Dionysidorus claims that this pæan isn't his. He also wrote a fable, in the style of Aesop, not very skillfully, and it starts—

Æsop one day did this sage counsel give
To the Corinthian magistrates: not to trust
The cause of virtue to the people’s judgement.

XXIII. So he died; but the Athenians immediately repented[22] of their action, so that they closed all the palæstræ and gymnasia; and they banished his accusers, and condemned Meletus to death; but they honoured Socrates with a brazen statue, which they erected in the place where the sacred vessels are kept; and it was the work of Lysippus. But Anytus had already left Athens; and the people of Heraclea banished him from that city the day of his arrival. But Socrates was not the only person who met with this treatment at the hands of the Athenians, but many other men received the same: for, as Heraclides says, they fined Homer fifty drachmas as a madman, and they said that Tyrtæus was out of his wits. But they honoured Astydamas, before Æschylus, with a brazen statue. And Euripides reproaches them for their conduct in his Palamedes, saying—

XXIII. So he died; but the Athenians immediately regretted[22] their actions, leading them to close all the gyms and wrestling halls. They banished his accusers and sentenced Meletus to death. However, they honored Socrates with a bronze statue, which they placed where the sacred vessels are kept; it was crafted by Lysippus. By that time, Anytus had already left Athens, and the people of Heraclea expelled him from their city on the day he arrived. Socrates wasn’t the only one to face this treatment from the Athenians; many others did as well. As Heraclides notes, they fined Homer fifty drachmas as a madman and claimed that Tyrtæus was out of his mind. Yet they honored Astydamas with a bronze statue before Æschylus. Euripides criticizes them for their actions in his play Palamedes, stating—

Ye have slain, ye have slain,
O Greeks, the all-wise nightingale,
The favourite of the Muses, guiltless all.

And enough has been said on this head.

And enough has been said about this.

But Philochorus says that Euripides died before Socrates; and he was born, as Apollodorus in his Chronicles asserts, in the archonship of Apsephion, in the fourth year of the seventy-seventh Olympiad, on the sixth day of the month Thargelion, when the Athenians purify their city, and when the citizens of Delos say that Diana was born. And he died in the first[74] year of the ninety-fifth Olympiad, being seventy years of age. And this is the calculation of Demetrius Phalereus, for some say that he was but sixty years old when he died.

But Philochorus claims that Euripides died before Socrates; he was born, as Apollodorus states in his Chronicles, during the archonship of Apsephion, in the fourth year of the seventy-seventh Olympiad, on the sixth day of the month Thargelion, when the Athenians purify their city, and when the citizens of Delos celebrate the birth of Diana. He died in the first[74] year of the ninety-fifth Olympiad, at the age of seventy. Demetrius Phalereus made this calculation, but some say he was only sixty when he died.

XXIV. Both he and Euripides were pupils of Anaxagoras; and Euripides was born in the first year of the seventy-fifth Olympiad, in the archonship of Calliades. But Socrates appears to me to have also discussed occasionally subjects of natural philosophy, since he very often disputes about prudence and foresight, as Xenophon tells us; although he at the same time asserts that all his conversations were about moral philosophy. And Plato, in his Apology, mentions the principles of Anaxagoras and other natural philosophers, which Socrates denies; and he is in reality expressing his own sentiments about them, though he attributes them all to Socrates. And Aristotle tells us that a certain one of the Magi came from Syria to Athens, and blamed Socrates for many parts of his conduct, and also foretold that he would come to a violent death. And we ourselves have written this epigram on him—

XXIV. Both he and Euripides were students of Anaxagoras; Euripides was born in the first year of the seventy-fifth Olympiad, during Calliades's term as archon. However, it seems that Socrates also occasionally talked about topics in natural philosophy, since he frequently debated prudence and foresight, as Xenophon tells us; even though he claims that all his discussions were focused on moral philosophy. In his Apology, Plato mentions the ideas of Anaxagoras and other natural philosophers, which Socrates denies; he’s actually expressing his own views on them, although he credits them all to Socrates. Aristotle informs us that a certain Magus came from Syria to Athens and criticized Socrates for many aspects of his behavior, also predicting that he would meet a violent end. We’ve written this epigram about him—

Drink now, O Socrates, in the realms of Jove,
For truly did the God pronounce you wise,
And he who said so is himself all wisdom:
You drank the poison which your country gave,
But they drank wisdom from your godlike voice.

XXV. He had, as Aristotle tells us in the third book of his Poetics, a contest with a man of the name of Antiolochus of Lemnos, and with Antipho, an interpreter of prodigies, as Pythagoras had with Cylon of Crotona; and Homer while alive with Sagaris, and after his death with Xenophanes the Colophonian; and Hesiod, too, in his lifetime with Cercops, and after his death with the same Xenophanes; and Pindar with Amphimenes of Cos; and Thales with Pherecydes; and Bias with Salarus of Priene; and Pittacus with Antimenides; and Alcæus and Anaxagoras with Sosibius; and Simonides with Timocreon.

XXV. He had, as Aristotle mentions in the third book of his Poetics, a competition with a man named Antiolochus from Lemnos, and with Antipho, who interpreted omens, just as Pythagoras had with Cylon from Crotona; and Homer, while he was alive, with Sagaris, and after his death with Xenophanes from Colophon; and Hesiod, too, during his lifetime with Cercops, and after his death with the same Xenophanes; and Pindar with Amphimenes from Cos; and Thales with Pherecydes; and Bias with Salarus from Priene; and Pittacus with Antimenides; and Alcæus and Anaxagoras with Sosibius; and Simonides with Timocreon.

XXVI. Of those who succeeded him, and who are called the Socratic school, the chiefs were Plato, Xenophon, and Antisthenes: and of the ten, as they are often called, the four most eminent were Æschines, Phædo, Euclides, and Aristippus. But we must first speak of Xenophon, and after him of Antisthenes among the Cynics. Then of the Socratic school, and[75] so about Plato, since he is the chief of the ten sects, and the founder of the first Academy. And the regular series of them shall proceed in this manner.

XXVI. Among those who followed him, known as the Socratic school, the main figures were Plato, Xenophon, and Antisthenes. Of the ten who are often mentioned, the four most notable were Æschines, Phædo, Euclides, and Aristippus. First, we will discuss Xenophon, followed by Antisthenes from the Cynics. Then we'll cover the Socratic school and[75] finally talk about Plato, as he is the leader of the ten sects and the founder of the first Academy. The regular order of these discussions will proceed accordingly.

XXVII. There was also another Socrates, a historian, who wrote a description of Argos; and another, a peripatetic philosopher, a native of Bithynia; and another a writer of epigrams; and another a native of Cos, who wrote invocations to the Gods.

XXVII. There was also another Socrates, a historian, who wrote a description of Argos; and another, a wandering philosopher, a native of Bithynia; and another a writer of epigrams; and another a native of Cos, who wrote invocations to the Gods.

LIFE OF XENOPHON.

I. Xenophon, the son of Gryllus, a citizen of Athens, was of the borough of Erchia; and he was a man of great modesty, and as handsome as can be imagined.

I. Xenophon, the son of Gryllus, a citizen of Athens, was from the borough of Erchia; and he was a man of great humility, and as good-looking as one could imagine.

II. They say that Socrates met him in a narrow lane, and put his stick across it, and prevented him from passing by, asking him where all kinds of necessary things were sold. And when he had answered him, he asked him again where men were made good and virtuous. And as he did not know, he said, “Follow me, then, and learn.” And from this time forth, Xenophon became a follower of Socrates.

II. It’s said that Socrates ran into him in a narrow street, blocked his way with his stick, and asked him where all sorts of essential items were sold. After he answered, Socrates asked him where people become good and virtuous. When he didn’t know the answer, Socrates said, “Then follow me and find out.” From that moment on, Xenophon became a follower of Socrates.

III. And he was the first person who took down conversations as they occurred, and published them among men, calling them memorabilia. He was also the first man who wrote a history of philosophers.

III. And he was the first person to record conversations as they happened and share them with others, calling them memorabilia. He was also the first person to write a history of philosophers.

IV. And Aristippus, in the fourth book of his treatise on Ancient Luxury, says that he loved Clinias; and that he said to him, “Now I look upon Clinias with more pleasure than upon all the other beautiful things which are to be seen among men; and I would rather be blind as to all the rest of the world, than as to Clinias. And I am annoyed even with night and with sleep, because then I do not see him; but I am very grateful to the sun and to daylight, because they show Clinias to me.”

IV. And Aristippus, in the fourth book of his treatise on Ancient Luxury, says that he loved Clinias; and he said to him, “Now I look at Clinias with more pleasure than at all the other beautiful things that can be seen among people; and I would rather be blind to everything else in the world than to Clinias. I even get frustrated with the night and sleep because that means I can't see him; but I am very thankful for the sun and daylight because they show Clinias to me.”

V. He became a friend of Cyrus in this manner. He had an acquaintance, by name Proxenus, a Bœotian by birth, a pupil of Gorgias of Leontini, and a friend of Cyrus. He being in Sardis, staying at the court of Cyrus, wrote a letter to Athens[76] to Xenophon, inviting him to come and be a friend of Cyrus. And Xenophon showed the letter to Socrates, and asked his advice. And Socrates bade him go to Delphi, and ask counsel of the God. And Xenophon did so, and went to the God; but the question he put was, not whether it was good for him to go to Cyrus or not, but how he should go; for which Socrates blamed him, but still advised him to go. Accordingly he went to Cyrus, and became no less dear to him than Proxenus. And all the circumstances of the expedition and the retreat, he himself has sufficiently related to us.

V. He became friends with Cyrus this way. He had a friend named Proxenus, who was from Bœotia, a student of Gorgias of Leontini, and also a friend of Cyrus. While in Sardis, visiting Cyrus’s court, he wrote a letter to Xenophon in Athens[76], inviting him to come and befriend Cyrus. Xenophon showed the letter to Socrates and asked for his advice. Socrates told him to go to Delphi and seek guidance from the God. Xenophon did this and approached the God, but instead of asking whether it was wise to go to Cyrus, he wanted to know how he should go; Socrates criticized him for that, but still encouraged him to proceed. So, he went to Cyrus and became just as dear to him as Proxenus was. He himself has told us all about the details of the expedition and the return.

VI. But he was at enmity with Menon the Pharsalian, who was the commander of the foreign troops at the time of the expedition; and amongst other reproaches, he says that he was much addicted to the worst kind of debauchery. And he reproaches a man of the name of Apollonides with having his ears bored.

VI. But he was in conflict with Menon the Pharsalian, who was in charge of the foreign troops during the expedition; and among other criticisms, he claimed that Menon was heavily into the worst kinds of excess. He also called out a guy named Apollonides for having pierced ears.

VII. But after the expedition, and the disasters which took place in Pontus, and the violations of the truce by Seuthes, the king of the Odrysæ, he came into Asia to Agesilaus, the king of Lacedæmon, bringing with him the soldiers of Cyrus, to serve for pay; and he became a very great friend of Agesilaus. And about the same time he was condemned to banishment by the Athenians, on the charge of being a favourer of the Lacedæmonians. And being in Ephesus, and having a sum of money in gold, he gave half of it to Megabyzus, the priest of Diana, to keep for him till his return; and if he never returned, then he was to expend it upon a statue, and dedicate that to the Goddess; and with the other half he sent offerings to Delphi. From thence he went with Agesilaus into Greece, as Agesilaus was summoned to take part in the war against the Thebans. And the Lacedæmonians made him a friend of their city.

VII. But after the expedition and the troubles that happened in Pontus, along with the broken truce by Seuthes, the king of the Odrysæ, he went to Asia to meet Agesilaus, the king of Lacedæmon, bringing the soldiers of Cyrus along to work for pay; he became a close ally of Agesilaus. Around the same time, the Athenians condemned him to exile, accusing him of supporting the Lacedæmonians. While he was in Ephesus and had a sum of money in gold, he gave half of it to Megabyzus, the priest of Diana, to keep for him until he returned; if he never came back, Megabyzus was to use it for a statue and dedicate it to the Goddess. With the other half, he sent offerings to Delphi. From there, he went with Agesilaus into Greece, as Agesilaus was called to join the war against the Thebans. The Lacedæmonians welcomed him as a friend of their city.

VIII. After this he left Agesilaus and went to Scillus, which is a strong place in the district of Elis, at no great distance from the city. And a woman followed him, whose name was Philesia, as Demetrius the Magnesian relates; and his sons, Gryllus and Diodorus, as Dinarchus states in the action against Xenophon;[23] and they were also called Dioscuri. And when[77] Megabyzus came into the country, on the occasion of some public assembly, he took back the money and bought a piece of ground, and consecrated it to the Goddess; and a river named Selinus, which is the same name as that of the river at Ephesus, flows through the land. And there he continued hunting, and entertaining his friends, and writing histories. But Dinarchus says that the Lacedæmonians gave him a house and land. They say also that Philopides, the Spartan, sent him there, as a present some slaves, who had been taken prisoners of war, natives of Dardanus, and that he located them as he pleased. And that the Eleans, having made an expedition against Scillus, took the place, as the Lacedæmonians dawdled in coming to his assistance.

VIII. After this, he left Agesilaus and went to Scillus, a stronghold in the district of Elis, not far from the city. A woman named Philesia followed him, as Demetrius the Magnesian reports, along with his sons, Gryllus and Diodorus, as mentioned by Dinarchus in the case against Xenophon;[23] and they were also called Dioscuri. When Megabyzus entered the region for a public gathering, he reclaimed some funds, purchased a plot of land, and dedicated it to the Goddess; a river named Selinus, sharing its name with the river at Ephesus, runs through the area. There, he continued hunting, hosting friends, and writing histories. However, Dinarchus claims that the Lacedæmonians provided him with a house and land. It's also said that Philopides, a Spartan, gave him some war captives, natives of Dardanus, as slaves, and that he settled them as he wished. The Eleans later launched an attack on Scillus, capturing the place while the Lacedæmonians delayed in coming to his aid.

IX. But then his sons escaped privily to Lepreum, with a few servants; and Xenophon himself fled to Elis before the place fell; and from thence he went to Lepreum to his children, and from thence he escaped in safety to Corinth, and settled in that city.

IX. But then his sons secretly escaped to Lepreum, with a few servants; and Xenophon himself fled to Elis before the place fell; and from there he went to Lepreum to see his children, and then he safely escaped to Corinth, where he settled in that city.

X. In the meantime, as the Athenians had passed a vote to go to the assistance of the Lacedæmonians, he sent his sons to Athens, to join in the expedition in aid of the Lacedæmonians; for they had been educated in Sparta, as Diocles relates in his Lives of the Philosophers. Diodorus returned safe back again, without having at all distinguished himself in the battle. And he had a son who bore the same name as his brother Gryllus. But Gryllus, serving in the cavalry, (and the battle took place at Mantinea,) fought very gallantly, and was slain, as Ephorus tells us, in his twenty-fifth book; Cephisodorus being the Captain of the cavalry, and Hegesides the commander-in-chief. Epaminondas also fell in this battle. And after the battle, they say that Xenophon offered sacrifice, wearing a crown on his head; but when the news of the death of his son arrived, he took off the crown; but after that, hearing that he had fallen gloriously, he put the crown on again. And some say that he did not even shed a tear, but said, “I knew that I was the father of a mortal man.” And Aristotle says, that innumerable writers wrote panegyrics and epitaphs upon Gryllus, partly out of a wish to gratify his father. And Hermippus, in his Treatise on Theophrastus, says that Isocrates also composed a panegyric on Gryllus. But Timon ridicules him in these words:—

X. Meanwhile, since the Athenians had voted to help the Lacedæmonians, he sent his sons to Athens to take part in the expedition supporting the Lacedæmonians; they had been raised in Sparta, as Diocles mentions in his Lives of the Philosophers. Diodorus returned safe and sound, having not distinguished himself in the battle at all. He had a son who shared the same name as his brother Gryllus. However, Gryllus, who fought in the cavalry during the battle at Mantinea, fought bravely and was killed, as Ephorus notes in his twenty-fifth book; Cephisodorus was the Captain of the cavalry, and Hegesides was the commander-in-chief. Epaminondas also died in this battle. After the battle, it is said that Xenophon offered a sacrifice while wearing a crown on his head; but when he received the news of his son's death, he took the crown off. However, after learning that Gryllus had fallen heroically, he put the crown back on. Some say he didn't even cry, simply stating, “I knew that I was the father of a mortal man.” Aristotle mentions that countless writers wrote praises and epitaphs for Gryllus, partly to please his father. Hermippus, in his Treatise on Theophrastus, states that Isocrates also wrote a panegyric for Gryllus. But Timon mocks him with these words:—

A silly couplet, or e’en triplet of speeches,
Or longer series still, just such as Xenophon
Might write, or Meagre Æschines.

Such, then, was the life of Xenophon.

That was Xenophon’s life.

XI. And he flourished about the fourth year of the ninety-fourth Olympiad; and he took part in the expedition of Cyrus, in the archonship of Xenænetus, the year before the death of Socrates. And he died, as Stesiclides the Athenian states in his List of Archons and Conquerors at Olympia, in the first year of the hundred and fifth Olympiad, in the archonship of Callidemides; in which year, Philip the son of Amyntas began to reign over the Macedonians. And he died at Corinth, as Demetrius the Magnesian says, being of a very advanced age.

XI. He flourished around the fourth year of the ninety-fourth Olympiad and participated in Cyrus's expedition during Xenænetus's term as archon, the year before Socrates died. According to Stesiclides the Athenian in his List of Archons and Conquerors at Olympia, he died in the first year of the hundred and fifth Olympiad, during Callidemides's term as archon; it was the year Philip, son of Amyntas, began his reign over the Macedonians. Demetrius the Magnesian notes that he died in Corinth at a very old age.

XII. And he was a man of great distinction in all points, and very fond of horses and of dogs, and a great tactician, as is manifest from his writings. And he was a pious man, fond of sacrificing to the Gods, and a great authority as to what was due to them, and a very ardent admirer and imitator of Socrates.

XII. He was a highly respected man in every way, with a deep appreciation for horses and dogs, and a skilled strategist, as shown in his writings. He was also a devout individual who enjoyed making sacrifices to the Gods, knowledgeable about what was owed to them, and a passionate admirer and imitator of Socrates.

XIII. He also wrote near forty books; though different critics divide them differently. He wrote an account of the expedition of Cyrus, to each book of which work he prefixed a summary, though he gave none of the whole history. He also wrote the Cyropædia, and a history of Greece, and Memorabilia of Socrates, and a treatise called the Banquet, and an essay on Œconomy, and one on Horsemanship, and one on Breaking Dogs, and one on Managing Horses, and a Defence of Socrates, and a Treatise on Revenues, and one called Hiero, or the Tyrant, and one called Agesilaus; one on the Constitution of the Athenians and Lacedæmonians, which, however, Demetrius the Magnesian says is not the work of Xenophon. It is said, also, that he secretly got possession of the books of Thucydides, which were previously unknown, and himself published them.

XIII. He also wrote about forty books, although different critics categorize them in various ways. He created an account of Cyrus's expedition, to which he added a summary for each book, but he did not cover the entire history. He also wrote the Cyropædia, a history of Greece, the Memorabilia of Socrates, a treatise called the Banquet, an essay on Economy, one on Horsemanship, one on Training Dogs, one on Managing Horses, a Defense of Socrates, a Treatise on Revenues, one titled Hiero, or the Tyrant, and one called Agesilaus; he also wrote on the Constitution of the Athenians and Lacedæmonians, which Demetrius the Magnesian claims is not authored by Xenophon. It is also said that he secretly obtained the previously unknown books of Thucydides and published them himself.

XIV. He was also called the Attic Muse, because of the sweetness of his diction, in respect of which he and Plato felt a spirit of rivalry towards one another, as we shall relate further in our life of Plato. And we ourselves have composed an epigram on him, which runs thus:—

XIV. He was also known as the Attic Muse because of the charm of his writing style, which led to a friendly rivalry between him and Plato, as we will discuss further in our account of Plato. We have also written an epigram about him, which goes like this:—

Not only up to Babylon for Cyrus
Did Xenophon go, but now he’s mounted up
[79]
The path which leads to Jove’s eternal realms—
For he, recounting the great deeds of Greece,
Displays his noble genius, and he shows
The depth of wisdom of his master Socrates.

And another which ends thus:—

And another that ends like this:—

O Xenophon, if th’ ungrateful countrymen
Of Cranon and Cecrops, banished you,
Jealous of Cyrus’ favour which he show’d you,
Still hospitable Corinth, with glad heart,
Received you, and you lived there happily,
And so resolved to stay in that fair city.

XV. But I have found it stated in some places that he flourished about the eighty-ninth Olympiad, at the same time as the rest of the disciples of Socrates. And Ister says, that he was banished by a decree of Eubulus, and that he was recalled by another decree proposed by the same person.

XV. But I have found it mentioned in some sources that he was active around the eighty-ninth Olympiad, alongside the other disciples of Socrates. And Ister states that he was exiled by a decree from Eubulus and was later brought back by another decree proposed by the same individual.

XVI. But there were seven people of the name of Xenophon. First of all, this philosopher of ours; secondly, an Athenian, a brother of Pythostratus, who wrote the poem called the Theseid, and who wrote other works too, especially the lives of Epaminondas and Pelopidas; the third was a physician of Cos; the fourth, a man who wrote a history of Alcibiades; the fifth, was a writer who composed a book full of fabulous prodigies; the sixth, a citizen of Paros, a sculptor; the seventh, a poet of the Old Comedy.

XVI. But there were seven people named Xenophon. First, there's our philosopher; second, an Athenian, the brother of Pythostratus, who wrote the poem called the Theseid, along with other works, especially the lives of Epaminondas and Pelopidas; the third was a doctor from Cos; the fourth wrote a history of Alcibiades; the fifth was an author who created a book filled with incredible tales; the sixth was a sculptor from Paros; and the seventh was a poet of the Old Comedy.

LIFE OF ÆSCHINES.

I. Æschines was the son of Charinus, the sausage-maker, but, as some writers say, of Lysanias; he was a citizen of Athens, of an industrious disposition from his boyhood upwards, on which account he never quitted Socrates.

I. Æschines was the son of Charinus, the sausage-maker, but some writers claim he was the son of Lysanias; he was a citizen of Athens, hardworking since childhood, which is why he never left Socrates.

II. And this induced Socrates to say, the only one who knows how to pay us proper respect is the son of the sausage-seller. Idomeneus asserts, that it was he who, in the prison, tried to persuade Socrates to make his escape, and not Crito. But that Plato, as he was rather inclined to favour Aristippus, attributed his advice to Crito.

II. And this led Socrates to say that the only person who really knows how to show us proper respect is the son of the sausage seller. Idomeneus claims that it was he who tried to convince Socrates to escape from prison, not Crito. But Plato, who had a tendency to support Aristippus, credited that advice to Crito.

III. And Æschines was calumniated on more than one occasion;[80] and especially by Menedemus of Eretria, who states that he appropriated many dialogues of Socrates as his own, having procured them from Xanthippe. And those of them which are called “headless,” are exceedingly slovenly performances, showing nothing of the energy of Socrates. And Pisistratus, of Ephesus, used to say, that they were not the work of Æschines. There are seven of them, and most of them are stated by Persæus to be the work of Pasiphon, of Eretria, and to have been inserted by him among the works of Æschines. And he plagiarised from the Little Cyrus, and the Lesser Hercules, of Antisthenes, and from the Alcibiades, and from the Dialogues of the other philosophers. The Dialogues then of Æschines, which profess to give an idea of the system of Socrates are, as I have said, seven in number. First of all, the Miltiades, which is rather weak; the Callias, the Axiochus, the Aspasia, the Alcibiades, the Telauges, and the Rhino. And they say that he, being in want, went to Sicily, to Dionysius, and was looked down upon by Plato, but supported by Aristippus, and that he gave Dionysius some of his dialogues, and received presents for them.

III. Æschines was criticized more than once;[80] especially by Menedemus of Eretria, who claims that he took many dialogues of Socrates and called them his own after getting them from Xanthippe. The dialogues referred to as “headless” are very poorly done, lacking the energy of Socrates. Pisistratus of Ephesus said that they weren't actually written by Æschines. There are seven of these dialogues, and most of them are said by Persæus to be the work of Pasiphon of Eretria, who inserted them among Æschines's works. He also copied from Antisthenes's Little Cyrus and Lesser Hercules, as well as from the Alcibiades and dialogues from other philosophers. The dialogues attributed to Æschines, which claim to represent Socrates's philosophy, number seven. They include the Miltiades, which is rather weak; the Callias, the Axiochus, the Aspasia, the Alcibiades, the Telauges, and the Rhino. It is said that, in need, he went to Sicily to Dionysius, faced disdain from Plato, but was supported by Aristippus, and that he gave Dionysius some of his dialogues in exchange for gifts.

IV. After that he came to Athens, and there he did not venture to practise the trade of a sophist, as Plato and Aristippus were in high reputation there. But he gave lectures for money, and wrote speeches to be delivered in the courts of law for persons under prosecution. On which account, Timon said of him, “The speeches of Æschines which do not convince any one.” And they say that when he was in great straights through poverty, Socrates advised him to borrow of himself, by deducting some part of his expenditure in his food.

IV. After that, he arrived in Athens, and he didn't dare to work as a sophist since Plato and Aristippus were very well-known there. Instead, he gave paid lectures and wrote speeches for people involved in legal cases. Because of this, Timon remarked, “The speeches of Æschines that fail to convince anyone.” It's said that when he was struggling due to poverty, Socrates advised him to borrow from himself by cutting back on some of his food expenses.

V. And even Aristippus suspected the genuineness of some of his Dialogues; accordingly, they say that when he was reciting some of them at Megara, he ridiculed him, and said to him, “Oh! you thief; where did you get that?”

V. Even Aristippus questioned the authenticity of some of his Dialogues; they say that when he was reciting some of them at Megara, he mocked him and said, “Oh! You thief; where did you get that?”

VI. And Polycritus, of Menda, in the first book of his History of Dionysius, says that he lived with the tyrant till he was deposed, and till the return of Dion to Syracuse; and he says that Carcinus, the tragedian, was also with him. And here is extant a letter of Æschines addressed to Dionysius.

VI. Polycritus from Menda, in the first book of his History of Dionysius, states that he lived with the tyrant until he was ousted and until Dion returned to Syracuse; he also mentions that Carcinus, the tragedian, was with him during that time. Additionally, there is a letter from Æschines addressed to Dionysius that still exists.

VII. But he was a man well versed in rhetorical art, as is plain from the defence of his father Phæax, the general; and from the works which he wrote in especial imitation of Gorgias[81] of Leontini. And Lysias wrote an oration against him entitling it, On Sycophancy; from all which circumstances it is plain that he was a skilful orator. And one man is spoken of as his especial friend, Aristotle, who was surnamed The Table.

VII. He was a man skilled in the art of rhetoric, as shown by his defense of his father Phæax, the general, and by the works he wrote specifically imitating Gorgias[81] of Leontini. Lysias wrote a speech against him titled On Sycophancy; from all these facts, it’s clear that he was a talented orator. One person often mentioned as his close friend is Aristotle, who was nicknamed The Table.

VIII. Now Panætius thinks that the Dialogues of the following disciples of the Socratic school are all genuine,—Plato, Xenophon, Antisthenes, and Æschines; but he doubts about those which go under the names of Phædon, and Euclides; and he utterly repudiates all the others.

VIII. Panætius believes that the Dialogues by the following disciples of the Socratic school are all authentic: Plato, Xenophon, Antisthenes, and Æschines. However, he has doubts about the ones attributed to Phædon and Euclides, and he completely rejects all the others.

IX. And there were eight men of the name of Æschines. The first, this philosopher of ours; the second was a man who wrote a treatise on Oratorical Art; the third was the orator who spoke against Demosthenes; the fourth was an Arcadian, a disciple of Isocrates; the fifth was a citizen of Mitylene, whom they used to call the Scourge of the Orators; the sixth was a Neapolitan, a philosopher of the Academy, a disciple and favourite of Melanthius, of Rhode; the seventh was a Milesian, a political writer; the eighth was a statuary.

IX. There were eight men named Æschines. The first was our philosopher; the second wrote a book on Oratory; the third was the orator who spoke against Demosthenes; the fourth was an Arcadian and a student of Isocrates; the fifth was from Mitylene, known as the Scourge of the Orators; the sixth was a Neapolitan, a philosopher from the Academy and a favorite of Melanthius from Rhodes; the seventh was a Milesian who wrote about politics; the eighth was a sculptor.

LIFE OF ARISTIPPUS.

I. Aristippus was by birth a Cyrenean, but he came to Athens, as Æschines says, having been attracted thither by the fame of Socrates.

I. Aristippus was originally from Cyrene, but he moved to Athens, as Æschines mentions, drawn there by the reputation of Socrates.

II. He, having professed himself a Sophist, as Phanias, of Eresus, the Peripatetic, informs us, was the first of the pupils of Socrates who exacted money from his pupils, and who sent money to his master. And once he sent him twenty drachmas, but had them sent back again, as Socrates said that his dæmon would not allow him to accept them; for, in fact, he was indignant at having them offered to him. And Xenophon used to hate him; on which account he wrote his book against pleasure as an attack upon Aristippus, and assigned the main argument to Socrates. Theodorus also, in his Treatise on Sects, has attacked him severely, and so has Plato in his book on the Soul, as we have mentioned in another place.

II. He, who claimed to be a Sophist, as Phanias of Eresus, the Peripatetic, tells us, was the first of Socrates’ students to charge money from his pupils and to send money to his teacher. At one point, he sent Socrates twenty drachmas, but they were sent back because Socrates said his inner voice wouldn’t allow him to accept them; he was actually upset at being offered the money. Xenophon disliked him so much that he wrote his book against pleasure as a critique of Aristippus, attributing the main argument to Socrates. Theodorus has also criticized him harshly in his Treatise on Sects, and Plato has done the same in his book on the Soul, as mentioned elsewhere.

III. But he was a man very quick at adapting himself to[82] every kind of place, and time, and person,[24] and he easily supported every change of fortune. For which reason he was in greater favour with Dionysius than any of the others, as he always made the best of existing circumstances. For he enjoyed what was before him pleasantly, and he did not toil to procure himself the enjoyment of what was not present. On which account Diogenes used to call him the king’s dog. And Timon used to snarl at him as too luxurious, speaking somewhat in this fashion:

III. But he was a man who quickly adapted to any place, time, or person, and he easily handled every change in fortune. Because of this, he was more favored by Dionysius than anyone else, as he always made the most of his circumstances. He enjoyed what was in front of him without stressing over what he didn’t have. For this reason, Diogenes used to call him the king’s dog. And Timon would criticize him for being too indulgent, saying something like this:

Like the effeminate mind of Aristippus,
Who, as he said, by touch could judge of falsehood.

They say that he once ordered a partridge to be bought for him at the price of fifty drachmas; and when some one blamed him, “And would not you,” said he, “have bought it if it had cost an obol?” And when he said he would, “Well,” replied Aristippus, “fifty drachmas are no more to me.” Dionysius once bade him select which he pleased of three beautiful courtesans; and he carried off all three, saying that even Paris did not get any good by preferring one beauty to the rest. However, they say, that when he had carried them as far as the vestibule, he dismissed them; so easily inclined was he to select or to disregard things. On which account Strato, or, as others will have it, Plato, said to him, “You are the only man to whom it is given to wear both a whole cloak and rags.” Once when Dionysius spit at him, he put up with it; and when some one found fault with him, he said, “Men endure being wetted by the sea in order to catch a tench, and shall not I endure to be sprinkled with wine to catch a sturgeon?”

They say he once had a partridge bought for him for fifty drachmas; and when someone criticized him, he said, “Wouldn’t you have bought it if it had cost just an obol?” And when the person agreed, Aristippus replied, “Then fifty drachmas mean nothing to me.” Dionysius once asked him to choose whichever of three beautiful courtesans he liked; he took all three, saying that even Paris didn’t gain anything by choosing just one beauty over the others. However, they say that once he got them to the entrance, he sent them away; he was so quick to choose or dismiss things. Because of this, Strato, or as some say, Plato, told him, “You’re the only person who can wear both a full cloak and rags.” Once, when Dionysius spat at him, he just took it; and when someone criticized him for it, he said, “People endure getting splashed by the sea to catch a small fish, and should I not endure a little wine splashing to catch a big one?”

IV. Once Diogenes, who was washing vegetables, ridiculed him as he passed by, and said, “If you had learnt to eat these vegetables, you would not have been a slave in the palace of a tyrant.” But Aristippus replied, “And you, if you had known how to behave among men, would not have been washing vegetables.” Being asked once what advantage he had derived from philosophy, he said, “The power of associating confidently[83] with every body.” When he was reproached for living extravagantly, he replied, “If extravagance had been a fault, it would not have had a place in the festivals of the Gods.” At another time he was asked what advantage philosophers had over other men; and he replied, “If all the laws should be abrogated, we should still live in the same manner as we do now.” Once when Dionysius asked him why the philosophers haunt the doors of the rich, but the rich do not frequent those of the philosophers, he said, “Because the first know what they want, but the second do not.”

IV. Once, while Diogenes was washing vegetables, he mocked Aristippus as he walked by, saying, “If you had learned to eat these vegetables, you wouldn’t have been a slave in a tyrant’s palace.” Aristippus replied, “And you, if you had known how to act around people, wouldn’t be washing vegetables.” When asked what benefit he gained from philosophy, he said, “The ability to confidently connect with anyone.” When he was criticized for living lavishly, he responded, “If extravagance were a fault, it wouldn’t be part of the gods’ festivals.” At another time, when asked what advantage philosophers had over others, he replied, “If all the laws were abolished, we would still live the same way we do now.” Once, when Dionysius asked why philosophers linger at the doors of the rich while the rich don’t visit philosophers, he said, “Because the first know what they want, but the second do not.”

On one occasion he was reproached by Plato for living in an expensive way; and he replied, “Does not Dionysius seem to you to be a good man?” And as he said that he did; “And yet,” said he, “he lives in a more expensive manner than I do, so that there is no impossibility in a person’s living both expensively and well at the same time.” He was asked once in what educated men are superior to uneducated men; and answered, “Just as broken horses are superior to those that are unbroken.” On another occasion he was going into the house of a courtesan, and when one of the young men who were with him blushed, he said, “It is not the going into such a house that is bad, but the not being able to go out.” Once a man proposed a riddle to him, and said, “Solve it.” “Why, you silly fellow,” said Aristippus, “do you wish me to loose what gives us trouble, even while it is in bonds?” A saying of his was, “that it was better to be a beggar than an ignorant person; for that a beggar only wants money, but an ignorant person wants humanity.” Once when he was abused, he was going away, and as his adversary pursued him and said, “Why are you going away?” “Because,” said he, “you have a license for speaking ill; but I have another for declining to hear ill.” When some one said that he always saw the philosophers at the doors of the rich men, he said, “And the physicians also are always seen at the doors of their patients; but still no one would choose for this reason to be an invalid rather than a physician.”

On one occasion, Plato criticized him for living an extravagant lifestyle, and he responded, “Doesn’t Dionysius seem like a good person to you?” When Plato agreed, he continued, “Yet he lives in a more lavish way than I do, so it’s not impossible for someone to live both extravagantly and well at the same time.” He was once asked how educated people are better than uneducated ones, and he replied, “Just like trained horses are better than untrained ones.” Another time, as he was entering a courtesan's house, a young man with him blushed. He said, “It’s not the act of entering a house like this that’s wrong, but the inability to leave it.” Once a man presented him with a riddle and said, “Solve it.” Aristippus replied, “Why, you silly guy, do you want me to untie what troubles us while it’s still bound?” One of his sayings was, “It’s better to be a beggar than ignorant; a beggar only wants money, but an ignorant person craves humanity.” Once, when he was insulted and started to walk away, his opponent followed him and asked, “Why are you leaving?” He responded, “Because you have a license to speak poorly, but I have a right to refuse to listen to it.” When someone remarked that he always saw philosophers at the doors of wealthy people, he said, “And physicians are always at the doors of their patients, but nobody would choose to be sick just because of that.”

Once it happened, that when he was sailing to Corinth, he was overtaken by a violent storm; and when somebody said, “We common individuals are not afraid, but you philosophers are behaving like cowards;” he said, “Very likely, for we have not both of us the same kind of souls at stake.” Seeing[84] a man who prided himself on the variety of his learning and accomplishments, he said, “Those who eat most, and who take the most exercise, are not in better health than they who eat just as much as is good for them; and in the same way it is not those who know a great many things, but they who know what is useful who are valuable men.” An orator had pleaded a cause for him and gained it, and asked him afterwards, “Now, what good did you ever get from Socrates?” “This good,” said he, “that all that you have said in my behalf is true.” He gave admirable advice to his daughter Arete, teaching her to despise superfluity. And being asked by some one in what respect his son would be better if he received a careful education, he replied, “If he gets no other good, at all events, when he is at the theatre, he will not be one stone sitting upon another.” Once when some one brought his son to introduce to him, he demanded five hundred drachmas; and when the father said, “Why, for such a price as that I can buy a slave.” “Buy him then,” he replied, “and you will have a pair.”

Once, while he was sailing to Corinth, a violent storm hit him. Someone said, “We regular folks aren’t afraid, but you philosophers are acting like cowards.” He replied, “That’s probably true, since we don’t have the same kind of souls at stake.” He saw a man who took pride in his wide range of knowledge and skills and said, “Those who eat the most and exercise the most aren’t any healthier than those who eat just enough to stay healthy; similarly, it’s not those who know a lot, but those who know what’s useful, who really matter.” An orator had successfully argued a case for him and later asked, “What good did you ever get from Socrates?” He answered, “This good—that everything you said on my behalf is true.” He gave excellent advice to his daughter, Arete, teaching her to avoid excess. When someone asked how his son would benefit from a good education, he replied, “If he gains nothing else, at least when he’s at the theater, he won’t be like one stone sitting on another.” Once, when someone brought his son to introduce to him, he asked for five hundred drachmas. The father said, “For that price, I can buy a slave.” He replied, “Then buy him, and you’ll have a pair.”

It was a saying of his that he took money from his acquaintances not in order to use it himself, but to make them aware in what they ought to spend their money. On one occasion, being reproached for having employed a hired advocate in a cause that he had depending: “Why not,” said he; “when I have a dinner, I hire a cook.” Once he was compelled by Dionysius to repeat some philosophical sentiment; “It is an absurdity,” said he, “for you to learn of me how to speak, and yet to teach me when I ought to speak:” and as Dionysius was offended at this, he placed him at the lowest end of the table; on which Aristippus said, “You wish to make this place more respectable.” A man was one day boasting of his skill as a diver; “Are you not ashamed,” said Aristippus, “to pride yourself on your performance of the duty of a dolphin?” On one occasion he was asked in what respect a wise man is superior to one who is not wise; and his answer was, “Send them both naked among strangers, and you will find out.” A man was boasting of being able to drink a great deal without being drunk; and he said, “A mule can do the very same thing.” When a man reproached him for living with a mistress, he said, “Does it make any difference whether one takes a house in which many others have lived before one, or one[85] where no one has ever lived?” and his reprover said, “No.” “Well does it make any difference whether one sails in a ship which ten thousand people have sailed before one, or whether one sails in one in which no one has ever embarked?” “By no means,” said the other. “Just in the same way,” said he, “it makes no difference whether one lives with a woman with whom numbers have lived, or with one with whom no one has lived.” When a person once blamed him for taking money from his pupils, after having been himself a pupil of Socrates: “To be sure I do,” he replied, “for Socrates too, when some friends sent their corn and wine, accepted a little, and sent the rest back; for he had the chief men of the Athenians for his purveyors. But I have only Eutychides, whom I have bought with money.” And he used to live with Lais the courtesan, as Sotion tells us in the Second Book of his Successions. Accordingly, when some one reproached him on her account, he made answer, “I possess her, but I am not possessed by her; since the best thing is to possess pleasures without being their slave, not to be devoid of pleasures.” When some one blamed him for the expense he was at about his food, he said, “Would you not have bought those things yourself if they had cost three obols?” And when the other admitted that he would, “Then,” said he, “it is not that I am fond of pleasure, but that you are fond of money.” On one occasion, when Simus, the steward of Dionysius, was showing him a magnificent house, paved with marble (but Simus was a Phrygian, and a great toper), he hawked up a quantity of saliva and spit in his face; and when Simus was indignant at this, he said, “I could not find a more suitable place to spit in.”

It was his saying that he accepted money from his friends not to use for himself, but to show them how they should spend their money. One time, when he was criticized for hiring a lawyer for a case he was involved in, he replied, “Why not? When I throw a dinner party, I hire a chef.” Once, Dionysius forced him to repeat a philosophical idea; he responded, “It’s ridiculous for you to learn from me how to speak and yet try to teach me when I should speak.” When Dionysius took offense and placed him at the bottom of the table, Aristippus quipped, “You want to make this spot more respectable.” Someone was bragging about his diving skills, and Aristippus said, “Aren't you embarrassed to take pride in doing the job of a dolphin?” When asked how a wise person is better than someone who isn’t wise, he answered, “Send them both naked among strangers, and you’ll see.” A guy boasted that he could drink a lot without becoming drunk, and Aristippus said, “A mule can do the same thing.” When someone criticized him for living with a mistress, he replied, “Does it matter whether you rent a place where many others have lived before you, or one where no one has ever lived?” The critic answered, “No.” “Then it doesn’t matter whether you sail on a ship that ten thousand people have already sailed or one that no one has ever boarded,” he continued. “Of course not,” the other replied. “Just like that, it doesn’t matter if you live with a woman who has had many partners or one who hasn’t.” When someone once called him out for taking money from his students after having been a student of Socrates himself, he replied, “Of course I do, because Socrates also accepted a bit of what his friends sent him in terms of grain and wine and returned the rest; he had the leading men of Athens as his suppliers. But I only have Eutychides, whom I’ve paid for.” He was known to live with Lais the courtesan, as Sotion recounts in the second book of his Successions. So when someone criticized him for that, he answered, “I own her, but I'm not owned by her; the ideal is to enjoy pleasures without being enslaved to them, not to be devoid of pleasures.” When someone accused him of spending too much on food, he said, “Would you have bought those things yourself if they cost three obols?” When the other acknowledged that he would, Aristippus replied, “Then it’s not that I love pleasure, but that you love money.” One time, when Simus, Dionysius’s steward, was showing him a lavish marble-paved house (but Simus was a Phrygian and a heavy drinker), he loogied on him. When Simus was furious, he said, “I couldn’t find a better place to spit.”

Charondas, or as some say, Phædon, asked him once, “Who are the people who use perfumes?” “I do,” said he, “wretched man that I am, and the king of the Persians is still more wretched than I; but, recollect, that as no animal is the worse for having a pleasant scent, so neither is a man; but plague take those wretches who abuse our beautiful unguents.” On another occasion, he was asked how Socrates died; and he made answer, “As I should wish to die myself.” When Polyxenus, the Sophist, came to his house and beheld his women, and the costly preparation that was made for dinner, and then blamed him for all this luxury, Aristippus after a while said, “Can you stay with me to day?” and when[86] Polyxenus consented, “Why then,” said he, “did you blame me? it seems that you blame not the luxury, but the expense of it.” When his servant was once carrying some money along the road, and was oppressed by the weight of it (as Bion relates in his Dissertations), he said to him, “Drop what is beyond your strength, and only carry what you can.” Once he was at sea, and seeing a pirate vessel at a distance, he began to count his money; and then he let it drop into the sea, as if unintentionally, and began to bewail his loss; but others say that he said besides, that it was better for the money to be lost for the sake of Aristippus, than Aristippus for the sake of his money. On one occasion, when Dionysius asked him why he had come, he said, to give others a share of what he had, and to receive a share of what he had not; but some report that his answer was, “When I wanted wisdom, I went to Socrates; but now that I want money, I have come to you.” He found fault with men, because when they are at sales, they examine the articles offered very carefully, but yet they approve of men’s lives without any examination. Though some attribute this speech to Diogenes. They say that once at a banquet, Dionysius desired all the guests to dance in purple garments; but Plato refused, saying:—

Charondas, or as some say, Phædon, once asked him, “Who are the people who use perfumes?” “I do,” he replied, “wretched man that I am, and the king of the Persians is even more wretched than I; but remember, just as no animal is worse off for having a nice scent, neither is a man; but curse those wretches who misuse our beautiful fragrances.” On another occasion, when he was asked how Socrates died, he answered, “As I would wish to die myself.” When Polyxenus, the Sophist, visited his house and saw his women and the lavish spread prepared for dinner, and then criticized him for this luxury, Aristippus eventually said, “Can you stay with me today?” When Polyxenus agreed, he replied, “Then why did you criticize me? It seems you’re not against luxury, but against the cost of it.” Once, when his servant was carrying money along the road and was struggling with the weight (as Bion recounts in his Dissertations), he told him, “Drop what’s too heavy for you, and just carry what you can handle.” One time, while at sea, he spotted a pirate ship in the distance and began to count his money; then he accidentally dropped it into the sea and started to mourn his loss. However, others say he added that it was better for the money to be lost for Aristippus than for Aristippus to be lost for the sake of his money. On one occasion, when Dionysius asked him why he had come, he said it was to share what he had with others and to receive what he lacked; but some say his answer was, “When I wanted wisdom, I went to Socrates; now that I want money, I’ve come to you.” He criticized people for carefully examining products at sales but approving of people’s lives without any scrutiny. Although some attribute this remark to Diogenes. They say that once at a banquet, Dionysius asked all the guests to dance in purple garments, but Plato refused, saying:—

“I could not wear a woman’s robe, when I
Was born a man, and of a manly race.”

But Aristippus took the garment, and when he was about to dance, he said very wittily:—

But Aristippus took the garment, and just before he started to dance, he said very cleverly:—

“She who is chaste, will not corrupted be
By Bacchanalian revels.”

He was once asking a favour of Dionysius for a friend, and when he could not prevail, he fell at his feet; and when some one reproached him for such conduct, he said, “It is not I who am to blame, but Dionysius who has his ears in his feet.” When he was staying in Asia, and was taken prisoner by Artaphernes the Satrap, some one said to him, “Are you still cheerful and sanguine?” “When, you silly fellow,” he replied, “can I have more reason to be cheerful than now when I am on the point of conversing with Artaphernes?” It used to be a saying of his, that those who had enjoyed the encyclic course of education, but who had omitted philosophy, were like the suitors of Penelope; for that they gained over Melantho and[87] Polydora and the other maid-servants, and found it easier to do that than to marry the mistress. And Ariston said in like manner, that Ulysses when he had gone to the shades below, saw and conversed with nearly all the dead in those regions, but could not get a sight of the Queen herself.

He once asked Dionysius for a favor on behalf of a friend, and when he was unsuccessful, he fell at his feet. When someone criticized him for this behavior, he replied, “I’m not the one to blame; it’s Dionysius for having his ears at his feet.” While he was in Asia and was captured by Artaphernes the Satrap, someone asked him, “Are you still cheerful and optimistic?” He answered, “When else, you silly fool, would I have more reason to be cheerful than now, when I'm about to speak with Artaphernes?” He often said that those who had gone through the entire curriculum but missed out on philosophy were like the suitors of Penelope; they managed to win over Melantho and Polydora and found it easier to do that than to marry the mistress. Ariston similarly noted that when Ulysses went to the underworld, he saw and spoke with nearly all the dead there but couldn’t catch a glimpse of the Queen herself.

On another occasion, Aristippus being asked what were the most necessary things for well-born boys to learn, said, “Those things which they will put in practice when they become men.” And when some one reproached him for having come from Socrates to Dionysius, his reply was, “I went to Socrates because I wanted instruction (παιδεῖας), and I have come to Dionysius because I want diversion (παιδιᾶς).” As he had made money by having pupils, Socrates once said to him, “Where did you get so much?” and he answered, “Where you got a little.” When his mistress said to him, “I am in the family way by you,” he said, “You can no more tell that, than you could tell, after you had gone through a thicket, which thorn had scratched you.” And when some one blamed him for repudiating his son, as if he were not really his, he said, “I know that phlegm, and I know that lice, proceed from us, but still we cast them away as useless.” One day, when he had received some money from Dionysius, and Plato had received a book, he said to a man who jeered him, “The fact is, money is what I want, and books what Plato wants.” When he was asked what it was for which he was reproached by Dionysius, “The same thing,” said he, “for which others reproach me.” One day he asked Dionysius for some money, who said, “But you told me that a wise man would never be in want;” “Give me some,” Aristippus rejoined, “and then we will discuss that point;” Dionysius gave him some, “Now then,” said he, “you see that I do not want money.” When Dionysius said to him;—

On another occasion, when Aristippus was asked what the most important things for well-born boys to learn were, he replied, “The things they will actually use when they grow up.” And when someone criticized him for moving from Socrates to Dionysius, he responded, “I went to Socrates for education, and I came to Dionysius for entertainment.” Since he made money by having students, Socrates once asked him, “Where did you get so much?” and he answered, “From where you got a little.” When his mistress told him, “I'm pregnant with your child,” he said, “You can no more know that than you could, after walking through a thicket, identify which thorn scratched you.” And when someone accused him of rejecting his son, questioning his paternity, he said, “I know that phlegm and lice come from us, but we still discard them as useless.” One day, after receiving some money from Dionysius while Plato received a book, he said to a man who mocked him, “The truth is, I need money, and Plato needs books.” When asked what Dionysius reproached him for, he replied, “The same thing others reproach me for.” One day, when he asked Dionysius for money, Dionysius said, “But you told me that a wise man would never lack anything;” Aristippus replied, “Give me some, and then we can argue about that;” Dionysius gave him some, and Aristippus said, “Now, you see that I don’t actually need money.” When Dionysius said to him;—

“For he who does frequent a tyrant’s court,[25]
Becomes his slave, though free when first he came:”

He took him up, and replied:—

He picked him up and said:—

“That man is but a slave who comes as free.”

This story is told by Diocles, in his book on the Lives of the[88] Philosophers; but others attribute the rejoinder to Plato. He once quarrelled with Æschines, and presently afterwards said to him, “Shall we not make it up of our own accord, and cease this folly; but will you wait till some blockhead reconciles us over our cups?” “With all my heart,” said Æschines. “Recollect, then,” said Aristippus, “that I, who am older than you, have made the first advances.” And Æschines answered, “You say well, by Juno, since you are far better than I; for I began the quarrel, but you begin the friendship.” And these are the anecdotes which are told of him.

This story is shared by Diocles in his writing about the Lives of the[88] Philosophers; however, some people credit the reply to Plato. He once argued with Æschines and soon after said to him, “Aren’t we going to settle this ourselves and stop acting foolish? Or do you want to wait until some idiot gets us back together over drinks?” “I’m totally fine with that,” Æschines replied. “Remember, though,” Aristippus said, “that I’m older than you, so I’m the one making the first move.” Æschines responded, “You’re right, by Juno, since you’re far better than I am; I started the fight, but you’re starting the friendship.” And these are the stories told about him.

V. Now there were four people of the name of Aristippus; one, the man of whom we are now speaking; the second, the man who wrote the history of Arcadia; the third was one who, because he had been brought up by his mother, had the name of μητροδίδαντος given to him; and he was the grandson of the former, being his daughter’s son; the fourth was a philosopher of the New Academy.

V. Now there were four people named Aristippus; one was the man we’re talking about now; the second was the one who wrote the history of Arcadia; the third was someone who was raised by his mother and was given the name μητροδίδαντος; he was the grandson of the first, being his daughter’s son; the fourth was a philosopher from the New Academy.

VI. There are three books extant, written by the Cyrenaic philosopher, which are, a history of Africa, and which were sent by him to Dionysius; and there is another book containing twenty-five dialogues, some written in the Attic, and some in the Doric dialect. And these are the titles of the Dialogues—Artabazus; to the Shipwrecked Sailors; to the Exiles; to a Beggar; to Lais; to Porus; to Lais about her Looking-glass; Mercury; the Dream; to the President of the Feast; Philomelus; to his Domestics; to those who reproached him for possessing old wine and mistresses; to those who reproached him for spending much money on his eating; a Letter to Arete his daughter; a letter to a man who was training himself for the Olympic games; a book of Questions; another book of Questions; a Dissertation addressed to Dionysius; an Essay on a Statue; an Essay on the daughter of Dionysius; a book addressed to one who thought himself neglected; another to one who attempted to give him advice. Some say, also, that he wrote six books of dissertations; but others, the chief of whom is Sosicrates of Rhodes, affirm that he never wrote a single thing. According to the assertions of Sotion in his second book; and of Panætius, on the contrary, he composed the following books,—one concerning Education; one concerning Virtue; one called An Exhortation; Artabazus; the Shipwrecked Men; the Exiles; six books of Dissertations; three books of Apophthegms;[89] an essay addressed to Lais; one to Porus; one to Socrates; one on Fortune. And he used to define the chief good as a gentle motion tending to sensation.

VI. There are three existing books written by the Cyrenaic philosopher. One is a history of Africa that he sent to Dionysius, and another contains twenty-five dialogues, some in Attic and some in Doric dialect. The titles of the Dialogues are—Artabazus; To the Shipwrecked Sailors; To the Exiles; To a Beggar; To Lais; To Porus; To Lais About Her Looking-glass; Mercury; The Dream; To the President of the Feast; Philomelus; To His Domestics; To Those Who Criticized Him for Having Old Wine and Mistresses; To Those Who Criticized Him for Spending Too Much on Food; a Letter to Arete, His Daughter; a Letter to a Man Training for the Olympic Games; a Book of Questions; Another Book of Questions; a Dissertation Addressed to Dionysius; an Essay on a Statue; an Essay on Dionysius' Daughter; a Book for Someone Who Thought He Was Overlooked; Another for Someone Who Tried to Give Him Advice. Some also say he wrote six books of dissertations, but others, mainly Sosicrates of Rhodes, assert that he never wrote anything. According to Sotion in his second book, and Panætius on the other hand, he produced the following books—one on Education; one on Virtue; one called An Exhortation; Artabazus; The Shipwrecked Men; The Exiles; six books of Dissertations; three books of Apophthegms;[89] an essay addressed to Lais; one to Porus; one to Socrates; one on Fortune. He defined the chief good as a gentle movement aimed at sensation.

VII. But since we have written his life, let us now speak of the Cyrenaics who came after him; some of whom called themselves Hegesiaci, some Annicerei, others Theodorei. And let us also enumerate the disciples of Phædo, the chief of whom were the Eretrians. Now the pupils of Aristippus were his own daughter Arete, and Æthiops of Ptolemais, and Antipater of Cyrene. Arete had for her pupil the Aristippus who was surnamed μητροδίδαντος, whose disciple was Theodorus the atheist, but who was afterwards called θεὸς. Antipater had for a pupil Epitimedes of Cyrene, who was the master of Paræbates, who was the master of Hegesias, who was surnamed πεισιθάνατος (persuading to die), and of Anniceris who ransomed Plato.

VII. Now that we've covered his life, let's talk about the Cyrenaics who came after him; some called themselves Hegesiaci, some Annicerei, and others Theodorei. We'll also mention the followers of Phædo, the main ones being the Eretrians. Among Aristippus's students were his daughter Arete, Æthiops of Ptolemais, and Antipater of Cyrene. Arete mentored the Aristippus known as μητροδίδαντος, whose student was Theodorus the atheist, who later went by θεὸς. Antipater taught Epitimedes of Cyrene, who in turn instructed Paræbates, who then taught Hegesias, nicknamed πεισιθάνατος (the one who persuades to die), and Anniceris, who ransomed Plato.

VIII. These men then who continued in the school of Aristippus, and were called Cyrenaics, adopted the following opinions.—They said that there were two emotions of the mind, pleasure and pain; that the one, namely pleasure, was a moderate emotion; the other, namely pain, a rough one. And that no one pleasure was different from or more pleasant than another; and that pleasure was praised by all animals, but pain avoided. They said also that pleasure belonged to the body, and constituted its chief good, as Panætius also tells us in his book on Sects; but the pleasure which they call the chief good, is not that pleasure as a state, which consists in the absence of all pain, and is a sort of undisturbedness, which is what Epicurus admits as such; for the Cyrenaics think that there is a distinction between the chief good and a life of happiness, for that the chief good is a particular pleasure, but that happiness is a state consisting of a number of particular pleasures, among which, both those which are past, and those which are future, are both enumerated. And they consider that particular pleasure is desirable for its own sake; but that happiness is desirable not for its own sake, but for that of the particular pleasure. And that the proof that pleasure is the chief good is that we are from our childhood attracted to it without any deliberate choice of our own; and that when we have obtained it, we do not seek anything further, and also that there is nothing which we avoid so much as we do its opposite,[90] which is pain. And they assert, too, that pleasure is a good, even if it arises from the most unbecoming causes, as Hippobotus tells us in his Treatise on Sects; for even if an action be ever so absurd, still the pleasure which arises out of it is desirable, and a good.

VIII. The people who continued in the school of Aristippus and were known as Cyrenaics had the following beliefs. They stated that there are two main emotions of the mind: pleasure and pain. They considered pleasure to be a moderate feeling, while pain was seen as a harsh one. They also believed that no one pleasure is different from or more enjoyable than another; that all animals seek pleasure and avoid pain. They claimed that pleasure is a bodily experience and represents its greatest good, as Panætius notes in his book on Sects. However, the pleasure they refer to as the greatest good is not the kind of pleasure that comes from the absence of pain—a state of tranquility like the one Epicurus accepts. The Cyrenaics distinguish between the greatest good and a happy life, asserting that the greatest good is a specific pleasure, while happiness is a state made up of many specific pleasures, including both past and future experiences. They believe that specific pleasure is sought for its own sake, whereas happiness is sought not for itself, but for the specific pleasure it brings. They argue that the evidence that pleasure is the greatest good is that we are naturally drawn to it from childhood without making a conscious choice. Once we attain pleasure, we don't look for anything else, and there's nothing we avoid more fiercely than its opposite, which is pain. They also claim that pleasure is good, even if it comes from the most inappropriate sources, as Hippobotus mentions in his Treatise on Sects. Even if an action is completely absurd, the pleasure derived from it is still desirable and good.[90]

Moreover, the banishment of pain, as it is called by Epicurus, appears to the Cyrenaics not to be pleasure; for neither is the absence of pleasure pain, for both pleasure and pain consist in motion; and neither the absence of pleasure nor the absence of pain are motion. In fact, absence of pain is a condition like that of a person asleep. They say also that it is possible that some persons may not desire pleasure, owing to some perversity of mind; and that all the pleasures and pains of the mind, do not all originate in pleasures and pains of the body, for that pleasure often arises from the mere fact of the prosperity of one’s country, or from one’s own; but they deny that pleasure is caused by either the recollection or the anticipation of good fortune—though Epicurus asserted that it was—for the motion of the mind is put an end to by time. They say, too, that pleasure is not caused by simple seeing or hearing. Accordingly we listen with pleasure to those who give a representation of lamentations; but we are pained when we see men lamenting in reality. And they called the absence of pleasure and of pain intermediate states; and asserted that corporeal pleasures were superior to mental ones, and corporeal sufferings worse than mental ones. And they argued that it was on this principle that offenders were punished with bodily pain; for they thought that to suffer pain was hard, but that to be pleased was more in harmony with the nature of man, on which account also they took more care of the body than of the mind.

Moreover, the elimination of pain, as Epicurus refers to it, doesn’t seem to the Cyrenaics to be pleasure; because the absence of pleasure isn't the same as pain, since both pleasure and pain involve movement, and neither the lack of pleasure nor the lack of pain involves movement. In fact, the absence of pain is like a state of sleep. They also argue that some people might not desire pleasure due to some mental quirks; and that not all mental pleasures and pains stem from bodily experiences, as pleasure can come simply from the prosperity of one’s country or personal achievements. However, they reject the idea that pleasure comes from either remembering or anticipating good fortune—contrary to Epicurus' claim—because the movement of the mind fades with time. They also contend that pleasure isn’t triggered just by seeing or hearing things. For instance, we listen with enjoyment to those who portray lamentations, but we feel pain when witnessing real lamentation. They referred to the absence of pleasure and pain as intermediate states and claimed that physical pleasures are superior to mental ones, while physical sufferings are worse than mental ones. They argued that this principle justified punishing offenders with physical pain, as they believed that undergoing pain is difficult, but experiencing pleasure aligns more with human nature. This is why they placed greater importance on caring for the body than the mind.

And although pleasure is desirable for its own sake, still they admit that some of the efficient causes of it are often troublesome, and as such opposite to pleasure; so that they think that an assemblage of all the pleasures which produce happiness, is the most difficult thing conceivable. But they admit that every wise man does not live pleasantly, and that every bad man does not live unpleasantly, but that it is only a general rule admitting of some exceptions. And they think it sufficient if a person enjoys a happy time in consequence of one pleasure which befalls him. They say that prudence is a[91] good, but is not desirable for its own sake, but for the sake of those things which result from it. That a friend is desirable for the sake of the use which we can make of him; for that the parts of the body also are loved while they are united to the body; and that some of the virtues may exist even in the foolish. They consider that bodily exercise contributes to the comprehension of virtue; and that the wise man will feel neither envy, nor love, nor superstition; for that these things originate in a fallacious opinion. They admit, at the same time, that he is liable to grief and fear, for that these are natural emotions. They said also that wealth is an efficient cause of pleasure, but that it is not desirable for its own sake. That the sensations are things which can be comprehended; but they limited this assertion to the sensations themselves, and did not extend it to the causes which produce them. They left out all investigation of the subjects of natural philosophy because of the evident impossibility of comprehending them; but they applied themselves to the study of logic, because of its utility.

Although pleasure is desirable for its own sake, they acknowledge that some of the sources of pleasure can be troublesome and thus opposite to pleasure. They believe that achieving a combination of all pleasures that lead to happiness is incredibly challenging. They recognize that not every wise person lives a pleasurable life, nor does every bad person lead an unpleasant one; it's more of a general rule with some exceptions. They think it's enough if someone enjoys a happy moment from just one pleasure that comes their way. They suggest that prudence is a good quality, but it's not sought after for itself—it's valued for the benefits that come from it. A friend is valued for the usefulness he provides; just as the body parts are loved when connected to the body, some virtues can exist even in foolish people. They believe that physical exercise helps in understanding virtue, and the wise person will not feel envy, love, or superstition, as these stem from false beliefs. However, they acknowledge that he can still experience grief and fear since these are natural emotions. They also state that wealth can lead to pleasure, but it isn’t desirable for its own sake. They claim that sensations are things that can be understood, but they limit this statement to the sensations themselves, without extending it to the causes behind them. They avoided exploring natural philosophy due to the clear difficulty in comprehending it, but they focused on the study of logic because of its usefulness.

Meleager, in the second book of his Treatise on Opinions and Clitomachus in the first book of his Essay on Sects says, that they thought natural philosophy and dialectics useless for that the man who had learnt to understand the question of good and evil could speak with propriety, and was free from superstition, and escaped the fear of death, without either. They also taught that there was nothing naturally and intrinsically just, or honourable, or disgraceful; but that things were considered so because of law and fashion. The good man will do nothing out of the way, because of the punishments which are imposed on, and the discredit which is attached to, such actions: and that the good man is a wise man. They admit, too, that there is such a thing as improvement in philosophy, and in other good studies. And they say that one man feels grief more than another; and that the sensations are not always to be trusted as faithful guides.

Meleager, in the second book of his Treatise on Opinions, and Clitomachus in the first book of his Essay on Sects, argue that they considered natural philosophy and dialectics useless. They believed that a person who understood good and evil could speak appropriately and was free from superstition and the fear of death, without needing those studies. They also taught that nothing is inherently just, honorable, or disgraceful; instead, things are viewed this way due to laws and societal norms. A good person won't act out of line because of the punishments and shame that come with such actions, and they believe that a good person is a wise person. They also acknowledge that there can be progress in philosophy and other worthwhile fields of study. Additionally, they state that one person may experience grief more deeply than another, and that our sensations aren't always reliable guides.

IX. But the philosophers who were called Hegesiaci, adopted the same chief goods, pleasure and pain; and they denied that there was any such thing as gratitude, or friendship, or beneficence, because we do not choose any of those things for their own sake, but on account of the use of which they are, and on account of these other things which cannot subsist without them. But they teach that complete happiness cannot[92] possibly exist; for that the body is full of many sensations, and that the mind sympathizes with the body, and is troubled when that is troubled, and also that fortune prevents many things which we cherished in anticipation; so that for all these reasons, perfect happiness eludes our grasp. Moreover, that both life and death are desirable. They also say that there is nothing naturally pleasant or unpleasant, but that owing to want, or rarity, or satiety, some men are pleased and some vexed; and that wealth and poverty have no influence at all on pleasure, for that rich men are not affected by pleasure in a different manner from poor men. In the same way they say that slavery and freedom are things indifferent, if measured by the standard of pleasure, and nobility and baseness of birth, and glory and infamy. They add that, for the foolish man it is expedient to live, but to the wise man it is a matter of indifference; and that the wise man will do everything for his own sake; for that he will not consider any one else of equal importance with himself; and he will see that if he were to obtain ever such great advantages from any one else, they would not be equal to what he could himself bestow. They excluded the sensations, inasmuch as they had no certain knowledge about them; but they recommended the doing of everything which appeared consistent with reason.

IX. The philosophers known as Hegesiaci accepted the same main goods: pleasure and pain. They argued that gratitude, friendship, and kindness don’t exist because we don’t choose these things for their own sake, but for the benefits they bring, as well as for other things that rely on them. They claim that true happiness is impossible because the body is filled with many sensations, the mind is affected by the body, and is disturbed when the body is in distress. Also, luck often ruins what we hope for, making perfect happiness out of reach. They believe that both life and death can be desirable. They argue that nothing is naturally pleasant or unpleasant; instead, pleasure and discomfort depend on need, rarity, or excess, so some people find pleasure in certain things while others are annoyed by them. They assert that wealth and poverty do not affect pleasure, as rich people don’t experience pleasure any differently than poor people. Similarly, slavery and freedom are neutral when measured by pleasure, along with nobility and low birth, or fame and shame. They add that for the foolish person, living is beneficial, but for the wise person, it’s irrelevant; the wise person will act for their own benefit, placing themselves above everyone else. They believe that no one else’s advantages can match what he can provide for himself. They dismissed sensations since they lacked definite knowledge about them, but they advocated for actions that are in line with reason.

They asserted also that errors ought to meet with pardon; for that a man did not err intentionally, but because he was influenced by some external circumstance; and that one ought not to hate a person who has erred, but only to teach him better. They likewise said that the wise man would not be so much absorbed in the pursuit of what is good, as in the attempt to avoid what is bad, considering the chief good to be living free from all trouble and pain; and that this end was attained best by those who looked upon the efficient causes of pleasure as indifferent.

They also argued that mistakes should be forgiven; since a person doesn't make mistakes on purpose, but because they are influenced by outside factors. They believed that instead of hating someone who has made a mistake, we should focus on teaching them how to do better. They also said that a wise person wouldn't be so focused on chasing after what is good, but rather on trying to avoid what is bad, believing that the ultimate goal is to live without any trouble or pain. They thought this goal is best achieved by those who view the sources of pleasure as neutral.

X. The Annicereans, in many respects, agreed with these last; but they admitted the existence in life of friendship and gratitude and respect for one’s parents, and the principle of endeavouring to serve one’s country. On which principle, even if the wise man should meet with some annoyance, he would be no less happy—even though he should have but few actual pleasures. They thought that the happiness of a friend was not to be desired by us for its own sake; for that in fact such happiness was not[93] capable of being felt by the person’s neighbour; and that reason is not sufficient to give one confidence, and to authorise one to look down upon the opinions of the multitude; but that one must learn a deference for the sentiments of others by custom, because the opposite bad disposition being bred up with infirm and early age. They also taught that one ought not to like friends solely on account of the advantage that we may derive from them, and not discard them when these hopes or advantages fail; but that we ought rather to cultivate them on account of one’s natural feelings of benevolence, in compliance with which we ought also to encounter trouble for their sakes, so that though they consider pleasure the chief good, and the deprivation of it an evil, still they think that a man ought voluntarily to submit to this deprivation out of his regard for his friend.

X. The Annicereans, in many ways, agreed with the previous thinkers; however, they acknowledged the importance of friendship, gratitude, respect for one's parents, and the idea of striving to serve one's country. According to this belief, even if a wise person faces some difficulties, they can still be happy—even if they have only a few real pleasures. They believed that the happiness of a friend should not be sought for its own sake because, in reality, that happiness cannot be truly experienced by someone else's neighbor; and that reasoning alone is not enough to inspire confidence or justify looking down on the opinions of the crowd. Instead, one must learn to respect the feelings of others through habit, as a negative attitude can develop when nurtured in weak and early stages of life. They also taught that we shouldn't like friends just for the benefits we may gain from them, nor should we abandon them when those hopes or advantages disappear; rather, we should nurture those relationships out of genuine goodwill and, in doing so, be willing to face challenges for their sake. Even though they consider pleasure the highest good and the lack of it a misfortune, they believe that a person should willingly endure that deprivation out of respect for their friend.

XI. The Theodoreans, as they are called, derived their name from the Theodorus who has been already mentioned, and adopted all his doctrines.

XI. The Theodoreans, as they are known, got their name from Theodorus, who has already been mentioned, and embraced all his teachings.

XII. Now Theodorus utterly discarded all previous opinions about the Gods: and we have met with a book of his which is entitled, On Gods, which is not to be despised; and it is from that that they say that Epicurus derived the principal portions of his sentiments. But Theodorus had been a pupil of Anniceris, and of Dionysius the Dialectician, as Antisthenes tells us in his Successions of Philosophers.

XII. Now Theodorus completely rejected all previous beliefs about the Gods: and we have come across a book of his called On Gods, which should not be ignored; and it is said that Epicurus took the main parts of his ideas from that. However, Theodorus had been a student of Anniceris and Dionysius the Dialectician, as Antisthenes mentions in his Successions of Philosophers.

XIII. He considered joy and grief as the chief goods: and that the former resulted from knowledge, and the latter from ignorance. And he called prudence and justice goods: the contrary qualities evils, and pleasure and pain something intermediate. He discarded friendship from his system, because it could not exist either in foolish men or in wise men. For that, in the case of the former, friendship was at an end the moment that the advantage to be derived from it was out of sight. And that wise men were sufficient for themselves, and so had no need of friends. He used also to say that it was reasonable for a good man not to expose himself to danger for the sake of his country, for that he ought not to discard his own prudence for the sake of benefiting those who had none. And he said that a wise man’s country was the World. He allowed that a wise man might steal, and commit adultery and sacrilege, at proper[94] seasons: for that none of these actions were disgraceful by nature, if one only put out of sight the common opinion about them, which owes its existence to the consent of fools. And he said that the wise man would indulge his passions openly, without any regard to circumstances: on which principle he used to ask the following questions: “Is a woman who is well instructed in literature of use just in proportion to the amount of her literary knowledge?” “Yes,” said the person questioned. “And is a boy, and is a youth, useful in proportion to his acquaintance with literature?” “Yes.” “Is not then, also, a beautiful woman useful in proportion as she is beautiful; and a boy and a youth useful in proportion to their beauty?” “Yes.” “Well, then, a handsome boy and a handsome youth must be useful exactly in proportion as they are handsome?” “Yes.” “Now the use of beauty is, to be embraced.” And when this was granted he pressed the argument thus:—If then a man embraces a woman just as it is useful that he should, he does not do wrong; nor, again, will he be doing wrong in employing beauty for the purposes for which it is useful. And with such questions as these he appeared to convince his hearers.

XIII. He viewed joy and grief as the main goods: joy came from knowledge, and grief stemmed from ignorance. He regarded prudence and justice as goods, while their opposites were evils, and pleasure and pain as something in between. He ruled out friendship from his philosophy because it couldn't exist with either foolish or wise people. In the case of foolish individuals, friendship ended when the benefits were no longer visible. Wise people, on the other hand, were self-sufficient and didn't need friends. He also argued that a good person shouldn't put themselves in danger for their country, as they shouldn't sacrifice their own prudence to help those lacking it. He stated that a wise person's country is the World. He acknowledged that a wise person might steal, commit adultery, or engage in sacrilege at the right times because none of these actions are inherently disgraceful if you disregard popular opinion, which is based on the agreement of fools. He claimed that a wise person would pursue their desires openly, without consideration for circumstances. Based on this idea, he would ask questions like: “Is a woman who is well-educated useful in proportion to her knowledge?” “Yes,” replied the person questioned. “And what about a boy or a young man—are they useful based on their education?” “Yes.” “Then isn’t a beautiful woman useful in proportion to her beauty, and the same for a boy or young man in relation to their attractiveness?” “Yes.” “So, a handsome boy and a handsome young man must be useful exactly in proportion to their looks?” “Yes.” “Now, the purpose of beauty is to be embraced.” Once this was accepted, he pressed the argument further: if a man embraces a woman as it is useful for him to do so, he is not doing wrong; neither would he be wrong for using beauty for its intended purpose. With arguments like these, he seemed to persuade his listeners.

XIV. But he appears to have got the name of θεὸς from Stilpo one day asking him, “Are you, Theodorus, what you say you are?” And when he said he was, “And you said that you are θεὸς,” continued his questioner; he admitted that also. “Then,” continued the other, “you are θεὸς.” And as he willingly received the title, the other laughed and said, “But you, wretched man, according to this principle, you would also admit that you were a raven, or a hundred other things.” One day Theodorus sat down by Euryclides the hierophant, and said to him, “Tell me now, Euryclides, who are they who behave impiously with respect to the mysteries?” And when Euryclides answered, “Those who divulge them to the uninitiated;” “Then,” said he, “you also are impious, for you divulge them to those who are not initiated.”

XIV. He seems to have gotten the title of θεὸς after Stilpo asked him one day, “Are you, Theodorus, what you say you are?” When he replied that he was, Stilpo pressed on, “And you said that you are θεὸς.” He accepted that too. “Then,” Stilpo said, “you are θεὸς.” Since he happily embraced the title, Stilpo laughed and remarked, “But you, poor man, by this logic, you would also have to admit that you’re a raven, or a hundred other things.” One day, Theodorus sat down next to Euryclides the hierophant and asked him, “So, Euryclides, who are the ones that behave impiously regarding the mysteries?” When Euryclides replied, “Those who reveal them to the uninitiated,” Theodorus responded, “Then you are also impious, because you reveal them to those who are not initiated.”

XV. And indeed he was very near being brought before the Areopagus if Demetrius of Phalereus had not saved him. But Amphicrates in his Essay on Illustrious Men, says that he was condemned to drink hemlock.

XV. And he was really close to being taken before the Areopagus if Demetrius of Phalereus hadn't rescued him. But Amphicrates in his Essay on Illustrious Men says that he was sentenced to drink hemlock.

XVI. While he was staying at the court of Ptolemy, the son of Lagus, he was sent once by him to Lysimachus as an[95] ambassador. And as he was talking very freely, Lysimachus said to him, “Tell me, Theodorus, have not you been banished from Athens?” And he replied, “you have been rightly informed; for the city of the Athenians could not bear me, just as Semele could not bear Bacchus; and so we were both cast out.” And when Lysimachus said again, “Take care that you do not come to me again;” “I never will,” he replied, “unless Ptolemy sends me.” And as Mythras, the steward of Lysimachus was present, and said, “You appear to me to be the only person who ignores both Gods and Sovereigns;” “How,” rejoined Theodorus, “can you say that I ignore the Gods, when I look upon you as their enemy?”

XVI. While he was at the court of Ptolemy, the son of Lagus, he was sent by him to Lysimachus as an[95] ambassador. As they were having a candid conversation, Lysimachus asked him, “So, Theodorus, haven’t you been exiled from Athens?” He replied, “You're right; the people of Athens couldn't handle me, just like Semele couldn't handle Bacchus; so we were both thrown out.” When Lysimachus said again, “Make sure you don’t come back to me,” Theodorus replied, “I won’t, unless Ptolemy sends me.” With Mythras, Lysimachus's steward, present, he remarked, “You seem to be the only one who disregards both Gods and Rulers.” Theodorus shot back, “How can you say that I disregard the Gods when I see you as their enemy?”

XVII. They say also that on one occasion he came to Corinth, bringing with him a great many disciples; and that Metrocles the Cynic, who was washing leeks, said to him, “You, who are a Sophist, would not have wanted so many pupils, if you had washed vegetables.” And Theodorus, taking him up, replied, “And if you had known how to associate with men, you would not have cared about those vegetables.” But this rejoinder, as I have said already, is attributed both to Diogenes and Aristippus.

XVII. They also say that once he came to Corinth with a lot of followers, and Metrocles the Cynic, while washing leeks, said to him, “You, a Sophist, wouldn’t have so many students if you knew how to wash vegetables.” Theodorus responded by saying, “And if you knew how to get along with people, you wouldn’t care about those vegetables.” However, as I’ve mentioned before, this comeback is credited to both Diogenes and Aristippus.

XVIII. Such was Theodorus, and such were his circumstances and opinions. But at last he went away to Cyrene, and lived there with Megas, being treated by him with the greatest distinction. And when he was first driven away from Cyrene, he is reported to have said very pleasantly, “You do wrong, O men of Cyrene, driving me from Africa to Greece.”

XVIII. That was Theodorus, and those were his situations and viewpoints. Eventually, he moved to Cyrene and lived there with Megas, who treated him with the utmost respect. When he was initially forced to leave Cyrene, he is said to have humorously remarked, “You guys are wrong, people of Cyrene, sending me from Africa to Greece.”

XIX. But there were twenty different people of the name of Theodorus. The first was a Samian, the son of Rhœcus; he it was who advised the putting of coals under the foundations of the temple of Diana at Ephesus; for as the ground was very swampy, he said that the coals, having got rid of their ligneous qualities, would retain their solidity in a way that could not be impaired by water. The second was a Cyrenean, a geometrician, and had Plato for one of his pupils. The third was the philosopher whom we have been describing. The fourth was an author who wrote a very remarkable treatise on the art of exercising the voice. The fifth was a man who wrote a treatise on Musical Composers, beginning with Terpander. The sixth was a Stoic. The seventh was the historian of Rome. The eighth was a Syracusan, who wrote an Essay on[96] Tactics. The ninth was a citizen of Byzantium, who was a political orator. The tenth was another orator, who is mentioned by Aristotle in his Epitome of the Orators. The eleventh was a Theban, a statuary. The twelfth was a painter, who is mentioned by Polemo. The thirteenth was also a painter, who is spoken of by Menodotus. The fourteenth was an Ephesian, a painter, mentioned by Theophanes in his Essay on Painting. The fifteenth was an epigrammatic poet. The sixteenth wrote an essay on Poets. The seventeenth was a physician, a pupil of Athenæus. The eighteenth was a Chian, a Stoic philosopher. The nineteenth was a citizen of Miletus, another Stoic. The twentieth was a tragic poet.

XIX. There were twenty different people named Theodorus. The first was a Samian, the son of Rhœcus; he suggested placing coals under the foundations of the temple of Diana at Ephesus, arguing that since the ground was very swampy, the coals, having lost their wood-like qualities, would maintain their solidity without being affected by water. The second was a mathematician from Cyrene who had Plato as one of his students. The third was the philosopher we've been discussing. The fourth was a writer who produced a notable work on vocal training. The fifth wrote a treatise on Musical Composers, starting with Terpander. The sixth was a Stoic philosopher. The seventh was the historian of Rome. The eighth was a Syracusan who wrote an Essay on Tactics. The ninth was a political orator from Byzantium. The tenth was another orator mentioned by Aristotle in his Epitome of the Orators. The eleventh was a Theban sculptor. The twelfth was a painter referenced by Polemo. The thirteenth was another painter talked about by Menodotus. The fourteenth was an Ephesian painter mentioned by Theophanes in his Essay on Painting. The fifteenth was an epigram poet. The sixteenth wrote an essay on Poets. The seventeenth was a physician, a student of Athenæus. The eighteenth was a Chian Stoic philosopher. The nineteenth was a citizen of Miletus, also a Stoic. The twentieth was a tragic poet.

LIFE OF PHÆDO.

I. Phædo the Elean, one of the Eupatridæ, was taken prisoner at the time of the subjugation of his country, and was compelled to submit to the vilest treatment. But while he was standing in the street, shutting the door, he met with Socrates, who desired Alcibiades, or as some say, Crito, to ransom him. And after that time he studied philosophy as became a free man. But Hieronymus, in his essay on suspending one’s judgment, calls him a slave.

I. Phædo the Elean, one of the Eupatridæ, was captured when his country was conquered and had to endure terrible treatment. While he was in the street closing a door, he encountered Socrates, who asked Alcibiades, or as some say, Crito, to pay for his freedom. After that, he pursued philosophy as a free man. However, Hieronymus, in his essay on withholding judgment, refers to him as a slave.

II. And he wrote dialogues, of which we have genuine copies; by name—Zopyrus, Simon, and Nicias (but the genuineness of this one is disputed); Medius, which some people attribute to Æschines, and others to Polyænus; Antimachus, or the Elders (this too is a disputed one); the Scythian discourses, and these, too, some attribute to Æschines.

II. He wrote dialogues, of which we have authentic copies; specifically—Zopyrus, Simon, and Nicias (though there is debate over the authenticity of this one); Medius, which some credit to Æschines and others to Polyænus; Antimachus, or the Elders (this one is also disputed); the Scythian discourses, which some also attribute to Æschines.

III. But his successor was Plistanus of Elis; and the next in succession to him were Menedemus of Eretria, and Asclepiades of Phlius, who came over from Stilpo. And down to the age of these last, they were called the Eliac school; but after the time of Menedemus, they were called the Eretrians. And we will speak of Menedemus hereafter, because he was the founder of a new sect.

III. But his successor was Plistanus of Elis; then came Menedemus of Eretria and Asclepiades of Phlius, who came over from Stilpo. Up until the time of these last philosophers, they were known as the Eliac school; but after Menedemus, they were referred to as the Eretrians. We will discuss Menedemus later, as he was the founder of a new sect.

LIFE OF EUCLIDES.

I. Euclides was a native of Megara on the Isthmus, or of Gela, according to some writers, whose statement is mentioned by Alexander in his Successions. He devoted himself to the study of the writings of Parmenides; and his successors were called the philosophers of the Megaric school; after that they were called the Contentious school, and still later, the Dialecticians, which name was first given to them by Dionysius the Carthaginian; because they carried on their investigations by question and answer. Hermodorus says that after the death of Socrates, Plato and the other philosophers came to Euclides, because they feared the cruelty of the tyrants.

I. Euclid was originally from Megara on the Isthmus, or from Gela, according to some writers, as mentioned by Alexander in his Successions. He focused on studying the works of Parmenides, and his followers became known as the philosophers of the Megarian school. Later, they were referred to as the Contentious school, and even later, the Dialecticians, a term first used by Dionysius the Carthaginian because they conducted their inquiries through questions and answers. Hermodorus states that after Socrates' death, Plato and the other philosophers turned to Euclid out of fear of the tyrants' cruelty.

II. He used to teach that the chief good is unity; but that it is known by several names; for at one time people call it prudence; at another time God; at another time intellect, and so on. But everything which was contrary to good, he discarded, denying its existence. And the proofs which he used to bring forward to support his arguments, were not those which proceed on assumptions, but on conclusions. He also rejected all that sort of reasoning which proceeds on comparison, saying that it must be founded either on things which are like, or on things which are unlike. If on things which are like, then it is better to reason about the things themselves, than about those which resemble them; and if on things which are unlike, then the comparison is quite useless. And on this account Timon uses the following language concerning him, where he also attacks all the other philosophers of the Socratic school:—

II. He used to teach that the ultimate good is unity, but it goes by various names; sometimes people refer to it as prudence, other times as God, or intellect, and so on. He rejected anything that was contrary to good, denying its existence. The evidence he presented to support his arguments was based on conclusions rather than assumptions. He also dismissed reasoning that relied on comparisons, arguing that it must be based either on similar things or different things. If based on similar things, it's better to reason about the things themselves than about their resemblances; if based on different things, then the comparison is completely pointless. For this reason, Timon criticizes him with the following words, where he also attacks all the other philosophers of the Socratic school:—

But I do care for none of all these triflers,
Nor for any one else; not for your Phædon,
Whoever he may be; not for the quarrelsome
Euclides, who bit all the Megareans
With love of fierce contention.

III. He wrote six dialogues—the Lamprias, the Æschines, the Phœnix, the Crito, the Alcibiades, and the Amatory dialogue.

III. He wrote six dialogues—the Lamprias, the Aeschines, the Phoenix, the Crito, the Alcibiades, and the Amatory dialogue.

IV. Next in succession to Euclides, came Eubulides of Miletus, who handed down a great many arguments in dialectics;[98] such as the Lying one; the Concealed one; the Electra; the Veiled one; the Sorites; the Horned one; the Bald one.[26] And one of the Comic poets speaks of him in the following terms:—

IV. After Euclid, Eubulides of Miletus followed, presenting a wide range of arguments in dialectics; [98] like the Lying one, the Concealed one, the Electra, the Veiled one, the Sorites, the Horned one, and the Bald one.[26] One of the comic poets mentions him in these words:—

Eubulides, that most contentious sophist,
Asking his horned quibbles, and perplexing
The natives with his false arrogant speeches,
Has gone with all the fluency of Demosthenes.

For it seems that Demosthenes had been his pupil, and that being at first unable to pronounce the R, he got rid of that defect. Eubulides had a quarrel with Aristotle, and was constantly attacking him.

For it seems that Demosthenes had been his student, and that at first he couldn't pronounce the R sound, but he overcame that issue. Eubulides had a feud with Aristotle and constantly challenged him.

V. Among the different people who succeeded Eubulides, was Alexinus of Elis, a man very fond of argument, on which account he was nicknamed Ἐλέγξινος.[27] He had an especial quarrel with Zeno; and Hermippus relates of him that he went from Elis to Olympia, and studied philosophy there; and that when his pupils asked him why he lived there, he said that he wished to establish a school which should be called the Olympic school; but that his pupils being in distress, through want of means of support, and finding the situation unhealthy for them, left him; and that after that Alexinus lived by himself, with only one servant. And after that, when swimming in the[99] Alpheus, he was pricked by a reed, and the injury proved fatal, and he died. And we have written an epigram on him which runs thus:—

V. Among the various people who followed Eubulides was Alexinus of Elis, a guy who really loved to argue, which is why he was nicknamed Ἐλέγξινος.[27] He had a particular dispute with Zeno; and Hermippus writes that he traveled from Elis to Olympia to study philosophy. When his students asked him why he lived there, he said he wanted to establish a school called the Olympic school. However, since his students were struggling due to lack of resources and found the place unhealthy, they left him. After that, Alexinus lived alone, with just one servant. Later, while swimming in the[99] Alpheus, he got pricked by a reed, and the injury turned out to be fatal, leading to his death. We have written an epigram about him that goes like this:—

Then the report, alas! was true,
That an unhappy man,
While swimming tore his foot against a nail
For the illustrious sage,
Good Alexinus, swimming in the Alpheus,
Died from a hostile reed.

And he wrote not only against Zeno, but he composed other works also, especially one against Ephorus the historian.

And he wrote not just against Zeno, but he also created other works, particularly one against Ephorus the historian.

VI. One of the school of Eubulides was Euphantus of Olynthus, who wrote a history of the events of his own time; he also composed several tragedies, for which he got great distinction at the festivals. And he was the preceptor of Antigonus, the king to whom he dedicated a treatise on Monarchy, which had an exceedingly high reputation. And at last he died of old age.

VI. One of Eubulides' students was Euphantus of Olynthus, who wrote a history of the events of his time; he also created several tragedies, for which he gained considerable recognition at the festivals. He was the teacher of Antigonus, the king to whom he dedicated a highly regarded treatise on Monarchy. Eventually, he died of old age.

VII. There are also other pupils of Eubulides, among whom is Apollonius Cronus, who was the preceptor of Diodorus of Iasos, the son of Aminias; and he too was surnamed Cronus, and is thus mentioned by Callimachus in his epigrams:—

VII. There are also other students of Eubulides, including Apollonius Cronus, who taught Diodorus of Iasos, the son of Aminias; he was also called Cronus, and is mentioned by Callimachus in his epigrams:—

Momus himself did carve upon the walls,
Cronus is wise.

And he was a dialectician, and, as some believe, he was the first person who invented the Concealed argument, and the Horned one. When he was staying at the court of Ptolemy Soter, he had several dialectic questions put to him by Stilpo; and as he was not able to solve them at the moment, he was reproached by the king with many hard words, and among other things, he was nicknamed Cronus, out of derision. So he left the banquet, and wrote an essay on the question of Stilpo, and then died of despondency. And we have written the following epigram on him:—

And he was a skilled debater, and some say he was the first to come up with the Hidden argument and the Horned argument. While he was at the court of Ptolemy Soter, Stilpo presented him with several logical challenges; since he couldn't answer them at the time, the king scolded him harshly and even mockingly called him Cronus. So he left the feast, wrote an essay on Stilpo's questions, and ultimately died from sadness. We have written the following poem about him:—

O Diodorus Cronus, what sad fate
Buried you in despair?
So that you hastened to the shades below,
Perplexed by Stilpo’s quibbles—
You would deserve your name of Cronus[28] better,
If C and r were gone.

VIII. One of the successors of Euclides was Icthyas, the son of Metellus, a man of great eminence, to whom Diogenes the Cynic addressed a dialogue. And Clinomachus of Thurii, who was the first person who ever wrote about axioms and categorems, and things of that kind. And Stilpo the Megarian, a most illustrious philosopher, whom we must now speak of.

VIII. One of Euclid's successors was Icthyas, the son of Metellus, a highly esteemed figure to whom Diogenes the Cynic had a conversation. Then there was Clinomachus of Thurii, the first person ever to write about axioms and categories, and similar topics. And we must now discuss Stilpo the Megarian, a very prominent philosopher.

LIFE OF STILPO.

I. Stilpo, a native of Megara in Greece, was a pupil of some of Euclides’ school. But some say that he was a pupil of Euclides himself. And also of Thrasymachus, the Corinthian, who was a friend of Icthyas, as Heraclides informs us.

I. Stilpo, originally from Megara in Greece, studied under some members of Euclid's school. However, some claim that he was actually a student of Euclid himself. He also learned from Thrasymachus, a Corinthian who was a friend of Icthyas, according to Heraclides.

II. And he was so much superior to all his fellows in command of words and in acuteness, that it may almost be said that all Greece fixed its eyes upon him, and joined the Megaric school. And concerning him Philippus of Megara speaks thus, word for word:—“For he carried off from Theophrastus, Metrodorus the speculative philosopher, and Timagoras of Gela; and Aristotle the Cyrenaic, he robbed of Clitarchus and Simias; and from the dialecticians’ school also he won men over, carrying off Pæoneius from Aristides, and Diphilus of the Bosphorus from Euphantus, and also Myrmex of the Venetes, who had both come to him to argue against him, but they became converts and his disciples.” And besides these men, he attracted to his school Phrasidemus the Peripatetic, a natural philosopher of great ability; and Alcimus the rhetorician, the most eminent orator in all Greece at that time; and he won over Crates, and great numbers of others, and among them Zeno the Phœnician.

II. He was so much better than all his peers in his command of language and sharpness of mind that you could almost say all of Greece looked up to him and joined the Megarian school. Philippus of Megara stated this about him, word for word:—“For he took Theophrastus’ student Metrodorus, the speculative philosopher, and Timagoras of Gela; he also snatched Clitarchus and Simias away from Aristotle the Cyrenaic; and from the dialecticians’ school, he won over several, including Pæoneius from Aristides, Diphilus of the Bosphorus from Euphantus, and Myrmex of the Venetes, who had originally come to debate with him but ended up becoming his followers.” In addition to these individuals, he also drew in Phrasidemus the Peripatetic, a highly skilled natural philosopher; and Alcimus the rhetorician, the most renowned orator in all of Greece at that time; he also won over Crates, along with many others, including Zeno the Phoenician.

III. And he was very fond of the study of politics. And he was married. But he lived also with a courtesan, named Nicarete, as Onetor tells us somewhere. And he had a licentious daughter, who was married to a friend of his named Simias, a citizen of Syracuse. And as she would not live in an orderly manner, some one told Stilpo that she was a disgrace to him. But he said, “She is not more a disgrace to me than I am an honour to her.”

III. He was really interested in politics. He was married, but he also lived with a courtesan named Nicarete, as Onetor mentions somewhere. He had a rebellious daughter who was married to his friend Simias, a citizen of Syracuse. When it was reported to Stilpo that she was a disgrace to him because of her behavior, he replied, “She is not more a disgrace to me than I am an honor to her.”

IV. Ptolemy Soter, it is said, received him with great honour; and when he had made himself master of Megara, he gave him money, and invited him to sail with him to Egypt. But he accepted only a moderate sum of money, and declined the journey proposed to him, but went over to Ægina, until Ptolemy had sailed. Also when Demetrius, the son of Antigonus had taken Megara, he ordered Stilpo’s house to be saved, and took care that everything that had been plundered from him should be restored to him. But when he wished Stilpo to give him in a list of all that he had lost, he said that he had lost nothing of his own; for that no one had taken from him his learning, and that he still had his eloquence and his knowledge. And he conversed with Demetrius on the subject of doing good to men with such power, that he became a zealous hearer of his.

IV. Ptolemy Soter reportedly welcomed him with great honor. After he took control of Megara, he offered him money and invited him to sail with him to Egypt. However, he only accepted a modest amount of money and declined the proposed trip, choosing instead to go to Ægina until Ptolemy had set sail. When Demetrius, the son of Antigonus, captured Megara, he ordered that Stilpo's house be saved and ensured everything stolen from him was returned. But when he asked Stilpo to provide a list of everything he had lost, Stilpo replied that he hadn't lost anything of his own; no one could take away his knowledge, and he still possessed his eloquence and wisdom. He engaged Demetrius in conversations about helping others with such passion that he became an enthusiastic listener.

V. They say that he once put such a question as this to a man, about the Minerva of Phidias:—“Is Minerva the Goddess the daughter of Jupiter?” And when the other said, “Yes;” “But this,” said he, “is not the child of Jupiter, but of Phidias.” And when he agreed that it was so—“This then,” he continued, “is not a God.” And when he was brought before the Areopagus for this speech, he did not deny it, but maintained that he had spoken correctly; for that she was not a God (θεὸς) but a Goddess (θεὰ); for that Gods were of the male sex only.[29] However the judges of the Areopagus ordered him to leave the city; and on this occasion, Theodorus, who was nicknamed θεὸς, said in derision, “Whence did Stilpo learn this? and how could he tell whether she was a God or a Goddess?” But Theodorus was in truth a most impudent fellow. But Stilpo was a most witty and elegant-minded man. Accordingly when Crates asked him if the Gods delighted in adoration and prayer; they say that he answered, “Do not ask these questions, you foolish man, in the road, but in private.” And they say too that Bion, when he was asked whether there were any Gods, answered in the same spirit:—

V. They say that he once asked a man about Phidias's statue of Minerva: “Is Minerva the Goddess, the daughter of Jupiter?” When the other replied, “Yes,” he said, “But this isn’t the child of Jupiter; it’s the creation of Phidias.” When the man agreed, he continued, “So this isn't a God.” When he was brought before the Areopagus for this statement, he didn't deny it but argued that he was correct; she was not a God (θεὸς) but a Goddess (θεὰ), since Gods are only male.[29] However, the judges of the Areopagus ordered him to leave the city. On this occasion, Theodorus, who was nicknamed θεὸς, mocked, “Where did Stilpo learn this? How could he determine whether she was a God or a Goddess?” But Theodorus was really quite arrogant. Stilpo, on the other hand, was very witty and insightful. So when Crates asked him if the Gods enjoyed worship and prayer, it’s said that he replied, “Don’t ask such foolish questions on the road; ask them in private.” It’s also said that Bion, when asked if there were any Gods, responded in the same way:—

“Will you not first, O! miserable old man,
Remove the multitude?”

VI. But Stilpo was a man of simple character, and free from all trick and humbug, and universally affable. Accordingly,[102] when Crates the Cynic once refused to answer a question that he had put to him, and only insulted his questioner—“I knew,” said Stilpo, “that he would say anything rather than what he ought.” And once he put a question to him, and offered him a fig at the same time; so he took the fig and ate it, on which Crates said, “O Hercules, I have lost my fig.” “Not only that,” he replied, “but you have lost your question too, of which the fig was the pledge.” At another time, he saw Crates shivering in the winter, and said to him, “Crates, you seem to me to want a new dress,” meaning, both a new mind and a new garment; and Crates, feeling ashamed, answered him in the following parody:—

VI. But Stilpo was a straightforward guy, genuine and warm-hearted, and always friendly. So, when Crates the Cynic once refused to answer a question he had asked and instead insulted him—“I knew,” said Stilpo, “that he would say anything except what he should.” And once he asked Crates a question while offering him a fig at the same time; Crates took the fig and ate it, at which point he said, “Oh Hercules, I’ve lost my fig.” “Not just that,” Stilpo replied, “but you’ve also lost your question, which the fig represented.” Another time, he saw Crates shivering in the winter and said to him, “Crates, you seem to need a new outfit,” implying both a new mindset and new clothes; feeling embarrassed, Crates responded with a parody:—

“There[30] Stilpo too, through the Megarian bounds,
Pours out deep groans, where Typhon’s voice resounds,
And there he oft doth argue, while a school
Of eager pupils owns his subtle rule,
And virtue’s name with eager chase pursues.”

And it is said that at Athens he attracted all the citizens to such a degree, that they used to run from their workshops to look at him; and when some one said to him, “Why, Stilpo, they wonder at you as if you were a wild beast,” he replied, “Not so; but as a real genuine man.”

And it’s said that in Athens he drew in everyone so much that they would rush from their jobs just to see him. When someone remarked, “Wow, Stilpo, they look at you like you’re a wild animal,” he replied, “No, it’s because I’m a true, genuine man.”

VII. And he was a very clever arguer; and rejected the theory of species. And he used to say that a person who spoke of man in general, was speaking of nobody; for that he was not speaking of this individual, nor of that one; for speaking in general, how can he speak more of this person than of that person? therefore he is not speaking of this person at all. Another of his illustrations was, “That which is shown to me, is not a vegetable; for a vegetable existed ten thousand years ago, therefore this is not a vegetable.” And they say that once when he was conversing with Crates, he interrupted the discourse to go off and buy some fish; and as Crates tried to drag him back, and said, “You are leaving the argument;” “Not at all,” he replied, “I keep the argument, but I am leaving you; for the argument remains, but the fish will be sold to some one else.”

VII. He was a really smart debater and dismissed the theory of species. He often said that when someone talked about people in general, they weren't really talking about anyone in particular; they weren't referring to this person or that one. When speaking generally, how could they say more about one person than another? So, in reality, they weren't talking about this person at all. One of his examples was, “What’s shown to me isn’t a vegetable; because a vegetable existed ten thousand years ago, so this isn’t a vegetable.” It's said that once, during a conversation with Crates, he broke off the discussion to go buy some fish. As Crates tried to pull him back, saying, “You’re abandoning the argument,” he replied, “Not at all. I’m still following the argument, but I’m leaving you; the argument stays, but the fish will be sold to someone else.”

VIII. There are nine dialogues of his extant, written in a frigid style: The Moschus; the Aristippus or Callias; the[103] Ptolemy; the Chœrecrates; the Metrocles; the Anaximenes; the Epigenes; the one entitled To my Daughter, and the Aristotle.

VIII. There are nine of his dialogues still available, written in a cold style: The Moschus; the Aristippus or Callias; the[103] Ptolemy; the Chœrecrates; the Metrocles; the Anaximenes; the Epigenes; the one titled To my Daughter, and the Aristotle.

IX. Heraclides affirms that Zeno, the founder of the Stoic school, had been one of his pupils.

IX. Heraclides states that Zeno, the founder of the Stoic school, was one of his students.

X. Hermippus says that he died at a great age, after drinking some wine, in order to die more rapidly. And we have written this epigram upon him:—

X. Hermippus says that he died at a very old age, after drinking some wine, so he could die faster. And we have written this epigram about him:—

Stranger, old age at first, and then disease,
A hateful pair, did lay wise Stilpo low.
The pride of Megara: he found good wine
The best of drivers for his mournful coach,
And drinking it, he drove on to the end.

And he was ridiculed by Sophilus the comic poet, in his play called Marriages:—

And he was mocked by Sophilus the comic poet in his play titled Marriages:—

The dregs of Stilpo make the whole discourse of this Charinus.

LIFE OF CRITO.

I. Crito was an Athenian. He looked upon Socrates with the greatest affection; and paid such great attention to him, that he took care that he should never be in want of anything.

I. Crito was an Athenian. He regarded Socrates with deep affection and paid so much attention to him that he made sure he was never lacking anything.

II. His sons also were all constant pupils of Socrates, and their names were Critobulus, Hermogenes, Epigenes, and Ctesippus.

II. His sons were all dedicated students of Socrates, and their names were Critobulus, Hermogenes, Epigenes, and Ctesippus.

III. Crito wrote seventeen dialogues, which were all published in one volume; and I subjoin their titles:—That men are not made good by Teaching; on Superfluity; what is Suitable, or the Statesman; on the Honourable; on doing ill; on Good Government; on Law; on the Divine Being; on Arts; on Society; Protagoras, or the Statesman; on Letters; on Political Science; on the Honourable; on Learning; on Knowledge; on Science; on what Knowledge is.

III. Crito wrote seventeen dialogues, which were all published in one volume; and I list their titles:—That people aren't made good by teaching; on excess; what is appropriate, or the Statesman; on honor; on wrongdoing; on good governance; on law; on the divine; on the arts; on society; Protagoras, or the Statesman; on writing; on political science; on honor; on education; on knowledge; on science; on the nature of knowledge.

LIFE OF SIMON.

I. Simon was an Athenian, a leather-cutter. He, whenever Socrates came into his workshop and conversed, used to make memorandums of all his sayings that he recollected.

I. Simon was an Athenian who worked as a leather-cutter. Whenever Socrates entered his workshop and talked, he would take notes on all the things he remembered Socrates saying.

II. And from this circumstance, people have called his dialogues leathern ones. But he has written thirty-three which, however, are all combined in one volume:—On the Gods; on the Good; on the Honourable; what the Honourable is; the first Dialogue on Justice; the second Dialogue on Justice; on Virtue, showing that it is not to be taught; the first Dialogue on Courage; the second; the third; on Laws; on the Art of Guiding the People; on Honour; on Poetry; on Good Health; on Love; on Philosophy; on Knowledge; on Music; on Poetry; on what the Honourable is; on Teaching; on Conversation; on Judgment; on the Existent; on Number; on Diligence; on Activity; on Covetousness; on Insolence; on the Honourable; Some also add to these dialogues; on taking Counsel; on Reason or Suitableness; on doing Harm.

II. Because of this, people have referred to his dialogues as leathern ones. However, he has written thirty-three in total, all of which are collected in one volume:—On the Gods; on the Good; on the Honorable; what the Honorable is; the first Dialogue on Justice; the second Dialogue on Justice; on Virtue, demonstrating that it cannot be taught; the first Dialogue on Courage; the second; the third; on Laws; on the Art of Guiding the People; on Honor; on Poetry; on Good Health; on Love; on Philosophy; on Knowledge; on Music; on Poetry; on what the Honorable is; on Teaching; on Conversation; on Judgment; on Existence; on Number; on Diligence; on Activity; on Greed; on Insolence; on the Honorable; Some also add to these dialogues; on Seeking Counsel; on Reason or Suitability; on Causing Harm.

III. He is, as some people say, the first writer who reduced the conversations of Socrates into the form of dialogues. And when Pericles offered to provide for him, and invited him to come to him, he said that he would not sell his freedom of speech.

III. He is, as some people say, the first writer who turned Socrates' conversations into dialogues. When Pericles offered to support him and invited him to come by, he said he wouldn’t trade his freedom of speech.

IV. There was also another Simon, who wrote a treatise on Oratorical Art. And another, who was a physician in the time of Seleucus Nicanor. And another, who was a statuary.

IV. There was also another Simon, who wrote a treatise on Oratory. And another, who was a doctor during the time of Seleucus Nicanor. And another, who was a sculptor.

LIFE OF GLAUCO.

Glauco was an Athenian; and there are nine dialogues of his extant, which are all contained in one volume. The Phidylus; the Euripides; the Amyntichias; the Euthias; the Lysithides; the Aristophanes; the Cephalus; the Anaxiphemus; the Menexenus. There are thirty-two others which go under his name, but they are spurious.

Glauco was an Athenian, and there are nine of his dialogues still available, all in one volume. The Phidylus, the Euripides, the Amyntichias, the Euthias, the Lysithides, the Aristophanes, the Cephalus, the Anaxiphemus, and the Menexenus. There are thirty-two other works attributed to him, but they are not genuine.

LIFE OF SIMIAS.

Simias was a Theban; and there are twenty-three dialogues of his extant, contained in one single volume. On Wisdom; on Ratiocination; on Music; on Verses; on Fortitude; on Philosophy; on Truth; on Letters; on Teaching; on Art; on Government; on what is Becoming; on what is Eligible, and what Proper to be Avoided; on A Friend; on Knowledge; on the Soul; on Living Well; on what is Possible; on Money; on Life; on what the Honourable is; on Industry; and on Love.

Simias was from Thebes, and we still have twenty-three of his dialogues, all in one volume. They cover topics like Wisdom, Reasoning, Music, Poetry, Courage, Philosophy, Truth, Letters, Teaching, Art, Government, Appropriateness, Preferences, Avoidance, Friendship, Knowledge, the Soul, Living Well, Possibility, Money, Life, Honor, Work, and Love.

LIFE OF CEBES.

Cebes was a Theban, and there are three dialogues of his extant. The Tablet; the Seventh; and the Phrynichus.

Cebes was from Thebes, and three of his dialogues still exist: The Tablet, the Seventh, and the Phrynichus.

LIFE OF MENEDEMUS.

I. This Menedemus was one of those who belonged to the school of Phædo; and he was one of those who are called Theopropidæ, being the son of Clisthenes, a man of noble family, but a poor man and a builder. And some say that he was a tent-maker, and that Menedemus himself learned both trades. On which account, when he on one occasion brought forward a motion for some decree, a man of the name of Alexinius attacked him, saying that a wise man had no need to draw a tent nor a decree.

I. This Menedemus was one of those who belonged to the school of Phædo; he was one of the Theopropidæ, the son of Clisthenes, a nobleman who was poor and worked as a builder. Some say he was a tent-maker, and that Menedemus learned both trades. Because of this, when he once proposed a motion for a decree, a man named Alexinius criticized him, saying that a wise man shouldn't need to draw up a tent or a decree.

II. But when Menedemus was sent by the Eretrians to Megara, as one of the garrison, he deserted the rest, and went to the Academy to Plato; and being charmed by him, he abandoned the army altogether. And when Asclepiades, the Phliasian, drew him over to him, he went and lived in Megara, near Stilpo, and they both became his disciples. And from thence they sailed to Elis, where they joined Anchipylus and Moschus, who belonged to Phædo’s school. And up to this time, as I have already mentioned in my account of Phædo,[106] they were called Eleans; and they were also called Eretrians, from the native country of Menedemus, of whom I am now speaking.

II. When Menedemus was sent by the Eretrians to Megara as part of the garrison, he deserted the others and went to the Academy to study under Plato. Captivated by him, he left the army completely. Later, when Asclepiades from Phlius attracted him, he moved to Megara to live near Stilpo, and they both became his students. From there, they traveled to Elis, where they joined Anchipylus and Moschus, who were part of Phædo’s school. Up to this point, as I have mentioned in my account of Phædo,[106] they were called Eleans; they were also referred to as Eretrians, named after Menedemus’s homeland, whom I am currently discussing.

III. Now Menedemus appears to have been a very severe and rigid man, on which account Crates, parodying a description, speaks of him thus:—

III. Menedemus seems to have been a very strict and harsh man, which is why Crates humorously mimics a description of him like this:—

And Asclepiades the sage of Phlius,
And the Eretrian bull.

And Timon mentions him thus:—

And Timon refers to him as:—

Rise up, you frowning, bristling, frothy sage.

And he was a man of such excessive rigour of principle, that when Eurylochus, of Cassandrea, had been invited by Antigonus, to come to him in company with Cleippides, a youth of Cyzicus, he refused to go, for he was afraid lest Menedemus should hear of it; for he was very severe in his reproofs, and very free spoken. Accordingly, when a young man behaved with boldness towards him, he did not say a word, but took a bit of stick and drew on the floor an insulting picture; until the young man, perceiving the insult that was meant in the presence of numbers of people, went away. And when Hierocles, the governor of the Piræus, attacked him in the temple of Amphiaraus, and said a great deal about the taking of Eretria, he made no other reply beyond asking him what Antigonus’s object was in treating him as he did.

And he was a man of such strict principles that when Eurylochus from Cassandrea was invited by Antigonus to join him along with Cleippides, a young man from Cyzicus, he refused to go because he was worried that Menedemus would hear about it. Menedemus was very harsh in his criticism and outspoken. So, when a young man acted arrogantly toward him, he didn’t say a word but picked up a stick and drew an insulting image on the floor. When the young man realized the insult in front of all those people, he left. Later, when Hierocles, the governor of the Piraeus, confronted him in the temple of Amphiaraus and talked a lot about the capture of Eretria, his only response was to ask Hierocles what Antigonus’s goal was in treating him like that.

On another occasion, he said to a profligate man who was giving himself airs, “Do not you know that the cabbage is not the only plant that has a pleasant juice, but that radishes have it also?” And once, hearing a young man talk very loudly, he said, “See whom you have behind you.” When Antigonus consulted him whether he should go to a certain revel, he made no answer beyond desiring those who brought him the message, to tell him that he was the son of a king. When a stupid fellow once said something at random to him, he asked him whether he had a farm; and when he said that he had, and a large stock of cattle, he said, “Go then and look after them; lest, if you neglect them, you lose them, and that elegant rusticity of yours with them.” He was once asked whether a good man should marry, and his reply was, “Do I seem to you to be a good man, or not?” and when the other[107] said he did; “Well,” said he, “and I am married.” On one occasion a person said that there were a great many good things, so he asked him how many; and whether he thought that there were more than a hundred. And as he could not bear the extravagance of one man who used frequently to invite him to dinner, once when he was invited he did not say a single word, but admonished him of his extravagance in silence, by eating nothing but olives.

On another occasion, he said to a lavish man who was acting superior, “Don’t you know that a cabbage isn’t the only plant with a tasty juice, but radishes have it too?” Once, when he overheard a young man speaking loudly, he pointed out, “Check who's behind you.” When Antigonus asked him if he should attend a certain party, he simply told those who brought the message to inform him that he was the son of a king. When a clueless guy made a random remark to him, he asked if he had a farm. The guy replied that he did, with a large herd of cattle, and he said, “Then go take care of them; otherwise, if you ignore them, you’ll lose them and that charming simplicity of yours along with them.” He was once asked if a good man should marry, and he responded, “Do I seem like a good man to you or not?” When the other person said he did, he replied, “Well, I am married.” On another occasion, someone claimed there were many good things, so he asked how many and if he thought there were more than a hundred. Unable to tolerate the absurdity of a man who often invited him to dinner, when he was invited once more, he didn’t say a word but silently criticized the man’s extravagance by eating nothing but olives.

IV. On account then of the great freedom of speech in which he indulged, he was very near while in Cyprus, at the court of Nicocreon, being in great danger with his friend Asclepiades. For when the king was celebrating a festival at the beginning of the month, and had invited them as he did all the other philosophers; Menedemus said, “If the assemblage of such men as are met here to-day is good, a festival like this ought to be celebrated every day: but if it is not good, even once is too often.” And as the tyrant made answer to this speech, “that he kept this festival in order to have leisure in it to listen to the philosophers,” he behaved with even more austerity than usual, arguing, even while the feast was going on, that it was right on every occasion to listen to philosophers; and he went on in this way till, if a flute-player had not interrupted their discussion, they would have been put to death. In reference to which, when they were overtaken by a storm in a ship, they say that Asclepiades said, “that the fine playing of a flute-player had saved them, but the freedom of speech of Menedemus had ruined them.”

IV. Because of the great freedom of speech he enjoyed, he came very close to getting into serious trouble in Cyprus at the court of Nicocreon, alongside his friend Asclepiades. When the king was celebrating a festival at the start of the month and had invited them, just like all the other philosophers, Menedemus remarked, “If the gathering of such esteemed individuals is good, then we should celebrate festivals like this every day; but if it’s not good, even once is too much.” The tyrant responded to this, saying that he hosted the festival so he could have time to listen to the philosophers. He acted even more seriously than usual, arguing during the feast that it was essential to listen to philosophers at all times. This continued until, if a flute-player hadn’t interrupted their discussion, they might have faced execution. Later, when they encountered a storm while on a ship, Asclepiades supposedly said, “It was the beautiful music of the flute-player that saved us, but it was Menedemus's freedom of speech that almost got us killed.”

V. But he was, they say, inclined to depart a good deal from the usual habits and discipline of a school, so that he never regarded any order, nor were the seats arranged around properly, but every one listened to him while lecturing, standing up or sitting down, just as he might chance to be at the moment, Menedemus himself setting the example of this irregular conduct.

V. But they say he often strayed from the usual rules and structure of a school, so he never followed any order, and the seats were never arranged properly. Everyone listened to him while he lectured, whether they were standing or sitting, depending on how he felt at the moment, with Menedemus himself setting the example for this unruly behavior.

VI. But in other respects, it is said that he was a nervous man, and very fond of glory; so that, as previously he and Asclepiades had been fellow journeymen of a builder, when Asclepiades was naked on the roof carrying mortar, Menedemus would stand in front of him to screen him when he saw any one coming.

VI. However, it's said that he was a nervous guy who really loved glory. So, back when he and Asclepiades were both apprentices for a builder, if Asclepiades was on the roof carrying mortar and was naked, Menedemus would stand in front of him to block his view whenever he saw someone approaching.

VII. When he applied himself to politics he was so nervous[108] that once, when setting down the incense, he actually missed the incense burner. And on one occasion, when Crates was standing by him, and reproaching him for meddling with politics, he ordered some men to put him in prison. But he, even then, continued not the less to watch him as he passed, and to stand on tiptoe and call him Agamemnon and Hegesipolis.

VII. When he got into politics, he was so nervous[108] that once, while trying to set down the incense, he completely missed the incense burner. One time, when Crates was next to him, criticizing him for getting involved in politics, he had some guys put him in prison. But even then, he still kept an eye on him as he walked by, standing on his tiptoes and calling him Agamemnon and Hegesipolis.

VIII. He was also in some degree superstitious. Accordingly, once, when he was at an inn with Asclepiades, and had unintentionally eaten some meat that had been thrown away, when he was told of it he became sick, and turned pale, until Asclepiades rebuked him, telling him that it was not the meat itself which disturbed him, but only the idea that he had adopted. But in other respects he was a high minded man, with notions such as became a gentleman.

VIII. He was somewhat superstitious. One time, while he was at an inn with Asclepiades, he accidentally ate some meat that had been discarded. When he found out, he got sick and went pale until Asclepiades scolded him, saying that it wasn’t the meat itself that upset him, but just the idea he had in his head. Besides that, he was a noble man, with values that suited a gentleman.

IX. As to his habit of body, even when he was an old man he retained all the firmness and vigour of an athlete, with firm flesh, and a ruddy complexion, and very stout and fresh looking. In stature he was of moderate size; as is plain from the statue of him which is at Eretria, in the Old Stadium. For he is there represented seated almost naked, undoubtedly for the purpose of displaying the greater part of his body.

IX. Regarding his physique, even in his old age he kept the strength and vitality of an athlete, with toned muscles, a healthy complexion, and a very robust and fresh appearance. He was of average height, as is evident from the statue of him located in Eretria, in the Old Stadium. There, he is shown sitting almost nude, clearly to showcase most of his body.

X. He was very hospitable and fond of entertaining his friends; and because Eretria was unhealthy, he used to have a great many parties, particularly of poets and musicians. And he was very fond of Aratus and Lycophon the tragic poet, and Antagoras of Rhodes. And above all he applied himself to the study of Homer; and next to him to that of the Lyric poets; then to Sophocles, and also to Achæus, to whom he assigned the second place as a writer of satiric dramas, giving Æschylus the first. And it is from Achæus that he quoted these verses against the politicians of the opposite party:—

X. He was very welcoming and loved having his friends over; since Eretria was unhealthy, he often hosted parties, especially for poets and musicians. He had a deep affection for Aratus, Lycophon the tragic poet, and Antagoras from Rhodes. Above all, he dedicated himself to studying Homer; after him, he focused on the Lyric poets, then Sophocles, and also Achæus, whom he ranked as the second-best writer of satirical plays, giving Æschylus the top spot. It is from Achæus that he quoted these lines against the politicians from the opposing party:—

A speedy runner once was overtaken
By weaker men than he. An eagle too,
Was beaten by a tortoise in a race.

And these lines are out of the satiric play of Achæus, called Omphale; so that they are mistaken who say that he had never read anything but the Medea of Euripides, which is found, they add, in the collection of Neophron, the Sicyonian.

And these lines are from the satirical play by Achæus, titled Omphale; so those who say that he only ever read the Medea by Euripides, which is included in Neophron’s collection from Sicyon, are wrong.

XI. Of masters of philosophy, he used to despise Plato and Xenocrates, and Paræbates of Cyrene; and admired no one but Stilpo. And once, being questioned about him, he said nothing more of him than that he was a gentleman.

XI. He used to look down on philosophers like Plato, Xenocrates, and Paræbates of Cyrene, and he admired no one except Stilpo. When asked about Stilpo, he simply said that he was a gentleman.

XII. Menedemus was not easy to be understood, and in his conversation he was hard to argue against; he spoke on every subject, and had a great deal of invention and readiness. But he was very disputatious, as Antisthenes says in his Successions; and he used to put questions of this sort, “Is one thing different from another thing?” “Yes.” “And is benefiting a person something different from the good?” “Yes.” “Then the good is not benefiting a person.” And he, as it is said, discarded all negative axioms, using none but affirmative ones; and of these he only approved of the simple ones, and rejected all that were not simple; saying that they were intricate and perplexing. But Heraclides says that in his doctrines he was a thorough disciple of Plato, and that he scorned dialectics; so that once when Alexinus asked him whether he had left off beating his father, he said, “I have not beaten him, and I have not left off;” and when he said further that he ought to put an end to the doubt by answering explicitly yes or no, “It would be absurd,” he rejoined, “to comply with your conditions, when I can stop you at the entrance.”

XII. Menedemus was hard to understand, and in conversations, he was tough to argue against; he could talk about any topic and was very inventive and quick-witted. However, he was quite argumentative, as Antisthenes mentions in his Successions; he would ask questions like, “Is one thing different from another thing?” “Yes.” “And is helping someone different from what is good?” “Yes.” “Then what is good isn’t helping someone.” He reportedly dismissed all negative statements, only using positive ones; and among those, he only accepted the simple ones and rejected everything else, claiming they were complicated and confusing. But Heraclides says that he was a true follower of Plato in his teachings and looked down on dialectics; so when Alexinus asked him if he had stopped beating his father, he replied, “I have not beaten him, and I have not stopped;” and when Alexinus pressed him to clarify with a straightforward yes or no, Menedemus shot back, “It would be ridiculous to follow your request when I can end the conversation right here.”

When Bion was attacking the soothsayers with great perseverance, he said that he was killing the dead over again. And once, when he heard some one assert that the greatest good was to succeed in everything that one desires; he said, “It is a much greater good to desire what is proper.” But Antigonus of Carystus, tells us that he never wrote or composed any work, and never maintained any principle tenaciously. But in cross-questioning he was so contentious as to get quite black in the face before he went away. But though he was so violent in his discourse, he was wonderfully gentle in his actions. Accordingly, though he used to mock and ridicule Alexinus very severely, still he conferred great benefits on him, conducting his wife from Delphi to Chalcis for him, as she was alarmed about the danger of robbers and banditti in the road.

When Bion was relentlessly challenging the soothsayers, he remarked that he was killing the dead all over again. One time, when he overheard someone claim that the greatest good was achieving everything one desires, he said, “It’s a much greater good to want what is right.” Antigonus of Carystus tells us that Bion never wrote or created any work, nor did he cling to any principle too tightly. However, during debates, he was so argumentative that he would turn quite red in the face before leaving. Despite his intense style of speaking, he was surprisingly gentle in his actions. So, even though he used to mock and criticize Alexinus harshly, he also did him a great favor by escorting his wife from Delphi to Chalcis, as she was terrified of the risk of robbers and bandits on the road.

XIII. And he was a very warm friend, as is plain from his attachment to Asclepiades; which was hardly inferior to the friendship of Pylades and Orestes. But Asclepiades was[110] the elder of the two, so that it was said that he was the poet, and Menedemus the actor. And they say that on one occasion, Archipolis bequeathed them three thousand pieces of money between them, they had such a vigorous contest as to which should take the smaller share, that neither of them would receive any of it.

XIII. He was a very close friend, as shown by his bond with Asclepiades, which was almost as strong as the friendship between Pylades and Orestes. However, Asclepiades was[110] the older of the two, leading people to say he was the poet and Menedemus the performer. It’s said that on one occasion, Archipolis left them three thousand coins to share, but they argued so passionately about who should take the smaller amount that neither of them ended up taking any of it.

XIV. It is said that they were both married; and that Asclepiades was married to the mother, and Menedemus to the daughter; and when Asclepiades’s wife died, he took the wife of Menedemus; and Menedemus, when he became the chief man of the state, married another who was rich; and as they still maintained one house in common, Menedemus entrusted the whole management of it to his former wife. Asclepiades died first at Eretria, being of a great age; having lived with Menedemus with great economy, though they had ample means. So that, when on one occasion, after the death of Asclepiades, a friend of his came to a banquet, and when the slaves refused him admittance, Menedemus ordered them to admit him, saying that Asclepiades opened the door for him, even now that he was under the earth. And the men who chiefly supported them were Hipponicus the Macedonian, and Agetor the Lamian. And Agetor gave each of them thirty minæ, and Hipponicus gave Menedemus two thousand drachmas to portion his daughters with; and he had three, as Heraclides tells us, the children of his wife, who was a native of Oropus.

XIV. It's said that both were married; Asclepiades was married to the mother and Menedemus to the daughter. When Asclepiades’s wife passed away, he married Menedemus’s wife. Later, when Menedemus became the leading figure in the state, he married someone else who was wealthy. Despite this, they still shared a household, and Menedemus put his ex-wife in charge of managing everything. Asclepiades died first in Eretria at an old age; he lived with Menedemus frugally, even though they had plenty of resources. So, one time, after Asclepiades’s death, a friend of his came to a party, and when the servants tried to deny him entry, Menedemus told them to let him in, claiming that Asclepiades would’ve welcomed him in, even from beyond the grave. The main supporters of both were Hipponicus the Macedonian and Agetor the Lamian. Agetor gave each of them thirty minæ, and Hipponicus gave Menedemus two thousand drachmas to help marry off his daughters; he had three, as Heraclides mentions, the children of his wife who was from Oropus.

XV. And he used to give banquets in this fashion:—First of all, he would sit at dinner, with two or three friends, till late in the day; and then he would invite in any one who came to see him, even if they had already dined; and if any one came too soon, they would walk up and down, and ask those who came out of the house what there was on the table, and what o’clock it was; and then, if there were only vegetables or salt fish, they would depart; but if they heard it was meat, they would go in. And during the summer, mats of rushes were laid upon the couches, and in winter soft cushions; and each guest was expected to bring a pillow for himself. And the cup that was carried round did not hold more than a cotyla. And the second course consisted of lupins or beans, and sometimes fruits, such as pears, pomegranates, pulse, and sometimes, by Jove, dried figs. And all these circumstances are detailed by Lycophron, in his satiric dramas, which[111] he inscribed with the name of Menedemus, making his play a panegyric on the philosopher. And the following are some of the lines:—

XV. He used to host dinners this way: first, he would sit at the table with two or three friends until late in the day. Then he’d invite anyone who came to visit, even if they had already eaten. If someone arrived too early, they would walk around and ask those leaving the house what was being served and what time it was. If they found out there were only vegetables or salted fish, they would leave; but if they heard there was meat, they would go in. In summer, mats made of rushes were placed on the couches, and in winter, soft cushions were used; each guest was expected to bring their own pillow. The cup that was passed around held no more than a small measure. The second course included lupins or beans, and occasionally fruits like pears, pomegranates, pulses, and, sometimes, dried figs. All these details are described by Lycophron in his satirical plays, which[111] he titled after Menedemus, turning the performance into a tribute to the philosopher. Here are some of the lines:—

After a temperate feast, a small-sized cup
Is handed round with moderation due;
And conversation wise makes the dessert.

XVI. At first, now, he was not thought much of, being called cynic and trifler by the Eretrians; but subsequently, he was so much admired by his countrymen, that they entrusted him with the chief government of the state. And he was sent on embassies to Ptolemy and Lysimachus, and was greatly honoured everywhere. He was sent as envoy to Demetrius; and, as the city used to pay him two hundred talents a year, he persuaded him to remit fifty. And having been falsely accused to him, as having betrayed the city to Ptolemy, he defended himself from the charge, in a letter which begins thus:—

XVI. At first, he wasn't regarded highly and was called a cynic and a lightweight by the Eretrians; but later, he gained so much respect from his fellow citizens that they entrusted him with the highest leadership in the state. He was sent on diplomatic missions to Ptolemy and Lysimachus, and was honored everywhere he went. He was sent as an envoy to Demetrius; and since the city used to pay him two hundred talents a year, he convinced him to reduce it by fifty. After being falsely accused of betraying the city to Ptolemy, he defended himself against the charges in a letter that begins as follows:—

“Menedemus to king Demetrius.—Health. I hear that information has been laid before you concerning us.” … And the tradition is, that a man of the name of Æschylus, who was one of the opposite party in the state, was in the habit of making these false charges. It is well known too that he was sent on a most important embassy to Demetrius, on the subject of Oropus, as Euphantus relates in his History.

“Menedemus to king Demetrius.—Greetings. I hear that you’ve been given information about us.” … It’s said that a man named Æschylus, who was part of the opposing faction in the government, often made these false accusations. It’s also well known that he was sent on a crucial mission to Demetrius regarding Oropus, as Euphantus mentions in his History.

XVII. Antigonus was greatly attached to him, and professed himself his pupil; and when he defeated the barbarians, near Lysimachia, Menedemus drew up a decree for him, in simple terms, free from all flattery, which begins thus:—

XVII. Antigonus was very fond of him and claimed to be his student; and when he defeated the barbarians near Lysimachia, Menedemus wrote a straightforward decree for him, free from any flattery, which starts like this:—

“The generals and councillors have determined, since king Antigonus has defeated the barbarians in battle, and has returned to his own kingdom, and since he has succeeded in all his measures according to his wishes, it has seemed good to the council and to the people.” … And from these circumstances, and because of his friendship for him, as shown in other matters, he was suspected of betraying the city to him; and being impeached by Aristodemus, he left the city, and returned to Oropus, and there took up his abode in the temple of Amphiaraus; and as some golden goblets which were there were lost, he was ordered to depart by a general vote of the Bœotians. Leaving Oropus, and being in a state of great despondency, he entered his country secretly; and taking with[112] him his wife and daughters, he went to the court of Antigonus, and there died of a broken heart.

“The generals and advisors have decided that since King Antigonus has defeated the barbarians in battle and returned to his own kingdom, and since he has achieved all his goals as he desired, it seemed right to the council and the people.” … Due to these circumstances, and because of his friendship with him, as shown in other matters, he was suspected of betraying the city to Antigonus; and being accused by Aristodemus, he left the city and returned to Oropus, taking refuge in the temple of Amphiaraus; and when some golden goblets went missing from there, he was ordered to leave by a unanimous decision of the Bœotians. After leaving Oropus, feeling extremely despondent, he secretly returned to his homeland; and taking his wife and daughters with him, he went to the court of Antigonus, where he died of a broken heart.

But Heraclides gives an entirely different account of him; saying, that while he was the chief councillor of the Eretrians, he more than once preserved the liberties of the city from those who would have brought in Demetrius the tyrant; so that he never could have betrayed the city to Antigonus, and the accusation must have been false; and that he went to the court of Antigonus, and endeavoured to effect the deliverance of his country; and as he could make no impression on him, he fell into despondency, and starved himself for seven days, and so he died. And Antigonus of Carystus gives a similar account: and Persæus was the only man with whom he had an implacable quarrel; for he thought that when Antigonus himself was willing to re-establish the democracy among the Eretrians for his sake, Persæus prevented him. And on this account Menedemus once attacked him at a banquet, saying many other things, and among them, “He may, indeed, be a philosopher, but he is the worst man that lives or that ever will live.”

But Heraclides tells a very different story about him, claiming that while he was the chief advisor to the Eretrians, he repeatedly defended the city's freedoms from those trying to bring in Demetrius the tyrant. So, he could never have betrayed the city to Antigonus; the accusation must have been false. He went to Antigonus's court and tried to secure his country's freedom, but after failing to make any impact, he fell into despair and fasted for seven days, which led to his death. Antigonus of Carystus shares a similar account, and Persæus was the only person he had a deep-seated conflict with. He believed that when Antigonus was willing to restore democracy for the Eretrians on his behalf, Persæus stopped him. Because of this, Menedemus once confronted him at a banquet, saying various things, including, “He may be a philosopher, but he is the worst person alive or that has ever lived.”

XVIII. And he died, according to Heraclides, at the age of seventy-four. And we have written the following epigram on him:—

XVIII. He died, according to Heraclides, at the age of seventy-four. And we have written the following poem about him:—

I’ve heard your fate, O Menedemus, that of your own accord,
You starved yourself for seven days and died;
Acting like an Eretrian, but not much like a man,
For spiritless despair appears your guide.

These men then were the disciples of Socrates, and their successors; but we must now proceed to Plato, who founded the Academy; and to his successors, or at least to all those of them who enjoyed any reputation.

These men were the disciples of Socrates and their successors; but now we need to move on to Plato, who founded the Academy, and to his successors, or at least to all of those who gained any recognition.


BOOK III.

LIFE OF PLATO.

I. Plato was the son of Ariston and Perictione or Potone, and a citizen of Athens; and his mother traced her family back to Solon; for Solon had a brother named Dropidas, who had a son named Critias, who was the father of Callæschrus, who was the father of that Critias who was one of the thirty tyrants, and also of Glaucon, who was the father of Charmides and Perictione. And she became the mother of Plato by her husband Ariston, Plato being the sixth in descent from Solon. And Solon traced his pedigree up to Neleus and Neptune. They say too that on the father’s side, he was descended from Codrus, the son of Melanthus, and they too are said by Thrasylus to derive their origin from Neptune. And Speusippus, in his book which is entitled the Funeral Banquet of Plato, and Clearchus in his Panegyric on Plato, and Anaxilides in the second book of his History of Philosophers, say that the report at Athens was that Perictione was very beautiful, and that Ariston endeavoured to violate her and did not succeed; and that he, after he had desisted from his violence saw a vision of Apollo in a dream, in consequence of which he abstained from approaching his wife till after her confinement.

I. Plato was the son of Ariston and Perictione, also known as Potone, and he was a citizen of Athens. His mother traced her lineage back to Solon; Solon had a brother named Dropidas, who had a son named Critias. That Critias was the father of Callæschrus, who was the father of another Critias, one of the thirty tyrants. He was also related to Glaucon, who was the father of Charmides and Perictione. Perictione became the mother of Plato through her husband Ariston, making Plato the sixth generation from Solon. Solon, in turn, traced his ancestry back to Neleus and Neptune. It's also said that on his father's side, he was descended from Codrus, the son of Melanthus, and Thrasylus claims they also originated from Neptune. Speusippus, in his book titled the Funeral Banquet of Plato, Clearchus in his Panegyric on Plato, and Anaxilides in the second book of his History of Philosophers, mention that people in Athens reported that Perictione was very beautiful, and that Ariston attempted to assault her but failed. After giving up on his violent intentions, he had a dream of Apollo, which led him to refrain from approaching his wife until after she gave birth.

II. And Plato was born, as Apollodorus says in his Chronicles, in the eighty-eighth Olympiad, on the seventh day of the month Thargelion, on which day the people of Delos say that Apollo also was born. And he died, as Hermippus says, at a marriage feast, in the first year of the hundred and eighth Olympiad, having lived eighty-one years. But Neanthes says that he was eighty-four years of age at his death. He is then younger than Isocrates by six years; for Isocrates was born in the archonship of Lysimachus, and Plato in that of Aminias, in which year Pericles died.

II. According to Apollodorus in his Chronicles, Plato was born in the eighty-eighth Olympiad, on the seventh day of the month Thargelion, which is also said to be the day Apollo was born, according to the people of Delos. He died, as Hermippus reports, at a wedding feast, in the first year of the hundred and eighth Olympiad, having lived for eighty-one years. However, Neanthes claims he was eighty-four years old when he died. This means he was six years younger than Isocrates, who was born during the archonship of Lysimachus, while Plato was born during the archonship of Aminias, the same year Pericles died.

III. And he was of the borough of Colytus, as Antileon tells us in his second book on Dates. And he was born, according to some writers, in Ægina, in the house of Phidiades[114] the son of Thales, as Phavorinus affirms in his Universal History, as his father had been sent thither with several others as a settler, and returned again to Athens when the settlers were driven out by the Lacedæmonians, who came to the assistance of the Æginetans. And he served the office of choregus at Athens, when Dion was at the expense of the spectacle exhibited, as Theodorus relates in the eighth book of his Philosophical Conversations.

III. He was from the borough of Colytus, as Antileon mentions in his second book on Dates. Some writers claim he was born in Ægina, in the house of Phidiades[114], the son of Thales, as Phavorinus states in his Universal History. His father had been sent there along with several others as settlers and returned to Athens when the settlers were expelled by the Lacedæmonians, who came to help the Æginetans. He also served as choregus in Athens when Dion funded the spectacle, as Theodorus notes in the eighth book of his Philosophical Conversations.

IV. And he had brothers, whose names were Adimantus and Glaucon, and a sister called Potone, who was the mother of Speusippus.

IV. He had brothers named Adimantus and Glaucon, and a sister named Potone, who was the mother of Speusippus.

V. And he was taught learning in the school of Dionysius, whom he mentions in his Rival Lovers. And he learnt gymnastic exercises under the wrestler Ariston of Argos. And it was by him that he had the name of Plato given to him instead of his original name, on account of his robust figure, as he had previously been called Aristocles, after the name of his grandfather, as Alexander informs us in his Successions. But some say that he derived this name from the breadth (πλατύτης) of his eloquence, or else because he was very wide (πλατὺς) across the forehead, as Neanthes affirms. There are some also, among whom is Dicæarchus in the first volume on Lives, who say that he wrestled at the Isthmian games.

V. He was educated in the school of Dionysius, who he mentions in his Rival Lovers. He also trained in gymnastics under the wrestler Ariston from Argos. It was Ariston who gave him the name Plato instead of his original name due to his strong build; he had originally been called Aristocles, after his grandfather, as Alexander mentions in his Successions. However, some say he got this name because of the breadth (πλατύτης) of his eloquence, or perhaps because he was very wide (πлаτὺς) across the forehead, as Neanthes claims. There are also those, including Dicæarchus in his first volume on Lives, who state that he competed in the Isthmian games.

VI. It is also said that he applied himself to the study of painting, and that he wrote poems, dithyrambics at first, and afterwards lyric poems and tragedies.

VI. It is also said that he focused on studying painting and that he wrote poems, starting with dithyrambs, and later created lyric poems and tragedies.

VII. But he had a very weak voice, they say; and the same fact is stated by Timotheus the Athenian, in his book on Lives. And it is said that Socrates in a dream saw a cygnet on his knees, who immediately put forth feathers, and flew up on high, uttering a sweet note, and that the next day Plato came to him, and that he pronounced him the bird which he had seen.

VII. But they say he had a really weak voice; Timotheus the Athenian mentions this too in his book about Lives. It's said that Socrates had a dream where he saw a swan on his knees, which suddenly grew feathers and flew up high, making a beautiful sound. The next day, Plato came to him, and Socrates identified him as the bird he had seen.

VIII. And he used to philosophize at first in the Academy, and afterwards in the garden near Colonus, as Alexander tells us in his Successions, quoting the testimony of Heraclitus; and subsequently, though he was about to contend for the prize in tragedy in the theatre of Bacchus, after he had heard the discourse of Socrates, he learnt his poems, saying:—

VIII. He initially shared his ideas at the Academy and later in the garden near Colonus, as Alexander mentions in his Successions, referencing Heraclitus; and then, even though he was preparing to compete for a prize in tragedy at the theater of Bacchus, after listening to Socrates, he reviewed his poems, saying:—

Vulcan, come here; for Plato wants your aid.

And from henceforth, as they say, being now twenty years old, he became a pupil of Socrates. And when he was gone, he attached himself to Cratylus, the disciple of Heraclitus, and to Hermogenes, who had adopted the principles of Parmenides. Afterwards, when he was eight and twenty years of age, as Hermodorus tells us, he withdrew to Megara to Euclid, with certain others of the pupils of Socrates; and subsequently, he went to Cyrene to Theodorus the mathematician; and from thence he proceeded to Italy to the Pythagoreans, Philolaus and Eurytus, and from thence he went to Eurytus to the priests there; and having fallen sick at that place, he was cured by the priests by the application of sea water, in reference to which he said:—

And from then on, as they say, now that he was twenty years old, he became a student of Socrates. Once he left, he connected with Cratylus, a student of Heraclitus, and Hermogenes, who had adopted Parmenides' teachings. Later, at the age of twenty-eight, as Hermodorus tells us, he moved to Megara to study with Euclid, along with some other students of Socrates; and after that, he traveled to Cyrene to visit the mathematician Theodorus; then he went to Italy to meet the Pythagoreans, Philolaus and Eurytus, and from there, he visited Eurytus and the local priests. While he was there, he got sick, but he was healed by the priests using seawater, to which he remarked:—

The sea doth wash away all human evils.

And he said too, that, according to Homer, all the Egyptians were physicians. Plato had also formed the idea of making the acquaintance of the Magi; but he abandoned it on account of the wars in Asia.

And he also said that, according to Homer, all the Egyptians were doctors. Plato had also thought about meeting the Magi, but he gave up on that due to the wars in Asia.

IX. And when he returned to Athens, he settled in the Academy, and that is a suburban place of exercise planted like a grove, so named from an ancient hero named Hecademus, as Eupolis tells us in his Discharged Soldiers.

IX. When he got back to Athens, he took up residence in the Academy, a gymnasium set up like a grove, named after an ancient hero called Hecademus, as Eupolis mentions in his Discharged Soldiers.

In the well-shaded walks, protected well
By Godlike Academus.

And Timon, with reference to Plato, says:—

And Timon, referring to Plato, says:—

A man did lead them on, a strong stout man,
A honeyed speaker, sweet as melody
Of tuneful grasshopper, who, seated high
On Hecademus’ tree, unwearied sings.

For the word academy was formerly spelt with E. Now our philosopher was a friend of Isocrates; and Praxiphanes composed an account of a conversation which took place between them, on the subject of poets, when Isocrates was staying with Plato in the country.

For the word academy was previously spelled with an E. Now, our philosopher was a friend of Isocrates, and Praxiphanes wrote about a conversation that happened between them regarding poets while Isocrates was visiting Plato in the countryside.

X. And Aristoxenus says that he was three times engaged in military expeditions; once against Tanagra; the second time against Corinth, and the third time at Delium; and that in the battle of Delium he obtained the prize of pre-eminent valour. He combined the principles of the schools of Heraclitus,[116] and Pythagoras and Socrates; for he used to philosophize on those things which are the subjects of sensation, according to the system of Heraclitus; on those with which intellect is conversant, according to that of Pythagoras; and on politics according to that of Socrates.

X. Aristoxenus mentions that he participated in military campaigns three times: first against Tanagra, second against Corinth, and third at Delium. In the battle of Delium, he received the award for outstanding bravery. He merged the ideas of the schools of Heraclitus, Pythagoras, and Socrates; he would philosophize about sensory experiences based on Heraclitus's approach, about intellectual matters according to Pythagorean principles, and about political issues in line with Socratic thought.

XI. And some people, (of whom Satyrus is one,) say that he sent a commission to Sicily to Dion, to buy him three books of Pythagoras from Philolaus for a hundred minæ; for they say that he was in very easy circumstances, having received from Dionysius more than eighty talents, as Onetor also asserts in his treatise which is entitled, Whether a wise Man ought to acquire Gains.

XI. Some people, like Satyrus, say that he sent a commission to Sicily to Dion to buy three books of Pythagoras from Philolaus for a hundred minæ. They claim he was well-off, having received more than eighty talents from Dionysius, as Onetor also mentions in his work titled, Whether a Wise Man Should Acquire Gains.

XII. And he was much assisted by Epicharmus the comic poet, a great part of whose works he transcribed, as Alcimus says in his essays addressed to Amyntas, of which there are four. And in the first of them he speaks as follows:—“And Plato appears to utter a great many of the sentiments of Epicharmus. Let us just examine. Plato says that that is an object of sensation, which is never stationary either as to its quality or its quantity, but which is always flowing and changing; as, for instance, if one take from any objects all number, then one cannot affirm that they are either equal, or of any particular things, or of what quality or quantity they are. And these things are of such a kind that they are always being produced, but that they never have any invariable substances.”

XII. He received a lot of help from Epicharmus the comic poet, a significant portion of whose works he copied, as Alcimus mentions in his essays addressed to Amyntas, of which there are four. In the first of these, he states: “Plato seems to express many of Epicharmus's ideas. Let’s take a closer look. Plato claims that what we perceive through our senses is never constant in quality or quantity; it's always in a state of flow and change. For instance, if we remove all numbers from any objects, we can’t assert that they are equal, or that they represent specific things, or what their quality or quantity might be. These elements are such that they are always being created, yet they never possess any fixed substance.”

But that is a subject for intellect from which nothing is taken, and to which nothing is added. And this is the nature of things eternal, which is always similar and the same. And, indeed, Epicharmus speaks intelligibly on the subject of what is perceived by the senses and by the intellect:—

But that's a topic for the mind that doesn't take anything away and doesn't add anything. This is the essence of eternal things, which are always consistent and unchanging. And, in fact, Epicharmus clearly discusses what can be perceived through the senses and through the intellect:—

A. But the great Gods were always present, nor
Did they at any moment cease to be;
And their peculiar likeness at all times
Do they retain, by the same principles.
B. Yet chaos is asserted to have been
The first existent Deity.
A. How is that possible?
For ’tis impossible that we should find
Any first principle arise from anything.
B. Is there then no first principle at all?
A. Nor second either in the things we speak of;
[117]
But thus it is—if to an even number,
Or e’en an odd one, if you so prefer it,
You add a unit, or if you deduct one,
Say will the number still remain the same?
B. Certainly not.
A. So, if you take a measurement
A cubit long, and add another cubit,
Or cut a portion off, the measure then
No longer is the same?
B. Of course, it isn't.
A. Now turn your eyes and thoughts upon mankind—
We see one grows, another perishes
So that they all exist perpetually
In a condition of transition. That
Whose nature changes must be different
At each successive moment, from the thing
It was before. So also, you and I
Are different people now from what we were
But yesterday; and then, again, to-morrow
We shall be different from what we’re now;
So that, by the same rule, we’re always different.

And Alcimus speaks as follows:—“The wise men say that the soul perceives some things by means of the body, as for instance, when it hears and sees; but that it also perceives something by its own power, without availing itself at all of the assistance of the body.” On which account existent things are divisible into objects of sensation and objects of understanding. On account of which Plato used to say, that those who wished to become acquainted with the principles of everything, ought first of all to divide the ideas as he calls them, separately, such as similarity, and unity, and multitude, and magnitude, and stationariness, and motion. And secondly, that they ought to form a notion of the honourable and the good, and the just, and things of that sort, by themselves, apart from other considerations. And thirdly, that they ought to ascertain the character of such ideas as are relative to one another, such as knowledge, or magnitude, or authority; considering that the things which come under our notice from partaking of their nature, have the same names that they have. I mean that one calls that just which partakes of the just; and that beautiful which partakes of the beautiful. And each of these primary species is eternal, and is to be understood by the intellect, and is not subject to the influence of external circumstances. On which account[118] he says, that ideas exist in nature as models; and that all other things are like them, and, as it were, copies of them. Accordingly Epicharmus speaks thus about the good, and about the ideas.

And Alcimus says: "Wise people say that the soul perceives some things through the body, like when it hears and sees; but it can also perceive some things entirely on its own, without any help from the body." Because of this, things can be divided into objects we can sense and objects we understand. This is why Plato often said that those who want to understand the principles of everything should first break down the ideas, as he called them, such as similarity, unity, multitude, magnitude, stillness, and motion. Secondly, they should develop a clear idea of what is honorable, good, just, and similar concepts, separate from other considerations. Thirdly, they should identify the nature of ideas that relate to one another, like knowledge, magnitude, or authority, understanding that things sharing a nature have the same names. For instance, we call something just if it participates in the just, and beautiful if it participates in the beautiful. Each of these primary categories is eternal, can be grasped by the intellect, and is not influenced by external factors. Therefore, he argues that ideas exist in nature as models, and that all other things resemble them, essentially being copies. In line with this, Epicharmus speaks about the good and the ideas.

A. Tell me, is flute-playing now a thing at all?
B. Of course it is.
A. Is man then playing the flute?
B. No, nothing of the sort.
A. Let’s see—
What is a flute-player? what think you now
Of him—is he a man, or is he not?
B. Of course he is a man.
A. Don't you think then
The case is just the same about the good.
That the good is something by itself, intrinsic
And he who’s learnt, does at once become
Himself a good man? just as he who’s learnt
Flute-playing is a flute-player; or dancing,
A dancer; weaving, a weaver. And in short,
Whoever learns an art, does not become
The art itself, but just an artist in it.

Plato, in his theory of Ideas, says, “That since there is such a thing as memory, the ideas are in existent things, because memory is only conversant about what is stable and enduring; and that no other thing is durable except ideas, for in what way,” he continues, “could animals be preserved, if they had no ideas to guide them, and if, in addition to them, they had not an intellect given to them by nature?” But as it is they recollect similitudes, and also their food, so as to know what kind of food is fit for them; which they learn because the notion of similarity is implanted naturally in every animal; owing to which notion they recognize those of the same species as themselves. What is it then that Epicharmus says?

Plato, in his theory of Ideas, says, “Since memory exists, the ideas are found in existing things because memory is only concerned with what is stable and lasting; and nothing else is enduring except ideas. For how,” he continues, “could animals survive if they had no ideas to guide them, and if they also didn’t have an intellect given to them by nature?” As it is, they remember similarities and also their food, so they know what kind of food is suitable for them; they learn this because the concept of similarity is naturally instilled in every animal, which is why they recognize others of the same species as themselves. So what is it that Epicharmus says?

Eumæus’ wisdom?—not a scanty gift
Appropriated to one single being;
But every animal that breathes and lives,
Has mind and intellect.—So if you will
Survey the facts attentively, you’ll find,
E’en in the common poultry yard, the hen
Brings not her offspring forth at first alive,
But sits upon her eggs, and by her warmth,
Cherishes them into life. And all this wisdom
She does derive from nature’s gift alone,
For nature is her only guide and teacher.

And in a subsequent passage he says:—

And in a later part, he says:—

There is no wonder in my teaching this,
That citizens please citizens, and seem
To one another to be beautiful:
And so one dog seems to another dog
The fairest object in the world; and so
One ox seems to another, ass to ass,
And swine to swine.

And these and similar speculations are examined and compared by Alcimus through four books, where he shows how much assistance Plato has derived from Epicharmus. And that Epicharmus himself was not indisposed to appreciate his own wisdom, one may learn from these lines, in which he predicts that there will arise some one to imitate him:—

And Alcimus explores and compares these and similar ideas in four books, where he highlights how much Plato has benefited from Epicharmus. You can also see that Epicharmus was aware of his own intelligence from these lines, where he predicts that someone will come along to imitate him:—

But as I think, I surely foresee this,
That these my words will be preserved hereafter
In many people’s recollection. And
Another man will come, who’ll strip my reasons
Of their poetic dress, and, clothing them
In other garments and with purple broidery
Will show them off; and being invincible,
Will make all rivals bow the knee to him.

XIII. Plato also appears to have brought the books of Sophron, the farce-writer,[31] to Athens, which were previously neglected; and to have availed himself of them in his Speculations on Morals: and a copy of them was found under his head.

XIII. Plato seems to have brought the works of Sophron, the farce-writer,[31] to Athens, which had been overlooked before; and he used them in his thoughts on morals: a copy of them was discovered under his head.

XIV. And Plato made three voyages to Sicily, first of all for the purpose of seeing the island and the craters of volcanoes, when Dionysius, the son of Hermocrates, being the tyrant of Sicily, pressed him earnestly to come and see him; and he, conversing about tyranny, and saying that that is not the best government which is advantageous for one individual alone, unless that individual is pre-eminent in virtue, had a quarrel with Dionysius, who got angry, and said, “Your words are those of an old dotard.” And Plato replied,[120] “And your language is that of a tyrant.” And on this the tyrant became very indignant, and at first was inclined to put him to death; but afterwards, being appeased by Dion and Aristomenes, he forebore to do that, but gave him to Pollis, the Lacedæmonian, who happened to have come to him on an embassy just at that time, to sell as a slave. And he took him to Ægina and sold him; and Charmander, the son of Charmandrides, instituted a capital prosecution against him, in accordance with the law which was in force, in the island of Ægina, that the first Athenian who landed on the island should be put to death without a trial; and he himself was the person who had originally proposed that law, as Phavorinus says, in his Universal History. But when some one said, though he said it only in joke, that it was a philosopher who had landed, the people released him. But some say that he was brought into the assembly and watched; and that he did not say a word, but stood prepared to submit to whatever might befall him; and that they determined not to put him to death, but to sell him after the fashion of prisoners of war. And it happened by chance that Anniceris, the Cyrenean, was present, who ransomed him for twenty minæ, or, as others say, for thirty, and sent him to Athens, to his companions, and they immediately sent Anniceris his money: but he refused to receive it, saying that they were not the only people in the world who were entitled to have a regard for Plato. Some writers again say, that it was Dion who sent the money, and that he did not refuse it, but bought him the garden in the Academy. And with respect to Pollis it is said that he was defeated by Chabrias, and that he was afterwards drowned in Helice, in consequence of the anger of the deity at his treatment of this philosopher. And this is the story told by Phavorinus in the first book of his Commentaries. Dionysius, however, did not remain quiet; but when he had heard what had happened he wrote to Plato not to speak ill of him, and he wrote back in reply that he had not leisure enough to think at all of Dionysius.

XIV. Plato made three trips to Sicily, primarily to explore the island and its volcanic craters, especially since Dionysius, the son of Hermocrates and the tyrant of Sicily, had urged him to visit. During their discussions about tyranny, Plato argued that the best government isn't one that benefits just one person, unless that person is exceptionally virtuous. This led to a conflict with Dionysius, who angrily remarked, “You sound like an old fool.” Plato retorted, “And you speak like a tyrant.” Dionysius became furious and initially considered killing him; however, thanks to Dion and Aristomenes calming him down, he ultimately decided against it. Instead, he handed Plato over to Pollis, a Spartan envoy who had arrived at that time, to be sold as a slave. Pollis took Plato to Ægina and sold him; Charmander, the son of Charmandrides, initiated a serious prosecution against him based on a law in Ægina that demanded the execution of any Athenian who first landed on the island without a trial. Ironically, he had proposed that law, as noted by Phavorinus in his Universal History. When someone jokingly mentioned that a philosopher had landed, the locals decided to set him free. However, some say he was brought before the assembly and observed silently, ready to accept whatever fate awaited him. They ultimately chose not to execute him, opting instead to sell him like a prisoner of war. By chance, Anniceris from Cyrene was there and paid twenty minæ, or according to some, thirty, to ransom him and sent him back to Athens. Plato's companions quickly sent Anniceris the money, but he refused it, stating that they weren't the only ones who should care for Plato. Others claim it was Dion who sent the money, which Plato accepted, using it to purchase a garden in the Academy. Regarding Pollis, it's said that he was defeated by Chabrias and later drowned in Helice, punished by the gods for his mistreatment of Plato. This account is relayed by Phavorinus in the first book of his Commentaries. However, Dionysius wasn't passive; upon hearing about the incident, he wrote to Plato asking him not to speak ill of him. Plato replied that he didn't have enough time to think about Dionysius at all.

XV. But he went a second time to Sicily to the younger Dionysius, and asked him for some land and for some men whom he might make live according to his own theory of a constitution. And Dionysius promised to give him some, but never did it. And some say that he was in danger[121] himself, having been suspected of exciting Dion and Theotas to attempt the deliverance of the island; but that Archytas, the Pythagorean, wrote a letter to Dionysius, and begged Plato off and sent him back safe to Athens. And the letter is as follows:—

XV. But he went to Sicily a second time to see the younger Dionysius and asked for some land and a few men so he could create his version of a constitution. Dionysius promised to give him some, but he never followed through. Some say he was in danger himself, having been suspected of encouraging Dion and Theotas to try to free the island; but Archytas, the Pythagorean, wrote a letter to Dionysius, asking him to let Plato go and sent him back safely to Athens. The letter is as follows:—

ARCHYTAS TO DIONYSIUS, GREETING.

“All of us who are the friends of Plato, have sent to you Lamiscus and Photidas, to claim of you this philosopher in accordance with the agreement which you made with us. And it is right that you should recollect the eagerness which you had to see him, when you pressed us all to secure Plato’s visit to you, promising to provide for him, and to treat him hospitably in every respect, and to ensure his safety both while he remained with you, and when he departed. Remember this too that you were very delighted indeed at his arrival, and that you expressed great pleasure at the time, such as you never did on any other occasion. And if any unpleasantness has arisen between you, you ought to behave with humanity, and restore the man unhurt; for by so doing you will act justly, and do us a favour.”

"All of us who are friends of Plato have sent Lamiscus and Photidas to ask you for this philosopher based on the agreement you made with us. You should remember how eager you were to see him when you urged us all to arrange for Plato's visit, promising to take care of him and treat him warmly in every way, and to ensure his safety while he was with you and when he left. Also, recall how delighted you were at his arrival and how you expressed great joy that you hadn’t shown on any other occasion. If there has been any conflict between you, you should act kindly and return the man unharmed; by doing so, you will be just and do us a favor."

XVI. The third time that he went to Sicily was for the purpose of reconciling Dion to Dionysius. And as he could not succeed he returned back to his own country, having lost his labour.

XVI. The third time he went to Sicily was to try to make peace between Dion and Dionysius. Since he was unsuccessful, he returned to his own country, feeling like his efforts were wasted.

XVII. And in his own country he did not meddle with state affairs, although he was a politician as far as his writings went. And the reason was, that the people were accustomed to a form of government and constitution different from what he approved of. And Pamphile, in the twenty-fifth book of his Commentaries, says that the Arcadians and Thebans, when they were founding a great city, appointed him its lawgiver; but that he, when he had ascertained that they would not consent to an equality of rights, refused to go thither.

XVII. In his own hometown, he didn’t get involved in politics, even though he was a politician through his writings. The reason was that the people were used to a form of government and constitution that he didn’t support. Pamphile, in the twenty-fifth book of his Commentaries, states that the Arcadians and Thebans, when they were establishing a great city, named him their lawgiver; however, when he realized they wouldn’t agree to equal rights for everyone, he refused to go there.

XVIII. It is said also, that he defended Chabrias the general, when he was impeached in a capital charge; when no one else of the citizens would undertake the task: and as he was going up towards the Acropolis with his client, Crobylus the sycophant met him and said, “Are you come to plead for another, not knowing that the hemlock of Socrates is waiting[122] also for you?” But he replied, “And also, when I fought for my country I encountered dangers: and now too I encounter them in the cause of justice and for the defence of a friend.”

XVIII. It's said that he defended Chabrias the general when he was accused of a serious crime, even when no other citizens were willing to take on the task. As he was heading up to the Acropolis with his client, Crobylus the snitch confronted him and said, “Are you here to advocate for someone else, not realizing that Socrates' hemlock is waiting for you too?” But he responded, “Just like when I fought for my country, I faced dangers then: and now I’m facing them for the sake of justice and to defend a friend.”

XIX. He was the first author who wrote treatises in the form of dialogues, as Phavorinus tells us in the eighth book of his Universal History. And he was also the first person who introduced the analytical method of investigation, which he taught to Leodamus of Thasos. He was also the first person in philosophy who spoke of antipodes, and elements, and dialectics, and actions (ποιήματα), and oblong numbers, and plane surfaces, and the providence of God. He was likewise the first of the philosophers who contradicted the assertion of Lysias, the son of Cephalus, setting it out word for word in his Phædrus. And he was also the first person who examined the subject of grammatical knowledge scientifically. And as he argued against almost every one who had lived before his time, it is often asked why he has never mentioned Democritus.

XIX. He was the first author to write treatises in the form of dialogues, as Phavorinus mentions in the eighth book of his Universal History. He was also the first person to introduce the analytical method of investigation, which he taught to Leodamus of Thasos. He was the first in philosophy to talk about antipodes, elements, dialectics, actions (ποιήματα), oblong numbers, plane surfaces, and the providence of God. Additionally, he was the first philosopher to challenge the claim made by Lysias, the son of Cephalus, presenting it word for word in his Phædrus. He was also the first to study the subject of grammatical knowledge scientifically. Since he argued against almost every thinker before him, people often wonder why he never mentioned Democritus.

XX. Neanthes of Cyzicus says, that when he came to the Olympic games all the Greeks who were present turned to look at him: and that it was on that occasion that he held a conversation with Dion, who was on the point of attacking Dionysius. Moreover, in the first book of the Commentaries of Phavorinus, it is related that Mithridates, the Persian, erected a statue of Plato in the Academy, and put on it this inscription, “Mithridates, the son of Rhodobates, a Persian, consecrated an image of Plato to the Muses, which was made by Silanion.”

XX. Neanthes of Cyzicus says that when he arrived at the Olympic games, all the Greeks present turned to look at him. It was at that moment that he had a conversation with Dion, who was about to attack Dionysius. Additionally, in the first book of the Commentaries of Phavorinus, it is mentioned that Mithridates, the Persian, erected a statue of Plato in the Academy, with this inscription: “Mithridates, the son of Rhodobates, a Persian, dedicated an image of Plato to the Muses, created by Silanion.”

XXI. And Heraclides says, that even while a young man, he was so modest and well regulated, that he was never once seen to laugh excessively.

XXI. Heraclides says that even as a young man, he was so modest and well-adjusted that he was never once seen to laugh too hard.

XXII. But though he was of such a grave character himself, he was nevertheless ridiculed by the comic poets. Accordingly, Theopompus, in his Pleasure-seeker, says:—

XXII. But even though he had such a serious character, he was still mocked by the comic poets. So, Theopompus, in his Pleasure-seeker, says:—

For one thing is no longer only one,
But two things now are scarcely one; as says
The solemn Plato.

And Anaxandrides in his Theseus, says:—

And Anaxandrides in his Theseus says:—

When he ate olives like our worthy Plato.

And Timon speaks of him in this way, punning on his name:—

And Timon talks about him like this, making a play on his name:—

As Plato placed strange platitudes on paper.[32]

Alexis says in his Meropis:—

Alexis says in his Meropis:—

You’ve come in time: since I’ve been doubting long,
And walking up and down some time, like Plato;
And yet have hit upon no crafty plan,
But only tir’d my legs.

And in his Ancylion, he says:—

And in his Ancylion, he says:—

You speak of what you do not understand,
Running about like Plato: hoping thus,
To learn the nature of saltpetre and onions.

Amphis says in his Amphicrates:—

Amphis says in his Amphicrates:—

A. But what the good is, which you hope to get
By means of her, my master, I no more
Can form a notion of, than of the good
Of Plato.
B. Listen up.

And in his Dexidemides he speaks thus:—

And in his Dexidemides he says this:—

O Plato! how your learning is confined
To gloomy looks, and wrinkling up your brows,
Like any cockle.

Cratinas in his Pseudypobolimæus, says:—

Cratinas in his Pseudypobolimæus says:—

You clearly are a man, endued with sense,
And so, as Plato says, I do not know;
But I suspect.

Alexis, in his Olympiodorus speaks thus:—

Alexis, in his Olympiodorus, says this:—

My mortal body became dry and withered:
But my immortal part rose to the sky.
Is not this Plato’s doctrine?

And in his Parasite he says:—

And in his Parasite he says:—

Or to converse alone, like Plato.

Anaxilas also laughs at him in his Botrylion, and Circe, and his Rich Women.

Anaxilas also mocks him in his Botrylion, and Circe, and his Wealthy Women.

XXIII. And Aristippus, in the fourth book of his treatise upon Ancient Luxury, says that he was much attached to a youth of the name of Aster, who used to study astronomy with him; and also to Dion, whom we have already mentioned.[124] And some say that he was also attached to Phædrus, and that the following epigrams which he wrote upon them are evidences of the love he felt for them:—

XXIII. Aristippus, in the fourth book of his work on Ancient Luxury, mentions that he was very fond of a young man named Aster, who studied astronomy with him; as well as Dion, whom we've already talked about.[124] Some also say that he had feelings for Phædrus, and that the following epigrams he wrote about them demonstrate the affection he had for them:—

My Aster, you’re gazing on the stars (ἀστέρες),
Would that I were the heavens, that so I might
Gaze in return with many eyes on thee.

Another of his epigrams is:—

Another one of his quotes is:—

Aster, you while among the living shone,
The morning star. But now that you are dead,
You beam like Hesperus in the shades below.

And he wrote thus on Dion:—

And he wrote this about Dion:—

Once, at their birth, the fates did destine tears
To be the lot of all the Trojan women.
And Hecuba, their Queen—to you, O Dion,
As the deserved reward for glorious deeds,
They gave extensive and illustrious hopes.
And now you lie beneath your native soil;
Honoured by all your countrymen, O Dion,
And loved by me with ardent, lasting love.

And they say that this epigram is inscribed upon his tomb at Syracuse. They say, also, that he was in love with Alexis, and with Phædrus, as I have already mentioned, and that he wrote an epigram on them both, which runs thus:—

And they say that this short poem is inscribed on his tomb in Syracuse. They also say that he was in love with Alexis and Phædrus, as I have already mentioned, and that he wrote a short poem about both of them, which goes like this:—

Now when Alexis is no longer aught,
Say only how beloved, how fair he was,
And every one does turn his eyes at once.
Why, my mind, do you show the dogs a bone?
You’re but preparing trouble for yourself:
Have we not also lost the lovely Phædrus!

There is also a tradition that he had a mistress named Archianassa, on whom he wrote the following lines:—

There’s also a story that he had a mistress named Archianassa, for whom he wrote these lines:—

I have a mistress fair from Colophon,
Archianassa, on whose very wrinkles
Sits genial love: hard must have been the fate,
Of him who met her earliest blaze of beauty,
Surely he must have been completely scorched.

He also wrote this epigram on Agathon:—

He also wrote this short poem about Agathon:—

While kissing Agathon, my soul did rise,
And hover’d o’er my lips; wishing perchance,
O’er anxious that it was, to migrate to him.

Another of his epigrams is:—

Another one of his quotes is:—

I throw this apple to you. And if you
Love me who love you so, receive it gladly,
And let me taste your lovely virgin charms.
Or if that may not be, still take the fruit,
And in your bosom cherish it, and learn
How fleeting is all gracefulness and beauty.

And another:—

And another one:—

I am an apple, and am thrown to you,
By one who loves you: but consent, Xanthippe;
For you and I shall both with time decay.

They also attribute to him the following epigram on the Eretrians who had been surprised in an ambuscade:—

They also credit him with the following saying about the Eretrians who were caught off guard in an ambush:—

We were Eretrians, of Eubœan race?
And now we lie near Susa, here entomb’d,
Far from my native land.

And this one also:—

And this one too:—

Thus Venus to the muses spoke:
Damsels submit to Venus’ yoke,
Or dread my Cupid’s arms.
Those threats, the Virgins nine replied,
May weigh with Mars, but we deride
Love’s wrongs, or darts, or charms.

Another is:—

Another is:—

A certain person found some gold,
Carried it off, and in its stead
Left a strong halter neatly roll’d.
The owner found his treasure fled;
And powerless to endure his fortune’s wreck,
Fitted the halter to his hapless neck.

XXIV. But Molon, who had a great dislike to Plato, says “There is not so much to wonder at in Dionysius being at Corinth, as in Plato’s being in Sicily.” Xenophon, too, does not appear to have been very friendlily disposed towards him: and accordingly they have, as if in rivalry of one another, both written books with the same title, the Banquet, the Defence of Socrates, Moral Reminiscences. Then, too, the one wrote the Cyropædia and the other a book on Politics; and Plato in his Laws says, that the Cyropædia is a mere romance, for that Cyrus was not such a person as he is described in that book. And though they both speak so much of Socrates, neither of[126] them ever mentions the other, except that Xenophon once speaks of Plato in the third book of his Reminiscences. It is said also, that Antisthenes, being about to recite something that he had written, invited him to be present; and that Plato having asked what he was going to recite, he said it was an essay on the impropriety of contradicting. “How then,” said Plato, “can you write on this subject?” and then he showed him that he was arguing in a circle. But Antisthenes was annoyed, and composed a dialogue against Plato, which he entitled Sathon; after which they were always enemies to one another; and they say that Socrates having heard Plato read the Lysis, said, “O Hercules! what a number of lies the young man has told about me.” For he had set down a great many things as sayings of Socrates which he never said.

XXIV. But Molon, who really disliked Plato, says, “There's not much to be surprised about with Dionysius being in Corinth, but it's surprising that Plato is in Sicily.” Xenophon doesn’t seem to have been very friendly toward him either: and so, as if in competition with one another, they both wrote books with the same title: the Banquet, the Defence of Socrates, Moral Reminiscences. Moreover, one wrote the Cyropædia and the other wrote a book on Politics; and Plato mentions in his Laws that the Cyropædia is just a story, because Cyrus wasn’t the person described in that book. Although they both talk a lot about Socrates, neither of them ever mentions the other, except that Xenophon refers to Plato once in the third book of his Reminiscences. It's also said that Antisthenes, when he was about to read something he had written, invited Plato to attend; when Plato asked what he was going to recite, Antisthenes replied that it was an essay on the wrongness of contradicting. “How can you write about that then?” Plato said, and then pointed out that he was arguing in circles. Antisthenes got irritated and wrote a dialogue against Plato called Sathon; from then on, they were always enemies. They say Socrates once heard Plato read the Lysis and exclaimed, “Oh Hercules! What a bunch of lies the young man has told about me.” He had written down many things as sayings of Socrates that he never actually said.

Plato also was a great enemy of Aristippus; accordingly, he speaks ill of him in his book on the Soul, and says that he was not with Socrates when he died, though he was in Ægina, at no great distance. He also had a great rivalry with Æschines, for that he had been held in great esteem by Dionysius, and afterwards came to want, and was despised by Plato, but supported by Aristippus. And Idomeneus says, that the speech which Plato attributes to Crito in the prison, when he counselled Socrates to make his escape, was really delivered by Æschines, but that Plato attributed it to Crito because of his dislike to the other. And Plato never makes the slightest mention of him in any of his books, except in the treatise on the Soul, and the Defence of Socrates.

Plato was also a major critic of Aristippus; as a result, he speaks poorly of him in his book on the Soul, stating that he wasn't with Socrates when he died, even though he was in Ægina, not far away. He had a significant rivalry with Æschines because Æschines was highly regarded by Dionysius but later fell into disrepute and was looked down upon by Plato, although Aristippus supported him. Idomeneus claims that the speech Plato attributes to Crito in prison, where he advises Socrates to escape, was actually delivered by Æschines, but Plato assigned it to Crito out of disdain for the latter. Furthermore, Plato never mentions Æschines in any of his works, except in the treatise on the Soul and the Defence of Socrates.

XXV. Aristotle says, that the treatises of Plato are something between poems and prose; and Phavorinus says, when Plato read his treatise on the Soul, Aristotle was the only person who sat it out, and that all the rest rose up and went away. And some say that Philip the Opuntian copied out the whole of his books upon Laws, which were written on waxen tablets only. Some people also attribute the Epinomis to him. Euphorion and Panætius have stated that the beginning of the treatise on the Republic was often altered and re-written; and that very treatise, Aristoxenus affirms, was found almost entire in the Contradictions of Protagoras; and that the first book he wrote at all was the Phædrus; and indeed that composition has a good many indications of a young composer. But Dicæarchus blames the whole style of that work as vulgar.

XXV. Aristotle says that Plato's writings are a mix of poetry and prose; and Phavorinus mentions that when Plato read his work on the Soul, Aristotle was the only one who stayed until the end, while everyone else got up and left. Some claim that Philip the Opuntian copied out all of his books on Laws, which were only written on wax tablets. Others also ascribe the Epinomis to him. Euphorion and Panætius noted that the beginning of the treatise on the Republic was frequently revised and rewritten; and that very work, Aristoxenus claims, was found almost complete in Protagoras's Contradictions; and that the first book he ever wrote was the Phædrus, which indeed shows several signs of a young writer. However, Dicæarchus criticizes the entire style of that work as being unrefined.

XXVI. A story is told, that Plato, having seen a man playing at dice, reproached him for it, and that he said he was playing for a trifle; “But the habit,” rejoined Plato, “is not a trifle.” On one occasion he was asked whether there would be any monument of him, as of his predecessors in philosophy? and he answered, “A man must first make a name, and the monument will follow.” Once, when Xenocrates came into his house, he desired him to scourge one of his slaves for him, for that he himself could not do it because he was in a passion; and that at another time he said to one of his slaves, “I should beat you if I were not in a passion.” Having got on horseback he dismounted again immediately, saying that he was afraid that he should be infected with horse-pride. He used to advise people who got drunk to look in the glass, and then they would abandon their unseemly habit; and he said that it was never decorous to drink to the degree of drunkenness, except at the festivals of the God who had given men wine. He also disapproved of much sleeping: accordingly in his Laws he says, “No one while sleeping is good for anything.” Another saying of his was, “That the pleasantest of all things to hear was the truth;” but others report this saying thus, “That the sweetest of all things was to speak truth.” And of truth he speaks thus in his Laws, “Truth, my friend, is a beautiful and a durable thing; but it is not easy to persuade men of this fact.”

XXVI. There's a story about Plato seeing a guy playing dice and criticizing him for it. The guy said he was playing for a small amount, to which Plato replied, “But the habit isn’t something small.” One time, he was asked if there would be any monument for him like there was for other philosophers, and he said, “A person must first earn a name, and the monument will come after.” Once, when Xenocrates visited him, he asked him to punish one of his slaves because he couldn’t do it himself since he was upset. At another time, he told one of his slaves, “I would hit you if I weren’t so mad.” After getting on a horse, he quickly got off again, saying he was worried he’d get too proud. He used to tell people who got drunk to look in the mirror, claiming it would make them stop their embarrassing behavior. He believed it was never appropriate to drink to the point of drunkenness, except during festivals for the God who provided wine. He also frowned upon excessive sleeping, stating in his Laws, “No one is good for anything while they’re sleeping.” Another phrase of his was that “the most pleasant thing to hear was the truth,” though others say it differently, stating, “the sweetest thing was to speak the truth.” In his Laws, he described truth as, “Truth, my friend, is a beautiful and lasting thing; but it’s not easy to convince people of this.”

XXVII. He used also to wish to leave a memorial of himself behind, either in the hearts of his friends, or in his books.

XXVII. He also wanted to leave a lasting memory of himself, either in the hearts of his friends or in his books.

XXVIII. He also used to travel a good deal as some authors inform us.

XXVIII. He also used to travel a lot, as some writers tell us.

XXIX. And he died in the manner we have already mentioned, in the thirteenth year of the reign of Philip of Macedon, as Phavorinus mentions in the third book of his Commentaries; and Theopompus relates that Philip on one occasion reproached him. But Myronianus, in his Resemblances, says that Philo mentions some proverbs that were in circulation about Plato’s lice; implying that he had died of that disease.

XXIX. He died as we’ve already mentioned, in the thirteenth year of Philip of Macedon’s reign, as Phavorinus notes in the third book of his Commentaries; and Theopompus reports that Philip once criticized him. However, Myronianus, in his Resemblances, states that Philo refers to some proverbs that were going around about Plato’s lice, suggesting that he had died from that illness.

XXX. He was buried in the Academy, where he spent the greater part of his time in the practice of philosophy, from which his was called the Academic school; and his[128] funeral was attended by all the pupils of that sect. And he made his will in the following terms:—“Plato left these things, and has bequeathed them as follows.—The farm in the district of the Hephæstiades, bounded on the north by the road from the temple of the Cephisiades, and on the south by the temple of Hercules, which is in the district of the Hephæstiades; and on the east by the estate of Archestratus the Phrearrian, and on the west by the farm of Philip the Chollidian, shall be incapable of being sold or alienated, but shall belong to my son Adimantus as far as possible. And so likewise shall my farm in the district of the Eiresides, which I bought of Callimachus, which is bounded on the north by the property of Eurymedon the Myrrhinusian, on the south by that of Demostratus of Xypeta, on the east by that of Eurymedon the Myrrhinusian, and on the west by the Cephisus;—I also leave him three minæ of silver, a silver goblet weighing a hundred and sixty-five drachms, a cup weighing forty-five drachms, a golden ring, and a golden ear-ring, weighing together four drachms and three obols. Euclides the stone-cutter owes me three minæ. I leave Diana her liberty. My slaves Tychon, Bictas, Apolloniades, and Dionysius, I bequeath to my son; and I also give him all my furniture, of which Demetrius has a catalogue. I owe no one anything. My executors shall be Sosthenes, Speusippus, Demetrius, Hegias, Eurymedon, Callimachus, and Thrasippus.” This was his will. And on his tomb the following epigrams were inscribed. First of all:—

XXX. He was buried in the Academy, where he spent most of his time practicing philosophy, which is why his school was called the Academic school; and his[128] funeral was attended by all his students. He wrote his will in these terms:—“Plato left these things and bequeathed them as follows.—The farm in the Hephæstiades district, bordered to the north by the road from the temple of the Cephisiades, to the south by the temple of Hercules in the Hephæstiades district; to the east by Archestratus the Phrearrian's estate, and to the west by Philip the Chollidian's farm, shall not be sold or transferred, but shall belong to my son Adimantus as much as possible. Likewise, my farm in the Eiresides district, which I bought from Callimachus, shall belong to him; it is bordered to the north by Eurymedon the Myrrhinusian's property, to the south by Demostratus of Xypeta's, to the east by Eurymedon the Myrrhinusian's, and to the west by the Cephisus;—I also leave him three minæ of silver, a silver goblet weighing one hundred sixty-five drachms, a cup weighing forty-five drachms, a golden ring, and a golden earring, together weighing four drachms and three obols. Euclides the stone-cutter owes me three minæ. I grant Diana her freedom. I bequeath my slaves Tychon, Bictas, Apolloniades, and Dionysius to my son, along with all my furniture, of which Demetrius has a list. I owe nothing to anyone. My executors shall be Sosthenes, Speusippus, Demetrius, Hegias, Eurymedon, Callimachus, and Thrasippus.” This was his will. And the following epigrams were inscribed on his tomb. First of all:—

Here, first of all men for pure justice famed,
And moral virtue, Aristocles lies;
And if there e’er has lived one truly wise,
This man was wiser still; too great for envy.

A second is:—

A second is:—

Here in her bosom does the tender earth
Embrace great Plato’s corpse.—His soul aloft
Has ta’en its place among the immortal Gods.
Ariston’s glorious son—whom all good men,
Though in far countries, held in love and honour,
Remembering his pure and god-like life.

There is another which is more modern:—

There is another that is more modern:—

A. Eagle, why fly you o’er this holy tomb?
Or are you on your way, with lofty wing,
To some bright starry domicile of the Gods?
B. I am the image of the soul of Plato,
And to Olympus now am borne on high;
His body lies in his own native Attica.

We ourselves also have written one epigram on him, which is as follows:—

We’ve also written one epigram about him, which goes like this:—

If fav’ring Phœbus had not Plato given
To Grecian lands, how would the learned God
Have e’er instructed mortal minds in learning?
But he did send him, that as Æsculapius
His son’s the best physician of the body,
So Plato should be of the immortal soul.

And others, alluding to his death:—

And others, referring to his death:—

Phœbus, to bless mankind, became the father
Of Æsculapius, and of god-like Plato;
That one to heal the body, this the mind.
Now, from a marriage feast he’s gone to heaven,
To realize the happy city there,
Which he has planned fit for the realms of Jove.

These then are the epigrams on him.

These are the epigrams about him.

XXXI. His disciples were, Speusippus the Athenian, Zenocrates of Chalcedon, Aristotle the Stagirite, Philip of Opus, Histiæus of Perinthus, Dion of Syracuse, Amyclus of Heraclea, Erastus and Coriscus of Sceptos, Timolaus of Cyzicus, Eudon of Lampsacus, Pithon and Heraclides of Æmus, Hippothales and Callippus, Athenians, Demetrius of Amphipolis, Heraclides of Pontus, and numbers of others, among whom there were also two women, Lasthenea of Mantinea, and Axiothea of Phlius, who used even to wear man’s clothes, as we are told by Dicæarchus. Some say that Theophrastus also was a pupil of his; and Chamælion says that Hyperides the orator, and Lycurgus, were so likewise. Polemo also asserts that Demosthenes was. Sabinus adds Mnesistratus of Thasos to the number, quoting authority for the statement in the fourth book of his Meditative Matter; and it is not improbable.

XXXI. His disciples included Speusippus from Athens, Zenocrates from Chalcedon, Aristotle from Stagira, Philip from Opus, Histiæus from Perinthus, Dion from Syracuse, Amyclus from Heraclea, Erastus and Coriscus from Sceptos, Timolaus from Cyzicus, Eudon from Lampsacus, Pithon and Heraclides from Æmus, Hippothales and Callippus, both from Athens, Demetrius from Amphipolis, Heraclides from Pontus, and many others, including two women, Lasthenea from Mantinea and Axiothea from Phlius, who reportedly wore men’s clothing, as noted by Dicæarchus. Some claim that Theophrastus was also one of his students, and Chamælion says that Hyperides the orator and Lycurgus were as well. Polemo also states that Demosthenes was among them. Sabinus adds Mnesistratus from Thasos to this list, citing authority for this claim in the fourth book of his Meditative Matter; and it seems quite likely.

XXXII. But as you, O lady, are rightly very much attached to Plato, and as you are very fond of hunting out in every quarter all the doctrines of the philosopher with great eagerness,[130] I have thought it necessary to subjoin an account of the general character of his lectures, and of the arrangement of his dialogues, and of the method of his inductive argument; going back to their elements and first principles as far as I could, so that the collection of anecdotes concerning his life which I have been able to make, may not be curtailed by the omission of any statement as to his doctrines. For it would be like sending owls to Athens, as the proverb is, if I were to descend to particular details.

XXXII. But since you, dear lady, are rightly very attached to Plato and you enjoy uncovering all of the philosopher's teachings with great enthusiasm,[130] I thought it was important to provide an overview of his lectures, the structure of his dialogues, and the approach of his inductive reasoning; tracing back to their basic elements and foundational principles as much as I could, so that the collection of anecdotes about his life I've gathered is not incomplete in terms of his teachings. Because it would be like sending owls to Athens, as the saying goes, if I got into specific details.

They say now, that Zeno, the Eleatic, was the first person who composed essays in the form of dialogue. But Aristotle, in the first book of his treatise on Poets, says that Alexamenus, a native of Styra, or Teos, did so before him, as Phavorinus also says in his Commentaries. But it seems to me that Plato gave this kind of writing the last polish, and that he has therefore, a just right to the first honour, not only as the improver, but also as inventor of that kind of writing. Now, the dialogue is a discourse carried on by way of question and answer, on some one of the subjects with which philosophy is conversant, or with which statesmanship is concerned, with a becoming attention to the characters of the persons who are introduced as speakers, and with a careful selection of language governed by the same consideration. And dialectics is the art of conversing, by means of which we either overturn or establish the proposition contended for, by means of the questions and answers which are put in the mouths of the parties conversing. Now, of the Platonic discourse there are two characteristics discernible on the very surface; one fitted for guiding, the other for investigating.

They say that Zeno from Elea was the first person to write essays in dialogue form. However, Aristotle, in the first book of his work on Poets, claims that Alexamenus, who was from Styra or Teos, did this before him, as Phavorinus mentions in his Commentaries. It seems to me that Plato really refined this type of writing, and therefore, he rightfully deserves the first honor, not just as an improver but also as the inventor of this style. A dialogue is a conversation conducted through questions and answers, focusing on subjects related to philosophy or politics, paying attention to the characters of the speakers, and carefully choosing language with the same consideration. Dialectics is the art of conversation, through which we either prove or disprove a proposed argument using the questions and answers exchanged between the conversing parties. In Platonic dialogue, you can clearly see two main characteristics: one aimed at guiding and the other aimed at investigating.

The first of these has two subordinate species, one speculative, the other practical; and of these two again, the speculative is divided into the natural and the logical, and the practical into the ethical and the political. Again, the kind fitted for investigating has also two primary divisions with their separate characteristics, one object of which is simply practice, the other being also disputatious: and the first of these two is again subdivided into two; one of which may be compared to the art of the midwife, and the other is as it were tentative; the disputatious one is also divided into the demonstrative and the distinctive.

The first category has two subcategories: one is speculative and the other is practical. Within these, the speculative is broken down into natural and logical, while the practical divides into ethical and political. Additionally, the part focused on investigation has its own two main divisions, each with distinct characteristics. One of these focuses purely on practice, while the other involves debate. The practice-oriented division is further split into two parts: one is similar to the work of a midwife, and the other is more exploratory. The debate-focused division is also divided into demonstrative and distinctive.

But we are not unaware that some writers distinguish the[131] various dialogues in a different manner from what we do. For they say that some of them are dramatic, and others narrative, and others of a mixed nature. But they, in this division, are classifying the dialogues in a theatrical rather than in a philosophical manner. Some of the dialogues also refer to subjects of natural philosophy, such as the Timæus. Of the logical class, there are the Politics, the Cratylus, the Parmenides, and the Sophist. Of the ethical kind there is the defence of Socrates, the Crito, the Phædo, the Phædrus, the Banquet, the Menexenus, the Clitophon, the Epistles, the Philebus, the Hipparchus, and the Rival Lovers. Of the political class there is the Republic, the Laws, the Minos, the Epinomis, and the Atlanticus. Of the midwife description we have the two Alcibiades’s, the Theages, the Lysis, the Laches. Of the tentative kind, there is the Euthyphro, the Meno, the Ion, the Charmides, and the Theætetus. Of the demonstrative description, we have the Protagoras, and of the distinctive class the Euthydemus, the two Hippias’s, and the Gorgias. And this is enough to say about the dialogues as to what they are, and what their different kinds are.

But we know that some writers categorize the[131] various dialogues differently than we do. They claim that some are dramatic, others are narrative, and some are a mix of both. However, their classification is based more on theatrical elements than philosophical ones. Some dialogues also address topics in natural philosophy, like the Timæus. For the logical category, we have the Politics, the Cratylus, the Parmenides, and the Sophist. The ethical category includes the defense of Socrates, the Crito, the Phædo, the Phædrus, the Banquet, the Menexenus, the Clitophon, the Epistles, the Philebus, the Hipparchus, and the Rival Lovers. In the political category, there are the Republic, the Laws, the Minos, the Epinomis, and the Atlanticus. The midwife type includes the two Alcibiades, the Theages, the Lysis, and the Laches. For the tentative type, we have the Euthyphro, the Meno, the Ion, the Charmides, and the Theætetus. The demonstrative type consists of the Protagoras, while the distinctive category includes the Euthydemus, the two Hippias, and the Gorgias. And that covers what we need to say about the dialogues and their various types.

XXXIII. But since there is also a great division of opinion respecting them, from some people asserting that in them Plato dogmatizes in a positive manner, while others deny this, we had better also touch upon this part of the question. Now, dogmatizing is laying down dogmas, just as legislating is making laws. But the word dogma is used in two senses; to mean both that which we think, and opinion itself. Now of these, that which we think is the proposition, and opinion is the conception by which we entertain it in our minds. Plato then explains the opinions which he entertains himself, and refutes false ones; and about doubtful matters he suspends his judgment. His opinions of matters as they appear to him he puts into the mouth of four persons, Socrates, Timæus, an Athenian poet, and an Eleatic stranger. But the strangers are not, as some people have supposed, Plato and Parmenides, but certain nameless imaginary characters. Since Plato asserts as undeniable axioms all the opinions which he puts into the mouth of Socrates or Timæus. But when he is refuting false propositions, he introduces such characters as Thrasymachus, and Callicles, and Polus, and Gorgias, and Protagoras, Hippias too, and Euthydemus, and men of that stamp. But when[132] he is demonstrating anything, then he chiefly uses the inductive form of argument, and that too not of one kind only, but of two. For induction is an argument, which by means of some admitted truths establishes naturally other truths which resemble them. But there are two kinds of induction; the one proceeding from contraries, the other from consequents. Now, the one which proceeds from contraries, is one in which from the answer given, whatever that answer may be, the contrary of the principle indicated in the question must follow. As for instance. My father is either a different person from your father, or he is the same person. If now your father is a different person from my father, then as he is a different person from a father, he cannot be a father. If, on the other hand, he is the same person as my father, then, since he is the same person as my father, he must be my father. And again, if man be not an animal, he must be either a stone or a piece of wood; but he is not a stone or a piece of wood, for he is a living animal, and capable of independent motion. Therefore, he is an animal. But, if he is an animal, and a dog or an ox is likewise an animal, then man must be an animal, and a dog, and an ox.—This then is the method of induction in contradiction and contention, which Plato was accustomed to employ, not for the purpose of establishing principles of his own, but with the object of refuting the arguments of others.

XXXIII. There is a lot of disagreement about this topic. Some people claim that Plato teaches definitively, while others argue the opposite. So, we should also address this aspect of the discussion. To dogmatize means to assert beliefs, just as legislating means to create laws. However, the term "dogma" has two meanings: it refers both to what we believe and to opinion itself. Among these, what we believe is the proposition, while opinion is the way we understand that proposition in our minds. Plato explains the opinions he holds and counters false ones; for uncertain issues, he holds back on making a judgment. He presents his opinions through four characters: Socrates, Timaeus, an Athenian poet, and a stranger from Elea. However, these strangers are not, as some believe, Plato and Parmenides, but rather unnamed fictional characters. Plato presents the opinions voiced by Socrates or Timaeus as undeniable truths. When he counters false propositions, he introduces characters like Thrasymachus, Callicles, Polus, Gorgias, Protagoras, Hippias, Euthydemus, and others like them. When demonstrating points, he primarily uses induction as an argument, and he employs two different kinds. Induction is an argument that uses accepted truths to establish other related truths. There are two types of induction: one that comes from opposites and the other from consequences. The type that comes from opposites means that whatever answer is given, the opposite of the principle in the question must follow. For example, my father is either a different person from your father or he is the same person. If your father is a different person from mine, then, as he is not my father, he cannot be a father. On the other hand, if he is the same person as my father, then he must be my father. Again, if a man is not an animal, he must be either a stone or a piece of wood. But since he is neither, being a living creature capable of movement, he is an animal. Moreover, since a dog or an ox is also an animal, then a man must be an animal and also a dog, and an ox. This is the method of induction using contradiction and debate that Plato often used, not to establish his own principles, but to refute the arguments of others.

Now, the inductive kind of argument drawn from consequents is of a twofold character. The one proving a particular opinion by an admitted fact of an equally particular nature; or else going from particulars to generals. And the first of these two divisions is the oratorical one, the second the dialectic one. As for instance, in the former kind the question is whether this person has committed a murder; the proof is that he was found at the time covered with blood. But this is the oratorical method of employing the induction; since oratory is conversant about particulars, and does not concern itself about generals. For its object is not to ascertain abstract justice, but only particular justice. The other is the dialectic kind, the general proposition having been established by particular ones. As for instance, the question is whether the soul is immortal, and whether the living consist of those who have once been dead; and this proposition[133] Plato establishes in his book on the Soul, by a certain general proposition, that contraries arise out of contraries; and this identical general proposition is established by certain particular ones. As, for instance, that sleep follows on waking, and waking from sleeping, and the greater from the less, and reversely the less from the greater. And this kind of induction he used to employ for the establishment of his own opinions.

Now, the inductive arguments based on outcomes have two main types. One proves a specific opinion through a recognized fact that is also specific; the other moves from specific cases to general principles. The first type is the oratorical method, while the second is the dialectic method. For example, in the first type, the issue is whether someone committed murder; the evidence is that they were found covered in blood. This is the oratorical way of using induction because oratory focuses on specifics and doesn’t deal with broader concepts. Its goal is not to discover abstract justice but rather to determine specific justice. The other type is dialectic, where a general statement is supported by specific examples. For instance, the question is whether the soul is immortal and whether living beings consist of those who have once died; Plato discusses this idea in his book on the Soul. He establishes a general principle that opposites come from opposites, which is supported by various specific examples such as sleep following wakefulness, wakefulness coming from sleep, the greater arising from the lesser, and vice versa. He often used this kind of induction to support his own views.

XXXIV. Anciently, in tragedy, it was only the chorus who did the whole work of the play; but subsequently, Thespis introduced one actor for the sake of giving the chorus some rest, and Æschylus added a second, and Sophocles a third, and so they made tragedy complete. So in the same manner, philosophical discourse was originally uniform, concerning itself solely about natural philosophy; then Socrates added to it a second character, the ethical: and Plato a third, the dialectic: and so he brought philosophy to perfection.

XXXIV. In ancient times, the chorus was the only one performing in plays; later on, Thespis brought in one actor to give the chorus a break, and then Æschylus added a second actor, followed by Sophocles who introduced a third, completing the form of tragedy. Similarly, philosophical discussion was initially focused only on natural philosophy; then Socrates contributed a second aspect, the ethical, and Plato added a third, the dialectical, perfecting the field of philosophy.

XXXV. But Thrasybulus says that he published his dialogues as the dramatic poets published their tetralogies. For, they contended with four plays, (and at four festivals, the Dionysiac, the Lenæan, the Panathenæan, and the Chytri), one of which was a satiric drama, and the whole four plays were called a tetralogy. Now, people say, the whole of his genuine dialogues amount to fifty-six; the treatise on the Republic being divided into ten books, (which Phavorinus, in the second book of his Universal History, says may be found almost entire in the Contradictions of Protagoras), and that on Laws into twelve. And there are nine tetralogies, if we consider the Republic as occupying the place of one book, and the Laws of another. He arranges, therefore, the first tetralogy of these dialogues which have a common subject, wishing to show what sort of life that of the philosopher may have been. And he uses two titles for each separate book, taking one from the name of the principal speaker, and the other from the subject.

XXXV. But Thrasybulus claims that he published his dialogues like the dramatic poets published their tetralogies. They competed with four plays at four festivals—the Dionysiac, the Lenæan, the Panathenæan, and the Chytri—with one of those being a satirical drama, and the complete set was called a tetralogy. Now, they say that all of his authentic dialogues add up to fifty-six; the work on the Republic is divided into ten books (which Phavorinus mentions in the second book of his Universal History, noting that it can be found almost in full in the Contradictions of Protagoras), and the one on Laws contains twelve. There are nine tetralogies if we consider the Republic as one book and the Laws as another. He thus organizes the first tetralogy of these dialogues with a common theme, hoping to illustrate what kind of life a philosopher might have led. He gives two titles for each separate book, using one from the name of the main speaker and the other from the subject matter.

This tetralogy then, which is the first, is commenced by the Euthyphron, or what is Holy; and that dialogue is a tentative one. The second is the Defence of Socrates, a moral one. The third is the Criton, or What is to be done, a moral one. The fourth is the Phædo, or the Dialogue on the Soul, a moral one.

This tetralogy, which is the first, begins with the Euthyphro, or what is Holy, and that dialogue is exploratory. The second is the Defense of Socrates, which is moral. The third is the Crito, or What Should Be Done, also a moral dialogue. The fourth is the Phaedo, or the Dialogue About the Soul, which is moral as well.

The second tetralogy is that of which the first piece is the Cratylus, or the correctness of names, a logical one. The Theætetus, or Knowledge, a tentative one. The Sophist, or a dialogue on the Existent, a logical one. The Statesman, or a dialogue of Monarchy, a logical one.

The second set of four is the one in which the first work is the Cratylus, which discusses the accuracy of names, and is logical in nature. The Theætetus, or Knowledge, explores ideas tentatively. The Sophist, which is a dialogue about existence, is also logical. The Statesman, a dialogue about monarchy, is likewise logical.

The first dialogue in the third tetralogy is the Parmenides, or a dialogue of Ideas, a logical one. The second is the Philebus, or on Pleasure, a moral one. The Banquet, or on the Good, a moral one. The Phædrus, or on Love, a moral one.

The first dialogue in the third tetralogy is the Parmenides, or a dialogue about Ideas, which is logical. The second is the Philebus, or a discussion on Pleasure, which is moral. The Banquet, or a conversation about the Good, is also moral. The Phædrus, or a discussion on Love, is moral as well.

The fourth tetralogy opens with the Alcibiades, or a treatise on the Nature of Man, a midwife-like work. The second Alcibiades, or on Prayer, a piece of the same character. The Hipparchus, or on the Love of Gain, a moral one. The Rival Lovers, or a treatise on Philosophy, a moral one.

The fourth tetralogy starts with the Alcibiades, or a discussion on the Nature of Man, a work that serves as a guide. The second Alcibiades, or on Prayer, is a similar piece. The Hipparchus, or on the Love of Gain, is a moral work. The Rival Lovers, or a discussion on Philosophy, is also a moral one.

The first dialogue in the fifth is the Theages, or another treatise on Philosophy, another midwife-like work. The Charmides, or on Temperance, a tentative essay. The Laches, or on Manly Courage, midwife-like. The Lysis, or a dissertation on Friendship, also midwife-like.

The first conversation in the fifth is the Theages, or another piece on Philosophy, another work that brings ideas to life. The Charmides, or on Temperance, a preliminary exploration. The Laches, or on Manly Courage, similarly a guiding work. The Lysis, or a discussion on Friendship, also serves a similar purpose.

The sixth tetralogy commences with the Euthydemus, or the Disputatious Man, a distinctive dialogue. Then comes the Protagoras, or the Sophists, a demonstrative one. The Gorgias, or a dissertation on Rhetoric, another distinctive one. And the Meno, or on Virtue, a tentative dialogue.

The sixth set of four plays starts with the Euthydemus, or the Disputatious Man, which is a unique dialogue. Next is the Protagoras, or the Sophists, which is more of a showcase. Then there's the Gorgias, or a discussion on Rhetoric, another unique piece. Finally, we have the Meno, or a conversation on Virtue, which is more exploratory.

The seventh begins with the two Hippias’s. The first being a dissertation on the Beautiful, the second one on Falsehood, both distinctive. The third is the Ion, or a dissertation on the Iliad, a tentative one. The fourth is the Menexenus, or the Funeral Oration, a moral one.

The seventh starts with the two Hippias works. The first is an essay on Beauty, and the second is one on Deception, both unique in their own right. The third is the Ion, which is an exploration of the Iliad, somewhat tentative. The fourth is the Menexenus, or the Funeral Oration, which carries a moral message.

The first dialogue in the eighth is the Clitophon, or the Exhortation, a moral piece. Then comes the Republic, or the treatise on Justice, a political one. The Timæus, or a dissertation on Nature, a dialogue on Natural Philosophy. And the Critias, or Atlanticus, a moral one.

The first dialogue in the eighth is the Clitophon, or the Exhortation, a moral piece. Then comes the Republic, or the treatise on Justice, a political one. The Timæus, or a dissertation on Nature, is a dialogue on Natural Philosophy. Lastly, there's the Critias, or Atlanticus, which is also a moral piece.

The ninth begins with the Minos, or a treatise on Law, a political work. The Laws, or a dissertation on Legislation, another political work. The Epinomis, or the Nocturnal Conversation, or the Philosopher, a third political one.

The ninth starts with the Minos, a discussion on Law, which is a political work. The Laws, a written piece on Legislation, is another political work. The Epinomis, also known as the Nocturnal Conversation, or the Philosopher, is a third political work.

XXXVI. And this last tetralogy is completed by thirteen epistles, all moral; to which is prefixed as a motto, εὖ πράττειν,[135] just as Epicurus inscribed on his εὖ διάγειν, and Cleon on his χαίρειν. They are, one letter to Aristodemus, two to Archytas, four to Dionysius, one to Hermeias, Erastus, and Coriscus, one to Leodamas, one to Dion, one to Perdiccas, and two to the friends of Dion.

XXXVI. This final tetralogy is completed by thirteen moral letters, which are introduced with the motto, εὖ πράττειν,[135] just like Epicurus wrote on his εὖ διάγειν, and Cleon on his χαίρειν. They include one letter to Aristodemus, two to Archytas, four to Dionysius, one to Hermeias, Erastus, and Coriscus, one to Leodamas, one to Dion, one to Perdiccas, and two to the friends of Dion.

XXXVII. And this is the way in which some people divide his works. But others, among whom is Aristophanes, the grammarian, arrange his dialogues in trilogies; and they make the first to consist of the Republic, the Timæus and the Critias.

XXXVII. And this is how some people categorize his works. But others, including Aristophanes, the grammarian, organize his dialogues into trilogies; they consider the first trilogy to include the Republic, the Timæus, and the Critias.

The second of the Sophist, the Statesman, the Cratylus.

The second of the Sophist, the Statesman, the Cratylus.

The third of the Laws, the Minos, the Epinomis.

The third of the Laws, the Minos, the Epinomis.

The fourth of the Theætetus, the Euthyphro, the Defence of Socrates.

The fourth of Theætetus, Euthyphro, and the Defense of Socrates.

The fifth of the Crito, the Phædo, the Epistles.

The fifth of the Crito, the Phaedo, the Letters.

And the rest they arrange singly and independently, without any regular order. And some authors, as has been said already, place the Republic at the head of his works: others begin with the Greater Alcibiades: others with the Theages; some with the Euthyphro, others with the Clitophon; some with the Timæus, some with the Phædrus, others again with the Theætetus. Many make the Defence of Socrates the first piece.

And the rest are organized one by one, without any specific order. Some authors, as mentioned before, put the Republic at the beginning of his works; others start with the Greater Alcibiades, some with the Theages, a few with the Euthyphro, others with the Clitophon, some with the Timæus, some with the Phædrus, and others again with the Theætetus. Many choose the Defence of Socrates as the first piece.

There are some dialogues attributed to him which are confessedly spurious. The Midon, or the Horse-breeder; the Eryxias, or Erasistratus; the Alcyon; the Acephali, or Sisyphi; the Axiochus; the Phæacians; the Demodorus; the Chelidon; the Seventh; the Epimenides. Of which the Alcyon is believed to be the work of a man named Leon; as Phavorinus tells us in the seventh book of his Commentaries.

There are some dialogues falsely attributed to him. These include the Midon, or the Horse-breeder; the Eryxias, or Erasistratus; the Alcyon; the Acephali, or Sisyphi; the Axiochus; the Phæacians; the Demodorus; the Chelidon; the Seventh; and the Epimenides. The Alcyon is thought to be written by a person named Leon, as Phavorinus mentions in the seventh book of his Commentaries.

XXXVIII. But he employs a great variety of terms in order to render his philosophical system unintelligible to the ignorant. In his phraseology he considers wisdom as the knowledge of things which can be understood by the intellect, and which have a real existence: which has the Gods for its object, and the soul as unconnected with the body. He also, with a peculiarity of expression, calls wisdom also philosophy, which he explains as a desire for divine wisdom. But wisdom and experience are also used by him in their common acceptation; as, for instance, when he calls an artisan wise (σοφὸς). He also uses the same words in different senses at different[136] times. Accordingly he uses φαῦλος in the sense of ἁπλοῦς, simple, in which meaning also the word occurs in Euripides, in the Licymonius, where the poet speaks of Hercules in the following terms:—

XXXVIII. But he uses a wide range of terms to make his philosophical system hard to understand for those who are not knowledgeable. In his language, he defines wisdom as the understanding of things that can be grasped by the intellect and that have real existence; its focus is on the Gods, with the soul being separate from the body. He uniquely refers to wisdom as philosophy, which he describes as a longing for divine wisdom. However, he also uses wisdom and experience in their standard meanings, such as when he calls an artisan wise (σοφὸς). He applies the same words with different meanings at various times. For instance, he uses φαῦλος in the sense of ἁπλοῦς, simple, which is how the word appears in Euripides, in the Licymonius, where the poet describes Hercules in the following terms:—

Mean looking (φαῦλος), rude, virtuous in great affairs,
Measuring all wisdom by its last results,
A hero unrefined in speech.

But Plato uses the word sometimes even for what is beautiful; and sometimes for small and insignificant; and very often he uses different words to express the same idea. Accordingly, besides the word ἰδέα for a class, he uses also εἶδος, and γένος, and παράδειγμα, and ἀρχὴ, and αἴτιον. Sometimes he uses opposite expressions for the same thing; accordingly, he says that it is an object of sensation that exists, while at other times he says it is that which does not exist; speaking of it as existing because of its origin, and as non-existent with reference to its continual changes. Then again, he defines his ἰδέα as something which is neither moving nor stationary, at one time calling the same thing, at another time one thing, at a third time many things. And he is in the habit of doing this in many instances.

But Plato sometimes uses the word to describe what is beautiful; at times for things that are small and insignificant; and he often uses different words to convey the same idea. So, besides the word ἰδέα for a class, he also uses εἶδος, γένος, παράδειγμα, ἀρχὴ, and αἴτιον. Sometimes he uses opposite terms for the same thing; for instance, he says that it is a sensory object that exists, while at other times he claims it does not exist; referring to it as existing due to its origin and as non-existent in light of its constant changes. Additionally, he defines his ἰδέα as something that is neither moving nor stationary, sometimes referring to it as one thing and at other times as many things. He tends to do this in many instances.

And the explanation of his arguments is three-fold. For first of all, it is necessary to explain what each thing that is said is; secondly, on what account it is said, whether because of its bearing on the principal point, or figuratively, and whether it is said for the purpose of establishing an opinion of his own, or of refuting the arguments brought forward by the other party to the conversation; and thirdly, whether it has been said truly.

And his explanations are three-part. First, it’s important to clarify what each statement means. Second, we need to consider why it’s being said—if it relates directly to the main issue, if it’s meant metaphorically, or if it’s intended to support his own views or to challenge the arguments made by the other person in the conversation. Finally, we should determine whether what has been said is truthful.

XXXIX. But since there are some particular marks put in his books, we must also say something about them. × indicates peculiar expressions and figures of speech, and generally any peculiarities of Plato’s style. When doubled it points to the doctrines and peculiar opinions of Plato; ※ when dotted all round, points to some select bits of beautiful writing. When doubled and dotted it indicates corrections of some passages. A dotted obelus indicates hasty disapprovals. An inverted sigma dotted all round points out passages which may be taken in a double sense, and transpositions of words.[137] The Ceraunium[33] indicates a connection of philosophical ideas. An asterisk points out an agreement in doctrine. And an obelus marks the rejection of the expression or of the passage. These then are the marginal marks which occur, and the writings of which Plato was the author:—which, as Antigonus the Carystian says, in his treatise on Zeno, when they had been but lately published, brought in some gain to the possessors, if any one else was desirous of reading them.

XXXIX. Since there are specific symbols used in his books, we should mention them. × indicates unique expressions and figures of speech, and generally any quirks of Plato’s style. When it's doubled, it points to Plato’s doctrines and distinct opinions; ※ when surrounded by dots, it highlights some beautiful writing. When it’s both doubled and dotted, it shows corrections of certain passages. A dotted obelus indicates quick disapproval. An inverted sigma surrounded by dots marks passages that can be interpreted in multiple ways, as well as word transpositions. [137] The Ceraunium[33] indicates a connection of philosophical ideas. An asterisk signifies agreement in doctrine. An obelus indicates the rejection of a term or passage. These are the marginal marks found in the writings of Plato:—which, as Antigonus the Carystian mentions in his work on Zeno, when they were recently published, benefited those who owned them, if anyone else wanted to read them.

XL. These now were his chief opinions. He affirmed that the soul was immortal and clothed in many bodies successively, and that its first principle was number, and that the first principle of the body was geometry. And he defined it as an abstract idea of spirit diffused in every direction. He said also, that it was self-moving and threefold. For that that part of it which was capable of reasoning was situated in the head, that that portion which was affected by passion was seated around the heart, and that which was appetitive was placed around the navel and the liver. And that it is placed in the middle of the body, and embraces it at the same time in all its parts, and that it consists of elements; and that when it is divided according to harmonic intervals it forms two connected circles; of which the inner circle is divided into six portions, and makes in all seven circles; and that this is placed on the left hand of the diameter, and situated in the interior. But the other is on the right hand of the same line; on which account, and because it is one only, it is the superior of the two. For the other is divided internally; and this too, is the circle of that which is always the same; the other, the circle of that which is changeable and different. And the one he says is the motion of the soul, but the other is the motion of the universe and of the planets.

XL. These were his main beliefs. He claimed that the soul is immortal and inhabits many bodies over time, and that its fundamental principle is number, while the body’s fundamental principle is geometry. He described it as an abstract idea of spirit that spreads in all directions. He also said that it is self-moving and has three parts. The part capable of reasoning is located in the head, the part affected by emotions is around the heart, and the part driven by desires is near the navel and liver. He argued that it resides in the center of the body, encompassing it in all its parts and consisting of elements. When divided according to harmonic intervals, it creates two connected circles; the inner circle is divided into six sections, resulting in a total of seven circles, positioned to the left of the diameter and located inside. The other circle is to the right of the same line; for this reason, and because it is singular, it is superior to the first. The first circle is divided internally; it represents the constant aspect of being, while the other represents the changing and diverse. He claimed that one is the motion of the soul, while the other represents the motion of the universe and the planets.

On the other side, the division of the circles from the centre to the extremities, being harmoniously appropriated to the essence of the soul, the one knows existing things and establishes harmony between them, because it is itself composed of harmonious elements. The circle of what is changeable, engenders opinion by its regular movements; but the circle of that which is always the same produces knowledge.

On the other hand, the division of the circles from the center to the edges, fitting perfectly with the essence of the soul, allows one to understand existing things and create harmony among them, because it is made up of harmonious elements itself. The circle of what is changeable generates opinion through its regular movements, while the circle of what is always the same leads to knowledge.

XLI. Plato lays down two primary causes or principles of all things, God and matter, which he also calls mind,[138] and the cause. And he defines matter as something without shape and without limitation, and says that from it all concretions arise. He affirms also that as it was moving about at random, it was brought by God into one settled place, as God thought order better than disorder; and that this nature is divided into four elements, fire, water, air, and earth, of which the world itself and everything in it was made. But he says that the earth is the only thing that is unchangeable, as he considers the cause to be the difference of the figures of which it is composed; for he says that the figures of the others are homogeneous; for that they are all composed equally of scalene triangles. The figure of the earth, however, is peculiar to itself; for the element of fire is a pyramid; of air, an octagon; of water, an eicosagon; and of the earth, a cube; owing to which these things cannot be changed into earth, nor earth into them. He teaches also that these elements are not separated so as to occupy each a peculiar and distinct place; for the spherical motion collects and compresses all the small things towards the centre, and the small things separate the great ones, on which account the species, as they change, do also change their positions.

XLI. Plato identifies two main causes or principles of everything: God and matter, which he also refers to as mind,[138] and the cause. He defines matter as formless and limitless, stating that all concrete things come from it. He also claims that as it was moving randomly, God brought it into a stable state, believing that order is better than chaos; this nature is divided into four elements: fire, water, air, and earth, from which the world and everything in it is made. However, he states that earth is the only unchanging element, as he views the differences in the shapes it is made from as the cause of this permanence; he argues that the shapes of the other elements are uniform, as they are all made up of the same type of scalene triangles. In contrast, the shape of earth is unique; fire takes the shape of a pyramid, air an octagon, water an eicosagon, and earth a cube, which means these elements cannot transform into earth, nor can earth transform into them. He also teaches that these elements aren’t separated to occupy unique spaces; instead, spherical motion gathers and compresses smaller things toward the center, while smaller things push away the larger ones, causing the species to shift positions as they change.

Moreover he asserts that the world is one, and has been produced, since it has been made by God, in such a manner as to be an object of sensation. And he considers it endowed with life, because that which is so endowed, is superior to that which is not, and it must be the production of the most excellent producer. It is also one, and illimitable; because the model after which it was made was one; and it is spherical, because its creator was of that form; for it also contains all other animals, and God who made it comprises all forms. And it is smooth, and has no instruments whatever all round it, because it has no need of any. But the whole world remains imperishable, because it cannot be resolved into God; and God is the cause of universal production, because it is the nature of the good to be productive of good; and the best is the cause of the production of the heaven; for the best of all productions can have no other cause than the best of all intelligible existences. And since God is of that character, and since heaven resembles the best, inasmuch as it is at least the most beautiful of all things, it cannot be like anything else that is produced, except God.

Moreover, he claims that the world is unified and has been created since it was made by God in a way that makes it perceivable. He believes it has life because what has life is superior to what does not, and it must be made by the best creator. It is also one and limitless because the model it was made after was singular, and it is spherical because its creator has that shape; it also includes all other creatures, and God, who created it, encompasses all forms. It is smooth and has no tools surrounding it because it doesn’t require any. The entire world remains imperishable because it cannot be broken down into God, and God is the source of all creation because it is in the nature of goodness to produce good; and the best is the reason for the creation of the heavens; the best of all creations can only come from the best of all intelligible beings. Since God embodies that quality and since heaven resembles the best due to being the most beautiful of all things, it can’t resemble anything else that is created, except God.

He also teaches that the world consists of fire, water, air,[139] and earth; of fire, in order that it may be visible; of earth, in order that it may be firm; of water and air, that it may not be destitute of proportion; for two middle terms are indispensable to keep the solid bodies in due proportion to one another, and to realize the unity of the whole. In short, the world is formed of all the elements together, in order that it may be perfect and imperishable.

He also teaches that the world is made up of fire, water, air,[139] and earth; fire so that it can be seen; earth to provide stability; and water and air to maintain balance; because two middle elements are essential for keeping solid bodies in proper proportion to each other and achieving the unity of the whole. In short, the world is composed of all the elements together to be perfect and everlasting.

Again, time is the image of eternity; eternity subsists for ever; but the motion of the heaven is time; for day, and night, and the months, and all such divisions, are parts of time, on which account there could be no such thing as time apart from the nature of the world; for time existed contemporaneously and simultaneously with the world. And it was with reference to time that the sun, and the moon, and the planets were made; and it was in order that the number of the seasons might be manifest, and that the animals might partake of number, that God kindled the light of the sun; and that the moon was above the circle of the earth, and that the sun was next to it, and in the still higher circles were the planets. And that the universe was animated, because it was altogether bound up in animated motion, and that the race of all other animals was produced in order that the world might be made perfect, and resembling an animal such as could be comprehended by intellect. Since then God had life, the heaven also must have life; and the Gods are to a great extent composed of fire. And there are three other races of animals, those which fly in the air; those which live in the water; those which walk in the earth. The oldest of all the deities in heaven is the Earth; she was formed in order to be the dispenser of night and day; and as she is placed in the centre, she is constantly in motion around the centre.

Again, time reflects eternity; eternity lasts forever; but the movement of the heavens is time. Day, night, months, and all such divisions are parts of time, which is why time cannot exist apart from the nature of the world; time existed at the same time as the world. The sun, moon, and planets were created with respect to time so that the seasons could be counted and animals could have a measure of time. God created the light of the sun for this reason, and the moon orbits above the Earth, with the sun next to it, and the planets in the higher orbits. The universe is alive because it is completely filled with living motion, and all other animals were created to make the world perfect, resembling an animal that could be understood by the mind. Since God has life, the heavens must also have life; and the gods are largely made of fire. There are three other groups of animals: those that fly in the air, those that live in the water, and those that walk on the earth. The oldest of all the deities in heaven is the Earth; she was formed to distribute night and day, and being at the center, she is always moving around that center.

And since there are two efficient causes, some things must, he says, be affirmed to exist in consequence of intellect, and some from some necessary cause. Now necessary causes are the air, fire, earth, and water, these not being real elements, but rather receptacles; and they too are formed of triangles in combination, and are resolvable into triangles; and their elements are the scalene triangle and the isosceles. These two before mentioned elements are the principles and causes of things, of which the models are God and matter, which last must necessarily be destitute of form, as is the case of other receptacles. And that the cause of these things was a necessary[140] cause, which, receiving the ideas, produced the substances, and was moved by the dissimilarity of its own power, and again by its motion compelled those things which were moved by it to move other things in their turn.

And since there are two main causes, some things must, he says, be recognized as existing because of the mind, while others arise from a necessary cause. Now, necessary causes include air, fire, earth, and water; these are not true elements, but rather containers. They are made up of triangles combined together and can be broken down into triangles. Their elements are the scalene triangle and the isosceles triangle. These two mentioned elements are the foundational principles and causes of things, with God and matter as their models. The latter must necessarily lack form, similar to other containers. The cause of these things was a necessary cause, which, by receiving ideas, created substances and was driven by the differences in its own power. Its motion also compelled things moved by it to cause other things to move in turn.

But all these things were formerly moved without any reason or order; but after they began to form the world by their combination, they then received symmetry and regularity from God, according to the principles applicable to them; for the efficient causes, even before the creation of the heaven, were two in number. There was also a third, namely production; but these were not very evident, but rather traces than actual things, and quite devoid of regularity. But after the world was made, then they too assumed a regular form and arrangement; but the heaven was made of all existing bodies. And Plato considers that God is incorporeal just as the soul is, and that it is owing to that that he is not affected by any destruction or external circumstances. And ideas, as we have said before, he defines as certain causes and principles, owing to which it is that such and such things are by nature what they are.

But all these things used to be in chaos, without any reason or order. Once they started to come together and form the world, they gained symmetry and regularity from God, based on the principles that applied to them. Before the creation of the heavens, there were essentially two efficient causes. There was also a third one, related to production, but this was less obvious—more like traces than actual things, lacking any regularity. After the world was created, these too took on a regular form and structure; the heavens were made up of all existing bodies. Plato believes that God is incorporeal, just like the soul, and that's why He is not affected by destruction or outside circumstances. Ideas, as we mentioned earlier, are defined by him as certain causes and principles, which explain why things are inherently what they are.

XLII. On the subject of good and evil, these were his sentiments: that the end was to become like God; and that virtue was sufficient of herself for happiness, but nevertheless required the advantages of the body as instruments to work with; such as health, strength, the integrity of the senses, and things of that kind; and also external advantages, such as riches, and noble birth, and glory. Still that the wise man would be not the less happy, even if destitute of these auxiliary circumstances; for he would enjoy the constitution of his country, and would marry, and would not transgress the established laws, and that he would legislate for his country, as well as he could under existing circumstances, unless he saw affairs in an unmanageable condition, in consequence of the excessive factiousness of the people. He thinks too that the Gods superintend all the affairs of men, and that there are such beings as dæmons. And he was the first person who defined the notion of the honourable, as that which borders on the praiseworthy, and the logical, and the useful, and the becoming, and the expedient, all which things are combined with that which is suitable to, and in accordance with, nature.

XLII. Regarding good and evil, his views were as follows: the ultimate goal is to become like God; virtue alone is enough for happiness but still needs the advantages of the body as tools to function, such as health, strength, clear senses, and similar benefits; along with external advantages like wealth, noble birth, and fame. However, even without these extra circumstances, a wise person would still be happy because they would appreciate their country's constitution, marry, and obey established laws. They would also strive to legislate for their country as best as they can, unless they see the situation is beyond control due to extreme factionalism among the people. He also believed that the gods oversee all human affairs and that there are such beings as demons. He was the first to define the concept of the honorable as something that is close to the praiseworthy, logical, useful, appropriate, and expedient, all of which align with what is natural and suitable.

XLIII. He also discussed in his dialogues the correctness of terms, so that he was the first person who reduced the science[141] of giving correct answers, and putting correct questions to a system, which he himself used to satiety.

XLIII. He also talked in his discussions about the accuracy of terms, making him the first person to systematize the science[141] of providing accurate answers and asking the right questions, which he himself utilized extensively.

XLIV. In his dialogues he used to speak of justice as a kind of law of God, as being of influence sufficient to excite men to act justly, in order to avoid suffering punishment as malefactors after death. Owing to which he appeared to some people rather fond of mythical stories, as he mingled stories of this kind with his writings, in order by the uncertainty of all the circumstances that affect men after their death, to induce them to abstain from evil actions. And these were his opinions.

XLIV. In his dialogues, he often described justice as a law of God, powerful enough to motivate people to act justly to avoid facing punishment as wrongdoers after death. Because of this, some people thought he was quite fond of mythical stories, as he mixed tales like this into his writings. He did this to highlight the uncertainty of everything that impacts people after they die, encouraging them to stay away from bad actions. And these were his opinions.

XLV. He used too, says Aristotle, to divide things in this manner:—Of good, some have their place in the mind, some in the body, and some are wholly external. As, for instance, justice, and prudence, and manly courage, and temperance, and qualities of that sort exist in the soul. Beauty, and a good constitution, and health, and strength exist in the body. But friends, and the prosperity of one’s country, and wealth, are external goods. There are then three species of goods, some in the soul, some in the body, and some external to either.

XLV. Aristotle also used to categorize things like this: some goods are found in the mind, some in the body, and some are completely external. For example, justice, prudence, courage, and temperance exist in the soul. Beauty, good health, and physical strength exist in the body. But friends, the prosperity of one’s country, and wealth are external goods. So, there are three types of goods: some in the soul, some in the body, and some external to both.

XLVI. There are also three species of friendship. For one kind is natural, another that which arises from companionship; and the third is that which is produced by ties of hospitality. We call that natural friendship which parents feel towards their offspring, and relations towards one another; and this is partaken of by other animals besides men. We call that the friendship of companionship which arises from a habit of association, and which has no reference to ties of blood, such as the friendship of Pylades for Orestes. That which arises from ties of hospitality is one which owes its origin to agreements, and which is carried on by means of letters between strangers. There is, therefore, natural friendship, and friendship between companions, and between strangers. Some also add a fourth kind, namely, the friendship of love.

XLVI. There are also three types of friendship. One type is natural, another comes from companionship, and the third is formed through hospitality. We refer to natural friendship as the bond that parents have with their children, and relatives with each other; this is something shared by other animals as well as humans. Companionship friendship develops from regular interactions and doesn’t depend on blood relations, like the friendship between Pylades and Orestes. Hospitality friendship originates from agreements and is maintained through letters between strangers. So, there is natural friendship, friendship between companions, and friendship between strangers. Some also include a fourth type, which is the friendship of love.

XLVII. Of political constitutions there are five species. There is one kind which is democratical, a second which is aristocratical, a third is oligarchical, a fourth monarchical, and the fifth is tyrannical. Now, the democratical form of constitution exists in those cities in which the multitude has the chief power, and elects magistrates, and passes laws at its own pleasure. But an aristocracy is that form in which neither[142] the rich, nor the poor, nor the most illustrious men of the city rule, but the most nobly born have the chief sway. And oligarchy is that constitution in which the magistracies are distributed according to some sort of rating: for the rich are fewer in number than the poor. The monarchical constitution is either dependent on law or on family. That in Carthage depends on law; that in Lacædemon and Macedonia on family; for they select their sovereign out of some particular family. But a tyranny is that kind of government in which the people are either cajoled or constrained into being governed by a single individual. Forms of government then, are divided into democracy, aristocracy, oligarchy, monarchy, and tyranny.

XLVII. There are five types of political constitutions. One is democratic, the second is aristocratic, the third is oligarchic, the fourth is monarchical, and the fifth is tyrannical. In a democratic constitution, the majority holds the main power, elects officials, and makes laws as they see fit. An aristocracy, on the other hand, is a system where it’s not the rich, the poor, or the most prominent citizens who hold power, but rather those from noble families. Oligarchy refers to a constitution where offices are allocated based on social standing, as the wealthy are fewer than the poor. A monarchy can either rely on laws or lineage. In Carthage, it is based on law; in Lacedaemon and Macedonia, it’s based on family connections, as they choose their leader from specific families. Tyranny is when the people are either deceived or forced to be ruled by one individual. Therefore, forms of government are categorized as democracy, aristocracy, oligarchy, monarchy, and tyranny.

XLVIII. Again, of justice there are three species. For there is one kind which is conversant with the gods; a second which has reference to men; and a third, which concerns the dead. For they who sacrifice according to the laws, and who pay due respect to the temples, are manifestly pious to the gods. And those who repay what has been lent to them, and restore what has been deposited with them, act justly as to men. And those who pay due respect to the tombs, clearly are pious towards the dead. There is, therefore, one justice towards the Gods, a second towards men, and a third towards the dead.

XLVIII. Once again, there are three types of justice. One type is related to the gods; a second is about human beings; and a third concerns the dead. Those who sacrifice according to the laws and show respect to the temples are clearly devoted to the gods. Those who repay what has been borrowed and return what has been entrusted to them act justly towards other people. And those who honor the graves obviously show respect towards the dead. Therefore, there is one form of justice towards the gods, another towards people, and a third towards the deceased.

XLIX. In the same way, there are also three species of knowledge. There is one kind which is practical, a second which is productive, a third which is theoretical. For the science of building houses or ships, is production. For one can see the work which is produced by it. Political science, and the science of playing the flute, or the harp, or such things as that, is practical; for one cannot see any visible result which has been produced by them, and yet they are doing something. For one man plays the flute or plays the harp, and another occupies himself with state affairs. Again, geometrical, and harmonic, and astronomical science are all theoretical, for they do nothing, and produce nothing. But the geometrician theorizes as to what relation lines bear to one another; and the harmonist speculates about sounds, and the astronomer about stars and about the world. Accordingly, of sciences some are theoretical, others productive, and a third species is practical.

XLIX. Similarly, there are three types of knowledge. One type is practical, another is productive, and the third is theoretical. The science of building houses or ships is productive, as you can see the results of the work it creates. Political science and the art of playing instruments like the flute or harp are practical; they don't produce visible results, but there's still action happening. One person plays the flute or harp while another engages in government matters. On the other hand, geometry, harmony, and astronomy are all theoretical because they don’t create anything tangible. The geometrician theorizes about how lines relate to each other, the harmonist thinks about sounds, and the astronomer contemplates stars and the universe. Therefore, we categorize sciences into theoretical, productive, and practical types.

L. Of medical science there are five species: one, pharmaceutical; a second, manual; a third, conversant about the regulation of the manner of life, and the diet; a fourth, the business of which is to detect diseases; and the fifth is remedial. The pharmaceutical relieves infirmities by means of medicines; the manual heals men by cutting and cauterizing; the one which attends to the diet, gets rid of diseases by altering and regulating the diet; the fourth produces its effects by a thorough comprehension of the nature of the disease; and the last relieves men from suffering by bringing prompt assistance at the moment. Medical science, then, is divided into the pharmaceutical, the manual, the dietetic, the diagnostic, and the remedial.

L. Medical science has five branches: the first is pharmaceutical; the second is manual; the third focuses on lifestyle and diet; the fourth deals with diagnosing diseases; and the fifth is remedial. The pharmaceutical branch treats ailments with medications; the manual branch heals by performing surgery and cauterization; the dietetic branch improves health by changing and managing diet; the diagnostic branch understands the disease's nature; and the remedial branch provides immediate relief from suffering. Therefore, medical science is categorized into pharmaceutical, manual, dietetic, diagnostic, and remedial.

LI. Of law there are two divisions. For there is a written and an unwritten law. The one by which we regulate our constitutions in our cities, is the written law; that which arises from custom, is the unwritten law. As, for instance, for a man to come naked into the market place, or to wear woman’s clothes, are actions which are not prohibited by any law, and yet we never do them because they are forbidden by the unwritten law. Law, therefore, is divided into the written and the unwritten law.

LI. Law is divided into two types: written and unwritten. The written law governs how we structure our governments in our cities, while the unwritten law comes from social customs. For example, actions like going into the market naked or wearing women's clothing aren't explicitly banned by any law, yet we would never do them because they're considered unacceptable under unwritten law. Therefore, law can be classified as written or unwritten.

LII. Discourse is divided into five heads; one of which heads is that which statesmen employ when they speak in the public assemblies; and this is called political. Another division is that which orators use in their written harangues, and bring forward for the sake of display in panegyrics or reproaches, or impeachments. And such a description of discourse as this is the rhetorical. A third class is that which private individuals use when conversing with one another. This is called private discourse. Another kind is that which is employed when men converse by means of putting short questions and giving brief answers to those who question them. This is called the dialectic kind of discourse. The fifth division is that which artists adopt when conversing on their own particular art, and this is called professional discourse. Thus discourse, then, is divided into political, rhetorical, private, dialectic, and professional.

LII. Discourse is divided into five types; one type is used by politicians when they speak in public gatherings, and this is called political. Another type is what orators use in their written speeches, which they present for the purpose of showcasing in praises, criticisms, or accusations. This type of discourse is known as rhetorical. A third category is the one that everyday people use when talking with each other. This is called private discourse. Another kind is used when people communicate by asking short questions and giving brief answers, and this is referred to as dialectic discourse. The fifth type is what artists use when discussing their specific craft, and this is called professional discourse. Therefore, discourse is divided into political, rhetorical, private, dialectic, and professional.

LIII. Music again is divided into three species. For there is the music of the mouth alone, such as song; secondly, there is the music which is performed by the hands and[144] mouth together, such as singing to the harp; thirdly, there is that which is executed by the hands alone, such as harp playing. Music, therefore, is divided into music of the mouth, music of the mouth and hands, and music of the hands.

LIII. Music is again divided into three types. First, there's music produced by the voice alone, like singing; second, there's music created by the hands and voice together, such as singing while playing the harp; third, there's music performed solely by the hands, like playing the harp. So, music is classified as vocal music, vocal and instrumental music, and instrumental music.

LIV. Nobleness of birth is divided into four species; the first is when one’s ancestors are noble, and valiant, and just; in which case they say that their posterity are nobly born. The second kind is when one’s ancestors have been princes and rulers of nations, and their posterity also we call noble. Another kind is when one’s ancestors have been distinguished for personal renown, such, for instance, as is gained by generalship or by victory at the games. For their offspring also we address as nobly born. And the last kind is when a man is himself noble in his spirit, and magnanimous. For that man also we call noble, and this is the last kind of nobility. There is, therefore, nobility arising from virtuous ancestors, from royal ancestors, from illustrious ancestors, and from one’s own excellent qualities.

LIV. Nobility by birth can be categorized into four types. The first type is when someone's ancestors are noble, brave, and just; in this case, their descendants are considered nobly born. The second type is when someone's ancestors were princes and rulers of nations, and their descendants are also referred to as noble. Another type is when someone's ancestors gained distinction through personal achievements, like military leadership or victories in competitions. Their offspring are also regarded as nobly born. Finally, the last type is when a person is noble in spirit and generous. This individual is also called noble, marking the final type of nobility. Thus, nobility can come from virtuous ancestors, royal lineage, distinguished achievements, and one's own admirable qualities.

LV. Beauty also is divided into three kinds. For there is one kind which is praiseworthy, as that of a beautiful face. Another which is useful, as an instrument or a house, and things of that kind which are beautiful, with reference to our use of them. There is also a beauty with reference to laws, and habits, and things of that kind, which is likewise beautiful, because of its utility. So that beauty again is looked at in three ways, with reference to its praise, its utility, and to our use of it.

LV. Beauty is also categorized into three types. One type is commendable, like that of a beautiful face. Another type is practical, such as an instrument or a house, and things that are beautiful in relation to how we use them. There's also a type of beauty tied to laws, customs, and similar things, which is considered beautiful due to its usefulness. Therefore, beauty can be viewed in three ways: in terms of its praise, its practicality, and how we utilize it.

LVI. The soul is divided into three parts; for one part of it is capable of reason, another is influenced by appetite, the third part is liable to passion. Of these the reasoning part is the cause of deliberating, and reasoning, and understanding, and everything of that kind. The appetite part is that portion of the soul which is the cause of desiring to eat, and to embrace and things of that kind. The passionate part is the cause of men feeling confidence and delight, and grief and anger. The soul therefore is divided into the reasoning part, the appetitive part, and the passionate part.

LVI. The soul is divided into three parts: one part is capable of reason, another is driven by desire, and the third part is prone to emotions. The reasoning part is responsible for thinking, deliberating, and understanding, along with everything similar. The appetitive part is what causes the desire to eat, to embrace, and similar actions. The passionate part is responsible for feelings of confidence and joy, as well as sadness and anger. Therefore, the soul consists of the reasoning part, the appetitive part, and the passionate part.

LVII. Of perfect virtue there are four species. One is prudence, one is justice, the third is manly gallantry, and the fourth is temperance. Of these, prudence is the cause of a[145] man acting rightly in affairs; justice is the cause of his acting justly in partnerships and bargains; manly gallantry is the cause of a man’s not being alarmed amid dangers and formidable circumstances, but standing firm; and temperance is the cause of his subduing his appetites, and being enslaved by no pleasure, but living decorously. So that virtue is divided into prudence, justice, manly gallantry, and temperance.

LVII. There are four types of perfect virtue. One is prudence, another is justice, the third is courage, and the fourth is temperance. Among these, prudence helps a person act correctly in matters; justice ensures they act fairly in relationships and agreements; courage is what keeps a person steady in the face of danger and tough situations; and temperance is about controlling desires and not being dominated by any pleasure, but living in a respectable way. Therefore, virtue breaks down into prudence, justice, courage, and temperance.

LVIII. Rule is divided into five parts. One is rule according to law; another is rule according to nature; a third kind is rule according to custom; a fourth division is rule with reference to family; the fifth is rule by force. Now when the rulers in cities are elected by the citizens, then they rule according to law; those who rule according to nature are the males, not only among men, but also among all other animals; for everywhere we shall find it as a general rule that the male rules the female; the rule of him who rules according to custom is such as this, when schoolmasters rule their pupils, and teachers their disciples. Rule according to family is that which prevails in places like Lacedæmon, where hereditary sovereigns reign. For the kingdom there belongs to a certain family; and in Macedonia they rule on the same principle. For there, too, the kingdom depends on family. But those who rule by force, only cajoling the citizens, rule in spite of them; and such a sway is called rule by force. So that there is rule by law, and by nature, and by custom, and by family, and by force.

LVIII. Rule is divided into five parts. One is rule by law; another is rule by nature; a third type is rule by custom; the fourth is rule based on family; and the fifth is rule through force. When leaders in cities are chosen by the citizens, they govern according to law; those who govern by nature are males, both among men and all other animals; as a general rule, the male tends to dominate the female in every species. The rule based on custom is exemplified when teachers oversee their students. Rule by family prevails in places like Lacedæmon, where hereditary monarchs govern. The kingdom there belongs to a specific family; the same principle applies in Macedonia, where the monarchy also depends on lineage. But those who rule through force, manipulating the citizens, govern against their will; this type of authority is known as rule by force. Therefore, there is rule by law, rule by nature, rule by custom, rule by family, and rule by force.

LIX. Of rhetoric he speaks of six species. For when orators exhort the people to make war upon or to form alliances against any one, this species of oratory is called exhortation. When they persuade the people not to make war, or to form alliances, but to keep quiet, this kind of rhetoric is called dissuasion. The third species of rhetoric, is when any one says that he has been injured by some one else, and impeaches that person as guilty of many crimes; for this species is called accusation. The fourth kind of rhetoric is called defence, when a man shows that he has done no wrong, and that he is not guilty of anything out of the way. Such a kind of speech they call a defence. The fifth species of rhetoric, is when any one speaks well of another, and shows him to be virtuous and honourable; and this kind is called encomium. The sixth species, is when any one shows that another person[146] is worthless; and this kind is called blame. So that rhetoric is divided into encomium and blame, exhortation and dissuasion, accusation and defence.

LIX. He discusses six types of rhetoric. When speakers urge people to go to war or to form alliances against someone, this type of speech is called exhortation. When they convince people not to wage war or to form alliances, but to stay quiet, this is referred to as dissuasion. The third type of rhetoric is when someone claims they have been wronged by another and accuses that person of various crimes; this is known as accusation. The fourth type is called defense, where a person demonstrates that they have done nothing wrong and are innocent of any wrongdoing. The fifth type is when someone speaks highly of another, highlighting their virtues and honor; this is called encomium. The sixth type is when someone shows that another person is worthless; this is known as blame. Thus, rhetoric is divided into encomium and blame, exhortation and dissuasion, accusation and defense.

Speaking correctly is divided under four heads. One, the saying what is right; one, the saying as much as is right; thirdly, the saying it to the proper people; and fourthly, the saying it at the proper time. Now as to the saying what is right, that is the saying what will be advantageous both to the speaker and to the hearer. The saying as much as is right, is saying neither more nor less than what is sufficient. The saying it to the proper people, is supposing one is speaking to one’s elders who are mistaken in any point, the using expressions proper to be addressed to those older than one’s self; or, on the other hand, if one is addressing those younger, then the using language such as is suitable to young people. The saying it at the proper time, is speaking neither too soon nor too late; for if one does, one will err and speak improperly.

Speaking correctly can be broken down into four main points. First, it’s about saying what is right; second, saying the right amount; third, addressing the right people; and fourth, saying it at the right time. Now, when we talk about saying what is right, it means saying things that will benefit both the speaker and the listener. Saying the right amount involves speaking neither more nor less than what is necessary. Addressing the right people means, for example, when speaking to elders who may be mistaken, using respectful language suitable for those older than you; conversely, if speaking to younger individuals, using language appropriate for them. Finally, saying it at the right time means not speaking too soon or too late; doing so can lead to mistakes and inappropriate remarks.

LX. Beneficence is divided under four heads. For it may be exerted either in money, or by personal exertion, or by knowledge, or by words. In money when any one assists those who are in want, so as to put them at ease with respect to money. And men benefit one another by personal exertion when they come upon those who are being beaten and assist them. Again, those who instruct, or heal, or who teach any good thing, benefit others by their knowledge; and when one person comes down to the court of justice as an advocate for another, and delivers some speech full of sense and good feeling in his behalf, that man assists his friend by words. So that there is one beneficence which is displayed in money, another in personal exertion, a third by means of knowledge, and the fourth kind by words.

LX. Beneficence is categorized into four types. It can be expressed through money, personal effort, knowledge, or words. It involves money when someone helps those in need to ease their financial situation. People benefit each other through personal effort when they intervene to help someone who is being attacked. Additionally, those who educate, heal, or teach any positive skill benefit others through their knowledge; and when someone acts as an advocate in court, delivering a thoughtful and heartfelt speech on behalf of another, that person helps their friend with words. Therefore, there are four types of beneficence: one shown through money, another through personal effort, a third through knowledge, and the fourth through words.

LXI. Again, Plato divides the end of all affairs into four species. An affair has one end in accordance with law, when a decree is passed, and when the law establishes it; it has an end in accordance with nature, when it is such a thing as a day, or a year, or the seasons. It has an end according to art, when it is architecture for instance, for a man builds a house; or when it is ship-building, for it makes a ship. And affairs also come to an end by chance, when they turn out differently from what any one expected. So that an end of an affair is regulated either by law, or by nature, or by art, or by chance.

LXI. Once more, Plato breaks down the outcome of all matters into four categories. A matter has one outcome according to the law when a decree is made, and when the law formalizes it; it has an outcome according to nature when it's something like a day, a year, or the seasons. It has an outcome according to art, such as in architecture when someone builds a house; or in shipbuilding, when a ship is constructed. Matters can also come to an end by chance when things turn out differently than expected. So, the outcome of a matter is determined either by law, by nature, by art, or by chance.

LXII. Power again is divided into four species. There is one power which we possess by our ability to reason and form conceptions by means of our intellect. There is another power which we owe to the body, such as the power of walking, or giving, or taking, and such like. There is a third which we possess through the multitude of soldiers or riches, on which account a king is said to have great power. And the fourth division of power consists in the being well or ill treated, and treating others well or ill; as, for instance, we may be sick, or we may be taught, or we may be in vigorous health, and many more cases of that sort. So that one kind of power dwells in the intellect, another in the body, another in an army and riches, and another in our capacity as agents or patients.

LXII. Power is divided into four types. First, there's the power we have through our ability to think and form ideas using our intellect. Second, there's the power that comes from our bodies, like the ability to walk, give, take, and so on. Third, there's the power that comes from having a large number of soldiers or wealth, which is why a king is considered powerful. The fourth type of power is about how we treat others and how we are treated, whether we are sick, learning, or in good health, among other examples. So, one type of power exists in the mind, another in the body, another in an army and wealth, and another in our roles as active participants or recipients.

LXIII. Of philanthropy there are three sorts. One which is displayed in addressing people, when some persons address every one whom they meet, and give them their right hand, and greet them heartily; another species is when one is disposed to assist every one who is unfortunate. The last kind is that sort of philanthropy which makes men pleasant boon companions. So that there is one kind of philanthropy displayed in addressing people, another in benefiting them, and a third in feasting and making merry with them.

LXIII. There are three types of philanthropy. The first is shown in how people greet others; some individuals warmly address everyone they encounter, shake their hands, and genuinely welcome them. The second type is when someone is willing to help those who are struggling. The last kind is the type of philanthropy that makes people enjoyable friends to be around. So, one type of philanthropy is in greeting others, another is in helping them, and the third is in celebrating and enjoying time with them.

LXIV. Happiness is divided into five parts. For one part of it is wisdom in counsel; another is a healthy condition of the sensations and general health of body; a third is good fortune in one’s affairs; a fourth kind is good reputation among men; a fifth is abundance of riches and of all those things which are useful in life. Now wisdom in counsel arises from good instruction, and from a person’s having experience of many things. A healthy condition of the sensations depends on the limbs of the body; as, for instance, when one sees with one’s eyes, and hears with one’s ears, and smells with one’s nose, and feels with one’s body, just what one ought to see, and hear, and smell, and feel. Such a condition as this is a healthy condition. And good fortune is when a man does rightly and successfully what a good and energetic man ought to do. And good reputation is when a man is well spoken of. And abundance of riches is when a man has such a sufficiency of everything which relates to the uses of life, that he is able to benefit his friends, and to discharge all[148] public obligations in a splendid and liberal manner. And the man who has all these different parts of happiness, is a perfectly happy man. So that happiness is made up of wisdom in counsel, a good condition of the sensations and health of body, good fortune, good reputation, and riches.

LXIV. Happiness is divided into five parts. One part is wisdom in decision-making; another is being physically healthy and having good senses; a third is having good luck in one’s endeavors; a fourth is being well-regarded by others; and the fifth is having an abundance of wealth and all the things that are helpful in life. Wisdom in decision-making comes from good guidance and having experienced many situations. A good state of health is determined by the body’s ability to see, hear, smell, and feel what it should. This kind of well-being is considered healthy. Good fortune is when someone successfully does what a good and proactive person is supposed to do. Good reputation is when people speak highly of someone. Having plenty of wealth means having enough of everything needed in life to help friends and fulfill public duties in an impressive and generous way. A person who possesses all these aspects of happiness is truly a happy person. Therefore, happiness consists of wisdom in decision-making, good health and physical condition, good fortune, a good reputation, and wealth.

LXV. The arts are divided into three kinds. The first, the second, and the third. The first are those of working mines and cutting wood, for these are preparatory arts. The second are such as working metals and carpentry, for they are alterative arts. For working in metals makes arms out of iron; and carpentry makes flutes and lyres out of wood. The third is the art which makes use of instruments; such as horsemanship, which uses bridles; the military art, which uses arms; music, which uses flutes and lyres. So that there are three species of art; one of which is the first, another the second, and another the third.

LXV. The arts are divided into three types. The first, the second, and the third. The first includes activities like mining and cutting wood, as these are basic arts. The second involves working with metals and carpentry, as these are transformative arts. Working with metals creates weapons from iron, while carpentry produces flutes and lyres from wood. The third type is the art that uses instruments; for example, horsemanship, which involves bridles; military skills, which utilize weapons; and music, which requires flutes and lyres. Therefore, there are three categories of art: one is the first, another is the second, and the last is the third.

LXVI. Good is divided into four kinds. One of which we mean when we speak of a man endowed with private virtue, as good; another kind is that which we indicate, when we call virtue and justice, good. A third kind is that which we attribute to suitable food, and exercise, and medicine. The fourth good, is that which we mean, when we speak of good flute playing, good acting, and things of that sort. There are therefore four kinds of good. One the having virtue; another, virtue itself; a third, useful food and exercise; and fourthly, we call skill in flute playing and acting, good.

LXVI. Good is divided into four types. One type is what we refer to when we describe a person as having personal virtue, which is considered good; another type is what we refer to when we talk about virtue and justice as good. The third type relates to appropriate food, exercise, and medicine. The fourth type is what we mean when we discuss good flute playing, good acting, and similar skills. Therefore, there are four types of good: first, having virtue; second, virtue itself; third, beneficial food and exercise; and fourth, skill in flute playing and acting, which we call good.

LXVII. Of things existing, some are bad, some good, and some neither one thing nor the other. Of these, we call those things bad, which are invariably capable of doing injury, such as intemperance, folly, injustice, and things of that sort. And the opposites to these qualities are good. But those things, which may at times be beneficial, and at times injurious, such as walking, sitting down, and eating; or which have absolutely no power in any case to benefit or injure any one; these are neither bad nor good. Of things existing then, there are some bad, and some good, and some of a neutral character, neither bad nor good.

LXVII. Among things that exist, some are bad, some are good, and some are neutral. We label things as bad if they consistently cause harm, like excess, foolishness, injustice, and similar issues. The opposite of these qualities is considered good. However, some things can be helpful at times and harmful at others, like walking, sitting, and eating; or have no effect on benefiting or harming anyone at all; these are neutral. So, there are things that are bad, things that are good, and things that are neither bad nor good.

LXVIII. A good state of affairs with reference to the laws, is divided under three heads. One when the laws are good, for that is a good state of affairs; so too is it, when the citizens abide by the existing laws; and the third case is, when although[149] there are no positive laws, still men are good citizens in deference to custom and to established institutions; and this is also called a good state of affairs. So that of these three heads, one depends on the laws being good, another on obedience to existing laws, and the third on men yielding to good customs and institutions.

LXVIII. A good situation regarding the laws can be divided into three parts. The first is when the laws are good, which represents a good situation. The second is when citizens follow the existing laws. The third is when, even if there aren't any formal laws, people are good citizens by respecting customs and established institutions; this is also considered a good situation. So, of these three parts, one depends on the laws being good, another on obeying the existing laws, and the third on individuals adhering to good customs and institutions.

So again, lawlessness is divided into three heads. One of which is, when the laws are bad, both as concerns strangers, and the citizens; another, when the citizens do not obey the laws that are established; and the third is when there is actually no law at all. So that one kind of lawlessness arises from bad laws, another from disobedience to existing laws, and the third from the absence of laws.

Lawlessness is broken down into three categories. The first happens when the laws are flawed, affecting both outsiders and citizens; the second occurs when citizens ignore the laws that are in place; and the third is when there are no laws whatsoever. So, one type of lawlessness comes from poor legislation, another from failing to follow established laws, and the third from a total lack of laws.

LXIX. Contraries are of three sorts; for instance, we say that good is contrary to evil, as justice to injustice, wisdom to folly, and so on. Again, some evils are contrary to others, as extravagance is to stinginess, and the being tortured with justice to the being tortured with injustice. And such evils as these are the contraries of other evils. Again, the heavy is contrary to the light, the swift to the slow, the black to the white; so that some things which are of a neutral character, neither good nor evil, are contrary to other things of a neutral character. Of contraries then, there are some which are so, as what is good is contrary to what is evil; others, as one evil is contrary to another; and others again, as neutral things are contrary to other things of a neutral character.

LXIX. There are three types of opposites. For example, we say that good is the opposite of evil, just as justice is the opposite of injustice, and wisdom is the opposite of folly, and so on. Some evils oppose each other, like extravagance being opposed to stinginess, and suffering due to justice being opposed to suffering due to injustice. These evils can be seen as opposites of each other. Additionally, heavy is the opposite of light, swift is the opposite of slow, and black is the opposite of white; thus, some neutral things that aren’t specifically good or evil can be opposed to other neutral things. So, in terms of opposites, there are some where what is good is opposed to what is evil; others where one evil is opposed to another; and yet others where neutral things are opposed to other neutral things.

LXX. Of good things there are three kinds; for there are some which can be possessed; others, which can be shared; others, which one realizes in one’s self. Those which can be possessed, are those which it is possible for a person to have, such as justice, or good health; those can be shared, which it is not possible for a person to have entirely to himself, but which he may participate in; as for instance, a person cannot be the sole possessor of abstract good, but he may participate in it. Those again a person realizes in himself, when they are such, that he cannot possess them himself, or share them with others, and yet they ought to exist; as for instance, it is good to be virtuous and just, but yet a man does not possess the being virtuous, or participate in it; but the being virtuous and just ought to exist in him. Of good things, therefore, there are those which are possessed, those which are shared, and those which ought to exist in a man.

LXX. There are three types of good things: some can be owned, others can be shared, and some are realized within oneself. The things that can be owned are those that a person can have, like justice or good health; the things that can be shared are those that one cannot have entirely by oneself, but can take part in; for example, no one can solely own the concept of the greater good, but they can partake in it. Then there are the things a person realizes within themselves when they cannot possess them or share them with others, yet they still ought to exist; for instance, being virtuous and just is good, but a person doesn’t possess or participate in being virtuous; rather, the qualities of virtue and justice should exist within him. Thus, in the realm of good things, we have those that are owned, those that are shared, and those that should exist within a person.

LXXI. In the same manner, good counsel is divisible into three kinds. For there is one kind which is derived from past time, another from the future, another from the present. That which is derived from past time is made up of instances, as for instance what the Lacedæmonians suffered by trusting to such and such people. That which relates to the present, is when what is wanted, is to show that the fortifications are weak, the men cowardly, or the provisions scanty. That which concerns the future, is when the speaker urges that no injury ought to be offered to ambassadors, in order that Greece may not get an evil reputation; and supports his argument by instances. So that good counsel has reference, firstly to what is past, secondly to what is present, and thirdly to the future.

LXXI. Similarly, good advice can be divided into three types. One type comes from the past, another from the future, and another from the present. The advice based on the past consists of examples, like what the Spartans experienced by trusting certain people. The advice related to the present indicates weaknesses, such as the fortifications being poor, the soldiers being cowardly, or the supplies being low. The advice concerning the future is when the speaker argues that ambassadors should not be harmed to avoid damaging Greece's reputation, supporting this point with examples. So, good advice refers, firstly to the past, secondly to the present, and thirdly to the future.

LXXII. Voice is divided into two parts, one of which is animated, and the other inanimate. That is animated, which proceeds from living animals, while sounds and echoes are inanimate. Again, animated voice may be divided into that which can be indicated by letters, and that which cannot; that which can be so indicated being the voice of men, and that which cannot being the voice of animals; so that one kind of voice is animated, the other inanimate.

LXXII. Voice is split into two categories: one is animated, and the other is inanimate. Animated voice comes from living creatures, while sounds and echoes are inanimate. Furthermore, animated voice can be divided into what can be represented by letters and what cannot; the voice of humans can be written down, while the voice of animals cannot. So, one type of voice is animated, and the other is inanimate.

LXXIII. Of existing things, some are divisible and some indivisible. Again, those which are divisible, consist either of similar or of dissimilar parts. Those which are indivisible are such as have no separate parts, and are not formed by any combination, such as unity, a point, or a sound. But those are divisible which are formed by some combination; as, for instance, syllables, and symphonies, and animals, and water, and gold. These too consist of similar parts, which are made up of particles resembling one another, and of which the whole does not differ from any part, except in number. As for instance, water and gold, and everything which is fusible, and so on. And these consist of dissimilar parts, which are made up of various things not resembling one another; as for instance, a house, and things of that sort; so that of existing things, some are divisible and others indivisible. And of those which are divisible, some consist of similar and others of dissimilar parts.

LXXIII. Among existing things, some are divisible and some are indivisible. Divisible things can consist of either similar or different parts. Indivisible things have no separate parts and are not made from any combination, like unity, a point, or a sound. Divisible things are created by some combination; for example, syllables, symphonies, animals, water, and gold. These consist of similar parts, made up of particles that look alike, so the whole doesn’t differ from any part, except in number. For instance, water and gold, and anything that can be melted, and so on. On the other hand, some consist of dissimilar parts, made up of various things that don’t resemble each other; for example, a house and other similar things. Therefore, of existing things, some are divisible and others are indivisible. Among those that are divisible, some have similar parts while others have dissimilar parts.

LXXIV. Again, of existing things, some are spoken of as having an independent, and some only a relative existence. Those which are spoken of as having an independent existence,[151] are those which require nothing else to be added to them, when we are explaining their nature; as man, a horse, and the other animals; for these have no need of any additional explanation. But those things are said to have a relative existence which do require some additional explanation. As for instance, that which is greater than something else, or less, or swifter, or more beautiful, and so on. For that which is greater, is greater than something which is less; and that which is swifter, is swifter than something else. So that, of existing things, some are spoken of as independently, and other relatively. And thus he divided them at first, according to Aristotle.

LXXIV. Once again, among existing things, some are referred to as having an independent existence, while others have only a relative existence. Those that are considered to have an independent existence, [151] are those that don't need anything else added when we describe their nature, like humans, horses, and other animals; these don't require any further explanation. On the other hand, things described as having a relative existence do need some additional clarification. For example, something that is greater than another, or less, or faster, or more beautiful, and so on. A thing that is greater is greater compared to something that is less; and something that is faster is faster than something else. Therefore, among existing things, some are described independently, and others relatively. This is how Aristotle originally categorized them.

LXXV. There was also another man of the name of Plato, a philosopher of Rhodes, a disciple of Panætius, as Seleucus, the grammarian says in the first book of his treatise on Philosophy; and another was a Peripatetic, a pupil of Aristotle; and there was a third, a pupil of Praxiphanes; and there was besides all these, the poet of the Old Comedy.

LXXV. There was also another man named Plato, a philosopher from Rhodes, a student of Panætius, as Seleucus the grammarian mentions in the first book of his treatise on Philosophy; and another was a Peripatetic, a student of Aristotle; and there was a third, a student of Praxiphanes; and besides all these, there was the poet of the Old Comedy.


BOOK IV.

LIFE OF SPEUSIPPUS.

I. The long account which I have given of Plato was compiled to the best of my power, and in it I collected with great zeal and industry all that was reported of the man.

I. The detailed account I've provided about Plato was put together as best as I could, and in it, I gathered with a lot of enthusiasm and effort everything that was said about him.

II. And he was succeeded by Speusippus, the son of Eurymedon, and a citizen of Athens, of the Myrrhinusian burgh, and he was the son of Plato’s sister Potone.

II. He was succeeded by Speusippus, the son of Eurymedon, a citizen of Athens from the Myrrhinus area, and he was the son of Plato’s sister Potone.

III. He presided over his school for eight years, beginning to do so in the hundred and eighth olympiad. And he set up images of the Graces in the temple of the Muses, which had been built in the Academy by Plato.

III. He led his school for eight years, starting in the hundred and eighth Olympiad. He also set up statues of the Graces in the temple of the Muses, which had been built in the Academy by Plato.

IV. And he always adhered to the doctrines which had been adopted by Plato, though he was not of the same disposition as he. For he was a passionate man, and a slave to pleasure. Accordingly, they say that he once in a rage threw a puppy into a well; and that for the sake of amusement, he went all the way to Macedonia to the marriage of Cassander.

IV. He always stuck to the ideas that Plato had accepted, even though he wasn’t quite like him. He was an intense person and gave in to his desires. So, it’s said that in a fit of anger, he once tossed a puppy into a well; and that just for fun, he traveled all the way to Macedonia for Cassander’s wedding.

V. The female pupils of Plato, Lasthenea of Mantinea, and Axiothea of Phlius, are said to have become disciples of Speusippus also. And Dionysius, writing to him in a petulant manner, says, “And one may learn philosophy too from your female disciple from Arcadia; moreover, Plato used to take his pupils without exacting any fee from them; but you collect tribute from yours, whether willing or unwilling.”

V. The female students of Plato, Lasthenea from Mantinea and Axiothea from Phlius, are said to have also become disciples of Speusippus. And Dionysius, writing to him in a snarky tone, says, “You can also learn philosophy from your female student from Arcadia; besides, Plato used to teach his students for free, but you charge yours, whether they want to pay or not.”

VI. He was the first man, as Diodorus relates in the first book of his Commentaries, who investigated in his school what was common to the several sciences; and who endeavoured, as far as possible, to maintain their connection with each other. He was also the first who published those things which Isocrates called secrets, as Cæneus tells us. And the first too who found out how to make light baskets of bundles of twigs.

VI. He was the first person, as Diodorus mentions in the first book of his Commentaries, who studied in his school what was shared among different sciences; and who tried, as much as he could, to keep them connected with one another. He was also the first to publish what Isocrates referred to as secrets, as Cæneus tells us. And he was the first to figure out how to make lightweight baskets from bundles of twigs.

VII. But he became afflicted with paralysis, and sent to[153] Xenocrates inviting him to come to him, and to become his successor in his school.

VII. But he was struck by paralysis and sent to[153] Xenocrates, inviting him to come and take his place as his successor in the school.

VIII. And they say that once, when he was being borne in a carriage into the Academy, he met Diogenes, and said, “Hail;” and Diogenes replied, “I will not say hail to you, who, though in such a state as you are, endure to live.”

VIII. They say that once, while he was being carried in a carriage to the Academy, he encountered Diogenes, and said, “Hello;” to which Diogenes responded, “I won’t say hello to you, who, despite being in your condition, can still bear to live.”

IX. And at last in despair he put an end to his life, being a man of a great age. And we have written this epigram on him:—

IX. In his despair, he finally took his own life, despite being a man of great age. We've written this epigram for him:—

Had I not known Speusippus thus had died,
No one would have persuaded me that he
Was e’er akin to Plato; who would never
Have died desponding for so slight a grief.

But Plutarch, in his Life of Lysander, and again in his Life of Sylla, says that he was kept in a state of constant inflammation by lice. For he was of a weak habit of body, as Timotheus relates in his treatise on Lives.

But Plutarch, in his Life of Lysander, and again in his Life of Sylla, says that he was constantly tormented by lice. He had a frail body, as Timotheus mentions in his treatise on Lives.

X. Speusippus said to a rich man who was in love with an ugly woman, “What do you want with her? I will find you a much prettier woman for ten talents.”

X. Speusippus said to a rich man who was in love with an unattractive woman, “What do you see in her? I can find you a much more attractive woman for ten talents.”

XI. He left behind him a great number of commentaries, and many dialogues; among which was one on Aristippus; one on Riches; one on Pleasure; one on Justice; one on Philosophy; one on Friendship; one on the Gods; one called the Philosopher; one addressed to Cephalus; one called Cephalus; one called Clinomachus, or Lysias; one called the Citizen; one on the Soul; one addressed to Gryllus; one called Aristippus; one called the Test of Art. There were also Commentaries by way of dialogues; one on Art; and ten about those things which are alike in their treatment. There are also books of divisions and arguments directed to similar things; Essays on the Genera and Species of Examples; an Essay addressed to Amartyrus; a Panegyric on Plato; Letters to Dion, and Dionysius, and Philip; an Essay on Legislation. There is also, the Mathematician; the Mandrobulus; the Lysias; Definitions; and a series of Commentaries. There are in all, forty-three thousand four hundred and seventy-five lines.

XI. He left behind a significant number of commentaries and many dialogues, including one on Aristippus, one on Wealth, one on Pleasure, one on Justice, one on Philosophy, one on Friendship, one on the Gods, one titled The Philosopher, one addressed to Cephalus, one called Cephalus, one called Clinomachus or Lysias, one titled The Citizen, one on the Soul, one addressed to Gryllus, one called Aristippus, and one called The Test of Art. There were also commentaries presented as dialogues; one on Art and ten that discuss similar topics. Additionally, there are books on classifications and arguments regarding related subjects; essays on the Types and Categories of Examples; an essay addressed to Amartyrus; a tribute to Plato; letters to Dion, Dionysius, and Philip; and an essay on Legislation. There is also The Mathematician, The Mandrobulus, The Lysias, Definitions, and a series of commentaries. In total, there are forty-three thousand four hundred and seventy-five lines.

Simonides dedicated to him the Histories, in which he had related the actions of Dion and Bion. And in the second[154] book of his Commentaries, Phavorinus states that Aristotle purchased his books for three talents.

Simonides dedicated the Histories to him, where he described the deeds of Dion and Bion. In the second[154] book of his Commentaries, Phavorinus mentions that Aristotle bought his books for three talents.

XII. There was also another person of the name of Speusippus, a physician of the school of Herophilus,[34] a native of Alexandria.

XII. There was also another person named Speusippus, a doctor from the Herophilus school,[34] who was from Alexandria.

LIFE OF XENOCRATES.

I. Xenocrates was the son of Agathenor, and a native of Chalcedon. From his early youth he was a pupil of Plato, and also accompanied him in his voyages to Sicily.

I. Xenocrates was the son of Agathenor and originally from Chalcedon. From a young age, he was a student of Plato and traveled with him on his trips to Sicily.

II. He was by nature of a lazy disposition, so that they say that Plato said once, when comparing him to Aristotle,—“The one requires the spur, and the other the bridle.” And on another occasion, he said, “What a horse and what an ass am I dressing opposite to one another!”

II. He was naturally lazy, so they say that Plato once compared him to Aristotle, saying, “One needs a push, while the other needs to be held back.” And at another time, he remarked, “What a horse and what a donkey I’m trying to dress next to each other!”

III. In other respects Xenocrates was always of a solemn and grave character, so that Plato was continually saying to him,—“Xenocrates, sacrifice to the Graces.” And he spent the greater part of his time in the Academy, and whenever he was about to go into the city, they say all the turbulent and quarrelsome rabble in the city used to make way for him to pass by. And once, Phryne the courtesan wished to try him and pretending that she was pursued by some people, she fled and took refuge in his house; and he admitted her indeed, because of what was due to humanity; and as there was but one bed in the room, he, at her entreaty, allowed her to share it with him; but at last, in spite of all her entreaties, she got up and went away, without having been able to succeed in her purpose; and told those who asked her, that she had quitted a statue and not a man. But some say that the real story is, that his pupils put Lais into his bed, and that he was so continent, that he submitted to some severe operations of excision and cautery.

III. In other ways, Xenocrates was always serious and reserved, so Plato often told him, “Xenocrates, show some appreciation for the Graces.” He spent most of his time in the Academy, and whenever he was about to go into the city, it's said that the rowdy and quarrelsome crowds would clear a path for him. On one occasion, the courtesan Phryne wanted to test him, so she pretended to be chased by some people and sought refuge in his home. He let her in out of basic decency, and since there was only one bed in the room, he allowed her to share it with him at her request. However, despite all her pleas, she eventually got up and left, unable to achieve her aim, and told those who asked that she had left a statue, not a man. Some claim the real story is that his students placed Lais in his bed, and he was so self-controlled that he endured some painful medical procedures to maintain his integrity.

IV. And he was a very trustworthy man; so that, though it was not lawful for men to give evidence except on oath, the Athenians made an exception in his favour alone.

IV. He was a very trustworthy man; so much so that, even though it was not allowed for people to give evidence unless under oath, the Athenians made an exception just for him.

V. He was also a man of the most contented disposition; accordingly they say that when Alexander sent him a large sum of money, he took three thousand Attic drachmas, and sent back the rest, saying, that Alexander wanted most, as he had the greatest number of mouths to feed. And when some was sent him by Antipater, he would not accept any of it, as Myronianus tells us in his Similitudes. And once, when he gained a golden crown, in a contest as to who could drink most, which was offered in the yearly festival of the Choes by Dionysius, he went out and placed the crown at the feet of the statue of Mercury, which was at the gate, where he was also accustomed to deposit his garlands of flowers. It is said also, that he was once sent with some colleagues as an ambassador to Philip; and that they were won over by gifts, and went to his banquets and conversed with Philip; but that he would do none of these things, nor could Philip propitiate him by these means; on which account, when the other ambassadors arrived in Athens, they said that Xenocrates had gone with them to no purpose; and the people were ready to punish him; but when they had learnt from him that they had now more need than ever to look to the welfare of their city, for that Philip had already bribed all their counsellors, but that he had been unable to win him over by any means, then they say that the people honoured him with redoubled honour. They add also, that Philip said afterwards, that Xenocrates was the only one of those who had come to him who was incorruptible. And when he went as ambassador to Antipater on the subject of the Athenian captives at the time of the Samian war, and was invited by him to a banquet, he addressed him in the following lines:—

V. He was also a man with a very contented nature; so they say that when Alexander sent him a large amount of money, he took three thousand Attic drachmas and returned the rest, saying that Alexander had the greatest need, as he had the most mouths to feed. When Antipater sent him some money, he refused to accept any of it, as Myronianus tells us in his Similitudes. And once, when he won a golden crown in a drinking contest held during the annual festival of the Choes by Dionysius, he went out and placed the crown at the feet of the statue of Mercury at the gate, where he usually left his garlands of flowers. It's also said that he was sent with some colleagues as an ambassador to Philip, and while the others were won over by gifts, attending his banquets and chatting with him, he refused to take part in any of it, and Philip couldn’t sway him with these bribes. Because of this, when the other ambassadors returned to Athens, they reported that Xenocrates had gone with them to no purpose, and the people were ready to punish him. However, after learning from him that they needed to focus on the welfare of their city more than ever, since Philip had already bribed all their advisors but had been unable to win him over, the people are said to have honored him even more. They also add that Philip later remarked that Xenocrates was the only one of the ambassadors who remained incorruptible. When he went as an ambassador to Antipater regarding the Athenian captives from the Samian war and was invited to a banquet, he addressed him with the following lines:—

I answer, Goddess human, is thy breast
By justice sway’d, by tender pity prest?
Ill fits it me, whose friends are sunk to beasts,
To quaff thy bowls, or riot in thy feasts:
Me would’st thou please, for them thy cares employ,
And them to me restore, and me to joy?[35]

And Antipater, admiring the appropriateness of the quotation, immediately released them.

And Antipater, impressed by how fitting the quote was, quickly set them free.

VI. On one occasion, when a sparrow was pursued by a hawk, and flew into his bosom, he caressed it, and let it go again, saying that we ought not to betray a suppliant. And being ridiculed by Bion, he said that he would not answer him, for that tragedy, when ridiculed by comedy, did not condescend to make a reply. To one who had never learnt music, or geometry, or astronomy, but who wished to become his disciple, he said, “Be gone, for you have not yet the handles of philosophy.” But some say that he said, “Be gone, for I do not card wool here.” And when Dionysius said to Plato that some one would cut off his head, he, being present, showed his own, and said, “Not before they have cut off mine.”

VI. One time, when a sparrow was chased by a hawk and flew into his arms, he gently held it and let it go, saying that we shouldn’t betray someone who seeks our help. When Bion mocked him for this, he replied that he wouldn’t respond because tragedy doesn’t stoop to answer comedy. To someone who hadn't learned music, geometry, or astronomy but wanted to be his student, he said, “Get lost, because you’re not ready for philosophy yet.” However, some say he said, “Get lost, because I don’t deal with that nonsense here.” And when Dionysius told Plato that someone was going to cut off his head, he, being there, pointed to his own head and said, “Not before they cut off mine.”

VII. They say too that once, when Antipater had come to Athens and saluted him, he would not make him any reply before he had finished quietly the discourse which he was delivering.

VII. They also say that once, when Antipater came to Athens and greeted him, he didn’t respond until he had calmly finished the speech he was giving.

VIII. Being exceedingly devoid of every kind of pride, he often used to meditate with himself several times a day; and always allotted one hour of each day, it is said, to silence.

VIII. Being completely free of any sort of pride, he often reflected quietly several times a day; and reportedly dedicated one hour each day to silence.

IX. And he left behind him a great number of writings, and books of recommendation, and verses, which are these,—six books on Natural Philosophy; six on Wisdom; one on Riches, the Arcadian; one volume on the Indefinite; one on a Child; one on Temperance; one on the Useful; one on the Free; one on Death; one on the Voluntary; two on Friendship; one on Courtesy; two on Contraries; two on Happiness; one on Writing; one on Memory; one on Falsehood; the Callicles one; two on Prudence; one on Œconomy; one on Temperance; one on the Power of Law; one on Political Constitutions; one on Piety; one to show that Virtue may be transmitted; one about the Existent; one on Fate; one on the Passions; one on Lives; one on Unanimity; two on Pupils; one on Justice; two on Virtue; one on Species; two on Pleasure; one on Life; one on Manly Courage; one on The One; one on Ideas; one on Art; two on the Gods; two on the Soul; one on Knowledge; one on the Statesman; one on Science; one on Philosophy; one on the School of Parmenides; one the Archedemus, or an essay on Justice; one on the Good; eight of those things which concern the Intellect;[157] ten essays in solution of the difficulties which occur respecting Orations; six books on the study of Natural Philosophy; the Principal, one; one treatise on Genus and Species; one on the doctrines of the Pythagoreans; two books of Solutions; seven of Divisions; several volumes of Propositions; several also about the method of conducting Discussions. Besides all this, there are one set of fifteen volumes, and another of sixteen, on the subject of those studies which relate to Speaking; nine more which treat of Ratiocination; six books on Mathematics; two more books on subjects connected with the Intellect; five books on Geometry; one book of Reminiscences; one of Contraries; one on Arithmetic; one on the Contemplation of Numbers; one on Intervals; six on Astronomy; four of elementary suggestions to Alexander, on the subject of Royal Power; one addressed to Arybas; one addressed to Hephæstion; two on Geometry; seven books of Verses.

IX. He left behind a large collection of writings, recommendation letters, and poems, which include: six books on Natural Philosophy; six on Wisdom; one on Wealth, titled "The Arcadian"; one volume on the Indefinite; one on Childhood; one on Temperance; one on Practical Matters; one on Freedom; one on Death; one on Free Will; two on Friendship; one on Courtesy; two on Opposites; two on Happiness; one on Writing; one on Memory; one on Falsehood; the one on Callicles; two on Prudence; one on Economics; one on Temperance; one on the Power of Law; one on Political Systems; one on Piety; one which argues that Virtue can be passed down; one about Existence; one on Fate; one on Emotions; one on Lives; one on Harmony; two on Students; one on Justice; two on Virtue; one on Species; two on Pleasure; one on Life; one on Courage; one on The One; one on Ideas; one on Art; two on the Gods; two on the Soul; one on Knowledge; one on the Statesman; one on Science; one on Philosophy; one on Parmenides' School; one on Justice, titled "The Archedemus"; one on the Good; eight on matters concerning the Intellect; ten essays addressing the challenges related to Oratory; six books on Natural Philosophy; one key book; one treatise on Genus and Species; one on Pythagorean doctrines; two books of Solutions; seven on Divisions; several volumes of Propositions; and several about the method of conducting Discussions. Additionally, there is one set of fifteen volumes and another set of sixteen, focused on the studies related to Speaking; nine more that explore Reasoning; six books on Mathematics; two more related to the Intellect; five books on Geometry; one book of Reminiscences; one on Opposites; one on Arithmetic; one on the Study of Numbers; one on Intervals; six on Astronomy; four elementary suggestions addressed to Alexander about Royal Authority; one addressed to Arybas; one addressed to Hephæstion; two on Geometry; and seven books of Verses.

X. But the Athenians, though he was such a great man, once sold him, because he was unable to pay the tax to which the metics were liable. And Demetrius Phalereus purchased him, and so assisted both parties, Xenocrates by giving him his freedom, and the Athenians in respect of the tax upon metics. This circumstance is mentioned by Myronianus of Amastra, in the first book of his chapters of Historical Coincidences.

X. But the Athenians, despite him being such a remarkable individual, once sold him because he couldn't pay the tax that metics were required to cover. Demetrius Phalereus bought him, which helped both sides: Xenocrates was granted his freedom, and the Athenians received payment for the metic tax. This event is noted by Myronianus of Amastra in the first book of his chapters on Historical Coincidences.

XI. He succeeded Speusippus, and presided over the school for twenty-five years, beginning at the archonship of Lysimachides, in the second year of the hundred and tenth olympiad.

XI. He succeeded Speusippus and led the school for twenty-five years, starting from the archonship of Lysimachides in the second year of the one hundred and tenth Olympiad.

XII. And he died in consequence of stumbling by night against a dish, being more than eighty-two years of age. And in one of our epigrams we speak thus of him:—

XII. And he died after tripping over a dish at night, being over eighty-two years old. And in one of our poems, we say this about him:—

He struck against a brazen pot,
And cut his forehead deep,
And crying cruel is my lot,
In death he fell asleep.
So thus Xenocrates did fall,
The universal friend of all.

XIII. And there were five other people of the name of Xenocrates. One was an ancient tactician, a fellow citizen, and very near relation of the philosopher of whom we have been speaking; and there is extant an oration of his which is scribed, On Arsinoe, and which was written on the death of[158] Arsinoe. A third was a philosopher who wrote some very indifferent elegiac poetry; and that is not strange, for when poets take to writing in prose, they succeed pretty well; but when prose writers try their hand at poetry, they fail; from which it is plain, that the one is a gift of nature, and the other a work of art. The fourth was a statuary; the fifth a writer of songs, as we are told by Aristoxenus.

XIII. There were five other people named Xenocrates. One was an ancient strategist, a fellow citizen and very close relative of the philosopher we've been discussing; there is a surviving speech of his titled On Arsinoe, which he wrote after the death of [158] Arsinoe. The third was a philosopher who wrote some pretty mediocre elegiac poetry; this isn't surprising, because when poets switch to prose, they usually do well, but when prose writers try their hand at poetry, they often fail. This shows that poetry is a natural talent, while prose is a skill that can be learned. The fourth was a sculptor, and the fifth was a songwriter, as noted by Aristoxenus.

LIFE OF POLEMO.

I. Polemo was the son of Philostratus, an Athenian, of the burgh of Œa. And when he was young, he was so very intemperate and profligate, that he used always to carry money about with him, to procure the instant gratification of his passions; and he used also to hide money in the narrow alleys, for this purpose. And once there was found in the Academy a piece of three obols, hidden against one of the columns, which he had put there for some purpose like that which I have indicated; and on one occasion he arranged beforehand with some young men, and rushed, adorned with a garland, and drunk, into the school of Xenocrates. But he took no notice of him, and continued his discourse as he had begun it, and it was in praise of temperance; and the young man, hearing it, was gradually charmed, and became so industrious, that he surpassed all the rest of the disciples, and himself became the successor of Xenocrates, in his school beginning in the hundred and sixteenth olympiad.

I. Polemo was the son of Philostratus, an Athenian from the town of Œa. When he was young, he was extremely indulgent and reckless, always carrying money with him to satisfy his desires immediately. He even hid money in narrow alleys for this purpose. At one point, a piece of three obols was found in the Academy, hidden against one of the columns, placed there by him for a similar reason. On another occasion, he planned in advance with some young men and barged into Xenocrates's school, decked out in a garland and drunk. However, Xenocrates didn’t acknowledge him and continued his lecture as if nothing happened, discussing the virtues of self-control. Listening to him, Polemo gradually became inspired, worked hard, and ended up surpassing all his peers. He eventually took over as the leader of Xenocrates's school, starting in the hundred and sixteenth Olympiad.

II. And Antigonus, of Carystus, says in his Lives, that his father had been the chief man of the city, and had kept chariots for the Olympic games.

II. Antigonus from Carystus mentions in his Lives that his father was the leading figure in the city and had provided chariots for the Olympic games.

III. He also asserts that Polemo was prosecuted by his wife, on the charge of ill-treatment, because he indulged in illicit pleasures, and despised her.

III. He also claims that Polemo was accused by his wife of mistreatment because he indulged in forbidden pleasures and looked down on her.

IV. But that when he began to devote himself to philosophy, he adopted such a rigorous system of morals, that he for the future always continued the same in appearance, and never even changed his voice, on which account Crantor was charmed by him. Accordingly, on one occasion, when a dog was mad and had bitten his leg, he was the only person who did not turn[159] pale; and once, when there was a great confusion in the city, he, having heard the cause, remained where he was without fleeing. In the theatres too he was quite immoveable; accordingly, when Nicostratus the poet, who was surnamed Clytæmnestra, was once reading something to him and Crates, the latter was excited to sympathy, he behaved as though he heard nothing. And altogether, he was such as Melanthius, the painter, describes in his treatise on Painting; for he says that some kind of obstinacy and harshness ought to exist in works of art as in morals.

IV. When he started focusing on philosophy, he adopted such a strict moral code that he consistently maintained the same demeanor and never even altered his voice, which is why Crantor admired him. One time, when a rabid dog bit him on the leg, he was the only person who didn’t go pale; and once, during a major disturbance in the city, he stayed put after learning what happened instead of running away. In the theaters, he remained completely still; so much so that when the poet Nicostratus, nicknamed Clytæmnestra, was reading something to him and Crates, who was moved by it, he acted like he didn’t hear a thing. Overall, he was just as Melanthius, the painter, describes in his book on Painting, where he mentions that a certain level of stubbornness and severity should be present in art just like in morals.

And Polemo used to say that a man ought to exercise himself in action, and not in dialectic speculations, as if one had drunk in and dwelt upon a harmonious kind of system of art, so as to be admired for one’s shrewdness, in putting questions; but to be inconsistent with one’s self in character. He was, then, a well-bred and high-spirited man, avoiding what Aristophanes says of Euripides, speeches of vinegar and assafœtida, such as he says himself:—

And Polemo used to say that a person should focus on taking action instead of just getting caught up in theoretical debates, as if one had simply absorbed a beautiful system of art, aiming to be admired for clever questioning while being inconsistent in character. He was, in fact, a refined and spirited individual, steering clear of what Aristophanes critiques about Euripides, warnings of bitter and unpleasant speeches, much like Euripides himself said:—

Are base delights compared with better things?

V. And he did not use to lecture on the propositions before him while sitting down; but he would walk about, it is said, and so discuss them. And he was much honoured in the city because of his noble sentiments; and after he had been walking about, he would rest in his garden; and his pupils erected little cabins near it, and dwelt near his school and corridor.

V. He didn’t usually lecture on the topics in front of him while sitting; instead, he would walk around and discuss them. He was greatly respected in the city for his admirable ideas, and after walking, he would relax in his garden. His students built small cabins nearby and lived close to his school and corridor.

VI. And as it seems, Polemo imitated Xenocrates in everything; and Aristippus, in the fourth book of his treatise on Ancient Luxury, says that Xenocrates loved him; at all events, Polemo used to be always speaking of him, and praising his guileless nature, and his rigorous virtues, and his chaste severity, like that of a Doric building.

VI. It seems that Polemo copied Xenocrates in every way; and Aristippus, in the fourth book of his work on Ancient Luxury, states that Xenocrates loved him. In any case, Polemo often talked about him, praising his sincere character, strict virtues, and pure severity, similar to that of a Doric structure.

VII. He was also very fond of Sophocles, and especially of those passages where, according to one of the comic poets, he seemed to have had a Molossian hound for his colleague in composing his poems; and when there was, to use the expression of Phrynichus:—

VII. He was also very fond of Sophocles, especially those parts where, as one of the comic poets put it, it seemed like he had a Molossian hound helping him write his poems; and when there was, to use Phrynichus's expression:—

No sweet or washy liquor, but purest Pramnian wine.

And he used to say that Homer was an epic Sophocles, and Sophocles a tragic Homer.

And he used to say that Homer was an epic version of Sophocles, and Sophocles was a tragic version of Homer.

VIII. And he died when he was very old, of decline, having[160] left behind him a great number of writings. And there is this epigram of ours upon him:—

VIII. And he died at a very old age from natural causes, having[160] left behind a substantial body of work. And here is our epigram about him:—

Do you not hear, we’ve buried Polemo,
Whom sickness, worst affliction of mankind
Attacked, and bore off to the shades below;
Yet Polemo lies not here, but Polemo’s body
And that he did himself place here on earth,
Prepared in soul to mount up to the skies.

LIFE OF CRATES.

I. Crates was the son of Antigenes, and of the Thriasian burgh, and a pupil and attached friend of Polemo. He was also his successor as president of his school.

I. Crates was the son of Antigenes, from the Thriasian town, and a student and close friend of Polemo. He also succeeded him as the head of his school.

II. And they benefited one another so much, that not only did they delight while alive in the same pursuits, but almost to their latest breath did they resemble one another, and even after they were both dead they shared the same tomb. In reference to which circumstance Antagoras has written an epigram on the pair, in which he expresses himself thus:—

II. And they helped each other so much that not only did they enjoy the same activities while they were alive, but they also almost mirrored each other right up until their last breath. Even after they both died, they shared the same tomb. Regarding this, Antagoras wrote an epigram about the two, in which he expressed himself like this:—

Stranger, who passest by, relate that here
The God-like Crates lies, and Polemo;
Two men of kindred nobleness of mind;
Out of whose holy mouths pure wisdom flowed,
And they with upright lives did well display,
The strength of all their principles and teaching.

And they say too that it was in reference to this that Arcesilaus, when he came over to them from Theophrastus, said that they were some gods, or else a remnant of the golden race; for they were not very fond of courting the people, but had a disposition in accordance with the saying of Dionysodorus the flute player, who is reported to have said, with great exultation and pride, that no one had ever heard his music in a trireme or at a fountain as they had heard Ismenius.

And they also say that Arcesilaus, when he joined them from Theophrastus, remarked that they were either gods or a leftover from the golden age; because they weren't really into seeking the people's favor, but instead had a character that matched what Dionysodorus the flute player is said to have proudly declared, that no one had ever heard his music on a trireme or at a fountain like they had heard Ismenius.

III. Antigonus relates that he used to be a messmate of Crantor, and that these philosophers and Arcesilaus lived together; and that Arcesilaus lived in Crantor’s house, but that Polemo and Crates lived in the house of one of the citizens,[161] named Lysicles; and he says that Crates was, as I have already mentioned, greatly attached to Polemo, and so was Arcesilaus to Crantor.

III. Antigonus shares that he used to be a dining companion of Crantor and that these philosophers, along with Arcesilaus, lived together; he also mentions that Arcesilaus stayed in Crantor’s house, while Polemo and Crates resided in the home of a local citizen, named Lysicles. He notes that Crates, as I’ve already mentioned, was very close to Polemo, and so was Arcesilaus to Crantor.[161]

IV. But when Crates died, as Apollodorus relates in the third book of his Chronicles, he left behind him compositions, some on philosophical subjects and some on comedy, and some which were speeches addressed to assemblies of the people, or delivered on the occasion of embassies.

IV. But when Crates died, as Apollodorus mentions in the third book of his Chronicles, he left behind writings, some on philosophical topics, some on comedy, and some that were speeches meant for public gatherings or delivered during diplomatic missions.

V. He also left behind him some eminent disciples, among whom were Arcesilaus, about whom we shall speak presently, for he too was a pupil of his, and Bion of the Borysthenes, who was afterwards called a Theodorean, from the sect which he espoused, and we shall speak of him immediately after Arcesilaus.

V. He also had some notable students, including Arcesilaus, who we'll discuss shortly, as he was also one of his students, and Bion of Borysthenes, who later became known as a Theodorean because of the philosophy he adopted. We'll talk about him right after Arcesilaus.

VI. But there were ten people of the name of Crates. The first was a poet of the old comedy; the second was an orator of Tralles, a pupil of Isocrates; the third was an engineer who served under Alexander; the fourth a Cynic, whom we shall mention hereafter; the fifth a Peripatetic philosopher; the sixth the Academic philosopher, of whom we are speaking; the seventh a grammarian of Malos; the eighth a writer in geometry; the ninth an epigrammatic poet; the tenth was an Academic philosopher, a native of Tarsus.

VI. There were ten people named Crates. The first was a poet from the old comedy; the second was an orator from Tralles, a student of Isocrates; the third was an engineer who worked under Alexander; the fourth was a Cynic, whom we will mention later; the fifth was a Peripatetic philosopher; the sixth was the Academic philosopher we’re discussing; the seventh was a grammarian from Malos; the eighth was a writer on geometry; the ninth was an epigrammatic poet; and the tenth was an Academic philosopher from Tarsus.

LIFE OF CRANTOR.

I. Crantor, a native of Soli, being admired very greatly in his own country, came to Athens and became a pupil of Xenocrates at the same time with Polemo.

I. Crantor, who was from Soli and highly respected in his homeland, came to Athens and became a student of Xenocrates alongside Polemo.

II. And he left behind him memorials, in the shape of writings, to the number of 30,000 lines, some of which, however, are by some writers attributed to Arcesilaus.

II. And he left behind him records, totaling 30,000 lines of writing, although some of these are attributed by certain writers to Arcesilaus.

III. They say of him that when he was asked what it was that he was so charmed with in Polemo, he replied, “That he had never heard him speak in too high or too low a key.”

III. People say that when he was asked what he found so charming about Polemo, he replied, “That he had never heard him speak in too high or too low a tone.”

IV. When he was ill he retired to the temple of Æsculapius, and there walked about, and people came to him from all quarters, thinking that he had gone thither, not on account of[162] any disease, but because he wished to establish a school there.

IV. When he was sick, he went to the temple of Æsculapius, where he walked around, and people from all over came to see him, believing he had gone there not because of a sickness, but because he wanted to start a school there.

V. And among those who came to him was Arcesilaus, wishing to be recommended by him to Polemo, although he was much attached to him, as we shall mention in the life of Arcesilaus. But when he got well he became a pupil of Polemo, and was excessively admired on that account. It is said, also, that he left his property to Arcesilaus, to the amount of twelve talents; and that, being asked by him where he would like to be buried, he said:—

V. Among those who came to him was Arcesilaus, wanting a recommendation to Polemo, even though he was quite fond of him, as we’ll discuss in the life of Arcesilaus. But once he recovered, he became a student of Polemo and was highly praised for it. It’s also said that he left his wealth to Arcesilaus, totaling twelve talents; and when Arcesilaus asked him where he would like to be buried, he replied:—

It is a happy fate to lie entombed
In the recesses of a well-lov’d land.

VI. It is said also that he wrote poems, and that he sealed them up in the temple of Minerva, in his own country; and Theætetus the poet wrote thus about him:—

VI. It’s also said that he wrote poems and sealed them in the temple of Minerva in his homeland; and Theætetus the poet wrote this about him:—

Crantor pleased men; but greater pleasure still
He to the Muses gave, ere he aged grew.
Earth, tenderly embrace the holy man,
And let him lie in quiet undisturb’d.

And of all writers, Crantor admired Homer and Euripides most; saying that the hardest thing possible was to write tragically and in a manner to excite sympathy, without departing from nature; and he used to quote this line out of the Bellerophon:—

And among all writers, Crantor admired Homer and Euripides the most; he said that the hardest thing to do was to write tragically and in a way that evokes sympathy, without straying from nature; and he would often quote this line from the Bellerophon:—

Alas! why should I say alas! for we
Have only borne the usual fate of man.

The following verses of Antagoras the poet are also attributed to Crantor; the subject is love, and they run thus:—

The following verses by the poet Antagoras are also credited to Crantor; the topic is love, and they go like this:—

My mind is much perplexed; for what, O Love,
Dare I pronounce your origin? May I
Call you chiefest of the immortal Gods,
Of all the children whom dark Erebus
And Royal Night bore on the billowy waves
Of widest Ocean? Or shall I bid you hail,
As son of proudest Venus? or of Earth?
Or of the untamed winds? so fierce you rove,
Bringing mankind sad cares, yet not unmixed
With happy good, so two-fold is your nature.

And he was very ingenious at devising new words and expressions; accordingly, he said that one tragedian had an unhewn (ἀπελέκητος) voice, all over bark; and he said that the[163] verses of a certain poet were full of moths; and that the propositions of Theophrastus had been written on an oyster shell. But the work of his which is most admired is his book on Mourning.

And he was really clever at coming up with new words and phrases; for example, he said that one actor had a raw, rough voice, like bark, and he commented that the verses of a particular poet were full of flaws, like moths. He also noted that Theophrastus's ideas were written on an oyster shell. But the work he is most admired for is his book on Mourning.

VII. And he died before Polemo and Crates, having been attacked by the dropsy; and we have written this epigram on him:—

VII. And he died in front of Polemo and Crates, having suffered from dropsy; and we have written this epigram about him:—

The worst of sicknesses has overwhelmed you,
O Crantor, and you thus did quit the earth,
Descending to the dark abyss of Hell.
Now you are happy there; but all the while
The sad Academy, and your native land
Of Soli mourn, bereaved of your eloquence.

LIFE OF ARCESILAUS.

I. Arcesilaus was the son of Seuthes or Scythes, as Apollodorus states in the third book of his Chronicles, and a native of Pitane in Æolia.

I. Arcesilaus was the son of Seuthes or Scythes, as Apollodorus states in the third book of his Chronicles, and a native of Pitane in Æolia.

II. He was the original founder of the Middle Academy, and the first man who professed to suspend the declaration of his judgment, because of the contrarieties of the reasons alleged on either side. He was likewise the first who attempted to argue on both sides of a question, and who also made the method of discussion, which had been handed down by Plato, by means of question and answer, more contentious than before.

II. He was the original founder of the Middle Academy and the first person to say he would hold off on making a judgment because of the conflicting reasons presented on both sides. He was also the first to try to argue both sides of a question and made the method of discussion, which had been passed down from Plato through questions and answers, more contentious than it had been before.

III. He met with Crantor in the following manner. He was one of four brothers, two by the same father and two by the same mother. Of those who were by the same mother the eldest was Pylades, and of those by the same father the eldest was Mœreas, who was his guardian; and at first he was a pupil of Autolycus the mathematician, who happened to be a fellow citizen of his before he went to Athens; and with Autolycus he travelled as far as Sardis. After that he became a pupil of Xanthus the musician, and after that attended the lectures of Theophrastus, and subsequently came over to the Academy to Crantor. For Mœreas his brother, whom I have mentioned[164] before, urged him to apply himself to rhetoric; but he himself had a preference for philosophy, and when he became much attached to him Crantor asked him, quoting a line out of the Andromeda of Euripides:—

III. He met with Crantor in the following way. He was one of four brothers: two from the same father and two from the same mother. Among the brothers from the same mother, the eldest was Pylades, and among those from the same father, the eldest was Mœreas, who was his guardian. Initially, he was a student of Autolycus the mathematician, who happened to be a fellow citizen of his before he went to Athens; and he traveled with Autolycus as far as Sardis. After that, he studied under Xanthus the musician, and then attended lectures by Theophrastus, before finally joining Crantor at the Academy. Mœreas, the brother I mentioned earlier, urged him to focus on rhetoric; however, he preferred philosophy, and as he grew closer to Crantor, Crantor quoted a line from Euripides' Andromeda:—

O virgin, if I save you, will you thank me?

And he replied by quoting the next line to it:—

And he responded by quoting the next line:—

O take me to you, stranger, as your slave,
Or wife, or what you please.

And ever after that they became very intimate, so that they say Theophrastus was much annoyed, and said, “That a most ingenious and well-disposed young man had deserted his school.”

And from then on, they became very close, to the point where people say Theophrastus was quite upset and remarked, “That a very clever and good-hearted young man had abandoned his studies.”

IV. For he was not only very impressive in his discourse, and displayed a great deal of learning in it, but he also tried his hand at poetry, and there is extant an epigram which is attributed to him, addressed to Attalus, which is as follows:—

IV. For he was not only very impressive in his speech, and showed a lot of knowledge in it, but he also tried his hand at poetry, and there is a surviving epigram that is attributed to him, addressed to Attalus, which is as follows:—

Pergamus is not famed for arms alone,
But often hears its praise resound
For its fine horses, at the holy Pisa.
Yet, if a mortal may declare,
Its fate as hidden in the breast of Jove,
It will be famous for its woes.

There is another addressed to Menodorus the son of Eudamus, who was attached to one of his fellow pupils:—

There’s another one addressed to Menodorus, the son of Eudamus, who was connected to one of his classmates:—

Phrygia is a distant land, and so
Is sacred Thyatira, and Cadanade,
Your country Menodorus. But from all,
As the unvaried song of bards relates,
An equal road does lie to Acheron,
That dark unmentioned river; so you lie
Here far from home; and here Eudamus raises
This tomb above your bones, for he did love you,
Though you were poor, with an undying love.

But he admired Homer above all poets, and always used to read a portion of his works before going to sleep; and in the morning he would say that he was going to the object of his love, when he was going to read him. He said, too, that Pindar was a wonderful man for filling the voice, and pouring[165] forth an abundant variety of words and expressions. He also, when he was a young man, wrote a criticism on Ion.

But he admired Homer more than any other poet and always read a bit of his work before going to sleep. In the morning, he'd say he was heading to see his true love when he meant he was going to read him. He also mentioned that Pindar was amazing for his rich voice and had a great talent for expressing a wide variety of words and ideas. When he was younger, he wrote a critique of Ion.

V. And he was a pupil likewise of Hipponicus, the geometrican whom he used to ridicule on other points as being lazy and gaping; but he admitted that in his own profession he was clear sighted enough, and said that geometry had flown into his mouth while he was yawning. And when he went out of his mind, he took him to his own house, and took care of him till he recovered his senses.

V. He was also a student of Hipponicus, the geometer, whom he often mocked for being lazy and dopey. However, he acknowledged that Hipponicus was quite sharp in his own field and joked that geometry had entered his mind while he was yawning. When he lost his mind, he brought him to his own home and looked after him until he regained his senses.

VI. And when Crates died, he succeeded him in the presidency of his schools, a man of the name of Socrates willingly yielding to him.

VI. When Crates died, a man named Socrates willingly stepped aside so that he could take over as head of the schools.

VII. And as he suspended his judgment on every point, he never, as it is said, wrote one single book. But others say that he was once detected correcting some passages in a work of his; and some assert that he published it, while others deny it, and affirm that he threw it into the fire.

VII. He held back his opinion on everything, and because of that, it’s said he never wrote a single book. However, some claim he was caught revising parts of a piece he had written; some say he released it, while others argue he burned it.

VIII. He seems to have been a great admirer of Plato, and he possessed all his writings. He also, according to some authorities, had a very high opinion of Pyrrho.

VIII. He appears to have been a big fan of Plato, and he had all of his writings. He also, according to some sources, had a very high regard for Pyrrho.

IX. He also studied dialectics, and the discussions of the Eretrian school; on which account Ariston said of him:—

IX. He also studied dialectics and the discussions of the Eretrian school; for this reason, Ariston said of him:—

First Plato comes, and Pyrrho last,
And in the middle Diodorus.

And Timon speaks thus of him:—

And Timon says this about him:—

For having on this side the heavy load
Of Menedemus plac’d beneath his breast,
He’ll to stout Pyrrho run, or Diodorus.

And presently afterwards he represents him as saying:—

And shortly after, he depicts him as saying:—

I’ll swim to Pyrrho, or that crooked sophist
Called Diodorus.

X. He was exceedingly fond of employing axioms, very concise in his diction, and when speaking he laid an emphasis on each separate word.

X. He really loved using maxims, was very brief in his language, and when he spoke, he emphasized each word.

XI. He was also very fond of attacking others, and very free spoken, on which account Timon in another passage speaks of him thus:—

XI. He also loved to criticize others and was quite outspoken, which is why Timon mentions him this way in another part:—

You’ll not escape all notice while you thus
Attack the young man with your biting sarcasm.

Once, when a young man was arguing against him with more boldness than usual, he said, “Will no one stop his mouth with the knout?”[36] And to a man who lay under the general imputation of low debauchery, and who argued with him that one thing was not greater than another, he asked him whether a cup holding two pints was not larger than one which held only one. There was a certain Chian named Hemon, exceedingly ugly, but who fancied himself good looking, and always went about in fine clothes; this man asked him one day, “If he thought that a wise man could feel attachment to him;” “Why should he not,” said he, “when they love even those who are less handsome than you, and not so well-dressed either?” and when the man, though one of the vilest characters possible, said to Arcesilaus as if he were addressing a very rigid man:—

Once, when a young man argued with him more boldly than usual, he said, “Will no one shut him up?”[36] And to a guy who was widely known for his low behavior, and who argued that one thing wasn’t bigger than another, he asked him if a cup that holds two pints isn’t larger than one that holds just one. There was a guy from Chios named Hemon, really ugly, but he thought he was good-looking and always paraded around in nice clothes; this guy asked him one day, “Do you think a wise man could care about me?” “Why wouldn’t he?” he replied, “They even love those who are less attractive than you, and not as well-dressed either.” And when the guy, despite being one of the worst characters possible, spoke to Arcesilaus as if he were addressing a very strict man:—

O, noble man, may I a question put,
Or must I hold my tongue?

Arcesilaus replied:—

Arcesilaus responded:—

O wretched woman, why do you thus roughen
Your voice, not speaking in your usual manner?

And once, when he was plagued by a chattering fellow of low extraction, he said:—

And once, when he was bothered by a talkative guy from a lower class, he said:—

The sons of slaves are always talking vilely.[37]

Another time, when a talkative man was giving utterance to a great deal of nonsense, he said, that “He had not had a nurse who was severe enough.” And to some people he never gave any answer at all. On one occasion a usurer, who made pretence to some learning, said in his hearing that he did not know something or other, on which he rejoined:—

Another time, when a chatty guy was rambling on about a lot of nonsense, he said that “He hadn’t had a nurse who was strict enough.” And to some people, he didn’t respond at all. One time a moneylender, who pretended to be knowledgeable, said in his presence that he didn’t know something or other, to which he responded:—

For often times the passing winds do fill
The female bird, except when big with young.[38]

And the lines come out of the Œnomaus of Sophocles. He once reminded a certain dialectician, a pupil of Alexinus, who was unable to explain correctly some saying of his master, of what had been done by Philoxenus to some brick-makers. For when they were singing some of his songs very badly he came upon them, and trampled their bricks under foot, saying, “As you spoil my works so will I spoil yours.”

And the lines come from the Œnomaus of Sophocles. He once reminded a certain dialectician, a student of Alexinus, who couldn’t explain a saying of his master correctly, of what Philoxenus did to some brick-makers. When they were singing some of his songs very poorly, he found them and trampled their bricks, saying, “Just as you ruin my works, I will ruin yours.”

XII. And he used to be very indignant with those who neglected proper opportunities of applying themselves to learning; and he had a peculiar habit, while conversing, of using the expression, “I think,” and “So and so,” naming the person, “will not agree to this.” And this was imitated by several of his pupils, who copied also his style of expression and everything about him. He was a man very ready at inventing new words, and very quick at meeting objections, and at bringing round the conversation to the subject before him, and at adapting it to every occasion, and he was the most convincing speaker that could be found, on which account numbers of people flocked to his school, in spite of being somewhat alarmed at his severity, which however they bore with complacency, for he was a very kind man, and one who inspired his hearers with abundant hope, and in his manner of life he was very affable and liberal, always ready to do any one a service without any parade, and shrinking from any expression of gratitude on the part of those whom he had obliged. Accordingly once, when he had gone to visit Ctesibius who was ill, seeing him in great distress from want, he secretly slipped his purse under his pillow; and when Ctesibius found it, “This,” said he, “is the amusement of Arcesilaus.” And at another time he sent him a thousand drachmas. He it was also who introduced Archias the Arcadian to Eumenes, and who procured him many favours from him.

XII. He often got really upset with those who missed good chances to focus on learning; he had this unique habit of saying, “I think,” followed by “So and so,” naming the person, “won't agree with this.” Several of his students picked up on this and imitated his way of speaking and everything about him. He was great at coming up with new words, quick to tackle objections, and skilled at steering the conversation back to the topic at hand, adapting it for different situations. He was one of the most persuasive speakers around, which is why so many people came to his school, even though they were a bit intimidated by his strictness, which they accepted because he was genuinely kind and gave his listeners a strong sense of hope. In his daily life, he was very friendly and generous, always willing to help others without showing off, and he avoided any displays of gratitude from those he had assisted. For example, one time when he visited Ctesibius, who was sick, and saw him suffering from poverty, he secretly put his purse under Ctesibius's pillow. When Ctesibius discovered it, he said, “This is the amusement of Arcesilaus.” On another occasion, he sent him a thousand drachmas. He was also the one who introduced Archias the Arcadian to Eumenes and helped him get many favors from him.

XIII. And being a very liberal man and utterly regardless of money, he made the most splendid display of silver plate, and in his exhibition of gold plate he vied with that of Archecrates and Callicrates; and he was constantly assisting and contributing to the wants of others with money; and once, when some one had borrowed from him some articles of silver plate to help him entertain his friends, and did not offer to return them, he never asked for them back or reclaimed them; but some say that he lent them with the purpose that they[168] should be kept, and that when the man returned them, he made him a present of them as he was a poor man. He had also property in Pitana, the revenues from which were transmitted to him by his brother Pylades.

XIII. Being a very generous man who didn’t care about money, he put on an impressive display of silver plates, and when it came to gold plates, he compared himself with Archecrates and Callicrates; he was always helping others financially. One time, someone borrowed some silver plates from him to entertain friends and didn’t offer to return them. He never asked for them back or tried to reclaim them; however, some say that he lent them with the intention that they should be kept, and when the man returned them, he gave them to him as a gift since he was poor. He also owned property in Pitana, and the income from it was sent to him by his brother Pylades.

XIV. Moreover, Eumenes, the son of Philetærus, supplied him with many things, on which account he was the only king to whom he addressed any of his discourses. And when many philosophers paid court to Antigonus and went out to meet him when he arrived, he himself kept quiet, not wishing to make his acquaintance. But he was a great friend of Hierocles, the governor of the harbours of Munychia and the Piræus; and at festivals he always paid him a visit. And when he constantly endeavoured to persuade him to pay his respects to Antigonus, he would not; but though he accompanied him as far as his gates, he turned back himself. And after the sea-fight of Antigonus, when many people went to him and wrote him letters to comfort him for his defeat, he neither went nor wrote; but still in the service of his country, he went to Demetrias as ambassador to Antigonus, and succeeded in the object of his mission.

XIV. Additionally, Eumenes, the son of Philetærus, provided him with many resources, which is why he was the only king to whom he spoke. When numerous philosophers sought Antigonus's favor and went out to greet him upon his arrival, he remained silent, preferring not to make his acquaintance. However, he was a close friend of Hierocles, the governor of the harbors of Munychia and the Piraeus; he always visited him during festivals. Despite Hierocles's persistent attempts to convince him to show respect to Antigonus, he refused; although he accompanied Hierocles to his gates, he turned back. After Antigonus's naval battle, when many people approached him and sent letters to comfort him for his defeat, he neither visited nor replied. Nevertheless, in service to his country, he went to Demetrias as an ambassador to Antigonus and successfully accomplished his mission.

XV. And he spent all his time in the Academy, and avoided meddling with public affairs, but at times he would spend some days in the Piræus of Athens, discoursing on philosophical subjects, from his friendship for Hierocles, which conduct of his gave rise to unfavourable reports being raised against him by some people.

XV. He spent all his time at the Academy and stayed away from public affairs, but occasionally he would spend a few days in the Piraeus of Athens, discussing philosophical topics out of his friendship for Hierocles. This behavior led some people to spread negative rumors about him.

XVI. Being a man of very expensive habits, for he was in this respect a sort of second Aristippus, he often went to dine with his friends. He also lived openly with Theodote and Philæte, two courtesans of Elis; and to those who reproached him for this conduct, he used to quote the opinions of Aristippus. He was also very fond of the society of young men, and of a very affectionate disposition, on which account Aristo, the Chian, a Stoic philosopher, used to accuse him of being a corrupter of the youth of the city, and a profligate man. He is said also to have been greatly attached to Demetrius, who sailed to Cyrene, and to Cleochares of Myrlea, of whom he said to his messmates, that he wished to open the door to him, but that he prevented him.

XVI. He had very expensive tastes and was somewhat of a modern Aristippus, often dining out with his friends. He openly lived with Theodote and Philæte, two courtesans from Elis, and when people criticized him for this, he would reference the views of Aristippus. He enjoyed spending time with young men and was very affectionate, which led Aristo, the Chian Stoic philosopher, to accuse him of corrupting the youth of the city and being a worthless man. It’s also said that he was very attached to Demetrius, who sailed to Cyrene, and to Cleochares of Myrlea; he told his companions that he wanted to help him out but was prevented from doing so.

XVII. Demochares the son of Laches, and Pythocles the son of Bugelus, were also among his friends, and he said that[169] he humoured them in all their wishes because of his great patience. And, on this account, those people to whom I have before alluded, used to attack him and ridicule him as a popularity hunter and vain-glorious man. And they set upon him very violently at an entertainment given by Hieronymus, the Peripatetic, when he invited his friends on the birthday of Alcyoneus, the son of Antigonus, on which occasion Antigonus sent him a large sum of money to promote the conviviality. On this occasion, as he avoided all discussion during the continuance of the banquet, when Aridelus proposed to him a question which required some deliberation, and entreated him to discourse upon it, it is said that he replied, “But this is more especially the business of philosophy, to know the proper time for everything.” With reference to the charge that was brought against him of being a popularity hunter, Timon speaks, among other matters, mentioning it in the following manner:—

XVII. Demochares, the son of Laches, and Pythocles, the son of Bugelus, were also among his friends, and he said that[169] he indulged them in all their wishes because of his great patience. Because of this, those people I mentioned earlier used to attack him and mock him as someone who craved popularity and was vain. They confronted him quite aggressively at a gathering hosted by Hieronymus, the Peripatetic, when he invited his friends to celebrate the birthday of Alcyoneus, the son of Antigonus, on which occasion Antigonus sent him a large sum of money to enhance the festivities. During the banquet, as he avoided all discussions, when Aridelus asked him a question that required some thought and urged him to elaborate, it is said that he replied, “But it is the essence of philosophy to know the right time for everything.” Regarding the accusation of him being a popularity seeker, Timon comments on it among other things, mentioning it in the following way:—

He spoke and glided quick among the crowd,
They gazed on him as finches who behold
An owl among them. You then please the people!
Alas, poor fool, ’tis no great matter that;
Why give yourself such airs for such a trifle?

XVIII. However, in all other respects he was so free from vanity, that he used to advise his pupils to become the disciples of other men; and once, when a young man from Chios was not satisfied with his school, but preferred that of Hieronymus, whom I have mentioned before, he himself took him and introduced him to that philosopher, recommending him to preserve his regularity of conduct. And there is a very witty saying of his recorded. For when some one asked him once, why people left other schools to go to the Epicureans, but no one left the Epicureans to join other sects, he replied, “People sometimes make eunuchs of men, but no one can ever make a man out of an eunuch.”

XVIII. However, in every other way, he was so free from vanity that he encouraged his students to learn from other teachers. Once, when a young man from Chios wasn’t happy with his school and preferred that of Hieronymus, whom I mentioned earlier, he personally took him to that philosopher and advised him to maintain his good behavior. He also had a very clever saying recorded. When someone asked him why people left other schools to join the Epicureans, but no one left the Epicureans for other groups, he replied, “People can sometimes make eunuchs out of men, but no one can ever make a man out of a eunuch.”

XIX. At last, when he was near his end, he left all his property to his brother Pylades, because he, without the knowledge of Mæreas, had taken him to Chios and had brought him from thence to Athens. He never married a wife, and never had any children. He made three copies of his will, and deposited one in Eretria with Amphicritus, and[170] one at Athens with some of his friends, and the third he sent to his own home to Thaumasias, one of his relations, entreating him to keep it. And he also wrote him the following letter:—

XIX. Finally, when he was close to death, he left all his belongings to his brother Pylades, who, without Mæreas knowing, had taken him to Chios and then brought him back to Athens. He never married and had no children. He made three copies of his will: one was stored in Eretria with Amphicritus, one in Athens with some friends, and the third he sent to his home with Thaumasias, a relative, asking him to keep it safe. He also wrote him the following letter:—

ARCESILAUS TO THAUMASIAS.

“I have given Diogenes a copy of my will to convey to you. For, because I am frequently unwell and have got very infirm, I have thought it right to make a will, that, if anything should happen to me I might not depart with the feelings of having done you any injury, who have been so constantly affectionate to me. And as you have been at all times the most faithful to me of all my friends, I entreat you to preserve this for me out of regard for my old age and your regard for me. Take care then to behave justly towards me, remembering how much I entrust to your integrity, so that I may appear to have managed my affairs well, as far as depends on you; and there is another copy of this will at Athens, in the care of some of my friends, and another at Eretria, in the hands of Amphicritus.”

“I’ve given Diogenes a copy of my will to pass on to you. Because I often feel unwell and have become quite fragile, I thought it was important to make a will. I want to ensure that if anything happens to me, I don’t leave with any regrets about hurting you, since you’ve always been so caring towards me. As you’ve been the most loyal of all my friends, I ask you to keep this will safe for me, out of respect for my old age and your care for me. Please make sure to act justly towards me, keeping in mind how much I rely on your integrity, so that I can seem to have managed my affairs well, as far as you’re concerned. There’s another copy of this will in Athens, with some of my friends, and another in Eretria, in the hands of Amphicritus.”

XX. He died, as Hermippus relates, after having drunk an excessive quantity of wine, and then became delirious, when he was seventy-five years old; and he was more beloved by the Athenians than any one else had ever been. And we have written the following epigram on him:—

XX. He died, as Hermippus reports, after drinking too much wine and then going into a delirium at the age of seventy-five; he was more loved by the Athenians than anyone else had ever been. And we have written the following epigram about him:—

O wise Arcesilaus, why didst thou drink
So vast a quantity of unmixed wine,
As to lose all your senses, and then die?
I pity you not so much for your death,
As for the insult that you thus did offer
The Muses, by your sad excess in wine.

XXI. There were also three other persons of the name of Arcesilaus; one a poet of the old Comedy; another an elegiac poet; the third a sculptor, on whom Simonides wrote the following epigram:—

XXI. There were also three other people named Arcesilaus; one was a poet of the old Comedy; another was an elegiac poet; and the third was a sculptor, about whom Simonides wrote the following epigram:—

This is a statue of chaste Dian’s self
The price two hundred Parian drachmas fine,
Stamp’d with the image of the wanton goat.
It is the work of wise Arcesilaus,
The son of Aristodicus: a man,
Whose hands Minerva guided in his art.

The philosopher of whom we have been speaking flourished, as Apollodorus tells us in his Chronicles, about the hundred and twentieth olympiad.

The philosopher we've been discussing thrived, as Apollodorus mentions in his Chronicles, around the hundred and twentieth Olympiad.

LIFE OF BION.

I. Bion was a native of the country around the Borysthenes; but as to who his parents were, and to what circumstances it was owing that he applied himself to the study of philosophy, we know no more than what he himself told Antigonus. For when Antigonus asked him:—

I. Bion was from the region around the Borysthenes; however, we don't know much about his parents or the reasons why he chose to study philosophy beyond what he told Antigonus. When Antigonus asked him:—

What art thou, say! from whence, from whom you came,
Who are your parents? tell thy race, thy name;[39]

He, knowing that he had been misrepresented to the king, said to him, “My father was a freedman, who used to wipe his mouth with his sleeve,” (by which he meant that he used to sell salt fish). “As to his race, he was a native of the district of the Borysthenes; having no countenance, but only a brand in his face, a token of the bitter cruelty of his master. My mother was such a woman as a man of that condition might marry, taken out of a brothel. Then, my father being in arrears to the tax-gatherers, was sold with all his family, and with me among them; and as I was young and good looking, a certain orator purchased me, and when he died he left me everything. And I, having burnt all his books, and torn up all his papers, came to Athens and applied myself to the study of Philosophy:—

He, knowing he had been misrepresented to the king, said to him, “My father was a freedman who used to wipe his mouth with his sleeve,” (which meant he sold salt fish). “As for his background, he was from the Borysthenes region; he had no facial features, just a brand on his face, a mark of his master’s cruel treatment. My mother was a woman that someone of his status might marry, taken from a brothel. Then, when my father fell behind on his taxes, he was sold with all his family, and I was among them; because I was young and attractive, a certain orator bought me, and when he died, he left me everything. Afterward, I burned all his books and tore up all his papers, came to Athens, and devoted myself to studying Philosophy:—

Such was my father, and from him I came,
The honoured author of my birth and name.[40]

This is all that I can tell you of myself: so that Persæus and Philonides may give up telling these stories about me: and you may judge of me on my own merits.”

This is everything I can share about myself: so that Persæus and Philonides will stop spreading these stories about me, and you can evaluate me based on my own qualities.

II. And Bion was truly a man of great versatility, and a very subtle philosopher, and a man who gave all who chose great opportunities of practising philosophy. In some respects he was of a gentle disposition, and very much inclined to indulge in vanity.

II. Bion was definitely a man of great versatility, a very insightful philosopher, and someone who provided anyone willing to engage with fantastic opportunities to practice philosophy. In some ways, he had a gentle nature and was quite prone to self-indulgence.

III. And he left behind him many memorials of himself in the way of writings, and also many apophthegms full of useful sentiments. As for instance, once when he was reproved for having failed to charm a young man, he replied, “You cannot possibly draw up cheese with a hook before it has got hard.” On another occasion he was asked who was the most miserable of men, and replied, “He who has set his heart on the greatest prosperity.” When he was asked whether it was advisable to marry (for this answer also is attributed to him), he replied, “If you marry an ugly woman you will have a punishment (ποινὴ), and if a handsome woman you will have one who is common” (κοινή). He called old age a port to shelter one from misfortune; and accordingly, he said that every one fled to it. He said that glory was the mother of years; that beauty was a good which concerned others rather than one’s self; that riches were the sinews of business. To a man who had squandered his estate he said, “The earth swallowed up Amphiaraus, but you have swallowed up the earth.” Another saying of his was that it was a great evil not to be able to bear evil. And he condemned those who burnt the dead as though they felt nothing, and then mocked them as though they did feel. And he was always saying that it was better to put one’s own beauty at the disposal of another, than to covet the beauty of others; for that one who did so was injuring both his body and his soul. And he used to blame Socrates saying, that if he derived no advantage from Alcibiades he was foolish, and if he never derived any advantage from him he then deserved no credit. He used to say that the way to the shades below was easy; and accordingly, that people went there with their eyes shut. He used to blame Alcibiades, saying that while he was a boy he seduced husbands from their wives, and when he had become a young man he seduced the wives from their husbands. While most of the Athenians at Rhodes practised rhetoric, he himself used to give lectures on philosophical subjects; and to one who blamed him for this he said, “I have bought wheat, and I sell barley.”

III. He left behind many reminders of himself through his writings and many sayings full of useful insights. For example, when he was criticized for not being able to charm a young man, he replied, “You can’t catch cheese with a hook before it’s firm.” On another occasion, when asked who was the most miserable person, he answered, “The one who has set his heart on achieving the greatest success.” When asked if it was a good idea to marry (this response is also attributed to him), he said, “If you marry an ugly woman you’ll be punished, and if you marry a beautiful one, you’ll end up with someone who is ordinary.” He referred to old age as a safe haven from misfortune and stated that everyone sought refuge in it. He claimed that fame was the mother of age, that beauty was something that mattered more to others than to oneself, and that wealth was essential for business. To a man who had wasted his fortune, he said, “The earth consumed Amphiaraus, but you’ve consumed the earth.” Another saying of his was that it was a serious flaw not to be able to endure misfortune. He criticized those who cremated the dead as if they felt nothing, only to mock them as if they did. He constantly said it was better to share one’s own beauty with someone else than to envy others’ beauty, as doing so harmed both the body and the soul. He used to criticize Socrates, saying that if he gained nothing from Alcibiades, he was foolish, and if he never gained anything from him, then he deserved no respect. He often remarked that the path to the underworld was easy, and therefore, people traveled there with their eyes closed. He reprimanded Alcibiades, saying that while he was a boy, he seduced husbands away from their wives, and as a young man, he seduced wives away from their husbands. While most Athenians in Rhodes practiced rhetoric, he lectured on philosophical topics, and when someone criticized him for this, he replied, “I’ve bought wheat, and I’m selling barley.”

It was a saying of his that the inhabitants of the shades below would be more punished if they carried water in buckets that were whole, than in such as were bored. To a chattering fellow who was soliciting him for aid, he said, “I will do what is sufficient for you, if you will send deputies to me, and forbear to come yourself.” Once when he was at sea in the company of some wicked men, he fell into the hands of pirates; and when the rest said, “We are undone, if we are known.” “But I,” said he, “am undone if we are not known.” He used to say that self-conceit was the enemy of progress. Of a rich man who was mean and niggardly, he said, “That man does not possess his estate, but his estate possesses him.” He used to say that stingy men took care of their property as if it was their own, but derived no advantage from it as if it belonged to other people. Another of his sayings was, that young men ought to display courage, but that old men ought to be distinguished for prudence. And that prudence was as much superior to the other virtues as sight was to the other senses. And that it was not right to speak of old age, at which every one is desirous to arrive. To an envious man who was looking gloomy, he said, “I know not whether it is because some misfortune has happened to you, or some good fortune to someone else.” One thing that he used to say was, that a mean extraction was a bad companion to freedom of speech. For:—

It was his saying that the people in the underworld would be punished more if they carried water in whole buckets than in ones that were leaky. To a chatterbox who was asking him for help, he said, “I’ll do what’s enough for you if you send representatives to me and don’t come yourself.” Once, when he was at sea with some bad people, he got captured by pirates; and when the others said, “We’re doomed if we’re recognized,” he replied, “But I’m doomed if we’re not recognized.” He used to say that self-importance was an enemy of progress. Concerning a wealthy but stingy man, he remarked, “That man doesn’t own his wealth; his wealth owns him.” He often noted that tightfisted people treated their property as if it were their own but gained no benefit from it as if it belonged to someone else. Another thing he said was that young men should show bravery, while older men should be known for their wisdom. He believed that wisdom was far superior to the other virtues, just as sight is superior to the other senses. He argued that it wasn’t right to criticize old age, a stage everyone hopes to reach. To an envious man who looked unhappy, he said, “I can’t tell if it’s because something unfortunate has happened to you or something fortunate to someone else.” One of his sayings was that a lowly background was not a good match for freedom of speech. For:—

It does enslave a man, however bold
His speech may be.[41]

And another was that we ought to keep our friends, whatever sort of people they may be, so that we may not seem to have been intimate with wicked men, or to have abandoned good men.

And another thing was that we should hold on to our friends, no matter what kind of people they are, so that we don’t come across as having been close to bad people or having given up on good people.

IV. Very early in his career he abandoned the school of the Academy, and at the same time became a disciple of Crates. Then he passed over to the sect of the Cynics, taking their coarse cloak and wallet. For what else could ever have changed his nature into one of such apathy? After that he adopted the Theodorean principles, having become a disciple of Theodorus the Atheist, who was used to employ every kind of reasoning in support of his system of philosophy. After[174] leaving him, he became a pupil of Theophrastus, the Peripatetic.

IV. Early in his career, he left the Academy and became a student of Crates. Then he joined the Cynics, donning their rough cloak and carrying a wallet. What else could explain his transformation into someone so indifferent? After that, he embraced the principles of Theodorus, the Atheist, who was known for using all kinds of reasoning to support his philosophy. After[174] leaving him, he studied under Theophrastus, the Peripatetic.

V. He was very fond of theatrical entertainments, and very skilful in distracting his hearers by exciting a laugh, giving things disparaging names. And because he used to avail himself of every species of reasoning, they relate that Eratosthenes said that Bion was the first person who had clothed philosophy in a flowery robe.

V. He really enjoyed theatrical performances and was quite good at grabbing his audience's attention by making them laugh and using silly names for things. Because he used all kinds of reasoning, people say that Eratosthenes claimed Bion was the first person to dress philosophy in a fancy way.

VI. He was also very ingenious in parodying passages, and adapting them to circumstances as they arose. As for instance, I may cite the following:—

VI. He was also really clever at parodying sections and tweaking them to fit the situation as it came up. For example, I can point out the following:—

Tender Archytas, born of tuneful lyre,
Whom thoughts of happy vanity inspire;
Most skilled of mortals in appeasing ire.[42]

And he jested on every part of music and geometry.

And he joked about everything related to music and geometry.

VII. He was a man of very expensive habits, and on this account he used to go from city to city, and at times he would contrive the most amazing devices.

VII. He had very costly habits, so he traveled from city to city, and sometimes he came up with the most incredible schemes.

VIII. Accordingly, in Rhodes, he persuaded the sailors to put on the habiliments of philosophical students and follow him about; and then he made himself conspicuous by entering the gymnasium with this train of followers.

VIII. So, in Rhodes, he convinced the sailors to dress up as philosophy students and follow him around; then he made himself stand out by entering the gym with this group of followers.

IX. He was accustomed also to adopt young men as his sons, in order to derive assistance from them in his pleasures, and to be protected by their affection for him. But he was a very selfish man, and very fond of quoting the saying, “The property of friends is common;” owing to which it is that no one is spoken of as a disciple of his, though so many men[175] attended his school. And he made some very shameless; accordingly, Betion, one of his intimate acquaintances, is reported to have said once to Menedemus, “So Menedemus constantly spends the evening with Bion, and I see no harm in it.” He used also to talk with great impiety to those who conversed with him, having derived his opinions on this subject from Theodorus.

IX. He was also known to take in young men as his sons to help him enjoy himself and to be supported by their affection. But he was a very selfish person and often quoted the saying, “Friends share everything;” because of this, no one is recognized as his disciple, even though many men[175] attended his school. He made some people quite shameless; for instance, Betion, one of his close friends, reportedly said to Menedemus, “So Menedemus always hangs out with Bion, and I don’t see anything wrong with it.” He would also speak very irreverently to those who talked with him, having borrowed his views on this matter from Theodorus.

X. And when at a later period he became afflicted with disease, as the people of Chalcis said, for he died there, he was persuaded to wear amulets and charms, and to show his repentance for the insults that he had offered to the Gods. But he suffered fearfully for want of proper people to attend him, until Antigonus sent him two servants. And he followed him in a litter, as Phavorinus relates in his Universal History. And the circumstances of his death we have ourselves spoken of in the following lines:—

X. Later on, when he fell ill, as the people of Chalcis claimed since he died there, he was convinced to wear amulets and charms and to express his repentance for the insults he had directed at the Gods. However, he endured terrible suffering due to the lack of proper care until Antigonus sent him two servants. He was carried in a litter, as Phavorinus mentions in his Universal History. We have discussed the details of his death in the following lines:—

We hear that Bion the Borysthenite,
Whom the ferocious Scythian land brought forth,
Used to deny that there were Gods at all.
Now, if he’d persevered in this opinion,
One would have said he speaks just as he thinks;
Though certainly his thoughts are quite mistaken.
But when a lengthened sickness overtook him,
And he began to fear lest he should die;
This man who heretofore denied the Gods,
And would not even look upon a temple,
And mocked all those who e’er approached the Gods
With prayer or sacrifice; who ne’er, not even
For his own hearth, and home, and household table,
Regaled the Gods with savoury fat and incense,
Who never once said, “I have sinned, but spare me.”
Then did this atheist shrink, and give his neck
To an old woman to hang charms upon,
And bound his arms with magic amulets,
With laurel branches blocked his doors and windows,
Ready to do and venture anything
Rather than die. Fool that he was, who thought
To win the Gods to come into existence,
Whenever he might think he wanted them.
So wise too late, when now mere dust and ashes,
He put his hand forth, Hail, great Pluto, Hail!

XI. There were ten people of the name of Bion. First of all, the one who flourished at the same time with Pherecydes of Syros, and who has left two books behind him, which are[176] still extant; he was a native of Proconnesus. The second was a Syracusan, the author of a system of rhetoric. The third was the man of whom we have been speaking. The fourth was a pupil of Democritus, and a mathematician, a native of Abdera, who wrote in both the Attic and Ionic dialect. He was the person who first asserted that there were countries where there was night for six months, and day for six months. The fifth was a native of Soli; who wrote a history of Æthiopia. The sixth was a rhetorician, who has left behind him nine books, inscribed with the names of the Muses, which are still extant. The eighth was a Milesian statuary, who is mentioned by Polemo. The ninth was a tragic poet of the number of those who are called Tarsicans. The tenth was a statuary, a native of Clazomenæ or Chios, who is mentioned by Hipponax.

XI. There were ten people named Bion. First, there was one who was active around the same time as Pherecydes of Syros, and he left behind two books, which are[176] still available; he was from Proconnesus. The second was a Syracusan who created a system of rhetoric. The third was the man we’ve been discussing. The fourth was a student of Democritus, a mathematician from Abdera, who wrote in both the Attic and Ionic dialects. He was the first to claim that there were places where it was night for six months and day for six months. The fifth was from Soli and wrote a history of Ethiopia. The sixth was a rhetorician who wrote nine books, named after the Muses, which are still available. The eighth was a Milesian sculptor mentioned by Polemo. The ninth was a tragic poet among those known as Tarsicans. The tenth was a sculptor, from Clazomenae or Chios, mentioned by Hipponax.

LIFE OF LACYDES.

I. Lacydes, the son of Alexander, was a native of Cyrene. He it is who was the founder of the New Academy, having succeeded Arcesilaus; and he was a man of great gravity of character and demeanour, and one who had many imitators.

I. Lacydes, the son of Alexander, was from Cyrene. He was the founder of the New Academy, taking over from Arcesilaus; he was a man of serious character and demeanor, and he had many followers.

II. He was industrious from his very childhood, and poor, but very pleasing and sociable in his manners.

II. He was hardworking from a young age and grew up poor, but he was very charming and friendly.

III. They say that he had a pleasant way of managing his house-keeping affairs. For when he had taken anything out of his store-chest, he would seal it up again, and throw in his seal through the hole, so that it should be impossible for anything of what he had laid up there to be stolen from him, or carried off. But his servants learning this contrivance of his, broke the seal, and carried off as much as they pleased, and then they put the ring back through the hole in the same manner as before; and though they did this repeatedly, they were never detected.

III. They say he had a good way of handling his household matters. Whenever he took something out of his storage chest, he would seal it up again and throw his seal through the hole, making it impossible for anything he had stored there to be stolen or taken away. However, his servants figured out this trick, broke the seal, and took as much as they wanted. Then they would put the ring back through the hole just like before, and even though they did this many times, they were never caught.

IV. Lacydes now used to hold his school in the Academy in the garden which had been laid out by Attalus the king, and it was called the Lacydeum, after him. And he was the[177] only man, who, while alive, resigned his school to a successor; but he resigned this to Telicles and Evander, of Phocis; and Hegesinus, of Pergamus, succeeded Evander; and he himself was in his turn succeeded by Carneades.

IV. Lacydes used to hold his classes in the Academy in the garden that had been laid out by King Attalus, and it was called the Lacydeum after him. He was the[177] only person who, while alive, handed over his school to someone else; he passed it on to Telicles and Evander from Phocis; then Hegesinus from Pergamus took over from Evander; and he was subsequently succeeded by Carneades.

V. There is a witty saying, which is attributed to Lacydes. For they say that when Attalus sent for him, he answered that statues ought to be seen at a distance. On another occasion, as it is reported, he was studying geometry very late in life, and some said to him, “Is it then a time for you to be learning now?” “If it is not,” he replied, “when will it be?”

V. There's a clever saying that’s attributed to Lacydes. They say that when Attalus called for him, he replied that statues should be viewed from a distance. On another occasion, it's reported that he was studying geometry late in life, and some asked him, “Is this really the right time for you to be learning?” “If it’s not,” he responded, “when will it be?”

VI. And he died in the fourth year of the hundred and thirty-fourth Olympiad, when he had presided over his school twenty-six years. And his death was caused by paralysis, which was brought on by drinking. And we ourselves have jested upon him in the following language.

VI. He passed away in the fourth year of the hundred and thirty-fourth Olympiad, after leading his school for twenty-six years. His death resulted from paralysis, which was triggered by drinking. We've made jokes about him using the following words.

’Tis an odd story that I heard of you—
Lacydes, that you went with hasty steps,
Spurred on by Bacchus, to the shades below.
How then, if this be true, can it be said,
That Bacchus e’er trips up his votaries’ feet
’Tis a mistake his being named Lyæus.[43]

LIFE OF CARNEADES.

I. Carneades was the son of Epicomus, or Philocomus, as Alexander states in his Successions; and a native of Cyrene.

I. Carneades was the son of Epicomus, or Philocomus, as Alexander mentions in his Successions; and he was from Cyrene.

II. He read all the books of the Stoics with great care, and especially those of Chrysippus; and then he wrote replies to them, but did it at the same time with such modesty that he used to say, “If Chrysippus had not lived, I should never have existed.”

II. He read all the Stoic books very attentively, especially those by Chrysippus; then he wrote responses to them but always did so with such humility that he would say, “If Chrysippus hadn't lived, I would never have existed.”

III. He was a man of as great industry as ever existed; not, however, very much devoted to the investigation of subjects of natural philosophy, but more fond of the discussion of ethical topics, on which account he used to let his hair and his nails grow, from his entire devotion of all his time to philosophical[178] discussion. And he was so eminent as a philosopher, that the orators would quit their own schools and come and listen to his lectures.

III. He was a man of remarkable work ethic; however, he wasn’t very focused on studying natural philosophy. Instead, he preferred discussing ethical topics, which is why he would let his hair and nails grow—completely devoted to philosophical discussions. He was such a distinguished philosopher that orators would leave their own schools to come listen to his lectures.

IV. He was also a man of a very powerful voice, so that the president of the Gymnasium sent to him once, to desire he would not shout so loudly. And he replied, “Give me then, measure for my voice.” And the gymnasiarch again rejoined with great wit, for he said, “You have a measure in your pupils.”

IV. He also had a very strong voice, so much so that the president of the Gymnasium once asked him not to shout so loudly. He replied, “Then give me a way to measure my voice.” The gymnasiarch cleverly responded, saying, “You have a measure in your students.”

V. He was a very vehement speaker, and one difficult to contend with in the investigation of a point. And he used to decline all invitations to entertainments, for the reasons I have already mentioned.

V. He was a very passionate speaker, and hard to argue with when discussing a topic. He used to turn down all invitations to events for the reasons I've already mentioned.

VI. On one occasion, when Mentor, the Bithynian, one of his pupils, came to him to attend his school, observing that he was trying to seduce his mistress (as Phavorinus relates in his Universal History), while he was in the middle of his lecture, he made the following parody in allusion to him:—

VI. One time, when Mentor from Bithynia, one of his students, came to join his school, he noticed that Mentor was trying to seduce his girlfriend (as Phavorinus describes in his Universal History). While he was in the middle of his lecture, he made this parody in reference to him:—

A weak old man comes hither, like in voice,
And gait, and figure, to the prudent Mentor
I order him to be expelled this school.

And Mentor rising up, replied:—

And Mentor replied:—

Thus did they speak, and straight the others rose.

VII. He appears to have been beset with fears of death; as he was continually saying, “Nature, who has put this frame together, will also dissolve it.” And learning that Antipater had died after having taken poison, he felt a desire to imitate the boldness of his departure, and said, “Give me some too.” And when they asked “What?” “Some mead,” said he. And it is said that an eclipse of the moon happened when he died, the most beautiful of all the stars, next to the sun, indicating (as any one might say) its sympathy with the philosopher. And Apollodorus, in his Chronicles, says that he died in the fourth year of the hundred and sixty-second olympiad, being eighty-five years old.

VII. He seemed to be overwhelmed by fears of death; he kept saying, “Nature, who put this body together, will also take it apart.” When he learned that Antipater had died after taking poison, he wanted to emulate the courage of his departure and said, “Give me some too.” When they asked “What?” he replied, “Some mead.” It’s said that a lunar eclipse occurred when he died, the most beautiful of all the stars beside the sun, suggesting (as anyone might say) its sympathy with the philosopher. Apollodorus, in his Chronicles, states that he died in the fourth year of the hundred and sixty-second Olympiad, at the age of eighty-five.

VIII. There are some letters extant addressed by him to Ariarathes, the king of the Cappadocians. All the other writings which are attributed to him were written by his disciples, for he himself left nothing behind him. And I[179] have written on him the following lines in logaœdical Archebulian metre.

VIII. Some letters still exist that he wrote to Ariarathes, the king of Cappadocia. All the other writings attributed to him were actually written by his students, as he left nothing behind. And I[179] have composed the following lines about him in logaœdical Archebulian meter.

Why now, O Muse, do you wish me Carneades to confute?
He was an ignoramus, as he did not understand
Why he should stand in fear of death: so once, when he’d a cough,
The worst of all diseases that affect the human frame,
He cared not for a remedy; but when the news did reach him,
That brave Antipater had ta’en some poison, and so died,
“Give me, said he, some stuff to drink.” “Some what?”—“Some luscious mead.”
Moreover, he’d this saying at all times upon his lips:
“Nature did make me, and she does together keep me still;
But soon the time will come when she will pull me all to pieces.”
But still at last he yielded up the ghost: though long ago
He might have died, and so escaped the evils that befell him.

IX. It is said that at night he was not aware when lights were brought in; and that once he ordered his servant to light the candles, and when he had brought them in and told him, “I have brought them;” “Well then,” said he, “read by the light of them.”

IX. It’s said that at night he didn’t notice when the lights were brought in; and that once he told his servant to light the candles, and when the servant brought them in and said, “I’ve brought them,” he replied, “Well then, read by their light.”

X. He had a great many other disciples; but the most eminent of them was Clitomachus, whom we must mention presently.

X. He had many other followers, but the most notable among them was Clitomachus, who we need to mention soon.

XI. There was also another man of the name of Carneades, a very indifferent elegiac poet.

XI. There was also another man named Carneades, a pretty mediocre elegiac poet.

LIFE OF CLITOMACHUS.

I. Clitomachus was a Carthaginian. He was called Asdrubal, and used to lecture on philosophy in his own country in his native language.

I. Clitomachus was from Carthage. He was named Asdrubal and used to give lectures on philosophy in his own country in his native language.

II. But when he came to Athens, at the age of forty years, he became a pupil of Carneades; and, as he was pleased with his industry, he caused him to be instructed in literature, and himself educated the man carefully. And he carried his diligence to such a degree, that he composed more than four hundred books.

II. But when he arrived in Athens at the age of forty, he became a student of Carneades. Impressed by his hard work, he made sure he was taught literature and personally educated him thoroughly. He was so dedicated that he wrote over four hundred books.

III. And he succeeded Carneades in his schools; and he illustrated his principles a great deal by his writings; as he[180] himself had studied the doctrines of their sects, the Academic, the Peripatetic, and the Stoic. Timon attacks the whole school of Academics, as a body, in these lines:—

III. He took over from Carneades in his schools and explained his ideas extensively through his writings, since he[180] himself had studied the teachings of their groups, the Academic, the Peripatetic, and the Stoic. Timon criticizes the entire Academic school as a whole in these lines:—

Nor the unprofitable chattering
Of all the Academics.

But now that we have gone through the philosophers of Plato’s school, let us go to the Peripatetics, who also derived their doctrines from Plato; and the founder of their sect was Aristotle.

But now that we've explored the philosophers from Plato’s school, let’s move on to the Peripatetics, who also got their ideas from Plato; their sect was founded by Aristotle.


BOOK V.

LIFE OF ARISTOTLE.

I. Aristotle was the son of Nicomachus and Phæstias, a citizen of Stagira; and Nicomachus was descended from Nicomachus, the son of Machaon, the son of Æsculapius, as Hermippus tells us in his treatise on Aristotle; and he lived with Amyntas, the king of the Macedonians, as both a physician and a friend.

I. Aristotle was the son of Nicomachus and Phæstias, a citizen of Stagira. Nicomachus was a descendant of Nicomachus, who was the son of Machaon, the son of Æsculapius, as Hermippus mentions in his work on Aristotle. He lived with Amyntas, the king of the Macedonians, serving as both a physician and a friend.

II. He was the most eminent of all the pupils of Plato; he had a lisping voice, as is asserted by Timotheus the Athenian, in his work on Lives. He had also very thin legs, they say, and small eyes; but he used to indulge in very conspicuous dress, and rings, and used to dress his hair carefully.

II. He was the most distinguished of all Plato's students; he had a lisp, according to Timotheus the Athenian in his work on Lives. They also say he had very skinny legs and small eyes, but he liked to wear flashy clothes, rings, and always styled his hair carefully.

III. He had also a son named Nicomachus, by Herpyllis his concubine, as we are told by Timotheus.

III. He also had a son named Nicomachus with his concubine Herpyllis, according to what Timotheus tells us.

IV. He seceded from Plato while he was still alive; so that they tell a story that he said, “Aristotle has kicked us off just as chickens do their mother after they have been hatched.” But Hermippus says in his Lives, that while he was absent on an embassy to Philip, on behalf of the Athenians, Xenocrates became the president of the school in the Academy; and that when he returned and saw the school under the presidency of some one else, he selected a promenade in the Lyceum, in which he used to walk up and down with his disciples, discussing subjects of philosophy till the time for anointing themselves came; on which account he was called a Peripatetic.[44] But others say that he got this name because once when Alexander was walking about after recovering from a sickness, he accompanied him and kept conversing with him. But when his pupils became numerous, he then gave them seats, saying:—

IV. He broke away from Plato while he was still alive; so they say he remarked, “Aristotle has kicked us away just like chicks do to their mother after they hatch.” But Hermippus mentions in his Lives that while he was away on a mission to Philip for the Athenians, Xenocrates took over as the head of the school at the Academy; and when he returned and found the school led by someone else, he chose a walkway in the Lyceum where he would pace back and forth with his students, discussing philosophical topics until it was time for them to anoint themselves. Because of this, he was called a Peripatetic.[44] But others say he got this name because once, after Alexander recovered from an illness, he walked alongside him and kept chatting. But as his students grew in number, he eventually provided them with seats, saying:—

It would be shame for me to hold my peace,
And for Isocrates to keep on talking.

And he used to accustom his disciples to discuss any question which might be proposed, training them just as an orator might.

And he would get his students used to discussing any questions that came up, training them just like a speaker would.

V. After that he went to Hermias the Eunuch, the tyrant of Atarneus, who, as it is said, allowed him all kinds of liberties; and some say that he formed a matrimonial connection with him, giving him either his daughter or his niece in marriage, as is recorded by Demetrius of Magnesia, in his essay on Poets and Prose-writers of the same name. And the same authority says that Hermias had been the slave of Eubulus, and a Bithynian by descent, and that he slew his master. But Aristippus, in the first book of his treatise on Ancient Luxury, says that Aristotle was enamoured of the concubine of Hermias, and that, as Hermias gave his consent, he married her; and was so overjoyed that he sacrificed to her, as the Athenians do to the Eleusinian Ceres. And he wrote a hymn to Hermias, which is given at length below.

V. After that, he went to Hermias the Eunuch, the tyrant of Atarneus, who reportedly granted him all sorts of freedoms. Some say that he even entered into a marriage arrangement with him, giving him either his daughter or his niece, as noted by Demetrius of Magnesia in his essay on Poets and Prose-writers of the same name. This source also mentions that Hermias had been a slave of Eubulus and was of Bithynian descent, and that he killed his master. However, Aristippus, in the first book of his treatise on Ancient Luxury, claims that Aristotle was in love with Hermias's concubine and that, with Hermias's approval, he married her. He was so happy that he sacrificed to her, much like the Athenians do for the Eleusinian Ceres. He even wrote a hymn to Hermias, which is provided in full below.

VI. After that he lived in Macedonia, at the court of Philip, and was entrusted by him with his son Alexander as a pupil; and he entreated him to restore his native city which had been destroyed by Philip, and had his request granted; and he also made laws for the citizens. And also he used to make laws in his schools, doing this in imitation of Xenocrates, so that he appointed a president every ten days. And when he thought that he had spent time enough with Alexander, he departed for Athens, having recommended to him his relation Callisthenes, a native of Olynthus; but as he spoke too freely to the king, and would not take Aristotle’s advice, he reproached him and said:—

VI. After that, he lived in Macedonia, at the court of Philip, where he was entrusted with teaching his son Alexander. He asked Philip to restore his home city that had been destroyed, and his request was granted. He also created laws for the citizens. In addition, he established laws in his schools, following the example of Xenocrates, and appointed a president every ten days. When he felt he had spent enough time with Alexander, he left for Athens, having recommended his relative Callisthenes, who was from Olynthus. However, Callisthenes spoke too freely to the king and refused to follow Aristotle's advice, which led to criticism from Aristotle, who said:—

Alas! my child, in life’s primeval bloom,
Such hasty words will bring thee to thy doom.[45]

And his prophecy was fulfilled, for as he was believed by Hermolaus to have been privy to the plot against Alexander, he was shut up in an iron cage, covered with lice, and untended; and at last he was given to a lion, and so died.

And his prophecy came true, because Hermolaus believed he was involved in the plot against Alexander. He was locked in an iron cage, infested with lice, and left alone; eventually, he was fed to a lion, and that’s how he died.

VII. Aristotle then having come to Athens, and having presided over his school there for thirteen years, retired secretly to Chalcis, as Eurymedon, the hierophant had impeached him on an indictment for impiety, though Phavorinus,[183] in his Universal History, says that his prosecutor was Demophilus, on the ground of having written the hymn to the beforementioned Hermias, and also the following epigram which was engraven on his statue at Delphi:—

VII. After Aristotle arrived in Athens and led his school there for thirteen years, he quietly retired to Chalcis. This was because Eurymedon, the hierophant, had accused him of impiety. However, Phavorinus,[183] in his Universal History, states that his accuser was Demophilus, claiming it was due to his writing the hymn to the previously mentioned Hermias, as well as the following epigram that was inscribed on his statue at Delphi:—

The tyrant of the Persian archer race,
Broke through the laws of God to slay this man
Not by the manly spear in open fight,
But by the treachery of a faithless friend.

And after that he died of taking a draught of aconite, as Eumelus says in the fifth book of his Histories, at the age of seventy years. And the same author says that he was thirty years old when he first became acquainted with Plato. But this is a mistake of his, for he did only live in reality sixty-three years, and he was seventeen years old when he first attached himself to Plato. And the hymn in honour of Hermias is as follows:—

And after that, he died from drinking a mixture containing aconite, as Eumelus mentions in the fifth book of his Histories, at the age of seventy. The same author claims that he was thirty years old when he first met Plato. But that’s an error, because he only actually lived for sixty-three years, and he was seventeen when he first became a student of Plato. The hymn in honor of Hermias goes like this:—

O Virtue, won by earnest strife,
And holding out the noblest prize
That ever gilded earthly life,
Or drew it on to seek the skies;
For thee what son of Greece would
Deem it an enviable lot,
To live the life, to die the death,
That fears no weary hour, shrinks from no fiery breath?
Such fruit hast thou of heavenly bloom,
A lure more rich than golden heap,
More tempting than the joys of home,
More bland than spell of soft-eyed sleep.
For thee Alcides, son of Jove,
And the twin boys of Leda strove,
With patient toil and sinewy might,
Thy glorious prize to grasp, to reach thy lofty height.
Achilles, Ajax, for thy love
Descended to the realms of night;
Atarneus’ King thy vision drove,
To quit for aye the glad sun-light,
Therefore, to memory’s daughters dear,
His deathless name, his pure career,
Live shrined in song, and link’d with awe,
The awe of Xenian Jove, and faithful friendship’s law.[46]

There is also an epigram of ours upon him, which runs thus:—

There’s also an epigram about him that goes like this:—

Eurymedon, the faithful minister
Of the mysterious Eleusinian Queen,
Was once about t’ impeach the Stagirite
Of impious guilt. But he escaped his hands
By mighty draught of friendly aconite,
And thus defeated all his wicked arts.

Phavorinus, in his Universal History, says that Aristotle was the first person who ever composed a speech to be delivered in his own defence in a court of justice, and that he did so on the occasion of this prosecution, and said that at Athens:—

Phavorinus, in his Universal History, states that Aristotle was the first person to ever write a speech for his own defense in a courtroom, and he did this in response to his prosecution, claiming this happened in Athens:—

Pears upon pear-trees grow; on fig-trees, figs.

Apollodorus, in his Chronicles, says that he was born in the first year of the ninety-ninth olympiad, and that he attached himself to Plato, and remained with him for twenty years, having been seventeen years of age when he originally joined him. And he went to Mitylene in the archonship of Eubulus, in the fourth year of the hundred and eighth olympiad. But as Plato had died in the first year of this same olympiad, in the archonship of Theophilus, he departed for the court of Hermias, and remained there three years. And in the archonship of Pythodotus he went to the court of Philip, in the second year of the hundred and ninth olympiad, when Alexander was fifteen years old; and he came to Athens in the second year of the hundred and eleventh olympiad, and presided over his school in the Lyceum for thirteen years; after that he departed to Chalcis, in the third year of the hundred and fourteenth olympiad, and died, at about the age of sixty-three years, of disease, the same year that Demosthenes died in Calauria, in the archonship of Philocles.

Apollodorus, in his Chronicles, mentions that he was born in the first year of the ninety-ninth Olympiad and that he became a follower of Plato, staying with him for twenty years, having been seventeen when he first joined. He traveled to Mitylene during Eubulus's archonship, in the fourth year of the hundred and eighth Olympiad. Since Plato had passed away in the first year of this same Olympiad, during Theophilus's archonship, he then went to the court of Hermias and stayed there for three years. In the archonship of Pythodotus, he moved to the court of Philip in the second year of the hundred and ninth Olympiad, when Alexander was fifteen; and he returned to Athens in the second year of the hundred and eleventh Olympiad, where he led his school at the Lyceum for thirteen years. After that, he left for Chalcis in the third year of the hundred and fourteenth Olympiad and died at around sixty-three years old due to illness, in the same year that Demosthenes died in Calauria, during Philocles's archonship.

VIII. It is said also that he was offended with the king, because of the result of the conspiracy of Callisthenes against Alexander; and that the king, for the sake of annoying him, promoted Anaximenes to honour, and sent presents to Xenocrates. And Theocritus, of Chios, wrote an epigram upon him to ridicule him, in the following terms, as it is quoted by Ambryon in his account of Theocritus:—

VIII. It’s also said that he was upset with the king because of the outcome of Callisthenes' conspiracy against Alexander. To irritate him, the king promoted Anaximenes and sent gifts to Xenocrates. Theocritus of Chios wrote an epigram to mock him, which Ambryon quotes in his account of Theocritus:—

The empty-headed Aristotle rais’d
This empty tomb to Hermias the Eunuch,
[185]
The ancient slave of the ill-us’d Eubulus.
[Who, for his monstrous appetite, preferred
The Bosphorus to Academia’s groves.]

And Timon attacked him too, saying of him:—

And Timon went after him too, saying:—

Nor the sad chattering of the empty Aristotle.

Such was the life of the philosopher.

Such was the life of the philosopher.

IX. We have also met with his will, which is couched in the following terms:—“May things turn out well; but if any thing happens to him, in that case Aristotle has made the following disposition of his affairs. That Antipater shall be the general and universal executor. And until Nicanor marries my daughter, I appoint Aristomedes, Timarchus, Hipparchus, Dioteles, and Theophrastus, if he will consent and accept the charge, to be the guardians of my children and of Herpyllis, and the trustees of all the property I leave behind me; and I desire them, when my daughter is old enough, to give her in marriage to Nicanor; but if any thing should happen to the girl, which may God forbid, either before or after she is married, but before she has any children, then I will that Nicanor shall have the absolute disposal of my son, and of all other things, in the full confidence that he will arrange them in a manner worthy of me and of himself. Let him also be the guardian of my daughter and son Nicomachus, to act as he pleases with respect to them, as if he were their father or brother. But if anything should happen to Nicanor, which may God forbid, either before he receives my daughter in marriage, or after he is married to her, or before he has any children by her, then any arrangements which he may make by will shall stand. But, if Theophrastus, in this case, should choose to take my daughter in marriage, then he is to stand exactly in the same position as Nicanor. And if not, then I will, that my trustees, consulting with Antipater concerning both the boy and girl, shall arrange everything respecting them as they shall think fit; and that my trustees and Nicanor, remembering both me and Herpyllis, and how well she has behaved to me, shall take care, if she be inclined to take a husband, that one be found for her who shall not be unworthy of us; and shall give her, in addition to all that has been already given her, a talent of silver, and three maidservants if she please to accept them, and the handmaid whom she has[186] now, and the boy Pyrrhæus. And if she likes to dwell at Chalcis, she shall have the house which joins the garden; but if she likes to dwell in Stagira, then she shall have my father’s house. And whichever of these houses she elects to take, I will that my executors do furnish it with all necessary furniture, in such manner as shall seem to them and to Herpyllis to be sufficient. And let Nicanor be the guardian of the child Myrmex, so that he shall be conducted to his friends in a manner worthy of us, with all his property which I received. I also will that Ambracis shall have her liberty, and that there shall be given to her when her daughter is married, five hundred drachmas, and the handmaid whom she now has. And I will that there be given to Thales, besides the handmaiden whom she now has, who was bought for her, a thousand drachmas and another handmaid. And to Timon, in addition to the money that has been given to him before for another boy, an additional slave, or a sum of money which shall be equivalent. I also will that Tychon shall have his liberty when his daughter is married, and Philon, and Olympius, and his son. Moreover, of those boys who wait upon me, I will that none shall be sold, but my executors may use them, and when they are grown up then they shall emancipate them if they deserve it. I desire too, that my executors will take under their care the statues which it has been entrusted to Gryllion to make, that when they are made they may be erected in their proper places; and so too shall the statues of Nicanor, and of Proxenus, which I was intending to give him a commission for, and also that of the mother of Nicanor. I wish them also to erect in its proper place the statue of Arimnestus which is already made, that it may be a memorial of her, since she has died childless. I wish them also to dedicate a statue of my mother to Ceres at Nemea, or wherever else they think fit. And wherever they bury me, there I desire that they shall also place the bones of Pythias, having taken them up from the place where they now lie, as she herself enjoined. And I desire that Nicanor, as he has been preserved, will perform the vow which I made on his behalf, and dedicate some figures of animals in stone, four cubits high, to Jupiter the saviour, and Minerva the saviour, in Stagira.”

IX. We have come across his will, which states the following:—“I hope everything works out well; but if anything should happen to him, then Aristotle has decided on the following arrangement for his affairs. Antipater will be the main and overall executor. Until Nicanor marries my daughter, I appoint Aristomedes, Timarchus, Hipparchus, Dioteles, and Theophrastus, if he agrees to take on the role, to be the guardians of my children and Herpyllis, as well as the trustees of all the property I leave behind; and I want them, when my daughter is old enough, to arrange her marriage to Nicanor. But if anything happens to the girl, which I hope will not occur, whether before or after she is married but before she has children, I appoint that Nicanor shall have complete control over my son and everything else, with the confidence that he will manage them in a manner that reflects well on both me and himself. He should also be the guardian of my daughter and my son Nicomachus, to act with them as if he were their father or brother. However, if something happens to Nicanor, which I hope will not occur, whether before he marries my daughter, after he marries her, or before they have children together, then any arrangements he makes in his will will be upheld. If, in this situation, Theophrastus chooses to marry my daughter, then he will be in the same position as Nicanor. If not, then I want my trustees, in consultation with Antipater regarding both the boy and the girl, to make appropriate arrangements for them. My trustees and Nicanor, remembering both me and Herpyllis and how well she has treated me, should ensure that if she wishes to remarry, she finds a husband who is worthy of us; and they should give her, in addition to what she has already received, a talent of silver and three maidservants, should she wish to accept them, along with her current handmaid and the boy Pyrrhæus. If she prefers to live in Chalcis, she shall have the house adjoining the garden; but if she wishes to reside in Stagira, then she will receive my father's house. Whichever of these houses she chooses, I want my executors to furnish it with all necessary items, in a way that seems adequate to her and Herpyllis. Let Nicanor take care of the child Myrmex, ensuring he is brought to his friends in a manner suitable for us, with all his property that I received. I also want Ambracis to have her freedom, and upon her daughter’s marriage, she shall receive five hundred drachmas and her current handmaid. I also want Thales to receive, in addition to the handmaid he currently has, a thousand drachmas and another handmaid. Timon shall receive, besides the money previously given for another boy, an additional slave or an equivalent amount of money. I also require that Tychon be freed when his daughter marries, along with Philon, Olympius, and his son. Furthermore, none of the boys who serve me shall be sold; instead, my executors may use them, and when they are grown, they shall be freed if they deserve it. I ask that my executors take care of the statues that Gryllion is commissioned to make, so they can be erected in their designated places; the same goes for the statues of Nicanor and Proxenus, for which I was intending to commission him, as well as that of Nicanor's mother. I also wish for them to place the already-made statue of Arimnestus in its proper place as a memorial for her since she died without children. I wish them to dedicate a statue of my mother to Ceres at Nemea, or wherever else they find suitable. And wherever I am buried, I desire that they also place the bones of Pythias, after moving them from their current resting place, as she herself requested. I also wish for Nicanor, as he has been preserved, to fulfill the vow I made on his behalf and to dedicate stone figures of animals, four cubits high, to Jupiter the Savior and Minerva the Savior in Stagira.”

These are the provisions of his will.

These are the terms of his will.

X. And it is said that a great many dishes were found in[187] his house; and that Lycon stated that he used to bathe in a bath of warm oil, and afterwards to sell the oil. But some say that he used to place a leather bag of warm oil on his stomach. And whenever he went to bed, he used to take a brazen ball in his hand, having arranged a brazen dish below it; so that, when the ball fell into the dish, he might be awakened by the noise.

X. It is said that many dishes were found in[187] his house; and that Lycon mentioned that he used to bathe in warm oil and then sell the oil afterward. But some say he would put a leather bag of warm oil on his stomach. And whenever he went to bed, he would hold a brass ball in his hand, with a brass dish placed beneath it, so that when the ball fell into the dish, the noise would wake him up.

XI. The following admirable apophthegms are attributed to him.

XI. The following impressive sayings are attributed to him.

He was once asked, what those who tell lies gain by it; “They gain this,” said he, “that when they speak truth they are not believed.”

He was once asked what liars gain from their deception. “They gain this,” he replied, “that when they do tell the truth, no one believes them.”

On one occasion he was blamed for giving alms to a worthless man, and he replied, “I did not pity the man, but his condition.”

On one occasion, he was criticized for giving money to a useless man, and he replied, “I didn’t feel sorry for the man, but for his situation.”

He was accustomed continually to say to his friends and pupils wherever he happened to be, “That sight receives the light from the air which surrounds it, and in like manner the soul receives the light from the science.”

He often told his friends and students wherever he was, “That sight gets its light from the air around it, and similarly, the soul gets its light from knowledge.”

Very often, when he was inveighing against the Athenians, he would say that they had invented both wheat and laws, but that they used only the wheat and neglected the laws.

Very often, when he was criticizing the Athenians, he would say that they had invented both wheat and laws, but that they only used the wheat and ignored the laws.

It was a saying of his that the roots of education were bitter, but the fruit sweet.

He used to say that the roots of education are hard, but the fruit is sweet.

Once he was asked what grew old most speedily, and he replied, “Gratitude.”

Once he was asked what aged the fastest, and he replied, “Gratitude.”

On another occasion the question was put to him, what hope is? and his answer was, “The dream of a waking man.”

On another occasion, someone asked him what hope is, and he replied, “The dream of a person who's awake.”

Diogenes once offered him a dry fig, and as he conjectured that if he did not take it the cynic had a witticism ready prepared, he accepted it, and then said that Diogenes had lost his joke and his fig too; and another time when he took one from him as he offered it, he held it up as a child does, and said, “O great Diogenes;” and then he gave it to him back again.

Diogenes once offered him a dry fig, and since he guessed that if he didn’t take it, the cynic had a clever remark ready, he accepted it. He then said that Diogenes had lost both his joke and his fig. Another time, when he took a fig from Diogenes as he offered it, he held it up like a child would and said, “Oh great Diogenes,” before giving it back to him.

He used to say that there were three things necessary to education; natural qualifications, instruction, and practice.

He used to say that three things are essential for education: natural ability, teaching, and practice.

Having heard that he was abused by some one, he said, “He may beat me too, if he likes, in my absence.”

Having heard that someone had mistreated him, he said, “He can hit me too if he wants, even when I’m not there.”

He used to say that beauty is the best of all recommendations, but others say that it was Diogenes who gave this description of it; and that Aristotle called beauty, “The gift of[188] a fair appearance,” that Socrates called it “A short-lived tyranny;” Plato, “The privilege of nature;” Theophrastus, “A silent deceit;” Theocritus, “An ivory mischief;” Carneades, “A sovereignty which stood in need of no guards.”

He used to say that beauty is the ultimate recommendation, but others claim that it was Diogenes who described it that way; Aristotle referred to beauty as "the gift of a fair appearance," Socrates called it "a short-lived tyranny," Plato described it as "the privilege of nature," Theophrastus called it "a silent deceit," Theocritus labeled it "an ivory mischief," and Carneades referred to it as "a sovereignty that needed no guards."

On one occasion he was asked how much educated men were superior to those uneducated; “As much,” said he, “as the living are to the dead.”

On one occasion, he was asked how much more educated people are compared to those who aren’t educated. “As much,” he replied, “as the living are to the dead.”

It was a saying of his that education was an ornament in prosperity, and a refuge in adversity. And that those parents who gave their children a good education deserved more honour than those who merely beget them: for that the latter only enabled their children to live, but the former gave them the power of living well.

It was his belief that education is a valuable asset in good times and a safe haven in tough times. He thought that parents who provided their children with a solid education deserved more respect than those who just brought them into the world, because while the latter only helped their children survive, the former empowered them to thrive.

When a man boasted in his presence that he was a native of an illustrious city, he said, “That is not what one ought to look at, but whether one is worthy of a great city.”

When a man bragged in his presence that he was from a famous city, he said, “That’s not what matters; it’s whether someone is deserving of a great city.”

He was once asked what a friend is; and his answer was, “One soul abiding in two bodies.”

He was once asked what a friend is, and his answer was, "One soul living in two bodies."

It was a saying of his that some men were as stingy as if they expected to live for ever, and some as extravagant as if they expected to die immediately.

It was his saying that some men were as cheap as if they thought they would live forever, and some were as wasteful as if they thought they would die right away.

When he was asked why people like to spend a great deal of their time with handsome people, “That,” said he, “is a question fit for a blind man to ask.”

When he was asked why people enjoy spending a lot of their time with attractive people, “That,” he replied, “is a question a blind person would ask.”

The question was once put to him, what he had gained by philosophy; and the answer he made was this, “That I do without being commanded, what others do from fear of the laws.”

The question was once asked of him what he had gained from philosophy, and his answer was, “I do what is right without being told, while others act out of fear of the law.”

He was once asked what his disciples ought to do to get on; and he replied, “Press on upon those who are in front of them, and not wait for those who are behind to catch them.”

He was once asked what his followers should do to succeed; and he replied, “Keep pushing forward toward those ahead of you, and don’t wait for those behind to catch up.”

A chattering fellow, who had been abusing him, said to him, “Have not I been jeering you properly?” “Not that I know of,” said he, “for I have not been listening to you.”

A talkative guy, who had been making fun of him, said to him, “Haven't I been mocking you enough?” “Not that I know of,” he replied, “because I haven't been paying attention to you.”

A man on one occasion reproached him for having given a contribution to one who was not a good man (for the story which I have mentioned before is also quoted in this way), and his answer was, “I gave not to the man, but to humanity.”

A man once criticized him for donating to someone who wasn't a good person (since the story I mentioned earlier is also told this way), and his response was, “I didn't give to the man, I gave to humanity.”

The question was once put to him, how we ought to behave to our friends; and the answer he gave was, “As we should wish our friends to behave to us.”

The question was once asked of him how we should treat our friends, and his answer was, “The same way we would want our friends to treat us.”

He used to define justice as “A virtue of the soul distributive of what each person deserved.”

He used to define justice as "A quality of the soul that gives everyone what they deserve."

Another of his sayings was, that education was the best viaticum for old age.

Another one of his sayings was that education was the best preparation for old age.

Phavorinus, in the second book of his Commentaries, says that he was constantly repeating, “The man who has friends has no friend.” And this sentiment is to be found also in the seventh book of the Ethics.

Phavorinus, in the second book of his Commentaries, says that he kept repeating, “The person who has friends has no true friend.” And this idea is also mentioned in the seventh book of the Ethics.

These apophthegms then are attributed to him.

These sayings are then attributed to him.

XII. He also wrote a great number of works; and I have thought it worth while to give a list of them, on account of the eminence of their author in every branch of philosophy. Four books on Justice; three books on Poets; three books on Philosophy; two books of The Statesman; one on Rhetoric, called also the Gryllus; the Nerinthus, one; the Sophist, one; the Menexenus, one; the Erotic, one; the Banquet, one; on Riches, one; the Exhortation, one; on the Soul, one; on Prayer, one; on Nobility of Birth, one; on Pleasure, one; the Alexander, or an Essay on Colonists, one; on Sovereignty, one; on Education, one; on the Good, three; three books on things in the Laws of Plato; two on Political Constitutions; on Economy, one; on Friendship, one; on Suffering, or having Suffered, one; on Sciences, one; on Discussions, two; Solutions of Disputed Points, two; Sophistical Divisions, four; on Contraries, one; on Species and Genera, one; on Property, one; Epicheirematic, or Argumentative Commentaries, three; Propositions relating to Virtue, three; Objections, one; one book on things which are spoken of in various ways, or a Preliminary Essay; one on the Passion of Anger; five on Ethics; three on Elements; one on Science; one on Beginning; seventeen on Divisions; on Divisible Things, one; two books of Questions and Answers; two on Motion; one book of Propositions; four of Contentious Propositions; one of Syllogisms; eight of the First Analytics; two of the second greater Analytics; one on Problems; eight on Method; one on the Better; one on the Idea; Definitions serving as a preamble to the Topics, seven; two books more of Syllogisms; one of Syllogisms and Definitions; one on what is Eligible, and on what is Suitable; the Preface to the Topics, one; Topics relating to the Definitions, two; one on the Passions; one on Divisions; one on Mathematics;[190] thirteen books of Definitions; two of Epicheiremata, or Arguments; one on Pleasure; one of Propositions; on the Voluntary, one; on the Honourable, one; of Epicheirematic or Argumentative Propositions, twenty-five books; of Amatory Propositions, four; of Propositions relating to Friendship, two; of Propositions relating to the Soul, one; on Politics, two; Political Lectures, such as that of Theophrastus, eight; on Just Actions, two; two books entitled, A Collection of Arts; two on the Art of Rhetoric; one on Art; two on other Art; one on Method; one, the Introduction to the Art of Theodectes; two books, being a treatise on the Art of Poetry; one book of Rhetorical Enthymemes on Magnitude; one of Divisions of Enthymemes; on Style, two; on Advice, one; on Collection, two; on Nature, three; on Natural Philosophy, one; on the Philosophy of Archytas, three; on the Philosophy of Speusippus and Xenocrates, one; on things taken from the doctrines of Timæus and the school of Archytas, one; on Doctrines of Melissus, one; on Doctrines of Alcmæon, one; on the Pythagoreans, one; on the Precepts of Gorgias, one; on the Precepts of Xenophanes, one; on the Precepts of Zeno, one; on the Pythagoreans, one; on Animals, nine; on Anatomy, eight; one book, a Selection of Anatomical Questions; one on Compound Animals; one on Mythological Animals; one on Impotence; one on Plants; one on Physiognomy; two on Medicine; one on the Unit; one on Signs of Storms; one on Astronomy; one on Optics; one on Motion; one on Music; one on Memory; six on Doubts connected with Homer; one on Poetry; thirty-eight of Natural Philosophy in reference to the First Elements; two of Problems Resolved; two of Encyclica, or General Knowledge; one on Mechanics; two consisting of Problems derived from the writings of Democritus; one on Stone; one book of Comparisons; twelve books of Miscellanies; fourteen books of things explained according to their Genus; one on Rights; one book, the Conquerors at the Olympic Games; one, the Conquerors at the Pythian Games in the Art of Music; one, the Pythian; one, a List of the Victors in the Pythian Games; one, the Victories gained at the Olympic Games; one on Tragedies; one, a List of Plays; one book of Proverbs; one on the Laws of Recommendations; four books of Laws; one of Categories; one on Interpretation; a book[191] containing an account of the Constitutions of a hundred and fifty-eight cities, and also some individual democratic, oligarchic, aristocratic, and tyrannical Constitutions; Letters to Philip; Letters of the Selymbrians; four Letters to Alexander; nine to Antipater; one to Mentor; one to Ariston; one to Olympias; one to Hephæstion; one to Themistagoras; one to Philoxenus; one to Democritus; one book of Poems beginning:—

XII. He also wrote a large number of works, and I thought it worthwhile to provide a list of them due to the author's prominence in every area of philosophy. Four books on Justice; three books on Poets; three books on Philosophy; two books on The Statesman; one on Rhetoric, also known as the Gryllus; one on the Nerinthus; one on the Sophist; one on the Menexenus; one on the Erotic; one on the Banquet; one on Riches; one on Exhortation; one on the Soul; one on Prayer; one on Nobility of Birth; one on Pleasure; one on the Alexander, or an Essay on Colonists; one on Sovereignty; one on Education; three on the Good; three books related to topics in the Laws of Plato; two on Political Constitutions; one on Economy; one on Friendship; one on Suffering, or having Suffered; one on Sciences; two on Discussions; two Solutions of Disputed Points; four Sophistical Divisions; one on Contraries; one on Species and Genera; one on Property; three Epicheirematic, or Argumentative Commentaries; three Propositions relating to Virtue; one Objection; one book on things that are spoken of in various ways, or a Preliminary Essay; one on the Passion of Anger; five on Ethics; three on Elements; one on Science; one on Beginning; seventeen on Divisions; one on Divisible Things; two books of Questions and Answers; two on Motion; one book of Propositions; four of Contentious Propositions; one on Syllogisms; eight of the First Analytics; two of the second greater Analytics; one on Problems; eight on Method; one on the Better; one on the Idea; seven Definitions serving as a preamble to the Topics; two more books of Syllogisms; one of Syllogisms and Definitions; one on what is Eligible and what is Suitable; one Preface to the Topics; two Topics relating to the Definitions; one on the Passions; one on Divisions; one on Mathematics;[190] thirteen books of Definitions; two of Epicheiremata, or Arguments; one on Pleasure; one of Propositions; one on the Voluntary; one on the Honourable; twenty-five books of Epicheirematic or Argumentative Propositions; four of Amatory Propositions; two of Propositions relating to Friendship; one of Propositions relating to the Soul; two on Politics; eight Political Lectures, like that of Theophrastus; two on Just Actions; two books titled, A Collection of Arts; two on the Art of Rhetoric; one on Art; two on other Art; one on Method; one Introduction to the Art of Theodectes; two books, being a treatise on the Art of Poetry; one book of Rhetorical Enthymemes on Magnitude; one of Divisions of Enthymemes; two on Style; one on Advice; two on Collection; three on Nature; one on Natural Philosophy; three on the Philosophy of Archytas; one on the Philosophy of Speusippus and Xenocrates; one on topics taken from the doctrines of Timæus and the school of Archytas; one on Doctrines of Melissus; one on Doctrines of Alcmæon; one on the Pythagoreans; one on the Precepts of Gorgias; one on the Precepts of Xenophanes; one on the Precepts of Zeno; one on the Pythagoreans; nine on Animals; eight on Anatomy; one book, a Selection of Anatomical Questions; one on Compound Animals; one on Mythological Animals; one on Impotence; one on Plants; one on Physiognomy; two on Medicine; one on the Unit; one on Signs of Storms; one on Astronomy; one on Optics; one on Motion; one on Music; one on Memory; six on Doubts related to Homer; one on Poetry; thirty-eight of Natural Philosophy concerning the First Elements; two of Problems Resolved; two of Encyclica, or General Knowledge; one on Mechanics; two derived from the writings of Democritus; one on Stone; one book of Comparisons; twelve books of Miscellanies; fourteen books explaining things according to their Genus; one on Rights; one book on the Conquerors at the Olympic Games; one on the Conquerors at the Pythian Games in the Art of Music; one on the Pythian; one on a List of the Victors in the Pythian Games; one on the Victories at the Olympic Games; one on Tragedies; one on a List of Plays; one book of Proverbs; one on the Laws of Recommendations; four books of Laws; one on Categories; one on Interpretation; a book[191] containing an account of the Constitutions of one hundred and fifty-eight cities, as well as some individual democratic, oligarchic, aristocratic, and tyrannical Constitutions; Letters to Philip; Letters of the Selymbrians; four Letters to Alexander; nine to Antipater; one to Mentor; one to Ariston; one to Olympias; one to Hephæstion; one to Themistagoras; one to Philoxenus; one to Democritus; one book of Poems beginning:—

Hail! holy, sacred, distant-shooting God.

A book of Elegies which begins:—

A book of elegies that starts:—

Daughter of all-accomplish’d mother.

The whole consisting of four hundred and forty-five thousand two hundred and seventy lines.

The whole consists of four hundred forty-five thousand two hundred seventy lines.

XIII. These then are the books which were written by him. And in them he expresses the following opinions:—that there is in philosophy a two-fold division; one practical, and the other theoretical. Again, the practical is divided into ethical and political, under which last head are comprised considerations affecting not only the state, but also the management, of a single house. The theoretical part, too, is subdivided into physics and logic; the latter forming not a single division, turning on one special point, but being rather an instrument for every art brought to a high degree of accuracy. And he has laid down two separate objects as what it is conversant about, the persuasive and the true. And he has used two means with reference to each end; dialectics and rhetoric, with reference to persuasion; analytical examination and philosophy, with reference to truth; omitting nothing which can bear upon discovery, or judgment, or use. Accordingly, with reference to discovery, he has furnished us with topics and works on method, which form a complete armoury of propositions, from which it is easy to provide one’s self with an abundance of probable arguments for every kind of question. And with reference to judgment, he has given us the former and posterior analytics; and by means of the former analytics, we may arrive at a critical examination of principles; by means of the posterior, we may examine the conclusions which are deduced from them. With reference to the use or application of his rules, he has given us works on discussion,[192] on question, on disputation, on sophistical refutation, on syllogism, and on things of that sort.

XIII. These are the books he wrote. In them, he shares the following views: philosophy can be divided into two parts: practical and theoretical. The practical side is further divided into ethics and politics, with the latter including issues that affect not only the state but also the management of an individual household. The theoretical side is also broken down into physics and logic; the latter is not just a single area focused on one specific point, but rather a tool useful for every discipline that requires precision. He has identified two main purposes of these fields: persuasion and truth. For each purpose, he employs two methods: dialectics and rhetoric for persuasion, and analytical examination and philosophy for truth, leaving out nothing that can aid in discovery, judgment, or application. In terms of discovery, he provides us with topics and methods that serve as a comprehensive toolkit of propositions, making it easy to gather a wealth of plausible arguments for any type of question. Regarding judgment, he offers us the prior and posterior analytics; the prior analytics allow us to critically assess principles, while the posterior helps us analyze the conclusions drawn from them. For the application of his methods, he provides works on discussion, questioning, debate, sophistical refutation, syllogism, and related topics.

He has also furnished us with a double criterion of truth. One, on the perception of those effects, which are according to imagination; the other, the intelligence of those things which are ethical, and which concern politics, and economy, and laws. The chief good he has defined to be the exercise of virtue in a perfect life. He used also to say, that happiness was a thing made up of three kinds of goods. First of all, the goods of the soul, which he also calls the principal goods in respect of their power; secondly, the goods of the body, such as health, strength, beauty, and things of that sort; thirdly, external goods, such as wealth, nobility of birth, glory, and things like those. And he taught that virtue was not sufficient of itself to confer happiness; for that it had need besides of the goods of the body, and of the external goods, for that a wise man would be miserable if he were surrounded by distress, and poverty, and circumstances of that kind. But, on the other hand, he said, that vice was sufficient of itself to cause unhappiness, even if the goods of the body and the external goods were present in the greatest possible degree. He also asserted that the virtues did not reciprocally follow one another, for that it was possible for a prudent, and just, and impartial man, to be incontinent and intemperate; and he said, that the wise man was not destitute of passions, but endowed with moderate passions.

He has also provided us with a two-part standard of truth. One is based on how we perceive those effects that are shaped by imagination; the other relates to our understanding of ethical matters, including politics, economics, and laws. He defined the ultimate good as the practice of virtue in a fulfilling life. He also noted that happiness consists of three types of goods. First, the goods of the soul, which he regarded as the most important due to their influence; second, the goods of the body, like health, strength, beauty, and similar attributes; third, external goods, such as wealth, noble lineage, fame, and the like. He taught that virtue alone was not enough to bring happiness, as it also needed to be accompanied by bodily goods and external goods; a wise person would be unhappy if faced with hardship, poverty, and similar situations. Conversely, he stated that vice could independently lead to unhappiness, even if one possessed the highest degree of bodily and external goods. He also claimed that virtues do not inherently lead to one another, as it is possible for a prudent, just, and unbiased person to be lacking in self-control and moderation; he argued that a wise person does not lack passions but holds them in moderation.

He also used to define friendship as an equality of mutual benevolence. And he divided it into the friendship of kindred, and of love, and of those connected by ties of hospitality. And he said, that love was divided into sensual and philosophical love. And that the wise man would feel the influence of love, and would occupy himself in affairs of state, and would marry a wife, and would live with a king. And as there were three kinds of life, the speculative, the practical, and the voluptuous, he preferred the speculative. He also considered the acquisition of general knowledge serviceable to the acquisition of virtue. As a natural philosopher, he was the most ingenious man that ever lived in tracing effects back to their causes, so that he could explain the principles of the most trifling circumstances; on which account he wrote a great many books of commentaries on physical questions.

He used to define friendship as a balance of mutual goodwill. He categorized it into friendship among family, romantic love, and those connected through hospitality. He mentioned that love could be split into physical love and intellectual love. He believed that a wise person would feel the pull of love, engage in state matters, marry, and live alongside a king. Since there were three types of life—speculative, practical, and hedonistic—he favored the speculative one. He also thought that gaining general knowledge was crucial for developing virtue. As a natural philosopher, he was exceptionally skilled at tracing effects back to their causes, allowing him to explain even the smallest details; for this reason, he wrote extensively on physical topics.

He used to teach that God was incorporeal, as Plato also asserted, and that his providence extends over all the heavenly bodies; also, that he is incapable of motion. And that he governs all things upon earth with reference to their sympathy with the heavenly bodies. Another of his doctrines was, that besides the four elements there is one other, making the fifth, of which all the heavenly bodies are composed; and that this one possesses a motion peculiar to itself, for it is a circular one. That the soul is incorporeal, being the first ἐντελέχεια; for it is the ἐντελέχεια of a physical and organic body, having an existence in consequence of a capacity for existence. And this is, according to him, of a twofold nature. By the word ἐντελέχεια, he means something which has an incorporeal species, either in capacity, as a figure of Mercury in wax, which has a capacity for assuming any shape; or a statue in brass; and so the perfection of the Mercury or of the statue is called ἐντελέχεια, with reference to its habit. But when he speaks of the ἐντελέχεια[47] of a natural body, he does so because, of bodies some are wrought by the hands, as for instance, those which are made by artists, for instance, a tower, or a ship; and some exist by nature, as the bodies of plants and animals. He has also used the term with reference to an organic body, that is to say, with reference to something that is made, as the faculty of sight for seeing, or the faculty of hearing for the purpose of hearing. The capacity of having life must exist in the thing itself. But the capacity is twofold, either in habit or in operation. In operation, as a man, when awake, is said to have a soul; in habit, as the same is said of a man when asleep. That, therefore, he may come under his definition, he has added the word capacity.

He used to teach that God is incorporeal, as Plato also claimed, and that His providence covers all the heavenly bodies; furthermore, that He is incapable of movement. He governs everything on earth in relation to their connection with the heavenly bodies. Another belief of his was that, in addition to the four elements, there is a fifth element that makes up all the heavenly bodies; this fifth element has its own kind of motion, which is circular. The soul is incorporeal and is the first ἐντελέχεια; it is the ἐντελέχεια of a physical and organic body, existing because it has the capacity for existence. According to him, this has a twofold nature. By the term ἐντελέχεια, he refers to something that has an incorporeal form, either in potential, like a figure of Mercury in wax, which can take any shape, or a statue in bronze; thus, the perfection of the Mercury or statue is called ἐντελέχεια, in relation to its form. When he talks about the ἐντελέχεια of a natural body, he refers to bodies that are crafted by human hands, such as those made by artists, like a tower or a ship; and some exist by nature, like the bodies of plants and animals. He also applies the term to an organic body, meaning something that is made, like the capacity for sight in order to see, or the capacity for hearing in order to hear. The ability to be alive must exist within the thing itself. But this ability has two aspects: either in habit or in operation. In operation, a man is said to have a soul when he's awake; in habit, the same is true when a man is asleep. Therefore, to fit his definition, he included the term capacity.

He has also given other definitions on a great many subjects, which it would be tedious to enumerate here. For he was in every thing a man of the greatest industry and ingenuity, as is plain from all his works which I have lately given a list of; which are in number nearly four hundred, the genuineness of which is undoubted. There are, also, a great[194] many other works attributed to him, and a number of apophthegms which he never committed to paper.

He has also provided various definitions on many topics, which would be boring to list here. He was a truly industrious and clever man in everything he did, as is clear from the nearly four hundred works I've recently listed, all of which are undoubtedly authentic. Additionally, there are many other works credited to him and a number of sayings he never wrote down.

XIV. There were eight persons of the name of Aristotle. First of all, the philosopher of whom we have been speaking; the second was an Athenian statesman, some of whose forensic orations, of great elegance, are still extant; the third was a man who wrote a treatise on the Iliad; the fourth, a Siciliot orator, who wrote a reply to the Panegyric of Isocrates; the fifth was the man who was surnamed Myth, a friend of Æschines, the pupil of Socrates; the sixth was a Cyrenean, who wrote a treatise on Poetry; the seventh was a schoolmaster, who is mentioned by Aristoxenus in his Life of Plato; the eighth, was an obscure grammarian, to whom a treatise on Pleonasm is attributed.

XIV. There were eight people named Aristotle. First, there’s the philosopher we’ve been discussing; second, an Athenian politician whose elegant speeches are still around; third, a writer who created a treatise on the Iliad; fourth, a Sicilian speaker who responded to Isocrates' Panegyric; fifth, a guy nicknamed Myth, a friend of Æschines and a student of Socrates; sixth, a person from Cyrene who wrote a treatise on Poetry; seventh, a teacher mentioned by Aristoxenus in his Life of Plato; and eighth, an unknown grammarian credited with a treatise on Pleonasm.

XV. And the Stagirite had many friends, the most eminent of whom was Theophrastus, whom we must proceed to speak of.

XV. The Stagirite had many friends, the most notable of whom was Theophrastus, who we need to discuss next.

LIFE OF THEOPHRASTUS.

I. Theophrastus was a native of Eresus, the son of Melantas, a fuller, as we are told by Athenodorus in the eighth book of his Philosophical Conversations.

I. Theophrastus was from Eresus, the son of Melantas, a fuller, according to Athenodorus in the eighth book of his Philosophical Conversations.

II. He was originally a pupil of Leucippus, his fellow citizen, in his own country; and subsequently, after having attended the lectures of Plato, he went over to Aristotle. And when he withdrew to Chalcis, he succeeded him as president of his school, in the hundred and fourteenth olympiad.

II. He was originally a student of Leucippus, his fellow citizen, in his home country; and later, after attending Plato's lectures, he joined Aristotle. When he moved to Chalcis, he took over as president of Aristotle's school during the hundred and fourteenth olympiad.

III. It is also said that a slave of his, by name Pomphylus, was a philosopher, as we are told by Myronianus of Amastra, in the first book of Similar Historical Chapters.

III. It is also said that one of his slaves, named Pomphylus, was a philosopher, as stated by Myronianus of Amastra in the first book of Similar Historical Chapters.

IV. Theophrastus was a man of great acuteness and industry, and, as Pamphila asserts in the thirty-second book of her Commentaries, he was the tutor of Menander, the comic poet. He was also a most benevolent man, and very affable.

IV. Theophrastus was a highly intelligent and hardworking person, and as Pamphila mentions in the thirty-second book of her Commentaries, he was the teacher of Menander, the comic poet. He was also a very kind and friendly man.

V. Accordingly Cassander received him as a friend; and Ptolemy sent to invite him to his court. And he was thought so very highly of at Athens, that when Agonides ventured to[195] impeach him on a charge of impiety, he was very nearly fined for his hardihood. And there thronged to his school a crowd of disciples to the number of two thousand. In his letter to Phanias, the Peripatetic, among other subjects he speaks of the court of justice in the following terms: “It is not only out of the question to find an assembly (πανήγυρις), but it is not easy to find even a company (συνέδριον) such as one would like; but yet recitations produce corrections of the judgment. And my age does not allow me to put off everything and to feel indifference on such a subject.” In this letter he speaks of himself as one who devotes his whole leisure to learning.

V. So, Cassander welcomed him as a friend, and Ptolemy sent an invitation for him to come to his court. He was held in such high regard in Athens that when Agonides tried to accuse him of impiety, he almost got fined for his audacity. A crowd of about two thousand students flocked to his school. In his letter to Phanias, the Peripatetic, he discusses the court of justice, saying, “It's not just impossible to find an assembly (πανήγυρις), but it's also hard to find even a gathering (συνέδριον) that one would prefer; nevertheless, recitations lead to corrections in judgment. And my age doesn’t allow me to postpone everything and be indifferent about such matters.” In this letter, he describes himself as someone who dedicates all his free time to learning.

And though he was of this disposition, he nevertheless went away for a short time, both he and all the rest of the philosophers, in consequence of Sophocles, the son of Amphiclides, having brought forward and carried a law that no one of the philosophers should preside over a school unless the council and the people had passed a resolution to sanction their doing so; if they did, death was to be the penalty. But they returned again the next year, when Philion had impeached Sophocles for illegal conduct; when the Athenians abrogated his law, and fined Sophocles five talents, and voted that the philosophers should have leave to return, that Theophrastus might return and preside over his school as before.

And even though he felt this way, he still left for a little while, along with all the other philosophers, because Sophocles, the son of Amphiclides, had proposed and passed a law that no philosopher could be in charge of a school unless both the council and the people approved it; if they didn’t, the punishment would be death. But they came back the next year when Philion accused Sophocles of wrongdoing; the Athenians repealed his law, fined Sophocles five talents, and decided that the philosophers could return, allowing Theophrastus to come back and lead his school as he had before.

VI. His name had originally been Tyrtamus, but Aristotle changed it to Theophrastus, from the divine character of his eloquence.[48]

VI. His name had originally been Tyrtamus, but Aristotle changed it to Theophrastus, based on the divine quality of his eloquence.[48]

VII. He is said also to have been very much attached to Aristotle’s son, Nicomachus, although he was his master; at least, this is stated by Aristippus in the fourth book of his treatise on the Ancient Luxury.

VII. He is also said to have been very close to Aristotle’s son, Nicomachus, even though he was his teacher; at least, this is what Aristippus states in the fourth book of his treatise on Ancient Luxury.

VIII. It is also related that Aristotle used the same expression about him and Callisthenes, which Plato, as I have previously mentioned, employed about Xenocrates and Aristotle himself. For he is reported to have said, since Theophrastus was a man of extraordinary acuteness, who could both comprehend and explain everything, and as the other was somewhat slow in his natural character, that Theophrastus required a bridle, and Callisthenes a spur.

VIII. It’s said that Aristotle used the same phrase about him and Callisthenes that Plato, as I mentioned earlier, used about Xenocrates and Aristotle himself. It’s reported that he said, since Theophrastus was an incredibly sharp guy who could understand and explain everything, and since the other was a bit slow by nature, that Theophrastus needed a bit of control, while Callisthenes needed some motivation.

IX. It is said, too, that he had a garden of his own after[196] the death of Aristotle, by the assistance of Demetrius Phalereus, who was an intimate friend of his.

IX. It’s also said that he had his own garden after[196] the death of Aristotle, with the help of Demetrius Phalereus, who was a close friend of his.

X. The following very practical apophthegms of his are quoted. He used to say that it was better to trust to a horse without a bridle than to a discourse without arrangement. And once, when a man preserved a strict silence during the whole of a banquet, he said to him, “If you are an ignorant man, you are acting wisely; but if you have had any education, you are behaving like a fool.” And a very favourite expression of his was, that time was the most valuable thing that a man could spend.

X. Here are some very practical sayings of his: He used to say that it was better to rely on a horse without a bridle than to depend on a conversation without structure. One time, when a man stayed completely silent throughout a banquet, he remarked, “If you’re uneducated, you’re being smart; but if you’ve had any schooling, you’re acting foolish.” One of his favorite expressions was that time was the most valuable thing a person could spend.

XI. He died when he was of a great age, having lived eighty-five years, when he had only rested from his labours a short time. And we have composed the following epigram on him:—

XI. He died at a great age, having lived eighty-five years, just after taking a brief rest from his work. And we have written the following epigram about him:—

The proverb then is not completely false,
That wisdom’s bow unbent is quickly broken;
While Theophrastus laboured, he kept sound,
When he relaxed, he lost his strength and died.

They say that on one occasion, when dying, he was asked by his disciples whether he had any charge to give them; and he replied, that he had none but that they should “remember that life holds out many pleasing deceits to us by the vanity of glory; for that when we are beginning to live, then we are dying. There is, therefore, nothing more profitless than ambition. But may you all be fortunate, and either abandon philosophy (for it is a great labour), or else cling to it diligently, for then the credit of it is great; but the vanities of life exceed the advantage of it. However, it is not requisite for me now to advise you what you should do; but do you yourselves consider what line of conduct to adopt.” And when he had said this, as report goes, he expired. And the Athenians accompanied him to the grave, on foot, with the whole population of the city, as it is related, honouring the man greatly.

They say that once, when he was dying, his disciples asked if he had any advice for them. He replied that he had none except to “remember that life presents many tempting illusions through the vanity of glory; because when we start to truly live, we are already dying. Therefore, nothing is more useless than ambition. But may you all be fortunate enough to either give up philosophy (since it requires a lot of effort) or pursue it diligently, because then it gains you a lot of respect; however, the vanities of life outweigh its benefits. Still, I don’t need to tell you what you should do; you should decide for yourselves what path to take.” And after saying this, as the story goes, he passed away. The Athenians accompanied him to the grave on foot, with the entire city honoring him greatly.

XII. But Phavorinus says, that when he was very old he used to go about in a litter; and that Hermippus states this, quoting Arcesilaus, the Pitanæan, and the account which he sent to Lacydes of Cyrene.

XII. But Phavorinus says that when he was very old, he used to travel in a litter; and Hermippus mentions this, citing Arcesilaus, the Pitanæan, and the report he sent to Lacydes of Cyrene.

XIII. He also left behind him a very great number of[197] works, of which I have thought it proper to give a list on account of their being full of every sort of excellence. They are as follows:—

XIII. He also left behind a significant number of[197] works, and I thought it was important to provide a list since they are all filled with various kinds of excellence. They are as follows:—

Three books of the First Analytics; seven of the Second Analytics; one book of the Analysis of Syllogisms; one book, an Epitome of Analytics; two books, Topics for referring things to First Principles; one book, an Examination of Speculative Questions about Discussions; one on Sensations; one addressed to Anaxagoras; one on the Doctrines of Anaxagoras; one on the Doctrines of Anaximenes; one on the Doctrines of Archelaus; one on Salt, Nitre, and Alum; two on Petrifactions; one on Indivisible Lines; two on Hearing; one on Words; one on the Differences between Virtues; one on Kingly Power; one on the Education of a King; three on Lives; one on Old Age; one on the Astronomical System of Democritus; one on Meteorology; one on Images or Phantoms; one on Juices, Complexions, and Flesh; one on the Description of the World; one on Men; one, a Collection of the Sayings of Diogenes; three books of Definitions; one treatise on Love; another treatise on Love; one book on Happiness; two books on Species; on Epilepsy, one; on Enthusiasm, one; on Empedocles, one; eighteen books of Epicheiremes; three books of Objections; one book on the Voluntary; two books, being an Abridgment of Plato’s Polity; one on the Difference of the Voices of Similar Animals; one on Sudden Appearances; one on Animals which Bite or Sting; one on such Animals as are said to be Jealous; one on those which live on Dry Land; one on those which Change their Colour; one on those which live in Holes; seven on Animals in General; one on Pleasure according to the Definition of Aristotle; seventy-four books of Propositions; one treatise on Hot and Cold; one essay on Giddiness and Vertigo and Sudden Dimness of Sight; one on Perspiration; one on Affirmation and Denial; the Callisthenes, or an essay on Mourning, one; on Labours, one; on Motion, three; on Stones, one; on Pestilences, one; on Fainting Fits, one; the Megaric Philosopher, one; on Melancholy, one; on Mines, two; on Honey, one; a collection of the Doctrines of Metrodorus, one; two books on those Philosophers who have treated of Meteorology; on Drunkenness, one; twenty-four books of Laws, in alphabetical order; ten books, being an Abridgment[198] of Laws; one on Definitions; one on Smells; one on Wine and Oil; eighteen books of Primary Propositions; three books on Lawgivers; six books of Political Disquisitions; a treatise on Politicals, with reference to occasions as they arise, four books; four books of Political Customs; on the best Constitution, one; five books of a Collection of Problems; on Proverbs, one; on Concretion and Liquefaction, one; on Fire, two; on Spirits, one; on Paralysis, one; on Suffocation, one; on Aberration of Intellect, one; on the Passions, one; on Signs, one; two books of Sophisms; one on the Solution of Syllogisms; two books of Topics; two on Punishment; one on Hair; one on Tyranny; three on Water; one on Sleep and Dreams; three on Friendship; two on Liberality; three on Nature; eighteen on Questions of Natural Philosophy; two books, being an Abridgment of Natural Philosophy; eight more books on Natural Philosophy; one treatise addressed to Natural Philosophers; two books on the History of Plants; eight books on the Causes of Plants; five on Juices; one on Mistaken Pleasures; one, Investigation of a proposition concerning the Soul; one on Unskilfully Adduced Proofs; one on Simple Doubts; one on Harmonics; one on Virtue; one entitled Occasions or Contradictions; one on Denial; one on Opinion; one on the Ridiculous; two called Soirees; two books of Divisions; one on Differences; one on Acts of Injustice; one on Calumny; one on Praise; one on Skill; three books of Epistles; one on Self-produced Animals; one on Selection; one entitled the Praises of the Gods; one on Festivals; one on Good Fortune; one on Enthymemes; one on Inventions; one on Moral Schools; one book of Moral Characters; one treatise on Tumult; one on History; one on the Judgment Concerning Syllogisms; one on Flattery; one on the Sea; one essay, addressed to Cassander, Concerning Kingly Power; one on Comedy; one on Meteors; one on Style; one book called a Collection of Sayings; one book of Solutions; three books on Music; one on Metres; the Megades, one; on Laws, one; on Violations of Law, one; a collection of the Sayings and Doctrines of Xenocrates, one; one book of Conversations; on an Oath, one; one of Oratorical Precepts; one on Riches; one on Poetry; one being a collection of Political, Ethical, Physical, and amatory[199] Problems; one book of Proverbs; one book, being a Collection of General Problems; one on Problems in Natural Philosophy; one on Example; one on Proposition and Exposition; a second treatise on Poetry; one on the Wise Men; one on Counsel; one on Solecisms; one on Rhetorical Art, a collection of sixty-one figures of Oratorical Art; one book on Hypocrisy; six books of a Commentary of Aristotle or Theophrastus; sixteen books of Opinions on Natural Philosophy; one book, being an Abridgment of Opinions on Natural Philosophy; one on Gratitude; one called Moral Characters; one on Truth and Falsehood; six on the History of Divine Things; three on the Gods; four on the History of Geometry; six books, being an Abridgment of the work of Aristotle on Animals; two books of Epicheiremes; three books of Propositions; two on Kingly Power; one on Causes; one on Democritus; one on Calumny; one on Generation; one on the Intellect and Moral Character of Animals; two on Motion; four on Sight; two on Definitions; one on being given in Marriage; one on the Greater and the Less; one on Music; one on Divine Happiness; one addressed to the Philosophers of the Academy; one Exhortatory Treatise; one discussing how a City may be best Governed; one called Commentaries; one on the Crater of Mount Etna in Sicily; one on Admitted Facts; one on Problems in Natural History; one, What are the Different Manners of Acquiring Knowledge; three on Telling Lies; one book, which is a preface to the Topics; one addressed to Æschylus; six books of a History of Astronomy; one book of the History of Arithmetic relating to Increasing Numbers; one called the Acicharus; one on Judicial Discourses; one on Calumny; one volume of Letters to Astycreon, Phanias, and Nicanor; one book on Piety; one called the Evias; one on Circumstances; one volume entitled Familiar Conversations; one on the Education of Children; another on the same subject, discussed in a different manner; one on Education, called also, a treatise on Virtue, or on Temperance; one book of Exhortations; one on Numbers; one consisting of Definitions referring to the Enunciation of Syllogisms; one on Heaven; two on Politics; two on Nature, on Fruits, and on Animals. And these works contain in all two hundred and thirty-two thousand nine hundred and eight lines.

Three books of the First Analytics; seven of the Second Analytics; one book on the Analysis of Syllogisms; one book, an Epitome of Analytics; two books, Topics for referencing things to First Principles; one book, an Examination of Speculative Questions about Discussions; one on Sensations; one addressed to Anaxagoras; one on the Doctrines of Anaxagoras; one on the Doctrines of Anaximenes; one on the Doctrines of Archelaus; one on Salt, Nitre, and Alum; two on Petrifactions; one on Indivisible Lines; two on Hearing; one on Words; one on the Differences between Virtues; one on Kingly Power; one on the Education of a King; three on Lives; one on Old Age; one on the Astronomical System of Democritus; one on Meteorology; one on Images or Phantoms; one on Juices, Complexions, and Flesh; one on the Description of the World; one on Men; one, a Collection of the Sayings of Diogenes; three books of Definitions; one treatise on Love; another treatise on Love; one book on Happiness; two books on Species; one on Epilepsy; one on Enthusiasm; one on Empedocles; eighteen books of Epicheiremes; three books of Objections; one book on the Voluntary; two books, being an Abridgment of Plato’s Polity; one on the Difference of the Voices of Similar Animals; one on Sudden Appearances; one on Animals that Bite or Sting; one on Animals that are said to be Jealous; one on those that live on Dry Land; one on those that Change their Colour; one on those that live in Holes; seven on Animals in General; one on Pleasure according to Aristotle’s Definition; seventy-four books of Propositions; one treatise on Hot and Cold; one essay on Giddiness, Vertigo, and Sudden Dimness of Sight; one on Perspiration; one on Affirmation and Denial; the Callisthenes, or an essay on Mourning; one on Labours; three on Motion; one on Stones; one on Pestilences; one on Fainting Fits; one on the Megaric Philosopher; one on Melancholy; two on Mines; one on Honey; a collection of the Doctrines of Metrodorus; two books on those Philosophers who have written about Meteorology; one on Drunkenness; twenty-four books of Laws, in alphabetical order; ten books, an Abridgment of Laws; one on Definitions; one on Smells; one on Wine and Oil; eighteen books of Primary Propositions; three books on Lawgivers; six books of Political Disquisitions; a treatise on Politicals, with reference to occasions as they arise, four books; four books of Political Customs; one on the best Constitution; five books of a Collection of Problems; one on Proverbs; one on Concretion and Liquefaction; two on Fire; one on Spirits; one on Paralysis; one on Suffocation; one on Aberration of Intellect; one on the Passions; one on Signs; two books of Sophisms; one on the Solution of Syllogisms; two books of Topics; two on Punishment; one on Hair; one on Tyranny; three on Water; one on Sleep and Dreams; three on Friendship; two on Liberality; three on Nature; eighteen on Questions of Natural Philosophy; two books, an Abridgment of Natural Philosophy; eight more books on Natural Philosophy; one treatise addressed to Natural Philosophers; two books on the History of Plants; eight books on the Causes of Plants; five on Juices; one on Mistaken Pleasures; one on Investigating a proposition concerning the Soul; one on Incorrectly Presented Proofs; one on Simple Doubts; one on Harmonics; one on Virtue; one called Occasions or Contradictions; one on Denial; one on Opinion; one on the Ridiculous; two called Soirees; two books of Divisions; one on Differences; one on Acts of Injustice; one on Calumny; one on Praise; one on Skill; three books of Epistles; one on Self-produced Animals; one on Selection; one titled the Praises of the Gods; one on Festivals; one on Good Fortune; one on Enthymemes; one on Inventions; one on Moral Schools; one book of Moral Characters; one treatise on Tumult; one on History; one on the Judgment Regarding Syllogisms; one on Flattery; one on the Sea; one essay addressed to Cassander about Kingly Power; one on Comedy; one on Meteors; one on Style; one book called a Collection of Sayings; one book of Solutions; three books on Music; one on Metres; one on Laws; one on Violations of Law; a collection of the Sayings and Doctrines of Xenocrates; one book of Conversations; one on Oaths; one of Oratorical Precepts; one on Riches; one on Poetry; one being a collection of Political, Ethical, Physical, and Amatory Problems; one book of Proverbs; one book, a Collection of General Problems; one on Problems in Natural Philosophy; one on Examples; one on Proposition and Exposition; a second treatise on Poetry; one on the Wise Men; one on Counsel; one on Solecisms; one on Rhetorical Art, a collection of sixty-one figures of Oratorical Art; one book on Hypocrisy; six books of a Commentary of Aristotle or Theophrastus; sixteen books of Opinions on Natural Philosophy; one book, an Abridgment of Opinions on Natural Philosophy; one on Gratitude; one titled Moral Characters; one on Truth and Falsehood; six on the History of Divine Things; three on the Gods; four on the History of Geometry; six books, an Abridgment of Aristotle's work on Animals; two books of Epicheiremes; three books of Propositions; two on Kingly Power; one on Causes; one on Democritus; one on Calumny; one on Generation; one on the Intellect and Moral Character of Animals; two on Motion; four on Sight; two on Definitions; one on being given in Marriage; one on the Greater and the Less; one on Music; one on Divine Happiness; one addressed to the Philosophers of the Academy; one Exhortatory Treatise; one discussing how a City may be best Governed; one titled Commentaries; one on the Crater of Mount Etna in Sicily; one on Admitted Facts; one on Problems in Natural History; one, What are the Different Ways of Acquiring Knowledge; three on Telling Lies; one book, a preface to the Topics; one addressed to Æschylus; six books of a History of Astronomy; one book of the History of Arithmetic relating to Increasing Numbers; one called the Acicharus; one on Judicial Discourses; one on Calumny; one volume of Letters to Astycreon, Phanias, and Nicanor; one book on Piety; one called the Evias; one on Circumstances; one volume titled Familiar Conversations; one on the Education of Children; another on the same subject, discussed in a different way; one on Education, also called, a treatise on Virtue, or on Temperance; one book of Exhortations; one on Numbers; one consisting of Definitions relating to the Enunciation of Syllogisms; one on Heaven; two on Politics; two on Nature, on Fruits, and on Animals. And these works contain in total two hundred and thirty-two thousand nine hundred and eight lines.

These, then, are the books which Theophrastus composed.

These are the books that Theophrastus wrote.

XIV. I have also found his will, which is drawn up in the following terms:—

XIV. I have also found his will, which is written in the following words:—

May things turn out well, but if anything should happen to me, I make the following disposition of my property. I give everything that I have in my house to Melantes and Pancreon, the sons of Leon. And those things which have been given to me by Hipparchus, I wish to be disposed of in the following manner:—First of all, I wish everything about the Museum[49] and the statue of the goddesses to be made perfect, and to be adorned in a still more beautiful manner than at present, wherein there is room for improvement. Then I desire the statue of Aristotle to be placed in the temple, and all the other offerings which were in the temple before. Then I desire the colonnade which used to be near the Museum to be rebuilt in a manner not inferior to the previous one. I also enjoin my executors to put up the tablets on which the maps of the earth are drawn, in the lower colonnade, and to take care that an altar is finished in such a manner that nothing may be wanting to its perfectness or its beauty. I also direct a statue of Nicomachus, of equal size, to be erected at the same time; and the price for making the statue has been already paid to Praxiteles; and he is to contribute what is wanting for the expense. And I desire that it shall be placed wherever it shall seem best to those who have the charge of providing for the execution of the other injunctions contained in this will. And these are my orders respecting the temple and the offerings. The estate which I have at Stagira, I give to Callinus, and all my books I bequeath to Neleus. My garden, and my promenade, and my houses which join the garden, I give all of them to any of the friends whose names I set down below, who choose to hold a school in them and to devote themselves to the study of philosophy, since it is not possible for any one to be always travelling, but I give them on condition that they are not to alienate them, and that no one is to claim them as his own private property; but they are to use them in common as if they were sacred ground, sharing them with one another in a kindred and friendly spirit, as is reasonable and just. And those who are to have this joint property in them are Hipparchus, Neleus, Strato, Callinus, Demotimus, Demaratus, Callisthenes, Melantes, Pancreon,[201] and Nicippus. And Aristotle, the son of Metrodorus and Pythias, shall also be entitled to a share in this property, if he like to join these men in the study of philosophy. And I beg the older men to pay great attention to his education that he may be led on to philosophy as much as possible. I also desire my executors to bury me in whatever part of the garden shall appear most suitable, incurring no superfluous expense about my funeral or monument. And, as has been said before, after the proper honours have been paid to me, and after provision has been made for the execution of my will as far as relates to the temple, and the monument, and the garden, and the promenade, then I enjoin that Pamphylus, who dwells in the garden, shall keep it and everything else in the condition as it has been in hitherto. And those who are in possession of these things are to take care of his interests. I further bequeath to Pamphylus and Threptes, who have been some time emancipated, and who have been of great service to me, besides all that they have previously received from me, and all that they may have earned for themselves, and all that I have provided for being given them by Hipparchus, two thousand drachmas, and I enjoin that they should have them in firm and secure possession, as I have often said to them, and to Melantes and Pancreon, and they have agreed to provide for this my will taking effect. I also give them the little handmaid Somatale; and of my slaves, I ratify the emancipation of Molon, and Cimon, and Parmenon which I have already given them. And I hereby give their liberty to Manes and Callias, who have remained four years in the garden, and have worked in it, and have conducted themselves in an unimpeachable manner. And I direct that my executors shall give Pamphylus as much of my household furniture as may seem to them to be proper, and shall sell the rest. And I give Carion to Demotimus, and Donax to Neleus. I order Eubius to be sold, and I request Hipparchus to give Callinus three thousand drachmas. And if I had not seen the great service that Hipparchus has been to me in former times, and the embarrassed state of his affairs at present, I should have associated Melantes and Pancreon with him in these gifts. But as I see that it would not be easy for them to arrange to manage the property together, I have thought it likely to be more advantageous for them to receive a fixed[202] sum from Hipparchus. Therefore, let Hipparchus pay to Melantes and to Pancreon a talent a-piece; and let him also pay to my executors the money necessary for the expenses which I have here set down in my will, as it shall require to be expended. And when he has done this, then I will that he shall be discharged of all debts due from him to me or to my estate. And if any profit shall accrue to him in Chalcis, from property belonging to me, it shall be all his own. My executors, for all the duties provided for in this will, shall be Hipparchus, Neleus, Strato, Callinus, Demotimus, Callisthenes, and Ctesarchus. And this my will is copied out, and all the copies are sealed with the seal-ring of me, Theophrastus; one copy is in the hands of Hegesias the son of Hipparchus; the witnesses thereto are Callippus of Pallene, Philomelus of Euonymus, Lysander of Hybas, and Philion of Alopece. Another copy is deposited with Olympiodorus, and the witnesses are the same. A third copy is under the care of Adimantus, and it was conveyed to him by Androsthenes, his son. The witnesses to that copy are Arimnestus the son of Cleobulus, Lysistratus of Thasos, the son of Phidon; Strato of Lampsacus, the son of Arcesilaus; Thesippus of Cerami, the son of Thesippus; Dioscorides of the banks of the Cephisus, the son of Dionysius.—This was his will.

May things turn out well, but if anything should happen to me, I want to arrange my property as follows: I give everything in my house to Melantes and Pancreon, the sons of Leon. As for the items Hipparchus has given me, I want them to be handled like this: First, I want everything related to the Museum[49] and the statue of the goddesses to be perfected and made even more beautiful than they are now, as there's room for improvement. Next, I want the statue of Aristotle to be placed in the temple, along with all the other offerings that were previously there. I also want the colonnade that used to be near the Museum to be rebuilt at least as well as the last one. I also instruct my executors to display the tablets with the maps of the earth in the lower colonnade, and to ensure that the altar is completed so that nothing is lacking in its perfection or beauty. I also ask for a statue of Nicomachus, of the same size, to be erected at the same time; Praxiteles has already been paid for the statue, and he will provide anything else needed for the cost. I want it to be placed wherever those responsible for my other wishes think is best. These are my orders regarding the temple and the offerings. I give my estate in Stagira to Callinus, and I bequeath all my books to Neleus. My garden, promenade, and the houses adjacent to the garden all go to any of the friends listed below who want to hold a school there and devote themselves to philosophy, since one can't always be traveling, but I give them under the condition that they can't sell them, and that no one can claim them as private property; instead, they should share them as if they were sacred ground, in a kind and friendly spirit, as is fair and just. The friends who will share this property are Hipparchus, Neleus, Strato, Callinus, Demotimus, Demaratus, Callisthenes, Melantes, Pancreon,[201] and Nicippus. And Aristotle, the son of Metrodorus and Pythias, will also have a share in this property if he decides to join these friends in studying philosophy. I ask the older men to pay close attention to his education so he can get into philosophy as much as possible. I also want my executors to bury me in the part of the garden that seems most suitable, without incurring unnecessary expenses for my funeral or monument. Once the proper honors have been paid to me, and after arranging for the carrying out of my will related to the temple, monument, garden, and promenade, I instruct that Pamphylus, who lives in the garden, should maintain it and everything else as it has been. Those in possession of these things should look after his interests. I additionally bequeath to Pamphylus and Threptes, who have been emancipated for some time and have been of great help to me, in addition to everything they have gotten from me and what they've earned for themselves, and all that I have arranged to be given to them by Hipparchus, two thousand drachmas, ensuring that they have them securely, as I've often stated, to them and Melantes and Pancreon, who have agreed to ensure that my will is executed. I also give them the little maid Somatale; and regarding my slaves, I confirm the emancipation of Molon, Cimon, and Parmenon, which I have already granted them. I hereby grant freedom to Manes and Callias, who have spent four years in the garden working diligently and have behaved impeccably. I direct my executors to give Pamphylus as much of my household furniture as they think is appropriate, and sell the rest. I give Carion to Demotimus, and Donax to Neleus. I order that Eubius be sold, and I ask Hipparchus to give Callinus three thousand drachmas. If I had not recognized the great service Hipparchus has provided me in the past, and his current financial struggles, I would have involved Melantes and Pancreon in these gifts as well. However, since I see it wouldn't be easy for them to manage the property together, I believe it's better for them to receive a fixed[202] sum from Hipparchus. Therefore, let Hipparchus pay each of Melantes and Pancreon a talent, and also give my executors the necessary funds for the expenses outlined in my will. Once he has done this, he will be free from all debts owed to me or to my estate. If he makes any profit in Chalcis from my property, it will belong entirely to him. My executors for all duties listed in this will will be Hipparchus, Neleus, Strato, Callinus, Demotimus, Callisthenes, and Ctesarchus. This will has been copied out, with all copies sealed with my seal, Theophrastus; one copy is held by Hegesias, the son of Hipparchus; the witnesses are Callippus of Pallene, Philomelus of Euonymus, Lysander of Hybas, and Philion of Alopece. Another copy is with Olympiodorus, with the same witnesses. A third copy is with Adimantus, which was given to him by his son Androsthenes. The witnesses to that copy are Arimnestus, the son of Cleobulus, Lysistratus of Thasos, the son of Phidon; Strato of Lampsacus, the son of Arcesilaus; Thesippus of Cerami, the son of Thesippus; Dioscorides of the banks of the Cephisus, the son of Dionysius.—This was his will.

XV. Some writers have stated that Erasistratus, the physician, was a pupil of his; and it is very likely.

XV. Some writers have said that Erasistratus, the physician, was one of his students; and that's very likely.

LIFE OF STRATO.

I. Theophrastus was succeeded in the presidency of his school by Strato of Lampsacus, the son of Arcesilaus, of whom he had made mention in his will.

I. Theophrastus was succeeded as the head of his school by Strato of Lampsacus, the son of Arcesilaus, whom he had mentioned in his will.

II. He was a man of great eminence, surnamed the Natural Philosopher, from his surpassing all men in the diligence with which he applied himself to the investigation of matters of that nature.

II. He was a highly respected man, nicknamed the Natural Philosopher, due to his exceptional dedication to studying subjects of that kind.

III. He was also the preceptor of Ptolemy Philadelphus, and received from him, as it is said, eighty talents; and he[203] began to preside over the school, as Apollodorus tells us in his Chronicles, in the hundred and twenty-third olympiad, and continued in that post for eighteen years.

III. He was also the teacher of Ptolemy Philadelphus and received eighty talents from him, as it's said. He[203] started to lead the school, according to Apollodorus in his Chronicles, in the one hundred and twenty-third Olympiad and stayed in that position for eighteen years.

IV. There are extant three books of his on Kingly Power; three on Justice; three on the Gods; three on Beginnings; and one on each of the subjects of Happiness, Philosophy, Manly Courage, the Vacuum, Heaven, Spirit, Human Nature, the Generation of Animals, Mixtures, Sleep, Dreams, Sight, Perception, Pleasure, Colours, Diseases, Judgments, Powers, Metallic Works, Hunger, and Dimness of Sight, Lightness and Heaviness, Enthusiasm, Pain, Nourishment and Growth, Animals whose Existence is Doubted, Fabulous Animals, Causes, a Solution of Doubts, a preface to Topics; there are, also, treatises on Contingencies, on the Definition, on the More and Less, on Injustice, on Former and Later, on the Prior Genus, on Property, on the Future. There are, also, two books called the Examination of Inventions; the Genuineness of the Commentaries attributed to him, is doubted. There is a volume of Epistles, which begins thus: “Strato wishes Arsinoe prosperity.”

IV. There are three existing books by him on Kingly Power; three on Justice; three on the Gods; three on Beginnings; and one on each of the topics of Happiness, Philosophy, Manly Courage, the Vacuum, Heaven, Spirit, Human Nature, the Generation of Animals, Mixtures, Sleep, Dreams, Sight, Perception, Pleasure, Colors, Diseases, Judgments, Powers, Metallic Works, Hunger, and Dimness of Sight, Lightness and Heaviness, Enthusiasm, Pain, Nourishment and Growth, Animals Whose Existence is Doubtful, Fabulous Animals, Causes, a Solution of Doubts, and a preface to Topics; there are also treatises on Contingencies, on Definition, on More and Less, on Injustice, on Former and Later, on the Prior Genus, on Property, and on the Future. Additionally, there are two books called the Examination of Inventions; the authenticity of the Commentaries attributed to him is questioned. There is a collection of Letters, which starts with: “Strato wishes Arsinoe prosperity.”

V. They say that he became so thin and weak, that he died without its being perceived. And there is an epigram of ours upon him in the following terms:—

V. They say he got so thin and weak that he died without anyone noticing. And we have an epigram about him that goes like this:—

The man was thin, believe me, from the use
Of frequent unguents; Strato was his name,
A citizen of Lampsacus; he struggled long
With fell disease, and died at last unnoticed.

VI. There were eight people of the name of Strato. The first was a pupil of Isocrates; the second was the man of whom we have been speaking; the third was a physician, a pupil of Erasistratus, or, as some assert, a foster-child of his; the fourth was an historian, who wrote a history of the Achievements of Philip and Perses in their wars against the Romans.… The sixth was an epigrammatic poet; the seventh was an ancient physician, as Aristotle tells us; the eighth was a Peripatetic philosopher, who lived in Alexandria.

VI. There were eight people named Strato. The first was a student of Isocrates; the second was the person we've been discussing; the third was a doctor, either a student of Erasistratus or, as some say, a foster child of his; the fourth was a historian who wrote about the achievements of Philip and Perses in their wars against the Romans.… The sixth was a poet known for his epigrams; the seventh was an ancient doctor, according to Aristotle; and the eighth was a Peripatetic philosopher who lived in Alexandria.

VII. But the will, too, of this natural philosopher is extant, and it is couched in the following language:—“If anything happens to me, I make this disposition of my property. I[204] leave all my property in my house to Lampyrion and Arcesilaus; and with the money which I have at Athens, in the first place, let my executors provide for my funeral and for all other customary expenses; without doing anything extravagant, or, on the other hand, anything mean. And the following shall be my executors, according to this my will: Olympichus, Aristides, Mnesigenes, Hippocrates, Epicrates, Gorgylus, Diocles, Lycon, and Athanes. And my school I leave to Lycon, since of the others some are too old, and others too busy. And the rest will do well, if they ratify this arrangement of mine. I also bequeath to him all my books, except such as we have written ourselves; and all my furniture in the dining-room, and the couches, and the drinking cups. And let my executors give Epicrates five hundred drachmas, and one of my slaves, according to the choice made by Arcesilaus. And first of all, let Lampyrion and Arcesilaus cancel the engagements which Daippus has entered into for Iræus. And let him be acquitted of all obligation to Lampyrion or the heirs of Lampyrion; and let him also be discharged from any bond or note of hand he may have given. And let my executors give him five hundred drachmas of silver, and one of my slaves, whichever Arcesilaus may approve, in order that, as he has done me great service, and co-operated with me in many things, he may have a competency, and be enabled to live decently. And I give their freedom to Diophantus, and Diocles, and Abus. Simias I give to Arcesilaus. I also give his freedom to Dromo. And when Arcesilaus arrives, let Iræus calculate with Olympichus and Epicrates, and the rest of my executors, the amount that has been expended on my funeral and on other customary expenses. And let the money that remains, be paid over to Arcesilaus by Olympichus, who shall give him no trouble, as to the time or manner of payment. And Arcesilaus shall discharge the engagements which Strato has entered into with Olympichus and Aminias, which are preserved in writing in the care of Philocrates, the son of Tisamenus. And with respect to my monument, let them do whatever seems good to Arcesilaus, and Olympichus, and Lycon.”

VII. The will of this natural philosopher is also available, and it states: “If anything happens to me, I want my property distributed like this: I leave everything in my house to Lampyrion and Arcesilaus; and with the money I have in Athens, first, my executors should take care of my funeral and all other customary expenses, without being extravagant or, on the other hand, stingy. The following people shall be my executors, according to this will: Olympichus, Aristides, Mnesigenes, Hippocrates, Epicrates, Gorgylus, Diocles, Lycon, and Athanes. I leave my school to Lycon, since some of the others are too old, and others are too busy. The rest should support this arrangement of mine. I also bequeath to him all my books, except those we've written ourselves, along with all my dining-room furniture, couches, and drinking cups. My executors should give Epicrates five hundred drachmas and one of my slaves, as selected by Arcesilaus. First, Lampyrion and Arcesilaus should cancel the obligations Daippus has made for Iræus. Iræus should be released from any obligation to Lampyrion or Lampyrion's heirs, and any bond or note of hand he may have signed should be nullified. My executors should also give him five hundred drachmas in silver and one of my slaves, whichever Arcesilaus approves, so he can live decently for the great service he has done for me and for his cooperation in many matters. I grant freedom to Diophantus, Diocles, and Abus. Simias I give to Arcesilaus. Dromo is also granted his freedom. When Arcesilaus arrives, Iræus should discuss with Olympichus, Epicrates, and the other executors the amount spent on my funeral and other customary expenses. The remaining money should be given to Arcesilaus by Olympichus, who should not cause him any trouble regarding the time or method of payment. Arcesilaus should settle the obligations that Strato has with Olympichus and Aminias, which are documented and kept by Philocrates, the son of Tisamenus. As for my monument, let them do whatever Arcesilaus, Olympichus, and Lycon think is best.”

This is his will, which is still extant, as Aristo, the Chian, has collected and published it.

This is his will, which still exists, as Aristo from Chios has gathered and published it.

VIII. And this Strato was a man, as has been shown above,[205] of deservedly great popularity; having devoted himself to the study of every kind of philosophy, and especially of that branch of it called natural philosophy, which is one of the most ancient and important branches of the whole.

VIII. And this Strato was a man, as mentioned above,[205] who was justly very popular; he dedicated himself to studying all kinds of philosophy, especially the area known as natural philosophy, which is one of the oldest and most significant branches overall.

LIFE OF LYCON.

I. He was succeeded by Lycon, a native of the Troas, the son of Astyanax, a man of great eloquence, and of especial ability in the education of youth. For he used to say that it was fit for boys to be harnessed with modesty and rivalry, as much as for horses to be equipped with a spur and a bridle. And his eloquence and energy in speaking is apparent, from this instance. For he speaks of a virgin who was poor in the following manner:—“A damsel, who, for want of a dowry, goes beyond the seasonable age, is a heavy burden to her father;” on which account they say that Antigonus said with reference to him, that the sweetness and beauty of an apple could not be transferred to anything else, but that one might see, in the case of this man, all these excellencies, in as great perfection as on a tree; and he said this, because he was a surpassingly sweet speaker. On which account, some people prefixed a Γ to his name.[50] But as a writer, he was very unequal to his reputation. And he used to jest in a careless way, upon those who repented that they had not learnt when they had the opportunity, and who now wished that they had done so, saying, said that they were accusing themselves, showing by a prayer which could not possibly be accomplished, their misplaced repentance for their idleness. He used also to say, that those who deliberated without coming to a right conclusion, erred in their calculations, like men who investigate a correct nature by an incorrect standard, or who look at a face in disturbed water, or a distorted mirror. Another of his sayings was, that many men go in pursuit of the crown to be won in the forum, but few or none seek to attain the one to be gained at the Olympic games.

I. He was followed by Lycon, a local from Troas, the son of Astyanax, a man known for his great eloquence and special talent in teaching young people. He would often say that boys should be equipped with modesty and a sense of competition, just like horses need a spur and a bridle. His eloquence and speaking energy is evident from this example. He talks about a poor young woman in this way: “A girl, who, due to lacking a dowry, goes past the appropriate age, is a heavy burden to her father.” For this reason, Antigonus reportedly said about him that the sweetness and beauty of an apple can’t be transferred to anything else, but with this man, you could see all those qualities in as much perfection as on a tree; he said this because he was an exceedingly charming speaker. Because of this, some people added a Γ to his name.[50] But as a writer, he didn't live up to his reputation. He would jokingly point out those who regretted not learning when they had the chance and now wished they had, saying they were blaming themselves, revealing their misplaced regret for their laziness through a prayer that couldn’t be realized. He also said that those who think things over without reaching the right conclusion make mistakes in their reasoning, like people trying to understand something correctly by using the wrong standard, or who are looking at a face in disturbed water or a distorted mirror. Another of his sayings was that many men seek the crown to be won in the forum, but few, if any, try to obtain the one available at the Olympic games.

II. And as he in many instances gave much advice to the Athenians, he was of exceedingly great service to them.

II. In many situations, he offered a lot of advice to the Athenians, which was incredibly helpful to them.

III. He was also a person of great neatness in his dress, wearing garments of an unsurpassable delicacy, as we are told by Hermippus. He was at the same time exceedingly devoted to the exercises of the Gymnasium, and a man who was always in excellent condition as to his body, displaying every quality of an athlete (though Antigonus of Carystus, pretends that he was bruised about the ears and dirty); and in his own country he is said to have wrestled and played at ball at the Iliæan games.

III. He was also a very neat dresser, wearing clothes of exceptional quality, as Hermippus tells us. At the same time, he was very dedicated to gym workouts and always kept himself in great shape, showing all the traits of an athlete (although Antigonus of Carystus claims he had bruises on his ears and was unkempt); and in his home country, he is said to have wrestled and played ball at the Iliæan games.

IV. And he was exceedingly beloved by Eumenes and Attalus, who made him great presents; and Antigonus also tried to seduce him to his court, but was disappointed. And he was so great an enemy to Hieronymus the Peripatetic, that he was the only person who would not go to see him on the anniversary festival which he used to celebrate, and which we have mentioned in our life of Arcesilaus.

IV. He was greatly loved by Eumenes and Attalus, who gave him lavish gifts; Antigonus also attempted to lure him to his court but was unsuccessful. He was such a fierce opponent of Hieronymus the Peripatetic that he was the only one who refused to attend the anniversary festival that Hieronymus celebrated, which we mentioned in our account of Arcesilaus.

V. And he presided over his school forty-four years, as Strato had left it to him in his will, in the hundred and twenty-seventh olympiad.

V. And he ran his school for forty-four years, just as Strato had left it to him in his will, during the one hundred twenty-seventh olympiad.

VI. He was also a pupil of Panthoides, the dialectician.

VI. He was also a student of Panthoides, the dialectician.

VII. He died when he was seventy-four years of age, having been a great sufferer with the gout, and there is an epigram of ours upon him:—

VII. He died at the age of seventy-four, having endured great suffering from gout, and we have an epigram about him:—

Nor shall wise Lycon be forgotten, who
Died of the gout, and much I wonder at it.
For he who ne’er before could walk alone,
Went the long road to hell in a single night.

VIII. There were several people of the name of Lycon. The first was a Pythagorean; the second was this man of whom we are speaking; the third was an epic poet; the fourth was an epigrammatic poet.

VIII. There were several people named Lycon. The first was a Pythagorean; the second was the man we're talking about; the third was an epic poet; the fourth was an epigrammatic poet.

IX. I have fallen in with the following will of this philosopher. “I make the following disposition of my property; if I am unable to withstand this disease:—All the property in my house I leave to my brothers Astyanax and Lycon; and I think that they ought to pay all that I owe at Athens, and that I may have borrowed from any one, and also all the expenses that may be incurred for my funeral, and for other customary solemnities. And all that I have in the city, or in Ægina, I give to Lycon because he bears the same name[207] that I do, and because he has spent the greater part of his life with me, showing me the greatest affection, as it was fitting that he should do, since he was in the place of a son to me. And I leave my garden walk to those of my friends who like to use it; to Bulon, and Callinus, and Ariston, and Amphion, and Lycon, and Python, and Aristomachus, and Heracleus, and Lycomedes, and Lycon my nephew. And I desire that they will elect as president him whom they think most likely to remain attached to the pursuit of philosophy, and most capable of holding the school together. And I entreat the rest of my friends to acquiesce in their election, for my sake and that of the place. And I desire that Bulon, and Callinus, and the rest of my friends will manage my funeral and the burning of my body, so that my obsequies may not be either mean or extravagant. And the property which I have in Ægina shall be divided by Lycon after my decease among the young men there, for the purpose of anointing themselves, in order that the memory of me and of him who honoured me, and who showed his affection by useful presents, may be long preserved. And let him erect a statue of me; and as for the place for it, I desire that Diophantus and Heraclides the son of Demetrius, shall select that, and take care that it be suitable for the proposed erection. With the property that I have in the city let Lycon pay all the people of whom I have borrowed anything since his departure; and let Bulon and Callinus join him in this, and also in discharging all the expenses incurred for my funeral, and for all other customary solemnities, and let him deduct the amount from the funds which I have left in my house, and bequeathed to them both in common. Let him also pay the physicians, Pasithemis and Medias, men who, for their attention to me and for their skill, are very deserving of still greater honour. And I give to the son of Callinus my pair of Thericlean cups; and to his wife I give my pair of Rhodian cups, and my smooth carpet, and my double carpet, and my curtains, and the two best pillows of all that I leave behind me; so that as far as the compliment goes, I may be seen not to have forgotten them. And with respect to those who have been my servants, I make the following disposition:—To Demetrius who has long been freed, I remit the price of his freedom, and I further give five minæ, and a cloak, and a tunic, that as he has a great deal of trouble about me, he[208] may pass the rest of his life comfortably. To Criton, the Chalcedonian, I also remit the price of his freedom, and I further give him four minæ. Micrus I hereby present with his freedom; and I desire Lycon to maintain him, and instruct him for six years from the present time. I also give his freedom to Chares, and desire Lycon to maintain him. And I further give him two minæ, and all my books that are published; but those which are not published, I give to Callinus, that he may publish them with due care. I also give to Syrus, whom I have already emancipated, four minæ, and Menodora; and if he owes me anything I acquit him of the debt. And I give to Hilaras four minæ, and a double carpet, and two pillows, and a curtain, and any couch which he chooses to select. I also hereby emancipate the mother of Micrus, and Noemon, and Dion, and Theon, and Euphranor, and Hermeas; and I desire that Agathon shall have his freedom when he has served two years longer; and that Ophelion, and Poseideon, my litter-bearers, shall have theirs when they have waited four years more. I also give to Demetrius, and Criton, and Syrus, a couch a piece, and coverlets from those which I leave behind me, according to the selection which Lycon is hereby authorised to make. And these are to be their rewards for having performed the duties to which they were appointed well. Concerning my burial, let Lycon do as he pleases, and bury me here or at home, just as he likes; for I am sure that he has the same regard for propriety that I myself have. And I give all the things herein mentioned, in the confidence that he will arrange everything properly. The witnesses to this my will are Callinus of Hermione, Ariston of Ceos, and Euphronius of Pæania.”

IX. I have come across the following will of this philosopher. “I make the following arrangements for my property; if I can’t fight this disease:—All the property in my house I leave to my brothers Astyanax and Lycon; and I believe they should pay off any debts I owe in Athens, as well as any loans from others, and all the costs for my funeral and other customary rites. I give everything I own in the city, or in Ægina, to Lycon because he shares my name and has spent most of his life with me, showing me great affection, as befits a son. I leave my garden to those friends who enjoy using it; specifically, Bulon, Callinus, Ariston, Amphion, Lycon, Python, Aristomachus, Heracleus, Lycomedes, and my nephew Lycon. I hope they will choose a president who is most likely to stay committed to philosophy and capable of keeping the school together. I ask the rest of my friends to support their decision for my sake and that of the place. I also wish for Bulon, Callinus, and my other friends to handle my funeral and the cremation of my body, so that my farewell isn’t either cheap or overly extravagant. The property I have in Ægina should be divided by Lycon after I pass away among the young men there, to use for their anointing, ensuring that the memory of me and the one who honored me with helpful gifts is long remembered. He should also erect a statue of me; as for the location, I want Diophantus and Heraclides, son of Demetrius, to choose it and ensure it is suitable for the intended statue. With the property I have in the city, let Lycon pay back anyone I borrowed from since his departure; and let Bulon and Callinus assist him in this, as well as in covering all expenses for my funeral and customary rites. He can deduct this from the funds I have left in my house, which I have bequeathed to both of them equally. He should also pay the doctors, Pasithemis and Medias, who truly deserve even greater honor for their care and skill. I give my pair of Thericlean cups to Callinus’ son, and to his wife, I give my pair of Rhodian cups, my smooth carpet, my double carpet, my curtains, and the two best pillows of everything I leave behind, so that I may not be seen as having forgotten them. Regarding those who have served me, I make the following arrangements:—To Demetrius, who has been freed for a long time, I waive the cost of his freedom, and I additionally give him five minae, a cloak, and a tunic, so he can live comfortably after all he has done for me. I also waive the cost of freedom for Criton, the Chalcedonian, and I give him four minae. I present Micrus with his freedom; I ask Lycon to take care of him and to instruct him for six years from now. I also grant freedom to Chares and request Lycon to look after him. I give him two minae and all my published books; however, those that are unpublished I give to Callinus for him to publish with care. I grant Syrus, whom I have already freed, four minae and Menodora; and if he owes me anything, I release him from that debt. I give Hilaras four minae, a double carpet, two pillows, a curtain, and any couch he chooses. I also free the mother of Micrus, Noemon, Dion, Theon, Euphranor, and Hermeas; I want Agathon to gain his freedom after two more years of service, and that Ophelion and Poseideon, my litter-bearers, be freed after four more years. I grant Demetrius, Criton, and Syrus each a couch, and coverlets from the ones I leave behind, as selected by Lycon. These are their rewards for having fulfilled their duties well. Regarding my burial, Lycon can do as he wishes, burying me here or at home, whatever he prefers; I trust he values propriety just as I do. And I give all the items mentioned in this will, confident that he will arrange everything properly. The witnesses to this will are Callinus of Hermione, Ariston of Ceos, and Euphronius of Pæania.”

As he then was thoroughly wise in everything relating to education, and every branch of philosophy, he was no less prudent and careful in the framing of his will. So that in this respect too he deserves to be admired and imitated.

Since he was well-versed in all aspects of education and every area of philosophy, he was equally wise and meticulous in the drafting of his will. In this regard as well, he deserves admiration and emulation.

LIFE OF DEMETRIUS.

I. Demetrius was a native of Phalerus, and the son of Phanostratus. He was a pupil of Theophrastus.

I. Demetrius was from Phalerus and the son of Phanostratus. He was a student of Theophrastus.

II. And as a leader of the people at Athens he governed the city for ten years, and was honoured with three hundred and sixty brazen statues, the greater part of which were equestrian; and some were placed in carriages or in pair-horse chariots, and the entire number were finished within three hundred days, so great was the zeal with which they were worked at. And Demetrius, the Magnesian, in his treatise on People of the same Name, says that he began to be the leader of the commonwealth, when Harpalus arrived in Athens, having fled from Alexander. And he governed his country for a long time in a most admirable manner. For he aggrandised the city by increased revenues and by new buildings, although he was a person of no distinction by birth.

II. As a leader of the people in Athens, he governed the city for ten years and was honored with three hundred sixty bronze statues, most of which were of horsemen. Some were positioned in carriages or in pairs of horses pulling chariots, and the entire collection was completed within three hundred days, reflecting the strong enthusiasm with which they were created. Demetrius the Magnesian, in his work on People of the same Name, states that he began his leadership of the commonwealth when Harpalus arrived in Athens after fleeing from Alexander. He governed the country for a long time in a truly impressive way, as he enhanced the city through increased revenues and new buildings, even though he came from a background of no notable status.

III. Though Phavorinus, in the first book of his Commentaries, asserts that he was of the family of Conon.

III. Although Phavorinus, in the first book of his Commentaries, claims that he was part of the Conon family.

IV. He lived with a citizen of noble birth, named Lamia, as his mistress, as the same author tells us in his first book.

IV. He lived with a noblewoman named Lamia, who was his mistress, as the same author tells us in his first book.

V. Again, in his second book he tells us that Demetrius was the slave of the debaucheries of Cleon.

V. Again, in his second book he tells us that Demetrius was a slave to Cleon's excesses.

VI. Didymus, in his Banquets, says that he was called χαριτοβλέφαρος, or Beautiful Eyed, and Lampeto, by some courtesan.

VI. Didymus, in his Banquets, says that he was called χαριτοβλέφαρος, or Beautiful Eyed, and Lampeto, by some courtesan.

VII. It is said that he lost his eye-sight in Alexandria, and recovered it again by the favour of Serapis; on which account he composed the pæans which are sung and spoken of as his composition to this day.

VII. It's said that he lost his eyesight in Alexandria and got it back thanks to Serapis; for this reason, he wrote the hymns that are sung and talked about as his work to this day.

VIII. He was held in the greatest honour among the Athenians, but nevertheless, he found his fame darkened by envy, which attacks every thing; for he was impeached by some one on a capital charge, and as he did not appear, he was condemned. His accusers, however, did not become masters of his person, but expended their venom on the brass, tearing down his statues and selling some and throwing others into the sea, and some they cut up into chamber-pots. For even this is stated. And one statue alone of him is preserved[210] which is in the Acropolis. But Phavorinus in his Universal History, says that the Athenians treated Demetrius in this manner at the command of the king; and they also impeached him as guilty of illegality in his administration, as Phavorinus says. But Hermippus says, that after the death of Cassander, he feared the enmity of Antigonus, and on that account fled to Ptolemy Soter; and that he remained at his court for a long time, and, among other pieces of advice, counselled the king to make over the kingdom to his sons by Eurydice. And as he would not agree to this measure, but gave the crown to his son by Berenice, this latter, after the death of his father, commanded Demetrius to be kept in prison until he should come to some determination about him. And there he remained in great despondency; and while asleep on one occasion, he was bitten by an asp in the hand, and so he died. And he is buried in the district of Busiris, near Diospolis, and we have written the following epigram on him:—

VIII. He was held in high regard among the Athenians, but his fame was overshadowed by envy, which targets everything; he was accused of a serious crime, and since he didn't show up, he was found guilty. However, his accusers couldn't control him, so they unleashed their bitterness on his statues, tearing them down, selling some, throwing others into the sea, and some they even turned into chamber pots. This is even mentioned. Only one statue of him remains, located in the Acropolis. But Phavorinus in his Universal History notes that the Athenians treated Demetrius this way on the king's orders; they also accused him of misconduct in his administration, according to Phavorinus. However, Hermippus says that after Cassander's death, Demetrius feared Antigonus's hostility and fled to Ptolemy Soter; he stayed at his court for a long time and advised the king to pass the kingdom to his sons with Eurydice. When the king refused and gave the crown to his son by Berenice, that son later ordered Demetrius to be imprisoned until he decided what to do with him. He languished in prison, and one day while he was asleep, an asp bit him on the hand, leading to his death. He was buried in the region of Busiris, near Diospolis, and we've composed the following epigram in his memory:—

An asp, whose tooth of venom dire was full,
Did kill the wise Demetrius.
The serpent beamed not light from out his eyes,
But dark and lurid hell.

But Heraclides, in his Epitome of the Successions of Sotion, says that Ptolemy wished to transmit the kingdom to Philadelphus, and that Demetrius dissuaded him from doing so by the argument, “If you give it to another, you will not have it yourself.” And when Menander, the comic poet, had an information laid against him at Athens (for this is a statement which I have heard), he was very nearly convicted, for no other reason but that he was a friend of Demetrius. He was, however, successfully defended by Telesphorus, the son-in-law of Demetrius.

But Heraclides, in his summary of Sotion's Successions, says that Ptolemy wanted to pass the kingdom to Philadelphus, and Demetrius convinced him not to by arguing, "If you give it to someone else, you won't have it yourself." And when Menander, the comic poet, faced charges in Athens (this is something I've heard), he was very close to being convicted, simply because he was a friend of Demetrius. However, he was successfully defended by Telesphorus, Demetrius's son-in-law.

IX. In the multitude of his writings and the number of lines which they amount to, he exceeded nearly all the Peripatetics of his day, being a man of great learning and experience on every subject. And some of his writings are historical, some political, some on poets, some rhetorical, some also are speeches delivered in public assemblies or on embassies; there are also collections of Æsop’s Fables, and many other books. There are five volumes on the Legislation of Athens; two on Citizens of Athens; two on the Management[211] of the People; two on Political Science; one on Laws; two on Rhetoric; two on Military Affairs; two on the Iliad; four on the Odyssey; one called the Ptolemy; one on Love; the Phædondas, one; the Mædon, one; the Cleon, one; the Socrates, one; the Artaxerxes, one; the Homeric, one; the Aristides, one; the Aristomachus, one; the Exhortatory, one; one on the Constitution; one on his Ten Years’ Government; one on the Ionians; one on Ambassadors; one on Good Faith; one on Gratitude; one on Futurity; one on Greatness of Soul; one on Marriage; one on Opinion; one on Peace; one on Laws; one on Studies; one on Opportunity; the Dionysius, one; the Chalcidean, one; the Maxims of the Athenians, one; on Antiphanes, one; a Historic Preface, one; one Volume of Letters; one called an Assembly on Oath; one on Old Age; one on Justice; one volume of Æsop’s Fables; one of Apophthegms. His style is philosophical, combined with the energy and impressiveness of an orator.

IX. In the vast amount of his writings and the number of lines they contain, he surpassed almost all the Peripatetics of his time, being a person of great knowledge and experience on every topic. Some of his works are historical, some political, some about poets, some rhetorical, and others are speeches given in public gatherings or on diplomatic missions; there are also collections of Aesop's Fables and many other books. He wrote five volumes on Athenian Legislation; two on Athenian Citizens; two on People Management; two on Political Science; one on Laws; two on Rhetoric; two on Military Affairs; two on the Iliad; four on the Odyssey; one titled Ptolemy; one on Love; one on Phædondas; one on Mædon; one on Cleon; one on Socrates; one on Artaxerxes; one on Homeric topics; one on Aristides; one on Aristomachus; one Exhortation; one on the Constitution; one on his Ten Years of Governance; one on the Ionians; one on Ambassadors; one on Good Faith; one on Gratitude; one on the Future; one on Greatness of Soul; one on Marriage; one on Opinion; one on Peace; one on Laws; one on Studies; one on Opportunity; one on Dionysius; one on Chalcis; one on Athenian Maxims; one on Antiphanes; one Historical Preface; one Volume of Letters; one titled Assembly on Oath; one on Old Age; one on Justice; one volume of Aesop's Fables; and one of Apophthegms. His style is philosophical, blending the energy and impact of an orator.

X. When he was told that the Athenians had thrown down his statues, he said, “But they have not thrown down my virtues, on account of which they erected them.” He used to say that the eyebrows were not an insignificant part of a man, for that they were able to overshadow the whole life. Another of his sayings was that it was not Plutus alone who was blind, but Fortune also, who acted as his guide. Another, that reason had as much influence on government, as steel had in war. On one occasion, when he saw a debauched young man, he said, “There is a square Mercury with a long robe, a belly, and a beard.” It was a favourite saying of his, that in the case of men elated with pride one ought to cut something off their height, and leave them their spirit. Another of his apophthegms was, that at home young men ought to show respect to their parents, and in the streets to every one whom they met, and in solitary places to themselves. Another, that friends ought to come to others in good fortune only when invited, but to those in distress of their own accord.

X. When he was told that the Athenians had knocked down his statues, he said, “But they haven’t taken away my virtues, which are the reason they were built.” He often said that eyebrows weren’t an insignificant part of a person because they could overshadow one’s entire life. Another of his sayings was that it wasn’t just Plutus who was blind, but also Fortune, who guided him. He also remarked that reason had as much influence on government as steel did in war. One time, when he saw a debauched young man, he said, “There’s a square Mercury with a long robe, a belly, and a beard.” He often said that when it comes to proud men, you should cut down their height a bit, but let them keep their spirit. Another one of his sayings was that at home, young men should respect their parents, in the streets everyone they meet, and in private, themselves. He also believed that friends should only approach others in good fortune when invited, but should reach out to those in distress on their own.

These are the chief sayings attributed to him.

These are the main sayings associated with him.

XI. There were twenty persons of the name of Demetrius, of sufficient consideration to be entitled to mention. First, a Chalcedonian, an orator, older than Thrasymachus; the second, this person of whom we are speaking; the third was a Byzantine, a Peripatetic philosopher; the fourth was a man[212] surnamed Graphicus, a very eloquent lecturer, and also a painter; the fifth was a native of Aspendus, a disciple of Apollonius, of Soli; the sixth was a native of Calatia, who wrote twenty books about Asia and Europe; the seventh was a Byzantine, who wrote an account of the crossing of the Gauls from Europe into Asia, in thirteen books, and the History of Antiochus and Ptolemy, and their Administration of the Affairs of Africa, in eight more; the eighth was a Sophist who lived in Alexandria, and who wrote a treatise on Rhetorical Art; the ninth was a native of Adramyttium, a grammarian, who was nick-named Ixion, in allusion to some crime he had committed against Juno; the tenth was a Cyrenean, a grammarian, who was surnamed Stamnus,[51] a very distinguished man; the eleventh was a Scepsian, a rich man of noble birth, and of great eminence for learning. He it was who advanced the fortunes of Metrodorus his fellow citizen; the twelfth was a grammarian of Erythræ, who was made a citizen of Lemnos; the thirteenth was a Bithynian, a son of Diphilus the Stoic, and a disciple of Panætius of Rhodes; the fourteenth was an orator of Smyrna. All of these were prose writers.

XI. There were twenty people named Demetrius, noteworthy enough to be mentioned. First, a Chalcedonian, an orator older than Thrasymachus; the second was the person we’re talking about; the third was a Byzantine, a Peripatetic philosopher; the fourth was a man surnamed Graphicus, a very eloquent lecturer and also a painter; the fifth was a native of Aspendus, a student of Apollonius of Soli; the sixth was from Calatia, who wrote twenty books about Asia and Europe; the seventh was a Byzantine who documented the Gauls' crossing from Europe to Asia in thirteen books, and the History of Antiochus and Ptolemy, and their Management of African Affairs, in eight additional books; the eighth was a Sophist living in Alexandria, who wrote a treatise on Rhetorical Art; the ninth was from Adramyttium, a grammarian nicknamed Ixion, referencing a crime he committed against Juno; the tenth was a grammarian from Cyrene, known as Stamnus, a very distinguished individual; the eleventh was a Scepsian, a wealthy man of noble birth, highly regarded for his knowledge. He was the one who promoted the fortune of Metrodorus, his fellow citizen; the twelfth was a grammarian from Erythræ, who became a citizen of Lemnos; the thirteenth was a Bithynian, the son of Diphilus the Stoic, and a student of Panætius of Rhodes; the fourteenth was an orator from Smyrna. All of these were prose writers.

The following were poets:—The first a poet of the Old Comedy. The second an Epic poet, who has left nothing behind him that has come down to us, except these lines which he wrote against some envious people:—

The following were poets:—The first was a poet of the Old Comedy. The second was an Epic poet, who hasn’t left anything behind that we have today, except for these lines he wrote against some jealous people:—

They disregard a man while still alive,
Whom, when he’s dead, they honour; cities proud,
And powerful nations, have with contest fierce,
Fought o’er a tomb and unsubstantial shade

The third was a native of Tarsus; a writer of Satires. The fourth was a composer of Iambics, a bitter man. The fifth was a statuary, who is mentioned by Polemo. The sixth was a native of Erythræ, a man who wrote on various subjects, and who composed volumes of histories and relations.[52]

The third was from Tarsus; a writer of satirical works. The fourth was a composer of iambic poetry, a man with a sharp tongue. The fifth was a sculptor, noted by Polemo. The sixth was from Erythræ, a person who wrote on various topics and produced many volumes of history and narratives.[52]

LIFE OF HERACLIDES.

I. Heraclides was the son of Euthyphron, and was born at Heraclea, in Pontus; he was also a wealthy man.

I. Heraclides was the son of Euthyphron, and was born at Heraclea, in Pontus; he was also a rich man.

II. After he came to Athens, he was at first a disciple of Speusippus, but he also attended the schools of the Pythagorean philosophers, and he adopted the principles of Plato; last of all he became a pupil of Aristotle, as we are told by Sotion in his book entitled the Successions.

II. After he arrived in Athens, he was initially a student of Speusippus, but he also went to the schools of the Pythagorean philosophers, and he embraced the principles of Plato; finally, he became a student of Aristotle, as noted by Sotion in his book called the Successions.

III. He used to wear delicate garments, and was a man of great size, so that he was nicknamed by the Athenians Pompicus[53] instead of Ponticus. But he was of quiet manners and noble aspect.

III. He used to wear fine clothes and was a big guy, which is why the Athenians called him Pompicus[53] instead of Ponticus. But he had a calm demeanor and a noble presence.

IV. There are several books extant by him, which are exceedingly good and admirable. They are in the form of dialogue; some being Ethical dialogues; three on the subject of Justice; one on Temperance; five on Piety; one on Manly Courage; one, and a second which is distinct from it, on Virtue; one on Happiness; one on Supremacy; one on Laws and questions connected with them; one on Names; one called Covenants; one called The Unwilling Lover; and the Clinias.

IV. He has several books available that are really good and impressive. They’re written in the form of dialogues; some are Ethical dialogues; there are three on Justice, one on Temperance, five on Piety, one on Manly Courage, one, and a separate one on Virtue, one on Happiness, one on Supremacy, one on Laws and related questions, one on Names, one called Covenants, one called The Unwilling Lover, and the Clinias.

Of the physical dialogues, one is on the Mind; one on the Soul; one on the Soul, and Nature and Appearances; one addressed to Democritus; one on the Heavenly Bodies; one on the State of Things in the Shades below; two on Lives; one on the Causes of Diseases; one on the Good; one on the doctrines of Zeno; one on the Doctrines of Metron.

Of the physical dialogues, one is about the Mind; one about the Soul; one about the Soul, Nature, and Appearances; one directed to Democritus; one about the Heavenly Bodies; one about the State of Things in the Underworld; two about Lives; one about the Causes of Diseases; one about the Good; one about the teachings of Zeno; one about the teachings of Metron.

Of his grammatical dialogues, there are two on the Age of Homer and Hesiod; two on Archilochus and Homer.

Of his grammatical discussions, there are two about the Age of Homer and Hesiod, and two about Archilochus and Homer.

There are some on Music too; three on Euripides and Sophocles, and two on Music. There are also two volumes, Solutions of Questions concerning Homer; one on Speculations; one, the Three Tragedians; one volume of Characters; one dialogue on Poetry and the Poets; one on Conjecture; one on Foresight; four, being Explanations of Heraclitus; one, Explanations with reference to Democritus; two books of Solutions of Disputed Points; one, the Axiom; one on Species; one book of Solutions; one of Suppositions; one addressed to Dionysius.

There are some about music too; three on Euripides and Sophocles, and two on music. There are also two volumes titled Solutions of Questions about Homer; one on Speculations; one called The Three Tragedians; one volume of Characters; one dialogue on Poetry and the Poets; one on Conjecture; one on Foresight; four, which are Explanations of Heraclitus; one, Explanations related to Democritus; two books of Solutions of Disputed Points; one, the Axiom; one on Categories; one book of Solutions; one of Assumptions; one addressed to Dionysius.

Of rhetorical works, there is the dialogue on the being an Orator, or the Protagoras.

Of rhetorical works, there’s the dialogue on being an Orator, or the Protagoras.

Of historical dialogues, there are some on the Pythagoreans, and on Inventions. Of these, some he has drawn up after the manner of Comic writers; as, for instance, the one about Pleasure, and that about Temperance. And some in the style of the Tragedians, as, for instance, the dialogues on the State of Things in the Shades below; and one on Piety, and that on Supremacy. And his style is a conversational and moderate one, suited to the characters of philosophers and men occupied in the military or political affairs conversing together. Some of his works also are on Geometry, and on Dialectics; and in all of them he displays a very varied and elevated style; and he has great powers of persuasion.

Of historical dialogues, there are some about the Pythagoreans and inventions. Some of these he has written in the style of comic writers, like the one about pleasure and the one about temperance. Others are in the style of tragic writers, such as the dialogues concerning the state of things in the underworld, one on piety, and another on supremacy. His style is conversational and moderate, fitting for discussions among philosophers and people engaged in military or political matters. He also has works on geometry and dialectics; in all of them, he shows a diverse and elevated style, and he has strong persuasive abilities.

V. He appears to have delivered his country when it was under the yoke of tyrants, by slaying the monarch, as Demetrius of Magnesia tells us, in his treatise on People of the Same Name.

V. He seems to have saved his country when it was under the control of tyrants by killing the king, as Demetrius of Magnesia mentions in his work on People of the Same Name.

VI. And he gives the following account of him. That he brought up a young serpent, and kept it till it grew large; and that when he was at the point of death, he desired one of his faithful friends to hide his body, and to place the serpent in his bed, that he might appear to have migrated to the[215] Gods. And all this was done; and while the citizens were all attending his funeral and extolling his character, the serpent hearing the noise, crept out of his clothes and threw the multitude into confusion. And afterwards everything was revealed, and Heraclides was seen, not as he hoped to have been, but as he really was. And we have written an epigram on him which runs thus:—

VI. He tells the following story about him: He raised a young serpent and kept it until it grew large. When he was close to death, he asked one of his loyal friends to hide his body and place the serpent in his bed so it would seem like he'd ascended to the [215] Gods. Everything was set up as he wished. While the townspeople were attending his funeral and praising his character, the serpent, hearing the commotion, slithered out of his clothes, causing chaos among the crowd. Eventually, the truth came to light, and Heraclides was revealed, not as he had hoped to be seen, but as he truly was. We've written an epigram about him that goes like this:—

You wish’d, O Heraclides, when you died,
To leave a strange belief among mankind,
That you, when dead, a serpent had become.
But all your calculations were deceived,
For this your serpent was indeed a beast,
And you were thus discovered and pronounced another.

And Hippobotus gives the same account.

And Hippobotus shares the same story.

But Hermippus says that once, when a famine oppressed the land, the people of Heraclea consulted the Pythian oracle for the way to get rid of it; and that Heraclides corrupted the ambassadors who were sent to consult the oracle, and also the priestess, with bribes; and that she answered that they would obtain a deliverance from their distresses, if Heraclides, the son of Euthyphron, was presented by them with a golden crown, and if when he was dead they paid him honours as a hero. Accordingly, this answer was brought back from the oracle to Heraclea, but they who brought it got no advantage from it; for as soon as Heraclides had been crowned in the theatre, he was seized with apoplexy, and the ambassadors who had been sent to consult the oracle were stoned, and so put to death; and at the very same moment the Pythian priestess was going down to the inner shrine, and while standing there was bitten by a serpent, and died immediately. This then is the account given of his death.

But Hermippus says that once, during a famine that troubled the land, the people of Heraclea went to consult the Pythian oracle for a way to end it. Heraclides bribed the ambassadors who were sent to consult the oracle, as well as the priestess. She answered that they would find relief from their troubles if they presented Heraclides, the son of Euthyphron, with a golden crown and honored him as a hero after his death. This message was brought back to Heraclea, but it didn't help them at all. As soon as Heraclides was crowned in the theater, he suffered a stroke, and the ambassadors who had gone to consult the oracle were stoned to death. At that very moment, the Pythian priestess was descending to the inner shrine and was bitten by a serpent, causing her to die instantly. This is the story of his death.

VII. And Aristoxenus the musician says, that he composed tragedies, and inscribed them with the name of Thespis. And Chamæleon says, that he stole essays from him on the subject of Homer and Hesiod, and published them as his own. And Autodorus the Epicurean reproaches him, and contradicts all the arguments which he advanced in his treatise on Justice. Moreover, Dionysius, called the Deserter, or as some say Spintharus, wrote a tragedy called Parthenopæus, and forged the name of Sophocles to it. And Heraclides was so much deceived that he took some passages out of one of his[216] works, and cited them as the words of Sophocles; and Dionysius, when he perceived it, gave him notice of the real truth; and as he would not believe it, and denied it, he sent him word to examine the first letters of the first verses of the book, and they formed the name of Pancalus, who was a friend of Dionysius. And as Heraclides still refused to believe it, and said that it was possible that such a thing might happen by chance, Dionysius sent him back word once more, “You will find this passage too:—

VII. Aristoxenus the musician claimed that he wrote tragedies and credited them to Thespis. Chamæleon said that he took essays from him about Homer and Hesiod and published them as his own work. Autodorus the Epicurean criticized him and challenged all the arguments he put forward in his treatise on Justice. Additionally, Dionysius, known as the Deserter, or some say Spintharus, wrote a tragedy called Parthenopæus and forged Sophocles' name on it. Heraclides was so misled that he quoted some passages from one of his[216]works, attributing them to Sophocles; and when Dionysius noticed this, he informed him of the truth. When Heraclides refused to believe it and denied it, Dionysius told him to look at the first letters of the first lines of the book, which spelled out the name Pancalus, a friend of Dionysius. Still not convinced, Heraclides argued that it could be a coincidence. Dionysius replied again, “You will find this passage too:—

“An aged monkey is not easily caught;
He’s caught indeed, but only after a time.”

And he added, “Heraclides knows nothing of letters, and has no shame.”

And he added, “Heraclides doesn’t know anything about reading or writing, and has no shame.”

VIII. And there were fourteen persons of the name of Heraclides. First, this man of whom we are speaking; the second was a fellow citizen of his, who composed songs for Pyrrhic dances, and other trifles; the third was a native of Cumæ, who wrote a history of the Persian war in five books; the fourth was also a citizen of Cumæ, who was an orator, and wrote a treatise on his art; the fifth was a native of Calatia or Alexandria, who wrote a Succession in six books, and a treatise on Ships, from which he was called Lembos; the sixth was an Alexandrian, who wrote an account of the peculiar habits of the Persians; the seventh was a dialectician of Bargyleia, who wrote against Epicurus; the eighth was a physician, a pupil of Hicesius; the ninth was a physician of Tarentum, a man of great skill; the tenth was a poet, who wrote Precepts; the eleventh was a sculptor of Phocæa; the twelfth was an Epigrammatic poet of considerable beauty; the thirteenth was a Magnesian, who wrote a history of the reign of Mithridates; the fourteenth was an astronomer, who wrote a treatise on Astronomy.

VIII. There were fourteen people named Heraclides. First, there's the man we're talking about; the second was his fellow citizen who wrote songs for Pyrrhic dances and other lighthearted pieces; the third was from Cumæ and wrote a five-book history of the Persian war; the fourth was also a resident of Cumæ, an orator who wrote a treatise on his craft; the fifth was from Calatia or Alexandria, who wrote a six-book work on Succession and a treatise on Ships, which earned him the nickname Lembos; the sixth was an Alexandrian who detailed the unique habits of the Persians; the seventh was a dialectician from Bargyleia who wrote against Epicurus; the eighth was a physician, a student of Hicesius; the ninth was a highly skilled physician from Tarentum; the tenth was a poet who wrote Precepts; the eleventh was a sculptor from Phocæa; the twelfth was an Epigrammatic poet known for his beauty; the thirteenth was a Magnesian who wrote a history of Mithridates' reign; and the fourteenth was an astronomer who wrote a treatise on Astronomy.


BOOK VI.

LIFE OF ANTISTHENES.

I. Antisthenes was an Athenian, the son of Antisthenes. And he was said not to be a legitimate Athenian; in reference to which he said to some one who was reproaching him with the circumstance, “The mother of the Gods too is a Phrygian;” for he was thought to have had a Thracian mother. On which account, as he had borne himself bravely in the battle of Tanagra, he gave occasion to Socrates to say that the son of two Athenians could not have been so brave. And he himself, when disparaging the Athenians who gave themselves great airs as having been born out of the earth itself, said that they were not more noble as far as that went than snails and locusts.

I. Antisthenes was an Athenian, the son of Antisthenes. Some claimed he wasn't a legitimate Athenian; when someone reproached him for this, he replied, “The mother of the Gods is also a Phrygian,” since people thought his mother was Thracian. Because he fought bravely in the battle of Tanagra, Socrates remarked that the son of two Athenians wouldn’t have been as brave. Antisthenes himself, while criticizing Athenians who acted superior as if they were born from the earth, said they were no more noble in that regard than snails and locusts.

II. Originally he was a pupil of Gorgias the rhetorician; owing to which circumstance he employs the rhetorical style of language in his Dialogues, especially in his Truth and in his Exhortations. And Hermippus says, that he had originally intended in his address at the assembly, on account of the Isthmian games, to attack and also to praise the Athenians, and Thebans, and Lacedæmonians; but that he afterwards abandoned the design, when he saw that there were a great many spectators come from those cities. Afterwards, he attached himself to Socrates, and made such progress in philosophy while with him, that he advised all his own pupils to become his fellow pupils in the school of Socrates. And as he lived in the Piræus, he went up forty furlongs to the city every day, in order to hear Socrates, from whom he learnt the art of enduring, and of being indifferent to external circumstances, and so became the original founder of the Cynic school.

II. He was initially a student of Gorgias the rhetorician, which is why he uses a rhetorical style in his Dialogues, especially in his Truth and Exhortations. Hermippus mentions that he originally planned to speak at the assembly for the Isthmian games, intending to both criticize and praise the Athenians, Thebans, and Lacedæmonians; however, he changed his mind when he noticed many spectators from those cities in attendance. Later, he became a follower of Socrates and made such significant progress in philosophy under his guidance that he encouraged all his own students to join him in studying with Socrates. Living in the Piraeus, he traveled forty furlongs to the city every day to listen to Socrates, from whom he learned the art of endurance and indifference to external circumstances, ultimately becoming the original founder of the Cynic school.

III. And he used to argue that labour was a good thing, by adducing the examples of the great Hercules, and of Cyrus, one of which he derived from the Greeks and the other from the barbarians.

III. And he used to argue that hard work was a good thing, using the examples of the great Hercules from the Greeks and Cyrus from the barbarians.

IV. He was also the first person who ever gave a definition of discourse, saying, “Discourse is that which shows what[218] anything is or was.” And he used continually to say, “I would rather go mad than feel pleasure.” And, “One ought to attach one’s self to such women as will thank one for it.” He said once to a youth from Pontus, who was on the point of coming to him to be his pupil, and was asking him what things he wanted, “You want a new book, and a new pen, and a new tablet;”—meaning a new mind. And to a person who asked him from what country he had better marry a wife, he said, “If you marry a handsome woman, she will be common;[54] if an ugly woman, she will be a punishment to you.” He was told once that Plato spoke ill of him, and he replied, “It is a royal privilege to do well, and to be evil spoken of.” When he was being initiated into the mysteries of Orpheus, and the priest said that those who were initiated enjoyed many good things in the shades below, “Why, then,” said he “do not you die?” Being once reproached as not being the son of two free citizens, he said, “And I am not the son of two people skilled in wrestling; nevertheless, I am a skilful wrestler.” On one occasion he was asked why he had but few disciples, and said, “Because I drove them away with a silver rod.” When he was asked why he reproved his pupils with bitter language, he said, “Physicians too use severe remedies for their patients.” Once he saw an adulterer running away, and said, “O unhappy man! how much danger could you have avoided for one obol!” He used to say, as Hecaton tells us in his Apophthegms, “That it was better to fall among crows,[55] than among flatterers; for that they only devour the dead, but the others devour the living.” When he was asked what was the most happy event that could take place in human life, he said, “To die while prosperous.”

IV. He was also the first person to define discourse, saying, “Discourse is what shows what anything is or was.” He often said, “I would rather go crazy than feel pleasure.” And, “One should attach themselves to women who will appreciate it.” He once told a young man from Pontus, who was about to come to him as a student and was asking what he needed, “You need a new book, a new pen, and a new tablet”—meaning a new mindset. When asked from which country he should marry a wife, he said, “If you marry a beautiful woman, she’ll be ordinary; if you marry an ugly woman, she’ll be a punishment.” He was informed that Plato spoke badly of him, and he replied, “It’s a royal privilege to do good and be spoken of unjustly.” During his initiation into the mysteries of Orpheus, when the priest said that those who were initiated enjoyed many good things in the underworld, he asked, “Why then, don’t you die?” When he was criticized for not being the son of two free citizens, he replied, “I’m also not the son of two skilled wrestlers; yet, I’m a skilled wrestler.” Once, when asked why he had so few disciples, he said, “Because I sent them away with a silver rod.” When asked why he scolded his students harshly, he said, “Doctors also use strong remedies on their patients.” He once saw an adulterer fleeing and said, “Oh, unfortunate man! How much danger you could have avoided for just one obol!” He used to say, as Hecaton tells us in his Apophthegms, “It’s better to fall among crows than among flatterers; for while crows only feast on the dead, flatterers devour the living.” When asked what the happiest event in human life could be, he said, “To die while prosperous.”

On one occasion one of his friends was lamenting to him that he had lost his memoranda, and he said to him, “You ought to have written them on your mind, and not on paper.” A favourite saying of his was, “That envious people were devoured by their own disposition, just as iron is by rust.” Another was, “That those who wish to be immortal ought to live piously and justly.” He used to say too, “That cities[219] were ruined when they were unable to distinguish worthless citizens from virtuous ones.”

On one occasion, one of his friends was complaining to him that he had lost his notes, and he said to him, “You should have kept them in your head instead of on paper.” A favorite saying of his was, “Envious people are consumed by their own nature, just like iron is by rust.” Another was, “Those who want to be immortal should live righteously and justly.” He also said, “Cities are doomed when they can’t tell the good citizens from the bad ones.”

On one occasion he was being praised by some wicked men, and said, “I am sadly afraid that I must have done some wicked thing.” One of his favourite sayings was, “That the fellowship of brothers of one mind was stronger than any fortified city.” He used to say, “That those things were the best for a man to take on a journey, which would float with him if he were shipwrecked.” He was once reproached for being intimate with wicked men, and said, “Physicians also live with those who are sick; and yet they do not catch fevers.” He used to say, “that it was an absurd thing to clean a cornfield of tares, and in war to get rid of bad soldiers, and yet not to rid one’s self in a city of the wicked citizens.” When he was asked what advantage he had ever derived from philosophy, he replied, “The advantage of being able to converse with myself.” At a drinking party, a man once said to him, “Give us a song,” and he replied, “Do you play us a tune on the flute.” When Diogenes asked him for a tunic, he bade him fold his cloak. He was asked on one occasion what learning was the most necessary, and he replied, “To unlearn one’s bad habits.” And he used to exhort those who found themselves ill spoken of, to endure it more than they would any one’s throwing stones at them. He used to laugh at Plato as conceited; accordingly, once when there was a fine procession, seeing a horse neighing, he said to Plato, “I think you too would be a very frisky horse:” and he said this all the more, because Plato kept continually praising the horse. At another time, he had gone to see him when he was ill, and when he saw there a dish in which Plato had been sick, he said, “I see your bile there, but I do not see your conceit.” He used to advise the Athenians to pass a vote that asses were horses; and, as they thought that irrational, he said, “Why, those whom you make generals have never learnt to be really generals, they have only been voted such.”

Once, he was praised by some shady characters and said, “I’m really worried that I must have done something wrong.” One of his favorite sayings was, “The brotherhood of like-minded people is stronger than any fortified city.” He would often say, “The best things to take on a journey are those that will float with you if you get shipwrecked.” He was criticized for being close to bad people and replied, “Doctors also spend time with sick people; they don’t catch their fevers.” He believed it was silly to clear a cornfield of weeds or to eliminate bad soldiers during wartime, yet not purge a city of its wicked citizens. When asked what he had gained from philosophy, he said, “The ability to have a conversation with myself.” At a party, someone asked him, “Sing us a song,” and he replied, “Why don’t you play us a tune on the flute?” When Diogenes asked him for a tunic, he told him to fold his cloak. He was once asked what learning was most essential, and he said, “To unlearn your bad habits.” He would encourage those who were being talked about to endure it more than they would tolerate someone throwing stones at them. He used to laugh at Plato for being arrogant; once, during a grand procession, he saw a horse neighing and said to Plato, “I think you would also be quite a spirited horse,” especially since Plato kept praising the horse. Another time, when he visited Plato while he was sick and saw a dish where Plato had been ill, he said, “I see your bile there, but I don’t see your arrogance.” He would often suggest that the Athenians vote to declare donkeys as horses, and when they found that ridiculous, he replied, “Well, those you choose as generals have never really learned to be generals; they’ve just been voted into the position.”

A man said to him one day, “Many people praise you.” “Why, what evil,” said he, “have I done?” When he turned the rent in his cloak outside, Socrates seeing it, said to him, “I see your vanity through the hole in your cloak.” On another occasion, the question was put to him by some one, as Phanias relates, in his treatise on the Philosophers of the[220] Socratic school, what a man could do to show himself an honourable and a virtuous man; and he replied, “If you attend to those who understand the subject, and learn from them that you ought to shun the bad habits which you have.” Some one was praising luxury in his hearing, and he said, “May the children of my enemies be luxurious.” Seeing a young man place himself in a carefully studied attitude before a modeller, he said, “Tell me, if the brass could speak, on what would it pride itself?” And when the young man replied, “On its beauty.” “Are you not then,” said he, “ashamed to rejoice in the same thing as an inanimate piece of brass?” A young man from Pontus once promised to recollect him, if a vessel of salt fish arrived; and so he took him with him, and also an empty bag, and went to a woman who sold meal, and filled his sack and went away; and when the woman asked him to pay for it, he said, “The young man will pay you, when the vessel of salt fish comes home.”

A man said to him one day, “A lot of people praise you.” “Why, what wrong have I done?” he responded. When he turned the tear in his cloak around, Socrates saw it and said to him, “I see your vanity through the hole in your cloak.” On another occasion, someone asked him, as Phanias mentions in his writing about the Philosophers of the [220] Socratic school, what a person could do to prove he is an honorable and virtuous man; he replied, “If you listen to those who know about it and learn from them that you should avoid the bad habits you have.” Someone was praising luxury while he was listening, and he said, “May the children of my enemies be luxurious.” When he saw a young man posing in a carefully crafted way before a sculptor, he asked, “Tell me, if the brass could talk, what would it take pride in?” When the young man answered, “Its beauty.” “Aren't you,” he said, “ashamed to take joy in the same thing as an inanimate piece of brass?” A young man from Pontus once promised to remember him if a shipment of salted fish arrived; so he took the young man with him, along with an empty bag, and went to a woman who sold flour, filled his bag, and left; when the woman asked him to pay for it, he replied, “The young man will pay you when the shipment of salted fish comes in.”

He it was who appears to have been the cause of Anytus’s banishment, and of Meletus’s death. For having met with some young men of Pontus, who had come to Athens, on account of the reputation of Socrates, he took them to Anytus, telling them, that in moral philosophy he was wiser than Socrates; and they who stood by were indignant at this, and drove him away. And whenever he saw a woman beautifully adorned, he would go off to her house, and desire her husband to bring forth his horse and his arms; and then if he had such things, he would give him leave to indulge in luxury, for that he had the means of defending himself; but if he had them not, then he would bid him strip his wife of her ornaments.

He was the one who seems to have caused Anytus’s banishment and Meletus’s death. After meeting some young men from Pontus who had come to Athens because of Socrates’s reputation, he took them to Anytus, claiming that he was wiser than Socrates when it came to moral philosophy. Those who were present were upset by this and sent him away. Whenever he saw a beautifully adorned woman, he would go to her house and ask her husband to bring out his horse and weapons. If he had those things, he would allow him to enjoy luxury, thinking that he could defend himself; but if he didn’t have them, he would tell him to strip his wife of her ornaments.

V. And the doctrines he adopted were these. He used to insist that virtue was a thing which might be taught; also, that the nobly born and virtuously disposed, were the same people; for that virtue was of itself sufficient for happiness, and was in need of nothing, except the strength of Socrates. He also looked upon virtue as a species of work, not wanting many arguments, or much instruction; and he taught that the wise man was sufficient for himself; for that everything that belonged to any one else belonged to him. He considered obscurity of fame a good thing, and equally good with labour. And he used to say that the wise man would regulate[221] his conduct as a citizen, not according to the established laws of the state, but according to the law of virtue. And that he would marry for the sake of having children, selecting the most beautiful woman for his wife. And that he would love her; for that the wise man alone knew what objects deserved love.

V. The beliefs he adopted were these. He insisted that virtue could be taught; he also believed that those who were nobly born and had a good character were the same people, as virtue alone was enough for happiness and needed nothing except the strength of Socrates. He viewed virtue as a form of work that didn't require a lot of arguments or extensive teaching; he taught that a wise person is self-sufficient, as everything that belongs to anyone else also belongs to him. He thought that being relatively unknown was a good thing, just like hard work. He would say that a wise person would conduct himself as a citizen not according to the laws of the state but according to the law of virtue. He believed he would marry to have children, choosing the most beautiful woman as his wife, and he would love her, as the wise man alone knew what should be truly loved.

Diocles also attributes the following apophthegms to him. To the wise man, nothing is strange and nothing remote. The virtuous man is worthy to be loved. Good men are friends. It is right to make the brave and just one’s allies. Virtue is a weapon of which a man cannot be deprived. It is better to fight with a few good men against all the wicked, than with many wicked men against a few good men. One should attend to one’s enemies, for they are the first persons to detect one’s errors. One should consider a just man as of more value than a relation. Virtue is the same in a man as in a woman. What is good is honourable, and what is bad is disgraceful. Think everything that is wicked, foreign. Prudence is the safest fortification; for it can neither fall to pieces nor be betrayed. One must prepare one’s self a fortress in one’s own impregnable thoughts.

Diocles also attributes the following sayings to him. To the wise person, nothing is strange and nothing is distant. The virtuous person deserves to be loved. Good people are friends. It’s right to make the brave and just your allies. Virtue is a weapon that can never be taken away from a person. It’s better to fight with a few good people against all the wicked than with many wicked people against a few good people. You should pay attention to your enemies, as they are the first to notice your mistakes. You should value a just person more than a relative. Virtue is the same in a man as it is in a woman. What is good is honorable, and what is bad is disgraceful. Consider everything wicked as foreign. Prudence is the safest stronghold; it can neither fall apart nor be betrayed. You must build a fortress in your own unshakeable thoughts.

VI. He used to lecture in the Gymnasium called Cynosarges, not far from the gates; and some people say that it is from that place that the sect got the name of Cynics. And he himself was called Haplocyon (downright dog).

VI. He used to give lectures at the gym called Cynosarges, not far from the city gates; and some say that’s where the group got its name, the Cynics. He himself was called Haplocyon (literally, "downright dog").

VII. He was the first person to set the fashion of doubling his cloak, as Diocles says, and he wore no other garment. And he used to carry a stick and a wallet; but Neanthes says that he was the first person who wore a cloak without folding it. But Sosicrates, in the third book of his Successions, says that Diodorus, of Aspendos, let his beard grow, and used to carry a stick and a wallet.

VII. He was the first person to start the trend of draping his cloak, as Diocles notes, and he didn't wear any other clothing. He also carried a stick and a bag; however, Neanthes claims that he was the first to wear a cloak without folding it. But Sosicrates, in the third book of his Successions, mentions that Diodorus from Aspendos grew a beard and carried a stick and a bag.

VIII. He is the only one of all the pupils of Socrates, whom Theopompus praises and speaks of as clever, and able to persuade whomsoever he pleased by the sweetness of his conversation. And this is plain, both from his own writings, and from the Banquet of Xenophon. He appears to have been the founder of the more manly Stoic school; on which account Athenæus, the epigrammatist, speaks thus of them:—

VIII. He is the only one among all of Socrates' students whom Theopompus praises for being smart and able to persuade anyone he wanted with the charm of his conversation. This is clear from both his own writings and from Xenophon's Symposium. He seems to have been the founder of the more robust Stoic school; for this reason, Athenæus, the poet, says this about them:—

O ye, who learned are in Stoic fables,
Ye who consign the wisest of all doctrines
[222]
To your most sacred books; you say that virtue
Is the sole good; for that alone can save
The life of man, and strongly fenced cities.
But if some fancy pleasure their best aim,
One of the Muses ’tis who has convinc’d them.

He was the original cause of the apathy of Diogenes, and the temperance of Crates, and the patience of Zeno, having himself, as it were, laid the foundations of the city which they afterwards built. And Xenophon says, that in his conversation and society, he was the most delightful of men, and in every respect the most temperate.

He was the main reason behind Diogenes' indifference, Crates' self-control, and Zeno's patience, essentially laying the groundwork for the city they later created. Xenophon mentions that in his conversations and company, he was one of the most enjoyable people and, in every way, the most moderate.

IX. There are ten volumes of his writings extant. The first volume is that in which there is the essay on Style, or on Figures of Speech; the Ajax, or speech of Ajax; the Defence, of Orestes or the treatise on Lawyers; the Isographe, or the Lysias and Isocrates; the reply to the work of Isocrates, entitled the Absence of Witnesses. The second volume is that in which we have the treatise on the Nature of Animals; on the Pro-creation of Children, or on Marriage, an essay of an amatory character; on the Sophists, an essay of a physiognomical character; on Justice and Manly Virtue, being three essays of an hortatory character; two treatises on Theognis. The third volume contains a treatise on the Good; on Manly Courage; on Law, or Political Constitutions; on Law, or what is Honourable and Just; on Freedom and Slavery; on Good Faith; on a Guardian, or on Persuasion; on Victory, an economical essay. The fourth volume contains the Cyrus; the Greater Heracles, or a treatise on Strength. The fifth volume contains the Cyrus, or a treatise on Kingly Power; the Aspasia.

IX. There are ten volumes of his writings still available. The first volume includes the essay on Style, or Figures of Speech; the Ajax, or the speech of Ajax; the Defence of Orestes, or the treatise on Lawyers; the Isographe, or the works of Lysias and Isocrates; and the response to Isocrates' work called the Absence of Witnesses. The second volume contains the treatise on the Nature of Animals; on Procreation, or Marriage, a piece with romantic themes; on the Sophists, an essay focused on physiognomy; on Justice and Manly Virtue, which includes three essays with a motivational tone; and two treatises on Theognis. The third volume has a treatise on the Good; on Manly Courage; on Law, or Political Constitutions; on Law, or what is Honorable and Just; on Freedom and Slavery; on Good Faith; on a Guardian, or Persuasion; and on Victory, an economic essay. The fourth volume is dedicated to Cyrus; the Greater Heracles, or a treatise on Strength. The fifth volume features the Cyrus, or a treatise on Kingship; and the Aspasia.

The sixth volume is that in which there is the treatise Truth; another (a disputatious one) concerning Arguing; the Sathon, or on Contradiction, in three parts; and an essay on Dialect. The seventh contains a treatise on Education, or Names, in five books; one on the Use of Names, or the Contentious Man; one on Questions and Answers; one on Opinion and Knowledge, in four books; one on Dying; one on Life and Death; one on those who are in the Shades below; one on Nature, in two books; two books of Questions in Natural Philosophy; one essay, called Opinions on the Contentious Man; one book of Problems, on the subject of[223] Learning. The eighth volume is that in which we find a treatise on Music; one on Interpreters; one on Homer; one on Injustice and Impiety; one on Calchas; one on a Spy; one on Pleasure. The ninth book contains an essay on the Odyssey; one on the Magic Wand; the Minerva, or an essay on Telemachus; an essay on Helen and Penelope; one on Proteus; the Cyclops, being an essay on Ulysses; an essay on the Use of Wine, or on Drunkenness, or on the Cyclops; one on Circe; one on Amphiaraus; one on Ulysses and Penelope, and also on Ulysses’ Dog. The tenth volume is occupied by the Heracles, or Medas; the Hercules, or an Essay on Prudence or Strength; the Lord or the Lover; the Lord or the Spies; the Menexenus, or an essay on Governing; the Alcibiades; the Archelaus, or an essay on Kingly Power.

The sixth volume contains the treatise on Truth; another one focused on Arguing; the Sathon, or on Contradiction, in three parts; and an essay on Dialect. The seventh volume has a treatise on Education, or Names, in five books; one on the Use of Names, or the Contentious Person; one on Questions and Answers; one on Opinion and Knowledge, in four books; one on Dying; one on Life and Death; one about those who are in the Underworld; one on Nature, in two books; two books of Questions in Natural Philosophy; one essay titled Opinions on the Contentious Person; and one book of Problems on the subject of[223] Learning. The eighth volume includes a treatise on Music; one on Interpreters; one on Homer; one on Injustice and Impiety; one on Calchas; one on a Spy; and one on Pleasure. The ninth book features an essay on the Odyssey; one on the Magic Wand; the Minerva, or an essay on Telemachus; an essay on Helen and Penelope; one on Proteus; the Cyclops, being an essay on Ulysses; an essay on the Use of Wine, or on Drunkenness, or on the Cyclops; one on Circe; one on Amphiaraus; one on Ulysses and Penelope, and also on Ulysses’ Dog. The tenth volume is about Heracles, or Medas; the Hercules, or an Essay on Prudence or Strength; the Lord or the Lover; the Lord or the Spies; the Menexenus, or an essay on Governing; the Alcibiades; and the Archelaus, or an essay on Kingly Power.

These then are the names of his works. And Timon, rebuking him because of their great number, called him a universal chatterer.

These are the names of his works. Timon, criticizing him for having so many, called him a universal talker.

X. He died of some disease; and while he was ill Diogenes came to visit him, and said to him, “Have you no need of a friend?” Once too he came to see him with a sword in his hand; and when Antisthenes said, “Who can deliver me from this suffering?” he, pointing to the sword, said, “This can;” But he rejoined, “I said from suffering, but not from life;” for he seemed to bear his disease the more calmly from his love of life. And there is an epigram on him written by ourselves, which runs thus:—

X. He died from an illness; and while he was sick, Diogenes came to visit him and said, “Don’t you need a friend?” One time, he visited with a sword in his hand, and when Antisthenes asked, “Who can free me from this suffering?” he pointed to the sword and replied, “This can.” But Antisthenes responded, “I meant from suffering, not from life,” because he seemed to endure his illness more calmly due to his love for life. There is an epigram about him that we wrote, which goes like this:—

In life you were a bitter dog, Antisthenes,
Born to bite people’s minds with sayings sharp,
Not with your actual teeth. Now you are slain
By fell consumption, passers by may say,
Why should he not, one wants a guide to Hell.

There were also three other people of the name of Antisthenes. One, a disciple of Heraclitus; the second, an Ephesian; the third, a historian of Rhodes. And since we have spoken of those who proceeded from the school of Aristippus and Phædon, we may now go on to the Cynics and Stoics, who derived their origin from Antisthenes. And we will take them in the following order.

There were also three other people named Antisthenes. One was a follower of Heraclitus; the second was from Ephesus; the third was a historian from Rhodes. Since we've talked about those who came from the school of Aristippus and Phaedo, we can now move on to the Cynics and Stoics, who originated from Antisthenes. We will discuss them in the following order.

LIFE OF DIOGENES.

I. Diogenes was a native of Sinope, the son of Hicesius, a money-changer. And Diocles says that he was forced to flee from his native city, as his father kept the public bank there, and had adulterated the coinage. But Eubulides, in his essay on Diogenes, says, that it was Diogenes himself who did this, and that he was banished with his father. And, indeed, he himself, in his Pordalus, says of himself that he had adulterated the public money. Others say that he was one of the curators, and was persuaded by the artisans employed, and that he went to Delphi, or else to the oracle at Delos, and there consulted Apollo as to whether he should do what people were trying to persuade him to do; and that, as the God gave him permission to do so, Diogenes, not comprehending that the God meant that he might change the political customs[56] of his country if he could, adulterated the coinage; and being detected, was banished, as some people say, but as other accounts have it, took the alarm and fled away of his own accord. Some again, say that he adulterated the money which he had received from his father; and that his father was thrown into prison and died there; but that Diogenes escaped and went to Delphi, and asked, not whether he might tamper with the coinage, but what he could do to become very celebrated, and that in consequence he received the oracular answer which I have mentioned.

I. Diogenes was from Sinope and the son of Hicesius, a money-changer. Diocles says he had to flee from his hometown because his father ran the public bank there and had forged the coins. But Eubulides, in his essay on Diogenes, claims that it was actually Diogenes who did this, and that he was banished along with his father. In fact, he himself mentions in his Pordalus that he had tampered with the public money. Others say he was one of the curators who was encouraged by the workers involved, and that he went to Delphi or possibly to the oracle at Delos to ask Apollo whether he should go along with what people were urging him to do. And since the God allowed him to proceed, Diogenes misunderstood this to mean he could change the political traditions of his country if he wanted, so he forged the coins; and when caught, he was either banished, according to some, or fled on his own. Some say he tampered with the money he had received from his father, which led to his father being imprisoned and dying there, while Diogenes managed to escape and went to Delphi. He asked not whether he could mess with the coins, but what he could do to become very famous, and as a result, he received the oracle's answer that I already mentioned.

II. And when he came to Athens he attached himself to Antisthenes; but as he repelled him, because he admitted no one; he at last forced his way to him by his pertinacity. And once, when he raised his stick at him, he put his head under it, and said, “Strike, for you will not find any stick hard enough to drive me away as long as you continue to speak.” And from this time forth he was one of his pupils; and being an exile, he naturally betook himself to a simple mode of life.

II. When he arrived in Athens, he connected with Antisthenes; but since Antisthenes rejected everyone, he eventually pushed his way in through sheer determination. Once, when Antisthenes raised his stick at him, he ducked under it and said, "Go ahead, hit me, because you won't find any stick tough enough to scare me off as long as you keep talking." After that, he became one of his students, and since he was an exile, he naturally embraced a simple lifestyle.

III. And when, as Theophrastus tells us, in his Megaric Philosopher, he saw a mouse running about and not seeking[225] for a bed, nor taking care to keep in the dark, nor looking for any of those things which appear enjoyable to such an animal, he found a remedy for his own poverty. He was, according to the account of some people, the first person who doubled up his cloak out of necessity, and who slept in it; and who carried a wallet, in which he kept his food; and who used whatever place was near for all sorts of purposes, eating, and sleeping, and conversing in it. In reference to which habit he used to say, pointing to the Colonnade of Jupiter, and to the Public Magazine, “that the Athenians had built him places to live in.” Being attacked with illness, he supported himself with a staff; and after that he carried it continually, not indeed in the city, but whenever he was walking in the roads, together with his wallet, as Olympiodorus, the chief man of the Athenians tells us; and Polyeuctus, the orator, and Lysanias, the son of Æschrion, tell the same story.

III. As Theophrastus tells us in his Megaric Philosopher, he saw a mouse running around without looking for a place to sleep, not avoiding the light, and not searching for any of the things that would normally attract such an animal. From this, he found a solution for his own poverty. According to some accounts, he was the first person to fold his cloak out of necessity and use it to sleep; he carried a bag to keep his food, and he used whatever space was nearby for all kinds of things—eating, sleeping, and chatting. He would often say, while pointing to the Colonnade of Jupiter and the Public Magazine, that the Athenians had built him places to live. When he became ill, he leaned on a staff, and after that, he carried it with him all the time—not in the city, but whenever he was walking on the roads—along with his bag, as Olympiodorus, a prominent Athenian, recounts; Polyeuctus, the orator, and Lysanias, the son of Æschrion, share the same story.

When he had written to some one to look out and get ready a small house for him, as he delayed to do it, he took a cask which he found in the Temple of Cybele, for his house, as he himself tells us in his letters. And during the summer he used to roll himself in the warm sand, but in winter he would embrace statues all covered with snow, practising himself, on every occasion, to endure anything.

When he wrote to someone to find and prepare a small house for him, and then delayed doing it, he took a cask he found in the Temple of Cybele to use as his home, as he mentions in his letters. During the summer, he would roll himself in the warm sand, and in winter, he would hug statues covered in snow, training himself to endure anything at every opportunity.

IV. He was very violent in expressing his haughty disdain of others. He said that the σχολὴ (school) of Euclides was χολὴ (gall). And he used to call Plato’s διατριβὴ (discussions) κατατριβὴ (disguise). It was also a saying of his that the Dionysian games were a great marvel to fools; and that the demagogues were the ministers of the multitude. He used likewise to say, “that when in the course of his life he beheld pilots, and physicians, and philosophers, he thought man the wisest of all animals; but when again he beheld interpreters of dreams, and soothsayers, and those who listened to them, and men puffed up with glory or riches, then he thought that there was not a more foolish animal than man.” Another of his sayings was, “that he thought a man ought oftener to provide himself with a reason than with a halter.” On one occasion, when he noticed Plato at a very costly entertainment tasting some olives, he said, “O you wise man! why, after having sailed to Sicily for the sake of such a feast, do you not now enjoy what you have before you?” And Plato replied,[226] “By the Gods, Diogenes, while I was there I ate olives and all such things a great deal.” Diogenes rejoined, “What then did you want to sail to Syracuse for? Did not Attica at that time produce any olives?” But Phavorinus, in his Universal History, tells this story of Aristippus. At another time he was eating dried figs, when Plato met him, and he said to him, “You may have a share of these;” and as he took some and ate them, he said, “I said that you might have a share of them, not that you might eat them all.” On one occasion Plato had invited some friends who had come to him from Dionysius to a banquet, and Diogenes trampled on his carpets, and said, “Thus I trample on the empty pride of Plato;” and Plato made him answer, “How much arrogance are you displaying, O Diogenes! when you think that you are not arrogant at all.” But, as others tell the story, Diogenes said, “Thus I trample on the pride of Plato;” and that Plato rejoined, “With quite as much pride yourself, O Diogenes.” Sotion too, in his fourth book, states, that the Cynic made the following speech to Plato: Diogenes once asked him for some wine, and then for some dried figs; so he sent him an entire jar full; and Diogenes said to him, “Will you, if you are asked how many two and two make, answer twenty? In this way, you neither give with any reference to what you are asked for, nor do you answer with reference to the question put to you.” He used also to ridicule him as an interminable talker. When he was asked where in Greece he saw virtuous men; “Men,” said he, “nowhere; but I see good boys in Lacedæmon.” On one occasion, when no one came to listen to him while he was discoursing seriously, he began to whistle. And then when people flocked round him, he reproached them for coming with eagerness to folly, but being lazy and indifferent about good things. One of his frequent sayings was, “That men contended with one another in punching and kicking, but that no one showed any emulation in the pursuit of virtue.” He used to express his astonishment at the grammarians for being desirous to learn everything about the misfortunes of Ulysses, and being ignorant of their own. He used also to say, “That the musicians fitted the strings to the lyre properly, but left all the habits of their soul ill-arranged.” And, “That mathematicians kept their eyes fixed on the sun and moon, and overlooked what was under their feet.” “That[227] orators were anxious to speak justly, but not at all about acting so.” Also, “That misers blamed money, but were preposterously fond of it.” He often condemned those who praise the just for being superior to money, but who at the same time are eager themselves for great riches. He was also very indignant at seeing men sacrifice to the Gods to procure good health, and yet at the sacrifice eating in a manner injurious to health. He often expressed his surprise at slaves, who, seeing their masters eating in a gluttonous manner, still do not themselves lay hands on any of the eatables. He would frequently praise those who were about to marry, and yet did not marry; or who were about to take a voyage, and yet did not take a voyage; or who were about to engage in affairs of state, and did not do so; and those who were about to rear children, yet did not rear any; and those who were preparing to take up their abode with princes, and yet did not take it up. One of his sayings was, “That one ought to hold out one’s hand to a friend without closing the fingers.”

IV. He was very aggressive in showing his arrogant disdain for others. He claimed that the school of Euclid was worthless. He also referred to Plato’s discussions as mere disguise. He would often say that the Dionysian games were only a great spectacle for fools, and that the demagogues served the masses. He remarked that whenever he saw pilots, doctors, and philosophers, he thought humans were the smartest of all animals; but when he saw dream interpreters, fortune tellers, and those who listened to them, as well as people full of pride or wealth, he believed there was no more foolish animal than man. He also said that a person should prioritize having a reason over having a noose. One time, when he saw Plato at a lavish feast tasting some olives, he said, “Oh you wise man! After sailing all the way to Sicily for such a feast, why aren’t you enjoying what’s in front of you?” Plato replied, “By the Gods, Diogenes, while I was there, I ate plenty of olives and such.” Diogenes responded, “Then why did you need to sail to Syracuse? Didn’t Attica have any olives at that time?” Phavorinus recounts a story about Aristippus where he was eating dried figs when Plato approached him. Plato said, “You can have some of these,” and as he took some and ate them, he remarked, “I said you could have some, not that you could eat them all.” At another time, when Plato invited friends who had come from Dionysius to a banquet, Diogenes trampled on his carpets and declared, “This is how I trample on the empty pride of Plato;” to which Plato responded, “How much arrogance you’re showing, Diogenes, thinking you’re not arrogant at all.” But other versions say that Diogenes said, “This is how I trample on Plato’s pride,” and Plato replied, “With just as much pride yourself, Diogenes.” Sotion, in his fourth book, notes that Diogenes once asked Plato for some wine and then for dried figs; so Plato sent him a whole jar, and Diogenes said, “Will you answer twenty if someone asks how much two and two make? You’re giving without regard to what I asked for, and you’re not answering in relation to the question.” He would also mock Plato for being a never-ending talker. When he was asked where in Greece he found virtuous men, he replied, “Men, nowhere; but I see good boys in Lacedæmon.” One time, when no one paid attention to him while he was speaking seriously, he began to whistle. When people gathered around him, he scolded them for eagerly flocking to foolishness but being lazy about pursuing good. One of his frequent remarks was that men competed with each other in fighting but showed no ambition in the pursuit of virtue. He expressed disbelief at grammarians who wanted to know everything about Ulysses’ misfortunes while ignoring their own. He also said that musicians properly tuned the strings of their lyres but left their own character disorganized. And that mathematicians focused on the sun and moon while overlooking what was at their feet. That orators were eager to talk justly but not concerned at all with acting justly. He noted that misers complained about money but were absurdly attached to it. He often criticized those who praised the just for being better than money while eagerly seeking riches themselves. He was very upset seeing men sacrifice to the Gods for good health while eating in a way that harmed their health during the sacrifice. He would often express amazement at slaves who, seeing their masters eat gluttonously, still refrained from touching any food. He frequently praised those who were about to marry but didn’t, those who were about to take a journey but didn’t, those who were about to enter politics but never did, those who were about to have children but didn’t, and those preparing to live with princes but chose not to. One of his quotes was, “One should extend a hand to a friend without closing their fingers.”

Hermippus, in his Sale of Diogenes, says that he was taken prisoner and put up to be sold, and asked what he could do; and he answered, “Govern men.” And so he bade the crier “give notice that if any one wants to purchase a master, there is one here for him.” When he was ordered not to sit down; “It makes no difference,” said he, “for fish are sold, be where they may.” He used to say, that he wondered at men always ringing a dish or jar before buying it, but being content to judge of a man by his look alone. When Xeniades bought him, he said to him that he ought to obey him even though he was his slave; for that a physician or a pilot would find men to obey them even though they might be slaves.

Hermippus, in his Sale of Diogenes, says that he was captured and put up for sale, and when asked what he could do, he replied, “Lead people.” He then told the auctioneer to “announce that if anyone wants to buy a master, there’s one available.” When he was told not to sit down, he said, “It doesn’t matter, because fish are sold regardless of where they are.” He often expressed his amazement at how people always check a dish or jar before buying it, yet are willing to judge a person based solely on their appearance. When Xeniades bought him, he told him that he should obey him even though he was his slave, because a doctor or a captain would still find people willing to follow them, even if they were slaves.

V. And Eubulus says, in his essay entitled, The Sale of Diogenes, that he taught the children of Xeniades, after their other lessons, to ride, and shoot, and sling, and dart. And then in the Gymnasium he did not permit the trainer to exercise them after the fashion of athletes, but exercised them himself to just the degree sufficient to give them a good colour and good health. And the boys retained in their memory many sentences of poets and prose writers, and of Diogenes himself; and he used to give them a concise statement of everything[228] in order to strengthen their memory; and at home he used to teach them to wait upon themselves, contenting themselves with plain food, and drinking water. And he accustomed them to cut their hair close, and to eschew ornament, and to go without tunics or shoes, and to keep silent, looking at nothing except themselves as they walked along. He used, also to take them out hunting; and they paid the greatest attention and respect to Diogenes himself, and spoke well of him to their parents.

V. Eubulus mentions in his essay, The Sale of Diogenes, that he taught Xeniades' children, after their other lessons, to ride, shoot, use a sling, and throw darts. Then, at the Gymnasium, he didn't let the trainer work them out like athletes but did it himself just enough to keep them looking healthy and fit. The boys memorized many lines from poets and prose writers, including Diogenes himself; he would give them concise summaries of everything to boost their memory. At home, he taught them to care for themselves, getting by with simple food and drinking water. He got them used to keeping their hair short, avoiding fancy things, going without tunics or shoes, and staying quiet while only looking at themselves as they walked. He also took them hunting, and they showed great attention and respect for Diogenes, speaking highly of him to their parents.

VI. And the same author affirms, that he grew old in the household of Xeniades, and that when he died he was buried by his sons. And that while he was living with him, Xeniades once asked him how he should bury him; and he said, “On my face;” and when he was asked why, he said, “Because, in a little while, everything will be turned upside down.” And he said this because the Macedonians were already attaining power, and becoming a mighty people from having been very inconsiderable. Once, when a man had conducted him into a magnificent house, and had told him that he must not spit, after hawking a little, he spit in his face, saying that he could not find a worse place. But some tell this story of Aristippus. Once, he called out, “Holloa, men.” And when some people gathered round him in consequence, he drove them away with his stick, saying, “I called men, and not dregs.” This anecdote I have derived from Hecaton, in the first book of his Apophthegms. They also relate that Alexander said that if he had not been Alexander, he should have liked to be Diogenes. He used to call ἀνάπηροι (cripples), not those who were dumb and blind, but those who had no wallet (πήρα). On one occasion he went half shaved into an entertainment of young men, as Metrocles tells us in his Apophthegms, and so was beaten by them. And afterwards he wrote the names of all those who had beaten him, on a white tablet, and went about with the tablet round his neck, so as to expose them to insult, as they were generally condemned and reproached for their conduct.

VI. The same author claims that he grew old in Xeniades' household, and when he died, his sons buried him. While he was living there, Xeniades once asked him how he wanted to be buried, and he replied, “On my face.” When asked why, he said, “Because, soon, everything will be turned upside down.” He said this because the Macedonians were already gaining power and becoming a strong people despite their humble beginnings. One time, when someone took him into a grand house and told him not to spit, he hawked a bit and then spat in the person's face, claiming he couldn’t think of a worse place to spit. Some people tell this story about Aristippus. At one point, he shouted, “Hey, men.” When a crowd gathered, he pushed them away with his stick, saying, “I called men, not trash.” I got this story from Hecaton in the first book of his Apophthegms. They also say that Alexander mentioned if he weren’t Alexander, he would have liked to be Diogenes. He referred to ἀνάπηροι (cripples) not as those who were mute or blind, but as those without a wallet (πήρα). Once, he went to a gathering of young men half-shaved, as Metrocles recounts in his Apophthegms, and ended up getting beaten by them. Afterwards, he wrote down the names of everyone who beat him on a white tablet and wore it around his neck to expose them to ridicule, as they were generally criticized for their behavior.

He used to say that he was the hound of those who were praised; but that none of those who praised them dared to go out hunting with him. A man once said to him, “I conquered men at the Pythian games:” on which he said, “I conquer men, but you only conquer slaves.” When some[229] people said to him, “You are an old man, and should rest for the remainder of your life;” “Why so?” replied he, “suppose I had run a long distance, ought I to stop when I was near the end, and not rather press on?” Once, when he was invited to a banquet, he said that he would not come: for that the day before no one had thanked him for coming. He used to go bare foot through the snow, and to do a number of other things which have been already mentioned. Once he attempted to eat raw meat, but he could not digest it. On one occasion he found Demosthenes, the orator, dining in an inn; and as he was slipping away, he said to him, “You will now be ever so much more in an inn.”[57] Once, when some strangers wished to see Demosthenes, he stretched out his middle finger, and said, “This is the great demagogue of the Athenian people.” When some one had dropped a loaf, and was ashamed to pick it up again, he, wishing to give him a lesson, tied a cord round the neck of a bottle and dragged it all through the Ceramicus. He used to say, that he imitated the teachers of choruses, for that they spoke too loud, in order that the rest might catch the proper tone. Another of his sayings, was that most men were within a finger’s breadth of being mad. If, then, any one were to walk along, stretching out his middle finger, he will seem to be mad; but if he puts out his fore finger, he will not be thought so. Another of his sayings was, that things of great value were often sold for nothing, and vice versâ. Accordingly, that a statue would fetch three thousand drachmas, and a bushel of meal only two obols; and when Xeniades had bought him, he said to him, “Come, do what you are ordered to.” And when he said—

He used to say that he was the hound of those who were praised; but that none of those who praised them dared to go out hunting with him. A man once told him, “I defeated men at the Pythian games,” to which he replied, “I conquer men, but you only conquer slaves.” When some people said to him, “You’re an old man and should relax for the rest of your life,” he replied, “Why? If I had run a long distance, should I stop when I'm near the end, or should I keep going?” Once, when he was invited to a banquet, he said he wouldn’t attend because nobody had thanked him for coming the day before. He used to walk barefoot through the snow and do many other things that have already been mentioned. Once he tried to eat raw meat but couldn’t digest it. On one occasion, he found Demosthenes, the orator, dining at an inn; and as he was slipping away, he said to him, “You’ll now be spending a lot more time in an inn.” Once, when some strangers wanted to see Demosthenes, he stretched out his middle finger and said, “This is the great demagogue of the Athenian people.” When someone dropped a loaf and felt embarrassed to pick it up, he wanted to teach him a lesson, so he tied a cord around the neck of a bottle and dragged it all through the Ceramicus. He used to say that he imitated the teachers of choruses because they spoke loudly so that the others could catch the right tone. Another of his sayings was that most men were just a finger's breadth away from being mad. So, if someone walked around with their middle finger out, they’d look crazy, but if they extended their index finger, they wouldn’t be thought of that way. Another of his sayings was that valuable things were often sold for next to nothing, and vice versa. For instance, a statue could fetch three thousand drachmas, while a bushel of grain only went for two obols; and when Xeniades bought him, he said to him, “Come on, do what you’re told.” And when he said—

“The streams of sacred rivers now
Run backwards to their source!”

“Suppose,” rejoined Diogenes, “you had been sick, and had bought a physician, could you refuse to be guided by him, and tell him—

“Suppose,” replied Diogenes, “you had been sick and hired a doctor, could you ignore his advice and tell him—

“The streams of sacred rivers now
Run backwards to their source?”

Once a man came to him, and wished to study philosophy[230] as his pupil; and he gave him a saperda[58] and made him follow him. And as he from shame threw it away and departed, he soon afterwards met him and, laughing, said to him, “A saperda has dissolved your friendship for me.” But Diocles tells this story in the following manner; that when some one said to him, “Give me a commission, Diogenes,” he carried him off, and gave him a halfpenny worth of cheese to carry. And as he refused to carry it, “See,” said Diogenes, “a halfpenny worth of cheese has broken off our friendship.”

Once, a man approached him, wanting to study philosophy as his student; he handed him a saperda[230] and asked him to follow. But out of embarrassment, the man threw it away and walked off. Later, he ran into him again and, laughing, said, “A saperda has ended our friendship.” Diocles recounts the story differently; when someone asked him, “Give me a task, Diogenes,” he took him aside and gave him a halfpenny's worth of cheese to carry. When the man refused, Diogenes remarked, “See, a halfpenny's worth of cheese has ended our friendship.”

On one occasion he saw a child drinking out of its hands, and so he threw away the cup which belonged to his wallet, saying, “That child has beaten me in simplicity.” He also threw away his spoon, after seeing a boy, when he had broken his vessel, take up his lentils with a crust of bread. And he used to argue thus,—“Everything belongs to the gods; and wise men are the friends of the gods. All things are in common among friends; therefore everything belongs to wise men.” Once he saw a woman falling down before the Gods in an unbecoming attitude; he, wishing to cure her of her superstition, as Zoilus of Perga tells us, came up to her, and said, “Are you not afraid, O woman, to be in such an indecent attitude, when some God may be behind you, for every place is full of him?” He consecrated a man to Æsculapius, who was to run up and beat all these who prostrated themselves with their faces to the ground; and he was in the habit of saying that the tragic curse had come upon him, for that he was—

On one occasion, he saw a child drinking from its hands, so he tossed away the cup that belonged to him, saying, “That child has outdone me in simplicity.” He also got rid of his spoon after seeing a boy, who had broken his dish, pick up his lentils with a piece of bread. He would argue this way: “Everything belongs to the gods, and wise people are friends of the gods. Everything is shared among friends; therefore, everything belongs to wise people.” Once, he saw a woman kneeling before the gods in a disrespectful manner; wanting to help her overcome her superstition, as Zoilus of Perga tells us, he approached her and said, “Aren’t you afraid, woman, to be in such an indecent position when some god might be behind you, because every place is full of him?” He dedicated a man to Æsculapius, who was supposed to run and strike everyone who was prostrating themselves on the ground; and he often said that the tragic curse had fallen upon him, for that he was—

Houseless and citiless, a piteous exile
From his dear native land; a wandering beggar,
Scraping a pittance poor from day to day.

And another of his sayings was that he opposed confidence to fortune, nature to law, and reason to suffering. Once, while he was sitting in the sun in the Craneum, Alexander was standing by, and said to him, “Ask any favour you choose of me.” And he replied, “Cease to shade me from the sun.” On one occasion a man was reading some long passages, and when he came to the end of the book and showed that there was nothing more written, “Be of good cheer, my friends,” exclaimed Diogenes, “I see land.” A man once proved to[231] him syllogistically that he had horns, so he put his hand to his forehead and said, “I do not see them.” And in a similar manner he replied to one who had been asserting that there was no such thing as motion, by getting up and walking away. When a man was talking about the heavenly bodies and meteors, “Pray how many days,” said he to him, “is it since you came down from heaven?”

And another thing he said was that he contrasted confidence with luck, nature with laws, and reason with suffering. Once, while he was sitting in the sun in the Craneum, Alexander stood nearby and said to him, “Ask for anything you want.” He replied, “Stop shading me from the sun.” On another occasion, a man was reading some lengthy passages, and when he reached the end of the book and showed that there was nothing left written, Diogenes exclaimed, “Cheer up, my friends, I see land.” A man once logically demonstrated to him that he had horns, so he touched his forehead and said, “I don’t see them.” He responded similarly to someone who claimed that motion didn’t exist by simply standing up and walking away. When a man was discussing the stars and meteors, he asked him, “How many days has it been since you came down from heaven?”

A profligate eunuch had written on his house, “Let no evil thing enter in.” “Where,” said Diogenes, “is the master of the house going?” After having anointed his feet with perfume, he said that the ointment from his head mounted up to heaven, and that from his feet up to his nose. When the Athenians entreated him to be initiated in the Eleusinian mysteries, and said that in the shades below the initiated had the best seats; “It will,” he replied, “be an absurd thing if Agesilaus and Epaminondas are to live in the mud, and some miserable wretches, who have been initiated, are to be in the islands of the blest.” Some mice crept up to his table, and he said, “See, even Diogenes maintains his favourites.” Once, when he was leaving the bath, and a man asked him whether many men were bathing, he said, “No;” but when a number of people came out, he confessed that there were a great many. When Plato called him a dog, he said, “Undoubtedly, for I have come back to those who sold me.”

A reckless eunuch had put up a sign on his house that said, “Let no evil thing enter here.” Diogenes asked, “Where is the owner of the house going?” After he put perfume on his feet, he remarked that the scent from his head went up to heaven, while the scent from his feet reached his nose. When the Athenians asked him to be initiated into the Eleusinian mysteries, claiming that the initiates had the best seats in the afterlife, he replied, “It would be ridiculous if Agesilaus and Epaminondas were stuck in the mud, while some pathetic individuals who got initiated were in the islands of the blessed.” When some mice scurried onto his table, he said, “Look, even Diogenes has his favorites.” One time, when he was leaving the bath and a man asked him if many people were bathing, he said, “No.” But when a lot of people came out, he admitted that there were many. When Plato called him a dog, he replied, “Of course, because I’ve come back to those who sold me.”

Plato defined man thus: “Man is a two-footed, featherless animal,” and was much praised for the definition; so Diogenes plucked a cock and brought it into his school, and said, “This is Plato’s man.” On which account this addition was made to the definition, “With broad flat nails.” A man once asked him what was the proper time for supper, and he made answer, “If you are a rich man, whenever you please; and if you are a poor man, whenever you can.” When he was at Megara he saw some sheep carefully covered over with skins, and the children running about naked; and so he said, “It is better at Megara to be a man’s ram, than his son.” A man once struck him with a beam, and then said, “Take care.” “What,” said he, “are you going to strike me again?” He used to say that the demagogues were the servants of the people; and garlands the blossoms of glory. Having lighted a candle in the day time, he said, “I am looking for a man.” On one occasion he stood under a fountain,[232] and as the bystanders were pitying him, Plato, who was present, said to them, “If you wish really to show your pity for him, come away;” intimating that he was only acting thus out of a desire for notoriety. Once, when a man had struck him with his fist, he said, “O Hercules, what a strange thing that I should be walking about with a helmet on without knowing it!”

Plato defined man like this: “Man is a two-footed, featherless animal,” and he received a lot of praise for this definition. So, Diogenes plucked a chicken and brought it into his classroom, saying, “This is Plato’s man.” Because of this, the definition was updated to include, “With broad flat nails.” One time, a man asked him what the right time for dinner was, and he replied, “If you’re rich, whenever you want; if you’re poor, whenever you can.” When he was in Megara, he saw sheep carefully covered with skins while the children ran around naked, and he said, “It’s better in Megara to be a man’s ram than his son.” Once, when a man hit him with a beam and then said, “Be careful,” he replied, “What, are you going to hit me again?” He used to say that the demagogues were the servants of the people, and that garlands were the blossoms of glory. After lighting a candle during the day, he said, “I’m looking for a man.” On another occasion, he stood under a fountain, and as the bystanders felt sorry for him, Plato, who was there, told them, “If you really want to show pity for him, leave;” implying that he was acting this way just to get attention. Once, when a man hit him with his fist, he said, “Oh Hercules, how weird it is that I’m walking around with a helmet on without even realizing it!”

When Midias struck him with his fist and said, “There are three thousand drachmas for you;” the next day Diogenes took the cestus of a boxer and beat him soundly, and said, “There are three thousand drachmas for you.”[59] When Lysias, the drug-seller, asked him whether he thought that there were any Gods: “How,” said he, “can I help thinking so, when I consider you to be hated by them?” but some attribute this reply to Theodorus. Once he saw a man purifying himself by washing, and said to him, “Oh, wretched man, do not you know that as you cannot wash away blunders in grammar by purification, so, too, you can no more efface the errors of a life in that same manner?”

When Midias punched him and said, “There are three thousand drachmas for you,” the next day Diogenes grabbed a boxer's gloves and gave him a solid beating, saying, “There are three thousand drachmas for you.”[59] When Lysias, the drug dealer, asked him if he believed in any gods, he replied, “How can I not think so when I see how much they're against you?” Although some attribute this response to Theodorus. Once, he saw a man trying to purify himself by washing and said to him, “Oh, miserable man, don’t you realize that just like you can’t wash away grammar mistakes with purification, you can’t erase the mistakes of your life that way either?”

He used to say that men were wrong for complaining of fortune; for that they ask of the Gods what appear to be good things, not what are really so. And to those who were alarmed at dreams he said, that they did not regard what they do while they are awake, but make a great fuss about what they fancy they see while they are asleep. Once, at the Olympic games, when the herald proclaimed, “Dioxippus is the conqueror of men;” he said, “He is the conqueror of slaves, I am the conqueror of men.”

He used to say that people were wrong to complain about fate because they ask the Gods for things that seem good, not what truly is. And to those who were worried about their dreams, he pointed out that they overlook what they do while they’re awake but make a big deal out of what they think they see while they’re asleep. Once, at the Olympic games, when the announcer proclaimed, “Dioxippus is the champion of men,” he responded, “He’s the champion of slaves; I’m the champion of men.”

He was greatly beloved by the Athenians; accordingly, when a youth had broken his cask they beat him, and gave Diogenes another. And Dionysius, the Stoic, says that after the battle of Chæronea he was taken prisoner and brought to Philip; and being asked who he was, replied, “A spy, to spy upon your insatiability.” And Philip marvelled at him and let him go. Once, when Alexander had sent a letter to Athens to Antipater, by the hands of a man named Athlias, he, being present, said, “Athlias from Athlius, by means of[233] Athlias to Athlius.”[60] When Perdiccas threatened that he would put him to death if he did not come to him, he replied, “That is nothing strange, for a scorpion or a tarantula could do as much: you had better threaten me that, if I kept away, you should be very happy.” He used constantly to repeat with emphasis that an easy life had been given to man by the Gods, but that it had been overlaid by their seeking for honey, cheese-cakes, and unguents, and things of that sort. On which account he said to a man, who had his shoes put on by his servant, “You are not thoroughly happy, unless he also wipes your nose for you; and he will do this, if you are crippled in your hands.” On one occasion, when he had seen the hieromnemones[61] leading off one of the stewards who had stolen a goblet, he said, “The great thieves are carrying off the little thief.” At another time, seeing a young man throwing stones at a cross, he said, “Well done, you will be sure to reach the mark.” Once, too, some boys got round him and said, “We are taking care that you do not bite us;” but he said, “Be of good cheer, my boys, a dog does not eat beef.” He saw a man giving himself airs because he was clad in a lion’s skin, and said to him, “Do not go on disgracing the garb of nature.” When people were speaking of the happiness of Callisthenes, and saying what splendid treatment he received from Alexander, he replied, “The man then is wretched, for he is forced to breakfast and dine whenever Alexander chooses.” When he was in want of money, he said that be reclaimed it from his friends and did not beg for it.

He was very much loved by the Athenians; so, when a young man broke his cask, they beat him and gave Diogenes another one. And Dionysius, the Stoic, says that after the battle of Chæronea he was captured and brought to Philip; when asked who he was, he replied, “A spy, to spy on your insatiability.” Philip was amazed by him and let him go. Once, when Alexander sent a letter to Athens for Antipater through a man named Athlias, he, being present, said, “Athlias from Athlius, through Athlias to Athlius.” When Perdiccas threatened to kill him if he didn’t come to him, he replied, “That’s nothing special; a scorpion or a tarantula could do the same: you’d be better off threatening me that you’d be very happy if I stayed away.” He constantly emphasized that the Gods gave man an easy life, but it became complicated by their pursuit of honey, cheese cakes, unguents, and similar things. For this reason, he said to a man who had his shoes put on by his servant, “You’re not truly happy unless he wipes your nose for you too, and he would do that if your hands were crippled.” One time, when he saw the hieromnemones taking away one of the stewards who had stolen a goblet, he said, “The big thieves are taking away the little thief.” At another time, watching a young man throw stones at a cross, he said, “Well done, you’re sure to hit your target.” Once, some boys surrounded him and said, “We’re making sure you don’t bite us;” but he said, “Don’t worry, boys, a dog doesn’t eat beef.” He saw a man acting superior because he was wearing a lion's skin and told him, “Stop disgracing the garment of nature.” When people were talking about the happiness of Callisthenes and how he received such great treatment from Alexander, he replied, “The man must be miserable, as he has to eat breakfast and dinner whenever Alexander wants.” When he needed money, he said he reclaimed it from his friends instead of begging for it.

On one occasion he was working with his hands in the market-place, and said, “I wish I could rub my stomach in the same way, and so avoid hunger.” When he saw a young man going with some satraps to supper, he dragged him away and led him off to his relations, and bade them take care of him. He was once addressed by a youth beautifully adorned, who asked him some question; and he refused to give him any answer, till he satisfied him whether he was a man or a woman. And on one occasion, when a youth was playing the[234] cottabus in the bath, he said to him, “The better you do it, the worse you do it.” Once at a banquet, some of the guests threw him bones, as if he had been a dog; so he, as he went away, put up his leg against them as if he had been a dog in reality. He used to call the orators, and all those who speak for fame τρισάνθρωποι (thrice men), instead of τρισάθλιοι (thrice miserable). He said that a rich but ignorant man, was like a sheep with a golden fleece. When he saw a notice on the house of a profligate man, “To be sold.” “I knew,” said he, “that you who are so incessantly drunk, would soon vomit up your owner.” To a young man, who was complaining of the number of people who sought his acquaintance, he said, “Do not make such a parade of your vanity.”

One time, he was busy working with his hands in the marketplace and said, “I wish I could scratch my stomach like this to avoid being hungry.” When he saw a young man heading off to dinner with some powerful folks, he pulled him away and took him to his family, telling them to look after him. He was once approached by a beautifully dressed young man who asked him a question; he refused to answer until he figured out if the young man was male or female. On another occasion, when a young man was playing a game in the bath, he told him, “The better you play, the worse you do.” At a banquet, some guests tossed him bones as if he were a dog; so, as he left, he lifted his leg against them like a real dog. He used to call orators and anyone who spoke for attention τρισάνθρωποι (thrice men) instead of τρισάθλιοι (thrice miserable). He said that a rich but clueless man was like a sheep with a golden fleece. When he saw a notice on the house of a reckless man that said, “To be sold,” he remarked, “I knew that you, who are always drunk, would soon throw up your owner.” To a young man who complained about how many people wanted to befriend him, he said, “Stop showing off your vanity.”

Having been in a very dirty bath, he said, “I wonder where the people, who bathe here, clean themselves.” When all the company was blaming an indifferent harp-player, he alone praised him, and being asked why he did so, he said, “Because, though he is such as he is, he plays the harp and does not steal.” He saluted a harp player who was always left alone by his hearers, with, “Good morning, cock;” and when the man asked him, “Why so?” he said, “Because you, when you sing, make every one get up.” When a young man was one day making a display of himself, he, having filled the bosom of his robe with lupins, began to eat them; and when the multitude looked at him, he said, “that he marvelled at their leaving the young man to look at him.” And when a man, who was very superstitious, said to him, “With one blow I will break your head;” “And I,” he replied, “with one sneeze will make you tremble.” When Hegesias entreated him to lend him one of his books, he said, “You are a silly fellow, Hegesias, for you will not take painted figs, but real ones; and yet you overlook the genuine practice of virtue, and seek for what is merely written.” A man once reproached him with his banishment, and his answer was, “You wretched man, that is what made me a philosopher.” And when, on another occasion, some one said to him, “The people of Sinope condemned you to banishment,” he replied, “And I condemned them to remain where they were.” Once he saw a man who had been victor at the Olympic games, feeding (νέμοντα) sheep, and he said to him, “You have soon come across my friend from the Olympic games, to the Nemean.”[235] When he was asked why athletes are insensible to pain, he said, “Because they are built up of pork and beef.”

After being in a really dirty bath, he said, “I wonder where the people who bathe here clean themselves.” While everyone else was criticizing a careless harp player, he was the only one who praised him, and when asked why, he said, “Because even though he has his faults, he plays the harp and doesn’t steal.” He greeted a harp player who was always ignored by his audience with, “Good morning, cock,” and when the guy asked, “Why that?” he replied, “Because when you sing, everyone gets up.” One day, when a young man was trying to show off, he filled the front of his robe with lupins and started eating them; and when the crowd stared at him, he said, “I’m amazed you’re leaving the young man to look at me.” When a very superstitious man threatened him, saying, “With one blow, I’ll break your head,” he answered, “And I’ll make you tremble with just one sneeze.” When Hegesias asked to borrow one of his books, he said, “You’re a foolish guy, Hegesias, because you won’t take painted figs, only real ones; yet you ignore real virtue and look for just what’s written.” One time, a man criticized him for being banished, and he replied, “You miserable man, that’s what made me a philosopher.” On another occasion, when someone told him, “The people of Sinope exiled you,” he answered, “And I sent them to stay right where they are.” Once he saw a man who’d won at the Olympic games herding sheep, and he joked, “Looks like you’ve gone from my friend at the Olympics straight to the Nemean.”[235] When asked why athletes don’t feel pain, he said, “Because they’re made of pork and beef.”

He once asked for a statue; and being questioned as to his reason for doing so, he said, “I am practising disappointment.” Once he was begging of some one (for he did this at first out of actual want), he said, “If you have given to any one else, give also to me; and if you have never given to any one, then begin with me.” On one occasion, he was asked by the tyrant, “What sort of brass was the best for a statue?” and he replied, “That of which the statues of Harmodius and Aristogiton are made.” When he was asked how Dionysius treats his friends, he said, “Like bags; those which are full he hangs up, and those which are empty he throws away.” A man who was lately married put an inscription on his house, “Hercules Callinicus, the son of Jupiter, lives here; let no evil enter.” And so Diogenes wrote in addition, “An alliance is made after the war is over.” He used to say that covetousness was the metropolis of all evils. Seeing on one occasion a profligate man in an inn eating olives, he said, “If you had dined thus, you would not have supped thus.” One of his apophthegms was, that good men were the images of the Gods; another, that love was the business of those who had nothing to do. When he was asked what was miserable in life, he answered, “An indigent old man.” And when the question was put to him, what beast inflicts the worst bite, he said, “Of wild beasts the sycophant, and of tame animals the flatterer.”

He once asked for a statue, and when questioned about why he wanted one, he said, “I am practicing disappointment.” At one point, he was asking someone for help (since he initially did this out of necessity), saying, “If you’ve given to anyone else, give to me too; and if you’ve never given to anyone, then start with me.” On another occasion, when a tyrant asked him, “What kind of bronze is best for a statue?” he replied, “The same as that used for the statues of Harmodius and Aristogiton.” When asked how Dionysius treats his friends, he said, “Like bags; he hangs up the full ones and throws away the empty ones.” A man who had just gotten married put a sign on his house that read, “Hercules Callinicus, son of Jupiter, lives here; may no evil enter.” Diogenes added, “A partnership is formed after the war is over.” He often said that greed was the source of all evils. Once, upon seeing a disreputable man in an inn eating olives, he remarked, “If you had eaten like this for dinner, you wouldn’t be eating like that now.” One of his sayings was that good people were like images of the Gods; another was that love is for those who have nothing else to do. When asked what was the most miserable thing in life, he answered, “An impoverished old man.” And when asked which animal gives the worst bite, he said, “Of wild beasts, the sycophant, and of tame animals, the flatterer.”

On one occasion he saw two Centaurs very badly painted; he said, “Which of the two is the worst?”[62] He used to say that a speech, the object of which was solely to please, was a honeyed halter. He called the belly, the Charybdis of life. Having heard once that Didymon the adulterer, had been caught in the fact, he said, “He deserves to be hung by his name.”[63] When the question was put to him, why gold is of a pale colour, he said, “Because it has so many people plotting[236] against it.” When he saw a woman in a litter, he said, “The cage is not suited to the animal.” And seeing a runaway slave sitting on a well, he said, “My boy, take care you do not fall in.” Another time, he saw a little boy who was a stealer of clothes from the baths, and said, “Are you going for unguents, (ἐπ’ ἀλειμμάτιον), or for other garments (ἐπ’ ἄλλ’ ἱμάτιον).” Seeing some women hanging on olive trees, he said, “I wish every tree bore similar fruit.” At another time, he saw a clothes stealer, and addressed him thus:—

On one occasion, he saw two Centaurs that were painted really badly; he asked, “Which of the two is worse?”[62] He often said that a speech meant only to please was like a sweetened noose. He referred to the belly as the Charybdis of life. After hearing that Didymon the adulterer had been caught in the act, he remarked, “He deserves to be hanged by his name.”[63] When someone asked him why gold is such a pale color, he replied, “Because it has so many people scheming against it.” Upon seeing a woman in a litter, he commented, “The cage doesn’t suit the animal.” And when he spotted a runaway slave sitting on a well, he warned, “My boy, watch out you don’t fall in.” Another time, he saw a little boy stealing clothes from the baths and said, “Are you going for oils (ἐπ’ ἀλειμμάτιον), or for different garments (ἐπ’ ἄλλ’ ἱμάτιον)?” When he saw some women hanging on olive trees, he remarked, “I wish every tree bore similar fruit.” Yet another time, he encountered a clothes thief and addressed him like this:—

“What moves thee, say, when sleep has clos’d the sight,
To roam the silent fields in dead of night?
Art thou some wretch by hopes of plunder led,
Through heaps of carnage to despoil the dead.”[64]

When he was asked whether he had any girl or boy to wait on him, he said, “No.” And as his questioner asked further, “If then you die, who will bury you?” He replied, “Whoever wants my house.” Seeing a handsome youth sleeping without any protection, he nudged him, and said, “Wake up:—

When he was asked if he had anyone, a girl or a boy, to take care of him, he replied, “No.” Then, when his questioner pressed on, “If you die, who will bury you?” he said, “Anyone who wants my house.” Noticing a handsome young man sleeping without any cover, he nudged him and said, “Wake up:—

“Mix’d with the vulgar shall thy fate be found,
Pierc’d in the back, a vile dishonest wound.”[65]

And he addressed a man who was buying delicacies at a great expense:—

And he spoke to a guy who was spending a lot of money on fancy food:—

“Not long, my son, will you on earth remain,
If such your dealings.”[66]

When Plato was discoursing about his “ideas,” and using the nouns “tableness” and “cupness;” “I, O Plato!” interrupted Diogenes, “see a table and a cup, but I see no tableness or cupness.” Plato made answer, “That is natural enough, for you have eyes, by which a cup and a table are contemplated; but you have not intellect, by which tableness and cupness are seen.”

When Plato was talking about his "ideas" and using the terms "tableness" and "cupness," Diogenes interrupted, "Hey, Plato! I see a table and a cup, but I don't see any tableness or cupness." Plato replied, "That's not surprising since you have eyes to see the cup and the table, but you lack the intellect to grasp tableness and cupness."

On one occasion, he was asked by a certain person, “What sort of a man, O Diogenes, do you think Socrates?” and he[237] said, “A madman.” Another time, the question was put to him, when a man ought to marry? and his reply was, “Young men ought not to marry yet, and old men never ought to marry at all.” When asked what he would take to let a man give him a blow on the head? he replied, “A helmet.” Seeing a youth smartening himself up very carefully, he said to him, “If you are doing that for men, you are miserable; and if for women, you are profligate.” Once he saw a youth blushing, and addressed him, “Courage, my boy, that is the complexion of virtue.” Having once listened to two lawyers, he condemned them both; saying, “That the one had stolen the thing in question, and that the other had not lost it.” When asked what wine he liked to drink, he said, “That which belongs to another.” A man said to him one day, “Many people laugh at you.” “But I,” he replied, “am not laughed down.” When a man said to him, that it was a bad thing to live; “Not to live,” said he, “but to live badly.” When some people were advising him to make search for a slave who had run away, he said, “It would be a very absurd thing for Manes to be able to live without Diogenes, but for Diogenes not to be able to live without Manes.” When he was dining on olives, a cheese-cake was brought in, on which he threw the olive away, saying:—

On one occasion, someone asked him, “What do you think of Socrates, Diogenes?” and he replied, “A madman.” Another time, he was asked when a man should marry, and he said, “Young men shouldn’t marry yet, and old men should never marry at all.” When asked what it would take for someone to hit him on the head, he replied, “A helmet.” Seeing a young man grooming himself carefully, he said, “If you’re doing that for men, you’re pathetic; and if it’s for women, you’re shameless.” Once, he saw a young man blushing and encouraged him, “Don’t worry, my boy; that’s the mark of virtue.” After listening to two lawyers, he condemned them both, saying, “One stole the item in question, and the other didn’t lose it.” When asked what wine he preferred, he said, “The kind that belongs to someone else.” A man told him, “Many people laugh at you.” He replied, “But I don’t let that get to me.” When a man said living was bad, he replied, “It’s not living that’s bad, but living badly.” When some people suggested that he look for a runaway slave, he said, “It would be ridiculous for Manes to live without Diogenes, but for Diogenes not to live without Manes.” While dining on olives, when a cheesecake was brought in, he threw the olives away, saying:—

Keep well aloof, O stranger, from all tyrants.[67]

And presently he added:—

And then he added:—

He drove the olive off (μαστίξεν δ’ ἐλάαν).[68]

When he was asked what sort of a dog he was, he replied, “When hungry, I am a dog of Melita; when satisfied, a Molossian; a sort which most of those who praise, do not like to take out hunting with them, because of the labour of keeping up with them; and in like manner, you cannot associate with me, from fear of the pain I give you.” The question was put to him, whether wise men ate cheese-cakes, and he replied, “They eat everything, just as the rest of mankind.” When asked why people give to beggars and not to philosophers,[238] he said, “Because they think it possible that they themselves may become lame and blind, but they do not expect ever to turn out philosophers.” He once begged of a covetous man, and as he was slow to give, he said, “Man, I am asking you for something to maintain me (εἰς τροφὴν) and not to bury me (εἰς ταφὴν).” When some one reproached him for having tampered with the coinage, he said, “There was a time when I was such a person as you are now; but there never was when you were such as I am now, and never will be.” And to another person who reproached him on the same grounds, he said, “There were times when I did what I did not wish to, but that is not the case now.” When he went to Myndus, he saw some very large gates, but the city was a small one, and so he said, “Oh men of Myndus, shut your gates, lest your city should steal out.” On one occasion, he saw a man who had been detected stealing purple, and so he said:—

When asked what kind of dog he was, he replied, “When I'm hungry, I’m a Maltese dog; when I’m satisfied, I’m a Molossian. Most people who praise that breed don’t want to take them hunting because they’re tough to keep up with. Similarly, you can’t be around me because of the pain I cause you.” When someone asked if wise men ate cheesecakes, he said, “They eat everything, just like everyone else.” When questioned why people give to beggars and not to philosophers, he replied, “Because they believe it’s possible for them to become lame or blind, but they don’t think they'll ever become philosophers.” He once asked a stingy man for help, and when the man hesitated to give, he said, “Hey, I’m asking for something to live on, not to be buried.” When someone criticized him for messing with money, he said, “There was a time when I was just like you; but you’ve never been like me and never will be.” To another person who criticized him similarly, he said, “There were times when I did things I didn’t want to do, but that’s not the case anymore.” When he visited Myndus, he saw some really large gates but noticed the city was small, so he said, “Oh, people of Myndus, close your gates before your city slips away.” One time, he caught a man trying to steal purple dye, and he said:—

A purple death, and mighty fate overtook him.[69]

When Craterus entreated him to come and visit him, he said, “I would rather lick up salt at Athens, than enjoy a luxurious table with Craterus.” On one occasion, he met Anaximenes, the orator, who was a fat man, and thus accosted him; “Pray give us, who are poor, some of your belly; for by so doing you will be relieved yourself, and you will assist us.” And once, when he was discussing some point, Diogenes held up a piece of salt fish, and drew off the attention of his hearers; and as Anaximenes was indignant at this, he said, “See, one pennyworth of salt fish has put an end to the lecture of Anaximenes.” Being once reproached for eating in the market-place, he made answer, “I did, for it was in the market-place that I was hungry.” Some authors also attribute the following repartee to him. Plato saw him washing vegetables, and so, coming up to him, he quietly accosted him thus, “If you had paid court to Dionysius, you would not have been washing vegetables.” “And,” he replied, with equal quietness, “if you had washed vegetables, you would never have paid court to Dionysius.” When a man said to him once, “Most people laugh at you;” “And very[239] likely,” he replied, “the asses laugh at them; but they do not regard the asses, neither do I regard them.” Once he saw a youth studying philosophy, and said to him, “Well done; inasmuch as you are leading those who admire your person to contemplate the beauty of your mind.”

When Craterus asked him to come and visit, he said, “I’d rather eat salt at Athens than enjoy a fancy meal with Craterus.” One time, he ran into Anaximenes, the orator, who was a heavy-set man, and he said to him, “Please share some of your belly with us poor folks; by doing so, you’ll lighten your own load and help us out.” Once, while discussing something, Diogenes held up a piece of salted fish, distracting his audience. When Anaximenes got angry about this, he remarked, “Look, a penny’s worth of salted fish ended Anaximenes’s lecture.” When he was criticized for eating in the marketplace, he replied, “I did, because I was hungry in the marketplace.” Some writers also attribute this comeback to him: Plato saw him washing vegetables and approached him, saying, “If you had cozied up to Dionysius, you wouldn’t be washing vegetables.” Diogenes calmly responded, “And if you had washed vegetables, you wouldn’t have cozied up to Dionysius.” One time, a guy told him, “Most people laugh at you.” Diogenes replied, “And likely the donkeys are laughing at them; but I don’t care about the donkeys, and neither do they.” Once, he saw a young man studying philosophy and said, “Good job; by leading those who admire your looks, you’re getting them to appreciate the beauty of your mind.”

A certain person was admiring the offerings in the temple at Samothrace,[70] and he said to him, “They would have been much more numerous, if those who were lost had offered them instead of those who were saved;” but some attribute this speech to Diagoras the Melian. Once he saw a handsome youth going to a banquet, and said to him, “You will come back worse (χείρων);” and when he the next day after the banquet said to him, “I have left the banquet, and was no worse for it;” he replied, “You were not Chiron, but Eurytion.”[71] He was begging once of a very ill-tempered man, and as he said to him, “If you can persuade me, I will give you something;” he replied, “If I could persuade you, I would beg you to hang yourself.” He was on one occasion returning from Lacedæmon to Athens; and when some one asked him, “Whither are you going, and whence do you come?” he said, “I am going from the men’s apartments to the women’s.” Another time he was returning from the Olympic games, and when some one asked him whether there had been a great multitude there, he said, “A great multitude, but very few men.” He used to say that debauched men resembled figs growing on a precipice; the fruit of which is not tasted by men, but devoured by crows and vultures. When Phryne had dedicated a golden statue of Venus at Delphi, he wrote upon it, “From the profligacy of the Greeks.”

A certain person was admiring the offerings at the temple in Samothrace,[70] and said to him, “They would have been a lot more if those who were lost had offered them instead of those who were saved.” Some people say this was said by Diagoras of Melos. Once, he saw an attractive young man on his way to a banquet and told him, “You’ll come back worse (χείρων);” and the next day, after the banquet, the young man said to him, “I left the banquet, and I’m no worse for it.” He replied, “You weren't Chiron, but Eurytion.”[71] He once asked a very grumpy man for something, and when the man said, “If you can convince me, I’ll give you something,” he replied, “If I could convince you, I’d ask you to hang yourself.” One time he was returning from Lacedæmon to Athens, and when someone asked him, “Where are you going, and where are you coming from?” he said, “I’m coming from the men’s quarters to the women’s.” Another time, after returning from the Olympic games, when someone asked if there were a lot of people there, he said, “A lot of people, but very few men.” He used to say that corrupted men were like figs growing on a cliff; the fruit of which isn’t tasted by men but is eaten by crows and vultures. When Phryne dedicated a golden statue of Venus at Delphi, he wrote on it, “From the profligacy of the Greeks.”

Once Alexander the Great came and stood by him, and said, “I am Alexander, the great king.” “And I,” said he, “am Diogenes the dog.” And when he was asked to what actions of his it was owing that he was called a dog, he said, “Because I fawn upon those who give me anything, and bark at those who give me nothing, and bite the rogues.” On one occasion he was gathering some of the fruit of a fig-tree, and[240] when the man who was guarding it told him a man hung himself on this tree the other day. “I, then,” said he, “will now purify it.” Once he saw a man who had been a conqueror at the Olympic games looking very often at a courtesan; “Look,” said he, “at that warlike ram, who is taken prisoner by the first girl he meets.” One of his sayings was, that good-looking courtesans were like poisoned mead.

Once Alexander the Great came over and said, “I am Alexander, the great king.” Diogenes replied, “And I am Diogenes the dog.” When asked why he was called a dog, he explained, “Because I flatter those who give me something, bark at those who give me nothing, and bite the crooks.” One time, he was picking figs from a tree, and when the guard told him a man had hung himself from that tree recently, he said, “Well then, I’ll purify it.” He once saw a man who had won at the Olympic games staring frequently at a courtesan and remarked, “Look at that brave ram, captured by the first girl he sees.” One of his sayings was that attractive courtesans are like poisoned mead.

On one occasion he was eating his dinner in the market-place, and the bystanders kept constantly calling out “Dog;” but he said, “It is you who are the dogs, who stand around me while I am at dinner.” When two effeminate fellows were getting out of his way, he said, “Do not be afraid, a dog does not eat beetroot.” Being once asked about a debauched boy, as to what country he came from, he said, “He is a Tegean.”[72] Seeing an unskilful wrestler professing to heal a man he said, “What are you about, are you in hopes now to overthrow those who formerly conquered you?” On one occasion he saw the son of a courtesan throwing a stone at a crowd, and said to him, “Take care, lest you hit your father.” When a boy showed him a sword that he had received from one to whom he had done some discreditable service, he told him, “The sword is a good sword, but the handle is infamous.” And when some people were praising a man who had given him something, he said to them, “And do not you praise me who was worthy to receive it?” He was asked by some one to give him back his cloak; but he replied, “If you gave it me, it is mine; and if you only lent it me, I am using it.” A supposititious son (ὑποβολιμαῖος) of somebody once said to him, that he had gold in his cloak; “No doubt,” said he, “that is the very reason why I sleep with it under my head (ὑποβεβλημένος).” When he was asked what advantage he had derived from philosophy, he replied, “If no other, at least this, that I am prepared for every kind of fortune.” The question was put to him what countryman he was, and he replied, “A Citizen of[241] the world.” Some men were sacrificing to the Gods to prevail on them to send them sons, and he said, “And do you not sacrifice to procure sons of a particular character?” Once he was asking the president of a society for a contribution,[73] and said to him:—

One time he was having dinner in the marketplace, and the people around kept shouting “Dog!” but he replied, “You’re the real dogs, standing around me while I eat.” When two effeminate guys moved out of his way, he said, “Don’t worry, a dog doesn’t eat beets.” When asked about a spoiled boy and where he was from, he said, “He’s from Tegea.”[72] Seeing a clumsy wrestler claiming to heal a man, he said, “What are you doing? Do you seriously think you can beat those who previously defeated you?” Another time, he saw the son of a prostitute throwing a stone at a crowd and said, “Be careful, or you might hit your father.” When a boy showed him a sword he got from someone he had done something disgraceful for, he told him, “The sword is good, but the handle is shameful.” When some people praised a man who had given him something, he said, “And why don’t you praise me, the one who deserved to receive it?” Someone asked him to return his cloak, and he replied, “If you gave it to me, it’s mine; if you only lent it to me, I’m using it.” A supposed son (ὑποβολιμαῖος) of someone once told him he had gold in his cloak; he said, “Of course, that’s why I sleep with it under my head (ὑποβεβλημένος).” When asked what benefit he gained from philosophy, he replied, “At the very least, I’m ready for anything life throws at me.” When asked what country he belonged to, he replied, “A citizen of the world.” Some men were making sacrifices to the gods, hoping for sons, and he said, “Don’t you think you should also sacrifice to get sons of a certain kind?” Once, he was asking the president of a society for a contribution,[73] and said to him:—

“Spoil all the rest, but keep your hands from Hector.”

He used to say that courtesans were the queens of kings; for that they asked them for whatever they chose. When the Athenians had voted that Alexander was Bacchus, he said to them, “Vote, too, that I am Serapis.” When a man reproached him for going into unclean places, he said, “The sun too penetrates into privies, but is not polluted by them.” When supping in a temple, as some dirty loaves were set before him, he took them up and threw them away, saying that nothing dirty ought to come into a temple; and when some one said to him, “You philosophize without being possessed of any knowledge,” he said, “If I only pretend to wisdom, that is philosophizing.” A man once brought him a boy, and said that he was a very clever child, and one of an admirable disposition. “What, then,” said Diogenes, “does he want of me?” He used to say, that those who utter virtuous sentiments but do not do them, are no better than harps, for that a harp has no hearing or feeling. Once he was going into a theatre while every one else was coming out of it; and when asked why he did so, “It is,” said he, “what I have been doing all my life.” Once when he saw a young man putting on effeminate airs, he said to him, “Are you not ashamed to have worse plans for yourself than nature had for you? for she has made you a man, but you are trying to force yourself to be a woman.” When he saw an ignorant man tuning a psaltery, he said to him, “Are you not ashamed to be arranging proper sounds on a wooden instrument, and not arranging your soul to a proper life?” When a man said to him, “I am not calculated for philosophy,” he said, “Why then do you live, if you have no desire to live properly?” To a man who treated his father with contempt, he said, “Are you not ashamed to despise him to whom you owe it that you have it in your power to give yourself airs at all?” Seeing a handsome young man chattering in an unseemly manner,[242] he said, “Are you not ashamed to draw a sword cut of lead out of a scabbard of ivory?” Being once reproached for drinking in a vintner’s shop, he said, “I have my hair cut, too, in a barber’s.” At another time, he was attacked for having accepted a cloak from Antipater, but he replied:—

He used to say that courtesans were like queens to kings because they could ask for whatever they wanted. When the Athenians voted to declare Alexander as Bacchus, he told them, “You should also vote that I’m Serapis.” When someone criticized him for visiting unclean places, he replied, “The sun also shines on toilets but isn’t tainted by them.” While dining in a temple, when some dirty loaves were placed in front of him, he picked them up and tossed them aside, saying that nothing unclean should be in a temple. When someone told him, “You talk about philosophy without actually knowing anything,” he responded, “If I only pretend to be wise, that’s still philosophy.” One time, a man brought him a boy, claiming he was very smart and had a great character. Diogenes asked, “So what does he want from me?” He often said that people who speak about virtue but don’t practice it are no better than harps because a harp has no hearing or feeling. Once, he walked into a theater while everyone else was leaving, and when asked why, he said, “It’s what I’ve been doing all my life.” When he saw a young man acting effeminate, he told him, “Aren’t you ashamed of wanting worse for yourself than what nature intended? She made you a man, but you’re trying to be a woman.” When he saw an ignorant person tuning a psaltery, he remarked, “Aren’t you ashamed of refining sounds on a wooden instrument but not refining your soul to lead a proper life?” When someone told him, “I’m not meant for philosophy,” he asked, “Then why do you live if you have no desire to live well?” To a man who disrespected his father, he said, “Aren’t you ashamed to scorn the one who has given you the opportunity to act superior?” When he noticed a handsome young man behaving inappropriately,[242] he said, “Aren’t you ashamed to pull a lead sword out of an ivory scabbard?” When he was criticized for drinking in a tavern, he replied, “I also get my hair cut at a barber’s.” At another time, he was questioned for accepting a cloak from Antipater, but he replied:—

“Refuse not thou to heed
The gifts which from the mighty Gods proceed.”[74]

A man once struck him with a broom, and said, “Take care,” so he struck him in return with his staff, and said, “Take care.”

A man once hit him with a broom and said, “Watch out,” so he hit him back with his staff and said, “Watch out.”

He once said to a man who was addressing anxious entreaties to a courtesan, “What can you wish to obtain, you wretched man, that you had not better be disappointed in?” Seeing a man reeking all over with unguents, he said to him, “Have a care, lest the fragrance of your head give a bad odour to your life.” One of his sayings was, that servants serve their masters, and that wicked men are the slaves of their appetites. Being asked why slaves were called ἀνδράποδα, he replied, “Because they have the feet of men (τοὺς πόδας ἀνδρῶν), and a soul such as you who are asking this question.” He once asked a profligate fellow for a mina; and when he put the question to him, why he asked others for an obol, and him for a mina, he said, “Because I hope to get something from the others another time, but the Gods alone know whether I shall ever extract anything from you again.” Once he was reproached for asking favours, while Plato never asked for any; and he said:—

He once said to a man who was pleading anxiously with a courtesan, “What do you hope to gain, you miserable man, that you wouldn’t be better off being disappointed?” When he saw a man reeking with perfumes, he remarked, “Watch out, or the scent on your head might give off a bad smell in your life.” One of his sayings was that servants serve their masters and that wicked people are slaves to their desires. When asked why slaves were called ἀνδράποδα, he replied, “Because they have the feet of men (τοὺς πόδας ἀνδρῶν) and a soul like yours, who is asking this question.” He once asked a disreputable man for a mina; when that man questioned why he asked others for just an obol but him for a mina, he answered, “Because I expect to possibly get something from the others another time, but only the Gods know if I’ll ever get anything from you again.” Once he was criticized for asking for favors, while Plato never did; and he said:—

“He asks as well as I do, but he does it
Bending his head, that no one else may hear.”

One day he saw an unskilful archer shooting; so he went and sat down by the target, saying, “Now I shall be out of harm’s way.” He used to say, that those who were in love were disappointed in regard of the pleasure they expected. When he was asked whether death was an evil, he replied, “How can that be an evil which we do not feel when it is present?” When Alexander was once standing by him, and saying, “Do not you fear me?” He replied, “No; for what are you, a good or an evil?” And as he said that he was[243] good, “Who, then,” said Diogenes, “fears the good?” He used to say, that education was, for the young sobriety, for the old comfort, for the poor riches, and for the rich an ornament. When Didymus the adulterer was once trying to cure the eye of a young girl (κόρης), he said, “Take care, lest when you are curing the eye of the maiden, you do not hurt the pupil.”[75] A man once said to him, that his friends laid plots against him; “What then,” said he, “are you to do, if you must look upon both your friends and enemies in the same light?”

One day, he saw a clumsy archer shooting, so he sat down by the target, saying, “Now I’ll be out of harm’s way.” He often remarked that people in love were let down about the pleasure they expected. When asked if death was an evil, he replied, “How can it be an evil if we don’t feel it when it’s here?” Once, when Alexander stood beside him and asked, “Aren’t you afraid of me?” he replied, “No; what are you, good or bad?” When Alexander claimed he was good, Diogenes responded, “Then who fears the good?” He used to say that education is, for the young, self-control; for the old, comfort; for the poor, wealth; and for the rich, elegance. When Didymus the adulterer tried to treat a young girl’s eye, he warned, “Be careful not to injure the pupil while you’re fixing her eye.” A man once told him that his friends were plotting against him. He replied, “So what? What are you supposed to do if you have to see both your friends and enemies the same way?”

On one occasion he was asked, what was the most excellent thing among men; and he said, “Freedom of speech.” He went once into a school, and saw many statues of the Muses, but very few pupils, and said, “Gods, and all my good schoolmasters, you have plenty of pupils.” He was in the habit of doing everything in public, whether in respect of Venus or Ceres; and he used to put his conclusions in this way to people: “If there is nothing absurd in dining, then it is not absurd to dine in the market-place. But it is not absurd to dine, therefore it is not absurd to dine in the market-place.” And as he was continually doing manual work in public, he said one day, “Would that by rubbing my belly I could get rid of hunger.” Other sayings also are attributed to him, which it would take a long time to enumerate, there is such a multiplicity of them.

One time, he was asked what the best thing was for people, and he replied, “Freedom of speech.” He once visited a school and saw many statues of the Muses, but very few students, and remarked, “Gods, and all my good teachers, you have plenty of students.” He tended to do everything openly, whether it involved Venus or Ceres; and he often expressed his thoughts like this: “If there's nothing ridiculous about dining, then it's not ridiculous to dine in the marketplace. Since it's not ridiculous to dine, it's not ridiculous to dine in the marketplace.” And as he frequently did manual work in public, he once said, “I wish rubbing my belly would make me less hungry.” Many other sayings are also attributed to him, which would take a long time to list, as there are so many.

He used to say, that there were two kinds of exercise: that, namely, of the mind and that of the body; and that the latter of these created in the mind such quick and agile phantasies at the time of its performance, as very much facilitated the practice of virtue; but that one was imperfect without the other, since the health and vigour necessary for the practice of what is good, depend equally on both mind and body. And he used to allege as proofs of this, and of the ease which practice imparts to acts of virtue, that people could see that in the case of mere common working trades, and other employments of that kind, the artisans arrived at no inconsiderable accuracy by constant practice; and that any one may see how much one flute player, or one wrestler, is superior to another, by his own continued practice. And that if these[244] men transferred the same training to their minds they would not labour in a profitless or imperfect manner. He used to say also, that there was nothing whatever in life which could be brought to perfection without practice, and that that alone was able to overcome every obstacle; that, therefore, as we ought to repudiate all useless toils, and to apply ourselves to useful labours, and to live happily, we are only unhappy in consequence of most exceeding folly. For the very contempt of pleasure, if we only inure ourselves to it, is very pleasant; and just as they who are accustomed to live luxuriously, are brought very unwillingly to adopt the contrary system; so they who have been originally inured to that opposite system, feel a sort of pleasure in the contempt of pleasure.

He used to say that there are two types of exercise: one for the mind and one for the body. He believed that the latter created quick and agile thoughts during physical activity, which greatly helped in practicing virtue. However, he argued that one is incomplete without the other, as the health and energy needed to do good depend on both mind and body. He provided examples to support this, noting that in everyday trades and similar jobs, workers achieve a significant level of skill through constant practice. Anyone can see how one flute player or wrestler outperforms another due to their continued practice. He asserted that if these individuals applied the same training to their minds, they wouldn't struggle in a fruitless or inadequate way. He also mentioned that nothing in life can reach perfection without practice, which is the only thing that can overcome any obstacle. Thus, we should avoid all pointless efforts and focus on meaningful work to live happily; our unhappiness is mainly due to foolishness. Even the disdain for pleasure can be enjoyable if we train ourselves to appreciate it. Just like those who are used to a luxury lifestyle find it hard to adapt to a simpler way of living, those who have grown accustomed to simplicity find some pleasure in rejecting pleasure.

This used to be the language which he held, and he used to show in practice, really altering men’s habits, and deferring in all things rather to the principles of nature than to those of law; saying that he was adopting the same fashion of life as Hercules had, preferring nothing in the world to liberty; and saying that everything belonged to the wise, and advancing arguments such as I mentioned just above. For instance: every thing belongs to the Gods; and the Gods are friends to the wise; and all the property of friends is held in common; therefore everything belongs to the wise. He also argued about the law, that without it there is no possibility of a constitution being maintained; for without a city there can be nothing orderly, but a city is an orderly thing; and without a city there can be no law; therefore law is order. And he played in the same manner with the topics of noble birth, and reputation, and all things of that kind, saying that they were all veils, as it were, for wickedness; and that that was the only proper constitution which consisted in order. Another of his doctrines was that all women ought to be possessed in common; and he said that marriage was a nullity, and that the proper way would be for every man to live with her whom he could persuade to agree with him. And on the same principle he said, that all people’s sons ought to belong to every one in common; and there was nothing intolerable in the idea of taking anything out of a temple, or eating any animal whatever, and that there was no impiety in tasting even human flesh; as is plain from the habits of foreign nations; and he said that this principle might be correctly extended to[245] every case and every people. For he said that in reality everything was a combination of all things. For that in bread there was meat, and in vegetables there was bread, and so there were some particles of all other bodies in everything, communicating by invisible passages and evaporating.

This used to be the way he thought, and he demonstrated it in practice, truly changing people’s habits and prioritizing the principles of nature over the laws; claiming that he was living in the same way as Hercules, valuing nothing more than freedom; and stating that everything belongs to the wise, while advancing arguments like the ones I mentioned earlier. For example: everything belongs to the Gods; and the Gods are friends with the wise; and all property among friends is shared; therefore, everything belongs to the wise. He also argued about the law, stating that without it, a constitution can't be upheld; because without a city, there can’t be order, and a city embodies order; thus, without a city, there can be no law; therefore, law is order. He approached the topics of noble birth, reputation, and similar matters in the same way, claiming these were merely disguises for wrongdoing; and that the only true constitution is one based on order. Another of his beliefs was that all women should be shared among everyone; and he claimed that marriage was pointless, suggesting that the right way would be for each man to live with whoever he could convince to be with him. Along the same lines, he said all children should belong to everyone collectively; and there’s nothing unreasonable about taking anything from a temple or eating any animal, even suggesting that there’s no sacrilege in tasting human flesh, as demonstrated by the customs of other nations; and he argued that this idea could be correctly applied to every situation and every people. He said that in reality, everything consists of a blend of all things. That in bread there’s meat, and in vegetables, there’s bread, and that all things contain elements of everything else, interacting through invisible connections and dispersing.

VII. And he explains this theory of his clearly in the Thyestes, if indeed the tragedies attributed to him are really his composition, and not rather the work of Philiscus, of Ægina, his intimate friend, or of Pasiphon, the son of Lucian, who is stated by Phavorinus, in his Universal History, to have written them after Diogenes’ death.

VII. He clearly explains this theory in the Thyestes, if the tragedies attributed to him are truly his own work and not just the creations of his close friend Philiscus from Ægina, or Pasiphon, the son of Lucian, who Phavorinus mentions in his Universal History as having written them after Diogenes' death.

VIII. Music and geometry, and astronomy, and all things of that kind, he neglected, as useless and unnecessary. But he was a man very happy in meeting arguments, as is plain from what we have already said.

VIII. He ignored music, geometry, astronomy, and all similar subjects, thinking they were useless and unnecessary. However, he was really good at handling arguments, as we’ve already mentioned.

IX. And he bore being sold with a most magnanimous spirit. For as he was sailing to Ægina, and was taken prisoner by some pirates, under the command of Scirpalus, he was carried off to Crete and sold; and when the crier asked him what art he understood, he said, “That of governing men.” And presently pointing out a Corinthian, very carefully dressed, (the same Xeniades whom we have mentioned before), he said, “Sell me to that man; for he wants a master.” Accordingly Xeniades bought him and carried him away to Corinth; and then he made him tutor of his sons, and committed to him the entire management of his house. And he behaved himself in every affair in such a manner, that Xeniades, when looking over his property, said, “A good genius has come into my house.” And Cleomenes, in his book which is called the Schoolmaster, says, that he wished to ransom all his relations, but that Diogenes told him that they were all fools; for that lions did not become the slaves of those who kept them, but, on the contrary, those who maintained lions were their slaves. For that it was the part of a slave to fear, but that wild beasts were formidable to men.

IX. He accepted being sold with an incredibly noble attitude. While he was sailing to Ægina, he was captured by some pirates led by Scirpalus, then taken to Crete and sold. When the auctioneer asked what skills he had, he replied, “The ability to govern people.” He then pointed to a well-dressed Corinthian—Xeniades, as we mentioned earlier—and said, “Sell me to that man; he needs a master.” So, Xeniades bought him and brought him to Corinth, where he made him the tutor of his sons and put him in charge of managing his household. He handled everything so well that when Xeniades reviewed his property, he remarked, “A good spirit has entered my home.” Cleomenes, in his book called the Schoolmaster, mentions that he wanted to ransom all his relatives, but Diogenes told him they were all fools. He explained that lions don’t become the slaves of those who keep them; instead, those who care for lions are their slaves. It’s the nature of a slave to fear, whereas wild animals are scary to humans.

X. And the man had the gift of persuasion in a wonderful degree; so that he could easily overcome any one by his arguments. Accordingly, it is said that an Æginetan of the name of Onesicritus, having two sons, sent to Athens one of them, whose name was Androsthenes, and that he, after having heard Diogenes lecture, remained there; and that after[246] that, he sent the elder, Philiscus, who has been already mentioned, and that Philiscus was charmed in the same manner. And last of all, he came himself, and then he too remained, no less than his son, studying philosophy at the feet of Diogenes. So great a charm was there in the discourses of Diogenes. Another pupil of his was Phocion, who was surnamed the Good; and Stilpon, the Megarian, and a great many other men of eminence as statesmen.

X. The man had a remarkable gift for persuasion, allowing him to easily sway anyone with his arguments. So, it’s said that an Aeginetan named Onesicritus sent one of his two sons, Androsthenes, to Athens, where he attended lectures by Diogenes and decided to stay. After that, he sent his older son, Philiscus, who had also been previously mentioned, and Philiscus was equally captivated. Finally, Onesicritus himself arrived, and he too remained, just like his son, learning philosophy at the feet of Diogenes. The talks of Diogenes had such a strong appeal. Another of his students was Phocion, known as the Good, along with Stilpon from Megara, and many other notable figures in politics.

XI. He is said to have died when he was nearly ninety years of age, but there are different accounts given of his death. For some say that he ate an ox’s foot raw, and was in consequence seized with a bilious attack, of which he died; others, of whom Cercidas, a Megalopolitan or Cretan, is one, say that he died of holding his breath for several days; and Cercidas speaks thus of him in his Meliambics:—

XI. He is said to have died when he was almost ninety years old, but there are various accounts of his death. Some claim that he ate a raw ox’s foot, which led to a severe illness that caused his death; others, including Cercidas, who is either from Megalopolis or Crete, say that he died from holding his breath for several days. Cercidas expresses this in his Meliambics:—

He, that Sinopian who bore the stick,
Wore his cloak doubled, and in th’ open air
Dined without washing, would not bear with life
A moment longer: but he shut his teeth,
And held his breath. He truly was the son
Of Jove, and a most heavenly-minded dog,
The wise Diogenes.

Others say that he, while intending to distribute a polypus to his dogs, was bitten by them through the tendon of his foot, and so died. But his own greatest friends, as Antisthenes tells us in his Successions, rather sanction the story of his having died from holding his breath. For he used to live in the Craneum, which was a Gymnasium at the gates of Corinth. And his friends came according to their custom, and found him with his head covered; and as they did not suppose that he was asleep, for he was not a man much subject to the influence of night or sleep, they drew away his cloak from his face, and found him no longer breathing; and they thought that he had done this on purpose, wishing to escape the remaining portion of his life.

Others say that he, intending to feed a polypus to his dogs, was bitten by them on the tendon of his foot and died as a result. However, his closest friends, as Antisthenes tells us in his Successions, support the story that he died from holding his breath. He lived in the Craneum, which was a gymnasium at the gates of Corinth. His friends came as usual and found him with his head covered; since they didn't think he was asleep—he was not someone who was easily influenced by night or sleep—they pulled the cloak from his face and discovered he was no longer breathing. They believed he had done this on purpose, wanting to escape the rest of his life.

On this there was a quarrel, as they say, between his friends, as to who should bury him, and they even came to blows; but when the elders and chief men of the city came there, they say that he was buried by them at the gate which leads to the Isthmus. And they placed over him a pillar, and on that a dog in Parian marble. And at a later period his fellow[247] citizens honoured him with brazen statues, and put this inscription on them:—

On this, there was an argument, as they say, among his friends about who should bury him, and they even started fighting; but when the elders and leaders of the city arrived, they say that he was buried by them at the gate that leads to the Isthmus. They set up a pillar over him, with a dog made of Parian marble on top. Later on, his fellow citizens honored him with bronze statues and had this inscription put on them:—

E’en brass by lapse of time doth old become,
But there is no such time as shall efface
Your lasting glory, wise Diogenes;
Since you alone did teach to men the art
Of a contented life: the surest path
To glory and a lasting happiness.

We ourselves have also written an epigram on him in the proceleusmatic metre.

We’ve also written a short poem about him in the proceleusmatic meter.

A. Tell me, Diogenes, tell me true, I pray,
How did you die; what fate to Pluto bore you?
B. The savage bite of an envious dog did kill me.

Some, however, say that when he was dying, he ordered his friends to throw his corpse away without burying it, so that every beast might tear it, or else to throw it into a ditch, and sprinkle a little dust over it. And others say that his injunctions were, that he should be thrown into the Ilissus; that so he might be useful to his brethren. But Demetrius, in his treatise on Men of the Same Name, says that Diogenes died in Corinth the same day that Alexander died in Babylon. And he was already an old man, as early as the hundred and thirteenth olympiad.

Some people, however, say that when he was dying, he told his friends to just toss his body away without burying it, so that any animal could tear it apart, or to throw it in a ditch and sprinkle a little dirt over it. Others claim his instructions were to be thrown into the Ilissus River, so he could be useful to his fellow humans. But Demetrius, in his work on Men of the Same Name, mentions that Diogenes died in Corinth on the same day that Alexander died in Babylon. He was already quite old by the time of the hundred and thirteenth Olympic Games.

XII. The following books are attributed to him. The dialogues entitled the Cephalion; the Icthyas; the Jackdaw; the Leopard; the People of the Athenians; the Republic; one called Moral Art; one on Wealth; one on Love; the Theodorus; the Hypsias; the Aristarchus; one on Death; a volume of Letters; seven Tragedies, the Helen, the Thyestes, the Hercules, the Achilles, the Medea, the Chrysippus, and the Œdipus.

XII. The following books are attributed to him: the dialogues titled the Cephalion, the Icthyas, the Jackdaw, the Leopard, the People of the Athenians, the Republic, one called Moral Art, one on Wealth, one on Love, the Theodorus, the Hypsias, the Aristarchus, one on Death, a collection of Letters, and seven Tragedies: the Helen, the Thyestes, the Hercules, the Achilles, the Medea, the Chrysippus, and the Œdipus.

But Sosicrates, in the first book of his Successions, and Satyrus, in the fourth book of his Lives, both assert that none of all these are the genuine composition of Diogenes. And Satyrus affirms that the tragedies are the work of Philiscus, the Æginetan, a friend of Diogenes. But Sotion, in his seventh book, says that these are the only genuine works of Diogenes: a dialogue on Virtue; another on the Good; another on Love; the Beggar; the Tolmæus; the Leopard; the Cassander; the Cephalion; and that the Aristarchus, the[248] Sisyphus, the Ganymede, a volume of Apophthegms, and another of Letters, are all the work of Philiscus.

But Sosicrates, in the first book of his Successions, and Satyrus, in the fourth book of his Lives, both claim that none of these are the genuine works of Diogenes. Satyrus also states that the tragedies are by Philiscus, the man from Aegina, who was a friend of Diogenes. However, Sotion, in his seventh book, says that these are the only authentic works of Diogenes: a dialogue on Virtue; another on the Good; another on Love; the Beggar; the Tolmæus; the Leopard; the Cassander; the Cephalion; and that the Aristarchus, the Sisyphus, the Ganymede, a collection of sayings, and another volume of Letters, are all by Philiscus.

XIII. There were five persons of the name of Diogenes. The first a native of Apollonia, a natural philosopher; and the beginning of his treatise on Natural Philosophy is as follows: “It appears to me to be well for every one who commences any kind of philosophical treatise, to lay down some undeniable principle to start with.” The second was a Sicyonian, who wrote an account of Peloponnesus. The third was the man of whom we have been speaking. The fourth was a Stoic, a native of Seleucia, but usually called a Babylonian, from the proximity of Seleucia to Babylon. The fifth was a native of Tarsus, who wrote on the subject of some questions concerning poetry which he endeavours to solve.

XIII. There were five people named Diogenes. The first was from Apollonia, a natural philosopher, and the beginning of his work on Natural Philosophy is as follows: “I think it’s important for anyone starting a philosophical treatise to establish some undeniable principle to begin with.” The second was from Sicyon, who wrote about Peloponnesus. The third was the person we've been discussing. The fourth was a Stoic from Seleucia, but he was commonly referred to as a Babylonian due to Seleucia’s close proximity to Babylon. The fifth was from Tarsus, who wrote about some questions regarding poetry that he tries to address.

XIV. Athenodorus, in the eighth book of his Conversations, says, that the philosopher always had a shining appearance, from his habit of anointing himself.

XIV. Athenodorus, in the eighth book of his Conversations, says that the philosopher always looked radiant because he had a habit of applying oil to himself.

LIFE OF MONIMUS.

I. Monimus was a Syracusan, and a pupil of Diogenes, but also a slave of some Corinthian money-changer, as Sosicrates tells us. Xeniades, who bought Diogenes, used often to come to him, extolling the excellency of Diogenes both in actions and words, till he excited a great affection for the man in the mind of Monimus. For he immediately feigned madness, and threw about all the money and all the coins that were on the table, until his master discarded him, and then he straightway went to Diogenes and became his pupil. He also followed Crates the Cynic a good deal, and devoted himself to the same studies as he did; and the sight of this conduct of his made his master all the more think him mad.

I. Monimus was from Syracuse and a student of Diogenes, but he was also a slave to a money-changer from Corinth, as Sosicrates tells us. Xeniades, who bought Diogenes, would often visit him, praising Diogenes's excellence in both actions and words, which sparked a strong admiration for him in Monimus. So, he pretended to be insane and scattered all the money and coins on the table until his master rejected him. Then he immediately went to Diogenes and became his student. He also closely followed Crates the Cynic and committed himself to the same studies, which made his master think he was even more crazy.

II. And he was a very eminent man, so that even Menander, the comic poet, speaks of him; accordingly, in one of his plays, namely in the Hippocomus, he mentions him thus:—

II. He was a very distinguished man, so much so that even Menander, the comic poet, references him; in one of his plays, specifically in the Hippocomus, he mentions him like this:—

There is a man, O Philo, named Monimus,
A wise man, though but little known, and one
[249]
Who bears a wallet at his back, and is not
Content with one but three. He never spoke
A single sentence, by great Jove I swear,
Like this one, “Know thyself,” or any other
Of the oft-quoted proverbs: all such sayings
He scorned, as he did beg his way through dirt;
Teaching that all opinion is but vanity.

But he was a man of such gravity that he despised glory, and sought only for truth.

But he was a man of such seriousness that he looked down on fame and only pursued truth.

III. He wrote some jests mingled with serious treatises, and two essays on the Appetites, and an Exhortation.

III. He wrote some jokes mixed with serious essays, two essays on the Appetites, and an Exhortation.

LIFE OF ONESICRITUS.

I. Onesicritus is called by some authors an Æginetan, but Demetrius the Magnesian affirms that he was a native of Astypalæa. He also was one of the most eminent of the disciples of Diogenes.

I. Onesicritus is referred to by some writers as an Æginetan, but Demetrius the Magnesian claims that he was from Astypalæa. He was also one of the most distinguished disciples of Diogenes.

II. And he appears in some points to resemble Xenophon. For Xenophon joined in the expedition of Cyrus, and Onesicritus in that of Alexander; and Xenophon wrote the Cyropædia, and Onesicritus wrote an account of the education of Alexander. Xenophon, too, wrote a Panegyric on Cyrus, and Onesicritus one on Alexander. They were also both similar to one another in style, except that a copyist is naturally inferior to the original.

II. He seems to share some similarities with Xenophon. Xenophon was part of Cyrus's campaign, while Onesicritus joined Alexander's. Xenophon wrote the Cyropædia, and Onesicritus documented Alexander's education. Additionally, Xenophon composed a Panegyric on Cyrus, and Onesicritus wrote one on Alexander. They both had a similar style, though it's natural for a copyist to be less impressive than the original.

III. Menander, too, who was surnamed Drymus, was a pupil of Diogenes, and a great admirer of Homer: and so was Hegesæus of Sinope, who was nicknamed Clœus, and Philiscus the Æginetan, as we have said before.

III. Menander, who was also called Drymus, was a student of Diogenes and a big fan of Homer. The same goes for Hegesæus from Sinope, nicknamed Clœus, and Philiscus from Ægina, as we mentioned earlier.

LIFE OF CRATES.

I. Crates was a Theban by birth, and the son of Ascondus. He also was one of the eminent disciples of the Cynic. But Hippobotus asserts that he was not a pupil of Diogenes, but of Bryson the Achæan.

I. Crates was from Thebes and was the son of Ascondus. He was also one of the prominent followers of the Cynic philosophy. However, Hippobotus claims that he wasn't a student of Diogenes, but of Bryson the Achaean.

II. There are the following sportive lines of his quoted:—

II. Here are the following quotes of his related to sports:—

The waves surround vain Peres’ fruitful soil,
And fertile acres crown the sea-born isle;
Land which no parasite e’er dares invade,
Or lewd seducer of a hapless maid;
It bears figs, bread, thyme, garlic’s savoury charms,
Gifts which ne’er tempt men to detested arms,
They’d rather fight for gold than glory’s dreams.

There is also an account-book of his much spoken of, which is drawn up in such terms as these:—

There is also a well-known account book that is written in terms like these:—

Put down the cook for minas half a score,
Put down the doctor for a drachma more:
Five talents to the flatterer; some smoke
To the adviser, an obol and a cloak
For the philosopher; for the willing nymph,
A talent.

He was also nicknamed Door-opener, because he used to enter every house and give the inmates advice. These lines, too, are his:—

He was also nicknamed Door-opener because he would enter every house and give the residents advice. These lines are his as well:—

All this I learnt and pondered in my mind,
Drawing deep wisdom from the Muses kind,
But all the rest is vanity.

There is a line, too, which tells us that he gained from philosophy:—

There is a line, too, that tells us he benefited from philosophy:—

A peck of lupins, and to care for nobody.

This, too, is attributed to him:—

This is also credited to him:—

Hunger checks love; and should it not, time does.
If both should fail you, then a halter choose.

III. He flourished about the hundred and thirteenth olympiad.

III. He thrived around the hundred and thirteenth olympiad.

IV. Antisthenes, in his Successions, says that he, having once, in a certain tragedy, seen Telephus holding a date basket, and in a miserable plight in other respects, betook himself to the Cynic philosophy; and having turned his patrimony into money (for he was of illustrious extraction), he collected three hundred talents by that means, and divided them among the citizens. And after that he devoted himself to philosophy with such eagerness, that even Philemon the comic poet mentions him. Accordingly he says:—

IV. Antisthenes, in his Successions, says that he once saw Telephus in a tragedy holding a basket of dates and looking miserable in other ways. This inspired him to embrace the Cynic philosophy. He turned his inheritance into cash (since he came from a well-known family) and managed to gather three hundred talents, which he distributed among the citizens. After that, he committed himself to philosophy with such enthusiasm that even Philemon the comic poet wrote about him. He states:—

And in the summer he’d a shaggy gown,
To inure himself to hardship: in the winter
He wore mere rags.

But Diocles says that it was Diogenes who persuaded him to discard all his estate and his flocks, and to throw his money into the sea; and he says further, that the house of Crates was destroyed by Alexander, and that of Hipparchia under Philip. And he would very frequently drive away with his staff those of his relations who came after him, and endeavoured to dissuade him from his design; and he remained immoveable.

But Diocles says it was Diogenes who convinced him to give up all his possessions and his herds, and to toss his money into the sea. He also states that Alexander destroyed Crates' house, and Philip destroyed Hipparchia's. Diogenes would often use his staff to chase away relatives who came after him, trying to talk him out of his plan, but he stood firm.

V. Demetrius, the Magnesian, relates that he deposited his money with a banker, making an agreement with him, that if his sons turned out ordinary ignorant people, he was then to restore it to them; but if they became philosophers, then he was to divide it among the people, for that they, if they were philosophers, would have no need of anything. And Eratosthenes tells us that he had by Hipparchia, whom we shall mention hereafter, a son whose name was Pasicles, and that when he grew up, he took him to a brothel kept by a female slave, and told him that that was all the marriage that his father designed for him; but that marriages which resulted in adultery were themes for tragedians, and had exile and bloodshed for their prizes; and the marriages of those who lived with courtesans were subjects for the comic poets, and often produced madness as the result of debauchery and drunkenness.

V. Demetrius from Magnesia says that he entrusted his money to a banker, making a deal that if his sons turned out to be average, ignorant individuals, the banker should return the money to them. However, if they became philosophers, the banker was to distribute it among the people, since philosophers would have no need for anything. Eratosthenes mentions that he had a son named Pasicles with Hipparchia, who we will discuss later. When Pasicles grew up, Eratosthenes took him to a brothel run by a female slave and told him that this was the only kind of marriage his father intended for him. He explained that marriages that led to infidelity were the stuff of tragedies, often resulting in exile and bloodshed, while relationships with courtesans were the themes for comedies and frequently ended in madness due to excess and drunkenness.

VI. He had also a brother named Pasicles, a pupil of Euclides.

VI. He also had a brother named Pasicles, who was a student of Euclid.

VII. Phavorinus, in the second book of his Commentaries, relates a witty saying of his; for he says, that once, when he was begging a favour of the master of a gymnasium, on the behalf of some acquaintance, he touched his thighs; and as he expressed his indignation at this, he said, “Why, do they not belong to you as well as your knees?” He used to say that it was impossible to find a man who had never done wrong, in the same way as there was always some worthless seed in a pomegranate. On one occasion he provoked Nicodromus, the harp-player, and received a black eye from him; so he put a plaster on his forehead and wrote upon it, “Nicodromus did this.” He used to abuse prostitutes designedly, for the purpose of practising himself in enduring reproaches. When[252] Demetrius Phalereus sent him some loaves and wine, he attacked him for his present, saying, “I wish that the fountains bore loaves;” and it is notorious that he was a water drinker.

VII. Phavorinus, in the second book of his Commentaries, shares a witty remark of his; he recounts that once, while he was asking the master of a gym for a favor on behalf of some friends, he touched his thighs; and when the man expressed his anger about this, he responded, "Why, don’t these belong to you just like your knees?" He often remarked that it was impossible to find a person who had never done something wrong, similar to how there’s always some bad seed in a pomegranate. One time, he irritated Nicodromus, the harp player, and ended up with a black eye from him; so he put a bandage on his forehead and wrote, "Nicodromus did this." He would deliberately insult prostitutes to practice enduring insults himself. When Demetrius Phalereus sent him some bread and wine, he criticized his gift, saying, "I wish the fountains produced loaves," and it was well known that he only drank water.

He was once reproved by the ædiles of the Athenians, for wearing fine linen, and so he replied, “I will show you Theophrastus also clad in fine linen.” And as they did not believe him, he took them to a barber’s shop, and showed him to them as he was being shaved. At Thebes he was once scourged by the master of the Gymnasium, (though some say it was by Euthycrates, at Corinth), and dragged out by the feet; but he did not care, and quoted the line:—

He was once criticized by the officials of Athens for wearing fine linen, and he replied, “I’ll show you Theophrastus dressed in fine linen too.” When they didn’t believe him, he took them to a barber’s shop and showed them Theophrastus as he was getting shaved. In Thebes, he was once whipped by the master of the Gymnasium (though some say it was Euthycrates in Corinth) and dragged out by his feet; but he didn’t mind it and quoted the line:—

I feel, O mighty chief, your matchless might,
Dragged, foot first, downward from th’ ethereal height.[76]

But Diocles says that it was by Menedemus, of Eretria, that he was dragged in this manner, for that as he was a handsome man, and supposed to be very obsequious to Asclepiades, the Phliasian, Crates touched his thighs and said, “Is Asclepiades within?” And Menedemus was very much offended, and dragged him out, as has been already said; and then Crates quoted the above-cited line.

But Diocles claims that it was Menedemus from Eretria who dragged him out like this because he was a handsome guy and seemed very submissive to Asclepiades, the Phliasian. Crates touched his thighs and asked, “Is Asclepiades around?” This really upset Menedemus, and he pulled Crates out, as mentioned before; then Crates quoted the line I mentioned earlier.

VIII. Zeno, the Cittiæan, in his Apophthegms, says, that he once sewed up a sheep’s fleece in his cloak, without thinking of it; and he was a very ugly man, and one who excited laughter when he was taking exercise. And he used to say, when he put up his hands, “Courage, Crates, as far as your eyes and the rest of your body is concerned:—

VIII. Zeno, the Cittiæan, in his Apophthegms, says that he once sewed a sheep’s fleece into his cloak without realizing it; he was quite unattractive and often made people laugh when he was working out. And he would say, when he raised his hands, “Courage, Crates, as far as your eyes and the rest of your body are concerned:—

IX. “For you shall see those who now ridicule you, convulsed with disease, and envying your happiness, and accusing themselves of slothfulness.” One of his sayings was, “That a man ought to study philosophy, up to the point of looking on generals and donkey-drivers in the same light.” Another was, that those who live with flatterers, are as desolate as calves when in the company of wolves; for that neither the one nor the other are with those whom they ought to be, or their own kindred, but only with those who are plotting against them.

IX. “You will see those who now mock you suffering from illness, envying your happiness, and blaming themselves for being lazy.” One of his sayings was, “A person should study philosophy to the point of seeing generals and donkey drivers in the same way.” Another saying was that those who spend time with flatterers are as lost as calves among wolves; neither one nor the other is with their true peers or loved ones, but only with those who are conspiring against them.

X. When he felt that he was dying, he made verses on himself, saying:—

X. When he felt that he was dying, he wrote verses about himself, saying:—

You’re going, noble hunchback, you are going
To Pluto’s realms, bent double by old age.

For he was humpbacked from age.

For he was bent over with age.

XI. When Alexander asked him whether he wished to see the restoration of his country, he said, “What would be the use of it? for perhaps some other Alexander would come at some future time and destroy it again.

XI. When Alexander asked him if he wanted to see his country restored, he replied, “What would be the point? Because maybe some other Alexander will come along in the future and destroy it all over again.”

“But poverty and dear obscurity,
Are what a prudent man should think his country
For these e’en fortune can’t deprive him of.”

He also said that he was:—

He also said that he was:—

A fellow countryman of wise Diogenes,
Whom even envy never had attacked.

Menander, in his Twin-sister, mentions him thus:—

Menander, in his Twin-sister, mentions him like this:—

For you will walk with me wrapped in your cloak,
As his wife used to with the Cynic Crates.

XII. He gave his daughter to his pupils, as he himself used to say:—

XII. He handed his daughter over to his students, as he often mentioned:—

To have and keep on trial for a month.

LIFE OF METROCLES.

I. Metrocles was the brother of Hipparchia; and though he had formerly been a pupil of Theophrastus, he had profited so little by his instructions, that once, thinking that, while listening to a lecture on philosophy, he had disgraced himself by his inattention, he fell into despondency, and shut himself up in his house, intending to starve himself to death. Accordingly, when Crates heard of it, he came to him, having been sent for; and eating a number of lupins, on purpose, he persuaded him by numbers of arguments, that he had done no harm; for that it was not to be expected that a man should not indulge his natural inclinations and habits; and he comforted him by showing him that he, in a similar case, would certainly have behaved in a similar manner.[254] And after that, he became a pupil of Crates, and a man of great eminence as a philosopher.

I. Metrocles was Hipparchia's brother. Although he had previously studied under Theophrastus, he gained very little from his teachings. Once, during a philosophy lecture, he felt embarrassed by his lack of attention and became so despondent that he isolated himself at home, planning to starve himself to death. When Crates learned of this, he came to him after being called. While eating some lupins, he used various arguments to convince Metrocles that he hadn't done anything wrong; he pointed out that it’s unrealistic to expect someone to completely suppress their natural tendencies and habits. Crates reassured him by explaining that he would have acted similarly in that situation. After this, Metrocles became Crates' pupil and later became a well-respected philosopher.[254]

II. He burnt all his writings, as Hecaton tells us in the first book of his Apophthegms, and said:—

II. He burned all his writings, as Hecaton tells us in the first book of his Apophthegms, and said:—

These are the phantoms of infernal dreams;

As if he meant that they were all nonsense. But some say that it was the notes which he had taken of the lectures of Theophrastus which he burnt, quoting the following verse:—

As if he meant that they were all ridiculous. But some say that it was the notes he had taken from Theophrastus's lectures that he burned, quoting the following verse:—

Vulcan, draw near, ’tis Thetis asks your aid.[77]

III. He used to say that some things could be bought with money, as for instance a house; and some with time and industry, as education; that wealth was mischievous, if a man did not use it properly.

III. He used to say that some things could be bought with money, like a house; and some with time and effort, like an education; that wealth could be harmful if a person didn't use it wisely.

IV. He died at a great age, having suffocated himself.

IV. He died at an old age, having suffocated himself.

V. His pupils were Theombrotus and Cleomenes, Demetrius of Alexandria, the son of Theombrotus, Timarchus of Alexandria, the son of Cleomenes, and Echecles, of Ephesus. Not but what Echecles was also a pupil of Theombrotus; and Menedemus, of whom we shall speak hereafter, was his pupil. Menippus, of Sinope, too, was a very eminent person in his school.

V. His students were Theombrotus and Cleomenes, Demetrius of Alexandria, the son of Theombrotus, Timarchus of Alexandria, the son of Cleomenes, and Echecles from Ephesus. It’s worth noting that Echecles was also a student of Theombrotus; and Menedemus, who we will discuss later, was his student. Menippus from Sinope was also a very prominent figure in his school.

LIFE OF HIPPARCHIA.

I. Hipparchia, the sister of Metrocles, was charmed among others, by the doctrines of this school.

I. Hipparchia, the sister of Metrocles, was fascinated, along with others, by the teachings of this school.

II. Both she and Metrocles were natives of Maronea. She fell in love with both the doctrines and manners of Crates, and could not be diverted from her regard for him, by either the wealth, or high birth, or personal beauty, of any of her suitors, but Crates was everything to her; and she threatened her parents to make away with herself, if she were not given in marriage to him. Crates accordingly, being entreated by her parents to dissuade her from this resolution, did all he[255] could; and at last, as he could not persuade her, he rose up, and placing all his furniture before her, he said, “This is the bridegroom whom you are choosing, and this is the whole of his property; consider these facts, for it will not be possible for you to become his partner, if you do not also apply yourself to the same studies, and conform to the same habits that he does.” But the girl chose him; and assuming the same dress that he wore, went about with him as her husband, and appeared with him in public everywhere, and went to all entertainments in his company.

II. Both she and Metrocles were from Maronea. She fell in love with Crates' ideas and lifestyle and couldn't be swayed by the wealth, noble birth, or attractiveness of any of her other suitors; Crates meant everything to her. She even threatened her parents that she would harm herself if they didn’t let her marry him. Crates, being urged by her parents to talk her out of this, did everything he could. Eventually, when he couldn't change her mind, he stood up, put all his belongings in front of her, and said, “This is the groom you're choosing, and this is all he owns; think about this, because you won't be able to be his partner unless you also dedicate yourself to the same studies and live the same way he does.” But the girl chose him anyway. She wore the same clothes he did, went around with him as her husband, appeared publicly with him, and attended all events together.

III. And once when she went to sup with Lysimachus, she attacked Theodorus, who was surnamed the Atheist; proposing to him the following sophism; “What Theodorus could not be called wrong for doing, that same thing Hipparchia ought not to be called wrong for doing. But Theodorus does no wrong when he beats himself; therefore Hipparchia does no wrong when she beats Theodorus.” He made no reply to what she said, but only pulled her clothes about; but Hipparchia was neither offended nor ashamed, as many a woman would have been; but when he said to her:—

III. One time when she was having dinner with Lysimachus, she confronted Theodorus, who was known as the Atheist, and presented him with this argument: “What Theodorus can’t be criticized for doing, Hipparchia shouldn’t be criticized for either. But Theodorus doesn’t do anything wrong when he hits himself; therefore, Hipparchia doesn’t do anything wrong when she hits Theodorus.” He didn’t respond to her argument but just tugged at her clothes. However, Hipparchia wasn’t upset or embarrassed, unlike many women would have been; when he said to her:—

“Who is the woman who has left the shuttle
So near the warp?”[78]

“I, Theodorus, am that person,” she replied; “but do I appear to you to have come to a wrong decision, if I devote that time to philosophy, which I otherwise should have spent at the loom?” And these and many other sayings are reported of this female philosopher.

“I, Theodorus, am that person,” she replied; “but do I seem to you to have made a wrong choice if I spend that time on philosophy, which I would have otherwise used at the loom?” And these and many other sayings are reported of this female philosopher.

IV. There is also a volume of letters of Crates[79] extant, in which he philosophizes most excellently; and in style is very little inferior to Plato. He also wrote some tragedies, which are imbued with a very sublime spirit of philosophy, of which the following lines are a specimen:—

IV. There is also a collection of letters by Crates[79] still available, in which he shares his philosophy excellently; his style is only slightly less impressive than Plato's. He also wrote some tragedies that are filled with a profound spirit of philosophy, of which the following lines are an example:—

’Tis not one town, nor one poor single house,
That is my country; but in every land
Each city and each dwelling seems to me,
A place for my reception ready made.

And he died at a great age, and was buried in Bœotia.

And he passed away at an old age and was buried in Bœotia.

LIFE OF MENIPPUS.

I. Menippus was also a Cynic, and a Phœnician by descent, a slave by birth, as Achaicus tells us in his Ethics; and Diocles informs us that his master was a native of Pontus, of the name of Baton; but that subsequently, in consequence of his importunities and miserly habits, he became rich, and obtained the rights of citizenship at Corinth.

I. Menippus was a Cynic and a Phoenician by descent, born a slave, as Achaicus tells us in his Ethics; and Diocles informs us that his master was from Pontus, named Baton. However, later on, due to his persistence and stingy habits, he became wealthy and gained citizenship in Corinth.

II. He never wrote anything serious; but his writings are full of ridiculous matter; and in some respects similar to those of Meleager, who was his contemporary. And Hermippus tells us that he was a man who lent money at daily interest, and that he was called a usurer; for he used to lend on nautical usury, and take security, so that he amassed a very great amount of riches.

II. He never wrote anything serious, but his writings are filled with ridiculous stuff, and in some ways, they’re similar to those of Meleager, who lived around the same time. Hermippus tells us that he was a guy who lent money with daily interest, and he was called a moneylender because he used to charge high interest rates and take collateral, which allowed him to accumulate a lot of wealth.

III. But at last he fell into a snare, and lost all his money, and in a fit of despair he hung himself, and so he died. And we have written a playful epigram on him:—

III. But eventually, he fell into a trap and lost all his money, and in a moment of despair, he took his own life, and so he died. And we’ve written a light-hearted poem about him:—

This man was a Syrian by birth,
And a Cretan usurious hound,
As the name he was known by sets forth,
You’ve heard of him oft I’ll be bound;
His name was Menippus—men entered his house,
And stole all his goods without leaving a louse,
When (from this the dog’s nature you plainly may tell)
He hung himself up, and so went off to hell.

IV. But some say that the books attributed to him are not really his work, but are the composition of Dionysius and Zopyrus the Colophonians, who wrote them out of joke, and then gave them to him as a man well able to dispose of them.

IV. But some say that the books credited to him aren't actually his, but were created by Dionysius and Zopyrus from Colophon, who wrote them as a joke and then handed them over to him because he was someone who could handle them well.

V. There were six persons of the name of Menippus; the first was the man who wrote a history of the Lydians, and made an abridgment of Xanthus; the second was this man of whom we have been speaking; the third was a sophist of Stratonice, a Carian by descent; the fourth was a statuary; the fifth and the sixth were painters, and they are both mentioned by Apollodorus.

V. There were six people named Menippus; the first was the person who wrote a history of the Lydians and summarized Xanthus; the second was the man we've been discussing; the third was a sophist from Stratonice, who was of Carian descent; the fourth was a sculptor; the fifth and sixth were painters, and both are mentioned by Apollodorus.

VI. The writings left by the Cynic amount to thirteen volumes; a Description of the Dead; a volume called Wills;[257] a volume of Letters in which the Gods are introduced; treatises addressed to the Natural Philosophers, and Mathematicians, and Grammarians; one on the Generations of Epicurus, and on the Observance of the Twentieth Day by the philosophers of his school; and one or two other essays.

VI. The writings left by the Cynic consist of thirteen volumes: a Description of the Dead; a volume titled Wills;[257] a volume of Letters featuring the Gods; treatises aimed at Natural Philosophers, Mathematicians, and Grammarians; one on the Generations of Epicurus, and on how the philosophers of his school observe the Twentieth Day; and one or two other essays.

THE LIFE OF MENEDEMUS.

I. Menedemus was a disciple of Colotes of Lampsacus.

I. Menedemus was a student of Colotes of Lampsacus.

II. He proceeded, as Hippobotus tells, to such a great degree of superstition, that he assumed the garb of a fury, and went about saying that he had come from hell to take notice of all who did wrong, in order that he might descend thither again and make his report to the deities who abode in that country. And this was his dress: a tunic of a dark colour reaching to his feet, and a purple girdle round his waist, an Arcadian hat on his head with the twelve signs of the zodiac embroidered on it, tragic buskins, a preposterously long beard, and an ashen staff in his hand.

II. He went so far into superstition, as Hippobotus says, that he dressed as a fury and claimed he had come from hell to keep an eye on everyone who did wrong, so he could go back there and report to the gods living in that place. His outfit was like this: a long, dark tunic that reached his feet, a purple belt around his waist, an Arcadian hat on his head embroidered with the twelve zodiac signs, tragic boots, an absurdly long beard, and a gray staff in his hand.

III. These then are the lives of each of the Cynics; and we shall also subjoin some of the doctrines which they all held in common, if indeed it is not an abuse of language to call that a sect of philosophy at all, instead of, as some contend it should be termed, a mere system of life.

III. These are the lives of each of the Cynics; and we will also add some of the beliefs they all shared in common, if it’s not a stretch to call this a philosophy at all, instead of what some argue it should be called, a simple way of life.

They wished to abolish the whole system of logic and natural philosophy, like Aristo of Chios, and thought that men should study nothing but ethics; and what some people assert of Socrates was described by Diocles as a characteristic of Diogenes, for he said that his doctrine was, that a man ought to investigate—

They wanted to get rid of the entire system of logic and natural philosophy, like Aristo of Chios, and believed that people should study only ethics. What some claim about Socrates was noted by Diocles as a trait of Diogenes, because he said that his teaching was that a person should investigate—

Only the good and ill that taketh place
Within our houses.

They also discard all liberal studies. Accordingly, Antisthenes said that wise men only applied themselves to literature and learning for the sake of perverting others; they also wish to abolish geometry and music, and everything of that[258] kind. Accordingly, Diogenes said once to a person who was showing him a clock; “It is a very useful thing to save a man from being too late for supper.” And once when a man made an exhibition of musical skill before him, he said:—

They also reject all liberal arts. Accordingly, Antisthenes stated that wise people only engage with literature and learning to mislead others; they also want to eliminate geometry, music, and anything similar to that[258]. Once, Diogenes said to someone who was showing him a clock, “It’s really helpful to keep someone from being late for dinner.” And one time when a man showcased his musical talent in front of him, he said:—

“Cities are governed, so are houses too,
By wisdom, not by harp-playing and whistling.”[80]

Their doctrine is, that the chief good of mankind is to live according to virtue, as Antisthenes says in his Hercules, in which they resemble the Stoics. For those two sects have a good deal in common with one another, on which account they themselves say that cynicism is a short road to virtue; and Zeno, the Cittiæan lived in the same manner.

Their belief is that the ultimate goal for humanity is to live a virtuous life, as Antisthenes mentions in his Hercules, which makes them similar to the Stoics. The two schools of thought share a lot of similarities, and because of this, they claim that cynicism is a quick path to virtue; Zeno, the Cittiæan, lived in a similar way.

They also teach that men ought to live simply, using only plain food in moderate quantities, wearing nothing but a cloak, and despising riches, and glory, and nobleness of birth; accordingly some of them feed upon nothing beyond herbs and cold water, living in any shelter that they can find, or in tubs as Diogenes did; for he used to say that it was the peculiar property of the Gods to want nothing, and that, therefore, when a man wished for nothing he was like the Gods.

They also teach that people should live simply, eating basic food in reasonable amounts, wearing just a cloak, and looking down on wealth, fame, and noble birth. As a result, some of them only eat herbs and drink cold water, living in whatever shelter they can find, or even in tubs like Diogenes did. He used to say that it was a unique trait of the Gods to want nothing, and that, therefore, when a person desired nothing, they were like the Gods.

Another of their doctrines is, that virtue is a thing which may be taught, as Antisthenes affirms in his Heraclides; and that when it has once been attained it can never be lost. They also say that the wise man deserves to be loved, and cannot commit error, and is a friend to every one who resembles him, and that he leaves nothing to fortune. And everything which is unconnected with either virtue or vice they call indifferent, agreeing in this with Aristo, the Chian.

Another of their beliefs is that virtue can be taught, as Antisthenes claims in his Heraclides; and once it's achieved, it can never be lost. They also say that a wise person deserves love, cannot make mistakes, is a friend to anyone who is like them, and doesn’t rely on luck. Anything that is unrelated to virtue or vice they consider indifferent, which is in line with Aristo, the Chian.

These then were the Cynics; and now we must pass on to the Stoics, of which sect the founder was Zeno, who had been a disciple of Crates.

These were the Cynics; now we need to move on to the Stoics, a group founded by Zeno, who was a student of Crates.


BOOK VII.

LIFE OF ZENO.

I. Zeno was the son of Mnaseas, or Demeas, and a native of Citium, in Cyprus, which is a Grecian city, partly occupied by a Phœnician colony.

I. Zeno was the son of Mnaseas, or Demeas, and he was from Citium, in Cyprus, which is a Greek city, partly settled by a Phoenician colony.

II. He had his head naturally bent on one side, as Timotheus, the Athenian, tells us, in his work on Lives. And Apollonius, the Tyrian, says that he was thin, very tall, of a dark complexion; in reference to which some one once called him an Egyptian Clematis, as Chrysippus relates in the first volume of his Proverbs: he had fat, flabby, weak legs, on which account Persæus, in his Convivial Reminiscences, says that he used to refuse many invitations to supper; and he was very fond, as it is said, of figs both fresh and dried in the sun.

II. He often tilted his head to one side, as Timotheus the Athenian mentions in his work on Lives. Apollonius the Tyrian describes him as very tall, thin, and dark-skinned; someone even referred to him as an Egyptian Clematis, according to Chrysippus in the first volume of his Proverbs. He had weak, floppy legs, which is why Persæus notes in his Convivial Reminiscences that he often turned down dinner invitations. It’s said he really liked figs, both fresh and sun-dried.

III. He was a pupil, as has been already stated, of Crates. After that, they say that he became a pupil of Stilpon and of Xenocrates, for ten years, as Timocrates relates in his Life of Dion. He is also said to have been a pupil of Polemo. But Hecaton, and Apollonius, of Tyre, in the first book of his essay on Zeno, say that when he consulted the oracle, as to what he ought to do to live in the most excellent manner, the God answered him that he ought to become of the same complexion as the dead, on which he inferred that he ought to apply himself to the reading of the books of the ancients. Accordingly, he attached himself to Crates in the following manner. Having purchased a quantity of purple from Phœnicia, he was shipwrecked close to the Piræus; and when he had made his way from the coast as far as Athens, he sat down by a bookseller’s stall, being now about thirty years of age. And as he took up the second book of Xenophon’s Memorabilia and began to read it, he was delighted with it, and asked where such men as were described in that book lived; and as Crates happened very seasonably to pass at the moment, the bookseller pointed him out, and said, “Follow that man.” From[260] that time forth he became a pupil of Crates; but though he was in other respects very energetic in his application to philosophy, still he was too modest for the shamelessness of the Cynics. On which account, Crates, wishing to cure him of this false shame, gave him a jar of lentil porridge to carry through the Ceramicus; and when he saw that he was ashamed, and that he endeavoured to hide it, he struck the jar with his staff, and broke it; and, as Zeno fled away, and the lentil porridge ran all down his legs, Crates called after him, “Why do you run away, my little Phœnician, you have done no harm?” For some time then he continued a pupil of Crates, and when he wrote his treatise entitled the Republic, some said, jokingly, that he had written it upon the tail of the dog.

III. He was a student, as already mentioned, of Crates. After that, they say he became a student of Stilpon and Xenocrates for ten years, as Timocrates describes in his Life of Dion. It's also said he was a student of Polemo. However, Hecaton and Apollonius of Tyre, in the first book of his essay on Zeno, state that when he consulted the oracle about how to live the best life, the God told him he should become like the dead. From this, he concluded he should focus on reading the works of the ancients. Consequently, he attached himself to Crates in this way: after buying a large amount of purple dye from Phoenicia, he was shipwrecked near the Piraeus. Once he reached Athens, he sat down by a bookseller’s stall, being about thirty years old. He picked up the second book of Xenophon’s Memorabilia and started reading it. He loved it and asked where the kind of people described in that book lived. At that moment, Crates happened to pass by, and the bookseller pointed him out, saying, “Follow that man.” From that time on, he became a student of Crates, but while he was otherwise quite dedicated to philosophy, he was too modest for the boldness of the Cynics. To help him overcome this false shame, Crates gave him a jar of lentil porridge to carry through the Ceramicus. When he saw Zeno was embarrassed and tried to hide it, Crates struck the jar with his staff, breaking it. As Zeno ran away with lentil porridge spilling down his legs, Crates called out, “Why do you run away, my little Phoenician? You haven’t done anything wrong!” For some time, he continued as Crates's student, and when he wrote his treatise called the Republic, some jokingly said he wrote it on the tail of a dog.

IV. And besides his Republic, he was the author also of the following works:—a treatise on a Life according to Nature; one on Appetite, or the Nature of Man; one on Passions; one on the Becoming; one on Law; one on the usual Education of the Greeks; one on Sight; one on the Whole; one on Signs; one on the Doctrines of the Pythagoreans; one on Things in General; one on Styles; five essays on Problems relating to Homer; one on the Bearing of the Poets. There is also an essay on Art by him, and two books of Solutions and Jests, and Reminiscences, and one called the Ethics of Crates. These are the books of which he was the author.

IV. Besides his Republic, he also wrote the following works: a treatise on Living According to Nature; one on Desire or Human Nature; one on Emotions; one on Becoming; one on Law; one on the Typical Education of the Greeks; one on Vision; one on the Whole; one on Signs; one on the Teachings of the Pythagoreans; one on General Things; one on Styles; five essays on Problems Related to Homer; and one on the Influence of Poets. He also wrote an essay on Art, two books of Solutions and Jokes, Reminiscences, and one called the Ethics of Crates. These are the books he authored.

V. But at last he left Crates, and became the pupil of the philosophers whom I have mentioned before, and continued with them for twenty years. So that it is related that he said, “I now find that I made a prosperous voyage when I was wrecked.” But some affirm that he made this speech in reference to Crates. Others say, that while he was staying at Athens he heard of a shipwreck, and said, “Fortune does well in having driven us on philosophy.” But as some relate the affair, he was not wrecked at all, but sold all his cargo at Athens, and then turned to philosophy.

V. Eventually, he left Crates and became a student of the philosophers I mentioned earlier, staying with them for twenty years. It's said that he remarked, “I now realize that I had a successful journey even when I was shipwrecked.” Some believe he made this statement about Crates. Others claim that while he was in Athens, he heard about a shipwreck and expressed, “Destiny is kind for leading us toward philosophy.” However, according to some accounts, he didn’t actually experience a shipwreck at all; instead, he sold all his goods in Athens and then pursued philosophy.

VI. And he used to walk up and down in the beautiful colonnade which is called the Peisianactium, and which is also called ποικίλη, from the paintings of Polygnotus, and there he delivered his discourses, wishing to make that spot tranquil; for in the time of the thirty, nearly fourteen hundred of the citizens had been murdered there by them.

VI. He used to stroll back and forth in the beautiful colonnade known as the Peisianactium, also called ποικίλη because of Polygnotus's paintings. He delivered his speeches there, hoping to create a sense of peace in that place; during the rule of the thirty, nearly fourteen hundred citizens had been killed there by them.

VII. Accordingly, for the future, men came thither to hear him, and from this his pupils were called Stoics, and so were his successors also, who had been at first called Zenonians, as Epicurus tells us in his Epistles. And before this time, the poets who frequented this colonnade (στοὰ) had been called Stoics, as we are informed by Eratosthenes, in the eighth book of his treatise on the Old Comedy; but now Zeno’s pupils made the name more notorious. Now the Athenians had a great respect for Zeno, so that they gave him the keys of their walls, and they also honoured him with a golden crown, and a brazen statue; and this was also done by his own countrymen, who thought the statue of such a man an honour to their city. And the Cittiæans, in the district of Sidon, also claimed him as their countryman.

VII. As a result, in the future, people came to hear him speak, and his students were known as Stoics, as were his followers who were initially called Zenonians, as Epicurus mentions in his letters. Before this, the poets who often visited this colonnade had been referred to as Stoics, as Eratosthenes informs us in the eighth book of his work on Old Comedy; but now Zeno’s students made the name more well-known. The Athenians held Zeno in high regard, granting him the keys to their city walls, and they honored him with a gold crown and a bronze statue; his fellow countrymen also celebrated him, believing that having a statue of such a man was an honor for their city. The Cittiæans, from the region of Sidon, also claimed him as one of their own.

VIII. He was also much respected by Antigonus, who, whenever he came to Athens, used to attend his lectures, and was constantly inviting him to come to him. But he begged off himself, and sent Persæus, one of his intimate friends, who was the son of Demetrius, and a Cittiæan by birth, and who flourished about the hundred and thirtieth olympiad, when Zeno was an old man. The letter of Antigonus to Zeno was as follows, and it is reported by Apollonius, the Syrian, in his essay on Zeno.

VIII. He was also highly regarded by Antigonus, who, whenever he visited Athens, would attend his lectures and often invited him to join him. However, he declined the invitation himself and sent Persæus, one of his close friends, the son of Demetrius and originally from Citium, who was active around the 130th Olympiad, when Zeno was an old man. The letter from Antigonus to Zeno was as follows, and it is mentioned by Apollonius, the Syrian, in his essay on Zeno.

KING ANTIGONUS TO ZENO THE PHILOSOPHER, GREETING.

“I think that in good fortune and glory I have the advantage of you; but in reason and education I am inferior to you, and also in that perfect happiness which you have attained to. On which account I have thought it good to address you, and invite you to come to me, being convinced that you will not refuse what is asked of you. Endeavour, therefore, by all means to come to me, considering this fact, that you will not be the instructor of me alone, but of all the Macedonians together. For he who instructs the ruler of the Macedonians, and who leads him in the path of virtue, evidently marshals all his subjects on the road to happiness. For as the ruler is, so is it natural that his subjects for the most part should be also.”

"I believe that in terms of good luck and glory, I have the upper hand over you; however, when it comes to reason and education, I am not as strong as you, and I also lack the perfect happiness that you have achieved. That's why I thought it would be good to reach out to you and invite you to come see me, trusting that you won’t turn down my request. So, please do everything you can to come to me, keeping in mind that your guidance will benefit not just me, but all the Macedonians as well. For the one who teaches the leader of the Macedonians and guides him toward virtue essentially points all his subjects toward happiness. Just as the leader is, it’s natural for most of his subjects to be as well."

And Zeno wrote him back the following answer.

And Zeno replied with the following answer.

ZENO TO KING ANTIGONUS, GREETING.

“I admire your desire for learning, as being a true object for the wishes of mankind, and one too that tends to their advantage. And the man who aims at the study of philosophy has a proper disregard for the popular kind of instruction which tends only to the corruption of the morals. And you, passing by the pleasure which is so much spoken of, which makes the minds of some young men effeminate, show plainly that you are inclined to noble pursuits, not merely by your nature, but also by your own deliberate choice. And a noble nature, when it has received even a slight degree of training, and which also meets with those who will teach it abundantly, proceeds without difficulty to a perfect attainment of virtue. But I now find my bodily health impaired by old age, for I am eighty years old: on which account I am unable to come to you. But I send you some of those who have studied with me, who in that learning which has reference to the soul, are in no respect inferior to me, and in their bodily vigour are greatly my superiors. And if you associate with them you will want nothing that can bear upon perfect happiness.”

“I admire your love for learning, as it's truly something that people desire and that benefits them. A person who is committed to studying philosophy disregards the trendy types of education that only lead to moral decay. And you, prioritizing the pleasures often mentioned that can weaken the minds of young men, clearly show that you are drawn to noble pursuits, Not just by nature, but also by your own conscious choices. A noble nature, when it receives even a bit of training and encounters those who will teach it well, can easily achieve true virtue. However, I now find my health declining with age, as I am eighty years old, which is why I can't come to you. But I’m sending some of those who have studied with me; in matters of knowledge concerning the soul, they are no less capable than I am, and in physical strength, they greatly surpass me. By spending time with them, you will want for nothing that contributes to complete happiness.”

So he sent him Persæus and Philonides, the Theban, both of whom are mentioned by Epicurus, in his letter to his brother Aristobulus, as being companions of Antigonus.

So he sent him Persæus and Philonides, the Theban, both of whom are mentioned by Epicurus in his letter to his brother Aristobulus as companions of Antigonus.

IX. And I have thought it worth while also to set down the decree of the Athenians concerning him; and it is couched in the following language.

IX. I thought it was important to also note the decree of the Athenians about him, which is worded as follows.

“In the archonship of Arrhenides, in the fifth presidency of the tribe Acamantis, on the twenty-first day of the month Maimacterion, on the twenty-third day of the aforesaid presidency, in a duly convened assembly, Hippo, the son of Cratistoteles, of the borough of Xypetion, being one of the presidents, and the rest of the presidents, his colleagues, put the following decree to the vote. And the decree was proposed by Thrason, of Anacæa, the son of Thrason.

“In the time of Arrhenides as archon, during the fifth presidency of the tribe Acamantis, on the twenty-first day of the month Maimacterion, and on the twenty-third day of that same presidency, in an assembly that was properly convened, Hippo, son of Cratistoteles from the borough of Xypetion, along with the other presidents, put the following decree to a vote. The decree was proposed by Thrason, from Anacæa, son of Thrason.”

“Since Zeno the son of Mnaseas, the Cittiæan, has passed many years in the city, in the study of philosophy, being in all other respects a good man, and also exhorting all the young men who have sought his company to the practice of virtue, and encouraging them in the practice of temperance; making his own life a model to all men of the greatest[263] excellence, since it has in every respect corresponded to the doctrines which he has taught; it has been determined by the people (and may the determination be fortunate), to praise Zeno, the son of Mnaseas, the Cittiæan, and to present him with a golden crown in accordance with the law, on account of his virtue and temperance, and to build him a tomb in the Ceramicus, at the public expense. And the people has appointed by its vote five men from among the citizens of Athens, who shall see to the making of the crown and the building of the tomb. And the scribe of the borough shall enrol the decree and engrave it on two pillars, and he shall be permitted to place one pillar in the Academy, and one in the Lyceum. And he who is appointed to superintend the work shall divide the expense that the pillars amount to, in such a way that every one may understand that the whole people of Athens honours good men both while they are living and after they are dead. And Thrason of Anacæa, Philocles of the Piræus, Phædrus of Anaphlystos, Medon of Acharnæ, Micythus of Sypalettus, and Dion of Pæania, are hereby appointed to superintend the building of the tomb.”

Since Zeno, the son of Mnaseas from Cittæa, has spent many years in the city studying philosophy, being a good man in every way, and encouraging all the young men who sought his guidance to practice virtue and temperance; living his life as a model of excellence that aligns with the teachings he has shared; the people have decided (and may this decision bring good fortune) to honor Zeno, the son of Mnaseas from Cittæa, by presenting him with a golden crown as per the law, in recognition of his virtue and temperance, and to construct a tomb for him in the Ceramicus at the public's expense. The citizens of Athens have also voted to appoint five men to oversee the creation of the crown and the building of the tomb. The borough's scribe will record the decree and engrave it on two pillars, and he will be allowed to place one pillar in the Academy and the other in the Lyceum. The person in charge of the work will manage the expenses for the pillars, ensuring that everyone understands that the whole city of Athens honors good people both in life and after death. Thrason of Anacæa, Philocles of the Piræus, Phædrus of Anaphlystos, Medon of Acharnæ, Micythus of Sypalettus, and Dion of Pæania are appointed to oversee the construction of the tomb.

These then are the terms of the decree.

These are the terms of the decree.

X. But Antigonus, of Carystos, says, that Zeno himself never denied that he was a native of Cittium. For that when on one occasion, there was a citizen of that town who had contributed to the building of some baths, and was having his name engraved on the pillar, as the countryman of Zeno the philosopher, he bade them add, “Of Cittium.”

X. But Antigonus from Carystos says that Zeno himself never denied he was from Cittium. One time, when a citizen of that town was having his name engraved on a pillar for contributing to the building of some baths, he asked them to add, “From Cittium,” as a nod to Zeno the philosopher.

XI. And at another time, when he had had a hollow covering made for some vessel, he carried it about for some money, in order to procure present relief for some difficulties which were distressing Crates his master. And they say that he, when he first arrived in Greece, had more than a thousand talents, which he lent out at nautical usury.

XI. One time, after getting a hollow cover made for a container, he carried it around to sell for some money to help ease the troubles that were stressing his master, Crates. It's said that when he first got to Greece, he had over a thousand talents, which he lent out at high interest.

XII. And he used to eat little loaves and honey, and to drink a small quantity of sweet smelling wine.

XII. And he would eat small loaves and honey, and drink a little bit of fragrant wine.

XIII. He had very few youthful acquaintances of the male sex, and he did not cultivate them much, lest he should be thought to be a misogynist. And he dwelt in the same house with Persæus; and once, when he brought in a female flute-player to him, he hastened to bring her back to him.

XIII. He had very few young male friends and didn't spend much time with them, fearing he might be seen as a woman-hater. He lived in the same house as Persæus, and once, when he brought in a female flute player for him, he quickly went to take her back.

XIV. And he was, it is said, of a very accommodating[264] temper; so much so, that Antigonus, the king, often came to dine with him, and often carried him off to dine with him, at the house of Aristocles the harp-player; but when he was there, he would presently steal away.

XIV. It is said that he had a very easygoing[264] personality; so much so that King Antigonus often came over to have dinner with him and frequently took him along to dine at the home of Aristocles the harp player. However, when he was there, he would quickly sneak away.

XV. It is also said that he avoided a crowd with great care, so that he used to sit at the end of a bench, in order at all events to avoid being incommoded on one side. And he never used to walk with more than two or three companions. And he used at times to exact a piece of money from all who came to hear him, with a view of not being distressed by numbers; and this story is told by Cleanthes, in his treatise on Brazen Money. And when he was surrounded by any great crowd, he would point to a balustrade of wood at the end of the colonnade which surrounded an altar, and say, “That was once in the middle of this place, but it was placed apart because it was in people’s way; and now, if you will only withdraw from the middle here, you too will incommode me much less.”

XV. It's said that he carefully avoided crowds, choosing to sit at the end of a bench to keep from being crowded on one side. He typically walked with only two or three companions. Occasionally, he would charge a small fee to anyone who wanted to hear him speak, so he wouldn't feel overwhelmed by too many people; Cleanthes mentions this in his writing on Brazen Money. When he found himself in a large crowd, he would point to a wooden railing at the end of the colonnade surrounding an altar and say, “That used to be in the middle of this place, but it was moved because it got in the way; if you could just step aside from the center here, you would make things much easier for me.”

XVI. And when Demochares, the son of Laches, embraced him once, and said that he would tell Antigonus, or write to him of everything which he wanted, as he always did everything for him, Zeno, when he had heard him say this, avoided his company for the future. And it is said, that after the death of Zeno, Antigonus said, “What a spectacle have I lost.” On which account he employed Thrason, their ambassador, to entreat of the Athenians to allow him to be buried in the Ceramicus. And when he was asked why he had such an admiration for him, he replied, “Because, though I gave him a great many important presents, he was never elated, and never humbled.”

XVI. When Demochares, the son of Laches, hugged him once and said he would tell Antigonus or write to him about everything he needed, just like he always did, Zeno, after hearing this, started avoiding him from then on. It’s said that after Zeno died, Antigonus remarked, “What a loss I’ve suffered.” For this reason, he sent Thrason, their ambassador, to ask the Athenians to permit him to be buried in the Ceramicus. When asked why he admired Zeno so much, he replied, “Because, even though I gave him many significant gifts, he was never arrogant and never overly modest.”

XVII. He was a man of a very investigating spirit, and one who inquired very minutely into everything; in reference to which, Timon, in his Silli, speaks thus:—

XVII. He was a man with a curious mind, someone who looked closely into everything; about this, Timon mentions in his Silli:—

I saw an aged woman of Phœnicia,
Hungry and covetous, in a proud obscurity,
Longing for everything. She had a basket
So full of holes that it retained nothing.
Likewise her mind was less than a skindapsus.[81]

He used to study very carefully with Philo, the dialectician, and to argue with him at their mutual leisure; on which[265] account he excited the wonder of the younger Zeno, no less than Diodorus his master.

He used to study very carefully with Philo, the dialectician, and to debate with him whenever they had free time; because of this[265] he amazed the younger Zeno, just as he did his teacher Diodorus.

XVIII. There were also a lot of dirty beggars always about him, as Timon tells us, where he says:—

XVIII. There were also a lot of dirty beggars always around him, as Timon tells us, where he says:—

Till he collected a vast cloud of beggars,
Who were of all men in the world the poorest,
And the most worthless citizens of Athens.

And he himself was a man of a morose and bitter countenance, with a constantly frowning expression. He was very economical, and descended even to the meanness of the barbarians, under the pretence of economy.

And he was a man with a gloomy and bitter look, always wearing a frown. He was very frugal, even going so far as to be stingy like the barbarians, pretending it was all about being economical.

XIX. If he reproved any one, he did it with brevity and without exaggeration, and as it were, at a distance. I allude, for instance, to the way in which he spoke of a man who took exceeding pains in setting himself off, for as he was crossing a gutter with great hesitation, he said, “He is right to look down upon the mud, for he cannot see himself in it.” And when some Cynic one day said that he had no oil in his cruise, and asked him for some, he refused to give him any, but bade him go away and consider which of the two was the more impudent. He was very much in love with Chremonides; and once, when he and Cleanthes were both sitting by him, he got up; and as Cleanthes wondered at this, he said, “I hear from skilful physicians that the best thing for some tumours is rest.” Once, when two people were sitting above him at table at a banquet, and the one next him kept kicking the other with his foot, he himself kicked him with his knee; and when he turned round upon him for doing so, he said, “Why then do you think that your other neighbour is to be treated in this way by you?”

XIX. When he criticized someone, he kept it short and straightforward, almost from a distance. For example, he commented on a man who was overly concerned with his appearance. As that man hesitated while crossing a gutter, he said, “He’s right to look down at the mud; he can’t see himself in it.” One day, when a Cynic asked him for oil because he had none, he refused to give any and told him to go away and think about which of them was more shameless. He had a deep affection for Chremonides; once, when he and Cleanthes were sitting with him, he got up. Cleanthes, surprised, asked why, and he replied, “I’ve heard from skilled doctors that the best treatment for some tumors is rest.” At another banquet, when two people were sitting above him at the table and one kept kicking the other, he kicked the kicker with his knee. When that person turned around to confront him, he said, “So, do you think it’s okay to treat your other neighbor that way?”

On one occasion he said to a man who was very fond of young boys, that “Schoolmasters who were always associating with boys had no more intellect than the boys themselves.” He used also to say that the discourses of those men who were careful to avoid solecisms, and to adhere to the strictest rules of composition, were like Alexandrine money, they were pleasing to the eye and well-formed like the coin, but were nothing the better for that; but those who were not so particular he likened to the Attic tetradrachmas, which were struck at random and without any great nicety, and so he said that their[266] discourses often outweighed the more polished styles of the others. And when Ariston, his disciple, had been holding forth a good deal without much wit, but still in some points with a good deal of readiness and confidence, he said to him, “It would be impossible for you to speak thus, if your father had not been drunk when he begat you;” and for the same reason he nicknamed him the chatterer, as he himself was very concise in his speeches. Once, when he was in company with an epicure who usually left nothing for his messmates, and when a large fish was set before him, he took it all as if he could eat the whole of it; and when the others looked at him with astonishment, he said, “What then do you think that your companions feel every day, if you cannot bear with my gluttony for one day?”

On one occasion, he told a man who really liked young boys that “Schoolmasters who constantly hang out with boys have about as much intelligence as the boys themselves.” He also commented that the speeches of those who are careful to avoid mistakes and follow strict rules of writing were like Alexandrine coins: they looked nice and were well-crafted, but that didn’t make them any better. In contrast, he compared those who weren’t so meticulous to Attic tetradrachmas, which were made randomly and without much precision, and he said that their speeches often had more substance than the more refined styles of others. When Ariston, his student, spoke at length without much wit but showed some quickness and confidence, he told him, “You could never speak like this if your father hadn’t been drunk when he conceived you,” and for that reason, he called him the chatterer since he himself was very brief in his speeches. Once, when he was with a glutton who usually didn’t leave anything for his friends, a large fish was placed in front of him. He ate the entire thing, as if he were capable of finishing it all, and when the others looked at him in disbelief, he said, “What do you think your friends feel every day if you can’t endure my indulgence for just one day?”

On one occasion, when a youth was asking him questions with a pertinacity unsuited to his age, he led him to a looking-glass and bade him look at himself, and then asked him whether such questions appeared suitable to the face he saw there. And when a man said before him once, that in most points he did not agree with the doctrines of Antisthenes, he quoted to him an apophthegm of Sophocles, and asked him whether he thought there was much sense in that, and when he said that he did not know, “Are you not then ashamed,” said he, “to pick out and recollect anything bad which may have been said by Antisthenes, but not to regard or remember whatever is said that is good?” A man once said, that the sayings of the philosophers appeared to him very trivial; “You say true,” replied Zeno, “and their syllables too ought to be short, if that is possible.” When some one spoke to him of Polemo, and said that he proposed one question for discussion and then argued another, he became angry, and said, “At what value did he estimate the subject that had been proposed?” And he said that a man who was to discuss a question ought to have a loud voice and great energy, like the actors, but not to open his mouth too wide, which those who speak a great deal but only talk nonsense usually do. And he used to say that there was no need for those who argued well to leave their hearers room to look about them, as good workmen do who want to have their work seen; but that, on the contrary, those who are listening to them ought to be so attentive to all that is said as to have no leisure to take notes.

Once, when a young person was asking him questions with an insistence that didn’t match his age, he took him to a mirror and told him to look at himself, then asked if those questions seemed fitting for the face he saw. One time, when a man said that he disagreed with most of Antisthenes' teachings, he cited a saying from Sophocles and asked if the man thought it made much sense. When the man replied that he didn’t know, he said, “Aren’t you ashamed to focus on and remember the negative things said by Antisthenes, but overlook the good?” Another man commented that the philosophers' statements seemed very trivial; Zeno responded, “That's true, and their words should be brief if possible.” When someone talked to him about Polemo and said he proposed one question for discussion but argued another, he got angry and asked, “What value did he place on the proposed topic?” He also stated that anyone discussing a question should have a strong voice and great energy, like actors, but shouldn't over-exaggerate their mouths, which is what those who talk a lot of nonsense tend to do. He used to say that those who argued well shouldn’t leave their listeners time to look around, like good craftsmen who want their work to be seen; instead, listeners should be so focused on what’s being said that they wouldn’t have time to take notes.

Once when a young man was talking a great deal, he said, “Your ears have run down into your tongue.” On one occasion a very handsome man was saying that a wise man did not appear to him likely to fall in love; “Then,” said he, “I cannot imagine anything that will be more miserable than you good-looking fellows.” He also used often to say that most philosophers were wise in great things, but ignorant of petty subjects and chance details; and he used to cite the saying of Caphesius, who, when one of his pupils was labouring hard to be able to blow very powerfully, gave him a slap, and said, that excellence did not depend upon greatness, but greatness on excellence. Once, when a young man was arguing very confidently, he said, “I should not like to say, O youth, all that occurs to me.” And once, when a handsome and wealthy Rhodian, but one who had no other qualification, was pressing him to take him as a pupil, he, as he was not inclined to receive him, first of all made him sit on the dusty seats that he might dirt his cloak, then he put him down in the place of the poor that he might rub against their rags, and at last the young man went away. One of his sayings used to be, that vanity was the most unbecoming of all things, and especially so in the young. Another was, that one ought not to try and recollect the exact words and expressions of a discourse, but to fix all one’s attention on the arrangement of the arguments, instead of treating it as if it were a piece of boiled meat, or some delicate eatable. He used also to say that young men ought to maintain the most scrupulous reserve in their walking, their gait, and their dress; and he was constantly quoting the lines of Euripides on Capaneus, that—

Once, when a young man was talking a lot, he said, “Your ears have run down into your tongue.” On another occasion, a very attractive man mentioned that he didn’t think a wise man was likely to fall in love. The reply was, “Then I can’t imagine anything more miserable than you good-looking types.” He often remarked that most philosophers were wise about big matters but clueless about minor details and everyday things. He would reference Caphesius, who, when one of his students was working hard to blow very powerfully, gave him a slap and said that excellence doesn’t rely on size, but greatness depends on excellence. Once, when a young man was arguing very confidently, he said, “I wouldn’t want to say, oh youth, everything that comes to mind.” And once, when a handsome and wealthy Rhodian, who had no other qualifications, was pressing him to take him on as a pupil, he, not wanting to accept him, first made him sit on the dusty seats to dirty his cloak, then placed him among the poor so he could rub against their rags, and in the end, the young man left. One of his sayings was that vanity was the most unbecoming trait of all, especially in the young. Another was that one shouldn’t focus on memorizing the exact words and phrases of a speech, but should direct all their attention to the arrangement of the arguments, rather than treating it as if it were a piece of boiled meat or some fancy delicacy. He also said that young men should be very careful about their walking, their posture, and their clothing; and he often quoted lines from Euripides about Capaneus that—

His wealth was ample.
But yet no pride did mingle with his state,
Nor had he haughty thought, or arrogance
More than the poorest man.

And one of his sayings used to be, that nothing was more unfriendly to the comprehension of the accurate sciences than poetry; and that there was nothing that we stood in so much need of as time. When he was asked what a friend was, he replied, “Another I.” They say that he was once scourging a slave whom he had detected in theft; and when he said to him, “It was fated that I should steal;” he rejoined, “Yes, and that you should be beaten.” He used to call beauty the[268] flower of the voice; but some report this as if he had said that the voice is the flower of beauty. On one occasion, when he saw a slave belonging to one of his friends severely bruised, he said to his friend, “I see the footsteps of your anger.” He once accosted a man who was all over unguents and perfumes, “Who is this who smells like a woman?” When Dionysius Metathemenus asked him why he was the only person whom he did not correct, he replied, “Because I have no confidence in you.” A young man was talking a great deal of nonsense, and he said to him, “This is the reason why we have two ears and only one mouth, that we may hear more and speak less.”

And he often said that nothing hindered the understanding of the exact sciences more than poetry, and that there was nothing we needed more than time. When asked what a friend was, he replied, “Another me.” It’s said that he once whipped a slave whom he caught stealing; when the slave claimed, “It was destined that I should steal,” he responded, “Yes, and that you should be punished.” He referred to beauty as the[268] flower of the voice; though some report this differently, saying he claimed the voice is the flower of beauty. Once, when he saw a slave who belonged to one of his friends badly beaten, he told his friend, “I see the signs of your anger.” He once approached a man covered in oils and perfumes, saying, “Who is this who smells like a woman?” When Dionysius Metathemenus asked him why he was the only person he didn’t correct, he replied, “Because I don’t trust you.” A young man was rambling on about nonsense, and he told him, “That’s why we have two ears and only one mouth, so we can listen more and talk less.”

Once, when he was at an entertainment and remained wholly silent, he was asked what the reason was; and so he bade the person who found fault with him tell the king that there was a man in the room who knew how to hold his tongue; now the people who asked him this were ambassadors who had come from Ptolemy, and who wished to know what report they were to make of him to the king. He was once asked how he felt when people abused him, and he said, “As an ambassador feels when he is sent away without an answer.” Apollonius of Tyre tells us, that when Crates dragged him by the cloak away from Stilpo, he said, “O Crates, the proper way to take hold of philosophers is by the ears; so now do you convince me and drag me by them; but if you use force towards me, my body may be with you, but my mind with Stilpo.”

Once, during a gathering, he stayed completely quiet, and when asked why, he told the person criticizing him to inform the king that there was someone in the room who knew how to keep quiet. The people asking were ambassadors from Ptolemy, and they wanted to report back to the king about him. He was also asked how he felt when people insulted him, and he replied, “Like an ambassador feels when he’s sent away without a response.” Apollonius of Tyre narrates that when Crates pulled him away by his cloak from Stilpo, he said, “Oh Crates, the right way to engage with philosophers is by the ears; so now convince me and pull me by them; but if you use force on me, my body may be with you, but my mind will remain with Stilpo.”

XX. He used to devote a good deal of time to Diodorus, as we learn from Hippobotus; and he studied dialectics under him. And when he had made a good deal of progress he attached himself to Polemo because of his freedom from arrogance, so that it is reported that he said to him, “I am not ignorant, O Zeno, that you slip into the garden-door and steal my doctrines, and then clothe them in a Phœnician dress.” When a dialectician once showed him seven species of dialectic argument in the mowing argument,[82] he asked him how much he charged for them, and when he said “A hundred drachmas,” he gave him two hundred, so exceedingly devoted was he to learning.

XX. He used to spend a lot of time with Diodorus, as we learn from Hippobotus, and he studied dialectics under him. After making significant progress, he joined Polemo because of his lack of arrogance. It's said that he remarked to him, “I know, O Zeno, that you sneak into the garden and take my ideas, then dress them up in a Phœnician style.” One time, when a dialectician showed him seven types of dialectic argument in the mowing argument,[82] he asked how much he charged for them, and when he replied “A hundred drachmas,” he gave him two hundred, so committed was he to learning.

XXI. They say too, that he was the first who ever employed[269] the word duty (καθῆκον), and who wrote a treatise on the subject. And that he altered the lines of Hesiod thus:—

XXI. They also say that he was the first to use the word duty (καθῆκον) and that he wrote a treatise on the topic. He even modified the lines of Hesiod like this:—

He is the best of all men who submits
To follow good advice; he too is good,
Who of himself perceives whate’er is fit.[83]

For he said that that man who had the capacity to give a proper hearing to what was said, and to avail himself of it, was superior to him who comprehended everything by his own intellect; for that the one had only comprehension, but the one who took good advice had action also.

For he said that the man who could truly listen to what was said and take it to heart was better than the one who understood everything through his own intellect; because the former had not just understanding, but also the ability to act on good advice.

XXII. When he was asked why he, who was generally austere, relaxed at a dinner party, he said, “Lupins too are bitter, but when they are soaked they become sweet.” And Hecaton, in the second book of his Apophthegms, says, that in entertainments of that kind, he used to indulge himself freely. And he used to say that it was better to trip with the feet, than with the tongue. And that goodness was attained by little and little, but was not itself a small thing. Some authors, however, attribute this saying to Socrates.

XXII. When he was asked why he, who was usually strict, let loose at a dinner party, he replied, “Lupins are also bitter, but when soaked, they become sweet.” And Hecaton, in the second book of his Apophthegms, noted that he would freely indulge at such gatherings. He would say it’s better to stumble with your feet than with your words. He believed that goodness is achieved little by little, but is not a small thing itself. However, some authors credit this saying to Socrates.

XXIII. He was a person of great powers of abstinence and endurance; and of very simple habits, living on food which required no fire to dress it, and wearing a thin cloak, so that it was said of him:—

XXIII. He had a remarkable ability to refrain from indulgence and endure hardship; and he led a very simple lifestyle, eating food that didn’t need cooking and wearing a light cloak, which led people to say of him:—

The cold of winter, and the ceaseless rain,
Come powerless against him; weak is the dart
Of the fierce summer sun, or fell disease,
To bend that iron frame. He stands apart,
In nought resembling the vast common crowd;
But, patient and unwearied, night and day,
Clings to his studies and philosophy.

XXIV. And the comic poets, without intending it, praise him in their very attempts to turn him into ridicule. Philemon speaks thus of him in his play entitled the Philosophers:—

XXIV. The comic poets, without meaning to, actually praise him in their efforts to mock him. Philemon describes him this way in his play called the Philosophers:—

This man adopts a new philosophy,
He teaches to be hungry; nevertheless,
He gets disciples. Bread his only food,
His best desert dried figs; water his drink.

But some attribute these lines to Posidippus. And they have become almost a proverb. Accordingly it used to be said of him, “More temperate than Zeno the philosopher.” Posidippus also writes thus in his Men Transported:—

But some people attribute these lines to Posidippus. They've almost become a proverb. So it was often said of him, “More moderate than Zeno the philosopher.” Posidippus also writes this in his Men Transported:—

So that for ten whole days he did appear
More temperate than Zeno’s self.

XXV. For in reality he did surpass all men in this description of virtue, and in dignity of demeanour, and, by Jove, in happiness. For he lived ninety-eight years, and then died, without any disease, and continuing in good health to the last. But Persæus, in his Ethical School, states that he died at the age of seventy-two, and that he came to Athens when he was twenty-two years old. But Apollonius says that he presided over his school for forty-eight years.

XXV. In reality, he exceeded all others in his description of virtue, in his dignified demeanor, and, honestly, in happiness. He lived to be ninety-eight and died without any illness, staying in good health until the end. However, Persæus, in his Ethical School, claims he died at the age of seventy-two and that he arrived in Athens when he was twenty-two. But Apollonius says he led his school for forty-eight years.

XXVI. And he died in the following manner. When he was going out of his school, he tripped, and broke one of his toes; and striking the ground with his hand, he repeated the line out of the Niobe:—

XXVI. And he died in the following manner. When he was leaving his school, he tripped and broke one of his toes; and as he hit the ground with his hand, he repeated the line from the Niobe:—

I come: why call me so?

And immediately he strangled himself, and so he died. But the Athenians buried him in the Ceramicus, and honoured him with the decrees which I have mentioned before, bearing witness to his virtue. And Antipater, the Sidonian, wrote an inscription for him, which runs thus:—

And right away he hanged himself, and that’s how he died. The Athenians buried him in the Ceramicus and honored him with the decrees I mentioned earlier, which attested to his virtue. Antipater, the Sidonian, wrote an inscription for him that goes like this:—

Here Cittium’s pride, wise Zeno, lies, who climb’d
The summits of Olympus; but unmoved
By wicked thoughts ne’er strove to raise on Ossa
The pine-clad Pelion; nor did he emulate
Th’ immortal toils of Hercules; but found
A new way for himself to th’ highest heaven,
By virtue, temperance, and modesty.

And Zenodotus, the Stoic, a disciple of Diogenes, wrote another:—

And Zenodotus, the Stoic, a student of Diogenes, wrote another:—

You made contentment the chief rule of life,
Despising haughty wealth, O God-like Zeno.
With solemn look, and hoary brow serene,
You taught a manly doctrine; and didst found
By your deep wisdom, a great novel school,
Chaste parent of unfearing liberty.
And if your country was Phœnicia,
Why need we grieve, from that land Cadmus came,
Who gave to Greece her written books of wisdom.

And Athenæus, the Epigrammatic poet, speaks thus of all the Stoics in common:—

And Athenæus, the Epigrammatic poet, speaks this way about all the Stoics:—

O, ye who’ve learnt the doctrines of the Porch,
And have committed to your books divine
The best of human learning; teaching men
That the mind’s virtue is the only good.
And she it is who keeps the lives of men,
And cities, safer than high gates or walls.
But those who place their happiness in pleasure,
Are led by the least worthy of the Muses.

And we also have ourselves spoken of the manner of Zeno’s death, in our collection of poems in all metres, in the following terms:—

And we've also talked about how Zeno died, in our collection of poems in various styles, in the following way:—

Some say that Zeno, pride of Cittium,
Died of old age, when weak and quite worn out;
Some say that famine’s cruel tooth did slay him;
Some that he fell, and striking hard the ground,
Said, “See, I come, why call me thus impatiently?”

For some say that this was the way in which he died. And this is enough to say concerning his death.

For some people say that this was how he died. And this is enough to say about his death.

XXVII. But Demetrius, the Magnesian, says, in his essay on People of the Same Name, that his father Mnaseas often came to Athens, as he was a merchant, and that he used to bring back many of the books of the Socratic philosophers, to Zeno, while he was still only a boy; and that, from this circumstance, Zeno had already become talked of in his own country; and that in consequence of this he went to Athens, where he attached himself to Crates. And it seems, he adds, that it was he who first recommended a clear enunciation of principles, as the best remedy for error. He is said, too, to have been in the habit of swearing “By Capers,” as Socrates swore “By the Dog.”

XXVII. Demetrius from Magnesia writes in his essay on People with the Same Name that his father Mnaseas often visited Athens as a merchant and would bring back many books by Socratic philosophers for Zeno when he was still a boy. Because of this, Zeno became talked about in his hometown, and as a result, he went to Athens where he studied under Crates. Additionally, Demetrius claims that Zeno was the first to suggest that clearly stating principles is the best way to avoid mistakes. It's also said that he had the habit of swearing “By Capers,” similar to how Socrates swore “By the Dog.”

XXVIII. Some, indeed, among whom is Cassius the Sceptic, attack Zeno on many accounts, saying first of all that he denounced the general system of education in vogue at the[272] time, as useless, which he did in the beginning of his Republic. And in the second place, that he used to call all who were not virtuous, adversaries, and enemies, and slaves, and unfriendly to one another, parents to their children, brethren to brethren, and kinsmen to kinsmen; and again, that in his Republic, he speaks of the virtuous as the only citizens, and friends, and relations, and free men, so that in the doctrine of the Stoic, even parents and their children are enemies; for they are not wise. Also, that he lays down the principle of the community of women both in his Republic and in a poem of two hundred verses, and teaches that neither temples nor courts of law, nor gymnasia, ought to be erected in a city; moreover, that he writes thus about money, “That he does not think that men ought to coin money either for purposes of traffic, or of travelling.” Besides all this, he enjoins men and women to wear the same dress, and to leave no part of their person uncovered.

XXVIII. Some people, including Cassius the Sceptic, criticize Zeno for several reasons. First, they say he condemned the general education system of his time as useless, which he did at the beginning of his Republic. Secondly, he referred to everyone who wasn't virtuous as adversaries, enemies, and slaves, and as unfriendly to one another—parents to their children, siblings to siblings, and relatives to relatives. Moreover, he claimed that in his Republic, only the virtuous are true citizens, friends, family, and free people, implying that even parents and their children are enemies if they lack wisdom. Also, he stated the principle of shared women in both his Republic and a two-hundred-verse poem, teaching that cities shouldn't have temples, courts, or gyms. Additionally, he wrote about money, saying he didn’t believe people should mint coins for trade or travel. On top of all this, he instructed men and women to wear the same clothing and to leave no part of their bodies uncovered.

XXIX. And that this treatise on the Republic is his work we are assured by Chrysippus, in his Republic. He also discussed amatory subjects in the beginning of that book of his which is entitled the Art of Love. And in his Conversations he writes in a similar manner.

XXIX. And we know that this treatise on the Republic is his work from Chrysippus, in his Republic. He also talked about romantic topics at the beginning of that book of his called the Art of Love. And in his Conversations, he writes in a similar way.

Such are the charges made against him by Cassius, and also by Isidorus, of Pergamus, the orator, who says that all the unbecoming doctrines and assertions of the Stoics were cut out of their books by Athenodorus, the Stoic, who was the curator of the library at Pergamus. And that subsequently they were replaced, as Athenodorus was detected, and placed in a situation of great danger; and this is sufficient to say about those doctrines of his which were impugned.

Such are the accusations against him from Cassius and Isidorus, the orator from Pergamus, who claims that Athenodorus, the Stoic and curator of the library at Pergamus, removed all the inappropriate teachings and statements of the Stoics from their writings. Later, those writings were put back, as Athenodorus was caught and put in a very precarious situation; this is enough to say about the criticized doctrines of his.

XXX. There were eight different persons of the name of Zeno. The first was the Eleatic, whom we shall mention hereafter; the second was this man of whom we are now speaking; the third was a Rhodian, who wrote a history of his country in one book; the fourth was a historian who wrote an account of the expedition of Pyrrhus into Italy and Sicily; and also an epitome of the transactions between the Romans and Carthaginians; the fifth was a disciple of Chrysippus, who wrote very few books, but who left a great number of disciples; the sixth was a physician of Herophila, a very shrewd man in intellect, but a very indifferent writer; the[273] seventh was a grammarian, who, besides other writings, has left some epigrams behind him; the eighth was a Sidonian by descent, a philosopher of the Epicurean school, a deep thinker, and very clear writer.

XXX. There were eight different people named Zeno. The first was the Eleatic, who we’ll mention later; the second was the guy we’re talking about now; the third was a Rhodian who wrote a history of his country in one volume; the fourth was a historian who documented Pyrrhus’s expedition to Italy and Sicily, as well as a summary of the events between the Romans and Carthaginians; the fifth was a student of Chrysippus, who wrote very few books but had many followers; the sixth was a physician of Herophilus, a clever person but not a great writer; the[273] seventh was a grammarian who, in addition to other works, left behind some epigrams; the eighth was a Sidonian by heritage, a philosopher from the Epicurean school, a deep thinker, and a very clear writer.

XXXI. The disciples of Zeno were very numerous. The most eminent were, first of all, Persæus, of Cittium, the son of Demetrius, whom some call a friend of his, but others describe him as a servant and one of the amanuenses who were sent to him by Antigonus, to whose son, Halcyoneus, he also acted as tutor. And Antigonus once, wishing to make trial of him, caused some false news to be brought to him that his estate had been ravaged by the enemy; and as he began to look gloomy at this news, he said to him, “You see that wealth is not a matter of indifference.”

XXXI. Zeno had a lot of disciples. The most notable among them was Persæus from Cittium, the son of Demetrius. Some refer to him as a friend, while others describe him as a servant and one of the scribes sent to Zeno by Antigonus. He also served as a tutor to Antigonus's son, Halcyoneus. At one point, Antigonus wanted to test him, so he had someone bring false news that his estate had been attacked by the enemy. When Persæus started to look upset by the news, Antigonus said to him, “You see that wealth is not something to take lightly.”

The following works are attributed to him. One on Kingly Power; one entitled the Constitution of the Lacedæmonians; one on Marriage; one on Impiety; the Thyestes; an Essay on Love; a volume of Exhortations; one of Conversations; four of Apophthegms; one of Reminiscences; seven treatises, the Laws of Plato.

The following works are attributed to him: one on Royal Authority; one titled the Constitution of the Lacedæmonians; one about Marriage; one on Impiety; the Thyestes; an Essay on Love; a collection of Exhortations; one of Conversations; four volumes of Sayings; one of Memories; and seven treatises, the Laws of Plato.

The next was Ariston, of Chios, the son of Miltiades, who was the first author of the doctrine of indifference; then Herillus, who called knowledge the chief good; then Dionysius, who transferred this description to pleasure; as, on account of the violent disease which he had in his eyes, he could not yet bring himself to call pain a thing indifferent. He was a native of Heraclea; there was also Sphærus, of the Bosphorus; and Cleanthes, of Assos, the son of Phanias, who succeeded him in his school, and whom he used to liken to tablets of hard wax, which are written upon with difficulty, but which retain what is written upon them. And after Zeno’s death, Sphærus became a pupil of Cleanthes. And we shall speak of him in our account of Cleanthes.

The next was Ariston from Chios, the son of Miltiades, who was the first to propose the idea of indifference; then came Herillus, who defined knowledge as the highest good; after him was Dionysius, who applied this definition to pleasure, as he found it hard to call pain indifferent because of the severe illness affecting his eyes. He hailed from Heraclea; alongside him was Sphærus from the Bosphorus, and Cleanthes from Assos, the son of Phanias, who succeeded him at the school and was often compared to hard wax tablets that are tough to write on but manage to hold what is written. After Zeno’s death, Sphærus became a student of Cleanthes. We’ll discuss him further in our account of Cleanthes.

These also were all disciples of Zeno, as we are told by Hippobotus, namely:—Philonides, of Thebes; Callippus, of Corinth; Posidonius, of Alexandria; Athenodorus, of Soli; and Zeno, a Sidonian.

These were all students of Zeno, according to Hippobotus: Philonides from Thebes, Callippus from Corinth, Posidonius from Alexandria, Athenodorus from Soli, and Zeno from Sidon.

XXXII. And I have thought it best to give a general account of all the Stoic doctrines in the life of Zeno, because he it was who was the founder of the sect.

XXXII. I thought it would be best to provide an overview of all the Stoic beliefs in the life of Zeno, since he was the one who founded the sect.

He has written a great many books, of which I have already[274] given a list, in which he has spoken as no other of the Stoics has. And his doctrines in general are these. But we will enumerate them briefly, as we have been in the habit of doing in the case of the other philosophers.

He has written a lot of books, for which I've already[274] provided a list, and he has talked about the Stoics like no one else has. His teachings overall are these. But we'll list them briefly, like we usually do with other philosophers.

XXXIII. The Stoics divide reason according to philosophy, into three parts; and say that one part relates to natural philosophy, one to ethics, and one to logic. And Zeno, the Cittiæan, was the first who made this division, in his treatise on Reason; and he was followed in it by Chrysippus, in the first book of his treatise on Reason, and in the first book of his treatise on Natural Philosophy; and also by Apollodorus; and by Syllus, in the first book of his Introduction to the Doctrines of the Stoics; and by Eudromus, in his Ethical Elements; and by Diogenes, the Babylonian; and Posidonius. Now these divisions are called topics by Apollodorus, species by Chrysippus and Eudromus, and genera by all the rest. And they compare philosophy to an animal, likening logic to the bones and sinews, natural philosophy to the fleshy parts, and ethical philosophy to the soul. Again, they compare it to an egg; calling logic the shell, and ethics the white, and natural philosophy the yolk. Also to a fertile field; in which logic is the fence which goes round it, ethics are the fruit, and natural philosophy the soil, or the fruit-trees. Again, they compare it to a city fortified by walls, and regulated by reason; and then, as some of them say, no one part is preferred to another, but they are all combined and united inseparably; and so they treat of them all in combination. But others class logic first, natural philosophy second, and ethics third; as Zeno does in his treatise on Reason, and in this he is followed by Chrysippus, and Archedemus, and Eudromus.

XXXIII. The Stoics categorize reason, according to philosophy, into three parts: one related to natural philosophy, one to ethics, and one to logic. Zeno the Citian was the first to make this division in his work on Reason, and Chrysippus followed in the first book of his work on Reason and the first book of his work on Natural Philosophy. Apollodorus, Syllus in the first book of his Introduction to the Doctrines of the Stoics, Eudromus in his Ethical Elements, Diogenes the Babylonian, and Posidonius also supported this classification. Apollodorus calls these divisions topics, while Chrysippus and Eudromus refer to them as species, and all the others call them genera. They liken philosophy to an animal, comparing logic to the bones and sinews, natural philosophy to the fleshy parts, and ethical philosophy to the soul. They also compare it to an egg, with logic as the shell, ethics as the white, and natural philosophy as the yolk. Additionally, they liken it to a fertile field, where logic is the fence surrounding it, ethics are the fruit, and natural philosophy is the soil or the fruit trees. Furthermore, they compare it to a fortified city governed by reason; some of them argue that no one part is more important than another, as they are all intricately connected, and thus they discuss them all together. However, others prioritize logic first, natural philosophy second, and ethics third, as Zeno does in his work on Reason, a view followed by Chrysippus, Archedemus, and Eudromus.

For Diogenes of Ptolemais begins with ethics; but Apollodorus places ethics second; and Panætius and Posidonius begin with natural philosophy, as Phanias, the friend of Posidonius asserts, in the first book of his treatise on the School of Posidonius.

For Diogenes of Ptolemais starts with ethics; however, Apollodorus puts ethics second; and Panætius and Posidonius start with natural philosophy, as Phanias, who was a friend of Posidonius, claims in the first book of his work on the School of Posidonius.

But Cleanthes says, that there are six divisions of reason according to philosophy: dialectics, rhetoric, ethics, politics, physics, and theology; but others assert that these are not divisions of reason, but of philosophy itself; and this is the opinion advanced by Zeno, of Tarsus, among others.

But Cleanthes says that there are six branches of reason in philosophy: dialectics, rhetoric, ethics, politics, physics, and theology; however, others argue that these are not branches of reason but of philosophy itself; this view is supported by Zeno of Tarsus, among others.

XXXIV. Some again say, that the logical division is[275] properly subdivided into two sciences, namely, rhetoric and dialectics; and some divide it also into definitive species, which is conversant with rules and tests; while others deny the propriety of this last division altogether, and argue that the object of rules and tests is the discovery of the truth; for it is in this division that they explain the differences of representations. They also argue that, on the other side, the science of definitions has equally for its object the discovery of truth, since we only know things by the intervention of ideas. They also call rhetoric a science conversant about speaking well concerning matters which admit of a detailed narrative; and dialectics they call the science of arguing correctly in discussions which can be carried on by question and answer; on which account they define it thus: a knowledge of what is true, and false, and neither one thing nor the other.

XXXIV. Some people say that logical division is properly split into two fields: rhetoric and dialectics. Others also break it down into specific categories that focus on rules and tests, while some completely reject this last division, arguing that the purpose of rules and tests is to uncover the truth. They explain the differences in representations within this division. On the other hand, they argue that the science of definitions also aims at discovering the truth since we only understand things through ideas. They describe rhetoric as the art of speaking well about topics that can be explained in detail, and they refer to dialectics as the science of arguing correctly in discussions that occur through questions and answers. For this reason, they define it as knowledge of what is true, false, and neither of those.

Again, rhetoric itself they divide into three kinds; for one description they say is concerning about giving advice, another is forensic, and the third encomiastic; and it is also divided into several parts, one relating to the discovery of arguments, one to style, one to the arrangement of arguments, and the other to the delivery of the speech. And a rhetorical oration they divide into the exordium, the narration, the reply to the statements of the adverse party, and the peroration.

Once again, they divide rhetoric into three types: one type focuses on giving advice, another is about legal matters, and the third is celebratory. They also break it down into several parts: one part deals with finding arguments, another with style, another with organizing arguments, and the last with delivering the speech. A rhetorical speech is divided into the introduction, the narrative, the counterarguments against the opposing side, and the conclusion.

XXXV. Dialectics, they say, is divided into two parts; one of which has reference to the things signified, the other to the expression. That which has reference to the things signified or spoken of, they divide again into the topic of things conceived in the fancy, and into those of axioms, of perfect determinations, of predicaments, of things alike, whether upright or prostrate, of tropes, of syllogisms, and of sophisms, which are derived either from the voice or from the things. And these sophisms are of various kinds; there is the false one, the one which states facts, the negative, the sorites, and others like these; the imperfect one, the inexplicable one, the conclusive one, the veiled one, the horned one, the nobody, and the mower.

XXXV. Dialectics, they say, is split into two parts: one relates to the things that are represented, and the other pertains to the expression itself. The part that relates to the things represented is further divided into topics about things imagined, axioms, definitive determinations, categories, similar things—whether standing upright or lying down—tropes, syllogisms, and sophisms, which come either from spoken language or from the things themselves. These sophisms come in various forms: there's the false one, the one that states facts, the negative, the sorites, and others like them; the imperfect one, the inexplicable one, the conclusive one, the veiled one, the horned one, the nobody, and the mower.

In the second part of dialectics, that which has for its object the expression, they treat of written language, of the different parts of a discourse, of solecism and barbarism, of poetical forms of expression, of ambiguity, of a melodious voice, of music; and some even add definitions, divisions, and diction.

In the second part of dialectics, which focuses on expression, they discuss written language, different parts of a discourse, mistakes in grammar and language use, poetic styles of expression, ambiguity, a pleasant voice, and music. Some even include definitions, classifications, and word choices.

They say that the most useful of these parts is the consideration of syllogisms; for that they show us what are the things which are capable of demonstration, and that contributes much to the formation of our judgment, and their arrangement and memory give a scientific character to our knowledge. They define reasoning to be a system composed of assumptions and conclusions: and syllogism is a syllogistic argument proceeding on them. Demonstration they define to be a method by which one proceeds from that which is more known to that which is less. Perception, again, is an impression produced on the mind, its name being appropriately borrowed from impressions on wax made by a seal; and perception they divide into comprehensible and incomprehensible: Comprehensible, which they call the criterion of facts, and which is produced by a real object, and is, therefore, at the same time conformable to that object; Incomprehensible, which has no relation to any real object, or else, if it has any such relation, does not correspond to it, being but a vague and indistinct representation.

They say that the most useful part of this is the study of syllogisms because they show us what can be demonstrated, which greatly helps shape our judgment. Their structure and how we remember them give a scientific aspect to our understanding. They define reasoning as a system made up of assumptions and conclusions, and a syllogism is an argument based on them. They explain demonstration as a method that moves from what is better known to what is less known. Meanwhile, perception is an impression made on the mind, a term that’s appropriately taken from how a seal makes an impression on wax. They categorize perception into comprehensible and incomprehensible: Comprehensible is the criterion for facts, created by a real object, and thus corresponds to that object; Incomprehensible, on the other hand, has no connection to any real object or, if it does, doesn’t match it, being merely a vague and unclear representation.

Dialectics itself they pronounce to be a necessary science, and a virtue which comprehends several other virtues under its species. And the disposition not to take up one side of an argument hastily, they defined to be a knowledge by which we are taught when we ought to agree to a statement, and when we ought to withhold our agreement. Discretion they consider to be a powerful reason, having reference to what is becoming, so as to prevent our yielding to an irrelevant argument. Irrefutability they define to be a power in an argument, which prevents one from being drawn from it to its opposite. Freedom from vanity, according to them, is a habit which refers the perceptions back to right reason.

They describe dialectics as a necessary science and a virtue that includes several other virtues within it. They define the ability to avoid jumping to conclusions on one side of an argument as a skill that helps us know when to agree with a statement and when to hold back our agreement. They see discretion as a strong reason that relates to what is appropriate, helping us avoid giving in to irrelevant arguments. Irrefutability, in their view, is a strength in an argument that keeps one from being swayed to its opposite. They believe that freedom from vanity is a habit that aligns our perceptions with sound reasoning.

Again, they define knowledge itself as an assertion or safe comprehension, or habit, which, in the perception of what is seen, never deviates from the truth. And they say further, that without dialectic speculation, the wise man cannot be free from all error in his reasoning. For that that is what distinguishes what is true from what is false, and which easily detects those arguments which are only plausible, and those which depend upon an ambiguity of language. And without dialectics they say it is not possible to ask or answer questions correctly. They also add, that precipitation in denials extends to those things which are done, so that those[277] who have not properly exercised their perceptions fall into irregularity and thoughtlessness. Again, without dialectics, the wise man cannot be acute, and ingenious, and wary, and altogether dangerous as an arguer. For that it belongs to the same man to speak correctly and to reason correctly, and to discuss properly those subjects which are proposed to him, and to answer readily whatever questions are put to him, all which qualities belong to a man who is skilful in dialectics. This then is a brief summary of their opinions on logic.

Again, they define knowledge as a claim or clear understanding, or a habit, which, in perceiving what is seen, never strays from the truth. They further say that without dialectical reasoning, a wise person cannot be free from all mistakes in their reasoning. This is what sets apart what is true from what is false, and it easily identifies arguments that are merely plausible and those based on ambiguous language. They also state that without dialectics, it’s impossible to ask or answer questions correctly. Additionally, they mention that rushing to deny things extends to actions, causing those who haven’t properly trained their perceptions to fall into disorder and thoughtlessness. Furthermore, without dialectics, a wise person cannot be sharp, clever, cautious, and altogether formidable as a debater. It's essential for the same person to speak accurately, reason correctly, address the subjects presented to them appropriately, and respond promptly to any questions posed—all qualities belonging to someone skilled in dialectics. This is a brief summary of their views on logic.

XXXVI. And, that we may also enter into some more minute details respecting them, we will subjoin what refers to what they call their introductory science, as it is stated by Diocles, of Magnesia, in his Excursion of Philosophers, where he speaks as follows, and we will give his account word for word.

XXXVI. To provide more detailed information about them, we will add what pertains to their introductory science, as explained by Diocles of Magnesia in his Excursion of Philosophers. He states the following, and we will present his account exactly as it is.

The Stoics have chosen to treat, in the first place, of perception and sensation, because the criterion by which the truth of facts is ascertained is a kind of perception, and because the judgment which expresses the belief, and the comprehension, and the understanding of a thing, a judgment which precedes all others, cannot exist without perception. For perception leads the way; and then thought, finding vent in expressions, explains in words the feelings which it derives from perception. But there is a difference between φαντασία and φάντασμα. For φάντασμα is a conception of the intellect, such as takes place in sleep; but φαντασία is an impression, τύπωσις, produced on the mind, that is to say, an alteration, ἀλλοίωσις, as Chrysippus states in the twelfth book of his treatise on the Soul. For we must not take this impression to resemble that made by a seal, since it is impossible to conceive that there should be many impressions made at the same time on the same thing. But φαντασία is understood to be that which is impressed, and formed, and imprinted by a real object, according to a real object, in such a way as it could not be by any other than a real object; and, according to their ideas of the φαντασίαι, some are sensible, and some are not. Those they call sensible, which are derived by us from some one or more senses; and those they call not sensible, which emanate directly from the thought, as for instance, those which relate to incorporeal objects, or any others which are embraced by reason. Again, those which are sensible, are produced by a[278] real object, which imposes itself on the intelligence, and compels its acquiescence; and there are also some others, which are simply apparent, mere shadows, which resemble those which are produced by real objects.

The Stoics have decided to first discuss perception and sensation because the way we determine the truth of facts relies on a type of perception. Additionally, the judgment that conveys belief, understanding, and comprehension of something—this key judgment—cannot exist without perception. Perception leads the way, and then thought, expressing itself through language, explains in words the feelings derived from perception. However, there is a distinction between φαντασία and φάντασμα. While φάντασμα refers to an idea created by the mind, like those that arise in sleep, φαντασία is an impression, τύπωσις, that is formed in the mind—essentially a change, ἀλλοίωσις, as Chrysippus mentions in the twelfth book of his work on the Soul. We shouldn’t think of this impression as similar to one made by a seal since it’s impossible for multiple impressions to occur simultaneously on the same thing. Instead, φαντασία is understood as what is impressed, shaped, and marked by a real object, in such a way that it couldn't come from anything other than a real object. According to their concepts of φαντασίαι, some are sensible, and some are not. The ones they call sensible come from one or more of our senses, while those termed not sensible arise directly from thought, such as those related to intangible objects or any ideas that are captured by reason. Again, the sensible ones are produced by a[278] real object that imposes itself on our understanding and demands our acceptance; there are also others that are merely apparent, mere shadows that resemble those produced by real objects.

Again, these φαντασίαι are divided into rational and irrational; those which are rational belong to animals capable of reason; those which are irrational to animals destitute of reason. Those which are rational are thoughts; those which are irrational have no name; but are again subdivided into artificial and not artificial. At all events, an image is contemplated in a different light by a man skilful in art, from that in which it is viewed by a man ignorant of art.

Again, these fantasies are divided into rational and irrational; those that are rational belong to creatures capable of reasoning, while those that are irrational belong to those without reason. The rational ones are thoughts; the irrational ones have no specific name but are further split into artificial and non-artificial. In any case, an image is perceived differently by someone skilled in art compared to someone who is not knowledgeable about it.

By sensation, the Stoics understand a species of breath which proceeds from the dominant portion of the soul to the senses, whether it be a sensible perception, or an organic disposition, which, according to the notions of some of them, is crippled and vicious. They also call sensation the energy, or active exercise, of the sense. According to them, it is to sensation that we owe our comprehension of white and black, and rough and smooth: from reason, that we derive the notions which result from a demonstration, those for instance which have for their object the existence of Gods, and of Divine Providence. For all our thoughts are formed either by indirect perception, or by similarity, or analogy, or transposition, or combination, or opposition. By a direct perception, we perceive those things which are the objects of sense; by similarity, those which start from some point present to our senses; as, for instance, we form an idea of Socrates from his likeness. We draw our conclusions by analogy, adopting either an increased idea of the thing, as of Tityus, or the Cyclops; or a diminished idea, as of a pigmy. So, too, the idea of the centre of the world was one derived by analogy from what we perceived to be the case of the smaller spheres. We use transposition when we fancy eyes in a man’s breast; combination, when we take in the idea of a Centaur; opposition, when we turn our thoughts to death. Some ideas we also derive from comparison, for instance, from a comparison of words and places.

The Stoics define sensation as a type of breath that flows from the dominant part of the soul to the senses, whether it is a simple sensory perception or an organic state that, according to some of them, is flawed and misguided. They also refer to sensation as the energy or active process of the senses. They believe that sensation gives us our understanding of concepts like white and black, as well as rough and smooth; whereas reason provides us with the ideas that come from demonstration, such as those concerning the existence of gods and divine guidance. All our thoughts come about either through indirect perception, similarity, analogy, transposition, combination, or opposition. Direct perception allows us to see things that are sensory objects; similarity lets us identify things that are linked to what we see; for example, we imagine Socrates based on his likeness. We form conclusions through analogy, either expanding our idea of something, like Tityus or the Cyclops, or shrinking it, like that of a pygmy. Similarly, the idea of the center of the world is drawn from analogies based on our observations of smaller spheres. We use transposition when we imagine eyes in a person's chest; we apply combination when we conceive of a Centaur; and we reflect opposition when we think about death. Some ideas also come from comparison, such as comparing words and places.

There is also nature; as by nature we comprehend what is just and good. And privation, when for instance, we form a notion of a man without hands. Such are the doctrines of[279] the Stoics, on the subject of phantasia, and sensation, and thought.

There is also nature; through nature, we understand what is right and good. And absence, like when we imagine a man without hands. These are the teachings of[279] the Stoics regarding imagination, perception, and thought.

XXXVII. They say that the proper criterion of truth is the comprehension, φαντασία; that is to say, one which is derived from a real object, as Chrysippus asserts in the twelfth book of his Physics; and he is followed by Antipater and Apollodorus. For Boethus leaves a great many criteria, such as intellect, sensation, appetite, and knowledge; but Chrysippus dissents from his view, and in the first book of his treatise on Reason, says, that sensation and preconception are the only criteria. And preconception is, according to him, a comprehensive physical notion of general principles. But others of the earlier Stoics admit right reason as one criterion of the truth; for instance, this is the opinion of Posidonius, and is advanced by him in his essay on Criteria.

XXXVII. They say that the true measure of what’s real is understanding, φαντασία; meaning, it's based on something real, as Chrysippus claims in the twelfth book of his Physics. He is supported by Antipater and Apollodorus. Meanwhile, Boethus lists many criteria like intellect, sensation, appetite, and knowledge; however, Chrysippus disagrees and states in the first book of his treatise on Reason that sensation and preconception are the only true criteria. He defines preconception as a broad understanding of general principles. Other early Stoics accept right reason as a way to determine truth; for example, this is Posidonius's view, which he presents in his essay on Criteria.

XXXVIII. On the subject of logical speculation, there appears to be a great unanimity among the greater part of the Stoics, in beginning with the topic of the voice. Now voice is a percussion of the air; or, as Diogenes, the Babylonian, defines it, in his essay on the Voice, a sensation peculiar to the hearing. The voice of a beast is a mere percussion of the air by some impetus: but the voice of a man is articulate, and is emitted by intellect, as Diogenes lays it down, and is not brought to perfection in a shorter period than fourteen years. And the voice is a body according to the Stoics; for so it is laid down by Archedemus, in his book on the Voice, and by Diogenes, and Antipater, and also by Chrysippus, in the second volume of his Physics. For everything which makes anything, is a body; and the voice makes something when it proceeds to those who hear from those who speak.

XXXVIII. When it comes to logical speculation, most Stoics seem to agree on starting with the topic of voice. Voice is just a vibration of the air; or, as Diogenes of Babylon puts it in his essay on Voice, it's a sensation that only applies to hearing. An animal's voice is just air being hit by some force, but a human voice is articulate and comes from intellect, as Diogenes explains, and it takes at least fourteen years to develop fully. Stoics view voice as a body; this is stated by Archedemus in his book on Voice, along with Diogenes, Antipater, and also Chrysippus in the second volume of his Physics. Everything that produces something is considered a body, and voice produces something when it travels from the speaker to the listener.

A word (λέξις), again, is, according to Diogenes, a voice consisting of letters, as “Day.” A sentence (λόγος) is a significant voice, sent out by the intellect, as for instance, “It is day;” but dialect is a peculiar style imprinted on the utterance of nations, according to their race; and causes varieties in the Greek language, being a sort of local habit, as for instance, the Attics say θάλαττα, and the Ionians say ἡμέρη. The elements of words are the twenty-four letters; and the word letter is used in a triple division of sense, meaning the element itself, the graphical sign of the element, and the name, as Alpha. There are seven vowels, α, ε, η, ι, ο, υ, ω; six mutes, β, γ, δ, κ, π, τ. But voice is different from[280] a word, because voice is a sound; but a word is an articulate sound. And a word differs from a sentence, because a sentence is always significative of something, but a word by itself has no signification, as for instance, βλίτρι. But this is not the case with a sentence. Again, there is a difference between speaking and pronouncing; the sounds are pronounced, but what are spoken are things which are capable of being spoken of.

A word (λέξις) is, according to Diogenes, a sound made up of letters, like “Day.” A sentence (λόγος) is a meaningful sound produced by the mind, such as “It is day;” but dialect is a specific way of speaking characteristic of different nations, based on their heritage, creating variations in the Greek language. For example, the Attics say θάλαττα, while the Ionians say ἡμέρη. The basic building blocks of words are the twenty-four letters. The term letter refers to three aspects: the element itself, the visual representation of that element, and its name, like Alpha. There are seven vowels: α, ε, η, ι, ο, υ, ω; and six consonants: β, γ, δ, κ, π, τ. However, sound is different from a word because sound is just noise, while a word is a meaningful sound. A word is distinct from a sentence since a sentence always conveys meaning, whereas a word on its own has no meaning, like βλίτρι. This isn’t true for a sentence. Additionally, there’s a difference between speaking and pronouncing; sounds are pronounced, but what is spoken refers to things that can be talked about.

XXXIX. Now of sentences there are five parts, as Diogenes tells us in his treatise on Voice; and he is followed by Chrysippus. There is the noun, the common noun, the verb, the conjunction, and the article. Antipater adds also quality, in his treatise upon Words and the things expressed by them. And a common noun (προσηγορία) is, according to Diogenes, a part of a sentence signifying a common quality, as for instance, man, horse. But a noun is a part of a sentence signifying a peculiar quality, such as Diogenes, Socrates. A verb is a part of a sentence signifying an uncombined categorem, as Diogenes (ὁ Διογένης) or, as others define it, an element of a sentence, devoid of case, signifying something compound in reference to some person or persons, as, “I write,” “I say.” A conjunction is a part of a sentence destitute of case, uniting the divisions of the sentence. An article is an element of a sentence, having cases, defining the genders of nouns and their numbers, as ὁ, ἡ, τὸ, οἱ, αἱ, τὰ.

XXXIX. According to Diogenes in his work on Voice, there are five parts of a sentence, which Chrysippus also supports. These are the noun, common noun, verb, conjunction, and article. Antipater also includes quality in his work on Words and what they express. A common noun (προσηγορία) signifies a general quality, like "man" or "horse." In contrast, a noun indicates a specific quality, such as "Diogenes" or "Socrates." A verb signifies an independent category, like "Diogenes" (ὁ Διογένης), or, as others describe it, an element that doesn’t have a case and represents something combined in relation to a person or people, like "I write" or "I say." A conjunction lacks case and connects the parts of the sentence. An article is an element that has cases, defining the genders and numbers of nouns, such as ὁ, ἡ, τὸ, οἱ, αἱ, τὰ.

XL. The excellences of a sentence are five,—good Greek, clearness, conciseness, suitableness, elegance. Good Greek (Ἑλληνισμὸς) is a correct style, according to art, keeping aloof from any vulgar form of expression; clearness is a style which states that which is conceived in the mind in such a way that it is easily known; conciseness is a style which embraces all that is necessary to the clear explanation of the subject under discussion; suitableness is a style suited to the subject; elegance is a style which avoids all peculiarity of expression. Of the vices of a sentence, on the other hand, barbarism is a use of words contrary to that in vogue among the well-educated Greeks; solecism is a sentence incongruously put together.

XL. The qualities of a sentence are five: good Greek, clarity, conciseness, appropriateness, and elegance. Good Greek (Ἑλληνισμὸς) refers to a correct style that adheres to the principles of the art, avoiding any slang or informal expressions; clarity is a style that expresses ideas in a way that is easily understood; conciseness is a style that includes everything necessary for a clear explanation of the topic being discussed; appropriateness is a style that fits the subject matter; elegance is a style that steers clear of any odd or unusual expressions. In contrast, the faults of a sentence include barbarism, which is the use of words that deviate from what is accepted among well-educated Greeks, and solecism, which is a sentence awkwardly constructed.

XLI. A poetical expression is, as Posidonius defines it in his introduction on Style, “A metrical or rhythmical diction, proceeding in preparation, and avoiding all resemblance to prose.” For instance, “The vast and boundless earth,” “Th’ expanse of heaven,” are rhythmical expressions; and[281] poetry is a collection of poetical expressions signifying something, containing an imitation of divine and human beings.

XLI. A poetical expression is, as Posidonius explains in his introduction on Style, “A metered or rhythmic way of speaking that prepares the listener while steering clear of anything that sounds like prose.” For example, “The vast and boundless earth,” “The expanse of heaven,” are rhythmic phrases; and[281] poetry is a collection of these poetical expressions that convey meaning, containing an imitation of divine and human beings.

XLII. A definition is, as Antipater explains it in the first book of his treatise on Definitions, a sentence proceeding by analysis enunciated in such a way as to give a complete idea; or, as Chrysippus says in his treatise on Definitions, it is the explanation of an idea. Description is a sentence which, in a figurative manner, brings one to a knowledge of the subject, or it may be called a simpler kind of definition, expressing the power of a definition in plainer language. Genus is a comprehending of many ideas indissolubly connected, as animal; for this one expression comprehends all particular kinds of animals. An idea is an imagination of the mind which does not express actually anything real, or any quality, but only a quasi reality and a quasi quality; such, for instance, is the idea of a horse when a horse is not present. Species is that which is comprehended under genus, as man is comprehended under animal.

XLII. A definition is, as Antipater explains in the first book of his treatise on Definitions, a statement made through analysis that provides a complete idea; or, as Chrysippus mentions in his treatise on Definitions, it's the explanation of an idea. Description is a statement that figuratively leads one to understand the subject, or it can be viewed as a simpler type of definition, expressing the essence of a definition in clearer language. Genus refers to a grouping of many ideas that are tightly connected, like "animal;" this term covers all specific types of animals. An idea is a mental image that doesn't actually represent anything real or any quality, but only a sort of reality and a sort of quality; for example, the idea of a horse when no horse is present. Species is what falls under a genus, like how man falls under animal.

Again, that is the most general genus which, being a genus itself, has no other genus, as the existent. And that is the most special species, which being a species has no other species, as, for instance, Socrates.

Again, that is the most general category which, while being a category itself, has no other category, like existence. And that is the most specific example, which while being an example has no other example, like Socrates.

XLIII. The division of genus is a dissection of it into the proximate species; as, for instance, “Of animals, some are rational, others irrational.” Contrary division is the dissection of genus into species on the principle of the contrary; so as to be by a sort of negation; as, for instance, “Of existent things, some are good and some not good;” and, “Of things which are not good, some are bad and some indifferent.” Partition is an arrangement of a genus with reference to place, as Crinis says, for instance, “Of goods, some have reference to the mind and some to the body.”

XLIII. The division of a genus breaks it down into its nearby species; for example, “Of animals, some are rational, while others are irrational.” Contrary division involves breaking down a genus into species based on opposition, using a sort of negation; for example, “Of existing things, some are good and some are not good,” and, “Of things that are not good, some are bad and some are indifferent.” Partition organizes a genus based on location, as Crinis says, for instance, “Of goods, some relate to the mind and some to the body.”

XLIV. Ambiguity (ἀμφιβολία) is an expression signifying two or more things having an ordinary or a peculiar meaning, according to the pronunciation, in such a way that more things than one may be understood by the very same expression. Take, for instance, the words αὐλητρὶς πέπτωκε. For you may understand by them, a house has fallen down three times (αὐλὴ τρὶς πέπτωκε), or, a female flute-player has fallen, taking αὐλητρὶς as synonymous with αὐλητρία.

XLIV. Ambiguity (ἀμφιβολία) refers to a situation where a word or expression can mean two or more things, either commonly or in a special way, depending on how it’s pronounced, allowing for multiple interpretations from the same phrase. For example, consider the words αὐλητρὶς πέπτωκε. You could understand this as a house has collapsed three times (αὐλὴ τρὶς πέπτωκε), or as a female flute-player has fallen, with αὐλητρὶς meaning the same as αὐλητρία.

LV. Dialectics are, as Posidonius explains them, the science[282] of what is true and false, and neither one or the other, and it is, as Chrysippus explains it, conversant about words that signify and things that are signified; these then are the doctrines asserted by the Stoics in their speculations on the subject of the voice.

LV. Dialectics are, as Posidonius explains them, the science[282] of what is true and false, and neither one nor the other, and it is, as Chrysippus explains it, about words that indicate and things that are indicated; these then are the theories proposed by the Stoics in their discussions on the topic of the voice.

XLVI. But in that part of dialectics which concerns things and ideas signified, they treat of propositions, of perfect enunciations, of judgments, of syllogisms, of imperfect enunciations, of attributes and deficiencies, and of both direct and indirect categorems or predicaments.

XLVI. But in that part of dialectics that deals with things and the ideas they represent, they discuss propositions, clear statements, judgments, syllogisms, unclear statements, attributes and shortcomings, as well as both direct and indirect categories or classifications.

XLVII. And they say that enunciation is the manifestation of the ideal perception; and these enunciations the Stoics pronounce some to be perfect in themselves, and some to be defective; now those are defective, which furnish an incomplete sense, as for instance, “He writes.” For then we ask further, “Who writes?” But those are perfect in themselves, which give a sense entirely complete, as for instance, “Socrates writes.” Accordingly, in the defective enunciations, categorems are applied; but in those which are perfect in themselves, axioms, and syllogisms, and questions, and interrogations, are brought into play. Now a categorem is something which is predicated of something else, being either a thing which is added to one or more objects, according to the definition of Apollodorus, or else a defective enunciation added to the nominative case, for the purpose of forming a proposition.

XLVII. They say that stating something is the expression of ideal understanding; and the Stoics claim that some of these statements are perfect, while others are flawed. Flawed statements provide an incomplete meaning, like “He writes.” Then we ask, “Who writes?” Perfect statements, on the other hand, convey a complete meaning, such as “Socrates writes.” Therefore, in the flawed statements, we apply categorems; whereas in the perfectly complete statements, we use axioms, syllogisms, questions, and inquiries. A categorem is something that is stated about something else, which can either be something added to one or more subjects, according to Apollodorus’s definition, or a flawed statement added to the nominative case to form a proposition.

Now of categorems, some are accidents …[84] as for instance, “The sailing through a rock.” … And of categorems, some are direct, some indirect, and some neither one nor the other. Now those are correct, which are construed with one of the oblique cases, in such a manner as to produce a categorem, as for instance, “He hears, he sees, he converses.” And those are indirect, which are construed with the passive voice, as for instance, “I am heard, I am seen.”[283] And those which are neither one nor the other, are those which are construed in a neutral kind of manner, as for instance, “To think, to walk.” And those are reciprocal, which are among the indirect ones, without being indirect themselves. Those are effects, ἐνεργήματα, which are such words as, “He is shaved;” for then, the man who is shaved, implies himself.

Now about categorems, some are accidents …[84] like, for example, “Sailing through a rock.” … And of categorems, some are direct, some indirect, and some are neither. Those that are correct are constructed with one of the oblique cases in a way that generates a categorem, like “He hears, he sees, he converses.” Those that are indirect are constructed with the passive voice, such as “I am heard, I am seen.”[283] And those that are neither one nor the other are constructed in a neutral way, like “To think, to walk.” The reciprocal ones fall among the indirect ones without being indirect themselves. These are effects, ἐνεργήματα, which are words like “He is shaved;” because then, the man who is shaved implies himself.

The oblique cases, are the genitive, the dative, and the accusative.

The oblique cases are the genitive, dative, and accusative.

XLVIII. An axiom, is that thing which is true, or false, or perfect in itself, being asserted, or denied positively, as far as depends upon itself; as Chrysippus explains it in his Dialectic Definitions; as for instance, “It is day,” “Dion is walking.” And it has received the name of axiom, ἀξίωμα, because it is either maintained, ἀξιοῦται, or repudiated. For the man who says, “It is day,” appears to maintain the fact of its being day. If then it is day, the axiom put before one is true; but if it is not day, the axiom is false. And an axiom, a question, and an interrogation, differ from one another, and so does an imperative proposition from one which is adjurative, or imprecatory, or hypothetical, or appellative, or false. For that is an axiom which we utter, when we affirm anything positively, which is either true or false. And a question is a thing complete in itself, as also is an axiom, but which requires an answer, as for instance, “Is it day?” Now this is neither true nor false; but, as “It is day” is an axiom; so is, “Is it day?” a question. But an interrogation, πύσμα, is a thing to which it is not possible to make an answer symbolically, as in the case of a question, ἐρώτημα, saying merely “Yes,” but we must reply, “He does live in this place.”

XLVIII. An axiom is something that is true, false, or inherently perfect, stated or denied clearly, as far as it relies on itself; as Chrysippus explains in his Dialectic Definitions. For example, “It is day” and “Dion is walking.” It is called an axiom, ἀξίωμα, because it is either asserted, ἀξιοῦται, or rejected. The person who says, “It is day” appears to assert that it is indeed day. If it is day, then the axiom presented is true; but if it is not day, the axiom is false. An axiom, a question, and an interrogation are different from each other, just as an imperative proposition differs from those that are adjurative, imprecatory, hypothetical, appellative, or false. An axiom is something we state when we positively affirm anything that is either true or false. A question is also complete in itself, like an axiom, but it requires an answer, such as “Is it day?” This is neither true nor false; just as “It is day” is an axiom, “Is it day?” is a question. Meanwhile, an interrogation, πύσμα, is something to which it’s not possible to respond simply, like with a question, ἐρώτημα, where you might only say “Yes”; instead, we must reply, “He does live in this place.”

The imperative proposition is a thing which we utter when we give an order, as for instance this:—

The imperative statement is something we say when we give a command, like this:—

Do you now go to the sweet stream of Inachus.[85]

The appellative proposition is one which is used in the case in which, when a man says anything, he must address somebody, as for instance:—

The appellative proposition is one that is used when a person says something and must address someone, for example:—

Atrides, glorious king of men,
Most mighty Agamemnon.[86]

A false judgment is a proposition, which, while it has at the[284] same time the appearance of a real judgment, loses this character by the addition, and under the influence of, some particle, as for instance:

A false judgment is a statement that, even though it seems like a true judgment, loses that quality due to the inclusion of a specific element or influence, such as:

The Parthenon at least is beautiful.
How like the herdsman is to Priam’s sons.

There is also the dubitative proposition, which differs from the judgment, inasmuch as it is always uttered in the form of a doubt; as for instance:—

There is also the doubtful proposition, which is different from the judgment because it is always expressed as a doubt; for example:—

Are not, then, grief and life two kindred states?[87]

But questions, and interrogations, and things like these, are neither true nor false, while judgments and propositions are necessarily one or the other.

But questions, interrogations, and things like that are neither true nor false, while judgments and statements are necessarily one or the other.

Now of axioms, some are simple, and others are not simple; as Chrysippus, and Archedemus, and Athenodorus, and Antipater, and Crinis, agree in dividing them. Those are simple, which consist of an axiom or proposition, which is not ambiguous, (or of several axioms, or propositions of the same character,) as for instance the sentence, “It is day.” And those are not simple, which consist of an axiom or proposition which is ambiguous, or of several axioms or propositions of that character. Of an axiom, or proposition, which is ambiguous, as “If it is day;” of several axioms, or propositions of that character, as, “If it is day, it is light.”

Now, some axioms are simple, and others are not; as Chrysippus, Archedemus, Athenodorus, Antipater, and Crinis agree in classifying them. Simple axioms consist of one clear axiom or proposition, or several of the same clear type, like the statement, “It is day.” Non-simple axioms consist of an ambiguous axiom or proposition, or several ambiguous axioms or propositions. An example of an ambiguous axiom is “If it is day,” and an example of several ambiguous propositions is, “If it is day, it is light.”

And simple propositions are divided into the affirmative, the negative, the privative, the categorical, the definite, and the indefinite; those which are not simple, are divided into the combined, and the adjunctive, the connected and the disjunctive, and the causal and the augmentative, and the diminutive. That is an affirmative proposition, “It is not day.” And the species of this is doubly affirmative. That again is doubly affirmative, which is affirmative of an affirmative, as for instance, “It is not not day;” for this amounts to, “It is day.” That is a negative proposition, which consists of a negative particle and a categorem, as for instance, “No one is walking.” That is a privative proposition which consists of a privative particle and an axiom according to power, as “This man is inhuman.” That is a categorical proposition, which consists of a nominative case and a categorem, as for instance, “Dion is walking.” That is a definite proposition,[285] which consists of a demonstrative nominative case and a categorem, as for instance, “This man is walking.” That is an indefinite one which consists of an indefinite particle, or of indefinite particles, as for instance, “Somebody is walking,” “He is moving.”

Simple propositions are categorized into affirmative, negative, privative, categorical, definite, and indefinite. Those that are not simple are categorized into combined, adjunctive, connected, disjunctive, causal, augmentative, and diminutive. An example of an affirmative proposition is, “It is not day.” The double affirmative is exemplified by “It is not not day,” which effectively means, “It is day.” A negative proposition includes a negative word and a subject, like “No one is walking.” A privative proposition includes a negative word and a concept based on capability, such as “This man is inhuman.” A categorical proposition includes a subject and a verb, like “Dion is walking.” A definite proposition consists of a demonstrative subject and a verb, such as “This man is walking.” An indefinite proposition contains an indefinite word or words, as in “Somebody is walking,” or “He is moving.”

Of propositions which are not simple, the combined proposition is, as Chrysippus states, in his Dialectics, and Diogenes, too, in his Dialectic Art; that which is held together by the copulative conjunction “if.” And this conjunction professes that the second member of the sentence follows the first, as for instance, “If it is day, it is light.” That which is adjunctive is, as Crinis states in his Dialectic Art, an axiom which is made to depend on the conjunction “since” (ἐπεὶ), beginning with an axiom and ending in an axiom, as for instance, “Since it is day, it is light.” And this conjunction professes both that the second portion of the proposition follows the first, and the first is true. That is a connected proposition which is connected by some copulative conjunctions, as for instance, “It both is day, and it is light.” That is a disjunctive proposition which is disconnected by the disjunctive conjunction, “or” (ἤτοι), as for instance, “It is either day or night.” And this proposition professes that one or other of these propositions is false. That is a causal proposition which is connected by the word, “because;” as for instance, “Because it is day, it is light.” For the first is, as it were, the cause of the second. That is an augmentative proposition, which explains the greater, which is construed with an augmentative particle, and which is placed between the two members of the proposition, as for instance, “It is rather day than night.” The diminutive proposition is, in every respect, the exact contrary of the preceding one; as for instance, “It is less night than day.” Again, at times, axioms or propositions are opposed to one another in respect of their truth and falsehood, when one is an express denial of the other; as for instance, “It is day,” and, “It is not day.”

Of propositions that are not simple, the combined proposition is, as Chrysippus states in his Dialectics, and Diogenes, too, in his Dialectic Art; it’s held together by the copulative conjunction “if.” This conjunction indicates that the second part of the sentence follows the first, as in, “If it is day, it is light.” What is adjunctive, as Crinis notes in his Dialectic Art, is an axiom that depends on the conjunction “since” (ἐπεὶ), starting with one axiom and ending in another, as in, “Since it is day, it is light.” This conjunction shows that the second part of the proposition follows the first and that the first is true. A connected proposition is linked by some copulative conjunctions, as in, “It is both day, and it is light.” A disjunctive proposition is separated by the disjunctive conjunction “or” (ἤτοι), like, “It is either day or night.” This proposition indicates that one of these statements is false. A causal proposition connects with the word “because” as in, “Because it is day, it is light.” Here, the first part acts as the cause of the second. An augmentative proposition highlights the greater and is combined with an augmentative particle placed between the two parts of the proposition, as in, “It is rather day than night.” The diminutive proposition is essentially the opposite of the previous one; for example, “It is less night than day.” Sometimes, axioms or propositions oppose each other regarding their truth and falsehood, where one explicitly denies the other; for example, “It is day,” and “It is not day.”

Again, a conjunctive proposition is correct, when it is such that the opposite of the conclusion is contradictory of the premiss; as for instance, the proposition, “If it is day, it is light,” is true; for, “It is not light,” which is the opposite to the conclusion expressed, is contradictory to the premiss, “It is day.” And a conjunctive proposition is incorrect, when it[286] is such that the opposite of the conclusion is not inconsistent with the premiss, as for instance, “If it is day, Dion is walking.” For the fact that Dion is not walking, is not contradictory of the premiss, “It is day.”

Once again, a conjunctive proposition is correct when its conclusion’s opposite contradicts the premise; for example, the proposition, “If it is day, then it is light,” is true because “It is not light,” which contradicts the conclusion, is in opposition to the premise, “It is day.” A conjunctive proposition is incorrect when its conclusion’s opposite does not contradict the premise, as in, “If it is day, then Dion is walking.” The fact that Dion is not walking does not contradict the premise, “It is day.”

An adjunctive proposition is correct, which begins with a true premiss, and ends in a consequence which follows of necessity, as for instance, “Since it is day, the sun is above the earth.” But it is incorrect when it either begins with a false premiss, or ends with a consequence which does not follow properly; as for instance, “Since it is night, Dion is walking,” for this may be said in the day-time.

An adjunctive statement is correct when it starts with a true premise and concludes with a necessary outcome, like, “Since it’s daytime, the sun is above the earth.” However, it’s incorrect if it starts with a false premise or ends with a conclusion that doesn't logically follow; for example, “Since it’s nighttime, Dion is walking,” because this could also be true during the day.

A causal proposition is correct, when it begins with a true premiss, and ends in a consequence which necessarily follows from it, but yet does not have its premiss reciprocally consequent upon its conclusion; as for instance, “Because it is day, it is light.” For the fact of its being light, is a necessary consequence of its being day; but the fact of its being day, is not necessarily a consequence of its being light. A causal proposition is incorrect, which either begins with a false premiss, or ends with a conclusion that does not follow from it, or which has a premiss which does not correspond to the conclusion; as for instance, “Because it is night, Dion is walking.”

A causal proposition is correct when it starts with a true premise and ends in a consequence that logically follows from it, but the premise is not necessarily dependent on the conclusion. For example, “Because it is day, it is light.” The fact that it is light is a necessary consequence of it being day; however, the fact that it is day is not necessarily a consequence of it being light. A causal proposition is incorrect if it either starts with a false premise, ends with a conclusion that doesn’t follow, or has a premise that doesn’t match the conclusion; for instance, “Because it is night, Dion is walking.”

A proposition is persuasive, which leads to the assent of the mind, as for instance, “If she brought him forth, she is his mother.” But still this is a falsehood, for a hen is not the mother of an egg. Again, there are some propositions which are possible, and some which are impossible; and some which are necessary, and some which are not necessary. That is possible, which is capable of being true, since external circumstances are no hindrance to its being true; as for instance, “Diocles lives.” And that is impossible which is not capable of being true; as for instance, “The earth flies.” That is necessary which, being true, is not capable of being false; or perhaps is intrinsically capable of being false, but still has external circumstances which hinder its being false, as for instance, “Virtue profits a man.” That again, is not necessary, which is true, but which has a capacity of being false, though external circumstances offer no hindrance to either alternative; as for instance, “Dion walks.”

A statement is convincing when it gets the mind to agree, like saying, “If she gave birth to him, she is his mother.” But this is actually a lie, because a hen isn’t the mother of an egg. There are also statements that are possible and others that are impossible; some are necessary and some are not necessary. Something is possible if it can be true, with no external factors stopping it from being true, like “Diocles is alive.” Something is impossible if it can't be true, like “The earth flies.” Something is necessary if, when true, it cannot be false; or it might be able to be false intrinsically, but external factors prevent it from being false, like “Virtue benefits a person.” On the other hand, something is not necessary if it is true but can still be false, even if external circumstances don’t affect either possibility, like “Dion is walking.”

That is a reasonable or probable proposition, which has a[287] great preponderance of opportunities in favour of its being true; as for instance, “I shall be alive to-morrow.” And there are other different kinds of propositions and conversions of them, from true to false, and re-conversions again; concerning which we must speak at some length.

That is a reasonable or likely statement, which has a[287] strong chance of being true; for example, “I will be alive tomorrow.” There are also other types of statements and their transformations from true to false, and back again; we need to discuss these in detail.

XLIX. An argument, as Crinis says, is that which is composed of a lemma or major premiss, an assumption or minor premiss, and a conclusion; as for instance this, “If it is day, it is light;” “But it is day, therefore it is light.” For the lemma, or major premiss, is, “If it is day, it is light.” The assumption, or minor premiss, is, “It is day.” The conclusion follows, “Therefore it is light.” The mode of a proposition is, as it were, a figure of an argument, as for instance, such as this, “If it is the first, it is the second; but it is the first, therefore it is the second.”

XLIX. An argument, as Crinis puts it, is made up of a major premise (lemma), a minor premise (assumption), and a conclusion. For example, “If it is day, it is light;” “But it is day, so it is light.” Here, the major premise is “If it is day, it is light.” The minor premise is “It is day.” The conclusion is “Therefore, it is light.” The structure of a proposition is, in a way, a framework for an argument, like this: “If it is the first, it is the second; but it is the first, so it is the second.”

A conditional syllogism is that which is composed of both the preceding arguments; as for instance, “If Plato is alive, Plato breathes; but the first fact is so, therefore so is the second.” And this conditional syllogism has been introduced for the sake, in long and complex sentences, of not being forced to repeat the assumption, as it was a long one, and also the conclusion; but of being able, instead, to content one’s self with summing it up briefly thus, “The first case put is true, therefore so is the second.”

A conditional syllogism is one that includes both of the earlier arguments; for example, “If Plato is alive, then Plato breathes; since the first statement is true, therefore the second one is as well.” This type of conditional syllogism was created to avoid having to repeat the lengthy assumption and conclusion in long and complicated sentences. Instead, you can simply summarize it by saying, “The first case presented is true, so the second case is true as well.”

Of arguments, some are conclusive, others are inconclusive. Those are inconclusive which are such, that the opposite of the conclusion drawn in them is not necessarily incompatible with the connection of the premisses. As for instance, such arguments as these, “If it is day, it is light; but it is day, therefore, Dion is walking.” But of conclusive arguments, some are called properly by the kindred name conclusions, and some are called syllogistic arguments. Those then are syllogistic which are either such as do not admit of demonstration, or such as are brought to an indemonstrable conclusion, according to some one or more propositions; such for instance as the following: “If Dion walks, then Dion is in motion.” Those are conclusive, which infer their conclusion specially, and not syllogistically; such for instance, as this, “The proposition it is both day and night is false. Now it is day; therefore, it is not night.”

Some arguments are conclusive, while others are inconclusive. Inconclusive arguments are those where the opposite of the conclusion isn't necessarily incompatible with the premises. For example, consider arguments like, “If it’s day, it’s light; but it’s day, therefore Dion is walking.” In contrast, conclusive arguments can be further categorized. Some are referred to as conclusions, while others are known as syllogistic arguments. Syllogistic arguments either do not permit demonstration or lead to an indemonstrable conclusion based on one or more propositions, like: “If Dion walks, then Dion is in motion.” Conclusive arguments specifically derive their conclusion, rather than doing so syllogistically; for example, “The statement that it is both day and night is false. Now it is day; therefore, it is not night.”

Those again, are unsyllogistic arguments which have an air[288] of probability about them, and a resemblance to syllogistic ones, but which still do not lead to the deduction of proper conclusions. As for instance, “If Dion is a horse, Dion is an animal; but Dion is not a horse, therefore, Dion is not an animal.”

Those are, again, unsyllogistic arguments that seem probable and resemble syllogistic ones, but they still don’t lead to valid conclusions. For example, “If Dion is a horse, Dion is an animal; but Dion is not a horse, therefore, Dion is not an animal.”

Again, of arguments, some are true, and some are false. Those are true which deduce a conclusion from true premisses, as, for instance, “If virtue profits, then vice injures.” And those are false which have some falsehood in their premisses, or which are inconclusive; as, for instance, “If it is day, it is light; but it is day, therefore, Dion is alive.”

Again, some arguments are true, and some are false. True arguments derive a conclusion from true premises, such as, for example, “If virtue is beneficial, then vice is harmful.” False arguments contain some falsehood in their premises, or they are inconclusive; for instance, “If it is daytime, it is light; but it is daytime, therefore, Dion is alive.”

There are also arguments which are possible, and others which are impossible; some likewise which are necessary, and others which are not necessary. There are too, some which are not demonstrated from their not standing in need of demonstration, and these are laid down differently by different people; but Chrysippus enumerates five kinds, which serve as the foundation for every kind of argument; and which are assumed in conclusive arguments properly so called, and in syllogisms, and in modes.

There are arguments that can be made, and others that can't; some are essential, while others aren't. There are also some that don't need proof because they're self-evident, and these are regarded differently by different people. However, Chrysippus identifies five types that form the basis for all arguments, which are used in definitive arguments, syllogisms, and various forms of reasoning.

The first kind that is not demonstrated, is that in which the whole argument consists of a conjunctive and an antecedent; and in which the first term repeats itself so as to form a sort of conjunctive proposition, and to bring forward as the conclusion the last term. As, for instance, “If the first be true, so is the second; but the first is true, therefore, so is the second.” The second kind that is not demonstrated, is that which, by means of the conjunctive and the opposite of the conclusion, has a conclusion opposite to the first premiss. As, for instance, “If it be day, it is light; but it is night, therefore it is not day.” For here the assumption arises from the opposite of the conclusion, and the conclusion from the opposite of the first term. The third kind that is not demonstrative, is that which, by a negative combination, and by one of the terms in the proposition, produces the contradictory of the remainder; as, for instance, “Plato is not dead and alive at the same time but Plato is dead; therefore, Plato is not alive.” The fourth kind that is not demonstrative, is that which, by means of a disjunctive, and one of those terms which are in the disjunctive, has a conclusion opposite to what remains; as, for instance, “It is either the first, or the second; but it[289] is the first; therefore, it is not the second.” The fifth kind that is not demonstrative, is that in which the whole argument consists of a disjunctive proposition, and the opposite of one of the terms, and then one makes the conclusion identical with the remainder; as, for instance, “It is either day or night; but it is not night; therefore it is day.”

The first type that isn’t proven is one where the whole argument consists of a conjunction and an antecedent; in this case, the first term repeats itself to create a kind of conjunctive statement, leading to the last term as the conclusion. For example, “If the first is true, then the second is also true; the first is true, so the second is true.” The second type that isn’t proven is one where, using the conjunction and the opposite of the conclusion, it leads to a conclusion that is opposite to the first premise. For instance, “If it’s day, it’s light; but it’s night, so it’s not day.” Here, the assumption comes from the opposite of the conclusion, and the conclusion arises from the opposite of the first term. The third type that isn’t proven is one that, through a negative combination, and by one of the terms in the statement, leads to the contradiction of the remaining term; for example, “Plato is not dead and alive at the same time, but Plato is dead; therefore, Plato is not alive.” The fourth type that isn’t proven is one that, using a disjunction and one of the terms in that disjunction, leads to a conclusion that contradicts what’s left; for example, “It’s either the first or the second; but it’s the first; therefore, it’s not the second.” The fifth type that isn’t proven is one where the entire argument consists of a disjunctive statement and the negation of one of the terms, leading to a conclusion that is identical to what remains; for instance, “It’s either day or night; but it’s not night; so it’s day.”

According to the Stoics, truth follows upon truth, as “It is light,” follows upon “It is day.” And falsehood follows upon falsehood; as, “If it is false that it is night, it is also false that it is dark.” Sometimes too, truth follows from falsehood; for instance, though it is false that “the earth flies,” it is true that “there is the earth.” But falsehood does never follow from truth; for, from the fact that “there is the earth,” it does not follow “that the earth flies.”

According to the Stoics, one truth leads to another, just like “It is light” comes after “It is day.” And falsehood leads to more falsehood; for example, “If it is false that it is night, it is also false that it is dark.” Sometimes, truth can come from falsehood; for instance, even though it’s false that “the earth flies,” it is true that “there is the earth.” However, falsehood never comes from truth; just because “there is the earth” doesn’t mean “that the earth flies.”

There are also some arguments which are perplexed, being veiled and escaping notice; or such as are called sorites, the horned one, or the nobody. That is a veiled argument[88] which resembles the following one; “two are not a few, nor three, nor those, nor four, and so on to ten; but two are few; therefore, so are ten few.”

There are also some confusing arguments that are hidden and go unnoticed; or those known as sorites, the horned one, or the nobody. That’s a hidden argument[88] that looks like this: “Two isn’t a small number, nor is three, nor those, nor four, and counting up to ten; but two is a small number; therefore, ten is also a small number.”

The nobody is a conjunctive argument, and one that consists of the indefinite and the definite, and which has a minor premiss and a conclusion; as, for instance, “If any one is here, he is not in Rhodes.”

The nobody is a combined argument that includes both indefinite and definite statements, which has a minor premise and a conclusion; for example, "If anyone is here, he is not in Rhodes."

L. Such then are the doctrines which the Stoics maintain on the subject of logic, in order as far as possible to establish their point that the logician is the only wise man. For they assert that all affairs are looked at by means of that speculation[290] which proceeds by argument, including under this assertion both those that belong to natural and also those which belong to moral philosophy: for, say they, how else could one determine the exact value of nouns, or how else could one explain what laws are imposed upon such and such actions? Moreover, as there are two habits both incidental to virtue, the one considers what each existing thing is, and the other inquires what it is called. These then are the notions of the Stoics on the subject of logic.

L. These are the beliefs that the Stoics hold about logic, aiming to prove that the logician is the only truly wise person. They argue that all matters are examined through reasoning[290], which includes both natural philosophy and moral philosophy. They claim that without this reasoning, we cannot determine the exact meaning of words or explain the rules governing certain actions. Additionally, there are two habits related to virtue: one focuses on what each thing is, while the other looks at what it is called. These are the Stoics' ideas about logic.

LI. The ethical part of philosophy they divide into the topic of inclination, the topic of good and bad, the topic of the passions, the topic of virtue, the topic of the chief good, and of primary estimation, and of actions; the topic of what things are becoming, and of exhortation and dissuasion. And this division is the one laid down by Chrysippus, and Archedemus, and Zeno, of Tarsus, and Apollodorus, and Diogenes, and Antipater, and Posidonius. For Zeno, of Cittium, and Cleanthes, have, as being more ancient they were likely to, adopted a more simple method of treating these subjects. But these men divided logical and the natural philosophy.

LI. They break down the ethical part of philosophy into topics like desire, good and bad, emotions, virtue, the ultimate good, main judgments, and actions; they also consider what is appropriate and how to encourage or discourage certain behaviors. This classification was established by Chrysippus, Archedemus, Zeno of Tarsus, Apollodorus, Diogenes, Antipater, and Posidonius. Zeno of Citium and Cleanthes, being older, generally took a more straightforward approach to these subjects. However, these thinkers made a distinction between logic and natural philosophy.

LII. They say that the first inclination which an animal has is to protect itself, as nature brings herself to take an interest in it from the beginning, as Chrysippus affirms in the first book of his treatise on Ends; where he says, that the first and dearest object to every animal is its own existence, and its consciousness of that existence. For that it is not natural for any animal to be alienated from itself, or even to be brought into such a state as to be indifferent to itself, being neither alienated from nor interested in itself. It remains, therefore, that we must assert that nature has bound the animal to itself by the greatest unanimity and affection; for by that means it repels all that is injurious, and attracts all that is akin to it and desirable. But as for what some people say, that the first inclination of animals is to pleasure, they say what is false. For they say that pleasure, if there be any such thing at all, is an accessory only, which, nature, having sought it out by itself, as well as those things which are adapted to its constitution, receives incidentally in the same manner as animals are pleased, and plants made to flourish.

LII. It’s said that an animal's first instinct is to protect itself, as nature takes an interest in it from the very start, as Chrysippus points out in the first book of his treatise on Ends. He states that the primary and most cherished concern of every animal is its own survival and awareness of that survival. It’s not natural for any animal to feel disconnected from itself or to reach a state of indifference toward its own existence. Therefore, we must conclude that nature has closely tied the animal to itself with the strongest bond and affection; this connection allows it to repel anything harmful and attract what is beneficial and desirable. However, regarding what some claim, that the first instinct of animals is towards pleasure, they are mistaken. They argue that pleasure, if it exists at all, is merely an accessory, which nature seeks out along with things that suit its constitution, and it is experienced incidentally, just as animals find joy and plants thrive.

Moreover, say they, nature makes no difference between[291] animals and plants, when she regulates them so as to leave them without voluntary motion or sense; and some things too take place in ourselves in the same manner as in plants. But, as inclination in animals tends chiefly to the point of making them pursue what is appropriate to them, we may say that their inclinations are regulated by nature. And as reason is given to rational animals according to a more perfect principle, it follows, that to live correctly according to reason, is properly predicated of those who live according to nature. For nature is as it were the artist who produces the inclination.

Furthermore, they say that nature doesn’t differentiate between[291] animals and plants, as she regulates them to exist without voluntary movement or sensation; and some processes within us happen in the same way as in plants. However, since animals' inclinations mainly drive them to seek what suits them, we can say that nature regulates their inclinations. Since rational animals are granted reason based on a more perfect principle, it follows that living correctly according to reason is properly attributed to those who live in harmony with nature. Nature is, in a sense, the artist that shapes these inclinations.

LIII. On which account Zeno was the first writer who, in his treatise on the Nature of Man, said, that the chief good was confessedly to live according to nature; which is to live according to virtue, for nature leads us to this point. And in like manner Cleanthes speaks in his treatise on Pleasure, and so do Posidonius and Hecaton in their essays on Ends as the Chief Good. And again, to live according to virtue is the same thing as living according to one’s experience of those things which happen by nature; as Chrysippus explains it in the first book of his treatise on the Chief Good. For our individual natures are all parts of universal nature; on which account the chief good is to live in a manner corresponding to nature, and that means corresponding to one’s own nature and to universal nature; doing none of those things which the common law of mankind is in the habit of forbidding, and that common law is identical with that right reason which pervades everything, being the same with Jupiter, who is the regulator and chief manager of all existing things.

LIII. Because of this, Zeno was the first writer who, in his work on the Nature of Man, stated that the ultimate good is simply to live in accordance with nature; which means to live in accordance with virtue, since nature guides us to that conclusion. Similarly, Cleanthes discusses this in his work on Pleasure, as do Posidonius and Hecaton in their essays on the Ultimate Good. Furthermore, living according to virtue is essentially the same as living according to our understanding of what naturally occurs; as Chrysippus explains in the first book of his treatise on the Ultimate Good. Our individual natures are all part of universal nature; therefore, the ultimate good is to live in a way that aligns with nature, which means aligning with both our own nature and universal nature; avoiding those actions that the common law of humanity generally forbids, and this common law aligns with the reason that permeates everything, which is the same as Jupiter, who is the overseer and main manager of all that exists.

Again, this very thing is the virtue of the happy man and the perfect happiness of life when everything is done according to a harmony with the genius of each individual with reference to the will of the universal governor and manager of all things. Diogenes, accordingly, says expressly that the chief good is to act according to sound reason in our selection of things according to our nature. And Archedemus defines it to be living in the discharge of all becoming duties. Chrysippus again understands that the nature, in a manner corresponding to which we ought to live, is both the common nature, and also human nature in particular; but Cleanthes will not admit of any other nature than the common one alone, as that to which people ought to live in a manner corresponding; and repudiates[292] all mention of a particular nature. And he asserts that virtue is a disposition of the mind always consistent and always harmonious; that one ought to seek it out for its own sake, without being influenced by fear or hope by any external influence. Moreover, that it is in it that happiness consists, as producing in the soul the harmony of a life always consistent with itself; and that if a rational animal goes the wrong way, it is because it allows itself to be misled by the deceitful appearances of exterior things, or perhaps by the instigation of those who surround it; for nature herself never gives us any but good inclinations.

Once again, this is the essence of a happy person and the true happiness of life when everything is in harmony with each individual’s nature, aligned with the will of the universal ruler and manager of all things. Diogenes clearly states that the greatest good is to act according to sound reason when choosing things that suit our nature. Archedemus defines it as living by fulfilling all necessary duties. Chrysippus believes that the nature we should live by includes both common nature and human nature specifically; however, Cleanthes insists on acknowledging only the common nature, which he believes people should align with, rejecting any notion of a specific nature. He argues that virtue is a mindset that is always consistent and harmonious; we should pursue it for its own sake, without being swayed by fear or hope from external influences. Additionally, he claims that true happiness lies in this virtue, as it brings harmony to a life that is always coherent with itself. If a rational being goes astray, it’s because it allows itself to be misled by the deceptive appearances of external factors or perhaps by those around it, as nature itself only inclines us toward what is good.

LIV. Now virtue is, to speak generally, a perfection in everything, as in the case of a statue; whether it is invisible as good health, or speculative as prudence. For Hecaton says, in the first book of his treatise on Virtues, that the scientific and speculative virtues are those which have a constitution arising from speculation and study, as, for instance, prudence and justice; and that those which are not speculative are those which are generally viewed in their extension as a practical result or effect of the former; such for instance, as health and strength. Accordingly, temperance is one of the speculative virtues, and it happens that good health usually follows it, and is marshalled as it were beside it; in the same way as strength follows the proper structure of an arch.—And the unspeculative virtues derive their name from the fact of their not proceeding from any acquiescence reflected by intelligence; but they are derived from others, are only accessories, and are found even in worthless people, as in the case of good health, or courage. And Posidonius, in the first book of his treaties on Ethics, says that the great proof of the reality of virtue is that Socrates, and Diogenes, and Antisthenes, made great improvement; and the great proof of the reality of vice may be found in the fact of its being opposed to virtue.

LIV. Virtue, in general, is a form of perfection in everything, similar to a statue; whether it’s something you can’t see, like good health, or something more abstract, like prudence. Hecaton mentions in the first book of his treatise on Virtues that the scientific and theoretical virtues come from speculation and study, like prudence and justice. In contrast, those that aren’t speculative are typically seen as practical results or effects of the former, such as health and strength. Therefore, temperance is one of the theoretical virtues, and it often leads to good health, which can be seen as accompanying it, just as strength follows the correct structure of an arch. The nonspeculative virtues are named for not arising from any insight from intelligence; instead, they come from other sources, are merely accessories, and can be found even in unworthy people, like good health or courage. Posidonius, in the first book of his treatise on Ethics, argues that the true evidence of the existence of virtue is shown by the significant improvements made by Socrates, Diogenes, and Antisthenes, while the stark evidence of the reality of vice is its opposition to virtue.

Again, Chrysippus, in the first book of his treatise on the Chief Good, and Cleanthes, and also Posidonius in his Exhortations, and Hecaton, all agree that virtue may be taught. And that they are right, and that it may be taught, is plain from men becoming good after having been bad. On this account Panætius teaches that there are two virtues, one speculative and the other practical; but others make three kinds, the logical, the natural, and the ethical. Posidonius[293] divides virtue into four divisions; and Cleanthes, Chrysippus, and Antipater make the divisions more numerous still; for Apollophanes asserts that there is but one virtue, namely, prudence.

Again, Chrysippus, in the first book of his work on the Chief Good, along with Cleanthes, Posidonius in his Exhortations, and Hecaton, all agree that virtue can be taught. It's clear they are correct, as we've seen people turn from bad to good. For this reason, Panætius teaches that there are two types of virtues: one speculative and the other practical; however, others identify three kinds: logical, natural, and ethical. Posidonius[293] divides virtue into four categories, while Cleanthes, Chrysippus, and Antipater have even more divisions; Apollophanes claims that there is only one virtue, which is prudence.

Among the virtues some are primitive and some are derived. The primitive ones are prudence, manly courage, justice, and temperance. And subordinate to these, as a kind of species contained in them, are magnanimity, continence, endurance, presence of mind, wisdom in council. And the Stoics define prudence as a knowledge of what is good, and bad, and indifferent; justice as a knowledge of what ought to be chosen, what ought to be avoided, and what is indifferent; magnanimity as a knowledge of engendering a lofty habit, superior to all such accidents as happen to all men indifferently, whether they be good or bad; continence they consider a disposition which never abandons right reason, or a habit which never yields to pleasure; endurance they call a knowledge or habit by which we understand what we ought to endure, what we ought not, and what is indifferent; presence of mind they define as a habit which is prompt at finding out what is suitable on a sudden emergency; and wisdom in counsel they think a knowledge which leads us to judge what we are to do, and how we are to do it, in order to act becomingly. And analogously, of vices too there are some which are primary, and some which are subordinate; as, for instance, folly, and cowardice, and injustice, and intemperance, are among the primary vices; incontinence, slowness, and folly in counsel among the subordinate ones. And the vices are ignorance of those things of which the virtues are the knowledge.

Among virtues, some are fundamental while others are derived. The fundamental ones are prudence, courage, justice, and temperance. Beneath these, as categories that fall under them, we have magnanimity, self-control, endurance, quick thinking, and wisdom in decision-making. The Stoics define prudence as knowledge of what is good, bad, and neutral; justice as understanding what should be chosen, what should be avoided, and what is neutral; magnanimity as the ability to cultivate a noble character, rising above the mishaps that happen to everyone, whether good or bad; self-control as a mindset that never abandons sound reasoning, or a habit that doesn’t give in to pleasure; endurance as the ability or habit of recognizing what we should tolerate, what we shouldn’t, and what is neutral; quick thinking as the ability to quickly determine what’s appropriate in an emergency; and wisdom in decision-making as the knowledge that helps us decide what to do and how to do it appropriately. Similarly, there are also primary and subordinate vices; for instance, folly, cowardice, injustice, and intemperance are considered primary vices, while lack of self-control, slowness, and poor judgment in decision-making are subordinate vices. Vices represent ignorance of those things that virtues encompass knowledge about.

LV. Good, looked at in a general way, is some advantage, with the more particular distinction, being partly what is actually useful, partly what is not contrary to utility. On which account virtue itself, and the good which partakes of virtue are spoken of in a threefold view of the subject. First, as to what kind of good it is, and from what it ensues; as, for instance, in an action done according to virtue. Secondly, as to the agent, in the case of a good man who partakes of virtue.…[89]

LV. Overall, goodness is considered an advantage, with a more specific distinction being what is actually useful and what doesn't go against usefulness. For this reason, virtue itself and the good that is related to virtue are discussed from three perspectives. First, regarding what type of good it is and what leads to it; for example, in an action performed according to virtue. Secondly, regarding the person acting, in the case of a good person who possesses virtue.…[89]

At another time, they define the good in a peculiar manner, as being what is perfect according to the nature of a rational being as rational being. And, secondly, they say that it is conformity to virtue, so that all actions which partake of virtue, and all good men, are themselves in some sense the good. And in the third place, they speak of its accessories, joy, and mirth, and things of that kind. In the same manner they speak of vices, which they divide into folly, cowardice, injustice, and things of that kind. And they consider that those things which partake of vices, and actions done according to vice, and bad men, are themselves in some sense the evil; and its accessories are despondency, and melancholy, and other things of that kind.

At another time, they define the good in a unique way, as being what is perfect according to the nature of a rational being as a rational being. Secondly, they say that it aligns with virtue, meaning that all actions that embody virtue, and all good people, are in some sense the good. Thirdly, they talk about its associated feelings, like joy and happiness, and similar things. Similarly, they discuss vices, which they categorize into folly, cowardice, injustice, and so on. They believe that those things associated with vices, actions driven by vice, and bad people, are in some sense the evil; and its associated feelings are despair, sadness, and other similar things.

LVI. Again, of goods, some have reference to the mind, and some are external; and some neither have reference to the mind, nor are external. The goods having reference to the mind are virtues, and actions according to the virtues. The external goods are the having a virtuous country, a virtuous friend, and the happiness of one’s country and friend. And those which are not external, and which have no reference to the mind, are such as a man’s being virtuous and happy to himself. And reciprocally, of evils, some have reference to the mind, such as the vices and actions according to them; some are external, such as having a foolish country, or a foolish friend, or one’s country or one’s friend being unhappy. And those evils which are not external, and which have no reference to the mind, are such as a man’s being worthless and unhappy to himself.

LVI. Again, some goods are related to the mind, some are external, and some are neither related to the mind nor external. The goods related to the mind are virtues and actions that align with those virtues. The external goods include having a virtuous country, a virtuous friend, and the happiness of one's country and friend. The goods that are neither external nor related to the mind are those where a person is virtuous and happy in themselves. Conversely, some evils are related to the mind, like vices and actions that correspond with them; some are external, such as having a foolish country or a foolish friend, or when one's country or friend is unhappy. The evils that are neither external nor related to the mind are those where a person feels worthless and unhappy within themselves.

LVII. Again, of goods, some are final, some are efficient, and some are both final and efficient. For instance, a friend,[295] and the services done by him to one, are efficient goods; but courage, and prudence, and liberty, and delight, and mirth, and freedom from pain, and all kinds of actions done according to virtue, are final goods. There are too, as I said before, some goods which are both efficient and final; for inasmuch as they produce perfect happiness they are efficient, and inasmuch as they complete it by being themselves parts of it, they are final. And in the same way, of evils, some are final, and some efficient, and some partake of both natures. For instance, an enemy and the injuries done to one by him, are efficient evils; fear, meanness of condition, slavery, want of delight, depression of spirits, excessive grief, and all actions done according to vice, are final evils; and some partake of both characters, since, inasmuch as they produce perfect unhappiness, they are efficient; and inasmuch as they complete it in such a way as to become parts of it, they are final.

LVII. Again, regarding goods, some are final, some are efficient, and some are both final and efficient. For example, a friend, [295] and the help they provide are efficient goods; however, courage, prudence, liberty, joy, laughter, relief from pain, and all virtuous actions are final goods. Also, as I mentioned before, there are goods that are both efficient and final; because they lead to complete happiness, they are efficient, and because they are part of it, they are final. Similarly, in the case of evils, some are final, some are efficient, and some have both qualities. For instance, an enemy and the harm they cause are efficient evils; fear, low status, slavery, lack of joy, depression, overwhelming grief, and all actions stemming from vice are final evils; and some have both aspects, since they create complete unhappiness, making them efficient, and they contribute to it in a way that makes them part of it, thus they are final.

LVIII. Again, of the goods which have reference to the mind, some are habits, some are dispositions, and some are neither habits nor dispositions. Dispositions are virtues, habits are practices, and those which are neither habits nor dispositions are energies. And, speaking generally, the following may be called mixed goods: happiness in one’s children, and a happy old age. But knowledge is a pure good. And some goods are continually present, such as virtue; and some are not always present, as joy, or taking a walk.

LVIII. Once again, regarding the things related to the mind, some are habits, some are traits, and some are neither habits nor traits. Traits are virtues, habits are actions, and those that are neither habits nor traits are energies. Broadly speaking, the following can be considered mixed goods: happiness in one’s children and a joyful old age. However, knowledge is a pure good. Some goods are always present, like virtue, while others are not consistently present, such as joy or going for a walk.

LIX. But every good is expedient, and necessary, and profitable, and useful, and serviceable, and beautiful, and advantageous, and eligible, and just. Expedient, inasmuch as it brings us things, which by their happening to us do us good; necessary, inasmuch as it assists us in what we have need to be assisted; profitable, inasmuch as it repays all the care that is expended on it, and makes a return with interest to our great advantage; useful, inasmuch as it supplies us with what is of utility; serviceable, because it does us service which is much praised; beautiful, because it is in accurate proportion to the need we have of it, and to the service it does. Advantageous, inasmuch as it is of such a character as to confer advantage on us; eligible, because it is such that we may rationally choose it; and just, because it is in accordance with law, and is an efficient cause of union.

LIX. But every good is beneficial, necessary, profitable, useful, helpful, beautiful, advantageous, desirable, and just. Beneficial, because it brings us things that positively impact our lives; necessary, as it supports us in ways we need help; profitable, because it rewards all the effort we put into it and gives back more than we invested; useful, as it provides us with what we find practical; helpful, since it offers us valuable services that are highly regarded; beautiful, because it is perfectly aligned with our needs and the service it provides. Advantageous, as it is designed to benefit us; desirable, because it is something we can rationally choose; and just, because it aligns with the law and fosters unity.

And they call the honourable the perfect good, because it[296] has naturally all the numbers which are required by nature, and because it discloses a perfect harmony. Now, the species of this perfect good are four in number: justice, manly courage, temperance, and knowledge; for in these goods all beautiful actions have their accomplishment. And analogously, there are also four species of the disgraceful: injustice, and cowardice, and intemperance, and folly. And the honourable is predicated in one sense, as making those who are possessed of it worthy of all praise; and in a second sense, it is used of what is well adapted by nature for its proper work; and in another sense, when it expresses that which adorns a man, as when we say that the wise man alone is good and honourable.

And they refer to the honorable as the perfect good, because it[296] naturally includes all the qualities needed by nature and reveals a perfect harmony. Now, the types of this perfect good are four: justice, bravery, self-control, and knowledge; because in these virtues, all beautiful actions are fulfilled. Similarly, there are also four types of disgraceful behavior: injustice, cowardice, lack of self-control, and foolishness. The honorable is described in one way as making those who possess it deserving of all praise; in another way, it refers to what is well-suited by nature for its rightful task; and in yet another way, it signifies that which enhances a person, as when we say that only the wise man is good and honorable.

The Stoics also say, that the beautiful is the only good, as Hecaton says, in the third book of his treatise on Goods, and Chrysippus asserts the same principle in his essays on the Beautiful. And they say that this is virtue, and that which partakes of virtue; and this assertion is equal to the other, that everything good is beautiful, and that the good is an equivalent term to the beautiful, inasmuch as the one thing is exactly equal to the other. For since it is good, it is beautiful; and it is beautiful, therefore, it is good.

The Stoics also say that beauty is the only true good, as Hecaton mentions in the third book of his treatise on Goods, and Chrysippus supports this idea in his essays on beauty. They believe this is what virtue is, and what relates to virtue; and this claim is the same as saying that everything good is beautiful, and that "good" and "beautiful" are interchangeable terms, since one is exactly equal to the other. Because something is good, it is beautiful; and because it is beautiful, it is good.

LX. But it seems that all goods are equal, and that every good is to be desired in the highest degree, and that it admits of no relaxation, and of no extension. Moreover, they divide all existing things into good, bad, and indifferent. The good are the virtues, prudence, justice, manly courage, temperance, and the rest of the like qualities. The bad are the contraries, folly, injustice, and the like. Those are indifferent which are neither beneficial nor injurious, such as life, health, pleasure, beauty, strength, riches, a good reputation, nobility of birth; and their contraries, death, disease, labour, disgrace, weakness, poverty, a bad reputation, baseness of birth, and the like; as Hecaton lays it down in the seventh book of his treatise on the Chief Good; and he is followed by Apollodorus, in his Ethics, and by Chrysippus. For they affirm that those things are not good but indifferent, though perhaps a little more near to one species than to the other.

LX. But it seems that all goods are equal, and that every good should be desired to the fullest, with no relaxation or extension allowed. They also categorize everything into good, bad, and neutral. The good includes virtues like prudence, justice, bravery, and temperance, along with similar qualities. The bad consists of their opposites, like foolishness and injustice. Neutral things are neither beneficial nor harmful, such as life, health, pleasure, beauty, strength, wealth, a good reputation, and noble birth; as well as their opposites: death, illness, hard work, disgrace, weakness, poverty, a bad reputation, and low birth. This is what Hecaton explains in the seventh book of his work on the Chief Good, and Apollodorus follows him in his Ethics, along with Chrysippus. They argue that these things are not good but neutral, although they might lean slightly more towards one category than the other.

For, as it is the property of the hot to warm and not to chill one, so it is the property of the good to benefit and not to injure one. Now, wealth and good health cannot be said to benefit any more than to injure any one: therefore, neither[297] wealth nor good health are goods. Again, they say that that thing is not good which it is possible to use both well and ill. But it is possible to make either a good or a bad use of wealth, or of health; therefore, wealth and good health are not goods. Posidonius, however, affirms that these things do come under the head of goods. But Hecaton, in the nineteenth book of his treatise on Goods, and Chrysippus, in his treatises on Pleasure, both deny that pleasure is a good. For they say that there are disgraceful pleasures, and that nothing disgraceful is good. And that to benefit a person is to move him or to keep him according to virtue, but to injure him is to move him or to keep him according to vice.

For just like it's the nature of heat to warm rather than to cool, it's also the nature of goodness to help rather than to harm. Now, wealth and good health don't clearly provide benefits without also carrying the potential for harm; therefore, neither wealth nor good health can be classified as true goods. Also, it's argued that something isn't a good if it can be used both positively and negatively. Since it's possible to use wealth and health in both good and bad ways, that means they aren't true goods either. However, Posidonius claims that these things are indeed considered goods. In contrast, Hecaton, in the nineteenth book of his work on Goods, and Chrysippus, in his writings on Pleasure, both argue that pleasure isn't a good. They point out that there are questionable pleasures, and nothing questionable can be considered good. They also say that to truly benefit a person means to guide them or support them in accordance with virtue, while to harm them means to lead them or support them in line with vice.

They also assert, that things indifferent are so spoken of in a twofold manner; firstly, those things are called so, which have no influence in producing either happiness or unhappiness; such for instance, as riches, glory, health, strength, and the like; for it is possible for a man to be happy without any of these things; and also, it is upon the character of the use that is made of them, that happiness or unhappiness depends. In another sense, those things are called indifferent, which do not excite any inclination or aversion, as for instance, the fact of a man’s having an odd or an even number of hairs on his head, or his putting out or drawing back his finger; for it is not in this sense that the things previously mentioned are called indifferent, for they do excite inclination or aversion. On which account some of them are chosen, though there is equal reason for preferring or shunning all the others.

They also claim that indifferent things are talked about in two ways; first, those things are considered indifferent which do not affect happiness or unhappiness. For example, wealth, fame, health, strength, and similar things can exist without impacting a person's happiness. Ultimately, whether these things lead to happiness or unhappiness depends on how they are used. In another sense, things are considered indifferent if they don’t create any desire or dislike, like whether a person has an odd or even number of hairs on their head or if they extend or retract a finger. However, this is not the sense in which the earlier mentioned things are labeled as indifferent, because they do provoke desire or dislike. That's why some of them are chosen, even though there’s equal reason to either prefer or avoid all the others.

LXI. Again, of things indifferent, they call some preferred (προηγμένα), and others rejected (ἀποπροηγμένα). Those are preferred, which have some proper value (ἀξίαν), and those are rejected, which have no value at all (ἀπαξίαν ἔχοντα). And by the term proper value, they mean that quality of things, which causes them to concur in producing a well-regulated life; and in this sense, every good has a proper value. Again, they say that a thing has value, when in some point of view, it has a sort of intermediate power of aiding us to live conformably to nature; and under this class, we may range riches or good health, if they give any assistance to natural life. Again, value is predicated of the price which one gives for the attainment of an object, which some one,[298] who has experience of the object sought, fixes as its fair price; as if we were to say, for instance, that as some wheat was to be exchanged for barley, with a mule thrown in to make up the difference. Those goods then are preferred, which have a value, as in the case of the mental goods, ability, skill, improvement, and the like; and in the case of the corporeal goods, life, health, strength, a good constitution, soundness, beauty; and in the case of external goods, riches, glory, nobility of birth, and the like.

LXI. Once again, regarding indifferent things, some are considered preferred, and others rejected. The preferred ones have some actual value, while the rejected ones have no value at all. By "actual value," they mean the quality of things that helps us achieve a well-ordered life; in this sense, everything good has actual value. They also say that something has value when, from a certain perspective, it has a kind of potential to help us live in accordance with nature; under this category, we can include wealth or good health if they assist natural living. Additionally, value is determined by the price one pays to acquire something, which someone knowledgeable about the desired object establishes as its fair price; for example, we could say that some wheat is exchanged for barley, with a mule added to balance the trade. Therefore, the preferred goods are those with value, like mental goods such as ability, skill, and improvement; physical goods like life, health, strength, good constitution, soundness, and beauty; and external goods like wealth, fame, nobility, and so on.

Rejected things are, in the case of qualities of the mind, stupidity, unskilfulness, and the like; in the case of circumstances affecting the body, death, disease, weakness, a bad constitution, mutilation, disgrace, and the like; in the case of external circumstances, poverty, want of reputation, ignoble birth, and the like. But those qualities and circumstances which are indifferent, are neither preferred nor rejected. Again, of things preferred, some are preferred for their own sakes, some for the sake of other things, and some partly for their own sakes and partly for that of other things. Those which are preferred for their own sakes, are ability, improvement, and the like; those which are preferred for the sake of other things, are wealth, nobility of birth, and the like; those which are preferred partly for their own sake, and partly for that of something else, are strength, vigour of the senses, universal soundness, and the like; for they are preferred, for their own sakes, inasmuch as they are in accordance with nature; and for the sake of something else, inasmuch as they are productive of no small number of advantages; and the same is the case in the inverse ratio, with those things which are rejected.

Rejected things include, when talking about mental qualities, things like ignorance and lack of skill; in terms of physical circumstances, there are death, illness, weakness, poor health, disability, disgrace, and similar issues; regarding external circumstances, we see poverty, lack of reputation, low birth status, and so on. However, the qualities and circumstances that are neutral are neither favored nor rejected. When it comes to things that are preferred, some are valued for their own sake, some for the benefit they provide to other things, and some for a mix of both. Those valued for their own sake include abilities, self-improvement, and similar qualities; those valued for the advantages they bring include wealth, noble birth, and similar factors; those that are appreciated for both their own sake and for what they lead to are strength, sensory vitality, overall health, and the like; they are appreciated for their own sake because they align with nature, and for the benefits they bring because they lead to numerous advantages. The same applies in the opposite way to those things that are rejected.

LXII. Again, they say that that is duty, which is preferred, and which contains in itself reasonable arguments why we should prefer it; as for instance, its corresponding to the nature of life itself; and this argument extends to plants and animals, for even their nature is subject to the obligation of certain duties. And duty (τὸ καθῆκον) had this name given to it by Zeno, in the first instance, its appellation being derived from its coming to, or according to some people, ἀπὸ τοῦ κατά τινας ἥκειν; and its effect is something kindred to the preparations made by nature. Now of the things done according to inclination, some are duties, and some are contrary to duty; and some are neither duties nor contrary to duty.[299] Those are duties, which reason selects to do, as for instance, to honour one’s parents, one’s brothers, one’s country, to gratify one’s friends. Those actions are contrary to duty, which reason does not choose; as for instance, to neglect one’s parents, to be indifferent to one’s brothers, to shirk assisting one’s friends, to be careless about the welfare of one’s country, and so on. Those are neither duties, nor contrary to duty, which reason neither selects to do, nor, on the other hand, repudiates, such actions, for instance, as to pick up straw, to hold a pen, or a comb, or things of that sort.

LXII. They say that duty is what we prioritize and that it has reasonable reasons for being prioritized, like how it aligns with the nature of life itself. This idea also applies to plants and animals, as their nature is bound by certain duties too. Zeno first used the term duty (τὸ καθῆκον), which comes from the concept of fulfilling a particular role or obligation, and its effect is similar to the natural preparations we see in the world. Among the actions we take based on our desires, some are duties, some go against duty, and some aren't related to duty at all.[299] Duties are the actions that reason chooses to undertake, such as honoring one's parents, brothers, and country, or pleasing one's friends. Actions that go against duty are those that reason rejects, like neglecting one's parents, being indifferent to one's brothers, avoiding helping friends, or disregarding the well-being of one's country, and so on. Actions that are neither duties nor opposed to duty are those that reason neither chooses nor rejects, such as picking up straw or holding a pen or a comb, and things like that.

Again, there are some duties which do not depend on circumstances, and some which do. These do not depend on circumstances, to take care of one’s health, and of the sound state of one’s senses, and the like. Those which do depend on circumstances, are the mutilation of one’s members, the sacrificing of one’s property, and so on. And the case of those actions which are contrary to duty, is similar. Again, of duties, some are always such, and some are not always. What is always a duty, is to live in accordance with virtue; but to ask questions, to give answers, to walk, and the like, are not always duties. And the same statement holds good with respect to acts contrary to duty.

Again, there are some responsibilities that don’t depend on circumstances and some that do. Responsibilities that don’t depend on circumstances include taking care of your health and maintaining your senses, among others. Those that do depend on circumstances include harming your body, sacrificing your possessions, and so on. The situation is similar for actions that go against duty. Also, some duties are always applicable, while others are not. What is always a duty is to live virtuously; however, asking questions, providing answers, walking, and similar actions are not always considered duties. The same is true for actions that violate duty.

There is also a class of intermediate duties, such as the duty of boys obeying their masters.

There is also a category of intermediate responsibilities, like the obligation of boys to follow their masters.

LXIII. The Stoics also say that the mind is divisible into eight parts; for that the five organs of sensation, and the vocal power, and the intellectual power, which is the mind itself, and the generative power, are all parts of the mind. But by error, there is produced a perversion which operates on the intellect, from which many perturbations arise, and many causes of inconstancy. And all perturbation is itself, according to Zeno, a movement of the mind, or superfluous inclination, which is irrational, and contrary to nature. Moreover, of the superior class of perturbations, as Hecaton says, in the second book of his treatise on the Passions, and as Zeno also says in his work on the Passions, there are four kinds, grief, fear, desire, and pleasure. And they consider that these perturbations are judgments, as Chrysippus contends in his work on the Passions; for covetousness is an opinion that money is a beautiful object, and in like manner drunkenness and intemperance, and other things of the sort, are judgments.[300] And grief they define to be an irrational contraction of the mind, and it is divided into the following species, pity, envy, emulation, jealousy, pain, perturbation, sorrow, anguish, confusion. Pity is a grief over some one, on the ground of his being in undeserved distress. Envy is a grief, at the good fortune of another. Emulation is a grief at that belonging to some one else, which one desires one’s self. Jealousy is a grief at another also having what one has one’s self. Pain is a grief which weighs one down. Perturbation is grief which narrows one, and causes one to feel in a strait. Sorrow is a grief arising from deliberate thought, which endures for some time, and gradually increases. Anguish is a grief with acute pain. Confusion is an irrational grief, which frets one, and prevents one from clearly discerning present circumstances. But fear is the expectation of evil; and the following feelings are all classed under the head of fear: apprehension, hesitation, shame, perplexity, trepidation, and anxiety. Apprehension is a fear which produces alarm. Shame is a fear of discredit. Hesitation is a fear of coming activity. Perplexity is a fear, from the imagination of some unusual thing. Trepidation is a fear accompanied with an oppression of the voice. Anxiety is a fear of some uncertain event.

LXIII. The Stoics also say that the mind is split into eight parts: the five senses, the ability to speak, the intellectual capacity, which is the mind itself, and the generative ability. However, through mistakes, a distortion occurs that affects the intellect, leading to various disturbances and causes of inconsistency. According to Zeno, all disturbance is essentially a movement of the mind or an unreasonable inclination that goes against nature. Furthermore, regarding the higher types of disturbances, as Hecaton mentions in the second book of his work on the Passions, and as Zeno also states in his writings about the Passions, there are four types: grief, fear, desire, and pleasure. They believe these disturbances are judgments, as Chrysippus argues in his work on the Passions; for example, greed is an opinion that money is something beautiful, and similarly, drunkenness, excess, and other similar behaviors are judgments. Grief is defined as an irrational tightening of the mind and is categorized into the following types: pity, envy, emulation, jealousy, pain, disturbance, sorrow, anguish, and confusion. Pity is feeling sorrow for someone because they are in undeserved trouble. Envy is feeling sorrow at someone else's good luck. Emulation is feeling sorrow at something that someone else has and that you want for yourself. Jealousy is feeling sorrow because someone else has what you already possess. Pain is a sorrow that weighs you down. Disturbance is sorrow that constricts you, making you feel trapped. Sorrow is a prolonged grief that builds up over time due to deliberate thoughts. Anguish is a grief that comes with sharp pain. Confusion is an irrational grief that agitates you and prevents you from clearly understanding your current situation. Fear is the anticipation of something bad, and the following feelings fall under fear: apprehension, hesitation, shame, perplexity, trepidation, and anxiety. Apprehension is a fear that causes alarm. Shame is a fear of being discredited. Hesitation is a fear of impending action. Perplexity is a fear stemming from imagining something unusual. Trepidation is a fear that is accompanied by a tightness in the voice. Anxiety is a fear of an uncertain outcome.

Again, desire is an irrational appetite; to which head, the following feelings are referrible: want, hatred, contentiousness, anger, love, enmity, rage. Want is a desire arising from our not having something or other, and is, as it were, separated from the thing, but is still stretching, and attracted towards it in vain. And hatred is a desire that it should be ill with some one, accompanied with a certain continual increase and extension. Contentiousness is a certain desire accompanied with deliberate choice. Anger is a desire of revenge, on a person who appears to have injured one in an unbecoming way. Love is a desire not conversant about a virtuous object, for it is an attempt to conciliate affection, because of some beauty which is seen. Enmity is a certain anger of long duration, and full of hatred, and it is a watchful passion, as is shown in the following lines:—

Again, desire is an irrational craving; related to this are the following feelings: want, hatred, contention, anger, love, enmity, and rage. Want is a desire that comes from not having something, and it feels separate from the object of desire, yet still reaches out toward it in vain. Hatred is a desire for someone to suffer, which involves a persistent increase and extension. Contention is a specific desire that comes with a conscious choice. Anger is a desire for revenge against someone who seems to have wronged you in an unacceptable way. Love is a desire not focused on a virtuous object; it seeks to win affection because of some beauty that is perceived. Enmity is a long-lasting anger filled with hatred, and it is a vigilant passion, as shown in the following lines:—

For though we deem the short-liv’d fury past,
’Tis sure the mighty will revenge at last.[90]

But rage is anger at its commencement.

But rage is just anger in its early stages.

Again, pleasure is an irrational elation of the mind over something which appears to be desirable; and its different species are enjoyment, rejoicing at evil, delight, and extravagant joy. Enjoyment now, is a pleasure which charms the mind through the ears. Rejoicing at evil (ἐπιχαιρεκακία), is a pleasure which arises at the misfortunes of others. Delight (τέρψις), that is to say turning (τρέψις), is a certain turning of the soul (προτροπή τις ψυχῆς), to softness. Extravagant joy is the dissolution of virtue. And as there are said to be some sicknesses (ἀῤῥωστήματα), in the body, as, for instance, gout and arthritic disorders; so too are those diseases of the soul, such as a fondness for glory, or for pleasure, and other feelings of that sort. For an ἀῤῥώστημα is a disease accompanied with weakness; and a disease is an opinion of something which appears exceedingly desirable. And, as in the case of the body, there are illnesses to which people are especially liable, such as colds or diarrhœa; so also are there propensities which the mind is under the influence of, such as enviousness, pitifulness, quarrelsomeness, and so on.

Again, pleasure is an irrational feeling of joy in response to something that seems appealing; and its different types include enjoyment, delighting in the misfortunes of others, joy, and excessive happiness. Enjoyment is a pleasure that captivates the mind through sound. Delighting in the misfortunes of others (ἐπιχαιρεκακία) is pleasure that comes from seeing others suffer. Delight (τέρψις), which means turning (τρέψις), is a kind of shift in the soul (προτροπή τις ψυχῆς) toward softness. Excessive joy is a breakdown of virtue. Just as there are certain illnesses (ἀῤῥωστήματα) in the body, like gout and arthritis; there are also ailments of the soul, such as a craving for fame or pleasure, and other similar feelings. An ἀῤῤώστημα is a weakness accompanied by sickness; and a sickness is a belief in something that seems incredibly desirable. And just as some people are prone to particular physical illnesses, like colds or diarrhea; there are also tendencies that affect the mind, such as envy, pity, quarrelsomeness, and so on.

There are also three good dispositions of the mind; joy, caution, and will. And joy they say is the opposite of pleasure, since it is a rational elation of the mind; so caution is the opposite of fear, being a rational avoidance of anything, for the wise man will never be afraid, but he will act with caution; and will, they define as the opposite of desire, since it is a rational wish. As therefore some things fall under the class of the first perturbations, in the same manner do some things fall under the class of the first good dispositions. And accordingly, under the head of will, are classed goodwill, placidity, salutation, affection; and under the head of caution are ranged reverence and modesty; under the head of joy, we speak of delight, mirth, and good spirits.

There are also three positive states of mind: joy, caution, and will. Joy is considered the opposite of pleasure because it’s a rational uplift of the mind; caution is seen as the opposite of fear, representing a rational avoidance of anything, as a wise person will never be afraid but will act with caution. Will is defined as the opposite of desire since it represents a rational wish. Just as some things belong to the category of first disturbances, some things also belong to the category of first positive states. Consequently, under will, we include goodwill, calmness, greetings, and affection; under caution, we find respect and modesty; and under joy, we refer to delight, laughter, and a positive attitude.

LXIV. They say also, that the wise man is free from perturbations, because he has no strong propensities. But that this freedom from propensities also exists in the bad man, being, however, then quite another thing, inasmuch as it proceeds in him only from the hardness and unimpressibility of his nature. They also pronounce the wise man free from vanity, since he regards with equal eye what is glorious and what is inglorious. At the same time, they admit that there[302] is another character devoid of vanity, who, however, is only reckoned one of the rash men, being in fact the bad man. They also say that all the virtuous men are austere, because they do never speak with reference to pleasure, nor do they listen to what is said by others with reference to pleasure. At the same time, they call another man austere too, using the term in nearly the same sense as they do when they speak of austere wine, which is used in compounding medicines, but not for drinking.

LXIV. They also say that a wise person is free from disturbances because they don't have strong desires. However, this lack of desires also exists in a bad person, but it originates from the cold and unchangeable nature of that person. They also claim that the wise person is free from vanity, since they see both the glorious and the inglorious equally. At the same time, they acknowledge that there is another type of person who lacks vanity, but is considered one of the reckless, being essentially a bad person. They also say that all virtuous people are strict because they never talk about pleasure, nor do they pay attention to what others say about it. Additionally, they label another person as strict as well, using the term in a similar way to how they describe austere wine, which is used for making medicines, but not for drinking.

They also pronounce the wise to be honest-hearted men, anxiously attending to those matters which may make them better, by means of some principle which conceals what is bad, and brings to light what is good. Nor is there any hypocrisy about them; for they cut off all pretence in their voice and appearance. They also keep aloof from business; for they guard carefully against doing any thing contrary to their duty. They drink wine, but they do not get drunk; and they never yield to frenzy. Occasionally, extraordinary imaginations may obtain a momentary power over them, owing to some melancholy or trifling, arising not according to the principle of what is desirable, but contrary to nature. Nor, again, will the wise man feel grief; because grief is an irrational contraction of the soul, as Apollodorus defines it in his Ethics.

They also consider wise people to be sincere, genuinely focused on improving themselves through principles that hide the bad and reveal the good. There’s no pretense about them; they eliminate any false displays in their words and appearance. They stay away from business matters, carefully avoiding anything that goes against their responsibilities. They drink wine, but they don’t get drunk, and they never fall into wildness. Sometimes, unusual thoughts may take hold of them for a moment due to feelings of sadness or trivial issues, arising not from what’s desirable but against nature. Additionally, a wise person doesn’t experience grief, as grief is an irrational tightening of the soul, as Apollodorus describes in his Ethics.

They are also, as they say, godlike; for they have something in them which is as it were a God. But the bad man is an atheist. Now there are two kinds of atheists; one who speaks in a spirit of hostility to, and the other, who utterly disregards, the divine nature; but they admit that all bad men are not atheists in this last sense. The good, on the contrary, are pious; for they have a thorough acquaintance with the laws respecting the Gods. And piety is a knowledge of the proper reverence and worship due to the Gods. Moreover they sacrifice to the Gods, and keep themselves pure; for they avoid all offences having reference to the Gods, and the Gods admire them; for they are holy and just in all that concerns the Deity; and the wise men are the only priests; for they consider the matters relating to sacrifices, and the erection of temples, and purifications, and all other things which peculiarly concern the Gods. They also pronounce that men are bound to honour their parents, and their brethren, in the second place after the Gods.[303] They also say that parental affection for one’s children is natural to them, and is a feeling which does not exist in bad men. And they lay down the position that all offences are equal, as Chrysippus argues in the fourth book of his Ethic Questions, and so say Persæus and Zeno. For if one thing that is true is not more true than another thing that is true, neither is one thing that is false more false than another thing that is false; so too, one deceit is not greater than another, nor one sin than another. For the man who is a hundred furlongs from Canopus, and the man who is only one, are both equally not in Canopus; and so too, he who commits a greater sin, and he who commits a less, are both equally not in the right path.

They are also, as people say, godlike; because they have something inside them that is like a God. But a bad person is an atheist. Now, there are two kinds of atheists: one who speaks out of hostility toward the divine, and the other who completely ignores the divine nature; however, they acknowledge that not all bad people are atheists in this latter sense. Conversely, good people are pious; they have a deep understanding of the laws regarding the Gods. Piety is knowing the proper respect and worship that is due to the Gods. They also make sacrifices to the Gods and keep themselves pure; they avoid all offenses related to the Gods, and the Gods admire them for being holy and just in everything concerning the divine. Wise men are the only true priests; they handle matters related to sacrifices, the building of temples, purification, and everything else that specifically pertains to the Gods. They also state that people are obligated to honor their parents and siblings, second only to the Gods.[303] They claim that parental love for one’s children comes naturally and does not exist in bad people. They assert that all offenses are equal, as Chrysippus argues in the fourth book of his Ethical Questions, as do Persæus and Zeno. Because if one true statement isn’t more true than another true statement, then one false statement isn’t more false than another false statement; similarly, one deception isn’t worse than another, nor is one sin worse than another. The man who is a hundred furlongs away from Canopus, and the man who is just one furlong away, are both equally not in Canopus; likewise, the person who commits a greater sin and the one who commits a lesser sin are both equally off the right path.

Heraclides of Tarsus, indeed, the friend of Antipater, of Tarsus, and Athenodorus, both assert that offences are not equal.

Heraclides of Tarsus, the friend of Antipater, and Athenodorus both claim that offenses are not equal.

Again, the Stoics, as for instance, Chrysippus, in the first book of his work on Lives, say, that the wise man will take a part in the affairs of the state, if nothing hinders him. For that he will restrain vice, and excite men to virtue. Also, they say that he will marry, as Zeno says, in his Republic, and beget children. Moreover, that the wise man will never form mere opinions, that is to say, he will never agree to anything that is false; and that he will become a Cynic; for that Cynicism is a short path to virtue, as Apollodorus calls it in his Ethics; that he will even eat human flesh, if there should be occasion; that he is the only free man, and that the bad are slaves; for that freedom is a power of independent action, but slavery a deprivation of the same. That there is besides, another slavery, which consists in subjection, and a third which consists in possession and subjection; the contrary of which is masterhood, which is likewise bad.

Once again, the Stoics, like Chrysippus in the first book of his work on Lives, say that a wise person will participate in state affairs if nothing stops him. He will work to suppress vice and encourage others toward virtue. They also mention that he will marry, as Zeno states in his Republic, and have children. Furthermore, the wise person will never form mere opinions, meaning he will never agree to anything false; he will become a Cynic because, as Apollodorus mentions in his Ethics, Cynicism is a direct route to virtue. He might even resort to eating human flesh if necessary; he is the only truly free person, while the immoral are slaves. Freedom is the ability to act independently, whereas slavery is the loss of that ability. Additionally, there is another form of slavery that involves submission, and a third that encompasses possession and submission; the opposite of which is mastery, which is also detrimental.

And they say, that not only are the wise free, but that they are also kings, since kingly power is an irresponsible dominion, which can only exist in the case of the wise man, as Chrysippus says in his treatise on the Proper Application of his Terms made by Zeno; for he says that a ruler ought to give decisions on good and evil, and that none of the wicked understand these things. In the same way, they assert that they are the only people who are fit to be magistrates or judges, or orators, and that none of the bad are qualified for these tasks. Moreover, that they are free from all error, in[304] consequence of their not being prone to any wrong actions. Also, that they are unconnected with injury, for that they never injure any one else, nor themselves. Also, that they are not pitiful, and that they never make allowance for any one; for that they do not relax the punishments appointed by law, since yielding, and pity, and mercifulness itself, never exist in any of their souls, so as to induce an affectation of kindness in respect of punishment; nor do they ever think any punishment too severe. Again, they say that the wise man never wonders at any of the things which appear extraordinary; as for instance, at the stories about Charon, or the ebbing of the tide, or the springs of hot water, or the bursting forth of flames. But, say they further, the wise man will not live in solitude; for he is by nature sociable and practical. Accordingly, he will take exercise for the sake of hardening and invigorating his body. And the wise man will pray, asking good things from the Gods, as Posidonius says in the first book of his treatise on Duties, and Hecaton says the same thing in the thirteenth book of his treatise on Extraordinary Things.

And they say that not only are the wise free, but they are also kings, since true power is an unaccountable control that only exists with the wise person, as Chrysippus explains in his work on the Proper Application of Terms by Zeno. He argues that a ruler should make judgments about what is good and what is evil, and that no wicked person understands these concepts. Similarly, they claim that they are the only ones qualified to be magistrates, judges, or orators, and that none of the immoral are suitable for these roles. Furthermore, they believe they are free from all mistakes because they do not engage in wrong actions. They also assert that they are disconnected from causing harm, as they never hurt anyone, not even themselves. Additionally, they are not compassionate and do not make exceptions for anyone; they won’t lessen the punishments dictated by law, since compassion, pity, and mercy do not exist in their souls to influence a false sense of kindness regarding punishment; they never consider any punishment too harsh. Moreover, they say that the wise person never marvels at things that seem extraordinary; for example, at the tales about Charon, or the tides, or hot springs, or volcanic eruptions. They also claim the wise person will not live in isolation; instead, he is naturally social and active. Thus, he will exercise to strengthen and energize his body. The wise person will pray, asking the gods for good things, as Posidonius says in the first book of his treatise on Duties, and Hecaton makes the same point in the thirteenth book of his work on Extraordinary Things.

They also say, that friendship exists in the virtuous alone, on account of their resemblance to one another. And they describe friendship itself as a certain communion of the things which concern life, since we use our friends as ourselves. And they assert that a friend is desirable for his own sake, and that a number of friends is a good; and that among the wicked there is no such thing as friendship, and that no wicked man can have a friend.

They also say that friendship exists only among the virtuous because of their similarity to one another. They describe friendship as a kind of shared connection around things that matter in life, since we treat our friends like we treat ourselves. They argue that a friend is valuable for their own sake, and that having multiple friends is a good thing; they claim that among the wicked, friendship doesn’t exist and that no wicked person can have a true friend.

Again, they say that all the foolish are mad; for that they are not prudent, and that madness is equivalent to folly in every one of its actions; but that the wise man does everything properly, just as we say that Ismenias can play every piece of flute-music well. Also, they say that everything belongs to the wise man, for that the law has given them perfect and universal power; but some things also are said to belong to the wicked, just in the same manner as some things are said to belong to the unjust, or as a house is said to belong to a city in a different sense from that in which a thing belongs to the person who uses it.

Again, they say that all the fools are insane because they aren't sensible, and that madness is the same as folly in everything they do; but the wise person does everything correctly, just like we say that Ismenias can play every flute piece well. They also claim that everything belongs to the wise person, since the law has granted them complete and universal power; however, some things are also said to belong to the wicked, just like some things are said to belong to the unjust, or like a house is said to belong to a city in a different way than how something belongs to the person who uses it.

LXV. And they say that virtues reciprocally follow one another, and that he who has one has all; for that the precepts[305] of them all are common, as Chrysippus affirms in the first book of his treatise on Laws; and Apollodorus, in his Natural Philosophy, according to the ancient system; and Hecaton, in the third book of his treatise on Virtues. For they say that the man who is endued with virtue, is able to consider and also to do what must be done. But what must be done must be chosen, and encountered, and distributed, and awaited; so that if the man does some things by deliberate choice, and some in a spirit of endurance, and some distributively, and some patiently; he is prudent, and courageous, and just, and temperate. And each of the virtues has a particular subject of its own, about which it is conversant; as, for instance, courage is conversant about the things which must be endured: prudence is conversant about what must be done and what must not, and what is of a neutral or indifferent character. And in like manner, the other virtues are conversant about their own peculiar subjects; and wisdom in counsel and shrewdness follow prudence; and good order and decorum follow temperance; and equality and goodness of judgment follow justice; and constancy and energy follow courage.

LXV. They say that virtues support each other, and that having one means you have all of them; because their principles are all common, as Chrysippus points out in the first book of his work on Laws; and Apollodorus mentions in his Natural Philosophy, based on the ancient system; and Hecaton refers to in the third book of his work on Virtues. They argue that a person who possesses virtue can think about and also act on what needs to be done. However, what needs to be done must be chosen, faced, divided, and anticipated; so if a person does some things by intentional choice, some with resilience, some in a distributed way, and some with patience, he is wise, brave, fair, and self-disciplined. Each virtue focuses on its own specific area; for example, courage focuses on what must be endured: wisdom focuses on what should be done or avoided, and what is neutral or indifferent. Likewise, the other virtues deal with their own unique topics; wisdom in planning and cleverness come from prudence; order and propriety derive from temperance; fairness and sound judgment come from justice; and determination and vigor follow courage.

Another doctrine of the Stoics is, that there is nothing intermediate between virtue and vice; while the Peripatetics assert that there is a stage between virtue and vice, being an improvement on vice which has not yet arrived at virtue. For the Stoics say, that as a stick must be either straight or crooked, so a man must be either just or unjust, and cannot be more just than just, or more unjust than unjust; and that the same rule applies to all cases. Moreover, Chrysippus is of opinion that virtue can be lost, but Cleanthes affirms that it cannot; the one saying that it can be lost by drunkenness or melancholy, the other maintaining that it cannot be lost on account of the firm perceptions which it implants in men. They also pronounce it a proper object of choice; accordingly, we are ashamed of actions which we do improperly, while we are aware that what is honourable is the only good. Again, they affirm that it is of itself sufficient for happiness, as Zeno says, and he is followed in this assertion by Chrysippus in the first book of his treatise on Virtues, and by Hecaton in the second book of his treatise on Goods.

Another belief of the Stoics is that there is no middle ground between virtue and vice, while the Peripatetics argue that there is a phase between them, which is an improvement on vice that hasn't reached the level of virtue yet. The Stoics say that, just like a stick must either be straight or crooked, a person must be either just or unjust, and they can't be more just than just or more unjust than unjust; this rule applies to all situations. Additionally, Chrysippus believes that virtue can be lost, but Cleanthes insists that it cannot; Chrysippus argues it can be lost through drunkenness or depression, while Cleanthes contends it cannot be lost because of the strong impressions it leaves on individuals. They also state that virtue is something we should choose, which is why we feel shame for actions we commit improperly, knowing that what is honorable is the only true good. Furthermore, they claim that virtue is sufficient for happiness on its own, as Zeno says, a point also supported by Chrysippus in the first book of his work on Virtues and Hecaton in the second book of his work on Goods.

“For if,” says he, “magnanimity be sufficient of itself to enable us to act in a manner superior to all other men; and[306] if that is a part of virtue, then virtue is of itself sufficient for happiness, despising all things which seem troublesome to it.” However, Panætius and Posidonius do not admit that virtue has this sufficiency of itself, but say that there is also need of good health, and competency, and strength. And their opinion is that a man exercises virtue in everything, as Cleanthes asserts, for it cannot be lost; and the virtuous man on every occasion exercises his soul, which is in a state of perfection.

"For if," he says, "being noble is enough by itself to allow us to act in a way that’s better than everyone else; and if that’s part of virtue, then virtue alone is enough for happiness, disregarding anything that seems bothersome to it." However, Panætius and Posidonius argue that virtue alone isn’t sufficient, stating that good health, resources, and strength are also necessary. They believe that a person practices virtue in all things, as Cleanthes claims, because it can't be lost; and the virtuous person constantly engages their soul, which is in a state of perfection.

LXVI. Again, they say that justice exists by nature, and not because of any definition or principle; just as law does, or right reason, as Chrysippus tells us in his treatise on the Beautiful; and they think that one ought not to abandon philosophy on account of the different opinions prevailing among philosophers, since on this principle one would wholly quit life, as Posidonius argues in his Exhortatory Essays. Another doctrine of Chrysippus is, that general learning is very useful.

LXVI. Again, they claim that justice is inherent in nature, not just a result of definitions or principles; similar to how law works or right reasoning, as Chrysippus discusses in his treatise on the Beautiful. They believe that one shouldn't give up on philosophy due to the various opinions held by philosophers, because if we did that, we would have to give up on life altogether, as Posidonius argues in his Exhortatory Essays. Another idea from Chrysippus is that broad knowledge is very beneficial.

And the School in general maintain that there are no obligations of justice binding on us with reference to other animals, on account of their dissimilarity to us, as Chrysippus asserts in the first book of his treatise on Justice, and the same opinion is maintained by Posidonius in the first book of his treatise on Duty. They say too, that the wise man will love those young men, who by their outward appearance, show a natural aptitude for virtue; and this opinion is advanced by Zeno, in his Republic, and by Chrysippus in the first book of his work on Lives, and by Apollodorus in his Ethics. And they describe love as an endeavour to benefit a friend on account of his visible beauty; and that it is an attribute not of acquaintanceship, but of friendship. Accordingly, that Thrasonides, although he had his mistress in his power, abstained from her, because he was hated by her. Love, therefore, according to them is a part of friendship, as Chrysippus asserts in his essay on Love; and it is not blameable. Moreover, beauty is the flower of virtue.

And the School generally argues that we have no justice-related obligations toward other animals because they are different from us, as Chrysippus states in the first book of his treatise on Justice. This same view is supported by Posidonius in the first book of his treatise on Duty. They also maintain that a wise person will care for young men who, by their appearance, seem naturally inclined toward virtue; this idea is put forth by Zeno in his Republic, by Chrysippus in the first book of his work on Lives, and by Apollodorus in his Ethics. They define love as the desire to help a friend because of their visible beauty, and claim that it is a characteristic of friendship rather than mere acquaintance. For instance, Thrasonides, even though he could have had his mistress, chose not to pursue her because she disliked him. Thus, love, according to them, is a component of friendship, as Chrysippus argues in his essay on Love, and it is not something to be condemned. Furthermore, beauty is seen as the expression of virtue.

And as there are three kinds of lives; the theoretical, the practical, and the logical; they say that the last is the one which ought to be chosen. For that a logical, that is a rational, animal was made by nature on purpose for speculation and action. And they say that a wise man will very rationally take himself out of life, either for the sake of his country or of[307] his friends, or if he be in bitter pain, or under the affliction of mutilation, or incurable disease. And they also teach that women ought to be in common among the wise, so that whoever meets with any one may enjoy her, and this doctrine is maintained by Zeno in his Republic, and by Chrysippus in his treatise on Polity, and by Diogenes the Cynic, and by Plato; and then, say they, we shall love all boys equally after the manner of fathers, and all suspicion on the ground of undue familiarity will be removed.

There are three types of lives: the theoretical, the practical, and the logical. It's said that the logical life is the one that should be chosen. A rational being was created by nature to engage in thought and action. A wise person will sensibly choose to remove themselves from life, whether for the sake of their country, their friends, or if they are in severe pain, dealing with a disability, or suffering from an incurable illness. They also teach that women should be shared among the wise, so that anyone who encounters one can enjoy her. This view is supported by Zeno in his Republic, Chrysippus in his writings on Polity, Diogenes the Cynic, and Plato. Thus, they believe we can love all boys equally like fathers, and any concerns about inappropriate relationships will be eliminated.

They affirm too, that the best of political constitutions is a mixed one, combined of democracy, and kingly power, and aristocracy. And they say many things of this sort, and more too, in their Ethical Dogmas, and they maintain them by suitable explanations and arguments. But this may be enough for us to say of their doctrines on this head by way of summary, and taking them in an elementary manner.

They also confirm that the best type of political system is a mixed one, combining democracy, royal authority, and aristocracy. They discuss many ideas like this, and more, in their Ethical Principles, backing them up with appropriate explanations and arguments. But this summary should suffice for us to convey their views on this topic in a basic way.

LXVII. They divide natural philosophy into the topics of bodies, and of principles, and of elements, and of Gods, and of boundaries, and of place, and of the vacuum. And they make these divisions according to species; but according to genera they divide them into three topics, that of the world, that of the elements, and the third is that which reasons on causes. The topic about the world, they say, is subdivided into two parts. For that in one point of view, the mathematicians also have a share in it; and according to it it is that they prosecute their investigations into the nature of the fixed stars and the planets; as, for instance, whether the sun is of such a size as he appears to be, and similarly, whether the moon is; and in the same way they investigate the question of spherical motion, and others of the same character. The other point of view is that which is reserved exclusively for natural philosophers, according to which it is that the existence and substance of things are examined, [for instance, whether the sun and the stars consist of matter and form,] and whether the sun is born or not born, whether it is living or lifeless, corruptible or incorruptible, whether it is regulated by Providence, and other questions of this kind.

LXVII. They categorize natural philosophy into topics like bodies, principles, elements, gods, boundaries, space, and the vacuum. These divisions are made according to specific types; however, when looked at from a broader perspective, they classify it into three main topics: the world, the elements, and the one that discusses causes. The topic about the world is said to have two parts. From one perspective, mathematicians also have a connection to it; this is where they explore the nature of fixed stars and planets, such as whether the sun is as big as it seems and the same for the moon. They also look into questions about spherical motion and similar topics. The other perspective is solely for natural philosophers, focusing on examining the existence and substance of things, such as whether the sun and the stars are made of matter and form, whether the sun is created or uncreated, whether it is living or dead, corruptible or incorruptible, if it is governed by Providence, and other questions like these.

The topic which examines into causes they say is also divisible into two parts; and with reference to one of its considerations, the investigations of physicians partake of it; according to which it is that they investigate the dominant[308] principle of the soul, and the things which exist in the soul, and seeds, and things of this kind. And its other division is claimed as belonging to them also by the mathematicians, as, for instance, how we see, what is the cause of our appearance being reflected in a mirror, how clouds are collected, how thunder is produced, and the rainbow, and the halo, and comets, and things of that kind.

The topic that looks into causes is also divided into two parts. One aspect involves the studies done by doctors, where they examine the main principle of the soul and things that exist within the soul, including seeds and similar concepts. The other part is claimed by mathematicians, covering questions like how we see, what causes our images to be reflected in mirrors, how clouds form, how thunder occurs, and phenomena such as rainbows, halos, comets, and other similar occurrences.

LXVIII. They think that there are two general principles in the universe, the active and the passive. That the passive is matter, an existence without any distinctive quality. That the active is the reason which exists in the passive, that is to say, God. For that he, being eternal, and existing throughout all matter, makes everything. And Zeno, the Cittiæan, lays down this doctrine in his treatise on Essence, and so does Cleanthes in his essay on Atoms, Chrysippus in the first book of his Investigations in Natural Philosophy, towards the end, Archedemus in his work on Elements, and Posidonius in the second book of his treatise on Natural Philosophy. But they say that principles and elements differ from one another. For that the one had no generation or beginning, and will have no end; but that the elements may be destroyed by the operation of fire. Also, that the elements are bodies, but principles have no bodies and no forms, and elements too have forms.

LXVIII. They believe that there are two fundamental forces in the universe: the active and the passive. The passive is matter, which exists without any specific qualities. The active is the reason that exists within the passive, that is to say, God. Since He is eternal and exists throughout all matter, He creates everything. Zeno of Citium presents this idea in his treatise on Essence, as does Cleanthes in his essay on Atoms, Chrysippus in the first book of his Investigations in Natural Philosophy towards the end, Archedemus in his work on Elements, and Posidonius in the second book of his treatise on Natural Philosophy. However, they argue that principles and elements are different from each other. The former has no origin or beginning and will have no end; on the other hand, the elements can be destroyed by fire. Additionally, elements are physical bodies, while principles have no physical form and elements do have forms.

Now a body, says Apollodorus in his Natural Philosophy, is extended in a threefold manner; in length, in breadth, in depth; and then it is called a solid body; and the superficies is the limit of the body having length and breadth alone, but not depth. But Posidonius, in the third book of his Heavenly Phænomena, will not allow a superficies either any substantial reality, or any intelligible existence. A line is the limit of a superficies, or length without breadth, or something which has nothing but length. A point is the boundary of a line, and is the smallest of all symbols.

Now, according to Apollodorus in his Natural Philosophy, a body is extended in three ways: length, width, and depth; when it has all three, it’s called a solid body. The surface is the boundary of a body that has only length and width, but not depth. However, Posidonius, in the third book of his Heavenly Phenomena, argues that a surface has neither substantial reality nor any intelligible existence. A line is the boundary of a surface, or length without width, or something that only has length. A point is the limit of a line and is the smallest of all symbols.

They also teach that God is unity, and that he is called Mind, and Fate, and Jupiter, and by many other names besides. And that, as he was in the beginning by himself, he turned into water the whole substance which pervaded the air; and as the seed is contained in the produce, so too, he being the seminal principle of the world, remained behind in moisture, making matter fit to be employed by himself in the production of those things which were to come after; and[309] then, first of all, he made the four elements, fire, water, air, and earth. And Zeno speaks of these in his treatise on the Universe, and so does Chrysippus in the first book of his Physics, and so does Archedemus in some treatise on the Elements.

They also teach that God is unified and that He is called Mind, Fate, Jupiter, and many other names as well. And that, just as He was alone in the beginning, He turned the entire substance that filled the air into water; and as a seed is found in its fruit, so He, being the creative principle of the world, remained in moisture, making matter ready to be used by Himself to create what would come next; and[309] then, He first created the four elements: fire, water, air, and earth. Zeno discusses these in his treatise on the Universe, as does Chrysippus in the first book of his Physics, and Archedemus in some work on the Elements.

LXIX. Now an element is that out of which at first all things which are are produced, and into which all things are resolved at last. And the four elements are all equally an essence without any distinctive quality, namely, matter; but fire is the hot, water the moist, air the cold, and earth the dry—though this last quality is also common to the air. The fire is the highest, and that is called æther, in which first of all the sphere was generated in which the fixed stars are set, then that in which the planets revolve; after that the air, then the water; and the sediment as it were of all is the earth, which is placed in the centre of the rest.

LXIX. An element is what everything comes from and what everything eventually returns to. The four elements are all essentially the same without unique characteristics, which we call matter; however, fire is hot, water is wet, air is cold, and earth is dry—although the air also shares this last quality. Fire is the highest element, referred to as ether, where first the sphere containing the fixed stars was created, followed by the sphere for the planets to move in; after that comes the air, then the water; and finally, the earth, which gathers everything and is set at the center of it all.

LXX. They also speak of the world in a threefold sense; at one time meaning God himself, whom they call a being of a certain quality, having for his peculiar manifestation universal substance, a being imperishable, and who never had any generation, being the maker of the arrangement and order that we see; and who, after certain periods of time, absorbs all substance in himself, and then re-produces it from himself. And this arrangement of the stars they call the world, and so the third sense is one composed of both the preceding ones. And the world is a thing which is peculiarly of such and such a quality consisting of universal substance, as Posidonius affirms in his Meteorological Elements, being a system compounded of heaven and earth, and all the creatures which exist in them; or it may be called a system compounded of Gods and men, and of the things created on their account. And the heaven is the most remote circumference of the world, in which all the Divine Nature is situated.

LXX. They also talk about the world in three different ways; sometimes referring to God himself, whom they describe as a being with a certain quality, uniquely manifesting as universal substance, an eternal being without origin, who creates the order and arrangement that we observe; and who, after certain periods, absorbs all substance back into himself and then reproduces it. They refer to the arrangement of the stars as the world, so the third meaning combines the first two. The world is something defined by specific qualities made up of universal substance, as Posidonius states in his Meteorological Elements, being a system made up of heaven and earth, along with all the living beings they contain; or it can be described as a system of gods and humans, and the things created for their sake. The heavens represent the outermost boundary of the world, where all Divine Nature resides.

Again, the world is inhabited and regulated according to intellect and providence, as Chrysippus says, in his works on Providence, and Posidonius in the thirteenth book of his treatise on Gods, since mind penetrates into every part of the world, just as the soul pervades us; but it is in a greater degree in some parts, and in a less degree in others. For instance, it penetrates as a habit, as, for instance, into the bones and sinews; and into some it penetrates as the mind[310] does, for instance, into the dominant principle. And thus the whole world, being a living thing, endowed with a soul and with reason, has the æther as its dominant principle, as Antipater, of Tyre, says in the eighth book of his treatise on the World. But Chrysippus, in the first book of his essay on Providence, and Posidonius in his treatise on Gods, say that the heaven is the dominant principle of the world; and Cleanthes attributes this to the sun. Chrysippus, however, on this point contradicts himself; for he says in another place, that the most subtle portion of the æther, which is also called by the Stoics the first God, is what is infused in a sensible manner into all the beings which are in the air, and through every animal and every plant, and through the earth itself according to a certain habit; and that it is this which communicates to them the faculty of feeling.

Once again, the world is filled and governed by intellect and divine guidance, as Chrysippus mentions in his works on Providence, and Posidonius in the thirteenth book of his treatise on the Gods. The mind permeates every part of the world, just like the soul permeates us, though it does so to varying degrees in different places. For example, it penetrates some parts like a habit, such as in the bones and sinews, while in others it acts more like the mind does, particularly in the dominant principle. Thus, the entire world, being a living entity with a soul and reason, has the ether as its dominant principle, as Antipater of Tyre notes in the eighth book of his treatise on the World. However, Chrysippus in the first book of his essay on Providence, along with Posidonius in his treatise on the Gods, argues that the heavens serve as the world's dominant principle, while Cleanthes attributes this title to the sun. Yet, Chrysippus contradicts himself here; in another place, he claims that the most refined part of the ether, which the Stoics also refer to as the first God, is infused in a tangible way into all beings in the air, as well as through every animal, every plant, and even the earth itself according to a certain manner. This essence grants them the capacity to feel.

They say too, that the world is one and also finite, having a spherical form. For that such a shape is the most convenient for motion, as Posidonius says, in the fifteenth book of his Discussions on Natural Philosophy, and so says Antipater also in his essay on the World. And on the outside there is diffused around it a boundless vacuum, which is incorporeal. And it is incorporeal inasmuch, as it is capable of being contained by bodies, but is not so. And that there is no such thing as a vacuum in the world, but that it is all closely united and compact; for that this condition is necessarily brought about by the concord and harmony which exist between the heavenly bodies and those of the earth. And Chrysippus mentions a vacuum in his essay on a Vacuum, and also in the first book of his treatise on the Physical Arts, and so does Apollophanes in his Natural Philosophy, and so does Apollodorus, and so does Posidonius in the second book of his discourses on Natural Philosophy. And they say that these things are all incorporeal, and all alike. Moreover, that time is incorporeal, since it is an interval of the motion of the world. And that of time, the past and the future are both illimitable, but the present is limited. And they assert that the world is perishable, inasmuch as it was produced by reason, and is one of the things which are perceptible by the senses; and whatever has its parts perishable, must also be perishable in the whole. And the parts of the world are perishable, for they change into one another. Therefore, the whole world is[311] perishable. And again, if anything admits of a change for the worse it is perishable; therefore, the world is perishable, for it can be dried up, and it can be covered with water.

They also say that the world is one and finite, having a spherical shape. This shape is the most convenient for motion, as Posidonius points out in the fifteenth book of his Discussions on Natural Philosophy, and Antipater agrees in his essay on the World. Surrounding it is an endless vacuum, which is incorporeal. It's incorporeal because, although it can be contained by physical objects, it is not a physical object itself. They argue that there's no such thing as a true vacuum in the world; everything is tightly united and compact. This condition arises from the harmony and concord that exist between celestial bodies and earthly ones. Chrysippus discusses a vacuum in his essay on a Vacuum, in the first book of his treatise on the Physical Arts; so does Apollophanes in his Natural Philosophy, Apollodorus, and Posidonius in the second book of his discourses on Natural Philosophy. They all claim that these things are incorporeal and similar. Furthermore, time is also incorporeal since it represents an interval in the motion of the world. With respect to time, the past and future are both limitless, but the present is limited. They argue that the world is perishable because it was created through reason and is one of the things we can perceive through our senses. Anything that has parts that are perishable must also be perishable as a whole. The world’s parts are perishable because they transform into one another. Therefore, the entire world is[311] perishable. Moreover, if anything can change for the worse, it is perishable; thus, the world is perishable since it can dry up or be covered with water.

Now the world was created when its substance was changed from fire to moisture, by the action of the air; and then its denser parts coagulated, and so the earth was made, and the thinner portions were evaporated and became air; and this being rarefied more and more, produced fire. And then, by the combination of all these elements, were produced plants and animals, and other kinds of things. Now Zeno speaks of the creation, and of the destruction of the world, in his treatise on the Universe, and so does Cleanthes, and so does Antipater, in the tenth book of his treatise on the World. But Panætius asserts that the world is imperishable.

Now the world was created when its substance changed from fire to moisture, due to the action of the air; then its denser parts solidified, and the earth was formed, while the lighter parts evaporated and became air; as this was further thinned out, it produced fire. Through the combination of all these elements, plants, animals, and other types of things came into existence. Zeno discusses the creation and destruction of the world in his work on the Universe, as do Cleanthes and Antipater in the tenth book of his work on the World. However, Panætius claims that the world is everlasting.

Again, that the world is an animal, and that it is endued with reason, and life, and intellect, is affirmed by Chrysippus, in the first volume of his treatise on Providence, and by Apollodorus in his Natural Philosophy, and by Posidonius; and that it is an animal in this sense, as being an essence endued with life, and with sensation. For that which is an animal, is better than that which is not an animal. But nothing is better than the world; therefore the world is an animal. And it is endued with life, as is plain from the fact of our own soul being as it were a fragment broken off from it. But Boethus denies that the world is an animal.

Again, Chrysippus states in the first volume of his work on Providence, along with Apollodorus in his Natural Philosophy and Posidonius, that the world is like an animal because it possesses reason, life, and intellect. The world is considered an animal in the sense that it is a living entity, capable of sensation. Anything that is an animal is superior to anything that is not. Since nothing is greater than the world, the world must be an animal. It is alive, as evidenced by the fact that our own soul seems to be a piece broken off from it. However, Boethus argues that the world is not an animal.

Again, that the world is one, is affirmed by Zeno, in his treatise on the Universe, and by Chrysippus, and by Apollodorus, in his Natural Philosophy, and by Posidonius, in the first book of his Discourses on Natural Philosophy. And by the term, the universe, according to Apollodorus, is understood both the world itself, and also the whole of the world itself, and of the exterior vacuum taken together. The world, then, is finite, and the vacuum infinite.

Again, the idea that the world is one is supported by Zeno in his treatise on the Universe, by Chrysippus, by Apollodorus in his Natural Philosophy, and by Posidonius in the first book of his Discourses on Natural Philosophy. According to Apollodorus, the term "the universe" refers to both the world itself and the entire extent of the world along with the surrounding vacuum. Therefore, the world is finite, while the vacuum is infinite.

LXXI. Of the stars, those which are fixed are only moved in connection with the movements of the entire heaven; but the planets move according to their own peculiar and separate motions. And the sun takes an oblique path through the circle of the zodiac, and in the same manner also does the moon, which is of a winding form. And the sun is pure fire, as Posidonius asserts in the seventh book of his treatise on the Heavenly Bodies, and it is larger than the earth, as the[312] same author informs us, in the sixteenth book of his Disclosures on Natural Philosophy. Also it is spherical, as he says in another place, being made on the same principle as the world is. Therefore it is fire, because it performs all the functions of fire. And it is larger than the earth, as is proved by the fact of the whole earth being illuminated by it, and also the whole heaven. Also the fact of the earth throwing a conical shadow, proves that the sun is greater than it, and the sun is seen in every part, because of its magnitude. But the moon is of a more earthy nature than the sun, inasmuch as it is nearer the earth.

LXXI. The fixed stars only move in relation to the movements of the entire sky, while the planets move in their own specific ways. The sun travels along an angled path through the zodiac, and the moon has a winding trajectory as well. The sun is pure fire, as Posidonius claims in the seventh book of his work on the Heavenly Bodies, and it is larger than the earth, as he also states in the sixteenth book of his Disclosures on Natural Philosophy. Furthermore, it is spherical, as he notes elsewhere, created on the same principle as the world itself. Thus, it is fire because it exhibits all the characteristics of fire. It is larger than the earth, proved by the fact that the entire earth is illuminated by it, as well as the entire sky. Additionally, the earth casts a conical shadow, showing that the sun is greater, and the sun is visible everywhere due to its size. However, the moon is more earth-like than the sun, as it is closer to the earth.

Moreover, they say that all these fiery bodies, and all the other stars, receive nutriment; the sun from the vast sea, being a sort of intellectual appendage; and the moon from the fresh waters, being mingled with the air, and also near the earth, as Posidonius explains it in the sixth book of his Discourses on Natural Philosophy. And all the other stars derive their nourishment from the earth. They also consider that the stars are of a spherical figure, and that the earth is immovable. And that the moon has not a light of her own, but that she borrows it from the sun. And that the sun is eclipsed, when the moon runs in front of it on the side towards us, as Zeno describes in his work on the Universe; for when it comes across it in its passage, it conceals it, and again it reveals it; and this is a phenomenon easily seen in a basin of water. And the moon is eclipsed when it comes below the shadow of the earth, on which account this never happens, except at the time of the full moon; and although it is diametrically opposite to the sun every month, still it is not eclipsed every month, because when its motions are obliquely towards the sun, it does not find itself in the same place as the sun, being either a little more to the north, or a little more to the south. When therefore it is found in the same place with the sun, and with the other intermediate objects, then it takes as it were the diameter of the sun, and is eclipsed. And its place is along the line which runs between the crab and the scorpion, and the ram and the bull, as Posidonius tells us.

They also say that all these fiery bodies, and the other stars, get their nourishment; the sun from the vast sea, being like an intellectual extension; and the moon from fresh waters, mixed with the air and close to the earth, as Posidonius explains in the sixth book of his Discourses on Natural Philosophy. All the other stars get their nourishment from the earth. They also believe that the stars are spherical and that the earth is stationary. The moon does not have its own light but gets it from the sun. The sun is eclipsed when the moon passes in front of it from our perspective, as Zeno describes in his work on the Universe; when it crosses in front of it, it hides it and then reveals it again, which is something you can easily see in a basin of water. The moon is eclipsed when it comes into the shadow of the earth, which is why this only happens at full moon; even though it is directly opposite the sun every month, it isn't eclipsed every month because when it moves at an angle towards the sun, it isn't in the same spot as the sun, being slightly more north or south. Therefore, when it is in the same spot as the sun and the other intermediate objects, it takes on the diameter of the sun and is eclipsed. Its path lies along the line between Cancer and Scorpio, and Aries and Taurus, as Posidonius tells us.

LXXII. They also say that God is an animal immortal, rational, perfect, and intellectual in his happiness, unsusceptible of any kind of evil, having a foreknowledge of the world[313] and of all that is in the world; however, that he has not the figure of a man; and that he is the creator of the universe, and as it were, the Father of all things in common, and that a portion of him pervades everything, which is called by different names, according to its powers; for they call him Δία as being the person (δι’ ὃν) everything is, and Ζῆνα, inasmuch as he is the cause of life, (τοῦ Ζῆν), or because he pervades life. And Ἀθηνᾶ, with reference to the extension of his dominant power over the æther (εἰς αἰθέρα). And Ἥρα, on account of his extension through the air (εἰς ἀέρα). And Ἥφαιστος, on account of his pervading fire, which is the chief instrument of art; and Ποσειδῶν, as pervading moisture, and Δημήτηρ, as pervading the earth (Γῆ). And in the same way, regarding some other of his peculiar attributes, they have given him other names.[91]

LXXII. They also say that God is an immortal, rational, perfect being who is happy and unaffected by any kind of evil, possessing knowledge of the world[313] and everything in it; however, he doesn’t have the form of a man. He is the creator of the universe and, in a sense, the Father of all things, with a part of him present in everything, which is referred to by different names depending on its attributes. They call him Δία because he is the reason (δι’ ὃν) for all existence, and Ζῆνα because he is the source of life (τοῦ Ζῆν) or because he fills life. They refer to him as Ἀθηνᾶ regarding his dominating power over the æther (εἰς αἰθέρα), and Ἥρα for his influence in the air (εἰς ἀέρα). They call him Ἥφαιστος because of his association with fire, which is the main tool of craft; Ποσειδῶν for his connection to moisture, and Δημήτηρ for his presence in the earth (Γῆ). Similarly, for other unique characteristics, they have assigned him additional names.[91]

The substance of God is asserted by Zeno to be the universal world, and the heaven; and Chrysippus agrees with this doctrine, in his eleventh book on the Gods, and so also does Posidonius, in the first book of his treatise on the same subject. Antipater, in the seventh book of his treatise on the World, says that his substance is aërial. And Boethus, in his treatise on Nature, calls the substance of God the sphere of the fixed stars.

The essence of God, according to Zeno, is the entire universe and the heavens. Chrysippus supports this idea in his eleventh book about the Gods, and so does Posidonius in the first book of his work on the same topic. Antipater, in the seventh book of his discussion on the World, claims that God's essence is airy. Boethus, in his work on Nature, refers to the essence of God as the sphere of the fixed stars.

LXXIII. And his nature they define to be, that which keeps the world together, and sometimes that which produces the things upon the earth. And nature is a habit which derives its movements from itself, perfecting and holding together all that arises out of it, according to the principles of production, in certain definite periods, and doing the same as the things from which it is separated. And it has for its object, suitableness and pleasure, as is plain from its having created man.

LXXIII. They define his nature as that which keeps the world together and sometimes produces things on Earth. Nature is a habit that derives its movements from itself, perfecting and holding together everything that comes from it according to the principles of production, at certain specific times, and performing similarly to the things from which it is separated. Its purpose is suitability and pleasure, as is evident from its creation of man.

LXXIV. But Chrysippus, in his treatise on Fate, and Posidonius, in the second book of his work on Fate, and Zeno, and Boethus, in the eleventh book of his treatise on Fate, say, that all things are produced by fate. And fate,[314] (εἱμαρμένη), is a connected (εἰρομένη) cause of existing things, or the reason according to which the world is regulated.

LXXIV. But Chrysippus, in his writing on Fate, and Posidonius, in the second book of his work on Fate, and Zeno, and Boethus, in the eleventh book of his treatise on Fate, claim that everything happens because of fate. And fate, [314] (εἱμαρμένη), is a connected (εἰρομένη) cause of things that exist, or the principle by which the world is organized.

LXXV. They also say that divination has a universal existence, since Providence has; and they define it as an act on account of certain results, as Zeno and Chrysippus, in the second book of his treatise on Divination, and Athenodorus and Posidonius, in the twelfth book of his discourses on Natural Philosophy, and in the fifth book of his treatise on Divination, all agree in saying; for Panætius denies that it has any certain foundation.

LXXV. They also say that divination exists universally, just like Providence does; and they define it as an action taken for specific results, as Zeno and Chrysippus mention in the second book of his work on Divination, and Athenodorus and Posidonius discuss in the twelfth book of his writings on Natural Philosophy and the fifth book of his treatise on Divination, all agreeing on this point; however, Panætius argues that it lacks any solid foundation.

LXXVI. And they say that the substance of all existing things is Primary Matter, as Chrysippus asserts in the first book of his Physics; and Zeno says the same. Now matter is that from which anything whatever is produced. And it is called by a twofold appellation, essence and matter; the one as relating to all things taken together, and the other to things in particular and separate. The one which relates to all things taken together, never becomes either greater or less; but the one relating to things in particular, does become greater or less, as the case may be.

LXXVI. They say that the essence of everything that exists is Primary Matter, as Chrysippus claims in the first book of his Physics, and Zeno agrees. Matter is what everything is made from. It has two names: essence and matter; one refers to everything as a whole, and the other to individual and separate things. The term that refers to everything as a whole never changes in quantity, while the term related to individual things can increase or decrease, depending on the situation.

LXXVII. Body is, according to them, a substance and finite; as Antipater says, in the second book of his treatise on Substance; and Apollodorus, in his Natural Philosophy, agrees with him. It is also subject to change, as we learn from the same author; for if it were immutable, then the things which have been produced out of it would not have been produced; on which account he also says that it is infinitely divisible: but Chrysippus denies that it is infinite; for that nothing is infinite, which is divisible at all.

LXXVII. According to them, the body is a substance and finite; as Antipater mentions in the second book of his treatise on Substance, and Apollodorus agrees in his Natural Philosophy. It is also subject to change, as we learn from the same author; because if it were unchanging, then the things that come from it couldn't have been produced. That's why he also claims that it is infinitely divisible. However, Chrysippus argues that it is not infinite; because nothing can be infinite if it is divisible at all.

LXXVIII. He admits, however, that it is infinitely divisible, and that its concretions take place over the whole of it, as he explains in the third book of his Physics, and not according to any circumference or juxtaposition; for a little wine when thrown into the sea, will keep its distinctness for a brief period, but after that, will be lost.

LXXVIII. He acknowledges, however, that it can be divided endlessly, and that its formations occur throughout the entire thing, as he explains in the third book of his Physics, and not based on any circumference or adjacency; for a small amount of wine thrown into the sea will maintain its uniqueness for a short time, but after that, it will be dissolved.

LXXIX. They also say that there are some Dæmones, who have a sympathy with mankind, being surveyors of all human affairs; and that there are heroes, which are the souls of virtuous men, which have left their bodies.

LXXIX. They also say that there are some demons who have an affinity for humanity, watching over all human affairs; and that there are heroes, which are the souls of virtuous people who have left their bodies.

LXXX. Of the things which take place in the air, they say that winter is the effect of the air above the earth being[315] cooled, on account of the retirement of the sun to a greater distance than before; that spring is a good temperature of the air, according to the sun’s approach towards us; that summer is the effect of the air above the earth being warmed by the approach of the sun towards the north; that autumn is caused by the retreat of the sun from us … to those places from which they flow.[92]

LXXX. They say that winter happens because the air above the earth gets cooler since the sun moves farther away; that spring brings a nice temperature in the air as the sun gets closer to us; that summer occurs when the air warms up as the sun moves north; and that autumn is caused by the sun moving away from us... to the places it originates from.[92]

LXXXI. And the cause of the production of the winds is the sun, which evaporates the clouds. Moreover, the rainbow is the reflexion of the sun’s rays from the moist clouds, or, as Posidonius explains it in his Meteorology, a manifestation of a section of the sun or moon, in a cloud suffused with dew; being hollow and continuous to the sight; so that it is reflected as in a mirror, under the appearance of a circle. And that comets, and bearded stars, and meteors, are fires which have an existence when the density of the air is borne upwards to the regions of the æther.

LXXXI. The winds are caused by the sun, which evaporates the clouds. Additionally, the rainbow is the reflection of the sun’s rays from the moist clouds, or, as Posidonius explains in his Meteorology, a display of a portion of the sun or moon in a dew-filled cloud; appearing hollow and continuous to the eye, it reflects like a mirror in the shape of a circle. Comets, shooting stars, and meteors are fires that exist when the density of the air rises into the higher regions of the atmosphere.

That a ray of light is a kindling of sudden fire, borne through the air with great rapidity, and displaying an appearance of length; that rain proceeds from the clouds, being a transformation of them into water, whenever the moisture which is caught up from the earth or from the sea, by the sun, is not able to be otherwise disposed of; for when it is solidified, it is then called hoar frost. And hail is a cloud congealed, and subsequently dispersed by the wind. Snow is moisture from a congealed cloud, as Posidonius tells us in the eighth book of his discourse on Natural Philosophy. Lightning is a kindling of the clouds from their being rubbed together, or else broken asunder by the wind, as Zeno tells us in his treatise on the Universe; and thunder is the noise made by them on the occasion of their being rubbed together or broken asunder; and the thunderbolt is a sudden kindling which falls with great violence on the earth, from the clouds being rubbed together or broken asunder, or, as others say, it is a conversion of fiery air violently brought down to the earth. A typhon is a vast thunderbolt, violent and full of wind, or a smoky breath of a cloud broken asunder. A πρηστὴς is a cloud[316] rent by fire, with wind,[93] … into the hollows of the earth, or when the wind is pent up in the earth, as Posidonius says in his eighth book; and that some of them are shakings, others rendings, others emissions of fire, and others, instances of violent fermentation.

A ray of light is a spark of sudden fire that travels quickly through the air and looks elongated; rain comes from the clouds, transforming them into water whenever the moisture collected from the earth or the sea by the sun cannot be disposed of another way; when it solidifies, it's called hoarfrost. Hail is a solidified cloud that the wind later disperses. Snow is moisture from a solid cloud, as Posidonius explains in the eighth book of his writing on Natural Philosophy. Lightning is caused by clouds rubbing against each other or being torn apart by the wind, as Zeno discusses in his work on the Universe; thunder is the sound created when they rub together or are torn apart; and a thunderbolt is a sudden spark that falls violently to the earth when the clouds are rubbed together or torn apart, or, as others suggest, it's a mass of fiery air violently brought down to the earth. A typhoon is a massive, violent thunderbolt filled with wind, or a smoky breath from a broken cloud. A πρηστὴς is a cloud, as Posidonius mentions in his eighth book, that is torn apart by fire and wind into the depths of the earth when the wind is trapped below the surface; some events are tremors, others rending, some are releases of fire, and others are examples of violent fermentation.

LXXXII. They also think that the general arrangement of the world is in this fashion; that the earth is in the middle, occupying the place of the centre; next to which comes the water, of a spherical form; and having the same centre as the earth; so that the earth is in the water; and next to the water comes the air, which has also a spherical form.

LXXXII. They also believe that the overall structure of the world is like this: the earth is in the center, taking the central position; surrounding it is water, which is spherical in shape and shares the same center as the earth, meaning that the earth is within the water; next to the water is air, which is also spherical.

LXXXIII. And that there are five circles in the heaven; of which the first is the arctic circle, which is always visible; the second is the tropical summer circle; the third is the equinoctial circle; the fourth, the winter tropical circle; and the fifth the antarctic, which is not visible. And they are called parallel, because they do not incline to one another; they are drawn however around the same centre. But the zodiac is oblique, cutting the parallel circles. There are also five zones on the earth; the first is the northern one, placed under the arctic circle, uninhabitable by reason of the cold; the second is temperate; the third is uninhabitable because of the heat, and is called the torrid zone; the fourth is a temperate zone, on the other side of the torrid zone; the fifth is the southern zone, being also uninhabitable by reason of the cold.[94]

LXXXIII. There are five circles in the sky: the first is the Arctic Circle, which is always visible; the second is the tropical summer circle; the third is the equatorial circle; the fourth is the winter tropical circle; and the fifth is the Antarctic Circle, which is not visible. They are called parallels because they don't slope towards each other; however, they are drawn around the same center. The zodiac is slanted, intersecting the parallel circles. There are also five zones on Earth: the first is the northern zone, located beneath the Arctic Circle, and is uninhabitable due to the cold; the second is temperate; the third is uninhabitable due to the heat and is known as the torrid zone; the fourth is a temperate zone on the opposite side of the torrid zone; and the fifth is the southern zone, which is also uninhabitable because of the cold.[94]

LXXXIV. Another of their doctrines is that nature is an artificial fire tending by a regular road to production, which is a fiery kind of breath proceeding according to art. Also, that the soul is sensible, and that it is a spirit which is born with us; consequently it is a body and continues to exist after death; that nevertheless it is perishable. But that the soul of the universe is imperishable, and that the souls which exist in animals are only parts of that of the universe. But Zeno, the Cittiæan, and Antipater, in their treatise concerning the[317] Soul, and Posidonius also, all say that the soul is a warm spirit; for that by it we have our breath, and by it we are moved. Cleanthes, accordingly, asserts that all souls continue to exist till they are burnt up; but Chrysippus says that it is only the souls of the wise that endure. And they further teach that there are eight parts of the soul; the five senses, and the generative faculties, and voice, and reason. And we see because of a body of luminous air which extends from the organ of sight to the object in a conical form, as it is asserted by Chrysippus, in the second book of his Natural Philosophy, and also by Apollodorus. And the apex of this cone is close to the eye, and its base is formed by the object which is seen; so that that which is seen is as it were reported to the eye by this continuous cone of air extended towards it like a staff. In the same way, we hear because the air between the speaker and the hearer is struck in a spherical manner; and is then agitated in waves, resembling the circular eddies which one sees in a cistern when a stone is dropped into it.

LXXXIV. Another of their beliefs is that nature is an artificial fire that follows a steady path to creation, which is a fiery kind of breath arising from skill. They also say that the soul is sensitive, a spirit that is born with us; therefore, it is a body that continues to exist after death, though it is still subject to decay. However, the soul of the universe is indestructible, and the souls in animals are merely parts of the universe's soul. Zeno of Citium, Antipater in their discussion about the [317] Soul, and Posidonius all argue that the soul is a warm spirit; it gives us breath and enables our movement. Cleanthes claims that all souls persist until they are burned up, but Chrysippus states that only the souls of the wise endure. They also teach that the soul consists of eight parts: the five senses, the generative faculties, voice, and reason. We see because of a body of luminous air that extends in a conical shape from the eye to the object, as Chrysippus indicates in the second book of his Natural Philosophy, as does Apollodorus. The tip of this cone is close to the eye, and its base is formed by the object being viewed; thus, what we see is reported to the eye through this continuous cone of air extending towards it like a staff. Similarly, we hear because the air between the speaker and the listener vibrates in a spherical way, creating waves, similar to the circular ripples seen in a cistern when a stone is dropped into it.

Sleep, they say, is produced by a relaxation of the æsthetic energies with reference to the dominant part of the soul. And the causes of the passions they explain to be the motions and conversions which take place in connection with this spirit or soul.

Sleep, they say, happens when the aesthetic energies relax in relation to the dominant part of the soul. They explain that the causes of emotions come from the movements and changes that occur in connection with this spirit or soul.

LXXXV. Seed, they define as a thing of a nature capable of producing other things of the same nature as the thing from which it has been separated. And the seed of man, which man emits, is, together with moisture, mixed up with the parts of the soul by that kind of mixture which corresponds[318] to the capacity of the parents. And Chrysippus says, in the second book of his Natural Philosophy, that it is a spirit according to substance; as is manifest from the seeds which are planted in the earth; and which, if they are old, do not germinate, because all their virtue has evaporated. And Sphærus says, that seed proceeds from the entire body, and that that is how it is that it produces all the parts of the body.

LXXXV. Seed is defined as something that has the ability to generate other things of the same kind as the one it comes from. The seed of a man, which man emits, is mixed with moisture and the components of the soul in a way that reflects the abilities of the parents. Chrysippus states in the second book of his Natural Philosophy that it is a spirit in terms of substance; this is evident from seeds planted in the ground, which fail to germinate if they are old, as all their life force has dissipated. Sphærus asserts that seed comes from the whole body, which is how it creates all parts of the body.

They also say that the seed of the female is unproductive; for, as Sphærus says, it is devoid of tone, and small in quantity, and watery.

They also say that the female seed is not effective; because, as Sphærus states, it lacks firmness, is low in amount, and watery.

LXXXVI. They also say that that is the dominant part of the soul which is its most excellent part; in which the imaginations and the desires are formed, and whence reason proceeds. And this place is in the heart.

LXXXVI. They also say that the dominant part of the soul is its most excellent part; where imaginations and desires are formed, and from which reason arises. This place is in the heart.

These then are the doctrines on the subject of natural philosophy entertained by them, which it seems sufficient for us to detail, having regard to the due proportions of this book. And the following are the points in which some of them disagreed with the rest.

These are the beliefs about natural philosophy that they held, and it seems enough for us to outline them, considering the appropriate length of this book. Here are the areas where some of them disagreed with others.

LIFE OF ARISTON.

I. Ariston the Bald, a native of Chios, surnamed the Siren, said, that the chief good was to live in perfect indifference to all those things which are of an intermediate character between virtue and vice; making not the slightest difference between them, but regarding them all on a footing of equality. For that the wise man resembles a good actor; who, whether he is filling the part of Agamemnon or Thersites, will perform them both equally well.

I. Ariston the Bald, originally from Chios and known as the Siren, stated that the highest good is to live with complete indifference to everything that lies in between virtue and vice. He believed there should be no distinction between them, treating them all as equal. He said that a wise person is like a skilled actor who can perform the roles of Agamemnon or Thersites just as well.

II. And he discarded altogether the topic of physics, and of logic, saying that the one was above us, and that the other had nothing to do with us; and that the only branch of philosophy with which we had any real concern was ethics.

II. He completely dismissed the topic of physics and logic, claiming that one was beyond our reach and the other irrelevant to us; he insisted that the only area of philosophy that truly mattered to us was ethics.

III. He also said that dialectic reasonings were like[319] cobwebs; which, although they seem to be put together on principles of art, are utterly useless.

III. He also said that dialectical reasoning was like[319] cobwebs; they might look intricate and well-crafted, but they're completely useless.

IV. And he did not introduce many virtues into his scheme, as Zeno did; nor one virtue under a great many names, as the Megaric philosophers did; but defined virtue as consisting in behaving in a certain manner with reference to a certain thing.

IV. He didn't include many virtues in his plan, like Zeno did; nor did he focus on one virtue with many names, as the Megaric philosophers did; instead, he defined virtue as how you behave in relation to something specific.

V. And as he philosophized in this manner, and carried on his discussions in the Cynosarges, he got so much influence as to be called a founder of a sect. Accordingly, Miltiades, and Diphilus were called Aristoneans.

V. While he contemplated in this way and engaged in discussions at the Cynosarges, he gained enough influence to be regarded as a founder of a movement. Consequently, Miltiades and Diphilus were labeled Aristoneans.

VI. He was a man of very persuasive eloquence, and one who could adapt himself well to the humours of a multitude. On which account Timon says of him:—

VI. He was a man with a really convincing way of speaking, and he could easily connect with the moods of a crowd. For this reason, Timon says of him:—

And one who, from Ariston’s wily race,
Traced his descent.

Diocles, the Magnesian, tells us that Ariston having fallen in with Polemo, passed over to his school, at a time when Zeno was lying ill with a long sickness. The Stoic doctrine to which he was most attached, was the one that the wise man is never guided by opinions. But Persæus argued against this, and caused one of two twin brothers to place a deposit in his hands, and then caused the other to reclaim it; and thus he convicted him, as he was in doubt on this point, and therefore forced to act on opinion. He was a great enemy of Arcesilaus. And once, seeing a bull of a monstrous conformation, having a womb, he said, “Alas! here is an argument for Arcesilaus against the evidence of his senses.” On another occasion, when a philosopher of the Academy said that he did not comprehend anything, he said to him, “Do not you even see the man who is sitting next to you?” And as he said that he did not, he said:—

Diocles from Magnesia tells us that Ariston, after meeting Polemo, joined his school while Zeno was seriously ill. The Stoic idea he favored most was that a wise person is never swayed by opinions. However, Persæus challenged this view by getting one of two twin brothers to deposit something with him, then having the other brother ask for it back; this way, he proved that the first brother, being unsure, had to act based on opinion. He was a strong critic of Arcesilaus. Once, when he saw an oddly-shaped bull with both male and female features, he remarked, “Oh no! Here’s an argument for Arcesilaus against what his senses tell him.” On another occasion, when a philosopher from the Academy claimed he didn’t understand anything, Persæus asked him, “You can’t even see the person sitting next to you?” And when the philosopher said he couldn’t, he replied:—

Who then has blinded you, who’s been so harsh,
As thus to rob you of your beaming eyes?

VII. The following works are attributed to him. Two books of Exhortatory Discourses; Dialogues on the Doctrines of Zeno; six books of Conversations; seven books of Discussions on Wisdom; Conversations on Love; Commentaries on Vain Glory; twenty-five books of Reminiscences; three books of[320] Memorabilia; eleven books of Apophthegms; a volume against the Orators; a volume against the Rescripts of Alexinus; three treatises against the Dialecticians; four books of Letters to Cleanthes. But Panætius and Sosicrates say, that his only genuine writings are his letters; and that all the rest are the works of Ariston the Peripatetic.

VII. The following works are credited to him: two books of Exhortatory Discourses, Dialogues on the Doctrines of Zeno, six books of Conversations, seven books of Discussions on Wisdom, Conversations on Love, Commentaries on Vain Glory, twenty-five books of Reminiscences, three books of[320] Memorabilia, eleven books of Apophthegms, a volume against the Orators, a volume against the Rescripts of Alexinus, three treatises against the Dialecticians, and four books of Letters to Cleanthes. However, Panætius and Sosicrates claim that his only authentic writings are his letters, and that all the other works belong to Ariston the Peripatetic.

VIII. It is said that he, being bald, got a stroke of the sun, and so died. And we have written a jesting epigram on him in Scazon iambics, in the following terms:—

VIII. It's said that he, being bald, got sunstroke and died from it. We've written a joking epigram about him in Scazon iambics, saying:—

Why, O Ariston, being old and bald,
Did you allow the sun to roast your crown?
Thus, in an unbecoming search for warmth,
Against your will, you’ve found out chilly Hell.

IX. There was also another man of the name of Ariston; a native of Julii, one of the Peripatetic school. And another who was an Athenian musician. A fourth who was a tragic poet. A fifth, a native of Alæa, who wrote a treatise on the Oratorical Art. A sixth was a peripatetic Philosopher of Alexandria.

IX. There was also another man named Ariston, a local from Julii and part of the Peripatetic school. There was another who was a musician from Athens. A fourth was a tragic poet. A fifth, from Alæa, wrote a guide on the Art of Oratory. A sixth was a Peripatetic philosopher from Alexandria.

LIFE OF HERILLUS

I. Herillus, a native of Carthage, said that the chief good was knowledge; that is to say, the always conducting one’s self in such a way as to refer everything to the principle of living according to knowledge, and not been misled by ignorance. He also said that knowledge was a habit not departing from reason in the reception of perceptions.

I. Herillus, who was from Carthage, stated that the highest good is knowledge; in other words, it's about always acting in a way that aligns with the principle of living by knowledge and not being swayed by ignorance. He also mentioned that knowledge is a habit that doesn’t stray from reason when it comes to accepting perceptions.

On one occasion, he said that there was no such thing as a chief good, but that circumstances and events changed it, just as the same piece of brass might become a statue either of Alexander or of Socrates. And that besides the chief good or end (τέλος[95]), there was a subordinate end (ὑποτελίς) different from it. And that those who were not wise aimed at the[321] latter; but that only the wise man directed his views to the former. And all the things between virtue and vice he pronounced indifferent.

On one occasion, he stated that there is no absolute good, and that it changes based on circumstances and events, just like the same piece of brass can be shaped into a statue of either Alexander or Socrates. He also mentioned that besides the highest good or goal (τέλος[95]), there is a secondary goal (ὑποτελίς) that is different from it. Those who lack wisdom tend to aim for the latter, while only the wise person focuses on the former. He deemed everything in between virtue and vice as neutral.

II. His books contain but few lines, but they are full of power, and contain arguments in opposition to Zeno.

II. His books have only a few lines, but they are packed with power and include arguments against Zeno.

III. It is said, that when he was a boy, many people were attached to him; and as Zeno wished to drive them away, he persuaded him to have his head shaved, which disgusted them all.

III. It’s said that when he was a boy, many people were drawn to him; and when Zeno wanted to push them away, he convinced him to shave his head, which turned them all off.

IV. His books are these. One on Exercise; one on the Passions; one on Opinion; the Lawgiver; the Skilful Midwife; the Contradictory Teacher; the Preparer; the Director; the Mercury; the Medea; a book of Dialogues; a book of Ethical Propositions.

IV. Here are his books: one on Exercise; one on the Passions; one on Opinion; the Lawgiver; the Skilled Midwife; the Contradictory Teacher; the Preparer; the Director; the Mercury; the Medea; a book of Dialogues; a book of Ethical Propositions.

LIFE OF DIONYSIUS

I. Dionysius, the Deserter, as he was called, asserted that pleasure was the chief good, from the circumstance of his being afflicted with a complaint in his eyes. For, as he suffered severely, he could not pronounce pain a thing indifferent.

I. Dionysius, known as the Deserter, claimed that pleasure was the highest good because he was suffering from a painful eye condition. Since he was in so much pain, he couldn’t consider pain to be something unimportant.

II. He was the son of Theophantus, and a native of Heraclea.

II. He was the son of Theophantus and was from Heraclea.

III. He was a pupil, as we are told by Diocles, first of all of Heraclides, his fellow citizen; after that of Alexinus, and Menedemus; and last of all of Zeno. And at first, as he was very devoted to learning, he tried his hand at all kinds of poetry. Afterwards, he attached himself to Aratus, whom he took for his model. Having left Zeno, he turned to the Cyrenaics, and became a frequenter of brothels, and in other respects indulged in luxury without disguise.

III. He was a student, as Diocles tells us, starting with Heraclides, his fellow townsman; then with Alexinus and Menedemus; and finally with Zeno. At first, being very dedicated to learning, he experimented with different types of poetry. Later, he followed Aratus, whom he chose as his role model. After parting ways with Zeno, he gravitated towards the Cyrenaics, frequently visited brothels, and openly indulged in a life of luxury.

IV. When he had lived near eighty years, he died of starvation.

IV. After living for nearly eighty years, he died from starvation.

V. The following books are attributed to him. Two books on Apathy; two on Exercise; four on Pleasure; one on[322] Riches, and Favours, and Revenge; one on the Use of Men; one on Good Fortune; one on Ancient Kings; one on Things which are Praised; one on Barbarian Customs.

V. The following books are attributed to him: two books on Apathy; two on Exercise; four on Pleasure; one on[322] Riches, Favors, and Revenge; one on the Use of People; one on Good Fortune; one on Ancient Kings; one on Things that are Praised; and one on Barbarian Customs.

These now are the chief men who differed from the Stoics. But the man who succeeded Zeno in his school was Cleanthes, whom we must now speak of.

These are the main figures who disagreed with the Stoics. The person who took over after Zeno in his school was Cleanthes, and he is who we will talk about now.

LIFE OF CLEANTHES

I. Cleanthes was a native of Assos, and the son of Phanias. He was originally a boxer, as we learn from Antisthenes, in his Successions. And he came to Athens, having but four drachmas, as some people say, and attaching himself to Zeno, he devoted himself to Philosophy in a most noble manner; and he adhered to the same doctrines as his master.

I. Cleanthes was from Assos and the son of Phanias. He started out as a boxer, according to Antisthenes in his Successions. He arrived in Athens with only four drachmas, as some say, and he became a devoted student of Zeno, embracing Philosophy in a very honorable way; he followed the same beliefs as his teacher.

II. He was especially eminent for his industry, so that as he was a very poor man, he was forced to undertake mercenary employments, and he used to draw water in the gardens by night, and by day he used to exercise himself in philosophical discussions; on which account he was called Phreantles.[96] They also say that he was on one occasion brought before a court of justice, to be compelled to give an account what his sources of income were from which he maintained himself in such good condition; and that then he was acquitted, having produced as his witness the gardener in whose garden he drew the water; and a woman who was a mealseller, in whose establishment he used to prepare the meal. And the judges of the Areopagus admired him, and voted that ten minæ should be given to him; but Zeno forbade him to accept them.

II. He was particularly known for his hard work, and since he was very poor, he had to take on odd jobs. He would draw water in the gardens at night and spend his days engaging in philosophical discussions, which is why people called him Phreantles.[96] They also say that one time he was brought before a court to explain how he managed to live so well. He was cleared when he brought in the gardener where he drew water and a woman who sold meals, where he would prepare his food. The judges of the Areopagus were impressed by him and decided to award him ten minae, but Zeno told him not to accept it.

They also say that Antigonus presented him three thousand drachmas. And once, when he was conducting some young men to some spectacle, it happened that the wind blew away his cloak, and it was then seen that he had nothing on under it; on which he was greatly applauded by the Athenians,[323] according to the account given by Demetrius, the Magnesian, in his essay on People of the same Name. And he was greatly admired by them on account of this circumstance.

They also say that Antigonus gave him three thousand drachmas. And once, while he was taking some young men to a show, the wind blew his cloak away, and it was revealed that he was wearing nothing underneath; this earned him a lot of applause from the Athenians,[323] according to Demetrius the Magnesian in his essay on People with the Same Name. He was greatly admired by them because of this event.

They also say that Antigonus, who was a pupil of his, once asked him why he drew water; and that he made answer, “Do I do nothing beyond drawing water? Do I not also dig, and do I not water the land, and do all sorts of things for the sake of philosophy?” For Zeno used to accustom him to this, and used to require him to bring him an obol by way of tribute.[97] And once he brought one of the pieces of money which he had collected in this way, into the middle of a company of his acquaintances, and said, “Cleanthes could maintain even another Cleanthes if he were to choose; but others who have plenty of means to support themselves, seek for necessaries from others; although they only study philosophy in a very lazy manner.” And, in reference to these habits of his, Cleanthes was called a second Heracles.

They also say that Antigonus, who was one of his students, once asked him why he was drawing water; and he replied, “Am I just drawing water? Don’t I also dig, water the land, and do various things for the sake of philosophy?” Zeno had trained him to do this and required him to bring him an obol as a form of tribute.[97] And one time, he brought one of the coins he had collected in this way to a group of his friends and said, “Cleanthes could support another Cleanthes if he wanted to; but others who have plenty of resources to take care of themselves look to others for what they need, even though they only approach philosophy in a very lazy way.” Because of these habits, Cleanthes was called a second Heracles.

III. He was then very industrious; but he was not well endowed by nature, and was very slow in his intellect. On which account Timon says of him:—

III. He was very hardworking, but he wasn't naturally gifted and was quite slow mentally. Because of this, Timon says about him:—

What stately ram thus measures o’er the ground,
And master of the flock surveys them round?
What citizen of Assos, dull and cold,
Fond of long words, a mouth-piece, but not bold.[98]

And when he was ridiculed by his fellow pupils, he used to bear it patiently.

And when his classmates made fun of him, he would tolerate it calmly.

IV. He did not even object to the name when he was called an ass; but only said that he was the only animal able to bear the burdens which Zeno put upon him. And once, when he was reproached as a coward, he said, “That is the reason why I make but few mistakes.” He used to say, in justification of his preference of his own way of life to that of the rich, “That while they were playing at ball, he was earning money by digging hard and barren ground.” And he very often used to blame himself. And once, Ariston heard him doing so, and said, “Who is it that you are reproaching?”[324] and he replied, “An old man who has grey hair, but no brains.”

IV. He didn’t even mind being called an ass; he just said that he was the only animal capable of handling the burdens Zeno placed on him. Once, when someone accused him of being a coward, he replied, “That’s why I make so few mistakes.” He often justified his choice of lifestyle over that of the wealthy by saying, “While they were playing ball, I was making money by digging hard, barren land.” He often criticized himself too. One time, Ariston heard him doing this and asked, “Who are you blaming?” He answered, “An old man with grey hair, but no brains.”[324]

When some one once said to him, that Arcesilaus did not do what he ought, “Desist,” he replied, “and do not blame him; for, if he destroys duty as far as his words go, at all events he establishes it by his actions.” Arcesilaus once said to him, “I never listen to flatterers.” “Yes,” rejoined Cleanthes, “I flatter you, when I say that though you say one thing, you do another.” When some one once asked him what lesson he ought to inculcate on his son, he replied, “The warning of Electra:”—

When someone once told him that Arcesilaus wasn’t doing what he should, he replied, “Stop, and don’t criticize him; because, while he might undermine duty with his words, he certainly upholds it through his actions.” Arcesilaus once told him, “I never pay attention to flatterers.” “True,” replied Cleanthes, “I flatter you when I say that even though you claim one thing, you do another.” When someone asked him what lesson he should teach his son, he answered, “The warning of Electra:”—

Silence, silence, gently step.[99]

When a Lacedæmonian once said in his hearing, that labour was a good thing, he was delighted, and addressed him:—

When a Spartan once said in his hearing that hard work was a good thing, he was thrilled and replied to him:—

Oh, early worth, a soul so wise and young
Proclaims you from the sage Lycurgus sprung.[100]

Hecaton tells us in his Apophthegms, that once when a young man said, “If a man who beats his stomach γαστρίζει then a man who slaps his thigh μηρίζει,” he replied, “Do you stick to your διαμηρίζει.” But analogous words do not always indicate analogous facts. Once when he was conversing with a youth, he asked him if he felt; and as he said that he did, “Why is it then,” said Cleanthes, “that I do not feel that you feel?”

Hecaton tells us in his Apophthegms that once a young man said, “If a man who beats his stomach is hungry, then a man who slaps his thigh is also hungry.” He replied, “Do you really believe that?” But similar words don’t always mean similar things. Once, when he was talking with a young man, he asked him if he felt anything. When the young man said he did, Cleanthes responded, “Then why is it that I don’t feel what you feel?”

When Sositheus, the poet, said in the theatre where he was present:—

When Sositheus, the poet, spoke in the theater where he was present:—

Men whom the folly of Cleanthes urges;

He continued in the same attitude; at which the hearers were surprised, and applauded him, but drove Sositheus away. And when he expressed his sorrow for having abused him in this manner, he answered him gently, saying, “That it would be a preposterous thing for Bacchus and Hercules to bear being ridiculed by the poets without any expression of anger, and for him to be indignant at any chance attack.” He used also to say, “That the Peripatetics were in the same condition as lyres, which though they utter sweet notes, do not[325] hear themselves.” And it is said, that when he asserted that, on the principles of Zeno, one could judge of a man’s character by his looks, some witty young men brought him a profligate fellow, having a hardy look from continual exercise in the fields, and requested him to tell them his moral character; and he, having hesitated a little, bade the man depart; and, as he departed, he sneezed, “I have the fellow now,” said Cleanthes, “he is a debauchee.”

He kept the same attitude, which surprised the listeners and made them applaud him, but they pushed Sositheus away. When he expressed regret for having treated him that way, Sositheus gently responded, saying, “It would be ridiculous for Bacchus and Hercules to be ridiculed by poets without showing any anger, and for me to get upset over any random insult.” He would also say, “The Peripatetics are like lyres; they produce sweet sounds but do not hear themselves.” It’s said that when he claimed, based on Zeno's principles, that you could judge a person’s character by their appearance, some clever young men brought him a disreputable guy who looked tough from constantly working outside and asked him to assess his moral character. After hesitating for a bit, he told the man to leave, and as he was leaving, the man sneezed. “I’ve got him now,” Cleanthes said, “he’s a debauchee.”

He said once to a man who was conversing with him by himself, “You are not talking to a bad man.” And when some one reproached him with his old age, he rejoined, “I too wish to depart, but when I perceive myself to be in good health in every respect, and to be able to recite and read, I am content to remain.” They say too, that he used to write down all that he heard from Zeno on oyster shells, and on the shoulder-blades of oxen, from want of money to buy paper with.

He once told a man who was talking with him alone, “You’re not talking to a bad person.” When someone criticized him for being old, he replied, “I also want to leave, but when I see that I’m in good health overall and can read and recite, I’m okay with staying.” It’s also said that he used to write down everything he heard from Zeno on oyster shells and shoulder blades of oxen because he didn’t have enough money to buy paper.

V. And though he was of this character, and in such circumstances, he became so eminent, that, though Zeno had many other disciples of high reputation, he succeeded him as the president of his School.

V. And even though he had this character and was in these circumstances, he became so prominent that, despite Zeno having many other well-known students, he took over as the leader of his School.

VI. And he left behind him some excellent books, which are these. One on Time; two on Zeno’s System of Natural Philosophy; four books of the Explanations of Heraclitus; one on Sensation; one on Art; one addressed to Democritus; one to Aristarchus; one to Herillus; two on Desire; one entitled Archæology; one on the Gods; one on the Giants; one on Marriage; one on Poets; three on Duty; one on Good Counsel; one on Favour; one called Exhortatory; one on Virtues; one on Natural Ability; one on Gorgippus; one on Enviousness; one on Love; one on Freedom; one called the Art of Love; one on Honour; one on Glory; The Statesman; one on Counsel; one on Laws; one on Deciding as a Judge; one on the Way of Life; three on Reason; one on the Chief Good; one on the Beautiful; one on Actions; one on Knowledge; one on Kingly Power; one on Friendship; one on Banquets; one on the Principle that Virtue is the same in Man and Woman; one on the Wise Man Employing Sophisms; one on Apophthegms; two books of Conversations; one on Pleasure; one[326] on Properties; one on Doubtful Things; one on Dialectics; one on Modes; one on Categorems.

VI. He left behind some outstanding books, which include: one on Time; two on Zeno’s System of Natural Philosophy; four books explaining Heraclitus; one on Sensation; one on Art; one addressed to Democritus; one to Aristarchus; one to Herillus; two on Desire; one titled Archæology; one on the Gods; one on the Giants; one on Marriage; one on Poets; three on Duty; one on Good Advice; one on Favor; one called Exhortatory; one on Virtues; one on Natural Ability; one on Gorgippus; one on Envy; one on Love; one on Freedom; one called the Art of Love; one on Honor; one on Glory; The Statesman; one on Advice; one on Laws; one on Judging; one on the Way of Life; three on Reason; one on the Highest Good; one on Beauty; one on Actions; one on Knowledge; one on Kingly Power; one on Friendship; one on Banquets; one on the Idea that Virtue is the same for Men and Women; one on the Wise Man Using Sophisms; one on Sayings; two books of Conversations; one on Pleasure; one[326] on Properties; one on Uncertain Things; one on Dialectics; one on Modes; one on Categorems.

VII. These are his writings.

VII. These are his writings.

And he died in the following manner. His gums swelled very much; and, at the command of his physicians, he abstained from food for two days. And he got so well that his physicians allowed him to return to all his former habits; but he refused, and saying that he had now already gone part of the way, he abstained from food for the future, and so died; being, as some report, eighty years old, and having been a pupil of Zeno nineteen years. And we have written a playful epigram on him also, which runs thus:—

And he died in the following way. His gums swelled up a lot, and, at his doctors’ advice, he didn't eat for two days. He got better, and his doctors said he could go back to his old habits, but he refused. He said that since he had made some progress already, he would keep fasting, and so he died; as some say, he was eighty years old and had been a student of Zeno for nineteen years. We also wrote a lighthearted poem about him, which goes like this:—

I praise Cleanthes, but praise Pluto more;
Who could not bear to see him grown so old,
So gave him rest at last among the dead,
Who’d drawn such loads of water while alive.

LIFE OF SPHÆRUS.

I. Sphærus, a native of the Bosphorus, was, as we have said before, a pupil of Cleanthes after the death of Zeno.

I. Sphærus, from the Bosphorus, was, as we mentioned earlier, a student of Cleanthes after Zeno's death.

II. And when he made a considerable advance in philosophy he went to Alexandria, to the court of Ptolemy Philopater. And once, when there was a discussion concerning the question whether a wise man would allow himself to be guided by opinion, and when Sphærus affirmed that he would not, the king, wishing to refute him, ordered some pomegranates of wax to be set before him; and when Sphærus was deceived by them, the king shouted that he had given his assent to a false perception. But Sphærus answered very neatly, that he had not given his assent to the fact that they were pomegranates, but to the fact that it was probable that they might be pomegranates. And that a perception which could be comprehended differed from one that was only probable.

II. When he made significant progress in philosophy, he went to Alexandria, to the court of Ptolemy Philopater. One time, during a debate about whether a wise person would let themselves be influenced by opinion, Sphærus argued that they wouldn’t. To challenge him, the king had some wax pomegranates placed in front of Sphærus. When Sphærus was fooled by them, the king claimed he had agreed to a false impression. But Sphærus cleverly replied that he hadn't agreed to the idea that they were pomegranates, but to the idea that they could possibly be pomegranates. He pointed out that a perception that could be understood was different from one that was just probable.

Once, when Mnesistratus accused him of denying that[327] Ptolemy was a king, he said to him, “That Ptolemy was a man with such and such qualities, and a king.”[101]

Once, when Mnesistratus accused him of denying that[327] Ptolemy was a king, he responded, “Ptolemy was a person with these qualities and a king.”[101]

III. He wrote the following books. Two on the World; one on the Elements of Seed; one on Fortune; one on the Smallest Things; one on Atoms and Phantoms; one on the Senses; five Conversations about Heraclitus; one on Ethical Arrangement; one on Duty; one on Appetite; two on the Passions; one on Kingly Power; on the Lacedæmonian Constitution; three on Lycurgus and Socrates; one on Law; one on Divination; one volume of Dialogues on Love; one on the Eretrian Philosophers; one on Things Similar; one on Terms; one on Habits; three on Contradictions; one on Reason; one on Riches; one on Glory; one on Death; two on the Art of Dialectics; one on Categorems; one on Ambiguity; and a volume of Letters.

III. He wrote the following books. Two about the World; one about the Elements of Seed; one about Fortune; one about the Smallest Things; one about Atoms and Phantoms; one about the Senses; five Conversations about Heraclitus; one about Ethical Arrangement; one about Duty; one about Appetite; two about the Passions; one about Kingly Power; one about the Lacedæmonian Constitution; three about Lycurgus and Socrates; one about Law; one about Divination; one volume of Dialogues on Love; one about the Eretrian Philosophers; one about Similar Things; one about Terms; one about Habits; three about Contradictions; one about Reason; one about Riches; one about Glory; one about Death; two about the Art of Dialectics; one about Categorems; one about Ambiguity; and a volume of Letters.

LIFE OF CHRYSIPPUS.

I. Chrysippus was the son of Apollonius, and a native of either Soli or Tarsus, as Alexander tells us in his Successions; and he was a pupil of Cleanthes. Previously he used to practise running as a public runner; then he became a pupil of Zeno or of Cleanthes, as Diocles and the generality of authors say, and while he was still living he abandoned him, and became a very eminent philosopher.

I. Chrysippus was the son of Apollonius and originally from either Soli or Tarsus, as Alexander mentions in his Successions; he was a student of Cleanthes. He initially competed as a public runner, but then he became a student of Zeno or Cleanthes, as Diocles and most authors report. While he was still alive, he left his teacher and became a highly respected philosopher.

II. He was a man of great natural ability, and of great acuteness in every way, so that in many points he dissented[328] from Zeno, and also from Cleanthes, to whom he often used to say that he only wanted to be instructed in the dogmas of the school, and that he would discover the demonstrations for himself. But whenever he opposed him with any vehemence, he always repented, so that he used frequently to say:—

II. He was a man of exceptional natural talent and sharpness in every way, so he disagreed with Zeno and Cleanthes on many points. He often told them that he just wanted to learn the school's doctrines and would figure out the arguments for himself. But whenever he argued against them strongly, he always felt regret afterward, so he often said:—

In most respects I am a happy man,
Excepting where Cleanthes is concerned;
For in that matter I am far from fortunate.

And he had such a high reputation as a dialectician, that most people thought that if there were such a science as dialectics among the Gods; it would be in no respect different from that of Chrysippus. But though he was so eminently able in matter, he was not perfect in style.

And he had such a strong reputation as a dialector that most people believed if there were a science of dialectics among the Gods, it would be just like that of Chrysippus. But even though he was exceptionally skilled in substance, he wasn't perfect in style.

III. He was industrious beyond all other men; as is plain from his writings; for he wrote more than seven hundred and five books. And he often wrote several books on the same subject, wishing to put down everything that occurred to him; and constantly correcting his previous assertions, and using a great abundance of testimonies. So that, as in one of his writings he had quoted very nearly the whole of the Medea of Euripides, and some one had his book in his hands; this latter, when he was asked what he had got there, made answer, “The Medea of Chrysippus.” And Apollodorus, the Athenian, in his Collection of Dogmas, wishing to assert that what Epicurus had written out of his own head, and without any quotations to support his arguments, was a great deal more than all the books of Chrysippus, speaks thus (I give his exact words), “For if any one were to take away from the books of Chrysippus all the passages which he quotes from other authors, his paper would be left empty.”

III. He was more hardworking than anyone else, which is clear from his writings; he wrote more than seven hundred and five books. He often wrote multiple books on the same topic because he wanted to capture everything he thought of, constantly revising his earlier claims and including a lot of references. In one of his works, he quoted nearly the entire Medea by Euripides, and when someone had his book and was asked what it was, they replied, "The Medea of Chrysippus." Apollodorus, an Athenian, in his Collection of Dogmas, wanted to argue that what Epicurus had written from his own ideas, without any quotes to back him up, was much more than all of Chrysippus's books, stating explicitly (I quote him directly), "If you were to remove all the passages Chrysippus quotes from other authors, his pages would be left blank."

These are the words of Apollodorus; but the old woman who lived with him, as Diocles reports, used to say that he wrote five hundred lines every day. And Hecaton says, that he first applied himself to philosophy, when his patrimony had been confiscated, and seized for the royal treasury.

These are the words of Apollodorus; but the old woman who lived with him, as Diocles reports, used to say that he wrote five hundred lines every day. And Hecaton says that he first turned to philosophy when his inheritance had been taken and seized for the royal treasury.

IV. He was slight in person, as is plain from his statue which is in the Ceramicus, which is nearly hidden by the equestrian statue near it; in reference to which circumstance, Carneades called him Crypsippus.[102] He was once reproached[329] by some one for not attending the lectures of Ariston, who was drawing a great crowd after him at the time; and he replied, “If I had attended to the multitude I should not have been a philosopher.” And once, when he saw a dialectician pressing hard on Cleanthes, and proposing sophistical fallacies to him, he said, “Cease to drag that old man from more important business, and propose these questions to us who are young.” At another time, when some one wishing to ask him something privately, was addressing him quietly, but when he saw a multitude approaching began to speak more energetically he said to him:—

IV. He was of slim build, which is evident from his statue in the Ceramicus, mostly obscured by the equestrian statue nearby; because of this, Carneades referred to him as Crypsippus.[102] At one point, someone criticized him for not attending Ariston's lectures, which were attracting large crowds at the time, and he replied, “If I had focused on the crowd, I wouldn’t have become a philosopher.” Once, when he noticed a dialectician pressuring Cleanthes with tricky arguments, he said, “Stop distracting that old man from more important matters and ask us young people instead.” Another time, when someone was trying to ask him something privately and started to speak more loudly upon seeing a crowd approaching, he told him:—

Alas, my brother! now your eye is troubled;
You were quite sane just now; and yet how quickly
Have you succumbed to frenzy.[103]

And at drinking parties he used to behave quietly, moving his legs about however, so that a female slave once said, “It is only the legs of Chrysippus that are drunk.” And he had so high an opinion of himself, that once, when a man asked him, “To whom shall I entrust my son?” he said, “To me, for if I thought that there was any one better than myself, I would have gone to him to teach me philosophy.” In reference to which anecdote they report that people used to say of him:—

And at drinking parties, he would act pretty composed, shifting his legs around, which led a female slave to remark, “Only the legs of Chrysippus are drunk.” He had such a high opinion of himself that when someone asked him, “Who should I trust with my son?” he replied, “Trust me, because if I believed anyone was better than me, I would go to them for philosophy lessons.” About this story, people would say of him:—

He has indeed a clear and subtle head,
The rest are forms of empty æther made.[104]

And also:—

And also:—

For if Chrysippus had not lived and taught,
The Stoic school would surely have been nought.

VI. But at last, when Arcesilaus and Lacydes, as Sotion records in his eighth book, came to the Academy, he joined them in the study of philosophy; from which circumstance he got the habit of arguing for and against a custom, and discussed magnitudes and quantities, following the system of the Academics.

VI. But finally, when Arcesilaus and Lacydes, as Sotion notes in his eighth book, arrived at the Academy, he joined them in studying philosophy. Because of this, he developed the habit of debating both sides of a custom and talked about sizes and amounts, following the system of the Academics.

VII. Hermippus relates, that one day, when he was teaching in the Odeum, he was invited to a sacrifice by his pupils;[330] and, that drinking some sweet unmixed wine, he was seized with giddiness, and departed this life five days afterwards, when he had lived seventy-three years; dying in the hundred and forty-third olympiad, as Apollodorus says in his Chronicles. And we have written an epigram on him:—

VII. Hermippus reports that one day, while he was teaching in the Odeum, his students invited him to a sacrifice;[330] and after drinking some sweet, unmixed wine, he became dizzy and passed away five days later, having lived for seventy-three years; he died in the hundred and forty-third Olympiad, as noted by Apollodorus in his Chronicles. We have also written an epigram about him:—

Chrysippus drank with open mouth some wine
Then became giddy, and so quickly died.
Too little reck’d he of the Porch’s weal,
Or of his country’s, or of his own dear life;
And so descended to the realms of Hell.

But some people say that he died of a fit of immoderate laughter. For that seeing his ass eating figs, he told his old woman to give the ass some unmixed wine to drink afterwards, and then laughed so violently that he died.

But some people say that he died from laughing too hard. He saw his donkey eating figs and told his wife to give the donkey some straight wine to drink afterward, and then he laughed so intensely that he died.

VIII. He appears to have been a man of exceeding arrogance. Accordingly, though he wrote such numbers of books, he never dedicated one of them to any sovereign. And he was contented with one single old woman, as Demetrius tells us, in his People of the same Name. And when Ptolemy wrote to Cleanthes, begging him either to come to him himself or to send him some one, Sphærus went to him, but Chrysippus slighted the invitation.

VIII. He seemed to be a very arrogant man. Even though he wrote a lot of books, he never dedicated any of them to a ruler. He was satisfied with just one elderly woman, as Demetrius mentions in his People of the same Name. When Ptolemy reached out to Cleanthes, asking him to either visit or send someone, Sphærus went, but Chrysippus ignored the invitation.

IX. However, he sent for the sons of his sister, Aristocreon and Philocrates, and educated them; and he was the first person who ventured to hold a school in the open air in the Lyceum, as the before mentioned Demetrius relates.

IX. However, he called for his sister's sons, Aristocreon and Philocrates, and educated them. He was the first person to dare to hold a school outdoors in the Lyceum, as previously mentioned by Demetrius.

X. There was also another Chrysippus, a native of Cnidos, a physician, from whom Erasistratus testifies that he received great benefit. And another also who was a son of his, and the physician of Ptolemy; who, having had a false accusation brought against him, was apprehended and punished by being scourged. There was also a fourth who was a pupil of Erasistratus; and a fifth was an author of a work called Georgics.

X. There was another Chrysippus from Cnidos, who was a doctor, and Erasistratus said he benefited greatly from him. There was also another Chrysippus, his son, who was the physician for Ptolemy. He was falsely accused, apprehended, and punished by being whipped. The fourth Chrysippus was a student of Erasistratus, and the fifth wrote a work called Georgics.

XI. Now this philosopher used to delight in proposing questions of this sort. The person who reveals the mysteries to the uninitiated commits a sin; the hierophant reveals them to the uninitiated; therefore the hierophant commits sin? Another was, that which is not in the city, is also not in the house; but a well is not in the city, therefore, there is not a well in the house. Another was, there is a certain head; that head you have not got; there is then a[331] head that you have not got; therefore, you have not got a head. Again, if a man is in Megara, he is not in Athens; but there is a man in Megara, therefore, there is not a man in Athens. Again, if you say anything, what you say comes out of your mouth; but you say “a waggon,” therefore a waggon comes out of your mouth. Another was, if you have not lost a thing, you have it; but you have not lost horns; therefore, you have horns. Though some attribute this sophism to Eubulides.

XI. This philosopher enjoyed posing questions like these. If someone reveals secrets to those who don’t understand them, it’s a sin; the hierophant reveals them to the uninitiated; therefore, the hierophant commits a sin? Another was, if something is not in the city, it’s also not in the house; but a well is not in the city, so there isn’t a well in the house. Another one was, there’s a certain head; you don’t have that head; therefore, there’s a head you don’t have; so, you don’t have a head. Again, if a man is in Megara, he’s not in Athens; but there’s a man in Megara, so there’s not a man in Athens. Again, if you say anything, what you say comes out of your mouth; but you say “a wagon,” so a wagon comes out of your mouth. Another was, if you haven’t lost something, you have it; but you haven’t lost horns; therefore, you have horns. Although some attribute this sophism to Eubulides.

XII. There are people who run Chrysippus down as having written a great deal that is very shameful and indecent. For in his treatise on the Ancient Natural Historians, he relates the story of Jupiter and Juno very indecently, devoting six hundred lines to what no one could repeat without polluting his mouth. For, as it is said, he composes this story, though he praises it as consisting of natural details, in a way more suitable to street walkers than to Goddesses; and not at all resembling the ideas which have been adopted or cited by writers in paintings. For they were found neither in Polemo, nor in Hypsicrates, nor in Antigonus, but were inserted by himself. And in his treatise on Polity, he allows people to marry their mothers, or their daughters, or their sons. And he repeats this doctrine in his treatise on those things which are not desirable for their own sake, in the very opening of it. And in the third book of his treatise on Justice, he devotes a thousand lines to bidding people devour even the dead.

XII. Some people criticize Chrysippus for writing a lot of material that they find shameful and inappropriate. In his work on the Ancient Natural Historians, he tells the story of Jupiter and Juno in a very indecent way, dedicating six hundred lines to content that no one can repeat without feeling dirty. Although he claims it’s about natural details, he presents the story in a way that seems more fitting for streetwalkers than for Goddesses, and it doesn’t reflect the ideas used by other writers in their artworks. These themes weren’t found in Polemo, Hypsicrates, or Antigonus, but were added by him. In his treatise on Polity, he suggests that people can marry their mothers, daughters, or sons. He reiterates this idea at the beginning of his work on things that aren’t desirable for their own sake. In the third book of his treatise on Justice, he spends a thousand lines encouraging people to consume even the dead.

In the second book of his treatise on Life and Means of Support, where he is warning us to consider beforehand, how the wise man ought to provide himself with means, he says, “And yet why need he provide himself with means? for if it is for the sake of living, living at all is a matter of indifference; if it is for the sake of pleasure, that is a matter of indifference too; if it is for the sake of virtue, that is of itself sufficient for happiness. But the methods of providing one’s self with means are ridiculous; for instance, some derive them from a king; and then it will be necessary to humour him. Some from friendship; and then friendship will become a thing to be bought with a price. Some from wisdom; and then wisdom will become mercenary; and these are the accusations which he brings.”

In the second book of his treatise on Life and Means of Support, where he warns us to think ahead about how a wise person should secure their resources, he says, “And yet why should he even secure resources? If it’s just to live, then life itself doesn’t really matter; if it’s for pleasure, that doesn’t matter either; if it’s for virtue, that alone is enough for happiness. But the ways of securing resources are laughable; for example, some take them from a king, which means they have to cater to him. Some rely on friendship, turning friendship into something that's transactional. Some depend on wisdom, which then becomes something you profit from; and those are the criticisms he raises.”

But since he has written many books of high reputation, it[332] has seemed good to me to give a catalogue of them, classifying them according to their subjects. They are the following:—

But since he has written many well-regarded books, it[332] seemed right to me to provide a list of them, organizing them by their topics. They are as follows:—

Books on Logic; Propositions; Logical Questions; a book of the Contemplations of the Philosopher; six books of Dialectic Terms addressed to Metrodorus; one on the Technical Terms used in Dialectics, addressed to Zeno; one called the Art of Dialectics, addressed to Aristagoras; four books of Probable Conjunctive Reasons, addressed to Dioscorides.

Books on Logic; Propositions; Logical Questions; a book of the Philosopher's Reflections; six books of Dialectical Terms addressed to Metrodorus; one on the Technical Terms used in Dialectics, addressed to Zeno; one titled the Art of Dialectics, addressed to Aristagoras; four books of Likely Conjunctive Reasons, addressed to Dioscorides.

The first set of treatises on the Logical Topics, which concern things, contains: one essay on Propositions; one on those Propositions which are not simple; two on the Copulative Propositions, addressed to Athenades; three on Positive Propositions, addressed to Aristagoras; one on Definite Propositions, addressed to Athenodorus; one on Privative Propositions, addressed to Thearus; three on the Best Propositions, addressed to Dion; four on the Differences between Indefinite Propositions; two on those Propositions which are enunciated with a reference to time; two on Perfect Propositions.

The first set of essays on Logical Topics, which focus on things, includes: one essay on Propositions; one on Propositions that aren't simple; two on Copulative Propositions, directed to Athenades; three on Positive Propositions, directed to Aristagoras; one on Definite Propositions, directed to Athenodorus; one on Privative Propositions, directed to Thearus; three on the Best Propositions, directed to Dion; four on the Differences between Indefinite Propositions; two on Propositions that reference time; and two on Perfect Propositions.

The second set contains, one essay on a Disjunctive True Propositions, addressed to Gorgippides; four on a Conjunctive True Proposition, also addressed to Gorgippides; one called, the Sect, addressed to Gorgippides; one on the argument of Consequents; one on questions touched upon in the three preceding treatises, and now re-examined, this also is addressed to Gorgippides; one on what is Possible, addressed to Clitus; one on the treatise of Philo, on Signification; one on what it is that Falsehood consists in.

The second set includes one essay on Disjunctive True Propositions, addressed to Gorgippides; four on Conjunctive True Propositions, also addressed to Gorgippides; one titled "The Sect," addressed to Gorgippides; one on the argument of Consequents; one revisiting questions discussed in the three previous treatises, which is also directed to Gorgippides; one on what is Possible, addressed to Clitus; one on Philo's treatise about Signification; and one on what constitutes Falsehood.

The third set contains, two treatises on Imperative Propositions; two on Interrogation; four on Examination; an epitome of the subject of Interrogation and Examination; four treatises on Answer; an abridgment on Answer; two essays on Investigation.

The third set includes two treatises on Imperative Propositions, two on Interrogation, four on Examination, a summary of the topic of Interrogation and Examination, four treatises on Answer, a shortened version on Answer, and two essays on Investigation.

The fourth set contains ten books on Categorems, addressed to Metrodorus; one treatise on what is Direct and Indirect, addressed to Philarchus; one on Conjunctions, addressed to Apollonides; four on Categorems, addressed to Pasylus.

The fourth set includes ten books on Categorems for Metrodorus; one essay on Direct and Indirect topics for Philarchus; one about Conjunctions for Apollonides; and four on Categorems for Pasylus.

The fifth set contains, one treatise on the Five Cases; one on Things defined according to the Subject; two on Enunciation, addressed to Stesagoras; two on Appellative Nouns.

The fifth set includes one essay on the Five Cases, one on Things defined by the Subject, two on Statements addressed to Stesagoras, and two on Appellative Nouns.

The next class of his writings refers to rules of Logic[333], with reference to words, and speech which consists of words.

The next category of his writings discusses the rules of Logic[333], focusing on words and speech that is made up of words.

The first set of these contains, six treatises on Singular and Plural Enunciations; five on Words, addressed to Sosigenes and Alexander; four on the Inequality of Words, addressed to Dion; three on the Sorites which refer to Words; one on Solecisms in the Use of Words, addressed to Dionysius; one entitled Discourses, contrary to Customs; one entitled Diction, and addressed to Dionysius.

The first set includes six essays on Singular and Plural Expressions; five on Words, directed to Sosigenes and Alexander; four on the Inequality of Words, directed to Dion; three on the Sorites related to Words; one on Solecisms in Word Usage, directed to Dionysius; one titled Discourses, Challenging Customs; and one titled Diction, also directed to Dionysius.

The second set contains, five treatises on the Elements of Speech and of Phrases; four on the Arrangement of Phrases; three on the Arrangement, and on the Elements of Phrases, addressed to Philip; one on the Elements of Discourse, addressed to Nicias; one on Correlatives.

The second set includes five treatises on the Elements of Speech and Phrases; four on the Arrangement of Phrases; three on the Arrangement and the Elements of Phrases, directed to Philip; one on the Elements of Discourse, directed to Nicias; and one on Correlatives.

The third set contains, two treatises against those who do not admit Division; four on Ambiguous Expressions, addressed to Apollos; one, Ambiguity in Modes; two on the Ambiguous Use of Figures, in Conjunctive Propositions; two on the essay on Ambiguous Expressions, by Panthoides; five on the Introduction to the Ambiguous Expressions; one, being an abridgment of the Ambiguous Expressions, addressed to Epicrates; and a collection of instances to serve as an Introduction to the Ambiguous Expressions, in two books.

The third set includes two essays against those who don't accept Division; four on Ambiguous Expressions, directed to Apollos; one on Ambiguity in Modes; two on the Ambiguous Use of Figures in Conjunctive Propositions; two on the essay about Ambiguous Expressions by Panthoides; five on the Introduction to Ambiguous Expressions; one, which is a summary of the Ambiguous Expressions aimed at Epicrates; and a collection of examples serving as an Introduction to the Ambiguous Expressions, in two volumes.

The next class is on the subject of that part of logic which is conversant about reasonings and modes.

The next class is about the part of logic that deals with reasoning and methods.

The first set of works in this class, contains, the Art of Reasoning and of Modes, in five books, addressed to Dioscorides; a treatise on Reasoning, in three books; one on the Structure of Modes, addressed to Stesagoras, in five books; a comparison of the Elements of Modes; a treatise on Reciprocal and Conjunctive Reasonings; an essay to Agathon, called also an essay on Problems, which follow one another; a treatise, proving that Syllogistic Propositions suppose one or more other terms; one on Conclusions, addressed to Aristagoras; one essay, proving that the same reasoning can affect several figures; one against those who deny that the same reasoning can be expressed by syllogism, and without syllogism, in two books; three treatises against those who attack the resolution of Syllogisms; one on the treatise on Modes, by Philo, addressed to Timostratus; two treatises on[334] Logic, in one volume, addressed to Timocrates and Philomathes; one volume of questions on Reasonings and Modes.

The first set of works in this class includes the Art of Reasoning and Modes, comprising five books addressed to Dioscorides; a treatise on Reasoning in three books; one on the Structure of Modes, addressed to Stesagoras, in five books; a comparison of the Elements of Modes; a treatise on Reciprocal and Conjunctive Reasonings; an essay to Agathon, also known as an essay on Problems, which follow one another; a treatise demonstrating that Syllogistic Propositions assume one or more other terms; one on Conclusions, addressed to Aristagoras; an essay proving that the same reasoning can apply to several figures; one against those who deny that the same reasoning can be expressed by syllogism, and without syllogism, in two books; three treatises against those who critique the resolution of Syllogisms; one on Philo's treatise on Modes, addressed to Timostratus; two treatises on[334] Logic, in one volume, addressed to Timocrates and Philomathes; and one volume of questions on Reasonings and Modes.

The second set contains, one book of Conclusive Reasonings, addressed to Zeno; one on Primary Syllogisms, which are not demonstrative; one on the resolution of Syllogisms; one, in two books, on Captious Reasonings, addressed to Pasylus; one book of Considerations on Syllogisms; one book of Introductory Syllogisms, addressed to Zeno; three of Introductory Modes, addressed also to Zeno; five of False Figures of Syllogism; one of a Syllogistic Method, for the resolution of arguments, which are not demonstrative; one of Researches into the Modes, addressed to Zeno and Philomathes (but this appears to be an erroneous title).

The second set includes one book of Conclusive Reasonings addressed to Zeno; one on Primary Syllogisms, which aren't demonstrative; one on resolving Syllogisms; one, in two books, on Tricky Reasonings, addressed to Pasylus; one book of Considerations on Syllogisms; one book of Introductory Syllogisms, addressed to Zeno; three of Introductory Modes, also addressed to Zeno; five of False Figures of Syllogism; one on a Syllogistic Method for resolving non-demonstrative arguments; and one on Researches into the Modes, addressed to Zeno and Philomathes (although this title seems to be incorrect).

The third set contains, one essay on Incidental Reasonings, addressed to Athenades (this again is an incorrect title); three books of Incidental Discourses on the Medium (another incorrect title); one essay on the Disjunctive Reasons of Aminias.

The third set includes one essay on Incidental Reasonings, directed at Athenades (this title is also incorrect); three books of Incidental Discourses on the Medium (another incorrect title); and one essay on the Disjunctive Reasons of Aminias.

The fourth set contains, a treatise on Hypothesis, in three books, addressed to Meleager; a book of hypothetical reasonings on the Laws, addressed also to Meleager; two books of hypothetical reasoning to serve as an Introduction; two books of hypothetical reasonings on Theorems; a treatise in two books, being a resolution of the Hypothetical Reasonings of Hedylus; an essay, in three books, being a resolution of the Hypothetical Reasonings of Alexander (this is an incorrect title); two books of Expositions, addressed to Leodamas.

The fourth set includes a treatise on Hypothesis in three parts, directed to Meleager; a book of hypothetical reasoning about the Laws, also addressed to Meleager; two introductory books of hypothetical reasoning; two books of hypothetical reasoning on Theorems; a two-part treatise that resolves the Hypothetical Reasonings of Hedylus; a three-part essay that resolves the Hypothetical Reasonings of Alexander (although this title is incorrect); and two books of Expositions directed to Leodamas.

The fifth set contains, an introduction to Fallacy, addressed to Aristocreon; an introduction to False Reasonings; a treatise in six books, on Fallacy, addressed to Aristocreon.

The fifth set includes an introduction to Fallacy, directed to Aristocreon; an introduction to False Reasonings; and a six-book treatise on Fallacy, also addressed to Aristocreon.

The sixth set contains, a treatise against those who believe Truth and Falsehood to be the same thing. One, in two books, against those who have recourse to division to resolve the Fallacy, addressed to Aristocreon; a demonstrative essay, to prove that it is not proper to divide indefinite terms; an essay, in three books, in answer to the objections against the non-division of Indefinite Terms, addressed to Pasylus; a solution, according to the principles of the ancients, addressed to Dioscorides; an essay on the Resolution of the Fallacy, addressed to Aristocreon, this is in three books; a resolution[335] of the Hypothetical Arguments of Hedylus, in one book, addressed to Aristocreon and Apollos.

The sixth set includes a discussion against those who think Truth and Falsehood are the same. One is in two books, aimed at those who use division to clarify the Fallacy, directed to Aristocreon; a clear essay that proves it’s not right to divide indefinite terms; an essay in three books responding to objections about the non-division of Indefinite Terms, addressed to Pasylus; a solution based on the principles of the ancients, directed to Dioscorides; an essay on resolving the Fallacy, addressed to Aristocreon, which is in three books; a resolution of the Hypothetical Arguments of Hedylus in one book, aimed at Aristocreon and Apollos.

The seventh set contains, a treatise against those who contend that the premisses on the Fallacy, are false; a treatise on Negative Reasoning, addressed to Aristocreon, in two books; one book of Negative Reasonings, addressed to Gymnasias; two books of a treatise on Reasoning by Progression, addressed to Stesagoras; two books of Reasonings by Interrogation, and on the Arrest,[105] addressed to Onetor; an essay, in two books, on the Corrected Argument, addressed to Aristobulus; another on the Non-apparent Argument, addressed to Athenades.

The seventh set includes a paper against those who argue that the premises on the Fallacy are false; a paper on Negative Reasoning, directed to Aristocreon, in two volumes; one volume of Negative Reasonings addressed to Gymnasias; two volumes of a paper on Reasoning by Progression, directed to Stesagoras; two volumes of Reasonings by Interrogation, and on the Arrest,[105] directed to Onetor; an essay, in two volumes, on the Corrected Argument, addressed to Aristobulus; and another on the Non-apparent Argument, directed to Athenades.

The eighth set contains, an essay on the Argument Outis, in eight books, addressed to Menecrates; a treatise, in two books, on Arguments composed of a finite term, and an indefinite term, addressed to Pasylus; another essay on the Argument Outis, addressed to Epicrates.

The eighth set includes an essay on the Argument Outis, in eight books, directed to Menecrates; a treatise, in two books, on arguments made up of a finite term and an indefinite term, aimed at Pasylus; and another essay on the Argument Outis, addressed to Epicrates.

The ninth set contains, two volumes of Sophisms, addressed to Heraclides, and Pollis; five volumes of Dialectic Arguments, which admit of no solution, addressed to Dioscorides; an essay, in one book, against the Method of Arcesilaus, addressed to Sphærus.

The ninth set includes two volumes of Sophisms, directed to Heraclides and Pollis; five volumes of Dialectic Arguments, which have no solution, addressed to Dioscorides; and an essay, in one book, opposing the Method of Arcesilaus, directed to Sphærus.

The tenth set contains, a treatise in six books, against Custom, addressed to Metrodorus; and another, in seven books, on Custom, addressed to Gorgippides.

The tenth set includes a six-book treatise against Custom, directed to Metrodorus; and another, in seven books, about Custom, addressed to Gorgippides.

There are, therefore, works on Logic, in the four grand classes which we have here enumerated, embracing various questions, without any connection with one another, to the number of thirty nine sets, amounting in the whole to three hundred and eleven treatises on Logic.

There are, then, works on Logic, in the four main categories we've listed here, covering various topics without any connection to each other, totaling thirty-nine sets, which add up to three hundred and eleven treatises on Logic.

The next division comprises those works which have for their object, the explanation of Moral Ideas.

The next section includes works that aim to explain moral ideas.

The first class of this division, contains an essay, giving a description of Reason, addressed to Theosphorus; a book of Ethical questions; three books of Principles, to serve as the foundation of Dogmas, addressed to Philomathes; two books of definitions of Good-breeding, addressed to Metrodorus; two books of definitions of the Bad, addressed to Metrodorus;[336] two books of definitions of Neutral Things, addressed also to Metrodorus; seven books of definitions of Things, according to their genera, addressed to Metrodorus; and two books of Definitions, according to other systems, addressed to Metrodorus.

The first section of this division includes an essay that describes Reason, directed to Theosphorus; a book of Ethical questions; three books on Principles that serve as the basis for Dogmas, aimed at Philomathes; two books defining Good manners, addressed to Metrodorus; two books defining the Bad, also addressed to Metrodorus; [336] two books defining Neutral Things, again addressed to Metrodorus; seven books defining Things based on their categories, directed to Metrodorus; and two books of Definitions according to different systems, also aimed at Metrodorus.

The second set contains, a treatise on Things Similar, in three books, addressed to Aristocles; an essay on Definitions, in seven books, addressed to Metrodorus.

The second set includes a work on Similar Things, in three parts, directed to Aristocles; an essay on Definitions, in seven parts, directed to Metrodorus.

The third set contains, a treatise, in seven books, on the Incorrect Objections made to Definitions, addressed to Laodamas; two books of Probable Arguments bearing on Definitions, addressed to Dioscorides; two books on Species and Genus, addressed to Gorgippides; one book on Divisions; two books on Contraries, addressed to Dionysius; a book of Probable Arguments relating to Divisions, and Genera, and Species; a book on Contraries.

The third set includes a treatise in seven parts about the Incorrect Objections to Definitions, directed at Laodamas; two books of Probable Arguments related to Definitions, aimed at Dioscorides; two books on Species and Genus, meant for Gorgippides; one book on Divisions; two books on Contraries, addressed to Dionysius; one book of Probable Arguments concerning Divisions, Genera, and Species; and one book on Contraries.

The fourth set contains, a treatise, in seven books, on Etymologies, addressed to Diocles; another, in four books, on the same subject, addressed to the same person.

The fourth set includes a treatise in seven books on Etymologies, directed to Diocles; and another in four books on the same topic, also addressed to him.

The fifth set contains, a treatise in two books, on Proverbs, addressed to Zenodotus; an essay on Poems, addressed to Philomathes; an essay, on How one Ought to Listen to Poems, in two books; an essay, in reply to Critics, addressed to Diodorus.

The fifth set includes a two-book treatise on Proverbs, directed to Zenodotus; an essay on Poems, aimed at Philomathes; a two-book essay on How One Should Listen to Poems; and an essay in response to Critics, addressed to Diodorus.

The next division refers to Ethics, looked at in a general point of view, and to the different systems arising out of them, and to the Virtues.

The next section talks about Ethics from a broad perspective, along with the various systems that come from them, as well as the Virtues.

The first set contains, an essay against Pictures, addressed to Timonax; an essay on the Manner in which we express ourselves about, and form our Conceptions of, each separate thing; two books of Thoughts, addressed to Laodamas; an essay, in three books, on Conception, addressed to Pythonax; an essay, that the Wise Man is not Guided by Opinion; an essay, in five books, on Comprehension, and Knowledge, and Ignorance; a treatise on Reason, in two books; a treatise on the Employment of Reason, addressed to Leptines.

The first set includes an essay against Pictures, directed to Timonax; an essay on how we express our thoughts about and shape our ideas of each individual thing; two books of Thoughts, directed to Laodamas; a three-book essay on Conception, aimed at Pythonax; an essay arguing that a Wise Person isn't led by Opinion; a five-book essay on Comprehension, Knowledge, and Ignorance; a two-book treatise on Reason; and a treatise on the Use of Reason, directed to Leptines.

The second set contains, a treatise, that the Ancient Philosophers approved of Logic, with Proofs to support the Arguments, in two books, addressed to Zeno; a treatise on Dialectics, in four books, addressed to Aristocreon; an answer to the Objections urged against Dialectics, in three[337] books; an essay on Rhetoric, in four books, addressed to Dioscorides.

The second set includes a treatise that the Ancient Philosophers endorsed about Logic, complete with Proofs to back up the Arguments, in two books addressed to Zeno; a treatise on Dialectics, in four books, addressed to Aristocreon; a response to the Objections raised against Dialectics, in three[337] books; and an essay on Rhetoric, in four books, addressed to Dioscorides.

The third set contains, a treatise on Habit, in three books, addressed to Cleon; a treatise on Art and Want of Art, in four books, addressed to Aristocreon; a treatise, in four books, on the Difference between the Virtues, addressed to Diodorus; a treatise, to show that all the Virtues are Equal; a treatise on the Virtues, in two books, addressed to Pollis.

The third set includes a work on Habit, in three books, directed to Cleon; a work on Art and Lack of Art, in four books, directed to Aristocreon; a work, in four books, on the Differences between the Virtues, directed to Diodorus; a work to demonstrate that all the Virtues are Equal; and a work on the Virtues, in two books, directed to Pollis.

The next division refers to Ethics, as relating to Good and Evil.

The next section relates to Ethics, specifically regarding Good and Evil.

The first set contains, a treatise in ten books, on the Honourable, and on Pleasure, addressed to Aristocreon; a demonstration, that Pleasure is not the Chief Good of Man, in four books; a demonstration that Pleasure is not a Good at all, in four books; a treatise on what is said by …[106]

The first set includes a ten-part treatise on Honor and Pleasure, addressed to Aristocreon; a four-part demonstration that Pleasure is not the Chief Good of Man; a four-part demonstration that Pleasure is not a Good at all; and a treatise on what is said by …[106]


BOOK VIII.

LIFE OF PYTHAGORAS.

I. Since we have now gone through the Ionian philosophy, which was derived from Thales, and the lives of the several illustrious men who were the chief ornaments of that school; we will now proceed to treat of the Italian School, which was founded by Pythagoras, the son of Mnesarchus, a seal engraver, as he is recorded to have been by Hermippus; a native of Samos, or as Aristoxenus asserts, a Tyrrhenian, and a native of one of the islands which the Athenians occupied after they had driven out the Tyrrhenians. But some authors say that he was the son of Marmacus, the son of Hippasus, the son of Euthyphron, the son of Cleonymus, who was an exile from Phlias; and that Marmacus settled in Samos, and that from this circumstance Pythagoras was called a Samian. After that he migrated to Lesbos, having come to Pherecydes with letters of recommendation from Zoilus, his uncle. And having made three silver goblets, he carried them to Egypt as a present for each of the three priests. He had brothers, the eldest of whom was named Eunomus, the middle one Tyrrhenus, and a slave named Zamolxis, to whom the Getæ sacrifice, believing him to be the same as Saturn, according to the account of Herodotus.[107]

I. Now that we've covered Ionian philosophy, which originated with Thales, and the lives of the notable figures who were the key contributors to that school, we'll move on to discuss the Italian School, founded by Pythagoras, the son of Mnesarchus, who is said to have been a seal engraver according to Hermippus. Pythagoras was originally from Samos, or as Aristoxenus claims, a Tyrrhenian from one of the islands that the Athenians took over after driving out the Tyrrhenians. Some sources mention that he was the son of Marmacus, the son of Hippasus, the son of Euthyphron, the son of Cleonymus, who had been exiled from Phlias; and that Marmacus settled in Samos, which is how Pythagoras earned the title of Samian. He later moved to Lesbos, having visited Pherecydes with letters of introduction from his uncle Zoilus. While there, he crafted three silver goblets and brought them to Egypt as gifts for each of the three priests. He had brothers, the oldest named Eunomus, the middle one Tyrrhenus, and a slave named Zamolxis, whom the Getæ honored with sacrifices, believing he was the same as Saturn, according to Herodotus.[107]

II. He was a pupil, as I have already mentioned, of Pherecydes, the Syrian; and after his death he came to Samos, and became a pupil of Hermodamas, the descendant of Creophylus, who was by this time an old man.

II. He was a student, as I already mentioned, of Pherecydes, the Syrian; and after his death, he went to Samos and became a student of Hermodamas, the descendant of Creophylus, who was now an old man.

III. And as he was a young man, and devoted to learning, he quitted his country, and got initiated into all the Grecian and barbarian sacred mysteries. Accordingly, he went to[339] Egypt, on which occasion Polycrates gave him a letter of introduction to Amasis; and he learnt the Egyptian language, as Antipho tells us, in his treatise on those men who have been conspicuous for virtue, and he associated with the Chaldæans and with the Magi.

III. As a young man dedicated to learning, he left his country and got involved in all the sacred mysteries of the Greeks and non-Greeks. He traveled to[339] Egypt, where Polycrates provided him with a letter of introduction to Amasis. He learned the Egyptian language, as Antipho mentions in his work on those who have stood out for their virtue, and he interacted with the Chaldeans and the Magi.

Afterwards he went to Crete, and in company with Epimenides, he descended into the Idæan cave, (and in Egypt too, he entered into the holiest parts of their temples,) and learned all the most secret mysteries that relate to their Gods. Then he returned back again to Samos, and finding his country reduced under the absolute dominion of Polycrates, he set sail, and fled to Crotona in Italy. And there, having given laws to the Italians, he gained a very high reputation, together with his scholars, who were about three hundred in number, and governed the republic in a most excellent manner; so that the constitution was very nearly an aristocracy.

After that, he went to Crete, and with Epimenides, he went down into the Idæan cave, (and in Egypt too, he entered the most sacred parts of their temples,) and learned all the secret mysteries related to their Gods. Then he returned to Samos, and finding his homeland under the complete control of Polycrates, he set sail and fled to Crotona in Italy. There, after giving laws to the Italians, he gained a great reputation, along with his students, who were about three hundred in number, and governed the republic extremely well; so much so that the government was very close to an aristocracy.

IV. Heraclides Ponticus says, that he was accustomed to speak of himself in this manner; that he had formerly been Æthalides, and had been accounted the son of Mercury; and that Mercury had desired him to select any gift he pleased except immortality. And that he accordingly had requested that, whether living or dead, he might preserve the memory of what had happened to him. While, therefore, he was alive, he recollected everything; and when he was dead, he retained the same memory. And at a subsequent period he passed into Euphorbus, and was wounded by Menelaus. And while he was Euphorbus, he used to say that he had formerly been Æthalides; and that he had received as a gift from Mercury the perpetual transmigration of his soul, so that it was constantly transmigrating and passing into whatever plants or animals it pleased; and he had also received the gift of knowing and recollecting all that his soul had suffered in hell, and what sufferings too are endured by the rest of the souls.

IV. Heraclides Ponticus says that he used to refer to himself this way: he had once been Æthalides and was believed to be the son of Mercury. Mercury had asked him to choose any gift he wanted except for immortality. So, he requested that whether he was alive or dead, he could remember everything that had happened to him. While he was alive, he remembered everything; and even after he died, he kept that same memory. Later on, he was reincarnated as Euphorbus and was wounded by Menelaus. While he was Euphorbus, he would say that he had previously been Æthalides and that Mercury had granted him the continuous ability to reincarnate, allowing his soul to move into any plants or animals he chose. He also received the gift of knowing and remembering all the suffering his soul experienced in hell, as well as what the other souls endured.

But after Euphorbus died, he said that his soul had passed into Hermotimus; and when he wished to convince people of this, he went into the territory of the Branchidæ, and going into the temple of Apollo, he showed his shield which Menelaus had dedicated there as an offering. For he said[340] that he, when he sailed from Troy, had offered up his shield[108] which was already getting worn out, to Apollo, and that nothing remained but the ivory face which was on it. And when Hermotimus died, then he said that he had become Pyrrhus, a fisherman of Delos; and that he still recollected everything, how he had been formerly Æthalides, then Euphorbus, then Hermotimus, and then Pyrrhus. And when Pyrrhus died, he became Pythagoras, and still recollected all the circumstances that I have been mentioning.

But after Euphorbus died, he claimed that his soul had moved into Hermotimus. To prove this, he went to the land of the Branchidæ and entered the temple of Apollo, where he displayed his shield that Menelaus had dedicated there as a gift. He said that when he sailed from Troy, he had offered his worn-out shield to Apollo, and all that was left was the ivory face on it. After Hermotimus died, he claimed he became Pyrrhus, a fisherman from Delos, and that he still remembered everything—how he had once been Æthalides, then Euphorbus, then Hermotimus, and finally Pyrrhus. When Pyrrhus died, he became Pythagoras and still recalled all the events I’ve been mentioning.

V. Now, some people say that Pythagoras did not leave behind him a single book; but they talk foolishly; for Heraclitus, the natural philosopher, speaks plainly enough of him, saying, “Pythagoras, the son of Mnesarchus, was the most learned of all men in history; and having selected from these writings, he thus formed his own wisdom and extensive learning, and mischievous art.” And he speaks thus, because Pythagoras, in the beginning of his treatise on Natural Philosophy, writes in the following manner: “By the air which I breathe, and by the water which I drink, I will not endure to be blamed on account of this discourse.”

V. Some people claim that Pythagoras didn’t leave behind any books, but that’s just not true. Heraclitus, the natural philosopher, clearly refers to him, saying, “Pythagoras, the son of Mnesarchus, was the most knowledgeable man in history; and by choosing from these writings, he formed his own wisdom and extensive knowledge, along with his tricky skills.” He says this because Pythagoras, at the start of his treatise on Natural Philosophy, writes: “By the air I breathe and the water I drink, I won’t accept blame for this discourse.”

And there are three volumes extant written by Pythagoras.[341] One on Education; one on Politics; and one on Natural Philosophy. But the treatise which is now extant under the name of Pythagoras is the work of Lysis, of Tarentum, a philosopher of the Pythagorean School, who fled to Thebes, and became the master of Epaminondas. And Heraclides, the son of Sarapion, in his Abridgment of Sotion, says that he wrote a poem in epic verse on the Universe; and besides that a sacred poem, which begins thus;—

And there are three existing volumes written by Pythagoras.[341] One about Education, one about Politics, and one about Natural Philosophy. However, the treatise currently attributed to Pythagoras is actually the work of Lysis from Tarentum, a philosopher from the Pythagorean School, who fled to Thebes and became the teacher of Epaminondas. Heraclides, the son of Sarapion, in his Abridgment of Sotion, mentions that he wrote an epic poem about the Universe; in addition to that, he wrote a sacred poem that begins like this;—

Dear youths, I warn you cherish peace divine,
And in your hearts lay deep these words of mine.

A third about the Soul; a fourth on Piety; a fifth entitled Helothales, which was the name of the father of Epicharmus, of Cos; a sixth called Crotona, and other poems too. But the mystic discourse which is extant under his name, they say is really the work of Hippasus, having been composed with a view to bring Pythagoras into disrepute. There were also many other books composed by Aston, of Crotona, and attributed to Pythagoras.

A third about the soul; a fourth on piety; a fifth titled Helothales, which was the name of Epicharmus's father from Cos; a sixth called Crotona, along with other poems as well. However, the mystical writings that exist under his name are said to actually be by Hippasus, written to discredit Pythagoras. There were also many other books written by Aston from Crotona that were wrongly attributed to Pythagoras.

Aristoxenus asserts that Pythagoras derived the greater part of his ethical doctrines from Themistoclea, the priestess at Delphi. And Ion, of Chios, in his Victories, says that he wrote some poems and attributed them to Orpheus. They also say that the poem called the Scopiadæ is by him, which begins thus:—

Aristoxenus claims that Pythagoras got most of his ethical teachings from Themistoclea, the priestess at Delphi. And Ion from Chios, in his Victories, states that he wrote some poems and credited them to Orpheus. They also mention that the poem titled the Scopiadæ is by him, which starts like this:—

Behave not shamelessly to any one.

VI. And Sosicrates, in his Successions, relates that he, having being asked by Leon, the tyrant of the Phliasians, who he was, replied, “A philosopher.” And adds, that he used to compare life to a festival. “And as some people came to a festival to contend for the prizes, and others for the purposes of traffic, and the best as spectators; so also in life, the men of slavish dispositions,” said he, “are born hunters after glory and covetousness, but philosophers are seekers after truth.” And thus he spoke on this subject. But in the three treatises above mentioned, the following principles are laid down by Pythagoras generally.

VI. Sosicrates, in his Successions, shares that he was asked by Leon, the tyrant of the Phliasians, who he was, and he replied, “A philosopher.” He goes on to say that he used to compare life to a festival. “Just like some people come to a festival to compete for prizes, while others come for trade, and the best come as spectators; in life, those with servile minds,” he said, “are driven by the pursuit of glory and greed, while philosophers seek truth.” He spoke further on this topic. In the three treatises mentioned earlier, Pythagoras lays out the following principles.

He forbids men to pray for anything in particular for themselves, because they do not know what is good for them. He calls drunkenness an expression identical with ruin, and[342] rejects all superfluity, saying, “That no one ought to exceed the proper quantity of meat and drink.” And on the subject of venereal pleasures, he speaks thus:—“One ought to sacrifice to Venus in the winter, not in the summer; and in autumn and spring in a lesser degree. But the practice is pernicious at every season, and is never good for the health.” And once, when he was asked when a man might indulge in the pleasures of love, he replied, “Whenever you wish to be weaker than yourself.”

He prohibits men from praying for specific things for themselves because they don’t know what’s truly good for them. He describes drunkenness as a clear sign of destruction and rejects all excess, stating, “No one should go beyond the proper amount of food and drink.” Regarding sexual pleasures, he says, “One should make offerings to Venus in winter, not in summer; and in autumn and spring to a lesser extent. However, indulging in such practices is harmful at any time and is never beneficial for health.” Once, when he was asked when a man could enjoy love's pleasures, he replied, “Whenever you want to be weaker than your true self.”

VII. And he divides the life of man thus. A boy for twenty years; a young man (νεάνισκος) for twenty years; a middle-aged man (νεανίας) for twenty years; an old man for twenty years. And these different ages correspond proportionably to the seasons: boyhood answers to spring; youth to summer; middle age to autumn; and old age to winter. And he uses νεάνισκος here as equivalent to μειράκιον, and νεανίας as equivalent to ἀνὴρ.

VII. He divides a person's life like this: a boy for twenty years; a young man for twenty years; a middle-aged man for twenty years; and an old man for twenty years. These different stages of life correspond to the seasons: childhood is like spring; youth is like summer; middle age is like autumn; and old age is like winter. He uses "young man" here as equivalent to "lad" and "middle-aged man" as equivalent to "man."

VIII. He was the first person, as Timæus says, who asserted that the property of friends is common, and that friendship is equality. And his disciples used to put all their possessions together into one store, and use them in common; and for five years they kept silence, doing nothing but listen to discourses, and never once seeing Pythagoras, until they were approved; after that time they were admitted into his house, and allowed to see him. They also abstained from the use of cypress coffins, because the sceptre of Jupiter was made of that wood, as Hermippus tells us in the second book of his account of Pythagoras.

VIII. According to Timæus, he was the first to claim that the belongings of friends are shared and that true friendship is based on equality. His followers would pool all their possessions into one place and use them together. For five years, they remained silent, focusing only on listening to teachings, without ever seeing Pythagoras until they were deemed worthy. After that period, they were welcomed into his home and allowed to meet him. They also avoided using cypress coffins, as the staff of Jupiter was made from that wood, as Hermippus mentions in the second book of his account of Pythagoras.

IX. He is said to have been a man of the most dignified appearance, and his disciples adopted an opinion respecting him, that he was Apollo who had come from the Hyperboreans; and it is said, that once when he was stripped naked, he was seen to have a golden thigh. And there were many people who affirmed, that when he was crossing the river Nessus it addressed him by his name.

IX. He was known to have a very dignified appearance, and his disciples believed that he was Apollo who had come from the Hyperboreans. It's said that once, when he was naked, he was seen to have a golden thigh. Many people claimed that when he was crossing the river Nessus, it called him by name.

X. Timæus, in the tenth book of his Histories, tells us, that he used to say that women who were married to men had the names of the Gods, being successively called virgins, then nymphs, and subsequently mothers.

X. Timæus, in the tenth book of his Histories, tells us that he used to say that women married to men had the names of the Gods, being called virgins at first, then nymphs, and later mothers.

XI. It was Pythagoras also who carried geometry to perfection, after Mœris had first found out the principles of the[343] elements of that science, as Aristiclides tells us in the second book of his History of Alexander; and the part of the science to which Pythagoras applied himself above all others was arithmetic. He also discovered the numerical relation of sounds on a single string: he also studied medicine. And Apollodorus, the logician, records of him, that he sacrificed a hecatomb, when he had discovered that the square of the hypothenuse of a right-angled triangle is equal to the squares of the sides containing the right angle. And there is an epigram which is couched in the following terms:—

XI. It was Pythagoras who perfected geometry, after Mœris had first discovered the principles of the[343] elements of that science, as Aristiclides mentions in the second book of his History of Alexander. The area of the science that Pythagoras focused on the most was arithmetic. He also discovered the numerical relationship of sounds on a single string and studied medicine. Apollodorus, the logician, notes that he sacrificed a hecatomb after discovering that the square of the hypotenuse of a right-angled triangle is equal to the squares of the sides that form the right angle. There is also an epigram that goes like this:—

When the great Samian sage his noble problem found,
A hundred oxen dyed with their life-blood the ground.

XII. He is also said to have been the first man who trained athletes on meat; and Eurymenes was the first man, according to the statement of Phavorinus, in the third book of his Commentaries, who ever did submit to this diet, as before that time men used to train themselves on dry figs and moist cheese, and wheaten bread; as the same Phavorinus informs us in the eighth book of his Universal History. But some authors state, that a trainer of the name of Pythagoras certainly did train his athletes on this system, but that it was not our philosopher; for that he even forbade men to kill animals at all, much less would have allowed his disciples to eat them, as having a right to live in common with mankind. And this was his pretext; but in reality he prohibited the eating of animals, because he wished to train and accustom men to simplicity of life, so that all their food should be easily procurable, as it would be, if they ate only such things as required no fire to dress them, and if they drank plain water; for from this diet they would derive health of body and acuteness of intellect.

XII. He is also said to be the first person who trained athletes on meat; and Eurymenes was, according to Phavorinus in the third book of his Commentaries, the first person to follow this diet, since before that, people trained on dry figs, fresh cheese, and wheat bread, as stated by Phavorinus in the eighth book of his Universal History. However, some authors claim that a trainer named Pythagoras did train his athletes using this diet, but it wasn't our philosopher; he even forbade people from killing animals at all, let alone allowing his followers to eat them, as they had a right to live alongside humanity. This was his excuse, but in reality, he banned the consumption of animals because he wanted to teach and prepare people for a simple lifestyle, so their food would be easy to get, by eating only things that didn't require cooking and by drinking plain water; from this diet, they would gain physical health and sharp intellect.

The only altar at which he worshipped was that of Apollo the Father, at Delos, which is at the back of the altar of Ceratinus, because wheat, and barley, and cheese-cakes are the only offerings laid upon it, being not dressed by fire; and no victim is ever slain there, as Aristotle tells us in his Constitution of the Delians. They say, too, that he was the first person who asserted that the soul went a necessary circle[344] being changed about and confined at different times in different bodies.

The only altar he worshipped at was that of Apollo the Father in Delos, located behind the altar of Ceratinus, because the only offerings placed there are wheat, barley, and cheesecakes, which aren't cooked with fire; no animals are ever sacrificed there, as Aristotle mentions in his Constitution of the Delians. They also say he was the first to claim that the soul went through a necessary cycle, being transformed and confined in different bodies at different times.[344]

XIII. He was also the first person who introduced measures and weights among the Greeks; as Aristoxenus the musician informs us.

XIII. He was also the first person to introduce measures and weights among the Greeks, as noted by Aristoxenus the musician.

XIV. Parmenides, too, assures us, that he was the first person who asserted the identity of Hesperus and Lucifer.

XIV. Parmenides also confirms that he was the first to claim that Hesperus and Lucifer are the same.

XV. And he was so greatly admired, that they used to say that his friends looked on all his sayings as the oracles of God.[109] And he himself says in his writings, that he had come among men after having spent two hundred and seven years in the shades below. Therefore the Lucanians and the Peucetians, and the Messapians, and the Romans, flocked around him, coming with eagerness to hear his discourses; but until the time of Philolaus there were no doctrines of Pythagoras ever divulged; and he was the first person who published the three celebrated books which Plato wrote to have purchased for him for a hundred minæ. Nor were the number of his scholars who used to come to him by night fewer than six hundred. And if any of them had ever been permitted to see him, they wrote of it to their friends, as if they had gained some great advantage.

XV. He was so highly admired that people used to say his friends regarded all his words as if they were the oracles of God.[109] He himself stated in his writings that he had come among humans after spending two hundred and seven years in the underworld. As a result, the Lucanians, Peucetians, Messapians, and Romans gathered around him, eagerly coming to hear his teachings. However, until the time of Philolaus, no doctrines of Pythagoras had ever been revealed, and he was the first to publish the three famous books that Plato had arranged to buy for him for a hundred minæ. There were also no fewer than six hundred scholars who would come to see him at night. If any of them had ever been allowed to meet him, they would write to their friends as if they had gained some significant advantage.

The people of Metapontum used to call his house the temple of Ceres; and the street leading to it they called the street of the Muses, as we are told by Phavorinus in his Universal History.

The people of Metapontum referred to his house as the temple of Ceres, and the street leading to it was known as the street of the Muses, as noted by Phavorinus in his Universal History.

And the rest of the Pythagoreans used to say, according to the account given by Aristoxenus, in the tenth book of his Laws on Education, that his precepts ought not to be divulged to all the world; and Xenophilus, the Pythagorean, when he was asked what was the best way for a man to educate his son, said, “That he must first of all take care that he was born in a city which enjoyed good laws.”

And the other Pythagoreans would say, based on what Aristoxenus wrote in the tenth book of his Laws on Education, that his teachings shouldn't be shared with everyone; and Xenophilus, a Pythagorean, when asked what the best way for a man to educate his son was, replied, “He must first ensure that he was born in a city with good laws.”

Pythagoras, too, formed many excellent men in Italy, by[345] his precepts, and among them Zaleucus,[110] and Charondas,[111] the lawgivers.

Pythagoras also trained many outstanding individuals in Italy through his teachings, including Zaleucus and Charondas, who were both lawgivers.

XVI. For he was very eminent for his power of attracting friendships; and among other things, if ever he heard that any one had any community of symbols with him, he at once made him a companion and a friend.

XVI. He was really known for his ability to make friends; and among other things, whenever he heard that someone shared something in common with him, he immediately welcomed them as a companion and a friend.

XVII. Now, what he called his symbols were such as these. “Do not stir the fire with a sword.” “Do not sit down on a bushel.” “Do not devour your heart.” “Do not aid men in discarding a burden, but in increasing one.” “Always have your bed packed up.” “Do not bear the image of a God on a ring.” “Efface the traces of a pot in the ashes.” “Do not wipe a seat with a lamp.” “Do not make water in the sunshine.”[346] “Do not walk in the main street.” “Do not offer your right hand lightly.” “Do not cherish swallows under your roof.” “Do not cherish birds with crooked talons.” “Do not defile; and do not stand upon the parings of your nails, or the cuttings of your hair.” “Avoid a sharp sword.” “When you are travelling abroad, look not back at your own borders.” Now the precept not to stir fire with a sword meant, not to provoke the anger or swelling pride of powerful men; not to violate the beam of the balance meant, not to transgress fairness and justice; not to sit on a bushel is to have an equal care for the present and for the future, for by the bushel is meant one’s daily food. By not devouring one’s heart, he intended to show that we ought not to waste away our souls with grief and sorrow. In the precept that a man when travelling abroad should not turn his eyes back, he recommended those who were departing from life not to be desirous to live, and not to be too much attracted by the pleasures here on earth. And the other symbols may be explained in a similar manner, that we may not be too prolix here.

XVII. Now, the symbols he referred to were like these. “Don’t poke the fire with a sword.” “Don’t sit on a bushel.” “Don’t eat your heart out.” “Don’t help people get rid of a burden, but rather help them take on more.” “Always have your bed ready.” “Don’t wear an image of a God on a ring.” “Clear away the signs of a pot in the ashes.” “Don’t wipe a seat with a lamp.” “Don’t relieve yourself in the sunshine.”[346] “Don’t walk on the main street.” “Don’t offer your right hand easily.” “Don’t take in swallows under your roof.” “Don’t keep birds with crooked talons.” “Don’t defile; and don’t stand on the scraps of your nails or the clippings of your hair.” “Stay away from a sharp sword.” “When you’re traveling, don’t look back at your own land.” Now the advice not to poke the fire with a sword means not to stir up the anger or pride of powerful people; not to violate the beam of the balance means to uphold fairness and justice; not to sit on a bushel signifies taking equal care for the present and the future, as a bushel refers to one’s daily food. By not eating your heart out, he intended to say that we shouldn't let grief and sorrow consume our souls. In the advice about not looking back while traveling, he suggested that those leaving this life shouldn’t be eager to cling to it or be too drawn to earthly pleasures. The other symbols can be explained in a similar way, so we won't go on any further here.

XVIII. And above all things, he used to prohibit the eating of the erythinus, and the melanurus; and also, he enjoined his disciples to abstain from the hearts of animals, and from beans. And Aristotle informs us, that he sometimes used also to add to these prohibitions paunches and mullet. And some authors assert that he himself used to be contented with honey and honeycomb, and bread, and that he never drank wine in the day time. And his desert was usually vegetables, either boiled or raw; and he very rarely ate fish. His dress was white, very clean, and his bed-clothes were also white, and woollen, for linen had not yet been introduced into that country. He was never known to have eaten too much, or to have drunk too much, or to indulge in the pleasures of love. He abstained wholly from laughter, and from all such indulgences as jests and idle stories. And when he was angry, he never chastised any one, whether slave or freeman. He used to call admonishing, feeding storks.

XVIII. Above all, he used to forbid eating the erythinus and the melanurus, and he also instructed his followers to stay away from animal hearts and beans. Aristotle tells us that he sometimes added paunches and mullet to these prohibitions. Some authors claim that he was satisfied with honey and honeycomb, and bread, and that he never drank wine during the day. His meals usually consisted of vegetables, either boiled or raw, and he rarely ate fish. His clothing was white and very clean, and his bed linens were also white and made of wool, as linen had not yet been introduced in that region. He was never known to overeat or drink excessively or indulge in sexual pleasures. He completely refrained from laughter and avoided all kinds of indulgences like jokes and idle stories. When he was angry, he never punished anyone, whether slave or free. He referred to his admonishments as feeding storks.

He used to practise divination, as far as auguries and auspices go, but not by means of burnt offerings, except only the burning of frankincense. And all the sacrifices which he offered consisted of inanimate things. But some, however, assert that he did sacrifice animals, limiting himself to cocks,[347] and sucking kids, which are called ἁπάλιοι, but that he very rarely offered lambs. Aristoxenus, however, affirms that he permitted the eating of all other animals, and only abstained from oxen used in agriculture, and from rams.

He used to practice divination, focusing on omens and signs, but not through burnt offerings, except for burning frankincense. All the sacrifices he made were of inanimate things. However, some claim that he did sacrifice animals, limiting himself to roosters and young goats, which are called ἁπάλιοι, but that he very rarely offered lambs. Aristoxenus, on the other hand, states that he allowed the consumption of all other animals, only avoiding oxen used for farming and rams.[347]

XIX. The same author tells us, as I have already mentioned, that he received his doctrines from Themistoclea, at Delphi. And Hieronymus says, that when he descended to the shades below, he saw the soul of Hesiod bound to a brazen pillar, and gnashing its teeth; and that of Homer suspended from a tree, and snakes around it, as a punishment for the things that they had said of the Gods. And that those people also were punished who refrained from commerce with their wives; and that on account of this he was greatly honoured by the people of Crotona.

XIX. The same author tells us, as I’ve already mentioned, that he got his ideas from Themistoclea at Delphi. Hieronymus says that when he went down to the underworld, he saw Hesiod’s soul tied to a bronze pillar, gnashing its teeth, and Homer’s soul hanging from a tree with snakes around it, as a punishment for what they had said about the gods. He also noted that those who avoided intimacy with their wives were punished, and because of this, he was highly respected by the people of Crotona.

But Aristippus, of Cyrene, in his Account of Natural Philosophers, says that Pythagoras derived his name from the fact of his speaking (ἀγορεύειν) truth no less than the God at Delphi (τοῦ πυθίου).

But Aristippus of Cyrene, in his Account of Natural Philosophers, says that Pythagoras got his name from the way he spoke the truth just like the God at Delphi.

It is said that he used to admonish his disciples to repeat these lines to themselves whenever they returned home to their houses:—

It is said that he used to urge his disciples to repeat these lines to themselves whenever they got home:—

In what have I transgress’d? What have I done?
What that I should have done have I omitted?

And that he used to forbid them to offer victims to the Gods, ordering them to worship only at those altars which were unstained with blood. He forbade them also to swear by the Gods; saying, “That every man ought so to exercise himself, as to be worthy of belief without an oath.” He also taught men that it behoved them to honour their elders, thinking that which was precedent in point of time more honourable; just as in the world, the rising of the sun was more so than the setting; in life, the beginning more so than the end; and in animals, production more so than destruction.

And he used to tell them not to offer sacrifices to the Gods, insisting they should only worship at altars that weren't stained with blood. He also prohibited them from swearing by the Gods, saying, “Every person should strive to be trustworthy without needing an oath.” He taught that people should respect their elders, believing that what came first in time deserved more honor; just like in the world, the sunrise is more significant than the sunset; in life, the beginning is more important than the end; and in animals, giving birth is more valued than dying.

Another of his rules was that men should honour the Gods above the dæmones, heroes above men; and of all men parents were entitled to the highest degree of reverence. Another, that people should associate with one another in such a way as not to make their friends enemies, but to render their enemies friends. Another was that they should think nothing exclusively their own. Another was to assist the law, and to make[348] war upon lawlessness. Not to destroy or injure a cultivated tree, nor any animal either which does not injure men. That modesty and decorum consisted in never yielding to laughter, and yet not looking stern. He taught that men should avoid too much flesh, that they should in travelling let rest and exertion alternate; that they should exercise memory; that they should never say or do anything in anger; that they should not pay respect to every kind of divination; that they should use songs set to the lyre; and by hymns to the Gods and to eminent men, display a reasonable gratitude to them.

One of his rules was that people should honor the gods over the spirits, heroes over regular people; and among all people, parents deserve the highest respect. Another rule was that individuals should interact in ways that don't turn friends into enemies but help make enemies into friends. Additionally, they should think that nothing belongs exclusively to them. They should support the law and fight against lawlessness. They should not destroy or harm cultivated trees or any animals that don't harm humans. Modesty and decorum mean never giving in to laughter while not appearing overly serious. He advised that people should avoid excessive meat, alternate rest and exertion while traveling, exercise their memory, never act or speak out of anger, not give too much respect to every kind of fortune-telling, use songs accompanied by the lyre, and show reasonable gratitude to the gods and to great individuals through hymns.

He also forbade his disciples to eat beans, because, as they were flatulent, they greatly partook of animal properties [he also said that men kept their stomachs in better order by avoiding them]; and that such abstinence made the visions which appear in one’s sleep gentle and free from agitation. Alexander also says, in his Successions of Philosophers, that he found the following dogmas also set down in the Commentaries of Pythagoras:—

He also prohibited his followers from eating beans, because, due to their tendency to cause gas, they had many animal characteristics. He claimed that men maintained better digestive health by avoiding them, and that this abstinence led to calmer and more peaceful dreams. Alexander also mentions in his Successions of Philosophers that he found the following principles written in the Commentaries of Pythagoras:—

That the monad was the beginning of everything. From the monad proceeds an indefinite duad, which is subordinate to the monad as to its cause. That from the monad and the indefinite duad proceed numbers. And from numbers signs. And from these last, lines of which plane figures consist. And from plane figures are derived solid bodies. And from solid bodies sensible bodies, of which last there are four elements; fire, water, earth, and air. And that the world, which is endued with life, and intellect, and which is of a spherical figure, having the earth, which is also spherical, and inhabited all over in its centre, results from a combination of these elements, and derives its motion from them; and also that there are antipodes,[112] and that what is below, as respects us, is above in respect of them.

That the monad was the starting point of everything. From the monad comes an indefinite duad, which is subordinate to the monad as its cause. That from the monad and the indefinite duad arise numbers. And from numbers come signs. And from these signs, lines that make up plane figures. And from plane figures come solid bodies. And from solid bodies, sensible bodies, of which there are four elements: fire, water, earth, and air. And that the world, which is filled with life and intelligence, and which has a spherical shape, with the earth, also spherical and inhabited all around its center, comes from a combination of these elements and gets its motion from them; and also that there are antipodes,[112] and that what is below, from our perspective, is above from theirs.

He also taught that light and darkness and cold and heat, and dryness and moisture, were equally divided in the world; and that, while heat was predominant it was summer; while cold had the mastery it was winter; when dryness prevailed it was spring; and when moisture preponderated, winter. And while all these qualities were on a level, then was the loveliest season of the year; of which the flourishing spring was the wholesome period, and the season of autumn the most pernicious one. Of the day, he said that the flourishing period was the morning, and the fading one the evening; on which account that also was the least healthy time.

He also taught that light and darkness, as well as cold and heat, and dryness and moisture, were evenly divided in the world. He said that when heat was dominant, it was summer; when cold was in control, it was winter. When dryness was dominant, it was spring; and when moisture was in charge, it was winter. When all these qualities were balanced, that was the most beautiful season of the year; spring was the most beneficial time, and autumn was the most harmful. He said that the best part of the day was the morning, and the decline was the evening, which is why that time of day was also the least healthy.

Another of his theories was, that the air around the earth was immoveable, and pregnant with disease, and that everything in it was mortal; but that the upper air was in perpetual motion, and pure and salubrious; and that everything in that was immortal, and on that account divine. And that the sun, and the moon, and the stars, were all Gods; for in them the warm principle predominates which is the cause of life. And that the moon derives its light from the sun. And that there is a relationship between men and the Gods, because men partake of the divine principle; on which account also, God exercises his providence for our advantage. Also, that fate is the cause of the arrangement of the world both generally and particularly. Moreover, that a ray from the sun penetrated both the cold æther and the dense æther; and they call the air (ἀὴρ), the cold æther (ψυχρὸν αἰθέρα), and the sea and moisture they call the dense æther (παχὺν αἰθέρα). And this ray descends into the depths, and in this way vivifies everything. And everything which partakes of the principle of heat lives, on which account also plants are animated beings; but that all living things have not necessarily souls. And that the soul is a something torn off from the æther, both warm and cold, from its partaking of the cold æther. And that the soul is something different from life. Also, that it is immortal, because that from which it has been detached is immortal.

Another one of his theories was that the air surrounding the Earth was still and filled with disease, making everything in it mortal. However, the upper air was in constant motion, pure, and healthy, where everything was immortal and therefore divine. He believed that the sun, the moon, and the stars were all gods, as they contained the warm principle that is the source of life. He also stated that the moon gets its light from the sun. There is a connection between humans and the gods because people share in the divine principle, which is why God provides for our benefit. Additionally, he claimed that fate determines the order of the world both in general and in specific cases. Furthermore, a ray from the sun penetrates both the cold aether and the dense aether; the air is called (ἀὴρ), the cold aether (ψυχρὸν αἰθέρα), and the sea and moisture are referred to as the dense aether (παχὺν αἰθέρα). This ray travels downward, bringing life to everything. Everything that contains the principle of heat lives, which is why plants are considered living beings; however, not all living things necessarily have souls. He argued that the soul is something that is separated from the aether, both warm and cold, due to its connection with the cold aether. The soul is distinct from life. Moreover, it is immortal because the source from which it is derived is immortal.

Also, that animals are born from one another by seeds, and[350] that it is impossible for there to be any spontaneous production by the earth. And that seed is a drop from the brain which contains in itself a warm vapour; and that when this is applied to the womb, it transmits virtue, and moisture, and blood from the brain, from which flesh, and sinews, and bones, and hair, and the whole body are produced. And from the vapour is produced the soul, and also sensation. And that the infant first becomes a solid body at the end of forty days; but, according to the principles of harmony, it is not perfect till seven, or perhaps nine, or at most ten months, and then it is brought forth. And that it contains in itself all the principles of life, which are all connected together, and by their union and combination form a harmonious whole, each of them developing itself at the appointed time.

Also, that animals are born from one another through seeds, and[350] that spontaneous generation from the earth is impossible. The seed is a drop from the brain that contains a warm vapor; when this is applied to the womb, it transmits vitality, moisture, and blood from the brain, which produce flesh, sinews, bones, hair, and the entire body. From the vapor, the soul and sensation are created. The infant first becomes a solid body at the end of forty days; however, according to the principles of harmony, it isn't fully developed until seven, or perhaps nine, or at most ten months, at which point it is born. Additionally, it contains all the principles of life, which are interconnected, and through their union and combination, they form a harmonious whole, each one developing at the right time.

The senses in general, and especially the sight, are a vapour of excessive warmth, and on this account a man is said to see through air, and through water. For the hot principle is opposed by the cold one; since, if the vapour in the eyes were cold, it would have the same temperature as the air, and so would be dissipated. As it is, in some passages he calls the eyes the gates of the sun. And he speaks in a similar manner of hearing, and of the other senses.

The senses, particularly sight, are basically a mist of intense heat, which is why people are said to see through air and water. The hot element is contrasted with the cold one; if the mist in the eyes were cold, it would be at the same temperature as the air and would evaporate. In some sections, he refers to the eyes as the gateways to the sun. He talks about hearing and the other senses in a similar way.

He also says that the soul of man is divided into three parts; into intuition (νοῦς), and reason (φρὴν), and mind (θυμὸς), and that the first and last divisions are found also in other animals, but that the middle one, reason, is only found in man. And that the chief abode of the soul is in those parts of the body which are between the heart and the brain. And that that portion of it which is in the heart is the mind (θυμὸς); but that deliberation (νοὺς), and reason (φρὴν), reside in the brain.[113]

He also says that the human soul is made up of three parts: intuition (nous), reason (phren), and spirit (thymos). He claims that the first and last parts are also present in other animals, but that reason is unique to humans. He states that the main residence of the soul is in the areas of the body between the heart and the brain. He explains that the part of the soul located in the heart is the spirit (thymos), while deliberation (nous) and reason (phren) are found in the brain.[113]

Moreover, that the senses are drops from them; and that the reasoning sense is immortal, but the others are mortal. And that the soul is nourished by the blood; and that reasons are the winds of the soul. That it is invisible, and so are its reasons, since the æther itself is invisible. That the links of the soul are the veins, and the arteries, and the nerves. But that when it is vigorous, and is by itself in a quiescent state,[351] then its links are words and actions. That when it is cast forth upon the earth it wanders about, resembling the body. Moreover, that Mercury is the steward of the souls, and that on this account he has the name of Conductor, and Commercial, and Infernal, since it is he who conducts the souls from their bodies, and from earth, and sea; and that he conducts the pure souls to the highest region, and that he does not allow the impure ones to approach them, nor to come near one another; but commits them to be bound in indissoluble fetters by the Furies. The Pythagoreans also assert, that the whole air is full of souls, and that these are those which are accounted dæmones, and heroes. Also, that it is by them that dreams are sent among men, and also the tokens of disease and health; these last too, being sent not only to men, but to sheep also, and other cattle. Also, that it is they who are concerned with purifications, and expiations, and all kinds of divination, and oracular predictions, and things of that kind.

Furthermore, the senses are derived from them; the reasoning sense is immortal, while the others are temporary. The soul is sustained by blood, and reasoning acts as the winds of the soul. It's invisible, just like its reasoning, since the ether itself is also unseen. The connections of the soul are the veins, arteries, and nerves. However, when it is strong and in a peaceful state, [351] its connections become words and actions. When it is released into the world, it roams around, similar to the body. Additionally, Mercury serves as the guide for souls, which is why he is called the Conductor, the Merchant, and the Infernal, because he leads souls from their bodies and from land and sea; he brings pure souls to the highest realm and prevents the impure ones from approaching or coming close to each other, instead binding them in unbreakable chains by the Furies. The Pythagoreans also claim that the entire air is filled with souls, which are considered dæmones and heroes. They are responsible for sending dreams to people, as well as signs related to illnesses and health; these signs are not just for humans but also for sheep and other livestock. They are involved in purifications, expiations, all sorts of divination, and prophetic predictions, among other things.

They also say, that the most important privilege in man is, the being able to persuade his soul to either good or bad. And that men are happy when they have a good soul; yet, that they are never quiet, and that they never retain the same mind long. Also, that an oath is justice; and that on that account, Jupiter is called Jupiter of Oaths (Ὅρκιος). Also, that virtue is harmony, and health, and universal good, and God; on which account everything owes its existence and consistency to harmony. Also, that friendship is a harmonious equality.

They also say that the most important privilege of a person is the ability to convince themselves to choose between good and bad. They believe people are happy when they have a good soul, but they also think that people are never at peace and don’t stay fixed in their thoughts for long. Additionally, they state that an oath represents justice, which is why Jupiter is referred to as Jupiter of Oaths (Ὅρκιος). They also define virtue as harmony, health, overall goodness, and God; for this reason, everything derives its existence and stability from harmony. Furthermore, they say that friendship is a balanced sense of equality.

Again, they teach that one ought not to pay equal honours to Gods and to heroes; but that one ought to honour the Gods at all times, extolling them with praises, clothed in white garments, and keeping one’s body chaste; but that one ought not to pay such honour to the heroes till after midday. Also, that a state of purity is brought about by purifications, and washings, and sprinklings, and by a man’s purifying himself from all funerals, or concubinage, or pollution of every kind, and by abstaining from all flesh that has either been killed or died of itself, and from mullets, and from melanuri, and from eggs, and from such animals as lay eggs, and from beans, and from other things which are prohibited by those who have the charge of the mysteries in the temples.

Once again, they teach that we shouldn't show the same level of respect to gods and heroes; rather, we should honor the gods at all times, praising them in white garments and keeping ourselves pure. However, we should save the honors for heroes until after midday. They also say that purity is achieved through rituals, washings, and sprinklings, and by keeping away from funerals, casual relationships, or any kind of contamination. This includes avoiding all meat from animals that have been killed or have died naturally, as well as mullets, melanuri, eggs, animals that lay eggs, beans, and other things that are forbidden by those who oversee the mysteries in the temples.

And Aristotle says, in his treatise on Beans, that Pythagoras enjoined his disciples to abstain from beans, either because[352] they resemble some part of the human body, or because they are like the gates of hell (for they are the only plants without parts); or because they dry up other plants, or because they are representatives of universal nature, or because they are used in elections in oligarchical governments. He also forbade his disciples to pick up what fell from the table, for the sake of accustoming them not to eat immoderately, or else because such things belong to the dead.

And Aristotle mentions in his essay on Beans that Pythagoras instructed his followers to avoid beans, either because they resemble parts of the human body, or because they are similar to the gates of hell (since they are the only plants without parts); or because they kill other plants, or because they represent universal nature, or because they are used in elections in oligarchical governments. He also advised his followers not to pick up what fell from the table, to help them avoid overeating, or because those things belong to the dead.

But Aristophanes says, that what falls belongs to the heroes; saying, in his Heroes:—

But Aristophanes says that what falls belongs to the heroes; stating in his Heroes:—

Never taste the things which fall
From the table on the floor.

He also forbade his disciples to eat white poultry, because a cock of that colour was sacred to Month, and was also a suppliant. He was also accounted a good animal;[114] and he was sacred to the God Month, for he indicates the time.

He also told his followers not to eat white poultry because a rooster of that color was sacred to Month and was also a supplicant. It was also considered a good animal;[114] and it was sacred to the God Month, as it signifies the time.

The Pythagoreans were also forbidden to eat of all fish that were sacred; on the ground that the same animals ought not to be served up before both Gods and men, just as the same things do not belong to freemen and to slaves. Now, white is an indication of a good nature, and black of a bad one. Another of the precepts of Pythagoras was, that men ought not to break bread; because in ancient times friends used to assemble around one loaf, as they even now do among the barbarians. Nor would he allow men to divide bread which unites them. Some think that he laid down this rule in reference to the judgment which takes place in hell; some because this practice engenders timidity in war. According to others, what is alluded to is the Union, which presides over the government of the universe.

The Pythagoreans were also not allowed to eat any sacred fish, believing that the same animals shouldn't be served to both Gods and humans, similar to the way certain things don’t belong to free people and slaves. They viewed white as a sign of a good nature and black as a sign of a bad one. Another teaching of Pythagoras was that people should not break bread, because in ancient times, friends would gather around one loaf, just like they still do among some non-Greek cultures. He also believed that men shouldn't divide bread that brings them together. Some think he established this rule in relation to the judgement that happens in the afterlife; others believe it’s because this practice creates fear in battle. According to some, it refers to the unity that governs the universe.

Another of his doctrines was, that of all solid figures the sphere was the most beautiful; and of all plane figures, the circle. That old age and all diminution were similar, and also increase and youth were identical. That health was the permanence of form, and disease the destruction of it. Of salt his opinion was, that it ought to be set before people as a reminder of justice; for salt preserves everything which it[353] touches, and it is composed of the purest particles of water and sea.

Another of his beliefs was that among all solid shapes, the sphere was the most beautiful, and among all flat shapes, the circle was the best. He thought that old age and all forms of decline were alike, just as growth and youth were the same. He saw health as the stability of form, while disease was its destruction. Regarding salt, he believed it should be presented to people as a reminder of justice; since salt preserves everything it touches, and it is made up of the purest particles from water and the sea.[353]

These are the doctrines which Alexander asserts that he discovered in the Pythagorean treatises; and Aristotle gives a similar account of them.

These are the principles that Alexander claims to have found in the Pythagorean writings; and Aristotle provides a similar description of them.

XV. Timon, in his Silli, has not left unnoticed the dignified appearance of Pythagoras, when he attacks him on other points. And his words are these:—

XV. Timon, in his Silli, has not overlooked the dignified appearance of Pythagoras when he criticizes him on other issues. His words are:—

Pythagoras, who often teaches
Precepts of magic, and with speeches
Of long high-sounding diction draws,
From gaping crowds, a vain applause.

And respecting his having been different people at different times, Xenophanes adds his evidence in an elegiac poem which commences thus:—

And regarding his experience of being different people at different times, Xenophanes presents his evidence in an elegiac poem that begins as follows:—

Now I will on another subject touch,
And lead the way.

And the passage in which he mentions Pythagoras is as follows:—

And the part where he talks about Pythagoras is as follows:—

They say that once, as passing by he saw
A dog severely beaten, he did pity him,
And spoke as follows to the man who beat him:—
“Stop now, and beat him not; since in his body,
Abides the soul of a dear friend of mine,
Whose voice I recognized as he was crying.”

These are the words of Xenophanes.

These are the words of Xenophanes.

Cratinus also ridiculed him in his Pythagorean Woman; but in his Tarentines, he speaks thus:—

Cratinus also mocked him in his Pythagorean Woman; but in his Tarentines, he says this:—

They are accustomed, if by chance they see
A private individual abroad,
To try what powers of argument he has,
How he can speak and reason: and they bother him
With strange antithesis and forced conclusions,
Errors, comparisons, and magnitudes,
Till they have filled and quite perplex’d his mind.

And Mnesimachus says in his Alcmæon:—

And Mnesimachus says in his Alcmæon:—

As we do sacrifice to the Phœbus whom
Pythagoras worships, never eating aught
Which has the breath of life.

Aristophon says in his Pythagorean:—

Aristophon mentions in his Pythagorean:—

A. He said that when he did descend below
Among the shades in Hell, he there beheld
All men who e’er had died; and there he saw,
That the Pythagoreans differ’d much
From all the rest; for that with them alone
Did Pluto deign to eat, much honouring
Their pious habits.
B. He's a civil god,
If he likes eating with such dirty fellows.

And again, in the same play he says:—

And again, in the same play he says:—

They eat
Nothing but herbs and vegetables, and drink
Pure water only. But their lice are such,
Their cloaks so dirty, and their unwash’d scent
So rank, that no one of our younger men
Will for a moment bear them.

XXI. Pythagoras died in this manner. When he was sitting with some of his companions in Milo’s house, some one of those whom he did not think worthy of admission into it, was excited by envy to set fire to it. But some say that the people of Crotona themselves did this, being afraid lest he might aspire to the tyranny. And that Pythagoras was caught as he was trying to escape; and coming to a place full of beans, he stopped there, saying that it was better to be caught than to trample on the beans, and better to be slain than to speak; and so he was murdered by those who were pursuing him. And in this way, also, most of his companions were slain; being in number about forty; but that a very few did escape, among whom were Archippus, of Tarentum, and Lysis, whom I have mentioned before.

XXI. Pythagoras died in this way. While he was sitting with some of his friends in Milo’s house, someone he didn't consider worthy to be there was motivated by envy to set it on fire. However, some say that the people of Crotona did this themselves, fearing that he might seek power over them. Pythagoras was caught while trying to escape, and when he reached a place filled with beans, he stopped there, saying it was better to be caught than to step on the beans, and better to be killed than to speak. That’s how he was murdered by those chasing him. Most of his companions, about forty in total, were also killed; only a few managed to escape, including Archippus from Tarentum and Lysis, whom I mentioned earlier.

But Dicæarchus relates that Pythagoras died afterwards, having escaped as far as the temple of the Muses, at Metapontum, and that he died there of starvation, having abstained from food for forty days. And Heraclides says, in his abridgment of the life of Satyrus, that after he had buried Pherecydes in Delos, he returned to Italy, and finding there a superb banquet prepared at the house of Milo, of Crotona, he left Crotona, and went to Metapontum, and there put an end to his life by starvation, not wishing to live any longer. But Hermippus says, that when there was war between the people of Agrigentum and the Syracusans, Pythagoras went out with his usual companions, and took the part of the Agrigentines;[355] and as they were put to flight, he ran all round a field of beans, instead of crossing it, and so was slain by the Syracusans; and that the rest, being about five-and-thirty in number, were burnt at Tarentum, when they were trying to excite a sedition in the state against the principal magistrates.

But Dicæarchus mentions that Pythagoras died later, having made it to the temple of the Muses in Metapontum, where he starved to death after going without food for forty days. Heraclides, in his summary of Satyrus's life, notes that after burying Pherecydes in Delos, Pythagoras returned to Italy. There, he found a lavish banquet set up at Milo's house in Crotona. However, he left Crotona and went to Metapontum, where he ended his life by starvation, not wanting to live any longer. Hermippus states that when war broke out between the people of Agrigentum and the Syracusans, Pythagoras joined his usual companions and sided with the Agrigentines; when they were routed, he ran around a field of beans rather than crossing it and was killed by the Syracusans. Meanwhile, the remaining thirty-five or so were burned at Tarentum while trying to incite a rebellion against the leading magistrates.

Hermippus also relates another story about Pythagoras. For he says that when he was in Italy, he made a subterraneous apartment, and charged his mother to write an account of everything that took place, marking the time of each on a tablet, and then to send them down to him, until he came up again; and that his mother did so; and that Pythagoras came up again after a certain time, lean, and reduced to a skeleton; and that he came into the public assembly, and said that he had arrived from the shades below, and then he recited to them all that had happened during his absence. And they, being charmed by what he told them, wept and lamented, and believed that Pythagoras was a divine being; so that they even entrusted their wives to him, as likely to learn some good from him; and that they too were called Pythagoreans. And this is the story of Hermippus.

Hermippus shares another story about Pythagoras. He says that when Pythagoras was in Italy, he created an underground room and asked his mother to record everything that happened, noting the time of each event on a tablet, and then send the updates down to him until he returned. His mother followed through with this request. After a while, Pythagoras emerged looking emaciated and almost skeletal. He entered the public assembly and announced that he had come back from the underworld, then recited everything that occurred during his absence. The crowd was captivated by his words, wept, and mourned, believing that Pythagoras was a divine figure. As a result, they even entrusted their wives to him, believing they would gain wisdom from him, and those women too came to be known as Pythagoreans. This is the story from Hermippus.

XXII. And Pythagoras had a wife, whose name was Theano; the daughter of Brontinus, of Crotona. But some say that she was the wife of Brontinus, and only a pupil of Pythagoras. And he had a daughter named Damo, as Lysis mentions in his letter to Hipparchus; where he speaks thus of Pythagoras: “And many say that you philosophize in public, as Pythagoras also used to do; who, when he had entrusted his Commentaries to Damo, his daughter, charged her to divulge them to no person out of the house. And she, though she might have sold his discourses for much money, would not abandon them, for she thought poverty and obedience to her father’s injunctions more valuable than gold; and that too, though she was a woman.”

XXII. Pythagoras had a wife named Theano, who was the daughter of Brontinus from Crotona. However, some people say she was actually Brontinus's wife and only a student of Pythagoras. He also had a daughter named Damo, as Lysis notes in his letter to Hipparchus, where he talks about Pythagoras: “Many say that you openly teach philosophy, just as Pythagoras used to do; who, when he entrusted his writings to Damo, his daughter, instructed her to keep them private. Although she could have sold his teachings for a lot of money, she chose to keep them secret because she valued poverty and loyal obedience to her father's wishes more than wealth, and she did this even though she was a woman.”

He had also a son, named Telauges, who was the successor of his father in his school, and who, according to some authors, was the teacher of Empedocles. At least Hippobotus relates that Empedocles said:—

He also had a son named Telauges, who succeeded his father in his school and, according to some writers, was the teacher of Empedocles. At least Hippobotus reports that Empedocles said:—

“Telauges, noble youth, whom in due time,
Theano bore to wise Pythagoras.”

But there is no book extant, which is the work of Telauges,[356] though there are some extant, which are attributed to his mother Theano. And they tell a story of her, that once, when she was asked how long a woman ought to be absent from her husband to be pure, she said, the moment she leaves her own husband, she is pure; but she is never pure at all, after she leaves any one else. And she recommended a woman, who was going to her husband, to put off her modesty with her clothes, and when she left him, to resume it again with her clothes; and when she was asked, “What clothes?” she said, “Those which cause you to be called a woman.”

But there are no surviving books that are the work of Telauges,[356] although there are some that are attributed to his mother, Theano. There's a story about her: when she was asked how long a woman should be away from her husband to be considered pure, she replied that the moment she leaves her own husband, she is pure; but she is never truly pure after leaving any other man. She advised a woman who was going to see her husband to take off her modesty like she would take off her clothes, and when she was done, to put it back on again with her clothes. When asked, "What clothes?" she answered, "The ones that make you a woman."

XXIII. Now Pythagoras, as Heraclides, the son of Sarapion, relates, died when he was eighty years of age; according to his own account of his age, but according to the common account, he was more than ninety. And we have written a sportive epigram on him, which is couched in the following terms:—

XXIII. Now Pythagoras, as Heraclides, the son of Sarapion, relates, died at the age of eighty; that’s according to his own statement about his age, but according to common belief, he was over ninety. We’ve written a light-hearted poem about him, which goes as follows:—

You’re not the only man who has abstained
From living food, for so likewise have we;
And who, I’d like to know did ever taste
Food while alive, most sage Pythagoras?
When meat is boil’d, or roasted well and salted,
I don’t think it can well be called living.
Which, therefore, without scruple then we eat it,
And call it no more living flesh, but meat.

And another, which runs thus:—

And another, which goes like this:—

Pythagoras was so wise a man, that he
Never eat meat himself, and called it sin.
And yet he gave good joints of beef to others.
So that I marvel at his principles;
Who others wronged, by teaching them to do
What he believed unholy for himself.

And another, as follows:—

And another, as follows:—

Should you Pythagoras’ doctrine wish to know,
Look on the centre of Euphorbus’ shield.
For he asserts there lived a man of old,
And when he had no longer an existence,
He still could say that he had been alive,
Or else he would not still be living now.

And this one too:

And this one too:

Alas! alas! why did Pythagoras hold
Beans in such wondrous honour? Why, besides,
Did he thus die among his choice companions?
[357]
There was a field of beans; and so the sage,
Died in the common road of Agrigentum,
Rather than trample down his favourite beans.

XXIV. And he flourished about the sixtieth olympiad; and his system lasted for nine or ten generations. And the last of the Pythagoreans, whom Aristoxenus knew, were Xenophilus, the Chalcidean, from Thrace; and Phanton, the Phliasian, and Echecrates, and Diodes, and Polymnestus, who were also Phliasians, and they were disciples of Philolaus and Eurytus, of Tarentum.

XXIV. He thrived around the sixtieth Olympic games, and his system lasted for nine or ten generations. The last of the Pythagoreans that Aristoxenus knew were Xenophilus, a Chalcidean from Thrace; Phanton, from Phlius; Echecrates; Diodes; and Polymnestus, who were also from Phlius, and they were students of Philolaus and Eurytus from Tarentum.

XXV. And there were four men of the name of Pythagoras, about the same time, at no great distance from one another. One was a native of Crotona, a man who attained tyrannical power; the second was a Phliasian, a trainer of wrestlers, as some say; the third was a native of Zacynthus; the fourth was this our philosopher, to whom they say the mysteries of philosophy belong, in whose time that proverbial phrase, “Ipse dixit,” was introduced into ordinary life. Some also affirm, that there was another man of the name of Pythagoras, a statuary of Rhodes; who is believed to have been the first discoverer of rhythm and proportion; and another was a Samian statuary; and another an orator, of no reputation; and another was a physician, who wrote a treatise on Squills; and also some essays on Homer; and another was a man, who wrote a history of the affairs of the Dorians, as we are told by Dionysius.

XXV. There were four men named Pythagoras around the same time, not too far from each other. One was from Crotona and gained tyrannical power; the second was from Phliasia and was said to be a wrestling trainer; the third was from Zacynthus; and the fourth was our philosopher, who is said to have been closely associated with the mysteries of philosophy and during whose time the saying "Ipse dixit" became common. Some also claim there was another Pythagoras, a sculptor from Rhodes, who is believed to have been the first to discover rhythm and proportion. There was also a Samian sculptor, a not-so-famous orator, a physician who wrote about Squills and some essays on Homer, and another person who wrote a history of the Dorians, as mentioned by Dionysius.

But Eratosthenes says, as Phavorinus quotes him, in the eighth book of his Universal History, that this philosopher, of whom we are speaking, was the first man who ever practised boxing in a scientific manner, in the forty-eighth olympiad, having his hair long, and being clothed in a purple robe; and that he was rejected from the competition among boys, and being ridiculed for his application, he immediately entered among the men, and came off victorious. And this statement is confirmed among other things, by the epigram which Theætetus composed:—

But Eratosthenes says, as quoted by Phavorinus in the eighth book of his Universal History, that the philosopher we're discussing was the first person to practice boxing in a scientific way during the forty-eighth Olympiad. He had long hair and wore a purple robe. He was turned away from the competition for boys, and after being ridiculed for trying, he immediately entered the men's competition and won. This claim is also supported by the epigram composed by Theætetus:—

Stranger, if e’er you knew Pythagoras,
Pythagoras, the man with flowing hair,
The celebrated boxer, erst of Samos;
I am Pythagoras. And if you ask
A citizen of Elis of my deeds,
You’ll surely think he is relating fables.

Phavorinus says, that he employed definitions, on account of the mathematical subjects to which he applied himself. And that Socrates and those who were his pupils, did so still more; and that they were subsequently followed in this by Aristotle and the Stoics.

Phavorinus says that he used definitions because of the mathematical subjects he focused on. He also mentioned that Socrates and his students did this even more, and that Aristotle and the Stoics followed suit later on.

He too, was the first person, who ever gave the name of κόσμος to the universe, and the first who called the earth round; though Theophrastus attributes this to Parmenides, and Zeno to Hesiod. They say too, that Cylon used to be a constant adversary of his, as Antidicus was of Socrates. And this epigram also used to be repeated, concerning Pythagoras the athlete:—

He was also the first person to call the universe "kosmos" and the first to describe the earth as round, although Theophrastus credits this to Parmenides and Zeno attributes it to Hesiod. They also claim that Cylon was a constant opponent of his, just like Antidicus was to Socrates. This epigram was also often repeated about Pythagoras the athlete:—

Pythagoras of Samos, son of Crates,
Came while a child to the Olympic games,
Eager to battle for the prize in boxing.

XXVI. There is a letter of this philosopher extant, which is couched in the following terms:—

XXVI. There is a letter from this philosopher that still exists, which is written in the following terms:—

PYTHAGORAS TO ANAXIMENES.

“You too, my most excellent friend, if you were not superior to Pythagoras, in birth and reputation, would have migrated from Miletus and gone elsewhere. But now the reputation of your father keeps you back, which perhaps would have restrained me too, if I had been like Anaximenes. But if you, who are the most eminent man, abandon the cities, all their ornaments will be taken from them, and the Median power will be more dangerous to them. Nor is it always seasonable to be studying astronomy, but it is more honourable to exhibit a regard for one’s country. And I myself am not always occupied about speculations of my own fancy, but I am busied also with the wars which the Italians are waging against one another.”

“You too, my excellent friend, if you weren’t superior to Pythagoras in background and reputation, would have left Miletus for other places. But now your father’s reputation holds you back, which might have restrained me as well if I were like Anaximenes. But if you, the most distinguished man, abandon the cities, all their beauty will be stripped away, and the Median power will pose a greater threat to them. It’s not always the right time to be studying astronomy; it’s more honorable to show care for your country. And I’m not always caught up in my own theories; I’m also concerned with the wars that the Italians are fighting against each other.”

But since we have now finished our account of Pythagoras, we must also speak of the most eminent of the Pythagoreans. After whom, we must mention those who are spoken of more promiscuously in connection with no particular school; and then we will connect the whole series of philosophers worth speaking of, till we arrive at Epicurus, as we have already promised.

But now that we've completed our discussion on Pythagoras, we should also talk about the most notable of the Pythagoreans. After that, we'll mention others who are discussed more generally without being linked to a specific school. Then, we will bring together the entire list of philosophers worthy of mention until we reach Epicurus, as we have already promised.

Now Telauges and Theano we have mentioned; and we must now speak of Empedocles, in the first place, for, according to some accounts, he was a pupil of Pythagoras.

Now we've mentioned Telauges and Theano; and we need to talk about Empedocles first, because according to some reports, he was a student of Pythagoras.

LIFE OF EMPEDOCLES.

I. Empedocles, as Hippobotus relates, was the son of Meton, the son of Empedocles, and a citizen of Agrigentum. And Timæus, in the fifteenth book of his Histories, gives the same account, adding that Empedocles, the grandfather of the poet, was also a most eminent man. And Hermippus tells the same story as Timæus; and in the same spirit Heraclides, in his treatise on Diseases, relates that he was of an illustrious family, since his father bred a fine stud of horses. Erastothenes, in his List of the Conquerors at the Olympic Games, says, that the father of Meton gained the victory in the seventy-first olympiad, quoting Aristotle as his authority for the assertion.

I. Empedocles, as Hippobotus tells us, was the son of Meton, who was the son of Empedocles, and a resident of Agrigentum. Timæus, in the fifteenth book of his Histories, shares the same story, adding that Empedocles, the poet's grandfather, was also a highly respected figure. Hermippus tells the same tale as Timæus; similarly, Heraclides, in his work on Diseases, mentions that he came from a distinguished family, as his father raised an impressive stable of horses. Eratosthenes, in his List of the Conquerors at the Olympic Games, states that Meton's father won a victory in the seventy-first Olympiad, citing Aristotle as his source for this claim.

But Apollodorus, the grammarian, in his Chronicles, says that he was the son of Meton; and Glaucus says that he came to Thurii when the city was only just completed. And then proceeding a little further, he adds:—

But Apollodorus, the grammarian, in his Chronicles, says that he was the son of Meton; and Glaucus mentions that he arrived in Thurii when the city was just finished. Then, going a bit further, he adds:—

And some relate that he did flee from thence,
And came to Syracuse, and on their side
Did fight in horrid war against th’ Athenians;
But those men seem to me completely wrong—
For by this time he must have been deceased,
Or very old, which is not much believed;
For Aristotle, and Heraclides too,
Say that he died at sixty years of age.

But certainly the person who got the victory with a single horse in the seventy-first olympiad was a namesake of this man, and that it is which deceived Apollodorus as to the age of this philosopher.

But the person who won with a single horse in the seventy-first Olympiad was definitely a namesake of this man, and that's what misled Apollodorus about the age of this philosopher.

But Satyrus, in his Lives, asserts, that Empedocles was the son of Exænetus, and that he also left a son who was named[360] Exænetus. And that in the same Olympiad, he himself gained the victory with the single horse; and his son, in wrestling, or, as Heraclides says in his Abridgment, in running. But I have found in the Commentaries of Phavorinus, that Empedocles sacrificed, and gave as a feast to the spectators of the games, an ox made of honey and flour, and that he had a brother named Callicratidas.

But Satyrus, in his Lives, claims that Empedocles was the son of Exænetus and that he also had a son named Exænetus. He won a race with a single horse during the same Olympiad, while his son competed in wrestling, or as Heraclides mentions in his Abridgment, in running. However, I found in Phavorinus's Commentaries that Empedocles sacrificed an ox made of honey and flour and hosted a feast for the spectators of the games, and that he had a brother named Callicratidas.

But Telauges, the son of Pythagoras, in his letters to Philolaus, says that Empedocles was the son of Archinomus; and that he was a citizen of Agrigentum, he himself asserts at the beginning of his Purifications.

But Telauges, the son of Pythagoras, says in his letters to Philolaus that Empedocles was the son of Archinomus; and he claims that he was a citizen of Agrigentum at the beginning of his Purifications.

Friends, who the mighty citadel inhabit,
Which crowns the golden waves of Acragas.

And this is enough to say about his family.

And that's all there is to say about his family.

II. Timæus, in his ninth book, relates that he was a pupil of Pythagoras, saying that he was afterwards convicted of having divulged his doctrines, in the same way as Plato was, and therefore that he was forbidden from thenceforth to attend his school. And they say that Pythagoras himself mentions him when he says:—

II. Timæus, in his ninth book, says that he was a student of Pythagoras, noting that he was later found guilty of revealing his teachings, just like Plato was, and as a result, he was banned from attending the school from that point on. It's also said that Pythagoras himself refers to him when he says:—

And in that band there was a learned man
Of wondrous wisdom; one, who of all men
Had the profoundest wealth of intellect.

But some say that when the philosopher says this, he is referring to Parmenides.

But some say that when the philosopher says this, he is referring to Parmenides.

Neanthes relates, that till the time of Philolaus and Empedocles, the Pythagoreans used to admit all persons indiscriminately into their school; but when Empedocles made their doctrines public by means of his poems, then they made a law to admit no Epic poet. And they say that the same thing happened to Plato; for that he too was excluded from the school. But who was the teacher of the Pythagorean school that Empedocles was a pupil of, they do not say; for, as for the letter of Telauges, in which he is stated to have been a pupil of Hippasus and Brontinus, that is not worthy of belief. But Theophrastus says that he was an imitator and a rival of Parmenides, in his poems, for that he too had delivered his opinions on natural philosophy in epic verse.

Neanthes mentions that until the time of Philolaus and Empedocles, the Pythagoreans accepted anyone into their school without discrimination. However, when Empedocles revealed their teachings through his poems, they established a rule to exclude Epic poets. They also say that Plato faced the same fate, as he was also kept out of the school. However, they don't specify who the teacher of the Pythagorean school was that Empedocles studied under; regarding the letter from Telauges that claims he was a student of Hippasus and Brontinus, that is considered unreliable. Theophrastus states that he was an imitator and rival of Parmenides in his poetry, as he also expressed his views on natural philosophy in epic verse.

Hermippus, however, says that he was an imitator, not of Parmenides, but of Xenophanes with whom he lived; and[361] that he imitated his epic style, and that it was at a later period that he fell in with the Pythagoreans. But Alcidamas, in his Natural Philosophy, says, that Zeno and Empedocles were pupils of Parmenides, about the same time; and that they subsequently seceded from him; and that Zeno adopted a philosophical system peculiar to himself; but that Empedocles became a pupil of Anaxagoras and Pythagoras, and that he imitated the pompous demeanour, and way of life, and gestures of the one, and the system of Natural Philosophy of the other.

Hermippus, however, states that he was an imitator, not of Parmenides, but of Xenophanes, with whom he lived; and[361] that he copied his epic style, and that it was later on that he encountered the Pythagoreans. But Alcidamas, in his Natural Philosophy, mentions that Zeno and Empedocles were students of Parmenides around the same time; that they eventually separated from him; that Zeno developed a unique philosophical approach; while Empedocles became a student of Anaxagoras and Pythagoras, and that he emulated the grand demeanor, lifestyle, and gestures of the former, and the system of Natural Philosophy of the latter.

III. And Aristotle, in his Sophist, says that Empedocles was the first person who invented rhetoric, and Zeno the first person who invented dialectics. And in his book on Poetry, he says, that Empedocles was a man of Homeric genius, and endowed with great power of language, and a great master of metaphor, and a man who employed all the successful artifices of poetry, and also that when he had written several poems, and among them one on the passage of the Hellespont, by Xerxes, and also the proœmium of a hymn to Apollo, his daughter subsequently burnt them, or, as Hieronymus says, his sister, burning the proœmium unintentionally, but the Persian poem on purpose, because it was incomplete. And speaking generally, he says that he wrote tragedies and political treatises.

III. Aristotle, in his Sophist, states that Empedocles was the first to invent rhetoric, and Zeno was the first to develop dialectics. In his book on Poetry, he describes Empedocles as someone with Homeric genius, gifted with a powerful command of language, a master of metaphor, and skilled in all the effective techniques of poetry. He notes that after writing several poems, including one about Xerxes’ crossing of the Hellespont and the prologue of a hymn to Apollo, his daughter later burned them. Alternatively, Hieronymus claims it was his sister who accidentally burned the prologue but intentionally burned the Persian poem because it was unfinished. Overall, he mentions that Empedocles wrote tragedies and political treatises.

But Heraclides, the son of Sarapion, says that the tragedies were the work of some other Empedocles; and Hieronymus says that he had met with forty-three. Neanthes, too, affirms that when he was a young man, he wrote tragedies, and that he himself had subsequently met with them; and Satyrus, in his Lives, states that he was a physician, and also a most excellent orator. And accordingly, that Gorgias, of Leontini, was his pupil, a man of the greatest eminence as a rhetorician, and one who left behind him a treatise containing a complete system of the art; and who, as we are told by Apollodorus, in his Chronicles, lived to the age of a hundred and nine years.

But Heraclides, the son of Sarapion, claims that the tragedies were the work of a different Empedocles; and Hieronymus notes that he came across forty-three of them. Neanthes also states that when he was younger, he wrote tragedies and that he found them later on; and Satyrus, in his Lives, mentions that he was a physician and also an excellent orator. Consequently, Gorgias of Leontini was his student, a highly regarded rhetorician who left behind a treatise that contained a complete system of the art; and as told by Apollodorus in his Chronicles, he lived to be one hundred and nine years old.

IV. Satyrus tells us that he used to say that he had been present when Empedocles was practising magic; and that he professes this science, and many others too in his poems when he says:—

IV. Satyrus tells us that he used to say he was there when Empedocles practiced magic; and that he claims to have knowledge of this art, along with many others, in his poems when he says:—

And all the drugs which can relieve disease,
Or soften the approach of age, shall be
Revealed to your inquiries; I do know them,
And I to you alone will them disclose.
You shall restrain the fierce unbridled winds,
Which, rushing o’er the earth, bow down the corn,
And crush the farmer’s hopes. And when you will,
You shall recall them back to sweep the land:
Then you shall learn to dry the rainy clouds,
And bid warm summer cheer the heart of men.
Again, at your behest, the drought shall yield
To wholesome show’rs: when you give the word
Hell shall restore its dead.

V. And Timæus, in his eighteenth book, says, that this man was held in great esteem on many accounts; for that once, when the etesian gales were blowing violently, so as to injure the crops, he ordered some asses to be flayed, and some bladders to be made of their hides, and these he placed on the hills and high places to catch the wind. And so, when the wind ceased, he was called wind-forbidder (κωλυσανέμας). And Heraclides, in his treatise on Diseases, says that he dictated to Pausanias the statement which he made about the dead woman. Now Pausanias, as both Aristippus and Satyrus agree, was much attached to him; and he dedicated to him the works which he wrote on Natural Philosophy, in the following terms:—

V. In his eighteenth book, Timæus says that this man was highly regarded for several reasons. Once, during a time when the strong easterly winds were wreaking havoc on the crops, he directed that some donkeys be skinned and that bladders be made from their hides. He then placed these bladders on the hills and elevated spots to catch the wind. When the wind finally calmed down, he earned the nickname "wind-forbidder" (κωλυσανέμας). Heraclides, in his work on Diseases, mentions that he dictated to Pausanias the statement regarding the deceased woman. Both Aristippus and Satyrus agree that Pausanias was very fond of him, and he dedicated the works he wrote on Natural Philosophy to him in the following terms:—

Hear, O Pausanias, son of wise Anchites.

He also wrote an epigram upon him:—

He also wrote a short poem about him:—

Gela, his native land, does boast the birth
Of wise Anchites’ son, that great physician,
So fitly named Pausanias,[115] from his skill;
A genuine son of Æsculapius,
Who has stopped many men whom fell disease
Marked for its own, from treading those dark paths
Which lead to Proserpine’s infernal realms.

VI. The case of the dead woman above mentioned, Heraclides says, was something of this sort; that he kept her corpse for thirty days dead, and yet free from corruption; on which account he has called himself a physician and a prophet, taking it also from these verses:—

VI. The case of the deceased woman mentioned earlier, Heraclides states, was something like this; he preserved her body for thirty days without decay, which is why he has called himself a doctor and a prophet, also referencing these verses:—

Friends who the mighty citadel inhabit,
Which crowns the golden waves of Acragas
Votaries of noble actions, Hail to ye;
I, an immortal God, no longer mortal,
Now live among you well revered by all,
As is my due, crowned with holy fillets
And rosy garlands. And whene’er I come
To wealthy cities, then from men and women
Due honours meets me; and crowds follow me,
Seeking the way which leads to gainful glory.
Some ask for oracles, and some entreat,
For remedies against all kinds of sickness.

VII. And he says that Agrigentum was a very large city, since it had eight hundred thousand inhabitants; on which account Empedocles, seeing the people immersed in luxury, said, “The men of Agrigentum devote themselves wholly to luxury as if they were to die to-morrow, but they furnish their houses as if they were to live for ever.”

VII. He says that Agrigentum was a very large city, with eight hundred thousand inhabitants. Because of this, Empedocles, observing the people caught up in luxury, remarked, “The people of Agrigentum live for luxury as if they were to die tomorrow, yet they decorate their homes as if they were going to live forever.”

VIII. It is said that Cleomenes, the rhapsodist, sung this very poem, called the Purifications, at Olympia; at least this is the account given by Phavorinus, in his Commentaries.

VIII. It's said that Cleomenes, the rhapsodist, performed this poem, called the Purifications, at Olympia; at least that's what Phavorinus mentions in his Commentaries.

IX. And Aristotle says, that he was a most liberal man, and far removed from anything like a domineering spirit; since he constantly refused the sovereign power when it was offered to him, as Xanthus assures us in his account of him, showing plainly that he preferred a simple style of living. And Timæus tells the same story, giving at the same time the reason why he was so very popular. For he says that when on one occasion, he was invited to a banquet by one of the magistrates, the wine was carried about, but the supper was not served up. And as every one else kept silence, he, disapproving of what he saw, bade the servants bring in the supper; but the person who had invited him said that he was waiting for the secretary of the council. And when he came he was appointed master of the feast, at the instigation of the giver of it, and then he gave a plain intimation of his tyrannical inclinations, for he ordered all the guests to drink, and those who did not drink were to have the wine poured over their heads. Empedocles said nothing at the moment, but the next day he summoned them before the court, and procured the execution of both the entertainer and the master of the feast.

IX. Aristotle was known to be a very generous person, far from being domineering; he consistently turned down offers of power, as Xanthus points out in his account, clearly indicating his preference for a simple lifestyle. Timæus tells a similar story and explains why he was so well-liked. He recounts that once, when invited to a banquet by a magistrate, the wine was served but the meal was not. While everyone else fell silent, Aristotle, disapproving of the situation, told the servants to bring in the food. However, the host said they were waiting for the council's secretary. When the secretary arrived, he was made the master of the feast at the host's suggestion, revealing his tyrannical tendencies by ordering all guests to drink, threatening that anyone who didn’t would have wine poured over their heads. Empedocles said nothing at that time, but the next day he brought them before the court and ensured the execution of both the host and the master of the feast.

And this was the beginning of his political career. And at another time, when Acron, the physician, asked of the council[364] a place where he might erect a monument to his father, on account of his eminence as a physician, Empedocles came forward and opposed any such grant, adducing many arguments on the ground of equality, and also putting the following question:—“And what elegy shall we inscribe upon it? Shall we say:—

And this was the start of his political career. At another time, when Acron, the doctor, asked the council[364] for a spot to build a monument for his father, due to his prominence as a physician, Empedocles stepped in and opposed the request, presenting several arguments based on fairness, and also asking this question:—“And what inscription should we put on it? Should we say:—

“Ἄκρον ἰητρὸν Ἄκρων’ Ἀκραγαντῖνον πατρὸς ἄκρου
κρύπτει κρημνὸς ἄκρος πατρίδος ἀκροτάτης.”[116]

But some give the second line thus:—

But some present the second line this way:—

Ἀκροτάτης κορυφῆς τύμβος ἄκρος κατέχει.

And others assert that it is the composition of Simonides.

And others claim that it was created by Simonides.

But afterwards Empedocles abolished the assembly of a thousand, and established a council in which the magistrates were to hold office for three years, on such a footing that it should consist not only of rich men, but of those who were favourers of the interests of the people. Timæus, however, in his first and second book (for he often mentions him), says that he appeared to entertain opinions adverse to a republic. And, as far as his poetry goes, any one may see that he was arrogant and self-satisfied. Accordingly, he says:—

But later, Empedocles got rid of the assembly of a thousand and set up a council where the magistrates would serve for three years. This council was designed to include not just wealthy individuals, but also those who supported the people's interests. However, Timæus, in his first and second books (since he mentions him often), claims that Empedocles seemed to have views that opposed a republic. And from his poetry, it’s clear that he was proud and self-satisfied. He thus states:—

Hail to ye,
I, an immortal God, no longer mortal,
Now live among you:

And so on.

And so forth.

But when he went to the olympic games he was considered a worthy object of general attention; so that there was no mention made of any one else in comparison of Empedocles.

But when he went to the Olympic Games, he was seen as someone deserving of everyone’s attention; so much so that no one else was mentioned in comparison to Empedocles.

X. Afterwards, indeed, when Agrigentum was settled, the descendants of his enemies opposed his return; on which account he retired to Peloponnesus, where he died. And Timon has not let even Empedocles escape, but satirises him in this style, saying:—

X. Later, when Agrigentum was established, the descendants of his enemies blocked his return; for this reason, he moved to Peloponnesus, where he passed away. And Timon hasn’t spared even Empedocles, but criticizes him in this way, saying:—

And then Empedocles, the honeyed speaker
Of soft forensic speeches; he did take
As many offices as he was able,
Creating magistrates who wanted helpers.

But there are two accounts of the manner of his death.

But there are two stories about how he died.

XI. For Heraclides, relating the story about the dead woman, how Empedocles got great glory from sending away a dead woman restored to life, says that he celebrated a sacrifice in the field of Pisianax, and that some of his friends were invited, among whom was Pausanias. And then, after the banquet, they lay down, some going a little way off, and some lying under the trees close by in the field, and some wherever they happened to choose. But Empedocles himself remained in the place where he had been sitting. But when day broke, and they arose, he alone was not found. And when he was sought for, and the servants were examined and said that they did not know, one of them said, that at midnight he had heard a loud voice calling Empedocles; and that then he himself rose up and saw a great light from heaven, but nothing else. And as they were all amazed at what had taken place, Pausanias descended and sent some people to look for him; but afterwards he was commanded not to busy himself about the matter, as he was informed that what had happened was deserving of thankfulness, and that they behoved to sacrifice to Empedocles as to one who had become a God.

XI. According to Heraclides, telling the story about the dead woman, Empedocles gained great fame for bringing a dead woman back to life. He celebrated a sacrifice in the field of Pisianax and invited some friends, including Pausanias. After the banquet, they stretched out to rest, some moving a little away, while others lay under the nearby trees in the field, and some wherever they felt like it. But Empedocles himself stayed where he had been sitting. When morning came and everyone got up, he was nowhere to be found. When people began to search for him, the servants were questioned, and they said they didn’t know where he was. One of them mentioned that at midnight, he had heard a loud voice calling for Empedocles, and that he then got up and saw a bright light from heaven, but nothing else. As they all marveled at what had happened, Pausanias went down and sent some people to look for him. Later, though, he was told not to worry about it, as he learned that what had happened was something to be grateful for, and they should offer sacrifices to Empedocles as if he had become a God.

Hermippus says also, that a woman of the name of Panthea, a native of Agrigentum, who had been given over by the physicians, was cured by him, and that it was on this account that he celebrated a sacrifice; and that the guests invited were about eighty in number. But Hippobotus says that he rose up and went away as if he were going to mount Ætna; and that when he arrived at the crater of fire he leaped in, and disappeared, wishing to establish a belief that he had become a God. But afterwards the truth was detected by one of his slippers having been dropped. For he used to wear slippers with brazen soles. Pausanias, however, contradicts this statement.[117]

Hermippus also mentions a woman named Panthea, from Agrigentum, who had been given up by the doctors. He says he cured her, and because of this, he held a celebration with around eighty guests. However, Hippobotus claims that he got up and left as if he were going to climb Mount Ætna. When he reached the fiery crater, he jumped in and vanished, aiming to create the belief that he had become a God. But later, the truth came out when one of his slippers was found. He used to wear slippers with bronze soles. Pausanias, however, disputes this claim.[117]

But Diodorus, of Ephesus, writing about Anaximander, says that Empedocles imitated him; indulging in a tragic sort of pride, and wearing magnificent apparel. And when a pestilence attacked the people of Selinus, by reason of the bad smells arising from the adjacent river, so that the men died and the women bore dead children, Empedocles contrived a plan, and brought into the same channel two other rivers at his own expense; and so, by mixing their waters with that of the other river, he sweetened the stream. And as the pestilence was removed in this way, when the people of Selinus were on one occasion holding a festival on the bank of the river, Empedocles appeared among them; and they rising up, offered him adoration, and prayed to him as to a God. And he, wishing to confirm this idea which they had adopted of him, leaped into the fire.

But Diodorus of Ephesus, writing about Anaximander, claims that Empedocles imitated him; indulging in a tragic sort of pride and wearing extravagant clothing. When a plague struck the people of Selinus due to the foul odors coming from the nearby river, causing men to die and women to give birth to stillborn babies, Empedocles came up with a plan. He diverted two other rivers into the same channel at his own expense, mixing their waters with that of the other river to purify the stream. When the plague was lifted this way, the people of Selinus once held a festival by the river, where Empedocles joined them. They stood up to honor him, praying to him as if he were a god. To reinforce the idea they had of him, he jumped into the fire.

But Timæus contradicts all these stories; saying expressly, that he departed into Peloponnesus, and never returned at all, on which account the manner of his death is uncertain. And he especially denies the tale of Heraclides in his fourth book; for he says that Pisianax was a Syracusan, and had no field in the district of Agrigentum; but that Pausanias erected a monument in honour of his friend, since such a report had got about concerning him; and, as he was a rich man, made it a statue and little chapel, as one might erect to a God. “How then,” adds Timæus, “could he have leaped into a crater, of which, though they were in the neighbourhood, he had never made any mention? He died then in Peloponnesus; and there is nothing extraordinary in there being no tomb of his to be seen; for there are many other men who have no tomb visible.” These are the words of Timæus; and he adds further, “But Heraclides is altogether a man fond of strange stories, and one who would assert that a man had fallen from the moon.”

But Timæus contradicts all these stories, stating clearly that he went to Peloponnesus and never came back, which is why his death is uncertain. He specifically denies the account from Heraclides in his fourth book; he claims that Pisianax was from Syracuse and didn’t own any land in the Agrigentum area. Instead, Pausanias built a monument in honor of his friend since such a rumor was going around about him. Because he was wealthy, he created a statue and a small chapel, similar to what one might build for a god. “How then,” adds Timæus, “could he have jumped into a crater, which, despite being nearby, he never mentioned? He died in Peloponnesus, and it’s not surprising that there’s no visible tomb for him, as there are many others who also lack a visible grave.” These are Timæus’s words, and he further adds, “But Heraclides is someone who loves strange stories and would even claim that a man fell from the moon.”

Hippobotus says, that there was a clothed statue of Empedocles which lay formerly in Agrigentum, but which was afterwards placed in front of the Senate House of the Romans divested of its clothing, as the Romans had carried it off and erected it there. And there are traces of some inscriptions or reliefs still discernible on it.

Hippobotus says that there used to be a dressed statue of Empedocles, which originally lay in Agrigentum, but it was later moved and set up in front of the Roman Senate House, stripped of its clothing, as the Romans had taken it and installed it there. You can still see some traces of inscriptions or reliefs on it.

Neanthes of Cyzicus, who also wrote about the Pythagoreans, says, that when Meton was dead, the seeds of tyrannical[367] power began to appear; and that then Empedocles persuaded the Agrigentines to desist from their factious disputes, and to establish political equality. And besides, as there were many of the female citizens destitute of dowry, he portioned them out of his own private fortune. And relying on these actions of his, he assumed a purple robe and wore a golden circlet on his hand, as Phavorinus relates in the first book of his Commentaries. He also wore slippers with brazen soles, and a Delphian garland. His hair was let grow very long, and he had boys to follow him; and he himself always preserved a solemn countenance, and a uniformly grave deportment. And he marched about in such style, that he seemed to all the citizens, who met him and who admired his deportment, to exhibit a sort of likeness to kingly power. And afterwards, it happened that as on the occasion of some festival he was going in a chariot to Messene, he was upset and broke his thigh; and he was taken ill in consequence, and so died, at the age of seventy-seven. And his tomb is in Megara.

Neanthes of Cyzicus, who also wrote about the Pythagoreans, says that after Meton died, the seeds of tyrannical power began to show up. Then, Empedocles convinced the Agrigentines to stop their factional disputes and to establish political equality. Additionally, since many of the female citizens were without dowries, he used his own money to provide for them. Based on these actions, he donned a purple robe and wore a golden ring on his hand, as Phavorinus recounts in the first book of his Commentaries. He also wore slippers with bronze soles and a Delphian garland. His hair was left very long, and he had boys following him; he maintained a serious expression and a consistently grave demeanor. He walked around in such a manner that everyone who met him admired his presence and thought he resembled a kind of royal authority. Later on, during a festival, as he was riding in a chariot to Messene, he was thrown from it and broke his thigh; he fell ill as a result and died at the age of seventy-seven. His tomb is in Megara.

But as to his age, Aristotle differs from this account of Neanthes; for he asserts that he died at sixty years of age; others again say, that he was a hundred and nine when he died. He flourished about the eighty-fourth olympiad. Demetrius, of Trœzen, in his book against the Sophists, reports that, as the lines of Homer say:—

But regarding his age, Aristotle disagrees with Neanthes's account; he claims that he died at sixty years old, while others say he was a hundred and nine when he died. He was active during the eighty-fourth Olympiad. Demetrius of Trœzen, in his book against the Sophists, mentions that, as the lines of Homer say:—

He now, self-murdered, from a beam depends,
And his mad soul to blackest hell descends.[118]

But in the letter of Telauges, which has been mentioned before, it is said that he slipped down through old age, and fell into the sea, and so died.

But in the letter from Telauges, which was mentioned earlier, it says that he slipped due to old age, fell into the sea, and died.

And this is enough to say about his death.

And that’s all there is to say about his death.

There is also a jesting epigram of ours upon him, in our collection of Poems in all Metres, which runs thus:—

There’s also a playful poem about him in our collection of Poems in all Metres, which goes like this:—

You too, Empedocles, essayed to purge
Your body in the rapid flames, and drank
The liquid fire from the restless crater;
I say not that you threw yourself at once
Into the stream of Ætna’s fiery flood.
But seeking to conceal yourself you fell,
And so you met with unintended death.

And another:—

And another one:—

’Tis said the wise Empedocles did fall
Out of his chariot, and so broke his thigh:
But if he leapt into the flames of Ætna,
How could his tomb be shown in Megara?

XII. The following were some of his doctrines. He used to assert that there were four elements, fire, water, earth, and air. And that that is friendship by which they are united, and discord by which they are separated. And he speaks thus on this subject:—

XII. The following were some of his teachings. He would claim that there are four elements: fire, water, earth, and air. He described friendship as the force that brings them together, and discord as the force that drives them apart. He discusses this topic as follows:—

Bright Jove, life-giving Juno, Pluto dark,
And Nestis, who fills mortal eyes with tears.

Meaning by Jove fire, by Juno the earth, by Pluto the air, and by Nestis water. And these things, says he, never cease alternating with one another; inasmuch as this arrangement is perpetual. Accordingly, he says subsequently:—

Meaning by Jupiter fire, by Juno the earth, by Pluto the air, and by Nestis water. And these things, he says, never stop alternating with each other; since this arrangement is ongoing. So, he goes on to say:—

Sometimes in friendship bound they coalesce,
Sometimes they’re parted by fell discord’s hate.

And he asserts that the sun is a vast assemblage of fire, and that it is larger than the moon. And the moon is disk-shaped; and that the heaven itself is like crystal; and that the soul inhabits every kind of form of animals and plants. Accordingly, he thus expresses himself.

And he claims that the sun is a huge ball of fire and that it's bigger than the moon. The moon is shaped like a disk; he says that the sky itself is like crystal; and that the soul exists in all sorts of animals and plants. So, this is how he puts it.

For once I was a boy, and once a girl.
A bush, a bird, a fish who swims the sea,

XIII. His writings on Natural Philosophy and his Purifications extend to five thousand verses; and his Medical Poem to six hundred; and his Tragedies we have spoken of previously.

XIII. His writings on Natural Philosophy and his Purifications cover five thousand verses; his Medical Poem consists of six hundred; and we have already discussed his Tragedies.

LIFE OF EPICHARMUS.

I. Epicharmus was a native of Cos, the son of Helothales; he also was a pupil of Pythagoras. When he was three months old he was brought to Megara, in Sicily, and from thence he came to Syracuse, as he himself tells us in his writings. And on his statue there is the following inscription.

I. Epicharmus was from Cos, the son of Helothales; he was also a student of Pythagoras. When he was three months old, he was taken to Megara in Sicily, and from there he went to Syracuse, as he mentions in his writings. There is an inscription on his statue that says the following.

As the bright sun excels the other stars,
As the sea far exceeds the river streams:
So does sage Epicharmus men surpass,
Whom hospitable Syracuse has crowned.

II. He has left behind him Commentaries in which he treats of natural philosophy, and delivers apophthegms, and discusses medicine. He has also added brief notes to many of his commentaries, in which he declares plainly that he is the author of the works.

II. He has left behind Commentaries where he discusses natural philosophy, shares insightful sayings, and talks about medicine. He has also included short notes in many of his commentaries, clearly stating that he is the author of the works.

III. He died at the age of ninety years.

III. He died at the age of ninety.

LIFE OF ARCHYTAS.

I. Archytas was a native of Tarentum, and the son of Mnesagoras; or, as Aristoxenus relates, of Histiæus.

I. Archytas was from Tarentum and was the son of Mnesagoras, or as Aristoxenus mentions, of Histiæus.

II. He also was a Pythagorean; and he it was who saved Plato’s life by means of a letter, when he was in danger of being put to death by Dionysius.

II. He was also a Pythagorean; it was him who saved Plato’s life with a letter when Plato was at risk of being executed by Dionysius.

III. He was a man held in very general esteem on account of his universal virtue; and he was seven times appointed general of his countrymen, when no one else had ever held the office for more than one year, as the law forbade it to be held for a longer period.

III. He was a man widely respected for his outstanding character, and he was appointed general of his people seven times, while no one else had ever held the position for more than a year, as the law prohibited longer terms.

IV. Plato wrote his letters to him; as he had begun the correspondence by writing himself to Plato, which he did in the following manner:—

IV. Plato wrote his letters to him; he had started the correspondence by writing to Plato himself, which he did in the following way:—

ARCHYTAS TO PLATO, GREETING.

“I am very glad that you have recovered from your delicate state of health; for you yourself have sent me word of your recovery, and Lamiscus gives the same account. I have been much occupied with some commentaries, and have been among the Lucanians, and have met with the descendants of Ocellus. I have now in my possession, and I send to you the treatises on Law, and Kingly Power, and Piety, and the Creation of the Universe. As for the rest, I have not been able to find them, but whenever I do find any, I will send them to you.”

“I’m really glad to hear that you’ve recovered from your illness; you’ve let me know about your recovery, and Lamiscus has confirmed it. I’ve been busy with some commentaries, spending time among the Lucanians, and I’ve met the descendants of Ocellus. I now have the treatises on Law, Kingly Power, Piety, and the Creation of the Universe, and I'm sending them to you. As for the others, I haven’t been able to find them, but I’ll send them your way as soon as I do.”

Thus wrote Archytas. And Plato sent him an answer in the following terms:—

Thus wrote Archytas. And Plato sent him a response in the following words:—

PLATO TO ARCHYTAS, GREETING.

“I was exceedingly glad to receive the Commentaries which came from you, and I have admired their author in the greatest possible degree; and he seems to us to be a man worthy of his ancient ancestors. For they are said to have been originally natives of Myra; and to have been among the Trojans, whom Laomedon took with him, gallant men, as the story handed down by tradition attests. As for my Commentaries which you ask me for, they are not yet completed, but such as they are I send them to you. And on the propriety of taking care of such things we are both agreed, so that I have no need to impress anything on you on that head. Farewell.”

"I was really happy to receive the Commentaries from you, and I have greatly admired their author; he truly seems to be a person worthy of his noble ancestors. They are said to have originally come from Myra and to have been among the Trojans, who were brave men, as the stories passed down tell us. Regarding my Commentaries that you asked for, they aren’t finished yet, but I’m sending you what I have. We both agree on the importance of taking care of such things, so I don’t need to remind you about that. Take care."

These then are the letters which these philosophers wrote to one another.

These are the letters that these philosophers exchanged with each other.

V. There were four people of the name of Archytas. The first, this man of whom we are speaking. The second was a Mytilenean, a musician. The third wrote a treatise on Agriculture. The fourth was an epigrammatic poet. Some writers also make mention of a fifth, who was an architect; and there is a book on mechanics extant which is attributed to him; which begins in this way:—

V. There were four people named Archytas. The first is the man we’re talking about. The second was a musician from Mytilene. The third wrote a book on Agriculture. The fourth was a poet known for clever poems. Some writers also mention a fifth, who was an architect, and there’s a book on mechanics still available that’s attributed to him, which begins like this:—

“This is what I heard from Teucer, the Carthaginian.”

“This is what I heard from Teucer, the Carthaginian.”

And concerning the musician, the following story is told: That once he was reproached for not making himself heard, and he replied, “My organ contends on my behalf, and speaks.”

And about the musician, here's the story: He was criticized for not being loud enough, and he replied, “My organ speaks for me and makes my voice heard.”

VI. Aristoxenus says, that this Pythagorean was never once defeated while acting as general. But that as he was attacked by envy, he once gave up his command, and his army was immediately taken prisoner.

VI. Aristoxenus says that this Pythagorean was never defeated while serving as general. However, when he faced envy, he once stepped down from his command, and his army was immediately captured.

VII. He was the first person who applied mathematical principles to mechanics, and reduced them to a system; and the first also who gave a methodical impulse to descriptive geometry in seeking, in the sections of a demicylinder for a proportional mean, which should enable him to find the double of a given cube. He was also the first person who ever gave the geometrical measure of a cube, as Plato mentions in his Republic.

VII. He was the first person to use mathematical principles in mechanics and organize them into a system; he also pioneered a systematic approach to descriptive geometry by looking for a proportional mean in the sections of a demicylinder, which would help him determine the double of a given cube. Additionally, he was the first to provide the geometric measurement of a cube, as mentioned by Plato in his Republic.

LIFE OF ALCMÆON.

I. Alcmæon was a citizen of Crotona; he also was a pupil of Pythagoras. And the chief part of his writings are on medical subjects; but he also at times discusses points of natural philosophy, and asserts that the greater part of human affairs have two sides. He appears to have been the first person who wrote a treatise on Natural Philosophy, as Phavorinus affirms, in his Universal History; and he used to argue that the moon had the same nature for ever which she had at that moment.

I. Alcmæon was a citizen of Crotona and a student of Pythagoras. Most of his writings focus on medical topics, but he also occasionally touches on issues of natural philosophy and claims that most human affairs have two sides. He seems to have been the first person to write a treatise on Natural Philosophy, as Phavorinus states in his Universal History; and he would argue that the moon has the same nature forever as it does at that moment.

II. He was the son of Pirithus, as he himself states at the beginning of his treatise, where he says, “Alcmæon, of Crotona, the son of Pirithus, says this to Brontinus, and Leon, and Bathyllus. About things invisible, and things mortal, the Gods alone have a certain knowledge; but men may form conjectures.…” And so on.

II. He was the son of Pirithus, as he himself states at the beginning of his treatise, where he says, “Alcmæon, from Crotona, the son of Pirithus, says this to Brontinus, Leon, and Bathyllus. Regarding things unseen and things mortal, only the Gods have certain knowledge; but people can only make guesses.…” And so on.

He used also to say that the soul was immortal, and that it was in a state of perpetual motion in the same way as the sun.

He also used to say that the soul is immortal and that it is in a constant state of motion, just like the sun.

LIFE OF HIPPASUS.

I. Hippasus was a citizen of Metapontum, and a pupil of Pythagoras.

I. Hippasus was a resident of Metapontum and a student of Pythagoras.

II. He used to say that the time of the changes of the world was definite, and that the universe also was finite, and in a state of perpetual motion.

II. He would say that the time for changes in the world was fixed, and that the universe was also finite and constantly in motion.

III. Demetrius, in his treatise on People of the same Name, says that he left no writings behind him.

III. Demetrius, in his work on People of the Same Name, says that he didn’t leave any writings behind.

IV. There were two people of the name of Hippasus; this man, and another who wrote an account of the Constitution of the Lacedæmonians, in five books. And he was himself a Lacedæmonian.

IV. There were two people named Hippasus; this man, and another who wrote a five-book account of the Constitution of the Lacedæmonians. And he was himself a Lacedæmonian.

LIFE OF PHILOLAUS.

I. Philolaus was a native of Crotona, and a pupil of Pythagoras, it was from him that Plato wrote to Dion to take care and purchase the books of Pythagoras.

I. Philolaus was from Crotona and a student of Pythagoras. It was from him that Plato wrote to Dion to make sure to take care and buy the books of Pythagoras.

II. And he died under suspicion of having designed to seize on the tyranny; and we have written an epigram on him:—

II. And he died under suspicion of planning to take over the tyranny; and we have written a short poem about him:—

I say that all men ought above all things
To guard against suspicion. For, though innocent,
Still if you are suspected, you’re unfortunate.
And thus his native city of Crotona
Slew Philolaus; for the jealous citizens
Thought that his house betrayed a tyrant’s purpose.

III. His theory was, that everything was produced by harmony and necessity. And he was the first person who affirmed that the earth moved in a circle; though some attribute the assertion of this principle to Icetas of Syracuse.

III. His theory was that everything was created by harmony and necessity. He was the first to claim that the earth moved in a circle, although some credit this idea to Icetas of Syracuse.

IV. He wrote one book, which Hermippus reports, on the authority of some unknown writer, that Plato the philosopher purchased when he was in Sicily (having come thither to the court of Dionysius), of the relations of Philolaus, for forty Alexandrian minæ of silver; and that from this book he copied his Timæus. But others say that Plato received it as a present, after having obtained his liberty for a young man, one of the disciples of Philolaus, who had been arrested by Dionysius. Demetrius, in his treatise on people of the same name, says that he was the first of the Pythagoreans who wrote a treatise on Natural Philosophy; and it begins thus:—

IV. He wrote one book, which Hermippus reports, based on some unknown source, that Plato the philosopher bought when he was in Sicily (after arriving at the court of Dionysius), from the accounts of Philolaus, for forty Alexandrian minas of silver; and that from this book he copied his Timæus. However, others claim that Plato received it as a gift, having secured the release of a young man, one of Philolaus's students, who had been captured by Dionysius. Demetrius, in his work about people with the same name, states that he was the first of the Pythagoreans to write a treatise on Natural Philosophy, and it starts like this:—

“But nature in the world has been composed of bodies infinite and finite, and so is the whole world and all that is in it.”

“But nature in the world consists of both infinite and finite bodies, and so does the entire world and everything within it.”

LIFE OF EUDOXUS.

I. Eudoxus was the son of Æschines, and a native of Cnidus. He was an astronomer, a geometrician, a physician,[373] and a lawgiver. In geometry he was a pupil of Archytas, and in medicine of Philistion, the Sicilian, as Callimachus relates in his Tablets; and Sotion, in his Successions, asserts that he was likewise a pupil of Plato; for that, when he was twenty-three years of age, and in very narrow circumstances, he came to Athens with Theomedon the physician, by whom he was chiefly supported, being attracted by the reputation of the Socratic school. Some say that his attachment to Theomedon was cemented by nearer ties. And when he had arrived at Piræus, he went up to the city every day, and when he had heard the Sophists lecture he returned. And having spent two months there, he returned home again; and being again aided by the contributions of his friends, he set sail for Egypt, with Chrysippus the physician, bearing letters of introduction from Agesilaus to Nectanabis, and that he recommended him to the priests.

I. Eudoxus was the son of Æschines and came from Cnidus. He was an astronomer, a mathematician, a doctor, [373] and a lawmaker. In geometry, he studied under Archytas, and in medicine, he learned from Philistion the Sicilian, as mentioned by Callimachus in his Tablets. Sotion, in his Successions, also claims that he was a student of Plato. When he was twenty-three and in difficult financial situations, he went to Athens with the physician Theomedon, who mostly supported him, drawn by the fame of the Socratic school. Some say he had a closer bond with Theomedon. Once he arrived at Piraeus, he went to the city daily, listening to the Sophists' lectures before heading back. After spending two months there, he returned home and, with support from friends, set sail for Egypt with the physician Chrysippus, carrying letters of introduction from Agesilaus to Nectanabis, recommending him to the priests.

II. And having remained there a year and four months, he shaved his eyebrows after the manner of the Egyptian priests, and composed, as it is said, the treatise called the Octaeteris. From thence he went to Cyzicus, and to the Propontis, in both of which places he lived as a Sophist; he also went to the court of Mausolus. And then, in this manner, he returned again to Athens, having a great many disciples with him, for the sake, as some say, of annoying Plato, because he had originally discarded him from his school. Some say, that when Plato gave an entertainment on one occasion, Eudoxus, as the guests were very numerous, introduced the fashion of sitting in a semicircle.

II. After staying there for a year and four months, he shaved his eyebrows like the Egyptian priests and wrote a treatise known as the Octaeteris. Then he went to Cyzicus and to the Propontis, where he lived as a Sophist; he also visited the court of Mausolus. Following that, he returned to Athens with many students, supposedly to annoy Plato, who had previously expelled him from his school. Some say that at one of Plato's gatherings, Eudoxus introduced the idea of seating guests in a semicircle, as there were so many attendees.

Nicomachus, the son of Aristotle, affirms that he used to say, that pleasure was the good.

Nicomachus, Aristotle's son, claimed that he often said pleasure was the ultimate good.

III. He was received in his own country with great honours, as the decree that was passed respecting him shows. He was also accounted very illustrious among the Greeks, having given laws to his own fellow citizens, as Hermippus tells us in the fourth book of his account of the Seven Wise Men; and having also written treatises on Astronomy and Geometry, and several other considerable works.

III. He was welcomed in his own country with great honors, as the decree about him shows. He was also regarded as very distinguished among the Greeks, having provided laws for his fellow citizens, as Hermippus mentions in the fourth book of his account of the Seven Wise Men; and he also wrote papers on Astronomy and Geometry and several other important works.

He had three daughters, Actis, Philtis, and Delphis. And Eratosthenes asserts, in his books addressed to Baton, that he also composed dialogues entitled Dialogues of Dogs; others say that these were written by some Egyptians, in their own[374] language, and that Eudoxus translated them, and published them in Greece. One of his pupils was Chrysippus, of Cnidos, son of Erineus, who learnt of him all that he knew about the Gods, and the world, and the heavenly bodies; and who learnt medicine from Philistion the Sicilian. He also left some very admirable Reminiscences.

He had three daughters, Actis, Philtis, and Delphis. Eratosthenes claims in his writings to Baton that he also created dialogues called Dialogues of Dogs; others believe these were written by some Egyptians in their own[374] language, and that Eudoxus translated and published them in Greece. One of his students was Chrysippus from Cnidos, son of Erineus, who learned everything he knew about the Gods, the world, and celestial bodies from him; he also studied medicine under Philistion the Sicilian. He also left behind some truly remarkable Reminiscences.

IV. He had a son of the name of Aristagoras, who was the teacher of Chrysippus, the son of Aëthlius; he was the author of a work on Remedies for the Eyes, as speculations on natural philosophy had come very much under his notice.

IV. He had a son named Aristagoras, who was the teacher of Chrysippus, the son of Aëthlius; he wrote a work called Remedies for the Eyes, as he had become quite interested in natural philosophy.

V. There were three people of the name of Eudoxus. The first, this man of whom we are speaking; the second, a Rhodian, who wrote histories; the third, a Siciliot, a son of Agathocles, a comic poet, who gained three victories at the Dionysia in the city, and five at the Lenæa,[119] as Apollodorus tells us in his Chronicles. We also find another, who was a physician of Cnidos, who is mentioned by this Eudoxus, in his Circuit of the World, where he says that he used to warn people to keep constantly exercising their limbs in every kind of exercise, and their senses too.

V. There were three people named Eudoxus. The first is the man we’re discussing; the second was a Rhodian who wrote histories; the third was a Sicilian, the son of Agathocles, a comic poet, who won three victories at the Dionysia in the city and five at the Lenæa,[119] as Apollodorus mentions in his Chronicles. We also find another one who was a physician from Cnidos, mentioned by this Eudoxus in his Circuit of the World, where he stated that he used to advise people to continually exercise their limbs in all kinds of activities, as well as their senses.

VI. The same author says, that the Cnidean Eudoxus flourished about the hundred and third olympiad; and that he was the inventor of the theory of crooked lines. And he died in his fifty-third year. But when he was in Egypt with Conuphis, of Heliopolis, Apis licked his garment; and so the priests said that he would be short-lived, but very illustrious, as it is reported by Phavorinus in his Commentaries. And we have written an epigram on him, that runs thus:—

VI. The same author states that the Cnidean Eudoxus thrived around the hundred and third Olympiad and that he created the theory of crooked lines. He died at the age of fifty-three. When he was in Egypt with Conuphis of Heliopolis, Apis licked his garment, which led the priests to say that he would be short-lived but quite illustrious, as reported by Phavorinus in his Commentaries. We have also written an epigram about him that goes:—

’Tis said, that while at Memphis wise Eudoxus
Learnt his own fate from th’ holy fair-horned bull;
He said indeed no word, bulls do not speak
Nor had kind nature e’er calf Apis gifted
With an articulately speaking mouth.
But standing on one side he lick’d his cloak,
Showing by this most plainly—in brief time
You shall put off your life. So death came soon,
When he had just seen three and fifty times
The Pleiads rise to warn the mariners.

And instead of Eudoxus, they used to call him Endoxus,[120] on account of the brilliancy of his reputation. And since we have gone through the illustrious Pythagoreans, we must now speak of the Promiscuous philosophers, as they call them. And we will first of all speak of Heraclitus.

And instead of Eudoxus, they used to call him Endoxus,[120]because of his outstanding reputation. Now that we’ve covered the famous Pythagoreans, we should talk about the so-called Promiscuous philosophers. First, we'll discuss Heraclitus.


BOOK IX.

LIFE OF HERACLITUS.

I. Heraclitus was the son of Blyson, or, as some say, of Heracion, and a citizen of Ephesus. He flourished about the sixty-ninth olympiad.

I. Heraclitus was the son of Blyson, or, as some say, of Heracion, and a citizen of Ephesus. He thrived around the sixty-ninth Olympiad.

II. He was above all men of a lofty and arrogant spirit, as is plain from his writings, in which he says, “Abundant learning does not form the mind; for if it did, it would have instructed Hesiod, and Pythagoras, and likewise Xenophanes, and Hecatæus. For the only piece of real wisdom is to know that idea, which by itself will govern everything on every occasion.” He used to say, too, that Homer deserved to be expelled from the games and beaten, and Archilochus likewise. He used also to say, “It is more necessary to extinguish insolence, than to put out a fire.” Another of his sayings was, “The people ought to fight for the law, as for their city.” He also attacks the Ephesians for having banished his companion Hermodorus, when he says, “The Ephesians deserve to have all their youth put to death, and all those who are younger still banished from their city, inasmuch as they have banished Hermodorus, the best man among them, saying, ‘Let no one of us be pre-eminently good; and if there be any such person, let him go to another city and another people.’”

II. He was, above all, a man of a high and arrogant spirit, as is clear from his writings, in which he says, “Just having a lot of knowledge doesn’t make you wise; if it did, it would have taught Hesiod, Pythagoras, and also Xenophanes and Hecatæus. The only true wisdom is to understand that idea, which will control everything in every situation.” He also claimed that Homer should be kicked out of the games and beaten, and the same goes for Archilochus. He used to say, “It’s more important to put an end to arrogance than to extinguish a fire.” Another saying of his was, “People should defend the law as they would their city.” He also criticized the Ephesians for banishing his friend Hermodorus, saying, “The Ephesians deserve to have all their young people executed and those even younger banished from their city, since they have exiled Hermodorus, the best among them, saying, ‘Let none of us stand out as better; and if there is someone like that, let him go to another city and another people.’”

And when he was requested to make laws for them, he refused, because the city was already immersed in a thoroughly bad constitution. And having retired to the temple of Diana with his children, he began to play at dice; and when all the Ephesians flocked round him, he said, “You wretches, what are you wondering at? is it not better to do this, than to meddle with public affairs in your company?”

And when they asked him to create laws for them, he refused because the city was already caught up in a completely flawed system. So, he took his kids to the temple of Diana and started playing dice; and when all the Ephesians gathered around him, he said, “You fools, what are you so surprised about? Isn't it better to do this than to get involved in public matters with you?”

III. And at last, becoming a complete misanthrope, he used to live, spending his time in walking about the mountains; feeding on grasses and plants, and in consequence of these[377] habits, he was attacked by the dropsy, and so then he returned to the city, and asked the physicians, in a riddle, whether they were able to produce a drought after wet weather. And as they did not understand him, he shut himself up in a stable for oxen, and covered himself with cow-dung, hoping to cause the wet to evaporate from him, by the warmth that this produced. And as he did himself no good in this way, he died, having lived seventy years; and we have written an epigram upon him which runs thus:—

III. Eventually, he became a total misanthrope and spent his time wandering the mountains, living off grasses and plants. Because of this lifestyle, he developed dropsy, so he returned to the city and posed a riddle to the doctors, asking if they could create a drought after a rainy season. Since they didn’t understand him, he locked himself in a stable with cows and covered himself in cow dung, thinking the heat would help him dry out. Not finding any relief this way, he died at the age of seventy. We wrote an epigram about him that goes like this:—

I’ve often wondered much at Heraclitus,
That he should chose to live so miserably,
And die by such a miserable fate.
For fell disease did master all his body,
With water quenching all the light of his eyes,
And bringing darkness o’er his mind and body.

But Hermippus states, that what he asked the physicians was this, whether any one could draw off the water by depressing his intestines? and when they answered that they could not, he placed himself in the sun, and ordered his servants to plaster him over with cow-dung; and being stretched out in that way, on the second day he died, and was buried in the market-place. But Neanthes, of Cyzicus says, that as he could not tear off the cow-dung, he remained there, and on account of the alteration in his appearance, he was not discovered, and so was devoured by the dogs.

But Hermippus says that he asked the doctors if anyone could relieve the water buildup by pressing on his intestines. When they told him they couldn’t, he sat in the sun and instructed his servants to cover him in cow dung. Lying like that, he died on the second day and was buried in the marketplace. However, Neanthes of Cyzicus claims that since he couldn’t remove the cow dung, he stayed there, and because of the changes in his appearance, he went unnoticed and was eaten by dogs.

IV. And he was a wonderful person, from his boyhood, since, while he was young, he used to say that he knew nothing but when he had grown up, he then used to affirm that he knew everything. And he was no one’s pupil, but he used to say, that he himself had investigated every thing, and had learned everything of himself. But Sotion relates, that some people affirmed that he had been a pupil of Xenophanes. And that Ariston, stated in his account of Heraclitus, that he was cured of the dropsy, and died of some other disease. And Hippobotus gives the same account.

IV. He was an amazing person from a young age, because while he was a kid, he would say that he didn't know anything. But as he grew up, he claimed he knew everything. He wasn't anyone's student; instead, he insisted that he had explored everything and learned it all on his own. However, Sotion reports that some people said he had been a student of Xenophanes. Ariston mentioned in his account of Heraclitus that he was cured of dropsy and then died of a different illness. Hippobotus shares the same story.

V. There is a book of his extant, which is about nature generally, and it is divided into three discourses; one on the Universe; one on Politics; and one on Theology. And he deposited this book in the temple of Diana, as some authors report, having written it intentionally in an obscure style, in order that only those who were able men might comprehend[378] it, and that it might not be exposed to ridicule at the hands of the common people. Timon attacks this man also, saying:—

V. There is a book of his that still exists, which is about nature in general, and it's divided into three sections: one on the Universe, one on Politics, and one on Theology. He placed this book in the temple of Diana, according to some authors, having written it in a deliberately obscure style so that only qualified individuals could understand it, and to prevent it from being ridiculed by the general public. Timon criticizes this man too, saying:—

Among them came that cuckoo Heraclitus
The enigmatical obscure reviler
Of all the common people.

Theophrastus asserts, that it was out of melancholy that he left some of his works half finished, and wrote several, in completely different styles; and Antisthenes, in his Successions, adduces as a proof of his lofty spirit, the fact, that he yielded to his brother the title and privileges of royalty.[121] And his book had so high a reputation, that a sect arose in consequence of it, who were called after his own name, Heracliteans.

Theophrastus claims that he left some of his works unfinished due to his melancholy and wrote several in completely different styles. Antisthenes, in his Successions, points to the fact that he gave up the title and privileges of royalty to his brother as a proof of his noble spirit.[121] His book gained such a high reputation that a group emerged from it, named after him, the Heracliteans.

VI. The following may be set down in a general manner as his main principles: that everything is created from fire, and is dissolved into fire; that everything happens according to destiny, and that all existing things are harmonized, and made to agree together by opposite tendencies; and that all things are full of souls and dæmones. He also discussed all the passions which exist in the world, and used also to contend that the sun was of that precise magnitude of which he appears to be. One of his sayings too was, that no one, by whatever road he might travel, could ever possibly find out the boundaries of the soul, so deeply hidden are the principles which regulate it. He used also to call opinion the sacred disease; and to say that eye-sight was often deceived. Sometimes, in his writings, he expresses himself with great brilliancy and clearness; so that even the most stupid man may easily understand him, and receive an elevation of soul from him. And his conciseness, and the dignity of his style, are incomparable.

VI. The following can be generally summarized as his main principles: everything is created from fire and is eventually returned to fire; everything happens according to fate, and all things in existence are balanced and made to work together through opposing forces; and all things are filled with souls and spirits. He also explored all the emotions that exist in the world and argued that the sun is exactly the size it appears to be. One of his statements was that no matter which path someone takes, they can never truly uncover the limits of the soul, as the principles that govern it are deeply hidden. He often referred to opinion as the sacred disease and mentioned that sight can be misleading. At times, in his writings, he expresses ideas with great brilliance and clarity, allowing even the most ignorant person to understand him and gain a sense of upliftment. His conciseness and the dignity of his style are unmatched.

In particulars, his doctrines are of this kind. That fire is an element, and that it is by the changes of fire that all things exist; being engendered sometimes by rarity, some times by density. But he explains nothing clearly. He also says, that everything is produced by contrariety, and that everything flows on like a river; that the universe is finite,[379] and that there is one world, and that that is produced from fire, and that the whole world is in its turn again consumed by fire at certain periods, and that all this happens according to fate. That of the contraries, that which leads to production is called war and contest, and that which leads to the conflagration is called harmony and peace; that change is the road leading upward, and the road leading downward; and that the whole world exists according to it.

Specifically, his ideas are like this: fire is an element, and it's through the changes in fire that everything comes into existence, created sometimes by being spread out and sometimes by being compacted. But he doesn't explain anything clearly. He also says that everything comes from opposites and that everything flows like a river; that the universe is finite,[379] and that there is only one world, which is created from fire, and that the whole world is eventually consumed by fire at certain times, all happening according to fate. Of the opposites, the force that leads to creation is called war and conflict, while the force that leads to destruction is called harmony and peace; that change is the path that goes upward and the path that goes downward, and that the entire world exists according to this.

For that fire, when densified becomes liquid, and becoming concrete, becomes also water; again, that the water when concrete is turned to earth, and that this is the road down; again, that the earth itself becomes fused, from which water is produced, and from that everything else is produced; and then he refers almost everything to the evaporation which takes place from the sea; and this is the road which leads upwards. Also, that there are evaporations, both from earth and sea, some of which are bright and clear, and some are dark; and that the fire is increased by the dark ones, and the moisture by the others. But what the space which surrounds us is, he does not explain. He states, however, that there are vessels in it, turned with their hollow part towards us; in which all the bright evaporations are collected, and form flames, which are the stars; and that the brightest of these flames, and the hottest, is the light of the sun; for that all the other stars are farther off from the earth; and that on this account, they give less light and warmth; and that the moon is nearer the earth, but does not move through a pure space; the sun, on the other hand, is situated in a transparent space, and one free from all admixture, preserving a well proportioned distance from us, on which account it gives us more light and more heat. And that the sun and moon are eclipsed, when the before-mentioned vessels are turned upwards. And that the different phases of the moon take place every month, as its vessel keeps gradually turning round. Moreover, that day and night, and months and years, and rains and winds, and things of that kind, all exist according to, and are caused by, the different evaporations.

For that fire, when compressed, becomes liquid, and when it solidifies, it also turns into water; again, that water, when it solidifies, turns to earth, which is the path downward; again, that the earth itself gets fused, producing water, and from that, everything else is created; and then he links almost everything to the evaporation that happens from the sea; and this is the path that leads upward. Also, he notes that there are evaporations from both earth and sea, some of which are clear and bright, and some are dark; and that fire is fueled by the dark ones, while the others add moisture. But he doesn’t explain what the space around us is. However, he mentions that there are containers in it, facing us with their hollow sides; in these, all the bright evaporations pool and form flames, which are the stars; and that the brightest and hottest of these flames is the sun's light; because all the other stars are farther from the earth; for that reason, they provide less light and warmth; and that the moon is closer to the earth, but it doesn't move through a pure space; the sun, on the other hand, is in a clear space, free from any mixture, keeping a well-balanced distance from us, which is why it provides us with more light and heat. And that the sun and moon get eclipsed when those mentioned vessels are turned upward. And that the different phases of the moon occur every month, as its container slowly turns around. Moreover, that day and night, as well as months and years, and rain and wind, and similar phenomena, all exist because of the different evaporations.

For that the bright evaporation catching fire in the circle of the sun causes day, and the predominance of the opposite one causes night; and again, from the bright one the heat is increased so as to produce summer, and from the dark one[380] the cold gains strength and produces winter; and he also explains the causes of the other phenomena in a corresponding manner.

For that, the bright vapor igniting in the sunlight creates day, and the dominance of the opposite causes night; and again, from the bright one, the heat increases to create summer, while from the dark one[380] the cold strengthens and produces winter; and he also explains the causes of other phenomena in a similar way.

But with respect to the earth, he does not explain at all of what character it is, nor does he do so in the case of the vessels; and these were his main doctrines.

But regarding the earth, he doesn't explain at all what its nature is, nor does he do so in the case of the vessels; and these were his main beliefs.

VII. Now, what his opinion about Socrates was, and what expressions he used when he met with a treatise of his which Euripides brought him, according to the story told by Ariston, we have detailed in our account of Socrates. Seleucus, the grammarian, however, says that a man of the name of Croton, in his Diver, relates that it was a person of the name of Crates who first brought this book into Greece; and that he said that he wanted some Delian diver who would not be drowned in it. And the book is described under several titles; some calling it the Muses, some a treatise on Nature; but Diodotus calls it—

VII. So, what he thought about Socrates and what he said when he came across a work of his that Euripides brought to him, according to a story told by Ariston, is detailed in our account of Socrates. However, Seleucus the grammarian claims that a man named Croton, in his Diver, states that it was a person named Crates who first brought this book to Greece; and he mentioned that he was looking for a Delian diver who wouldn't drown in it. The book is referred to by several titles; some call it the Muses, while others refer to it as a treatise on Nature; but Diodotus calls it—

A well compacted helm to lead a man
Straight through the path of life.

Some call it a science of morals, the arrangement of the changes[122] of unity and of everything.

Some refer to it as a moral science, the organization of the changes[122] of unity and everything.

VIII. They say that when he was asked why he preserved silence, he said, “That you may talk.”

VIII. They say that when he was asked why he kept quiet, he said, “So that you can speak.”

IX. Darius was very desirous to enjoy his conversation; and wrote thus to him:—

IX. Darius really wanted to have a conversation with him, so he wrote to him:—

KING DARIUS, THE SON OF HYSTASPES, ADDRESSES HERACLITUS OF EPHESUS, THE WISE MAN, GREETING HIM.

KING DARIUS, THE SON OF HYSTASPES, ADDRESSES HERACLITUS OF EPHESUS, THE WISE MAN, GREETING HIM.

“You have written a book on Natural Philosophy, difficult to understand and difficult to explain. Accordingly, if in some parts it is explained literally, it seems to disclose a very important theory concerning the universal world, and all that is contained in it, as they are placed in a state of most divine motion. But commonly, the mind is kept in suspense, so that those who have studied your work the most, are not able precisely to disentangle the exact meaning of your expressions. Therefore, king Darius, the son of Hystaspes wishes to enjoy the benefit of hearing you discourse, and of receiving some[381] Grecian instruction. Come, therefore, quickly to my sight, and to my royal palace; for the Greeks, in general, do not accord to wise men the distinction which they deserve, and disregard the admirable expositions delivered by them, which are, however, worthy of being seriously listened to and studied; but with me you shall have every kind of distinction and honour, and you shall enjoy every day honourable and worthy conversation, and your pupils’ life shall become virtuous, in accordance with your precepts.”

“You've written a book on Natural Philosophy that's hard to understand and explain. Because of this, when some parts are taken literally, they seem to reveal a significant theory about the universe and everything in it, all in a state of divine motion. However, most of the time, the reader is left uncertain, so those who study your work closely often can't precisely grasp what you mean. Therefore, King Darius, the son of Hystaspes, wants to benefit from hearing you speak and receiving some[381] Greek instruction. So, please come quickly to my presence and my royal palace; the Greeks, in general, don't give wise men the recognition they deserve and overlook the valuable insights they offer, which are truly worth listening to and studying. But with me, you'll receive all kinds of distinction and honor, and you'll enjoy meaningful conversations every day, helping your students live a virtuous life according to your teachings.”

HERACLITUS, OF EPHESUS, TO KING DARIUS, THE SON OF HYSTASPES, GREETING.

“All the men that exist in the world, are far removed from truth and just dealings; but they are full of evil foolishness, which leads them to insatiable covetousness and vain-glorious ambition. I, however, forgetting all their worthlessness, and shunning satiety, and who wish to avoid all envy on the part of my countrymen, and all appearance of arrogance, will never come to Persia, since I am quite contented with a little, and live as best suits my own inclination.”

“All the men in the world are far from truth and fairness; instead, they are filled with wicked foolishness, which drives them to endless greed and empty ambition. However, I, putting aside their worthlessness and avoiding excess, and wanting to steer clear of envy from my fellow countrymen and any hint of arrogance, will never go to Persia, as I am perfectly happy with a little and live in a way that suits my own preferences.”

X. This was the way in which the man behaved even to the king. And Demetrius, in his treatise on People of the same Name, says that he also despised the Athenians, among whom he had a very high reputation. And that though he was himself despised by the Ephesians, he nevertheless preferred his own home. Demetrius Phalereus also mentions him in his Defence of Socrates.

X. This was how the man acted even towards the king. And Demetrius, in his writing on People of the same Name, states that he also looked down on the Athenians, among whom he had a great reputation. Despite being looked down upon by the Ephesians, he still favored his own home. Demetrius Phalereus also mentions him in his Defence of Socrates.

XI. There were many people who undertook to interpret his book. For Antisthenes and Heraclides, Ponticus, and Cleanthes, and Sphærus the Stoic; and besides them Pausanias, who was surnamed Heraclitistes, and Nicomedes, and Dionysius, all did so. And of the grammarians, Diodotus undertook the same task; and he says that the subject of the book is not natural philosophy, but politics; and that all that is said in it about natural philosophy, is only by way of illustration. And Hieronymus tells us, that a man of the name of Scythinus, an iambic poet, attempted to render the book into verse.

XI. Many people tried to interpret his book. Antisthenes, Heraclides, Ponticus, Cleanthes, and Sphærus the Stoic were among them, as well as Pausanias, known as Heraclitistes, Nicomedes, and Dionysius. Diodotus, one of the grammarians, also took on this task; he claims that the book's main focus is politics, not natural philosophy, and that everything mentioned about natural philosophy serves just as examples. Hieronymus mentions that a man named Scythinus, an iambic poet, tried to turn the book into verse.

XII. There are many epigrams extant which were written upon him, and this is one of them:—

XII. There are many epigrams still around that were written about him, and this is one of them:—

I who lie here am Heraclitus, spare me
Ye rude unlettered men: ’Twas not for you
That I did labour, but for wiser people.
One man may be to me a countless host,
And an unnumbered multitude be no one;
And this I still say in the shades below.

And there is another expressed thus:—

And there is another expressed like this:—

Be not too hasty, skimming o’er the book
Of Heraclitus; ’tis a difficult road,
For mist is there, and darkness hard to pierce.
But if you have a guide who knows his system,
Then everything is clearer than the sun.

XIII. There were five people of the name of Heraclitus. The first was this philosopher of ours. The second a lyric poet, who wrote a panegyrical hymn on the Twelve Gods. The third was an Elegiac poet, of Halicarnassus; on whom Callimachus wrote the following epigram:—

XIII. There were five people named Heraclitus. The first was our philosopher. The second was a lyric poet who wrote a praise hymn about the Twelve Gods. The third was an Elegiac poet from Halicarnassus; about whom Callimachus wrote this epigram:—

I heard, O Heraclitus, of your death,
And the news filled my eyes with mournful tears,
When I remembered all the happy hours
When we with talk beguiled the setting sun.
You now are dust; but still the honeyed voice
Of your sweet converse doth and will survive;
Nor can fell death, which all things else destroys,
Lay upon that his ruthless conquering grasp.

The fourth was a Lesbian, who wrote a history of Macedonia. The fifth was a man who blended jest with earnest; and who, having been a harp-player, abandoned that profession for a serio-comic style of writing.

The fourth was a woman who wrote a history of Macedonia. The fifth was a man who mixed humor with seriousness and, after being a harp player, left that career to pursue a serio-comic style of writing.

LIFE OF XENOPHANES.

I. Xenophanes was the son of Dexius, or, as Apollodorus says, of Orthomenes. He was a citizen of Colophon; and is praised by Timon. Accordingly, he says:—

I. Xenophanes was the son of Dexius, or, as Apollodorus says, of Orthomenes. He was a citizen of Colophon and is praised by Timon. Accordingly, he says:—

Xenophanes, not much a slave to vanity,
The wise reprover of the tricks of Homer.

He, having been banished from his own country, lived at Zancle, in Sicily, and at Catana.

He was exiled from his own country and lived in Zancle, Sicily, and Catana.

II. And, according to the statements made by some people, he was a pupil of no one; but, as others say, he was a pupil of Boton the Athenian; or, as another account again affirms, of Archelaus. He was, if we may believe Sotion, a contemporary of Anaximander.

II. According to what some people say, he didn’t have any teacher; but others claim he was a student of Boton from Athens; or as another account suggests, he studied under Archelaus. If we can trust Sotion, he was a contemporary of Anaximander.

III. He wrote poems in hexameter and in elegiac verse; and also he wrote iambics against Hesiod and Homer, attacking the things said in their poems about the Gods. He also used to recite his own poems. It is said likewise, that he argued against the opinions of Thales and Pythagoras, and that he also attacked Epimenides. He lived to an extreme old age; as he says somewhere himself:—

III. He wrote poems in hexameter and in elegiac verse; and he also wrote iambics criticizing Hesiod and Homer for their descriptions of the Gods. He would also recite his own poems. It's said that he disputed the views of Thales and Pythagoras, and that he also challenged Epimenides. He lived to a very old age; as he mentions somewhere himself:—

Threescore and seven long years are fully passed,
Since first my doctrines spread abroad through Greece:
And ’twixt that time and my first view of light
Six lustres more must added be to them:
If I am right at all about my age,
Lacking but eight years of a century.

His doctrine was, that there were four elements of existing things; and an infinite number of worlds, which were all unchangeable. He thought that the clouds were produced by the vapour which was borne upwards from the sun, and which lifted them up into the circumambient space. That the essence of God was of a spherical form, in no respect resembling man; that the universe could see, and that the universe could hear, but could not breathe; and that it was in all its parts intellect, and wisdom, and eternity. He was the first person who asserted that everything which is produced is perishable, and that the soul is a spirit. He used also to say that the many was inferior to unity. Also, that we ought to associate with tyrants either as little as possible, or else as pleasantly as possible.

His belief was that there are four elements that make up everything, and an infinite number of worlds that are all unchangeable. He thought that clouds are formed from the vapor that rises from the sun and lifts them into the surrounding space. He believed that the essence of God has a spherical shape and doesn’t resemble a human at all; that the universe can see and hear but cannot breathe; and that in all its parts, it embodies intellect, wisdom, and eternity. He was the first to claim that everything that exists is perishable and that the soul is a spirit. He also used to say that the many is less important than the one. Additionally, he believed that we should associate with tyrants as little as possible, or at least in the most pleasant way possible.

When Empedocles said to him that the wise man was undiscoverable, he replied, “Very likely; for it takes a wise man to discover a wise man.” And Sotion says, that he was the first person who asserted that everything is incomprehensible. But he is mistaken in this.

When Empedocles told him that the wise man is impossible to find, he answered, “That’s probably true; it takes a wise person to recognize another wise person.” And Sotion claims that he was the first to say that everything is beyond understanding. But he is wrong about that.

Xenophanes wrote a poem on the Founding of Colophon; and also, on the Colonisation of Elea, in Italy, consisting of two thousand verses. And he flourished about the sixtieth olympiad.

Xenophanes wrote a poem about the founding of Colophon and another one about the colonization of Elea in Italy, which contains two thousand verses. He was active around the sixtieth Olympiad.

IV. Demetrius Phalereus, in his treatise on Old Age, and Phenætius the Stoic, in his essay on Cheerfulness, relate that he buried his sons with his own hands, as Anaxagoras had also done. And he seems to have been detested[123] by the Pythagoreans, Parmeniscus, and Orestades, as Phavorinus relates in the first book of his Commentaries.

IV. Demetrius Phalereus, in his writing on Old Age, and Phenætius the Stoic, in his essay on Happiness, mention that he buried his sons with his own hands, just like Anaxagoras did. He appears to have been disliked[123] by the Pythagoreans, Parmeniscus, and Orestades, as Phavorinus notes in the first book of his Commentaries.

V. There was also another Xenophanes, a native of Lesbos, and an iambic poet.

V. There was also another Xenophanes, who was from Lesbos and was an iambic poet.

These are the Promiscuous or unattached philosophers.

These are the casual or unattached philosophers.

LIFE OF PARMENIDES.

I. Parmenides, the son of Pyres, and a citizen of Velia, was a pupil of Xenophanes. And Theophrastus, in his Abridgment, says that he was also a pupil of Anaximander. However, though he was a pupil of Xenophanes, he was not afterwards a follower of his; but he attached himself to Aminias, and Diochaetes the Pythagorean, as Sotion relates, which last was a poor but honourable and virtuous man. And he it was whose follower he became, and after he was dead he erected a shrine, or ἡρῷον, in his honour. And so Parmenides, who was of a noble family and possessed of considerable wealth, was induced, not by Xenophanes but by Aminias, to embrace the tranquil life of a philosopher.

I. Parmenides, the son of Pyres and a resident of Velia, was a student of Xenophanes. Theophrastus, in his Abridgment, mentions that he was also a student of Anaximander. However, even though he studied under Xenophanes, he didn’t follow his teachings later; instead, he allied himself with Aminias and Diochaetes the Pythagorean, as Sotion notes. Diochaetes was a poor but honorable and virtuous man. Parmenides became his follower, and after his death, he built a shrine, or ἡρῷον, in his honor. Thus, although Parmenides came from a noble family and had significant wealth, it was Aminias, not Xenophanes, who inspired him to pursue the peaceful life of a philosopher.

II. He was the first person who asserted that the earth was of a spherical form; and that it was situated in the centre of the universe. He also taught that there were two elements, fire and earth; and that one of them occupies the place of the maker, the other that of the matter. He also used to teach that man was originally made out of clay; and that they were composed of two parts, the hot and the cold; of which, in fact, everything consists. Another of his doctrines was, that the mind and the soul were the same thing, as we are informed[385] by Theophrastus, in his Natural Philosophy, when he enumerates the theories of nearly all the different philosophers.

II. He was the first person to claim that the earth is round and that it’s located at the center of the universe. He also taught that there are two elements, fire and earth, with one serving as the creator and the other as the material. He often taught that humans were originally made from clay and that they consist of two parts, hot and cold, which is, in fact, what everything is made of. Another belief of his was that the mind and the soul are the same, as we learn from Theophrastus in his Natural Philosophy, where he lists the theories of almost all the different philosophers.

He also used to say that philosophy was of a twofold character; one kind resting on certain truth, the other on opinion. On which account he says some where:

He also used to say that philosophy has two aspects; one based on certain truths, and the other on opinions. For this reason, he says somewhere:

And ’twill be needful for you well to know,
The fearless heart of all-convincing truth:
Also the opinions, though less sure, of men,
Which rest upon no certain evidence.

III. Parmenides too philosophizes in his poems; as Hesiod and Xenophanes, and Empedocles used to. And he used to say that argument was the test of truth; and that the sensations were not trustworthy witnesses. Accordingly, he says:—

III. Parmenides also shares his thoughts in his poems, similar to Hesiod, Xenophanes, and Empedocles. He believed that reasoning was the true measure of truth and that our senses aren't reliable sources. Therefore, he states:—

Let not the common usages of men
Persuade your better taught experience,
To trust to men’s unsafe deceitful sight,
Or treacherous ears, or random speaking tongue:
Reason alone will prove the truth of facts.

On which account Timon says of him:—

On that note, Timon says about him:—

The vigorous mind of wise Parmenides,
Who classes all the errors of the thoughts
Under vain phantasies.

Plato inscribed one of his dialogues with his name—Parmenides, or an essay on Ideas. He flourished about the sixty-ninth Olympiad. He appears to have been the first person who discovered that Hesperus and Lucifer were the same star, as Phavorinus records, in the fifth book of his Commentaries. Some, however, attribute this discovery to Pythagoras. And Callimachus asserts that the poem in which this doctrine is promulgated is not his work.

Plato titled one of his dialogues after himself—Parmenides, or an essay on Ideas. He was active around the sixty-ninth Olympiad. He seems to be the first person to realize that Hesperus and Lucifer are the same star, as noted by Phavorinus in the fifth book of his Commentaries. However, some people credit this discovery to Pythagoras. Additionally, Callimachus claims that the poem in which this idea is presented is not attributed to him.

IV. He is said also to have given laws to his fellow-citizens, as Speusippus records, in his account of the Philosophers. He was also the first employer of the question called the Achilles,[124] as Phavorinus assures us in his Universal History.

IV. He is also said to have created laws for his fellow citizens, as Speusippus notes in his account of the Philosophers. He was the first to use the question known as the Achilles,[124] as Phavorinus confirms in his Universal History.

V. There was also another Parmenides, an orator, who wrote a treatise on the art of Oratory.

V. There was also another Parmenides, a speaker, who wrote an essay on the art of public speaking.

LIFE OF MELISSUS.

I. Melissus was a Samian, and the son of Ithagenes. He was a pupil of Parmenides; but he also had conversed with Heraclitus, when he recommended him to the Ephesians, who were unacquainted with him, as Hippocrates recommended Democritus to the people of Abdera.

I. Melissus was from Samos and the son of Ithagenes. He studied under Parmenides, but he also spoke with Heraclitus, who suggested him to the Ephesians, who didn't know him, just like Hippocrates recommended Democritus to the people of Abdera.

II. He was a man greatly occupied in political affairs, and held in great esteem among his fellow citizens; on which account he was elected admiral. And he was admired still more on account of his private virtues.

II. He was a man heavily involved in political matters and highly regarded by his fellow citizens; for this reason, he was elected admiral. He was even more admired for his personal qualities.

III. His doctrine was, that the Universe was infinite, unsusceptible of change, immoveable, and one, being always like to itself, and complete; and that there was no such thing as real motion, but that there only appeared to be such. As respecting the Gods, too, he denied that there was any occasion to give a definition of them, for that there was no certain knowledge of them.

III. His belief was that the Universe is infinite, unchanging, unmovable, and singular, always consistent with itself and whole; and that real motion doesn't actually exist, but only seems to. Regarding the Gods, he also claimed that there was no need to define them, as there is no certain knowledge about them.

IV. Apollodorus states that he flourished about the eighty-fourth olympiad.

IV. Apollodorus says that he was active around the eighty-fourth Olympiad.

LIFE OF ZENO, THE ELEATIC.

I. Zeno was a native of Velia. Apollodorus, in his Chronicles, says that he was by nature the son of Teleutagoras, but by adoption the son of Parmenides.

I. Zeno was from Velia. Apollodorus, in his Chronicles, states that he was naturally the son of Teleutagoras, but by adoption, he was the son of Parmenides.

II. Timon speaks thus of him and Melissus:—

II. Timon speaks about him and Melissus like this:—

Great is the strength, invincible the might
Of Zeno, skilled to argue on both sides
Of any question, th’ universal critic;
And of Melissus too. They rose superior
To prejudice in general; only yielding
To very few.

And Zeno had been a pupil of Parmenides, and had been on other accounts greatly attached to him.

And Zeno had been a student of Parmenides, and for other reasons, he had been very close to him.

III. He was a tall man, as Plato tells us in his Parmenides,[387] and the same writer, in his Phædrus, calls him also the Eleatic Palamedes.

III. He was a tall guy, as Plato mentions in his Parmenides,[387] and the same author, in his Phaedrus, refers to him as the Eleatic Palamedes.

IV. Aristotle, in his Sophist, says that he was the inventor of dialectics, as Empedocles was of rhetoric. And he was a man of the greatest nobleness of spirit, both in philosophy and in politics. There are also many books extant, which are attributed to him, full of great learning and wisdom.

IV. Aristotle, in his Sophist, says that he was the inventor of dialectics, just like Empedocles was of rhetoric. He was a man of great nobility of spirit, both in philosophy and in politics. There are also many existing books attributed to him that are full of profound knowledge and wisdom.

V. He, wishing to put an end to the power of Nearches, the tyrant (some, however, call the tyrant Diomedon), was arrested, as we are informed by Heraclides, in his abridgment of Satyrus. And when he was examined, as to his accomplices, and as to the arms which he was taking to Lipara, he named all the friends of the tyrant as his accomplices, wishing to make him feel himself alone. And then, after he had mentioned some names, he said that he wished to whisper something privately to the tyrant; and when he came near him he bit him, and would not leave his hold till he was stabbed. And the same thing happened to Aristogiton, the tyrant slayer. But Demetrius, in his treatise on People of the same Name, says that it was his nose that he bit off.

V. He, wanting to end the control of Nearches, the tyrant (though some refer to the tyrant as Diomedon), was arrested, as noted by Heraclides in his summary of Satyrus. When he was questioned about his accomplices and the weapons he was taking to Lipara, he named all the tyrant's associates as his partners in crime, hoping to make the tyrant feel isolated. After mentioning a few names, he stated that he wanted to whisper something privately to the tyrant; when he got close, he bit him and wouldn’t let go until he was stabbed. The same thing happened to Aristogiton, the slayer of the tyrant. However, Demetrius, in his work on People with the Same Name, claims that it was his nose that he bit off.

Moreover, Antisthenes, in his Successions, says that after he had given him information against his friends, he was asked by the tyrant if there was any one else. And he replied, “Yes, you, the destruction of the city.” And that he also said to the bystanders, “I marvel at your cowardice, if you submit to be slaves to the tyrant out of fear of such pains as I am now enduring.” And at last he bit off his tongue and spit it at him; and the citizens immediately rushed forward, and slew the tyrant with stones. And this is the account that is given by almost every one.

Moreover, Antisthenes, in his Successions, says that after he had informed the tyrant about his friends, the tyrant asked if there was anyone else. He replied, “Yes, you, the downfall of the city.” He also told the bystanders, “I’m amazed at your cowardice if you allow yourselves to be slaves to the tyrant out of fear of the suffering I’m currently experiencing.” Ultimately, he bit off his tongue and spit it at him; and the citizens immediately charged forward and killed the tyrant with stones. This is the account that is given by almost everyone.

But Hermippus says, that he was put into a mortar, and pounded to death. And we ourselves have written the following epigram on him:—

But Hermippus says that he was put in a mortar and pounded to death. And we have written the following epigram about him:—

Your noble wish, O Zeno, was to slay
A cruel tyrant, freeing Elea
From the harsh bonds of shameful slavery,
But you were disappointed; for the tyrant
Pounded you in a mortar. I say wrong,
He only crushed your body, and not you.

VI. And Zeno was an excellent man in other respects, and he was also a despiser of great men in an equal degree[388] with Heraclitus; for he, too, preferred the town which was formerly called Hyele, and afterwards Elea, being a colony of the Phocæans, and his own native place, a poor city possessed of no other importance than the knowledge of how to raise virtuous citizens, to the pride of the Athenians; so that he did not often visit them, but spent his life at home.

VI. Zeno was a remarkable man in many ways, and he shared Heraclitus's disdain for prominent figures. He preferred the town once known as Hyele and later as Elea, a colony founded by the Phocaeans and his hometown. It was a modest city with no significance other than its ability to cultivate virtuous citizens, unlike the prideful Athenians. Because of this, he rarely visited them and chose to live his life at home.

VII. He, too, was the first man who asked the question called Achilles,[125] though Phavorinus attributes its first use to Parmenides, and several others.

VII. He was also the first person to ask the question known as Achilles,[125] although Phavorinus credits its initial use to Parmenides, along with several others.

VIII. His chief doctrines were, that there were several worlds, and that there was no vacuum; that the nature of all things consisted of hot and cold, and dry and moist, these elements interchanging their substances with one another; that man was made out of the earth, and that his soul was a mixture of the before-named elements in such a way that no one of them predominated.

VIII. His main beliefs were that there are multiple worlds and that nothing can be empty space; that everything is made up of hot and cold, and dry and moist, with these elements constantly changing into one another; that humans are created from the earth, and that their soul is a blend of these elements in a way that none of them is more dominant than the others.

IX. They say that when he was reproached, he was indignant; and that when some one blamed him, he replied, “If when I am reproached, I am not angered, then I shall not be pleased when I am praised.”

IX. They say that when he was criticized, he was upset; and when someone blamed him, he replied, “If I’m not angry when I’m criticized, then I won’t feel happy when I’m praised.”

X. We have already said in our account of the Cittiæan, that there were eight Zenos; but this one flourished about the seventy-ninth olympiad.

X. We have already mentioned in our account of the Cittiæan that there were eight Zenos, but this one was active around the seventy-ninth Olympiad.

LIFE OF LEUCIPPUS.

I. Leucippus was a native of Velia, but, as some say, of Abdera; and, as others report, of Melos.

I. Leucippus was originally from Velia, but some say he was from Abdera, while others claim he was from Melos.

II. He was a pupil of Zeno. And his principal doctrines were, that all things were infinite, and were interchanged with one another; and that the universe was a vacuum, and full of bodies; also that the worlds were produced by bodies falling into the vacuum, and becoming entangled with one another; and that the nature of the stars originated in motion, according to their increase; also, that the sun is borne round in a[389] greater circle around the moon; that the earth is carried on revolving round the centre; and that its figure resembles a drum; he was the first philosopher who spoke of atoms as principles.

II. He was a student of Zeno. His main ideas were that everything is infinite and that all things are interconnected; that the universe is a vacuum filled with bodies; that worlds are created when bodies fall into the vacuum and get tangled with each other; that the nature of the stars comes from their motion as they grow; and that the sun moves in a[389] larger circle around the moon. He also said that the earth revolves around its center and has a shape like a drum. He was the first philosopher to talk about atoms as fundamental principles.

III. These are his doctrines in general; in particular detail, they are as follow: he says that the universe is infinite, as I have already mentioned; that of it, one part is a plenum, and the other a vacuum. He also says that the elements, and the worlds which are derived from them, are infinite, and are dissolved again into them; and that the worlds are produced in this manner: That many bodies, of various kinds and shapes, are borne by amputation from the infinite, into a vast vacuum; and then, they being collected together, produce one vortex; according to which they, dashing against one another, and whirling about in every direction, are separated in such a way that like attaches itself to like.

III. These are his general beliefs; specifically, they are as follows: he claims that the universe is infinite, as I’ve already mentioned; that one part of it is full, while the other part is empty. He also asserts that the elements and the worlds that come from them are infinite and eventually return to them; and that the worlds are created in this way: Many bodies of different types and shapes are separated from the infinite and move into a vast emptiness; then, once they come together, they form a vortex. In this vortex, they collide and spin in every direction, separating in such a way that similar things cluster together.

But as they are all of equal weight, when by reason of their number they are no longer able to whirl about, the thin ones depart into the outer vacuum, as if they bounded through, and the others remain behind, and becoming entangled with one another, run together, and produce a sort of spherical shaped figure.

But since they all have the same weight, when their numbers make it impossible for them to continue spinning, the lighter ones move out into the empty space, as if they are bouncing away, while the others stay behind. They get tangled up with each other, come together, and form a kind of spherical shape.

This subsists as a kind of membrane; containing within itself bodies of every kind; and as these are whirled about so as to revolve according to the resistance of the centre, the circumambient membrane becomes thin, since bodies are without ceasing, uniting according to the impulse given by the vortex; and in this way the earth is produced, since these bodies which have once been brought to the centre remain there.

This exists like a membrane, holding within it all kinds of bodies. As these bodies spin and move in response to the central resistance, the surrounding membrane thins out. This happens because the bodies continuously come together due to the push from the vortex. In this way, the earth is formed, as these bodies that are pulled to the center stay there.

On the other side, there is produced another enveloping membrane, which increases incessantly by the accretion of exterior bodies; and which, as it is itself animated by a circular movement, drags with it, and adds to itself, everything it meets with; some of these bodies thus enveloped re-unite again and form compounds, which are at first moist and clayey, but soon becoming dry, and being drawn on in the universal movement of the circular vortex, they catch fire, and constitute the substance of the stars. The orbit of the sun is the most distant one; that of the moon is the nearest to the earth; and between the two are the orbits of the other stars.

On the other side, there's another surrounding membrane that keeps growing from the accumulation of outside materials; and because it moves in a circular motion, it pulls in and incorporates everything it encounters. Some of these enclosed bodies come together again and form compounds, which start off moist and muddy but soon dry out. As they are swept along in the universal circular motion, they ignite and become the building blocks of the stars. The sun's orbit is the farthest out, while the moon's orbit is closest to the earth; and in between are the orbits of the other stars.

All the stars are set on fire by the rapidity of their own motion; and the sun is set on fire by the stars; the moon has only a slight quantity of fire; the sun and the moon are eclipsed in …[126] in consequence of the inclination of the earth towards the south. In the north it always snows, and those districts are cold, and are often frozen.

All the stars are lit up by their fast movement, and the sun is ignited by the stars; the moon has only a little bit of fire. The sun and the moon are eclipsed in …[126] because the earth tilts towards the south. In the north, it always snows, and those areas are cold and often frozen.

The sun is eclipsed but seldom; but the moon frequently, because her orbits are unequal.

The sun is rarely eclipsed, but the moon is often eclipsed because her orbits are inconsistent.

Leucippus admits also, that the production of worlds, their increase, their diminution, and their destruction, depend on a certain necessity, the character of which he does not precisely explain.

Leucippus also acknowledges that the creation of worlds, their growth, their decline, and their destruction depend on a certain necessity, the nature of which he doesn't clearly define.

LIFE OF DEMOCRITUS.

I. Democritus was the son of Hegesistratus, but as some say, of Athenocrites, and, according to other accounts, of Damasippus. He was a native of Abdera, or, as it is stated by some authors, a citizen of Miletus.

I. Democritus was the son of Hegesistratus, though some say he was the son of Athenocrites, and according to other sources, of Damasippus. He was originally from Abdera, or, as some writers claim, a resident of Miletus.

II. He was a pupil of some of the Magi and Chaldæans, whom Xerxes had left with his father as teachers, when he had been hospitably received by him, as Herodotus informs us;[127] and from these men he, while still a boy, learned the principles of astronomy and theology. Afterwards, his father entrusted him to Leucippus, and to Anaxagoras, as some authors assert, who was forty years older than he. And Phavorinus, in his Universal History, says that Democritus said of Anaxagoras, that his opinions about the sun and moon were not his own, but were old theories, and that he had stolen them. And that he used also to pull to pieces his assertions about the composition of the world, and about mind, as he was hostile to him, because he had declined to admit him as a pupil. How then can he have been a pupil of his, as some assert? And[391] Demetrius in his treatise on People of the same Name, and Antisthenes in his Successions, both affirm that he travelled to Egypt to see the priests there, and to learn mathematics of them; and that he proceeded further to the Chaldæans, and penetrated into Persia, and went as far as the Persian Gulf. Some also say that he made acquaintance with the Gymnosophists in India, and that he went to Æthiopia.

II. He was a student of some of the Magi and Chaldeans, whom Xerxes had left with his father as teachers when he had been kindly received by him, as Herodotus tells us; [127] and from these men, while still a boy, he learned the basics of astronomy and theology. Later, his father entrusted him to Leucippus, and to Anaxagoras, as some writers claim, who was forty years older than him. Phavorinus, in his Universal History, mentions that Democritus said of Anaxagoras that his views on the sun and moon were not original but were old ideas that he had copied. He also used to criticize his views on the composition of the world and the mind because he was opposed to him for not accepting him as a student. How then could he have been a student of his, as some claim? And [391] Demetrius in his work on People of the Same Name, and Antisthenes in his Successions, both state that he traveled to Egypt to meet the priests there and learn mathematics from them; that he then went further to the Chaldeans, penetrated into Persia, and reached as far as the Persian Gulf. Some also say that he befriended the Gymnosophists in India and that he traveled to Ethiopia.

III. He was one of three brothers who divided their patrimony among them; and the most common story is, that he took the smaller portion, as it was in money, because he required money for the purpose of travelling; though his brothers suspected him of entertaining some treacherous design. And Demetrius says, that his share amounted to more than a hundred talents, and that he spent the whole of it.

III. He was one of three brothers who split their inheritance among themselves; the most popular story is that he chose the smaller share because it was in cash, as he needed money for traveling. However, his brothers suspected that he had some secretive plan. Demetrius says that his share was over a hundred talents, and that he spent all of it.

IV. He also says, that he was so industrious a man, that he cut off for himself a small portion of the garden which surrounded his house, in which there was a small cottage, and shut himself up in it. And on one occasion, when his father brought him an ox to sacrifice, and fastened it there, he for a long time did not discover it, until his father having roused him, on the pretext of the sacrifice, told him what he had done with the ox.

IV. He also says that he was such a hardworking man that he carved out a small piece of the garden surrounding his house, where there was a little cottage, and isolated himself in it. One time, when his father brought him an ox to sacrifice and tied it there, he didn’t notice it for a long time. It was only when his father woke him up under the pretense of the sacrifice that he found out what his father had done with the ox.

V. He further asserts, that it is well known that he went to Athens, and as he despised glory, he did not desire to be known; and that he became acquainted with Socrates, without Socrates knowing who he was. “For I came,” says he, “to Athens, and no one knew me.” “If,” says Thrasylus, “the Rivals is really the work of Plato, then Democritus must be the anonymous interlocutor, who is introduced in that dialogue, besides Œnopides and Anaxagoras, the one I mean who, in the conversation with Socrates, is arguing about philosophy, and whom the philosopher tells, that a philosopher resembles a conqueror in the Pentathlum.” And he was veritably a master of five branches of philosophy. For he was thoroughly acquainted with physics, and ethics, and mathematics, and the whole encyclic system, and indeed he was thoroughly experienced and skilful in every kind of art. He it was who was the author of the saying, “Speech is the shadow of action.” But Demetrius Phalereus, in his Defence of Socrates, affirms that he never came to Athens at all. And[392] that is a still stranger circumstance than any, if he despised so important a city, not wishing to derive glory from the place in which he was, but preferring rather himself to invest the place with glory.

V. He also claims that it is well known he went to Athens, and since he looked down on fame, he didn't want to be recognized; he got to know Socrates without Socrates having any idea who he was. “I came,” he says, “to Athens, and no one knew me.” “If,” Thrasylus says, “The Rivals is genuinely Plato's work, then Democritus must be the unnamed speaker introduced in that dialogue, along with Œnopides and Anaxagoras, the one who, in the discussion with Socrates, debates philosophy, and whom the philosopher tells that a philosopher is like a winner in the pentathlon.” He was indeed a master of five areas of philosophy. He had a deep understanding of physics, ethics, mathematics, the entire curriculum, and he was truly experienced and skilled in all kinds of art. He is the one who came up with the saying, “Speech is the shadow of action.” However, Demetrius Phalereus, in his Defense of Socrates, claims that he never actually came to Athens at all. And[392] that’s an even stranger situation if he looked down on such an important city, not wanting to gain fame from the place where he was, but instead preferring to give the place its own glory.

VI. And it is evident from his writings, what sort of man he was. “He seems,” says Thrasylus, “to have been also an admirer of the Pythagoreans.” And he mentions Pythagoras himself, speaking of him with admiration, in the treatise which is inscribed with his name. And he appears to have derived all his doctrines from him to such a degree, that one would have thought that he had been his pupil, if the difference of time did not prevent it. At all events, Glaucus, of Rhegium, who was a contemporary of his, affirms that he was a pupil of some of the Pythagorean school.

VI. It's clear from his writings what kind of person he was. “He seems,” Thrasylus says, “to have been an admirer of the Pythagoreans.” He even mentions Pythagoras himself, speaking of him with admiration in the treatise that bears his name. It seems he got all his ideas from him to such an extent that one might think he was his student, if not for the time difference. In any case, Glaucus of Rhegium, who was his contemporary, claims that he was a student of some members of the Pythagorean school.

And Apollodorus, of Cyzicus, says that he was intimate with Philolaus; “He used to practise himself,” says Antisthenes, “in testing perceptions in various manners; sometimes retiring into solitary places, and spending his time even among tombs.”

And Apollodorus of Cyzicus says that he was close to Philolaus; “He would practice,” says Antisthenes, “by testing perceptions in different ways; sometimes isolating himself and spending his time even among graves.”

VII. And he further adds, that when he returned from his travels, he lived in a most humble manner; like a man who had spent all his property, and that on account of his poverty, he was supported by his brother Damasus. But when he had foretold some future event, which happened as he had predicted, and had in consequence become famous, he was for all the rest of his life thought worthy of almost divine honours by the generality of people. And as there was a law, that a man who had squandered the whole of his patrimony, should not be allowed funeral rites in his country, Antisthenes says, that he, being aware of this law, and not wishing to be exposed to the calumnies of those who envied him, and would be glad to accuse him, recited to the people his work called the Great World, which is far superior to all his other writings, and that as a reward for it he was presented with five hundred talents; and not only that, but he also had some brazen statues erected in his honour. And when he died, he was buried at the public expense; after having attained the age of more than a hundred years. But Demetrius says, that it was his relations who read the Great World, and that they were presented with a hundred talents only; and Hippobotus coincides in this statement.

VII. He also adds that when he came back from his travels, he lived very simply, like a man who had lost all his wealth. Because of his poverty, he was supported by his brother Damasus. However, after he predicted a future event that came true, he became famous and was regarded as almost divine by most people for the rest of his life. There was a law that stated a man who had squandered his entire inheritance could not have a proper burial in his homeland. Antisthenes noted that, knowing this law and wanting to avoid the slander of those who envied him and would be eager to accuse him, he presented his work called the Great World to the people, which is much better than all his other writings. In return, he was given five hundred talents and had bronze statues erected in his honor. When he died at over a hundred years old, he was buried at public expense. However, Demetrius claims that it was his relatives who read the Great World and that they were awarded only a hundred talents, and Hippobotus agrees with this account.

VIII. And Aristoxenus, in his Historic Commentaries, says that Plato wished to burn all the writings of Democritus that he was able to collect; but that Amyclas and Cleinias, the Pythagoreans, prevented him, as it would do no good; for that copies of his books were already in many hands. And it is plain that that was the case; for Plato, who mentions nearly all the ancient philosophers, nowhere speaks of Democritus; not even in those passages where he has occasion to contradict his theories, evidently, because he said that if he did, he would be showing his disagreement with the best of all philosophers; a man whom even Timon praises in the following terms:—

VIII. And Aristoxenus, in his Historical Commentaries, says that Plato wanted to burn all the writings of Democritus that he could gather; however, Amyclas and Cleinias, the Pythagoreans, stopped him, believing it wouldn't help because copies of his books were already widely circulated. It's clear that this was true; Plato, who references nearly all the ancient philosophers, never mentions Democritus, not even in those instances where he could contradict his ideas. Clearly, he avoided this because he felt that doing so would indicate he disagreed with the greatest of all philosophers—a man who even Timon praises in the following terms:—

Like that Democritus, wisest of men,
Sage ruler of his speech; profound converser,
Whose works I love to read among the first.

IX. But he was, according to the statement made by himself in the Little World, a youth when Anaxagoras was an old man, being forty years younger than he was. And he says, that he composed the Little World seven hundred and thirty years after the capture of Troy. And he must have been born, according to the account given by Apollodorus in his Chronicles, in the eightieth olympiad; but, as Thrasylus says, in his work entitled the Events, which took place before the reading of the books of Democritus, in the third year of the seventy-seventh olympiad, being, as it is there stated, one year older than Socrates. He must therefore have been a contemporary of Archelaus, the pupil of Anaxagoras, and of Œnopides, for he makes mention of this letter. He also speaks of the theories of Parmenides and Zeno, on the subject of the One, as they were the men of the highest reputation in histories, and he also speaks of Protagoras of Abdera, who confessedly lived at the same time as Socrates.

IX. He was, as he mentioned in the Little World, a young man while Anaxagoras was already old, being forty years younger than him. He states that he wrote the Little World seven hundred and thirty years after the fall of Troy. According to Apollodorus in his Chronicles, he must have been born during the eightieth Olympic Games; however, Thrasylus notes in his work The Events that he was born in the third year of the seventy-seventh Olympic Games, which was one year older than Socrates. Therefore, he was likely a contemporary of Archelaus, Anaxagoras's student, and Œnopides, since he references this letter. He also discusses the ideas of Parmenides and Zeno regarding the concept of the One, as they were highly regarded figures in history, and mentions Protagoras of Abdera, who was known to have lived at the same time as Socrates.

X. Athenodorus tells us, in the eighth book of his Conversations, that once, when Hippocrates came to see him, he ordered some milk to be brought; and that, when he saw the milk, he said that it was the milk of a black goat, with her first kid; on which Hippocrates marvelled at his accurate knowledge. Also, as a young girl came with Hippocrates, on the first day, he saluted her thus, “Good morning, my maid;”[394] but on the next day, “Good morning, woman;” for, indeed, she had ceased to be a maid during the night.

X. Athenodorus tells us in the eighth book of his Conversations that once, when Hippocrates visited him, he had some milk brought in. When he saw the milk, he remarked that it was from a black goat with her first kid, and Hippocrates was amazed by his accurate knowledge. Also, when a young girl came with Hippocrates on the first day, he greeted her by saying, “Good morning, my maid;” but the next day, he said, “Good morning, woman;” because, indeed, she had stopped being a maid during the night.

XI. And Hermippus relates, that Democritus died in the following manner: he was exceedingly old, and appeared at the point of death; and his sister was lamenting that he would die during the festival of the Thesmophoria,[128] and so prevent her from discharging her duties to the Goddess; and so he bade her be of good cheer, and desired her to bring him hot loaves every day. And, by applying these to his nostrils, he kept himself alive even over the festival. But when the days of the festival were passed (and it lasted three days), then he expired, without any pain, as Hipparchus assures us, having lived a hundred and nine years. And we have written an epigram upon him in our collection of poems in every metre, which runs thus:—

XI. Hermippus tells us that Democritus died in the following way: he was very old and seemed near death; his sister was upset that he would die during the Thesmophoria festival,[128] which would prevent her from fulfilling her duties to the Goddess. He encouraged her to stay positive and asked her to bring him hot loaves every day. By putting these to his nostrils, he managed to stay alive throughout the festival. But once the festival ended (which lasted three days), he passed away without any pain, as Hipparchus confirms, having lived to be one hundred and nine years old. We have written an epigram about him in our collection of poems in various meters, which goes like this:—

What man was e’er so wise, who ever did
So great a deed as this Democritus?
Who kept off death, though present for three days,
And entertained him with hot steam of bread.

Such was the life of this man.

Such was the life of this man.

XII. Now his principal doctrines were these. That atoms and the vacuum were the beginning of the universe; and that everything else existed only in opinion. That the worlds were infinite, created, and perishable. But that nothing was created out of nothing, and that nothing was destroyed so as to become nothing. That the atoms were infinite both in magnitude and number, and were borne about through the universe in endless revolutions. And that thus they produced all the combinations that exist; fire, water, air, and earth; for that all these things are only combinations of certain atoms; which combinations are incapable of being affected by external circumstances,[395] and are unchangeable by reason of their solidity. Also, that the sun and the moon are formed by such revolutions and round bodies; and in like manner the soul is produced; and that the soul and the mind are identical: that we see by the falling of visions across our sight; and that everything that happens, happens of necessity. Motion, being the cause of the production of everything, which he calls necessity. The chief good he asserts to be cheerfulness; which, however, he does not consider the same as pleasure; as some people, who have misunderstood him, have fancied that he meant; but he understands by cheerfulness, a condition according to which the soul lives calmly and steadily, being disturbed by no fear, or superstition, or other passion. He calls this state εὐθυμία, and εὐεστὼ, and several other names. Everything which is made he looks upon as depending for its existence on opinion; but atoms and the vacuum he believes exist by nature. These were his principal opinions.

XII. His main beliefs were these: that atoms and the void were the origin of the universe, and that everything else is just a matter of perception. He claimed that there are infinite worlds, all created and transient. However, he argued that nothing comes from nothing, and nothing is destroyed to the point of becoming nothing. He believed that atoms are infinite in both size and quantity, constantly moving through the universe in endless cycles. This motion leads to all the combinations that exist: fire, water, air, and earth, since all these things are just combinations of specific atoms. These combinations are unaffected by outside forces and remain unchanged because of their solidity. He also stated that the sun and the moon are formed through similar motions and round shapes; in the same way, the soul is produced, and he maintained that the soul and the mind are one and the same. He explained that we perceive through the passing of images across our vision and that everything that happens occurs inevitably. He viewed motion as the driving force behind everything, referring to it as necessity. He argued that the greatest good is cheerfulness, which he didn’t equate with pleasure, contrary to what some people mistakenly assumed. For him, cheerfulness represented a state in which the soul remains calm and stable, undisturbed by fear, superstition, or other passions. He referred to this state as εὐθυμία, εὐεστὼ, and a few other names. He regarded everything made as reliant on perception for its existence, but believed that atoms and the void exist naturally. These were his core views.

XIII. Of his books, Thrasylus has given a regular catalogue, in the same way that he has arranged the works of Plato, dividing them into four classes.

XIII. Thrasylus has provided a complete list of his books, just like he organized the works of Plato, categorizing them into four groups.

Now these are his ethical works. The Pythagoras; a treatise on the Disposition of the Wise Man; an essay on those in the Shades Below; the Tritogeneia (this is so called because from Minerva three things are derived which hold together all human affairs); a treatise on Manly Courage or Valour; the Horn of Amalthea; an essay on Cheerfulness; a volume of Ethical Commentaries. A treatise entitled, For Cheerfulness, (εὐεστὼ) is not found.

Now these are his ethical works. The Pythagoras; a treatise on the mindset of the wise person; an essay on those in the afterlife; the Tritogeneia (this is named that because three things come from Minerva that hold all human affairs together); a treatise on manly courage or valor; the Horn of Amalthea; an essay on happiness; a collection of ethical commentaries. A treatise called For Happiness (εὐεστὼ) is missing.

These are his writings on natural philosophy. The Great World (which Theophrastus asserts to be the work of Leucippus); the Little World; the Cosmography; a treatise on the Planets; the first book on Nature; two books on the Nature of Man, or on Flesh; an essay on the Mind; one on the Senses (some people join these two together in one volume, which they entitle, on the Soul); a treatise on Juices; one on Colours; one on the Different Figures; one on the Changes of Figures; the Cratynteria (that is to say, an essay, approving of what has been said in preceding ones); a treatise on Phænomenon, or on Providence; three books on Pestilences, or Pestilential Evils; a book of Difficulties. These are his books on natural philosophy.

These are his writings on natural philosophy. The Great World (which Theophrastus claims is the work of Leucippus); the Little World; the Cosmography; a treatise on the Planets; the first book on Nature; two books on the Nature of Man, or on Flesh; an essay on the Mind; one on the Senses (some people combine these two into one volume, which they call on the Soul); a treatise on Juices; one on Colors; one on Different Figures; one on Changes of Figures; the Cratynteria (which is an essay supporting what has been stated in the previous ones); a treatise on Phenomena, or on Providence; three books on Pestilences, or Pestilential Evils; a book of Difficulties. These are his books on natural philosophy.

His miscellaneous works are these. Heavenly Causes; Aërial Causes; Causes affecting Plane Surfaces; Causes referring to Fire, and to what is in Fire; Causes affecting Voices; Causes affecting Seeds, and Plants, and Fruits; three books of Causes affecting Animals; Miscellaneous Causes; a treatise on the Magnet. These are his miscellaneous works.

His various works are these: Heavenly Causes; Aërial Causes; Causes related to Flat Surfaces; Causes concerning Fire and what’s within Fire; Causes affecting Sounds; Causes related to Seeds, Plants, and Fruits; three books on Causes affecting Animals; Miscellaneous Causes; and a treatise on the Magnet. These are his various works.

His mathematical writings are the following. A treatise on the Difference of Opinion, or on the Contact of the Circle and the Sphere; one on Geometry; one on Numbers; one on Incommensurable Lines, and Solids, in two books; a volume called Explanations; the Great Year, or the Astronomical Calendar; a discussion on the Clepsydra; the Map of the Heavens; Geography; Polography; Actinography, or a discussion on Rays of Light. These are his mathematical works.

His mathematical writings include the following: a treatise on the Difference of Opinion, or on the Intersection of the Circle and the Sphere; one on Geometry; one on Numbers; one on Incommensurable Lines and Solids, in two volumes; a book titled Explanations; the Great Year, or the Astronomical Calendar; a discussion on the Clepsydra; the Map of the Heavens; Geography; Polography; and Actinography, or a discussion on Rays of Light. These are his mathematical works.

His works on music are the following. A treatise on Rhythm and Harmony; one on Poetry; one on the beauty of Epic Poems; one on Euphonious and Discordant Letters; one on Homer, or on Propriety of Diction[129] and Dialects; one on Song, one on Words; the Onomasticon. These are his musical works.

His works on music are the following: a treatise on Rhythm and Harmony; a piece on Poetry; a study on the beauty of Epic Poems; a work on Euphonious and Discordant Letters; a discussion on Homer, or the Appropriateness of Diction and Dialects; a book on Song, and a study on Words; the Onomasticon. These are his musical works.

The following are his works on art. Prognostics; a treatise on the Way of Living, called also Diætetics, or the Opinions of a Physician; Causes relating to Unfavourable and Favourable Opportunities; a treatise on Agriculture, called also the Georgic; one on Painting; Tactics, and Fighting in heavy Armour. These are his works on such subjects.

The following are his works on art: Prognostics; a treatise on the Way of Living, also known as Diætetics, or the Opinions of a Physician; Causes related to Unfavourable and Favourable Opportunities; a treatise on Agriculture, also known as the Georgic; one on Painting; Tactics; and Fighting in Heavy Armour. These are his works on these subjects.

Some authors also give a list of some separate treatises which they collect from his Commentaries. A treatise on the Sacred Letters seen at Babylon; another on the Sacred Letters seen at Meroe; the Voyage round the Ocean; a treatise on History; a Chaldaic Discourse; a Phrygian Discourse; a treatise on Fever; an essay on those who are attacked with Cough after illness; the Principles of Laws; Things made by Hand, or Problems.

Some authors also provide a list of separate works they gather from his Commentaries. There's a work on the Sacred Letters found in Babylon; another on the Sacred Letters found in Meroe; a Journey around the Ocean; a work on History; a Chaldaic Discourse; a Phrygian Discourse; a piece on Fever; an essay about those who develop a Cough after being ill; the Principles of Laws; Handmade Items, or Problems.

As to the other books which some writers ascribed to him, some are merely extracts from his other writings, and some are confessedly the work of others. And this is a sufficient account of his writings.

As for the other books that some authors claim he wrote, some are just excerpts from his other works, and some are clearly written by other people. This is a complete overview of his writings.

XIV. There were six people of the name of Democritus. The first was this man of whom we are speaking; the second was a musician of Chios, who lived about the same time; the third was a sculptor who is mentioned by Antigonus; the fourth is a man who wrote a treatise on the Temple at Ephesus, and on the city of Samothrace; the fifth was an epigrammatic poet, of great perspicuity and elegance; the sixth was a citizen of Pergamus, who wrote a treatise on Oratory.

XIV. There were six people named Democritus. The first is the man we're discussing; the second was a musician from Chios who lived around the same time; the third was a sculptor mentioned by Antigonus; the fourth was someone who wrote a treatise on the Temple at Ephesus and the city of Samothrace; the fifth was an epigrammatic poet known for his clarity and elegance; the sixth was a citizen of Pergamus who wrote a treatise on Oratory.

LIFE OF PROTAGORAS.

I. Protagoras was the son of Artemon, or, as Apollodorus says (which account is corroborated by Deinon, in his History of Persia), of Mæander. He was a native of Abdera, as Heraclides Ponticus tell us, in his treatise on Laws; and the same authority informs us that he made laws for the Thurians. But, according to the statement of Eupolis, in his Flatterers, he was a native of Teos; for he says:—

I. Protagoras was the son of Artemon, or, as Apollodorus mentions (a claim supported by Deinon in his History of Persia), of Mæander. He was originally from Abdera, as Heraclides Ponticus notes in his treatise on Laws; and this same source tells us that he created laws for the Thurians. However, according to Eupolis in his Flatterers, he was actually from Teos; he states:—

Within you’ll find Protagoras, of Teos.

He, and Prodicus of Ceos, used to levy contributions for giving their lectures; and Plato, in his Protagoras, says that Prodicus had a very powerful voice.

He and Prodicus of Ceos used to collect fees for their lectures; and Plato, in his Protagoras, mentions that Prodicus had a very strong voice.

II. Protagoras was a pupil of Democritus. And he was surnamed Wisdom, as Phavorinus informs us in his Universal History.

II. Protagoras was a student of Democritus. He was nicknamed Wisdom, as Phavorinus tells us in his Universal History.

III. He was the first person who asserted that in every question there were two sides to the argument exactly opposite to one another. And he used to employ them in his arguments, being the first person who did so. But he began something in this manner: “Man is the measure of all things: of those things which exist as he is; and of those things which do not exist as he is not.” And he used to say that nothing else was soul except the senses, as Plato says, in the Theætetus; and that everything was true. And another of his treatises he begins in this way: “Concerning the Gods, I am not able to know[398] to a certainty whether they exist or whether they do not. For there are many things which prevent one from knowing, especially the obscurity of the subject, and the shortness of the life of man.” And on account of this beginning of his treatise, he was banished by the Athenians. And they burnt his books in the market-place, calling them in by the public crier, and compelling all who possessed them to surrender them.

III. He was the first person to claim that for every question, there are two sides to the argument that are completely opposite. He used this approach in his discussions, being the first to do so. He started with the idea: “Man is the measure of all things: of those things that exist as he is; and of those things that don’t exist as he is not.” He asserted that nothing was the soul except the senses, as Plato mentions in the Theætetus, and that everything is true. In another of his writings, he begins with: “Regarding the Gods, I cannot know for sure whether they exist or not. There are many factors that make it difficult to know, especially the complexity of the subject and the briefness of human life.” Because of this introduction to his treatise, he was exiled by the Athenians. They burned his books in the marketplace, calling them in through the public crier and forcing anyone who had them to hand them over.

He was the first person who demanded payment of his pupils; fixing his charge at a hundred minæ. He was also the first person who gave a precise definition of the parts of time; and who explained the value of opportunity, and who instituted contests of argument, and who armed the disputants with the weapon of sophism. He it was too who first left facts out of consideration, and fastened his arguments on words; and who was the parent of the present superficial and futile kinds of discussion. On which account Timon says of him:—

He was the first person to charge his students for lessons, setting his fee at a hundred minae. He was also the first to clearly define the parts of time, explain the importance of opportunity, and organize debates, equipping the debaters with the tools of sophistry. He was the one who initially ignored facts and based his arguments on language, becoming the originator of the current shallow and pointless discussions. Because of this, Timon remarked about him:—

Protagoras, that slippery arguer,
In disputatious contests fully skilled.

He too, it was, who first invented that sort of argument which is called the Socratic, and who first employed the reasonings of Antisthenes, which attempt to establish the point that they cannot be contradicted; as Plato tells us in his Euthydemus. He was also the first person who practised regular discussions on set subjects, as Artemidorus, the dialectician, tells us in his treatise against Chrysippus. He was also the original inventor of the porter’s pad for men to carry their burdens on, as we are assured by Aristotle, in his book on Education; for he himself was a porter, as Epicurus says somewhere or other. And it was in this way that he became highly thought of by Democritus, who saw him as he was tying up some sticks.

He was also the first to come up with the kind of argument known as the Socratic method, and he was the first to use the reasoning of Antisthenes, which tries to prove that they can’t be contradicted, as Plato mentions in his Euthydemus. He also pioneered regular discussions on specific topics, as Artemidorus, the dialectician, notes in his work against Chrysippus. Additionally, he was the original inventor of the porter’s pad for carrying loads, as Aristotle confirms in his book on Education; he himself worked as a porter, as Epicurus mentions somewhere. This is how he earned the respect of Democritus, who saw him while he was bundling some sticks.

He was also the first person who divided discourse into four parts; entreaty, interrogation, answer, and injunction: though some writers make the parts seven; narration, interrogation, answer, injunction, promise, entreaty, and invocation; and these he called the foundations of discourse: but Alcidamas says that there are four divisions of discourse; affirmation, denial, interrogation, and invocation.

He was also the first person to break down discourse into four parts: request, question, answer, and command. However, some authors list seven parts: narration, questioning, answering, commanding, promising, requesting, and invoking. He referred to these as the foundations of discourse. But Alcidamas claims that there are four categories of discourse: affirmation, denial, questioning, and invoking.

V. The first of his works that he ever read in public was[399] the treatise on the Gods, the beginning of which we have quoted above, and he read this at Athens in the house of Euripides, or, as some say, in that of Megaclides; others say that he read it in the Lyceum; his pupil, Archagoras, the son of Theodotus, giving him the aid of his voice. His accuser was Pythodorus, the son of Polyzelus, one of the four hundred; but Aristotle calls him Evathlus.

V. The first work he ever read aloud in public was[399] the treatise on the Gods, the beginning of which we have quoted above. He read this in Athens, either at the house of Euripides or, as some say, at Megaclides' place; others claim he read it in the Lyceum, with his student Archagoras, the son of Theodotus, helping him out with his voice. His accuser was Pythodorus, the son of Polyzelus, one of the four hundred; but Aristotle refers to him as Evathlus.

VI. The writings of his which are still extant are these: a treatise on the Art of Contention; one on Wrestling; one on Mathematics; one on a Republic; one on Ambition; one on Virtues; one on the Original Condition of Man; one on those in the Shades Below; one on the Things which are not done properly by Men; one volume of Precepts; one essay entitled Justice in Pleading for Hire; two books of Contradictions.

VI. The writings of his that still exist are: a treatise on the Art of Contention; one on Wrestling; one on Mathematics; one on a Republic; one on Ambition; one on Virtues; one on the Original Condition of Man; one on those in the Shadows Below; one on the Things that are not done properly by People; one volume of Guidelines; one essay titled Justice in Pleading for Pay; two books of Contradictions.

These are his books.

These are his books.

Plato also addressed a dialogue to him.

Plato also sent him a message.

VII. Philochorus relates that, as he was sailing to Sicily his ship was wrecked, and that this circumstance is alluded to by Euripides in his Ixion; and some say that he died on his journey, being about ninety years old. But Apollodorus states his age at seventy years, and says that he was a sophist forty years, and that he flourished about the eighty-fourth Olympiad. There is an epigram upon him written by myself, in the following terms:—

VII. Philochorus tells us that while he was sailing to Sicily, his ship was wrecked, which Euripides mentions in his play Ixion. Some say he died during his journey at around ninety years old. However, Apollodorus claims he was seventy years old and states that he was a sophist for forty years, flourishing around the eighty-fourth Olympiad. I wrote an epigram about him that goes like this:—

I hear accounts of you, Protagoras,
That, travelling far from Athens, on the road,
You, an old man, and quite infirm, did die.
For Cecrops’ city drove you forth to exile;
But you, though ’scaping dread Minerva’s might,
Could not escape the outspread arms of Pluto.

VIII. It is said that once, when he demanded of Evathlus his pupil payment for his lessons, Evathlus said to him, “But I have never been victorious in an argument;” and he rejoined, “But if I gain my cause, then I should naturally receive the fruits of my victory, and so would you obtain the fruits of yours.”

VIII. It’s said that once, when he asked his student Evathlus for payment for his lessons, Evathlus replied, “But I’ve never won an argument;” and he responded, “But if I win my case, then I should naturally receive the rewards of my victory, and you would also reap the rewards of yours.”

IX. There was also another Protagoras, an astronomer, on whom Euphorion wrote an elegy; and a third also, who was a philosopher of the Stoic sect.

IX. There was also another Protagoras, an astronomer, who Euphorion wrote an elegy for; and a third one, who was a philosopher from the Stoic school.

LIFE OF DIOGENES, OF APOLLONIA.

I. Diogenes was a native of Apollonia, and the son of Apollothemis, a natural philosopher of high reputation; and he was, as Antisthenes reports, a pupil of Anaximenes. He was also a contemporary of Anaxagoras, and Demetrius Phalereus says, in his Defence of Socrates, that he was very unpopular at Athens, and even in some danger of his life.

I. Diogenes was from Apollonia and the son of Apollothemis, a well-known philosopher. As Antisthenes mentions, he was a student of Anaximenes. He was also a contemporary of Anaxagoras, and Demetrius Phalereus notes in his Defense of Socrates that he was quite unpopular in Athens, facing even some risks to his life.

II. The following were his principal doctrines; that the air was an element; that the worlds were infinite, and that the vacuum also was infinite; that the air, as it was condensed, and as it was rarified, was the productive cause of the worlds; that nothing can be produced out of nothing;[130] and that nothing can be destroyed so as to become nothing; that the earth is round, firmly planted in the middle of the universe, having acquired its situation from the circumvolutions of the hot principle around it, and its consistency from the cold.

II. The main ideas he presented were that air is an element; that there are infinite worlds and an infinite vacuum; that the varying density of air is what creates the worlds; that nothing can come from nothing; and that nothing can be destroyed to the point of becoming nothing; that the Earth is round, securely positioned in the center of the universe, having reached this position due to the movements of the hot principle around it, and its solidity coming from the cold.

The first words of his treatise are:—

The first words of his essay are:—

“It appears to me that he who begins any treatise ought to lay down principles about which there can be no dispute, and that his exposition of them ought to be simple and dignified.”

“It seems to me that anyone starting a discussion should establish clear principles that are undisputed, and that their explanation of these principles should be straightforward and respectful.”

LIFE OF ANAXARCHUS.

I. Anaxarchus was a native of Abdera. He was a pupil of Diogenes, of Smyrna; but, as some say, of Metrodorus, of Chios; who said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing; and Metrodorus was a pupil of Nessus, of Chios; though others assert that he was a disciple of Democritus.

I. Anaxarchus was from Abdera. He studied under Diogenes from Smyrna; however, some say he was a student of Metrodorus from Chios, who claimed he wasn’t even sure if he knew nothing. Metrodorus was a pupil of Nessus from Chios, though others maintain that he was a follower of Democritus.

II. Anaxarchus too enjoyed the intimacy of Alexander, and flourished about the hundred and tenth olympiad. He had for an enemy Nicocreon, the tyrant of Cyprus. And on one occasion, when Alexander, at a banquet, asked him what he[401] thought of the entertainment, he is said to have replied, “O king, everything is provided very sumptuously; and the only thing wanting is to have the head of some satrap served up;” hinting at Nicocreon. And Nicocreon did not forget his grudge against him for this; but after the death of the king, when Anaxarchus, who was making a voyage, was driven against his will into Cyprus, he took him and put him in a mortar, and commanded him to be pounded to death with iron pestles. And then they say that he, disregarding this punishment, uttered that celebrated saying, “Beat the bag of Anaxarchus, but you will not beat Anaxarchus himself.” And then, when Nicocreon commanded that his tongue should be cut out, it is said that he bit it off, and spit it at him. And we have written an epigram upon him in the following terms:—

II. Anaxarchus also had a close relationship with Alexander and lived around the hundred and tenth Olympiad. He had a rival in Nicocreon, the tyrant of Cyprus. One time, when Alexander asked him at a banquet what he thought of the food, he supposedly replied, “O king, everything is provided very lavishly; the only thing missing is the head of some satrap served up," referring to Nicocreon. Nicocreon held onto his grudge against him for this; but after the king's death, when Anaxarchus, who was traveling by sea, was forced into Cyprus, Nicocreon captured him and had him placed in a mortar, ordering him to be pounded to death with iron pestles. It's said that he, ignoring this punishment, declared that famous saying, “Strike the bag of Anaxarchus, but you won't strike Anaxarchus himself.” Then, when Nicocreon ordered that his tongue be cut out, he supposedly bit it off and spat it at him. We have written an epigram about him in the following lines:—

Beat more and more; you’re beating but a bag;
Beat, Anaxarchus is in heav’n with Jove.
Hereafter Proserpine will rack your bones,
And say, Thus perish, you accursed beater.

III. Anaxarchus, on account of the evenness of his temper and the tranquillity of his life, was called the Happy. And he was a man to whom it was very easy to reprove men and bring them to temperance. Accordingly, he produced an alteration in Alexander who thought himself a God, for when he saw the blood flowing from some wound that he had received, he pointed to him with his finger, and said, “This is blood, and not:—

III. Anaxarchus, due to his calm demeanor and peaceful life, was nicknamed the Happy. He had a knack for correcting others and guiding them towards self-control. As a result, he influenced Alexander, who believed he was a God. When Alexander saw blood flowing from a wound he had received, Anaxarchus pointed at him and said, “This is blood, not:—

“Such stream as issues from a wounded God;
Pure emanation, uncorrupted flood,
Unlike our gross, diseas’d, terrestrial blood.”[131]

But Plutarch says that it was Alexander himself who quoted these lines to his friends.

But Plutarch says that it was Alexander himself who shared these lines with his friends.

They also tell a story that Anaxarchus once drank to him, and then showed the goblet, and said:—

They also share a story about how Anaxarchus once toasted him, then held up the goblet and said:—

Shall any mortal hand dare wound a God?

LIFE OF PYRRHO.

I. Pyrrho was a citizen of Elis, and the son of Pleistarchus, as Diocles informs us, and, as Apollodorus in his Chronicles asserts, he was originally a painter.

I. Pyrrho was a citizen of Elis and the son of Pleistarchus, as Diocles tells us, and, as Apollodorus states in his Chronicles, he originally worked as a painter.

II. And he was a pupil of Bryson, the son of Stilpon, as we are told by Alexander in his Chronicles. After that he attached himself to Anaxarchus, and attended him everywhere; so that he even went as far as the Gymnosophists, in India, and the Magi.

II. He was a student of Bryson, the son of Stilpon, as mentioned by Alexander in his Chronicles. After that, he became devoted to Anaxarchus and followed him everywhere; he even traveled as far as the Gymnosophists in India and the Magi.

III. Owing to which circumstance, he seems to have taken a noble line in philosophy, introducing the doctrine of incomprehensibility, and of the necessity of suspending one’s judgment, as we learn from Ascanius, of Abdera. For he used to say that nothing was honourable, or disgraceful, or just, or unjust. And on the same principle he asserted that there was no such thing as downright truth; but that men did everything in consequence of custom and law. For that nothing was any more this than that. And his life corresponded to his principles; for he never shunned anything, and never guarded against anything; encountering everything, even waggons for instance, and precipices, and dogs, and everything of that sort; committing nothing whatever to his senses. So that he used to be saved, as Antigonus the Carystian tells us, by his friends who accompanied him. And Ænesidemus says that he studied philosophy on the principle of suspending his judgment on all points, without however, on any occasion acting in an imprudent manner, or doing anything without due consideration. And he lived to nearly ninety years of age.

III. Because of this, he seems to have taken a noble approach to philosophy, introducing the idea of incomprehensibility and the need to suspend one’s judgment, as we learn from Ascanius of Abdera. He used to say that nothing was truly honorable or disgraceful, just or unjust. Following this idea, he claimed there was no absolute truth; instead, people did everything based on custom and law. Nothing was more this than that. His life reflected his beliefs; he never avoided anything and never took precautions, facing everything head-on, including wagons, cliffs, dogs, and similar things, relying on nothing but his senses. As Antigonus the Carystian tells us, he was often saved by his friends who were with him. Anecdotes from Ænesidemus suggest he approached philosophy by suspending judgment on all matters while still never acting recklessly or making decisions without careful thought. He lived to nearly ninety years old.

IV. And Antigonus, of Carystus, in his account of Pyrrho, mentions the following circumstances respecting him; that he was originally a person of no reputation, but a poor man, and a painter; and that a picture of some camp-bearers, of very moderate execution, was preserved in the Gymnasium at Elis, which was his work; and that he used to walk out into the fields and seek solitary places, very rarely appearing to his family at home; and that he did this in consequence of having heard some Indian reproaching Anaxarchus for never[403] teaching any one else any good, but for devoting all his time to paying court to princes in palaces. He relates of him too, that he always maintained the same demeanour, so that if any one left him in the middle of his delivery of a discourse, he remained and continued what he was saying; although, when a young man, he was of a very excitable temperament. Often too, says Antigonus, he would go away for a time, without telling any one beforehand, and taking any chance persons whom he chose for his companions. And once, when Anaxarchus had fallen into a pond, he passed by without assisting him; and when some one blamed him for this, Anaxarchus himself praised his indifference and absence of all emotion.

IV. Antigonus of Carystus, in his account of Pyrrho, mentions the following details about him: he was originally an unknown person, just a poor man and a painter. A painting of some camp-bearers, done with very average skill, was kept in the Gymnasium at Elis and was his work. He would go out into the fields and look for quiet places, rarely spending time with his family at home. He did this after hearing some Indian criticize Anaxarchus for never teaching anyone anything valuable, only spending all his time trying to impress princes in their palaces. He also mentions that he always showed the same demeanor, so if someone left while he was giving a talk, he would just keep going with what he was saying, even though he had been very excitable as a young man. Antigonus also says that he would often leave for a while without telling anyone in advance, taking along whoever he felt like as his companions. And once, when Anaxarchus fell into a pond, he just walked by without helping him; when someone criticized him for this, Anaxarchus praised his indifference and lack of emotion.

On one occasion he was detected talking to himself, and when he was asked the reason, he said that he was studying how to be good. In his investigations he was never despised by any one, because he always spoke explicitly and straight to the question that had been put to him. On which account Nausiphanes was charmed by him even when he was quite young. And he used to say that he should like to be endowed with the disposition of Pyrrho, without losing his own power of eloquence. And he said too, that Epicurus, who admired the conversation and manners of Pyrrho, was frequently asking him about him.

Once, he was caught talking to himself, and when asked why, he said he was trying to learn how to be a better person. During his inquiries, no one ever looked down on him because he always spoke clearly and directly answered the questions he was asked. For this reason, Nausiphanes was impressed by him even in his youth. He used to say that he wished he could have Pyrrho's mindset without losing his own gift for speaking. He also mentioned that Epicurus, who admired Pyrrho's conversations and behavior, often asked him about him.

V. He was so greatly honoured by his country, that he was appointed a priest; and on his account all the philosophers were exempted from taxation. He had a great many imitators of his impassiveness; in reference to which Timon speaks thus of him in his Python, and in his Silli:—

V. He was so highly honored by his country that he was made a priest, and because of him, all the philosophers were exempt from taxes. Many tried to imitate his calm demeanor; in this regard, Timon writes about him in his Python and in his Silli:—

Now, you old man, you Pyrrho, how could you
Find an escape from all the slavish doctrines
And vain imaginations of the Sophists?
How did you free yourself from all the bonds
Of sly chicane, and artful deep persuasion?
How came you to neglect what sort of breeze
Blows round your Greece, and what’s the origin
And end of everything?

And again, in his Images, he says:—

And once more, in his Images, he says:—

These things, my heart, O Pyrrho, longs to hear,
How you enjoy such ease of life and quiet,
The only man as happy as a God.

And the Athenians presented him with the freedom of their[404] city, as Diocles tells us, because he had slain Cotys, the Thracian.

And the Athenians granted him the freedom of their[404] city, as Diocles informs us, because he had killed Cotys, the Thracian.

VI. He also lived in a most blameless manner with his sister, who was a midwife, as Eratosthenes relates, in his treatise on Riches and Poverty; so that he himself used to carry poultry, and pigs too if he could get any, into the market-place and sell them. And he used to clean all the furniture of the house without expressing any annoyance. And it is said that he carried his indifference so far that he even washed a pig. And once, when he was very angry about something connected with his sister (and her name was Philista), and some one took him up, he said, “The display of my indifference does not depend on a woman.” On another occasion, when he was driven back by a dog which was attacking him, he said to some one who blamed him for being discomposed, “That it was a difficult thing entirely to put off humanity; but that a man ought to strive with all his power to counteract circumstances with his actions if possible, and at all events with his reason.” They also tell a story that once, when some medicines of a consuming tendency, and some cutting and cautery was applied to him for some wound, that he never even contracted his brow. And Timon intimates his disposition plainly enough in the letters which he wrote to Python. Moreover, Philo, the Athenian, who was a friend of his, said that he was especially fond of Democritus; and next to him of Homer; whom he admired greatly, and was continually saying:—

VI. He also lived in a very respectable way with his sister, who was a midwife, as Eratosthenes mentions in his treatise on Riches and Poverty. He would carry chickens, and pigs if he could get any, to the marketplace to sell. He took it upon himself to clean all the furniture in the house without showing any annoyance. It is said that he even went so far as to wash a pig. One time, when he was really angry about something related to his sister (her name was Philista), and someone confronted him, he said, “My indifference doesn’t depend on a woman.” On another occasion, when he was chased by an aggressive dog and someone criticized him for being disturbed, he replied that it was hard to completely suppress human feelings; but a man should try his best to deal with situations through his actions if he can, and at least with reason. There's a story that once, when some treatments that were painful, including cutting and burning, were applied to him for a wound, he didn’t even furrow his brow. Timon clearly reveals his character in the letters he wrote to Python. Also, Philo the Athenian, who was his friend, said he was particularly fond of Democritus, and next to him, Homer, whom he greatly admired and often spoke of:—

But as the race of falling leaves decay,
Such is the fate of man.[132]

He used also, as it is said, to compare men to wasps, and flies, and birds, and to quote the following lines:—

He also, as they say, used to compare men to wasps, flies, and birds, and would quote these lines:—

Die then, my friend, what boots it to deplore?
The great, the good Patroclus is no more.
He, far thy better, was foredoom’d to die;
And thou, doest thou bewail mortality?[133]

And so he would quote anything that bore on the uncertainty and emptiness and fickleness of the affairs of man. Posidonius tells the following anecdote about him: that when some people who were sailing with him were looking gloomy because[405] of a storm, he kept a calm countenance, and comforted their minds, exhibiting himself on deck eating a pig, and saying that it became a wise man to preserve an untroubled spirit in that manner. Numenius is the only writer who asserts that he used to deliver positive dogmas.

And so he would quote anything related to the uncertainty, emptiness, and unpredictability of human affairs. Posidonius shares this story about him: when some people sailing with him looked gloomy because of a storm, he remained calm and reassured them. He appeared on deck eating a pig and said that a wise person should maintain a peaceful spirit like that. Numenius is the only writer who claims that he used to express definite beliefs.

VII. He had many eminent disciples, and among them Eurylochus, of whom the following defective characteristic is related; for, they say, that he was once worked up to such a pitch of rage that he took up a spit with the meat on it, and chased the cook as far as the market-place. And once in Elis he was so harassed by some people who put questions to him in the middle of his discourses, that he threw down his cloak and swam across the Alpheus. He was the greatest possible enemy to the Sophists, as Timon tells us. But Philo, on the contrary, was very fond of arguing; on which account Timon speaks of him thus:—

VII. He had many distinguished followers, and among them was Eurylochus, whose notable flaw is recounted; they say he once became so furious that he picked up a spit with meat on it and chased the cook all the way to the market. And once in Elis, he was so disturbed by people asking him questions in the middle of his speeches that he threw down his cloak and swam across the Alpheus. He was a fierce opponent of the Sophists, as Timon tells us. In contrast, Philo really enjoyed debating, which is why Timon describes him this way:—

Avoiding men to study all devoted,
He ponders with himself, and never heeds
The glory or disputes which harass Philo.

Besides these disciples, Pyrrho also had Hecateus of Abdera, and Timon the Phliasian, who wrote the Silli, and whom we shall speak of hereafter; and also Nausiphanes, of Teos, who, as some say, was the master of Epicurus.

Besides these disciples, Pyrrho also had Hecateus of Abdera and Timon of Phliasus, who wrote the Silli and whom we will discuss later; and also Nausiphanes from Teos, who, according to some, was the teacher of Epicurus.

VIII. All these men were called Pyrrhoneans from their master; and also doubters, and sceptics, and ephectics, or suspenders of their judgment, and investigators, from their principles. And their philosophy was called investigatory, from their investigating or seeking the truth on all sides; and sceptical from their being always doubting (σκέπτομαι), and never finding; and ephectic, from the disposition which they encouraged after investigation, I mean the suspending of their judgment (ἐποχὴ); and doubting, because they asserted that the dogmatic philosophers only doubted, and that they did the same. [And they were called Pyrrhoneans from Pyrrho himself.]

VIII. All these men were called Pyrrhoneans after their master; they were also known as doubters, skeptics, and ephectics, or those who suspend their judgment, as well as investigators, based on their principles. Their philosophy was termed investigatory because they sought the truth from all angles; it was called skeptical due to their constant doubt (σκέπτομαι) and never finding answers; and ephectic, stemming from the mindset they adopted after investigation, which is the suspension of judgment (ἐποχὴ); and doubting, since they claimed that the dogmatic philosophers only doubted, while they did the same. [And they were called Pyrrhoneans from Pyrrho himself.]

But Theodosius, in his Chapters on Scepticism, contends, that we ought not to call the Pyrrhonean school sceptical; for since, says he, the motion and agitation of the mind in each individual is incomprehensible to others, we are unable to know what was the disposition of Pyrrho; and if we do not[406] know it we ought not to be called Pyrrhoneans. He also adds that Pyrrho was not the original inventor of Scepticism, and that he had no particular dogma of any kind; and that, consequently, it can only be called Pyrrhonism from some similarity. Some say that Homer was the original founder of this school; since he at different times gives different accounts of the same circumstance, as much as any one else ever did; and since he never dogmatizes definitively respecting affirmation; they also say that the maxims of the seven wise men were sceptical; such as that, “Seek nothing in excess,” and that, “Suretyship is near calamity;” which shows that calamity follows a man who has given positive and certain surety; they also argue that Archilochus and Euripides were Sceptics; and Archilochus speaks thus:—

But Theodosius, in his Chapters on Scepticism, argues that we shouldn't label the Pyrrhonean school as sceptical. He states that because each person's thoughts and feelings are incomprehensible to others, we can't really know what Pyrrho's mindset was like; and if we don't know that, we shouldn't be called Pyrrhoneans. He also points out that Pyrrho wasn't the original creator of Scepticism and didn't have any specific beliefs; therefore, it can only be referred to as Pyrrhonism based on some resemblance. Some people say that Homer was the true founder of this school, since he provides different accounts of the same events at various times, as much as anyone else could; and because he never firmly asserts anything regarding certainty. They also claim that the sayings of the seven wise men were sceptical, like "Seek nothing in excess," and "Suretyship is close to disaster," which implies that trouble follows someone who gives a definite and certain guarantee. They further argue that Archilochus and Euripides were Sceptics, and Archilochus expresses it this way:—

And now, O Glaucus, son of Leptines,
Such is the mind of mortal man, which changes
With every day that Jupiter doth send.

And Euripides says:—

And Euripides says:—

Why then do men assert that wretched mortals
Are with true wisdom gifted; for on you
We all depend; and we do everything
Which pleases you.

Moreover, Xenophanes, and Zeno the Eleatic, and Democritus were also Sceptics; of whom Xenophanes speaks thus:—

Moreover, Xenophanes, Zeno the Eleatic, and Democritus were also Skeptics; of whom Xenophanes speaks like this:—

And no man knows distinctly anything,
And no man ever will.

And Zeno endeavours to put an end to the doctrine of motion by saying: “The object moved does not move either in the place in which it is, or in that in which it is not.” Democritus, too, discards the qualities, where he says: what is cold is cold in opinion, and what is hot is hot in opinion; but atoms and the vacuum exist in reality. And again he says: “But we know nothing really; for truth lies in the bottom.” Plato, too, following them, attributes the knowledge of the truth to the Gods and to the sons of the Gods, and leaves men only the investigation of probability. And Euripides says:—

And Zeno tries to end the idea of motion by stating: “An object in motion doesn't actually move either in the place it's in or in the place it isn't.” Democritus also dismisses qualities, claiming that what is cold is only cold in opinion, and what is hot is just hot in opinion; however, atoms and the vacuum truly exist. He also states: “But we know nothing for sure; because truth lies at the bottom.” Plato, following their lead, assigns the knowledge of truth to the Gods and their offspring, leaving humans with only the quest for what seems likely. And Euripides says:—

Who now can tell whether to live may not
Be properly to die. And whether that
Which men do call to die, may not in truth
Be but the entrance into real life?

And Empedocles speaks thus:—

And Empedocles says this:—

These things are not perceptible to sight,
Nor to the ears, nor comprehensible
To human intellect.

And in a preceding passage he says:—

And in a previous section, he says:—

Believing nothing, but such circumstances
As have befallen each.

Heraclitus, too, says, “Let us not form conjectures at random, about things of the greatest importance.” And Hippocrates delivers his opinion in a very doubtful manner, such as becomes a man; and before them all Homer has said:—

Heraclitus also says, “Let’s not make random guesses about things that really matter.” And Hippocrates shares his views in a way that’s quite uncertain, which is fitting for a person; and before them all, Homer has said:—

Long in the field of words we may contend,
Reproach is infinite and knows no end.

And immediately after:—

And right after:—

Armed, or with truth or falsehood, right or wrong.
(So voluble a weapon is the tongue),
Wounded we wound, and neither side can fail,
For every man has equal strength to rail:[134]

Intimating the equal vigour and antithetical force of words. And the Sceptics persevered in overthrowing all the dogmas of every sect, while they themselves asserted nothing dogmatically; and contented themselves with expressing the opinions of others, without affirming anything themselves, not even that they did affirm nothing; so that even discarded all positive denial; for to say, “We affirm nothing,” was to affirm something. “But we,” said they, “enunciate the doctrines of others, to prove our own perfect indifference; it is just as if we were to express the same thing by a simple sign.” So these words, “We affirm nothing,” indicate the absence of all affirmation, just as other propositions, such as, “Not more one thing than another,” or, “Every reason has a corresponding reason opposed to it,” and all such maxims indicate a similar idea. But the phrase, “Not more one thing,” &c., has sometimes an affirmative sense, indicating the equality of certain things, as for instance, in this sentence, “A pirate is not worse than a liar.” But by the sceptics this is said not positively, but negatively, as for instance, where the speaker contests a point[408] and says, “It was not Scylla, any more than it was Chimæra.” And the word “more,” itself, is sometimes used to indicate a comparison, as when we say, “That honey is more sweet than grapes.” And at other times it is used positively, and at the same time negatively, as when we say, “Virtue profits us more than hurts us;” for in this phrase we intimate that virtue does profit, and does not hurt us. But the Sceptics abolish the whole expression, “Not more than it;” saying, that “Prudence has not existence, any more than it has no existence.” Accordingly, then, expression, as Timon says in his Python, indicates nothing more than an absence of all affirmation, or of all assent of the judgment.

Implying the equal power and opposing force of words. The Sceptics continued to challenge all the beliefs of various groups while they themselves asserted nothing definitively; they were satisfied with sharing the opinions of others without claiming anything themselves, not even that they claimed nothing; so they even rejected all positive denial; because to say, “We affirm nothing,” is in itself an affirmation. “But we,” they said, “state the beliefs of others to demonstrate our complete indifference; it’s as if we were to express the same idea through a simple sign.” Thus, the phrase “We affirm nothing” shows a lack of any affirmation, just like other statements such as, “Not one thing more than another,” or, “For every reason, there’s an opposing reason,” and all such sayings express a similar concept. However, the phrase “Not one thing more,” etc., can sometimes have a positive meaning, indicating the equality of certain things, as in the sentence, “A pirate is no worse than a liar.” But for the Sceptics, this is stated negatively, like when the speaker disputes a point and says, “It was neither Scylla nor Chimæra.” The term “more” itself is sometimes used for comparison, as when we say, “That honey is sweeter than grapes.” Other times it’s used both positively and negatively, as when we say, “Virtue benefits us more than it harms us;” because in this statement, we suggest that virtue does indeed benefit us and does not harm us. The Sceptics eliminate the whole expression, “Not more than it,” saying that “Prudence has no existence, just as it has no non-existence.” Therefore, expression, as Timon states in his Python, signifies nothing more than a complete absence of affirmation, or of any agreement of the judgment.

Also the expression, “Every reason has a corresponding reason,” &c., does in the same manner indicate the suspension of the judgment; for if, while the facts are different, the expressions are equipollent, it follows that a man must be quite ignorant of the real truth.

Also, the phrase, “Every reason has a corresponding reason,” etc., similarly suggests a pause in judgment; because if, while the facts differ, the expressions are equivalent, it means a person must be completely unaware of the actual truth.

Besides this, to this assertion there is a contrary assertion opposed, which, after having destroyed all others, turns itself against itself, and destroys itself, resembling, as it were, those cathartic medicines which, after they have cleansed the stomach, then discharge themselves, and are got rid of. And so the dogmatic philosophers say, that all these reasonings are so far from overturning the authority of reason that they confirm it. To this the Sceptics reply, that they only employ reason as an instrument, because it is impossible to overturn the authority of reason, without employing reason; just as if we assert that there is no such thing as space, we must employ the word “space,” but that not dogmatically, but demonstratively; and if we assert that nothing exists according to necessity, it is unavoidable that we must use the word “necessity.” The same principle of interpretation did they adopt; for they affirmed that facts are not by nature such as they appear to be, but that they only seem such; and they said, that what they doubt is not what they think, for their thoughts are evident to themselves, but the reality of the things which are only made known to them by their sensations.

Besides this, there’s an opposing argument to this claim, which, after negating all others, ends up contradicting itself and ultimately destroys itself, similar to those cleansing medicines that empty the stomach and then are expelled. The dogmatic philosophers argue that these reasonings do not undermine the authority of reason; rather, they bolster it. The Sceptics counter that they only use reason as a tool because it's impossible to challenge the authority of reason without using reason itself; for example, if we claim that space doesn’t exist, we must still use the term “space,” but not as an absolute statement, rather as part of a demonstration. Similarly, if we say that nothing exists necessarily, we inevitably need to use the term “necessity.” They adopted the same interpretive principle; they believed that facts are not inherently as they seem, but only appear that way. They maintained that their doubt isn't about their thoughts, which are clear to them, but about the reality of things, which they only know through their sensations.

The Pyrrhonean system, then, is a simple explanation of appearances, or of notions of every kind, by means of which, comparing one thing with another one arrives at the conclusion,[409] that there is nothing in all these notions, but contradiction and confusion; as Ænesidemus says in his Introduction to Pyrrhonism. As to the contradictions which are found in those speculations, when they have pointed out in what way each fact is convincing, they then, by the same means, take away all belief from it; for they say that we regard as certain, those things which always produce similar impressions on the senses, those which are the offspring of habit, or which are established by the laws, and those too which give pleasure or excite wonder. And they prove that the reasons opposite to those on which our assent is founded are entitled to equal belief.

The Pyrrhonean system is a straightforward way to explain appearances or concepts of all kinds. By comparing one thing to another, you reach the conclusion,[409] that there's nothing in these concepts but contradiction and confusion, as Ænesidemus mentions in his Introduction to Pyrrhonism. Regarding the contradictions found in those theories, they first show how each fact is convincing, then use the same approach to undermine all belief in it. They argue that we consider certain things to be true when they consistently produce similar impressions on our senses, those rooted in habit or established by laws, and also those that bring pleasure or provoke wonder. They demonstrate that the reasons contrary to those on which we base our agreement deserve equal belief.

IX. The difficulties which they suggest, relating to the agreement subsisting between what appears to the senses, and what is comprehended by the intellect, divide themselves into ten modes of argument, according to which the subject and object of our knowledge is incessantly changing. And these ten modes Pyrrho lays down in the following manner.

IX. The challenges they point out, concerning the relationship between what we perceive with our senses and what we understand with our minds, can be broken down into ten different arguments, where the subject and object of our knowledge are constantly shifting. Pyrrho explains these ten arguments as follows.

The first relates to the difference which one remarks between the sentiments of animals in respect of pleasure, and pain, and what is injurious, and what is advantageous; and from this we conclude, that the same objects do not always produce the same impressions; and that the fact of this difference ought to be a reason with us for suspending our judgment. For there are some animals which are produced without any sexual connexion, as those which live in the fire, and the Arabian Phœnix, and worms. Others again are engendered by copulation, as men and others of that kind; and some are composed in one way, and others in another; on which account they also differ in their senses, as for instance, hawks are very keen-sighted; dogs have a most acute scent. It is plain, therefore, that the things seen produce different impressions on those animals which differ in their power of sight. So, too, young branches are eagerly eaten by the goat, but are bitter to mankind; and hemlock is nutritious for the quail, but deadly to man; and pigs eat their own dung, but a horse does not.

The first point is about the difference in how animals experience pleasure and pain, and what is harmful versus what is beneficial; from this, we conclude that the same objects don’t always create the same reactions. This difference should make us hesitate in passing judgment. Some animals reproduce without sexual connection, like those that live in fire, the Arabian Phoenix, and worms. Others are born through copulation, like humans and similar creatures; some are made one way and others another. This is why they also have different senses. For example, hawks have excellent vision, while dogs have an incredibly sharp sense of smell. Clearly, what they see affects different animals based on their sight abilities. Similarly, young branches are eagerly eaten by goats but are bitter for humans; hemlock is nutritious for quails but toxic to people; and pigs eat their own waste, while horses do not.

The second mode refers to the nature and idiosyncracies of men. According to Demophon, the steward of Alexander used to feel warm in the shade, and to shiver in the sun. And Andron, the Argive, as Aristotle tells us, travelled[410] through the dry parts of Libya, without once drinking. Again, one man is fond of medicine, another of farming, another of commerce; and the same pursuits are good for one man, and injurious to another; on which account, we ought to suspend our opinions.

The second mode refers to the nature and quirks of people. According to Demophon, Alexander's steward used to feel warm in the shade and shiver in the sun. And Andron, the Argive, as Aristotle tells us, traveled[410] through the dry areas of Libya without drinking once. Moreover, one person loves medicine, another enjoys farming, and another is into commerce; the same activities can be beneficial for one person and harmful to another; for this reason, we should keep an open mind.

The third mode, is that which has for its object the difference of the organs of sense. Accordingly, an apple presents itself to the sight as yellow, to the taste as sweet, to the smell as fragrant; and the same form is seen, in very different lights, according to the differences of mirrors. It follows, therefore, that what is seen is just as likely to be something else as the reality.

The third mode is focused on the differences in our senses. For example, an apple looks yellow, tastes sweet, and smells fragrant; the same object can appear very different depending on the mirrors reflecting it. Therefore, it's just as possible that what we perceive is something other than reality.

The fourth refers to the dispositions of the subject, and the changes in general to which it is liable. Such as health, sickness, sleep, waking, joy, grief, youth, old age, courage, fear, want, abundance, hatred, friendship, warmth, cold, easiness of breathing, oppression of the respiratory organs, and so on. The objects, therefore, appear different to us according to the disposition of the moment; for, even madmen are not in a state contrary to nature. For, why are we to say that of them more than of ourselves? For we too look at the sun as if it stood still. Theon, of Tithora, the Stoic, used to walk about in his sleep; and a slave of Pericles’ used, when in the same state, to walk on the top of the house.

The fourth refers to a person's mood and the general changes they go through, like health, sickness, sleep, wakefulness, joy, sadness, youth, old age, courage, fear, lack, abundance, hatred, friendship, warmth, cold, ease of breathing, difficulty breathing, and so on. Therefore, things seem different to us depending on our mood at the time; even people who are mad aren’t acting contrary to nature. Why should we judge them differently than ourselves? After all, we also see the sun as if it’s standing still. Theon from Tithora, a Stoic, would walk around in his sleep, and a slave of Pericles would walk on the roof while in the same state.

The fifth mode is conversant with laws, and established customs, and belief in mythical traditions, and the conventions of art, and dogmatical opinions. This mode embraces all that relates to vice, and to honesty; to the true, and to the false; to the good, and to the bad; to the Gods, and to the production, and destruction of all visible objects. Accordingly, the same action is just in the case of some people, and unjust in that of others. And good in the case of some, and bad in that of others. On this principle we see that the Persians do not think it unnatural for a man to marry his daughter; but among the Greeks it is unlawful. Again, the Massagetæ, as Eudoxus tells us in the first book of his Travels over the World, have their women in common; but the Greeks do not. And the Cilicians delight in piracy, but the Greeks avoid it. So again, different nations worship different Gods; and some believe in the providence of God, and others do not. The Egyptians embalm their dead, and then bury them; the Romans burn[411] them; the Pæonians throw them into the lakes. All these considerations show that we ought to suspend our judgment.

The fifth mode deals with laws, established customs, belief in myths, artistic conventions, and authoritative opinions. This mode covers everything related to vice and honesty; what is true and what is false; what is good and what is bad; the gods, and the creation and destruction of all visible things. Therefore, the same action can be considered just for some people and unjust for others. It can be good for some and bad for others. For instance, Persians may not see it as unnatural for a man to marry his daughter, while it's illegal among the Greeks. Similarly, as Eudoxus mentions in the first book of his Travels over the World, the Massagetæ share their women, which the Greeks do not accept. The Cilicians enjoy piracy, whereas the Greeks avoid it. Moreover, different cultures worship different gods; some believe in divine providence while others do not. The Egyptians embalm their dead and then bury them; the Romans cremate theirs; the Pæonians toss their dead into lakes. All these factors indicate that we should withhold judgment.

The sixth mode has reference to the promiscuousness and confusion of objects; according to which nothing is seen by us simply and by itself; but in combination either with air, or with light, or with moisture, or with solidity, or heat, or cold, or motion, or evaporation or some other power. Accordingly, purple exhibits a different hue in the sun, and in the moon, and in a lamp. And our own complexions appear different when seen at noonday and at sunset. And a stone which one cannot lift in the air, is easily displaced in the water, either because it is heavy itself and is made light by the water, or because it is light in itself and is made heavy by the air. So that we cannot positively know the peculiar qualities of anything, just as we cannot discover oil in ointment.

The sixth mode refers to the mixed nature and confusion of objects, meaning that nothing is seen by us on its own; instead, it's always in combination with elements like air, light, moisture, solidity, heat, cold, motion, evaporation, or some other force. For instance, purple looks different in sunlight, moonlight, and under a lamp. Similarly, our skin tones appear different when seen at noon compared to sunset. A stone that’s too heavy to lift in the air can be easily moved in water, either because it's heavy and made lighter by the water, or because it's light and made heavier by the air. Thus, we can't truly know the unique qualities of anything, just as we can't find oil in ointment.

The seventh mode has reference to distances, and position, and space, and to the objects which are in space. In this mode one establishes the fact that objects which we believe to be large, sometimes appear small; that those which we believe to be square, sometimes appear round; that those which we fancy even, appear full of projections; those which we think straight, seem bent; and those which we believe to be colourless, appear of quite a different complexion. Accordingly, the sun, on account of its distance from us, appears small. The mountains too, at a distance,[135] appear airy masses and smooth, but when beheld close, they are rough. Again, the sun has one appearance at his rise, and quite a different one at midday. And the same body looks very different in a wood from what it does on plain ground. So too, the appearance of an object changes according to its position as regards us; for instance, the neck of a dove varies as it turns. Since then, it is impossible to view these things irrespectively of place and position, it is clear that their real nature is not known.

The seventh mode relates to distance, position, and space, as well as the objects that occupy that space. In this mode, we recognize that objects we consider large can sometimes look small; those we think are square may appear round; what we imagine has projections can seem smooth; things we perceive as straight might look bent; and items we believe to be colorless can actually show a different hue. For example, the sun, due to its distance from us, appears small. Mountains, seen from afar, look like light, smooth shapes, but up close, they are rough and rugged. Additionally, the sun looks one way at sunrise and completely different at noon. An object can also look very different in a forest than it does on open ground. Similarly, an object's appearance changes based on its position relative to us; for example, the neck of a dove looks different as it turns. Since it is impossible to observe these things without considering their position and distance, it’s clear that we do not truly know their real nature.

The eighth mode has respect to the magnitudes or quantities of things; or to the heat or coldness, or to the speed or slowness,[412] or to the paleness or variety of colour of the subject. For instance, a moderate quantity of wine when taken invigorates, but an excessive quantity weakens. And the same is the case with food, and other similar things.

The eighth mode relates to the sizes or amounts of things; or to their heat or coldness, or to how fast or slow they are,[412] or to their paleness or range of colors. For example, a moderate amount of wine can give you energy, but too much can make you weak. The same applies to food and other similar things.

The ninth depends upon the frequency, or rarity, or strangeness of the thing under consideration. For instance, earthquakes excite no wonder among those nations with whom they are of frequent occurrence; nor does the sun, because he is seen every day.

The ninth depends on how often, rarely, or strangely the thing in question happens. For example, earthquakes don't surprise those nations where they happen often; nor does the sun, since it is seen every day.

The ninth mode is called by Phavorinus, the eighth, and by Sextus and Ænesidemus, the tenth; and Sextus calls the tenth the eighth, which Phavorinus reckons the tenth as the ninth in order.

The ninth mode is referred to by Phavorinus as the eighth, and by Sextus and Ænesidemus as the tenth; meanwhile, Sextus refers to the tenth as the eighth, which Phavorinus counts as the tenth, classifying it as the ninth in sequence.

The tenth mode refers to the comparison between one thing and another; as, for instance, between what is light and what is heavy; between what is strong and what is weak; between what is greater and what is less; what is above and what is below. For instance, that which is on the right, is not on the right intrinsically and by nature, but it is looked upon as such in consequence of its relation to something else; and if that other thing be transposed, then it will no longer be on the right. In the same way, a man is spoken of as a father, or brother, or relation to some one else; and day is called so in relation to the sun: and everything has its distinctive name in relation to human thought: therefore, those things which are known in relation to others, are unknown of themselves.

The tenth mode involves comparing one thing with another; for example, comparing what is light with what is heavy, what is strong with what is weak, what is greater with what is lesser, and what is above with what is below. For instance, something that is on the right is not inherently on the right by its own nature, but is considered as such due to its relationship with something else; if that other thing is moved, it will no longer be on the right. Similarly, a person is identified as a father, brother, or relative to someone else; and daytime is defined in relation to the sun. Everything has its specific name based on human perception: thus, things that are understood in relation to others are not understood on their own.

And these are the ten modes.

And these are the ten ways.

X. But Agrippa adds five other modes to them. One derived from the disagreement of opinions; another from the necessity of proceeding ad infinitum from one reasoning to another; a third from relation; a fourth from hypothesis; and the last from the reciprocal nature of proofs.

X. But Agrippa adds five other modes to them. One comes from the disagreement of opinions; another from the need to go ad infinitum from one reasoning to another; a third from relation; a fourth from hypothesis; and the last from the reciprocal nature of proofs.

That which refers to the disagreement of opinions, shows that all the questions which philosophers propose to themselves, or which people in general discuss, are full of uncertainty and contradiction.

The disagreement of opinions indicates that all the questions philosophers ask themselves, or that people discuss in general, are filled with uncertainty and contradictions.

That which is derived from the necessity of proceeding incessantly from one reasoning to another, demonstrates that it is impossible for a man ever, in his researches, to arrive at undeniable truth; since one truth is only to be established by another truth; and so on, ad infinitum.

What comes from the need to continually move from one piece of reasoning to another shows that it's impossible for a person to ever find undeniable truth in their searches; since one truth can only be proven by another truth, and so on, ad infinitum.

The mode which is derived from relation rests on the doctrine that no object is ever perceived independently and entirely by itself, but always in its relation to something else; so that it is impossible to know its nature correctly.

The mode that comes from relation is based on the idea that no object is ever seen completely on its own, but always in connection to something else; therefore, it is impossible to understand its true nature accurately.

That which depends on hypothesis is directed against those arguers who pretend that it is necessary to accept the principles of things taken absolutely, and that one must place one’s faith in them without any examination, which is an absurdity, for one may just as well lay down the opposite principles.

What depends on assumptions targets those debaters who claim that it’s essential to accept the fundamental truths of things as they are, and that one must trust them without any scrutiny, which is ridiculous, because one could just as easily establish contrary principles.

The fifth mode, that one namely which arises from the reciprocal nature of proofs, is capable of application whenever the proof of the truth which we are looking for supposes, as a necessary preliminary, our belief in that truth; for instance, if, after we have proved the porosity of bodies by their evaporations, we return and prove the evaporations by the porosity.

The fifth mode, which arises from the interconnected nature of proofs, can be used whenever proving the truth we seek relies on first believing in that truth. For example, if we prove that bodies are porous by looking at their evaporation, we can then go back and prove the evaporations by referencing their porosity.

XI. These Sceptics then deny the existence of any demonstration, of any test of truth, of any signs, or causes, or motion, or learning, and of anything as intrinsically or naturally good or bad. For every demonstration, say they, depends either on things which demonstrate themselves, or on principles which are indemonstrable. If on things which demonstrate themselves, then these things themselves require demonstration; and so on ad infinitum. If on principles which are indemonstrable, then, the very moment that either the sum total of these principles, or even one single one of them, is incorrectly urged, the whole demonstration falls instantly to pieces. But if any one supposes, they add, that there are principles which require no demonstration, that man deceives himself strangely, not seeing that it is necessary for him in the first place to establish this point, that they contain their proof in themselves. For a man cannot prove that there are four elements, because there are four elements.

XI. These skeptics deny that there’s any way to prove something, any test for truth, any signs, causes, motions, or knowledge, and that anything is naturally good or bad. They argue that every demonstration relies either on things that prove themselves or on principles that can’t be proven. If it relies on things that prove themselves, then those things need proof as well; and this goes on ad infinitum. If it relies on principles that can’t be proven, then the moment either the totality of those principles or even just one of them is incorrectly asserted, the entire demonstration collapses. But if someone thinks there are principles that need no proof, they argue, that person is fooling themselves, not realizing they first need to establish that those principles are self-evident. A person cannot prove there are four elements simply because there are four elements.

Besides, if particular proofs are denied in a complex demonstration, it must follow that the whole demonstration is also incorrect. Again, if we are to know that an argument is really a demonstrative proof, we must have a test of truth; and in order to establish a test, we require a demonstrative proof; and these two things must be devoid of every kind of certainty, since they bear reciprocally the one on the other.

Besides, if specific proofs are denied in a complex argument, it follows that the entire argument is also wrong. Additionally, to know that an argument is genuinely a valid proof, we need a way to test for truth; to establish this test, we require a valid proof; and these two aspects must lack any form of certainty, as they rely on each other.

How then is any one to arrive at certainty about obscure matters, if one is ignorant even how one ought to attempt to[414] prove them? For what one is desirous to understand is not what the appearance of things is, but what their nature and essence is.

How can anyone be sure about unclear issues if they don't even know how to go about proving them? What we really want to understand isn’t just how things seem, but what their true nature and essence are.

They show, too, that the dogmatic philosophers act with great simplicity; for that the conclusions which they draw from their hypothetical principles, are not scientific truths but mere suppositions; and that, in the same manner, one might establish the most improbable propositions. They also say that those who pretend that one ought not to judge of things by the circumstances which surround them, or by their accessories, but that one ought to take their nature itself as one’s guide, do not perceive that, while they pretend to give the precise measure and definition of everything, if the objects present such and such an appearance, that depends solely on their position and relative arrangement. They conclude from thence, that it is necessary to say that everything is true, or that everything is false. For if certain things only are true, how is one to recognize them. Evidently it will not be the senses which judge in that case of the objects of sensation, for all appearances are equal to the senses; nor will it be the intellect, for the same reason. But besides these two faculties, there does not appear to be any other test or criterion at all. So, say they, if we desire to arrive at any certainty with respect to any object which comes under either sense or intellect, we must first establish those opinions which are laid down previously as bearing on those objects. For some people have denied this doctrine, and others have overturned that; it is therefore indispensable that they should be judged of either by the senses or by the intellect. And the authority of each of these faculties is contested; it is therefore impossible to form a positive judgment of the operations of the senses and of the intellect; and if the contest between the different opinions, compels us to a neutrality, then the measure which appeared proper to apply to the appreciation of all those objects is at the same time put an end to, and one must fix a similar valuation on everything.

They also show that dogmatic philosophers act very simply; the conclusions they draw from their hypothetical principles aren't scientific truths but mere assumptions. Similarly, one could establish the most unlikely propositions. They argue that those who claim we shouldn't judge things by their surrounding circumstances or by their context, but should instead take their essence as our guide, fail to see that how objects appear depends entirely on their position and arrangement. They conclude that everything must either be true or false. If only certain things are true, how can we identify them? Clearly, it won't be the senses judging in that case since all appearances are equal to the senses; nor will it be the intellect for the same reason. Additionally, there doesn't seem to be any other test or standard. So, they say, if we want certainty about any object that comes under the senses or intellect, we must first establish the opinions that have been previously set regarding those objects. Some people have denied this doctrine, and others have overturned that one; therefore, it’s essential that they be judged by either the senses or the intellect. The authority of each of these faculties is debated, making it impossible to form a definitive judgment on how the senses and intellect operate. If the conflict between different opinions forces us into neutrality, then the method we thought was appropriate for evaluating all those objects is no longer valid, and we must assign the same value to everything.

Perhaps our opponent will say, “Are then appearances trustworthy or deceitful?”[136] We answer that, if they are[415] trustworthy, the other side has nothing to object to those to whom the contrary appearance presents itself. For, as he who says that such and such a thing appears to him is trustworthy, so also is he who says that the contrary appears to him. And if appearances are deceitful, then they do not deserve any confidence when they assert what appears to them to be true. We are not bound then to believe that a thing is true, merely because it obtains assent. For all men do not yield to the same reasons; and even the same individual does not always see things in the same light. Persuasion often depends on external circumstances, on the authority of the speaker, on his ability, on the elegance of his language, on habit, or even on pleasure.

Our opponent might ask, “Are appearances reliable or misleading?”[136] We respond that if they are reliable, then the other side can’t argue against those who see things differently. Just as someone who claims that something appears a certain way is trustworthy, so is someone who claims the opposite appears to them. And if appearances are misleading, then we shouldn't trust them when they state what seems true to them. We aren’t obligated to believe something is true just because others agree with it. Not everyone responds to the same arguments, and even an individual might not always see things the same way. Convincing someone often relies on outside factors, the authority of the speaker, their skill, the way they express themselves, familiarity, or even personal preference.

They also, by this train of reasoning, suppress the criterion of truth. Either the criterion has been decided on, or it has not. And if it has not, it does not deserve any confidence, and it cannot be of any use at all in aiding us to discern truth from falsehood. If, on the other hand, it has been decided on, it then enters into the class of particular things which require a criterion, and in that case to judge and to be judged amount to the same thing; the criterion which judges is itself judged of by something else, that again by a third criterion, and so on ad infinitum. Add to this, say they, the fact that people are not even agreed as to the nature of the criterion of truth; some say that man is the criterion, others that it is the senses which are so: one set places reason in the van, another class rely upon cataleptic perception.

They also, by this line of reasoning, dismiss the standard for truth. Either the standard has been established, or it hasn’t. If it hasn’t, it doesn’t warrant any trust, and it can’t help us distinguish truth from falsehood at all. On the other hand, if it has been established, it falls into the category of specific things that need a standard, and in that case, judging and being judged are the same; the standard that judges is itself judged by something else, which in turn is judged by a third standard, and so on ad infinitum. Additionally, they point out that people don’t even agree on the nature of the standard for truth; some argue that humans are the standard, while others say it’s the senses. One group prioritizes reason, while another relies on cataleptic perception.

As to man himself, he disagrees both with himself and with others, as the diversity of laws and customs proves. The senses are deceivers, and reason disagrees with itself. Cataleptic perception is judged of by the intellect, and the intellect changes in various manners; accordingly, we can never find any positive criterion, and in consequence, truth itself wholly eludes our search.

As for man himself, he disagrees with both himself and others, as the variety of laws and customs shows. Our senses can mislead us, and reason often contradicts itself. Cataleptic perception is assessed by the intellect, which changes in different ways; therefore, we can never establish any solid standard, and as a result, the truth completely escapes our grasp.

They also affirm that there are no such things as signs; for if there are signs, they argue they must be such as are apprehended either by the senses or by the intellect. Now, there are none which are apprehended by the senses, for everything which is apprehended by the senses is general, while a sign is something particular. Moreover, any object which is apprehended by the senses has an existence of its own, while signs are only relative. Again, signs are not apprehended by the[416] intellect, for in that case they would be either the visible manifestation of a visible thing, or the invisible manifestation of an invisible thing, or the invisible sign of a visible thing; or the visible sign of an invisible thing. But none of all these cases are possible; there are therefore no such things as signs at all.

They also insist that there are no such things as signs; because if there are signs, they argue, they must be understood either through the senses or the mind. Now, there are none that can be understood by the senses, since everything sensed is general, while a sign is something specific. Additionally, any object perceived through the senses exists independently, whereas signs are only relative. Furthermore, signs are not understood by the mind, because in that case they would either be the visible representation of a visible thing, the invisible representation of an invisible thing, the invisible sign of a visible thing, or the visible sign of an invisible thing. But none of these possibilities can occur; so, there are no such things as signs at all.

There is therefore no such thing as a visible sign of a visible thing; for that which is visible has no need of a sign. Nor, again, is there any invisible sign of an invisible thing; for when anything is manifested by means of another thing, it must become visible. On the same principle there is no invisible sign of a visible object; for that which aids in the perception of something else must be visible. Lastly, there is no visible manifestation of an invisible thing; for as a sign is something wholly relative, it must be perceived in that of which it is the sign; and that is not the case. It follows, therefore, that none of those things which are not visible in themselves admit of being perceived; for one considers signs as things which aid in the perception of that which is not evident by itself.

There’s no such thing as a visible sign for something visible, because something that can be seen doesn’t need a sign. Similarly, there’s no invisible sign for something invisible; whenever something is shown through another thing, it becomes visible. By the same logic, there’s no invisible sign for a visible object, since anything that helps us perceive something else must be visible. Finally, there’s no visible manifestation of something invisible; since a sign is entirely relative, it must be perceived in relation to what it signifies, and that’s not the case here. Therefore, none of the things that aren’t visible themselves can be perceived, because we think of signs as things that assist in perceiving what isn’t clear by itself.

They also wholly discard, and, as far as depends on them, overturn the idea of any cause, by means of this same train of reasoning. Cause is something relative. It is relative to that of which it is the cause. But that which is relative is only conceived, and has no real existence. The idea of a cause then is a pure conception; for, inasmuch as it is a cause, it must be a cause of something; otherwise it would be no cause at all. In the same way as a father cannot be a father, unless there exists some being in respect of whom one gives him the title of father; so too a cause stands on the same ground. For, supposing that nothing exists relatively to which a cause can be spoken of; then, as there is no production, or destruction, or anything of that sort, there can likewise be no cause. However, let us admit that there are such things as causes. In that case then, either a body must be the cause of a body, or that which is incorporeal must be the cause of that which is incorporeal. Now, neither of these cases is possible, therefore, there is no such thing as cause. In fact, one body cannot be the cause of another body, since both bodies must have the same nature; and if it be said that one is the cause, inasmuch as it is a body, then the other must[417] be a cause for the same reason. And in that case one would have two reciprocal causes; two agents without any passive subject.

They completely reject and, as far as they are concerned, overturn the concept of any cause using this same line of reasoning. Cause is something relative. It relates to whatever it causes. But what’s relative only exists as a concept and doesn’t have any real existence. So, the idea of a cause is just a concept; because if it is a cause, it must be a cause of something; otherwise, it wouldn’t be a cause at all. Just like a father can't be considered a father unless there is someone to whom he is called a father, a cause operates the same way. If nothing exists in relation to which we can talk about a cause, then without production, destruction, or anything like that, there can't be a cause either. However, if we accept that causes do exist, then either a body must be the cause of another body, or something incorporeal must cause something else incorporeal. Neither of these scenarios is possible, so there’s no such thing as cause. In fact, one body can’t cause another body since both must share the same nature; and if we say that one is the cause because it's a body, then the other must also be a cause for the same reason. In that case, we would have two reciprocal causes; two agents with no passive subject.

Again, one incorporeal thing cannot be the cause of another incorporeal thing for the same reason. Also, an incorporeal thing cannot be the cause of a body, because nothing that is incorporeal can produce a body. Nor, on the other hand, can a body be the cause of anything incorporeal, because in every production there must be some passive subject matter; but, as what is incorporeal is by its own nature protected from being a passive subject, it cannot be the object of any productive power. There is, therefore, no such thing as any cause at all. From all which it follows, that the first principles of all things have no reality; for such a principle, if it did exist, must be both the agent and the efficient cause.

Again, one non-physical thing cannot cause another non-physical thing for the same reasons. Also, a non-physical thing cannot cause a physical body, because nothing non-physical can create a body. On the flip side, a physical body cannot cause anything non-physical either, because every creation requires some sort of passive material; but since what is non-physical is inherently protected from being a passive subject, it cannot be the target of any creative power. Therefore, there is no such thing as any cause at all. From all of this, it follows that the fundamental principles of all things have no real existence; because such a principle, if it existed, would have to be both the agent and the effective cause.

Again, there is no such thing as motion. For whatever is moved, is moved either in the place in which it is, or in that in which it is not. It certainly is not moved in the place in which it is, and it is impossible that it should be moved in the place in which it is not; therefore, there is no such thing as motion at all.

Again, there is no such thing as motion. Anything that moves is either moving in the place where it is, or in a place where it isn't. It definitely isn't moving in the place where it is, and it can't possibly be moving in a place where it isn't; therefore, motion doesn't exist at all.

They also denied the existence of all learning. If, said they, anything is taught, then either that which does exist is taught in its existence or that which does not exist is taught in its non-existence; but that which does exist is not taught in its existence (for the nature of all existent things is visible to all men, and is known by all men); nor is that which does not exist taught in its non-existence, for nothing can happen to that which does not exist, so that to be taught cannot happen to it.

They also denied the possibility of any learning. They argued that if anything is taught, then either what exists is taught in its existence or what doesn't exist is taught in its non-existence. However, what exists isn't taught in its existence (because the nature of all existing things is clear to everyone and is known by everyone); and what doesn't exist can't be taught in its non-existence, since nothing can happen to what doesn't exist, so it can't be taught.

Nor again, say they, is there any such thing as production. For that which is, is not produced, for it exists already; nor that which is not, for that does not exist at all. And that which has no being nor existence at all, cannot be produced.

Nor again, they say, is there any such thing as production. Because what exists is not produced; it already exists. And what doesn’t exist cannot be produced at all. Anything that has no being or existence cannot be produced.

Another of their doctrines is, that there is no such thing as any natural good, or natural evil. For if there be any natural good, or natural evil, then it must be good to everyone, or evil to everyone; just as snow is cold to everyone. But there is no such thing as one general good or evil which is common to all beings; therefore, there is no such thing as any natural good, or natural evil. For either one must pronounce everything[418] good which is thought so by anyone whatever, or one must say that it does not follow that everything which is thought good is good. Now, we cannot say that everything which is thought good is good, since the same thing is thought good by one person (as, for instance, pleasure is thought good by Epicurus) and evil by another (as it is thought evil by Antisthenes); and on this principle the same thing will be both good and evil. If, again, we assert that it does not follow that everything which is thought good is good, then we must distinguish between the different opinions; which it is not possible to do by reason of the equality of the reasons adduced in support of them. It follows that we cannot recognize anything as good by nature.

Another of their beliefs is that there is no such thing as natural good or natural evil. If there were any natural good or evil, it would have to be good for everyone or evil for everyone, just like snow is cold for everyone. But there isn't one universal good or evil that applies to all beings; hence, there’s no such thing as natural good or natural evil. Either we must declare everything considered good by anyone as actually good, or we must say that just because something is thought to be good, that doesn’t mean it is. We can't say that everything thought to be good is actually good, since the same thing can be viewed as good by one person (like pleasure, which Epicurus thinks is good) and evil by another (as it is seen as evil by Antisthenes); based on this logic, something can be both good and evil. If we claim that it doesn’t follow that everything thought to be good is good, we then need to distinguish between different opinions; but we can't do that because of the equal strength of the arguments supporting them. Therefore, we cannot recognize anything as inherently good.

And we may also take a view of the whole of their system by the writings which some of them have left behind them. Pyrrho himself has left nothing; but his friends Timon, and Ænesidemus, and Numenius, and Nausiphanes, and others of that class have left books. And the dogmatical philosophers arguing against them, say that they also adopt spurious and pronounce positive dogmas. For where they think that they are refuting others they are convicted, for in the very act of refutation, they assert positively and dogmatize. For when they say that they define nothing, and that every argument has an opposite argument; they do here give a positive definition, and assert a positive dogma. But they reply to these objectors; as to the things which happen to us as men, we admit the truth of what you say; for we certainly do know that it is day, and that we are alive; and we admit that we know many other of the phænomena of life. But with respect to those things as to which the dogmatic philosophers make positive assertions, saying that they are comprehended, we suspend our judgment on the ground of their being uncertain; and we know nothing but the passions; for we confess that we see, and we are aware that we comprehend that such a thing is the fact; but we do not know how we see, or how we comprehend. Also, we state in the way of narrative, that this appears white, without asserting positively that it really is so. And with respect to the assertion, “We define nothing,” and other sentences of that sort, we do not pronounce them as dogmas. For to say that is a different kind of statement from[419] saying that the world is spherical; for the one fact is not evident, while the other statements are mere admissions.

We can also get an overview of their entire system through the writings that some of them have left behind. Pyrrho himself didn't write anything, but his friends Timon, Ænesidemus, Numenius, Nausiphanes, and others from that group have published books. Philosophers who disagree with them argue that they also embrace questionable concepts and make definitive claims. They believe they are disproving others, but in the act of refuting, they make assertions and advocate their own viewpoints. When they claim that they don’t define anything and that every argument has an opposing argument, they actually provide a clear definition and make a definite assertion. In response to these critics, they acknowledge the truths about our experiences as humans. They accept that we know it is daytime and that we are alive, and they agree that we understand many aspects of life. However, regarding those things on which dogmatic philosophers make firm statements, asserting that they are understood, they choose to withhold judgment because of uncertainty; they only know their feelings. They admit that they see and recognize that something is a certain way, but they do not understand how they see or comprehend. Furthermore, when they describe something as appearing white, they do not claim it definitively is white. As for the statement, “We define nothing,” and similar phrases, they do not treat them as definitive claims. Saying that is a different assertion from claiming the world is spherical; one is not obvious, while the other statements are simply acknowledgments.

While, therefore, we say that we define nothing, we do not even say that as a definition.

While we claim that we define nothing, we don't even say that as a definition.

Again, the dogmatic philosophers say that the Sceptics overthrow all life, when they deny everything of which life consists. But the Sceptics say that they are mistaken; for they do not deny that they see, but that they do not know how it is that they see. For, say they, we assert what is actually the fact, but we do not describe its character. Again, we feel that fire burns, but we suspend our judgment as to whether it has a burning nature. Also, we see whether a person moves, and that a man dies; but how these things happen we know not. Therefore, say they, we only resist the uncertain deductions which are put by the side of evident facts. For when we say that an image has projections, we only state plainly what is evident; but when we say that it has not projections, we no longer say what appears evident, but something else. On which account Timon, in his Python, says that Pyrrho does not destroy the authority of custom. And in his Images he speaks thus:—

Again, the dogmatic philosophers argue that the Sceptics undermine all of life by denying everything that life is made of. But the Sceptics claim they're mistaken; they don’t deny that they see, but they question how it is that they see. They assert that what they state is an actual fact, but they don’t define its nature. For example, they acknowledge that fire burns, but they withhold judgment on whether it has a burning nature. They also see someone moving and know that a person dies; however, they don’t understand how these things happen. Thus, they say that they only challenge the uncertain conclusions that accompany clear facts. When we say that an image has projections, we simply express what is clear; but when we claim that it doesn’t have projections, we’re no longer stating what seems obvious, but something different. This is why Timon, in his Python, notes that Pyrrho does not negate the authority of custom. And in his Images, he expresses it this way:—

But what is evidently seen prevails,
Wherever it may be.

And in his treatise on the Senses, he says, “The reason why a thing is sweet I do not declare, but I confess that the fact of sweetness is evident.” So too, Ænesidemus, in the first book of his Pyrrhonean Discourses, says that Pyrrho defines nothing dogmatically, on account of the possibility of contradiction, but that he is guided by what is evident. And he says the same thing in his book against Wisdom, and in his treatise on Investigation.

And in his essay on the Senses, he states, “I won’t say why something is sweet, but I admit that sweetness is clear.” Similarly, Ænesidemus, in the first book of his Pyrrhonean Discourses, mentions that Pyrrho doesn’t define anything dogmatically due to the potential for contradiction, but instead follows what is evident. He makes the same point in his book against Wisdom and in his essay on Investigation.

In like manner, Zeuxis, a friend of Ænesidemus, in his treatise on Twofold Arguments, and Antiochus, of Laodicea, and Apellas, in his Agrippa, all declare nothing beyond what is evident. The criterion therefore, among the Sceptics, is that which is evident; as Ænesidemus also says; and Epicurus says the same thing.

In the same way, Zeuxis, a friend of Ænesidemus, in his work on Twofold Arguments, along with Antiochus from Laodicea and Apellas in his Agrippa, all assert nothing beyond what is obvious. Therefore, the standard among the Sceptics is what is evident; as Ænesidemus also states; and Epicurus expresses the same idea.

But Democritus says, that there is no test whatever of appearances, and also that they are not criteria of truth. Moreover, the dogmatic philosophers attack the criterion derived[420] from appearances, and say that the same objects present at times different appearances; so that a town presents at one time a square, and at another a round appearance; and that consequently, if the Sceptic does not discriminate between different appearances, he does nothing at all. If, on the contrary, he determines in favour of either, then, say they, he no longer attaches equal value to all appearances. The Sceptics reply to this, that in the presence of different appearances, they content themselves with saying that there are many appearances, and that it is precisely because things present themselves under different characters, that they affirm the existence of appearances.

But Democritus argues that there’s no reliable test for appearances, and that they aren’t a standard for truth. Additionally, the dogmatic philosophers criticize the standards based on appearances, claiming that the same objects show different appearances at times; for example, a town can look square at one moment and round at another. They assert that if the Skeptic doesn’t differentiate between these various appearances, they aren’t accomplishing anything. Conversely, if the Skeptic decides in favor of one appearance over another, they argue that the Skeptic is no longer treating all appearances equally. The Skeptics respond by stating that when faced with different appearances, they simply acknowledge that there are many appearances, and it’s precisely because things appear in various ways that they affirm the existence of appearances.

Lastly, the Sceptics say, that the chief good is the suspension of the judgment which tranquillity of mind follows, like its shadow, as Timon and Ænesidemus say; for that we need not choose these things, or avoid those, which all depend on ourselves: but as to those things which do not depend upon us, but upon necessity, such as hunger, thirst, and pain, those we cannot avoid; for it is not possible to put an end to them by reason.

Lastly, the Skeptics argue that the highest good is the suspension of judgment, which leads to a peaceful mind, much like a shadow, as Timon and Aenesidemus point out. We don’t need to choose or avoid things that depend on us. But for those things that are beyond our control and are determined by necessity, like hunger, thirst, and pain, we can’t avoid them; it’s not possible to eliminate them through reason.

But when the dogmatic philosophers object that the Sceptic, on his principles, will not refuse to kill his own father, if he is ordered to do so; so that they answer, that they can live very well without disquieting themselves about the speculations of the dogmatic philosophers; but, suspending their judgment in all matters which do not refer to living and the preservation of life. Accordingly, say they, we avoid some things, and we seek others, following custom in that; and we obey the laws.

But when the dogmatic philosophers argue that the Sceptic would not hesitate to kill his own father if told to do so, they respond that they can live perfectly fine without worrying about the ideas of dogmatic philosophers. Instead, they suspend their judgment on any matters that don’t relate to living and preserving life. So, they say, we avoid certain things and pursue others, following societal norms in that, and we comply with the laws.

Some authors have asserted, that the chief good of the Stoics is impassibility; others say that it is mildness and tranquillity.

Some authors have claimed that the main goal of the Stoics is to be free from suffering; others argue that it is kindness and calmness.

LIFE OF TIMON.

I. Apollonides, of Nicæa, a philosopher of our school, in the first book of his Commentaries on the Silli, which he dedicated to Tiberius Cæsar, says that Timon was the son of[421] Timarchus, and a Phliasian by birth. And then, when he was young, he studied dancing, and afterwards he renounced that study, and went to Megara to Stilpo. And having spent some time there, he returned home again and married. Then he came with his wife to Elis, to see Pyrrho, and there he remained while his children were born; the elder of whom, he called Xanthus, and taught him medicine, and left him his successor in his sect of philosophy. And he was a man of considerable eminence, as Sotion tells us in his eleventh book. Afterwards, being in difficulty as to his means, he departed to the Hellespont and the Propontis; and living at Chalcedon as a Sophist, he earned a very high reputation and great popularity; from thence he departed, after having made a considerable fortune, and went to Athens, and remained there till his death, going across once for a short time to Thebes. He was also acquainted with king Antigonus, and with Ptolemy Philadelphus, as he himself testifies in his Iambics.

I. Apollonides, from Nicæa, a philosopher from our school, in the first book of his Commentaries on the Silli, which he dedicated to Tiberius Caesar, mentions that Timon was the son of Timarchus and was born in Phlius. When he was young, he studied dancing but later gave it up and went to Megara to study under Stilpo. After spending some time there, he returned home and got married. He then traveled with his wife to Elis to meet Pyrrho and stayed there until their children were born; the eldest was named Xanthus, whom he taught medicine and made his successor in his philosophy. He was quite well-respected, as Sotion notes in his eleventh book. Later, facing financial difficulties, he moved to the Hellespont and the Propontis. Living in Chalcedon as a Sophist, he gained significant fame and popularity. After making a good fortune, he moved to Athens, where he lived until his death, with a brief visit to Thebes. He was also familiar with King Antigonus and Ptolemy Philadelphus, as he mentions in his Iambics.

II. He was, says Antigonus, fond of drinking, and he at times occupied himself with works quite inconsistent with philosophy; for he wrote lyric and epic poems, and tragedies and satiric dramas, and thirty comedies, and sixty tragedies and Silli, and amatory poems.

II. Antigonus says he enjoyed drinking and sometimes worked on things that didn’t really fit with philosophy. He wrote lyric and epic poems, tragedies and satirical plays, thirty comedies, sixty tragedies, Silli, and love poems.

There are works of his also enumerated in a regular catalogue, extending to twenty thousand verses, which are mentioned by Antigonus, of Carystos, who also wrote his life. Of the Silli, there are three volumes; in which he attacks every one as if he were a Sceptic, and especially he lampoons the dogmatic philosophers under the form of parodies. The first volume of these Silli contains a long uninterrupted narration; but the second and third are in the form of dialogues. He is represented in them, as interrogating Xenophanes, the Colophonian, about every thing, and he utters a long continued discourse; in his second book he speaks of the more ancient philosophers; and in his third of the more modern ones; on which account some people have given the last book the name of the epilogue.

There are also works of his listed in a standard catalog, amounting to twenty thousand verses, which are noted by Antigonus of Carystos, who also wrote about his life. The Silli consists of three volumes; in these, he criticizes everyone as if they were Sceptics, particularly mocking the dogmatic philosophers through parodies. The first volume of these Silli features a long, uninterrupted narrative, while the second and third are structured as dialogues. In these dialogues, he is depicted as questioning Xenophanes of Colophon about various subjects, presenting a lengthy discourse; the second book discusses the earlier philosophers, and the third focuses on the later ones, which is why some people refer to the last book as the epilogue.

But the first book contains the same subjects, with this difference, that in that it is all confined to one single person and its first line begins thus:—

But the first book covers the same topics, with the difference that it focuses entirely on one individual, and its opening line starts like this:—

Come hither, all you over-busy Sophists

III. He died when he was nearly ninety years old, as Antigonus tells us; and Sotion, in his eleventh book, makes the same statement. I have heard it said that he had only one eye, and, indeed, he used to call himself Cyclops.

III. He died when he was almost ninety years old, as Antigonus tells us; and Sotion, in his eleventh book, makes the same point. I've heard it said that he had only one eye, and he even used to call himself Cyclops.

IV. There was also another Timon, the misanthrope.

IV. There was also another Timon, the recluse.

V. Now this philosopher was very fond of a garden, and also of solitude, as we are told by Antigonus. Accordingly it is reported, that Hieronymus, the Peripatetic, said of him, as among the Scythians, both they who fly, and they who pursue shoot with the bow, so in the case of the philosophers, those who pursue and those who fly both hunt for pupils, as Timon for instance.

V. This philosopher really loved his garden and solitude, as Antigonus tells us. It's said that Hieronymus, the Peripatetic, remarked that just like among the Scythians, where both those who flee and those who chase shoot arrows, in the world of philosophers, both those who seek and those who retreat are looking for students, like Timon, for instance.

VI. He was a man of very acute perceptions, and very quick at seeing the ridiculous side of any question: he was also very fond of learning, and a very clever man at devising plots for poets, and at composing dramas. And he used to associate with himself, in the composition of his tragedies, two other poets, named Alexander and Homer; and whenever he was disturbed by his maid-servants or by the dogs, he paid no attention to them, studying above all things to live in tranquillity. They tell a story, that Aratus asked him how he could procure an entire and correct copy of Homer’s poetry, and he answered, “If he could fall in with an old manuscript which had never been corrected.” And all his works used to lie about at random, and at times half eaten by mice; so that once when he was reading them to Zopyrus, the orator, and unrolling a volume, he read whatever passages came first, and when he got to the middle of the book he found a great gap, which he had not previously perceived, so very indifferent was he about such matters.

VI. He was a man with sharp perceptions and quick to see the ridiculous side of any issue. He loved learning and was quite clever at coming up with plots for poets and writing plays. He often worked with two other poets, named Alexander and Homer, on his tragedies. Whenever he was interrupted by his maids or the dogs, he ignored them, focusing primarily on living in peace. There's a story that Aratus asked him how he could get a complete and accurate copy of Homer's poetry, and he replied, “If he could come across an old manuscript that hadn’t been edited.” His works were often scattered around, sometimes even partially eaten by mice. Once, while reading them to Zopyrus, the orator, and unrolling a volume, he read whatever sections came first, only to discover a huge gap in the middle of the book that he hadn’t noticed before, showing just how little he cared about such things.

His constitution was so vigorous, that he could easily go without his dinner. And they say, that once when he saw Arcesilaus passing through the forum of the Cercopes, he said, “What are you doing here, where we freemen are?” And he used constantly to quote to those who invoked the testimony of their intellects to judge of the senses:—

His health was so strong that he could easily skip dinner. They say that once, when he saw Arcesilaus walking through the marketplace of the Cercopes, he said, “What are you doing here, among us free people?” And he often quoted to those who relied on their intellects to judge the senses:—

Attagas and Numenius are met.[137]

And this jesting manner was habitual with him. Accordingly[423] he once said to a man, who was surprised at everything, “Why do you not wonder that we three men have only four eyes between us?” for he himself had only one eye, no more had Dioscorides, his pupil; but the man to whom he was speaking had his sight unimpaired. On another occasion, he was asked by Arcesilaus, why he had come from Thebes, and he said, “To laugh at you all when I see you face to face.” But though he attacked Arcesilaus in his Silli, he has praised him in the book entitled the Funeral Banquet of Arcesilaus.

And this joking attitude was a regular thing for him. So, he once said to a guy who was surprised by everything, “Why don’t you find it strange that we three men only have four eyes between us?” because he himself only had one eye, and so did Dioscorides, his student; but the guy he was talking to had perfect vision. Another time, Arcesilaus asked him why he had come from Thebes, and he replied, “To laugh at all of you when I see you face to face.” But even though he criticized Arcesilaus in his Silli, he praised him in the book called the Funeral Banquet of Arcesilaus.

VII. He had no successor, as Menodotus tells us; but his school ceased, till Ptolemy the Cyrenean re-established it. According to the account given to us by Hippobotus and Sotion, he had as pupils, Dioscorides of Cyprus, and Nicolochus of Rhodes, and Euphranor of Seleucia, and Praylus of the Troas, who was a man of such constancy of mind that, as Phylarchus relates in his History, he allowed himself to be punished as a traitor wholly undeservedly, not uttering one word of complaint against his fellow citizens; and Euphranor had for his pupil, Eubulus, of Alexandria, who was the master of Ptolemy, who was the master of Sarpedon and Heraclides. And Heraclides was the master of Ænesidemus, of Cnossus, who wrote eight books of Pyrrhonean discourses; he was also the master of Zeuxippus Polites, who was the master of Zeuxis Goniopus, who was the master of Antiochus, of Laodicea, in Lycia. Antiochus again, was the master of Menodotus, of Nicomedia, a skilful physician, and of Theodas, of Laodicea; and Menodotus was the master of Herodotus, of Tarsus, the son of Arieus; Herodotus was the master of Sextus Empiricus, who left ten books of Sceptic Maxims, and other excellent works; and Sextus was the master of Saturninus Cythenas, who was also an empiric.

VII. He had no successor, as Menodotus tells us, but his school ended until Ptolemy from Cyrene revived it. According to the accounts from Hippobotus and Sotion, he had students like Dioscorides from Cyprus, Nicolochus from Rhodes, Euphranor from Seleucia, and Praylus from Troas, who was remarkably steadfast; as Phylarchus recounts in his History, he accepted punishment as a traitor without having done anything wrong, not saying a single word of complaint against his fellow citizens. Euphranor taught Eubulus from Alexandria, who was the teacher of Ptolemy, who in turn taught Sarpedon and Heraclides. Heraclides taught Ænesidemus from Cnossus, who wrote eight books of Pyrrhonean discussions; he also taught Zeuxippus Polites, who taught Zeuxis Goniopus, who taught Antiochus from Laodicea in Lycia. Antiochus was the teacher of Menodotus from Nicomedia, a skilled physician, and Theodas from Laodicea; and Menodotus taught Herodotus from Tarsus, son of Arieus. Herodotus taught Sextus Empiricus, who wrote ten books of Sceptic Maxims and other excellent works; and Sextus taught Saturninus Cytheras, who was also an empiric.


BOOK X.

LIFE OF EPICURUS.

I. Epicurus was an Athenian, and the son of Neocles and Chærestrate, of the burgh of Gargettus, and of the family of the Philaidæ, as Metrodorus tells us in his treatise on Nobility of Birth. Some writers, and among them Heraclides, in his Abridgment of Sotion, say, that as the Athenians had colonised Samos, he was brought up there, and came to Athens in his eighteenth year, while Xenocrates was president of the Academy, and Aristotle at Chalcis. But after the death of Alexander, the Macedonian, when the Athenians were driven out of Samos by Perdiccas, Epicurus went to Colophon to his father.

I. Epicurus was an Athenian, the son of Neocles and Chærestrate, from the town of Gargettus, and part of the Philaidæ family, as Metrodorus mentions in his work on Nobility of Birth. Some authors, including Heraclides in his Abridgment of Sotion, say that since the Athenians had settled Samos, he was raised there and moved to Athens at the age of eighteen, during the time when Xenocrates was leading the Academy and Aristotle was in Chalcis. However, after Alexander the Great died, when the Athenians were forced out of Samos by Perdiccas, Epicurus went to Colophon to be with his father.

II. And when he had spent some time there, and collected some disciples, he again returned to Athens, in the time of Anaxicrates, and for some time studied philosophy, mingling with the rest of the philosophers; but subsequently, he some how or other established the school which was called after his name; and he used to say, that he began to study philosophy, when he was fourteen years of age; but Apollodorus, the Epicurean, in the first book of his account of the life of Epicurus, says, that he came to the study of philosophy, having conceived a great contempt for the grammarians, because they could not explain to him the statements in Hesiod respecting Chaos.

II. After spending some time there and gathering some followers, he went back to Athens during Anaxicrates' time and studied philosophy for a while, interacting with other philosophers. Eventually, he somehow established a school that was named after him. He claimed that he started studying philosophy when he was fourteen. However, Apollodorus, the Epicurean, in the first book of his account of Epicurus' life, states that he pursued philosophy out of a strong disdain for the grammarians because they couldn't clarify Hesiod's statements about Chaos.

But Hermippus tells us, that he himself was a teacher of grammar, and that afterwards, having met with the books of Democritus, he applied himself with zeal to philosophy, on which account Timon says of him:—

But Hermippus tells us that he was a grammar teacher and that later, after discovering the works of Democritus, he passionately dedicated himself to philosophy. For this reason, Timon says of him:—

The last of all the natural philosophers,
And the most shameless too, did come from Samos,
A grammar teacher, and the most ill-bred
And most unmanageable of mankind.

And he had for his companions in his philosophical studies,[425] his three brothers, Neocles, Chæredemus, and Aristobulus, who were excited by his exhortations, as Philodemus, the Epicurean, relates in the tenth book of the Classification of Philosophers. He had also a slave, whose name was Mus, as Myronianus tells us in his Similar Historical Chapters.

And for his philosophical studies, he had his three brothers, Neocles, Chæredemus, and Aristobulus, who were inspired by his encouragement, as Philodemus, the Epicurean, mentions in the tenth book of the Classification of Philosophers. He also had a slave named Mus, as Myronianus tells us in his Similar Historical Chapters.

III. But Diotimus, the Stoic, was very hostile to him, and calumniated him in a most bitter manner, publishing fifty obscene letters, and attributing them to Epicurus, and also giving him the credit of the letters, which generally go under the name of Chrysippus. And Posidonius, the Stoic, and Nicolaus, and Sotion, in the twelfth of these books, which are entitled the Refutations of Diocles, of which there are altogether twenty-four volumes, and Dionysius, of Halicarnassus, have also attacked him with great severity; for they say that he used to accompany his mother when she went about the small cottages, performing purifications, and that he used to read the formula, and that he used also to keep a school with his father at very low terms. Also, that he, as well as one of his brothers, was a most profligate man in his morals, and that he used to live with Leontium, the courtesan. Moreover, that he claimed the books of Democritus on Atoms, and that of Aristippus on Pleasure, as his own; and that he was not a legitimate citizen; and this last fact is asserted also by Timocrates, and by Herodotus, in his treatise on the Youth of Epicurus.

III. But Diotimus, the Stoic, was very hostile to him and slandered him in a bitter way, publishing fifty vulgar letters and claiming they were written by Epicurus. He also credited Epicurus with letters that are typically attributed to Chrysippus. Posidonius, the Stoic, along with Nicolaus and Sotion in the twelfth of their books titled the Refutations of Diocles, which consists of twenty-four volumes, and Dionysius of Halicarnassus, also attacked him harshly; they said that he used to accompany his mother as she went around small cottages performing purifications, that he read the rituals, and that he ran a school with his father for very low fees. They further claimed that he and one of his brothers had very loose morals and that he lived with the courtesan Leontium. Additionally, they accused him of claiming the works of Democritus on Atoms and Aristippus on Pleasure as his own, and that he wasn’t a legitimate citizen; this last point was also affirmed by Timocrates and by Herodotus in his essay on the Youth of Epicurus.

They also say that he used to flatter Mithras, the steward of Lysimachus, in a disgraceful manner, calling him in his letters Pæan, and King; and also that he flattered Idomeneus, and Herodotus, and Timocrates who had revealed all his secret practices, and that he flattered them on this very account. And in his letters to Leontium, he says, “O king Apollo, my dear Leontium, what transports of joy did I feel when I read your charming letter.” And to Themista, the wife of Leonteus, he writes, “I am ready and prepared, if you do not come to me, to roll myself to wherever you and Themista invite me.” And he addresses Pythocles, a beautiful youth, thus, “I will sit quiet,” says he, “awaiting your longed for and god-like approach.” And at another time, writing to Themista, he says, “That he had determined to make his way with her,” as Theodorus tells us in the fourth book of his treatises against Epicurus.

They also say that he used to flatter Mithras, the steward of Lysimachus, in a shameful way, calling him in his letters Pæan and King; and he also flattered Idomeneus, Herodotus, and Timocrates who had exposed all his secret actions, flattering them for that very reason. In his letters to Leontium, he says, “Oh King Apollo, my dear Leontium, what waves of joy did I feel when I read your lovely letter.” And to Themista, the wife of Leonteus, he writes, “I am ready and willing, if you do not come to me, to roll myself wherever you and Themista invite me.” And he addresses Pythocles, a handsome young man, saying, “I will sit quietly,” he says, “waiting for your longed-for and god-like arrival.” And at another time, writing to Themista, he says, “That he had decided to pursue her,” as Theodorus tells us in the fourth book of his writings against Epicurus.

He also wrote to many other courtesans, and especially to Leontium, with whom Metrodorus also was in love. And in his treatise on the Chief Good, he writes thus, “For I do not know what I can consider good, if I put out of sight the pleasures which arise from favours, and those which are derived from amatory pleasures, and from music, and from the contemplation of beauty.” And in his letter to Pythocles, he writes, “And, my dear boy, avoid all sorts of education.”

He also wrote to many other courtesans, especially to Leontium, who Metrodorus was also in love with. In his treatise on the Chief Good, he says, “I can't figure out what I can call good if I ignore the pleasures that come from favors, those that come from romantic pleasures, music, and appreciating beauty.” In his letter to Pythocles, he writes, “And, my dear boy, stay away from all kinds of education.”

Epictetus also attacks him as a most debauched man, and reproaches him most vehemently, and so does Timocrates, the brother of Metrodorus, in his treatise entitled the Merry Guests, and this Timocrates had been a disciple in his school, though he afterwards abandoned it; and he says that he used to vomit twice a day, in consequence of his intemperance; and that he himself had great difficulty in escaping from this nocturnal philosophy, and that mystic kind of re-union. He also accuses Epicurus of shameful ignorance in his reasoning, and still more especially in all matters relating to the conduct of life. And says that he was in a pitiable state of health, so that he could not for many years rise up from his sofa; and that he used to spend a minæ a day on his eating, as he himself states in his letter to Leontium, and in that to the philosophers at Mitylene. He also says that many courtesans used to live with him and Metrodorus; and among them Marmarium, and Hedea, and Erotium, and Nicidium.

Epictetus also criticizes him as a very debauched man and harshly reproaches him, and so does Timocrates, the brother of Metrodorus, in his work titled the Merry Guests. Timocrates was once a student in his school but later left it. He claims that this man would vomit twice a day due to his excessive behavior, and that he himself struggled to break free from this nighttime philosophy and that mystical type of connection. He also accuses Epicurus of being shamefully ignorant in his reasoning, especially regarding how to lead a proper life. He mentions that Epicurus was in such poor health that he could not get up from his sofa for many years, and that he spent a mina a day on food, as he states in his letter to Leontium and in his correspondence with the philosophers in Mitylene. He also notes that several courtesans lived with him and Metrodorus, including Marmarium, Hedea, Erotium, and Nicidium.

IV. And in the thirty-seven books which he wrote about natural philosophy, they say that he says a great many things of the same kind over and over again, and that in them he writes in contradiction of other philosophers, and especially of Nausiphanes, and speaks as follows, word for word: “But if any one else ever was afflicted in such a manner, then certainly this man had a continual labour, striving to bring forth the sophistical boastfulness of his mouth, like many other slaves.” And Epicurus also speaks of Nausiphanes in his letters, in the following terms: “These things led him on to such arrogance of mind, that he abused me and called me a schoolmaster.” He used also to call him Lungs, and Blockhead, and Humbug, and Fornicator. And he used to call Plato’s followers Flatterers of Dionysius, but Plato himself he called Golden. Aristotle he called a debauchee and a glutton, saying that he joined the army after he had squandered his patrimony, and[427] sold drugs. He used also to call Protagoras a porter, and the secretary of Democritus, and to say that he taught boys their letters in the streets. Heraclitus, he called a disturber; Democritus, he nicknamed Lerocritus;[138] and Antidorus, Sænidorus;[139] the Cynics he called enemies of Greece; and the Dialecticians he charged with being eaten up with envy. Pyrrho, he said, was ignorant and unlearned.

IV. In the thirty-seven books he wrote on natural philosophy, people say that he repeats a lot of similar ideas and contradicts other philosophers, especially Nausiphanes. He specifically says, “But if anyone else was ever troubled in this way, then this man definitely endured a constant struggle, trying to show off the cleverness of his speech, like many other slaves.” Epicurus also mentions Nausiphanes in his letters, stating: “These things made him so arrogant that he insulted me and called me a schoolmaster.” He also called him Lungs, Blockhead, Humbug, and Fornicator. He referred to Plato’s followers as Flatterers of Dionysius, but called Plato himself Golden. He described Aristotle as a debauchee and a glutton, claiming he joined the army after wasting his inheritance and selling drugs. He also called Protagoras a porter and the secretary of Democritus, saying he taught kids their letters in the streets. He called Heraclitus a disruptor; Democritus, he nicknamed Lerocritus; and Antidorus, Sænidorus. He referred to the Cynics as enemies of Greece and accused the Dialecticians of being consumed by envy. Pyrrho, he claimed, was ignorant and uneducated.

V. But these men who say this are all wrong, for there are plenty of witnesses of the unsurpassable kindness of the man to every body; both his own country which honoured him with brazen statues, and his friends who were so numerous that they could not be contained in whole cities; and all his acquaintances who were bound to him by nothing but the charms of his doctrine, none of whom ever deserted him, except Metrodorus, the son of Stratoniceus, who went over to Carneades, probably because he was not able to bear with equanimity the unapproachable excellence of Epicurus. Also, the perpetual succession of his school, which, when every other school decayed, continued without any falling off, and produced a countless number of philosophers, succeeding one another without any interruption. We may also speak here of his gratitude towards his parents, and his beneficence to his brothers, and his gentleness to his servants (as is plain from his will, and from the fact too, that they united with him in his philosophical studies, and the most eminent of them was the one whom I have mentioned already, named Mus); and his universal philanthropy towards all men.

V. But these people who claim this are completely mistaken, because there are plenty of witnesses to the unmatched kindness of the man towards everyone; both his own country that honored him with bronze statues, and his friends who were so numerous that they couldn't fit in entire cities; and all his acquaintances who were connected to him solely through the appeal of his teachings, none of whom ever deserted him except for Metrodorus, the son of Stratoniceus, who switched to Carneades, probably because he couldn't handle the unparalleled greatness of Epicurus. Also, the continuous succession of his school, which thrived even when every other school declined, kept going without any lapse and produced countless philosophers, one after another without interruption. We can also mention his gratitude towards his parents, his generosity towards his brothers, and his kindness towards his servants (as is clear from his will, and also from the fact that they joined him in his philosophical studies, with the most notable among them being the one I mentioned earlier, named Mus); and his universal love for all people.

His piety towards the Gods, and his affection for his country was quite unspeakable; though, from an excess of modesty, he avoided affairs of state. And though he lived when very difficult times oppressed Greece, he still remained in his own country, only going two or three times across to Ionia to see his friends, who used to throng to him from all quarters, and to live with him in his garden, as we are told by Apollodorus. (This garden he bought for eighty minæ.)

His devotion to the gods and his love for his country were truly remarkable; however, due to his excessive modesty, he steered clear of political matters. Even though he lived during the challenging times that troubled Greece, he chose to stay in his homeland, only making two or three trips to Ionia to visit his friends, who came from everywhere to spend time with him in his garden, as Apollodorus tells us. (He bought this garden for eighty minæ.)

VI. And Diocles, in the third book of his Excursion, says[428] that they all lived in the most simple and economical manner; “They were content,” says he, “with a small cup of light wine, and all the rest of their drink was water.” He also tells us that Epicurus would not allow his followers to throw their property into a common stock, as Pythagoras did, who said that the possessions of friends were held in common. For he said that such a doctrine as that was suited rather for those who distrusted one another; and that those who distrusted one another were not friends. But he himself in his letters, says that he is content with water and plain bread, and adds, “Send me some Cytherean cheese, that if I wish to have a feast, I may have the means.” This was the real character of the man who laid down the doctrine that pleasure was the chief good; whom Athenæus thus mentions in an epigram:—

VI. Diocles, in the third book of his Excursion, says[428] that they all lived very simply and frugally; “They were satisfied,” he says, “with a small cup of light wine, and the rest of their drinks was just water.” He also mentions that Epicurus wouldn’t let his followers pool their belongings like Pythagoras did, who believed that friends should share everything. Epicurus argued that such a belief was better suited for those who didn’t trust each other, and that those who distrust each other aren’t truly friends. However, in his letters, he mentions that he is happy with just water and plain bread, and adds, “Send me some Cytherean cheese, so that if I want to have a feast, I can.” This reflects the true nature of the man who taught that pleasure was the highest good; Athenæus refers to him in an epigram:—

O men, you labour for pernicious ends;
And out of eager avarice, begin
Quarrels and wars. And yet the wealth of nature
Fixes a narrow limit for desires,
Though empty judgment is insatiable.
This lesson the wise child of Neocles
Had learnt by heart, instructed by the Muses,
Or at the sacred shrine of Delphi’s God.

And as we advance further, we shall learn this fact from his dogmas, and his apophthegms.

And as we move forward, we will learn this truth from his beliefs and his sayings.

VII. Of all the ancient philosophers he was, as we are told by Diocles, most attached to Anaxagoras (although in some points he argued against him); and to Archelaus, the master of Socrates. And he used, Diocles adds, to accustom his pupils to preserve his writings in their memory. Apollodorus, in his Chronicles, asserts that he was a pupil of Nausiphanes, and Praxiphanes; but he himself does not mention this; but says in his letter to Euridicus, that he had been his own instructor. He also agreed with Hermarchus in not admitting that Leucippus deserved to be called a philosopher; though some authors, among whom is Apollodorus, speak of him as the master of Democritus. Demetrius, the Magnesian, says that he was a pupil of Xenocrates also.

VII. Of all the ancient philosophers, he was, as Diocles tells us, most attached to Anaxagoras (though he did argue against him on some points) and to Archelaus, who was Socrates' teacher. Diocles adds that he used to train his students to memorize his writings. Apollodorus, in his Chronicles, claims that he was a student of Nausiphanes and Praxiphanes; however, he himself doesn’t mention this, stating in his letter to Euridicus that he was his own teacher. He also agreed with Hermarchus that Leucippus shouldn't be called a philosopher; although some authors, including Apollodorus, refer to him as the teacher of Democritus. Demetrius the Magnesian claims that he was also a student of Xenocrates.

VIII. He uses in his works plain language with respect to anything he is speaking of, for which Aristophanes, the grammarian, blames him, on the ground of that style being vulgar.[429] But he was such an admirer of perspicuity, that even in his treatise on Rhetoric, he aims at and recommends nothing but clearness of expression. And in his letters, instead of the usual civil expressions, “Greeting,” “Farewell,” and so on, he substitutes, “May you act well,” “May you live virtuously,” and expressions of that sort. Some of his biographers assert that it was he who composed the treatise entitled the Canon, in imitation of the Tripod of Nausiphanes, whose pupil they say that he was, and add that he was also a pupil of Pamphilus, the Platonist, at Samos.

VIII. In his works, he uses straightforward language about whatever he discusses, which Aristophanes, the grammarian, criticizes as being too common. But he valued clarity so much that even in his treatise on Rhetoric, he focuses on and promotes nothing but clear expression. In his letters, instead of the usual polite greetings like “Hello” and “Goodbye,” he replaces them with phrases like “May you act well” and “May you live virtuously.” Some of his biographers claim that he wrote the treatise called the Canon, inspired by the Tripod of Nausiphanes, who they say was his teacher, and add that he was also a student of Pamphilus, the Platonist, in Samos.[429]

IX. They further tell us that he began to study philosophy at twelve years of age, and that he presided over his school thirty-two years. And he was born as we are told by Apollodorus, in his Chronicles, in the third year of the hundred and ninth olympiad, in the archonship of Sosigenes, on the seventh day of the month Gamelion, seven years after the death of Plato. And when he was thirty-two years of age, he first set up his school at Mitylene, and after that at Lampsacus; and when he had spent five years in these two cities, he came to Athens; and he died there in the second year of the hundred and twenty-seventh olympiad, in the archonship of Pytharatus, when he had lived seventy-two years. And Hermarchus, the son of Agemarchus, and a citizen of Mitylene, succeeded him in his school.

IX. They also say that he started studying philosophy at the age of twelve and ran his school for thirty-two years. According to Apollodorus in his Chronicles, he was born in the third year of the one hundred and ninth Olympiad, during the archonship of Sosigenes, on the seventh day of Gamelion, seven years after Plato's death. At the age of thirty-two, he established his first school in Mitylene, then moved it to Lampsacus; after spending five years in those two cities, he came to Athens. He died there in the second year of the one hundred and twenty-seventh Olympiad, during the archonship of Pytharatus, having lived for seventy-two years. Hermarchus, the son of Agemarchus and a citizen of Mitylene, took over his school.

He died of the stone, as Hermarchus mentions in his letters, after having been ill a fortnight; and at the end of the fortnight, Hermippus says that he went into a brazen bath, properly tempered with warm water, and asked for a cup of pure wine and drank it; and having recommended his friends to remember his doctrines, he expired. And there is an epigram of ours on him, couched in the following language:—

He died from a kidney stone, as Hermarchus mentions in his letters, after being sick for two weeks. At the end of those two weeks, Hermippus states that he took a warm bath made of bronze and asked for a glass of pure wine, which he drank. He also urged his friends to remember his teachings before he passed away. We have an epigram about him that goes like this:—

Now, fare-ye-well, remember all my words;
This was the dying charge of Epicurus:
Then to the bath he went, and drank some wine,
And sank beneath the cold embrace of Pluto.

Such was the life of the man, and such was his death.

Such was the man's life, and such was his death.

X. And he made his will in the following terms:—

X. And he wrote his will in these words:—

“According to this my will, I give all my possessions to Amynomachus, of Bate, the son of Philocrates, and to Timocrates, of Potamos, the son of Demetrius; according to the[430] deed of gift to each, which is deposited in the temple of Cybele; on condition that they make over my garden and all that is attached to it to Hermarchus, of Mitylene, the son of Agemarchus; and to those who study philosophy with him, and to whomsoever Hermarchus leaves as his successors in his school, that they may abide and dwell in it, in the study and practice of philosophy; and I give it also to all those who philosophize according to my doctrines, that they may, to the best of their ability, maintain my school which exists in my garden, in concert with Amynomachus and Timocrates; and I enjoin their heirs to do the same in the most perfect and secure manner that they can; so that they also may maintain my garden, as those also shall to whom my immediate successors hand it down. As for the house in Melita, that Amynomachus and Timocrates shall allow Hermarchus that he may live in it during his life, together with all his companions in philosophy.

According to my will, I bequeath all my possessions to Amynomachus, from Bate, son of Philocrates, and Timocrates, from Potamos, son of Demetrius; as stated in the deed of gift for each, which is stored in the temple of Cybele; with the condition that they transfer my garden and everything attached to it to Hermarchus, from Mitylene, son of Agemarchus; and to those who study philosophy with him, and to whoever Hermarchus designates as his successors in his school, so they can live and work there, focusing on the study and practice of philosophy; and I also give it to all who philosophize according to my teachings, so they may, to the best of their ability, support my school that exists in my garden, in partnership with Amynomachus and Timocrates; and I instruct their heirs to do the same in the most thorough and secure way possible; so that they too may preserve my garden, just as those will who receive it from my immediate successors. Regarding the house in Melita, Amynomachus and Timocrates shall allow Hermarchus to live in it for the duration of his life, along with all his philosophy companions.

“Out of the income which is derived from that property, which is here bequeathed by me to Amynomachus and Timocrates, I will that they, consulting with Hermarchus, shall arrange in the best manner possible the offerings to the manes in honour of the memory of my father, and mother, and brothers, and myself, and that my birth-day may be kept as it has been in the habit of being kept, on the tenth day of the month Gamelion; and that the re-union of all the philosophers of our school, established in honour of Metrodorus and myself, may take place on the twentieth day of every month. They shall also celebrate, as I have been in the habit of doing myself, the day consecrated to my brothers, in the month Poseideon; and the day consecrated to the memory of Polyænus, in the month Metageitnion.

“From the income generated by the property I’m leaving to Amynomachus and Timocrates, I want them, in consultation with Hermarchus, to arrange the offerings to honor the memory of my father, mother, brothers, and myself in the best way possible. My birthday should be celebrated as it has been, on the tenth day of the month Gamelion. The gathering of all the philosophers from our school, established in honor of Metrodorus and me, should take place on the twentieth day of every month. They should also observe, as I have done, the day dedicated to my brothers in the month Poseideon and the day dedicated to the memory of Polyænus in the month Metageitnion.

“Amynomachus and Timocrates, shall be the guardians of Epicurus, the son of Metrodorus, and of the son of Polyænus, as long as they study philosophy under, and live with, Hermarchus. In the same way also, they shall be the guardians of the daughter of Metrodorus, and when she is of marriageable age, they shall give her to whomsoever Hermarchus shall select of his companions in philosophy, provided she is well behaved and obedient to Hermarchus. And Amynomachus and Timocrates shall, out of my income, give them such a sum for their support as shall appear sufficient year by year, after due[431] consultation with Hermarchus. And they shall associate Hermarchus with themselves in the management of my revenues, in order that everything may be done with the approval of that man who has grown old with me in the study of philosophy, and who is now left as the president of all those who have studied philosophy with us. And as for the dowry for the girl when she is come to marriageable age, let Amynomachus and Timocrates arrange that, taking for the purpose such a sum from my property as shall seem to them, in conjunction with Hermarchus, to be reasonable. And let them also take care of Nicanor, as we ourselves have done; in order that all those who have studied philosophy with us, and who have assisted us with their means, and who have shown great friendship for us, and who have chosen to grow old with us in the study of philosophy, may never be in want of anything as far as our power to prevent it may extend.

“Amynomachus and Timocrates will be the guardians of Epicurus, the son of Metrodorus, and of Polyænus's son, as long as they study philosophy with Hermarchus. They will also be the guardians of Metrodorus's daughter, and when she is of marriageable age, they will give her to whoever Hermarchus selects from his philosophy companions, as long as she is well-behaved and obedient to Hermarchus. Amynomachus and Timocrates will provide them with a sufficient amount for their support each year, based on my income, after consulting with Hermarchus. They will involve Hermarchus in managing my finances so that everything is approved by the person who has grown old alongside me in philosophical study and who is now the leader of all who have studied philosophy with us. Regarding the dowry for the girl when she reaches marriageable age, let Amynomachus and Timocrates handle that, using what they and Hermarchus jointly consider a reasonable amount from my property. They should also take care of Nicanor, just as we have done, so that none of those who have studied philosophy with us, supported us, shown us great friendship, and chosen to grow old with us in philosophy lack for anything we can help with.

“I further enjoin them to give all my books to Hermarchus; and, if anything should happen to Hermarchus before the children of Metrodorus are grown up, then I desire that Amynomachus and Timocrates, shall take care that, provided they are well behaved, they shall have everything that is necessary for them, as far as the estate which I leave behind me shall allow such things to be furnished to them. And the same men shall also take care of everything else that I have enjoined; so that it may all be fulfilled, as far as the case may permit.

“I also instruct them to give all my books to Hermarchus; and if anything happens to Hermarchus before Metrodorus's children are grown, I want Amynomachus and Timocrates to ensure that, as long as they behave well, they will have everything they need, as much as the estate I leave can provide. These same individuals will also take care of all my other requests so that everything can be fulfilled as much as the situation allows.”

“Of my slaves, I hereby emancipate Mus, and Nicias, and Lycon: I also give Phædrium her freedom.”

“Of my slaves, I hereby free Mus, Nicias, and Lycon: I also grant Phædrium her freedom.”

And when he was at the point of death, he wrote the following letter to Idomeneus:—

And when he was about to die, he wrote the following letter to Idomeneus:—

“We have written this letter to you on a happy day to us, which is also the last day of our life. For strangury has attacked me, and also a dysentery, so violent that nothing can be added to the violence of my sufferings. But the cheerfulness of my mind, which arises from the recollection of all my philosophical contemplations, counterbalances all these afflictions. And I beg you to take care of the children of Metrodorus, in a manner worthy of the devotion shown by the youth to me, and to philosophy.”

“We're writing this letter to you on a day that’s happy for us, which also happens to be the last day of our lives. I’m suffering from a painful urinary issue and an intense dysentery that’s so severe, there’s nothing that can add to the intensity of my pain. But the positivity in my mind, which comes from remembering all my philosophical thoughts, balances out all these hardships. I ask you to care for Metrodorus's children in a way that reflects the dedication shown to me by the youth and to philosophy.”

Such then as I have given it, was his will.

Such as I have presented it, was his wish.

XI. He had a great number of pupils, of whom the most[432] eminent were Metrodorus, the Athenian, and Timocrates, and Sandes, of Lampsacus; who, from the time that he first became acquainted with him, never left him, except once when he went home for six months; after which he returned to him. And he was a virtuous man in every respect, as Epicurus tells us in his Fundamental Principles. And he also bears witness to his virtue in the third book of his Timocrates. And being a man of this character, he gave his sister Batis in marriage to Idomeneus; and he himself had Leontium, the Attic courtesan, for his concubine. He was very unmoved at all disturbances, and even at death; as Epicurus tells us, in the first book of his Metrodorus. He is said to have died seven years before Epicurus himself, in the fifty-third year of his age. And Epicurus himself, in the will which I have given above, gives many charges about the guardianship of his children, showing by this that he had been dead some time. He also had a brother whom I have mentioned before, of the name of Timocrates, a trifling, silly man.

XI. He had a large number of students, among whom the most notable were Metrodorus, the Athenian, and Timocrates, as well as Sandes from Lampsacus. From the time they first met him, they never left his side, except for one occasion when he went home for six months, after which he returned. He was a virtuous man in every way, as Epicurus mentions in his Fundamental Principles. Epicurus also attests to his character in the third book of his Timocrates. Being of such character, he arranged for his sister Batis to marry Idomeneus, while he himself had Leontium, the Athenian courtesan, as his concubine. He remained completely unfazed by any disturbances, even in the face of death, as Epicurus recounts in the first book of his Metrodorus. It’s said that he died seven years before Epicurus, at the age of fifty-three. In the will I referenced earlier, Epicurus included many instructions regarding the guardianship of his children, indicating that Timocrates had been dead for some time. He also had a brother, whom I mentioned before, named Timocrates, who was a rather trivial and foolish man.

The writings of Metrodorus are these. Three books addressed to the Physicians; one essay on the Sensations; one addressed to Timocrates; one on Magnanimity; one on the Illness of Epicurus; one addressed to the Dialecticians; one against the Nine Sophists; one on the Road to Wisdom; one on Change; one on Riches; one against Democritus; one on Nobility of Birth.

The writings of Metrodorus are as follows: three books for physicians; one essay on sensations; one addressed to Timocrates; one about magnanimity; one on Epicurus' illness; one for dialecticians; one against the nine sophists; one on the path to wisdom; one on change; one about wealth; one against Democritus; and one on noble birth.

XII. Likewise Polyænus, of Lampsacus, the son of Athenodorus, was a man of mild and friendly manners, as Philodemus particularly assures us.

XII. Similarly, Polyænus from Lampsacus, son of Athenodorus, was known for his gentle and friendly demeanor, as Philodemus specifically tells us.

XIII. And his successor was Hermarchus, of Mitylene, the son of Agemarchus, a poor man; and his favourite pursuit was rhetoric. And the following excellent works of his are extant. Twenty-two books of letters about Empedocles; an essay on Mathematics; A treatise against Plato; another against Aristotle. And he died of paralysis, being a most eminent man.

XIII. His successor was Hermarchus from Mitylene, the son of Agemarchus, a man of modest means; his main interest was rhetoric. The following outstanding works by him still exist: twenty-two books of letters about Empedocles, an essay on Mathematics, a treatise against Plato, and another against Aristotle. He died from paralysis, having been a very distinguished individual.

XIV. There was also Leonteus, of Lampsacus, and his wife Themista, to whom Epicurus wrote.

XIV. There was also Leonteus from Lampsacus and his wife Themista, to whom Epicurus wrote.

XV. There were also Colotes and Idomeneus; and these also were natives of Lampsacus. And among the most eminent philosophers of the school of Epicurus, were Polystratus, who succeeded Hermarchus, and Dionysius who succeeded him, and[433] Basilides who succeeded him. Likewise Apollodorus, who was nicknamed the tyrant of the gardens (κηποτύραννος), was a very eminent man, and wrote more than four hundred books. And there were the two Ptolemies of Alexandria, Ptolemy the Black, and Ptolemy the Fair. And Zeno, of Sidon, a pupil of Apollodorus, a very voluminous author; and Demetrius, who was surnamed the Lacedæmonian; and Diogenes, of Tarsus, who wrote the Select Dialogues; and Orion, and others whom the genuine Epicureans call Sophists.

XV. There were also Colotes and Idomeneus, both from Lampsacus. Among the most prominent philosophers of the Epicurean school were Polystratus, who took over from Hermarchus, followed by Dionysius, and then Basilides. Additionally, Apollodorus, known as the tyrant of the gardens, was a significant figure and authored over four hundred books. The two Ptolemies from Alexandria, Ptolemy the Black and Ptolemy the Fair, were also noteworthy. Zeno of Sidon, a student of Apollodorus, was a prolific writer, along with Demetrius, known as the Lacedæmonian, Diogenes of Tarsus, who wrote the Select Dialogues, Orion, and others whom the true Epicureans refer to as Sophists.

XVI. There were also three other persons of the name of Epicurus; first, the son of Leonteus and Themista; secondly, a native of Magnesia; and lastly, a Gladiator.

XVI. There were also three other people named Epicurus; first, the son of Leonteus and Themista; second, a native of Magnesia; and finally, a gladiator.

XVII. And Epicurus was a most voluminous author, exceeding all men in the number of his books; for there are more than three hundred volumes of them; and in the whole of them there is not one citation from other sources, but they are filled wholly with the sentiments of Epicurus himself. In the quantity of his writings he was rivalled by Chrysippus, as Carneades asserts, who calls him a parasite of the books of Epicurus; for if ever this latter wrote anything, Chrysippus immediately set his heart on writing a book of equal size; and in this way he often wrote the same thing over again; putting down whatever came into his head; and he published it all without any corrections, by reason of his haste. And he quotes such numbers of testimonies from other authors, that his books are entirely filled with them alone; as one may find also in the works of Aristotle and Zeno.

XVII. Epicurus was an incredibly prolific writer, surpassing everyone in the number of his books; he wrote over three hundred volumes. Not a single one of them includes references from other sources; they are entirely composed of Epicurus's own thoughts. Chrysippus matched him in the sheer quantity of his writings, as Carneades claims, who refers to him as a copycat of Epicurus's works. Whenever Epicurus produced something, Chrysippus would immediately try to write a book of similar length, often repeating the same ideas. He would jot down whatever came to mind and published everything without making any corrections due to his eagerness. He included so many citations from other authors that his books are mostly filled with those alone, similar to what you can find in the works of Aristotle and Zeno.

Such then, and so numerous are the works of Epicurus; the chief of which are the following. Thirty-seven treatises on Natural Philosophy; one on Atoms, and the Vacuum; one on Love; an abridgment of the Arguments employed against the Natural Philosophers; Doubts in Contradiction of the Doctrines of the Megarians; Fundamental Propositions; a treatise on Choice and Avoidance; another on the Chief Good; another on the Criterion, called also the Canon; the Chæredemus, a treatise on the Gods; one on Piety; the Hegesianax; four essays on Lives; one on Just Dealing; the Neocles; one essay addressed to Themista; the Banquet; the Eurylochus; one essay addressed to Metrodorus; one on Seeing; one on the Angle in an Atom; one on Touch;[434] one on Fate; Opinions on the Passions; one treatise addressed to Timocrates; Prognostics; Exhortations; a treatise on Spectres; one on Perceptions; the Aristobulus; an essay on Music; one on Justice and the other Virtues; one on Gifts and Gratitude; the Polymedes; the Timocrates, a treatise in three books; the Metrodorus, in five books; the Antidorus, in two books; Opinions about the South Winds; a treatise addressed to Mithras; the Callistolas; an essay on Kingly Power; the Anaximenes; Letters.

Here are the numerous works of Epicurus; the main ones include the following. Thirty-seven writings on Natural Philosophy; one on Atoms and the Vacuum; one on Love; a summary of the Arguments used against the Natural Philosophers; Doubts against the Doctrines of the Megarians; Fundamental Propositions; a work on Choice and Avoidance; another on the Chief Good; another on the Criterion, also known as the Canon; the Chæredemus, a treatise on the Gods; one on Piety; the Hegesianax; four essays on Lives; one on Just Dealing; the Neocles; one essay addressed to Themista; the Banquet; the Eurylochus; one essay addressed to Metrodorus; one on Seeing; one on the Angle in an Atom; one on Touch;[434] one on Fate; Opinions on the Passions; one treatise addressed to Timocrates; Prognostics; Exhortations; a treatise on Spectres; one on Perceptions; the Aristobulus; an essay on Music; one on Justice and the other Virtues; one on Gifts and Gratitude; the Polymedes; the Timocrates, a treatise in three books; the Metrodorus, in five books; the Antidorus, in two books; Opinions about the South Winds; a treatise addressed to Mithras; the Callistolas; an essay on Kingly Power; the Anaximenes; Letters.

XVIII. And I will endeavour to give an abridgment of the doctrines contained in these works, as it may be agreeable, quoting three letters of his, in which he has made a sort of epitome of all his philosophy. I will also give his fundamental and peculiar opinions, and any apophthegms which he uttered which appear worthy of being selected. So that you may be thoroughly acquainted with the man, and may also judge that I understand him.

XVIII. I will try to provide a summary of the ideas found in these works, as it might be helpful, quoting three of his letters where he has summarized all his philosophy. I will also include his fundamental and unique opinions, along with any sayings of his that seem worth noting. This way, you'll have a complete understanding of the man and can see that I grasp his thoughts.

Now the first letter is one that he wrote to Herodotus, on the subject of Natural Philosophy; the second is one that he wrote to Pythocles, which is about the Heavenly Bodies; the third is addressed to Menœceus, and in that there are contained the discussions about lives.

Now the first letter is one he wrote to Herodotus about Natural Philosophy; the second is one he wrote to Pythocles, which is about the Heavenly Bodies; the third is addressed to Menœceus, and in that one, there are discussions about lives.

We must now begin with the first, after having said a little by way of preface concerning the divisions of philosophy which he adopted.

We should now start with the first part, having shared a brief introduction about the divisions of philosophy that he chose.

XIX. Now he divides philosophy into three parts. The canonical, the physical, and the ethical. The canonical, which serves as an introduction to science, is contained in the single treatise which is called the Canon. The physical embraces the whole range of speculation on subjects of natural philosophy, and is contained in the thirty-seven books on nature, and in the letters again it is discussed in an elementary manner. The ethical contains the discussions on Choice and Avoidance; and is comprised in the books about lives, and in some of the Letters, and in the treatise on the Chief Good. Accordingly, most people are in the habit of combining the canonical division with the physical; and then they designate the whole under the names of the criterion of the truth, and a discussion on principles, and elements. And they say that the physical division is conversant about production, and destruction, and[435] nature; and that the ethical division has reference to the objects of choice and avoidance, and lives, and the chief good of mankind.

XIX. He now divides philosophy into three parts: the canonical, the physical, and the ethical. The canonical serves as an introduction to science and is contained in a single work called the Canon. The physical covers the entire range of natural philosophy and is found in thirty-seven books on nature, discussed in a basic way in the letters as well. The ethical focuses on discussions of Choice and Avoidance and is included in the books about lives, some of the Letters, and the treatise on the Chief Good. As a result, most people tend to combine the canonical division with the physical; they refer to the whole as the criterion of truth and discussions on principles and elements. They claim that the physical division deals with production, destruction, and nature, while the ethical division pertains to the objects of choice and avoidance, lives, and the chief good of humanity.

XX. Dialectics they wholly reject as superfluous. For they say that the correspondence of words with things is sufficient for the natural philosopher, so as to enable him to advance with certainty in the study of nature.

XX. They completely dismiss dialectics as unnecessary. They argue that the correspondence between words and things is enough for the natural philosopher, allowing him to confidently progress in the study of nature.

Now, in the Canon, Epicurus says that the criteria of truth are the senses, and the preconceptions, and the passions. But the Epicureans, in general, add also the perceptive impressions of the intellect. And he says the same thing in his Abridgment, which he addresses to Herodotus, and also in his Fundamental Principles. For, says he, the senses are devoid of reason, nor are they capable of receiving any impressions of memory. For they are not by themselves the cause of any motion, and when they have received any impression from any external cause, then they can add nothing to it, nor can they subtract anything from it. Moreover, they are out of the reach of any control; for one sensation cannot judge of another which resembles itself; for they have all an equal value. Nor can one judge of another which is different from itself; since their objects are not identical. In a word, one sensation cannot control another, since the effects of all of them influence us equally. Again, the reason cannot pronounce on the senses; for we have already said that all reasoning has the senses for its foundation. Reality and the evidence of sensation establish the certainty of the senses; for the impressions of sight and hearing are just as real, just as evident, as pain.

Now, in the Canon, Epicurus states that the criteria for truth are the senses, preconceptions, and emotions. However, the Epicureans generally also include the perceptions of the intellect. He makes the same point in his Abridgment, which he writes to Herodotus, as well as in his Fundamental Principles. He explains that the senses lack reason and cannot store memories. By themselves, the senses don't cause any movement, and when they receive impressions from external sources, they can't add to or take away from those impressions. Additionally, they cannot be controlled; one sensation cannot judge another similar sensation since they all hold equal value. Likewise, one sensation cannot assess a different sensation because their objects are not the same. In short, one sensation cannot dominate another since all their effects influence us equally. Furthermore, reason cannot make judgments about the senses; as we've stated, all reasoning is built on the foundation of sensory experiences. Reality and the clarity of sensation confirm the reliability of the senses; after all, the impressions from sight and hearing are just as real and evident as pain.

It follows from these considerations that we ought to judge of things which are obscure by their analogy to those which we perceive directly. In fact, every notion proceeds from the senses, either directly, or in consequence of some analogy, or proportion, or combination. Reasoning having always a share in these last operations. The visions of insanity and of sleep have a real object, for they act upon us; and that which has no reality can produce no action.

It follows from these thoughts that we should evaluate things that are unclear by comparing them to those we directly observe. In reality, every idea comes from our senses, either directly or through some analogy, relationship, or combination. Reasoning is always involved in these later processes. The images we see in insanity and dreams have real significance, as they influence us; and anything that lacks reality cannot produce any action.

XXI. By preconception, the Epicureans mean a sort of comprehension as it were, or right opinion, or notion, or general idea which exists in us; or, in other words, the recollection of an external object often perceived anteriorly. Such for instance, is this idea: “Man is a being of such and such a[436] nature.” At the same moment that we utter the word man, we conceive the figure of a man, in virtue of a preconception which we owe to the preceding operations of the senses. Therefore, the first notion which each word awakens in us is a correct one; in fact, we could not seek for anything if we had not previously some notion of it. To enable us to affirm that what we see at a distance is a horse or an ox, we must have some preconception in our minds which makes us acquainted with the form of a horse and an ox. We could not give names to things, if we had not a preliminary notion of what the things were.

XXI. By preconception, the Epicureans refer to a kind of understanding, or correct opinion, or idea that exists within us; in other words, it’s the memory of an external object that we've often encountered before. For example, consider this idea: “A man is a being with certain characteristics.” The moment we say the word man, we picture the image of a man, thanks to a preconception that comes from our previous sensory experiences. Consequently, the first idea that any word triggers in us is an accurate one; in fact, we wouldn’t be able to search for anything if we didn’t already have some notion of it. To recognize that what we see from a distance is a horse or an ox, we need to have a preconception in our minds that helps us understand the appearance of a horse and an ox. We couldn't label things if we didn't have an initial idea of what those things are.

XXII. These preconceptions then furnish us with certainty. And with respect to judgments, their certainty depends on our referring them to some previous notion, of itself certain, in virtue of which we affirm such and such a judgment; for instance, “How do we know whether this thing is a man?”

XXII. These assumptions then give us certainty. And regarding judgments, their certainty relies on our connecting them to some earlier idea that is itself certain, which is why we state this or that judgment; for example, “How do we know if this thing is a man?”

The Epicureans call opinion (δόξα) also supposition (ὑπόληψις). And say that it is at times true, and at times false; for that, if it is supported by testimony, and not contradicted by testimony, then it is true; but if it is not supported by testimony, and is contradicted by testimony, then it is false. On which account they have introduced the expression of “waiting,” as if, before pronouncing that a thing seen is a tower, we must wait till we come near, and learn what it looks like when we are near it.

The Epicureans refer to opinion (δόξα) as also being a supposition (ὑπόληψις). They believe that it can be true at times and false at others; if it is backed by evidence and not contradicted by evidence, then it is true. But if it lacks support from evidence and is contradicted by evidence, then it is false. For this reason, they have introduced the idea of “waiting,” suggesting that before declaring something seen as a tower, we should wait until we are close enough to understand what it really looks like up close.

XXIII. They say that there are two passions, pleasure and pain, which affect everything alive. And that the one is natural, and the other foreign to our nature; with reference to which all objects of choice and avoidance are judged of. They say also, that there are two kinds of investigation; the one about facts, the other about mere words. And this is as far as an elementary sketch can go—their doctrine about division, and about the criterion.

XXIII. It’s said that there are two driving forces, pleasure and pain, that impact all living things. One of these is natural, while the other is external to our nature; this is how we determine what we seek and what we avoid. It's also said that there are two types of inquiry: one focused on facts, and the other on mere words. This is about as much as a basic overview can cover—regarding their teachings on division and the criteria.

XXIV. Let us now go to the letter:—

XXIV. Now, let's move on to the letter:—

EPICURUS TO HERODOTUS, WISHING HE MAY DO WELL.

“For those, O Herodotus, who are not able accurately to comprehend all the things which I have written about nature, nor to investigate those larger books which I have composed on the subject, I have made an abridgment of the whole discussion[437] on this question, as far as I thought sufficient to enable them to recollect accurately the most fundamental points; that so, on all grave occasions, they might be able to assist themselves on the most important and undeniable principles; in proportion as they devoted themselves to speculations on natural philosophy. And here it is necessary for those who have made sufficient progress in their view of the general question, to recollect the principles laid down as elements of the whole discussion; for we have still greater need of a correct notion of the whole, than we have even of an accurate understanding of the details. We must, therefore, give preference to the former knowledge, and lay up in our memory those principles on which we may rest, in order to arrive at an exact perception of things, and at a certain knowledge of particular objects.

“For those, O Herodotus, who cannot fully understand everything I’ve written about nature, or dive into the larger books I’ve created on the topic, I’ve put together a summary of the entire discussion[437] on this subject. I aimed to help them remember the most essential points, so they can rely on the most important and undeniable principles during serious situations, especially as they engage in discussions about natural philosophy. It’s important for those who have made some progress in understanding the larger question to recall the principles laid out as foundational aspects of the entire discussion. We need a clear view of the whole concept even more than we require a precise grasp of the details. Therefore, we should prioritize this broader understanding and commit to memory the principles we can lean on to achieve a clear perception of things and solid knowledge of specific objects.”

“Now one has arrived at that point when one has thoroughly embraced the conceptions, and, if I may so express myself, the most essential forms, and when one has impressed them adequately on one’s senses. For this clear and precise knowledge of the whole, taken together, necessarily facilitates one’s particular perceptions, when one has brought one’s ideas back to the elements and simple terms. In short, a veritable synthesis, comprising the entire circle of the phænomena of the universe, ought to be able to resume in itself, and in a few words, all the particular facts which have been previously studied. This method being useful even to those who are already familiarised with the laws of the universe, I recommend them, while still pursuing without intermission the study of nature, which contributes more than anything else to the tranquillity and happiness of life, to make a concise statement or summary of their opinions.

"Now we have reached a point where we have fully embraced these ideas, and if I may put it this way, the most essential forms, and have effectively impressed them on our senses. This clear and precise understanding of the whole makes our specific perceptions easier when we simplify our thoughts to their basic elements. In short, a genuine synthesis that covers the entire range of the phenomena in the universe should be able to summarize all the specific facts we've studied in just a few words. This method is useful even for those who are already familiar with the laws of the universe, so I encourage them to continue studying nature, which contributes more than anything else to life's tranquility and happiness, and to create a concise summary of their views."

“First of all, then, Herodotus, one must determine with exactness the notion comprehended under each separate word, in order to be able to refer to it, as to a certain criterion, the conceptions which emanate from ourselves, the ulterior researches and the difficulties; otherwise the judgment has no foundation. One goes on from demonstration to demonstration ad infinitum; or else one gains nothing beyond mere words. In fact, it is absolutely necessary that in every word we should perceive directly, and without the assistance of any demonstration, the fundamental notion which it expresses, if we wish to[438] have any foundation to which we may refer our researches, our difficulties, and our personal judgments, whatever in other respects may be the criterion which we adopt, whether we take as our standard the impressions produced on our senses, or the actual impression in general; or whether we cling to the idea by itself, or to any other criterion.

“First of all, then, Herodotus, one must clearly understand the meaning behind each individual word to use it as a reliable reference point for the ideas that come from ourselves, our further inquiries, and the challenges we face; otherwise, our judgments are baseless. We could go on proving things indefinitely, or we might only end up with empty words. It’s essential that we grasp the core meaning of every word directly, without needing further proof, if we want a solid basis for our explorations, our challenges, and our personal judgments, regardless of the other standards we choose to use, whether that’s the impressions our senses give us, the overall impression, the idea itself, or any other criteria.

“We must also note carefully the impressions which we receive in the presence of objects, in order to bring ourselves back to that point in the circumstances in which it is necessary to suspend the judgment, or even when the question is about things, the evidence of which is not immediately perceived.

“We also need to pay close attention to the impressions we get from being around objects, so we can bring ourselves back to that moment when we need to hold off on making a judgment, or even when it comes to things whose evidence isn’t immediately obvious.”

“When these foundations are once laid we may pass to the study of those things, the evidence of which is not immediate. And, first of all, we must admit that nothing can come of that which does not exist; for, were the fact otherwise, then every thing would be produced from everything, and there would be no need of any seed. And if that which disappeared were so absolutely destroyed as to become non-existent, then every thing would soon perish, as the things with which they would be dissolved would have no existence. But, in truth, the universal whole always was such as it now is, and always will be such. For there is nothing into which it can change; for there is nothing beyond this universal whole which can penetrate into it, and produce any change in it.”

“When these foundations are laid, we can move on to studying things that aren't immediately obvious. First of all, we have to acknowledge that nothing can come from what doesn’t exist; if that were the case, everything would come from everything, and there would be no need for any seed. If something that disappeared was completely destroyed to the point of becoming non-existent, everything would eventually vanish too, since the things that would cause their dissolution wouldn’t exist. But in reality, the entire universe has always been as it is now and always will be. Nothing can change into anything else; there’s nothing outside of this universe that can enter it and create any change.”

(And Epicurus establishes the same principles at the beginning of the great Abridgment; and in the first book of his treatise on Nature.)[140] “Now the universal whole is a body; for our senses bear us witness in every case that bodies have a real existence; and the evidence of the senses, as I have said before, ought to be the rule of our reasonings about everything which is not directly perceived. Otherwise, if that which we call the vacuum, or space, or intangible nature, had not a real existence, there would be nothing on which the bodies could be contained, or across which they could move, as we see that they really do move. Let us add to this reflection that one cannot conceive, either in virtue of perception, or of any analogy founded on perception, any general quality peculiar[439] to all beings which is not either an attribute, or an accident of the body, or of the vacuum.”

(And Epicurus establishes the same principles at the beginning of the great Abridgment; and in the first book of his treatise on Nature.)[140] “Now the entire universe is a body; because our senses confirm for us in every instance that bodies truly exist; and the evidence from our senses, as I’ve mentioned before, should guide our reasoning about everything that isn’t directly perceived. If what we call a vacuum, or space, or intangible nature didn’t actually exist, then there would be nothing for bodies to occupy or through which they could move, as we observe them truly moving. Additionally, we must consider that one cannot imagine, whether through perception or any analogy based on perception, any general quality unique to all beings that isn’t either an attribute or an accident of the body, or of the vacuum.”

(The same principles are laid down in the first, and fourteenth, and fifteenth book of the treatise on Nature; and also in the Great Abridgment.)

(The same principles are stated in the first, fourteenth, and fifteenth books of the treatise on Nature; and also in the Great Abridgment.)

“Now, of bodies, some are combinations, and some the elements out of which these combinations are formed. These last are indivisible, and protected from every kind of transformation; otherwise everything would be resolved into non-existence. They exist by their own force, in the midst of the dissolution of the combined bodies, being absolutely full, and as such offering no handle for destruction to take hold of. It follows, therefore, as a matter of absolute necessity, that the principles of things must be corporeal, indivisible elements.

“Now, some bodies are combinations, while others are the elements that make up these combinations. The latter are indivisible and immune to any kind of transformation; otherwise, everything would ultimately break down into nothingness. They exist by their own power, amidst the breakdown of the combined bodies, being completely full, which prevents any possibility of destruction. Therefore, it is absolutely necessary that the principles of things must be physical, indivisible elements.”

“The universe is infinite. For that which is finite has an extreme, and that which has an extreme is looked at in relation to something else. Consequently, that which has not an extreme, has no boundary; and if it has no boundary, it must be infinite, and not terminated by any limit. The universe then is infinite, both with reference to the quantity of bodies of which it is made up, and to the magnitude of the vacuum; for if the vacuum were infinite, the bodies being finite, then, the bodies would not be able to rest in any place; they would be transported about, scattered across the infinite vacuum for want of any power to steady themselves, or to keep one another in their places by mutual repulsion. If, on the other hand, the vacuum were finite, the bodies being infinite, then the bodies clearly could never be contained in the vacuum.

“The universe is infinite. Anything that is finite has a limit, and anything with a limit is understood in relation to something else. Therefore, if something has no limit, it has no boundaries; and if it has no boundaries, it must be infinite and not confined by any limits. So, the universe is infinite, both in terms of the number of objects it contains and the size of the vacuum; because if the vacuum were infinite and the objects finite, then the objects couldn't settle anywhere; they would be moved around, scattered throughout the infinite vacuum without any way to stabilize themselves or keep each other in place through mutual repulsion. Conversely, if the vacuum were finite and the objects infinite, then the objects clearly couldn't fit into the vacuum.”

“Again: the atoms which form the bodies, these full elements from which the combined bodies come, and into which they resolve themselves, assume an incalculable variety of forms, for the numerous differences which the bodies present cannot possibly result from an aggregate of the same forms. Each variety of forms contains an infinity of atoms, but there is not for that reason an infinity of atoms; it is only the number of them which is beyond all calculation.”

“Once again: the atoms that make up bodies, these complete elements from which combined bodies arise and into which they break down, take on an endless variety of forms. The many differences we see in bodies can't possibly come from just a collection of the same forms. Each variety of forms contains countless atoms, but that doesn’t mean there’s an infinite number of atoms; it’s just that the total number of them is beyond any calculation.”

(Epicurus adds, a little lower down, that divisibility, ad infinitum, is impossible; for, says he, the only things which change are the qualities; unless, indeed, one wishes to proceed from division to division, till one arrives absolutely at infinite littleness.)

(Epicurus adds, a little further down, that division, ad infinitum, is impossible; because, as he says, the only things that change are the qualities; unless, of course, one wants to keep dividing until they reach truly infinite smallness.)

“The atoms are in a continual state of motion.”

“The atoms are always in motion.”

(He says, farther on, that they move with an equal rapidity from all eternity, since the vacuum offers no more resistance to the lightest than it does to the heaviest.)

(He states later that they travel with the same speed from all eternity, since the vacuum presents no more resistance to the lightest than it does to the heaviest.)

“Among the atoms, some are separated by great distances, others come very near to one another in the formation of combined bodies, or at times are enveloped by others which are combining; but in this latter case they, nevertheless, preserve their own peculiar motion, thanks to the nature of the vacuum, which separates the one from the other, and yet offers them no resistance. The solidity which they possess causes them, while knocking against one another, to re-act the one upon the other; till at last the repeated shocks bring on the dissolution of the combined body; and for all this there is no external cause, the atoms and the vacuum being the only causes.”

“Among the atoms, some are spaced far apart, while others come very close together to form combined bodies, or sometimes are surrounded by others that are merging; but even in this case, they still maintain their own unique movement, thanks to the nature of the vacuum that separates them and offers no resistance. Their solidity causes them to collide with each other, which leads to a reaction between them; eventually, these repeated impacts cause the combined body to break apart; and through all this, there is no external cause, as the atoms and the vacuum are the only causes.”

(He says, further on, that the atoms have no peculiar quality of their own, except from magnitude and weight. As to colour, he says in the twelfth book of his Principia, that it varies according to the position of the atoms. Moreover, he does not attribute to the atoms any kind of dimensions; and, accordingly, no atom has ever been perceived by the senses; but this expression, if people only recollect what is here said, will by itself offer to the thoughts a sufficient image of the nature of things.)

(He says later that atoms don't have any unique qualities of their own, other than size and weight. Regarding color, he mentions in the twelfth book of his Principia that it changes based on the position of the atoms. Additionally, he doesn't assign any dimensions to the atoms; thus, no atom has ever been sensed. However, if people remember what is said here, this expression will be enough to give them a clear idea of the nature of things.)

“But, again, the worlds also are infinite, whether they resemble this one of ours or whether they are different from it. For, as the atoms are, as to their number, infinite, as I have proved above, they necessarily move about at immense distances; for besides, this infinite multitude of atoms, of which the world is formed, or by which it is produced, could not be entirely absorbed by one single world, nor even by any worlds, the number of which was limited, whether we suppose them like this world of ours, or different from it. There is, therefore, no fact inconsistent with an infinity of worlds.

"But, once again, the worlds are infinite, whether they look like ours or are completely different. The atoms, as I showed earlier, are infinite in number, which means they must move over vast distances. This countless number of atoms that make up the universe cannot be contained within just one world, nor even within a limited number of worlds, whether we think of them as similar to ours or different. Therefore, there's nothing that contradicts the idea of an infinite number of worlds."

“Moreover, there are images resembling, as far as their form goes, the solid bodies which we see, but which differ materially from them in the thinness of their substance. In fact it is not impossible but that there may be in space some secretions of this kind, and an aptitude to form surfaces without depth, and of an extreme thinness; or else that from the solids there[441] may emanate some particles which preserve the connection, the disposition, and the motion which they had in the body. I give the name of images to these representations; and, indeed, their movement through the vacuum taking place, without meeting any obstacle or hindrance, perfects all imaginable extent in an inconceivable moment of time; for it is the meeting of obstacles, or the absence of obstacles, which produces the rapidity or the slowness of their motion. At all events, a body in motion does not find itself, at any moment imaginable, in two places at the same time; that is quite inconceivable. From whatever point of infinity it arrives at some appreciable moment, and whatever may be the spot in its course in which we perceive its motion, it has evidently quitted that spot at the moment of our thought; for this motion which, as we have admitted up to this point, encounters no obstacle to its rapidity, is wholly in the same condition as that the rapidity of which is diminished by the shock of some resistance.

Moreover, there are images that look like the solid objects we see, but they are actually very different in their thinness. It's possible that there are some types of these thin forms in space, which can form surfaces without depth and are extremely thin; or perhaps solid objects can emit particles that maintain the connection, arrangement, and motion they had while in the body. I refer to these representations as images; indeed, their movement through a vacuum, happening without any obstacles or resistance, expands to unimaginable lengths in an instant; because it’s the presence or absence of resistance that affects how fast or slow they move. In any case, a moving object can never be in two places at once; that’s entirely unimaginable. No matter from where in infinity it comes to an observable moment, and wherever we notice its movement along the way, it has clearly left that spot at the moment we think of it; for this motion that we have acknowledged up to now faces no obstacles to its speed, is entirely in the same condition as a motion slowed down by some form of resistance.

“It is useful, also, to retain this principle, and to know that the images have an incomparable thinness; which fact indeed is in no respect contradicted by sensible appearances. From which it follows that their rapidity also is incomparable; for they find everywhere an easy passage, and besides, their infinite smallness causes them to experience no shock, or at all events to experience but a very slight one, while an infinite multitude of elements very soon encounter some resistance.

“It’s also helpful to keep this principle in mind and to understand that the images are incredibly thin; this fact isn’t contradicted by what we can see. From this, it follows that their speed is also unmatched; they can move through everything easily, and their infinite smallness means they don’t face any impact, or at most, a very slight one, while an infinite number of elements quickly encounter some resistance.”

“One must not forget that the production of images is simultaneous with the thought; for from the surface of the bodies images of this kind are continually flowing off in an insensible manner indeed, because they are immediately replaced. They preserve for a long time the same disposition, and the same arrangement that the atoms do in the solid body, although, notwithstanding, their form may be sometimes altered. The direct production of images in space is equally instantaneous, because these images are only light substances destitute of depth.

“One must not forget that producing images happens at the same time as thinking; because images like this are constantly flowing off the surface of bodies in a subtle way, since they are immediately replaced. They maintain the same arrangement and disposition for a long time, similar to the atoms in a solid body, even though their form may occasionally change. The direct creation of images in space occurs just as quickly, since these images are merely light substances without any depth.”

“But there are other manners in which natures of this kind are produced; for there is nothing in all this which at all contradicts the senses, if one only considers in what way the senses are exercised, and if one is inclined to explain the relation which is established between external objects and[442] ourselves. Also, one must admit that something passes from external objects into us in order to produce in us sight and the knowledge of forms; for it is difficult to conceive that external objects can affect us through the medium of the air which is between us and them, or by means of rays, whatever emissions proceed from us to them, so as to give us an impression of their form and colour. This phenomenon, on the contrary, is perfectly explained, if we admit that certain images of the same colour, of the same shape, and of a proportionate magnitude pass from these objects to us, and so arrive at being seen and comprehended. These images are animated by an exceeding rapidity, and, as on the other side, the solid object forming a compact mass, and comprising a vast quantity of atoms, emits always the same quantity of particles, the vision is continued, and only produces in us one single perception which preserves always the same relation to the object. Every conception, every sensible perception which bears upon the form or the other attributes of these images, is only the same form of the solid perceived directly, either in virtue of a sort of actual and continued condensation of the image, or in consequence of the traces which it has left in us.

But there are other ways in which these kinds of natures are produced; for there's nothing here that contradicts our senses, as long as we consider how our senses work and are willing to explain the connection between external objects and[442] ourselves. We must also accept that something moves from external objects into us to create sight and our understanding of shapes; it's hard to imagine that external objects can influence us through the air between us and them, or by means of rays, regardless of what emissions come from us to them, to give us an impression of their shape and color. This phenomenon, however, is fully explained if we accept that certain images of the same color, shape, and appropriate size move from these objects to us, allowing us to see and understand them. These images move at an incredible speed, and while on the other side, the solid object forms a compact mass with a vast number of atoms, it always emits the same number of particles, keeping our vision engaged and producing only one perception that maintains the same relationship to the object. Every idea or sensory perception related to the shape or other characteristics of these images is simply the same form of the solid seen directly, either due to a sort of actual and ongoing condensation of the image or as a result of the traces it has left in us.

“Error and false judgments always depend upon the supposition that a preconceived idea will be confirmed, or at all events will not be overturned, by evidence. Then, when it is not confirmed, we form our judgment in virtue of a sort of initiation of the thoughts connected, it is true with the perception, and with a direct representation; but still connected also with a conception peculiar to ourselves, which is the parent of error. In fact the representations which intelligence reflects like a mirror, whether one perceives them in a dream, or by any other conceptions of the intellect, or of any other of the criteria, can never resemble the objects that one calls real and true, unless there were objects of this kind perceived directly. And, on the other side, error could not be possible if we did not receive some other motion also, a sort of initiative of intelligence connected; it is true with direct representation, but going beyond that representative. These conceptions being connected with the direct perception which produces the representation, but going beyond it, in consequence of a motion peculiar to the individual thought, produces error when it is not confirmed by evidence, or when it is contradicted[443] by evidence; but when it is confirmed, or when it is not contradicted by evidence, then it produces truth.

“Errors and wrong judgments always rely on the assumption that a preconceived idea will be supported, or at the very least, not disproven by evidence. When it’s not supported, we form our judgment based on a kind of initiation of the related thoughts, which, while connected to perception and direct representation, are also tied to an understanding unique to ourselves, which leads to error. In fact, the representations that our intelligence reflects like a mirror—whether we perceive them in a dream or through any other intellectual concept—can never truly resemble the objects we call real and true unless we directly perceive such objects. On the other hand, error wouldn't be possible if we didn't also receive some other type of motion, a sort of initiative from intelligence that is indeed related to direct representation but goes beyond it. These concepts, linked to the direct perception that produces representation but extending beyond it due to a unique motion of individual thought, lead to error when not supported by evidence or when contradicted by evidence; however, when they are supported or not contradicted by evidence, they lead to truth.[443]

“We must carefully preserve these principles in order not to reject the authority of the faculties which perceive truth directly; and not, on the other hand, to allow what is false to be established with equal firmness, so as to throw everything into confusion.

“We must keep these principles in mind to avoid dismissing the authority of the faculties that perceive truth directly; and, on the other hand, we must not let falsehoods be accepted with the same certainty, which would lead to total confusion.”

“Moreover, hearing is produced by some sort of current proceeding from something that speaks, or sounds, or roars, or in any manner causes any sort of audible circumstance. And this current is diffused into small bodies resembling one another in their parts; which, preserving not only some kind of relation between one another, but even a sort of particular identity with the object from which they emanate, puts us, very frequently, into a communication of sentiments with this object, or at least causes us to become aware of the existence of some external circumstance. If these currents did not carry with them some sort of sympathy, then there would be no such perception. We must not therefore think that it is the air which receives a certain form, under the action of the voice or of some other sound. For it is utterly impossible that the voice should act in this manner on the air. But the percussion produced in us when we, by the utterance of a voice, cause a disengagement of certain particles, constitutes a current resembling a light whisper, and prepares an acoustic feeling for us.

“Moreover, hearing is created by some kind of wave coming from something that speaks, makes sounds, roars, or in any way creates an audible situation. This wave spreads into small bodies that are similar in their parts; which, not only maintaining a certain relationship with each other but also a kind of particular identity with the source they come from, often connects us emotionally with this source, or at least makes us aware of some external situation. If these waves didn’t carry some sort of connection, we wouldn’t have that perception. Therefore, we shouldn’t think that it’s the air that takes on a certain form when impacted by the voice or another sound. It’s completely impossible for the voice to affect the air in that way. Instead, the vibrations created in us when we produce a voice cause the release of certain particles, creating a wave similar to a gentle whisper and preparing us for an acoustic experience.”

“We must admit that the case of smelling is the same as that of hearing. There would be no sense of smell if there did not emanate from most objects certain particles capable of producing an impression on the smell. One class being ill-suited to the organ, and consequently producing a disordered state of it, the other being suited to it, and causing it no distress.

“We have to acknowledge that the situation with smell is similar to that of hearing. There would be no sense of smell if certain particles didn't come from most objects that could create an impression on our sense of smell. One group of particles isn't compatible with our olfactory system, leading to a disturbed state, while the other is compatible and does not cause any discomfort.”

“One must also allow, that the atoms possess no one of the qualities of sensible objects, except form, weight, magnitude and anything else is unavoidably inherent in form; in fact, every quality is changeable, but the atoms are necessarily unchangeable; for it is impossible but that in the dissolution of combined bodies, there must be something which continues solid and indestructible, of such a kind, that it will not change either into what does not exist, or out of what does[444] not exist; but that it results either from a simple displacement of parts, which is the most usual case, or from the addition or subtraction of certain particles. It follows from that, that that which does not admit of any change in itself, is imperishable, participates in no respect in the nature of changeable things, and in a word, has its dimensions and forms immutably determined. And this is proved plainly enough, because even in the transformations which take place under our eyes, in consequence of the retrenchment of certain parts, we can still recognise the form of these constituent parts; while those qualities, which are not constituent parts, do not remain like the form, but perish in the dissolution of the combination. The attributes which we have indicated, suffice to explain all the differences of combined bodies; for we must inevitably leave something indestructible, lest everything should resolve itself into non-existence.

One must also acknowledge that atoms lack all the qualities of tangible objects, except for form, weight, size, and anything else that is inherently tied to form; in fact, every quality can change, but atoms are necessarily unchangeable. It’s impossible that when combined bodies break down, there isn’t something that remains solid and indestructible—something that won’t turn into what doesn’t exist or emerge from something that doesn’t exist. It results either from a simple shift in parts, which is the most common scenario, or from adding or removing certain particles. Therefore, what doesn’t change in itself is imperishable, doesn’t share any characteristics with changeable things, and, in short, has its dimensions and forms determined without variation. This is clearly evident because even in the transformations we observe, due to the removal of certain parts, we can still recognize the form of those parts; meanwhile, qualities that aren’t part of the structure don’t remain like the form does, but disappear when the combination dissolves. The characteristics we’ve pointed out are enough to explain all the differences in combined bodies; we must inevitably leave something indestructible, or else everything would revert to non-existence.

“However, one must not believe that every kind of magnitude exists in atoms, lest we find ourselves contradicted by phænomena. But we must admit that there are atoms of different magnitude, because, as that is the case, it is then more easy to explain the impressions and sensations; at all events, I repeat, it is not necessary for the purpose of explaining the differences of the qualities, to attribute to atoms every kind of magnitude.

“However, we shouldn’t assume that all types of size exist in atoms, as that could lead to contradictions with observations. But we must acknowledge that there are atoms of different sizes, because this makes it easier to explain impressions and sensations; in any case, I emphasize that it’s not necessary to assign every kind of size to atoms in order to explain the differences in qualities.”

“We must not suppose either, that an atom can become visible to us; for, first of all, one does not see that that is the case, and besides, one cannot even conceive, how an atom is to become visible; besides, we must not believe, that in a finite body there are particles of every sort, infinite in number; consequently, one must not only reject the doctrine of infinite divisibility in parcels smaller and smaller, lest we should be reducing everything to nothing, and find ourselves forced to admit, that in a mass composed of a crowd of elements, existence can reduce itself to non-existence. But one cannot even suppose that a finite object can be susceptible of transformations ad infinitum, or even of transformation into smaller objects than itself; for when once one has said that there are in an object particles of every kind, infinite in number, there is absolutely no means whatever of imagining that this object can have only a finite magnitude; in fact, it is evident that these particles, infinite in number, have some kind of dimension[445] or other, and whatever this dimension may be in other respects, the objects which are composed of it will have an infinite magnitude; in presenting forms which are determined, and limits which are perceived by the senses, one conceives, easily, without its being necessary to study this last question directly, that this would be the consequence of the contrary supposition, and that consequently, one must come to look at every object as infinite.

“We shouldn't assume that an atom can become visible to us; first of all, we don't see it happening, and besides, we can't even imagine how an atom could become visible. Additionally, we shouldn't believe that a finite object contains particles of every kind in endless quantities. Therefore, we must reject the idea of infinite divisibility into smaller and smaller parts, as doing so would lead us to reduce everything to nothing and force us to admit that in a mass made up of numerous elements, existence could turn into non-existence. However, we can't even think that a finite object could undergo infinite transformations or change into smaller objects than itself; once we state that an object has an infinite number of particles of every kind, we cannot imagine that this object can have only a finite size. In fact, it's clear that these infinitely numerous particles must have some kind of dimension, and whatever that dimension is in other ways, the objects made up of it would have an infinite size. By presenting forms with clear characteristics and boundaries that our senses can perceive, it's easy to understand, without needing to directly study this last point, that this would be the result of the opposite assumption, and thus we must view every object as infinite.”

“One must also admit, that the most minute particle perceptible to the sense, is neither absolutely like the objects which are susceptible of transformation, nor absolutely different from them. It has some characteristics in common with the object which admit of transformation, but it also differs from them, inasmuch as it does not allow any distinct parts to be discerned in it. When then, in virtue of these common characteristics, and of this resemblance, we wish to form an idea of the smallest particle perceptible by the senses, in taking the objects which change for our terms of comparison, it is necessary that we should seize on some characteristic common to these different objects. In this way, we examine them successively, from the first to the last, not by themselves, nor as composed of parts in juxtaposition, but only in their extent; in other words, we consider the magnitudes by themselves, and in an abstract manner, inasmuch as they measure, the greater a greater extent, and the smaller a smaller extent. This analogy applies to the atom, as far as we consider it as having the smallest dimensions possible. Evidently by its minuteness, it differs from all sensible objects, still this analogy is applicable to it; in a word, we establish by this comparison, that the atom really has some extent, but we exclude all considerable dimensions, for the sake of only investing it with the smallest proportions.[141]

One has to acknowledge that the smallest particle we can perceive is neither completely like the objects that can change nor completely different from them. It shares some traits with changeable objects, but it also differs because we can't identify any distinct parts in it. So, when we try to imagine the tiniest particle we can notice by our senses, using changing objects as a comparison, we need to identify some common feature shared by these different objects. This way, we can look at them one by one, not as separate entities or as parts that are just next to each other, but only in terms of their size. In other words, we consider the sizes on their own and in an abstract way, since they measure larger amounts and smaller amounts. This comparison holds true for the atom when we think of it as having the smallest dimensions possible. Clearly, because of its tiny size, it is different from all things we can sense, but this comparison still applies to it; to put it briefly, this comparison shows that the atom does have some size, but we disregard any significant dimensions to focus only on the smallest scales. [141]

“We must also admit, in taking for our guide, the reasoning which discourses to us things which are invisible to the senses, that the most minute magnitudes, those which are not compound magnitudes, and which from the limit of sensible extent, are the first measure of the other magnitudes which are only called greater or less in their relation to the others. For these relations which they maintain with these particles, which are not subject to transformation, suffice to give them this characteristic of first measure. But they cannot, like atoms, combine themselves, and form compound bodies in virtue of any motion belonging to themselves.

“We must also acknowledge that by using reasoning to understand things that we can't see with our senses, the smallest sizes—those that aren't made up of other sizes and fall within the limits of what we can perceive—serve as the basic measure for other sizes that we describe as larger or smaller compared to others. The relationships these sizes have with these particles, which cannot change, are enough to give them this role as the basic measure. However, unlike atoms, they cannot combine to form complex bodies through any type of movement of their own.”

“Moreover, we must not say (while speaking of the infinite), that such or such a point is the highest point of it, or the lowest. For height and lowness must not be predicated of the infinite. We know, in reality, that if, wishing to determine the infinite, we conceive a point above our head, this point, whatever it may be, will never appear to us to have the character in question: otherwise, that which would be situated above the point so conceived as the limit of the infinite, would be at the same moment, and by virtue of its relation to the same point, both high and low; and this is impossible to imagine.

“Also, we shouldn’t say (when talking about the infinite) that a certain point is the highest or lowest of it. Height and lowness don’t apply to the infinite. We know that if we try to define the infinite by imagining a point above our heads, that point, no matter what it is, will never seem to have those qualities. Otherwise, what’s above that imagined point—which we see as the limit of the infinite—would, at the same time, and because of its relation to that same point, be both high and low; and that’s impossible to envision.”

“It follows that thought can only conceive that one single movement of transference, from low to high, ad infinitum; and one single movement from high to low. From low to high, when even the object in motion, going from us to the places situated above our heads, meets ten thousand times with the feet of those who are above us; and from high to low, when in the same way it advances towards the heads of those who are below us. For these two movements, looked at by themselves and in their whole, are conceived as really opposed the one to the other, in their progress towards the infinite.

“It follows that thought can only grasp two movements: one moving from low to high, ad infinitum; and another moving from high to low. The movement from low to high occurs when the object in motion travels away from us to places above us, repeatedly encountering the feet of those who are above us. The movement from high to low happens similarly, as it moves toward the heads of those below us. When considered individually and as a whole, these two movements are understood as truly opposing each other in their progression toward the infinite.”

“Moreover, all the atoms are necessarily animated by the same rapidity, when they move across the vacuum, or when no obstacle thwarts them. For why should heavy atoms have a more rapid movement than those which are small and light, since in no quarter do they encounter any obstacle? Why, on[447] the other hand, should the small atoms have a rapidity superior to that of the large ones, since both the one and the other find everywhere an easy passage, from the very moment that no obstacle intervenes to thwart their movements? Movement from low to high, horizontal movement to and fro, in virtue of the reciprocal percussion of the atoms, movement downwards, in virtue of their weight, will be all equal, for in whatever sense the atom moves, it must have a movement as rapid as the thought, till the moment when it is repelled, in virtue of some external cause, or of its own proper weight, by the shock of some object which resists it.

“Also, all atoms move at the same speed when they travel through a vacuum or when there’s nothing in their way. Why should heavier atoms move faster than lighter ones when they don’t encounter any obstacles? On[447] the flip side, why should smaller atoms move faster than larger ones when both can easily pass through without anything blocking them? Movement upwards or downwards, sideways movement back and forth, due to the collisions between atoms, and downward movement because of their weight will all be equal. No matter which direction an atom moves, it must move as quickly as thought until it’s pushed back by some external force or its own weight in response to an object that resists it.

“Again, even in the compound bodies, one atom does not move more rapidly than another. In fact, if one only looks at the continued movement of an atom which takes place in an indivisible moment of time, the briefest possible, they all have a movement equally rapid. At the same time, an atom has not, in any moment perceptible to the intelligence, a continued movement in the same direction; but rather a series of oscillating movements from which there results, in the last analysis, a continued movement perceptible to the senses. If then, one were to suppose, in virtue of a reasoning on things invisible, that, in the intervals of time accessible to thought, the atoms have a continued movement one would deceive one’s self, for that which is conceived by the thought is true as well as that which is directly perceived.

“Once again, even in complex substances, one atom doesn’t move faster than another. In fact, if we look at the ongoing movement of an atom in an indivisible moment of time—the shortest possible—they all show movement that is equally swift. At the same time, an atom doesn’t have a consistent movement in the same direction at any moment that can be perceived; instead, it exhibits a series of oscillating movements that ultimately result in a continuous movement that can be sensed. Therefore, if one were to assume, based on reasoning about things that can’t be seen, that atoms have a continuous movement during intervals of time that thought can grasp, one would be mistaken, since what is understood through thought is just as real as what is directly observed.”

“Let us now return to the study of the affections, and of the sensations; for this will be the best method of proving that the soul is a bodily substance composed of slight particles, diffused over all the members of the body, and presenting a great analogy to a sort of spirit, having an admixture of heat, resembling at one time one, and at another time the other of those two principles. There exists in it a special part, endowed with an extreme mobility, in consequence of the exceeding slightness of the elements which compose it, and also in reference to its more immediate sympathy with the rest of the body. That it is which the faculties of the soul sufficiently prove, and the passions, and the mobility of its nature, and the thoughts, and, in a word, everything, the privation of which is death. We must admit that it is in the soul most especially that the principle of sensation resides. At the same time, it would not possess this power if it were not enveloped by the[448] rest of the body which communicates it to it, and in its turn receives it from it, but only in a certain measure; for there are certain affections of the soul of which it is not capable.

“Let’s go back to studying emotions and sensations because this is the best way to show that the soul is a physical substance made up of tiny particles spread throughout the body. It has a strong similarity to a type of spirit, mixing elements of heat, sometimes resembling one and sometimes the other of those two principles. Within it, there’s a special part that has extreme mobility due to the tiny size of the elements that make it up, and also because of its close connection to the rest of the body. This is what the soul's faculties, emotions, and the nature of its mobility, as well as thoughts — in short, everything that, when absent, signifies death — demonstrate. We must acknowledge that the principle of sensation primarily resides in the soul. However, it wouldn’t have this ability if it weren’t surrounded by the rest of the body, which communicates it to the soul and, in return, receives it back, but only to a certain extent; there are some emotional states of the soul that it cannot experience."

“It is on that account that, when the soul departs, the body is no longer possessed of sensation; for it has not this power, (that of sensation namely) in itself; but, on the other hand, this power can only manifest itself in the soul through the medium of the body. The soul, reflecting the manifestations which are accomplished in the substance which environs it, realises in itself, in a virtue or power which belongs to it, the sensible affections, and immediately communicates them to the body in virtue of the reciprocal bonds of sympathy which unite it to the body; that is the reason why the destruction of a part of the body does not draw after it a cessation of all feeling in the soul while it resides in the body, provided that the senses still preserve some energy; although, nevertheless, the dissolution of the corporeal covering, or even of any one of its portions, may sometimes bring on with it the destruction of the soul.

“It’s for this reason that when the soul leaves, the body no longer has sensation; it doesn't have this ability (that is, sensation) on its own. Instead, this ability can only show itself through the soul using the body as a medium. The soul, reflecting the experiences that occur in its surrounding substance, realizes, in a virtue or power that belongs to it, the sensory feelings and instantly shares them with the body because of the mutual bonds of sympathy that connect them. That’s why the destruction of part of the body doesn’t automatically lead to the soul losing all feeling while it’s still in the body, as long as the senses still have some energy. However, the breakdown of its physical covering, or even just one of its parts, can sometimes result in the destruction of the soul.”

“The rest of the body, on the other hand, even when it remains, either as a whole, or in any part, loses all feeling by the dispersion of that aggregate of atoms, whatever it may be, that forms the soul. When the entire combination of the body is dissolved, then the soul too is dissolved, and ceases to retain those faculties which were previously inherent in it, and especially the power of motion; so that sensation perishes equally as far as the soul is concerned; for it is impossible to imagine that it still feels, from the moment when it is no longer in the same conditions of existence, and no longer possesses the same movements of existence in reference to the same organic system; from the moment, in short, when the things which cover and surround it are no longer such, that it retains in them the same movements as before.

“The rest of the body, on the other hand, even when it stays intact, whether fully or partially, loses all sensation because the collection of atoms that makes up the soul is dispersed. When the whole body breaks down, the soul does too, and it stops having the abilities it once had, especially the ability to move. As a result, sensation disappears for the soul as well, because it's hard to believe it can still feel once it's no longer in the same state of existence and doesn't have the same movements related to the same organic system; in short, from the moment the things that cover and surround it are no longer able to provide the same movements as before.”

(Epicurus expresses the same ideas in other works, and adds that the soul is composed of atoms of the most perfect lightness and roundness; atoms wholly different from those of fire. He distinguishes in it the irrational part which is diffused over the whole body, from the rational part which has its seat in the chest, as is proved by the emotions of fear and joy. He adds that sleep is produced when the parts of the soul diffused over the whole of the body concentre themselves, or when they[449] disperse and escape by the pores of the body; for particles emanate from all bodies.)

(Epicurus shares similar ideas in other writings and adds that the soul is made up of atoms that are extremely light and round; these atoms are completely different from those of fire. He differentiates between the irrational part, which spreads throughout the entire body, and the rational part, which is located in the chest, as seen in feelings of fear and joy. He explains that sleep occurs when the parts of the soul that are spread across the body come together or when they disperse and escape through the body's pores; because particles emit from all bodies.)

“It must also be observed, that I use the word incorporeal (ἀσώματος) in the usual acceptation of the word, to express that which is in itself conceived as such. Now, nothing can be conceived in itself as incorporeal except the vacuum; but the vacuum cannot be either passive or active; it is only the condition and the place of movement. Accordingly, they who pretend that the soul is incorporeal, utter words destitute of sense; for, if it had this character, it would not be able either to do or to suffer anything; but, as it is, we see plainly enough that it is liable to both these circumstances.

"It should also be noted that I use the term incorporeal (ἀσώματος) in the usual sense to describe something that is understood to be that way in itself. Now, nothing can be conceived as truly incorporeal except for a vacuum; however, the vacuum cannot be either passive or active; it merely serves as the condition and location for movement. Thus, those who claim that the soul is incorporeal are speaking nonsense; because if it were truly like that, it wouldn’t be able to do anything or experience anything. Yet, as we can clearly see, it is capable of both."

“Let us then apply all these reasonings to the affections and sensations, recollecting the ideas which we laid down at the beginning, and then we shall see clearly that these general principles contain an exact solution of all the particular cases.

“Now, let’s take all these thoughts and apply them to our feelings and sensations, keeping in mind the ideas we established earlier, and we’ll see clearly that these basic principles provide a precise answer to all the specific situations.”

“As to forms, and hues, and magnitudes, and weight, and the other qualities which one looks upon as attributes, whether it be of every body, or of those bodies only which are visible and perceived by the senses, this is the point of view under which they ought to be considered: they are not particular substances, having a peculiar existence of their own, for that cannot be conceived; nor can one say any more that they have no reality at all. They are not incorporeal substances inherent in the body, nor are they parts of the body. But they constitute by their union the eternal substance and the essence of the entire body. We must not fancy, however, that the body is composed of them, as an aggregate is formed of particles of the smallest dimensions of atoms or magnitudes, whatever they may be, smaller than the compound body itself; they only constitute by their union, I repeat, the eternal substance of the body. Each of these attributes has ideas and particular perceptions which correspond to it; but they cannot be perceived independently of the whole subject taken entirely; the union of all these perceptions forms the idea of the body. Bodies often possess other attributes which are not eternally inherent in them, but which, nevertheless, cannot be ranged among the incorporeal and invisible things. Accordingly, it is sufficient to express the general idea of the movement of transference to enable us to conceive in a moment certain distinct qualities, and those combined beings, which, being[450] taken in their totality, receive the name of bodies; and the necessary and eternal attributes without which the body cannot be conceived.

“As for forms, colors, sizes, weight, and other qualities that people consider attributes—whether of all bodies or just the ones we can see and sense—this is how we should view them: they are not distinct substances with their own separate existence, as that thought is impossible; nor can we claim they have no reality at all. They are not incorporeal substances that exist within the body, nor are they parts of the body. Rather, they come together to create the eternal substance and essence of the entire body. We shouldn’t think that the body is made up of these attributes like an aggregate formed from tiny particles or atoms, however small they might be, and smaller than the compound body; they only join together, as I said, to form the eternal substance of the body. Each of these attributes has its own ideas and specific perceptions, but they cannot be perceived separately from the whole subject itself; the union of all these perceptions creates the idea of the body. Bodies often have other attributes that are not eternally inherent in them, but still cannot be classified as incorporeal and invisible. Therefore, it’s enough to express the general idea of movement of transfer to allow us to quickly imagine certain distinct qualities and those combined entities, which, when taken as a whole, are called bodies, along with the necessary and eternal attributes without which the body cannot be conceived.”

“There are certain conceptions corresponding to these attributes; but, nevertheless, they cannot be known abstractedly, and independently of some subjects; and further, inasmuch as they are not attributes necessarily inherent in the idea of a body, one can only conceive them in the moment in which they are visible; they are realities nevertheless; and one must not refuse them being an existence merely because they have neither the characteristic of the compound beings to which we give the name of bodies, nor that of the eternal attributes. We should be equally deceived if we were to suppose that they have a separate and independent existence; for that is true neither of them nor of the eternal attributes. They are, as one sees plainly, accidents of the body; accidents which do not of necessity make any part of its nature; which cannot be considered as independent substances, but still to each of which sensation gives the peculiar character under which it appears to us.

"There are specific concepts related to these attributes; however, they can’t be understood in isolation or apart from certain subjects. Furthermore, since they aren’t attributes that are inherently part of the concept of a body, we can only grasp them when they are observable. They are real nonetheless, and we shouldn’t deny their existence just because they lack the traits of the physical entities we refer to as bodies, or those of the eternal attributes. We would also be mistaken if we thought they exist separately and independently; that applies to neither them nor the eternal attributes. Clearly, they are accidents of the body—accidents that don’t necessarily form any part of its essence; they can’t be viewed as independent substances, yet each is given a distinct character by our perception."

“Another important question is that of time. Here we cannot apply any more the method of examination to which we submit other objects, which we study with reference to a given subject; and which we refer to the preconceptions which exist in ourselves. We must seize, by analogy, and going round the whole circle of things comprised under this general denomination of time—we must seize, I say—that essential character which causes us to say that a time is long or short. It is not necessary for that purpose to seek for any new forms of expression as preferable to those which are in common use; we may content ourselves with those by which time is usually indicated. Nor need we, as certain philosophers do, affirm any particular attribute of time, for that would be to suppose that its essence is the same as that of this attribute. It is sufficient too seek for the ingredients of which this particular nature which we call time is composed, and for the means by which it is measured. For this we have no need of demonstration; a simple exposition is sufficient. It is, in fact, evident, that we speak of time as composed of days and nights, and parts of days and nights; passiveness and impassibility, movement and repose, are equally comprised in time. In[451] short, it is evident that in connection with these different states, we conceive a particular property to which we give the name of time.

Another important question is about time. Here, we can no longer use the same method of examination that we apply to other objects, which we study regarding a specific subject and relate to our own preconceptions. We must understand, by analogy, and encompassing everything under this general term of time—we must understand, I say—that essential characteristic that leads us to say a time is long or short. It's not necessary to look for any new ways to express this that are better than those commonly used; we can be satisfied with the terms that usually indicate time. Nor do we, as some philosophers do, need to assert any specific attribute of time, as that would mean assuming that its essence is the same as that attribute. It is enough to seek out the components of this particular nature we call time and the methods by which it is measured. For this, we don't need demonstration; a simple explanation is sufficient. In fact, it's clear that we refer to time as made up of days and nights, and parts of days and nights; passiveness and impassibility, movement and stillness, are all included in time. In[451]short, it’s clear that in relation to these different states, we conceive a specific property that we call time.

(Epicurus lays down the same principles in the second book of his treatise on Nature, and in his great Abridgment.)

(Epicurus sets out the same ideas in the second book of his work on Nature, and in his major Abridgment.)

“It is from the infinite that the worlds are derived, and all the finite aggregates which present numerous analogies with the things which we observe under our own eyes. Each of these objects, great and small, has been separated from the infinite by a movement peculiar to itself. On the other hand, all these bodies will be successively destroyed, some more, and others less rapidly; some under the influence of one cause, and others because of the agency of some other.

“It comes from the infinite that the worlds are formed, along with all the finite collections that show many similarities with the things we see right in front of us. Each of these objects, big and small, has been separated from the infinite by a unique movement. On the flip side, all these bodies will eventually be destroyed, some faster than others; some due to one cause, and others because of different factors.”

(It is evident, after this, that Epicurus regards the worlds as perishable, since he admits that their parts are capable of transformation. He also says in other places, that the earth rests suspended in the air.)

(It is clear, after this, that Epicurus sees the worlds as temporary, since he accepts that their components can change. He also mentions in other places that the earth is suspended in the air.)

“We must not believe that the worlds have of necessity all one identical form.

“We shouldn't assume that all worlds must have the same exact form.”

(He says, in fact, in the twelfth book of his treatise on the World, that the worlds differ from one another; some being spherical, other elliptical, and others of other shapes.)

(He states, in fact, in the twelfth book of his treatise on the World, that the worlds vary from one another; some are spherical, others are elliptical, and some have different shapes.)

“Nevertheless, there are not worlds of every possible form and shape.

“However, there aren't worlds of every possible form and shape."

“Let us also beware of thinking that animals are derived from the infinite; for there is no one who can prove that the germs from which animals are born, and plants, and all the other objects which we contemplate, have been brought from the exterior in such a world, and that this same world would not have been able to produce them of itself. This remark applies particularly to the earth.

“Let’s also be careful not to assume that animals come from the infinite; there’s no one who can prove that the seeds from which animals, plants, and all other things we see originate were brought in from outside this world, and that this world itself couldn’t have produced them on its own. This observation is especially relevant to the earth.”

“Again, we must admit that in many and various respects, nature is both instructed and constrained by circumstances themselves; and that reason subsequently makes perfect and enriches with additional discoveries the things which it has borrowed from nature; in some cases rapidly, and in others more slowly. And in some cases according to periods and times greater than those which proceed from the infinite; in other cases according to those which are smaller. So, originally it was only in virtue of express agreements that one gave names to things. But men whose ideas and passions varied[452] according to their respective nations, formed these names of their own accord, uttering divers sounds produced by each passion, or by each idea, following the differences of the situations and of the peoples. At a later period one established in each nation, in a uniform manner, particular terms intended to render the relations more easy, and language more concise. Educated men introduced the notion of things not discoverable by the senses, and appropriated words to them when they found themselves under the necessity of uttering their thoughts; after this, other men, guided in every point by reason, interpreted these words in the same sense.

“Once again, we have to acknowledge that in many ways, nature is both taught and limited by the circumstances themselves; and that reason refines and adds new discoveries to the things it has taken from nature, sometimes quickly and other times more slowly. In some instances, this occurs over periods longer than those stemming from the infinite, while in others, it happens over shorter ones. Initially, names were given to things solely based on explicit agreements. However, people with different ideas and emotions, depending on their cultures, created these names independently, producing different sounds based on each emotion or idea, reflecting the variations in situations and peoples. Later on, each nation standardized specific terms to make relationships clearer and language more concise. Educated individuals introduced concepts that could not be perceived by the senses and assigned words to them when they needed to express their thoughts; afterward, others, guided entirely by reason, understood these words in the same way.”

“As to the heavenly phænomena, such as the motion and course of the stars, the eclipses, their rising and setting, and all other appearances of the same kind, we must beware of thinking that they are produced by any particular being which has regulated, or whose business it is to regulate, for the future, the order of the world, a being immortal and perfectly happy; for the cares and anxieties, the benevolence and the anger, far from being compatible with felicity, are, on the contrary, the consequence of weakness, of fear, and of the want which a thing has of something else. We must not fancy either that these globes of fire, which roll on in space, enjoy a perfect happiness, and give themselves, with reflection and wisdom, the motions which they possess. But we must respect the established notions on this subject, provided, nevertheless, that they do not all contradict the respect due to truth; for nothing is more calculated to trouble the soul than this strife of contradictory notions and principles. We must therefore admit that from the first movement impressed on the heavenly bodies since the organization of the world there is derived a sort of necessity which regulates their course to this day.

When it comes to celestial phenomena, like the movements and paths of the stars, eclipses, their rising and setting, and all similar occurrences, we need to avoid the assumption that these are caused by any specific being that has set or is responsible for managing the future order of the universe—a being that is immortal and perfectly happy. Cares and anxieties, kindness and anger don’t align with true happiness; instead, they stem from weakness, fear, and an entity’s need for something else. We shouldn't think that these fiery spheres moving through space experience perfect happiness or consciously direct their own movements with reflection and wisdom. We should respect established ideas on this topic, as long as they don’t contradict the truth, because nothing disturbs the soul more than conflicting notions and principles. Therefore, we must accept that the initial movement imparted to heavenly bodies since the world was organized has created a kind of necessity that governs their paths to this day.

“Let us be well assured that it is to physiology that it belongs to determine the causes of the most elevated phænomena, and that happiness consists, above all things, in the science of the heavenly things and their nature, and in the knowledge of analogous phænomena which may aid us in the comprehension of the ethics. These heavenly phænomena admit of several explanations; they have no reason of a necessary character, and one may explain them in different manners. In a word, they have no relation—a moment’s consideration will prove[453] this by itself—with those imperishable and happy natures which admit of no division and of no confusion. As for the theoretical knowledge of the rising and setting of the stars, of the movement of the sun between the tropics, of the eclipses, and all other similar phænomena, that is utterly useless, as far as any influence upon happiness that it can have. Moreover, those who, though possessed of this knowledge, are ignorant of nature, and of the most probable causes of the phænomena, are no more protected from fear than if they were in the most complete ignorance; they even experience the most lively fears, for the trouble, with which the knowledge of which they are possessed inspires them, can find no issue, and is not dissipated by a clear perception of the reasons of these phænomena.

“Let’s be clear that it’s physiology that determines the causes of the highest phenomena, and that happiness is fundamentally about understanding celestial matters and their nature, as well as the related phenomena that can help us grasp ethics. These heavenly phenomena can be explained in various ways; they don’t have a necessary explanation, and one can interpret them differently. In short, they don’t relate—just think about it for a moment—to those eternal and blissful natures that can’t be divided or confused. As for theoretical knowledge about the stars' rising and setting, the sun's movement between the tropics, eclipses, and similar phenomena, that knowledge is completely pointless when it comes to influencing happiness. Furthermore, those who have this knowledge but lack understanding of nature and the most likely causes of these phenomena are just as vulnerable to fear as those who know nothing at all; in fact, they may experience even greater fears because the anxiety from their knowledge has no outlet and isn’t eased by a clear understanding of these phenomena.”

“As to us, we find many explanations of the motions of the sun, of the rising and setting of the stars, of the eclipses and similar phænomena, just as well as of the more particular phænomena. And one must not think that this method of explanation is not sufficient to procure happiness and tranquillity. Let us content ourselves with examining how it is that similar phænomena are brought about under our own eyes, and let us apply these observations to the heavenly objects and to everything which is not known but indirectly. Let us despise those people who are unable to distinguish facts susceptible of different explanations from others which can only exist and be explained in one single way. Let us disdain those men who do not know, by means of the different images which result from distance, how to give an account of the different appearances of things; who, in a word, are ignorant what are the objects which can excite any trouble in us. If, then, we know that such a phænomenon can be brought about in the same manner as another given phænomenon of the same character which does not inspire us with any apprehension; and if, on the other hand, we know that it can take place in many different manners, we shall not be more troubled at the sight of it than if we knew the real cause of it.

“As for us, we see many explanations for the movements of the sun, the rising and setting of the stars, eclipses, and similar phenomena, just like we do for more specific events. And we shouldn’t think that this way of explaining things isn’t enough to bring us happiness and peace. Let’s focus on observing how similar phenomena occur right before our eyes, and let’s apply these observations to celestial objects and anything else we only understand indirectly. Let’s dismiss those who can’t tell the difference between facts that have multiple explanations and those that can only exist and be explained one way. Let’s look down on those who don’t know how to account for the different appearances of things due to distance; in short, those who are unaware of what can truly disturb us. If we know that a phenomenon can be explained in the same way as another similar phenomenon that doesn’t scare us, and if we also know it can happen in many different ways, we won’t be more bothered by seeing it than if we understood its real cause.”

“We must also recollect that that which principally contributes to trouble the spirit of men is the persuasion which they cherish that the stars are beings imperishable and perfectly happy, and that then one’s thoughts and actions are in contradiction to the will of these superior beings; they also,[454] being deluded by these fables, apprehend an eternity of evils, they fear the insensibility of death, as that could affect them. What do I say? It is not even belief, but inconsiderateness and blindness which govern them in every thing, to such a degree that, not calculating these fears, they are just as much troubled as if they had really faith in these vain phantoms. And the real freedom from this kind of trouble consists in being emancipated from all these things, and in preserving the recollection of all the principles which we have established, especially of the most essential of them. Accordingly, it is well to pay a scrupulous attention to existing phænomena and to the sensations, to the general sensations for general things, and to the particular sensations for particular things. In a word, we must take note of this, the immediate evidence with which each of these judicial faculties furnishes us; for, if we attend to these points, namely, whence confusion and fear arise, we shall divine the causes correctly, and we shall deliver ourselves from those feelings, tracing back the heavenly phænomena to their causes, and also all the others which present themselves at every step, and inspire the common people with extreme terror.

"We also need to remember that what mainly causes distress in people's minds is the belief they hold that the stars are eternal and completely happy, and that their thoughts and actions go against the will of these higher beings. They are also,[454] misled by these myths, fearing an eternity of suffering and the numbness of death, as if it could impact them. What am I saying? It’s not even just belief, but thoughtlessness and ignorance that control them in everything, to the extent that, without considering these fears, they are just as troubled as if they truly believed in these empty illusions. Real freedom from this kind of distress comes from breaking free from all these notions and keeping in mind all the principles we've established, especially the most important ones. Therefore, we should pay close attention to current phenomena and to the sensations—general sensations for general things and specific sensations for specific things. In short, we must recognize the immediate evidence that each of these judgment faculties provides us; because, if we focus on these aspects, specifically where confusion and fear originate, we will uncover the correct causes and free ourselves from those feelings, tracing the heavenly phenomena back to their origins, as well as all the others that arise along the way and instill deep fear in the common people."

“This, Herodotus, is a kind of summary and abridgment of the whole question of natural philosophy. So that, if this reasoning be allowed to be valid, and be preserved carefully in the memory, the man who allows himself to be influenced by it, even though he may not descend to a profound study of its details, will have a great superiority of character over other men. He will personally discover a great number of truths which I have myself set forth in my entire work; and these truths being stored in his memory, will be a constant assistance to him. By means of these principles, those who have descended into the details, and have studied the question sufficiently, will be able, in bringing in all their particular knowledge to bear on the general subject, to run over without difficulty almost the entire circle of the natural philosophy; those, on the other hand, who are not yet arrived at perfection, and who have not been able to hear me lecture on these subjects, will be able in their minds to run over the main of the essential notions, and to derive assistance from them for the tranquillity and happiness of life.”

“This, Herodotus, is a summary and overview of the whole topic of natural philosophy. So, if this reasoning is accepted as valid and remembered well, a person who allows it to influence them, even if they don't dive deep into its details, will have a significant advantage over others. They will personally discover many truths that I have presented in my complete work; having these truths memorized will be a constant help to them. With these principles, those who have delved into the details and studied the topic enough will be able to integrate all their specific knowledge into the broader subject and navigate almost the entire realm of natural philosophy with ease; on the other hand, those who have not yet reached proficiency and haven’t had the chance to hear my lectures on these topics will still be able to grasp the main essential ideas and benefit from them for the peace and happiness of life.”

This then is his letter on physics.

This is his letter about physics.

XXV. About the heavenly bodies he writes thus:—

XXV. He writes this about the heavenly bodies:—

EPICURUS TO PYTHOCLES, WISHING HE MAY DO WELL.

“Cleon has brought me your letter, in which you continue to evince towards me an affection worthy of the friendship which I have for you. You devote all your care, you tell me, to engraving in your memory those ideas which contribute to the happiness of life; and you entreat me at the same time to send you a simple abridgment and abstract of my ideas on the heavenly phænomena, in order that you may without difficulty preserve the recollection of them. For, say you, what I have written on this subject in my other works is difficult to recollect, even with continual study.

“Cleon has brought me your letter, in which you continue to show me an affection deserving of the friendship I have for you. You tell me that you dedicate all your effort to memorizing the ideas that contribute to a happy life; and at the same time, you ask me to send you a simple summary and overview of my thoughts on the heavenly phenomena, so that you can easily remember them. Because, as you say, what I’ve written on this topic in my other works is hard to remember, even with constant study.”

“I willingly yield to your desire, and I have good hope, that in fulfilling what you ask, I shall be useful too to many others, especially to those who are as yet novices in the real knowledge of nature, and to those to whom the perplexities and the ordinary affairs of life leave but little leisure. Be careful then to seize on those precepts thoroughly, engrave them deeply in your memory, and meditate on them with the abridgment addressed to Herodotus, which I also send you.

“I willingly give in to your wishes, and I truly believe that by doing what you ask, I will also be helpful to many others, especially to those who are still beginners in really understanding nature, and to those whose everyday concerns leave them little time for learning. So make sure to grasp those principles completely, memorize them well, and reflect on them along with the summary I’ve sent you that’s addressed to Herodotus.”

“Know then, that it is with the knowledge of the heavenly phænomena, both with those which are spoken of in contact with one another, and of those which have a spontaneous existence, as with every other science; it has no other aim but that freedom from anxiety, and that calmness which is derived from a firm belief.

“Know then, that understanding the heavenly phenomena, both those that interact with each other and those that exist on their own, is like any other science; it aims solely for freedom from anxiety and the peace that comes from a strong belief.”

“It is not good to desire what is impossible, and to endeavour to enunciate a uniform theory about everything; accordingly, we ought not here to adopt the method, which we have followed in our researches into Ethics, or in the solution of problems of natural philosophy. We there said, for instance, that there are no other things, except bodies and the vacuum, that the atoms are the principles of things, and so of the rest. In a word, we gave a precise and simple explanation of every fact, conformable to appearances.

“It’s not healthy to want what’s impossible or to try to come up with a single theory that explains everything. Therefore, we shouldn’t use the same approach here as we did in our studies of Ethics or in solving problems in natural philosophy. For example, we stated that nothing exists except for matter and empty space, and that atoms are the foundational elements of everything else. In short, we provided a clear and straightforward explanation for every fact that aligns with what we observe.”

“We cannot act in the same way with respect to the heavenly phænomena: these productions may depend upon several different causes, and we may give many different explanations on this subject, equally agreeing with the impressions of the senses. Besides, it is not here a question about reasoning on new principles,[456] and of laying down, à priori, rules for the interpretation of nature; the only guides for us to follow are the appearances themselves; for that which we have in view is not a set of systems and vain opinions, but much rather a life exempt from every kind of disquietude.

“We can’t approach the heavenly phenomena the same way: these occurrences may be influenced by various causes, and we can offer many explanations on this topic that still align with our sensory experiences. Furthermore, this isn’t about reasoning from new principles,[456] or setting up à priori rules for interpreting nature; the only guides we have are the appearances themselves. What we’re aiming for isn’t a collection of theories and empty opinions, but rather a life free from any kind of distress.”

“The heavenly phænomena do not inspire those who give different explanations of them, conformable with appearances, instead of explaining them by hypothesis, with any alarm. But if, abandoning hypothesis, one at the same time renounces the attempt to explain them by means of analogies founded on appearances, then one is placing one’s self altogether at a distance from the science of nature, in order to fall into fables.

“The heavenly phenomena do not provoke concern in those who offer various explanations that align with what we see, rather than explaining them through hypothesis. However, if one gives up hypothesis and also stops trying to explain them using analogies based on appearances, then one is moving entirely away from the science of nature, leading to the embrace of fables.”

“It is possible that the heavenly phænomena may present some apparent characters which appear to assimilate them to those phænomena which we see taking place around ourselves, without there being any real analogy at the bottom. For the heavenly phænomena may depend for their production on many different causes; nevertheless, we must observe the appearances presented by each, and we must distinguish the different circumstances which attach to them, and which can be explained in different manners by means of analogous phænomena which arise under our eyes.

“It’s possible that the heavenly phenomena might show some features that seem similar to the phenomena we see around us, even though there’s no real analogy underneath. The heavenly phenomena may arise from many different causes; however, we need to pay attention to the appearances of each and distinguish the various circumstances associated with them, which can be explained in different ways using similar phenomena that occur right before our eyes.”

“The world is a collection of things embraced by the heaven, containing the stars, the earth, and all visible objects. This collection, separated from the infinite, is terminated by an extremity, which is either rare, or dense, or revolving, or in a state of repose, or of a round, or triangular, or of some shape or other in fact, for it may be of any shape, the dissolution of which must bring the destruction of everything which they embrace. In fact, it can take place in every sort of way, since there is not one of those things which are seen which testifies against this world in which we cannot detect any extremity; and that such worlds are infinite in number is easily seen, and also that such a world can exist both in the world and in the μετακόσμιον, as we call the space between the worlds, being a huge space made up of plenum and vacuum, but not, as some philosophers pretend, an immensity of space absolutely empty. This production of a world may be explained thus: seeds suitably appropriated to such an end may emanate either from one or from several worlds, or from the space that separates[457] them; they flow towards a particular point where they become collected together and organized; after that, other germs come to unite them together in such a way as to form a durable whole, a basis, a nucleus to which all successive additions unite themselves.

“The world is a collection of things embraced by the heavens, containing the stars, the earth, and all visible objects. This collection, separate from the infinite, ends at a boundary that can be rare, dense, in motion, at rest, round, triangular, or any shape really, since it can take on any form. The disappearance of this boundary would mean the destruction of everything it encompasses. In fact, it can happen in various ways, as none of the visible things argue against a world where we cannot find a boundary; and it's easy to see that such worlds are infinite in number. A world can exist both in the known universe and in the μετάκόσμιον, which we refer to as the space between worlds— a vast expanse made of fullness and emptiness, but not, as some philosophers claim, an immense space that's completely empty. The creation of a world can be explained like this: seeds fit for this purpose may come from one or several worlds, or from the space that separates them; they flow toward a specific point where they gather and organize; then, other seeds join them in a way that forms a lasting whole, a foundation, a nucleus to which all following additions connect themselves.[457]

“One must not content one’s self in this question with saying, as one of the natural philosophers has done, that there is a re-union of the elements, or a violent motion in the vacuum under the influence of necessity, and that the body which is thus produced increases until it comes to crash against some other; for this doctrine is contrary to appearances.

“One should not be satisfied with simply stating, like one of the natural philosophers has, that there is a reassembly of elements, or a violent movement in a vacuum driven by necessity, and that the body created this way grows until it collides with another; because this belief contradicts what we observe.”

“The sun, the moon, and the other stars, were originally formed separately, and were afterwards comprehended in the entire total of the world. All the other objects which our world comprises, for instance, the earth and the sea, were also formed spontaneously, and subsequently gained size by the addition and violent movement of light substances, composed of elements of fire and air, or even of these two principles at once. This explanation, moreover, is in accordance with the impressions of the senses.

“The sun, the moon, and the other stars were initially created separately and later became part of the whole universe. All the other things that make up our world, like the earth and the sea, were also formed naturally and then grew larger through the accumulation and intense movement of light materials made of fire and air elements, or even a combination of both. This explanation also matches what we perceive through our senses.”

“As to the magnitude of the sun and of the other stars, it is as far as we are concerned, such as it appears to us to be.”

“As for the size of the sun and the other stars, it is, for us, just as it seems to be.”

(This same doctrine is reproduced, and occurs again in the eleventh book of his treatise on Nature; where he says, “If the distance has made it lose its size, à fortiori, it would take away its brilliancy; for colour has not, any more than size, the property of traversing distance without alteration.”)

(This same doctrine is repeated in the eleventh book of his treatise on Nature, where he says, “If the distance has made it lose its size, à fortiori, it would take away its brilliance; for color, just like size, does not have the ability to travel through distance without changing.”)

“But, considered by itself, the sun may be a little greater or a little smaller than it appears; or it may be just such as it looks; for that is exactly the case with the fires of common occurrence among men, which are perceived by the senses at a distance. Besides, all the difficulties on this subject will be easily explained if one attends to the clear evidence of the perceptions, as I have shown in my books about Nature.

“But, on its own, the sun might be slightly bigger or smaller than it seems; or it could be exactly how it looks; because that's true for the everyday fires we encounter, which we can sense from a distance. Moreover, all the challenges surrounding this topic can be easily clarified if one pays attention to the clear evidence of our perceptions, as I have demonstrated in my books about Nature.”

“The rising and setting of the sun, of the moon, and of the stars, may depend on the fact of their becoming lighted up, and extinguished alternately, and in the order which we behold. One may also give other reasons for this phænomenon, which are not contradicted by any sensible appearances; accordingly, one might explain them by the passage of the stars above and[458] below the earth, for the impressions of the senses agree also with this supposition.

“The rising and setting of the sun, the moon, and the stars may be due to them being lit up and then going dark alternately, in the order that we observe. Other explanations for this phenomenon can also be given that aren't contradicted by any observable facts; thus, one could explain it by the movement of the stars above and [458] below the earth, as the impressions of our senses support this idea as well."

“As to their motion, one may make that depend on the circular movement of the entire heaven. One may also suppose that the stars move, while the heaven itself is immoveable; for there is nothing to prevent the idea that originally, before the formation of the world, they may have received, by the appointment of fate, an impulse from east to west, and that now their movement continues in consequence of their heat, as the fire naturally proceeds onwards in order to seek the aliment which suits it.

“As for their movement, it could be based on the circular motion of the entire universe. It's also possible to think that the stars move while the universe itself is stationary; there's nothing stopping the idea that originally, before the world was formed, they might have been set in motion from east to west by fate, and that their movement continues now due to their heat, just like fire naturally moves forward to find the fuel that suits it.”

“The intertropical movements of the sun and moon may depend, either on the obliquity impressed by fate on the heaven at certain determined epochs, or on the resistance of the air, or on the fact that these ignited bodies stand in need of being nourished by a matter suitable to their nature, and that this matter fails them; or finally, they may depend on the fact of their having originally received an impulse which compels them to move as they do describing a sort of spiral figure. The sensible evidence does not in the least contradict these different suppositions, and all those of the same kind which one can form, having always a due regard to what is possible, and bringing back each phænomenon to its analogous appearances in sensible facts, without disquieting one’s self about the miserable speculations of the astronomers.

The movements of the sun and moon in the tropics may depend on the tilt determined by fate at specific times, the resistance of the air, or the fact that these celestial bodies need a matter that suits their nature, and that this matter is lacking; or, finally, they may depend on the initial push they received that causes them to move in a sort of spiral pattern. The observable evidence doesn’t contradict these different possibilities, or any similar ideas we might come up with, as long as we take into account what's feasible and relate each event to similar occurrences in observable facts, without getting stressed over the petty theories of astronomers.

“The evacuations and subsequent replenishings of the moon may depend either on a conversion of this body, or on the different forms which the air when in a fiery state can adopt, or perhaps to the interposition of another body, or lastly, to some one of the causes by which one gives account of the analogous phænomena which pass under our eyes. Provided, however, that one does not obstinately adopt an exclusive mode of explanation; and that, for want of knowing what is possible for a man to explain, and what is inaccessible to his intelligence; one does not throw one’s self into interminable speculations.

“The evacuations and later refills of the moon might rely on either a transformation of this celestial body, or on the various forms the air can take when it’s in a fiery state, or maybe due to the interference of another body, or finally, to some of the reasons we use to account for the similar phenomena we observe. However, it’s important not to stubbornly cling to a single way of explaining things; and, without knowing what can actually be explained by a person and what is beyond their understanding, one should avoid getting caught up in endless speculations.”

“It may also be possibly the case that the moon has a light of her own, or that she reflects that of the sun. For we see around us many objects which are luminous of themselves, and many others which have only a borrowed light. In a word,[459] one will not be arrested by any of the celestial phænomena, provided that one always recollects that there are many explanations possible; that one examines the principles and reasons which agree with this mode of explanation, and that one does not proceed in accounting for the facts which do not agree with this method, to suffer one’s self to be foolishly carried away, and to propose a separate explanation for each phænomenon, sometimes in one way, and sometimes in another.

“It might also be possible that the moon has its own light or that it reflects the sunlight. We see many objects around us that are luminous on their own and many others that only have borrowed light. In short,[459] one won't be stopped by any celestial phenomena as long as one remembers that there are many possible explanations; that one examines the principles and reasons that align with this way of explaining things, and that one doesn't get swept away trying to come up with a separate explanation for each phenomenon, sometimes one way and sometimes another.”

“The appearance of a face in the orb of the moon, may depend either on a displacement of its parts, or on the interposition of some obstacle, or on any other cause capable of accounting for such an appearance. For one must not neglect to apply this same method to all the heavenly phænomena; for, from the moment when one comes to any point of contradiction to the evidence of the senses, it will be impossible to possess perfect tranquillity and happiness.

“The appearance of a face in the moon may be due to a shift in its features, the presence of an obstacle, or some other reason that can explain such an appearance. We shouldn't ignore applying this same approach to all celestial phenomena; because whenever we encounter something that contradicts what our senses tell us, it becomes impossible to have true peace and happiness.”

“The eclipses of the sun and moon may depend either on the fact that these stars extinguish themselves, a phænomenon which we often see produced under our eyes, or on the fact of other bodies, the earth, the heaven, or something else of the same kind interposing, between them and us. Besides, we must compare the different modes of explanation appropriate to phænomena, and recollect that it is not impossible that many causes may at one and the same time concur in their production.

“The eclipses of the sun and moon may either happen because these celestial bodies block themselves out, a phenomenon we often witness, or because other objects, like the earth, the sky, or something similar are getting in the way. Additionally, we need to compare the various ways to explain these phenomena and remember that it's possible for multiple causes to come together at the same time to create them.”

(He says the same thing in the twelfth book of his treatise on Nature; and adds that the eclipses of the sun arise from the fact that it penetrates into the shade of the moon, to quit it again presently; and the eclipses of the moon from the fact of its entering into the shade of the earth. We also find the same doctrine asserted by Diogenes, the Epicurean, in the first book of his Select Opinions.)

(He says the same thing in the twelfth book of his treatise on Nature; and adds that solar eclipses happen because the sun moves into the shadow of the moon, only to come out of it again shortly after; and lunar eclipses occur when the moon enters the shadow of the earth. We also see the same idea expressed by Diogenes, the Epicurean, in the first book of his Select Opinions.)

“The regular and periodical march of these phænomena has nothing in it that ought to surprise us, if we only attend to the analogous facts which take place under our eyes. Above all things let us beware of making the Deity interpose here, for that being we ought to suppose exempt from all occupation and perfectly happy; otherwise we shall be only giving vain explanations of the heavenly phænomena, as has happened already to a crowd of authors. Not being able to recognize what is really possible, they have fallen into vain theories, in[460] supposing that for all phænomena there was but one single mode of production, and in rejecting all other explanations which are founded on probability; they have adopted the most unreasonable opinions, for want of placing in the front the study of the heavenly phænomena, and of sensible facts, which ought to serve to explain the first.

“The regular and periodic occurrence of these phenomena shouldn’t surprise us if we simply pay attention to the similar facts happening right in front of us. Above all, we need to avoid assuming that a deity is intervening here, as we should imagine that being is free from all tasks and perfectly content; otherwise, we will just be offering meaningless explanations for celestial phenomena, as many authors have done before. Unable to identify what is truly possible, they have resorted to baseless theories, in[460] assuming that there is only one way to account for all phenomena, and dismissing any other explanations based on likelihood; they have embraced the most unreasonable views because they failed to prioritize the study of celestial phenomena and observable facts, which should serve to clarify the former.”

“The differences in the length of nights and days may arise from the fact that the passage of the sun above the earth is more or less rapid; and more or less slow, according to the length of the regions which it has to pass through. Or, again, to the fact that certain regions are passed through more rapidly than others, as is seen to be the case by our own eyes, in those things to which we can compare the heavenly phænomena. As to those who on this point admit only one explanation as possible, they put themselves in opposition to facts, and lose sight of the bounds set to human knowledge.

“The variations in night and day length may come from how quickly the sun moves across the sky, which can be faster or slower depending on the distance it has to cover. Alternatively, some areas are crossed more quickly than others, as we can observe in the celestial phenomena we can compare to. Those who only accept one possible explanation for this are going against the facts and ignoring the limits of human understanding."

“The prognostics which are derived from the stars may, like those which we borrow from animals, arise from a simple coincidence. They may also have other causes, for example, some change in the air; for these two suppositions both harmonize equally with facts; but it is impossible to distinguish in what case one is to attribute them to the one cause or to the other.

“The predictions we get from the stars might, like those we take from animals, come from pure coincidence. They could also be influenced by other factors, like changes in the atmosphere; both of these ideas align equally well with the facts. However, it's impossible to determine in which case we should credit them to one cause or the other."

“The clouds may be formed either by the air condensed under the pressure of the winds, or by the agency of atoms set apart for that end, or by emanations from the earth and waters, or by other causes. For there are a great number which are all equally able to produce this effect. When the clouds clash with one another, or undergo any transformation, they produce showers; and the long rains are caused by the motion of the clouds when moved from places suitable to them through the air, when a more violent inundation than usual takes place, from collections of some masses calculated to produce these effects.

“The clouds can form either by air being compressed by strong winds, by certain atoms designated for that purpose, by emissions from the earth and waters, or by other factors. There are many ways to create clouds, all equally effective. When clouds collide or change form, they create rain; prolonged rainfall occurs when clouds are moved from their usual spots through the air, leading to more intense downpours due to the accumulation of certain mass that causes these effects.”

“Thunder possibly arises from the movement of the winds revolving in the cavities of the clouds; of which we may see an image in vessels in our own daily use. It may also arise from the noise of fire acted upon by the wind in them, and from the tearings and ruptures of the clouds when they have received a sort of crystaline consistency. In a word, experience drawn from our senses, teaches us that all these phænomena,[461] and that one in particular, may be produced in many different manners.

"Thunder might come from the winds swirling around inside the clouds; we can see a similar example in the containers we use every day. It could also be caused by the sound of fire disturbed by the wind in those containers, as well as by the ripping and breaking of clouds when they have taken on a kind of crystalline texture. In short, our sensory experiences show us that all these phenomena,[461] especially that one, can be produced in many different ways."

“One may also assign different causes to the lightning; either the shock and collision of the clouds produce a fiery appearance, which is followed by lightning; or the lighting up of the clouds by the winds, produces this luminous appearance; or the mutual pressure of the clouds, or that of the wind against them, disengages the lightning. Or, one might say, that the interception of the light diffused from the stars, arrested for a time in the bosom of the clouds, is driven from them subsequently by their own movements, and by those of the winds, and so escapes from their sides; that the lightning is an extremely subtile light that evaporates from the clouds; that the clouds which carry the thunder are collected masses of fire; that the lightning arises from the motion of the fire, or from the conflagration of the wind, in consequence of the rapidity and continuousness of its motion. One may also attribute the luminous appearance of lightning to the rupture of the clouds under the action of the winds, or to the fall of inflammable atoms. Lastly, one may easily find a number of other explanations, if one applies to sensible facts, in order to search out the analogies which they present to the heavenly phænomena.

One could also give different explanations for lightning; either the shock and collision of clouds creates a fiery look that leads to lightning, or the winds illuminate the clouds, causing this glowing effect; or perhaps the clouds pushing against each other, or the wind hitting them, releases the lightning. Alternatively, one might say that light from the stars is temporarily trapped in the clouds and later released as the clouds move and the winds blow, escaping from their sides; that lightning is a very fine light that evaporates from the clouds; that the clouds carrying thunder are large collections of fire; that lightning is generated by the movement of this fire or by the rapid motion of the wind. One might also connect the bright appearance of lightning to the clouds breaking apart due to the wind's force or to the fall of ignitable particles. Lastly, one can easily find many more explanations by observing tangible facts to uncover the similarities they have with heavenly phenomena.

“Lightning precedes thunder, either because it is produced at the same moment that the wind falls on the cloud, while the noise is only heard at the instant when the wind has penetrated into the bosom of the cloud; or, perhaps, the two phænomena being simultaneous, the lightning arrives among us more rapidly than the noise of the thunder-bolt, as is in fact remarked in other cases when we see at a distance the clash of two objects.

“Lightning happens before thunder, either because it occurs at the same moment the wind hits the cloud, while the sound is only heard when the wind has entered the cloud; or, maybe, since both events happen at the same time, the lightning reaches us faster than the sound of the thunder, similar to what we observe when we see two objects collide from a distance.”

“The thunderbolt may be produced either by a violent condensation of the winds, or by their rapid motion and conflagration. It may arise from the fact of the winds meeting in places which are too dense, in consequence of the accumulation of clouds, and then a portion of the current detaches itself and proceeds towards the lower situations; or else it may be caused by the fire which is contained in the bosom of the clouds precipitating itself downwards. As one may suppose that an immense quantity of fire being accumulated in the clouds dilates, violently bursting the substance which envelops it,[462] because the resistance of the centre hinders it from proceeding further. This effect is especially produced in the neighbourhood of high mountains; and, accordingly, they are very frequently struck with the thunderbolts. In short, one may give a number of explanations of the thunderbolt; but we ought, above all things, to be on our guard against fables, and this one will easily be, if one follows faithfully the sensible phænomena in the explanation of these things, which are not perceived, except indirectly.

“The thunderbolt can be caused by either a sudden condensation of winds or their fast movement and combustion. It might happen when the winds collide in areas that are too dense due to cloud buildup, causing part of the current to detach and move downwards; or it can be triggered by the fire contained within the clouds rushing downwards. One can imagine that a huge amount of fire building up in the clouds expands, violently breaking through the material that surrounds it, because the pressure from the center stops it from going any further. This effect is particularly strong near tall mountains, which is why they are often hit by lightning. In summary, there are various ways to explain the thunderbolt; however, we should always be cautious of myths, and we can easily do this by closely observing the sensible phenomena in explaining these events, which can only be noticed indirectly.[462]

“Hurricanes (πρηστῆρες) may be caused either by the presence of a cloud, which a violent wind sets in motion and precipitates with a spiral movement towards the lower regions, or by a violent gust which bears a cloud into the neighbourhood of some other current, or else by the mere agitation of the wind by itself, when air is brought together from the higher regions and compressed without being able to escape on either side, in consequence of the resistance of the air which surrounds it; when the hurricane descends towards the earth, then there result whirlwinds in proportion to the rapidity of the wind that has produced them; and this phænomenon extends over the sea also.

“Hurricanes can be caused either by the presence of a cloud that a strong wind sets in motion, causing it to spiral downward, or by a sudden gust that pushes a cloud into the area of another wind current. Alternatively, they can occur simply from the agitation of the wind itself when air is pulled together from higher elevations and compressed without an escape route due to the surrounding air resistance. When the hurricane moves down toward the ground, whirlwinds form that correspond to the speed of the wind that created them, and this phenomenon also occurs over the sea.”

“Earthquakes may arise from the wind penetrating into the interior of the earth, or from the earth itself receiving incessantly the addition of exterior particles, and being in incessant motion as to its constituent atoms, being in consequence disposed to a general vibration. That which permits the wind to penetrate is the fact that falls take place in the interior, or that the air being impressed by the winds insinuates itself into the subterraneous caverns. The movement which numberless falls and the re-action of the earth communicate to the earth, when this motion meets bodies of greater resistance and solidity, is sufficient to explain the earthquakes. One might, however, give an account of them in several other ways.

"Earthquakes can happen due to wind entering the Earth's interior or because the Earth constantly receives additional outside particles and is always in motion at the atomic level, leading to a general vibration. The reason the wind can penetrate is that collapses occur within the Earth or because the air, influenced by the winds, finds its way into underground caverns. The movement caused by numerous collapses and the Earth's reaction to them, when this motion encounters more solid and resistant bodies, is enough to explain earthquakes. That said, there are several other ways to account for them."

“Winds are caused, either by the successive and regular addition of some foreign matter, or else by the re-union of a great quantity of water; and the differences of the winds may arise from the fact that some portions of this same matter fall into the numerous cavities of the earth, and are divided there.

“Winds are caused by either the continuous and consistent addition of some outside material or by the coming together of a large amount of water. The differences in winds can occur because certain parts of this same material get trapped in the many cavities of the earth and are separated there.”

“Hail is produced by an energetic condensation acting on[463] the ethereal particles which the cold embraces in every direction; or, in consequence of a less violent condensation acting however on aqueous particles, and accompanied by division, in such a manner as to produce, at the same time, the re-union of certain elements and of the collective masses; or by the rupture of some dense and compact mass which would explain at the same time, the numerousness of the particles and their individual hardness. As to the spherical form of the hail, one may easily account for that by admitting that the shocks which it receives in every direction make all the angles disappear, or else that at the moment when the different fragments are formed, each of them is equally embraced on all sides by aqueous or ethereal particles.

Hail is created by a strong condensation acting on[463] the ethereal particles that the cold surrounds in every direction; or as a result of a less intense condensation acting on water particles, accompanied by separation, which allows for the simultaneous rejoining of certain elements and the collective masses; or by the breaking apart of some dense and compact mass, which explains both the abundance of particles and their individual hardness. Regarding the spherical shape of hail, it can easily be explained by the idea that the impacts it experiences from all directions smooth out all the angles, or that when the different fragments are formed, each one is evenly surrounded on all sides by water or ethereal particles.

“Snow may be produced by a light vapour full of moisture which the clouds allow to escape by passages intended for that end, when they are pressed, in a corresponding manner, by other clouds, and set in motion by the wind. Subsequently, these vapours become condensed in their progress under the action of the cold which surrounds the clouds in the lower regions. It may also be the case that this phænomenon is produced by clouds of a slight density as they become condensed. In this case the snow which escapes from the clouds would be the result of the contact, or approximation of the aqueous particles, which in a still more condensed state produce hail. This effect is most especially produced in the air. Snow, again, may result from the collection of clouds previously condensed and solidified; or from a whole army of other causes.

“Snow can form from light vapor full of moisture that the clouds release through passages designed for that purpose when they are pressed by other clouds and moved by the wind. As these vapors move, they condense due to the cold surrounding the clouds in the lower areas. It’s also possible that this phenomenon occurs with less dense clouds as they condense. In this case, the snow that falls from the clouds would be the result of the collision or close proximity of water particles, which in an even more condensed state can produce hail. This effect primarily occurs in the air. Additionally, snow can result from the gathering of clouds that have already condensed and solidified, or from a variety of other causes.”

“Dew proceeds from a re-union of particles contained in the air calculated to produce this moist substance. These particles may be also brought from places which are moist or covered with water (for in those places, above all others, it is that dew is abundant). These then re-unite, again resume their aqueous form, and fall down. The same phænomenon takes place in other cases before our own eyes under many analogies.

Dew comes from a gathering of particles in the air that create this moist substance. These particles can also come from areas that are wet or covered with water (because it's especially in those places that dew is plentiful). They then combine again, take on their watery form, and fall down. The same phenomenon occurs in other situations right before our eyes in various ways.

“Hoar-frost is dew congealed by the influence of the cold air that surrounds it.

“Hoar-frost is dew frozen by the cold air around it.

“Ice is formed either by the detrition of round atoms contained in the water, and the re-union at scalene and acute angles of the atoms which exist in the water, or by an addition from without of these latter particles, which penetrating into[464] the water, solidify it by driving away an equal amount of round atoms.

“Ice forms either by the breakdown of round atoms in the water and the joining of atoms at different angles, or by the introduction of additional particles from outside, which penetrate into[464] the water, solidifying it by removing an equal amount of round atoms.

“The rainbow may be produced by the reflection of the solar rays on the moist air; or it may arise from a particular property of light and air, in virtue of which these particular appearances of colour are formed, either because the shades which we perceive result directly from this property, or because, on the contrary, it only produces one single shade, which, reflecting itself on the nearest portions of the air, communicates to them the tints which we observe. As to the circular form of the rainbow, that depends either on the fact of the sight perceiving an equal distance in every direction, or the fact of the atoms taking this form when re-uniting in the air; or it may be caused by its detaching from the air which moves towards the moon, certain atoms which, being re-united in the clouds, give rise to this circular appearance.

“The rainbow can be formed by the reflection of sunlight on moist air, or it may be due to a specific property of light and air that creates these colors. This can either happen because the shades we see come directly from this property, or, on the other hand, it may produce just one single shade that reflects onto nearby air molecules, giving them the colors we observe. As for the circular shape of the rainbow, that can be attributed to the way our eyes perceive equal distances in every direction, or because atoms take this shape when they cluster together in the air. It might also happen when certain atoms detach from the air moving toward the moon, and when these atoms regroup in the clouds, they create this circular appearance.

“The lunar halo arises from the fact of the air, which moves towards the moon from all quarters, uniformly intercepting the rays emitted by this star, in such a way as to form around it a sort of circular cloud which partially veils it. It may also arise from the fact of the moon uniformly rejecting from all quarters, the air which surrounds it, in such a manner as to produce this circular and opaque covering. And perhaps this opaqueness may be caused by some particles which some current brings from without; perhaps also, the heat communicates to the moon the property of emitting by the pores in its surface, the particles by which this effect is produced.

“The lunar halo comes from the air, which moves toward the moon from all directions, uniformly blocking the rays emitted by it, creating a sort of circular cloud that partially obscures it. It might also be caused by the moon uniformly pushing away the surrounding air from all sides, producing this circular and opaque covering. Additionally, this opaqueness could be due to some particles brought in by a current from outside; it’s also possible that the heat gives the moon the ability to emit particles through its surface pores, causing this effect.”

“Comets arise either from the fact, that in the circumstances already stated, there are partial conflagrations in certain points of the heaven; or, that at certain periods, the heaven has above our heads a particular movement which causes them to appear. It may also be the case, that being themselves endowed with a peculiar movement, they advance at the end of certain periods of time, and in consequence of particular circumstances, towards the places which we inhabit. The opposite reasons explain their disappearance.

“Comets come about either because there are partial fires at certain points in the sky, as previously mentioned, or because, at certain times, the sky has a specific movement that makes them visible. It's also possible that comets have their own unique movement and, after a certain amount of time and due to specific circumstances, they move toward the areas where we live. The opposite factors clarify why they vanish.”

“Certain stars return to the same point in accomplishing their revolutions; and this arises, not only as has been sometimes believed, from the fact of the pole of the world, around which they move, being immoveable, but also from the fact that the gyrations of the air which surrounds them, hinder[465] them from deviations like the wandering stars. Perhaps also, this may be caused by the fact, that except in the route in which they move, and in which we perceive them, they do not find any material suitable to their nature. One may also explain this phænomenon in many other manners, reasoning according to sensible facts; thus, it is possible that certain stars may be wandering because that is the nature of their movements, and, for the same reason, others may be immoveable. It is also possible, that the same necessity which has originally given them their circular movement, may have compelled some to follow their orbit regularly, and have subjected others to an irregular progress; we may also suppose that the uniform character of the centre which certain stars traverse favour their regular march, and their return to a certain; and that in the case of others, on the contrary, the differences of the centre produce the changes which we observe. Besides, to assign one single cause to all these phænomena, when the experience of our senses suggests us several, is folly. It is the conduct of ignorant astronomers covetous of a vain knowledge, who, assigning imaginary causes to facts, wish to leave wholly to the Deity the care of the government of the universe.

Certain stars return to the same point as they complete their orbits; this happens, not just because the celestial pole they revolve around is stationary, but also due to the surrounding air currents that prevent them from straying like wandering stars. Additionally, it could be that these stars only find materials suitable to their nature along the paths they take and where we observe them. There are various ways to explain this phenomenon using observable facts; for instance, some stars may wander as part of their natural movement, while others remain fixed for the same reason. It's also possible that the same force that initially set their circular motions has caused some to follow their orbits consistently while forcing others to move irregularly. One might suggest that the stable nature of the center certain stars pass through supports their regular movement and return to a set point, whereas the variability of other centers leads to the changes we see. Moreover, attributing a single cause to these phenomena when our sensory experiences indicate multiple reasons is foolish. This tendency reflects the behavior of uninformed astronomers who, in their quest for superficial knowledge, assign imaginary causes to events and prefer to leave the universe's management entirely to the Deity.

“Some stars appear to be left behind by others in their progress; this arises either from the fact of their having a slower motion, though traversing the same circle; or, because, though they are drawn on by the same propelling power, they have, nevertheless, a movement proper to themselves in a contrary direction; or it may be caused by the fact that, though all are placed in the same sphere of movement, still some have more space to traverse, and others less. To give one uniform and positive explanation of all these facts, is not consistent with the conduct of any people but those who love to flash prodigies in the eyes of the multitude.

“Some stars seem to lag behind others as they move; this can be due to their slower speed, even if they’re all following the same path; or, because they are being pulled by the same force, they might have their own movements going in the opposite direction; or it could simply be that, while they’re all in the same area of movement, some have more distance to cover than others. Providing a single, clear explanation for all these observations doesn’t align with the behavior of anyone except those who enjoy dazzling the public with extraordinary claims.”

“Falling stars may be particles detached from the stars, or fragments resulting from their collision; they may also be produced by the fall of substances which are set on fire by the action of the wind; by the re-union of inflammable atoms which are made to come together so as to produce this effect by a sort of reciprocal attraction; or else by the movement which is produced in consequence of the re-union of atoms in the very place where they meet. It may also happen that the light vapours re-unite and become condensed under the[466] form of clouds, that they then take fire in consequence of their rotatory motion, and that, bursting the obstacles which surround them, they proceed towards the places whither the force by which they are animated drags them. In short, this phænomenon also may admit of a great number of explanations.

“Falling stars could be particles that have broken off from stars, or fragments created when they collide; they might also result from substances that catch fire due to wind actions; from the coming together of flammable atoms that attract each other to create this effect; or from movements that occur when atoms reunite where they meet. It’s also possible that light vapors come together and condense into clouds, then catch fire because of their spinning motion, and burst through the obstacles around them, moving toward the places that the force driving them pulls them to. In short, this phenomenon can have a lot of different explanations.”

“The presages which are drawn from certain animals arise from a fortuitous concourse of circumstances; for there is no necessary connection between certain animals and winter. They do not produce it; nor is there any divine nature sitting aloft watching the exits of these animals, and then accomplishing signs of this kind. Nor can such folly as this occur to any being who is even moderately comfortable, much less to one which is possessed of perfect happiness.

“The signs we get from certain animals come from random circumstances; there’s no essential link between those animals and winter. They don’t cause it, and there’s no divine power up above observing these animals and then creating such signs. No one who is even somewhat content would entertain such foolishness, let alone someone who is completely happy.”

“Imprint all these precepts in your memory, O Pythocles, and so you will easily escape fables, and it will be easy for you to discover other truths analogous to these. Above all, apply yourself to the study of general principles, of the infinite, and of questions of this kind, and to the investigation of the different criteria and of the passions, and to the study of the chief good, with a view to which we prosecute all our researches. When these questions are once resolved, all particular difficulties will be made plain to you. As to those who will not apply themselves to these principles, they will neither be able to give a good explanation of these same questions, nor to reach that end to which all our researches tend.”

“Remember all these principles, Pythocles, and you'll easily avoid misconceptions, making it simpler for you to uncover other related truths. Most importantly, focus on understanding general principles, the infinite, and similar questions, as well as exploring different standards and emotions, and studying the ultimate good, which is the aim of all our inquiries. Once you solve these questions, all specific challenges will become clear to you. Those who ignore these principles will not be able to provide a solid explanation of these same questions or achieve the goal of our research.”

XXVI. Such are his sentiments on the heavenly phænomena. But concerning the rules of life, and how we ought to choose some things, and avoid others, he writes thus. But first of all, let us go through the opinions which he held, and his disciples held about the wise man.

XXVI. These are his thoughts on the heavenly phenomena. But regarding the rules of life, and how we should choose some things and avoid others, he writes this. First, let's examine the views he and his disciples had about the wise person.

He said that injuries existed among men, either in consequence of hatred, or of envy, or of contempt, all which the wise man overcomes by reason. Also, that a man who has once been wise can never receive the contrary disposition, nor can he of his own accord invent such a state of things as that he should be subjected to the dominion of the passions; nor can he hinder himself in his progress towards wisdom. That the wise man, however, cannot exist in every state of body, nor in every nation. That even if the wise man were to be put to the torture, he would still be happy. That the wise man will only feel gratitude to his friends, but to them equally[467] whether they are present or absent. Nor will he groan and howl when he is put to the torture. Nor will he marry a wife whom the laws forbid, as Diogenes says, in his epitome of the Ethical Maxims of Epicurus. He will punish his servants, but also pity them, and show indulgence to any that are virtuous. They do not think that the wise man will ever be in love, nor that he will be anxious about his burial, nor that love is a passion inspired by the Gods, as Diogenes says in his twelfth book. They also assert that he will be indifferent to the study of oratory. Marriage, say they, is never any good to a man, and we must be quite content if it does no harm; and the wise man will never marry or beget children, as Epicurus himself lays it down, in his Doubts and in his treatises on Nature. Still, under certain circumstances of life, he will forsake these rules and marry. Nor will he ever indulge in drunkenness, says Epicurus, in his Banquet, nor will he entangle himself in affairs of state (as he says in his first book on Lives). Nor will he become a tyrant. Nor will he become a Cynic (as he says in his second book about Lives). Nor a beggar. And even, though he should lose his eyes, he will still partake of life (as he says in the same book).

He said that injuries happen among people, whether due to hatred, envy, or contempt, all of which the wise person overcomes through reason. Also, once someone has become wise, they can never develop the opposite mindset, nor can they willingly create a situation where they are controlled by their emotions; they also can't stop their progress toward wisdom. However, a wise person can't exist in every physical condition or in every nation. Even if a wise person were tortured, they would still find happiness. A wise person will feel gratitude towards their friends, whether they are present or not. They won’t groan or scream when being tortured. They won’t marry a woman whom the laws prohibit, as Diogenes mentions in his summary of the Ethical Maxims of Epicurus. They may punish their servants but will also feel pity for them and show leniency to those who are virtuous. It’s said that a wise person will never fall in love, nor will they worry about their burial, nor view love as a passion from the Gods, as Diogenes states in his twelfth book. They also claim he won’t care about studying oratory. They believe that marriage is never good for a man, and we should be satisfied if it doesn't cause harm; a wise person won’t marry or have children, as Epicurus himself mentions in his Doubts and in his writings on Nature. Still, in certain life circumstances, he may abandon these rules and marry. Additionally, he will never engage in drunkenness, as Epicurus states in his Banquet, nor will he get involved in politics (as mentioned in his first book on Lives). He will not become a tyrant or a Cynic (as indicated in his second book about Lives), nor will he become a beggar. Even if he loses his sight, he will still appreciate life (as he states in the same book).

The wise man will be subject to grief, as Diogenes says, in the fifth book of his Select Opinions; he will also not object to go to law. He will leave books and memorials of himself behind him, but he will not be fond of frequenting assemblies. He will take care of his property, and provide for the future. He will like being in the country, he will resist fortune, and will grieve none of his friends. He will show a regard for a fair reputation to such an extent as to avoid being despised; and he will find more pleasure than other men in speculations.

The wise person will experience sadness, as Diogenes mentions in the fifth book of his Select Opinions; they also won’t shy away from legal matters. They will leave behind books and records of themselves, but won’t be keen on regularly attending gatherings. They will manage their finances and plan for the future. They will enjoy being in nature, stand strong against adversity, and won't cause distress to their friends. They will value their reputation enough to avoid being looked down upon; and they will find more joy in contemplation than most people do.

All faults are not equal. Health is good for some people, but a matter of indifference to others. Courage is a quality which does not exist by nature, but which is engendered by a consideration of what is suitable. Friendship is caused by one’s wants; but it must be begun on our side. For we sow the earth; and friendship arises from a community of, and participation in, pleasures. Happiness must be understood in two senses; the highest happiness, such as is that of God, which admits of no increase; and another kind, which admits of the addition or abstraction of pleasures. The wise man may raise statues if it suits his inclination, if it does not it does[468] not signify. The wise man is the only person who can converse correctly about music and poetry; and he can realise poems, but not become a poet.

Not all faults are the same. Health is beneficial for some people, while others don’t care about it. Courage isn’t something we’re born with; it’s developed through understanding what’s appropriate. Friendship stems from our needs, but it must be initiated by us. We cultivate our relationships, and friendship grows from sharing and enjoying pleasures together. Happiness needs to be understood in two ways: the ultimate happiness, like that of God, which can’t be increased, and another type that can grow or shrink based on our pleasures. A wise person can create statues if they feel like it; if not, it doesn’t matter. The wise person is the only one who can talk meaningfully about music and poetry; they can appreciate poems but cannot become a poet.

It is possible for one wise man to be wiser than another. The wise man will also, if he is in need, earn money, but only by his wisdom; he will propitiate an absolute ruler when occasion requires, and will humour him for the sake of correcting his habits; he will have a school, but not on such a system as to draw a crowd about him; he will also recite in a multitude, but that will be against his inclination; he will pronounce dogmas, and will express no doubts; he will be the same man asleep and awake; and he will be willing even to die for a friend.

One wise person can definitely be wiser than another. The wise person will also make money when needed, but only through their wisdom; they'll appease a powerful ruler when necessary and tolerate them to help improve their behavior. They might have a school, but it won't be designed to attract a large following; they may speak in front of a crowd, but that's not what they prefer; they will declare beliefs and won't show any uncertainty; they will be the same person whether asleep or awake; and they would even be willing to die for a friend.

These are the Epicurean doctrines.

These are the Epicurean teachings.

XXVII. We must now proceed to his letter:—

XXVII. We should now move on to his letter:—

EPICURUS TO MENŒCEUS, GREETING

“Let no one delay to study philosophy while he is young, and when he is old let him not become weary of the study; for no man can ever find the time unsuitable or too late to study the health of his soul. And he who asserts either that it is not yet time to philosophize, or that the hour is passed, is like a man who should say that the time is not yet come to be happy, or that it is too late. So that both young and old should study philosophy, the one in order that, when he is old, he may be young in good things through the pleasing recollection of the past, and the other in order that he may be at the same time both young and old, in consequence of his absence of fear for the future.

“Don’t wait to study philosophy when you’re young, and don’t give up on it when you’re older; no one should ever think it’s too early or too late to take care of their soul. Anyone who claims it’s not the right time to start philosophizing, or that the moment has passed, is like someone saying it’s not the right time to be happy, or that it’s too late for that. Both young and old should study philosophy: the young so they can look back on a good life with fond memories when they’re older, and the old so they can feel both young and wise, free from fear of the future.”

“It is right then for a man to consider the things which produce happiness, since, if happiness is present, we have everything, and when it is absent, we do everything with a view to possess it. Now, what I have constantly recommended to you, these things I would have you do and practise, considering them to be the elements of living well. First of all, believe that God is a being incorruptible and happy, as the common opinion of the world about God dictates; and attach to your idea of him nothing which is inconsistent with incorruptibility or with happiness; and think that he is invested with everything which is able to preserve to him this happiness, in conjunction with incorruptibility. For there are Gods; for[469] our knowledge of them is indistinct. But they are not of the character which people in general attribute to them; for they do not pay a respect to them which accords with the ideas that they entertain of them. And that man is not impious who discards the Gods believed in by the many, but he who applies to the Gods the opinions entertained of them by the many. For the assertions of the many about the Gods are not anticipations (προλήψεις), but false opinions (ὑπολήψεις). And in consequence of these, the greatest evils which befall wicked men, and the benefits which are conferred on the good, are all attributed to the Gods; for they connect all their ideas of them with a comparison of human virtues, and everything which is different from human qualities, they regard as incompatible with the divine nature.

“It’s important for a person to think about what brings happiness because when we have happiness, we have everything, and when we don’t, we do everything to try to achieve it. So, what I’ve always suggested to you, I want you to do and practice, as I believe these are the keys to living well. First, believe that God is an incorruptible and happy being, as is commonly believed; and don’t associate anything with Him that contradicts incorruptibility or happiness. Think of Him as having everything that can maintain this happiness along with incorruptibility. There are gods, but our understanding of them is vague. However, they are not like what most people think; they don’t receive the respect that aligns with how people perceive them. A person isn’t impious for rejecting the gods that the majority believes in, but rather he is impious who attributes to the gods the views that the majority holds. The beliefs of the many about the gods aren't true anticipations but false opinions. Because of this, the worst misfortunes that befall bad people and the good that comes to the virtuous are all attributed to the gods; they relate all their ideas about them to comparisons with human virtues and see anything different from human qualities as incompatible with the divine nature.”

“Accustom yourself also to think death a matter with which we are not at all concerned, since all good and all evil is in sensation, and since death is only the privation of sensation. On which account, the correct knowledge of the fact that death is no concern of ours, makes the mortality of life pleasant to us, inasmuch as it sets forth no illimitable time, but relieves us for the longing for immortality. For there is nothing terrible in living to a man who rightly comprehends that there is nothing terrible in ceasing to live; so that he was a silly man who said that he feared death, not because it would grieve him when it was present, but because it did grieve him while it was future. For it is very absurd that that which does not distress a man when it is present, should afflict him when only expected. Therefore, the most formidable of all evils, death, is nothing to us, since, when we exist, death is not present to us; and when death is present, then we have no existence. It is no concern then either of the living or of the dead; since to the one it has no existence, and the other class has no existence itself. But people in general, at times flee from death as the greatest of evils, and at times wish for it as a rest from the evils in life. Nor is the not living a thing feared, since living is not connected with it: nor does the wise man think not living an evil; but, just as he chooses food, not preferring that which is most abundant, but that which is nicest; so too, he enjoys time, not measuring it as to whether it is of the greatest length, but as to whether it is most agreeable. And he who enjoins a young man to live well, and an[470] old man to die well, is a simpleton, not only because of the constantly delightful nature of life, but also because the care to live well is identical with the care to die well. And he was still more wrong who said:—

"Get used to the idea that death isn't something we should worry about, since all good and all bad is related to sensation, and death is simply the absence of sensation. Understanding that death isn't something we need to be concerned with makes life’s temporary nature easier to accept. It frees us from the desire for immortality because there's nothing frightening about living for someone who realizes that there’s nothing terrifying about not living. So, the person was foolish who claimed to fear death—not because it would upset him when it arrived, but because it troubled him when he thought about it in advance. It's quite ridiculous for something that doesn't bother a person when it happens to trouble him when he's just anticipating it. Therefore, the greatest fear, death, is nothing to us, since when we are alive, death isn't here; and when death does come, we won't be here anymore. So, it doesn’t concern either the living or the dead; for the living don’t experience it, and the dead no longer exist. Yet, people often flee from death as if it’s the worst thing, while at other times they desire it as an escape from life’s hardships. Not living isn’t something to fear since it isn’t linked to living; the wise man doesn't see not living as a negative. Just as he chooses food based on quality rather than quantity, he values time not by how long it is but by how enjoyable it is. Telling a young person to live well and an old person to die well is foolish, both because life is constantly wonderful and because caring about living well is the same as caring about dying well. And he was even more mistaken who said:—"

“’Tis well to taste of life, and then when born
To pass with quickness to the shades below.[142]

“For if this really was his opinion why did he not quit life? for it was easily in his power to do so, if it really was his belief. But if he was joking, then he was talking foolishly in a case where it ought not to be allowed; and, we must recollect, that the future is not our own, nor, on the other hand, is it wholly not our own, I mean so that we can never altogether await it with a feeling of certainty that it will be, nor altogether despair of it as what will never be. And we must consider that some of the passions are natural, and some empty; and of the natural ones some are necessary, and some merely natural. And of the necessary ones some are necessary to happiness, and others, with regard to the exemption of the body, from trouble; and others with respect to living itself; for a correct theory, with regard to these things, can refer all choice and avoidance to the health of the body and the freedom from disquietude of the soul. Since this is the end of living happily; for it is for the sake of this that we do everything, wishing to avoid grief and fear; and when once this is the case, with respect to us, then the storm of the soul is, as I may say, put an end to; since the animal is unable to go as if to something deficient, and to seek something different from that by which the good of the soul and body will be perfected.

“For if this truly was his opinion, why didn’t he just end his life? He easily could have if that was what he believed. But if he was joking, then he was being foolish in a situation where that shouldn’t be allowed; and we must remember that the future isn’t entirely ours, nor is it completely outside our control. We can never fully expect it with certainty that it will happen, nor should we entirely despair that it won’t happen. We should consider that some passions are natural while others are empty; of those that are natural, some are necessary and some are just natural. Among the necessary ones, some are essential to happiness, others help the body avoid trouble, and others relate to the act of living itself. A correct understanding of these matters can link all choices and avoidances to the health of the body and the peace of the soul. Because this is the goal of living happily; we do everything for this reason, wanting to avoid grief and fear. Once that’s established for us, the turmoil of the soul can, so to speak, come to an end; as the animal cannot pursue something lacking and seek something different from that which will perfect the good of the soul and body.”

“For then we have need of pleasure when we grieve, because pleasure is not present; but when we do not grieve, then we have no need of pleasure; and on this account, we affirm, that pleasure is the beginning and end of living happily; for we have recognized this as the first good, being connate with us; and with reference to it, it is that we begin every choice and avoidance; and to this we come as if we judged of all good by passion as the standard; and, since this is the first good and connate with us, on this account we do not choose every pleasure, but at times we pass over many pleasures when any difficulty is likely to ensue from them; and we think many[471] pains better than pleasures, when a greater pleasure follows them, if we endure the pain for a time.

“For when we grieve, we need pleasure because it’s not around; but when we’re not grieving, we don’t need pleasure. For this reason, we believe that pleasure is both the beginning and end of living happily; we recognize it as our first good, something innate to us. Our choices and rejections are based on this, as if we're assessing all good things against our feelings as the standard. Since this is the primary good and something we’re born with, we don’t choose every pleasure; sometimes, we skip over many pleasures if they might lead to problems. We even consider some pains better than pleasures when a greater pleasure awaits us, if we can tolerate the pain for a while.

“Every pleasure is therefore a good on account of its own nature, but it does not follow that every pleasure is worthy of being chosen; just as every pain is an evil, and yet every pain must not be avoided. But it is right to estimate all these things by the measurement and view of what is suitable and unsuitable; for at times we may feel the good as an evil, and at times, on the contrary, we may feel the evil as good. And, we think, contentment a great good, not in order that we may never have but a little, but in order that, if we have not much, we may make use of a little, being genuinely persuaded that those men enjoy luxury most completely who are the best able to do without it; and that everything which is natural is easily provided, and what is useless is not easily procured. And simple flavours give as much pleasure as costly fare, when everything that can give pain, and every feeling of want, is removed; and corn and water give the most extreme pleasure when any one in need eats them. To accustom one’s self, therefore, to simple and inexpensive habits is a great ingredient in the perfecting of health, and makes a man free from hesitation with respect to the necessary uses of life. And when we, on certain occasions, fall in with more sumptuous fare, it makes us in a better disposition towards it, and renders us fearless with respect to fortune. When, therefore, we say that pleasure is a chief good, we are not speaking of the pleasures of the debauched man, or those which lie in sensual enjoyment, as some think who are ignorant, and who do not entertain our opinions, or else interpret them perversely; but we mean the freedom of the body from pain, and of the soul from confusion. For it is not continued drinkings and revels, or the enjoyment of female society, or feasts of fish and other such things, as a costly table supplies, that make life pleasant, but sober contemplation, which examines into the reasons for all choice and avoidance, and which puts to flight the vain opinions from which the greater part of the confusion arises which troubles the soul.

Every pleasure is a good because of its nature, but that doesn’t mean every pleasure is worth choosing; just like every pain is bad, but not every pain should be avoided. It’s important to evaluate all these things based on what’s suitable and unsuitable; sometimes we perceive good as bad, and other times we see bad as good. We consider contentment a great good, not so we can have very little, but so that when we don’t have much, we can appreciate a little. We genuinely believe that those who can do without luxury enjoy it the most; and that everything natural is easy to obtain, while what is unnecessary isn’t. Simple foods bring as much pleasure as expensive meals when we remove all painful feelings and desires; grains and water can provide immense pleasure when someone in need eats them. Therefore, getting used to simple and affordable habits is essential for good health and helps a person feel confident about life’s necessities. When we occasionally encounter richer foods, it puts us in a better frame of mind and makes us less anxious about our circumstances. So, when we say that pleasure is a main good, we’re not talking about the pleasures of the debauched or those focused on sensual enjoyment, as some ignorant people think, who misinterpret our views; we mean the body’s freedom from pain and the soul's peace from turmoil. It’s not endless drinking, partying, or enjoying female companionship, or extravagant feasts that make life enjoyable, but rather sober reflection that explores the reasons behind our choices and rejections, clearing away the misguided beliefs that often confuse the soul.

“Now, the beginning and the greatest good of all these things is prudence, on which account prudence is something more valuable than even philosophy, inasmuch as all the other virtues spring from it, teaching us that it is not possible to[472] live pleasantly unless one also lives prudently, and honourably, and justly; and that one cannot live prudently, and honestly, and justly, without living pleasantly; for the virtues are connate with living agreeably, and living agreeably is inseparable from the virtues. Since, who can you think better than that man who has holy opinions respecting the Gods, and who is utterly fearless with respect to death, and who has properly contemplated the end of nature, and who comprehends that the chief good is easily perfected and easily provided; and the greatest evil lasts but a short period, and causes but brief pain. And who has no belief in necessity, which is set up by some as the mistress of all things, but he refers some things to fortune, some to ourselves, because necessity is an irresponsible power, and because he sees that fortune is unstable, while our own will is free; and this freedom constitutes, in our case, a responsibility which makes us encounter blame and praise. Since it would be better to follow the fables about the Gods than to be a slave to the fate of the natural philosopher; for the fables which are told give us a sketch, as if we could avert the wrath of God by paying him honour; but the other presents us with necessity who is inexorable.

“Now, the foundation and the greatest asset of all these things is wisdom, which is why wisdom is considered more valuable than even philosophy. It teaches us that it's impossible to live happily unless one also lives wisely, honorably, and justly; and that one cannot live wisely, honestly, and justly without living happily. The virtues are inherently connected to living agreeably, and living agreeably is inseparable from the virtues. After all, who do you think is better than a person who holds sacred beliefs about the gods, fears nothing about death, has thoughtfully considered the end of nature, and understands that the highest good is easily achievable and easily within reach; and that the greatest harm lasts only a short time and causes only brief suffering? This person has no faith in the necessity some claim is the master of all things; instead, they attribute some events to luck and others to our choices, because necessity is an uncontrollable force, and they recognize that fortune is unpredictable, while our own will is free. This freedom brings responsibility, which means we have to face both blame and praise. It’s better to follow the myths about the gods than to be a prisoner of the fate described by the natural philosopher; for the myths provide a picture suggesting we can appease divine anger through our respect, while the other offers us the harsh reality of necessity, who is unyielding.”

“And he, not thinking fortune a goddess, as the generality esteem her (for nothing is done at random by a God), nor a cause which no man can rely on, for he thinks that good or evil is not given by her to men so as to make them live happily, but that the principles of great goods or great evils are supplied by her; thinking it better to be unfortunate in accordance with reason, than to be fortunate irrationally; for that those actions which are judged to be the best, are rightly done in consequence of reason.

“And he, not believing that fortune is a goddess, as most people think (since nothing happens randomly by a God), nor a force that can’t be depended on, because he believes that good or evil isn’t given by her to make people live happily, but that the foundations of great goods or great evils come from her; believing it’s better to be unfortunate in line with reason than to be fortunate without reason; for those actions that are considered the best are rightly done as a result of reason.”

“Do you then study these precepts, and those which are akin to them, by all means day and night, pondering on them by yourself, and discussing them with any one like yourself, and then you will never be disturbed by either sleeping or waking fancies, but you will live like a God among men; for a man living amid immortal Gods, is in no respect like a mortal being.”

“Then, do you study these principles and the ones similar to them, day and night? Reflect on them on your own and talk about them with others who think like you. If you do this, you won’t be troubled by thoughts while you’re awake or asleep, and you’ll live like a God among people. A person living among immortal Gods is not at all like an ordinary human.”

In other works, he discards divination; and also in his Little Epitome. And he says divination has no existence;[473] but, if it has any, still we should think that what happens according to it is nothing to us.

In other writings, he rejects divination; and also in his Little Epitome. He claims that divination doesn't exist; [473] but even if it does, we should still believe that whatever occurs because of it doesn’t concern us.

These are his sentiments about the things which concern the life of man, and he has discussed them at greater length elsewhere.

These are his feelings about the things that matter in human life, and he has talked about them in more detail in other places.

XXVIII. Now, he differs with the Cyrenaics about pleasure. For they do not admit that to be pleasure which exists as a condition, but place it wholly in motion. He, however, admits both kinds to be pleasure, namely, that of the soul, and that of the body, as he says in his treatise on Choice and Avoidance; and also in his work on the Chief Good; and in the first book of his treatise on Lives, and in his Letter against the Mitylenian Philosophers. And in the same spirit, Diogenes, in the seventeenth book of his Select Discourses, and Metrodorus, in his Timocrates, speak thus. “But when pleasure is understood, I mean both that which exists in motion, and that which is a state.…” And Epicurus, in his treatise on Choice, speaks thus: “Now, freedom from disquietude, and freedom from pain, are states of pleasure; but joy and cheerfulness are beheld in motion and energy.”

XXVIII. Now, he disagrees with the Cyrenaics about pleasure. They don't consider pleasure to be a state, but see it entirely as something that happens in motion. He, on the other hand, accepts both types as pleasure: the pleasure of the mind and the pleasure of the body, as he mentions in his work on Choice and Avoidance; and also in his book on the Chief Good; and in the first book of his treatise on Lives, and in his Letter against the Mitylenian Philosophers. Likewise, Diogenes, in the seventeenth book of his Select Discourses, and Metrodorus, in his Timocrates, express this idea: “But when we understand pleasure, I mean both that which is in motion and that which is a state….” And Epicurus, in his treatise on Choice, states: “Now, freedom from disturbance and freedom from pain are states of pleasure; but joy and cheerfulness are experienced in motion and energy.”

XXIX. For they make out the pains of the body to be worse than those of the mind; accordingly, those who do wrong, are punished in the body. But he considers the pains of the soul the worst; for that the flesh is only sensible to present affliction, but the soul feels the past, the present, and the future. Therefore, in the same manner, he contends that the pleasures of the soul are greater than those of the body; and he uses as a proof that pleasure is the chief good, the fact that all animals from the moment of their birth are delighted with pleasure, and are offended with pain by their natural instinct, and without the employment of reason. Therefore, too, we, of our own inclination, flee from pain; so that Hercules, when devoured by his poisoned tunic, cries out:—

XXIX. They view physical pain as worse than mental pain; therefore, those who do wrong are punished in their bodies. But he thinks the pain of the soul is the worst because the body only feels current suffering, while the soul experiences the past, present, and future. Similarly, he argues that the pleasures of the soul are greater than those of the body; he points out that pleasure is the highest good, evidenced by the fact that all animals, from the moment they are born, are drawn to pleasure and instinctively avoid pain, without needing to reason. Likewise, we naturally shy away from pain; hence, when Hercules was consumed by his poisoned tunic, he cried out:—

Shouting and groaning, and the rocks around
Re-echoed his sad wails, the mountain heights
Of Locrian lands, and sad Eubœa’s hills.[143]

XXX. And we choose the virtues for the sake of pleasure, and not on their own account; just as we seek the skill of the physician for the sake of health, as Diogenes says, in the[474] twentieth book of his Select Discourses, where he also calls virtue a way of passing one’s life (διαγωγή). But Epicurus says, that virtue alone is inseparable from pleasure, but that every thing else may be separated from it as mortal.

XXX. We choose virtues for the sake of pleasure, not for their own sake; just like we seek a physician's skill for the sake of health, as Diogenes mentions in the[474] twentieth book of his Select Discourses, where he also describes virtue as a way of living (διαγωγή). However, Epicurus argues that virtue is inherently linked to pleasure, while everything else can be separated from it as temporary.

XXXI. Let us, however, now add the finishing stroke, as one may say, to this whole treatise, and to the life of the philosopher; giving some of his fundamental maxims, and closing the whole work with them, taking that for our end which is the beginning of happiness.

XXXI. Let’s now put the final touches on this entire treatise and the life of the philosopher by sharing some of his key principles, wrapping up the work with them, aiming for what we see as the start of true happiness.

1. “That which is happy and imperishable, neither has trouble itself, nor does it cause it to anything; so that it is not subject to the feelings of either anger or gratitude; for these feelings only exist in what is weak.

1. “What is happy and everlasting has no troubles of its own and doesn’t cause any for others; it’s not affected by feelings like anger or gratitude, which only exist in what is weak.

(In other passages he says that the Gods are speculated on by reason, some existing according to number, and others according to some similarity of form, arising from the continual flowing on of similar images, perfected for this very purpose in human form.)

(In other passages he says that people think about the Gods through reason, some existing based on numbers, and others based on some similarity in form, arising from the constant flow of similar images, refined for this very purpose in human form.)

2. “Death is nothing to us; for that which is dissolved is devoid of sensation, and that which is devoid of sensation is nothing to us.

2. “Death doesn’t matter to us; because once something has ended, it has no feelings, and what has no feelings is irrelevant to us.

3. “The limit of the greatness of the pleasures is the removal of everything which can give pain. And where pleasure is, as long as it lasts, that which gives pain, or that which feels pain, or both of them, are absent.

3. “The extent of the enjoyment of pleasures is the elimination of anything that can cause pain. And where pleasure exists, for as long as it lasts, anything that causes pain, or that experiences pain, or both, are not present."

4. “Pain does not abide continuously in the flesh, but in its extremity it is present only a very short time. That pain which only just exceeds the pleasure in the flesh, does not last many days. But long diseases have in them more that is pleasant than painful to the flesh.

4. "Pain doesn't stay constantly in the body; at its worst, it only lasts a very short time. Pain that just slightly surpasses pleasure in the body doesn't last for many days. However, prolonged illnesses often have more pleasure than pain for the body."

5. “It is not possible to live pleasantly without living prudently, and honourably, and justly; nor to live prudently, and honourably, and justly, without living pleasantly. But he to whom it does not happen to live prudently, honourably, and justly, cannot possibly live pleasantly.

5. “You can't live happily without living wisely, honorably, and fairly; and you can't live wisely, honorably, and fairly without living happily. But someone who doesn't live wisely, honorably, and fairly can't possibly live happily.

6. “For the sake of feeling confidence and security with regard to men, and not with reference to the nature of government and kingly power being a good, some men have wished to be eminent and powerful, in order that others might attain this feeling by their means; thinking that so they would secure safety as far as men are concerned. So that, if the life of[475] such men is safe, they have attained to the nature of good; but if it is not safe, then they have failed in obtaining that for the sake of which they originally desired power according to the order of nature.[144]

6. “To feel confident and secure about other people, and not because government and royal authority are inherently good, some individuals have aimed to be prominent and influential so that others could feel that confidence through them; believing that in doing so, they would ensure safety in relation to others. Therefore, if the lives of these individuals are secure, they have achieved what is good; but if their lives are not secure, then they have failed to attain what they originally sought power for in accordance with the natural order.[144]

7. “No pleasure is intrinsically bad: but the efficient causes of some pleasures bring with them a great many perturbations of pleasure.

7. "No pleasure is inherently bad: however, the means of obtaining some pleasures can lead to a lot of disturbances in enjoyment."

8. “If every pleasure were condensed, if one may so say, and if each lasted long, and affected the whole body, or the essential parts of it, then there would be no difference between one pleasure and another.

8. “If every pleasure were combined, so to speak, and if each lasted a long time and impacted the whole body or its essential parts, then there would be no difference between one pleasure and another.

9. “If those things which make the pleasures of debauched men, put an end to the fears of the mind, and to those which arise about the heavenly bodies, and death, and pain; and if they taught us what ought to be the limit of our desires, we should have no pretence for blaming those who wholly devote themselves to pleasure, and who never feel any pain or grief (which is the chief evil) from any quarter.

9. “If the things that bring pleasure to excessive people can end mental fears, and concerns about the heavens, death, and pain; and if they show us what our desires should be limited to, then we have no reason to criticize those who completely indulge in pleasure and who never experience pain or grief (which is the main evil) from any source."

10. “If apprehensions relating to the heavenly bodies did not disturb us, and if the terrors of death have no concern with us, and if we had the courage to contemplate the boundaries of pain and of the desires, we should have no need of physiological studies.

10. “If worries about celestial bodies didn't bother us, and if fears of death didn't concern us, and if we had the courage to think about the limits of pain and desires, we wouldn't need physiological studies.

11. “It would not be possible for a person to banish all fear about those things which are called most essential, unless he knew what is the nature of the universe, or if he had any idea that the fables told about it could be true; and therefore, it is, that a person cannot enjoy unmixed pleasure without physiological knowledge.

11. “A person can't completely rid themselves of all fear regarding what are considered the most essential things unless they understand the nature of the universe or believe that the stories told about it might be true; and that's why a person can't experience pure pleasure without some knowledge of physiology.

12. “It would be no good for a man to secure himself safety as far as men are concerned, while in a state of apprehension as to all the heavenly bodies, and those under the earth, and in short, all those in the infinite.

12. “It wouldn’t help a man to find safety from other people if he’s still worried about everything in the sky, beneath the earth, and basically all that’s in the universe.”

13. “Irresistible power and great wealth may, up to a certain point, give us security as far as men are concerned; but the security of men in general depends upon the tranquillity of their souls, and their freedom from ambition.

13. “Irresistible power and great wealth can, to some extent, provide us with security in relation to others; however, the overall security of people relies on the peace of their minds and their lack of ambition.

14. “The riches of nature are defined and easily procurable; but vain desires are insatiable.

14. “The wealth of nature is clear and easy to obtain; but empty desires are never satisfied.

15. “The wise man is but little favoured by fortune; but his reason procures him the greatest and most valuable goods, and these he does enjoy, and will enjoy the whole of his life.

15. “The wise man has little favor from luck; however, his reasoning gives him the most significant and valuable blessings, and he enjoys these now and will continue to enjoy them throughout his life.

16. “The just man is the freest of all men from disquietude; but the unjust man is a perpetual prey to it.

16. “The just person is the freest of all people from worry; but the unjust person is constantly plagued by it.

17. “Pleasure in the flesh is not increased, when once the pain arising from want is removed; it is only diversified.

17. "Enjoyment of physical pleasure doesn't get better once the pain from lack is gone; it just changes."

18. “The most perfect happiness of the soul depends on these reflections, and on opinions of a similar character on all those questions which cause the greatest alarm to the mind.

18. “The greatest happiness of the soul relies on these reflections and on similar opinions regarding all those questions that cause the most anxiety to the mind.

19. “Infinite and finite time both have equal pleasure, if any one measures its limits by reason.

19. "Both infinite and finite time can bring equal pleasure if someone measures their boundaries with reason."

20. “If the flesh could experience boundless pleasure, it would want to dispose of eternity.[145]

20. “If the body could feel unlimited pleasure, it would want to get rid of eternity.[145]

21. “But reason, enabling us to conceive the end and dissolution of the body, and liberating us from the fears relative to eternity, procures for us all the happiness of which life is capable, so completely that we have no further occasion to include eternity in our desires. In this disposition of mind, man is happy even when his troubles engage him to quit life; and to die thus, is for him only to interrupt a life of happiness.

21. “But reason allows us to understand the end of the body and frees us from fears about eternity, giving us all the happiness that life can offer. So much so that we no longer feel the need to incorporate eternity into our wishes. In this state of mind, a person can be happy even when faced with struggles that lead them to consider leaving life behind; for them, dying simply means pausing a life of happiness.”

22. “He who is acquainted with the limits of life knows, that that which removes the pain which arises from want, and which makes the whole of life perfect, is easily procurable; so that he has no need of those things which can only be attained with trouble.

22. “Someone who understands the boundaries of life knows that what alleviates the pain of need and makes life complete is easily accessible; therefore, they do not require things that can only be obtained with difficulty.

23. “But as to the subsisting end, we ought to consider it with all the clearness and evidence which we refer to whatever we think and believe; otherwise, all things will be full of confusion and uncertainty of judgment.

23. “But regarding the existing goal, we should examine it with the same clarity and evidence that we apply to everything we think and believe; otherwise, everything will be filled with confusion and uncertainty in judgment.

24. “If you resist all the senses, you will not even have anything left to which you can refer, or by which you may be able to judge of the falsehood of the senses which you condemn.

24. “If you push away all the senses, you won't have anything left to refer to or any way to judge the falsehood of the senses you're rejecting.

25. “If you simply discard one sense, and do not distinguish between the different elements of the judgment, so as to know[477] on the one hand, the induction which goes beyond the actual sensation, or, on the other, the actual and immediate notion; the affections, and all the conceptions of the mind which lean directly on the sensible representation, you will be imputing trouble into the other sense, and destroying in that quarter every species of criterion.

25. “If you just ignore one sense and don’t differentiate between the various aspects of judgment, so that you can understand[477] on one hand, the induction that goes beyond what you actually sense, or, on the other hand, the immediate understanding; the emotions, and all the concepts in your mind that directly rely on what you perceive, you’ll be causing confusion in the other sense and wiping out any kind of standard in that area.”

26. “If you allow equal authority to the ideas, which, being only inductive, require to be verified, and to those which bear about them an immediate certainty, you will not escape error; for you will be confounding doubtful opinions with those which are not doubtful, and true judgments with those of a different character.

26. “If you give the same weight to ideas that are just based on induction and need to be verified, as to those that are clearly certain, you’ll end up making mistakes; because you’ll mix up uncertain opinions with those that are clear, and true judgments with those that are different.”

27. “If, on every occasion, we do not refer every one of our actions to the chief end of nature, if we turn aside from that to seek or avoid some other object, there will be a want of agreement between our words and our actions.

27. “If we don't always align our actions with the ultimate purpose of nature, and instead pursue or avoid something else, there will be a mismatch between what we say and what we do.

28. “Of all the things which wisdom provides for the happiness of the whole life, by far the most important is the acquisition of friendship.

28. “Of all the things that wisdom offers for a happy life, the most important is definitely the gaining of friendship.

29. “The same opinion encourages man to trust that no evil will be everlasting, or even of long duration; as it sees that, in the space of life allotted to us, the protection of friendship is most sure and trustworthy.

29. "The same belief leads a person to have faith that no misfortune will last forever, or even for a long time; because it recognizes that, within our lifetime, the support of friendship is the most reliable and dependable."

30. “Of the desires, some are natural and necessary, some natural, but not necessary, and some are neither natural nor necessary, but owe their existence to vain opinions.”

30. “Some desires are natural and necessary, some are natural but not necessary, and some are neither natural nor necessary; they exist only because of mistaken beliefs.”

(Epicurus thinks that those are natural and necessary which put an end to pains, as drink when one is thirsty; and that those are natural but not necessary which only diversify pleasure, but do not remove pain, such as expensive food; and that these are neither natural nor necessary, which are such as crowns, or the erection of statues.)

(Epicurus believes that things that are natural and necessary help to relieve pain, like drinking when you're thirsty; that things that are natural but not necessary just add variety to pleasure without relieving pain, like gourmet food; and that things that are neither natural nor necessary, like crowns or the construction of statues, fall into a different category.)

31. “Those desires which do not lead to pain, if they are not satisfied, are not necessary. It is easy to impose silence on them when they appear difficult to gratify, or likely to produce injury.

31. “Desires that don’t cause pain when they aren’t met aren’t essential. It’s easy to ignore them when they seem hard to fulfill or might lead to harm.

32. “When the natural desires, the failing to satisfy which is, nevertheless, not painful, are violent and obstinate, it is a proof that there is an admixture of vain opinion in them; for then energy does not arise from their own nature, but from the vain opinions of men.

32. “When natural desires are intense and stubborn, yet not fulfilling them isn’t painful, it shows there’s some empty belief mixed in; because in that case, the drive doesn’t come from their true nature, but from people’s pointless opinions.”

33. “Natural justice is a covenant of what is suitable, leading men to avoid injuring one another, and being injured.

33. “Natural justice is an agreement about what is fair, encouraging people to refrain from hurting each other and being hurt themselves.

34. “Those animals which are unable to enter into an argument of this nature, or to guard against doing or sustaining mutual injury, have no such thing as justice or injustice. And the case is the same with those nations, the members of which are either unwilling or unable to enter into a covenant to respect their mutual interests.

34. “Animals that can’t engage in this kind of argument or protect themselves from causing or suffering harm don’t understand justice or injustice. The same goes for nations whose members are either unwilling or unable to agree to respect each other’s interests.”

35. “Justice has no independent existence; it results from mutual contracts, and establishes itself wherever there is a mutual engagement to guard against doing or sustaining mutual injury.

35. “Justice doesn’t exist on its own; it comes from mutual agreements and establishes itself wherever there’s a shared commitment to prevent causing or enduring harm to each other.

36. “Injustice is not intrinsically bad; it has this character only because there is joined with it a fear of not escaping those who are appointed to punish actions marked with that character.

36. “Injustice isn’t inherently bad; it only seems that way because there’s a fear of not avoiding those who are meant to punish actions that have that label."

37. “It is not possible for a man who secretly does anything in contravention of the agreement which men have made with one another, to guard against doing, or sustaining mutual injury, to believe that he shall always escape notice, even if he have escaped notice already ten thousand times; for, till his death, it is uncertain whether he will not be detected.

37. “A man who secretly breaks the agreements made with others cannot avoid causing harm or accepting harm himself. He might think he will always go unnoticed, even if he has managed to avoid detection a thousand times, but until his death, there’s no guarantee he won’t eventually be caught.”

38. “In a general point of view, justice is the same thing to every one; for there is something advantageous in mutual society. Nevertheless, the difference of place, and divers other circumstances, make justice vary.

38. “From a general perspective, justice is the same for everyone; there’s something beneficial in social interactions. However, differences in location and various other circumstances make justice change.”

39. “From the moment that a thing declared just by the law is generally recognized as useful for the mutual relations of men, it becomes really just, whether it is universally regarded as such or not.

39. “From the moment something that is declared just by the law is widely recognized as beneficial for the interactions between people, it becomes truly just, whether or not it is seen that way by everyone.”

40. “But if, on the contrary, a thing established by law is not really useful for the social relations, then it is not just; and if that which was just, inasmuch as it was useful, loses this character, after having been for some time considered so, it is not less true that, during that time, it was really just, at least for those who do not perplex themselves about vain words, but who prefer, in every case, examining and judging for themselves.

40. “But if, on the other hand, something set by law isn’t actually helpful for social relations, then it isn’t just; and if what was just, because it was useful, stops being so after a while even though it was considered just for some time, it remains true that during that time, it was genuinely just, at least for those who don’t get bogged down by meaningless words but prefer, in every case, to evaluate and judge for themselves.

41. “When, without any fresh circumstances arising, a thing which has been declared just in practice does not agree with the impressions of reason, that is a proof that the thing[479] was not really just. In the same way, when in consequence of new circumstances, a thing which has been pronounced just does not any longer appear to agree with utility, the thing which was just, inasmuch as it was useful to the social relations and intercourse of mankind, ceases to be just the moment when it ceases to be useful.

41. “When a thing that has been declared just in practice no longer aligns with reason without any new circumstances arising, it shows that the thing[479] was never truly just. Similarly, when new circumstances cause a previously regarded just thing to no longer seem useful, that thing, which was just because it benefited social relations and interactions among people, stops being just the moment it stops being useful.

42. “He who desires to live tranquilly without having any thing to fear from other men, ought to make himself friends; those whom he cannot make friends of, he should, at least, avoid rendering enemies; and if that is not in his power, he should, as far as possible, avoid all intercourse with them, and keep them aloof, as far as it is for his interest to do so.

42. “If you want to live peacefully without fearing others, you should make friends; for those you can’t befriend, try not to make enemies. And if that’s not possible, do your best to avoid interacting with them and keep your distance, as much as it’s in your best interest.”

43. “The happiest men are they who have arrived at the point of having nothing to fear from those who surround them. Such men live with one another most agreeably, having the firmest grounds of confidence in one another, enjoying the advantages of friendship in all their fulness, and not lamenting, as a pitiable circumstance, the premature death of their friends.”

43. “The happiest people are those who no longer fear the people around them. These individuals live together comfortably, with strong trust in one another, fully enjoying the benefits of friendship, and they don’t mourn the early loss of their friends as a sad situation.”


FOOTNOTES

[1] “The religion of the ancient Persians was the worship of fire or of the elements, in which fire was symbolical of the Deity. At a later period, in the time of the Greeks, the ancient worship was changed into the adoration of the stars (Sabæism), especially of the sun and of the morning star. This religion was distinguished by a simple and majestic character. Its priests were called Magi.”—Tenneman’s Manual of the History of Philosophy, Introd. § 70.

[1] “The religion of the ancient Persians involved the worship of fire or the elements, with fire representing the Deity. Later, during the time of the Greeks, this ancient worship transformed into the adoration of the stars (Sabæism), particularly the sun and the morning star. This religion was notable for its simplicity and grandeur. Its priests were known as Magi.” —Tenneman’s Manual of the History of Philosophy, Introd. § 70.

[2] “The Chaldæans were devoted to the worship of the stars and to astrology; the nature of their climate and country disposing them to it. The worship of the stars was revived by them and widely disseminated even subsequently to the Christian era.”—Ibid. § 71.

[2] “The Chaldeans were dedicated to star worship and astrology, influenced by their climate and land. They revived the worship of the stars and spread it widely even after the Christian era.”—Ibid. § 71.

[3] “Cicero speaks of those who in India are accounted philosophers, living naked and enduring the greatest severity of winter without betraying any feeling of pain, and displaying the same insensibility when exposed to the flames.”—Tusc. Quæst. v. 27.

[3] “Cicero talks about those in India who are considered philosophers, living without clothes and enduring the harshest winters without showing any signs of pain, and showing the same indifference when exposed to fire.”—Tusc. Quæst. v. 27.

[4] “The religion of the Britons was one of the most considerable parts of their government, and the Druids who were their priests, possessed great authority among them. Besides ministering at the altar, and directing all religious duties, they presided over the education of youth; they possessed both the civil and criminal jurisdiction, they decided all controversies among states as well as among private persons, and whoever refused to submit to their decree was exposed to the most severe penalties. The sentence of excommunication was pronounced against him; he was forbidden access to the sacrifices of public worship; he was debarred all intercourse with his fellow citizens even in the common affairs of life: his company was universally shunned as profane and dangerous, he was refused the protection of law, and death itself became an acceptable relief from the misery and infamy to which he was exposed. Thus the bonds of government, which were naturally loose among that rude and turbulent people, were happily corroborated by the terrors of their superstition.

[4] “The religion of the Britons was a significant part of their government, and the Druids, who served as their priests, held considerable power among them. In addition to conducting religious ceremonies and overseeing all spiritual duties, they were in charge of educating young people; they had both civil and criminal authority, settled disputes between states as well as personal disagreements, and anyone who refused to comply with their decisions faced severe penalties. A sentence of excommunication was issued against them; they were barred from participating in public worship sacrifices; they were cut off from all interactions with fellow citizens, even in everyday matters: their presence was universally avoided as defiled and harmful, they were denied legal protection, and death itself became a welcome escape from the suffering and disgrace they faced. Thus, the ties of government, which were typically weak among that rough and unruly population, were effectively strengthened by the fears stemming from their beliefs.”

“No species of superstition was ever more terrible than that of the Druids; besides the several penalties which it was in the power of the ecclesiastics to inflict in this world, they inculcated the eternal transmigration of souls, and thereby extended their authority as far as the fears of their timorous votaries. They practised their rites in dark groves or other secret recesses, and in order to throw a greater mystery over their religion, they communicated their doctrines only to the initiated, and strictly forbade the committing of them to writing, lest they should at any time be exposed to the examination of the profane and vulgar. Human sacrifices were practised among them; the spoils of war were often devoted to their divinities, and they punished with the severest tortures whoever dared to secrete any part of the consecrated offering. These treasures they kept secreted in woods and forests, secured by no other guard than the terrors of their religion; and their steady conquest over human avidity may be regarded as more signal than their prompting men to the most extraordinary and most violent efforts. No idolatrous worship ever attained such an ascendant over mankind as that of the ancient Gauls and Britons. And the Romans after their conquest, finding it impossible to reconcile those nations to the laws and institutions of their masters while it maintained its authority, were at last obliged to abolish it by penal statutes, a violence which had never in any other instance been resorted to by those tolerating conquerors.”—Hume’s History of England, chap. 1. § 1.

“No form of superstition was ever more terrifying than that of the Druids. Besides the various punishments the clergy could inflict in this life, they taught the idea of the eternal transmigration of souls, which expanded their power through the fears of their anxious followers. They performed their rituals in dark groves or other hidden places, and to create more mystery around their religion, they only shared their teachings with the initiated and strictly prohibited writing them down, fearing that they might be scrutinized by the unworthy and common people. Human sacrifices were practiced among them; the spoils of war were often offered to their gods, and they inflicted severe torture on anyone who dared to hide any part of the sacred offering. They kept these treasures hidden in woods and forests, protected only by the fears instilled by their religion. Their control over human greed was more remarkable than their ability to inspire people to undertake extraordinary and violent actions. No idolatrous worship ever held such sway over people as that of the ancient Gauls and Britons. After conquering them, the Romans found it impossible to make those nations accept the laws and institutions of their conquerors while this belief retained its power, so they were ultimately compelled to eliminate it through legal penalties—a harsh measure they had never before used against any other people they had conquered.” —Hume’s History of England, chap. 1. § 1.

[5] “Zamolxis, or Zalmoxis, so called from the bear-skin (ζάλμος) in which he was wrapped as soon as he was born, was a Getan, and a slave of Pythagoras at Samos; having been emancipated by his master, he travelled into Egypt; and on his return to his own country he introduced the ideas which he had acquired in his travels on the subject of civilisation, religion, and the immortality of the soul. He was made priest of the chief deity among the Getæ, and was afterwards himself worshipped as a divine person. He was said to have lived in a subterraneous cavern for three years, and after that to have re-appeared among his countrymen.” Herodotus, however, who records these stories (iv. 95), expresses his disbelief of them, placing him before the time of Pythagoras by many years, and seems to incline to the belief that he was an indigenous Getan deity.

[5] “Zamolxis, or Zalmoxis, named after the bear-skin (ζάλμος) he was wrapped in at birth, was a Getan and a slave of Pythagoras in Samos. After being freed by his master, he traveled to Egypt; upon returning home, he brought back ideas he learned during his travels about civilization, religion, and the immortality of the soul. He became the priest of the main god among the Getæ and was later worshipped as a divine figure himself. It was said that he lived in an underground cave for three years and then reappeared among his people.” However, Herodotus, who notes these stories (iv. 95), expresses skepticism about them, suggesting that Zamolxis lived many years before Pythagoras and leans towards the belief that he was a native Getan deity.

[6] The real time of Zoroaster is, as may be supposed, very uncertain, but he is said by some eminent writers to have lived in the time of Darius Hystaspes; though others, apparently on better grounds, place him at a very far earlier date. He is not mentioned by Herodotus at all. His native country too is very uncertain. Some writers, among whom are Ctesias and Ammian, call him a Bactrian, while Porphyry speaks of him as a Chaldæan, and Pliny as a native of Proconnesus;—Niebuhr considers him a purely mythical personage. The great and fundamental article of the system (of the Persian theology) was the celebrated doctrine of the two principles; a bold and injudicious attempt of Eastern philosophy to reconcile the existence of moral and physical evil with the attributes of a beneficent Creator and governor of the world. The first and original being, in whom, or by whom the universe exists, is denominated, in the writings of Zoroaster, Time without bounds.… From either the blind or the intelligent operation of this infinite Time, which bears but too near an affinity to the Chaos of the Greeks, the two secondary but active principles of the universe were from all eternity produced; Ormusd and Ahriman, each of them possessed of the powers of creation, but each disposed by his invariable nature to exercise them with different designs; the principle of good is eternally absorbed in light, the principle of evil is eternally buried in darkness. The wise benevolence of Ormusd formed man capable of virtue, and abundantly provided his fair habitation with the materials of happiness. By his vigilant providence the motion of the planets, the order of the seasons, and the temperate mixture of the elements are preserved. But the maker of Ahriman has long since pierced Ormusd’s Egg, or in other words, has violated the harmony of his works. Since that fatal irruption, the most minute articles of good and evil are intimately intermingled and agitated together; the rankest poisons spring up among the most salutary plants; deluges, earthquakes, and conflagrations attest the conflict of nature, and the little world of man is perpetually shaken by vice and misfortune. While the rest of mankind are led away captives in the chains of their infernal enemy, the faithful Persian alone reserves his religious adoration for his friend and protector Ormusd, and fights under his banner of light, in the full confidence that he shall, in the last day, share the glory of his triumph. At that decisive period, the enlightened wisdom of goodness will render the power of Ormusd superior to the furious malice of his rival; Ahriman and his followers, disarmed and subdued, will sink into their native darkness, and virtue will maintain the eternal peace and harmony of the universe.… As a legislator, Zoroaster “discovered a liberal concern for the public and private happiness seldom to be found among the visionary schemes of superstition. Fasting and celibacy, the common means of purchasing the divine favour, he condemns with abhorrence, as a criminal rejection of the best gifts of Providence.”—Gibbon, Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, c. viii.

[6] The exact time when Zoroaster lived is quite unclear, but some notable writers suggest he existed during the reign of Darius Hystaspes, while others, seemingly based on better evidence, place him much earlier. Herodotus doesn’t mention him at all. His birthplace is also uncertain. Some authors, including Ctesias and Ammian, describe him as a Bactrian, whereas Porphyry refers to him as a Chaldean, and Pliny labels him a native of Proconnesus; Niebuhr even considers him entirely mythical. A key element of the Persian theological system is the well-known doctrine of the two principles; a bold and questionable attempt by Eastern philosophy to explain the presence of moral and physical evil alongside the qualities of a good Creator governing the world. The first being, who creates or sustains the universe, is called in Zoroaster's writings, Time without bounds. From either the blind or intelligent workings of this infinite Time, which closely resembles the Greek concept of Chaos, the two secondary but active principles of the universe were created from eternity: Ormusd and Ahriman, each endowed with creative powers but each inclined by their unchanging nature to use these powers for different purposes; the principle of good is eternally immersed in light, while the principle of evil is eternally shrouded in darkness. The wise and benevolent Ormusd created humanity to be virtuous, providing a beautiful world filled with happiness. Through his watchful care, he maintains the movement of planets, the cycle of seasons, and the balanced mixture of elements. Yet the creator of Ahriman has long ago breached Ormusd’s Egg, or in other words, disturbed the harmony of his creation. Since that disastrous event, the smallest aspects of good and evil are closely mixed and stirred together; harmful poisons emerge among the healthiest plants; floods, earthquakes, and fires reveal nature's turmoil, and humanity is consistently rocked by vice and misfortune. While the rest of humanity is trapped in the chains of their infernal enemy, the devoted Persian alone holds his religious reverence for his friend and protector Ormusd, fighting under his banner of light, fully confident that on the final day, he will share in the glory of triumph. At that crucial moment, the enlightened wisdom of goodness will make Ormusd's power greater than the furious malice of his rival; Ahriman and his followers, disarmed and defeated, will fall back into their original darkness, and virtue will uphold the everlasting peace and harmony of the universe.… As a lawgiver, Zoroaster “showed a genuine concern for the public and individual happiness, which is rarely found in the fanciful ideas of superstition. He condemns fasting and celibacy, the common methods for gaining divine favor, as a wrongful rejection of the greatest gifts from Providence.”—Gibbon, Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, c. viii.

[7] This is the account given by Virgil—

This is what Virgil described—

Spretæ Ciconum quo munere matres
Inter sacra Deûm nocturnique orgia Bacchi,
Discerptum latos juvenem sparsere per agros.—Georg. iv. 520.

Which Dryden translates—

Which Dryden translates—

The Thracian matrons who the youth accus’d,
Of love disdain’d and marriage rites refus’d;
With furies and nocturnal orgies fir’d,
At length against his sacred life conspir’d;
Whom ev’n the savage beasts had spar’d they kill’d,
And strew’d his mangled limbs about the field.

[8] This was the temple of the national deity of the Ionians, Neptune Heliconius, on Mount Mycale.—Vide Smith, Dict. Gr. and Rom. Antiq.

[8] This was the temple of the national god of the Ionians, Neptune Heliconius, on Mount Mycale.—See Smith, Dict. Gr. and Rom. Antiq.

[9] Vide Thirlwall, Hist. of Greece, ii. p. 34.

[9] See Thirlwall, History of Greece, volume II, page 34.

[10] One of the Sporades.

One of the Sporades.

[11] An island near Crete.

An island close to Crete.

[12] Hom. Il. 2. 671. Dryden’s Version.

[12] Hom. Il. 2. 671. Dryden’s Version.

[13] Vide Herod. lib. 1. c. 30-33.

[13] See Herodotus, Book 1, Chapters 30-33.

[14] A drachma was something less than ten pence.

[14] A drachma was worth just under ten pence.

[15] “Ἔνη καὶ νέα the last day of the month: elsewhere τριανιὰς. So called for this reason. The old Greek year was lunar; now the moon’s monthly orbit is twenty-nine and a half days. So that if the first month began with the sun and moon together at sunrise, at the month’s end it would be sunset; and the second month would begin at sunset. To prevent this irregularity, Solon made the latter half day belong to the first month; so that this thirtieth day consisted of two halves, one belonging to the old, the other to the new moon. And when the lunar month fell into disuse, the last day of the calendar month was still called Ἔνη καὶ νέα.”—L. & S. Greek Lexicon, in v. ἔνος.

[15] “Ene kai nea the last day of the month: elsewhere trianias. That's what it's called for this reason. The old Greek year was based on the lunar cycle; now the moon takes about twenty-nine and a half days to orbit. So, if the first month started with the sun and moon rising together, by the end of the month it would be sunset; and the second month would start at sunset. To fix this inconsistency, Solon decided that the latter half of the day would belong to the first month, meaning this thirtieth day consisted of two halves—one related to the old moon and the other to the new moon. And when the lunar month fell out of use, the last day of the calendar month was still referred to as Ene kai nea.”—L. & S. Greek Lexicon, in v. ἔνος.

[16] Herodotus mentions the case of Periander’s children, iii. 50, and the death of his wife, and his burning the clothes of all the Corinthian women, v. 92.

[16] Herodotus talks about Periander's kids, iii. 50, and the death of his wife, as well as his act of burning the clothes of all the women in Corinth, v. 92.

[17] Some propose to read καρπὸν, fruit, instead of καπνὸν, smoke, here; others explain this saying as meaning that the Greeks avoided houses on the hills in order not to be annoyed with the smoke from the low cottage, and yet did not use coal, but wood, which would make more smoke.

[17] Some suggest reading καρπὸν, fruit, instead of καπνὸν, smoke, here; others interpret this saying to mean that the Greeks steered clear of houses on the hills to avoid being bothered by the smoke from the low cottage, yet they did not use coal, but wood, which would create more smoke.

[18] This refers to the result of the war which Antipater, who became regent of Macedonia on the death of Alexander the Great, carried on against the confederacy of Greek states, of which Athens was the head; and in which, after having defeated them at Cranon, he compelled the Athenians to abolish the democracy, and to admit a garrison into Munychia.

[18] This refers to the outcome of the war that Antipater, who became the regent of Macedonia after Alexander the Great's death, fought against the alliance of Greek states led by Athens. After defeating them at Cranon, he forced the Athenians to dismantle their democracy and allow a garrison to be stationed in Munychia.

[19] Φρύγανα, sticks or faggots.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Firewood, sticks, or bundles.

[20] After the battle of Arginusæ.

After the Battle of Arginusae.

[21] “This is not quite correct. Socrates believed that the dæmon which attended him, limited his warnings to his own conduct; preventing him from doing what was wrong, but not prompting him to do right.”—See Grote’s admirable chapter on Socrates. Hist. of Greece, vol. v.

[21] “This isn’t exactly accurate. Socrates thought that the spirit guiding him focused his warnings on his own behavior; it stopped him from doing wrong, but didn’t encourage him to do what was right.”—See Grote’s excellent chapter on Socrates. Hist. of Greece, vol. v.

[22] Grote gives good reasons for disbelieving this.

[22] Grote provides solid reasons to doubt this.

[23] The Greek is, ἐν τῷ πρὸς Ξενοφῶντα ἀποστασίου—“ἀποστασίου δίκη, an action against a freedman for having forsaken or slighted his προστάτης.”—L. & S.

[23] The Greek is, ἐν τῷ πρὸς Ξενοφῶντα ἀποστασίου—“ἀποστασίου δίκη, a lawsuit against a freedman for abandoning or disrespecting his guardian.”—L. & S.

[24] This is exactly the character that Horace gives of him:—

[24] This is exactly how Horace describes him:—

Omnis Aristippum decuit color et status et res;
Tentantem majora, fere præsentibus æequum.—
Ep. i. 23, 24.

[25] Plutarch, in his life of Pompey, attributes these lines to Sophocles, but does not mention the play in which they occurred.

[25] Plutarch, in his biography of Pompey, credits these lines to Sophocles, but does not specify the play they are from.

[26] The French translator gives the following examples, to show what is meant by these several kinds of quibbling arguments:—

[26] The French translator provides these examples to illustrate what is meant by these different types of quibbling arguments:—

The lying one is this:—Is the man a liar who says that he tells lies. If he is, then he does not tell lies; and if he does not tell lies, is he a liar?

The lying one is this:—Is the guy a liar if he claims he tells lies? If he is, then he's not telling lies; and if he's not telling lies, is he a liar?

The concealed one:—Do you know this man who is concealed? If you do not, you do not know your own father; for he it is who is concealed.

The concealed one:—Do you know this man who is hidden? If you don’t, then you don’t know your own father; because he is the one who is hidden.

The veiled one is much the same as the preceding.

The veiled one is pretty much the same as the one before.

The electra is a quibble of the same kind as the two preceding ones: Electra sees Orestes: she knows that Orestes is her brother, but does not know that the man she sees is Orestes; therefore she does know, and does not know, her brother at the same time.

The electra is a similar puzzle to the two before it: Electra sees Orestes; she recognizes that Orestes is her brother, but she doesn't realize that the man in front of her is him. So, at the same time, she both knows and doesn't know her brother.

The Sorites is universally known.

The Sorites is well-known.

The bald one is a kind of Sorites; pulling one hair out of a man’s head will not make him bald, nor two, nor three, and so on till every hair in his head is pulled out.

The bald one is a type of Sorites; pulling out one hair from a man's head won't make him bald, nor two, nor three, and so on until every hair on his head is gone.

The horned one:—You have what you have not lost. You have not lost horns, therefore you have horns.

The horned one:—You have what you haven't lost. You haven't lost your horns, so you have horns.

[27] From ἐλέγχω, to confute.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ From ἐλέγχω, to refute.

[28] Κρόνος, take away Κ. ρ., leaves ὄνος, an ass.

[28] Kronos, remove K. r., leaves onos, a donkey.

[29] The quibble here is that θεὸς is properly only masculine, though it is sometimes used as feminine.

[29] The point of contention here is that θεὸς is technically only masculine, although it is occasionally used in a feminine context.

[30] The Greek is a parody on the descriptions of Tantalus and Sisyphus. Hom. Od. ii. 581, 592. See also, Dryden’s Version, B. ii. 719.

[30] The Greek text is a joke about the stories of Tantalus and Sisyphus. Hom. Od. ii. 581, 592. See also, Dryden’s Version, B. ii. 719.

[31] The Greek is τοῦ μιμογράφου. “A mime was a kind of prose drama, intended as a familiar representation of life and character, without any distinct plot. It was divided into μῖμιοι ἀνδρεῖοι and γυναικεῖοι, also into μῖμοι σπουδαίων and γελοίων.”—L. &. S. in voc. μῖμος.

[31] The Greek is τοῦ μιμογράφου. “A mime was a type of prose drama meant to depict everyday life and character in a relatable way, without a clear plot. It was categorized into male and female mimes, as well as serious and comedic mimes.”—L. &. S. in voc. μῖμος.

[32] The Greek is, ὡς ἀνέπλαττε Πλάτων πεπλασμένα θαύματα εἰδώς.

[32] The Greek says, "as Plato shaped wonders knowing."

[33] This figure was like a barbed arrow, according to Zevort.

[33] This figure was like a sharp arrow, according to Zevort.

[34] Herophilus was one of the most celebrated physicians of antiquity, who founded the Medical School at Alexandria, in the time of the first Ptolemy.

[34] Herophilus was one of the most famous doctors of ancient times, who established the Medical School at Alexandria during the era of the first Ptolemy.

[35] Hom. Od. x. 387. Pope’s Version, 450.

[35] Hom. Od. x. 387. Pope’s Version, 450.

[36] Perhaps there is a pun here; ἀστράγαλος means not only a knout composed of small bones strung together, but also a die.

[36] Maybe there's a play on words here; ἀστράγαλος means not just a whip made of small bones tied together, but also a dice.

[37] This is a quotation from some lost play of Euripides, slightly altered, the line, as printed in the Variorum Edition, vol. vii., Mc. Trag. cxxx. is—

[37] This is a quote from a lost play by Euripides, slightly changed; the line, as shown in the Variorum Edition, vol. vii., Mc. Trag. cxxx. is—

ἀκόλαστα πάντα γίνεται, δούλων τέκνα.

[38] There is a pun here which is untranslateable. The Greek is πλὴν ὅταν τόκος παρῇ, meaning usury, and also offspring or delivery.

[38] There's a pun here that's impossible to translate. The Greek is πλὴν ὅταν τόκος παρΉ, which means both usury and also offspring or delivery.

[39] Hom. Od. x. 335. Pope’s Version, 387.

[39] Hom. Od. x. 335. Pope’s Version, 387.

[40] Hom. Il. vi. 211. Pope’s Version, 254.

[40] Hom. Il. vi. 211. Pope’s Version, 254.

[41] This is a quotation from the Hippolytus of Euripides, v. 424.

[41] This is a quote from Euripides' Hippolytus, line 424.

[42] I doubt if the wit of these parodies will be appreciated by the modern reader. The lines of Homer, which they are intended to parody, are:—

[42] I question whether today's readers will appreciate the humor in these parodies. The lines of Homer that they aim to mimic are:—

Ὦ μάκαρ Ατρεΐδη, μοιρηγενὲς, ὀλβιοδαίμων.—Il. 3, 182.
ἠέ συ Πηλεΐδη, πάντων ἐκπαγλότατ’ ἀνδρῶν.—Il. v. 146.

The first of which is translated by Pope:—

The first one is translated by Pope:—

Oh, blest Atrides, born of prosperous fate,
Successful monarch of a mighty state!

The Greek parody in the text is:—

The Greek parody in the text is:—

Ὦ πέπον Ἀρχύτα, ψαλληγενὲς, ὀλβιότυφε
Τῆς ὑπάτης ἔριδος πάντων ἐμπειρότατ’ ἀνδρῶν.

[43] From λύω, solvo, to relax or weaken the limbs.

[43] From λύω, solvo, to loosen or reduce tension in the limbs.

[44] From περιπατέω, “to walk about.”

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ From περιπατέω, "to walk around."

[45] Il. 18, 95.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Il. 18, 95.

[46] This very spirited version I owe to the kindness of my brother, the Rev. J. E. Yonge, of Eton College.

[46] I owe this lively version to my brother, the Rev. J. E. Yonge, of Eton College.

[47] “ἐντελέχεια, the actuality of a thing, as opposed to simple capability or potentiality (δύναμις); a philosophic word invented by Aristotle.— … quite distinct from ἐνδελέχεια, though Cicero (Tusc. i. 10,) confounded them.”—L. & S. in voc.

[47] “entelechy, the reality of something, as opposed to mere ability or potential; a philosophical term created by Aristotle.— … quite different from endelechy, although Cicero (Tusc. i. 10) mixed them up.”—L. & S. in voc.

[48] From θεῖος divine, and φράσις diction.

From divine and diction.

[49] This was a temple of the Muses which he had built for a school.

[49] This was a temple of the Muses that he had built for a school.

[50] So as to make it appear connected with γλυκὺς, sweet.

[50] To make it look linked to γλυκὺς, sweet.

[51] στάμνος, means an earthenware jar for wine.

[51] στάμνος, means a clay jar for wine.

[52] The foregoing account hardly does justice to Demetrius, who was a man of real ability, and of a very different class to the generality of those whom the ancients dignified with the title of philosophers. He was called Phalereus, to distinguish him from his contemporary Demetrius Poliorcetes. His administration of the affairs of Athens was so successful, that Cicero gives him the praise of having re-established the sinking and almost prostrate power of the republic. (Cic. de Rep. ii. 1.) As an orator, he is spoken of by the same great authority with the highest admiration. Cicero calls him “a subtle disputer, not vehement, but very sweet, as a pupil of Theophrastus might be expected to be.” (de Off. i. 3.) In another place he praises him as possessed of great learning, and as one who “rather delighted than inflamed the Athenians.” (de Clav. Orat. § 37.) And says, “that he was the first person who endeavoured to soften eloquence, and who made it tender and gentle; preferring to appear sweet, as indeed he was, rather than vehement.” (Ibid. § 38.) In another place he says, “Demetrius Phalereus the most polished of all those orators” (he has been mentioning Demosthenes, Hyperides, Lycurgus, Æschines, and Dinarchus) “in my opinion.” (de Orat. ii. 23.) And he praises him for not confining his learning to the schools, but for bringing it into daily use, and employing it as one of his ordinary weapons. (de Leg. iii. 14.) And asks who can be found besides him who excelled in both ways, so as to be pre-eminent at the same time as a scholar, and a governor of a state. (Ibid.) He mentions his death in the oration for Rabirius Postumus, § 9. He appears to have died about B.C. 282.

[52] The above description hardly captures Demetrius, who was truly talented and stood apart from most of those the ancients referred to as philosophers. He was known as Phalereus to differentiate him from his contemporary Demetrius Poliorcetes. His management of Athenian affairs was so effective that Cicero commended him for restoring the faltering and nearly collapsed power of the republic. (Cic. de Rep. ii. 1.) As an orator, Cicero speaks of him with great admiration. He describes him as “a subtle debater, not forceful, but very pleasant, as one would expect from a student of Theophrastus.” (de Off. i. 3.) Elsewhere, Cicero praises him for his extensive knowledge and for “entrancing rather than agitating the Athenians.” (de Clav. Orat. § 37.) He notes, “He was the first to try to soften eloquence, making it gentle and sweet; preferring to come across as pleasant, which he was, rather than intense.” (Ibid. § 38.) Additionally, Cicero refers to “Demetrius Phalereus, the most refined of all those orators” (after mentioning Demosthenes, Hyperides, Lycurgus, Æschines, and Dinarchus) “in my view.” (de Orat. ii. 23.) He commends him for not limiting his scholarship to academic settings, but for applying it in everyday life and using it as one of his regular tools. (de Leg. iii. 14.) Cicero questions who else could excel in both areas, being outstanding as both a scholar and a state leader. (Ibid.) He notes Demetrius' death in the speech for Rabirius Postumus, § 9. He seems to have died around 282 B.C.

[53] From πομπὴ, a procession.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ From πομπὴ, a parade.

[54] There is a play on the similarity of the two sounds, κοινὴ, common, and ποίνη, punishment.

[54] There’s a playful connection between the two similar sounds, κοινὴ, common, and ποίνη, punishment.

[55] The Greek is, ἐς κόρακας, which was a proverb for utter destruction.

[55] The Greek phrase is ἐς κόρακας, which was a saying that meant complete and total destruction.

[56] The passage is not free from difficulty; but the thing which misled Diogenes appears to have been that νόμισμα, the word here used, meant both “a coin, or coinage,” and “a custom.”

[56] The passage isn't without its challenges; however, what seems to have confused Diogenes is that the term νόμισμα used here referred to both “a coin, or coinage,” and “a custom.”

[57] This line is from Euripides, Medea, 411.

[57] This line is from Euripides, Medea, 411.

[58] The saperda was the coracinus (a kind of fish) when salted.

[58] The saperda was the coracinus (a type of fish) when it was salted.

[59] This is probably an allusion to a prosecution instituted by Demosthenes against Midias, which was afterwards compromised by Midias paying Demosthenes thirty minæ, or three thousand drachmæ. See Dem. Or. cont. Midias.

[59] This likely refers to a lawsuit brought by Demosthenes against Midias, which was later settled when Midias paid Demosthenes thirty minæ, or three thousand drachmæ. See Dem. Or. cont. Midias.

[60] This is a pun upon the similarity of Athlias’s name to the Greek adjective ἄθλιος, which signifies miserable.

[60] This is a play on words based on how similar Athlias’s name is to the Greek adjective ἄθλιος, which means miserable.

[61] The ἱερομνήμονες were the sacred secretaries or recorders sent by each Amphictyonic state to the council along with their πυλαγόρας, (the actual deputy or minister). L. & S. Gr. & Eng. Lex., in voc.

[61] The hieromnemon were the sacred secretaries or recorders sent by each Amphictyonic state to the council along with their pylagoras, (the actual deputy or minister). L. & S. Gr. & Eng. Lex., in voc.

[62] There is a pun here. Χείρων is the word used for worse. Chiron was also the most celebrated of the Centaurs, the tutor of Achilles.

[62] There's a play on words here. Χείρων is the term used for worse. Chiron was also the most famous of the Centaurs, the teacher of Achilles.

[63] There is a pun intended here; as Diogenes proposed Didymus a fate somewhat similar to that of the beaver.

[63] There’s a play on words here; Diogenes suggested to Didymus a fate somewhat like that of the beaver.

Cupiens evadere damno
Testiculorum.

[64] This is taken from Homer, Il. κ. 387. Pope’s Version, 455.

[64] This comes from Homer, Iliad, line 387. Pope’s Version, 455.

[65] This is also from Homer, Il. θ. 95. Pope’s Version, 120.

[65] This is also from Homer, Iliad 8.95. Pope’s Version, 120.

[66] This is a parody on Homer, Il. ξ. 95, where the line ends οἷ’ ἀγορεύεις—“if such is your language,” which Diogenes here changes to οἷ’ ἀγοράζεις, if you buy such things.

[66] This is a parody of Homer, Il. ξ. 95, where the line ends with οἷ’ ἀγορεύεις—“if that’s how you speak,” which Diogenes changes here to οἷ’ ἀγοράζεις, meaning “if you buy such things.”

[67] This is a line of the Phœnissæ of Euripides, v. 40.

[67] This is a line from the Phoenician Women by Euripides, v. 40.

[68] The pun here is on the similarity of the noun ἐλάαν, an olive, to the verb ἐλαᾶν, to drive; the words μάστιξεν δ’ ἐλαᾶν are of frequent occurrence in Homer.

[68] The joke here is based on the similarity between the noun ἐλάαν, which means an olive, and the verb ἐλαᾶν, meaning to drive; the phrase μάστιξεν δ’ ἐλαᾶν appears frequently in Homer.

[69] This line occurs, Hom. Il. ε. 83.

[69] This line appears in Hom. Il. ε. 83.

[70] The Samothracian Gods were Gods of the sea, and it was customary for those who had been saved from shipwreck to make them an offering of some part of what they had saved; and of their hair, if they had saved nothing but their lives.

[70] The Samothracian Gods were sea Gods, and it was common for those who had survived a shipwreck to make an offering of whatever they had managed to save; or at least a piece of their hair if they had only saved their lives.

[71] Eurytion was another of the Centaurs, who was killed by Hercules.

[71] Eurytion was another one of the Centaurs, who was killed by Hercules.

[72] This is a pun on the similarity of the sound, Tegea, to τέγος, a brothel.

[72] This is a play on words because "Tegea" sounds a lot like "τέγος," which means brothel.

[73] The Greek is ἔρανον αἰτούμενος πρὸς τὸν ἐρανάρχην ἔφη,—ἔρανος was not only a subscription or contribution for the support of the poor, but also a club or society of subscribers to a common fund for any purpose, social, commercial, or charitable, or especially political.… On the various ἔρανοι, v. Böckh, P. E. i. 328. Att. Process. p. 540, s. 99. L. & S. in voc. ἔρανος.

[73] The Greek term is ἔρανον αἰτούμενος πρὸς τὸν ἐρανάρχην ἔφη,—ἔρανος was not just a donation or contribution to help the needy, but also a group or association of donors pooling resources for various purposes, whether social, commercial, charitable, or particularly political.… For more on the different ἔρανοι, see Böckh, P. E. i. 328. Att. Process. p. 540, s. 99. L. & S. in voc. ἔρανος.

[74] Hom. Il. Γ. 65.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Hom. Il. Γ. 65.

[75] There is a pun here; κόρη means both “a girl” and “the pupil of the eye.” And φθείρω, “to destroy,” is also especially used for “to seduce.”

[75] There's a play on words here; κόρη means both “a girl” and “the pupil of the eye.” And φθείρω, “to destroy,” is also commonly used to mean “to seduce.”

[76] This is a parody on Homer. Il. 591. Pope’s Version, 760.

[76] This is a parody of Homer. Il. 591. Pope’s Version, 760.

[77] Hom. Il. Σ. 395. Pope’s version, 460.

[77] Hom. Il. Σ. 395. Pope’s version, 460.

[78] This line is from the Bacchæ of Euripides, v. 1228.

[78] This line is from the Bacchae by Euripides, v. 1228.

[79] From this last paragraph it is inferred by some critics, that originally the preceding memoirs of Crates, Metrocles, and Hipparchia formed only one chapter or book.

[79] Some critics suggest from this last paragraph that the earlier memoirs of Crates, Metrocles, and Hipparchia were originally part of a single chapter or book.

[80] This a parody on two lines in the Antiope of Euripides:

[80] This is a parody of two lines from Euripides' Antiope:

Γνώμῃ γὰρ ἀνδρὸς εὖ μὲν οἰκοῦνται πόλεις,
Εὖ δ’ οἶκος εἴς τ’ αὖ πόλεμον ἰσχύει μέγα.

Which may be translated:—

Which can be translated:—

Wisdom it is which regulates both cities,
And private citizens, and makes their lot
Secure and happy; nor is her influence
Of less account in war.

[81] A sort of guitar or violin.

[81] A type of guitar or violin.

[82] The Greek is, ἐν τῷ θερίζοντι λόγῳ, a species of argument so called, because he who used it mowed or knocked down his adversaries.—Aldob.

[82] The Greek phrase is, ἐν τῷ θερίζοντι λόγῳ, a type of argument named so because the person using it easily defeated or took down their opponents.—Aldob.

[83] The Greek in the text is:—

[83] The Greek in the text is:—

Κεῖνος μὲν πανάριστος ὃς εὖ εἰπόντι πίθηται,
Ἐσθλὸς δ’ αὖ κἀκεῖνος ὃς αὐτὸς πάντα νοήσῃ.

The lines in Hesiod are:—

The lines in Hesiod are:—

Κεῖνος μὲν πανάριστος ὃς αὐτὸς πάντα νοήσῃ
Ἐσθλὸς δ’ αὖ κἀκεῖνος ὃς εὖ εἰπόντι πίθηται.—Op. E. Di. 293.
That man is best, whose unassisted wit
Perceives at once what in each case is fit.
And next to him, he surely is most wise,
Who willingly submits to good advice.

[84] Huerner thinks (as indeed is evident) that something is lost here; and proposes to read the sentence thus:—Τῶν δὲ κατηγορημάτων τὰ μέν ἐστι συμβάματα ὡς τὸ πλεῖν, οἷον Σωκράτης πλεῖ, τὰ δὲ παρασυμβάματα ὡς τὸ διὰ πέτρας πλεῖν. With reference to which passage, Liddell and Scott, Gr. Eng. Lex. voc. σύμβαμα, thus speak: “σύμβαμα … as a philosophical term of the Stoics = κατηγόρημα, a complete predicament such as is an intransitive verb: e.g. Σωκράτης περιπατεῖ; while an imperfect verb was regarded as an incomplete predicament; e.g. Σωκράτει μέλει, and called παρασύμβαμα, or παρακατηγόρημα.”

[84] Huerner believes (and it's pretty clear) that something is missing here; he suggests reading the sentence like this:—Τῶν δὲ κατηγορημάτων τὰ μέν ἐστι συμβάματα ὡς τὸ πλεῖν, οἷον Σωκράτης πλεῖ, τὰ δὲ παρασυμβάματα ὡς τὸ διὰ πέτρας πλεῖν. In relation to this passage, Liddell and Scott, Gr. Eng. Lex. voc. σύμβαμα, say: “σύμβαμα … as a philosophical term of the Stoics = κατηγόρημα, a complete predicament such as is an intransitive verb: e.g. Σωκράτης περιπατεῖ; while an imperfect verb was seen as an incomplete predicament; e.g. Σωκράτει μέλει, and called παρασύμβαμα, or παρακατηγόρημα.”

[85] This line is from the Inachus of Sophocles (one of his lost plays).

[85] This line is from Sophocles' Inachus (one of his lost plays).

[86] Homer, Iliad II. 484.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Homer, Iliad II. 484.

[87] This line is from the Citharista of Menander.

[87] This line is from the Citharista by Menander.

[88] It would appear that there is a considerable hiatus here; for the instance following is a sorites, and not a specimen of the veiled argument. And there is no instance given of the concealed, or of the horned one. Still, the mere fact of the text being unintelligible, is far from proving that we have not got it as Diogenes wrote it; as though in the language of the writer in Smith’s Biographical Dictionary, vol. i. pp. 1022, 1023, “the work contains a rich store of living features, which serve to illustrate the private life of the Greeks,” it is equally clear that the author “was unequal to writing a history of Greek philosophy. His work in reality is nothing but a compilation of the most heterogeneous and often contradictory accounts.… The traces of carelessness and mistakes are very numerous; much in the work is confused, and there is also much that is quite absurd. And as far as philosophy itself is concerned, Diogenes very frequently did not know what he was talking about when he abridged the theories of the philosophers.”

[88] It seems there's a significant gap here; the next example is a sorites, not a case of the veiled argument. There’s also no example provided of the concealed or the horned one. However, just because the text is unclear doesn’t mean we don’t have it as Diogenes originally wrote it; as noted by the author in Smith’s Biographical Dictionary, vol. i. pp. 1022, 1023, “the work contains a wealth of living details that help illustrate the private life of the Greeks.” It’s also clear that the author “was not capable of writing a history of Greek philosophy. His work is essentially just a compilation of the most diverse and often contradictory accounts. The signs of carelessness and errors are abundant; much of the work is confusing, and there’s also a lot that is simply ridiculous. When it comes to philosophy itself, Diogenes often didn’t fully understand what he was discussing when he summarized the philosophers’ theories.”

[89] The third point of view is wanting; and those that are given appear to be ill selected. The French translator, following the hint of Huebner, gives the following passage from Sextus Empiricus (a physician of the Sceptic school, about B.C. 250), in his work against the Philosophers, which he says may serve to rectify and complete the statement of Diogenes Laërtius. “Good is said in one sense of that which produces the useful, or from which the useful results; that is, the good par excellence, virtue. For virtue is as it were the source from which all utility naturally flows. In another sense it is said of that which is accidentally the cause of utility; under this point of view we call good not only virtue, but also those actions which are conformable to virtue, for they are accidentally useful. In the third and last place, we call good everything that possibly can be useful, comprehending under this definition virtue, virtuous actions, friends, good men, the Gods, &c., &c.”

[89] The third perspective is lacking, and the ones provided seem poorly chosen. The French translator, following Huebner's suggestion, includes this passage from Sextus Empiricus (a physician from the Sceptic school, around BCE 250) in his work against the Philosophers, which he claims might help clarify and complete Diogenes Laërtius’s statement. “Good is defined in one way as that which produces what is useful, or from which useful outcomes arise; this is the supreme good, virtue. Virtue is essentially the source from which all utility naturally flows. In another sense, it refers to what is accidentally the cause of utility; in this view, we call good not only virtue but also those actions that align with virtue, as they are incidentally useful. Lastly, we define good as everything that has the potential to be useful, including virtue, virtuous actions, friends, good people, the Gods, etc.”

[90] Hom. Il. I. 81. Pope’s Version, l. 105.

[90] Hom. Il. I. 81. Pope’s Version, l. 105.

[91] It is hardly necessary to remark that Ἀθηνᾶ is the name of Minerva, not of Jupiter; Ἥρα, of Juno; Ἥφαιστος, of Vulcan; Ποσειδῶν, of Neptune, and Δημήτηρ, of Ceres. Ἥφαιστος is properly derived from φαίνω, to shine; Ποσειδῶν has some affinity with πόω, to drink. Δημήτηρ is only a dialectic variation of Τῆ μητὴρ.

[91] It's worth noting that Ἀθηνᾶ is the name for Minerva, not Jupiter; Ἥρα is Juno; Ἥφαιστος is Vulcan; Ποσειδῶν is Neptune, and Δημήτηρ is Ceres. Ἥφαιστος actually comes from φαίνω, meaning to shine; Ποσειδῶν has a connection to πόω, which means to drink. Δημήτηρ is just a dialect variation of Τῆ μητὴρ.

[92] There is a hiatus in the text here. Casaubon supplies the meaning by a reference to Plutarch’s Treatise on the opinions of the Philosophers, iii. 7, “that the winds are a flowing of the air, and that they have various names with reference to the countries from which they flow.”

[92] There’s a gap in the text here. Casaubon explains it by referencing Plutarch’s Treatise on the Opinions of the Philosophers, iii. 7, “that winds are just air in motion, and they have different names based on the regions they come from.”

[93] Something is evidently wanting here; probably some mention of an earthquake.

[93] Something is clearly missing here; likely a reference to an earthquake.

[94] This is similar to Virgil’s description.

[94] This is similar to Virgil's description.

Quinque tenent cœlum zonæ, quarum una corusco
Semper Sole rubens, et torrida semper ab igni:
Quam circum extremæ dextrà lævàque trahuntur.
Cœruleâ glacie concretæ atque imbribus atris.
Has inter mediamque duæ mortalibus ægris
Munere concessæ Divûm, et via secta per ambas,
Obliquus qua se signorum verteret ordo.—Georg. I. 233.

There is no part of Dryden’s translation superior to that of this passage.

There’s no part of Dryden’s translation that’s better than this passage.

Five girdles bind the skies; the torrid zone
Glows with the passing and repassing sun;
Far on the right and left, th’ extremes of heaven,
To frosts, and snows, and bitter blasts are given;
Betwixt the midst. And there the Gods assigned
Four habitable seats for human kind,
And, cross their limits cut a sloping way,
Which the twelve signs in beauteous order sway. l. 322.

[95] “Ὑποτελὶς, a name given by Herillus in Diogenes Laërtius to a man’s natural talents, &c., which ought all to be subordinate to the attainment of the chief good.”—L. & S. in voc.

[95] “Hypotelis, a term coined by Herillus in Diogenes Laërtius to refer to a person's natural abilities, etc., which should all be focused on achieving the highest good.” —L. & S. in voc.

[96] From φρέαρ, a well, and ἀντλέω to draw water.

[96] From φρέαρ, meaning a well, and ἀντλέω, meaning to draw water.

[97] The Greek used is ἀποφορὰ; which was a term especially applied to the money which slaves let out to hire paid to their master.

[97] The Greek term used is ἀποφορὰ; this was specifically used to refer to the money that slaves earned by working for others and then paid to their master.

[98] This is a parody on Hom. Il. iii. 196. Pope’s version, i. 260. The word ὅλμος means the mouth piece of a flute.

[98] This is a parody of Hom. Il. iii. 196. Pope’s version, i. 260. The word ὅλμος means the mouthpiece of a flute.

[99] Taken from the Orestes of Euripides, i. 140.

[99] Taken from the Orestes by Euripides, i. 140.

[100] This is parodied from Hom. Od. iv. 611. Pope’s version, l. 831.

[100] This is a parody of Hom. Od. iv. 611. Pope’s version, l. 831.

[101] This is referring to the Stoic doctrine ridiculed by Horace:

[101] This is talking about the Stoic belief that Horace made fun of:

Si dives qui sapiens est,
Et sutor bonus, et solus formosus, et est Rex
Cur optas quod habes?—Hor. Sat. i. 130.

Which may be translated:—

Which may be translated as:—

If every man is rich who’s wise,
A cobbler too beyond all price;
A handsome man, and eke a king;
Why thus your vows at random fling?

[102] From κρύπτω, to hide, and ἵππος, a horse.

[102] From κρύπτω, to hide, and ἵππος, a horse.

[103] These lines are from the Erestes of Euripides, v. 247.

[103] These lines are from the "Orestes" by Euripides, line 247.

[104] This is a quotation from Homer, Od. x. 495. Pope’s Version, 586. The Greek here is, οἷος πέπνυται. The line in Homer stands:

[104] This is a quote from Homer, Odyssey x. 495. Pope’s Version, 586. The Greek here is, οἷος πέπνυται. The line in Homer reads:

οἵῳ πέπνυσθαι,—sc: πόρε περσεφόνεια.

[105] The argument by progression is the sorites. “The arrest” is the method of encountering the sorites, by taking some particular point at which to stop the admissions required by the sorites.

[105] The argument by progression is called the sorites. "The arrest" is the technique used to address the sorites, by choosing a specific point to halt the necessary admissions that the sorites demands.

[106] The remainder of the life of Chrysippus is lost.

[106] The rest of Chrysippus's life is a mystery.

[107] See Herod. iv. 93.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ See Herod. IV. 93.

[108] This resembles the account which Ovid puts into the mouth of Pythagoras, in the last book of his Metamorphoses, where he makes him say:—

[108] This is similar to the story that Ovid attributes to Pythagoras in the final book of his Metamorphoses, where he has him say:—

Morte carent animæ, semperque priore relicta
Sede, novis domibus habitant vivuntque receptæ;
Ipse ego, nam memini, Trojani tempora belli,
Panthorides Euphorbus eram, cui pectore quondam
Hæsit in adverso gravis hasta minoris Atridæ:
Agnovi Clypeum lævæ gestamina nostræ
Nuper Abanteïs templo Junonis in Argis.

Which may be translated:—

Which can be translated:—

Death has no pow’r th’ immortal soul to slay;
That, when its present body turns to clay,
Seeks a fresh home, and with unminish’d might
Inspires another frame with life and light.
So I myself, (well I the past recall)
When the fierce Greeks begirt Troy’s holy wall,
Was brave Euphorbus; and in conflict drear,
Poured forth my blood beneath Atrides’ spear:
The shield this arm did bear I lately saw
In Juno’s shrine, a trophy of that war.

[109] This passage has been interpreted in more ways than one. Casaubon thinks with great probability that there is a hiatus in the text. I have endeavoured to extract a meaning out of what remains. Compare Samuel ii. 16, 23. “And the counsel of Ahitophel, which he counselled in those days, was as if a man had enquired at the oracle of God; so was all the counsel of Ahitophel both with David and with Absalom.”

[109] This passage has been understood in several different ways. Casaubon believes with considerable certainty that there is a gap in the text. I've tried to find meaning in what is left. See Samuel ii. 16, 23. “And the advice of Ahitophel, which he gave in those days, was like someone asking an oracle of God; so was all the advice of Ahitophel for both David and Absalom.”

[110] Zaleucus was the celebrated lawgiver of the Epizephyrian Locrians, and is said to have been originally a slave employed by a shepherd, and to have been set free and appointed lawgiver by the direction of an oracle, in consequence of his announcing some excellent laws, which he represented Minerva as having communicated to him in a dream. Diogenes, is wrong however, in calling him a disciple of Pythagoras (see Bentley on Phalaris), as he lived about a hundred years before his time; his true date being 660 B.C. The code of Zaleucus is stated to have been the first collection of written laws that the Greeks possessed. Their character was that of great severity. They have not come down to us. His death is said to have occurred thus. Among his laws was one forbidding any citizen to enter the senate house in arms, under the penalty of death. But in a sudden emergency, Zaleucus himself, in a moment of forgetfulness, transgressed his own law: on which he slew himself, declaring that he would vindicate his law. (Eustath. ad. Il. i. p. 60). Diodorus, however, tells the same story of Charondas.

[110] Zaleucus was the famous lawmaker of the Epizephyrian Locrians. He was originally a slave working for a shepherd, but after he announced some remarkable laws—allegedly revealed to him by Minerva in a dream—he was freed and appointed as the lawgiver by an oracle. Diogenes is mistaken in calling him a disciple of Pythagoras (see Bentley on Phalaris), as he lived about a hundred years before Pythagoras; his actual date is 660 BCE. Zaleucus's legal code is considered the first collection of written laws that the Greeks had, characterized by their strictness. These laws have not survived to the present day. His death is said to have occurred in this way: one of his laws forbade any citizen from entering the senate house armed, punishable by death. However, during a sudden crisis, Zaleucus himself inadvertently broke his own law and, in a moment of remorse, took his own life, declaring he would uphold his law. (Eustath. ad. Il. i. p. 60). Diodorus, however, recounts the same story about Charondas.

[111] Charondas was a lawgiver of Catana, who legislated for his own city and the other towns of Chalcidian origin in Magna Grecia, such as Zancle, Naxos, Leontini, Eubœa, Mylæ, Himera, Callipolis, and Rhegium. His laws have not been preserved to us, with the exception of a few judgments. They were probably in verse, for Athenæus says that they were sung in Athens at banquets. Aristotle tells us that they were adapted to an aristocracy. It is much doubted whether it is really true that he was a disciple of Pythagoras, though we are not sure of his exact time, so that we cannot pronounce it as impossible as in the preceding case. He must have lived before the time of Anaxilaus, tyrant of Rhegium, who reigned from B.C. 494 to B.C. 476, because he abolished the laws of Charondas, which had previously been in force in that city. Diodorus gives a code of laws which he states that Charondas gave to the city of Thurii, which was not founded till B.C. 443, when he must certainly have been dead a long time. There is one law of his preserved by Stobæus, which is probably authentic, since it is found in a fragment of Theophrastus; enacting that all buying and selling shall be transacted by ready money only.

[111] Charondas was a lawmaker from Catana who created laws for his own city and other towns of Chalcidian origin in Magna Grecia, like Zancle, Naxos, Leontini, Eubœa, Mylæ, Himera, Callipolis, and Rhegium. His laws haven’t been preserved, except for a few judgments. They were likely in verse, as Athenæus notes that they were sung at banquets in Athens. Aristotle mentions that they were tailored for an aristocracy. There is considerable doubt about whether he was truly a student of Pythagoras, although the exact timing of his life is uncertain, so we can't definitively say it's impossible, as in the earlier case. He must have lived before Anaxilaus, the tyrant of Rhegium, who ruled from B.C. 494 to BCE 476, since he repealed Charondas' laws that had previously been in effect in that city. Diodorus provides a set of laws that he claims Charondas gave to the city of Thurii, which was founded in B.C.E. 443, meaning Charondas must have certainly been dead by then. One law of his survives, recorded by Stobæus, which is likely authentic since it appears in a fragment of Theophrastus; it states that all buying and selling must be done with cash only.

[112] This doctrine is alluded to doubtfully by Virgil, Georg. i. 247.

[112] This concept is mentioned with uncertainty by Virgil, Georg. i. 247.

Illic, ut perhibent, aut intempesta silet nox
Semper, et obductâ densantur nocte tenebræ;
Aut redit a nobis Aurora, diemque reducit;
Nosque ubi primus equis oriens afflavit anhelis,
Illic sera rubens accendit lumina Vesper.

Thus translated by Dryden, l. 338:—

Thus translated by Dryden, l. 338:—

There, as they say, perpetual night is found,
In silence brooding o’er th’ unhappy ground.
Or when Aurora leaves our northern sphere,
She lights the downward heav’n and rises there;
And when on us she breathes the living light
Red Vesper kindles there the tapers of the night.

[113] νοῦς appears, in a division like this, to be the deliberative part of the mind; φρὴν, the rational part of the intellect: θυμὸς, that part with which the passions are concerned.

[113] The term νοῦς seems to represent the decision-making aspect of the mind; φρὴν refers to the logical part of the intellect; and θυμὸς relates to the part that deals with emotions and passions.

[114] There is a great variety of suggestions as to the proper reading here. There is evidently some corruption in the text.

[114] There are many different suggestions about the right way to read this. There seems to be some distortion in the text.

[115] From παύω, to cause to cease, ἀνία, sorrow.

[115] From παύω, to cause to stop, ἀνία, sadness.

[116] It is impossible to give the force of this epigram in any other language. It is a pun on Ἄκρων, Ἀκράγας and ἄκρος. The last word meaning not only high, lofty, but also eminent, very skilful. The plain English would be:—“The lofty height of a most eminent country conceals Acron, a skilful physician of Acragas, the son of a skilful father.” The variation would be:—“A high tomb on a very high summit, conceals,” &c.

[116] It’s impossible to translate the impact of this epigram into any other language. It’s a play on the words Ἄκρων, Ἀκράγας, and ἄκρος. The last word means not just high, lofty, but also eminent and very skilled. In plain English, it would be:—"The high elevation of a very distinguished country hides Acron, a skilled doctor from Acragas, the son of a talented father." The alternative could be:—"A tall tomb on a very high peak hides," &c.

[117] This story is mentioned by Horace:—

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Horace shares this story:—

Siculique poetæ,
Narrabo interitum; deus immortalis haberi,
Dum cupit Empedocles ardentem frigidus Ætnam,
Insiluit. A. P. 466.

[118] This is slightly parodied from Homer. Od. xi. 278. Pope’s Version, 337.

[118] This is a bit of a parody of Homer. Od. xi. 278. Pope’s Version, 337.

[119] There were three festivals of Bacchus at Athens at which dramatic contests took place, the Διονύσια κατ’ ἄγρους, or, “in the fields;” the Ληναῖα or τὰ ἐν Λίμναις, or “the marshes,” a part of the city near the Acropolis, in which was situated the Λήναιον, an enclosure dedicated to Bacchus; and the τὰ ἐν ἄστει, “in the city,” or τὰ μέγαλα Διονύσια. The comic contests usually took place at the second or Lenæan festivals. Sometimes also at the Great Dionysia.

[119] There were three Bacchus festivals in Athens where dramatic competitions were held: the Διονύσια κατ’ ἄγρους, or “in the fields;” the Ληναῖα or τὰ ἐν Λίμναις, or “the marshes,” which was an area of the city near the Acropolis, home to the Λήναιον, a space dedicated to Bacchus; and the τὰ ἐν ἄστει, “in the city,” or τὰ μέγαλα Διονύσια. The comedic competitions typically occurred during the second or Lenæan festivals, and sometimes at the Great Dionysia.

[120] ἔνδοξος, glorious.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ glorious.

[121] According to Strabo, the descendants of Androclus, the founder of Ephesus (of which family Heraclitus came), bore the title of king, and had certain prerogatives and privileges attached to the title.

[121] Strabo noted that the descendants of Androclus, the founder of Ephesus (from which family Heraclitus came), held the title of king and enjoyed specific rights and privileges that came with that title.

[122] There is probably some corruption in the text here.

[122] There might be some errors in the text here.

[123] There is great obscurity and uncertainty of the text here. The reading translated is that of Huebner, πεφωρᾶσθαι. Some read πεπρᾶσθαι, he seems to have abandoned the Pythagoreans. Others propose πεπρᾶχθαι. The French translator renders,—He had for enemies the Pythagoreans.

[123] There is a lot of confusion and uncertainty in the text here. The version translated is that of Huebner, πεφωρᾶσθαι. Some read it as πεπρᾶσθαι, he seems to have left the Pythagoreans behind. Others suggest πεπρᾶχθαι. The French translator interprets it as,—He had the Pythagoreans as enemies.

[124] See the account of Zeno the Cittiæan.

[124] Check out the story of Zeno from Citium.

[125] See the life of Parmenides.

[125] Check out the life of Parmenides.

[126] There is evidently a considerable gap in the text here.

[126] It’s clear that there’s a significant gap in the text here.

[127] As there is no such passage in Herodotus, Valckenær conjectures that we ought here to read Metrodorus.

[127] Since there isn’t any passage like that in Herodotus, Valckenær suggests that we should read Metrodorus instead.

[128] The Thesmophoria was a festival in honour of Ceres, celebrated in various parts of Greece; and only by married women; though girls might perform some of the ceremonies. Herodotus says, that it was introduced into Greece from Egypt, by the daughters of Danaus. The Attic Thesmophoria lasted probably three days, and began on the eleventh day of the month Pyanession; the first day was called ἄνοδος, or κάθοδος, from the women going in procession to Eleusis; the second νηστεία, or fasting; the third was called καλλιγένεια, as on that day Ceres was invoked under that name, and it was the day of merriment of the festival.

[128] The Thesmophoria was a festival honoring Ceres, celebrated in various parts of Greece, exclusively by married women, though young girls could take part in some of the ceremonies. Herodotus mentioned that it was brought to Greece from Egypt by the daughters of Danaus. The Attic Thesmophoria likely lasted about three days and started on the eleventh day of the month Pyanession; the first day was called ἄνοδος, or κάθοδος, because the women would process to Eleusis; the second day was νηστεία, or fasting; and the third was called καλλιγένεια, as on that day Ceres was invoked by that name, marking the festive day of celebration.

[129] Namely, reasoning well, expressing one’s self well, and acting well.

[129] That is, thinking clearly, communicating effectively, and behaving appropriately.

[130] This is thus embodied by Lucretius:—

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ This is shown by Lucretius:—

Nam nihil e nihilo, in nihilum nîl posse reverti.

[131] Hom. Il. v. 340. Pope’s version, 422.

[131] Hom. Il. v. 340. Pope’s version, 422.

[132] Il. vi. 146.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Il. 6.146.

[133] Il. xxi. 106. Pope’s version, 115.

[133] Il. xxi. 106. Pope’s version, 115.

[134] Homer, Il. xx. 248. Pope’s version, 294.

[134] Homer, Iliad xx. 248. Pope’s version, 294.

[135] There is too remarkable a similarity in this to Campbell’s lines:—

[135] There is a striking similarity to Campbell’s lines:—

’Tis distance lends enchantment to the view,
And robes the mountains in their azure hue:

to allow one to pass it over without pointing it out.

to let someone overlook it without bringing it up.

[136] “Diogenes here appears (though, he gives no intimation of his doing so,) to be transcribing the reasonings of some one of the Sceptics.” French Transl.

[136] “Diogenes seems to be writing down the arguments of someone from the Sceptics, even though he doesn’t indicate that he’s doing so.” French Transl.

[137] That is to say, the harmony between intellect and the senses will not last long. Attagas and Numenius were two notorious brigands.

[137] In other words, the balance between the mind and the senses won't last long. Attagas and Numenius were two infamous criminals.

[138] That is, “trifler,” from κρίνω, to judge; and λῆρος, nonsensical talk.

[138] That is, “trifler,” from κρίνω, to judge; and λῆρος, silly talk.

[139] That is, flattering for gifts; from σαίνω, to wag the tail as a dog, to caress; and δῶρον, a gift.

[139] In other words, to ingratiate for gifts; from σαίνω, to wag the tail like a dog, to show affection; and δῶρον, a gift.

[140] This sentence is a remark of Diogenes himself. There are several more of his observations in parentheses as we proceed.

[140] This sentence is a comment from Diogenes himself. There are a few more of his insights in parentheses as we continue.

[141] This is the argument in its completed form: “We can only form an idea of an atom by analogy, and analogy demonstrates to us that it is not of infinite littleness. In fact, let us compare it to the smallest particles recognisable by sense, and then let us endeavour to form an idea of these last. To do this we must take a term of comparison in complex objects, which are composed of various parts. Abstracting from these all other characteristics but that of extent, we see that these objects have dimensions, some greater and some less, measuring an extent which is greater or less as the case may be. The smallest sensible particle will then have its dimensions; it will measure the smallest possible sensible extent, that is to say, it will not be infinitely small. Applying this analogy to an atom, one comes to conceive it as measuring the smallest extent possible, but not as having no extent at all, which was what Epicurus wished to prove.”—French Translator.

[141] Here’s the argument in its final form: “We can only understand an atom through analogy, which shows us that it isn't infinitely small. Let's compare it to the tiniest particles we can perceive and try to grasp those. To do this, we need to look at complex objects made up of various parts. If we ignore all characteristics except for their size, we can see that these objects have dimensions, some larger and some smaller, measuring a range that varies. The smallest particle we can sense will still have its dimensions; it will measure the smallest possible visible size, meaning it won't be infinitely small. Using this analogy for an atom, we can conceive it as measuring the tiniest possible size, but not as having no size at all, which was the point Epicurus was trying to make.” —French Translator.

[142] This is a quotation from Theognis.

[142] This is a quote from Theognis.

[143] From the Trachiniæ of Sophocles, 1784.

[143] From the Trachiniæ by Sophocles, 1784.

[144] There is some hopeless corruption in the text here. Nor has any one succeeded in making it intelligible. The French translator divides it into two maxims.

[144] There's a lot of confusing corruption in the text here. No one has been able to make it clear. The French translator breaks it down into two maxims.

[145] There in some great corruption here again. The French translator takes 19, 20, and 21 all as one.

[145] There's some major corruption here again. The French translator takes 19, 20, and 21 all as one.


INDEX.

⁂ The Roman numerals refer to the sections, the Arabic figures to the pages.

⁂ The Roman numerals refer to the sections, and the Arabic numbers refer to the pages.

  • Aeschines, a rhetorician, vii. 80.
  • calumniated, iii. 79.
  • lectured at Athens, iv. 80.
  • son of a sausage seller, i. 79.
  • Alcmaeon, Crotona, his view of the soul, 371.
  • Anacharsis, inventions of, ii. 48.
  • letter to Crœsus, 49.
  • received by Solon, iii. 47.
  • return to Scythia, iv. 47.
  • sayings of, v. 47.
  • one of the wise, 46.
  • Anaxagoras, called Mind, i. 59.
  • epigrams on, x. 62.
  • first prose writer, viii. 61.
  • opinions of, iii. 59.
  • prosecuted for impiety, ix. 61.
  • Anaxarchus, called Happy, iii. 401.
  • intimate with Alexander, 400.
  • Nicocreon, his enemy, 401.
  • Anaximander, the astronomer, 57.
  • Anaximenes, letters to Pythagoras, 58.
  • Annicereans, their opinions, x. 92.
  • Antisthenes, doctrines of, v. 220.
  • founds a manly Stoic school, viii. 221.
  • love of life, x. 223.
  • pupil of Gorgias, ii. 217.
  • sayings of, iv. 218.
  • writings of, ix. 222.
  • Arcesilaus, a favourite of Eumenes and Hierocles, xiv. 168.
  • an admirer of Plato, viii. 165.
  • a poet, iv. 164.
  • axiomatic and free-spoken, x. 165.
  • death from excess, x. 170.
  • disliked talkativeness, 166.
  • founder of the Middle Academy, ii. 163.
  • goes to Crantor, iii. 163.
  • letter to Thaumasias, xix. 170.
  • liberal with money, xiii. 167.
  • vices of, xvi. 168.
  • Archelaus, 62.
  • a natural philosopher, ii. 62.
  • opinions on heat and cold, &c. iii. 63.
  • —— production of animals, iii. 63.
  • Archytas, general at Tarentum, 369.
  • letter to Plato and reply, iv. 369.
  • mathematician, vii. 370.
  • Aristippus, a favourite of Dionysius, iii. 81.
  • opinions of, on pain and pleasure, 90.
  • retorts, iv. 82.
  • school of philosophy, viii. 89.
  • sycophancy, iv. 82.
  • teaches for money, ii. 81.
  • wealth, iv. 82.
  • writings, vi. 88.
  • Ariston, the bald, called Siren, i. 318.
  • an eloquent philosopher, vi. 319.
  • his writings, vii. 319.
  • [482]Aristotle, apophthegms, xi. 187.
  • death from poison, vii. 182.
  • hymn to Hermias, 183.
  • leaves Plato, iv. 181.
  • lived in Philip’s court, vi. 182.
  • opinions, criterion of truth, 192.
  • —— friendship, 192.
  • —— God, 193.
  • —— philosophy, 191.
  • Plato’s most eminent pupil, ii. 181.
  • peripatetic, why so called, iv. 181.
  • scheme for early waking, x. 186.
  • school at Athens, vii. 182.
  • will of, ix. 185.
  • writings, many, xii. 189.
  • Prejudice, the wise, 38.
  • declines the tripod, i. 38.
  • death of, in court, iv. 39.
  • eloquent and just as a lawyer, iii. 39.
  • a poet, v. 39.
  • sayings of, v. 39.
  • stratagem to save Priene, his native city, ii. 39.
  • Bion, apophthegms of, iii. 172.
  • change of schools, iv. 173.
  • fear of death, x. 175.
  • fond of theatre, v. 174.
  • poverty of, i. 171.
  • selfishness of, ix. 174.
  • Carneades, his letters, viii. 178.
  • well read in Stoic lore, ii. 177.
  • industry of, iii. 178.
  • his fear of death, vii. 178.
  • Cebes, the Theban, 105.
  • Charondas, account of, note, 345.
  • Chilo, the wise one of, 32.
  • brief in speech, v. 34.
  • death of, through joy, v. 34.
  • letter to Periander, v. 34.
  • opinion as to Cythera, iv. 33.
  • saying about suretyship, v. 34.
  • sayings of, ii. 33.
  • Chrysippus, his abilities, ii. 327.
  • his books, xii. 331.
  • his industry, iii. 328.
  • his questions, xi. 330.
  • a pupil of Cleanthes, i. 327.
  • his self-esteem, iv. 329.
  • said to be an indecent writer, xii. 331.
  • Cleanthes, a boxer, 322.
  • books of, ii. 325.
  • called an ass, iv. 323.
  • poor and industrious, ii. 322.
  • slow of intellect, iii. 323.
  • starved himself, vii. 326.
  • wrote on oyster shells, &c. for want of paper, iv. 323.
  • Cleobulus, one of the wise men, 41.
  • apophthegms of, iv. 42.
  • letter to Solon, vi. 43.
  • Clitomachus, disciple and successor of Carneades, 179.
  • Crantor, a poet, vi. 162.
  • a pupil of Polemo, iii. 161.
  • retires to temple of Æsculapius, iv. 161.
  • Boxes, a pupil of Polemo, 160.
  • lived with Crantor, iii. 160.
  • writings of, and disciples, iv. 161.
  • Boxes, a Theban cynic, 249.
  • his disposal of property, iv. 250.
  • his jesting with death, x. 252.
  • his indifference to public opinion, viii. 252.
  • his sayings, ix. 282.
  • Crito, the Athenian, 103.
  • Cynics, doctrines of, iii. 257.
  • discard liberal studies, 257.
  • prefer ethics to logic, 257.
  • simplicity in living, 258.
  • virtue, the chief good, 258.
  • —— may be taught, 258.
  • Cyrenaics, a sect of the school of Aristippus, viii. 89.
  • Demetrius, governor of Athens, ii. 209.
  • [483]honoured and envied, viii. 209.
  • his reported blindness and restoration of sight, vii. 209.
  • statues erected to him, ii. 209.
  • sayings of, x. 211.
  • writings of, ix. 210.
  • Democritus, pupil of the magi, 390.
  • death, xi. 390.
  • disregard of glory, v. 391.
  • —— of wealth, vii. 392.
  • doctrines of, xii. 394.
  • lowly life, vii. 392.
  • Plato’s dislike of him, viii. 393.
  • sagacity, stories of, x. 394.
  • writings of, xiii. 395.
  • Dialectics, the Stoics’ doctrine of, xxxv. 275.
  • Diogenes, accounts of his death, xi. 246.
  • anecdotes of him, vi. 228.
  • cynical sayings, 226.
  • lived in a cask, 225.
  • money changer, 224.
  • —— corrupted by him, i. 224.
  • neglect of music, vii. 245.
  • persuader, a skilful, x. 245.
  • poverty of, reconciled to, iii. 224.
  • pride and haughtiness of, iv. 225.
  • pupil of Antisthenes, ii. 224.
  • sold as a slave, ix. 245.
  • writings of, xii. 247.
  • Diogenes of Apollonia, 400.
  • his chief doctrines, ii. 400.
  • Dionysus, a pupil of Zeno, 321.
  • writings of, v. 321.
  • Druids, account of, note 3.
  • Egyptian philosophy, vii. 9.
  • Empedocles, accused of pride, xi. 366.
  • doctrines of, xii. 368.
  • inventor of rhetoric, iii. 361.
  • liberality of, ix. 363.
  • pacifies the Agrigentines, xi. 366.
  • political career, ix. 363.
  • retires to Peloponnesus, x. 364.
  • story of his wonder working, xi. 365.
  • why called, wind-forbidder, v. 362.
  • Epicharmus, inscription on his statue, 368.
  • Epicurus, an Athenian, 424.
  • his character, v. 427.
  • criteria of truth, 435.
  • said to be debauched, iii. 426.
  • rejected dialectics, 435.
  • Diotimus, a Stoic, opposes him, iii. 425.
  • doctrines, his, on affections, 447.
  • —— atoms, 439.
  • —— clouds, thunder, &c. 460.
  • —— comets, 464.
  • —— faults among men, 467.
  • —— forms and attributes, 449.
  • —— grief, 467.
  • —— heaven’s phenomena, 452, 458.
  • —— injuries among men, 466.
  • —— meteorological, 461.
  • —— opinion and supposition, 436.
  • —— passions, pleasure, and pain, 436.
  • —— pleasure, 471, 473.
  • —— production of things, 441.
  • —— self-production, 451.
  • —— stars, 464.
  • —— study of philosophy, 468.
  • —— universe, 439.
  • flattered Mithras, iii. 425.
  • fundamental maxims of, xxxi. 474.
  • letter of, to Herodotus, xxiv. 436.
  • —— Menœceus, xxvii. 468.
  • —— Pythocles, xxv. 455.
  • manner of his death, ix. 429.
  • plain language, his, viii. 428.
  • [484]pupils, his, xi. 431.
  • virtue, why to be chosen, xxx. 473.
  • voluminous writings, xvii. 483.
  • will, his last, x. 429.
  • writings on natural philosophy, iv. 426.
  • youthful student, a, ix. 429.
  • Epimenides, one of the wise men, 50.
  • built a temple at Athens, vi. 52.
  • honoured as a deity, xi. 53.
  • letter to Solon, ix. 52.
  • long life, his, story of, iv. 51.
  • long sleep, his, story of, ii. 50.
  • poems, and other writings, v. 51.
  • stays the plague at Athens, iii. 51.
  • Ethical philosophy, what, xiii. 12.
  • subdivisions, xiii. 12.
  • Euclid, his followers, iv. 97.
  • opinions, ii. 97.
  • protector of Socrates, i. 97.
  • Eudoxus, astronomer, geometrician, and lawgiver, 373.
  • inventor of theory of crooked lines, vi. 374.
  • writings of, iii. 373.
  • Fate, Stoics’ view of, lxxiv. 318.
  • Gymnosophistæ, what and who, i. 3.
  • God, Stoics’ view of, lxxii. 312.
  • Hegesiaci, a sect of the school of Aristippus, their opinions, ix. 91.
  • Heraclides, a Peripatetic, Pythagorean, and Platonist, by turns, ii. 213.
  • remarkable attempt to deceive at his death, ii. 215.
  • surnamed Pompicus from his dress and size, iii. 213.
  • writings of, iv. 213.
  • Heraclitus, book on nature, v. 377.
  • epigrams on him, xii. 381.
  • esteemed by Darius Hystaspes, letters between them, ix. 380.
  • lofty and arrogant, 376.
  • misanthropic, iii. 376.
  • Hipparchia, a female philosopher, in love with Crates the Cynic, 254.
  • Her contest with Theodorus, iii. 255.
  • Hippasus, a disciple of Pythagoras, 371.
  • Ionian school of philosophy, x. 10.
  • Italian school of philosophy, x. 10.
  • “Know thyself,” the apophthegm, xiii. 21.
  • Lacydes, founder of the New Academy, i. 176.
  • his death from excess, vi. 177.
  • his industry, ii. 176.
  • Leucippus, his chief doctrines, ii. 388.
  • pupil of Zeno the Eleatic, 388.
  • Lycon, an eloquent instructor of youth, i. 205.
  • delicacy in dress, iii. 206.
  • favourite of Eumenes and Attalus, iv. 206.
  • his will, ix. 206.
  • Magi, what and who, note, 3.
  • Melissus, his doctrine of universe, 386.
  • Menedemus, his banquets, xv. 110.
  • his character, vi. 107.
  • his death, xviii. 112.
  • despised Plato, &c., xi. 109.
  • disciple of Phædo, 105.
  • endangered by his free speech, iv. 107.
  • friend of Antigonus, xvii. 111.
  • invention and readiness, xii. 109.
  • regardlessness of appearances, v. 107.
  • severe and rigid, iii. 106.
  • sent to Megara, but deserts, ii. 105.
  • thought highly of by his countrymen, xvi. 111.
  • Menedemus, a superstitious Cynic, 267.
  • Menippus, a Cynic, 253.
  • [485]hangs himself, iii. 256.
  • writer of low ridicule, ii. 256.
  • writings, vi. 256.
  • Metrocles, pupil of Crates the Cynic, 253.
  • destroys himself, 254.
  • Mind, Stoics, doctrine of, lxxiii. 299.
  • Monimus, feigned madness, i. 248.
  • a pupil of Diogenes, 248.
  • Myson, one of the wise men, 49.
  • Natural philosophy, what so called, xiii. 11.
  • Stoics’ account of, lxvii. 307.
  • Orpheus, not a philosopher, iv. 7.
  • Onesicritus, a pupil of Diogenes, 249.
  • Parmenides, first to speak of the earth as a sphere, ii. 384.
  • philosophized in poems, iii. 385.
  • Periander, one of the wise men, his domestic crimes, 43.
  • his letter to Procles, viii. 46.
  • —— to the wise men, vii. 45.
  • —— from Thrasybulus, ix. 46.
  • sayings of, v. 45.
  • wish to conceal his grave, iii. 44.
  • Phaedo, founder of the Eliac school, 96.
  • Pherecydes, one of the wise men, 53.
  • epigrams on, vii. 55.
  • first writer on natural philosophy, ii. 54.
  • grave of, at Ephesus, iv. 54.
  • letter to Thales, viii. 56.
  • makes a sun-dial, vi. 55.
  • Philolaus, a pupil of Pythagoras, 372.
  • aims at regal power, ii. 372.
  • book, his one, iv. 372.
  • first to describe the earth’s movement in a circle, iii. 372.
  • Philosophers, names of their sects, xii. 11.
  • who did not write, xi. 11.
  • Philosophy, arose among Greeks, iii. 6.
  • divisions of, xiii. 11.
  • earliest study of, i. 3.
  • two schools of, x. 10.
  • various kinds of, xi. 11.
  • Pisistratus, his letter to Solon, vi. 20.
  • Pittacus, one of the wise men, 35.
  • advice about marrying, viii. 37.
  • death of, vi. 36.
  • forbearance of, iii. 35.
  • a general and soldier, i. 35.
  • honoured by his country, ii. 35.
  • lameness of, ix. 38.
  • letter to Crœsus, x. 38.
  • a poet, v. 36.
  • sayings of, iv. 36.
  • Plato, academy, his, ix. 115.
  • account of his opinions, by Alcimus, 117.
  • aided by Epicharmus, a comic poet, xii. 116.
  • attachments, xxiii. 123.
  • —— to writings of Sophron, 119.
  • birth and early abode, ii. 113.
  • danger from Dionysius, xv. 120.
  • defends Chabrias, xviii. 121.
  • descent of, i. 113.
  • dialogues of, xxxv. 133.
  • disciples of, xxxi. 129.
  • disliked Aristippus, 126.
  • disliked by Xenophon, xxiv. 125.
  • education, his, v. 114.
  • epigrams on his tomb, 128.
  • epistles, his, xxxvi. 134.
  • marks in his books, xxxix. 136.
  • method of his argument, xxxii. 129.
  • opinions on arts, beauty, 144.
  • beneficence, 146.
  • contraries, 149.
  • discourse, 143.
  • entities divisible and undivisible, 150.
  • —— independent and relative, 150.
  • end of affairs, 146.
  • friendships, 141.
  • God and matter, 137.
  • [486]good and evil, 140.
  • good counsel, 150.
  • good laws and lawlessness, 148.
  • the good, 148.
  • good things, 149.
  • happiness, 147.
  • justice, 142.
  • knowledge, 142.
  • law, 143.
  • medical science, 143.
  • music, 143.
  • noble birth, 144.
  • philanthropy, 147.
  • political constitutions, 141.
  • power, 147.
  • rhetoric, 145.
  • rule, 145.
  • the soul, 144.
  • things existing, 148.
  • virtue perfect, 144.
  • voice, 150.
  • opinions on his writings, xxv. 126.
  • refuses appointments from Arcadia and Thebes, xvii. 121.
  • ridiculed, xxii. 121.
  • Socrates’ dream of him, vii. 114.
  • system, his, made difficult on purpose, xxxviii. 135.
  • theory of ideas, 118.
  • valiant soldier, a, x. 115.
  • visits Sicily, volcanoes, xiv. 119.
  • what he taught, xix. 122.
  • where he first taught, viii. 114.
  • will, his last, xxx. 127.
  • Polemo, his calmness, iv. 158.
  • epigram, viii. 160.
  • fond, of Sophocles, vii. 159.
  • imitated Xenocrates, vi. 159.
  • intemperate and profligate, 158.
  • much honoured, iv. 158.
  • rigorous system of morals, iv. 158.
  • Potamo and his school, xiv. 13.
  • Potter’s wheel, invented by Anacharsis, viii. 48.
  • Protagoras, method of arguing, his, iii. 397.
  • taught at a fixed price, 398.
  • works, his, v. 398.
  • wrecked in his way to Sicily, vii. 399.
  • Pyrrho, originally a painter, 402.
  • account of him, by Antigonus, 402.
  • arguing, ten modes of, ix. 409.
  • arguing, five others added by Agrippa, x. 412.
  • attached to Anaxarchus, ii. 402.
  • certainty not attainable, 414.
  • disciples, vii. 405.
  • —— called Sceptics from their doubting every thing, viii. 405.
  • eloquent, 403.
  • fortitude and economy, vi. 404.
  • good, natural, or natural evil, none, 417.
  • honoured by his country, 403.
  • impassiveness, vi. 404.
  • learning, no such thing, 417.
  • left no writings, 418.
  • motion, none, 417.
  • production, none, 417.
  • signs, invisible of visible things, 416.
  • signs, visible of visible things, none, 415.
  • system learned from his disciples, 418.
  • travelled to India, 402.
  • Pythagoras, accounted a son of Mercury, iv. 339.
  • his works, v. 340.
  • community of property with friends, viii. 342.
  • division of life, vii. 342.
  • doctrine of monads, xix. 348.
  • founder of Italian philosophy, i. 338.
  • geometrician, xi. 342.
  • greatly admired, xv. 342.
  • initiated into mysteries, iii. 338.
  • introduced weights and measures to Greece, xiii. 344.
  • letter to Anaximenes, xxvi. 358.
  • manner of his death, xxi. 354.
  • opinions on nature, xix. 349.
  • practised divination, xviii. 346.
  • precepts, vi. 341.
  • —— as to worship, xix. 347.
  • prohibition as to food, xviii. 346.
  • [487]ridiculed by Timon, xv. 353.
  • symbols, his, xvii. 345.
  • wife and son, xxii. 355.
  • worship of Apollo, xii. 343.
  • Schools of philosophy, xiii. 12.
  • Seven wise men, the, xiv. 21.
  • Monkeys, the Theban, 105.
  • Simon, the Athenian leather cutter, 104.
  • Socrates, an artificer, 64.
  • character, his, viii. 66.
  • contests, his, xxv. 74.
  • counsels and sayings, xvi. 69.
  • dæmon warnings, xvi. 69.
  • executed for opinions, the first philosopher who was, v. 64.
  • lamented by the Athenians, xxiii. 73.
  • persuasive power, xii. 68.
  • ransoms Phædo and teaches him philosophy, xiv. 68.
  • school, his, xxvi. 74.
  • saves Xenophon’s life, vii. 65.
  • serves in Xenophon’s army, vii. 65.
  • slaves, would not have, xiii. 68.
  • wives, his, xvii. 70.
  • Solon, the wise, life of, 23.
  • apophthegms, his, xvi. 30.
  • counsels, his, xii. 29.
  • death of, xv. 29.
  • escapes from Athens, iv. 25.
  • excites Athens against Salamis, ii. 23.
  • inscription on his statue, xv. 29.
  • laws as to debts, i. 23.
  • laws, vii. 26.
  • letter to Crœsus, xx. 52.
  • —— Epimenides, xviii. 30.
  • —— Periander, xvii. 30.
  • —— Pisistratus, xix. 31.
  • means of preventing injustice, x. 28.
  • opposes Pisistratus, iii. 24.
  • poems, his, xiii. 29.
  • taught time by moon, xi. 28.
  • Speusippus, a basket-maker, vi. 152.
  • commentaries, his, xi. 153.
  • passionate and voluptuous, 152.
  • Plato’s successor, 152.
  • puts an end to his life, ix. 153.
  • Sphærus, at Alexandria, 326.
  • his books, iii. 327.
  • Stars, Stoics, doctrine of, lxxi. 311.
  • Stilpo, his acuteness, ii. 100.
  • his dialogues, viii. 102.
  • his end, x. 103.
  • opinions on statues, v. 101.
  • politician, a, iii. 100.
  • rejects theory of species, vii. 102.
  • his simplicity, vi. 101.
  • visits Ptolemy Soter, iv. 101.
  • Stoics, doctrines of, xxxiii. 274.
  • Stratosphere, the natural philosopher, ii. 202.
  • Ptolemy Philadelphus, his pupil, iii. 202.
  • successor of Theophrastus, 202.
  • will, his last, vii. 203.
  • writings, his, iv. 203.
  • Thales, the wise, astronomical science studied and taught by him, ii. 14.
  • death of, xii. 20.
  • letter to Pherecydes, xv. 22.
  • —— Solon, xvi. 22.
  • sayings of, ix. 18.
  • star-gazing and falling into the ditch, viii. 18.
  • tripod awarded to him, vii. 16.
  • views of the soul, his, iii. 15.
  • Theodoreans, their opinions, xi. 93.
  • Theodorus, a disciple of Aristippus, xv. 94.
  • banished for his opinions, xvi. 95.
  • Theophrastus, Aristotle’s pupil and friend, 194.
  • character of, iv. 194.
  • name, symbolic, vi. 195.
  • will, his last, xiv. 200.
  • writings, his, xiii. 196.
  • Thesmophoria, what, note, 394.
  • Timon, of Phliasis, 420.
  • acuteness of, ii. 422.
  • [488]delighted in a garden, v. 422.
  • fond of drinking, ii. 421.
  • a jester, vi. 422.
  • his pupils, vii. 423.
  • Virtue and vice, Stoics’ doctrine of, lxv. 304.
  • Water, the principle of all things, vi. 15.
  • Wise man, the Stoics’, lxiv. 301.
  • Wise men, the, who, ix. 10.
  • Xenocrates, accidental death, xii. 157.
  • a grave and solemn man, iii. 154.
  • habit of meditation, viii. 156.
  • kind to a sparrow, vi. 156.
  • pupil of Plato, 154.
  • self-denial of, v. 155.
  • sold for his taxes, x. 157.
  • writings, his, ix. 156.
  • Xenophanes, banished, 382.
  • buried his sons with his own hands, iv. 384.
  • doctrines, his, iii. 383.
  • wrote poems, iii. 383.
  • Xenophon, banished by the Athenians, vii. 76.
  • called the Attic muse, xiv. 78.
  • conduct on death of his son, x. 77.
  • escape to Corinth, ix. 77.
  • first writer of memorabilia, iii. 75.
  • follower of Socrates, ii. 75.
  • friend of Cyrus, v. 75.
  • love of Clinias, iv. 75.
  • writings, his, xiii. 78.
  • Zaleucus, account of, note, 345.
  • Zeno, the Stoic, his abstinence, &c. xxiii. 269.
  • admires Diodorus, xx. 266.
  • anecdotes of him, xix. 266.
  • Antigonus respects him, viii. 261.
  • Athenians crown him, ix. 263.
  • disciples and works, xxxi. 273.
  • doctrines, xxxii. 273.
  • kills himself, xxvi. 270.
  • lectures in the Stoa or porch, vii. 261.
  • manner of reproving, xix. 265.
  • personal appearance, ii. 259.
  • pupil of Crates, iii. 259.
  • retiring disposition, xv. 264.
  • republic, his, xxviii. 271.
  • turn for investigation, xvii. 264.
  • his vices, xiii. 263.
  • writes about duty, xxi. 269.
  • writings, iv. 260.
  • Zeno, the Eleatic, adopted son of Parmenides, 386.
  • arrested for treason against Nearches, v. 387.
  • chief doctrines, viii. 388.
  • invented dialectics, iv. 387.
  • pounded to death in a mortar, v. 387.
  • Zoroaster, his philosophy, note, 5.

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Transcriber’s Note

The original of this text was not edited as carefully as it could have been. As a result, for this e-text quite a number of changes have been made. These are based on comparison with other editions of the same work and with the original Greek text.

The original version of this text wasn't edited as thoroughly as it should have been. Because of this, a number of changes have been made for this e-text. These changes are based on comparisons with other editions of the same work as well as the original Greek text.

List of changes made:

No changes made.

Table of Contents, swapped positions of “Preface” and “Introduction”

Table of Contents, switched the positions of “Preface” and “Introduction”

Table of Contents, “Zenophon” changed to “Xenophon”

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, “Xenophon” changed to “Xenophon”

Page 7, “apophthegmns” changed to “apophthegms” (apophthegms in enigmatical language)

Page 7, “apophthegmns” changed to “apophthegms” (apophthegms in puzzling language)

Page 12, “Pyhrronean” changed to “Pyrrhonean” (the Pyrrhonean is repudiated by many writers)

Page 12, “Pyhrronean” changed to “Pyrrhonean” (many writers reject the Pyrrhonean)

Page 14, “Focus” changed to “Phocus” (Phocus the Samian)

Page 14, “Focus” changed to “Phocus” (Phocus the Samian)

Page 16, “Bathydes” changed to “Bathycles” twice (of the name of Bathycles / the son of Bathycles)

Page 16, “Bathydes” changed to “Bathycles” twice (of the name of Bathycles / the son of Bathycles)

Page 31, “ursurping” changed to “usurping” (from usurping the tyranny)

Page 31, “usurping” changed to “usurping” (from usurping the tyranny)

Page 35, “his” changed to “her” (Pamphila says, in the second book of her Commentaries)

Page 35, “his” changed to “her” (Pamphila says, in the second book of her Commentaries)

Page 37, “Favorinus” changed to “Phavorinus” (as Phavorinus tells us)

Page 37, “Favorinus” has been updated to “Phavorinus” (as Phavorinus states)

Page 46, “Anacharis” changed to “Anacharsis” (Anacharsis the Scythian was the son of Gnurus)

Page 46, “Anacharis” changed to “Anacharsis” (Anacharsis the Scythian was the son of Gnurus)

Page 51, “Ctesilius” changed to “Ctesibius” (Cratinus and Ctesibius)

Page 51, “Ctesilius” was changed to “Ctesibius” (Cratinus and Ctesibius)

Page 51, “Rhodamanthus” changed to “Rhadamanthus” (on Minos and Rhadamanthus)

Page 51, “Rhodamanthus” changed to “Rhadamanthus” (on Minos and Rhadamanthus)

Page 53, “Sosilius” changed to “Sosibius” (as Sosibius the Lacedæmonian says)

Page 53, “Sosilius” changed to “Sosibius” (as Sosibius the Spartan says)

Page 55, “wiih” changed to “with” (Adorned with valour while alive)

Page 55, “wiih” changed to “with” (Adorned with valor while alive)

Page 57, plus in 22 other places throughout the book, “Pharorinus” changed to “Phavorinus”

Page 57, plus in 22 other places throughout the book, “Pharorinus” changed to “Phavorinus”

Page 57, missing words “Ionic dialect.” added (and wrote in the Ionic dialect.)

Page 57, missing words “Ionic dialect.” added (and wrote in the Ionic dialect.)

Page 60, “Phalerius” changed to “Phalereus” (as Demetrius Phalereus tells us)

Page 60, “Phalerius” changed to “Phalereus” (as Demetrius Phalereus tells us)

Page 61, “Metro” changed to “Metrodorus” (and Metrodorus, of Lampsacus)

Page 61, “Metro” changed to “Metrodorus” (and Metrodorus from Lampsacus)

Page 61, “Medison” changed to “Medism” (but also for Medism)

Page 61, “Medison” changed to “Medism” (but also for Medism)

Page 63, “becaused” changed to “because” (because he enlarged his principles)

Page 63, “becaused” changed to “because” (since he expanded his principles)

Page 63, “Meætetus” changed to “Theætetus” (as Plato records in his Theætetus)

Page 63, “Meætetus” changed to “Theætetus” (as Plato notes in his Theætetus)

Page 63, “Moresimachus” changed to “Mnesimachus” (to which idea, Mnesimachus speaks)

Page 63, “Moresimachus” changed to “Mnesimachus” (to which idea, Mnesimachus speaks)

Page 65, “Delian” changed to “Delium” (saved Xenophon in the battle of Delium)

Page 65, “Delian” updated to “Delium” (rescued Xenophon during the battle of Delium)

Page 66, “Crononian” changed to “Cranonian” (Scopas the Cranonian)

Page 66, “Crononian” changed to “Cranonian” (Scopas the Cranonian)

Page 67, repeated word “and” removed (and all such kind of follies)

Page 67, repeated word “and” removed (along with all those kinds of foolishness)

Page 68, “Glauson” changed to “Glaucon” (he wrought upon Glaucon)

Page 68, “Glauson” changed to “Glaucon” (he worked on Glaucon)

Page 68, “Glauernides” changed to “Glauconides” (and Glauconides said, that)

Page 68, “Glauernides” changed to “Glauconides” (and Glauconides said that)

Page 69, repeated word “it” removed (that it was not absurd to learn)

Page 69, repeated word “it” removed (that learning was not absurd)

Page 69, “Augur” changed to “Auge” (Euripides, in his Auge)

Page 69, “Augur” changed to “Auge” (Euripides, in his Auge)

Page 71 and following pages, “Melitus” changed to “Meletus” 7 times

Page 71 and following pages, “Melitus” changed to “Meletus” 7 times

Page 72, “Pittea” changed to “Pithus” (the son of Meletus, of Pithus)

Page 72, “Pittea” changed to “Pithus” (Meletus's son, from Pithus)

Page 73, “Iystæus” changed to “Tyrtæus” (they said that Tyrtæus was out of his wits)

Page 73, “Iystæus” changed to “Tyrtæus” (they claimed that Tyrtæus had lost his mind)

Page 74, “Cereops” changed to “Cercops” (in his lifetime with Cercops)

Page 74, “Cereops” updated to “Cercops” (during his life with Cercops)

Page 74, “Aphimenes” changed to “Amphimenes” (Amphimenes of Cos)

Page 74, “Aphimenes” updated to “Amphimenes” (Amphimenes from Cos)

Page 74, “Salamis” changed to “Salarus” (Salarus of Priene)

Page 74, “Salamis” changed to “Salarus” (Salarus of Priene)

Page 74, “Cellæus” changed to “Alcæus” (Alcæus and Anaxagoras)

Page 74, “Cellæus” changed to “Alcæus” (Alcæus and Anaxagoras)

Page 74, “Sosibrius” changed to “Sosibius” (Anaxagoras with Sosibius)

Page 74, “Sosibrius” changed to “Sosibius” (Anaxagoras with Sosibius)

Page 74, “Timocrea” changed to “Timocreon” (Simonides with Timocreon)

Page 74, “Timocrea” changed to “Timocreon” (Simonides with Timocreon)

Page 80, “Jelanges” changed to “Telauges” (the Telauges, and the Rhino)

Page 80, “Jelanges” changed to “Telauges” (the Telauges, and the Rhino)

Page 80, “Caramis” changed to “Carcinus” (Carcinus, the tragedian)

Page 80, “Caramis” changed to “Carcinus” (Carcinus, the playwright)

Page 82, “prefering” changed to “preferring” (by preferring one beauty to the rest)

Page 82, “preferring” changed to “preferring” (by preferring one beauty to the rest)

Page 84, “Aretes” changed to “Arete” (his daughter Arete)

Page 84, “Aretes” changed to “Arete” (his daughter Arete)

Page 84, repeated word “a” removed (whether one takes a house)

Page 84, repeated word “a” removed (whether someone takes a house)

Page 85, “reproched” changed to “reproached” (when some one reproached him)

Page 85, “reproched” changed to “reproached” (when someone reproached him)

Page 89, “Annicerci” changed to “Annicerei” (some Annicerei, others Theodorei)

Page 89, “Annicerci” changed to “Annicerei” (some Annicerei, others Theodorei)

Page 89, “Pyræbates” changed to “Paræbates” (the master of Paræbates)

Page 89, “Pyræbates” changed to “Paræbates” (the master of Paræbates)

Page 89, “Parætius” changed to “Panætius” (as Panætius also tells us)

Page 89, “Parætius” changed to “Panætius” (as Panætius also informs us)

Page 93, “Theodereans” changed to “Theodoreans” (The Theodoreans, as they are called)

Page 93, “Theodereans” updated to “Theodoreans” (The Theodoreans, as they are known)

Page 95, “so” changed to “to” (Metrocles the Cynic, who was washing leeks, said to him)

Page 95, “so” changed to “to” (Metrocles the Cynic, who was washing leeks, said to him)

Page 95, “Rhœus” changed to “Rhœcus” (a Samian, the son of Rhœcus)

Page 95, “Rhœus” changed to “Rhœcus” (a Samian, the son of Rhœcus)

Page 95, “Musicial” changed to “Musical” (a treatise on Musical Composers)

Page 95, “Musicial” changed to “Musical” (a detailed guide on Music Composers)

Page 96, “Athenæas” changed to “Athenæus” (a physician, a pupil of Athenæus)

Page 96, “Athenæas” changed to “Athenæus” (a doctor, a student of Athenæus)

Page 96, “Phistamus” changed to “Plistanus” (his successor was Plistanus of Elis)

Page 96, “Phistamus” was changed to “Plistanus” (his successor was Plistanus of Elis)

Page 96, “Philias” changed to “Phlius” (Asclepiades of Phlius)

Page 96, “Philias” changed to “Phlius” (Asclepiades of Phlius)

Page 97, “may” changed to “many” (a great many arguments)

Page 97, “may” changed to “many” (many arguments)

Page 98, “preplexing” changed to “perplexing” (Asking his horned quibbles, and perplexing)

Page 98, “perplexing” changed to “perplexing” (Asking his horned quibbles, and perplexing)

Page 98, “C” changed to “R” (unable to pronounce the R)

Page 98, “C” switched to “R” (unable to say the R)

Page 100, “Therium” changed to “Thurii” (Clinomachus of Thurii)

Page 100, “Therium” changed to “Thurii” (Clinomachus of Thurii)

Page 100, “Dippilus” changed to “Diphilus” (Diphilus of the Bosphorus)

Page 100, “Dippilus” changed to “Diphilus” (Diphilus of the Bosphorus)

Page 100, “Venites” changed to “Venetes” (Myrmex of the Venetes)

Page 100, “Venites” changed to “Venetes” (Myrmex of the Venetes)

Page 102, “Syphon” changed to “Typhon” (where Typhon’s voice resounds)

Page 102, “Syphon” changed to “Typhon” (where Typhon’s voice echoes)

Page 102, “Cnistippus” changed to “Aristippus” (the Aristippus or Callias)

Page 102, “Cnistippus” changed to “Aristippus” (the Aristippus or Callias)

Page 103, “Sophibus” changed to “Sophilus” (Sophilus the comic poet)

Page 103, “Sophibus” changed to “Sophilus” (Sophilus the comic poet)

Page 103, “dicourse” changed to “discourse” (the whole discourse of this Charinus)

Page 103, “dicourse” changed to “discourse” (the whole discourse of this Charinus)

Page 103, “Polititical” changed to “Political” (on Political Science)

Page 103, “Polititical” changed to “Political” (on Political Science)

Page 104, “Minexenus” changed to “Menexenus” (the Cephalus; the Anaxiphemus; the Menexenus)

Page 104, “Minexenus” changed to “Menexenus” (the Cephalus; the Anaxiphemus; the Menexenus)

Page 105, “Simeas” changed to “Simias” (Simias was a Theban)

Page 105, “Simeas” changed to “Simias” (Simias was from Thebes)

Page 105, “Theoprobidæ” changed to “Theopropidæ” (one of those who are called Theopropidæ)

Page 105, “Theoprobidæ” changed to “Theopropidæ” (one of those known as Theopropidæ)

Page 106, “Cassandra” changed to “Cassandrea” (Eurylochus, of Cassandrea)

Page 106, “Cassandra” changed to “Cassandrea” (Eurylochus, of Cassandrea)

Page 107, “Nicorreon” changed to “Nicocreon” (at the court of Nicocreon)

Page 107, “Nicorreon” updated to “Nicocreon” (at the court of Nicocreon)

Page 110, “Hyporicus” changed to “Hipponicus” (Hipponicus the Macedonian)

Page 110, “Hyporicus” changed to “Hipponicus” (Hipponicus from Macedonia)

Page 110, “Hipporicus” changed to “Hipponicus” (Hipponicus gave Menedemus two thousand drachmas)

Page 110, “Hipporicus” changed to “Hipponicus” (Hipponicus gave Menedemus two thousand drachmas)

Page 113, “Petone” changed to “Potone” (the son of Ariston and Perictione or Potone)

Page 113, “Petone” changed to “Potone” (the child of Ariston and Perictione or Potone)

Page 113, “Diopidas” changed to “Dropidas” (had a brother named Dropidas)

Page 113, “Diopidas” changed to “Dropidas” (had a brother named Dropidas)

Page 114, “Conservations” changed to “Conversations” (the eighth book of his Philosophical Conversations)

Page 114, “Conservations” changed to “Conversations” (the eighth book of his Philosophical Conversations)

Page 114, “Petone” changed to “Potone” (a sister called Potone)

Page 114, “Petone” changed to “Potone” (a sister named Potone)

Page 116, “Alcinus” changed to “Alcimus” (as Alcimus says in his essays)

Page 116, “Alcinus” changed to “Alcimus” (as Alcimus mentions in his essays)

Page 117, “Alcinus” changed to “Alcimus” (And Alcimus speaks as follows)

Page 117, “Alcinus” updated to “Alcimus” (And Alcimus says the following)

Page 119, “Alcinus” changed to “Alcimus” (compared by Alcimus through four books)

Page 119, “Alcinus” changed to “Alcimus” (compared by Alcimus through four books)

Page 120, “Deni” changed to “Dion” twice (being appeased by Dion / it was Dion who sent the money)

Page 120, “Deni” changed to “Dion” twice (being satisfied by Dion / it was Dion who sent the money)

Page 120, “Aristimenes” changed to “Aristomenes” (being appeased by Dion and Aristomenes)

Page 120, “Aristimenes” changed to “Aristomenes” (being satisfied by Dion and Aristomenes)

Page 120, “Helia” changed to “Helice” (drowned in Helice)

Page 120, “Helia” changed to “Helice” (drowned in Helice)

Page 121, “Thetas” changed to “Theotas” (suspected of exciting Dion and Theotas)

Page 121, “Thetas” changed to “Theotas” (thought to be influencing Dion and Theotas)

Page 123, “Mesopis” changed to “Meropis” (Alexis says in his Meropis)

Page 123, “Mesopis” changed to “Meropis” (Alexis mentions in his Meropis)

Page 123, “Analion” changed to “Ancylion” (And in his Ancylion, he says)

Page 123, “Analion” changed to “Ancylion” (And in his Ancylion, he says)

Page 123, “Pseudripobolimæus” changed to “Pseudypobolimæus” (Cratinas in his Pseudypobolimæus, says)

Page 123, “Pseudripobolimæus” updated to “Pseudypobolimæus” (Cratinas in his Pseudypobolimæus, states)

Page 126, “Sothon” changed to “Sathon” (which he entitled Sathon)

Page 126, “Sothon” changed to “Sathon” (which he named Sathon)

Page 127, “Mysonianus” changed to “Myronianus” (But Myronianus, in his Resemblances)

Page 127, “Mysonianus” switched to “Myronianus” (But Myronianus, in his Resemblances)

Page 128, “Cephiciades” changed to “Cephisiades” (the temple of the Cephisiades)

Page 128, “Cephiciades” changed to “Cephisiades” (the temple of the Cephisiades)

Page 128, “Phreanian” changed to “Phrearrian” (Archestratus the Phrearrian)

Page 128, “Phreanian” changed to “Phrearrian” (Archestratus the Phrearrian)

Page 128, “Challidian” changed to “Chollidian” (Philip the Chollidian)

Page 128, “Challidian” changed to “Chollidian” (Philip the Chollidian)

Page 128, “Ademantus” changed to “Adimantus” (shall belong to my son Adimantus)

Page 128, “Ademantus” changed to “Adimantus” (will belong to my son Adimantus)

Page 128, “Sychon” changed to “Tychon” (My slaves Tychon, Bictas)

Page 128, “Sychon” changed to “Tychon” (My slaves Tychon, Bictas)

Page 128, “Tozthenes” changed to “Sosthenes” (My executors shall be Sosthenes)

Page 128, “Tozthenes” changed to “Sosthenes” (My executors will be Sosthenes)

Page 130, “Alexander” changed to “Alexamenus” (Alexamenus, a native of Styra)

Page 130, “Alexander” changed to “Alexamenus” (Alexamenus, from Styra)

Page 130, “at” changed to “as” (the other is as it were tentative)

Page 130, “at” changed to “as” (the other is, so to speak, tentative)

Page 131, “Clitiphon” changed to “Clitophon” (the Menexenus, the Clitophon, the Epistles)

Page 131, “Clitiphon” changed to “Clitophon” (the Menexenus, the Clitophon, the Epistles)

Page 131, “Hippiastro” changed to “Hippias too” (and Protagoras, Hippias too)

Page 131, “Hippiastro” changed to “Hippias too” (and Protagoras, Hippias too)

Page 134, “Meætetus” changed to “Theætetus” (The Theætetus, or Knowledge)

Page 134, “Meætetus” changed to “Theætetus” (The Theætetus, or Knowledge)

Page 135, “Aristodemns” changed to “Aristodemus” (one letter to Aristodemus)

Page 135, “Aristodemns” changed to “Aristodemus” (one letter changed to Aristodemus)

Page 135, “Chilidon” changed to “Chelidon” (the Demodorus; the Chelidon; the Seventh;)

Page 135, “Chilidon” changed to “Chelidon” (the Demodorus; the Chelidon; the Seventh;)

Page 139, “lives” changed to “live” (those which live in the water)

Page 139, “lives” changed to “live” (those that live in the water)

Page 142, “Lacædemon” changed to “Lacedæmon” (in Lacedæmon and Macedonia)

Page 142, “Lacædemon” switched to “Lacedæmon” (in Lacedæmon and Macedonia)

Page 152, “aud” changed to “and” (paralysis, and sent to)

Page 152, “aud” changed to “and” (paralysis, and sent to)

Page 153, “Amartynus” changed to “Amartyrus” (an Essay addressed to Amartyrus)

Page 153, “Amartynus” changed to “Amartyrus” (an Essay addressed to Amartyrus)

Page 155, “Myornianus” changed to “Myronianus” (as Myronianus tells us in his Similitudes)

Page 155, “Myornianus” changed to “Myronianus” (as Myronianus explains in his Similitudes)

Page 156, “Archidemus” changed to “Archedemus” (the Archedemus, or an essay on Justice)

Page 156, “Archidemus” changed to “Archedemus” (the Archedemus, or an essay on Justice)

Page 157, “Spuesippus” changed to “Speusippus” (He succeeded Speusippus)

Page 157, “Spuesippus” changed to “Speusippus” (He took over from Speusippus)

Page 162, “Meætetus” changed to “Theætetus the poet wrote thus about him” (Theætetus the poet wrote thus about him)

Page 162, “Meætetus” changed to “Theætetus the poet wrote this about him” (Theætetus the poet wrote this about him)

Page 167, “Aleximes” changed to “Alexinus” (a certain dialectician, a pupil of Alexinus)

Page 167, “Aleximes” changed to “Alexinus” (a certain dialectician and student of Alexinus)

Page 167, “Callecrates” changed to “Callicrates” (that of Archecrates and Callicrates)

Page 167, “Callecrates” updated to “Callicrates” (referring to Archecrates and Callicrates)

Page 168, “Aristi” changed to “Aristo” (Aristo, the Chian)

Page 168, “Aristi” changed to “Aristo” (Aristo, the Chian)

Page 168, “Mydea” changed to “Myrlea” (Cleochares of Myrlea)

Page 168, “Mydea” is now “Myrlea” (Cleochares of Myrlea)

Page 169, “Alcymeus” changed to “Alcyoneus” (the birthday of Alcyoneus)

Page 169, “Alcymeus” changed to “Alcyoneus” (the birthday of Alcyoneus)

Page 174, “Eretosthenes” changed to “Eratosthenes” (they relate that Eratosthenes said)

Page 174, “Eretosthenes” changed to “Eratosthenes” (it's said that Eratosthenes remarked)

Page 176, “Proconnesas” changed to “Proconnesus” (he was a native of Proconnesus)

Page 176, “Proconnesas” changed to “Proconnesus” (he was from Proconnesus)

Page 179, “logoædical” changed to “logaœdical” (lines in logaœdical Archebulian metre)

Page 179, “logoædical” changed to “logaœdical” (lines in logaœdical Archebulian meter)

Page 183, “Demophelus” changed to “Demophilus” (his prosecutor was Demophilus)

Page 183, “Demophelus” changed to “Demophilus” (his prosecutor was Demophilus)

Page 184, “Calumia” changed to “Calauria” (Demosthenes died in Calauria)

Page 184, “Calumia” changed to “Calauria” (Demosthenes died in Calauria)

Page 184, “Calisthenes” changed to “Callisthenes” (the conspiracy of Callisthenes against Alexander)

Page 184, “Calisthenes” changed to “Callisthenes” (the plot of Callisthenes against Alexander)

Page 186, “Aubracis” changed to “Ambracis” (Ambracis shall have her liberty)

Page 186, “Aubracis” changed to “Ambracis” (Ambracis will have her freedom)

Page 186, “where-ever” changed to “wherever” (wherever else they think fit)

Page 186, “where-ever” changed to “wherever” (wherever else they think is appropriate)

Page 188, “is” changed to “his” (and his answer was)

Page 188, “is” changed to “his” (and his answer was)

Page 193, “incoporeal” changed to “incorporeal” (something which has an incorporeal species)

Page 193, “incoporeal” changed to “incorporeal” (something that has a non-physical form)

Page 194, “his” changed to “her” (as Pamphila asserts in the thirty-second book of her Commentaries)

Page 194, “his” changed to “her” (as Pamphila states in the thirty-second book of her Commentaries)

Page 194, “Menandar” changed to “Menander” (he was the tutor of Menander)

Page 194, “Menandar” changed to “Menander” (he was Menander's tutor)

Page 195, “Tyrtanius” changed to “Tyrtamus” (His name had originally been Tyrtamus)

Page 195, “Tyrtanius” changed to “Tyrtamus” (He was originally named Tyrtamus)

Page 196, “Phalerius” changed to “Phalereus” (by the assistance of Demetrius Phalereus)

Page 196, “Phalerius” updated to “Phalereus” (with help from Demetrius Phalereus)

Page 199, repeated word “Natural” removed (Problems in Natural History)

Page 199, the repeated word “Natural” has been removed (Problems in Natural History)

Page 199, “Astyceron” changed to “Astycreon” (Letters to Astycreon, Phanias, and Nicanor)

Page 199, “Astyceron” changed to “Astycreon” (Letters to Astycreon, Phanias, and Nicanor)

Page 200, “Callenus” changed to “Callinus” (Neleus, Strato, Callinus, Demotimus)

Page 200, “Callenus” changed to “Callinus” (Neleus, Strato, Callinus, Demotimus)

Page 201, “Donar” changed to “Donax” (and Donax to Neleus)

Page 201, “Donar” changed to “Donax” (and Donax to Neleus)

Page 201, “Eulius” changed to “Eubius” (I order Eubius to be sold)

Page 201, “Eulius” changed to “Eubius” (I command that Eubius be sold)

Page 202, “Thrasos” changed to “Thasos” (Lysistratus of Thasos)

Page 202, “Thrasos” changed to “Thasos” (Lysistratus of Thasos)

Page 202, “dilligence” changed to “diligence” (in the diligence with which he applied himself)

Page 202, “dilligence” changed to “diligence” (in the diligence with which he applied himself)

Page 204, “Innesigenes” changed to “Mnesigenes” (Aristides, Mnesigenes, Hippocrates)

Page 204, “Innesigenes” changed to “Mnesigenes” (Aristides, Mnesigenes, Hippocrates)

Page 204, “Olympicus” changed to “Olympichus” (let Iræus calculate with Olympichus)

Page 204, “Olympicus” updated to “Olympichus” (let Iræus compute with Olympichus)

Page 204, “Ausinias” changed to “Aminias” (with Olympichus and Aminias)

Page 204, “Ausinias” changed to “Aminias” (with Olympichus and Aminias)

Page 204, “Philoreatos” changed to “Philocrates” (Philocrates, the son of Tisamenus)

Page 204, “Philoreatos” changed to “Philocrates” (Philocrates, the son of Tisamenus)

Page 205, “saying” changed to “sayings” (Another of his sayings was)

Page 205, “sayings” changed to “sayings” (Another of his sayings was)

Page 206, repeated word “in” removed (all that I have in the city)

Page 206, repeated word “in” removed (all that I have in the city)

Page 207, “Amplicon” changed to “Amphion” (and Ariston, and Amphion, and Lycon)

Page 207, “Amplicon” changed to “Amphion” (along with Ariston, and Amphion, and Lycon)

Page 208, “Micras” changed to “Micrus” twice (Micrus I hereby present with his freedom / I also hereby emancipate the mother of Micrus)

Page 208, “Micras” changed to “Micrus” twice (Micrus, I present you with your freedom / I also set the mother of Micrus free)

Page 208, “Menedora” changed to “Menodora” (four minæ, and Menodora)

Page 208, “Menedora” updated to “Menodora” (four minæ, and Menodora)

Page 208, “to” changed to “too” (in this respect too he deserves)

Page 208, “to” changed to “too” (in this respect too he deserves)

Page 211, “Antiphones” changed to “Antiphanes” (on Antiphanes, one;)

Page 211, “Antiphones” updated to “Antiphanes” (regarding Antiphanes, one;)

Page 212, “Colatia” changed to “Calatia” (the sixth was a native of Calatia)

Page 212, “Colatia” changed to “Calatia” (the sixth was a native of Calatia)

Page 212, “Euthyræ” changed to “Erythræ” (the twelfth was a grammarian of Erythræ)

Page 212, “Euthyræ” changed to “Erythræ” (the twelfth was a scholar from Erythræ)

Page 212, “Bythinian” changed to “Bithynian” (the thirteenth was a Bithynian)

Page 212, “Bythinian” changed to “Bithynian” (the thirteenth was a Bithynian)

Page 212, “Pamotus” changed to “Panætius” (Panætius of Rhodes)

Page 212, “Pamotus” updated to “Panætius” (Panætius of Rhodes)

Page 212, “unsubtantial” changed to “unsubstantial” (Fought o’er a tomb and unsubstantial shade)

Page 212, “unsubtantial” changed to “unsubstantial” (Fought over a tomb and unsubstantial shade)

Page 215, “Aretodorus” changed to “Autodorus” (Autodorus the Epicurean reproaches him)

Page 215, “Aretodorus” changed to “Autodorus” (Autodorus the Epicurean criticizes him)

Page 215, “Spentharus” changed to “Spintharus” (as some say Spintharus)

Page 215, “Spentharus” changed to “Spintharus” (as some refer to Spintharus)

Page 216, “Panculus” changed to “Pancalus” (they formed the name of Pancalus)

Page 216, “Panculus” changed to “Pancalus” (they created the name Pancalus)

Page 216, “Nisius” changed to “Hicesius” (a physician, a pupil of Hicesius)

Page 216, “Nisius” changed to “Hicesius” (a doctor, a student of Hicesius)

Page 219, “Philosphers” changed to “Philosophers” (his treatise on the Philosophers)

Page 219, “Philosphers” changed to “Philosophers” (his essay on the Philosophers)

Page 223, missing word “an” added (an essay on Telemachus)

Page 223, missing word “an” added (an essay on Telemachus)

Page 224, “Tresius” changed to “Hicesius” (the son of Hicesius, a money-changer)

Page 224, “Tresius” changed to “Hicesius” (the son of Hicesius, a currency exchanger)

Page 224, “Perdalus” changed to “Pordalus” (he himself, in his Pordalus)

Page 224, “Perdalus” changed to “Pordalus” (he himself, in his Pordalus)

Page 225, “Polymeter” changed to “Polyeuctus” (Polyeuctus, the orator)

Page 225, “Polymeter” changed to “Polyeuctus” (Polyeuctus, the speaker)

Page 225, “Æschorion” changed to “Æschrion” (Lysanias, the son of Æschrion)

Page 225, “Æschorion” changed to “Æschrion” (Lysanias, the son of Æschrion)

Page 231, “Ægesilaus” changed to “Agesilaus” (if Agesilaus and Epaminondas are)

Page 231, “Ægesilaus” changed to “Agesilaus” (if Agesilaus and Epaminondas are)

Page 233, “Calisthenes” changed to “Callisthenes” (the happiness of Callisthenes)

Page 233, “Calisthenes” changed to “Callisthenes” (the happiness of Callisthenes)

Page 239, “Thelian” changed to “Melian” (Diagoras the Melian)

Page 239, “Thelian” changed to “Melian” (Diagoras the Melian)

Page 244, “belong” changed to “belongs” (everything belongs to the wise)

Page 244, “belong” changed to “belongs” (everything belongs to the wise)

Page 245, “Philistus” changed to “Philiscus” (not rather the work of Philiscus)

Page 245, “Philistus” changed to “Philiscus” (not just the work of Philiscus)

Page 245, “Circe” changed to “crier” (when the crier asked him)

Page 245, “Circe” changed to “town crier” (when the town crier asked him)

Page 247, missing word “art” added (Since you alone did teach to men the art)

Page 247, missing word “art” added (Since you alone taught men the art)

Page 247, “Œdippus” changed to “Œdipus” (the Chrysippus, and the Œdipus)

Page 247, “Œdippus” changed to “Œdipus” (the Chrysippus, and the Œdipus)

Page 247, “Solmæus” changed to “Tolmæus” (the Beggar; the Tolmæus; the Leopard)

Page 247, “Solmæus” changed to “Tolmæus” (the Beggar; the Tolmæus; the Leopard)

Page 248, “Sicymian” changed to “Sicyonian” (The second was a Sicyonian)

Page 248, “Sicymian” changed to “Sicyonian” (The second was a Sicyonian)

Page 249, “Osnesicritus” changed to “Onesicritus” (Onesicritus is called by some authors)

Page 249, “Osnesicritus” changed to “Onesicritus” (some authors refer to Onesicritus as this)

Page 249, “Clocus” changed to “Clœus” (Hegesæus of Sinope, who was nicknamed Clœus)

Page 249, “Clocus” changed to “Clœus” (Hegesæus of Sinope, who was called Clœus)

Page 254, “Theomentus” changed to “Theombrotus” (His pupils were Theombrotus and Cleomenes)

Page 254, “Theomentus” changed to “Theombrotus” (His students were Theombrotus and Cleomenes)

Page 257, “Celotes” changed to “Colotes” (a disciple of Colotes of Lampsacus)

Page 257, “Celotes” changed to “Colotes” (a disciple of Colotes of Lampsacus)

Page 259, “Innaseas” changed to “Mnaseas” (Zeno was the son of Mnaseas)

Page 259, “Innaseas” changed to “Mnaseas” (Zeno was the son of Mnaseas)

Page 260, “Priscanactium” changed to “Peisianactium” (colonnade which is called the Peisianactium)

Page 260, “Priscanactium” changed to “Peisianactium” (colonnade which is called the Peisianactium)

Page 262, “Innaseas” changed to “Mnaseas” (Since Zeno the son of Mnaseas)

Page 262, “Innaseas” changed to “Mnaseas” (Since Zeno, the son of Mnaseas)

Page 263, “Innaseas” changed to “Mnaseas” (Zeno, the son of Mnaseas, the Cittiæan)

Page 263, “Innaseas” switched to “Mnaseas” (Zeno, the son of Mnaseas, from Cittiæa)

Page 263, “Acharnæs” changed to “Acharnæ” (Medon of Acharnæ)

Page 263, “Acharnæs” changed to “Acharnæ” (Medon of Acharnæ)

Page 263, “Mecythus of Sypalyttas” changed to “Micythus of Sypalettus” (Micythus of Sypalettus, and Dion)

Page 263, “Mecythus of Sypalyttas” changed to “Micythus of Sypalettus” (Micythus of Sypalettus, and Dion)

Page 264, “simdapsus” changed to “skindapsus” (Likewise her mind was less than a skindapsus.)

Page 264, “simdapsus” changed to “skindapsus” (Similarly, her mind was less than a skindapsus.)

Page 265, “coni” changed to “coin” (well-formed like the coin)

Page 265, “coni” changed to “coin” (correctly formed like the coin)

Page 265, “tessedrachmas” changed to “tetradrachmas” (he likened to the Attic tetradrachmas)

Page 265, “tessedrachmas” changed to “tetradrachmas” (he compared it to the Attic tetradrachmas)

Page 268, “perssn” changed to “person” (why he was the only person)

Page 268, “perssn” changed to “person” (why he was the only person)

Page 269, “entertaiments” changed to “entertainments” (in entertainments of that kind)

Page 269, “entertaiments” changed to “entertainments” (in entertainments of that sort)

Page 270, “sumits” changed to “summits” (The summits of Olympus)

Page 270, “sumits” changed to “summits” (The summits of Olympus)

Page 271, “Innaseas” changed to “Mnaseas” (his father Mnaseas often came to Athens)

Page 271, “Innaseas” changed to “Mnaseas” (his father Mnaseas frequently visited Athens)

Page 272, “Hesophila” changed to “Herophila” (the sixth was a physician of Herophila), although it is possible “a Herophilean physician”, i.e. a follower of Herophilus, is intended here.

Page 272, “Hesophila” changed to “Herophila” (the sixth was a doctor of Herophila), although it’s possible “a Herophilean physician,” meaning a follower of Herophilus, is intended here.

Page 273, “Halcymeus” changed to “Halcyoneus” (to whose son, Halcyoneus, he also acted)

Page 273, “Halcymeus” changed to “Halcyoneus” (to whose son, Halcyoneus, he also acted)

Page 273, “Theles” changed to “Thebes” (Philonides, of Thebes)

Page 273, “Theles” changed to “Thebes” (Philonides, from Thebes)

Page 274, “Posidorus” changed to “Posidonius” (Diogenes, the Babylonian; and Posidonius)

Page 274, “Posidorus” changed to “Posidonius” (Diogenes, the Babylonian; and Posidonius)

Page 274, “Archidemus” changed to “Archedemus” (Chrysippus, and Archedemus, and Eudromus)

Page 274, “Archidemus” changed to “Archedemus” (Chrysippus, Archedemus, and Eudromus)

Page 275, “coversant” changed to “conversant” (which is conversant with rules and tests)

Page 275, “coversant” changed to “conversant” (which is familiar with rules and tests)

Page 279, “Boethius” changed to “Boethus” (For Boethus leaves a great many criteria)

Page 279, “Boethius” changed to “Boethus” (For Boethus has many criteria)

Page 279, “Archidemus” changed to “Archedemus” (so it is laid down by Archedemus)

Page 279, “Archidemus” changed to “Archedemus” (as stated by Archedemus)

Page 282, “deificiences” changed to “deficiencies” (of attributes and deficiencies)

Page 282, “deficiencies” changed to “deficiencies” (of attributes and deficiencies)

Page 291, “Archidemus” changed to “Archedemus” (And Archedemus defines it)

Page 291, “Archidemus” changed to “Archedemus” (And Archedemus defines it)

Page 297, “exite” changed to “excite” (do not excite any inclination)

Page 297, “exite” changed to “excite” (do not excite any inclination)

Page 306, “Chrysyppus” changed to “Chrysippus” (Another doctrine of Chrysippus)

Page 306, “Chrysyppus” changed to “Chrysippus” (Another teaching of Chrysippus)

Page 306, “Thrasmides” changed to “Thrasonides” (Accordingly, that Thrasonides)

Page 306, “Thrasmides” changed to “Thrasonides” (So, that Thrasonides)

Page 316, “sone” changed to “some” (some of them are shakings)

Page 316, “sone” changed to “some” (some of them are shakes)

Page 318, “Scion” changed to “Siren” (surnamed the Siren)

Page 318, “Scion” changed to “Siren” (called the Siren)

Page 320, “Scayon” changed to “Scazon” (a jesting epigram on him in Scazon iambics)

Page 320, “Scayon” changed to “Scazon” (a playful reference to him in Scazon iambics)

Page 326, “Innesistratus” changed to “Mnesistratus” (Once, when Mnesistratus accused him)

Page 326, “Innesistratus” changed to “Mnesistratus” (One time, when Mnesistratus accused him)

Page 328, “Dioles” changed to “Diocles” (as Diocles reports)

Page 328, “Dioles” changed to “Diocles” (as Diocles states)

Page 328, “Cryxippus” changed to “Crypsippus” (Carneades called him Crypsippus)

Page 328, “Cryxippus” changed to “Crypsippus” (Carneades referred to him as Crypsippus)

Page 330, “Aristocrea” changed to “Aristocreon” (the sons of his sister, Aristocreon and Philocrates)

Page 330, “Aristocrea” changed to “Aristocreon” (the sons of his sister, Aristocreon and Philocrates)

Page 330, “heirophant” changed to “hierophant” (the hierophant reveals them)

Page 330, “heirophant” changed to “hierophant” (the hierophant reveals them)

Page 331, repeated word “a” removed (there is then a head that you have not got)

Page 331, repeated word “a” removed (there is then a head that you have not got)

Page 333, “Sosigines” changed to “Sosigenes” (addressed to Sosigenes and Alexander)

Page 333, “Sosigines” updated to “Sosigenes” (directed to Sosigenes and Alexander)

Page 333, “Panthorides” changed to “Panthoides” (Ambiguous Expressions, by Panthoides)

Page 333, “Panthorides” changed to “Panthoides” (Ambiguous Expressions, by Panthoides)

Page 333, “Agatha” changed to “Agathon” (an essay to Agathon)

Page 333, “Agatha” was changed to “Agathon” (an essay to Agathon)

Page 334, “Meliager” changed to “Meleager” twice (addressed to Meleager / addressed also to Meleager)

Page 334, “Meliager” changed to “Meleager” twice (addressed to Meleager / addressed also to Meleager)

Page 334, “hyopthethical” changed to “hypothetical” (of hypothetical reasoning to serve as an Introduction)

Page 334, “hyopthethical” changed to “hypothetical” (of hypothetical reasoning to serve as an Introduction)

Page 334, missing word “to” added (an introduction to Fallacy, addressed to Aristocreon)

Page 334, missing word “to” added (an introduction to Fallacy, addressed to Aristocreon)

Page 335, “Oretis” changed to “Outis” (an essay on the Argument Outis)

Page 335, “Oretis” turned into “Outis” (an essay on the Argument Outis)

Page 340, “maner” changed to “manner” (writes in the following manner)

Page 340, “maner” changed to “manner” (writes in the following way)

Page 341, “Scopeadæ” changed to “Scopiadæ” (the poem called the Scopiadæ)

Page 341, “Scopeadæ” changed to “Scopiadæ” (the poem called the Scopiadæ)

Page 343, “then” changed to “them” (allowed his disciples to eat them)

Page 343, “then” changed to “them” (allowed his disciples to eat them)

Page 353, “Innesimachus” changed to “Mnesimachus” (And Mnesimachus says in his Alcmæon)

Page 353, “Innesimachus” changed to “Mnesimachus” (And Mnesimachus mentions in his Alcmæon)

Page 353, “Austophon” changed to “Aristophon” (Aristophon says in his Pythagorean)

Page 353, “Austophon” changed to “Aristophon” (Aristophon mentions in his Pythagorean)

Page 354, “Cortona” changed to “Crotona” (at the house of Milo, of Crotona)

Page 354, “Cortona” changed to “Crotona” (at the home of Milo, of Crotona)

Page 356, “Sarapian” changed to “Sarapion” (Heraclides, the son of Sarapion)

Page 356, “Sarapian” changed to “Sarapion” (Heraclides, the son of Sarapion)

Page 356, “Phythagoras” changed to “Pythagoras” (Should you Pythagoras’ doctrine wish to know)

Page 356, “Phythagoras” changed to “Pythagoras” (If you want to know about Pythagoras’ teachings)

Page 357, “Echurates” changed to “Echecrates” (and Echecrates, and Diodes)

Page 357, “Echurates” updated to “Echecrates” (and Echecrates, and Diodes)

Page 359, “Jelanges” changed to “Telauges” (Now Telauges and Theano we have mentioned)

Page 359, “Jelanges” is now “Telauges” (Now we’ve mentioned both Telauges and Theano)

Page 360, “Jelanges” changed to “Telauges” twice (But Telauges, the son of Pythagoras / the letter of Telauges)

Page 360, “Jelanges” switched to “Telauges” two times (But Telauges, the son of Pythagoras / the letter of Telauges)

Page 362, missing section number “VI.” added in what seemed to be the appropriate place for it (VI. The case of the dead woman)

Page 362, missing section number “VI.” added in what seemed to be the right spot for it (VI. The case of the dead woman)

Page 364, “κοουφῆς” changed to “κορυφῆς” (Ἀκροτάτης κορυφῆς τύμβος ἄκρος κατέχει.)

Page 364, “κοουφῆς” changed to “κορυφῆς” (The tomb of the highest peak holds the utmost).

Page 369, “Innesagoras” changed to “Mnesagoras” (the son of Mnesagoras)

Page 369, “Innesagoras” changed to “Mnesagoras” (Mnesagoras's son)

Page 369, “Orellus” changed to “Ocellus” (the descendants of Ocellus)

Page 369, “Orellus” changed to “Ocellus” (the descendants of Ocellus)

Page 373, “Octacteris” changed to “Octaeteris” (the treatise called the Octaeteris)

Page 373, “Octacteris” changed to “Octaeteris” (the writing called the Octaeteris)

Page 373, “Mansolus” changed to “Mausolus” (he also went to the court of Mausolus)

Page 373, “Mansolus” changed to “Mausolus” (he also went to the court of Mausolus)

Page 373, “Nichomachus” changed to “Nicomachus” (Nicomachus, the son of Aristotle)

Page 373, “Nichomachus” changed to “Nicomachus” (Nicomachus, Aristotle's son)

Page 374, “Sicilist” changed to “Siciliot” (the third, a Siciliot, a son of Agathocles)

Page 374, “Sicilist” changed to “Siciliot” (the third, a Siciliot, a son of Agathocles)

Page 376, “Heraceon” changed to “Heracion” (the son of Blyson, or, as some say, of Heracion)

Page 376, “Heraceon” changed to “Heracion” (the son of Blyson, or, as some say, of Heracion)

Page 381, “Phaleruus” changed to “Phalereus” (Demetrius Phalereus also mentions him)

Page 381, “Phaleruus” changed to “Phalereus” (Demetrius Phalereus also mentions him)

Page 381, “Scythenus” changed to “Scythinus” (Scythinus, an iambic poet)

Page 381, “Scythenus” changed to “Scythinus” (Scythinus, an iambic poet)

Page 382, “Zande” changed to “Zancle” (lived at Zancle, in Sicily)

Page 382, “Zande” updated to “Zancle” (resided in Zancle, Sicily)

Page 383, “Anaxemander” changed to “Anaximander” (a contemporary of Anaximander)

Page 383, “Anaxemander” changed to “Anaximander” (a contemporary of Anaximander)

Page 384, “Diochartes” changed to “Diochaetes” (and Diochaetes the Pythagorean)

Page 384, “Diochartes” changed to “Diochaetes” (and Diochaetes the Pythagorean)

Page 386, “Ithageses” changed to “Ithagenes” (a Samian, and the son of Ithagenes)

Page 386, “Ithageses” changed to “Ithagenes” (a Samian, and the son of Ithagenes)

Page 386, “Telentagoras” changed to “Teleutagoras” (he was by nature the son of Teleutagoras)

Page 386, “Telentagoras” became “Teleutagoras” (he was naturally the son of Teleutagoras)

Page 396, “Artmography” changed to “Actinography” (Actinography, or a discussion on Rays of Light)

Page 396, “Artmography” changed to “Actinography” (Actinography, or a discussion on Light Rays)

Page 389, “resistence” changed to “resistance” (according to the resistance of the centre)

Page 389, “resistence” changed to “resistance” (according to the resistance of the center)

Page 396, “Rythm” changed to “Rhythm” (A treatise on Rhythm and Harmony)

Page 396, “Rythm” changed to “Rhythm” (A treatise on Rhythm and Harmony)

Page 397, “Prodicas” changed to “Prodicus” twice (He, and Prodicus of Ceos / Prodicus had a very powerful voice)

Page 397, “Prodicas” changed to “Prodicus” twice (He, and Prodicus of Ceos / Prodicus had a very strong voice)

Page 398, “Allidomas” changed to “Alcidamas” (but Alcidamas says that)

Page 398, “Allidomas” changed to “Alcidamas” (but Alcidamas says that)

Page 405, “Memenius” changed to “Numenius” (Numenius is the only writer who asserts)

Page 405, “Memenius” changed to “Numenius” (Numenius is the only author who claims)

Page 405, “Epianus” changed to “Epicurus” (was the master of Epicurus)

Page 405, “Epianus” changed to “Epicurus” (was the teacher of Epicurus)

Page 407, “antethetical” changed to “antithetical” (antithetical force of words)

Page 407, “antithetical” changed to “antithetical” (antithetical force of words)

Page 409, “Phyrrho” changed to “Pyrrho” (Pyrrho lays down in the following manner)

Page 409, “Phyrrho” changed to “Pyrrho” (Pyrrho is described in the following way)

Page 414, “iotellect” changed to “intellect” (either sense or intellect)

Page 414, “iotellect” changed to “intellect” (either meaning or intellect)

Page 414, “dawn” changed to “down” (those opinions which are laid down previously)

Page 414, “dawn” changed to “down” (those opinions that were stated earlier)

Page 422, “Cercipes” changed to “Cercopes” (through the forum of the Cercopes)

Page 422, “Cercipes” changed to “Cercopes” (through the forum of the Cercopes)

Page 423, “Nilolochus” changed to “Nicolochus” (Nicolochus of Rhodes)

Page 423, “Nilolochus” changed to “Nicolochus” (Nicolochus of Rhodes)

Page 423, “Pracylus” changed to “Praylus” (Praylus of the Troas)

Page 423, “Pracylus” changed to “Praylus” (Praylus of the Troas)

Page 423, “Xeuxippus” changed to “Zeuxippus” (Zeuxippus Polites)

Page 423, “Xeuxippus” updated to “Zeuxippus” (Zeuxippus Polites)

Page 423, “Gonicpus” changed to “Goniopus” (Zeuxis Goniopus)

Page 423, “Gonicpus” changed to “Goniopus” (Zeuxis Goniopus)

Page 423, “Theodos” changed to “Theodas” (Theodas, of Laodicea)

Page 423, “Theodos” changed to “Theodas” (Theodas, from Laodicea)

Page 424, “had Colonis and” changed to “had colonised” (as the Athenians had colonised Samos)

Page 424, “had colonised and” changed to “had colonised” (as the Athenians had colonised Samos)

Page 425, “Inus” changed to “Mus” (a slave, whose name was Mus)

Page 425, “Inus” was changed to “Mus” (a slave named Mus)

Page 425, repeated word “as” removed (well as one of his brothers)

Page 425, repeated word “as” removed (along with one of his brothers)

Page 425, “Leontius” changed to “Leonteus” (Themista, the wife of Leonteus)

Page 425, “Leontius” changed to “Leonteus” (Themista, the wife of Leonteus)

Page 426, “Marmaricem” changed to “Marmarium” (and among them Marmarium)

Page 426, “Marmaricem” changed to “Marmarium” (and among them Marmarium)

Page 427, “nicnamed Lerocrates” changed to “nicknamed Lerocritus” (Democritus, he nicknamed Lerocritus)

Page 427, “nicknamed Lerocrates” changed to “nicknamed Lerocritus” (Democritus, he called Lerocritus)

Page 427, “friend” changed to “friends” (his friends who were so numerous)

Page 427, “friend” changed to “friends” (his friends who were so many)

Page 427, “Inus” changed to “Mus” (the one whom I have mentioned already, named Mus)

Page 427, “Inus” changed to “Mus” (the one I've already mentioned, named Mus)

Page 428, “his” changed to “is” (among whom is Apollodorus)

Page 428, “his” changed to “is” (among whom is Apollodorus)

Page 430, “sucessors” changed to “successors” (my immediate successors hand it down)

Page 430, “successors” changed to “successors” (my immediate successors hand it down)

Page 431, “Inus” changed to “Mus” (Of my slaves, I hereby emancipate Mus)

Page 431, “Inus” changed to “Mus” (I free Mus, one of my slaves)

Page 432, “Bates” changed to “Batis” (he gave his sister Batis in marriage)

Page 432, “Bates” changed to “Batis” (he married off his sister Batis)

Page 432, “Leontius” changed to “Leonteus” (There was also Leonteus, of Lampsacus)

Page 432, “Leontius” changed to “Leonteus” (There was also Leonteus, from Lampsacus)

Page 433, “Chæridemus” changed to “Chæredemus” (the Chæredemus, a treatise on the Gods)

Page 433, “Chæridemus” changed to “Chæredemus” (the Chæredemus, a work about the Gods)

Page 433, “Hegesiana” changed to “Hegesianax” (the Hegesianax; four essays on Lives)

Page 433, “Hegesiana” changed to “Hegesianax” (the Hegesianax; four essays on Lives)

Footnote 8, “diety” changed to “deity” (the national deity of the Ionians)

Footnote 8, “diety” changed to “deity” (the national deity of the Ionians)

Footnote 31, “μιμογράφον” changed to “μιμογράφου” (The Greek is τοῦ μιμογράφου.)

Footnote 31, “μιμογράφον” changed to “μιμογράφου” (The Greek is τοῦ μιμογράφου.)

Footnote 31, “μῖμιοι” changed to “μῖμοι” (μῖμοι σπουδαίων)

Footnote 31, “μῖμιοι” changed to “μῖμοι” (μῖμοι σπουδαίων)

Footnote 80, “Euripid” changed to “Euripides” (the Antiope of Euripides)

Footnote 80, “Euripid” changed to “Euripides” (the Antiope of Euripides)

Footnote 82, “adversariese” changed to “adversaries” (knocked down his adversaries)

Footnote 82, “adversariese” changed to “adversaries” (knocked down his adversaries)

Footnote 108, missing word “of” added (which Ovid puts into the mouth of Pythagoras); “Jononis” changed to “Junonis” (templo Junonis in Argis)

Footnote 108, missing word “of” added (which Ovid puts into the mouth of Pythagoras); “Jononis” changed to “Junonis” (templo Junonis in Argis)

Footnote 111, “Challidian” changed to “Chalcidian” (towns of Chalcidian origin)

Footnote 111, “Challidian” changed to “Chalcidian” (towns of Chalcidian origin)

Footnote 119, “Linæan” changed to “Lenæan” (the second or Lenæan festivals)

Footnote 119, “Linæan” changed to “Lenæan” (the second or Lenæan festivals)

Footnote 127, “Valchenær” changed to “Valckenær” (Valckenær conjectures)

Footnote 127, “Valchenær” changed to “Valckenær” (Valckenær suggests)

Footnote 143, “Trachinæ” changed to “Trachiniæ” (the Trachiniæ of Sophocles)

Footnote 143, “Trachinæ” changed to “Trachiniæ” (the Trachiniæ of Sophocles)

Index entry, “Alemæon” changed to “Alcmæon”

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, “Alemæon” changed to “Alcmæon”

Index entry under Ariston, “Scion” changed to “Siren”

Index entry under Ariston, “Scion” changed to “Siren”

Index entry, “Arnicereans” changed to “Annicereans” and moved to the correct alphabetical position

Index entry, “Arnicereans” changed to “Annicereans” and moved to the correct alphabetical position

Index entry under Bias, “Priam” changed to “Priene”

Index entry under Bias, “Priam” changed to “Priene”

Index entry, “Clido” changed to “Chilo”

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, “Clido” changed to “Chilo”

Index entry, “Endoxus” changed to “Eudoxus”

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, “Endoxus” updated to “Eudoxus”

Index entry, “Gynosophistæ” changed to “Gymnosophistæ”

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, “Gynosophists” changed to “Gymnosophists”

Index entry under Plato, “Alcinus” changed to “Alcimus”

Index entry under Plato, “Alcinus” changed to “Alcimus”

Index entry, “Thesmopheria” changed to “Thesmophoria”

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, “Thesmopheria” updated to “Thesmophoria”

Index entry, “Zaleneus” changed to “Zaleucus”

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, “Zaleneus” updated to “Zaleucus”

Greek ς, when not at the end of a word, has been normalised to σ. Punctuation and accents have been amended without note as have æ/œ ligature substitutions. Where there was any doubt the text is left as printed; any remaining errors are as they appeared in the original.

Greek ς, when not at the end of a word, has been changed to σ. Punctuation and accents have been adjusted without further comment, along with æ/œ ligature substitutions. If there was any uncertainty, the text remains as it was printed; any remaining errors are as they were in the original.


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