This is a modern-English version of A vindication of the rights of men, in a letter to the Right Honourable Edmund Burke; occasioned by his Reflections on the Revolution in France, originally written by Wollstonecraft, Mary. It has been thoroughly updated, including changes to sentence structure, words, spelling, and grammar—to ensure clarity for contemporary readers, while preserving the original spirit and nuance. If you click on a paragraph, you will see the original text that we modified, and you can toggle between the two versions.

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Transcriber’s Note:

Transcriber's Note:

The cover image was created by the transcriber and is placed in the public domain.

The cover image was made by the transcriber and is in the public domain.

A
VINDICATION
OF THE
HUMAN RIGHTS,
IN A
MESSAGE
TO THE HONOURABLE
EDMUND BURKE;
CAUSED BY
HIS THOUGHTS
ON THE
French Revolution.

By MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT.
THE SECOND EDITION.
LONDON:
PRINTED FOR J. JOHNSON.
NO. 72, ST. PAUL’S CHURCH-YARD.
M. DCC. XC.

iii

ADVERTISEMENT.

Mr. Burke’s Reflections on the French Revolution first engaged my attention as the transient topic of the day; and reading it more for amusement than information, my indignation was roused by the sophistical arguments, that every moment crossed me, in the questionable shape of natural feelings and common sense.

Mr. Burke’s Reflections on the French Revolution first caught my attention as the hot topic of the moment; and I read it more for fun than for knowledge, but I found myself getting angry at the clever but misleading arguments that confronted me constantly, wrapped up in the dubious guise of natural feelings and common sense.

Many pages of the following letter were the effusions of the moment; but, swelling imperceptibly to a considerable size, the idea was suggested ivof publishing a short vindication of the Rights of Men.

Many pages of the following letter were the quick thoughts of the moment; however, gradually growing into a substantial size, the idea came up of publishing a short defense of the Rights of Men. iv

Not having leisure or patience to follow this desultory writer through all the devious tracks in which his fancy has started fresh game, I have confined my strictures, in a great measure, to the grand principles at which he has levelled many ingenious arguments in a very specious garb.

Not having the time or patience to follow this scattered writer through all the winding paths his imagination has taken, I have mostly limited my criticism to the core principles he has targeted with many clever arguments presented in a very misleading way.

1

A
LETTER
TO THE
Right Honorable EDMUND BURKE.

Sir,

It is not necessary, with courtly insincerity, to apologise to you for thus intruding on your precious time, not to profess that I think it an honour to discuss an important subject with a man whose literary abilities have raised him to notice in the state. I have not yet learned to twist my periods, nor, in the equivocal idiom of politeness, to disguise my sentiments, and imply what I should be afraid to utter: 2if, therefore, in the course of this epistle, I chance to express contempt, and even indignation, with some emphasis, I beseech you to believe that it is not a flight of fancy; for truth, in morals, has ever appeared to me the essence of the sublime; and, in taste, simplicity the only criterion of the beautiful. But I war not with an individual when I contend for the rights of men and the liberty of reason. You see I do not condescend to cull my words to avoid the invidious phrase, nor shall I be prevented from giving a manly definition of it, by the flimsy ridicule which a lively fancy has interwoven with the present acceptation of the term. Reverencing the rights of humanity, I shall dare to assert them; not intimidated by the horse laugh that you have raised, or waiting till time has wiped away the compassionate tears which you have elaborately laboured to excite.

It's not necessary, with polite insincerity, to apologize for interrupting your valuable time, nor to pretend that I'm honored to discuss an important topic with a man whose literary talents have brought him recognition in society. I haven't yet learned to craft my words carefully or to hide my true feelings behind a polite facade, implying things I would be too afraid to say outright: 2 so if, during this letter, I happen to express contempt or indignation strongly, please understand that it’s not just an exaggeration; for me, the truth in morals has always seemed to be the essence of the sublime, while in taste, simplicity is the only standard of beauty. But I’m not fighting against an individual when I stand up for the rights of men and the freedom of thought. You see, I don’t hold back my words to avoid causing offense, nor will I let the light ridicule that a vivid imagination has woven into the current meaning of the term stop me from giving a straightforward definition. Respecting human rights, I will boldly assert them, undeterred by the laughter you've provoked or waiting until time has washed away the sympathetic tears you’ve worked so hard to evoke.

3From the many just sentiments interspersed through the letter before me, and from the whole tendency of it, I should believe you to be a good, though a vain man, if some circumstances in your conduct did not render the inflexibility of your integrity doubtful; and for this vanity a knowledge of human nature enables me to discover such extenuating circumstances, in the very texture of your mind, that I am ready to call it amiable, and separate the public from the private character.

3Based on the many sincere feelings expressed in the letter in front of me, and the overall message of it, I would assume you are a good, though somewhat vain person. However, certain actions of yours make me question the unwavering integrity you portray. This vanity reveals, through my understanding of human nature, some mitigating factors within your mindset, leading me to view it as endearing and to distinguish between your public and private persona.

I know that a lively imagination renders a man particularly calculated to shine in conversation and in those desultory productions where method is disregarded; and the instantaneous applause which his eloquence extorts is at once a reward and a spur. Once a wit and always a wit, is an aphorism that has received the sanction of experience; yet I am apt to conclude that the man who with scrupulous anxiety endeavours to support that shining 4character, can never nourish by reflection any profound, or, if you please, metaphysical passion. Ambition becomes only the tool of vanity, and his reason, the weather-cock of unrestrained feelings, is only employed to varnish over the faults which it ought to have corrected.

I know that a vivid imagination makes a person particularly suited to stand out in conversation and in those random pieces where structure is ignored; the instant praise his eloquence commands is both a reward and a motivation. "Once a wit, always a wit" is a saying that's proven true with experience; however, I tend to think that someone who anxiously tries to maintain that sparkling persona can never cultivate any deep, or if you like, philosophical passion through reflection. Ambition becomes just a tool for vanity, and his reasoning, swayed by unrestrained emotions, is only used to gloss over the mistakes it should have fixed.

Sacred, however, would the infirmities and errors of a good man be, in my eyes, if they were only displayed in a private circle; if the venial fault only rendered the wit anxious, like a celebrated beauty, to raise admiration on every occasion, and excite emotion, instead of the calm reciprocation of mutual esteem and unimpassioned respect. Such vanity enlivens social intercourse, and forces the little great man to be always on his guard to secure his throne; and an ingenious man, who is ever on the watch for conquest, will, in his eagerness to exhibit his whole store of knowledge, furnish an attentive observer with some 5useful information, calcined by fancy and formed by taste.

Sacred, however, would the weaknesses and mistakes of a good person be, in my eyes, if they were only shown in a private setting; if the minor fault merely made the cleverness anxious, like a celebrated beauty, to gain admiration at every turn and stir emotions instead of the calm exchange of mutual respect and unexcited regard. Such vanity brightens social interactions and makes the little great person constantly vigilant to protect their position; and a clever person, always on the lookout for success, will, in their eagerness to showcase their full range of knowledge, provide an attentive observer with some 5valuable insights, refined by imagination and shaped by taste.

And though some dry reasoner might whisper that the arguments were superficial, and should even add, that the feelings which are thus ostentatiously displayed are often the cold declamation of the head, and not the effusions of the heart—what will these shrewd remarks avail, when the witty arguments and ornamental feelings are on a level with the comprehension of the fashionable world, and a book is found very amusing? Even the Ladies, Sir, may repeat your sprightly sallies, and retail in theatrical attitudes many of your sentimental exclamations. Sensibility is the manie of the day, and compassion the virtue which is to cover a multitude of vices, whilst justice is left to mourn in sullen silence, and balance truth in vain.

And even though some logical thinker might say that the arguments are shallow and might even suggest that the feelings being so dramatically showcased are often just the cold talk of the mind, not genuine expressions of the heart—what do those clever comments matter when the witty arguments and fancy emotions resonate with the understanding of the fashionable crowd, making a book very entertaining? Even the ladies, sir, might quote your clever quips and dramatically mimic many of your heartfelt cries. Sensitivity is the trend of the day, and compassion is the virtue that covers up a lot of wrongs, while justice is left to lament in silence, struggling to weigh the truth.

In life, an honest man with a confined understanding is frequently the slave of his habits 6and the dupe of his feelings, whilst the man with a clearer head and colder heart makes the passions of others bend to his interest; but truly sublime is the character that acts from principle, and governs the inferior springs of activity without slackening their vigour; whose feelings give vital heat to his resolves, but never hurry him into feverish eccentricities.

In life, an honest person with a limited understanding is often trapped by their habits and manipulated by their emotions, while someone with a sharper mind and cooler emotions gets others' passions to work in their favor. However, the truly admirable person is one who acts on principle and manages their lesser impulses without losing their energy; their feelings energize their decisions but never push them into erratic behavior. 6

However, as you have informed us that respect chills love, it is natural to conclude, that all your pretty flights arise from your pampered sensibility; and that, vain of this fancied pre-eminence of organs, you foster every emotion till the fumes, mounting to your brain, dispel the sober suggestions of reason. It is not in this view surprising, that when you should argue you become impassioned, and that reflection inflames your imagination, instead of enlightening your understanding.

However, since you’ve told us that respect dampens love, it makes sense to conclude that all your charming expressions come from your overly sensitive nature; and that, proud of this imagined superiority of feelings, you nurture every emotion until the overwhelming thoughts rise to your head and cloud your rational judgment. It’s not surprising, then, that when you try to reason, you become passionate, and that thinking stirs up your imagination instead of clarifying your understanding.

Quitting now the flowers of rhetoric, let us, Sir, reason together; and, believe me, I 7should not have meddled with these troubled waters, in order to point out your inconsistencies, if your wit had not burnished up some rusty, baneful opinions, and swelled the shallow current of ridicule till it resembled the flow of reason, and presumed to be the test of truth.

Let's set aside the flowery language for a moment and have a real conversation, Sir. Honestly, I wouldn't have waded into these murky waters to highlight your inconsistencies if your cleverness hadn't polished up some outdated, harmful ideas and turned shallow mockery into something that looks like reason, claiming to be a measure of truth.

I shall not attempt to follow you through “horse-way and foot-path;” but, attacking the foundation of your opinions, I shall leave the superstructure to find a centre of gravity on which it may lean till some strong blast puffs it into air; or your teeming fancy, which the ripening judgment of sixty years has not tamed, produces another Chinese erection, to stare, at every turn, the plain country people in the face, who bluntly call such an airy edifice—a folly.

I won’t try to keep up with you on "horse trails and footpaths;" instead, I’ll focus on the foundation of your beliefs and let the structure find its balance until some strong wind blows it away; or your overflowing imagination, which sixty years of experience hasn’t tamed, creates another bizarre construction that shocks the straightforward country folks who simply call such a crazy building—a nonsense.

The birthright of man, to give you, Sir, a short definition of this disputed right, is such a degree of liberty, civil and religious, as is 8compatible with the liberty of every other individual with whom he is united in a social compact, and the continued existence of that compact.

The birthright of man, to give you, Sir, a short definition of this disputed right, is a level of freedom, both civil and religious, that is compatible with the freedom of every other person he is connected with in a social agreement, and the ongoing existence of that agreement.

Liberty, in this simple, unsophisticated sense, I acknowledge, is a fair idea that has never yet received a form in the various governments that have been established on our beauteous globe; the demon of property has ever been at hand to encroach on the sacred rights of men, and to fence round with awful pomp laws that war with justice. But that it results from the eternal foundation of right—from immutable truth—who will presume to deny, that pretends to rationality—if reason has led them to build their morality[1] and religion on 9an everlasting foundation—the attributes of God?

Liberty, in this straightforward, uncomplicated sense, I admit, is a good concept that has never truly been realized in the various governments established around our beautiful planet; the quest for property has always been there to infringe upon the sacred rights of individuals and to create imposing laws that contradict justice. But that it stems from the eternal basis of what is right—from unchanging truth—who would dare to deny it, if they claim to be rational—if reason has guided them to build their morality[1] and religion on 9an everlasting foundation—the characteristics of God?

I glow with indignation when I attempt, methodically, to unravel your slavish paradoxes, in which I can find no fixed first principle to refute; I shall not, therefore, condescend to shew where you affirm in one page what you deny in another; and how frequently you draw conclusions without any previous premises:—it would be something like cowardice to fight with a man who had never exercised the weapons with which his opponent chose to combat, and irksome to refute sentence after sentence in which the latent spirit of tyranny appeared.

I feel a strong sense of anger when I try, carefully, to untangle your confusing contradictions, where I can’t find any solid principle to argue against; I won't lower myself to point out where you claim one thing on one page and deny it on another; and how often you jump to conclusions without any supporting evidence: it would be like cowardice to fight someone who has never used the tools their opponent chose to fight with, and tiresome to argue against sentence after sentence that reveals a hidden spirit of oppression.

I perceive, from the whole tenor of your Reflections, that you have a mortal antipathy to reason; but, if there is any thing like argument, or first principles, in your wild declamation, behold the result:—that we are to reverence the rust of antiquity, and term the 10unnatural customs, which ignorance and mistaken self-interest have consolidated, the sage fruit of experience: nay, that, if we do discover some errors, our feelings should lead us to excuse, with blind love, or unprincipled filial affection, the venerable vestiges of ancient days. These are gothic notions of beauty—the ivy is beautiful, but, when it insidiously destroys the trunk from which it receives support, who would not grub it up?

I see from the overall tone of your thoughts that you have a strong dislike for reason; however, if there’s any sort of argument or foundational principles in your passionate ranting, here’s the outcome: we’re supposed to respect outdated traditions and label the unnatural customs, which ignorance and selfish interests have solidified, as the wise result of experience. Furthermore, if we happen to uncover some mistakes, our feelings should blind us to excuse them with unconditional love or unprincipled loyalty to these ancient relics. These are outdated ideas of beauty—the ivy is pretty, but when it secretly weakens the trunk it relies on, who wouldn’t want to get rid of it?

Further, that we ought cautiously to remain for ever in frozen inactivity, because a thaw, whilst it nourishes the soil, spreads a temporary inundation; and the fear of risking any personal present convenience should prevent a struggle for the most estimable advantages. This is sound reasoning, I grant, in the mouth of the rich and short-sighted.

Further, we should be careful to stay indefinitely in a state of frozen inactivity, because while a thaw nourishes the soil, it also creates a temporary flood; and the fear of risking any personal current convenience should stop us from striving for the most valuable benefits. I admit this is sound reasoning coming from the wealthy and shortsighted.

Yes, Sir, the strong gained riches, the few have sacrificed the many to their vices; and, to be able to pamper their appetites, and 11supinely exist without exercising mind or body, they have ceased to be men.—Lost to the relish of true pleasure, such beings would, indeed, deserve compassion, if injustice was not softened by the tyrant’s plea—necessity; if prescription was not raised as an immortal boundary against innovation. Their minds, in fact, instead of being cultivated, have been so warped by education, that it may require some ages to bring them back to nature, and enable them to see their true interest, with that degree of conviction which is necessary to influence their conduct.

Yes, Sir, the powerful have gained wealth, and the few have exploited the many for their own desires; and, to indulge their cravings and live passively without using their minds or bodies, they have stopped being human. Deprived of the taste for true pleasure, these people would indeed deserve sympathy, if injustice wasn't justified by the tyrant’s excuse—necessity; if established norms weren't upheld as an eternal barrier to change. Their minds, instead of being nurtured, have been so twisted by education that it might take centuries to return them to their natural state, allowing them to recognize their true interests with the kind of conviction necessary to guide their actions.

The civilization which has taken place in Europe has been very partial, and, like every custom that an arbitrary point of honour has established, refines the manners at the expence of morals, by making sentiments and opinions current in conversation that have no root in the heart, or weight in the cooler resolves of the mind.—And what has stopped its progress?—hereditary 12property—hereditary honours. The man has been changed into an artificial monster by the station in which he was born, and the consequent homage that benumbed his faculties like the torpedo’s touch;—or a being, with a capacity of reasoning, would not have failed to discover, as his faculties unfolded, that true happiness arose from the friendship and intimacy which can only be enjoyed by equals; and that charity is not a condescending distribution of alms, but an intercourse of good offices and mutual benefits, founded on respect for justice and humanity.

The civilization that has developed in Europe has been very selective, and like any custom that an arbitrary sense of honor has created, it refines behaviors at the expense of morals, making feelings and opinions that lack genuine basis in the heart or weight in more rational thought common in conversation.—And what has hindered its progress?—hereditary property—hereditary honors. A person has been transformed into an artificial monster by the position they were born into, and the resulting admiration that numbs their faculties like the touch of a torpedo;—or a being, capable of reasoning, would have realized, as their abilities grew, that true happiness comes from friendship and closeness that can only be experienced among equals; and that charity is not just a condescending distribution of donations, but a relationship of goodwill and mutual support, based on respect for justice and humanity.

Governed by these principles, the poor wretch, whose inelegant distress extorted from a mixed feeling of disgust and animal sympathy present relief, would have been considered as a man, whose misery demanded a part of his birthright, supposing him to be industrious; but should his vices have reduced him to poverty, he could only have addressed his 13fellow-men as weak beings, subject to like passions, who ought to forgive, because they expect to be forgiven, for suffering the impulse of the moment to silence the suggestions of conscience, or reason, which you will; for, in my view of things, they are synonymous terms.

Guided by these principles, the unfortunate person, whose clumsy distress elicited a mix of disgust and a basic sense of sympathy, would have been seen as someone whose suffering deserved part of his basic rights, assuming he was hard-working; but if his flaws had led him to poverty, he could only appeal to his fellow humans as weak individuals, driven by similar urges, who should forgive because they hope to be forgiven, for letting momentary feelings drown out the voice of conscience, or reason, whichever you prefer; because, in my perspective, they are the same thing.

Will Mr. Burke be at the trouble to inform us, how far we are to go back to discover the rights of men, since the light of reason is such a fallacious guide that none but fools trust to its cold investigation?

Will Mr. Burke take the trouble to tell us how far we need to look back to understand the rights of men, since reason is such a misleading guide that only fools rely on its dispassionate examination?

In the infancy of society, confining our view to our own country, customs were established by the lawless power of an ambitious individual; or a weak prince was obliged to comply with every demand of the licentious barbarous insurgents, who disputed his authority with irrefragable arguments at the point of their swords; or the more specious requests 14of the Parliament, who only allowed him conditional supplies.

In the early days of society, focusing on our own country, traditions were created by the unchecked power of an ambitious person; or a powerless king had to give in to every demand of the reckless barbarian rebels, who challenged his authority with undeniable arguments backed by their swords; or the more questionable demands of Parliament, which only granted him support under certain conditions. 14

Are these the venerable pillars of our constitution? And is Magna Charta to rest for its chief support on a former grant, which reverts to another, till chaos becomes the base of the mighty structure—or we cannot tell what?—for coherence, without some pervading principle of order, is a solecism.

Are these the respected foundations of our constitution? And is the Magna Carta supposed to rely mainly on an earlier grant, which goes back to another one, until chaos becomes the foundation of this great structure—or we have no idea what?—because coherence, without some guiding principle of order, doesn't make any sense.

Speaking of Edward the IIId. Hume observes, that ‘he was a prince of great capacity, not governed by favourites, not led astray by any unruly passion, sensible that nothing could be more essential to his interests than to keep on good terms with his people: yet, on the whole, it appears that the government, at best, was only a barbarous monarchy, not regulated by any fixed maxims, or bounded by any certain or undisputed rights, which in practice were regularly observed. The King 15conducted himself by one set of principles; the Barons by another; the Commons by a third; the Clergy by a fourth. All these systems of government were opposite and incompatible: each of them prevailed in its turn, as incidents were favourable to it: a great prince rendered the monarchical power predominant: the weakness of a king gave reins to the aristocracy: a superstitious age saw the clergy triumphant: the people, for whom chiefly government was instituted, and who chiefly deserve consideration, were the weakest of the whole.’

Speaking of Edward III, Hume notes that he was a capable prince, not controlled by favorites, and not swayed by any wild passions. He understood that maintaining good relations with his people was crucial to his interests. However, overall, it seems that the government was, at best, just a harsh monarchy, lacking any established principles or clear, universally accepted rights that were consistently followed in practice. The King operated under one set of rules; the Barons followed another; the Commons had a third; and the Clergy adhered to a fourth. All of these government systems were conflicting and incompatible; each one took precedence as circumstances favored it. A strong prince strengthened the monarchy, while a weak king empowered the aristocracy; a superstitious era saw the clergy in power. The people, for whom government was primarily established and who deserved the most attention, were the weakest of all.

And just before that most auspicious æra, the fourteenth century, during the reign of Richard II. whose total incapacity to manage the reins of power, and keep in subjection his haughty Barons, rendered him a mere cypher; the House of Commons, to whom he was obliged frequently to apply, not only for subsidies but assistance to quell the insurrections 16that the contempt in which he was held naturally produced, gradually rose into power; for whenever they granted supplies to the King, they demanded in return, though it bore the name of petition, a confirmation, or the renewal of former charters, which had been infringed, and even utterly disregarded by the King and his seditious Barons, who principally held their independence of the crown by force of arms, and the encouragement which they gave to robbers and villains, who infested the country, and lived by rapine and violence.

And just before that very important era, the fourteenth century, during the reign of Richard II, who was completely unable to handle power and control his proud Barons, rendered him a mere figurehead; the House of Commons, which he often had to turn to not just for funds but also for help in putting down the uprisings that the disrespect he faced naturally caused, gradually gained power. Whenever they provided the King with money, they demanded in return, though it was called a petition, a confirmation or renewal of previous charters that had been violated and even completely ignored by the King and his rebellious Barons, who mainly maintained their independence from the crown through force and by encouraging thieves and criminals who plagued the land and thrived on theft and violence.

To what dreadful extremities were the poorer sort reduced, their property, the fruit of their industry, being entirely at the disposal of their lords, who were so many petty tyrants!

To what terrible extremes were the poorer folks driven, their possessions, the result of their hard work, completely at the mercy of their lords, who acted like petty tyrants!

In return for the supplies and assistance which the king received from the commons, they demanded privileges, which Edward, in his distress for money to prosecute the numerous 17wars in which he was engaged during the greater part of his reign, was constrained to grant them; so that by degrees they rose to power, and became a check on both king and nobles. Thus was the foundation of our liberty established, chiefly through the pressing necessities of the king, who was more intent on being supplied for the moment, in order to carry on his wars and ambitious projects, than aware of the blow he gave to kingly power, by thus making a body of men feel their importance, who afterwards might strenuously oppose tyranny and oppression, and effectually guard the subject’s property from seizure and confiscation. Richard’s weakness completed what Edward’s ambition began.

In exchange for the supplies and help the king received from the common people, they demanded certain privileges. Edward, facing a financial crisis to fund the many wars he fought throughout most of his reign, had no choice but to grant them. Gradually, they gained power and became a check on both the king and the nobles. This laid the groundwork for our freedom, mostly due to the king's urgent need for resources to continue his wars and ambitious plans, rather than realizing he was undermining royal authority by making a group of people aware of their significance. These individuals would later strongly resist tyranny and oppression, effectively protecting the people's property from being seized and confiscated. Richard's weakness finished what Edward's ambition started.

At this period, it is true, Wickliffe opened a vista for reason by attacking some of the most pernicious tenets of the church of Rome; still the prospect was sufficiently misty to 18authorize the question—Where was the dignity of thinking of the fourteenth century?

At this time, it’s true, Wickliffe opened up a pathway for reason by challenging some of the worst beliefs of the Roman Church; however, the view was still quite unclear enough to raise the question—Where was the dignity in thinking during the fourteenth century? 18

A Roman Catholic, it is true, enlightened by the reformation, might, with singular propriety, celebrate the epoch that preceded it, to turn our thoughts from former atrocious enormities; but a Protestant must acknowledge that this faint dawn of liberty only made the subsiding darkness more visible; and that the boasted virtues of that century all bear the stamp of stupid pride and headstrong barbarism. Civility was then called condescension, and ostentatious almsgiving humanity; and men were content to borrow their virtues, or, to speak with more propriety, their consequence, from posterity, rather than undertake the arduous task of acquiring it for themselves.

A Roman Catholic, it’s true, enlightened by the Reformation, might, with a unique sense of appropriateness, celebrate the period that came before it to shift our focus from past horrific atrocities; but a Protestant must admit that this faint dawn of freedom only highlighted the remaining darkness. The so-called virtues of that century all carry the marks of foolish pride and stubborn barbarism. Civility was then known as condescension, and showy charity was seen as humanity; people were happy to borrow their virtues, or to put it more accurately, their importance, from the future rather than take on the challenging task of earning it for themselves.

The imperfection of all modern governments must, without waiting to repeat the 19trite remark, that all human institutions are unavoidably imperfect, in a great measure have arisen from this simple circumstance, that the constitution, if such an heterogeneous mass deserve that name, was settled in the dark days of ignorance, when the minds of men were shackled by the grossest prejudices and most immoral superstition. And do you, Sir, a sagacious philosopher, recommend night as the fittest time to analyze a ray of light?

The flaws in all modern governments must, without needing to reiterate the obvious point that all human institutions are inevitably imperfect, largely stem from the fact that the constitution, if such a mixed collection can even be called that, was established during the dark ages of ignorance, when people's minds were chained by the worst prejudices and the most misguided superstitions. And do you, Sir, a wise philosopher, suggest that night is the best time to examine a beam of light?

Are we to seek for the rights of men in the ages when a few marks were the only penalty imposed for the life of a man, and death for death when the property of the rich was touched? when—I blush to discover the depravity of our nature—when a deer was killed! Are these the laws that it is natural to love, and sacrilegious to invade?—Were the rights of men understood when the law authorized or tolerated murder?—or is power and right the same in your creed?

Are we supposed to look for the rights of people in times when a few coins were the only punishment for taking a man's life, and death was the consequence for touching the property of the wealthy? When—I feel ashamed to acknowledge the flaws in our nature—when a deer was killed! Are these the laws that it's natural to cherish and wrong to challenge? Were people's rights recognized when the law allowed or accepted murder? Or do you believe that power and right are the same thing?

20But in fact all your declamation leads so directly to this conclusion, that I beseech you to ask your own heart, when you call yourself a friend of liberty, whether it would not be more consistent to style yourself the champion of property, the adorer of the golden image which power has set up?—And, when you are examining your heart, if it would not be too much like mathematical drudgery, to which a fine imagination very reluctantly stoops, enquire further, how it is consistent with the vulgar notions of honesty, and the foundation of morality—truth; for a man to boast of his virtue and independence, when he cannot forget that he is at the moment enjoying the wages of falsehood[2]; and that, in a skulking, unmanly way, he has secured himself a pension of fifteen hundred pounds per annum on the Irish establishment? Do honest men, Sir, for I am not rising to the refined principle of 21honour, ever receive the reward of their public services, or secret assistance, in the name of another?

20But honestly, all your speeches lead directly to this point, so I urge you to ask yourself, when you call yourself a friend of freedom, whether it wouldn’t be more fitting to call yourself a supporter of property, someone who worships the golden idol that those in power have created?—And, as you reflect on this, if it doesn’t feel too much like tedious work that a vibrant imagination doesn’t easily accept, think further about how it aligns with common ideas of honesty and the basics of morality—truth; for a person to brag about their virtue and independence when they can’t ignore the fact that they are currently benefiting from deception[2]; and that, in a sneaky, unmanly way, they have secured a pension of fifteen hundred pounds a year from the Irish establishment? Do honest people, Sir, for I’m not talking about the intricate principle of 21honor, ever receive the rewards for their public service or hidden help in the name of another?

But to return from a digression which you will more perfectly understand than any of my readers—on what principle you, Sir, can justify the reformation, which tore up by the roots an old establishment, I cannot guess—but, I beg your pardon, perhaps you do not wish to justify it—and have some mental reservation to excuse you, to yourself, for not openly avowing your reverence. Or, to go further back;—had you been a Jew—you would have joined in the cry, crucify him!—crucify him! The promulgator of a new doctrine, and the violator of old laws and customs, that not melting, like ours, into darkness and ignorance, rested on Divine authority, must have been a dangerous innovator, in your eyes, particularly if you had not been informed that the Carpenter’s Son was of the 22stock and lineage of David. But there is no end to the arguments which might be deduced to combat such palpable absurdities, by shewing the manifest inconsistencies which are necessarily involved in a direful train of false opinions.

But to get back from a tangent that you will understand better than any of my readers—on what grounds you, Sir, can justify the reformation that uprooted an old establishment, I can't guess—but, excuse me, maybe you don't want to justify it—and have some internal reasoning to allow yourself to not openly express your respect. Or, to take it even further back; had you been a Jew—you would have joined in the shout, crucify him!—crucify him! The promoter of a new doctrine and the breaker of old laws and customs, which didn’t fade away like ours into darkness and ignorance, but rested on Divine authority, must have seemed like a dangerous innovator to you, especially if you hadn't been told that the Carpenter’s Son was from the line of David. But there’s no end to the arguments that could be made to counter such obvious absurdities by showing the clear inconsistencies involved in a terrible chain of false beliefs.

It is necessary emphatically to repeat, that there are rights which men inherit at their birth, as rational creatures, who were raised above the brute creation by their improvable faculties; and that, in receiving these, not from their forefathers but, from God, prescription can never undermine natural rights.

It is necessary to strongly emphasize that there are rights that people are born with, as rational beings who have risen above the animal world due to their ability to improve themselves; and that these rights are given not by their ancestors but by God, and that established practices can never diminish natural rights.

A father may dissipate his property without his child having any right to complain;—but should he attempt to sell him for a slave, or fetter him with laws contrary to reason; nature, in enabling him to discern good from evil, teaches him to break the ignoble chain, and not to believe that bread becomes flesh, 23and wine blood, because his parents swallowed the Eucharist with this blind persuasion.

A father can waste his money without his child having any grounds to complain; however, if he tries to sell him into slavery or bind him with unreasonable laws, nature, by allowing him to understand right from wrong, teaches him to break free from that shameful bondage and not to think that bread turns into flesh and wine into blood just because his parents took the Eucharist with this mindless belief. 23

There is no end to this implicit submission to authority—some where it must stop, or we return to barbarism; and the capacity of improvement, which gives us a natural sceptre on earth, is a cheat, an ignis-fatuus, that leads us from inviting meadows into bogs and dunghills. And if it be allowed that many of the precautions, with which any alteration was made, in our government, were prudent, it rather proves its weakness than substantiates an opinion of the soundness of the stamina, or the excellence of the constitution.

There’s no end to this unspoken obedience to authority—at some point, it has to stop, or we’ll slide back into barbarism; and the potential for improvement, which gives us a natural authority here on earth, is a deception, a will-o'-the-wisp, that leads us from beautiful meadows into swamps and garbage heaps. And even if we allow that many of the precautions taken during any changes in our government were wise, it actually shows its weakness rather than proving that its foundation is solid or that the constitution is exceptional.

But on what principle Mr. Burke could defend American independence, I cannot conceive; for the whole tenor of his plausible arguments settles slavery on an everlasting foundation. Allowing his servile reverence for antiquity, and prudent attention to self-interest, to have the force which he insists on, 24the slave trade ought never to be abolished; and, because our ignorant forefathers, not understanding the native dignity of man, sanctioned a traffic that outrages every suggestion of reason and religion, we are to submit to the inhuman custom, and term an atrocious insult to humanity the love of our country, and a proper submission to the laws by which our property is secured.—Security of property! Behold, in a few words, the definition of English liberty. And to this selfish principle every nobler one is sacrificed.—The Briton takes place of the man, and the image of God is lost in the citizen! But it is not that enthusiastic flame which in Greece and Rome consumed every sordid passion: no, self is the focus; and the disparting rays rise not above our foggy atmosphere. But softly—it is only the property of the rich that is secure; the man who lives by the sweat of his brow has no asylum from oppression; the strong man 25may enter—when was the castle of the poor sacred? and the base informer steal him from the family that depend on his industry for subsistence.

But I can't understand on what basis Mr. Burke defends American independence; his arguments only seem to support slavery forever. Even if we accept his blind admiration for the past and careful attention to self-interest as valid, then the slave trade should never be banned. Just because our ignorant ancestors, who didn't recognize the inherent dignity of man, allowed a practice that goes against every principle of reason and religion, we should tolerate this inhuman tradition and call our love for our country and adherence to laws that protect our property a terrible insult to humanity. — Property security! In just a few words, that's what English liberty means. And to this self-serving idea, every more noble value is sacrificed. — The Briton takes precedence over the human, and the divine image is lost in the citizen! But this isn't the passionate fire that burned away all selfish desires in Greece and Rome; no, the focus is on self, and the stray thoughts never rise above our smoggy atmosphere. But wait—only the property of the wealthy is protected; the person who works hard has no refuge from oppression. The strong can come in—since when has the poor person's home been sacred? And the deceitful informer can snatch him away from the family that relies on his labor for survival.

Fully sensible as you must be of the baneful consequences that inevitably follow this notorious infringement on the dearest rights of men, and that it is an infernal blot on the very face of our immaculate constitution, I cannot avoid expressing my surprise that when you recommended our form of government as a model, you did not caution the French against the arbitrary custom of pressing men for the sea service. You should have hinted to them, that property in England is much more secure than liberty, and not have concealed that the liberty of an honest mechanic—his all—is often sacrificed to secure the property of the rich. For it is a farce to pretend that a man fights for his country, his hearth, or his altars, when he has neither liberty nor property.—His 26property is in his nervous arms—and they are compelled to pull a strange rope at the surly command of a tyrannic boy, who probably obtained his rank on account of his family connections, or the prostituted vote of his father, whose interest in a borough, or voice as a senator, was acceptable to the minister.

Fully aware of the harmful consequences that inevitably follow this notorious violation of the most important rights of people, and that it is a disgrace upon the very face of our flawless constitution, I can’t help but express my surprise that when you praised our system of government as a model, you didn’t warn the French about the arbitrary practice of forcing men into naval service. You should have pointed out to them that property in England is much safer than freedom, and not hidden the fact that the freedom of a hardworking person—everything they have—is often sacrificed to protect the property of the wealthy. It’s absurd to pretend that a man fights for his country, his home, or his faith, when he has neither freedom nor property.—His 26property is in his strong arms—and they are forced to pull a foreign rope at the harsh command of a tyrannical boy, who probably got his position because of his family connections, or his father's skewed vote, whose influence in a borough or role as a senator was valuable to the minister.

Our penal laws punish with death the thief who steals a few pounds; but to take by violence, or trepan, a man, is no such heinous offence.—For who shall dare to complain of the venerable vestige of the law that rendered the life of a deer more sacred than that of a man? But it was the poor man with only his native dignity who was thus oppressed—and only metaphysical sophists and cold mathematicians can discern this insubstantial form; it is a work of abstraction—and a gentleman of lively imagination must borrow some drapery from fancy before he can love or pity a man.—Misery, 27to reach your heart, I perceive, must have its cap and bells; your tears are reserved, very naturally considering your character, for the declamation of the theatre, or for the downfall of queens, whose rank alters the nature of folly, and throws a graceful veil over vices that degrade humanity; whilst the distress of many industrious mothers, whose helpmates have been torn from them, and the hungry cry of helpless babes, were vulgar sorrows that could not move your commiseration, though they might extort an alms. ‘The tears that are shed for fictitious sorrow are admirably adapted,’ says Rousseau, ‘to make us proud of all the virtues which we do not possess.’

Our laws punish a thief who steals a few pounds with death, yet violently abducting a person isn’t considered such a serious crime. Who would dare to question the old law that values a deer's life more than a man's? It’s the poor person with only their inherent dignity who suffers—only abstract thinkers and cold mathematicians can see this intangible concept; it's all about abstraction—and a gentleman with a vivid imagination needs to dress it up with creativity to feel love or pity for a man. Misery, to reach your heart, seems to need its cap and bells; your tears are naturally reserved, considering your nature, for theatrical performances or the downfall of queens, whose status changes the perception of foolishness and hides the vices that diminish humanity. Meanwhile, the suffering of countless hardworking mothers, whose partners have been taken from them, and the desperate cries of starving babies are common sorrows that don’t elicit your compassion, even if they might lead to a donation. “The tears shed for made-up suffering are perfectly suited,” says Rousseau, “to make us feel proud of all the virtues we lack.”

The baneful effects of the despotic practice of pressing we shall, in all probability, soon feel; for a number of men, who have been taken from their daily employments, will shortly be let loose on society, now that there is no longer any apprehension of a war.

The harmful effects of the oppressive practice of pressing will likely be felt soon; many men who have been taken from their everyday jobs will soon be released back into society, now that there’s no longer any fear of war.

28The vulgar, and by this epithet I mean not only to describe a class of people, who, working to support the body, have not had time to cultivate their minds; but likewise those who, born in the lap of affluence, have never had their invention sharpened by necessity are, nine out of ten, the creatures of habit and impulse.

28The common people, and by that I mean not only those who labor to make a living and haven't had the chance to develop their minds, but also those who were born into wealth and haven't had their creativity tested by challenges, are, nine out of ten times, driven by routine and instinct.

If I were not afraid to derange your nervous system by the bare mention of a metaphysical enquiry, I should observe, Sir, that self-preservation is, literally speaking, the first law of nature; and that the care necessary to support and guard the body is the first step to unfold the mind, and inspire a manly spirit of independence. The mewing babe in swaddling clothes, who is treated like a superior being, may perchance become a gentleman; but nature must have given him uncommon faculties if, when pleasure hangs on every bough, he has sufficient fortitude either to exercise his 29mind or body in order to acquire personal merit. The passions are necessary auxiliaries of reason: a present impulse pushes us forward, and when we discover that the game did not deserve the chace, we find that we have gone over much ground, and not only gained many new ideas, but a habit of thinking. The exercise of our faculties is the great end, though not the goal we had in view when we started with such eagerness.

If I weren't worried about upsetting your nerves just by bringing up a philosophical topic, I would say, Sir, that self-preservation is, in simple terms, the primary law of nature; and that the effort needed to take care of and protect the body is the first step toward developing the mind and inspiring a strong sense of independence. The crying baby in diapers, who is treated like a higher being, might eventually grow into a gentleman; but nature must have equipped him with exceptional abilities if, when pleasure is all around, he has the courage to engage his mind or body to earn personal worth. Emotions are essential supports for reason: a sudden urge drives us forward, and when we realize that the pursuit wasn’t worth it, we see that we've covered a lot of ground and gained not only new ideas but also a habit of thinking. Exercising our abilities is the ultimate purpose, even if it wasn’t our original goal when we began with such enthusiasm.

It would be straying still further into metaphysics to add, that this is one of the strongest arguments for the natural immortality of the soul.—Every thing looks like a means, nothing like an end, or point of rest, when we can say, now let us sit down and enjoy the present moment; our faculties and wishes are proportioned to the present scene; we may return without repining to our sister clod. And, if no conscious dignity whisper that we are capable of relishing more refined pleasures, the 30thirst of truth appears to be allayed; and thought, the faint type of an immaterial energy, no longer bounding it knows not where, is confined to the tenement that affords it sufficient variety.—The rich man may then thank his God that he is not like other men—but when is retribution to be made to the miserable, who cry day and night for help, and there is no one at hand to help them? And not only misery but immorality proceeds from this stretch of arbitrary authority. The vulgar have not the power of emptying their mind of the only ideas they imbibed whilst their hands were employed; they cannot quickly turn from one kind of life to another. Pressing them entirely unhinges their minds; they acquire new habits, and cannot return to their old occupations with their former readiness; consequently they fall into idleness, drunkenness, and the whole train of vices which you stigmatise as gross.

It would be wandering even further into abstract thinking to add that this is one of the strongest arguments for the natural immortality of the soul. Everything seems like a means, nothing like an end or place of rest, when we can say, now let’s sit down and enjoy the present moment; our abilities and desires fit the current scene; we may go back without regret to our sister earth. And if no conscious dignity reminds us that we’re capable of enjoying more refined pleasures, the thirst for truth seems to be satisfied; and thought, the faint likeness of an immaterial force, no longer wandering aimlessly, is restricted to the space that offers enough variety. The rich man may then thank his God that he is not like other people—but when will the suffering see justice who cry day and night for help, and no one is there to assist them? And not only suffering but also wrongdoing arises from this abuse of power. The common folks do not have the ability to free their minds of the only ideas they picked up while working; they cannot easily shift from one way of life to another. Forcing them to do so completely disrupts their minds; they develop new habits and can’t return to their old jobs with the same ease; as a result, they fall into laziness, drunkenness, and the full range of vices you label as disgraceful.

31A government that acts in this manner cannot be called a good parent, nor inspire natural (habitual is the proper word) affection, in the breasts of children who are thus disregarded.

31A government that behaves this way cannot be seen as a good parent, nor can it foster genuine (the right word is habitual) affection in the hearts of the children who are so neglected.

The game laws are almost as oppressive to the peasantry as press-warrants to the mechanic. In this land of liberty what is to secure the property of the poor farmer when his noble landlord chooses to plant a decoy field near his little property? Game devour the fruit of his labour; but fines and imprisonment await him if he dare to kill any—or lift up his hand to interrupt the pleasure of his lord. How many families have been plunged, in the sporting countries, into misery and vice for some paltry transgression of these coercive laws, by the natural consequence of that anger which a man feels when he sees the reward of his industry laid waste by unfeeling luxury?—when his children’s bread is given to dogs!

The game laws are nearly as oppressive to the peasantry as press warrants are to the working class. In this land of freedom, what protects the property of the struggling farmer when his wealthy landlord decides to set up a decoy field near his small lot? Wildlife consumes the fruits of his labor, but fines and imprisonment await him if he dares to kill any or even try to disrupt his lord’s enjoyment. How many families have been thrown into misery and vice in the sporting regions due to some minor violation of these strict laws, as a result of the anger one feels when seeing the rewards of hard work destroyed by careless luxury?—when his children’s bread is given to dogs!

32You have shewn, Sir, by your silence on these subjects, that your respect for rank has swallowed up the common feelings of humanity; you seem to consider the poor as only the live stock of an estate, the feather of hereditary nobility. When you had so little respect for the silent majesty of misery, I am not surprised at your manner of treating an individual whose brow a mitre will never grace, and whose popularity may have wounded your vanity—for vanity is ever fore. Even in France, Sir, before the revolution, literary celebrity procured a man the treatment of a gentleman; but you are going back for your credentials of politeness to more distant times.—Gothic affability is the mode you think proper to adopt, the condescension of a Baron, not the civility of a liberal man. Politeness is, indeed, the only substitute for humanity; or what distinguishes the civilised man from the unlettered savage? and he who is not governed by reason should 33square his behaviour by an arbitrary standard; but by what rule your attack on Dr. Price was regulated we have yet to learn.

32You have shown, Sir, by your silence on these matters, that your respect for status has overshadowed common human feelings; you seem to view the poor as merely the livestock of an estate, a mere ornament of hereditary nobility. Given your lack of respect for the silent gravity of misery, I’m not surprised by how you treat someone whose forehead will never wear a mitre, and whose popularity may have bruised your ego—because vanity is always front and center. Even in France, Sir, before the revolution, literary recognition granted a man the treatment of a gentleman; yet you seem to be reaching back to more distant times for your standards of politeness. The Gothic friendliness you choose to adopt reflects the condescension of a baron, not the kindness of an educated person. Politeness is, in fact, the only substitute for humanity; what else distinguishes the civilized individual from the uneducated savage? Those who aren’t guided by reason should at least measure their behavior against an arbitrary standard; but we have yet to understand by what rule your critique of Dr. Price was conducted. 33

I agree with you, Sir, that the pulpit is not the place for political discussions, though it might be more excusable to enter on such a subject, when the day was set apart merely to commemorate a political revolution, and no stated duty was encroached upon. I will, however, wave this point, and allow that Dr. Price’s zeal may have carried him further than sound reason can justify. I do also most cordially coincide with you, that till we can see the remote consequences of things, present calamities must appear in the ugly form of evil, and excite our commiseration. The good that time slowly educes from them may be hid from mortal eye, or dimly seen; whilst sympathy compels man to feel for man, and almost restrains the hand that would amputate a limb to save the whole body. But, after 34making this concession, allow me to expostulate with you, and calmly hold up the glass which will shew you your partial feelings.

I agree with you, sir, that the pulpit isn’t the right place for political debates, although it might be more understandable to discuss such a topic on a day set aside specifically to commemorate a political revolution, as long as no specific duty is being neglected. However, I’ll set that point aside and acknowledge that Dr. Price’s passion might have led him further than what sound judgment would support. I also fully agree with you that until we can see the long-term effects of events, current disasters will appear as clear evils and will understandably evoke our compassion. The good that time slowly brings from them may be hidden from our sight or only partially visible; meanwhile, empathy urges us to care for one another, almost stopping us from taking drastic actions, like amputating a limb to save the whole body. But, after acknowledging this, let me challenge you a bit and calmly hold up a mirror to show you your biased feelings.

In reprobating Dr. Price’s opinions you might have spared the man; and if you had had but half as much reverence for the grey hairs of virtue as for the accidental distinctions of rank, you would not have treated with such indecent familiarity and supercilious contempt, a member of the community whose talents and modest virtues place him high in the scale of moral excellence. I am not accustomed to look up with vulgar awe, even when mental superiority exalts a man above his fellows; but still the sight of a man whose habits are fixed by piety and reason, and whose virtues are consolidated into goodness, commands my homage—and I should touch his errors with a tender hand when I made a parade of my sensibility. Granting, for a moment, that Dr. Price’s political opinions are Utopian reveries, 35and that the world is not yet sufficiently civilized to adopt such a sublime system of morality; they could, however, only be the reveries of a benevolent mind. Tottering on the verge of the grave, that worthy man in his whole life never dreamt of struggling for power or riches; and, if a glimpse of the glad dawn of liberty rekindled the fire of youth in his veins, you, who could not stand the fascinating glance of a great Lady’s eyes, when neither virtue nor sense beamed in them, might have pardoned his unseemly transport,—if such it must be deemed.

In condemning Dr. Price’s views, you could have shown some respect for the man. If you had even a fraction of the respect for the wisdom that comes with age as you do for the arbitrary distinctions of social status, you wouldn’t have treated a valuable member of the community—whose talents and humble virtues place him at a high level of moral excellence—with such disrespect and arrogance. I don’t usually look up to someone with blind awe, even when their intellect sets them apart from others; but still, just seeing a man whose life is guided by piety and reason, and whose virtues are solidly grounded in goodness, earns my respect—and I would approach his faults with sensitivity while expressing my feelings. Assuming for a moment that Dr. Price’s political ideas are idealistic fantasies, and that the world isn’t yet advanced enough to embrace such a noble system of ethics; they would still only reflect the thoughts of a kind-hearted person. Nearing the end of his life, this good man never dreamed of fighting for power or wealth; and if a glimpse of the promising dawn of freedom sparked youthful passion in him, you—who struggled to resist the enchanting gaze of a great lady when neither virtue nor intellect shone in her eyes—might have forgiven his seemingly inappropriate enthusiasm, if that’s how it must be regarded.

I could almost fancy that I now see this respectable old man, in his pulpit, with hands clasped, and eyes devoutly fixed, praying with all the simple energy of unaffected piety; or, when more erect, inculcating the dignity of virtue, and enforcing the doctrines his life adorns; benevolence animated each feature, and persuasion attuned his accents; the preacher 36grew eloquent, who only laboured to be clear; and the respect that he extorted, seemed only the respect due to personified virtue and matured wisdom.—Is this the man you brand with so many opprobrious epithets? he whose private life will stand the test of the strictest enquiry—away with such unmanly sarcasms, and puerile conceits.—But, before I close this part of my animadversions, I must convict you of wilful misrepresentation and wanton abuse.

I can almost picture this respectable old man in his pulpit, hands clasped and eyes devoutly focused, praying with the genuine energy of true faith. Or, when standing tall, teaching the value of virtue and emphasizing the principles his life embodies; kindness lit up his face, and his voice was persuasive. The preacher became eloquent, only striving for clarity; the respect he commanded felt like the respect owed to embodied virtue and wisdom gained through experience. Is this the guy you label with all those harsh names? The one whose private life would hold up under the strictest scrutiny? Let go of those cowardly jabs and childish ideas. But before I wrap up this part of my criticisms, I need to point out your deliberate misrepresentation and reckless attacks.

Dr. Price, when he reasons on the necessity of men attending some place of public worship, concisely obviates an objection that has been made in the form of an apology, by advising those, who do not approve of our Liturgy, and cannot find any mode of worship out of the church, in which they can conscientiously join, to establish one for themselves. This plain advice you have tortured into a very different meaning, and represented the preacher 37as actuated by a dissenting phrensy, recommending dissensions, ‘not to diffuse truth, but to spread contradictions[3].’ A simple question will silence this impertinent declamation.—What is truth? A few fundamental truths meet the first enquiry of reason, and appear as clear to an unwarped mind, as that air and bread are necessary to enable the body to fulfil its vital functions; but the opinions which men discuss with so much heat must be simplified and brought back to first principles; or who can discriminate the vagaries of the imagination, or scrupulosity of weakness, from the verdict of reason? Let all these points be demonstrated, and not determined by arbitrary authority and dark traditions, lest a dangerous supineness should take place; for probably, in ceasing to enquire, our reason would remain dormant, and delivered up, without a curb, to every impulse of passion, we might 38soon lose sight of the clear light which the exercise of our understanding no longer kept alive. To argue from experience, it should seem as if the human mind, averse to thought, could only be opened by necessity; for, when it can take opinions on trust, it gladly lets the spirit lie quiet in its gross tenement. Perhaps the most improving exercise of the mind, confining the argument to the enlargement of the understanding, is the restless enquiries that hover on the boundary, or stretch over the dark abyss of uncertainty. These lively conjectures are the breezes that preserve the still lake from stagnating. We should be aware of confining all moral excellence to one channel, however capacious; or, if we are so narrow-minded, we should not forget how much we owe to chance that our inheritance was not Mahometism; and that the iron hand of destiny, in the shape of deeply rooted authority, has not suspended the sword of destruction 39over our heads. But to return to the misrepresentation.

Dr. Price, when he discusses the need for people to attend a public place of worship, straightforwardly addresses an objection that has been made as an excuse by suggesting that those who don't like our Liturgy and can't find a way to worship outside the church that they can sincerely support should create one for themselves. You have twisted this simple advice into a completely different meaning and portrayed the preacher as driven by a dissenting mania, recommending division, "not to spread truth, but to spread contradictions." A simple question will end this pointless argument—What is truth? A few basic truths answer the first inquiry of reason and are as clear to an unbiased mind as the fact that air and food are necessary for the body to function; however, the opinions that people debate with such passion need to be simplified and returned to their fundamental principles, or how can one separate the whims of imagination or the doubts of weakness from the conclusions of reason? All these issues should be established through proof and not decided by arbitrary authority and obscure traditions, lest we fall into a dangerous complacency; because if we stop questioning, our reason might fall asleep, and, unchecked by any restraint, we could easily be swayed by every impulse of passion, leading us to lose sight of the clear light that our understanding no longer sustains. Arguing from experience, it seems the human mind, resistant to thought, can only be awakened by necessity; when it can accept opinions blindly, it happily allows the spirit to remain still in its crude form. Perhaps the most beneficial exercise for the mind, focusing solely on expanding understanding, is the relentless inquiries that hover on the edge or stretch across the dark void of uncertainty. These vibrant speculations are the fresh breezes that keep the still lake from becoming stagnant. We should be cautious not to restrict all moral goodness to a single path, no matter how wide; or, if we are so myopic, we should remember how much we owe to chance that our legacy wasn't Islam and that the harsh grip of fate, in the form of entrenched authority, hasn't held the sword of destruction over us. But back to the misrepresentation.

[4]Blackstone, to whom Mr. Burke pays great deference, seems to agree with Dr. Price, that the succession of the King of Great Britain depends on the choice of the people, or that 40they have a power to cut it off; but this power, as you have fully proved, has been cautiously exerted, and might with more propriety be termed a right than a power. Be it so!—yet when you elaborately cited precedents to shew that our forefathers paid great respect to hereditary claims, you might have gone back to your favourite epoch, and shewn their respect for a church that fulminating laws have since loaded with opprobrium. The preponderance of inconsistencies, when weighed with precedents, should lessen the most bigoted veneration for antiquity, and force men 41of the eighteenth century to acknowledge, that our canonized forefathers were unable, or afraid, to revert to reason, without resting on the crutch of authority; and should not be brought as a proof that their children are never to be allowed to walk alone.

[4]Blackstone, whom Mr. Burke respects greatly, seems to agree with Dr. Price that the succession of the King of Great Britain depends on the people's choice, or that they have the power to end it; however, this power, as you have thoroughly demonstrated, has been carefully exercised and could more appropriately be called a right rather than a power. So be it!—yet when you carefully cited examples to show that our ancestors greatly valued hereditary claims, you might have referred back to your favorite period and shown their respect for a church that later laws have burdened with disgrace. The weight of inconsistencies, when compared with precedents, should diminish even the most devoted reverence for the past, compelling people of the eighteenth century to recognize that our canonized forefathers were either unable or unwilling to return to reason without relying on the crutch of authority; and this should not be used as evidence that their descendants should never be allowed to stand on their own.

When we doubt the infallible wisdom of our ancestors, it is only advancing on the same ground to doubt the sincerity of the law, and the propriety of that servile appellation—our Sovereign Lord the King. Who were the dictators of this adulatory language of the law? Were they not courtly parasites and worldly priests? Besides, whoever at divine service, whose feelings were not deadened by habit, or their understandings quiescent, ever repeated without horror the same epithets applied to a man and his Creator? If this is confused jargon—say what are the dictates of sober reason, or the criterion to distinguish nonsense?

When we doubt the unquestionable wisdom of our ancestors, it's only logical to also doubt the sincerity of the law and the appropriateness of that flattering title—our Sovereign Lord the King. Who came up with this flattering language of the law? Were they not sycophantic courtiers and worldly priests? Furthermore, who at a divine service, with feelings not dulled by habit or their minds not inactive, ever repeated, without horror, the same titles given to a man and his Creator? If this is just confusing talk—then what are the principles of clear reason, or the standards to differentiate nonsense?

42You further sarcastically animadvert on the consistency of the democratists, by wresting the obvious meaning of a common phrase, the dregs of the people; or your contempt for poverty may have led you into an error. Be that as it may, an unprejudiced man would have directly perceived the single sense of the word, and an old Member of Parliament could scarcely have missed it. He who had so often felt the pulse of the electors needed not have gone beyond his own experience to discover that the dregs alluded to were the vicious, and not the lower class of the community.

42You sarcastically point out the inconsistency of the democrats by twisting the clear meaning of a common phrase, the dregs of the people; or perhaps your disdain for poverty has led you astray. Regardless, an unbiased person would have easily understood the true meaning of the term, and an experienced Member of Parliament should have definitely recognized it. Someone who has often gauged the opinions of voters wouldn’t need to look beyond their own understanding to see that the dregs refer to the morally corrupt, not the lower class of society.

Again, Sir, I must doubt your sincerity or your discernment.—You have been behind the curtain; and, though it might be difficult to bring back your sophisticated heart to nature and make you feel like a man, yet the awestruck confusion in which you were plunged must have gone off when the vulgar emotion of 43wonder, excited by finding yourself a Senator, had subsided. Then you must have seen the clogged wheels of corruption continually oiled by the sweat of the laborious poor, squeezed out of them by unceasing taxation. You must have discovered that the majority in the House of Commons was often purchased by the crown, and that the people were oppressed by the influence of their own money, extorted by the venal voice of a packed representation.

Once again, Sir, I have to question your sincerity or your understanding. You’ve seen behind the scenes; and while it might be hard to reconnect your jaded heart with genuine feeling and make you experience life like a real person, the overwhelming confusion you felt must have faded once the basic excitement of being a Senator wore off. By then, you should have noticed the corrupt systems continually fueled by the hard work of the struggling poor, who are squeezed dry by relentless taxes. You must have realized that the majority in the House of Commons was often bought off by the crown, and that the people were being burdened by the very money they earned, taken from them through a biased representation.

You must have known that a man of merit cannot rise in the church, the army, or navy, unless he has some interest in a borough; and that even a paltry exciseman’s place can only be secured by electioneering interest. I will go further, and assert that few Bishops, though there have been learned and good Bishops, have gained the mitre without submitting to a servility of dependence that degrades the man.—All these circumstances you must have known, yet you talk of virtue and liberty, 44as the vulgar talk of the letter of the law; and the polite of propriety. It is true that these ceremonial observances produce decorum; the sepulchres are white-washed, and do not offend the squeamish eyes of high rank; but virtue is out of the question when you only worship a shadow, and worship it to secure your property.

You must know that a deserving person can’t get ahead in the church, the army, or the navy without some connection to a district; and even a lowly position as an exciseman can only be obtained through political favors. I’ll go even further and say that few Bishops, despite having been wise and good, have achieved the bishopric without submitting to a humiliating dependence that diminishes their worth. You must be aware of all this, yet you speak of virtue and freedom, just like the average person talks about the letter of the law; and the refined discuss propriety. It’s true that these formal customs create decorum; the tombs are painted over and don’t offend the sensitive eyes of the elite; but true virtue is out of the question when you’re only worshipping a façade, and doing it to protect your own interests.

Man has been termed, with strict propriety, a microcosm, a little world in himself.—He is so;—yet must, however, be reckoned an ephemera, or, to adopt your figure of rhetoric, a summer’s fly. The perpetuation of property in our families is one of the privileges you most warmly contend for; yet it would not be very difficult to prove that the mind must have a very limited range that thus confines its benevolence to such a narrow circle, which, with great propriety, may be included in the sordid calculations of blind self-love.

Man has been rightly called a microcosm, a small world in himself. He is, indeed; but he should also be seen as an ephemeral being, or, to use your rhetorical figure, a summer fly. The passing down of property within our families is one of the privileges you passionately support; however, it wouldn’t be hard to show that a mind restricted in such a way has a limited perspective, confining its kindness to such a small scope, which can be aptly seen as part of the selfish calculations of blind self-interest.

45A brutal attachment to children has appeared most conspicuous in parents who have treated them like slaves, and demanded due homage for all the property they transferred to them, during their lives. It has led them to force their children to break the most sacred ties; to do violence to a natural impulse, and run into legal prostitution to increase wealth or shun poverty; and, still worse, the dread of parental malediction has made many weak characters violate truth in the face of Heaven; and, to avoid a father’s angry curse, the most sacred promises have been broken. It appears to be a natural suggestion of reason, that a man should be freed from implicit obedience to parents and private punishments, when he is of an age to be subject to the jurisdiction of the laws of his country; and that the barbarous cruelty of allowing parents to imprison their children, to prevent their contaminating their noble blood by following the 46dictates of nature when they chose to marry, or for any misdemeanor that does not come under the cognizance of public justice, is one of the most arbitrary violations of liberty.

45A harsh attachment to children has become most noticeable in parents who have treated them like property and demanded recognition for everything they gave them during their lives. This has pushed them to force their children to break the strongest bonds; to go against natural instincts, and resort to unethical ways to gain wealth or avoid poverty; and, even worse, the fear of a parent's curse has driven many weak individuals to lie, even in front of God; and to escape a father's wrath, the most sacred promises have been broken. It seems reasonable that a person should be free from blind obedience to parents and private punishments when they reach an age where they are subject to the laws of their country; and that the cruel practice of allowing parents to imprison their children to prevent them from marrying according to their own choice, or for any minor misdeed that doesn’t involve public justice, is one of the most arbitrary violations of freedom. 46

Who can recount all the unnatural crimes which the laudable, interesting desire of perpetuating a name has produced? The younger children have been sacrificed to the eldest son; sent into exile, or confined in convents, that they might not encroach on what was called, with shameful falsehood, the family estate. Will Mr. Burke call this parental affection reasonable or virtuous?—No; it is the spurious offspring of over-weening, mistaken pride—and not that first source of civilization, natural parental affection, that makes no difference between child and child, but what reason justifies by pointing out superior merit.

Who can list all the unnatural crimes that the admirable, intriguing desire to keep a name alive has caused? The younger children have been sacrificed for the eldest son; sent into exile or locked away in convents so they wouldn’t infringe on what was falsely called the family estate. Will Mr. Burke call this parental love reasonable or virtuous?—No; it’s the false result of excessive, misguided pride—and not that original source of civilization, natural parental love, which makes no distinction between child and child except what reason justifies by highlighting superior merit.

Another pernicious consequence which unavoidably arises from this artificial affection is, the insuperable bar which it puts in the way 47of early marriages. It would be difficult to determine whether the minds or bodies of our youth are most injured by this impediment. Our young men become selfish coxcombs, and gallantry with modest women, and intrigues with those of another description, weaken both mind and body, before either has arrived at maturity. The character of a master of a family, a husband, and a father, forms the citizen imperceptibly, by producing a sober manliness of thought, and orderly behaviour; but, from the lax morals and depraved affections of the libertine, what results?—a finical man of taste, who is only anxious to secure his own private gratifications, and to maintain his rank in society.

Another harmful outcome that inevitably comes from this fake affection is the significant barrier it creates to early marriages. It’s hard to say whether young people’s minds or bodies are more negatively affected by this obstacle. Our young men become selfish show-offs, and their flirtations with modest women and affairs with others weaken both their minds and bodies before either is fully developed. The role of a family leader, husband, and father subtly shapes a citizen by fostering a sense of mature thought and responsible behavior; however, what do we get from the loose morals and corrupted feelings of a libertine?—a fussy person focused only on securing his own pleasures and maintaining his status in society.

The same system has an equally pernicious effect on female morals.—Girls are sacrificed to family convenience, or else marry to settle themselves in a superior rank, and coquet, without restraint, with the fine gentleman 48whom I have already described. And to such lengths has this vanity, this desire of shining, carried them, that it is not now necessary to guard girls against imprudent love matches; for if some widows did not now and then fall in love, Love and Hymen would seldom meet, unless at a village church.

The same system has a similarly harmful effect on women's morals. Girls are sacrificed for family convenience, or they marry to elevate their social status and flirt, without hesitation, with the suave gentlemen I've already mentioned. This vanity and desire to stand out have gotten so extreme that it's no longer necessary to protect girls from impulsive romantic relationships; if it weren't for the occasional widow falling in love, romance and marriage would rarely happen, except at a small-town church. 48

I do not intend to be sarcastically paradoxical when I say, that women of fashion take husbands that they may have it in their power to coquet, the grand business of genteel life, with a number of admirers, and thus flutter the spring of life away, without laying up any store for the winter of age, or being of any use to society. Affection in the marriage state can only be founded on respect—and are these weak beings respectable? Children are neglected for lovers, and we express surprise that adulteries are so common! A woman never forgets to adorn herself to make an impression on the senses of the other sex, and to extort 49the homage which it is gallant to pay, and yet we wonder that they have such confined understandings!

I don’t mean to be sarcastically contradictory when I say that fashionable women marry so they can flirt, which is the main focus of high society, with a number of admirers. They end up wasting the best years of their lives without saving anything for the old age or being of any real value to society. Love in marriage can only be built on respect—so are these fragile beings really respectable? Children are ignored for lovers, and we act surprised that affairs are so common! A woman never forgets to dress up to catch the attention of men and to elicit the admiration that it’s considered chivalrous to give, and yet we’re puzzled that they have such limited minds!

Have ye not heard that we cannot serve two masters? an immoderate desire to please contracts the faculties, and immerges, to borrow the idea of a great philosopher, the soul in matter, till it becomes unable to mount on the wing of contemplation.

Have you not heard that we cannot serve two masters? An excessive desire to please constricts our abilities and, to borrow the idea of a great philosopher, submerges the soul in the material world, until it becomes unable to rise to the heights of contemplation.

It would be an arduous task to trace all the vice and misery that arise in society from the middle class of people apeing the manners of the great. All are aiming to procure respect on account of their property; and most places are considered as sinecures that enable men to start into notice. The grand concern of three parts out of four is to contrive to live above their equals, and to appear to be richer than they are. How much domestic comfort and private satisfaction is sacrificed to this irrational ambition! It is a destructive mildew 50that blights the fairest virtues; benevolence, friendship, generosity, and all those endearing charities which bind human hearts together, and the pursuits which raise the mind to higher contemplations, all that were not cankered in the bud by the false notions that ‘grew with its growth and strengthened with its strength,’ are crushed by the iron hand of property!

It would be a tough task to trace all the problems and suffering in society that come from the middle class trying to imitate the wealthy. Everyone is trying to gain respect because of their money; and many positions are seen as easy jobs that allow people to gain attention. The main concern for three out of four people is figuring out how to live above their peers and seem richer than they actually are. How much home comfort and personal satisfaction is sacrificed for this unrealistic ambition! It’s a destructive force that ruins the best virtues; kindness, friendship, generosity, and all those loving qualities that connect people, along with pursuits that elevate the mind to greater thoughts, all that weren’t stunted at the start by the false ideas that ‘grew with its growth and strengthened with its strength,’ are crushed by the harsh reality of wealth! 50

Property, I do not scruple to aver it, should be fluctuating, which would be the case, if it were more equally divided amongst all the children of a family; else it is an everlasting rampart, in consequence of a barbarous feudal institution, that enables the elder son to overpower talents and depress virtue.

Property, I’m not afraid to say, should be variable, which would happen if it were divided more equally among all the children in a family; otherwise, it becomes a permanent barrier due to a cruel feudal system that allows the eldest son to overshadow talent and undermine virtue.

Besides, an unmanly servility, most inimical to true dignity of character is, by this means, fostered in society. Men of some abilities play on the follies of the rich, and mounting to fortune as they degrade themselves, they stand 51in the way of men of superior talents, who cannot advance in such crooked paths, or wade through the filth which parasites never boggle at. Pursuing their way straight forward, their spirit is either bent or broken by the rich man’s contumelies, or the difficulties they have to encounter.

Besides, an unmanly servility, which is very harmful to true dignity of character, is encouraged in society this way. Some capable men exploit the foolishness of the wealthy, and as they rise to fortune by degrading themselves, they obstruct the way for more talented individuals who can’t succeed in such twisted paths or wade through the muck that parasites never shy away from. By continuing on their straight path, their spirit is either bent or broken by the rich man's insults or the challenges they have to face. 51

The only security of property that nature authorizes and reason sanctions is, the right a man has to enjoy the acquisitions which his talents and industry have acquired; and to bequeath them to whom he chooses. Happy would it be for the world if there were no other road to wealth or honour; if pride, in the shape of parental affection, did not absorb the man, and prevent friendship from having the same weight as relationship. Luxury and effeminacy would not then introduce so much idiotism into the noble families which form one of the pillars of our state: the ground would not lie fallow, nor would undirected activity 52of mind spread the contagion of restless idleness, and its concomitant, vice, through the whole mass of society.

The only security for property that nature allows and reason supports is the right a person has to enjoy the wealth they’ve earned through their talents and hard work, and to pass it on to whoever they choose. It would be great for the world if there were no other path to wealth or honor; if pride, in the form of parental love, didn’t overwhelm a person and prevent friendship from being valued as much as family ties. Luxury and indulgence wouldn’t bring so much foolishness into the noble families that are one of the foundations of our society: the land wouldn’t remain unused, and unstructured thinking wouldn’t spread the infection of restless idleness and its side effect, vice, throughout society. 52

Instead of gaming they might nourish a virtuous ambition, and love might take place of the gallantry which you, with knightly fealty, venerate. Women would probably then act like mothers, and the fine lady, become a rational woman, might think it necessary to superintend her family and suckle her children, in order to fulfil her part of the social compact. But vain is the hope, whilst great masses of property are hedged round by hereditary honours; for numberless vices, forced in the hot-bed of wealth, assume a sightly form to dazzle the senses and cloud the understanding. The respect paid to rank and fortune damps every generous purpose of the soul, and stifles the natural affections on which human contentment ought to be built. Who will venturously ascend the steeps of 53virtue, or explore the great deep for knowledge, when the one thing needful, attained by less arduous exertions, if not inherited, procures the attention man naturally pants after, and vice ‘loses half its evil by losing all its grossness[5].’—What a sentiment to come from a moral pen!

Instead of gaming, they could cultivate a virtuous ambition, and love could replace the gallantry that you, with knightly loyalty, admire. Women would likely then behave more like mothers, and the refined lady, becoming a reasonable woman, might see it as essential to oversee her family and nurse her children to fulfill her role in society. But that hope is futile while large amounts of wealth are protected by hereditary honors; countless vices grow in the fertile soil of wealth, taking on a pleasing appearance that dazzles the senses and clouds judgment. The respect given to rank and wealth dampens every noble aspiration of the soul and stifles the natural affections on which human happiness should be based. Who will boldly climb the heights of virtue or dive deep for knowledge when the one thing truly needed, achieved with less strenuous effort, if not inherited, secures the attention that people naturally crave, and vice loses half its evil by losing all its grossness? What a thought to come from a moral writer!

A surgeon would tell you that by skinning over a wound you spread disease through the whole frame; and, surely, they indirectly aim at destroying all purity of morals, who poison the very source of virtue, by smearing a sentimental varnish over vice, to hide its natural deformity. Stealing, whoring, and drunkenness, are gross vices, I presume, though they may not obliterate every moral sentiment, and have a vulgar brand that makes them appear with all their native deformity; but overreaching, adultery, and coquetry, are venial offences, though they reduce virtue to an 54empty name, and make wisdom consist in saving appearances.

A surgeon would tell you that covering up a wound spreads disease throughout the entire body; and, it's true, those who corrupt the very source of virtue by applying a sentimental gloss over vice to hide its true ugliness aim to destroy all moral purity. Stealing, prostitution, and drunkenness are serious vices, I think, even if they don’t erase all moral feelings and carry a crude stigma that reveals their inherent ugliness. But deceit, adultery, and flirtation are minor sins, even though they turn virtue into a meaningless label and make wisdom about maintaining appearances. 54

‘On this scheme of things[6] a king is but a man; a queen is but a woman; a woman is but an animal, and an animal not of the highest order.’—All true, Sir; if she is not more attentive to the duties of humanity than queens and fashionable ladies in general are, I will still further accede to the opinion you have so justly conceived of the spirit which begins to animate this age.—‘All homage paid to the sex in general, as such, and without distinct views, is to be regarded as romance and folly.’ Undoubtedly; because such homage vitiates them, prevents their endeavouring to obtain solid personal merit; and, in short, makes those beings vain inconsiderate dolls, who ought to be prudent mothers and useful members of society. ‘Regicide and sacrilege are but fictions of superstition 55corrupting jurisprudence, by destroying its simplicity. The murder of a king, or a queen, or a bishop, are only common homicide.’—Again I agree with you; but you perceive, Sir, that by leaving out the word father, I think the whole extent of the comparison invidious.

‘In this scheme of things[6] a king is just a man; a queen is just a woman; a woman is just an animal, and not even the highest type of one.’—That’s true, Sir; if she doesn’t pay more attention to her human responsibilities than queens and fashionable women typically do, I will further agree with your well-formed opinion about the spirit starting to emerge in this age.—‘Any respect shown to women as a group, without specific reasons, is just romance and nonsense.’ Absolutely; because such respect undermines them, stops them from striving for real personal worth; and ultimately turns them into vain, thoughtless dolls, when they should be sensible mothers and contributing members of society. ‘Killing a king or queen, or a bishop, is just regular murder, and the ideas of regicide and sacrilege are simply superstitions that corrupt the law by complicating its straightforwardness.’—Once again, I agree with you; but you notice, Sir, that by omitting the word father, I find the whole comparison unfair.

You further proceed grossly to misrepresent Dr. Price’s meaning; and, with an affectation of holy fervour, express your indignation at his profaning a beautiful rapturous ejaculation, when alluding to the King of France’s submission to the National Assembly[7]; he rejoiced to hail a glorious revolution, which promised an universal diffusion of liberty and happiness.

You continue to seriously misinterpret Dr. Price’s meaning; and, with an exaggerated display of righteous passion, you express your outrage at his misuse of a beautiful, heartfelt expression when referring to the King of France’s submission to the National Assembly[7]; he was excited to celebrate a glorious revolution that promised widespread freedom and happiness.

Observe, Sir, that I called your piety affectation.—A rant to enable you to point your 56venomous dart, and round your period. I speak with warmth, because, of all hypocrites, my soul most indignantly spurns a religious one;—and I very cautiously bring forward such a heavy charge, to strip you of your cloak of sanctity. Your speech at the time the bill for a regency was agitated now lies before me.—Then you could in direct terms, to promote ambitious or interested views, exclaim without any pious qualms—‘Ought they to make a mockery of him, putting a crown of thorns on his head, a reed in his hand, and dressing him in a raiment of purple, cry, Hail! King of the British!’ Where was your sensibility when you could utter this cruel mockery, equally insulting to God and man? Go hence, thou slave of impulse, look into the private recesses of thy heart, and take not a mote from thy brother’s eye, till thou hast removed the beam from thine own.

Look here, Sir, I called your religious devotion fake. It's just a show to help you sharpen your venomous words and finish your sentences dramatically. I speak passionately because, more than any other kind of hypocrite, I despise a religious one the most; and I bring this serious accusation forward carefully, to expose your false piety. Your speech from when the regency bill was being discussed is now in front of me. Back then, you could directly voice your ambitious or selfish agenda, shouting without any pious hesitation—‘Should they mock him, placing a crown of thorns on his head, a reed in his hand, and dressing him in purple, shouting, Hail! King of the British!’ Where was your sensitivity when you could say such a cruel mockery, which insults both God and humanity? Step away, you slave to your impulses, look deep into your heart, and don't try to take a speck from your brother's eye until you've removed the log from your own.

57Of your partial feelings I shall take another view, and shew that ‘following nature, which is,’ you say, ‘wisdom without reflection, and above it’—has led you into great inconsistences, to use the softest phrase. When, on a late melancholy occasion, a very important question was agitated, with what indecent warmth did you treat a woman, for I shall not lay any stress on her title, whose conduct in life has deserved praise, though not, perhaps, the servile elogiums which have been lavished on the queen. But sympathy, and you tell us that you have a heart of flesh, was made to give way to party spirit, and the feelings of a man, not to allude to your romantic gallantry, to the views of the statesman. When you descanted on the horrors of the 6th of October, and gave a glowing, and, in some instances, a most exaggerated description of 58that infernal night, without having troubled yourself to clean your palette, you might have returned home and indulged us with a sketch of the misery you personally aggravated.

57I'll look at your mixed feelings from a different angle and show that “following nature, which is,” as you say, “wisdom without reflection, and above it”—has led you into significant inconsistencies, to put it mildly. When a very important issue was recently discussed amid a somber atmosphere, how inappropriately did you address a woman—I'm not going to focus on her title—who has conducted herself in a way that deserves praise, though not necessarily the uncritical praise that’s been heaped on the queen. But empathy, and you tell us you have a heart of flesh, was sacrificed to party loyalty, and your feelings as a man, not to mention your romantic bravado, were overshadowed by the ambitions of a politician. When you spoke about the horrors of October 6th and gave an impassioned—and in some cases, excessively dramatic—account of that dreadful night, without bothering to step back and reconsider, you could have gone home and shared a perspective on the suffering you personally contributed to. 58

With what eloquence might you not have insinuated, that the sight of unexpected misery and strange reverse of fortune makes the mind recoil on itself; and, pondering, traced the uncertainty of all human hope, the frail foundation of sublunary grandeur! What a climax lay before you. A father torn from his children,—a husband from an affectionate wife,—a man from himself! And not torn by the resistless stroke of death, for time would then have lent its aid to mitigate remediless sorrow; but that living death, which only kept hope alive in the corroding form of suspense, was a calamity that called for all your pity.

With what eloquence might you not have suggested that seeing unexpected suffering and a strange twist of fate makes the mind turn inward; and, reflecting, realize the uncertainty of all human hope, the fragile foundation of worldly greatness! What a climax lay ahead of you. A father separated from his children—a husband from a loving wife—a man from himself! And not torn apart by the unstoppable force of death, because time would then have helped to soften the unbearable grief; but that living death, which only kept hope alive in the painful form of suspense, was a tragedy that demanded all your compassion.

The sight of august ruins, of a depopulated country—what are they to a disordered soul! 59when all the faculties are mixed in wild confusion. It is then indeed we tremble for humanity—and, if some wild fancy chance to cross the brain, we fearfully start, and pressing our hand against our brow, ask if we are yet men?—if our reason is undisturbed?—if judgment hold the helm? Marius might sit with dignity on the ruins of Carthage, and the wretch in the Bastille, who longed in vain to see the human face divine, might yet view the operations of his own mind, and vary the leaden prospect by new combinations of thought: poverty, shame, and even slavery, may be endured by the virtuous man—he has still a world to range in—but the loss of reason appears a monstrous flaw in the moral world, that eludes all investigation, and humbles without enlightening.

The sight of grand ruins and an empty country—what do they mean to a troubled mind! 59when all our thoughts are in a chaotic mix. It’s in those moments we truly worry for humanity—and if some crazy idea crosses our mind, we jump, pressing our hand to our forehead, wondering if we are still human?—if our reason is still intact?—if our judgment is still in control? Marius could sit with pride among the ruins of Carthage, and the unfortunate soul in the Bastille, who longed in vain to see a kind face, might still observe the workings of his own mind and change his grim outlook with new ideas: poverty, shame, and even slavery can be endured by a good person—he still has a world to explore—but the loss of reason seems like a terrible flaw in the moral order, which escapes understanding and brings us down without giving clarity.

In this state was the King, when you, with unfeeling disrespect, and indecent haste, wished to strip him of all his hereditary honours.—You 60were so eager to taste the sweets of power, that you could not wait till time had determined, whether a dreadful delirium would settle into a confirmed madness; but, prying into the secrets of Omnipotence, you thundered out that God had hurled him from his throne, and that it was the most insulting mockery to recollect that he had been a king, or to treat him with any particular respect on account of his former dignity.—And who was the monster whom Heaven had thus awfully deposed, and smitten with such an angry blow? Surely as harmless a character as Lewis XVIth; and the queen of Great Britain, though her heart may not be enlarged by generosity, who will presume to compare her character with that of the queen of France?

In this state was the King when you, with blatant disrespect and hasty urgency, wanted to strip him of all his hereditary honors. You were so eager to enjoy the perks of power that you couldn't wait to see if a terrible delirium would turn into full-blown madness; instead, you intruded into the secrets of the Almighty and proclaimed that God had thrown him from his throne, insisting it was the most insulting mockery to remember he had been a king or to show him any special respect because of his past dignity. And who was the monster that Heaven had so horrifically deposed and struck with such a fierce blow? Surely as harmless a person as Louis XVI; and the queen of Great Britain, though her heart may not be filled with generosity, who would dare to compare her character with that of the queen of France?

Where then was the infallibility of that extolled instinct which rises above reason? was it warped by vanity, or hurled from its throne by self-interest? To your own heart answer 61these questions in the sober hours of reflection—and, after reviewing this gust of passion, learn to respect the sovereignty of reason.

Where was the supposed infallibility of that praised instinct that rises above reason? Was it distorted by vanity, or cast off its throne by self-interest? Answer these questions in your own heart during moments of quiet reflection—and, after considering this rush of emotion, learn to honor the authority of reason.

I have, Sir, been reading, with a scrutinizing, comparative eye, several of your insensible and profane speeches during the King’s illness. I disdain to take advantage of a man’s weak side, or draw consequences from an unguarded transport—A lion preys not on carcasses! But on this occasion you acted systematically. It was not the passion of the moment, over which humanity draws a veil: no; what but the odious maxims of Machiavelian policy could have led you to have searched in the very dregs of misery for forcible arguments to support your party? Had not vanity or interest steeled your heart, you would have been shocked at the cold insensibility which could carry a man to those dreadful mansions, where human weakness appears in its most awful form to calculate the 62chances against the King’s recovery. Impressed as you are with respect for royalty, I am astonished that you did not tremble at every step, lest Heaven should avenge on your guilty head the insult offered to its vicegerent. But the conscience that is under the direction of transient ebullitions of feeling, is not very tender or consistent, when the current runs another way.

I have been reading, with a critical and comparative eye, some of your insensitive and disrespectful speeches during the King’s illness. I refuse to exploit someone’s vulnerabilities or to draw conclusions from an unguarded outburst—A lion doesn’t prey on carcasses! But in this case, you acted deliberately. It wasn’t just a moment’s passion that humanity usually overlooks: no; only the disgusting principles of Machiavellian policy could have led you to search in the depths of suffering for strong arguments to support your side. If vanity or self-interest hadn’t hardened your heart, you would have been appalled at the cold insensitivity that could drive someone to those dreadful places, where human weakness is displayed in its most horrific way to calculate the odds against the King’s recovery. Being as impressed as you are with respect for royalty, I’m shocked you didn’t flinch at every step, fearing that Heaven would take vengeance on you for the insult to its representative. But a conscience swayed by fleeting emotions is not very gentle or consistent when the tide changes.

Had you been in a philosophizing mood, had your heart or your reason been at home, you might have been convinced, by ocular demonstration, that madness is only the absence of reason.—The ruling angel leaving its seat, wild anarchy ensues. You would have seen that the uncontrouled imagination often pursues the most regular course in its most daring flight; and that the eccentricities are boldly relieved when judgment no longer officiously arranges the sentiments, by bringing them to the test of principles. You would 63have seen every thing out of nature in that strange chaos of levity and ferocity, and of all sorts of follies jumbled together. You would have seen in that monstrous tragi-comic scene the most opposite passions necessarily succeed, and sometimes mix with each other in the mind; alternate contempt and indignation; alternate laughter and tears; alternate scorn and horror[8].—This is a true picture of that chaotic state of mind, called madness; when reason gone, we know not where, the wild elements of passion clash, and all is horror and confusion. You might have heard the best turned conceits, flash following flash, and doubted whether the rhapsody was not eloquent, if it had not been delivered in an equivocal language, neither verse nor prose, if the sparkling periods had not stood alone, 64wanting force because they wanted concatenation.

If you had been in a reflective mood, if your heart or your mind were present, you might have been convinced, by clear evidence, that madness is just the lack of reason. When the guiding force leaves its post, chaos takes over. You would have noticed that uncontrolled imagination often follows a consistent path, even in its boldest flights; and that the quirks and oddities seem more pronounced when judgment no longer dutifully organizes thoughts by measuring them against principles. You would have seen everything out of balance in that bizarre mix of lightheartedness and brutality, with all kinds of foolishness thrown together. In that monstrous tragic-comedy, you would have observed the most contrasting emotions naturally following one another, and at times blending in the mind: alternating between contempt and outrage; laughter and tears; disdain and terror. This is an accurate depiction of that chaotic mental state we call madness; when reason has vanished, and the wild elements of passion clash, leaving nothing but horror and confusion. You might have heard the best-crafted ideas, each one striking after another, and questioned whether the rhapsody was truly eloquent, had it not been expressed in ambiguous language, neither poetry nor prose, if the sparkling phrases had not stood alone, lacking impact because they lacked connection.

It is a proverbial observation, that a very thin partition divides wit and madness. Poetry therefore naturally addresses the fancy, and the language of passion is with great felicity borrowed from the heightened picture which the imagination draws of sensible objects concentred by impassioned reflection. And, during this ‘fine phrensy,’ reason has no right to rein-in the imagination, unless to prevent the introduction of supernumerary images; if the passion is real, the head will not be ransacked for stale tropes and cold rodomontade. I now speak of the genuine enthusiasm of genius, which, perhaps, seldom appears, but in the infancy of civilization; for as this light becomes more luminous reason clips the wing of fancy—the youth becomes a man.

It's a well-known saying that there's a very thin line between wit and madness. Poetry naturally speaks to the imagination, and the passionate language takes inspiration from the vivid images that the mind creates based on strong feelings about real things. During this 'creative frenzy,' reason shouldn't hold back the imagination unless it's to keep out unnecessary ideas; if the passion is genuine, the mind won't search for tired clichés or dull talk. I'm referring to the true enthusiasm of genius, which probably only shows up in the early stages of civilization; as this light grows brighter, reason tends to stifle creativity—the youth grows into adulthood.

Whether the glory of Europe is set, I shall not now enquire; but probably the spirit of 65romance and chivalry is in the wane; and reason will gain by its extinction.

Whether the greatness of Europe is fading, I won’t discuss now; but it seems like the spirit of 65romance and chivalry is declining, and reason will benefit from its disappearance.

From observing several cold romantic characters I have been led to confine the term romantic to one definition—false, or rather artificial, feelings. Works of genius are read with a prepossession in their favour, and sentiments imitated, because they were fashionable and pretty, and not because they were forcibly felt.

From watching several emotionally distant romantic characters, I’ve come to define the term "romantic" as having false or, more accurately, artificial feelings. Masterpieces are read with a bias in their favor, and emotions are copied just because they’re trendy and attractive, not because they are genuinely felt.

In modern poetry the understanding and memory often fabricate the pretended effusions of the heart, and romance destroys all simplicity; which, in works of taste, is but a synonymous word for truth. This romantic spirit has extended to our prose, and scattered artificial flowers over the most barren heath; or a mixture of verse and prose producing the strangest incongruities. The turgid bombast of some of your periods fully proves these assertions; for 66when the heart speaks we are seldom shocked by hyperbole, or dry raptures.

In modern poetry, understanding and memory often create fake expressions of the heart, and romance eliminates all simplicity; which, in well-crafted works, is just another word for truth. This romantic influence has spread to our prose, covering the most desolate landscapes with artificial embellishments; or a mix of verse and prose creates the oddest contradictions. The inflated exaggeration found in some of your writing clearly supports these points; for when the heart speaks, we are rarely taken aback by hyperbole or empty enthusiasm. 66

I speak in this decided tone, because from turning over the pages of your late publication, with more attention than I did when I first read it cursorily over; and comparing the sentiments it contains with your conduct on many important occasions, I am led very often to doubt your sincerity, and to suppose that you have said many things merely for the sake of saying them well; or to throw some pointed obloquy on characters and opinions that jostled with your vanity.

I speak with this strong tone because after going through your recent publication more carefully than when I initially skimmed it, and comparing the ideas it presents with your actions on several important occasions, I often find myself questioning your sincerity. It seems like you’ve said many things just for the sake of sounding good or to make sharp remarks about people and opinions that conflict with your ego.

It is an arduous task to follow the doublings of cunning, or the subterfuges of inconsistency; for in controversy, as in battle, the brave man wishes to face his enemy, and fight on the same ground. Knowing, however, the influence of a ruling passion, and how often it assumes the form of reason when there is 67much sensibility in the heart, I respect an opponent, though he tenaciously maintains opinions in which I cannot coincide; but, if I once discover that many of those opinions are empty rhetorical flourishes, my respect is soon changed into that pity which borders on contempt; and the mock dignity and haughty stalk, only reminds me of the ass in the lion’s skin.

It’s a tough job to keep track of the clever tricks and inconsistencies in arguments; because in a debate, just like in a battle, a brave person wants to confront their opponent and fight on the same terms. However, knowing how a strong passion can influence someone and how often it pretends to be reason when there’s a lot of feeling involved, I respect someone who holds onto opinions that I can’t agree with. But if I find out that many of those opinions are just empty rhetorical flourishes, my respect quickly turns into a pity that’s close to contempt; and the false dignity and arrogant demeanor only remind me of a donkey wearing a lion’s skin.

A sentiment of this kind glanced across my mind when I read the following exclamation. ‘Whilst the royal captives, who followed in the train, were slowly moved along, amidst the horrid yells, and shrilling screams, and frantic dances, and infamous contumelies, and all the unutterable abominations of the furies of hell, in the abused shape of the ‘vilest of women[9].’ Probably you mean women who gained a livelihood by selling vegetables or fish, who never had had any advantages 68of education; or their vices might have lost part of their abominable deformity, by losing part of their grossness. The queen of France—the great and small vulgar, claim our pity; they have almost insuperable obstacles to surmount in their progress towards true dignity of character; still I have such a plain downright understanding that I do not like to make a distinction without a difference. But it is not very extraordinary that you should, for throughout your letter you frequently advert to a sentimental jargon which has long been current in conversation, and even in books of morals, though it never received the regal-stamp of reason. A kind of mysterious instinct is supposed to reside in the soul, that instantaneously discerns truth, without the tedious labour of ratiocination. This instinct, for I know not what other name to give it, has been termed common sense, and more frequently sensibility; and, by a kind of indefeasible 69right, it has been supposed, for rights of this kind are not easily proved, to reign paramount over the other faculties of the mind, and to be an authority from which there is no appeal.

A feeling like this crossed my mind when I read the following remark. ‘As the royal captives, who followed in the procession, were slowly moved along amidst the terrible yells, piercing screams, frantic dances, and vile insults, along with all the unspeakable horrors of hell’s fury, in the distorted form of the ‘worst of women[9].’ You probably mean women who made a living selling vegetables or fish, who never had any educational advantages; or perhaps their wrongdoings would lose some of their ugly nature by shedding some of their coarseness. The queen of France—and both the high and low classes—deserve our sympathy; they face nearly insurmountable challenges on their journey to true dignity of character. Still, I have such a straightforward understanding that I dislike making a distinction without a difference. However, it’s not surprising that you do, because throughout your letter you often refer to a sentimental language that has long been popular in conversation and even in moral writings, although it never received the regal seal of reason. There’s a kind of mysterious instinct that is believed to exist in the soul, which instantly recognizes truth without the slow effort of reasoning. This instinct, as I don’t know what else to call it, has been labeled common sense, and more commonly sensibility; and by a kind of indefeasible right, it has been supposed—since rights like this are not easily proven—to hold a superior position over the other faculties of the mind and to be an authority from which there is no appeal.

This subtle magnetic fluid, that runs round the whole circle of society, is not subject to any known rule, or, to use an obnoxious phrase, in spite of the sneers of mock humility, or the timid fears of some well-meaning Christians, who shrink from any freedom of thought, lest they should rouse the old serpent, to the eternal fitness of things. It dips, we know not why, granting it to be an infallible instinct, and, though supposed always to point to truth, its pole-star, the point is always shifting, and seldom stands due north.

This subtle magnetic fluid that flows throughout society isn't governed by any known rules. Despite the condescension of false humility and the cautious fears of some well-meaning Christians who shy away from any freedom of thought for fear of awakening old dangers, it still exists in the eternal fitness of things. It dips for reasons unknown, and while it's believed to always guide us towards truth, its direction is constantly changing and rarely points due north.

It is to this instinct, without doubt, that you allude, when you talk of the ‘moral constitution of the heart.’ To it, I allow, for I consider it as a congregate of sensations 70and passions, Poets must apply, ‘who have to deal with an audience not yet graduated in the school of the rights of men.’ They must, it is clear, often cloud the understanding, whilst they move the heart by a kind of mechanical spring; but that ‘in the theatre the first intuitive glance’ of feeling should discriminate the form of truth, and see her fair proportion, I must beg leave to doubt. Sacred be the feelings of the heart! concentred in a glowing flame, they become the sun of life; and, without his invigorating impregnation, reason would probably lie in helpless inactivity, and never bring forth her only legitimate offspring—virtue. But to prove that virtue is really an acquisition of the individual, and not the blind impulse of unerring instinct, the bastard vice has often been begotten by the same father.

It’s definitely this instinct that you refer to when you talk about the ‘moral constitution of the heart.’ I agree, because I see it as a collection of feelings and passions. 70 Poets must tap into this since they are speaking to an audience that hasn’t yet learned the principles of human rights. They often have to cloud understanding while stirring emotions like a mechanical trigger. However, I have to question whether in the theater, the first intuitive feeling can truly distinguish the form of truth and recognize her true proportions. The feelings of the heart should be cherished! When concentrated in a blazing flame, they become the essence of life; without their energizing influence, reason might remain inactive and fail to produce its only legitimate result—virtue. But to show that virtue is genuinely something an individual acquires, rather than just a blind impulse of infallible instinct, it’s worth noting that the same origin has often produced flawed behavior.

In what respect are we superior to the brute creation, if intellect is not allowed to be the 71guide of passion? Brutes hope and fear, love and hate; but, without a capacity to improve, a power of turning these passions to good or evil, they neither acquire virtue nor wisdom.—Why? Because the Creator has not given them reason[10].

In what way are we better than animals if our intellect isn't allowed to guide our emotions? Animals experience hope and fear, love and hate, but without the ability to grow or the power to direct these feelings towards something good or bad, they don't gain virtue or wisdom.—Why? Because the Creator hasn't given them reason.

But the cultivation of reason is an arduous task, and men of lively fancy, finding it easier to follow the impulse of passion, endeavour to persuade themselves and others that it is most natural. And happy is it for those, who indolently let that heaven-lighted spark rest like the ancient lamps in sepulchres, that some virtuous habits, with which the reason of others shackled them, supplies its place.—Affection for parents, reverence for superiors or antiquity, notions of honour, or that worldly 72self-interest that shrewdly shews them that honesty is the best policy: all proceed from the reason for which they serve as substitutes;—but it is reason at second-hand.

But developing reason is a tough job, and people with vivid imagination often find it easier to go with their passions, trying to convince themselves and others that it’s the most natural way to live. And it’s fortunate for those who lazily let that divine spark sit like ancient lamps in tombs, that some good habits, which the reasoning of others has bound them with, can take its place. — Love for parents, respect for authority or tradition, ideas about honor, or that practical self-interest that clearly shows them that being honest is the best approach: all come from the reason they replace; — but it’s reason from a secondhand perspective.

Children are born ignorant, consequently innocent; the passions, are neither good nor evil dispositions, till they receive a direction, and either bound over the feeble barrier raised by a faint glimmering of unexercised reason, called conscience, or strengthen her wavering dictates till sound principles are deeply rooted, and able to cope with the headstrong passions that often assume her awful form. What moral purpose can be answered by extolling good dispositions, as they are called, when these good dispositions are described as instincts: for instinct moves in a direct line to its ultimate end, and asks not for guide or support. But if virtue is to be acquired by experience, or taught by example, reason, perfected by reflection, must be the director of the whole host of 73passions, which produce a fructifying heat, but no light, that you would exalt into her place.—She must hold the rudder, or, let the wind blow which way it list, the vessel will never advance smoothly to its destined port; for the time lost in tacking about would dreadfully impede its progress.

Children are born ignorant and therefore innocent; passions aren't inherently good or bad until they get directed. They can either push past the weak barrier of a faintly developed reason called conscience, or they can reinforce its shaky guidance until solid principles are established, enabling them to handle the stubborn passions that often take a frightening form. What moral value is there in praising good traits if those traits are just instincts? Instincts move straight toward their goal without needing guidance or support. However, if virtue comes from experience or is taught through examples, reason, refined through reflection, must lead the whole range of passions. These passions create a nurturing warmth but provide no clarity that you would place in her role. She must steer the ship; otherwise, if the winds blow wherever they please, the vessel will never smoothly reach its intended destination. The time wasted in zigzagging will severely slow its journey.

In the name of the people of England, you say, ‘that we know we have made no discoveries; and we think that no discoveries are to be made in morality; nor many in the great principles of government, nor in the ideas of liberty, which were understood long before we were born, altogether as well as they will be after the grave has heaped its mould upon our presumption, and the silent tomb shall have imposed its law on our pert loquacity. In England we have not yet been completely emboweled of our natural entrails; we still feel within us, and we cherish and cultivate those inbred sentiments which 74are the faithful guardians, the active monitors of our duty, the true supporters of all liberal and manly morals[11].’—What do you mean by inbred sentiments? From whence do they come? How were they bred? Are they the brood of folly, which swarm like the insects on the banks of the Nile, when mud and putrefaction have enriched the languid soil? Were these inbred sentiments faithful guardians of our duty when the church was an asylum for murderers, and men worshipped bread as a God? when slavery was authorized by law to fasten her fangs on human flesh, and the iron eat into the very soul? If these sentiments are not acquired, if our passive dispositions do not expand into virtuous affections and passions, why are not the Tartars in the first rude horde endued with sentiments white and elegant as the driven snow? Why is passion or heroism the child of reflection, the 75consequence of dwelling with intent contemplation on one object? The appetites are the only perfect inbred powers that I can discern; and they like instincts have a certain aim, they can be satisfied—but improvable reason has not yet discovered the perfection it may arrive at—God forbid!

In the name of the people of England, you say, ‘that we know we haven’t made any discoveries; and we believe that there are no discoveries to be made in morality; nor many in the major principles of government, nor in the concepts of liberty, which were understood long before we were born, just as well as they will be after death has buried our arrogance, and the silent grave will have set its rules on our annoying talk. In England, we haven't completely lost our natural instincts; we still feel within us, and we cherish and nurture those innate feelings which are the faithful guardians, the active reminders of our duty, the true supporters of all noble and manly morals[11].’—What do you mean by innate feelings? Where do they come from? How were they developed? Are they the offspring of foolishness, swarming like insects on the banks of the Nile when mud and decay have enriched the sluggish soil? Were these innate feelings faithful guardians of our duty when the church was a safe haven for murderers, and people worshipped bread as a God? When slavery was legally permitted to sink its claws into human flesh, and the iron embedded itself deep into the soul? If these feelings are not learned, if our passive tendencies do not grow into virtuous affections and passions, why are the Tartars in their early, primitive tribes not endowed with feelings pure and refined as the driven snow? Why is passion or heroism the result of reflection, the outcome of intentionally contemplating one object? The desires are the only truly innate powers I can see; and like instincts, they have a specific aim, they can be satisfied—but developed reason has not yet uncovered the perfection it may achieve—God forbid!

First, however, it is necessary to make what we know practical. Who can deny, that has marked the slow progress of civilization, that men may become more virtuous and happy without any new discovery in morals? Who will venture to assert that virtue would not be promoted by the more extensive cultivation of reason? If nothing more is to be done, let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die—and die for ever! Who will pretend to say, that there is as much happiness diffused on this globe as it is capable of affording? as many social virtues as reason would foster, if she could gain the strength she is able to acquire 76even in this imperfect state; if the voice of nature was allowed to speak audibly from the bottom of the heart, and the native unalienable rights of men were recognized in their full force; if factitious merit did not take place of genuine acquired virtue, and enable men to build their enjoyment on the misery of their fellow-creatures; if men were more under the dominion of reason than opinion, and did not cherish their prejudices ‘because they were prejudices[12]?’ I am not, Sir, aware of your sneers, hailing a millennium, though a state of greater purity of morals may not be a mere poetic fiction; nor did my fancy ever create a heaven on earth, since reason threw off her swaddling clothes. I perceive, but too forcibly, that happiness, literally speaking, dwells not here;—and that we wander to and fro in a vale of darkness as well as tears. I perceive that my passions pursue objects that the imagination 77enlarges, till they become only a sublime idea that shrinks from the enquiry of sense, and mocks the experimental philosophers who would confine this spiritual phlogiston in their material crucibles. I know that the human understanding is deluded with vain shadows, and that when we eagerly pursue any study, we only reach the boundary set to human enquires.—Thus far shalt thou go, and no further, says some stern difficulty; and the cause we were pursuing melts into utter darkness. But these are only the trials of contemplative minds, the foundation of virtue remains firm.—The power of exercising our understanding raises us above the brutes; and this exercise produces that ‘primary morality,’ which you term ‘untaught feelings.’

First, however, we need to make what we know practical. Who can deny, after observing the slow progress of civilization, that people can become more virtuous and happy without any new discoveries in morals? Who will claim that virtue wouldn’t be enhanced by a broader application of reason? If nothing else can be done, let's eat and drink, for tomorrow we die—and die forever! Who would say that there is as much happiness in the world as it can provide? Are there as many social virtues as reason would cultivate if it could gain the strength it's capable of even in this imperfect state? If the voice of nature could speak clearly from the depths of the heart, and the unalienable rights of people were fully recognized; if artificial merit didn’t replace true acquired virtue and allow individuals to find enjoyment in the suffering of others; if people were more guided by reason than opinion and didn't hold onto their prejudices just because they were prejudices? I am not, Sir, unaware of your mockery, anticipating a better future, although a state of higher moral purity might not just be a poetic fantasy; nor has my imagination ever created a heaven on earth since reason matured. I see, all too clearly, that happiness, to put it literally, does not exist here; we drift back and forth in a valley of darkness as well as tears. I realize that my passions chase after objects that the imagination expands until they transform into a sublime idea that evades sensory investigation, mocking the experimental philosophers who would try to contain this spiritual essence in their tangible crucibles. I know that human understanding is misled by empty illusions, and when we fervently pursue any study, we only reach the limits of human inquiry. “Thus far shall you go, and no further,” says some harsh difficulty, and the cause we were chasing melts into complete darkness. But these are merely challenges for contemplative minds; the foundation of virtue remains solid. The ability to engage our minds lifts us above the animals; and this engagement fosters what you call “untaught feelings”—the essence of “primary morality.”

If virtue be an instinct, I renounce all hope of immortality; and with it all the sublime reveries and dignified sentiments that have smoothed the rugged path of life: it is all a 78cheat, a lying vision; I have disquieted myself in vain; for in my eye all feelings are false and spurious, that do not rest on justice as their foundation, and are not concentred by universal love.

If being virtuous is just instinct, then I give up all hope of living forever; and with that, I lose all the great thoughts and noble feelings that have made life's rough journey easier: it’s all a trick, a deceitful illusion; I have worried myself for nothing; because to me, all feelings are false and fake if they aren't built on justice and unified by love for everyone.

I reverence the rights of men.—Sacred rights! for which I acquire a more profound respect, the more I look into my own mind; and, professing these heterodox opinions, I still preserve my bowels; my heart is human, beats quick with human sympathies—and I FEAR God!

I honor the rights of individuals. — Sacred rights! The more I reflect on them, the deeper my respect grows; and, while I hold these unconventional beliefs, I still have compassion; my heart is human and beats strongly with human feelings—and I ANXIETY God!

I bend with awful reverence when I enquire on what my fear is built.—I fear that sublime power, whose motive for creating me must have been wise and good; and I submit to the moral laws which my reason deduces from this view of my dependence on him.—It is not his power that I fear—it is not to an arbitrary will, but to unerring reason I submit.—Submit—yes; I disregard the charge of 79arrogance, to the law that regulates his just resolves; and the happiness I pant after must be the same in kind, and produced by the same exertions as his—though unfeigned humility overwhelms every idea that would presume to compare the goodness which the most exalted created being could acquire, with the grand source of life and bliss.

I bow with deep respect when I question what my fear is based on. I fear that tremendous power, whose reason for creating me must have been wise and good; and I accept the moral laws that my reason infers from this understanding of my dependence on him. It’s not his power that scares me—it’s not an arbitrary will, but rather unerring reason that I accept. Accept—yes; I ignore the accusation of arrogance, regarding the law that governs his fair decisions; and the happiness I strive for must be the same in nature and arise from the same efforts as his—though genuine humility overwhelms any thought that would attempt to compare the goodness the most elevated created being could achieve with the grand source of life and happiness.

This fear of God makes me reverence myself.—Yes, Sir, the regard I have for honest fame, and the friendship of the virtuous, falls far short of the respect which I have for myself. And this, enlightened self-love, if an epithet the meaning of which has been grossly perverted will convey my idea, forces me to see; and, if I may venture to borrow a prostituted term, to feel, that happiness is reflected, and that, in communicating good, my soul receives its noble aliment.—I do not trouble myself, therefore, to enquire whether this is the fear the people of England feel:—and, 80if it be natural to include all the modifications which you have annexed—it is not[13].

This fear of God makes me respect myself. Yes, Sir, the regard I have for a good reputation and the friendship of virtuous people is nothing compared to the respect I have for myself. This enlightened self-love—if I can use a term that has been badly twisted—makes me realize, and if I may borrow a misused term, to feel, that happiness is reflected, and that by doing good, my soul receives its true nourishment. So, I don’t concern myself with whether this is the fear that the people of England feel:—and, 80if it is natural to include all the modifications you’ve added—it is not[13].

Besides, I cannot help suspecting that, if you had the enlightened respect for yourself, which you affect to despise, you would not have said that the constitution of our church and state, formed, like most other modern ones, by degrees, as Europe was emerging out of barbarism, was formed ‘under the auspices, and was confirmed by the sanctions, of religion and piety.’ You have turned over the historic page; have been hackneyed in the ways of men, and must know that private cabals and public feuds, private virtues and vices, religion and superstition, have all concurred to foment the mass and swell it to its present form; nay more, that it in part owes 81its sightly appearance to bold rebellion and insidious innovation. Factions, Sir, have been the leaven, and private interest has produced public good.

Besides, I can't help but suspect that if you truly had the enlightened respect for yourself that you pretend to look down on, you wouldn't have said that the structure of our church and state, developed like most other modern institutions over time as Europe was coming out of the Dark Ages, was created 'under the guidance and was confirmed by the principles of religion and piety.' You've turned the historical page; you've seen how people operate, and must understand that private conspiracies and public conflicts, personal virtues and vices, religion and superstition have all worked together to shape the whole and build it into its current form; even more, it partly owes its appealing appearance to bold rebellion and sneaky innovation. Factions, sir, have been the catalyst, and personal interest has led to public benefit.

These general reflections are not thrown out to insinuate that virtue was a creature of yesterday: No; she had her share in the grand drama. I guard against misrepresentation; but the man who cannot modify general assertions, has scarcely learned the first rudiments of reasoning. I know that there is a great portion of virtue in the Romish church, yet I should not choose to neglect clothing myself with a garment of my own righteousness, depending on a kind donative of works of supererogation. I know that there are many clergymen, of all denominations, wise and virtuous; yet I have not that respect for the whole body, which, you say, characterizes our nation, ‘emanating from a certain plainness and directness of understanding.’—Now 82we are stumbling on inbred feelings and secret lights again—or, I beg your pardon, it may be the furbished up face which you choose to give to the argument.

These general thoughts aren't meant to suggest that virtue is a thing of the past: No; she played her part in the grand narrative. I want to avoid any misunderstandings; however, a person who can't adjust broad statements has barely grasped the basics of reasoning. I understand that there's a significant amount of virtue within the Roman Catholic Church, but I wouldn't rely on my own sense of righteousness, hoping for a kind offer of extra good deeds. I recognize that there are many clergy members across all denominations who are wise and virtuous; however, I don't hold the same level of respect for the entire group that you claim is typical of our nation, ‘coming from a certain straightforwardness and clarity of thought.’—Now 82 we are once again grappling with innate feelings and hidden insights—or, I apologize, it might be the polished perspective you choose to present in the argument.

It is a well-known fact, that when we, the people of England, have a son whom we scarcely know what to do with—we make a clergyman of him. When a living is in the gift of a family, a son is brought up to the church; but not always with hopes full of immortality. ‘Such sublime principles are not constantly infused into persons of exalted birth;’ they sometimes think of ‘the paltry pelf of the moment[14]’—and the vulgar care of preaching the gospel, or practising self-denial, is left to the poor curates, who, arguing on your ground, cannot have, from the scanty stipend they receive, ‘very high and worthy notions of their function and destination.’ This consecration for ever; a word, 83that from lips of flesh is big with a mighty nothing, has not purged the sacred temple from all the impurities of fraud, violence, injustice, and tyranny. Human passions still lurk in her sanctum sanctorum; and, without the profane exertions of reason, vain would be her ceremonial ablutions; morality would still stand aloof from this national religion, this ideal consecration of a state; and men would rather choose to give the goods of their body, when on their death beds, to clear the narrow way to heaven, than restrain the mad career of passions during life.

It's a well-known fact that when we, the people of England, have a son we hardly know what to do with—we make him a clergyman. When a living is controlled by a family, a son is raised for the church; but not always with great expectations of glory. 'Such noble principles are not constantly instilled in people of high birth;' they sometimes focus on 'the trivial money of the moment[14]'—and the ordinary task of preaching the gospel or practicing self-denial is left to the struggling curates, who, basing their arguments on your level, cannot have, from the meager salary they receive, 'very high and worthy ideas of their role and purpose.' This consecration for ever; a word, 83 that from the mouths of humans carries a heavy emptiness, has not cleansed the sacred temple of all the impurities of deceit, violence, injustice, and oppression. Human emotions still linger in her sacred space; and, without the meaningful efforts of reason, her ceremonial cleansings would be pointless; ethics would still be separate from this national religion, this ideal sanctification of a state; and people would rather choose to give their physical possessions, when on their deathbeds, to clear the narrow path to heaven than to rein in the reckless pursuits of their passions during life.

Such a curious paragraph occurs in this part of your letter, that I am tempted to transcribe it[15], and must beg you to elucidate it, if I misconceive your meaning.

Such a curious paragraph appears in this part of your letter that I feel compelled to transcribe it[15], and I must ask you to clarify it if I misunderstand your meaning.

84The only way in which the people interfere in government, religious or civil, is in electing representatives. And, Sir, let me ask you, with manly plainness—are these holy nominations? Where is the booth of religion? Does she mix her awful mandates, or lift her persuasive voice, in those scenes of drunken riot and beastly gluttony? Does she preside over those nocturnal abominations which so 85evidently tend to deprave the manners of the lower class of people? The pestilence stops not here—the rich and poor have one common nature, and many of the great families, which, on this side adoration, you venerate, date their misery, I speak of stubborn matters of fact, from the thoughtless extravagance of an electioneering frolic.—Yet, after the effervescence of spirits, raised by opposition, and all the little and tyrannic arts of canvassing are over—quiet souls! they only intend to march rank and file to say YES—or NO.

84The only way people get involved in government, whether religious or civil, is by choosing their representatives. And, sir, let me ask you plainly—are these so-called holy choices? Where is the place for religion in this? Does it mix its serious commands or raise its persuasive voice in those scenes of drunken chaos and gluttony? Does it oversee those nighttime atrocities that clearly corrupt the behavior of the lower class? The problem doesn't stop there—the rich and poor share the same human nature, and many of the prestigious families you admire here trace their misfortunes, and I'm speaking of undeniable facts, back to the reckless extravagance of election campaigns. Yet, after the excitement stirred by opposition and all the small, oppressive tactics of campaigning are done—calm individuals! they just plan to line up and say YES—or NO.

Experience, I believe, will shew that sordid interest, or licentious thoughtlessness, is the spring of action at most elections.—Again, I beg you not to lose sight of my modification of general rules. So far are the people from being habitually convinced of the sanctity of the charge they are conferring, that the venality of their votes must admonish them that they have no right to expect disinterested conduct. 86But to return to the church, and the habitual conviction of the people of England.

Experience, I believe, will show that selfish interests or careless thinking drive most elections. Again, I urge you not to forget my adjustments to the general rules. The people are so far from being consistently aware of the seriousness of the power they're giving that the corruption of their votes should make them realize they can't expect selfless behavior. 86 But let's get back to the church and the common beliefs of the people of England.

So far are the people from being ‘habitually convinced that no evil can be acceptable, either in the act or the permission, to him whose essence is good[16];’ that the sermons which they hear are to them almost as unintelligible as if they were preached in a foreign tongue. The language and sentiments rising above their capacities, very orthodox Christians are driven to fanatical meetings for amusement, if not for edification. The clergy, I speak of the body, not forgetting the respect and affection which I have for individuals, perform the duty of their profession as a kind of fee-simple, to entitle them to the emoluments accruing from it; and their ignorant flock think that merely going to church is meritorious.

The people are so far from being ‘habitually convinced that no evil can be acceptable, either in the act or the permission, to him whose essence is good[16];’ that the sermons they hear are almost as confusing as if they were delivered in a foreign language. The language and ideas are beyond their understanding, so very orthodox Christians end up going to fanatical gatherings for entertainment rather than for spiritual growth. The clergy, and I’m referring to the group as a whole, not forgetting the respect and affection I have for certain individuals, approach their duties like a job, just to earn the income that comes with it; and their uninformed congregation thinks that just attending church is commendable.

So defective, in fact, are our laws, respecting religious establishments, that I have heard 87many rational pious clergymen complain, that they had no method of receiving their stipend that did not clog their endeavours to be useful; whilst the lives of many less conscientious rectors are passed in litigious disputes with the people they engaged to instruct; or in distant cities, in all the ease of luxurious idleness.

So flawed are our laws regarding religious institutions that I have heard many thoughtful and devoted clergymen express their frustration at not having a way to receive their salaries that doesn’t hinder their efforts to be helpful. Meanwhile, the lives of many less ethical rectors are spent in legal battles with the very people they are supposed to teach, or enjoying comfortable laziness in far-off cities.

But you return to your old firm ground.—Art thou there, True-penny? Must we swear to secure property, and make assurance doubly sure, to give your perturbed spirit rest? Peace, peace to the manes of thy patriotic phrensy, which contributed to deprive some of thy fellow-citizens of their property in America: another spirit now walks abroad to secure the property of the church.—The tithes are safe!—We will not say for ever—because the time may come, when the traveller may ask where proud London stood? when its temples, its laws, and its trade, may be buried in one common ruin, and only 88serve as a by-word to point a moral, or furnish senators, who wage a wordy war, on the other side of the Atlantic, with tropes to swell their thundering bursts of eloquence.

But you're back on solid ground.—Are you there, True-penny? Do we need to swear to secure property and make assurance doubly sure, just to give your restless spirit some peace? Rest in peace, you troubled spirit of patriotic fervor, which led to some of your fellow citizens losing their property in America: another spirit is now out there protecting the church's property.—The tithes are safe!—We won’t say forever—because the time may come when travelers will ask where proud London once stood? When its temples, its laws, and its trade might be buried in one great ruin, serving only as a warning to teach a lesson or provide senators, who wage a battle of words on the other side of the Atlantic, with phrases to amplify their loud bursts of eloquence.

Who shall dare to accuse you of inconsistency any more, when you have so staunchly supported the despotic principles which agree so perfectly with the unerring interest of a large body of your fellow-citizens; not the largest—for when you venerate parliaments—I presume it is not the majority, as you have had the presumption to dissent, and loudly explain your reasons.—But it was not my intention, when I began this letter, to descend to the minutiæ of your conduct, or to weigh your infirmities in a balance; it is only some of your pernicious opinions that I wish to hunt out of their lurking holes; and to shew you to yourself, stripped of the gorgeous drapery in which you have enwrapped your tyrannic principles.

Who will dare to accuse you of inconsistency now that you have so strongly supported the authoritarian principles that align so perfectly with the undeniable interests of many of your fellow citizens? Not the majority—because when you respect parliaments, I assume it’s not the majority, since you’ve had the audacity to disagree and clearly explain your reasons. But it wasn’t my intention, when I started this letter, to dive into the details of your actions or to weigh your shortcomings. I only want to bring to light some of your harmful opinions and show you who you really are, stripped of the flashy cover you’ve used to disguise your tyrannical principles.

89That the people of England respect the national establishment I do not deny; I recollect the melancholy proof which they gave, in this very century, of their enlightened zeal and reasonable affection. I likewise know that, according to the dictates of a prudent law, in a commercial state, truth is reckoned a libel; yet I acknowledge, having never made my humanity give place to Gothic gallantry, that I should have been better pleased to have heard that Lord George Gordon was confined on account of the calamities which he brought on his country, than for a libel on the queen of France.

89I don’t deny that the people of England respect their national institutions; I remember the sad evidence they provided, in this very century, of their enlightened enthusiasm and reasonable loyalty. I also understand that, according to the principles of a prudent law in a commercial society, truth can be seen as a libel; however, I admit that I would have preferred to hear that Lord George Gordon was imprisoned for the troubles he caused his country instead of for a libel against the queen of France.

But one argument which you adduce to strengthen your assertion, appears to carry the preponderancy towards the other side.

But one argument you make to support your claim seems to actually weigh more in favor of the other side.

You observe that ‘our education is so formed as to confirm and fix this impression, (respect for the religious establishment); and that our education is in a manner wholly in the hands 90of ecclesiastics, and in all stages from infancy to manhood[17].’ Far from agreeing with you, Sir, that these regulations render the clergy a more useful and respectable body, experience convinces me that the very contrary is the fact. In schools and colleges they may, in some degree, support their dignity within the monastic walls; but, in paying due respect to the parents of the young nobility under their tutorage, they do not forget, obsequiously, to respect their noble patrons. The little respect paid, in great houses, to tutors and chaplains proves, Sir, the fallacy of your reasoning. It would be almost invidious to remark, that they sometimes are only modern substitutes for the jesters of Gothic memory, and serve as whetstones for the blunt wit of the noble peer who patronizes them; and what respect a boy can imbibe for a butt, at which the shaft of ridicule is daily glanced, I leave 91those to determine who can distinguish depravity of morals under the specious mask of refined manners.

You notice that “our education is designed to reinforce this idea, (respect for the religious establishment); and that our education is basically managed entirely by clergy, from childhood to adulthood.” Far from agreeing with you, Sir, that these rules make the clergy a more useful and respectable group, my experience shows me that the opposite is true. In schools and colleges, they might maintain some dignity within their monastic walls; however, while they show respect to the parents of the young nobility they oversee, they don’t hesitate to also show deference to their noble sponsors. The little respect given to tutors and chaplains in elite households proves, Sir, the flaw in your reasoning. It would be almost unfair to point out that they sometimes serve merely as modern-day substitutes for the jesters of ancient times, existing to sharpen the dull humor of the noble peers who support them; and what respect a boy can learn for a butt, which daily endures ridicule, I leave to those who can recognize the decay of morals hidden behind polished manners.

Besides, the custom of sending clergymen to travel with their noble pupils, as humble companions, instead of exalting, tends inevitably to degrade the clerical character: it is notorious that they meanly submit to the most servile dependence, and gloss over the most capricious follies, to use a soft phrase, of the boys to whom they look up for preferment. An airy mitre dances before them, and they wrap their sheep’s clothing more closely about them, and make their spirits bend till it is prudent to claim the rights of men and the honest freedom of speech of an Englishman. How, indeed, could they venture to reprove for his vices their patron: the clergy only give the true feudal emphasis to this word. It has been observed, by men who have not superficially investigated the human heart, that 92when a man makes his spirit bend to any power but reason, his character is soon degraded, and his mind shackled by the very prejudices to which he submits with reluctance. The observations of experience have been carried still further; and the servility to superiors, and tyranny to inferiors, said to characterize our clergy, have rationally been supposed to arise naturally from their associating with the nobility. Among unequals there can be no society;—giving a manly meaning to the term; from such intimacies friendship can never grow; if the basis of friendship is mutual respect, and not a commercial treaty. Taken thus out of their sphere, and enjoying their tithes at a distance from their flocks, is it not natural for them to become courtly parasites, and intriguing dependents on great patrons, or the treasury? Observing all this—for these things have not been transacted in the dark—our young men of fashion, by a common, though 93erroneous, association of ideas, have conceived a contempt for religion, as they sucked in with their milk a contempt for the clergy.

Besides, the practice of sending clergymen to accompany their wealthy students as humble companions, rather than lifting them up, inevitably lowers the standing of the clergy: it's well known that they shamefully submit to the most degrading dependence and overlook the most whimsical antics, to put it mildly, of the boys they hope will help them advance. An enticing position in the church dangles before them, and they tighten their sheep’s clothing around themselves, forcing their spirits to bow until it seems wise to claim their rights as men and the honest freedom of speech of an Englishman. How could they possibly confront their patron about his vices? The clergy only reinforce the feudal nature of this concept. Those who have taken a deeper look into the human heart have noted that when a person submits their will to any authority other than reason, their character quickly deteriorates, and their minds become shackled by the very prejudices they reluctantly accept. Experiences have shown that the subservience to superiors and the tyranny of inferiors attributed to our clergy likely stem from their associations with the nobility. Among unequals, true society cannot exist—giving a true sense to the term; from such relationships, genuine friendship can never arise; if the foundation of friendship is mutual respect and not a business arrangement. Removed from their sphere and enjoying their earnings distant from their flocks, isn’t it natural for them to become sycophantic courtiers and scheming dependents on powerful patrons or the treasury? Seeing all this—since these events haven't been hidden—our fashionable young men, through a common but misguided connection of ideas, have developed a disdain for religion, as they absorbed a disdain for the clergy along with their upbringing.

The people of England, Sir, in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, I will not go any further back to insult the ashes of departed popery, did not settle the establishment, and endow it with princely revenues, to make it proudly rear its head, as a part of the constitutional body, to guard the liberties of the community; but, like some of the laborious commentators on Shakespeare, you have affixed a meaning to laws that chance, or, to speak more philosophically, the interested views of men, settled, not dreaming of your ingenious elucidations.

The people of England, Sir, in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries—I won’t go any further back to disrespect the memories of the past—did not establish and fund the church with wealth to make it stand tall as part of the constitutional framework to protect the rights of the community. Instead, like some of the diligent interpreters of Shakespeare, you have attached a meaning to laws that were shaped by chance or, to put it more philosophically, by people's self-serving interests, without any thought of your clever explanations.

What, but the rapacity of the only men who exercised their reason, the priests, secured such vast property to the church, when a man gave his perishable substance to save himself from the dark torments of purgatory; and 94found it more convenient to indulge his depraved appetites, and pay an exorbitant price for absolution, than listen to the suggestions of reason, and work out his own salvation: in a word, was not the separation of religion from morality the work of the priests, and partly achieved in those honourable days which you so piously deplore?

What else but the greed of the only people who used their reason, the priests, allowed them to accumulate such enormous wealth for the church, when someone gave their fleeting possessions to save themselves from the dark sufferings of purgatory; and found it easier to cater to their corrupt desires and pay an outrageous price for forgiveness, rather than heed the voice of reason and strive for their own salvation: in short, wasn’t the separation of religion from morality a result of the priests, partly established in those honourable days that you so devoutly mourn? 94

That civilization, that the cultivation of the understanding, and refinement of the affections, naturally make a man religious, I am proud to acknowledge.—What else can fill the aching void in the heart, that human pleasures, human friendships can never fill? What else can render us resigned to live, though condemned to ignorance?—What but a profound reverence for the model of all perfection, and the mysterious tie which arises from a love of goodness? What can make us reverence ourselves, but a reverence for that Being, of whom we are a faint image? That 95mighty Spirit moves on the waters—confusion hears his voice, and the troubled heart ceases to beat with anguish, for trust in Him bade it be still. Conscious dignity may make us rise superior to calumny, and sternly brave the winds of adverse fortune,—raised in our own esteem by the very storms of which we are the sport—but when friends are unkind, and the heart has not the prop on which it fondly leaned, where can a tender suffering being fly but to the Searcher of hearts? and, when death has desolated the present scene, and torn from us the friend of our youth—when we walk along the accustomed path, and, almost fancying nature dead, ask, Where art thou who gave life to these well-known scenes? when memory heightens former pleasures to contrast our present prospects—there is but one source of comfort within our reach;—and in this sublime solitude the world appears to contain only the 96Creator and the creature, of whose happiness he is the source.—These are human feelings; but I know not of any common nature or common relation amongst men but what results from reason. The common affections and passions equally bind brutes together; and it is only the continuity of those relations that entitles us to the denomination of rational creatures; and this continuity arises from reflection—from the operations of that reason which you contemn with flippant disrespect.

That civilization, the development of understanding, and the refinement of our emotions naturally make someone religious, and I’m proud to admit it. What else can fill the aching emptiness in the heart that human pleasures and friendships can never satisfy? What else can help us accept life, even while facing ignorance? What other than a deep respect for the ideal of all perfection and the mysterious bond that comes from loving goodness? What can make us respect ourselves if not a respect for that Being, of whom we are just a faint reflection? That mighty Spirit moves on the waters—chaos hears His voice, and the troubled heart stops beating in anguish, for trust in Him tells it to be still. A sense of dignity might help us rise above slander and bravely face the storms of misfortune—uplifted in our own esteem by the very trials we endure—but when friends are unkind, and the heart lacks the support it once relied on, where can a gentle, suffering person turn but to the Searcher of hearts? And when death has taken everything from us and stolen away our youthful friend—when we walk along familiar paths, almost feeling nature is dead, asking, Where are you, who brought life to these well-known places? When memory intensifies past joys to contrast with our current outlook—there is only one source of comfort available to us; and in this profound solitude, the world seems to hold only the Creator and the creature, of whose happiness He is the source. These are human feelings; but I don’t know of any shared nature or common relationship among people that doesn’t arise from reason. The shared emotions and passions also unite animals; and it is only the continuity of those relationships that justifies our label as rational beings; and this continuity comes from reflection—from the functioning of that reason which you dismiss with casual disrespect.

If then it appears, arguing from analogy, that reflection must be the natural foundation of rational affections, and of that experience which enables one man to rise above another, a phenomenon that has never been seen in the brute creation, it may not be stretching the argument further than it will go to suppose, that those men who are obliged to exercise their reason have the most reason, and are 97the persons pointed out by Nature to direct the society of which they make a part, on any extraordinary emergency.

If it then seems, based on comparison, that reflection must be the natural basis for rational feelings and for the experience that allows one person to excel over another—a phenomenon not observed in the animal world—it may not be too far-fetched to suggest that those who have to use their reason the most possess the greatest amount of it and are the individuals designated by Nature to lead the society they are part of during any significant crisis. 97

Time only will shew whether the general censure, which you afterwards qualify, if not contradict, and the unmerited contempt that you have ostentatiously displayed of the National Assembly, be founded on reason, the offspring of conviction, or the spawn of envy. Time may shew, that this obscure throng knew more of the human heart and of legislation than the profligates of rank, emasculated by hereditary effeminacy.

Time will only tell whether the widespread criticism that you later amend, if not contradict, and the undeserved disdain you've openly shown for the National Assembly, is based on reason and conviction, or if it's just a result of jealousy. Time may reveal that this unremarkable crowd understood more about the human heart and legislation than the privileged elite, softened by their inherited weaknesses.

It is not, perhaps, of very great consequence who were the founders of a state; savages, thieves, curates, or practitioners in the law. It is true, you might sarcastically remark, that the Romans had always a smack of the old leaven, and that the private robbers, supposing the tradition to be true, only became 98public depredators. You might have added, that their civilization must have been very partial, and had more influence on the manners than morals of the people; or the amusements of the amphitheatre would not have remained an everlasting blot not only on their humanity, but on their refinement, if a vicious elegance of behaviour and luxurious mode of life is not a prostitution of the term. However, the thundering censures which you have cast with a ponderous arm, and the more playful bushfiring of ridicule, are not arguments that will ever depreciate the National Assembly, for applying to their understanding rather than to their imagination, when they met to settle the newly acquired liberty of the state on a solid foundation.

It might not really matter who founded a state—whether they were savages, thieves, priests, or lawyers. You could sarcastically point out that the Romans always had a hint of their old ways and that the private robbers, if the story is to be believed, just became public plunderers. You might say their civilization was quite limited, impacting their social customs more than their morals; otherwise, the brutal entertainment of the amphitheater wouldn’t be such a lasting stain on both their humanity and their sophistication, if a twisted sense of elegance and a lavish lifestyle aren’t just a misuse of the term. Still, the harsh criticisms you've thrown around and the more lighthearted mockery won’t ever diminish the National Assembly, which focused on understanding rather than imagination when they assembled to establish the newly gained freedom of the state on a firm foundation.

If you had given the same advice to a young history painter of abilities, I should have admired your judgment, and re-echoed your sentiments[18]. 99Study, you might have said, the noble models of antiquity, till your imagination is inflamed; and, rising above the vulgar practice of the hour, you may imitate without copying those great originals. A glowing picture, of some interesting moment, would probably have been produced by these natural means; particularly if one little circumstance is not overlooked, that the painter had noble models to revert to, calculated to excite admiration and stimulate exertion.

If you had given the same advice to a young, talented history painter, I would have admired your judgment and echoed your thoughts[18]. 99You might have said, study the great examples of the past until your imagination is ignited; and by rising above the ordinary practices of the time, you can imitate those great originals without copying them directly. A vibrant painting of a compelling moment would likely come from these natural methods, especially if one important detail isn't overlooked: that the painter had impressive models to refer to, inspiring awe and motivating effort.

But, in settling a constitution that involved the happiness of millions, that stretch beyond the computation of science, it was, perhaps, 100necessary for the Assembly to have a higher model in view than the imagined virtues of their forefathers; and wise to deduce their respect for themselves from the only legitimate source, respect for justice. Why was it a duty to repair an ancient castle, built in barbarous ages, of Gothic materials? Why were the legislators obliged to rake amongst heterogeneous ruins; to rebuild old walls, whose foundations could scarcely be explored, when a simple structure might be raised on the foundation of experience, the only valuable inheritance our forefathers could bequeath? Yet of this bequest we can make little use till we have gained a stock of our own; and even then, their inherited experience would rather serve as lighthouses, to warn us against dangerous rocks or sand-banks, than as finger-posts that stand at every turning to point out the right road.

But, when creating a constitution that affects the happiness of millions, beyond what science can measure, it was perhaps essential for the Assembly to have a higher standard in mind than the supposed virtues of their ancestors; and wise to base their self-respect on the only real foundation, respect for justice. Why was it necessary to restore an ancient castle built in barbaric times, using Gothic materials? Why did the lawmakers have to sift through unrelated ruins to rebuild old walls, whose foundations were barely discernible, when they could easily construct a new building on the foundation of experience, the only valuable legacy our ancestors could leave behind? Yet we can make little use of this legacy until we’ve established our own, and even then, their inherited experience would be more like lighthouses, warning us of dangerous rocks or sandbanks, rather than signposts guiding us on the right path.

Nor was it absolutely necessary that they should be diffident of themselves when they 101were dissatisfied with, or could not discern the almost obliterated constitution of their ancestors[19]. They should first have been convinced that our constitution was not only the best modern, but the best possible one; and that our social compact was the surest foundation of all the possible liberty a mass of men could enjoy, that the human understanding could form. They should have been certain that our representation answered all the purposes of representation; and that an established inequality of rank and property secured the liberty of the whole community, instead of rendering it a sounding epithet of subjection, when applied to the nation at large. They 102should have had the same respect for our House of Commons that you, vauntingly, intrude on us, though your conduct throughout life has spoken a very different language; before they made a point of not deviating from the model which first engaged their attention.

It wasn't absolutely necessary for them to be unsure of themselves when they were unhappy with or couldn't see the almost erased constitution of their ancestors[19]. They should have first been convinced that our constitution was not only the best modern one but also the best possible. They needed to understand that our social agreement was the most reliable foundation for all the possible freedom a large group of people could enjoy, as understood by human reasoning. They should have been sure that our representation fulfilled all the roles of representation and that an established inequality of rank and property actually secured the freedom of the entire community, rather than turning it into a mere term of subjugation when applied to the nation as a whole. They should have held the same respect for our House of Commons that you, proudly, impose on us, even though your actions throughout your life have communicated a very different message, before they insisted on sticking to the model that first caught their attention.

That the British House of Commons is filled with every thing illustrious in rank, in descent, in hereditary, and acquired opulence, may be true,—but that it contains every thing respectable in talents, in military, civil, naval, and political distinction, is very problematical. Arguing from natural causes, the very contrary would appear to the speculatist to be the fact; and let experience say whether these speculations are built on sure ground.

That the British House of Commons is made up of all kinds of prestigious people with high status, lineage, and both inherited and earned wealth might be true—but whether it includes everyone respected for their skills in military, civil, naval, and political achievements is quite questionable. From a natural perspective, the exact opposite might seem to be true to the observer; and let experience determine if these thoughts are based on solid evidence.

It is true you lay great stress on the effects produced by the bare idea of a liberal descent[20]; 103but from the conduct of men of rank, men of discernment would rather be led to conclude, that this idea obliterated instead of inspiring native dignity, and substituted a factitious pride that disemboweled the man. The liberty of the rich has its ensigns armorial to puff the individual out with insubstantial honours; but where are blazoned the struggles of virtuous poverty? Who, indeed, would dare to blazon what would blur the pompous monumental inscription you boast of, and make us view with horror, as monsters in human shape, the superb gallery of portraits proudly set in battle array?

It’s true you put a lot of emphasis on the impact of having a noble lineage[20]; 103 but based on the behavior of people from high society, thoughtful individuals would likely conclude that this idea actually diminishes rather than inspires true dignity, replacing it with a fake pride that diminishes a person’s character. The freedom of the wealthy comes with fancy titles that inflate the individual with empty honors; but where are the stories of the struggles faced by the noble poor? Who would dare to highlight what might tarnish the grand achievements you flaunt and force us to see, like horrifying monsters, the lavish portraits displayed in proud formation?

But to examine the subject more closely. Is it among the list of possibilities that a man 104of rank and fortune can have received a good education? How can he discover that he is a man, when all his wants are instantly supplied, and invention is never sharpened by necessity? Will he labour, for every thing valuable must be the fruit of laborious exertions, to attain knowledge and virtue, in order to merit the affection of his equals, when the flattering attention of sycophants is a more luscious cordial?

But let’s take a closer look at this topic. Is it possible for a wealthy and influential man to have received a good education? How can he realize he is truly a man when all his needs are immediately met, and he never feels the urge to innovate out of necessity? Will he strive for knowledge and virtue, aiming to earn the respect of his peers, when the enticing attention of flatterers is a much sweeter reward?

Health can only be secured by temperance; but is it easy to persuade a man to live on plain food even to recover his health, who has been accustomed to fare sumptuously every day? Can a man relish the simple food of friendship, who has been habitually pampered by flattery? And when the blood boils, and the senses meet allurements on every side, will knowledge be pursued on account of its abstract beauty? No; it is well known that talents are only to be unfolded by industry, and 105that we must have made some advances, led by an inferior motive, before we discover that they are their own reward.

Health can only be maintained through moderation; but is it easy to convince someone to eat simple food to regain their health when they are used to indulging every day? Can a person appreciate the simple joys of friendship when they've always been spoiled by compliments? And when emotions run high and temptations surround us, will someone seek knowledge just for its inherent value? No; it's widely understood that skills can only be developed through hard work, and we often need to make some progress, motivated by lesser reasons, before realizing that they are rewarding in themselves. 105

But full blown talents may, according to your system, be hereditary, and as independent of ripening judgment, as the inbred feelings that, rising above reason, naturally guard Englishmen from error. Noble franchises! what a grovelling mind must that man have, who can pardon his step-dame Nature for not having made him at least a lord?

But full blown talents might, according to your system, be inherited, and as detached from mature judgment, as the ingrained feelings that, rising above logic, naturally protect Englishmen from mistakes. Noble privileges! What a pathetic mindset that person must have, who can forgive his stepmother Nature for not making him at least a lord?

And who will, after your description of senatorial virtues, dare to say that our House of Commons has often resembled a bear-garden; and appeared rather like a committee of ways and means than a dignified legislative body, though the concentrated wisdom and virtue of the whole nation blazed in one superb constellation? That it contains a dead weight of benumbing opulence I readily allow, and of ignoble ambition; nor is there any thing surpassing 106belief in a supposition that the raw recruits, when properly drilled by the minister, would gladly march to the Upper House to unite hereditary honours to fortune. But talents, knowledge, and virtue, must be a part of the man, and cannot be put, as robes of state often are, on a servant or a block, to render a pageant more magnificent.

And who will, after your description of the virtues of senators, dare to say that our House of Commons often resembles a bear pit; and looks more like a committee of ways and means than a respected legislative body, even though the combined wisdom and virtue of the entire nation shines in one brilliant constellation? I readily admit that it carries a dead weight of suffocating wealth and unworthy ambition; nor is it beyond belief to think that newcomers, once properly trained by the minister, would eagerly march to the Upper House to combine inherited titles with their fortune. But talent, knowledge, and virtue must be a part of a person; they can't be put on, like ceremonial robes, on a servant or a statue to make a spectacle more grand.

Our House of Commons, it is true, has been celebrated as a school of eloquence, a hot-bed for wit, even when party intrigues narrow the understanding and contract the heart; yet, from the few proficients it has accomplished, this inferior praise is not of great magnitude: nor of great consequence, Mr. Locke would have added, who was ever of opinion that eloquence was oftener employed to make ‘the worse appear the better part,’ than to support the dictates of cool judgment. However, the greater number who have gained a seat by their fortune and hereditary 107rank, are content with their pre-eminence, and struggle not for more hazardous honours. But you are an exception; you have raised yourself by the exertion of abilities, and thrown the automatons of rank into the back ground. Your exertions have been a generous contest for secondary honours, or a grateful tribute of respect due to the noble ashes that lent a hand to raise you into notice, by introducing you into the house of which you have ever been an ornament, if not a support. But, unfortunately, you have lately lost a great part of your popularity: members were tired of listening to declamation, or had not sufficient taste to be amused when you ingeniously wandered from the question, and said certainly many good things, if they were not to the present purpose. You were the Cicero of one side of the house for years; and then to sink into oblivion, to see your blooming honours fade before you, was enough to rouse 108all that was human in you—and make you produce the impassioned Reflections which have been a glorious revivification of your fame.—Richard is himself again! He is still a great man, though he has deserted his post, and buried in elogiums, on church establishments, the enthusiasm that forced him to throw the weight of his talents on the side of liberty and natural rights, when the will[21] of the nation oppressed the Americans.

Our House of Commons has indeed been known as a place for great speeches and a breeding ground for wit, even when party politics narrow perspectives and limit compassion. Still, the few skilled speakers it has produced make this praise seem minor. Mr. Locke would say that eloquence is often used to make the weaker arguments seem stronger rather than to uphold rational judgment. Many who secure their seats through luck and family status are satisfied with their position and don’t strive for riskier achievements. But you are different; you have elevated yourself through your abilities, pushing the advantages of rank into the background. Your efforts have been a commendable pursuit of secondary honors or a respectful acknowledgment of those noble legacies that helped you gain attention by introducing you into this assembly, of which you have always been an adornment, if not a support. However, you have recently lost much of your popularity: members grew weary of your elaborate speeches or simply lacked the appreciation for your clever diversions from the topic, even if you said many good things that weren’t relevant at the moment. You were the Cicero for one side of the house for years, and then to fade into obscurity and watch your glowing honors disappear before your eyes was enough to awaken all your human emotions and inspire you to write the passionate Reflections that have brilliantly revived your reputation. Richard is back! He remains a significant figure, even though he has abandoned his post and hidden, in praises of church institutions, the fervor that once drove him to apply his talents in favor of liberty and natural rights when the will[21] of the nation was suppressing the Americans.

There appears to be such a mixture of real sensibility and fondly cherished romance in your composition, that the present crisis carries you out of yourself; and since you could not be one of the grand movers, the next best thing that dazzled your imagination was to be a conspicuous opposer. Full of yourself, you make as much noise to convince the world 109that you despise the revolution, as Rousseau did to persuade his contemporaries to let him live in obscurity.

There seems to be a mix of genuine feeling and cherished romance in your work that the current situation takes you out of your own self; and since you couldn't be one of the major players, the next best thing that caught your imagination was to be a prominent opponent. Confident in yourself, you make as much noise to convince the world that you look down on the revolution, as Rousseau did to get his peers to let him live in anonymity. 109

Reading your Reflections warily over, it has continually and forcibly struck me, that had you been a Frenchman, you would have been, in spite of your respect for rank and antiquity, a violent revolutionist; and deceived, as you now probably are, by the passions that cloud your reason, have termed your romantic enthusiasm an enlightened love of your country, a benevolent respect for the rights of men. Your imagination would have taken fire, and have found arguments, full as ingenious as those you now offer, to prove that the constitution, of which so few pillars remained, that constitution which time had almost obliterated, was not a model sufficiently noble to deserve close adherence. And, for the English constitution, you might not have had such a profound veneration as you have lately acquired; nay, it 110is not impossible that you might have entertained the same opinion of the English Parliament, that you professed to have during the American war.

Reading your Reflections cautiously, it has consistently and forcefully struck me that if you were a Frenchman, despite your respect for rank and tradition, you would have been a passionate revolutionary. Deceived, as you probably are now, by the emotions that cloud your judgment, you have called your romantic enthusiasm an enlightened love for your country, a sincere respect for human rights. Your imagination would have ignited, and you would have found arguments just as clever as those you present now, to argue that the constitution, of which so few supports remained, that constitution which time had nearly erased, was not worthy enough to deserve strict adherence. And, regarding the English constitution, you might not have held the deep respect that you have recently developed; indeed, it’s possible you could have had the same opinion of the English Parliament that you professed during the American war.

Another observation which, by frequently occurring, has almost grown into a conviction, is simply this, that had the English in general reprobated the French revolution, you would have stood forth alone, and been the avowed Goliah of liberty. But, not liking to see so many brothers near the throne of fame, you have turned the current of your passions, and consequently of your reasoning, another way. Had Dr. Price’s sermon not lighted some sparks very like envy in your bosom, I shrewdly suspect that he would have been treated with more candour; nor is it charitable to suppose that any thing but personal pique and hurt vanity could have dictated such bitter sarcasms and reiterated expressions of contempt as occur in your Reflections.

Another observation that has happened often enough to almost feel like a belief is this: if the English had generally rejected the French revolution, you would have stood out alone as the open champion of freedom. But, not wanting to see so many peers close to the spotlight, you’ve redirected your passions and reasoning elsewhere. If Dr. Price’s sermon hadn’t sparked some envy in you, I strongly suspect he would have received more kindness; it’s uncharitable to think that anything but personal grudge and bruised pride could have inspired the harsh sarcasm and repeated contempt found in your Reflections.

111But without fixed principles even goodness of heart is no security from inconsistency, and mild affectionate sensibility only renders a man more ingeniously cruel, when the pangs of hurt vanity are mistaken for virtuous indignation, and the gall of bitterness for the milk of Christian charity.

111But without solid principles, even a good heart can't guarantee consistency, and gentle, caring sensitivity can make someone more skillfully cruel when feelings of wounded pride are confused with righteous anger, and bitterness is mistaken for the genuine kindness of Christian compassion.

Where is the dignity, the infallibility of sensibility, in the fair ladies, whom, if the voice of rumour is to be credited, the captive negroes curse in all the agony of bodily pain, for the unheard of tortures they invent? It is probable that some of them, after the sight of a flagellation, compose their ruffled spirits and exercise their tender feelings by the perusal of the last imported novel.—How true these tears are to nature, I leave you to determine. But these ladies may have read your Enquiry concerning the origin of our ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful, and, convinced by your arguments, 112may have laboured to be pretty, by counterfeiting weakness.

Where is the dignity, the certainty of feeling, in the fair ladies who, according to gossip, are cursed by the captive black men in their agony from the unimaginable tortures they face? It's likely that some of them, after witnessing a whipping, calm their troubled minds and nurture their sensitivity by reading the latest imported novel. —How genuine these tears are to nature, I leave it to you to decide. But these ladies might have read your Inquiry into the origin of our ideas about the Sublime and Beautiful and, convinced by your arguments, may have worked to appear delicate by pretending to be weak. 112

You may have convinced them that littleness and weakness are the very essence of beauty; and that the Supreme Being, in giving women beauty in the most supereminent degree, seemed to command them, by the powerful voice of Nature, not to cultivate the moral virtues that might chance to excite respect, and interfere with the pleasing sensations they were created to inspire. Thus confining truth, fortitude, and humanity, within the rigid pale of manly morals, they might justly argue, that to be loved, woman’s high end and great distinction! they should ‘learn to lisp, to totter in their walk, and nick-name God’s creatures.’ Never, they might repeat after you, was any man, much less a woman, rendered amiable by the force of those exalted qualities, fortitude, justice, wisdom, 113and truth; and thus forewarned of the sacrifice they must make to those austere, unnatural virtues, they would be authorized to turn all their attention to their persons, systematically neglecting morals to secure beauty.—Some rational old woman indeed might chance to stumble at this doctrine, and hint, that in avoiding atheism you had not steered clear of the mussulman’s creed; but you could readily exculpate yourself by turning the charge on Nature, who made our idea of beauty independent of reason. Nor would it be necessary for you to recollect, that if virtue has any other foundation than worldly utility, you have clearly proved that one half of the human species, at least, have not souls; and that Nature, by making women little, smooth, delicate, fair creatures, never designed that they should exercise their reason to acquire the virtues that produce opposite, if not contradictory, feelings. 114The affection they excite, to be uniform and perfect, should not be tinctured with the respect which moral virtues inspire, lest pain should be blended with pleasure, and admiration disturb the soft intimacy of love. This laxity of morals in the female world is certainly more captivating to a libertine imagination than the cold arguments of reason, that give no sex to virtue. If beautiful weakness be interwoven in a woman’s frame, if the chief business of her life be (as you insinuate) to inspire love, and Nature has made an eternal distinction between the qualities that dignify a rational being and this animal perfection, her duty and happiness in this life must clash with any preparation for a more exalted state. So that Plato and Milton were grossly mistaken in asserting that human love led to heavenly, and was only an exaltation of the same affection; for the love of the Deity, 115which is mixed with the most profound reverence, must be love of perfection, and not compassion for weakness.

You may have convinced them that smallness and fragility are the true essence of beauty; and that the Supreme Being, by granting women an exceptional beauty, seemed to command them, through the powerful voice of Nature, not to develop the moral virtues that might evoke respect and interfere with the pleasant feelings they were meant to inspire. By restricting truth, courage, and humanity within the strict boundaries of masculine morals, they might reasonably argue that to be loved, which is a woman’s ultimate purpose and distinction, she should "learn to speak softly, walk unsteadily, and give us amusing names for God’s creations." Never, they might echo from you, was any man, much less a woman, made charming by those exalted qualities—bravery, justice, wisdom, 113 and truth; and thus, warned of the sacrifices they must make for those strict, unnatural virtues, they would be justified in focusing all their attention on their appearance, systematically neglecting morals to ensure beauty.—Some sensible old woman might stumble upon this idea and suggest that in avoiding atheism, you had not escaped the views of the Muslims; but you could easily clear yourself by blaming Nature, who made our concept of beauty independent of reason. Nor would you need to remember that if virtue is built on anything other than worldly utility, you have clearly shown that at least half of humanity lacks souls; and that Nature, by making women small, smooth, delicate, and fair, never intended for them to use their reasoning to gain the virtues that create opposite, if not contradictory, feelings. 114 The affection they inspire, to be consistent and perfect, should not be tainted with the respect that moral virtues bring, lest pain mix with pleasure, and admiration disrupt the gentle closeness of love. This relaxed attitude towards morals in the female world is certainly more appealing to a libertine imagination than the cold logic of reason, which gives no gender to virtue. If beautiful fragility is woven into a woman’s being, if her main purpose in life is (as you suggest) to inspire love, and Nature has established a permanent distinction between the qualities that elevate a rational being and this animal-like perfection, her duty and happiness in this life must conflict with any preparation for a higher state. So Plato and Milton were terribly mistaken in claiming that human love leads to heavenly love and is merely an elevation of the same emotion; for the love of the Deity, 115 which is intertwined with the deepest reverence, must be a love for perfection, not compassion for weakness.

To say the truth, I not only tremble for the souls of women, but for the good natured man, whom every one loves. The amiable weakness of his mind is a strong argument against its immateriality, and seems to prove that beauty relaxes the solids of the soul as well as the body.

To be honest, I not only worry about the souls of women, but also for the kind man that everyone loves. The gentle weakness of his mind strongly suggests its immateriality, and it seems to show that beauty softens the solid aspects of the soul just like it does the body.

It follows then immediately, from your own reasoning, that respect and love are antagonist principles; and that, if we really wish to render men more virtuous, we must endeavour to banish all enervating modifications of beauty from civil society. We must, to carry your argument a little further, return to the Spartan regulations, and settle the virtues of men on the stern foundation of mortification and self-denial; for any attempt to civilize the heart, to make it humane by implanting 116reasonable principles, is a mere philosophic dream. If refinement inevitably lessens respect for virtue, by rendering beauty, the grand tempter, more seductive; if these relaxing feelings are incompatible with the nervous exertions of morality, the sun of Europe is not set; it begins to dawn, when cold metaphysicians try to make the head give laws to the heart.

It follows then immediately, from your own reasoning, that respect and love are opposing principles; and that, if we truly want to make people more virtuous, we must work to eliminate all weakening influences of beauty from society. We must, to take your argument a bit further, go back to the Spartan rules and base the virtues of people on the strict foundation of discipline and self-denial; because any attempt to civilize the heart, to make it compassionate by instilling reasonable principles, is just a philosophical pipe dream. If refinement inevitably reduces respect for virtue by making beauty, the ultimate temptation, more enticing; if these relaxing feelings conflict with the intense demands of morality, the sun of Europe has not set; it begins to rise, when detached thinkers try to make reason dictate to the heart.

But should experience prove that there is a beauty in virtue, a charm in order, which necessarily implies exertion, a depraved sensual taste may give way to a more manly one—and melting feelings to rational satisfactions. Both may be equally natural to man; the test is their moral difference, and that point reason alone can decide.

But if experience shows that there is a beauty in virtue and a charm in order, which require effort, a corrupted sense of pleasure might be replaced by a stronger, more noble one—and emotional feelings might evolve into rational satisfactions. Both can be natural to humanity; the real test is their moral difference, which can only be determined by reason.

Such a glorious change can only be produced by liberty. Inequality of rank must ever impede the growth of virtue, by vitiating the mind that submits or domineers; that 117is ever employed to procure nourishment for the body, or amusement for the mind. And if this grand example be set by an assembly of unlettered clowns, if they can produce a crisis that may involve the fate of Europe, and ‘more than Europe[22],’ you must allow us to respect unsophisticated reason, and reverence the active exertions that were not relaxed by a fastidious respect for the beauty of rank, or a dread of the deformity produced by any void in the social structure.

Such an amazing change can only happen through freedom. Differences in status will always hinder the development of virtue by corrupting the mind that either submits or rules; it’s constantly focused on getting food for the body or fun for the mind. And if a group of uneducated people can create a moment that could shape the fate of Europe, and ‘more than Europe,’ then we must recognize simple reasoning and admire the efforts that were not held back by a picky respect for social status or a fear of the ugliness caused by any gaps in the social structure.

After your contemptuous manner of speaking of the National Assembly, after descanting on the coarse vulgarity of their proceedings, which, according to your own definition of virtue, is a proof of its genuineness; was it not a little inconsistent, not to say absurd, 118to assert, that a dozen people of quality were not a sufficient counterpoise to the vulgar mob with whom they condescended to associate? Have we half a dozen leaders of eminence in our House of Commons, or even in the fashionable world? yet the sheep obsequiously pursue their steps with all the undeviating sagacity of instinct.

After your dismissive way of talking about the National Assembly, after going on about the crude behavior of their meetings, which, by your own standards of virtue, actually shows its authenticity; wasn’t it a bit inconsistent, if not downright ridiculous, 118 to claim that a dozen people of high status aren't enough to balance out the common crowd they chose to mingle with? Do we have even half a dozen notable leaders in our House of Commons, or in high society? Yet, people blindly follow them with all the unwavering instinct of sheep.

In order that liberty should have a firm foundation, an acquaintance with the world would naturally lead cool men to conclude that it must be laid, knowing the weakness of the human heart, and the ‘deceitfulness of riches,’ either by poor men, or philosophers, if a sufficient number of men, disinterested from principle, or truly wise, could be found. Was it natural to expect that sensual prejudices should give way to reason, or present feelings to enlarged views?—No; I am afraid that human nature is still in such a weak state, that the abolition of titles, the corner-stone of 119despotism, could only have been the work of men who had no titles to sacrifice. The National Assembly, it is true, contains some honourable exceptions; but the majority had not such powerful feelings to struggle with, when reason led them to respect the naked dignity of virtue.

For liberty to have a solid foundation, a good understanding of the world would likely lead level-headed people to realize that it must be established, given the fragility of the human heart and the 'deceitfulness of riches,' either by poor individuals or philosophers, if enough disinterested and genuinely wise people could be found. Was it reasonable to think that selfish biases would yield to logic, or immediate feelings to broader perspectives?—No; I’m afraid human nature is still so weak that eliminating titles, the cornerstone of 119despotism, could only have been achieved by people who had no titles to lose. The National Assembly does have some honorable exceptions; however, the majority didn’t have such strong emotions to contend with when reason guided them to honor the pure dignity of virtue.

Weak minds are always timid. And what can equal the weakness of mind produced by servile flattery, and the vapid pleasures that neither hope nor fear seasoned? Had the constitution of France been new modelled, or more cautiously repaired, by the lovers of elegance and beauty, it is natural to suppose that the imagination would have erected a fragile temporary building; or the power of one tyrant, divided amongst a hundred, might have rendered the struggle for liberty only a choice of masters. And the glorious chance that is now given to human nature of attaining more virtue and happiness than has hitherto blessed 120our globe, might have been sacrificed to a meteor of the imagination, a bubble of passion. The ecclesiastics, indeed, would probably have remained in quiet possession of their sinecures; and your gall might not have been mixed with your ink on account of the daring sacrilege that brought them more on a level. The nobles would have had bowels for their younger sons, if not for the misery of their fellow-creatures. An august mass of property would have been transmitted to posterity to guard the temple of superstition, and prevent reason from entering with her officious light. And the pomp of religion would have continued to impress the senses, if she were unable to subjugate the passions.

Weak minds are always fearful. And what can compare to the weakness of mind created by obsequious flattery and the shallow pleasures that neither hope nor fear enhance? If the constitution of France had been restructured, or more carefully fixed, by those who appreciate elegance and beauty, it's natural to think that the imagination might have built a delicate, temporary structure; or that the power of one tyrant, divided among many, could have made the fight for freedom merely a choice of rulers. The wonderful chance that is now available for human nature to achieve more virtue and happiness than ever before on our planet might have been sacrificed to a fleeting fantasy, a fleeting desire. The clergy would likely have stayed comfortably in their secure positions; and your bitterness might not have mixed with your ink because of the bold sacrilege that brought them closer to equality. The nobles would have had support for their younger sons, if not for the suffering of their fellow humans. A great amount of wealth would have been passed down to future generations to protect the temple of superstition and keep reason out with her intrusive light. And the grandeur of religion would have continued to captivate the senses, if she were unable to conquer the passions.

Is hereditary weakness necessary to render religion lovely? and will her form have lost the smooth delicacy that inspires love, when stripped of its Gothic drapery? Must every grand model be placed on the pedestal of property? 121and is there no beauteous proportion in virtue, when not clothed in a sensual garb?

Is inherited weakness necessary to make religion appealing? And will its form lose the graceful quality that evokes love when it's taken out of its Gothic style? Does every great example have to be put on the pedestal of wealth? 121 Is there no beautiful balance in virtue when it's not dressed in a physical guise?

Of these questions there would be no end, though they lead to the same conclusion;—that your politics and morals, when simplified, would undermine religion and virtue to set up a spurious, sensual beauty, that has long debauched your imagination, under the specious form of natural feelings.

Of these questions, there would be no end, even though they all lead to the same conclusion: your politics and morals, when boiled down, would weaken religion and virtue to create a false, physical beauty that has long corrupted your imagination, disguised as genuine feelings.

And what is this mighty revolution in property? The present incumbents only are injured, or the hierarchy of the clergy, an ideal part of the constitution, which you have personified, to render your affection more tender. How has posterity been injured by a distribution of the property snatched, perhaps, from innocent hands, but accumulated by the most abominable violation of every sentiment of justice and piety? Was the monument of former ignorance and iniquity to be held sacred, to enable the present possessors 122of enormous benefices to dissolve in indolent pleasures? Was not their convenience, for they have not been turned adrift on the world, to give place to a just partition of the land belonging to the state? And did not the respect due to the natural equality of man require this triumph over Monkish rapacity? Were those monsters to be reverenced on account of their antiquity, and their unjust claims perpetuated to their ideal children, the clergy, merely to preserve the sacred majesty of Property inviolate, and to enable the Church to retain her pristine splendor? Can posterity be injured by individuals losing the chance of obtaining great wealth, without meriting it, by its being diverted from a narrow channel, and disembogued into the sea that affords clouds to water all the land? Besides, the clergy not brought up with the expectation of great revenues will not feel the loss; and if bishops should happen to be chosen on account 123of their personal merit, religion may be benefited by the vulgar nomination.

And what is this huge change in property? The current holders are the only ones harmed, or the hierarchy of the clergy, an ideal part of the constitution, which you’ve personalized to make your affection more heartfelt. How has future generations been harmed by the redistribution of property that may have been taken from innocent hands but was built up through the most horrible violations of justice and decency? Was the monument of past ignorance and wrongdoing supposed to be preserved so that those with huge benefits could just lounge in laziness? Shouldn't their comfort, since they haven't been abandoned in the world, make way for a fair distribution of the land owned by the state? And shouldn’t respect for the natural equality of mankind demand this victory over greedy clergymen? Were those monsters to be honored just because of their age, and their unjust claims passed down to their ideal descendants, the clergy, just to protect the sacred majesty of Property and allow the Church to keep its original glory? Can future generations really be harmed by individuals losing the opportunity to gain great wealth without deserving it, simply because it’s redirected from a narrow channel and emptied into the sea that waters all the land? Moreover, clergy who were not raised with the expectation of large incomes won’t feel the loss; and if bishops happen to be chosen based on their personal merit, religion might actually benefit from the common nominations.

The sophistry of asserting that Nature leads us to reverence our civil institutions from the same principle that we venerate aged individuals, is a palpable fallacy ‘that is so like truth, it will serve the turn as well.’ And when you add, ‘that we have chosen our nature rather than our speculations, our breasts rather than our inventions[23]’, the pretty jargon seems equally unintelligible.

The idea that Nature makes us respect our civil institutions in the same way we respect older people is obviously a fallacy that’s so similar to truth, it works just as well. And when you say, 'that we have chosen our nature instead of our theories, our feelings instead of our inventions[23]', the nice-sounding nonsense feels just as confusing.

But it was the downfall of the visible power and dignity of the church that roused your ire; 124you could have excused a little squeezing of the individuals to supply present exigencies; the actual possessors of the property might have been oppressed with something like impunity, if the church had not been spoiled of its gaudy trappings. You love the church, your country, and its laws, you repeatedly tell us, because they deserve to be loved; but from you this is not a panegyric: weakness and indulgence are the only incitements to love and confidence that you can discern, and it cannot be denied that the tender mother you venerate deserves, on this score, all your affection.

But it was the loss of the church's visible power and dignity that made you angry; 124 you might have accepted a bit of pressure on individuals to meet immediate needs; the actual owners of the property might have been treated with some level of impunity if the church hadn't lost its flashy adornments. You keep telling us that you love the church, your country, and its laws because they deserve that love; but for you, this isn’t a compliment. Weakness and leniency are the only reasons for love and trust that you can see, and it can't be denied that the gentle mother you admire truly deserves all your affection on that account.

It would be as vain a task to attempt to obviate all your passionate objections, as to unravel all your plausible arguments, often illustrated by known truths, and rendered forcible by pointed invectives. I only attack the foundation. On the natural principles of justice I build my plea for disseminating the property artfully said to be appropriated to religious purposes, but, in reality, 125to support idle tyrants, amongst the society whose ancestors were cheated or forced into illegal grants. Can there be an opinion more subversive of morality, than that time sanctifies crimes, and silences the blood that calls out for retribution, if not for vengeance? If the revenue annexed to the Gallic church was greater than the most bigoted protestant would now allow to be its reasonable share, would it not have been trampling on the rights of men to perpetuate such an arbitrary appropriation of the common stock, because time had rendered the fraudulent seizure venerable? Besides, if Reason had suggested, as surely she must, if the imagination had not been allowed to dwell on the fascinating pomp of ceremonial grandeur, that the clergy would be rendered both more virtuous and useful by being put more on a par with each other, and the mass of the people it was their duty to instruct;—where was there room for hesitation? The charge of presumption, 126thrown by you on the most reasonable innovations, may, without any violence to truth, be retorted on every reformation that has meliorated our condition, and even on the improvable faculty that gives us a claim to the pre-eminence of intelligent beings.

Trying to address all your passionate objections is just as pointless as unraveling all your convincing arguments, often backed by well-known truths and made strong by sharp criticisms. Instead, I focus on the foundation. I build my case for redistributing property that is cleverly claimed to be for religious purposes, but in reality, it supports lazy tyrants—within a society where ancestors were deceived or forced into illegal grants. Can there be a more morally corrupt opinion than believing that time makes crimes acceptable and silences the cries for justice, if not revenge? If the revenue tied to the Gallic church was greater than what even the most zealous Protestant would consider fair, wouldn’t it be a violation of human rights to continue this arbitrary appropriation of shared resources, just because time has made the theft seem respectable? Furthermore, if Reason, as surely she must, suggested that if imagination hadn’t been allowed to linger on the alluring spectacle of ceremonial grandeur, the clergy would become both more virtuous and useful by being more equal among themselves and with the general public they were meant to educate—where is the room for doubt? The accusation of presumption you level at the most reasonable changes can, without any distortion of truth, be turned back on every reform that has improved our condition, and even on the very faculty that grants us the status of intelligent beings.

Plausibility, I know, can only be unmasked by shewing the absurdities it glosses over, and the simple truths it involves with specious errors. Eloquence has often confounded triumphant villainy; but it is probable that it has more frequently rendered the boundary that separates virtue and vice doubtful.—Poisons may be only medicines in judicious hands; but they should not be administered by the ignorant, because they have sometimes seen great cures performed by their powerful aid.

Plausibility, I know, can only be revealed by showing the absurdities it hides and the simple truths it mixes up with misleading errors. Eloquence has often confused successful wrongdoing; however, it’s likely that it has more often blurred the line between virtue and vice. Poisons can just be medicines in skilled hands, but they shouldn’t be given by those who don't know better, even if they’ve occasionally seen great recoveries thanks to their potent help.

The many sensible remarks and pointed observations which you have mixed with opinions that strike at our dearest interests, fortify 127those opinions, and give them a degree of strength that render them formidable to the wise, and convincing to the superficial. It is impossible to read half a dozen pages of your book without admiring your ingenuity, or indignantly spurning your sophisms. Words are heaped on words, till the understanding is confused by endeavouring to disentangle the sense, and the memory by tracing contradictions. After observing a host of these contradictions, it can scarcely be a breach of charity to think that you have often sacrificed your sincerity to enforce your favourite arguments, and called in your judgment to adjust the arrangement of words that could not convey its dictates.

The many sensible comments and sharp observations you mix with opinions that challenge our deepest interests strengthen those opinions and give them a level of power that makes them daunting to the wise and convincing to the less discerning. It's impossible to read even a few pages of your book without either admiring your creativity or feeling outraged by your fallacies. Words pile on top of each other until the reader gets confused trying to figure out the meaning and the memory gets tangled up tracing contradictions. After noticing so many contradictions, it's hardly unkind to think that you've often sacrificed your honesty to push your favorite arguments and manipulated your own judgment to rearrange words that couldn't express its true meaning.

A fallacy of this kind, I think, could not have escaped you when you were treating the subject that called forth your bitterest animadversions, the confiscation of the ecclesiastical revenue. Who of the vindicators of the rights 128of men ever ventured to assert, that the clergy of the present day should be punished on account of the intolerable pride and inhuman cruelty of many of their predecessors[24]? No; such a thought never entered the mind of those who warred with inveterate prejudices. A desperate disease required a powerful remedy. Injustice had no right to rest on prescription; nor has the character of the present clergy any weight in the argument.

A flaw like this, I believe, couldn’t have gone unnoticed by you when you discussed the topic that triggered your harshest criticisms, the seizure of church funds. Which of those defending human rights ever dared to claim that today’s clergy should be punished for the unbearable arrogance and inhumane cruelty of many of their predecessors? No; that idea never crossed the minds of those battling deep-seated biases. A severe problem called for a strong solution. Injustice can’t be justified by past actions; nor does the reputation of today’s clergy hold any relevance in this argument.

You find it very difficult to separate policy from justice: in the political world they have frequently been separated with shameful dexterity. To mention a recent instance. According to the limited views of timid, or interested politicians, an abolition of the infernal slave trade would not only be unsound policy, but a flagrant infringement of the laws (which are allowed to have been infamous) that induced the planters to purchase their estates. 129But is it not consonant with justice, with the common principles of humanity, not to mention Christianity, to abolish this abominable mischief? [25]There is not one argument, one invective, levelled by you at the confiscators of the church revenue, which could not, with the strictest propriety, be applied by the planters and negro-drivers to our Parliament, if it gloriously dared to shew the world that British senators were men: if the natural feelings of humanity silenced the cold cautions of timidity, till this stigma on our nature was wiped off, and all men were allowed 130to enjoy their birth-right—liberty, till by their crimes they had authorized society to deprive them of the blessing they had abused.

You find it really hard to separate policy from justice: in the political world, they’re often separated with disgraceful skill. Take a recent example. According to the narrow views of timid or self-interested politicians, ending the horrific slave trade wouldn’t just be bad policy, but also a blatant violation of the laws (which are known to be terrible) that led landowners to buy their estates. 129 But isn't it fair and just, in line with basic human principles, not to mention Christianity, to put an end to this awful disaster? [25]Not one argument or insult you direct at those taking church revenue could not be just as appropriately directed by landowners and slave drivers at our Parliament, if it boldly showed the world that British lawmakers were indeed human. If the natural feelings of compassion silenced the cold fears of timidity, until this stain on our character was erased, and everyone was allowed to enjoy their birthright—freedom—until their own actions justified society taking away the blessing they had misused. 130

The same arguments might be used in India, if any attempt were made to bring back things to nature, to prove that a man ought never to quit the cast that confined him to the profession of his lineal forefathers. The Bramins would doubtless find many ingenious reasons to justify this debasing, though venerable prejudice; and would not, it is to be supposed, forget to observe that time, by interweaving the oppressive law with many useful customs, had rendered it for the present very convenient, and consequently legal. Almost every vice that has degraded our nature might be justified by shewing that it had been productive of some benefit to society: for it would be as difficult to point out positive evil as unallayed good, in this imperfect state. What indeed would become of 131morals, if they had no other test than prescription? The manners of men may change without end; but, wherever reason receives the least cultivation—wherever men rise above brutes, morality must rest on the same base. And the more man discovers of the nature of his mind and body, the more clearly he is convinced, that to act according to the dictates of reason is to conform to the law of God.

The same arguments could be made in India if there were any attempt to return things to nature, to claim that a person should never leave the caste that confines them to the profession of their ancestors. The Brahmins would likely come up with many clever reasons to justify this degrading, yet respected, prejudice; and they would probably not forget to point out that time, by blending the oppressive law with many useful customs, has made it quite convenient at present, and thus legal. Almost every vice that has degraded our nature could be defended by showing that it has had some benefit to society: it would be as hard to identify absolute evil as it is to find pure good in this imperfect state. What would morals even be if they had no other standard than tradition? Human behavior may change endlessly, but wherever reason is nurtured—wherever humans rise above animals—morality must be built on the same foundation. And the more humans learn about the nature of their minds and bodies, the more they are convinced that acting according to reason is to follow the law of God.

The test of honour may be arbitrary and fallacious, and, retiring into subterfuge, elude close enquiry; but true morality shuns not the day, nor shrinks from the ordeal of investigation. Most of the happy revolutions that have taken place in the world have happened when weak princes held the reins they could not manage; but are they, on that account, to be canonized as saints or demi-gods, and pushed forward to notice on the throne of ignorance? Pleasure wants a zest, if experience cannot compare it with pain; but who courts pain to 132heighten his pleasures? A transient view of society will further illustrate arguments which appear so obvious that I am almost ashamed to produce illustrations. How many children have been taught œconomy, and many other virtues, by the extravagant thoughtlessness of their parents; yet a good education is allowed to be an inestimable blessing. The tenderest mothers are often the most unhappy wives; but can the good that accrues from the private distress that produces a sober dignity of mind justify the inflictor? Right or wrong may be estimated according to the point of sight, and other adventitious circumstances; but, to discover its real nature, the enquiry must go deeper than the surface, and beyond the local consequences that confound good and evil together. The rich and weak, a numerous train, will certainly applaud your system, and loudly celebrate your pious reverence for authority and establishments—they find it pleasanter 133to enjoy than to think; to justify oppression than correct abuses.—The rights of men are grating sounds that set their teeth on edge; the impertinent enquiry of philosophic meddling innovation. If the poor are in distress, they will make some benevolent exertions to assist them; they will confer obligations, but not do justice. Benevolence is a very amiable specious quality; yet the aversion which men feel to accept a right as a favour, should rather be extolled as a vestige of native dignity, than stigmatized as the odious offspring of ingratitude. The poor consider the rich as their lawful prey; but we ought not too severely to animadvert on their ingratitude. When they receive an alms they are commonly grateful at the moment; but old habits quickly return, and cunning has ever been a substitute for force.

The test of honor may be random and misleading, and by retreating into trickery, it can evade direct scrutiny; but true morality doesn’t shy away from the spotlight or fear the process of investigation. Most of the positive changes that have occurred in the world have happened when incompetent leaders were in power; but does that mean they should be celebrated as saints or demigods and elevated to a position of authority in ignorance? Pleasure loses its thrill if we can’t compare it to pain; but who seeks out pain just to enhance their enjoyment? A brief look at society will further illustrate points that seem so clear I’m almost embarrassed to provide examples. How many children have learned frugality and other virtues from their parents' reckless behavior; yet a good education is widely recognized as a priceless gift. The most caring mothers are often the most miserable wives; but can the benefits that come from the personal suffering that leads to a sober mindset justify the one causing it? Right or wrong can be judged based on perspective and other random factors; however, to understand its true nature, the inquiry must dig deeper than the surface and go beyond the immediate consequences that blur the lines between good and evil. The rich and weak, a large group, will definitely praise your system and loudly honor your respect for authority and institutions—they find it more enjoyable to indulge than to think; to justify oppression rather than correct wrongs. The phrase The rights of men sounds harsh and grates on them; it’s the annoying inquiry of philosophical meddling and change. If the poor are struggling, they will make some benevolent efforts to help them; they will create obligations but won’t deliver justice. Benevolence is a very charming but deceptive quality; yet the reluctance people feel to accept a right as a favor should be celebrated as a sign of inherent dignity, rather than condemned as the ugly result of ingratitude. The poor see the rich as their rightful targets; but we shouldn’t be too harsh in criticizing their ingratitude. When they receive charity, they are usually grateful at that moment; but old habits return quickly, and cunning has always replaced force.

That both physical and moral evil were not only foreseen, but entered into the scheme of 134Providence, when this world was contemplated in the Divine mind, who can doubt, without robbing Omnipotence of a most exalted attribute? But the business of the life of a good man should be, to separate light from darkness; to diffuse happiness, whilst he submits to unavoidable misery. And a conviction that there is much unavoidable wretchedness, appointed by the grand Disposer of all events, should not slacken his exertions: the extent of what is possible can only be discerned by God. The justice of God may be vindicated by a belief in a future state; but, only by believing that evil is educing good for the individual, and not for an imaginary whole. The happiness of the whole must arise from the happiness of the constituent parts, or the essence of justice is sacrificed to a supposed grand arrangement. And that may be good for the whole of a creature’s existence, that disturbs the comfort of a small portion. The evil which 135an individual suffers for the good of the community is partial, it must be allowed, if the account is settled by death.—But the partial evil which it suffers, during one stage of existence, to render another stage more perfect, is strictly just. The Father of all only can regulate the education of his children. To suppose that, during the whole or part of its existence, the happiness of any individual is sacrificed to promote the welfare of ten, or ten thousand, other beings—is impious. But to suppose that the happiness, or animal enjoyment, of one portion of existence is sacrificed to improve and ennoble the being itself, and render it capable of more perfect happiness, is not to reflect on either the goodness or wisdom of God.

That both physical and moral evil were not only anticipated but also part of the plan of 134Providence, when this world was envisioned in the Divine mind, who can doubt, without diminishing Omnipotence’s most important quality? However, the focus of a good person’s life should be to distinguish light from darkness; to spread happiness while accepting unavoidable suffering. The understanding that there is a lot of unavoidable misery, allowed by the great Disposer of all events, should not reduce his efforts: only God can see the full extent of what is possible. God’s justice can be justified by believing in a future state; but only by believing that evil brings about good for the individual, not for some imagined whole. The happiness of the whole must come from the happiness of its parts, or the essence of justice is sacrificed for a supposed larger plan. What may be beneficial for the entirety of a being’s existence can disrupt the comfort of a small part. The suffering that 135an individual endures for the benefit of the community is partial, it must be acknowledged, if the account is closed by death. —But the partial suffering experienced during one phase of life to enhance another phase is strictly fair. Only the Father of all can oversee the education of His children. To think that, during any part of its existence, the happiness of one individual is sacrificed to improve the welfare of ten, or ten thousand other beings—is irreverent. But to believe that the happiness or enjoyment of one portion of existence is sacrificed to enrich and elevate the being itself, making it capable of greater happiness, is not to reflect on either the goodness or wisdom of God.

It may be confidently asserted that no man chooses evil, because it is evil; he only mistakes it for happiness, the good he seeks. And the desire of rectifying these mistakes, is the 136noble ambition of an enlightened understanding, the impulse of feelings that Philosophy invigorates. To endeavour to make unhappy men resigned to their fate, is the tender endeavour of short-sighted benevolence, of transient yearnings of humanity; but to labour to increase human happiness by extirpating error, is a masculine godlike affection. This remark may be carried still further. Men who possess uncommon sensibility, whose quick emotions shew how closely the eye and heart are connected, soon forget the most forcible sensations. Not tarrying long enough in the brain to be subject to reflection, the next sensations, of course, obliterate them. Memory, however, treasures up these proofs of native goodness; and the being who is not spurred on to any virtuous act, still thinks itself of consequence, and boasts of its feelings. Why? Because the sight of distress, or an affecting narrative, made its blood flow with more velocity, and the 137heart, literally speaking, beat with sympathetic emotion. We ought to beware of confounding mechanical instinctive sensations with emotions that reason deepens, and justly terms the feelings of humanity. This word discriminates the active exertions of virtue from the vague declamation of sensibility.

It can be confidently said that no one chooses evil just because it’s evil; they simply mistake it for happiness, the good they’re seeking. The desire to correct these mistakes is the noble goal of an enlightened understanding, the drive of feelings that Philosophy strengthens. Trying to make unhappy people accept their fate is a compassionate but short-sighted effort of temporary human longing; however, striving to increase human happiness by eliminating error is a strong, almost divine passion. This idea can be taken even further. People with extraordinary sensitivity, whose quick emotions show how closely connected the mind and heart are, soon forget their most intense feelings. They don’t linger long enough in their minds to reflect, so the next emotions naturally erase the previous ones. Memory, however, keeps these signs of innate goodness; the person who isn’t motivated to act virtuously still considers themselves significant and takes pride in their feelings. Why? Because witnessing distress or an emotional story made their blood rush faster, and their heart literally beat with empathy. We should be careful not to confuse instinctive mechanical sensations with emotions that reason deepens and rightly calls the feelings of humanity. This term distinguishes the active efforts of virtue from the vague expressions of sensitivity.

The declaration of the National Assembly, when they recognized the rights of men, was calculated to touch the humane heart—the downfall of the clergy, to agitate the pupil of impulse. On the watch to find fault, faults met your prying eye; a different prepossession might have produced a different conviction.

The declaration of the National Assembly, when they acknowledged the rights of men, was designed to resonate with the compassionate heart—the fall of the clergy, to stir the observer’s emotions. Always ready to criticize, flaws caught your inquisitive gaze; a different perspective could have led to a different conclusion.

When we read a book that supports our favourite opinions, how eagerly do we suck in the doctrines, and suffer our minds placidly to reflect the images that illustrate the tenets we have previously embraced. We indolently acquiesce in the conclusion, and our spirit animates and corrects the various subjects. But 138when, on the contrary, we peruse a skilful writer, with whom we do not coincide in opinion, how attentive is the mind to detect fallacy. And this suspicious coolness often prevents our being carried away by a stream of natural eloquence, which the prejudiced mind terms declamation—a pomp of words! We never allow ourselves to be warmed; and, after contending with the writer, are more confirmed in our opinion; as much, perhaps, from a spirit of contradiction as from reason. A lively imagination is ever in danger of being betrayed into error by favourite opinions, which it almost personifies, the more effectually to intoxicate the understanding. Always tending to extremes, truth is left behind in the heat of the chace, and things are viewed as positively good, or bad, though they wear an equivocal face.

When we read a book that aligns with our favorite opinions, we eagerly absorb the ideas and let our minds reflect the images that illustrate the beliefs we've already accepted. We lazily go along with the conclusions, and our spirit animates and corrects various topics. But 138 when we read a skilled writer whose opinions we don’t agree with, our minds are sharp in looking for flaws. This skeptical distance often stops us from being swept away by a flow of natural eloquence, which the biased mind dismisses as just fancy talk—a bunch of words! We never let ourselves get excited; and after arguing with the writer, we often become even more set in our views, perhaps out of sheer opposition rather than logic. A vivid imagination is always at risk of being misled by favorite opinions, which it almost brings to life, only to confuse our understanding even more. Always leaning toward extremes, we leave truth behind in the heat of the chase, viewing things as either clearly good or bad, even if they have a complicated appearance.

Some celebrated writers have supposed that wit and judgment were incompatible; opposite 139qualities, that, in a kind of elementary strife, destroyed each other: and many men of wit have endeavoured to prove that they were mistaken. Much may be adduced by wits and metaphysicians on both sides of the question. But, from experience, I am apt to believe that they do weaken each other, and that great quickness of comprehension, and facile association of ideas, naturally preclude profundity of research. Wit is often a lucky hit; the result of a momentary inspiration. We know not whence it comes, and it blows where it lifts. The operations of judgment, on the contrary, are cool and circumspect; and coolness and deliberation are great enemies to enthusiasm. If wit is of so fine a spirit, that it almost evaporates when translated into another language, why may not the temperature have an influence over it? This remark may be thought derogatory to the inferior qualities of the mind: but it is not a hasty one; and I mention it as 140a prelude to a conclusion I have frequently drawn, that the cultivation of reason damps fancy. The blessings of Heaven lie on each side; we must choose, if we wish to attain any degree of superiority, and not lose our lives in laborious idleness. If we mean to build our knowledge or happiness on a rational basis, we must learn to distinguish the possible, and not fight against the stream. And if we are careful to guard ourselves from imaginary sorrows and vain fears, we must also resign many enchanting illusions: for shallow must be the discernment which fails to discover that raptures and ecstasies arise from error.—Whether it will always be so, is not now to be discussed; suffice it to observe, that Truth is seldom arrayed by the Graces; and if she charms, it is only by inspiring a sober satisfaction, which takes its rise from a calm contemplation of proportion and simplicity. But, though it is allowed that one man has by nature more 141fancy than another, in each individual there is a spring-tide when fancy should govern and amalgamate materials for the understanding; and a graver period, when those materials should be employed by the judgment. For example, I am inclined to have a better opinion of the heart of an old man, who speaks of Sterne as his favourite author, than of his understanding. There are times and seasons for all things: and moralists appear to me to err, when they would confound the gaiety of youth with the seriousness of age; for the virtues of age look not only more imposing, but more natural, when they appear rather rigid. He who has not exercised his judgment to curb his imagination during the meridian of life, becomes, in its decline, too often the prey of childish feelings. Age demands respect; youth love: if this order is disturbed, the emotions are not pure; and when love for a man in his grand climacteric takes place 142of respect, it, generally speaking, borders on contempt. Judgment is sublime, wit beautiful; and, according to your own theory, they cannot exist together without impairing each other’s power. The predominancy of the latter, in your endless Reflections, should lead hasty readers to suspect that it may, in a great degree, exclude the former.

Some well-known writers have suggested that wit and judgment cannot coexist; they see them as opposing qualities that destroy each other in a kind of fundamental conflict. Many clever people have tried to prove them wrong. There’s a lot that can be said by both wits and philosophers on this topic. However, from my experience, I tend to believe that they do diminish each other, and that sharpness of understanding and easy connections between ideas naturally limit deep exploration. Wit is often just a lucky coincidence, the result of a fleeting inspiration. We don't know where it comes from; it comes and goes as it pleases. In contrast, judgment operates in a cool and careful manner; calmness and thoughtfulness are significant foes of enthusiasm. If wit is so delicate that it nearly vanishes when translated into another language, might not its environment have some effect on it? This observation may seem to belittle the lesser qualities of the mind, but it's not a rushed conclusion; I mention it as a lead-in to my often-repeated observation that cultivating reason dampens imagination. The blessings of life are found on both sides; we must choose, if we want to attain any level of excellence, and not get lost in tedious idleness. If we aim to build our knowledge or happiness on a rational foundation, we need to learn to differentiate the possible and not fight against the current. And while we should protect ourselves from fake sorrows and pointless fears, we must also give up many alluring illusions; for only a shallow understanding fails to realize that joys and ecstatic feelings often stem from mistakes. Whether this will always be the case is not the focus of the moment; it's enough to note that truth is rarely dressed up by charm, and when it does enchant, it primarily does so by evoking a steady satisfaction that arises from a calm observation of balance and simplicity. Though it’s true that one person may naturally have more imagination than another, everyone experiences moments when imagination should take charge and combine ideas for understanding, and then graver times when those ideas should be used by judgment. For instance, I tend to think more highly of the heart of an old man who favors Sterne as his favorite author than of his intelligence. There are appropriate times for everything: I believe moralists are mistaken when they mix the carefree spirit of youth with the seriousness of age; for the virtues of age appear not only more impressive but more genuine when they seem a bit stern. If someone hasn't trained their judgment to control their imagination during their prime, they often become too vulnerable to childish emotions in their later years. Age deserves respect; youth deserves love: if this order is disrupted, the feelings aren't pure; and when love for a man in his later years takes the place of respect, it often comes close to contempt. Judgment is profound, wit is lovely; and according to your own theory, they cannot coexist without diminishing each other's strength. The dominance of the latter in your countless Reflections should lead quick readers to suspect that it might largely overshadow the former.

But, among all your plausible arguments, and witty illustrations, your contempt for the poor always appears conspicuous, and rouses my indignation. The following paragraph in particular struck me, as breathing the most tyrannic spirit, and displaying the most factitious feelings. ‘Good order is the foundation of all good things. To be enabled to acquire, the people, without being servile, must be tractable and obedient. The magistrate must have his reverence, the laws their authority. The 143body of the people must not find the principles of natural subordination by art rooted out of their minds. They must respect that property of which they cannot partake. They must labour to obtain what by labour can be obtained; and when they find, as they commonly do, the success disproportioned to the endeavour, they must be taught their consolation in the final proportions of eternal justice. Of this consolation, whoever deprives them, deadens their industry, and strikes at the root of all acquisition as of all conservation. He that does this, is the cruel oppressor, the merciless enemy, of the poor and wretched; at the same time that, by his wicked speculations, he exposes the fruits of successful industry, and the accumulations of fortune,’ (ah! there’s the rub) ‘to the plunder of the negligent, the disappointed, and the unprosperous[26].’

But among all your reasonable arguments and clever examples, your disdain for the poor always stands out and makes me angry. The following paragraph, in particular, struck me as embodying the most tyrannical spirit and showing the most artificial feelings. ‘Good order is the foundation of all good things. To enable the people to acquire without being servile, they must be compliant and obedient. The magistrate deserves respect, and the laws must hold their authority. The body of the people should not have the principles of natural subordination removed from their minds. They *must* respect property that they *cannot* share. *They must work to obtain what can be achieved through effort; and when they find, as they often do, that the rewards are disproportionate to the effort, they must be taught their consolation in the ultimate fairness of eternal justice.* Whoever denies them this consolation undermines their motivation and strikes at the core of both acquisition and preservation. That person is a cruel oppressor, a merciless enemy of the poor and unfortunate; while at the same time, through their wicked schemes, they put the fruits of successful work and the buildup of wealth at risk to the negligence of the disappointed and the unlucky[26].’

144This is contemptible hard-hearted sophistry, in the specious form of humility, and submission to the will of Heaven.—It is, Sir, possible to render the poor happier in this world, without depriving them of the consolation which you gratuitously grant them in the next. They have a right to more comfort than they at present enjoy; and more comfort might be afforded them, without encroaching on the pleasures of the rich: not now waiting to enquire whether the rich have any right to exclusive pleasures. What do I say?—encroaching! No; if an intercourse were established between them, it would impart the only true pleasure that can be snatched in this land of shadows, this hard school of moral discipline.

144This is cruel and unfeeling reasoning, disguised as humility and submission to God's will.—It is, Sir, possible to make the poor happier in this world, without taking away the comfort you freely offer them in the next. They deserve more comfort than they currently have; and they could easily be given more comfort without taking away from the pleasures of the wealthy: not bothering to consider whether the wealthy have any right to exclusive pleasures. What am I saying?—taking away! No; if a relationship were formed between them, it would bring the only true joy that can be found in this land of shadows, this tough school of moral growth.

I know, indeed, that there is often something disgusting in the distresses of poverty, at which the imagination revolts, and starts back to exercise itself in the more 145attractive Arcadia of fiction. The rich man builds a house, art and taste give it the highest finish. His gardens are planted, and the trees grow to recreate the fancy of the planter, though the temperature of the climate may rather force him to avoid the dangerous damps they exhale, than seek the umbrageous retreat. Every thing on the estate is cherished but man;—yet, to contribute to the happiness of man, is the most sublime of all enjoyments. But if, instead of sweeping pleasure-grounds, obelisks, temples, and elegant cottages, as objects for the eye, the heart was allowed to beat true to nature, decent farms would be scattered over the estate, and plenty smile around. Instead of the poor being subject to the griping hand of an avaricious steward, they would be watched over with fatherly solicitude, by the man whose duty and pleasure it was to guard their happiness, and shield from rapacity 146the beings who, by the sweat of their brow, exalted him above his fellows.

I know that there’s often something off-putting about the struggles of poverty, which makes us want to turn away and instead focus on the more appealing stories of fiction. The wealthy person builds a house, and art and style give it a flawless look. Their gardens are planted, and the trees grow to please the vision of the owner, even if the climate actually makes them want to avoid the dampness that comes from them rather than seek the cool shade. Everything on the property is valued except for people; yet, finding ways to make people happy is the greatest joy of all. But instead of expansive pleasure gardens, obelisks, temples, and stylish cottages as visual attractions, if the heart were allowed to align with nature, there would be decent farms spread across the estate, and abundance would be evident everywhere. Instead of the poor being at the mercy of a greedy manager, they would be cared for with a fatherly concern by the person whose role and joy it was to ensure their happiness and protect them from exploitation—those who, through their hard work, elevated him above others.

I could almost imagine I see a man thus gathering blessings as he mounted the hill of life; or consolation, in those days when the spirits lag, and the tired heart finds no pleasure in them. It is not by squandering alms that the poor can be relieved, or improved—it is the fostering sun of kindness, the wisdom that finds them employments calculated to give them habits of virtue, that meliorates their condition. Love is only the fruit of love; condescension and authority may produce the obedience you applaud; but he has lost his heart of flesh who can see a fellow-creature humbled before him, and trembling at the frown of a being, whose heart is supplied by the same vital current, and whose pride ought to be checked by a consciousness of having the same infirmities.

I can almost picture a man collecting blessings as he climbs the hill of life, or finding comfort on those days when spirits are low and a tired heart can’t find joy. It’s not about throwing money around to help the poor; it’s about showing kindness and offering wisdom that helps them find work that builds good habits and improves their lives. Love comes from love; while authority might get you the obedience you want, someone has truly lost their compassion if they can watch another person feel small and afraid in front of them—especially when they share the same vulnerabilities and should be reminded of their own weaknesses.

147What salutary dews might not be shed to refresh this thirsty land, if men were more enlightened! Smiles and premiums might encourage cleanliness, industry, and emulation.—A garden more inviting than Eden would then meet the eye, and springs of joy murmur on every side. The clergyman would superintend his own flock, the shepherd would then love the sheep he daily tended; the school might rear its decent head, and the buzzing tribe, let loose to play, impart a portion of their vivacious spirits to the heart that longed to open their minds, and lead them to taste the pleasures of men. Domestic comfort, the civilizing relations of husband, brother, and father, would soften labour, and render life contented.

147What beneficial rains could pour down to revitalize this dry land if people were more aware! Encouragement and rewards could promote cleanliness, hard work, and healthy competition. A garden more beautiful than Eden would then greet the eye, and bubbling springs of joy would be found everywhere. The pastor would take care of his own community, the shepherd would genuinely care for the sheep he looked after daily; schools could flourish, and the lively children, set free to play, would share some of their energetic spirits with those eager to inspire them and guide them to experience the joys of life. The comforts of home and the supportive roles of husband, brother, and father would ease work and make life more fulfilling.

Returning once from a despotic country to a part of England well cultivated, but not very picturesque—with what delight did I not observe the poor man’s garden!—The homely 148palings and twining woodbine, with all the rustic contrivances of simple, unlettered taste, was a sight which relieved the eye that had wandered indignant from the stately palace to the pestiferous hovel, and turned from the awful contrast into itself to mourn the fate of man, and curse the arts of civilization!

Returning from a harsh country to a well-tended but not very scenic part of England—how delighted I was to see the poor man’s garden! The simple fences and climbing vines, along with all the charming creations of straightforward, unsophisticated taste, were a sight that soothed my eyes after moving from the grand palace to the filthy shack, making me reflect on the terrible contrast and lament humanity's plight while resenting the advancements of civilization!

Why cannot large estates be divided into small farms? these dwellings would indeed grace our land. Why are huge forests still allowed to stretch out with idle pomp and all the indolence of Eastern grandeur? Why does the brown waste meet the traveller’s view, when men want work? But commons cannot be enclosed without acts of parliament to increase the property of the rich! Why might not the industrious peasant be allowed to steal a farm from the heath? This sight I have seen;—the cow that supported the children grazed near the hut, and the cheerful poultry were fed by the chubby babes, who breathed 149a bracing air, far from the diseases and the vices of cities. Domination blasts all these prospects; virtue can only flourish amongst equals, and the man who submits to a fellow-creature, because it promotes his worldly interest, and he who relieves only because it is his duty to lay up a treasure in heaven, are much on a par, for both are radically degraded by the habits of their life.

Why can’t large estates be split into small farms? These homes would truly enhance our landscape. Why are massive forests still allowed to spread out with their lazy grandeur reminiscent of the East? Why does the brown wasteland greet travelers when people are seeking jobs? But commons can’t be enclosed without acts of parliament to increase the wealth of the rich! Why can’t the hardworking farmer be allowed to take land from the heath? I've seen this— the cow that fed the children grazed near the hut, and the happy chickens were fed by the chubby kids, who breathed fresh air, far from the diseases and vices of the cities. Domination ruins all these possibilities; true virtue can only thrive among equals, and a person who submits to another human being just because it benefits their worldly gain, and someone who helps others only because they believe it’ll earn them a reward in heaven, are pretty much the same, as both are fundamentally diminished by their way of life.

In this great city, that proudly rears its head, and boasts of its population and commerce, how much misery lurks in pestilential corners, whilst idle mendicants assail, on every side, the man who hates to encourage importers, or repress, with angry frown, the plaints of the poor! How many mechanics, by a flux of trade or fashion, lose their employment; whom misfortunes, not to be warded off, lead to the idleness that vitiates their character and renders them afterwards averse to honest labour! Where is the eye that 150marks these evils, more gigantic than any of the infringements of property, which you piously deprecate? Are these remediless evils? And is the humane heart satisfied with turning the poor over to another world, to receive the blessings this could afford? If society was regulated on a more enlarged plan; if man was contented to be the friend of man, and did not seek to bury the sympathies of humanity in the servile appellation of master; if, turning his eyes from ideal regions of taste and elegance, he laboured to give the earth he inhabited all the beauty it is capable of receiving, and was ever on the watch to shed abroad all the happiness which human nature can enjoy;—he who, respecting the rights of men, wishes to convince or persuade society that this is true happiness and dignity, is not the cruel oppressor of the poor, nor a short-sighted philosopher—He fears God and loves his fellow-creatures.—Behold the whole duty 151of man!—the citizen who acts differently is a sophisticated being.

In this great city, which proudly raises its profile and boasts about its population and commerce, there is so much misery hiding in the polluted corners, while idle beggars surround those who dislike encouraging importers or suppressing the complaints of the poor with an angry glare! How many workers, affected by changes in trade or fashion, lose their jobs; and how misfortunes, which can't be avoided, lead them to idleness that damages their character and makes them reluctant to pursue honest work afterward! Where is the eye that sees these problems, more enormous than any property infringements that you strongly condemn? Are these issues hopeless? And is a compassionate heart satisfied with simply sending the poor to another world to receive the blessings this life could offer? If society were organized on a broader scale; if people were willing to be friends to one another and didn’t hide their human compassion under the title of master; if, looking away from idealized notions of beauty and elegance, they strived to make the earth they live on as beautiful as possible and were always ready to spread as much happiness as human nature can enjoy;—the one who respects the rights of others and wants to convince society that this is true happiness and dignity is not the cruel oppressor of the poor nor a shortsighted philosopher—He fears God and loves his fellow humans.—This is the whole duty of man!—A citizen who acts differently is a twisted individual.

Surveying civilized life, and seeing, with undazzled eye, the polished vices of the rich, their insincerity, want of natural affections, with all the specious train that luxury introduces, I have turned impatiently to the poor, to look for man undebauched by riches or power—but, alas! what did I see? a being scarcely above the brutes, over which he tyrannized; a broken spirit, worn-out body, and all those gross vices which the example of the rich, rudely copied, could produce. Envy built a wall of separation, that made the poor hate, whilst they bent to their superiors; who, on their part, stepped aside to avoid the loathsome sight of human misery.

Surveying modern life and seeing, without being blinded, the polished vices of the wealthy, their insincerity, lack of genuine emotions, along with all the deceptive trappings that luxury brings, I have turned, in frustration, to the poor, hoping to find a person untouched by wealth or power—but, unfortunately, what did I find? A being barely above the animals they oppressed; a broken spirit, a worn-out body, and all those crude vices that the example of the rich, harshly imitated, could create. Envy built a wall of separation, causing the poor to hate, even as they submitted to their superiors; who, in turn, stepped aside to avoid the unpleasant sight of human suffering.

What were the outrages of a day[27] to these continual miseries? Let those sorrows hide their diminished head before the tremendous 152mountain of woe that thus defaces our globe! Man preys on man; and you mourn for the idle tapestry that decorated a gothic pile, and the dronish bell that summoned the fat priest to prayer. You mourn for the empty pageant of a name, when slavery flaps her wing, and the sick heart retires to die in lonely wilds, far from the abodes of men. Did the pangs you felt for insulted nobility, the anguish that rent your heart when the gorgeous robes were torn off the idol human weakness had set up, deserve to be compared with the long-drawn sigh of melancholy reflection, when misery and vice are thus seen to haunt our steps, and swim on the top of every cheering prospect? Why is our fancy to be appalled by terrific perspectives of a hell beyond the grave?—Hell stalks abroad;—the lash resounds on the slave’s naked sides; and the sick wretch, who can no longer earn the sour bread of unremitting labour, steals to a 153ditch to bid the world a long good night—or, neglected in some ostentatious hospital, breathes his last amidst the laugh of mercenary attendants.

What were the outrages of a day[27] compared to these ongoing miseries? Let those sorrows take a back seat to the massive mountain of suffering that scars our planet! Humans prey on each other; yet, you grieve for the idle decorations that adorned a gothic building, and the lazy bell that called the overweight priest to pray. You mourn for the empty spectacle of a name, while slavery spreads its wings, and the broken heart retreats to die in lonely wilderness, far from human dwellings. Did the pain you felt for insulted nobility, the anguish that tore at your heart when the beautiful garments were ripped from the idol that human weakness created, deserve to be compared to the deep sighs of sadness when we see misery and vice haunting our every step, overshadowing every hopeful outlook? Why should our imagination be haunted by terrifying visions of hell after we die?—Hell is everywhere;—the whip cracks on the slave’s bare skin; and the sick person, who can no longer earn the meager bread from relentless labor, sneaks to a 153ditch to say a long farewell to the world—or, neglected in some flashy hospital, breathes their last surrounded by the laughter of indifferent staff.

Such misery demands more than tears—I pause to recollect myself; and smother the contempt I feel rising for your rhetorical flourishes and infantine sensibility.

Such misery needs more than just tears—I take a moment to collect myself and suppress the disdain I feel bubbling up for your dramatic expressions and child-like sensitivity.

- - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - -

Taking a retrospective view of my hasty answer, and casting a cursory glance over your Reflections, I perceive that I have not alluded to several reprehensible passages, in your elaborate work; which I marked for censure when I first perused it with a steady eye. And now I find it almost impossible candidly to refute your sophisms, without quoting your own words, and putting the numerous contradictions I observed in opposition to each other. This would be an effectual refutation; 154but, after such a tedious drudgery, I fear I should only be read by the patient eye that scarcely wanted my assistance to detect the flagrant errors. It would be a tedious process to shew, that often the most just and forcible illustrations are warped to colour over opinions you must sometimes have secretly despised; or, at least, have discovered, that what you asserted without limitation, required the greatest. Some subjects of exaggeration may have been superficially viewed; depth of judgment is, perhaps, incompatible with the predominant features of your mind. Your reason may have often been the dupe of your imagination; but say, did you not sometimes angrily bid her be still, when she whispered that you were departing from strict truth? Or, when assuming the awful form of conscience, and only smiling at the vagaries of vanity, did she not austerely bid you recollect your own errors, before you lifted the avenging 155stone? Did she not sometimes wave her hand, when you poured forth a torrent of shining sentences, and beseech you to concatenate them—plainly telling you that the impassioned eloquence of the heart was calculated rather to affect than dazzle the reader, whom it hurried along to conviction? Did she not anticipate the remark of the wise, who drink not at a shallow sparkling dream, and tell you that they would discover when, with the dignity of sincerity, you supported an opinion that only appeared to you with one face; or, when superannuated vanity made you torture your invention?—But I forbear.

Looking back at my hasty response and taking a quick look at your Reflections, I realize that I didn’t address several problematic parts of your detailed work, which I had noted for criticism when I first read it closely. Now, I find it almost impossible to genuinely refute your misleading arguments without quoting your own words and contrasting the many contradictions I noticed. This would effectively refute your points; 154 but after such a tedious effort, I fear only those with the patience to sift through it would benefit, as they likely didn’t need my help to spot the glaring errors. It would be a long task to show that often the most accurate and powerful examples are twisted to support opinions you must have sometimes secretly disdained, or at least realized that what you asserted without limits needed major qualifications. Some exaggerated topics may have been superficially considered; deep understanding might be at odds with the main traits of your thinking. Your reasoning may have frequently been fooled by your imagination, but tell me, didn’t you sometimes angrily tell it to be quiet when it suggested that you were straying from the truth? Or, when taking on the serious form of conscience, and only smirking at the whims of vanity, didn’t it sternly remind you to recall your own mistakes before you cast judgment? Didn’t it sometimes signal you to pause when you unleashed a flood of eloquent phrases, urging you to connect them? It clearly indicated that the heartfelt passion meant to move the reader was more effective than dazzling them, guiding them toward conviction. Didn’t it foresee the wise remark, who don’t drink from a shallow, sparkling illusion, telling you that they would notice when, with the gravity of honesty, you upheld an opinion that only seemed to present itself in one way; or when aging vanity pushed you to twist your creativity?—But I’ll stop here.

I have before animadverted on our method of electing representatives, convinced that it debauches both the morals of the people and the candidates, without rendering the member really responsible, or attached to his constituents; but, amongst your other contradictions, you blame the National Assembly for expecting 156any exertions from the servile principle of responsibility, and afterwards insult them for not rendering themselves responsible. Whether the one the French have adopted will answer the purpose better, and be more than a shadow of representation, time only can shew. In theory it appears more promising.

I have previously commented on our way of electing representatives, convinced that it corrupts both the morals of the people and the candidates, without making the member truly accountable or connected to his constituents. Yet, among your other contradictions, you criticize the National Assembly for expecting any efforts from the servile notion of responsibility, and then insult them for not making themselves accountable. Whether the system the French have chosen will serve the purpose better and be more than just an illusion of representation remains to be seen. In theory, it looks more promising.

Your real or artificial affection for the English constitution seems to me to resemble the brutal affection of some weak characters. They think it a duty to love their relations with a blind, indolent tenderness, that will not see the faults it might assist to correct, if their affection had been built on rational grounds. They love they know not why, and they will love to the end of the chapter.

Your genuine or feigned love for the English constitution reminds me of the misguided affection some weak individuals have. They believe it's their duty to love their relationships with a naive, lazy tenderness that refuses to acknowledge the flaws that could be addressed if their love were based on reason. They love without understanding why, and they will continue to love until the end of the chapter.

Is it absolute blasphemy to doubt of the omnipotence of the law, or to suppose that religion might be more pure if there were fewer baits for hypocrites in the church? But our manners, you tell us, are drawn from the 157French, though you had before celebrated our native plainness[28]. If they were, it is time we broke loose from dependence——Time that Englishmen drew water from their own springs; for, if manners are not a painted substitute for morals, we have only to cultivate our reason, and we shall not feel the want of an arbitrary model. Nature will suffice; but I forget myself:—Nature and Reason, according to your system, are all to give place to authority; and the gods, as Shakespeare 158makes a frantic wretch exclaim, seem to kill us for their sport, as men do flies.

Is it completely outrageous to question the all-powerfulness of the law or to think that religion could be more genuine if there were fewer traps for hypocrites in the church? But you say our behaviors come from the French, even though you previously praised our natural simplicity. If that's true, it's time to break away from that dependency—time for Englishmen to draw from their own resources; because, if manners aren't just a superficial replacement for morals, we need only to nurture our reasoning, and we won't miss an imposed standard. Nature alone should be enough; but I digress: according to your view, Nature and Reason must yield to authority; and as Shakespeare has a mad character shout, the gods seem to destroy us for their amusement, just like humans do to flies.

Before I conclude my cursory remarks, it is but just to acknowledge that I coincide with you in your opinion respecting the sincerity of many modern philosophers. Your consistency in avowing a veneration for rank and riches deserves praise; but I must own that I have often indignantly observed that some of the enlightened philosophers, who talk most vehemently of the native rights of men, borrow many noble sentiments to adorn their conversation, which have no influence on their conduct. They bow down to rank, and are careful to secure property; for virtue, without this adventitious drapery, is seldom very respectable in their eyes—nor are they very quick-sighted to discern real dignity of character when no sounding name exalts the man above his fellows.—But neither open enmity 159nor hollow homage destroys the intrinsic value of those principles which rest on an eternal foundation, and revert for a standard to the immutable attributes of God.

Before I wrap up my brief comments, I want to acknowledge that I agree with you about the sincerity of many modern philosophers. Your consistency in expressing admiration for status and wealth is commendable; however, I must admit that I’ve often been frustrated to see some of the enlightened philosophers, who loudly proclaim the inherent rights of men, borrow many noble ideas to enhance their conversations without letting them influence their actions. They show deference to status and are careful to hold onto wealth, because without this extra embellishment, virtue rarely appears respectable to them—nor are they very perceptive in recognizing true character when no impressive title elevates a person above their peers. Still, neither open hostility nor false praise can diminish the true worth of principles that are based on an eternal foundation and refer back to the unchanging attributes of God.

THE END.

1. As religion is included in my idea of morality, I should not have mentioned the term without specifying all the simple ideas which that comprehensive word generalizes; but as the charge of atheism has been very freely banded about in the letter I am considering, I wish to guard against misrepresentation.

1. Since religion is part of my understanding of morality, I shouldn't have used the term without clarifying all the basic concepts it encompasses; however, since the accusation of atheism has been thrown around quite a bit in the letter I'm examining, I want to protect myself from being misrepresented.

2. See Mr. Burke’s Bills for œconomical reform.

2. Check out Mr. Burke's proposals for budget-friendly reforms.

3. Page 15.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__. Page 15.

4. ‘The doctrine of hereditary right does by no means imply an indefeasible right to the throne. No man will, I think, assert this, that has considered our laws, constitution, and history, without prejudice, and with any degree of attention. It is unquestionably in the breast of the supreme legislative authority of this kingdom, the King and both Houses of Parliament, to defeat this hereditary right; and, by particular entails, limitations, and provisions, to exclude the immediate heir, and vest the inheritance in any one else. This is strictly consonant to our laws and constitution; as may be gathered from the expression so frequently used in our statute books, of “the King’s Majesty, his heirs, and successors.” In which we may observe that, as the word “heirs” necessarily implies an inheritance, or hereditary right, generally subsisting in “the royal person;” so the word successors, distinctly taken, must imply that this inheritance may sometimes be broken through; or, that there may be a successor, without being the heir of the king.’

4. “The idea of hereditary right doesn’t imply an indefeasible right to the throne. I don't think anyone who has looked at our laws, constitution, and history without bias and with any level of attention would claim otherwise. Ultimately, it is certainly within the power of the supreme legislative authority of this kingdom—the King and both Houses of Parliament—to override this hereditary right; they can specifically determine, limit, and take measures to exclude the immediate heir and assign the inheritance to someone else. This aligns completely with our laws and constitution, as can be seen from the phrase frequently found in our statutes: “the King’s Majesty, his heirs, and successors.” Here, we can notice that while the term “heirs” typically indicates an inheritance or hereditary right that generally resides in “the royal person,” the term “successors,” taken on its own, suggests that this inheritance can sometimes be bypassed, meaning a successor can exist without being the king's heir.”

I shall not, however, rest in something like a subterfuge, and quote, as partially as you have done, from Aristotle. Blackstone has so cautiously fenced round his opinion with provisos, that it is obvious he thought the letter of the law leaned towards your side of the question—but a blind respect for the law is not a part of my creed.

I won't, however, rely on any kind of trick and quote Aristotle as selectively as you have. Blackstone has carefully surrounded his opinion with conditions, making it clear that he believed the letter of the law favored your side of the issue—but blindly respecting the law isn't part of my beliefs.

5. Page 113.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__. Page 113.

6. As you ironically observe, p. 114.

6. As you ironically note, p. 114.

7. In July, when he first submitted to his people; and not the mobbing triumphal catastrophe in October, which you chose, to give full scope to your declamatory powers.

7. In July, when he first agreed to serve his people; and not the chaotic, triumphant disaster in October, which you picked, to showcase your ability to express yourself dramatically.

8. This quotation is not marked with inverted commas, because it is not exact. P. 11.

8. This quote isn't enclosed in quotation marks because it's not an exact reproduction. P. 11.

9. Page 106.

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10. I do not now mean to discuss the intricate subject of their mortality; reason may, perhaps, be given to them in the next stage of existence, if they are to mount in the scale of life, like men, by the medium of death.

10. I don't intend to talk about the complicated issue of their mortality right now; perhaps they will receive reason in the next stage of existence if they are to rise in the hierarchy of life, like humans, through the process of death.

11. Page 128.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__. Pg. 128.

12. Page 129.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__. Page 129.

13. Vide Reflections, p. 128. “We fear God; we look up with awe to kings; with affection to parliaments; with duty to magistrates; with reverence to priests; and with respect to nobility.”

13. See Reflections, p. 128. “We fear God; we look up to kings with awe; we regard parliaments with affection; we feel duty towards magistrates; we show reverence to priests; and we hold respect for nobility.”

14. Page 137.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__. Page 137.

15. ‘When the people have emptied themselves of all the lust of selfish will, which without religion it is utterly impossible they ever should; when they are conscious that they exercise, and exercise perhaps in an higher link of the order of delegation, the power, which to be legitimate must be according to that eternal immutable law, in which will and reason are the same, they will be more careful how they place power in base and incapable hands. In their nomination to office, they will not appoint to the exercise of authority as to a pitiful job, but as to an holy function; not according to their sordid selfish interest, nor to their wanton caprice, nor to their arbitrary will; but they will confer that power (which any man may well tremble to give or to receive) on those only, in whom they may discern that predominant proportion of active virtue and wisdom, taken together and fitted to the charge, such, as in the great and inevitable mixed mass of human imperfections and infirmities, is to be found.’ P. 140.

15. "When people have let go of all their selfish desires—which is impossible without some form of religion—they will recognize that they hold power in a higher sense of responsibility. This power can only be legitimate if it aligns with that eternal, unchanging law where will and reason are one. They will be more cautious about putting power in the hands of those who are unworthy or incapable. When nominating someone for office, they will see it not as just a job, but as a sacred duty; they won’t make decisions based on personal greed or impulsive whims, but will grant authority only to those whom they see possessing a significant level of virtue and wisdom, suitable for the role, despite the inherent flaws and weaknesses of humanity." P. 140.

16. Page 140.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__. Page 140.

17. Page 148.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__. Page 148.

18. Page 51. ‘If the last generations of your country appeared without much lustre in your eyes, you might have passed them by, and derived your claims from a more early race of ancestors. Under a pious predilection to those ancestors, your imaginations would have realized in them a standard of virtue and wisdom, beyond the vulgar practice of the hour: and you would have risen with the example to whose imitation you aspired. Respecting your forefathers, you would have been taught to respect yourselves.’

18. Page 51. "If the previous generations in your country didn’t impress you much, you might have overlooked them and traced your heritage back to an earlier set of ancestors. With a deep admiration for those ancestors, you would have envisioned them as a benchmark of virtue and wisdom, standing apart from the ordinary behavior of the time: and you would have aimed to emulate their example. By honoring your forefathers, you would have learned to honor yourselves."

19. Page 53. ‘If diffident of yourselves, and not clearly discerning the almost obliterated constitution of your ancestors, you had looked to your neighbours in this land, who had kept alive the ancient principles and models of the old common law of Europe meliorated and adapted to its present state—by following wise examples you would have given new examples of wisdom to the world.’

19. Page 53. ‘If you lack confidence in yourselves and can't clearly see the nearly forgotten principles of your ancestors, you should have looked to your neighbors in this land, who have preserved the ancient principles and models of the old common law of Europe, updated for today—by following their smart examples, you would have set new standards of wisdom for the world.’

20. Page 49. ‘Always acting as if in the presence of canonized forefathers, the spirit of freedom, leading in itself to misrule and excess, is tempered with an awful gravity. This idea of a liberal descent inspires us with a sense of habitual native dignity, which prevents that upstart insolence almost inevitably adhering to and disgracing those who are the first acquirers of any distinction!’

20. Page 49. ‘Always behaving as if we’re in front of revered ancestors, the spirit of freedom, which often leads to chaos and excess, is balanced by a heavy seriousness. This notion of a noble heritage gives us a sense of inherent dignity that stops the arrogant attitude that usually comes with being the first to achieve any kind of recognition!’

21. Page 6. ‘Being a citizen of a particular state, and bound up in a considerable degree, by its public will,’ &c.

21. Page 6. ‘As a citizen of a specific state, and significantly influenced by its public will,’ &c.

22. Page 11. ‘It looks to me as if I were in a great crisis, not of the affairs of France alone but of all Europe, perhaps of more than Europe. All circumstances taken together, the French revolution is the most astonishing that has hitherto happened in the world.’

22. Page 11. ‘It seems to me that I'm in the middle of a major crisis, not just concerning France but all of Europe, maybe even more than that. Considering everything, the French Revolution is the most incredible event that has ever occurred in the world.’

23. Page 50. ‘We procure reverence to our civil institutions on the principle upon which nature teaches us to revere individual men; on account of their age; and on account of those from whom they are descended. All your sophisters cannot produce any thing better adapted to preserve a rational and manly freedom than the course that we have pursued; who have chosen our nature rather than our speculations, our breasts rather than our inventions, for the great conservatories and magazines of our rights and privileges.’

23. Page 50. ‘We respect our civic institutions based on the same principle that nature teaches us to respect individuals; because of their age and their ancestry. None of your philosophers can come up with anything better suited to maintain a rational and strong freedom than the path we’ve taken; we have preferred our nature over our theories, our hearts over our inventions, as the main sources and stores of our rights and privileges.’

24. Vide Page 210.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__. See Page 210.

25. ‘When men are encouraged to go into a certain mode of life by the existing laws, and protected in that mode as in a lawful occupation—when they have accommodated all their ideas, and all their habits to it,’ &c.—‘I am sure it is unjust in legislature, by an arbitrary act, to offer a sudden violence to their minds and their feelings; forcibly to degrade them from their state and condition, and to stigmatize with shame and infamy that character and those customs which before had been made the measure of their happiness.’ Page 230.

25. ‘When people are encouraged to pursue a certain way of life by the laws in place and are protected in that lifestyle as if it’s a legitimate occupation—when they have adjusted all their thoughts and habits to it,’ &c.—‘I believe it’s unfair for the legislature, through an arbitrary decision, to suddenly disrupt their minds and feelings; to degrade them from their status and situation, and to label with shame and disgrace the identity and customs that previously defined their happiness.’ Page 230.

26. Page 351.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__. Page 351.

27. The 6th of October.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__. October 6th.

28. Page 118. ‘It is not clear, whether in England we learned those grand and decorous principles, and manners, of which considerable traces yet remain, from you, or whether you took them from us. But to you, I think, we trace them best. You seem to me to be—gentis incunabula nostræ. France has always more or less influenced manners in England; and when your fountain is choaked up and polluted, the stream will not run long, or not run clear with us, or perhaps with any nation. This gives all Europe, in my opinion, but too close and connected a concern in what is done in France.’

28. Page 118. ‘It’s unclear whether we in England learned those grand and proper principles and manners, which still have considerable traces, from you or if you took them from us. But I think we can trace them back to you. You seem to me to be—gentis incunabula nostræ. France has always had some influence on manners in England; and when your source is clogged and polluted, the flow won’t last long, or won’t be clear with us, or perhaps with any nation. This, in my opinion, gives all of Europe far too close a connection to what happens in France.’


TRANSCRIBER’S NOTES
  1. P. 92, changed “very prejudies” to “very prejudices”.
  2. P. 114, changed “quaities” to “qualities”.
  3. P. 126, changed “triumphant villany” to “triumphant villainy”.
  4. Silently corrected typographical errors and variations in spelling.
  5. Archaic, non-standard, and uncertain spellings retained as printed.
  6. Footnotes were re-indexed using numbers and collected together at the end of the last chapter.

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