This is a modern-English version of Psyche: The Cult of Souls and Belief in Immortality among the Greeks, originally written by Rohde, Erwin. It has been thoroughly updated, including changes to sentence structure, words, spelling, and grammar—to ensure clarity for contemporary readers, while preserving the original spirit and nuance. If you click on a paragraph, you will see the original text that we modified, and you can toggle between the two versions.

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Psyche

The Cult of Souls and Belief in Immortality among the Greeks

The Cult of Souls and Belief in Immortality among the Greeks

By

By

ERWIN ROHDE

ERWIN ROHDE

LONDON
KEGAN PAUL, TRENCH, TRUBNER & CO., LTD.
NEW YORK: HARCOURT, BRACE & COMPANY, INC.
1925

LONDON
KEGAN PAUL, TRENCH, TRUBNER & CO., LTD.
NEW YORK: HARCOURT, BRACE & COMPANY, INC.
1925

Translated from the eighth edition by

Translated from the eighth edition by

W. B. HILLIS. M.A.

W. B. HILLIS, M.A.


Printed in Great Britain by Stephen Austin & Sons, Ltd., Hertford.

Printed in Great Britain by Stephen Austin & Sons, Ltd., Hertford.

CONTENTS

PAGE.
PREINTRODUCTION TO THE FFIRST EDITION VII
PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION XI
PPRELIMINARY NNOTE TO THE SEVENTH AND EIGHTH EDITION XIII
TTRANSLATOR’S NOTE XV
 
PART I
 
CHAPTER  
I. BBELIEFS ABOUT THE SOUL AND CULT OF SOULS IN THE HOMERIC POEMs 3
II. IISLANDS OF THE BLest. Translation 55
III. CAVE DEITIES. SUNDERGROUND Translation 88
IV. HHEROES 115
V. THE CULT OF SOULS 156
I. Cult of Chthonic Deities 158
II. Funeral ceremonies and worship of the dead 162
III. Traces of the Cult of Souls in the Blood Feud and Satisfaction for murder 174
VI. THE ELEUSINIAN MMYSTERIES 217
VII. IIDEAS OF THE FFUTURE LIFE 236
 
PART II
 
VIII. OORIGINS OF THE BBELIEF IN IMORTALITY. THE THRACIAN WORSHIP OF DIONYSOS 253
IX. DIONYSIAC RRELIGION IN GREECE. ITS AMERGING WITH APOLLINE RRELIGION. ECSTATIC PPROPHECY. RITUAL PURIFICATION AND EEXORCISM. ASkepticism 282
X. THE ORPHICS 335
XI. THE PPHILOSOPHERS 362
XII. THE LAY AAUTHORS (LYRIC POETS—PINDAR—THE TRagedians) 411
vi
XIII. PLato 463
XIV. THE LATER AGE OF THE GSTINK WORLD 490
I. Philosophy 490
II. Popular Belief 524
 
APPENDIX
I. Consecration of persons struck by lightning 581
II. masculinism 582
III. uninitiated, single, Danaids in the lower world 586
IV. The Tetralogies of Antiphon 588
V. Ritual Purification 588
VI. Hekate and the Hecatonic specters 590
VII. The Hosts of Hekate 593
VIII. Disintegration of Consciousness and Reduplication of Personality 595
IX. The Great Orphic Theogony 596
X. Previous Lives of Pythagoras. His Descent to Hades 598
XI. Initiation considered as Adoption by the god 601
XII. Magical Exorcisms of the Dead 603
 
[INDEX] 607
 
[Transcriber’s Note and Extended List of Abbreviations] end

PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION

THIS book offers an account of the opinions held by the Greeks about the life of the human soul after death, and is thus intended as a contribution to the history of Greek religion. Such an undertaking has in a special measure to contend with the difficulties that face any inquiry into the religious life and thought of the Greeks. Greek religion was a natural growth, not a special foundation, and the ideas and feelings which gave it its inward tone and outward shape never received abstract formulation. It expressed itself in religious performances alone: it had no sacred books from which we might determine the inward meaning and interconnexion of the ideas with which the Greeks approached the gods created by their faith. The central essence of the religion held by the Greek people, in spite of this absence of conceptual formulation—or perhaps because of it—preserved its original character to a remarkable degree: the speculations and fancies of Greek poets continually refer to this central nucleus. Indeed the poets and philosophers in such of their writings as have come down to us are our only authorities for the religious thought of the Greeks. In the present inquiry they have naturally had to be our guides for the greater part of the way. But though under the special conditions of Greek life the religious views of poets and philosophers represent an important side of Greek religion, they yet allow us to perceive very clearly the independent and self-determined position with regard to the ancestral religion retained by the individual. The individual believer might always, if his own temper and disposition allowed him, give himself up to the plain and unsophisticated emotions which had shaped and decided the faith of the people and the religious performances of popular εὐσέβεια. But we should know very little of the religious ideas that filled the mind of the believing Greek if we had to do without the evidence of philosophers and poets (and of some Attic orators as well) in whose words dumb and inarticulate emotion finds expression. The inquirer would, however, be entirely on the wrong track viii and be led to some remarkable conclusions who ventured without more ado to deduce from the religious ideas that find expression in Greek literature a complete Theology of the Greek people. Where direct literary statements and allusions fail us we are left with nothing but surmises in face of the religion of the Greeks and its inmost guiding forces. Of course there are plenty of people of sanguine temperament and industrious fancy who find no difficulty in producing for our benefit the most admirable solutions of the problem. Others in varying degrees of good faith press the emotions of Christian piety into the service of explaining ancient faith in gods. Thus injustice is done to both forms of religion and an understanding of the essentials of Greek belief in its true and independent reality is made completely impossible. A good example of this is provided by the Eleusinian Mysteries, and by that favourite topic of controversy (which has, indeed, received more than its due share of attention from students of religion), the amalgamation of the worship of gods and the belief in Souls said to have taken place therein. Nowhere else has the complete unprofitableness of the attempt to make use of the shifting ideas and tendencies of modern civilization to explain the underlying motive forces of these significant cult practices, been more strikingly and repeatedly demonstrated. On this head in particular the author of the present work has renounced all attempts to cast a fitful and ambiguous light upon the venerable gloom of the subject by the help of the farthing dip of his own private imaginings. There is no denying that here as in so many departments of ancient εὐσέβεια there is something greater and finer that eludes our grasp. The revealing word, never having been written down, has been lost. Instead of trying to find a substitute in modern catch phrases it seems better simply to describe, in the plainest and most literal fashion, the actual phenomena of Greek piety exactly as they are known to us. There will be plenty of opportunity for the author’s own suggestions and they need not always obtrude themselves. The aim of this work is to make plain the facts of the Greek Cult of Souls and of that belief in immortality the inner workings of which are only partially intelligible to our most sympathetic efforts to understand them. To give a clearer presentation of the origin and development of those practices and those beliefs; to distinguish the transformations through which they passed and their relationship with other and kindred intellectual tendencies; to disentangle the many different lines of thought and speculation from the inextricable ix confusion in which they lie in many minds (and in many books) and to let them stand out clearly and distinctly one from another, seemed particularly desirable. Why this design has not been carried out by the same methods throughout; why it has sometimes seemed sufficient to give a bald summary of the essential points, while at other times certain topics are pursued into their most distant ramifications (sometimes with apparently irrelevant prolixity), will be obvious enough to those who are familiar with the subject. Where a more careful examination of the overflowing mass of detail was to be attempted advantage has been taken of the Appendix to achieve a greater, though still only a relative degree of completeness. This was made possible by the lengthy period which elapsed between the publication of the two parts of the book. The first half [to the end of chapter vii] appeared as long ago as the spring of 1890. Unpropitious circumstances have delayed the completion of the remainder till the present moment. The two parts could easily be kept separate (as they have been): in the main they fall apart and correspond to the two sides of the question indicated in the title of the book—Cult of Souls and Belief in Immortality. The Cult of Souls and the faith in immortality may eventually come together at some points, but they have a different origin and travel most of the way on separate paths. The conception of immortality in particular arises from a spiritual intuition which reveals the souls of men as standing in close relationship, and indeed as being of like substance, with the everlasting gods. And simultaneously the gods are regarded as being in their nature like the soul of man, i.e. as free spirits needing no material or visible body. (It is this spiritualized view of the gods—not the belief in gods itself as Aristotle supposes in the remarkable statement quoted by Sextus Empiricus Adv. Mathematicos, iii, 20 ff.—which arises from the vision of its own divine nature achieved by the soul καθ’ ἑαυτήν relieved of the body, in ἐνθουσιασμοί and μαντεῖαι.) And this conception leads far away from the ideas on which the Cult of Souls was based.

THis book provides an account of the Greek beliefs about the life of the human soul after death, aiming to contribute to the history of Greek religion. This undertaking faces unique challenges typical of any exploration into the religious life and thought of the Greeks. Greek religion developed naturally rather than being formally established, and the ideas and emotions that shaped it were never systematically articulated. Instead, it found expression solely in religious rituals: there were no sacred texts from which we could ascertain the inner meaning and connections of the ideas through which the Greeks approached the gods of their faith. Remarkably, the core essence of Greek religion maintained its original character despite—or perhaps because of—the lack of conceptual formulation: the musings and imaginations of Greek poets continually refer back to this central core. Indeed, the surviving works of poets and philosophers are our only sources regarding Greek religious thought. In this inquiry, they’ve largely guided us. However, while the religious perspectives of poets and philosophers represent an important aspect of Greek religion, they also reveal the independent stance individuals maintained toward their ancestral beliefs. An individual believer could always, depending on their mood and temperament, immerse themselves in the simple, unrefined emotions that defined the people's faith and the communal religious practices of popular piety. Yet, we would know very little about the religious ideas that filled the mind of a believing Greek without the contributions from philosophers and poets (and some Attic orators) whose words express deep and inarticulate feelings. An inquirer would be entirely misguided viii and draw flawed conclusions if they hastily attempted to derive a complete Theology of the Greek people from the religious ideas expressed in Greek literature. In the absence of clear literary statements and references, we are left to speculate about the religion of the Greeks and its fundamental driving forces. Certainly, many optimistic and imaginative individuals seem to have no trouble presenting outstanding solutions to this dilemma. Others, with varying levels of sincerity, impose Christian emotional experiences to explain the ancient belief in gods. This approach unjustly distorts both religions and makes it impossible to understand the true and independent nature of Greek belief. A prime example of this is the Eleusinian Mysteries and the often-debated topic (which has, in fact, received more than its fair share of attention from religious scholars) of the blend between the worship of gods and the belief in souls alleged to occur within them. Nowhere else has the utter futility of trying to exploit the ever-changing ideas and tendencies of modern society to clarify the underlying motivations behind these significant cult practices been more clearly and repeatedly shown. Regarding this matter, the author of this work has chosen not to attempt to shed a flickering and unclear light on the ancient darkness surrounding the subject with the flicker of his personal imagination. There is no denying that, as in many areas of ancient piety, there is something more significant and refined that eludes our understanding. The enlightening word, never written down, has been lost. Rather than seeking a substitute in modern jargon, it seems better to plainly and literally describe the actual phenomena of Greek piety as we know them. There will be ample opportunity for the author’s own suggestions, and they need not always be intrusive. The objective of this work is to clarify the facts of the Greek Cult of Souls and the belief in immortality, the inner workings of which are only partially comprehensible to our most empathetic attempts to grasp them. It aims to provide a clearer presentation of the origin and development of these practices and beliefs; to differentiate the transformations they underwent and their connections with other related intellectual trends; to unravel the various lines of thought and speculation from the tangled ix confusion in which they exist in many minds (and in many books) and to allow them to stand out distinctively from one another seemed particularly desirable. The reasons this design hasn’t been consistently applied throughout; why in some cases a straightforward summary of the key points seemed sufficient, while other topics are explored to their most distant offshoots (sometimes with seemingly irrelevant excess), will be clear to those familiar with the subject. Where a more detailed examination of the abundant particulars was intended, an Appendix has been utilized to achieve a greater, though still only relatively complete, level of thoroughness. This was made possible by the long interval between the publication of the two parts of the book. The first half [up to the end of chapter vii] was released in the spring of 1890. Unfavorable circumstances delayed the completion of the remainder until now. The two sections can easily be kept separate (as they have been): in essence, they align with the two aspects of the question indicated in the book’s title—Cult of Souls and Belief in Immortality. The Cult of Souls and the belief in immortality may eventually converge at some points, but they originate differently and mainly follow separate paths. The notion of immortality specifically emerges from a spiritual insight revealing that human souls are closely linked and, in fact, share a similar essence with the everlasting gods. At the same time, the gods are seen as being, in their nature, akin to the human soul, that is, as free spirits requiring no physical or visible form. (It is this spiritualized view of the gods—not the belief in gods themselves as Aristotle suggests in the notable statement referenced by Sextus Empiricus Adv. Mathematicos, iii, 20 ff.—that arises from the soul’s vision of its divine nature achieved when freed from the body, in enthusiasms and oracles.) This conception diverges significantly from the ideas that underpinned the Cult of Souls.

The publication of the book in two parts has brought with it a regrettable circumstance for which I must ask the indulgence of well-disposed readers (that the first half found so many of them is a fact which I must gratefully acknowledge). As the dimensions of the whole work grew beyond expectation and almost overstepped the μέτρον αὔταρκες, the sixteen excursuses which were promised in x the first volume have had to be dropped: the book would otherwise have been overloaded. So far as they possess independent interest they will find a place elsewhere. They are real excursuses and were intended as such, and the proper understanding of the book will not be affected by their absence.

The release of the book in two parts has created an unfortunate situation for which I must ask for the understanding of readers who support it (and I must acknowledge how grateful I am that so many enjoyed the first half). As the overall length of the work exceeded expectations and nearly crossed the self-sufficient measure, the sixteen excursuses mentioned in x the first volume had to be removed: it would have made the book too heavy. Wherever they have independent value, they will be included elsewhere. They are genuine excursuses and were meant to be, and the main understanding of the book won’t be compromised by their absence.

ERWIN ROHDE.

ERWIN ROHDE.

HEIDELBERG.
November 1st, 1893.

HEIDELBERG.
November 1, 1893.

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

THE publication of a second edition of this book affords me a welcome opportunity of making my account more exact and to the point in certain places; of adding some points that had been overlooked or omitted; and of noticing with approval or disapproval some divergent opinions that had obtained currency in the interval. Controversy is, however, confined within the narrowest limits and to points of minor importance (and only then in answer to more serious and significant objections). The plan and—if I may say so—the style of the whole book demanded throughout, and more especially in the great points at issue, a purely positive statement of my own views and the results of my own studies. Such a statement, it may well be imagined, was not arrived at without being preceded in the mind of the author by a controversial reckoning with the manifold views and doctrines of others upon the subjects here dealt with—views which in some cases he felt obliged to reject. Controversy in this sense lies behind every page of the book, though as a rule only in a latent condition. In this condition I have been content to let it remain in this revised edition of the book. My opinions were not arrived at without toil and much careful reflection; one view being made to reinforce another till they were all bound together in a single closely-knitted whole. Neither further reflection on my part nor the criticisms of others have shaken my belief in the tenability of opinions reached in this way. I have therefore ventured to leave my account unaltered in all its main points. I hope that it contains its own justification and defence in itself without further vindication on my part.

THE release of a second edition of this book gives me a great chance to make my account clearer and more precise in certain areas; to add some points that were overlooked or missing; and to acknowledge, whether positively or negatively, some differing opinions that have gained traction during this time. However, the debate remains limited to minor issues (and only in response to more serious objections). The overall plan and—if I may say so—the style of the book required, especially on the major points at stake, a straightforward presentation of my own views and the findings from my research. It shouldn't be surprising that arriving at such a statement involved wrestling with the various opinions and theories of others on the topics discussed—opinions that in some cases I found necessary to reject. This underlying debate can be felt throughout the book, although it typically remains unexpressed. In this revised edition, I've chosen to keep it in this way. My views were formed through hard work and thorough thought, with one idea building on another until they all fit together tightly. Neither further consideration on my part nor others' critiques have shaken my confidence in the validity of my conclusions. Thus, I've decided to keep my account unchanged in all its key aspects. I trust that it stands justified and defended on its own without requiring further justification from me.

Nothing in the plan or execution of the whole or its parts has been altered; neither have I taken anything away. The book contained nothing that was superfluous to the attainment of the object that I had in view. This object, it will be apparent, was not in the least to provide a brief and compendious statement of the most indispensable facts about the cult of Souls and the belief in immortality among the Greeks for the benefit of those who wished to take a hasty xii glance over the subject. Such a hasty picker-up of knowledge who regards himself—I cannot imagine why—as peculiarly fitted to criticise my book, has ingenuously besought me, in view of a second edition which he was kind enough to think probable, to throw overboard most of what he considered the superfluous parts of the book. With this request I have not felt myself able to comply. My book was written for maturer readers who have passed beyond the school stage and look for something more than an elementary handbook, and who would be able to understand and appreciate the plan and intention which led me to draw my material so widely from many departments of literary and cultural history. The first edition of the book found many such readers: I may hope and expect that the second will do the same.

Nothing in the plan or execution of the entire work or its sections has been changed; I haven't removed anything either. The book included nothing unnecessary for achieving the goal I had in mind. This goal, as you'll see, was not at all to provide a quick and concise summary of the most essential facts about the cult of Souls and the belief in immortality among the Greeks for those wanting a swift xii overview of the topic. A person who hurriedly picks up knowledge and believes—though I can't understand why—that he is especially qualified to critique my book, has earnestly asked me, in light of a second edition that he kindly thinks is likely, to cut out most of what he sees as unnecessary parts of the book. I haven’t felt able to agree to this request. My book was written for more mature readers who have moved beyond basic schooling and are looking for something more than an elementary guide, and who would be able to understand and appreciate the plan and intention that led me to draw my material broadly from various areas of literary and cultural history. The first edition of the book attracted many such readers; I hope and expect that the second will do the same.

In its revised form the book has been divided for the convenience of those who use it into two volumes (which correspond with the two parts in which it was first published). I was urged to take away the notes that stand at the foot of the text and relegate them to a place by themselves in a separate appendix. I found, however, that I could not bring myself to adopt this fashionable modern practice, which so far as I have experience of it in books published in recent years seems to me to be inconvenient and to hinder rather than help that undisturbed appreciation of the text which such an arrangement is intended to serve. Independent readers who in using the book are working out the subject for themselves would certainly not desire the separation of the documentary evidence from the statement of the author’s view. The book has also, to my peculiar satisfaction, attracted a large number of readers from outside the immediate circle of professional philologists. Such readers have evidently not been seriously disturbed by the elaborate and perhaps rather pedantic aspect of the mysterious disquisitions at the foot of the page, and have been able to fix their attention upon the clearer language of the text above. I have therefore decided to remove a few only of the notes which had grown to independent dimensions to an appendix at the end of each of the two volumes.

In its updated version, the book has been split into two volumes for the convenience of readers, aligning with the two parts in which it was originally published. I was encouraged to remove the notes at the bottom of the text and place them in a separate appendix. However, I couldn’t bring myself to follow this popular modern trend, which, based on my experience with recently published books, seems inconvenient and actually disrupts the uninterrupted appreciation of the text that this setup is meant to facilitate. Independent readers who use the book to explore the subject on their own would likely prefer not to have the documentary evidence separated from the author's perspective. I'm also pleased to note that the book has attracted a significant number of readers beyond just professional linguists. These readers have clearly not been overly bothered by the detailed and possibly pedantic nature of the notes at the bottom of the page and have been able to focus on the clearer prose of the text above. Therefore, I have decided to move only a few of the notes that had expanded significantly into an appendix at the end of each of the two volumes.

ERWIN ROHDE.

ERWIN ROHDE.

HEIDELBERG.
November 27th, 1897.

HEIDELBERG.
November 27, 1897.

PRELIMINARY NOTE TO THE SEVENTH AND EIGHTH EDITIONS

IN supervising together this reprint of “Psyche” we have found ourselves faced with the question which Schöll and Dieterich had to decide in bringing out the third edition—whether changes or additions would be admissible. It went without saying that the text must remain untouched in the form last given to it by Rohde’s own hand. Nor was it possible to make any additions to the notes without seriously disturbing the carefully considered architecture of the whole book. It would have been more possible to add an appendix or supplementary pamphlet recording the literature of the subject which has appeared since 1898 and giving an account of the present state of the questions dealt with by Rohde: as has been done with the “Griechische Roman” by W. Schmid. But on making the attempt we soon found that the problem was a different one in the case of “Psyche” with which (much more than in the other case) all subsequent study of the history of religion as pursued by all nations has had to reckon, and from which such study has in no small degree taken its starting point. We have therefore refrained; and we have also refrained from remodelling the citations to make them correspond with critical editions that have since appeared. This process could not be carried through without, in some places, introducing contradictions with Rohde’s interpretation that would have necessitated more detailed discussion. Rohde’s own method of citation was only seriously inconvenient in the case of Euripides: here he evidently, as we observed from about the middle of the first volume onwards, made use of more than one edition at the same time, and has consequently quoted lines in accordance with different enumerations. For the greater assurance and convenience of the reader the lines are uniformly referred to according to the numbering of Nauck. This task has been undertaken by our devoted helper Frl. Emilie Boer, who has also verified, with a very few exceptions, the whole of the references to ancient writers and inscriptions; xiv a considerable number of errors missed by the author or later editors have thus been corrected. The minor changes introduced in the third and following editions—the recording on the margin of the pagination of the first edition and the valuable enlargement of the index due to W. Nestle with the assistance of O. Crusius—have all naturally been retained.

IN supervising this reprint of “Psyche,” we encountered the same question that Schöll and Dieterich faced when they released the third edition—whether changes or additions would be allowed. It was clear that the text must remain as it was last presented by Rohde himself. Adding to the notes was not an option either, as it would disrupt the carefully structured flow of the entire book. It might have been feasible to include an appendix or additional pamphlet highlighting literature on the topic published since 1898 and summarizing the current state of the issues Rohde addressed, similar to what was done with W. Schmid’s “Griechische Roman.” However, upon trying this, we quickly realized that “Psyche” posed a different challenge for which further studies in religious history by various cultures necessarily engaged with it, and from which many of these studies have taken their beginnings. Therefore, we decided against it, and we also chose not to update the citations to align with more recent critical editions. Making such changes could have introduced contradictions with Rohde’s interpretations that would require more in-depth discussion. Rohde’s citation style was mainly problematic in the case of Euripides, where, as we noted from around the middle of the first volume onward, he used multiple editions which led to quoting lines according to different numbering systems. To enhance the reader's confidence and ease, the lines are consistently referenced according to Nauck’s numbering system. This task was carried out by our dedicated assistant, Frl. Emilie Boer, who also checked nearly all the references to ancient writers and inscriptions; xiv she corrected a significant number of errors overlooked by the author or subsequent editors. The minor updates made in the third edition and later—such as including the pagination of the first edition in the margins and the valuable enhancements to the index by W. Nestle with help from O. Crusius—have all naturally been preserved.

F. BOLL.
O. WEINREICH.

F. BOLL.
O. WEINREICH.

HEIDELBERG.
November, 1920.

HEIDELBERG.
November 1920.

TRANSLATOR’S NOTE

ROHDE is very unsystematic in his mode of quoting from ancient authorities: he has, for example, four different ways of referring to the Iliad and the Odyssey, two of referring to Demosthenes and the Orators, etc. In quoting from the lesser authorities he sometimes used editions which have since become antiquated. (He even goes so far as to quote Clem. Alex. by the page and letter of Heinsius’ re-edition of Sylburg.) I have made an attempt to reduce the number of inconsistencies and to give references where possible to modern editions. In these and other small ways I have tried to make the notes—the text I hope is intelligible enough—more accessible to English readers. I have given references to English translations of German works (where I have been able to find them); but I have refrained from adding references to the modern literature of the subject: most readers of the book will prefer to do that for themselves. In order to save space I have used abbreviation pretty freely in quoting names of authors and titles of books. The abbreviated forms agree generally with those given in Liddell and Scott (supplemented by the list drawn up for the new edition of the Lexicon): most of the following may be noted:—

ROHDE is quite inconsistent in how he quotes from ancient sources: for example, he has four different ways to reference the Iliad and the Odyssey and two ways for Demosthenes and the Orators, and so on. When quoting from lesser-known authorities, he sometimes relies on editions that are now outdated. (He even goes as far as to cite Clem. Alex. by the page and letter of Heinsius’ re-edition of Sylburg.) I’ve tried to reduce the number of inconsistencies and provide references to modern editions when possible. In these and other small ways, I’ve aimed to make the notes—while I hope the text is clear enough—more accessible to English readers. I’ve included references to English translations of German works (where I could find them); however, I didn’t add references to the latest literature on the topic, as most readers will likely prefer to explore that themselves. To save space, I’ve used abbreviations quite liberally when quoting author names and book titles. The abbreviated forms generally align with those found in Liddell and Scott (supplemented by the list prepared for the new edition of the Lexicon): most of the following may be noted:—

A. (or Aesch.) = Aeschylus.
Amm. = Ammonius.
AP. = Anthologia Palatina.
Apollod. = Ps.-Apollodorus, Bibiotheca (unless Epit. is added).
A. R. = Apollonius Rhodius.
Ath. Mitth. = Mittheilungen d. deutsch. arch. Inst. zu Athen.
Aug. = Augustine.
D. (or Dem.) = Demosthenes.
D. C. = Dio Cassius.
D. Chr. = Dio Chrysostom.
D. H. = Dionysius of Halicarnassus (i.e. Rom. Antiq. unless otherwise indicated)
D. L. = Diogenes Laertius.
D. P. = Dionysius Periegetes.
D. S. = Diodorus Siculus.
E. (or Eur.) = Euripides.
Epigr. Gr. = Kaibel, Epigrammata Graeca.
Eun. = Eunapius Vitae Sophistarum. xvi
Gal. = Galen (vol. and page of Kühn).
GDI. = Collitz, Griechische Dialektinschriften.
Gp. = Geoponica.
Grimm = Grimm, Deutsche Mythologie transl. as Teutonic Mythology, by J. S. Stallybrass, Lond., 1880.
Heraclid. Pol. = Heraclides Ponticus, Politica.
Him. = Himerius.
Hipp. = Hippolytus.
Hp. = Hippokrates.
Hsch. = Hesychius.
H. Smyrn. = Hermippus of Smyrna.
Homer is quoted by the majuscules of the Greek alphabet for the books of the Iliad, by the minuscules for the Odyssey.
Inscr. Perg. = Inschriften von Pergamon ed. Fraenkel.
IPE. = Inscriptiones Ponti Euxini ed. Latyschev.
Is. = Isaeus.
J. M. = Justin Martyr.
Leg. Sacr. = von Prott and Ziehen, Leges Graecorum Sacrae.
Pall. = Palladius, de Re Rustica.
Phld. = Philodemus.
Pi. = Pindar.
Pl. = Plato.
PLG. = Bergk, Poetae Lyrici Graeci ed. 4.
Plot. = Plotinus.
Plu. = Plutarch.
PMagPar. = Paris Magical Papyrus ed. Wessely.
Rh. Mus. = Rhenish Museum.
S. (or Soph.) = Sophokles.
S. E. = Sextus Empiricus.
SIG. = Dittenberger, Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum ed. 2 (unless otherwise stated).
Str. = Strabo (Casaubon's page).
Tab. Defix. = Tabellae Defixionum ed. Wünsch (Appendix to CIA.).
Thphr. = Theophrastus (Ch. = Characters ed. Jebb).
Tylor = E. B. Tylor, Primitive Culture ed. 4.
Tz. = Tzetzes.
Vg. = Vergil.
Vors. = Diels, Fragmente der Vorsokratiker ed. 4 (vol. i unless otherwise indicated).
X. (or Xen.) = Xenophon historicus.
Znb. = Zenobius.

I take this opportunity of thanking my friend Mr. R. Burn, of Glasgow University, for his invaluable help in these matters.

I want to take this chance to thank my friend Mr. R. Burn from Glasgow University for his invaluable help with these matters.

W. B. HILLIS.

W. B. HILLIS.

PART I

CHAPTER I

BELIEFS ABOUT THE SOUL AND CULT OF SOULS IN THE HOMERIC POEMS

I

§ 1

To the immediate understanding of mankind nothing seems so self-evident, nothing so little in need of explanation, as the phenomenon of Life itself, the fact of man’s own existence. On the other hand, the cessation of this so self-evident existence, whenever it obtrudes itself upon his notice, arouses man’s ever-renewed astonishment. There are primitive peoples to whom death whenever it occurs seems an arbitrary abbreviation of life: if it is not due to visible forces, then some invisible magic must have caused it. So difficult is it for such peoples to grasp the idea that the present state of being alive and conscious can come to an end of its own accord.

To most people, nothing seems more obvious, nothing needs less explanation, than the phenomenon of Life itself, the fact of our own existence. However, when the end of this obvious existence forces itself into our awareness, it constantly astonishes us. There are some primitive cultures where death, whenever it happens, feels like an arbitrary interruption of life: if it’s not caused by visible factors, then some invisible magic must be behind it. These cultures find it hard to understand that being alive and aware can simply come to an end on its own.

Once reflection on such problems is aroused, life itself, standing as it does on the threshold of all sensation and experience, soon begins to appear no less mysterious than death—that kingdom into which no experience reaches. It may even come about that when they are regarded too long and too hard, light and darkness seem to change places. It was to a Greek poet that the question suggested itself: “Who knows then whether Life be not Death, and what we here call Death be called Life there below?”

Once we start thinking about these issues, life itself, which sits at the edge of all feeling and experience, begins to seem just as mysterious as death—the realm where no experience can enter. In fact, it might happen that when we examine these concepts for too long and too intensely, light and darkness seem to swap places. A Greek poet even posed the question: “Who knows if Life is not Death, and what we refer to as Death might be called Life down there?”

From such jaded wisdom and its doubts Greek civilization is still far removed when, though already at an advanced stage in its development, it first speaks to us in the Homeric poems. The poet and his heroes speak with lively feeling of the pains and troubles of life, both in its individual phases and as a whole. The gods have allotted a life of pain and misery to men, while they themselves remain free from care. On the other hand, to turn aside from life altogether never enters the head of anyone in Homer. Nothing may be said expressly of the joy and happiness of life, but that is because such things 4 go without saying among a vigorous folk engrossed in a movement of progress, whose circumstances were never complicated and where all the conditions of happiness easily fell to the lot of the strong in activity and enjoyment. And, indeed, it is only for the strong, the prudent, and the powerful that this Homeric world is intended. Life and existence upon this earth obviously belongs to them—is it not an indispensable condition of the attainment of all particular good things? As for death—the state which is to follow our life here—there is no danger of anyone mistaking that for life. “Do not try and explain away death to me,” says Achilles to Odysseus in Hades; and this would be the answer any Homeric man would have given to the sophisticated poet, if he had tried to persuade him that the state of things after life on this earth is the real life. Nothing is so hateful to man as death and the gates of Hades: for when death comes it is certain that life—this sweet life of ours in the sunlight—is done with, whatever else there may be to follow.

Greek civilization is still far from the jaded wisdom and doubts of later times when it first speaks to us in the Homeric poems, despite being at an advanced stage in its development. The poet and his heroes express lively feelings about the pains and troubles of life, both in individual moments and as a whole. The gods have given humans a life filled with pain and misery while remaining carefree themselves. However, no one in Homer ever considers completely turning away from life. Joy and happiness aren't explicitly mentioned, but that's because such things are understood by a vigorous people focused on progress, whose lives weren't complicated and where the conditions for happiness easily fell to those who were strong, active, and enjoying life. Indeed, this Homeric world is meant only for the strong, the wise, and the powerful. Life and existence in this world clearly belong to them—aren't they essential for achieving all the good things? As for death—the state that comes after our life here—no one can confuse that with life. "Don’t try to downplay death for me," Achilles says to Odysseus in Hades; and that's the response any Homeric man would have had to a clever poet trying to convince him that what comes after life is the real life. Nothing is more repulsive to people than death and the gates of Hades: because when death comes, it's certain that life—this sweet life of ours in the sunlight—is over, no matter what may come next.

§ 2

But what does follow? What happens when life departs for ever from the inanimate body?

But what happens next? What occurs when life leaves the inanimate body for good?

It is strange that anyone should have maintained (as it has been in recent times1) that in any stage of the development of the Homeric poems the belief can be found that with the moment of death all is at an end: that nothing survives death. We are not warranted by any statement in either of the two poems (to be found perhaps in their oldest parts, as is suggested) nor yet by the tell-tale silence of the poet, in attributing such an idea either to the poet or his contemporaries. Wherever the occasion of death is described we are told how the dead man (still referred to by his name), or his “Psyche”, hastens away into the house of Aïdes—into the kingdom of Aïdes and the grim Persephoneia; goes down to the darkness below the earth, to Erebos; or, more vaguely, sinks into the earth itself. In any case, it is no mere nothing that can enter the gloomy depths, nor over what does not exist could one suppose that the divine Pair holds sway below.

It’s odd that anyone could have claimed (as has been suggested recently1) that at any point in the development of the Homeric poems, there’s a belief that with death, everything comes to an end: that nothing survives after death. We don’t have any evidence in either of the two poems (which might be found in their oldest sections, as some suggest) nor even in the telling silence of the poet, to conclude that this idea comes from the poet or his contemporaries. Whenever death is mentioned, we hear that the dead person (still addressed by his name), or his “Psyche,” quickly moves into the realm of Aïdes—into the kingdom of Aïdes and the dark Persephone; descends into the darkness beneath the earth, into Erebos; or, more vaguely, sinks into the earth itself. In any case, it’s not just nothing that can enter those gloomy depths, nor could anyone believe that the divine Pair rules over what doesn’t exist below.

But how are we to think of this “Psyche” that, unnoticed during the lifetime of the body, and only observable when it is “separated” from the body, now glides off to join the multitude of its kind assembled in the murky regions of the “Invisible” (Aïdes)? Its name, like the names given to the 5 “soul” in many languages, marks it off as something airy and breathlike, revealing its presence in the breathing of the living man. It escapes out of the mouth—or out of the gaping wound of the dying—and now freed from its prison becomes, as the name well expresses it, an “image” (εἴδωλον). On the borders of Hades Odysseus sees floating “the images of those that have toiled (on earth)”. These immaterial images withdrawing themselves from the grasp of the living, like smoke (Il. xxiii, 100) or a shadow (Od. xi, 207; x, 495), must at least recognizably present the general outlines of the once living person. Odysseus immediately recognizes his mother, Antikleia, in such a shadow-person, as well as the lately dead Elpenor, and those of his companions of the Trojan War who have gone before him. The psyche of Patroklos appearing to Achilleus by night resembles the dead man absolutely in stature, bodily appearance and expression. The nature of this shadowy double of mankind, separating itself from man in death and taking its departure then, can best be realized if we first make clear to ourselves what qualities it does not possess. The psyche of Homeric belief does not, as might have been supposed, represent what we are accustomed to call “spirit” as opposed to “body”. All the faculties of the human “spirit” in the widest sense—for which the poet has a large and varied vocabulary—are indeed only active and only possible so long as a man is still alive: when death comes the complete personality is no longer in existence. The body, that is the corpse, now becomes mere “senseless earth” and falls to pieces, while the psyche remains untouched. But the latter is by no means the refuge of “spirit” and its faculties, any more than the corpse is. It (the psyche) is described as being without feeling, deserted by mind and the organs of mind. All power of will, sensation, and thought have vanished with the disintegration of the individual man into his component parts. So far from it being permissible to ascribe the functions of “spirit” to the psyche, it would be more reasonable to speak of a contrast between the two. Man is a living creature, conscious of himself and intelligently active, only so long as the psyche remains within him. But it is not the psyche which communicates its own faculties to man and gives him capacity for life together with consciousness, will and knowledge. It is rather that during the union of the psyche and the body all the faculties of living and acting lie within the empire of the body, of which they are functions. Without the presence of the psyche, the body cannot perceive, feel, or will, but it does not use these 6 or any of its faculties through or by means of the psyche. Nowhere does Homer attribute any such function to the psyche in living man: it is, in fact, only mentioned when its separation from the living man is imminent or has occurred. As the body’s shadow-image it survives the body and all its vital powers.

But how should we understand this “Psyche” that goes unnoticed during a person's life and is only seen when it “separates” from the body, now drifting off to join countless others in the dark realms of the “Invisible” (Aïdes)? Its name, similar to the word for “soul” in various languages, suggests something airy and breath-like, showing its presence in the breath of a living person. It escapes through the mouth—or out of the gaping wound of the dying—and once freed from its prison, becomes, as the name suggests, an “image” (idol). On the edges of Hades, Odysseus sees floating “the images of those who have toiled (on earth)”. These immaterial images pull away from the living, like smoke (Il. xxiii, 100) or a shadow (Od. xi, 207; x, 495), but still must clearly represent the general outlines of the once living person. Odysseus immediately recognizes his mother, Antikleia, in such a shadow figure, as well as the recently deceased Elpenor and those of his companions from the Trojan War who have passed before him. The psyche of Patroklos appearing to Achilleus at night looks exactly like the dead man in size, physical appearance, and expression. To understand this shadowy version of humanity that separates from a person in death and departs then, we should first clarify what qualities it does not have. The psyche, according to Homeric belief, does not represent what we usually think of as “spirit” opposed to “body”. All the faculties of the human “spirit”—which the poet describes with a wide range of vocabulary—are only active and possible as long as a person is alive: when death comes, the complete personality no longer exists. The body, meaning the corpse, now becomes just “senseless earth” and falls apart, while the psyche remains intact. But it is not a refuge for “spirit” and its faculties, just like the corpse is not. The psyche is described as lacking feeling, abandoned by reason and mental functions. All will, sensation, and thought vanish with the breakdown of the individual into their parts. It is far more accurate to talk about a contrast between the psyche and “spirit” rather than attributing the functions of “spirit” to the psyche. A person is a living being, aware of themselves and actively intelligent, only as long as the psyche is within them. However, it is not the psyche that imparts its abilities to a person and grants them life with consciousness, will, and knowledge. Instead, during the connection of the psyche and body, all faculties of living and acting exist within the body, of which they are functions. Without the psyche, the body cannot perceive, feel, or will, but it does not utilize these 6 or any of its capabilities through or by means of the psyche. Nowhere does Homer ascribe any such function to the psyche in a living person: it is, in fact, mentioned only when its separation from the living individual is near or has already happened. As the shadow image of the body, it survives beyond the body and all its vital powers.

If we now ask—as our Homeric psychologists generally do—which, in the face of this mysterious association between a living body and its counterfeit the psyche, is the “real” man, we find that Homer in fact gives contradictory answers. Not infrequently (indeed, in the first lines of the Iliad) the material body is contrasted,2 as the “man himself”, with the psyche—which cannot therefore be any organ or component part of the living body. On the other hand, that which takes its departure at death and hastens into the realm of Hades is also referred to by the proper name of the person as “himself”3—which means that here the shadowy psyche (for nothing else can go down to Hades) is invested with the name and value of the complete personality, the “self” of the man. But those who draw from these phrases the conclusion that either the body or the psyche must be the “real man” have, in either case,4 left out of account or unexplained one half of the recorded evidence. Regarded without prejudice, these apparently contradictory methods of speaking simply prove that both the visible man (the body and its own faculties) and the indwelling psyche could be described as the man’s “self”. According to the Homeric view, human beings exist twice over: once as an outward and visible shape, and again as an invisible “image” which only gains its freedom in death. This, and nothing else, is the Psyche.

If we now ask—as our Homeric psychologists often do—which, in light of this mysterious connection between a living body and its counterpart the psyche, is the “real” man, we find that Homer actually gives conflicting answers. Not infrequently (in fact, in the opening lines of the Iliad), the physical body is contrasted, 2 as the “man himself,” with the psyche—meaning it can't be any organ or part of the living body. On the other hand, that which leaves at death and rushes into the realm of Hades is also referred to by the person's proper name as “himself” 3—indicating that the shadowy psyche (since nothing else can go to Hades) is given the name and value of the complete personality, the “self” of the man. However, those who conclude from these phrases that either the body or the psyche must be the “real man” have, in either case, 4 overlooked or not explained half of the recorded evidence. When viewed without bias, these seemingly contradictory ways of speaking simply show that both the visible man (the body and its faculties) and the inner psyche can be described as the man’s “self.” According to the Homeric perspective, human beings exist in two ways: once as an outward and visible form, and again as an invisible “image” that only gains its freedom in death. This, and nothing else, is the Psyche.

Such an idea—that the psyche should dwell with the living and fully conscious personality, like an alien and a stranger, a feebler double of the man, as his “other self”—this may well seem very strange to us. And yet this is what so-called “savage” peoples,5 all over the world, actually believe. Herbert Spencer in particular has shown this most decisively. It is therefore not very surprising to find the Greeks, too, sharing a mode of thought that lies so close to the mind of primitive mankind. The earlier age which handed down to the Greeks of Homer their beliefs about the soul cannot have failed any more than other nations to observe the facts upon which a fantastic logic based the conclusion of man’s double personality. It was not the phenomena of sensation, will, perception, or thought in waking and conscious man which led to this conclusion. It was the experience of an apparent 7 double of the self in dreaming, in swoons, and ecstasy, that gave rise to the inference of a two-fold principle of life in man, and of the existence of an independent, separable “second self” dwelling within the viable self of daily life. One has only to listen to the words of a Greek writer of a later period who, far more explicitly than Homer, describes the nature of the psyche and at the same time lets us see the origin of the belief in such an entity. Pindar (fr. 131) tells us that the body obeys Death, the almighty, but the image of the living creature lives on (“since this alone is derived from the gods”: which, of course, is not Homeric belief); for it (this eidôlon) is sleeping when the limbs are active, but when the body is asleep it often reveals the future in a dream. Words could hardly make it plainer that in the activities of the waking and conscious man, the image-soul has no part. Its world is the world of sleep. While the other “I”, unconscious of itself, lies in sleep, its double is up and doing. In other words, while the body of the sleeper lies wrapped in slumber, motionless, the sleeper in his dream lives and sees many strange and wonderful things. It is “himself” who does this (of that there can be no doubt), and yet not the self known and visible to himself and others; for that lies still as death beyond the reach of sensation. It follows that there lives within a man a second self, active in dreaming. That the dream experiences are veritable realities and not empty fancies for Homer is also certain. He never says, as later poets often do, that the dreamer “thought” he saw this or that. The figures seen in dreams are real figures, either of the gods themselves or a “dream spirit” sent by them, or a fleeting “image” (eidôlon) that they allow to appear for a moment. Just as the dreamer’s capacity for vision is no mere fancy, so, too, the objects that he sees are realities. In the same way it is something real that appears to a man asleep as the shape of a person lately dead. Since this shape can show itself to a dreamer, it must of necessity still exist; consequently it survives death, though, indeed, only as a breath-like image, much as we have seen reflections of our own faces mirrored in water.6 It cannot, indeed—this airy substance—be grasped or held like the once viable self; and hence comes its name, the “psyche”. The primeval argument for such a counterpart of man is repeated by Achilleus himself (Il. xxiii, 103 f.) when his dead friend appears to him and then vanishes again: so, then, ye Gods, there yet lives in Hades’ house a psyche and shadowy image (of man), but there is no midriff in it (and consequently none of the faculties which preserve the visible man alive). 8

Such an idea—that the mind should exist alongside the living, fully aware personality, like an outsider or a weaker version of the person, as his “other self”—might seem quite odd to us. Yet this is what so-called “savage” peoples, 5 all over the world, actually believe. Herbert Spencer has particularly demonstrated this convincingly. Therefore, it’s not surprising to find that the Greeks also shared a way of thinking that is closely aligned with primitive people. The earlier age that passed down to the Greeks of Homer their beliefs about the soul must have observed the facts that gave rise to a fantastical logic about man’s double personality, just like other nations. It wasn't the sensations, will, perception, or thoughts of awake and conscious individuals that led to this conclusion. It was the experience of an apparent 7 double of the self in dreams, fainting, and ecstasy that suggested a dual principle of life in humans, and the existence of a separate, independent "second self" residing within the active self of everyday life. You only need to listen to the words of a later Greek writer who, more explicitly than Homer, describes the nature of the psyche and reveals the origin of such beliefs. Pindar (fr. 131) tells us that the body succumbs to Death, the all-powerful, but the image of the living creature continues to exist (“since this alone is derived from the gods”: which is not the belief of Homer); for it (this eidôlon) is sleeping when the limbs are active, but when the body sleeps, it often reveals the future in dreams. It couldn’t be clearer that in the activities of a waking, conscious person, the image-soul is not involved. Its realm is the world of dreams. While the other "I," unaware of itself, lies asleep, its double is active. In other words, while the body of the sleeper lies motionless in slumber, the sleeper experiences and sees many strange and wonderful things in his dreams. It is "himself" who does this (without a doubt), yet not the self that he knows and that others see; that self lies still as death, beyond the reach of sensation. It follows that within a person, there exists a second self, alive in dreaming. The dream experiences are real and not mere fantasies for Homer, who never claims, as later poets often do, that the dreamer “thought” he saw this or that. The figures seen in dreams are real figures, either of the gods themselves or a “dream spirit” sent by them, or a fleeting “image” (eidôlon) that they let appear for a moment. Just as the dreamer’s ability to see is not simply a fancy, the objects seen are also real. Similarly, something real can appear to a sleeping person as the shape of someone recently deceased. Since this shape can present itself to a dreamer, it must, by necessity, still exist; consequently, it survives death, albeit only as a breath-like image, much like we see reflections of our own faces in water.6 This airy substance indeed cannot be grasped or held like the once-living self; hence the name, the “psyche.” The fundamental argument for such a counterpart of man is echoed by Achilleus himself (Il. xxiii, 103 f.) when his dead friend appears to him and then fades away: thus, ye Gods, there still exists in Hades’ realm a psyche and shadowy image (of a person), but it lacks a midriff (and consequently none of the faculties that keep the visible person alive). 8

The dreamer, then, and what he sees in his dream proves the existence of an alter ego in man.7 Man, however, also observes that his body may suffer a deathlike torpor without the second self being occupied with dream experiences. In such moments of “swoon”, according to Greek thought and actual Homeric expression, “the psyche has left the body.”8 Where had it gone? No man could tell. But on this occasion it comes back again: whereupon the “spirit is gathered again into the midriff”. If ever, as happens in the case of death, the psyche should become completely separated from the visible body, then the “spirit” will never return. But the psyche, which in those temporary separations from the body9 did not perish, will not vanish into nothingness now.

The dreamer, then, and what he experiences in his dream shows the existence of an alter ego in humans.7 However, a person also notices that their body can fall into a deathlike stupor without this second self engaging in dream experiences. During these moments of “swoon,” according to Greek beliefs and actual Homeric references, “the psyche has left the body.”8 Where has it gone? No one can say. But on this occasion, it comes back: after which the “spirit is gathered again into the midriff.” If ever, as in the case of death, the psyche fully separates from the visible body, then the “spirit” will never return. But the psyche, which in these temporary separations from the body9 did not cease to exist, will not disappear into nothingness now.

§ 3

So far experience takes us, from which primitive logic arrived at very much the same conclusions all over the world. But, we may proceed to ask, where does this liberated psyche go? What becomes of it? Here begins “the undiscovered country” and it might appear that at its entrance there was a complete parting of the ways.

So far, experience leads us to similar conclusions that primitive logic reached around the world. But we can ask, where does this liberated mind go? What happens to it? This is where “the undiscovered country” begins, and it seems there’s a clear division at its entrance.

Primitive people are accustomed to attribute unlimited powers to the disembodied “soul”—powers all the more formidable because they are not seen. Indeed, they refer in part all invisible forces to the action of “souls”, and strain anxiously by means of the richest offerings within their power to secure for themselves the goodwill of these powerful spirits. Homer, on the contrary, knows nothing of any influence exerted by the psyche upon the visible world, and, consequently, hardly anything of a cult of the psyche. How, indeed, could the souls (as I may venture to call them without further risk of misunderstanding) have any such influence? They are all without exception collected in the realm of Aïdes, far from the living, separated from them by Okeanos and Acheron, guarded by the relentless god himself, the inexorable doorkeeper. Only a fabled hero like Odysseus may for once, perhaps, reach the entrance of that gloomy kingdom alive: the souls themselves, once they have crossed the river, never come back—so the soul of Patroklos assures his friend. How do they get there? The implication seems to be that on leaving the body the soul passes away, unwilling and complaining of its fate, but, nevertheless, unresisting, to Hades; and after the destruction of the body by fire, disappears for ever into the depths of Erebos. It was only a 9 later poet who, in giving the final touches to the Odyssey, introduced Hermes, the “Guide of the Dead”. Whether this is an invention of the poet’s, or, as appears more likely, it is borrowed from the ancient folk-belief of some remote corner of Greece, in the completely rounded circle of Homeric belief at any rate it is an innovation and an important one. Doubt has arisen, it appears, whether indeed all the souls must of necessity pass away into the Unseen; and they are provided with a divine guide who by his mysteriously compelling summons (Od. xxiv, 1) and the power of his magic wand constrains them to follow him.10

Primitive people tend to attribute unlimited powers to the disembodied "soul"—powers that are even more intimidating because they are invisible. In fact, they attribute all unseen forces to the actions of "souls" and anxiously offer their best gifts to win the favor of these powerful spirits. Homer, on the other hand, doesn't acknowledge any influence that the psyche has on the visible world, and as a result, there's hardly any focus on the worship of the psyche. How could these souls (which I’ll call them without risk of confusion) possibly have any influence? They are all located in the realm of Hades, far from the living, separated by Okeanos and Acheron, and guarded by the relentless god himself, the merciless doorkeeper. Only a legendary hero like Odysseus might occasionally reach the entrance of that dark kingdom while alive: the souls themselves, once they cross the river, never return—so the soul of Patroklos tells his friend. How do they get there? It seems that upon leaving the body, the soul reluctantly passes away, complaining about its fate but ultimately going to Hades without resistance; after the body is burned, it disappears forever into the depths of Erebos. Only later did a poet, in finishing the Odyssey, introduce Hermes, the "Guide of the Dead." Whether this is the poet's invention or likely borrowed from ancient folk beliefs in some distant part of Greece, it's an important innovation in the otherwise complete belief system of Homer. Doubts have emerged, it seems, about whether all souls necessarily must go into the Unseen; they are accompanied by a divine guide who, with his mysteriously compelling call (Od. xxiv, 1) and the magic of his wand, forces them to follow him.

Down in the murky underworld they now float unconscious, or, at most, with a twilight half-consciousness, wailing in a shrill diminutive voice, helpless, indifferent. Of course, flesh, bones, and sinews,11 the midriff, the seat of all the faculties of mind and will—these are all gone for ever. They were attached to the once-visible partner of the psyche, and that has been destroyed. To speak of an “immortal life” of these souls, as scholars both ancient and modern have done, is incorrect. They can hardly be said to live even, any more than the image does that is reflected in the mirror; and that they prolong to eternity their shadowy image-existence—where in Homer do we ever find this said? The psyche may survive its visible companion, but it is helpless without it. Is it possible to believe that a realistically imaginative, materially minded people like the Greeks would have regarded as immortal a creature incapable (once the funeral is over) of requiring or receiving further nourishment—either in religious cult or otherwise?

Down in the murky underworld, they now float unconscious, or at most, with a faint half-awareness, wailing in a high-pitched, tiny voice, helpless and indifferent. Of course, flesh, bones, and sinews—the midriff, the center of all mental and willpower faculties—are all gone forever. They were linked to the once-visible partner of the soul, and that has been destroyed. Talking about an “immortal life” for these souls, as scholars both ancient and modern have done, is incorrect. They can hardly be said to live at all, just like the image reflected in a mirror; and the idea that they carry on their shadowy existence for eternity—where in Homer do we ever find this mentioned? The soul may survive its visible partner, but it is powerless without it. Is it really plausible to think that a realistically imaginative, materially minded people like the Greeks would consider a being immortal that, once the funeral is over, cannot require or receive further nourishment—either through religious rituals or otherwise?

The daylight world of Homer is thus freed from spectres of the night (for even in dreams the psyche is seen no more after the body is burnt); from those intangible and ghostly essences at whose unearthly activity the superstitious of every age tremble. The living are no longer troubled by the dead. The world is governed by the gods alone; not pale and ghostly phantoms, but palpable and fully materialized figures, working powerfully everywhere, and dwelling on the clear mountain tops: “and brightness gleams around them.” No daimonic powers can compare with the gods or can avail against them; and night does not set free the departed souls of the dead. The reader starts involuntarily and begins to suspect the influence of another age, when in a part of Book XX of the Odyssey, added by a later hand, he reads how shortly before the destruction of the suitors the clairvoyant soothsayer beholds in hall and forecourt the soul-phantoms (eidôla) 10 floating in multitudes and hurrying down to the darkness under the earth: “the sun was darkened in the heaven and a thick mist came over all.” The later poet has been very successful in suggesting the terror awakened by a foreboding of tragedy; but such terror in the face of the doings of the spirit world is entirely un-Homeric.

The world of daylight in Homer is free from the ghosts of the night (because even in dreams, the mind is no longer seen after the body is burned); from those intangible and ghostly presences that have frightened the superstitious throughout history. The living are no longer haunted by the dead. The world is ruled solely by the gods; not pale and ghostly figures, but solid and fully formed beings, powerfully active everywhere, residing on the clear mountaintops: “and brightness gleams around them.” No demonic powers can rival the gods or overcome them; and night does not release the souls of the deceased. The reader is taken aback and may sense the influence of a different time when, in a section of Book XX of the Odyssey, added later, the prophetic seer observes in the hall and courtyard the soul-phantoms (eidôla) 10 floating in large numbers and rushing down into the darkness below: “the sun was darkened in the sky, and a thick mist covered everything.” The later poet successfully conveys the fear stirred by a hint of tragedy; however, such fear regarding the actions of the spirit world is completely un-Homeric.

§ 4

Were the Greeks, then, always so untroubled by such fears of the souls of the dead? Was there never any cult of disembodied spirits, such as was not only known to all primitive peoples throughout the world, but was also quite familiar to nations belonging to the same family as the Greeks, for instance, the Indians and the Persians? The question and its answer have more than a passing interest. In later times—long subsequent to Homer—we find in Greece itself a lively worship of ancestors and a general cult of the departed. Were it demonstrable—as it is generally assumed without proof—that the Greeks only at this late period first began to pay a religious cult to the souls of the dead, this fact would give very strong support to the oft-repeated theory that the cult of the dead arose from the ruins of a previous worship of the gods. Anthropologists are accustomed to deny this and to regard the worship of disembodied souls as one of the earliest forms (if not as originally the only form) of the reverence paid to unseen powers. The peoples, however, upon whose conditions of life and mental conceptions such views are generally based, have indeed behind them a long past, but no history. What is to prevent pure speculation and theorizing in conformity with the preconceived idea just mentioned (which is almost elevated to the position of a doctrine of faith by some comparative religionists) from introducing into the dim past of such savage peoples the primitive worship of gods, out of which the worship of the dead may then subsequently arise? But Greek religious development can be traced from Homer onwards for a long period; and there we find the certainly remarkable fact that a cult of the dead, unknown to Homer, only appears later, in the course of a long and vigorous expansion of religious ideas in after times; or, at least, then shows itself more plainly—but not, it is important to notice, as the precipitate of a dying belief in gods and worship of the gods, but rather as a collateral development by the side of that highly developed form of piety.

Were the Greeks always so unbothered by fears of the souls of the dead? Was there never any cult of disembodied spirits, like the ones known to all primitive societies worldwide, and also familiar to nations related to the Greeks, such as the Indians and Persians? This question and its answer are quite intriguing. In later times—well after Homer—we see a vibrant worship of ancestors and a widespread cult of the departed in Greece itself. If it could be proven—as is generally assumed without evidence—that the Greeks only began to pay religious homage to the souls of the dead at this late time, this would strongly support the often-repeated theory that the cult of the dead emerged from the decline of a previous worship of the gods. However, anthropologists tend to reject this idea and view the worship of disembodied souls as one of the earliest forms (if not the original form) of reverence for unseen powers. The cultures that these views are based on certainly have a long history behind them, but they lack a detailed historical record. What prevents pure speculation and theorizing from imposing the primitive worship of gods into the ancient past of such tribal peoples, from which the worship of the dead could later emerge? But Greek religious development can be traced from Homer onward for quite some time; and here we find the notable fact that a cult of the dead, unknown to Homer, only appears later as part of a substantial growth of religious ideas in later times; or at least becomes more evident then—but it's crucial to note that this wasn't a result of a declining belief in the gods and their worship, but rather a parallel development alongside that well-established form of devotion.

Are we, then, really to believe that the cult of disembodied 11 spirits was absolutely unknown to the Greeks of pre-Homeric times?

Are we really supposed to believe that the worship of disembodied 11 spirits was completely unknown to the Greeks before Homer?

Such an assertion, if made without due qualification, is contradicted by a closer study of the Homeric poems themselves.

Such a statement, if made without proper context, is contradicted by a closer look at the Homeric poems themselves.

It is true that Homer represents for us the earliest great stage in the evolution of Greek civilization of which we have clear evidence. But the poems do not stand at the beginning of that evolution. Indeed, they only stand at the beginning of Greek Epic poetry—so far as this has been transmitted to us—because the natural greatness and wide popularity of the Iliad and the Odyssey secured their preservation in writing. Their very existence and the degree of artistic finish which they show, oblige us to suppose that behind them lies a long history of heroic “Saga” poetry. The conditions which they describe and imply point to a long course of previous development—from nomadic to city life, from patriarchal rule to the organization of the Greek Polis. And just as the maturity of material development tells its tale, so do the refinement and maturity of culture, the profound and untrammelled knowledge of the world, the clarity and simplicity of thought reflected in them. All these things go to show that before Homer, in order to reach Homer, the Greek world must have thought and learned much—must, indeed, have unlearned and undone much. As in art, so in all the products of civilization, what is simple, appropriate, and convincing is not the achievement of beginners, but the reward of prolonged study. It is prima facie unthinkable that during the whole length of Greek evolution before Homer, religion alone, the relationship between man and the invisible world, should have remained stationary at any one point. It is not from the comparison of religious beliefs and their development among kindred nations, nor even from the study of apparently primitive ideas and usages in the religious life of the Greeks themselves of later times, that we are to seek the truth about the religious customs of that remote period which is obscured for us by the intervening mass of the Homeric poems. Comparative studies of this kind are valuable in their way, but must only be used to give further support to the insight derived from less easily misleading methods of inquiry. For us the only completely satisfactory source of information about pre-Homeric times is Homer himself. We are allowed—indeed, we are forced—to conclude that there have been change in conceptions and customs, if, in that otherwise so uniform and rounded Homeric world, we meet with isolated occurrences, customs, forms of speech that contradict the 12 normal atmosphere of Homer and can only be explained by reference to a world in all essentials differently orientated from his own and for the most part kept in the background by Homer. All that is necessary is to open our eyes, freed from preconceived ideas, to the “rudiments” (“survivals”, as they are better called by English scholars) of a past stage of civilization discoverable in the Iliad and Odyssey themselves.

It's true that Homer represents the earliest significant stage in the evolution of Greek civilization for which we have clear evidence. However, his poems don't mark the start of that evolution. They actually only mark the beginning of Greek Epic poetry—based on what has been passed down to us—because the natural greatness and wide appeal of the Iliad and the Odyssey ensured they were preserved in writing. The very existence of these works and their artistic quality imply that there was a long history of heroic “Saga” poetry that preceded them. The settings they describe suggest a lengthy development, shifting from nomadic lifestyles to city living, from patriarchal rule to the organization of the Greek Polis. Just as the advancement of material development is evident, so too are the sophistication and maturity of culture, the deep and unrestricted understanding of the world, and the clarity and simplicity of thought reflected in them. All of this indicates that before Homer, the Greek world must have thought deeply, learned a lot, and even unlearned many things to arrive at his work. In art and all aspects of civilization, what is simple, suitable, and convincing isn't the work of beginners but rather the result of extensive study. It seems unimaginable that during the extensive period of Greek development leading up to Homer, religion and the relationship between humans and the unseen world remained stagnant at any one point. We don't find the truth about the spiritual customs of that distant period—which is obscured for us by the overwhelming mass of the Homeric poems—through comparisons of religious beliefs among similar nations or by studying seemingly primitive notions and practices in the religious lives of later Greeks. While comparative studies are valuable, they should only complement insights gained from less misleading methods of inquiry. For us, the only fully satisfactory source of information about pre-Homeric times is Homer himself. We are allowed—and indeed compelled—to conclude that there have been changes in beliefs and customs if, in that otherwise uniform and cohesive Homeric world, we encounter isolated instances, customs, and expressions that contradict the usual atmosphere of Homer and can only be explained by referring to a world that is fundamentally different from his own and largely kept in the background by him. All that is needed is to open our eyes, free from preconceived notions, to the “rudiments” (or “survivals,” as English scholars prefer to call them) of an earlier stage of civilization that can be found in the Iliad and Odyssey themselves.

§ 5

Such rudiments of a once vigorous soul-worship are not hard to find in Homer. In particular, we may refer to what the Iliad tells us of the manner in which the dead body of Patroklos is dealt with. The reader need only recall the general outline of the story. In the evening of the day upon which Hektor has been slain, Achilles with his Myrmidons sings the funeral dirge to his dead friend: they go three times in procession round the body, Achilles laying his “murderous hands” on the breast of Patroklos and calling upon him with the words: “Hail, Patroklos mine, even in Aïdes’ dwelling-place; what I vowed to thee before is now performed; Hektor lies slain and is the prey of dogs, and twelve noble Trojan youths will I slay at thy funeral pyre.” After they have laid aside their arms he makes ready the funeral feast for his companions—bulls, sheep, goats, and pigs are killed, “and all around, in beakers-full, the blood flowed round the corpse.” During the night the soul of Patroklos appears to Achilles demanding immediate burial. In the morning the host of the Myrmidons marches out in arms, bearing the body in their midst. The warriors lay locks of their hair, cut off for the purpose, upon the body, and last of all Achilles places his own hair in the hand of his friend—it was once pledged by his father to Spercheios the River-god, but Patroklos must now take it with him, since return to his home is denied to Achilles. The funeral pyre is got ready, many sheep and oxen slaughtered. The corpse is wrapped in their fat, while their carcasses are placed beside it; jars of oil and honey are set round the body. Next, four horses are killed, two dogs belonging to Patroklos, and last of all twelve Trojan youths taken prisoner for this purpose by Achilles. All these are burnt together with the corpse, and Achilles spends the whole night pouring out dark wine upon the earth, calling the while upon the psyche of Patroklos. Only when morning comes is the fire extinguished with wine; the bones of Patroklos are collected and laid in a golden casket and entombed within a mound. 13

Such basics of a once strong reverence for souls are easy to spot in Homer. Specifically, we can look at how the Iliad describes the treatment of Patroclus's dead body. The reader only needs to remember the general outline of the story. In the evening after Hector has been killed, Achilles and his Myrmidons sing a funeral dirge for his deceased friend: they walk around the body three times, with Achilles laying his “murderous hands” on Patroclus's chest and calling out, “Hail, my Patroclus, even in the land of the dead; what I vowed to you before is now fulfilled; Hector is slain and is the prey of dogs, and I will kill twelve noble Trojan youths at your funeral pyre.” After they’ve set aside their weapons, he prepares the funeral feast for his companions—bulls, sheep, goats, and pigs are sacrificed, “and all around, blood flowed in cups around the corpse.” During the night, Patroclus's spirit appears to Achilles, demanding immediate burial. In the morning, the Myrmidon army marches out armed, carrying the body in their midst. The warriors place locks of their hair, cut for this purpose, on the body, and finally, Achilles puts his own hair in his friend’s hand—it was once pledged by his father to Spercheios the River-god, but Patroclus must take it with him since Achilles can’t return home. The funeral pyre is prepared, many sheep and cows are slaughtered. The corpse is wrapped in their fat, while their bodies are laid next to it; jars of oil and honey are placed around the body. Then, four horses are killed, two dogs belonging to Patroclus, and finally, twelve Trojan youths captured for this purpose by Achilles. All these are burned along with the body, and Achilles spends the entire night pouring dark wine on the ground, calling out to Patroclus's spirit. Only when morning comes is the fire put out with wine; Patroclus's bones are collected, placed in a golden box, and buried in a mound. 13

Here we have a picture of the funeral of a chieftain which, in the solemnity and ceremoniousness of its elaborate detail, is in striking conflict with the normal Homeric conception of the nothingness of the soul after its separation from the body. A full and rich sacrifice is here offered to such a soul. This sacrifice is inexplicable if the soul immediately upon its dissolution flutters away insensible, helpless and powerless, and therefore incapable of enjoying the offerings made to it. It is therefore not unnatural that a method of interpretation which isolates Homer as far as possible and adheres closely to his own fixed and determinate range of ideas, should attempt to deny the sacrificial character of the offerings made on this occasion.12 We may well ask, however, what else but a sacrifice, i.e. a repast offered in satisfaction of the needs of the person honoured (in this case the psyche), can be intended by this stream of blood about the corpse; this slaughtering and burning of cattle and sheep, horses and dogs, and finally of twelve Trojan prisoners on or at the funeral pyre? To explain it all as a mere performance of pious duties, as is often done in interpreting many of the gruesome pictures of Greek sacrificial ceremonies, is impossible here. Besides, Homer often tells us of merely pious observances in honour of the dead, and they are of a very different character. And the most horrible touch of all (the human sacrifice) is not put in simply to satisfy Achilles’ lust for vengeance—twice over does Achilles call to the soul of Patroklos with the words: “To you do I bring what I formerly promised to you” (Il. xxiii, 20 ff., 180 ff.).13 The whole series of offerings on this occasion is precisely of the kind which we may take as typical of the oldest sort of sacrificial ritual such as we often find in later Greek religion in the cultus of the infernal deities. The sacrificial offerings are completely burnt in honour of the Daimon and are not shared between the bystanders as in the case of other offerings. If such “holocausts”, when offered to the Chthonic and some of the Olympian deities, are to be regarded as sacrificial in character, then it is unjustifiable to invent some other meaning for the performances at the funeral pyre of Patroklos. The offering of wine, oil, and honey, at least, are normal in sacrificial rituals of later times. Even the severed lock of hair spread out over the dead body or laid in the cold hand is a well known sacrificial tribute, and must be supposed such here as much as in later Greek ceremonial or in that of many other peoples.14 In fact, this gift in particular, symbolically representing as it does a more valuable sacrifice by means of another and less important 14 object (in the giving of which only the goodwill of the giver is to be considered)—this very offering, like all such symbolical substitutions, bears witness to the long duration and past development of the cultus in which it occurs—in this case of the worship of the dead in pre-Homeric times.

Here we have a depiction of a chieftain's funeral that, with its solemnity and detailed rituals, sharply contrasts with the typical Homeric view of the soul's emptiness once it leaves the body. A complete and generous sacrifice is offered to this soul. This offering doesn't make sense if the soul, upon dying, simply drifts away, unfeeling and devoid of power, and thus incapable of enjoying the offerings. It's understandable that some interpretations, aiming to keep Homer within his own defined ideas, try to deny the sacrificial significance of these offerings. However, one must ask, what else could this flow of blood around the corpse signify if not a sacrifice meant to satisfy the needs of the honored individual (in this case, the psyche)? The slaughtering and burning of cattle, sheep, horses, and dogs, plus the sacrifice of twelve Trojan prisoners at the funeral pyre, clearly point to a sacrifice. To dismiss it merely as a performance of religious duties, as is often done with other gruesome representations of Greek sacrificial rituals, is simply not possible here. Furthermore, Homer mentions other more conventional religious acts performed in honor of the dead, and they are quite different in character. The most disturbing element (the human sacrifice) isn’t included just to satisfy Achilles’ desire for revenge—he explicitly calls out to Patroklos’ soul, saying: “To you do I bring what I once promised to you” (Il. xxiii, 20 ff., 180 ff.).13 The entire series of offerings is exactly what we can regard as typical of the oldest sacrificial rituals, similar to what we later find in ancient Greek religion regarding the worship of underworld deities. The sacrifices are completely burned in honor of the Daimon and aren’t shared with onlookers like other offerings. If such “holocausts,” offered to Chthonic and some Olympian deities, are deemed sacrificial in nature, then it’s unreasonable to ascribe a different meaning to the rituals at Patroklos' funeral pyre. The offerings of wine, oil, and honey, at the very least, fit the norms of later sacrificial rituals. Even the severed lock of hair laid on the dead body or in the cold hand is a recognized sacrificial gesture, and it should be understood as such here as it would be in later Greek ceremonies or among many other cultures.14 In reality, this specific gift, symbolically representing a more significant sacrifice through a lesser and unimportant object (where only the giver's goodwill matters)—this kind of symbolic offering signifies the long-standing tradition and historical evolution of the worship involved, in this case, of honoring the dead in pre-Homeric times.

The whole narrative presupposes the idea that by the pouring out of streams of blood, by offerings of wine and burnt offerings of human beings and of cattle, the psyche of a person lately dead can be refreshed, and its resentment mollified. At any rate, it is thus thought of as accessible to human prayers and as remaining for some time in the neighbourhood of the sacrifice made to it. This contradicts what we expect in Homer, and, in fact, just in order to make this unusual performance plausible to an audience no longer familiar with the idea, and to make it admissible on a special occasion, the poet (though the actual course of his story does not really require it)15 makes the psyche of Patroklos appear by night to Achilles. And, in fact, to the end of the narrative Achilles repeatedly greets the soul of Patroklos as though it were present.16 The unusual way in which Homer deals with this whole affair, so full of primeval, savage ideas as it is, seems, indeed, to betray a certain vagueness about what its real meaning may be. That the writer has certain qualms on the subject is indicated by the brevity—not at all like Homer—with which the most shocking part of the story, the slaughter of human beings, together with horses and dogs, is hurried over. But the thing to be noted particularly is that the poet is certainly not devising such unpleasant circumstances for the first time out of his own imagination. This epic picture of the worship of the dead was adopted by Homer from an earlier source (whatever that source may have been),17 and not invented by him. He makes it serve his special purpose, which is to provide a satisfactory climax to the series of vivid and emotional scenes beginning with the tragic death of Patroklos and ending with the death and dishonouring of the champion of Troy. After such emotional exaltation the overstrained nerves must not be allowed to relax too suddenly; a last flicker of the superhuman rage and grief that made Achilles rave so furiously against his foes must show itself in the serving up of this awful banquet to the soul of his friend. It is as though a primitive and long-suppressed savagery had broken out again for a last effort. Only when all is over does the soul of Achilles find repose in melancholy resignation. More calmly he calls upon the rest of the Achæans to take their seats “in a wide circle round about”; and there follows the 15 description of those splendid “Games”, a subject that must have awakened the enthusiasm of every experienced athlete in the audience—and was there ever a Greek who was not an athlete? It is true that athletic contests are described by Homer mainly on account of their own peculiar interest and for the sake of the artistic effects that their description allowed. Still, the selection of such games as a fitting conclusion to a chieftain’s funeral cannot be fully understood except as a survival of an ancient and once vigorous worship of the dead. Such athletic contests in honour of the great immediately after their death are often referred to by Homer;18 indeed, a funeral is the only occasion19 recognized by him as suitable for the exhibition of athletic prize-competitions. The practice never quite died out, and it became usual in later post-Homeric times to mark the festivals of Heroes and, later of gods, too, by Games which gradually became regularly repeated performances, developed from the traditional contests that had concluded the funeral ceremonies of great men. Now, no one doubts that the Agon at the festival of a Hero or a god formed part of their religious worship. It is only reasonable, then, to suppose that the funeral games which accompany the burial of a chieftain (and are confined to that one occasion) belong to the religious cult of the dead, and to recognize that such a mode of worship can only have been introduced at a time when men regarded the soul, in whose honour the ceremony took place, as capable of sharing consciously in its enjoyment. Even Homer is certainly conscious of the fact that the games, like the rest of the offerings made then, were intended for the satisfaction of the dead and not solely for the entertainment of the living.20 We may also cite the declared opinion of Varro, who says that the dead in whose honour funeral games are celebrated are thereby proved to have been regarded originally, if not as gods, at least as very powerful spirits.21 Of course, this feature of the original cultus of the soul was very easily stripped of its real meaning—it recommended itself quite apart from its religious significance—and for that very reason remained longer than other performances of the kind in general use.

The entire story assumes that by pouring out streams of blood, offering wine, and burning human and animal sacrifices, the soul of a recently deceased person can be refreshed and its anger eased. It’s believed that this soul is accessible to human prayers and lingers in the vicinity of the sacrifice for some time. This contradicts what we expect from Homer. To make this unusual act believable for an audience unfamiliar with the concept and to justify it for a special occasion, the poet—though the actual storyline doesn’t necessitate it—has the soul of Patroklos appear at night to Achilles. In fact, throughout the narrative, Achilles repeatedly acknowledges Patroklos' soul as if it were there. Homer's treatment of this whole matter, filled with primitive, brutal ideas, seems to reveal a certain ambiguity regarding its real meaning. The author’s discomfort with the topic is shown by the brevity—unlike Homer—with which the most shocking part of the story, the slaughter of humans along with horses and dogs, is rushed through. What’s particularly noteworthy is that the poet is definitely not creating these gruesome elements out of his own imagination for the first time. This epic depiction of honoring the dead was borrowed by Homer from an earlier source (whatever that source was), not invented by him. He uses it to fulfill his specific purpose of providing a fitting climax to the series of intense and emotional scenes that start with Patroklos' tragic death and end with the demise and dishonoring of Troy's champion. After such heightened emotions, the strained nerves must not be allowed to relax too quickly; a final show of the superhuman rage and grief that made Achilles rage fiercely against his enemies must manifest in the serving of this horrific feast to his friend’s soul. It’s as if a primitive and long-suppressed savagery has surged forth one last time. Only when everything is over does Achilles’ soul find peace in sorrowful resignation. More calmly, he invites the rest of the Achaeans to gather “in a wide circle around”; and then follows the 15 description of those grand “Games,” a topic that must have excited every experienced athlete in the audience—and was there ever a Greek who wasn’t an athlete? It is true that Homer describes athletic contests mainly for their own unique interest and for the artistic effects their depiction allows. Still, the choice of such games as a suitable conclusion to a chieftain’s funeral can’t be fully understood without recognizing that it’s a remnant of an ancient and once vigorous practice of honoring the dead. Homer frequently references athletic contests in honor of great individuals right after their deaths; indeed, a funeral is the only occasion19 he acknowledges as appropriate for showcasing athletic prize competitions. This practice never completely vanished and eventually became common in later post-Homeric times to celebrate the festivals of Heroes and, later, gods, with Games that gradually morphed into regular performances stemming from the traditional contests that concluded the funerals of distinguished individuals. Nobody doubts that the Agon at the festival of a Hero or a god was part of their religious worship. It makes sense, then, to assume that the funeral games accompanying a chieftain’s burial (which are confined to that single event) fall under the religious cult of the dead and recognize that this form of worship could only have arisen when people believed the soul being honored could consciously partake in the enjoyment. Even Homer was certainly aware that the games, like the other offerings made then, were intended to please the dead and not just entertain the living.20 We can also refer to Varro’s clear statement that those who are honored with funeral games were originally viewed, if not as gods, at least as very powerful spirits.21 Of course, this aspect of the original worship of the soul was easily stripped of its real significance—it was appealing beyond its religious meaning—and for that very reason, it persisted longer than other similar practices in general use.

If we now survey the whole series of ritual acts directed to the honouring of the soul of Patroklos, we can deduce from the seriousness of these attempts to please the disembodied spirit what must have been the strength of the original conception—how vivid must have been the impression of enduring sensibility, of formidable power possessed by a soul 16 to whom such a cult was offered. It is true of the cult of the dead, as of any other sacrificial custom, that its perpetuation is due solely to the hope of avoiding hurt and obtaining assistance at the hands of the Unseen.22 A generation that no longer anticipated either help or harm from the “Souls” might be ready to perform last offices of all kinds to the deserted body out of pure piety, and to offer to the dead a certain traditional reverence. But this would testify rather to the grief of those left behind than to any special reverence felt for the departed.23 This is mostly the case in Homer. It is not, however, what we should call piety, but much rather mistrust of a “ghost” become powerful through its separation from the body, that explains the exaggerated fullness of the funeral offerings that are made at the burial of Patroklos. They cannot be made to fit in with the ordinary circle of Homeric ideas. Indeed, that this circle of ideas excluded all misgiving at the possible action of unseen spirits is quite clearly shown by the fact that the honours paid even to a dead man held in such veneration as Patroklos are confined to the solitary occasion of his funeral. As the psyche of Patroklos himself assures his friend, once the burning of the body is completed, it, the psyche, will take its departure to Hades, never to return.24 It is easy to see that from this point of view there was no motive whatever that could lead to a permanent cult of the soul such as was common among the Greeks of later times. But it should be noticed further that the luxurious repast offered to the soul of Patroklos on the occasion of his funeral had no point if the goodwill of the soul which was to be assured by that process would never have an opportunity in the future of making itself felt. The contradiction between Homeric belief and Homeric practice on this occasion is complete, and shows decisively that the traditional view that would see in this description of soul-worship at the funeral of Patroklos an effort after new and more lively ideas of the life after death, must certainly be wrong. When new surmises, wishes, conjectures begin to arise and seek a means of expression, the new ideas generally find incomplete utterance in the old and inappropriate external forms, but express themselves more clearly and certainly (generally with some tendency to exaggeration) in the less conservative words and language of men. Here just the opposite occurs: every word the poet utters about the circumstances contradicts the elaborately wrought ceremonial which those circumstances call forth. It is impossible to point to a single touch that accords with the belief implied by the 17 ceremonial. The poet’s bias is a different and, indeed, an opposite one. Of this much at least there cannot be the slightest doubt: the funeral ceremonies over the body of Patroklos are not the first budding of a new principle, but rather represent a “vestige” of a more vigorous worship of the dead in earlier times, a worship that must once have been a complete and sufficient expression of belief in the great and enduring power of the disembodied spirit. It has, however, been preserved unaltered into an age that, with quite other religious beliefs, no longer understands, or at best half-guesses at the sense of such strange ceremonial observances. Thus ritual generally outlives both the state of mind and the belief which originally gave rise to it.

If we now look at the entire series of rituals meant to honor the soul of Patroklos, we can infer from the seriousness of these efforts to please the spirit what the original idea must have been—how strong the impression of lasting sensitivity and formidable power must have been that a soul 16 received such worship. It's true for the cult of the dead, just like any other sacrificial tradition, that its continuation relies solely on the hope of avoiding harm and gaining help from the Unseen.22 A generation that no longer expects either assistance or threat from the “Souls” might still perform last rites of all kinds for the lifeless body out of simple piety, and offer the dead a measure of traditional respect. But this would reflect more on the sorrow of the living than any particular reverence for the deceased.23 This is mainly the case in Homer. However, what we might call piety is not what’s at play here; it’s more about a mistrust of a “ghost” that becomes powerful after separating from the body, which explains the excessive generosity of the funeral offerings made for Patroklos. They don't fit neatly into the standard Homeric concepts. In fact, the fact that this circle of ideas excluded any doubt about the potential actions of unseen spirits is clearly illustrated by the honors given even to a dead man revered like Patroklos being limited to the unique event of his funeral. As Patroklos's psyche assures his friend, once the body is burned, it will leave for Hades, never to return.24 From this perspective, there is no reason for a lasting cult of the soul, as was common among later Greeks. However, it should be noted further that the lavish meal offered to Patroklos's soul during his funeral would serve no purpose if the goodwill of the soul, ensured by that act, had no chance to manifest in the future. The contradiction between Homeric belief and practice in this case is complete and clearly shows that the traditional understanding viewing the soul-worship during Patroklos's funeral as an attempt at new and more vivid concepts of the afterlife must be incorrect. When new ideas, desires, and guesses start to surface and seek a way to express themselves, they often find incomplete expression in old and unsuitable external forms but come through more clearly and confidently (often with some tendency to exaggerate) in the less traditional words and language of people. Here, though, the opposite happens: every word the poet says about the circumstances contradicts the intricate ceremony that those circumstances prompt. There's no single aspect that aligns with the belief implied by the 17 ceremony. The poet's inclination is quite different and, in fact, the opposite. There can be no doubt about this: the funeral rites for Patroklos's body are not the first signs of a new principle but rather represent a “vestige” of a more vigorous worship of the dead in earlier times, a worship that must once have fully and adequately expressed belief in the immense and enduring power of the disembodied spirit. However, it has been preserved unchanged into an era that, with entirely different religious beliefs, no longer understands or only partially grasps the meaning behind such unusual ceremonial practices. Thus, rituals typically outlast both the mindset and the beliefs that originally led to their creation.

§ 6

Neither the Iliad nor the Odyssey contains anything that can equal the scenes at the funeral of Patroklos as evidence of primitive worship of the dead. But even the ordinary forms of interment of the dead are not entirely without such “vestigial” features. The dead man’s eyes and mouth are closed,25 the body is washed and anointed, and after being wrapped in a clean linen cloth is laid upon a bier,26 and the funeral dirge begins.27 It is hardly possible to see even the remotest, lingering, reminiscence of a once vigorous worship of the dead in such performances as these; or in the very simple burial customs that follow the burning of the body; the bones are collected in a jar or a casket and buried under a mound, and a post set up to mark the place as a “grave-mound”.28 But when we find that the body of Elpenor, in accordance with the command issued by his psyche to Odysseus (Od. xi, 74), is burned together with his weapons (Od. xii, 13); when, further, we read that Achilles burnt the weapons of his overthrown foe together with his body on the funeral pyre (Il. vi, 418), it is impossible not to feel that we have here, too, survivals of an ancient belief that the soul in some mysterious fashion was capable of making use of these objects that are burnt along with its discarded bodily envelope. No one doubts that this is the reason for such a custom when it meets us in the case of other nations; with the Greeks, too, it must have had an equally good foundation, however little such is to be discovered in the ordinary Homeric view of the soul. The custom, moreover, more precisely described in these cases, was of general observance; we often hear how the completeness of a burial requires the burning of the possessions of the dead along with the body.29 We cannot 18 tell to what extent the duty of offering to the dead all his movable possessions30 (a duty originally without doubt interpreted quite literally) had come in Homeric times to be interpreted in a symbolical sense—a process which reached its lowest stage in the custom prevalent in later times of presenting an obol “for the Ferryman of the Dead”. Finally, the “funeral feast” offered by the king to the mourning people either after the funeral of a chieftain (Il. xxiv, 802, 665), or before the burning of his body (Il. xxiii, 29 ff.), could only have derived its full meaning from an ancient belief that the soul of the person thus honoured could itself take a share in the feast. In the banquet in honour of Patroklos the dead man is given a definite portion—the blood of the slaughtered animals which is poured round his body (Il. xxiii, 34). Like the funeral games, this banquet is apparently intended to propitiate the soul of the dead man. Consequently, we find even Orestes, after slaying Aigisthos, his father’s murderer, offering him a funeral feast (Od. iii, 309)—not, surely, in a mood of simple “piety”. The custom of inviting the whole people, on the occasion of important funerals, to such a banquet no longer appears in later times; it has little resemblance to the funeral feasts shared by the relations of the dead man (περίδειπνα) that were afterwards customary; it is far closer to the great cenæ ferales that accompanied the silicernia in Rome, to which the relations of the dead man, if he were an important person, invited the whole population.31 After all, it is no harder to understand the underlying conception of the soul in this case sharing the feast with the whole people, than it is to understand the same conception when applied to the great sacrifices to the gods which, though the congregation partakes, are, in name and in fact, essentially “Banquets of the Gods” (Od. iii, 336).

Neither the Iliad nor the Odyssey has anything that matches the scenes at Patroklos’s funeral as proof of early worship of the dead. However, even the usual burial practices aren't completely devoid of these “vestigial” elements. The deceased's eyes and mouth are closed, the body is washed and anointed, and after being wrapped in a clean linen cloth, it is placed on a bier, and the funeral dirge begins. It's hard to find even the faintest trace of a once vibrant worship of the dead in these rituals or in the very basic burial customs that follow cremation; the bones are gathered in a jar or casket and buried under a mound, with a post set up to mark the spot as a “grave-mound.” But when we note that Elpenor's body is burned along with his weapons as directed by his spirit to Odysseus (Od. xi, 74), and when we read that Achilles burned the weapons of his vanquished foe along with his body on the funeral pyre (Il. vi, 418), it’s hard not to sense that we’re witnessing remnants of an ancient belief that the soul, in some mysterious way, could use the items that are burned alongside its discarded physical form. No one doubts that this practice has similar significance in other cultures; the Greeks must have had a solid foundation for it as well, even if it’s not clearly evident in the typical Homeric view of the soul. Furthermore, as described in these instances, the practice was widely observed; we often hear that a proper burial necessitates the burning of the dead’s possessions alongside the body. We can't determine the extent to which the obligation to offer all of the deceased's movable possessions (which was undoubtedly once interpreted literally) was understood in a more symbolic way during Homeric times—a process that eventually led to the later custom of giving an obol “for the Ferryman of the Dead.” In the end, the “funeral feast” provided by the king for the grieving people either after the burial of a chief (Il. xxiv, 802, 665) or before the cremation of the body (Il. xxiii, 29 ff.) could only have its full meaning from an ancient belief that the soul of the honored individual could partake in the feast. During the banquet for Patroklos, the dead man receives a specific portion—the blood of the slaughtered animals poured around his body (Il. xxiii, 34). Like the funeral games, this banquet seems aimed at appeasing the soul of the deceased. Consequently, even Orestes, after killing Aigisthos, his father's murderer, offers him a funeral feast (Od. iii, 309)—not, surely, out of mere “piety.” The custom of inviting the whole community to such a banquet for significant funerals no longer appears in later times; it bears little resemblance to the funeral feasts shared by the deceased's relatives (περίδειπνα) that became customary afterward; it is much closer to the grand cenæ ferales that accompanied the silicernia in Rome, to which the deceased’s relatives, if he were important, invited the entire population. After all, it's no more difficult to understand the idea of the soul sharing a feast with the whole community than it is to grasp the same concept when applied to the grand sacrifices to the gods, which the congregation partakes in but are essentially “Banquets of the Gods” (Od. iii, 336).

Such are the relics of ancient soul-worship to be found within the limits of the Homeric world. Further attention to the spirits of the dead beyond the time of the funeral was prevented by the deeply ingrained conviction that after the burning of the body the psyche was received into the inaccessible world of the Unseen, from which no traveller returns. But, in order to secure this complete departure of the soul, it is necessary for the body to be burnt. Though we do occasionally read in the Iliad or the Odyssey that immediately after death and before the burning of the body “the psyche departed to Hades”,32 the words must not be taken too literally; the soul certainly flies off at once towards Hades, but it hovers now between the realms of the living and 19 the dead until it is received into the final safekeeping of the latter after the burning of the body. The psyche of Patroklos appearing by night to Achilles declares this; it prays for immediate burial in order that it may pass through the door of Hades. Until then the other shadow-creatures prevent its entrance and bar its passage across the river, so that it has to wander restlessly round the house of Aïs of the wide gate (Il. xxiii, 71 ff.). This hastening off towards the house of Hades is again all that is meant when it is said elsewhere of Patroklos himself (Il. xvi, 856) that the psyche departed out of his limbs to the house of Hades. In exactly the same way it is said of Elpenor, the companion of Odysseus, that “his soul descended to Hades” (Od. x, 560). This soul meets his friend, nevertheless, later on, at the entrance of the Shadow-world, not yet deprived of its senses like the rest of the dwellers in that House of Darkness; not until the destruction of its physical counterpart is complete can it enter into the rest of Hades. Only through fire are the souls of the dead “appeased” (Il. vii, 410). So long, then, as the psyche retains any vestige of “earthliness” it possesses some feeling still, some awareness of what is going on among the living.33

These are the remnants of ancient soul-worship found within the boundaries of the Homeric world. Further attention to the spirits of the dead after the funeral was prevented by the deeply held belief that, following the cremation of the body, the psyche entered the unreachable realm of the Unseen, from which no traveler returns. However, to ensure the complete departure of the soul, the body must be burned. Though we occasionally read in the Iliad or the Odyssey that immediately after death and before the body is burned, “the psyche departed to Hades,” the words shouldn't be taken too literally; the soul does indeed head straight towards Hades, but it lingers between the living and the dead until it is finally received into the latter after the body is burned. The psyche of Patroklos, appearing to Achilles at night, confirms this; it begs for immediate burial so that it can pass through the gates of Hades. Until then, the other shadow-creatures prevent its entry and block its passage across the river, forcing it to roam restlessly around the house of Aïs with the wide gate (Iliad xxiii, 71 ff.). This quick journey towards the house of Hades is what is meant when it’s stated elsewhere about Patroklos himself (Iliad xvi, 856) that the psyche left his limbs for the house of Hades. Similarly, it is said of Elpenor, Odysseus's companion, that “his soul descended to Hades” (Odyssey x, 560). However, this soul later meets his friend at the entrance to the Shadow-world, not yet deprived of its senses like the other inhabitants of that House of Darkness; it cannot enter the rest of Hades until its physical counterpart is fully destroyed. Only through fire are the souls of the dead “appeased” (Iliad vii, 410). As long as the psyche retains any trace of “earthliness,” it still has some feeling, some awareness of what’s happening among the living.

But once the body is destroyed by fire, then is the psyche relegated to Hades; no return to this earth is permitted to it, and not a breath of this world can penetrate to it there. It cannot even return in thought. Indeed, it no longer thinks at all, and knows nothing more of the world beyond. The living also forget one so completely cut off from themselves (Il. xxii, 389). What, then, should tempt them, during the rest of their lives here, to try to hold communication with the dead by means of a cult?

But once the body is destroyed by fire, the soul is sent to Hades; it can't come back to this earth, and nothing from this world can reach it there. It can't even return in thought. In fact, it doesn't think at all anymore and knows nothing of the world beyond. The living also completely forget someone who is so totally cut off from them (Il. xxii, 389). So, what could possibly tempt them, for the rest of their lives, to try to connect with the dead through a cult?

§ 7

The practice of cremation itself will perhaps give us one last piece of evidence that there had been a time when the idea of the prolonged sojourn of the disembodied spirit in the realm of the living and its power of influencing the survivors existed among the Greeks. Homer knows of no other kind of funeral than that of fire. On a funeral pyre are burnt the bodies of king or leader with the most solemn ritual; those of the common people fallen in war are given to the flames with less ceremony; none are buried. We may well ask whence comes this custom, and what is its meaning for Greeks of the Homeric age? This means of disposing of the bodies of the dead is not by any means the most simple and obvious; it 20 is far easier to carry out, and far less expensive, to bury them in the earth. It has been suggested that the custom of cremation as observed by Persians, Germans, Slavs, and other peoples, is inherited from a nomadic period. The wandering horde has no permanent habitation in which or near which the body of the beloved dead can be buried and perpetual sustenance offered to his soul. Unless, therefore, as is the custom with some nomadic tribes, the dead body is given up to be the prey of beasts or weather, it might seem a natural idea to reduce it to ashes and carry the remains, preserved in a light jar, along with the tribe on its further journeyings.34 Whether such practical reasonings can have had so much influence in a connexion that is generally governed entirely by fancy, and in which practical considerations are altogether scouted—I shall leave undecided. But, in any case, if we postulate a nomadic origin for the practice of burning the dead among the Greeks, we should have to go back altogether too far into the past to explain a mode of behaviour that, by no means exclusively practised in early times by the Greeks, becomes absolutely prescriptive in a period when they have long ceased to wander. The Asiatic Greeks, and in particular the Ionians, whose popular beliefs and customs are, in general outline, at least, reproduced for us in Homer, deserted one settled habitation in order to found another. Cremation then must have been so permanently established among them that it never entered their heads to seek any other method of disposing of their dead. In Homer not only the Greeks before Troy and Elpenor, far away from home, are burnt when they die; Eëtion, too, in his own home is given a funeral pyre by Achilles (Il. vi, 418). Hektor’s body is burnt in the middle of Troy and the Trojans themselves in their own native land burn their dead (Il. vii). The box or urn that holds the cremated bones of the dead is buried in a mound; the ashes of Patroklos, Achilles, Antilochos, and Aias rest on foreign soil (Od. iii, 109 ff.; xxiv, 76 ff.). It never occurs to Agamemnon that if Menelaos dies before Ilios his brother’s grave could be anywhere else than at Troy (Il. iv, 174 ff.). There is, therefore, evidently no intention on the part of the living of taking the remains of the dead with them on their return home;35 and this cannot be the object of cremation. It will be necessary to look for some principle more in accordance with primitive modes of thought than such merely practical considerations. Jakob Grimm36 suggested that the burning of the corpse might have been intended as an offering of the dead man to the gods. Among 21 the Greeks this could only mean the gods of the lower world; but nothing in Greek belief or ritual suggests such a grim intention.37 The real purpose aimed at in cremation is not so far to seek. Since the destruction of the body by fire is supposed to result in the complete separation of the spirit from the land of the living,38 it must be assumed that this result is also intended by the survivors who employ the means in question; and consequently that the complete banishment of the psyche once and for all into the other world is the real purpose and the original occasion of the practice of cremation. Isolated expressions of opinion among the nations that have practised the custom do, as a matter of fact, indicate as its object the speedy and entire separation of soul from body.39 The exact nature of the intention varies with the state of belief about the soul. When the Indians turned from the custom of burying their dead to that of burning them, they were actuated, it appears, by the idea that the sooner and more completely the soul was freed from the body and its limitations, the more easily would it reach the Paradise of the Just.40 Of the purifying effects of the fire implied in this conception, the Greeks knew nothing until the idea was revived in later times.41 The Greeks of the Homeric age, innocent of any such “Kathartic” notion, thought only of the destructive powers of that element to which they entrusted the body of their dead, and of the benefit that they were conferring upon the soul in freeing it by fire from the lifeless body, thus adding their assistance to its own efforts to get free.42 Nothing can destroy the psyche’s visible counterpart more quickly than fire. If, then, the body is burnt and the most treasured possessions of the dead man consumed along with it, no tie remains that can detain the soul any longer in the world of the living.

The practice of cremation gives us one last clue that there was a time when the belief in the lingering presence of the spirit among the living, and its ability to influence the survivors, existed among the Greeks. Homer knows only fire as a funeral method. On a funeral pyre, the bodies of kings or leaders are burned with the utmost solemnity; those of common soldiers who died in war are cremated with less ceremony; no one is buried. We might wonder where this custom originated and what it meant to the Greeks of Homer's time. Disposing of the dead this way is by no means simple or obvious; it is much easier and cheaper to bury them in the ground. It has been suggested that the custom of cremation, as seen among Persians, Germans, Slavs, and other cultures, came from a nomadic lifestyle. A wandering group has no permanent home where the body of a loved one can be buried and where offerings can be made to their soul. Unless, as some nomadic tribes do, the body is left to be scavenged by animals or weather, it seems reasonable to reduce it to ashes and carry the remains in a light jar as the tribe moves on. Whether such practical reasons were influential in a practice generally driven by imagination, and where practical concerns are typically dismissed, is something I will leave open. However, if we assume a nomadic origin for the cremation practice among the Greeks, we'd have to go back too far to explain a behavior that, while not exclusive to early Greeks, becomes completely necessary in a time when they have long settled down. The Asiatic Greeks, particularly the Ionians, whose beliefs and customs are represented in Homer, left one established settlement to create another. Cremation must have been so firmly established among them that it never occurred to them to consider any other way to handle their dead. In Homer, not only do the Greeks before Troy and Elpenor, far from home, get cremated when they die; Eëtion receives a funeral pyre from Achilles in his own home. Hector’s body is burned in the heart of Troy, and the Trojans themselves burn their dead in their homeland. The box or urn that holds the cremated remains is buried in a mound; the ashes of Patroclus, Achilles, Antilochus, and Ajax rest on foreign soil. Agamemnon never thinks that if Menelaus dies before Ilios, his brother's grave could be anywhere but in Troy. Therefore, it’s clear that the living have no intention of bringing the remains of the dead back home, and this cannot be the purpose of cremation. We need to search for a principle that aligns more with primitive ways of thinking than with mere practical concerns. Jakob Grimm suggested that burning the corpse might have been seen as an offering to the gods. For the Greeks, this could only mean the deities of the underworld, but nothing in Greek belief or ritual implies such a grim intention. The real purpose of cremation is not hard to find. Since the destruction of the body by fire is believed to completely separate the spirit from the world of the living, we must assume that this outcome is also intended by the survivors using this method; thus, the total banishment of the soul to the other world is the true purpose and original reason for the cremation practice. Isolated opinions among cultures that have practiced this custom indicate that its goal is the swift and complete detachment of the soul from the body. The motivation behind the Indians’ shift from burial to cremation seems to be the belief that the quicker and more thoroughly the soul is freed from the body's limits, the easier it would reach the Paradise of the Just. The Greeks were unaware of the purifying effects of fire in this context until the idea resurfaced later. The Greeks of Homer's era, lacking any "cathartic" concept, focused solely on the destructive power of fire and the benefit they provided the soul by freeing it through fire, thus aiding its own efforts to escape. Nothing destroys the physical form of the soul faster than fire. Therefore, if the body is burned along with the deceased's most valued possessions, no connection remains to hold the soul in the realm of the living.

Cremation, therefore, is intended to benefit the dead, whose soul no longer wanders unable to find rest; but still more the living, for they will not be troubled by ghosts that are securely confined to the depths of the earth. The Greeks of Homer, accustomed by long usage to the burning of the dead, are free from all fears of haunting “ghostly” presences. But when the practice of the fire-funeral was first adopted, that which was to be guarded against in the future by the destruction of the body with fire must have been a real cause of fear.43 The souls that were so anxiously relegated to the other world of the Unseen must have been feared as awesome inhabitants of this world. And so, from whatever source it may have come to them,44 the custom of cremation gives firm ground for 22 supposing that at some period of their history the belief in the power and activity of the spirits of the dead and their influence upon the living—a subject of fear rather than reverence—must have been prevalent amongst the Greeks; even though only a few scattered hints still bear witness to such beliefs in the Homeric poems.

Cremation is meant to benefit the dead, whose souls no longer roam and struggle to find peace; but it also greatly aids the living, as they won't be disturbed by ghosts that are securely buried deep in the earth. The Greeks of Homer, who were long accustomed to cremating their dead, are free from fears of haunting "ghostly" presences. However, when the practice of cremation was first adopted, it must have been due to a genuine fear of what could arise from keeping the body intact. The souls that were anxiously sent to the unseen afterlife must have been feared as powerful entities in this world. Therefore, regardless of its origins, the tradition of cremation strongly suggests that at some point in their history, the Greeks held a belief in the power and activity of the spirits of the dead and their impact on the living—thoughts that were more about fear than reverence—despite only a few scattered hints in the Homeric poems indicating such beliefs.

§ 8

And evidence of these ancient beliefs we can now see with our eyes and touch with our hands. Owing to an inestimable series of fortunate circumstances, we are enabled to catch a glimpse of a far distant period of Greek history, which not only supplies a background to Homer, but makes him cease to be the earliest source of our information upon Greek life and thought. He is brought suddenly much nearer, perhaps deceptively nearer, to ourselves. The last decades of excavation in the citadel and lower town of Mycenæ and other sites in the Peloponnese right into the centre of the peninsula and as far northwards as Attica and Thessaly, have resulted in the discovery of graves—shaft-graves, chamber-graves, and elaborately constructed domed vaults, which were built and walled up in the period before the Dorian invasion. These graves prove to us—what was already hinted at by a few isolated expressions in Homer45—that the Greek “Age of Burning” was preceded, as in the case of the Persians, Indians, and Germans, by a period in which the dead were buried in the ground intact.46 The lords and ladies of golden Mycenæ, and lesser folk, too (in the graves at Nauplia, in Attica, etc.), were buried when they died. Chieftains take with them into the grave a rich paraphernalia of gorgeous furniture and ornaments—unburnt like their own bodies; they rest upon a bed of small stones, and are covered by a layer of loam and pebbles;47 traces of smoke and remains of ashes and charred wood bear witness to the fact that the dead were laid upon the place where the “sacrifice for the dead” had already been made; upon the hearth where offerings had been previously burnt inside the grave chamber.48 This may very well be a burial procedure of the most primeval antiquity. Our oldest “Giants’” graves, in whose treasures no metal of any kind is found, and whose age is on that account considered to be pre-Teutonic, exhibit similar features. Either on the ground, or, occasionally, on a specially prepared basis of fire-brick, the sacrificial fire is lighted, and, when it has burnt out, the corpse is set down upon the place and given 23 a covering of sand, loam, and stone.49 Remains of burnt sacrificial animals (sheep and goats) have also been found in the graves at Nauplia and elsewhere.50 In conformity with such different burial customs, the conceptions then held of the nature and powers of the disembodied spirits must have differed widely from those of the Homeric world. Offerings to the dead at a funeral occur in Homer only on special and isolated occasions and accompanied by an obsolete and half-understood ritual. Here they were the regular procedure both with rich and poor alike. But why should they have made offerings to their dead if they did not believe in their power? And why should they have taken away gold and jewellery and art treasures of all kinds and in astonishing quantities from the living and given them to the dead if they had not believed that the dead could find enjoyment in their former possessions even in the grave? Where the material body still remains intact, there the second self can at least occasionally return. Its treasured possessions laid by its side in the tomb are there to prevent its appearing uninvited in the outer world.51

And now we can see and touch evidence of these ancient beliefs. Thanks to a remarkable series of fortunate events, we can catch a glimpse of a far distant time in Greek history, which not only provides a backdrop for Homer but also shows that he isn’t the earliest source of our knowledge about Greek life and thought. He feels much closer to us now, perhaps misleadingly so. Recent excavations in the citadel and lower town of Mycenae and other sites in the Peloponnese, stretching deep into the peninsula and as far north as Attica and Thessaly, have uncovered graves—shaft graves, chamber graves, and intricately built domed vaults, all constructed and sealed before the Dorian invasion. These graves demonstrate—what was already suggested by a few scattered lines in Homer— that the Greek “Age of Burning” followed a period like those of the Persians, Indians, and Germans, where the dead were buried intact. The lords and ladies of golden Mycenae, along with common people (identified in the graves at Nauplia, Attica, etc.), were laid to rest when they died. Chieftains took with them into the grave a wealth of beautiful furniture and ornaments—left unburnt like their own bodies; they were placed on a bed of small stones and covered with dirt and pebbles; traces of smoke, along with remains of ashes and charred wood, indicate that the dead were laid where a “sacrifice for the dead” had already taken place; on the hearth where offerings had been burned before inside the grave chamber. This might be a burial practice from very ancient times. Our oldest “Giants’” graves, which contain no metal of any kind and are therefore thought to be pre-Teutonic, share similar characteristics. Whether on the ground or occasionally on a specially prepared fire-brick base, the sacrificial fire is ignited, and when it has burned out, the body is placed on the spot and covered with sand, dirt, and stone. Remains of burnt sacrificial animals (sheep and goats) have also been found in graves at Nauplia and elsewhere. In light of these varying burial customs, the beliefs about the nature and powers of the disembodied spirits must have been quite different from those in the Homeric world. Offerings to the dead at funerals in Homer occur only on special, isolated occasions and are accompanied by an outdated and partially understood ritual. Here, however, they were a regular practice for both the wealthy and the poor. But why would they have made offerings to their dead if they didn’t believe in their power? And why would they have removed gold, jewelry, and all kinds of art treasures in large quantities from the living to give to the dead if they hadn’t believed that the dead could enjoy their former possessions even in the grave? As long as the physical body remains intact, the second self can at least occasionally return. Its cherished belongings placed beside it in the tomb are there to prevent it from appearing uninvited in the outside world.

Supposing, however, that the soul could return if and where it liked, it is evident that the cult of the dead would not be confined to the occasion of the funeral. And, indeed, that very circumstance—the prolongation of the cult paid to the dead beyond the time of the funeral—of which we could not find a vestige in Homer, can at last (as it seems to me) be traced in pre-Homeric Mycenæ. Over the middle one of four shaft-graves found on the citadel stands an altar which can only have been placed there after the grave was closed and sealed up.52 It is a round altar, hollow inside, and not closed in at the bottom; in fact, a sort of funnel standing directly upon the earth. If, now, the blood of the victim, mingled with the various drink-offerings, were poured down into this receptacle, the whole would flow downwards into the ground beneath and to the dead man lying there. This is no altar (βωμός) such as was in use in the worship of the gods above, but a sacrificial hearth (ἐσχάρα) for the worship of the inhabitants of the underworld. This structure corresponds closely with the description we have of the hearths upon which offerings were made in a later age to “Heroes”, i.e. the souls of transfigured human beings.53 Here, then, we have a contrivance for the permanent and repeated worship of the dead; for such worship alone can this structure have been intended. The funeral offering to the dead had already been completed inside the grave-chamber. We thus find a 24 meaning in the “beehive” tombs, for the vaulted main-chamber, beside which the corpse lay in a smaller chamber by itself. They were evidently intended to allow sacrifices to be made inside them—and not once only.54 At least this is the purpose which the outer chamber serves elsewhere in double-vaulted graves. The evidence of the eye is therefore able to establish the truth of what could only be made out with difficulty from the Homeric poems. We can thus see that there had been a time in which the Greeks, too, believed that after the separation of body and soul the psyche did not entirely cease from intercourse with the upper world. Such a belief naturally called forth a cult of the soul, which lasted on even when the method of burying the body had changed, and even survived into Homeric times, when, with the prevalence of other beliefs, such observances ceased to have any meaning.

Supposing, however, that the soul could return whenever and wherever it wanted, it’s clear that the worship of the dead wouldn’t be limited to just the funeral. In fact, that very fact—the continued worship of the dead beyond the funeral—of which we couldn’t find any trace in Homer, can finally (as I see it) be traced back to pre-Homeric Mycenæ. Over the middle one of four shaft-graves discovered on the citadel stands an altar that could only have been placed there after the grave was sealed. It’s a round altar, hollow inside, and open at the bottom; essentially, a funnel standing directly on the ground. If the blood of the sacrifice, mixed with various drink offerings, was poured into this receptacle, everything would flow down into the ground below and to the dead man resting there. This isn’t an altar (altar) used in the worship of the gods above, but a sacrificial hearth (hearth) for the worship of the inhabitants of the underworld. This structure closely matches the description we have of the hearths where offerings were made in a later time to “Heroes,” meaning the souls of transformed human beings. Here, we find a setup for the ongoing and repeated worship of the dead; this structure must have been designed for that purpose. The funeral offering to the dead had already been made inside the grave chamber. We can thus uncover a 24 meaning in the “beehive” tombs, as the vaulted main chamber, alongside which the corpse lay in a smaller chamber by itself, was clearly intended to allow sacrifices to be made inside them—and not just once. At least this is the purpose that the outer chamber serves in other double-vaulted graves. Eye-witness evidence can therefore establish what could only be hard to determine from the Homeric poems. We can see that there was a time when the Greeks, too, believed that after the body and soul were separated, the psyche didn’t completely stop interacting with the upper world. Such a belief naturally led to a cult of the soul, which continued even when the method of burying the body changed, and even persisted into Homeric times, when, alongside the rise of other beliefs, such practices lost their significance.

II

Homer consistently assumes the departure of the soul into an inaccessible land of the dead where it exists in an unconscious half-life. There it is without clear self-consciousness and consequently neither desires nor wills anything. It has no influence on the upper world, and consequently no longer receives any share of the worship of the living. The dead are beyond the reach of any feelings whether of fear or love. No means exists of forcing or enticing them back again. Homer knows nothing of necromancy or of oracles of the dead,55 both common in later Greek life. Gods come into the poems and take part in the action of the story; the souls of the departed never do. Homer’s immediate successors in the Epic tradition think quite differently on this point; but for Homer the soul, once relegated to Hades, has no further importance.

Homer consistently depicts the departure of the soul to an unreachable realm of the dead, where it exists in a state of unconsciousness. There, it lacks clear self-awareness and, as a result, has no desires or will. It doesn't influence the living world and, therefore, no longer receives worship from the living. The dead are beyond any feelings, whether fear or love. There’s no way to force or lure them back. Homer is unaware of necromancy or dead oracles, which became common in later Greek culture. Gods appear in the poems and participate in the story; the souls of the dead do not. Homer's immediate successors in the Epic tradition think differently about this, but for Homer, once a soul is sent to Hades, it no longer holds any significance.

If we think how different it must have been before the time of Homer, and how different it certainly was after him, we can hardly help feeling surprise at finding at this early stage of Greek culture such extraordinary freedom from superstitious fears in that very domain where superstition is generally most deeply rooted. Inquiries, however, into the origin and cause of such an untroubled attitude must be made very cautiously and a completely conclusive answer must not be expected. More especially it must be borne in mind that in these poems we have to do, directly and immediately, at least, only with the poet and his circle. The Homeric Epos can only be called “folk poetry” in the sense that it was adapted to the 25 acceptance of the whole family of Greek-speaking people who welcomed it eagerly and transformed it to their own uses; and not because the “folk” in some mystical sense had a share in its composition. Many hands contributed to the composition of the poem, but they merely carried it further in the general direction which had been given to it not by the “Folk” or by the “Saga” tradition, as is sometimes too confidently asserted, but by the authority of the greatest poetic genius that the Greeks or, indeed, mankind ever knew. The tradition once formed was handed on by a close corporation of master-poets and their pupils who preserved, disseminated, continued and imitated the original great poet’s work. If, then, we find on the whole, and apart from a few vagaries in detail, a single unified picture of the world, of gods and men, life and death, given in these two poems, that is the picture which shaped itself in the mind of Homer and was impressed upon his work, and afterwards preserved by the Homeridai. It is plain that the freedom, almost the freethinking, with which every possible occurrence in the world is regarded in these poems, cannot ever have been characteristic of a whole people or race. And not only the animating spirit, but even the outward shape that is given in the two epic poems to the ideal world surrounding and ruling over the world of men, is the work of the poet. It was no priestly theology that gave him his picture of the gods. The popular beliefs of the time, each peculiar to some countryside, canton, or city, must, if left to themselves, have split up into even more contradictory varieties of thought than they did in later times when there existed some few religious institutions common to all Hellas to act as centres of union. The poet alone must have been responsible for the conception and consistent execution of the picture of a single and unified world of gods, confined to a select company of sharply characterized heavenly beings, grouped together in certain well-recognized ways and dwelling together in a single place of residence above the earth. If we listened to Homer alone we should suppose that the innumerable local cults of Greece, with their gods closely bound to the soil, hardly existed. Homer ignores them almost entirely. His gods are pan-Hellenic, Olympian. In fact, in his picture of the gods, Homer fulfilled most completely his special poetic task of reducing confusion and superfluity to uniformity and symmetry of design—the very task which Greek idealism in art continually set before itself. In his picture Greek beliefs about the gods appear absolutely uniform—as uniform as dialect, political condition, manners, 26 and morals. In reality—of this we may be sure—no such uniformity existed; the main outlines of pan-Hellenism were doubtless there, but only the genius of the poet can have combined and fused them into a purely imaginary whole. Provincial differences in themselves interested him not at all. So, too, in the special question that we are considering, if we find him speaking of a single kingdom of the underworld, the resort of all departed spirits ruled over by a single pair of divinities and removed as far from the world of men and their cities as the Olympian dwelling of the Blessed Ones is in the opposite direction, who shall say how far he represents naive popular belief in such matters? On this side Olympus, the meeting place of all the gods that rule in the daylight;56 on that the realm of Hades that holds in its grasp the unseen spirits that have left this life behind—the parallel is too apparent to be due to anything but the same simplifying and co-ordinating spirit in the one case as in the other.

If we think about how different things must have been before Homer's time and how different they definitely were after him, it's hard not to feel surprised at finding such remarkable freedom from superstitious fears in an early stage of Greek culture, especially in a realm where superstition usually runs deep. However, inquiries into the origin and reason for this calm attitude must be approached carefully, and we shouldn't expect a completely conclusive answer. It's important to remember that these poems directly deal with the poet and his circle. The Homeric Epics can only be considered “folk poetry” in the sense that they were shaped to suit the acceptance of all Greek-speaking people who eagerly embraced and adapted them for their own purposes—not because the “folk” in some mystical way helped create them. Many contributors played a role in composing the poem, but they merely furthered it in the direction given by the greatest poetic genius known to the Greeks or, indeed, humanity. Once the tradition was established, it was passed down by a close group of master-poets and their students who preserved, shared, continued, and imitated the work of the original great poet. So, when we notice, apart from a few oddities in detail, a cohesive picture of the world, gods, and humans, life and death, in these two poems, it's the vision that formed in Homer's mind and was stamped onto his work, then preserved by the Homeridai. It's clear that the freedom—almost like freethinking—with which all possible occurrences in the world are seen in these poems couldn't have been typical of an entire people or race. Moreover, not only the spirit but even the structure given in the two epic poems to the ideal world that surrounds and governs the human world is the poet's creation. It wasn't a priestly theology that shaped his image of the gods. The popular beliefs of the time, each unique to a specific region or city, would have likely fractured into even more contradictory varieties if left unchecked than they did later when a few religious institutions were common across all of Greece, acting as centers of unity. The poet alone must have been responsible for the idea and consistent portrayal of a singular and cohesive world of gods, limited to a select group of distinctly characterized heavenly beings, organized in familiar ways and living together in one residence above the earth. If we only listened to Homer, we might think that the countless local cults of Greece, with their gods closely tied to the land, barely existed. Homer almost entirely overlooks them. His gods are pan-Hellenic, Olympian. In fact, his depiction of the gods fulfills his special poetic task of bringing clarity and order to confusion and excess—a task that Greek idealism in art continually aimed for. In his portrayal, Greek beliefs about the gods appear completely uniform—just as uniform as dialect, politics, customs, and morals. In reality—of this we can be sure—no such uniformity existed; the main outlines of pan-Hellenism were probably there, but only the poet's genius could have blended them into a purely imaginary whole. He showed no interest in provincial differences. So, in the specific question we’re addressing, when he talks about a single underworld kingdom, the destination for all departed spirits ruled by a single pair of deities, and as far removed from the world of humans and their cities as the Olympian home of the Blessed Ones is in the opposite direction, who can say how accurately this reflects naive popular belief? On one side is Olympus, the meeting place of all the gods that rule in the daylight; on the other, the realm of Hades, which holds the unseen spirits that have left this life behind—the parallel is too clear to be attributed to anything other than the same simplifying and coordinating spirit in both cases.

§ 2

It would, however, be an equally complete misunderstanding of the relation in which Homer stood to the popular beliefs of his time if we imagined that relation to be one of opposition, or even supposed him to have taken up an attitude resembling that of Pindar or the Attic Tragedians towards the conventional opinions of their time. These later poets often enough allow us to see quite clearly the intentional departure from normal opinion represented by their more advanced conceptions. Homer, on the contrary, is as free from controversy as he is from dogma. He does not offer his pictures of God, the world and fate as anything peculiar to himself; and it is natural, therefore, to suppose that his public recognized them as substantially the same as their own. The poet has not taken over the whole body of popular belief, but what he does say must have belonged to popular belief. The selection and combination of this material into a consistent whole was the poet’s real work. If the Homeric creed had not been so constructed in essentials that it corresponded to the beliefs of the time, or, at least, could be made to correspond, then it is impossible to account (even allowing for the poetic tradition of a school) for the uniformity that marks the work of the many poets that had a hand in the composition of the two poems. In this narrow sense it can be truly said that Homer’s poems represent the popular belief of their time; not, indeed, the belief of all Greece, but only of the Ionian 27 cities of the coasts and islands of Asia Minor in which the poet and his songs were at home. In a similarly restricted sense may the pictures of outward life and manners that we find in the Iliad and the Odyssey be taken as a reflection of the contemporary life of the Greeks with particular reference to that of the Ionians. This life must have differed in many respects from that of the “Mycenæan civilization”, and there can be little doubt that the reasons for this difference are to be sought in the long-continued disturbances which marked the centuries that divide Homer from the age of Mycenæ, more especially in the Greek migrations, both in what they destroyed and what they created. The violent invasion of northern Greek peoples into the central mainland and the Peloponnese, the destruction of ancient empires and their civilization, the foundation of new Dorian states held by right of conquest, the great migrations to the Asiatic coasts, and the institution of a new life on foreign soil—all these violent modifications of the old course of existence must have dealt a severe blow at the whole fabric of that civilization and culture. In the same way we find that the cult of Souls and the conception of the fate of departed spirits which governed this cult did not remain in Ionia (the beliefs of which country are reflected in Homer) what it had been at the height of the Mycenæan period. To this change, as to the others which accompanied it, we may well suppose that the struggles and wanderings of the intermediate period contributed a good deal. Homer’s clear-sighted vision that transcends the limits of city and even of racial gods, faiths, and worships, would hardly be explicable without the freedom of movement beyond the boundaries of country, the common life shared with companions of other races, the widened knowledge of all the conditions of foreign life, such as must have resulted from the dislocations and migrations of whole peoples. It is true that the Ionians of Asia Minor did, as we can prove, take a good many of their religious observances with them to their new homes. The migrations, however, did not preserve the connexion between the old homes and the new country with anything like the closeness that marked the later colonization; and when the colonists left the familiar soil behind, the local cults attached to the soil must often have had to be abandoned, too. Now the worship of ancestors, connected as it was with the actual graves of those ancestors, was essentially a local cult. Remembrance of the great ones of the past might survive transplantation, but not their religious worship, which could only be offered at the one spot 28 where their bodies lay buried and which had now been left behind in an enemy’s country. The deeds of ancestors lived on in song, but they themselves began to be relegated to the domain of poetry and imagination. Imagination might adorn the story of their earthly life, but a world that was no longer reminded of their power by the regularly repeated performance of ceremonial, ceased to pay honour to their disembodied souls. Thus the most highly developed form of the cult of Souls—ancestor worship—died out, and the later version of the same thing, the cult of those of the tribe that had died in the new land and been buried there, was prevented from attaining a similar force and development by the newly-introduced practice of burning the bodies of the dead. It may well be that the origin of this new form of funeral rite lay, as has been suggested, in the wish to dismiss the soul of the dead man as quickly and completely as possible from the realm of the living; but it is beyond doubt that the result of this practice was to cut at the root of the belief in the near presence of the departed and the duty of performing the religious observances that were their right; so that such things being deprived of their support, fell into decay and disappeared.

It would be a total misunderstanding of the relationship between Homer and the popular beliefs of his time to think that he opposed them, or that he had a viewpoint similar to Pindar or the Attic Tragedians regarding conventional opinions. Those later poets clearly show their intentional break from mainstream beliefs with their more progressive ideas. Homer, on the other hand, avoids controversy and dogma. He presents his ideas about God, the world, and fate not as something unique to him, but it's natural to assume that his audience saw them as basically the same as their own beliefs. The poet didn't adopt all of popular belief, but what he expressed must have belonged to it. The real work of the poet was in selecting and combining this material into a coherent narrative. If Homer's beliefs had not been essentially constructed to align with those of his time, or at least could be made to align, it’s hard to explain the consistency seen in the work of the many poets involved in creating the two poems (even considering the poetic tradition of a school). In this specific sense, it can truly be said that Homer's poems reflect the popular beliefs of his time; not the beliefs of all Greece, but specifically those of the Ionian 27 cities along the coasts and islands of Asia Minor, where Homer and his works were most at home. Similarly, the depictions of everyday life and customs found in the Iliad and the Odyssey can be seen as a reflection of contemporary Greek life, especially pertaining to the Ionians. This life would have differed in many ways from that of the “Mycenæan civilization,” and it's likely that the reasons for this difference lie in the prolonged disruptions that occurred between Homer and the Mycenæan period, especially during the Greek migrations and their resulting upheavals. The fierce invasions by northern Greek tribes into the central mainland and the Peloponnese, the destruction of ancient empires and their cultures, the establishment of new Dorian states by conquest, the large migrations to the Asian coasts, and the creation of new lives in foreign lands— all these dramatic changes to the old ways of living must have severely impacted the entire structure of that civilization and culture. Similarly, the worship of souls and the beliefs surrounding the fate of spirits did not remain unchanged in Ionia (as reflected in Homer) compared to how they were during the peak of the Mycenæan era. The struggles and migrations of the intervening period likely contributed to these changes. Homer's clear insight, which transcends the constraints of city and ethnic gods, beliefs, and rituals, would hardly make sense without the opportunity to interact across national borders, share experiences with people of different races, and gain broader awareness of foreign lifestyles due to the dislocations and migrations of entire populations. It's true that the Ionians of Asia Minor maintained many of their religious practices when they settled in new areas. However, these migrations did not keep the connection between the old homes and the new regions as strong as later colonization did. When the colonists left their familiar environment behind, the local religious practices tied to the land often had to be abandoned as well. Ancestor worship, which was closely linked to the actual graves of ancestors, was fundamentally a local practice. While the memory of past great figures might survive moving to a new place, their religious worship could only be performed at the specific site 28 where their bodies were buried, which was now left behind in an enemy territory. The deeds of ancestors lived on in songs, but the figures themselves started to fade into the realms of poetry and imagination. Imagination could enhance the tales of their earthly lives, but a society no longer reminded of their power through regular ceremonial observance stopped honoring their spirits. Consequently, the sophisticated form of soul worship—ancestor worship—began to disappear, and the later version of this practice, honoring those who died in the new land and were buried there, didn't develop with the same strength because of the newly adopted practice of cremating the dead. It’s likely this new funeral rite originated, as suggested, from a desire to quickly and completely separate the soul of the deceased from the living realm; however, it’s clear that this practice undermined the belief in the close presence of the departed and the obligation to perform the religious rites that were their due. Without this support, such practices gradually decayed and vanished.

§ 3

We can thus see at least dimly how it was that the Ionian people of the Homeric age were led by the events of their own history and the alteration in funeral customs into holding that view of the soul which a study of their own poets has persuaded us was theirs. This view can hardly have retained more than a few stray vestiges of the ancient cult of the dead. Still, we should only be in a position to say what were the real reasons for this alteration in belief and custom if we knew and understood more about the intellectual changes that led to the gradual appearance of the Homeric view of the world; a view which included within its range a set of beliefs about the soul. Here it is best to confess our ignorance. We have before us the results only of those changes. From them, however, we can at least perceive that the religious consciousness of the Greeks, among whom Homer sang, had developed in a direction which did not allow much scope to the belief in ghosts and spirits of the dead. The Homeric Greeks had the deepest consciousness of man’s finite nature, of his dependence upon forces that lay without him. To remind himself of this and be content with his lot was his proper form of piety. Over him the gods hold sway, wielding a supernatural power—29not infrequently a misguided and capricious power—but a conception of a general world-order is beginning to make its way; of a plan underlying the cross-purposes of individual and common life, working itself out in accordance with measured and appointed lot (μοῖρα). The arbitrary power of individual daimones is thus limited, and it is limited further by the will of the highest of the gods. The belief is growing that the world is, in fact, a cosmos, a perfect organization such as men try to establish in their earthly states. In the face of such conceptions it would be increasingly difficult to believe in the vagaries of a supernatural ghostly order which, in direct opposition to the real heavenly order, is always distinguished by the fact that it stands outside any all-embracing dispensation, and allows full play to the caprice and malice of individual unseen powers. The irrational and the unaccountable is the natural element of the belief in ghosts and spirits; this is the source of the peculiar disquiet inspired by this province of belief or superstition. It owes most of its effect to the instability of its fibres. The Homeric world, on the contrary, lives by reason; its gods are fully intelligible to Greek minds and their forms and behaviour are clearly and easily comprehensible to Greek imagination. And the more distinctly were the gods represented, the more did the spirit-phantoms fade away into empty shadows. There was no one who might have been interested in the preservation and extension of the superstitious side of religion; there was in particular no priesthood with a monopoly of instruction or an exclusive knowledge of the details of ritual and the methods of controlling the behaviour of spirits. If anyone did possess any monopoly of teaching, it was, in this age when all the highest faculties of the spirit found their expression in poetry, the poet and the singer. They, however, showed a completely “secular” outlook even in religious matters. Indeed, these very clear-headed men, belonging to the same stock which in a later age “invented” (if one may be allowed to put it so) science and philosophy, were already displaying a mental attitude that distantly threatened the whole system of that plastic representation of things spiritual which the older antiquity had laboriously constructed.

We can see, even if just a little, how the Ionian people of the Homeric age were shaped by their own historical events and changes in funeral customs to adopt the view of the soul that their poets have encouraged us to believe was theirs. This perspective likely kept only a few remnants of the ancient worship of the dead. However, we can only truly understand why their beliefs and customs changed if we knew more about the intellectual shifts that led to the gradual emergence of the Homeric worldview, which included specific beliefs about the soul. Here, we must admit our ignorance. We only have the results of those changes before us. Nevertheless, we can at least see that the religious understanding of the Greeks, among whom Homer sang, evolved in a way that didn’t leave much room for the belief in ghosts and spirits of the dead. The Homeric Greeks had a profound awareness of human finiteness, of dependence on forces outside themselves. Accepting this truth and being content with one’s situation was the proper way to show piety. The gods exercised their power over humans—a power that was often misguided and capricious—but there was a growing sense of a general order in the world; a plan behind the conflicting goals of individual and communal life, unfolding according to fate (μοῖρα). The erratic power of individual daimones is thus limited, further constrained by the will of the highest gods. The idea is forming that the world is, in fact, a cosmos, a perfect organization akin to the political systems humans attempt to establish on earth. In light of such concepts, it would become increasingly hard to believe in the unpredictable nature of a supernatural, ghostly realm, which stands in direct contradiction to the true heavenly order and often enables the whims and malice of unseen powers. The irrational and unexplainable are the natural elements of beliefs in ghosts and spirits; this contributes to the unsettling feelings these beliefs evoke. Much of its impact comes from its unstable nature. In contrast, the Homeric world was grounded in reason; its gods were easily understood by Greek minds, their forms and behaviors were clear and accessible to the Greek imagination. As the gods became more distinctly represented, the specters of spirits faded into mere shadows. There was no one particularly invested in maintaining or expanding the superstitious aspects of religion; notably, there was no priesthood with exclusive knowledge or control over rituals and how to manage spirits. If anyone had a monopoly on teaching, it was the poets and singers during this era when the highest intellectual abilities were expressed through poetry. These individuals, however, maintained a completely “secular” perspective, even in religious matters. Indeed, these clear-headed men, who belonged to the same lineage that later “invented” (if that’s an acceptable term) science and philosophy, were already exhibiting a mindset that subtly threatened the entire system of spiritual representations that earlier ages had painstakingly constructed.

The earliest view held by primitive man about the activities of willing, feeling, or thinking, regards them simply as the manifestations of something which lives and wills inside the visible man. This something is regarded as embodied in one or other of the organs of the human body or as concealed 30 therein. Accordingly the Homeric poems give the name of the “midriff” (φρήν, φρένες) to most of the phenomena of will or feeling and even to those of the intellect. The “heart” (ἦτορ, κῆρ) is also the name of a variety of feelings that were regarded as located in the heart and even identified with it. But this mode of expression had already for Homer become mere formula; such expressions are not always to be taken literally; the words of the poet often show that as a matter of fact he thought of these functions and emotions as incorporeal, though they were still named after parts of the body.57 And so we often find mentioned side by side with the “midriff” and in the closest conjunction with it, the θυμός, a name which is not taken from any bodily organ and shows already that it is thought of as an immaterial function. In the same way many other words of this kind (νόος-νοεῖν-νόημα, βουλή, μένος, μῆτις) are used to describe faculties and activities of the will, sense, or thought, and show that these activities are thought of as independent, free-working, and incorporeal. A single thread still attaches the poet to the modes of conception and expression of the older world, but he himself has penetrated adventurously far into the realm of pure spirit. With a less cultured people the identification of the special functions of the will and the intellect only leads to the materialization of these into the notion of special physical entities, and consequently to the association of still other “souls”, in the shape of “Conscience”, it may be, or “Will”, in addition to that other shadowy “double” of mankind, the “second self”.58 The tendency of the Homeric singers was already setting in just the opposite direction—the mythology of the “inner man” was breaking down altogether. They had only to take a few steps further in the same direction to find that they could dispense with the psyche as well. The belief in the existence of the psyche was the oldest and most primitive hypothesis adopted by mankind to explain the phenomena of dreams, swoons, and ecstatic visions; these mysterious states were accounted for by the intervention of a special material personality. Now, Homer has little interest in premonitions and ecstatic states, and no inclination in that direction whatever. He cannot, therefore, have been very much concerned with the evidence for the existence of a psyche in living men. The final proof of the idea that the psyche must have been dwelling in man is the fact that it is separated from him in death. A man dies when he breathes out his last breath. This breath, something like a breath of air, and not a “nothing”, any more than the wind its relative, 31 but a body with a definite form (though it may not be visible to waking eyes)—this is the psyche, whose shape, the image of the man himself, is well known from dream-vision. One, however, who has become accustomed to the idea of bodiless powers working inside man will, on this last occasion when the powers within man show themselves, be likely to suppose that what brings about the death of a man is not a physical thing that goes out of him, but a power—a quality—which ceases to act; nothing else, in fact, than his “life”. And he would not, of course, think of ascribing an independent continuous existence after the disruption of the body to a mere abstract idea like “life”. Homer, however, never got quite as far as this; for the most part the psyche is for him and always remains a real “thing”—the man’s second self. But that he had already begun to tread the slippery path in the course of which the psyche is transformed into an abstract “concept of life”, is shown by the fact that he several times quite unmistakably uses the word “psyche” when we should say “life”.59 It is essentially the same mode of thought that leads him to say “midriff” (φρένες) when he no longer means the physical diaphragm, but the abstract concept of will or intellect. To say “psyche” instead of “life” is not the same thing as saying “life” instead of “psyche” (and Homer never did the latter); but it is clear that for him in the process of dematerializing such concepts, even the psyche, a figure once so full of significance, is beginning to fade and vanish away.

The earliest view that primitive humans had about willing, feeling, or thinking was that these activities were simply expressions of something that lives and has a will inside the visible body. This something was seen as embodied in one or more of the organs of the human body or as hidden 30 within it. Accordingly, the Homeric poems refer to the “midriff” (φρήν, φρένες) as the source of most phenomena related to will or feeling, and even those of the intellect. The “heart” (heart, spirit) is also used to describe a variety of feelings believed to be located in the heart and even associated with it. However, by Homer’s time, this way of speaking had become more of a formula; such expressions shouldn't always be taken literally, as the poet often suggests that he thinks of these functions and emotions as incorporeal, even though they were still named after body parts. 57 Likewise, we frequently see the “midriff” mentioned alongside the anger, a term that isn't derived from any bodily organ and indicates that it is already considered an immaterial function. Similarly, many other terms (νόος-νοεῖν-νόημα, intention, decision, passion, wisdom) are used to describe abilities and activities of will, sensation, or thought, reflecting that these activities are seen as independent, freely operating, and incorporeal. There remains a single thread connecting the poet to the conceptions and expressions of the older world, but he has ventured far into the realm of pure spirit. For less sophisticated societies, identifying specific functions of the will and intellect only leads to their materialization into the idea of specific physical entities, resulting in the association of still other “souls,” like “Conscience” or “Will,” in addition to that other elusive “double” of humanity, the “second self.” 58 The tendency of Homeric poets was already headed in just the opposite direction—the mythology of the “inner man” was breaking down entirely. They just needed to take a few more steps in that direction to realize that they could do without the psyche as well. The belief in the existence of the psyche was the oldest and most primitive explanation adopted by humans to account for the phenomena of dreams, fainting, and ecstatic visions; these mysterious states were attributed to the influence of a special material personality. However, Homer has little interest in premonitions and ecstatic states and shows no inclination in that direction whatsoever. Therefore, he could not have been very concerned with evidence for the existence of a psyche in living people. The final proof of the belief that the psyche must dwell within humans is the notion that it separates from them in death. A person dies when they exhale their last breath. That breath, much like a breath of air, is not a “nothing,” just as the wind is not its relative, 31 but rather a body with a definite form (though it may not be visible to awake eyes)—this is the psyche, whose shape, mirroring the person themselves, is well known from dreams. However, someone who has become accustomed to the idea of bodiless powers operating inside humans may, at that final moment when these inner powers are revealed, think that what causes a person’s death is not a physical entity leaving them, but a power—a quality—that stops functioning; nothing else, in fact, but their “life.” And, of course, they would not think of attributing an independent continuous existence after the body’s disintegration to an abstract idea like “life.” Homer, however, never quite reached this realization; for him, the psyche is mostly and always remains a real “thing”—the person’s second self. But it is evident that he had started to tread the slippery path where the psyche transforms into an abstract “concept of life,” as shown by the fact that he sometimes clearly uses the word “psyche” when we would say “life.” 59 It is fundamentally the same way of thinking that leads him to use “midriff” (brakes) when he no longer means the physical diaphragm, but the abstract idea of will or intellect. Saying “psyche” instead of “life” doesn’t equate to saying “life” instead of “psyche” (and Homer never did the latter); however, it’s clear that in the process of dematerializing such concepts, even the psyche, a term once so full of significance, is beginning to fade and disappear.

The separation from the land of their forefathers, and habituation to the use of cremation, the new direction taken by religious thought, the tendency to turn the once material forces of man’s inner life into attractions—all these things contributed to weaken the belief in a powerful and significant life of the disembodied soul and its connexion with the affairs of this world. And at the same time it caused the decline of the cult of the Souls. So much, I think, we may safely assert. The deepest and most fundamental reasons for this decline in both belief and cult may elude our search, just as it is impossible for us to be sure how far in detail the Homeric poems reflect the beliefs of the people who first listened to them, and where the free invention of the poet begins. But the combination of the various elements of belief into a whole which, though far from being a dogmatically closed system, may yet not unfairly be called the Homeric Theology—this, we may say, is most probably the work of the poet. The poet has a free hand in the picture he gives of the gods and never comes into conflict with any popular doctrine because Greek 32 religion then, as always, consisted essentially in the right honouring of the gods of the country and not in any particular set of dogmas. There could hardly be any general conception of godhead and divinity with which the poet might come into conflict. That the popular mind absorbed thoroughly that picture of the world of gods which the Homeric poems had given, is shown by the whole future development of Greek culture and religion. If divergent conceptions did, in fact, also maintain themselves, they derived their strength not so much from a different religious theory, as from the postulates of a different religious cult that had not been influenced by any poet’s imagination. They might also more particularly have had the effect of causing an incidental obscurity within the epic itself, in the poet’s vision of the Unseen World and its life.

The separation from the land of their ancestors and the adoption of cremation, along with the new direction in religious thought and the shift from focusing on tangible aspects of human inner life to spiritual attractions—these factors all contributed to a weakened belief in the importance of the disembodied soul and its connection to our world. Simultaneously, this shift led to a decline in the worship of souls. I think we can confidently say that. The deeper reasons behind this decline in both belief and worship might be hard to pinpoint, just as it’s unclear how closely the Homeric poems reflect the beliefs of the people who originally heard them, and where the poet’s creativity begins. However, we can assert that the combination of various belief elements into a whole, referred to as the Homeric Theology—this is likely the poet's doing. The poet has the freedom to portray the gods as they wish and never conflicts with popular beliefs because Greek religion, then and always, was fundamentally about honoring the local gods rather than adhering to a specific set of doctrines. There was hardly a unified concept of divinity that the poet could challenge. The widespread acceptance of the world of gods depicted in the Homeric poems is evident in the entire future development of Greek culture and religion. If different ideas did persist, they likely drew their strength not from a different religious theory, but from the foundations of another religious cult that hadn’t been shaped by the poet's imagination. They may also have contributed to some ambiguity within the epic itself regarding the poet's vision of the Unseen World and its existence.

III

A test case of the thorough-going uniformity and consistency of the Homeric conception of the nature and circumstances of the souls of the departed is provided for us, within the limits of the poems themselves, by the story of Odysseus’ Journey to Hades—a test they are hardly likely to survive, it may well be thought. How is the poet in describing a living hero’s dealings with the inhabitants of the shadow-world, going to preserve the immaterial, dreamlike character of the Homeric “Souls”? How keep up the picture of the soul as something that holds itself resolutely aloof and seems to avoid all active intercourse with other folk? It is hard to see what could tempt the poet to try and penetrate with the torch of imagination into this underworld of ineffectual shadows. The matter becomes somewhat more intelligible, however, as soon as it is realized in what manner the narrative arose; how through continual additions from later hands it gradually assumed a form quite unlike itself.60

A clear example of the consistent and uniform nature of the Homeric view on the condition and experience of the souls of the dead is illustrated for us, within the limits of the poems themselves, by the story of Odysseus’ Journey to Hades—a challenge that seems unlikely to endure, or so one might think. How can the poet, in portraying a living hero’s interactions with the residents of the shadow realm, maintain the ethereal, dreamlike quality of the Homeric “Souls”? How can he keep the image of the soul as something that remains distinctly separate and seems to shy away from any real engagement with others? It’s hard to imagine what could persuade the poet to venture with the light of imagination into this underworld of insubstantial shadows. The situation becomes a bit clearer, though, once we understand how the narrative developed; that through constant additions from later contributors it gradually took on a form that was quite different from its original state.60

§ 1

It may be taken as one of the few certain results of the critical analysis of the Homeric poems that the narrative of the Descent of Odysseus to the Underworld did not form part of the original plan of the Odyssey. Kirke bids Odysseus undertake the journey to Hades in order that he may see Teiresias there and be told of “the way and the means of his return, and how he may reach his home again over the fish-teeming deep” (Od. x, 530 f.). Teiresias, however, on being 33 discovered in the realm of shadows, fulfils this requirement only very partially and superficially. Whereupon, Kirke herself gives to the returned Odysseus a much fuller account, and as regards the one point already mentioned by Teiresias, a much more precise account, of the perils that lie before him on his homeward journey.61 The journey to the land of the dead was thus unnecessary, and there can be no doubt that originally it had no place in the poem. It is plain, however, that the composer of this adventure only used the (superfluous) inquiry addressed to Teiresias as a pretext which afforded a more or less plausible motive for the introduction of this narrative into the body of the poem. The real object of the poet, the true motive of the story, must then be sought elsewhere than in the prophecy of Teiresias, which turns out to be so brief and unhelpful. It would be natural to suppose that the aim of the poet was to give the eye of imagination a glimpse into the marvels and terrors of that dark realm into which all men must go. Such an intention would be very intelligible in the case of a medieval or a Greek poet of later times; and there were afterwards plenty of Greek poems which described a Descent to Hades. But it would be hard to account for it in a poet of the Homeric school; for such a poet the realm of the dead and its inhabitants could hardly supply a subject for a narrative. And, in fact, the inventor of Odysseus’ visit to the dead had quite a different object in view. He was anything but a Greek Dante. It is possible to see the purpose which guided him as soon as his poem is stripped of the manifold additions with which later times invested it. The original kernel which thus remains is then seen to be nothing but a series of conversations between Odysseus and the souls of those of the dead with whom he had stood in close personal relationship. Besides Teiresias he speaks with his old ship-companion Elpenor, who had just died, with his mother Antikleia, with Agamemnon and Achilles; and he tries in vain to effect a reconciliation with the implacable Aias. These conversations in Hades are, for the general furtherance of the story of Odysseus’ wanderings and return, quite superfluous, and they serve in a very minor degree and only incidentally to give information about the conditions and character of the inscrutable world beyond the grave. The questions and answers there given are confined entirely to the affairs of the upper world. They bring Odysseus, who has now been wandering so long alone and far from the world of actual humanity, into ideal association with the substantial world of flesh and blood to which his thoughts 34 stretch out, and in which he himself had once been an actor and is soon to play an important part again.62 His mother informs him of the distracted state of Ithaca, Agamemnon of the treacherous deed of Aigisthos carried out with the help of Klytaimnestra. Odysseus himself is able to console Achilles with an account of the heroic deeds of his son, who is still alive in the daylight; with Aias, resentful even in Hades, he cannot come to terms. Thus the theme of the second part of the Odyssey begins to appear; even to the shadows below there reaches an echo of the great deeds of the Trojan war and of the adventures of the Return from Troy, which occupied the minds of all the singers of the time. The introduction of these stories by means of conversations with the persons who took part in them is the essential purpose of the poet. The impelling instinct to expand in all directions the circle of legend in whose centre stood the adventure of the Iliad, and link it up with other circles of heroic legend, was fully satisfied by later poets in the separate poems of the Epic Cycle. At the time when the Odyssey was composed these other epic narratives were in the full tide of their youthful exuberance. The streams had not yet found a convenient bed in which to run, and they added their individual contributions (for they all related events which preceded it) to the elaborate narration of the return of the last Hero who still wandered vainly and alone. The main object of the story of Telemachos’ journey to meet Nestor and Menelaos (in the third and fourth books of the Odyssey) is manifestly to bring the son into relation with the father’s companions in war, and so to provide occasion for further narratives in which a more detailed picture of some of the events between the Iliad and the Odyssey might be given. Demodokos, the Phæacian bard, is made to recount (in abbreviated form) two adventures that had occurred to the great chieftain. Even when such stories did not immediately add to the picture of Odysseus’ deeds or character, they served to point to the great background from which the adventures of the much-enduring wanderer, now completely isolated, should stand out; and to set these in the ideal framework which could alone give them their full significance. This natural creative instinct of legendary poetry also inspired the poet of the “Journey to Hades”. He, too, saw the adventures of Odysseus not in isolation but in lively and vital connexion with all the other adventures that took their origin from Troy. He conceived the idea of bringing once more, for the last time, the chieftain famed in council and war, into communication with the mightiest king and the noblest 35 hero of that famous expedition; and to do that he had to take him to the realm of the shadows which had long contained them. Nor could he well avoid the tone of pathos which is natural to this interview on the borders of the realm of nothingness to which all the desire and the strength of life must eventually come. The questioning of Teiresias is merely, as has been said, the poet’s pretext for confronting Odysseus with his mother and his former companions, and this meeting was his prime motive. Probably this particular device was suggested by the recollection of the story which Menelaos tells of his meeting with Proteus, the Old Man of the Sea (Od. iv, 351 ff.),63 where the inquiry from the seer as to the means of reaching home again is also a mere pretext for the narration of Return adventures—those of Aias, Agamemnon, and Odysseus.

It can be considered one of the few definite findings from the critical analysis of the Homeric poems that the story of Odysseus’ descent to the Underworld wasn’t part of the original plan of the *Odyssey*. Kirke asks Odysseus to make the journey to Hades so he can meet Teiresias, who will inform him about “the way and the means of his return, and how he can reach his home again across the fish-teeming sea” (*Od.* x, 530 f.). However, when Teiresias is found in the realm of shadows, he only partially fulfills this requirement. Then, Kirke herself gives the returned Odysseus a much more comprehensive and detailed account of the dangers that lie ahead on his journey home. The journey to the land of the dead was unnecessary, and it is clear that it originally had no place in the poem. It is evident that the creator of this adventure used the (superfluous) inquiry to Teiresias as a pretext to introduce this narrative into the poem. The true purpose of the poet must be found elsewhere, as Teiresias’ prophecy turns out to be brief and unhelpful. It’s reasonable to think that the poet wanted to provide a glimpse into the wonders and horrors of that dark realm where all humans must eventually go. This intention would be understandable for a medieval or later Greek poet; in fact, there were many subsequent Greek poems that depicted a descent to Hades. But it’s difficult to reconcile this with a Homeric poet, as the world of the dead and its inhabitants hardly offered material for a narrative. In reality, the creator of Odysseus’ visit to the dead had a different aim. He was far from being a Greek Dante. One can discern his purpose as soon as the poem is stripped of the various additions made by later times. What remains is a series of conversations between Odysseus and the souls of the dead whom he had personal connections with. Besides Teiresias, he speaks with his old shipmate Elpenor, who has just died, his mother Antikleia, Agamemnon, and Achilles; and he tries unsuccessfully to reconcile with the unforgiving Aias. These conversations in Hades are entirely superfluous to the overall story of Odysseus’ wanderings and return, and they only slightly and incidentally provide information about the conditions and character of the mysterious world beyond the grave. The questions and answers are completely focused on matters of the upper world. They bring Odysseus, who has been wandering alone for so long and so far from the realm of actual humanity, back into ideal connection with the tangible world of flesh and blood to which his thoughts reach, and in which he once acted and will soon play an important role again. His mother updates him on the troubled state of Ithaca, Agamemnon informs him about Aigisthos’ treachery aided by Klytaimnestra. Odysseus brings comfort to Achilles by recounting the heroic deeds of his still-living son; however, he cannot reconcile with the resentful Aias, even in Hades. Thus, the theme of the second part of the *Odyssey* begins to unfold; even the shadows below hear echoes of the great deeds of the Trojan war and the Return from Troy, which captured the attention of all the singers of the time. The poet's essential purpose is to introduce these stories through conversations with the individuals involved. The strong instinct to expand the circle of legend centered on the adventure of the *Iliad* and link it with other heroic legends was fully met by later poets in the separate poems of the Epic Cycle. When the *Odyssey* was composed, these other epic narratives were in a period of youthful vibrancy. The narratives hadn’t yet settled into a structured form, and they contributed their individual elements (since they all related earlier events) to the intricate story of the last hero still wandering in vain and alone. The main aim of the story of Telemachos’ journey to meet Nestor and Menelaos (in the third and fourth books of the *Odyssey*) is clearly to connect the son with his father’s war companions, providing a framework for further narratives that could offer a more detailed portrayal of events that occurred between the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. Demodokos, the Phæacian bard, recounts (in a condensed form) two adventures that occurred to the great chieftain. Even when these stories do not immediately contribute to the portrayal of Odysseus’ deeds or character, they point to the vast backdrop from which the adventures of the long-enduring wanderer, now entirely isolated, should stand out, placing them in the ideal context necessary for their full significance. This natural creative urge of legendary poetry also inspired the poet of the "Journey to Hades." He too viewed Odysseus’ adventures not in isolation but in vibrant connection with all the other adventures stemming from Troy. He envisioned bringing back, for the final time, the renowned leader in counsel and war into contact with the mightiest king and noblest hero of the famous expedition; for this, he had to take him to the realm of shadows where they had long resided. The tone of pathos inherent in this meeting on the edge of the realm of nothingness, where all life’s desires and strengths must eventually lead, was unavoidable. As previously stated, the questioning of Teiresias is merely the poet's pretext for confronting Odysseus with his mother and former companions, and this meeting was his primary goal. This specific device was likely inspired by the story Menelaos tells of his encounter with Proteus, the Old Man of the Sea (*Od.* iv, 351 ff.), where the inquiry to the seer about how to return home is also just a pretext for recounting the return adventures—those of Aias, Agamemnon, and Odysseus.

§ 2

It is certain that the intention of this poet cannot possibly have been simply the description of the underworld for its own sake. Even the scenery of these mysterious incidents which might well have attracted his fancy, is only given in brief allusions. The ship sails over Okeanos to the people of the Kimmerians64 that never see the sun, and reaches at last the “barren coast” and the “Grove of Persephone”, with its black poplars and weeping willows. Odysseus with two companions goes on ahead to the entrance of Erebos, where Pyriphlegethon and Kokytos, a branch of the Styx, flow into Acheron. There he digs his sacrificial trench to which the souls flock upward out of Erebos over the asphodel-meadows. It is the same underworld in the bowels of the earth that is presupposed in the Iliad, too, as the dwelling-place of the dead, only more accurately described and more fully realized.65 The details of the picture are so lightly sketched in that one might well suppose that they, too, had been taken from some older mythical material. At any rate, he borrowed the “Styx”, so well known in the Iliad; and it may be supposed that the same applies to the other rivers as well, whose names are clearly derived from words meaning burning (of dead bodies?),66 lamentation, and sorrow.67 The poet himself, interested only in the representation of character, is not at all disposed to dwell upon the merely fanciful, and confines himself to a few brief allusions. Nor does he give any very lengthy account of the dwellers in Erebos, and what he does say of them keeps well within the limits of the usual Homeric belief. The Souls resemble shadow- or dream-pictures, and 36 are impalpable to the human touch.68 They are without consciousness when they appear. Elpenor alone, whose body still lies unburnt, has for that very reason retained his senses and even shows a form of heightened consciousness that approaches prophecy; resembling in this respect Patroklos and Hektor at the moment when the psyche is parted from the body.69 This, however, is to leave him as soon as his corpse is destroyed. Teiresias alone, the prophet famed above all others in Theban legend, has preserved his consciousness and prophetic vision even in the Shadow-world through the good-will of Persephone; but this is an exception which only establishes the rule. What Antikleia tells her son of the powerlessness and immateriality of the soul after the burning of the body70 sounds almost like an official confirmation of the orthodox Homeric view. Everything, in fact, in this poet’s description enforces the truth of this belief, and though the living are, indeed, untroubled by the feeble souls banished to outer darkness, yet out of Erebos itself the piteous knell of this decree reaches us in the lament of Achilles as he refuses his friend’s attempt at comfort—everyone knows the unforgettable words.

It’s clear that the poet's intent wasn’t just to describe the underworld for its own sake. Even the settings of these mysterious events, which might have intrigued him, are only briefly mentioned. The ship sails over Okeanos to the land of the Kimmerians—those who never see the sun—and finally reaches the “barren coast” and the “Grove of Persephone,” filled with black poplars and weeping willows. Odysseus, along with two companions, heads to the entrance of Erebos, where Pyriphlegethon and Kokytos, branches of the Styx, flow into Acheron. There, he digs a sacrificial trench to which the souls rise from Erebos across the asphodel meadows. This underworld, located deep within the earth, is also referenced in the Iliad as the home of the dead, but it’s more clearly depicted and described in more detail. The details are sketched so lightly that one might assume they were taken from some older mythological sources. At any rate, he borrows the “Styx,” which is well-known from the Iliad; it’s likely the same goes for the other rivers, whose names suggest meanings of burning (of dead bodies?), lamentation, and sorrow. The poet, focused only on character representation, doesn’t linger on the fanciful and keeps to just a few brief references. He doesn’t provide an extensive account of the inhabitants of Erebos, and what he does say aligns well with the usual Homeric beliefs. The souls are like shadow or dream images, and are imperceptible to human touch. They lack consciousness when they appear. Only Elpenor, whose body remains unburned, retains his senses and exhibits a form of heightened awareness that borders on prophecy; he resembles Patroklos and Hector at the moment when the soul separates from the body. However, this awareness will fade as soon as his body is destroyed. Teiresias, the well-known prophet from Theban legend, maintains his consciousness and prophetic insight in the Shadow-world thanks to Persephone's kindness; but this is an exception that proves the rule. What Antikleia tells her son about the soul's powerlessness and immateriality after the body is burned sounds almost like an official endorsement of the traditional Homeric view. In fact, everything in this poet's description reinforces the truth of this belief; while the living are, indeed, unaffected by the frail souls banished to darkness, the mournful echo of this decree still reaches us through Achilles’ lament as he rejects his friend’s comforting words—everyone knows those unforgettable lines.

§ 3

And yet the poet ventures to go beyond Homer in one important point. What he hints rather than actually says of the condition of things in Hades conflicts in no single point with the conventional Homeric view; but it is an innovation to suggest that this condition of things can even for the briefest moment be interrupted. The blood drunk by the souls gives them back for a moment their consciousness; their remembrance of the upper world returns to them. Their senses must then all the while have been not dead but sleeping. There can be no doubt that the poet for whom this supposition is indispensable to his story did not thereby intend to formulate an entirely new doctrine. But in order to add to his poetic effect, he was led to include in his story some touches which, meaningless within the circle of his own beliefs, pointed elsewhere, and, indeed, backward, to older, quite differently moulded beliefs, and to the usages founded upon them. He makes Odysseus, following the advice of Kirke, dig a grave at the entrance of Hades in which to pour out a solemn drink-offering to “all the dead”, consisting first of all in a mixture of milk and honey, then wine and water, over which white meal is finely sprinkled. Next he slays a ram and a black ewe, bending their heads downwards into the grave.71 37 Then the bodies of the animals are burnt, and round the blood collect all the souls, who flutter about it, kept at a distance by Odysseus’ sword72 till Teiresias has first drunk. Here the drink-offerings constitute undoubtedly a sacrificial offering devoted to the dead and poured out for their satisfaction. The poet indeed does not think of the slaughtered animals as a sacrifice; the tasting of the blood is simply intended to restore to the souls their consciousness; in the case of Teiresias, who retains his senses, the gift of prophetic clairvoyance. But this, we can see clearly, is a fiction of the poet’s: what he here describes is in every detail a sacrifice to the dead, such as we so often find described as such in accounts from later times. The scent of the blood calls up the spirits; their satiation with blood (αἱμακουρία) is the essential purpose of such offerings; and these are what the poet’s imagination dimly recalls as models. Nothing in this picture has been invented. Neither, on the other hand, it is quite clear, has he altered his sacrificial ceremony to make it fit in with novel ideas that were beginning to gain ground; ideas that ascribed a more vital existence to the souls of the dead. For here, too, just as in the case of the offerings to the dead described in the funeral of Patroklos, the poet’s manner of conceiving the life of the dead is not such as could give support to new and more vigorous cult ceremonies. His conception tends rather to contradict the ceremonies that he describes. In fact, what we have here, too, is a “fossilized” and no longer intelligible vestige of a practice that was once rooted in belief—a relic deprived of its original meaning and adapted by the poet to the special purposes of his narrative. The sacrificial ritual used to attract the souls on this occasion strikingly resembles the ritual which was used in later times to conjure up the souls of the dead at those places which were supposed to give entrance to the ghostly world below the earth. It is also not impossible that, even in the time of the poet of the “Journey to Hades”, in some remote corners of Greek lands such calling-up of the dead was still practised as a relic of former belief. But, supposing that the poet had some information of such local cults of the dead, and modelled his story on them,73 that only makes it the more remarkable that he effaces all trace of the original meaning of his ritual, and in adherence to the strict Homeric doctrine on the point, banishes all thought that the souls may possibly continue in the neighbourhood of the living and can thence be conjured up into the light of day.74 He knows only of one kingdom of the Dead far off in the dim West, beyond the bounds of sea 38 and ocean, where the legendary hero of romance can, indeed, reach its gateway, but where alone he can have communication with the souls of the dead. The House of Hades never allows its inhabitants to pass out.

And yet the poet dares to go beyond Homer in one important way. What he implies, rather than explicitly states, about the state of things in Hades doesn’t contradict the traditional Homeric view at all; however, it is a departure to suggest that this state of affairs can even be briefly interrupted. The blood that the souls drink restores their awareness for a moment; their memories of the upper world come back to them. Their senses must have been sleeping, not dead, the entire time. There’s no doubt that the poet, who relies on this assumption for his story, didn’t intend to create a completely new doctrine. But to enhance his poetic effect, he included details in his story that, while meaningless within his own beliefs, pointed elsewhere, even backward, to older beliefs and the practices based on them. He makes Odysseus, acting on Kirke's advice, dig a grave at the entrance of Hades to pour out a solemn drink-offering to “all the dead,” beginning with a mixture of milk and honey, then wine and water, over which white meal is finely sprinkled. Then he sacrifices a ram and a black ewe, bending their heads down into the grave. Then the bodies of the animals are burned, and all the souls gather around the blood, fluttering about it, kept at bay by Odysseus’ sword until Teiresias has drunk first. The drink-offerings are certainly a sacrificial offering dedicated to the dead, poured out for their satisfaction. The poet doesn't consider the slaughtered animals as a sacrifice; the act of tasting the blood is simply meant to bring back the souls' awareness; in Teiresias' case, who retains his senses, it restores his prophetic insight. But it's clear that this is a creation of the poet's imagination: what he describes is a sacrifice to the dead, as often recounted in later accounts. The scent of the blood summons the spirits; their satiation with blood (αἱμακουρία) is the main purpose of such offerings, which the poet's imagination vaguely recalls as examples. Nothing in this scene has been invented. Similarly, it is clear that he hasn’t altered his sacrificial ceremony to fit in with new ideas that had started to emerge; ideas suggesting a more vital existence for the souls of the dead. Here, as in the offerings to the dead described during Patroklos' funeral, the poet's view of the dead is not one that would support new and more vigorous cult practices. His view actually contradicts the ceremonies he describes. What we have here is also a “fossilized” and no longer clear remnant of a practice that was once based on belief—a relic stripped of its original meaning and adapted by the poet to fit the specific needs of his narrative. The sacrificial ritual used to summon the souls on this occasion closely resembles the rituals used in later times to call up the souls of the dead at places believed to connect with the ghostly world below the earth. It’s also possible that even during the time of the poet of the “Journey to Hades,” some distant areas of Greek lands still practiced this summoning of the dead as a remnant of earlier beliefs. But if the poet did have some knowledge of such local dead cults and shaped his story around them, that only makes it more surprising that he erases all traces of the original meaning of his ritual and, in line with strict Homeric doctrine, dismisses the idea that the souls might continue to linger near the living and could thus be called forth into the light. He knows only of one kingdom of the Dead far away in the shadowy West, beyond the boundaries of sea and ocean, where the legendary hero of romance can indeed reach its entrance, but where he can only communicate with the souls of the dead. The House of Hades never allows its inhabitants to leave.

And yet all this is hopelessly contradicted by the votive offerings that the poet, by what can only be called an oversight, makes Odysseus promise to all the dead, and particularly to Teiresias, upon his return home (Od. x, 521–6; xi, 29–33). Of what use would it be to the dead to receive the offering of a “barren cow”,75 of “treasures” burnt upon the funeral pyre; or how could Teiresias enjoy the slaughtering of a black sheep far away in Ithaca—when they are all confined to Erebos and could not taste the offerings made to them? This is the most remarkable and important of all vestiges of an ancient worship of the dead. It proves indubitably that in pre-Homeric times the belief prevailed that even after the funeral of the body the soul is not eternally banished to the inaccessible land of shadows, but is able to approach the sacrificer and to enjoy the sacrifices offered to it, just as much as the gods can. A single obscure allusion in the Iliad76 suggests what is here much more clearly and almost naïvely revealed—namely that even at the time when the Homeric view of the nothingness of the souls for ever parted from their bodies reigned supreme, the custom of making offerings to the dead after the funeral was over (though in exceptional circumstances only, and not as a regularly recurring performance) had not been entirely forgotten.

And yet all this is completely contradicted by the offerings that the poet, through what can only be described as an oversight, has Odysseus promise to all the dead, especially to Teiresias, upon his return home (Od. x, 521–6; xi, 29–33). What good would it do the dead to receive the offering of a “barren cow”, 75 or “treasures” burnt on the funeral pyre; or how could Teiresias enjoy the slaughter of a black sheep far away in Ithaca—when they are all stuck in Erebos and can't partake in the offerings made to them? This is the most remarkable and important remnant of ancient worship of the dead. It clearly shows that in pre-Homeric times, there was a belief that even after the body’s funeral, the soul is not eternally banished to the unreachable land of shadows, but can approach the person making the offering and enjoy the sacrifices made to it, just like the gods can. A single vague reference in the Iliad 76 suggests what is more clearly and almost childishly revealed here—namely that even at a time when the Homeric view that souls forever separated from their bodies are nothingness was dominant, the practice of making offerings to the dead after the funeral was not completely forgotten (although it only happened in exceptional circumstances and not as a regular practice).

§ 4

The contradictions into which he is betrayed by the introduction of such intercourse between the living and the dead proves that the undertaking was rather venturesome for a Homeric poet of strictly orthodox views. Still, in the picture of Odysseus’ meeting with his mother and former companions, which was his main object, the poet hardly strayed at all from the normal Homeric path. This, however, was, as it happened, the very point in which later generations of poetically inclined readers or hearers found his narrative wanting. He himself carefully linked up every detail with his living hero, the central interest of his story, and only made him speak with the souls of such as had some real and close connexion with him. A review of the motley inhabitants of the underworld in their multitude hardly interested him at all. It was the very thing which seemed indispensable to later readers. They made additions to his story and introduced the multitudes of the dead of all ages; the warriors with 39 wounds still visible and in bloodstained armour;77 or else, more in the manner of a Hesiodic catalogue for the assistance of the memory than making them live in Homeric fashion for the imagination, they pictured a whole host of mothers, the illustrious ancestors of great families, passing before Odysseus, though they had no particular claim upon his sympathy; nor, indeed, is any serious attempt made to bring them into relationship with him.78 This seemed to improve the picture of the general multitude of the dead, represented in the persons of selected individuals. Next, the condition of things in the world below must at least be illustrated by a few examples. Odysseus casts a glance into the inner recesses of the underworld—which was hardly possible for him, considering that he stood at its outermost gateway—and sees there the heroic figures of those who, like true “images” (εἴδωλα) of the living, still continue the activities of their former lives. There he sees Minos giving judgment among the dead, Orion hunting, Herakles still with the bow in his hand, and the arrow fitted to the string, “like one ever about to shoot.” This is certainly not Herakles, the “Hero-God”, as he was known to later ages. The poet knows nothing as yet of the elevation of the son of Zeus above the lot of all mortals-—any more than the earliest poet of the “Journey” knew of the translation of Achilles out of Hades. The disregard of such things was naturally regarded by later readers as a negligence on the part of the poet. And, in fact, they boldly inserted three verses here which inform us that he “himself”, the real Herakles, dwells among the gods—what Odysseus saw in Hades was only his counterfeit. Whoever wrote this was practising a little original theology on his own account. Such a contrast between a fully animated “self” possessing the original man’s body and soul still united, and a counterfeit presentment of himself (which cannot be his psyche) relegated to Hades, is quite strange both to Homer and to Greek thought of later times.79 It is, in fact, an example of the earliest “harmonizer’s” solution of a difficulty. The poet does, indeed, attempt to connect Herakles with Odysseus by making the two enter into conversation, in imitation of the conversations with Agamemnon and Achilles. But it is soon evident that these two have really nothing to say to each other; Odysseus, in fact, is silent. There was no real relationship between them, at most an analogy; Herakles, too, having once descended alive into Hades. This analogy alone, in fact, appears to have suggested the introduction of Herakles in this place.80 40

The contradictions that arise from introducing interactions between the living and the dead show that this was quite a risky move for a Homeric poet with strictly traditional views. However, in the scene where Odysseus meets his mother and former companions, which was his main goal, the poet mostly stayed within the usual Homeric framework. Yet, this was precisely the point where later poets and audiences found his storytelling lacking. He connected every detail carefully to his living hero, the central figure of his story, and only let him speak to the souls of those who had a real and close connection with him. A look at the diverse residents of the underworld didn’t really interest him. This, however, seemed essential to later readers. They added to his narrative, introducing numerous dead from all eras; warriors with visible wounds still wearing bloodstained armor or, more like a Hesiodic catalog to jog memory rather than bringing them to life in a Homeric way, they imagined a whole lineup of mothers and notable ancestors of great families passing by Odysseus, even though they had no particular claim on his sympathy; nor did they make any serious effort to relate them to him. This was seen as an improvement to the depiction of the general dead, represented through selected individuals. Next, the state of the underworld must at least be illustrated through a few examples. Odysseus peers into the depths of the underworld—which was hardly feasible for him, since he stood at its outermost gate—and sees the heroic figures who, like true “images” (εἴδωλα), continue the activities of their past lives. There he sees Minos judging among the dead, Orion hunting, and Herakles still with his bow drawn, “like one ever about to shoot.” This is definitely not the Herakles, the “Hero-God” known to later generations. The poet hasn’t heard of the elevation of Zeus’s son above all mortals—just like the earliest poet of the “Journey” didn’t know about the transition of Achilles out of Hades. Later readers naturally viewed this lack of awareness as negligence on the poet's part. In fact, they daringly added three lines here that tell us that the “real” Herakles resides among the gods—what Odysseus saw in Hades was just a copy. Whoever wrote this was practicing some original theology. The contrast between a fully animated “self” with the original body and soul still united, and a mere representation of himself (which cannot be his psyche) confined to Hades, is quite strange to both Homer and later Greek thought. It’s, in fact, an example of one of the earliest “harmonizer’s” attempts to solve a problem. The poet does try to connect Herakles with Odysseus by having them engage in conversation, like the talks with Agamemnon and Achilles. But it soon becomes clear that they really have nothing to say to each other; Odysseus, in fact, is silent. There’s no real bond between them, just a similarity; Herakles had once descended alive into Hades. This similarity alone seems to have inspired his inclusion here.

There now remains (inserted after Minos and Orion and before Herakles and probably composed by the same hand that was responsible for them) the incident of the three “penitents” undergoing punishment; a passage that no reader can possibly forget. First Tityos, whose giant frame is preyed upon by two vultures, is seen, then Tantalos, who in the middle of a lake is parched with thirst and cannot reach up to the fruit-laden branches over his head, and last Sisyphos, who is bound to roll up-hill the stone that ever rolls back again. The limits of the Homeric conception (with which the pictures of Minos, Orion, and Herakles might still perhaps be reconciled) are in these pictures definitely overstepped. The souls of these three unfortunates are credited with complete and continuous consciousness. Without this, their punishment would not have been felt and would not have been inflicted. And, observing the extraordinarily matter-of-fact and cursory description, which takes the reasons of the punishment for granted except in the case of Tityos, we cannot help feeling that these examples of punishment after death were not invented for the first time by the composer of these lines. They cannot have been offered to the astonished ears of their hearers as a daring novelty, but were rather recalled briefly to those hearers’ recollection. Probably these three are selected as examples out of a much larger collection of such pictures. Can it be that still older poets (who may still, however, have been more recent than the poet of the earliest parts of the “Journey”) had already dared to desert the Homeric view of the soul?

There now remains (inserted after Minos and Orion and before Herakles and probably written by the same person who created them) the incident of the three “penitents” undergoing punishment; a passage that no reader can possibly forget. First, we see Tityos, whose giant frame is attacked by two vultures. Next is Tantalos, who is stuck in the middle of a lake, dying of thirst and unable to reach the fruit-laden branches above him. Lastly, there’s Sisyphus, who is doomed to roll a stone uphill, only for it to roll back down again. The limits of the Homeric concept (with which the depictions of Minos, Orion, and Herakles might still possibly align) are clearly surpassed in these images. The souls of these three unfortunate figures are described as having full and ongoing awareness. Without this awareness, their punishment wouldn’t be felt or inflicted. Furthermore, given the remarkably straightforward and brief description, which assumes the reasons for the punishment except in Tityos's case, we can’t help but feel that these examples of post-death punishment were not introduced for the first time by the writer of these lines. They likely were not presented to the amazed audience as a bold new idea, but rather were briefly remembered by those listeners. It's probable that these three were chosen as examples from a much larger collection of similar depictions. Could it be that even older poets (who might still have been more recent than the poet of the earliest parts of the “Journey”) had already dared to move beyond the Homeric view of the soul?

However that may be, we may be sure that the punishment of the three “penitents” was not intended to contradict flatly the Homeric conception of the unconsciousness and nothingness of the shades. They could not in that case have accommodated themselves so well to a poem that is founded upon such conceptions. They do not disprove the rule because they are, and are only intended to be, exceptions to that rule. This, however, would be impossible if it were justifiable to interpret the poet’s fiction as representing, in the person of these three unfortunates, three types of special sins and classes of sinners; as, for example, unbridled Lust (Tityos), insatiable Gluttony (Tantalos), and Pride of the Intellect (Sisyphos).81 They would in that case be particular examples of the retribution which one must think of as being extended to all the innumerable hosts of shadows who have been guilty of the same sins. But nothing in the description itself warrants such a theological interpretation; indeed, we have no reason 41 or excuse for attributing to this particular poet such a desire to prove the existence of a compensatory justice in an after life. It is quite strange to Homer, and so far as it ever became known to later Greek theology, it was only introduced very late, through the influence of a speculative mysticism. No, the almighty power of the gods is able in special cases, so this picture assures us, to preserve for individual souls their consciousness; in the case of Teiresias as a reward, in the case of these three objects of the gods’ hatred, in order that they may be capable of feeling their punishment. The real fault for which they are punished can be guessed fairly certainly from what the poet tells us about Tityos—it is in each case a grievous offence committed by them against the gods. The crime of Tantalos we can make out from what we know of him through other sources. It is less easy to discover what was the exact misdeed for which the crafty Sisyphos is punished.82 In any case, it is clear that retribution has overtaken all three of them for sins against the gods themselves—sins which human beings of later times could not possibly commit. And for this reason alone, neither their deeds nor their punishment can have anything typical or representative about them; they are sheer exceptions, and that is why the poet found them interesting.

However that may be, we can be sure that the punishment of the three “penitents” was not meant to completely contradict the Homeric view of the unconsciousness and nothingness of the shades. They wouldn't have fit so well into a poem built on such ideas if that were the case. They don't disprove the rule because they are, and are meant to be, exceptions to that rule. However, it would be impossible if we justified interpreting the poet’s narrative as representing, through these three unfortunate figures, three specific types of sins and categories of sinners; like, for instance, unrestrained Lust (Tityos), endless Gluttony (Tantalos), and Intellectual Pride (Sisyphos).81 In that case, they would be specific examples of the punishment that is assumed to extend to all the countless shadows guilty of the same sins. But nothing in the description itself supports such a theological interpretation; in fact, we have no reason to think that this particular poet had any intent to showcase the existence of compensatory justice in an afterlife. It feels quite strange to Homer, and as far as it became known in later Greek theology, it was introduced only much later, influenced by a speculative mysticism. No, the immense power of the gods can, in special cases, as this picture assures us, allow individual souls to maintain their consciousness; for Teiresias as a reward, and for these three objects of the gods’ hatred, so they can feel their punishment. We can reasonably guess the main fault for which they are punished based on what the poet tells us about Tityos—it is a serious offense committed against the gods. We can reference Tantalos' crime from what we know about him from other sources. It’s less clear what exactly crafty Sisyphos did to deserve his punishment.82 In any case, it’s evident that all three have faced retribution for sins against the gods themselves—sins that humans in later times could not possibly commit. And for that reason alone, neither their actions nor their punishments can be seen as typical or representative; they are clear exceptions, which is why the poet found them interesting.

The episode of Odysseus’ journey to Hades (even in its latest portions) suggests no acquaintance whatever with any general class of sinners who receive their punishment in that place. If, indeed, it had alluded to the punishment in the after-world of perjurers, orthodox Homeric doctrine would not in that case have been violated. Twice over in the Iliad, on solemn occasions of oath-taking, besides the gods of the upper world, the Erinyes also are called upon as witnesses of the oath; for they punish under the earth those who break their oath.83 Not without reason have these passages been held to show “that the Homeric conception of the phantasmal half-life of the souls under the earth, where they are without feeling or consciousness, was not a general folk-belief.”84 We must add, however, that the belief held in Homeric times of the punishment of oath-breakers in the realm of shadows cannot as yet have been very vital, for it was quite unable to prevent the success of the totally incompatible belief in the unconscious nothingness of disembodied spirits. A solemn oath-formula (so much that is primitive persisting, even after it has become dead letter, in formula) preserved a reference to that ancient belief, which had become strange to Homeric ears—a vestige, in fact, of a bygone point of view. It may be 42 that in the dim past, when men still vividly and literally believed in the reality of a punishment in after life for perjury, all the souls in Hades were credited with a conscious existence; but there never was a time when men generally believed that earthly sins (including perjury as only one among many) were punished in Hades. Oath-breaking was not punished as a specially outrageous moral failing—it may well be doubted whether the Greeks ever considered or felt it to be such. The perjurer, rather than any other particular sinner, was the special victim of the dread goddesses, for the simple reason that the perjurer in his desire to emphasize in the most awful manner his aversion to falsehood, has invoked against himself, if he fails to keep his oath, the most terrible fate of all—to suffer torment in the realm of Hades whence is no escape.85 To the Infernal Spirits of the Underworld, to whom he had condemned himself, he falls a victim if he breaks his word. Belief in the supernatural power of such imprecations,86 and not any special moral importance attached to truth-telling—an idea quite strange to the older Antiquity—gave to the oath its peculiar terrors.

The episode of Odysseus’ journey to the Underworld (even in its latest parts) implies no familiarity at all with a general category of sinners who are punished there. If it referred to the punishment for perjurers, classic Homeric beliefs wouldn’t be violated. Twice in the Iliad, during solemn oaths, in addition to the gods of the upper world, the Erinyes are also called as witnesses; they punish those who break their oaths under the earth. Not without reason have these passages been interpreted to show that “the Homeric idea of the ghostly half-life of souls in the underworld, where they exist without feeling or awareness, was not a common folk-belief.” We must add, however, that the belief in Homeric times regarding the punishment of oath-breakers in the realm of shadows couldn’t have been very strong, as it was unable to overshadow the conflicting belief in the unconscious nothingness of disembodied spirits. An oath formula (with a lot of primitive elements surviving even after it became just a formality) still referenced this ancient belief, which had become odd to Homeric ears—a remnant of a past perspective. It could be 42 that in ancient times, when people still firmly and literally believed in the reality of punishment in the afterlife for perjury, all souls in Hades were thought to have conscious existence; however, there was never a time when people widely believed that earthly sins (with perjury just one of many) were punished in Hades. Oath-breaking wasn't viewed as an especially severe moral failing—it’s questionable whether the Greeks ever regarded it as such. The perjurer, rather than any other specific sinner, was especially targeted by the feared goddesses because the perjurer, in their intense desire to emphasize their disdain for falsehood, called upon the most dreadful fate of all—suffering torment in the Underworld with no escape if they broke their oath. To the Infernal Spirits of the Underworld, to whom they had consigned themselves, they become victims if they fail to uphold their word. The belief in the supernatural power of such curses, and not any special moral significance given to truth-telling—an idea quite foreign to earlier times—gave the oath its unique terrors.

§ 5

A final example of the tenacity with which custom may outlive the belief on which it is founded is afforded by the story told of Odysseus, that in fleeing from the Kikonian land, he did not leave it until he had called thrice upon those of his companions who had fallen in the battle with the Kikones (Od. ix, 65–6). References to similar callings upon the dead in later literature make the meaning of such behaviour clear. The souls of the dead who have fallen in foreign lands must be “called”;87 they will then, if this is properly done, follow the caller to their distant home, where an “empty grave” awaits them.88 This duty is regularly performed in Homer for the benefit of those whose bodies it is impossible to recover and bury in the proper way. But a summons of the dead and the erection of such empty receptacles—intended for whom if not for the souls who must then be accessible to the devotion of their relations?—was natural enough for those who believed in the possibility of the soul’s sojourn in the neighbourhood of its living friends; it was not admissible for supporters of the Homeric belief. Here we have once more a remarkable vestige of an ancient belief, surviving in a custom that has not been entirely given up even in altered times. Here, too, the belief which had given rise to the custom, was extinct. 43 If we ask the Homeric poet for what purpose a mound was heaped up over the grave of the dead and a gravestone set upon it, he will answer us: in order that his fame may remain imperishable among men, and that future generations may not be ignorant of his story.89 That sounds truly Homeric. When a man dies his soul departs into a region of twilit dream-life; his body, the visible man, perishes. Only his glorious name, in fact, lives on. His praises speak to after ages from the monument to his honour on his grave-mound—and in the song of the bard. A poet would naturally be inclined to think such things.

A final example of how customs can outlast the beliefs they’re based on is the story of Odysseus. When he was escaping from the land of the Kikonians, he didn’t leave until he had called out three times for his fallen companions from the battle with the Kikones (Od. ix, 65–6). Later literature references similar callings to the dead, making the purpose of such behavior clear. The souls of the dead who fell in foreign lands must be “called”; they will then, if done correctly, follow the caller to their distant home, where an “empty grave” awaits them.87 This duty is routinely carried out in Homer for those whose bodies cannot be recovered or buried properly. But summoning the dead and setting up these empty graves—meant for whom if not for the souls who should then be accessible to their loved ones?—made sense to those who believed that souls linger near their living friends; it wasn’t acceptable for supporters of the Homeric belief. Once again, we see a fascinating remnant of an ancient belief surviving in a custom that hasn’t completely disappeared even in changed times. Here, too, the belief that created the custom was gone. 43 If we ask the Homeric poet why a mound was built over the grave of the dead and a gravestone placed on it, he would answer: so that his fame remains everlasting among people, and future generations won’t be unaware of his story.89 That seems very Homeric. When a person dies, their soul moves into a realm of shadowy dreams; their body, the visible self, ceases to exist. Only their glorious name truly lives on. Their praises echo through the ages from the monument honoring them on their grave-mound—and in the bard’s song. A poet would naturally be inclined to think this way.

NOTES TO CHAPTER I

I

1 E. Kammer, Einheit d. Odyssee, 510 ff.

1 E. Kammer, Unity of the Odyssey, 510 ff.

2 E.g. Il. Α 3, πολλὰς δ’ ἰφθίμους ψυχὰς (κεφαλάς Apol. Rhod., as in Λ 55: mistakenly) Ἄϊδι προΐαψεν ἡρώων, αὐτοὺς δὲ ἑλώρια τεῦχε κύνεσσιν. Ψ 105, παννυχίη γὰρ μοι Πατροκλῆος δειλοῖο ψυχὴ ἐφεστήκει . . . ἔϊκτο δὲ θέσκελον αὐτῷ (cf. 66).

2 For example, Il. Α 3, many of the brave souls(κεφαλάς Apol. Rhod., as in Λ 55: mistakenly) Hades unleashed the heroes, and their bodies became food for the dogs. Ψ 105, For the night vigils of the cowardly Patroclus haunt me . . . it felt right for him. (cf. 66).

3 E.g. Λ 262, ἔνθ’ Ἀντήνορος υἷες ὑπ’ Ἀτρείδῃ βασιλῆι πότμον ἀναπλήσαντες ἔδυν δόμον Ἄϊδος εἴσω. The ψυχή of Elpenor and afterwards that of Teiresias, of his mother, of Agamemnon, etc., is addressed by Odysseus in the Nekyia of the Od. simply as: Ἐλπῆνορ, Τειρεσίη, μῆτερ ἐμή, etc. And cf. such expressions as: Ψ 244, εἰς ὅ κεν αὐτὸς ἐγὼ Ἄϊδι κεύθωμαι, or Ο 251, καὶ δὴ ἔγωγ’ ἐφάμην, νέκυας καὶ δῶμ’ Ἀίδαο ἤματι τῷδ’ ἵξεσθαι . . . or Ξ 456 f., etc.

3 For example, Λ 262, There, the sons of Antenor, serving under King Agamemnon, met their destiny and entered the house of Hades.. The soul of Elpenor, and later that of Teiresias, his mother, Agamemnon, and others, is addressed by Odysseus in the Nekyia of the Odyssey simply as: Elpenor, Teiresias, my mom, etc. And compare such expressions as: Ψ 244, wherever I might be hiding in Hades, or Ο 251, And I indeed said that the souls and the home of Hades should come here . . ., or Ξ 456 f., etc.

4 The first view is Nägelsbach’s, the second that of Grotemeyer.

4 The first perspective is Nägelsbach's, and the second is Grotemeyer's.

5 And of civilized peoples, too, in antiquity. Just such a second self, an εἴδωλον duplicating the visible self of man, were, in their original significance, the genius of the Romans, the Fravashi of the Persians, the Ka of the Egyptians.

5 And among civilized societies in ancient times. This second self, an idol mirroring the visible self of a person, were, in their original meaning, the genius of the Romans, the Fravashi of the Persians, and the Ka of the Egyptians.

6 ὑποτίθεται (sc. Homer) τὰς ψυχὰς τοῖς εἰδώλοις τοῖς ἐν τοῖς κατόπτροις φαινομένοις ὁμοίας καὶ τοῖς διὰ τῶν ὑδάτων συνισταμένοις, ἃ καθάπαξ ἡμῖν ἐξείκασται καὶ τὰς κινήσεις μιμεῖται στερεμνιώδη δὲ ὑπόστασιν οὐδεμίαν ἔχει εἰς ἀντίληψιν καὶ ἁφήν, Apollod. π. θεῶν ap. Stob., Ecl. i, p. 420 W.

6 It is assumed (referring to Homer) The souls look like the images in mirrors and those created by waters, which are shown to us and imitate movements but lack any real existence for our perception and touch., Apollod. π. gods ap. Stob., Ecl. i, p. 420 W.

7 Cf. Cic., Div. i, 63: iacet corpus dormientis ut mortui, viget autem et vivit animus. Quod multo magis faciet post mortem cum omnino corpore excesserit. TD. i, 29: visis quibusdam saepe movebantur eisque maxime nocturnis, ut viderentur ei qui vita excesserant vivere. Here we have precise ancient testimony both for the subjective and the objective elements in dreaming and for their importance for the origin of belief about the soul.

7 See Cicero, Div. i, 63: The body sleeps like it's dead, but the soul is awake and alive. This will be even more accurate after death when it completely separates from the body. TD. i, 29: Some people are often touched by certain visions, especially at night, as they feel that those who have passed away are still alive. Here we have clear ancient evidence for both the subjective and objective aspects of dreaming and their significance for the origin of beliefs about the soul.

8 Τὸν δ’ ἔλιπε ψυχή . . . αὖτις δ’ ἀμπνύνθη, Ε 696 f. Τὴν δὲ κατ’ ὀφθαλμῶν ἐρεβεννὴ νὺξ ἐκάλυψεν, ἤριπε δ’ ἐξοπίσω, ἀπὸ δὲ ψυχὴν ἐκάπυσσεν . . . ἔπει οὖν ἄμπνυτο καὶ ἐς φρένα θυμὸς ἀγέρθηX 466 ff., 475; and ω 348: ἀποψύχοντα.

8 He left her soul . . . and then she drifted off to sleep., E 696 f. A dark night blinded her, she collapsed, and her soul departed . . . it was at that moment her spirit came back and her heart was uplifted.X 466 ff., 475; and ω 348: disappearing.

9 Speaking of suspirium (= λειποψυχία), Sen., Ep. liv, 2, says, medici hanc “meditationem mortis” vocant. faciet enim aliquando spiritus ille quod saepe conatus est.

9 Speaking of suspirium (= discouragement), Sen., Ep. liv, 2, says, Doctors refer to this as "the meditation on death." At some point, that spirit will accomplish what it has often sought to do.

10 A remarkable idea seems to be obscurely suggested in an expression such as that of ξ 207, ἀλλ’ ἤτοι τὸν Κῆρες ἔβαν θανάτοιο φέρουσαι εἰς Ἀΐδαο δόμους; cf. Β 302. Usually the Keres bring death to men: here (like Thanatos himself in later poetry) they conduct the dead into the realm of Hades. They are daimones of Hades, originally and primitively themselves souls of the departed (see below, p. 168), and it is a natural idea to make such soul-spirits, hovering in the air, carry off the souls of men just dead to the realm of the souls. In Homer only a stereotyped phrase preserves the vague memory of such a conception. 45

10 An intriguing idea is somewhat hinted at in an expression like ξ 207, But really, the Keres took the dead into the homes of Hades.; cf. Β 302. Normally, the Keres bring death to people: here, like Thanatos himself in later poetry, they guide the dead into the underworld. They are daimones of Hades, originally and fundamentally themselves the souls of the departed (see below, p. 168), and it makes sense to picture these spirit-souls, floating in the air, carrying away the souls of those who have just died to the realm of the souls. In Homer, only a fixed phrase preserves the faint memory of such a notion. 45

11 Of the dead we read in λ 219, οὐ γὰρ ἔτι σάρκας τε καὶ ὀστέα ἶνες ἔχουσι. Taking the words strictly this might mean that the dead possess sinews but not the flesh or bones that should be held together by the sinews. This is how Nauck, in fact, understood the Homeric words: Mélanges Grécorom. iv, 718. But it is very difficult to picture “shadows” which in this manner possess sinews but no body of flesh and bones: the corrupt words of fr. 229, preserved apart from their context, are quite insufficient to prove that Aesch. derived such an unrealizable impression from the Homeric words.—That the poet of these lines from the Nek. simply meant “flesh, bones, and sinews, too, which might have held them together”, is shown quite clearly by what follows: ἀλλὰ τὰ μέν τε πυρὸς κρατερὸν μένος αἰθομένοιο δαμνᾷ, ἐπεί κε πρῶτα λίπῃ λεύκ’ ὀστέα θυμός, ψυχὴ δ’ ἠΰτ’ ὄνειρος ἀποπταμένη πεπότηται. How, then, could the fire help destroying the sinews too?

11 In the dead we read in λ 219, for they no longer have bodies. Taking the words literally, this might suggest that the dead have sinews but lack the flesh or bones that should connect them. This is how Nauck understood the Homeric words: Mélanges Grécorom. iv, 718. However, it's hard to imagine “shadows” that have sinews but no body of flesh and bones; the corrupted words of fr. 229, preserved out of context, are not enough to prove that Aesch. derived such an impractical image from the Homeric words. The poet of these lines from the Nek. clearly meant “flesh, bones, and sinews, too, which could have held them together,” as shown by what follows: but the intensity of the fire consumes them, once the white bones are left behind by the spirit, and the soul, like a gentle dream, drifts away. How, then, could the fire also destroy the sinews?

12 The sacrificial character of the proceedings at the rogus of Patroklos has again been called in question by v. Fritze, de libatione veterum Graecorum, 71 f. (1893). He admits this interpretation of the pouring of the blood on the pyre, but explains the other circumstances differently. It would be quite easy to disprove in this fashion the sacrificial character of every ὁλοκαύτωμα for χθόνιοι whether Heroes or the dead. It is true that the bodies of sheep and cattle, horses and dogs, thus completely consumed by fire, are not a “food-offering”, but they are a sacrifice for all that, and belong to the class of expiatory offerings in which the flesh is not offered for the food of the daimon but the lives of the victims are sacrificed to him. That Achilles slays the Trojan prisoners at the rogus κταμένοιο χολωθείς (Ψ 23) does not destroy the sacrificial character of this offering intended to appease the wrath (felt also by Achilles) of the dead man.—The whole procedure gives a picture of primitive sacrificial ritual in honour of the dead and differs in no particular from the ritual of sacrifice to the θεοὶ χθόνιοι. This is recognized by Stengel in his Chthonischer und Todtencult (Festschr. Friedländ.), p. 432, who also marks clearly the differences between the two religious ceremonies as they were gradually evolved in the process of time.

12 The sacrificial nature of the events at the rogus of Patroclus has been questioned again by v. Fritze in his work, de libatione veterum Graecorum, 71 f. (1893). He acknowledges this interpretation of the blood being poured on the pyre, but he explains the other details differently. It would be quite easy to argue against the sacrificial nature of every sacrifice for underworld beings, whether they are Heroes or the dead. It is true that the bodies of sheep, cattle, horses, and dogs, which are completely consumed by fire, are not a “food-offering,” but they are still a sacrifice and fall into the category of expiatory offerings, where the flesh isn’t offered as food for the daimon, but the lives of the victims are sacrificed to him. The fact that Achilles kills the Trojan prisoners at the rogus κταμένοιο χολωθείς (Ψ 23) does not invalidate the sacrificial nature of this offering intended to appease the wrath (which Achilles also feels) of the deceased. The whole process illustrates a picture of primitive sacrificial ritual in honor of the dead and does not differ in any significant way from the ritual of sacrifice to the underworld deities. This is acknowledged by Stengel in his Chthonischer und Todtencult (Festschr. Friedländ.), p. 432, who also clearly outlines the differences between the two religious ceremonies as they gradually developed over time.

13 It cannot be denied that the libation of wine poured out by Achilles during the night (to which he expressly summons the psyche of Patroklos, Ψ 218–22) is sacrificial in character, like all similar χοαί. The wine with which the embers of the funeral pyre are extinguished may have been intended to serve that purpose alone and not as a sacrifice. But the jars of honey and oil which Achilles has placed upon the pyre (Ψ 170; cf. ω 67–8) can hardly be regarded as anything but sacrificial (cf. Bergk, Opusc. ii, 675; acc. to Stengel, Jahrb. Philol., p. 649, 1887, they only serve to kindle the flames, but the honey, at any rate, seems a strange material for the purpose. For libations at the rogus or at the grave honey and oil are regularly used—see Stengel himself, loc. cit., and Philol. xxxix, 378 ff.). Acc. to v. Fritze, de libat., 72, the jars of honey and oil were intended not as libations but for the “bath of the dead”—in the next world, in the Homeric Hades!—Honey can only have been used for bathing purposes, in Greece as elsewhere, by those who unintentionally fell into it like Glaukos.

13 It's undeniable that the wine poured out by Achilles during the night (to which he specifically calls the spirit of Patroklos, Ψ 218–22) is sacrificial in nature, just like all similar χοαί. The wine used to extinguish the embers of the funeral pyre might have been meant for that purpose alone and not as a sacrifice. However, the jars of honey and oil that Achilles places on the pyre (Ψ 170; cf. ω 67–8) can hardly be considered anything but sacrificial (cf. Bergk, Opusc. ii, 675; according to Stengel, Jahrb. Philol., p. 649, 1887, they only serve to ignite the flames, but the use of honey, in this case, seems odd for that purpose. For libations at the rogus or at the grave, honey and oil are typically used—see Stengel himself, loc. cit., and Philol. xxxix, 378 ff.). According to v. Fritze, de libat., 72, the jars of honey and oil were intended not as libations but for the “bath of the dead”—in the afterlife, in the Homeric Hades!—Honey can only have been used for bathing purposes, in Greece and elsewhere, by those who unintentionally fell into it like Glaukos.

14 On Greek hair offerings see Wieseler, Philol. ix, 711 ff., who rightly regards these offerings as symbolic and as substitutes for primitive human sacrifice. The same explanation of the offering of hair is given in the case of other peoples also; cf. Tylor, ii, 401. 46

14 For information on Greek hair offerings, see Wieseler, Philol. ix, 711 ff., who correctly views these offerings as symbolic and as replacements for early human sacrifice. The same reasoning for the offering of hair is noted in other cultures as well; cf. Tylor, ii, 401. 46

15 Patroklos’ request for prompt burial (69 ff.) gives no sufficient motive, since Achilles has already given orders for the funeral to take place next day, 49 ff. (cf. 94 f.).

15 Patroklos’ request for a quick burial (69 ff.) isn’t a strong enough reason, since Achilles has already instructed that the funeral will happen the next day, 49 ff. (cf. 94 f.).

16 ll. 19; 179. Again, in the night following the erection of the funeral pyre, when the body is burning, Achilles calls to the soul of Patroklos ψυχὴν κικλήσκων Πατροκλῆος δειλοῖο 221. The person thus called upon is evidently supposed to be still close at hand. This is not contradicted by the formula χαῖρε . . . καὶ εἰν Ἀΐδαο δόμοισι (19, 179), for in l. 19. at least, the words cannot mean in Hades, since the soul is still outside Hades, as it tells us itself, 71 ff. The words can only mean “about”, “before” the House of Hades (like ἐν ποταμῷ “by the river”, etc.). In the same way εἰς Ἀΐδαο δόμον often only means towards the house of Hades (Ameis on κ 512).

16 ll. 19; 179. Once more, on the night after the funeral pyre has been built and the body is burning, Achilles calls out to the soul of Patroclus Calling the soul of cowardly Patroclus 221. The person being called is clearly meant to be nearby. This is supported by the phrase Greetings . . . even in the halls of Hades. (19, 179), because in line 19 at least, the words cannot mean in Hades, as the soul is still outside Hades, as it tells us itself, 71 ff. The terms can only mean “around” or “in front of” the House of Hades (like in the river “by the river,” etc.). Similarly, to the house of Hades often just means towards the house of Hades (Ameis on κ 512).

17 From descriptions in ancient poetry? or had similar customs—at least, at the funerals of chieftains—survived into the poet’s own time? Especially magnificent, e.g., were the burials of Spartan kings—and also Cretan kings, it appears, so long as there were any; cf. Arist. fr. 476, p. 1556a, 37 ff.

17 Were these descriptions in ancient poetry? Or had similar customs—at least during the funerals of leaders—survived into the poet's own time? Especially impressive, for instance, were the burials of Spartan kings—and also Cretan kings, it seems, as long as there were any; cf. Arist. fr. 476, p. 1556a, 37 ff.

18 Funeral games for Amarynkeus, Ψ 630 ff., for Achilles, ω 85 ff. Such games are referred to as being quite the usual custom in ω 87 ff. Later poetry is full of descriptions of such ἀγῶνες ἐπιτάφιοι of the heroic age.

18 Funeral games for Amarynkeus, Ψ 630 ff., for Achilles, ω 85 ff. These games are described as a common tradition in ω 87 ff. Later poetry is filled with descriptions of such Funeral contests from the heroic age.

19 As Aristarchos noticed: see Rh. Mus. 36, 544 f. Rather different are the (certainly ancient) games and contests for the hand of a bride (cf. stories of Pelops, Danaos, Ikarios, etc.).

19 As Aristarchos pointed out: see Rh. Mus. 36, 544 f. The ancient games and competitions for winning a bride’s hand are quite different (see the tales of Pelops, Danaos, Ikarios, etc.).

20 Cf. Ψ 274, εἰ μὲν νῦν ἐπὶ ἄλλῳ ἀεθλεύοιμεν Ἀχαιοί, i.e. in honour of Patroklos; cf. 646: σὸν ἑταῖρον ἀέθλοισι κτερέϊζε. κτερεΐζειν means to give the dead man his κτέρεα, i.e. his former possessions (by burning them). The games are therefore on exactly the same footing as the burning of the personal effects of the dead in which the soul of the dead man was supposed still to take pleasure.

20 Cf. Ψ 274, if we are now competing against each other, Achaeans, meaning in honor of Patroklos; cf. 646: your teammate in the competitions is honored. To award him his honors means to return the deceased's awards, referring to his former possessions (by burning them). The competitions are therefore exactly the same as the burning of the deceased's personal belongings, which were thought to still please the soul of the dead man.

21 Aug., CD. viii, 26: Varro dicit omnes mortuos existimari manes deos, et probat per ea sacra quae omnibus fere mortuis exhibentur, ubi et ludos commemorat funebres, tamquam hoc sit maximum divinitatis indicium, quod non solent ludi nisi numinibus celebrari.

21 Aug., CD. viii, 26: Varro states that all the deceased are regarded as manes gods, and he backs this up by referencing the sacred rites typically held for the dead. He also brings up funeral games, viewing them as a significant indicator of divinity, since such games are usually celebrated only for the gods.

22 Quae pietas ei debetur a quo nihil acceperis? aut quid omnino, cuius nullum meritum sit, ei deberi potest? . . . (dei) quamobrem colendi sint non intellego nullo nec accepto ab eis nec sperato bono, Cic., ND. i, 116; cf. Pl., Euthphr. pass. Homer speaks in the same way of the ἀμοιβὴ ἀγακλειτῆς ἑκατόμβης, γ 58–9 (cf. ἀμοιβὰς τῶν θυσιῶν from the side of the gods, Pl. Smp., 202 E).

22 What kind of respect do you owe to someone who hasn't given you anything? Or what could you possibly owe someone with no merit at all? ... (gods) So, I don't see why they should be honored since we get no good from them and don't expect any., Cic., ND. i, 116; cf. Pl., Euthphr. pass. Homer speaks similarly of the exchange of the great sacrifice, γ 58–9 (cf. sacrificial offerings from the perspective of the gods, Pl. Smp., 202 E).

23 τοῦτό νυ καὶ γέρας οἷον ὀϊζυροῖσι βροτοῖσιν, κείρασθαί τε κόμην βαλέειν τ’ ἀπὸ δάκρυ παρειῶν, δ 197 f.; cf. ω 188 f., 294 f.

23 This is truly a badge of honor for unfortunate humans, to be isolated and to have their hair fall from the tears streaming down their faces., d 197 f.; cf. ω 188 f., 294 f.

24 οὐ γὰρ ἔτ’ αὖτις νίσομαι ἐξ’ Ἀΐδαο ἐπήν με πυρὸς λελάχητε, Ψ 75 f.

24 I won't come back from the Underworld if you take my fire., Psalms 75 f.

25 —ἰόντι εἰς Ἀΐδαο χερσὶ κατ’ ὀφθαλμοὺς ἐλέειν σύν τε στόμ’ ἐρεῖσαι, λ 426; cf. Λ 453, ω 296. To do this is the duty of the next of kin, mother or wife. The necessity for closing the sightless eyes and dumb mouth of the dead is intelligible without reference to any superstitious arrière pensée. Such an idea is, however, dimly discernible in such a phrase as ἄχρις ὅτου ψυχήν μου μητρὸς χέρες εἶλαν ἀπ’ ὄσσων, Epigr. Gr., 314, 24. Was there originally some idea of the “soul” being released by these means?—Seat of the soul in the κόρη of the eye: ψυχαὶ δ’ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖσι τῶν τελευτώντων, Babr. 95, 35 (see Crusius, Rh. Mus. 46, 319). Augurium non timendi mortem in aegritudine quamdiu oculorum pupillae imaginem reddant, Plin., N.H. 28, 64; cf. Grimm, p. 1181. (If a person can no longer see his or her εἴδωλον 47 in a mirror it is a sign of approaching death, Oldenburg, Rel. d. Ved., 526 [p. 4493 French tr.].)—Among many peoples it is believed that the eyes of the dead must be closed in order to prevent the dead person seeing or haunting anyone in the future: Robinsohn, Psychol. d. Naturv., 44; cf. Cic., Verr. v, 118 (of the Greeks); Vg., A. iv, 684 f.: extremus si quis super halitus errat ore legam. Serv. ad loc.: muliebriter, tamquam possit animam sororis excipere et in se transferre (cf. Epigr. Gr., 547; IG. Sic. et It., 607e, 9–10). ψυχή making its exit through the mouth: I 409; cf. “Among the Seminoles of Florida when a woman died in childbirth the infant was held over her face to receive her parting spirit and thus acquire strength and knowledge for future use,” Tylor, i, 433.

25 —Entering Hades, with hands covering the blind eyes and silent mouth, λ 426; cf. Λ 453, ω 296. This is the responsibility of the closest relative, whether it be mother or wife. The need to close the eyes and mouth of the deceased is clear without any superstitious implications. However, a somewhat vague belief might be sensed in a phrase like until my soul was taken from my mother's gaze, Epigr. Gr., 314, 24. Was there originally a belief that the “soul” was set free in this way?—The soul's seat in the student of the eye: the souls of the departed live on in the eyes, Babr. 95, 35 (see Crusius, Rh. Mus. 46, 319). There's no indication of fearing death in illness as long as the pupils show a reflection., Plin., N.H. 28, 64; cf. Grimm, p. 1181. (If a person can no longer see their icon 47 in a mirror, it is a sign of impending death, Oldenburg, Rel. d. Ved., 526 [p. 4493 French tr.].)—Many cultures believe that the eyes of the dead must be closed to prevent the deceased from seeing or haunting anyone in the future: Robinsohn, Psychol. d. Naturv., 44; cf. Cic., Verr. v, 118 (of the Greeks); Vg., A. iv, 684 f.: If any final breath passes over them, I will read it. Serv. ad loc.: like a woman, as if she could seize her sister's soul and pass it on (cf. Epigr. Gr., 547; IG. Sic. et It., 607e, 9–10). The spirit making its exit through the mouth: I 409; cf. “Among the Seminoles of Florida when a woman died in childbirth, the infant was held over her face to receive her parting spirit and thus gain strength and knowledge for the future,” Tylor, i, 433.

26 And even ἀνὰ πρόθυρον τετραμμένος, Τ 212, i.e. with feet turned towards the door. The reason for this custom—which existed elsewhere, too, and still exists—is hardly to be sought only in the ritus naturae, as Plin. 7, 46, thinks. This has generally little to do with the customs observed on the solemn occasions of life. The meaning of the practice is much more naively revealed in a statement about the manners of the Pehuenchen Indians in South America given by Pöpig, Reise in Chile, Peru, etc., i, 393. There they carry the dead man feet foremost out of the door “because if the corpse of the dead man were carried out otherwise his wandering ghost might come back into the house”. The Greek custom, though in Homeric times long faded to a mere symbol, must be supposed to have depended originally upon similar fears of the return of the “soul”. (Similar precautions arising from the same belief were customary at funerals elsewhere: Oldenberg, Rel. d. Veda, 573–4 [489 F.T.]. Robinsohn, Psychol. d. Naturv., 45 f.) Belief in the incomplete departure of the soul from this world has dictated these customs, too.

26 And even narrowed down in the doorway, Τ 212, meaning with feet facing the door. The reason for this tradition—which also existed in other cultures and continues today—cannot simply be attributed to ritus naturae, as Plin. 7, 46 suggests. This is generally not related to the customs followed during significant life events. The significance of this practice is more clearly revealed in a description of the Pehuenchen Indians in South America, provided by Pöpig in Reise in Chile, Peru, etc., i, 393. There, they carry the deceased out the door feet first “because if the corpse is carried out in any other way, the wandering ghost might return to the house.” The Greek custom, although it faded to a mere symbol by Homeric times, likely originated from similar fears about the return of the “soul.” (Similar precautions based on the same belief were common at funerals elsewhere: Oldenberg, Rel. d. Veda, 573–4 [489 F.T.]. Robinsohn, Psychol. d. Naturv., 45 f.) The belief in the soul's incomplete departure from this world has also influenced these customs.

27 The details of the procedure until the funeral dirge are given in Σ 343–55.

27 The details of the procedure leading up to the funeral dirge are provided in Σ 343–55.

28 τύμβος and στήλη, Π 457, 675, Ρ 434, Λ 371, μ 14. A heaped-up σῆμα as the burial-place of Eetion round which the Nymphs plant elms: Ζ 419 ff.—which preserves a trace of the custom, obtaining also in later times, of planting trees and even a whole grove round the grave.

28 tomb and column, Π 457, 675, Ρ 434, Λ 371, μ 14. A piled-up σῆμα as the burial site of Eetion, around which the Nymphs plant elms: Ζ 419 ff.—which preserves a trace of the custom, also seen in later times, of planting trees and even an entire grove around the grave.

29 κτέρεα κτερεΐζειν in the formula σημά τέ οἱ χεῦαι καὶ ἐπὶ κτέρεα κτερεΐζειν, α 291, β 222. Here the κτερεΐζειν comes after the heaping up of the grave-mound—possibly the κτέρεα are to be burnt on or at the grave-mound. Schol. B on Τ 212 is, however, mistaken in the rule deduced from these cases: προὐτίθεσαν, εἶτα ἔθαπτον, εἶτα ἐτυμβοχόουν, εἶτα ἐκτερέϊζον. All the cases refer to the ceremonial at empty graves. Where the body was obtainable the relatives or friends would have burnt the κτέρεα with the body. This is done in the case of Eetion and Elpenor, and it must be understood in the close connexion of the words ἐν πυρὶ κήαιεν καὶ ἐπὶ κτέρεα κτερίσαιεν, Ω 38, and again ὄφρ’ ἕταρον θάπτοι καὶ ἐπὶ κτέρεα κτερίσειεν, γ 285.

29 ktereā keterizein in the formula sēma and I are going to meet up to discuss some things., a 291, b 222. Here the ktereizein comes after the construction of the grave-mound—possibly the ktereā are meant to be burned on or at the grave-mound. Schol. B on T 212 is, however, wrong in the conclusion drawn from these cases: proutithesan, this is ethapton, this is etumbochooun, this is ektereizon. All the cases refer to the ritual at empty graves. Where the body was available, the relatives or friends would have burned the ktereā along with the body. This is done in the instances of Eetion and Elpenor, and it must be understood in the close connection of the words en puri kēaien kai epi kterea keterisaien, Ω 38, and again ōphr’ hetaron thaptoi kai epi kterea keteriseien, g 285.

30—a custom that originally belonged to all primitive peoples and remained in force for a very long time among many of them. All the possessions of a dead Inca remain his own absolute property: Prescott, Peru4, i, 31. Among the Abipones of Paraguay all the possessions of the dead are burnt: Klemm, Culturges. ii, 99. The Albanians of the Caucasus buried all the dead man’s possessions with him, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πένητες ζῶσιν οὐδὲν πατρῷον ἔχοντες, Str. 503. Of ancient origin are also the extravagant burial customs of the Mingrelians living in what was formerly Albania: Chardin, Voy. en Perse (ed. Langlès), i, 325, 298, 314, 322. 48

30—a tradition that initially belonged to all early societies and continued to exist for a long time among many of them. All the belongings of a deceased Inca remain his own absolute property: Prescott, Peru4, i, 31. Among the Abipones of Paraguay, all the belongings of the dead are burned: Klemm, Culturges. ii, 99. The Albanians of the Caucasus buried all the possessions of the deceased with him, And for this reason, the poor live without any inheritance., Str. 503. The extravagant burial customs of the Mingrelians, who lived in what was once Albania, also have ancient roots: Chardin, Voy. en Perse (ed. Langlès), i, 325, 298, 314, 322. 48

31 Examples given by O. Jahn, Persius, p. 219 fin.

31 Examples provided by O. Jahn, Persius, p. 219 fin.

32 ψυχὴ δ’ ἐκ ῥεθέων πταμένη Ἄϊδόσδε βεβήκει, ὃν πότμον γοόωσα λιποῦσ’ ἀνδροτῆτα καὶ ἥβην, Π 756. Χ 362 cf. Υ 294, Ν 415. ψυχὴ δ’ Ἀϊδόσδε κατῆλθεν, κ 560, λ 65. Complete departure into the depths of the kingdom of Hades is more clearly expressed in such words as βαίην δόμον Ἄϊδος εἴσω, Ω 246, κίον Ἄϊδος εἴσω, Ζ 422, etc. Again, in λ 150, the soul of Teiresias while speaking to Odysseus is still in Hades in the wider sense but is more exactly on the extreme edge of that region: we are told ψυχὴ μὲν ἔβη δόμον Ἄϊδος εἴσω—now at last it goes back again into the depths of the Kingdom of Hades.

32 The soul has drifted down from the rivers into the underworld, lamenting the life it left behind—its manhood and youth., Π 756. Χ 362 cf. Υ 294, Ν 415. The soul has gone down to Hades., κ 560, λ 65. A complete departure into the depths of the Hades is more clearly expressed in words like I head into Hades., Ω 246, I'm going into Hades., Ζ 422, and so forth. Again, in λ 150, the soul of Teiresias, while speaking to Odysseus, is still in Hades in a broader sense but is more precisely on the very edge of that region: we are told the soul entered the house of Hades—finally, it goes back again into the depths of the Kingdom of Hades.

33 Aristonikos on Ψ 104: ἡ διπλῆ ὅτι τὰς τῶν ἀτάφων ψυχὰς Ὅμηρος ἔτι σωζούσας τὴν φρόνησιν ὑποτίθεται. (Rather too systematically put by Porph. ap. Stob., Ecl. i, p. 422, 20 ff., 425, 25 ff. W.) Elpenor is the first to approach Odysseus’ sacrificial trench οὐ γάρ πω ἐτέθαπτο, λ 52. His ψυχή had not yet been received into Hades (Rh. Mus. 1, 615). Achilles’ treatment of the body of Hektor shows that he thought of his enemy (because he was still unburied) as being able to feel what was done to him: lacerari eum et sentire credo putat, Cic., TD. i, 105.

33 Aristonikos on Ψ 104: the duality that Homer hints at, that the souls of those who haven't been buried still keep their reasoning. (Rather too systematically put by Porph. ap. Stob., Ecl. i, p. 422, 20 ff., 425, 25 ff. W.) Elpenor is the first to approach Odysseus’ sacrificial trench for he has not been buried yet, λ 52. His soul had not yet been taken to Hades (Rh. Mus. 1, 615). Achilles’ treatment of Hektor's body shows that he believed his enemy (since he was still unburied) could feel what was done to him: I believe he thinks he can tear him apart and feel it., Cic., TD. i, 105.

34 Plin. vii, 187, explains the change among the Romans from burial to cremation as being due to the fear that in times of war and disturbance the dead might be deprived of their rest. If a man dies in war time, i.e. during a period of temporary nomadism, his body is burnt, but a limb (sometimes the head) is cut off to be taken home and buried ad quod servatum iusta fierent, Paul. Festi, 148, 11; Varro, LL. v, 23; Cic., Lg. ii, 55, 60. The same custom is found among certain German tribes: see Weinhold, Sitzb. Wien. Ac. xxix, 156; xxx, 208. Even among the negroes of Guinea and the South American Indians practices resembling the os resectum of the Romans are found in the case of those who die in war in foreign country; cf. Klemm, Culturg. iii, 297; ii, 98 f. In every case burial is regarded as the ancient and traditional mode of disposing of the dead, and the one strictly required on religious grounds.

34 Plin. vii, 187, discusses the shift among the Romans from burial to cremation, which happened because of the fear that during times of war and turmoil, the dead might be denied their peace. If a person dies during wartime, meaning while moving around temporarily, their body is burned, but a limb (sometimes the head) is removed to be taken home and buried for the preservation of justice, Paul. Festi, 148, 11; Varro, LL. v, 23; Cic., Lg. ii, 55, 60. This same practice is observed among certain German tribes: see Weinhold, Sitzb. Wien. Ac. xxix, 156; xxx, 208. Similar customs can even be found among the Black people of Guinea and the South American Indians, resembling the Romans' os resectum for those who die in battles far from home; cf. Klemm, Culturg. iii, 297; ii, 98 f. In all these cases, burial is viewed as the ancient and traditional way to handle the dead, and the only method that is strictly required for religious reasons.

35 Only once is there any mention of taking home the burnt bones, Η 334 f. Aristarch. rightly recognized this as being in conflict with the normal conceptions and practice of Homer and regarded the lines as the composition of a later poet (Sch. A ad loc. and on Δ 174; Sch. EMQ., γ 109). The lines may have been inserted to account for the absence from the Troad of such enormous grave-mounds as the burial of the ashes of both armies should have produced. The same reason—the desire expressed in these lines to bring back those who have died in a foreign country to their own land at last—is implied as the origin of cremation in the illustrative story of Herakles and Argeios, the son of Likymnios, in the ἱστορία (derived from Andron) of Sch. A on Α 52.

35 There’s only one mention of bringing home the burnt bones. Η 334 f. Aristarchus rightly pointed out that this clashes with the usual beliefs and practices of Homer, seeing these lines as the work of a later poet (Sch. A ad loc. and on Δ 174; Sch. EMQ., γ 109). The lines might have been added to explain the lack of massive burial mounds in the Troad that should have followed the cremation of both armies. The same idea—wanting to bring back those who died in a foreign land to their homeland—is suggested as the reason for cremation in the story of Herakles and Argeios, the son of Likymnios, in the history (derived from Andron) of Sch. A on Α 52.

36 Kl. Schr. ii, 216, 220.

36 Kl. Schr. vol. 2, 216, 220.

37 It would apply better to Roman beliefs; cf. Vg., A. iv, 698–9—though even that means something else. (Cf. also Oldenberg, Rel. d. Veda, 585, 2.)

37 It would fit better with Roman beliefs; see Vg., A. iv, 698–9—though that means something different. (Also see Oldenberg, Rel. d. Veda, 585, 2.)

38 Cf. esp. Ψ 75–6, λ 218–22.

38 See especially Ψ 75–6, λ 218–22.

39 Serv. ad A. iii, 68: Aegyptii condita diutius servant cadavera scilicet ut anima multo tempore perduret et corpori sit obnoxia nec cito ad aliud transeat. Romani contra faciebant, comburentes cadavera ut statim anima in generalitatem, i.e. in suam naturam rediret (the pantheistic touch may be neglected).—Cf. the account given by Ibn Foslan of the burial customs of the pagan Russians 49 (quoted from Frähn by J. Grimm, Kl. Schr. ii, 292): the preference for burning was due to the idea that the soul was less quickly set free on its way to Paradise when the body was buried intact, than when it was destroyed by fire.

39 Serv. ad A. iii, 68: The Egyptians buried bodies for a longer period so that the soul could last longer and stay connected to the body, instead of quickly moving on to another form. In contrast, the Romans cremated bodies so that the soul would quickly return to the general essence or nature. (The pantheistic aspect can be overlooked).—See the account by Ibn Foslan regarding the burial customs of pagan Russians 49 (cited from Frähn by J. Grimm, Kl. Schr. ii, 292): the preference for cremation stemmed from the belief that the soul would be freed more slowly on its journey to Paradise if the body was buried whole than if it was destroyed by fire.

40 Cf. the Hymn of the Rigveda (x, 16) which is to be said at a cremation, esp. v. 2, 9 (quoted by Zimmer, Altind. Leben, 402 f.), and also Rigv. x, 14, 8 (Zimmer, p. 409). The Indians also wished to prevent the return of the dead to the world of the living. The feet of the corpse were chained so that the dead could not return (Zimmer, p. 402).

40 See the Hymn of the Rigveda (x, 16) that is recited at a cremation, especially verses 2 and 9 (quoted by Zimmer, Altind. Leben, 402 f.), and also Rigv. x, 14, 8 (Zimmer, p. 409). The Indians also wanted to prevent the dead from returning to the world of the living. The feet of the corpse were bound so that the dead could not come back (Zimmer, p. 402).

41 It lies at the root of the stories of Demeter and Demophoon (or Triptolemos), and also that of Thetis and Achilles, when the goddess, laying the mortal child in the fire, περιῄρει τὰς θνητὰς σάρκας, ἔφθειρεν ὃ ἦν αὐτῷ θνητόν, in order to make it immortal (cf. Preller, Dem. u. Perseph., 112); cf. also the custom observed at certain festivals (? of Hecate, cf. Bergk, PLG. iii, 682) of lighting fires in the streets and leaping through the flames carrying children, see Grimm (E.T.), p. 625; cf. also Cic., Div. i, 47: o praeclarum discessum cum ut Herculi contigit mortali corpore cremato in lucem animus excessit! Ov., M., ix, 250: Luc., Herm., 7; Q.S. v, 640 ff. (For more about the “purifying” effects of fire, see below, chap. ix, n. 127.)

41 It lies at the heart of the tales of Demeter and Demophoon (or Triptolemos), as well as that of Thetis and Achilles, when the goddess, placing the mortal child in the fire, He stripped away the mortal flesh and destroyed what was mortal to him., to make him immortal (cf. Preller, Dem. u. Perseph., 112); see also the tradition at certain festivals (? of Hecate, cf. Bergk, PLG. iii, 682) of lighting fires in the streets and jumping through the flames while carrying children, see Grimm (E.T.), p. 625; cf. also Cic., Div. i, 47: Oh, what a remarkable departure it was when, just like Hercules, the soul left the mortal body after cremation! Ov., M., ix, 250: Luc., Herm., 7; Q.S. v, 640 ff. (For more about the “purifying” effects of fire, see below, chap. ix, n. 127.)

42 Nothing else than this is implied by the words of Η 409–10, οὐ γὰρ τις φειδὼ νεκύων κατατεθνηώτων γίγνετ’, ἐπεί κε θάνωσι πυρὸς μειλισσέμεν ὦκα. The souls of the dead must be quickly “assuaged with fire” (their longing gratified) and so their bodies are burnt. Purification from what is mortal and unclean, which Dieterich (Nekyia, 197, 3) thinks is referred to in this passage, is certainly not suggested as such by the words of the poet.

42 Nothing more than this is suggested by the words of Η 409–10, for no one mourns the dead who have died, once they are to be quickly “calmed with fire”. The souls of the dead must be swiftly “calmed with fire” (their desires fulfilled) and so their bodies are burned. The purification from what is mortal and impure, which Dieterich (Nekyia, 197, 3) believes is mentioned in this passage, is certainly not implied by the words of the poet.

43 Light may be incidentally thrown on the question of the transition from burial to cremation by such a story as that which an Icelandic Saga tells of a man who is buried by his own wish before the door of his house; “but as he returned and did much mischief his body was exhumed and burnt and the ashes scattered over the sea” (Weinhold, Altnord. Leben, 499). We often read in old stories how the body of a dead man who goes about as a vampire is burnt. His soul is then exorcized and cannot come back again.

43 Light can be shed on the shift from burial to cremation by a story from an Icelandic Saga about a man who, at his own request, is buried in front of his house; “but after he returned and caused a lot of trouble, his body was dug up, burned, and the ashes were scattered in the sea” (Weinhold, Altnord. Leben, 499). We often come across old tales where the body of a deceased man who rises as a vampire is burned. This way, his soul is expelled and can't return.

44 It is natural to think of Asiatic influence. Cremation hearths have recently (1893) been discovered in Babylonia.

44 It's natural to consider the influence from Asia. Recently (1893), cremation sites have been found in Babylonia.

45 See Helbig, D. Hom. Epos aus d. Denkm. erl., 42 f.

45 See Helbig, D. Hom. Epos aus d. Denkm. erl., 42 f.

46 That the men of the “Mycenaean” culture, though much affected by foreign influences, were Greeks—the Greeks of the Heroic age of whom Homer speaks—may now be regarded as certain (see esp. E. Reisch, Verh. Wien. Philol., 99 ff.).

46 It's now clear that the men of the "Mycenaean" culture, while heavily influenced by foreign cultures, were Greeks—the same Greeks from the Heroic age that Homer mentions (see especially E. Reisch, Verh. Wien. Philol., 99 ff.).

47 See Schliemann, Mycenae, E.T., 155, 165, 213–14.

47 See Schliemann, Mycenae, translated by E.T., pages 155, 165, 213–14.

48 Helbig. Hom. Epos2, p. 52.

48 Helbig. Hom. Epos2, p. 52.

49 Cf. K. Weinhold, Sitzb. Wien. Ak., 1858 (Phil. hist. Cl.), xxix, pp. 121, 125, 141. The remarkable coincidences between the Mycenaean and these North European burial customs do not seem as yet to have been noticed. (The object of this elaborate foundation and covering may have been to preserve the corpse from decay longer, and especially from the effects of damp.)

49 See K. Weinhold, Sitzb. Wien. Ak., 1858 (Phil. hist. Cl.), xxix, pp. 121, 125, 141. The notable similarities between Mycenaean and these North European burial practices don’t seem to have been acknowledged yet. (The purpose of this detailed foundation and covering may have been to keep the body from decaying for a longer time, particularly from the impact of moisture.)

50 Also in the domed grave of Dimini: Ath. Mitth., xii, 138.

50 Also in the domed tomb of Dimini: Ath. Mitth., xii, 138.

51 The soul of a dead man from whom a favourite possession is withheld returns (equally whether the body and the possessions with it are burnt or buried). The story in Lucian, Philops., xxvii, of the wife of Eukrates (cf. Hdt. v, 92η), is quite in accordance with popular belief. 50

51 The spirit of a deceased person whose cherished item is kept from them will return, regardless of whether their body and belongings are cremated or buried. The tale in Lucian, Philops., xxvii, about the wife of Eukrates (see Hdt. v, 92η) aligns perfectly with common belief. 50

52 Schliemann, Myc., 212–13: see plan F. A similar altar in the Hall of the Palace of Tiryus: Schuchhardt, Schliemann’s Exc. (E.T.), p. 107.

52 Schliemann, Myc., 212–13: see plan F. A similar altar in the Hall of the Palace of Tiryus: Schuchhardt, Schliemann’s Exc. (E.T.), p. 107.

53 ἐσχάρα is essentially ἐφ’ ἧς τοῖς ἥρωσιν ἀποθύομεν, Poll. i, 8; cf. Neanthes ap. Ammon., Diff. Voc., p. 34 V. Such an altar rested directly on the ground without anything intervening (μὴ ἔχουσα ὕψος ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ γῆς ἱδρυμένη), it is round (στρογγυλοειδής) and hollow (κοίλη): cf. esp. Harp., 87, 15 ff. Phot., s.v. ἐσχάρα (2 glosses); AB. 256, 32; EM., 384, 12 ff.; Sch. on ζ 52; Eust., Od., p. 1939 (ψ 71): Sch. Eur., Ph., 284. It is evident that the ἐσχάρα is not very far removed from the sacrificial trench of the cult of the dead: thus it is actually called also βόθρος; Sch. Eur., Ph., 274 (σκαπτή S. Byz., 191, 7 Mein.).

53 fireplace is essentially We sacrifice for the heroes., Poll. i, 8; cf. Neanthes ap. Ammon., Diff. Voc., p. 34 V. Such an altar rested directly on the ground without anything intervening (Not having height but being set on the ground.), it is round (oval) and hollow (hollow): cf. esp. Harp., 87, 15 ff. Phot., s.v. grill (2 glosses); AB. 256, 32; EM., 384, 12 ff.; Sch. on ζ 52; Eust., Od., p. 1939 (ψ 71): Sch. Eur., Ph., 284. It is evident that the __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ is not very far removed from the sacrificial trench of the cult of the dead: thus it is actually called also βόθρος; Sch. Eur., Ph., 274 (σκαπτή S. Byz., 191, 7 Mein.).

54 Stengel has a different view (Chthon. u. Todt., 427, 2).

54 Stengel sees things differently (Chthon. u. Todt., 427, 2).

II

55 It is doubtful whether Homer even knew of dream-oracles (which would be closely related to oracles of the dead). That in Α 63 ἐγκοίμησις is “at least alluded to” (as Nägelsbach, Nachhom. Theol., 172, thinks) is by no means certain. The ὀνειροπόλος would not be a priest who intentionally gave himself up to prophetic sleep and thus ὑπὲρ ἑτέρων ὀνείρους ὁρᾷ, but rather an ὀνειροκρίτης—an interpreter of other men’s unsought dream-visions.

55 It's uncertain whether Homer was even aware of dream-oracles (which would be closely related to oracles of the deadSure! Please provide the text you'd like me to modernize.. The notion that in Α 63 sleep is “at least mentioned” (as Nägelsbach, Nachhom. Theol., 172, suggests) is by no means guaranteed. The dreamer would not be a priest who willingly entered prophetic sleep and thus He dreams for others., but instead an dream interpreter—an interpreter of other people's unintended dream visions.

56 Even the river-gods and Nymphs who are usually confined to their own homes are called to the ἀγορά of all the gods in Olympos, Υ 4 ff. These deities who remain fixed in the locality of their worship are weaker than the Olympians just because they are not elevated with the rest to the ideal summit of Olympos. Kalypso resignedly admits this, ε 169 f., εἴ κε θεοί γ’ ἐθέλωσι, τοὶ οὐρανὸν εὐρὺν ἔχουσιν, οἵ μευ φέρτεροί εἰσι νοῆσαί τε κρῆναί τε. They have sunk to the second rank of deities. They are, however, never thought of as free and independent, but as a mere addition to the kingdom of Zeus and the other Olympians.

56 Even the river gods and Nymphs, who usually stay in their own territories, are called to the market of all the gods on Olympus, Υ 4 ff. These deities, who are tied to the places where they are worshipped, are weaker than the Olympians simply because they aren’t raised up with the others to the ideal height of Olympus. Kalypso acknowledges this with resignation, ε 169 f., If the gods, who hold the wide heavens, wish it, those who are more powerful than I can understand and provide.. They have fallen to a lower rank among the deities. However, they are never considered free and independent, but rather as a simple addition to the realm of Zeus and the other Olympians.

57 Exx. in Nägelsbach, Hom. Theol.2, 387 f. (φρένες), W. Schrader, Jb. f. Philol. 1885, p. 163 f. (ἦτορ).

57 Exx. in Nägelsbach, Hom. Theol.2, 387 f. (brakes), W. Schrader, Jb. f. Philol. 1885, p. 163 f. (ἦτορ).

58 The belief in the existence of more than one soul in the same person is very wide-spread. See J. G. Müller, Americ. Urrelig., p. 66, 207 f., Tylor, i, 432 f. The distinction between the five spiritual powers dwelling within man given by the Avesta rests upon similar grounds (Geiger, Civ. of East. Iran, 1, 124 ff.). Even in Homer Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, i, 249, finds a “two-soul” theory fully developed. According to him Homer recognizes in the θυμός—a word supposed to be derived from the steam rising from freshly shed and still warm blood—a second soul in addition to the ψυχή: a “smoke-soul” side by side with the “breath-soul”. But if by soul a “something” is meant—as it must be in popular psychology—which is added independently to the body and its faculties, something which lives separately in the body and after the death of the body (with which it is not indissolubly united) dissociates itself and goes off independently—then the θυμός of Homer cannot be called a “soul” or a double of the ψυχή. Again and again the θυμός is clearly referred to as a mental faculty of the living body; either thinking or willing or merely feeling (θυμῷ νοέω, θυμῷ δεῖσαι, γηθήσει θυμῷ, ἐχολώσατο θυμῷ, ἤραρε θυμὸν ἐδωδῇ, etc.) is conducted by its means. It is the seat of the emotions (μένος ἔλλαβε θυμόν) and belongs to the body of the living man, and is especially enclosed in the φρένες. In the face of 51 this it is impossible to regard it as something independent of the body or as anything else than a special faculty of the same living body. Once, indeed, Η 131, the θυμός is spoken of, instead of ψυχή as that which goes down to Haides, but this can only be an error or an oversight (see also below, ch. xi, n. 2). According to Homeric ideas—and this is a conception repeated over and over again in Greek literature and even in Greek philosophy—the body has all its vital powers in itself, not merely θυμός but μένος, νόος, μῆτις, βουλή. Yet it only acquires life when supplemented by the ψυχή, which is something different from all these bodily powers—something with an independent being of its own and alone deserving the name “soul”, a name which belongs as little to θυμός as to νόος. Gomperz thinks that θυμός, etc., were at first the only recognized faculties of the body and that ψυχή was only (for the Greeks) added later. This is certainly not to be made out from Homer—or any other part of Greek literature.

58 The idea that a person can have multiple souls is quite common. See J. G. Müller, Americ. Urrelig., p. 66, 207 f., Tylor, i, 432 f. The division of the five spiritual powers within humans from the Avesta is based on similar concepts (Geiger, Civ. of East. Iran, 1, 124 ff.). Even in Homer, Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, i, 249, identifies a developed “two-soul” theory. According to him, Homer acknowledges the anger—a term thought to come from the steam rising from freshly spilled and still warm blood—as a second soul, in addition to the soul: a “smoke-soul” alongside the “breath-soul.” However, if by soul we mean a “something” that is attached independently to the body and its abilities, which lives separately within the body and, after the body dies, separates and exists on its own—then Homer’s anger cannot be considered a “soul” or a double of the soul. Again and again, the anger is clearly described as a mental ability of the living body; whether it is thinking, choosing, or simply feeling (I understand with my spirit, I must beseech with my spirit, my spirit will rejoice, my spirit became angry, my spirit was calmed by the food., etc.) occurs through it. It is the center of emotions (he was filled with anger) and is part of the living man's body, specifically located in the brakes. In light of this, it is impossible to see it as something separate from the body or anything other than a special capability of the living body. Once, indeed, Η 131, the anger is mentioned instead of soul as that which goes down to Haides, but this must be a mistake or an oversight (see also below, ch. xi, n. 2). According to Homeric beliefs—and this notion recurs throughout Greek literature and philosophy—the body possesses all its vital abilities within itself, not just anger but also μένους, νους, σοφία, απόφαση. Yet, it only comes to life when complemented by the soul, which is distinct from all these bodily capacities—something with its own separate existence and truly deserving of the title “soul,” a term that applies as little to anger as to mind. Gomperz believes that anger and the like were originally the only recognized faculties of the body and that soul was only (for the Greeks) introduced later. This cannot be concluded from Homer—or any other segment of Greek literature.

59 περὶ ψυχῆς θέον, X 161; περὶ ψυχέων ἐμάχοντο, χ 245; ψυχὴν παραβαλλόμενος, I 322; ψυχὰς παρθέμενοι, γ 74, ι 255; ψυχῆς ἀντάξιον, I 401; and cf. ι 523: αἲ γὰρ δὴ ψυχῆς τε καὶ αἰῶνός σε δυναίμην εὖνιν ποιήσας πέμψαι δόμον Ἄϊδος εἴσω. No one strictly speaking can go into Hades bereft of his ψυχή, for it is the ψυχή alone which goes there. Thus ψυχή here clearly = life, as is shown also by the addition of the words καὶ αἰῶνος for the sake of clearness. It is more doubtful whether this is the explanation of ψυχῆς ὄλεθρος, X 325, or of ψυχὰς ὀλέσαντες, Ν 763, Ω 168. Other passages adduced by Nägelsb., Hom. Th.2, 381, and Schrader, Jb. f. Philol. 1885, p. 167, either admit or require the material sense of the word ψυχή: e.g. Ε 696 ff., Θ 123, σ 91, etc.

59 about the spirit, X 161; they argued about souls, χ 245; comparing the spirit, I 322; setting souls aside, γ 74, ι 255; soul-worthy, I 401; and cf. ι 523: for sure if I could give you a good life and send you to the house of Hades. No one can enter Hades without their spirit, since it is the spirit that goes there. Thus, spirit clearly represents life, as also indicated by the addition of the words and forever for clarity. It’s less certain whether this explains the soul's destruction, X 325, or soul destruction, Ν 763, Ω 168. Other passages cited by Nägelsb., Hom. Th.2, 381, and Schrader, Jb. f. Philol. 1885, p. 167, either support or necessitate the material meaning of the word spirit: for example, Ε 696 ff., Θ 123, σ 91, etc.

III

60 A more detailed statement and documentation of the following analysis of the Nekyia in Od. λ will be found in Rh. Mus. 1, 600 ff. (1895). [Kl. Schr. ii, 255.]

60 A more detailed explanation and documentation of the following analysis of the Nekyia in Od. λ can be found in Rh. Mus. 1, 600 ff. (1895). [Kl. Schr. ii, 255.]

61 The information given by Teiresias, λ 107 ff., about Thrinakia and the cattle of Helios seems to be put in such a brief and inadequate form just because the fuller account given by Kirke, μ 127, was already known to the poet who did not wish to repeat this word for word.

61 The information provided by Teiresias, λ 107 ff., about Thrinakia and Helios's cattle appears to be presented in a brief and insufficient way simply because the more detailed description from Kirke, μ 127, was already familiar to the poet, who didn't want to restate it verbatim.

62 A final example of such pictures intended to suggest the background of the Odyssey is the conversation between Achilles and Agamemnon in the “second Nekyia”, ω 19 ff. The composer of these lines has understood quite correctly the meaning and purpose of his model, the original Nekyia of λ, though his continuation of it is certainly very clumsy.

62 A final example of such images meant to evoke the background of the Odyssey is the exchange between Achilles and Agamemnon in the “second Nekyia,” ω 19 ff. The writer of these lines has grasped the meaning and intent of his model, the original Nekyia of λ, although his continuation of it is definitely quite awkward.

63 κ 539–40 is borrowed from δ 389–90, 470.—I find after writing this that Kammer had already suggested imitation of δ in the Nekyia: Einheit d. Od., 494 f.

63 κ 539–40 is borrowed from δ 389–90, 470.—I realize after writing this that Kammer had already pointed out the imitation of δ in the Nekyia: Einheit d. Od., 494 f.

64 It is striking (and may have some special reason) that in Kirke’s account there is no mention of the Kimmerians. It is easier to see why the careful description of the country in Kirke’s speech, κ 509–15, is not afterwards repeated but merely recalled to the memory of the reader in a few words (λ 21–2).

64 It's surprising (and might have a specific reason) that Kirke’s account doesn’t mention the Kimmerians. It's clearer why the detailed description of the land in Kirke’s speech, κ 509–15, isn’t repeated later but is just referenced briefly for the reader’s memory in a few words (λ 21–2).

65 I can see no essential difference between the conception and situation of Hades as indicated in the Iliad and the account given in the Nekyia of the Odyssey. J. H. Voss and Nitzsch were right in this matter. Nor do the additional details given in the “second Nekyia” of ω essentially “conflict” (as Teuffel, Stud. u. Charact., thinks) with the description of the first Nekyia. It does not adhere 52 slavishly to its original, but it rests upon the same fundamental conceptions.

65 I see no significant difference between the idea and portrayal of Hades as described in the Iliad and the account presented in the Nekyia of the Odyssey. J. H. Voss and Nitzsch were correct about this. Moreover, the extra details provided in the “second Nekyia” of ω do not really “conflict” (as Teuffel, Stud. u. Charact., suggests) with the description of the first Nekyia. It doesn't just follow its original too closely, but it is based on the same fundamental ideas.

66 Sch. H.Q., κ 514, Πυριφλεγέθων, ἤτοι τὸ πῦρ τὸ ἀφανίζον τὸ σάρκινον τῶν βροτῶν, cf. Apollodor., π. θεῶν, ap. Stob., Ecl. i, p. 420, 9 W. Πυριφλεγέθων εἴρηται ἀπὸ τοῦ πυρὶ φλέγεσθαι τοὺς τελευτῶντας.

66 Sch. H.Q., κ 514, Puriphlegethon, which is the fire that burns the flesh of mortals., cf. Apollodor., p. theôn, ap. Stob., Ecl. i, p. 420, 9 W. Puriphlegethon is said to be named after the fire that burns those who are dying..

67 Acheron, too, seems to be regarded as a river. The soul of the unburied Patroklos, which has already departed, ἀν’ εὐρυπυλὲς Ἄϊδος δῶ, and has therefore passed over Okeanos, is prevented by the other souls from passing over “the river”, Ψ 72 f. This can hardly be the Okeanos, and must, therefore, be Acheron (so, too, Porph. ap. Stob., Ecl. i, p. 422 f., 426 W.). κ 515 does not in the least prove that Acheron was thought of as a lake and not a river, as Bergk, Opusc. ii, 695, thinks.

67 Acheron is also seen as a river. The soul of the unburied Patroklos, which has already left, In the broad gates of Hades, and has therefore crossed Okeanos, is stopped by the other souls from crossing “the river,” Ψ 72 f. This can hardly be Okeanos, so it must be Acheron (as noted by Porph. ap. Stob., Ecl. i, p. 422 f., 426 W.). κ 515 does not prove at all that Acheron was imagined as a lake and not a river, contrary to what Bergk claims in Opusc. ii, 695.

68 Cf. λ 206 ff., 209–393 ff., 475.

68 Cf. λ 206 ff., 209–393 ff., 475.

69 See Π 851 ff. (Patroklos), X 358 ff. (Hektor), λ 69 ff. Behind each of these there lies the ancient belief that the soul in the moment of escape achieves a higher state of being and returns to a form of knowledge independent of sense-perception (cf. Artemon ap. Sch., Π 854, Arist. fr. 12 (10) R.). Otherwise this power belongs to gods and, strictly, only to Zeus, who can foresee everything (in Homer). But the statements are intentionally modified to suggest an undefined middle position between prophecy in the full sense and mere στοχάζεσθαι (cf. Sch. B.V., X 359)—X 359 at the most may go beyond this point.

69 See Π 851 ff. (Patroklos), X 358 ff. (Hektor), λ 69 ff. Behind each of these is the ancient belief that the soul, at the moment of escape, reaches a higher state of being and gains a form of knowledge that is separate from sensory perception (cf. Artemon ap. Sch., Π 854, Arist. fr. 12 (10) R.). Otherwise, this power is reserved for the gods, and specifically only for Zeus, who can see everything (in Homer). However, these statements are intentionally modified to imply an unclear position between full prophecy and mere contemplate (cf. Sch. B.V., X 359)—X 359 may at most extend beyond this point.

70 λ 218–24.

70 λ 218–24.

71 ὄϊν ἀρνειὸν ῥέζειν, θῆλύν τε μέλαιναν, εἰς Ἔρεβος στρέψας, κ 527 f. From the word μέλαιναν the ὄϊν ἀρνειὸν is also to be understood ἀπὸ κοινοῦ as being, more precisely, black (and so again in 572)—the ram offered to the gods (or Souls) of the underworld is regularly black. εἰς Ἔρεβος στρέψας, i.e. bending the head downwards (not towards the west) = ἐς βόθρον, λ 36—as Nitzsch rightly explains it. Everything corresponds to the regular ἔντομα of later times for the underworld beings (cf. Stengel, Ztsch. f. Gymn., 1880, p. 743 f.).

71 In the mentioned passage, κ 527 f. From the word dark, the "RAM" is also understood to signify specifically black (and again in 572)—the ram offered to the gods (or souls) of the underworld is typically black. "leaning downwards", meaning turning the head down (not towards the west) = “into a ditch”, λ 36—as Nitzsch accurately explains. Everything matches with the usual "creatures" of later traditions for the underworld beings (cf. Stengel, Ztsch. f. Gymn., 1880, p. 743 f.).

72 κοινή τις παρὰ ἀνθρώποις ἐστὶν ὑπόληψις ὅτι νεκροὶ καὶ δαίμονες σίδηρον φοβοῦνται, Sch. Q., λ 48. It is really the sound of the bronze or iron that drives away spirits: Luc., Philops. 15 (cf. O. Jahn, Abergl. d. bös. Blicks, 70). But even the mere presence of iron objects is sufficient: [Aug.] Hom. de sacrileg. (about the seventh century), 22, states that to the sacrilegi belong among others those who wear rings or armlets of iron, aut qui in domo sua quaecumque de ferro, propter ut daemones timeant, ponunt.

72 Many people believe that the dead and demons are afraid of iron., Sch. Q., λ 48. It’s really the sound of bronze or iron that scares away spirits: Luc., Philops. 15 (cf. O. Jahn, Abergl. d. bös. Blicks, 70). But just having iron objects around is enough: [Aug.] Hom. de sacrileg. (around the seventh century), 22, says that among those who are sacrilegi are those who wear iron rings or armlets, for those who put any iron objects in their home to ward off demons.

73 The idea that the Thesprotian νεκυομαντεῖον by the river Acheron was the original of the Homeric picture was first started by Paus. 1, 17, 5. He was followed by K. O. Müller, Introd. to a Scientific System of Myth., pp. 297–8 (E. T., Leitch), who has been followed by many others. But it has scarcely more justification than has e.g. the localization of the Homeric entrance to Hades at Cumae, Herakleia Pont. (cf. Rh. Mus. 36, 555 ff.), or other places of ancient worship of the dead (e.g. Pylos). At such places the traditional names of Acheron, Kokytos, Pyriphlegethon were easily introduced—but taken from Homer and not coming thence into Homer. The fact that it is just this Thesprotian oracle of the dead that is mentioned in Hdt.’s well-known story (v, 92 η) does not at all prove that this was the oldest of all such oracles.

73 The idea that the Thesprotian necromancer's cave by the river Acheron was the original source of the Homeric depiction was first proposed by Paus. 1, 17, 5. He was followed by K. O. Müller, Introd. to a Scientific System of Myth., pp. 297–8 (E. T., Leitch), and many others have since echoed this view. However, it has hardly more support than, for example, the idea of locating the Homeric entrance to Hades at Cumae, Herakleia Pont. (cf. Rh. Mus. 36, 555 ff.), or at other ancient sites of worship for the dead (e.g. Pylos). At these locations, the traditional names of Acheron, Kokytos, and Pyriphlegethon were easily introduced—but they were borrowed from Homer rather than originating from these places. The fact that this particular Thesprotian oracle of the dead is mentioned in Herodotus’s well-known story (v, 92 η) does not prove that it was the oldest of all such oracles.

74 To this extent Lobeck’s denial of necromancy to the Homeric poems (Agl. 316) may, perhaps, require to be modified; but so modified it may be accepted. 53

74 In this regard, Lobeck’s dismissal of necromancy in the Homeric poems (Agl. 316) might need some adjustment; however, with that adjustment, it can be accepted. 53

75 In accordance with primeval sacrificial custom. To the dead only female (or castrated) animals are offered (see Stengel, Chthon. u. Todtenc., 424). Here it is a στεῖρα βοῦς, ἄγονα τοῖς ἀγόνοις (Sch.). So among the Indians, “to the Manes that are without the powers of life and procreation” a wether instead of a ram was offered: Oldenberg, Rel. d. Ved., 358 [= 306 Fr. T.].

75 Following ancient sacrificial traditions, only female (or castrated) animals are offered to the dead (see Stengel, Chthon. u. Todtenc., 424). Here it is a Infertile cows, barren to the offspring (Sch.). Similarly, among the Indians, "to the Manes who lack the powers of life and procreation," a wether instead of a ram was offered: Oldenberg, Rel. d. Ved., 358 [= 306 Fr. T.].

76 Ω 592 ff. Achilles says to the dead Patroklos μή μοι Πάτροκλε σκυδμαινέμεν αἴ κε πύθηαι εἰν Ἄϊδός περ ἐὼν ὅτι Ἕκτορα δῖον ἔλυσα πατρὶ φίλῳ, ἔπει οὔ μοι ἀεικέα δῶκεν ἄποινα. σοὶ δ’ αὖ ἐγὼ καὶ τῶνδ’ ἀποδάσσομαι ὅσσ’ ἐπέοικεν. The possibility that the dead in Hades may be able to know what is happening in the upper world is referred to only hypothetically (αἴ κε)—not so, however, the intention of giving the dead man a share in the gifts of Priam (δι’ ἐπιταφίων εἰς αὐτὸν ἀγώνων as Sch. B.V. on 594 thinks). The strangeness of such a promise seems to have been one of the reasons that made Aristarch. (unjustly) athetize ll. 594–5.

76 Ω 592 ff. Achilles says to the dead Patroclus, “Don’t be upset, Patroclus, if you learn in the afterlife that I’ve killed noble Hector and brought him back to your father, since he never gave me a proper ransom. But for you, I will also distribute what I have instead of what is right.” The idea that the dead in Hades might know what’s happening in the world above is only suggested as a possibility; however, that doesn’t apply to sharing the offerings with the dead man as Sch. B.V. on 594 thinks. The oddity of such a promise seems to be one of the reasons that led Aristarchus (unfairly) to dismiss lines 594–5.

77 40–1. This is not un-Homeric, cf. esp. Ξ 456. Thus on many vase-paintings we see the psyche of a fallen warrior flying over the corpse, often clad in full armour, but very diminutive in size—to express invisibility.

77 40–1. This isn't without Homeric elements, see especially Ξ 456. Therefore, in many vase paintings, we see the soul of a fallen warrior soaring above the body, often wearing full armor but depicted as very small—to represent invisibility.

78 Strictly speaking Odysseus is supposed to enter into conversation with the women while each informs him of her fate (231-4); every now and then comes a φάτο 236, φῆ 237, εὔχετο 261, φάσκε 306. But the whole section is little more than a review at which Odysseus assists without taking any real part.

78 Technically, Odysseus is supposed to talk to the women while each tells him about her fate (231-4); now and then there’s a φάτο 236, φῆ 237, N/A 261, φάσκε 306. But this whole section is really just a summary that Odysseus watches without truly engaging.

79 Cf. Rh. Mus. 1, 625 ff. The nearest parallel to such a distinction between an εἴδωλον and the fully animated αὐτός is to be found in what Stesichoros (and Hesiod before him: see Paraphr. ant. Lyc., 822, p. 71, Scheer, and PLG. iii, p. 215) relates of Helen and her εἴδωλον. Prob. this latter story gave rise to the insertion of these lines, λ 602 ff.

79 Cf. Rh. Mus. 1, 625 ff. The closest comparison to the distinction between an idol and the fully animated self is found in what Stesichoros (and Hesiod before him: see Paraphr. ant. Lyc., 822, p. 71, Scheer, and PLG. iii, p. 215) tells about Helen and her idol. This latter story likely led to the addition of these lines, λ 602 ff.

80 Cf. 623 ff.

80 See 623 ff.

81 Welcker, Gr. Götterl. i, 818, and others following him.

81 Welcker, Gr. Götterl. i, 818, and others following him.

82 [Apollod.] 1, 9, 3, 2; Sch., Α 180 (p. 18b, 23 ff., Bekk.) gives as reason for the punishment of Sisyphos that he betrayed to Asopos the rape of his daughter Aigina by Zeus. This, however, does not rest upon good epic tradition. Another story follows up the betrayal with the myth of the outwitting of Death and then Hades by S., after which he is sent down to Hades again and punished by the task of the endless stone-rolling. The story of the double outwitting of the powers of death (cf. the similar fairy tale of Spielhansel: Grimm, Fairy Tales, n. 82, and Anm., vol. ii, p. 163, ed. 1915) is obviously intended humorously, and so it seems to have been treated in a satyr-drama of Aesch., the Σίσυφος δραπέτης [Sch., Ζ 153.] The fact that this story ends in the punishment of the stone-rolling ought to be sufficient warning against taking it in the serious and edifying sense in which Welcker and his followers interpret it. It is quite contrary to ancient ideas to suppose that Sis. is punished for his cunning as a warning to other crafty (as well as good) men. In Ζ 153 he is called κέρδιστος ἀνδρῶν as praise and not blame: so Aristarch. rightly maintained and supported his case by clear ἀναφορά to the line of the Nekyia (see Sch., Ζ 153, Κ 44, Lehrs, Aristarch.3, p. 117 and λ 593). The idea that the adj. refers to the κακότροπον of S. is merely a misunderstanding of Porph. ap. Sch., λ 385. How little anyone thought of S. as a criminal, even with the Homeric story in his mind, is shown by the Platonic Sokrates who rejoices (Apol., 41 C) over the fact that in Hades he will meet, amongst others, Sisyphos (cf. also 54 Thgn., 702 ff.). The case of Sis. presents the most serious difficulties that face any attempt to give a moralizing sense (quite outside the poet’s intention) to the section of the “three penitents”. (See also Rh. Mus. 1, 630.)

82 [Apollod.] 1, 9, 3, 2; Sch., Α 180 (p. 18b, 23 ff., Bekk.) explains that Sisyphus was punished because he revealed to Asopus the assault on his daughter Aegina by Zeus. However, this isn’t based on solid epic tradition. Another story continues from his betrayal, featuring Sisyphus outsmarting Death and then Hades, after which he is sent back to Hades and punished with the endless task of rolling a stone. This tale of outsmarting the forces of death (see the similar fairy tale of Spielhansel: Grimm, Fairy Tales, n. 82, and Anm., vol. ii, p. 163, ed. 1915) is clearly meant to be humorous, and it seems to have been used in a satyr-play by Aeschylus, the Σίσυφος δραπέτης [Sch., Ζ 153.] The fact that this story ends with his punishment of stone-rolling should caution against interpreting it in a serious and instructive way, as Welcker and his followers do. It goes against ancient beliefs to think that Sisyphus was punished for his cleverness as a warning to other crafty (as well as good) people. In Ζ 153 he is called winning of men as a compliment, not an insult: Aristarchus rightfully argued this and supported his point with clear report to the line from the Nekyia (see Sch., Ζ 153, Κ 44, Lehrs, Aristarch.3, p. 117 and λ 593). The idea that the adjective refers to the bad-tempered of Sisyphus is simply a misunderstanding of Porphyry as noted by Sch., λ 385. How little anyone viewed Sisyphus as a criminal, even considering the Homeric story, is demonstrated by Plato's Socrates who rejoices (Apol., 41 C) at the thought that in Hades he will meet, among others, Sisyphus (see also 54 Thgn., 702 ff.). The case of Sisyphus presents significant challenges for anyone trying to assign a moralizing meaning (well beyond the poet’s intention) to the section about the “three penitents.” (See also Rh. Mus. 1, 630.)

83 Γ 279, Τ 260 (cf. Rh. Mus. 1, 8). Nitzsch, Anm. z. Od. iii, p. 184 f., vainly employs all the arts of interpretation and criticism to deny their obvious meaning to both passages.

83 Γ 279, Τ 260 (cf. Rh. Mus. 1, 8). Nitzsch, Anm. z. Od. iii, p. 184 f., unsuccessfully uses all techniques of interpretation and criticism to deny the clear meaning of both passages.

84 K. O. Müller, Aeschylus Eumenides, p. 167 = E.T., 1853, p. 159.

84 K. O. Müller, Aeschylus Eumenides, p. 167 = E.T., 1853, p. 159.

85 It should be remembered also that no legal penalties against perjury existed in Greece, any more than in Rome. They were unnecessary in face of the general expectation that the deity whom the perjurer had invoked against himself would take immediate revenge upon the criminal. (Esp. instructive are the words of Agamemnon on the Trojan breach of faith, Δ 158 ff.) Such revenge would be taken either during the life time of the perjurer—in which case the instruments of vengeance would be the spirits of Hell, the Erinyes: Hes., Op., 802 ff.—or else after death.

85 It's also important to remember that there were no legal penalties for perjury in Greece, just like in Rome. They weren't needed because people generally expected that the deity whom the liar had called upon would quickly punish the wrongdoer. (Agamemnon's words about the Trojan betrayal are especially revealing, Δ 158 ff.) This punishment could happen either during the perjurer's lifetime—where the Enforcers of vengeance would be the spirits of the underworld, the Erinyes: Hes., Op., 802 ff.—or after death.

86 The oath as a bond in favour of the oath-gods: Thgn., 1195 f., μήτι θεοὺς ἐπίορκον ἐπόμνυθι, οὐ γὰρ ἀνυστὸν ἀθανάτους κρύψαι χρεῖος ὀφειλόμενον. Perjury would be εἰς θεοὺς ἁμαρτάνειν, Soph. fr. 431 (472 P.).

86 The oath as a commitment to the gods of oaths: Thgn., 1195 f., Swear by the vows of the gods, because you can't hide from the immortal beings what you owe.. Perjury would be to offend the gods, Soph. fr. 431 (472 P.).

87 Eust., Od., p. 1614–15, has understood this. He calls attention to Pi., P. 4, 159, κέλεται γὰρ ἑὰν ψυχὰν κομίζαι Φρίξος ἐλθόντας πρὸς Αἰήτα θαλάμους—on which passage the Sch. refers us back again to Homer. Both passages imply the same belief: τῶν ἀπολομένων ἐν ξένῃ γῇ τὰς ψυχὰς εὐχαῖς τισιν ἐπεκαλοῦντο ἀποπλεόντες οἱ φίλοι εἰς τὴν ἐκείνων πατρίδα καὶ ἐδόκουν κατάγειν αὐτοὺς πρὸς τοὺς οἰκείους (Sch. ι 65 f., Sch. Η, ι 62). Nitzsch, Anm. iii, 17–18, vainly attempts to get out of the necessity of seeing in this act the fulfilment of a religious duty. He supposes that Odysseus is merely satisfying a “need of the heart”, etc. The real meaning of religious performance is too often obscured by such “ethical” interpretation.

87 Eust., Od., p. 1614–15, understood this. He points to Pi., P. 4, 159, He calls for his soul to be brought back as Phrixus arrives at Aiētas' chambers.—on which passage the Sch. refers us back to Homer. Both passages suggest the same belief: Those who lost their lives in a foreign land were called upon by their friends who were setting sail to their homeland, and they believed they would bring them down to their loved ones. (Sch. ι 65 f., Sch. Η, ι 62). Nitzsch, Anm. iii, 17–18, unsuccessfully tries to avoid seeing this act as fulfilling a religious duty. He suggests that Odysseus is just meeting a "need of the heart," etc. The true meaning of religious practice is often clouded by such "ethical" interpretations.

88 The command of Athene to Telem., α 291, presupposes as universally customary the erection of a cenotaph for those who die in foreign lands unless their bodies can be obtained by their friends. Menelaos erects an empty tomb to Agamemnon in Egypt, δ 584.

88 Athene's command to Telemachus, α 291, assumes it's a common practice to set up a cenotaph for those who die far from home unless their friends can recover their bodies. Menelaus builds an empty grave for Agamemnon in Egypt, δ 584.

89 δ 584, χεῦ’ Ἀγαμέμνονι τύμβον ἷν’ ἄσβεστον κλέος εἴη. λ 75 f., σῆμά τέ μοι χεῦαι πολιῆς ἐπὶ θινὶ θαλάσσης, ἀνδρὸς δυστήνοιο, καὶ ἐσσομένοισι πύθεσθαι. Achilles in the second Nekyia, ω 30 ff., says to Agam.: Would thou hadst died before Troy, for then the Achaeans would have set up a tomb for thee and καὶ σῷ παιδὶ μέγα κλέος ἤρα’ ὀπίσσω (cf. 93 f., where Agam. says to Achilles ὡς σὺ μὲν οὐδὲ θανὼν ὄνομ’ ὤλεσας ἀλλά τοι αἰεὶ πάντας ἐπ’ ἀνθρώπους κλέος ἔσσεται ἐσθλὸν Ἀχιλλεῦ). The words of Hektor, Η 84 ff., show how the σῆμα ἐπὶ πλατεῖ Ἑλλησπόντῳ served to remind sailors as they passed, ἀνδρὸς μὲν τόδε σῆμα πάλαι κατατεθνηῶτος κτλ. and to suggest that this was the proper and principal purpose of such erections.—In contrast with this cf. what is stated of the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands: “they laid their illustrious dead in a chest and set them up on a high place or on a rock by the bank of a river in order that they might be worshipped by the pious”: Lippert, Seelencult, p. 22.

89 δ 584, For Agamemnon, may his fame live on forever. λ 75 f., I address the remnants of a man whose fate was troubled, so that we may remember him. Achille, dans la seconde Nécromancie, ω 30 ff., dit à Agamemnon : Si seulement tu étais mort avant Troie, alors les Achéens t'auraient construit un tombeau et and your son's great glory would have been secured (cf. 93 f., où Agamemnon dit à Achille Even in death, you haven't lost your name; your legacy will always live on among people.). Les paroles d'Hector, Η 84 ff., montrent comment le tomb along the banks of the Hellespont rappelait aux marins leur passage, This is the tomb of a man who died long ago, etc. et suggérait que tel était le but principal de telles constructions.—À l'inverse, on peut comparer cela à ce que l'on dit des habitants des îles Philippines : “ils mettaient leurs morts illustres dans un coffre et les plaçaient en hauteur ou sur un rocher au bord d'une rivière pour qu'ils puissent être vénérés par les pieux” : Lippert, Seelencult, p. 22.

CHAPTER II

ISLANDS OF THE BLESSED

TRANSLATION

The Homeric picture of the shadow-life of the disembodied soul is the work of resignation, not of hope. Hope would never have beguiled itself with the anticipation of a state of things which neither afforded men the chance of further activity after death, nor, on the other hand, gave them rest from the toil of life; one which promised them only a restless, purposeless fluttering to and fro, an existence, indeed, but without any of the content that might have made it worthy of the name of life.

The Homeric view of the afterlife for disembodied souls is shaped by resignation, not hope. Hope wouldn't get caught up in expecting a situation that neither allows people to continue their activities after death nor provides them with peace from life's struggles; one that only offers a restless, aimless existence, life in name only, but without any of the meaning that could make it truly worthwhile.

Was there never any aspiration after a more consolatory picture of the life after death? Did the tremendous vital energies of that time really devote themselves so completely to the realms of Zeus that not even a ray of hope penetrated to the House of Hades? We should have had to suppose so were it not for a single passing glimpse which we get of a distant land of hearts’ desire, such as even the Greece that lay under the sway of the Homeric order of things still imagined for itself.

Was there never any desire for a more comforting view of life after death? Did the powerful energies of that time really commit themselves so fully to the domains of Zeus that not even a glimmer of hope reached the House of Hades? We would have to think so if not for a brief glimpse we get of a distant land of dreams, like the Greece that still envisioned this under the influence of the Homeric way of life.

When Proteus, the sea-god who could foretell the future, has finished informing Menelaos, on the sea-shore of Egypt, of the circumstances of his return home to his country and of the fate of his dearest companions, he adds the prophetic words—so Menelaos himself informs Telemachos in the fourth book of the Odyssey (560 ff.): “But thou, god-like Menelaos, art not ordained to die in horse-pasturing Argos or to meet thy fate there; for the immortals shall send thee far away to the Elysian plain, to the ends of the world where dwells fair-haired Rhadamanthys, and where life is most easy for men. There is neither snow nor heavy storms nor rain, but Okeanos ever sends zephyrs with soft-breathing breezes to refresh men—because thou hast Helen to wife and art thereby in their eyes the son-in-law of Zeus.”

When Proteus, the sea god who could predict the future, finishes telling Menelaus, on the shores of Egypt, about how he will return home and the fate of his beloved companions, he adds these prophetic words—Menelaus himself shares this with Telemachus in the fourth book of the Odyssey (560 ff.): “But you, god-like Menelaus, are not meant to die in horse-pasturing Argos or meet your fate there; the immortals will send you far away to the Elysian Fields, to the ends of the earth where the fair-haired Rhadamanthus lives, and where life is easiest for men. There is neither snow nor heavy storms nor rain, but Oceanus continually sends soft breezes to refresh people—because you have Helen as your wife and are therefore seen as the son-in-law of Zeus.”

These verses allow us a glimpse into a world about which the Homeric poems are otherwise silent. At the end of the 56 world, by the River Okeanos, lies the “Elysian Plain”, a land where the sky is always clear, as in the land where the gods live.1 There dwells the great Rhadamanthys, not alone, one may suppose as “men” are spoken of (565, 568). Thither shall the gods some day send Menelaos—he is not to die (562); that is to say, he is to reach that place alive nor shall he suffer death there. The place to which he is to be sent is not a part of the realm of Hades, but a land on the surface of the earth set apart as the abode not of disembodied “souls”, but of men whose souls have not been separated from their visible selves—for only thus can they feel and enjoy the sense of life (565). The picture which fancy has drawn here is the precise opposite of the blessed immortality of the soul in its separate existence. Just because such an idea remained quite unthinkable for Homeric singers, hope sought and found an exit from the shadow-world which swallows up all living energy. Hope imagined a land at the end of the world, but still of this world, to which occasionally some few favourites of the gods might be “translated” without the psyche being separated from its body and descending to Hades.

These verses give us a look into a world that the Homeric poems don’t really cover. At the edge of the world, by the River Okeanos, is the “Elysian Plain,” a place where the sky is always clear, just like the land where the gods live.1 There lives the great Rhadamanthys, and it’s likely he’s not alone since “men” are mentioned (565, 568). Eventually, the gods will send Menelaos there—he won't die (562); in other words, he will reach that place alive and won't face death there. The place he is being sent to isn’t part of the realm of Hades, but a land on the surface of the earth designed not for disembodied “souls,” but for men whose souls are still connected to their physical bodies—because only then can they truly experience and enjoy the feeling of life (565). The vision painted here is the complete opposite of the blessed immortality of the soul existing separately. Since such an idea was completely unfathomable for Homeric poets, hope sought and found a way out of the shadow-world that consumes all living energy. Hope envisioned a land at the end of the world, but still part of this world, where occasionally a few favorites of the gods might be “translated” without their psyche being separated from their body and going down to Hades.

The actual mention of such miraculous “translation” stands alone in the Homeric poems, and the passage in the Odyssey seems to have been introduced by a later hand.2 But the conditions of such a miracle are all implied within the range of Homeric ideas. Menelaos is carried off by the power of the gods and lives an eternal life far from the world of mortals. The belief that a god could suddenly withdraw his earthly favourite from the eyes of men and invisibly waft him away on the breeze not infrequently finds its application in the battle-scenes of the Iliad.3 The gods could also make a mortal “invisible” for a prolonged period. When Odysseus has been so long lost to his friends they suspect that the gods have “made him invisible” (Od. i, 235 ff.); they do not regard him as “dead” but “the Harpies have carried him away”, and he is consequently withdrawn from all human ken (Od. i, 241 f.; xiv, 371). Penelope, in her grief, prays either for swift death through the arrows of Artemis, or that a storm wind may lift her up and carry her away on dark pathways to the mouths of Okeanos, that is, to the entrance of the Land of the Dead (Od. xx, 61–5; 79 ff.).4 To explain her wish she recalls a fairy tale of the kind that must often have been told in the women’s quarters; how the daughters of Pandareos, after the violent death of their parents, were brought up to lovely maidenhood by Aphrodite and provided by Hera, Artemis, and Athene with all kinds of gifts and 57 accomplishments; till one day when Aphrodite had gone to Olympos to ask Zeus to make a match for them, the Harpies came and carried them off and made them the hand-maidens of the hated Erinyes.5 This folk-tale reveals more clearly than is usual with the generally cultured Homeric narrative the popular belief that men might be carried off permanently from the land of the living, and, without seeing death, live on in another dwelling-place. For the daughters of Pandareos are carried away alive—to the Kingdom of the Dead, it is true, for that is where they must go if they become the servants of the Erinyes, the spirits of the underworld.6 That is where Penelope wishes to be carried off, and without dying first—away from the land of the living which has become intolerable for her. Such a translation is accomplished by means of the Harpies or the Stormwind, which is the same thing, since the Harpies are nothing else but wind-deities of a peculiarly sinister kind. They may be compared to the Devil’s Bride or the “Whirlwind’s Bride” of German folk-tales, who rides in the whirlwind and also carries off men with her.7 The Harpies and what we are here told of them, belong to the “vulgar mythology” which so seldom finds any expression in Homer; a popular folk-lore that could tell of many things between heaven and earth of which the Homeric “grand style” takes little notice. In Homer the Harpies never act on their own authority; only as the servants of the gods or of a single god do they transport mortals where no word of man, no human power, can reach.8

The actual mention of such miraculous “translation” stands out in the Homeric poems, and the passage in the Odyssey seems to have been added later. But the idea of such a miracle is hinted at in Homeric thought. Menelaos is taken away by the power of the gods and lives forever far from the world of mortals. The belief that a god could suddenly remove his earthly favorite from people's sight and discreetly carry him away on the wind appears multiple times in the battle scenes of the Iliad. The gods could also make a mortal “invisible” for an extended time. When Odysseus has been missing for so long, his friends suspect that the gods have “made him invisible” (Od. i, 235 ff.); they don’t see him as “dead” but think “the Harpies have carried him away,” thus he is hidden from all human awareness (Od. i, 241 f.; xiv, 371). Penelope, in her sorrow, prays for either a quick death by Artemis’s arrows or for a storm wind to lift her away and carry her along dark paths to the mouths of Okeanos, which is the entrance to the Land of the Dead (Od. xx, 61–5; 79 ff.). To explain her wish, she remembers a fairy tale likely told often among women; how the daughters of Pandareos, after their parents’ violent deaths, were raised to beautiful womanhood by Aphrodite, and provided by Hera, Artemis, and Athene with various gifts and skills; until one day when Aphrodite went to Olympos to ask Zeus to arrange marriages for them, the Harpies came and took them away, making them handmaidens of the feared Erinyes. This folk tale reveals more clearly than is typical in the generally refined Homeric narrative that people could be permanently taken away from the realm of the living, and without facing death, continue living in another place. The daughters of Pandareos are taken away alive—indeed to the Kingdom of the Dead, for that is where they must go if they serve the Erinyes, the spirits of the underworld. That is where Penelope longs to be taken—away from the unbearable world of the living. Such a transition occurs through the Harpies or the Stormwind, as they are essentially the same, since the Harpies are simply wind deities of a particularly dark nature. They can be compared to the Devil’s Bride or the “Whirlwind’s Bride” from German folk tales, who rides the whirlwind and also takes men with her. The Harpies and what we are told about them here belong to the “vulgar mythology,” which is rarely expressed in Homer; a popular folklore that could talk about many things between heaven and earth that the Homeric “grand style” overlooks. In Homer, the Harpies never act on their own; they only transport mortals at the bidding of the gods or a single god, to places where no human words or power can reach.

The prophesied removal of Menelaos to the Elysian fields at the end of the world is only another example of such a “translation” by the will and the might of the gods. Even the fact that prolonged habitation in that happy land, inaccessible to other men, is promised to him, does not differentiate the fate of Menelaos from that of the daughters of Pandareos, or from that which Penelope wishes for herself. For Menelaos, however, immortal life is promised not in Hades, or even at its entrance, but in a special country of the blest, as though in a new kingdom of the gods. He is to become a “god”; for since to the Homeric poets “god” and “immortal” are interchangeable terms, a man who is granted immortality (that is, whose psyche is never separated from his visible self) becomes for them a god.

The predicted transfer of Menelaos to the Elysian fields at the end of the world is just another instance of such a "translation" by the will and power of the gods. The fact that he is promised a long life in that blissful land, which is off-limits to other people, doesn’t set Menelaos’s fate apart from that of the daughters of Pandareos or from what Penelope wishes for herself. However, for Menelaos, immortality is promised not in Hades, or even at its entrance, but in a unique land of the blessed, almost like a new kingdom of the gods. He is to become a "god"; for to the Homeric poets, "god" and "immortal" are synonymous, so a man who is granted immortality (meaning his soul is never separated from his physical form) effectively becomes a god in their eyes.

It is also a Homeric belief that gods can raise mortals to their own realm, to immortality. Kalypso wishes to make Odysseus “immortal and ageless for all time”, that he may remain for ever by her side (Od. v, 135 f.; 209 f.; xxiii, 335 f.), 58 that is to say, make him a god like herself. The immortality of the gods is conditioned by the eating of the magic food ambrosia and nectar;9 man, too, by eating continually the food of the gods, becomes an immortal god. What Odysseus in his longing for the earthly home, to which he is drawn by loyalty and duty, rejects, has been attained by other mortals. The Homeric poems can tell of more than one mortal promoted to immortal life.

It’s also a common belief from Homer that gods can elevate mortals to their own level, granting them immortality. Kalypso desires to make Odysseus “immortal and ageless for all time,” so he can stay by her side forever (Od. v, 135 f.; 209 f.; xxiii, 335 f.), 58 meaning she wants to turn him into a god like herself. The immortality of the gods relies on consuming the magical food ambrosia and nectar; a man can also become an immortal god by continuously eating the food of the gods. What Odysseus, in his yearning for his earthly home—pulled by loyalty and duty—rejects has already been achieved by other mortals. The Homeric poems recount stories of more than one mortal who has been elevated to immortal life.

As he is struggling in the stormy sea rescue comes to Odysseus in the person of Ino Leukothea, once the daughter of Kadmos, “who had formerly been a mortal woman, but now in the waves of the sea shares in the honour of the gods” (Od. v, 333 ff.).10 Did some god of the sea bear her away and imprison her for ever in his own element? The belief existed that a god might descend from heaven even upon an earthly maiden and carry her off for ever as his spouse (Od. vi, 280 f.).11

As he struggles in the stormy sea, rescue comes to Odysseus in the form of Ino Leukothea, who was once the daughter of Kadmos. “She had once been a mortal woman, but now she shares in the honor of the gods in the waves of the sea” (Od. v, 333 ff.).10 Did some sea god take her away and trap her forever in his own realm? There was a belief that a god could descend from heaven and carry off an earthly maiden to be his eternal bride (Od. vi, 280 f.).11

Ganymede, the most beautiful of mortals, had been carried away by the gods to Olympos to dwell among immortals, as the cup-bearer of Zeus (Il. xx, 232 ff.).12 He was a scion of the old Trojan royal house, to which Tithonos also belonged, whom both the Iliad and the Odyssey already know as the husband of Eos; from his side the goddess arose every morning to bring the light of day to gods and men.13 It appears that she had “translated” her beloved not to Olympos but to the distant dwelling-place by the River Okeanos from which she sets out in the morning.14 It was Eos who had once borne off the beautiful Orion, and in spite of the jealousy of the other gods had enjoyed his love until Artemis “on Ortygia” had slain him with her gentle arrow (Od. v, 122 ff.). The story may be derived from ancient star-myths, which represented in the language of myth what is actually to be observed in the morning sky. But in such myths the elements and celestial phenomena are thought of as living and animate like men. And in the same way, these star-spirits, in accordance with the regular development of legend, have long ago sunk, for the Homeric poet, to the level of earthly youths and heroes. If the goddess can raise Orion into her own kingdom, then, according to the belief of the time (which is all that matters to us here), the same thing might happen to any mortal through the favour of the gods. A simple imitation of the same legend in a purely human setting is the story of Kleitos, a youth of the family of the seer Melampous, whom Eos has carried off for the sake of his beauty that he may dwell among the gods (Od. xv, 249 f.). 59

Ganymede, the most beautiful mortal, had been taken by the gods to Olympus to live among the immortals as Zeus's cup-bearer (Il. xx, 232 ff.). 12 He was from the old Trojan royal family, which also included Tithonus, whom both the Iliad and the Odyssey mention as Eos's husband; from him, the goddess rose every morning to bring light to gods and humans.13 It seems she had “translated” her beloved not to Olympus but to the distant place by the River Oceanus from where she departs each morning.14 Eos had once abducted the beautiful Orion and, despite the other gods' jealousy, she enjoyed his love until Artemis “on Ortygia” killed him with her gentle arrow (Od. v, 122 ff.). The story may come from ancient star myths, which expressed in mythological terms what is seen in the morning sky. In these myths, elements and celestial phenomena are considered alive and animated like humans. Similarly, these star-spirits, in keeping with the typical evolution of legend, have long since in Homeric poetry been reduced to the status of earthly youths and heroes. If the goddess can elevate Orion to her own realm, then, according to the beliefs of the time (which is what matters to us here), the same could happen to any mortal through the favor of the gods. A straightforward retelling of the same legend in a purely human context is the story of Kleitos, a young man from the family of the seer Melampus, whom Eos has taken for his beauty so he may live among the gods (Od. xv, 249 f.). 59

§ 2

The translation, then, of Menelaos, while still alive, to the ends of the earth to live there in perpetual blessedness is indeed a miracle, but a miracle that finds its justification and precedent in the range of Homeric belief. The only thing new about it is that Menelaos has a special dwelling-place assigned to him, not in the land of the gods, the proper realm of immortality, nor as in the case of Tithonos and as Kalypso desired for Odysseus, in the company of a deity, but in a separate place specially allotted to the translated hero, the Elysian fields. Nor does this appear to be the invention of the writer of these lines. He refers so briefly to the “Land of the Departed”15 and its delights that we are forced to believe that he did not himself originate so enticing a vision.16 He can only, in the case of Menelaos, have added a fresh companion to the company of the blessed. That Rhadamanthys the Just dwells there seems to be known to him from ancient tradition, for he evidently only intends to recall the fact and does not think it necessary to justify this selection of the brother of Minos.17 It might even be supposed that the picture of such a wonderland had been invented and embellished by older poets simply for the benefit of Rhadamanthys. The only novelty is that this picture, which has been fully adopted into the circle of Homeric poetry, now includes a hero of the Trojan epic cycle among the number of those translated to that land of ever unclouded happiness. The lines were inserted, as has already been remarked, at a later date, into the prophecy of Proteus, and it is hard not to suppose that the whole idea lay far from the thoughts of previous Homeric singers. Would the flower of the heroic chivalry, including Achilles himself, have been doomed to that dim shadow-world in which we see them wandering in the Nekyia of the Odyssey, if a way out into a life exempt from death had already revealed itself to imagination at the time when the Epic gave the stamp of its approval to the stories which dealt with the fate of the greater number of the heroes? Because the poem of the Trojan War and the adventures of the Return from Troy had not yet decided upon the fate of Menelaos, a later poet could speak of his “translation” to the—since “discovered”—Land of Destiny. It is highly probable that even at the time of the composition of the Journey to Hades of Odysseus this conception—afterwards so important for the development of the Greek belief in immortality—of a secluded resting-place of living and translated heroes had not yet been completely 60 formulated. It fits easily into the framework of belief prevailing in the Homeric poems, but it is not necessarily required by that framework. It is natural on this account to suppose that it entered the Epic from without. And, remembering the Babylonian story of Hasisatra and the Hebrew one of Enoch,18 both of whom without suffering death were translated into the realm of immortal life—either to “Heaven” or to the “End of the Rivers” to the gods—we might be inclined to follow the fashion that prevails in some quarters nowadays, and believe that these earliest Greek translation legends were borrowed from Semitic tradition. Little, however, would be gained by such a mechanical derivation. Here and in all such cases the main question remains still unanswered: what were the reasons which led the Greek mind to wish to borrow this particular idea at this particular time from abroad? In the present instance at least, nothing argues specially for the handing on of the belief in translation from one nation to another rather than for its independent origin in the different countries out of similar needs.

The translation of Menelaos, while still alive, to the ends of the earth to live in eternal happiness is indeed a miracle, but it's one that finds justification and precedent in the scope of Homeric belief. The only new aspect is that Menelaos has a special place assigned to him, not in the realm of the gods, which is the proper domain of immortality, nor as in the case of Tithonos and as Kalypso wanted for Odysseus, in the company of a deity, but in a separate area specifically designated for the hero, the Elysian fields. This doesn't seem to be an invention of the writer of these lines. He briefly refers to the “Land of the Departed”15 and its joys, leading us to believe that he didn’t originate such an enticing vision.16 In Menelaos's case, he likely just added a new companion to the group of the blessed. It seems he knows from ancient tradition that Rhadamanthys the Just lives there, as he merely intends to recall this fact and doesn't feel the need to justify his choice of the brother of Minos.17 It might even be thought that the vision of such a wonderland was created and enhanced by earlier poets solely for Rhadamanthys's benefit. The only novelty is that this picture, which has been fully incorporated into the realm of Homeric poetry, now includes a hero from the Trojan epic cycle among those taken to that land of eternal happiness. As mentioned before, these lines were added later to the prophecy of Proteus, and it’s hard not to believe that this whole idea was far from the thoughts of earlier Homeric singers. Would the best of the heroic knights, including Achilles himself, have been doomed to that shadowy world where we see them wandering in the Nekyia of the Odyssey if the idea of a life free from death had already emerged in the imaginations at the time when the Epic endorsed stories about the fates of most heroes? Because the poem about the Trojan War and the adventures of returning from Troy had not yet determined Menelaos's fate, a later poet could refer to his “translation” to the—now “discovered”—Land of Destiny. It's very likely that even when the Journey to Hades of Odysseus was composed, this concept—important later for the development of Greek beliefs about immortality—of a secluded resting place for living and translated heroes had not yet been fully 60 formulated. It easily fits into the prevailing beliefs in the Homeric poems, but it isn't strictly required by that framework. Therefore, it makes sense to think that it entered the Epic from elsewhere. Also, considering the Babylonian story of Hasisatra and the Hebrew one of Enoch,18 both of whom were translated into the realm of immortal life without facing death—either to “Heaven” or to the “End of the Rivers” to the gods—it’s tempting to follow some modern trends and believe that these earliest Greek translation legends were borrowed from Semitic traditions. However, such a mechanical derivation offers little value. Here, as in all such cases, the main question remains unanswered: what were the reasons that led the Greek mind to choose to borrow this particular idea at this specific time from abroad? In this case, at least, nothing suggests that the belief in translation was passed from one nation to another rather than having been independently developed in different regions out of similar needs.

This new idea did not contradict the normal Homeric beliefs about the soul but on the contrary presupposed them and supplemented them without incongruity. It was also, as we have seen, based upon conceptions that were familiar and natural to Greek thought. There was, indeed, no need for any stimulus from without to produce from these materials the undoubtedly new and peculiarly attractive idea of which we receive the earliest intimation in the prophecy of Proteus.

This new idea didn't contradict the usual Homeric beliefs about the soul; instead, it assumed them and added to them without conflict. As we've seen, it was also based on concepts that were well-known and natural to Greek thought. In fact, there was no need for any external influence to create the undeniably new and uniquely appealing idea that we first encounter in the prophecy of Proteus.

§ 3

The importance of this new creation for the later development of Greek belief makes it all the more necessary to be quite clear as to what exactly this novelty really was. Was it a Paradise for the pious and the just? A sort of Greek Valhalla for the bravest heroes?—or was it that a reconciliation and adjustment between virtue and happiness such as this life never knows had revealed itself to the eyes of hope in a Land of Promise? Nothing of the kind is warranted by these lines. Menelaos was never particularly remarkable for those virtues which the Homeric age rated highest.19 He is only to be transported to Elysium because he has Helen to wife and is therefore the son-in-law of Zeus; such is Proteus’ prophecy to him. We are not told why Rhadamanthys has reached the place of happiness; nor do we learn it through the title by which he was referred to almost invariably by 61 later poets, the “Just”. We may, however, remind ourselves that as brother of Minos he was also a son of Zeus.20 It was not virtue or merit that gave him a claim to blessedness after this life; indeed, of any such claim we never find the least trace. Just as the retention of the psyche in the body and the consequent avoidance of death can occur only as a miracle or by magic—that is, as an exceptional case—so does translation into the “Land of Destiny” remain a privilege of a few special favourites of the gods. No one could deduce from such cases any article of faith of universal application. The nearest parallel to this miraculous preservation of life for a few individuals in a land of blessed repose is to be found in the equally miraculous preservation of consciousness in those three enemies of the gods in Hades whom we hear of in the Nekyia of the Odyssey. The Penitents in Erebos and the blessed in Elysium correspond: both represent exceptions which do not destroy the rule and do not affect the main outline of Homeric belief. In the first case, as in the second, the omnipotence of Heaven has broken through the rule. Those, however, who owe to the special favour of the gods their escape from death and their translation to Elysium are near relatives of the gods. This seems to be the only reason for the favour shown to them.21 If therefore any more general reason beyond the capricious good-will of some god is to account for the translation of these individuals it might perhaps be found in the belief that near relationship with the gods, that is, the very highest nobility of lineage, could preserve a man from the descent into the common realm of hopeless nothingness after the separation of the psyche from the body. In the same way the beliefs of many primitive peoples represent the ordinary man as departing to a joyless country of the dead (if he is not annihilated altogether) while the descendants of gods and kings, or the aristocracy, go to a land of unending happiness.22 Such a fancy, however, is only dimly apparent in the promise made to Menelaos; nowhere is anything said of a general rule from which the individual case might be deduced.—

The significance of this new creation for the later evolution of Greek belief makes it crucial to clearly understand what this novelty was. Was it a Paradise for the righteous and the virtuous? A kind of Greek Valhalla for the bravest heroes?—or was it a reconciliation between virtue and happiness, something never known in this life, revealed to the hopeful in a Land of Promise? Nothing of the sort is supported by these lines. Menelaos was never particularly noted for those virtues that the Homeric age most valued. He is only destined for Elysium because he is married to Helen and is thus the son-in-law of Zeus; this is the prophecy given to him by Proteus. We aren’t told why Rhadamanthys arrived in this happy place; nor do we learn it from the title almost always used by later poets, which is “the Just.” We can, however, remember that as Minos's brother, he was also a son of Zeus. It was neither virtue nor merit that granted him a right to happiness after this life; in fact, we find no evidence of any such claim. Just as the retention of the psyche in the body and the avoidance of death can only happen as a miracle or through magic—that is, as an exception—so too does being taken to the “Land of Destiny” remain a privilege for a few special favorites of the gods. No one could derive from such cases any universally applicable article of faith. The closest parallel to this miraculous preservation of life for a few in a land of bliss is found in the equally miraculous preservation of consciousness in those three enemies of the gods in Hades mentioned in the Nekyia of the Odyssey. The Penitents in Erebos and the blessed in Elysium are alike: both represent exceptions that do not invalidate the rule and do not alter the fundamental structure of Homeric belief. In both cases, the power of Heaven has interrupted the norm. However, those who owe their escape from death and their arrival in Elysium to the special favor of the gods are close relatives of the gods. This seems to be the only reason for the favor they receive. If there is to be any broader rationale beyond the random kindness of a god accounting for the ascent of these individuals, it might be anchored in the belief that kinship with the gods—the highest nobility of lineage—could shield a person from descending into the bleak realm of nothingness after the psyche separates from the body. Similarly, the beliefs of many primitive peoples depict the average person as departing to a joyless land of the dead (if they aren't completely obliterated), while the descendants of gods and kings or the aristocracy go to a realm of everlasting happiness. This notion, however, is only faintly hinted at in the promise given to Menelaos; there is no mention of a general principle from which individual cases could be inferred.

§ 4

But the individuals who are admitted to an everlasting life in the Elysian land at the end of the world are much too distantly removed from the habitations of the living for them to be credited with the power of influencing the world of men.23 They resemble the gods only in the enjoyment accorded to them of an unendingly conscious life. Of the omnipotence of 62 the gods they have not the smallest share24 any more than the dwellers in Erebos, from whose fate their own is otherwise so different. We must not suppose, therefore, that the origin of the stories of the promotion of individual heroes above their companions and their translation into a distant dwelling-place, is to be sought in any cultus offered to those individuals in their previous earthly dwelling-place. Every religious cult is the worship of something real and powerful; no popular religion and no poet’s fancy would have given the national heroes, if they were to be regarded as powerful and worshipped accordingly, such a distant and inaccessible home.

But the people who are accepted into an eternal life in the Elysian Fields at the end of the world are far too removed from the lives of the living for anyone to think they can affect the human world.23 They only resemble the gods in that they enjoy an endlessly conscious existence. They have no share in the gods’ omnipotence, just like those who dwell in Erebos, even though their fates are otherwise quite different. Therefore, we shouldn't assume that the stories of individual heroes being elevated above their peers and taken to a distant home come from any worship offered to them while they were alive. Every religious cult is based on something real and powerful; no popular religion or poet's imagination would have given national heroes, if they were seen as powerful and properly worshipped, such a distant and unreachable home.

It was the free activity of the poetic fancy which created and embellished this last refuge of human aspiration upon the Elysian plain. The needs which this new creation was chiefly intended to satisfy were poetical and not religious.

It was the unrestricted work of creative imagination that formed and adorned this final haven of human hope on the Elysian plain. The primary needs that this new creation aimed to fulfill were artistic rather than spiritual.

The atmosphere of the younger of the two Homeric epics already differs widely from that of its older companion, the Iliad, with its heroic delight in the untiring manifestation of vital energy. It is likely that the feelings of the conquerors of a new home upon the Asiatic coast may have differed considerably from those of the same people confirmed in undisturbed possession and enjoyment of their conquests. It seems as if the Odyssey reflected the temper and aspiration of these Ionian city-dwellers of a later time. A spirit of contentment and leisure seems to flow like an undercurrent through the whole poem, and has made for itself a haven of rest in the midst of the busy action of the story. When the poet’s own feelings find their true expression they show us idyllic scenes of quiet enjoyment of daily life; magnificent in the country of the Phæacians, gay and more homely at the farm of Eumaios; pictures of quiet repose after the fights of the heroic past, that have now faded into a mere pleasant memory, such as we get in the house of Nestor, or in the Palace of Menelaos and the regained Helen. Or, again, we have a description of nature in a mood of liberality and gentleness, as upon the island of Syriê, the home of Eumaios’ childhood, upon which in ample possession of cattle, wine and corn, a people live free from necessity and pain, till they arrive at a good old age when Apollo and Artemis with their gentlest shafts bring swift death to them (Od. xv, 403 ff.). If you ask the poet where this fortunate island lies he will tell you that it lies over there beyond Ortygiê where the sun turns back. But where is Ortygiê,25 and who can point out the place where the sun begins his return journey far in the West? The country of idyllic happiness lies indeed almost beyond 63 the limit of this world. Phœnician merchant-men who go everywhere may perhaps reach that land as well (415 ff.), and Ionian seamen in this earliest period of Greek colonization into which the composition of the Odyssey reaches may well have hoped to find far out over the sea such propitious habitations of a new life.

The vibe of the younger of the two Homeric epics is already quite different from its older counterpart, the Iliad, which celebrates the relentless display of energy and heroism. It's likely that the feelings of the conquerors settling into a new home on the Asian coast were different from those of the same people, who were comfortably settled and enjoying their victories. It seems like the Odyssey captures the mood and aspirations of these Ionian city dwellers from a later time. A sense of tranquility and leisure runs like an undercurrent throughout the entire poem, creating a refuge of comfort amid the busy action of the narrative. When the poet expresses his true feelings, we see idyllic scenes of enjoying everyday life; beautiful in the land of the Phaeacians, cheerful and more homey at Eumaeus' farm. These are pictures of peaceful rest after the heroic battles of the past, which have now faded into pleasant memories, like we find in Nestor's house or in the palace of Menelaus and the returned Helen. We also get descriptions of nature in a generous and gentle mood, like on the island of Syros, Eumaeus' childhood home, where people live comfortably with plenty of cattle, wine, and grain, free from need and pain, reaching a good old age until Apollo and Artemis bring them quick death with their gentle arrows (Od. xv, 403 ff.). If you ask the poet where this lucky island is, he’ll tell you it’s over there beyond Ortygia, where the sun sets. But where is Ortygia, 63 and who can point out where the sun begins its retreat far in the West? The land of idyllic happiness seems to lie almost beyond the edge of this world. Phoenician traders who travel everywhere might reach that place as well (415 ff.), and Ionian sailors from the early days of Greek colonization, during which the Odyssey was composed, might have hoped to find such favorable lands for a new life far out at sea.

In the same way the country and the life of the Phæacians seem like an ideal picture of an Ionian state newly founded in a distant land far from the turmoil, the restless competition, and all the limitations of their familiar Greek homes. But this unclouded dream-picture, bathed in purest light, lies far away in a distant land all but inaccessible to man. Only by chance is a strange ship cast away on to that coast, and at once the magic ships of the Phæacians carry back the stranger through night and cloud to his own home again. True, there is no reason to see in the Phæacians a sort of ferry-people of the dead, neighbours of the Elysian fields. Still, the poetic fancy which invented the country of the Phæacians is not unrelated to that which gave rise to the idea of an Elysian plain beyond the bounds of the inhabited world. Given the idea that a life of untroubled bliss can only be had in the remotest confines of the earth, jealously guarded from all intrusion, only one more step remains to be taken before men come to believe that such bliss is really only to be found where neither accident nor purpose can ever bring men, more remote even than the Phæacians, than the country of the Æthiopians, the beloved of the gods, or than the Abioi of the North, already known to the Iliad. It must lie beyond the bounds of real life. Such idyllic longings have given rise to the picture of Elysium. The happiness of those who there enjoy everlasting life seemed to be fully safeguarded only if their place of abode were removed for ever beyond the range of all exploration, out of reach of all future discovery. This happiness is imagined as a condition of perfect bliss under the most benignant sky; easy and untroubled says the poet, is the life of men there, in this resembling the life of the gods, but at the same time without aspiration and without activity. It is doubtful whether the poet of the Iliad would have considered such a future worthy of his heroes, or given the name of happiness to such felicity as this.

In the same way, the country and life of the Phaeacians seem like an ideal version of an Ionian state newly established in a distant land, far from chaos, relentless competition, and all the constraints of their familiar Greek homes. But this clear dream is far away in a land that is almost unreachable by humans. Only by chance does a strange ship end up on that shore, and immediately the magical ships of the Phaeacians take the stranger back through night and clouds to his own home. True, there’s no reason to see the Phaeacians as a kind of ferry-people for the dead, neighbors of the Elysian fields. Still, the poetic imagination that created the land of the Phaeacians is connected to the one that inspired the idea of an Elysian plain beyond the limits of the human world. With the belief that a life of untroubled bliss can only be found in the most remote corners of the earth, protected from any intrusion, it’s just a small step before people start to think that such bliss truly exists only where neither chance nor intention can ever reach them, even more isolated than the Phaeacians, the land of the Ethiopians, who are favored by the gods, or the Abioi of the North, already mentioned in the Iliad. It must lie beyond the realm of real life. These idyllic desires have led to the concept of Elysium. The happiness of those who enjoy eternal life there seems to be fully protected only if their home is permanently beyond the limits of all exploration, out of reach of any future discovery. This happiness is imagined as a state of perfect bliss under the most favorable sky; easy and untroubled, says the poet, is the life of people there, resembling the life of the gods, but at the same time lacking aspiration and activity. It’s uncertain whether the poet of the Iliad would have deemed such a future fitting for his heroes or would have called such a state happiness.

§ 5

We were obliged to assume that the poet who inserted these inimitably smooth, melodious verses in the Odyssey was not the first inventor or discoverer of the Elysian paradise beyond 64 the realm of mortality. But though he followed in the footsteps of others, when he introduced into the Homeric poem a reference to this new belief, he was giving this idea for the first time an enduring place in Greek imagination. Other poems might disappear, but anything that appeared in the Iliad or the Odyssey was assured of perpetual remembrance.

We had to assume that the poet who included these incredibly smooth, melodious verses in the Odyssey wasn’t the first creator or discoverer of the Elysian paradise beyond 64 the world of the living. However, even though he built on the ideas of others, by bringing this new belief into the Homeric poem, he gave the concept its first lasting presence in Greek imagination. Other poems might fade away, but anything found in the Iliad or the Odyssey was guaranteed to be remembered forever.

The imagination of Greek poets or Greek people never gave up the alluring fancy of a distant land of blessedness into which individual mortals might by the favour of the gods be translated. Even the scanty notices which have come down to us of the contents of the heroic poems that led up to, continued, or connected the two Homeric Epics and linked them up with the whole cycle of Theban and Trojan legend enable us to see how this post-Homeric poetry took pleasure in the recital of still further examples of translation.

The imagination of Greek poets and the Greek people never abandoned the enticing idea of a distant land of happiness where individual mortals could be taken by the favor of the gods. Even the limited information we have about the contents of the heroic poems that preceded, followed, or connected the two Homeric Epics, as well as the entire cycle of Theban and Trojan legends, allows us to see how this post-Homeric poetry enjoyed recounting even more examples of translation.

The Kypria first described how the army of the Achæans for the second time encamped in Aulis, was detained by adverse winds sent by Artemis; and how Agamemnon on the advice of Kalchas would have sacrificed his own daughter Iphigeneia to the goddess. Artemis, however, snatched away the maiden and transported her to the land of the Taurians, and there made her immortal.26

The Kypria first described how the Achaean army camped in Aulis for the second time, held back by unfavorable winds sent by Artemis. Agamemnon, following the advice of Kalchas, was about to sacrifice his own daughter Iphigeneia to the goddess. However, Artemis took the maiden away and brought her to the land of the Taurians, where she was made immortal.26

The Aithiopis, a continuation of the Iliad, tells of the help brought to the Trojans by Penthesileia and her Amazons, and after her death by Memnon the Æthiopian prince, an imaginary representative of the eastern monarchies of inner Asia. Antilochos, the new favourite of Achilles, falls in the war, but Achilles slays Memnon himself. Thereupon Eos the mother of Memnon (and known as such already to the Odyssey) obtains the permission of Zeus to give immortality to her son.27 It may be supposed that the poet described what we see so often represented upon Greek vases: the mother bearing through the air the dead body of her son. According to the story told in the Iliad, Apollo, with the help of Sleep and Death, the twin brothers, bore off the body of Sarpedon, the son of Zeus, to his Lycian home after he had been slain by Achilles, merely in order that he might be buried in his own country. But the poet of the Aithiopis has tried to outdo the story in the Iliad in impressiveness (for it was evidently his model),28 and has made Eos, with the permission of Zeus, not merely carry off the dead to his far-off home in the East, but there awaken him to immortal life.

The Aithiopis, which continues the Iliad, tells the story of the assistance given to the Trojans by Penthesileia and her Amazons, and after her death, by Memnon, the Ethiopian prince, an imaginary representative of the eastern monarchies of inner Asia. Antilochos, the new favorite of Achilles, dies in the war, but Achilles himself kills Memnon. Following that, Eos, Memnon's mother (which is already known from the Odyssey), gets Zeus's permission to grant her son immortality.27 It's likely that the poet depicted what we often see on Greek vases: a mother carrying her son's dead body through the air. According to the story in the Iliad, Apollo, with the help of Sleep and Death, the twin brothers, took Sarpedon's body, the son of Zeus, back to his Lycian home after he was killed by Achilles, just so he could be buried in his own land. But the poet of the Aithiopis aimed to surpass the Iliad in impact (since that was clearly his model)28 and made Eos, with Zeus's permission, not only take the dead back to his distant home in the East but also revive him to immortal life there.

Soon after the death of Memnon fate overtakes Achilles himself. When his body, rescued by his friends after much hard fighting, is laid upon its bier, Thetis, his mother, with 65 the Muses and the other sea-goddesses come and sing the funeral dirge. Of this we are told in the last book of the Odyssey (xxiv, 47 ff.) which relates further how his body was burnt, his bones gathered together and entombed under a mound, and the psyche of Achilles departed to the House of Hades; the whole story being told to him in the underworld by the psyche of Agamemnon. But the author of the Aithiopis—always remarkable for his bold innovations in the traditional material—here ventures upon an important new touch. From the funeral pyre, he tells us, Thetis carried off the body of her son and brought him to Leuke.29 That she restored him to life again there and made him immortal the one meagre extract which accident has preserved to us does not say. But there can be no question that that is what the poet narrated—all later accounts conclude the story in this way.

Soon after Memnon's death, fate catches up with Achilles himself. When his body, retrieved by his friends after a lot of fierce fighting, is placed on its bier, Thetis, his mother, along with the Muses and the other sea goddesses, arrive to sing the funeral dirge. We're told about this in the last book of the Odyssey (xxiv, 47 ff.), which also explains how his body was cremated, his bones collected and buried under a mound, and how Achilles' soul went to the House of Hades; the whole story is recounted to him in the underworld by Agamemnon's soul. However, the author of the Aithiopis—known for his bold changes to traditional tales—adds a significant new detail here. He tells us that Thetis took her son's body from the funeral pyre and brought him to Leuke. The one brief mention that has survived doesn't specify that she restored him to life there and made him immortal. But there's no doubt that this is what the poet conveyed—later accounts all end the story this way.

The parallel is clear: the two opponents, Achilles and Memnon, are both set free from the fate of mortals by their goddess-mothers. In bodies once more restored to life they continue to live, not among men, nor yet among the gods, but in a distant wonderland—Memnon in the east, Achilles in the “White Island”. The poet himself can hardly have imagined Achilles’ Island to have been in the Euxine Sea, where, however, later Greek sailors located this purely mythical spot.

The comparison is obvious: both Achilles and Memnon, the two rivals, are freed from the fate of mortals by their goddess mothers. With their bodies restored to life, they continue to exist, not among humans or gods, but in a faraway wonderland—Memnon in the east and Achilles in the “White Island.” The poet probably never imagined Achilles’ Island to be in the Euxine Sea, where later Greek sailors placed this entirely mythical location.

The translation of Menelaos is still more closely paralleled by the story told in the Telegoneia, which was the final and the latest-written of the Cyclic poems, of the fate which attended the family of Odysseus. Telegonos, the son of Odysseus and Kirke, slays his father unwittingly; when he discovers his mistake he brings the body of Odysseus with Penelope and Telemachos to his mother, Kirke, who makes them immortal; and there they dwell now (in the Isle Aiaia, far away over the sea, we must suppose)—Penelope as the wife of Telegonos, and Kirke with Telemachos.30

The story in the Telegoneia, which is the last and most recent of the Cyclic poems, parallels the translation of Menelaos closely, focusing on the fate of Odysseus's family. Telegonos, the son of Odysseus and Kirke, accidentally kills his father. When he realizes his mistake, he takes Odysseus's body, along with Penelope and Telemachus, to his mother, Kirke, who makes them immortal. They now live there (on the Isle Aiaia, far across the sea, we can assume)—Penelope as the wife of Telegonos, and Kirke with Telemachos.30

§ 6

It is natural to feel surprise that in none of these stories is there any mention of translation to a common meeting-place of the Elect, such as the Elysian plain seemed to be. We must on that account be content to leave unanswered the question to what precise extent these lines of the Odyssey which describe the translation of Menelaos to Elysium may have influenced the development of translation stories in the post-Homeric Epics. The influence must clearly have been 66 considerable.31 The stories of the translation of individual heroes to a solitary after-life in secluded abodes of immortality show, at any rate, the same direction of fancy as that which produced the fields of Elysium. No longer does Eos, after she has snatched him from Hades, raise her son to be among the gods as once she had raised Kleitos and others of her favourites. Memnon enters upon a peculiar state of being that differentiates him from the rest of mankind as much as from the gods. The same applies to Achilles and the other translated heroes. Thus did poetry increase the number of those who belonged to this middle realm; who, born in mortality have, outside the realms of Olympos, achieved immortality. It is still only favoured individuals who enter this kingdom; it is still poetical aspiration, giving free rein to its creative instinct, that continues to transport an ever-increasing number of the bright figures of Legend into the illumination of everlasting life. Religious worship can have had no more influence in the development of these stories than it had in the narrative of the translation of Menelaos. Achilles, for example, may in later times have had a cult paid to him on an island at the mouth of the Danube, supposed to be Leuke. But the cult was the result and not the motive or the cause of the story. Iphigeneia was certainly the epithet of a Moon-goddess; but the poet who told of the translation of her namesake, the daughter of Agamemnon, had no suspicion of the latter’s identity with a goddess—otherwise he would never have regarded her as Agamemnon’s daughter. Nor, we may be fairly certain, can it have been an accidental meeting with the cult of the goddess Iphigeneia, which induced him to invent an immortality iure postlimini for his mortal Iphigeneia, by the machinery of translation. Both for the poet and his contemporaries the importance and the essence of his narrative—whether free invention or a reconstruction out of older material—lay in the fact that it told of the raising of a mortal maiden, the daughter of mortal parents, to immortal life, and not to religious veneration which could not have made itself very apparent to the maiden relegated to the distant Tauric country.

It's surprising that none of these stories mention a common afterlife destination for the Elect, like the Elysian Fields appeared to be. We can't definitively answer how much the passages in the Odyssey describing Menelaos's journey to Elysium influenced the creation of translation stories in later epics. However, it's clear that the influence was significant. The tales of individual heroes being transported to a solitary afterlife in secluded places reflect a similar imagination that led to the concept of Elysium. Eos no longer raises her son to be among the gods after taking him from Hades, unlike how she raised Kleitos and others close to her. Memnon enters a unique state that separates him from both humanity and the divine. The same goes for Achilles and the other heroes who were translated. Poetry expanded the number of those in this intermediate realm; those who, born mortal, have achieved immortality outside of Olympus. Only favored individuals still enter this realm, driven by poetic aspiration that continually brings more legendary figures into the light of eternal life. Religious worship had no more influence on these stories than it did on Menelaos's narrative. For instance, Achilles may have been worshiped later on an island at the mouth of the Danube, believed to be Leuke, but that worship resulted from the story, not the other way around. Iphigeneia is certainly associated with a Moon goddess, but the poet who tells the story of Agamemnon's daughter didn't connect her with a goddess—otherwise, he wouldn't have viewed her as Agamemnon's child. Moreover, the chance encounter with the cult of the goddess Iphigeneia didn't inspire him to create a story of mortal Iphigeneia's immortality through translation. For the poet and his peers, the key significance of the narrative—whether it was pure invention or based on older material—was that it told of a mortal girl, daughter of mortal parents, being raised to eternal life, not about religious reverence that wouldn't have seemed very apparent to the girl stuck in the faraway Tauric country.

The busy expansion of the legendary material went on in epics that finally lost themselves in genealogical poems. To what extent it may have made use of the motif of translation or transfiguration we can no longer accurately judge. The materials at our disposal are quite insufficient to warrant any conclusion. When such a misty figure as Telegonos is deemed worthy of immortality, it may be supposed that in the mind 67 of the poet all the heroes of Epic tradition had come to be possessed of a virtual claim to a share in this mode of continued existence in a life after death. Certainly the more important among them could not be left out—those at least of whose end the Homeric poems themselves had not already given a different version. The poem of the Return of the Heroes from Troy may especially have given scope for many translation stories.32 We may, for example, ask whether Diomedes, at least, whose immortality is often vouched for by later mythology, was not already added to the number of the immortals in the epics of the Heroic cycle. An Attic folk-song of the fifth century can speak with assurance of Diomedes as not having died but as living in the “Islands of the Blest”. Thus a far greater company of the Heroes of the Trojan War was thought of by the poetry of Homeric tradition as gathered together in “Isles of the Blest”, far out to sea, than we should guess from the summaries of the post-Homeric Epics which accident has preserved to us. This conclusion must be drawn from the lines of a Hesiodic poem which give us some remarkable information about the oldest Greek forms of the Cult of the Souls and belief in immortality, and the lines, therefore, must be subjected to a closer examination.

The rapid growth of the legendary material continued in epic tales that eventually got lost in genealogical poems. We can no longer accurately judge how much it may have used the motif of translation or transformation. The information we have is quite insufficient to support any conclusions. When such a vague figure as Telegonos is considered deserving of immortality, we can assume that in the poet's mind, all the heroes of Epic tradition had a sort of claim to a share in this mode of continued existence in life after death. Certainly, the more significant among them could not be overlooked—at least those whose fate the Homeric poems themselves hadn’t already told a different story about. The poem about the Return of the Heroes from Troy may have particularly inspired many tales of transformation.32 For instance, we might wonder whether Diomedes, at least, whose immortality is often supported by later mythology, was already included among the immortals in the epic stories of the Heroic cycle. An Attic folk song from the fifth century confidently claims that Diomedes did not die but lives in the "Islands of the Blest." Thus, a far larger number of the Heroes of the Trojan War were thought of by the poetry of Homeric tradition as gathered in the "Isles of the Blest," far out at sea, than we would expect from the summaries of the post-Homeric Epics that have happened to survive. This conclusion can be drawn from lines of a Hesiodic poem that provide us with remarkable information about the oldest Greek forms of the Cult of the Souls and beliefs in immortality, and therefore, these lines must be examined more closely.

II

The Hesiodic poem known as the “Works and Days” consists of a number of independent pieces of didactic or narrative interest loosely strung together. In it, not far from the beginning, comes the story of the Five Ages of Men. As regards its subject-matter, the train of thought which unites this section to the passages which precede and follow it is hardly discoverable; in form it is quite disconnected.

The Hesiodic poem called "Works and Days" includes several separate pieces of teaching or storytelling that are loosely tied together. Early on, it presents the story of the Five Ages of Men. In terms of its content, it’s difficult to see how this part connects to the sections before and after it; in its structure, it feels quite disjointed.

In the beginning we are there told the gods of Olympos created a Golden race whose members lived like the gods, without care, sickness or decrepitude, and in enjoyment of rich possessions. After their death, which came upon them like sleep to tired men, they became, by the will of Zeus, Daimones and Guardians of mankind. They were followed by a Silver race, far inferior to the first, and unlike them in body as in mind. The men of this race had a long childhood, lasting a hundred years, followed by a short youth, during which their wantonness and pride in their dealings with each other and with the gods brought them much sorrow. Because they refused the honours due to the gods Zeus destroyed them and they are now Daimones of the Underworld, honoured 68 but inferior to the Daimones of the Golden Age. Zeus then created a third race, this time of Bronze—hard-hearted and of great strength; war was their delight, and being destroyed by their own hands they went down unhonoured to the House of Hades. Thereupon Zeus made a fourth race that was juster and better, the race of Heroes, who were called “Demigods”. They fought before Thebes and Troy and some of them died, while others Zeus sent to dwell at the ends of the world on the Islands of the Blest by the river Okeanos, where the Earth brings them her fruits three times in the year. “Would that I did not belong to the fifth Age; would that I had died earlier or been born hereafter,” says the poet, “since now is the Iron Age,” when toil and grief never leave men, when there is enmity of all against all and force conquers right, and Envy, evil-tongued, delighting in wickedness, fierce-eyed, is over everything. Now, Shame and the goddess of retribution, Nemesis, depart from men and go to the gods; every misfortune is left behind for man, and there is no defence against evil.

In the beginning, it is said that the gods of Olympus created a Golden race whose members lived like the gods, free from worry, illness, or old age, and enjoyed abundant wealth. After they died, which came upon them like sleep to weary people, they became, by the will of Zeus, Daimones and guardians of humanity. They were followed by a Silver race, much worse than the first, different from them in both body and mind. The men of this race had a long childhood lasting a hundred years, followed by a brief youth, during which their reckless behavior and pride in their interactions with each other and the gods brought them great sorrow. Because they disrespected the honors owed to the gods, Zeus destroyed them, and they are now 68 Daimones of the Underworld, honored but lesser than the Daimones of the Golden Age. Zeus then created a third race, this time of Bronze—hard-hearted and strong; they delighted in war, and, having been destroyed by their own hands, they went down unhonored to the House of Hades. Afterward, Zeus made a fourth race that was more just and noble, the race of Heroes, known as “Demigods.” They fought before Thebes and Troy, and some died while others Zeus sent to live at the edge of the world on the Islands of the Blest by the river Oceanus, where the Earth provides her fruits three times a year. “I wish I didn’t belong to this fifth Age; I wish I had died earlier or been born later,” says the poet, “since now is the Iron Age,” when labor and sorrow are constant companions, when there is animosity among all and might prevails over right, and Envy, with her cruel words and fierce gaze, dominates everything. Now, Shame and the goddess of retribution, Nemesis, leave humanity and return to the gods; every misfortune is left behind for mankind, with no escape from evil.

The author here lays before us the results of gloomy reflection upon the origin and growth of evil in the world of men. He sees the steps of mankind’s degeneration from the height of godlike happiness to the extremes of misery and wickedness. He is following popular conceptions. It is natural to every race of men to lay the scene of earthly perfection in the past, so long, at least, as man gets his information about that past not from distinct historical memory, but from the picturesque stories and beautiful dreams of the poets which encourage the natural tendency of fancy to retain only the more attractive features of the past in the memory. The folk-lore of many lands can tell of a Golden Age and how mankind gradually fell from that high estate; and it is not at all surprising if fanciful speculation starting from the same point and travelling along the same road has reached the same conclusion in the case of more than one people without the aid of any historical connexion. We have a number of expressions of the idea of man’s gradual degeneration through several Ages which present the most striking similarities among themselves and with the Hesiodic picture of the five Ages of Men. Even Homer is sometimes overcome by the mood; it lies, for instance, at the root of such idealizations of the past as are implied when in his description of the heroic life he thinks of “men as they now are” and “how few sons are equal to their fathers in virtue; worse, most of them; few, indeed, are the men who are better than their fathers” 69 (Od. ii, 276 f.). But the epic poet keeps himself and his fancy on the heights of the heroic Past; only occasionally, and in passing, his glance falls upon the commonplace level of real life. But the poet of the “Works and Days” has all his thoughts fixed upon the level plain of real and contemporary life; the glance which he occasionally casts upon the heights of the storied past is all the more bitter on that account.

The author presents the results of a somber examination of the origins and development of evil in humanity. He observes how humanity has declined from a state of godlike happiness to extreme misery and wickedness. He aligns with common beliefs. It’s natural for every culture to view earthly perfection as existing in the past, especially as long as people gather their information about that past not from clear historical memory, but from vivid stories and beautiful dreams created by poets, which reinforce the tendency to remember only the more appealing aspects of history. Folklore from many cultures narrates a Golden Age and how humanity gradually fell from that elevated state; it’s not surprising that imaginative speculation starting from the same premise and following the same narrative has arrived at the same conclusion for various peoples, even without historical links. There are various expressions of the idea of humanity’s gradual decline through different Ages, showing striking similarities both to each other and to Hesiod’s depiction of the five Ages of Men. Even Homer sometimes succumbs to this mood; for example, it underlies his idealizations of the past when he reflects on “men as they now are” and observes “how few sons are equal to their fathers in virtue; worse, most of them; few, indeed, are the men who are better than their fathers” 69 (Od. ii, 276 f.). However, the epic poet keeps his imagination focused on the heights of the heroic Past; only occasionally does he acknowledge the everyday reality of life. In contrast, the poet of the “Works and Days” centers all his thoughts on the level ground of actual and contemporary life; the glances he casts at the heights of an idealized past are all the more bitter for it.

What he has to say of the first condition of mankind and the gradual process of deterioration is given, not as an abstract exposition of what in the necessary course of things must have occurred, but rather as a traditional account of what had actually happened—in fact, as history.

What he says about the initial state of humanity and the slow decline that followed isn’t just a theoretical explanation of what must have happened over time; it's more of a traditional narrative of actual events—essentially, it’s history.

In this light he himself must certainly have regarded it, though, apart from a few vague memories, no historical tradition is contained in what he says of the nature and deeds of the earlier generations of mankind. His story remains an imaginary picture. And for this reason the development, as he presents it, takes a logically defined and regulated course, based on the idea of a gradual deterioration. The uneventful happiness of the first race of men who know neither virtue nor vice is followed by a second race, which after a prolonged minority displays pride and contempt of the gods. In the third, or brazen age, active wickedness breaks out, with war and murder. The last age, at the beginning of which the poet himself seems to stand, marks the breakdown of all moral restraint. The fourth race of men, to which the heroes of the Theban and Trojan wars belong, is alone among all the others in not being named and ranked after a metal. It is an alien in the evolutionary process. The downward course is checked during the fourth age, and yet in the fifth it goes on again as if it had never been interrupted. It is not apparent why that course should have been interrupted. Most of the commentators have recognized in the story of the fourth age a fragment of different material, originally foreign to the poem of the Ages of Men and added deliberately by Hesiod to this poem, which he may have taken over in its essential features from older poets. But if we adopt this view we have to ask what can have tempted the poet to such serious disturbance and dislocation of the orderly succession of the original speculative poem. It will not be enough to say that the poet, brought up in the Homeric tradition, found it impossible to pass over, in a description of the earlier ages of men, the figures of the heroic poetry which, thanks to the power of song, had acquired in the imagination of the Greeks more reality than the plainest manifestations of actual life. Nor 70 is it likely that, having in his grim description of the Bronze race introduced a darker picture of the Heroic age, drawn from a point of view different from that of the courtly Epos, he wished to set by its side this bright vision of the same age as he saw it in his own mind. If the picture of the Bronze race does really refer to the Heroic age,33 giving its reverse side, so to speak, Hesiod never seems to have noticed the fact. He must have had stronger grounds than these for the introduction of his narrative. He cannot have failed to perceive that he was breaking the continuity of moral deterioration by his introduction of the Heroic race. It follows that he must have had some aim, other than that of the description of the moral deterioration of men, which he imagined himself to be serving by the introduction of this new section. This other purpose will become plain if we inquire what it is that really interests the poet in the Heroic race. It is not their higher morality—that only interrupted the series of continually worsening generations. Nor would he in that case have dismissed the subject with a few words which barely suffice to connect this section with the theme of moral development. Further, it is not the fights and great deeds done at Thebes or Troy that interest him for he says nothing of their greatness, and at once declares that the cruel war and the dread fury of battle destroyed the Heroes. This, again, does not discriminate between the Heroes and the men of the Bronze age who also, being destroyed by their own deeds, had to go down to Hades. What distinguishes the Heroic age from the others is the way in which some of the Heroes depart from this life without dying. This is the point that interests the poet, and this it must have been that chiefly induced him to bring in here his account of the fourth race of men. He combines clearly enough with his main purpose of describing the advancing moral decline of man, a secondary aim—that of telling what happened after death to the representatives of each successive race. In introducing the Heroic race of men this secondary aim becomes the chief one, and justifies what would otherwise have been merely an intrusive episode. It is this aim, too, which gives the Hesiodic narrative its importance for our present inquiry.

In this context, he must have viewed it that way, even though, aside from a few vague memories, there’s no historical record in what he says about the nature and actions of earlier generations of humanity. His narrative remains a fictional depiction. For this reason, the development he outlines follows a logically defined and systematic path, based on the idea of gradual decline. The uncomplicated happiness of the first race of people, who know neither virtue nor vice, is succeeded by a second race, which, after a long period of immaturity, displays pride and disdain for the gods. In the third age, known as the age of bronze, active wickedness erupts, bringing war and murder. The last age, where the poet himself seems to find himself, signifies the collapse of all moral restraint. The fourth race of people, to which the heroes of the Theban and Trojan wars belong, is unique among all others in that it is not named or associated with a metal. It feels out of place in the evolutionary narrative. The downward trend is halted during the fourth age, but resumes in the fifth as if it had never been interrupted. It's unclear why that trend was disrupted. Most commentators have suggested that the story of the fourth age is a fragment of different material, originally unrelated to the poem of the Ages of Men, which Hesiod deliberately added, possibly drawing from older poets' work. However, if we take this perspective, we must question what could have motivated the poet to significantly disturb and rearrange the orderly sequence of the original speculative poem. It's not sufficient to claim that, influenced by the Homeric tradition, the poet found it impossible to overlook the heroic figures in describing earlier human ages, figures which, thanks to the power of storytelling, had become more real in the Greek imagination than even the most obvious aspects of actual life. Nor is it likely that, having painted a grim picture of the Bronze age, he wanted to counter it with a bright vision of the same era based on his own perspective. If the depiction of the Bronze age genuinely reflects the Heroic age, showing its darker side, Hesiod doesn’t seem to have recognized that. He must have had more compelling reasons for introducing his narrative. He can’t have been unaware that he was disrupting the continuity of moral decline by bringing in the Heroic race. Therefore, he must have had a purpose beyond merely describing the moral degradation of humanity, which he believed he was serving by the introduction of this new section. This other purpose will become clear if we examine what genuinely intrigues the poet about the Heroic race. It’s not their higher morality—that only interrupted the sequence of increasingly corrupt generations. Otherwise, he wouldn’t have summarized the topic with a few words that barely link this section to the theme of moral development. Additionally, it’s not the battles and great deeds at Thebes or Troy that capture his attention, as he makes no mention of their greatness and immediately states that the brutal war and terrible fury of battle wiped out the Heroes. This does not set the Heroes apart from the men of the Bronze age, who also met their end due to their own actions and descended to Hades. What differentiates the Heroic age from the others is how some Heroes leave this life without actually dying. This aspect captivates the poet, and it must have primarily motivated him to introduce his account of the fourth race of humans here. He clearly combines with his main goal of describing the ongoing moral decline of humanity a secondary aim—explaining what happens after death for the representatives of each successive race. By introducing the Heroic race, this secondary aim becomes the primary focus and justifies what would otherwise be merely an extraneous episode. This aim also lends the Hesiodic narrative its significance for our current inquiry.

§ 2

The men of the Golden Age, after sleep has overcome them and they have died and been laid in the earth, become by the will of Zeus “Daimones”—Daimones upon earth, watchers of men, wandering over all the earth, veiled in clouds, 71 observing justice and injustice,34 dispensing riches like kings. These men of the earliest times have then become effective realities. They are not spirits confined to an inaccessible region beyond this world, but powers acting and working amongst men. In this exalted state Hesiod calls them Daimones, and thus describes them by a name which is otherwise applied by him as well as by Homer only to the immortal gods. The name so employed is not to be understood as implying a separate class of immortals, an intermediate class of beings between gods and men, as later speculation used the word.35 These later beings of an intermediate class were thought of as possessing an originally immortal nature like the gods, and as dwelling in an intermediate region of their own. Hesiod’s Daimones, on the contrary, have once been men and have only after their death become immortals invisibly36 roaming the earth. When they are given the name Daimones nothing more is implied than that they now share the invisible might and unending life of the gods, and to that extent may be called gods—with as much right as Ino Leukothea, for instance, who, according to Homer, became a goddess after being a mortal; or as Phaëthon, who, according to the Hesiodic Theogony, was raised by Aphrodite from the world of mortality and is now called a “godlike Daimon” (Th., 991). On the other hand, these immortals who were once men are clearly distinguished from the everlasting gods, “who have their Olympian dwellings,” by being called Daimones “who rule upon earth”.37 And though they are given the name, familiar to everybody from Homer, of Daimones, i.e. gods, they, nevertheless, form a class of beings which is entirely unknown to Homer. Homer knows of certain individual men who are raised or translated, body and soul together, to undying life. The later Epos can tell of certain also who, like Memnon or Achilles, receive a new life after their death and now live on in undivided unity of body and soul. But that the soul outside Erebos could carry on a conscious life of its own and influence living men—of this there is no mention in Homer. Yet this is exactly what has happened according to the Hesiodic poem. The men of the Golden Age have died and now live on divided from their bodies, invisible and godlike, and therefore called gods. Just as in Homer, the gods themselves assume manifold shapes and visit the cities of men, observing the good and evil deeds of men,38 so also do the souls of the dead in Hesiod. For the beings who here, after their separation from the body, have become Daimones, are Souls—that is to say, beings who after their 72 death have entered in any case upon a higher existence than was theirs while they were united to the body. This, however, is an idea that we never meet with in the Homeric poems.

The men of the Golden Age, after they fall asleep and die, and are laid in the ground, become by the will of Zeus “Daimones”—Daimones on earth, watchers of people, roaming across the land, shrouded in clouds, 71 observing justice and injustice, 34 dispensing wealth like kings. These ancient men have turned into real forces. They are not spirits stuck in some unreachable place beyond this world, but powers that act and work among people. In this elevated state, Hesiod calls them Daimones, using a term that he and Homer also apply to immortal gods. This term doesn't imply a separate category of immortals or beings that exist between gods and humans, as later theories suggested.35 Those later beings of an intermediary class were believed to have an originally immortal nature like the gods and to live in their own middle ground. Hesiod’s Daimones, on the other hand, were once men and only became immortals after their death, invisibly36 wandering the earth. When they are called Daimones, it only means that they now share the invisible power and eternal life of the gods and may be regarded as gods—with as much legitimacy as Ino Leukothea, who, according to Homer, became a goddess after being human; or as Phaëthon, who, per the Hesiodic Theogony, was raised by Aphrodite from the mortal realm and is now referred to as a “godlike Daimon” (Th., 991). However, these immortals who were once men are clearly distinguished from the everlasting gods, “who have their homes on Olympus,” by being referred to as Daimones “who rule upon earth.” 37 Although they are named Daimones, a term familiar to everyone from Homer, meaning gods, they still represent a group of beings unknown to Homer. Homer knows of specific individuals who are taken or transformed, body and soul together, into eternal life. Later epics tell of others, like Memnon or Achilles, who receive a new life after death and continue to exist in complete unity of body and soul. But there is no mention in Homer of the soul living outside Erebos carrying on its own conscious existence and affecting the living. Yet that is exactly what happens according to the Hesiodic poem. The men of the Golden Age have died and now live on separated from their bodies, invisible and godlike, and thus called gods. Just as in Homer, the gods themselves take on various forms and visit human cities, observing the good and bad deeds of people, 38 so too do the souls of the dead in Hesiod. For those beings who, after separating from their bodies, have become Daimones, are Souls—which means beings who, after their 72 death, have entered into a higher existence than what they had while connected to the body. This, however, is an idea that we never encounter in the Homeric poems.

And yet it is quite unthinkable that this remarkable conception is the independent and passing invention of the Boeotian poet. He comes back to it again later on in the course of his poem. “Thirty thousand,” that is, innumerable immortal Watchers over mortal men wander invisibly in the service of Zeus over the earth, taking note of right and wrong (Op., 252 ff.). The conception is important to him for ethical reasons; if he is to make use of it in his argument he must not have invented it himself. And, in fact, nothing that belongs to the sphere of religious belief and cultus, or even the lower levels of superstition, has been invented by this earnest-minded poet. The Boeotian school of poetry to which he belonged was far removed from, and indeed, hostile to the free inventiveness and roaming fancy with which the Homeric school “. . . know how to put forward many lies and make them seem like truth” (Th., 27). In pursuance of their purpose not simply to please but always in some sense to teach, the Boeotian poets never innovate in the region of the purely mythical, but simply order or piece together, or merely register what they find in the tradition. In religion especially invention lies farthest from their minds, though they do not by any means deny themselves the right of independent speculation about the traditional. Thus, what Hesiod tells us about the men of a previous age, whose souls after death become Daimones, came to him from tradition. It might still be objected that this tradition while being older than Hesiod may, nevertheless, be more recent than Homer, and be the result of post-Homeric speculation. It is unnecessary to develop the reasons which make such a view untenable; the course of our inquiry up to the present has made it possible for us to maintain decidedly that in what Hesiod here says we have a fragment of primitive belief reaching back far beyond Homer and surviving in the secluded Boeotian countryside. We have found even in the poems of Homer vestiges of a cult of the dead sufficient to make us believe that once in a distant past the Greeks resembled the majority of other nations and believed in the continued, conscious existence of the psyche after its separation from the body and in its powerful influence upon the world of men. We found, too, that in accordance with this belief, religious honours of various sorts were paid to the disembodied souls. In Hesiod’s narrative we simply have documentary confirmation of 73 what could only be with difficulty extracted from the study of Homer. Here we encounter the still living belief in the elevation of the soul after death to a higher life. They are the souls, it must be noted, of a race of men long since disappeared, about whom this belief is held. The belief in their godlike after-life must therefore be long-standing, and the worship of these souls as powerful beings still continues. For when it is said of the souls of the second race “these also receive worship”39 (Op., 142), it is distinctly implied that the Daimones of the first or Golden generation a fortiori received worship.

And yet, it’s hard to believe that this incredible idea is just a random invention of the Boeotian poet. He revisits it later in his poem, stating, “Thirty thousand,” meaning countless immortal Watchers over mortal humans, who invisibly serve Zeus on earth, keeping track of right and wrong (Op., 252 ff.). This idea is crucial for him for ethical reasons; if he’s going to use it in his argument, he couldn’t have come up with it himself. In fact, nothing related to religious belief, rituals, or even simple superstitions was invented by this serious-minded poet. The Boeotian school of poetry he belonged to was quite different from, and even opposed to, the imaginative freedom and fanciful storytelling of the Homeric school, which “...know how to put forward many lies and make them seem like truth” (Th., 27). With their goal not just to entertain but also to teach, the Boeotian poets don’t innovate in purely mythical stories; they simply organize, piece together, or record what's already in tradition. Especially in religion, invention is far from their minds; however, they don’t completely shy away from independent thought about what’s traditional. So, when Hesiod talks about the people of a past age whose souls become Daimones after death, he’s drawing from tradition. It could be argued that this tradition, while older than Hesiod, might still be more recent than Homer and could stem from post-Homeric speculation. It’s unnecessary to explain why this view is untenable; our research thus far allows us to confidently assert that what Hesiod describes here is a fragment of primitive belief that goes back well before Homer and has persisted in the isolated Boeotian countryside. We have even found traces of a cult of the dead in Homer’s poems, enough to suggest that the Greeks once, long ago, shared with most other nations a belief in the continued, conscious existence of the psyche after its separation from the body and its significant influence on the human world. We also saw that, in line with this belief, various religious honors were paid to these disembodied souls. In Hesiod’s narrative, we simply have documented proof of 73 what could only be difficult to glean from studying Homer. Here we see the enduring belief in the soul’s elevation to a higher life after death. It’s important to note that these are the souls of a long-gone race of people about whom this belief is held. The belief in their godlike existence after death must therefore be ancient, and the worship of these souls as powerful beings continues. When it’s stated that the souls of the second race “these also receive worship”39 (Op., 142), it clearly implies that the Daimones of the first, or Golden, generation a fortiori received worship.

The men of the Silver generation, on account of their refusal to pay due honour to the Olympians, are “hidden” by Zeus under the earth, and are now called “mortal Blessed Ones that live below the earth, second in rank, yet worship is paid to them also” (141-2). Thus, the poet knows of the souls of men who likewise belonged to the distant past, whose home is in the bowels of the earth, who receive religious honour and who must therefore have been conceived as powerful. The poet has not specified the nature of their influence upon the upper world. It is true that he does not distinctly call the spirits of this second generation “good”, as he had done the first (122), and he makes them spring from the less perfect Silver age and seems to have given them inferior rank. But it does not follow that he here anticipated later speculation and thought of the second generation as a class of wicked demons whose nature it is to work evil.40 Only to the Olympians do they seem to stand in a rather more distant relationship—almost one of hostility. They had before paid the gods none of their pious dues, and so now they are not called, like the souls of the first race, “Daimones appointed by Zeus to be Watchers of men.” The poet refers to them with a remarkable expression, “mortal Blessed Ones,” that is, mortal gods. This very singular denomination, the two parts of which really cancel one another, points to a certain embarrassment felt by the poet in making use of an expression taken from the Homeric vocabulary (to which the poet felt himself confined) to designate clearly and effectively a class of beings that was unknown to Homer.41 The disembodied souls of the first race he had simply called Daimones. But this name, common as it was both to the race of those who from mortality had achieved immortality and to the immortal gods, left the essential difference between the two classes of immortal beings unexpressed. For that very reason the name was never employed in Hesiod’s fashion by later ages,42 who always 74 called such as, not having been born immortal, had achieved immortality, by the name of “Heroes”. Hesiod, who could not use the word in this sense, described them by the bold oxymoron: mortal Blessed Ones, human gods. As immortal spirits they resembled the gods in their new state of being. But their nature was still mortal, and hence their bodies had to die, and this constituted their difference from the everlasting gods.43

The men of the Silver generation, because they refused to honor the Olympians, are “hidden” by Zeus beneath the earth, and are now referred to as “mortal Blessed Ones that live below the earth, second in rank, yet worship is paid to them also” (141-2). Thus, the poet knows about the souls of men from the distant past, whose home is in the depths of the earth, who receive religious honor and must therefore have been considered powerful. The poet does not specify the nature of their influence on the world above. He does not explicitly call the spirits of this second generation “good” as he did the first (122), and he suggests they come from the less perfect Silver age, appearing to assign them a lower rank. However, this does not mean he anticipated later ideas and viewed the second generation as a class of evil demons. They seem to have a more distant, almost hostile relationship with the Olympians. They had previously failed to give the gods their due respect, and so they are not called, like the souls of the first race, “Daimones appointed by Zeus to be Watchers of men.” The poet describes them with the interesting term, “mortal Blessed Ones,” meaning mortal gods. This unique label, where the two parts effectively cancel each other out, indicates the poet's discomfort in using a term from Homeric language (to which he felt restricted) to clearly and effectively define a group of beings that Homer did not know. The disembodied souls of the first race were simply referred to as Daimones. But this term, common to both those who achieved immortality from mortality and to the immortal gods, did not express the essential difference between the two kinds of immortal beings. For this reason, the name was never used in Hesiod’s way by later generations, who always called those who were not born immortal but gained immortality “Heroes.” Hesiod, unable to use the term in this sense, described them with the striking oxymoron: mortal Blessed Ones, human gods. As immortal spirits, they resembled the gods in their new form. But their nature was still mortal, so their bodies had to die, which is what set them apart from the eternal gods.

The name Daimones then does not appear to involve any essential distinction between the spirits of the men of the Silver generation and the Daimones of the Golden Age. Only the place where the two classes of spirits have their dwelling is different—the Daimones of the Silver race live in the depths of the earth. The expression “of the underworld”, used of them, is a vague one, and only suffices to differentiate them from the spirits of the “upper world” who were derived from the first race. Still, the abode of the souls of the Silver Age is in any case not thought of as being the distant meeting-place of the unconscious, vegetating shadow-souls—the House of Hades; the “phantoms” that hover about that place could not have been called Daimones or “mortal gods”, nor do they receive any kind of worship after their death.

The name Daimones doesn’t seem to show any significant difference between the spirits of the Silver generation and those of the Golden Age. The only distinction is where these two groups of spirits live—the Daimones of the Silver race reside in the depths of the earth. The term “of the underworld” used for them is somewhat vague and only serves to separate them from the spirits of the “upper world” that came from the first race. Nevertheless, the home of the souls from the Silver Age is not viewed as a distant place for unconscious, vegetating shadow-souls—the House of Hades; the “phantoms” that linger there wouldn’t be called Daimones or “mortal gods,” nor do they receive any kind of worship after they die.

§ 3

The Silver Age, then, belongs to a long-since vanished past.44 The stalwarts of the Bronze Age, we are told, destroyed by their deeds, went down into the gloomy home of the dreadful Hades, nameless. Black Death seized them, for all their violence, and they left the light of the sun.

The Silver Age, then, belongs to a long-gone past.44 The heroes of the Bronze Age, as we're told, were destroyed by their actions and descended into the dark realm of the fearsome Hades, nameless. The Black Death claimed them, despite all their strength, and they left the sunlight behind.

Except for the addition of the adjective “nameless” one might, indeed, suppose that this was a description of the fate of the souls of the Homeric heroes. Perhaps, however, the word45 only means that no honourable and distinctive title, such as belonged to the souls of the first and second as well as to the fourth race, was attached to those who had gone down into the shadow-world of annihilation and become as nothing.

Except for adding the word “nameless,” one might think this describes the fate of the souls of the heroes from Homer. However, the word 45 might just mean that those who descended into the shadowy world of nothingness lacked any honorable or distinct title, unlike the souls from the first, second, and fourth races.

There follows “the divine race of Heroes who were called the Demigods”. The wars at Thebes and Troy destroyed these. Part were “enfolded in the destiny of Death”; others received life and a home far from men at the hand of Zeus Kronides, who gave them a dwelling-place at the ends of the world. There they live, free from care, in the Islands of the Blest, by the deep-flowing Okeanos; favoured Heroes, for whom the Earth, of her own accord, brings forth her sweet fruits three times a year. 75

There are the "divine race of Heroes known as the Demigods." The wars at Thebes and Troy wiped them out. Some were "caught up in the fate of Death"; others were given life and a home away from humanity by Zeus Kronides, who provided them a sanctuary at the ends of the world. There they live, free of worries, in the Islands of the Blest, by the deep-flowing Okeanos; favored Heroes, for whom the Earth, on her own, yields her sweet fruits three times a year. 75

Here, at last, for the first time we have reached a clearly definable period of legendary history. The poet means to speak of the Heroes whose adventures were narrated in the Thebais, the Iliad and kindred poems. What we notice here specially is how little the Greeks yet knew of their history. Immediately after the disappearance of the Heroes the poet begins the age in which he himself must live. Where the realm of poetry ends, there is an end of all further tradition; there follows a blank, and to all appearances the present age immediately begins. That explains why the Heroic Age is the last before the fifth, to which the poet himself belongs, and why it does not, for example, precede the (undated) Bronze Age. It connects itself conveniently with the Bronze Age also in what is related of the fate suffered by a part of its representatives, for the subject which here particularly interests the poet is the fate of the departed. Some of the fallen Heroes simply die—that is to say (there can be no doubt of it) they enter the realm of Hades like the members of the Bronze race or the Heroes of the Iliad. But when others are distinguished from those whom “Death took” in that they reach the Islands of the Blest, it is impossible not to suppose that these last have not suffered death, that is, the separation of the Psyche from the visible Self, but have been carried away alive in the flesh. The poet is thinking of such cases as those we have met with in the Odyssean narrative of Menelaos, or, in the Telegoneia, of Penelope, Telemachos and Telegonos. These few exceptional instances could hardly have made such a deep impression on him that he felt himself bound on their behalf to erect a special class of the Translated to be set over against those who simply died. There can be no doubt that he had many more examples before him of this same mysterious mode of separation from the world of men that did not involve death. We have already seen how the lines in the Odyssey in which the translation of Menelaos is foreshadowed, point back to other and earlier poems of the same kind. Further, the references to the subject which we found in the remains of the Cyclic Epics make it easy to suppose that later Heroic poetry had been continually widening the circle of those who enjoyed translation and illumination.

Here, at last, for the first time, we’ve reached a clearly defined period of legendary history. The poet intends to talk about the Heroes whose adventures are recounted in the Thebais, the Iliad, and similar poems. What stands out here is how little the Greeks actually knew about their history. As soon as the Heroes vanish, the poet begins the age in which he himself must live. Where the realm of poetry ends, there’s a complete break in tradition; what follows is a blank, and the present age starts immediately. This explains why the Heroic Age is the last before the fifth, which the poet himself belongs to, and why it doesn’t, for instance, precede the undated Bronze Age. It conveniently connects with the Bronze Age as well in the stories about the fate of some of its figures, because the poet is particularly interested in the fate of those who have passed on. Some of the fallen Heroes simply die—meaning, without a doubt, they enter the realm of Hades like the members of the Bronze race or the Heroes of the Iliad. But when others are distinguished from those whom “Death took” because they reach the Islands of the Blest, it's hard not to assume that these last ones haven’t actually died, that is, undergone the separation of the Psyche from the visible Self, but were taken away alive in the flesh. The poet has in mind cases like those we encountered in the Odyssean tale of Menelaos, or in the Telegoneia, involving Penelope, Telemachos, and Telegonos. These few exceptional cases likely didn’t leave such a lasting impression on him that he felt the need to create a special category of the Translated to set apart from those who simply died. There’s no doubt he had many more examples of this mysterious way of separating from the world of men that didn’t involve death. We’ve already seen how the lines in the Odyssey suggesting Menelaos’s translation refer back to other earlier poems of the same kind. Furthermore, references to the subject found in the remains of the Cyclic Epics suggest that later Heroic poetry continually expanded the circle of those who experienced translation and enlightenment.

Only from such a poetical source can Hesiod have derived his conception of a common meeting-place where the Translated enjoy for ever their untroubled existence. He calls that place the “Islands of the Blest”; and these lie far removed from the world of men, in the Ocean, on the confines of the earth, just where the Odyssey puts the Elysian 76 plain, another meeting-place of the still-living Translated, or rather the same under a different name. Its name does not oblige us to regard the “Elysian plain” as an island, but neither does it exclude that assumption. Homer never expressly calls the land of the Phæacians an island,46 but the imagination of most readers will picture Scheriê as such, and so did the Greeks perhaps already at the time of the Hesiodic school of poets. In the same way a poet may have thought of the “Land of Destiny” that receives passing mention in Homer as an island, or group of islands; only an island surrounded and cut off by the sea can give the full impression of a distant asylum far from the world, inaccessible to all save those specially called thither. And accordingly the mythology of many peoples, especially those who live by the sea, has made a distant island the dwelling-place of the souls of the departed.

Only from such a poetic source could Hesiod have come up with his idea of a common meeting-place where the Translated enjoy their peaceful existence forever. He refers to this place as the “Islands of the Blest,” which are located far from the world of humans, in the Ocean, at the edge of the earth, just where the Odyssey describes the Elysian 76 plain, another gathering place for the still-living Translated, or rather the same place under a different name. The name doesn’t force us to see the “Elysian plain” as an island, but it doesn’t rule out that idea either. Homer never directly calls the land of the Phæacians an island, but most readers will likely imagine Scheriê that way, and perhaps the Greeks thought so as well during the time of the Hesiodic school of poets. Similarly, a poet may have envisioned the “Land of Destiny,” which is mentioned briefly in Homer, as an island or a group of islands; only an island surrounded and cut off by the sea can fully convey the idea of a distant sanctuary far from the world, accessible only to those specifically called there. As a result, the mythology of many cultures, especially those living by the sea, has depicted a distant island as the resting place for the souls of the departed.

Complete isolation is the essential feature of the whole idea of translation, as Hesiod clearly shows. A later poet has added a line—which does not quite fit into its place—to make this isolation even more marked.47 According to it, these Blessed Ones live not only “far from men” (167), but also (169) far from the immortals, and are ruled over by Kronos. The writer of this line follows a beautiful legend, later, however, than Hesiod, in which Zeus released the aged Kronos, together with the other Titans,48 from Tartaros, so that the old king of the gods, under whose rule the Golden Age had once prevailed with peace and happiness upon earth, now wields the sceptre of another Golden Age over the Blessed in Elysium, himself a figure of peaceful contemplation dwelling far away from the stormy world, from the throne of which he has been ousted by Zeus. Hesiod himself has provoked this transference of Kronos from the Golden Age to the land of the Translated; for in the few lines that he devotes to the description of the life of the Blessed a reminiscence of the picture of the Golden Age’s untroubled existence is clearly discernible. Both pictures, the one of a childhood’s paradise in the past, the other of unclouded happiness reserved in the future for the elect, are closely related; it is difficult to say which of them has influenced the other49 since the colours must have been the same in any case—the purely idyllic having an inevitable uniformity of its own.

Complete isolation is the key aspect of the whole concept of translation, as Hesiod clearly shows. A later poet added a line—which doesn’t quite fit—to highlight this isolation even more. According to it, these Blessed Ones live not only “far from men” (167), but also (169) far from the immortals, and they are ruled by Kronos. The writer of this line follows a beautiful legend, which is later than Hesiod, in which Zeus frees the aged Kronos and the other Titans from Tartaros, so that the old king of the gods, under whose rule the Golden Age once thrived with peace and happiness on earth, now has the scepter of another Golden Age over the Blessed in Elysium, himself a figure of peaceful contemplation dwelling far away from the stormy world, from which he has been ousted by Zeus. Hesiod himself has prompted this transfer of Kronos from the Golden Age to the land of the Translated; for in the few lines he devotes to describing the life of the Blessed, a memory of the untroubled existence of the Golden Age is clearly recognizable. Both images, one of a childhood paradise in the past and the other of unclouded happiness preserved for the chosen in the future, are closely related; it’s hard to say which influenced the other since the colors would have been the same in any case—the purely idyllic having an inevitable uniformity of its own.

§ 4

Hesiod says nothing of any influence upon this world exerted by the souls of the Translated in the Islands of the Blest, such as is attributed to the Daimones of the Golden 77 race, nor of any religious worship, which would be implied by such influence if it existed, such as the underworld spirits of the Silver Age receive. All relations with this world are broken off, for any influence from this side would completely contradict the whole conception of these blessed departed. Hesiod faithfully sets down the conception of the Translated exactly as poetic fancy, without any interference from religious cultus, or the folk-belief founded on it, had instinctively shaped it.

Hesiod doesn't mention any impact on this world from the souls of those who have been Translated to the Islands of the Blest, unlike the influence attributed to the Daimones of the Golden race. He also doesn't talk about any religious worship that would suggest such influence exists, which is what the underworld spirits from the Silver Age receive. All connections with this world are severed because any influence from this side would completely contradict the idea of these blessed departed souls. Hesiod accurately records the idea of the Translated as pure poetic imagination, without any interference from religious practices or folk beliefs that may have shaped it instinctively.

Supposing, then, that he follows Homeric and post-Homeric poetic tradition in this particular, whence did he derive his ideas about the Daimones and spirits of the Golden and Silver Ages? He did not and could not have got these from Homeric or semi-Homeric sources, for they (unlike the idea of Translation) do not simply expand, but actually contradict Homeric beliefs about the soul. To this question we may answer with certainty; he derived them from cultus. There survived, in spite of Homer, at least in central Greece where the Hesiodic poetry had its home, a religious worship paid to the souls of certain departed classes of men; and this cultus preserved alive, at least as a vague tradition, a belief which Homer had obscured and dispossessed. It only reached the Boeotian poet, whose own conceptions spring entirely from the soil of Homeric belief, as from a far distance. Already in the days of the Bronze race, he tells us, the souls of the dead were swallowed up in the dread House of Hades, and this (with a few miraculous exceptions) applies to the Heroic race as well. And for the poet, standing as he does, at the opening of the Iron Age, to which he himself belongs, nothing remains but dissolution in the nothingness of Erebos. That such is his view is proved by his silence about the fate after death of his generation—a silence that is all the more oppressive because the grim picture that he gives of the misery and ever-increasing depravity of real and contemporary life might seem to require a brighter and more hopeful picture of future compensation, if only to balance it and make it endurable. But he is silent about all such future compensation; he has no such hope to offer. Though in another part of the same poem Hope alone of all the blessings of an earlier and better age still remains among men, such Hope no longer illuminates the next world, at any rate, with its beams. The poet, more deeply distressed by the common realities of life, can by no means dispense so easily as the singers of the epic tradition enclosed in the magic circle of their poetry, with such hopes of the future. He can draw comfort only from what poetry 78 or religious myth tell him of the far distant past. It never enters his head to believe that the miracle of the translation of living men could transcend the limits of the Heroic Age and repeat itself in the common and prosaic present day. And the time when, according to a law of nature no longer (so it seems) in operation, the souls of the dead became Daimones and lived a higher life upon and beneath the earth, is situated far back in the distant past. Another law rules now; the men of to-day may still worship the immortal spirits of the Golden and the Silver Age, but they themselves will never be added to the number of those illuminated and exalted souls.

Assuming he follows the poetic traditions from Homer and later, where did he get his ideas about the Daimones and spirits of the Golden and Silver Ages? He didn't and couldn't have gotten these from Homeric or semi-Homeric sources because they (unlike the idea of Translation) don’t just expand but actually contradict Homeric beliefs about the soul. We can answer this question with certainty; he got them from cultus. Despite Homer, there remained, at least in central Greece where Hesiod's poetry originated, a religious worship of the souls of certain classes of the deceased. This cultus kept alive, at least as a vague tradition, a belief that Homer had obscured and replaced. It only reached the Boeotian poet, whose ideas fully stem from Homeric beliefs, from a far distance. He tells us that even in the days of the Bronze race, the souls of the dead were swallowed up in the terrifying House of Hades, and this (with a few miraculous exceptions) applies to the Heroic race as well. For the poet, who stands at the start of the Iron Age to which he belongs, nothing remains but dissolution into the void of Erebos. This view is confirmed by his silence about what happens after death to his generation—a silence that is even more oppressive because the grim picture he paints of the misery and increasing depravity of real, contemporary life might seem to require a brighter and more hopeful vision of future compensation, just to balance it and make it bearable. But he says nothing about such future compensation; he has no hope to offer. Although in another part of the same poem, only Hope remains among men from the blessings of an earlier and better age, this Hope no longer sheds its light on the next world. The poet, more deeply troubled by the harsh realities of life, cannot easily relinquish the hopes for the future like the singers of the epic tradition, who are enclosed in the magical circle of their poetry. He can only find solace in what poetry 78 or religious myth tells him about the distant past. He never considers that the miracle of the transformation of living people could go beyond the limits of the Heroic Age and repeat itself in the ordinary and mundane present. And the time when, according to a natural law that no longer seems to operate, the souls of the dead became Daimones and lived a higher life above and below the earth is situated far back in the distant past. Another law governs now; people today may still worship the immortal spirits of the Golden and Silver Ages, but they themselves will never join the ranks of those illuminated and exalted souls.

§ 5

Hesiod’s description, then, of the five Ages of Men gives us the most important information about the development of Greek belief in the soul. What he tells us of the spirits of the Silver and Golden race shows that from the earliest dawn of history down to the actual lifetime of the poet, a form of ancestor-worship had prevailed, based upon the once living belief in the elevation of disembodied and immaterial souls to the rank of powerful, consciously active spirits. But the company of these spirits receives no additions from the life of the present day. For centuries now the souls of the dead have been claimed by Hades and his vain shadow world. The worship of the soul is stationary; it affects only the souls of the long-since departed; it no longer increases the number of the objects of its worship. In other words, the belief has changed; the Homeric poems have triumphed and the view they held, and to which they gave authority, and, as it were, official sanction, now prevails. They teach men that the psyche once separated from the body loses all its powers and consciousness; the strengthless shadows are received into a distant Underworld. For them, no action, no influence upon the world of men is possible, and therefore no cult can be paid to them. Only on the farthest horizon faintly appear the Islands of the Blest, but the circle of the fortunate, who, according to the visionary fancy of the poets, are translated alive there, is now closed, just as the circle of epic story is complete also. Such miracles no longer happen.

Hesiod’s description of the five Ages of Men provides key insights into the development of Greek beliefs about the soul. His accounts of the spirits of the Silver and Golden races indicate that from the earliest days of history up to the poet's own time, a form of ancestor worship was prevalent, rooted in the long-held belief that disembodied and immaterial souls could become powerful, conscious spirits. However, the number of these spirits has not grown with the living. For centuries, Hades has claimed the souls of the dead, along with his shadowy realm. The worship of the soul has stagnated; it only pertains to the souls of those long gone and no longer adds to the number of objects of worship. In other words, the belief has shifted; the Homeric poems have prevailed, and the perspective they endorsed now dominates. They teach that once the psyche is separated from the body, it loses all its powers and awareness; the powerless shadows are sent to a distant Underworld. For them, no actions or influence on the world of the living are possible, and therefore no worship can be offered to them. Only faintly visible on the farthest horizon are the Islands of the Blest, but the circle of the fortunate, who, according to the poets' visions, are transported there alive, is now closed, just as the circle of epic stories is also complete. Such miracles no longer happen.

Nothing in this evolutionary process so clearly depicted in the poem of Hesiod contradicts what we have learned from Homer. One thing only is new and immensely important; in spite of everything the memory survives that once the souls of departed generations of men had achieved a higher, 79 undying life. Hesiod speaks in the present tense of their being and working and of the worship paid to them after their death; if they are believed to be immortal, men will naturally continue to worship them. And the opposite also is true; if the worship of such spirits had not survived into the present, no one would have held them to be deathless and eternally potent.

Nothing in this evolutionary process clearly illustrated in Hesiod's poem contradicts what we’ve learned from Homer. One thing, however, is new and incredibly important: despite everything, there's a lasting memory that once the souls of past generations of humans lived a higher, 79 undying life. Hesiod talks in the present tense about their existence and influence and the worship that continues after their death; if people believe they are immortal, they will naturally keep worshipping them. Conversely, if the worship of such spirits hadn’t survived into the present, no one would consider them deathless and eternally powerful.

In a word, we are in the old Greek mainland, the land of Boeotian peasants and urban farmers, among a stay-at-home race which neither knows nor desires to know of the seafaring life that tempts men to foreign lands whence they bring back so much that is new and strange. Here in the central uplands vestiges of ancient custom and belief remained that had been forgotten in the maritime cities of new Greece on the Asiatic coast. Even here, however, the new learning had penetrated to this extent: the structure of ancient belief, transported into the distant past, interwoven with fanciful tales of the earliest state of mankind, like the expiring echo of half-forgotten song lives on only in memory. But the cult of Souls, is not yet quite dead; the possibility remains that it may yet renew its strength and expand into fresh life when once the magic influence of the Homeric view of the world shall have been broken.

In short, we are in the old Greek mainland, the land of Boeotian farmers and town-dwellers, among a community that neither knows nor wants to know about the seafaring life that lures people to distant lands where they bring back so much that is new and strange. Here in the central uplands, remnants of ancient customs and beliefs remain that have been forgotten in the coastal cities of modern Greece on the Asian shore. Even here, though, new knowledge has made its way in to some extent: the framework of ancient beliefs, moved into the distant past, mixed with imaginative stories of humanity's earliest state, lives on only in memory like a fading echo of a half-forgotten song. But the cult of Souls is not completely gone; there is still a chance it could regain its strength and grow into new life once the magical influence of the Homeric worldview has been broken.

NOTES TO CHAPTER II

1 It is not for nothing that what is here said of the “climate”, if one may so call it, of the Elysian plain, δ 566–8, reminds us so strikingly of the description of the abode of the Gods on Olympos, ζ 43–5.

1 The way the "climate," as one might put it, of the Elysian plain is described, δ 566–8, strongly brings to mind the depiction of the home of the Gods on Olympus, ζ 43–5.

2 The announcement of the fate of Menelaos is quite superfluous; it is not necessitated (and not even justified) by his first request (468 ff.), or by his further questions (486 ff.; 551 ff.). Nitzsch already regarded the lines 561–8 as a later addition: Anm. z. Od. iii, p. 352—though indeed on grounds that I cannot regard as conclusive. Others have done the same since.

2 The announcement about what happened to Menelaos is pretty unnecessary; it doesn't really come from his initial request (468 ff.) or from his follow-up questions (486 ff.; 551 ff.). Nitzsch already thought that lines 561–8 were added later: Anm. z. Od. iii, p. 352—although I don't find his reasons convincing. Others have come to the same conclusion since then.

3 The following are made invisible (by envelopment in a cloud) and carried away—this, though not always stated, is most probably to be understood in most cases: Paris, by Aphrodite, Γ 380 ff.; Aeneas, by Apollo, Ε 344 f.; Idaios, son of Dares, the priest of Hephaistos, by Heph., Ε 23; Hektor, by Apollo, Υ 443 f.; Aeneas, by Poseidon, Υ 325 ff.; Agenor, by Apollo, Φ 596 ff.—this last appears to be the original copied twice over in the story of this one day of fighting by later poets (in the above-mentioned cases of the use of the motif, Υ 325 ff.; 443 f.). It is remarkable (for no special reason for it suggests itself) that all these cases of translation are found on the Trojan side. Otherwise we only have one instance (and that only in the narrative of a long past adventure), the translation of the Anaktoriones by their father Poseidon, Λ 750 ff. Lastly, a case that hardly goes beyond those already mentioned: Zeus could have translated alive his son Sarpedon out of the fray and placed him in his Lykian home (Π 436), but refrains owing to the warning of Hera (440 ff.).

3 The following individuals are made invisible (enveloped in a cloud) and taken away—this, although not always explicitly stated, is likely understood in most cases: Paris, by Aphrodite, Γ 380 ff.; Aeneas, by Apollo, Ε 344 f.; Idaios, son of Dares, the priest of Hephaistos, by Heph., Ε 23; Hektor, by Apollo, Υ 443 f.; Aeneas, by Poseidon, Υ 325 ff.; Agenor, by Apollo, Φ 596 ff.—this last instance seems to be the original repeated by later poets in the story of this one day of fighting (in the previously mentioned cases of the motif, Υ 325 ff.; 443 f.). It's notable (for no particular reason stands out) that all these instances of being taken away occur on the Trojan side. Otherwise, we only have one case (and that only in the account of a long-ago adventure), the translation of the Anaktoriones by their father Poseidon, Λ 750 ff. Finally, there's a situation that barely extends beyond those already mentioned: Zeus could have saved his son Sarpedon from the battle and brought him to his home in Lycia (Π 436), but he holds back due to Hera's warning (440 ff.).

4 The wish to die quickly is expressly contrasted with the wish to be carried off by the Harpies, 63 ἢ ἔπειτα—“or if not,” i.e. if quick death is denied to me. (v. Rh. Mus. 50, 2, 2.) Again 79–80: ὡς ἔμ’ ἀϊστώσειαν Ὀλύμπια δώματ’ ἔχοντες ἠέ μ’ ἐϋπλόκαμος βάλοι Ἄρτεμις. Thus the Harpies (= θύελλα 63) in this case do not bring death but carry away men alive (ἀναρπάξασα οἴχοιτο 63 f., ἅρπυιαι ἀνηρείψαντο 77 = ἀνέλοντο θύελλαι 66, and they carry them off κατ’ ἠερόεντα κέλευθα 64 to the προχοαὶ ἀψορρόου Ὠκεανοῖο 65 ἔδοσαν στυγερῇσιν Ἐρινύσιν ἀμφιπολεύειν 78). At the “mouths of Okeanos” (where it goes into the sea) is the entrance to the world of the dead; κ 508 ff., λ 13 ff. To be carried off by the storm-spirits used proverbially as a wish: Ζ 345 ff. ὧς μ’ ὄφελ’ ἤματι τῷ ὅτε με πρῶτον τέκε μήτηρ οἴχεσθαι προφέρουσα κακὴ ἀνέμοιο θύελλα εἰς ὄρος ἢ εἰς κῦμα πολυφλοίσβοιο θαλάσσης (i.e. to some solitary place, Orph., H. 19, 19; 36, 16; 71, 11). Such transportation through the air is elsewhere contrasted with death and dwelling in Hades, as in Penelope’s prayer. (Roscher, Kynanthropie [Abh. d. sächs. Ges. d. Wiss. xvii], p. 67, gives a strange but hardly the correct explanation of this.) Cf. Soph., Tr., 953 ff.; Ai., 1193 ff.; (Phil., 1092 ff.?); cf. also Eur., Hipp., 1279 ff.; Ion, 805 f.; Supp., 833–6. A deeply rooted popular mode of thought, and one of primeval antiquity, lies at the root of all 81 these instances.—ὑπὸ πνευμάτων συναρπαγέντα ἄφαντον γενέσθαι is a reason for τιμαὶ ἀθάνατοι, in the only half-rationalized story of Hesperos in D.S. 3, 60, 3.

4 The desire to die quickly is clearly contrasted with the desire to be taken away by the Harpies, 63 or later—“or if not,” meaning if a quick death is not an option for me. (v. Rh. Mus. 50, 2, 2.) Again 79–80: As they let me, having homes on Olympus, or as fair-haired Artemis might throw me.. Thus, the Harpies (= storm 63) in this context do not bring death but take people away alive (She would be taken away. 63 f., Harpyas attacked 77 = storm clouds gathered 66, and they carry them off through the cloudy paths 64 to the προχοαὶ ἀψορρόου Ὠκεανοῖο 65 They gave to the dreaded Furies to roam. 78). At the “mouths of Okeanos” (where it enters the sea) is the entrance to the underworld; κ 508 ff., λ 13 ff. To be taken away by the storm spirits is commonly used as a wish: Ζ 345 ff. When I was born, my mother wished that I could have been carried off by a cruel storm, either to the mountains or into the waves of the roaring sea. (i.e., to some isolated place, Orph., H. 19, 19; 36, 16; 71, 11). Such transportation through the air is often contrasted with death and living in Hades, as shown in Penelope’s prayer. (Roscher, Kynanthropie [Abh. d. sächs. Ges. d. Wiss. xvii], p. 67, gives an unusual but probably not the correct explanation of this.) Cf. Soph., Tr., 953 ff.; Ai., 1193 ff.; (Phil., 1092 ff.?); cf. also Eur., Hipp., 1279 ff.; Ion, 805 f.; Supp., 833–6. A deeply rooted popular way of thinking, dating back to ancient times, underlies all these instances.—Under spirits, becoming invisible. is a reason for immortal honors, in the only half-rationalized story of Hesperos in D.S. 3, 60, 3.

5 One would like to know more of this strange story, but what we learn elsewhere of Pandareos and his daughters (Sch. υ 66–7; τ 518; Ant. Lib. 36) contributes nothing to the understanding of the Homeric narrative and probably belongs in part to another connexion. Pandareos, father of Aëdon (τ 518 ff.), seems to be another person. Even the strange representation of the two daughters of Pandareos in Polygnotos’ picture of the underworld (Paus. 10, 30, 2) casts no light on the Homeric fable. (Cf. Roscher, Kynan., 4 ff., 65 f.)

5 We would like to know more about this strange story, but what we learn elsewhere about Pandareos and his daughters (Sch. υ 66–7; τ 518; Ant. Lib. 36) doesn’t really help us understand the Homeric narrative and likely belongs to a different context. Pandareos, the father of Aëdon (τ 518 ff.), appears to be a different person. Even the unusual depiction of Pandareos' two daughters in Polygnotos’ painting of the underworld (Paus. 10, 30, 2) doesn't shed light on the Homeric tale. (Cf. Roscher, Kynan., 4 ff., 65 f.)

6 The Erinyes live normally in Erebos, as is shown esp. by I 571 f.; Τ 259. But when they punish during the lifetime of the criminal acts done in contravention of the laws of family life, it must be supposed that they were sometimes thought of as going about the earth, e.g. I 454: λ 278—for “working at a distance” seems impossible—as in Hes., Op., 803 f.—Ἐρινύσιν ἀμφιπολεύειν (78) cannot be anything but “serve the Erinyes”, “become their ἀμφίπολοι”. To understand it as Roscher does (Kynan., 65, n. 183) following Eustathius, in the sense “fly about in the train of the E.” is forbidden by the use of the simple dative Ἐρινύσι joined closely with ἀμφ. (θεαῖς ἀμφιπολῶν Soph., O.C., 680, is different.)

6 The Erinyes normally reside in Erebos, as indicated especially by I 571 f.; Τ 259. However, when they punish the wrongdoing that occurs during a person's life against the laws of family life, it seems they were sometimes imagined as roaming the Earth, for example I 454: λ 278—since it seems impossible for them to “work from a distance,” as mentioned in Hes., Op., 803 f.—To be haunted by Furies (78) can only mean “serve the Erinyes,” or “become their handmaidens.” To interpret it as Roscher does (Kynan., 65, n. 183) following Eustathius, meaning “fly around in the company of the E.” is incorrect based on the usage of the simple dative Furies closely associated with ἀμφ. (θεάς __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ Soph., O.C., 680, is different.)

7 “When the Bride of the Wind comes by you must throw yourself on the ground as though it were the Muodisheere (on which see Grimm (E.T.), p. 931) otherwise they will carry you off.” Birlinger, Volksthüml. a. Schwaben, i, 192, “She is the Devil’s Bride,” ib. (On the “Bride of the Wind”, etc., see Grimm, pp. 632, 1009.) Such wind-spirits are in unholy alliance with the “Furious Host”, i.e. the unquiet “souls” of the dead that travel through the air by night.

7 “When the Bride of the Wind comes by, you have to lie down on the ground as if it were the Muodisheere (see Grimm (E.T.), p. 931); otherwise, they will take you away.” Birlinger, Volksthüml. a. Schwaben, i, 192, “She is the Devil’s Bride,” ib. (For more on the “Bride of the Wind,” etc., see Grimm, pp. 632, 1009.) These wind-spirits have an unholy alliance with the “Furious Host,” which refers to the restless “souls” of the dead that roam through the air at night.

8 On the Harpies, see Rh. Mus., 50, 1–5.

8 For information on the Harpies, check Rh. Mus., 50, 1–5.

9 See Nägelsb., H.T., pp. 42–3, and Roscher, Nektar u. Ambrosia, p. 51 ff., answering Bergk’s objections, Opusc. ii, 669. (Arist. Meta., 1000a, 9–14, is very definite.)

9 See Nägelsb., H.T., pp. 42–3, and Roscher, Nektar u. Ambrosia, p. 51 ff., addressing Bergk’s criticisms, Opusc. ii, 669. (Arist. Meta., 1000a, 9–14, is very clear.)

10 It is not improbable that this Ino Leukothea was originally a goddess who was later turned into a “Heroine” (identified with the daughter of Kadmos for reasons no longer recoverable) and only afterwards turned back again into a goddess. But for the Homeric age she was essentially a mortal who had become a goddess: for this reason, just because she was an example of such deification of mortals, she remained an interesting character to later writers; cf. in addition to the well-known passages in Pindar, etc., Cic., T.D. i, 28. Only what the actual conception of the people and their poets was—not what may possibly be suggested as the doubtful background of such conceptions—concerns me in this as in many other cases.

10 It’s not unlikely that this Ino Leukothea was originally a goddess who was later turned into a “Heroine” (associated with the daughter of Kadmos for reasons that we can no longer trace) and then transformed back into a goddess. However, during the Homeric age, she was fundamentally a mortal who had become a goddess. For this reason, since she represented such deification of mortals, she continued to be an intriguing character for later writers; in addition to the well-known references in Pindar, etc., see Cic., T.D. i, 28. What really matters to me, as in many other cases, is not what might be suggested as the uncertain background of such conceptions, but what the people's and poets' actual understanding of her was.

11 Only temporary translation (ἀνήρπασε) of Marpessa by Apollo I 564.

11 Only temporary translation (airtight) of Marpessa by Apollo I 564.

12 Ganymedes, ἀνήρπασε θέσπις ἄελλα, h. Ven., 208, as the θύελλα (= Ἅρπυια) did the daughters of Pandareos. The eagle is the addition of later poetry.

12 Ganymedes, was taken by the divine storm, h. Ven., 208, just like the storm (= Harpies) did the daughters of Pandareos. The eagle is a later addition by poets.

13 Λ 1; ε 1.

13 L 1; e 1.

14 Ἠὼς . . . ἀπ’ Ὠκεανοῖο ῥοάων ὤρνυθ’, ἵν’ ἀθανάτοισι φόως φέροι ἠδὲ βροτοῖσιν, Τ 1 f.: cf. ψ 244 (h. Merc., 184 f.). So also h. Ven., 224 ff., says of Tithonos: Ἠοῖ τερπόμενος χρυσοθρόνῳ ἠριγενείῃ ναῖε παρ’ Ὠκεανοῖο ῥοῇς ἐπὶ πείρασι γαίης, in good Homeric style. It seems that the magic island Aiaia was considered the home of Eos (and of Tithonos): μ 3: νῆσόν τ’ Αἰαίην, ὅθι τ’ Ἠοῦς ἠριγενείης 82 οἰκία καὶ χοροί εἰσι ἀντολαὶ ἠελίοιο. I need not here go into the attempts made even in antiquity to explain the much-discussed difficulty introduced by this verse and to bring it into conformity with the westerly situation of Aiaia implied in the rest of the Odyssey. One thing is certain: the first composer of this verse thought of Aiaia as lying towards the east. Only the last resources of the commentator’s art could situate the place of the “sun’s uprising” and the “dwelling of the Dawn” in the west.

14 Eos... emerged from the ocean's flow, where the light of the immortals shines upon mortals., T 1 f.: cf. ψ 244 (h. Merc., 184 f.). Similarly, h. Ven., 224 ff., speaks of Tithonos: Eos, enjoying her golden throne, residing by the Ocean’s edge at the ends of the earth., in fine Homeric style. It appears that the magical island Aiaia was thought to be the home of Eos (and of Tithonos): μ 3: the island Aiaia, where Eos, the dawn goddess, lives and the choral songs of the rising sun are heard 82 are located. I don’t need to delve into the efforts made even in ancient times to explain the long-discussed challenge posed by this verse and to align it with the western location of Aiaia suggested elsewhere in the Odyssey. One thing is clear: the original composer of this verse imagined Aiaia as lying to the east. Only the most extreme efforts of commentating could place the "sun's rising" and the "dwelling of the Dawn" in the west.

15 Among innumerable unsuccessful attempts made by the ancients at finding an etymological derivation for the word Ἠλύσιον (Sch., δ 563, Eust., p. 1509, Hesych., s.v., etc., also Cels. ap. Orig., Cels. vii, 28, p. 53 L.) occurs also the right one, E.M., 428, 36: παρὰ τὴν ἔλευσιν, ἔνθα οἱ εὐσεβεῖς παραγίνονται. The grammarians seem to have disputed over the question, did Menelaos live for ever in Elysion? It was agreed on all hands that he reached that abode alive, without separation of psyche from body; but the over-subtle thought that the prophecy meant that he too should die there though not in Argos—not that he should never die at all: so esp. E. Gud., 242, 2 ff. This was the opinion also of those who derived Ἠλύσιον from the fact that there the ψυχαὶ λελυμέναι τῶν σωμάτων διάγουσι: Eust., 1509, 29, E.M., etc. The etymology is as bad as the interpretation of the line. The line remained, however, throughout antiquity as a curiosity; intelligent readers understood the prophecy quite rightly as referring to the translation of Menelaos to everlasting life without separation of ψυχή from body; e.g. Porph. ap. Stob., Ecl. i, p. 422, 8 ff., W. So, too, those who gave the right interpretation of fact, but rested it upon the more dubious etymology: Ἠλύσιον οὐλύσιον, ὅτι οὐ διαλύονται ἀπὸ τῶν σωμάτων αἱ ψυχαί. Hesych. (cf. E.M., 428, 34–5; Sch., δ 563; Procl. on Hes., Op., 169).

15 Among countless failed attempts by the ancients to find a meaning for the word Elysium (Sch., δ 563, Eust., p. 1509, Hesych., s.v., etc., also Cels. ap. Orig., Cels. vii, 28, p. 53 L.) was also the correct one, E.M., 428, 36: At the arrival, where the devout gather. The grammarians seemed to argue over the question of whether Menelaos lived forever in Elysion. Everyone agreed that he reached that place alive, without the separation of soul from body; but the overly detailed idea that the prophecy suggested he would also die there, though not in Argos—not that he would never die at all: especially E. Gud., 242, 2 ff. This was also the view of those who derived Elysium from the fact that there the Souls are released from bodies.: Eust., 1509, 29, E.M., etc. The etymology is as flawed as the interpretation of the line. However, throughout antiquity, the line remained a curiosity; intelligent readers correctly understood the prophecy as referring to Menelaos's ascension to eternal life without the separation of soul from body; e.g. Porph. ap. Stob., Ecl. i, p. 422, 8 ff., W. Similarly, there were those who provided the correct interpretation of the fact, but based it on the more questionable etymology: Elysium is a place where souls do not separate from their bodies.. Hesych. (cf. E.M., 428, 34–5; Sch., δ 563; Procl. on Hes., Op., 169).

16 οὐ μὴν φαίνεταί γε (ὁ ποιητής) προαγαγὼν τὸν λόγον ἐς πλέον ὡς εὕρημα ἄν τις οἰκεῖον, προσαψάμενος δὲ αὐτοῦ μόνον ἅτε ἐς ἅπαν ἤδη διαβεβοημένου τὸ Ἑλληνικόν—to adopt the words that Pausanias (10, 31, 4) uses of a similar case.

16 It definitely seems (the poet)has expanded the argument as if it were an invention that someone could claim ownership of, just linking themselves to it since it is already fully acknowledged as Greek.—to adopt the words that Pausanias (10, 31, 4) uses of a similar case.

17 The reasons for the special favour shown to Rhadamanthys are as unknown to us as they evidently were to the Greeks of later times. What is generally said of the “justice” of Rhad. rests upon private opinion only and does not supply the place of the precise legend that should have justified his translation. That he once had a complete legend of his own may be guessed from the allusion to him in η 323, though that passage still leaves us quite in the dark. At any rate, it certainly does not follow from that reference that while dwelling in Elysion he was a neighbour of the Phaeacians as Welcker thinks: nor further that he had always been a dweller in Elysion, as Preller supposes, instead of being transported there. Nothing in the former passage justifies us in regarding him as then dwelling in Elysion; while the other reference to him must be supposed to mean that Rhad. just as much as Menelaos, was translated to Elys. (and so e.g. Paus. understood the poet 8, 53, 5: πρότερον δὲ ἔτι Ῥαδάμανθυν ἐνταῦθα ἥκειν; doubtful: Aesch. fr. 99, 12–13). In fact, we have lost the legends which gave the details of his translation: his figure had become isolated and had not entered into the greater circle of epic figures—and as a consequence his mythical context soon disappeared too.

17 The reasons for the special favor given to Rhadamanthys are as unknown to us as they were to the later Greeks. What is commonly said about Rhadamanthys's “justice” is based solely on personal opinions and does not replace the specific legend that should have explained his transfer. We can guess that he once had a complete legend of his own from the mention of him in η 323, though that passage still leaves us in the dark. At any rate, it certainly doesn't follow from that reference that, while living in Elysium, he was a neighbor of the Phaeacians as Welcker thinks; nor that he had always lived in Elysium, as Preller suggests, instead of being brought there. Nothing in the previous passage supports the idea that he was then living in Elysium; while the other reference to him must be understood to mean that Rhadamanthys, just like Menelaus, was transported to Elysium. (And thus, for example, Pausanias understood the poet in 8, 53, 5: Previously, however, Rhadamanthus came here.; which is uncertain: Aesch. fr. 99, 12–13). In fact, we have lost the legends that provided the details of his transfer: his character became isolated and did not integrate into the larger circle of epic figures—and as a result, his mythical context soon faded away too.

18 Hasisatra’s Translation: see the translation of the Babylonian account in Paul Haupt’s Der Keilins. Sintfluthber. (Leip. 1881), p. 17, 18. The expressions used by the Greek-writing reporters are exactly like those common in Greek accounts of translation: γενέσθαι ἀφανῆ 83 (τὸν Ξίσουθρον) μετὰ τῶν θεῶν οἰκήσοντα, Beros. ap. Sync., p. 55, 6, 11 Di.; θεοί μιν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων ἀφανίζουσι, Abydenus ap. Syncell., p. 70, 13. Of Enoch we read, Gen. 524: οὐχ εὑρίσκετο ὅτι μετέθηκεν αὐτὸν ὁ θεός (μετετέθη, Ecclus., 4416; Hebr. 115); ἀνελήφθη ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς, Ecclus. 4914; ἀνεχώρησε πρὸς τὸ θεῖον, Jos., AJ. i, 3, 4 (of Moses: ἀφανίζεται, Jos., AJ. iv, 8, 48). On the translation of Enoch and Elijah, see also Schwally, D. Leben. nach d. Tode n. d. Vorst. d. a. Israel (1892), p. 140. Translation of the living into Sheol often in the O.T., see Schwally, p. 62. Even Enoch has not escaped the fate of being regarded by comparative mythologists as the sun. Enoch may be given up to them, if the Orientalists have no objection; but it seems a pity that the theory, in accordance with the favourite argument from analogy, should be applied to Greek Translation-myths too, so that we should see the whole series of such figures, from Menelaos to Apollonios of Tyana, transformed by magic into mythological suns (or dawns, water-meadows, thunder-clouds, etc.).

18 Hasisatra’s Translation: see the translation of the Babylonian account in Paul Haupt’s Der Keilins. Sintfluthber. (Leip. 1881), p. 17, 18. The phrases used by Greek-speaking reporters are exactly like those commonly found in Greek translations: become invisible 83 (τὸν Ξίσουθρον)living with the gods, Beros. ap. Sync., p. 55, 6, 11 Di.; The gods hide me from people., Abydenus ap. Syncell., p. 70, 13. About Enoch, we read in Gen. 524: He was not found because God had taken him away. (μετετέθη, Ecclus., 4416; Hebr. 115); taken up from the earth, Ecclus. 4914; moved on to the divine, Jos., AJ. i, 3, 4 (of Moses: disappears, Jos., AJ. iv, 8, 48). For more on the translations of Enoch and Elijah, see Schwally, D. Leben. nach d. Tode n. d. Vorst. d. a. Israel (1892), p. 140. The translation of the living into Sheol appears frequently in the O.T., see Schwally, p. 62. Even Enoch has not escaped the scrutiny of comparative mythologists who view him as the sun. Enoch can be surrendered to them if the Orientalists don’t mind; however, it seems unfortunate that this theory, supported by the popular argument from analogy, should also be applied to Greek translation myths, leading us to see the entire series of figures, from Menelaos to Apollonios of Tyana, magically transformed into mythological suns (or dawns, water meadows, thunder clouds, etc.).

19 μαλθακὸς αἰχμητής, Ρ 588.

19 soft spearman, Ρ 588.

20 Ξ 321–2.

20 Ξ 321–2.

21 One might even suspect that Menelaos is translated to everlasting life not merely because he has Helen, Zeus’ daughter, to wife: οὕνεκ’ ἔχεις Ἑλένην as Proteus tells him, but in imitation of a much earlier mythical tradition, according to which Helen herself was translated and made immortal. No ancient tradition reports the death of Helen—with the exception of the absurd invention of Ptolemaios Chennos (Phot. Bibl., p. 149a, 37 Bk.; 42; 149b, 1 ff.) and the not very superior aetiological myth in Paus. 3, 19, 10. On the other hand, we often hear of her deification, living on the island Leuke or else in the Islands of the Blest. It was not unnatural that mythological tradition should have at an early period set free the most “daemonic” of women from the usual fate of mankind and that Menelaos should rather have followed her example than she his (as Isoc. 10, 62, definitely says).

21 One might even suspect that Menelaus was granted eternal life not just because he has Helen, the daughter of Zeus, as his wife: Since you have Helen as Proteus tells him, but in emulation of a much earlier mythical tradition, which suggests that Helen herself was granted immortality. No ancient tradition reports the death of Helen—except for the ridiculous story created by Ptolemaios Chennos (Phot. Bibl., p. 149a, 37 Bk.; 42; 149b, 1 ff.) and the somewhat inferior aetiological myth in Paus. 3, 19, 10. On the other hand, we frequently hear about her becoming a goddess, living on the island Leuke or in the Blessed Islands. It wasn't surprising that mythological tradition would have, at an early stage, liberated the most “daemonic” of women from the usual fate of humanity and that Menelaus would follow her lead rather than the other way around (as Isoc. 10, 62, clearly states).

22 Cf. Tylor, ii, 85: J. G. Müller, Ges. d. Americ. Urrelig., 660 f.; Waitz, Anthrop. v, 2, 114; vi, 302, 307.

22 See Tylor, ii, 85: J. G. Müller, Ges. d. Americ. Urrelig., 660 f.; Waitz, Anthrop. v, 2, 114; vi, 302, 307.

23 We are told that Rhadamanthys was once conveyed by the Phaeacians to Euboea ἐποψόμενος Τιτυὸν Γαιήϊον υἱόν (η 321 ff.). We have no grounds and no right to complete this story by supposing that this was when Rh. already lived in Elysion. To regard the Phaeacians as a sort of “ferry-folk of the dead” connected in some way with Elysion is pure unsupported fancy.

23 We’re told that Rhadamanthys was once taken by the Phaeacians to Euboea Looking at Titan Gaea's son (η 321 ff.). We have no reasons or rights to complete this story by assuming that this was when Rh. was already living in Elysium. To consider the Phaeacians as a type of “ferry-people of the dead” connected in some way to Elysium is completely unfounded imagination.

24 The possessor of ἀθανασία did not necessarily possess also δύναμιν ἰσόθεον (Isoc. 10, 61).

24 The one who has immortality doesn't necessarily also have divine power (Isoc. 10, 61).

25 To identify Ὀρτυγίη, ο 404, with Delos, and Συρίη with the island Syros as the older commentators and K. O. Müller, Dorier, i, 381 [? not in E.T.], did, is impossible on account of the addition of the words ὅθι τροπαὶ ἠελίοιο alone. These show that Syrie was far away in the fabulous west, the only possible place for such a wonderland. It is evident that Ortygia is originally a purely mythical spot, sacred to Artemis and no more certainly fixed in one place than the Dionysian Nysa, and for that reason always to be found wherever the cult of Artemis was especially popular, in Aetolia, Syracuse, Ephesos, or Delos. Delos is clearly distinguished from O. in h. Ap. 16, and only later identified with O. (Delos being considered the older name, O. Schneider, Nicandr., p. 22, n.), when Artemis had been brought into closer connexion with Apollo, and even then not invariably. Thus in Homer Ortygia never clearly = Delos. 84

25 Identifying Quail, ο 404, with Delos, and Συρία with the island Syros, as earlier scholars and K. O. Müller did in Dorier, i, 381 [? not in E.T.], is impossible due to the addition of the phrase where trophies of the sun. This indicates that Syrie was located far away in an enchanting western land, the only possible place for such a mythical realm. It's clear that Ortygia is essentially a mythical location, sacred to Artemis and not more specifically located than the Dionysian Nysa, which means it can be found wherever the worship of Artemis was particularly strong, such as in Aetolia, Syracuse, Ephesos, or Delos. Delos is clearly differentiated from O. in h. Ap. 16, and was only later associated with O. (Delos being regarded as the older name according to O. Schneider, Nicandr., p. 22, n.), when Artemis was linked more closely to Apollo, and even then, not consistently. Thus in Homer's works, Ortygia never directly corresponds to Delos. 84

26 Ἄρτεμις δὲ αὐτὴν ἑξαρπάξασα εἰς Ταύρους μετακομίζει (cf. the μετέθηκεν αὐτὸν ὁ θεός of Enoch, Gen. 524) καὶ ἀθάνατον ποιεῖ, ἔλαφον δὲ ἀντὶ τῆς κόρης παρίστησι τῷ βωμῷ, Procl., Chrest. ap. Kinkel Epic. Fr., p. 19: [Apollod.] Epit. iii, 22. Wagn.

26 Artemis picked her up and took her away to Taurus. (cf. the God took him. of Enoch, Gen. 524) and makes her immortal, placing a stag at the altar instead of the maiden, Procl., Chrest. ap. Kinkel Epic. Fr., p. 19: [Apollod.] Epit. iii, 22. Wagn.

27 τούτῳ (τῷ Μέμνονι) Ἠὼς παρὰ Διὸς αἰτησαμένη ἀθανασίαν δίδωσι says Proclus with regrettable brevity (p. 33, Kinkel).

27 This (to Memnon)grants eternal life as requested from Zeus, says Proclus with regrettable brevity (p. 33, Kinkel).

28 It cannot be doubted (in spite of Meier, Annali dell’ Inst. Arch., 1883, p. 217 ff.) that the story given in Π of Sarpedon’s death and the carrying away of his body, even if it does not belong to the oldest part of the poem (which I cannot regard as certain), is nevertheless earlier than the Aithiopis and was the model for its account of Memnon’s death (cf. also Christ, Chron. altgr. Epos., p. 25). But why do Thanatos and Hypnos carry away the body of Sarpedon (instead of the usual θύελλα, ἄελλα, Ἅρπυια, or the winds, Q.S. ii, 550, in the case of Memnon)? Where these two are found on Attic lekythoi as bearers of the corpse (Robert, Thanatos, 19) they were perhaps intended in some consolatory sense as in the grave inscriptions ὕπνος ἔχει σε, μάκαρ . . . καὶ νέκυς οὐκ ἐγένου. The Homeric poet, however, can hardly have meant anything of the sort, but merely invents the indispensable second bearer to assist Thanatos—an effective touch but not one that rested on any religious grounds. Hypnos as brother of Thanatos is also found in the Διὸς ἀπάτη, Ξ 231.

28 There's no doubt (despite Meier, Annali dell’ Inst. Arch., 1883, p. 217 ff.) that the account of Sarpedon's death and the retrieval of his body in Π is, even if it doesn't come from the oldest section of the poem (which I'm not sure about), still predates the Aithiopis and served as inspiration for its depiction of Memnon’s death (see also Christ, Chron. altgr. Epos., p. 25). But why do Thanatos and Hypnos take Sarpedon's body (instead of the usual storm, gust, Harpy, or the winds, Q.S. ii, 550, in Memnon's case)? When these two appear on Attic lekythoi as carriers of the corpse (Robert, Thanatos, 19), they might have been intended in a comforting way, similar to grave inscriptions like Sleep has taken you, blessed one... and death did not come.. However, the poet of Homer likely had no such intention and simply created the necessary second bearer to help Thanatos—an effective detail, but not one based on any religious reasons. Hypnos, as Thanatos' brother, is also mentioned in the Deception of Zeus, Ξ 231.

29 ἐκ τῆς πυρᾶς ἡ Θέτις ἀναρπάσασα τὸν παῖδα εἰς τὴν Λευκὴν νῆσον διακομίζει, Procl., Chrest., p. 34, Kink. Then he continues, οἱ δὲ Ἀχαιοὶ τὸν τάφον χώσαντες ἀγῶνα τιθέασιν. Thus a grave-mound is set up though the body of Achilles has been translated: evidently a concession to the older narrative (ω 80–4), which knew nothing of the translation of the body but gives prominence to the grave-mound. Besides which, the tumulus of Achilles—a landmark on the seashore of the Troad—required explanation, and the poet accordingly speaks of the erection of a cenotaph. It was not considered a contradiction to erect cenotaphs, not only to those whose bodies were irrecoverable (see above, Ch. I, n. 88), but also to Heroes whose bodies had been translated. Thus Herakles, after he has been struck by lightning and snatched up into the sky, has a χῶμα made for him, though no bones were found upon the πυρά, D.S. 4, 38, 5; 39, 1. (The tumuli found in the Troad were not, indeed, originally empty as Schliemann, Troy, etc., pp. 252, 263, supposed; they were not cenotaphs but merely grave-mounds that had once been filled and belong to a type frequently met with in Phrygia; see Schuchhardt, Schliemann’s Excav. [E.T.], p. 84 ff. Kretschmer, Einl. Ges. gr. Spr., 1896, p. 176.)

29 From the pyre, Thetis grabbed the child and brought him to the White Island., Procl., Chrest., p. 34, Kink. Then he continues, The Achaeans buried him and organized a competition.. Thus, a grave mound is created even though the body of Achilles has been moved: evidently this is a nod to the earlier version of the story (ω 80–4), which had no knowledge of the body being moved but emphasizes the grave mound. Additionally, the tumulus of Achilles—a landmark along the Troad coast—needed an explanation, and the poet thus mentions the building of a cenotaph. It was not seen as contradictory to erect cenotaphs not just for those whose bodies couldn’t be recovered (see above, Ch. I, n. 88), but also for Heroes whose bodies had been moved. For instance, Herakles, after being struck by lightning and taken up into the sky, has a burial mound built for him, even though no bones were found on the funeral pyre, D.S. 4, 38, 5; 39, 1. (The tumuli found in the Troad were not originally empty as Schliemann, Troy, etc., pp. 252, 263, thought; they were not cenotaphs but simply grave mounds that had once contained remains, belonging to a type commonly found in Phrygia; see Schuchhardt, Schliemann’s Excav. [E.T.], p. 84 ff. Kretschmer, Einl. Ges. gr. Spr., 1896, p. 176.)

30 What became of Odysseus? Proclus is silent on the point, and we have no means of guessing. According to Hyginus 127 he was buried in Aiaia; but if nothing more was going to be done with his body why bring him to Aiaia? Acc. to Sch. Lyc., 805, he was raised to life again by Kirke, but what happened to him then? (Acc. to [Apollod.] Epit. vii, 37 W., the dead Odysseus seems to remain in Ithaka.—We have no grounds for altering the words to suit the Telegoneia as Wagner does, esp. as a complete correspondence with that poem cannot be obtained.) The death and burial of Od. among the Tyrrhenians (Müller, Etruscans iii, 281 tr. Gray) belong to quite another connexion.

30 What happened to Odysseus? Proclus doesn't say, and we have no way to guess. According to Hyginus 127, he was buried in Aiaia, but if nothing more was going to be done with his body, why take him to Aiaia? According to Sch. Lyc., 805, Kirke brought him back to life, but what happened to him after that? (According to [Apollod.] Epit. vii, 37 W., the dead Odysseus seems to stay in Ithaka.—We have no reason to change the words to fit the Telegoneia as Wagner does, especially since a complete match with that poem can't be achieved.) The death and burial of Od. among the Tyrrhenians (Müller, Etruscans iii, 281 tr. Gray) belong to a completely different context.

31 The Aithiopis is later than the Hades scenes in ω, and consequently later still than the Nekyia of λ. The prophecy of the Translation of Menelaos in δ is likewise later than the Nekyia but to all appearance older than the Aithiopis. 85

31 The Aithiopis comes after the Hades scenes in ω, and therefore it’s even later than the Nekyia of λ. The prophecy about the Translation of Menelaos in δ is also later than the Nekyia, but it seems to be older than the Aithiopis. 85

32 The extract from the Nostoi in Proclus, Chrest., is particularly inadequate and evidently gives no full idea of the very wide and various subject matter of that poem. Thus, too, the notices of it preserved from other sources give details of its subject matter (esp. of the Nekyia which was included in it) that cannot be fitted into the limits of Proclus’ outline.

32 The excerpt from the Nostoi in Proclus, Chrest., is particularly lacking and clearly doesn't provide a complete understanding of the extensive and diverse themes of that poem. Similarly, the references from other sources offer details about its content (especially the Nekyia that was included in it) that don't fit within the framework of Proclus’ outline.

33 The idea that the Bronze age is really identical with the age of Heroes is at first sight attractive (see e.g. Steitz, Die W. u. T. des Hesiod, p. 61); one soon finds, however, that it breaks down on closer examination.

33 The notion that the Bronze Age is the same as the Age of Heroes seems appealing at first (see e.g. Steitz, Die W. u. T. des Hesiod, p. 61); however, upon further scrutiny, it becomes clear that this idea falls apart.

34 It does not seem to me absolutely necessary to strike out lines 124 f. (οἵ ῥα φυλάσσουσίν τε δίκας καὶ σχέτλια ἔργα, ἠέρα ἑσσάμενοι πάντη φοιτῶντες ἐπ’ αἶαν). They are repeated in lines 254 f., but that is a natural place to repeat them. Proclus does not comment on them; but it does not follow that he did not have them before him; and Plutarch, D.O. 37, p. 431 B, seems to allude to l. 125 in its present context.

34 I don't think it's absolutely necessary to remove lines 124 f. (They guard both justice and harsh deeds, having touched the air as they wander everywhere upon the earth.). They are repeated in lines 254 f., which makes sense as a natural place to repeat them. Proclus doesn’t comment on them, but that doesn’t mean he didn’t have them in front of him; and Plutarch, D.O. 37, p. 431 B, seems to refer to l. 125 in the current context.

35 Plu., D.O., 10, p. 415 B, in obvious error, takes Hesiod’s δαίμονες for such an intermediate class of beings; he supposes that Hesiod distinguishes four classes τῶν λογικῶν, θεοί, δαίμονες, ἥρωες, ἄνθρωποι. In this Platonist division the ἥρωες would correspond rather with Hesiod’s δαίμονες of the first age. (What Proclus has to say on Hesiod, Op. 121, p. 101, Gaisf., is taken evidently word for word from Plutarch’s commentary on Hesiod and resembles closely the remarks in the passage cited from the Def. Orac.) Modern critics have often failed to notice the difference between the Hesiodic δαίμονες and the Platonic. Plato himself is very decided about the difference (Crat. 397 E–398 C).

35 Plu., D.O., 10, p. 415 B, clearly makes a mistake by interpreting Hesiod’s demons as an intermediate class of beings; he assumes that Hesiod identifies four classes: of rational beings: gods, demons, heroes, humans. In this classification, the heroes would rather align with Hesiod’s demons from the first age. (What Proclus mentions about Hesiod, Op. 121, p. 101, Gaisf., is evidently taken word for word from Plutarch’s commentary on Hesiod and closely resembles the comments in the cited passage from the Def. Orac.) Modern critics have frequently overlooked the distinction between the Hesiodic demons and the Platonic version. Plato himself is quite emphatic about this difference (Crat. 397 E–398 C).

36 ἠέρα ἑσσάμενοι 125 (cf. 223; Ξ 282) is a naive equivalent for “invisible” as Tzet. correctly explains. This is how it is to be understood regularly in Homer whenever there is mention of envelopment in a cloud and the like.

36 aura touched 125 (cf. 223; Ξ 282) is a straightforward equivalent for “invisible,” as Tzet. correctly explains. This is how it should be understood in Homer whenever there’s a reference to being surrounded by a cloud or something similar.

37 These daimones are called ἐπιχθόνιοι in contrast (not to the ὑποχθόνιοι of l. 141, but) to the θεοὶ ἐπουράνιοι, as Proclus on l. 122 rightly remarks. Thus in Homer we have ἐπιχθόνιοι regularly used as an adjective, or, standing alone, as an equivalent of men as distinguished from gods. Then the ὑποχθόνιοι of 141 are brought in to form another and secondary contrast with the ἐπιχθόνιοι.

37 These spirits are called earth dwellers in contrast (not to the underworld beings of l. 141, but) to the heavenly gods, as Proclus notes on l. 122. Thus in Homer, we regularly see Underworld dwellers used as an adjective, or standing alone as a term for humans as distinct from gods. Then the Underworld spirits of 141 are introduced to create another and secondary contrast with the earth-dwelling.

38 ρ 485 ff. It follows that the descriptions of the visits paid by gods to the homes of men are of great antiquity; cf. my Griech. Roman, p. 506 ff. Zeus Philios in particular is fond of visiting men: Diod. Com. Ἐπίκληρ., Mein. Com. iii, p. 543 f. (ii, p. 420 K.).

38 ρ 485 ff. This indicates that the stories about gods visiting the homes of humans are very ancient; see my Griech. Roman, p. 506 ff. Zeus Philios, in particular, enjoys visiting people: Diod. Com. Epikleros., Mein. Com. iii, p. 543 f. (ii, p. 420 K.).

39 τιμὴ καὶ τοῖσιν ὀπηδεῖ 142. τιμή in the sense not of simple honour but of practical worship, as frequently in Homer, e.g. in such phrases as: τιμὴ καὶ κῦδος ὀπηδεῖ, Ρ 251; τιμῆς ἀπονήμενος, ω 30: τιμὴν δὲ λελόγχασιν ἶσα θεοῖσιν, λ 304; ἔχει τιμήν, λ 495, etc. In the same way here, l. 138: οὕνεκα τιμὰς οὐκ ἐδίδουν μακάρεσσι θεοῖς.

39 Honor and those who pursue it 142. Respect here means not just simple respect but practical worship, as often seen in Homer, for example in phrases like: Honor and glory will follow, R 251; cut off from honor, Ω 30: they have talked about honor that’s on par with the gods, Λ 304; he has integrity, Λ 495, etc. Similarly here, l. 138: because they did not show respect to the blessed gods.

40 Light and dark, i.e. good and bad, δαίμονες are acc. to Roth, Myth. v. d. Weltaltern (1860), pp. 16–17, distinguished in Hesiod’s daimones of the golden and silver age. Such a distinction, however, never appears in Hesiod; and it is hardly credible that the gods and spirits of ancient Greek popular belief (which never really admitted the categories good and bad) should in this primitive period have been actually classified in accordance with such categories. At any rate, Greek readers never found anything of the kind expressed in Hesiod: 86 the conception of bad daimones is regularly supported by reference to the philosophers alone (e.g. Plut., D.O., 17, p. 419 A), and the conception is certainly no older than the earliest philosophic speculation.

40 Light and dark, meaning good and bad, demons are, according to Roth, Myth. v. d. Weltaltern (1860), pp. 16–17, distinguished in Hesiod’s daimones of the golden and silver age. However, this distinction never appears in Hesiod, and it’s hard to believe that the gods and spirits of ancient Greek popular belief (which didn’t really acknowledge the categories of good and bad) would have been classified this way in such a primitive period. In any case, Greek readers never found anything like that in Hesiod: 86 the idea of bad daimones is typically backed up by references to philosophers alone (e.g. Plut., D.O., 17, p. 419 A), and this concept is definitely no older than the earliest philosophic speculation.

41 l. 141: τοὶ μὲν ὑποχθόνιοι (ἐπιχθόνιοι all MSS. except one, see Köchly’s Apparatus; also Tz.) μάκαρες θνητοὶ καλέονται.—φύλακες θνητοὶ was read and explained by Proclus. This is clearly wrong, and is corrected to φύλακες θνητῶν (as in l. 123) by Hagen and Welcker. But this transfers from the first to the second race an expression that we cannot be sure Hesiod meant to be transferred. Not merely the words but the sense, too, is thus corrected, without due ground. μάκαρες does not look like a corruption; it is more likely that φύλακες is an accidental alteration. ὑπ. μάκαρες θνητοῖς καλέονται is the reading of the latest editor: but here to say the least of it the addition of θνητοῖς is superfluous. We should rather try to understand and explain the traditional text and show how the poet came by the remarkable expression.

41 l. 141: the underworld creatures (earthlings all manuscripts except one, see Köchly’s Apparatus; also Tz.) the blessed mortals are called—the guardians of mortals was read and interpreted by Proclus. This reading is clearly incorrect and has been corrected to the guardians of humanity (as in l. 123) by Hagen and Welcker. However, this changes an expression from the first group to the second, which we can't be sure was supposed to be changed as such. Both the wording and the meaning are thus modified without just cause. the blessed does not seem like a mistake; it’s more likely that the protectors is an accidental change. are referred to by fortunate mortals is the reading of the latest editor: but at the very least, the addition of humans is unnecessary. We should instead seek to understand and explain the traditional text and how the poet arrived at the remarkable term.

42 When philosophers and philosophizing poets of a later age occasionally refer to the soul when freed from the body as a δαίμων, the expression has a totally different sense.

42 When later philosophers and poetic thinkers talk about the soul being released from the body as a spirit, they mean something completely different.

43 Similarly, though the oxymoron is much less daring in his case, Isocrates, 9, 72, has δαίμων θνητός. In order to describe a daimon who has originally been a mortal later ages boldly invented the compound ἀνθρωποδαίμων which corresponds fairly well with the Hesiodic μάκαρ θνητός: [Eur.] Rhes., 971; Procop., An. 12, p. 79, 17 D. (νεκυδαίμων on a defixio from Carthage, BCH. xii, 299). Later still a king destined to become a god is called, even at his birth, by Manetho (i, 280) θεὸν βροτὸν ἀνθρώποισιν.

43 Similarly, although the oxymoron is much less bold in his case, Isocrates, 9, 72, refers to mortal spirit. To describe a spirit that was originally mortal, later generations cleverly created the term human spirit, which aligns fairly well with the Hesiodic blessed mortal: [Eur.] Rhes., 971; Procop., An. 12, p. 79, 17 D. (νεκυδαίμων on a defixio from Carthage, BCH. xii, 299). Even later, a king destined to become a god is referred to, from his birth, by Manetho (i, 280) as mortal god to humans.

44 The silver race was created by the gods of Olympos, like the golden before them (l. 110; 128); only the third race (l. 143) and then the fourth (158) by Zeus alone. It might be supposed from this that the silver age as well as the golden age occurred in the period before Zeus’ rule, ἐπὶ Κρόνου ὅτ’ οὐρανῷ ἐμβασίλευεν (l. 111); and in this sense “Orpheus” understood the words of Hesiod when he τοῦ ἀργυροῦ γένους βασιλεύειν φησὶ τὸν Κρόνον (Proclus on l. 126). But it would be very difficult to reconcile l. 138 Ζεὺς Κρονίδης κτλ. with this view. Hesiod may then have placed the silver age in the time when sub Iove mundus erat (as Ovid explicitly states, M. i, 113 f.); but all the same it lay for him in the far distant past before all history.

44 The silver race was created by the gods of Olympus, just like the golden one before it (l. 110; 128); only the third race (l. 143) and then the fourth (158) were created solely by Zeus. One might assume that both the silver age and the golden age happened before Zeus's reign, When Cronus ruled the sky (l. 111); in this way, “Orpheus” interpreted Hesiod’s words when he He says that Cronus rules over the silver race. (Proclus on l. 126). However, it would be quite challenging to align l. 138 Zeus, son of Cronus, etc. with this perspective. Hesiod might have placed the silver age in the period when Under love, the world existed. (as Ovid clearly states, M. i, 113 f.); nonetheless, he still viewed it as part of a very ancient past before all recorded history.

45 νώνυμνοι 154 may quite as well mean “nameless”, i.e. without name or special title, as “fameless” (as it does for the most part though not invariably in Homer).

45 νώνυμνοι 154 can just as easily mean “nameless,” meaning without a name or special title, as “fameless” (which is usually the case, though not always in Homer).

46 See Welcker, Kl. Schr. ii, 6, who, however, in the desire to rule out all possibility of identifying Scherie with Korkyra asserts too positively that it was a part of the mainland. ζ 204 (compared with δ 354) at least comes very close to regarding it as an island. But it is clear that nowhere is it explicitly called an island.—It is possible that Σχερίη, connected with σχερός, may really mean “mainland” (Welcker, loc. cit.; Kretschmer, Einl. Gesch. gr. Spr., 281): but the question still remains whether the Homeric poet, who did not invent the name, understood or respected its original significance. At any rate, it was no longer understood by those who in very early times identified Scherie with the island Korkyra.

46 See Welcker, Kl. Schr. ii, 6, who, in his effort to eliminate any chance of connecting Scherie with Korkyra, claims too confidently that it was part of the mainland. ζ 204 (compared with δ 354) at least comes very close to considering it an island. But it is clear that it is never explicitly referred to as an island. — It's possible that Σχερίη, related to σχερός, may actually mean “mainland” (Welcker, loc. cit.; Kretschmer, Einl. Gesch. gr. Spr., 281): but the question still remains whether the Homeric poet, who didn't create the name, understood or acknowledged its original meaning. In any case, it was no longer recognized by those who in very early times associated Scherie with the island Korkyra.

47 The objections to l. 169 as regards its form are brought out by Steitz, Hesiods W. u. T., p. 69. The line is missing in most of the MSS.; it was rejected (together with the line following, which, however, 87 is quite sound) by ancient critics (Proclus on l. 158). Later editors are united in condemning it. But the interpolation is at any rate old: probably even Pindar already knew the line in this place (O. ii, 70).

47 The objections to line 169 regarding its form are highlighted by Steitz, Hesiods W. u. T., p. 69. This line is absent in most of the manuscripts; it was dismissed (along with the following line, which is, however, 87 completely valid) by ancient critics (Proclus on line 158). Later editors all agree in condemning it. Nevertheless, the interpolation is quite old: probably even Pindar was already familiar with this line in this context (O. ii, 70).

48 λῦσε δὲ Ζεὺς ἄφθιτος Τιτᾶνας Pi. (P. iv, 291), in whose time, however, this was a well-known myth to which he is only making a passing allusion for the sake of an example. The Hesiodic Theogony still knows nothing of it.

48 Zeus freed the immortal Titans Pi. (P. iv, 291), during a time when this was a common myth that he refers to briefly just to make a point. The Hesiodic Theogony is still unaware of it.

49 Before Hesiod we have no mention of the myth of a Golden, Saturnian Age, nor any complete description of the imaginary life upon Blessed Islands. But epic poetry had already, as we have seen, provided him with occasional examples of translation to a place of blessedness, and he only collects these into a combined picture of such a place. To that extent the belief in a blessed life beyond the grave meets us earlier than the myth of a Golden Age. But we have not the slightest ground for saying that the former “must have existed from the beginning among the Greeks” (as Milchhöfer at least thinks, Anf. Kunst, p. 230). On the other hand, it may be mere accident that the myth of the Golden Age has no older authority than Hesiod—the story itself may be much earlier. After Hesiod it was frequently taken up and improved upon; not, however, first by Empedocles as Graf supposes, ad aureæ aet. fab. sym. (Leip. Stud. viii, p. 15), but already in the epic Ἀλκμεωνίς, see Philod. Piet., p. 51 Gp. (See also some remarks by Alfred Nutt, The Voyage of Bran, p. 269 f., 1895, with which I cannot agree.)

49 Before Hesiod, there was no mention of the myth of a Golden Age or any complete description of life on the Blessed Islands. However, epic poetry had already provided him with examples of people being taken to a place of happiness, which he then combined into a single image of such a place. In this way, the belief in a blessed life after death appears earlier than the myth of a Golden Age. Yet, we have no evidence to support the idea that this belief “must have existed from the beginning among the Greeks” (as Milchhöfer thinks, Anf. Kunst, p. 230). On the other hand, it may simply be a coincidence that the myth of the Golden Age has no earlier reference than Hesiod—the story itself may be much older. After Hesiod, the myth was often revisited and developed further; not, as Graf suggests, by Empedocles, ad aureæ aet. fab. sym. (Leip. Stud. viii, p. 15), but already in the epic Alcmaeonid, see Philod. Piet., p. 51 Gp. (See also some comments by Alfred Nutt, The Voyage of Bran, p. 269 f., 1895, which I cannot agree with.)

CHAPTER III

CAVE DEITIES: SUBTERRANEAN TRANSLATION

The history of Greek culture and religion shows no sudden break or revolution in its course. The Greeks neither at any time experienced a movement from within that caused a violent recoil from the path which they had chosen, nor were they ever diverted by the overwhelming might of an invading force from the natural course of their evolution. Out of their own natural feelings and reflexion this most intellectually gifted nation evolved the great ideas that nourished succeeding centuries. They anticipated all later ages. The profoundest and the boldest, the most devout as well as the most irreverent speculations as to the nature of God, the world and men have their origin among the Greeks. But this excessive many-sidedness led to a general condition of equipoise in which individual factors restrained or balanced each other. Whereas the most violent impacts and sudden revolutions in the history of civilization are given by just those nations who are only able to embrace one idea at a time and who, confined in the narrow limits of their fanaticism, throw everything else overboard.

The history of Greek culture and religion shows no sudden breaks or revolutions in its development. The Greeks never experienced a movement from within that caused a drastic turn away from the path they had chosen, nor were they ever diverted by the overwhelming force of an invading power from the natural course of their evolution. From their own genuine feelings and reflections, this highly intellectual nation developed the major ideas that influenced later centuries. They anticipated all future eras. The deepest and boldest, most devout as well as the most irreverent speculations about the nature of God, the world, and humanity originated among the Greeks. However, this excessive diversity led to a general state of balance where individual factors restrained or countered one another. In contrast, the most intense shocks and sudden revolutions in the history of civilization come from those nations that can only embrace one idea at a time and, confined by the narrow limits of their fanaticism, cast everything else aside.

It is true, indeed, that the Greeks were ever open to influences—whether civilized or the reverse—from abroad. In wave after wave of peaceful invasion foreign ideas and ways of life, especially from the East, flowed over Greece. In one case, at least (that of the ecstatic religion of the Thracian Dionysos-worshippers), a spring flood burst out that broke down all the dykes. In many cases the invading elements might be easily eliminated again from Greek culture; in many others they obtained a permanent footing and influenced it deeply. But never did an influence from abroad obtain in Greece an authority at all comparable to the subversive and transforming power exercised by Buddhism, Christianity, or Islam over the peoples on whom they laid their grip. The Greek genius, as supple as it was tenacious, maintained control over all such foreign influences, in full possession of its original nature, its genial naivety. New ideas, whether introduced from abroad or engendered at home, were taken up and assimilated, but the old were not done away with; they gradually amalgamated with the new so that much was learnt while nothing was quite forgotten. The stream flowed on in its peaceful course, but it still remained the same stream. Nec manet ut fuerat nec formas servat easdem: sed tamen ipse idem est. 89

It’s true that the Greeks were always open to influences—whether positive or negative—from outside. Time after time, waves of peaceful invasions brought foreign ideas and lifestyles, especially from the East, into Greece. In at least one instance (the ecstatic religion of the Thracian worshippers of Dionysus), a flood of new ideas broke through all barriers. In many cases, the new elements could be easily removed from Greek culture; in many others, they took root and had a lasting impact. However, no influence from abroad ever gained authority in Greece that compared to the powerful and transformative effects of Buddhism, Christianity, or Islam on other cultures. The Greek spirit, both flexible and resilient, kept control over these foreign influences, holding on to its original character and its natural friendliness. New ideas, whether brought in from elsewhere or developed locally, were embraced and blended in, but the old ones weren’t discarded; they gradually merged with the new, so that a lot was learned while nothing was completely forgotten. The stream continued on its peaceful path, yet it still remained the same stream. Nec manet ut fuerat nec formas servat easdem: sed tamen ipse idem est. 89

The history of Greek culture, then, has no sharply contrasted epochs, no periods of abrupt change, when the old is completely given up and a new era definitely begins. Indeed, the most serious revulsions of Greek history, culture, and religion took place beyond doubt before the time of the Homeric Epos, and in that dim past it is possible that more violent and startling upheavals may have occurred to make the Greeks what we afterwards know them to be. Greek life becomes first clearly known to us in Homer. It is true that the broad uniformity that it has in the picture reflected for us in the poems of Homer vanishes in the course of the years that follow. New forces emerge; much that was forgotten comes to light again now that the Homeric system of ideas, once all powerful, is falling to pieces; out of the very old and the quite new things of which Homer never gives the least hint are being put together. But nowhere during the violent movements of the next troubled centuries after Homer did any absolute break with the Epic or its system take place. Only in the sixth century did the defiant speculation of a few bold spirits begin to seek a way of escape from the thraldom of the Homeric poems which still lay over the whole of Greece. The history of the Greek common people knows nothing of a reaction against Homer and his world. Homeric religion and moral ideas gradually ceased to reign supreme in men’s minds, but they were never violently or completely discarded.

The history of Greek culture doesn't have clearly defined periods or sudden changes where the old is completely abandoned for a new era. In fact, the most significant shifts in Greek history, culture, and religion likely happened well before the time of the Homeric Epics. In that distant past, it's possible there were more intense and shocking upheavals that shaped the Greeks into what we recognize today. Greek life becomes clearly understood through Homer. While it's true that the general uniformity depicted in Homer's poems fades over the years that follow, new influences emerge, and many forgotten aspects resurface as the once-dominant Homeric framework starts to break down. Remarkably old and entirely new elements that Homer never hints at are being combined. However, during the subsequent turbulent centuries after Homer, there was no complete break from the Epic or its structure. It wasn't until the sixth century that a few daring thinkers began to seek ways to escape the dominance of the Homeric poems that still influenced all of Greece. The history of the common Greek people shows no signs of a backlash against Homer and his world. Homeric religion and moral beliefs gradually lost their hold on people's minds, but they were never completely or violently rejected.

So we, too, though we leave behind us Homer and the Epos and enter upon the tortuous paths of the later history of Greek soul worship and belief in immortality, may still for a time be guided by the Ariadne thread of the epic. In our subject, too, there are links which connect the Homeric with following ages. Soon enough the thread will break, and we shall have to enter the new field of inquiry depending on our own resources. . . .

So we, too, even though we move past Homer and the Epic and step into the complex history of Greek soul worship and beliefs about immortality, can still be guided for a while by the thread of the epic. In our topic, there are connections that link the Homeric period with later times. Before long, that thread will break, and we will have to explore the new area of inquiry using our own resources. . . .

§ 1

Prominent among the chieftains, who, under the leadership of Adrastos, came to the help of Polyneikes and laid siege to Thebes, was Amphiaraos the Argive hero and seer descended from the mysterious priest and prophet Melampous. He was drawn into the war against his will, for he foresaw its unhappy end. After the decisive struggle in which the opposing brothers fell slain by each other’s hand, the Argive host turned to flight, and with them fled Amphiaraos. But before Periklymenos, who was pursuing him, could drive his spear into the fugitive’s back, Zeus made the earth open before him in a flash of 90 lightning and Amphiaraos with his horses, his chariot, and his charioteer, was swallowed up in the depths where Zeus made him immortal. So runs the legend of the fate of Amphiaraos as we learn it from innumerable sources from Pindar onwards,1 and we may be sure that thus it was told in the Thebaïs, the old epic poem of the war of the Seven against Thebes, which was taken up into the Epic Cycle.2

Prominent among the chieftains who, under Adrastos's leadership, came to help Polyneikes and laid siege to Thebes was Amphiaraos, the Argive hero and seer descended from the mysterious priest and prophet Melampous. He was reluctantly drawn into the war because he foresaw its tragic outcome. After the decisive battle in which the two opposing brothers killed each other, the Argive army turned to run, and Amphiaraos fled with them. But before Periklymenos, who was chasing him, could thrust his spear into Amphiaraos's back, Zeus made the ground open up in a flash of lightning, swallowing Amphiaraos along with his horses, chariot, and charioteer into the depths where Zeus made him immortal. So goes the legend of Amphiaraos's fate as we learn it from countless sources starting with Pindar, and we can be sure it was told this way in the Thebaïs, the ancient epic poem about the war of the Seven against Thebes, which was included in the Epic Cycle.

At Thebes, then, Amphiaraos lived on for ever under the earth. Northwards in the Boeotian countryside, near Lebadeia, men told of a similar marvel. In a cave of the mountainous ravine, before which Lebadeia lies, lived Trophonios for ever immortal. The legends that professed to explain his miraculous cave-existence do not quite agree among themselves, as, indeed, is generally the case with those figures who were not early taken up by the poets and given a fixed place in the narratives of heroic adventure. But all accounts (the oldest of which perhaps go back to the “Telegoneia”) agree in the assumption that Trophonios, like Amphiaraos, was first a man, a famous master-builder, who while flying from his foes, had dived underground at Lebadeia and now lives for ever in the depths of the earth whence he foretells the future to those who come and question him there.

At Thebes, Amphiaraos lived forever beneath the earth. To the north, in the Boeotian countryside near Lebadeia, people spoke of a similar wonder. In a cave in the mountainous ravine where Lebadeia sits, Trophonios lived forever as an immortal. The legends that attempt to explain his miraculous existence in the cave don’t quite agree, as is often the case with figures who weren’t embraced early on by poets and given a fixed role in heroic tales. However, all accounts (the oldest of which might date back to the “Telegoneia”) agree that Trophonios, like Amphiaraos, was once a man, a renowned master-builder, who, while fleeing from his enemies, dove underground at Lebadeia and now lives forever in the depths of the earth, where he predicts the future for those who come to ask him.

These stories, then, claim to speak of men who during their lifetime were swallowed up by the earth, and who now live on for ever at the places where they were taken down into the depths—places situated in quite definite localities of the Greek countryside.

These stories, then, claim to tell of men who, during their lives, were consumed by the earth, and who now live on forever in the places where they were taken down into the depths—places located in specific areas of the Greek countryside.

We are not entirely without other legends of a similar character. One of the wild spirits of the Lapith people from Thessalia, Kaineus by name, having been made invulnerable by Poseidon (who had before this transformed him from a woman into a man), was cudgelled with tree-trunks in a battle with the Centaurs; but they could do nothing to him, and with “upright foot” (i.e. standing upright, alive, not lying at full length like a dead man or one mortally wounded) he clove the earth under him and went down alive into the depths.3 In Rhodes Althaimenes was honoured as the “founder” of the Greek cities on that island; he had not died but had vanished into a chasm in the ground.4 Like Amphiaraos, his son Amphilochos, the heir of his prophetic power, appears to have had a legend according to which he still dwelt alive under the earth either in Akarnania or Cilicia.5 A few more examples of the same type might be produced,6 but the number of such stories remains small, and they only make their appearance here and there, as if by 91 accident, in the tradition. Epic poetry without whose co-operation such local legends rarely achieved widespread or lasting popularity, with few exceptions left such narratives out of account. In fact, they conflicted with the normal Homeric outlook. The belief, however, that immortality when it was miraculously bestowed by the favour of heaven upon certain individual men, was absolutely conditioned by the non-occurrence of death, i.e. the separation of the psyche from the visible man—this belief has helped to shape these stories too. They never speak of an undying existence of the soul by itself in separation from the body. Thus far they are firmly rooted in orthodox Homeric belief.

We’re not completely lacking other legends that are similar. One of the wild spirits from the Lapith people in Thessaly, named Kaineus, was made invulnerable by Poseidon (who had previously transformed him from a woman into a man). In a battle against the Centaurs, they tried to beat him with tree-trunks, but it had no effect. Standing upright, he struck the ground beneath him and descended alive into the depths.3 In Rhodes, Althaimenes was honored as the “founder” of the Greek cities on that island; he didn’t die but instead vanished into a chasm in the earth.4 Like Amphiaraos, his son Amphilochos, who inherited his prophetic powers, seems to have a legend suggesting he still lives under the earth, either in Akarnania or Cilicia.5 A few more examples of the same kind could be mentioned,6 but the total number of such stories is limited, and they appear here and there, almost by accident, in the tradition. Epic poetry, which often needed to collaborate for local legends to gain broader or longer-lasting popularity, mostly ignored these narratives, with few exceptions. In fact, they went against the usual Homeric perspective. However, the belief that immortality, when granted miraculously by divine favor to certain individuals, was entirely tied to the absence of death—meaning the separation of the psyche from the visible body—has influenced these stories as well. They never talk about the soul having an eternal existence on its own apart from the body. Up to this point, they are firmly rooted in traditional Homeric beliefs.

But the heroes of these stories have their everlasting existence in special abodes under the surface of the earth, in subterranean chambers7—not in the common meeting place of the departed; they each have their own peculiar domain far from the House of Aïdoneus. Such isolation of individuals below the earth does not agree with Homeric ideas; though it almost seems as if a dim echo of these stories of seers like Amphiaraos and Amphilochos, translated alive and with consciousness undestroyed, could be discerned in what the Homeric Nekyia says of Teiresias the Theban seer, in whom alone of all the shadows Persephone had allowed consciousness and intelligence (the essential vital powers) to remain undiminished.8 But even he is fast bound in Erebos, the general home of the dead, and cut off from all connexion with the upper world, as is demanded by the Homeric view of the world. Amphiaraos and Trophonios, on the other hand, are released from Hades; not having suffered death they have not entered the world of the strengthless dead. They are also translated out of this life (besides out of Hades). But this “subterranean translation” is in its nature and in the origin of the belief in it quite distinct from that “translation to Islands of the Blest” of which we spoke in the last chapter. Those Heroes dwelling alone or in company on holy islands far out over the sea are far removed from human life and beyond the reach of prayers and desires. No influence upon the things of this world is attributed to them, and consequently no cult is offered to them: there never existed a cult of the dwellers in Elysium as such. They glimmer in the distance like visions of the poet’s fancy from which no one anticipates active interference with the world of reality. It is quite different with these dwellers in the caves. They are actually alive under the surface of the earth; not far away in the inaccessible, spectral world of Hades, but here in the midst of Greece. Questions and prayers 92 can reach down to them, and they can send up aid to those who call to them. To them, accordingly, as powerful and effectual Spirits a cult is paid.

But the heroes of these stories have their eternal existence in special places beneath the earth, in underground chambers7—not in the usual gathering spot for the departed; each has their own unique domain away from the House of Aïdoneus. This isolation of individuals below the earth doesn't align with Homeric beliefs; however, it almost feels like a faint echo of tales involving seers like Amphiaraos and Amphilochos, who seem to be alive with their awareness intact, can be sensed in what the Homeric Nekyia says about Teiresias the Theban seer. He is the only one among the shadows whom Persephone allowed to retain consciousness and intelligence (the vital essence). 8 But even he is firmly trapped in Erebos, the common home of the dead, and disconnected from everything in the upper world, as the Homeric view of the world requires. In contrast, Amphiaraos and Trophonios are freed from Hades; since they haven't died, they haven't entered the realm of the powerless dead. They are also transitioned from this life (along with being liberated from Hades). Yet, this “subterranean transition” is fundamentally and originarily different from that “transition to the Islands of the Blest” we discussed previously chapter. Those heroes living alone or with others on sacred islands far out at sea are removed from human life and beyond the reach of prayers and wishes. They are not believed to influence the affairs of this world, and thus, no worship is offered to them: there was never a cult dedicated to the inhabitants of Elysium as such. They shimmer in the distance like visions from a poet's imagination, from which no one expects active involvement in the reality of the world. The situation is quite different for these residents of the caves. They are genuinely alive beneath the earth; not far away in the unreachable, ghostly realm of Hades, but right here in the heart of Greece. Questions and prayers 92 can reach them, and they can send assistance to those who call on them. Accordingly, they receive a cult as powerful and effective Spirits.

We have detailed information of the manner in which Amphiaraos was worshipped, more especially in later times, when, in addition to the neighbourhood of Thebes, where the original legend of his descent beneath the earth was localized, Oropos also, the boundary town between Boeotia and Attica, was with overwhelming success identified as the place of his disappearance and made a centre of his influence.9 We have also a certain amount of information, again from later ages, about the cult of Trophonios. With the passage of time, the details of the worship grew and multiplied, but among them all certain features stand out as especially characteristic and allow us to understand the religious ideas lying behind them. To Amphiaraos and Trophonios were offered just those sacrifices which were also paid to the Chthonic deities, i.e. those deities who dwelt in the depths of the earth.10 Aid was not expected from them in the details of the daily life of individuals or states. Only in the actual locality of their descent were they effectual, and only there because they revealed the future. Kroisos had already, and Mardonios after him, sent inquiries to the most famous oracles of the day,11 and among them to Amphiaraos at his ancient oracular seat near Thebes and to Trophonios at Lebadeia. Of Amphiaraos it was believed that he revealed the future by visions sent in dreams to those who after making offering laid themselves down to sleep in his temple. To question Trophonios, it was necessary to pass through a narrow passage into his cave. Inside, the inquirer expected to see Trophonios in person or, at least, to hear his instructions.12 He dwelt, like a spirit confined to the scene of his magical existence, in bodily person at the bottom of his cave. In fact, the method of Incubation, or temple-sleep, by which Amphiaraos (like many other daimones and Heroes) was questioned, was based on the assumption that the daimon, who was only visible indeed to mortal eyes in the higher state achieved by the soul in dreams, had his permanent dwelling at the seat of his oracle.13 That is why his appearance can only be expected at this particular place and nowhere else. Originally, too, it was only the dwellers in the depths of the earth who were thus visible in dreams to those who lay down to sleep in the temple over the place where they had their subterranean abode. Homer knows nothing of either gods or daimones who live permanently under the ground in definite places in the inhabited world, near mankind; and for that 93 reason he betrays no knowledge of Incubation-oracles.14 There is some ground for the belief that this method, inherent in the divinatory power, of getting into touch with the spirit world, was one of the oldest types of Greek oracular art—certainly not later than the Apolline mantikê of inspiration. And it is precisely in the legend of Amphiaraos, as we may believe it to have been related as early as the cyclic poem of the Thebaïs, that we have a proof that already in the days when the quasi-Homeric poetry was still popular, people believed in deathless dwellers below the earth and in their active potency in the mantic art.

We have detailed information about how Amphiaraos was worshipped, especially in later times. Besides the area around Thebes, where the original legend of his descent into the earth originated, Oropos, the border town between Boeotia and Attica, was also successfully identified as the place of his disappearance and became a center of his influence.9 We also have some information, again from later times, about the cult of Trophonios. Over time, the details of the worship grew and multiplied, but certain features stand out as particularly notable and help us understand the underlying religious ideas. Sacrifices were offered to Amphiaraos and Trophonios, similar to those paid to the Chthonic deities, meaning the gods who dwell in the depths of the earth.10 People did not expect help from them in the everyday affairs of individuals or states. They were only considered effective in the specific location of their descent, primarily because they revealed the future. Kroisos had already sent inquiries to the most famous oracles of the time, including Amphiaraos at his ancient oracular site near Thebes and Trophonios at Lebadeia. It was believed that Amphiaraos revealed the future through visions sent in dreams to those who made offerings and then slept in his temple. To consult Trophonios, one had to pass through a narrow passage into his cave. Inside, the seeker expected to either see Trophonios in person or at least hear his guidance.12 He existed, like a spirit tethered to his magical location, in a tangible form at the bottom of his cave. In fact, the method of Incubation or temple-sleep, used to question Amphiaraos (like many other spirits and heroes), was based on the belief that the spirit, visible only to human eyes in the elevated state achieved through dreams, had his permanent dwelling at the site of his oracle.13 That’s why his appearance was only anticipated in that specific place and nowhere else. Initially, it was only the inhabitants of the earth's depths who were visible in dreams to those who slept in the temple situated over their subterranean residence. Homer doesn't mention any gods or spirits living permanently underground in specific locations among humans, and therefore he shows no awareness of Incubation-oracles.14 There’s some reason to believe that this method of connecting with the spirit world was one of the oldest forms of Greek oracular practice—certainly no later than the Apolline mantikê of inspiration. And it is precisely in the legend of Amphiaraos, as it may have been shared as early as the cyclic poem of the Thebaïs, that we find proof that even in the days when the quasi-Homeric poetry was still popular, people believed in immortal beings dwelling underground and their active role in the art of prophecy.

It is clear, then, that the worship of Amphiaraos and the belief in his subterranean existence was not due to the influence of the Epic. Rather the reverse was the case; the cult already existed and provided the idea of the daimon and this gave rise to the Epic narrative. The Epic found an existing cult of an oracular daimon who dwelt beneath the earth near Thebes ready to its hand. It reduced this fact to a form which it could understand in a manner typical of the relation which frequently existed between the facts of religious life and Epic poetry. The cult was connected with an event in legendary history, and so brought into harmony with the Epic outlook. The Epic knew nothing of gods attached in this way to a particular earthly spot, and so the spirit worshipped in the cult became in the epic imagination a chieftain and Seer who had not always lived beneath the earth in that place, but had only been transported there subsequently by a miraculous fiat of the supreme god, who had also accorded an eternal life in the depths to the translated hero.15

It’s clear that the worship of Amphiaraos and the belief in his existence underground didn't arise from the Epic. In fact, it was the other way around; the cult already existed and inspired the idea of the daimon, which led to the Epic narrative. The Epic found a pre-existing cult of an oracular daimon who lived underground near Thebes, which fit perfectly into its narrative. It simplified this reality in a way that it could understand, reflecting the common relationship between religious facts and Epic poetry. The cult was tied to an event in legendary history, aligning it with the Epic perspective. The Epic didn't acknowledge gods linked to a specific earthly location, so the spirit worshipped in the cult became, in the Epic imagination, a chieftain and Seer who hadn’t always resided underground there but had only been moved there later by a miraculous decree from the supreme god, who also granted the hero eternal life in the depths. 15

We may perhaps find a parallel in more recent Saga story that will throw light on the question. German mythology is perfectly familiar with such figures for ever, or until the day of judgment, alive in caverns of the mountains or subterranean chambers. Thus, Charlemagne, or it may be Charles the Fifth, still has his abode in Odenberg or in Unterberg, near Salzburg, Frederick II (or, in more recent versions of the legend, Frederick I Barbarossa) in Kyffhäuser, Henry the Fowler in Sudemerberg, near Goslar. Thus, too, King Arthur, Holger Danske, and many other favourite characters of popular tradition dwell in subterranean caverns.16 Occasionally, we can still plainly see how these were originally ancient gods who according to pagan belief dwelt in hollow mountains and whose place has been taken by these heroes and holy men “translated” beneath the earth.17 So, too, Greek tradition allows us to see even now that those ancient 94 translated mortals, Amphiaraos and Trophonios, are only Epic substitutes for ancient deities who did not owe their everlasting life and subterranean abode to the favour of heaven, but had possessed these from the beginning. At least, at the site of his worship men knew that the prophetic dweller in the cave was a god; one of them is called Zeus Trophonios or Trephonios, not only by learned authorities, but in inscriptions from Lebadeia;18 Amphiaraos, too, is once called Zeus Amphiaraos and more often a god.19 In the Translation legends of Christianized people the kings have usurped the place of the ancient gods because the gods themselves, fallen into neglect, have been dethroned. For reasons not so very different from these the ancient gods on Greek soil were turned into heroes.

We might find a similar example in a more recent saga that sheds light on this issue. German mythology has long been familiar with figures who, until the day of judgment, are said to reside in mountain caves or underground chambers. For instance, Charlemagne, or perhaps Charles the Fifth, still lives in Odenberg or Unterberg near Salzburg, Frederick II (or in newer versions of the legend, Frederick I Barbarossa) in Kyffhäuser, and Henry the Fowler in Sudemerberg near Goslar. Similarly, King Arthur, Holger Danske, and many other beloved characters from popular tradition are said to dwell in subterranean caves.16 Occasionally, it’s clear that these were originally ancient gods who, according to pagan belief, lived in hollow mountains and have now been replaced by these heroes and holy men “translated” beneath the earth.17 Likewise, Greek tradition reveals to us that those ancient 94 translated mortals, Amphiaraos and Trophonios, are simply epic stand-ins for ancient deities who did not gain their eternal life and underground home through divine favor but had these from the start. At the site of their worship, people recognized that the prophetic inhabitant of the cave was a god; one of them is referred to as Zeus Trophonios or Trephonios, supported not just by scholarly sources but by inscriptions from Lebadeia;18 Amphiaraos, too, is sometimes called Zeus Amphiaraos and more frequently a god.19 In the translation legends of Christianized societies, the kings have taken the place of the ancient gods because the gods themselves, having fallen into disfavor, have been overthrown. For reasons not very different from these, the ancient gods in Greek territories were transformed into heroes.

Surrounded by the unending multiplicity of contemporary notions of divinity the imagination of the Epic poet had fashioned for itself a generalized picture of a divine kingdom. This was at that time a solitary attempt to erect a Panhellenic theological system, but it had the greatest influence upon the mental conceptions of Greeks of every race, for the Epic poet addressed them all. He stood as though on a height looking down on all the narrow valleys and mountainous countrysides cut off from the rest of the world, and a wide prospect opened out before his eyes. He soars above all the innumerable contradictory and conflicting details of local cult and belief, and finds something universal beyond. The name and conception of Zeus, Apollo, Hermes, Athena, and all the gods represented innumerable diversities in the myths and ritual of the different cities and races; their outward shapes and personalities differed widely according to their localization and the manner of their influence. Instead of all these the Epic poet sees only one Zeus, Apollo, etc., reduced in each case to a single unified personality. And just as he had looked beyond the multiplicity of local deities so he did not confine his gods to particular local habitations and centres of influence in the Greek countries; they did not belong to one locality more than another. True they worked and ruled in the world, but they were for all that free to move where they would. They dwell and meet together on the heights of Olympos, the Pierian Holy Mountain, which, however, became in the imagination of Homer, unfettered by attachment to any particular place, more and more an ideal mountain of fancy. So the broad sea is the dwelling-place of Poseidon; he is not confined to any one place. Even the rulers of the spirit world. Aïdes and Persephoneia, have their abode, not, indeed, on 95 Olympos, and certainly not here or there beneath the surface of the Greek countryside, but far away in a land of fancy; they, too, are not bound to any particular locality of the actual world. At the end of this enormous work of unification and idealization, that, out of all the infinite special manifestations of the name Zeus, each worshipped only in its narrow little circle in Greece, had evolved the single almighty figure of Zeus Father of Gods and Men—how could one who had imagined all this be able to understand, if he met with such a creature, a special Zeus, calling himself Zeus Trophonios, who passed his undying existence in a cave near Lebadeia and was only powerful in that one spot?

Surrounded by the endless variety of modern ideas about divinity, the imagination of the Epic poet created a broad vision of a divine realm. At that time, this was a unique effort to establish a unified Panhellenic theological system, but it had a significant impact on the beliefs of Greeks from all backgrounds, as the Epic poet spoke to them all. He seemed to stand on a hill, looking down at all the isolated valleys and rugged landscapes separated from the rest of the world, with a vast view stretching out before him. He rises above the countless contradictory and conflicting details of local worship and belief, discovering something universal beyond them. The names and ideas of Zeus, Apollo, Hermes, Athena, and all the gods represented countless variations in the myths and rituals of different cities and races; their physical forms and personalities varied greatly depending on their location and influence. Instead of these multitude, the Epic poet sees only one Zeus, Apollo, and so on, each reduced to a single, unified identity. Just as he looked past the diversity of local deities, he did not limit his gods to specific local homes or centers of power in the Greek world; they did not belong to any one place more than another. True, they acted and ruled in the world, but they remained free to move wherever they pleased. They resided and gathered together on the heights of Olympus, the Pierian Holy Mountain, which, in the imagination of Homer, became increasingly an ideal mountain of fantasy, unconstrained by any specific location. Thus, the vast sea is the home of Poseidon; he is not limited to one place. Even the rulers of the underworld, Hades and Persephone, do not dwell on Olympus, nor are they tied to any specific spot beneath the Greek landscape, but exist far away in a realm of imagination; they too are not restricted to any particular location in the actual world. By the end of this monumental effort of unification and idealization, in which the countless specific representations of the name Zeus, worshiped only in their narrow little circles in Greece, evolved into the single all-powerful figure of Zeus, Father of Gods and Men—how could someone who envisioned all of this understand, if he encountered such a being, a specific Zeus calling himself Zeus Trophonios, who lived his eternal existence in a cave near Lebadeia and was only powerful in that one spot?

Of course, the inhabitant of such a holy spot would not allow himself to be deprived of the belief in the existence and presence of the god on his native soil. Though he might be ready enough in general and in respect of other men’s local deities to regulate conceptions of the nature of the gods in accordance with the Homeric picture, yet he refused absolutely to be shaken in his belief in his own local deity, however unknown to the Olympian family of gods in Homer that deity might be. The local worship in its unaltered, undisturbed persistence, witnessed to the objective truth of his belief. Thus there were preserved in the pious faith of their worshippers large numbers of local deities whose circle of influence was, however, very limited. They had not been raised with the other gods to the heights of Olympos, but had remained faithful to the soil in which they had their home,20 witnesses to a far distant past in which the members of every remote little community had their separate god bound to the soil beyond which their thoughts did not stray. We shall see how in post-Homeric times many such ancient earth-gods, i.e. gods thought of as living below the surface of the ground, were given new and in some cases a more wide-reaching lease of life. The Epic in its prime knew nothing of these earth-dwelling deities. When it could not close its eyes to their existence it changed them into translated heroes, and beyond the immediate locality of the cult this version of them became the commonly accepted one throughout the rest of Greece.

Of course, someone living in such a sacred place wouldn’t let go of their belief in the presence of a god on their own land. While they might be open to adapting ideas about other people's gods to match the images described by Homer, they wouldn’t waver in their faith in their own local deity, no matter how unknown that deity might be to the Olympian gods in Homer’s stories. The ongoing and unchanged local rituals showed the realness of their belief. So, many local gods were preserved in the devotion of their worshippers, even though their influence was pretty limited. They hadn’t been elevated like other gods to the heights of Olympus, but remained true to the land they were associated with, 20 serving as reminders of a distant past when every small community had its own god tied to the soil they knew. We’ll see how in the times after Homer, many of these ancient earth-gods, seen as living beneath the ground, were given new, sometimes broader roles. The Epic during its height didn’t recognize these earth-dwelling deities. When it couldn’t ignore their existence, it turned them into transformed heroes, and outside the area of their worship, this version became the widely accepted one throughout the rest of Greece.

§ 2

But the Epic was by no means uniform in intention, or carried through as a systematic unity; it was far from being the offspring of a learned reflection that could tolerate no discrepancy. Even here we find at least some few dim 96 recollections of the ancient belief in gods that can have their permanent abode in mountain hollows.

But the Epic was definitely not consistent in its purpose, nor was it executed with a systematic unity; it was far from being the product of a scholarly reflection that could accept no contradictions. Even here, we see at least a few vague 96 memories of the old belief in gods that can permanently reside in mountain caves.

The Odyssey (xix, 178 f.) calls Minos, the son of Zeus (cf. Il. xiii, 450; xiv, 322; Od. xi, 568) who ruled in Knossos the Cretan city, “the familiar gossip of great Zeus.”21 Very probably the poet meant by these words much the same as was understood by them in later times: that Minos was personally acquainted with Zeus, on earth, of course, and, in fact, in the cave—not far from Knossos on the side of Mount Ida—which was revered as the “Cave of Zeus”.22 The island of Crete, overrun by the Greeks at an early period, still preserved in its remote seclusion much that was primeval in belief and legend. There, sometimes on Mount Ida, sometimes on Mount Dicte (in the east of the island) the holy cave was pointed out where (already in Hesiod) Zeus was said to have been born.23 According to a local legend, which probably was present to the fancy of the writer of these lines of the Odyssey, the god now fully grown up still dwelt in his subterranean chamber, and was visited by individual mortals. As Minos before him, so, too, Epimenides had been allowed to hear the prophecies of the god.24 The Zeus that dwelt in Ida was worshipped in a mystical cult;25 every year a “throne” was “spread” for him, i.e. probably a “divine banquet” (Theoxenion) was prepared for his consumption, as for other especially Chthonic deities. The initiated then entered the cave dressed in black woollen garments, and remained within for thrice nine days.26 Everything points to the existence of conceptions similar to those that we found expressed in the cult of Zeus Trophonios at Lebadeia. Zeus dwelling in bodily form in the depths of his cave can appear in person to those who enter his cave duly sanctified.

The Odyssey (xix, 178 f.) describes Minos, the son of Zeus (cf. Il. xiii, 450; xiv, 322; Od. xi, 568) who ruled the Cretan city of Knossos, as “the familiar gossip of great Zeus.”21 Likely, the poet intended these words to convey a similar meaning to how they were interpreted in later times: that Minos had a personal connection with Zeus, here on earth, in fact, in the cave near Knossos on Mount Ida, which was honored as the “Cave of Zeus.”22 The island of Crete, which was invaded by the Greeks early on, still held onto many ancient beliefs and legends in its remote isolation. Sometimes on Mount Ida and other times on Mount Dicte (in the eastern part of the island), the holy cave was identified as the birthplace of Zeus (noted even by Hesiod).23 According to a local legend, which likely inspired the writer of these lines in the Odyssey, the now fully grown god still lived in his underground chamber and was visited by individual mortals. Just as Minos had done, so too had Epimenides received prophecies from the god.24 The Zeus who resided in Ida was worshipped in a mystical cult;25 each year a “throne” was “spread” for him, likely a “divine banquet” (Theoxenion) prepared for his enjoyment, similar to offerings made to other especially Chthonic deities. The initiated would then enter the cave dressed in black wool garments and remain inside for a period of thrice nine days.26 Everything suggests that there were conceptions similar to those found in the cult of Zeus Trophonios at Lebadeia. Zeus, residing in bodily form deep within his cave, could appear personally to those who entered his cave in a sanctified manner.

Then there appears, from the fourth century onwards, the strange statement, perhaps started by Euhemeros and eagerly taken up in later ages by scoffers like Lucian or Christian opponents of the old religion, that Zeus lay buried on Ida.27 What is here called the grave of the god is nothing in reality but the cave which was generally regarded as his permanent abode.28 The idea—always strange to the Greeks29—that a god could lie buried anywhere on the earth, deprived of life for ever or even for a limited period of time, is often met with in the tradition of Semitic and other non-Greek peoples.30 We need not inquire what deeper or perhaps allegorical sense such legends may have had in the beliefs of those nations; there is no reason to suppose that such foreign legends had any influence in the formation of Greek myth. Nor does the 97 tradition in Greek lands give the slightest support to the view current among modern mythologists that the death and burial of gods is intended to symbolize the “death of Nature”. It is, in fact, plain that in the legend of the Cretan Zeus’ grave, the “grave” has simply taken the place of the cave as the everlasting abode of the undying god, and that it is a paradoxical expression intended to signify his perpetual confinement to that place. We are immediately reminded of a no less paradoxical notice of a god’s grave at Delphi. Under the navel stone (Omphalos) of the Earth-goddess (which was a vaulted piece of masonry in the Temple of Apollo recalling in its shape the ancient vaulted tombs),31 there lay buried a divine being. Our learned authorities call this being Python, the enemy of Apollo; one and only one quite untrustworthy witness says it was Dionysos.32 Here we have a case of one god setting up his temple and abode over the grave of another god. Apollo, the god of prophecy, thrones it over the Earth-spirit Python, the son of the Earth-goddess Gaia. Now, we have ancient and in the highest degree trustworthy traditions to the effect that there was originally at Delphi an ancient Earth-Oracle into whose place Apollo and his mantic art came later as an intruder. We are therefore justified in believing that this circumstance in the history of religion has found expression in the legend that Apollo’s temple and oracular seat stood over the place where an ancient and superseded oracle-daimon lay “buried”.33 In the days when the primeval Earth-Oracle was still powerful its guardian would not lie dead and buried under the Omphalos of the Earth-goddess, but would have dwelt there alive underground, like Amphiaraos or Trophonios or Zeus on Ida.

Then, starting in the fourth century, a strange claim emerged, possibly originating from Euhemeros and eagerly adopted by later skeptics like Lucian or Christian opponents of the old religion, that Zeus was buried on Ida.27 What is referred to here as the grave of the god is actually just the cave that was generally thought to be his permanent dwelling.28 The notion—always odd to the Greeks29—that a god could be buried somewhere on earth, lifeless for eternity or even for a limited time, often appears in the traditions of Semitic and other non-Greek cultures.30 We won’t delve into what deeper or perhaps symbolic meanings such legends may have held in those cultures; there’s no evidence to suggest that these foreign legends influenced Greek mythology. Nor does the 97 tradition in Greek regions provide any support for the modern mythologists' idea that the death and burial of gods symbolize the “death of Nature.” It’s clear that in the story of Zeus’ grave in Crete, the “grave” has simply replaced the cave as the eternal home of the immortal god, serving as a paradoxical expression meant to indicate his continuous presence in that location. We are immediately reminded of another paradoxical mention of a god's grave at Delphi. Beneath the navel stone (Omphalos) of the Earth-goddess (which was a domed structure in the Temple of Apollo, resembling ancient domed tombs),31 a divine being was said to be buried. Our esteemed scholars identify this being as Python, the enemy of Apollo; only one unreliable source claims it was Dionysos.32 Here we have a situation of one god building his temple and home over the grave of another god. Apollo, the god of prophecy, oversees the Earth-spirit Python, the offspring of the Earth-goddess Gaia. We have ancient and highly reliable traditions stating that an old Earth-Oracle initially existed at Delphi, which was later replaced by Apollo and his prophetic art as an intruder. Thus, we are justified in believing that this aspect of religious history is reflected in the legend that Apollo's temple and oracular seat were situated over the place where an ancient and replaced oracle spirit lay “buried.”33 During the time when the primeval Earth-Oracle still held power, its guardian wouldn't be dead and buried under the Omphalos of the Earth-goddess but would have been alive and dwelling underground, like Amphiaraos or Trophonios or Zeus on Ida.

§ 3

The “grave” under the Omphalos means in the case of Python the overthrow of an earth-dwelling Chthonic Daimon by the cult of Apollo. The “grave” of Zeus, which had thrust itself into the place of an older legend of the dwelling of Zeus in the cave of the mountain, expresses the same idea as this legend, but expresses it in a form current in later ages which knew of many “Heroes” who after their death and from their graves gave proof of a higher existence and a powerful influence. The Zeus that died and is buried is only a god reduced to a Hero;34 remarkable and paradoxical is only the fact that unlike Zeus Amphiaraos, Zeus Trophonios (and Zeus Asklepios), he has not, in the usual fashion, dropped his title of god, which directly contradicted his “Hero” 98 nature. It is possible that in the case of this cave-Zeus, half-god half-Hero, a conception has been transferred merely on analogy from other cases where it was applied more properly, after they had become fully “Heroized”, to gods who according to the no longer intelligible theory had once been dwellers in the depths of the earth.

The “grave” beneath the Omphalos represents, in the case of Python, the defeat of an earth-dwelling Chthonic Daimon by the worshippers of Apollo. The “grave” of Zeus, which replaced an older legend about his dwelling in a mountain cave, conveys the same idea as that legend but in a form popular in later times that recognized many “Heroes” who, after their death and from their graves, demonstrated a higher existence and significant influence. The Zeus who died and was buried is simply a god transformed into a Hero; what is remarkable and paradoxical is that, unlike Zeus Amphiaraos, Zeus Trophonios, and Zeus Asklepios, he has not abandoned his title of god, which directly contradicts his “Hero” nature. It’s possible that in the case of this cave-Zeus, half-god and half-Hero, this notion was transferred by analogy from other instances where it was applied more appropriately, after they had become fully “Heroized,” to gods who, according to an outdated and incomprehensible belief, were once inhabitants of the earth's depths.

We have several accounts of Heroes who were buried in temples of gods and were sometimes associated with the cult of the higher god to whom the temple was dedicated. The way in which such legends could arise may be seen unusually clearly from the case of Erechtheus.

We have multiple accounts of Heroes who were buried in temples dedicated to gods and were sometimes linked with the worship of the higher god to whom the temple was devoted. The emergence of such legends can be observed particularly clearly in the case of Erechtheus.

The Ship-Catalogue in the Iliad (ii, 546 ff.) tells us that Erechtheus was the son of the Earth, but that Athene brought him up and “settled him in her rich temple”,35 where the Athenians every year honour him with sacrifice of sheep and bulls.36 It is plain that Erechtheus is here thought of as still living; to honour a dead man with such offerings, repeated every year and attended by the whole community, would be a custom quite unknown to Homer. Erechtheus is, therefore, thought of as dwelling alive in the temple in which Athene has set him down, i.e. the ancient temple on the Acropolis which was enclosed in the “strong house of Erechtheus”, to which, according to the Odyssey, Athene betakes herself as her own home. On the old citadel of the Kings, royal residence and sanctuary of the goddess were combined; its foundation walls have recently been discovered on the spot where later joint worship was paid to Athene and Erechtheus in the “Erechtheion”.37 Erechtheus dwells below the ground in a crypt of this temple,38 like other earth-deities, in the form of a snake, immortally. He is not dead, for as Euripides still says, in a story which otherwise follows different lines, “the earth gaped and covered him over,”39 i.e. he was translated and lived on under the earth. On the analogy of the examples already discussed it is clear that this is also a case of a primitive local deity,40 once supposed to have been living always in a cave on the mountain-side, transformed to a Hero who has been brought there and raised to immortal life. The later belief in Heroes required a grave at which the continued existence and potency of the “Hero” was localized; by a natural process of development the Hero Erechtheus translated alive and made immortal is thought of as buried in a grave. Erichthonios, who was expressly identified with the Homeric Erechtheus, was by later ages supposed to be buried in the Temple of Polias, i.e. the oldest temple of Athene, on the Acropolis.41 We have clearly before us the steps by which the 99 aboriginal deity, dwelling beneath the ground, the son of Earth, is made into a mortal Hero, translated to immortality and placed under the protection of the Olympian goddess who has now become more powerful than he; and finally transferred, cave and all, to the precincts of her temple, and finally reduced to the condition of a Hero like another, who had died and lies peacefully buried in the temple of the goddess on the citadel.

The Ship-Catalogue in the Iliad (ii, 546 ff.) tells us that Erechtheus was the son of the Earth, but that Athena raised him and “settled him in her rich temple,”35 where the Athenians honor him every year with sacrifices of sheep and bulls.36 It's clear that Erechtheus is viewed as still living; honoring a dead person with such offerings, repeated annually and attended by the entire community, would not be a custom familiar to Homer. Therefore, Erechtheus is thought to be living in the temple where Athena has placed him, i.e., the ancient temple on the Acropolis, which is part of the “strong house of Erechtheus,” where, according to the Odyssey, Athena goes as her own home. On the old citadel of the Kings, the royal residence and sanctuary for the goddess were combined; the foundation walls have recently been found at the site where later joint worship was held for Athena and Erechtheus in the “Erechtheion.”37 Erechtheus resides beneath the ground in a crypt of this temple,38 like other earth-deities, in the form of a snake, immutably immortal. He is not dead, for as Euripides still says, in a story that otherwise takes a different path, “the earth gaped and covered him over,”39 which means he was translated and continues to live below the earth. Based on the examples already discussed, it’s evident that this is also a case of a primitive local deity,40 once believed to have always lived in a cave on the mountainside, transformed into a Hero who has been brought there and granted immortal life. The later belief in Heroes required a grave where the ongoing existence and power of the “Hero” were localized; through natural progression, the Hero Erechtheus, who is translated alive and made immortal, is thought of as buried in a grave. Erichthonios, who was explicitly identified with the Homeric Erechtheus, was later believed to be buried in the Temple of Polias, i.e., the oldest temple of Athena, on the Acropolis.41 We can clearly see the steps by which the 99 original deity, dwelling beneath the ground, the son of Earth, becomes a mortal Hero, transformed to immortality and placed under the protection of the Olympian goddess who has now become more powerful than he; and finally shifted, cave and all, to the grounds of her temple, ultimately reduced to the status of a Hero like others, who has died and is peacefully buried in the temple of the goddess on the citadel.

With this example before us we may explain several other analogous cases, in which we have only the last stage of the process, the grave of a Hero in a god’s temple, without any of the intermediate steps. A single example may be given.

With this example in mind, we can explain several other similar cases where we only have the final stage of the process— a Hero's grave in a god's temple— without any of the earlier steps. We can give one specific example.

At Amyklai, not far from Sparta, in the holiest temple of Laconia, stood the ancient bronze statue of Apollo upon an altar-shaped base, within which, according to legend, Hyakinthos lay buried. Through a bronze door in the side of the altar offerings for the dead were sent down to “Hyakinthos” buried below every year at the festival of the Hyakinthia.42 The recipient of these offerings has little resemblance to the gentle youth of popular legend. The Hellenistic poets tell how he was beloved by Apollo and died by a cast of Apollo’s discus and was changed into a flower. The fable, almost destitute of local reference, has been put together from many popular themes.43 The sculpture on the above-mentioned altar, on the other hand, represents among many gods and heroes Hyakinthos and his sister Polyboia as they are being carried up to heaven—which will not square with the metamorphosis story. Further, he is represented as bearded, and so not as the boy whom Apollo loved,44 but as a grown man (of whose daughters indeed other legends make mention).45 The true story of this Hyakinthos has disappeared almost without leaving a trace. But in what the monument reveals and in what we know of the yearly festival held in honour of Hyakinthos significant features emerge which perhaps can tell us the real character of the Daimon that was honoured at Amyklai together with, and as our information clearly shows, before Apollo himself.46 Hyakinthos was given offerings that were otherwise peculiar to the gods that ruled the lower world.47 These offerings were let down directly into the underground place where, in fact, Hyakinthos himself was supposed to dwell. In the great festival of the Hyakinthia the alternate worship of Apollo and Hyakinthos (after whom as the chief personage the festival is named) points to the incomplete amalgamation of two originally distinct cults; and the plain and unadorned, almost dismal, ceremonies of 100 the days devoted to Hyakinthos—contrasted with the more cheerful worship paid to Apollo on the middle day of the feast48—allow us to see clearly the real nature of Hyakinthos as a Daimon related to the gods of the underworld. On the altar-relief Polyboia was represented as his sister: she was a goddess of the underworld like Persephone.49 Hyakinthos was, then, an old local deity of the Amyklaian countryside, dwelling below the earth, and his worship at Amyklai was older than that of Apollo. But he is a dim figure. The Olympian god (probably not before the Doric conquest of the Achæan land) has set himself down beside, and indeed over, the ancient earth-spirit, and now outshines him without quite being able to banish his worship. The divine existence of the latter under the ground could not be imagined by later ages, except as the after-existence of the psyche of a dead and buried Hero whose body lay in the “grave” under the statue of the god. Next, in order to explain their association in cult, poetic legend made the god a lover, just as in another case, and for similar reasons, it had made him the lover of Daphne.50

At Amyklai, not far from Sparta, in the holiest temple of Laconia, stood the ancient bronze statue of Apollo on an altar-shaped base, where, according to legend, Hyakinthos was buried. Through a bronze door on the side of the altar, offerings for the dead were sent down to “Hyakinthos” buried below every year during the festival of the Hyakinthia.42 The recipient of these offerings doesn't closely resemble the gentle youth of popular legend. Hellenistic poets describe how he was loved by Apollo and died from being struck by Apollo’s discus, transforming into a flower. This story, lacking local detail, is a blend of various popular themes.43 The sculpture on the altar mentioned above, however, depicts Hyakinthos along with his sister Polyboia being carried up to heaven—this contradicts the metamorphosis tale. Additionally, he is shown bearded, representing not the boy loved by Apollo,44 but a grown man (whose daughters are indeed mentioned in other legends).45 The true story of this Hyakinthos has almost entirely faded from history. Nonetheless, what the monument reveals and what we know about the yearly festival honoring Hyakinthos highlight features that may reveal the true nature of the Daimon venerated at Amyklai, alongside, and as our information clearly indicates, before Apollo himself.46 Hyakinthos received offerings typically reserved for gods of the underworld.47 These offerings were sent directly down to the underground area where Hyakinthos was believed to reside. During the grand festival of the Hyakinthia, the alternating worship of Apollo and Hyakinthos (after whom the festival is named) suggests the incomplete merging of two originally distinct cults; and the plain, unembellished, almost somber ceremonies devoted to Hyakinthos—contrasted with the more joyful worship of Apollo on the festival's middle day48—allow us to clearly see the true nature of Hyakinthos as a Daimon connected to the gods of the underworld. On the altar relief, Polyboia was depicted as his sister: she was a goddess of the underworld like Persephone.49 Thus, Hyakinthos was an ancient local deity of the Amyklaian area, dwelling underground, and his worship at Amyklai predated that of Apollo. However, he remains a vague figure. The Olympian god (likely not before the Doric conquest of the Achaean land) positioned himself beside, and indeed over, the ancient earth spirit, now shining more brightly yet unable to completely eliminate his worship. The divine essence of the latter underground could not be conceived by later generations other than as the afterlife of the psyche of a dead, buried Hero whose body rested in the “grave” beneath the god’s statue. To explain their shared cult, poetic tradition made the god a lover, similar to how it had depicted him as the lover of Daphne for comparable reasons.50

§ 4

Thus it may be that under many a Hero whose grave was shown in the Temple of a god an ancient local-god was hidden, whose abode beneath the earth had been converted into a “grave” now that he himself had sunk from a deity of higher rank to a human chieftain. It depended upon the circumstances of the case whether his humanization was complete or whether the memory of his former god-head (preserved in cult) secured for him a second elevation to the heavenly regions51 among the Olympian gods whose nature was originally quite foreign to that of the old earth-daimon. Such conceptions, differing widely according to the circumstances of place and time, are shown most clearly in the different views taken of Asklepios. For Homer and the poets he is generally a great chieftain, a mortal who had learnt the art of healing from Cheiron. In religious cult he was generally set on a level with the upper gods. In reality he, too, is a local earth-dwelling deity from Thessaly, who from beneath the earth dispenses, like so many earth-spirits, healing from the ills of the flesh and knowledge of the future52—the two being closely connected in antiquity. He, too, easily bore the change from god to Hero. Asklepios was struck by Zeus’ lightning which in this, as in many cases, did not destroy life, but translated the person affected to a higher existence outside the visible world.53 101 We can now easily understand what it means when even this ancient earth-deity is said to be “buried”—his grave being shown at different places.54 Many peculiarities of the worship paid to him show clearly the original character of Asklepios as an ancient god living below the earth.55 One essential characteristic indeed of such earth-spirits he lacks—he is not bound to any one particular place. An enterprising priesthood, wandering in company with the rest of their tribe, had taken with them this old established worship of theirs, and spread it far and wide, so that Asklepios himself became at home in many different places.

So, it might be that under many of the Heroes whose graves were marked in a temple of a god, there was an ancient local deity hidden away, whose home underground was turned into a "grave" now that he had fallen from a higher-ranked deity to a human leader. Whether he was completely humanized or if the memory of his former divinity (kept alive through worship) allowed him to ascend again to the heavenly realms among the Olympian gods, whose nature was originally quite different from that of the old earth spirit, depended on the specific situation. These varying ideas, which differ significantly based on place and time, are best illustrated by the differing perceptions of Asklepios. For Homer and other poets, he is typically seen as a great leader, a mortal who learned the healing arts from Cheiron. In religious practice, he was often treated on par with the higher gods. In reality, he was also a local earth-dwelling deity from Thessaly, who from underground provided healing for physical ailments and knowledge of the future—two things that were closely linked in ancient times. He also easily transitioned from god to Hero. Asklepios was struck by Zeus' lightning, which, as in many cases, did not end his life but instead elevated him to a higher existence beyond the visible world. 101 Now we can clearly understand what is meant when this ancient earth deity is described as “buried”—his grave being claimed at various locations. Many unique aspects of the worship offered to him clearly reveal the original nature of Asklepios as an ancient god residing below the earth. One key characteristic of these earth spirits that he lacks is a connection to any specific location. A resourceful priesthood, traveling with their tribe, took this long-established worship with them and spread it widely, allowing Asklepios himself to feel at home in many different places.

Now, in closest relationship, though they remained more faithful to their original character, with this Zeus Asklepios stood those Boeotian earth-spirits with whom this discussion began. Trophonios, and Amphiaraos, too, might have been described as an Asklepios, who had stayed at home in his old cavern dwelling.56 They, too, Amphiaraos and Trophonios, had become mortal men of a past age in the imagination of a time which could no longer properly understand such cave-spirits. But we never hear of their “graves”; for the generation which made them Heroes knew nothing of mortal chieftains who after dying and being buried yet lived on with undiminished powers. But it was the belief in their uninterrupted potency that gave those strange cavern deities a secure place in men’s memory. In the epic and in legends inspired by the epic they are recognized as human beings that had not died but had been translated, without any division of soul from body, to everlasting life in the depths of the earth. Ever afterwards—even when they are not only called immortal, but actually “gods”—they are reckoned as men who have become immortal or godlike.57 And they have become the patterns of what other mortals too may rise to. In the Electra of Sophokles (836 ff.) the chorus wishing to justify the hope of a continued life for the departed, expressly appeal to the example of Amphiaraos, who still rules below the earth with all his spiritual powers intact. For the same reason these and other examples offered by ancient legend and poetry of the “translation” of individual great men to a life below the earth are important for our inquiry too. In them, as it did (in another sense) in the case of those translated to the Islands of the Blest, the Epic points beyond its own resigned and gloomy conception of the state after death towards a higher life after the visible world has been left behind. It took isolated cases of the once numerous class of cavern deities worshipped in Greek countries, and deprived 102 them of their god-head, though not of the superhumanly continued existence and (especially mantic) powers claimed for them by the belief and cult of their countrymen. Thus reduced to mortal rank, it interwove them in the fabric of the heroic mythology, and in so doing instituted a class of outstanding human individuals who had been raised to a godlike existence, far, indeed, from the upper world, but, at least, not condemned to the common realm of the souls. Instead they were given a home beneath the earth, each in a definite place in Greek territory, near living men, and able to help them. The descent from god to mortal Hero resulted, since the essential point of continued existence was not denied, in a corresponding exaltation of the mortal and the heroic to the divine. Thus the epic leads us in this instance towards a range of conceptions which the poems themselves treated as though it never existed, and which now suddenly comes into view.

Now, in the closest relationship, while they stayed true to their original nature, Zeus Asklepios was joined by the Boeotian earth-spirits that this discussion began with. Trophonios and Amphiaraos could also be seen as an Asklepios who remained in his old cave home. They, too, Amphiaraos and Trophonios, had become mortal men from a past era in the minds of those who could no longer fully comprehend such cave-spirits. However, we never hear about their "graves," because the generation that made them Heroes didn’t know anything about mortal leaders who, after dying and being buried, continued to live on with their powers intact. It was the belief in their lasting strength that gave these strange cave deities a firm place in people's memories. In epics and legends inspired by those epics, they are acknowledged as humans who didn’t really die but were transformed, without any separation of soul from body, into eternal life in the depths of the earth. Even later—when they are not only called immortal but are actually referred to as "gods"—they are considered to be men who have become immortal or godlike. They have set the standard for what other mortals can aspire to achieve. In Sophokles's *Electra* (836 ff.), the chorus, wanting to affirm hope for a continued life for those who’ve passed, specifically points to the example of Amphiaraos, who still governs below the earth with all his spiritual abilities intact. For this reason, these and other examples from ancient legend and poetry depicting the "translation" of remarkable individuals to an existence below the earth are also significant for our inquiry. They show, as did the case of those transported to the Islands of the Blessed (in another sense), that Epic literature points beyond its own resigned and somber view of the afterlife towards a higher existence after leaving the visible world behind. It took individual cases from the once numerous class of cave deities worshiped in Greek regions and stripped them of their divinity, but not of the superhuman continued existence and especially prophetic powers attributed to them by the beliefs and rituals of their people. Thus reduced to a mortal status, they were woven into the fabric of heroic mythology, creating a class of exceptional individuals who had been elevated to a godlike existence—far from the upper world, but not condemned to the common realm of souls. Instead, they were given a place beneath the earth, each in a specific location within Greek lands, close to living people, and able to assist them. This shift from god to mortal Hero resulted, since the core concept of continued existence was not disputed, in a corresponding elevation of the mortal and heroic to the divine. Consequently, the epic guides us in this instance toward a range of ideas that the poems themselves treated as though they didn’t exist, but which now suddenly comes into focus.

NOTES TO CHAPTER III

1 Pi., N. ix, 24 ff., x, 8 f., [Apollod.] iii, 6, 8, 4 (σὺν τῷ ἅρματι καὶ τῷ ἡνιόχῳ Βάτωνι . . . ἐκρύφθη καὶ Ζεὺς ἀθάνατον αὐτὸν ἐποίησεν) etc. The expressions used to describe the translation and continued conscious existence of A. are noteworthy: κατὰ γαῖ’ αὐτόν τέ νιν καὶ φαιδίμους ἵππους ἔμαρψεν, Pi., O. vi, 14. Ζεὺς κρύψεν ἅμ’ ἵπποις, N. ix, 25. γαῖα ὑπέδεκτο μάντιν Οἰκλείδαν, x, 8. μάντις κεκευθὼς πολεμίας ὑπο χθονός, A., Th., 588. ἐδέξατο ῥαγεῖσα Θηβαία κόνις, S. fr., 873 (= 958 P.). θεοὶ ζῶντ’ ἀναρπάσαντες ἐς μύχους χθονὸς αὐτοῖς τεθρίπποις εὐλογοῦσιν ἐμφανῶς, E. Supp., 928 f. ἥρπασεν χάρυβδις οἰωνοσκόπον, τέθριππον ἅρμα περιβαλοῦσα χάσματι, 501 f. (Eriphyle) Ἀμφιάραον ἔκρυψ’ ὑπὸ γῆν αὐτοῖσι σὺν ἵπποις, Oracle in Ephorus ap. Ath., 232 F. Ἀμφιαράου ζῶντος τὸ σῶμα καταδέξασθαι τὴν γῆν, Agatharch., p. 115, 21 Mü. ἐπεσπάσατο ἡ γῆ ζῶντα, Philostr., V. Ap., 2, 37, p. 79, 18 Kays. ἀφανισμός of A., St. Byz. s. Ἅρπυια.—πάμψυχος ἀνάσσει, S., El., 841; ἀεὶ ζῶν τιμᾶται, Xen., Cyn. i, 8.

1 Pi., N. ix, 24 ff., x, 8 f., [Apollod.] iii, 6, 8, 4 (Along with the chariot and the driver Batos... he was hidden and Zeus made him immortal.) etc. The phrases used to describe A.'s translation and ongoing conscious existence are remarkable: He struck him down on the ground along with his shining horses., Pi., O. vi, 14. Zeus hid with the horses, N. ix, 25. γαῖα ὑπέδεκτο μάντιν Οἰκλείδαν, x, 8. μαντεία κάτω από τη γη, A., Th., 588. Thivaian dust accepted its fate., S. fr., 873 (= 958 P.). The gods, having snatched away those who live, openly bless them with distinguished chariots from the depths of the earth., E. Supp., 928 f. Charybdis seized the augur, engulfing him in a chasm while engulfing the four-horse chariot., 501 f. (Eriphyle) Amphiaraus hid under the ground with his horses., Oracle in Ephorus ap. Ath., 232 F. Amphiarus’s body to the ground, Agatharch., p. 115, 21 Mü. the earth brought forth living, Philostr., V. Ap., 2, 37, p. 79, 18 Kays. disappearance of A., St. Byz. s. Ἅρπυια.—all-souled rules, S., El., 841; Always honored while living, Xen., Cyn. i, 8.

2 That the translation of Amphiaraos in the form so frequently repeated by later authors (clearly following an important and influential original) appeared already in the Thebaïs of the epic cycle is taken by Welcker for granted, Ep. Cykl. ii, 362, 66. The view is intrinsically probable: but it can claim more definite grounds. Pi., O. vi, 12–17, tells us that after Amphiaraos and his team had been swallowed up by the earth, Adrastos, over the seven funeral-pyres (which consumed the bodies of the Argives who had fallen in battle), said ποθέω στρατιᾶς ὀφθαλμὸν ἐμᾶς, ἀμφότερον, μάντιν τ’ ἀγαθὸν καὶ δουρὶ μάρνασθαι. That this famous lament was taken ἐκ τῆς κυκλικῆς Θηβαΐδος, fr. 5 Kinkel, p. 12, is proved by the testimony of the ancient scholia on ποθέω κτλ., quoting Asklepiades. This means that in the Thebaïs too, after the battle was over Amphiaraos was not to be found either among the fallen or the survivors—was in fact translated. Pindar must have taken not merely the words of the lament of Adrastos but the whole situation that led up to these words, as he described it, from the Thebaïs. (Bethe, Theb. Held. [1891], p. 58 f., 94 ff., claims to prove that Pindar took nothing but the words ἀμφότερον κτλ. from the Thebaïs which said nothing of the burial of these who had fallen before Thebes, and that Pindar added this last on his own account, O. vi, as well as N. ix, 25. But the “proofs” of this view, in itself highly improbable, on closer examination come to nothing.)—In the Odyssey it is said of Amph. ὄλετ’ ἐν Θήβῃσι ο 247; θάνεν Ἀμφιάραος 253. The expression “is naturally to be understood as merely implying disappearance from the earth” says Welcker, Ep. C. ii, 366. All we can claim is that the expression does not indeed prevent us from assuming that the story of the “disappearance” of Amph. was known also to the poet of these lines. Thus in the OC. of Soph. Antigone says twice over (ll. 1706, 1714) that Oedipus ἔθανε, whereas he really was like Amphiaraos translated alive (ἄσκοποι πλάκες ἔμαρψαν 1681).

2 The translation of Amphiaraos, as often repeated by later authors (clearly following an important and influential original), already appeared in the Thebaïs of the epic cycle, which Welcker accepts as a given, Ep. Cykl. ii, 362, 66. This view is inherently likely, but has more definitive backing. Pi., O. vi, 12–17, recounts that after Amphiaraos and his team were swallowed up by the earth, Adrastos, over the seven funeral pyres (which burned the bodies of the Argives who had fallen in battle), said I place my gaze on the army, both sides, to fight well with a good seer and with a spear.. This well-known lament was taken from the circular Thebaid, fr. 5 Kinkel, p. 12, as shown by the testimony of the ancient scholia on ποθέω κτλ., quoting Asklepiades. This indicates that in the Thebaïs, after the battle was over, Amphiaraos was not found among either the fallen or the survivors—he was indeed translated. Pindar must have taken not just the words of Adrastos's lament but the whole situation leading up to these words, as he described it, from the Thebaïs. (Bethe, Theb. Held. [1891], p. 58 f., 94 ff., claims to prove that Pindar took nothing but the words Both etc. from the Thebaïs, which said nothing about the burial of those who fell before Thebes, and that Pindar added this last part on his own in O. vi, as well as N. ix, 25. However, the “proofs” for this view, which is already quite unlikely, fall apart upon closer examination.)—In the Odyssey, it is said of Amph. ὄλετ’ ἐν Θήβῃσι ο 247; θάνεν Amphiaraus 253. The phrase “is naturally understood as simply implying disappearance from the earth,” says Welcker, Ep. C. ii, 366. All we can assert is that the expression does not actually prevent us from assuming that the story of Amphiaraos's “disappearance” was known to the poet of these lines. So, in the OC. of Soph. Antigone states twice (ll. 1706, 1714) that Oedipus he died, while he truly was, like Amphiaraos, translated alive (useless plates were carved 1681).

3 Pi., fr. 167, A.R. i, 57–64 (ζωός περ ἔτι . . . ἐδύσετο νειόθι γαίης). Orph., Arg., 171–5 (φασὶν . . . ζωόν τ’ ἐν φθιμένοισι μολεῖν ὑπὸ κεύθεσι γαίης). Agatharch., p. 114, 39–43 Mü. (εἰς τὴν γῆν καταδῦναι ὀρθόν τε καὶ ζῶντα). Schol. and Eust. on Α 264, p. 1001.—In Ovid, M. xii, 514 ff., the translation becomes a metamorphosis (into a bird); and 104 often an ancient translation myth has thus been replaced by a metamorphosis in later mythology. The connected story of Kaineus has been lost, and only a few fragments survive in Sch., A.R. i, 57; Sch., Α 264 (the best known being the change of sex [cf. also Meineke, h. crit. com., 345], the meaning of which is very dubious. Similar stories are told of Teiresias, Sithon (Ov., M. iv, 280), Iphis, and Ianthe, this last reminding us strikingly of a narrative in the Mahâbhârata. Then frequently in many miracle tales, both heathen and Christian, to which far too much respect is paid by those who seek to find in them dark reminiscences of bisexual gods). No traces of a cult of Kaineus can be found.

3 Pi., fr. 167, A.R. i, 57–64 (the zoo is always going down into the ground). Orph., Arg., 171–5 (They say there’s a living being concealed beneath the earth's surface.). Agatharch., p. 114, 39–43 Mü. (to sink down into the ground, both standing and alive). Schol. and Eust. on Α 264, p. 1001.—In Ovid, M. xii, 514 ff., the transformation becomes a metamorphosis (into a bird); and 104 an ancient translation myth has often been replaced by a metamorphosis in later mythology. The related story of Kaineus has been lost, and only a few fragments remain in Sch., A.R. i, 57; Sch., Α 264 (the most famous being the sex change [cf. also Meineke, h. crit. com., 345], the meaning of which is very unclear. Similar stories are told of Teiresias, Sithon (Ov., M. iv, 280), Iphis, and Ianthe, the latter notably reminding us of a tale in the Mahâbhârata. There are also many miracle stories, both pagan and Christian, which are given far too much respect by those who seek to find in them obscure hints of bisexual gods). There are no traces of a cult of Kaineus.

4 Althaimenes, son of Katreus (cf. Rh. Mus. 36, 432 f.), εὐξάμενος ὑπὸ χάσματος ἐκρύβη [Apollod.], iii, 2, 2, 3. Rationalistic version of Zeno of Rhodos ap. D.S., 5, 59, 4, who says, however, ὕστερον κατὰ χρησμόν τινα τιμὰς ἔσχε παρὰ Ῥοδίοις ἡρωϊκάς, and, in fact, we learn from an insc. in Newton, Gr. Insc. in B.M. ii, 352, that a political division (Ktoina?) of the people of Rhodos was called Ἀλθαιμενίς, whose ἥρως ἐπώνυμος must have been Althaimenes.

4 Althaimenes, the son of Katreus (see Rh. Mus. 36, 432 f.), Prayed and hid from the gap [Apollod.], iii, 2, 2, 3. This rationalistic interpretation of Zeno of Rhodes as reported by D.S., 5, 59, 4, indicates, however, Later, according to a certain prophecy, he received heroic honors from the Rhodians., and we actually find, from an inscription in Newton, Gr. Insc. in B.M. ii, 352, that a political group (Ktoina?) among the people of Rhodes was called Ἀλθαιμενίς, whose hero name must have been Althaimenes.

5 Amphilochos appeared in person to sleepers at his dream-oracle at Mallos in Cilicia (Luc., Philops., 38)—so also did his rival Mopsos, Plut., DO. 45, 434 D—as well as at his oracle in Akarnania, Aristid. i, p. 78 D. [38, 21 Keil]. Mopsos in Cilicia and Amphilochos in Akarnania are alike in being among those δαιμόνια which ἱδρυμένα ἔν τινι τόπῳ τοῦτον οἰκοῦσιν, Orig., c. Cels. iii, 34, pp. 293–4 L. The same author says of Amph. Mopsos and others, ἀνθρωποειδεῖς θεωρεῖσθαι θεούς, vii, 35, p. 53.

5 Amphilochos appeared in person to those sleeping at his dream oracle in Mallos, Cilicia (Luc., Philops., 38)—just like his rival Mopsos, Plut., DO. 45, 434 D—and also at his oracle in Akarnania, Aristid. i, p. 78 D. [38, 21 Keil]. Mopsos in Cilicia and Amphilochos in Akarnania are both among those δαίμονα which They are settled in a certain place., Orig., c. Cels. iii, 34, pp. 293–4 L. The same author describes Amph. Mopsos and others as Humans see gods as humanoid., vii, 35, p. 53.

6 Laodike, daughter of Priam [Apollod.], Epit. v, 25; Nicol. Prog. ii, 1.—Aristaios, who ἄφαντος γίγνεται in M. Haemus and is now honoured ἀθανάτοις τιμαῖς, D.S. iv, 82, 6. (Cf. Hiller v. Gärtr., Pauly-Wiss. ii, 855, 23 ff.)

6 Laodike, daughter of Priam [Apollod.], Epit. v, 25; Nicol. Prog. ii, 1.—Aristaios, who went invisible in M. Haemus and is now honored with eternal honors, D.S. iv, 82, 6. (Cf. Hiller v. Gärtr., Pauly-Wiss. ii, 855, 23 ff.)

7 The regular expression for these subterranean dwelling-places is μέγαρα. Lex. rhet. ap. Eust., Od., 1387, 17 f. Hence also the sacrificial pits into which men lowered the offerings made to the deities of the lower world are called μέγαρα (Lob., Agl., 830; μέγαρα = χάσματα, Schol. Luc., D. Mer. 2, pp. 275 ff. Rabe). It was thought that by sinking the gifts in the ground they would immediately reach the dwelling-place of the spirit who lived there. The sacrificial chasm is itself the “chamber”, μέγαρον, in which the spirit lives (in the form of a snake) and dwells.

7 The term for these underground living spaces is megara. Lex. rhet. ap. Eust., Od., 1387, 17 f. Consequently, the sacrificial pits where people lowered offerings to the deities of the underworld are also called houses (Lob., Agl., 830; megara = gaps, Schol. Luc., D. Mer. 2, pp. 275 ff. Rabe). It was believed that by burying the gifts in the ground, they would immediately reach the inhabitant of that spirit realm. The sacrificial pit is itself the “chamber,” building, where the spirit resides (in the form of a snake) and lives.

8 κ 492 ff., ψυχῇ χρησομένους Θηβαίου Τειρεσίαο, μάντηος ἀλαοῦ τοῦ τε φρένες ἔμπεδοί εἰσιν· τῷ καὶ τεθνηῶτι νόον πόρε Περσεφόνεια, οἴῳ πεπνῦσθαι· τοὶ δὲ σκιαὶ ἀΐσσουσιν. His φρένες being undestroyed the most important and distinguishing feature of death is absent. His body, indeed, is destroyed and hence he is called τεθνηώς like all the other dwellers in Hades, though it is still difficult to see how the φρένες could remain without a body. It is highly probable that the idea of the continued existence of the consciousness of the famous seer renowned in Theban legend was derived by the poet from a popular tradition according to which Teiresias still gave proof of the clearness of his wits by the oracles which he sent up from below the earth. In Orchomenos there was a χρηστήριον Τειρεσίου, Plu., DO. 44, p. 434 C (as Nitzsch, Anm. Od. iii, p. 151. also reminds us). If we may argue from the context in which Plutarch speaks of him, this must have been an earth-oracle, i.e. an incubation-oracle. There stories like those told at Thebes of Amphiaraos may have been related of Teiresias and his survival after death. Some such information the poet of 105 the Nekyia may then have transformed and made use of for his own purposes. Str. 762 not without good ground connects these verses about Teiresias with the stories of Amphiaraos and Trophonios.

8 κ 492 ff., The soul of Theban Tiresias, the blind prophet, is firmly rooted; he even provided a thought to the dead, as if he had received insight from Persephone alone. The shadows whisper.. With his brakes intact, the key element that defines death is missing. His body is indeed gone, which is why he is referred to as dead, like all the other inhabitants of Hades, though it remains puzzling how the brakes could persist without a physical form. It's very likely that the concept of the famous seer’s continued awareness, celebrated in Theban lore, stemmed from a common belief that Teiresias continued to demonstrate his sharpness through the prophecies he provided from the underworld. In Orchomenos, there was a Tiresias oracle, Plu., DO. 44, p. 434 C (as Nitzsch, Anm. Od. iii, p. 151 also points out). From the way Plutarch discusses him, it seems this was an earth-oracle, or an incubation-oracle. Stories similar to those about Amphiaraos in Thebes may also have been told about Teiresias and his existence after death. The poet of 105 the Nekyia might have transformed and utilized some of this information for his own narrative. Str. 762 reasonably connects these verses about Teiresias with the tales of Amphiaraos and Trophonios.

9 The ancient site of the Oracle of Amphiaraos was near Thebes at the place (Knopia) where according to the epic story he sank into the earth. Paus. 9, 8, 3, Str. 404. Even at the time of the Persian war the envoy of Mardonios inquired of him there, near Thebes, as Hdt. viii, 134, unmistakably says. (That the oracle lay in Theban territory is shown also by the addition of the words, otherwise pointless, Θηβαίων οὐδενὶ ἔξεστι μαντεύεσθαι αὐτοθί. A similar rule is found at the temple of Herakles in Erythrai which may be approached by Thracian women but not by Erythræan women [Paus. 7, 5, 7–8]; and in the same way the Lampsakenoi were excluded from the funeral games of Miltiades on the Chersonnese: Hdt. vi, 38.) Oropos also claimed to harbour Amphiaraos under its soil; Sch. Pi., O. vi, 18, 21–3; differently in Paus. 1, 34, 2–4. But the oracle must have been moved there afterwards—hardly before the end of the fifth century (μεθιδρύθη, Str. 404); to suppose that it had always been confined to Oropos is contrary to all the traditional evidence.

9 The ancient site of the Oracle of Amphiaraos was located near Thebes at the spot (Knopia) where, according to the epic tale, he sank into the ground. Paus. 9, 8, 3, Str. 404. Even during the Persian war, Mardonios's envoy asked about him there, near Thebes, as Hdt. viii, 134, clearly states. (The fact that the oracle was in Theban territory is also indicated by the seemingly unnecessary addition of the phrase, No one from Thebes can prophecy here.. A similar rule existed at the temple of Herakles in Erythrai, which could be accessed by Thracian women but not by Erythræan women [Paus. 7, 5, 7–8]; likewise, the Lampsakenoi were excluded from the funeral games of Miltiades on the Chersonnese: Hdt. vi, 38.) Oropos also claimed to have Amphiaraos buried beneath its soil; Sch. Pi., O. vi, 18, 21–3; differently noted in Paus. 1, 34, 2–4. However, the oracle must have been moved there later—hardly before the end of the fifth century (μεθιδρύθη, Str. 404); to believe that it had always been limited to Oropos contradicts all traditional accounts.

10 Those who wished to inquire of his oracle offered by night to Trophonios, before going down into the cave, a ram, sacrificing it in a pit (βόθρος): Paus. 9, 39, 6; to Amphiaraos, after a considerable fast (Philos., VA., 2, 37, pp. 79, 19 ff. K.) and the provision of a καθάρσιον, the inquirer offered a ram upon the fleece of which he lay down to sleep (Paus. 1, 34, 5).—Cleanthem cum pede terram percussisset versum ex Epigonis (prob. of Soph.) ferunt dixisse: audisne haec, Amphiaraë, sub terram abdite? Cic., TD. ii, 60. The gesture also must have been borrowed from the same scene in the Ἐπίγονοι. It was thus customary to knock on the ground in calling upon A., as in the case of other καταχθόνιοι (Ἀμφιάραε χθόνιε occurs as late as P. Mag. Par. 1446 f. W .): I 568; cf. Paus. 8, 15, 3. Cf. also Nägelsb., Nachh. Theol., 102, 214. Skedasos in Sparta γῆν τύπτων ἀνεκαλεῖτο τὰς Ἐρινύας, Plu., AN. 3, p. 774 B. In his grief for the loss of his daughter Herodes Atticus threw himself on the ground τὴν γῆν παίων καὶ βοῶν· τί σοι, θύγατερ, καθαγίσω; τί σοι ξυνθάψω; Philostr., VS. 2, 1, 10. Pythagoras ὅταν βροντήσῃ τῆς γῆς ἅψασθαι παρήγγειλεν, Iamb., VP. 156.

10 Those who wanted to consult his oracle would offer a ram to Trophonios at night, sacrificing it in a pit (βόθρος): Paus. 9, 39, 6; to Amphiaraos, after fasting for a significant period (Philos., VA., 2, 37, pp. 79, 19 ff. K.) and providing a cleansing, the person seeking answers would lay down on the fleece of a ram to sleep (Paus. 1, 34, 5).—Cleanthem, when he struck the ground with his foot, turned to the verse from the Epigonis. (probably from Soph.) It is said to have stated: do you hear this, Amphiaraë, buried underground? Cic., TD. ii, 60. This gesture was likely taken from the same scene in the Descendants. It was common to knock on the ground when calling upon A., as with other underworld dwellers (Amphiarus, earthbound one appears as late as P. Mag. Par. 1446 f. W.): I 568; cf. Paus. 8, 15, 3. See also Nägelsb., Nachh. Theol., 102, 214. Skedasos in Sparta Striking the ground, he summoned the Furies., Plu., AN. 3, p. 774 B. In his sorrow for the loss of his daughter, Herodes Atticus threw himself on the ground Striking the ground and calling out, what can I do for you, daughter? What should I bury with you? Philostr., VS. 2, 1, 10. Pythagoras When thunder strikes, it has been commanded to touch the earth., Iamb., VP. 156.

11 That the dream-oracle of Trophonios had a much older influence is implied by the story of the inquiry made of it by the Βοιωτοὶ ἁλόντες ὑπὸ Θρᾳκῶν in Phot. (Suid.) λύσιοι τελεταί.

11 The dream oracle of Trophonios had a much older influence, as suggested by the story of the inquiry made to it by the Boeotians captured by Thracians in Phot. (Suid.) λύσιοι τελεταί.

12 Trophonios himself was supposed to appear in the cave at Lebadeia. The inquirer goes down to it δεόμενος συγγενέσθαι τῷ δαιμονίῳ (Max. Tyr. 14, 2, p. 249 R.); indications were sought from sacrifice εἰ δὴ τὸν κατιόντα εὐμενὴς καὶ ἵλεως δέξεται (Trophonios), Paus. 9, 36, 6. Saon, the discoverer of the oracle and founder of the cult, had after entering the μαντεῖον met Trophonios himself in person, τὴν ἱερουργίαν . . . διδαχθῆναι παρὰ τοῦ Τροφωνίου φασί (Paus. 9, 40, 2). He dwells and is visible in the oracular cavern: Orig., Cels. iii, 34, pp. 293–4 L.; vii, 35, p. 53; Aristid. i, p. 78 D. [38, 21 Keil]. Even the stupidly rationalising account of Troph. in Schol. Ar., Nub. 508, p. 190 Ruth., Sch. Luc., DM. iii, Cosm. ad Greg. Naz. p. 184 [Clarke, p. 52] (Eudoc., Viol., p. 682, 8)—implies the bodily presence of an ἐγκατοικῆσαν δαιμόνιον in the cave of Trophonios. Lucian, too, shows that this was the popular impression (DM. iii, 2) by his curious satiric fiction that whereas Troph. himself was in Hades (to which acc. to Necyom. 22 the cave of Trophonios was only an 106 entrance) τὸ θεῖον ἡμίτομον of Trophonios χρᾷ ἐν Βοιωτίᾳ. Thus the visitor expected to meet Trophonios there in his divine shape, as Ampelius puts it in a similar case with great simplicity and directness, 8, 3: ibi (Argis in Epiro) Iovis templum hyphonis (irretrievably corrupt: Trophonii absurdly Duker; Typhonis, Tychonis others not much better) unde est ad inferos descensus ad tollendas sortes: in quo loco dicuntur ii qui descenderunt Iovem ipsum videre. Otherwise, Tr. was said to inhabit the cave in the shape of a snake as is so frequently the case with earth-deities. Not only are snakes sacred to him as to Asklepios (Paus. 9, 39, 3) and live in his cave (to propitiate them people take honey-cakes down with them) but he himself is present in the form of a snake: ὄφις ἦν ὁ μαντευόμενος, Schol. Ar., Nub. 508: cf. Suidas Τροφώνιος. It was this personal contact between the god and the inquirer which specially distinguished the oracle of Tr. μόνον ἐκεῖνο (τὸ μαντεῖον) δι’ αὐτοῦ χρᾷ τοῦ χρωμένου. Philostr., VA. 8, 19, p. 335, 30 K. Of course, many only heard without seeing: τις καὶ εἶδεν καὶ ἄλλος ἤκουσεν, Paus. 9, 39, 11. But it was the god they heard.

12 Trophonios was believed to show up in the cave at Lebadeia. The seeker descends into it δεόμενος συγγενέσθαι τῷ δαιμονίῳ (Max. Tyr. 14, 2, p. 249 R.); signs were looked for from sacrifices If indeed a benevolent and gracious one will welcome the approaching. (Trophonios), Paus. 9, 36, 6. Saon, who discovered the oracle and founded the cult, claimed that after entering the oracle he met Trophonios in person, They say that the priesthood was taught by Trophonius. (Paus. 9, 40, 2). He resides and can be seen in the oracular cave: Orig., Cels. iii, 34, pp. 293–4 L.; vii, 35, p. 53; Aristid. i, p. 78 D. [38, 21 Keil]. Even the overly rationalized version of Troph. in Schol. Ar., Nub. 508, p. 190 Ruth., Sch. Luc., DM. iii, Cosm. ad Greg. Naz. p. 184 [Clarke, p. 52] (Eudoc., Viol., p. 682, 8)—suggests the physical presence of an They inhabited a demon. in the cave of Trophonios. Lucian also indicates that this was a common belief (DM. iii, 2) in his satirical fiction, where he claimed that while Troph. himself was in Hades (which, according to Necyom. 22, the cave of Trophonios was just an 106 entrance) the divine half of Trophonios Use it in Boeotia. Thus, visitors expected to meet Trophonios there in a divine form, as Ampelius expresses it simply and directly, 8, 3: Here, in Argis, Epiro, is the temple of Jupiter on the river Hypon. (irretrievably corrupt: Trophonii absurdly Duker; Typhonis, Tychonis others not much better) Where is the descent to the underworld to retrieve souls: in this place, it is said that those who descended saw Jupiter himself. Alternatively, Trophonios was said to reside in the cave in the form of a snake, as is often the case with earth deities. Not only are snakes sacred to him like they are to Asklepios (Paus. 9, 39, 3) and live in his cave (to please them, people bring honey cakes with them), but he himself is also present in the form of a snake: The serpent was the oracle., Schol. Ar., Nub. 508: cf. Suidas Trophonius. It was this direct contact between the god and the seeker that especially set apart the oracle of Trophonios only that(the oracle)through him who is using. Philostr., VA. 8, 19, p. 335, 30 K. Of course, many only heard without seeing: Someone saw it, and another person heard it., Paus. 9, 39, 11. But it was the god they heard.

13 Speaking of Zalmoxis among the Getae (cf. Str. 297 f.; 762; Hdt. iv, 95–6. EM. Ζάλμ.), Mopsos in Cilicia, Amphilochos in Akarnania, Amphiaraos and Trophonios—in fact, all of them daimones who had oracles of Incubation—Or. (Cels. iii, 34, p. 293–4 L.) says: they have temples and ἀγάλματα as δαιμονίοις οὐκ οἶδ’ ὅπως ἱδρυμένοις ἔν τινι τόπῳ, ὃν . . . οἰκοῦσιν. They dwell within this ἕνα κεκληρωμένον τόπον, vii, 35 (pp. 53–4 L.), cf. iii, 35 fin. In that place and only there are such daimones visible. Cels. vii, 35 (p. 53 L.), of the temples of Amph., Troph., Mops.: ἔνθα φησὶν ἀνθρωποειδεῖς θεωρεῖσθαι θεοὺς καὶ οὐ ψευδομένους ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐναργεῖς. . . . ὄψεταί τις αὐτοὺς οὐχ ἅπαξ παραρρυέντας . . . ἀλλ’ ἄει τοῖς βουλομένοις ὁμιλοῦντας (and so ever present there). Aristid. i, p. 78 Di. [38, 21 K.], Ἀμφιάραος καὶ Τροφώνιος ἐν Βοιωτίᾳ καὶ Ἀμφίλοχος ἐν Αἰτωλίᾳ χρησμῳδοῦσι καὶ φαίνονται. On the extension beyond its original home of the cult of such an Incubation-deity localization in a single spot was of course relaxed. It was either disputed where his permanent habitation really was (as in the case of Amph.), or else the god gradually ceased to be bound to any one place, though still bound to certain places in the sense that he could appear only there, and not anywhere he chose. Such is the case with Asklepios and with various other daimones equally bound originally to a single spot, who then ἐπιφαίνονται, ἐπιφοιτῶσιν, in certain other temples as well (cf. for example, the account of the ἐπιφάνειαι of Machaon and Podaleirios in Adrotta given by Marin., V. Procli, 32; cf. Suid. Εὐστέφιος, from Damascius, V. Isid.). But when inquiries are made of a god by Incubation the god must always appear in person; if he is absent no oracle can be given. See the story of Amphiaraos in Plu., DO. 5, p. 412 A. In the records of miracles of healing found in Epidauros the god himself regularly comes to the sleeper in the ἄδυτον (or else in the form of a snake Ἐφ. Ἀρχ. ’83, p. 215 f., ll. 113–19), sometimes accompanied by his ὑπήρεται (the Asklepiadai), cf. Ἐφ. Ἀρχ. ’85, p. 17 ff. ll. 38 ff., 111 f. In the old miracle of Aristagora of Troezen (Ἐφ. Ἀρχ. ’85, p. 15, l. 10 ff.) reported already by Hippys of Rhegion (which there is no reason to doubt) at first only “the sons of the god” appeared to the sick woman οὐκ ἐπιδαμοῦντος αὐτοῦ ἀλλ’ ἐν Ἐπιδαύρῳ ἐόντος. Only in the following night did Asklepios himself appear to her ἱκὼν ἐξ Ἐπιδαύρου. Everywhere it is implied that dream-healing can only take place through personal action of the god (cf. Ar., Plut.); 107 later by the advice, at least, of the god, personally appearing to the patient (see Zacher, Hermes, xxi, 472 f.); and this presumption is explained by the fact that originally Incubation could only take place at the actual spot where the god (or Hero) had his permanent abode.

13 When talking about Zalmoxis among the Getae (cf. Str. 297 f.; 762; Hdt. iv, 95–6. EM. Zalm.), Mopsos in Cilicia, Amphilochos in Akarnania, Amphiaraos and Trophonios—basically, all of them daimones who had oracles of Incubation—Or. (Cels. iii, 34, p. 293–4 L.) mentions: they have temples and statues as I have no idea how the spirits, settled in a certain place, which... they inhabit.. They reside in this a selected place, vii, 35 (pp. 53–4 L.), cf. iii, 35 fin. In that place and only there are such daimones visible. Cels. vii, 35 (p. 53 L.), discusses the temples of Amph., Troph., Mops.: Here, it is said that god-like beings can be seen and they are not deceiving but rather clear... someone will not see them just once flowing by... but they are always interacting with those who wish to engage. (and so they are always there). Aristid. i, p. 78 Di. [38, 21 K.], Amphiaraus and Trophonius in Boeotia, and Amphilochus in Aetolia, are known for delivering oracles.. About the spread of the worship of such Incubation-deities beyond their original location, it was generally flexible regarding a single spot. It was either debated where his permanent residence really was (like in the case of Amph.), or the deity gradually stopped being tied to just one location, but still remained linked to specific places where they could appear, instead of being free to show up anywhere. This is true for Asklepios and other daimones who were originally associated with just one spot, but then They appear, they hover in various other temples as well (cf. for example, the accounts of the epiphanies of Machaon and Podaleirios in Adrotta noted by Marin., V. Procli, 32; cf. Suid. Eustheneus, from Damascius, V. Isid.). However, when someone asks a god through Incubation, the god must always show up in person; if he doesn’t appear, no oracle can be delivered. Check out the story of Amphiaraos in Plu., DO. 5, p. 412 A. In the records of miraculous healings in Epidauros, the god consistently comes to the sleeper in the sanctuary (or sometimes as a snake Ἐφ. Ἀρχ. ’83, p. 215 f., ll. 113–19), occasionally accompanied by his Assists (the Asklepiadai), cf. Ἐφ. Ἀρχ. ’85, p. 17 ff. ll. 38 ff., 111 f. In the old miracle of Aristagora of Troezen (Eph. Arch. ’85, p. 15, l. 10 ff.) first reported by Hippys of Rhegion (which is credible), only “the sons of the god” appeared to the sick woman not being in Epidamnos but being in Epidaurus. It was only the next night that Asklepios himself came to her Icon from Epidaurus. It’s implied everywhere that dream-based healing can only happen through the direct action of the god (cf. Ar., Plut.); 107 later, at least by the guidance of the god, appearing personally to the patient (see Zacher, Hermes, xxi, 472 f.); and this assumption is supported by the fact that originally, Incubation could only happen at the specific location where the god (or Hero) had his permanent home.

14 The ὑποφῆται of the Dodonian Zeus the Σελλοί, ἀνιπτόποδες χαμαιεῦναι, Π 234 f., were explained by some already in antiquity as priests of an Incubation oracle (Eust., Il., p. 1057, 64 ff.), Welcker agreeing with them, Kl. Schr. iii, 90 f. This view is founded solely on the adj. χαμαιεῦναι, which is not, however, to be separated from ἀνιπτόποδες. But since ἀνιπτόποδες can have no connexion with Incubation neither then can χαμαιεῦναι. Both epithets refer obviously to the special severity and simplicity of the life of the Σελλοί, the (ritual) reason for which it is true we do not know and have no means of guessing.

14 The subordinates of the Dodonian Zeus the Σελλοί, ανυπότακτοι χαμαιεύνοι, Π 234 f., were already explained by some in ancient times as priests of an Incubation oracle (Eust., Il., p. 1057, 64 ff.), with Welcker agreeing with them, Kl. Schr. iii, 90 f. This perspective is based solely on the adjective χαμαιεῦναι, which, however, should not be separated from Unwashed feet. But since Unwashed feet has no connection with Incubation, neither does χαμαιεῦναι. Both titles clearly relate to the unique severity and simplicity of the life of the Σελλοί, the (ritual) reason for which we unfortunately do not know and have no way of guessing.

15 It remains indeed impossible to determine what moved the epic to recognize in the Boeotian cave-daimon the Argive seer Amphiaraos (even during his life-time an adept in the incubation-mantic art acc. to Paus. 2, 13, 7; cf. Did. in Gp. 2, 35, 8, p. 73, 14 ff. Beckh), or why the heroized god Amphiaraos was turned into an Argive and made a member of the prophetic family of Melampous otherwise the foes of the Boeotian seers; or, finally, why he was brought to Boeotia as an enemy and then made to dwell for ever in that hostile and alien land.

15 It's still impossible to figure out why the epic recognized the Boeotian cave spirit as the Argive seer Amphiaraos (who, even when he was alive, was skilled in the incubation-mantic art according to Paus. 2, 13, 7; cf. Did. in Gp. 2, 35, 8, p. 73, 14 ff. Beckh), or why the deified hero Amphiaraos became an Argive and was joined to the prophetic family of Melampous, who were otherwise enemies of the Boeotian seers; or, ultimately, why he was brought to Boeotia as an adversary and then made to live forever in that unfriendly and foreign land.

16 Henry the Fowler in Sudemerberg: Kuhn and Schwartz, Nordd. Sag., p. 185. The other examples in Grimm, ch. xxxii.—G. Voigt in Sybel’s hist. Zeits. xxvi (1871), pp. 131–87, shows in his most lucid account that it was not originally Frederick Barbarossa but Frederick II whom the legend represented as not dead but “lost” and to whom the expectation referred that he would come again some day. From the fifteenth century the story begins to appear that he was dwelling in Kyffhäuser (or in a cave in the rocks near Kaiserslautern); the name of Barbarossa does not appear till the sixteenth century, and then gradually predominates. But how it came about that from a definite moment onwards the translated emperor was thought of as living on in a hollow mountain is by no means clear from the written documents alone or from the critical study of the evolution of the legend. Suddenly and without intermediate steps the story assumes this shape, and it can hardly be accounted for except on the view that it arose from the combination of the Frederick legend with already existing Saga-stories of translated Heroes or gods (as Voigt also suggests, p. 160).

16 Henry the Fowler in Sudemerberg: Kuhn and Schwartz, Nordd. Sag., p. 185. The other examples in Grimm, ch. xxxii.—G. Voigt in Sybel’s hist. Zeits. xxvi (1871), pp. 131–87, clearly shows that it was not originally Frederick Barbarossa but Frederick II who the legend depicted as not dead but “lost,” and to whom the hope referred that he would return one day. From the fifteenth century, the story starts to emerge that he was living in Kyffhäuser (or in a cave near Kaiserslautern); the name Barbarossa doesn’t show up until the sixteenth century, and then it gradually takes over. But how it came to be that from a specific point onward, the translated emperor was imagined to be living in a hollow mountain is not clear from the written records alone or from the critical analysis of the legend's evolution. Suddenly and without any steps in between, the story takes this form, and it can hardly be explained except by the idea that it emerged from the merging of the Frederick legend with existing Saga stories of translated heroes or gods (as Voigt also suggests, p. 160).

17 Grimm, pp. 959–61. Simrock, D. Myth.3, p. 144.—How easily similar legends can appear spontaneously among different peoples without interconnexion appears from the fact that translation legends are also found not only in Greece but in distant Mexico; see Müller, Gesch. am. Urrel. 582. Holy men who have “vanished” and are not dead but live on in the depths of mountain caves, and are expected one day to reappear on earth, occur in the legends of Mohammedan peoples of the East: A. v. Kremer, Culturg. Streifz. Geb. Islam, 50; Gesch. Ideen Islam, 375 f., 378.

17 Grimm, pp. 959–61. Simrock, D. Myth.3, p. 144.—It's interesting how similar legends can emerge independently among different cultures without any connections. For example, translation legends exist not just in Greece but also in far-off Mexico; see Müller, Gesch. am. Urrel. 582. Holy figures who have "disappeared" and are not actually dead, but instead live deep within mountain caves, are expected to return to the world one day, and these stories can be found in the legends of Islamic peoples in the East: A. v. Kremer, Culturg. Streifz. Geb. Islam, 50; Gesch. Ideen Islam, 375 f., 378.

18 Διὶ Τρεφωνίοι Insc. from Lebadeia, Meister, Böot. Insc. 423 (GDI. i, p. 163); otherwise only Τρεφωνίοι (n. 407, 414, καταβὰς ἐν Τρεφώνιον BCH. 1890, p. 21), Τροφωνίῳ (n. 413); and side by side occur τῦ Δὶ τῦ Βασιλεῖι κὴ τῦ Τρεφωνίυ, etc. (n. 425, 429, 430). Διονύσω εὐσταφύλω κατὰ χρησμὸν Διὸς Τροφωνίου Insc. from Labadeia in Stephani Reise d. Geg. nörd. Griechen, No. 47. Ins. from Leb. IGSept. i, 3077 (1st–2nd cent. A.D.)—Str. 414: Λεβάδεια ὅπου Διὸς Τροφωνίου μαντεῖον ἵδρυται. 108 Liv. 45, 27, 8, Labadiae templum Iovis Trophonii adiit. Obs. 50 (= 110) Lebadiae Eutychides in templum Iovis Trophonii degressus—. Διὸς μαντεῖον is the name given to the oracle of Tr. in Phot. also and Hesych. Λεβάδεια.

18 Διὶ Τρεφωνίοι Inscription from Lebadeia, Meister, Böot. Insc. 423 (GDI. i, p. 163); otherwise only Trefonius (n. 407, 414, Descended into Trophonius BCH. 1890, p. 21), Τροφωνίῳ (n. 413); and side by side occur To Zeus, to the King, and to the Trophonium., etc. (n. 425, 429, 430). Διονύσω εὐσταφύλω according to the oracle of Zeus Trophonius. Inscription from Labadeia in Stephani Reise d. Geg. nörd. Griechen, No. 47. Inscription from Leb. IGSept. i, 3077 (1st–2nd cent. A.D.)—Str. 414: Levadeia, where the oracle of Trophonius, dedicated to Zeus, is located.. 108 Liv. 45, 27, 8, He visited the temple of Jupiter Trophonius. Obs. 50 (= 110) Lebadiae Eutychides went down to the temple of Jupiter Trophonius—. Oracle of Zeus is the name given to the oracle of Tr. in Phot. also and Hesych. Λιβαδειά.

19 Διὸς Ἀμφιαράου ἱερόν (at Oropos): [Dicaearch.] Descr. Gr. i, § 6 (i, 100 Mü.). Even Hyperides in the speech for Euxenippos refers throughout to Amph. at Oropos as a god. Amph. in Or. ὁ θεός (1st–2nd cent. B.C.): IGS. i, 3498; 412; CIG. 1570a, 25, 30, 52. Liv. 45, 27, 10 (in Oropos) pro deo vates antiquus colitur. Cic. Div. i, 88: Amphiaraum sic honoravit fama Græciæ, deus ut haberetur. Plutarch also, speaking of the embassy sent by Mardonios to the ancient Theban oracle, calls Amph. θεός: DO. 5, p. 412 A. Acc. to Paus. 1, 34, 2, however, Amph. was first honoured as a god in Oropos.

19 Temple of Amphiaraus (at Oropos): [Dicaearch.] Descr. Gr. i, § 6 (i, 100 Mü.). Even Hyperides, in his speech for Euxenippos, refers to Amph. at Oropos as a god. Amph. in Or. the god (1st–2nd cent. BCE): IGS. i, 3498; 412; CIG. 1570a, 25, 30, 52. Liv. 45, 27, 10 (in Oropos) Pro bono, the ancient bard is honored. Cic. Div. i, 88: Amphiaraus was honored by the reputation of Greece, so that he would be regarded as a god. Plutarch also, while discussing the embassy sent by Mardonios to the ancient Theban oracle, refers to Amph. as god: DO. 5, p. 412 A. According to Paus. 1, 34, 2, however, Amph. was first honored as a god in Oropos.

20 Origen is expressing it in his own way, but he is quite right in principle when he distinguishes the local gods remaining in the countryside from the gods of Olympos, Cels. iii, 35 fin.: μοχθηρῶν δαιμόνων καὶ τόπους ἐπὶ γῆς προκατειληφότων, ἐπεὶ τῆς καθαρωτέρας οὐ δύνανται ἐφάψασθαι χώρας καὶ θειοτέρας. He says of Asklepios, 5, 2 (p. 169 L.), θεὸς μὲν ἂν εἴη ἀεὶ δὲ λαχὼν οἰκεῖν τὴν γῆν καὶ ὡσπερεὶ φυγὰς τοῦ τόπου τῶν θεῶν.

20 Origen is putting it in his own way, but he is fundamentally correct when he separates the local gods that stay in the countryside from the gods of Olympus, Cels. iii, 35 fin.: the evil demons and the parts of the earth they've taken over, since they can't reach the purer and more divine areas. He refers to Asklepios, 5, 2 (p. 169 L.), He might be a god, but he always lives on earth, as if escaping from the realm of the gods..

21 Διὸς μεγάλου ὀαριστής. The word implies quite as much familiar conversation as well as general intimacy with Zeus. The obscure ἐννέωρος need not be considered here. In any case it is to be taken closely with βασίλευε, next to which it stands, and not with Διὸς μ. ὀαριστής (as many even ancient writers have done).

21 Zeus' great companion. The term suggests both casual conversation and a close relationship with Zeus. The unclear ἐννέωρος doesn’t need to be discussed here. In any case, it should be closely linked with rule, right next to it, and not with Zeus' messenger (as many even ancient writers have done).

22 Intercourse of Minos with Zeus in the cave: [Pl.] Min. 319 E. (whence Str. 762), Ephorus ap. Str. 476; (from Eph. also Nic. Dam. ap. Stob. Fl. iv, 2, 25, p. 161 H.). V.M. i, 2, ext. 1. Here the position of the cave is as a rule not precisely stated. But the Idaian cave is generally meant and Max. Tyr. definitely refers to this one as the place where Minos met Zeus, 38, 2 (p. 221 R.).

22 The relationship between Minos and Zeus in the cave: [Pl.] Min. 319 E. (from which Str. 762), Ephorus cited by Str. 476; (from Eph. also Nic. Dam. cited by Stob. Fl. iv, 2, 25, p. 161 H.). V.M. i, 2, ext. 1. Here, the exact location of the cave is typically not specified. However, it usually refers to the Idaian cave, and Max. Tyr. explicitly mentions this location as the site where Minos encountered Zeus, 38, 2 (p. 221 R.).

23 Birth of Zeus in the cave: Αἰγαίῳ ἐν ὄρει Hes., Th. 481 ff. Thence his mother bore him ἐς Λύκτον 482 (cf. 477), which would be near Ida:—ἐς Δίκτην Schömann. And, at any rate, the cave on Mt. Dicte was the generally reputed place of Zeus’ birth: [Apoll.] 1, 1, 6. D.S. 5, 70, 6; Mela 2, 113; D.H. 2, 61 (who also makes Minos visit Zeus there). At Praisos τὸ τοῦ Δικταίου Διὸς ἱερόν: Str. 475–8. Others, indeed, mention Ida as the place of the birth of Zeus: D.S. 5, 70, 2, 4; A.R. iii, 134. Both the holy caves are thus continually rivals; but it appears that the legend of the birth of Zeus was principally localized at the Diktaian cave, that of his intercourse with Minos chiefly at the Idaian; cf. now also M. Mayer, Myth. Lex. s. Kronos, ii, 1533 ff.

23 Birth of Zeus in the cave: Aegean in the mountains Hes., Th. 481 ff. From there, his mother gave birth to him to Lyctos 482 (see 477), which would be near Ida:—to Dike Schömann. And, in any case, the cave on Mt. Dicte is widely recognized as the birthplace of Zeus: [Apoll.] 1, 1, 6. D.S. 5, 70, 6; Mela 2, 113; D.H. 2, 61 (who also mentions Minos visiting Zeus there). At Praisos, the sanctuary of Diktean Zeus: Str. 475–8. Others indeed point to Ida as the birthplace of Zeus: D.S. 5, 70, 2, 4; A.R. iii, 134. Both sacred caves are thus constantly in competition; however, it seems that the story of Zeus’ birth was mainly centered at the Diktaian cave, while his interactions with Minos were primarily tied to the Idaian cave; see also M. Mayer, Myth. Lex. s. Kronos, ii, 1533 ff.

24 Max. Tyr. 16, 1 (cf. 38, 3; prob. from Max. only, Theod. Met. Misc. c. 90, p. 580 Mü.). Cf. Rh. Mus. 35, 161 f. Max. speaks of the cave of Diktaian Zeus, perhaps only inexactly and by oversight. It would be to Ida rather and its cave which rose above Knossos, the home of Epimenides, that the legend would make him go on pilgrimage. So, too, D.L. viii, 1, 3, of Pythagoras, ἐν Κρήτῃ σὺν Ἐπιμενίδῃ κατῆλθεν εἰς τὸ Ἰδαῖον ἄντρον. Pyth. in the Idaian cave, Porph., VP. 17.

24 Max. Tyr. 16, 1 (see 38, 3; probably from Max. only, Theod. Met. Misc. c. 90, p. 580 Mü.). See Rh. Mus. 35, 161 f. Max. mentions the cave of Diktaian Zeus, perhaps inaccurately and by mistake. The legend would more likely refer to Ida and its cave that rises above Knossos, the home of Epimenides, where the legend states he went on a pilgrimage. Similarly, D.L. viii, 1, 3, about Pythagoras, In Crete, he descended into the Idaean cave with Epimenides.. Pyth. in the Idaian cave, Porph., VP. 17.

25 Schol. Plat., Leg. i, introd. (p. 372 Herm.) and Leg. 625 B, see Lob., Agl. 1121. (Διὸς Ἰδαίου μύστης, Eur., Cret. fr. 472, 10 N.) Recently the Idaian cave of Zeus has been rediscovered high up in the mountains, a day’s journey from Knossos (Fabricius, Ath. Mitth., vol. x, 59 ff.). Remains of votive offerings of antiquity have been 109 found, but only before the entrance to the cave ἐν τῷ στομίῳ τοῦ ἄντρου (where Thphr. had already remarked the like, HP. 3, 3, 4); inside the cave, which, like a vaulted tomb, consisted of two chambers, only traces of the cult from Roman times were found. It seems from this that the sacrificial ritual of the previous period did not reach further than the entrance of the cave (as was the case also at the temple of Troph. at Lebadeia); while the interior of the cave as the seat of the god himself was only entered by Mystai and priests (the birth-chamber was not to be approached at all: Boios, ap. Ant. Lib. 19).

25 Schol. Plat., Leg. i, introd. (p. 372 Herm.) and Leg. 625 B, see Lob., Agl. 1121. (Idaeus of Zeus, initiate, Eur., Cret. fr. 472, 10 N.) Recently, the Idaian cave of Zeus was rediscovered high in the mountains, a day's journey from Knossos (Fabricius, Ath. Mitth., vol. x, 59 ff.). Remains of ancient votive offerings have been 109 found, but only at the entrance of the cave in the mouth of the cave (where Thphr. had already noted the same, HP. 3, 3, 4); inside the cave, which resembled a vaulted tomb and consisted of two chambers, only traces of the cult from Roman times were discovered. This suggests that the sacrificial rituals from the earlier period did not extend beyond the entrance of the cave (as was also the case at the temple of Troph. at Lebadeia); while the inner part of the cave, considered the dwelling of the god himself, was only accessible to Mystai and priests (the birth-chamber was completely off-limits: Boios, ap. Ant. Lib. 19).

26 Porph., VP. 17, p. 25 N.: εἰς δὲ τὸ Ἰδαῖον καλούμενον ἄντρον καταβὰς ἔρια ἔχων μέλανα τὰς νομιζομένας τρὶς ἐννέα (cf. Nauck on S., OC. 483) ἡμέρας ἐκεῖ διέτριψεν καὶ καθήγισεν τῷ Διί, τόν τε στορνύμενον αὐτῷ κατ’ ἔτος θρόνον ἐθεάσατο. The historical truth of the story of Pyth.’s visit to the cave need not be discussed here, but we may assume the credibility of the details given of the cult of Zeus in the cave and the customary ceremonial of pilgrimage to it. (The story comes from relatively good sources, Gr. Roman, p. 254.)—The long time spent in the cave (i.e. in the wide and lofty outer chamber) has its companion picture in what Str. 649 says of Χαρώνιον at Acharaka, Plu., Gen. Soc. 21, 590 B., of the cave of Trophonios. It was necessary also to spend several days in the οἴκημα Δαίμονος ἀγαθοῦ καὶ Τύχης in preparation for the descent into the cave: Paus. 9, 39, 5. The (to Zeus) στορνύμενος κατ’ ἔτος θρόνος has nothing to do with the Korybantic θρονισμός (see Hiller, Hermes, 21, 365). What is meant is in any case a lectisternium: thus in Athens it was usual to κλίνην στρῶσαι τῷ Πλούτωνι, CIA. ii, 948–50; to Asklepios (CIA. ii, 453b 11): to Attis, CIA. ii, 622; (in Cos at the ξενισμός of Herakles, Ins. Cos 36b, 22), etc. The θρόνος (στρωνύειν θρόνους δύο for a goddess CIA. ii, 624, 9, 10) appearing instead of a κλίνη is possibly in accordance with ancient ritual. Thus in the so-called feasts of the dead in ancient times the Hero is represented on a throne while later he reclines on the κλίνη. Thus in Rome besides lectisternia we sometimes have sellisternia especially for female deities: Comm. Lud. Saec., l. 71; 101; 138 [Dessau, ii, 1, p. 282; CIL. vi, 32] and elsewhere.

26 Porph., VP. 17, p. 25 N.: Once he went down into the cave called the Idaean cave, carrying a black fleece that was three times nine. (cf. Nauck on S., OC. 483) He spent several days there and led rituals for Zeus, and he saw the throne that was prepared for him each year.. The historical truth of Pyth.’s visit to the cave doesn’t need to be analyzed here, but we can accept the authenticity of the details about the worship of Zeus in the cave and the usual rituals of pilgrimage to it. (The story comes from fairly reliable sources, Gr. Roman, p. 254.)—The lengthy time spent in the cave (meaning in the large and high outer chamber) parallels what Str. 649 states about Charônion at Acharaka, Plu., Gen. Soc. 21, 590 B., regarding the cave of Trophonios. It was also necessary to spend several days in the house of the good Daemon and Fortune in preparation for entering the cave: Paus. 9, 39, 5. The (for Zeus) yearly prepared throne does not relate to the Korybantic thronism (see Hiller, Hermes, 21, 365). In any case, it refers to a lectisternium: thus in Athens it was customary to set up a couch for Pluto, CIA. ii, 948–50; for Asclepius (CIA. ii, 453b 11): for Attis, CIA. ii, 622; (in Cos at the front desk of Herakles, Ins. Cos 36b, 22), etc. The seat of power (setting up two thrones for a goddess CIA. ii, 624, 9, 10) appearing instead of a sofa is possibly in line with ancient rituals. Thus, in the so-called feasts of the dead in ancient times, the Hero is depicted on a throne while later he reclines on the sofa. Therefore, in Rome, alongside lectisternia, we sometimes have sellisternia specifically for female deities: Comm. Lud. Saec., l. 71; 101; 138 [Dessau, ii, 1, p. 282; CIL. vi, 32] and elsewhere.

27 Acc. to Ennius, Euh. 73 Vahl. (ap. Lactant. i, 11, and ap. Min. Fel. xxi, 1) Euhemeros spoke of the grave of Zeus. Call., h. Jov. 8–9, clearly attacks the fable of Zeus’ grave in Crete. It seems to me very probable that Euh. had taken up the story as one that evidently suited his cheap pragmatical interpretation of myths and had introduced it into literature. It would be Euh. then whom Call., loc. cit., was attacking as he did elsewhere the γέρων ἀλαζών and his ἄδικα βιβλία (fr. 86).

27 According to Ennius, Euh. 73 Vahl. (in Lactantius i, 11, and in Min. Fel. xxi, 1) Euhemeros mentioned the grave of Zeus. Callimachus, h. Jov. 8–9, clearly criticizes the story of Zeus’ grave in Crete. It seems very likely to me that Euh. adopted the tale because it fit his simplistic, practical approach to interpreting myths and introduced it into literature. It would be Euh. whom Callimachus was critiquing in that context, just as he did elsewhere with the old fraud and his unjust books (fr. 86).

28 The grave of Zeus in Crete is spoken of without exact specification of the place by Call., loc. cit., Cic., ND. iii, 53; D.S. 3, 61, 2; Mela ii, 112; Luc., Tim. 6, J. Tr. 45, Sacr. 10, D. Conc. 6; Min. xxi, 8; Firm., Err. Prof. Rel. vii, 6. Euhemeros ap. Min. xxi, 1, speaks of the Dictæi Iovis sepulcrum obviously inexactly, for acc. to Lact. i, 11, he made the grave in oppido Cnosso far from Mt. Dicte. Even there he means not “in” but “near” Knossos, i.e. on Mt. Ida. For the fact that it was on Mt. Ida we have the testimony of Varro de litoralibus ap. Solin. 11, p. 81, 12–15 Momms. Finally, the situation of the grave within the Idaian cave is clear from Porph., VP. 17, p. 25 N.

28 The grave of Zeus in Crete is mentioned without specific details by Call., loc. cit., Cic., ND. iii, 53; D.S. 3, 61, 2; Mela ii, 112; Luc., Tim. 6, J. Tr. 45, Sacr. 10, D. Conc. 6; Min. xxi, 8; Firm., Err. Prof. Rel. vii, 6. Euhemeros, as quoted by Min. xxi, 1, refers to the Dictæi Iovis sepulcrum in a way that seems inaccurate, because according to Lact. i, 11, he placed the grave in the town of Knossos, which is far from Mt. Dicte. Even there, he means not “in” but “near” Knossos, specifically on Mt. Ida. The testimony that it was on Mt. Ida comes from Varro de litoralibus as referenced by Solin. 11, p. 81, 12–15 Momms. Finally, the grave’s location within the Idaian cave is clarified by Porph., VP. 17, p. 25 N.

29 Hence the story of the grave of Zeus (when not denied outright as by Call.) was allegorized; Celsus hinted at τροπικὰς ὑπονοίας: Or., Cels. iii, 43, p. 307 L.; cf. Philostr., VS. p. 76, 15 ff. K. 110

29 So the story of Zeus's grave (when not flat-out denied like Callimachus did) was given an allegorical interpretation; Celsus suggested tropical suspicions: Or., Cels. iii, 43, p. 307 L.; cf. Philostr., VS. p. 76, 15 ff. K. 110

30 Examples are frequent in the mythology of Oriental, and generally but not exclusively Semitic peoples. It is generally “Kronos” who is buried (cf. Mayer, Myth. Lex. ii, 1487 ff.); at other times Astarte, Adonis, the Phrygian Attis, “Herakles,” and others. Cf. also the stories of the Heroes sleeping eternally in Sardinia (Rh. Mus. 35, 157 ff.; 37, 465 ff.); and of Kragos and the other ἄγριοι θεοί (or θεοὶ ἀγρεῖς? JHS. 10, 57, 55) who “were made immortal” on Mt. Kragos in Lykia (St. Byz. Κράγος): they, too, were thought of as sleeping, and not “dead”, as Eust. on D.P. 847 expresses it.

30 Examples are common in the mythology of Eastern, particularly but not exclusively Semitic cultures. It is usually “Kronos” who is buried (cf. Mayer, Myth. Lex. ii, 1487 ff.); at other times, Astarte, Adonis, the Phrygian Attis, “Herakles,” and others. See also the stories of the Heroes who sleep eternally in Sardinia (Rh. Mus. 35, 157 ff.; 37, 465 ff.); and of Kragos and the other wild gods (or hunters of gods? JHS. 10, 57, 55) who “were made immortal” on Mt. Kragos in Lycia (St. Byz. Kragos): they, too, were considered to be sleeping rather than “dead,” as Eust. on D.P. 847 states.

31 Varro, LL. vii, 17, p. 124 Sp.2, compares the shape of the Omphalos with a thesaurus, i.e. with one of the vaulted buildings which used to be called treasuries, but which have now been undoubtedly proved to be really vaulted graves. On a smaller scale (as vase paintings show) the ὀμφαλός had the shape generally given to the dwelling-places made for the spirits of the departed who dwelt below the earth, as well as that of the abodes of other earth-spirits; even the χάσμα γῆς over the cavern of Trophonios was of this shape, Paus. 9, 39, 10. Was this dome-shape especially connected with earth-spirits who had mantic powers? The Delphic “omphalos” was even used as a technical expression to describe this “tholos” shape; thus the ὀμφαλοί (of φιάλαι) καὶ τῶν βαλανείων οἱ θόλοι παρόμοιοι, Ath. 501 D. E. (cf. Hesych. Βαλανειομφάλους, AB. 225, 6). It was called ὀμφαλός Γῆς because sacred to the earth-goddess. It was later interpreted “navel”, i.e. middle point of the earth, by mistake, and then fabulous accounts made up to explain this.

31 Varro, LL. vii, 17, p. 124 Sp.2, compares the shape of the Omphalos to a thesaurus, referring to one of the vaulted buildings that used to be called treasuries, but which have now been clearly shown to be actual vaulted graves. On a smaller scale (as vase paintings illustrate), the omphalos had the shape typically attributed to the homes made for the spirits of the dead who resided underground, as well as to the dwellings of other earth-spirits; even the earth's chasm over the cave of Trophonios was shaped like this, Paus. 9, 39, 10. Was this dome shape particularly associated with earth-spirits who had prophetic powers? The Delphic “omphalos” was even used as a technical term to describe this “tholos” shape; thus the navels (of φιάλαι) και των βαλανείων οι θόλοι παρόμοιοι, Ath. 501 D. E. (cf. Hesych. Βαλανειομφάλους, AB. 225, 6). It was called navel of the Earth because it was sacred to the earth-goddess. It was later mistakenly interpreted as “navel,” meaning the center of the earth, which led to the creation of fantastical stories to explain this.

32 Modern writers have adopted the view that Dionysos was buried under the Omphalos: e.g. Enmann, Kypros u. Ursp. Aphrod., S. Petersb., 1886, p. 47 ff. But closer examination shows that all that we have good authority for is that the ὀμφαλός was Pythonis tumulus (Varro, LL. vii, 17, p. 124 Sp.), τάφος τοῦ Πύθωνος (Hesych. s. Τοξίου βουνός). Dionysos, on the other hand, was buried at Delphi, παρὰ τὸν Ἀπόλλωνα τὸν χρυσοῦν (Philochoros ap. Sync. 307, 4 ff. Di.; Eus. Arm. = Hier. Chr., pp. 44–5 Sch.; Malal., p. 45, 7 Di., from Africanus acc. to Gelzer, Afric. i, 132 f.), i.e. he was buried in the ἄδυτον (cf. Paus. 10, 24, 5), or, what comes to the same thing, παρὰ τὸ χρηστήριον (Plu., Is. et O. 35, 365 A.), παρὰ τὸν τρίποδα (Call. ap. Tz. Lyc. 208; cf. E.M. Δελφοί). The tripod stood in the Adyton (D.S. 16, 26; Str. 419; cf. Hdt. vii, 140). Whether the ὀμφαλός also stood in the Adyton (or whether as some think, in the Cella of the Temple) cannot be made out for certain though it seems probable. No one, however, made the grave of Dionysos under the Omphalos except Tat., Gr. viii, p. 40 Ott. [p. 9, 16 ff. Schw.]: ὁ ὀμφαλὸς τάφος ἐστὶ Διονύσου, and the statement of this very careless pamphleteer cannot stand against the witness of Varro, etc. It is plain that Tatian confused the two “graves”, as Hyg. 140 and Serv. (A. iii, 92; iii, 360; vi, 347) did, reversing the process and making the tripod into the grave of the Python. The real tradition knew, besides the grave of Dionysos near the tripod, the grave of Python in the Omphalos of his mother Gaia. This was never seriously denied; doubt might rather have been believed to linger over the question, who then was preserved in the tripod? Porph., VP. 18, p. 25, 6 ff. N., says that it was Apollo himself, or possibly an Apollo the son of Silenos. This absurdity seems to go back to Euhemeros (cf. Minuc. xxi, 1; worthless is Fulgentius Expos., 2, p. 769 Stav. = p. 112, 3 ff. Helm), and may be merely a frivolous jest. (Too much respect is paid to this tradition by K. O. Müller, Introd. to Scient. Myth., p. 246.) 111

32 Modern writers now believe that Dionysos was buried under the Omphalos, as noted by Enmann in Kypros u. Ursp. Aphrod., S. Petersb., 1886, p. 47 ff. However, a closer look reveals that what we have strong evidence for is that the navel was the Pythonis tumulus (Varro, LL. vii, 17, p. 124 Sp.) and tomb of Python (Hesych. s. Toxic mountain). On the other hand, Dionysos was buried at Delphi, by the golden Apollo (Philochoros ap. Sync. 307, 4 ff. Di.; Eus. Arm. = Hier. Chr., pp. 44–5 Sch.; Malal., p. 45, 7 Di., from Africanus acc. to Gelzer, Afric. i, 132 f.), which means he was buried in the sanctum (cf. Paus. 10, 24, 5) or, essentially, at the oracle (Plu., Is. et O. 35, 365 A.), next to the tripod (Call. ap. Tz. Lyc. 208; cf. E.M. Delphi). The tripod stood in the Adyton (D.S. 16, 26; Str. 419; cf. Hdt. vii, 140). Whether the omphalos also stood in the Adyton (or some suggest, in the Cella of the Temple) isn’t certain, though it seems likely. However, only Tatian claimed that Dionysos was buried under the Omphalos, as noted in Gr. viii, p. 40 Ott. [p. 9, 16 ff. Schw.]: The navel is the tomb of Dionysus., and his careless statement doesn't hold up against Varro and others. It's clear that Tatian mixed up the two “graves,” as Hyginus 140 and Servius (A. iii, 92; iii, 360; vi, 347) did, flipping the narrative and suggesting the tripod was the grave of the Python. The actual tradition recognized, in addition to Dionysos's grave near the tripod, Python's grave in the Omphalos of his mother Gaia. This was never seriously questioned; instead, doubt might have been cast on who was then preserved in the tripod? Porphyry, VP. 18, p. 25, 6 ff. N., suggested it was Apollo himself, or possibly an Apollo who was the son of Silenus. This ridiculous idea seems to trace back to Euhemeros (cf. Minuc. xxi, 1; Fulgentius Expos., 2, p. 769 Stav. = p. 112, 3 ff. Helm), and may just be a trivial joke. (K. O. Müller gives this tradition too much credibility in Introd. to Scient. Myth., p. 246.) 111

33 That the snake killed by Apollo was the guardian of the old μαντεῖον χθόνιον we have on unimpeachable authority (testim. collected by Th. Schreiber, Apollo Pythoktonos, p. 3): esp. Eur., IT. 1245 ff. Call., fr. 364; ποιηταί acc. to Paus. 10, 6, 6, who say that (τὸν Πύθωνα) ἐπὶ τῷ μαντείῳ φύλακα ὑπὸ Γῆς τετάχθαι κτλ. That the struggle was for the oracle is shown briefly and plainly by [Apollod.] 1, 4, 1, 3: ὡς δὲ ὁ φρουρῶν τὸ μαντεῖον Πύθων ὄφις ἐκώλυεν αὐτὸν (Ἀπόλλωνα) παρελθεῖν ἐπὶ τὸ χάσμα (the oracular cleft), τοῦτον ἀνελών τὸ μαντεῖον παραλαμβάνει. The snake form is proper to earth-spirits, and, as earth-spirits always have mantic power, to oracle-spirits. Trophonios appeared as a snake and so did Asklepios. There can be no doubt that the Delphian δράκων is the embodiment of the pre-Apolline oracle-daimon. Thus Hesych. says exactly Πύθων δαιμόνιον μαντικόν (elaborated in Hyg. 140). Cf. Act. 1616.—Supporters of the doctrine of the Greek “religion of Nature” find even in the legend of Apollo’s fight with the snake an allegorical version of a physical fact tending to become an ethical one. I cannot regard such an allegory as primitive.

33 We have solid evidence that the snake killed by Apollo was the guardian of the ancient underworld oracle (as collected by Th. Schreiber, Apollo Pythoktonos, p. 3): especially Eur., IT. 1245 ff. Call., fr. 364; poets according to Paus. 10, 6, 6, who say that (the Python)The guardian is assigned under the Earth at the oracle, and so on. The fact that the struggle was for the oracle is clearly indicated by [Apollod.] 1, 4, 1, 3: As the guards prevented him from reaching the oracle, the Python serpent stood in his way.(Apollo)cross over to the abyss (the oracular cleft), He takes the oracle after this.. The snake form is typical of earth spirits, and since earth spirits always possess prophetic power, they are also oracle spirits. Trophonios appeared as a snake, as did Asklepios. There’s no doubt that the Delphian dragon is a representation of the pre-Apolline oracle spirit. Thus, Hesych. clearly states Python oracle spirit (expanded in Hyg. 140). Cf. Act. 1616.—Proponents of the notion of the Greek “religion of Nature” see in the legend of Apollo’s battle with the snake an allegorical interpretation of a physical truth that is evolving into an ethical one. I can't see such an allegory as being primitive.

34 An instructive parallel may be added. In [Clem.] Hom. 5, 22, p. 70, 32 Lag., there is mention of a grave of Plouton ἐν τῇ Ἀχερουσίᾳ λίμνῃ. This may be explained as follows. At Hermione Hades under the name of Klymenos was honoured together with Demeter Χθονία and Kore (CIG. 1197, 1199). Pausanias knew well that Klymenos was a titular name (ἐπίκλησις) of Hades (2, 35, 9), but his rejection of the opinion that Klymenos was a man from Argos who had come to Hermione (as founder of the Chthonic cult) shows that this was the general view. Behind the temple of Chthonia lay χωρία ἃ καλοῦσιν Ἑρμιονεῖς τὸ μὲν Κλυμένου, τὸ δὲ Πλούτωνος, τὸ τρίτον δὲ αὐτων λίμνην Ἀχερουσίαν. At this λίμνη Ἀχερουσία it is possible that a grave of Hades, transformed into the Hero Klymenos, may have been shown. This Clemens referred to, but instead of Klymenos or Hades used inaccurately the name more familiar to later times, Plouton.

34 An informative parallel can be added. In [Clem.] Hom. 5, 22, p. 70, 32 Lag., there is mention of a grave of Plouton in Lake Acherusia. This can be explained as follows. At Hermione, Hades, referred to as Klymenos, was honored alongside Demeter Chthonic and Kore (CIG. 1197, 1199). Pausanias knew well that Klymenos was a titular name (Invocation) of Hades (2, 35, 9), but his rejection of the view that Klymenos was a man from Argos who had come to Hermione (as the founder of the Chthonic cult) shows that this was the general belief. Behind the temple of Chthonia lay The places that the Hermionians call are one, Clemenou; the other, Ploutonos; and the third, the Acherusian Lake.. At this Achereusian Lake, it is possible that a grave of Hades, transformed into the Hero Klymenos, may have been shown. This is what Clemens referred to, but instead of Klymenos or Hades, he inaccurately used the name more familiar in later times, Plouton.

35 κὰδ δ’ ἐν Ἀθήνῃσ’ εἶσεν, ἑῷ ἐνὶ πίονι νηῷ. These words may be kept in mind in order to explain the mysterious narrative in Hesiod Th. 987 ff. of Phaethon whom Aphrodite ὦρτ’ ἀνερειψαμένη καί μιν ζαθέοις ἐνὶ νήοις νηοπόλον μύχιον ποιήσατο, δαίμονα δῖον. Aphr., in fact. “translated” Phaethon alive and made him immortal—within her own temple just as Athene had Erechtheus. Perhaps Phaethon was translated beneath the ground under the temple—the adj. μύχιον may mean this. θεοὶ μύχιοι are those that rule over the μυχός of a house, e.g. over the θάλαμος as the inmost chamber: thus Ἀφροδίτη μυχία (Ael., HA. x, 34). Λητὼ μυχία (Plu. ap. Eus., PE. iii, 1, 3, p. 84 c.). A goddess called simply Μυχία, ins. fr. Mytilene, GDI. 255. But μύχιοι could also mean dwellers in the depths of the earth (μυχῷ χθονὸς εὐρυοδείης, Hes., Th. 119; more commonly in the plural μυχοὶ χθονός, see Markland on Eur., Sup. 545; cf. Ἄϊδος μυχός, AP. vii, 213, 6 (Archias); also μυχὸς εὐσεβέων, ἀθανάτων under the earth, Epigr. Gr. 241 a, 18; 658 a; Rh. Mus. 34, 192). Thus (of the Erinyes) Orph. H. 69, 3, μύχιαι, ὑπὸ κεύθεσιν οἰκί’ ἔχουσαι ἄντρῳ ἐν ἠερόεντι. Phot. 274, 18, μυχόπεδον· γῆς βάθος, Ἅιδης.

35 He entered the city of Athens, while he was in a lush ship.. These words can help explain the mysterious story in Hesiod Th. 987 ff. about Phaethon, whom Aphrodite She, having been lifted up, made him the hidden interior of sacred ships, the divine spirit.. Aphrodite, in fact, “translated” Phaethon while he was alive and made him immortal—within her own temple, just as Athene had done with Erechtheus. It’s possible that Phaethon was taken underground beneath the temple—the adjective μύχιον may suggest this. secret gods are those who rule over the __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ of a house, for example, over the room as the innermost chamber: thus Aphrodite of the hidden chamber (Ael., HA. x, 34). Λητὼ μυχία (Plu. ap. Eus., PE. iii, 1, 3, p. 84 c.). A goddess called simply Μυχία, ins. fr. Mytilene, GDI. 255. But μύχιοι could also refer to those who dwell in the earth's depths (In the depths of the earth, Hes., Th. 119; more commonly in the plural hidden depths, see Markland on Eur., Sup. 545; cf. Hades' underworld, AP. vii, 213, 6 (Archias); also The depths of the righteous, immortals under the earth, Epigr. Gr. 241 a, 18; 658 a; Rh. Mus. 34, 192). Thus (of the Erinyes) Orph. H. 69, 3, Hidden away, they have homes in a cave beneath the misty air.. Phot. 274, 18, Underworld: depth of the earth, Hades.

36 That the μίν of line 550 refers to Erechtheus and not Athene is shown by the context: Schol. BL. states it expressly. Athene cannot have been intended to accept the offering of bulls and rams, for θήλεα τῇ Ἀθηνᾷ θύουσιν. And, in fact, cows, not bulls, were offered to Athene; cf. P. Stengel, quaest. sacr., p. 4–5, Berl. 1879.

36 The μίν in line 550 refers to Erechtheus and not Athene, as shown by the context: Schol. BL. clearly states this. Athene couldn't have been meant to accept the offering of bulls and rams, for They sacrifice to Athena.. In fact, cows and not bulls were offered to Athene; see P. Stengel, quaest. sacr., p. 4–5, Berl. 1879.

37 See Wachsmuth, Ber. sächs. Ges. Wiss., p. 399 ff., 1887. 112

37 See Wachsmuth, Ber. sächs. Ges. Wiss., p. 399 ff., 1887. 112

38 Thus there was, at the temple of Palaimon on the Isthmus, an ἄδυτον καλούμενον, κάθοδος δὲ ἐς αὐτὸ ὑπόγεως, ἔνθα δὴ τὸν Παλαίμονα κεκρύφθαι (i.e. not dead and buried) φασίν. Paus. 2, 2, 1.

38 So, at the temple of Palaimon on the Isthmus, there was an adytum, the entrance that leads underground, where they say Palaimon is hidden (i.e. not dead and buried) they say. Paus. 2, 2, 1.

39 χάσμα κρύπτει χθονός, Eur. Ion, 292.—Erechtheus ab Iove Neptuni rogatu fulmine est ictus, Hyg. 46. That is only another kind of translation.

39 The abyss hides the underworld., Eur. Ion, 292.—Erechtheus was hit by a lightning bolt at the request of Jupiter and Neptune., Hyg. 46. That is only another way of translating it.

40 We need not here speak of the relationship between Erechtheus and Poseidon, with whom he was eventually merged.

40 We don't need to discuss the connection between Erechtheus and Poseidon, with whom he eventually became intertwined.

41 Clem. Al. Protr. iii, p. 39 P. (with Arnob. and the others who copy him); [Apollod.] 3, 14, 7, 1. Clemens (quoting Antiochos of Syracuse) mentions a grave of Kekrops on the citadel. It is uncertain what is the relation between this and the Κεκρόπιον known from insc. CIA. i, 322, and τὸ τοῦ Κέκροπος ἱερόν on the citadel (Decree honouring the Epheboi of the tribe Kekropis in the year 333: BCH. ’89, p. 257. l. 10).

41 Clem. Al. Protr. iii, p. 39 P. (with Arnob and the others who follow him); [Apollod.] 3, 14, 7, 1. Clemens (citing Antiochos of Syracuse) mentions a grave of Kekrops on the citadel. It's unclear how this relates to the Kekropion referenced in the inscription CIA. i, 322, and the temple of Cecrops on the citadel (Decree honoring the Epheboi of the tribe Kekropis in the year 333: BCH. ’89, p. 257. l. 10).

42 Ὑακινθίοις πρὸ τῆς τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος θυσίας ἐς τοῦτον Ὑακίνθῳ τὸν βωμὸν διὰ θύρας χαλκῆς ἐναγίζουσιν· ἐν ἀριστερᾷ δέ ἐστιν ἡ θύρα τοῦ βωμοῦ. Paus. 3, 19, 3. We shall meet with similar examples in treating of the sacrifices made to Heroes. This naive sacrificial rite regularly presumes the physical presence of the god or “spirit” in the place underground into which the offerings are poured or thrown (as in the μέγαρα of Demeter and Kore, etc.).

42 Hyacinthians bring their offerings to the bronze door of the altar of Apollo in front of the Hyacinth, and to the left is the door of the altar.. Paus. 3, 19, 3. We will find similar instances when discussing the sacrifices made to Heroes. This simple sacrificial practice typically assumes the actual presence of the god or “spirit” in the underground place where the offerings are poured or thrown (like in the megara of Demeter and Kore, etc.).

43 The story of Hyakinthos is found in its familiar form in the poets of the Hellenistic period and their imitators, Nikander, Bion, Ovid, etc.: already Simmias and Euphorion had told it (see Welcker, Kl. Sch. i, 24 ff.; and G. Knaack, Anal. Alexandrino-romana, p. 60 ff.). It may even reach back to earlier times; the death of H. caused by Apollo’s discus-throw is mentioned by Eur., Hel. 1472 ff., though he does not speak of the love of Apollo for H. As the story was generally given, and, indeed, as it had already been implicitly told by Nikias, it had no local colouring and no importance as local legend. It was not ever even an aetiological myth for it could only account in the most general way for the melancholy character of the Hyakinthos festival and not at all for the peculiar features of its ritual. It is an erotic myth leading up to a metamorphosis, like so many others of its kind, in substance, it is true, closely related the Linos myth, etc., with which it is generally compared—and in accordance with the fashionable theory interpreted as an allegory of the spring blossom fading beneath the heat of the sun. It is, in fact, a regular mythological theme (the death through the cast of the discus occurring for example in the stories of Akrisios, Kanobos, Krokos [see Haupt, Opusc. iii, 574 f. In Philo ap. Galen, xiii, 268, read v. 13 ἠϊθέοιο, v. 15 perhaps κείνου δὴ σταθμόν]). We cannot tell how far the flower Hyakinthos had anything to do with the Amyklaian Hyakinthos (cf. Hemsterhuis, Lucian ii, p. 291 Bip.); perhaps nothing at all—there were no hyacinths used in the Hyakinthia. The similarity of the name may have suggested this addition to the metamorphosis story to the Hellenistic poets.

43 The story of Hyakinthos appears in its well-known form in the works of Hellenistic poets and their followers, like Nikander, Bion, and Ovid. Earlier, Simmias and Euphorion had also told it (see Welcker, Kl. Sch. i, 24 ff.; and G. Knaack, Anal. Alexandrino-romana, p. 60 ff.). It might even trace back to earlier periods; Euripides mentions Hyakinthos's death caused by Apollo's discus throw in Hel. 1472 ff., although he doesn't mention Apollo's love for him. The story was often told without any local flavor or significance as a local legend. It was never even considered an aetiological myth, as it could only vaguely explain the somber nature of the Hyakinthos festival and not the specific aspects of its rituals. It's an erotic myth leading to a transformation, similar to many others, and is closely related to the Linos myth, which it is frequently compared to. According to the popular theory, it symbolizes the spring flower fading under the sun's heat. In fact, it is a common mythological theme (the death from the discus throw also appears in the stories of Akrisios, Kanobos, Krokos [see Haupt, Opusc. iii, 574 f. In Philo ap. Galen, xiii, 268, read v. 13 ἠϊθέοιο, v. 15 perhaps that station]). We can’t say how much the flower Hyakinthos was related to the Amyklaian Hyakinthos (cf. Hemsterhuis, Lucian ii, p. 291 Bip.); it’s possible there was no connection at all—no hyacinths were used in the Hyakinthia. The similarity of the name may have inspired Hellenistic poets to add this detail to the transformation story.

44 Certainly not as Apollo’s ἐρώμενος (as which Hauser, Philol. 52, 218, in spite of the beard, regards the Hyakinthos of the Amyklaian altar). Bearded παιδικά are unthinkable as every reader of the Anth. Pal. knows. The most ancient form of the story, as implied in the sculpture at Amyklai, neither knows anything of the love of Apollo and Hyakinthos nor consequently of the latter’s early death, etc.

44 Definitely not as Apollo's Love interest (which Hauser, Philol. 52, 218, despite the beard, considers the Hyakinthos of the Amyklaian altar). Bearded kid's are unimaginable, as every reader of the Anth. Pal. knows. The oldest version of the story, as suggested by the sculpture at Amyklai, doesn't mention the love between Apollo and Hyakinthos or, consequently, Hyakinthos's early death, etc.

45 The Ὑακινθίδες at Athens were regarded as the daughters (strangely migrated to Athens) of the “Lacedaemonian” Hyakinthos. i.e. the one buried in Amyklai. See St. Byz. Λουσία; Harp. 113 Ὑακινθίδες; [Apollod.] 3, 15, 8, 5–6; Hyg. 238 (Phanodemos ap. Suid. Παρθένοι arbitrarily identifies the Ὑακινθίδες with the Ὑάδες or daughters of Erechtheus. So also [Dem.] 60, 27). This idea implies a form of the story in which Hyak. did not die while still a boy or a half-grown youth as in the metamorphosis version.—That the figure of Hyakinthos on the sculpture at Amyklai had a beard is expressly mentioned by Paus. 3, 19, 4, as conflicting with the fresh youthfulness of Hyakinthos as Nikias (second half fourth century) with reference to the love-story had represented him in his famous picture (πρωθήβην Ὑάκινθον, Nic., Th. 905). Paus. § 5, expressly raises a doubt as to the truth of the traditional fable about H.’s death.

45 The Hyacinth flowers in Athens were seen as the daughters (oddly relocated to Athens) of the “Lacedaemonian” Hyakinthos, who is buried in Amyklai. See St. Byz. Lucia; Harp. 113 Hyacinths; [Apollod.] 3, 15, 8, 5–6; Hyg. 238 (Phanodemos ap. Suid. Virgins randomly identifies the Hyacinths with the Hyades or daughters of Erechtheus. This idea is also supported by [Dem.] 60, 27). This suggests a version of the story in which Hyak. did not die as a boy or a young man, unlike in the metamorphosis version. The sculpture of Hyakinthos at Amyklai specifically mentions that he had a beard, as noted by Paus. 3, 19, 4, which contrasts with the youthful image of Hyakinthos as portrayed by Nikias (in the second half of the fourth century) in his famous painting (ἔχω ὑακίνθου, Nic., Th. 905). Paus. § 5 raises questions about the validity of the traditional tale concerning H.'s death.

46 πρὸ τῆς τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος θυσίας Paus. 3, 19, 3. More than once it is stated that at a particular festival sacrifice to the Hero preceded that to the god (cf. Wassner, de heroum ap. Gr. cultu, p. 48 ff.). Probably the reason in all such cases is that the cult of the “Hero” (or god turned Hero) is older in that particular spot than the worship of the god whose cult had only been adopted there at a later time. Thus in Plataea at the Daidalia sacrifice was made to Leto before Hera (προθύεσθαι): Plu. ap. Eus., PE. iii, 84 C: there it is quite evident that the cult of Hera was adopted later. Perhaps even the form of the word Ὑάκινθος implies that it was the name of an ancient deity worshipped already by the pre-Greek inhabitants of the Peloponnese. See Kretschmer, Einl. in Gesch. gr. Spr. 402–5.

46 before the sacrifice of Apollo Paus. 3, 19, 3. It's mentioned multiple times that during a specific festival, sacrifices to the Hero were made before those to the god (see Wassner, de heroum ap. Gr. cultu, p. 48 ff.). The likely reason for this is that the worship of the “Hero” (or god who became a Hero) predates the worship of the god, which was adopted later in that location. For example, in Plataea at the Daidalia festival, a sacrifice was offered to Leto before that to Hera (προθύεσθαι): Plu. ap. Eus., PE. iii, 84 C; it's clear there that Hera's worship was established at a later time. Additionally, the form of the name Hyacinth suggests it may have referred to an ancient deity worshipped by the pre-Greek inhabitants of the Peloponnese. See Kretschmer, Einl. in Gesch. gr. Spr. 402–5.

47 Ὑακίνθῳ ἐναγίζουσιν, Paus. 3, 19, 3.

47 They are doing a ritual for Hyacinth., Paus. 3, 19, 3.

48 The second day of the festival was sacred to Apollo and not to Hyakinthos: τὸν θεὸν ᾄδουσιν Ath. 139 E. (It has been rightly said that this was when the παιάν mentioned by Xen., HG. 4, 5, 11, must have been sung.) It is impossible to deny, with Unger, Philol. 37, 30, the cheerful character of this second day of the festival as described by Polykrates ap. Ath. 139 E, F. It is true that Didymus (whose words Athenaeus is quoting) begins in a way (139 D) that might lead one to suppose that all three days of the τῶν Ὑακινθίων θυσία διὰ τὸ πένθος τὸ γενόμενον (γινόμενον?) περὶ τὸν Ὑάκινθον were passed in gloom without festivity, crowns, feasting, or Paean, etc. But he refutes himself afterwards in his description of the second day of the festival, at which not merely at the performances but at the sacrifice and the banquetings festivity reigns supreme. We can only suppose that his language at the beginning is inaccurate, and that he means what he says of the solemnity of the occasion “because of the mourning for Hyakinthos” to be taken as limited like the mourning itself to the first day of the feast.

48 The second day of the festival was dedicated to Apollo, not to Hyakinthos: The God Ath. 139 E. (It's been correctly noted that this was when the paean mentioned by Xen., HG. 4, 5, 11, must have been sung.) It's impossible to deny, as Unger argues in Philol. 37, 30, the joyful nature of this second day of the festival as described by Polykrates in Ath. 139 E, F. Didymus (whose words Athenaeus is quoting) starts in a way (139 D) that might make one think that all three days of the The Hyacinthian sacrifice because of the mourning that has occurred.(γινόμενον?)About Hyacinthus were spent in sadness without celebration, crowns, feasting, or Paean, etc. However, he contradicts himself later when describing the second day of the festival, at which not only the performances but also the sacrifices and the feasting are filled with joy. We can only assume that his wording at the beginning is misleading, and that when he refers to the solemnity of the occasion “because of the mourning for Hyakinthos,” he means it to apply only to the first day of the feast.

49 Hesych. Πολύβοια· θεός τις ὑπ’ ἐνίων Ἄρτεμις, ὑπὸ δὲ ἄλλων Κόρη. Cf. K. O. Müller, Dorians, i. 361 (Ἄρτεμις there probably as Hekate).

49 Hesych. Polybos; a god sometimes called Artemis and by others as Kore.. See K. O. Müller, Dorians, i. 361 (Artemis likely mentioned there as Hekate).

50 Another view of the combined worship of Apollo and Hyakinthos at Amyklai is taken by Enmann, Kypros, etc., 35. In this as elsewhere he relies on certain opinions adopted from H. D. Müller’s mythological writings, which must be approved of in general before they can be found enlightening as applied to any particular case.

50 Enmann offers another perspective on the joint worship of Apollo and Hyakinthos at Amyklai in his work, Kypros, etc., 35. In this instance, as in others, he leans on some ideas borrowed from H. D. Müller’s mythological writings, which need to be generally accepted before they can be truly insightful in any specific situation.

51 As happened in the case of Hyakinthos, too, in the scene represented on the Amyklaian altar, Paus. 3, 19, though nothing can be deduced from this as to his original nature.

51 Just like what happened with Hyakinthos, in the scene depicted on the Amyklaian altar, Paus. 3, 19, although we can't draw any conclusions about his true nature from this.

52 The oracular activity of Asklepios plays a subordinate part in the usual accounts of him in comparison with his powers of healing. But originally they were closely united (as was usually the case with earth spirits). Apollodorus π. θεῶν ap. Macrob. 1, 20, 4, puts it 114 distinctly: scribit quod Aesculapius divinationibus et auguriis praesit. Celsus calls Asklepios εὐεργετοῦντα καὶ τὰ μέλλοντα προλέγοντα ὅλαις πόλεσιν ἀνακειμέναις ἑαυτῷ, Or., Cels. iii, 3, pp. 255–6 L.

52 The prophetic role of Asklepios is usually viewed as less important compared to his healing abilities. However, these aspects were originally closely linked (which was common with earth spirits). Apollodorus π. θεῶν ap. Macrob. 1, 20, 4, states clearly: It is said that Aesculapius oversees divinations and auguries.. Celsus refers to Asklepios as helping and predicting future events while all the cities depend on him, Or., Cels. iii, 3, pp. 255–6 L.

53 Check __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

54 Cicero quoting the pragmatical “theologi” says, ND. iii, 57, Aesculapius (the second one) fulmine percussus dicitur humatus esse Cynosuris (the district of Sparta? From a similar source come Clem. Al., Protr. ii, p. 26 P.; Lyd., Mens. iv, 90, p. 164 Wünsch); of the third Askl., Cic. § 57 says: cuius in Arcadia non longe a Lusio flumine sepulcrum et lucus ostenditur. Even the temple of Asklepios in Epidauros was regarded by many as the place of his grave if we are to believe the Clementine Hom. v, 21, Rec. x, 24 (sepulcrum demonstrator in Epidauro Aesculapii).

54 Cicero references the practical "theologians," stating in ND. iii, 57, that Aesculapius (the second one) is said to have been buried in Cynosura after being struck by lightning (the area near Sparta? From a similar source, see Clem. Al., Protr. ii, p. 26 P.; Lyd., Mens. iv, 90, p. 164 Wünsch). Regarding the third Askl., Cic. § 57 mentions: In Arcadia, not far from the Lusio River, a tomb and a grove are shown.. Many considered the temple of Asklepios in Epidauros to be his burial site, according to the Clementine Hom. v, 21, Rec. x, 24 (tomb of Aesculapius in Epidaurus).

55 The chthonic character of Asklepios is shown specially by the fact that not only are snakes sacred and dedicated to him but that he himself was actually thought of as a snake (cf. Welcker, Götterl. ii, 734). ὄφις, Γῆς παῖς (Hdt. i, 78); deities who dwell in the earth, and afterwards “Heroes” (in the later sense), appear in the form of snakes as χθόνιοι. Since such earth-spirits generally have oracular powers the snake is an oracular animal; but that is a secondary development. The offer of a cock, too (as by Sokrates before his departure to the underworld), points to the chthonic character of Ask., for it was a sacrifice also made to Heroes. Thus the ἡρῷα at Athens were frequented by the priests of Asklepios (CIA. ii, 453 b); cf. Köhler, Ath. Mitth. vol. ii, 245 f. (Sacrificial pit, βόθρος, for this chthonic worship in the Asklepieion at Athens? see Köhler, ib. 254.)

55 The underworld aspect of Asklepios is particularly highlighted by the fact that not only are snakes sacred to him, but he was also considered to be a snake himself (cf. Welcker, Götterl. ii, 734). serpent, child of Earth (Hdt. i, 78); deities that reside in the earth and later "Heroes" (in the later sense) appear in the form of snakes as Underworld spirits. Since these earth-spirits typically have prophetic abilities, the snake is considered an oracular animal, though this is a later development. The offering of a rooster, as Socrates did before his journey to the underworld, also underscores Asklepios's underworld nature, since it was a sacrifice made to the Heroes as well. Thus, the ἡρῷα in Athens were often visited by the priests of Asklepios (CIA. ii, 453 b); cf. Köhler, Ath. Mitth. vol. ii, 245 f. (Is there a sacrificial pit, βόθρος, for this chthonic worship in the Asklepieion at Athens? see Köhler, ib. 254.)

56 The connexion between Amphiaraos and Asklepios is shown also by the fact that Iaso, one of the allegorical figures attached to Asklepios, though generally the daughter of Askl. (e.g. EM. 434, 17 Ἰασώ with Sylb.; cf. Herond. iv, 6), was probably also regarded as the daughter of Amph.: Sch. Ar., Plut. 701. Hesych. s.v. (her portrait in the temple at Oropos, Paus. 1, 34, 3). So, too, Ἄλκανδρος the son of Trophonios (Charax. ap. Schol. Ar., Nub., 508, p. 500 Bk.) seems to be the same as Ἄλκων, the Asklepiad daimon whose priest Sophokles was. The portraits of Trophonios followed the type of the Asklepios statues: Paus. 9, 39, 3–4. Troph. son of Valens (= Ischys) and Koronis, and brother of Asklepios: Cic., ND. iii, 56, acc. to the theologi. With good reason, considering their intrinsic affinity, Trophonios, Amphiaraos, Amphilochos, and the Asklepiadai are mentioned side by side by Aristid. i, p. 78 D.

56 The connection between Amphiaraos and Asklepios is highlighted by the fact that Iaso, one of the symbolic figures associated with Asklepios, is generally considered the daughter of Askl. (e.g. EM. 434, 17 Iaso with Sylb.; cf. Herond. iv, 6), but was likely also viewed as the daughter of Amph.: Sch. Ar., Plut. 701. Hesych. s.v. (her depiction in the temple at Oropos, Paus. 1, 34, 3). Similarly, Alcander, the son of Trophonios (Charax. ap. Schol. Ar., Nub., 508, p. 500 Bk.) appears to be the same as Alcon, the Asklepiad spirit whose priest was Sophokles. The representations of Trophonios followed the style of the Asklepios statues: Paus. 9, 39, 3–4. Troph. son of Valens (= Ischys) and Koronis, and brother of Asklepios: Cic., ND. iii, 56, according to the theologi. It makes sense, considering their natural connections, that Trophonios, Amphiaraos, Amphilochos, and the Asklepiadai are mentioned together by Aristid. i, p. 78 D.

57 Sulla counted Amphiaraos a “god” and hence the territory belonging to his temple at Oropos was excepted from the lease for the collection of taxes granted to the Roman publicani. The Roman Senate allowed this to stand, ins. from Oropos Ἐφ. Ἀρχ., 1884, p. 101 ff.; Hermes, 20, 268 ff.; the publicani had denied immortalis esse ullos qui aliquando homines fuissent, Cic., ND. iii, 49. Thus only the fact that he was now a god was claimed by the other side—it was not denied that he had once been a mortal. Paus. again 8, 2, 4, mentions Amph. among the θεοί who ἐγίνοντο ἐξ ἀνθρώπων; so too Varro ap. Serv. A. viii, 275; cf. Apul., D. Soc. 15 fin.; also Philo, Leg. ad Gaium, § 78, ii, p. 557 M.

57 Sulla regarded Amphiaraos as a “god,” which meant that the land belonging to his temple in Oropos was excluded from the tax lease granted to the Roman publicani. The Roman Senate allowed this decision to stand, ins. from Oropos __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, 1884, p. 101 ff.; Hermes, 20, 268 ff.; the tax collectors had argued against the notion that to be immortal means to be someone who was once human, Cic., ND. iii, 49. So, the only claim from the other side was that he was now a god—it was not disputed that he had once been human. Paus. again 8, 2, 4, mentions Amph. among the gods who they became from humans; as does Varro ap. Serv. A. viii, 275; cf. Apul., D. Soc. 15 fin.; and Philo, Leg. ad Gaium, § 78, ii, p. 557 M.

CHAPTER IV

HEROES

§ 1

When about the year 620 Drakon at Athens for the first time collected and committed to writing the customary law of his country he also ordained that the gods and the national Heroes should be honoured together according to ancestral usage.1

When around the year 620, Drakon in Athens first gathered and wrote down the customary laws of his country, he also established that the gods and national heroes should be honored together according to traditional practices.1

We are thus for the first time introduced to Heroes as beings of a higher kind, mentioned side by side with the gods, and like them to be worshipped with regularly offered sacrifice. Their cult, like that of the gods, is by implication of long standing: it does not have to be reorganized, but is merely established in the form ancestral ordinances had given it. We see at this turning-point of Greek religious development how defective our knowledge is of the history of religious ideas in primitive Greece. This is our earliest record, and it has been preserved to us by a mere accident, but it points backwards and beyond itself to a long previous history in the worship of such guardian deities of the country—of which, however, we have hardly a scrap of early evidence.2 We should in fact, from the meagre remains of the literature that is so important from this point of view, especially the lyric poetry of the seventh and early sixth centuries, hardly have derived a suspicion of the existence of this quite un-Homeric element in the religious life of Greece.3 When at last the stream of surviving literature begins to flow more broadly, then, indeed, the Heroes are often referred to. Pindar’s Hymns of Victory and Herodotos’ History cover the generations that lived through the Persian wars and the following fifty years. From them we can see with overwhelming distinctness how strong at that time was the belief in the existence and potency of Heroes even among men of education who had not been too much influenced by the fashionable enlightenment of the time. In the beliefs of the people, in the religious customs of countries and cities, the national Heroes have their recognized place beside the gods. The representatives of states swear by the gods and the Heroes of the country:4 it is to the gods and Heroes of Greece that the pious attribute the victory over the Barbarians.5 So well established, indeed, was the validity of the Greek belief in Heroes that even the Persian magi in the army of Xerxes made libation by night in the Troad to the Heroes buried there.6 116

We are now introduced to Heroes as beings of a higher order, mentioned alongside the gods and worshipped with regular sacrifices. Their cult, like that of the gods, has a long-standing tradition: it doesn't need to be restructured, but is simply maintained in the form that ancient customs have established. At this key moment in Greek religious development, it becomes clear how limited our understanding is regarding the history of religious ideas in early Greece. This is our earliest record, preserved by chance, yet it hints at a much longer history of worship for such protective deities of the land—of which we have hardly any early evidence. We would not have even suspected the existence of this non-Homeric aspect of Greek religious life from the scant remnants of literature important in this regard, especially the lyric poetry from the seventh and early sixth centuries. When the flow of surviving literature broadens, the Heroes start to be referenced frequently. Pindar’s Hymns of Victory and Herodotus’ History cover the generations that experienced the Persian wars and the following fifty years. From these works, we can clearly see how strong the belief in the existence and power of Heroes was during that time, even among educated individuals who weren’t overly swayed by the prevailing enlightenment. In the beliefs of the people and in the religious practices of cities and countries, national Heroes have their established place beside the gods. State representatives swear by the gods and Heroes of the land: it is to the gods and Heroes of Greece that the devout credit the victory over the Barbarians. The belief in Heroes was so firmly established that even the Persian magi in Xerxes’ army made offerings at night in the Troad to the Heroes buried there. 116

§ 2

If now we inquire into the nature and essence of this species of higher beings that was as yet unknown to, or disregarded by, the epic we get little information on the subject from direct statements as to their nature by writers of antiquity. We can, however, learn a great deal about them from what we are told of individual Heroes and more particularly from what we know of the peculiar nature of the religious worship paid to them.7 The Heroes were worshipped with sacrifice like the gods; but these sacrifices were very different from the offerings that were made to the Olympians.8 They differ in time, place, and character. Sacrifice was made to the gods in broad daylight, to Heroes towards evening or at night;9 and not on raised altars, but on low, and sometimes hollow, sacrificial hearths close to the ground.10 For them were slain animals of black colour and male sex,11 and in sacrificing, the heads of the animals were not turned upwards towards heaven as they were when offered to the gods, but were bent down to the ground.12 The blood of these animals was allowed to run down into the ground or into the sacrificial hearth, that the Heroes might have their “appeasement of blood”.13 The carcass was completely burnt, for no living man might taste of it.14 This peculiar mode of worshipping the Heroes was in strict usage described by a different name from that used of the sacrifices to the gods.15 On special occasions a sacrificial meal of cooked food was prepared, to which the Hero was invited as a guest.16 They are near by in the earth itself, and there is no need in their case, as for the Olympians, to send up the savour of sacrifice in smoke to heaven.

If we now look into the nature and essence of this type of higher beings that was unknown to or overlooked by the epic, we get little information about them from the direct statements of ancient writers. However, we can learn a lot from what we are told about individual Heroes and especially from the unique nature of the religious worship dedicated to them. 7 The Heroes were worshipped with sacrifices similar to the gods, but these sacrifices were quite different from those made to the Olympians. 8 They varied in timing, location, and character. Sacrifices were offered to the gods during the day, while those to the Heroes took place in the evening or at night; 9 and they were made not on raised altars but on low or sometimes hollow ceremonial hearths close to the ground. 10 For them, animals that were black and male were sacrificed, 11 and during the sacrifice, the heads of the animals were not directed upward toward the heavens as they were when offered to the gods, but were instead lowered to the ground. 12 The blood of these animals was allowed to run down into the earth or into the sacrificial hearth, so the Heroes could have their “appeasement of blood.” 13 The entire carcass was burned, as no living person could partake of it. 14 This unique way of worshipping the Heroes was described by a different name than that used for sacrifices to the gods. 15 On special occasions, a sacrificial meal of cooked food was prepared, to which the Hero was invited as a guest. 16 They are nearby in the earth itself, and there’s no need, unlike with the Olympians, to send up the scent of sacrifice in smoke to the heavens.

This sacrificial ritual is in those features which distinguish it from that commonly in use for the gods of Olympos precisely identical with that by which the gods who dwelt under the earth, and, later, even the souls of dead men, were honoured. This will seem quite natural if we regard the Heroes as closely related to the chthonic deities on the one hand, and to the dead on the other. In fact, they are nothing else than the spirits of dead men who now dwell beneath the earth, immortal like the gods of that underworld, and almost equal to them in power. Their real nature as the souls of great men of the past, who have died but have not been deprived of conscious existence, is made plain by another mode of doing honour to them originally belonging to them and them only—I mean the yearly repeated celebration of Funeral Games.

This sacrificial ritual is marked by features that set it apart from the one commonly used for the gods of Olympus, which is almost identical to the way the gods who lived underground, and later even the souls of the dead, were honored. This will seem completely understandable if we see the Heroes as closely connected to the chthonic deities on one side and to the dead on the other. In fact, they are nothing more than the spirits of deceased individuals who now exist beneath the earth, immortal like the gods of the underworld, and almost equal to them in power. Their true nature as the souls of great people from the past, who have died but still retain conscious existence, is made clear by another way of honoring them that originally belonged solely to them—the annual celebration of Funeral Games.

Athletic contests for chieftains at the funeral of a prominent 117 one of their number were known to Homer, and we have already referred to them among other relics in epic poetry of a once powerful cult of souls.17 But Homer knew nothing of their repetition, and certainly not of an annual recurrence of such funeral celebrations.18 Games celebrated afresh after the lapse of a definite period became known to the Greeks only when the cult of Heroes had reached its maturity. Many of these contests were connected perpetually with the yearly festivals of individual Heroes, and were intended to honour their memory.19 Even in historical times, generally on the command of the Delphic oracle, annual contests were instituted in honour of Heroes.20 It was the mode of worship proper to Heroes, and men realized that in holding such contests they were really repeating the funeral ceremonies of a dead man.21 The cult of Heroes was the earliest breeding ground of the Agôn, that most characteristic feature of Greek life and school of the individualism that made the greatness of Greece. It was not unreasonable that afterwards many of the victors at the great Agônes were themselves raised by popular superstition to the number of the Heroes. The greatest Games of all, to which all Greece assembled, the Pythian, Olympian, Nemean, and Isthmian, were during the historical period, it is true, celebrated in honour of gods; but that they had been originally instituted as Funeral Games of Heroes and only subsequently transferred to higher guardianship was, at any rate, the general opinion of antiquity.22

Athletic contests for chieftains at the funeral of a notable person were known to Homer, and we've already mentioned them among other remnants in epic poetry from a once powerful cult of souls. But Homer didn’t know anything about them being repeated, certainly not about them occurring annually. The Greeks only came to recognize games held regularly after the cult of Heroes had matured. Many of these contests were closely linked to the yearly festivals of specific Heroes and were meant to honor their memory. Even in historical times, usually at the direction of the Delphic oracle, annual contests were established to honor Heroes. This was the worship style suitable for Heroes, and people understood that by holding such contests, they were essentially repeating the funeral ceremonies for a deceased individual. The cult of Heroes was the initial foundation of the Agôn, the most distinctive aspect of Greek life and the source of individualism that contributed to Greece's greatness. It wasn’t surprising that later many of the winners at the major Agônes were themselves lifted by popular belief into the ranks of Heroes. The greatest Games of all, to which all of Greece gathered—the Pythian, Olympian, Nemean, and Isthmian—were, during the historical period, indeed celebrated in honor of gods; however, it was generally believed in antiquity that they were originally established as Funeral Games for Heroes and only later adapted for divine recognition.

§ 3

The Heroes are, then, spirits of the dead, and not a species of inferior deities or “demigods”;23 and quite distinct again from the “daimones” known to later speculative thought and, indeed, to popular superstition. These latter are divine spirits of a lower order; but spirits which have always been exempt from death because they have never entered into the finite existence of men. The Heroes on the other hand have once been living men; from being men they have become Heroes, and that only after their death.24 Furthermore, they have now entered upon a higher stage of existence as a special class of beings who are named by the side of gods and men.25 In them we meet with something quite unknown to the Homeric poems—souls which after their death and separation from the body have a higher imperishable life.

The Heroes are spirits of the dead, not a kind of lesser deities or “demigods”;23 and they are also quite different from the “daimones” recognized by later philosophical thought and popular superstition. The latter are divine spirits of a lower rank who have always been free from death because they've never lived a finite human existence. In contrast, the Heroes were once living men; they have become Heroes, but only after their death.24 Moreover, they have now moved into a higher state of existence as a unique class of beings who are placed alongside gods and men.25 In them, we encounter something entirely new compared to the Homeric poems—souls that, after death and separation from the body, possess a higher, everlasting life.

But though the Heroes have once been men, it does not follow that all men become Heroes after their death. On the contrary, the Heroes, even though their number was not fixed 118 and limited, but continually admitted additions, remained an exception, a select minority which for that reason alone can be contrasted with ordinary humanity. The chief figures, the outstanding representatives of this heroic company, we may say, were those whose lifetime was fixed by legend or history in the distant past—who were in fact the ancestors of later humanity. The worship of Heroes is not, then, a cult of souls, but in a narrower sense a cult of ancestors. Even their name, as it appears, distinguishes the Heroes as men of the past. In the Iliad and the Odyssey “Hero” is the honourable title of chieftains, and also, generally, of all free men.26 Poetry of later centuries, so far as it touched upon the events of the legendary past, continued to use the word “Hero” in this sense. But when in post-Homeric times the speaker, whether he is a poet or prose-writer, regards the matter from the point of view of contemporary life, then by “Hero”, if he is referring to a man at all, he means a man of those days when, according to the Homeric poems, this honourable title was still in use among living men—he refers in a word to men belonging to the legendary past celebrated in poetry.27 In Hesiod’s narrative of the Five Ages of Men, the use of the word Hero is confined to the Champions of the wars at Thebes and Troy; they are called, as though by their special name, the “divine race of Heroes”.28 For Hesiod the “Heroes” are by no means the transfigured dead of past generations.29 He knows well enough of such transfigured dead of a still earlier past, but these he calls “Daimones”. And so, too, when in after times the name of Hero is applied to these favoured individuals who enjoy a higher life after their death, the name which in itself did not imply the higher nature of such departed spirits is evidently intended to show that the lifetime of those who had received this privilege after their death occurred in a legendary past. As these men of the distant past had been “Heroes” during their life, so, too, they must be called after their death. But the meaning of the word Hero has undergone a change, and now contains the additional notion of unending transfigured existence. The worship of the Heroes reveals itself as something quite new, a form of religious belief and cult, of which the Homeric poems at least gave no inkling. And, indeed, the conception of such transfigured ancestral souls living on in a higher state must have been a novel one, if no special word of ancient coinage could be found to express it, and a long-standing word of the epic vocabulary had to be pressed into a new sense.

But even though Heroes were once men, that doesn’t mean all men become Heroes after they die. On the contrary, the Heroes, despite their number not being fixed and constantly growing, remained an exception, a select minority that can be contrasted with ordinary humanity. The main figures, the standout representatives of this heroic group, were those whose lifetimes were defined by legend or history in the distant past—who were actually the ancestors of later humanity. The worship of Heroes is not just a cult of souls, but more specifically a cult of ancestors. Even their name clearly marks the Heroes as figures from the past. In the Iliad and the Odyssey, “Hero” is the honorable title for chieftains and generally for all free men. Poetry in later centuries, when referencing events from the legendary past, continued to use the word “Hero” in this way. But when, in post-Homeric times, a speaker—whether poet or prose writer—looks at things from the perspective of contemporary life, then by “Hero,” if he’s talking about a man at all, he means someone from the days when, according to the Homeric poems, this honorable title was still used for living men—he refers to individuals belonging to the legendary past celebrated in poetry. In Hesiod’s narrative of the Five Ages of Men, the term Hero is limited to the Champions of the wars at Thebes and Troy; they are referred to as the “divine race of Heroes.” For Hesiod, “Heroes” are not the transformed dead of past generations. He knows about such transformed dead from an even earlier time, but he calls them “Daimones.” Thus, when later on the name Hero is used for those favored individuals who live a higher existence after death, the term—which by itself doesn’t imply the elevated nature of such spirits—clearly serves to show that the lifetime of those who gained this privilege after death took place in a legendary past. Just as these men of the distant past were called “Heroes” during their lives, the same applies after their deaths. However, the meaning of the word Hero has changed, now incorporating the idea of unending transformed existence. The worship of the Heroes emerges as something completely new, a form of religious belief and cult that the Homeric poems did not hint at. In fact, the concept of such transformed ancestral souls living on in a higher state must have been a novel idea, if there was no suitable ancient word to express it, necessitating the adaptation of a long-standing word from epic vocabulary into a new meaning.

Whence came this new thing? If we try to derive it from 119 a natural process of development in the Homeric view of life we shall find ourselves in the greatest perplexity when it comes to showing the connecting links between two such widely different conceptions. It would not avail us much to say that the prestige of the epic was such that those whom it had honoured in song must have appeared so glorious and distinguished among mankind that it was natural for later imagination to transform them to demigods and to worship them as such. The Homeric poems, so violently opposed to any idea of a conscious or active existence of the soul after death, could hardly have brought it about that those very champions whom it had represented as indeed dead and departed to the distant land of Hades should be regarded as still living and exercising an influence from out their graves. Moreover, it is in the highest degree improbable that in the process of historical development it should have been just the champions of the epic from whose worship the cult of Heroes arose; for in cult, at any rate, with negligible exceptions, those champions played little part. And, indeed, that any cult at all should have arisen from the mere suggestions of fancy, such as the epic offered, is in itself unlikely. And it is essentially upon a religious cult that the belief in Heroes is founded.

Where did this new idea come from? If we try to trace it back to 119 a natural evolution in the Homeric understanding of life, we’ll get really confused when trying to find the links between two such different ideas. It wouldn’t really help to say that the epic enjoyed such prestige that those celebrated in song must have seemed so glorious and distinguished among people that it was natural for later imaginations to turn them into demigods and worship them as such. The Homeric poems, which strongly reject any notion of a conscious or active existence of the soul after death, could hardly have led to the idea that the champions they depicted as genuinely dead and gone to the far-off land of Hades should be seen as still living and influencing the world from their graves. Moreover, it’s extremely unlikely that in the historical process, it would have been exactly the champions of the epic from whose worship the cult of Heroes emerged; because, in cults, they played little role, with few exceptions. Indeed, it is improbable that any cult at all arose simply from the fanciful suggestions that the epic put forward, as the belief in Heroes is fundamentally rooted in a religious cult.

In fact after all that has been hitherto shown, what we see most plainly is the contrast between the belief in Heroes and Homeric conceptions. The fanciful thought of the translation of individuals to Islands of the Blest or the underground dwellings did not itself conflict with the implications of Homeric eschatology. The miraculous preservation in an immortal existence of men whom the gods loved did not involve the separation of soul from body, nor the consequence of that separation—the dim borderland existence of the disembodied soul. But the belief in Heroes was a different matter; that involved the continuation of a conscious mode of being, in the neighbourhood of the living, after death, and in spite of the separation of soul from body. This directly contradicts Homeric psychology. We should have to give up the attempt altogether to bring this new belief into any real relationship with earlier development—if we could not draw upon what we have learnt from our previous investigations. In the Homeric poems themselves, in striking contrast with the general conception there prevailing of the insubstantiality of the disembodied soul, we found vestiges of a once-vigorous cult of the soul which implied the existence of a corresponding belief in the conscious after-life of the soul and its lingering 120 in the neighbourhood of the living. From the study of Hesiod’s picture of the Five Ages of Men, we saw that, in fact, vestiges of an ancient belief in the continued and enhanced existence of dead men, of which no clear trace remained in Homer, had been preserved at least in occasional remote corners of the Greek countryside. But it was only the dead of a legendary past who were regarded by Hesiod as “Daimones”: the poet could relate no similar marvels from more recent periods, and still less of men in his own lifetime. Thus, we have in this case traces of ancestor-worship indeed, but not of a general worship of souls that is elsewhere the normal development of the worship of ancestors. So, then, in the worship of Heroes, what we have before us is not a general cult of the soul but a cult of ancestors. We may express the matter in this way: in the cult of the “Hero” a still burning spark of ancient belief is kindled to renewed flame—it is not the appearance of something entirely strange and new, but something long past and half-forgotten is awakened to new life. Those Daimones which arose from the men of the earlier golden and silver ages—whom the poet of the “Works and Days” had situated in the dimmest and remotest past—what are they but the “Heroes” worshipped by later ages under a new name and brought down nearer to the period of contemporary life?

In fact, after everything we've covered so far, what stands out most clearly is the contrast between the belief in Heroes and the ideas presented by Homer. The imaginative idea of individuals being transported to the Islands of the Blest or having underground homes didn’t really clash with Homeric views on the afterlife. The miraculous preservation of men favored by the gods in an eternal existence didn’t require separating the soul from the body, nor did it involve the outcome of that separation—the vague existence of the disembodied soul. However, the belief in Heroes was a different story; it involved the continuation of a conscious existence close to the living, even after death, despite the separation of soul from body. This directly contradicts Homeric ideas about the mind and soul. We would have to completely abandon the effort to connect this new belief with earlier developments—if we couldn’t refer to what we’ve learned from our prior studies. In the Homeric poems themselves, in stark contrast to the prevailing idea there about the insubstantial nature of the disembodied soul, we found remnants of a once-strong cult of the soul that suggested a belief in the conscious afterlife of the soul and its lingering 120 near the living. From studying Hesiod’s depiction of the Five Ages of Men, we saw that remnants of an ancient belief in the continued and improved existence of the dead, which was largely absent in Homer, were preserved at least in some remote parts of the Greek countryside. But only the dead from a legendary past were viewed by Hesiod as “Daimones”: the poet couldn't recount similar wonders from more recent times and even less so from men still alive during his time. Therefore, in this instance, we find traces of ancestor-worship, but not a general worship of souls that is generally the normal evolution of ancestor worship. So, in the worship of Heroes, what we see is not a widespread cult of the soul but a cult of ancestors. We can put it this way: in the cult of the “Hero,” a still-glowing spark of ancient belief is reignited—it’s not the emergence of something entirely unfamiliar and new, but rather something long gone and half-forgotten that is brought back to life. Those Daimones that emerged from men of the earlier golden and silver ages—whom the poet of the “Works and Days” placed in the dimmest and most distant past—what are they but the “Heroes” worshipped by later generations under a new name and brought closer to contemporary life?

§ 4

How it came about that the cult of ancestors was rescued from partial, and more than partial, oblivion, and rose to a new and lasting importance, that, indeed, we cannot say. We can give no real explanation indicative of the origin and progress of this important development in Greek religious life. We know neither the time nor the place of the first serious revival of this newly awakened primitive worship; nor can we tell the manner or stages of its diffusion during those obscure years of the eighth and seventh centuries. We can, however, bring the fact of the revival of ancestor-worship into relation with a number of other facts which prove that during those years many hitherto buried or repressed ideas about the life of gods and men came to the surface again out of the depths of popular faith and out of an older worship of the gods that had never quite died out. This revival did not, indeed, suppress the Homeric view entirely—that never occurred—but it did set itself on a level with that view. The great movement with which we shall be dealing in the next chapter also contributed to the progress of the belief in Heroes. Many other favouring 121 circumstances may in detail have helped to strengthen that belief. Even the epic itself had in one point at least approached the ideas that were receiving a new life in the worship of Heroes. Many of the local gods who had faded before the new deities of common Hellenic belief had been reduced to the rank of humanity and joined in heroic adventure. By a sort of compromise effected with the local cult of such gods the epic poets had been led, in a few cases, to the creation of a remarkable series of figures in which the divine and the human was wonderfully mixed. These champions and seers of old time, as they had once been mortal men among other men, so now after their departure must they live on and have influence eternally like the gods. We can easily see the close resemblance that exists between such figures as Amphiaraos or Trophonios and the Heroes of later belief; in fact, both of them, when they were not called gods, were frequently reckoned among these Heroes. But for all that, they are only quasi-Heroes; prototypes of the real Heroes they can never have been. They have been translated during their lifetime, and live on immortally just because they have never tasted death. They, with those others translated to the Islands of the Blest, represent the idea of immortality in the only form recognized by the Homeric poetry. The Heroes of the newly awakening creed, on the contrary, have died unmistakably; and yet they continue to live on, though relieved of their bodies. They are entirely distinct from the translated few of the epic tradition. They emerge out of the obscurity of the half-remembered past as something strange—as something, indeed, opposed to the circle of ideas influenced by the epic.

How the ancestor cult was saved from being mostly forgotten and became significantly important again, we can't really say. We can't provide a true explanation of how this important shift in Greek religious life started or developed. We don't know when or where the revival of this old worship began, nor can we describe how it spread during those unclear years of the eighth and seventh centuries. However, we can connect the revival of ancestor worship to several other facts showing that many previously buried or suppressed beliefs about the lives of gods and people resurfaced during that time, revitalizing older forms of worship that had never completely died out. This revival didn’t completely overshadow the Homeric perspective—it didn't just disappear—but it did exist alongside it. The significant movement we will discuss in the next chapter also played a role in believing in Heroes. Many other favorable circumstances might have also helped strengthen that belief. Even the epic itself touched on some ideas that were gaining new life in Hero worship. Many local gods, who had faded with the rise of the new common Hellenic deities, became human and joined heroic adventures. Through a compromise with the local cults of these gods, epic poets sometimes created an impressive series of figures where the divine and human blended beautifully. These champions and seers of the past, who once lived as ordinary men, continue to live on and exert influence like the gods after their departure. It’s clear that figures like Amphiaraos or Trophonios closely resemble the later Heroes; in fact, both were often counted among these Heroes when they weren't called gods. But even so, they are only quasi-Heroes; they can never truly be prototypes of real Heroes. They were transformed during their lives and continue to exist immortally precisely because they never experienced death. Together with those other beings moved to the Islands of the Blest, they represent the only form of immortality recognized by Homeric poetry. On the other hand, the Heroes of the newly emerging belief have undoubtedly died; yet they continue to live on, even without their bodies. They are completely distinct from the few transformed figures of the epic tradition. They emerge from the hazy past as something strange—something indeed, opposite to the ideas shaped by the epic.

It was not from poetic imagination or story that the Heroes took their origin, but from the remains of an ancient pre-Homeric belief which local worship had preserved alive.

It wasn't from poetic imagination or storytelling that the Heroes originated, but from the remnants of an ancient pre-Homeric belief that local worship had kept alive.

§ 5

The worship of a Hero is everywhere connected with the site of his grave. That is the general rule proved in innumerable cases. That is why in the case of a more than ordinarily revered Hero, his grave as the centre of his worship is set up in some prominent and honourable place—the market-place of the city, the Prytaneion,30 or, like the grave of Pelops in the Altis at Olympia, in the very middle of the holy precinct, in the thick of the festival crowd.31 Or else the Hero who guarded the city and the land might have his grave in the wall of the city gate or upon the farthest border of its territory.32 Where his grave is, there the Hero is fast bound; that is his 122 dwelling-place.33 This idea prevails everywhere, though it may not be given such blunt expression as at Tronis, in the country of the Phocians, where the blood of the offering made to the Hero was poured down through an opening immediately into his grave mound.34 It is implied, as a rule, in these cases that the grave contains the bones of the Hero. The bones—all that is left of his mortality—chain the Hero to his grave. Hence, when it was thought desirable to attach a Hero and his protective power to a city his bones (or what were taken for such) on the command of an oracle were brought from a foreign land and laid to rest in his native country. We possess many accounts of such transference of relics.35 Most of them occurred in the distant past, but we also read how in the full light of history in the year 476 enlightened Athens brought over the bones of Theseus from Skyros;36 and not until they were buried in the Theseion was Theseus properly attached to Athens.

The worship of a Hero is always linked to the location of his grave. This is a general rule shown in countless examples. That’s why, for a particularly honored Hero, his grave as the focus of his worship is placed in a prominent and respected location—the city’s market square, the Prytaneion, or, like Pelops’ grave in the Altis at Olympia, right in the middle of the sacred area, surrounded by the festival crowd. Alternatively, the Hero who protected the city and the land might have his grave in the wall of the city gate or on the farthest edge of its territory. Where his grave is located, there the Hero is firmly attached; that is his dwelling place. This idea is common everywhere, even if it isn’t stated as plainly as it is at Tronis, in the land of the Phocians, where the blood of the offering made to the Hero was poured through an opening straight into his grave mound. It is generally implied in these cases that the grave holds the Hero's bones. The bones—everything that remains of his human existence—connect the Hero to his grave. Thus, when it was thought important to connect a Hero and his protective power to a city, his bones (or what were believed to be such) were brought from a foreign land and buried in his homeland at the command of an oracle. We have many accounts of such transfers of relics. Most of them happened in ancient times, but we also read about how, in 476, enlightened Athens retrieved the bones of Theseus from Skyros; and only after they were buried in the Theseion was Theseus properly linked to Athens.

Since the possession of the corporeal remains37 of the Hero secured the possession of the Hero himself, the cities often protected themselves against strangers, who might remove the treasured bones, by keeping the position of the grave a secret.38 A grave is always necessary to fix the Hero at a definite place, or, at least, an “empty tomb”, which sometimes had to do duty for a grave.39 In such cases the Hero was perhaps thought of as bound by a spell to that place.40 As a rule, it is the remains of his former body that hold him fast. But these remains are a part of the Hero himself; though dead (and mummified, as we are told in one case),41 he works and acts just the same; his psyche, his invisible counterpart and double, hovers in the neighbourhood of the body and the grave.

Since having the physical remains37 of the Hero meant possessing the Hero himself, cities often kept their burial sites hidden to protect them from outsiders who might steal the precious bones.38 A grave is always essential to anchor the Hero to a specific location, or at least an “empty tomb” that sometimes had to serve as a grave.39 In those instances, the Hero was perhaps believed to be magically tied to that spot.40 Generally, it’s the remains of his bodily form that keep him grounded. But these remains are part of the Hero; even though he is dead (and mummified, as we’re told in one account),41 he continues to function and act just the same; his psyche, his unseen counterpart and double, lingers near the body and the grave.

These are all very primitive conceptions such as have, as a rule, only been preserved among peoples who have remained at a very undeveloped stage of culture.42 When we find them in force among Greeks of post-Homeric times, we cannot really believe that they arose then for the first time, in complete contrast with the clear-sighted freedom of the men of the Homeric age. They have only re-emerged from the repressive influence of the Homeric rationalism. It would be natural to think that the same ideas that have been described as underlying the belief in Heroes were already in the minds of those prehistoric Greeks who in Mycenae and elsewhere took such care (even it seems going so far as to embalm them)43 to preserve the bodies of their princes from destruction, and who put ornaments and utensils in their graves for future use 123 or enjoyment. It has been explained above how, in the times of which Homer’s poems give us a picture, the alteration in sentiment as well as the spread of the custom of completely destroying the bodies of the dead with fire must have weakened the belief in the confinement of the soul to this world and to the remains of the body. This belief never entirely perished. It was preserved alive, perhaps for a long time only by a few, in those places where there remained a cult attached to a grave. Such a cult would not, indeed, extend to those whose death had occurred within more recent times, but it did not allow the old-established worship of the great dead of the past to die out entirely. Over the royal graves on the citadel at Mycenae stood a sacrificial hearth,44 which bears witness to the continuance of the ancient worship of the kings buried there. The Catalogue of Ships in Homer mentions the “grave of Aipytos”, an old Arcadian local monarch, as a landmark of the district;45 may not the sanctity of that grave have been preserved? In many places, at any rate, graves were pointed out and honoured that belonged to Heroes who owed their existence solely to poetic fancy or were even mere personifications—abstractions of the names of places and countries whose ancestors they purported to be. In such cases the Hero-worship had become purely symbolic, and often perhaps a mere formality. But from such a fictitious ancestor-worship the cult of the graves of Heroes cannot possibly have arisen; such fictions are themselves only intelligible as copies of another and more vivid worship, of a cult of real ancestors. If no such cult had existed in actual fact before men’s eyes, it would be impossible to understand how men came to imitate ancestor-worship in the shape of such purely imaginary creatures. A copy implies the existence of a model; a symbol requires the contemporary or earlier existence of the reality symbolized. We should certainly know more of the worship of ancestors among the ancient royal families if in nearly all the Greek states monarchy had not been abolished at an early period and all traces of it suppressed. Sparta alone provides us with a solitary example of what may once have been the prevailing custom in all the seats of royal authority. When a Spartan king died his funeral was celebrated with extreme pomp. His body (which, even when he had died abroad, was embalmed and brought home to Sparta) was laid beside the other dead of his family, and honour was paid to him, in Xenophon’s words, not as a man, but as a Hero.46 In this case, which undoubtedly represents a traditional usage handed down from remote 124 antiquity, we have the rudiments of Hero-worship as applied to the dead of a royal family. The members of noble families who, like the Eupatridai of Athens, sometimes traced their descent from a king,47 must also have retained from ancient times the practice of ancestor-worship. As of all unofficial cults, we hear little of the cults of the old clans based on blood-relationship and connexion by marriage (γένη, πάτραι). But just as out of their combination first the village communities and then the fully organized Greek Polis grew up, so, too, the religious cults which were paid to the ancestors of these unions of kinsfolk set a pattern for the manifold social groups out of which the developed state was built up.48

These are all very basic concepts that typically have only survived among cultures that have remained at a very undeveloped stage of society. When we find these beliefs among Greeks after the time of Homer, it's hard to believe they just emerged then, completely opposing the clear-minded freedom of the Homeric era. They likely resurfaced from the restrictive influence of Homeric rationality. It seems reasonable to think that the same ideas connected to the belief in Heroes were already in the minds of prehistoric Greeks who, in Mycenae and other places, took great care (even going so far as to embalm them) to preserve the bodies of their rulers from decay, and who placed items and decorations in their graves for future use or enjoyment. It's been explained how, during the times depicted in Homer's poems, changes in sentiment and the widespread practice of completely cremating the dead likely diminished the belief that souls were bound to this world and the remains of the body. This belief never completely disappeared. It was likely kept alive, maybe only by a few people, in places where there remained a cult connected to a grave. Such a cult wouldn't typically include those who had died more recently, but it still ensured that the established worship of the deceased greats of the past didn't entirely fade away. A sacrificial hearth stood over the royal graves at the Mycenaean citadel, witnessing the ongoing veneration of the kings buried there. The Catalogue of Ships in Homer references the “grave of Aipytos,” an old local king of Arcadia, as a landmark for the region; might the sacredness of that grave have been maintained? In many areas, graves were recognized and honored, belonging to Heroes who were either created by poetic imagination or were simply personifications—abstractions of place names and regions they claimed descent from. In these cases, the worship of Heroes had become purely symbolic and perhaps just a formality. However, such fictitious ancestor-worship could not have originated from the worship of heroes; these fabrications are only understandable as imitations of another, more vivid worship, that of real ancestors. If no such worship had existed in reality, it wouldn't make sense how people began to mimic ancestor-worship for entirely imaginary figures. A copy implies there’s an original; a symbol needs the real thing it represents to exist at the same time or earlier. We would surely know more about ancestor worship among ancient royal families if, in nearly every Greek state, monarchies hadn't been abolished early on and all traces suppressed. Sparta is the only place that gives us a glimpse of what might have been the usual practice in the former royal seats. When a Spartan king passed away, his funeral was marked by great ceremony. His body (even if he died abroad, it was embalmed and transported back to Sparta) was laid to rest alongside other deceased family members, and he was honored, in Xenophon’s words, not just as a man, but as a Hero. In this instance, which undoubtedly reflects a traditional practice passed down from ancient times, we see the beginnings of Hero-worship applied to the deceased members of a royal family. Members of noble families, like the Eupatridai of Athens, who sometimes traced their lineage back to a king, likely also maintained the practice of ancestor-worship from ancient times. Like all unofficial cults, we hear little about the cults of ancient clans based on blood relations and marriage connections. But just as their coming together first formed village communities and then the fully organized Greek Polis, the religious honors they paid to their ancestors established a model for the various social groups that contributed to the development of the state.

§ 6

The “clans” that we meet with at Athens and in other Greek states are, as a rule, groups for which a demonstrable common kinship is no longer a condition of membership. The majority of such politically recognized, self-contained clans assemble together for the common worship of particular gods but many also honour a Hero as well, who generally in such cases gives his name to the clan. Thus, the Eteoboutadai at Athens paid honour to Boutes, the Alkmaionidai to Alkmaion, the Bouzygai to Bouzyges, in Sparta and Argos Talthybios was worshipped by the Talthybiadai, etc. And in these cases, as the name of the clan itself shows, the Hero of their common worship was regarded as the ancestor of the clan.49 Further, this ancestor-worship and the name derived from a common, even if fictitious, ancestor, distinguished the clans from the cult-associations of a different origin which since the time of Kleisthenes had been put on a footing of legal equality with the clans in the phratries. The members of these associations (Orgeones) lacked a common name, the existence of which, therefore, indicated in the case of the members of a clan a closer bond of union than mere membership of a religious association which had been chosen at will, and was not decided by the fact of birth.

The "clans" we encounter in Athens and other Greek states are generally groups where a clear common ancestry is no longer a requirement for membership. Most of these politically recognized, self-contained clans come together to worship specific gods, but many also honor a Hero, who typically lends his name to the clan. For example, the Eteoboutadai in Athens honored Boutes, the Alkmaionidai honored Alkmaion, the Bouzygai honored Bouzyges, and in Sparta and Argos, Talthybios was worshiped by the Talthybiadai, and so on. In these cases, as the clan names indicate, the Hero they worshipped was viewed as the ancestor of the clan.49 Moreover, this ancestor worship and the name derived from a shared, even if fictional, ancestor set the clans apart from other types of cult associations that, since the time of Kleisthenes, had been granted legal equality with clans in the phratries. Members of these associations (Orgeones) did not have a common name, which means that, for clan members, having a shared name indicated a stronger bond than mere participation in a voluntary religious association, which was not determined by birth.

Everywhere these clans kept up the outward formalities of ancestor-worship; and the formality must once have had meaning. However the publicly recognized clans may have developed their own special characteristics, in their origin, at least, they must go back (like the Roman gentes) to associations of kinsfolk developed from the family (extended through the male line) and held together by a real bond of kinship. Even the purely symbolical ancestor-worship of the later “clans”, of which hardly a single one could have shown the 125 pedigree of its descent from the reputed common ancestor, must have arisen from the real ancestor-worship of genuine groups of kinsfolk. The imitation in this case, too, points to the existence at some time of an original.

Everywhere these clans maintained the outward rituals of ancestor worship, which must have once held significance. While the publicly recognized clans may have developed their own unique traits, they must trace their origins (much like the Roman gentes) back to associations of relatives that grew from the family (extended through the male line) and were connected by genuine kinship. Even the purely symbolic ancestor worship of the later "clans," which could hardly prove the 125 lineage from the supposed common ancestor, must have emerged from the authentic ancestor worship of real groups of relatives. This imitation also indicates the existence of an original at some point in time.

In the same way the larger groups into which the Athenian state since the time of Kleisthenes was divided were unable to dispense with the practice of association for the cult of a commonly worshipped Hero. The Heroes of the newly organized phylai50 had their temple, land, priests, statues, and regular cult; and so also had the Heroes of the smaller purely local divisions, the demes. Here, too, the fiction of ancestor-worship was kept up; the names of the phylai, always patronymic in form, represent the members of each phyle as the descendants of the Hero Eponymos or Archegetes of the phyle.51 The demes also in many cases have patronymic titles which for the most part are also known to us as the names of aristocratic families.52 It is evident that in such demes the members of individual aristocratic families had settled down together or near each other. The Archegetes, whether real or fictitious, of the family must then have been regarded as the Archegetes of the deme. We thus see how the cult of a family ancestor, taken over by a wider group of worshippers, might be preserved and extended—little as the cult might benefit in sincerity by such political enlargement.

In the same way, the larger groups that the Athenian state was divided into since the time of Kleisthenes still relied on the practice of coming together to honor a commonly worshipped Hero. The Heroes of the newly organized phylai50 had their temples, land, priests, statues, and regular worship; and the Heroes of the smaller local divisions, the demes, had the same. Here too, the idea of ancestor-worship was maintained; the names of the phylai, which were always in patronymic form, represent the members of each phyle as descendants of the Hero Eponymos or Archegetes of that phyle.51 The demes also often have patronymic titles, which are mostly known to us as the names of aristocratic families.52 It’s clear that in these demes, members of individual aristocratic families settled together or close by. The Archegetes, whether real or imaginary, of the family were seen as the Archegetes of the deme. This shows how the worship of a family ancestor, adopted by a larger group of worshippers, could be preserved and expanded—even if such political growth might not enhance the sincerity of the worship.

The cult of Heroes everywhere has the same features as the cult of ancestors; at least, the more influential Heroes, those worshipped by the greater communities, were everywhere regarded as the forefathers and progenitors of the groups of countryfolk, citizens, or kinsmen who honoured them. The fact that the persons of these prehistoric Heroes owed their existence almost without exception solely to poetry or fancy allows us to conclude that at the time when ancestor-worship had its re-birth in Hero-worship, the memory of the real Archegetai of the country, the ancestors of the ruling families and clans, together with their cult, had fallen into oblivion. A great or illustrious name was introduced where the real name was no longer known. More often, even when the real forefather of the clan was still well known, the name of a great man of the primeval past was placed at the head of the list in order to throw the origin of the family as far back into the past as possible and connect it the more closely with a divine source.53 Men thus came to worship a phantom, often a mere symbol, of an ancestor. But they held fast to the imitation of real ancestor-worship; the remains of a true cult of ancestors provided the model and were the real starting-point for the later belief and cult of Heroes. 126

The cult of Heroes everywhere shares the same characteristics as the cult of ancestors; at least, the more prominent Heroes, those celebrated by larger communities, were seen as the founders and progenitors of the groups of locals, citizens, or relatives who honored them. The fact that these prehistoric Heroes existed almost entirely through poetry or imagination allows us to conclude that by the time ancestor-worship was revived as Hero-worship, the memory of the actual Archegetai of the country, the ancestors of the ruling families and clans, along with their worship, had been forgotten. A notable name was used when the real name was no longer known. More often, even when the actual forefather of the clan was still recognized, the name of a great figure from ancient times was placed at the top of the list to trace the family's origins as far back as possible and connect it closely to a divine source. Men thus came to worship a ghost, often merely a symbol, of an ancestor. But they clung to the imitation of true ancestor-worship; the remnants of a real cult of ancestors served as the model and were the true starting point for the later belief and worship of Heroes. 126

§ 7

We can no longer follow in detail the process of development and extension which the idea of the Hero underwent. The accounts which we possess show us the fully developed product, not the steps which led up to this result. We first get an idea of the number of Hero-cults existing in Greece during the greatest period of its history from the enormous number of graves or cults of Heroes mentioned by Pausanias in the account of his travels in the age of the Antonines over the most important countries of the Greece that was now fast falling into decay. Nearly all the legendary figures celebrated in epic poetry were now worshipped as Heroes, whether in their own homes (as Achilles in Thessaly, Aias at Salamis, etc.) or in other places that either claimed to possess their graves (as the Delphians did that of Neoptolemos, the people of Sybaris that of Philoktetes, etc.) or else, through the genealogical relationship of their leading families with the Heroes, regarded themselves as closely connected with them (as, for example, the Athenians with Aias and his sons). In the colonies especially the Hero-cults, like the ingredients of the population, may have been a motley crew; thus, in Tarentum the Atreidai, the Tydidai, the Aiakidai, the Laertiadai, and especially the Agamemnonidai were worshipped in a combined Hero-cult, and Achilles also had a temple of his own.54

We can’t delve into the detailed process of development and expansion that the idea of the Hero underwent anymore. The accounts we have show us the fully formed concept, not the steps that led to it. We first get an idea of the number of Hero-cults existing in Greece during its most magnificent period from the vast number of graves or cults of Heroes mentioned by Pausanias in his travel accounts during the age of the Antonines, covering the most significant regions of Greece, which was now rapidly declining. Nearly all the legendary figures celebrated in epic poetry were now worshipped as Heroes, whether in their own lands (like Achilles in Thessaly, Aias at Salamis, etc.) or in other locations that claimed to house their graves (like the Delphians with Neoptolemos, the people of Sybaris with Philoktetes, etc.) or, through genealogical ties with their leading families, regarded themselves as closely linked to them (for instance, the Athenians with Aias and his sons). In the colonies, especially, the Hero-cults, like the population itself, may have been quite diverse; for example, in Tarentum, the Atreidai, the Tydidai, the Aiakidai, the Laertiadai, and especially the Agamemnonidai were all worshipped in a combined Hero-cult, and Achilles also had his own temple.

There were Heroes with famous names who may yet have owed their subsequent elevation to that position, during the times of the greatest extent of the cult, in part to their fame in ancient poetry. Side by side with these were a host of obscurer figures whose memory had been kept alive by their cult alone, which a small circle of country or city folk had paid to them from primitive times. These are the real “national Heroes”, of whose worship Drakon had spoken; as true forebears and real ancestors of their country they, too, are called “Archegetai”.55 We are told the names of the seven Archegetai of Plataea to whom Aristeides was commanded by the Delphic oracle to sacrifice before the battle of Plataea; not one of them is ever heard of again.56 It might happen that the name of a Hero to whom worship had been paid from time immemorial might no longer be known even to the dwellers near his grave. In the market at Elis there stood a little temple whose roof was supported on wooden pillars; men knew that this was the chapel belonging to a grave, but no one could give the name of the Hero buried there.57 In the market at Herakleia on the Black Sea was a monument of a Hero 127 overshadowed by wild olive-trees; it contained the body of that Hero whom once the Delphian oracle had bidden the founders of Herakleia to placate. The learned differed as to his name; the inhabitants of Herakleia called him simply “the local Hero”.58 In the Hippodrome at Olympia stood a round altar at which the chariot horses used to shy. It was disputed what Hero lay buried there, but the people called him, after the effect he had on the horses, simply Taraxippos.59 In the same way many Heroes, instead of being called by their real names, were more often referred to by adjectives which recalled their nature or their power or some external detail of their appearance.60 At Athens there was a Hero Physician, a Hero General, and a Hero Garland-bearer.61 Many a Hero may have been known to the neighbourhood which worshipped him simply as “the Hero”.62 In such cases it was entirely due to the grave and the cult attached to the grave that the Hero’s memory had been preserved at all. There might, indeed, be stories current as to his doings and nature as a “spirit”, but what it was that had marked him out in his lifetime and caused his elevation to a Hero was totally forgotten. Undoubtedly these are precisely the oldest Hero-cults. In the instances quoted from Elis, Herakleia and Olympia, first one and then another of the famous champions of antiquity were supposed to be buried under that nameless gravestone. But, often enough, the doubt was suppressed, and by an arbitrary and successful imposition some famous name out of the heroic legend may have been substituted as occupant of such ownerless or unclaimed grave sanctuaries.

There were Heroes with well-known names who might have gained their later status during the peak of their worship, partly due to their fame in ancient poetry. Alongside them were many lesser-known figures whose memory survived solely because of their cult, honored by a small group of locals from ancient times. These are the true "national Heroes" Drakon mentioned; as genuine forebears and real ancestors of their homeland, they, too, are called "Archegetai." 55 We know the names of the seven Archegetai of Plataea to whom Aristeides was instructed by the Delphic oracle to sacrifice before the battle of Plataea; none of them are ever mentioned again.56 Sometimes, the name of a Hero who had been worshipped for ages might not even be known by locals living nearby his grave. In the market at Elis, there was a small temple supported by wooden pillars; people were aware that this was a shrine linked to a tomb, but no one could name the Hero buried there.57 In the market at Herakleia on the Black Sea stood a monument of a Hero 127 shaded by wild olive trees; it held the remains of the Hero whom the Delphian oracle had instructed the founders of Herakleia to appease. Scholars disagreed about his name; the people of Herakleia referred to him simply as "the local Hero." 58 In the Hippodrome at Olympia, there was a round altar where the chariot horses used to act up. There was debate about which Hero was buried there, but people called him simply Taraxippos, after the effect he had on the horses.59 Similarly, many Heroes were more often referred to by descriptive names reflecting their qualities, powers, or physical characteristics rather than their actual names.60 In Athens, there was a Hero Physician, a Hero General, and a Hero Garland-bearer.61 Many Heroes may have only been known to their local worshippers as “the Hero.” 62 In such cases, it was mainly the grave and the worship related to it that kept the Hero's memory alive. There may have been tales about his deeds and character as a "spirit," but what distinguished him in life and led to his becoming a Hero was completely forgotten. Undoubtedly, these are among the oldest Hero-cults. In the examples from Elis, Herakleia, and Olympia, people speculated that one famous champion after another was buried under that nameless gravestone. Yet often, the uncertainty was overlooked, and through an arbitrary and successful imposition, a famed name from heroic legend might have been used as the occupant of such nameless or unclaimed grave sites.

§ 8

As a rule there was no difficulty in securing great or famous names when it was necessary to find a patron-Hero for the city. In particular the founder of the city and its regular worship of the gods, and the whole divine circle which hedged round the life of the citizens, was regularly worshipped with high honour as Hero Archegetes.63 Naturally, they were mostly mythical or even arbitrarily invented figures to whom the greater or lesser cities of Greece, as well as their offshoots in foreign lands, did honour as their “Founder”.

As a general rule, it was easy to find well-known or legendary figures whenever there was a need for a patron hero for the city. Specifically, the founder of the city and its established worship of the gods, along with the entire divine circle that surrounded the lives of the citizens, was customarily honored with great respect as Hero Archegetes. 63 Naturally, most of these figures were either mythical or even randomly created characters that various cities in Greece, along with their colonies abroad, recognized as their "Founder."

But from the times when colonies were frequently dispatched and laid out in accordance with a carefully thought-out plan, under the leadership of a single person (generally named by an oracle) who was given plenipotentiary powers,64 this real Oikistes was himself usually promoted after his death to the rank of Hero. Pindar speaks of the sacred grave of the 128 Hero-founder of Kyrene in the marketplace of the city;65 the inhabitants of the Thracian Chersonnese made sacrifices to Miltiades the son of Kypselos as their Oikistes, “as the custom is,” and held games annually in his honour;66 at Katana, in Sicily, Hieron of Syracuse was buried, and was worshipped with the honours of a Hero as the Founder of the city.67 At Abdera the Teians on the occasion of the second founding of the city restored to his position of Hero its original founder Timesios.68 On the other hand, the original and real Oikistes of a colony might be deprived of his worship if the inhabitants quarrelled with the mother country, and another “Founder” chosen after the event and given the highest honours of a Hero in his place. This was what happened in the year 422 with Hagnon and Brasidas in Amphipolis.69

But back when colonies were often sent out and established according to a well-thought-out plan, typically led by a single individual (usually chosen by an oracle) who was given full authority,64 this true Oikistes was often honored after his death with the title of Hero. Pindar mentions the sacred grave of the 128 Hero-founder of Kyrene in the city's marketplace;65 the people of the Thracian Chersonnese made sacrifices to Miltiades the son of Kypselos as their Oikistes, “as the custom is,” and held annual games in his honor;66 at Katana in Sicily, Hieron of Syracuse was buried and worshipped with Heroic honors as the Founder of the city.67 In Abdera, the Teians, during the second founding of the city, reinstated its original founder Timesios to his position as Hero.68 However, the original and true Oikistes of a colony could lose his worship if the residents clashed with the mother city, and another “Founder” could be chosen afterward and given the highest honors of a Hero instead. This occurred in the year 422 with Hagnon and Brasidas in Amphipolis.69

In these cases Hero-making leaves the sacred mists of antiquity and enters the light of the contemporary world: faith and cult become profaned by political motives. The name of Hero, once applied only to the glorified figures of the far distant past, now that such Heroizing of the recent dead was possible, must have begun to have the more general meaning of one who has come to enjoy a higher nature and enlarged capacities after his death. In fact, any kind of prominence during a man’s lifetime seems at last to have given him a virtual claim to heroic honours after his death. As Heroes are now regarded, great kings such as Gelon of Syracuse, law-givers such as Lykourgos of Sparta,70 and even representatives of poetic genius from Homer down to Aeschylus and Sophokles,71 no less than the most famous victors in the contests of bodily skill and strength. One of the Olympic victors, Philippos of Kroton, was reputed to be the most beautiful man in Greece of his time. Over his grave the people of Egesta, so Herodotos (v, 47) tells us, erected a Hero’s temple and paid honour to him with sacrifice as to a Hero merely on account of his great personal beauty.

In these cases, Hero-making moves away from the sacred mists of the past and steps into the light of the modern world: faith and cult are tainted by political motives. The term Hero, which was once reserved for the glorified figures of a distant past, now that we can also idolize the recently deceased, must have started to take on a broader meaning. It now refers to someone who gains a higher status and greater abilities after death. In fact, any notable achievement during a person's life seems to lead to a claim for heroic honors posthumously. Today, Heroes are seen as great kings like Gelon of Syracuse, law-givers like Lykourgos of Sparta, and also renowned poets from Homer to Aeschylus and Sophokles, as well as the most celebrated champions in athletic competitions. One of the Olympic winners, Philippos of Kroton, was known as the most beautiful man in Greece during his time. Over his grave, the people of Egesta, as Herodotos tells us, built a temple to honor him as a Hero simply because of his extraordinary beauty.

Still, religious or superstitious motives were not always absent. They were particularly to the fore in the numerous cases where the extent and importance of the world of Heroes were added to on the recommendation of the Delphic oracle. Ever since the Delphic priesthood had risen from its obscure beginnings to a recognized position as the supreme authority in all questions of spiritual right, the opinion of the oracle had been sought on all occurrences that seemed to have any connexion with the unseen world. Especially in the case of prolonged drought or infertility of the soil, or when pestilential sicknesses had attacked a part of the country, was the oracle 129 requested to state the origin of the misfortune. In many cases the answer of the oracle would be that the origin of the evil lay in the anger of a Hero who was to be placated by sacrifice and the foundation of a permanent worship; or it would command that the plague should be averted by the recovery of the bones of a Hero from a foreign land, which should then be preserved at home and be the object of an official cult.72 Innumerable cults had their origin in this way, nor do the examples all belong to a half-legendary past. When pestilence and dearth broke out in the island of Cyprus after the death of Kimon, the oracle bade the inhabitants of Kition “not to slight” Kimon, but to regard him as a “higher” being, i.e. do him honour as a Hero.73 So, too, when some one possessed by special religious scruples inquired the cause of a strange vision that he had had, or of the remarkable appearance of the body of one lately dead,74 the oracle would often trace the matter to the action of a Hero who must forthwith be given an official cult. When a serious undertaking lay before a state, whether it was the invasion of a foreign land or a decisive battle in war, the oracle would bid the inquirers first placate the Heroes of the country that was to be attacked or where the battle was to be fought.75 Sometimes the oracle of its own accord, without being applied to, commanded the honours of a Hero to be paid to a dead man.76

Still, religious or superstitious reasons were often present. They were especially apparent in the many instances where the significance of the world of Heroes was emphasized based on the advice of the Delphic oracle. Since the Delphic priesthood had evolved from humble beginnings to a recognized authority on all matters of spiritual law, people sought the oracle's opinion on any events that seemed connected to the unseen world. This was particularly true during extended periods of drought, infertility of the land, or when outbreaks of disease affected the region; the oracle was asked to identify the source of the misfortune. Often, the oracle would respond that the cause of the problem was the wrath of a Hero who needed to be appeased with sacrifices and established worship. Alternatively, it might instruct them to avert the plague by retrieving the bones of a Hero from abroad, which should then be kept locally and honored with an official cult. Countless cults originated in this way, and these examples aren't just from a distant past. For instance, when famine and disease struck the island of Cyprus after Kimon's death, the oracle instructed the residents of Kition to “not disregard” Kimon, but to recognize him as a “higher” being, meaning they should honor him as a Hero. Similarly, when someone with strong religious beliefs asked about a strange vision or the unusual appearance of a recently deceased person, the oracle would frequently link it to a Hero's influence that required an official cult to be established. When a significant endeavor faced a state, whether it involved invading another land or a critical battle, the oracle would tell the inquirers to first honor the Heroes of the territory to be invaded or where the conflict was to take place. Sometimes, the oracle would, without being asked, instruct that honors be given to a deceased person as a Hero.

A peculiar case is that of Kleomedes of Astypalaia. This man had at the 71st Olympic festival (486) killed his opponent in the boxing match. He was disqualified by the Hellanodikai from taking his crown and returned home to Astypalaia full of indignation. There he tore down the pillar which supported the roof of a boys’ school, and on the destruction of the boys fled to Athene’s temple where he hid himself in a chest. His pursuers vainly sought to open the lid of the chest and at last the chest itself had to be broken into by main force. But Kleomedes was not found inside, either alive or dead. The envoys sent to inquire of the oracle were informed that Kleomedes had become a Hero, and that he must be honoured with sacrifice since he was no longer a mortal.77 And so the inhabitants of Astypalaia paid honour to Kleomedes as a Hero. In this case the simple conception of a Hero as one raised to divine power after his death is united with the ancient belief, which had never quite died out since the great days of the epic, in the translation of individual mortals who without dying disappear from sight to enter immortal life with body and soul complete. Such a miracle seemed to have occurred once again in the case of Kleomedes. He had “disappeared” and 130 been “carried away”.78 He could, however, only be called a “Hero” because there was no common name to describe the effect of translation which made men no longer mortals nor yet gods. The oracle called Kleomedes “the last of the Heroes”; indeed, it might well appear time to close at last the already over-lengthy list of “Heroes”. The Delphic oracle79 had itself contributed largely to their increase, and with full intent; nor did it observe for long its own decision to make an end now.80

A strange case is that of Kleomedes of Astypalaia. This man had killed his opponent during the boxing match at the 71st Olympic festival (486). He was disqualified by the judges from receiving his crown and returned home to Astypalaia filled with rage. There, he knocked down the pillar supporting the roof of a boys' school, and when the boys ran away in fear, he fled to Athena's temple, where he hid in a chest. His pursuers tried unsuccessfully to open the lid of the chest, and eventually, they had to force the chest open. But Kleomedes was not found inside, either alive or dead. The messengers sent to consult the oracle were told that Kleomedes had become a Hero, and that he must be honored with a sacrifice because he was no longer a mortal. And so the people of Astypalaia honored Kleomedes as a Hero. In this case, the simple idea of a Hero as someone elevated to divine status after death is combined with the ancient belief, which had never fully disappeared since the days of epic tales, in the translation of individual mortals who seem to vanish from sight and enter immortal life with their bodies and souls intact. Such a miracle seemed to have happened once again with Kleomedes. He had "disappeared" and been "taken away." However, he could only be called a "Hero" because there was no general term to describe the transformation that made people neither mortals nor gods. The oracle referred to Kleomedes as "the last of the Heroes"; indeed, it might finally seem time to end the already lengthy list of "Heroes." The Delphic oracle had largely contributed to their increase, and with full intent; nor did it long adhere to its own decision to put a stop to it now.

It is easy to understand the reasons for the universal acceptance among the Greeks of the unquestioned authority of the oracle in all matters connected with the Heroes. The god does not invent new Heroes or add to the number of local divinities at his own caprice or by the exercise of his own authority. He merely sees them where human eyes are not clear-sighted enough. He, the all-seeing, recognizes them as one spirit does another, and is able to see them at work when men only feel the results of their activity. Thus, he enables inquirers to be rid of their difficulties, to understand supernatural occurrences by the recognition and worship of invisible powers. For the believer he is in this, as in all other directions of religious life, “the true Expositor”.81 He only points out what already exists; he does not invent anything new, though the information that he gives may be something quite new to men. We, indeed, may be permitted to inquire what motive the shrewd Delphic priesthood may have had in the creation or renewal of so many Hero-cults. There is very evident method in their promotion of the belief in Heroes, as there is in all the activities of the oracle in religious and political matters. Was it ecclesiastical policy that made the priests of Delphi, in this as so many other cases, search out and multiply to the greatest possible extent the objects of belief and cult? The more widespread and the more deeply ingrained was the uneasy dread of an invisible all-powerful spirit-world, the greater became the authority of the oracle that alone could give guidance in this confused turmoil of ghostly activities. Superstition had achieved a power that the Homeric age never knew, and it cannot be denied that the oracle encouraged this deisidaimonia and did its best to increase it. Still, the priests of the oracle themselves were undoubtedly subject to the beliefs of their age; at any rate, they shared the belief in Heroes. They would think it quite natural, when faced by anxious inquiries as to the cause of disease or dearth, to confirm the half-expressed attribution of the evil to the action of an angry Hero. They had rather 131 to give their sanction to what was already anticipated than invent something new. They only applied to the particular case (with free scope in the invention of details) what the popular belief of the times had already settled in principle. But what it all meant was that the oracle took under its protection everything that could promote and strengthen the cult of souls: and in so far as it is possible to speak of a “Theology of Delphi”, the popular belief in the survival of the soul after death and the cult of the disembodied soul formed two of the most important articles in its creed. We shall have more to say on this subject hereafter. In any case, if the priests lived in the atmosphere of such ideas, it was natural for them in times of need and stress, when strange things happened, to regard as the author of the disturbance some dead legendary Hero’s ghost or even a powerful spirit of more recent times, and to direct the faithful accordingly. Thus, the Delphic god became the patron of the cult of Heroes, just as he was a patron of the Heroes themselves, and invited them every year at the Theoxenia to a meal in his own temple.82

It’s easy to see why the Greeks universally accepted the unquestioned authority of the oracle on all matters related to the Heroes. The god doesn’t create new Heroes or add to the number of local deities on a whim or by using his own power. He simply sees them where human perception is lacking. He, the all-seeing one, recognizes them as one spirit recognizes another and can see them in action when people only experience the effects of their activities. This way, he helps seekers resolve their troubles and understand supernatural events through the acknowledgment and worship of unseen forces. For believers, he is, as in all other aspects of religious life, “the true Expositor.” He merely highlights what already exists; he doesn’t create anything new, even if the information he provides may be completely new to humans. We might wonder about the motivations behind the clever Delphic priesthood's establishment or revival of so many Hero-cults. There’s a clear strategy in promoting the belief in Heroes, just as there is in all the oracle's actions regarding religious and political matters. Was it church policy that led the priests of Delphi, in this and many other cases, to seek out and amplify the objects of faith and worship? The more widespread and deeply rooted the uneasy fear of an invisible, all-powerful spirit world became, the greater the authority of the oracle, which alone could guide people through the chaotic realm of ghostly activities. Superstition gained a power that the Homeric era never experienced, and it’s undeniable that the oracle encouraged this deisidaimonia and did its best to promote it. Still, the priests of the oracle were undoubtedly influenced by the beliefs of their time; at the very least, they shared the belief in Heroes. They would find it quite normal, when faced with worried questions about the causes of illness or scarcity, to support the vague attribution of the problem to the actions of an angry Hero. They preferred to endorse what was already implied rather than invent something new. They simply applied the prevailing popular belief to specific cases (with room to invent details) that had already been established in principle. Ultimately, this meant that the oracle protected everything that could promote and strengthen the cult of souls: and as far as we can talk about a “Theology of Delphi,” the popular belief in the survival of the soul after death and the worship of disembodied souls were two of its most important tenets. We will discuss this further hereafter. In any case, since the priests lived in an environment filled with these ideas, it was natural for them, in times of need or crisis when unusual events occurred, to attribute the disturbances to the ghost of a dead legendary Hero or even a powerful spirit from more recent times, and to guide the faithful accordingly. Thus, the Delphic god became the patron of the cult of Heroes, just as he was a patron of the Heroes themselves, inviting them every year to a meal in his own temple during the Theoxenia. 82

§ 9

Thus encouraged on all sides, Hero-worship began to multiply the objects of the cult beyond all counting. The great wars of freedom against the Persians had aroused the deepest and most religious feelings of the Greeks, and it did not seem too much when whole companies of those who had fallen for freedom were raised to the rank of Hero. Thus, even into a very late period, the solemn procession every year to honour the Greeks who had been left on the field of Plataea was never omitted; and at the sacrifice the archon of the city called upon the “brave men who had laid down their lives for Greece” and invited them to a meal and satisfaction of blood.83 At Marathon, also, those who had once fallen in battle and been buried there were worshipped as Heroes.84

Thus encouraged from all sides, Hero-worship began to multiply the objects of the cult beyond all counting. The great wars for freedom against the Persians had stirred the deepest and most devout feelings of the Greeks, and it didn’t seem excessive when entire groups of those who had died for freedom were elevated to the rank of Hero. Even in later periods, the solemn procession held every year to honor the Greeks who were left on the field of Plataea was never skipped; during the sacrifice, the archon of the city called upon the “brave men who had given their lives for Greece” and invited them to a meal and a tribute of blood.83 At Marathon, too, those who had fallen in battle and were buried there were revered as Heroes.84

Out of the enormous multitude of those who had thus become Heroes an aristocracy of Heroes of a higher rank came to be formed, chiefly composed of those who had been honoured in legend and poetry from the earliest times and had acquired fame all over Greece. Examples of these are those whom Pindar85 in one place names together: the descendants of Oineus in Aetolia, Iolaos in Thebes, Perseus in Argos, the Dioscuri in Sparta, the many-branched heroic family of the Aiakidai in Aegina, Salamis, and many other places. Indeed, a brighter lustre seemed to illumine some of the greater Heroes 132 and to distinguish them almost in kind from the rest of their fellows. Thus, Herakles was now elevated to the gods, though Homer did not even know him as a “Hero” in the later sense, and though in many places he was still worshipped as a Hero.86 Asklepios is sometimes a Hero and sometimes a god, as he had been originally.87 Then many other Heroes began to receive sacrifice as gods,88 not without the assistance of the Delphic oracle, which in the case of Lykourgos, at least, seems itself to have given the lead in the elevation of that Hero.89 The boundary line between the Hero and the god seems to become more and more uncertain; sometimes a Hero of the narrowest local observance is called a “god”,90 without our having any reason for thinking of a formal elevation to divine honour in his case or any corresponding alteration of ritual. The title of Hero seemed already to have lost some of its value, though the time had not yet come when to name a dead man as Hero hardly distinguished him at all from all the other dead.

From the vast number of those who became Heroes, a select group of higher-ranking Heroes emerged, mainly made up of those honored in ancient stories and poetry, gaining fame throughout Greece. Examples of these are the people mentioned by Pindar85: the descendants of Oineus in Aetolia, Iolaos in Thebes, Perseus in Argos, the Dioscuri in Sparta, and the extensive heroic family of the Aiakidai in Aegina, Salamis, and many other locations. In fact, some of the greater Heroes seemed to shine brighter, setting them apart from the others. For instance, Herakles was elevated to the status of a god, even though Homer did not recognize him as a “Hero” in the later sense, and in many places, he was still worshiped as a Hero.86 Asklepios is sometimes regarded as a Hero and sometimes as a god, as he originally had been.87 Then more Heroes started to receive sacrifices as gods,88 often with the help of the Delphic oracle, which, in the case of Lykourgos, seems to have played a role in his elevation.89 The line between a Hero and a god appears to blur more and more; sometimes a locally worshipped Hero is called a “god,”90 without any indication of a formal elevation to divine status or a change in rituals. The term Hero seemed to have lost some of its significance, even though it wasn’t yet the time when calling a deceased person a Hero barely distinguished them from all the other dead.

§ 10

However much the meaning attached to the name of Hero may have widened or even deteriorated, the belief in the Heroes lost none of its significance and long retained its hold on the people. The belief in such a class of spirits stood almost on a par with the belief in gods. If the circle of influence possessed by some particular local-Hero was narrow and restricted, that only made him seem all the nearer to his worshippers. The spirits of their ancestors, their own and the country’s peculiar possession and shared with no one else, seemed more intimately theirs than other invisible powers even of higher rank. Permanent as the gods themselves, such Heroes were honoured as hardly second to the gods, “though they cannot equal them in might.”91 “Not equal”—for their efficacy was confined within bounds; it did not reach beyond the limits of their home and the little band of their worshippers. They were bound to the soil as the Olympian gods no longer were—(a Hero who breaks free from local limitations soon achieves divinity). In particular those Heroes who send up, from beneath the earth where they dwell, relief in sickness or prevision of the future are certainly bound to one spot. Only at their graves can such assistance be expected, for that is their dwelling-place. In their case the relationship between the belief in Heroes and the belief in those subterranean deities, of whom something was said in the previous chapter, is peculiarly plain. Indeed, in so far as their influence is limited 133 to a single locality and their powers concerned especially with iatromantic manifestations, these two classes of spirits essentially coincide.

No matter how much the meaning of the name Hero may have changed or faded over time, the belief in Heroes remained significant and continued to resonate with people. The belief in these spirits was nearly as strong as the belief in gods. If a local Hero's influence was limited, it only made them feel closer to their worshippers. The spirits of their ancestors, along with unique aspects of their land that they shared exclusively, felt more personal to them than other invisible beings, even those of higher status. As enduring as the gods themselves, these Heroes were honored just below the gods, "though they cannot equal them in might." "Not equal"—because their power was confined; it didn’t extend beyond their local area and their small group of followers. They were tied to the land in a way the Olympian gods were not—(a Hero who breaks away from local ties eventually becomes a god). Specifically, those Heroes who provide healing or foresight from beneath the earth where they reside are definitely anchored to one location. Assistance can only be found at their graves, which are their true homes. In this way, the connection between belief in Heroes and the belief in subterranean deities, mentioned in the previous chapter, is particularly clear. In fact, since their power is limited 133 to a specific area and their abilities focus particularly on iatromantic activities, these two types of spirits coincide significantly.

Such relief in sickness was expected, not only from Asklepios himself, but from the Asklepiadai, Machaon—who had a grave and temple at Gerenia on the coast of Laconia—and Podaleirios. The latter was buried in Apulia, near Mount Garganus. In his heroön those who sought his aid laid themselves down to sleep on the skin of the ram that had been previously sacrificed. In sleep they received other revelations from the Hero besides remedies for the ailments of man and beast.92 Machaon’s son, too, Polemokrates, healed sicknesses in his temple of Eua in Argolis.93 In Attica there was a Heros Iatros in the city whose efficacy in curing disease was witnessed to by innumerable silver ex voto facsimiles of various parts of the body restored to health by him.94 Another Hero Iatros, whose name is given as Aristomachos, had an oracle of healing at Marathon.95 Healing of disease was rarely attributed to any other than these Asklepiad Heroes. Dream-revelations of other kinds, however, were vouchsafed from their graves especially by those Heroes who had been seers also in their lifetime, such as Mopsos and Amphilochos at Mallos in Cilicia, Amphilochos, again, in Akarnania, Teiresias at Orchomenos, Kalchas in Apulia near the just-mentioned heroön of Podaleirios.96 Besides these Odysseus, too, had a dream-oracle among the Eurytanes in Aetolia,97 Protesilaos one at his grave-monument at Elaious in the Thracian Chersonnese,98 Sarpedon in Cilicia and another (alleged) in the Troad,99 Menestheus, the Athenian leader, far away in Spain,100 Autolykos in Sinope,101 and perhaps also Anios in Delos.102 A Heroine called Hemithea had a dream-oracle, from which she dispensed cures in sickness, at Kastabos in Karia;103 Pasiphaë gave prophecies in dreams at Thalamai on the Laconian coast.104 Since from none of these Heroes did the epic tradition give any particular grounds in legend for expecting a display of mantic powers, we must suppose that knowledge of the future and communication of such knowledge to the living was regarded as belonging naturally to the spiritual nature of the glorified souls of Heroes. The notices which have come down to us allow us to hear of a few regular and permanently established Hero-oracles, but there may have been numbers of them of which we know nothing, and isolated and occasional manifestations of oracular powers by other Heroes may not have been entirely out of the question.105 134

Such relief from sickness was expected not just from Asklepios himself, but also from the Asklepiadai, Machaon—who had a sanctuary and temple at Gerenia on the Laconian coast—and Podaleirios. The latter was buried in Apulia, near Mount Garganus. Those seeking his help would lay down to sleep on the skin of a ram that had been sacrificed. In their dreams, they received other insights from the Hero, in addition to remedies for ailments affecting both humans and animals.92 Machaon’s son, Polemokrates, also healed illnesses in his temple of Eua in Argolis.93 In Attica, there was a Heros Iatros in the city whose effectiveness in curing diseases was evidenced by countless silver ex-voto replicas of various body parts restored to health.94 Another Hero Iatros, known as Aristomachos, had a healing oracle at Marathon.95 Healing was rarely attributed to anyone other than these Asklepiad Heroes. However, dream revelations of other sorts were granted from their graves, especially by those Heroes who had been seers in their lifetimes, like Mopsos and Amphilochos at Mallos in Cilicia, Amphilochos again in Akarnania, Teiresias at Orchomenos, and Kalchas in Apulia near the previously mentioned heroön of Podaleirios.96 Besides these, Odysseus had a dream oracle among the Eurytanes in Aetolia,97 Protesilaos had one at his grave marker at Elaious in the Thracian Chersonese,98 Sarpedon in Cilicia, and another (supposedly) in the Troad,99 Menestheus, the Athenian leader, far away in Spain,100 Autolykos in Sinope,101 and perhaps also Anios in Delos.102 A Heroine named Hemithea had a dream oracle at Kastabos in Karia, where she offered cures for sickness;103 and Pasiphaë delivered prophecies in dreams at Thalamai on the Laconian coast.104 Since the epic tradition does not provide special reasons in legends to expect any display of prophetic powers from these Heroes, we must assume that knowledge of the future and sharing such knowledge with the living were seen as qualities inherent to the spiritual nature of the glorified souls of Heroes. The records we have allow us to learn about a few established Hero-oracles, but there may have been many more of which we are unaware, and isolated and occasional displays of oracular abilities by other Heroes might not have been entirely implausible.105 134

§ 11

The oracular Heroes are regularly confined to the neighbourhood of their graves. In addition, what we know of the legends that were told of the appearances or the unseen activities of these Heroes shows that, like the spirits that haunt ancient castles or caverns in our own popular mythology, they were confined within the boundaries of their native country, the neighbourhood of their graves or the site of their cult. They are, as a rule, artless stories of the anger displayed by a Hero whose rights have been infringed or whose cult neglected. At Tanagra106 there was a Hero Eunostos, who, having been deprived of his life through the machinations of a woman, would tolerate no woman in his grove or near his grave.107 If any of the hated sex intruded there was danger of an earthquake or drought, or else the Hero was seen going down to the sea (which washes away all pollutions) to cleanse himself. In Orchomenos there was a spirit who went about “with a stone” devastating the neighbourhood. This was Aktaion, whose earthly remains were therefore buried with much ceremony on the command of an oracle. A bronze statue of him was also set up and fastened with chains to a rock, and honoured every year in a feast of the dead.108 Herodotos solemnly tells us of the wrath of Minos with the Cretans, who had not avenged his own violent end, whereas they had gone to the aid of Menelaos.109 There is a deeper sense in the legend, also related by Herodotos, of Talthybios who was enraged not for any private grievance but because of a violation of the moral law and order. He himself as the protector of heralds and messengers punished the Spartans for their murder of the Persian envoys.110 But the most awe-inspiring legend of the revenge of a Hero was told of a local-Hero of the Athenian parish of Anagyros. A countryman had cut down the Hero’s sacred grove.111 The Hero first caused the death of the man’s wife and then inspired the second wife with a guilty passion for his son, her stepson. The latter opposed her wishes and when she denounced him to her husband was blinded by him and banished to a desert island. The father, having become an object of loathing to all men, hanged himself; the stepmother threw herself into a well.112 This story is remarkable for the fact that in it the Hero, like the gods themselves, is regarded as able to affect men’s consciousness, their feelings, and their resolves. Many of the details may have been improved upon by a taste accustomed to poetry of a higher style.113 But as a rule the legends of Heroes bear a 135 thoroughly popular stamp. They are a kind of vulgar mythology, which still put forth fresh shoots in this way now that the myths of ancient gods and champions have become merely traditional and have been given over to the never-ending operations of the poets. Such myths were no longer thrown off naturally by the creative instinct of the people. The gods seemed too far removed, their visible influence in the affairs of men seemed only credible in the legends of a far-distant past. The spirits of Heroes hovered nearer to men; in good fortune and bad men traced their handiwork. In the myths and legends of the people arising out of the events of the immediate present they now constitute the supernatural element without which neither life nor stories would offer any attraction or meaning to the simple-minded.

The oracular Heroes are usually tied to the area around their graves. Additionally, what we know about the legends surrounding the appearances or unseen actions of these Heroes suggests that, similar to the spirits that haunt ancient castles or caves in our own folklore, they were restricted to their native land, the vicinity of their graves, or the location of their worship. Generally, these are straightforward tales about the anger of a Hero whose rights have been violated or whose worship has been ignored. At Tanagra106, there was a Hero named Eunostos, who, after being betrayed by a woman, allowed no woman to enter his grove or approach his grave.107 If any woman intruded, it could lead to earthquakes or droughts, or the Hero would be seen going to the sea (which washes away all impurities) to purify himself. In Orchomenos, there was a spirit who roamed "with a stone," causing devastation in the area. This was Aktaion, whose remains were buried with great ceremony on the order of an oracle. A bronze statue of him was also erected and chained to a rock, receiving yearly honors during a feast for the dead.108 Herodotos recounts the wrath of Minos against the Cretans, who had not avenged his violent death, even though they aided Menelaos.109 There is a deeper meaning in the legend, also recounted by Herodotos, of Talthybios, who was furious not over personal grievances but due to a breach of moral law and order. As the protector of heralds and messengers, he punished the Spartans for murdering the Persian envoys.110 Yet, the most chilling tale of a Hero's revenge is about a local Hero from the Athenian area of Anagyros. A farmer had cut down the Hero's sacred grove.111 The Hero first caused the death of the man's wife and then led the second wife to develop an illicit desire for his son, her stepson. The son resisted her advances, and when she accused him to her husband, he was blinded and exiled to a desert island. The father, becoming despised by everyone, hanged himself; the stepmother threw herself into a well.112 This story is notable because the Hero, like the gods themselves, is seen as capable of influencing people's thoughts, emotions, and decisions. Many details may have been embellished by a taste refined by higher poetry.113 But generally, the legends of Heroes are marked by a thoroughly popular style. They represent a kind of folk mythology that continues to grow even now that the myths of ancient gods and champions have become merely traditional and have been left to the endless creativity of poets. Such myths were no longer born naturally from the people's creative spirit. The gods seemed too distant, their direct influence in human affairs only believable in the legends of a long-ago past. The spirits of Heroes hovered closer to people; in both good and bad times, people recognized their influence. In the myths and legends emerging from contemporary events, they now make up the supernatural aspect without which neither life nor stories would captivate or have meaning for the simple-minded.

We can learn what these legends were like from a single example, which happens to have been preserved to us and which must stand for the numbers of similar stories which once must have been current. At Temesa, in Lucania, there was a Hero who went about destroying any of the inhabitants that he could lay his hand on. The Temesians, who had got as far as thinking of leaving Italy, turned in their distress to the Delphic oracle, and were told that the ghost was the spirit of a stranger who had once been stoned to death by the inhabitants of the country for the violation of a maiden.114 A sacred precinct must be dedicated to him, and a temple built, where every year the most beautiful maiden in Temesa must be delivered up to him. The citizens of Temesa did as they were told, and the spirit left them in peace, but every year the awful sacrifice took place. To this place there came in the 77th Olympiad a famous boxer, Euthymos of Locri, returning with his crown of victory back to Italy. He heard at Temesa of the sacrifice that was about to take place, and entered the temple where he saw the chosen maiden waiting for the Hero. Pity and love filled his heart; and when the Hero arrived the victor of so many single combats dared to try conclusions with this new foe and finally threw him into the sea and rid the country of the monster. It is just as in our own fairy tale of the youth who went forth to learn how to shudder;115 and, of course, now that the land is delivered there is a brilliant wedding and the “Knight of Good Courage” marries the beautiful maiden he has rescued. He lived on to extreme old age, and even then he did not die but was translated alive and is now himself a Hero.116

We can understand what these legends were like from a single example that has been preserved for us, representing the many similar stories that must have once existed. In Temesa, in Lucania, there was a hero who went around killing any of the locals he could capture. The people of Temesa, who had even considered leaving Italy, turned to the Delphic oracle in their desperation and were told that the ghost was the spirit of a stranger who had once been stoned to death by the local inhabitants for violating a maiden. A sacred space should be dedicated to him, and a temple built, where every year the most beautiful maiden in Temesa would be handed over to him. The citizens of Temesa followed the oracle's advice, and the spirit left them in peace, but the horrific sacrifice continued every year. During the 77th Olympiad, a famous boxer named Euthymos from Locri, returning to Italy with his victory crown, learned about the upcoming sacrifice in Temesa. He went to the temple and saw the chosen maiden waiting for the hero. Filled with pity and love, when the hero arrived, the champion of many battles dared to confront this new enemy and ultimately tossed him into the sea, freeing the land from the monster. It's similar to our own fairy tale about the youth who set out to learn how to shudder; and of course, now that the land is free, there is a magnificent wedding, and the “Knight of Good Courage” marries the beautiful maiden he has saved. He lived to a very old age, and even then, he didn't die but was taken up alive and is now a hero himself.

Such champions of the Pan-Hellenic contests, of whom 136 Euthymos was one, are the favourite figures of popular legend both in their lifetime and, after their death, as spirits. A story was told also of one of the contemporaries of Euthymos, Theagenes of Thasos, one of the most famous victors in the great games, and how after his death one of his opponents went and thrashed his statue by night till one night the statue fell on him and killed him. The Thasians then threw the murderous image into the sea, but were thereupon plagued with barrenness as a result of the Hero’s anger. This went on until, after the several times repeated command of the Delphic oracle, they fished up the statue from where it had sunk and restored it to its old position and sacrificed to it “as to a god”.117 The remarkable thing about this story is the way in which the crude and primitive notion, common to almost all image-worshipping peoples, that the strength of a “spirit” resides in his effigy, is here more than usually striking and applied to the belief in Heroes. It lies at the bottom of many stories of the revenge of dumb statues against those who offend them.118 The statue of Theagenes, indeed, cured fevers even in later ages,119 as did the statue of another famous boxer, Polydamas of Skotoussa.120 An Achæan Olympic victor, Oibotas of Dyme, had for centuries prevented the Achæans from winning in any contest by a curse.121 When he had been appeased the Achæans, on starting out to take part in a contest at Olympia, used to do sacrifice to his statue.122

Such champions of the Pan-Hellenic games, like Euthymos, are the beloved figures of popular legend both during their lives and after their deaths as spirits. There’s also a story about one of Euthymos's contemporaries, Theagenes of Thasos, who was one of the most renowned victors in the major games. After his death, one of his rivals went and vandalized his statue at night, but eventually, the statue fell on him and killed him. The people of Thasos then tossed the deadly statue into the sea, but they were soon afflicted with infertility because of the Hero’s wrath. This continued until, after several commands from the Delphic oracle, they retrieved the statue from where it had sunk and restored it to its original spot, sacrificing to it “as if it were a god.” The striking aspect of this story is how the basic and primitive idea, common to nearly all image-worshiping cultures, that a “spirit’s” power lies within its likeness, is particularly evident here and connected to the belief in Heroes. This concept is the basis for many tales about the vengeance of silent statues against those who disrespect them. The statue of Theagenes, in fact, cured fevers even in later times, just like the statue of another famous boxer, Polydamas of Skotoussa. An Achaean Olympic champion, Oibotas of Dyme, had cursed the Achaeans for centuries, preventing them from winning any contests. Once he was appeased, the Achaeans would sacrifice to his statue before participating in a contest at Olympia.

§ 12

But the belief in Heroes rose to still greater heights. Not merely in peaceful athletic contests, but in real need, in struggles when they were fighting to defend the highest possessions of all—the freedom and safety of their country—the Heroes were found on the side of the Greeks. Nowhere do we see more plainly how real and vivid was the faith of contemporary Greece in the Heroes than in the stories told of the appeals then made to them and of their participation in the Persian wars. At Marathon there were many who saw an apparition of Theseus in full armour fighting in the front of the battle against the barbarians.123 In the painting of Panainos (the brother of Pheidias) in the Stoa Poikile at Athens there was shown among the fighters at Marathon a certain Hero, Echetlos, of whose appearance at the battle a peculiar story was told.124 In the war against Xerxes Delphi was preserved by two of the local Heroes of the land against a Persian raid.125 In the morning before the battle of Salamis the Greeks prayed to the gods, but they called directly 137 upon the Heroes to give them practical help: Aias and Telamon were summoned from Salamis, and a ship was sent to fetch Aiakos and the other Aiakidai from Aegina.126 So little were these Hero spirits mere symbols or great names to the Greeks. Their actual physical participation in the decisive hour was confidently expected. And, indeed, they came and helped:127 after the battle had been won a trireme out of the spoil was dedicated to the Hero Aias as well as to the gods as a thankoffering.128 A Salaminian local Hero, Kychreus, had also come to the help of the Greeks, as a snake, in which form the Heroes, like the earth spirits, frequently appeared.129 After the battle everyone was fully persuaded that they owed their victory to the gods and Heroes.130 As Xenophon puts it, it was the Heroes and their aid which “made Greece unconquerable” in the fight against the barbarians.131 Less frequently we hear of the active participation of national Heroes in the fights of one Greek state against another.132

But the belief in Heroes grew even stronger. Not just in peaceful sports, but in real situations where they fought to protect the most important things of all—the freedom and safety of their country—the Heroes stood with the Greeks. Nowhere is the faith of contemporary Greece in the Heroes clearer than in the stories about the appeals made to them and their involvement in the Persian wars. At Marathon, many people claimed to see an apparition of Theseus in full armor fighting at the front against the barbarians. In the painting by Panainos (the brother of Pheidias) in the Stoa Poikile at Athens, there was a particular Hero, Echetlos, depicted among the fighters at Marathon, with a unique story about his appearance in the battle. During the war against Xerxes, two local Heroes of the land protected Delphi from a Persian raid. On the morning before the battle of Salamis, the Greeks prayed to the gods but specifically called upon the Heroes for practical help: Aias and Telamon were summoned from Salamis, and a ship was sent to bring Aiakos and the other Aiakidai from Aegina. The Greeks did not see these Hero spirits as mere symbols or famous names. They expected their actual physical participation at the critical moment. And indeed, they arrived and assisted: after the victory, a trireme from the spoils was dedicated to Hero Aias as well as to the gods as a thank offering. A local Hero from Salamis, Kychreus, also came to the Greeks' aid in the form of a snake, as Heroes frequently appeared like earth spirits. After the battle, everyone was convinced that they owed their victory to the gods and Heroes. As Xenophon states, it was the Heroes and their support that “made Greece unconquerable” in the struggle against the barbarians. Less often, we hear about the active participation of national Heroes in conflicts between Greek states.

Even in the petty details of the life of individuals the Heroes played their part, helping or hindering, as once in mythical times the gods had done. Everyone will be reminded of well-known legends of the gods, and will at the same time be able to measure the difference between the sublime and the merely idyllic, in reading Herodotos’ naive and circumstantial tale of how Helen once appeared in person to a nurse at Therapne. The nurse was praying at Helen’s grave for her ill-favoured foster-child, when the Heroine appeared to her and with a touch of her hand made the child the most beautiful maiden in Sparta.133 So, too, we read how the Hero Astrabakos, in the likeness of Ariston, king of Sparta, visited in secret the king’s wife and made her the mother of Demaratos.134 The heroön of this Astrabakos was situated by the door of Ariston’s house,135 and it was a frequent custom thus to place a Hero’s shrine before the house-door where he might give a special protection to his neighbour.136

Even in the small details of individual lives, the Heroes played their roles, helping or hindering, just like the gods did in ancient myths. Everyone will think of well-known legends about the gods and will also be able to see the difference between the grand and the simply charming when reading Herodotos’ straightforward and detailed story about how Helen once appeared in person to a nurse at Therapne. The nurse was praying at Helen’s grave for her unattractive foster child when the Heroine showed up and with a touch of her hand turned the child into the most beautiful girl in Sparta.133 Similarly, we read about how the Hero Astrabakos, disguised as Ariston, king of Sparta, secretly visited the king’s wife and made her the mother of Demaratos.134 The heroön of this Astrabakos was located by the door of Ariston’s house,135 and it was common practice to place a Hero’s shrine in front of the door to provide special protection to his neighbor.136

In all the circumstances of human life, in happiness or in need, for individuals or the city, the Heroes are thus very near to men. It is now often said of the Hero worshipped by a city (just as it was said of the city’s gods) that he rules it, is its possessor, or is lord over it;137 he is its true guardian and protector. It may, indeed, have been the case in many cities, as it was said to be in some, that the belief in the city-Hero was more deeply held there than the belief in the gods worshipped by all Greece in common.138 The relation of man to the Heroes is closer than it is to the majestic gods above: 138 the faith in Heroes gave a different and a more familiar bond of union between men and the spirit-world above them. The worship of Heroes began as an ancestor-cult and an ancestor-cult it remained in essence, but it had now been widened to a cult of certain greater human souls who had raised themselves above their fellows by peculiar powers exercised in many, and by no means predominantly moral, directions. Many of them were of later ages or even of the quite recent past, and in this lies the peculiar importance of their cult. They show that the company of the spirits is not fixed and made up; individual mortals are still continually being raised to that higher circle after the completion of their earthly life. Death does not end all conscious existence nor does the gloom of Hades swallow up all life.

In all aspects of human life, whether in joy or in need, for individuals or for the community, Heroes are very close to people. It’s often said that the Hero honored by a city, just like its gods, rules it, owns it, or holds power over it; he is its true protector and guardian. In many places, it may have been true that the belief in the city-Hero was stronger than the belief in the gods worshiped across all of Greece. The connection between people and Heroes is closer than that with the majestic gods above: the faith in Heroes created a different and more personal bond between people and the spirit world above them. The worship of Heroes started as a way to honor ancestors, and it still fundamentally remains that, but it expanded to include certain exceptional individuals who distinguished themselves from others through unique abilities that were not solely moral. Many of these Heroes lived in later times or even quite recently, which highlights the unique significance of their worship. They demonstrate that the community of spirits isn't fixed and closed; individual humans are continually being elevated to that higher realm after their earthly lives are complete. Death doesn’t mark the end of all conscious existence, nor does the darkness of Hades consume all life.

But for that reason the cult of Heroes cannot be the origin of the belief in an immortality belonging to all human souls by their very nature. Nor can this ever have been its effect. In the beginning, among the hosts that streamed down to Hades, the special individuals who had another fate were a small class apart and favoured above all others—and so it still remained. Though the numbers of the heroic figures might be increased enormously, yet every individual case of the transition of a human soul into the ranks of the Heroes was a fresh and special miracle. Such exceptional cases, however frequently repeated, could never produce a general rule applying without distinction to all men alike.

But because of that, the worship of Heroes can't be the source of the belief in immortality that belongs to all human souls by their very nature. And this couldn't have ever been its outcome. In the beginning, among the many that descended to Hades, the special individuals with a different fate were a small, distinct group, favored above everyone else—and it still is the case. Even though the number of heroic figures might increase significantly, each individual case of a human soul becoming one of the Heroes was a unique and special miracle. These exceptional cases, no matter how frequently they happened, could never create a general rule that applied equally to all people.

The belief in Heroes in its gradual evolution and extension unquestionably led far away from the course taken by the Homeric belief in the things after death. In fact, it pointed in the opposite direction. But with the belief in Heroes men had not yet arrived at the belief in an immortality proper to the human soul by virtue of its own nature, nor yet (which would be something different again) was a general cult of souls thereby founded. In order that such beliefs might arise after, but not out of, the cult of Heroes, and maintain themselves side by side with an undiminished cult of Heroes, a movement was first necessary that had its origin in different sources.

The belief in Heroes gradually evolved and expanded, clearly moving far away from the Homeric views on the afterlife. In fact, it pointed in the opposite direction. However, with the belief in Heroes, people hadn't yet reached the idea of immortality as something inherent to the human soul, nor had a widespread cult of souls been established as a separate entity. For such beliefs to develop later, but not directly from the cult of Heroes, and to coexist alongside an unchanged cult of Heroes, a significant movement was needed, one that originated from different sources.

NOTES TO CHAPTER IV

1 Porph., Abst. 4, 22, p. 268, 23 Nauck.

1 Porph., Abst. 4, 22, p. 268, 23 Nauck.

2 It is not quite clear whether it is legitimate to see in what Paus. 2, 2, 2, says about the graves of Neleus and Sisyphos a first trace of the worship of Hero-relics, as Lobeck does, Agla. 284. The oracle verse from Oinom. ap. Eus., PE. 5, 28, p. 223 B, in which Lykourgos is warned to honour Μενέλαν τε καὶ ἄλλους ἀθανάτους ἥρωας, οἳ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι δίῃ—is certainly quite late, later than the ἥκεις ὦ Λυκόοργε that was known already to Herod.; earlier however than the second century, cf. Isyllos (GDI. 3342), l. 26. Oinomaos got it, like all the oracles that he used in making his Γοήτων φώρα from a collection of oracular sayings, certainly not from (or even indirectly from) Ephoros as has been groundlessly maintained.—Unquestionably the cult of Helen and Menelaos at Therapne was ancient: see Ross, Arch. Aufs. ii, 341 ff. Connexion with the legitimate pre-Dorian monarchy was eagerly sought for in Sparta; thus the bones of Orestes and Tisamenos were brought to Sparta and both honoured there as Heroes. The cult of Menelaos in Therapne has nothing whatever to do with his translation to Elysion (Od. δ).

2 It's not entirely clear whether we can consider what Paus. 2, 2, 2 says about the graves of Neleus and Sisyphos as an early sign of the worship of hero relics, as Lobeck suggests, Agla. 284. The oracle verse from Oinom. ap. Eus., PE. 5, 28, p. 223 B, which warns Lykourgos to honor Menelaus and other immortal heroes, who are in Laconia.—is definitely quite late, more recent than the You're here, Lykoorge. that was already known to Herod.; however, it's earlier than the second century, see Isyllos (GDI. 3342), l. 26. Oinomaos got it, like all the oracles he used in creating his Γοήτων φώνα from a collection of prophetic sayings, definitely not from (or even indirectly from) Ephoros as has been wrongly claimed.—There's no doubt that the cult of Helen and Menelaos at Therapne was ancient: see Ross, Arch. Aufs. ii, 341 ff. A connection with the legitimate pre-Dorian monarchy was actively sought in Sparta; thus the bones of Orestes and Tisamenos were brought to Sparta and both honored there as Heroes. The cult of Menelaos in Therapne has nothing to do with his translation to Elysion (Od. δ).

3 One Daites ἥρωα τιμώμενον παρὰ τοῖς Τρωσίν is mentioned by Mimn. fr. 18. Still earlier Alc. seems to refer to the cult of Achilles as a Hero, fr. 48 b: Ἀχίλλευ, ὃ γᾶς Σκυδίκας μέδεις (see Wassner, de her. cult., p. 33).

3 One Daites hero honored by the Trojans is mentioned by Mimn. fr. 18. Even earlier, Alc. seems to refer to the worship of Achilles as a Hero, fr. 48 b: Achilles, who rules the Scythians (see Wassner, de her. cult., p. 33).

4 θεοὶ ὅσοι γῆν τὴν Πλαταιΐδα ἔχετε καὶ ἥρωες, ξυνίστορές ἐστε, Thuc. ii, 74, 2; μάρτυρας θεοὺς καὶ ἥρωας ἐγχωρίους ποιήσομαι, Th. iv, 87, 2; cf. Th. v, 30, 2–5.

4 Gods who oversee the land of Plataea and the heroes, you are our witnesses., Thuc. ii, 74, 2; I will have local gods and heroes as my witnesses., Th. iv, 87, 2; cf. Th. v, 30, 2–5.

5 Hdt. viii, 109: τάδε γὰρ οὐκ ἡμεῖς κατεργασάμεθα ἀλλὰ θεοί τε καὶ ἥρωες.

5 Hdt. viii, 109: Because we didn't accomplish these things; instead, it was the gods and heroes who did.

6 Hdt. vii, 43.

6 Hdt. 7:43.

7 In the first edition of this book I could not refer to the copiously documented article by Deneken on “Heros” in Roscher’s Myth. Lex. Even now I must be content to refer the reader generally to the rich collections of material there supplied. The view taken of the nature and origin of the Hero is, however, one which I can only reject. According to that account (which in this follows the current view) the belief in Heroes arose from a weakened belief in gods, and the race of Heroes was composed of formerly divine figures who had come to be regarded in the course of time with diminished awe. But the cult of Heroes was by no means an attenuated worship of the gods: on the contrary it was fundamentally contrasted in its essence to the cult of the gods above: ἐναγίζειν can never have been derived from θύειν in however attenuated a form. Equally little can the Heroes of cult have been ever (much less frequently) derived from gods directly. The “Heroes” (as objects of a cult) are invariably elevated souls of men, not reduced divinities. This rule holds good even though a considerable number of once divine figures after they had been deprived of their godhead and made into great men, were when they died exalted, as outstanding human beings, to the rank of Hero. In this respect they did not differ from the innumerable cases before and beside them of simple mortals who had never been gods. Only when and because they had become men and been mortal could such 140 ex-divine personages become Heroes: no one stepped straight from godhood to Herohood. The Hero is regularly a promoted human spirit and nothing else.—I intend here and generally in this book to avoid further polemic against the currently accepted view of the origin of the Hero out of degraded godhead and to content myself instead with the statement of my own positive attitude in these matters.

7 In the first edition of this book, I couldn't refer to the extensively documented article by Deneken on “Heros” in Roscher’s Myth. Lex. Even now, I can only suggest that readers check out the wealth of information provided there. However, I must reject the perspective on the nature and origin of Heroes presented in that article. According to that explanation (which follows the mainstream view), the belief in Heroes emerged from a weakened belief in gods, and the race of Heroes consisted of once-divine figures who had gradually become less awe-inspiring over time. But the cult of Heroes was by no means a diluted form of worship of the gods; rather, it was fundamentally distinct in its essence from the worship of the gods above: ἐναγίζειν could never have evolved from θύειν, even in a weakened form. Likewise, the Heroes of the cult cannot have originated from gods directly. The “Heroes” (as objects of worship) are always elevated souls of men, not diminished deities. This rule is valid even though a significant number of once-divine figures, after losing their divinity and becoming great men, were exalted upon their deaths, as notable humans, to the status of Hero. In this regard, they did not differ from countless examples of ordinary mortals who had never been gods. Only when they had become men and experienced mortality could these former divine figures become Heroes: no one transitioned directly from godhood to Herohood. The Hero is consistently a elevated human spirit and nothing more. —I intend to avoid any further arguments against the currently accepted view on the origin of Heroes as degraded deities and instead focus on outlining my own positive perspective on these matters.

8 θεῶν ἄλλοις ἄλλαι τιμαὶ πρόσκεινται καὶ ἥρωσιν ἄλλαι, καὶ αὗται ἀποκεκριμέναι τοῦ θειοῦ, Arr., Anab. iv, 11, 3.

8 The gods have different honors for various heroes, and these are set aside for the divine., Arr., Anab. iv, 11, 3.

9 Sacrifice to Heroes ἐν δυθμαῖσιν αὐγᾶν and throughout the night, Pi., I. iv, 65 ff. ὑπὸ κνέφας, Ap. Rh. i, 587 (= περὶ ἡλίου δυσμάς, Schol.). τῷ μὲν (Ἀλεξάνορι) ὡς ἥρωϊ μετὰ ἥλιον δύνατα ἐναγίζουσιν Εὐαμερίωνι δὲ ὡς θεῷ θύουσιν, Paus. 2, 11, 7. νύκτωρ κατὰ ἔτος ἐναγίζουσιν, (the Pheneatai) to Myrtilos, Paus. 8, 14, 11. By night Solon sacrificed to the Salaminian Heroes, Plu., Sol. 9.—After noon, ἀπὸ μέσου ἡμέρας, must sacrifice be made to the Heroes, D.L. viii, 33; τοῖς κατοιχομένοις ἀπὸ μεσημβρίας, EM. 468, 34 (cf. Procl. in Hes. Op. 763, Eust., Θ 65, p. 698, 36). The Heroes also are among the κατοιχόμενοι: τοῖς ἥρωσιν ὡς κατοιχομένοις ἔντομα ἔθυον, ἀποβλέποντες κάτω ἐς γῆν, Schol. A.D., Α 459.—In later times sacrifice seems to have been made to the ordinary dead even in broad daylight (see Stengel, Chthon. u. Todtencult, 422 f.), but to “Heroes”, as once to the dead (Ψ 218 ff.), always towards evening or at night.

9 Sacrifice to Heroes in twilight glow and throughout the night, Pi., I. iv, 65 ff. under the twilight, Ap. Rh. i, 587 (= sunset, Schol.). τῷ μὲν(Alexanor)As heroes, they offer sacrifices at sunset, and to Euaemerios, they sacrifice as if to a god., Paus. 2, 11, 7. They perform sacrifices yearly., (the Pheneatai) to Myrtilos, Paus. 8, 14, 11. By night, Solon sacrificed to the Salaminian Heroes, Plu., Sol. 9.—After noon, midday, sacrifices should be made to the Heroes, D.L. viii, 33; the residents from the south, EM. 468, 34 (cf. Procl. in Hes. Op. 763, Eust., Θ 65, p. 698, 36). The Heroes are also included among the living: To the heroes, as if they were overwhelmed, they offered sacrifices to insects, looking down towards the earth., Schol. A.D., Α 459.—In later times, sacrifices seem to have been made to the ordinary dead even during the day (see Stengel, Chthon. u. Todtencult, 422 f.), but to “Heroes”, as once to the dead (Ψ 218 ff.), always towards evening or at night.

10 ἐσχάρα, see above, Ch. I. n. 53.

10 eschará, see above, Ch. I. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

11 Cf. Stengel, Jb. f. Phil., 1886, pp. 322, 329.

11 See Stengel, Jb. f. Phil., 1886, pp. 322, 329.

12 Schol. A.D., Α 459. Schol., Ap. Rh. i, 587. ἐντέμνειν, see Stengel, Zt. f. Gymn., 1880, p. 743 ff.

12 Schol. A.D., Α 459. Schol., Ap. Rh. i, 587. ἐντέμνειν, see Stengel, Zt. f. Gymn., 1880, p. 743 ff.

13 αἱμακουρία, Pi., O. i, 90. Plu., Aristid. 21. The word is supposed to be Boeotian acc. to Schol. Pi., O. i, 146 (hence Greg. Cor., p. 215, Schaefer).

13 혈액 주사, Pi., O. i, 90. Plu., Aristid. 21. The term is believed to be Boeotian according to Schol. Pi., O. i, 146 (thus Greg. Cor., p. 215, Schaefer).

14 Rightly (as against Welcker) Wassner, de h. cult., p. 6, maintains that the ἐναγίσματα for Heroes were ὁλοκαυτώματα.

14 Correctly (in opposition to Welcker) Wassner, de h. cult., p. 6, argues that the sacrifices for Heroes were burnt offerings.

15 ἐναγίζειν to heroes, θύειν to gods. Pausanias in particular is careful in his use of the words, but even he, and Herodotos, too, occasionally says θύειν where ἐναγίζειν would have been correct (e.g. Hdt. vii, 117, τῷ Ἀρταχαίῃ θύουσι Ἀκάνθιοι ὡς ἤρωι). Others frequently say θύειν instead of ἐναγίζειν, which as the more special idea could easily be included in θύειν the more generic word for making sacrifice.

15 No modern equivalent. to heroes, θύειν to gods. Pausanias is particularly careful with his word choices, but even he, along with Herodotos, sometimes uses θύειν when ἐναγίζειν would have been more appropriate (e.g. Hdt. vii, 117, The Acantians offer sacrifices to Artacheia as to a hero.). Others often use θύειν instead of νεκρότους, as the more specific meaning can easily be included under θυείν, the broader term for making sacrifices.

16 Cf. Deneken, de theoxeniis (Berl. 1881), cap. 1; Wassner, de h. cult., p. 12. The expressions used by primitive peoples allow us to see the ideas that lie at the bottom of this mode of offering; cf. Réville, les rel. des peuples non-civ. i, 73. The ritual may be regarded as specially primitive and even earlier than the practice of burnt offering (cf. Oldenberg, Rel. d. Veda, 344 f.).

16 See Deneken, de theoxeniis (Berlin, 1881), chapter 1; Wassner, de h. cult., page 12. The terms used by early cultures help us understand the ideas behind this kind of offering; see Réville, les rel. des peuples non-civ. volume 1, page 73. The ritual can be seen as particularly primitive and possibly older than the practice of burnt offerings (see Oldenberg, Rel. d. Veda, page 344 and following).

17 See above, Ch. I, p. 14 ff.—ἐπὶ Ἀζᾶνι τῷ Ἀρκάδος τελευτήσαντι ἆθλα ἐτέθη πρῶτον· εἰ μὲν καὶ ἄλλα οὐκ οἶδα, ἱπποδρομίας δὲ ἐτέθη, Paus. 8, 4, 5.

17 See above, Ch. I, p. 14 ff.—After Arkados passed away, prizes were given out at Aza. I'm not sure if there were any other awards, but they did give prizes for horse races., Paus. 8, 4, 5.

18 The same is implied by the observation of Aristarchos that Homer knows no ἱερὸς καὶ στεφανίτης ἀγών, see Rh. Mus. 36, 544 f. (as to the observation there put forward that Homer in fact did not know the word στέφανος or its use, cf. further Schol. Pi., Nem. intr., pp. 7, 8 ff., Abel; see also Merkel, Ap. Rh. proleg., p. cxxvi: ἐϋστέφανος derived from στεφάνη not from στέφανος: Schol. Φ 511).

18 The same is suggested by Aristarchos's observation that Homer doesn't know the term sacred and crown competition, see Rh. Mus. 36, 544 f. (regarding the point made there that Homer actually did not know the word Stefanos or how it was used, see further Schol. Pi., Nem. intr., pp. 7, 8 ff., Abel; also refer to Merkel, Ap. Rh. proleg., p. cxxvi: Beautifully crowned coming from στεφάνη instead of Stefanos: Schol. Φ 511).

19 Many such Agones for Heroes are mentioned, esp. by Pindar.

19 Many competitions for heroes are mentioned, especially by Pindar.

20 e.g. on the command of the oracle an ἀγὼν γυμνικὸς καὶ ἱππικός was founded in honour of the fallen Phocaeans in Agylla, Hdt. i, 167. 141 Agon for Miltiades, Hdt. vi, 38; for Brasidas, Thuc. v, 11; for Leonidas in Sparta, Paus. 3, 14, 1.

20 For example, at the command of the oracle, a nude games and horse races were established in honor of the fallen Phocaeans in Agylla, Hdt. i, 167. 141 Agon for Miltiades, Hdt. vi, 38; for Brasidas, Thuc. v, 11; for Leonidas in Sparta, Paus. 3, 14, 1.

21 At the Iolaia in Thebes μυρσίνης στεφάνοις στεφανοῦνται οἱ νικῶντες· μυρσίνῃ δὲ στεφανοῦνται διὰ τὸ εἶναι τῶν νεκρῶν στέφος, Sch. Pi., I. iii, 117. (The myrtle τοῖς χθονίοις ἀφιέρωτο, Apollod. ap. Sch. Ar., Ran. 330; as adorning graves, Eur., El. 324, 511.)

21 At the Iolaia in Thebes Myrtle wreaths are awarded to the winners; they are crowned with myrtle because it represents the dead., Sch. Pi., I. iii, 117. (The myrtle was presented to the gods of the underworld, Apollod. ap. Sch. Ar., Ran. 330; as adorning graves, Eur., El. 324, 511.)

22 General statement: ἐτελοῦντο οἱ παλαιοὶ πάντες ἀγῶνες ἐπὶ τισι τετελευτηκόσι, Sch. Pi., I, p. 349 Ab. (τὰς ἐπιτυμβίους ταυτασὶ πανηγύρεις, Clem. Alex. calls the four great games, Protr. ii, p. 29 P.). The Nemean as an ἀγὼν ἐπιτάφιος for Archemoros, Sch. Pi., N., pp. 7, 8 Ab.; later offered to Zeus first by Herakles, ib., p. 11, 8 ff.; 12, 14–13, 4 (cf. Welcker, Ep. Cycl. ii, 350 ff.). Victor’s crown, since the Persian wars, of parsley ἐπὶ τιμῇ τῶν κατοιχομένων, ib., p. 10 (parsley on graves: Schneidewin on Dgn. viii, 57; see below. σελίνου στέφανος πένθιμος . . . Δοῦρις ἐν τῷ περὶ ἀγώνων, Phot. 506, 5). Black dress of the judges, ib., p. 11, 8 ff. Schol. Arg., N. iv, v.—Isthmian games as ἐπιτάφιος ἀγών for Melikertes and then for Sinis or Skiron, Plu., Thes. 25. Sch. Pi., I., pp. 350–2 Ab. Crown made of parsley or pine, both signs of mourning, Paus. 8, 48, 2 (and elsewhere see Meineke, An. Alex., 80 ff.). The Pythian games are said to be an ἀγὼν ἐπιτάφιος for Python; the Olympian for Oinomaos or Pelops (Phlegon, FHG. iii, 603; cf. P. Knapp, Corresp. Würt. Gelehr. 1881, p. 9 ff.). These notices cannot all be learned invention. It is a fact, for instance, that the funeral games of Tlepolemos in Rhodes, known to Pindar, O. vii, 77 ff., were later transferred to Helios (cf. Sch. Pi., O. vii, 36, 146–7, and Böckh on v, 77).

22 General statement: The ancient competitions were all held in honor of the dead., Sch. Pi., I, p. 349 Ab. (the funeral games were public festivals, Clem. Alex. refers to the four major games, Protr. ii, p. 29 P.). The Nemean as an funeral competition for Archemoros, Sch. Pi., N., pp. 7, 8 Ab.; later offered to Zeus first by Herakles, ib., p. 11, 8 ff.; 12, 14–13, 4 (cf. Welcker, Ep. Cycl. ii, 350 ff.). Victor’s crown, since the Persian wars, of parsley in memory of the deceased, ib., p. 10 (parsley on graves: Schneidewin on Dgn. viii, 57; see below. the sad crown of parsley . . . Douris in the context of the competitions, Phot. 506, 5). Black robes of the judges, ib., p. 11, 8 ff. Schol. Arg., N. iv, v.—Isthmian games as funeral competition for Melikertes and then for Sinis or Skiron, Plu., Thes. 25. Sch. Pi., I., pp. 350–2 Ab. Crown made of parsley or pine, both symbols of mourning, Paus. 8, 48, 2 (and elsewhere see Meineke, An. Alex., 80 ff.). The Pythian games are said to be a funeral competition for Python; the Olympian for Oinomaos or Pelops (Phlegon, FHG. iii, 603; cf. P. Knapp, Corresp. Würt. Gelehr. 1881, p. 9 ff.). These accounts cannot all be mere invention. For instance, it is a fact that the funeral games of Tlepolemos in Rhodes, known to Pindar, O. vii, 77 ff., were later dedicated to Helios (cf. Sch. Pi., O. vii, 36, 146–7, and Böckh on v, 77).

23 “Half-gods,” ἡμίθεοι. The name does not, as is sometimes declared, imply that the Heroes were spirits who thus constituted a class of intermediate beings between gods and men. The Heroes were not called ἡμίθεοι; the name was really applied to the kings and champions of the legendary age, more especially those who fought at Troy or Thebes (Hes., Op., 160; Hom. M 23; h. Hom., 31, 19; 32, 19. Callin., fr. i, 19, and often later). It applies to them, however, as living men not as glorified spirits (thus Pla., Ap. 41 A; cf. D.H. 7, 32, 13, ἡμιθέων γενομένων [on earth] αἱ ψυχαί).—The ἡμίθεοι are a species of men not of spirits or daimones; they are those οἳ πρότερόν ποτ’ ἐπέλοντο, θεῶν δ’ ἐξ ἀνάκτων ἐγένονθ’ υἷες ἡμίθεοι (Simon., fr. 36; cf. Pla., Crat. 398 D), the sons of gods and mortal women and then their companions as well (a potiori so named). Even the idea that the great men of the past, thus called ἡμίθεοι, were naturally made “Heroes” after their death as a consequence of their half-divine nature which might give them special privileges even then—this idea has no very ancient authority. Cicero, ND. iii, 45, seems to be the first to suggest such a view. That the Greeks of the best period ever regarded semi-divine origin as a qualification for becoming a Hero is refuted by the simple fact that for the great majority of the “Heroes” descent from a god was not claimed. Of course, poetry was always ready to give a Hero a divine father in order to enhance his value, cf. Paus. 6, 11, 2; but this was never a condition of being made a Hero (rather of being raised from Hero to god).

23 “Half-gods,” demigods. The term does not, as is sometimes claimed, suggest that the Heroes were spirits that formed a middle class between gods and humans. Heroes were not referred to as demigods; the name was actually used for the kings and champions of the legendary era, especially those who fought at Troy or Thebes (Hes., Op., 160; Hom. M 23; h. Hom., 31, 19; 32, 19. Callin., fr. i, 19, and often later). It applies to them, however, as living beings and not as glorified spirits (thus Pla., Ap. 41 A; cf. D.H. 7, 32, 13, demigods becoming [on earth] the souls).—The demigods are a type of humans, not spirits or daimons; they are those Those who once followed before, became demigod sons of the gods from the rulers. (Simon., fr. 36; cf. Pla., Crat. 398 D), the sons of gods and mortal women, and also their companions (a potiori so named). Even the idea that the great men of the past, called demigods, naturally became “Heroes” after their death due to their half-divine nature—this notion lacks ancient authority. Cicero, ND. iii, 45, appears to be the first to suggest such a perspective. The fact that the Greeks during the best period ever viewed semi-divine origin as a qualification for becoming a Hero is disproven by the simple fact that most of the “Heroes” did not claim descent from a god. Of course, poetry was always quick to give a Hero a divine father to enhance his status, see Paus. 6, 11, 2; but this was never a requirement for becoming a Hero (rather for being elevated from Hero to god).

24 μάκαρ μὲν ἀνδρῶν μέτα, ἥρως δ’ ἔπειτα λαοσεβής, Pi., P. v, 94 f.

24 Blessed among men, the noble hero admired by the people., Pi., P. v, 94 f.

25 τίνα θεόν, τίν’ ἥρωα, τίνα δ’ ἄνδρα; Pi., O. ii init. οὔτε θεοὺς οὔτε ἥρωας οὔτε ἀνθρώπους αἰσχυνθεῖσα, Antiph. i, 27. With “daimones” added: Gods, daimones, heroes, men: Pl., Rp. 392 A; 427 B; Lg. iv, 717 AB. In later times the distinction between θεοί, δαίμονες, ἥρωες, corresponded to a real and popular opinion, see e.g. GDI. 142 1582 (Dodona), cf. also 1566, 1585 b.—There can be no question of identifying Heroes with the daimones (as Nägelsb., N. Th. 104, does). When philosophers call the dead “daimones” that is from quite a different point of view. It is a speculative idea peculiar to Plutarch himself that, in view of the transition from men to Heroes and from these to daimones, the Heroes themselves might be regarded as a sort of lower daimon (DO. 10, 415 A; Rom. 28). A Schol. on Eur., Hec. 165, quite justifiably makes a parallel between gods and daimones on the one hand and Heroes and men on the other: the gods are ὑψηλότερόν τι τάγμα τῶν δαιμόνων and this is the relation of οἱ ἥρωες πρὸς τοὺς λοιποὺς ἀνθρώπους, ὑψηλότεροί τινες δοκοῦντες καὶ ὑπερέχοντες.

25 Which god, which hero, which man? Pi., O. ii init. Neither gods, heroes, nor humans feel ashamed., Antiph. i, 27. With “daimones” added: Gods, daimones, heroes, men: Pl., Rp. 392 A; 427 B; Lg. iv, 717 AB. In later times the distinction between gods, spirits, heroes reflected a real and popular belief, see e.g. GDI. 142 1582 (Dodona), cf. also 1566, 1585 b.—There is no way to equate Heroes with the daimones (as Nägelsb., N. Th. 104, does). When philosophers refer to the dead as “daimones,” that comes from a completely different perspective. It is a speculative idea unique to Plutarch that, considering the shift from men to Heroes and then from Heroes to daimones, the Heroes themselves might be seen as a kind of lesser daimon (DO. 10, 415 A; Rom. 28). A Schol. on Eur., Hec. 165 correctly draws a parallel between gods and daimones on one side and Heroes and men on the other: the gods are a higher rank of the spirits, and this shows the relationship of the heroes to other people, who seem to be greater and better.

26 Aristarchos’ remark that in Homer not only kings but πάντες κοινῶς are designated as ἥρωες, was directed against the mistaken limitation of the word by Ister; see Lehrs, Aristarch.3, p. 101. Before Aristarch., however, the mistaken idea that οἱ ἡγεμόνες τῶν ἀρχαίων μόνοι ἦσαν ἥρωες, οἱ δὲ λαοὶ ἄνθρωποι seems to have been general: it is expressed in the [Arist.] Probl. 19, 48, p. 922b, 18; Rhianos, too, held it, see Schol. Τ 41 (Mayhoff, de Rhiani stud. Hom., p. 46).—It is incorrect to say that in the supposed “later” parts of the Odyssey ἥρως is no longer used of all free men, but only of the aristocracy (Fanta, Staat in Il. u. Od., 17 f.). In δ 268, θ 242, ξ 97, the word is used as an honourable title of free men of superior rank, but there is no suggestion of a restriction of the word to such use. In addition to which, the word ἥρως unmistakably appears in its wider sense also in other parts of the poem equally and rightly supposed to be late (α 272, θ 483, ω 68, etc.).

26 Aristarchos pointed out that in Homer, not just kings but everyone together are referred to as heroes, which challenged Ister's incorrect limitation of the term; see Lehrs, Aristarch.3, p. 101. However, before Aristarchos, the mistaken belief that The leaders of the ancients were the only heroes, while the people were just humans. seemed to be widespread: it is mentioned in [Arist.] Probl. 19, 48, p. 922b, 18; Rhianos also accepted this view, see Schol. Τ 41 (Mayhoff, de Rhiani stud. Hom., p. 46).—It's incorrect to claim that in the supposed “later” sections of the Odyssey, hero is no longer used for all free men, but only for the aristocracy (Fanta, Staat in Il. u. Od., 17 f.). In δ 268, θ 242, ξ 97, the term is used as a respectable title for free men of higher status, but there is no indication that its use is restricted. Moreover, the term hero clearly appears in its broader sense in other parts of the poem that are also considered late (α 272, θ 483, ω 68, etc.).

27 So for example esp. when Pausanias speaks of the καλούμενοι ἥρωες, 5, 6, 2; 6, 5, 1; 7, 17, 1; 8, 12, 2; 10, 10, 1, etc.

27 So for example, especially when Pausanias talks about the called heroes, 5, 6, 2; 6, 5, 1; 7, 17, 1; 8, 12, 2; 10, 10, 1, etc.

28 ἀνδρῶν ἡρώων θεῖον γένος, Hes., Op. 159.

28 divine line of heroic men, Hes., Op. 159.

29 Of the “Heroes” of his fourth race the great majority fell according to Hesiod in the war of Troy or Thebes and died without any “illumination”; the few, on the other hand, who are translated to the Islands of the Blest are illuminated indeed, but have never died. To regard them as the prototypes and forerunners of the Heroes worshipped in later times (as many do) is inadmissible.

29 Most of the “Heroes” from his fourth generation, according to Hesiod, died in the wars of Troy or Thebes without any “enlightenment.” The few who are taken to the Islands of the Blest are indeed enlightened but have never actually died. Considering them as the examples and predecessors of the Heroes honored later on (as many do) is not acceptable.

30 Grave in the market: Battos in Kyrene, Pi., P. v, 87 ff., and frequently. Hero-graves in the Prytaneion at Megara, Paus. 1, 43, 2–3. Adrastos was buried in the market at Sikyon. Kleisthenes, to play a trick on him, brought from Thebes (the corpse of) Melanippos, who, when alive, had been his greatest enemy, and placed him ἐν τῷ πρυτανείῳ καί μιν ἵδρυσε ἐνθαῦτα ἐν τῷ ἰσχυροτάτῳ, Hdt. v, 67. Themistokles had a μνημεῖον in the market at Magnesia on the Maiander. Th. 1, 138, 5; i.e. a ἡρῷον (see Wachsmuth, Rh. Mus. lii, 140).

30 Grave in the market: Battos in Cyrene, Pi., P. v, 87 ff., and often. Hero-graves in the Prytaneion at Megara, Paus. 1, 43, 2–3. Adrastos was buried in the market at Sikyon. Kleisthenes, wanting to play a trick on him, brought from Thebes the corpse of Melanippos, who had been his greatest enemy during his life, and placed him In the prytaneion, he established him right there in the strongest place., Hdt. v, 67. Themistocles had a μνημείο in the market at Magnesia on the Maiander. Th. 1, 138, 5; i.e. a hero (see Wachsmuth, Rh. Mus. lii, 140).

31 τύμβον ἀμφίπολον ἔχων πολυξενωτάτῳ παρὰ βώμῳ, Pi., O. i, 93; i.e. the great ash-altar of Zeus. The excavations have confirmed Pindar’s description (cf. Paus. 5, 13, 1–2).

31 a tomb surrounded by a lot of hospitality near the altar, Pi., O. i, 93; meaning the large ash-altar of Zeus. The excavations have confirmed Pindar’s description (cf. Paus. 5, 13, 1–2).

32 Grave built in the gateway: ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ πυλῇ at Elis Aitolos the son of Oxylos was buried, Paus. 5, 4, 4; cf. Lobeck, Agl. 281 f. Grave at the boundary of the country: Koroibos, the first Olympic victor, was buried Ἠλείας ἐπὶ τῷ πέρατι as the insc. stated: Paus. 8, 26, 4. Grave of Koroibos, son of Mygdon, ἐν ὅροις Φρυγῶν Στεκτορηνῶν, Paus. 10, 27, 1.

32 Grave built in the gateway: at this gate at Elis Aitolos, the son of Oxylos, was buried, Paus. 5, 4, 4; cf. Lobeck, Agl. 281 f. Grave at the boundary of the country: Koroibos, the first Olympic champion, was buried Ilia at the edge as the inscription stated: Paus. 8, 26, 4. Grave of Koroibos, son of Mygdon, in the terms of Phrygian Stektorin, Paus. 10, 27, 1.

33 The idea of the grave as the dwelling-place of the Hero is shown in a very strange fashion by the story that the Phliasians before the feast of Demeter καλοῦσιν ἐπὶ τὰς σπονδάς the hero Aras and his sons, looking while so doing towards the graves of these Heroes: Paus. 2, 12, 5. 143

33 The concept of the grave as the resting place of the Hero is illustrated in a peculiar way by the story that the Phliasians, before the feast of Demeter, They call for the libations. call upon the hero Aras and his sons, looking towards the graves of these Heroes while doing so: Paus. 2, 12, 5. 143

34 This hero (Xanthippos or Phokos) ἔχει ἐπὶ ἡμέρᾳ τε πάσῃ τιμάς, καὶ ἄγοντες ἱερεῖα οἱ Φωκεῖς τὸ μὲν αἷμα δι’ ὀπῆς ἐγχέουσιν ἐς τὸν τάφον κτλ. Paus. 10, 4, 10. Similarly at the grave of Hyakinthos at Amyklai, Paus. 3, 19, 3. The meaning of such an offering is the same in Greece as in similar cases among any “savage” tribe. In Tylor, ii, 28, we read: “In the Congo district the custom has been described of making a channel into the tomb to the head or mouth of the corpse, to send down month by month the offerings of food and drink.”

34 This hero (Xanthippos or Phokos) honors every day, and the Phocians, during their sacrifices, pour the blood through an opening into the grave, etc. Paus. 10, 4, 10. Similarly at the grave of Hyakinthos at Amyklai, Paus. 3, 19, 3. The significance of such an offering in Greece is the same as in similar practices among any “savage” tribe. In Tylor, ii, 28, we read: “In the Congo district, there’s a custom of creating a channel into the tomb to the head or mouth of the corpse, to send food and drink offerings down each month.”

35 Most of the examples are mentioned by Lobeck, Agl. 281 [u], but he omits the most remarkable case, fully reported by Hdt. i, 67–8, of the transference of the bones of Orestes from Tegea to Sparta (cf. Paus. 3, 3, 6; 11, 10; 8, 54, 4. The reason is obvious, cf. Müller, Dorians, i, 72). Besides this note: the removal of the bones of Hektor from Ilion to Thebes, Paus. 9, 18, 5, Sch. and Tz., Lyc. 1194, 1204; of Arkas from Mainalos to Mantinea, Paus. 8, 9, 3; cf. 8, 36, 8; of Hesiod from Naupaktos to Orchomenos, Paus. 9, 38, 3; of Hippodameia from Midea in Argolis to Olympia, Paus. 6, 20, 7; of Tisamenos from Helike to Sparta, Paus. 7, 1, 8; of Aristomenes from Rhodes to Messene, Paus. 4, 32, 3. Strange story of the shoulder bone of Pelops, Paus. 5, 13, 4–6. In all these cases the removal followed upon a command of the oracle, cf. also Paus. 9, 30, 9–11. Practical stimulus may have been given occasionally by the discovery of abnormally large bones in dug-up graves; we often hear of such discoveries, cf. W. Schmid, Atticismus, iv, 572 f., and it was always believed that such gigantic bones were remains of one of τῶν καλουμένων ἡρώων, Paus. 6, 5, 1 (cf. also 1, 35, 5 ff.; 3, 22, 9). It would be the business of the oracle to determine the name of the Hero concerned and see that the remains were reverently preserved. (One example may be given, though from a later period. In the dried-up bed of the Orontes a clay coffin 11 yards long was found and a corpse within it. The oracle of the Clarian Apollo on being applied to for enlightenment as to its origin answered Ὀρόντην εἶναι, γένους δὲ αὐτὸν εἶναι τοῦ Ἰνδῶν, Paus. 8, 29, 4; Philostr., H. 669 p. 138, 6–19 K.

35 Most of the examples are mentioned by Lobeck, Agl. 281 [u], but he misses the most significant case, fully reported by Hdt. i, 67–8, regarding the transfer of Orestes' bones from Tegea to Sparta (see Paus. 3, 3, 6; 11, 10; 8, 54, 4). The reason is clear, see Müller, Dorians, i, 72. Aside from this note: the relocation of Hector's bones from Ilion to Thebes, Paus. 9, 18, 5, Sch. and Tz., Lyc. 1194, 1204; of Arkas from Mainalos to Mantinea, Paus. 8, 9, 3; see also 8, 36, 8; of Hesiod from Naupaktos to Orchomenos, Paus. 9, 38, 3; of Hippodameia from Midea in Argolis to Olympia, Paus. 6, 20, 7; of Tisamenos from Helike to Sparta, Paus. 7, 1, 8; of Aristomenes from Rhodes to Messene, Paus. 4, 32, 3. There's a strange story about the shoulder bone of Pelops, Paus. 5, 13, 4–6. In all these cases, the relocations followed a command from the oracle, see also Paus. 9, 30, 9–11. Practical motivation may have sometimes come from discovering unusually large bones in excavated graves; we often hear about such discoveries, see W. Schmid, Atticismus, iv, 572 f., and there was a consistent belief that such gigantic bones were the remains of one of of the so-called heroes, Paus. 6, 5, 1 (see also 1, 35, 5 ff.; 3, 22, 9). It would be the oracle's duty to determine the name of the relevant Hero and ensure that the remains were treated with respect. (One example can be noted, though from a later time. In the dried-up bed of the Orontes, a clay coffin measuring 11 yards was found with a corpse inside. When asked about its origin, the oracle of Clarian Apollo replied He is from Orontes, and he belongs to the race of the Indians., Paus. 8, 29, 4; Philostr., H. 669 p. 138, 6–19 K.

36 Plu., Cim. 8; Thes. 36; Paus. 3, 3, 7.—In the year 437–6 we hear of the removal by Hagnon and his Athenians, at the command of the oracle, of the bones of Rhesos from Troy to Amphipolis: Polyaen. vi, 53. The neighbourhood of the mouth of the Strymon on the western slopes of Mt. Pangaios was the original home of Rhesos: he was already known to the Doloneia as the son of Eïoneus; to later writers as the son of Strymon and (like Orpheus) a Muse—which is the same thing (see Conon, 4). On M. Pangaios he still lived as an oracular deity: this must have been the popular belief of the district which the author of the Rhesus explains after Greek fashion (ll. 955–66). He is a tribal god of the Edonians, of the same pattern as Zalmoxis of the Getai, and Sabos or Sabazios of other Thracian tribes. In the mind of the Greeks he had become since the poem of the Doloneia entirely detached from the site of his worship and was a mere mortal champion with whom fancy might do what it chose (cf. Parth. 36). The restoration of his bones to the neighbourhood of the lower Strymon (μνημεῖον τοῦ Ῥήσου in Amphipolis: Marsyas ὁ νεώτερος in Sch., Rhes. 346), and the heroic cult which was undoubtedly paid to him in connexion therewith, may have been a kind of official recognition by the Greeks of the worship of Rhesos discovered in that neighbourhood by the Athenian colonists. I see no reason for doubting the historical fact of the occurrence, though some of the details of Polyaenus’ account have a fabulous colouring. It is true Cicero says of Rhesos, nusquam 144 colitur (ND. iii, 45), and so it may have been in C.’s time: for the earlier period the close of the tragedy clearly suggests the cult of R. as a divinity, while the story of Polyaen. implies his Hero-cult.

36 Plu., Cim. 8; Thes. 36; Paus. 3, 3, 7.—In the year 437–6, we learn about Hagnon and his fellow Athenians moving the bones of Rhesos from Troy to Amphipolis at the oracle's command: Polyaen. vi, 53. The area near the mouth of the Strymon on the western slopes of Mt. Pangaios was originally Rhesos's home. He was already recognized in the Doloneia as the son of Eïoneus and by later writers as the son of Strymon and (like Orpheus) a Muse—which is essentially the same thing (see Conon, 4). On Mt. Pangaios, he continued to be worshiped as an oracular deity, which reflects the beliefs of the local people, as explained by the author of the Rhesus in typical Greek style (ll. 955–66). He is a tribal god of the Edonians, similar to Zalmoxis of the Getai and Sabos or Sabazios of other Thracian tribes. In Greek thought, since the poem of the Doloneia, he had become completely separated from the place of his worship and was seen merely as a mortal champion whom imagination could shape in any way (cf. Parth. 36). The return of his bones to the area near the lower Strymon (Tomb of Rhēsus in Amphipolis: Marsyas the younger in Sch., Rhes. 346), along with the heroic reverence undoubtedly given to him in connection with this, may have served as an official recognition by the Greeks of the worship of Rhesos found by the Athenian colonists in that area. I see no reason to doubt the historical validity of this event, although some details in Polyaenus's account seem somewhat mythical. It’s true that Cicero says of Rhesos, nusquam 144 colitur (ND. iii, 45), and this might have been true in Cicero's time. However, the ending of the tragedy strongly suggests that R. was revered as a deity, while Polyaenus's account implies his Hero-cult.

37 Sometimes only single parts of the body, e.g. the shoulder-blade of Pelops at Olympia (Paus. 5, 13).—In Argos on the road to the Akropolis their heads were buried in the μνῆμα τῶν Αἰγύπτου παίδων, while the rest of their bodies were in Lerne, Paus. 2, 24, 2.

37 Sometimes only individual body parts are found, like the shoulder blade of Pelops at Olympia (Paus. 5, 13).—In Argos, along the road to the Acropolis, their heads were buried in the Memorial of the Egyptian children, while the rest of their bodies were in Lerne, Paus. 2, 24, 2.

38 See Lob., Agl. 281. This only can be the meaning of Soph., OC. 1522 f. (Nauck otherwise).—A strange case is that of Hippolytos in Troizen: ἀποθανεῖν αὐτὸν οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν (οἱ Τροιζήνιοι) συρέντα ὑπὸ τῶν ἵππων οὐδὲ τὸν τάφον ἀποφαίνουσιν εἰδότες· τὸν δὲ ἐν οὐρανῷ καλούμενον ἡνίοχον τοῦτον εἶναι νομίζουσιν ἐκεῖνον (ἐκεῖνοι?) Ἱππόλυτον, τιμὴν παρὰ θεῶν ταύτην ἔχοντα Paus. 2, 32, 1. Here it seems as if the grave were not shown because Hipp. was not regarded as having died and therefore would not have a grave; he is said to have been translated and set among the stars. But there was a grave and the translation story must therefore only be an afterthought. (The death of Hipp. is spoken of clearly enough by the poets: but what happened to him after Asklepios had restored him to life again? The Italian Virbius legend seems to have been little known in Greece. Paus. 2, 27, 4, knows it from Aricia.)—Very occasionally the possession of the relics of the Hero was secured by burning the bones and scattering the ashes in the market place of the city. Thus Phalanthos in Tarentum, Justin. 3, 4, 13 ff.; Solon in Salamis, D.L. i, 62; Plu., Sol. 32. As a rule the scattering of ashes is intended to serve a different purpose, cf. Plu., Lycurg. 31 fin.; Nic. Dam., Paradox. 16, p. 170 West.

38 See Lob., Agl. 281. This can only mean what is stated in Soph., OC. 1522 f. (Nauck has a different interpretation).—A peculiar case is that of Hippolytus in Troezen: They don't want him to die.(the Troezen locals)Even as he's being dragged by the horses, they don't show the seriousness of this; instead, they believe that the one known as the charioteer in heaven is him.(they?)Hippolytus, receiving this honor from the gods Paus. 2, 32, 1. It seems that the grave is not shown because Hippolytus was not seen as having died, and therefore would not have a grave; he is said to have been translated and placed among the stars. However, there was a grave, and the story of his translation must be an afterthought. (The poets clearly speak of Hippolytus' death: but what happened to him after Asclepius restored him to life? The Italian legend of Virbius seems to have been little known in Greece. Paus. 2, 27, 4, mentions it from Aricia.)—Sometimes, the possession of the relics of the Hero was claimed by burning the bones and scattering the ashes in the city’s marketplace. For example, Phalanthos in Tarentum, Justin. 3, 4, 13 ff.; Solon in Salamis, D.L. i, 62; Plu., Sol. 32. Generally, scattering ashes serves a different purpose; cf. Plu., Lycurg. 31 fin.; Nic. Dam., Paradox. 16, p. 170 West.

39 A few examples: κενὸν σῆμα of Teiresias in Thebes, Paus. 9, 18, 4; of Achilles at Elis, Paus. 6, 23, 3; of the Argives who fought in the war against Troy, at Argos, Paus. 2, 20, 6; of Iolaos at Thebes, Paus. 9, 23, 1; Sch. Pi., N. iv, 32 (in the tomb of Amphitryon? Pi., P. ix, 81); of Odysseus at Sparta, Plut., Q. Gr., 48, 302 C; of Kalchas in Apulia, Lyc. 1047 f.

39 Here are a few examples: empty symbol of Teiresias in Thebes, Paus. 9, 18, 4; of Achilles at Elis, Paus. 6, 23, 3; of the Argives who fought in the war against Troy, at Argos, Paus. 2, 20, 6; of Iolaos at Thebes, Paus. 9, 23, 1; Sch. Pi., N. iv, 32 (in the tomb of Amphitryon? Pi., P. ix, 81); of Odysseus at Sparta, Plut., Q. Gr., 48, 302 C; of Kalchas in Apulia, Lyc. 1047 f.

40 Perhaps by ἀνάκλησις of the ψυχή? see above, Ch. I, n. 86 (at the foundation of Messene ἐπεκαλοῦντο ἐν κοινῷ καὶ ἥρωάς σφισιν ἐπανήκειν συνοίκους, Paus. 4, 27, 6).

40 Maybe by the ανάκλησις of the soul? See above, Ch. I, n. 86 (at the foundation of Messene They were calling together in common for their heroes to return as neighbors., Paus. 4, 27, 6).

41 καὶ τεθνεὼς καὶ τάριχος ἐὼν δύναμιν πρὸς θεῶν ἔχει τὸν ἀδικέοντα τίνεσθαι, Hdt. ix, 120.

41 After his death, as a meat dealer, he has the power with the gods to punish those who do wrong., Hdt. ix, 120.

42 No detailed proof of this statement is needed. We will only remark that the attempt to conceal the grave is often met with among so-called “savage” tribes and has the same purpose as in the Greek Hero-cult: cf. on this subject Herbert Spencer, Princ. of Sociol. i, p. 176.

42 No detailed proof of this statement is needed. We will just point out that the effort to conceal the grave is commonly seen among so-called "savage" tribes and serves the same purpose as in the Greek Hero-cult: see Herbert Spencer, Princ. of Sociol. i, p. 176.

43 See Helbig, D. hom. Epos aus Denkm.1, p. 41.

43 See Helbig, D. hom. Epos aus Denkm.1, p. 41.

44 See above, p. 23.

44 See above, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

45 Β 603 οἳ δ’ ἔχον Ἀρκαδίην ὑπὸ Κυλλήνης ὄρος αἰπύ, Αἰπύτιον παρὰ τύμβον.—Cf. Paus. 8, 16, 2–3.—In the Troad the frequently mentioned Ἴλου σῆμα, the σῆμα πολυσκάρθμοιο Μυρίνης which “men” call Βατίεια, were similar monuments.

45 B 603 those who live in Arcadia, beneath the steep mountain of Cyllene, close to the tomb of Aipytus.—See Paus. 8, 16, 2–3.—In the Troad, the often-mentioned tomb of Ilus, the tomb of famous Murine which “men” refer to as Batiea, were similar monuments.

46 The ceremonial announcement of death, the καταμιαίνεσθαι of the proper persons (as usual the next of kin to the dead); the assembling of Spartiates Perioikoi and Helots (cf. Tyrt. fr. 7) with their women to the number of several thousands, the extravagant expression of grief and praise of the dead, the period of mourning (no business in the market for ten days, etc.)—all this is described by Hdt. vi, 58. He compares this grandiose funeral with the pomp customary at the burial of an Asiatic (Persian) monarch.—The Lycurgan νόμοι by these funeral rites οὐχ ὡς ἀνθρώπους ἀλλ’ ὡς ἥρωας τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίων 145 βασιλεῖς προτετιμήκασιν, Xen., Rep. Lac. xv, 9. King Agis I ἔτυχε σεμνοτέρας ἢ κατ’ ἄνθρωπον ταφῆς, Xen., HG. 3, 3, 1.—A peculiar circumstance at the burial of a Spartan king is mentioned by Apollod., fr. 36.—The burial places of the royal Houses of the Agiadai and the Eurypontidai (apart even in their death), Paus. 3, 12, 8; 14, 2 (cf. Bursian, Geog. ii, 126).—Embalming of the body of a king who dies abroad, Xen., HG. 5, 3, 19: D.S. 15, 93, 6; Nep., Ages. 8; Plu., Ages. 40.—Besides this the participation in primitive times of the whole people in the funeral of the Herakleid kings in Corinth may probably be deduced from the story told of the compulsory attendance of the Megarian subjects of Corinth at the funeral at Corinth of a king of the Bakchiad family: Sch. Pi., N. vii, 155 (cf. AB. 281, 27 ff.; Zenob. v, 8; Dgn. vi, 34). In Crete τῶν βασιλέων κηδευομένων προηγεῖτο πυρριχίζων ὁ στρατός (as at the funeral of Patroklos, Ψ 131 ff.), Arist. ap. Schol. V., Ψ 130.

46 The formal announcement of death, the καταμιαίνεσθαι of the appropriate individuals (typically the next of kin of the deceased); the gathering of Spartiates, Perioikoi, and Helots (cf. Tyrt. fr. 7) along with their women, totaling several thousand, the elaborate displays of grief and praise for the deceased, the mourning period (no business in the market for ten days, etc.)—all of this is detailed by Hdt. vi, 58. He compares this grand funeral with the lavish ceremonies customary at the burial of an Asiatic (Persian) king.—The Lycurgan laws through these funeral rites not as human beings but as heroes of the Spartans 145 The kings have distinguished, Xen., Rep. Lac. xv, 9. King Agis I It received a more honorable burial than is typical for a human., Xen., HG. 3, 3, 1.—A unique aspect of a Spartan king's burial is noted by Apollod., fr. 36.—The burial sites of the royal Houses of the Agiad and the Eurypontid (separate even in death), Paus. 3, 12, 8; 14, 2 (cf. Bursian, Geog. ii, 126).—Embalming the body of a king who dies abroad, Xen., HG. 5, 3, 19: D.S. 15, 93, 6; Nep., Ages. 8; Plu., Ages. 40.—Additionally, the collective participation of the entire populace in the funeral of the Herakleid kings in Corinth can likely be inferred from the account of the mandatory attendance of the Megarian subjects of Corinth at the funeral in Corinth of a king from the Bakchiad family: Sch. Pi., N. vii, 155 (cf. AB. 281, 27 ff.; Zenob. v, 8; Dgn. vi, 34). In Crete, The army led the procession of the kings being buried, dancing the pyrrhic dance. (as at the funeral of Patroklos, Ψ 131 ff.), Arist. ap. Schol. V., Ψ 130.

47 Εὐπατρίδαι, οἱ . . . μετέχοντες τοῦ βασιλικοῦ γένους, EM. 395, 50.—Thus the Bakchiadai in Corinth were descendants of the royal family of the house of Bakchis. The Βασιλίδαι, a ruling family of oligarch nobles in Ephesos (Ael. fr. 48), Erythrai (Arist., Pol. 1305b, 19), and perhaps Chios as well (see Gilbert, Gr. Alt. ii, 153), also traced back their descent to the old kings of those Ionic cities. Respect paid to those who were descended ἐκ τοῦ γένους of Androklos at Ephesos, Stra. 633.—The Aigid Admetos, priest of Apollo Karneios at Thera was descended Λακεδαίμονος ἐκ βασιλήων, Epigr. Gr. 191; 192.

47 Eupatridae, those who are part of the royal bloodline., EM. 395, 50.—So the Bacchiadae in Corinth were descendants of the royal family of the Bacchis house. The Basilisk, a ruling family of oligarchic nobles in Ephesus (Ael. fr. 48), Erythrae (Arist., Pol. 1305b, 19), and possibly Chios as well (see Gilbert, Gr. Alt. ii, 153), also traced their ancestry back to the ancient kings of those Ionian cities. Respect was shown to those who descended from the family line of Androklos in Ephesus, Stra. 633.—The Aigid Admetus, priest of Apollo Karneios at Thera, was descended from the Spartan rulers, Epigr. Gr. 191; 192.

48 Here some reference might have been expected to Fustel de Coulanges’ brilliant and penetrating work La Cité antique. In that book the attempt is made to fix upon ancestor-worship, la religion du foyer et des ancêtres, as the root of all the higher types of worship (among the Greeks: only that part of the book concerns us here); and to show how out of these ancestor-worshipping aggregations, begun by the family, larger communities of ever-widening membership developed, and finally out of these the πόλις itself—the highest and most extensive political as well as religious community of all. For the author of that book the proof of his theory lies entirely in the simple logical consequence with which the details and, as far as we know it, the development of both private and public law follow from the original causes adopted by him essentially as postulates. A strictly historical proof that should not have to deduce the original causes from the results but should start from known beginnings and demonstrate the actual existence of every step was indeed an impossibility. The whole historical process must have been already finished when our knowledge first begins: for Homer shows us the πόλις and its component parts (κρῖν’ ἄνδρας κατὰ φῦλα κατὰ φρήτρας Ἀγάμεμνον) as well as the worship of the gods as fully established and developed. It is no disparagement of the valuable and fruitful suggestions made in that book if we say that its leading idea—as far as Greece is concerned—cannot be considered as more than an intuition, which though it may be just and true, must remain unproved. If there ever was a time when ancestor-worship was the only Greek religion at least we cannot see into that dim epoch long anterior to all tradition. To that remote period long before both the all-powerful religion of the gods and the earliest records of the Greek genius, even the narrow and slippery path of inference and reconstruction will hardly lead us. Natural as it might seem, therefore, so far as the subject itself is concerned to deal with such questions, I have taken no notice in the 146 present work of any attempts to deduce Greek religion from an original sole worship of ancestors (such as have been made by many scholars besides F. de Coulanges both in England and in Germany).

48 Here, some reference might have been expected to Fustel de Coulanges’ brilliant and insightful work La Cité antique. In that book, the author tries to identify ancestor-worship, la religion du foyer et des ancêtres, as the root of all the higher forms of worship (only the Greek context is relevant here); and to demonstrate how these ancestor-worshiping groups, initiated by families, grew into larger communities with ever-expanding memberships, ultimately leading to the city itself—the most significant and extensive political and religious community of all. According to the author, the evidence for his theory relies entirely on the straightforward logical outcomes that arise from the details and, as far as we know, the development of both private and public law based on the initial causes he assumes as fundamental. A strictly historical proof, one that does not infer the original causes from the outcomes but instead begins with known origins and demonstrates the actual existence of every step, was indeed impossible. The entire historical process must have already been complete when our understanding starts: for Homer presents the city and its parts (Choose men according to their tribes, according to their clans, Agamemnon.) alongside the established and developed worship of the gods. It does not undermine the valuable and insightful ideas presented in that book to say that its main concept—at least regarding Greece—should be viewed as nothing more than an intuition, which, while possibly valid and true, remains unproven. If there was ever a time when ancestor-worship was the only Greek religion, we cannot access that distant era long before any tradition. Regarding that remote time, long before the dominant religion of the gods and the earliest records of Greek thought, even the narrow and precarious path of inference and reconstruction is unlikely to take us. Naturally, it may seem relevant to discuss such topics; however, I have chosen not to address in the 146 present work any attempts to derive Greek religion from an initial sole worship of ancestors (such as many scholars besides F. de Coulanges have attempted in both England and Germany).

49 Those worshipped by a γένος regarded as its progenitors, γονεῖς: AB. 240, 31 (τὰ θύματα δίδωσιν) εἰς τὰ γονέων (ἱερὰ) τὰ γένη.—Physical relationship between the γεννῆται, originally a fact though afterwards only occasionally demonstrable, is indicated by the ancient name ὁμογάλακτες applied to the members of the same clan (Philoch. fr. 91–4) and meaning strictly παῖδες καὶ παίδων παῖδες (Arist., Pol. 1252b, 18).—The word πάτρα with the same meaning as γένος (Μιδυλιδᾶν πάτρα, Pi., P. viii, 38), makes it still more clear that the members of such a group are regarded as the descendants of a single ancestor. See Dikaiarch. ap. St. Byz. πάτρα.

49 Those revered by a species seen as its ancestors, parents: AB. 240, 31 (He gives the sacrifices.)εἰς τὰ γονέων(ἱερὰ)the species.—The biological connection between the generates, originally a certainty though later only occasionally verifiable, is noted by the ancient term blood relatives used for members of the same clan (Philoch. fr. 91–4) and meaning strictly Kids and kids' kids (Arist., Pol. 1252b, 18).—The word dad with the same meaning as gender (Midalid's father, Pi., P. viii, 38), makes it even clearer that the members of such a group are seen as the descendants of a single ancestor. See Dikaiarch. ap. St. Byz. father.

50 Whose names were chosen by the voice of the Delphic oracle out of a hundred submitted to the Pythia. Arist. Ἀθπ. 21, 6. Cf. Mommsen, Philol., N.F. i, 456 f.

50 Whose names were selected by the Delphic oracle from a hundred that were submitted to the Pythia. Arist. Ἀθπ. 21, 6. Cf. Mommsen, Philol., N.F. i, 456 f.

51 Instead of the common ἐπώνυμοι we also find the word ἀρχήγεται used of the Heroes of the phylai: Ar. Γῆρας, fr. 126 H.–G. (AB. 449, 14); Pl., Lys. 205 D, cf. CIA. ii, 1191; 1575. It is even plainer that the Hero is regarded as the ancestor of his φυλή when he is called ἀρχηγός: thus Oineus was the ἀρχηγός of the Oineïdai, Kekrops the ἀρχηγός of the Kekropidai, Hippothoön ἀρχηγός of the Hippothoöntidai in [Dem.] 60, 30–1. The ἀρχηγὸς τοῦ γένους is its physical forebear and progenitor, Poll. iii, 19: thus Apollo ἀρχηγὸς τοῦ γένους of the Seleucids, CIG. 3595, 26; cf. Isocr. 5, 32. Thus too the members of a phyle are actually described as the συγγενεῖς of their Hero eponymos: [Dem.] 60, 28.

51 Instead of the usual named, we also see the term ἀρχήγεται used for the Heroes of the phylai: Ar. Old age, fr. 126 H.–G. (AB. 449, 14); Pl., Lys. 205 D, cf. CIA. ii, 1191; 1575. It’s even clearer that the Hero is seen as the ancestor of his tribe when referred to as leader: for instance, Oineus was the leader of the Oineïdai, Kekrops the leader of the Kekropidai, and Hippothoön the leader of the Hippothoöntidai in [Dem.] 60, 30–1. The leader of the race is its biological ancestor and progenitor, Poll. iii, 19: thus Apollo is the leader of the race of the Seleucids, CIG. 3595, 26; cf. Isocr. 5, 32. Similarly, the members of a phyle are actually referred to as the relatives of their Hero eponymos: [Dem.] 60, 28.

52 Thus we know of both δῆμος and γένος of the Ionidai, Philaïdai, Boutadai (for the intentional distinctness of the Eteoboutadai see Meier, p. 39), Kephalidai, Perithoïdai, etc.: Meier, de gentil. Attica, p. 35. Such demes were called ἀπὸ τῶν κτισάντων, others ἀπὸ τῶν τόπων: Arist. Ἀθπ. 21, 5 (in which case a name as much like a personal name as possible was extracted out of the place-name and made into the local Hero: cf. Wachsm., Stadt Athen, ii, 1, 248 ff.). Similar conditions existed at other places. In Teos the same names occur as πύργοι (= δῆμοι) and συμμορίαι (= γένη), e.g. Κολωτίων, τοῦ Ἀλκίμου πύργου, Ἀλκιμίδης (also names which differ Ναίων, τοῦ Μηράδου πύργου, Βρυσκίδης), CIG. 3064, where see Böckh II, p. 651. In Rhodos a πάτρα as well as its larger inclusive group (κτοίνα) is called Ἀμφινεῖς: IGM. Aeg. i, 695, Ἀμφινέων πάτραι· Εὐτελίδαι, Ἀμφινεῖς, etc. (Ancestor worship προγονικὰ ἱερά in the Rhodian κτοῖναι is vouched for by Hesych. κτύναι: see Martha, BCH. iv, 144.)

52 So, we know about both demos and genus of the Ionidai, Philaïdai, Boutadai (for the intentional distinction of the Eteoboutadai, see Meier, p. 39), Kephalidai, Perithoïdai, etc.: Meier, de gentil. Attica, p. 35. Such demes were called from the created, while others were named from the places: Arist. Ἀθπ. 21, 5 (in which case a name similar to a personal name was derived from the place-name and turned into the local Hero: cf. Wachsm., Stadt Athen, ii, 1, 248 ff.). Similar situations occurred in other locations. In Teos, the same names appear as towers(= communities) and gangs(= γένη), for example, Κολωτίων, του Άλκιμου πύργου, Αλκιμίδης (also different names like Ναίων, tower of Μηράδος, Βρυσκίδης), CIG. 3064, where see Böckh II, p. 651. In Rhodes, a dad and its larger inclusive group (κτοίνα) are called Amphineus: IGM. Aeg. i, 695, Amphineon parents: Eutelians, Amphineus, etc. (Ancestor worship ancestral shrines in the Rhodian κτοῖναι is confirmed by Hesych. κτύναι: see Martha, BCH. iv, 144.)

53 Thus the descendants of Bakchis in Corinth traced their descent to Aletes (D.S. 7, 9, 4; Paus. 2, 4, 3); the descendants of Aipytos in Messenia to Kresphontes (Paus. 4, 3, 8), the descendants of Agis and Eurypon in Sparta to Eurysthenes and Prokles. The real ancestors were in these cases well known and could not be entirely eclipsed (being too deeply rooted in cult); thus later, as well as in the earlier period, these same families are called Βακχίδαι, Αἰπυτίδαι, not Ἡρακλεῖδαι (D.S., loc. cit., Paus. 4, 3, 8); the Spartan royal families are still Agidai, Eurypontidai, while the fictitious ancestors Eurysthenes and Prokles never quite achieved the status of ἀρχηγέται: Ephoros ap. Str. 366. In many other, perhaps more numerous, cases the fictitious ancestor may have ousted the real and once better known from men’s minds altogether.

53 So, the descendants of Bakchis in Corinth traced their ancestry back to Aletes (D.S. 7, 9, 4; Paus. 2, 4, 3); the descendants of Aipytos in Messenia traced theirs to Kresphontes (Paus. 4, 3, 8), and the descendants of Agis and Eurypon in Sparta traced theirs to Eurysthenes and Prokles. The actual ancestors in these cases were well-known and couldn't be totally overshadowed (due to their strong ties to religious practices); consequently, both in earlier and later times, these same families are referred to as Βακχίδαι, Αἰπυτίδαι, not Heracleidae (D.S., loc. cit., Paus. 4, 3, 8); the royal families of Sparta are still the Agidai and Eurypontidai, while the invented ancestors Eurysthenes and Prokles never truly reached the level of leaders: Ephoros ap. Str. 366. In many other cases, perhaps even more prevalent, the fictional ancestor might have completely replaced the real and once better-known figure in people’s minds.

54 [Arist.] Mirab. 106. 147

54 [Arist.] Mirab. 106. 147

55 See Paus. 10, 4, 10. In an oracle ap. Plu., Sol. 9: ἀρχηγοὺς χώρας θυσίαις ἥρωας ἐνοίκους ἵλασο.

55 See Paus. 10, 4, 10. In an oracle ap. Plu., Sol. 9: Leaders of the land sacrifices heroes inhabitants gracious.

56 Plu., Arist. 11, names seven ἀρχηγέται Πλαταιέων; Clem. Al., Protr. ii, 35 P., gives four of these (Κυκλαῖος seems to be a mistake). Androkrates seems to have been the most prominent; his τέμενος is mentioned by Hdt. ix, 25, his ἡρῷον Thuc. iii, 24, 1; it stood in a thick grove, Paus. loc. cit.

56 Plutarch, Aristotle 11, names seven Plataea leaders; Clement of Alexandria, Protrepticus ii, 35 P., gives four of these (the name Kuklaios seems to be an error). Androkrates appears to have been the most notable; his sacred space is mentioned by Herodotus ix, 25, and his heroic shrine by Thucydides iii, 24, 1; it was located in a dense grove, as noted by Pausanias in the same place.

57 Paus. 6, 24, 9–10.

57 Pause. 6, 24, 9–10.

58 A.R. ii, 835–50, says that this Hero was Idmon the prophet, others called him Agamestor. Sch. ad 845: λέγει δὲ καὶ προμαθίδας, ὅτι διὰ τὸ ἀγνοεῖν ὅστις εἴη ἐπιχώριον ἥρωα καλοῦσιν οἱ Ἡρακλεῶται. He was the local daimon worshipped on the spot before the colony came, and then taken over by the colonists for their own. Cf. the case of Rhesos, above, n. 36.

58 A.R. ii, 835–50, mentions that this Hero was Idmon the prophet, while others referred to him as Agamestor. Sch. ad 845: He also mentions that due to not knowing who the local hero is, the Heracleans call him __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.. He was the local spirit worshipped in the area before the colony arrived, and then adopted by the colonists for their own use. Compare this to the case of Rhesos, mentioned above, n. 36.

59 Paus. 6, 20, 15–19. It was a round altar, according to many τάφος ἀνδρὸς αὐτόχθονος καὶ ἀγαθοῦ τὰ ἐς ἱππικήν—the grave and altar being one as was the grave and altar of Aiakos at Aegina, Paus. 2, 29, 8—whose name was Olenios. Acc. to others it was the grave of Dameon son of Phlious and of his horse; or the κενὸν ἠρίον of Myrtilos set up in his honour by Pelops; or of Oinomaos; or of Alkathoös son of Porthaon, one of the suitors of Hippodameia—to say nothing of the learned suggestion of the ἀνὴρ Αἰγύπτιος given by Paus. l.c. as a last resort. Acc. to Hesych. ταράξιππος it belonged to Pelops himself, acc. to Lyc. 42 f. to a giant called Ischenos (see Sch. and Tz.). Besides all this a ταράξιππος seems to have been almost indispensable on the racecourses of the great games. The Isthmus and Nemea had theirs as well (Paus. § 19)—and Paus. 10, 37, 4, mentions it as something unusual that the course at Delphi had no ταράξιππος. Cf. Pollak, Hippodromica, p. 91 ff., 1890.

59 Paus. 6, 20, 15–19. It was a round altar, according to many The grave of a native man and a good one, related to horsemanship.—the grave and altar being one just like the grave and altar of Aiakos in Aegina, Paus. 2, 29, 8—whose name was Olenios. According to others, it was the grave of Dameon, son of Phlious, and his horse; or the empty dawn of Myrtilos set up in his honor by Pelops; or of Oinomaos; or of Alkathoös, son of Porthaon, one of the suitors of Hippodameia—not to mention the scholarly suggestion of the Egyptian man given by Paus. l.c. as a last resort. According to Hesych. ταράξιππος it belonged to Pelops himself, while according to Lyc. 42 f. it belonged to a giant named Ischenos (see Sch. and Tz.). Besides all this, a ταράξιππος seems to have been almost essential on the racecourses of the major games. The Isthmus and Nemea had theirs as well (Paus. § 19)—and Paus. 10, 37, 4 mentions it as unusual that the course at Delphi had no tauracorn. Cf. Pollak, Hippodromica, p. 91 ff., 1890.

60 ἥρως εὔοδος, CIG. 4838b, cf. Welcker, Rhein. Mus., N.F. vii, 618—καλαμίτης ἥρως (Dem. 18, 129, with Sch. and Hesych. s.v.)—ἥρως τειχοφύλαξ ἐν Μυρίνῃ, Hesych.—ἥρως ἐπιτέγιος, CIA. iii, 1, 290, and 1, 194–206, see Hiller v. Gärt., Philol. 55, 180 f.—With place-names ὁ ἐπὶ βλαύτῃ ἥρως, Poll. vii, 87—ἥροιν ἐμ πεδίῳ, Att. ins. ap., Leg. Sacr. i, p. 5.—In Epidauros on an architrave occurs the inscr. ἥρωος κλαϊκοφόρου, F. d’Epid. i, n. 245. τῷ κλαϊκοφόρῳ also occurs in an inscr. from Mt. Ithome, Leg. Sacr., p. 36 (n. 15, l. 11).—Probably to this class belongs the ἥρως πάνοψ at Athens, Pl. Lys. init.; Hesych. Phot. s.v.

60 Hero with a positive journey, CIG. 4838b, cf. Welcker, Rhein. Mus., N.F. vii, 618—Hero of the reeds (Dem. 18, 129, with Sch. and Hesych. s.v.)—Hero who protects the walls in Myrine, Hesych.—Roof hero, CIA. iii, 1, 290, and 1, 194–206, see Hiller v. Gärt., Philol. 55, 180 f.—With place-names Hero at Blau, Poll. vii, 87—Leader in my field, Att. ins. ap., Leg. Sacr. i, p. 5.—In Epidauros on an architrave occurs the inscription of the crying Hero, F. d’Epid. i, n. 245. To the crying one also appears in an inscription from Mt. Ithome, Leg. Sacr., p. 36 (n. 15, l. 11).—Probably from this category is the Hero Panops in Athens, Pl. Lys. init.; Hesych. Phot. s.v.

61 ἥρως ἰατρός in Athens, CIA. ii, 403–4, see below.—A ἥρως στρατηγός is mentioned by a (late) ins. Ἐφ. Ἀρχ., 1884, p. 170, l. 53. From their activities are named also the Heroes Matton, Keraon in Sparta, Deipneus in Achaea (Polemon: Ath. ii, 39 C; iv, 173 F).—The Στεφανηφόρου ἡρῷον was mentioned by Antiph., στεφανήφορος ἥρως by Hellan., but his name was unknown: Harp. Phot. Suid. s.v.; AB. 301, 19 ff. Cf. Böckh, Econ. of Ath.2, p. 144 Lew.; CIG. 1, p. 168.

61 hero doctor in Athens, CIA. ii, 403–4, see below.—A hero general is mentioned by a (late) inscription Αρχαιολογία, 1884, p. 170, l. 53. From their activities are named also the Heroes Matton, Keraon in Sparta, Deipneus in Achaea (Polemon: Ath. ii, 39 C; iv, 173 F).—The Crowned hero monument was mentioned by Antiph., stephanephoros hero by Hellan., but his name was unknown: Harp. Phot. Suid. s.v.; AB. 301, 19 ff. Cf. Böckh, Econ. of Ath.2, p. 144 Lew.; CIG. 1, p. 168.

62 In Phaleron there was an altar, καλεῖται δὲ “ἥρωος”—the learned declared it to be an altar of Androgeos the son of Minos: Paus. 1, 1, 4.—Cf. 10, 36, 6: Χαραδραίοις (at Charadra in Phocis) Ἡρώων καλουμένων (i.e. they were called “the Heroes”) εἰσὶν ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ βωμοί, καὶ αὐτοὺς οἱ μὲν Διοσκούρων, οἱ δὲ ἐπιχωρίων φασὶν εἶναι ἡρώων.—ἡρωι, ἡρωΐνῃ a sacrifice is offered at Marathon: sacrificial Calendar of the Attic Tetrapolis (fourth century B.C.) in Leg. Sacr. i, p. 48. ἡρωι, ἡρωΐνῃ, ib., p. 2; CIA. i, 4: fifth century.—Decree ordering a record to be set up in the Peiraeus παρὰ τὸν ἥρω, SIG. 834, 26; CIA. ii, 1546–7: ἥρῳ ἀνέθηκεν ὁ δεῖνα. Roehl, IG. 148 Ant. 29: (Mykenai) τοῦ ἥρωός ἠμι, cf. Furtwängler, Ath. Mitth. 1896, p. 9; ib. 323; ἀνέθηκαν τῷ ἡρωι (Locris).—On the different superimposed layers of stucco on the so-called Heroön west of the Altis at Olympia were the ins. Ἥρωος, Ἥρωορ, and once also Ἡρώων. There seems to me to be no reason to suppose that this nameless Hero was Iamos in particular, the ancestor of the Iamidai (as Curtius does, Die Altäre v. Olymp., p. 25, Abh. Berl. Ak. 1881). For what reason should the name of this highly honoured oracular Hero—which had by no means been forgotten—be suppressed? The name of the Hero was not given for the simple reason that it was unknown. Nameless ἥρωες ἐπιχώριοι, who according to some had set up the great sacrificial altar of Zeus in Olympia, are mentioned by Paus. 5, 13, 8. In some cases the namelessness of a Hero is explained by the fear of uttering awful names, which esp. in the case of the spirits of the lower world are very frequently suppressed or referred to by a circumlocution (cf. Erinyes and spirits of the dead, Rh. Mus. 50, 20, 3): cf. Ant. Lib. 13, p. 214, 19 W. This was perhaps why Narkissos was called ἥρως σιγηλός, Str. 404. On the other hand, it was a special form of respect, at the sacrifice to a Hero, to call out his name: τῷ Ἀρταχαίῃ θύουσι Ἀκάνθιοι ἐκ θεοπροπίου ὡς ἥρωϊ ἐπουνομάζοντες τὸ οὔνομα, Hdt. vii, 117. Ὕλᾳ θύουσιν καὶ αὐτὸν ἐξ ὀνόματος εἰς τρὶς ὁ ἱερεὺς φωνεῖ κτλ. Anton. Lib. 26 fin. Cf. Paus. 8, 26, 7; ἐπικαλούμενοι τὸν Μυίαγρον.—No one will miss the obvious analogy with the worship of the gods. In many places in Greece nameless (or merely “adjectival”) gods were worshipped, ἄγνωστοι θεοί, as at Olympia, Paus. 5, 14, 8, and elsewhere. At Phaleron βωμοὶ θεῶν τε ὀνομαζομένων ἀγνώστων καὶ ἡρώων (sc., ἀγνώστων?) Paus. 1, 1, 4. (ἀγνῶτες θεοὶ Poll. viii, 119. Hesych. s.v.: βωμοὶ ἀνώνυμοι in Attica D.L. i, 110.)

62 In Phaleron, there was an altar, called "hero"—scholars identified it as an altar for Androgeos, the son of Minos: Paus. 1, 1, 4.—Compare 10, 36, 6: Χαραδραίοις (at Charadra in Phocis) Heroes called (i.e., they were called “the Heroes”) There are altars in the marketplace, and some say they belong to the Dioscuri, while others claim they are heroes from the local area.—heroes, heroine a sacrifice is offered at Marathon: sacrificial Calendar of the Attic Tetrapolis (fourth century BCE) in Leg. Sacr. i, p. 48. heroes, heroine, ib., p. 2; CIA. i, 4: fifth century.—Decree ordering a record to be set up in the Peiraeus beside the hero, SIG. 834, 26; CIA. ii, 1546–7: Person named __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ dedicated this statue.. Roehl, IG. 148 Ant. 29: (Mykenai) the hero’s half, cf. Furtwängler, Ath. Mitth. 1896, p. 9; ib. 323; Dedicated to the hero (Locris).—On the different layers of stucco on the so-called Heroën west of the Altis at Olympia were the inscriptions. Ἥρωος, Ἥρωορ, and once also Heroes. To me, there seems to be no reason to think that this unnamed Hero was Iamos in particular, the ancestor of the Iamidai (as Curtius argues, Die Altäre v. Olymp., p. 25, Abh. Berl. Ak. 1881). Why would the name of this highly respected oracular Hero, which had certainly not been forgotten, be concealed? The name of the Hero was not given simply because it was unknown. Nameless local heroes, who according to some set up the great sacrificial altar of Zeus in Olympia, are mentioned by Paus. 5, 13, 8. In some instances, the namelessness of a Hero is explained by the fear of pronouncing dreadful names, which especially in the case of spirits from the underworld are often omitted or referred to in a roundabout way (see Erinyes and spirits of the dead, Rh. Mus. 50, 20, 3): see Ant. Lib. 13, p. 214, 19 W. This might explain why Narkissos was called silent hero, Str. 404. Conversely, it was a special form of respect during the sacrifices to a Hero to call out his name: The Acantians sacrifice to Artachaeus, calling on him as a hero according to the oracle., Hdt. vii, 117. They sacrifice to Hylas, and the priest calls out his name three times, etc. Anton. Lib. 26 fin. cf. Paus. 8, 26, 7; calling on Myiagrus.—No one will miss the clear parallel with the worship of the gods. In many places in Greece, nameless (or just “descriptive”) gods were worshipped, unknown gods, as at Olympia, Paus. 5, 14, 8, and elsewhere. At Phaleron Altars of known gods and unknown heroes (sc., unknowns?) Paus. 1, 1, 4. (unknown gods Poll. viii, 119. Hesych. s.v.: anonymous altars in Attica D.L. i, 110.)

63 Τλαπολέμῳ ἀρχαγέτᾳ Pi., O. vii, 78; P. v, 56. The regular custom is mentioned by Ephorus ap. Str. 366: οὐδ’ ἀρχηγέτας νομισθῆναι· ὅπερ πᾶσιν ἀποδίδοται οἰκισταῖς.

63 Tlapolemō leader Pi., O. vii, 78; P. v, 56. The regular practice is noted by Ephorus ap. Str. 366: Would you consider the founders? For they are granted to all settlers..

64 Δημοκλείδην δὲ καταστῆσαι τὴν ἀποικίαν αὐτοκράτορα. Official decree about Brea: CIA. i, 31 [Hicks and Hill2, n. 41, l. 8].

64 To set up the colony under Democles as an autocrat. Official decree about Brea: CIA. i, 31 [Hicks and Hill2, n. 41, l. 8].

65 Pi., P. v, 87 ff.

65 Pi., P. v, 87+

66 Hdt. vi, 38.

66 Hdt. 6.38.

67 D.S. 11, 66, 4.

67 D.S. 11, 66, 4.

68 Hdt. i, 168.

68 Hdt. i, 168.

69 Thuc. v, 11.—Thus in the fourth century at Sikyon Euphron the leader of the demos has been murdered by some of the other party, but οἱ πολῖται αὐτοῦ ὡς ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν κομισάμενοι ἔθαψάν τε ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ καὶ ὡς ἀρχηγέτην τῆς πόλεως σέβονται, Xen., HG. 7, 4, 12.

69 Thuc. v, 11.—In the fourth century in Sikyon, Euphron, the leader of the people, was killed by some members of the opposing faction, but The citizens recognized him as a good man, giving him a fitting burial in the agora and respected him as the city’s leader., Xen., HG. 7, 4, 12.

70 Worship of the law-givers of Tegea as Heroes: Paus. 8, 48, 1.

70 Worship of the lawmakers of Tegea as Heroes: Paus. 8, 48, 1.

71 In the case of Sophokles the “heroizing” had a special superstitious reason. He had once received Asklepios as a guest into his house (and established a worship of A.) and was therefore regarded as especially favoured by heaven and after his death worshipped as Hero Δεξίων: EM. 256, 7–13. (In the temple of Amynos, an Asklepiad daimon, on the west of the Akropolis an honorific decree dating from the end of the fourth century B.C. has been discovered, referring to the ὀργεῶνες τοῦ Δεξίωνος together with those of Amynos and Asklepios: Ath. Mitt. 1896, p. 299.) In this way many mortals who had entertained the gods as guests were themselves made Heroes, cf. Deneken, de Theoxen. c, ii.

71 For Sophocles, the “heroization” had a unique superstitious significance. He had once welcomed Asclepius as a guest in his home (and established a worship of him), so he was seen as particularly blessed by the gods and was worshipped as a hero after his death Right-wing: EM. 256, 7–13. (In the temple of Amynos, an Asclepiad deity, on the west side of the Acropolis, an honorific decree from the end of the fourth century BCE was discovered, mentioning the οργεώνες του Δεξίωνος along with those of Amynos and Asclepius: Ath. Mitt. 1896, p. 299.) In this way, many mortals who had hosted the gods as guests were also made heroes, cf. Deneken, de Theoxen. c, ii.

72 In the examples collected in n. 35 above the removal of the Hero’s bones was in each case commanded by the Delphic oracle. Typical examples of the foundation of an annual festival of a Hero on 149 the recommendation of an oracle: Hdt. i, 167; Paus. 8, 23, 7; 9, 38, 5.

72 In the examples gathered in n. 35 above, the removal of the Hero’s bones was ordered by the Delphic oracle in each case. Typical examples of the establishment of an annual festival for a Hero following the advice of an oracle can be found on 149: Hdt. i, 167; Paus. 8, 23, 7; 9, 38, 5.

73 Plu. Cim. 19—his authority is Nausikrates ὁ ῥήτωρ the pupil of Isokrates. The god ordered μὴ ἀμελεῖν Κίμωνος. Kimon’s spirit was thus expressing its anger at the “neglect” by sending pestilence and γῆς ἀφορία—he wanted a cult.

73 Plu. Cim. 19—his authority is Nausikrates the speaker, a student of Isokrates. The god commanded Don't neglect Kimon's matters.. Kimon’s spirit was thus showing its rage at the “neglect” by unleashing pestilence and earthly abomination—he desired worship.

74 Appearance at the battle of Marathon, command of the oracle τιμᾶν Ἐχετλαῖον ἥρωα, Paus. 1, 32, 5.—Swarm of bees in the severed head of Onesilos at Amathos; the oracle orders his head to be buried Ὀνησίλῳ δὲ θύειν ὡς ἥρωι ἀνὰ πᾶν ἔτος, Hdt. v, 114.

74 Appearance at the battle of Marathon, command of the oracle honoring the hero Echetlaeus, Paus. 1, 32, 5.—Swarm of bees in the severed head of Onesilos at Amathos; the oracle orders his head to be buried Onesilus is to be honored as a hero with sacrifices every year., Hdt. v, 114.

75 Before the battle of Plataea: Plu., Arist. 11. Before the occupation of Salamis the oracle ordered Solon ἀρχηγοὺς ἥρωας ἵλασο, Plu. Sol. 9.

75 Before the battle of Plataea: Plu., Arist. 11. Before the occupation of Salamis, the oracle instructed Solon leaders heroes gracious, Plu. Sol. 9.

76 The Persian Artachaies, of the family of the Achaimenidai, was given a burial of great pomp after his death, by Xerxes at Akanthos: θύουσι Ἀκάνθιοι ἐκ θεοπροπίου ὡς ἡρωι ἐπουνομάζοντες τὸ οὔνομα, Hdt. vii, 117 (—the Ἀρταχαίου τάφος remained a well-known spot, Ael., HA. xiii, 20). It is hardly likely that the unusual size of the Persian of which Hdt. speaks was the cause of his being made a Hero by the oracle.

76 The Persian Artachaies, from the Achaemenid family, received a grand burial after his death, arranged by Xerxes at Akanthos: The Acanthians proclaim from the oracle as they honor the hero by calling out his name., Hdt. vii, 117 (—the Artaxerxes' tomb remained a well-known spot, Ael., HA. xiii, 20). It's unlikely that the unusual size of the Persian mentioned by Hdt. was the reason he was regarded as a Hero by the oracle.

77 Paus. 6, 9, 6–7. Plu., Rom. 28. Oinom. ap. Eus., PE. 5, 34, p. 230 C (Vig.). Celsus c. Xt. also refers to the miracle, Or., Cels. iii, 33, p. 292 L. Cf. iii, 3, p. 256; iii, 25, p. 280.

77 Paus. 6, 9, 6–7. Plu., Rom. 28. Oinom. ap. Eus., PE. 5, 34, p. 230 C (Vig.). Celsus c. Xt. also mentions the miracle, Or., Cels. iii, 33, p. 292 L. See also iii, 3, p. 256; iii, 25, p. 280.

78 Kleomedes μοίρᾳ τωὶ δαιμονίᾳ διέπτη ἀπὸ τῆς κιβωτοῦ, Cels. ap. Orig., Cels. iii, 33, p. 293 L. Oinom. ap. Euseb., PE. 5, 34, 1, (p. 296 Giff.): οἱ θεοὶ ἀνηρείψαντό σε ὥσπερ οἱ τοῦ Ὁμήρου τὸν Γανυμήδην. Thus the gods, acc. to the popular opinion derided by Oinom., gave Kleomedes immortality, ἀθανασίαν ἔδωκαν, p. 297 Giff.

78 Kleomedes was swept away by fate, Cels. ap. Orig., Cels. iii, 33, p. 293 L. Oinom. ap. Euseb., PE. 5, 34, 1, (p. 296 Giff.): the gods took you up just like they did with Ganymede in Homer's stories. So, according to popular belief, which Oinom. ridiculed, the gods granted Kleomedes immortality, they granted him immortality, p. 297 Giff.

79 We rarely hear of other oracles directing Heroes to be worshipped. But cf. Xenag. ap. Macr. 5, 18, 30: on the occasion of a failure of the crops at Sicily ἔθυσαν Πεδιοκράτῃ τινὶ ἥρωι προστάξαντος αὐτοῖς τοῦ ἐκ Παλικῶν χρηστηρίου.—This Hero is probably the same as Pediakrates, one of the six στρατηγοί of the ἐγχώριοι Σικανοί in Sicily who were slain by Herakles and μέχρι τοῦ νῦν ἡρωϊκῆς τιμῆς τυχάνουσιν. D.S. 4, 23, 5: from Timaeus?

79 We seldom hear of other oracles instructing Heroes to be honored. But see Xenag. ap. Macr. 5, 18, 30: during a crop failure in Sicily They made sacrifices to Pediakrates, a particular hero, as instructed by the oracle from Palikoi..—This Hero is likely the same as Pediakrates, one of the six generals of the local Sicilians in Sicily who were killed by Herakles and still receive heroic honors even today. D.S. 4, 23, 5: from Timaeus?

80 The lines of the oracle about Kleomedes may very well be ancient (ἔσχατος ἡρώων κτλ.) simply on the ground that its assertion had not been fulfilled. If oracles that come true are rightly regarded as subsequent to the events which they profess to foresee, then it is only reasonable to regard an oracle which is proved incorrect by later events as earlier than the events which contradict its prophecy.

80 The statements of the oracle about Kleomedes could definitely be ancient (Last of the heroes, etc.) simply because what it predicted didn't happen. If we consider that oracles that come true are seen as following the events they claim to predict, then it's only logical to think of an oracle that’s proven wrong by later events as earlier than those events that go against its prediction.

81 οὗτος γὰρ ὁ θεὸς περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις πάτριος ἐξηγητὴς ἐν μέσῳ τῆς γῆς ἐπὶ τοῦ ὀμφαλοῦ καθήμενος ἐξηγεῖται, in the words of Plato, Rp. 427 C.

81 This god acts as a guide on these issues for everyone, residing at the center of the earth and providing clarity., in the words of Plato, Rp. 427 C.

82 γίνεται ἐν Δελφοῖς ἥρωσι ξένια, ἐν οἷς δοκεῖ ὁ θεὸς ἐπὶ ξένια καλεῖν τοὺς ἥρωας, Sch. Pi. N. vii, 68.

82 In Delphi, there are rituals for heroes, where it's believed that the god invites the heroes for hospitality., Sch. Pi. N. vii, 68.

83 Plu., Arist. 21.—Grave of the Megarians who had fallen in the Persian wars, erected in the market of that city: CIG. 1051 (= Sim., fr. 107 PLG.), Paus. 1, 43, 3. We hear nothing of the Hero-worship of these men, but it is natural to suppose it.—Thus in Phigaleia in the market place there was a common grave of the hundred Oresthasians who had died fighting for Phigaleia, καὶ ὡς ἥρωσιν αὐτοῖς ἐναγίζουσιν ἀνὰ πᾶν ἔτος, Paus. 8, 41, 1.

83 Plu., Arist. 21.—Grave of the Megarians who fell in the Persian wars, built in the market of that city: CIG. 1051 (= Sim., fr. 107 PLG.), Paus. 1, 43, 3. We don’t hear anything about the Hero-worship of these men, but it’s reasonable to assume it existed.—Similarly, in Phigaleia, there was a common grave in the marketplace for the hundred Oresthasians who died fighting for Phigaleia, And as they sacrifice to the heroes every year., Paus. 8, 41, 1.

84 Paus. 1, 32, 4: σέβονται δὲ οἱ Μαραθώνιοι τούτους, οἳ παρὰ τὴν μάχην ἀπέθανον ἥρωας ὀνομάζοντες. They lay buried on the field of battle, Paus. 1, 29, 4; 32, 3. Every night could be heard the neighing 150 of horses and the sound of battle. Those who attempted to witness the doings of the spirits suffered for it, Paus. l.c. The sight of the spirits made men blind or killed them. This is well known of gods—χαλεποὶ δὲ θεοὶ φαίνεσθαι ἐναργῶς. As to the results of seeing a Hero cf. the story in Hdt. vi, 117.

84 Paus. 1, 32, 4: The Marathon people remember those who died in battle by calling them heroes.. They are buried on the battlefield, Paus. 1, 29, 4; 32, 3. Every night, you could hear the neighing 150 of horses and the sounds of combat. Those who tried to witness the actions of the spirits faced consequences, Paus. l.c. Seeing the spirits could either blind men or kill them. This is well known about gods—gods can be really scary. For the effects of seeing a hero, see the story in Hdt. vi, 117.

85 Pi., I. iv, 26 ff.; cf. N. iv, 46 ff.

85 Pi., I. iv, 26 ff.; cf. N. iv, 46 ff.

86 Hdt. ii, 44, has recourse to the idea that there was a difference between the god Herakles and the Hero Herakles the son of Amphitryon: καὶ δοκέουσι δέ μοι οὗτοι ὀρθότατα Ἑλλήνων ποιέειν, οἳ διξὰ Ἡράκλεια ἱδρυσάμενοι ἔκτηνται καὶ τῷ μὲν ὡς ἀθανάτῳ Ὀλυμπίῳ δὲ ἐπωνυμίην θύουσι, τῷ δὲ ἑτέρῳ ὡς ἥρωϊ ἐναγίζουσι. Combination of θύειν and ἐναγίζειν in one sacrifice to Herakles, at Sikyon: Paus. 2, 10, 1. Herakles ἥρως θεός Pi., N. iii, 22.

86 Hdt. ii, 44 refers to the notion that there was a distinction between the god Heracles and the Hero Heracles, the son of Amphitryon: These people seem to me to truly represent the Greeks, who, during the celebration of Heracleia, make sacrifices to the one considered an immortal Olympian, while they honor the other as a hero.. A combination of θύειν and to perform a ritual sacrifice in one sacrifice to Heracles, at Sikyon: Paus. 2, 10, 1. Heracles hero god Pi., N. iii, 22.

87 Varying worship of the same person as Hero and as god, e.g. Achilles. He was a god in Epirus for example (called upon as Ἄσπετος, Plu., Pyr. 1) in Astypalaia (Cic., ND. iii, 45) in Erythrai (third century ins. SIG. 600, 50, 75), etc. As Hero he was worshipped in Elis where an empty grave was erected to him ἐκ μαντείας, and where at his annual festival at sunset the women κόπτεσθαι νομίζουσιν, i.e. lament over him as dead. Paus. 6, 23, 3.

87 Different forms of worship for the same figure as both a hero and a god, for example, Achilles. He was recognized as a god in Epirus, where he was invoked as Unbounded (Plu., Pyr. 1), in Astypalaia (Cic., ND. iii, 45), and in Erythrai (third century ins. SIG. 600, 50, 75), among other places. As a hero, he was honored in Elis, where an empty grave was built for him from prophecy. At his annual festival at sunset, the women They think they are cut., meaning they mourn over him as if he were dead. Paus. 6, 23, 3.

88 I shall not multiply examples and only note Plu., M. Virt., p. 255 E: τῇ Λαμψάκῃ πρότερον ἡρωϊκὰς τιμὰς ἀποδιδόντες, ὕστερον ὡς θεῷ θύειν ἐψηφίσαντο.

88 I won't provide a ton of examples, but I will point out Plu., M. Virt., p. 255 E: In Lampsacus, they first offered heroic honors, and later they voted to sacrifice to the god..

89 In the well-known lines ἥκεις ὦ Λύκόοργε κτλ. Hdt. i, 65.

89 In the famous lines You have arrived, O Lycaon, etc. Hdt. i, 65.

90 Thus Eupolis calls the Hero Akademos θεός, as Sophokles does the Hero Kolonos, and others do the same, see Nauck on Soph., OC. 65.

90 So Eupolis refers to the Hero Akademos as God, just like Sophocles does with the Hero Kolonos, and others also do the same. Check Nauck on Soph., OC. 65.

91 οἱ ἥρωες καὶ αἱ ἡρωίδες τοῖς θεοῖς τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχουσι λόγον (i.e. for dream-interpretation), πλὴν ὅσα δυνάμεως ἀπολείπονται, Artemid. iv, 78.—Paus. 10, 31, 11: the ancients considered the Eleusinian mysteries as τοσοῦτον ἐντιμότερον than all other religious ceremonies ὅσῳ καὶ θεοὺς ἐπίπροσθεν ἡρώων.

91 The heroes and heroines share the same purpose as the gods. (i.e. for dream interpretation), but whatever power remains, Artemid. iv, 78.—Paus. 10, 31, 11: the ancients regarded the Eleusinian mysteries as more respected than all other religious ceremonies just as the gods are above the heroes.

92 Machaon’s μνῆμα and ἱερὸν ἅγιον at Gerenia, Paus. 3, 26, 9. His bones had been brought by Nestor when he came home from Troy: § 10. Cf. Schol. Marc. and Tz. Lyc. 1048. The first to sacrifice to him was Glaukos the son of Aipytos: Paus. 4, 3, 9.—Podaleirios. His ἡρῷον lay at the foot of the λόφος Δρίον by Mt. Garganus 100 stades from the sea, ῥεῖ δὲ ἐξ αὐτοῦ ποτάμιον πάνακες πρὸς τὰς τῶν θρεμμάτων νόσους, Str. 284. The method of incubation given in the text is described by Lyc. 1047–55. He also speaks of a river Althainis (so called because of its medicinal properties, cf. EM. 63, 3, from Schol. Lyc.), which cured disease if one sprinkled oneself with water from it.—? from Timaeus, cf. Tz. on 1050. (Cf. also the spring by the Amphiaraion at Oropos: Paus. 1, 34, 4.)

92 Machaon's memorial service and holy shrine at Gerenia, Paus. 3, 26, 9. His bones were brought by Nestor when he returned home from Troy: § 10. See Schol. Marc. and Tz. Lyc. 1048. The first to make a sacrifice to him was Glaukos, son of Aipytos: Paus. 4, 3, 9.—Podaleirios. His hero was located at the base of the Drion Hill near Mt. Garganus, 100 stades from the sea, from which a river flows that heals all sorts of ailments, Str. 284. The method of incubation mentioned in the text is detailed by Lyc. 1047–55. He also references a river called Althainis (named for its healing properties, cf. EM. 63, 3, from Schol. Lyc.), which cured illness if one sprinkled oneself with its water.—? from Timaeus, cf. Tz. on 1050. (See also the spring by the Amphiaraion at Oropos: Paus. 1, 34, 4.)

93 Paus. 2, 38, 6.—The brother of Polemokrates, Alexanor, had a heroön at Titane in the territory of Sikyon: Paus. 2, 11, 7; 23, 4; but we hear nothing of sick-cures (though his name would lead us to suspect such).—Other Asklepiadai: Nikomachos, Gorgasos, Sphyros (Wide, Lac. Culte, 195).

93 Paus. 2, 38, 6.—The brother of Polemokrates, Alexanor, had a hero at Titane in the territory of Sikyon: Paus. 2, 11, 7; 23, 4; but there’s no mention of any healing practices (even though his name suggests there might be).—Other Asklepiadai: Nikomachos, Gorgasos, Sphyros (Wide, Lac. Culte, 195).

94 Sanctuary of Ἥρως ἰατρός near the Theseion: Dem. 19, 249; 18, 129; Apollon., V. Aesch., p. 265, 5 f. West. Decree about melting down silver votive-offerings (third and second century), CIA. ii, 403–4.—Acc. to Usener (Götternamen, 149–53) Ἰατρός is to be regarded as the proper name of this Hero (really a functional “Sondergott”) and not as an adjectival description of a nameless Hero (as in ἥρως στρατηγός, στεφανηφόρος, κλαϊκοφόρος—this last in two different places, like ἥρως ἰατρός, see above, n. 61). Acc. to 151 his view Ἰατρός was given the adj. title ἥρως to distinguish him from a θεὸς Ἰατρός. But this would only be possible if there existed a god who was not merely an ἰατρός and so called by this title, like Ἀπόλλων, Ποσειδῶν ἰατρός, but whose proper name was Ἰατρός. But there was no such god. Usener (151) infers the existence of a god Ἰατρός out of the proper name Ἰατροκλῆς. But this would only be justifiable if there were not a whole host of proper names compounded with -κλῆς, the first part of which is anything but a god’s name (list in Fick, Griech. Personennamen2, p. 165 ff.).—There seems no real reason for understanding the name ἥρως ἰατρός differently from the analogous ἥ. στρατηγός, ἥ. τειχοφύλαξ, etc.—There existed besides even νύμφαι ἰατροί, περὶ Ἠλείαν. Hesych.

94 Sanctuary of Hero doctor near the Theseion: Dem. 19, 249; 18, 129; Apollon., V. Aesch., p. 265, 5 f. West. Decree about melting down silver votive offerings (third and second century), CIA. ii, 403–4.—According to Usener (Götternamen, 149–53), Doctor should be considered the proper name of this Hero (actually a functional “Sondergott”) instead of just an adjectival description of a nameless Hero (like heroic general, wreath-wearing, lamenting—this last in two different contexts, similar to hero doctor, see above, n. 61). According to 151, his view is that Doctor was given the adjectival title hero to differentiate him from a God the Healer. But this would only be valid if there existed a god who was not just an doctor and called by that title, like Apollo, Poseidon the healer, but whose proper name was Doctor. However, there was no such god. Usener (151) infers the existence of a god Doctor from the proper name Iatrokles. But this could only be justified if there weren’t many proper names composed with -κλῆς, where the first part is clearly not a god’s name (see Fick, Griech. Personennamen2, p. 165 ff.).—There doesn’t seem to be a good reason to interpret the name hero doctor differently from similar examples like General, Watchman, etc.—Additionally, there were even brides physicians, about Elia. Hesych.

95 CIA. ii, 404, distinguishes the Hero referred to by the decree as the ἥρως ἰατρὸς ὁ ἐν ἄστει. This clearly implies a second ἥρως ἰατρός, outside Athens. But the Rhet. Lex. in AB. 262, 16 f. (cf. Sch. Dem., p. 437, 19–20 Di.), speaks of a ἥρως ἰατρός called Aristomachos ὅς ἐτάφη ἐν Μαραθῶνι παρὰ τὸ Διονύσιον, who it is clear cannot be the ἥρως ἰατρὸς that Demosthenes meant—for he is ὁ ἐν ἄστει; but the description applies very well to the Hero Physician worshipped in Attica outside the ἄστυ. See L. v. Sybel, Hermes, xx, 43.

95 CIA. ii, 404, distinguishes the Hero mentioned in the decree as the hero doctor in the city. This clearly suggests the existence of another hero doctor outside of Athens. However, the Rhet. Lex. in AB. 262, 16 f. (see Sch. Dem., p. 437, 19–20 Di.) mentions a hero doctor named Aristomachos He was buried in Marathon near the Dionysian., who clearly cannot be the hero doctor that Demosthenes was referring to—since he is the one in the city; but the description fits perfectly with the Hero Physician worshipped in Attica outside the city. See L. v. Sybel, Hermes, xx, 43.

96 Cenotaph of Kalchas in Apulia near the heroön of Podaleirios, Lyc. 1047 ff.—his body was said to be buried in Kolophon: Νόστοι; Tz. Lyc. 427; Schol. D.P. 850. ἐγκοίμησις at his heroön, sleeping on the skin of the sacrificed ram: Str. 284; the same as, acc. to Lycophron, in the temple of Podaleirios. It almost looks like a mistake in either Strabo or Lyc. But the ritual may quite well have been the same in both temples and we find it again in the dream-oracle of Amphiaraos in Oropos, Paus. 1, 34, 5.—At the present day the Archangel Michael is worshipped at Monte Sant’ Angelo beneath Mt. Garganus. He appeared there during the fifth century and in a cave which is perhaps rightly regarded as the former site of the incubation-oracle of Kalchas: Lenormant, à travers l’Apulie, i, p. 61, Paris, 1883. S. Michael had in other cases also taken over the duties of the ancient incubation mantic, and continued them in a Christian form—though the task belonged more often to SS. Cosmas and Damian—e.g. in the Michaelion in Constantinople, the ancient Σωσθένιον: see Malal., pp. 78–9 Bonn.; Soz., HE. ii, 3.

96 Cenotaph of Kalchas in Apulia near the heroön of Podaleirios, Lyc. 1047 ff.—his body was believed to be buried in Kolophon: Homecomings; Tz. Lyc. 427; Schol. D.P. 850. sleeping at his heroön, resting on the skin of the sacrificed ram: Str. 284; according to Lycophron, the same ritual in the temple of Podaleirios. It seems like there might be an error in either Strabo or Lycophron. However, the ritual might have been similar in both temples, and we see it again in the dream-oracle of Amphiaraos in Oropos, Paus. 1, 34, 5.—Today, Archangel Michael is honored at Monte Sant’ Angelo beneath Mt. Garganus. He appeared there in the fifth century, likely in a cave that is possibly the former site of the incubation-oracle of Kalchas: Lenormant, à travers l’Apulie, i, p. 61, Paris, 1883. St. Michael has also taken over the tasks of the ancient incubation prophet in a Christian form—though this role was more often associated with SS. Cosmas and Damian—e.g., in the Michaelion in Constantinople, the ancient Σωσθένιον: see Malal., pp. 78–9 Bonn.; Soz., HE. ii, 3.

97 Lyc. 799 f. Arist. and Nicand. in Schol. ad loc. Was there a legend that made Odysseus die there? Lyc. himself, it is true, gives quite a different story a little later (805 ff.), much to the amazement of his scholiasts. Perhaps in 799 f. he was thinking, in spite of the dream oracle, only of a κενὸν σῆμα of Odysseus in Aetolia (as in the case of Kalchas).

97 Lyc. 799 f. Arist. and Nicand. in Schol. ad loc. Was there a legend that caused Odysseus to die there? Lyc. himself does offer a completely different story a bit later (805 ff.), which surprised his commentators. Maybe in 799 f. he was thinking, despite the dream oracle, only of a empty tomb of Odysseus in Aetolia (similar to the case of Kalchas).

98 Grave of Prot.: Hdt. ix, 116 ff.; Lyc. 532 ff. ἱερὸν τοῦ Πρωτεσιλάου Thuc. viii, 102, 3. Oracle: Philostr., Her. 678, p. 146 f. K. It was esp. also an oracle of healing: ib., 147, 30 f. K.

98 Grave of Protesilaus: Hdt. ix, 116 ff.; Lyc. 532 ff. Temple of Protesilaus Thuc. viii, 102, 3. Oracle: Philostr., Her. 678, p. 146 f. K. It was especially known as an oracle of healing: ib., 147, 30 f. K.

99 An oracle “Sarpedonis in Troade” is mentioned in a cursory enumeration of oracular sites by Tert., An. 46. It is difficult to imagine how Sarpedon, the Homeric one—no other can be meant here—whose body had been so ceremoniously brought to Lykia, can have had an oracle in the Troad. It may be merely a slip of the pen on Tertullian’s part.—At Seleucia in Cilicia there was an oracle of Apollo Sarpedonios, D.S. 32, 10, 2; Zos. 1, 57. Wesseling on D.S. ii, p. 519, has already called attention to the more detailed account in the Vit. S. Theclae of Basilius bishop of Seleucia; see the extracts given by R. Köhler, Rhein. Mus. 14, 472 ff. There the oracle is described 152 as a dream-oracle of Sarpedon himself who was consulted at his grave in Seleucia. It is also certain, as Köhler remarks, that Sarpedon, the son of Europa and brother of Minos, is meant. (This Cretan Sarpedon appears first in Hesiod and is quite distinct from the Homeric one: Aristonic. on Ζ 199. Indeed, Homer knows no other brother of Minos except Rhadamanthys: Ξ 322. In spite of this he was often regarded as the same as the Homeric Sarpedon who came from Lykia [cf. the name Zrppädoni on the Obelisk of Xanthos: Lyc. Inscr. tab. vii, l. 6]; acc. to [Apollod.] 3, 1, 3, he lived through three γενεαί, cf. Schol. V., Ζ 199: which seems a marvellous feat much in the manner of Hellanikos. Others made the Cretan Sarp. into the grandfather of the Lykian: D.S. 5, 79, 3.) The oracle belonged properly to Sarpedon; Apollo seems merely to have been an intruder here and to have taken the place of the Hero as he did with Hyakinthos at Amyklai. That Sarpedon, however, was not therefore quite forgotten is shown by the Christian notice of him. Perhaps Apollo was regarded as merely the patron of the oracle whose real guardian was still Sarpedon. It certainly indicates community of worship when Ap. is there called Ἀπόλλων Σαρπηδόνιος; so too in Tarentum—brought thither from Sparta and Amyklai—there was a τάφος παρὰ μέν τισιν Ὑακίνθου προσαγορευόμενος, παρὰ δέ τισιν Ἀπόλλωνος Ὑακίνθου (in which no alteration is necessary), Plb. 8, 30, 2. In Goityn there was a cult of Atymnos (Solin. 11, 9, p. 73 Mom.), the beloved of Apollo (or of Sarpedon): he too was worshipped as Apollo Atymnios (Nonn., D. 11, 131; 258; 12, 217).

99 An oracle “Sarpedonis in Troade” is briefly mentioned in a list of oracular sites by Tertullian, An. 46. It's hard to believe that Sarpedon, the one from Homer—no other could be meant here—whose body was so ceremoniously brought to Lykia, could have had an oracle in the Troad. It might just be a mistake from Tertullian's side. At Seleucia in Cilicia, there was an oracle of Apollo Sarpedonios, D.S. 32, 10, 2; Zos. 1, 57. Wesseling in D.S. ii, p. 519, already pointed out the more detailed account in the Vit. S. Theclae by Basilius, the bishop of Seleucia; see the excerpts provided by R. Köhler, Rhein. Mus. 14, 472 ff. There, the oracle is described as a dream-oracle of Sarpedon himself, who was consulted at his grave in Seleucia. It's also clear, as Köhler notes, that the Sarpedon referred to is the son of Europa and brother of Minos. (This Cretan Sarpedon first appears in Hesiod and is quite different from the Homeric one: Aristonic. on Ζ 199. Indeed, Homer mentions no other brother of Minos except Rhadamanthys: Ξ 322. Nonetheless, he was often viewed as the same as the Homeric Sarpedon who came from Lykia [see the name Zrppädoni on the Obelisk of Xanthos: Lyc. Inscr. tab. vii, l. 6]; according to [Apollod.] 3, 1, 3, he lived through three generations, see Schol. V., Ζ 199: which seems like an incredible feat, much like Hellanikos. Others made the Cretan Sarp. into the grandfather of the Lykian: D.S. 5, 79, 3.) The oracle rightfully belonged to Sarpedon; Apollo seems to have been an outsider who took over the role of the Hero, similar to what happened with Hyakinthos at Amyklai. However, the fact that Sarpedon wasn’t entirely forgotten is evident from the Christian reference to him. Maybe Apollo was seen as just the protector of the oracle, while the true guardian was still Sarpedon. It certainly shows a shared worship when Apollo is referred to there as Apollo Sarpedonian; likewise, in Tarentum—brought there from Sparta and Amyklai—there was a The tomb, known by some as the tomb of Hyacinthus, is called by others the tomb of Apollo Hyacinthus. (in which no alteration is necessary), Plb. 8, 30, 2. In Goityn, there was a cult of Atymnos (Solin. 11, 9, p. 73 Mom.), the beloved of Apollo (or of Sarpedon): he was also worshipped as Apollo Atymnios (Nonn., D. 11, 131; 258; 12, 217).

100 The inhabitants of Gadeira sacrificed to Men.; Philostr., VA. 5, 4, p. 167, 10 K. τὸ Μενεσθέως μαντεῖον on the Baetis is mentioned by Str., p. 140. How it got there we do not know.

100 The people of Gadeira made sacrifices to Men.; Philostr., VA. 5, 4, p. 167, 10 K. the Menestheus oracle on the Baetis is mentioned by Str., p. 140. We don't know how it ended up there.

101 Str. 546. Autol. came there as a sharer in the expedition of Herakles against the Amazons and with the Argonauts. A.R. ii, 955–61. Plut., Luc. 23.

101 Str. 546. Autol. participated in the campaign of Herakles against the Amazons and joined the Argonauts. A.R. ii, 955–61. Plut., Luc. 23.

102 For Anios see Meineke, An. Alex. 16–17; Wentzel in Pauly-Wissowa Anios. Apollo taught him the mantic art and gave him great τιμάς: D.S. 5, 62, 2. He is called μάντις also by Clem. Al., Strom. i, p. 400 P. Perhaps he was also a mantic Hero in the cult that was paid to him at Delos; in giving a list of the δαίμονας ἐπιχωρίους, Clem. Al., Protr. ii, p. 35 P., mentions also παρὰ δ’ Ἠλείους Ἄνιον, which Sylburg corrected to παρὰ Δηλίοις. A priest of Anios ἱερεὺς Ἀνίου at Delos is given CIA. ii, 985 D 10; E 4, 53.

102 For Anios, see Meineke, An. Alex. 16–17; Wentzel in Pauly-Wissowa Anios. Apollo taught him the art of prophecy and gave him great honor: D.S. 5, 62, 2. He is also referred to as mantic by Clem. Al., Strom. i, p. 400 P. Perhaps he was also a prophetic hero in the worship dedicated to him at Delos; when providing a list of the local demons, Clem. Al., Protr. ii, p. 35 P., also mentions παρὰ δ’ Ἠλείους Άνιον, which Sylburg corrected to at Delos. A priest of Anios Priest of Anius at Delos is noted in CIA. ii, 985 D 10; E 4, 53.

103 D.S. 5, 63, 2. There she is identified with Molpadia, daughter of Staphylos. In that case ἡμιθέα would more probably be an adjectival title of a Heroine whose real name was unknown, like the names of the unknown Heroes mentioned above, nn. 60–2. The daughter of Kyknos of the same name is quite a different person.

103 D.S. 5, 63, 2. Here, she is identified with Molpadia, the daughter of Staphylos. In this context, demigod is likely an adjectival title for a Heroine whose actual name is unknown, similar to the names of the unknown Heroes mentioned earlier, nn. 60–2. The daughter of Kyknos with the same name is a completely different person.

104 Plut., Agis, 9, cf. Cic., Div. i, 43. At Thalamai we hear of a dream-oracle of Ino in front of which was a statue of Pasiphaë: Paus. 3, 26, 1. This probably means, as Welcker, Kl. Schr. iii, 92, says, that the same oracle had once belonged to Pas., but had then been afterwards dedicated to Ino. (Not of course that Pasiphaë = Ino, and this is not suggested by W., but merely that Ino may have taken the place of Pas.) A μαντεῖον τῆς Πασιφίλης is also mentioned by Apollon., Mir. 49: see also Müller, FHG. ii, 288 [see Keller, Paradoxogr., p. 55, 15].

104 Plut., Agis, 9, cf. Cic., Div. i, 43. At Thalamai, there’s a dream oracle of Ino in front of which stands a statue of Pasiphaë: Paus. 3, 26, 1. This likely means, as Welcker mentions in Kl. Schr. iii, 92, that the oracle originally belonged to Pas. but was later dedicated to Ino. (This doesn’t imply that Pasiphaë is the same as Ino, which W. does not suggest, but simply indicates that Ino may have replaced Pas.) A Oracle of Pasiphae is also referenced by Apollon., Mir. 49: see also Müller, FHG. ii, 288 [see Keller, Paradoxogr., p. 55, 15].

105 Something of the kind seems to be suggested by Pi., P. viii, 57: I praise Alkmaion γείτων ὅτι μοι καὶ κτεάνων φύλαξ ἐμῶν ὑπάντασέ τ’ ἰόντι γᾶς ὀμφαλὸν παρ’ ἀοίδιμον μαντευμάτων τ’ ἐφάψατο συγγόνοισι 153 τέχναις. Those much-discussed words I can only interpret as follows. Alkmaion had a ἡρῷον near Pindar’s house: he could only be “Guardian of his possessions” if he were either the guardian spirit of his neighbour or if Pindar had deposited money for safe keeping in his temple—the custom is well known, see Büchsenschütz, Besitz in Cl. Alt., p. 508 ff. As Pindar was once thinking of going to Delphi “Alk. applied himself to the prophetic arts traditional in his family” (τέχναις to be connected with ἐφάψ., a construction common in Pind.): i.e. he made him a revelation in a dream—on what subject Pindar does not say—as was customary in the family of the Amythaonidai, though not generally undertaken by Alkmaion (elsewhere) who unlike his brother Amphilochos nowhere seems to have had a dream-oracle of his own. (It seems to be a mere slip when Clem. Al., Str. i, p. 400 P. attributes the Oracle in Akarnania to Alk. instead of Amphil.)

105 Something like this seems to be hinted at by Pi., P. viii, 57: I praise Alkmaion Neighbor, since you are my guardian of belongings, meet me at the center of the earth as I approach, and let us touch upon the renowned oracles together with our kin. 153 skills. Those often-discussed words can only be interpreted as follows. Alkmaion had a heroine near Pindar’s house: he could only be the “Guardian of his possessions” if he were either the guardian spirit of his neighbor or if Pindar had left money for safekeeping in his temple—the custom is well known, see Büchsenschütz, Besitz in Cl. Alt., p. 508 ff. When Pindar was thinking of going to Delphi, “Alk. applied himself to the prophetic arts that were traditional in his family” (arts connected with ἐφάψ., a structure common in Pind.): that is, he gave Pindar a revelation in a dream—about what, Pindar doesn’t say—as was customary in the family of the Amythaonidai, though Alkmaion himself does not seem to have generally undertaken this (unlike his brother Amphilochos, who appears to have had a dream-oracle of his own). (It seems to be a simple mistake when Clem. Al., Str. i, p. 400 P. attributes the Oracle in Akarnania to Alk. instead of Amphil.)

106 Plu., Q. Gr., 40, 300 D.

106 Plus, Q. Gr., 40, 300 D.

107 Thus no herald might approach the heroön of Okridion in Rhodes, Plu., Q. Gr., 27, 297 C. No flute-player might approach, nor the name of Achilles be mentioned in the heroön of Tenes at Tenedos, ib., 28, 297 D. How an old grievance of a Hero might be continued into his after-life as a spirit is shown by an instructive example given by Hdt. v, 67.

107 So, no herald could approach the hero shrine of Okridion in Rhodes, Plu., Q. Gr., 27, 297 C. No flute-player could come near, and the name of Achilles couldn’t be mentioned in the hero shrine of Tenes at Tenedos, ib., 28, 297 D. An interesting example from Hdt. v, 67 shows how an old grievance of a hero could carry on into his afterlife as a spirit.

108 Paus. 9, 38, 5. The fetters were no doubt intended in such cases to fasten the statue (as the abode of the Hero himself) to the site of his worship. Thus in Sparta an ἄγαλμα ἀρχαῖον of Enyalios was kept in fetters. About this the γνώμη τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων was that οὔποτε τὸν Ἐνυάλιον φεύγοντα οἰχήσεσθαί σφισιν ἐνεχόμενον ταῖς πέδαις, Paus. 3, 15, 7. Similar things elsewhere: Lob., Agl. 275; cf. again Paus. 8, 41, 6. The striking effect of the statue fastened to the rocks may then very well have given rise to the (aetiological) legend of the πέτραν ἔχον εἴδωλον.

108 Paus. 9, 38, 5. The chains were obviously meant to secure the statue (representing the Hero himself) to the place of his worship. For instance, in Sparta, an ancient statue of Enyalios was kept in chains. The opinion of the Spartans was that Never will they escape the Enyalios, being held fast by their shackles., Paus. 3, 15, 7. Similar occurrences can be found elsewhere: Lob., Agl. 275; see also Paus. 8, 41, 6. The striking impact of the statue tied to the rocks likely inspired the (aetiological) legend of the stone idol.

109 Hdt. vii, 169–70.

109 Hdt. vii, 169–70.

110 Hdt. vii, 134–7.

110 Hdt. 7, 134–7.

111 Sanctity of trees and groves dedicated to a Hero: Ael., VH. v, 17: Paus. 2, 28, 7; but esp. 8, 24, 7.

111 The sacredness of trees and groves dedicated to a Hero: Ael., VH. v, 17: Paus. 2, 28, 7; but especially 8, 24, 7.

112 The story of the wrath of the Hero of Anagyros is told, with a few variations in detail, by Jerome ap. Suid. Ἀνάγ. δαίμων = Apostol. ix, 79; Dgn., Prov. iii, 31 (in cod. Coisl., p. 219 f. Götting.); cf. Zenob. ii, 55 = Dgn. i, 25. Similar stories of a δαίμων Κιλίκιος, Αἴνειος, are implied but not related by Macarius, iii, 18 (ii, p. 155 Gött.).

112 The tale of the Hero of Anagyros's anger is recounted, with some variations in detail, by Jerome as found in Suid. Demon of necessity = Apostol. ix, 79; Dgn., Prov. iii, 31 (in cod. Coisl., p. 219 f. Götting.); cf. Zenob. ii, 55 = Dgn. i, 25. Similar stories about a Κιλικian daemon, Aeneas are hinted at but not detailed by Macarius, iii, 18 (ii, p. 155 Gött.).

113 The story in Suid. goes back to Hieron. Rhod. περὶ τραγῳδιοποιῶν (fr. 4 Hill.), who compared the story with the theme of the Euripides Phoenix.

113 The story in Suid. dates back to Hieron. Rhod. about playwrights (fr. 4 Hill.), who compared the story to the theme of Euripides' Phoenix.

114 According to Paus. the ghost was explained to be one of the companions of Odysseus. Strabo says more particularly Polites, who was one of these. But a copy of an ancient picture representing the adventure called the daimon Lykas and made him black and grim-looking and dressed in a wolf-skin. The last is probably merely symbolic and represents full wolf-shape such as belonged to the Athenian Hero Lykos: Harp. δεκάζων. Wolf-shape given to a death-bringing spirit of the underworld, as often: cf. Roscher, Kynanth. 60–1. This must have been the more ancient form of the legend and the daimon was only subsequently changed into a Hero.

114 According to Paus. the ghost was said to be one of Odysseus's companions. Strabo specifically names Polites as one of them. However, an ancient painting depicting the event referred to the spirit as Lykas and portrayed him as black and grim-looking, dressed in a wolf-skin. This last detail likely serves a symbolic purpose and represents a full wolf form, similar to the Athenian Hero Lykos: Harp. tithing. The wolf form is often associated with a death-bringing spirit from the underworld; see Roscher, Kynanth. 60–1. This must have been the earlier version of the legend, with the spirit only later transformed into a Hero.

115 The story in its general outline recalls esp. the other Greek legends in which similar rescues occur; we are reminded not merely of the stories of Perseus and Andromeda or Herakles and Hesione, but also of the fight of Herakles with Thanatos for the sake of Alkestis, 154 in Eurip., Alc., and of Koroibos’ struggle with the Ποίνη in Argos. But the story of Euthymos and the Hero of Temesa agrees even in its details with a story coming from a far distant locality, Krisa at the foot of Mt. Parnassos, where lived the monster Lamia, or Sybaris, who was overthrown by Eurybatos—as it is told in Nikander’s Ἑτεροιούμενα, ap. Ant. Lib. viii—and is even to this day related as a fairy-tale; see B. Schmidt. Gr. Märchen, 142, 246 f. It is unnecessary to suppose imitation of either legend by the other; both independently reproduce the same fairy-tale motif, which is in fact very common everywhere. The monster overcome by the champion is regularly a chthonic being, a fiend from below: Thanatos, Poine, Lamia (which is the generic name, Σύβαρις being apparently the special name of this particular Lamia) and the ghostly “Hero” of Temesa.

115 The overall story resembles other Greek legends where similar rescues take place; we are reminded not only of the tales of Perseus and Andromeda or Heracles and Hesione but also of Heracles' battle with Thanatos for Alkestis, 154 in Euripides' Alc., and Koroibos’ fight with the Ποινή in Argos. However, the story of Euthymos and the Hero of Temesa is even more closely aligned in its details with a tale from a far-off place, Krisa at the base of Mt. Parnassos, where the monster Lamia or Sybaris was defeated by Eurybatos—as recounted in Nikander’s Ἑτεροιούμενα, cited in Ant. Lib. viii—and is still told today as a fairy tale; see B. Schmidt. Gr. Märchen, 142, 246 f. There’s no need to think one legend inspired the other; both independently reflect the same fairy-tale theme, which is quite common worldwide. The monster defeated by the hero is typically a chthonic being, a creature from below: Thanatos, Poine, Lamia (which is the general term, Sybaris likely being the specific name for this Lamia) and the ghostly “Hero” of Temesa.

116 Paus. 6, 6, 7–11, the main source; Str. 255; Ael., VH. viii, 18; Plut. Paroem. ii, 31; Suid. Εὔθυμος. The “translation” occurs in Paus. Ael., and Suid. According to Aelian he went to the River Kaikinos near his old home Locri and disappeared: ἀφανισθῆναι. (The river-god Kaikinos is regarded as his real father: Paus. 6, 6, 4.) Perhaps the heroön of Euthymos may have been near the river. “Heroizing” of Euthymos by a flash of lightning is confirmed by his statue: Callim., fr. 399; Pliny, NH. 7, 152; Schol. Paus. Hermes, 29, 148. Inscription on base of statue of E. at Olympia: Arch. Zeit., 1878, p. 82.

116 Paus. 6, 6, 7–11, the main source; Str. 255; Ael., VH. viii, 18; Plut. Paroem. ii, 31; Suid. Cheerful. The “translation” occurs in Paus. Ael., and Suid. According to Aelian, he went to the River Kaikinos near his old home in Locri and disappeared: disappear. (The river-god Kaikinos is considered his real father: Paus. 6, 6, 4.) Perhaps the heroön of Euthymos was located near the river. The “heroizing” of Euthymos by a flash of lightning is confirmed by his statue: Callim., fr. 399; Pliny, NH. 7, 152; Schol. Paus. Hermes, 29, 148. There is an inscription on the base of the statue of E. at Olympia: Arch. Zeit., 1878, p. 82.

117 Paus. 6, 11, 2–9; D. Chr. 31, 340 M. [i, 247 Arn.]. Cf. Oinom. ap. Eus. PE. 5, 34, p. 231–2 V. Oinomaos 232 C refers to a similar legend of the pentathlos Euthykles and his statue, at Locri.

117 Paus. 6, 11, 2–9; D. Chr. 31, 340 M. [i, 247 Arn.]. See Oinom. ap. Eus. PE. 5, 34, p. 231–2 V. Oinomaos 232 C talks about a similar story involving the pentathlete Euthykles and his statue in Locri.

118 The story of Mitys (or Bitys) in Argos is known from Arist. Po. 9, p. 1452a, 7 ff. (Mirab. 156). A few more such stories are recorded in Wyttenbach, Plu. M. vii, p. 316 (Oxon.); cf. also Theoc. 23. Just as in the story of Theagenes, the statue was punished as responsible for the murder, so, too, the attribution of a fetichistic personality to inanimate objects lies at the bottom of the ancient customs observed in the Athenian murder laws, by which judgment was given in the Prytaneion περὶ τῶν ἀψύχων τῶν ἐμπεσόντων τινὶ καὶ ἀποκτεινάντων: Poll. viii, 120, after Dem. 23, 76, cf. Arist. Ἀθπ. 57, 4. Such judgments cannot originally have been merely symbolical in meaning.

118 The story of Mitys (or Bitys) in Argos is known from Arist. Po. 9, p. 1452a, 7 ff. (Mirab. 156). A few more such stories are recorded in Wyttenbach, Plu. M. vii, p. 316 (Oxon.); cf. also Theoc. 23. Just like in the story of Theagenes, the statue was held accountable for the murder, and the belief in a magical personality assigned to inanimate objects underlies the ancient customs seen in the Athenian murder laws, where judgment was given in the Prytaneion About the inanimate things that someone has fallen upon and killed.: Poll. viii, 120, after Dem. 23, 76, cf. Arist. Ἀθπ. 57, 4. Such judgments couldn't have originally been just symbolic in meaning.

119 Luc., D. Conc. 12; Paus. 6, 11, 9.

119 Luc., D. Conc. 12; Paus. 6, 11, 9.

120 Luc., l.c. On Polydamas see Paus. 6, 5, and among many others Eus. Chron. Olympionic., Ol. 93, p. 204 Sch.

120 Luc., l.c. For Polydamas, check Paus. 6, 5, and among others, see Eus. Chron. Olympionic., Ol. 93, p. 204 Sch.

121 His victory was won in Ol. 6 (see also Eus. Chron., Ol. 6, p. 196); the statue erected to him only in Ol. 80; Paus. 7, 17, 6.

121 He won his victory in the 6th Olympiad (see also Eus. Chron., 6th Olympiad, p. 196); the statue in his honor was only erected in the 80th Olympiad; Paus. 7, 17, 6.

122 Paus. 7, 17, 13–14.

122 Pause. 7, 17, 13–14.

123 Plu., Thes. 35.

123 Plus, Thes. 35.

124 Paus. 1, 15, 3; 32, 5.

124 Paus. 1, 15, 3; 32, 5.

125 Hdt. viii, 38–9.

125 Hdt. 8:38-39.

126 Hdt. viii, 64. The difference should be noted: εὔξασθαι τοῖσι θεοῖσι καὶ ἐπικαλέσασθαι τοὺς Αἰακίδας συμμάχους. So, too, we are told in Hdt. v, 75, that both the Tyndaridai ἐπίκλητοι εἴποντο the Spartans into the field. (The Aeginetans sent the Aiakidai to the help of the Thebans, but as they proved unprofitable the Thebans τοὺς Αἰακίδας ἀπεδίδοσαν. Hdt. v, 80).

126 Hdt. viii, 64. The difference should be noted: Pray to the gods and call on the Aiakides allies. Similarly, it is mentioned in Hdt. v, 75, that the Tyndaridai Called out they said the Spartans into battle. (The Aeginetans sent the Aiakidai to assist the Thebans, but since they were not helpful, the Thebans the Aiakides were given back. Hdt. v, 80).

127 Plu., Them. 15.

127 Plu., They. 15.

128 Hdt. viii, 121.

128 Hdt. VIII, 121.

129 Kychreus: Paus. 1, 36, 1. The Hero himself appeared as a snake, as also e.g. Sosipolis in Elis before the battle, Paus. 6, 20, 4–5; Erichthonios, Paus. 1, 24, 7: for οἱ παλαιοὶ μάλιστα τῶν ζώων τὸν δράκοντα τοῖς ἥρωσι συνῳκείωσαν, Plu., Cleom. 39. The temple snake, 155 the Κυχρείδης ὄφις kept at Eleusis, was undoubtedly the Hero himself; though acc. to the rationalizing account in Str. 393–4 it had merely been reared by Kychreus.

129 Kychreus: Paus. 1, 36, 1. The Hero appeared as a snake, similar to how Sosipolis did in Elis before the battle, Paus. 6, 20, 4–5; and Erichthonios, Paus. 1, 24, 7: for The ancients especially associated the dragon with the heroes., Plu., Cleom. 39. The temple snake, 155 the Κυχρείδης φίδι kept at Eleusis, was undoubtedly the Hero himself; although according to the rational explanation in Str. 393–4, it was just raised by Kychreus.

130 Themistokles in Hdt. viii, 109.

130 Themistocles in Hdt. viii, 109.

131 Xen., Cyn. i, 17.

131 Xen., Cyn. 1, 17.

132 The Dioscuri helped the Spartans in war, Hdt. v, 75; the Locrian Aias the Locrians in Italy: Paus. 3, 19, 12–13; Conon 18 (artistically elaborated and no longer naive legend but both taken from the same source).

132 The Dioscuri assisted the Spartans in battle, Hdt. v, 75; the Locrian Aias supported the Locrians in Italy: Paus. 3, 19, 12–13; Conon 18 (artistically developed and no longer a simple legend but both derived from the same source).

133 Hdt. vi, 61 (hence Paus. 3, 7, 7); grave of Helen at Therapne, Paus. 3, 19, 8.

133 Hdt. vi, 61 (therefore Paus. 3, 7, 7); grave of Helen at Therapne, Paus. 3, 19, 8.

134 Hdt. vi, 69. Thus, too, the Theagenes mentioned above was regarded in Thasos not as the son of Timosthenes, τοῦ Θεαγένους δὲ τῇ μητρὶ Ἡρακλέους συγγενέσθαι φάσμα ἐοικὸς Τιμοσθένει, Paus. 6, 11, 2.—Everyone will be reminded, too, of the fable of Zeus and Alkmene. But it should be noticed how near such stories as that so naively told by Herod. approach the risky novel-plot in which some profane mortal visits in disguise an unsuspecting woman and plays the part of a god or spirit-lover. That in Greece, too, such stories were current we may perhaps deduce from Eur., Ion, 1530 ff. Ov., M. iii, 281; says outright: multi nomine divorum thalamos iniere pudicos. An adventure of this sort is told by the writer of [Aeschines] Ep. 10, and he is able to produce two similar cases which he certainly has not invented himself (8-9).—In more recent times both western and Oriental nations have delighted in telling such stories; a typical Oriental example is the story of “the Weaver as Vishnu” in the Panchatantra (see Benfey, Pantsch. i, § 56); in the West there is the story of Boccaccio dealing with Alberto of Imola as the angel Gabriel, Decam. iv, 2—Very suspicious, too, seems the account of a miracle that occurred in Epidauros: a barren woman comes to the temple of Asklepios to seek advice by ἐγκοίμησις. A big snake approaches her and she has a child. Ἐφ. Ἀρχ. 1885, pp. 21–2, l. 129 ff.

134 Hdt. vi, 69. Similarly, Theagenes mentioned earlier was seen in Thasos not just as the son of Timosthenes, The apparition of Theagenes is said to have been related to the mother of Heracles, resembling Timosthenes., Paus. 6, 11, 2.—Everyone will also recall the fable of Zeus and Alcmene. However, it’s important to notice how closely such tales, naively told by Herodotus, resemble the risky plots of novels where a mortal disguises themselves to visit an unsuspecting woman and impersonates a god or spirit-lover. We can perhaps infer from Euripides, Ion, 1530 ff. and Ovid, M. iii, 281, who states outright: they entered into chaste marriages under many names of the gods. An adventure like this is recounted by the author of [Aeschines] Ep. 10, and he provides two similar cases that he definitely did not make up himself (8-9).—In more recent times, both Western and Eastern cultures have enjoyed telling such stories; a typical Eastern example is the tale of “the Weaver as Vishnu” in the Panchatantra (see Benfey, Pantsch. i, § 56); in the West, there’s Boccaccio's story about Alberto of Imola as the angel Gabriel, Decam. iv, 2—The account of a miracle that took place in Epidauros also seems very questionable: a barren woman visits the temple of Asklepios to seek advice through napping. A large snake approaches her, and she has a child. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ 1885, pp. 21–2, l. 129 ff.

135 ἐκ τοῦ ἡρωίου τοῦ παρὰ τῇσι θύρῃσι τῇσι αὐλείῃσι ἱδρυμένου, Hdt. vi, 69.

135 from the hero shrine near the entrance of the courtyard, Hdt. vi, 69.

136 Hero ἐπὶ προθύρῳ, Callim., Ep. 26; a Hero πρὸ πύλαις, πρὸ δόμοισιν, late epigram from Thrace, Epigr. Gr. 841; ἥρωας πλησίον τῆς τοῦ ἰδόντος οἰκίας ἱδρυμένους, Artemid. iv, 79, p. 248, 9 H. This, too, is how Pindar’s words about the Hero Alkmaion as his γείτων are to be understood: Pyth. viii, 57, see above, n. 105. An Aesopian fable dealing with the relations of a man with his neighbour-Hero begins ἥρωά τις ἐπὶ τῆς οἰκίας ἔχων τούτῳ πολυτελῶς ἔθυεν, 161 Halm.; cf. also Babr. 63.—A similar idea is at work when a son put up a monument to his father at the doorway of his house—see the fine lines of Eur., Hel. 1165 ff.

136 Hero at the doorway, Callim., Ep. 26; a Hero at the gates, in front of the houses, late epigram from Thrace, Epigr. Gr. 841; A hero set up near the house of the observer., Artemid. iv, 79, p. 248, 9 H. This is also how Pindar’s words about the Hero Alkmaion as his neighbor should be interpreted: Pyth. viii, 57, see above, n. 105. An Aesopian fable about a man's relationship with his neighbor-Hero starts with Someone had a hero at their house and offered expensive sacrifices to them., 161 Halm.; cf. also Babr. 63.—A similar concept appears when a son erects a monument to his father at the entrance of his house—see the beautiful lines of Eur., Hel. 1165 ff.

137 Κύπρῳ ἔνθα Τεῦκρος ἀπάρχει. Aias ἔχει Salamis and Achilles his island in the Pontus; Θέτις δὲ κρατεῖ Φθίᾳ, and so, too, Neoptolemos in Epirus: Pi., N. iv, 46–51; ἀμφέπει used of a Hero, P. ix, 70; τοῖς θεοῖς καὶ ἥρωσι τοῖς κατέχουσι τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὴν χώραν τὴν Ἀθηναίων: Dem. 18, 184.

137 In Cyprus, Teucer begins. Ajax has Salamis and Achilles has his island in the Black Sea; Thetis is in charge in Phthia, and likewise, Neoptolemus in Epirus: Pi., N. iv, 46–51; includes used of a Hero, P. ix, 70; to the gods and heroes that protect the city and the land of the Athenians: Dem. 18, 184.

138 Cf. Alabandus whom the inhabitants of Alabanda sanctius colunt quam quemquam nobilium deorum: Cic., ND. iii, 50 (in connexion with an anecdote relating to the fourth century)—Tenem, qui apud Tenedios sanctissimus deus habetur, Cic., V. ii, 1, 49.

138 See Alabandus, whom the people of Alabanda worship more than any of the great gods: Cic., ND. iii, 50 (connected to an anecdote from the fourth century)—The one regarded as the most sacred god among the Tenedii, Cic., V. ii, 1, 49.

CHAPTER V

The Cult of Souls

Greek civilization as we see it reflected in the Homeric poems strikes us as so variously developed, and yet so complete in itself, that if we had no further sources of information, we should naturally suppose that the characteristic culture of the Greeks there reached the highest point attainable under the conditions set by national character and external circumstance. In reality the Homeric poems stand on the border line between an older development that has come to complete maturity and a new, and in many ways differently constituted, order of things. The poems themselves offer an idealized picture of a past that was on the point of disappearing entirely. The profound upheavals of the following centuries can be measured by their final results; we can guess the underlying forces from a study of the individual symptoms. But the fact remains that in the very imperfect state of our information about this period of transformation, we can do little more than recognize the existence of all the conditions necessary for a complete reorganization of Greek life. We can see how the once less-important races in Greece now come into the foreground of history; how they set up new kingdoms by the right of conquest on the ruins of the old, and bring into prominence their own special ways of thinking. Colonization over a wide area meant the expansion of Greek life; while the colonies themselves, as is so often the case, traversed all the stages of development at a much faster rate. Commerce and industry developed, calling forth and satisfying new demands. New elements of the population came to the fore, governments began to fall and the old rule of the kings gave way to Aristocracy, Tyranny, Democracy. In friendly and (in the West especially) hostile relationship the Greeks came into contact more than formerly with foreign peoples in every stage of civilization who influenced them in many directions.

Greek civilization, as shown in the Homeric poems, seems to be highly developed yet complete on its own. If we had no other sources of information, we might naturally think that this depiction represents the peak of Greek culture, shaped by national character and outside influences. However, the Homeric poems actually mark the transition between a fully matured earlier development and a new, distinctly different order of things. The poems present an idealized version of a past that was on the verge of fading away. The significant changes of the following centuries can be understood by their outcomes; we can infer the driving forces by analyzing individual details. Yet, given our limited knowledge about this transformative period, we can only acknowledge that all the conditions needed for a comprehensive reorganization of Greek life existed. We can observe how once lesser-known groups in Greece began to take center stage in history, establishing new kingdoms through conquest on the ruins of the old and highlighting their unique perspectives. Widespread colonization led to the expansion of Greek life, with the colonies often experiencing rapid development. Commerce and industry flourished, creating and meeting new demands. New segments of the population emerged, governments began to collapse, and the old monarchy transitioned to aristocracy, tyranny, and democracy. The Greeks, in both friendly and (especially in the West) hostile interactions, came into contact with foreign peoples at various stages of civilization, influencing them in numerous ways.

All these great movements must have produced many fresh currents in intellectual life too. And in fact the attempt to get free from tradition, from the long-standing culture that seemed, when reflected in the Homeric poems, so permanent and 157 complete in itself, is seen most clearly in the sphere of poetry. The poets threw off the tyranny of the epic convention. They ceased to obey its formal verse-rhythm. And with the freedom thus gained from its vocabulary of stock words, phrases, and images, it was inevitable that the point of view also should change and gain in width. The poet no longer turns his gaze away from his own time and his own person. He himself becomes the central figure of his poetry, and to express the ferment of his own emotions he invents for himself the most natural rhythm, in close alliance with music which now becomes an important and independent element in Greek life. It is as though the Greeks had just discovered the full extent of their own capacities and dared to make free use of them. In every branch of the plastic arts the hand of the artist wins in the course of the centuries an ever greater capacity to give visible shape to the imagined world of beauty. Even the ruins of that world reveal to us more plainly and impressively (because less mixed with conscious reflexion) than any literary achievement, the thing that is of permanent value in Greek art.

All these great movements must have sparked many new trends in intellectual life as well. In fact, the effort to break free from tradition and the long-established culture that seemed so permanent and complete when reflected in the Homeric poems is most clearly seen in poetry. The poets rejected the constraints of the epic style. They stopped following its formal verse rhythm. With the freedom gained from its vocabulary of common words, phrases, and images, it was unavoidable that their perspective would shift and broaden. The poet no longer ignores his own time and experiences. He becomes the main character in his poetry, and to express the turmoil of his emotions, he creates a rhythm that feels natural and closely connected to music, which now plays an important and independent role in Greek life. It's as if the Greeks had just discovered the full range of their abilities and felt confident to use them freely. In every area of the visual arts, the artist's skill has grown over the centuries, allowing them to better shape the imagined world of beauty. Even the ruins of that world reveal to us more clearly and powerfully (because they are less muddied by conscious thought) than any literary work, what is of lasting value in Greek art.

It was impossible that religion, alone unaffected by the general atmosphere of change, should remain unaltered in the old paths. But here, even more than in other directions, we must admit that the inward reality of the change remains hidden from us. We can see indeed many external alterations, but of the directing spirit which called them forth we hardly catch more than a glimpse. It is easy, by comparing the later condition of religion with the Homeric, to see how enormously the objects of religious worship have multiplied. We can see how much more sumptuous and elaborate ceremonial has become and observe the development in beauty and variety, in conjunction with the fine arts, of the great religious festivals of the different cities and peoples of Greece. Temples and sculpture bear unmistakable witness to the increased power and importance of religion. That an inward and far-reaching change had come over religious thought and belief might have been already guessed from the fame and importance which belonged to the oracle at Delphi, now coming into real power; and from the many new developments in Greek religious life taking their origin from this spiritual centre. At this time there grew up, under the influence of a deepening moral sense, that new interpretation of religion that we meet with in its completed form in Aeschylus and Pindar. The age was decidedly more “religious-minded” than that in which Homer lived. It is as though the Greeks then went through a period such as 158 most civilized nations go through at some time or other, and such as the Greeks themselves were to repeat more than once in after centuries—a period in which the mind after it has at least half succeeded in winning its freedom from disquieting and oppressive beliefs in invisible powers shrinks back once more. Under the influence of adversity it feels the need of some comforting illusions behind which it may take shelter and be relieved in part of the burden of responsibility.

It was impossible for religion, remaining untouched by the overall atmosphere of change, to stay the same on its old paths. However, even more than in other areas, we must acknowledge that the true essence of the change is still obscure to us. We can observe many external shifts, but the guiding spirit that prompted them is elusive. By comparing the later state of religion with the Homeric period, it's clear how greatly the objects of religious worship have multiplied. We can see how much more elaborate and luxurious the ceremonies have become and notice the growth in beauty and variety, alongside the fine arts, of the major religious festivals across different Greek cities and cultures. Temples and sculptures clearly reflect the increased power and importance of religion. The significant transformation in religious thought and belief could already be inferred from the fame and significance of the oracle at Delphi, which was gaining real influence, and from the many new developments in Greek religious life stemming from this spiritual hub. During this time, a new interpretation of religion emerged under the influence of a heightened moral awareness, which we find fully realized in the works of Aeschylus and Pindar. The era was definitely more "religious-minded" than the time when Homer lived. It was as if the Greeks experienced a phase similar to what 158 most advanced nations encounter at some point, and which the Greeks themselves would undergo repeatedly in later centuries—a time when the mind, after at least partially breaking free from troubling and oppressive beliefs in unseen powers, recoils once again. Under the strain of hardship, it feels the need for comforting illusions to provide shelter and alleviate some of the burden of responsibility.

The obscurity of this period of growth hides also from our sight the origin and development of beliefs about the soul very different from the Homeric. The results of the process are however visible enough and we can still discern how a regular cult of the disembodied soul and eventually a belief in immortality fully worthy of the name were being built up at this time. These things are the result of phenomena which partly represent the re-emergence of elements in religious life which had been submerged in the previous period, and partly the entry of fresh forces which in conjunction with the resuscitated old give rise between them to a third and new creation.

The unclear nature of this growth period also obscures the origins and evolution of beliefs about the soul that are quite different from those in Homeric times. However, the outcomes of this process are clear enough, and we can still see how a consistent practice surrounding the disembodied soul and eventually a belief in true immortality were being established during this time. These developments stem from a mix of factors that partly represent the return of elements in religious life that had been suppressed in the earlier period, and partly the introduction of new forces that, combined with the revived old, lead to the creation of something entirely new.

I

CULT OF THE CHTHONIC DEities

The chief new feature revealing itself to comparative study in the development of religion in the post-Homeric period is the worship of chthonic deities, that is, of deities dwelling in the interior of the earth. And yet it is an undoubted fact that these divinities are among the oldest possessions of Greek religious faith. Indeed, bound as they are to the soil of the country, they are the true local deities, the real gods of home and country. They are also not unknown to Homer; but epic poetry had transferred them, divested of all local limitation, to a distant subterranean region, inaccessible to living men, beyond the limits of Okeanos. There Aïdes and the terrible Persephoneia rule as guardians of the dead. From that distant and unapproachable place they can have no influence upon the life and doings of men on earth. Religious cult, too, only knows these deities in connexion with particular localities and particular groups of worshippers. Each of these worships the deities of the underworld as denizens of their soil and their countryside alone. They are untroubled by any considerations of a general and uniform kingdom of the gods such as the epic had set up; nor are they disturbed by similar and conflicting claims made by neighbouring 159 communities. And only in these local cults are the gods of the lower world seen in their true nature as they were conceived by the faith of their worshippers. They are the gods of a settled, agricultural, inland population. Dwelling beneath the soil they guarantee two things to their worshippers: they bless the cultivation of the ground and ensure the increase of the fruits of the soil to the living; they receive the souls of the dead into their underworld.1 In certain places they also send up from the spirit-world revelations of future events.

The main new feature that stands out in the study of religion during the post-Homeric period is the worship of chthonic deities, which are gods that live underground. However, it's a well-known fact that these gods are among the oldest parts of Greek religious belief. Since they are tied to the land, they represent the true local deities, the genuine gods of home and country. They aren’t unknown to Homer, but epic poetry has moved them, stripping away their local ties, to a distant underworld that’s unreachable for the living, beyond the boundaries of Okeanos. There, Aïdes and the fearsome Persephoneia oversee the dead. From that remote and inaccessible place, they have no influence on the lives and actions of people on earth. Religious practices only recognize these deities in relation to specific locations and particular groups of worshippers. Each group worships the underworld gods as beings connected to their specific land and region. They are unaffected by the concepts of a general and uniform kingdom of gods like the epic poems established, nor are they disturbed by conflicting claims made by neighboring 159 communities. Only within these local cults do the gods of the lower world appear in their true essence, as understood by their followers. They represent the gods of a settled, agricultural, inland population. Living beneath the earth, they promise their worshippers two things: they bless the farming of the land and ensure the growth of crops for the living; they welcome the souls of the dead into their underworld. In some places, they also send messages from the spirit world about future events.

The most exalted name we met with among these dwellers below the earth is that of Zeus Chthonios. This is at once the most general and the most exclusive designation of the god of the lower world; for the name “Zeus” had in many local cults thus preserved the generalized meaning of “god” in combination with a particularizing adjective. The Iliad also once speaks of “Zeus of the lower world”; though by this is meant none other than the ruler of the distant realm of the dead, Hades. Hades too, in the Hesiodic Theogony is once called “Zeus the Chthonian”.2 But the agricultural poem of Hesiod bids the Boeotian countryman, when preparing his fields for sowing, pray for a blessing to the Chthonic Zeus. Zeus Chthonios was also sacrificed to in Mykonos for the “fruits of the earth”.3

The highest name we encountered among those living underground is Zeus Chthonios. This is both a broad and specific title for the god of the underworld; because the name “Zeus” in many local cults has kept the general meaning of “god” along with a defining adjective. The Iliad also refers to “Zeus of the underworld”; which actually means the ruler of the distant land of the dead, Hades. Hades is also referred to in the Hesiodic Theogony as “Zeus the Chthonian”.2 However, Hesiod’s agricultural poem advises the Boeotian farmer, when getting his fields ready for planting, to pray for a blessing from Chthonic Zeus. Zeus Chthonios was also honored in Mykonos with sacrifices for the “fruits of the earth”.3

But, more frequently than under this most general and exalted title,4 we meet with the god of the living and the dead under various disguises. The gods of the underworld were generally referred to by affectionate or cajoling nicknames that laid stress on the lofty or beneficent character of their rule and threw a veil over the darkest side of their nature with conciliatory euphemism.5 Thus Hades had many flattering titles and special names.6 So, too, in many places Zeus of the underworld was worshipped as Zeus Eubouleus or Bouleus,7 at other places, especially Hermione, as Klymenos.8 Zeus Amphiaraos, Zeus Trophonios we have dealt with already in their capacity of Heroes, but they are really nothing else but such earth deities with honourable titles, who have been deprived to some extent of their full status as gods9 and have on that account developed all the more strongly the oracular side of their powers. Hades, the ruler of that distant kingdom of darkness, is one of this class of manifestations of Zeus Chthonios that vary in name according to the different localities of their worship. The king of the shadows in Erebos as he appears in Homer has no altars or sacrifices made to him10; but these things belong to him as the local god of particular places. In the Peloponnese there were local centres 160 of his worship in Elis and Triphylia,11 sites of a very ancient civilization; and it is probable enough that tribes and clans having their origin there contributed by their wanderings to the spread of their native cult of the chthonic deity in other Greek countries as well.12 Hades, too, was for his Peloponnesian worshippers a god of the fertility of the earth just as much as a god of the dead.13 And in the same way he was the lord of the Souls as well, in those places where “in fear of the name of Hades”14 he was called, in honour of his beneficent powers, Plouton, Plouteus, or Zeus Plouteus.

But more often than not, under this broad and revered title, we encounter the god of the living and the dead in various forms. The gods of the underworld were typically referred to with affectionate or flattering nicknames that highlighted the noble or kind aspects of their rule, while glossing over the darker parts of their nature with gentle euphemisms. Thus, Hades had many flattering titles and special names. Similarly, in some places, Zeus of the underworld was worshipped as Zeus Eubouleus or Bouleus, and in other places, especially Hermione, as Klymenos. We have previously discussed Zeus Amphiaraos and Zeus Trophonios in their roles as Heroes, but they are essentially nothing more than earth deities with honorable titles, who have to some extent lost their full status as gods and, as a result, have developed their oracular abilities even more. Hades, the ruler of that distant realm of darkness, is one of these manifestations of Zeus Chthonios that varies in name depending on the region of worship. The king of shadows in Erebos, as he appears in Homer, has no altars or sacrifices dedicated to him; these belong to him as the local god of specific places. In the Peloponnese, there were local centers of his worship in Elis and Triphylia, sites of a very ancient civilization; and it is quite likely that tribes and clans originating there helped spread their native worship of this chthonic deity to other Greek regions as well. For his Peloponnesian worshippers, Hades was a god of earth's fertility just as much as he was a god of the dead. Similarly, he was also the lord of the Souls in those areas where, out of reverence for the name of Hades, he was honored with titles like Plouton, Plouteus, or Zeus Plouteus.

The welfare of the living and the dead was also the concern of the female deity of the underworld called by the name of the earth itself Ge or Gaia. At the places where she was worshipped she was regarded as one who brought fruitfulness to the fields, but she held sway over the souls of the dead as well, in conjunction with whom prayers and sacrifice were offered to her.15 Her temples remained in honour, especially at Athens and at the primeval centre of ancient worship of the gods, Olympia.16 But her personality had never been quite reduced to definite and intelligible outline from the enormous vagueness natural to primitive deities. Earth-goddesses of more recent and intelligible form had supplanted her. She retained longest her mantic powers which she exercised from beneath the earth, the abode of spirits and souls, at ancient oracular sites—though even here she often had to give way to oracular gods of another description, such as Zeus and Apollo. A poet indeed mentions her once side by side with the great ruler of the lower world,17 but in actual worship she was seldom found among the groups of male and female deities of chthonic nature such as were worshipped together at many places. Above all, at Hermione there flourished from primitive times a solemn cult of the lower-world Demeter in conjunction with the lower-world Zeus, under the name of Klymenos, and with Kore.18 At other places Plouton and these two goddesses were worshipped together, or Zeus Eubouleus and the same two, etc.19 The names of the underworld god vary indefinitely, but the names of Demeter and her divine daughter appear every time unchanged. Either alone or together, and worshipped in connexion with other related deities, these two goddesses have by far the most important place in the cult of the underworld. The fame and widespread popularity of their cult in all Greek cities of the mother-country and in the colonies proves more than anything else that since Homeric times a change must have taken place in the sphere of religious emotion and service of the gods. 161

The well-being of both the living and the dead was also a concern of the female deity of the underworld known as Ge or Gaia, after the earth itself. In the places where she was honored, she was seen as a giver of abundance to the fields, but she also had authority over the souls of the dead, to whom prayers and sacrifices were made. 15 Her temples remained respected, especially in Athens and at the ancient religious center of Olympia. 16 However, her character was never completely defined or clear, as was common with early deities. More recent and recognizable earth-goddesses took her place. She held onto her prophetic powers the longest, which she exercised from underground, the realm of spirits and souls, at ancient oracular sites—though even there she often had to make way for other prophetic gods like Zeus and Apollo. A poet even mentions her alongside the great ruler of the underworld, 17 but in actual worship, she was rarely included with groups of male and female deities of the underworld that were venerated together in many locations. Notably, at Hermione, there was a long-standing solemn cult of the lower-world Demeter together with the lower-world Zeus, known as Klymenos, and Kore. 18 In other places, Plouton and these two goddesses were worshipped together, or Zeus Eubouleus along with the same two, etc. 19 The names of the underworld god vary widely, but the names of Demeter and her divine daughter remain constant. Whether worshipped separately or together, often in connection with other related deities, these two goddesses hold the most significant place in the underworld cult. The fame and widespread popularity of their worship across all Greek cities and colonies demonstrate that since Homeric times, there must have been changes in the realm of religious feeling and the worship of the gods. 161

Homer gives no hint of the character or importance of the later cult of Demeter and Persephone. For him Persephone is simply the grim unapproachable Queen of the dead, Demeter invariably (and solely) a goddess of the fertility of crops20; she stands apart indeed from the rest of the Olympians, but no reference to a close association with her daughter is ever made.21 Now, however, both goddesses appear in various and changing activity, but always closely associated, and it seems as if they had come to share some of their previously distinct characteristics. Both are now chthonic deities who together have in their protection the growth of the crops and the care of the souls of the dead. How in detail the change came about we can no longer discover. It may be that, in the times of the great migrations, from various centres of the worship of the two goddesses, such as had existed from great antiquity in the Peloponnese especially,22 there issued forth this faith that differed so essentially from the Homeric-Ionic view of things. It must have spread just as in later times the special variety of the cult of the closely associated goddesses that was practised in Eleusis was widely propagated by regular missions. It also seems that Demeter, in whose name there was early a tendency to recognize a second “Mother Earth,” in many places took the place of Gaia in religious cult, and thereby entered into closer connexion with the realm of the souls below the earth.

Homer doesn't give any clues about the character or significance of the later cult of Demeter and Persephone. For him, Persephone is just the grim, unreachable Queen of the dead, while Demeter is exclusively a goddess of crop fertility20; she stands apart from the other Olympians, and there's never any mention of a close bond with her daughter.21 Now, however, both goddesses appear in various and changing roles, but always closely linked, and it seems like they've begun to share some of their previously distinct traits. Both are now underworld deities who together oversee crop growth and take care of the souls of the dead. How exactly this change happened is something we can no longer determine. It might be that during the great migrations, from various centers of worship of the two goddesses, particularly in the Peloponnese, this belief developed that was so different from the Homeric-Ionic perspective. It must have spread just like later on, the specific form of the cult of the closely linked goddesses practiced in Eleusis was widely promoted by organized missions. It also seems that Demeter, whose name early on was often associated with a second "Mother Earth," in many places took the place of Gaia in religious practices, thereby establishing a closer connection with the realm of souls beneath the earth.

§ 2

As the numbers of the underworld beings increased, and their cult grew and expanded, these divinities began to have a very different meaning for the living from what they once had for the Greeks of the Homeric age. The upper and the lower worlds are drawn closer to each other; the world of the living borders upon that world after death over which the chthonic gods hold sway. The ancient belief that the earth-caverns of their own land, on which men dwelt and worked, were the near and accessible abode of divinity, now reappeared here and there, and was no longer completely awed into silence by the poetic lustre of the all-embracing divine world of Olympos. We have spoken in a previous chapter of Amphiaraos at Thebes, Trophonios in the Lebadean cave, and Zeus in the cave on Mt. Ida; and again of that Zeus who was seen enthroned by those who descended into a cave in Epirus. These are all vestiges of the same belief which originally underlay all local cults of underworld deities. The realm of 162 chthonic gods, of spirits and departed souls, seemed to be close at hand. Ploutonia, i.e. direct inlets to the underworld, existed at many places,23 as also did Psychopompeia, clefts in the rock through which the souls can pass out into the upper world. In the middle of the city of Athens, in a natural chasm on the Areiopagos, underworld beings were reputed to have their home.24 The most striking denial of the separation between the living and the underworld, such as was demanded by Homeric theology, was at Hermione. Here, behind the temple of Chthonia lay a sacred precinct of Plouton or Klymenos with a chasm in the ground through which Herakles had once brought up Kerberos to the earth—and an “Acherusian Lake”.25 So near did the spirit world seem here, that the people of Hermione did not give their dead the usual coin to pay the fare of Charon, the ferryman of the dead:26 for them, in whose own country lay the river Acheron, no tract of water lay between the land of the living and the dead.

As the number of underworld beings grew and their cult expanded, these deities took on a very different significance for the living than they had for the Greeks in the Homeric age. The realms of the living and the dead became increasingly intertwined; the world of the living was now adjacent to the afterlife ruled by the chthonic gods. The old belief that the earth's caverns in their own land, where people lived and worked, were close and accessible places of divinity, re-emerged here and there, no longer completely silenced by the poetic allure of the all-encompassing divine world of Olympus. We previously mentioned chapter Amphiaraos at Thebes, Trophonios in the Lebadean cave, and Zeus in the cave on Mt. Ida; and again that Zeus who was seen seated by those who descended into a cave in Epirus. These are all remnants of the same belief that originally underpinned all local cults of underworld deities. The realm of 162 chthonic gods, spirits, and departed souls seemed to be within reach. Ploutonia, or direct access points to the underworld, were found in many places, 23 as were Psychopompeia, openings in the rock through which souls could enter the upper world. In the heart of Athens, in a natural chasm on the Areiopagos, underworld beings were believed to have their home. 24 The most notable denial of the separation between the living and the underworld, as required by Homeric theology, occurred at Hermione. Here, behind the temple of Chthonia, lay a sacred area of Plouton or Klymenos with a chasm in the ground through which Herakles once brought up Kerberos to the earth—and an “Acherusian Lake.” 25 The spirit world felt so close here that the people of Hermione did not provide their dead with the usual coin to pay Charon, the ferryman of the dead: 26 for them, in whose land the river Acheron lay, no body of water separated the land of the living from the dead.

More important than these cases of contact between the dark underworld and the world of the living—for the localization of the underworld still remained for the most part matter of fancy—is the fact that the creatures of that world are again drawing closer to the senses of men. The thoughts of men turn more frequently to the other world at so many festivals and anniversaries; the gods who rule below desire and repay the veneration of mankind, both of the individual and the city. And in the train of the chthonic gods the souls of the dead, always closely bound to them, receive a cult which in many particulars goes beyond anything customary in the Homeric Age.

More important than these instances of interaction between the dark underworld and the living is the fact that the beings of that world are increasingly becoming more perceptible to people. People’s thoughts are turning more often to the afterlife during various festivals and anniversaries; the gods who govern below seek and reward the respect of humanity, both individuals and communities. Accompanying the chthonic gods, the souls of the dead, who are always closely connected to them, receive a worship that, in many ways, surpasses anything typical from the Homeric Age.

II

FFUNERAL CCEREMONIES AND WWORSHIP OF THE DEAD

The first duty that the survivors owe to their dead is to bury the body in the customary manner. This age takes the matter more seriously than the Homeric people had done. Whereas in Homer denial of burial to enemies fallen in war is often mentioned, it is now regarded as a religious duty that is seldom neglected to give back the bodies of the fallen foe for burial. To deny the honour of burial to members of one’s own city is an outrage of the most extreme kind; everyone knows what terrible vengeance for such a neglect of duty was taken, by the excited populace at Athens, on the generals after Arginousai. Nothing can release a son from the duty of burying his father and offering him the regular gifts at his 163 grave.27 And if the relations, in spite of everything, neglect their task the law at Athens requires the Demarch to see to the burial of his fellow demesman.28 Religious requirements, however, go beyond the law. At the solemn agricultural festival of Demeter the Bouzyges at Athens invoked a curse on all who should leave a corpse unburied.29 This matter, which the chthonic deities take under their protection, is no mere sanitary police regulation. It is not any such consideration, but solely the “unwritten laws” of religion which are obeyed by Antigone when she covers the dead body of her brother with a little dust: even such symbolical burial is enough to avert the “abomination” (ἄγος). Motives of pure piety may have played their part, but the really fundamental idea underlying all such practices was the one already met with in the Iliad:30 that the soul of the unburied person can find no rest in the hereafter. The ghost haunts the neighbourhood, its rage afflicts the land in which it is detained against its will; and the withholding of burial “is worse for the withholder than for him to whom burial is refused”.31 Condemned criminals, indeed, are thrown by the state, unburied, into a pit;32 the sacrilegious and traitors to their country are denied burial in the ground of that country.33 This is a formidable punishment, for even though the outlaw is buried in a foreign country,34 his soul cannot be permanently tended there. Only the family of the dead in their own home can give their departed kinsman the honour due to him in the cult of the souls, and only they at the spot where his remains lie buried.35

The first duty that survivors owe to their dead is to bury the body in the usual way. This era takes the matter more seriously than the time of Homer. While Homer often mentions the denial of burial for enemies fallen in battle, it is now seen as a religious duty that is rarely overlooked to return the bodies of fallen foes for burial. Denying burial to fellow citizens is an extreme outrage; everyone knows the terrible vengeance the people of Athens took on the generals after Arginousai for such neglect. Nothing can excuse a son from the duty of burying his father and making the regular offerings at his grave. And if the family neglects their responsibility, the law in Athens requires the Demarch to ensure that a fellow citizen is buried. However, religious obligations go beyond legal requirements. At the solemn agricultural festival of Demeter, the Bouzyges in Athens invoked a curse on anyone who left a corpse unburied. This matter, which the underworld deities protect, is not just a sanitary regulation. It's not merely about such considerations, but solely about the "unwritten laws" of religion that Antigone follows when she covers her brother's dead body with a little dust; even that symbolic burial is enough to prevent the “abomination.” Pure piety may have played a role, but the fundamental idea behind all these practices is the one already found in the Iliad: that the soul of an unburied person cannot find peace in the afterlife. The ghost haunts the area, its rage harms the land where it’s trapped against its will; and the denial of burial “is worse for the one withholding than for the one denied burial.” Condemned criminals, in fact, are thrown by the state, unburied, into a pit; those who commit sacrilege and betray their country are denied burial in their homeland. This is a serious punishment because even if the outlaw is buried in a foreign land, their soul cannot be properly cared for there. Only the family of the deceased at home can honor their departed relative with the appropriate rituals, and only they at the location where their remains are buried.

What we know of the details of the funeral ceremonies, differs very little in essence from what had survived into the Homeric age as customs no longer fully explained by contemporary belief. The new features that we meet with may also, for the most part, be very primitive usage restored to currency. Some of the particular details make the solemnity of the act more apparent.

What we know about the details of the funeral ceremonies is very similar to what continued into the Homeric age as customs that contemporary beliefs no longer fully explain. The new features we encounter are mostly very primitive practices brought back into use. Some specific details highlight the seriousness of the ritual more clearly.

After the eyes and mouth have been closed by the next of kin the body is washed and anointed by women of the family, and clothed in clean garments. It is then laid out upon a bier in the interior of the house for the ceremonial lying-in-state. In Athens marjoram was strewn under the body, for superstitious reasons,36 and also four broken-off vine branches; in the grave, also, the corpse lay on vine branches.37 Underneath the bier were placed ointment vessels of the peculiar slim shape that the graves have restored to us again in such numbers. At the door of the room, for the benefit of those leaving the house who had incurred religious defilement by coming in contact 164 with the corpse, was placed a bowl full of pure water brought in from another house.38 Cypress branches fixed upon the house door outside warned the scrupulous that a corpse was in the house.39 The head of the dead person was generally decked with garlands and fillets, in a manner unknown to the Homeric age, as a sign, it appears, of respect for the higher sanctity of the departed.40

After the eyes and mouth have been closed by the family, the body is washed and anointed by women from the family, and dressed in clean clothes. It is then laid out on a bier inside the house for the ceremonial viewing. In Athens, marjoram was sprinkled under the body for superstitious reasons, and also four broken-off vine branches; in the grave, the corpse was also placed on vine branches. Beneath the bier were ointment vessels in the unique slim shape that the graves have revealed to us in large quantities. At the door of the room, to help those leaving the house who had become religiously unclean from coming into contact with the corpse, a bowl of pure water was placed, brought in from another house. Cypress branches fixed on the door outside served as a warning that there was a corpse in the house. The deceased person's head was typically adorned with garlands and fillets, a practice not known in the Homeric age, apparently as a sign of respect for the higher sanctity of the departed.

The lying-in-state of the dead, lasting the whole of one day, was certainly not intended originally to serve the purpose of a public “notification of death”, such as later writers attribute to it.41 The funeral dirge was sung at the bier of the dead man, and to give opportunity for this ceremony was its real purpose. The habit of the old Attic government of the Eupatridai had increased the pomp of funeral ceremonies in every direction, and had encouraged an extravagant cult of the souls of the departed. Solon’s legislation had to restrain and limit such exaggeration in many ways, and in particular, the tendency to increase unduly the lamentation sung over the dead body required to be kept within bounds. Only the women of the immediate family of the dead might take part in it, for to them alone the cult of the departed belonged as a duty.42 The violent expression of grief, the tearing of the cheeks, beating the breast and head, was forbidden,43 as also was the singing of “poems”,44 i.e. in all probability regular funeral dirges specially written for the purpose such as Homer made the women sing round Hektor’s bier. To extend the subject of the funeral dirge to apply to others beside the person then being buried had to be made absolutely illegal.45 This prohibition must also have been applied already to the gathering at the graveside. But to sacrifice animals before the procession to the grave was a very ancient custom, and it seems as if Solon forbade this too.46 In other states, also, legislation was necessary to put a curb on the tendency to overdo the violence of the expressions of grief for the dead47 which were common in the antiquity of the Greeks as among many of the “uncivilized” tribes who carry them to the point of exhaustion. It was not simple piety or natural human grief (never particularly given to violent or excessive demonstration) that caused these things. It was rather the ancient belief that the soul of the dead was still invisibly present, and would be pleased at the most violent expressions of grief for its loss.48 The dirge, carried to this extreme, belongs in fact to the cult of the departed spirit. The restraints placed upon the traditional lamentation may in their turn—in so far as they were effective—have been derived not from considerations of good 165 sense (which rarely have much influence in such matters) but from religious or superstitious reasons.49

The lying-in-state of the deceased, which lasted a whole day, was definitely not originally meant to notify the public of a death, as later writers suggest. The funeral dirge was sung at the deceased's bier, and the real purpose was to allow for this ceremony. The tradition of the old Attic government of the Eupatridai had enhanced the grandeur of funeral ceremonies in every way and had promoted an extravagant reverence for the souls of the departed. Solon’s legislation had to restrain and limit these excesses, particularly the tendency to overly amplify the lamentations sung over the dead, which needed to be kept in check. Only the women of the immediate family of the deceased were allowed to participate in this, as the responsibility of honoring the dead belonged solely to them. Expressions of grief that were excessive, such as tearing at one’s cheeks or beating the breast and head, were prohibited, as was the singing of “poems,” which likely referred to regular funeral dirges specifically written for the occasion, like those Homer described being sung around Hektor’s bier. It became absolutely illegal to broaden the subject of the funeral dirge to include anyone other than the person being buried. This prohibition must also have already applied to gatherings at the gravesite. However, sacrificing animals before the procession to the grave was an ancient custom, and it seems Solon forbade this as well. In other states, legislation was also needed to rein in the tendency to overly dramatize expressions of grief for the dead, a common practice in ancient Greece and among many "uncivilized" tribes who took it to extremes. It wasn't just simple piety or natural human grief—rarely inclined toward violent or excessive display—that drove these practices. It was more so the ancient belief that the soul of the deceased remained invisibly present and would be honored by the most intense expressions of sorrow for its loss. This extreme form of the dirge actually ties back to the cult of the departed spirit. The restrictions on traditional lamentation may, to the extent that they were effective, not have stemmed from practical considerations (which rarely influence such matters) but rather from religious or superstitious beliefs.

The lying-in-state of the body seems invariably to have lasted for one day only.50 In the early morning of the third day51 after death the corpse, together with the bier on which it lay, was borne out of the house. Legislation was in some places necessary to check excessive ostentation at the funeral procession.52 What pomp and ceremony was customary in the time of the old aristocratic rule at this part of the cult of the dead, we may gather (if it corresponded at all to reality) from the picture of a funeral procession represented on a very archaic “Dipylon vase”.53 There the body is carried on high on a wagon drawn by two horses: men carrying swords surround it, and a whole company of women, making lamentation and beating their heads, follow the procession. At Athens the attendance in the procession was confined, in the case of women at least, to those of the immediate kinsfolk (for three generations). The men, who had their place in front of the women seem to have been admitted without such restriction.54 The admission of hired companies of Karian women and men, singing the national dirges, seems at Athens not to have been forbidden.55 At Keos and elsewhere, the laws ordered processions to the grave to be conducted in silence.56 On the whole, the discipline of respectable city life reduced the “excessive and barbaric”,57 which must once have been the rule in the display of mourning, to a discreet symbolism.

The lying-in-state of the body typically lasted for just one day. In the early morning of the third day after death, the corpse, along with the bier it rested on, was carried out of the house. In some places, laws were necessary to prevent excessive showiness during the funeral procession. We can infer what extravagance was standard during the era of the old aristocracy in this aspect of mourning practices from a depiction of a funeral procession shown on a very ancient “Dipylon vase.” There, the body is elevated on a wagon pulled by two horses: men with swords surround it, and a group of women, wailing and beating their heads, follow the procession. In Athens, the attendees at the procession were limited, at least for women, to immediate family members (for three generations). The men, who walked ahead of the women, did not face such restrictions. The inclusion of hired groups of Karian women and men, singing traditional dirges, seems not to have been prohibited in Athens. In Keos and other places, laws mandated that processions to the grave be conducted in silence. Overall, the standards of respectable city life tempered the “excessive and barbaric,” which must have once been normal in mourning displays, into a more reserved symbolism.

On the details of the burial procedure our information is incomplete. Occasional expressions used by Greek authors allow us to conclude—and this is confirmed by the excavation of graves in Greek countries—that besides the custom, exclusively prevailing in Homeric times, of cremation, the more ancient practice of burying the body unburnt was still kept up.58 The body was not intended to be completely destroyed. Out of the ashes of the funeral pyre the son carefully gathers the remains of his father’s bones59 in order to bury them, enclosed in an urn or a box. If on the other hand the body remains unburnt, it is either enclosed in a coffin made of baked clay, or wood60—a custom clearly betraying its foreign origin, or else—and this must have been certainly the older and more purely native Greek usage—it is let down into the earth without a coffin, and laid upon a bed of leaves;61 at other times, if the nature of the ground allows, it may rest unburied in a rock-chamber, upon a bed of stonework.62

Our information about the burial process is incomplete. Some phrases used by Greek writers suggest—and this is supported by the discovery of graves in Greek regions—that, in addition to the custom of cremation, which was common in Homeric times, the older practice of burying uncremated bodies was still practiced. The body was not meant to be completely destroyed. From the ashes of the funeral pyre, the son carefully collects the remains of his father's bones to bury them in an urn or a box. Alternatively, if the body remains uncremated, it is either placed in a coffin made of baked clay or wood—a method that clearly shows foreign influence—or, as was probably the older and more authentically Greek practice, it is lowered into the ground without a coffin and laid on a bed of leaves; at other times, if the ground permits, it may rest uncovered in a rock chamber on a stone bed.

The soul, though now set free, keeps up some connexion with the body it once inhabited. It is for its use and pleasure 166 that an ample provision of household implements and vessels is laid beside the corpse (though no longer the whole of the dead man’s possessions as once was usual); and graves since opened have restored such things in large numbers to our gaze.63 But the Greeks never seriously believed that such a phantasmal existence could be prolonged to eternity. Elaborate expedients for the perpetual preservation of the corpse (by embalmment and other means, such as were employed in the case of bodies buried in the Mycenæan shaft-graves)64 were unknown in these later times—except as a peculiar archaism in the burial of Spartan kings.

The soul, now set free, still maintains a connection with the body it once inhabited. For its use and enjoyment 166, a variety of household items and vessels are placed next to the corpse (though not the entirety of the deceased's belongings as was once common); and graves that have been opened since have revealed many of these items to us.63 However, the Greeks never genuinely believed that such a ghostly existence could last forever. Complex methods for the long-term preservation of the body (such as embalming and other techniques seen in the Mycenaean shaft-graves)64 were not practiced in these later times—except as a rare tradition in the burial of Spartan kings.

§ 2

Once the body is buried, the soul of the dead enters the invisible company of the “Better and Superior”.65 This belief, which Aristotle regarded as of primeval antiquity in Greece, emerges very clearly in the cult-observance of these post-Homeric centuries from the obscurity which the Homeric age had imposed upon it. The soul of the dead has its special cult-group composed naturally enough of the descendants and family of the dead, and of them only. There even survived a dim memory of the time when the body of the dead was buried inside the house, which thus became the immediate centre of his cult.66 That must quite certainly have been during an age which knew little or nothing of the almost painful sensitiveness to the idea of ritual “purification” such as prevailed in later times. At least, we have no reason for supposing that the Greeks (like many so-called “savage” peoples among whom the custom prevails of burying the corpse within the dead man’s own hut) deserted the house that had now become haunted, and left it to the undisturbed possession of the ghost of the dead man buried there.67 To bury the dead within the walls of the city, at least, was considered unobjectionable in later times by certain Dorian states.68 Even where religious scruples and the practical convenience of city life combined to fix the place for burials outside the city walls, families kept their graves together often in a single extensive plot with a wall built round it.69 Where a country estate belonged to a family, this generally also included the graves of its ancestors.70

Once the body is buried, the soul of the dead enters the invisible company of the "Better and Superior." 65 This belief, which Aristotle thought was very old in Greece, becomes clear in the religious practices of these post-Homeric centuries, breaking free from the darkness that the Homeric age had imposed. The soul of the dead has its special group of worshippers, made up, quite naturally, of the descendants and family of the deceased, and only them. There was even a faint memory of a time when the body of the dead was buried inside the house, which then became the center of worship for the dead. 66 This must have been during an era that was largely unaware of the extreme sensitivity to the idea of ritual "purification" that developed later. At least, we have no reason to believe that the Greeks (like many so-called "savage" peoples who buried the corpse inside the deceased's hut) abandoned the house that had now become haunted, leaving it to the ghost of the dead person buried there without interference. 67 To bury the dead within the city walls was, at least, considered acceptable in later times by certain Dorian states. 68 Even where religious concerns and the practical needs of city life led to burials being located outside the city walls, families often kept their graves together in a large, enclosed plot. 69 If a family owned a country estate, it usually included the graves of their ancestors as well. 70

Wherever it was situated, the grave was holy, as being the place where later generations tended and worshipped the souls of departed members of their family. Grave columns indicated the holiness of the spot;71 trees and sometimes a complete 167 grove surrounded the grave, as they did so often the altars and temples of the gods.72 These were intended to serve as pleasant retreats for the souls of the beloved dead.73

Wherever it was located, the grave was sacred, as it was the place where later generations honored and worshipped the souls of their deceased family members. Grave markers signified the sanctity of the area; 71 trees and sometimes an entire 167 grove surrounded the grave, just like they often did at the altars and temples of the gods. 72 These were meant to provide peaceful resting spots for the souls of the cherished departed. 73

Sacrificial offerings began for the most part at the actual time of the funeral. The custom of pouring libations of wine, oil, and honey at the grave was probably in general use.74 Even the sacrifice of animals, such as was made at the funeral pyre of Patroklos and even of Achilles, cannot have been unusual at an earlier period. Solon expressly forbade the sacrifice of an ox at the grave.75 At Keos, permission is just as expressly given for a “preliminary sacrifice to be offered at the funeral in accordance with ancestral custom”.76 When the funeral ceremony is over, the members of the family, after a solemn rite of religious purification,77 put on garlands (they had previously avoided this78) and begin the funeral feast.79 This also was a part of the cult of the dead. The soul of the dead man was regarded as being present—even as playing the part of host.80 It was awe felt for the invisible presence that originally inspired the custom of speaking only praise of the dead at the funeral feast.81 This feast was an entertainment given in the house of the dead man to the surviving members of his family. The dead man had a meal to himself alone, which was offered at the grave82 on the third and on the ninth day after the funeral.83 On the ninth day it appears that ancient usage brought the period of mourning to an end.84 Where it was extended to a longer period the earlier series of offerings to the dead was prolonged proportionally. Sparta had a period of mourning lasting eleven days.85 At Athens, in addition to the sacrifice on the third and ninth days, another funeral feast which might be repeated several times,86 was held on the thirteenth day.87

Sacrificial offerings mostly began at the time of the funeral. The practice of pouring libations of wine, oil, and honey at the grave was likely common. Even sacrificing animals, like what happened at the funeral pyres of Patroklos and Achilles, probably wasn’t unusual in earlier times. Solon specifically banned the sacrifice of an ox at the grave. At Keos, it was clearly permitted to offer a “preliminary sacrifice at the funeral in line with ancestral tradition.” Once the funeral ceremony was over, family members, after a serious religious purification rite, put on garlands (which they had previously avoided) and began the funeral feast. This was also part of honoring the dead. The soul of the deceased was believed to be present—almost as if hosting. There was awe for this invisible presence that originally inspired the custom of only speaking well of the dead at the funeral feast. This feast was an occasion held at the home of the deceased for the surviving family members. The deceased person had a separate meal offered at the grave on the third and ninth days after the funeral. On the ninth day, it seems that ancient custom marked the end of the mourning period. If mourning lasted longer, the earlier offerings to the dead were extended accordingly. In Sparta, the mourning period lasted eleven days. In Athens, in addition to the sacrifice on the third and ninth days, another funeral feast that could be repeated several times was held on the thirteenth day.

Even after the ceremonies attached to the funeral itself were at last over, the relations of the dead were by no means released from the duty of tending not merely the grave, but the soul of the deceased member of their family. In particular the son and heir had no more sacred duty to perform than the offering of “the customary things” (τὰ νόμιμα) to the soul of his father. These consisted above all of libations to be made to the dead on certain fixed and recurrent festivals. On the 30th of the month there was a traditional feast of the dead.88 Besides this, every year at the “Genesia”, when the birthday of the dead came round, the occasion was regularly celebrated with sacrifice.89 The day on which he first entered this life is still of importance to the psyche of the dead man. It is plain that no impassable gulf was fixed between life and 168 death: it almost seems as though life went on quite uninterrupted by death.

Even after the funeral ceremonies were finally finished, the family of the deceased still had the responsibility to care for not just the grave, but the soul of their loved one. Specifically, the son and heir had a special duty to offer “the customary things” (the laws) for his father's soul. This mainly involved making libations to the dead during certain regular festivals. On the 30th of each month, there was a traditional feast for the dead.88 Additionally, every year during the “Genesia”, which marked the anniversary of the deceased's birth, the event was celebrated with sacrifices.89 The day he was born continues to hold significance for the soul of the deceased. It's clear that there wasn't an unbridgeable divide between life and 168 death; it almost feels like life continued seamlessly, even after death.

Besides these variable feasts of the Genesia, celebrated as they occurred by the individual families, there was at Athens a festival, also called the Genesia, at which the whole citizen body did honour to the souls of their dead relatives on the 5th Boëdromion.90 We hear also of the Nemesia as a feast of the dead in Athens91 (probably intended for the averting of the anger of the dead—always a subject of apprehension), and of various festivals of the dead in other Greek States.92 At Athens the chief festival of all the dead occurred at the close of the Dionysiac feast of the Anthesteria, in the spring, of which it formed the concluding day. This was the time when the dead swarmed up into the world of the living, as they did in Rome on the days when the “mundus patet”, and so still in the belief of our own (German) country people at “Twelfth-tide”. The days belonged to the souls (and their master Dionysos): they were days of “uncleanness”93 unsuited to the business of city life. The temples of the gods were closed during that period.94 As protection against the ghosts invisibly present, the citizens employed various old and tried precautionary measures; they chewed hawthorn leaves on their morning walk, and smeared their doorposts with pitch. In this way the ghosts were kept at arms length.95 Each family made offering to its own dead, and the offerings they made have remained for the most part the appropriate gifts of the dead on their feast-days in many lands down to modern times. A special offering was made to the dead96 on the last day of the feast, the Chytrai, which was sacred to none of the Olympians, but to Hermes the leader of the dead. To this god—but “for the dead”—were offered cooked vegetables and seeds in pots (which gave their name to this day of the festival).97 It seems probable that as a sacrifice to the dead honey-cakes were thrown into a cleft of the earth in the Temne of Ge Olympia.98 Indoors, too, the swarming ghosts entered and were entertained. They were not, however, permanently welcome guests, and finally they were driven out of the house in a manner parallelled at the close of festivals of the dead among many nations of old and modern times.99 “Begone ye Keres, Anthesteria is over” were the words used in sending away the souls, and it is remarkable that in this formula they were given their primeval name—a name whose original sense had been forgotten by Homer, but not by the language of the common people of Attica.100

Besides these variable feasts of the Genesia, celebrated by individual families as they occurred, there was a festival in Athens, also called the Genesia, where the entire citizen body honored the souls of their deceased relatives on the 5th of Boëdromion.90 We also hear about the Nemesia as a feast for the dead in Athens91 (probably aimed at preventing the wrath of the dead—always a concern), and various festivals for the dead in other Greek states.92 In Athens, the main festival for all the dead took place at the end of the Dionysiac celebration of the Anthesteria in the spring, serving as its concluding day. This was when the dead were believed to return to the world of the living, similar to Rome on days when the "mundus patet," and still observed in the beliefs of our own (German) folk during “Twelfth-tide.” These days belonged to the souls (and their master Dionysos): they were days of "uncleanness"93 unfit for city life activities. The temples of the gods were closed during this time.94 To protect against the unseen ghosts, citizens used various age-old precautionary measures; they chewed hawthorn leaves on their morning walks and smeared their doorposts with pitch. This way, they kept the ghosts at bay.95 Each family made offerings to their own dead, and the offerings they presented have, for the most part, remained the typical gifts for the dead on their feast days in many cultures up to modern times. A special offering was made to the dead96 on the last day of the festival, the Chytrai, which was dedicated not to any Olympian gods but to Hermes, the guide of the dead. To this god—but "for the dead"—cooked vegetables and seeds in pots were offered (which gave this day of the festival its name).97 It seems likely that as a sacrifice to the dead, honey-cakes were thrown into a crevice of the earth in the Temne of Ge Olympia.98 Inside the homes, too, the returning ghosts were welcomed and entertained. However, they were not permanent guests and were eventually driven out of the house in a manner similar to the conclusion of dead festivals among many ancient and modern cultures.99 "Begone ye Keres, the Anthesteria is over," were the words used to send the souls away, and it's notable that in this phrase they were referred to by their ancient name—a name whose original meaning had been forgotten by Homer, but not by the common language of the people in Attica.100

Individuals may have found still further opportunities of 169 bringing gifts to their own dead and showing their reverence for them. The cult paid by the family to the spirits of their ancestors is hardly distinguished, except by the greater limitation of the circle of worshippers, from the worship of underworld deities and Heroes. In the case of the souls, however, nature itself united the sacrificers and worshippers (and no one else) with the object of their devotion. If we wish to form some idea of the way in which (under the influence of a civilization that tended to reduce all primitive grandeur to mere idyll) the worship of the dead altered its character in the direction of piety and intimacy—we need only look at the pictures representing such worship (though rarely before the fourth century) on the oilflasks which were used at funerals in Attica and then laid by the side of the dead in the grave. These slight sketches breathe a spirit of simple kindliness; we see the mourners decking the grave monument with wreaths and ribbons; worshippers approaching with gestures of adoration, bringing with them many objects of daily use—mirrors, fans, swords, etc., for the entertainment of the dead.101 Sometimes the living seek to give pleasure to the spirit of the dead by the performance of music.102 Gifts, too, of cakes, fruit, and wine are being made—but the blood of the sacrificial animals is never spilt.103 There was a time when more solemn—and less comfortable—thoughts prevailed;104 and of these we learn something from the much older sculptured reliefs, found on sepulchral monuments in Sparta, which give the dead a more awe-inspiring attitude. The ancestral pair sit in state and are approached by members of the family (represented as much smaller figures) offering their worship. These bring with them flowers, pomegranates, and sometimes even animals for sacrifice, a cock, a pig, or a ram. Other and later types of such “banquets of the dead” show the dead person standing up (not infrequently by the side of a horse) or lying upon a couch and accepting the drink-offering made to him by the survivors.105 These reliefs allow us to see at what a distance the departed spirits are supposed to stand from the living: the dead do, indeed, seem now to be “better and stronger” beings; they are well on the road to becoming “Heroes”. Drink offerings such as those we see offered on these reliefs—a mixture of honey-water, milk, and wine, and other liquids, offered in accordance with precise ritual—always formed a regular part of sacrifices made to the dead.106 Besides these, animals, too, were slain, especially sheep (less often oxen) of black colour. These must be completely burnt, as being intended for the sole enjoyment of the dead—a custom 170 observed at all sacrifices made to the spirits of the underworld.107

Individuals may have found even more opportunities to 169 bring gifts to their deceased loved ones and show their respect for them. The rituals performed by families for their ancestors are not much different, except for a smaller group of worshippers, from the worship of underworld deities and Heroes. In the case of souls, nature itself connected the sacrificers and worshippers (and no one else) with the object of their devotion. If we want to understand how the worship of the dead changed towards greater piety and intimacy, especially under a civilization that often reduced primitive grandeur to simple ideals—we can look at the images of such worship (though rarely before the fourth century) on the oil flasks used at funerals in Attica and then placed next to the dead in the grave. These small sketches exude a spirit of simple kindness; we see mourners decorating the grave with wreaths and ribbons, and worshippers approaching with gestures of reverence, bringing various everyday items—mirrors, fans, swords, etc., for the enjoyment of the dead.101 Sometimes the living try to please the spirit of the deceased through music.102 Gifts of cakes, fruit, and wine are also presented—but the blood of sacrificial animals is never shed.103 There was a time when more solemn—and less comfortable—thoughts were common;104 and we learn something about this from much older sculpted reliefs found on grave monuments in Sparta, which present the dead in a more awe-inspiring manner. The ancestral couple is depicted in a dignified posture, approached by family members (represented as much smaller figures) offering their worship. These family members bring flowers, pomegranates, and sometimes even animals for sacrifice, such as a rooster, a pig, or a ram. Other later depictions of such “banquets of the dead” show the deceased standing (often beside a horse) or lying on a couch and accepting the drink offerings made by the living.105 These reliefs illustrate how distant the departed spirits are believed to be from the living: the dead indeed seem to be “better and stronger” beings; they are on their way to becoming “Heroes.” Drink offerings like those seen in these reliefs—a mixture of honey-water, milk, wine, and other liquids, presented according to specific rituals—were a regular part of sacrifices to the dead.106 Additionally, animals, particularly black sheep (and less frequently oxen), were also sacrificed. These must be completely burned, as they were intended solely for the enjoyment of the dead—a custom 170 observed at all sacrifices made to the spirits of the underworld.107

The whole of this very material cult depended upon the assumption—which was sometimes distinctly expressed—that the soul of the dead is capable of receiving, and is in need of, a physical satisfaction from the gifts made to it.108 It is consequently, not thought of as deprived of the power of sense-perception. Even in the grave it can feel what is going on in its neighbourhood.109 It is not a good thing to attract its attention; it is best to pass by the graves of the dead in silence.110 The common people thought of the dead, according to a famous phrase of Plato’s, as “hovering” suspended over their graves, the site of their cult.111 The pictures on the Attic oilflasks illustrate this belief, for they represent the souls of the dead flying above the grave-monument, and the diminutive size of these winged figures is evidently intended to represent their somewhat contradictory immaterial materiality, and to express their invisibility for mortal eyes.112 Sometimes, indeed, the souls become visible, and then, like the underworld gods and the Heroes, they prefer the shape of a snake.113 Nor are they absolutely bound to the immediate neighbourhood of the grave; they sometimes revisit their old habitations among the living, and not only on those days of the dead in the month Anthesterion. The Greeks, like other people, were acquainted with the custom of allowing what fell to the ground to lie there undisturbed for the spirits that hovered about the house to carry away if they liked.114 The dead man’s spirit, being thus invisibly present, can overhear if anyone speaks ill of it: either with the idea of defending the helpless, or, on the contrary, to avoid incurring the wrath of invisible but potent spirits, a Solonian law forbade abusive language to be addressed to a dead man. That is the real meaning of the old warning de mortuis nil nisi bene, as popular belief understood it. The descendants of a dead man were bound to prosecute anyone who slandered their ancestor:115 this also is among the religious duties owed by the living to the soul of the dead.

The entire material cult relied on the belief—which was sometimes clearly stated—that the soul of the deceased can receive and needs physical offerings from the gifts made to it.108 It is therefore not considered to be deprived of sensory perception. Even in the grave, it can sense what is happening around it.109 It's not a good idea to draw its attention; it's best to pass by the graves of the dead quietly.110 Common people viewed the dead, according to a well-known phrase from Plato, as “hovering” over their graves, which are the sites of their worship.111 The images on the Attic oil flasks depict this belief, as they show the souls of the dead flying above the grave monument, and the small size of these winged figures seems to represent their somewhat contradictory immaterial physicality and to convey their invisibility to mortal eyes.112 Sometimes, the souls do become visible, and then, like the gods of the underworld and the Heroes, they tend to take the form of a snake.113 They are not strictly limited to the immediate vicinity of the grave; they occasionally return to their former homes among the living, not just on the days of the dead in the month of Anthesterion. The Greeks, like many others, were familiar with the custom of leaving anything that fell to the ground undisturbed for the spirits that lingered around the house to take if they wished.114 The spirit of the deceased can thus be invisibly present and overhear if anyone speaks ill of it: either to defend the defenseless, or to avoid provoking the wrath of powerful invisible spirits, a Solonian law prohibited speaking abusively about a dead person. This is the true meaning of the old saying de mortuis nil nisi bene, as common belief interpreted it. The descendants of the deceased were obligated to take legal action against anyone who slandered their ancestor: 115 this is also part of the religious duties the living owe to the soul of the dead.

§ 3

Like all other cults, the cult of the dead had more to do with the relations of the daimon to the living than with his nature and essence considered abstractly, and in itself: a dogmatic account of this nature was neither offered nor required by his worship. Still, the cult was founded upon a general 171 conception, merely evading more exact definition, of the nature of the departed spirit. Men sacrificed to the souls of the dead, as to the gods116 and Heroes, because they regarded them as invisible Powers,117 a special class of “Blessed Ones”, as the dead were beginning to be called even in the fifth century. They attempted to propitiate them,118 or at least to avert their easily awakened displeasure.119 Their help was also sought in all times of need; but most especially, like the chthonic gods into whose realm they have entered, they can prosper the fruits of the earth120 and lend assistance at the entry of a new soul into life. For this reason libation is made to the souls of ancestors at a marriage.121 The Tritopatores also, who were invoked at wedding celebrations in Attica that the marriage might prove fruitful,122 were nothing else than the souls of the ancestors.123 We know them also to have been referred to as wind-spirits,124 and in this there appears, plainly or obscurely, an isolated fragment of the most ancient belief of the people: the departed spirits of the dead become spirits of the air; the ghosts that travel on the winds are the liberated souls of the dead.

Like all other cults, the cult of the dead focused more on the relationship between the spirit and the living than on the spirit's nature and essence in an abstract sense. A detailed explanation of this nature wasn't provided or needed for worship. Still, the cult was based on a general idea that avoided precise definitions of the departed spirit's nature. People made sacrifices to the souls of the dead, just like to the gods and heroes, because they saw them as invisible powers, a special class of “Blessed Ones,” a term being used even in the fifth century. They tried to win their favor or at least prevent their easily stirred displeasure. Their help was sought in times of need, especially since, like the earth-bound gods whose realm they entered, they had the power to improve the harvest and assist with the arrival of a new soul into life. For this reason, offerings were made to the souls of ancestors at weddings. The Tritopatores, who were called upon at wedding celebrations in Attica to ensure a fruitful marriage, were essentially the souls of ancestors. We also know they were referred to as wind spirits, which suggests, whether clearly or vaguely, a remnant of the oldest beliefs of the people: the spirits of the departed became air spirits; the ghosts that travel with the winds are the freed souls of the dead.

§ 4

Though it is good and profitable in one’s own interest to enlist the sympathy and retain the goodwill of these invisible spirit powers by sacrifice, yet their worship is to a much greater degree conditioned by a sentiment of piety which no longer seeks its own advantage, but the greater honour and welfare of the dead. Such piety certainly takes on a curious form, but it is this which gives its special character to the cult of the souls, and the ideas which lie behind that cult. The souls of the dead are dependent upon the cult paid to them by the members of their family who still live on in this world; their fate is determined by the nature of this cult.125 The beliefs which nourished the cult of the dead are totally distinct from the mode of thought prevailing in the Homeric poems according to which the souls are banished into the distant realm of Hades and cut off eternally from all attention or care that the living might pay them. It differs again from the beliefs which the mysteries implanted in the minds of their worshippers; for in this case it was not their merit—whether religious or moral—which secured to the disembodied souls their position in the future life. These two streams of religious belief flowed side by side, but never met. The nearest analogue to the cult of the souls and its appropriate beliefs was undoubtedly the cult 172 of Heroes, but even here the difference is profound. It is no longer a special privilege miraculously bestowed upon a few favoured individuals; every soul has a right to the attentive care of its own family, and in each case its fate is settled, not by the character displayed or deeds done during its lifetime, but by the relation to itself of those who survive. As a consequence everybody on the approach of death thinks of the “future state” of his soul, and that means the cult which he would like to make sure will be offered to his departed spirit. Sometimes for this purpose he makes a special foundation, or bequest, which is provided for in his will.126 Of course, if he leaves a son behind him, the care of his spirit will be amply provided for; until that son comes of age, a guardian will offer the appropriate gifts.127 Even slaves to whom he has given their freedom will be sure to take part in the permanent and regular cult of their former master.128 One who has no son to leave behind him will make haste to take a son from another family into his own house, who, together with his property will inherit also the duty of offering a regular and enduring cult to his adopted father, and his new ancestors, and of caring for the needs of their souls. This is the real and original meaning of all adoption; and how seriously such provision for the proper care of the souls of the departed was taken, can best and most clearly be seen from the testamentary speeches of Isaeus, in which with a completeness of art that almost conceals itself expression is given to the genuine and simple feelings of the homely Athenian bourgeoisie whom no enlightenment had ever disturbed in the beliefs of their fathers.129

Though it’s beneficial and in one’s interest to gain the sympathy and keep the goodwill of these unseen spirit powers through sacrifice, their worship is largely driven by a sense of piety that no longer seeks personal gain, but rather the greater honor and well-being of the dead. This piety may seem unusual, but it defines the character of the soul cult and the underlying ideas of that cult. The souls of the deceased rely on the worship offered to them by their living family members; their fate hinges on the nature of this worship. The beliefs that supported the cult of the dead are completely different from the worldview presented in the Homeric poems, which depict souls as banished to the distant realm of Hades, cut off forever from any attention or care from the living. It also contrasts with the beliefs introduced by the mysteries, where it wasn’t the merit—whether religious or moral—that guaranteed the position of disembodied souls in the afterlife. These two streams of religious belief coexisted without ever merging. The closest parallel to the soul cult and its associated beliefs was undoubtedly the cult of Heroes, yet even here the difference is significant. It’s no longer a special privilege miraculously granted to a select few; every soul has the right to the attentive care of its own family, and its fate is determined not by the character or deeds of its lifetime, but by the relationship of those who survive. As a result, everyone approaching death considers the “future state” of their soul, which translates to the worship they hope will be offered to their spirit. Sometimes they make specific arrangements or bequests for this purpose in their will. Of course, if they leave behind a son, the care of their spirit will be adequately managed; until that son reaches adulthood, a guardian will offer the necessary gifts. Even freed slaves will certainly participate in the ongoing and regular worship of their former master. Someone without a son to succeed them will rush to adopt a boy from another family, who, along with their property, will inherit the responsibility of maintaining regular and lasting worship for their adoptive father and new ancestors and caring for their souls. This is the true and original meaning of all adoption; and the seriousness with which arrangements for the proper care of the souls of the departed were made is best illustrated by the testamentary speeches of Isaeus, which express, with such artistic finesse that it almost goes unnoticed, the genuine and simple feelings of the everyday Athenian middle class, whose beliefs had never been shaken by modern enlightenment.

All cult, all prospect of a full life and future well-being—for so we may express the naive conception—of the soul on its separation from the body, depends upon the holding together of the family. To the family itself the souls of its former ancestors are, in a limited sense, of course, gods—its gods.130 It can hardly be doubted that here we have the root of all belief in the future life of the soul, and we shall be tempted to subscribe to the belief—as a guess tending in the right direction—of those who see in such family worship of the dead one of the most primitive roots of all religious belief—older than the worship of the higher gods of the state and the community as a whole; older even than the worship of Heroes, and of the ancestors of large national groups. The family is older than the state,131 and among all peoples that have not passed beyond family-organization and formed states, we find this type of belief about the soul invariably present. Among 173 the Greeks, who in the course of their history learnt so much that was new without ever quite discarding the old, this belief lived on in the shadow of the great gods and their cults, even in the midst of the tremendous increase in the power and organized influence of the state. But these larger and wider organizations cramped and hindered its development. Left to itself, and given more freedom to grow, such belief might possibly have elevated the souls of the family ancestors to the position of all-powerful spirits of the house under whose hearth they had once been laid to rest. The Greeks, however, never had anything to correspond exactly with the Italian Lar familiaris.132 The nearest equivalent to it would be the Good Daimon which the Greek household honoured. Careful examination shows this Daimon to have been originally the soul of an ancestor who has become the good spirit of his house—but the Greeks themselves had forgotten this.133

All worship, all hope for a fulfilling life and future happiness — this is how we can describe the simple idea — of the soul after it separates from the body, relies on the unity of the family. The family itself considers the souls of its deceased ancestors, in a limited way of course, as gods — its gods. It’s hardly questionable that this is the foundation of all beliefs in an afterlife for the soul, and we might be inclined to agree with the idea — as a fair guess — of those who view such family rituals for the dead as one of the most basic origins of religious belief — older than the worship of the higher gods of the state and the larger community; even older than the reverence for Heroes and the ancestors of large national groups. The family predates the state, 131 and among all cultures that haven't moved beyond family structures to form states, we find this kind of belief about the soul consistently present. Among 173 the Greeks, who throughout their history absorbed many new ideas without entirely discarding the old, this belief persisted alongside the powerful gods and their rituals, even amid the significant growth of state power and organized influence. However, these larger organizations constrained and stifled its development. Had it been left to itself, and allowed more freedom to flourish, such belief might have recognized the souls of family ancestors as mighty spirits of the home beneath whose hearth they were once laid to rest. The Greeks, however, never had a direct equivalent to the Italian Lar familiaris. 132 The closest counterpart would be the Good Daimon, which the Greek household revered. A detailed look reveals that this Daimon was originally the soul of an ancestor who transformed into the benign spirit of the house — but the Greeks had forgotten this connection themselves. 133

§ 5

We cannot at this late date trace the reawakening of the cult of souls in post-Homeric times or the varying stages it may have gone through in its development. Still, some of the facts are plain. Indications have already been noticed that point to the view that the cult of the dead was carried on in the days when the aristocratic regime still held sway in Greece with greater pomp and seriousness than in the centuries—the fifth and sixth—beyond which our knowledge hardly extends. In these earlier times, we are forced to conclude, there must also have been a livelier belief in the power and importance of the souls corresponding with the greater vigour of religious cult. It seems as if at this time ancient usage and belief broke violently through the suppression and neglect under which they lay in the times that speak to us in the Homeric poems. There is no reason to suppose that any one member of the Greek peoples was specially responsible for the change. At the same time, different districts in accordance with their varying natural proclivities and civilization differed in the cult they paid their dead. In Attica, with the spread of democracy, the ideas at the bottom of such practice tended more and more in the direction of mere affectionate piety. In Laconia and Boeotia134 and in other places where primitive life and customs maintained themselves for a long time, more serious notions of the nature and reality of the disembodied spirits remained in force and a more serious cult was paid to them. Elsewhere, as in Locris and on the island of Keos,135 the 174 cult of the dead seems to have maintained itself only in a very much weakened form. When advancing culture made individuals less dependent on the traditional beliefs of their own country many temperamental variations and gradations in belief and conception made their appearance. Homeric ideas on the subject, universally familiar from poetry, may have entered into the question and added to the confusion; even where the cult of the dead was practised with the greatest fervour, ideas radically incompatible with that cult—as that the souls of the worshipped dead are “in Hades”136—are sometimes revealed unintentionally. At quite an early period we find expressions of the view, which goes beyond anything said in Homer, that nothing at all survives after death. Attic orators, for example, are allowed to speak to their audience in a tone of hesitation and doubt about hopes commonly cherished of continued consciousness and sensation after death. Such doubts, however, only affect the theoretic consideration of the soul’s future life; the cult of the souls was still carried on inside the family. Even an unbeliever, if he were in other respects a true son of his city and deeply rooted in its ancient customs, might in his last will and testament provide seriously for the perpetual cult of his own soul and those of his near relatives—as Epicurus did in his will, to the astonishment of after ages.137 Thus, even unbelief still clung to cult as to other old established customs, and in many an individual the cult still tended to awaken the beliefs which alone could justify it.

We can't trace the revival of the soul cult in post-Homeric times or the different stages it went through at this late date. However, some facts are clear. There are already signs that point to the idea that the cult of the dead was practiced with more pomp and seriousness during the time when the aristocratic regime was still in power in Greece than in the fifth and sixth centuries, where our knowledge is limited. We must conclude that during these earlier times, there was likely a stronger belief in the power and significance of souls, corresponding with a more vigorous religious practice. It seems that at this time, ancient customs and beliefs broke through the suppression and neglect that they experienced in the times represented in the Homeric poems. There's no reason to think that any one group among the Greek people was solely responsible for this change. At the same time, different regions, based on their unique natural tendencies and cultures, varied in the way they honored their dead. In Attica, with the rise of democracy, the motivations for such practices increasingly leaned towards mere affectionate piety. In Laconia and Boeotia, as well as other places where primitive life and customs persisted for a long time, more serious ideas about the nature and reality of disembodied spirits continued to be upheld, and a more serious form of worship was directed towards them. Elsewhere, such as in Locris and on the island of Keos, the cult of the dead seems to have only survived in a significantly weakened form. As culture advanced and people became less reliant on the traditional beliefs of their homeland, various temperamental variations and shifts in belief emerged. Homeric ideas, widely known from poetry, may have influenced this issue and added to the confusion; even where the cult of the dead was practiced with great fervor, ideas that fundamentally contradicted that cult—like the belief that the souls of the honored dead are “in Hades”—sometimes surfaced unintentionally. Early on, we find expressions of the view that go beyond anything mentioned in Homer, suggesting that nothing survives after death. For instance, Attic orators often spoke to their audiences with hesitation and doubt regarding the commonly held hopes of continued consciousness and sensation after death. Despite these doubts affecting theoretical discussions about the soul's afterlife, the cult of souls was still practiced within families. Even a skeptic, if he was otherwise a true son of his city and deeply connected to its ancient customs, could seriously provide for the ongoing worship of his own soul and those of his close relatives in his last will and testament, just like Epicurus did, to the astonishment of future generations. Thus, even disbelief still clung to the cult, as it did to other long-established customs, and in many individuals, the cult continued to evoke the beliefs that could justify it.

III

TRaces of the CULT OF SSOUls IN THE BLOOD-FEUD AND SSATISFACTION FOR MMurder

§ 1

In the renewal and development of the cult offered to the dead, an important part was again played by that priestly association which exercised such a decisive influence on the public worship of invisible powers in the Greek states—the priesthood of the Delphic oracle. On the occurrence of disturbing portents in the sky recourse was had to the god, who gave orders that in addition to the gods and Heroes “sacrifice should be made to the dead also on the appointed days, in accordance with custom and tradition, by their relatives.”138 Individuals in doubt as to what the sacred law 175 required in the observance due to a departed soul applied at Athens to one of the “Exegetai”—probably one of that college of Exegetai that had been founded under the influence of Delphi.139 The god protected the rights of the dead, too; the fact that his decisions confirmed the sanctity of the cult of the dead must have contributed a good deal to the consideration and awe in which that cult was held by the living.140

In the revival and growth of the rituals for the dead, a crucial role was taken on by the priestly group that had such a strong impact on public worship of unseen powers in the Greek states—the priesthood of the Delphic oracle. When unsettling signs appeared in the sky, people sought guidance from the god, who commanded that in addition to sacrifices for the gods and heroes, “sacrifices should also be made to the dead on the designated days, in keeping with customs and traditions by their relatives.”138 Individuals unsure about what the sacred law 175 required in honoring a deceased person turned to one of the “Exegetai” in Athens—likely a member of that college of Exegetai founded under the influence of Delphi.139 The god also safeguarded the rights of the dead; the fact that his decisions reinforced the sanctity of the rituals for the dead likely contributed significantly to the respect and reverence in which those rituals were held by the living.140

The decrees of Delphi were even more influential where they concerned a cult to be offered not to one who had died in peace, but to a person who had been robbed of his life through an act of violence. The treatment of such cases shows with striking distinctness the change which had come over the beliefs about the dead since the Homeric period.

The decrees of Delphi were even more impactful when they related to a cult dedicated not to someone who had died peacefully, but to a person who had lost their life due to an act of violence. The way these cases were handled clearly illustrates the shift in beliefs about the dead since the Homeric period.

In Homer, when a free man has been killed, the State takes no share whatever in the pursuit and punishment of the murderer. It is the duty of the nearest relatives or the friends of the murdered man141 to carry on the blood-feud against the assailant. As a rule the latter puts himself out of reach of reprisals by flight. He withdraws to a foreign country which is unconcerned in his action. We hear nothing of any distinction between premeditated murder and unintentional or even justifiable homicide;142 and it seems probable that at that time, when no regular inquiry was made into the nature of the individual case, the relatives of the murdered man took no account of the different varieties of killing. If the guilty man can escape by flight from those whose duty it is to avenge his deed, they on their part may forgo the full toll of vengeance, which would have required the death of the murderer, and may be satisfied with the payment of compensation, after which the doer of the deed is allowed to remain in his own country undisturbed.143 The requirements of vengeance are thus in essence fulfilled, but the retaliatory murder of the murderer can be bought off. This decided relaxing of the ancient notion of vengeance can only be accounted for by an equally decided weakening of the belief in the continued consciousness, power, and rights of the murdered man, upon which the requirement of vengeance was founded. The soul of the dead is powerless; its claims can be easily satisfied by the payment of “weregild” to the living. In such a satisfaction as this, the departed soul is in reality not concerned at all; it remains a simple business transaction between living people.144 In the midst of the general declension of the beliefs about the dead—amounting almost to complete extinction—which is found throughout the Homeric poems, this weakening of belief in one particular point is not very surprising. But 176 in this case, as in the general study of Homeric beliefs about the dead, it is clear that the conception of the soul as powerless, shadowlike, and feeble is not the primitive or original one; it has foisted itself gradually in the course of years upon a more ancient mode of conception in which the dead had undiminished sensibility and could influence the condition of the living. Of this older conception we have emphatic witness in the duty—not forgotten even in Homeric Greece—of prosecuting the blood-feud.

In Homer's time, when a free person was killed, the State played no role in tracking down and punishing the murderer. It was the responsibility of the closest relatives or friends of the victim to seek vengeance against the attacker. Usually, the murderer escapes retaliation by fleeing to a different country that isn't involved in his crime. There’s no differentiation made between planned murder and unintentional or even justifiable killings; it seems likely that back then, when no formal investigation was conducted into the specifics of each case, the victim's relatives disregarded the different forms of killing. If the guilty party can get away by running from those meant to avenge the crime, they might choose to forego complete revenge—which would mean killing the murderer—and instead accept compensation, allowing the perpetrator to remain in his homeland without fear. The basic need for revenge has, therefore, been met, but the act of retaliatory murder can be avoided through a payment. This significant easing of the ancient concept of vengeance can only be explained by a corresponding decline in the belief in the murdered person's ongoing consciousness, power, and rights, which underpin the demand for vengeance. The deceased's soul is powerless; its claims can be easily settled by paying "weregild" to the living. In this form of satisfaction, the departed soul is really not involved at all; it’s just a straightforward transaction between living individuals. Amid the waning beliefs about the dead—almost leading to their complete elimination—seen throughout the Homeric poems, this particular decline in belief isn’t surprising. But 176 here, as with the broader exploration of Homeric beliefs about the dead, it's clear that the idea of the soul as powerless, shadowy, and weak isn't the original one; it gradually replaced an older view where the dead had full sensibility and could impact the living. We see strong evidence of this older perspective in the enduring responsibility—even in Homeric Greece—of pursuing the blood-feud.

In later times the pursuit and punishment of homicide was organized in accordance with quite different principles. The State recognized its interest in the reprisals made for such a breach of the peace: we may take it as certain that in Greek cities generally the state took a share in the regular investigation and punishment of murder in its courts of justice,145 though here, too, it is only in the case of Athenian law that we have precise information. At Athens, in accordance with the ancient code dealing with the legal prosecution of murder (which never fell into disuse after Drakon had established it by his penal legislation), the exclusive right—and the unavoidable duty—of prosecuting the murderer belonged to the next of kin of the murdered man. (In special cases only it was extended to include the more distant relatives, and even the members of the phratria to which he had belonged.) It is clear that this duty of making an accusation which fell upon the next of kin, preserves a relic of the ancient duty of the blood-feud which has been transformed by the requirements of the public welfare. It is the same narrow circle of relationship, extending to the third generation, united by a strict religious bond, to which alone belonged the right to inherit property and the duty of performing the cult of the dead. This circle of relatives is here again called upon to “succour” the unfortunate who has been violently done to death.146 The reason for this duty—a duty evidently derived from the ancient blood-feud—is easy to understand: it, too, is a department of the cult of the dead which was binding as a duty upon exactly that circle of relatives. It was no mere abstract “right”, but a quite definite personal claim, made by the dead man himself, that the surviving relatives were required to satisfy. At Athens even in the fourth and fifth centuries the belief still survived in undiminished vigour that the soul of one violently done to death, until the wrong done to him was avenged upon the doer of it, would wander about finding no rest,147 full of rage at the violent act, and wrathful, too, against the relatives 177 who should have avenged him, if they did not fulfil their duty. He himself would become an “avenging spirit”; and the force of his anger might be felt throughout whole generations.148 Implacable revenge is the sacred duty of those—his representatives and executors—who are specially called upon to fulfil the needs of the dead soul. The state forbids them to take the law into their own hands; but it commands them to seek redress at the tribunals of justice. It will take over the duties of judge and executioner itself; but a decided consideration will be shown to the relatives of the murdered man at the hearing of the case. In duly conducted criminal procedure the courts specially appointed for this purpose will decide whether the deed is to be considered one of wilful murder, unintentional manslaughter, or justifiable homicide. In making these distinctions the state has struck a blow at that older code of the blood-feud in which the right of vengeance belonged entirely to the family of the murdered man. According to that code, as we cannot but conclude from Homer, nothing but the fact of the violent death of a relative was considered, not the character or motive of the deed itself. Now, however, the murderer is liable to a death penalty which he can avoid before the verdict is given by going into voluntary and perpetual exile. He disappears and leaves the country—at the boundaries of the country the state’s authority ceases, and so does the power of the indignant spirit of the dead, which is bound to its native soil—like that of all local deities, whose influence is confined to the place where they are worshipped. If, by such flight over the frontier, “the doer of the deed withdraws himself from the person injured by him—i.e. the angry soul of the dead man”149—his life is thereby saved, even if he himself is not justified. This alone is meant by the permission of such voluntary exile. Involuntary homicide150 is punished by banishment for a limited period, after the expiration of which the relations of the dead man are to grant a pardon to the murderer on his return to his native land.151 If they voted for it unanimously152 they could even do this before he went into banishment, in which case this would not take place at all. There can be no doubt that this pardon had to be granted by them in the name of the dead man as well, of whose rights they were the representatives; indeed, the man himself lying mortally wounded could before his death, even in the case of wilful murder, pardon his assailant and thereby excuse his relatives the duty of prosecution;153 to such an extent was the injured soul’s wish for vengeance the only point at issue, 178 even in the legal procedure of a constitutionally governed state, and not in the least the lawless act of the murderer as such. When there is no desire for vengeance on the part of the victim requiring to be satisfied, the murderer goes unpunished. When he suffers punishment, he suffers it for the satisfaction of the soul of the murdered man. He is no longer slain as a sacrifice to his victim; but when the relations of the dead exact vengeance from him by legally constituted processes, that, too, is a part of the cult offered to the soul of the dead.

In later times, the pursuit and punishment of homicide were organized based on quite different principles. The State recognized its interest in the responses made for such a disruption of the peace: we can be sure that in Greek cities, the state participated in the regular investigation and punishment of murder in its courts of justice,145 although we only have precise information for Athenian law. At Athens, in line with the ancient code addressing the legal prosecution of murder (which remained in use after Drakon established it through his penal legislation), the exclusive right—and the necessary duty—of prosecuting the murderer belonged to the next of kin of the deceased. (In special cases, this right extended to include more distant relatives, and even members of the phratria to which the deceased had belonged.) It's evident that this obligation to accuse, placed on the next of kin, preserves a remnant of the ancient blood-feud, transformed by the needs of public welfare. This same narrow circle of relatives, extending to the third generation and united by a strict religious bond, held the exclusive right to inherit property and the obligation to perform the rituals for the dead. This circle of relatives is once again called upon to “help” the unfortunate who has been violently killed.146 The reason for this obligation—a duty obviously stemming from the ancient blood-feud—is easy to grasp: it, too, forms part of the rituals for the dead that were binding on that specific circle of relatives. It wasn't just an abstract “right,” but a distinct personal claim made by the deceased, which the surviving relatives were expected to fulfill. Even in the fourth and fifth centuries at Athens, the belief persisted in full force that the soul of someone violently killed would wander restlessly until the wrong done to them was avenged,147 filled with rage over the violent act, and also angry at the relatives who should have avenged them, if they failed to meet their obligation. The deceased would become an “avenging spirit”; and the impact of their anger could be felt across generations.148 Unyielding revenge is the sacred duty of those—his representatives and executors—who are specifically tasked with fulfilling the needs of the deceased's soul. The state prohibits them from taking the law into their own hands; however, it requires them to seek justice through the courts. The state will assume the roles of judge and executioner itself; yet, the interests of the relatives of the murdered person will be given serious consideration during the proceedings. In properly conducted criminal procedures, designated courts will determine whether the act is classified as willful murder, unintentional manslaughter, or justifiable homicide. In making these distinctions, the state has struck a blow against that older code of the blood-feud, where the right to vengeance belonged solely to the family of the murdered individual. According to that code, based on our understanding from Homer, only the fact of a relative’s violent death was considered, without regard for the nature or motive of the act itself. However, now the murderer faces the death penalty, which they can avoid by choosing voluntary and permanent exile before the verdict is delivered. They vanish and leave the country—at the borders, the state’s authority ends, and so does the power of the furious spirit of the deceased, which is tied to its homeland—similar to all local deities, whose influence is limited to the places where they are worshipped. If, through such flight beyond the border, “the doer of the deed withdraws from the person he wronged—meaning the angry soul of the deceased”149—his life is spared, even if he is not justified. This is the intended meaning of allowing such voluntary exile. Involuntary homicide150 is punished by a limited period of banishment, after which the deceased's relatives are expected to grant the murderer a pardon upon his return to his homeland.151 If they agreed unanimously152, they could even grant this pardon before his exile, in which case the banishment would not occur at all. There's no doubt that this pardon had to be granted by them in the name of the deceased as well, of whose rights they were the representatives; indeed, even a mortally wounded man could, before his death, pardon his attacker and thereby relieve his relatives of the obligation to prosecute;153 to such an extent was the desire for vengeance from the injured soul the primary focus, 177 even within the legal proceedings of a constitutionally governed state, rather than the illegal actions of the murderer as such. When there is no desire for vengeance from the victim that needs satisfying, the murderer goes unpunished. When punishment is meted out, it is for the fulfillment of the murdered man's soul. He is no longer killed as a sacrifice to his victim; but when the deceased's relatives seek vengeance through legally established processes, that, too, is part of the rituals offered to the soul of the departed.

§ 2

It is true that the state directs the blood-feud required of the relatives of the dead man along constitutional channels that shall not contravene the laws of the community; but it does not in the least intend to abolish the fundamental idea of the ancient family vendetta. It reasserts the original claim to vengeance of the victim violently done to death—a claim closely bound up with the cult of the dead—by forbidding the old custom, common in Homeric times, of buying off the blood-guiltiness of the murderer by a compensatory payment made to the relatives of the dead man.154 It does not destroy the religious character of the whole transaction; it uses its own processes to secure the fulfilment of the requirements of religion. That is why the head of all criminal jurisdiction is the King Archon, the constitutional Administrator of all the religious functions of the ancient royal government. The religious basis of the oldest Athenian criminal jurisdiction is particularly evident. It has its seat on the Areiopagos, the hill of the Curse-Goddesses, over the sacred chasm in which they themselves, the “Venerable Ones”, have their dwelling. The judicial office is closely bound up with the service of the goddesses.155 At the commencement of the proceedings both parties take an oath in the name of the Erinyes.156 Each of the three days at the end of the month, upon which legal proceedings in these courts took place,157 was sacred to one of the three goddesses.158 To them sacrifice was made by those who were acquitted in those courts;159 for it is the goddesses who have given them absolution just as it is the goddesses who demand the punishment of the guilty. They still do it, as once they had done in the typical case of Orestes, in which they themselves had been the accusers.160 In this Athenian worship the Erinyes had not vet entirely lost their true and original character. They had not become the mere guardians of law in general, as which they were sometimes 179 represented by poets and philosophers who thus extended and weakened immeasurably their once much narrower significance. They are formidable daimones, dwelling in the depths of the earth from which they are conjured up by the curses and maledictions of those who have no earthly avenger left. Hence they are more particularly the avengers of murder committed within the family itself; they punish the man who has slain the very person whom he would have been called upon to avenge, if that person had fallen at the hand of another murderer than himself. When the son has slain his father or mother, who shall then carry out the blood-feud incumbent upon the nearest relation of the dead? This nearest relation is the murderer himself. It is the Erinys of the father or the mother who sees to it that the dead shall still receive due satisfaction. She breaks out from the kingdom of the dead to seize the murderer. She is ever at his heels in pursuit, leaving him no rest night or day. Vampire-like she sucks his blood:161 he is her destined victim.162 Even in the judicial procedure of the fully organized state it is the Erinyes who demand revenge for murder at the courts of law. Their absolute power extends in widening circle to all murder, even when it is committed outside the limits of the family; though it was only the imagination of the poetically or philosophically minded that ever transformed them completely to champions of justice of all kinds, in heaven and upon earth. In the cult and beliefs proper to individual cities they remained the auxiliaries attached to the souls of murdered men. These gruesome daimones had their origin in the worship of the dead, and they lived on in connexion with the undying worship of which they were a part. Indeed, if we examine closely the sources of information at our disposal, we can see even through their inadequacy and obscurity that the Erinys was nothing else but the soul itself of the murdered man, indignant at its fate and seizing its revenge for itself—till later ages substituted for this the conception of the ghost from hell taking over to itself the rage of the dead man’s soul.163

It’s true that the state guides the blood feud expected from the relatives of the deceased through legal channels that don’t violate community laws; however, it certainly doesn’t intend to eliminate the core idea of the ancient family vendetta. It reaffirms the original right to vengeance for the victim who was violently killed—a right closely linked to the worship of the dead—by prohibiting the old practice, common in Homeric times, of easing the murderer’s blood guilt with a payment made to the deceased's family. It doesn’t erase the religious nature of the whole process; instead, it utilizes its own methods to ensure the religious requirements are met. That’s why the head of all criminal jurisdiction is the King Archon, the constitutional administrator of all the religious functions of the ancient royal government. The religious foundation of the oldest Athenian criminal jurisdiction is particularly clear. It is based on the Areiopagos, the hill of the Curse-Goddesses, above the sacred chasm where the “Venerable Ones” reside. The judicial role is closely tied to the service of the goddesses. At the start of the proceedings, both parties swear an oath in the name of the Erinyes. Each of the three days at the end of the month, when legal cases were heard in these courts, was dedicated to one of the three goddesses. Sacrifices were made to them by those who were acquitted in those courts, for it is the goddesses who grant them absolution just as it is the goddesses who demand punishment for the guilty. They continue to do this, as they did in the infamous case of Orestes, where they themselves were the accusers. In this Athenian worship, the Erinyes had not yet completely lost their true and original nature. They hadn’t simply become the guardians of law in general, as they were sometimes depicted by poets and philosophers, who greatly broadened and diluted their once much narrower significance. They are formidable spirits, dwelling deep underground, summoned forth by the curses and maledictions of those who have no earthly avenger left. Thus, they are particularly the avengers of murders committed within the family; they punish the person who has killed the very individual they would have typically been required to avenge had that person been slain by someone else. When a son kills his father or mother, who is responsible for the blood feud expected of the deceased's closest relative? This closest relative is the murderer himself. It is the Erinys of the father or mother who ensures that the dead receive appropriate reparation. She emerges from the realm of the dead to pursue the murderer. She is always on his tail, giving him no peace day or night. Like a vampire, she drains his blood: he is her destined victim. Even within the judicial system of the fully organized state, it is the Erinyes who demand revenge for murder in the courts. Their absolute power extends broadly to all murder, even those committed outside the family; though it was only the imagination of the poetically or philosophically inclined that fully transformed them into champions of justice of all types, in heaven and on earth. In the local beliefs and rituals of individual cities, they remained aids tied to the souls of murdered individuals. These fearsome spirits originated from the worship of the dead, and they continued to exist as part of the enduring worship in connection with which they thrived. In fact, if we closely examine the available sources of information, even through their inadequacies and obscurities, we can see that the Erinys was just the soul of the murdered person, outraged at its fate and seeking to exact revenge for itself—until later ages replaced this with the idea of a ghost from the underworld reclaiming the anger of the dead person’s soul.

§ 3

Thus, the whole procedure at murder trials was directed rather to the satisfaction of invisible powers—the injured souls of the dead and the daimones that represent them—than of the state and its living members. In essence it was a religious act. As a result all was not at an end when the human verdict on the case had been given. On his return from exile the man guilty of involuntary homicide, besides receiving the 180 pardon of the relatives of the dead man, had still a double duty to perform; he had to be purified and to offer propitiatory sacrifice.164 Purification from the blood of the slain was necessary even in the case of the unpunished agent of what the state regarded as justifiable homicide;165 it restored the man, hitherto regarded as “unclean”, to participation in the religious gatherings of state and family which could not have been approached by an unpurified person without suffering defilement. The Homeric poems know nothing of any such religious purification of those who have incurred the stain of blood.166 Analogous occurrences in the religious usage of allied peoples make it, however, almost impossible to doubt that the notion of religious uncleanness belonging to a man who has had any dealings with uncanny powers was of primeval antiquity among the Greeks, too. It can only have been suppressed in the Homeric view of the matter; just as that view also suppressed the usages of expiation. These were intended to propitiate the indignant soul of the dead and the gods who protected it, by means of solemn sacrifice; but in the Homeric picture of the world they never appear, for the ideas on which they were based had themselves been swept away.

Thus, the entire process in murder trials focused more on appeasing unseen forces—the grieving spirits of the deceased and the daimons that represent them—rather than satisfying the state and its living citizens. Essentially, it was a religious act. Consequently, things didn't end just with the human verdict in the case. Upon his return from exile, the person found guilty of involuntary manslaughter, aside from receiving the 180 pardon from the relatives of the deceased, still had two obligations to fulfill; he had to be purified and offer a sacrificial gift. Purification from the blood of the victim was necessary even for someone deemed by the state to have committed justifiable homicide; it reinstated the individual, previously seen as “unclean,” into the religious gatherings of both state and family, which an unpurified person could not attend without risking contamination. The Homeric poems do not mention any such religious purification for those who carry the stain of blood. However, similar practices in the religious customs of neighboring peoples make it nearly impossible to doubt that the concept of ritual uncleanness for someone who has interacted with supernatural forces was an ancient belief among the Greeks as well. It must have been downplayed in the Homeric perspective; just as that perspective also overlooked the practices of atonement. These rituals aimed to appease the angry spirit of the deceased and the deities protecting it through solemn sacrifices; yet in the Homeric view of the world, they were absent, as the underlying ideas had been entirely erased.

The details of purification and expiation—the former serving the interests of the state and its religious needs, the latter intended as a final appeasement of the injured powers of the unseen world—were closely united in practice and are often confused in the accounts which have come down to us. A hard and fast distinction between them cannot be drawn. So much at all events is clear; the expiatory rites indispensable when murder had been committed had the closest possible similarity with the ritual of sacrifice to the gods of the underworld.167 And, in fact, the deities invoked at such rites of expiation—Zeus Meilichios, Zeus Apotropaios, and the rest—belong to the underworld circle of gods.168 To them, instead of the murderer himself, a victim was offered to appease the anger felt by them as the patrons of the departed soul. The Erinyes, too, have sacrifice made to them at expiations169—everything in these matters is connected with the kingdom of the dead and its inhabitants.

The details of purification and atonement— the former serving the interests of the state and its religious needs, and the latter intended as a final appeasement of the injured powers of the unseen world—were closely intertwined in practice and are often mixed up in the accounts that have come down to us. It's hard to draw a clear line between them. What is clear, however, is that the atonement rituals necessary after a murder closely resembled the sacrifice rituals dedicated to the gods of the underworld.167 In fact, the deities called upon during these atonement rites—Zeus Meilichios, Zeus Apotropaios, and others—are part of the underworld circle of gods.168 Instead of the murderer, a victim was offered to calm the anger of these gods, who are seen as the guardians of the departed soul. Sacrifices were also made to the Erinyes during atonements169—everything in these matters is linked to the realm of the dead and its inhabitants.

But it was the Delphic Oracle that saw to the details of purification and expiation after murder. The necessity of such rights was impressed on men by the example set in the story of Apollo’s own flight and purification after the slaying of the earth-spirit at Pytho. These events were symbolically enacted over again regularly every eight years.170 At Delphi, 181 too, according to Aeschylus, Apollo himself purified Orestes the matricide from the pollution of his crime.171 At Athens one of the oldest propitiatory sites was called after one of Apollo’s titles, the Delphinion.172 The Oracle must often have directed its inquirers to placate not merely the Heroes, but also the angry souls of murdered (and not heroized) men by means of expiatory sacrifices: as it bade the murderers of Archilochos and the Spartan king Pausanias.173 Propitiatory sacrifice in this sense does not belong to the Apolline cult as an exclusive possession; it belongs, also, to other, mostly lower-world, deities; but it was the Oracle of Apollo that set the seal on its sanctity. At Athens the Exegetai founded under the influence of the Delphic Oracle were the official administrators of this expiatory ritual.174 Plato was certainly following the customs of Greek cities when in the “Laws” he declares that his state shall take its regulations for purification and propitiation from Delphi.175

But it was the Delphic Oracle that handled the details of purification and atonement after a murder. The need for these rites was made clear to people through the example of Apollo’s own flight and purification after he killed the earth-spirit at Pytho. These events were symbolically reenacted every eight years. 170 At Delphi, 181 according to Aeschylus, Apollo himself purified Orestes, the matricide, from the stain of his crime. 171 In Athens, one of the oldest sites for propitiatory rituals was named after one of Apollo’s titles, the Delphinion. 172 The Oracle must have often directed those seeking answers to appease not only the Heroes but also the angry spirits of murdered men (who were not honored) through sacrificial offerings, as it instructed the murderers of Archilochos and the Spartan king Pausanias. 173 This type of sacrificial offering doesn't solely belong to the Apolline cult; it also pertains to other, mostly underworld, deities. However, it was the Oracle of Apollo that affirmed its sacredness. In Athens, the Exegetai established under the influence of the Delphic Oracle were the official administrators of this atonement ritual. 174 Plato was certainly aligned with the customs of Greek cities when in the “Laws” he stated that his state would adopt its rules for purification and propitiation from Delphi. 175

§ 4

The Oracle, then, of the omniscient God sanctified and recommended these rites of expiation; the state regulated its judicial procedure in murder cases on the lines of the old family blood-feud. It was natural, then, that the ideas on which these religious and political institutions were based—the conviction of a continued existence enjoyed by the murdered man’s soul and of his consciousness and knowledge of what occurred among the living who survived, his anger and his powers—that these ideas should attain to something like the position of an article of faith. The confidence with which these beliefs were held still manifests itself to us in the speeches at murder trials in which Antiphon, suiting his language to his real or imagined public, tries to arouse terror and awe, as at the presence of indubitable realities, by calling upon the angry soul of the dead man and the spirits that avenge the dead.176 About the souls of murdered men indeed, regarded as more than other spirits unable to find rest, a strange and ghostly mythology grew up, of which we shall have some specimens later on. How primitive such beliefs could be we may gather with startling clearness from occasional records of purely savage customs177 which are derived from them—customs which cannot possibly have been freshly invented in the Greece of this enlightened period, and must be either primitive Greek savagery come to light again, or else barbarisms only too easily welcomed from less civilized neighbours. In any case they imply the most materialistic view of the survival 182 of the murdered man, and of the revenge that might be taken by his soul.

The Oracle, then, of the all-knowing God approved and endorsed these rituals of atonement; the state organized its legal processes in murder cases based on the ancient family blood feud. It made sense, then, that the ideas supporting these religious and political structures—the belief in the continued existence of the murdered person's soul and its awareness of what happened among the living who remained, along with its anger and powers—would take on the status of an article of faith. The certainty with which these beliefs were held still shows up in the speeches at murder trials where Antiphon, tailoring his words to suit his real or imagined audience, tries to inspire fear and awe, as if faced with undeniable truths, by invoking the vengeful spirit of the deceased and the spirits that seek vengeance for the dead.176 About the souls of murder victims, seen as more restless than other spirits, a strange and eerie mythology developed, of which we will provide some examples later. The primitive nature of such beliefs becomes strikingly clear from occasional records of purely savage customs177 that stem from them—customs that could not have been freshly created in the Greece of this enlightened era and must either be remnants of primitive Greek savagery resurfacing or barbarisms eagerly adopted from less civilized neighbors. In any case, these imply a very materialistic view of the survival 182 of the murdered individual and the vengeance that might be exacted by their soul.

It is evident that what men believed about the souls of murdered men must have had an important influence upon the general belief in a future life as it took shape in the mind of the people. But the extent of such an influence can be more exactly measured in the story which Xenophon tells about the dying Kyros; as the strongest grounds for the hope that an after-life will be the portion of all souls after their separation from the body, the dying king points to the unquestioned facts which, as all admit, prove a special after-life for the souls “of those who have suffered injustice”. In addition to this he lays stress on the argument that the worship of the dead would not have been preserved intact to his own time if their souls had been entirely deprived of all active power.178 Thus we see how the cult of the souls of the dead was the chief source of the belief in a continued life after death.

It’s clear that what people thought about the souls of murdered individuals had a significant impact on the overall belief in an afterlife as it developed in the collective mindset. However, this influence can be more precisely understood through the tale that Xenophon shares about the dying Cyrus; as the strongest basis for the hope that every soul will experience an afterlife after leaving the body, the dying king points to the undeniable facts that everyone acknowledges, which demonstrate a special afterlife for the souls "of those who have suffered injustice." He also emphasizes that the worship of the dead would not have remained intact up to his own time if their souls had completely lost all active power.178 Thus, we see how the worship of the souls of the deceased was the primary origin of the belief in a continued existence after death.

NOTES TO CHAPTER V

I

1 This dual efficacy of the χθόνιοι is explained naturally enough by their nature as underground spirits. There is no reason for supposing that their influence on the fertility of the fields was a later addition (as Preller does, Dem. u. Perseph. 188 ff., followed by many). Still less have we any grounds for regarding the protection of souls and the care for the fertility of crops as a sort of allegorizing parallel (soul = grain of seed) as has been usual since the time of K. O. Müller.

1 This dual efficacy of the chthonic is easily understood considering their nature as underground spirits. There's no reason to believe that their influence on the fertility of the fields was a later addition, as Preller suggests in Dem. u. Perseph. 188 ff., a view that many have followed. Even less do we have any basis for seeing the protection of souls and the care for crop fertility as some kind of allegorical parallel (soul = grain of seed), which has been a common interpretation since K. O. Müller.

2 Ζεὺς καταχθόνιος, I 457. θεοῦ χθονίου . . . ἰφθίμου Ἀΐδεω, Hes. Th. 767 f. Evidently there is no distinction here between καταχθόνιος and χθόνιος, as Preller, Dem. u. Pers. 187, wishes to make out.

2 Zeus the Underworld, I 457. of the Underworld . . . of the everlasting Hades, Hes. Th. 767 f. Clearly, there is no difference here between the Underworld and of the planet, as Preller, Dem. u. Pers. 187, suggests.

3 Hes. Op. 465, εὔχεσθαι δὲ Διὶ χθονίῳ Δημήτερί θ’ ἁγνῇ κτλ. It is impossible even by far-fetched methods of interpretation (such as Lehrs makes use of, Popul. Aufs.2 298 f.) to make this Ζεὺς χθόνιος into anything else than a Zeus of the underworld. The god of the lower world, totally distinct from the Olympian Zeus (Ζεὺς ἄλλος, Aesch., Supp. 231), is here a dispenser of blessings to the farmer. In the sacrificial regulation from Mykonos (SIG. 615) it is prescribed to offer: ὑπὲρ καρπῶν (καμπῶν on the stone) Διὶ Χθόνίῳ Γῇ Χθονίῃ ΔΕΡΤΑ μέλανα ἐτήσια; ξένῳ οὐ θέμις (where δερτὰ = hostias pelle spoliatas, see Prott, Leg. Sacr. i, p. 17; though the addition of the colour of the no longer visible skin seems remarkable)—ὑπὲρ καρπῶν here belongs to Διί, etc., as the division-mark on the stone before ὑπὲρ shows: see BCH. 1888, p. 460 f. Evidence of this sort makes it clear how unjustifiable it would be to rule out all fructifying influence from the “idea of the chthonic” and to regard the chthonic deities as simply the power of death and destruction in the world of nature and men, as is done by H. D. Müller (who is met by serious difficulty in this passage from the Op.: Mythol. d. griech. St. ii, 40). It is, indeed, scarcely necessary to seek for an abstractly formulated “idea of the chthonic”; but if this fructifying and life-giving force does belong to the nature of the χθόνιοι as such, what becomes of H. D. Müller’s ingeniously thought-out and violently defended view according to which the chthonic only constitutes one side of the nature of certain deities who have in addition a different, Olympian, side in which they are positively creative and beneficent?

3 Hes. Op. 465, Pray to Earth-bound Zeus and to pure Demeter, etc. It's impossible, even with the most far-fetched interpretations (like those used by Lehrs, Popul. Aufs.2 298 f.), to understand this Zeus of the Underworld as anything other than a Zeus of the underworld. The god of the lower world, completely distinct from the Olympian Zeus (Ζευς άλλος, Aesch., Supp. 231), here acts as a giver of blessings to farmers. In the sacrificial regulation from Mykonos (SIG. 615), it prescribes offerings: for crops(καμπών on the stone) To Zeus Chthonian and the black Earth, are the annual rites due? It is not lawful for a stranger. (where δερτὰ = hostias pelle spoliatas, see Prott, Leg. Sacr. i, p. 17; though the mention of the color of the no longer visible skin is noteworthy)—for fruits here relates to Διί, etc., as indicated by the division mark on the stone before ὑπὲρ: see BCH. 1888, p. 460 f. Such evidence clearly shows how unjustifiable it would be to eliminate any fruitful influence from the “idea of the chthonic” and to view chthonic deities merely as the force of death and destruction in the natural and human world, as H. D. Müller does (who faces serious challenges in this passage from the Op.: Mythol. d. griech. St. ii, 40). It's really unnecessary to hunt for an abstractly formulated “idea of the chthonic”; however, if this fruitful and life-giving force is indeed part of the nature of the Underworld dwellers, where does that leave H. D. Müller’s cleverly constructed and vigorously defended perspective that sees the chthonic as merely one aspect of certain deities who also embody a distinct, Olympian aspect that is positively creative and beneficial?

4 Ζεὺς χθόνιος at Corinth, Paus. 2, 2, 8; at Olympia, 5, 14, 8.

4 Zeus Chthonios at Corinth, Paus. 2, 2, 8; at Olympia, 5, 14, 8.

5 Thus Persephone is called Ἁγνή, Δέσποινα, etc. (Lehrs, Pop. Aufs.2 288), also Μελιτώδης, Μελίβοια; Μελινδία, consort of Hades, Malalas, p. 62, 10, Di. [8th ed., Bonn.] (? Μελίνοια, as Hekate is Μειλινόη, Orph., H. 71). Ἀρίστη χθονία, P. Mag. Par. 1450.—Hekate is Καλλίστη, Εὐκολίνη (κατ’ ἀντίφρασιν ἡ μὴ οὖσα εὖκολος, EM.), the Erinyes Σεμναί, Εὐμενίδες; their mother Εὐωνύμη (= Γῆ): Ister ap. Sch. Soph., OC. 42 (from a similar source, Sch. Aeschin. i, 188), etc. Cf. Bücheler, Rh. Mus. 33, 16–17.

5 So, Persephone is known as Agni, Mistress, among other names (Lehrs, Pop. Aufs.2 288), including Μελιχά, Μελίβοια; Melindia, wife of Hades, Malalas, p. 62, 10, Di. [8th ed., Bonn.] (? Melinoia, as Hekate is Μειλινόη, Orph., H. 71). Best in the land, P. Mag. Par. 1450.—Hekate is Καλλίστη, Εύκολη(According to the opposite, the one that is not is easy., EM.), the Erinyes Respectful, Kindly; their mother Eunomy (= Earth): Ister ap. Sch. Soph., OC. 42 (from a similar source, Sch. Aeschin. i, 188), etc. Cf. Bücheler, Rh. Mus. 33, 16–17.

6 Πολυδέκτης, Πολυδέγμων, Ἀγησίλαος (Epigr. Gr. 195; see Bentley ad Callim., Lav. Pall. 130; Preller, Dem. u. Pers. 192; Welcker, Götterl. ii, 482), Εὐκλῆς (Bücheler, Rh. Mus. 36, 332 f.).—Εὔκολος (corresponding to the Εὐκολίνη above) as a title of Hades must be rejected if Köhler’s correction of CIA. ii, 3, 1529, is right: Ἡδύλος—Εὐκόλου. 184

6 Poludecktes, Poludegmon, Agesilaus (Epigr. Gr. 195; see Bentley ad Callim., Lav. Pall. 130; Preller, Dem. u. Pers. 192; Welcker, Götterl. ii, 482), Eukles (Bücheler, Rh. Mus. 36, 332 f.).—Eukolos (corresponding to the Eukoline above) as a title of Hades must be dismissed if Köhler’s correction of CIA. ii, 3, 1529, is accurate: Hedylos—Eukolou. 184

7 Cult of Ζεὺς Εὐβουλεύς at Amorgos, Paros (insc. cit. by Foucart, BCH. vii, 402), of Ζεὺς Βουλεύς at Mykonos, SIG. 615 (Ζεὺς Βουλαῖος, Ins. Perg. i, 246, l. 49, does not belong here); of Εὔβουλος (original title of Hades: Orph., H. xviii, 12) in Eleusis (side by side ὁ θεός, ἡ θεά): SIG. 20, 39; CIA. ii, 1620 c.d. (The Athenian legend makes Eubouleus into a mortal herdsman: Clem. Al., Protr. ii, pp. 14–15 P.; Schol. Luc., De Merc., 2, p. 275, 27 Rabe.) Εὐβουλεύς simply = Hades: Nic., Al. 14; epitaph from Syros, Epigr. Gr. 272, 9, and frequently. So, too, the Ζεὺς Εὐβουλεύς (Hesych. s. Εὐβ.) worshipped in Kyrene must have been a Ζεὺς χθόνιος. Eubouleus is also a title of Dionysos as Zagreus (Iakchos), i.e. the Dionysos of the underworld.—Incidentally, what is the origin of this designation of the god of the underworld as “good counsellor” (boni consilii praestitem as Macr. 1, 8, 17, translates Εὐβουλῆα)? It can hardly have been because he was specially able to take counsel on his own behalf (this is the sense in which D.S. 5, 72, 2, takes the title); but rather because he was an oracle god, and as such dispensed good counsel to inquirers. Thus the oracle-god Nereus is called εὔβουλος in Pi., P. iii, 92; so also I. vii, 32: εὔβουλος Θέμις.

7 Cult of Zeus the Counsellor at Amorgos, Paros (insc. cit. by Foucart, BCH. vii, 402), of Zeus the Counselor at Mykonos, SIG. 615 (Zeus Boulaeus, Ins. Perg. i, 246, l. 49, does not belong here); of Εὔβουλος (original title of Hades: Orph., H. xviii, 12) in Eleusis (alongside the god, the goddess): SIG. 20, 39; CIA. ii, 1620 c.d. (The Athenian legend transforms Eubouleus into a mortal herdsman: Clem. Al., Protr. ii, pp. 14–15 P.; Schol. Luc., De Merc., 2, p. 275, 27 Rabe.) Advisor simply = Hades: Nic., Al. 14; epitaph from Syros, Epigr. Gr. 272, 9, and frequently. Likewise, the Zeus the Wise (Hesych. s. Εύβοια.) worshipped in Kyrene must have been a God of the underworld. Eubouleus is also a title of Dionysos as Zagreus (Iakchos), meaning the Dionysos of the underworld.—By the way, what is the origin of this title for the god of the underworld as “good counselor” (boni consilii praestitem as Macr. 1, 8, 17 translates Eubulea)? It can't be because he was particularly good at taking care of his own interests (this is how D.S. 5, 72, 2 interprets the title); but more likely because he was an oracle god, and as such provided good advice to seekers. Thus, the oracle-god Nereus is referred to as wise in Pi., P. iii, 92; similarly in I. vii, 32: Wise Themis.

8 Lasos fr. 1 (PLG. iii, 376), etc.—Consecration to Κλύμενος from Athens: CIG. 409.—Hesych. Περικλύμενος· ὁ Πλούτων (it is no accident that gave the name Periklymenos to the magically gifted son of Neleus). Klymenos = Hades, Epigr. Gr. 522 a 2.

8 Lasos fr. 1 (PLG. iii, 376), etc.—Devotion to Κλύμενος from Athens: CIG. 409.—Hesych. Περικλυμένος· ο Πλούτωνας (it's no coincidence that the name Periklymenos was given to Neleus's magically talented son). Klymenos = Hades, Epigr. Gr. 522 a 2.

9 The name Τρεφώνιος, Τροφώνιος itself also points to the fact that assistance to the fertility of the earth was expected of this Ζεὺς χθόνιος. In the later cult of Trophonios not a trace of such a belief survives.

9 The name Τρεφώνιος and Trophonius indicates that people expected this Zeus of the Underworld to help with the earth’s fertility. However, in the later worship of Trophonios, there’s no sign of that belief remaining.

10 ἐν οὐδεμιᾷ πόλει Ἅιδου βωμός ἐστιν. Αἰσχύλος φησίν· μόνος θεῶν γὰρ Θάνατος οὐ δώρων ἐρᾷ κτλ. (fr. 161 Sidg.): Schol., AB. on A 158.

10 There is no altar in any city of Hades. Aeschylus says that among the gods, only Death does not seek offerings, etc. (fr. 161 Sidg.): Schol., AB. on A 158.

11 In Elis ἱερὸς τοῦ Ἅιδου περίβολός τε καὶ ναός, Paus. 6, 25, 2. Cult of Demeter and Kore and of Hades in the very fertile Triphylia, Str. 344.

11 In Elis The sacred enclosure and temple of Hades., Paus. 6, 25, 2. Worship of Demeter and Kore and of Hades in the highly fertile Triphylia, Str. 344.

12 Kaukones from Pylos, the Nelidai at their head, reach Attica: connexion with the cult of the χθόνιοι in Phlya in Eleusis: see K. O. Müller, Kl. S. ii, 258. Such accounts may have an historical foundation. The elaborate accounts by H. D. Müller, Mythol. Gr. 1, c. 6, and O. Crusius, Ersch-Gruber “Kaukones”—operate with too many uncertain factors for the results to have any certainty.

12 The Kaukones from Pylos, led by the Nelidai, arrive in Attica: connection with the cult of the chthonic in Phlya in Eleusis: see K. O. Müller, Kl. S. ii, 258. These accounts might have some historical basis. The detailed accounts by H. D. Müller, Mythol. Gr. 1, c. 6, and O. Crusius, Ersch-Gruber “Kaukones”—have too many uncertain factors for their findings to be definitive.

13 Ἅιδης . . . τοῖς ἐνθάδε τοσαῦτα ἀγαθὰ ἀνίησιν: Pl., Crat. 403 E. ὁ Ἅιδης οὐ μόνον τὰς ψυχὰς συνέχει, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς καρποῖς αἴτιός ἐστιν ἀναπνοῆς καὶ ἀναδόσεως καὶ αὐξήσεως: Schol. B.L., Ο 188.

13 Hades . . . provides many good things to those who are here.: Pl., Crat. 403 E. Hades not only contains the souls but is also in charge of the breath, nourishment, and growth of the fruits.: Schol. B.L., O 188.

14 οἱ πολλοὶ φοβούμενοι τὸ ὄνομα Πλούτωνα καλοῦσιν αὐτόν (τὸν Ἅιδην), Pl., Crat. 403 A.

14 those who fear the name Pluto refer to him as (Underworld), Pl., Crat. 403 A.

15 At the Genesia (Nekysia) sacrifice for Ge and the dead, Hesych. Γενέσια.—χοαὶ Γῇ τε καὶ φθιτοῖς, A. Pers. 220: calling to Hermes, Ge, and Aïdoneus in “spirit-raising”, Pers. 628 ff., 640 ff. cf. Ch. 124 ff.—appeal to Hermes and Γῆ κάτοχος on defixiones: CIG. 538–9.

15 At the Genesia (Nekysia) sacrifice for Earth and the dead, Hesych. Γενέσια.—χοαὶ Γῇ και φθιτοῖς, A. Pers. 220: calling to Hermes, Earth, and Hades in “spirit-raising”, Pers. 628 ff., 640 ff. cf. Ch. 124 ff.—appeal to Hermes and Landowner on defixiones: CIG. 538–9.

16 Γαῖος in Olympia, Paus. 5, 14, 10; cf. E. Curtius, Altäre v. Olymp., p. 15. At Kos it would seem to have been stated that Ge was worshipped μόνη θεῶν, Ant. Lib. 15 (acc. to Boios). Side by side with Ζεὺς Χθόνιος was worshipped Γῆ χθονίη at Mykonos, SIG. 615, 26.

16 Gaia in Olympia, Paus. 5, 14, 10; cf. E. Curtius, Altäre v. Olymp., p. 15. At Kos, it seems there was a belief that Ge was worshipped goddess alone, Ant. Lib. 15 (according to Boios). Alongside Hades, Earthly realm was worshipped in Mykonos, SIG. 615, 26.

17 πότνια Γῆ Ζαγρεῦ τε, θεῶν πανυπέρτατε πάντων, Alkmaionis fr. 3 (Kink.).

17 Goddess Earth, the highest of all deities, Alkmaionis fr. 3 (Kink.).

18 Cult of Klymenos and Demeter Χθονία (her festival Χθόνεια: see also Ael. HA. xi, 4) in Hermione, Paus. 2, 35, 4 ff. Pausanias also thinks (3, 14, 5) that the cult of Dem. Χθονία was brought to Sparta 185 from Hermione, which may be right. Kore as Μελίβοια is also mentioned in this connexion by Lasos of Herm. fr. 1, PLG. iii, 376. Dedicatory inscriptions (CIG. 1194–1200) also mention, side by side with Demeter Chthonia, Klymenos, and Kore as well. Once (BCH. 1889, p. 198, n. 24) only Δάματρι, Κλυμένῳ. Demeter was clearly the chief goddess: cf. CIG. 1193.—From the community of the worship of Damater Chthonia in both Hermione and Asine it may be justifiable to conclude that this cult belonged originally to the Dryopians who combined with the Dorians in Hermione and were driven by them out of Argolic Asine. There is no warrant whatever for the fanciful derivation of the Demeter-cult of these neighbourhoods from “Pelasgians” submerged by Dryopian invaders.

18 Cult of Klymenos and Demeter Chthonia (her festival Chthonic: see also Ael. HA. xi, 4) in Hermione, Paus. 2, 35, 4 ff. Pausanias also believes (3, 14, 5) that the cult of Dem. Chthonic was brought to Sparta 185 from Hermione, which could be true. Kore, as Melivia, is also mentioned in this context by Lasos of Herm. fr. 1, PLG. iii, 376. Dedicatory inscriptions (CIG. 1194–1200) also mention, alongside Demeter Chthonia, Klymenos, and Kore. Once (BCH. 1889, p. 198, n. 24), it only mentions Δάματρι, Κλυμένῳ. Demeter was clearly the main goddess: cf. CIG. 1193.—From the shared worship of Demeter Chthonia in both Hermione and Asine, it may be reasonable to conclude that this cult originally belonged to the Dryopians who merged with the Dorians in Hermione and were driven by them out of Argolic Asine. There is no basis whatsoever for the fanciful idea that the Demeter cults in these areas came from “Pelasgians” who were overwhelmed by Dryopian invaders.

19 There was a common worship of: Zeus Eubouleus, Demeter, and Kore at Amorgos; Zeus Eub., Demeter Thesmophoros, Kore, Here, Babo at Paros; Plouton, Demeter, Kore, Epimachos, Hermes in Knidos; Plouton and Kore in Karia. See the citations given by Foucart, BCH. vii, 402 (with whose own pronouncements I cannot, however, agree at all). In Delos, Demeter, Kore, Zeus Eubouleus: BCH. 24, 505 n. 4. So, too, in Corinth Plouton, Demeter, and Kore: Paus. 2, 18, 3; Hades Demeter and Kore in Triphylia, Str. 344. Observe also the group of divinities at Lebadeia in the cult of Trophonios: Paus. 9, 39.—At Eleusis side by side with Demeter and Kore Plouton also was worshipped: CIA. ii, 834 b. But there existed even there other groups of χθόνιοι worshipped in conjunction, τὼ θεώ once more joined with Triptolemos, and a second triad: ὁ θεός, ἡ θεά, and Eubouleus, CIA. Suppl. i, 27b, p. 59, ff. ii, 1620 bc; iii, 1108–9. This second triad, which is not mentioned on the inscr. CIA. i, 5 (from the beginning of the fifth century), may have only been subsequently added to the Eleusinian official cult (see Ziehen, Leg. Sacr., Dissert. pp. 9–10). It is a waste of time to try and identify the vague appellations θεός and θεά with the names of definite chthonic deities (as e.g. Kern attempts, Ath. Mitth. 1891, pp. 5–6). Acc. to Löschcke, D. Enneakrunosepis. bei Paus., pp. 15–16, these Eleusinian divinities were imported into Athens, established in the chasm of the Eumenides, and instead of ὁ θεός, ἡ θεά and Eubouleus, were called Hermes, Ge, and Plouton. But the correlation of these divinities worshipped there in conjunction with the Σεμναί (acc. to Paus. 1, 28, 6) with the Eleusinian group depends entirely upon the identification of the Σεμναί with Demeter and Kore. This, however, is based on nothing more than a guess of K. O. Müller’s (Aesch. Eum., p. 176 [160 f. E.T.]), which would still be very much in the air even if the theories about “Demeter Erinys” with which it is connected did not rest on such insecure foundations. (To identify the Eleusinian-Athenian Eubouleus with Plouton is impossible, if only because of the fact that in the chthonic cult of those places Εὐβουλεύς, originally the name of an underworld god, has developed into the name of a Hero who now has a place alongside the chthonic deities.)—With the cautious appelations ὁ θεός, ἡ θεά we may compare the appeal on a defixio from Athens, CIG. 1034: δαίμονι χθονίῳ καὶ τῇ χθονίᾳ καὶ τοῖς χθονίοις πᾶσι κτλ.

19 There was a shared worship of Zeus Eubouleus, Demeter, and Kore in Amorgos; Zeus Eub., Demeter Thesmophoros, Kore, Here, Babo in Paros; Plouton, Demeter, Kore, Epimachos, Hermes in Knidos; Plouton and Kore in Karia. See the references provided by Foucart, BCH. vii, 402 (though I cannot agree with his statements at all). In Delos, Demeter, Kore, Zeus Eubouleus: BCH. 24, 505 n. 4. Similarly, in Corinth, Plouton, Demeter, and Kore: Paus. 2, 18, 3; Hades, Demeter, and Kore in Triphylia, Str. 344. Also note the group of deities in the cult of Trophonios at Lebadeia: Paus. 9, 39.—At Eleusis, alongside Demeter and Kore, Plouton was also worshipped: CIA. ii, 834 b. However, there were other groups of chthonic worshipped together, the two gods once again associated with Triptolemos, and a second triad: God, goddess, and Eubouleus, CIA. Suppl. i, 27b, p. 59, ff. ii, 1620 bc; iii, 1108–9. This second triad, which isn't mentioned in the inscription CIA. i, 5 (from the beginning of the fifth century), may have only been later added to the official Eleusinian worship (see Ziehen, Leg. Sacr., Dissert. pp. 9–10). It’s pointless to try and connect the vague titles god and goddess with specific chthonic deities (as Kern attempts, Ath. Mitth. 1891, pp. 5–6). According to Löschcke, D. Enneakrunosepis. bei Paus., pp. 15–16, these Eleusinian deities were brought to Athens, established in the chasm of the Eumenides, and instead of the god, the goddess and Eubouleus, were referred to as Hermes, Ge, and Plouton. However, the connection of these deities worshipped together with the Σεμνές (according to Paus. 1, 28, 6) to the Eleusinian group relies entirely on identifying the Respectful with Demeter and Kore. This is based solely on a guess from K. O. Müller (Aesch. Eum., p. 176 [160 f. E.T.]), which would still be very much unproven even if the theories about “Demeter Erinys” it's linked to didn’t rest on such shaky ground. (To equate the Eleusinian-Athenian Eubouleus with Plouton is impossible, primarily because the name Consultant, which originated as an underworld god's name, has evolved into the name of a Hero who now holds a place alongside the chthonic deities.)—In comparison to the cautious titles the god, the goddess, we can look at an appeal on a defixio from Athens, CIG. 1034: to the chthonic demon and the chthonic realm and to all the chthonic beings, etc.

20 Cf. Mannhardt, Mythol. Forsch. 1884, p. 225 ff.

20 See Mannhardt, Mythol. Forsch. 1884, p. 225 and following.

21 It cannot, however, be denied that already in Homer Persephone is the daughter of Demeter and Zeus. Adducing Ξ 326 and λ 217 K. O. Müller (Kl. Sch. ii, 91) has disposed conclusively of Preller’s doubts: in spite of which H. D. Müller in his reconstruction of the Demeter-myth clings firmly to the view that the goddess carried 186 away by Hades was only afterwards made the daughter of Demeter.—The Homeric poems seem to know of the rape of Persephone by Aïdoneus but not the story of her periodical return to the upper world—which is the most important feature in the Eleusinian creed. What Lehrs says on this much-discussed subject is completely convincing (Pop. Aufs.2, p. 277 f.).

21 It can't be denied that even in Homer's works, Persephone is recognized as the daughter of Demeter and Zeus. Referencing Ξ 326 and λ 217, K. O. Müller (Kl. Sch. ii, 91) has effectively addressed Preller’s doubts. Nevertheless, H. D. Müller, in his reconstruction of the Demeter myth, firmly adheres to the idea that the goddess taken away by Hades was only later recognized as the daughter of Demeter. The Homeric poems seem to acknowledge the abduction of Persephone by Aïdoneus, but do not mention her periodic return to the upper world, which is the key aspect of the Eleusinian belief. Lehrs' insights on this much-debated topic are entirely convincing (Pop. Aufs.2, p. 277 f.).

22 The cult of Demeter is old in Phthiotis too (—Πύρασον, Δήμητρος τέμενος, Β 695 f.—ἔχουσαι Ἀντρῶνα πετρήεντα, h. Cer. 490). Also in Paros and Crete. That it is possible to trace the extension of the worship of Demeter in detail (as many have tried to do), is one of the current illusions on this subject that I cannot share.

22 The worship of Demeter has deep roots in Phthiotis too (—Πύρασον, Demeter temple, Β 695 f.—Having rocky a cave, h. Cer. 490). It’s also present in Paros and Crete. The idea that we can map out the spread of Demeter's worship in detail (as many have attempted) is one of the current misconceptions on this topic that I can't agree with.

23 Aornon and νεκυομαντεῖον (ψυχοπομπεῖον Phot. Θεοὶ Μολοττικοί cf. Append. prov. iii, 18 L.-S.; Eust. κ 514, p. 1667) at Ephyre on the River Acheron in Thesprotia: well known from Hdt.’s story of Periander (v, 92). Here the place of Orpheus’ descent to the lower world was localised, Paus. 9, 30, 6; cf. also Hyg. 88, p. 84, 19–20 Schm.—Entrance to Hades at Tainaron, through which Herakles dragged up Kerberos (Schol. D.P. 791, etc.), with ψυχομαντεῖον: cf. Plu., Ser. Num. Vind. 17, p. 560 E (cf. Stat., Th. ii, 32 ff., 48 f., etc.).—Similar entrance to Hades at Hermione, see below; καταβάσιον ᾅδου at Aigialos = Sikyon: Call. fr. 110.—At Phigaleia in Arcadia a ψυχομαντεῖον at which King Pausanias inquired, Paus. 3, 17, 9.—More famous is the ψυχομαντεῖον at Herakleia Pont.: see Rh. Mus. 36, 556 (this also was a place where Kerberos appeared above, Mela i, 103). Hither Pausanias came for guidance, acc. to Plu., Ser. Num. 10, p. 555 C; Cimon 6.—The Πλουτώνιον and ψυχομαντεῖον at Cumae in Italy had a long-standing reputation (mentioned as early as Soph., fr. 682 [748 P.]): cf. Rh. Mus. 36, 555 (an Italian Greek applies to τι ψυχομαντεῖον, Plu., Cons. Apoll. 14, p. 109 C).—Next the Asiatic Πλουτώνια and Χαρώνεια: at Acharaka in Karia, Str. 649–50; at Magnesia on the Maiander, ἄορνον σπήλαιον ἱερόν, Χαρώνιον λεγόμενον, Str. 636; at Myous, Str. 579. This is what τὸ ἐν Λάτμῳ ὄρυγμα must have been, mentioned among other Χαρώνια by Antig. Caryst. 123; the Κίμβρος καλούμενος ὁ περὶ Φρυγίαν βόθυνος also mentioned there, may very well have been the place in Phrygia spoken of by Alkman ap. Str. 580: βόθυνος Κερβήσιος ἔχων ὀλεθρίους ἀποφοράς (suggested by Keller on Antig). Perhaps the latter place—named after the Korybantes (?) see Bergk on Alcm. fr. 82—is the same as the cave at Hierapolis.—Better known than any was the oracular cavern at Hierapolis in Phrygia into which only the Galli of the Great Mother, the Matris Magnae sacerdos, can go without being overcome by the vapours issuing from it: Str. 629–30, Plin. ii, 208. There existed under a temple of Apollo a direct καταβάσιον ᾅδου, accessible at least to the faithful τετελεσμένοι: see the very remarkable account of Damasc., V. Isid. ap. Phot., p. 344b, 35–345a, 27 Bk. (Cult of Echidna in Hierapolis, see Gutschmid, Rh. Mus. 19, 398 ff.; this is also a chthonic cult: νέρτερος Ἔχιδνα, Eur. Ph. 1023; Echidna among the monsters of Hades: Ar., Ra. 473).—These are the mortifera in Asia Plutonia, quae vidimus, Cic., Div. i, 79 (cf. Gal. iii, 540; xvii, 1, 10).—Entrances to Hades were regularly to be found at those places where the cave was shown by which Aidoneus made his exit or his entrance in carrying off Kore. Thus at Eleusis, τόθι περ πύλαι εἰσ’ Ἀΐδαο, Orph., H. 18, 15, Paus. 1, 38, 5; at Kolonos, Sch. S., OC. 1590–3; at Lerna, Paus. 2, 36, 7; at Pheneos (a χάσμα ἐν Κυλλήνῃ: Conon 15), and probably in Crete too (cf. Bacch. fr. 53 Jebb, ap. Sch. Hes., Th. 914); at Enna in Sicily a χάσμα κατάγειον: D.S. 5, 3, 3; Cic., Verr. iv, 107; 187 at Syracuse at the spring Kyane, D.S. 5, 4, 2; at Kyzikos, Prop. 3 (4), 22, 4.

23 Aornon and necromancy (psychopomp Phot. Moltak Gods cf. Append. prov. iii, 18 L.-S.; Eust. κ 514, p. 1667) at Ephyre on the River Acheron in Thesprotia: well known from Herodotus’ account of Periander (v, 92). This was identified as the spot where Orpheus descended to the underworld, Paus. 9, 30, 6; cf. also Hyg. 88, p. 84, 19–20 Schm.—Entrance to Hades at Tainaron, through which Herakles pulled up Kerberos (Schol. D.P. 791, etc.), with psychic medium: cf. Plu., Ser. Num. Vind. 17, p. 560 E (cf. Stat., Th. ii, 32 ff., 48 f., etc.).—A similar entry to Hades is found at Hermione, see below; downward to Hades at Aigialos = Sikyon: Call. fr. 110.—At Phigaleia in Arcadia, a ψυχοπαντεῖον where King Pausanias inquired, Paus. 3, 17, 9.—More famous is the psychic medium at Herakleia Pont: see Rh. Mus. 36, 556 (this was also a place where Kerberos was seen above, Mela i, 103). Pausanias sought guidance here, according to Plu., Ser. Num. 10, p. 555 C; Cimon 6.—The Plutonium and psychic oracle at Cumae in Italy had a long-standing reputation (mentioned as early as Soph., fr. 682 [748 P.]): cf. Rh. Mus. 36, 555 (an Italian Greek refers to what a fortune-telling place, Plu., Cons. Apoll. 14, p. 109 C).—Next are the Asiatic Plutonium and Χαρούμενα: at Acharaka in Karia, Str. 649–50; at Magnesia on the Maiander, sacred cave of Aornos, called Charonium, Str. 636; at Myous, Str. 579. This is what the pit in Latmus must have been, mentioned among other Χαρώνια by Antig. Caryst. 123; the The area around Phrygia called Kimbros. also mentioned there, may very well have been the place in Phrygia referred to by Alkman ap. Str. 580: Cursed depths of Cerberus (suggested by Keller on Antig). Perhaps the latter location—named after the Korybantes (?) see Bergk on Alcm. fr. 82—is the same as the cave at Hierapolis.—Better known than any was the oracular cave at Hierapolis in Phrygia, where only the Galli of the Great Mother, the Matris Magnae sacerdos, can enter without being overwhelmed by the vapors coming from it: Str. 629–30, Plin. ii, 208. Below a temple of Apollo existed a direct descent into Hades, accessible at least to the initiated finished: see the very remarkable account of Damasc., V. Isid. ap. Phot., p. 344b, 35–345a, 27 Bk. (Cult of Echidna in Hierapolis, see Gutschmid, Rh. Mus. 19, 398 ff.; this is also a chthonic cult: νέρτερος Ἔχιδνα, Eur. Ph. 1023; Echidna among the monsters of Hades: Ar., Ra. 473).—These are the mortifera in Asia Plutonia, which we saw, Cic., Div. i, 79 (cf. Gal. iii, 540; xvii, 1, 10).—Entrances to Hades were typically found at places where the cave showed the route by which Aidoneus would exit or enter while taking Kore. Thus at Eleusis, There are gates to Hades., Orph., H. 18, 15, Paus. 1, 38, 5; at Kolonos, Sch. S., OC. 1590–3; at Lerna, Paus. 2, 36, 7; at Pheneos (a gap in Kyllene: Conon 15), and probably in Crete too (cf. Bacch. fr. 53 Jebb, ap. Sch. Hes., Th. 914); at Enna in Sicily a χάσμα __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__: D.S. 5, 3, 3; Cic., Verr. iv, 107; 187 at Syracuse at the spring Kyane, D.S. 5, 4, 2; at Kyzikos, Prop. 3 (4), 22, 4.

24 The Σεμναί live there in a χάσμα χθονός, Eur., El. 1266 f., on the eastern slope of the hill.

24 The Serious live there in a underworld chasm, Eur., El. 1266 f., on the eastern slope of the hill.

25 Paus. 2, 35, 10. The precinct of the temple was an Asylon, Phot. Ἑρμίονη; AB. 256, 15; Znb. ii, 25 (Ar. Βαβυλ.).—Kerberos is brought up from below at Hermione: Eur., HF. 615. An Acheron, and even an Ἀχερουσιὰς λίμνη, was to be found in Thesprotia, Triphylia, Herakleia on the Pontus, Cumae, and Cosentia in Bruttium—all sites of ancient cults of Hades and reputed as in close proximity to the underworld.

25 Paus. 2, 35, 10. The area around the temple was a sanctuary, Phot. Hermione; AB. 256, 15; Znb. ii, 25 (Ar. Βαβυλώνα.).—Cerberus is brought up from below at Hermione: Eur., HF. 615. An Acheron, and even an Lake Acheron, could be found in Thesprotia, Triphylia, Herakleia on the Pontus, Cumae, and Cosentia in Bruttium—all places of ancient worship of Hades and believed to be close to the underworld.

26 Strabo viii, 373—the same is reported by Call. fr. 110 of the inhabitants of Αἰγιαλός (prob. = Sikyon, where there was a cult of Demeter, Paus. 2, 11, 2–3; cf. 2, 5, 8. Hesych. ἐπωπίς· Δημήτηρ παρὰ Σικυωνίοις), where, at any rate, there was a καταβάσιον ᾅδου.—The name “Hermione” seems almost to have acquired a generic sense. In the Orphic Argonautica a city Hermioneia is said to be situated in the fabulous north-west of Europe in the neighbourhood of the gold-bearing river Acheron, where (as always on the margin of the οἰκουμένη) there dwell γένη δικαιοτάτων ἀνθρώπων, οἷσιν ἀποφθιμένοις ἄνεσις ναύλοιο τέτυκται, etc. (1135-47). Thus Hermione in this case lies immediately in the country of souls and blessedness, which the ancient inhabitants of the Peloponnesian city rather supposed to be in the neighbourhood of their own country.—Hesych. strangely: Ἑρμιόνη· καὶ ἡ Δημήτηρ καὶ ἡ κόρη ἐν Συρακούσαις. Was there a place called Hermione there too? See Lob., Paralip. 299.

26 Strabo viii, 373—Callimachus reports the same. fr. 110 of the residents of Seashore (probably = Sikyon, where there was a worship of Demeter, Paus. 2, 11, 2–3; cf. 2, 5, 8. Hesych. ἐπωπίς· Demeter among the Sicyonians), where, in any case, there was a descent to Hades.—The name “Hermione” seems to have almost taken on a general meaning. In the Orphic Argonautica, there is mention of a city called Hermioneia located in the mythical northwest of Europe near the gold-bearing river Acheron, where (as is always on the edge of the oikoumene) there live A community of the most just people, who have found relief in the afterlife from the burdens of life., etc. (1135-47). Hence, Hermione in this case is directly in the land of souls and paradise, which the ancient residents of the Peloponnesian city believed to be near their own territory.—Hesych. strangely notes: Hermione· both Demeter and the daughter in Syracuse. Was there also a place named Hermione there? See Lob., Paralip. 299.

II

27 If a father makes money by his son’s unchastity, the son is released from the duty of providing food or shelter for his father while the latter is alive—ἀποθανόντα δ’ αὐτὸν θαπτέτω καὶ τἆλλα ποιείτω τὰ νομιζόμενα: Solonian law ap. Aeschin., Tim. 13.

27 If a father profits from his son’s immoral behavior, the son is no longer obligated to provide food or shelter for his father while he is alive—When he dies, let him be buried and do all the customary things.: Solonian law ap. Aeschin., Tim. 13.

28 Dem. 43, 57–8.

28 Dem. 43, 57–8.

29 Sch. Soph., Ant. 255. Philo ap. Euseb., PE. viii, 358 D; 359 A. See Bernays, Berichte Ber. Ak. 1876, p. 604, 606 f.

29 Sch. Soph., Ant. 255. Philo quoted by Eusebius, PE. viii, 358 D; 359 A. See Bernays, Berichte Ber. Ak. 1876, p. 604, 606 f.

30 Ψ 71 ff.

30 Ψ 71 ff.

31 Isoc. 14, 55.

31 Isoc. 14, 55.

32 The βάραθρον at Athens, the Καιάδας at Sparta. But the bodies were often given up to the relatives to bury, and in any case the refusal of burial can only have been temporary—it is incredible that they could have wished to leave the bodies to putrify in the open air.

32 The βάραθρον in Athens, the Καιάδας in Sparta. However, the bodies were often returned to the relatives for burial, and in any case, the refusal of burial could only have been temporary—it's hard to believe they would have wanted to leave the bodies to rot in the open air.

33 Athenian law, Xen., HG. 1, 7, 22; common Greek institution at least as against temple-robbers, D.S. 16, 25. Examples of the enforcement of this law in the fifth and fourth centuries discussed by W. Vischer, Rh. Mus. 20, 446 ff.—Suicides in some places were refused burial honours (in Thebes and Cyprus); even in Athens it was customary to cut off the hand of the suicide and bury it separately (Aeschin., Ctes. 244). This is the punishment of αὐτόχειρες. Self-starvation was considered less shocking and that is perhaps why it occurs so frequently as a method of suicide. Cf. Thalheim, Gr. Rechtsalt. p. 44 f. Perhaps also the religious objection of the Pythagoreans (and Platonists) to taking this means of escape from an existence that has become unbearable rests upon popular feeling and belief—it was not shared at all by the enlightened of later ages. (There is, however, nothing in ancient beliefs that points to the idea that the body of the suicide should be allowed only burial, not burning. Acc. 188 to the Ἰλιὰς μικρά Aias after taking his own life was buried, not burnt, διὰ τὴν ὀργὴν τοῦ βασιλέωςfr. 3: [Apollod.] Epit. v, 7. There is no ground for supposing that the fable of Philostr., H. 721, p. 188 K., acc. to which Kalchas declared the burning of the bodies of suicides to be not ὅσιον, is taken out of an ancient poem; as Welcker does Kl. Schr. ii, 291.)

33 Athenian law, Xen., HG. 1, 7, 22; common Greek institution at least as it pertains to temple robbers, D.S. 16, 25. Examples of how this law was enforced in the fifth and fourth centuries are discussed by W. Vischer, Rh. Mus. 20, 446 ff.—In some places, suicides were denied burial honors (in Thebes and Cyprus); even in Athens, it was customary to cut off the hand of the suicide and bury it separately (Aeschin., Ctes. 244). This is the punishment for suicide. Self-starvation was seen as less shocking, which may explain its frequent use as a method of suicide. Cf. Thalheim, Gr. Rechtsalt. p. 44 f. The religious objection of the Pythagoreans (and Platonists) against taking this route to escape an unbearable existence may have been based on popular sentiment and belief—it was not shared by the enlightened thinkers of later ages. (However, there is nothing in ancient beliefs suggesting that the bodies of suicides should only be buried, not burned. According to 188 the Iliad for kids, Aias was buried, not burned, for the king's angerfr. 3: [Apollod.] Epit. v, 7. There is no evidence to support the idea that the tale from Philostr., H. 721, p. 188 K., in which Kalchas stated that burning the bodies of suicides is not ὅσιον, comes from an ancient poem, as suggested by Welcker in Kl. Schr. ii, 291.)

34 Cf. the words of Teles περὶ φυγῆς ap. Stob., Fl. 40, 8 (iii, p. 738, 17 ff. Hens.), and the answer of Krates Cyn. to Demetrius of Phaleron ap. Plu., Adul. 28, p. 69 CD. It is worth remarking that in the fourth and even third centuries it was still necessary to reply to the idea ὅμως δὲ τὸ ἐπὶ ξένης ταφῆναι ὄνειδος. When later on the cosmopolitanism preached by the Cynics (and after their model by Teles) becomes really common property it seems no longer necessary to introduce special grounds of consolation for having to be buried in foreign soil into pamphlets περὶ φυγῆς. At least this is not done by the Stoic Musonius or the Platonizing Plutarch. Cf. also Philodem. Mort., p. 33–4 Mekl.

34 See the words of Teles about escape in Stob., Fl. 40, 8 (iii, p. 738, 17 ff. Hens.), and the response of Krates Cyn. to Demetrius of Phaleron in Plu., Adul. 28, p. 69 CD. It's notable that in the fourth and even third centuries, it was still necessary to address the notion However, to be buried in a foreign land is a disgrace.. Later, when the cosmopolitanism promoted by the Cynics (and later imitated by Teles) becomes widely accepted, it seems unnecessary to provide special reasons for consolation about being buried in foreign land in pamphlets about escape. At least, this is not the case with the Stoic Musonius or the Platonist Plutarch. See also Philodem. Mort., p. 33–4 Mekl.

35 This is the reason why so often the bones or ashes of those who die abroad are collected and brought home for burial by their relations. Exx. ap. Westermann on Dem., Eubul. 70; cf. also Plu., Phoc. 37.

35 This is why the bones or ashes of people who die abroad are frequently gathered and brought back home for burial by their family members. Exx. ap. Westermann on Dem., Eubul. 70; cf. also Plu., Phoc. 37.

36 Ar., Ec. 1030. Origanon (wild marjoram, white thyme) possesses apotropaic power: it keeps away evil spirits. The ancients knew of the virtue possessed by these plants of scaring snakes, ants, and other vermin—Aristot., HA. 4, 8, 534b, 22; Plin. 10, 195; Thphr., CP. 6, 5, 4; Diosc., MM. iii, 29 = i, p. 375 Spr.; Gp. 12, 19, 9: cf. Niclas ad Gp. 13, 10, 5. Modern superstition employs them against goblins and water sprites, witches and ghosts, Grimm, p. 1214; p. 1820, n. 980. If marjoram and gentian are laid by women in child-bed ghosts and devils can do them no harm “for they shun such herbs”: J. Ch. Männlingen ap. Alwin Schultz, Alltagsleben e. d. Frau im 18 Jahrh., p. 195 f. The two purposes are closely connected. The pungent odour of herbs and burning stuff keeps away snakes as do nocentes spiritus monstra noxia: Pall. 1, 35 = 11, 3, p. 49 Sohn. The same thing applies to monstra noxia if they try to approach the corpse in the shape of snakes or insects (just as the ghost in Apul., M. ii, 25, approaches the corpse in the shape of a weasel; where we also read that the versipelles which threaten the corpse et aves et rursum canes et mures immo vero etiam muscas induunt: ii, 22). So, too, the marjoram has a kathartic effect on the corpse, i.e. it is a means of keeping off underworld spirits.

36 Ar., Ec. 1030. Origanum (wild marjoram, white thyme) has protective powers: it wards off evil spirits. The ancients recognized the ability of these plants to scare away snakes, ants, and other pests—Aristot., HA. 4, 8, 534b, 22; Plin. 10, 195; Thphr., CP. 6, 5, 4; Diosc., MM. iii, 29 = i, p. 375 Spr.; Gp. 12, 19, 9: cf. Niclas ad Gp. 13, 10, 5. Modern superstitions use them against goblins, water spirits, witches, and ghosts, Grimm, p. 1214; p. 1820, n. 980. If marjoram and gentian are placed by women in childbirth, ghosts and devils cannot harm them “for they avoid such herbs”: J. Ch. Männlingen ap. Alwin Schultz, Alltagsleben e. d. Frau im 18 Jahrh., p. 195 f. These two uses are closely linked. The strong smell of herbs and burning substances keeps away snakes just as harmful spirits dangerous monsters: Pall. 1, 35 = 11, 3, p. 49 Sohn. The same holds for monstrous harm if they try to approach a corpse in the form of snakes or insects (similar to the ghost in Apul., M. ii, 25, that approaches the corpse in the shape of a weasel; where it's also noted that the versatile that threaten the corpse Both birds and dogs, as well as mice, and indeed even flies, take on new forms.: ii, 22). Similarly, marjoram has a purifying effect on the corpse, acting as a means to repel underworld spirits.

37 Ar., Ec. 1031. The corpse lay on vine branches in several of the recently discovered Dipylon graves at Athens: Athen. Mitt. 1893, pp 165, 184. Superstitious reasons (as in the cases where olive leaves are used as a bed: see below) are to be suspected in this case, too, but can hardly be proved: cf. Fredrich, Sarkophagstud., Nach. Gött. Ges. Wiss. Ph. Cl. 1895, pp. 18, 69; Anrich, Gr. Mysterienw. 102, 3. Apart from this the ἄμπελος does not seem to have lustral effect.

37 Ar., Ec. 1031. The body was found on vine branches in several of the recently discovered Dipylon graves in Athens: Athen. Mitt. 1893, pp 165, 184. Superstitious reasons (like the cases where olive leaves are used as bedding: see below) are likely at play here too, but it's hard to prove: cf. Fred, Sarkophagstud., Nach. Gött. Ges. Wiss. Ph. Cl. 1895, pp. 18, 69; Anrich, Gr. Mysterienw. 102, 3. Besides this, the vine doesn't seem to have a purifying effect.

38 λήκυθοι, τοὔστρακον: Ar., Ec. 1032 f.; χέρνιψ ἐπὶ φθιτῶν πύλαις: Eur., Al. 98 ff. The bowl was called ἀρδάνιον: Sch. Ar., Ec. 1033; Poll. viii, 65 (cf. Phot. 346, 1 ὀρδάνιον). It contained water fetched from another house: Hesych, ὄστρακον—obviously because the water in the house where the corpse lay was regarded as polluted. (Thus when the fire, for example, is “polluted”, fresh fire is brought in from outside: Plu., Q. Gr. 24, p. 297 A; Arist. 20.) Those who left the house purified themselves with it: Hesych. ἀρδάνια, cf. 189 πηγαῖον, πηγαῖον ὕδωρ. A laurel branch (as holy-water sprinkler, as commonly in lustrations) was placed in it: Sch. Eur., Al. 98.

38 lêkythos, the pottery shard: Ar., Ec. 1032 f.; chernips on decaying doorways: Eur., Al. 98 ff. The bowl was called ardanion: Sch. Ar., Ec. 1033; Poll. viii, 65 (cf. Phot. 346, 1 Jordanian). It held water brought in from another house: Hesych, ostrakon—clearly because the water in the house where the body lay was seen as contaminated. (So when the fire, for instance, is “impure,” fresh fire is brought in from outside: Plu., Q. Gr. 24, p. 297 A; Arist. 20.) Those who left the house purified themselves with it: Hesych. ardania, cf. 189 pegaion, pegaion water. A laurel branch (used as a holy-water sprinkler, commonly in purifications) was placed in it: Sch. Eur., Al. 98.

39 Serv., A. iii, 680: apud Atticos funestae domus huius (cupressi) frondo velantur. The object may have been to warn the superstitious against approaching the “unclean” house: it is a characteristic of the δεισιδαίμων, οὔτε ἐπιβῆναι μνήματι, οὔτε ἐπὶ νεκρὸν οὔτ’ ἐπὶ λεχὼ ἐλθεῖν ἐθελῆσαι, Thphr., Ch. 16. This at least was the reason given at Rome for a similar custom: Serv., A. 3, 64; 4, 507.

39 Serv., A. iii, 680: Among the Athenians, this cursed cypress house is concealed by its leaves.. The purpose might have been to warn the superstitious against going near the “unclean” house: it reflects the belief of the The fearful one neither wants to step onto a grave nor to approach a corpse or to go near a bed., Thphr., Ch. 16. This was at least the explanation provided in Rome for a similar practice: Serv., A. 3, 64; 4, 507.

40 Crowning of the dead with garlands, afterwards a general custom, is first mentioned in the Ἀλκμαιωνίς (epical, but hard to date precisely: fr. ii, p. 76 Kink.). On the “Archemoros” vase a woman is about to place a myrtle-wreath on the head of Archemoros. The myrtle is sacred to the χθόνιοι, and hence the myrtle-crown belongs to the Mystai of Demeter as well as to the dead: see Apollod. ap. Sch. Ar., Ran. 330; Ister ap. Sch. Soph., OC. 681. Grave-monuments too were crowned and planted especially with myrtles; Eur., El. 324, 512; cf. Thphr., HP. 5, 8, 3; Vg., A. iii, 23. Not only the dead but graves too were frequently crowned with σέλινον, parsley: Plu., Timol. 26; Smp. 5, 3, 2, p. 676 D; Diogen. viii, 57, and others; cf. above, chap. iv, n. 21. The crowning invariably implies some form of consecration to a god. Acc. to Tertul., Cor. Mil. 10, the dead were crowned quoniam et ipsi idola statim fiunt habitu et cultu consecrationis; which at least gets nearer the real sense of the practice than the view of Sch. Ar., Lys. 601: στέφανος ἐδίδοτο τοῖς νεκροῖς ὡς τὸν βίον διηγωνισμένοις.

40 The practice of honoring the dead with garlands, which later became common, is first noted in the Alcmaeonid (epic in nature, but hard to date precisely: fr. ii, p. 76 Kink.). On the “Archemoros” vase, a woman is about to place a myrtle wreath on Archemoros's head. Myrtle is sacred to the chthonic, so the myrtle crown is significant for the Mystai of Demeter as well as for the dead: see Apollod. ap. Sch. Ar., Ran. 330; Ister ap. Sch. Soph., OC. 681. Grave monuments were also adorned and specifically planted with myrtles; Eur., El. 324, 512; cf. Thphr., HP. 5, 8, 3; Vg., A. iii, 23. Not only the dead but graves were often decorated with celery, parsley: Plu., Timol. 26; Smp. 5, 3, 2, p. 676 D; Diogen. viii, 57, and others; cf. above, chap. iv, n. 21. The act of crowning always signifies some form of dedication to a god. According to Tertul., Cor. Mil. 10, the dead were crowned because they themselves become idols immediately through the manner and ritual of consecration; which at least approaches a better understanding of the practice than the view of Sch. Ar., Lys. 601: Stefanos was given to the dead as a reward for those who had lived their lives in competition..

41 Pl., Lg. 959 A. Poll. iii, 65. A still stranger reason added ap. Phot. πρόθεσις.

41 Pl., Lg. 959 A. Poll. iii, 65. An even more unusual reason is added in Phot. intent.

42 Permission to attend either the πρόθεσις of the corpse (and the funeral lamentation) or the funeral procession (the ἐκφορά) given only to women of kinship μεχρὶ ἀνεψιότητος: Law ap. Dem. 43, 62–3: i.e. within the ἀγχιστεία, to which alone the duty of the cult of the dead belonged in principle. Only these women of the immediate kin are μιαινόμεναi in the case of death: cf. Hdt. vi, 58; this is the reason for the restrictions laid down by the funeral regulation from Keos (SIG. 877, 25 ff.), which makes an even narrower selection within the ranks of the ἀγχιστεία. (From l. 22 μὴ ὑποτιθέναι, etc., the law speaks of the πρόθεσις, even though at the beginning only the ἐκφορά is in question.)

42 Permission to attend either the prosthesis of the deceased (and the funeral lamentation) or the funeral procession (the ekphora) is granted only to women of close kinship mechri anepsiotetos: Law ap. Dem. 43, 62–3: that is, within the agchisteia, which had the primary responsibility for the care of the dead. Only these close female relatives are miainomenai in the event of death: cf. Hdt. vi, 58; this explains the restrictions imposed by the funeral regulation from Keos (SIG. 877, 25 ff.), which narrows the qualifications even further within the agchisteia. (From l. 22 mê hupotithenai, etc., the law refers to the prosthesis, although initially only the ekphora is addressed.)

43 ἀμυχὰς κοπτομένων ἀφεῖλεν. Plu., Sol. 21. The democratizing of life in Attica after Solon’s time may have contributed to the carrying out there of provisions restricting the elaborate funeral rites of the old aristocratic period. The practice of κόπτεσθαι ἐπὶ τεθνηκότι appears, however, to have remained in use: beating of the head at funeral lamentations is a favourite motif in Attic vase-paintings (the so-called “Prothesis” vases); cf. Monum. dell’ Instit. viii, 4, 5; iii, 60, etc. See Benndorf, Griech. Sicil. Vasenb. 1.

43 He removed the cuts.. Plu., Sol. 21. The democratization of life in Attica after Solon’s time may have played a role in enforcing restrictions on the elaborate funeral rites of the old aristocratic era. However, the practice of mourning for the deceased seems to have continued: the act of beating one's head during funeral laments is a popular theme in Attic vase paintings (the so-called “Prothesis” vases); cf. Monum. dell’ Instit. viii, 4, 5; iii, 60, etc. See Benndorf, Griech. Sicil. Vasenb. 1.

44 τὸ θρηνεῖν πεποιημένα, Plu., Sol. 21: by which is meant funeral hymns carefully prepared beforehand and perhaps ordered from professional θρήνων σοφισταί, not spontaneous expressions of grief breaking out as though involuntarily.

44 the created lament, Plu., Sol. 21: this refers to funeral hymns that were carefully composed in advance and possibly commissioned from professional sophists of lament, rather than spontaneous outbursts of grief that happen involuntarily.

45 Plu., Sol. 21: καὶ τὸ κωκύειν ἄλλον ἐν ταφαῖς ἑτέρων ἀφεῖλεν. This must surely mean: Solon forbade dirges to be sung at a funeral of one person in honour of another, different from the person actually being buried. (ἑτέρων is only used for variety after ἄλλον and simply = ἄλλων: as frequently by Attic writers: μὴ προϊέμενον ἄλλον ἑτέρῳ τὴν ἀλλαγὴν, Pl., Lg. viii, 849 E: ἕτερον—ἄλλον Isoc. 10, 36, etc.). 190 The tendency to extend the funeral hymns to include others besides the dead man is implied by a prohibition in a funeral ordinance of the πατρία of the Λαβυάδαι at Delphi (fifth–fourth century B.C.), BCH. ’95, p. 11, l. 39 ff. τῶν δὲ πρόστα τεθνακότων ἐν τοῖς σαμάτεσσι μὴ θρηνεῖν μηδ’ ὀτοτύζεν (at the funeral of another person). Was Homer thinking of something of the kind in Τ 302: Πάτροκλον πρόφασιν—?

45 Plu., Sol. 21: and mourning for someone else at other people's funerals has been prohibited. This must mean that Solon prohibited dirges from being sung at the funeral of one person in honor of someone else, who is not the person being buried. (ἑτέρων is used for variety after another and simply means ἄλλων: as often seen in Attic writers: don't provide another instead of the change, Pl., Lg. viii, 849 E: another—another Isoc. 10, 36, etc.). 190 The tendency to extend funeral hymns to include other people besides the deceased is suggested by a prohibition in a funeral ordinance from the homeland of the Λαβυδινά at Delphi (fifth–fourth century BCE), BCH. ’95, p. 11, l. 39 ff. Do not grieve for those who have passed during the gatherings. (at the funeral of another person). Was Homer thinking of something like this in Τ 302: they mention Patroclus—?

46 In Athens it had once been the custom ἱερεῖα προσφάττειν πρὸ τῆς ἐκφορᾶς, i.e. while still in the house of the dead person: [Pl.] Min. 315 C. Such a sacrifice before the ἐκφορά (which is not described till l. 1261 ff.) is implied by Euripides, Hel. 1255, at the burial of the dead body found in the sea: προσφάζεται μὲν αἷμα πρῶτα νερτέροις—where προσφάγιον is used inaccurately of sacrifice at the grave, in which case the πρό is meaningless; as also in the insc. from Keos (SIG. 877, 21). πρόσφαγμα is also thus used, Eur., Hec. 41. Plu. (Sol. 21) says of Solon: ἐναγίζειν δὲ βοῦν οὐκ εἴασεν. Possibly Solon forbade the sacrifice of animals before the ἐκφορά, since the author of the Ps.-Platonic Minos seems also to refer to such a prohibition.

46 In Athens, it used to be customary Offer to the priest before the funeral, meaning while still at the house of the deceased: [Pl.] Min. 315 C. Such a sacrifice before the funeral procession (which is not described until l. 1261 ff.) is suggested by Euripides, Hel. 1255, during the burial of the body found in the sea: προσφάζεται μὲν αἷμα πρῶτα νερτέροις—where appetizer is incorrectly used for sacrifice at the grave, making the πρό meaningless; as is also seen in the inscription from Keos (SIG. 877, 21). πρόσφαγμα is similarly used, Eur., Hec. 41. Plu. (Sol. 21) mentions Solon: He did not allow the bull to be sacrificed.. Possibly Solon banned the sacrifice of animals before the ἐκφορά, as the author of the Ps.-Platonic Minos seems to also reference such a prohibition.

47 The Solonian restrictions says Plu. (Sol. 21) have been for the most part adopted in our (i.e. the Boeotian) νόμοι—as acc. to the indubitable witness of Cicero, Solon’s funeral regulations had been reproduced eisdem prope verbis in the tenth of the Twelve Tables by the Decemviri. Limits set to ceremonial mourning in Sparta: Plu., Lyc. 27 (whence Inst. Lac., 18, p. 238 D), in Syracuse by Gelon: D.S. 11, 38, 2; cf. “Charondas”, Stob., Fl. 44, 40 M. = iv, 2, 24, p. 153, 10 H. Some degree of restriction was imposed on their members (about the beginning of the fourth century B.C.) by the πατρία of the Λαβυάδαι in Delphi in the τεθμός published in the BCH. ’95, p. 9 ff.

47 The Solonian restrictions say Plutarch. (Sol. 21) have mostly been adopted in our (the Boeotian) laws—as per the undeniable account of Cicero, Solon’s funeral regulations had been reproduced eisdem nearly the same words in the tenth of the Twelve Tables by the Decemviri. Limits were set on ceremonial mourning in Sparta: Plutarch, Lyc. 27 (from which Inst. Lac., 18, p. 238 D), and in Syracuse by Gelon: D.S. 11, 38, 2; cf. “Charondas”, Stob., Fl. 44, 40 M. = iv, 2, 24, p. 153, 10 H. Some degree of restriction was placed on their members (around the beginning of the fourth century BCE) by the homeland of the Λαβυάδαι in Delphi in the τεθμός published in the BCH. ’95, p. 9 ff.

48 We have a very naive expression of the ideas lying behind such violent lamentations, self-inflicted injuries, and other excessive demonstrations of grief in the presence of the dead body, when e.g. in Tahiti people wound themselves and then “call out to the soul of the dead man to witness their attachment to him” (Ratzel, Hist. of Mankind, i, 330); cf. Waitz-Gerland, Anthrop. vi, 402.

48 We have a very naive view of the ideas behind such extreme expressions of grief, self-inflicted harm, and other excessive displays of sorrow in the presence of a dead body, like when people in Tahiti hurt themselves and then “call out to the soul of the deceased to show their connection to him” (Ratzel, Hist. of Mankind, i, 330); cf. Waitz-Gerland, Anthrop. vi, 402.

49 It is a very ancient idea common to many different nations that too violent expressions of grief for the dead man may disturb his rest and make him return: see Mannhardt, Götter der deutschen Völker, 1860, p. 290 (for Germany in partic. see Wuttke, Deut. Volksabergl.2, § 728, p. 431; Rochholz, D. Glaube u. Brauch, i, 207). Similar superstition in Greece is referred to in Lucian, Luct. 24 (in which the lateness of the witness does not prevent the belief from being ancient). The survivors who prolong beyond reason their laments are asked: μέχρι τίνος ὀδυρόμεθα; ἔασον ἀναπαύσασθαι τοὺς τοῦ μακαρίου δαίμονας.—In Pl., Mx. 248 B, the dead say δεόμεθα πατέρων καὶ μητέρων εἰδέναι ὅτι οὐ θρηνοῦτες οὐδὲ ὀλοφυρόμενοι ἡμᾶς ἡμῖν μάλιστα χαριοῦνται—thus violent grief is intended in Greece, too, to please the dead: see last noteἀλλὰ . . . οὕτως ἀχάριστοι εἶεν ἂν μάλιστα: while acc. to “Charondas”, Stob., Fl. iv, 2, 24, p. 153 H.: ἀχαριστία ἐστὶ πρὸς δαίμονας χθονίους λύπη ὑπὲρ τὸ μέτρον γιγνομένη.

49 The idea that intense displays of grief for the deceased might disturb their rest and bring them back is very old and found in many cultures. See Mannhardt, Götter der deutschen Völker, 1860, p. 290 (for Germany in particular, see Wuttke, Deut. Volksabergl.2, § 728, p. 431; Rochholz, D. Glaube u. Brauch, i, 207). A similar superstition in Greece is mentioned by Lucian in Luct. 24 (where the late reference doesn't detract from the belief's ancient roots). Those who excessively prolong their mourning are asked: Until when shall we mourn? Allow the blessed spirits to rest.. In Plato's Mx. 248 B, the dead say We ask our fathers and mothers to know that they are especially pleased with us, not mourning or lamenting over us.—showing that in Greece, intense grief is also meant to honor the dead: see last noteBut... in this way they would be ungrateful most of all.: while according to “Charondas,” Stob., Fl. iv, 2, 24, p. 153 H.: Being ungrateful towards the chthonic spirits brings sorrow that exceeds the limits..

50 ἐκφέρειν τὸν ἀποθανόντα τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ ᾗ ἂν προθῶνται, πρὶν ἥλιον ἐξέχειν, Solonian law in D. 43, 62; cf. Antipho, Chor. 34. Klearch. ap. Proclus in Pl. Rp. ii, 114 Kroll: Kleonymos in Athens, τεθνάναι δόξας τρίτης ἡμέρας οὔσης κατὰ τὸν νόμον προὐτέθη, i.e. it was the morning of the third day, immediately before the ἐκφορά, the πρόθεσις having occupied the whole of the second day (quite differently taken by Maass, Orpheus, 1895, p. 232, 46; but hardly correctly. It is scarcely probable that a man τεθνάναι δόξας, i.e. seeming to those 191 around him to be dead, should be recognized by these same people and treated as merely in a trance—as in fact, was the case). So, too, in the analogous story of Thespesios of Soli in Plutarch, S. Num. Vind. 22, p. 563 D, τριταῖος, ἤδη περὶ τὰς ταφὰς αὐτάς, ἀνήνεγκε (Philostr., VA. 3, 38, p. 114, 28 K.: the wife of the man who has just died περὶ τὴν εὐνὴν ὕβρισε, τριταίου κειμένου [sc. τοῦ ἀνδρός] γαμηθεῖσα ἑτέρῳ: i.e. immediately before the ἐκφορά, while the dead man still was in the house). Similar customs are implied for the Greeks in Cyprus ap. Ant. Lib. 39, 5, p. 235, 21 West. [= p. 122, 7 f. Mart.]: ἡμέρᾳ δὲ τριτῃ τὸ σῶμα προήνεγκαν εἰς ἐμφανές (εἰς τοὐμφανές?) οἱ προσήκοντες. Further, acc. to Plato’s view as given in Lg. 959 A, there should be τριταία πρὸς τὸ μνῆμα ἐκφορά.

50 To conduct the burial of the deceased the following day before sunrise., Solonian law in D. 43, 62; cf. Antipho, Chor. 34. Klearch. ap. Proclus in Pl. Rp. ii, 114 Kroll: Kleonymos in Athens, was deemed dead on the morning of the third day according to the law, i.e. it was the morning of the third day, just before the funeral, with the prep taking up the entirety of the second day (which is interpreted quite differently by Maass, Orpheus, 1895, p. 232, 46; though that’s probably incorrect. It seems improbable that a man who looks dead, i.e. seems dead to those 191 around him, would then be recognized by those same people and treated as just being in a trance—as was indeed the case). Similarly, in the related story of Thespesios of Soli in Plutarch, S. Num. Vind. 22, p. 563 D, On the third day, regarding his burial, he was raised. (Philostr., VA. 3, 38, p. 114, 28 K.: his wife soiled the bed while he was still lying there [sc. being married to a man]while still grieving: i.e. just before the funeral, while the deceased was still in the house). Similar practices are suggested for the Greeks in Cyprus as noted by Ant. Lib. 39, 5, p. 235, 21 West. [= p. 122, 7 f. Mart.]: On the third day, they revealed the body. (out in the open?) the family members. Furthermore, according to Plato’s view as expressed in Lg. 959 A, there should be a burial on the third day at the grave.

51 Before sunrise: D. 43, 62 (more distinctly commanded by a law of Dem. Phal.: Cic., Lg. ii, 66). On the other hand, it was considered a disgrace to be buried during the night: ἦ κακὸς κακῶς ταφήσῃ, νυκτὸς οὐκ ἐν ἡμέρᾳ, Eur., Tro. 448.

51 Before sunrise: D. 43, 62 (more explicitly mandated by a law of Dem. Phal.: Cic., Lg. ii, 66). Conversely, it was seen as shameful to be buried at night: You will be badly buried, at night, not during the day., Eur., Tro. 448.

52 So in particular the funeral-law from Keos, SIG. 877; cf. Plu., Sol. 21; Bergk, Rh. Mus. 15, 468. Funeral-law of the Labyadai at Delphi, l. 29 f.: στρῶμα δὲ ἓν ὑποβαλέτω καὶ ποικεφάλαιον ἓν ποτιθέτω (for the dead).

52 Specifically, the funeral customs from Keos, SIG. 877; see also Plu., Sol. 21; Bergk, Rh. Mus. 15, 468. The funeral customs of the Labyadai at Delphi, l. 29 f.: Let him lay down one covering and add one colorful headpiece. (for the deceased).

53 Reproduced Monum. dell’ Instituto, ix, 391 [and in Rayet-Collignon, Céramique grecque, Pl. i].

53 Reproduced Monum. dell’ Instituto, ix, 391 [and in Rayet-Collignon, Céramique grecque, Pl. i].

54 The law in D. 43, 62 (cf. 64), makes restrictions in the attendance at a funeral which are to apply to women only (and only then for those under 60): men seem therefore to be granted permission indiscriminately. We are told too in Plu., Sol. 21, that at the ἐκκομιδή Solon had not forbidden ἐπ’ ἀλλότρια μνήματα βαδίζειν—for men that is, we must suppose. The men went in front in procession; the women followed: D. 43, 62. Evidently the same applied in Keos: SIG. 877, 20.—Pittakos as aesymnetes in Mitylene forbade absolutely accedere quemquam in funus aliorum, Cic., Lg. ii, 65.—Funeral-law of the Labyadai (Delphi), l. 42 ff.: from the burial ἀπῖμεν ϝοἴκαδε ἕκαστον, ἔχθω ὁμεστίων καὶ πατραδελφεῶν καὶ πενθερῶν κἠκγόνων καὶ γαμβρῶν, i.e. the next-of-kin of the dead in ascending and descending order.

54 The law in D. 43, 62 (see also 64) has restrictions on attendance at a funeral that apply only to women (and only for those under 60): men appear to be allowed to attend without restrictions. We also learn from Plu., Sol. 21, that at the transportation, Solon did not prohibit walk on someone else's grave—for men, we must assume. The men led the procession, and the women followed: D. 43, 62. Clearly, the same applied in Keos: SIG. 877, 20.—Pittakos as aesymnetes in Mitylene completely forbade visit someone at another's funeral, Cic., Lg. ii, 65.—Funeral law of the Labyadai (Delphi), l. 42 ff.: from the burial Let's each return home, bringing along our kinsmen, brothers, in-laws, children, and sons-in-law., meaning the next-of-kin of the deceased in ascending and descending order.

55 This is referred to as still-existing custom by Plato, Lg. 800 E; cf. Sch. ad loc.; Hesych. Καρῖναι. Menand. Καρίνη, Mein., Com. iv, p. 144 (Karo-phrygian funeral-flutes: Ath. 174 F: Poll. iv, 75–9).

55 This is known as an enduring custom by Plato, Lg. 800 E; see Sch. ad loc.; Hesych. Karinai. Menand. Kariní, Mein., Com. iv, p. 144 (Karo-Phrygian funeral flutes: Ath. 174 F: Poll. iv, 75–9).

56 τὸν θανόντα δὲ φέρεν κατακεκαλυμμένον σιωπῇ μέχρι ἐπὶ τὸ σῆμα, SIG. 877, 11. Funeral-law of Labyad., l. 40 ff. τὸν δὲ νεκρὸν κεκαλυμμένον φερέτω σιγᾷ, κὴν ταῖς στροφαῖς (“at the street-corners”) μὴ καττιθέντων μηδαμεῖ, μηδ’ ὀτοτυζόντων ἔχθος τᾶς ϝοικίας πρίγ κ’ ἐπὶ τὸ σᾶμα ἵκωντι· τηνεῖ δ’ ἔναγος ἔστω κτλ. (the last not yet satisfactorily explained).

56 The deceased is carried in silence to the grave., SIG. 877, 11. Funeral law of Labyad., l. 40 ff. The body, wrapped up, should be carried silently at the crossroads. without being disrespected or disturbed in any way, as they make their journey from home to the grave; let there be a solemn chant, etc. (the last not yet satisfactorily explained).

57 Solon diminished (under the alleged influence of Epimenides) at funerals τὸ σκληρὸν καὶ τὸ βαρβαρικὸν ᾧ συνείχοντο πρότερον αἱ πλεῖσται γυναῖκες, Plu., Sol. 12.

57 Solon became less strict (allegedly influenced by Epimenides) at funerals the harsh and the barbaric which most women were previously subjected to, Plu., Sol. 12.

58 In the list of quotations from individual authors from the fifth century on, given in Becker Char.2 iii, 98 ff. [= E.T.3 pp. 390–1], only the foll. speak for burial as the prevailing custom: Plu., Sol. 21. οὐκ εἴασεν (Solon) συντιθέναι πλέον ἱματίων τριῶν, and Plu., Lyc. 27, συνθάπτειν οὔδεν εἰασεν (Lycurg.) ἀλλὰ ἐν φοινικίδι καὶ φύλλοις ἐλαίας θέντες τὸ σῶμα περιέστελλον: cf. Th. i, 134, 4. Cremation, on the other hand, is implied as the more common in Athens (fourth century) by Is. 4, 19: οὔτ’ ἔκαυσεν οὐτ’ ὠστολόγησεν; so, too, the will (third century) of the Peripatetic Lykon (D.L. v, 70): περὶ δὲ τῆς ἐκφορᾶς καὶ 192 καύσεως ἐπιμεληθήτωσαν κτλ. Cf. Also Teles ap. Stob. 40, 8, i, p. 747, 5 H.; τί διαφέρει ὑπὸ πυρὸς κατακαυθῆναι—which is here regarded as Greek funeral usage.—In the graves recently discovered before the Dipylon gate in Athens those belonging to the earliest period almost without exertion have their dead buried (without coffin); the following period (into the sixth century) generally burnt their dead; later, burial seems to have been more usual—see the account by Brückner and Pernice of the excavations before the Dipylon gate, Ath. Mitt. 1893, pp. 73–191. Thus it appears that in the later period burial was the prevailing practice in Attica (L. Ross, Archaeol. Aufs. i, 23), as also, being essentially cheaper than cremation, in other parts of Greece as well (a few references given in BCH. ’95, p. 144, 2).

58 In the list of quotes from individual authors from the fifth century onward, provided in Becker Character.2 iii, 98 ff. [= E.T.3 pp. 390–1], only the following support burial as the common practice: Plutarch, Sol. 21. did not allow (Solon) συντιθέναι now three garments, and Plutarch, Lyc. 27, συνθάπτειν left nothing untouched (Lycurgus) But in a Phoenician cloth and olive leaves, they wrapped the body.: cf. Th. i, 134, 4. Cremation, on the other hand, is suggested as the more common practice in Athens (fourth century) by Is. 4, 19: didn't burn or didn't hit; likewise, the will (third century) of the Peripatetic Lykon (D.L. v, 70): περὶ δὲ τῆς ἐκφορᾶς καὶ 192 καύσεως ἐπιμεληθήτωσαν κτλ. Cf. also Teles ap. Stob. 40, 8, i, p. 747, 5 H.; τί διαφέρει ὑπὸ πυρὸς κατακαυθῆναι—which is considered Greek funeral practice here. In the graves recently uncovered before the Dipylon gate in Athens, those from the earliest period clearly show that people were buried (without a coffin) with little effort; the next period (up to the sixth century) generally cremated their dead; later, burial seems to have become more common—refer to the account by Brückner and Pernice of the excavations before the Dipylon gate, Ath. Mitt. 1893, pp. 73–191. Thus, it seems that in the later period, burial was the main practice in Attica (L. Ross, Archaeol. Aufs. i, 23), and, being generally cheaper than cremation, was also common in other parts of Greece (a few references provided in BCH. ’95, p. 144, 2).

59 ὠστολόγησεν, Is. 4, 19.

59 ὠστολόγησεν, Is. 4, 19.

60 The custom of ἐκφορά on an open κλίνη is not in harmony with the intention of laying the body of the dead in a coffin, but evidently presupposes that the body is to be placed either unenveloped in the ground or else to be burnt. The practice of coffin-burial (probably introduced from the East) later became common, but was never completely harmonized with the ancient ceremonies of the ἐκφορά.

60 The tradition of Funeral procession on an open bed doesn't align with the practice of placing the dead in a coffin; instead, it clearly implies that the body is meant to be either buried directly in the ground or cremated. The custom of coffin burial (likely introduced from the East) eventually became widespread, but it was never fully integrated with the ancient rituals of the ἐκφορά.

61 Coffinless burial was usual in the graves of the “Mycenaean” period, and also in the oldest times in Attica. The Spartans were merely keeping up this ancient custom when they ἐν φοινικίδι καὶ φύλλοις ἐλαίας θέντες τὸ σῶμα περιέστελλον (buried), Plu., Lyc. 27. Here everything points to the retention of primitive usage. The bodies were buried in the ancient fashion, not burnt; they were wrapped in a crimson robe. Crimson is otherwise the special colour for war and festival dress (cf. Müller, Dorians, ii, 264); here it is used in connexion with chthonic cult: ἔχει γάρ τινα τὸ πορφυροῦν χρῶμα συμπάθειαν πρὸς τὸν θάνατον says rightly Artemid. 1, 77, p. 70, 11 H. This can hardly be because of the red colour of blood; any more than that is why θάνατος is called πορφύρεος. But even Homer Ω 796 makes Hektor’s bones wrapped πυρφυρέοις πέπλοισι—the bones only in this case instead of the whole body: clearly a vestige of an older custom which survived unchanged in Sparta. Similarly Ψ 254. So, too, e.g. in the Dipylon graves at Athens burnt bones were found wrapped in a cloth, Ath. Mitt. 18, 160–1, 185. The head of the murdered brother φοινικίδι ἐκαλυψάτην καὶ ἐθαψάτην the two other Kabeiroi in the religious myth related by Clem. Al., Protr. ii, p. 16 P. Crimson frequently occurs as a colour used in chthonic cult: e.g. at the ceremonial ἄραι implying consecration to the infernal deities in [Lys.] 6, 51; at sacrifices to the Plataean Heroes: Plu., Arist. 21; at the transfer of the bones of Rhesos: see above, chap. iv, n. 36; Polyaen. vi, 53; at sacrifices to the Eumenides, Aesch., Eum. 1028.—The custom of burial upon leaves was also retained by the Pythagoreans: they buried their dead (without burning them, Iamb., VP. 154) in myrti et oleae et populi nigrae foliis (in fact, the trees regularly sacred to the χθόνιοι), Plin. 35, 160. Fauvel (ap. Ross, Arch. Aufs. i, 31) found in graves by the Melitean gate at Athens le squelette couché sur un lit épais de feuilles d’olivier encore en état de brûler. (Olive stones in Mycenaean Graves, Tsundas, Ἐφ. Ἀρχ., ’88, p. 136; ’89, p. 152.)

61 Coffinless burials were common in the graves from the “Mycenaean” period and also in the oldest times in Attica. The Spartans were simply continuing this ancient tradition when they In a bed of palm and olive leaves, they wrapped the body. (buried), Plu., Lyc. 27. Everything here indicates the preservation of primitive practices. The bodies were buried the old way, not cremated; they were wrapped in a crimson robe. Crimson is, in other contexts, the distinctive color for war and festive attire (cf. Müller, Dorians, ii, 264); here it is associated with funerary rites: The color purple has a certain connection to death. as Artemid rightly points out. 1, 77, p. 70, 11 H. This is probably not due to the red color of blood, nor is that the reason death is called crimson. Even Homer Ω 796 describes Hektor’s bones wrapped in purple cloaks—in this case, only the bones rather than the entire body: a clear remnant of an older tradition that remained unchanged in Sparta. Similarly Ψ 254. For example, in the Dipylon graves at Athens, burned bones were found wrapped in cloth, Ath. Mitt. 18, 160–1, 185. The head of the murdered brother φοινικίδι covered and buried her, along with the other two Kabeiroi in the religious myth related by Clem. Al., Protr. ii, p. 16 P. Crimson is often used as a color in funerary rites: for example, at the ceremonial άραι suggesting dedication to the underworld deities in [Lys.] 6, 51; at sacrifices to the Plataean Heroes: Plu., Arist. 21; at the transfer of Rhesos's bones: see above, chap. iv, n. 36; Polyaen. vi, 53; during sacrifices to the Eumenides, Aesch., Eum. 1028.—The practice of burying on leaves was also maintained by the Pythagoreans: they buried their dead (without cremating them, Iamb., VP. 154) in myrtle and olive and black poplar leaves (in fact, those trees were regularly sacred to the underworld beings), Plin. 35, 160. Fauvel (ap. Ross, Arch. Aufs. i, 31) discovered skeletons in graves by the Melitean gate at Athens the skeleton lying on a thick bed of olive leaves still able to burn. (Olive stones in Mycenaean Graves, Tsundas, Ἐφ. Ἀρχ., ’88, p. 136; ’89, p. 152.)

62 Thus in the letter of Hipparchos, in Phlegon, 1; similarly Xen. Eph. 3, 7, 4 (see my Griech. Roman, p. 391 n. 2). Plato wished his Euthynoi to be buried like this on stone κλῖναι (Lg. xii, 947 D); and this is probably how the bodies were placed in the rock burial-chambers provided with separate couches, such as occur at e.g. Rhodos and Kos 193 (see Ross, Arch. Aufs. ii, 384 ff., 392): cf. esp. the description given by Heusey, Mission arch. de Macédoine (Texte), p. 257 ff., ’76. It is the regular mode of burial in Etruria (following Greek models?): several skeletons have been found there lying on couches of masonry in the grave-chambers.

62 In the letter from Hipparchos, as noted by Phlegon, 1; similarly, in Xen. Eph. 3, 7, 4 (see my Griech. Roman, p. 391 n. 2). Plato wanted his Euthynoi to be buried like this on stone κλῖναι (Lg. xii, 947 D); and this is likely how the bodies were arranged in the rock burial chambers that had individual couches, which can be found in places like Rhodos and Kos 193 (see Ross, Arch. Aufs. ii, 384 ff., 392): particularly refer to the description provided by Heusey, Mission arch. de Macédoine (Texte), p. 257 ff., ’76. This was the typical burial practice in Etruria (following Greek traditions?): several skeletons have been discovered there lying on stone couches in the grave chambers.

63 As though the dead had not entirely departed καὶ ὅπλα καὶ σκεύη καὶ ἱμάτια συνήθη τοῖς τεθνηκόσιν συνθάπτοντες ἥδιον ἔχουσιν Plu., Ne Suav. Ep. 26, p. 1104 D. Restrictions in Law of the Labyad. (l. 19 ff.) ὅδ’ ὁ τεθμός περ τῶν ἐντοθηκῶν· μὴ πλέον πέντε καὶ τριάκοντα δραχμᾶν ἐνθέμεν, μήτε πριάμενον μήτε ϝοίκω.

63 As if the dead hadn't completely left, Weapons, belongings, and the usual clothing that are buried with the deceased bring more comfort. Plu., Ne Suav. Ep. 26, p. 1104 D. Restrictions in Law of the Labyad. (l. 19 ff.) This is the rule regarding the deposits: Do not place more than thirty-five drachmas, whether buying or selling..

64 Helbig, Hom. Epos. 41.

64 Helbig, Hom. Epos. 41.

65 βελτίονες καὶ κρείττονες. Arist., Eudem. 37 [44] ap. Plu., Cons. Apoll. 27, p. 115 BC.

65 better and stronger. Arist., Eudem. 37 [44] ap. Plu., Cons. Apoll. 27, p. 115 BC.

66 [Pl.] Min. 315 D. To raise doubts on this point is mere perversity. It is of no avail to advance the argument (which is commonly used also against the similar statements about Rome in Serv., A. v, 64; vi, 152) that this story only intends to explain the origin of the worship of the household Lares. The Greeks did not have this particular worship, or else it was so completely forgotten that no explanatory account of its origin was ever offered.—Beside the hearth and the altar of Hestia the most ancient resting place of the head of the house must have been placed too. When the wife of Phokion had had the body of her husband burnt abroad ἐνθεμένη τῷ κόλπῳ τὰ ὀστᾶ καὶ κομίσασα νύκτωρ εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν κατώρυξε παρὰ τὴν ἑστίαν, Plu., Phoc. 37.—It was wrongly believed that in the remarkable rock-graves in the neighbourhood of the Pnyx at Athens examples of such graves situated inside the house had been discovered. See Milchhöfer in Baumeister’s Denkm. 153b.

66 [Pl.] Min. 315 D. Questioning this point is just being contrary. It doesn’t help to argue (which is also commonly used against similar statements about Rome in Serv., A. v, 64; vi, 152) that this story is only meant to explain the origin of the worship of the household Lares. The Greeks didn’t have this specific form of worship, or if they did, it was so completely forgotten that no explanation of its origin was ever given.—Next to the hearth and the altar of Hestia, there must have also been the most ancient resting place of the head of the house. When Phokion’s wife had her husband’s body cremated abroad, Placing the bones in her bosom and secretly bringing them home at night, she buried them by the hearth., Plu., Phoc. 37.—It was mistakenly believed that in the remarkable rock-graves near the Pnyx in Athens, examples of such graves located inside the house had been found. See Milchhöfer in Baumeister’s Denkm. 153b.

67 This occurs among the New Zealanders, Eskimos, etc.; cf. Lubbock, Prehistoric Times, pp. 465, 511, etc.

67 This happens among the people of New Zealand, Eskimos, and others; see Lubbock, Prehistoric Times, pp. 465, 511, etc.

68 In Sparta and Tarentum: see Becker, Char.2 iii, 105 (E.T.3 p. 393). Acc. to Klearch. ap. Ath. 522 F certain men of Tarentum were struck by lightning and killed; they were then buried πρὸ τῶν θυρῶν of their houses and στῆλαι were put up in their honour. If they had really been the criminals that legend made them it would have been impossible, even in Tarentum, for them to have been buried within the walls of the city, still less before the doors of their houses—an honour given only to Heroes; cf. above, chap. iv, n. 136. The violent alteration of πρὸ τῶν θυρῶν into πρὸ τῶν πυλῶν in order to avoid this difficulty, is obviously rendered untenable by the previous ἑκάστη τῶν οἰκιῶν ὅσους κτλ. The legend is evidently a fiction and these διόβλητοι (to whom it appears, as Heroes, neither the funeral dirge nor the usual χοαί were offered) must have belonged to the class of those whom death by the flash of lightning raised to a higher and honoured rank (see Append. 1). Thus, too, the graves in the market at Megara mentioned by Becker must have been Hero-graves: see above, chap. iv, n. 83. These cases where the graves of Heroes are found in the middle of the city, in the market place, etc., show very plainly the essential difference that was held to exist between the Heroes and the ordinary dead.

68 In Sparta and Tarentum: see Becker, Char.2 iii, 105 (E.T.3 p. 393). According to Klearch. ap. Ath. 522 F, certain men of Tarentum were struck by lightning and killed; they were then buried at the doors of their houses, and στάσεις were set up in their honor. If they had truly been the criminals that legend made them out to be, it would have been impossible, even in Tarentum, for them to be buried within the city walls, let alone in front of their houses—an honor reserved only for Heroes; cf. above, chap. iv, n. 136. The drastic change of At the doors to in front of the gates to avoid this issue is clearly invalidated by the earlier mention of ἑκάστη τῶν οἰκιῶν ὅσους κτλ. The legend is clearly a fabrication, and these untrustworthy (to whom it appears, as Heroes, neither the funeral dirge nor the usual χοαί were offered) must have been part of the group whose death by lightning granted them a higher and honored status (see Append. 1). Similarly, the graves in the market at Megara mentioned by Becker must have been Hero-graves: see above, chap. iv, n. 83. These instances where Hero graves are found in the center of the city, in the marketplace, etc., clearly demonstrate the significant difference that was believed to exist between Heroes and ordinary deceased individuals.

69 The μνῆμα κοινὸν πᾶσι τοῖς ἀπὸ Βουσέλου γενομένοις was a πολὺς τόπος περιβεβλημένος, ὥσπερ οἱ ἀρχαῖοι ἐνόμιζον: D. 43, 79. The Bouselidai composed not a γένος, but a group of five οἶκοι bound together by definitely traceable ties of kinship. The members of a γένος in its political sense no longer held graves in common possession: see Meier, de gentil. Att. 33; Dittenb., Hermes, 20, 4. The Κιμώνεια 194 μνήματα were also family-graves: Plu., Cim. 4, Marcellin. V. Th. 17, Plu., X Or., p. 838 B. It was always insisted on, for obvious reasons, that no stranger to the family should be laid in the family grave. But just as the penal clauses so often inscribed on graves of a later period were necessary to prevent the burial of strangers in those graves, so too Solon had to make a law in respect of graves ne quis alienum inferat: Cic., Lg. ii, 64.

69 The A memorial common to all those from Bousselos. was a a large area marked off, just like the ancients believed: D. 43, 79. The Bouselidai were not a genus, but a group of five houses connected by clearly traceable family ties. The members of a gender in its political sense no longer shared burial sites: see Meier, de gentil. Att. 33; Dittenb., Hermes, 20, 4. The Kimonia 194 memories were also family graves: Plu., Cim. 4, Marcellin. V. Th. 17, Plu., X Or., p. 838 B. It was always emphasized, for obvious reasons, that no outsider to the family should be buried in the family grave. But just like the legal restrictions often inscribed on graves in later times were necessary to prevent the burial of outsiders in those graves, Solon also had to create a law regarding graves no one should bring harm: Cic., Lg. ii, 64.

70 The speaker in Dem. 55, 13 ff., mentions the παλαιὰ μνήματα of the πρόγονοι of the earlier possessors of his χωρίον (country-estate). This custom of burying the family dead in the private ground of the family καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις χωρίοις συμβέβηκε. Timarchos is asked by his mother τὸ Ἀλωπέκῃσι χωρίον (which lay 11 or 12 stades away from the city walls) ἐνταφῆναι ὑπολιπεῖν αὐτῇ (in spite of which he sold it): Aeschin., Tim. 99. Examples in East Attica of walled-in family cemeteries with room for many graves: Belger, Localsage von den Gräbern Agamem., etc. (Progr. Berl. 1893), pp. 40–2. It was thus the very general custom to keep the family graves on their own ground and soil; and this corresponds closely enough with the oldest custom of all, that of burying the master of the house in his own home.—In Plu., Arist. 1, Demetr. Phal. mentions an Ἀριστείδου χωρίον ἐν ᾧ τέθαπται in Phaleron.

70 The speaker in Dem. 55, 13 ff., refers to the ancient graves of the ancestors of the previous owners of his country estate. This practice of burying family members on their own property also applied to others. Timarchos's mother asks him about the property in Alopêke, which was located about 11 or 12 stades from the city walls, to bury her there, even though he ended up selling it: Aeschin., Tim. 99. There are examples in East Attica of family cemeteries enclosed by walls with space for many graves: Belger, Localsage von den Gräbern Agamem., etc. (Progr. Berl. 1893), pp. 40–2. Thus, it was a common custom to have family graves on their own land, which aligns quite closely with the oldest tradition of burying the head of the household at home. In Plu., Arist. 1, Demetr. Phal. mentions a burial site of Aristides in Phaleron.

71 Restriction of the growing magnificence of grave columns in Athens made by Demetr. Phal., Cic., Lg. ii, 66. (Penal clauses εἴ τίς κα θά[πτῃ ἢ ἐπί]σταμα ἐφιστᾷ κτλ. in a law from Nisyros [Berl. Phil. Woch. 1896, pp. 190, 420]: they probably do not refer to a general prohibition of tombstones altogether.)

71 The limits placed on the increasing grandeur of grave markers in Athens, made by Demetrius Phalereus, Cicero, Lg. ii, 66. (Penal clauses εἴ τίς κα θά[πτῃ ἢ ἐπί]σταμα ἐφιστᾷ κτλ. in a law from Nisyros [Berl. Phil. Woch. 1896, pp. 190, 420]: they likely do not indicate a complete ban on tombstones.

72 Cf. Curtius, Z. Ges. Wegebaus Gr., p. 262.

72 See Curtius, Z. Ges. Wegebaus Gr., p. 262.

73 Nemora aptabant sepulcris ut in amoenitate animae forent post vitam: Serv., A. v, 760. In lucis habitabant manes piorum: iii, 302; cf. ad i, 441; vi, 673. “My grave is in a grove, the pleasant haunt of birds,” says a dead man ὄφρα καὶ εἰν Ἄϊδι τερπνὸν ἔχοιμι τόπον, Epigr. Gr. 546, 5–14.

73 They were creating groves near the tombs so that the soul would find joy after life.: Serv., A. v, 760. The souls of the good lived in the light.: iii, 302; cf. ad i, 441; vi, 673. “My grave is in a grove, the pleasant haunt of birds,” says a dead man So that I may have a pleasant place even in Hades., Epigr. Gr. 546, 5–14.

74 Cf. the ins. from Keos, SIG. 877, 8–9. Eur. IT. 633 ff.: ξανθῷ τ’ ἐλαίῳ σῶμα σὸν κατασβέσω, καὶ . . . γάνος ξουθῆς μελίσσης ἐς πυρὰν βαλῶ.

74 See the inscription from Keos, SIG. 877, 8–9. Eur. IT. 633 ff.: I will douse your body with yellow olive oil, and . . . the glow of the pale honey will be thrown into the fire..

75 ἐναγίζειν δὲ βοῦν οὐκ εἴασεν, Plu., Sol. 21.

75 He didn't permit the sacrifice of the bull., Plu., Sol. 21.

76 προσφαγίῳ (at the funeral) χρῆσθαι κατὰ τὰ πάτρια, SIG. 877, 13. In general, however, the sacrifice of animals at the graves of private individuals gradually became rarer and rarer: see Stengel, Chthon. u. Todt. 430 f.

76 προσφαγίῳ (at the funeral) use according to tradition, SIG. 877, 13. In general, however, the practice of sacrificing animals at the graves of private individuals steadily became less common: see Stengel, Chthon. u. Todt. 430 f.

77 Cf. esp. the ins. from Keos, l. 15 ff., 30. The ἐγχυτρίστριαι employed in old Athenian usage, [Pl.] Min. 315 C, seem to have been women who caught the blood of the sacrificed animals in bowls and purified the μιαινόμενοι with it. The name itself suggests it; to this effect is one among several other, clearly mistaken, explanations given by the Schol. to Min., loc. cit. (differently Sch. Ar., Vesp. 289).

77 See especially the inscription from Keos, lines 15 and following, 30. The Ἐγχυτρίστριαι used in ancient Athenian practice, [Pl.] Min. 315 C, appear to have been women who collected the blood of the sacrificed animals in bowls and purified the contaminated with it. The name itself implies this; this is one among several other, clearly incorrect, explanations provided by the Schol. to Min., loc. cit. (differently Sch. Ar., Vesp. 289).

78 περὶ τὰ πένθη . . . ὁμοπαθείᾳ τοῦ κεκμηκότος κολοβοῦμεν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς τῇ τε κουρᾷ τῶν τριχῶν καὶ τῇ τῶν στεφάνων ἀφαιρέσει, Arist. fr. 108 (101) Rose.

78 Regarding the sorrows... we share in the grief of the one who has died by cutting our hair and removing our wreaths., Arist. fr. 108 (101) Rose.

79 περίδειπνον. This is implied as universally occurring by Aen. Tact. 10, 5. This meal shared by the relatives (who alone are invited: Dem. 43, 62) must be meant by Heraklid., Pol. 30, 2, παρὰ τοῖς Λόκροις ὀδύρεσθαι οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπὶ τοῖς τελευτήσασιν, ἀλλ’ ἐπειδὰν ἐκκομίσωσιν εὐωχοῦνται.

79 dinner party. This is suggested to be a common occurrence by Aen. Tact. 10, 5. This meal shared by family members (who are the only ones invited: Dem. 43, 62) must be what Heraklid. means, Pol. 30, 2, Among the Locrians, there is no lament for those who have passed away; instead, once they bury them, they celebrate with a feast..

80 ἡ ὑποδοχὴ γίγνεται ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀποθανόντος, Artemid. 5, 82, p. 271, 10 H.

80 The acceptance happens by the deceased., Artemid. 5, 82, p. 271, 10 H.

81 Cic., Lg. ii, 63 (cf. λέγειν ἐπιδέξια ἐπὶ τεθνηκότι, Anaxandr. ap. Ath. 464 A.). On the other 195 hand, mentiri nefas erat. And yet εἰώθεσαν οἱ παλαιοὶ ἐν τοῖς περιδείπνοις τὸν τελευτηκότα ἐπαινεῖν, καὶ εἰ φαῦλος ἦν, Zenob. v, 28, and other Paroemiogr.—Besides this the lamentation for the dead may have been renewed at the various commemorations of the dead; the funeral regulation of the Labyadai at Delphi forbids expressly (not the festival but) the funeral dirge on such occasions: l. 46 ff. μηδὲ τᾷ ὑστεραίᾳ (after the burial, on which day the περίδειπνον was held) μηδὲ ἐν ταῖς δεκάταις μηδ’ ἐν τοῖς ἐνιαυτοῖ[ς] (we should expect rather ἐν τ. ἐνιαυτίοις, cf. nn. 88–92 of this chap.) μήτ’ οἰμώζεν μήτ’ ὀτοτύζεν.

81 Cic., Lg. ii, 63 (cf. To speak skillfully about the deceased, Anaxandr. ap. Ath. 464 A.). On the other 195 hand, It was wrong to lie.. And yet The ancients used to praise the deceased at banquets, even if they were flawed., Zenob. v, 28, and other Paroemiogr.—Besides this, the mourning for the dead might have been renewed at the various commemorations of the dead; the funeral regulation of the Labyadai at Delphi explicitly forbids (not the festival but) the funeral dirge on such occasions: l. 46 ff. μηδὲ τᾷ ὑστεραίᾳ (after the burial, on which day the dinner party was held) Neither in the tenths nor in the annuals.[ς] (we should expect rather ἐν t. ἐνιαυτίοις, cf. nn. 88–92 of this chap.) μήτ’ οἰμώζεν μήτ’ ὀτοτύζεν.

82 These meals given to the dead took place at the grave itself. Ar., Lys. 612 f. ἥξει σοι . . .; Is. 8, 39, τὰ ἔνατα ἐπήνεγκα.

82 These meals offered to the dead occurred right at the grave. Ar., Lys. 612 f. It will come to you...; Is. 8, 39, I brought the ninth..

83 The τρίτα and ἔνατα, at any rate, were held on the third and ninth days after the funeral, and not after the day of death. It is true the references to these sacrifices in Ar., Lys. 612 ff., Is., etc., do not make this very clear. But if the τρίτα had taken place on the third day after death it would have coincided with the ἐκφορά itself, which is against all the evidence. Further, the Roman novemdiale, which was clearly modelled on Greek custom, also occurred on the ninth day after the burial, acc. to the unequivocal testimony of Porph. on Hor., Epod. xvii, 48 (nona die qua sepultus est). This is also deducible from Vg., A. v, 46 ff., and 105; cf. also Ap., M. ix, 31.

83 The Tuesday and ἔνατα, in any case, were held on the third and ninth days after the funeral, not after the day of death. It's true the mentions of these sacrifices in Ar., Lys. 612 ff., Is., etc., don't make this very clear. But if the Tuesday had taken place on the third day after death, it would have coincided with the Procession itself, which contradicts all the evidence. Furthermore, the Roman novemdiale, which was clearly influenced by Greek customs, also occurred on the ninth day after the burial, according to the clear testimony of Porph. on Hor., Epod. xvii, 48 (nona die qua sepultus est). This is also deducible from Vg., A. v, 46 ff., and 105; see also Ap., M. ix, 31.

84 That this was the object of the Novemdialia festival at Rome is shown clearly enough by the evidence; that the same was true of Greece is at least highly probable; cf. K. O. Müller, Aesch. Eum., p. 143 [120 E.T.]. Leist, Graecoitalische Rechts., p. 34.—Nine is evidently a round number, esp. in Homer; i.e. the division of periods of time into groups of nine was in antiquity a very common and familiar practice. Cf. now, Kaegi, Die Neunzahl bei den Ostariern, Phil. Abh. f. Schweitzer-Sidler, 50 ff. Mourning customs were really intended to ward off maleficent action on the part of the dead. They lasted as a rule as long as the return of the soul of the dead was to be feared (esp. so in India: see Oldenberg, Rel. d. Veda, p. 589), and acc. to ancient belief the soul can return once more on the ninth day after death. See below, chap. xiv, ii, n. 154.

84 It's clear from the evidence that the Novemdialia festival in Rome served this purpose; it's also highly likely that the same applied to Greece; cf. K. O. Müller, Aesch. Eum., p. 143 [120 E.T.]. Leist, Graecoitalische Rechts., p. 34.—Nine is clearly a significant number, especially in Homer; dividing time into groups of nine was a common practice in ancient times. Cf. now, Kaegi, Die Neunzahl bei den Ostariern, Phil. Abh. f. Schweitzer-Sidler, 50 ff. Mourning customs were meant to protect against harmful actions from the dead. Typically, these customs lasted as long as there was a fear of the soul of the deceased returning (especially in India: see Oldenberg, Rel. d. Veda, p. 589), and according to ancient belief, the soul could return on the ninth day after death. See below, chap. xiv, ii, n. 154.

85 A χρόνος πένθους of eleven days, the mourning concluded with a sacrifice to Demeter: Plu., Lyc. 27; cf. Hdt. vi, 58 fin. The Labyadai at Delphi celebrate the tenth day after the funeral as a feast of the dead; see above, n. 81 of this chapter. This mourning period is not otherwise demonstrable for Greece (SIG. 633, 5, is different), but it is met with again among the Indians and Persians (cf. Kaegi, p. 5, 11), and may be primitive.

85 An eleven-day mourning period, which ended with a sacrifice to Demeter: Plu., Lyc. 27; cf. Hdt. vi, 58 fin. The Labyadai at Delphi celebrate the tenth day after the funeral as a feast for the deceased; see above, n. 81 of this chapter. This mourning period isn't clearly documented for Greece (SIG. 633, 5, is different), but it appears among the Indians and Persians (cf. Kaegi, p. 5, 11) and may be an ancient practice.

86 Lex. Rh., in AB. 268, 19 ff.; Phot. a little differently: καθέδρα· τῇ τριακοστῇ (πρώτῃ Phot.: Α instead of Λ) ἡμέρᾳ τοῦ ἀποθανόντος οἱ προσήκοντες συνελθόντες κοινῇ ἐδειπνοῦν ἐπὶ τῷ ἀποθανόντι—καὶ τοῦτο καθέδρα ἐκαλεῖτο (Phot. adds: ὅτι καθεζόμενοι ἐδείπνουν καὶ τὰ νομιζόμενα ἐπλήρουν·) ἦσαν δὲ καθέδραι τέσσαρες (the last clause is absent from Phot.) It was a meal shared by the relatives of the dead in honour of the dead and held “on the thirtieth day”; possibly nothing more nor less than the oft-mentioned τριακάδες. The guests eat their food sitting after the old custom prevailing in Homeric times and always observed by women; as applied to men it survived in Crete only, see Müller, Dorians, ii, 284. Perhaps this primitive attitude preserved in cultus is what we see in the Spartan sculptured reliefs representing “feasts of the dead” where the figures are seated. There were four such καθέδραι, i.e. the period of mourning extended over four months: thus it was the law in Gambreion (SIG. 879, 11 ff.) that 196 mourning might last at the most three months, or in the case of women four. We often hear of monthly repetitions of the feasts of the dead: monthly celebration of the εἰκάδες for Epicurus in acc. with his will, D.L. x, 18; cf. Cic., Fin. ii, 101; Plin. 35, 5; κατὰ μῆνα sacrifice to the deified Ptolemies, CIG. 4697, 48. (In India, too, the sacrifices to the dead on the thirtieth of the month were several times repeated: Kaegi, 7; 11.)

86 Lex. Rh., in AB. 268, 19 ff.; Phot. slightly differently: καθέδρα· τῇ 30η(first Phot.: Α instead of Λ) On the day of the deceased's passing, the relatives gathered together to share a meal in honor of the deceased — and this was called the "chair." (Phot. adds: Because they were sitting down to dinner and fulfilling the usual customs.)There were four seats. (the last clause is absent from Phot.) It was a meal shared by the deceased's relatives to honor them, held “on the thirtieth day”; possibly nothing more nor less than the often-mentioned three of a kind. The guests ate their food sitting, following the old custom from Homeric times, which was always practiced by women; as for men, it survived only in Crete, see Müller, Dorians, ii, 284. Perhaps this primitive attitude preserved in rituals is what we observe in the Spartan sculptured reliefs depicting “feasts of the dead” where the figures are seated. There were four such chairs, meaning the mourning period lasted four months: thus it was the law in Gambreion (SIG. 879, 11 ff.) that 196 mourning could last a maximum of three months, or four in the case of women. We often hear of monthly repetitions of the feasts for the dead: the monthly celebration of the εἰκάδες for Epicurus according to his will, D.L. x, 18; cf. Cic., Fin. ii, 101; Plin. 35, 5; per month sacrifice to the deified Ptolemies, CIG. 4697, 48. (In India, too, the sacrifices for the dead on the thirtieth of the month were repeated several times: Kaegi, 7; 11.)

87 The Lexicographers, Harp., Phot., etc. (AB. 308, 5, is ambiguous, too), speak of the τριακάς in a way that makes it hard to see whether they mean the traditional sacrifice of the dead taking place regularly on the thirtieth day of the month, or a special offering on the thirtieth day after burial or after the day of death (ἡ τριακοστὴ ἡμέρα διὰ τοῦ θανάτου Harp., Phot. μετὰ θάνατον is the correction of Schömann on Is., p. 219, but διὰ θανάτου is formed, not quite correctly, on the analogy of διὰ χρόνου, διὰ μέσου [even διὰ προγόνων “since the time of our forefathers”, Polyb. 21, 21, 4], and must mean the same thing, viz. “after death”). But in Lys. 1, 14, we have the idea clearly expressed that the period of mourning should last till the thirtieth day (see Becker, Char.2 3, 117 E.T.3, p. 398), and in this case it is natural to suppose that the τριακάδες corresponding with the τρίτα and ἔνατα, took place on the thirtieth day after burial. So, too, the ins. from Keos, SIG. 877, 21, ἐπὶ τῷ θανόντι τριηκόστια μὴ ποιεῖν. For Argos see Plu., Q. Gr. 24, p. 296 F. It is evident that the τριακάδες were not so firmly established in Athens (at least in the fourth century) as the τρίτα and ἔνατα: e.g. Isaeus generally only refers to these last as the indispensable νομιζόμενα: 2, 36–7; 8, 39. It appears also that it is wrong to regard the τριακάδες as otherwise exactly on a footing with the τρ. and ἔνατα, as is generally done. The last-mentioned pair were sacrifices to the dead, the τριακάδες seems to have been a commemorative banquet of the living.—These fixed periods of mourning like so much else in the cult of the dead may have been handed down by tradition from a very early time. The third, ninth (or tenth), and thirtieth days after the funeral marked stages in the gradually diminishing “uncleanness” of the relatives of the dead, and this existed, it appears, already in “Indo-Germanic” times. Until the ninth day the relatives were still in contact with the departed and were consequently “unclean”; the thirtieth day puts an end to this, and is a memorial festival (though often repeated); cf. Kaegi, pp. 5, 10, 12 (of the separate edition); Oldenberg, 578. In Christian usage, sanctioned by the church, the third, ninth, and fortieth days after death or after burial were very early observed as memorial days (sometimes third, seventh, thirtieth; cf. Rochholz, D. Gl. u. Brauch, i, 203), and survive in some cases to the present day: see Ac. Soc. ph. Lips. v, 304 f.

87 The lexicographers Harp. and Phot., etc. (AB. 308, 5, is unclear, too), discuss the τριακάς in a way that makes it difficult to determine whether they refer to the traditional sacrifice for the dead that occurs regularly on the thirtieth day of the month, or a special offering on the thirtieth day after burial or after the day of death (the thirtieth day after death Harp., Phot. after death is Schömann's correction on Is., p. 219, but by death is incorrectly formed based on the analogy of over time, through the middle [even by ancestors “since the time of our forefathers”, Polyb. 21, 21, 4], and must mean the same thing, that is, “after death”). However, in Lys. 1, 14, we see the idea clearly stated that the mourning period should last until the thirtieth day (see Becker, Char.2 3, 117 E.T.3, p. 398), and in this case it’s reasonable to assume that the three times corresponding to the Tuesday and ἔνατα occurred on the thirtieth day after burial. Similarly, the inscription from Keos, SIG. 877, 21, Don't make a thirty-day period of mourning for the deceased.. For Argos, see Plu., Q. Gr. 24, p. 296 F. It’s clear that the triples were not as firmly established in Athens (at least in the fourth century) as the Tuesday and ἔνατα: for example, Isaeus typically only refers to these last as the essential assumptions: 2, 36–7; 8, 39. It also seems incorrect to view the triples as being exactly on par with the τρ. and ἔνατα, as is usually done. The latter pair were sacrifices for the dead, while the three-card draw appear to have been a memorial feast for the living.—These fixed periods of mourning, like many other customs in the cult of the dead, may have been passed down by tradition from very early times. The third, ninth (or tenth), and thirtieth days after the funeral marked stages in the gradually reducing “uncleanness” of the deceased's relatives, a concept that seems to have existed since “Indo-Germanic” times. Until the ninth day, the relatives were still in contact with the deceased and were thus considered “unclean”; the thirtieth day ends this period and is a memorial festival (often repeated); cf. Kaegi, pp. 5, 10, 12 (from the separate edition); Oldenberg, 578. In Christian practice, authorized by the church, the third, ninth, and fortieth days after death or burial were very early observed as memorial days (sometimes third, seventh, thirtieth; cf. Rochholz, D. Gl. u. Brauch, i, 203), and some of these customs persist even today: see Ac. Soc. ph. Lips. v, 304 f.

88 τὰ νεκύσια τῇ τριακάδι ἄγεται: Plu., Prov. Alex. viii, p. 6, 10 Crus. (App. prov. Vat. in Schneidewin’s Crit. App. to Diogen. viii, 39). There was a festival kept by servants in honour of their dead masters (ἀλλαθεάδες, GDI. 1731, 10; 1775, 29; 1796, 6) twice monthly, at the νουμηνία and on the seventh: GDI. 1801, 6–7 Delphi. The last three days of the month are at Athens sacred to the inhabitants of the lower world and therefore ἀποφράδες: EM. 131, 13 f.; E. Gud. 70, 3 ff.; cf. Lys., fr. 53. On these days banquets were prepared, at the crossroads, etc., for Hekate (acc. to Ath. 325 A), for Hekate καὶ τοῖς ἀποτροπαίοις (Plu., Symp. 7, 6, p. 709 A). The souls of the dead were then not forgotten. Sch. Pl., Lg. vii, 800 D, ἀποφράδες ἡμέραι ἐν αἷς τοῖς κατοιχομένοις χοὰς ἐπιφέρουσιν. 197

88 The necromancy is conducted at the triad.: Plu., Prov. Alex. viii, p. 6, 10 Crus. (App. prov. Vat. in Schneidewin’s Crit. App. to Diogen. viii, 39). There was a festival celebrated by servants in honor of their deceased masters (ἀλλαθεάδες, GDI. 1731, 10; 1775, 29; 1796, 6) twice a month, on the νουμηνία and on the seventh: GDI. 1801, 6–7 Delphi. The last three days of the month are sacred in Athens to the inhabitants of the underworld and are therefore called not available: EM. 131, 13 f.; E. Gud. 70, 3 ff.; cf. Lys., fr. 53. On these days, banquets were set up at the crossroads, etc., for Hekate (according to Ath. 325 A), along with offerings for Hekate and the protective ones (Plu., Symp. 7, 6, p. 709 A). The souls of the dead were then not forgotten. Sch. Pl., Lg. vii, 800 D, The dreadful days in which those living inside bring offerings for the dead.. 197

89 The son ἐναγίζει καθ’ ἕκαστον ἐνιαυτόν to his dead father, Is. 2, 46. This sacrifice to the dead, celebrated once every year (θυσία ἐπέτειος offered by a παῖς πατρί), is the festival of the Γενέσια, in vogue acc. to Hdt. iv, 26, among the Greeks, everywhere as it appears. As the name shows this festival fell on the birthday of the honoured ancestor as it recurred (not on the day of his death as Amm. pp. 34–5 Valck. incorrectly says); cf. Schol. Pl., Alc. i, 121 C. So Epicurus in his will (D.L. x, 18) provides for a yearly celebration of his birthday. (Similar foundation, CIG. 3417.) The Koans ἐναγίζουσι to Hippokrates every year on the 27th Agrianos as his birthday: Soran., V.Hp., p. 450, 13–14 West. Hero-festivals, too, fall on the birthday of the Hero: Plu., Arat. 53. Gods have their feast-days and their birthdays combined; thus Hermes has his on the 4th of the month, Artemis on the 6th, Apollo on the 7th, and so on. These are birthday festivals repeated every month. In the second century at Sestos, following such precedents, there was held τὰ γενέθλια τοῦ βασιλέως (one of the deified Attalids) καθ’ ἕκαστον μῆνα: SIG.1 246, 36. Celebration of the ἔμμηνος γενέσιος of the ruling Emperor: Ins. Perg. ii, 374 B, 14. Even in later times in imitation of heathen usage the Kephallenians still honour Epiphanes, son of Karpokrates, κατὰ νουμηνίαν, γενέθλιον ἀποθέωσιν, Clem. Al., Str. iii, p. 511 P.

89 The son offers a sacrifice each year to his deceased father, Is. 2, 46. This annual sacrifice to the dead (sacrifice anniversary offered by a child to father) is the festival of the Γενέσια, which was observed, according to Hdt. iv, 26, by the Greeks everywhere. As the name indicates, this festival took place on the birthday of the honored ancestor, recurring annually (not on the day of his death, as Amm. pp. 34–5 Valck. incorrectly states); cf. Schol. Pl., Alc. i, 121 C. Epicurus, in his will (D.L. x, 18), arranged for a yearly celebration of his birthday. (Similar foundation, CIG. 3417.) The people of Kos They offer sacrifices Hippocrates every year on the 27th of Agrianos as his birthday: Soran., V.Hp., p. 450, 13–14 West. Hero festivals also occur on the birthday of the hero: Plu., Arat. 53. Gods have their feast days and birthdays combined; Hermes has his on the 4th of the month, Artemis on the 6th, Apollo on the 7th, and so on. These are birthday festivals celebrated each month. In the second century at Sestos, following such traditions, the king's birthday (one of the deified Attalids) was celebrated monthly: SIG.1 246, 36. There was a celebration of the menstrual origin of the ruling Emperor: Ins. Perg. ii, 374 B, 14. Even later, imitating pagan practices, the Kephallenians continued to honor Epiphanes, son of Karpokrates, on the new moon, birthday deification, Clem. Al., Str. iii, p. 511 P.

90 This is the public festival meant by Phryn., p. 103 Lob. = 83, p. 184 Ruth., when, to distinguish it from the birthday celebrations of living persons, γενέθλια (which did not become common till later), he calls the Γενέσια, Ἀθήνησιν ἑορτή [πένθιμος add. Meursius; cf. Hesych. γενέσια; AB. 231, 19]. The Antiatticista, in his rather absurd polemic against Phryn. (p. 86, 20 ff.), adds the still clearer statement (taken from Solon’s ἄξονες and Philochoros) that the ἑορτὴ δημοτελής of the Γενέσια at Athens was held on the 5th Boedromion. There is not the slightest reason for doubting the correctness of this statement (as many have done). In Rome, too, besides the many moveable parentalia of the families there was an official and public Parentalia held every year (in Feb.). Similarly in ancient India: Oldenberg, 550, 3.

90 This refers to the public festival mentioned by Phryn., p. 103 Lob. = 83, p. 184 Ruth., when, to differentiate it from the birthday celebrations of living individuals, birthday (which didn't become common until later), he calls the Birthday, festival in Athens[mourning add. Meursius; cf. Hesych. birth; AB. 231, 19]. The Antiatticista, in his rather ridiculous argument against Phryn. (p. 86, 20 ff.), provides a clearer statement (taken from Solon’s axes and Philochoros) that the public festival of the Origin in Athens occurred on the 5th of Boedromion. There is absolutely no reason to doubt the accuracy of this statement (as many have done). In Rome, alongside the numerous movable parentalia of families, there was an official and public Parentalia held every year (in February). Similarly in ancient India: Oldenberg, 550, 3.

91 The Νεμέσεια is mentioned by Dem. 41, 11. The context suggests a rite performed by a daughter in honour of her dead father. It is a quite certainly correct conjecture (μήποτε—) of the Lexicog. that the Nemeseia may be a festival of the dead (see Harp. s.v. AB. 282, 32: both glosses combined in Phot. Suid. νεμέσια). It is clear, however, that they knew nothing further about it. Mommsen declares (Heort. 209) the Nemeseia to have been “without doubt” identical with the Γενέσια. I see no reason at all for supposing so.—The name νεμέσεια characterizes it as a festival dedicated to the “wrath” of the dead, to the νέμεσις τῶν θανόντων, Soph., El. 792; φθιμένων ὠκυτάτη νέμεσις, Epigr. Gr. 119; cf. 195—this easily becomes a personified Νέμεσις: ἔστι γὰρ ἐν φθιμένοις Νέμεσις μέγα, Epigr. Gr. 367, 9. The cult of the dead, like the cult of the underworld in general, is always apotropaic in character (placantur sacrificiis ne noceant, Serv., A. iii, 63): the Nemeseia must then have been apotropaic in intention too.

91 The Νεμέσεια is mentioned by Dem. 41, 11. The context suggests a ritual performed by a daughter in honor of her deceased father. It is a quite reasonable guess (μήποτε—) of the Lexicographer that the Nemeseia may be a festival for the dead (see Harp. s.v. AB. 282, 32: both glosses combined in Phot. Suid. νεμέσια). However, it is clear that they knew nothing more about it. Mommsen states (Heort. 209) that the Nemeseia was “without doubt” the same as the Birth. I see no reason to believe that. —The name νεμέσεια identifies it as a festival dedicated to the “wrath” of the dead, to the retribution of the dead, Soph., El. 792; swiftest fate of the doomed, Epigr. Gr. 119; cf. 195—this easily becomes a personified Nemesis: For in the mortal realm, Nemesis is great., Epigr. Gr. 367, 9. The cult of the dead, like the cult of the underworld in general, is always meant to ward off evil (set aside for sacrifices, Serv., A. iii, 63): the Nemeseia must have had an apotropaic intention too.

92 At Apollonia in Chalcidice there was a yearly custom to τὰ νόμιμα συντελεῖν τοῖς τελευτήσασιν in early times in Elaphebolion, later in Anthesterion: Hegesand. ap. Ath. 334 F.—ἐνιαύσια, a yearly festival of the dead (but perhaps rather to be taken as sacra privata) in Keos: SIG. 878.—There is a month called Νεκύσιος in Knossos (and common to the whole of Crete acc. to the Ἡμερολόγιον Flor. [Corsini, Fast. Att. ii, 428]). It took its name from a feast of the dead (νεκύσια is mentioned along with περίδειπνα, as a regular expression by Artemid. 198 iv, 81, p. 249, 9 H.): for this see “Treaties of Kretan cities”, BCH. 1879, 294, l. 56 f.—There was a month Ἀγριώνιος or Ἀγριάνιος in Boeotia and even in Byzantium, Kalymna, Kos, Rhodos: Hesych. Ἀγριάνια· νεκύσια παρὰ Ἀργείοις καὶ ἀγῶνες ἐν Θήβαις (as to the Agon at the A. see the ins. from Thebes, Ath. Mitt. vii, 349).—ἐτελεῖτο δὲ καὶ θυσία τοῖς νεκροῖς ἐν Κορίνθῳ, δι’ ἣν τῆς πόλεως ἐν τοῖς μνήμασιν οὔσης ἐπέρχεται ὁ Ἀλήτης κτλ. Sch. Pi. N. vii, 155.

92 In Apollonia, Chalcidice, there was a yearly tradition to the laws to aid the deceased, originally in Elaphebolion and later in Anthesterion: Hegesand. ap. Ath. 334 F.—yearly, a yearly festival for the dead (but it might be more about sacra privata) in Keos: SIG. 878.—There is a month called Deadly in Knossos (and it was common throughout Crete according to the Diary Flor. [Corsini, Fast. Att. ii, 428]). It got its name from a feast for the dead (νεκύσια is mentioned with dinner parties, as a common expression by Artemid. 198 iv, 81, p. 249, 9 H.): for more on this see “Treaties of Kretan cities”, BCH. 1879, 294, l. 56 f.—There was also a month called Ἀγριώνιος or Ἀγριάνιος in Boeotia and even in Byzantium, Kalymna, Kos, and Rhodos: Hesych. Ἀγριάνια· νεκύσια by the Argives and contests in Θήβαις (regarding the Agon at the A., see the inscription from Thebes, Ath. Mitt. vii, 349).—A sacrifice was also performed for the dead in Corinth, through which the Truth comes to the city in the graves, and so on. Sch. Pi. N. vii, 155.

93 Hesych. μιαραὶ ἡμέραι. Phot. μιαρὰ ἡμέρα.

93 Hesych. wicked days. Phot. wicked day.

94 συγκλεισθῆναι τὰ ἱερὰ during the Choes: Phanodem. ap. Ath. 437 C.

94 Close the temples. during the Choes: Phanodem. ap. Ath. 437 C.

95 Phot. μιαρὰ ἡμέρα· ἐν τοῖς Χουσὶν Ἀνθεστηριῶνος μηνός, ἐν ᾧ (ἐν οἷς?) δοκοῦσιν αἱ ψυχαὶ τῶν τελευτησάντων ἀνιέναι, ῥάμνον ἕωθεν ἐμασῶντο, καὶ πίττῃ τὰς θύρας ἔχριον. Ῥάμνος· φυτόν, ὃ ἐν τοῖς Χουσὶν ὡς ἀλεξιφάρμακον ἐμασῶντο ἕωθεν· καὶ πίττῃ ἐχρίοντο τὰ σώματα (leg. δώματα)· ἀμίαντος γὰρ αὕτη· διὸ καὶ ἐν ταῖς γενέσεσι τῶν παιδίων χρίουσι τὰς οἰκίας εἰς ἀπέλασιν τῶν δαιμόνων.—I do not recollect having read elsewhere of pitch as a protection against malevolent spirits or of its use in Greek superstitious practices. (The flame and smoke of burning pitch—and of ἄσφαλτος: Diph. fr. 126 [ii, p. 577 K.] ap. Clem. Al. Str. 7, 4, 26, p. 844 P.—as of sulphur, belong to the region of magic and are καθαρμοί: but that is a different matter.—τὰ καθάρσια· ταῦτα δέ ἐστι δᾷδες καὶ θεῖον καὶ ἄσφαλτος, Zos. ii, 5, p. 67, 19 Bk.). Better known is the magic protective power of the ῥάμνος. It is of use against φάρμακα and φαντάσματα, and is therefore hung up on the doors ἐν τοῖς ἐναγίσμασι: Sch. Nic., Th. 860 (Euphorion and Sophnon had also referred to this superstition). Cf. Anon., de Vir. Herb. 9–13, 20 ff., and the Scholia (p. 486, ed. Haupt., Opusc. 2); also Dioscorides i, 119 fin. (ῥάμνος also frightens away poisonous beasts: Diosc. iii, 12. In the same way marjoram and scilla are equally available against daimones and ἰοβόλα.) At Rome the hawthorn (spina alba) is specially known for these purificatory properties. Ovid, F. vi, 129 (at a wedding procession a torch made of a branch of the spina alba is used [Fest. 245a, 3 Mü.], and this is purgationis causa: Varro ap. Charis., p. 144, 22 K.).—At the Choes the ῥάμνος (i.e. twigs or leaves of it) is chewed: this is in order that its powers may be absorbed into the chewer’s own body. The Superstitious man (like the Pythia) puts laurel leaves in his mouth καὶ οὕτω τὴν ἡμέραν περιπατεῖ: also at the Choes? Thphr., Ch. 16. The laurel in addition to its other marvellous properties can also drive off spirits: ἔνθα ἂν ᾗ δάφνη, ἐκποδὼν δαίμονες, Gp. 11, 2, 5–7. Lyd., Mens. 4, 4, p. 68, 9 Wü.

95 Phot. miry day: in the Choes in the month of Anthesterion, when (in what?) The souls of the dead appear to rise up, chewing on ramnos from early morning, and they coated the doors with pitch. Ramnos is a plant they chew on during the Choes as a protective remedy from early morning; and with the pitch, they also anointed their bodies. (leg. homes)This is sacred; therefore, they also bless the homes during childbirth to protect against demons..—I don’t recall seeing anywhere else how pitch is used to protect against evil spirits or in Greek superstitions. (The flame and smoke from burning pitch—and from blacktop: Diph. fr. 126 [ii, p. 577 K.] as quoted by Clem. Al. Str. 7, 4, 26, p. 844 P.—like sulphur, belong to the realm of magic and are cleanings: but that’s a different story.—Purifications: these include ashes, divine substances, and asphalt., Zos. ii, 5, p. 67, 19 Bk.). More commonly recognized is the magical protective power of the ramnos. It is effective against substances and spirits, and is therefore hung on doors during cleansing rituals: Sch. Nic., Th. 860 (Euphorion and Sophnon also mentioned this superstition). See Anon., de Vir. Herb. 9–13, 20 ff., and the Scholia (p. 486, ed. Haupt., Opusc. 2); also Dioscorides i, 119 fin. (ramnos also scares away poisonous creatures: Diosc. iii, 12. In the same way, marjoram and scilla can also work against daimons and gorgons.) In Rome, the hawthorn (spina alba) is particularly known for its purifying properties. Ovid, F. vi, 129 (during a wedding procession, a torch made from a branch of spina alba is used [Fest. 245a, 3 Mü.], and this is for purification: Varro quoted by Charis., p. 144, 22 K.).—At the Choes, the ramnos (i.e., twigs or leaves of it) is chewed: this is done so its powers can be absorbed by the person chewing it. A superstitious person (like the Pythia) puts laurel leaves in their mouth and so goes through the day: also at the Choes? Thphr., Ch. 16. The laurel, in addition to its other extraordinary properties, can also drive away spirits: where there is laurel, it keeps demons away, Gp. 11, 2, 5–7. Lyd., Mens. 4, 4, p. 68, 9 Wü.

96 Sch. Ar., Ach. 961, p. 26, 8 ff. Dübn.—At the νεκρῶν δεῖπνα the souls of the departed members of the family are summoned by the προσήκοντες to come and take their share (with the single exception of those who have hanged themselves): Artemid. i, 4, p. 11, 10 f. H. (cf. what is said of the νεκύσια in Bithynia by Arr. ap. Eust., ι 65, p. 1615). The same thing must have happened at the Anthesteria.

96 Sch. Ar., Ach. 961, p. 26, 8 ff. Dübn.—At the dinner of the dead, the souls of the deceased family members are called by the relevant to come and take their share (with the only exception being those who have hanged themselves): Artemid. i, 4, p. 11, 10 f. H. (cf. what is mentioned about the νεκύσια in Bithynia by Arr. ap. Eust., ι 65, p. 1615). The same thing must have occurred at the Anthesteria.

97 Worshippers offered the χύτραν πανσπερμίας to Hermes ἱλασκόμενοι τὸν Ἑρμῆν καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀποθανόντων, Sch. Ar., Ach. 1076 (Didymus from Theopomp.)—τοὺς τότε παραγενομένους (read περιγινομένους, viz. from the Flood) ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀποθανόντων ἱλάσασθαι τὸν Ἑρμῆν, Sch. Ar., Ran. 218 (after Theop.). The offering was merely placed ready for the recipients (not sent up to heaven in flames and smoke) as was customary at the Theoxenia (esp. those in honour of chthonic deities) and in offerings made to Heroes. The Ἑκάτης δεῖπνα were similar, and particularly the offerings to the Erinyes: τὰ πεμπόμενα αὐταῖς ἱερὰ πόπανα καὶ γάλα ἐν ἄγγεσι κεραμείοις, Sch. Aeschin. i, 188. 199

97 Worshippers offered the  ̄亚洲ρόμα τών πανσπερμικών to Hermes Worshiping Hermes and the deceased., Sch. Ar., Ach. 1076 (Didymus from Theopomp.)—the attendees at that time (read περιγινομένους, viz. from the Flood) To appease Hermes for the dead., Sch. Ar., Ran. 218 (after Theop.). The offering was simply prepared for the recipients (not sent up to heaven in flames and smoke) as was the custom at the Theoxenia (especially those in honor of chthonic deities) and in offerings made to Heroes. The Hecate's feasts were similar, particularly the offerings to the Erinyes: The sacred offerings sent to them are wine and milk in clay vessels., Sch. Aeschin. i, 188. 199

98 EM. 774, 56: Ὑδροφόρια· ἑορτὴ Ἀθήνησι πένθιμος (so far Hesych. too, s.v.) ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐν τῷ κατακλυσμῷ ἀπολομένοις. The feast of Chytrai was also supposed to have been a commemoration of Deucalion’s Flood. The flood was said to have subsided finally through a cleft in the earth in the Temple of Γῆ Ὀλυμπία: Paus. 1, 18, 7. Pausanias adds, ἐσβάλλουσιν ἐς αὐτὸ (the chasm) ἀνὰ πᾶν ἔτος ἄλφιτα πυρῶν μέλιτι μάξαντες. It is at least natural, with Preller, Dem. u. Pers. 229, n., to see in the Hydrophoria a part of which is described by Pausanias, a festival related to the Chytrai. Connexion of the dead with Γῆ in the Γενέσια too: Hesych. s.v.—Ὑδροφόρια a feast of Apollo at Aegina: Sch. Pi., N. v, 81 (fanciful remarks thereon by K. O. Müller, in Aesch. Eum., p. 141 [116 E.T.]).

98 EM. 774, 56: Hydrophoria: a mourning festival in Athens (so far Hesych. too, s.v.) for those who were lost in the Flood. The feast of Chytrai is also thought to have commemorated Deucalion’s Flood. The flood was said to have finally receded through a crack in the earth in the Temple of Olympics: Paus. 1, 18, 7. Pausanias adds, they toss offerings into it (the chasm) every year after combining barley and honey. It is quite reasonable, following Preller, Dem. u. Pers. 229, n., to view the Hydrophoria, part of which is described by Pausanias, as a festival connected to the Chytrai. There's also a link between the dead and in the Genesia: Hesych. s.v.—Hydrophoria is a festival of Apollo celebrated at Aegina: Sch. Pi., N. v, 81 (with fanciful comments by K. O. Müller, in Aesch. Eum., p. 141 [116 E.T.]).

99 Ovid’s account of the Lemuria at Rome, F. v, shows the closest resemblances to the Athen. customs. The spirits are finally driven out: Manes exite paterni! (443). The same happens in the festivals of the dead in many places: esp. in India, Oldenberg, 553; cf. also the Esthonian customs: Grimm, p. 1844, n. 42. A parallel from ancient Prussia is given (after Joh. Meletius, 1551) by Ch. Hartknoch, in Alt- u. Neues Preussen, 1684, pp. 187–8. There on the third, sixth, ninth, and fortieth day after the funeral a banquet of the relatives of the dead was held. The souls of the dead were invited and (with other souls as well) entertained. “When the feasting was ended the priest rose from the table and swept out the house, driving forth the souls of the dead as though he were driving out fleas, saying the while: ‘Ye have eaten and drunk, O ye Blessed Ones, depart hence! depart hence!’” At the close of the lantern-feast to the dead in Nagasaki (Japan) when the entertainment of the souls was over a great noise was made all over the house “so that no single soul should remain behind and haunt the place—they must be driven out without mercy”: Preuss. Exped. nach Ostasien, ii, 22. Other examples of the expulsion of souls given in Tylor, ii, 199. The ghosts were thought of in a thoroughly materialistic fashion, and driven out by waving clubs in the air, swinging torches, etc., as in the case of the ξενικοὶ θεοί of the Kaunians: Hdt. i, 172. Compare with this the prayers addressed to Herakles in the Orphic Hymns (reproducing ancient superstitions as frequently): ἐλθὲ μάκαρ . . . ἐξέλασον δὲ κακὰς ἄτας, κλάδον ἐν χερὶ πάλλων, πτηνοῖς τ’ ἰοβόλοις κῆρας χαλεπὰς ἀπόπεμπε (12, 15–16). It will be clear how near such personified ἆται and κῆρες are to the angry “souls”, from which in fact they have arisen; cf. besides, Orph., H. 11, 23; 14, 14; 36, 16; 71, 11.—κῆρας ἀποδιοπομπεῖσθαι, Plu., Lys. 17.

99 Ovid’s description of the Lemuria in Rome, F. v, shows the closest similarities to Athenian customs. The spirits are ultimately driven away: Father's manes, arise! (443). The same occurs during the festivals for the dead in many regions, especially in India, Oldenberg, 553; see also the Estonian customs: Grimm, p. 1844, n. 42. An example from ancient Prussia is provided (after Joh. Meletius, 1551) by Ch. Hartknoch, in Alt- u. Neues Preussen, 1684, pp. 187–8. There, on the third, sixth, ninth, and fortieth day after the funeral, a banquet was held for the relatives of the deceased. The souls of the dead were invited and entertained, along with other souls. “When the feast was over, the priest stood up from the table and swept out the house, driving forth the souls of the dead as if he were shooing away fleas, while saying: ‘You have eaten and drunk, O Blessed Ones, depart from here! depart from here!’” At the end of the lantern festival for the dead in Nagasaki (Japan), when the entertainment for the souls concluded, a loud noise was made throughout the house “so that no single soul would be left behind to haunt the place—they had to be expelled without mercy”: Preuss. Exped. nach Ostasien, ii, 22. Other instances of soul expulsion are mentioned in Tylor, ii, 199. The ghosts were conceived of in a very materialistic way and were driven out by waving clubs in the air, swinging torches, etc., similar to the foreign gods of the Kaunians: Hdt. i, 172. Compare this with the prayers directed to Herakles in the Orphic Hymns (often reflecting ancient superstitions): Come, blessed one… drive away the evil troubles, shaking the branch in your hand, and send away the harsh spirits with the bird-shooting arrows. (12, 15–16). It will be evident how closely related these personified This text does not provide enough context for modernization. and kères are to the angry “souls,” from which they have actually emerged; see also Orph., H. 11, 23; 14, 14; 36, 16; 71, 11.—Send away the spirits, Plu., Lys. 17.

100 θύραζε Κῆρες, οὐκ ἔτ’ Ἀνθεστήρια. This is the correct wording of the formula; Κᾶρες the form common later and explained with mistaken ingenuity. Photius has it right and explains, ὡς κατὰ τὴν πόλιν τοῖς Ἀνθεστηρίους τῶν ψυχῶν περιερχομένων.—Κῆρες—is clearly a most primitive equivalent for ψυχαί which has become almost completely obscured in Homer, though it dimly appears in Β 302, ξ 207, where the Κῆρες are spoken of as those who carry away other ψυχαί to Hades. Aeschylus knew it (presumably from old Attic speech) and simply substituted ψυχαί for the Keres in the fate-weighing scene in Homer, thus turning the Kerostasia into a Ψυχοστασία (to the surprise of the Schol. A, Θ 70; A.B. X 209). See O. Crusius in Ersch-Gruber, “Keren,” 2, 35, 265–7 [Aesch. fr. 279 Sidg.].

100 At the door of the Keres, it’s no longer the season for the Anthestiria. This is the correct wording of the formula; Keres became the more common form later, explained with misguided creativity. Photius has it right and explains, as in the city where the Anthestirians interact with the souls.—Keres—is clearly a very primitive equivalent for spirits which is almost entirely obscured in Homer, although it faintly appears in B 302, ξ 207, where the Keres are mentioned as those who take other souls to Hades. Aeschylus knew it (presumably from old Attic speech) and simply replaced spirits for the Keres in the fate-weighing scene in Homer, turning the Kerostasia into a Psyche Assessment (to the surprise of Schol. A, Θ 70; A.B. X 209). See O. Crusius in Ersch-Gruber, “Keren,” 2, 35, 265–7 [Aesch. fr. 279 Sidg.].

101 Cf. the collections in Pottier, Les lécythes blancs attiques à représ. funér., p. 57, 70 ff.

101 See the collections in Pottier, The White Attic Lekythoi with Funerary Representations, p. 57, 70 ff.

102 Though not all of them, some at any rate of the scenes in which 200 lyre-playing at a grave is represented on a lekythos are to be taken as implying that the living provide music for the entertainment of the dead: see Furtwängler on the Sammlung Saburoff. i, Pl. lx.

102 While not all of them, some of the scenes where 200 a lyre is played at a grave depicted on a lekythos suggest that the living offer music for the enjoyment of the deceased: see Furtwängler on the Sammlung Saburoff. i, Pl. lx.

103 See Benndorf, Sicil. u. unterital. Vasenb., p. 33.

103 See Benndorf, Sicil. u. unterital. Vasenb., p. 33.

104 How the mode of conceiving the spiritual activity of the dead and consequently the cult of the dead was at first more solemn and awestruck and completely on a par with the cult of the χθόνιοι; how in the course of time the relations of the living to the departed became more familiar and the cult of the dead correspondingly less awe-inspiring, more piously protective in character than apotropaic—all this is set out in more detail by P. Stengel, Chthonisch. u. Todtencult [Festschrift für Friedländer], p. 414 ff.

104 In the beginning, the way people understood the spiritual presence of the dead, and the rituals surrounding them, was much more serious and filled with reverence, similar to the worship of the chthonic; over time, however, the relationship between the living and the deceased became more casual, and the rituals for the dead became less terrifying and more focused on protection than on warding off evil. All of this is discussed in greater detail by P. Stengel in Chthonisch. u. Todtencult [Festschrift für Friedländer], p. 414 ff.

105 The reliefs represent a man enthroned, sometimes alone, sometimes with a woman beside him, stretching out a kantharos to receive the offerings. As a rule he is approached by a group of worshippers represented on a smaller scale. The earliest examples of these reliefs were found in Sparta and go back to the sixth century. Since the investigations of Milchhöfer especially, they are now generally recognised as representing the family worship of the dead. They are the forerunners of the representations of similar food-offerings in which (following later custom) the Hero is lying on a kline and receiving his worshippers. (That this class of reliefs representing “banquets of the dead” was also sacrificial in character is proved clearly by the presence of the worshippers who in many cases lead sacrificial victims. H. v. Fritze in Ath. Mitt. ’96, p. 347 ff., supposes that they are intended to represent not sacrifices but the συμπόσιον which the dead person is to enjoy in the after life. But he can only account for the presence of the worshippers in such a forced and unnatural way [p. 356 ff.], that this alone seems to refute his theory. πυραμίδες and incense among the offerings made do not by any means contradict its nature as a sacrifice to the dead.) The same is the meaning of the reliefs found esp. in Boeotia in which the person worshipped is seated on a horse, or leading a horse, and accepting offerings (summary by Wolters, Archäol. Zeitung, 1882, p. 299 ff.; cf. also Gardner, JHS. 1884, pp. 107–42; Furtwängler, Samml. Sab. i, p. 23). The worshippers bring pomegranates, a cock (e.g. Ath. Mitt. ii, Pl. 20–2), a pig (cock and pig on Theban relief: A. Mitt. iii, 377; pig on Boeotian rel.: A. Mitt. iv, Pl. 17, 2), a ram (rel. from Patras: A. Mitt. iv, 125 f.; cf. the ram’s head on a grave monument from the neighbourhood of Argos, A. Mitt. viii, 141). All these gifts are of the kind proper to the underworld. We know the pomegranate as food of the χθόνιοι from the Hymn to Demeter; the pig and ram are the main constituents of sacrifice made to the χθόνιοι and burnt in cathartic or hilastic (propitiatory) ceremonial. In such cases the cock, of course, does not appear because it was sacred to Helios and Selene (cf. D.L. viii, 34; Iamb., VP. 84), but because it was a sacrificial animal of the χθόνιοι (and of Asklepios) and for the same reason much used in necromancy, spirit-raising, and magic [Dieterich, Pap. mag. 185, 3]. As such it was forbidden food to the Mystai of Demeter at Eleusis: Porph., Abs. 4, 16, p. 255, 5 N. Sch. Luc., D. Me. 7, 4, p. 280, 23 Rabe—Anyone who partakes of the food of the underworld spirits is forfeit to them. On their side the reclining or enthroned spirits of the dead on these reliefs are brought into conjunction with a snake (A. Mitt. ii, Pl. 20–2; viii, Pl. 18, 1, etc.), a dog, or a horse (sometimes a horse’s head only occurs). The snake is the well-known symbol of the Hero: the 201 dog and the horse certainly do not represent victims as Gardner, p. 131, thinks—their real meaning has not yet been made out. The horse occurs sometimes by the side of women and therefore can hardly symbolize a knight’s status. I regard it as also a symbol of the departed as now having entered the spirit-world, like the snake too (Grimm understands it differently: p. 841 f., 844). I can form no decided opinion as to the dog: it is not likely to be mere genre—any more than anything else in these sculptures.

105 The reliefs show a man on a throne, sometimes alone and sometimes with a woman next to him, extending a kantharos to receive offerings. Typically, he is approached by a group of smaller-sized worshippers. The earliest examples of these reliefs were discovered in Sparta and date back to the sixth century. Thanks to the research of Milchhöfer, they are now generally recognized as depicting family worship of the deceased. They serve as the precursors to later representations of similar food offerings in which the Hero is reclining on a kline and receiving worshippers. (The fact that this type of relief representing “banquets of the dead” also had a sacrificial aspect is clearly demonstrated by the presence of worshippers who often lead sacrificial victims. H. v. Fritze in Ath. Mitt. ’96, p. 347 ff., suggests they represent not sacrifices but the symposium that the deceased person is meant to enjoy in the afterlife. However, his explanation for the worshippers' presence seems forced and unnatural [p. 356 ff.], which casts doubt on his theory. pyramids and incense among the offerings do not contradict their nature as a sacrifice to the dead.) The same interpretation applies to the reliefs found especially in Boeotia, where the figure being worshipped is depicted either sitting on a horse or leading one while accepting offerings (summary by Wolters, Archäol. Zeitung, 1882, p. 299 ff.; see also Gardner, JHS. 1884, pp. 107–42; Furtwängler, Samml. Sab. i, p. 23). The worshippers offer pomegranates, a rooster (e.g. Ath. Mitt. ii, Pl. 20–2), a pig (both rooster and pig on Theban relief: A. Mitt. iii, 377; pig on Boeotian relief: A. Mitt. iv, Pl. 17, 2), and a ram (relief from Patras: A. Mitt. iv, 125 f.; cf. the ram’s head on a grave monument near Argos, A. Mitt. viii, 141). All these offerings are typical for the underworld. The pomegranate is known as food for the Chthonic from the Hymn to Demeter; the pig and ram are the main components of sacrifices made to the Chthonic and burned during purifying or propitiatory ceremonies. In these instances, the rooster does not appear because it was sacred to Helios and Selene (cf. D.L. viii, 34; Iamb., VP. 84), but because it was a sacrificial animal for the Underworld beings (and of Asklepios) and was frequently used in necromancy, spirit-raising, and magic [Dieterich, Pap. mag. 185, 3]. As such, it was forbidden food to the Mystai of Demeter at Eleusis: Porph., Abs. 4, 16, p. 255, 5 N. Sch. Luc., D. Me. 7, 4, p. 280, 23 Rabe—anyone who consumes the food of the spirits of the underworld is claimed by them. Meanwhile, the reclining or seated spirits of the dead on these reliefs are often shown with a snake (A. Mitt. ii, Pl. 20–2; viii, Pl. 18, 1, etc.), a dog, or a horse (sometimes only a horse's head is depicted). The snake is a well-known symbol of the Hero: the 201 dog and the horse likely do not represent victims, as Gardner, p. 131, suggests—their true meaning hasn't yet been determined. The horse sometimes appears alongside women, indicating it probably doesn't symbolize a knight’s status. I view it as a symbol of the deceased having entered the spirit world, similar to the snake (Grimm interprets it differently: p. 841 f., 844). I can't form a definitive opinion about the dog: it is unlikely to be just a genre element, just as is the case with everything else in these sculptures.

106 The χοαί, ἅπερ νεκροῖσι μειλικτήρια, of wine, honey, water, or oil, which are offered in Tragedy by children at the grave of a father—A. Pers. 609 ff.; Ch. 84 ff.; E., IT. 159 ff.—are modelled upon the food offerings to the dead in real life. Honey and water (μελίκρατον) were always the chief ingredients: cf. Stengel, Philolog. 39, 378 ff.; Jahr. f. Phil. 1887, p. 653. The ritual at the pouring of an ἀπόνιμμα—essentially a cathartic libation-sacrifice but also offered εἰς τιμὴν τοῖς νεκροῖς is described by Kleidemos ἐν τῷ Ἐξηγητικῷ (the quotation is not complete), Ath. 409 E f. (Striking similarities in ritual and language in Indian sacrifice to the dead: Oldenberg, Rel. d. Ved. 550. Something extremely primitive may be preserved in these uses.) The same is the meaning of the χθόνια λουτρὰ τοῖς νεκροῖς ἐπιφερόμενα, Zenob. vi, 45, etc. These things have nothing to do with the Ὑδροφόρια, as some have thought.

106 The χοαί, ἅπερ νεκροῖσι μειλικτήρια, offered by children at their father's grave in Tragedy, such as wine, honey, water, or oil—A. Pers. 609 ff.; Ch. 84 ff.; E., IT. 159 ff.—are modeled after the food offerings made to the dead in real life. Honey and water (honeycomb) were always the primary ingredients: see Stengel, Philolog. 39, 378 ff.; Jahr. f. Phil. 1887, p. 653. The ritual of pouring an ἀπόνιμμα—which is primarily a purifying libation-sacrifice but is also offered in honor of the dead—is described by Kleidemos In the Explanatory (the quotation is not complete), Ath. 409 E f. (There are striking similarities in ritual and language in Indian sacrifices to the dead: Oldenberg, Rel. d. Ved. 550. Some very primitive practices might be preserved in these uses.) The same applies to the Underworld baths for the dead, Zenob. vi, 45, etc. These practices are unrelated to the Hydrophoria, as some have thought.

107 The regular animal used as victim in ἐναγίσματα for the dead is a sheep; other animals occur less frequently. The black colour is general; the sacrifice was burnt completely: cf. the instances collected by Stengel, Ztschr. f. Gymnasi., 1880, p. 743 f., Jahrb. f. Phil. 1882, p. 322 f.; ’83, p. 375.—Phot. καυστόν· καρπωτὸν ὃ ἐναγίζεται τοῖς τετελευτηκόσιν (cf. Hesych. καυτόν).—The σέλινον (a plant sacred to the dead; see above, n. 40) probably served as food for the dead at the τρίτα and other banquets “of the dead”, and was not used as food for the living at the περίδειπνον; consequently it might never be used at the meals of the living: Plin. 20, 113, following Chrysippos and Dionysios. (In the mysteries of the Kabeiroi the ἀνακτοτελέσται had a special reason of their own for forbidding parsley αὐτόριζον ἐπὶ τραπέζης τιθέναι, Clem. Al., Protr. ii, p. 16 P.)

107 The usual animal sacrificed in sacrifices for the deceased is a sheep; other animals are used less often. The common color is black; the entire sacrifice was burned: see the examples gathered by Stengel, Ztschr. f. Gymnasi., 1880, p. 743 f., Jahrb. f. Phil. 1882, p. 322 f.; ’83, p. 375.—Phot. burning; fruitful, which is offered for those who have passed away. (see Hesych. hot).—The σέλινον (a plant dedicated to the dead; see above, n. 40) likely served as food for the dead during the Tuesday and other "of the dead" banquets and was not eaten by the living at the dinner party; thus, it was probably never used at meals for the living: Plin. 20, 113, following Chrysippos and Dionysios. (In the Kabeiroi mysteries, the ανακτοτελέσται had their own specific reasons for forbidding parsley putting something on the table, Clem. Al., Protr. ii, p. 16 P.)

108 The food offered is a meal for the dead: A., Ch. 483 ff. (cf. Luc., Luct. 9; Char. 22). The dead man is summoned to come and drink the offerings (ἐλθὲ δ’ ὡς πίῃς): E., Hec. 535 ff. It was the general opinion that ὁ νεκρὸς πίεται of the drink offerings (AP. xi, 8; Epigr. Gr. 646, 12), αἱ γὰρ χοαὶ παραψυχή τις εἰσεφέρετο τοῖς εἰδώλοις τῶν τετελευτηκότων κτλ. Lyd., Mens. 4, 31, p. 90 Wü.

108 The food presented is a meal for the deceased: A., Ch. 483 ff. (see Luc., Luct. 9; Char. 22). The deceased is invited to come and drink the offerings (Come drink.): E., Hec. 535 ff. It was generally believed that The dead drink. from the drink offerings (AP. xi, 8; Epigr. Gr. 646, 12), For the libations, some spirit was offered to the idols of the deceased, etc. Lyd., Mens. 4, 31, p. 90 Wü.

109 It feels when friends or enemies approach its grave: Is. 9, 4, 19.

109 It feels when friends or enemies come near its grave: Is. 9, 4, 19.

110 Sch. Ar., Av. 1490 (referring to the Τιτανόπανες of Myrtilos, a poet of the Old Comedy). Phot. κρείττονες (Hesych. κρείττονας) οἱ ἥρωες· δοκοῦσι δὲ κακωτικοὶ εἶναι· δι’ ὃ καὶ οἱ τὰ ἡρῷα παριόντες σιωπῶσιν. (ἥρωες and ἡρῷα here, in accordance with the usage common in later times, simply = τετελευτηκότες and μνήματα of the usual kind.) Since a Hero in the higher sense was buried there it was customary to pass in silence the monument, e.g., of Narkissos, ἥρως Σιγηλός: Str. 404 (so also the grove and chasm of Kolonos where the Erinyes dwell: S., OC. 130 ff.). The feeling underlying this is easy to understand, and the custom therefore is widespread: e.g. among West African negroes, Réville, Relig. des peuples non civil. i, 73. It is a German superstition (Grimm, p. 1811, n. 830). “Never call the dead by name or you may cry them up”.

110 Sch. Ar., Av. 1490 (referring to the Titanic of Myrtilos, a poet of the Old Comedy). Phot. κρείττονες (Hesych. κρείττονας) The heroes seem to be cruel; for this reason, those who pass by the heroes remain silent.(heroes and hero here, in accordance with the usage common in later times, simply = τετελευτηκότες and memorials of the usual kind.) Since a Hero in the higher sense was buried there it was customary to pass in silence the monument, e.g., of Narkissos, hero Sigilos: Str. 404 (so also the grove and chasm of Kolonos where the Erinyes dwell: S., OC. 130 ff.). The feeling behind this is easy to understand, and the custom is therefore widespread: e.g., among West African blacks, Réville, Relig. des peuples non civil. i, 73. It is a German superstition (Grimm, p. 1811, n. 830). “Never call the dead by name or you may cry them up.”

111 Pl., Phd. 81 CD. The ψυχή . . . ὥσπερ λέγεται περὶ τὰ μνήματά τε 202 καὶ τοὺς τάφους κυλινδομένη· περὶ ἃ δὴ καὶ ὤφθη ἄττα ψυχῶν σκιοειδῆ φαντάσματα, κτλ.

111 Pl., Phd. 81 CD. The soul . . . just as it's said about the tombs and 202 And the tombs were cylindrical; around them, there indeed appeared various shadowy images of souls, etc.

112 See O. Jahn, Archäol. Beitr. 128 ff.; Benndorf, Griech. u. sicil. Vasenb., p. 33 f., p. 65 (on Pl. 14, 32); also Pottier, Lécythes blancs, p. 65, 2 (who proposes a doubtful theory of a supposed Éros funèbre, p. 76 ff.).

112 See O. Jahn, Archäol. Beitr. 128 ff.; Benndorf, Griech. u. sicil. Vasenb., p. 33 f., p. 65 (on Pl. 14, 32); also Pottier, Lécythes blancs, p. 65, 2 (who suggests a questionable theory about a supposed Éros funèbre, p. 76 ff.).

113 We frequently on vases see the occupant of a grave represented in the form of a snake at the foot of his tomb, etc.; e.g. on the Prothesis vase, Monum. d. Instit. viii, 4, 5, and often, see Luckenbach, Jahrb. f. Phil., Suppl. ii, 500.—We have already met with snakes as a favourite form of incarnation chosen by χθόνιοι of all kinds, deities of the underworld, Heroes, and the ordinary dead, and we shall frequently meet with the same thing again. Here we need only refer to Photius ἥρως ποικίλος—διὰ τὸ τοὺς ὄφεις ποικίλους ὄντας ἥρωας καλεῖσθαι.

113 We often see the occupant of a grave depicted as a snake at the foot of their tomb on vases, such as on the Prothesis vase, Monum. d. Instit. viii, 4, 5, and frequently, see Luckenbach, Jahrb. f. Phil., Suppl. ii, 500. — We have already encountered snakes as a popular form of embodiment chosen by chthonic of various kinds, including deities of the underworld, heroes, and the average dead, and we will often come across this again. Here, we need only mention Photius The diverse hero—because those with various snakes are called heroes..

114 What falls to the ground belongs to the ἥρωες (= souls of the dead): Ar. Ἥρωες fr. 305 H. and G. τοῖς τετελευτηκόσι τῶν φίλων ἀπένεμον τὰ πίπτοντα τῆς τροφῆς ἀπὸ τῶν τραπεζῶν (alluded to by Eur. in the Belleroph. [Stheneb. fr. 667 Din.]), ap. Ath. 427 E. This is the origin of the Pythagorean σύμβολον—as usual founded on ancient belief about the soul—τὰ πεσόντα ἀπὸ τραπεζῆς μὴ ἀναιρεῖσθαι, D.L. viii, 34. Suid. Πυθαγόρα τὰ σύμβολα. This superstition is also the reason for the νόμος said to have been current in Kroton, τὸ πεσὸν ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν κωλύων ἀναιρεῖσθαι, Iamb., VP. 126. Similar belief and custom in Rome: Plin. 28, 27. Among the ancient Prussians it was the custom not to pick up the fragments of food that fell to the ground at meal times, but to leave them for the “poor” souls that have no blood-relations or friends left behind in the world to look after them; see Chr. Hartknoch, Alt- u. Neues Preussen, p. 188. Similar customs elsewhere: Spencer, Princ. of Sociol. i, 281.

114 What falls to the ground belongs to the heroes (= souls of the dead): Ar. Heroes fr. 305 H. and G. To those who have passed away, I distributed the leftover food from the tables to my friends. (mentioned by Eur. in the Belleroph. [Stheneb. fr. 667 Din.]), ap. Ath. 427 E. This is the origin of the Pythagorean symbol—as usual based on ancient beliefs about the soul—Do not take away what has fallen from the table., D.L. viii, 34. Suid. Pythagoras symbols. This superstition is also the reason for the law that was said to have been common in Kroton, Preventing what has fallen to the ground from being destroyed., Iamb., VP. 126. A similar belief and practice existed in Rome: Plin. 28, 27. Among the ancient Prussians, there was a custom of not picking up the food scraps that fell to the ground during meals, leaving them for the “poor” souls who had no living relatives or friends to watch over them; see Chr. Hartknoch, Alt- u. Neues Preussen, p. 188. Similar customs can be found in other places: Spencer, Princ. of Sociol. i, 281.

115 Solonian law: D. 20, 104; 40, 49. Plu., Sol. 21, Σόλωνος ὁ κωλύων νόμος τὸν τεθνηκότα κακῶς ἀγορεύειν. καὶ γὰρ ὅσιον τοὺς μεθεστηκότας ἱεροὺς νομίζειν. This reminds us of the words of Arist., Eudem. fr. 37 [44] given in Plu., C. Apoll. 27, p. 115 B, τὸ ψεύσασθαί τι κατὰ τῶν τετελευκηκότων καὶ τὸ βλασφημεῖν οὐχ ὅσιον ὡς κατὰ βελτιόνων καὶ κρειττόνων ἤδη γεγονότων (Chilon ap. Stob., Fl. 125, 15 M.: τὸν τετελευκηκότα μὴ κακολόγει ἀλλὰ μακάριζε). A very extreme form of outrage is ψεύσασθαι κατὰ τοῦ τελευτήσαντος: Is. 9, 6; 23; 26. (The κακολόγος is particularly liable to κακὰ εἰπεῖν περὶ τῶν τετελευτηκότων, Thphr., Char. 28.) The heir of the dead man has the duty of carrying out the cult of the dead man’s soul, and this includes the legal prosecution of slanderers of the dead: see Meier and Schömann, Att. Process2, p. 630.

115 Solonian law: D. 20, 104; 40, 49. Plu., Sol. 21, Solon's law forbids speaking negatively about the dead. It's seen as respectful to treat those who have died as sacred. This reminds us of the words of Arist., Eudem. fr. 37 [44] cited in Plu., C. Apoll. 27, p. 115 B, Lying about the dead and slandering them is not honorable, as it involves dishonoring the better and greater things that have already taken place. (Chilon ap. Stob., Fl. 125, 15 M.: Do not speak negatively about those who have passed away; instead, honor them.). A particularly serious form of outrage is to lie about the dead: Is. 9, 6; 23; 26. (The defamer is especially prone to speak poorly of the deceased, Thphr., Char. 28.) The heir of the deceased is responsible for honoring the dead person's spirit, which includes legally pursuing those who slander the deceased: see Meier and Schömann, Att. Process2, p. 630.

116 Ar., Tagenist. fr. 485, 12, says of the dead, καὶ θύομέν γ’ αὐτοῖσι τοῖς ἐναγίσμασιν, ὥσπερ θεοῖσιν κτλ.

116 Ar., Tagenist. fr. 485, 12, says of the dead, and we make offerings to them, just like we do to the gods, etc.

117 κρείττονες Hesych. Phot. s.v. Arist. ap. Plu., C. Apoll. 27, p. 115 C.

117 κρείττονες Hesych. Phot. s.v. Arist. ap. Plu., C. Apoll. 27, p. 115 C.

118 ἵλεως ἔχειν (τοὺς τελευτήσαντας): Pl., Rp. 427 B.

118 to have mercy (the deceased): Pl., Rp. 427 B.

119 That the ἥρωες δυσόργητοι καὶ χαλεποὶ τοῖς ἐμπελάζουσι γίγνονται (Sch. Ar., Av. 1490) applies equally to the “Heroes” properly so called—see above, chap. iv, § 11, the legends of the Hero Anagyros, the Hero of Temesa, etc.—and to those who gradually came to be called “Heroes” in later times by an extension of the term, viz. the souls of the dead in general—χαλεποὺς καὶ πλήκτας τοὺς ἥρωας νομίζουσι, καὶ μᾶλλον νύκτωρ ἢ μεθ’ ἡμέραν: Chamaileon ap. Ath. 461 C (and hence the precautions taken against nocturnal 203 apparitions: Ath. 149 C). Cf. Zenob. v, 60. Hesych. Phot. s. κρείττονες.—That the ἥρωες do, and are responsible for, evil only and never good (Sch. Ar., Av. 1490; Babr. 63) is a late belief; it does not apply either to Heroes or ordinary dead in the conceptions of earlier ages. Originally the “gods”, just as much as Heroes and the dead, shared in the violent and malignant nature of the unseen. This was later confined more and more to the lower classes of the κρείττονες and came to be attached to them so exclusively that it could in the end be regarded as a sufficient ground of distinction between them and the gods (as it certainly had not been to start with) that malice is excluded from the nature of the gods and benevolence on the contrary from that of Heroes and the dead.

119 The Heroes can get annoyed and difficult with those who interrupt them. (Sch. Ar., Av. 1490) applies equally to the "Heroes" in the strict sense—see above, chap. iv, § 11, the legends of Hero Anagyros, the Hero of Temesa, etc.—and to those who gradually came to be referred to as "Heroes" in later times by an expanded definition, specifically the souls of the dead in general—They see the heroes as short-tempered and aggressive, especially at night instead of during the day.: Chamaileon ap. Ath. 461 C (and thus the precautions taken against nighttime 203 appearances: Ath. 149 C). Cf. Zenob. v, 60. Hesych. Phot. s. κρείττονες.—The belief that heroes do, and are responsible for, evil only and never good (Sch. Ar., Av. 1490; Babr. 63) is a later idea; it doesn't apply to either Heroes or ordinary dead in the beliefs of earlier times. Originally, the "gods," just like Heroes and the dead, shared in the violent and harmful nature of the unseen. Over time, this was confined more and more to the lower classes of the κρείττονες and became so exclusively associated with them that it could eventually be seen as a sufficient reason to differentiate between them and the gods (as it certainly had not been at the beginning) that malice is excluded from the nature of the gods while benevolence is associated with Heroes and the dead.

120 Ar., Tagenist. fr. 485, 13: καὶ χοάς γε χεόμενοι (to the dead) αἰτούμεθ’ αὐτοὺς τὰ καλὰ δεῦρ’ ἀνιέναι (intended as a παροιμία or at any rate imitated from a tragedian—apostrophe to a dead woman ἐκεῖ βλέπουσα, δεῦρ’ ἀνίει τἀγαθά, Sch. Ar., Ran. 1462—and reproduced in this passage by the interpolator of Aristoph.). This “sending-up blessings from below” is to be understood in the widest sense (cf. A., Pers. 222); but it is natural to be reminded by such a prayer to ἀνιέναι τἀγαθά of Demeter ἀνησιδώρα (Paus. 1, 31, 4; Plu., Smp. 9, 14, 4, p. 745 A), and of Γῆ ἀνησιδώρα. διὰ τὸ καρποὺς ἀνιέναι (Hesych.); S., OT. 269, εὔχομαι θεοὺς μήτ’ ἄροτον αὐτοῖς γῆς ἀνιέναι τινά.—That the dead who dwell beneath the ground were really expected to assist the growth of the soil we may learn especially from a very interesting statement in the Hippocratic work περὶ ἐνυπνίων (ii, p. 14 Kühn; vi, p. 658 Littré [π. διαίτης iv, 92]). If a person in his dream sees ἀποθανόντας dressed in white, offering something, that is a good omen: ἀπὸ γὰρ τῶν ἀποθανόντων αἱ τροφαὶ καὶ αὐξησιες καὶ σπέρματα γίνονται. There was a custom at Athens of strewing seeds of all kinds over the newly-made grave: Isigon., Mir. 67; Cic., Lg. ii, 63. The reason for this (evidently religious) is variously given (another, no more convincing, is suggested by K. O. Müller, Kl. Schr. ii, 302 f.). It seems most natural to suppose that the seed of the earth is put under the protection of the souls of dead who have now themselves become spirits inhabiting the earth. (Note besides the entirely similar custom in ancient India, Oldenberg, Rel. d. Veda, 582.)

120 Ar., Tagenist. fr. 485, 13: and pouring out drinks (to the dead) we ask them to share the good things with us (intended as a saying or at least inspired by a tragedy—addressing a deceased woman Looking down from there, send down the blessings., Sch. Ar., Ran. 1462—and reproduced in this passage by the person adapting Aristophanes). This “sending up blessings from below” should be understood broadly (cf. A., Pers. 222); however, it’s natural to think of such a prayer to send down the good vibes in relation to Demeter Anesidora (Paus. 1, 31, 4; Plu., Smp. 9, 14, 4, p. 745 A), and of Gaea Anesidora, because of the crops she provides. (Hesych.); S., OT. 269, I hope the gods don’t keep any crops from the earth for them..—The belief that the dead beneath the ground were thought to help the growth of the soil can be seen especially in an interesting statement in the Hippocratic work On Dreams (ii, p. 14 Kühn; vi, p. 658 Littré [p. diet iv, 92]). If someone dreams of the deceased dressed in white and offering something, it is seen as a good omen: because nourishment, growth, and seeds come from the dead. In Athens, there was a tradition of scattering various seeds over freshly made graves: Isigon., Mir. 67; Cic., Lg. ii, 63. The reasons for this practice (clearly religious) are given in various ways (another, less convincing explanation, is suggested by K. O. Müller, Kl. Schr. ii, 302 f.). It seems most logical to think that the earth's seeds are placed under the guardianship of the souls of the dead, who have now become spirits living in the earth. (Note as well the very similar tradition in ancient India, Oldenberg, Rel. d. Veda, 582.)

121 Electra in A., Ch. 486 ff., makes a vow to the soul of her father: κἀγὼ χοάς σοι τῆς ἐμῆς παγκληρίας οἴσω πατρῴων ἐκ δόμων γαμηλίους· πάντων δὲ πρῶτον τόνδε πρεσβεύσω τάφον.—As chthonic powers the Erinyes also send blessings on agriculture and the bringing-up of children. Rh. Mus. 50, 21. Prayer was also made to Γῆ by those who desired to have children.

121 Electra in A., Ch. 486 ff., makes a vow to her father's spirit: And I will bring you offerings from my ancestral home of the family of Gamelios; but first, I will make an appeal to this tomb..—As earthbound deities, the Erinyes also grant blessings for farming and raising children. Rh. Mus. 50, 21. Those who wanted to have children also prayed to Earth.

122 Φανόδημός φησιν ὅτι μόνοι Ἀθηναῖοι θύουσιν καὶ εὔχονται αὐτοῖς ὑπὲρ γενέσεως παίδων, ὅταν γαμεῖν μέλλωσιν, Phot. Suid. τριτοπάτορες.

122 Phanodemus says that only the Athenians make sacrifices and pray for children when they are about to get married., Phot. Suid. tritopatores.

123 The form of the word itself shows that the τριτοπάτορες are simply πρόπαπποι. τριτοπάτωρ is the earliest ancestor, ὁ πάππου ἢ τήθης πατήρ (Arist. ap. Poll. 3, 17). Just as μητροπάτωρ is ὁ μητρὸς πατήρ and πατροπάτωρ ὁ πατρὸς πατήρ (Poll. 3, 16), προπατώρ the forefather, ψευδοπάτωρ = ψευδὴς πατήρ, ἐπιπάτωρ the stepfather (μητρομήτηρ = μητρὸς μήτηρ)—in the same way τριτοπάτωρ is the third forefather, the father of the πατροπάτωρ, i.e. the πρόπαππος. The τριτοπάτορες have an alternative form τριτοπάτρεῖς, Philoch. ap. Suidas τριτοπάτορες: SIG. 443; Leg. Sacr. i, p. 49, l. 32, 52: in Orphic verse this form alone, and not τριτοπάτορες, could be used: see Lobeck, Agl. 764. They were in fact the τρίτοι πατέρες (just as 204 the τριτέγγονοι are the τρίτοι ἔγγονοι, the ἔγγονοι of the third generation). But the “third forefathers” are in fact the first ancestors (Lobeck, 763 f.), οἱ προπάτορες (Hesych.), οἱ πρῶτοι ἀρχηγέται (AB. 307, 16)—the ancestors of the individual first of all, his bodily γονεῖς (the series of whom was not generally counted beyond the πρόπαππος—Is. 8, 32—i.e. the τριτοπάτωρ), and then the “ancestors” of the human race in general (acc. to the explanation of Philoch. ap. Phot. Suid. τριτοπ.; cf. Welcker, Götterl. iii, 73).—We cannot do more than refer here to the completely analogous ideas of the ancient Indians about the “three-fathers”: the father, grandfather, great-grandfather, as the Sapinda-fathers beyond whom the line of ancestry was not traced (Kaegi, Neunzahl, pp. 5, 6).

123 The structure of the word itself indicates that the τρυτοπάτορες are simply great-grandparents. third floor refers to the earliest ancestor, the grandpa or grandma dad (Arist. ap. Poll. 3, 17). Just as μητροπάτωρ is the mother father and father of the father (Poll. 3, 16), ancestor means forefather, false father = false father, stepfather the stepfather (μητρομήτηρ = mother's mother)—similarly, third floor is the third forefather, the father of the ancestor, i.e. the great-grandfather. The trip hop have an alternative form τροποπατρείς, Philoch. ap. Suidas third parents: SIG. 443; Leg. Sacr. i, p. 49, l. 32, 52: in Orphic verse this form alone, and not τροπικοί γονείς, could be used: see Lobeck, Agl. 764. They were in fact the third fathers (just as 204 the triplets are the third grandchildren, the descendants of the third generation). But the “third forefathers” are actually the first ancestors (Lobeck, 763 f.), the ancestors (Hesych.), the first leaders (AB. 307, 16)—the ancestors of the individual first and foremost, his biological parents (the line of which was generally not counted beyond the great-grandfather—Is. 8, 32—i.e. the third-floor), and then the “ancestors” of the human race in general (according to the explanation of Philoch. ap. Phot. Suid. τριτοπ.; cf. Welcker, Götterl. iii, 73).—We can only mention here the completely similar concepts from ancient Indian culture regarding the “three-fathers”: the father, grandfather, and great-grandfather, as the Sapinda-fathers beyond whom the lineage was not traced (Kaegi, Neunzahl, pp. 5, 6).

124 The Tritopatores are most distinctly referred to as ἄνεμοι: Demon ap. Phot. Suid. τριτοπ. cf. δεσπόται ἀνέμων Phot. τριτοπάτωρ; Tz. Lyc. 738. Orphic poetry made them θυρωροὺς καὶ φύλακας τῶν ἀνέμων. This is already a free interpretation; the Attic belief, expressed by Demon, knows nothing about this. It can only have been learned invention that limited their number to three (as in the case of the originally unlimited number of Horai, Erinyes, etc.), and gave them definite names (Amalkeides, etc., Orph. fr. 240, Ab.) or identified them with the three Hekatoncheires (Kleidemos in the Ἐξηγ.). The genuine and ancient belief about them can still be discerned through all the confusion of misinterpretation and misunderstanding, and according to this the τριτοπάτορες were the souls of ancestors who were also wind-spirits. People prayed for children to these spirits: and Lobeck, Agl. 755 ff., is right in connecting with this custom the Orphic doctrine that the soul of man comes into him from without with the wind. Even this, however, is only a speculative embellishment of the popular belief about the Tritopatores (which the Orphics cannot, as Welcker thinks, Götterl. iii, 71, have “invented”: they only explained it after their fashion and consequently must have found it already existing). When we have stripped off all speculative accretions we find the Tritopatores to have been the souls of ancestors who have become wind-spirits and travel in the wind like other ψυχαί (whose name even is derived from the breath of the wind). From these as from real πνοιαὶ ζῳογόνοι their descendants hope for aid where the entry into life of a new ψυχή is concerned. It is not hard to understand the connexion between souls and wind-spirits; it is merely that such conceptions were rare among the Greeks and for that reason these isolated wind-spirits surviving in popular belief were turned into individual daimones—the Tritopatores no less than the Harpies (see Rh. Mus. 50, 3 ff.).

124 The Tritopatores are most commonly referred to as winds: Demon ap. Phot. Suid. τριτοπ. cf. lords of the winds Phot. third floor; Tz. Lyc. 738. In Orphic poetry, they are depicted as doorkeepers and guardians of the winds. This is already a loose interpretation; the Attic belief, as expressed by Demon, doesn't align with this. It must have been a learned invention that limited their number to three (similar to the originally limitless numbers of Horai, Erinyes, etc.) and assigned them specific names (Amalkeides, etc., Orph. fr. 240, Ab.) or linked them to the three Hekatoncheires (Kleidemos in the Ἐξηγ.). The genuine and ancient belief about them still shines through the confusion of misinterpretation and misunderstanding, and according to this view, the third-party were the souls of ancestors who became wind-spirits. People prayed to these spirits for children: and Lobeck, Agl. 755 ff., correctly associates with this custom the Orphic belief that a person's soul enters them from the outside with the wind. Even this, however, is merely a speculative enhancement of the popular belief about the Tritopatores (which the Orphics, contrary to Welcker's assumption, Götterl. iii, 71, didn't “invent”: they simply explained it in their own way and must have found it already in existence). Once we peel away all the speculative additions, we see the Tritopatores as the souls of ancestors who have transformed into wind-spirits and travel with the wind like other souls (which even derives its name from the breath of the wind). From these, as from real life-giving breaths, their descendants hope for assistance concerning the arrival of a new soul. It's not difficult to grasp the connection between souls and wind-spirits; it's just that such ideas were uncommon among the Greeks, which is why these isolated wind-spirits that persisted in popular belief were transformed into distinct daimones—the Tritopatores no less than the Harpies (see Rh. Mus. 50, 3 ff.).

125 The words of Orestes in A., Ch. 483, give very naive expression to the belief. He calls to the soul of his father: οὕτω (if thou sendest me aid) γὰρ ἄν σοι δαῖτες ἔννομοι βροτῶν κτιζοίατ’· εἰ δὲ μή, παρ’ εὐδείπνοις ἔσει ἄτιμος ἐμπύροισι κνισωτοῖς χθονός. Thus we see that the belief ridiculed by Luc., Luct. 9, was true of earlier times as well: τρέφονται δὲ ἄρα (the dead) ταῖς παρ’ ἡμῖν χοαῖς καὶ τοῖς καθαγιζομένοις ἐπὶ τῶν τάφων· ὡς εἴ τῳ μὴ εἴη καταλελειμμένος ὑπὲρ γῆς φίλος ἢ συγγενής, ἄσιτος οὗτος νεκρὸς καὶ λιμώττων ἐν αὐτοῖς πολιτεύεται.

125 Orestes’s words in A., Ch. 483, express the belief in a very straightforward way. He calls to his father's soul: thus (if you send me help) For if the feasts of mortals are established by law for you; but if not, you will be dishonored among those who dine well, with the fragrant offerings of the earth.. This shows that the belief mocked by Luc., Luct. 9, also existed in earlier times: They are fed then (the dead) With the libations offered by us and those consecrated at the graves; as if to someone who is not left abandoned over the earth—a friend or relative—this dead person remains unfed and suffers hunger among them..

126 Epicurus devotes by will certain definite πρόσοδοι to the yearly offering of ἐναγίσματα to his parents, his brothers, and himself: D.L. x, 18.—To the end of the third century belongs the “Testament of Epikteta”, i.e. the inscription recording the foundation by Epikteta (who came from Thera as we know now for certain: Ἐφ. Ἀρχ. 1894, p. 142) of a three-day sacrificial feast to be performed every year for 205 the Muses and “the Heroes”, i.e. for her husband, herself, and her sons; and the institution for this special purpose of a κοινὸν τοῦ ἀνδρείου τῶν συγγενῶν (together with women of the family). The inscr. gives also the rules of this sacrificial society (Michel n. 1001; CIG. 2448).—The offerings to the dead in this case (vi, 6 ff.) consist of a ἱερεῖον (i.e. a sheep) and ἱερά, especially ἐλλύται of five choinikes of wheaten flour and a stater of dry cheese (ἐλλ. are a kind of sacrificial cake specially offered to the deities of the lower world, as for ex. to Trophonios at Lebadeia: GDI. 413 with n., p. 393), and in addition to these garlands are mentioned. The following are to be sacrificed: the customary parts of the victim, an ἐλλύτης, a loaf, a πάραξ (= βάραξ, βήρηξ: interchange of tenuis and media as frequently) and some ὀψάρια (i.e. small fishes: cf. the ἀποπυρίς for the dead, GDI. 3634 Kos). The rest was probably consumed by the religious society: these special portions the person offering the sacrifice, we are told, καρπωσεῖ, i.e. (he) shall offer them to the Heroes by burning them entire. Cf. Phot. καυστόν· καρπωτόν, ὃ ἐναγίζεται τοῖς τετελευτηκόσιν (καρπῶσαι, κάρπωμα, ὁλοκάρπωσις, etc., are frequent in the LXX) and Phot. ὁλοκαρπούμενον and ὁλοκαυτισμός. καρποῦν = ὁλοκαυτοῦν in the sacrificial calendar from Kos, GDI. 3636; cf. Stengel, Hermes, 27, 161 f.

126 Epicurus specifies in his will certain designated income for the annual offering of sacrifices to his parents, his brothers, and himself: D.L. x, 18.—In the late third century, there is the “Testament of Epikteta,” which documents the establishment by Epikteta (who we now know came from Thera: Ἐφ. Ἀρχ. 1894, p. 142) of a three-day sacrificial feast that is to be held every year for the Muses and “the Heroes,” which means for her husband, herself, and her sons; and the creation for this specific purpose of a common to the bravery of relatives (along with the female family members). The inscription also outlines the rules for this sacrificial society (Michel n. 1001; CIG. 2448).—The offerings to the deceased in this case (vi, 6 ff.) include a sacred offering (meaning a sheep) and sacred, particularly ἐλλύται of five choinikes of wheat flour and a stater of dry cheese (ἐλλ. refers to a type of sacrificial cake specifically offered to the underworld deities, such as Trophonios at Lebadeia: GDI. 413 with n., p. 393), and in addition to these, garlands are also mentioned. The following items are to be sacrificed: the customary parts of the victim, an ἐλλύτης, a loaf, a πάραξ (= βάραξ, βήρηξ: an interchange of tenuis and media as is often the case) and some fish (meaning small fish: cf. the Unburnt for the deceased, GDI. 3634 Kos). The remainder was likely consumed by the religious society: these special portions, it is said, the person offering the sacrifice will καρπώσει, meaning (he) shall offer them to the Heroes by burning them entirely. Cf. Phot. καυστόν· καρπωτόν, ὃ ἐναγίζεται τοῖς τετελευτηκόσιν(καρπῶσαι, κάρπωμα, ὁλοκάρπωσις, etc., are common in the LXX) and Phot. ὁλοκαρπούμενον and Holocaust. Harvest. = holocaust in the sacrificial calendar from Kos, GDI. 3636; cf. Stengel, Hermes, 27, 161 f.

127 See Is. 1, 10.

127 See Isaiah 1:10.

128 In manumission records it is sometimes definitely enjoined that the freed persons shall at the death of their masters θαψάντω καὶ τὰ ὥρια αὐτῶν ποιησάτωσαν: thus on the insc. from Phokis, SIG. 841. (Instructions of this kind as esp. frequent in the records of emancipation from Delphi: see Büchsenschütz, Bes. u. Erw., 178 Anm. 3–4.) τὰ ὥρια when applied to the dead (GDI. 1545–6; ὡραίων τυχεῖν E., Sup. 175) means the καθ’ ὥραν συντελούμενα ἱερά (Hesych. ὡραῖα; funeral ordinance of the Labyadai, l. 49 ff.: τὰς δ’ ἄλλας θοίνας κατ’ τὰν ὥραν ἀγαγέσθαι), i.e. the sacrifices to be celebrated periodically (ταῖς ἱκνουμέναις ἡμέραις, n. 138; cf. τελεταὶ ὥριαι, Pi., P. ix, 98 ff.). This doubtless means in particular the ἐνιαύσια ἱερά (cf. nn. 81, 89, 92 of this chap.). Garlanding of graves κατ’ ἐνιαυτὸν ταῖς ὡρίοις (sc. ἁμέραις), GDI. 1775, 21; κατ’ ἐνιαυτὸν ὡραῖα ἱερὰ ἀπετέλουν (to the Heroes), Pl., Cri. 116 C.

128 In manumission records, it is sometimes explicitly stated that the freed individuals must, upon the death of their masters, perform burial rites and carry out their ὥρια: thus on the inscription from Phokis, SIG. 841. (Such instructions are especially common in the records of emancipation from Delphi: see Büchsenschütz, Bes. u. Erw., 178 Anm. 3–4.) the hours when referring to the dead (GDI. 1545–6; Catch some good fortune E., Sup. 175) means the regular rituals (Hesych. beautiful; funeral ordinance of the Labyadai, l. 49 ff.: the other offerings should take place at the right times), i.e. the sacrifices to be celebrated periodically (on the scheduled days, n. 138; cf. ceremonial periods, Pi., P. ix, 98 ff.). This likely refers specifically to the yearly traditions (cf. nn. 81, 89, 92 of this chap.). Decorating graves is done every year on the designated ritual days (i.e., days), GDI. 1775, 21; Annual offerings were made to the Heroes.), Pl., Cri. 116 C.

129 The foll. are the expressions occurring in the speeches of Isaeus which conclusively warrant what is said above. The childless Menekles ἐσκόπει ὅπως μὴ ἔσοιτο ἄπαις, ἀλλ’ ἔσοιτο αὐτῷ ὅστις ζῶντα γηροτροφήσοι καὶ τελευτήσαντα θάψοι αὐτὸν καὶ εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον τὰ νομιζόμενα αὐτῷ ποιήσοι, 2, 10. To be cared for in old age, buried after death, and to have permanent attention paid to one’s soul is a single unified conception, in which ritual burial at the hands of one’s own ἔκγονοι (thus securing the cult of the family) does not form the least important part (cf. Pl., Hipp. ma. 291 DE: it is κάλλιστον for a man—according to the popular view—ἀφικομένῳ ἐς γῆρας τοὺς αὑτοῦ γονέας τελευτήσαντας καλῶς περιστείλαντι ὑπὸ τῶν αὑτοῦ ἐκγόνων καλῶς καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς ταφῆναι. Medea says to her children in E., Med. 1032 εἶχον ἐλπίδας πολλὰς ἐν ὑμῖν γηροβοσκήσειν τ’ ἐμὲ καὶ κατθανοῦσαν χερσὶν εὖ περιστελεῖν, ζηλωτὸν ἀνθρώποισιν). That he may share in this attention to the souls of the dead a man must leave behind him a son; upon a son alone this will fall as a sacred duty. Hence a man who has no son takes the chosen heir of his possessions into his own family by adoption. Inheritance and adoption invariably accompany each other in such cases (and even in the first speech, where, though nothing is actually said of adoption, it is certainly implied throughout). The 206 motive of adoption is said in the clearest possible terms to be the desire on the part of the adopter for a permanent care of his own soul at the hands of his adopted son: 2, 25, 46; 6, 51, 65; 7, 30; 9, 7, 36. There is consequently a close connexion between εἶναι κληρονόμον καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ μνήματα ἰέναι, χεόμενοι καὶ ἐναγιοῦντα (6, 51). It is a mark of the heir τὰ νομιζόμενα ποιεῖν, ἐναγίζειν, χεῖσθαι (6, 65); cf. also D. 43, 65. Duties towards the soul of the dead consist in the son and heir’s provision for a solemn funeral, the erection of a handsome grave-monument and in his offering of the τρίτα and ἔνατα καὶ τἆλλα τὰ περὶ τὴν ταφήν: 2, 36, 37; 4, 19; 9, 4. After that he is responsible for the regular continuation of the cult and of sacrifice to the dead, ἐναγίζεσθαι καθ’ ἕκαστον ἐνιαυτόν (2, 46), and generally, καὶ εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον τὰ νομιζόμενα ποιεῖν (2, 10). Then, just as he has to carry on for the dead man his family worships, his ἱερὰ πατρῷα (2, 46: e.g. for Zeus Ktesios: 8, 16); so also he must, as the dead man once did, make regular offering to the πρόγονοι of the house: 9, 7. In this way the family cult secures its own continuity.—Everything in this reminds us in the strongest way of what is done for the continuation of the cult of the dead, esp. by adoption, in the country where ancestor-worship reaches its greatest height—China. Desire to perpetuate the family name, the strongest motive with us in the adoption of male children, could not be so strong in Greece when only individual names were usual. Even this, however, occurs as a motive for the adoption of a son, ἵνα μὴ ἀνώνυμος ὁ οἶκος αὐτοῦ γένηται, 2, 36, 46; cf. Isocr. 19, 35 (and Philodem., Mort., p. 28, 9 ff. Mekl.). The “house” at any rate is called after its ancestors (like those Βουσελίδαι of whom Dem. speaks), and if the house has no male heir this common name will disappear. Apart from this, the adopted person will call himself the son of his adoptive father, and will ensure the preservation of the latter’s name, in the well-known fashion, by giving this name to the eldest (Dem. 39, 27) of his own sons. (A similar perpetuation of a name is probably intended in E., IT. 695–8.)

129 The following are the phrases found in the speeches of Isaeus that clearly support what was previously mentioned. The childless Menekles He looked to ensure that there would be someone without children, but that there would be someone who, while alive, would care for him in his old age and, after his death, would bury him and perform the rituals deemed appropriate for him in the future., 2, 10. To be looked after in old age, buried after death, and to have ongoing care for one’s soul is a single, unified concept, where a proper burial by one’s own descendants (thus ensuring the family's traditions) is an essential part (cf. Pl., Hipp. ma. 291 DE: it is most beautiful for a man—according to common belief—When he reached old age and his parents passed away, he made sure that they were buried well and with great dignity by their grandchildren.. Medea tells her children in E., Med. 1032 I had many hopes in you, that you would care for me in my old age and would cover my dying body well with your hands, making me a figure worthy of admiration among people.). To ensure this ongoing care for the souls of the deceased, a man must leave behind a son; only a son carries this sacred duty. Therefore, a man without a son adopts an heir for his possessions into his own family. Inheritance and adoption always go hand in hand in such cases (even in the first speech, where, although adoption isn't explicitly mentioned, it is certainly implied throughout). The 206 motive behind adoption is clearly expressed as the adopter's desire for ongoing care for his own soul from his adopted son: 2, 25, 46; 6, 51, 65; 7, 30; 9, 7, 36. There is thus a strong connection between to be an heir and go to the graves, pouring out libations and performing rites (6, 51). It denotes the heir's duty to Keep the beliefs, make offerings, be humble. (6, 65); cf. also D. 43, 65. The responsibilities towards the soul of the deceased involve the provision of a formal funeral, the construction of a grand grave marker, and the offering of the Tuesday and Nine and the other things concerning the burial.: 2, 36, 37; 4, 19; 9, 4. After that, the heir is responsible for the ongoing maintenance of the worship and sacrifices for the dead, to be sacrificed every year (2, 46), and generally, and to do the things that are considered appropriate in the future (2, 10). Thus, just as he must continue the family worship for the deceased, his sacred homeland (2, 46: for example, for Zeus Ktesios: 8, 16); he must also regularly offer to the ancestors of the house: 9, 7. In this way, the family worship ensures its own continuity.—Everything here strongly reminds us of what is done to ensure the continuation of the worship of the dead, especially through adoption, in cultures where ancestor worship is most prominent—like in China. The desire to preserve the family name, which is our primary reason for adopting male children, could not be as compelling in Greece, where only personal names were typical. However, this still serves as a motivation for adopting a son, So that his house does not become anonymous., 2, 36, 46; cf. Isocr. 19, 35 (and Philodem., Mort., p. 28, 9 ff. Mekl.). The “house,” in any case, is named after its ancestors (like the Βουσελίδες mentioned by Dem.), and if the house has no male heir, this common name will vanish. Besides this, the adopted child will call himself the son of his adoptive father and will ensure the preservation of the latter’s name, typically by passing this name on to the oldest (Dem. 39, 27) of his sons. (A similar preservation of a name is likely intended in E., IT. 695–8.)

130 Appealing to φῆμαι, πολλαὶ καὶ σφόδρα παλαιαί, Plato asserts, Lg. 927 A, ὡς ἄρα αἱ τῶν τελευτησάντων ψυχαὶ δύναμιν ἔχουσί τινα τελευτήσασαι, ᾗ τῶν κατ’ ἀνθρώπους πραγμάτων ἐπιμελοῦνται. Hence the ἐπίτροποι of orphaned children πρῶτον μὲν τοὺς ἄνω θεοὺς φοβείσθων . . . εἶτα τὰς τῶν κεκμηκότων ψυχάς, αἷς ἐστιν ἐν τῇ φύσει τῶν αὑτῶν ἐκγόνων κήδεσθαι διαφερόντως, καὶ τιμῶσί τε αὐτοὺς εὐμενεῖς καὶ ἀτιμάζουσι δυσμενεῖς. It is only the circle of influence belonging to the ψυχαί which is here limited (and the circle of worship in consequence), not the potency of that influence.

130 Referring to I say, many and very old, Plato asserts, Lg. 927 A, As the souls of those who have passed away have some power in managing the affairs of human life, they care for certain matters that have come to an end.. Thus, the commissioners of orphaned children First of all, fear the gods above... then honor the souls of the deceased, who naturally have a special concern for their descendants, treating them kindly and showing them respect, while the unkind treat them with dishonor.. It is only the influence of the souls that is limited here (and consequently the scope of worship), not the power of that influence.

131 This is true at least of the Greeks, as ancient philosophy was already aware: Arist., Pol. i, 2; Dicaearchus ap. St. Byz. πάτρα (who apparently thinks of the πάτρα as held together by “endogamous” marriage). The whole development of Greek law and politics—this much at least may be conceded to the analysis of Fustel de Coulanges (La Cité antique)—points to the conclusion that the division into the smallest groups goes back to the beginning of Greek life. The Greeks were even then divided into families and groups of kinsfolk, from the combination of which the later Greek state grew up; they never (as happened elsewhere) lived the community life of the tribe or the horde. And yet, can we imagine the Greek gods without the tribal community that worshipped them?

131 This is at least true for the Greeks, as ancient philosophy recognized: Arist., Pol. i, 2; Dicaearchus ap. St. Byz. Dad (who seems to regard the dad as being held together by “endogamous” marriage). The entire evolution of Greek law and politics—this much can at least be acknowledged from Fustel de Coulanges’ analysis in La Cité antique—suggests that the division into the smallest units traces back to the origins of Greek life. The Greeks were already divided into families and groups of relatives, from which the later Greek state emerged; they never lived, as was the case elsewhere, the communal life of the tribe or the horde. And yet, can we really picture the Greek gods without the tribal community that worshipped them?

132 The idea of the Lar familiaris can be translated into Greek not inadequately by the words ὁ κατ’ οἰκίαν ἥρως, ἥρως οἰκουρός, as is done by Dionys. Hal., and Plutarch in their accounts of the story 207 of Ocrisia (D.H. 4, 2, 3; Plu. Fort. Rom. 9, p. 323 C). But this was not an idea current among the Greeks. The Latin genius generis = Lar familiaris (Laber. 54 Rib.) is most nearly approached by the remarkable expression ἥρως συγγενείας, CIA. iii, 1460. Inside the house, at the family hearth (in whose μυχοί, “dwells” Hekate: E., Med. 397), the Greeks worshipped—no longer the spirits of the ancestors—but the θεοὶ πατρῷοι, κτήσιοι, μύχιοι, ἑρκεῖοι. These were compared with the Roman Penates (D.H. 1, 67, 3; cf. Hyg. ap. Macr. 3, 4, 13), but their relationship to the spirits of the house and of the family is considerably less apparent than in the case of the Penates. (It is simply imitation of Roman custom that makes the dying Peregrinus call upon the δαίμονες πατρῷοι καὶ μητρῷοι: Luc., Peregr. 36. Στέφανος τοῖς τοῦ πατρὸς αὑτοῦ δαίμοσιν, ins. from Lykia, CIG. 4232 = BCH. xv, 552, n. 26. τοῖς δαίμοσι τῆς ἀποθανούσης γυναικός, Philo, Leg. ad G. 65, ii, p. 555 M. More in Lob., Agl. 769 n.)

132 The concept of the Lar familiaris can be translated into Greek quite accurately using the terms the household hero, the domestic hero, as Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Plutarch do in their accounts of the story 207 of Ocrisia (D.H. 4, 2, 3; Plu. Fort. Rom. 9, p. 323 C). However, this idea was not commonly recognized among the Greeks. The Latin term genius generis = Lar familiaris (Laber. 54 Rib.) is most closely represented by the notable phrase hero of kinship, CIA. iii, 1460. Within the home, at the family hearth (where μυχοί, “dwells” Hekate: E., Med. 397), the Greeks worshipped—not the spirits of their ancestors—but the ancestral gods, territorial, hidden, protective. These were likened to the Roman Penates (D.H. 1, 67, 3; cf. Hyg. ap. Macr. 3, 4, 13), but their connection to the spirits of the household and family is much less clear than that of the Penates. (It is merely imitation of Roman custom that leads the dying Peregrinus to invoke the ancestral demons: Luc., Peregr. 36. Stefanos to the spirits of his father, inscription from Lycia, CIG. 4232 = BCH. xv, 552, n. 26. to the spirits of the deceased woman, Philo, Leg. ad G. 65, ii, p. 555 M. More in Lob., Agl. 769 n.)

133 The ἀγαθὸς δαίμων of which Attic writers in particular often speak has very indefinite features. Those who used the word combined ideas—no longer fully intelligible—of a divine being of fairly definite nature and shape with this name which in itself was altogether too liable to generalization. Modern writers have declared that it was originally a daimon of the fertility of crops. But there is just as little ground for believing this as there is for identifying it with Dionysos, as was done by the physician Philonides in connexion with an absurd story which he has invented on his own account (Ath. 675 B). There is much, however, that points to the connexion of the ἀγαθὸς δαίμων with chthonic powers. He appears as a snake (Gerhard, Akad. Abh. ii, 24) like all χθόνιοι. (On a snake on a talisman the words are written τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ δαίμονος: P. Mag. Par. 2427 ff.) ἀγαθοδαίμονες was the name given to a special kind of non-poisonous snake (described after Archigenes, in the Vatican iologus brought to light by myself: Rh. Mus. 38, 278; cf. Photius, αρεῖαι ὄφεις, and again esp. s.v. ὄφεις παρείας, 364, 1). Sacrifice was made to them in Alexandria on the 25th Tybi as τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς δαίμοσι τοῖς προνοουμένοις τῶν οἰκιῶν: [Callisth.] i, 32 (cod. A), or as “penates dei” as the words are translated by Jul. Valer., p. 38, 29 ff. (Kuebl.). In this instance the ἀγ. δ. is evidently a good spirit who protects the house. Only with this in mind can we understand how anyone could consecrate his house ἀγαθῷ δαίμονι, as Timoleon did at Syracuse (ἀγαθῷ δαίμονι, Plu., Ips. Laud., 11, p. 542 E; τὴν οἰκίαν ἱερῷ δαίμονι καθιέρωσεν, Plu., Timol. 36, where ἱερῷ is evidently an ancient copyist’s error). Cf. also the saying of Xeniades, D.L. vi, 74. Such guardian spirits of the house are of course familiar enough in our own popular superstition, but in their case “the transition from souls of the dead to kindly house-spirits or kobolds is still demonstrable” (Grimm, p. 913). At the household meal the first few drops of unmixed wine belong by right to the ἀγαθὸς δαίμων (Hug, Plat. Symp.2, p. 23); then follows the libation to Zeus Soter. But sometimes it was the “Heroes” and not the ἀγ. δ. who preceded Zeus Soter (Sch. Pi., I v, 10; Gerhard, p. 39): they have taken the place of the ἀγ. δ., which itself reveals the connexion between the ἀγ. δ. and these “souls”. Another fact pointing in the same direction is the worship of the ἀγαθὸς δαίμων in common with many other deities of chthonic nature in the temple of Trophonios at Lebadeia (Paus. 9, 39, 5). In this case it is mentioned by the side of Tyche and these two are sometimes met with together in grave-inscriptions (e.g. CIG. 2465 f.) and Tyche herself appears with such chthonic deities as Despoina, Plouton, and Persephone (CIG. 208 1464 Sparta). In epitaphic inscriptions δαιμόνων ἀγαθῶν sometimes occurs as completely equivalent to Dis Manibus: e.g. Δαιμόνων ἀγαθῶν Ποτίου, CIG. 2700 b.c. (Mylasa); δαιμόνων ἀγαθῶν Ἀρτέμωνος καὶ Τίτου, Ath. Mitt. ’90, p. 110 (Mylasa); cf. the inscr. from Mylasa in Ath. Mitt. ’90, pp. 276–7 (nn. 23–5, 27). The singular is rare: Δαίμονος ἀγαθοῦ Ἀριστέου κτλ. BCH. ’90, p. 626 (Karia). (δαίμοσιν ἑαυτοῦ τε καὶ Λαιτιτίας τῆς γυναικὸς αὐτοῦ = Dis Manibus suis et Laetitiae uxoris in the bilingual ins. from Beroea, CIG. 4452: cf. 4232 and 5827.) All these have come under Roman influence, but it is worth noticing, all the same, that the ἀγαθὸς δ. was identified with the Di Manes; which means that it was regarded as a daimon that had once been a disembodied human soul.—The subject might be dealt with more fully than would be in place here.

133 The good spirit that Attic writers often mention is quite ambiguous in its characteristics. Those who used the term combined ideas—now not entirely clear—of a divine being with a somewhat specific nature and appearance with this name, which by itself is too prone to broad interpretation. Modern authors claim it originally referred to a spirit of crop fertility, but there is hardly any evidence to support that, just as there’s no basis for linking it to Dionysos, as the physician Philonides did in connection with a ridiculous story he created (Ath. 675 B). However, there’s much that suggests a link between the good spirit and chthonic powers. He appears as a snake (Gerhard, Akad. Abh. ii, 24), like all Underworld entities. (On a snake depicted on a talisman, the words inscribed are the name of the good spirit: P. Mag. Par. 2427 ff.) The term good spirits was used for a specific type of non-poisonous snake (described after Archigenes in the Vatican iologus I uncovered: Rh. Mus. 38, 278; cf. Photius, beautiful snakes, and especially s.v. snake pit, 364, 1). Sacrifices were offered to them in Alexandria on the 25th of Tybi as to the good spirits who care for homes: [Callisth.] i, 32 (cod. A), or as “household gods” as translated by Jul. Valer., p. 38, 29 ff. (Kuebl.). In this case, the ἀγ. δ. is clearly a benevolent spirit that guards the home. With this understanding, we can see why someone would dedicate his house good spirit, as Timoleon did in Syracuse (good spirit, Plu., Ips. Laud., 11, p. 542 E; He dedicated the house to the sacred spirit., Plu., Timol. 36, where ἱερῷ is evidently an ancient copyist’s error). See also the saying of Xeniades, D.L. vi, 74. These guardian spirits of the home are familiar in our own popular beliefs, but in their case, "the transition from souls of the dead to friendly house-spirits or kobolds is still evident" (Grimm, p. 913). At the household meal, the first few drops of unmixed wine rightfully belong to the good spirit (Hug, Plat. Symp.2, p. 23); then follows the libation to Zeus Soter. However, sometimes it was the “Heroes” and not the ἀγ. δ. who preceded Zeus Soter (Sch. Pi., I v, 10; Gerhard, p. 39): they have taken the place of the ἀγ. δ., which itself indicates the connection between the ἀγ. δ. and these “souls.” Another point in the same direction is the worship of the good spirit alongside many other deities of chthonic nature in the temple of Trophonios at Lebadeia (Paus. 9, 39, 5). Here, it's mentioned alongside Tyche, and these two sometimes appear together in grave inscriptions (e.g. CIG. 2465 f.) and Tyche herself appears with such chthonic deities as Despoina, Plouton, and Persephone (CIG. 208 1464 Sparta). In epitaphs, good demons sometimes appears as completely equivalent to Dis Manibus: e.g. Goddess of Good Spirits Potia, CIG. 2700 b.c. (Mylasa); good spirits of Artemis and Titus, Ath. Mitt. ’90, p. 110 (Mylasa); cf. the inscription from Mylasa in Ath. Mitt. ’90, pp. 276–7 (nn. 23–5, 27). The singular form is rare: Δαίμονος ἀγαθοῦ Ἀριστέου κτλ. BCH. ’90, p. 626 (Karia). (to his own demons and to his wife Laetitia = To his ancestors and his wife Laetitia in the bilingual inscription from Beroea, CIG. 4452: cf. 4232 and 5827.) All these have been influenced by Roman culture, but it's interesting to note that the good job. was identified with the Di Manes; which indicates that it was seen as a spirit that had once been a disembodied human soul.—The topic could certainly be explored more extensively than what is dealt with here.

134 In Boeotia (and elsewhere, particularly in Thessaly) the designation of the dead as ἥρως—always an indication of a higher conception of its spirit nature—is especially frequent on tombstones. More will be found on this subject below. The inscriptions are for the most part of late date. But even in the fifth century (at all events at the beginning of the fourth) the custom of “heroizing” the ordinary dead was current. To this Plato Com. (i, p. 622 K.) alludes in the “Menelaos”, τί οὐκ ἀπήγξω, ἵνα Θήβησιν ἥρως γένῃ; (Zenob. vi, 17, etc. The Paroemiogrr. connect this with the Theban custom of refusing the honours of the dead to those who committed suicide. This is certainly wrong and contradicts Pl.’s intention. Keil shows this clearly, Syll. Insc. Boeot., p. 153).

134 In Boeotia (and other places, especially Thessaly), the term for the dead as hero—which always suggests a greater understanding of their spiritual nature—is particularly common on tombstones. More information on this topic can be found below. Most of the inscriptions date from later times. However, even in the fifth century (at least at the start of the fourth), the practice of “heroizing” regular deceased individuals was prevalent. Plato mentions this in the “Menelaos” (Com. i, p. 622 K.) with the phrase Why shouldn't I hang myself, so that I can become a hero to Thebes?; (Zenob. vi, 17, etc.). The Paroemiogr. link this to the Theban practice of denying honors to those who died by suicide, which is certainly incorrect and goes against Plato's intention. Keil makes this clear in Syll. Insc. Boeot., p. 153).

135 Among the Epizephyrian Locrians ὀδύρεσθαι οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπὶ τοῖς τελευτήσασιν, ἀλλ’ ἐπειδὰν ἐκκομίσωσιν, εὐωχοῦνται, Heraclid., Pol. 30, 2. In Keos the men never wear any sign of mourning, though women mourn for a year for a son who dies young; ib. 9, 4 (see Welcker, Kl. Schr. ii, 502). The funeral regulation of Iulis (SIG. 877) published in imitation of Athenian usage implies rather a tendency to exaggerated display of mourning, at least among the common people.

135 Among the Epizephyrian Locrians There’s no mourning for those who have passed away, but when they’re buried, people celebrate., Heraclid., Pol. 30, 2. In Keos, men never show any signs of mourning, even though women mourn for a year for a son who dies young; ib. 9, 4 (see Welcker, Kl. Schr. ii, 502). The funeral customs in Iulis (SIG. 877), published in the style of Athenian practices, suggest a tendency toward exaggerated displays of mourning, at least among the lower classes.

136 e.g. Is. 2, 47: βοηθήσατε καὶ ἡμῖν καὶ ἐκείνῳ τῷ ἐν Ἅιδου ὄντι. Strictly speaking no one can βοηθεῖν the departed in Hades. Few nations have entirely escaped such contradictions between a cult of the dead in the house or at a grave and the conception of the relegation of the soul to an inaccessible other world. They arise from two simultaneously existing mental attitudes (representing also different stages of culture) towards these obscure subjects. The naive theology of the common people reconciles such discrepancies by attributing two souls to men, one of which goes down to Hades while the other remains beside the still-animated body and receives the offerings of the family: e.g. North American Indians: Müller, Ges. d. Amer. Urrel. 66; cf. Tylor, i, 434. These two souls are in reality the creation of two mutually incompatible modes of thought.

136 e.g. Is. 2, 47: Help both us and that person who is in Hades. Technically, no one can help the deceased in Hades. Few cultures have completely avoided the contradictions between a ritual for the dead at home or at a grave and the idea of the soul being sent to an unreachable afterlife. These contradictions stem from two overlapping mindsets (reflecting different cultural stages) regarding these complex topics. The basic beliefs of ordinary people reconcile these inconsistencies by suggesting that humans have two souls: one that descends to Hades and another that stays with the still-living body to receive offerings from the family, for example, among North American Indians: Müller, Ges. d. Amer. Urrel. 66; cf. Tylor, i, 434. In reality, these two souls arise from two conflicting ways of thinking.

137idne testamento cavebit is qui nobis quasi oraculum ediderit nihil post mortem ad nos pertinere? Cic., Fin. ii, 102.—Besides Epic., Theophrastos seems to have made some arrangement for the regular celebration of his memory (by the associates of the Peripatos?). Harp. 139, 4 ff.: μήποτε δὲ ὕστερον νενόμισται τὸ ἐπὶ τιμῇ τινας τῶν ἀποθανόντων συνιέναι καὶ ὀργεῶνας ὁμοίως ὠνομάσθαι· ὡς ἔστι συνιδεῖν ἐκ τῶν Θεοφράστου διαθηκῶν. The will of Thphr. preserved by D.L. 5, 2, 14, is silent on the point. 209

137Will it be stated in the will that those who have sent us messages like oracles will have nothing to do with us after we die? Cic., Fin. ii, 102.—In addition to Epicurus, Theophrastus seems to have arranged for regular celebrations of his memory (by the members of the Peripatos?). Harp. 139, 4 ff.: Maybe in the future, it will be considered an honor for some of the deceased to gather and have ornaments with similar names; it’s like what can be seen in Theophrastus' writings on wills.. The will of Theophrastus, preserved by D.L. 5, 2, 14, does not address this issue. 209

III

138 Oracle ap. D. 43, 66 (cf. 67) τοῖς ἀποφθιμένοις ἐν ἱκνουμένᾳ ἁμέρᾳ (ἐν ταῖς καθηκούσαις ἡμέραις, § 67) τελεῖν τοὺς καθήκοντας καττὰ ôγημένα.—τὰ ôγημένα = τὰ νομιζόμενα “the customary things” (Buttmann, Ausf. Gramm., § 113 n. 7, 1, p. 84 Lob.).

138 Oracle ap. D. 43, 66 (cf. 67) to those who have died on the coming day(during tough times, § 67)to fulfill the usual requirements.—the usual requirements = best practices “the customary things” (Buttmann, Ausf. Gramm., § 113 n. 7, 1, p. 84 Lob.).

139 Inquiry, at sacrifices to the dead, of an ἐξηγητής: Is. 8, 39; of the ἐξηγηταί (who give detailed instructions and advice): [D.] 47, 68 ff. Harp. ἐξηγητής· ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἃ (perh. ὅτε τὰ) πρὸς τοὺς κατοιχομένους νομιζόμενα ἐξηγοῦντο τοῖς δεομένοις. Tim. Lex. ἐξηγηταί· τρεῖς γίνονται πυθόχρηστοι (there is no need to understand this other than literally, i.e. that the college of the πυθόχρ. ἐξηγ. consisted of three members: Schöll, Hermes, 22, 564), οἷς μέλει καθαίρειν τοὺς ἄγει τινὶ ἐνισχηθέντας. The purification of the ἐναγεῖς is closely connected with the cult of the souls. It is true that prescriptions for such purification were to be found also ἐν τοῖς τῶν Εὐπατριδῶν (so Müller, Aesch. Eum. 163 A. 20 [152 n. E.T.]) πατρίοις: Ath. 9, 410 A, and it may be that the college of the ἐξ Εὐπατριδῶν ἐξηγηταί may have also given decisions in such cases. Still, that does not prevent the statement of Timaeus in regard to the ἐξηγ. πυθόχρ. from being true. (Expiations belong principally if not exclusively to the Apolline cult.)

139 Inquiry into sacrifices for the dead, by an analysis: Is. 8, 39; of the exegesis (who provide detailed instructions and advice): [D.] 47, 68 ff. Harp. exegesis; it also covers the (perhaps when the) reaching out to those thought to be living in the underworld, offering guidance to those who need it. Tim. Lex. interpreters; three become oracle readers (this should be understood literally, meaning that the group of the oracle interpreters consisted of three members: Schöll, Hermes, 22, 564), those who are focused on guiding and purifying those who are being led by someone. The purification of the exhaled spirits is closely linked to the worship of souls. It's true that guidelines for such purification could also be found among the aristocrats (as Müller notes, Aesch. Eum. 163 A. 20 [152 n. E.T.]) by traditional customs: Ath. 9, 410 A, and it’s possible that the group of the Eupatrid elites may have also made rulings in such matters. However, this doesn't undermine Timaeus's statement regarding the oracle interpreters. (Expiations are primarily if not exclusively related to the Apolline cult.)

140 Plu., Ser. Num. 17, p. 650 C.D. expressly appeals for confirmation of the belief in a continued existence of the soul after the death of the body to utterances of the Delphic god: ἄχρι τοῦ πολλὰ τοιαῦτα προθεσπίζεσθαι, οὐχ ὅσιόν ἐστι τῆς ψυχῆς καταγνῶναι θάνατον.

140 Plu., Ser. Num. 17, p. 650 C.D. specifically calls for support of the belief in the soul's continued existence after the body dies, citing the words of the Delphic god: Until many such things are foretold, it is not right to know death of the soul..

141 That already in Homer the circle of the ἀγχιστεῖς (in the Athenian legal sense) was called upon to prosecute the blood-feud is certainly probable in itself; it cannot, however, be proved from examples occurring in Homer. Leist’s statements in Graecoital. Rechtsges., p. 42, are not quite exact. The facts are: a father is called upon to avenge his son, and a son his father, and a brother to avenge his brother (γ 307; I 632 f.; ω 434); once the avengers are the κασίγνητοί τε ἔται τε of the murdered man, ο 273. ἔται has a very wide sense and is not even confined to kinship; at any rate it is not simply “cousins” (ἔται καὶ ἀνεψιοί side by side. I 464).—In Attic law, too, in certain cases the duty of prosecuting the murderer extended beyond the limits of the ἀνεψιαδοῖ to more distant relatives and even to the φράτορες of the murdered man (Law ap. D. 43, 57).

141 It’s certainly likely that even in Homer, the circle of the cousins (in the Athenian legal sense) was called to take action in blood feuds; however, this can't be proven based on examples found in Homer. Leist’s claims in Graecoital. Rechtsges., p. 42, are not entirely accurate. The facts are: a father is called to avenge his son, a son to avenge his father, and a brother to avenge his brother (γ 307; I 632 f.; ω 434); at one point, the avengers are the siblings and friends of the murdered man, ο 273. friend has a very broad meaning and isn’t limited to just kinship; it doesn’t simply mean “cousins” (friends and cousins together. I 464).—In Attic law, in certain situations, the responsibility to prosecute the murderer extended beyond the cousins to more distant relatives and even to the φράτορες of the murdered man (Law ap. D. 43, 57).

142 Flight, indeed ἀειφυγία, on account of φόνος ἀκούσιος: Ψ 85 ff. (The fugitive becomes the θεράπων of the person who receives him into his house in the foreign land: l. 90; cf. Ο 431 f.; this must have been the rule.)—Flight on account of φόνος ἑκούσιους (λοχησάμενος 268) ν 259 ff. And so frequently.

142 Flight, indeed unending escape, due to manslaughter: Ψ 85 ff. (The fugitive becomes the caregiver of the person who takes him in when he reaches a foreign land: l. 90; cf. Ο 431 f.; this must have been the norm.)—Flight due to voluntary manslaughter (λοχησάμενος 268) ν 259 ff. And so often.

143 I 632 ff. καὶ μέν τίς τε κασιγνήτοιο φονῆος ποινὴν ἢ οὗ παιδὸς ἑδέξατο τεθνηῶτος· καί ῥ’ ὁ μὲν ἐν δήμῳ μένει αὐτοῦ πόλλ’ ἀποτίσας τοῦ δέ τ’ ἐρητύεται κραδίη καὶ θυμὸς ἀγήνωρ ποινὴν δεξαμένου. Here it is very plainly represented that all that is required is to appease “the heart and spirit” of the receiver of the ποινή: the murdered man is not considered.

143 I 632 ff. And really, who would accept the punishment for killing a sibling or for the loss of a child they’ve mourned? So, the person who stays in the community has settled many debts, while the heart and noble spirit of the one facing the ποινή is still troubled. Here it clearly shows that all that is needed is to appease “the heart and spirit” of the person who receives the punishment: the murdered individual is not taken into account.

144 It is very natural to suppose that the ποινή (as K. O. Müller suggests in Aesch. Eum. 145 [122 E T.]) may have arisen out of the substitution of a vicarious sacrifice instead of that of the murderer himself, who should strictly have been offered to the dead man. In this way primitive human sacrifice has in many cases been replaced by sacrifice of animals. In that case the ποινή too must have originally been offered to the murdered man: in Homeric times 210 only the satisfaction of the living avenger was thought of.—In any case it is a mistake to look upon the permission to buy off the blood-feud as a mitigation of primitive severity in the taking of vengeance due to the intervention of the State. The State in this case mitigated nothing since it took no interest at all (in Homer) in the treatment of murder cases. Of course, legal proceedings can be taken to decide whether a stipulated ποινή has been paid or not (Σ 497 ff.), as in the case of any other συμβόλαιον. But the prosecution of the murderer in all its departments is left entirely in the hands of the family of the murdered man.

144 It's natural to assume that the penalty (as K. O. Müller suggests in Aesch. Eum. 145 [122 E T.]) may have come from replacing the murderer's sacrifice with a vicarious one, rather than the murderer himself being offered to the deceased. This way, primitive human sacrifice has often been replaced by animal sacrifice. In that sense, the punishment was likely originally offered to the murdered man; however, in Homeric times, 210, only the satisfaction of the living avenger was considered. In any case, it’s a mistake to view the option to buy off the blood feud as lessening the primitive harshness of vengeance as a result of state intervention. The state didn’t actually mitigate anything, since it showed no interest (in Homer) in handling murder cases. Certainly, legal action can be taken to determine whether a specified penalty has been paid or not (Σ 497 ff.), just like with any other contract. However, the pursuit of the murderer in all its aspects remains solely the responsibility of the murdered man's family.

145 We have very few details on this point. In Sparta οἱ γέροντες (δικάζουσι) τὰς φονικὰς (δίκας), Arist., Pol. 3, 1, p. 1275b 10 (and in Corinth, too, D.S. 16, 65, 6 ff.). Involuntary homicide is punished by exile and (in this being more severe than at Athens) perpetual exile as it appears. The Spartiate Drakontios serving in the army of the Ten Thousand ἔφυγε παῖς ὢν οἴκοθεν παῖδα ἄκων κατακανὼν (like Patroklos in fact, Ψ 87), ξυήλῃ πατάξας, Xen., An. 4, 8, 25. If his banishment had been only temporary the period must have expired long before.—In Kyme there are vestiges of legal prosecution of murder (with witnesses): Arist., Pol. 1269a, 1 ff.—In Chalkis ἐπὶ Θράκῃ the laws of Androdamas of Rhegion were in force περί τε τὰ φονικὰ καὶ τὰς ἐπικλήρους, Arist., Pol. 2, 8, p. 1274b 23 ff.—In Lokri were used the laws of Zaleukos in combination with Cretan, Spartan and Areopagite institutions; these last undoubtedly dealing with homicide, which must therefore have been regulated constitutionally. (Str. vi, 260, following Eph.)

145 We have very few details on this point. In Sparta, the elders (the elders)(They are judging.)the deadly(Justice), Arist., Pol. 3, 1, p. 1275b 10 (and in Corinth, too, D.S. 16, 65, 6 ff.). Involuntary homicide is punished by exile and, notably more harshly than in Athens, by perpetual exile. The Spartan Drakontios, serving in the army of the Ten Thousand, Left home as a child, killing a boy. (similar to Patroklos in fact, Ψ 87), ξυήλῃ πατάξας, Xen., An. 4, 8, 25. If his exile had only been temporary, that period should have ended long ago. In Kyme, there are signs of legal prosecution for murder (with witnesses): Arist., Pol. 1269a, 1 ff. In Chalkis, in Thrace, the laws of Androdamas of Rhegion were in effect περί τε τα φονικά καὶ τας επικλήρους, Arist., Pol. 2, 8, p. 1274b 23 ff. In Lokri, the laws of Zaleukos were used in conjunction with Cretan, Spartan, and Areopagite institutions; these last undoubtedly addressed homicide, indicating that it must have been regulated constitutionally. (Str. vi, 260, following Eph.)

146 The limits of those qualified to inherit extends in Athenian law μέχρι ἀνεψιαδῶν παίδων (Law ap. D. 43, 51; cf. § 27) as did the duty of avenging murder μεχρὶ ἀνεψιαδῶν: D. 47, 72 (ἐντὸς ἀνεψιότητος, which must mean the same thing, Law ap. D. 43, 57). The circle of persons thus united in the right of inheritance and the duty of taking vengeance for murder constituted the ἀγχιστεία, the body of kinsfolk tracing their descent (in the male line only) from the same man, the father, grandfather, or great-grandfather of them all. This is the limit to which the γονεῖς are traced: Is. 8, 32; cf. above, note 123. Many nations of the earth are familiar with a similar limitation of the narrower body of kinsfolk composing a “house”: as to the underlying reasons for the practice many conjectures are made by H. E. Seebohm, On the Structure of Greek Tribal Society (1895).

146 The limits of those eligible to inherit in Athenian law extend to μέχρι cousins παίδων (Law ap. D. 43, 51; cf. § 27), similar to the duty of avenging murder up to cousins: D. 47, 72 (within cousinship, which seems to mean the same thing, Law ap. D. 43, 57). The group of people connected through the right of inheritance and the obligation to take vengeance for murder formed the ἀγχιστεία, the group of relatives tracing their descent (only through the male line) from the same ancestor, the father, grandfather, or great-grandfather of them all. This marks the boundary to which the parents are traced: Is. 8, 32; cf. above, note 123. Many nations around the world are familiar with a similar restriction regarding the close-knit group of relatives that make up a “house”: as for the reasons behind this practice, many theories are proposed by H. E. Seebohm in On the Structure of Greek Tribal Society (1895).

147 As to the restless wandering of the βιαιοθάνατοι more details will be given below [Append. vii]. In the meantime it will be enough to refer to A., Eum. 98, where the still unavenged soul of the murdered Klytaimnestra complains αἰσχρῶς ἀλῶμαι. A later authority uses words that correspond well with ancient belief: Porph., Abst. ii, 47, τῶν ἀνθρώπων αἱ τῶν βίᾳ ἀποθανόντων (ψυχαὶ) κατέχονται πρὸς τῷ σώματι, like the souls of the ἄταφοι.

147 Regarding the restless wandering of the βιαιοθάνατοι, more details will be provided below [Append. vii]. For now, it suffices to reference A., Eum. 98, where the still unavenged soul of the murdered Klytaimnestra laments αἰσχρῶς αλῶμαι. A later authority uses terms that align well with ancient belief: Porph., Abst. ii, 47, People who have died by violence(souls)κατέχονται to the body, like the souls of the unburied.

148 In Homeric times the injured dead becomes a θεῶν μήνιμα to the evil-doer (X 358, λ 73). Later times believed that the soul of the dead man himself angrily pursued the murderer with its terrors till it drove him beyond its own boundaries: ὁ θανατωθεὶς θυμοῦται τῷ δράσαντι κτλ., Pl., Lg. 865 DE, appealing to παλαιόν τινα τῶν ἀρχαίων μύθων λεγόμενον; cf. X., Cyr. 8, 7, 18: A., Cho. 39 ff., 323 ff. If the next-of-kin whose duty it is to avenge the death of his relative shirks the duty incumbent on him the anger of the dead man is turned upon the latter: Pl., Leg. 9, 866 B—τοῦ παθόντος προστρεπομένου τὴν πάθην. The indignant soul becomes προστρόπαιος. προστρόπαιος probably 211 applies only in a derivative sense to a δαίμων who takes the part of the dead man (esp. Ζεὺς προστρόπαιος); it is strictly speaking an epithet of the soul itself in its longing for vengeance. Thus in Antiphon Tetral. 1, γ 10, ἡμῖν μὲν προστρόπαιος ὁ ἀποθανὼν οὐκ ἔσται. 3, δ 10, ὁ ἀποκτείνας (or rather ὁ τεθνηκὼς) τοῖς αἰτίοις προστρόπαιος ἔσται. So, too, A., Cho. 287, ἐκ προστροπαίων ἐν γένει πεπτωκότων. EM. 42, 7, Ἠριγόνην, ἀναρτήσασαν ἑαυτήν, προστρόπαιον τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις γενέσθαι. We can, however, see particularly well from this case how easily the change came about from a soul in a special condition to a similar daimonic being which takes the place of the soul of the dead. The same Antiphon speaks also of οἱ τῶν ἀποθανόντων προστρόπαιοι, ὁ προστρόπαιος τοῦ ἀποθανόντος as something distinct from the dead man himself: Tetr. 3, α 4; 3, β 8; cf. ὁ Μυρτίλου προστρόπαιος, Paus. 2, 18, 2, etc.; cf. Zacher, Dissert. phil. Halens., iii, p. 228. The injured dead himself becomes ἀραῖος, Soph., Tr. 1201 ff. (cf. fr. 367; E., IT. 778; Med. 608); later his place is taken by δαίμονες ἀραῖοι. What terrible evils the unavenged soul can bring upon the person who is called upon to take vengeance are painted for us by Aesch. in Cho. 278 ff. (or else as some think an ancient interpolator of A.). Sickness and trouble might be sent over several generations by such παλαιὰ μηνίματα of the dead: Pl., Phdr. 244 D (see Lobeck’s account, Agl. 636 f.). True to ancient beliefs an Orphic hymn prays to the Titanes μῆνιν χαλεπὴν ἀποπέμπειν, εἴ τις ἀπὸ χθονίων προγόνων οἴκοισι πελάσθη, H. 37, 7 f.; cf. 39, 9–10.

148 In Homeric times, the injured dead became a gods anger to the wrongdoer (X 358, λ 73). Later generations believed that the soul of the deceased person pursued the murderer with its terrors until it drove him beyond the thresholds of the living: The one who was killed is angry at the one who did it, etc., Pl., Lg. 865 DE, referencing a certain old tale from the ancient myths; cf. X., Cyr. 8, 7, 18: A., Cho. 39 ff., 323 ff. If a relative whose duty it is to avenge the death of a loved one neglects that responsibility, the anger of the deceased turns against him: Pl., Leg. 9, 866 B—the suffering one turning to suffering. The outraged soul becomes προστρόπαιος. προστρόπαιος probably 211 applies only in a derivative sense to a spirit who advocates for the deceased (especially Zeus the Protector); it is technically an epithet of the soul itself in its desire for revenge. Thus, in Antiphon Tetral. 1, γ 10, The deceased will no longer be a protector for us.. 3, δ 10, the killer (or rather the deceased) It will be a monument to the guilty.. Similarly, A., Cho. 287, fallen from the ranks in general. EM. 42, 7, Erigone, having hanged herself, aimed to become a memorial to the Athenians.. We can, however, clearly see from this instance how easily the concept shifted from a soul in a special state to a similar daimonic being that took the place of the deceased's soul. The same Antiphon also refers to the memorials of the deceased, the memorial for the one who has passed away as something distinct from the dead person themselves: Tetr. 3, α 4; 3, β 8; cf. Myrtilus the celebrant, Paus. 2, 18, 2, etc.; cf. Zacher, Dissert. phil. Halens., iii, p. 228. The injured dead person themselves becomes ἀραῖος, Soph., Tr. 1201 ff. (cf. fr. 367; E., IT. 778; Med. 608); later, their role is taken by scattered demons. The terrible misfortunes an unavenged soul can inflict on the person responsible for vengeance are illustrated for us by Aesch. in Cho. 278 ff. (or alternatively by an ancient interpolator of A.). Illness and distress could be passed down through multiple generations by such old messages of the dead: Pl., Phdr. 244 D (see Lobeck’s account, Agl. 636 f.). True to ancient beliefs, an Orphic hymn prays to the Titans If anyone is close to the homes of their earthy ancestors, it's hard to send away their wrath., H. 37, 7 f.; cf. 39, 9–10.

149 χρεών ἐστιν ὑπεξελθεῖν τῷ παθόντι τὸν δράσαντα τὰς ὥρας πάσας τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ, καὶ ἐρημῶσαι πάντας τοὺς οἰκείους τόπους ξυμπάσης τῆς πατρίδος, Pl., Lg. ix, 865 E. The law says in the case of the criminal convicted of murder εἴργειν μὲν τῆς τοῦ παθόντος πατρίδος, κτείνειν δὲ οὐχ ὅσιον ἁπανταχοῦ, D. 23, 38.

149 The person who has suffered must retreat from all the places that experienced the events of the past year and leave behind all the familiar spots in their homeland., Pl., Lg. ix, 865 E. The law states that in the case of a criminal convicted of murder It is not allowed to enter the victim's homeland, but also not just anywhere., D. 23, 38.

150 When the victim was a citizen, and also in wilful murder of a non-citizen. See Mei. and Sch., Att. Proc.2, p. 379, n. 520.—When the citizenship of a city rested upon conquest the lives of the subjects belonging to the older subject population were of less account. In Tralles (Karia) the murder of one of the Leleges by an (Argive) full citizen might be bought off by payment of a bushel of peas (a purely symbolical ποινή) to the relations of the victim: Plu., Q.Gr. 46, p. 302 B.

150 When the victim was a citizen, and also in the case of willful murder of a non-citizen. See Mei. and Sch., Att. Proc.2, p. 379, n. 520.—When a city's citizenship was based on conquest, the lives of the subjects from the older population mattered less. In Tralles (Karia), the murder of one of the Leleges by a (Argive) full citizen could be settled by paying a bushel of peas (a purely symbolic penalty) to the victim's relatives: Plu., Q.Gr. 46, p. 302 B.

151 On the expiry of the legally appointed period of banishment the relations of the dead man do not seem to have been allowed to refuse αἴδεσις. See Philippi, Areop. u. Epheten, 115 f.

151 Once the officially designated banishment period comes to an end, it appears that the deceased's family was not permitted to decline αἴδεσις. See Philippi, Areop. u. Epheten, 115 f.

152 Law ap. D. 43, 57.

152 Law app. D. 43, 57.

153 D. 37, 59. See Philippi, op. cit., p. 144 ff. Cf. E., Hipp. 1435 f., 1442 f., 1448 f.

153 D. 37, 59. See Philippi, cited work, p. 144 ff. Cf. E., Hipp. 1435 f., 1442 f., 1448 f.

154 Such prohibition against taking a ποινή for murder is made by the Law ap. D. 23, 28: τοὺς δ’ ἀνδροφόνους ἐξεῖναι ἀποκτείνειν . . . λυμαίνεσθαι δὲ μή, μηδὲ ἀποινᾶν (cf. § 33 τὸ δὲ μηδ’ ἀποινᾶν· μὴ χρήματα πράττειν, τὰ γὰρ χρήματα ἄποινα ὠνόμαζον οἱ παλαιοί). In spite of this Meier and others unjustifiably conclude that murder could be indemnified by payment of money, from the illegal practice mentioned in [D.] 58, 29: this speaks rather for the contrary. They have more appearance of justification when they appeal to Harp. (Phot. Suid., E.M. 784, 26; AB. 313, 5 ff.), s.v. ὑποφόνια· τὰ ἐπὶ φόνῳ διδόμενα χρήματα τοῖς οἰκείοις τοῦ φονευθέντος, ἵνα μὴ ἐπεξίωσιν. On the strength of this Hermann, Gr. Staatsalt.5 104, 6, says, “even intentional murder could be absolutely indemnified.” Nothing is actually said of φόνος ἑκούσιος here nor do we anywhere learn that the payment of ὑποφόνια 212 on the occasion of a murder was ever a formally legalized proceeding. It remains possible, and even in the circumstances more probable, that Dinarch. and Thphr. in the passages on ὑποφόνια quoted by Harp. referred to the practice as one forbidden by law, though it might be, on occasion, an actual fact. If we had only the gloss of Suidas—ἄποινα· λύτρα, ἃ δίδωσί τις ὑπὲρ φόνου ἢ σώματος. οὕτως Σόλων ἐν νόμοις—we might have concluded that payment of such blood-money was allowed in Athens and mentioned in Solon’s laws as allowable. This would be quite as justifiable as to argue as above from Harp. s. ὑποφόνια. We know, in fact, that the law referred to the ἄποινα and ἀποινᾶν as forbidden things, from the passages already quoted from Dem. (23, 28–33). From these the gloss was itself probably derived.

154 The law clearly prohibits taking a penalty for murder, as stated in the Law ap. D. 23, 28: It's allowed to kill murderers... but don’t harm anyone else, nor demand a ransom. (cf. § 33 But don't even negotiate for a ransom; it's not good to deal in money, for the ancients called money a ransom.). Despite this, Meier and others mistakenly conclude that murder could be compensated with a payment. This interpretation is contradicted by reference to the illegal practice mentioned in [D.] 58, 29, which suggests the opposite. Their argument seems more valid when they cite Harp. (Phot. Suid., E.M. 784, 26; AB. 313, 5 ff.), s.v. Murder compensation: the money given to the family of the murdered person so that they do not seek revenge.. On this basis, Hermann, Gr. Staatsalt.5 104, 6, claims that “even intentional murder could be fully compensated.” However, there's no mention of deliberate homicide, nor do we learn anywhere that the payment of Assassination 212 for murder was ever an officially recognized legal process. It's more likely that Dinarch. and Thphr. in the passages about murder cited by Harp. referred to this practice as something forbidden by law, even if it happened in reality. If we only had the gloss from Suidas—Ransom: payment someone gives for a murder or injury. Thus, Solon wrote in his laws.—we might have concluded that such blood-money payments were permitted in Athens and recognized in Solon’s laws. This argument would be just as valid as the previous one based on Harp. s. subdued sound. In fact, we know that the law considered ransom and ἀποινᾶν as forbidden, based on the previously quoted passages from Dem. (23, 28–33). The gloss itself probably derived from these sources.

155 We cannot, however, believe on the poor authority of Sch. Dem. p. 607, 16 ff., that the ἱεροποιοὶ ταῖς Σεμναῖς θεαῖς were selected out of the whole Athenian citizen body by the Areiopagos. (“Three” were chosen out of all the Athenians: D. 21, 115; at other times “ten”: Dinarch. ap. EM. 469, 12 ff.; an indefinite number: Phot. ἱεροποιοί.) According to all analogies we should rather expect this selection to have been made by the popular Assembly.

155 However, we cannot rely solely on the questionable authority of Sch. Dem. p. 607, 16 ff., to believe that the Priests of the Venerable Goddesses were chosen from the entire Athenian citizen body by the Areiopagos. (“Three” were selected from all the Athenians: D. 21, 115; at other times “ten”: Dinarch. ap. EM. 469, 12 ff.; an unspecified number: Phot. priestesses.) Based on all available evidence, we would expect this selection to have been made by the popular Assembly instead.

156 αἱ διωμοσίαι καὶ τὰ τόμια, Antiphon, Herod. 88. In more detail D. 23, 67–8. Those who had to take an oath swore by the Σεμναὶ θεαί and other gods: Dinarch., adv. Demosth. 47. Both sides had to swear to the justice of their case in respect of the material facts in dispute (Philippi, Areop., pp. 87–95). Such a compulsory oath taken by both parties could not of course in any circumstances serve as proof: one side at least must be perjured. Nor can the Athenians themselves have failed to see this. It is surely doing them an injustice not to see the simple explanation of this strange sort of preliminary oath-taking and to dismiss the matter with a reference to the Athenians as “not a legally-minded people” (as Philippi does, p. 88). It is much more natural to suppose that this double oath, taken under circumstances of peculiar solemnity, was not regarded as a juridical matter at all, but had a purely religious sense (as it had in the quite similar cases mentioned by Meiners, Allg. Gesch. d. Relig. ii, 296 f.). The oath-taker invokes a dreadful curse upon himself if he breaks his oath and devotes αὑτὸν καὶ γένος καὶ οἰκίαν τὴν αὑτοῦ (Antiphon, Herod. 11) to the Curse-Goddesses, the Ἀραί or the Ἐρινύες αἵ θ’ ὑπὸ γαῖαν ἀνθρώπους τίνυνται, ὅτις κ’ ἐπίορκον ὀμόσσῃ (Τ 259 f.)—and to the Gods who are to punish his children and his whole kith and kin on earth (Lycurg., Leocr. 79). If the court discovers the perjured party the punishment due to his action overtakes him (or if he is the plaintiff, he fails in his purpose) and at the same time the justice of heaven punishes him for his broken oath (cf. D. 23, 68). But the court may make a mistake and not find out the perjurer; in which case the perjurer is still punished for he becomes a victim of the gods to whom he has devoted himself—who do not err. Thus the double oath is an addition to the judicial inquiry, and heavenly punishment stands side by side with that of men. The two may coincide, but this need not be so, and in this way the guilty is punished whatever happens. (How familiar such ideas were in antiquity we see from expressions used by orators: Isoc. 18, 3; D. 19, 239–40; Lycurg., Leocr. 79.) The oath, being an appeal to a higher court, supplemented human justice, or rather the legal processes of men supplemented the oath-taking, for in this partnership the appeal to an oath must have been the older member. 213

156 The agreements and the boundaries, Antiphon, Herod. 88. For more details, see D. 23, 67–8. Those who needed to take an oath swore by the Respectful Goddesses and other gods: Dinarch., adv. Demosth. 47. Both sides had to affirm the righteousness of their case in relation to the material facts at issue (Philippi, Areop., pp. 87–95). This compulsory oath taken by both parties could not possibly serve as proof since one of them must be lying. The Athenians themselves surely recognized this. It is unfair to overlook the straightforward explanation of this unusual type of preliminary oath-taking and to dismiss it by labeling the Athenians as “not a legally-minded people” (as Philippi does, p. 88). It is much more reasonable to assume that this dual oath, taken in particularly solemn circumstances, was not viewed as a legal matter at all, but had purely religious significance (as seen in similar cases referenced by Meiners, Allg. Gesch. d. Relig. ii, 296 f.). The person taking the oath invokes a terrible curse upon himself if he breaks it, committing himself, his lineage, and his household (Antiphon, Herod. 11) to the Curse-Goddesses, the A curse or the The Furies, who punish those on Earth, target anyone who makes a false oath. (Τ 259 f.)—and to the gods who are meant to punish his children and entire family on earth (Lycurg., Leocr. 79). If the court identifies the perjurer, the punishment for their actions will catch up with them (or if they are the plaintiff, they will not succeed in their goal) and simultaneously, divine justice will reprimand them for their broken oath (cf. D. 23, 68). However, the court might make a mistake and not discover the perjurer; in that case, the perjurer is still punished because they become a target of the gods to whom they have committed themselves—who are infallible. Therefore, the double oath serves as an addition to the judicial process, with divine punishment existing alongside human punishment. The two can happen at the same time, but this isn’t necessary, and this way, the guilty party is punished regardless of the situation. (The familiarity of these ideas in ancient times is evident from phrases used by orators: Isoc. 18, 3; D. 19, 239–40; Lycurg., Leocr. 79.) The oath, being an appeal to a higher authority, complemented human justice, or rather, the legal processes of people complemented the oath-taking, as in this relationship, the appeal to an oath must have been the earlier practice. 213

157 Poll. 8, 117, καθ’ ἕκαστον δὲ μῆνα τριῶν ἡμερῶν ἐδίκαζον (the judges on the Areiopagos) ἐφεξῆς, τετάρτῃ φθίνοντος, τρίτῃ, δευτέρᾳ.

157 Poll. 8, 117, every month, every three days (the judges on the Areiopagos) in sequence, on the fourth day, third, second.

158 οἱ Ἀρεοπαγῖται τρεῖς που τοῦ μῆνος ἡμέρας τὰς φονικὰς δίκας ἐδίκαζον, ἑκάστῃ τῶν θεῶν μίαν ἡμέραν ἀπονέμοντες, Sch. Aeschin. 1, 188, p. 282 Sch. This certainly implies that the limitation of the number of the Erinyes to three (and not two for example)—which first appears in Eurip., but was certainly not his own invention—was officially current in the worship of the city.—Since these three days were sacred to the Erinyes, as goddesses of Hades, they counted as ἀποφράδες ἡμέραι: EM. 131, 16 f.; Et. Gud. 70, 5 (the thirtieth day of the month is for that reason φαύλη πᾶσιν ἔργοις acc. to “Orpheus” fr. 28 Ab.).

158 The Areopagites heard murder cases for three days each month, with one day dedicated to each of the respective gods., Sch. Aeschin. 1, 188, p. 282 Sch. This clearly suggests that the idea of limiting the Erinyes to three (rather than two, for example)—first noted in Euripides, though he did not create it—was widely accepted in the city's worship. Since these three days were sacred to the Erinyes, as goddesses of the Underworld, they were called days of atonement: EM. 131, 16 f.; Et. Gud. 70, 5 (thus, the thirtieth day of the month is considered bad for everything according to “Orpheus” fr. 28 Ab.).

159 Paus. 1, 28, 6.

159 Pause. 1, 28, 6.

160 The Erinyes are the accusers of Orestes not only in Aeschylus (and thence in Eurip. too, IT. 940 ff.), but also in the varying accounts derived from different sources, in which the twelve gods served as judges ap. D. 23, 66 (cf. 74, and Dinarch., adv. Dem. 87).

160 The Furies are the accusers of Orestes not only in Aeschylus (and also in Euripides, IT. 940 ff.), but also in the different versions from various sources, where the twelve gods acted as judges according to D. 23, 66 (see also 74, and Dinarchus, adv. Dem. 87).

161 The Erinyes are said ἀπὸ ζῶντος ῥοφεῖν ἐρυθρὸν ἐκ μελέων πέλανον, A., Eum. 264 f.; cf. 183 f.; 302; 305. In this they closely resemble the “vampires” which we hear of especially in Slav popular mythology, and the Tii of the Polynesians, etc. These, however, are the souls of the dead returned from the grave and sucking men’s blood.

161 The Erinyes are said to be from the living flow red from the flesh of the fish, A., Eum. 264 f.; cf. 183 f.; 302; 305. In this way, they are very similar to the “vampires” we often hear about in Slav popular mythology, as well as the Tii of the Polynesians, and others. However, these beings are the souls of the dead who come back from the grave and feed on human blood.

162 The Erinyes say to Orestes: ἐμοὶ τραφείς τε καὶ καθιερωμένος καὶ ζῶν με δαίσεις οὐδὲ πρὸς βωμῷ σφαγείς, A., Eum. 304 f. The matricide is divis parentum (i.e. their Manes) sacer, their sacrificial victim (θῦμα καταχθονίου Διός D.H. 2, 10, 3), in the older belief of Greece, too.

162 The Furies say to Orestes: You will sacrifice me, nourished and blessed, while I'm still alive, and not sacrificed on the altar., A., Eum. 304 f. The act of killing one's mother is parental division (meaning their spirits) sacred, their sacrificial offering (θῦμα of the underworld Zeus D.H. 2, 10, 3), in the ancient beliefs of Greece, too.

163 See Rh. Mus. 50, 6 ff.

163 See *Rh. Mus.* 50, 6 ff.

164 The fact that after receiving the αἴδεσις of the dead man’s relatives the agent of a φόνος ἀκούσιος was still required to offer the expiatory sacrifice as well as undergo purification (ἱλασμός and καθαρμός) is alluded to by Dem. 23, 72–3, in the double expression θῦσαι καὶ καθαρθῆναι, ὁσιοῦν καὶ καθαίρεσθαι (cf. Müller, Aesch. Eum., p. 144 [122, n. 2, E.T.]).

164 The fact that after receiving the awe from the dead man's relatives, the agent of a manslaughter was still required to offer the expiatory sacrifice and undergo purification (atonement and cleansing) is mentioned by Dem. 23, 72–3, in the dual expression To sacrifice and be purified, to be made holy and to cleanse. (cf. Müller, Aesch. Eum., p. 144 [122, n. 2, E.T.]).

165 See Philippi, Areop. u. Eph. 62.

165 See Philippi, Areop. u. Eph. 62.

166 In the Iliad and the Odyssey there is a total absence not only of all reference to purification from blood-guiltiness but of the necessary conditions for it. The murderer goes freely among men without there being any fear of others suffering from a μίασμα attaching to him. Cf. the case especially of Theoklymenos, ο 271–8. Lobeck rightly emphasizes this, Agl. 301. K. O. Müller’s attempts to prove in spite of everything that purifications from the stain of murder were a Homeric custom, are failures. See Nägelsbach, Hom. Theol.2, p. 293.—The oldest examples of purifications from murder in the literature are (Lobeck 309): purification of Achilles from the blood of Thersites in the Αἰθιοπίς, p. 33 Kink.; refusal of Neleus to purify Herakles from the murder of Iphitos: Hesiod ἐν καταλόγοις, Sch., Il. Β 336.—Mythical exx. of such purifications in later accounts: Lob., Agl. 968–9.

166 In the Iliad and the Odyssey, there is a complete lack of any mention of purification from blood guilt, as well as the necessary conditions for such purification. The murderer interacts freely with others without any concern about a contamination affecting them. This is particularly evident in the case of Theoklymenos, ο 271–8. Lobeck rightly points this out, Agl. 301. K. O. Müller's attempts to argue that purifications for the stain of murder were a custom in Homer's time are inadequate. See Nägelsbach, Hom. Theol.2, p. 293.—The earliest examples of purifications from murder in literature are (Lobeck 309): the purification of Achilles from the blood of Thersites in the Abyssinian, p. 33 Kink.; the refusal of Neleus to purify Herakles for the murder of Iphitos: Hesiod in lists, Sch., Il. Β 336.—Mythical examples of such purifications in later accounts: Lob., Agl. 968–9.

167 E g. offering of cakes, sacrifice of drink-offerings without wine, burning of the materials of sacrifice; cf. the description of ἱλασμός (in this place clearly distinguished from καθαρμός) in A.R. iv, 712 ff. Similar account (offerings without wine, etc.) of the ἱλασμός (which is, however, improperly called καθαρμός, l. 466) of the Eumenides at Kolonos which the chorus recommends to Oedipus, S., O.C. 469 ff. No one might eat of the expiatory sacrifice: Porph., Abst. 2, 44. It is burnt completely: Stengel, Jahrb. f. Phil. 1883, p. 369 ff.—The 214 clash of bronze was used πρὸς πᾶσαν ἀφοσίωσιν καὶ ἀποκάθαρσιν: Apollod. fr. 36 (and in offerings to Hekate, Theoc. ii, 36; as protection against ghosts, Luc., Philops. 15; Sch. Theoc. ii, 36; Tz., Lyc. 77. Clash of bronze in this apotropaic sense occurs, too, in the dance of the Kouretes, etc.; see below). The ritual of expiation was affected in many ways by admixture of foreign superstitions from Phrygia and Lydia. Its chief source is to be found in the Cretan worship of the (chthonic) Zeus. Thence it seems to have spread all over Greece assisted by the Apolline oracle of Delphi. This is why the ram, the peculiar victim of Ζεὺς χθόνιος, is the principal victim in expiatory sacrifices, its fleece, the Διὸς κώδιον, receiving the various materials of expiation, etc.

167 E.g. offering cakes, pouring drink offerings without wine, burning the sacrificial materials; see the description of atonement (here clearly different from catharsis) in A.R. iv, 712 ff. A similar description (offerings without wine, etc.) of the appeasement (which is, however, incorrectly called cleansing, l. 466) of the Eumenides at Kolonos suggested to Oedipus by the chorus, S., O.C. 469 ff. No one was allowed to eat from the expiatory sacrifice: Porph., Abst. 2, 44. It is completely burned: Stengel, Jahrb. f. Phil. 1883, p. 369 ff.—The 214 clash of bronze was used to every commitment and cleansing: Apollod. fr. 36 (and in offerings to Hekate, Theoc. ii, 36; as protection against ghosts, Luc., Philops. 15; Sch. Theoc. ii, 36; Tz., Lyc. 77. The clash of bronze in this protective sense also appears in the dance of the Kouretes, etc.; see below). The expiation ritual was influenced in many ways by foreign superstitions from Phrygia and Lydia. Its main source seems to be found in the Cretan worship of the (chthonic) Zeus. It appears to have spread throughout Greece, supported by the Apolline oracle of Delphi. This is why the ram, the special victim of Hades, is the main victim in expiatory sacrifices, with its fleece, the Zeus's notebook, receiving the various materials for expiation, etc.

168 On the chthonic character of the deities of expiation see in gen. K. O. Müller, Aesch. Eum., p. 139 ff. (112 ff.). Chief among them is Ζεὺς μειλίχιος (a euphemistic title; cf. above, n. 5), who is unmistakably a χθόνιος. Hence, like all χθόνιοι he is represented as a snake on the votive tablet to Ζ. μειλ. discovered in the Peiraeus (certainly the Athenian god and not a foreign deity identified with this god whom all Athenians knew well from the feast of the Diasia): BCH. 7, 507 ff.; CIA. ii, 1578 ff. On a votive insc. from Lykia we have, side by side with the chthonic Hekate, Διὶ Μειλιχίῳ καὶ Ἐνοδίᾳ, BCH. 13, 392. Other θεοὶ μειλίχιοι in Lokris were worshipped with nocturnal sacrifice (as regularly in the case of underworld deities): Paus. 10, 38, 8. The δαίμονες μειλίχιοι as χθόνιοι are contrasted with the μακάρεσσιν οὐρανίοις in the oracle verses ap. Phlegon, Macr. iv, p. 93, 5 Kel.: deis milicheis Acta Lud. Saecul. Tab. A l. 11 [= CIL. vi, 32, 323; see Mommsen, Ges. Schr. viii, 570].—Then come the ἀποτρόπαιοι: their nature can be guessed from the fact that they were worshipped together with the dead and Hekate on the thirtieth day of the month (see above, n. 88). After a bad dream offerings were made to the ἀποτρόπαιοι, to Ge and the Heroes: Hp., Diaet. 4, 8, vi, p. 652 L. Ζεὺς ἀποτρόπαιος must have been a χθόνιος, but we have side by side with him an Ἀθηνᾶ ἀποτροπαία (and an Apollo ἀποτρ. too): ins. from Erythrai, SIG. 600, 69; 115: the provinces of Ὀλύμπιοι and χθόνιοι were not always kept absolutely distinct.—An ancient and hereditary service of the propitiation deities belonged to the Attic family of the Phytalids who had once purified and offered expiatory sacrifice for Theseus after the murder of Skiron and others (ἁγνίσαντες καὶ μειλίχια θύσαντες): Plu., Thes. 12. The gods to whom this family offered sacrifice were Demeter and Zeus Meilichios: Paus. 1, 37, 2–4.—Isoc. 5, 117, makes a clear distinction between the θεοὶ Ὀλύμπιοι and the gods to whom only an apotropaic cult, ἀποπομπάς, was offered; these being the gods of expiation (cf. ἀποδιοπομπεῖσθαι in propitiatory sacrifices; ἀποπομπαῖοι θεοί: Apollod. ap. Harp. ἀποπομπάς. Cf. also ἀποπομπή of evil daimones in contrast to the ἐπιπομπή of the same: Anon. Vir. Herb. xxii, 165. See Hemsterhuys, Lucian ii, p. 255 Bip.; Lob., Agl. 984, ii).

168 For information on the underworld nature of the expiation deities, see generally K. O. Müller, Aesch. Eum., p. 139 ff. (112 ff.). The main deity among them is Gentle Zeus (a euphemistic title; cf. above, n. 5), who is clearly an underworld deity. Like all underworld deities, he is depicted as a snake on the votive tablet dedicated to Ζ. email., found in the Peiraeus (certainly the Athenian god, not a foreign deity identified with a god well-known to all Athenians from the festival of the Diasia): BCH. 7, 507 ff.; CIA. ii, 1578 ff. On a votive inscription from Lycia, we find, alongside the chthonic Hekate, To Dius Meilichios and Enochios, BCH. 13, 392. Other gentle gods in Lokris were honored with nocturnal sacrifices (as is customary with underworld deities): Paus. 10, 38, 8. The gentle demons as chthonians are contrasted with the blessed are the heavenly in the oracle verses cited by Phlegon, Macr. iv, p. 93, 5 Kel.: deis milicheis Acta Lud. Saecul. Tab. A l. 11 [= CIL. vi, 32, 323; see Mommsen, Ges. Schr. viii, 570].—Next come the no modern equivalent: their nature is evident from the fact that they were worshipped alongside the dead and Hekate on the thirtieth day of the month (see above, n. 88). After a bad dream, offerings were made to the Averted or deterring, Ge, and the Heroes: Hp., Diaet. 4, 8, vi, p. 652 L. Hades, the terrible god must have been an underworld deity, but we also find alongside him an Athena the Rescuer (and also an Apollo ἀποτρ.): inscription from Erythrai, SIG. 600, 69; 115: the regions of Olympians and chthonic were not always kept completely separate.—An ancient and hereditary role of propitiation deities belonged to the Attic family of the Phytalids, who once purified and offered expiatory sacrifices for Theseus after the murder of Skiron and others (Purified and peacefully sacrificed): Plu., Thes. 12. The gods to whom this family offered sacrifices were Demeter and Zeus Meilichios: Paus. 1, 37, 2–4.—Isoc. 5, 117, makes a clear distinction between the Olympian gods and the gods to whom only an apotropaic cult, apopompai, was offered; these were the gods of expiation (cf. exile in propitiatory sacrifices; banishing gods: Apollod. ap. Harp. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__. See also dismissal of evil daimones in contrast to the escort of the same: Anon. Vir. Herb. xxii, 165. See Hemsterhuys, Lucian ii, p. 255 Bip.; Lob., Agl. 984, ii).

169 e.g. in the description of the ἱλασμός of Medea by Kirke in A.R. iv, 712 ff.

169 for example, in the description of the atonement of Medea by Kirke in A.R. iv, 712 ff.

170 K. O. Müller, Dorians, i, 328, 336; cf. the same ancient custom of flight for nine years and penance for the slaying of a man in the legend and cult of Zeus Lykaios; cf. H. D. Müller, Myth. d. gr. St. ii, 105. See below.

170 K. O. Müller, Dorians, i, 328, 336; compare this with the same ancient practice of being in exile for nine years and undergoing penance for killing someone in the legend and worship of Zeus Lykaios; see also H. D. Müller, Myth. d. gr. St. ii, 105. Check out below.

171 Cho. 1055–60. Eum. 237 ff., 281 ff., 445 ff., 470.

171 Cho. 1055–60. Eum. 237 ff., 281 ff., 445 ff., 470.

172 The Delphinion, the court for trying φόνος δίκαιος, and the ancient dwelling of Aegeus (Plu., Thes. 12), was at the same time 215 (and perhaps originally) an expiation site. Expiatory sacrifice was there made for Theseus after his fights with the Pallantidai and the highway robbers (ἀφοσιούμενος τὸ ἄγος, Poll. viii, 119).

172 The Delphinion, the court for judging justifiable self-defense, and the ancient home of Aegeus (Plu., Thes. 12), was also 215 (and maybe originally) a site for atonement. Atoning sacrifices were made there for Theseus after his battles with the Pallantidai and the highway robbers (making amends for the offense, Poll. viii, 119).

173 Plu., Ser. Num. 17, p. 560 EF. Note the expressions: ἱλάσασθαι τὴν τοῦ Ἀρχιλόχου ψυχήν, ἱλασασθαι τὴν Παυσανίου ψυχήν. Suid. Ἀρχίλοχος, from Aelian: μειλίξασθαι τὴν τοῦ Τελεσικλείου παιδὸς ψυχήν, καὶ πραῧναι χοαῖς.

173 Plu., Ser. Num. 17, p. 560 EF. Note the expressions: ἱλάσασθαι to appease the soul of Archilochus, ἱλασασθαι to appease the soul of Pausanias. Suid. Archilochus, from Aelian: μειλίξασθαι to soothe the soul of the child Teletis, and to calm with libations.

174 The three ἐξηγηταὶ πυθόχρηστοι, οἷς μέλει καθαῖρειν τοὺς ἄγει τινὶ ἐνισχηθέντας, Tim. Lex. p. 109 R.

174 The three interpreters of the oracle, who are in charge of cleansing those who have been taken to someone, Tim. Lex. p. 109 R.

175 Pl., Lg. 865 B: the agent in a φόνος ἀκούσιος (of a special kind) καθαρθεὶς κατὰ τὸν ἐκ Δελφῶν κομισθέντα περὶ τούτων νόμον ἔστω καθαρός.

175 Pl., Lg. 865 B: the agent in a involuntary manslaughter (of a special type) should be purified according to the law brought from Delphi concerning these matters.

176 I set down here the expressions occurring in the speeches and the (at any rate contemporary [see Appendix iv]) Tetralogies of Antiphon, which throw light on the religious ideas lying behind the procedure in trials for murder. In the prosecution of the murderer the following are concerned: ὁ τεθνεώς, οἱ νόμοι, and θεοὶ οἱ κάτω, Or. 1, 31. The vigorous prosecution of the case on the part of the relations of the dead is βοηθεῖν τῷ τεθνεῶτι: 1, 31. Tetr. 1 β, 13. The condemnation of the murderer is τιμωρία τῷ ἀδικηθέντι, his personal revenge: 5, 88 = 6, 6. The accusing relatives come before the court as representatives of the dead man, ἀντὶ τοῦ παθόντος ἐπισκήπτομεν ὑμῖν, as they say to the judges, Tetr. 3 γ, 7. The duty of accusing as well as the ἀσέβημα of the deed of bloodshed rests upon them until satisfaction is made for it: Tetr. 1 α, 3. But the μίασμα of the deed attaches to the whole city in which the murderer lives. All who sit at table with him, or live under the same roof, even the temples he walks in, are polluted by his mere presence: hence come ἀφορίαι and δυστυχεῖς πράξεις on the city. It is to the greatest interest of the judges to avert this pollution by giving a propitiatory judgment: Tetr. 1 α, 10; Or. 5, 11, 82; Tetr. 1 α, 3; 1 γ, 9, 11; 3 γ, 6, 7. Above all it is necessary to find the real criminal and to punish him. If the relatives of the dead prosecute some one other than the real doer of the deed, it is they, and not the judges (on account of their wrong decision), who will have to bear the wrath of the dead man and of the avenging spirits: Tetr. 1 α, 3; 3 α, 4; 3 δ, 10; for in this case the murdered man is deprived of his τιμωρία: 3 α, 4. But perjured witnesses and unjust judges are liable to a μίασμα, too, which they then introduce into their own houses: Tetr. 3 α, 3; or at least, if they give a false condemnation (but not a false acquittal) of the accused, they incur the μήνιμα τῶν ἀλιτηρίων acc. to Tetr. 3 β, 8—i.e. that of the falsely condemned person (whereas the murdered man still continues angry with his own relatives). If they knowingly acquit the murderer contrary to justice, the murdered man becomes ἐνθύμιος to the judges and no longer to his relatives: Tetr. 1 γ, 10.—The source of the resentment is said to be the dead man himself: προστρόπαιος ὁ ἀποθανών, Tetr. 1 γ, 10; cf. 3 δ, 10; where he is parallel with τὸ μήνιμα τῶν ἀλιτηρίων. The murdered man leaves behind him τὴν τῶν ἀλιτηρίων δυσμένειαν (and this is what the μίασμα really is—not as some modern writers have imagined, any sort of “moral” pollution—as is clearly stated in this passage: τὴν τῶν ἀλιτ. δυσμένειαν, ἢν . . . μίασμα . . . εἰσάγονται): Tetr. 3 α, 3; cf. Again 3 β, 8; 3 γ, 7. In this case the avenging spirits substitute themselves for the soul of the dead man (just as in the case where a προστρόπαιος τοῦ ἀποθανόντος is spoken of: cf. above, n. 148). The προστρόπαιοι τῶν ἀποθανάντων become themselves δεινοὶ ἀλιτήριοι of the dilatory relatives: 216 Tetr. 3 α, 4. There is no essential distinction between the two (cf. Poll. 5, 131). Elsewhere we hear of τὸ προστρόπαιον as the special attribute or feeling of the murdered man himself: Tetr. 2 δ, 9. Thus also we have the alternatives ἐνθύμιος ὁ ἀποθανών (1 γ, 10) and τὸ ἐνθύμιον (2 α, 2; 2 δ, 9). In this connexion it is clear that ἐνθύμιον (as the fixed and conventional expression for these superstitions) means the indignant memory, the longing for revenge of the murdered man (—ἐνθύμιον ἔστω Δάματρος καὶ Κούρας, GDI. 3541, 8). The proper understanding of this word will help us to see what is meant by the expression ὀξυθύμια used of the meal offered to the dead and Hekate, and the almost identical purificatory offerings, that after the religious cleansing of a house were thrown out at the cross-roads (Harp. s.v. Phot. s.v. Art. 1, 2, 3; AB. 287, 24, 288, 7; EM. 626, 44 ff.). They are intended to appease the easily awakened anger of the souls (and of their patroness Hekate), their ὀξύθυμον, a stronger version of ἐνθύμιον, by apotropaic sacrifice.

176 I've listed here the phrases found in the speeches and the (at least contemporary [see Appendix iv]) Tetralogies of Antiphon, which shed light on the religious beliefs underlying murder trials. In prosecuting a murder case, the following are involved: the deceased, the laws, and the gods below, Or. 1, 31. The active pursuit of the case by the deceased's family is helping the deceased: 1, 31. Tetr. 1 β, 13. The conviction of the murderer is punishment for the wronged, his personal retribution: 5, 88 = 6, 6. The accusing relatives appear before the court as representatives of the dead, We advise you instead of the suffering., as they say to the judges, Tetr. 3 γ, 7. The obligation to accuse, as well as the impiety of the crime of murder, falls on them until it is resolved: Tetr. 1 α, 3. However, the miasma of the act affects the whole city where the murderer resides. Everyone who dines with him or shares his home, even the temples he visits, are tainted by his mere presence: this leads to Aphorisms and unfortunate actions upon the city. It's crucial for the judges to eliminate this pollution by delivering a favorable judgment: Tetr. 1 α, 10; Or. 5, 11, 82; Tetr. 1 α, 3; 1 γ, 9, 11; 3 γ, 6, 7. Above all, it's essential to identify and punish the actual criminal. If the deceased's relatives pursue someone other than the true perpetrator, it's they—rather than the judges (due to their wrong decision)—who will face the wrath of the murdered individual and the avenging spirits: Tetr. 1 α, 3; 3 α, 4; 3 δ, 10; in this scenario, the murdered person is denied his punishment: 3 α, 4. However, false witnesses and unjust judges also bear a miasma, which they then bring into their own homes: Tetr. 3 α, 3; or at the very least, if they wrongly convict (but not falsely acquit) the accused, they incur the sentence of the criminals according to Tetr. 3 β, 8—that of the wrongly convicted individual (while the murdered individual remains angry with his own relatives). If they knowingly acquit the murderer unjustly, the deceased becomes thoughtful towards the judges and not his relatives: Tetr. 1 γ, 10.—The source of the resentment is called the dead person's spirit: the deceased, Tetr. 1 γ, 10; cf. 3 δ, 10; where he is compared to the monthly report of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__. The murdered individual leaves behind the hostility of the pirates (and this is what the contagion truly is—not as some modern writers have suggested, any sort of “moral” pollution—as clearly stated in this passage: the hostility of the thieves, if . . . pollution . . . is introduced): Tetr. 3 α, 3; cf. Again 3 β, 8; 3 γ, 7. In this situation, the vengeful spirits take the place of the deceased's soul (similar to when a mourning the deceased is mentioned: cf. above, n. 148). The memorials for the deceased become terrifying criminals towards the unresponsive relatives: 216 Tetr. 3 α, 4. There is no fundamental difference between the two (cf. Poll. 5, 131). In other instances, we hear about the monument as the unique characteristic or feeling of the murdered man himself: Tetr. 2 δ, 9. Likewise, we have the options The deceased is thoughtful. (1 γ, 10) and the thought (2 α, 2; 2 δ, 9). In this context, it is clear that reflection (as the fixed and standard term for these superstitions) signifies the indignant memory and desire for revenge of the murdered individual (—Let there be a reminder of Demeter and Persephone., GDI. 3541, 8). Understanding this word correctly will help us grasp the meaning of the phrase ὀξυθύμια used for the meal offered to the dead and Hekate, and the almost identical purifying offerings that were thrown out at the crossroads after the religious cleansing of a house (Harp. s.v. Phot. s.v. Art. 1, 2, 3; AB. 287, 24, 288, 7; EM. 626, 44 ff.). These are meant to placate the easily stirred anger of the souls (and of their protector Hekate), their quick-tempered, a more intense version of reflection, through apotropaic sacrifice.

177 See Appendix ii (μασχαλισμός).

177 See __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ (maschalism).

178 Xen., Cyr. 8, 7, 17 ff.: οὐ γὰρ δήπου τοῦτό γε σαφῶς δοκεῖτε εἰδέναι ὡς οὐδέν εἰμι ἐγὼ ἔτι, ἐπειδὰν τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου βίου τελευτήσω· οὐδὲ γὰρ νῦν τοι τήν γ’ ἐμὴν ψυχὴν ἑωρᾶτε . . . τὰς δὲ τῶν ἄδικα παθόντων ψυχὰς οὔπω κατενοήσατε, οἵους μὲν φόβους τοῖς μιαιφόνοις ἐμβάλλουσιν, οἵους δὲ παλαμναίους (which means first the criminal and then, as here, the punishing spirit that avenges the criminal deed, exactly like προστρόπαιος, ἀλιτήριος, ἀλάστωρ, μιάστωρ: see Zacher, Dissert. phil. Halens. iii, 232 ff.) τοῖς ἀνοσίοις ἐπιπέμπουσι; τοῖς δὲ φθιμένοις τὰς τιμὰς διαμένειν ἔτι ἂν δοκεῖτε, εἰ μηδενὸς αὐτῶν αἱ ψυχαὶ κύριαι ἦσαν; οὔτοι ἔγωγε, ὦ παῖδες, οὐδὲ τοῦτο πώποτε ἐπείσθην, ὡς ἡ ψυχή, ἕως μὲν ἂν ἐν θνητῷ σώματι ᾖ, ζῇ, ὅταν δὲ τούτου ἀπαλλαγῇ, τέθνηκεν. Then follow other popular arguments for the belief in the continued existence of the soul after its separation from the body.

178 Xen., Cyr. 8, 7, 17 ff.: You probably don't really think I'm nothing anymore, now that I'm about to end my human life; even now, you don't see my soul . . . nor have you understood the souls of those who have suffered unfairly, the kinds of fears that torment the murderers, and the vengeful spirits. (which means first the criminal and then, as here, the punishing spirit that avenges the criminal deed, exactly like prostro-paios, aletheirios, alastor, miastor: see Zacher, Dissert. phil. Halens. iii, 232 ff.) Do you think those guilty souls will be punished? Do you believe that the souls of the deceased still have honors? Were any of their souls really in charge? Certainly not, my children, and I was never convinced of this; the soul exists only as long as it is in a mortal body, and when it is released from it, it is dead.. Then follow other popular arguments for the belief in the continued existence of the soul after its separation from the body.

CHAPTER VI

THE ELEUSINIAN MYSTERIES

The cult of the dead, thus pursued in unhampered freedom, preserved and encouraged certain ideas of the life of the soul after death; of the soul as a conscious and powerful being which though separated from the body has not been parted for ever from the scene of its earthly existence. To the Greeks such ideas had become strange and unfamiliar—strange, at least, to the Ionian Greeks of the Homeric age.

The worship of the dead, carried out without restrictions, maintained and promoted certain beliefs about what happens to the soul after death; the soul is seen as a conscious and powerful entity that, although it has been separated from the body, is not permanently cut off from its earthly life. For the Greeks, these ideas had become odd and unfamiliar—odd, at least, to the Ionian Greeks of the Homeric period.

But from such a cult no dogmatic or distinctly outlined picture of the life of the departed soul could have been deduced, nor ever was deduced. Everything in this connexion dealt with the relation of the dead to the living. Families by means of sacrifice and religious acts sought to nourish the souls of their own dead. But the cult was in itself chiefly precautionary (apotropaic) in character, and as a consequence men preferred rather to avoid investigation into the nature and condition of the dead themselves, except in so far as they came into the life of the living.

But from such a cult, no strict or clearly defined understanding of the departed soul's life could ever be derived. Everything related to the connection between the dead and the living. Families sought to support the souls of their deceased through sacrifices and religious rituals. However, the cult primarily served a precautionary purpose, and as a result, people preferred not to explore the nature and condition of the dead themselves, unless it affected the lives of the living.

This is the point at which the cult of the souls and belief in the existence of souls stopped short among many of the so-called “savage” peoples who have no history. Nor can there be much doubt that it had reached this stage of development in Greece, too, before the time of Homer; though temporarily overshadowed, it continued to exist for it was rooted firmly in the united life of the family and its traditional practices.

This is where the belief in souls and the cult surrounding them came to a halt among many of the so-called "savage" peoples who have no recorded history. There's also little doubt that this belief had developed similarly in Greece before Homer's time; even though it was briefly overshadowed, it persisted because it was deeply ingrained in the collective life of the family and its customs.

Such traditional beliefs, however, left the nature of the disembodied soul vague and undefined; they viewed it purely from the standpoint of the living and almost entirely in its relations with this world; and resting on such foundations it is not very surprising if they yielded unresistingly and sank into insignificance once the feeling of the influence exercised by the dead upon the living began to weaken, or if anything happened to cause the decline or discredit of the cult of the dead. When the living withdrew their support and reverence from the departed soul the latter ceased to present any clear picture to the minds of men—it became a mere evanescent shadow—unsubstantial—little more than nothing. This is what 218 happened in the period of Ionic culture, in which Homer lived.

Such traditional beliefs, however, left the nature of the disembodied soul unclear and vague; they viewed it purely from the perspective of the living and almost entirely in relation to this world. With such foundations, it’s not surprising that they faded away and became insignificant once the perception of the dead’s influence on the living started to weaken, or if anything happened to diminish or discredit the cult of the dead. When the living withdrew their support and respect for the departed soul, it stopped presenting any clear image in people's minds—it became just a fleeting shadow—unsubstantial—barely more than nothing. This is what 218 happened in the period of Ionic culture, during Homer’s time.

The poetry of that period, however, had of its own accord given rise to aspirations after a fuller and more definite picture of the long, unbounded future in the life to come. These aspirations had been given shape in the pictures of the translation of individual mortals to Elysium and the Islands of the Blest.

The poetry of that time, however, naturally sparked a desire for a clearer and more complete vision of the endless future in the afterlife. These desires took form in the images of individual people being taken to Elysium and the Islands of the Blest.

Such things, however, were, and continued to be, matters of poetry, not of religious faith. Even the poetical fancy dealt with the marvellous past and with exceptional heroes chosen out long ago by the special favour of the gods; such favour was not extended to include the living generations of men. The desire, once it was awakened, for a more hopeful prospect of the life to come beyond the grave and for something more than the mere negative existence of the ancestors worshipped in family cults, must look to other sources for its satisfaction. Such desires began to be felt by many, but their originating source and the secret forces that set them going must remain for us hidden behind the obscurity that lies over the most important period of Greek development, the eighth and seventh centuries. Nor does it help us very much when historians try to stop the gaps of our knowledge with platitudes or the barren offspring of their own imagination. The existence of such desires and their growing strength is shown by the fact that they were able to create for themselves a means of satisfaction (a peculiarly limited satisfaction it is true) in a direction that immediately occurs to everyone as soon as the subject of future blessedness or belief in immortality among the Greeks is mentioned—the Eleusinian Mysteries.

Such things were, and still are, more about poetry than about religious faith. Even the poetic imagination focused on the amazing past and exceptional heroes who were chosen long ago by the gods' special favor; that favor didn't extend to include the living generations. Once the desire for a more hopeful outlook on life after death was sparked, people sought something beyond just the negative existence of ancestors honored in family rituals, looking for other sources to fulfill that need. Many began to feel these desires, but their origins and the hidden forces that stirred them remain obscured, particularly during the critical period of Greek development in the eighth and seventh centuries. It doesn't help when historians fill in the gaps in our knowledge with clichés or the sterile ideas of their imagination. The existence of these desires and their increasing strength is evident in the fact that they managed to create a form of satisfaction (albeit a very limited one) in a way that readily comes to mind whenever the topic of future happiness or belief in immortality among the Greeks arises—the Eleusinian Mysteries.

§ 2

Wherever the cult of the gods of the earth and the lower world, and particularly of Demeter and her daughter, was at its height it was not difficult for hopes of a better fate in the kingdom of souls below the earth, where those deities ruled, to become attached to participation in their cult. The tendency to connect closely such hopes with the worship of these gods may have existed in many different localities. In Eleusis alone, however (and in the cults, mostly of later origin, affiliated to Eleusis), we see this connexion carried out as a fully organized institution. We can follow at least in general outline the gradual advance of the Eleusinian religious organization. The Homeric Hymn to Demeter tells us the origin 219 of the cult according to the national legends of Eleusis. In the country of the Eleusinians the divine daughter of Demeter, after being carried down to the lower world by Aïdoneus, came up once more to the light of day, and was restored to her mother. Before ascending to Olympos and the company of the other immortals, in accordance with the wish of Zeus, Demeter fulfilled her promise, and when the Eleusinians had erected a temple to her outside the city, over the spring Kallichoros, she founded the sacred worship whereby men should do honour to her in the future. She herself instructed the princes of the land “in the performance of the cult and taught them her sacred Orgia”, which respect for the goddess does not allow them to communicate to others.1 This primitive Eleusinian cult of Demeter, then, is the religious service of a close corporation. Knowledge of the holy ritual, carrying with it the priesthood of the two goddesses is confined to the descendants of the four Eleusinian princes to whom Demeter once gave her ordinances as an inheritance. The cult is therefore a “secret” one: not more so, indeed, than a great many cult-societies of Greece, participation in which was strictly forbidden to all unauthorized persons.2 It differs from them, however, in the solemn promise which is made to the participants in its worship. “Blessed is the man who has beheld these holy acts; but he that is uninitiated and has no share in the holy ceremonies shall not enjoy a like fate after his death, in the gloomy darkness of Hades.” To those who share in the Eleusinian worship a privileged fate is promised after death; but even in his lifetime, we read further on,3 he is highly blessed whom the two goddesses love: they send him Ploutos, the giver of good things, to be a beloved partner of his hearth and home. On the other hand, whosoever honours not Korê, the queen of the lower world, with gifts and sacrifice, shall do penance everlastingly (368 ff.).

Wherever the worship of the earth and underworld gods, especially Demeter and her daughter, was thriving, it wasn’t hard for people to attach hopes of a better existence in the afterlife to participating in their rituals. This close association of such hopes with the worship of these deities likely existed in various places. However, only in Eleusis (and the mostly later cults related to it) do we see this connection organized as a formal institution. We can generally trace the gradual development of the Eleusinian religious organization. The Homeric Hymn to Demeter recounts the origins of the cult based on Eleusian national legends. In Eleusis, Demeter’s divine daughter, after being taken to the underworld by Hades, returned to the light of day and was reunited with her mother. Before she ascended to Olympus and joined the other immortals, following Zeus's wish, Demeter fulfilled her promise, and when the Eleusinians built a temple for her outside the city, over the spring Kallichoros, she established the sacred worship for future honoring. She personally taught the local princes "how to perform the rituals and instructed them in her sacred Orgia", which respect for the goddess forbids them to share with anyone else.1 This ancient Eleusinian cult of Demeter is, therefore, a religious service of an exclusive group. Knowledge of the sacred rituals, which includes the priesthood of the two goddesses, is limited to the descendants of the four Eleusinian princes to whom Demeter once entrusted her practices as an inheritance. Consequently, the cult is a “secret” one, though not more so than many other religious societies in Greece, whose participation was strictly prohibited for those not authorized.2 It stands apart, however, due to the solemn promise made to participants in its worship. “Blessed is the person who has witnessed these holy rites; but the uninitiated, who has no part in the sacred ceremonies, will not enjoy the same fate after death in the dark gloom of Hades.” To those who partake in the Eleusinian worship, a special fate is promised after death; and even in life, as we will see later,3 he is truly blessed whom the two goddesses favor: they send him Ploutos, the giver of good things, to be a cherished companion in his home. Conversely, anyone who does not honor Korê, the queen of the underworld, with gifts and sacrifices, will face eternal punishment (368 ff.).

The narrow circle of those to whom such a tremendous promise was made began to be extended after the time when Eleusis was united with Athens (which may have taken place some time in the seventh century), and when the Eleusinian worship was raised to the position of an official cult of the Athenian state. Nor was it Attica alone, but the whole of Greece which became interested in the Eleusinian festival, when Athens became the chief centre of Greek life. A solemn “truce of God” was proclaimed which assured the peaceful and undisturbed performance of the sacred ritual, and distinguished the Eleusinia, like the great games and Fairs of Olympia, the Isthmus, etc., as a Pan-Hellenic festival. At 220 the height of Athenian power (about 440)4 a decree of the people was passed which required the yearly offering of first fruits of the fields to the Eleusinian temple from Athenian citizens and allies, and invited similar offerings from all Greek states. The decree could appeal in so doing to ancient and ancestral custom, and to an utterance of the Delphic god who had authorized these things.5 The inner history of the development of the Eleusinian festival is a matter of some obscurity. The holy rites continued to be performed at Eleusis; Eleusinian noble families still took part6 in the worship of the goddesses, which was yet directed by the Athenian government. On the other hand, a good deal must have been altered in the course of time. The popular decree mentioned above acquaints us with the names of two triads, each composed of two divine personages and a Hero, who were worshipped at Eleusis at that time. Demeter and Korê occur together with Triptolemos, and also “the god, the goddess, and Eubouleus”.7 The Homeric hymn gives no hint of the very important position here (and in innumerable other accounts, as well as pictorial representations) attributed to Triptolemos, nor of the other addition to the Eleusinian group of divinities. It is evident that in the course of years many different local figures and modes of worship have been added to and fused with the old cult of the two goddesses; and that in these local figures we have always the one type of chthonic godhead expressing itself anew in ever varied and differentiated forms. Their number is not exhausted by the six already mentioned.8 The most important addition to the Eleusinian circle of deities was Iakchos, the son of Zeus (Chthonios) and Persephone. This god was himself an underworld deity, quite distinct from that Dionysos, with whom other Athenian cults confused him, and with whom he was in fact commonly identified.9 It is a very probable supposition that this god, who soon came to be regarded as the central figure of the group of deities worshipped at Eleusis,10 was the contribution of Athens to that circle: his temple was situated in Athens not Eleusis;11 in the Athenian suburb Agrai the “Little Mysteries” were celebrated in his honour in the spring as a sort of prelude to the greater festival. At the Eleusinia itself, the sacred procession, in which the picture of the youthful god was borne from Athens to Eleusis, formed the link between the part of the festival already performed at Athens and that still to take place at Eleusis. The introduction of Iakchos into the festival of Eleusis did not merely make an external addition to the group of divinities that already shared in it; it added 221 an act12 to the sacred story, the representation of which was the goal and summit of the festival; and thereby in all probability enriched it internally in meaning and substance. It is, indeed, quite impossible for us even to hazard a guess as to the exact meaning and essence of the change which came over the festival thus enlarged in the course of time. We can, however, be sure of this much; there is no ground at all for entertaining the commonly held view that it was the private mysteries of Orphic conventicles which exercised such a transforming influence on the public mysteries of the Athenian state. Those who are not content with solemn and mysterious jargon about “Orphics” and the like, but keep clearly in mind the well-known and quite distinctive features of the Orphic doctrine about gods and the souls of men, will easily recognize that everything points to the unlikelihood of even a single one of these having entered the circle of ideas current at Eleusis.13 They could only have shattered such ideas to pieces.

The small group of people who received such a significant promise started to grow after Eleusis was united with Athens (which likely happened sometime in the seventh century) and when the Eleusinian worship was established as an official religion of the Athenian state. It wasn't just Attica that became engaged; the entire region of Greece became interested in the Eleusinian festival when Athens emerged as the central hub of Greek culture. A formal “truce of God” was declared to ensure the peaceful and uninterrupted celebration of the sacred rituals, similar to the grand games and fairs of Olympia, the Isthmus, etc., which made the Eleusinia a Pan-Hellenic festival. At 220 the peak of Athenian power (around 440), a decree was enacted that required Athenian citizens and allies to annually offer the first fruits of their fields to the Eleusinian temple, inviting similar offerings from all Greek states. This decree leaned on ancient customs and a pronouncement from the Delphic god who had authorized these practices.5 The detailed history of the development of the Eleusinian festival remains somewhat unclear. The sacred rituals continued to be held at Eleusis; noble families from Eleusis still participated in the worship of the goddesses, which was overseen by the Athenian government. However, many changes must have occurred over time. The previously mentioned decree provides us with the names of two groups made up of two gods and a hero who were worshipped at Eleusis during that period. Demeter and Korê appeared alongside Triptolemos, as well as “the god, the goddess, and Eubouleus.”7 The Homeric hymn does not indicate the significant role attributed to Triptolemos here (and in countless other accounts and visual depictions), nor does it mention the other additions to the Eleusinian pantheon. It’s clear that over the years, many different local figures and worship styles were integrated into and merged with the ancient cult of the two goddesses; these local figures consistently represented the same type of underworld deity in various and distinctive forms. Their presence extends beyond the six already mentioned.8 The most notable addition to the Eleusinian group of deities was Iakchos, the son of Zeus (Chthonios) and Persephone. This god was an underworld deity, distinctly different from Dionysos, whom other Athenian cults sometimes confused him with, and whom he was commonly identified. 9 It’s likely that this god, who eventually became seen as the central figure among the deities worshipped at Eleusis,10 was Athens' contribution to that group: his temple was located in Athens, not Eleusis;11 in the Athenian suburb of Agrai, the “Little Mysteries” were celebrated in his honor in spring as a sort of prelude to the larger festival. During the Eleusinia, the sacred procession, which carried the image of the youthful god from Athens to Eleusis, linked the part of the festival already held in Athens with that still to take place in Eleusis. The inclusion of Iakchos in the Eleusis festival didn't just add another deity to the existing pantheon; it introduced a new act12 to the sacred narrative, the representation of which became the main highlight of the festival, likely deepening its meaning and significance over time. It is very challenging for us to even speculate on the precise meaning and nature of the changes that occurred in the expanded festival over the years. However, we can be certain about one thing: there is no basis for the widely held belief that the private mysteries of Orphic groups had a transformative impact on the public mysteries of the Athenian state. Those who do not settle for solemn and cryptic language about “Orphics” and instead focus on the well-known and unique characteristics of the Orphic beliefs about gods and human souls will easily see that it’s very unlikely that even one of these ideas made its way into the prevailing thoughts at Eleusis.13 They would have only disrupted such ideas.

If the festival, then, grew of its own accord in inward meaning and outward circumstance, the circle of those who came to take part in it grew as well. Originally this festival, so rich in promised blessings, admitted only the citizens of Eleusis, perhaps only the members of certain noble Eleusinian families—and may have appeared to its members an even greater privilege through this very exclusiveness. In this respect it changed completely, admission to it was thrown open to all Greeks—not merely Athenians, but every Greek without distinction of race or country, whether man or woman, was welcomed at Eleusis (and even hetairai, who were still excluded, e.g. from the Demeter-festival of the Athenian women; to say nothing of children and slaves).14 The generosity of Athens—such was the glorious boast—wished the unexampled salvation which this festival promised to its worshippers to be made accessible to all Greeks.15 What contrast to the exclusive cult-unions into which a man had to be born in order, as citizen of a state, member of a phratria, clan, or family, to participate in the advantages they offered! The society of the Eleusinian mystery-festival, once just as exclusive as the rest, had thrown open its doors so widely that this almost unconditional freedom of access became its principle and distinguishing characteristic. The attraction of membership was even heightened by the fact that just by his own unhampered free will and choice the individual could enter the great society through the mediation of one of the two families to whom the highest priesthood of the festival 222 was committed.16 The only condition made was ritual purity, and murderers, for whom this was an impossibility—as it was even for those who were only accused of the shedding of blood—were as such excluded from the mysteries: as, indeed, they were from all the religious ceremonies of the state.17

If the festival grew organically in its inner significance and outer circumstances, the number of people participating in it increased as well. Initially, this festival, rich in promised blessings, was only open to the citizens of Eleusis, possibly only to certain noble families from Eleusis, which might have made it seem like an even greater privilege due to its exclusivity. In this regard, it underwent a complete transformation; admission was opened to all Greeks—not just Athenians, but every Greek, regardless of race or origin, whether male or female, was welcomed at Eleusis (even the hetairai, who were still excluded from the Demeter festival of Athenian women, not to mention children and slaves). The generosity of Athens—this was the proud claim—sought to make the unparalleled salvation promised by the festival accessible to all Greeks. This stood in stark contrast to the exclusive cult associations into which a person had to be born in order to, as a citizen, be part of a phratria, clan, or family and enjoy the benefits they offered! The society of the Eleusinian mystery-festival, which was once just as exclusive as the others, had opened its doors so widely that this almost unrestricted access became its guiding principle and defining feature. The appeal of membership was further enhanced by the fact that individuals could enter this grand society by their own free will and choice, facilitated by one of the two families entrusted with the highest priesthood of the festival. The only requirement was ritual purity, and murderers, for whom this was impossible—as it was for those merely accused of shedding blood—were excluded from the mysteries: as were all those participating in the state’s religious ceremonies.

Religious purification of the worshippers preceded and accompanied the holding of the festival; to many of the believers it may have appeared that the whole festival itself was principally a great purification and religious dedication of unusual solemnity, by which the members (“the Pure”18 as they called themselves) were made worthy of the favour of the goddesses.

Religious purification of the worshippers took place before and during the festival; for many of the believers, it might have seemed that the entire festival was mainly a significant purification and religious dedication of unusual seriousness, through which the members (“the Pure”18 as they referred to themselves) were made deserving of the goddesses' favor.

§ 3

As to the actual details of what went on at the long-drawn-out festival itself our knowledge hardly extends beyond the most external circumstances, and is even so most incomplete. A few notices in late and often untrustworthy writers give us a very inadequate picture of what took place inside the great temple of initiation and of the essential Mystery. The secret which was committed19 to the Mystai and Epoptai has been well kept. Considering the enormous number of worshippers indiscriminately admitted to the festival, this would, indeed, have been a real miracle, if the secret to be kept had taken the form of dogma expressed in concept and words and capable of being communicated verbally to others. Since the labours of Lobeck, however, drastically reducing to order the confusion of opinions on this subject, no reasonable person believes that this was the case. It was difficult to let out the “secret” for there was essentially no secret to let out. Profanation could only come through actions, through “the Mysteries being acted”,20 as they were in the year 415 in the house of Poulytion. The Mystery was a dramatic performance, or, more strictly, a religious Pantomime, accompanied by sacred songs21 and formal speeches; a representation, as Christian authors let us see, of the Rape of Korê, the wanderings of Demeter, and the final reunion of the goddesses. This in itself would not have made the mysteries remarkable; a similar dramatic reproduction of the circumstances attending the life of a god, which had led to the foundation of the festival in question, was a very widespread cult-practice in Greece; it was part of the festivals of Zeus, Here, Apollo, Artemis, Dionysos, and, above all, of other festivals in honour of Demeter herself. But the Eleusinia was distinguished from all other such festivals, even from the equally secret festivals of Demeter known as the Thesmophoria and the Haloa, by reason 223 of the hopes which it inspired in the minds of the initiated. The Hymn to Demeter tells us that the pious worshipper of the Goddess at Eleusis might hope for riches upon earth and a better fate after death. Later authorities also speak of the success in this life which initiation at Eleusis gave good ground for expecting. But far more emphatic are the statements, made by innumerable witnesses from Pindar and Sophokles onwards, that only they who have been initiated into these mysteries may entertain a joyful expectation of the life to come. To them only is it granted to have real “life” in Hades; nothing but evil awaits others in that place.22

As for the actual details of what happened at the lengthy festival itself, our understanding is limited to the most superficial aspects, and even that is pretty incomplete. A few accounts from later, often unreliable writers give us a very inadequate view of what occurred inside the grand temple of initiation and the core Mystery. The secret that was entrusted19 to the Mystai and Epoptai has been well preserved. Given the vast number of worshippers allowed into the festival without restriction, it would indeed have been a true miracle if the secret to be kept had been a doctrine expressed in concepts and words that could be shared verbally. However, since Lobeck's work has significantly clarified the confusion of opinions on this topic, no reasonable person believes that was the case. It was hard to reveal the “secret” because there was essentially no secret to disclose. Profanation could only happen through actions, through “the Mysteries being acted”,20 as they were in the year 415 at the house of Poulytion. The Mystery was a dramatic performance, or more specifically, a religious Pantomime, accompanied by sacred songs21 and formal speeches; it depicted, as Christian authors have shown us, the Rape of Korê, the wanderings of Demeter, and the eventual reunion of the goddesses. This alone wouldn't have made the mysteries stand out; a similar dramatic representation of the events surrounding the life of a god that led to the festival's foundation was a common cult practice in Greece. It was part of the festivals dedicated to Zeus, Hera, Apollo, Artemis, Dionysos, and especially other festivals in honor of Demeter herself. But the Eleusinia was different from all other such festivals, even from the equally secret festivals of Demeter known as the Thesmophoria and the Haloa, because of the hopes it inspired in the minds of the initiates. The Hymn to Demeter tells us that the devout worshipper of the Goddess at Eleusis might hope for wealth on earth and a better fate after death. Later sources also mention the success in this life that initiation at Eleusis rightfully promised. But far stronger are the statements made by countless witnesses from Pindar and Sophokles onward, that only those who have been initiated into these mysteries may look forward joyfully to the afterlife. Only they are granted real “life” in Hades; for others, nothing but misery awaits in that place.22

It was these promises of a blessed immortality that for centuries drew so many worshippers to the Eleusinian festival. Nowhere else could such promises be obtained with such distinctness and assurance. The injunction commanding secrecy must obviously have referred to quite other matters; it cannot have applied to this, the greatest boon anticipated from initiation at Eleusis. Everyone speaks out aloud and without restraint about it. At the same time, all our information is so completely at one on the point and so free from doubt or uncertainty that we must perforce believe that the performances that were to be preserved so secret were, in reality, for the believers the source of an assurance which was not held as the mere probable conjecture of individuals, but as fixed and certain truth beyond question or need of interpretation.

It was these promises of a blessed afterlife that drew countless worshippers to the Eleusinian festival for centuries. Nowhere else could such promises be offered with such clarity and confidence. The requirement for secrecy must have pertained to totally different matters; it clearly did not apply to this, the greatest gift expected from the initiation at Eleusis. Everyone speaks openly and without hesitation about it. At the same time, all our sources are completely aligned on this point and free from doubt or uncertainty, leading us to believe that the rituals meant to be kept secret were, in reality, for the believers a source of assurance that was seen not as mere speculation from individuals, but as fixed and certain truth beyond question or need for interpretation.

How this was brought about certainly remains obscure. Since the discrediting of “symbolism” in the sense made familiar by Creuzer or Schelling, many of our modern mythologists and historians of religion have been all the more eager to assert that the performances at the Eleusinian mysteries were in reality the true and mystic celebration of the Greek “Religion of Nature” as discovered by themselves. Demeter, in this view, would be the earth; Korê-Persephone, her daughter, the seed of corn; the Rape and Return of Korê would mean the sowing of the seed in the earth and the rise of the young grain from beneath the soil; or, in a more general sense, “the yearly decay and renewal of vegetation.” In some way or other the Mystai must have had revealed to them the real meaning of the “nature-symbolism” hidden in the mystical performances. Witnessing these performances they are supposed to have learnt that the fate of the seed of corn, represented by Persephone, its disappearance beneath the earth and eventual rebirth, is an image of the fate of the human soul, which also disappears that it may 224 live again. This, then, must be the real content of the holy Mystery.

How this came about still isn’t clear. Since the discrediting of “symbolism” in the way that Creuzer or Schelling popularized it, many modern mythologists and historians of religion have been even more eager to claim that the ceremonies at the Eleusinian mysteries were actually the true and mystical celebration of the Greek “Religion of Nature” as they have discovered it. In this view, Demeter symbolizes the earth; Korê-Persephone, her daughter, represents the seed of corn; the Rape and Return of Korê refers to the sowing of the seed in the earth and the emergence of the young grain from below the soil; or, more generally, “the yearly decay and renewal of vegetation.” Somehow, the Mystai must have had the real meaning of the “nature-symbolism” revealed to them during the mystical performances. By witnessing these events, they are thought to have learned that the fate of the seed of corn, represented by Persephone, its disappearance beneath the earth and eventual rebirth, serves as a metaphor for the fate of the human soul, which also disappears so that it may 224 live again. This must then be the true essence of the holy Mystery.

It remains, however, first and foremost, to be proved that the Greeks23 themselves would have regarded such symbolistic mummery, in which the phenomena and processes of nature appear under the guise of anthropomorphic gods, as religious at all, or would have recognized their own religion in such things. Still further—admitting for the sake of argument the possibility of such an interpretation—the identification of Korê with the seed of corn and its fate leads at once, if we try to get beyond the vaguest generalities, to intolerable absurdity. It is difficult to see, however (and this would be the main point at issue), how such an analogy between the soul and the grain of seed could have led to a faith in immortality that was not to be had, it would seem, in a more direct fashion. What possible effect could have been produced by such a far-fetched and arbitrary parallel between the phenomena of two such wholely different provinces of existence? If a reasonably plausible deduction was to be made from the visible and unmistakable (the condition of the grain) to the invisible and unknown (the condition of the soul) surely the first and simplest requisite would be that a real causal connexion between the two should be plainly demonstrated. These may seem dull and pedantic considerations where the sublimest forebodings of the heart are concerned; but I should not have supposed that it would have been so easy to tempt the Greeks with vague surmises from the path of logic and lucidity, or that such surmises would have afforded them such extremity of “bliss”.

It still needs to be proven whether the Greeks themselves would have viewed such symbolic nonsense, where natural phenomena and processes are represented as anthropomorphic gods, as religious at all, or whether they would have seen their own religion in such things. Furthermore—assuming for argument's sake that such an interpretation is possible—the association of Korê with the seed of corn and its fate quickly leads to unacceptable contradictions if we try to move beyond vague generalities. It's hard to understand, however (and this is the main point at hand), how such an analogy between the soul and the grain of seed could have inspired a belief in immortality that doesn't seem to come about in a more straightforward way. What impact could have been made by such a distant and arbitrary comparison between the processes of two completely different realms of existence? If a reasonably believable conclusion was to be drawn from the visible and undeniable (the state of the grain) to the invisible and unknown (the state of the soul), the simplest requirement would surely be that a clear causal connection between the two should be obvious. These may seem like dull and pedantic thoughts when it comes to the most profound feelings of the heart; however, I wouldn’t have thought it would be so easy to lead the Greeks away from logic and clarity with vague guesses, or that such guesses would give them such a degree of “bliss.”

Lastly, the analogy, even if it proved anything, is false. It would only hold if the soul, like the grain, after a temporary disappearance below the earth, were promised a new life upon the earth—if a palingenesia in fact were promised. That this, however, was not a belief supported by the officially conducted mysteries of Athens, is admitted on all hands.

Lastly, the analogy, even if it proved anything, is false. It would only hold if the soul, like the grain, after a temporary disappearance below the earth, were promised a new life upon the earth—if a palingenesia in fact were promised. That this, however, was not a belief supported by the officially conducted mysteries of Athens, is admitted on all hands.

Equally untenable is the view that the dramatic presentation at the mysteries of the Rape and Return of Korê (regarded this time as a divine personage, not as the personified grain of corn) was intended to inspire hopes of an analogous fate for the human soul, by virtue of a mystic unification of the life of man with the life of the godhead to whom he swears allegiance.24 Even so the hope based upon the typical fate of Korê could only have led to a hope for the palingenesia of mankind in general, not (what was and always remained the real belief of Eleusis) to the hope of a specially 225 favoured after-life for the Mystai in the kingdom below the world. Indeed, we must not look to the Eleusinian mysteries for the ecstatic exaltation of the soul to the recognition of its own godhead—though such exaltation was the motive force and the essential core of Greek mysticism, as of all mysticism and mystic religion. From the mysteries of Eleusis, however, it remained far removed; the belief there fostered, with its absolute division and distinction between the divine and the human, never transgressed the bounds of popular Greek religion, over whose portals stood the universally prescriptive words: ἓν ἀνδρῶν, ἓν θεῶν γένος—“the race of men is one, and the race of gods is another.” Nor was Eleusis any exception to this rule; the mysteries did not point the way to mysticism.

The idea that the dramatic performance at the mysteries of the Rape and Return of Korê (this time seen as a divine figure, not just a representation of grain) was meant to give people hope for a similar fate for the human soul through a mystical connection between humans and the god they follow is equally flawed. Even so, the hope based on Korê's typical fate could only lead to a general hope for the rebirth of humanity, not, as was truly believed in Eleusis, a special afterlife for the Mystai in the underworld. In fact, we shouldn't expect the Eleusinian mysteries to provide an ecstatic elevation of the soul to recognize its own divinity—although that elevation was the driving force and essential core of Greek mysticism, as with all mysticism and spiritual religions. The mysteries of Eleusis stayed far from that; the beliefs promoted there maintained a strict separation between the divine and the human that never crossed the limits of popular Greek religion, which was summed up by the widely accepted phrase: One of men, one of gods—“the race of men is one, and the race of gods is another.” Eleusis was no exception to this rule; the mysteries did not lead to mysticism.

§ 4

Inquiry is on the wrong track when a deeper meaning is sought for in the mimic presentation of the sacred myth at Eleusis whereby the human soul was to obtain the blessed hope of immortality. The conviction that the human soul was immortal in its own right, by reason of its own nature, was not a conviction that was obtained at Eleusis. That is why we may dismiss such fanciful analogies as those between the human soul and the seed of corn or the goddess of the earth’s life. Such analogies, if they proved anything, would prove at most the complete indestructibility, in spite of all vicissitude, of the life of the human soul—of every human soul. But this was not Eleusinian doctrine. The continued conscious existence of the soul after its separation from the body was not a doctrine but a presupposition of Eleusis; and it could be thus presupposed because it was the basic idea of the popular and widespread cult offered to the souls of the departed.25 The advantage obtained by the initiated at Eleusis was that a livelier and fuller content was given to the bare existence of the disembodied soul, which was all that the current worship of the souls essentially contemplated. We are assured that only the initiated at Eleusis will have a real “life” after death; that evil will be the fate of “the others”.26 Not that the soul, relieved of the presence of the body, will live hereafter, but how it will live was what Eleusis taught men. With the calm assurance common to all close and confined religious associations, the Eleusinian society divided mankind into two classes: the “Pure”, that is those who had been initiated at Eleusis, and the innumerable multitude of the uninitiated. Only for the members in 226 communion with the mystery of Eleusis was salvation assured. Salvation was theirs as a reversionary right, but salvation such as theirs was a privilege and could only be obtained by participation in the bounteous festival of the Athenian State and in its ceremonial. Centuries of large-minded tolerance in admitting to the mysteries extended this privilege to an immense number of Greeks (and of Romans, too, in later times). But the prospect of a blessed hereafter never became a matter of course; not as man, not even as a virtuous and pious man did such a privilege come to anyone. It was granted solely to the member of the Eleusinian religious society and the participator in the divine service of the goddesses.27

Inquiry goes astray when trying to find a deeper meaning in the symbolic presentation of the sacred myth at Eleusis, which aimed to offer hope for immortality to the human soul. The belief that the human soul is inherently immortal, due to its own nature, was not something that came from Eleusis. This is why we can disregard fanciful comparisons, like those between the human soul and a corn seed or the goddess of the earth's vitality. Such comparisons, if they proved anything, would at most suggest that the life of the human soul—of every human soul—is completely indestructible, despite all changes. However, this was not the teaching of Eleusis. The ongoing conscious existence of the soul after separating from the body was a presupposition of Eleusis, accepted because it was the foundational idea of the popular and widespread cult dedicated to the souls of the deceased. The benefit gained by those initiated at Eleusis was that they received a richer and fuller understanding of the mere existence of the disembodied soul, which was all that the general worship of souls really focused on. We are told that only the initiated at Eleusis will have a true "life" after death and that "the others" will face a terrible fate. Not that the soul, freed from the body, will continue to exist, but how it will exist is what Eleusis taught. With the calm confidence typical of all close-knit religious groups, the Eleusinian society divided humanity into two groups: the "Pure," meaning those who had been initiated at Eleusis, and the countless uninitiated. Only for those in 226 communion with the mystery of Eleusis was salvation guaranteed. Salvation was their birthright, but it was a privilege that could only be attained through participation in the generous festival of the Athenian State and its ceremonies. Centuries of broad-minded tolerance in allowing people to join the mysteries extended this privilege to a vast number of Greeks (and to Romans, too, in later times). But the hope for a blessed afterlife never became an automatic assumption; it didn't come to anyone just by being human, or even by being a virtuous and pious person. It was given solely to members of the Eleusinian religious community and participants in the divine service of the goddesses.27

What were the means employed to impress this hope—this certain expectation rather—of a blessed hereafter in Hades upon the Mystai? We must frankly admit that we cannot, unfortunately, say anything definite in answer to this question. Only to the suggestion that these hopes were grounded upon symbolic representations of any kind may we give a decided denial. And yet this is the generally accepted opinion. “Symbols” there may have been, as an assistance to the dramatic or pantomimic representation of the Rape and Return of Korê;28 but hardly in any other sense than that of typical condensations—the part being put for the whole, or the whole understood in the part—of scenes impossible to represent in their entirety. It is true that with the lapse of centuries, and in the absence of any official written interpretation of the inner meaning and intention of the ritual many of these symbols became unintelligible—a disadvantage which belonged to all other departments of Greek religion as well. As soon as independent reflexion on matters of religion began to arise, many sorts of allegorical or symbolical interpretations began to be applied to the details of the performances at the mysteries. Does it follow from this that the mysteries of the Earth divinities, as some are inclined to believe, bore a symbolical or allegorical character from the outset, and differed in this respect from all other Greek worship of the gods?29 Similar interpretations were applied by philosophers or would-be philosophers to the fables of the gods in Homeric or popular mythology; the mysteries did not by any means hold a peculiar position in the minds of connoisseurs of myth-interpretation in antiquity. If a “deeper meaning” was attached by preference to the performances at Eleusis, that only shows that much in these performances was no longer understood, or in its real meaning no longer satisfied the spirit of the philosophic centuries. But it shows also that for this 227 festival of unexampled splendour, where night and the injunction of secrecy awakened awed expectancy,30 performed according to an archaic ritual of ever-increasing perfection and attended by the whole of Greece, an unusual sympathy was felt. It offered something to the eye and the ear which was attractive to all men, and they exerted themselves to find a satisfactory meaning in its sights and sounds. Finally, it is likely enough that the “meaning” which they themselves had arbitrarily bestowed upon them was what made the mysteries specially attractive to many. To this extent it is legitimate to say that symbolism was a real and historical factor in the constitution of the mysteries.

What methods were used to instill this hope—this certain expectation—of a blessed afterlife in Hades among the Mystai? We must honestly admit that we unfortunately cannot provide a definite answer to this question. We can, however, firmly deny the suggestion that these hopes were based on symbolic representations of any kind. Yet this is the common belief. “Symbols” may have existed to assist the dramatic or pantomimic representation of the Abduction and Return of Korê; 28 but they hardly served any purpose beyond being typical condensations—with a part representing the whole or the whole understood through the part—of scenes that were impossible to depict in their entirety. It's true that over the centuries, and due to the lack of an official written interpretation of the inner meaning and intentions behind the rituals, many of these symbols became unclear—a limitation that affected all areas of Greek religion as well. Once independent reflection on religious matters began, various allegorical or symbolic interpretations started being applied to the details of the mysteries' performances. Does this mean that the mysteries of the Earth deities, as some tend to believe, were symbolical or allegorical from the start and differed in this regard from all other Greek worship of the gods? 29 Similar interpretations were given by philosophers or would-be philosophers to the fables of the gods in Homeric or popular mythology; the mysteries did not occupy a unique position among those interpreting myths in antiquity. If a “deeper meaning” was favored in relation to the performances at Eleusis, that simply indicates that much of what occurred was no longer understood or failed to resonate with the spirit of philosophical thought in later centuries. However, it also indicates that for this 227 festival of unparalleled splendor, where night and the demand for secrecy stirred awed anticipation, 30 conducted according to an archaic ritual of ever-growing perfection and attended by all of Greece, there was a unique sense of empathy. It presented something visually and audibly appealing to all people, and they endeavored to find a satisfactory meaning in its sights and sounds. Ultimately, it is very likely that the “meaning” they themselves had arbitrarily assigned to the mysteries was what made them particularly attractive to many. To this extent, it is valid to say that symbolism was a real and historical factor in shaping the mysteries.

Even supposing, however, that much in the presentation of this mystic festival was consciously ordered and disposed by the founders of it with a view to symbolic interpretation, and consequently to the possibility of an ever-increasing idealization of its significance, yet this cannot have extended to the hopes of a blessed immortality revealed to the Mystai. Symbolist or allegorizing modes of interpretation must always have been the private concern of individuals and therefore liable to much uncertainty and variety.31 Our authorities, however, from the most diverse periods, speak with far too great distinctness and unanimity about the blessed hereafter vouchsafed to the initiated in the mysteries, for it to be credible that this can have been the outcome of any interpretation of complexities, or of any metaphorical application of the hopes derived from events in the life of the gods to a quite different province, the life of the human soul. What every witness speaks of in the plainest and simplest language without any special “mystery”—the hope of future blessedness—must have been offered to the participants in the mysteries in the most unequivocal fashion. It is natural, above all, to suppose that the exhibition of the “mystic drama” included particularly the final scene as it is sketched in the 2nd Homeric Hymn: the foundation of the Eleusinian festival by the goddess herself—what had once been revealed to the little city-community must have been proclaimed to the great company of those admitted to the common festival of Eleusis:32 the highest reward of participation in this unparalleled act of worship is what the Homeric Hymn distinctly puts forth as such—the peculiar favour of the gods of the lower world and a future life of blessedness within their kingdom. The statues of the goddesses were seen radiantly illuminated;33 at this festival of grace in remembrance of their trials, their happiness, and their beneficent acts, they 228 themselves—as it seemed to the faithful believer—were invisibly present. What further need of warrant was there for the promises of future blessedness?

Even if a lot of the way this mystical festival was presented was carefully planned by its founders for symbolic interpretation, and thus aimed at a deeper idealization of its meaning, this doesn’t seem to extend to the hopes of a blessed immortality revealed to the Mystai. Symbolic or allegorical interpretations must always have been a personal matter, making them uncertain and varied. Our sources, however, from different periods, speak too clearly and uniformly about the blessed afterlife promised to the initiated in the mysteries for it to be believable that this came from interpreting complex ideas or metaphorically applying hopes from the gods' lives to the human soul. What every witness describes in the simplest language—without any special “mystery”—is the hope of future blessedness, which must have been presented to the participants in the mysteries in a very straightforward way. It’s natural to think that the performance of the “mystic drama” particularly included the final scene as outlined in the 2nd Homeric Hymn: the goddess herself establishing the Eleusinian festival—what was once revealed to the small community must have been shared with the larger group attending the common festival of Eleusis. The highest reward for participating in this extraordinary act of worship is what the Homeric Hymn clearly states: the special favor of the gods of the underworld and a future life of happiness in their realm. The statues of the goddesses were seen glowing; at this festival of grace, in memory of their struggles, joys, and good deeds, they themselves—at least to the faithful believer—were invisibly present. What more assurance was needed for the promises of future blessedness?

§ 5

In spite of many extravagant statements from antiquity, we have no means of estimating how widely participation in the Eleusinian mysteries (whether of those celebrated at Eleusis itself or in the numerous associated festivals) was extended in Greece. Still, it is probable that large numbers, not from Athens alone but from the whole of Greece, sought eagerly to enter the state of grace vouchsafed to the worshippers at Eleusis. In this way the more lively conception of the state of the soul in the hereafter may have gradually become the common property of Greek imagination.

Despite many extravagant claims from ancient times, we have no way of knowing how widely participation in the Eleusinian mysteries (whether those held at Eleusis itself or in the many related festivals) was spread across Greece. However, it's likely that many people, not just from Athens but from all over Greece, were eager to enter the state of grace promised to the worshippers at Eleusis. In this way, the more vivid idea of the soul's state in the afterlife may have gradually become a shared concept in Greek thought.

On the whole, we must be on our guard against attributing too great an importance to these mysteries. There can hardly have been any question of moral influence—the ancients themselves in their most exaggerated eulogies of the mysteries and their greatness, say almost nothing of this.34 Nor is it easy to see what part of the mysteries could have served as a vehicle of moral influence.35 Distinct dogma in the religious sense was never provided by the mysteries any more than by other worships of the gods in Greece. Nor was there anything exclusive about the cult of the mysteries; side by side with that cult and after it the Mystai took part in other worships of the gods, according to the usages prevailing in their own homes. The great festival when it was over left no sting behind in the hearts of the initiated. No requirement of a new manner of life, no new and peculiar condition of conscience was theirs on its account; no strange revaluation of values, contradicting the general opinions of the time, was learnt there. There was a total absence of that which (if we rightly understand the word) gives to the doctrines of sectarian religion their force and persuasiveness—paradox. Even the prospect of future bliss opened to the initiated did not divert them from the normal tenor of their existence. It was a genial prospect; not a compelling demand drawing all things to itself and turning men away from ordinary life. The light that fell from beyond was not so blinding that it made all things on this earth seem dark and mean. If in the decadence of Greek culture—and even among the people of Homer—ideas hostile to this life made their appearance and in many places acquired weight and influence; if some men began to think death superior 229 to life, and this life, of which alone we can be assured, as merely a preparation, a land of passage to a higher life in the world invisible—for all this the mysteries were not responsible. It was not they, nor the feelings and surmises awakened by their pictures and performances, that dulled the beauty of this earth for the enthusiasts “intoxicated with other-worldliness”, or made them strangers to the instincts of life and sanity prevailing in older and unspoiled ages of Greek life.

Overall, we need to be cautious about placing too much importance on these mysteries. There's almost no mention of moral influence in the ancient claims extolling the mysteries and their significance. It's also hard to see how any aspect of the mysteries could have acted as a source of moral influence. The mysteries provided no clear dogma in a religious sense, just like other forms of worship of the gods in Greece. Furthermore, the cult of the mysteries wasn’t exclusive; the initiates engaged in other forms of worship according to the traditions of their own communities. After the grand festival, the initiated didn’t feel any lingering regret. They were not required to adopt a new way of living or endure a distinctive moral dilemma because of it; they didn’t encounter any drastic reassessment of values that contradicted the prevailing views of their time. There was a complete absence of what gives sectarian religions their persuasive power—paradox. Even the promise of future happiness for the initiated didn’t distract them from their everyday lives. It was a pleasant possibility, not a force that pulled everything toward it or drove people away from ordinary life. The light shining from beyond wasn’t so blinding that it made everything in this world seem bleak or insignificant. If, during the decline of Greek culture—and even among the people of Homer—ideas that were critical of this life emerged and gained traction; if some began to consider death superior to life, viewing this life merely as a preparation for a higher existence in an invisible realm—it was not the mysteries that caused this. They did not dull the beauty of this world for those "intoxicated with other-worldliness" or disconnect them from the primal instincts of life and sanity that characterized the older and uncorrupted phases of Greek existence.

NOTES TO CHAPTER VI

1 H. Cer. 270 ff. (Demeter speaks) ἀλλ’ ἄγε μοι νηόν τε μέγαν καὶ βωμὸν ὑπ’ αὐτῷ τευχόντων πᾶς δῆμος ὑπαὶ πόλιν αἰπύ τε τεῖχος, Καλλιχόρου καθύπερθεν, ἐπὶ προὔχοντι κολωνῷ. ὄργια δ’ αὐτὴ ἐγὼν ὑποθήσομαι, ὡς ἂν ἔπειτα εὐαγέως ἔρδοντες ἐμὸν μένος ἱλάσκησθε. Building of the temple: 298 ff., and following that the instructions of the goddess as to the δρησμοσύνη ἱερῶν and the ὄργια, 474 ff.

1 H. Cer. 270 ff. (Demeter speaks) But come now, build me a great temple and an altar underneath it, where the entire community can gather beneath the towering city walls, above the resting column of Callichorus. I will provide the rituals, so that when you celebrate them properly, you can invoke my spirit. Building of the temple: 298 ff., and following that the instructions of the goddess as to the sacred rituals and the festivals, 474 ff.

2 See Lobeck, Agl. 272 ff.

2 See Lobeck, Agl. 272 and following.

3 487 ff. I will not stop to answer the attacks made on the concluding part of the hymn nor to defend the many lines which editors have rejected. None of the attacks seem to me justified.

3 487 ff. I won’t take the time to respond to the criticisms aimed at the ending of the hymn, nor will I defend the numerous lines that editors have discarded. I don’t find any of the criticisms justified.

4 Körte, Ath. Mitt. 1896, p. 320, dates the decree in the year 418.

4 Körte, Ath. Mitt. 1896, p. 320, states that the decree is from the year 418.

5 κατὰ τὰ πάτρια καὶ τὴν μαντείαν τὴν ἐκ Δελφῶν, SIG. 20, l. 5; 26 f.; 35 [IG. i, Supp., p. 59, 27b]. In Sicily the Eleusinia are already well known in the time of Epicharmos: Epich. ἐν Ὀδυσσεῖ αὐτομόλῳ ap. Ath. 374 D = 100 Kaib. EM. 255, 2; cf. K. O. Müller, Kl. Schr. ii, 259.

5 according to ancestral traditions and the oracle from Delphi, SIG. 20, l. 5; 26 f.; 35 [IG. i, Supp., p. 59, 27b]. In Sicily, the Eleusinia were already well known during the time of Epicharmos: Epich. in Odysseus' betrayal ap. Ath. 374 D = 100 Kaib. EM. 255, 2; cf. K. O. Müller, Kl. Schr. ii, 259.

6 We can only state this definitely of the Eumolpidai who provided the male and female hierophants. Severely as the genealogy of this family has suffered on all sides through fictitious accretions and combinations there can be no doubt of its Eleusinian origin. On the other hand, it is a striking fact that none of the γένη who are known to have shared in the direction of the Eleus. mysteries derived their origin from the Eleusinian princes mentioned in h. Cer. 475–6 as receiving with Eumolpos the instructions of the goddess (Triptolemos, Diokles, Keleos). The Krokonidai and Koironidai did, it is true, claim Triptolemos as their ancestor, but their connexion with the sacred festival is obscure and dubious (see K. O. Müller, Kl. Schr. ii, 255 f.). The Kerykes (in whose family the posts of Dadouchos, Herald of the Mysteries, Priest ἐπὶ βωμῷ, etc., were hereditary) were only connected with Eumolpos by a tradition which the family itself regarded as apocryphal (Paus. 1, 38, 3); they themselves traced their descent from Hermes and Herse the daughter of Kekrops (s. Dittenberger, Hermes, xx, 2), and therefore evidently regarded themselves as an Athenian family. We know too little of these relationships to venture to say that this claim was unjustified (as Müller, p. 250 f., is inclined to do). Nothing need prevent us from supposing that this is one of the many innovations introduced at and after the union of Eleusis and its festival with Athens—many of them are quite evident—and that in addition to the old Eleusinian priestly families the Athenian family of the Kerykes was given a regular part in the δρησμοσύνη ἱερῶν. This would then be part of the compromise (συνθῆκαι, Paus. 2, 14, 2) between Athens and Eleusis upon which the whole relationship between the two states and their religious cults rested.

6 We can only be sure of this regarding the Eumolpidai, who provided both the male and female hierophants. Although the genealogy of this family has been heavily distorted from all sides due to false additions and combinations, there's no doubt about its Eleusinian roots. On the flip side, it's striking that none of the γένη known to have participated in overseeing the Eleusinian mysteries were descended from the Eleusinian princes mentioned in h. Cer. 475–6, who received the goddess's teachings along with Eumolpos (Triptolemos, Diokles, Keleos). The Krokonidai and Koironidai did claim Triptolemos as their ancestor; however, their connection to the sacred festival is unclear and questionable (see K. O. Müller, Kl. Schr. ii, 255 f.). The Kerykes (in whose family the roles of Dadouchos, Herald of the Mysteries, Priest at the altar, etc., were hereditary) were only linked to Eumolpos through a tradition that the family itself considered questionable (Paus. 1, 38, 3). They traced their lineage back to Hermes and Herse, the daughter of Kekrops (see Dittenberger, Hermes, xx, 2), clearly viewing themselves as an Athenian family. We know too little about these relationships to claim that this assertion was unfounded (as Müller, p. 250 f., seems to suggest). There's nothing to stop us from thinking that this is one of many changes made during and after the merger of Eleusis and its festival with Athens—many of which are quite apparent—and that in addition to the old Eleusinian priestly families, the Athenian family of the Kerykes was formally integrated into the sacrificial offering. This would then be part of the agreement (συνθήκες, Paus. 2, 14, 2) between Athens and Eleusis on which the entire relationship between the two states and their religious practices was founded.

7 See above, chap. v, n. 18.

7 See above, chapter 5, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__

8 It is doubtful what part the goddess Daeira played in the Eleusinia: that she played some part must be regarded as certain from the fact that among the official priesthoods of the festival a δαειρίτης is expressly mentioned (Poll. i, 35). She stands in a certain opposition to Demeter: but though she is nevertheless identified by Aesch. 231 and others with Persephone (K. O. Müller, Kl. Schr. ii, 288) the most we may deduce from this is that she also was a chthonic deity. (Acc. to the sacrificial calendar of the Attic Tetrapolis, Leg. Sacr. i, p. 48, B. 12. Δαίρᾳ οἷς κυοῦσα was offered. This does not point to the identity of this goddess with Persephone—as the editor, p. 52, points out. Pregnant animals were by preference offered to Demeter, though occasionally to Artemis and Athene too.) Daeira seems from all the indications to belong to the χθόνιοι. (Meaning of the name uncertain: ? “the knowing one” or “the (torch) burning one”: cf. Lobeck, Pathol. prol. 263.) In Eust. on Ζ 378, p. 648, 24, among the notices collected from the lexicographers there is one in which Pherekydes makes her the sister of Styx (it is not Pherekydes but the over-subtle scholar to whom Eust. owes his note, who thinks that Daeira signified the ὑγρὰ φύσις to the ancients; so also Ael. Dionys. quoting οἱ περὶ τελετὰς καὶ μυστήρια in his Lexicon, ap. Eust. 648, 41. This is a worthless allegorical interpretation).—For which reason some made her the daughter of Okeanos (Müller, pp. 244, 288)—τινὲς δὲ φύλακα Περσεφόνης ὑπὸ Πλούτωνος ἀποδειχθῆναί φασι τὴν Δάειραν (648, 40). According to this she would be a Hades-daimon keeping guard over the wife of Aidoneus (cf. the guardian Κωκυτοῦ περίδρομοι κύνες in Ar., Ran. 472, quoting Eurip.). In this case we can see the origin of Demeter’s hostility. Did this Daeira also play a part (as a character) in the Eleusinian δρᾶμα μυστικόν? Ap. Rh. makes her the same as Hekate, who, however, in the h. Cer. (and on vase-paintings) is the helper rather than the enemy of Demeter.

8 It's uncertain what role the goddess Daeira had in the Eleusinia, but it's clear she had some involvement since a δαειρίτης is specifically mentioned among the festival's official priesthoods (Poll. i, 35). She seems to oppose Demeter, yet Aesch. 231 and others associate her with Persephone (K. O. Müller, Kl. Schr. ii, 288), indicating that she also belongs to the underworld deities. (According to the sacrificial calendar of the Attic Tetrapolis, Leg. Sacr. i, p. 48, B. 12, Δαίρᾳ οἷς κυοῦσα was offered. This doesn't indicate that this goddess is the same as Persephone—as the editor points out on p. 52. Pregnant animals were mainly offered to Demeter, but sometimes to Artemis and Athena as well.) It seems that Daeira is associated with the chthonic. (The meaning of her name is unclear: possibly “the knowing one” or “the (torch) burning one”: see Lobeck, Pathol. prol. 263.) In Eust. on Ζ 378, p. 648, 24, there is a reference from the lexicographers where Pherekydes describes her as the sister of Styx (although it's not Pherekydes but rather a pedantic scholar to whom Eust. attributes the note, who suggests that Daeira represented the wet nature to ancient people; Ael. Dionys. quoting οι που ασχολούνται με τελετές και μυστηρίων in his Lexicon, ap. Eust. 648, 41. This is a meaningless allegorical interpretation).—For this reason, some claimed she was the daughter of Okeanos (Müller, pp. 244, 288)—Some say that the guardian of Persephone has been revealed as Daiera by Pluto. (648, 40). This would imply she is a Hades-daimon guarding the wife of Aidoneus (see the guardian Κυνηγόσκυλα που περιφέρονται in Ar., Ran. 472, quoting Eurip.). In this context, we can understand the origin of Demeter’s hostility. Did this Daeira also have a role (as a character) in the Eleusinian secret drama? Ap. Rh. makes her the same as Hekate, who, however, in the h. Cer. (and on vase paintings) is portrayed as more of a helper than an adversary to Demeter.

9 So also in the recently discovered Paean (fourth century B.C.) of Philodamos of Skarpheia addressed to Dionysos (BCH. 1895, p. 403), where in the third section we are told how Dionysos, the son of Thyone, born in Thebes, went from Delphi to Eleusis where he was called Iakchos by the mortals to whom he had (in the mysteries) revealed πόνων ὅρμον ἄλυπον.—The attempt at historical synthesis, bringing together as many as possible of the different relations and ramifications of the Dionysos nature, is particularly evident in the whole composition of this hymn. The cult of Dionysos was established in Attica by the Delphic oracle—so much is certain; and that is enough for the poet who now makes Iakchos, too, come from Delphi to the people of Attica. Such a conception has no historical significance.

9 Similarly, in the recently found Paean (fourth century BCE) by Philodamos of Skarpheia dedicated to Dionysos (BCH. 1895, p. 403), the third section describes how Dionysos, the son of Thyone, born in Thebes, traveled from Delphi to Eleusis, where he was referred to as Iakchos by the mortals to whom he had revealed pain-free harmony during the mysteries.—The effort to create a historical narrative, combining various aspects and connections of the nature of Dionysos, is especially clear throughout this hymn. The worship of Dionysos was established in Attica by the Delphic oracle—this is certain; and that's sufficient for the poet, who also portrays Iakchos coming from Delphi to the people of Attica. This idea holds no historical significance.

10 Ἴακχος (there clearly distinguished from Διόνυσος) τῆς Δήμητρος δαίμων is described as ὁ ἀρχηγέτης τῶν μυστηρίων in Str. 468 (cf. Ar., Ran. 398 f.).

10 Iacchos (clearly distinguished from Dionysus, the essence of Demeter) is referred to as the leader of the secrets in Str. 468 (see Ar., Ran. 398 f.).

11 The Ἰακχεῖον (Plu., Arist. 27. Alciphr. iii, 59, 1).

11 The Iakcheion (Plu., Arist. 27. Alciphr. iii, 59, 1).

12 Was the birth of Iakchos any part of the spectacle at the mysteries? It might be thought so from what we are told by Hippol., RH. 5, 8, p. 162 D.-S.: the hierophant νυκτὸς ἐν Ἐλευσῖνι ὑπὸ πολλῷ πυρὶ τελῶν τὰ μυστήρια βοᾷ καὶ κέκραγε λέγων· ἱερὸν ἔτεκε πότνια κοῦρον Βριμὼ βριμόν. This statement, however, suffers from the disadvantage belonging to all information given by Christian writers on the subject of mysteries when not confirmed by earlier evidence; such information is admissible at most for the actual time of the writer. (Immediately combined with this in Hippol. comes the remarkable assertion that the hierophant was εὐνουχισμένος διὰ κωνείου. Of this Epict. for example (3, 21, 16) knows nothing, but only speaks of the ἁγνεία—probably confined to the time of the festival and its preparation—of the hierophant. Still, Jerome, adv. Jovin. 1, 49, p. 320 C Vall., speaks of the cicutae sorbitione castrari of the hierophant. Likewise Serv., A. vi, 661.) 232

12 Was the birth of Iakchos part of the spectacle at the mysteries? It could be thought so from what Hippolytus tells us in RH. 5, 8, p. 162 D.-S.: the hierophant At night in Eleusis, under a great fire, the mysteries are being completed, and a voice cries out, saying: "The revered goddess has given birth to the mighty boy Brimos!". However, this statement is limited by the issues that all information from Christian writers about mysteries face when not backed by earlier evidence; such information is only relevant to the time of the writer. (Alongside this, Hippolytus makes the striking claim that the hierophant was castrated by hemlock. For example, Epictetus (3, 21, 16) knows nothing of this but only mentions the purity—likely limited to the time of the festival and its preparation—of the hierophant. Nevertheless, Jerome in adv. Jovin. 1, 49, p. 320 C Vall., talks about the cicutae sorbitione castrari of the hierophant. Similarly, Servius, A. vi, 661.) 232

13 An opportunity of speaking in more detail of Orphic doctrine will occur later on. Here I will only point out in passing that the ancients themselves never suggested for a moment that Orpheus—the master of every kind of mysticism—had anything in particular to do with the Eleusinia; as Lob. Agl. 239 shows.

13 There will be a chance to discuss the Orphic teachings in more detail later on. For now, I want to briefly mention that the ancients never implied that Orpheus—the expert in all forms of mysticism—had any specific connection to the Eleusinia, as Lob. Agl. 239 shows.

14 As to the admission of slaves to the Eleusinian initiation ceremonies K. O. Müller, Kl. Schr. ii, 56, opposes Lobeck (Agl. 19) and suggests a doubt. His main objection is that on the great inscr. dealing with the regulation of the Eleusinia (CIA. i, 1) side by side with μύσται καὶ ἐπόπται there is mention also of ἀκόλουθοι (but not of δοῦλοι, Ziehen, Leg. Sacr. [Diss.], p. 14 f.)—i.e. presumably slaves, not themselves Mystai, belonging to the μύσται. But if slaves were initiated that would not prevent there being other slaves, ἀκόλουθοι of the μύσται, uninitiated and not reckoned among the μύσται. It is definitely stated on the official record of building expenses at Eleusis dating from the year 329/8, CIA. ii, 834, b, col. 2, 71, μύησις δυοῖν τῶν δημοσίων (the state slaves employed in the building operations) Δ Δ Δ (cf. l. 68). Initiation of the δημόσιοι also in CIA. ii, 834 c, 24. On this view, when the comic poet Theophilos (ii, p. 473 K.) makes someone speak of his ἀγαπητὸς δεσπότης by whom he ἐμυήθη θεοῖς, it will not be necessary to suppose that a freedman (as Meineke, Com. 3, 626) is speaking and not a slave.—The generosity implied was all the greater since in many of the most sacred feasts of the gods at Athens slaves were expressly excluded: cf. Philo, Q. omn. Prob. 20, ii, p. 467 M. Casaubon on Ath., vol. 12, p. 495 Schw.

14 Regarding the inclusion of slaves in the Eleusinian initiation ceremonies, K. O. Müller, Kl. Schr. ii, 56, disagrees with Lobeck (Agl. 19) and raises a question. His main argument is that in the significant inscription concerning the regulations of the Eleusinia (CIA. i, 1), alongside Initiates and observers, there is also mention of followers (but not of slaves, Ziehen, Leg. Sacr. [Diss.], p. 14 f.)—which presumably refers to slaves, who were not Mystai themselves, but belonged to the initiates. However, if slaves were indeed initiated, it wouldn't exclude the possibility of other slaves, followers of the initiates, being uninitiated and not counted among the initiates. The official record of building expenses from Eleusis, dating back to 329/8, clearly states in CIA. ii, 834, b, col. 2, 71, initiation of the two public (the state slaves involved in the construction) Δ Δ Δ (see l. 68). The initiation of the public is also referenced in CIA. ii, 834 c, 24. According to this interpretation, when the comic poet Theophilos (ii, p. 473 K.) has a character mention his Beloved master, by whom he initiated into the gods, it’s unnecessary to assume that a freedman (as suggested by Meineke, Com. 3, 626) is speaking instead of a slave. — The generosity implied is even more significant since slaves were explicitly excluded from many of the most sacred festivals of the gods in Athens: see Philo, Q. omn. Prob. 20, ii, p. 467 M. Casaubon on Ath., vol. 12, p. 495 Schw.

15 Isoc. 4, 28, Δήμητρος γὰρ ἀφικομένης εἰς τὴν χώραν . . . καὶ δούσης δωρεὰς διττάς, αἵπερ μέγισται τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι, τούς τε καρποὺς καὶ τὴν τελετήν, . . . οὗτως ἡ πόλις ἡμῶν οὐ μόνον θεοφιλῶς ἀλλὰ καὶ φιλανθρώπως ἔσχεν, ὥστε κυρία γενομένη τοσούτων ἀγαθῶν οὐκ ἐφθόνησε τοῖς ἄλλοις, ἀλλ’ ὧν ἔλαβεν ἅπασι (he means all Greeks: cf. 157) μετέδωκεν.

15 Isoc. 4, 28, When Demeter came to the land and offered two generous gifts, which are the most important—both the fruits and the ceremony—our city was not only favored by the gods but also embodied a spirit of humanity. Despite having so many resources, it didn't hold back from sharing with everyone ἅπασι. (he means all Greeks: cf. 157) withheld.

16 μυεῖν δ’ εἶναι τοῖς οὖσι Κηρύκων καὶ Εὐμολπιδῶν as the law appoints, CIA. i, 1 (more exactly Supp. p. 3 f.), ll. 110–11. Thus the μύησις belonged exclusively to the members of the γένη of the Eumolpidai and Kerykes (but to all the members, not merely those serving as officers at the particular festival concerned). Cf. Dittenberger, Hermes, 20, 31 f. The Emperor Hadrian, in order to be able to hold the festival in a more sumptuous manner, had himself made ἄρχων of the Εὐμολπιδῶν γένος, having already been made a member of that γένος: ins. from Eleusis, Ath. Mitt. 1894, p. 172.—There is no reference to the Eleusinia in what is said about the μυεῖν of a priestess belonging to the family of the Phyllidai in Phot. Φιλλεῖδαι: see Töpffer, Att. Geneal. 92.—The exx. of μύησις collected by Lobeck (Agl. 28 ff.) do not contradict this law: in the case of Lysias who ὑπέσχετο μυήσειν the hetaira Metaneira [D.] 59, 21, μυεῖν merely means defray the cost of initiation (quite correctly explained by Müller, review of Aglaoph., Kl. Schr. ii, 56). So, too, in the case of Theoph. (ii, p. 473 K.) ἐμυήθην θεοῖς, i.e. at the expense of my master.

16 To initiate the mysteries for those present, the Heralds and the Eumolpidai. as the law states, CIA. i, 1 (more precisely Supp. p. 3 f.), ll. 110–11. Thus, the initiation was exclusively for the members of the γένη of the Eumolpidai and Kerykes (but for all members, not just those serving as officers at the specific festival). Cf. Dittenberger, Hermes, 20, 31 f. The Emperor Hadrian, to hold the festival in a more extravagant manner, had himself made ruler of the Eumolpid lineage, having already been made a member of that genus: ins. from Eleusis, Ath. Mitt. 1894, p. 172.—There is no mention of the Eleusinia concerning the μυεῖν of a priestess from the Phyllidai family in Phot. Φιλλεῖδαι: see Töpffer, Att. Geneal. 92.—The examples of initiation collected by Lobeck (Agl. 28 ff.) do not contradict this law: in the case of Lysias who promised to initiate the hetaira Metaneira [D.] 59, 21, μυεῖν simply means to cover the cost of initiation (as correctly explained by Müller, review of Aglaoph., Kl. Schr. ii, 56). Likewise, in the case of Theoph. (ii, p. 473 K.) I was initiated into the gods., meaning at the expense of my master.

17 The πρόρρησις of the Basileus and the proclamations of the hierophant and dadouchos excluded all ἀνδροφόνοι from those taking part in the mysteries: Lob., Agl. 15. They were also, it is true, excluded from all other sacred rites: Lob. 17. Even τοῖς ἐν αἰτίᾳ the Archon gave warning ἀπέχεσθαι μυστηρίων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων νομίμων (Poll. 8, 90): in fact, the person accused of murder was in any case, as “unclean”, excluded from all νόμιμα: Antipho, vi, 36 (in AB. 310, 8 read νομίμων). 233

17 The proclamation from the ruler and the announcements from the hierophant and dadouchos barred all murderers from participating in the mysteries: Lob., Agl. 15. It's true they were also excluded from all other sacred ceremonies: Lob. 17. Even the Archon warned those involved in the accusations to avoid the mysteries and other legal actions (Poll. 8, 90): in fact, anyone accused of murder was considered "unclean" and excluded from all legally: Antipho, vi, 36 (in AB. 310, 8 read νομίμων). 233

18 ὅσιοι μύσται, Ar., Ran. 336. (So, too, the Mystai of the Orphic mysteries are called οἱ ὅσιοι: Pl., Rp. 363 C; Orph., H. 84, 3.) ὅσιος is probably here used in its primitive sense = “clean” (ὅσιαι χεῖρες, etc.). [Pl.] Axioch. 371 D refers to τὰς ὁσίους ἀγχιστείας of the Eleus. Mystai. In the same way ὁσιοῦν was used of ritual purification and expiation: φυγαῖσιν ὁσιοῦν the murder, E., Or. 515; ὁσιοῦν the returned homicide, D. 23, 73; (of the Bacchic mysteries βάκχος ἐκλήθην ὁσιωθείς, E. fr. 472, 15). Thus the ὅσιοι are identical with the κεκαθαρμένοι as the initiated are called: Pl. Phd. 69 C, and frequently. It would be hazardous to suppose that the Mystai called themselves ὅσιοι as the only pious and righteous people (though that is what ὅσιος ἄνθρωπος and the like mean elsewhere). Their spiritual self-satisfaction hardly went as far as that, and indeed they did not ascribe so much personal merit to themselves at all.

18 holy initiates, Ar., Ran. 336. (Similarly, the Mystai of the Orphic mysteries are referred to as the saints: Pl., Rp. 363 C; Orph., H. 84, 3.) The term holy is likely used here in its original sense of “pure” (holy hands, etc.). [Pl.] Axioch. 371 D mentions the sacred relatives of the Eleusinian Mystai. Likewise, ὁσιοῦν was used in the context of ritual purification and atonement: φυγαῖσιν ὁσιοῦν referring to the murder, E., Or. 515; ὁσιοῦν used for the returned murderer, D. 23, 73; (concerning the Bacchic mysteries I was called Bacchus, consecrated., E. fr. 472, 15). Thus, the saints are the same as the κεκαθαρμένοι who are referred to as the initiated: Pl. Phd. 69 C, and often. It would be risky to assume that the Mystai viewed themselves as holy as the only righteous and pious individuals (though that’s what holy person and similar terms indicate elsewhere). Their spiritual self-satisfaction likely didn’t extend that far, and in fact, they didn’t attribute so much personal merit to themselves either.

19 In a solemn announcement of the Keryx as it seems: the latter acc. to Sopater διαίρ. ζητημ. (Walz, Rhet. Gr. viii, 118, 24 f.) δημοσίᾳ ἐπιτάττει τὴν σιωπήν at the commencement of the sacred ritual.

19 In a serious announcement of the Keryx as it appears: according to Sopater, διαίρ. ζητημ. (Walz, Rhet. Gr. viii, 118, 24 f.) publicly commands silence at the beginning of the sacred ritual.

20 τὰ μυστήρια ποιεῖν, Andoc., Myst. 11–12.—The more clearly descriptive expression, ἐξορχεῖσθαι τὰ μυστήρια does not seem to occur before Aristides, Lucian, and the latter’s imitator Alciphron. [Lys.] 6, 51: οὗτος ἐνδὺς στολήν, μιμούμενος τὰ ἱερὰ ἐπεδείκνυε τοῖς ἀμυήτοις καὶ εἶπε τῇ φωνῇ τὰ ἀπόρρητα. The ἀπορ. thus divulged were the sacred formulæ uttered by the hierophant.

20 the mysteries, Andoc., Myst. 11–12.—The more clearly descriptive phrase, to perform the rituals does not seem to appear until Aristides, Lucian, and Lucian’s imitator Alciphron. [Lys.] 6, 51: He, wearing a robe and mimicking the sacred rituals, disclosed to the untrained and spoke openly about the secret teachings.. The secrets thus revealed were the sacred formulas spoken by the hierophant.

21 At least in later ages there was plenty to hear: εἰς ἐφάμιλλον κατέστη ταῖς ἀκοαῖς τὰ ὁρώμενα, Aristid., Eleus. I, 415 Di. [ii, 28 Ke.]. We frequently hear of the beautiful voices of the hierophants, of ὕμνοι ringing out, etc.

21 At least in later times, there was a lot to listen to: It became similar to the senses as the seen things., Aristid., Eleus. I, 415 Di. [ii, 28 Ke.]. We often hear about the beautiful voices of the hierophants and hymns ringing out, etc.

22 The well-known statements of Pindar, Sophokles, Isokrates, Krinagoras, Cicero, and others are collected by Lobeck, Agl. 69 ff. There is a reminiscence of Isocr. in Aristid. Eleus. I 421 Di. [ii, 30 Ke.] ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε κέρδος τῆς πανηγύρεως οὐχ ὅσον ἡ παροῦσα εὐθυμία . . . ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τῆς τελευτῆς ἡδίους ἔχειν τὰς ἐλπίδας. id. Panath. I, 302 Di. τὰς ἀρρήτους τελετὰς ὧν τοῖς μετασχοῦσι καὶ μετὰ τῆν τοῦ βίου τελευτὴν βελτίω τὰ πράγματα γίγνεσθαι δοκεῖ. Cf. also Welcker’s account, Gr. Götterl. ii, 519 ff., in which, however, there is a good deal mixed up which has nothing to do with the mysteries.

22 The well-known quotes from Pindar, Sophocles, Isocrates, Crinagoras, Cicero, and others are compiled by Lobeck, Agl. 69 ff. There is a reference to Isocrates in Aristides, Eleus. I 421 Di. [ii, 30 Ke.] But the benefit from the festival isn’t as significant as the joy we feel right now... and also to have more optimistic hopes for the future.. id. Panath. I, 302 Di. the unimaginable rituals in which participants believe they will enhance their circumstances after death. Cf. also Welcker’s account, Gr. Götterl. ii, 519 ff., which, however, contains a lot of unrelated content that has nothing to do with the mysteries.

23 That is, in the time of still vital religion and in the circles which still retained an unspoilt feeling for it. Apart from these it is true that the allegorical interpretation of myths was already familiar in antiquity, and in learned circles the gods and the stories of the gods were transformed and disintegrated εἰς πνεύματα καὶ ῥεύματα καὶ σπόρους καὶ ἀρότους καὶ πάθη γῆς καὶ μεταβολὰς ὡρῶν as Plutarch complains, Is. et O. 66, p. 377 D. These allegorical interpreters from Anaxagoras and Metrodoros onwards are the real ancestors of our modern “nature” mythologists. No one doubts, however, that from their interpretations nothing can be learnt except what the real sense of Greek belief in the gods certainly was not. It is worth noticing that Prodikos, because he said that ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην καὶ ποταμοὺς καὶ λειμῶνας καὶ καρποὺς καὶ πᾶν τὸ τοιουτῶδες were the real essence of the Greek gods, was looked upon as one of the ἄθεοι (S.E., M. 9, 51–2 = B 5 Diels). Quam tandem religionem reliquit? asks the Greek whom Cicero is reproducing in ND. i, 118, with reference to this ancient prophet of Greek “nature-religion”.—For the ancient allegorists Persephone, too, is nothing but τὸ διὰ τῶν καρπῶν φερόμενον πνεῦμα (so Kleanthes: Plu. as above). Acc. to Varro Persephone “means” fecunditatem seminum, 234 carried off by Orcus on the occasion of some crop-failure, etc. (Aug., CD. vii, 20). In Porph. ap. Eus., PE. 3, 11, 7–9. we actually have the very interpretation which has been recently restored to so much favour—that Κόρη is nothing else but a (feminine) personification of κόρος = young plant, shoot.

23 Back when religion was still alive and meaningful, and among those who still had an untouched appreciation for it. It's true that, aside from these groups, the allegorical interpretation of myths was already known in ancient times, and in scholarly circles, the gods and their stories were reinterpreted and deconstructed into spirits and flows and seeds and crops and the passions of the earth and the changes of the seasons, as Plutarch points out, Is. et O. 66, p. 377 D. The allegorical interpreters from Anaxagoras and Metrodoros onward are the true precursors of our current "nature" mythologists. However, it’s clear that nothing can be learned from their interpretations except what the true meaning of Greek belief in the gods definitely was not. It is interesting to note that Prodikos, for claiming that the sun and the moon and rivers and meadows and fruits and everything similar to these were the true nature of the Greek gods, was considered one of the atheists (S.E., M. 9, 51–2 = B 5 Diels). When did they finally leave religion? asks the Greek whom Cicero quotes in ND. i, 118, regarding this ancient advocate of Greek “nature-religion”.—For the ancient allegorists, Persephone was merely the spirit carried through the fruits (so Kleanthes: Plu. as above). According to Varro, Persephone “means” seed fertility, 234 taken away by Orcus due to some crop failure, etc. (Aug., CD. vii, 20). In Porph. ap. Eus., PE. 3, 11, 7–9, we actually find the same interpretation that has recently regained popularity—that Daughter is simply a (feminine) personification of κόρος = young plant, shoot.

24 A hint of such an explanation occurs in Sallustius, de Dis iv, κατὰ τὴν ἐναντίαν ἰσημερίαν (i.e. the autumnal) ἡ τῆς Κόρης ἁρπαγὴ μυθολογεῖται γενέσθαι· ὃ δὴ κάθοδός ἑστι τῶν ψυχῶν (from the standpoint of this Neoplatonist at any rate the analogy might be carried through). So, too, Sopater διαίρ. ζητ. in Walz, Rh. Gr. viii, 115, 3, speaks of τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς τὸ θεῖον συγγενές as if it were confirmed in the (Eleusinian) mysteries.

24 A hint of such an explanation appears in Sallustius, de Dis iv, against the opposite equinox (i.e. the autumnal) The abduction of Persephone is said to have happened; indeed, this is the descent of the souls. (from the perspective of this Neoplatonist, at least, the analogy could be applied). Similarly, Sopater διαίρεση. αναζητήστε. in Walz, Rh. Gr. viii, 115, 3, refers to the soul's connection to the divine as if it were validated in the (Eleusinian) mysteries.

25 It may be mentioned here by anticipation that a real doctrine of the indestructibility of the human soul was first traditionally attributed in antiquity to the Greek philosophers such as Thales or to the theosophoi such as Pherekydes (and Pythagoras too). In what sense this can be regarded as true we shall learn in the course of our inquiry. The mysteries of Eleusis, from which many modern critics would like to derive the belief in immortality among the Greeks, are mentioned by no ancient authority as among the sources of that belief or of such a doctrine. In which they were quite right.

25 It can be noted here in advance that the concept of the indestructibility of the human soul was initially attributed to ancient Greek philosophers like Thales and to the theosophoi such as Pherekydes (and Pythagoras as well). We will discover how this can be seen as true as we explore further. The mysteries of Eleusis, which many modern critics suggest are the origin of the Greeks' belief in immortality, are not cited by any ancient authority as a source of that belief or doctrine. They were correct in this regard.

26 Soph. fr. 753 N. [791 P.] ὡς τρὶς ὄλβιοι κεῖνοι βροτῶν, οἳ ταῦτα δερχθέντες τέλη μόλωσ’ ἐς Ἅιδου· τοῖσδε γὰρ μόνοις ἐκεῖ ζῆν ἔστι, τοῖς δ’ ἄλλοισι πάντ’ ἐκεῖ κακά.

26 Soph. fr. 753 N. [791 P.] Those who have gone through this are truly lucky among people, because only they can exist in Hades; for everyone else, it’s just suffering.

27 The privileged position of the initiated is exhibited with striking vigour in the well-known outburst of Diogenes: τί λέγεις, ἔφη, κρείττονα μοῖραν ἕξει Παταικίων ὁ κλέπτης ἀποθανὼν ἢ Ἐπαμεινώνδας, ὅτι μεμύηται; Plu., Aud. Poet. iv, p. 21 F; D.L. vi, 39; Jul., Or. vii, 238 A (p. 308 Hert.).—A homiletic application of Diogenes’ saying is made by Philo, Vict. Off. 12, ii, p. 261 M. συμβαίνει πολλάκις τῶν μὲν ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν μηδένα μυεῖσθαι, λῃστὰς δὲ ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ καταποντιστὰς καὶ γυναικῶν θιάσους βδελυκτῶν καὶ ἀκολάστων, ἐπὰν ἀργύριον παράσχωσι τοῖς τελοῖσι καὶ ἱεροφαντοῦσι. Cf. Spec. Leg. 3, 7, i, p. 306 M.

27 The privileged status of those who are initiated is vividly illustrated in Diogenes' famous remark: What do you think, he asked, does the thief of Pataikion have a better fate when he dies than Epameinondas, just because he is initiated? Plu., Aud. Poet. iv, p. 21 F; D.L. vi, 39; Jul., Or. vii, 238 A (p. 308 Hert.).—Philo makes a moral application of Diogenes’ statement in Vict. Off. 12, ii, p. 261 M. It often happens that none of the decent men are initiated, while thieves and those who lead corrupt and unruly women manage to bribe the initiates and the hierophants with money.. Cf. Spec. Leg. 3, 7, i, p. 306 M.

28 Of this nature were the ἱερά which the hierophant “showed” and the other things that were employed in the festival: pictures of gods, relics, and paraphernalia of all sorts (e.g. the κίστη and the κάλαθος: O. Jahn, Hermes, 3, 327 f.): see Lob., Agl. 51–62.

28 This included the sacred that the hierophant “displayed” along with the other items used in the festival: images of gods, relics, and various tools (e.g. the kystis and the basket: O. Jahn, Hermes, 3, 327 f.): see Lob., Agl. 51–62.

29 Preller, for example (stimulated by K. O. Müller), is fond of dwelling on the special character and meaning of the worship of the chthonic deities as something quite distinct from other Greek worships of the gods. An example may be found in Pauly-Wissowa1, s.v. Eleusis, iii, p. 108: “The department of religion to which the Eleusinian cult belongs is that of the chthonic deities, which had been indigenous in Greece from the earliest times and was a widely popular cultus. In this cultus ideas of the generous fruitfulness of the earth’s soil and of the fruitfulness of death—whose seat seems to be beneath the earth like the Old Testament Sheol—were interwoven in a mysteriously suggestive way: a way which essentially resisted all efforts at clear and distinct comprehension, and could not help leading to mystical or occult suggestions and obscure symbolistic expression.” This and further amplifications in the same sense all rest upon the unprovable axiom that the activities of the χθόνιοι as gods of the soil and as gods of the kingdom of the souls were “interwoven”: the suggestive haze of the rest follows naturally. But what in all this is Greek?

29 Preller, influenced by K. O. Müller, emphasizes the unique characteristics and significance of worshiping chthonic deities as something distinctly different from other forms of Greek worship. A reference can be found in Pauly-Wissowa1, s.v. Eleusis, iii, p. 108: “The area of religion to which the Eleusinian cult belongs is that of the chthonic deities, which have been a part of Greece since ancient times and were widely popular. In this cult, concepts of the earth’s generous fertility and the fertility of death—whose realm appears to be beneath the earth like the Old Testament Sheol—were intertwined in a mysteriously suggestive manner: a way that fundamentally resisted clear and distinct understanding, inevitably leading to mystical or occult meanings and vague symbolic expressions.” This and similar elaborations are based on the unprovable assumption that the activities of the chthonic as gods of the soil and as gods of the realm of souls were “interwoven”: the suggestive ambiguity of the rest follows naturally. But what, in all of this, is truly Greek?

30 ἡ κρύψις ἡ μυστικὴ τῶν ἱερῶν σεμνοποιεῖ τὸ θεῖον, μιμουμένη τὴν φύσιν αὐτοῦ φεύγουσαν ἡμῶν τὴν αἴσθησιν. Str. 467. 235

30 The hidden mystery of the sacred respectfully represents the divine, reflecting its essence while slipping past our understanding.. Str. 467. 235

31 In fact the ancient allegorical interpretations of the mysteries differed widely among themselves: Lob., Agl. 136–40.—Even Galen attributed an allegorical sense to the mysteries of Eleusis, but he thinks ἀμυδρὰ ἐκεῖνα πρὸς ἔνδειξιν ὧν σπεύδει διδάσκειν (iv, p. 361 K.). This cannot have been true of the assurances given to the Mystai of a blessed future in Hades.

31 In fact, the ancient allegorical interpretations of the mysteries varied widely: Lob., Agl. 136–40.—Even Galen assigned an allegorical meaning to the mysteries of Eleusis, but he believes ἀμυδρὰ those things are faint indicators of what one is eager to teach. (iv, p. 361 K.). This cannot have been true regarding the assurances given to the Mystai of a blessed future in Hades.

32 Such proclamations may have occurred in the ἱεροφάντου ῥήσεις (Sop. διαίρ. ζητ. Walz, viii, 123, 29; cf. Lob., Agl. 189).

32 Such statements may have appeared in the sacred utterances (Sop. διαίρ. ζητ. Walz, viii, 123, 29; cf. Lob., Agl. 189).

33 Lob., Agl. 52, 58 f.

33 Lob., Agl. 52, 58 f.

34 No one says anything of any kind of moral obligation undertaken by the Mystai or of any consequent moral influence of the festival: not even Andokides in whose warnings addressed to the college of judges composed of Mystai (Myst. 31) the words ἵνα τιμωρήσητε μὲν τοὺς ἀσεβοῦντας κτλ. are not to be taken with the previous μεμύησθε καὶ ἑωράκατε τοῖν θεοῖν τὰ ἱερά but with οἵτινες ὅρκους μεγάλους κτλ., καὶ ἀρασάμενοι κτλ. He speaks, in fact, of the moral obligation of the jury who have taken the oath, as judges not as Mystai. In Ar., Ran., 455 ff., the words ὅσοι μεμυήμεθα stand loosely side by side with εὐσεβῆ διήγομεν τρόπον περὶ τοὺς ξένους καὶ τοὺς ἰδιώτας. (Of the Samothrakian mysteries Diodoros says, 5, 49, 6: γίνεσθαι δέ φασι καὶ εὐσεβεστέρους καὶ δικαιοτέρους καὶ κατὰ πᾶν βελτίονας ἑαυτῶν τοὺς τῶν μυστηρίων κοινωνήσαντας—as it seems without effort on their part by a pure act of grace.)

34 No one mentions any moral obligation undertaken by the Mystai or any resulting moral influence of the festival: not even Andokides, who warns the college of judges made up of Mystai (Myst. 31) by saying So that you may punish the wicked, etc., which should not be interpreted with the earlier You've been initiated and have seen the sacred things of the gods., but rather with who take great oaths, etc., and having invoked, etc. He actually talks about the moral obligation of the jury that has taken the oath, as judges, not as Mystai. In Ar., Ran., 455 ff., the phrase Those of us initiated sits loosely alongside We speak respectfully about foreigners and private individuals.. (Regarding the Samothrakian mysteries, Diodoros states, 5, 49, 6: They say that those who participate in the mysteries become more pious, more just, and better in every way than they were before.—as it appears, without any effort on their part, through an act of pure grace.)

35 Formal or verbal instruction of a theological or moral kind was not supplied at Eleusis; so much may be stated without fear of contradiction since the work of Lobeck. Thus, the three commandments of Triptolemos, which acc. to Xenokrates διαμένουσι Ἐλευσῖνι (Porph., Abs. 4, 22) cannot be regarded as moral precepts proclaimed at the mysteries: indeed, there is nothing to lead one to conclude that they had anything to do with the mystery festival at Eleusis. In character these very simple precepts seem related to the laws of Bouzyges, with whom Triptolemos is sometimes confused (Haupt, Opusc. iii, 505) and were very likely, like them, recited at some agricultural festival. Supposing further that the third “law” of Triptolemos: ζῷα μὴ σίνεσθαι was really (as Xenokr. seems to have understood it) intended to recommend a complete ἀποχὴ ἐμψύχων, then it certainly cannot have been proclaimed at the Eleusinia (though this is what Dieterich thinks happened, Nekyia, 165). It is surely unthinkable that the Mystai at Eleusis were, after the Orphic model, absolutely forbidden to eat flesh for the rest of their lives. It remains a possibility that the precept had quite a different meaning—it does not definitely speak of the killing of animals—and that it belongs to some simple farmer’s festival (not to the great festival of Eleusis, but rather, e.g. the Haloa) at which the farmer was recommended to spare his live stock (just as the third of the three laws of Demonassa at Cyprus forbade the farmer μὴ ἀποκτεῖναι βοῦν ἀρότριον, D. Chr. 64, 3 [329 R., 148 Arn.]; Attic law ap. Ael. VH. 5, 14, etc.).—In any case to bring all this into connexion with the mystery festival of Eleusis is absolutely without justification.

35 There was no formal or verbal teaching of theology or morals at Eleusis; this can be stated confidently since Lobeck's work. Therefore, the three commandments of Triptolemos, which according to Xenokrates They are living in Eleusis. (Porph., Abs. 4, 22) cannot be seen as moral guidelines given during the mysteries: in fact, there’s no evidence to suggest they were related to the mystery festival at Eleusis. These very simple rules seem to be connected to the laws of Bouzyges, with whom Triptolemos is sometimes mixed up (Haupt, Opusc. iii, 505), and they were likely recited at some agricultural festival. If we assume that the third “law” of Triptolemos: Animals should not be kept. was truly intended to recommend a complete Animal rights, as Xenokr. seems to have interpreted, then it definitely wasn’t proclaimed at the Eleusinia (though Dieterich thinks otherwise, Nekyia, 165). It’s hard to believe that the Mystai at Eleusis were, after the Orphic way, completely banned from eating meat for the rest of their lives. There’s a chance that the rule had a totally different meaning—it doesn’t specifically mention killing animals—and it might belong to some simple farmer’s festival (not the major festival of Eleusis, but perhaps something like the Haloa) where farmers were advised to spare their livestock (just as the third of the three laws of Demonassa at Cyprus forbade farmers Do not kill a plow ox, D. Chr. 64, 3 [329 R., 148 Arn.]; Attic law ap. Ael. VH. 5, 14, etc.).—In any case, linking all of this with the mystery festival of Eleusis is completely unjustified.

CHAPTER VII

Ideas for Future Life

Certain allusions in Plutarch and Lucian1 would lead us to suppose that the “mystery-drama” of Eleusis included also a visual exhibition of the underworld and its blest, or unblest, inhabitants. But these contemporaries of a final and luxuriant flowering of mystery-religions of every kind can serve as reliable witnesses only for their own period. In their day the Eleusinian festival, in competition it may be with other secret worships which were invading the Greco-Roman world in ever-increasing numbers, seems to have undergone a considerable alteration and extension of its primitive and traditional shape. We may doubt whether in earlier, classical times the Eleusinia can have attempted to bind the imagination with what were always petty details, or confine within formal limits what lay beyond all human experience. Still the solemn promise of future blessedness made in the mystic festival may, at any rate, have stimulated the imagination of its worshippers and given a more definite turn to their own natural efforts to picture the life to come. The ideas cultivated at Eleusis unmistakably contributed to the process by which the picture of Hades acquired colour and distinctness. Even without such stimulus, the natural instinct of the Greeks at all periods to give form even to what was essentially formless, worked in the same direction. The limits set by Homeric beliefs about the future world had made the Odyssean description of a descent to Hades seem a risky experiment only to be undertaken with the greatest caution. Now, however, since the re-establishment of the belief in a conscious after-life of the disembodied soul, such imaginative bodyings-forth of the invisible realm of shadows had become apparently the most natural and innocent employment of poetic fancy.

Certain references in Plutarch and Lucian1 suggest that the “mystery-drama” of Eleusis also featured a visual display of the underworld and its blessed or cursed inhabitants. However, these contemporary sources can only be considered reliable witnesses for their own time. During their era, the Eleusinian festival, possibly facing competition from numerous other secret cults that were spreading throughout the Greco-Roman world, seems to have experienced significant changes and expansions from its original and traditional form. We may question whether, in the earlier classical period, the Eleusinia sought to captivate the imagination with what were always minor details or constrain what lay outside human experience within formal boundaries. Still, the solemn promise of future bliss made during the mystic festival may have inspired worshippers' imaginations and given a clearer direction to their natural impulses to envision life after death. The concepts developed at Eleusis undoubtedly played a role in shaping the more vivid and defined picture of Hades. Even without such inspiration, the inherent Greek tendency throughout history to give form to what was essentially formless also contributed to this direction. The constraints imposed by Homeric beliefs about the afterlife made the Odyssean depiction of a descent into Hades seem like a risky endeavor best approached with caution. However, since the revival of the belief in a conscious afterlife for disembodied souls, such imaginative explorations of the unseen realm of shadows have become the most natural and innocent expressions of poetic creativity.

The story of Odysseus’ journey to Hades and its expansion in conformity with the gradually increasing distinctness with which the life after death was conceived, was followed at an early period in the development of Epic poetry by further accounts of such journeys undertaken by other heroes. A Hesiodic poem described the descent of Theseus and Peirithoös to the underworld.2 A Nekyia, the details of which are unknown, occurred in the poem of the Return of the heroes 237 from Troy. The epic which went by the name of the “Minyas” seems to have given considerable space to a descent to Hades.3 The ancient fable of Herakles’ descent to Hades and conflicts in the underworld received embellishment at more than one poet’s hand.4 As a result of such repeated and rival interpretations of the story the stock of characters and events associated with Hades was gradually and continually being enlarged. Accident has preserved to us the fact about the little-known Minyas that it, too, added to the details of the picture. To what extent popular imagination and mythology, on the one hand, and poetic inventiveness, on the other, may have been responsible for all this we can hardly say. It seems probable that here, as in the development of so many Greek myths, on the whole the balance of invention lay on the side of the poets. Purely poetic visions or pictures like that of the translation of individual heroes to Elysium may have gradually won their way to popular acceptance. “Dearest Harmodios,” said the Athenian Skolion, “thou art not dead indeed, but livest yet, men say, in the Islands of the Blest.” Not that there was anything fixed or dogmatic on the point. In a funeral oration Hyperides represents Leosthenes and his companions in battle as meeting in Hades, among the illustrious dead, the Tyrannicides, Harmodios and Aristogeiton.5

The story of Odysseus' journey to Hades and its growth in line with the gradually clearer ideas about life after death was followed early on in the development of Epic poetry by more accounts of similar journeys taken by other heroes. A poem by Hesiod described the descent of Theseus and Peirithoös to the underworld. A Nekyia, the details of which are unknown, appeared in the poem about the Return of the heroes 237 from Troy. The epic known as the “Minyas” seems to have devoted a lot of space to a descent to Hades. The ancient legend of Herakles’ descent to Hades and his battles in the underworld was enhanced by several poets. Because of these repeated and competing interpretations of the story, the collection of characters and events associated with Hades was continually expanding. By chance, we have learned that the lesser-known Minyas also contributed to this picture. It’s hard to say how much popular imagination and mythology, on one side, and poetic creativity, on the other, were responsible for this. It seems likely that, as with many Greek myths, the poets had the main role in creating these ideas. Purely poetic visions or images, like the translation of individual heroes to Elysium, may have gained popularity over time. “Dearest Harmodios,” said the Athenian Skolion, “you are not dead indeed, but still live, as people say, in the Islands of the Blest.” There was nothing firm or dogmatic about this idea. In a funeral speech, Hyperides depicted Leosthenes and his fellow warriors as meeting in Hades, among the great dead, the Tyrannicides, Harmodios and Aristogeiton.

Much that may have been the invention of poets for the filling up or furnishing of the desert region so stamped itself upon the general mind that it almost seemed the natural growth of authentic popular belief. Everyone was familiar with the guardian of the gate of Plouton, the malignant hound of Hades who admits everyone but lets no one out again. He is the same creature, long known from the adventure of Herakles, which is already named Kerberos by Hesiod.6 Like the gate and the gate-keeper, the waters that divide Erebos from the world of the living are already known to Homer. Now they have a Ferryman added to them, the churlish old man Charon, who, like a second Kerberos, safely transports everyone across the water, but lets no one return.7 The Minyas is the first to mention him: that he became a real figure of popular belief (as he is still in Greece to this day, though with altered significance) is shown by pictures on the Attic vases that were put into the graves with the dead. These represent the soul as it stands upon the sedgy bank and meets the ferryman who will carry it over to the other side whence no man returns.8 The custom of burying the dead with a small coin fixed between the teeth was also explained as provision for the passage-money that would have to be paid to Charon.9 238

A lot of what may have come from poets to fill or embellish the desolate area has become so ingrained in common thought that it almost feels like a natural part of authentic popular belief. Everyone knew about the guardian of the entrance to Pluton's realm, the vicious hound of Hades who allows everyone to enter but won’t let anyone leave. He is the same creature long known from Heracles’ adventure, already called Cerberus by Hesiod. 6 Like the gate and its keeper, the waters that separate Erebos from the living world are familiar to Homer. Now, there’s also a Ferryman, the grumpy old man Charon, who, like a second Cerberus, safely ferries everyone across the waters but lets no one come back. 7 The Minyas is the first to mention him: his transformation into a real figure of popular belief (as he still is in Greece today, though with a different meaning) is illustrated by images on the Attic vases placed in graves with the deceased. These depictions show the soul standing on the grassy bank meeting the ferryman who will take it to the other side, from where no one returns. 8 The tradition of burying the dead with a small coin placed between the teeth was also understood as payment for the passage to be given to Charon. 9 238

§ 2

The soul, then, being safely arrived on the other bank and Kerberos passed by—what awaited it there? Those who had been initiated into the mysteries now counted upon enjoying the glad future that their hopes had formerly pictured. In reality this blessed future, vouchsafed by the grace of the deities who rule below, was not very hard to obtain. So many were initiated and recommended to divine favour that the picture of Hades, once so gloomy, began to assume a more genial aspect. Quite early we meet with the general name of “Blessedness” as applied to the future life; while the dead without much distinction are called the “Blessed”.10

The soul, having safely reached the other side and got past Cerberus—what was waiting there? Those who had been initiated into the mysteries were now looking forward to enjoying the happy future they had once envisioned. In reality, this blessed future, granted by the grace of the gods who preside below, wasn't very hard to attain. So many were initiated and favored by the divine that the image of Hades, once so dark, began to appear more welcoming. Early on, we see the general term “Blessedness” used to describe the afterlife, while the dead, without much distinction, are referred to as the “Blessed.”10

Of course, anyone who had been so foolish as to neglect or despise initiation has “not the same fate below”, as the Hymn to Demeter discreetly puts it. Only the initiated have life, says Sophokles: the uninitiated, with whom it goes ill in the land below, can hardly have been thought of otherwise than as floating in the glimmering half-life of the shadows in the Homeric Erebos. Well-meaning modern efforts to read a moral meaning into things Greek have sought to prove that the Greeks, too, had a genuine popular belief in a future judgment and recompense for the past deeds and character of the dead. Homer makes hardly the most distant allusion to such a belief. The perjurer alone suffers in Homer the punishment at the hands of the gods of the underworld which he had invoked upon himself in his oath. Even the “Sinners” and their punishment which later imitation added to the story of Odysseus’ Journey to Hades, considered without prejudice, do not support the opinion that Homeric poetry knew of a belief in retribution hereafter. Later poets were only following this model when they made other enemies of the gods endure eternal punishment in Hades—Thamyris, for example, or Amphion (as the Minyas related), and later Ixion in particular.11 All this does not, even in the slightest degree, suggest a general belief in future rewards and punishment. Of course, there is the judgment that is given in Hades by “One” according to Pindar (Ol. ii, 65), but this occurs in connexion with a description of the “last things” which the poet has borrowed from the teachings of mystic separatists. Aeschylus12 knows of a judgment pronounced by Hades himself; but his thoughts about divine retribution both on earth and hereafter are derived from his own religious temperament which was entirely opposed to the popular beliefs of his day and more inclined to accept the speculative doctrines of the theologians. The 239 first precise account of the three judges in Hades, Minos, Rhadamanthys, and Aiakos, who judge the deeds of men done in their lifetime upon earth occurs in Plato in a description of the other world which reproduces anything rather than the popular beliefs of the time.13 Later on, the picture of the judges in Hades (to whom Triptolemos was also added),14 like many other details of the Platonic eschatological myths, became a real part of popular fancy, as allusions in later literature and even, perhaps, pictures of the underworld on vase-paintings from Southern Italy, bear witness. But the idea that in the supreme period of Greek culture the belief in a judgment and judges in Hades, who passed sentence on the deeds of men done on earth, had really any root in popular belief, is quite unproved and can be shown to be erroneous from the argument ex silentio. And where there are no judges no judgment can take place.

Of course, anyone who was foolish enough to ignore or disdain initiation does “not have the same fate below,” as the Hymn to Demeter subtly suggests. Only the initiated have life, says Sophocles: the uninitiated, who fare poorly in the underworld, can hardly be seen as anything other than existing in the dim, half-life of the shadows in Homer’s Erebos. Well-meaning modern attempts to interpret a moral meaning in Greek beliefs have tried to show that the Greeks genuinely believed in some sort of future judgment and rewards for the actions and character of the dead. However, Homer makes almost no reference to such beliefs. Only the perjurer suffers the punishment from the gods of the underworld that he brought upon himself with his oath. Even the "Sinners" and their punishments, later added to the story of Odysseus' Journey to Hades, do not support the idea that Homeric poetry acknowledged a belief in retribution in the afterlife. Later poets were merely following this model when they depicted other enemies of the gods facing eternal punishment in Hades—like Thamyris, or Amphion (as mentioned in the Minyas), and particularly Ixion later on.11 None of this implies a widespread belief in future rewards and punishments. Of course, there is a judgment in Hades given by “One” according to Pindar (Ol. ii, 65), but that is presented in connection with a description of “last things” that the poet borrowed from the teachings of mystic sects. Aeschylus12 mentions a judgment given by Hades himself; however, his views on divine retribution, both on earth and beyond, reflect his personal religious feelings, which were entirely in opposition to the popular beliefs of his time and more aligned with the speculative doctrines of theologians. The 239 first clear account of the three judges in Hades—Minos, Rhadamanthys, and Aiakos—who judge the actions of men during their lifetime on earth appears in Plato’s description of the afterlife, which reproduces anything but the popular beliefs of the time.13 Later, the image of the judges in Hades (to whom Triptolemos was also added),14 like many other details from the Platonic eschatological myths, became a real part of popular imagination, as evidenced by references in later literature and potentially even images of the underworld on vase paintings from Southern Italy. But the notion that during the peak of Greek culture, the belief in judgment and judges in Hades, who sentenced men based on their earthly deeds, had any real roots in popular belief is entirely unproven and can be shown to be incorrect through the argument ex silentio. And where there are no judges, no judgment can occur.

We often see it asserted that the belief in a future state of compensation for the good and evil deeds of this world was obtained by the Greeks from the Eleusinian mysteries. In reality the opposite is true; if and in so far as the Greeks ever received or entertained such a belief in future rewards and punishments the mysteries of Eleusis had nothing whatever to do with the matter. We have only to remember the simple fact that the Eleusinian mysteries admitted to initiation, with the single exception of those stained by the crime of murder, Greeks of all sorts without any inquiry into their past life and actions, or even their character. The initiated were promised a blessed life hereafter; a gloomy fate awaited the uninitiated. The difference was not made by goodness or badness; “Pataikion the thief will have a better fate after his death because he has been initiated at Eleusis than Agesilaos or Epameinondas” sneered Diogenes the Cynic. Not political or moral worth but “spiritual” merit alone is decisive. Nor will anyone be very surprised at that. It is so in most religions. But in any case, the idea of a sentence passed on virtue or vice in Hades had been forestalled by the system of rewards and punishments in the lower world which the mysteries had already formulated from quite a different point of view. Where the mysteries were seriously and conscientiously taken they would rather have thrown their weight into the scales against any such idea, if it began to make itself felt, of compensation for good and evil deeds in Hades; they certainly contained nothing that fostered such a belief.

We often hear it claimed that the belief in an afterlife where good and bad deeds are rewarded or punished originated with the Eleusinian mysteries among the Greeks. In reality, the opposite is true; if the Greeks ever embraced the idea of future rewards and punishments, the Eleusinian mysteries had nothing to do with it. We just need to note that anyone could be initiated into the Eleusinian mysteries, except for those guilty of murder, without any examination of their past actions or character. The initiated were promised a blessed life after death, while the uninitiated faced a grim fate. The distinction wasn't based on being good or bad; Diogenes the Cynic mockingly pointed out that “Pataikion the thief will have a better fate after his death because he has been initiated at Eleusis than Agesilaos or Epameinondas.” It was not about political or moral worth but solely about “spiritual” merit. There's nothing surprising about that; it's common in most religions. However, the concept of divine justice in Hades was already addressed by the system of rewards and punishments in the mortal world that the mysteries presented from a completely different perspective. Where the mysteries were taken seriously, they likely would have opposed any emerging idea of compensation for good and evil deeds in Hades; they certainly did not promote such a belief.

No doubt in the long run, among a spiritually alert people, 240 the morality inculcated by religion allied itself freely and without reluctance to the morality of the citizen in its independent development. Only in this way could the former maintain its ascendancy. Thus, in the minds of many of the Greeks the idea of religious justification (through the mysteries) may have lent its support to the idea of civic just dealing; and, at the same time, the company of the unblest who had neglected the sacred mysteries and their future salvation as well, was increased by the not unimportant body of those who receive the wages of sin in Hades and expiate their crimes against the gods, the family, and the civil society of men. Those who have taken a false oath, parricides, violators of the laws of hospitality are made by Aristophanes (in the Frogs) to “lie in the mud”—a form of penalty originally anticipated for the uninitiated in some Orphic private mysteries, but now transferred by him to those guilty of moral misdemeanours.15 The inconsistency with the promises made in the mysteries themselves involved in such conceptions may have been the less observed just because the idea of a future system of compensation in accordance with the requirements of morality was never seriously or fully developed, but remained merely a matter of vague suggestion. In circumstances of real need that ideal never satisfied anyone in Greece. Men expected to see the retributive power of the gods visibly active upon earth; those in whom experience weakened this belief would not have derived much comfort from the idea of compensation hereafter. Everyone knows the typical case of Diagoras, the “Atheist”.16

No doubt in the long run, among a spiritually aware people, 240 the morality taught by religion connected effortlessly and willingly with the morality of the citizen as it developed on its own. Only this way could the former keep its influence. Thus, in the minds of many Greeks, the idea of religious justification (through the mysteries) might have supported the idea of fair dealing in civic matters; at the same time, the group of the unblessed who had overlooked the sacred mysteries and their future salvation was added to by the significant number of those who pay for their sins in Hades and atone for their wrongdoings against the gods, family, and society. Those who have taken a false oath, parricides, and violators of hospitality laws are made by Aristophanes (in the Frogs) to “lie in the mud”—a punishment originally meant for those uninitiated in certain Orphic private mysteries, but now applied by him to those guilty of moral wrongs.15 The inconsistency with the promises made in the mysteries themselves in such beliefs may have been less noticed simply because the idea of a future system of compensation based on moral standards was never fully developed and remained just a vague suggestion. In times of real need, that ideal never satisfied anyone in Greece. People expected to see the gods' retributive power visibly active on earth; those whose experiences weakened this belief wouldn’t have found much comfort in the notion of compensation later on. Everyone knows the typical case of Diagoras, the “Atheist.” 16

§ 3

The picturing of the future life, however seriously it might be carried on by adherents of certain mystical sects, remained for the poets and the public at Athens in the fifth century little more than an amusement of idle fancy in which a man might indulge his own whim with perfect freedom. The comic poets from Pherekrates onwards regarded a Descent into the Unknown country as a suitable framework for a burlesque play.17 According to their fancy a Paradise, like that of the golden age on earth when Kronos still ruled, awaited the “Blessed” in the world below;18 a “City of Delight”19 such as men hoped to meet with at the ends of the world, or even somewhere upon the real world. It is from a comedy, the Frogs of Aristophanes, in connexion with the Descent to Hades of a typical commonplace Athenian citizen, who for the time being plays the part of Dionysos, that we get a clearer outline of the geography of the lower regions. Beyond 241 the Acherousian Sea with its cross-grained ferryman dwell snakes and monsters of all kinds. Having passed by the darkness and putrescence of the slough in which wallow perjurers and those who have committed crimes against father or stranger, the way leads to the palace of Plouton, near which lives the chorus of those who have been initiated into the mysteries. For them even in Hades the sun dispenses a brilliant light; they dance in myrtle groves and sing to the sound of the flute hymns of praise to the gods of the underworld.20 A separation of the inhabitants of the lower regions into two classes as taught by the mysteries, is here also carried through: at least clear consciousness is implied in the case of the Mystai which in itself marks clearly the change which has taken place since the Nekyia of the Odyssey. Then there are other regions in Hades besides the places where the initiated and the impious dwell. There is a reference to the plain of Lethe,21 and to the place where Oknos is plaiting the rope which his she-ass gnaws to pieces as fast as he plaits it. This is a parody, half humorous, half pathetic, of the Homeric figures of Sisyphos and Tantalos; a sort of bourgeois counterpart of that Homeric aristocracy of the enemies of heaven, whose punishment, as Goethe remarked, is a type of ever-unrewarded labour. But, we may ask, what had honest Oknos done to deserve this fate of eternally fruitless toil? He is only a man like other men, but he “typifies all human endeavour.” That anyone could have introduced such quaint inventions of innocent humour into the realm of Hades shows how far all this was from theological seriousness.

The idea of an afterlife, no matter how seriously certain mystical groups might have pursued it, was mostly just a whimsical pastime for poets and the general public in Athens during the fifth century. The comedic poets, starting with Pherekrates, viewed a journey into the Underworld as a fitting setup for a parody play. According to their imagination, a paradise similar to the golden age on earth, when Kronos reigned, awaited the "Blessed" below; a "City of Delight" that people dreamed of finding at the ends of the earth or even somewhere in the real world. We get a clearer picture of the Underworld’s geography from Aristophanes' comedy, the Frogs, featuring the descent to Hades of a typical Athenian citizen who temporarily plays the role of Dionysos. Beyond the Acherousian Sea with its grumpy ferryman, snakes and monsters of all kinds reside. After passing through the darkness and muck where perjurers and those who have wronged family or strangers suffer, the path leads to Plouton's palace, next to which the initiated ones reside. For them, even in Hades, the sun shines brightly; they dance in myrtle groves and sing hymns to the underworld gods while accompanied by flute music. The separation of the inhabitants of the Underworld into two classes, as taught by the mysteries, is also present here: a clear understanding is implied for the Mystai, highlighting the change from the Nekyia of the Odyssey. Other regions in Hades exist, besides the areas for the initiated and the impious. There’s a mention of the plain of Lethe and the spot where Oknos is weaving a rope that his donkey rapidly chews apart. This serves as a parody, both humorous and somewhat tragic, of Homeric figures like Sisyphos and Tantalos; it offers a kind of middle-class version of the Homeric aristocrats who defy the gods, whose punishment, as Goethe noted, exemplifies endless, unrewarded labor. But one might wonder, what did honest Oknos do to deserve such endlessly fruitless toil? He’s just an ordinary guy, yet he "represents all human efforts." The fact that someone could bring such whimsical and innocent humor into the realm of Hades shows how distant this was from any serious theological concerns.

§ 4

We ought to be able to observe the change which had come over the conception of the future life since the days of Homer from a consideration of the picture of the Underworld which Polygnotos of Thasos painted on one of the walls of the Hall of the Knidians at Delphi. The details of this picture are precisely known to us from the account given by Pausanias. The first impression that we get from it is the extraordinary vagueness and undeveloped state of the mythology of the underworld at this period, about the middle of the fifth century. On the wall was represented the questioning of Teiresias by Odysseus; the companies of heroes, the men and women of poetry, occupied the greater part of the space. The divine judgment of heaven was illustrated by the figures of the Homeric “Sinners”, Tityos, Tantalos, and Sisyphos. Outside the ranks of the Heroic company is Oknos and his 242 she-ass. But where is the reward of virtue, the punishment of wickedness? In expiation of the worst excesses, those committed against gods and parents, a temple-robber receives a cup of poison from a sorceress,22 and an undutiful son is being choked by his own father.23 Apart from these evil-doers are the “uninitiated”, those who have made light of the Eleusinian mysteries. Because they have missed the “completion” of the initiation they are now forced, men and women, to pour water from broken pitchers into a (perforated) jar in ever-unavailing endeavour.24 There is no sign anywhere of a judge who should separate the souls into two classes; and of the monsters of the underworld there only appears the corpse-devouring daimon Eurynomos who must have been known to the artist from some local legend.25 Of the reward of the “virtuous” there is not a trace, and even the hopes of the initiated in the mysteries are only vaguely alluded to in the casket which Kleoboia, as she crosses the river in Charon’s boat with Tellis, is holding on her knee.26 This is a symbol of the sacred mysteries of Demeter which Kleoboia once brought from Paros to Thasos, the home of Polygnotos.

We can see how ideas about the afterlife changed since Homer by looking at the depiction of the Underworld painted by Polygnotos of Thasos on one of the walls in the Hall of the Knidians at Delphi. We know the details of this painting from Pausanias’s account. The first thing we notice is the striking vagueness and undeveloped nature of Underworld mythology at this time, around the middle of the fifth century. The wall shows Odysseus questioning Teiresias; the groups of heroes, along with the men and women from poetry, take up most of the image. The divine judgment from above is portrayed by the figures of the Homeric “Sinners,” Tityos, Tantalos, and Sisyphos. Separate from the heroic figures is Oknos with his 242 she-ass. But where are the rewards for virtue and the punishments for wickedness? To atone for their worst actions, including offenses against gods and parents, a temple robber receives a cup of poison from a sorceress, and a disloyal son is being strangled by his own father. Aside from these wrongdoers are the “uninitiated,” who have disregarded the Eleusinian mysteries. Because they missed the “completion” of the initiation, they are now doomed, both men and women, to try to pour water from broken pitchers into a (perforated) jar in a futile effort. There’s no indication of a judge to sort the souls into two groups, and the only monster of the underworld depicted is the corpse-eating demon Eurynomos, who must have been known to the artist from some local tale. There’s no evidence of a reward for the “virtuous,” and even the hopes of those initiated into the mysteries are only vaguely hinted at in the casket that Kleoboia holds on her lap as she crosses the river in Charon’s boat with Tellis. This represents the sacred mysteries of Demeter that Kleoboia once brought from Paros to Thasos, Polygnotos's homeland.

With this series of pictures, hardly altered at all from Homer,27 contrast for a moment the scenes of torment represented in Etruscan pictures of the Underworld, or the pedantic details of the trial of the dead on the day of judgment as the Egyptians elaborated them in picture and writing. From such gloomy severity, from the rigid and overpowering dogmatism that a people without imagination had constructed for itself out of religious speculations and visions won by much labour and thought, the Greeks were fortunately preserved by their own genius. Their fancy is a winged god whose nature it is to pass lightly over things—not to fall heavily to earth and there remain ponderously prostrate. Nor were they very susceptible during their best centuries to the infectious malady of a “sick conscience”. What had they to do with pictures of an underworld of purgatory and torment in expiation of all imaginary types and degrees of sin, as in Dante’s ghastly Hell? It is true that even such dark fancies of the Christian Hell are in part derived from Greek sources. But it was only the misguided fancy of particular isolated sects that could call forth such pictures as these, and recommend itself to a philosophic speculation which in its worst excesses violently contradicted all the most fundamental principles of Greek culture. The people and the religion of Greece, the mysteries which her cities organized and deemed holy, may be freely acquitted of all such aberrations.

With this series of images, hardly changed at all from Homer, 27 take a moment to compare the scenes of suffering depicted in Etruscan art of the Underworld or the dry details of the dead's trial on judgment day as the Egyptians illustrated in their art and writing. Fortunately, the Greeks were saved from such grim rigidity and overwhelming dogmatism that a people without imagination built for themselves from religious ideas and hard-won visions through deep thought. Their creativity is like a winged god, meant to soar lightly over things—not to fall heavily to the ground and remain there in a burdensome way. During their greatest centuries, they weren't easily affected by the contagious illness of a "sick conscience." What did they have to do with depictions of an underworld filled with purgatory and suffering to atone for all imaginary sins, like in Dante's horrifying Hell? It's true that even these dark visions of Christian Hell partly came from Greek sources. But only the misguided imaginations of certain isolated groups could conjure such images and try to connect them to a philosophical exploration that, at its worst, sharply contradicted the core principles of Greek culture. The people and religion of Greece, the mysteries their cities organized and regarded as sacred, can clearly be exonerated from such deviations.

NOTES TO CHAPTER VII

1 Plu. (the MSS. wrongly give Themistios) de An. fr. 6 ap. Stob., Fl. iv, 52 b, 48 H. = p. 107, 27 ff. Mein.; Luc., Catapl. 23.

1 Plu. (the manuscripts incorrectly state Themistios) de An. fr. 6 ap. Stob., Fl. iv, 52 b, 48 H. = p. 107, 27 ff. Mein.; Luc., Catapl. 23.

2 Paus. 9, 31, 5.

2 Pause. 9, 31, 5.

3 The remains in Kinkel, Frag. Epic. i, 215 ff. This Μινυάς was identified by K. O. Müller, Orchom2., p. 12, with the Orphic κατάβασις εἰς Ἅιδου, and this suggestion has been followed, though with hesitation, even by Lobeck, Agl. 360, 373. It rests solely on the fact that the Orphic κατάβασις was very doubtfully ascribed according to Clemens to Prodikos of Samos, according to Suidas to Herodikos of Perinthos (or to Kerkops, or to Orpheus of Kamarina); while the Minyas, according to Paus. 4, 33, 7, was very doubtfully ascribed to Prodikos of Phokaia. Müller first identified Prodikos of Samos with Herodikos of Perinthos, and then both of them with Prodikos of Phokaia. The justification of such a procedure is by no means “self-evident” and the identification—entirely depending upon this quite arbitrary view—of the Orphic κατάβασις εἰς Ἅιδου with the Minyas is in the last degree hazardous. Such an alternative title to an ancient narrative poem can only be defended by fictitious and quite untenable parallels. The name Μινυάς has no parallel in Orphic literature, and suggests rather a poem dealing with heroic adventure in which the Nekyia would only be an episode. If we are to believe in the double title we require at least to be told how the name (Minyas) could possibly have been given to a poem whose contents as implied by the title κατάβασις εἰς Ἅιδου plainly consisted in a descent to Hades—made by Orpheus himself (as Lobeck also understands, p. 373). Besides, everything we learn about the Nekyia of the Minyas differs widely from the temper and doctrine of Orphism, which should have manifested themselves very distinctly in such a vision of the life to come. Nor is anything from the Minyas given elsewhere under the name of Orpheus, like so many of the details of underworld mythology. There is nothing to suggest that it was Orpheus who sought the atra atria Ditis: an unprejudiced interpretation of fr. 1 (ap. Paus. 10, 28, 2) would suggest that it was rather Theseus and Peirithoos whose descent to Hades supplied the framework for the Hades episode in the poem. There is then not the slightest justification for including the Minyas in the list of Orphic poems or for citing what is known of its contents as Orphic mythological doctrine (which last Lobeck himself did not do: he knew too well the real nature and meaning of Orphism). Cf. Dümmler, Delphika, p. 19 (Bas. 1894).

3 The remains in Kinkel, Frag. Epic. i, 215 ff. This Minyas was identified by K. O. Müller, Orchom2., p. 12, with the Orphic Descend into Hades, and this suggestion has been followed, though with some doubt, even by Lobeck, Agl. 360, 373. It is based solely on the fact that the Orphic downward movement was very uncertainly attributed according to Clemens to Prodikos of Samos, and according to Suidas to Herodikos of Perinthos (or to Kerkops, or to Orpheus of Kamarina); while the Minyas, according to Paus. 4, 33, 7, was also very uncertainly ascribed to Prodikos of Phokaia. Müller first connected Prodikos of Samos with Herodikos of Perinthos, and then linked both of them to Prodikos of Phokaia. The justification for this approach is by no means “self-evident,” and the identification—completely relying on this quite arbitrary interpretation—of the Orphic Descend into Hades with the Minyas is extremely risky. An alternative title for an ancient narrative poem can only be defended by imaginary and entirely untenable parallels. The name Minyas has no equivalent in Orphic literature and suggests rather a poem about heroic adventure in which the Nekyia would simply be an episode. If we are to accept the dual title, we at least need to understand how the name (Minyas) could have been applied to a poem whose contents, as implied by the title descent into Hades, clearly involved a descent to Hades—made by Orpheus himself (as Lobeck also interprets, p. 373). Furthermore, everything we learn about the Nekyia of the Minyas differs significantly from the spirit and teachings of Orphism, which should have been clearly reflected in such a vision of the afterlife. There is also nothing from the Minyas referred to elsewhere under the name of Orpheus, unlike many details of underworld mythology. There is no indication that it was Orpheus who sought the atra atria Ditis: a fair interpretation of fr. 1 (ap. Paus. 10, 28, 2) would suggest that it was rather Theseus and Peirithoos whose descent to Hades formed the basis for the Hades episode in the poem. Therefore, there is no justification for including the Minyas in the list of Orphic poems or for presenting what is known of its contents as part of Orphic mythological doctrine (which Lobeck himself did not do: he understood too well the true nature and meaning of Orphism). Cf. Dümmler, Delphika, p. 19 (Bas. 1894).

4 Allusions in the Iliad and Odyssey presuppose the existence of an old poem on the journey to Hades of Herakles: how he was commissioned by Eurystheus, conducted by Athene (and Hermes), went down below and wounded Hades himself and carried off the dog of Hades. Many hands must subsequently have taken part in filling in the details of the adventure: we cannot, however, definitely name the poet who gave its final form and character to the whole. As far as the individual features of the poem are known to us (esp. from the survey given in [Apollod.], 2, 12. Myth. Gr., 2, 122 ff. W., combining both early and late mythological characteristics), they are rather the features of a vigorous story of heroic adventure, full of movement and tending to the gruesome and the extravagant—not of a static or 244 tranquil narrative that would allow of the calm reception of pictures illustrating the quiet ordinary life and events of frequent occurrence in the mysterious world of darkness. In this respect the κατάβασις of Herakles in its traditional form must have differed noticeably from the Nekyia in λ, as well as from the Minyas. In fact, not one of the fabulous details current in later times about Hades can be traced back to a description in the Herakles adventure (even “Kerberos” seems to have got his name elsewhere).

4 References in the Iliad and Odyssey assume there was an ancient poem about Herakles's journey to Hades: how Eurystheus sent him, guided by Athene (and Hermes), to go down below, wound Hades himself, and brought back the dog of Hades. Many different people must have contributed to fleshing out the details of this adventure, but we can't definitively identify the poet who shaped its final version. Based on what we know about the poem’s individual elements (especially from the overview in [Apollod.], 2, 12. Myth. Gr., 2, 122 ff. W., which combines both early and later mythological traits), these elements reflect a dynamic tale of heroic adventure, filled with action and leaning towards the gruesome and bizarre—not a calm or 244 serene story that would allow for the quiet depiction of everyday life and common occurrences in the mysterious world of darkness. In this sense, Herakles's traditional journey down must have looked quite different from the Nekyia in λ, as well as from the Minyas. In fact, none of the later fantastic details about Hades can be traced back to the descriptions in the Herakles adventure (even “Kerberos” seems to have gotten his name from elsewhere).

5 Hyperides, Epit. § 35–9 = p. 92 f. (Blass3): Leosthenes will meet ἐν Ἅιδου the Heroes of the Trojan war, the Persian war, and also Harmodios and Aristogeiton. This is a stereotyped rhetorical idea: cf. Pl., Ap. 41 A-C. An epigram from Knossos on a Cretan who has distinguished himself in a cavalry battle (BCH. 1889, p. 60, ll. 1–2, after Simon., Ep. 99, 3–4 Bgk.), ll. 9–10: τοὔνεκά σε φθιμένων καθ’ ὁμήγυριν ὁ κλυτὸς Ἅδης ἴσε πολισσούχῳ σύνθρονον Ἰδομενεῖ.

5 Hyperides, Epit. § 35–9 = p. 92 f. (Blass3): Leosthenes will meet in Hades the Heroes of the Trojan War, the Persian War, and also Harmodius and Aristogeiton. This is a typical rhetorical idea: cf. Pl., Ap. 41 A-C. An epigram from Knossos about a Cretan who stood out in a cavalry battle (BCH. 1889, p. 60, ll. 1–2, after Simon., Ep. 99, 3–4 Bgk.), ll. 9–10: Therefore, you, O renowned Hades, are equal to the city-founding Idomeneus among the gathering of the dying..

6 Kerberos is first named in Hes., Th. 311, and he is the same hound of Hades which Homer knows and leaves unnamed, as Hesiod does, Th. 769 ff. According to this account he admits everyone, fawning about them and wagging his tail: but anyone who tries to slip out of Hades again he devours. That Kerberos inspires terror in those who enter Hades is therefore a conception of later ages (when his name was sometimes derived from the fact that he τὰς κῆρας, ὃ δηλοῖ τὰς ψυχάς, ἔχει βοράν: Porph. ap. Eus., PE. 3, 11, 11, p. 110 A, etc.): the superstitious are afraid τῷ Κερβέρῳ διαδάκνεσθαι (Plu., N.P. Suav. Ep. 1105 A; cf. Verg., A. vi, 401; Apul., Met. i, 15 fin.). The honey cakes given to those who enter Hades are intended to pacify him (Sch. Ar., Lys. 601; Verg., A. vi, 420; Ap., Met. vi, 19). It cannot be proved that this is an ancient conception (certainly not from the absurd invention of Philochoros, fr. 46, to which Dieterich, Nekyia, 49, appeals). Ar., Lys. 601, speaks of the μελιτοῦττα for the dead without suggesting any such purpose; and in fact honeycakes would hardly be a satisfactory bait to a dog: they rather suggest offerings for underworld snakes (as in the cave of Trophonios, Ar, Nu. 507; for the Asklepios-snake, Herond. iv, 90–1) and for spirits appearing as snakes (and hence customary at offerings for the dead, and even e.g. according to the precepts of the ῥιζοτόμοι when digging up medicinal plants, Thphr., HP. 9, 8, 7). In the lines of Sophokles, OC. 1574 ff., Löschcke, Aus der Unterwelt, p. 9 (Progr. Dorpat, 1888) finds an expression of the idea that there was need of pacifying Kerb. in his rage against souls entering Hades. In reality nothing of the kind is even suggested there. The traditional text is unintelligible, and is emended and interpreted with probable correctness by Nauck (δός instead of ὅν). Adopting this correction the words express a prayer of the Chorus addressed to a child of Tartaros and Ge, who is called ὁ αἰένυπνος, which must mean “who sends to everlasting sleep” (not “who sleeps for ever”)—(or to separate παῖς Γᾶς καὶ Ταρτάρου from αἰένυπνος as the Schol. would do, is impossible. The αἰένυπνος, as the Schol. has already noticed, can hardly be anyone else than Thanatos (it would be an unintelligible epithet for Hesychos, of whom L. thinks). Thanatos, however, is nowhere else called son of Tartaros and Ge (nor is Hesychos, while Typhon and Echidna are, though the adj. would not suit them; who else besides Soph., OC. 40, calls the Erinyes daughters of Ge and Skotos?). The Chorus pray to him (acc. to Nauck’s correction) to grant Oedipus a safe passage in his journey to Hades. Terrors of all kinds were to be met with on the way there, ὄφεις καὶ θηρία (Ar., Ra. 143 ff., 278 ff.; we may also remember Verg., 245 A. vi, 273 ff., 285 ff., etc.): that Kerberos is among these terrors is suggested by Soph. as little as it is by Aristoph. in the Frogs. In fact, Soph. had spoken of him a few lines before (1569 ff.) in words which suggest anything rather than danger to those who enter Hades. Sophokles, then, cannot be made to serve as witness for the view that the Greeks thought of Kerberos after the manner of the two piebald dogs of the Indian Yama that terrify and drive back the dead. Further, there is no good evidence for a Greek tradition of two hounds of Hell. Nor can it be proved by the case adduced by Löschcke: the picture on a sarcophagus from Klazomenai of a naked boy holding a cock in each hand and standing between two (female) dogs that leap round him (in a manner suggesting play rather than anger). The picture can hardly have a mythical sense. This cannot give support to the view (as old as Wilford) that Κέρβερος is no other than one of the two piebald (çabala) dogs of Yama and a creation of primitive Indo-Germanic times. In any case, the evidence is weak enough. See Gruppe, Gr. Culte u. Mythen, i, 113–14; Oldenberg, Rel. d. Veda, 538 [= 459 Fr. T.].

6 Kerberos is first mentioned in Hesiod, Th. 311, and he is the same hound of Hades that Homer refers to without naming, as Hesiod does, Th. 769 ff. According to this version, he welcomes everyone, fawning over them and wagging his tail: but anyone who tries to sneak out of Hades he devours. The idea that Kerberos scares those entering Hades is a later conception (when his name was sometimes derived from the fact that he The spirits, which signify the souls, have a feast.: Porph. ap. Eus., PE. 3, 11, 11, p. 110 A, etc.): the superstitious fear to be bitten by Cerberus (Plu., N.P. Suav. Ep. 1105 A; cf. Verg., A. vi, 401; Apul., Met. i, 15 fin.). The honey cakes given to those entering Hades are meant to appease him (Sch. Ar., Lys. 601; Verg., A. vi, 420; Ap., Met. vi, 19). It cannot be proven that this is an ancient idea (certainly not from the ridiculous invention of Philochoros, fr. 46, which Dieterich, Nekyia, 49, refers to). Ar., Lys. 601, mentions the μελιτοῦττα for the dead without suggesting any such purpose; and in fact, honey cakes would hardly be adequate bait for a dog: they are more reminiscent of offerings for underworld snakes (like in the cave of Trophonios, Ar, Nu. 507; for the Asklepios-snake, Herond. iv, 90–1) and for spirits appearing as snakes (and thus customary at offerings for the dead, and even according to the practices of the root cutters when digging up medicinal plants, Thphr., HP. 9, 8, 7). In the lines of Sophocles, OC. 1574 ff., Löschcke, Aus der Unterwelt, p. 9 (Progr. Dorpat, 1888) finds an expression of the idea that there was a need to calm Kerb. in his rage against souls entering Hades. In truth, nothing of the sort is even implied there. The traditional text is unclear and has been corrected and interpreted with likely accuracy by Nauck (δός instead of ὅν). Adopting this correction, the words express a prayer of the Chorus addressed to a child of Tartaros and Ge, who is called the ever-sleepy, which must mean “who sends to everlasting sleep” (not “who sleeps forever”)—(or to separate Child of Earth and Tartarus from sleepy as the Schol. would do is impossible. The Always sleeping, as the Schol. has already noted, can hardly be anyone else but Thanatos (it would be an unintelligible epithet for Hesychos, as L. suggests). Thanatos, however, is never called the son of Tartaros and Ge elsewhere (nor is Hesychos, while Typhon and Echidna are, though the adjective wouldn’t apply to them; who else besides Soph., OC. 40, calls the Erinyes daughters of Ge and Skotos?). The Chorus prays to him (according to Nauck’s correction) to grant Oedipus a safe passage on his journey to Hades. Numerous terrors would be encountered on the way there, snakes and beasts (Ar., Ra. 143 ff., 278 ff.; we should also recall Verg., 245 A. vi, 273 ff., 285 ff., etc.): that Kerberos is among these terrors is suggested by Soph. just as little as it is by Aristoph. in the Frogs. In fact, Soph. had referred to him a few lines before (1569 ff.) in terms that imply anything but danger to those who enter Hades. Thus, Sophocles cannot be used to support the view that the Greeks envisioned Kerberos like the two piebald dogs of the Indian Yama that scare and deter the dead. Furthermore, there is no strong evidence for a Greek tradition of two hounds of Hell. Likewise, it cannot be proven by the case brought forward by Löschcke: the image on a sarcophagus from Klazomenai of a naked boy holding a rooster in each hand and standing between two (female) dogs that leap around him (in a manner suggesting play rather than anger). The image can hardly imply a mythical significance. This does not support the theory (which dates back to Wilford) that Κέρβερος is simply one of the two piebald (çabala) dogs of Yama and a creation of primitive Indo-Germanic times. In any case, the evidence is weak enough. See Gruppe, Gr. Culte u. Mythen, i, 113–14; Oldenberg, Rel. d. Veda, 538 [= 459 Fr. T.].

7 Agatharch. p. 115, 14 ff. Müll., says that it is a popular belief τῶν οὐκέτι ὄντων τοὺς τύπους ἐν πορθμίδι διαπλεῖν, ἔχοντας Χάρωνα ναύκληρον καὶ κυβερνήτην, ἵνα μὴ καταστραφέντες ἐκφορᾶς ἐπιδέωνται πάλιν.

7 Agatharch. p. 115, 14 ff. Müll., states that it is a common belief that those who no longer exist sail through the strait, with Charon as their captain and helmsman, ensuring they are not destroyed and forced to return again.

8 Cf. v. Duhn, Arch. Zeit. 1885, 19 ff.; Jahrb. arch. Inst. ii, 240 ff.

8 See v. Duhn, Arch. Zeit. 1885, 19 ff.; Jahrb. arch. Inst. ii, 240 ff.

9 Charon’s fare (2 obols instead of the otherwise usual one—the difference not satisfactorily explained) is first mentioned in Ar., Ran. 140, 270. That this is the purpose of the money that was inserted between the teeth of the dead is frequently asserted by later authors. The many different names which were given to this “Charon’s penny” (καρκάδων, cf. Lobeck, Prol. Path. 351; κατιτήριον, δανάκη and simply ναῦλον: see Hemsterh. Lucian, ii, 514 ff.) show that this idea and the symbolism underlying it was a favourite subject of speculation. In spite of this we may doubt whether the custom of supplying the dead with a small coin has really arisen out of the wish to give them the fare-penny for the underworld ferryman. It is extremely doubtful whether Charon and his boat can have been figures of such clear dogmatic fixity as to have given rise to such a remarkable custom expressing itself in such a literal fashion. The custom itself, now, it seems, attested in Greece only from graves of a late period (see Ross. Archäol. Aufs. i, 29, 32, 57 Anm.; Raoul Rochette, Mém. de l’Inst. de Fr., Ac. des Ins. xiii, p. 665 f.) must be ancient (though no older than the use of coined money in Greece), and has held its own with the most remarkable tenacity in many parts of the Roman Empire to a late age—even through the Middle Ages to our own time (cf. among others Maury, La magie et l’astrol. dans l’antiq. 158, 2). It is not very hard to understand that it might be ingeniously connected with the poetical story of the ferryman of the dead, and this plausible explanation of the strange custom might then become a part of popular belief. The custom itself ought rather to have been brought into connexion with the practice common in many lands of satisfying the requirements of the dead by the gift of some diminutive and all but symbolical object which is offered at burial and put in the grave (see something of the kind in Tylor, i, 193–4). Parva petunt Manes: pietas pro divite grata est munere; non avidos Styx habet ima deos. The obol may be the last symbolical vestige of the entire property of the dead which the ancient law of the dead required to be placed undiminished in their graves. τεθνήξῃ . . . ἐκ πολλῶν ὀβολὸν 246 μοῦνον ἐνεγκάμενος: the epigram of Antiphanes Maced. (AP. xi, 168) expresses more nearly perhaps, though in sentimental language, the original and primitive intention of the gift of an obol, than does the fable of Charon’s penny (cf. AP. xi, 171, 7; 209, 3). According to German superstition “money should be laid in the mouth of the dead man so that if he has buried a treasure he may not return”, Grimm, p. 1785, n. 207. Here the undoubtedly ancient conception is quite clearly betrayed: that by giving a coin the property of the dead was bought up. The evidence for this first and proper meaning of the custom has been preserved in the strangest fashion, together with the custom itself, even down to the eighteenth century, when J. Chr. Männlingen voices it, Albertäten 353 (summarized in A. Schultz, Alltagsleben e. d. Frau im 18 Jh., p. 232 f.): this custom, common both to heathendom and Christianity, of putting a penny in the coffin of the dead “means that men buy up the property of the dead, whereby they think they will have good luck in their life”.

9 Charon’s fare (2 obols instead of the usual one—the reason for this difference is not clearly explained) is first mentioned in Ar., Ran. 140, 270. Later authors often state that this is what the money placed between the teeth of the dead is for. The various names given to this “Charon’s penny” (καρκάδων, see Lobeck, Prol. Path. 351; κατιτήριον, δανάκη and simply shipping fee: see Hemsterh. Lucian, ii, 514 ff.) show that this concept and its symbolism were popular topics of discussion. Despite this, we can question whether the practice of providing the dead with a small coin actually came from the desire to give them the fare for the underworld ferryman. It's quite uncertain whether Charon and his boat were such stable figures in belief that they could lead to a custom expressed so literally. The practice itself, now confirmed in Greece only from later graves (see Ross. Archäol. Aufs. i, 29, 32, 57 Anm.; Raoul Rochette, Mém. de l’Inst. de Fr., Ac. des Ins. xiii, p. 665 f.), must be ancient (though not older than the use of coins in Greece) and has persisted remarkably in many parts of the Roman Empire into modern times—even through the Middle Ages (cf. among others Maury, La magie et l’astrol. dans l’antiq. 158, 2). It's not hard to see how it could be cleverly linked to the poetic tale of the ferryman of the dead, making this plausible explanation part of popular belief. The practice should likely be linked more to the common tradition in many cultures of fulfilling the needs of the dead with tiny symbolic objects offered at burial and placed in the grave (see something similar in Tylor, i, 193–4). The spirits seek small offerings: devotion is welcomed as a gift by the wealthy; the underworld does not have greedy gods. The obol may symbolize the entirety of the deceased's property that ancient customs required to be placed intact in their graves. You will have died... for many obols. 246 μόνο με το να φέρω: the epigram of Antiphanes Maced. (AP. xi, 168) perhaps better captures, in sentimental terms, the original and basic intent behind giving an obol than the story of Charon’s penny (cf. AP. xi, 171, 7; 209, 3). According to German superstition, “money should be placed in the mouth of the dead man so that if he has buried a treasure he may not return,” Grimm, p. 1785, n. 207. Here, the clearly ancient idea is evident: that giving a coin essentially bought up the property of the deceased. The evidence of this original meaning of the custom has surprisingly persisted, along with the custom itself, even into the eighteenth century, when J. Chr. Männlingen stated it, Albertäten 353 (summarized in A. Schultz, Alltagsleben e. d. Frau im 18 Jh., p. 232 f.): this custom, prevalent in both paganism and Christianity, of placing a penny in the coffin of the dead “means that people buy up the property of the dead, hoping to gain good fortune in their lives.”

10 Ar., Tagenist. fr. 488, 9: διὰ ταῦτα γάρ τοι καὶ καλοῦνται (οἱ νέκροὶ) μακάριοι· πᾶς γὰρ λέγει τις, ὁ μακαρίτης οἴχεται κτλ., μακαρίτης, then, was already, by that time, a common expression for the dead which had lost its full sense and value, just like the German “selig” (which is borrowed from Greek). Strictly speaking it means a condition approaching the existence of the μάκαρες θεοὶ αἰὲν ἐόντες. The full meaning still appears in the appeal to the heroized Persian monarch: μακαρίτας ἰσοδαίμων βασιλεύς, Aesch., Pers. 633 (νῦν δ’ ἐστὶ μάκαιρα δαίμων, E., Alc. 1003); cf. also Xen., Ages. xi, 8, νομίζων τοὺς εὐκλεῶς τετελευτηκότας μακαρίους. Such passages allow us to see that μακάριος, μακαρίτης were not used of the dead in any sense κατ’ ἀντίφρασιν, as χρηστός sometimes is (Plu., Q. Gr. v, p. 292 B; though on grave inscr. it is generally meant in its proper sense); cf. εὐκρινής, Phot. Suid. μακαρίτης frequently occurs as applied to one lately dead in late writers: see Ruhnken, Tim., p. 59. Lehrs, Popul. Aufs2., p. 344. Doric form ζαμερίτας: Phot. μακαρίτας. μακαρία “Blessedness”, the land of the Blessed, i.e. the dead, is only used in a humorous sense in such phrases as ἄπαγ’ ἐς μακαρίαν (Ar. Eq. 1151), βάλλ’ ἐς μακαρίαν. So, too, is ἐς ὀλβίαν. ὡς εἰς μακαρίαν· τὸ εἰς ᾅδου, Phot. (μακαρία, the name of a sacrificial cake—Harp. νεήλατα—occurs in modern Greek usage as a cake used at funerals, Lob., Agl. 879).

10 Ar., Tagenist. fr. 488, 9: For this reason, they are called(the dead)Blessed are those; for everyone says, the blessed one has departed, etc., blessed one., by that time, was already a common term for the dead, which had lost its full meaning and significance, similar to the German word “selig” (which comes from Greek). Strictly speaking, it refers to a state close to the existence of the μακάριοι θεοί πάντα υπάρχουν. The complete meaning can still be seen in the reference to the glorified Persian king: blessed king, Aesch., Pers. 633 (Now is a blessed goddess., E., Alc. 1003); see also Xen., Ages. xi, 8, thinking of the blessed dead. These passages show that blessed, deceased were not used for the dead in any contradictory sense, as good is sometimes (Plu., Q. Gr. v, p. 292 B; although on grave inscriptions it usually has its proper meaning); cf. clear, Phot. Suid. late tends to be used to refer to someone who has just died in later writings: see Ruhnken, Tim., p. 59. Lehrs, Popul. Aufs2., p. 344. Doric form ζαμερίτας: Phot. blessed. μακαρία “Blessedness,” the land of the Blessed, meaning the dead, is only used in a humorous way in phrases like go to paradise (Ar. Eq. 1151), put into blissful. Similarly, into happiness. as if into bliss; the one going to Hades, Phot. (blessed, the name of a sacrificial cake—Harp. νεήλατα—is used in modern Greek to refer to a cake used at funerals, Lob., Agl. 879).

11 The punishment of Ixion for his ingratitude to Zeus consisted according to the older form of the story in his being fastened to a winged wheel and then being whirled through the air. That Zeus ἐταρτάρωσεν him (Sch. Eur., Ph. 1185) must then be a later story or one which did not become current till later: not until A.R. iii, 61 f., is there any mention of Ixion in Hades, though after him frequently; cf. Klügmann, Annali d. Inst., 1873, pp. 93–5. (The analogy with the punishment of Tantalos and its displacement from the upper world to Hades is obvious; see Comparetti, Philol. 32, 237.)

11 Ixion's punishment for his ingratitude to Zeus originally involved being tied to a winged wheel and spun through the air. The detail that Zeus ἐταρτάρωσεν him (Sch. Eur., Ph. 1185) is likely a later addition or one that became popular later on: Ixion is not mentioned in Hades until A.R. iii, 61 f., although he is frequently referenced afterward; see Klügmann, Annali d. Inst., 1873, pp. 93–5. (The similarity with Tantalus's punishment and its transition from the upper world to Hades is clear; see Comparetti, Philol. 32, 237.)

12 Aesch., Eum. 273 f.; cf. Supp. 230 f. The fact that in this passage the poet says ἐκεῖ δικάζει τὰμπλακήμαθ’, ὡς λόγος, Ζεὺς ἄλλος simply shows that he is not simply following his own ideas in this fancy of a judgment in the other world (οὐκ ἐμὸς ὁ μῦθος). It does not in the least suggest (as Dieterich, Nek. 126, seems to think) that he is reproducing popular tradition or could be so doing. Only theological doctrines, at that time at least, knew anything of such a judgment in the future life upon the deeds of this: it is their λόγος that Aesch. is following (in this one point). See below, p. 425.

12 Aesch., Eum. 273 f.; cf. Supp. 230 f. The fact that in this passage the poet says There, the court hears the complaints, as the saying goes, Zeus acts differently. clearly shows that he isn't just following his own ideas in this concept of judgment in the afterlife (Not my myth). It doesn’t imply (as Dieterich, Nek. 126, seems to think) that he is copying popular tradition or could be doing so. Only theological beliefs, at least at that time, were aware of such a judgment in the afterlife regarding the actions of this life: it is their word that Aesch. is following (in this one aspect). See below, p. 425.

13 Gorg. 523 A ff. (whence Axioch. 371 B ff., etc.). When Plato 247 keeps closer to popular belief, in Ap. 41 A, he speaks of the judges in Hades, Minos, Rhadamanthys, Aiakos καὶ Τριπτόλεμος καὶ ἄλλοι ὅσοι τῶν ἡμιθέων δίκαιοι ἐγένοντο ἐν τῷ ἑαυτῶν βίῳ. He says nothing of a judgment given on the deeds done in this life, and clearly does not imply any decision as to the good or evil deserts of those who have just left the upper world and come down to Hades. We should be much rather led to suppose that those ἀληθῶς δικασταί, οἵπερ καὶ λέγονται ἐκεῖ δικάζειν exercise their powers as judges among the dead, too, and decide between them in their disputes just as Minos does in the Nekyia of λ 568–71, and as Rhadamanthys still does in Pi., O. ii, 83 ff., on the μακάρων νᾶσος. Only the number of those who have this wide authority below is extended (in Plato) almost indefinitely. The process seems to have been as follows: the allusions in the Odyssey were taken up and in the course of the elaboration of the picture of Hades the number was enlarged of those who like Minos are patterns of justice among the dead and give judgment among them. Then philosophico-poetical speculation (perhaps not without Egyptian influence) about a judgment in the next world handed over to this increased number of judges in Hades the office of judging the conduct during their lifetime of those who have just entered Hades.—The selection of judges is not hard to understand. Aiakos, Rhadamanthys, and Minos are regarded as patterns of justice: Dem. 18, 127. Minos as judge in Hades was taken from λ 568 ff. Rhadamanthys is known to δ 564 as dwelling among those who have been translated alive to Elysion. There he is—not judge: there is nothing there to judge, but—πάρεδρος of Kronos, acc. to Pi., O. ii, 83. As soon as men began to transfer Elysion to Hades (of which more later) Rhad. also found his place there. His fame as the most just of judges (see Cratin., Χείρωνες, 231 [i, p. 83 K.]; Pl., Lg. 948 B, etc.; cf. also Plu., Thes. 16 ad fin.) allowed him easily to find his place next to Minos as judge over the dead. Aiakos, too, as a model of εὐσέβεια (Isoc. 9, 14, etc.), lawgiver to Aegina, arbitrator among the gods themselves (Pi., I. viii, 24 f.), seemed naturally called to be a judge among the dead. His position as judge, however, was never so secure as that of Minos and Rhadamanthys. Pindar, though he often speaks of Aiakos and the Aiakidai gives no hint of a special position held by Aiakos in the next world. Isoc. 9, 15, λέγεται παρὰ Πλούτωνι καὶ Κόρῃ μεγίστας τιμὰς ἔχων παρεδρεύειν ἐκείνοις where nothing is implied as to his office of judge but merely to the honour done to Aiakos in being given a seat near the ruling pair (cf. Pi., O. ii, 83, of Rhad.; Ar., Ra. 765, there is a rule in Hades that the best artist λαμβάνει θρόνον τοῦ Πλούτωνος ἑξῆς. Proedria of the Mystai in Hades, etc.). Aiakos is κλειδοῦχος of Hades; [Apollod.] 3, 12, 6, 10; Epigr. Gr., 646, 4; P. Mag. Par. 1264 ff.; πυλωρός (cf. Hades himself as πυλάρτης, Θ 368) in Luc., D. Mort. 13, 3; 20, 1, 6; 22, 3; De Luct. 4; Philops. 25 and Philostr., VA. 7, 31, p. 385 K. “Holder of the Key” is an office of high distinction (suggested in the case of Aiakos perhaps by the cult offered to him together with chthonic powers): keys belong to many of the gods—Plouton himself, Paus. 5, 20, 3, and others; see Tafel and Dissen on Pi., P. 8, 4; in P. Mag. Par. 1403 comes the trimeter, κλειδοῦχε Περσέφασσα Ταρτάρου κόρη. It is difficult to believe that the attribution of this remarkable office of distinction to Aiakos was a later invention than the apparently commonplace office of judge. It seems, in fact, that Eurip. in the Peirithoos (fr. 591 N.) made Aiakos the first to meet Herakles as he entered Hades, i.e. probably at the gate itself. It can hardly be anything but a 248 reminiscence of Eurip. that suggested (not to Aristoph. himself—see Hiller, Hermes viii, 455—but to a well-read grammaticus) the name “Aiakos” as that of the person who meets Herakles at the very gate of Plouton in the Frogs (l. 464). Just because the story of Aiakos’ position as holder of the key at the gate of Hades was an old one and mentioned by respected authorities, the belief in his position as judge never quite prevailed, in spite of Plato.

13 Gorg. 523 A ff. (from which Axioch. 371 B ff., etc.). When Plato 247 sticks closer to popular belief in Ap. 41 A, he talks about the judges in Hades, Minos, Rhadamanthys, Aiakos Triptolemus and all the other just demigods existed in their own lives.. He doesn’t mention any judgment based on actions from this life and clearly doesn’t suggest any decision about the good or bad fates of those who have just left the living world and arrived in Hades. Instead, we should assume that those Truly judges, who are also said to judge there. act as judges among the dead too, resolving their conflicts just like Minos does in the Nekyia of λ 568–71, and as Rhadamanthys still does in Pi., O. ii, 83 ff., on the island of the blessed. The number of those with such authority in the underworld is greatly expanded in Plato’s writings. This development seems to have taken place as follows: the references in the Odyssey were expanded upon, and as the image of Hades was developed, more figures like Minos were added as examples of justice among the dead who render judgments. Then, philosophical and poetic speculation (possibly influenced by Egyptian thoughts) about a judgment in the afterlife assigned this larger group of judges in Hades the duty of evaluating the behavior of those who just entered Hades.—The choice of judges is understandable. Aiakos, Rhadamanthys, and Minos are considered models of justice: Dem. 18, 127. Minos, as a judge in Hades, is taken from λ 568 ff. Rhadamanthys is recognized in δ 564 as living among those who were taken alive to Elysion. He is there—not as a judge since there is nothing there to judge—but as παρέδρος of Kronos, according to Pi., O. ii, 83. Once people began to associate Elysion with Hades (of which more later) Rhad. also found his place there. His reputation as the most just of judges (see Cratin., Chiron, 231 [i, p. 83 K.]; Pl., Lg. 948 B, etc.; cf. also Plu., Thes. 16 at the end) allowed him to easily be placed next to Minos as a judge over the dead. Aiakos, too, as a symbol of piety (Isoc. 9, 14, etc.), lawgiver of Aegina, mediator among the gods themselves (Pi., I. viii, 24 f.), seemed naturally destined to be a judge among the dead. However, his role as judge was never as firmly established as that of Minos and Rhadamanthys. Pindar, although he often mentions Aiakos and the Aiakidai, gives no indication of a special role for Aiakos in the next world. Isoc. 9, 15, It is said that in the presence of Pluto and Persephone, he serves with great honor. where nothing is implied about his role as judge but simply the honor accorded to Aiakos in being given a seat near the ruling pair (cf. Pi., O. ii, 83, of Rhad.; Ar., Ra. 765, there’s a rule in Hades that the best artist λαμβάνει θρόνο του Πλούτωνα ἑξῆς. Proedria of the Mystai in Hades, etc.). Aiakos is keyholder of Hades; [Apollod.] 3, 12, 6, 10; Epigr. Gr. 646, 4; P. Mag. Par. 1264 ff.; doorkeeper (cf. Hades himself as pillar, Θ 368) in Luc., D. Mort. 13, 3; 20, 1, 6; 22, 3; De Luct. 4; Philops. 25 and Philostr., VA. 7, 31, p. 385 K. “Holder of the Key” is a title of high distinction (possibly linked to the worship offered to him along with chthonic powers): keys are associated with many gods—Plouton himself, Paus. 5, 20, 3, and others; see Tafel and Dissen on Pi., P. 8, 4; in P. Mag. Par. 1403 comes the trimeter, Keyholder Persephone, Daughter of Tartarus. It’s hard to believe that the assignment of this remarkable title of distinction to Aiakos was a later creation compared to the seemingly ordinary role of judge. It appears, in fact, that Eurip. in the Peirithoos (fr. 591 N.) made Aiakos the first to greet Herakles as he entered Hades, i.e., likely at the gate itself. It can hardly be anything but a 248 remnant of Eurip. that led (not to Aristoph. himself—see Hiller, Hermes viii, 455—but to a well-read grammaticus) to use the name “Aiakos” for the person who meets Herakles at the very gate of Plouton in the Frogs (l. 464). Just because the story of Aiakos’ role as the gatekeeper of Hades was an old one and noted by reputable sources, the belief in his role as a judge never fully took hold, despite Plato.

14 This is obviously Attic invention. Plato certainly mentions Triptolemos in addition to Minos and the other judges. But it seems that to the Athenians Minos was unacceptable as a type of justice (he was, especially on the stage, the object of bitter attacks as an enemy of the country; see Plu., Thes. 16). and they tried to substitute their own Triptolemos for him in the triad of judges. Thus we find Triptolemos not beside Minos but in his place in a picture of the underworld on a vase from Altamura (Tript. Aiak. Rhad.), and in an analogous picture on an amphora at Karlsruhe (Aiak. Tript., the left side is broken off but prob. represented Rhadamanthys not Minos). Cf. Winkler, Darst. d. Unterwelt auf unterital. Vasen, p. 37. For the rest, nothing suggests that the three judges on these vase-pictures pass judgment on the deeds of men done in their lifetime: in strictness nothing is implied about their giving judgments. What is certain is simply that they, as types of justice, ἐπὶ ταῖσι τοῦ Πλούτωνος οἰκοῦσιν θύραις (like the Mystai in Ar., Ra. 163): they enjoy the rights of πάρεδοι of the divine pair, and hence they are seated on θρόνοι or δίφροι.

14 This is clearly an invention from Athens. Plato definitely mentions Triptolemos along with Minos and the other judges. However, it appears that the Athenians found Minos unacceptable as a symbol of justice (he was the target of harsh criticism as an enemy of the city; see Plu., Thes. 16). They attempted to replace him with their own Triptolemos in the trio of judges. Therefore, we see Triptolemos not next to Minos but actually taking his place in a representation of the underworld on a vase from Altamura (Tript. Aiak. Rhad.), and in a similar depiction on an amphora in Karlsruhe (Aiak. Tript., the left side is missing but likely depicted Rhadamanthys instead of Minos). Cf. Winkler, Darst. d. Unterwelt auf unterital. Vasen, p. 37. Moreover, there is no indication that the three judges in these vase images judge the actions of people during their lifetime: technically, nothing suggests that they make any judgments. What is certain is that they, as representations of justice, At the doors of those who belong to Pluto (like the Mystai in Ar., Ra. 163): they hold the positions of trustees of the divine couple, and thus they are seated on thrones or doublesex.

15 Ar., Ra. 145 ff., 273 ff. “Darkness and mud,” σκότος καὶ βόρβορος, as manner and place of punishment for ἀμύητοι καὶ ἀτέλεστοι, are derived from Orphic teaching: Pl., Rp. 363 D; Olympiod. on Pl., Phd. 69 C. By an inaccurate extension of meaning this fate was said to threaten all ἀτέλεστοι without distinction: Plu. π. ψυχῆς ap. Stob. Fl. 120, 28 (4, 108, 2 Mein.); Aristid., Eleus., p. 421 D. = ii, 30 Keil; Plot., 1, 6, 6. Plotinos undoubtedly has the right interpretation of the reason for this strange form of punishment: the mud in which the uninitiated lie marks them out as μὴ κεκαθαρμένους who have not shared in the purifications such as were offered by the Orphic initiation ceremonies. Hence they remain fixed for ever in their original foulness (and in darkness because of their ignorance of the θεῖα). It is, in fact, an allegorical punishment which has no meaning outside the range of Orphic doctrines of katharsis and atonement. Aristoph. transfers it to those who have seriously transgressed the laws of city or religion, for whom it was unsuitable: this only shows that an appropriate penalty in Hades for crimes against civil society had not yet been invented. It had evidently been thought sufficient to say generally that the ἀσεβεῖς (or at least the more heinous offenders) would be punished in Hades. This commonplace form of the opinion is probably to be regarded as a final echo of some definite theological doctrine which had become vulgarized and emptied of distinct meaning among the general public of the profane. The author of the first speech against Aristogeiton ([D.] 25) who speaks of the εἰς τοὺς ἀσεβεῖς ὠσθῆναι in Hades (53), confesses himself an adherent of Orpheus (11).—The μεμυημένοι dwell in Hades next to the palace of Plouton himself: Ar., Ra. 162 f., where they have the privilege of προεδρία, D.L., vi, 39. When a distinction between a χῶρος εὐσεβῶν and a χῶρος ἀσεβῶν in Hades began to be made, the initiated, in order that they might not be deprived of their privileged position, were given προεδρία in the χ. εὐσεβῶν. In this way, e.g. the author of the Axioch. 371 D (who 249 can hardly have written before the third century) tries to reconcile the hopelessly contradictory pretensions of the εὐσεβεῖς and μεμυημένοι to reward in Hades.

15 Ar., Ra. 145 ff., 273 ff. “Darkness and mud,” darkness and filth, as the manner and place of punishment for Uninitiated and unfinished, comes from Orphic teachings: Pl., Rp. 363 D; Olympiod. on Pl., Phd. 69 C. Due to a misinterpretation of meaning, this fate was said to threaten all Incomplete without distinction: Plu. π. ψυχῆς ap. Stob. Fl. 120, 28 (4, 108, 2 Mein.); Aristid., Eleus., p. 421 D. = ii, 30 Keil; Plot., 1, 6, 6. Plotinus certainly has the right idea about the reason for this unusual form of punishment: the mud in which the uninitiated are trapped identifies them as not purified who have not undergone the purifications offered by the Orphic initiation ceremonies. Consequently, they remain forever stuck in their original filth (and in darkness due to their ignorance of the Aunt). It is, in fact, an allegorical punishment that makes no sense outside the context of Orphic doctrines of katharsis and atonement. Aristophanes applies it to those who have seriously broken the laws of the city or religion, for whom it was inappropriate: this simply indicates that a suitable punishment in Hades for offenses against civil society had yet to be established. It appears that it was generally thought sufficient to suggest that the unholy (or at least the more serious offenders) would be punished in Hades. This common view is likely a final echo of some specific theological concept that had become diluted and lost its clear meaning among the general public. The author of the first speech against Aristogeiton ([D.] 25) who talks about to be thrust into the wicked in Hades (53), reveals himself to be a follower of Orpheus (11).—The initiated reside in Hades next to the palace of Plouton himself: Ar., Ra. 162 f., where they hold the privilege of presidency, D.L., vi, 39. When a distinction between a place of the faithful and a place of the wicked in Hades started to be recognized, the initiated were granted presidency in the χ. faithful to maintain their privileged status. In this way, for example, the author of the Axioch. 371 D (who 249 probably didn't write before the third century) attempts to reconcile the irreconcilable claims of the devout and initiated for rewards in Hades.

16 Sex. Emp., M. ix, 53. Suid. Διαγόρας.

16 Sex. Emp., M. ix, 53. Suid. Diagoras.

17 Descents to Hades occurred in the Κραπάταλοι of Pherecr. (i, p. 167 K.); the Βάτραχοι and Γηρυτάδης of Ar.; [Pherecr.] Μεταλλ. (i, p. 174 K.); and probably also in the Τροφώνιος of Cratin., etc.—On a vase from Eretria, fifth century, there is a representation of a repulsive scene of torture; an old woman, naked and tied to a tree, is being tortured by three satyrs. This, according to J. Zingerle, Archäol. epigr. Mittheil. a. Oesterreich, 18, 162 ff., is a parody of some incident from a comedy of the time, the plot of which was laid in Hades. But nothing in the picture suggests that the lower regions are the scene of this gruesome affair; and what would the satyrs be doing there?

17 Descents to Hades happened in the Krapatalos of Pherecr. (i, p. 167 K.); the Frogs and Γηρυτάδης of Ar.; [Pherecr.] Metal. (i, p. 174 K.); and probably also in the Trophonius of Cratin., etc.—On a vase from Eretria, dating back to the fifth century, there's a disturbing depiction of torture; an old woman, naked and tied to a tree, is being tormented by three satyrs. This scene, according to J. Zingerle, Archäol. epigr. Mittheil. a. Oesterreich, 18, 162 ff., is a parody of some event from a comedy of that time, which was set in Hades. However, nothing in the image indicates that the underworld is the setting for this horrific event; and what would the satyrs be doing there?

18 Utopian existence in Hades; see in partic. [Pherecr.] Μεταλλ. (i, p. 174 K.). A pretext for such parodies was perhaps given by the Orphic promise of an everlasting carouse for the initiated at the συμπόσιον τῶν ὁσίων in Hades (Pl., Rp. ii, 263 C, μακάρῶν εὐωχία, Ar., Ra. 85). Many details were borrowed from the descriptions of the reign of bliss upon earth in the golden age under Kronos’ rule which had long been a familiar subject of comedy (cf. Pöschel, Das Märchen vom Schlaraffenland, 7 ff.). The golden age in the dim past and the land of Elysion in the future always had many features in common. (See above, chap. ii, n. 49.) From these traditional pictures of a spirit-world only to be met with in the long-vanished past or in the next world, the whole Greek literature of imaginary Utopias drew its sustenance (see my Griech. Roman, ii, § 2, 3). That literature was really an attempt to transpose those early fantasies of a land of spirits into real life and on to the inhabited world.

18 Utopian existence in Hades; see in particular [Pherecr.] Metal. (i, p. 174 K.). A reason for these parodies may have come from the Orphic promise of an eternal party for the initiated at the symposium of the saints in Hades (Pl., Rp. ii, 263 C, feast of the blessed, Ar., Ra. 85). Many details were taken from the descriptions of a blissful reign on earth during the golden age under Kronos, which had long been a popular theme in comedy (cf. Pöschel, Das Märchen vom Schlaraffenland, 7 ff.). The golden age in the distant past and the land of Elysium in the future often shared many characteristics. (See above, chap. ii, n. 49.) From these traditional images of a spirit world, found only in the long-gone past or in the afterlife, the entire Greek literature of imaginary Utopias drew its inspiration (see my Griech. Roman, ii, § 2, 3). This literature was really an attempt to turn those early fantasies of a spirit land into real life and into the world we inhabit.

19 ἔστι γ’ εὐδαίμων πόλις παρὰ τὴν ἐρυθρὰν θάλατταν, Ar., Av. 144 f. (cf. Griech. Roman, 201 ff.).

19 There’s a thriving city by the Red Sea., Ar., Av. 144 f. (cf. Griech. Roman, 201 ff.).

20 λίμνη (the Acherousian lake: Eur., Alc. 443, and often afterwards). Charon: Ar., Ra. 137 ff., 182 ff., 185 ff.—σκότος καὶ βόρβορος 144 ff., 278 ff., 289 ff. Abode and life of the Mystai: 159, 163, 311 ff., 454 ff.

20 lake (the Acherousian lake: Eur., Alc. 443, and frequently later). Charon: Ar., Ra. 137 ff., 182 ff., 185 ff.—darkness and filth 144 ff., 278 ff., 289 ff. Home and life of the Mystai: 159, 163, 311 ff., 454 ff.

21 τὸ Λήθης πεδίον, l. 186. This is the earliest reference to Lethe of which we can be quite sure; but it is made so casually that it is obvious that Aristoph. is merely alluding to a story well known to his audience. Plato makes use of the Λήθης πεδίον together with the Ἀμέλης ποταμός (hence 621 C: Λήθης ποταμός) in the myth at the close of the Republic, x, 621 A, which is intended to illustrate and support the theory of palingenesia. Of course, this ingenious fancy was eminently suitable for use by adherents of the doctrine of metempsychosis; but there is nothing to show that it had been actually invented for the special benefit of this doctrine, i.e. by Orphics or Pythagoreans—as many have supposed. It is probable that it was nothing more originally but an attempt to explain symbolically the unconscious condition of the ἀμενηνὰ κάρηνα. Does Theognis already (704, 705) refer to it?—Περσεφόνην . . . ἥτε βρότοις παρέχει λήθην, βλάπτουσα νόοιο. Other references to the Λήθης πύλαι, Λάθας δόμοι, Λήθης ὕδωρ are all later; the Λήθης θρόνος in the account of Theseus’ journey to Hades in [Apollod.] Epit. i, 24, is perhaps taken from older legendary material. (Bergk’s assertion, Opusc. ii, 716: “The conception of Lethe’s fountain and stream is certainly ancient and popular: the well of Lethe is nothing but the fountain of the gods: whoever drinks of it forgets all sorrows, etc.,” 250 is entirely devoid of foundation in fact.) The river of Lethe was in later times localized on earth like Acheron and Styx; in the R. Limia of Gallaecia—far away on the western sea—men rediscovered the Oblivionis flumen (account of the year 137 B.C.: Liv., Epit. 55; Flor. 1, 33, 12; App., Hisp. 72: Plu., QR. 34, p. 272 D; cf. Mela, 3, § 10; Plin., NH. 4, § 115. Absurd aetiology in Strabo, p. 153).

21 the Plain of Forgetfulness, l. 186. This is the earliest reference to Lethe of which we can be fairly certain; however, it is mentioned so casually that it’s clear Aristophanes is simply referencing a story well-known to his audience. Plato uses the Field of Forgetfulness along with the Ameless River (thus 621 C: River of Forgetfulness) in the myth at the end of the Republic, x, 621 A, which aims to illustrate and support the theory of palingenesia. Naturally, this clever idea was very useful for supporters of the doctrine of metempsychosis; yet, there’s nothing to indicate that it was specifically created for the benefit of this doctrine, i.e., by Orphics or Pythagoreans—as many have assumed. It’s likely that it was originally just an attempt to symbolically explain the unconscious state of the ἀμενηνὰ κάρηνα. Does Theognis already refer to it (704, 705)?—Persephone... who brings forgetfulness to mortals, harming the mind.. Other references to the Forgetting gates, the home of Lathas, the water of Forgetting are all later; the Throne of Oblivion in the story of Theseus’ trip to Hades in [Apollod.] Epit. i, 24, may be drawn from older legends. (Bergk’s claim, Opusc. ii, 716: “The concept of Lethe’s fountain and stream is certainly ancient and popular: the well of Lethe is just the fountain of the gods: anyone who drinks from it forgets all sorrows, etc.,” 250 is entirely unfounded.) The river of Lethe was later placed on earth like Acheron and Styx; in the R. Limia of Gallaecia—far away on the western sea—people rediscovered the Oblivionis flumen (account of the year 137 BCE: Liv., Epit. 55; Flor. 1, 33, 12; App., Hisp. 72: Plu., QR. 34, p. 272 D; cf. Mela, 3, § 10; Plin., NH. 4, § 115. Absurd aetiology in Strabo, p. 153).

22 This is presumably the meaning of the words which Pausanias (10, 28, 5) uses: his absurd mannerism makes him talk round the incident instead of simply describing it. (Much too artificial explanation of the circumstance in Dümmler, Delphika, p. 15 [1894].)

22 This likely explains what Pausanias (10, 28, 5) means: his ridiculous style leads him to go around the incident instead of just describing it directly. (Dümmler's explanation of the situation in Delphika, p. 15 [1894] is way too contrived.)

23 Paus. 10, 28, 4.

23 Pause. 10, 28, 4.

24 Check __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

25 Eurynomos: dark-blue body like a bluebottle, with prominent teeth, sitting on a vulture’s skin, Paus. 10, 28, 7. There seems to be no mention of him in literature: whether the statement of Pausanias that he was a δαίμων τῶν ἐν Ἅιδου who eats the flesh of corpses off their bones, is anything more than a guess, we cannot tell. The vulture-skin indeed suggests that the nature of the Daimon who sits on it was related to the vulture. The fact that the vulture eats the flesh of corpses was often observed by the ancients (see Plu., Rom. 9, etc.: Leemans on Horapollo, p. 177). Welcker (Kl. Schr. v, 117) sees in Eurynomos nothing but the “corruption” of the body, in which case he would be a purely allegorical figure. On the contrary he is much more likely to be one of those very concretely imagined spirits of Hell (only with a euphemistic name), like the lesser spirits Lamia, Mormo, Gorgyra, Empousa, etc. (a word about them will be found below, Append. vi). The artist must have known him from some local tradition. He devours the flesh of the corpse: thus a late epigram (Epigr. Gr. 647, 16) calls the dead λυπρὴν δαῖτα Χάρωνι. Even in Soph., El. 542, we have; Ἅιδης ἵμερον τέκνων τῶν ἐκείνης ἔσχε δαίσασθαι (Welcker, Syll., p. 94).

25 Eurynomos: a dark-blue body similar to a bluebottle fly, with prominent teeth, sitting on a vulture’s skin, Paus. 10, 28, 7. There seems to be no references to him in literature; we can’t tell if Pausanias’s claim that he was a spirit of the underworld who eats the flesh of corpses off their bones is more than just a guess. The vulture-skin suggests that the nature of the Daimon sitting on it is related to the vulture. The ancients often noticed that vultures eat the flesh of corpsesSure! Please provide the text you'd like me to modernize.see Plu., Rom. 9, etc.: Leemans on Horapollo, p. 177). Welcker (Kl. Schr. v, 117) sees Eurynomos as nothing but the “corruption” of the body, in which case he would be a purely allegorical figure. However, he is more likely one of those practically imagined spirits of Hell (just with a euphemistic name), like the lesser spirits Lamia, Mormo, Gorgyra, Empousa, etc. (more on them can be found below, Append. vi). The artist must have known him from some local tradition. He devours the flesh of the corpse: thus, a later epigram (Epigr. Gr. 647, 16) refers to the dead as sad feast for Charon. Even in Soph., El. 542, we have; Hades had a desire today to feast on the children of that place. (Welcker, Syll., p. 94).

26 Paus. 10, 28, 3. Cf. O. Jahn, Hermes, iii, 326.

26 Paus. 10, 28, 3. Cf. O. Jahn, Hermes, iii, 326.

27 The third century vase-paintings from Southern Italy also as a rule keep within the limits of the epic Nekyia. In addition to the few special types of the sinners undergoing punishment in Hades (Sisyphos, Tantalos, the Danaids) we have allusions to the journeys to Hades of Theseus, Peirithoos, Herakles, and Orpheus. All attempts to read mystical or edifying intentions into these (as in Baumeister’s Denkm. 1926–30) are now regarded as completely mistaken. (Orpheus appears there not as founder and prophet of his mysteries but simply as the mythical singer who goes down to the underworld to rescue Eurydike with his singing. This is rightly maintained by Milchhöfer, Philol. 53, 385 ff., 54, 750 f., against Kuhnert, Arch. Jahrb. viii, 104 ff.; Philol. 54, 193.) Nothing at all is suggested as to the fate of mankind in general. On a vase from Canosa a father and mother with a boy stand on the left of Orpheus: this, too, must belong to the region of mythology. (They cannot, however, be Dionysos and Ariadne as Winkler suggests, Darst. d. Unterw. auf unterit. Vasen, 49. But it is difficult to imagine that they can be a family of Mystai as Milchhöfer supposes.)

27 The vase paintings from Southern Italy in the third century generally stick to the themes of the epic Nekyia. Along with a few specific types of sinners being punished in Hades (like Sisyphus, Tantalus, and the Danaids), we also see references to the journeys to Hades of Theseus, Peirithoos, Heracles, and Orpheus. Any attempts to interpret these as mystical or moral lessons (as seen in Baumeister’s Denkm. 1926–30) are now seen as completely wrong. (Orpheus is depicted not as the founder and prophet of his mysteries but simply as the legendary musician who travels to the underworld to rescue Eurydice with his music. This point is correctly supported by Milchhöfer, Philol. 53, 385 ff., 54, 750 f., countering Kuhnert, Arch. Jahrb. viii, 104 ff.; Philol. 54, 193.) There is no indication about the fate of humanity in general. On a vase from Canosa, a father and mother stand with a boy to the left of Orpheus: this, too, likely belongs to the realm of mythology. (However, they cannot be Dionysus and Ariadne as Winkler suggests in Darst. d. Unterw. auf unterit. Vasen, 49. Yet, it’s hard to believe they are a family of Mystai as Milchhöfer assumes.)

PART II

CHAPTER VIII

ORIGINS OF THE BELIEF IN IMMORTALITY
The Thracian Worship of Dionysus

The popular conception of the continued existence of the souls of the dead, resting upon the cult of the dead, grew up and coalesced with a view of the soul derived from Homeric teaching on the subject, which was in essential, though unrecognized, contradiction with the cult of souls. The popular conception, unchanged in all essentials, remained in force throughout the coming centuries of Greek life. It did not contain within itself the seeds of further development; it did not make any demand for better and deeper ideas of the character and condition of the soul in its independent life after its separation from the body. Still more, it had nothing in it that could have led beyond the belief in the independent future life of those souls to the conception of an everlasting, indestructible, immortal life. The continued life of the soul, such as was implied in and guaranteed by the cult of souls, was entirely bound up with the remembrance of the survivors upon earth, and upon the care, the cult, which they might offer to the soul of their departed ancestor. If that memory dies out, if the venerating thoughtfulness of the living ceases, the soul of the departed is at once deprived of the sole element in which it still maintained its shadow of an existence.

The common belief in the ongoing existence of the souls of the dead, based on the cult of the dead, developed and merged with ideas about the soul that came from Homer's teachings, which were fundamentally, though unacknowledged, contradictory to the cult of souls. This popular belief, largely unchanged, persisted throughout the following centuries of Greek life. It didn’t contain any potential for further growth; it didn’t inspire a demand for deeper or more comprehensive ideas about the nature and condition of the soul in its independent life after separating from the body. Furthermore, it lacked anything that could lead beyond the belief in a separate future life for those souls to the idea of an eternal, indestructible, immortal life. The continued existence of the soul, as suggested by the cult of souls, was completely tied to the memory of the living on earth and the care and rituals they performed for their deceased ancestors. If that memory fades, if the living stop their reverent thoughts, the soul of the departed immediately loses the only aspect in which it still held a semblance of existence.

It was impossible, then, that the cult of the souls should produce out of itself the idea of a true immortality of the soul or of the independent life of the soul indestructible by its very nature. Greek religion as it existed among the people of Homer could not shape such a belief of its own accord, and even if it were offered from outside could not have accepted it. It would have meant giving up its own essential character.

It was impossible, then, for the cult of the souls to generate the idea of true immortality of the soul or of a soul that lives independently and is indestructible by its very nature. Greek religion, as it existed among the people of Homer, couldn't create such a belief on its own, and even if it were presented from outside, it wouldn’t have been able to accept it. Doing so would have meant giving up its own essential nature.

If the soul is immortal, it must be in its essential nature like God; it must itself be a creature of the realm of Gods. When a Greek says “immortal” he says “God”: they are interchangeable ideas. But the real first principle of the religion of the Greek people is this—that in the divine ordering of the world, humanity and divinity are absolutely divided in place and nature, and so they must ever remain. A deep 254 gulf is fixed between the worlds of mortality and divinity. The relations between man and God promoted by religion depend entirely upon this distinction. The ethical ideas of the Greek popular conscience were rooted in the frank admission of the limitations proper to human capacity which was conditioned by an existence and a fate so different from that enjoyed by the gods; in the renunciation of all human claims to happiness and independence. Poetic fancies about the “Translation” of individual mortals to an unending life enjoyed by the soul still united to the body might make their appeal to popular belief; but such things remained miracles in which divine omnipotence had broken down the barriers of the natural order on a special occasion. It was but a miracle, too, if the souls of certain mortals were raised to the rank of Heroes, and so promoted to everlasting life. The gulf between the human and the divine was not made any narrower on that account; it remained unbridged, abysmal. The bare idea that the gulf did not in reality exist, that actually in the order of nature the inner man, the “Soul” of man belonged to the realm of gods; that as a divine being it had everlasting life—such an idea would involve further consequences about which no one can be in much doubt: it would have contradicted every single idea of Greek popular religion. It never could have become widely held and believed in by the Greek populace.

If the soul is immortal, it must essentially be like God; it must be a being from the realm of the divine. When a Greek says “immortal,” they mean “God”: these concepts are interchangeable. However, the fundamental principle of Greek religion is that in the divine structure of the world, humanity and divinity are completely separated in both position and nature, and that separation must always remain. A deep 254 chasm exists between the worlds of mortality and divinity. The relationship between humans and God as encouraged by religion completely relies on this distinction. The ethical views of the Greek public were based on a clear acknowledgment of the limitations inherent to human ability, shaped by an existence and a fate vastly different from that of the gods; it involved giving up any human claims to happiness and autonomy. Poetic notions about the “Translation” of individual mortals to an eternal life enjoyed by the soul still linked to the body might appeal to popular belief, but these remained miracles where divine omnipotence had momentarily breached the barriers of the natural order. It was also a miracle if the souls of certain mortals were elevated to the status of Heroes and thus granted everlasting life. The divide between the human and the divine was not made any smaller because of that; it remained profound and unbridgeable. The mere thought that this divide didn’t truly exist, that in nature, the inner man, the “Soul” of man belonged to the realm of the divine; that as a divine entity it possessed everlasting life—such a concept would lead to additional implications that no one could doubt: it would contradict every single notion of popular Greek religion. It could never have become widely accepted or believed by the Greek populace.

Nevertheless, at a certain period in Greek history, and nowhere earlier or more unmistakably than in Greece, appeared the idea of the divinity, and the immortality implicit in the divinity, of the human soul. That idea belonged entirely to mysticism—a second order of religion which, though little remarked by the religion of the people and by orthodox believers, gained a footing in isolated sects and influenced certain philosophical schools. Thence it has affected all subsequent ages and has transmitted to East and West the elementary principles of all true mysticism: the essential unity of the divine and the human spirit; their unification as the aim of religion; the divine nature of the human soul and its immortality.

Nevertheless, at a certain point in Greek history, and nowhere earlier or more clearly than in Greece, the concept of the divinity, and the immortality inherent in that divinity, of the human soul emerged. This idea was entirely part of mysticism—a secondary form of religion that, while largely unnoticed by the public religion and by orthodox believers, gained traction in small sects and influenced various philosophical schools. From there, it impacted all later ages and passed on to both the East and the West the fundamental principles of all true mysticism: the essential unity of the divine and the human spirit; their unification as the goal of religion; the divine essence of the human soul and its immortality.

The theory and doctrine of mysticism grew up in the soil of an older cult-practice. Greece received from abroad a deeply emotional religious cult, accompanied by practices that stimulated mysterious and extraordinary imaginings. The sparks of momentary illumination struck out by this faith were fed and fanned by mysticism till they became a vivid and enduring flame. For the first time, clearly 255 discernible through its mystical wrappings, we meet with the belief in the indestructibility and eternal life of the soul: we meet it in the doctrines of a mystical sect which united in the worship of Dionysos. The worship of Dionysos must have sown the first seed of the belief in an immortal life of the soul. To explain how this may have happened; to make clear to the mind of the reader how the essence and inner reality of that worship was bound to stir up the belief in an immortal life—such is our next task.

The theory and practice of mysticism emerged from an older religious tradition. Greece adopted an emotionally charged religious cult from abroad, which included practices that sparked mysterious and extraordinary imaginations. The brief moments of insight inspired by this faith were nurtured and intensified by mysticism until they grew into a bright and lasting flame. For the first time, clearly 255 visible beneath its mystical layers, we encounter the belief in the indestructibility and eternal life of the soul: this belief appears in the teachings of a mystical group that worshipped Dionysos. The worship of Dionysos likely planted the initial seed for the belief in the soul's immortality. Our next task is to explain how this may have happened and to clarify for the reader how the essence and core reality of that worship were tied to the belief in eternal life.

§ 2

In the spiritual life of men and nations, it is not by any means the extravagant or, in one sense or another, the abnormal that is most difficult for our sympathetic understanding to grasp. By clinging to a traditional and too narrow formula for the Greek spirit we make difficulties for ourselves; but it is not really a matter of serious perplexity, if we reflect upon it, to understand how Greek religion at the height of its development regarded “madness” (μανία) as a religious phenomenon of wide-reaching importance. Madness, in this sense, is a temporary destruction of physical balance, a condition in which the self-conscious spirit is overwhelmed, “possessed” by a foreign power, as our authorities explain it to us. This madness “which comes not from mortal weakness or disease, but from a divine banishment of the commonplace”1 found effective application in the mantic and telestic arts. Its effects were so common and well recognized that the truth and importance of such religious madness (entirely distinguishable from bodily disease) was treated as a fact of experience not merely by philosophers, but by the doctors themselves.2 For us it only remains obscure how such “divine mania” was fitted into the regular working order of the religious life; the sensations and experiences themselves belonging to this condition are made intelligible enough by a whole host of analogies. In fact if the truth were told we should rather have to admit that it is easier for us to sympathize with such overflowing of sensation and all that goes with it than with the opposite pole of Greek religious life, the calm and measured composure with which man lifted up heart and eye to the gods, as the patterns of all life and the patrons of a serenity as brilliant and unmoved as that of the clear heavens themselves.

In the spiritual lives of individuals and nations, it’s not the extravagant or, in some way, the abnormal that is hardest for us to understand compassionately. By sticking to a traditional and overly narrow view of the Greek spirit, we create challenges for ourselves; however, it's not really a serious puzzle, if we think about it, to grasp how Greek religion, at its peak, saw “madness” (madness) as a significant religious phenomenon. Madness, in this context, is a temporary loss of physical balance, a state where the self-aware spirit is overwhelmed, “possessed” by an outside force, as experts explain. This madness “which arises not from human frailty or illness, but from a divine removal of the ordinary”1 found productive use in the mantic and telestic arts. Its effects were so prevalent and well acknowledged that the reality and significance of such religious madness (entirely distinct from physical illness) was accepted as a fact not only by philosophers but also by doctors themselves.2 For us, it only remains unclear how such “divine mania” fitted into the regular flow of religious life; the feelings and experiences associated with this state are made understandable enough through a variety of analogies. In fact, if we’re honest, we’d have to admit that it’s easier for us to relate to such intense emotions and everything that comes with it than to the other side of Greek religious life—the calm and composed way humans raised their hearts and eyes to the gods, who represented all of life and the unwavering peace as bright and steady as the clear skies above.

But how came it that in the character of a single people such extravagance of emotion was combined with a fast-bound and regulated equilibrium of temper and behaviour? The answer is that these opposing features sprang from two 256 different sources. They were not originally combined in Greece. The Homeric poems hardly give any hint of that overflowing of religious emotion which later Greek peoples knew and honoured as a heaven-sent madness. It spread among the Greeks themselves in the train of a religious agitation, we might almost say revolution, of which Homer records, at most, only the first faint essays. It had its origin in the religion of Dionysos, and in company with this religion enters as something new and strange into Greek life.

But how is it that within the character of a single people, such intense emotion was combined with a steadfast and regulated balance of temperament and behavior? The answer is that these contrasting traits came from two 256 different origins. They weren't initially combined in Greece. The Homeric poems hardly hint at the overwhelming religious emotion that later Greek societies experienced and revered as a divine madness. It spread among the Greeks themselves following a wave of religious excitement, which we might even describe as a revolution, of which Homer captures, at most, only its earliest signs. It originated from the worship of Dionysos, and along with this religion, something new and unusual entered Greek life.

The Homeric poems do not recognize Dionysos as belonging to the gods of Olympos, but they are aware of his existence. It is true they nowhere plainly3 refer to him as the wine-god honoured in joyful festivals, but we read (in the narrative of Glaukos’ meeting with Diomedes) of the “frenzied” Dionysos and his “Nurses” who were attacked by the Thracian Lykourgos.4 The Mainas, the frenzied woman of the Dionysos-cult, was such a well-known phenomenon, so familiar in men’s minds, that the word could be used in a simile to explain the meaning of something else.5 In this form the worship of the god first came to the notice of the Greeks; this was the origin of all the other festivals of Dionysos that later Greece developed in so many different directions.6 They learnt to know Dionysos Bakcheios, “who makes men frenzied,”7 as he was worshipped in his own country.

The Homeric poems don’t recognize Dionysos as part of the gods of Olympus, but they know he exists. While they don't directly call him the wine-god celebrated in joyful festivals, there’s a mention (in the story of Glaukos’ meeting with Diomedes) of the “frenzied” Dionysos and his “Nurses,” who were attacked by the Thracian Lykourgos. The Mainas, the frenzied woman of the Dionysos cult, was such a well-known figure, so familiar to people, that the term could be used in a simile to explain something else. This was how the worship of the god first came to the attention of the Greeks; this marked the beginning of all the other festivals of Dionysos that later Greece developed in various ways. They came to know Dionysos Bakcheios, “who makes men frenzied,” as he was worshipped in his homeland.

That the original home of Dionysos-worship was in Thrace, that his cult, popular among many of the Thracian peoples,8 was particularly honoured among the southernmost of the Thracian stocks who were best known to the Greeks and lived on the coast between the mouths of the rivers Hebros and Axios and in the mountainous country behind—to all this the Greeks themselves bore frequent and manifold witness.9 The god whose name the Greeks knew in its Greek form “Dionysos” had, it appears, among the numerous and divided Thracian peoples various appellations of which those most familiar to the Greeks were Sabos and Sabazios.10 The Greeks must have known and remarked on the nature and worship of the god at an early period of their history. They may have met with him in Thrace itself. At all periods they had an extensive and varied intercourse with this country and must in the early days of their wanderings have passed through it on their way to their future home. They may have had further opportunities of knowing it from the Thracian races or tribes who, according to a few isolated legends, had dwelt in primitive times in certain localities of Central Greece. The ethnographical material of these 257 legends was regarded as founded on fact by the great historians of the fifth and fourth centuries.11

The original home of Dionysus worship was in Thrace, and his cult was popular among many of the Thracian peoples. It was particularly honored among the southernmost Thracian groups who were best known to the Greeks and lived on the coast between the mouths of the Hebros and Axios rivers and in the mountainous region behind—this is something the Greeks often acknowledged. The god whose name the Greeks knew as “Dionysus” had various names among the many divided Thracian peoples, with the most familiar to the Greeks being Sabos and Sabazios. The Greeks likely recognized and noted the nature and worship of the god early in their history. They might have encountered him in Thrace itself. Throughout different periods, they had extensive and varied interactions with this country and must have passed through it during their early migrations to their eventual home. They might have further learned about it from the Thracian races or tribes that, according to a few isolated legends, lived in certain areas of Central Greece in ancient times. The ethnographical details of these legends were considered factual by the notable historians of the fifth and fourth centuries.

The cult of this Thracian divinity differed in every particular from anything that we know of from Homer as Greek worship of the gods. On the other hand, it was closely related to the cult paid by the Phrygians, a people almost identical with the Thracians, to their mountain-mother Kybele. It was thoroughly orgiastic in character. The festival was held on the mountain tops in the darkness of night amid the flickering and uncertain light of torches. The loud and troubled sound of music was heard; the clash of bronze cymbals; the dull thunderous roar of kettledrums; and through them all penetrated the “maddening unison” of the deep-toned flute,12 whose soul Phrygian aulêtai had first waked to life. Excited by this wild music, the chorus of worshippers dance with shrill crying and jubilation.13 We hear nothing about singing:14 the violence of the dance left no breath for regular songs. These dances were something very different from the measured movement of the dance-step in which Homer’s Greeks advanced and turned about in the Paian. It was in frantic, whirling, headlong eddies and dance-circles15 that these inspired companies danced over the mountain slopes. They were mostly women who whirled round in these circular dances till the point of exhaustion was reached;16 they were strangely dressed; they wore bassarai, long flowing garments, as it seems, stitched together out of fox-skins;17 over these were doeskins,18 and they even had horns fixed to their heads.19 Their hair was allowed to float in the wind;20 they carried snakes sacred to Sabazios21 in their hands and brandished daggers or else thyrsos-wands, the spear-points of which were concealed in ivy-leaves.22 In this fashion they raged wildly until every sense was wrought to the highest pitch of excitement, and in the “sacred frenzy” they fell upon the beast selected as their victim23 and tore their captured prey limb from limb. Then with their teeth they seized the bleeding flesh and devoured it raw.

The worship of this Thracian deity was completely different from what we see in Homer’s depiction of Greek god worship. However, it was closely linked to the rituals practiced by the Phrygians, who were nearly identical to the Thracians, in honor of their mountain-mother, Kybele. The celebration was intensely orgiastic. The festival took place on mountain tops under the cover of night, illuminated by the flickering and uncertain light of torches. The air was filled with loud, chaotic music: the clash of bronze cymbals, the deep, thunderous sound of kettledrums, and amidst it all, the “maddening unison” of the deep-toned flute, whose spirit the Phrygian aulêtai had first awakened. Energized by this wild music, the group of worshippers danced, filled with shrill cries and excitement. There was no mention of singing; the intensity of the dance left no breath for regular songs. These dances were completely different from the structured movements of the dance-step that Homer’s Greeks performed in the Paian. Instead, these inspired groups danced in frantic, swirling circles across the mountain slopes. Most of the participants were women who spun around in these circular dances until they reached exhaustion; they wore unique outfits made of bassarai, long flowing garments seemingly stitched from fox pelts; over these, they donned doe-skins, and some even had horns attached to their heads. Their hair was allowed to blow freely in the wind; they held snakes sacred to Sabazios in their hands, brandishing daggers or thyrsos-wands with spear points hidden in ivy leaves. In this manner, they danced wildly until every sense was heightened, and in the “sacred frenzy,” they would pounce on the chosen beast and tear their victim apart limb by limb. Then, they would bite into the bleeding flesh and consume it raw.

It is easy enough, by following poets’ descriptions and plastic representations of such scenes, to elaborate still further the picture of this nocturnal festival of fanatic enthusiasm. But, we must ask, what was the meaning of it all? We shall get nearest to the truth if we will exclude as far as possible all theories imported from unrelated provinces of thought and fix our attention solely on what, for the participants, was the result of it all—the result anticipated and consciously proposed by them, and therefore the recognized object, or, at least, one 258 of the recognized objects of these strange proceedings. The participators in these dance-festivals induced intentionally in themselves a sort of mania, an extraordinary exaltation of their being. A strange rapture came over them in which they seemed to themselves and others “frenzied”, “possessed”.24 This excessive stimulation of the senses, going even as far as hallucination,25 was brought about, in those who were susceptible to their influence, by the delirious whirl of the dance, the music and the darkness, and all the other circumstances of this tumultuous worship.26 This extreme pitch of excitement was the result intended. The violently induced exaltation of the senses had a religious purpose, in that such enlargement and extension of his being was man’s only way, as it seemed, of entering into union and relationship with the god and his spiritual attendants. The god is invisibly present among his inspired worshippers. At any rate, he is close at hand, and the tumult of the festival is to bring him completely into their midst.27 There are various legends about the disappearance of the god into another world and his return thence to mankind.28 Every second year his return is celebrated, and it is just this Appearance, this “Epiphany” of the god, that gives the reason and the motive of the festival. The Bull-God, in the most ancient and primitive form of the belief, appeared in person among the dancers,29 or else the imitated roaring of a bull produced by hidden “Mimes of Terror” served to suggest the invisible Presence.30 The worshippers, too, in furious exaltation and divine inspiration, strive after the god; they seek communion with him. They burst the physical barriers of their soul. A magic power takes hold of them; they feel themselves raised high above the level of their everyday existence; they seem to become those spiritual beings who wildly dance in the train of the god.31 Nay, more, they have a share in the life of the god himself; nothing less can be the meaning of the fact that the enraptured servants of the god call themselves by the name of the god. The worshipper who in his exaltation has become one with the god, is himself now called Sabos, Sabazios.32 The superhuman and the infra-human are mingled in his person; like the frenzied god33 he throws himself upon the sacrificial animal to devour it raw. To make this transformation of their nature outwardly manifest, the participants in the dance-festival wear strange dress: they resemble in their appearance the members of the wild thiasos of the god;34 the horns they set on their heads recall the horned, bull-shaped god himself, etc.35 The whole might be called a religious drama, since 259 everything is carefully arranged so as to suggest to the imagination the actual presence of the mysterious figures from the spirit world. At the same time, it is something more than mere drama, for it can hardly be doubted that the players themselves were possessed by the illusion of living the life of a strange person. The awe-inspiring darkness of night, the music, especially that of the Phrygian flute, to which the Greeks attributed the power of making its hearers “full of the god”,36 the vertiginous whirl of the dance—all these may very well, in suitably disposed natures,37 have really led to a state of visionary exaltation in which the inspired person saw all external objects in accordance with his fancy and imagination. Intoxicating drinks, to which the Thracians were addicted, may have increased the excitement;38 perhaps they even used the fumes derived from certain seeds, with which the Scythians and Massagetai knew how to intoxicate themselves.39 We all know how even to day in the East the smoke of hashish may make men visionaries and excite religious raptures40 in which the whole of nature is transformed for the enthralled dreamer. “Only when thus possessed did the Bakchai drink milk and honey out of the rivers; their power ceased when they came to themselves again,” says Plato.41 For them the earth flowed with milk and honey, and the air was filled with the sweet odours of Syria.42 Hallucination was accompanied by a state of feeling in which pain itself was only an added stimulus to sensation or in which the visionary became completely insensible to pain, as is not unusual in such states of exaltation.43

It’s pretty straightforward, by following poets’ descriptions and artistic representations of these scenes, to further elaborate on the image of this night festival filled with intense enthusiasm. But we need to ask, what was the meaning of it all? We’ll get closest to the truth if we exclude, as much as possible, theories that come from unrelated areas of thought and focus solely on what, for the participants, was the outcome of it all—the outcome they anticipated and consciously aimed for, and therefore the recognized goal, or at least one 258 of the recognized goals of these strange activities. The participants in these dance festivals intentionally induced a kind of mania in themselves, an extraordinary elevation of their spirits. A strange exhilaration came over them in which they appeared to themselves and others “frenzied,” “possessed.”24 This intense stimulation of their senses, reaching even hallucination,25 was created, in those who were vulnerable to it, by the wild swirling of the dance, the music, the darkness, and all the other aspects of this chaotic worship.26 This extreme level of excitement was the intended outcome. The heightened sensory experience had a spiritual purpose, as this expansion of their being was, it seemed, the only way for people to connect and relate to the god and his spiritual followers. The god is invisibly present among his inspired worshippers. In any case, he is nearby, and the noise of the festival aims to bring him fully into their midst.27 There are different legends about the god disappearing into another world and then returning to humanity.28 Every two years, his return is celebrated, and it is this Appearance, this “Epiphany” of the god that provides the reason and motivation for the festival. The Bull-God, in the earliest and most primitive form of the belief, appeared in person among the dancers,29 or the imitated roaring of a bull made by hidden “Mimes of Terror” suggested the invisible Presence.30 The worshippers, caught up in their intense joy and divine inspiration, reach out for the god; they seek to be close to him. They break through the physical limits of their souls. A magical force takes over; they feel themselves elevated far above their normal existence; they seem to become those spiritual beings who wildly dance in the god's entourage.31 What’s more, they share in the life of the god himself; that’s the only way to understand why the enthralled servants of the god call themselves by his name. The worshipper who, in his high state, has become one with the god, is now known as Sabos, Sabazios.32 The superhuman and the infra-human mix in his identity; like the frenzied god33 he throws himself upon the sacrificial animal to eat it raw. To make this transformation of their nature outwardly visible, the participants in the dance festival wear strange costumes: they look like the members of the wild thiasos of the god;34 the horns they wear on their heads remind of the horned, bull-shaped god, etc.35 The whole thing could be called a religious drama, as 259 everything is carefully arranged to spark the imagination into thinking that the mysterious figures from the spirit world are actually present. At the same time, it’s more than just drama, as it’s hard to doubt that the performers themselves were caught up in the illusion of living the life of a strange character. The awe-inspiring darkness of night, the music, especially the Phrygian flute's tunes, which the Greeks believed could make listeners “full of the god,”36 the dizzying whirl of the dance—all of these could very well, in the right state of mind,37 lead to a genuine state of visionary elevation in which the inspired individual sees all external objects through their imagination. Intoxicating drinks, which the Thracians were known for, may have heightened the excitement;38 they might have even used the fumes from certain seeds that the Scythians and Massagetai knew how to use for intoxication.39 We all know how even today in the East, the smoke of hashish can turn people into visionaries and stir religious ecstasies40 that transform all of nature for the captivated dreamer. “Only when possessed did the Bakchai drink milk and honey from the rivers; their power ceased when they returned to their senses,” says Plato.41 For them, the land flowed with milk and honey, and the air was filled with the sweet scents of Syria.42 Hallucination was accompanied by a state of feeling where pain itself was just another stimulus to sensation, or where the visionary became completely immune to pain, which is common in such elevated states.43

Every detail confirms the picture of a condition of wild excitement in which the limitations of ordinary life seemed to be abolished. These extraordinary phenomena transcending all normal experience were explained by saying that the soul of a person thus “possessed”44 was no longer “at home”45 but “abroad”, having left its body behind. This was the literal and primitive meaning understood by the Greek when he spoke of the “ekstasis” of the soul in such orgiastic conditions of excitement.46 This ekstasis is “a brief madness”, just as madness is a prolonged ekstasis.47 But the ekstasis, the temporary alienatio mentis of the Dionysiac cult was not thought of as a vain purposeless wandering in a region of pure delusion, but as a hieromania,48 a sacred madness in which the soul, leaving the body, winged its way to union with the god.49 It is now with and in the god, in the condition of enthousiasmos; those who are possessed by this are ἔνθεοι; they live and have their being in the god.50 While still retaining 260 the finite Ego, they feel and enjoy to the full the infinite powers of all life.

Every detail confirms a state of wild excitement where the limits of ordinary life seemed to disappear. These extraordinary experiences, which went beyond normality, were explained by saying that the soul of a person who was “possessed”44 was no longer “at home”45 but rather “abroad,” having left its body behind. This was the basic and primitive understanding of the Greek when they referred to the “ekstasis” of the soul in such intense states of excitement.46 This ekstasis is “a brief madness,” just as madness is a prolonged ekstasis.47 But the ekstasis, the temporary alienatio mentis of the Dionysiac cult, was not seen as a pointless wandering in a realm of pure illusion, but as a hieromania,48 a sacred madness where the soul, leaving the body, soared to unite with the god.49 It is now with and in the god, in a state of enthousiasmos; those who are possessed by this are divine; they live and exist within the god.50 While still maintaining 260 their finite self, they fully experience and enjoy the infinite powers of all life.

In ekstasis the soul is liberated from the cramping prison of the body; it communes with the god and develops powers of which, in the ordinary life of everyday, thwarted by the body, it knew nothing. Being now a spirit holding communion with spirits it is able to free itself from Time and see what only the spiritual eye beholds—things separated from it in time and space. The enthusiastic worship of the Thracian servants of Dionysos gave birth to the inspiration mantikê,51 a form of prophecy which did not (like prophecy as it invariably appears in Homer) have to wait for accidental, ambiguous and external signs of the god’s will, but on the contrary entered immediately into communion with the world of gods and spirits and in this heightened spiritual condition beheld and proclaimed the future. This power belonged to men only in ekstasis, in religious madness, when “the God enters into men”. The Mainads are the official exponents of this mantikê of inspiration.52 It is simple and intelligible enough that the Thracian cult of Dionysos, which was throughout a means of stimulating men to a condition of extreme exaltation that they might enter into direct communion with the spirit-world, also encouraged the prophesying of inspired seers, who in their rapt exaltation and frenzy became clairvoyant. Among the Thracian Satrai there was a tribe called the Bessoi who produced prophêtai, and these were in charge of an oracle of Dionysos situated on the top of a high mountain. The prophetess of this temple was a woman who gave prophecies like the Pythia at Delphi, that is to say, in a state of rapt ecstasy. This, at least, is what Herodotos says,53 and we have many other accounts of Thracian mantikê and its close connexion with the orgiastic cult of Dionysos.54

In ekstasis, the soul is freed from the constricting prison of the body; it connects with the divine and develops abilities that, in ordinary daily life, hindered by the body, it knew nothing about. Now a spirit communicating with spirits, it can detach itself from Time and perceive what only the spiritual eye can see—things separated from it in time and space. The passionate worship of the Thracian followers of Dionysos led to the inspiration mantikê,51 a form of prophecy that did not (like prophecy as it typically appears in Homer) have to rely on random, ambiguous, external signs of the god’s will. Instead, it immediately entered into communion with the world of gods and spirits, and in this heightened spiritual state, it envisioned and announced the future. This ability was accessible to people only in ekstasis, in religious ecstasy, when “the God enters into people.” The Mainads are the official representatives of this mantikê of inspiration.52 It’s clear enough that the Thracian cult of Dionysos, which was a means of elevating individuals to a state of extreme exaltation for direct communion with the spirit world, also fostered the predictions of inspired seers, who, in their ecstatic frenzy, became clairvoyant. Among the Thracian Satrai, there was a tribe called the Bessoi who produced prophêtai, and these were responsible for an oracle of Dionysos located on a high mountain. The prophetess of this temple was a woman who delivered prophecies like the Pythia at Delphi, that is to say, in a state of ecstatic rapture. This is what Herodotos claims,53 and we have many other accounts of Thracian mantikê and its close connection to the orgiastic cult of Dionysos.54

§ 3

The Greek type of religion, perhaps from its very origin, certainly at the earliest period of its development in which it becomes accessible to our observation—the period to which the Homeric poems belong—had no leaning to anything resembling an excited emotional worship like that practised by the Thracians in their orgiastic cult of Dionysos. The whole movement wherever it came to their notice must have struck the Greeks of Homer as something strange and barbaric, attractive only through the interest ever attached to the unknown. And yet—the fact is certain—the thrilling tones 261 of this “enthusiastic” worship awoke an answering chord deep in the hearts of many Greeks; in spite of all that was strange they must have recognized a familiar accent in it—something that, however outlandishly expressed, could appeal to the common nature of mankind.

The Greek type of religion, perhaps from its very beginnings, definitely during the earliest period of its development when it becomes observable—the time of the Homeric poems—did not show any inclination towards emotional worship like that practiced by the Thracians in their wild rituals for Dionysos. The whole movement, wherever it was noticed, must have seemed strange and barbaric to the Greeks of Homer, only intriguing because of the interest always tied to the unknown. Yet—the fact remains— the thrilling tones 261 of this “enthusiastic” worship resonated deeply within the hearts of many Greeks; despite its strangeness, they must have recognized a familiar note in it—something that, no matter how bizarrely expressed, could connect to the common nature of humanity.

This enthusiastic Thracian cult was in fact only a special expression, conforming to their peculiar national characteristics, of a religious impulse that is to be found all over the earth, and which breaks out in every stage of civilization. It must, indeed, answer to an instinctive need of human nature, and be rooted in the physical and psychical constitution of man. In moments of supreme exaltation man felt the presence above him and around him of mighty powers that seemed to express themselves even in his own personal life. These he was no longer to confront in pious and fearful awe, passively confined within the limits of his own separate personality: he was to break down every barrier and clasp them to his heart, making them his own in unconditional surrender. Mankind needed not to wait for that strange product of poetry and thought, Pantheism, before it could experience this instinctive need to lose its own private existence, for a moment, in the divine. There are whole races of men, not otherwise among the most distinguished members of the human family, who have a special tendency and gift for such expansion of the human consciousness into the supra-personal. They have an urgent impulse to such rapt and visionary states, and they regard the enticing or horrifying visions that visit them in those states as actual experiences of another world into which their “souls” have for a brief while been transported. In every part of the world there are peoples who regard such ecstatic exaltation as the only true religious act, the only way of intercourse with the spirit-world available to man, and base their religious performances principally upon such ceremonial as experience has shown to be most capable of inducing the ecstasies and visions. The means most commonly adopted by such peoples to produce the desired intensity and stimulation of feeling is a violently excited dance prolonged to the point of exhaustion, in the darkness of night, to the accompaniment of tumultuous music. Sometimes whole companies of the people induce in themselves a state of religious excitement by wild and furious dancing.55 More often selected individuals, specially susceptible to such impressions, suffer their “souls” to be drawn out by music and dancing and every other sort of stimulating influence, and made to visit the world of spirits and gods.56 Such “magicians” and priests who can place 262 themselves in immediate contact of soul with the spirit world, are to be found all over the globe. The shamans of Asia, the “medicine men” of North America, the Angekoks of Greenland, the Butios of the Antilles, the Piajes of the Caribbees are merely special cases of a universal type, essentially the same in all its different manifestations. Africa, Australia, and the island world of the Pacific are equally familiar with them. Both their performances and the range of ideas that lie behind them belong to a type of religious experience that occurs with the regularity of a natural phenomenon, and must therefore not be regarded as abnormal. Even among Christian peoples of long standing, the smouldering fires of this primitive and emotional type of religion are ever ready to burst out again in renewed flames, and those who feel their warmth are kindled to a more than human sense of life and vigour.57 Conventionality and traditionalism, even the substitution of a cold and spurious mimicry for real feeling, are of course quite compatible with a form of religion which consists so much in the display of emotion. But even so, the most cautious observers58 have declared that by such violent stimulation of every sense the “magicians” are thrown into a state of quite unfeigned exaltation. In accordance with the character and content of their normal modes of thought, the hallucinations to which the magicians are subject differ in different cases; but as a general rule their frenzy opens to them a way of immediate intercourse, frequently of complete communion of being, with the gods. This is the only explanation which will account for the fact that, like the inspired Bakchantes of Thrace, the magicians and priests of so many peoples are called by the name of the divinity to whom their “enthusiastic” worship elevates them.59 The impulse to union with God, the extinction of the individual in the divine—these are what form the fundamental points of contact between the mysticism of the most highly cultivated and talented people and the emotional religion of primitive “savages”. Even the external machinery of excitement and stimulation are not always dispensed with by the mystics:60 they are always the same as those with which we are already familiar in the orgiastic religion of primitive peoples—music, the giddy whirl of the dance, narcotic stimulants. Thus (to take the most striking example out of many that might be given) the dervishes of the Orient whirl round in their violent dances to the rattle of drums, and the sound of flutes till the last stages of excitement and exhaustion are reached. The purpose of it all is vividly expressed by the 263 most fearless of all the mystics, Jelaleddin Rumi, in the words: “He that knows the power of the dance dwells in God; for he has learnt that Love can slay.61 Allah hu! . . .”

This enthusiastic Thracian cult was really just a unique expression of their distinct national characteristics, reflecting a religious urge found all over the globe, emerging in every stage of civilization. It must address an instinctive need of human nature, rooted in both the physical and psychological makeup of people. In moments of intense emotion, individuals felt the presence of powerful forces around and above them that seemed to resonate with their own lives. They no longer stood in pious fear, confined to their individual identities; instead, they broke down barriers and embraced these forces wholeheartedly, surrendering completely. Humanity didn't need to await the unique product of poetry and philosophy, Pantheism, to feel this instinctive desire to temporarily lose their individual existence in the divine. Entire races, among the most distinguished in humanity, seem particularly inclined and gifted in expanding human consciousness beyond the individual. They feel an urgent drive towards ecstatic and visionary states, viewing the captivating or terrifying visions that come to them in those moments as genuine experiences of another world, where their “souls” have briefly traveled. Around the world, there are communities that see such ecstatic elevation as the true religious act, the only way for humans to connect with the spirit world, and they base their rituals primarily on the ceremonies proven to induce these ecstatic experiences and visions. The most common means for these people to achieve the necessary intensity and emotional stimulation is through fervent dancing pushed to the point of exhaustion, under the cover of night, accompanied by loud music. Sometimes entire groups induce religious excitement through wild and frenetic dancing. More often, selected individuals, especially sensitive to such influences, let their “souls” be drawn into the spirit world by music, dancing, and other stimulating experiences. Such “magicians” and priests who can establish a direct connection with the spirit realm are found across the planet. The shamans of Asia, the “medicine men” of North America, the Angekoks of Greenland, the Butios of the Antilles, and the Piajes of the Caribbean are just specific instances of a universal archetype that essentially shares the same characteristics in various forms. They exist similarly in Africa, Australia, and the Pacific island regions. Their rituals and the underlying ideas are part of a type of religious experience that recurs as reliably as a natural phenomenon, so they should not be considered abnormal. Even among long-standing Christian populations, the lingering nature of this primitive and emotional type of religion can easily ignite again, and those who feel its warmth are inspired to a more than human sense of energy and life. Conventionality and traditionalism, including the replacement of genuine emotion with cold imitation, can certainly coexist within a form of religion that emphasizes emotional expression. Yet, even the most cautious observers have noted that through such intense stimulation of their senses, the “magicians” enter a state of genuine exaltation. The visions experienced by these magicians vary according to their usual thought patterns, but generally, their frenzy leads them to immediate and often complete communion with the gods. This is the only explanation that accounts for why, similar to the inspired Bacchae of Thrace, the magicians and priests of many cultures bear the name of the deity to whom their “enthusiastic” worship elevates them. The drive to unite with God, the dissolution of the individual self into the divine—these are the fundamental connections between the mysticism of the most cultured and gifted people and the emotional religion of primitive “savages.” Even the external elements of excitement and stimulation are not always absent among the mystics: they frequently utilize the same methods familiar in the ecstatic religions of primitive peoples—music, the dizzying motion of dance, narcotic stimulants. For instance, the dervishes of the East spin around in frenzied dances to the sounds of drums and flutes until they reach profound excitement and exhaustion. The purpose of this is powerfully expressed by the boldest of all mystics, Jelaleddin Rumi, in the words: “He that knows the power of the dance dwells in God; for he has learnt that Love can slay. Allah hu! . . .”

§ 4

Wherever a cultus of this kind, making its aim and object the evocation of ecstatic raptures, has taken root—whether in whole races of men or in religious communities—there we find in close alliance with it, whether as cause or effect or both, a peculiarly vital belief in the life and power of the soul of man after its separation from the body. Our comparative glance over the analogous phenomena of other lands has shown us that the exalted worship offered to “Dionysos” among the Thracians was only a single variety of a method, familiar to more than half the human race, of getting into touch with the divine by a religious “enthousiasmos”. We therefore expect to find among the Thracians a specially strong and well-developed belief in the life of the “soul”. And in fact we find Herodotos telling us of a Thracian tribe, the Getai, whose belief “made men immortal”.62 They had only one god, Zalmoxis by name.63 To this god, who dwelt in a cavernous mountain, all the dead of their race, they believed, would one day be gathered and have immortal life.64 The same belief was held by other Thracian tribes, too.65 This creed seems to have had in view the “transplantation”66 of the dead to a blessed life in the hereafter. But, it would seem, this transplantation was not perhaps for ever. We hear of the belief that the dead would “return”67 from the other world; and that this idea existed among the Getai is implied (though the narrator does not clearly understand this) by the absurd pragmatizing fable which Herodotos got from the Greek settlers on the Hellespont and the Pontos.68 In this story (as often in later accounts too) Zalmoxis is actually a slave and pupil of Pythagoras of Samos. Whoever invented this fairy-tale was led to it by observing the close relationship between the Pythagorean doctrine of the soul and the Thracian belief. In the same way later observers of the same fact reversed the positions and made Pythagoras the pupil of the Thracian.69 In any case the fact cannot to be doubted that in Thrace people thought they had found again the special doctrine of Pythagoras as to the transmigration of souls. The belief in the “return” of the soul must be interpreted as meaning that the souls of the dead return to life in new bodies and resume their life on earth, to this extent being 264 “immortal”. Only so interpreted could it have been held for a moment without coming into conflict with obvious appearances. An allusion in Euripides seems to regard as Thracian such a belief in a recurrent incarnation of the soul.70

Wherever a cult like this, aimed at creating ecstatic experiences, has emerged—whether among entire races or in religious communities—we notice a strong belief in the existence and power of the human soul after it separates from the body, closely tied to this cult, either as a cause, an effect, or both. A look at similar phenomena in other regions has revealed that the intense worship of “Dionysos” among the Thracians was just one variation of a method, known to more than half of humanity, for connecting with the divine through religious “enthousiasmos.” Therefore, we expect to find among the Thracians a particularly strong and well-developed belief in the life of the “soul.” Indeed, Herodotos tells us about a Thracian tribe, the Getai, whose belief made men immortal. They worshipped only one god, named Zalmoxis. They believed that all their deceased would one day gather in a cavernous mountain where this god lived, and enjoy immortal life. The same belief was also shared by other Thracian tribes. This belief seems to have envisioned the “transplantation” of the dead to a blessed afterlife. However, it also appears that this transplantation might not be permanent. There are mentions of the belief that the dead would “return” from the other world. While the narrator doesn’t fully grasp this, it’s suggested that the Getai held this belief, which is implied in a far-fetched story that Herodotos heard from Greek settlers at the Hellespont and the Pontos. In this tale (as in many later accounts), Zalmoxis is described as a slave and student of Pythagoras from Samos. This fairy tale seems to have been inspired by the close connection between the Pythagorean view of the soul and the Thracian belief. Similarly, later observers reversed the roles, depicting Pythagoras as a student of the Thracian. Regardless, it is undeniable that in Thrace, people believed they had rediscovered Pythagoras' unique doctrine about the transmigration of souls. The belief in the “return” of the soul should be understood to mean that the souls of the dead return to life in new bodies and continue their existence on earth, to that extent being 264 “immortal.” Only with this interpretation could it have been maintained without clashing with obvious realities. An allusion in Euripides seems to suggest that such a belief in the soul's recurrent incarnation is Thracian.

We should be justified in expecting to find an inner connexion between this Thracian belief in immortality, which seems to have made such an impression on our Greek informants, and the religion and “enthousiastic” worship of the same people. Nor are traces lacking of a close association of the Thracian worship of Dionysos and Thracian cult of the Souls.71 But if we ask why the religion of the Thracian Dionysos was attended by a belief in the independent, indestructible life of the soul, a life not confined to the period of its sojourn in the body which at present envelopes it, the answer must be sought not in the nature of the god to whom the cult was offered (that nature being, in fact, insufficiently known to us) but in the nature of the cult itself. The object of that cult—we might almost say its special task—was to exalt its worshippers to a state of “ekstasis” in which their “souls” should be forcibly delivered from the normal circle of their human and circumscribed being, and raised as pure spirits to communion with the god and his company of spirits. The true “Bakchai”72—those who were really cast into a state of religious madness—found in the rapture of these orgies a new province of experience open before them: they experience things of which they could give no account in the fully conscious light of ordinary day. There can be no doubt that the experiences and visions that their “ekstasis” gave them were regarded by them as the plainest and most literally real of facts.73 The belief in the existence and life of a second self distinct from the body and separable from it was already encouraged by the “experiences” of the separate existence and independent behaviour of that self in dreams and fainting fits.74 How much more strongly and vividly must this belief have been confirmed for those who in the intoxication of those delirious dances had “experienced” for themselves how the soul, freed from the body, could participate in the joys and terrors of the divine existence; not indeed the whole man, body and soul together, but the soul by itself and in separation from the body—the spiritual being invisibly living within the man. The sense of its own divinity, its eternity, which had been blindingly revealed to it in “ekstasis”, might be developed by the soul into a lasting persuasion that it was indeed of a divine nature, and called to a divine life which it would enjoy for ever as soon as it was freed from the body, 265 just as it had then enjoyed it for a moment. No mere intellectual arguments could give such powerful support to a spiritualism of this kind as the personal experience itself which, even in this life supplied a foretaste of what the individual was one day to enjoy as his own for ever.

We have good reason to expect a connection between the Thracian belief in immortality, which clearly impacted our Greek sources, and the religion and passionate worship of the Thracians themselves. There are also clear signs of a close link between the Thracian worship of Dionysos and the Thracian cult of the Souls.71 However, if we ask why the religion of the Thracian Dionysos included a belief in the soul’s independent, indestructible life—one that transcends its time in the physical body—we must look not at the nature of the god being worshipped (which we actually know very little about) but at the nature of the cult itself. The goal of that cult—we might say its main purpose—was to elevate its followers to a state of “ekstasis” in which their “souls” could be forcibly released from the typical limitations of their human existence and raised as pure spirits to connect with the god and his entourage of spirits. The true “Bakchai”72—those genuinely engulfed in religious ecstasy—discovered a new realm of experience during the ecstasy of these rituals: they encountered things that they couldn’t explain in the clear light of everyday life. There’s no doubt that the experiences and visions arising from their “ekstasis” were seen by them as the most concrete and literal truths.73 The belief in a distinct second self that exists separately from the body was already supported by “experiences” where that self acted independently in dreams and fainting spells.74 How much more strongly and vividly must this belief have been reinforced for those who, in the thrill of those ecstatic dances, had “experienced” firsthand how the soul, freed from the body, could share in the joys and fears of divine existence; not the whole person, body and soul combined, but the soul alone, separate from the body—the spiritual essence living invisibly within the individual. The awareness of its own divinity, its eternal nature, which had been powerfully disclosed to it during “ekstasis,” could evolve into a lasting conviction that it was indeed of a divine essence and destined for a divine life that it would enjoy forever once freed from the body, 265 just as it had briefly experienced during that moment. No mere intellectual reasoning could provide such strong support for a spiritualism like this as the personal experience itself, which even in this life offered a glimpse of what the individual would one day possess as their own forever.

In some such way as this, the persuasion of an independent, continued existence of the soul after the death of its body was developed into a belief in the divinity and immortality of the soul. In all such cases it was almost inevitable that the naive distinction between “body” and “soul”, natural to simple-minded peoples and individuals, should harden into an opposition between the two. The descent from the heights where the ecstatic and emancipated soul enjoyed its thrilling delights was too sudden; the body could not but seem a burden and a hindrance, almost an enemy of the heaven-born soul. Disparagement of the ordinary existence of every day, a turning aside from this life—these are the natural results of such an advanced spiritualism, even though it may have no speculative basis, when it influences so profoundly the religious temperament of a people as yet untroubled by the subtleties of a scientific culture. A trace of such a depreciation of the earthly life of mankind in comparison with the joys of a free spirit-existence is to be found in what Herodotos and other narrators tell of certain Thracian tribes75 who receive the new-born among their kinsfolk with mourning, and bury their dead with joyful acclamation, for the latter are now beyond the reach of all pain, and are living “in perfect happiness”.76 The cheerfulness with which the Thracians faced death in battle77 was explained by the persuasion which they held that death was only an entrance into a higher life for the soul. They were even credited with a real desire for death, for to them “dying seemed so fair”.78

In a way like this, the idea of the soul continuing to exist independently after the body dies evolved into a belief in the divine and eternal nature of the soul. In these cases, it was almost unavoidable that the simple distinction between “body” and “soul,” common among straightforward people, would turn into a conflict between the two. The fall from the heights where the ecstatic and liberated soul experienced its exhilarating joys was too abrupt; the body could only appear as a burden and an obstacle, almost an enemy to the heavenly soul. Criticism of everyday life and a move away from this existence are natural outcomes of such advanced spiritualism, even if it lacks a theoretical foundation, when it deeply impacts the religious mindset of a people who are still undisturbed by the complexities of a scientific culture. A glimpse of this undervaluing of earthly life compared to the joys of a liberated spirit can be found in what Herodotus and other historians mention about certain Thracian tribes75 who greet newborns with mourning and bury their dead with joyful celebration, believing that the latter are now free from all suffering and living “in perfect happiness.”76 The optimism with which the Thracians confronted death in battle77 was attributed to their belief that death was merely a passage into a higher existence for the soul. They were even thought to genuinely desire death, as to them “dying seemed so beautiful.”78

§ 5

Further than this the Thracians—who never quite outgrew a sort of semi-animated torpor of the intellect—could not go on the way marked out for them. The seed of a mystical form of religion that existed in the ecstatic dance-orgies of Dionysos-worship never came to fruition. We never feel with them that we are being taken beyond the region of vague unconscious emotion; it is but a passing illumination that for a moment of wild excitement reveals the near presence of overwhelming spirit-forces.

Further than this, the Thracians—who never fully moved past a kind of dullness of the mind—could not progress along the path set for them. The potential for a mystical form of religion that was present in the ecstatic dance parties devoted to Dionysos never really developed. We never truly feel that we are being taken beyond a realm of unclear, unconscious emotions; it’s just a brief flash that, for a moment of intense excitement, shows the close presence of powerful spiritual forces.

Not until the flames of such ecstatic worship were fed and nourished by a people of more independent and developed spiritual life, could fitful suggestions be welded into deep and 266 enduring thought. Reflexion upon the nature of the world and of God, the changing and deceptive flow of appearance with the indestructible One Reality behind it; the conception of a divinity that is One, a single light that, divided into a thousand rays and reflected from everything that is, achieves its unity again in the soul of man; such thoughts as these, allied to the dim half-conscious impulse of an enthusiastic dance-worship, might allow the pure waters of the stream of mysticism to run clear at last, freed from the turbid and unsatisfying enthusiasm of popular religious practices.

Not until the flames of that ecstatic worship were fed and nurtured by a people with a more independent and developed spiritual life could intermittent ideas be transformed into profound and 266 lasting thoughts. Reflecting on the nature of the world and of God, the shifting and misleading flow of appearances contrasted with the unchangeable One Reality behind it; the idea of a divinity that is One, a single light that, split into a thousand rays and reflected from everything that exists, reunites in the soul of humanity; thoughts like these, combined with the faint, half-conscious urge of an enthusiastic dance-worship, might finally allow the pure waters of the stream of mysticism to run clear, liberated from the murky and unfulfilling enthusiasm of popular religious practices.

Thus, for example, among the stern and rigid-minded peoples of Islam, with their stiff, uncompromising Monotheism, there arose, no one knows whence, the inspired dance-orgies of the Dervishes, which then spread far and wide carrying with them the mystical doctrine of the Sûfis, that child of the profound mind of India. Man is God; God is All: such was the pronouncement of the inspired poetry—the special contribution in particular of Persia to this religion of mystic ecstasy—now in the most transparent simplicity, now in the most gorgeous magnificence of imagery. In the ecstatic dance, which in this case remained in organic connexion with the mystical doctrine (as the soil of the maternal earth with the flowers which she puts forth) new strength was ever being added to the spiritual superstructure. Mystical theory was invigorated by the practical experience, in heightened consciousness, of an internal and unquenchable source of undying power and might. The veil of the world was torn aside for the inspired worshipper; the All-One became sensible and intelligible for him; it poured into his own being; the “deification” of the Mystai was realized in him. “Who knows the power of the Dance dwells in God”. . .

Thus, for example, among the strict and uncompromising followers of Islam, with their rigid, unyielding Monotheism, there emerged, out of nowhere, the inspired dance parties of the Dervishes, which then spread widely, bringing with them the mystical teachings of the Sûfis, a product of India’s deep intellectual heritage. Man is God; God is Everything: this was the message of the inspired poetry—particularly Persia's notable contribution to this religion of mystic euphoria—now expressed in the clearest simplicity, now in the most stunning richness of imagery. In the ecstatic dance, which remained closely connected to the mystical teachings (like the nurturing earth with the flowers it produces), new strength was constantly added to the spiritual foundation. Mystical theories were energized by the practical experience of a heightened awareness of an eternal and unquenchable source of lasting power. The veil of the world was pulled back for the inspired worshipper; the All-One became tangible and understandable to him; it flowed into his very being; the “deification” of the Mystai was realized within him. “Who knows the power of the Dance dwells in God.”

Many years before all this, a process of development was completed on Greek soil which has no closer parallel than the special phase of Oriental religion just referred to. Greek religion never indeed (so long at least as the independence of Greek life lasted) went to the extravagant lengths of Oriental mysticism. Even the sense of the infinite had to be expressed by the Greek imagination in plastic form. But for all that, on Greek soil, in the ecstatic Cult of Dionysos, under the influence of Greek reflexion upon God, the world and mankind, the seeds which previously lay undeveloped in the womb of that cult were unfolded in a mystical doctrine, whose guiding principle was the divinity of the human soul and the infiniteness of its life in God. It was from this source that Greek philosophy found the courage to advance a doctrine of the immortality of the soul.

Many years before all this, a development took place on Greek land that has no closer parallel than the specific phase of Eastern religion just mentioned. Greek religion never really (at least as long as Greek life remained independent) reached the extreme levels of Eastern mysticism. Even the concept of the infinite had to be expressed by the Greek imagination in a tangible way. However, on Greek soil, in the ecstatic Cult of Dionysus, influenced by Greek reflections on God, the world, and humanity, the seeds that had previously been undeveloped within that cult were revealed in a mystical doctrine, centered on the divinity of the human soul and the infinite nature of its life in God. It was from this foundation that Greek philosophy found the courage to propose a doctrine of the immortality of the soul.

NOTES TO CHAPTER VIII

1 Pl., Phdr. 265 A.

1 Pl., PhD 265 A.

2 e.g. Cael. Aurel. (i.e. Soranos), Morb. Chr. i, § 144 ff.; Aret. Chron. Pass. i, 6, p. 84 Kühn [vol. 24].

2 e.g. Cael. Aurel. (i.e. Soranos), Morb. Chr. i, § 144 ff.; Aret. Chron. Pass. i, 6, p. 84 Kühn [vol. 24].

3 Even the late interpolated passages Ξ 325, ω 74, are not quite conclusive. Apart from these the statement of Sch. ι 198 applies strictly throughout both poems: τὸ μὴ παραδιδόναι Ὅμηρον Διόνυσον οἴνου εὑρετήν, Lehrs, Arist.3, p. 181.

3 Even the later added passages Ξ 325, ω 74, are not entirely conclusive. Besides these, the statement of Sch. ι 198 applies consistently throughout both poems: Not to hand over Homer, the discoverer of wine, to Dionysus., Lehrs, Arist.3, p. 181.

4 Ζ 132 ff. The scene is evidently meant to be a Bacchic festival. This is shown by the θύσθλα, which the Διωνύσοιο τιθῆναι let fall out of their hands. All the rest is obscure. Even in antiquity no one knew who the τιθῆναι of Dionysos really were, and hence alternative suggestions were all the more numerous: cf. Nauck, Fr. Trag.2, p. 17. Voigt, in Roscher’s Mythol. Lex. i, 1049. It can hardly be necessary (with Sch. A on Z 129) to deduce from the reference to τιθῆναι that Dionysos himself was regarded as νήπιος ἔτι καὶ παῖς. His former τιθῆναι follow him in the Bacchic festival even after he has grown up, exactly as in h. Hom. xxvi, 3, 7–10. αἱ Διονύσου τροφοί as the frenzied mob worshipping the god, τῷ θεῷ ὀργιάζουσαι (in Thessaly), come in D.S. 5, 50, 4, in a parallel narrative to the story of Lykourgos and the Mainads. With the conception of the god as λικνίτης neither his leap into the sea (Ζ 135 ff.), nor esp. the adj. μαινομένοιο (132) are in harmony. This last word does certainly give us pause. The accounts provided by later ages of the madness of Dionysos are obviously made up from the lines of Homer and are therefore of no use to us (already ap. Eumelos in the Εὐρωπία, Schol. AD. Ζ 131; then Pherekydes, Achaios ἐν Ἴριδι: Phld., Piet., p. 36 [Nauck, Fr. Trag.2, p. 751]; E., Cyc. 3. [Apollod.] iii, 5, 1, is prob. derived from Pherec. as are also Philistos fr. 57, FHG. i; Pl., Lg. 672 B; Nic. Ὀφιακ. fr. 30 Schn., etc.). Scholastic interpreters even thought of a hypallage: μαινομένοιο = μανιοποιοῦ, βακχείας παρασκευαστικοῦ, Schol. A, Ζ 132; cf. Sch. B, p. 182a, 43 f. Bk. And, indeed, there is certainly in this case a sort of mythological or sacramental hypallage: the state of mind brought about by the god in those who surround him is reflected back on to the god himself (μαινόμενοι Σάτυροι, E., Ba. 130; cf. the mad nurses of Dionysos, Nonn., D. ix, 38 ff.). It would not be hard to parallel this (e.g. Dionys. who makes men drunk is represented as himself drunk, Ath. 428 E, etc.).

4 Ζ 132 ff. The scene is clearly intended to represent a Bacchic festival. This is indicated by the θύσθλα, which the Να γιορτάσουμε τον Διόνυσο dropped from their hands. The rest remains unclear. Even in ancient times, no one knew exactly who the No modern equivalent. of Dionysos actually were, resulting in numerous alternative theories: see Nauck, Fr. Trag.2, p. 17. Voigt, in Roscher’s Mythol. Lex. i, 1049. It seems unnecessary (with Sch. A on Z 129) to conclude from the reference to τιθῆναι that Dionysos himself was seen as child and still immature. His former τιθῆναι continue to follow him during the Bacchic festival even after he has reached adulthood, just as in h. Hom. xxvi, 3, 7–10. The nurturers of Dionysus as the frenzied crowd worshipping the god, to the god partying (in Thessaly), appear in D.S. 5, 50, 4, in a related story about Lykourgos and the Mainads. With the conception of the god as λικνίτης, neither his leap into the sea (Ζ 135 ff.) nor especially the adjective μαινομένοιο (132) align well. This last term certainly gives us pause. The accounts from later periods about the madness of Dionysos are clearly derived from Homeric lines and are therefore not useful to us (already noted by Eumelos in the Europe, Schol. AD. Ζ 131; then Pherekydes, Achaios in Iris: Phld., Piet., p. 36 [Nauck, Fr. Trag.2, p. 751]; E., Cyc. 3. [Apollod.] iii, 5, 1, likely derives from Pherec. as do Philistos fr. 57, FHG. i; Pl., Lg. 672 B; Nic. Ὀφιακ. fr. 30 Schn., etc.). Scholarly interpreters even considered a hypallage: μαινομένοιο = madness, preparation for Bacchus, Schol. A, Ζ 132; cf. Sch. B, p. 182a, 43 f. Bk. And indeed, in this instance, there is certainly a kind of mythological or sacramental hypallage: the state of mind produced by the god in those around him is reflected back onto the god himself (Furious Satyrs, E., Ba. 130; cf. the mad nurses of Dionysos, Nonn., D. ix, 38 ff.). It would not be difficult to find parallels for this (e.g. Dionysos, who causes others to get drunk, is depicted as being drunk himself, Ath. 428 E, etc.).

5 Ξ 460, μεγάροιο διέσσυτο μαινάδι ἴση, παλλομένη κραδίην. The evidence of this passage for the familiarity of Homer’s audience with the nature of the Mainads cannot be set aside as Lob., Agl. 285, tries to do. The word could only be used as an εἰκών if the thing were often before men’s eyes. μαινάς, indeed, is even something different from, and more specialized than μαινομένη (Ζ 389).

5 Ξ 460, The Mainads were passionately chasing the maenad, their hearts racing.. The proof from this passage shows that Homer’s audience was well-acquainted with the nature of the Mainads, a fact that cannot be ignored, contrary to Lob., Agl. 285, who attempts to dismiss it. The term could only be used as an icon if it was frequently seen by people. μαινάς is, in fact, distinct from and more specific than furious (Ζ 389).

6 The view that μαίνεσθαι was primitive in the cult of D., the wine, etc., being added later, was definitely put forward in 1825 by O. Müller (Kl. Schr. ii, 26 ff.) arguing against J. H. Voss. But it is only in quite recent times that in tracing the origin of the religion of Dionysos occasional inquirers have taken this view as their starting point: cf. esp. Voigt in his noteworthy treatment of Dionysos in Roscher’s Myth. Lex. i, 1029 ff.

6 The belief that be enraged was fundamental in the worship of D., with the aspects of wine and other elements being added later, was clearly proposed in 1825 by O. Müller (Kl. Schr. ii, 26 ff.) in opposition to J. H. Voss. However, it’s only in recent years that some scholars tracing the origins of Dionysos's religion have begun to use this perspective as their foundation: see particularly Voigt in his significant analysis of Dionysos in Roscher’s Myth. Lex. i, 1029 ff.

7 ὃς μαίνεσθαι ἐνάγει ἀνθρώπους, Hdt. iv, 79. 268

7 Who drives men to madness, Hdt. iv, 79. 268

8 E.g. the Odrysai, who, however, lived further north in the Hebros valley; Mela, ii, 17, mentions distinctly the mountain chains of Haimos, Rhodope, and Orbelos as sacris Liberi patris et coetu Maenadum celebratos.

8 For example, the Odrysai, who lived further north in the Hebros valley; Mela, ii, 17, clearly mentions the mountain ranges of Haimos, Rhodope, and Orbelos as the sacred celebrations of the Liber Pater and the gathering of the Maenads.

9 Lob., Agl. 289 ff.

9 Lob., Agl. 289 ff.

10 Sabazios: Σαβάζιον τὸν Διόνυσον οἱ Θρᾷκες καλοῦσιν Sch. Ar., Ves. 9; cf. Sch. Ar., Lys. 388; D.S. 4, 4, 1; Harp. Σαβοί; Alex. Polyh. ap. Macr. i, 18, 11 (Sebadius: cf. Apul., M. viii, 25, p. 150, 11 Ey. The original form of this name seems to have been Savos, Savadios, Kretschmer, Einleitung in. d. Gesch. d. griech. Spr. 195 f.; Usener, Götternamen 44). Sabos, Phot. p. 495, 11–12 Pors. Hesych. s.v.; Orph., H. 49, 2, etc. The fact that others could call Sabazios a Phrygian god (Amphitheos π. Ἡρακλείος βʹ ap. Sch. Ar., Av. 874; Str. 470; Hsch. s.v.), only serves to bring out more clearly the opinion, unanimously held even in antiquity, that the Thracians and the Phrygians were closely related. Sabazios (besides being identified with Helios: Alex. Polyh. l.c.; cf. Soph. fr. 523 N.), as the supreme and almighty god of the Thracians, was even called Ζεὺς Σαβάζιος (Val. Max. i, 3, 2), esp. on inss. (a few are given in Rapp, Dionysoscult [Progr.] p. 21; cf. also ins. from Peiraeus Ἐφ. Ἀρχ. 1883, p. 245; Ins. Pergam. i, 248, 33, 49: from Pisidia, Papers of the Amer. School at Athens, ii, p. 54, 56. Jovi Sabazio, Orelli, Ins. 1259). We even find Ζεὺς Βάκχος, Ζεὺς Ἥλιος (BCH. vi, 189).—The name Σαβάζιος was derived from σαβάζειν = εὐάζειν, διὰ τὸν γενόμενον περὶ αὐτὸν εὐασμόν (θειασμόν): Sch. Ar., Av. 874; Lys. 388. So, too, Βάκχος was on this view only another way of expressing the same meaning; since this name also was derived by the ancients from βάζειν = εὐάζειν (it is really from the root ϝαχ (ἀχέω) Βάκχος, with “affrication”; a reduplicated form of it is ϝιϝαχος, Ἴακχος, ἰαχέω, ἰακχέω; cf. Curtius, Griech. Etym.5, p. 460, 576). Other names of the Thracian Dionysos are the following: Βασσαρεύς (Βάσσαρος, Orph., H. 45, 2), derived from βασσάρα the long dress (made of skin?) worn by the Βασσαρίδες = Θρᾴκιαι βάκχαι, AB. 222, 26 f.; Hsch. s.v. Βασσάραι and EM. s.v. (the last compiled from Orion and Sch. Lyc. 771). Other accounts (not contradicting in this point the statement of Hsch.) made it the dress worn by the god himself: Sch. Pers. i, 101. (The Βασσαρεύς was generally described as bearded and even senili specie, like the representation of Dionysos himself in the oldest Greek art: Macr. i, 18, 9.) If Βασσαρεύς means “the wearer of the long fox-skin” we should be strongly reminded of the—also Thracian—god Ζάλμολξις (Ζάλμοξις), whose name was derived from ζαλμός = δορὰ ἄρκτου (Porph., VP. 14, though this comes only from Antonius Diogenes 6), and probably means “he who is cloaked in the bearskin” (see Fick, Spracheinh. d. Indog. Europ., p. 418; Hehn, Culturpflanz. 428 E.T.).—Γίγων a name of Dionysos, EM. 231, 28: perhaps a name given to the god in the city Gigonos mentioned in the same passage, and the ἄκρα Γίγωνις at the western end of the Thracian Chalkidike.—EM. 186, 32, is too short to be intelligible: βαλιά· διαποίκιλος. καὶ τὸν Διόνυσον Θρᾷκες.—Δύαλος Διόνυσος παρὰ Παίοσιν, Hesych.

10 Sabazios: The Thracians call Dionysus Sabazios. Sch. Ar., Ves. 9; cf. Sch. Ar., Lys. 388; D.S. 4, 4, 1; Harp. Σαβοί; Alex. Polyh. ap. Macr. i, 18, 11 (Sebadius: cf. Apul., M. viii, 25, p. 150, 11 Ey. The original form of this name seems to have been Savos, Savadios, Kretschmer, Einleitung in. d. Gesch. d. griech. Spr. 195 f.; Usener, Götternamen 44). Sabos, Phot. p. 495, 11–12 Pors. Hesych. s.v.; Orph., H. 49, 2, etc. The fact that others could call Sabazios a Phrygian god (Amphitheos π. Heraclius II ap. Sch. Ar., Av. 874; Str. 470; Hsch. s.v.), only serves to bring out more clearly the opinion, unanimously held even in antiquity, that the Thracians and the Phrygians were closely related. Sabazios (besides being identified with Helios: Alex. Polyh. l.c.; cf. Soph. fr. 523 N.), as the supreme and almighty god of the Thracians, was even called Zeus Sabaoth (Val. Max. i, 3, 2), especially on inscriptions (a few are given in Rapp, Dionysoscult [Progr.] p. 21; cf. also ins. from Peiraeus Ἐφ. Ἀρχ. 1883, p. 245; Ins. Pergam. i, 248, 33, 49: from Pisidia, Papers of the Amer. School at Athens, ii, p. 54, 56. Jovi Sabazio, Orelli, Ins. 1259). We even find Zeus Bacchus, Zeus Helios (BCH. vi, 189).—The name Σαβάζιος was derived from σαβάζειν = To celebrate, due to the reverence shown towards him.(θειασμόν): Sch. Ar., Av. 874; Lys. 388. So, too, Bacchus was on this view only another way of expressing the same meaning; since this name also was derived by the ancients from βάζειν = εὐάζειν (it is really from the root ϝαχ(ἀχέω)Bacchus, with “affrication”; a reduplicated form of it is ϝιϝαχος, Ἴακχος, ἰαχέω, ἰακχέω; cf. Curtius, Griech. Etym.5, p. 460, 576). Other names of the Thracian Dionysos are the following: Βασσαρεύς(Bassaros, Orph., H. 45, 2), derived from bassa the long dress (made of skin?) worn by the Bassarids = Thracian Bacchae, AB. 222, 26 f.; Hsch. s.v. Βασσάραι and EM. s.v. (the last compiled from Orion and Sch. Lyc. 771). Other accounts (not contradicting in this point the statement of Hsch.) made it the dress worn by the god himself: Sch. Pers. i, 101. (The Βασσαρεύς was generally described as bearded and even senili specie, like the representation of Dionysos himself in the oldest Greek art: Macr. i, 18, 9.) If Βασσαρεύς means “the wearer of the long fox-skin” we should be strongly reminded of the—also Thracian—god Ζάλμολξις(Ζάλμοξις), whose name was derived from ζαλμός = bear skin (Porph., VP. 14, though this comes only from Antonius Diogenes 6), and probably means “he who is cloaked in the bearskin” (see Fick, Spracheinh. d. Indog. Europ., p. 418; Hehn, Culturpflanz. 428 E.T.).—Giant a name of Dionysos, EM. 231, 28: perhaps a name given to the god in the city Gigonos mentioned in the same passage, and the Giant's Peak at the western end of the Thracian Chalkidike.—EM. 186, 32, is too short to be intelligible: Balia; diverse. And the Dionysus Thracians. — Dual Dionysus among the Paeonians., Hesych.

11 At any rate the people whom Thuc., Ephoros, and others call Thracians and regarded as having been once settled in Phokis, Boeotia, etc., are undoubtedly to be considered Thracians—and not the impossibly honest and exemplary people, a creation of the fancy, the “Thracians of the Muses”, alleged to be quite distinct from the real Thracian peoples, of whom we have heard so much since K. O. 269 Müller (Orchom. 379 ff.) introduced the idea. Antiquity only knew of one kind of Thracian. In the Homeric poems they are not so different from the Greeks in civilization as they were in later times, when we know them from the accounts of Herod. and Xen. For all that they are the same people. They seem in the course of time to have degenerated, or rather they have not shared in the progress made by others and so have remained backward (even behind their Phrygian relatives who wandered to Asia Minor and achieved a higher culture under Semitic influence). In fact, like the Keltoi, they were never able to get beyond a condition of semi-civilization.

11 Anyway, the people that Thucydides, Ephorus, and others call Thracians and who are thought to have once settled in Phokis, Boeotia, etc., should definitely be considered Thracians—not the overly idealized and virtuous group, the "Thracians of the Muses," who are said to be completely different from the real Thracian peoples, about whom we've learned so much since K. O. Müller (Orchom. 379 ff.) introduced this concept. In ancient times, there was only one kind of Thracian. In the Homeric poems, they were not so different from the Greeks in their civilization as they were later, when we know them from the writings of Herodotus and Xenophon. Regardless, they are the same people. Over time, they seem to have declined, or rather, they didn't keep up with the progress made by others and thus remained backward (even compared to their Phrygian relatives who moved to Asia Minor and developed a higher culture under Semitic influence). In fact, like the Celts, they were never able to move beyond a state of semi-civilization.

12 μανίας ἐπαγωγὸν ὁμοκλάν. Aesch. in the Ἠδωνοί ap. Str. 470–1 (fr. 57), is the locus classicus for the music in the Thracian festival of Dionysos. Apart from this it is impossible to distinguish in the accounts given by our ancient authorities, between the strictly Thracian festival and the ideal generalized festival of Dionysos (not the mitigated ceremonial actually used in the festival in Greece). They merge completely into each other.

12 μανίας ἐπαγωγὸν ὁμοκλάν. Aesch. in the Ἠδωνοί ap. Str. 470–1 (fr. 57), is the classic reference for the music in the Thracian festival of Dionysos. Aside from this, it’s difficult to differentiate in the accounts provided by our ancient sources between the purely Thracian festival and the ideal generalized festival of Dionysos (not the toned-down ceremonies actually performed in the festival in Greece). They completely blend into one another.

13 σαβάζειν = εὐάζειν, Schol. Ar., Av. 874; Lys. 388.

13 saba-zein = euazein, Schol. Ar., Av. 874; Lys. 388.

14 αἱ Βάκχαι σιγῶσιν. Diogen., Prov. iii, 43.

14 The Bacchae are silent. Diogen., Prov. iii, 43.

15 Complete revolution round one’s own axis, as in the dance of a dervish, is known at least only in the more fanatic dance-festivals of antiquity: στροφὴν ὁλοσώματον ὥσπερ οἱ κάτοχοι δινεύοντες, Heliod. 4, 17, p. 116, 1 Bk. δίνησις τῶν θεοφορήτων in Phrygia: Horus ap. EM. 276, 32. Crusius, Philol. 55, 565, compares besides Verg., A. vii, 377 ff.; Alex. Aphr., Prob., p. 6 Us. In the Spartan dance διαμαλέας (?) Seilenoi and Satyrs appeared ὀρχούμενοι ὑπότροχα [περίτροχα acc. to Meineke: perhaps better]. Poll. 4, 104.

15 A complete spin around one's own axis, like the dance of a dervish, is known mainly from the more extreme dance festivals of ancient times: στροφὴν ὁλοσώματον ὥσπερ οἱ κάτοχοι δινεύοντες, Heliod. 4, 17, p. 116, 1 Bk. δίνησις of the divine bearers in Phrygia: Horus ap. EM. 276, 32. Crusius, Philol. 55, 565, also compares Verg., A. vii, 377 ff.; Alex. Aphr., Prob., p. 6 Us. In the Spartan dance διαμαλέας (?) Seilenoi and Satyrs appeared dancing in circles[περίτροχα acc. to Meineke: perhaps better]. Poll. 4, 104.

16 E., Ba. 116 ff., 664 ff. Thracian: assiduis Edonis fessa choreis qualis in herboso concidit Apidano, Prop. 1, 3, 5 f.

16 E., Ba. 116 ff., 664 ff. Thracian: The weary dancer of the Edonians falls like that on the grassy Apidanus., Prop. 1, 3, 5 f.

17 Bassaris: Thracian acc. to Sch. Pers. i, 101; worn by βάκχαι Hsch. βασσάραi. Lydian, too: ὅστις χιτῶνας βασσάρας τε Λυδίας ἐχει ποδήρεις, A. ἐν Ἠδωνοῖς, fr. 59; cf. Poll. 7, 59. “Perhaps a Phrygian word that has penetrated into Lydia,” Kretschmer, Einleitung, 390. The worship of Dionysos which had also presumably come from Phrygia, was esp. popular in Lydia.

17 Bassaris: Thracian according to Sch. Pers. i, 101; worn by Bacchae Hsch. βασσάραi. Also Lydian: Whoever wears the purple tunic and has the foot-length garments of Lydia., A. ἐν Ἠδωνοῖς, fr. 59; cf. Poll. 7, 59. “Perhaps a Phrygian word that has made its way into Lydia,” Kretschmer, Einleitung, 390. The worship of Dionysos, which likely also originated in Phrygia, was especially popular in Lydia.

18 Familiar in the Bacchic ceremonial of Greece; but occurring already in Thrace: Aesch. ἐν Ἠδωνοί (dealing entirely with Thracian customs) mentions the νεβρίδες, and in the same place has αἰγίδας as well (fr. 64).

18 Familiar in the Bacchic rituals of Greece, but already found in Thrace: Aesch. in Edone (entirely about Thracian customs) mentions the nebris, and in the same context has aegises as well (fr. 64).

19 The Βάκχαι of Macedonia and the Μιμαλλόνες, in all respects resembling the Thracian Bacchants, κερατοφοροῦσι κατὰ μίμησιν Διονύσου: Sch. Lyc. 1237 (Λαφυστίας κερασφόρους γυναῖκας).

19 The Bacchae of Macedonia and the Mimallones, in every way similar to the Thracian Bacchants, wear horns in homage to Dionysus: Sch. Lyc. 1237 (Laphystian horned women).

20 Mentis inops rapitur, quales audire solemus Threicias passis Maenadas ire comis, Ov., F. iv, 457 f.

20 The mind is overloaded, like the Thracian Maenads we often hear about, their hair flying as they move., Ov., F. iv, 457 f.

21 Thphr. Ch. 16 (28, p. 141 Jebb); Artemid. 2, 13, p. 106, 9 H.

21 Thphr. Ch. 16 (28, p. 141 Jebb); Artemid. 2, 13, p. 106, 9 H.

22 Snakes and daggers are found in the hands of the μιμαλλόνες καὶ βασσάραι καὶ λυδαί in the train of Ptol. Philad.: Kallixenos ap. Ath. 198 E. Snakes and θύρσοι belong to the paraphernalia of the ἔνοχοι τοῖς Ὀρφικοῖς καὶ τοῖς περὶ τὸν Διόνυσον ὀργιασμοῖς γυναῖκες in Macedonia, and of the Κλώδωνες καὶ Μιμαλλόνες who πολλὰ τοῖς Ἠδωνίσι καὶ ταῖς περὶ τὸν Αἷμον Θρῄσσαις ὅμοια δρῶσιν, Plu., Alex. 2 (in connexion with the snake of Olympias. She was especially given to the Thrako-Dionysian mysteries: cf. the letter of Olympias to Alexander, Ath. 659 F).—θύρσοι of the Macedonian Μιμαλλόνες: Polyaen. 4, 1; Sch. Pers. 1, 99.—“Even now” the thyrsos wands are decked with ivy in the Thraciae populis sollemnibus sacris, Plin., 270 NH. xvi, 144.—The νάρθηξ of the thyrsos is really a shepherd’s staff: Clem. Al., Protr. ii, p. 14 P.

22 Snakes and daggers are associated with the μιμαλλόνες και βασσάραι και λυδαί following Ptolemy Philadelphus, as noted by Kallixenos in Ath. 198 E. Snakes and θύρσοι are part of the equipment used by the Women involved in the Orphic rituals and those related to the Dionysian festivities. in Macedonia, and by the Klodones and Mimallones who Many things similar to what the Edonians and the Thracians around Haemon do., Plutarch, Alex. 2 (in connection with the snake of Olympias. She was particularly involved in the Thrako-Dionysian mysteries: see Olympias's letter to Alexander, Ath. 659 F).—The θύρσοι of the Macedonian Μιμαλλόνες: Polyaenus 4, 1; Sch. Pers. 1, 99.—“Even now,” the thyrsos wands are decorated with ivy in the Thraciae populis sollemnibus sacris, Pliny, 270 NH. xvi, 144.—The νάρθηξ of the thyrsos is essentially a shepherd’s staff: Clement of Alexandria, Protr. ii, p. 14 P.

23 Eur., Ba. 735 ff. and frequently.

23 Eur., Ba. 735 ff. and often.

24 κατοχαὶ καὶ ἐνθουσιασμοί in the Thrako-Macedonian worship of Dionysos: Plu., Alex. 2. (The Mimallones imitantur furorem Liberi, Sch., Pers. i, 99.) οἱ τῷ Σαβαζίῳ κάτοχοι: Porph. ap. Iamb. de Myst. 3, 9, p. 117, 16. βάκχος· ὁ μανιώδης, Eust. δ 249; β 16. Κλώδωνες is the name given to the μαινάδες καὶ βάκχαι ἀπὸ τοῦ κατόχους γινομένας κλώζειν, EM. 521, 50. οἱ κάτοχοι τοῖς περὶ τὸν Διόνυσον ὀργιασμοῖς, Plu., Is. et Os. 35, p. 364 F.

24 Ecstasies and Enthusiasms in the Thraco-Macedonian worship of Dionysus: Plu., Alex. 2. (The Mimallones imitate the frenzy of Liber, Sch., Pers. i, 99.) The followers of Sabazius: Porph. ap. Iamb. de Myst. 3, 9, p. 117, 16. Bacchus, the crazy one, Eust. d 249; b 16. Klôdônes is the name given to the Maenads and Bacchae who go into a frenzy from possession, EM. 521, 50. The followers in the Dionysian celebrations, Plu., Is. et Os. 35, p. 364 F.

25 οἱ βακχευόμενοι καὶ κορυβαντιῶντες ἐνθουσιάζουσι μέχρις ἂν τὸ ποθούμενον ἴδωσιν, Philo, Vit. Cont. 2, ii, p. 473 M.

25 Those who are celebrating and dancing joyfully are filled with excitement until they see what they've been hoping for., Philo, Vit. Cont. 2, ii, p. 473 M.

26 So too the wild shaking and whirling-round of the head, which acc. to innumerable literary and pictorial descriptions was a regular feature of the Bacchic dance and cult, must have contributed—and was so intended—to bring about the condition of ecstasy and frenzy (ῥιψαύχενι σὺν κλόνῳ, Pi., fr. 208; κρᾶτα σεῖσαι, E., Ba. 185, etc.).—How such fanatic shaking of the head, if kept up for along time, is by itself sufficient, in persons naturally predisposed to it, to bring on complete religious ἔκστασις, may be learnt from a remarkable account in Moreau du hachisch, p. 290 ff., derived from personal observation in the East.

26 Similarly, the wild shaking and spinning of the head, which according to countless literary and artistic descriptions was a defining element of the Bacchic dance and ritual, must have contributed—and was intended to—create a state of ecstasy and frenzy (Daring with a twist, Pi., fr. 208; κράτα σφιχτά, E., Ba. 185, etc.).—How such intense shaking of the head, if continued for a long time, can by itself be enough, in individuals naturally inclined to it, to induce complete religious ecstasy, can be learned from a remarkable account in Moreau du hachisch, p. 290 ff., based on personal observation in the East.

27 The object of the trieteric festival of Dionysos (repeated every second year) held in so many places in Greece (cf. Weniger, Dionysosdienst in Elis, Progr. 1883, p. 8) was to celebrate the presence of the god. This is clearly shown by D.S. 4, 3, 2, who also attributes the trieteric festival to the Thracians: τοὺς Βοιωτοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους Ἕλληνας καὶ Θρᾷκας . . . καταδεῖξαι τὰς τριετηρίδας θυσίας Διονύσῳ καὶ τὸν θεὸν νομίζειν κατὰ τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον ποιεῖσθαι τὰς παρὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐπιφανείας. At this time women and maidens celebrated τὴν παρουσίαν τοῦ Διονύσου. (In the archaic song of the Elean women the Bull-god is thus called upon: Plu., QG. 36, 299 A; Is. et Os. 35, p. 364 F; whereupon the Eleans believed that τὸν θεόν σφισιν ἐπιφοιτᾶν ἐς τῶν Θυίων τὴν ἑορτήν: Paus. 6, 26, 1.)—For Bakchos amongst the dancers see E., Ba. 185 ff., 306 f., and often. At the trieteric festival at Delphi Διόνυσος . . . Παρνασὸν κατὰ πηδᾷ χορεύει παρθένοις σὺν Δελφίσιν, E., Hypsip. fr. 752. And so often in poetry: see Nauck on S., OT. 213; Ant. 1126 ff.—Thracian trieteric festival: tuo motae proles Semeleia thyrso Ismariae celebrant repetita triennia bacchae, Ov., M. ix, 641 f.; tempus erat, quo sacra solent trieterica Baccho Sithoniae celebrare nurus; nox conscia sacris, etc., vi, 587.

27 The purpose of the trieteric festival of Dionysos (held every two years) celebrated in various locations across Greece (cf. Weniger, Dionysosdienst in Elis, Progr. 1883, p. 8) was to honor the presence of the god. This is clearly stated by D.S. 4, 3, 2, who also links the trieteric festival to the Thracians: The Boiotians, along with the other Greeks and Thracians . . . showcased the triennial sacrifices to Dionysos and believed that the god appeared during this period, as observed in the practices of the people epiphanei/as. During this period, women and maidens celebrated the presence of Dionysus. (In the ancient song of the Elean women, the Bull-god is thus invoked: Plu., QG. 36, 299 A; Is. et Os. 35, p. 364 F; as a result, the Eleans believed that the god would come to them during the Thuiôn festival: Paus. 6, 26, 1.)—For Bakchos among the dancers, see E., Ba. 185 ff., 306 f., and often. At the trieteric festival at Delphi, Dionysus... dances on Parnassus with the Delphic maidens., E., Hypsip. fr. 752. And this appears frequently in poetry: see Nauck on S., OT. 213; Ant. 1126 ff.—Thracian trieteric festival: The offspring of Semele celebrate every three years the Ismarian Bacchae with a thyrsus., Ov., M. ix, 641 f.; It was the time when the brides of Bacchus usually celebrate the triennial rites in Sithonia; the night is aware of the rituals., etc., vi, 587.

28 ἀφανισμός followed by ἐπιφάνεια of Dionysos represent, as we frequently learn, the varying relationship of the god with mankind. These are alternating and periodically repeated, and they are reflected in the trieteric period of the festivals. It is customary to explain this disappearance and return of the god as an allegorical typification of the destruction and restoration of vegetation. There is no reason at all to believe this, except for those who regard the doctrines of the Greek “Religion of Nature” as infallible axioms. The god is simply, and in the literal sense of the words, regarded as removed for a time from the world of men, during which period he is in the world of spirits. In the same way Apollo, according to the Delphic legend, is carried away from the human world for certain periods: he lives during that time among the Hyperboreans, whose land is inaccessible to mortal foot or ship. We ought not to be afraid to make use of the light thrown on these matters by parallel legends of the temporary disappearance 271 of gods among uncivilized peoples (the god may be sometimes asleep or under constraint; cf. Plu., Is. et Os., 69 fin. 378 F); cf. what we are told in Dobrizhoffer’s Gesch. d. Abip. ii, p. 63 (E.T.), about the beliefs held by the Abipones of Paraguay; or, again, what is said of the negro races of West Africa, according to whom the god normally lives in the depths of the earth, but at regularly recurring intervals comes up to visit men; whereupon the members of a mystical society build him a house, receive his oracles, etc.; Réville, Rel. des peuples non-civil. i, 110–11. Thus Dionysos, too, is for a time in the underworld, in the world of spirits and the souls. This is clearly presupposed by the festival at Lerna, in which Dionysos is called up out of the bottomless spring Alkyonia by which there was an entrance to Hades (just as the inhabitants of Kos every year ἀνακαλοῦνται Hylas out of his spring, i.e. from the underworld: H. Türk, De Hyla, p. 3 f.; Welcker, Kl. Schr. i, 12; and see Maass, Litt. Ztg. 1896, 7–8). Hence also in Lerna a lamb was offered as a victim τῷ πυλαόχῳ, i.e. to Hades himself, and was thrown into the spring (Plu., Is. et Os. 35, p. 368 F, quoting Sokrates περὶ τῶν Ὁσίων; Smp. 4, 6, 2, p. 671 E; Paus. 2, 36, 7; 37, 5–6). Because he is in the realm of the dead a pragmatical myth represented him as slain by Perseus and thrown into the spring of Lerna: Lob., Agl. 574. In Delphi, too, something was known of the death and reawakening of Dionysos, but we have in Orph., H. 53, a quite unambiguous expression of the real conception, acc. to which D. “rested in the house of Persephone”, and appears again in the upper world at the time of the trieteric festival when he ἐγείρει his κῶμον, εὐάζων κινῶν τε χορούς. We may be all the more certain that the same idea is to be attributed to the trieteric festival in Thrace, since the same belief exactly occurs again in the legend of the Thracian (Getic) god Zalmoxis (see below)—he was believed to have disappeared into his infernal kingdom among the spirits and souls and to have made periodical returns to the world of the living. The reason why Dionysos, as worshipped both in Thracian and Greek trieteric festivals, stops for a time in the underworld of the souls, is clear enough: that too was his realm. We can now understand why it is that Dionysos is also ruler over the souls and can be called Ζαγρεὺς, Νυκτέλιος, Ἰσοδαίτης: i.e. he is simply given names of Hades himself (Plu., E ap. D. ix, p. 389 A). His real character of master of the souls and spirits (ἄναξ, ἥρως), as it had been originally in the Thracian cult, was thus preserved, in spite of much alteration in its Greek form, partly in Greek local cults, partly in the Orphic cult of Dionysos.—There is a legend which is based on a reminiscence of this periodic disappearance of Dionysos to the underworld, viz. the thoroughly Greek story of his descent on a single occasion into Hades in order to bring back Semele. Elsewhere his disappearance into the realm of the spirits gave rise to the legend of his escape and flight to the Muses; this was spoken of in the Agrionia at Chaironeia (Plu., Smp. 8 Praef.).

28 Disappearance followed by manifestation of Dionysos represent, as we often learn, the changing relationship of the god with humanity. These experiences alternate and occur at regular intervals, reflected in the three-year cycle of the festivals. It’s common to explain this disappearance and return of the god as an allegorical representation of the destruction and rebirth of nature. There is no reason to believe this, except for those who consider the tenets of the Greek “Religion of Nature” to be absolute truths. The god is simply seen, in the most literal sense, as being absent for some time from the human world, during which he exists in the spirit world. Similarly, Apollo, according to the Delphic legend, is taken from the human realm for certain periods; he spends that time among the Hyperboreans, whose land is unreachable by human feet or ships. We shouldn’t hesitate to use insights from parallel legends of gods temporarily disappearing among non-civilized peoples (the god may sometimes be asleep or constrained; see Plu., Is. et Os., 69 fin. 378 F); compare what Dobrizhoffer mentions in Gesch. d. Abip. ii, p. 63 (E.T.) about the beliefs of the Abipones in Paraguay; or what is stated about the black communities in West Africa, who believe that the god typically resides deep in the earth but periodically comes up to visit humanity. When this happens, members of a mystical society build him a house, receive his prophecies, etc.; see Réville, Rel. des peuples non-civil. i, 110–11. Thus, Dionysos is also temporarily in the underworld, in the realm of spirits and souls. This is clearly suggested by the festival at Lerna, in which Dionysos is summoned from the bottomless spring Alkyonia, which serves as an entrance to Hades (just as the inhabitants of Kos annually They are being called back. Hylas from his spring, i.e., from the underworld: H. Türk, De Hyla, p. 3 f.; Welcker, Kl. Schr. i, 12; and see Maass, Litt. Ztg. 1896, 7–8). Therefore, at Lerna, a lamb was sacrificed to to the gatekeeper, i.e., to Hades himself, and was tossed into the spring (Plu., Is. et Os. 35, p. 368 F, quoting Socrates About the Saints; Smp. 4, 6, 2, p. 671 E; Paus. 2, 36, 7; 37, 5–6). Because he exists in the realm of the dead, a practical myth depicted him as killed by Perseus and thrown into the Lerna spring: Lob., Agl. 574. In Delphi, there were also accounts of Dionysos' death and resurrection, but we have in Orph., H. 53, a very clear expression of the understanding that Dionysos “rested in the house of Persephone” and reappears in the upper world during the three-year festival when he Rise his κῶμος, εὐάζων χορούς κινώ. We can be even more certain that the same concept applies to the three-year festival in Thrace, since this same belief is mirrored in the legend of the Thracian (Getic) god Zalmoxis (see below)—he was thought to have vanished into his underworld kingdom among the spirits and souls and to periodically return to the living world. The reason Dionysos, as worshipped in both Thracian and Greek three-year festivals, stays for a time in the underworld of souls is clear: that was also his domain. Now we can understand why Dionysos is also the ruler over souls and can be referred to as Zagreus, Nyctelius, Isodaitis: he simply shares names with Hades himself (Plu., E ap. D. ix, p. 389 A). His true role as master of souls and spirits (king, hero), which was originally part of the Thracian cult, was thus kept, despite considerable transformation in its Greek interpretation, partly in Greek local cults, and partly in the Orphic cult of Dionysos.—There is a legend rooted in a memory of this periodic disappearance of Dionysos into the underworld, namely the entirely Greek tale of his singular descent into Hades to retrieve Semele. In other instances, his disappearance into the spirit realm led to the tale of his escape and flight to the Muses; this was recounted in the Agrionia at Chaironeia (Plu., Smp. 8 Praef.).

29 Cf. Eur., Ba. 920 ff., 1020 f.

29 See Eur., Ba. 920 ff., 1020 f.

30 ταυρόφθογγοι δ’ ὑπομυκῶνταί ποθεν ἐξ ἀφανοῦς φοβεροὶ μῖμοι: A. Ἠδωνοί describing the Thracian worship of D. (fr. 57). This was “certainly intended to increase for the participants in the festival the feeling of the god’s presence and thus to add to the wildness of their orgies”, as Rapp, Dionysosc., 19, very rightly observes. The invisible bellowing bull is the god himself. (Dionysos appears as a bull to the insane Pentheus: E., Ba. 920 ff.).—“The Batloka, a tribe in the Northern Transvaal, hold a yearly festival of the dead in which 272 hidden magicians make weird sounds with flutes which the people take for the voice of spirits; they say ‘Modimo is there’.” Schneider, Relig. d. Afrikan. Naturv. 143.

30 The bull's eerie call resonates from the hidden, frightening imitations.: A. The Edonians describing the Thracian worship of D. (fr. 57). This was “certainly intended to enhance the sense of the god’s presence for those participating in the festival, thus amplifying the intensity of their orgies,” as Rapp, Dionysosc., 19, wisely notes. The unseen bellowing bull is the god himself. (Dionysos appears as a bull to the deranged Pentheus: E., Ba. 920 ff.).—“The Batloka, a tribe in the Northern Transvaal, holds an annual festival for the dead where 272 concealed magicians produce strange sounds with flutes that the people interpret as the voices of spirits; they say, ‘Modimo is there’.” Schneider, Relig. d. Afrikan. Naturv. 143.

31 The women taking part in the trieteric festival of the god play the part of the μαινάδες in his train; D.S. 4, 3, 3. Imitation of the Νύμφαι τε καὶ Πᾶνες καὶ Σειληνοὶ καὶ Σάτυροι in the βακχεία: Pl., Lg. 815 C. What was afterwards merely a piece of traditional ritual was originally without doubt a real hallucination of the κάτοχοι.—The idea that a throng, θίασος, of wood-spirits Satyrs and Seilenoi danced about the God must also have been common in the Thracian cult (συγχορευεταὶ Διονύσου, Ael., VH. iii, 40; ὁ τῷ Διονύσῳ παρεπόμενος ὄχλος, Ath. 362 E). σαυάδαι (obviously related to Σαβάζιος; cf. Usener, Götternamen, 44 f.) was the name given to οἱ σειληνοί by the Macedonians, who in the practice of Dionysos-worship were entirely dependent upon the Thracians. Hsch. s.v., cf. Hdt. viii, 138 fin.

31 The women participating in the trieteric festival of the god act as the maenads in his entourage; D.S. 4, 3, 3. They imitate the Nymphs, Pans, Sileni, and Satyrs in the βακχεία: Pl., Lg. 815 C. What later became just a traditional ritual was originally undoubtedly a genuine hallucination of the holders.—The notion that a crowd, θίασος, of wood-spirits, Satyrs, and Seilenoi danced around the God must have also been common in the Thracian worship (followers of Dionysus, Ael., VH. iii, 40; the crowd following Dionysus, Ath. 362 E). σαυάδαι (clearly linked to Savage; cf. Usener, Götternamen, 44 f.) was the term used for the sileni by the Macedonians, who relied on the Thracians in their practice of Dionysos worship. Hsch. s.v., cf. Hdt. viii, 138 fin.

32 The βακχεύοντες τῷ θεῷ (i.e. Sabazios, Sabos) are called σάβοι καὶ σάβαι καὶ σαβάζιοι: Phot. σαβούς; cf. Eust., β 16, p. 1431, 46. Harp. (Phot.) s. σάβοι; Phot. παρασαβάζειν (p. 383, 16 Pors.); Sch. Ar., Av. 874. This identification of the god with his ecstatic worshippers belongs to the Phrygian cult of Kybele as well. Just as the goddess is called Κυβήβη so ὁ κατεχόμενος τῇ μητρὶ τῶν θεῶν is called Κύβηβος: Phot. Κύβηβος, κύβηβον, Eust. β 16. Thus the Greeks in calling the ecstatic worshippers of Bakchos by the name of the god were only adopting the conceptions and vocabulary of the Thracian religion of inspiration into their Dionysos-worship which was modelled on the Thracian cult. Βάκχος is their name for the ὀργιαστὴς τοῦ θεοῦ (etymologically connected is βαβάκτης [κραύγασος, ὅθεν καὶ Βάκχος Hsch.] a Phrygian word for the frenzied priest of Kybele: and therefore = Κύβηβος; cf. Ribbeck, Alazon, p. 86). It appears that the βάκχοι of Dionysos were often called by the old Thracian name σάβοι: σάβους καὶ νῦν ἔτι πολλοὶ τοὺς βάκχους καλοῦσιν, Plu., Smp. 4, 6, 2, p. 671 F (Λαφύστιοι is also a name given, after Διόνυσος Λαφύστιος, to the Βάκχοι who worship him: Lyc. 1237 with Sch.).

32 The bacchanal with the god (i.e. Sabazios, Sabos) are referred to as sappers and sapper units: Phot. sabbath; cf. Eust., β 16, p. 1431, 46. Harp. (Phot.) s. sabbath; Phot. παρασαβάζειν (p. 383, 16 Pors.); Sch. Ar., Av. 874. This association of the god with his ecstatic worshippers is also part of the Phrygian cult of Kybele. Just as the goddess is called Κυβήβη, the one who is filled with the spirit of the mother of the gods is called the one held by the Mother of the Gods, known as Κύβος: Phot. Κύβος, κύβον, Eust. β 16. Therefore, when Greeks referred to the ecstatic worshippers of Bakchos by the name of the god, they were simply adopting ideas and language from the Thracian religion of inspiration into their worship of Dionysos, which was modeled after the Thracian cult. Dionysus is their term for the god's worshipper (etymologically related is βαβάκτης [κραύγασος, ὅθεν καὶ Βάκχος Hsch.] a Phrygian word for a frenzied priest of Kybele: and therefore = Cubes; cf. Ribbeck, Alazon, p. 86). It seems that the Bacchants of Dionysos were often called by the old Thracian name σάβοι: Even now, many still call them the Bacchae., Plu., Smp. 4, 6, 2, p. 671 F (Λαφύστιοι is also a name given, after Dionysus the Laphystian, to the Bacchae who worship him: Lyc. 1237 with Sch.).

33 Διόνυσος ὠμάδιος (Porph., Abs. ii, 55), ὠμηστής (Plu., Them. 13), λαφύστιος, ταυροφάγος (Soph. fr. 607 N.).—At other times we catch a glimpse of the idea that the god himself is the torn and devoured bull (just as in many ancient worships the proper victim of the god is the animal most homogeneous with him): this is evidently the most primitive form of ἐν-θουσιασμός, the primeval symbolism of a mystic worship that, like all mysticism, desires to take personal possession of the God.

33 Dionysus Omadios (Porph., Abs. ii, 55), Omaistēs (Plu., Them. 13), Laphystios, Bull-Eater (Soph. fr. 607 N.).—At other times, we catch a glimpse of the idea that the god himself is the torn and consumed bull (just as in many ancient religions the suitable offering for the god is the animal most similar to him): this is clearly the most basic form of enthusiasm, the ancient symbolism of a mystical worship that, like all mysticism, seeks to personally embrace the God.

34 Dionysos himself also carries the thyrsos (as often in sculpture): E., Hyps. fr. 752, etc.

34 Dionysus himself also carries the thyrsus (as frequently depicted in sculptures): E., Hyps. fr. 752, etc.

35 See above, n. 19 (ὁ βούκερως Ἴακχος, Soph., fr. 874, ταυρόκερως θεός, E., Ba. 100). The Greek Dionysos is often described as bull-shaped and horned: this, too, in imitation of Thracian belief. It is Sabazios whom they κεραστίαν παρεισάγουσι, D.S. 4, 4, 2; cf. 3, 64, 2. Ὕῃ ταυροκέρωτι, Euphor. fr. 14.—An allusion in D.S. 4, 4, 2, seems to suggest that the god, the μυριόμορφος, was also (like Attis) regarded as a herdsman. Something of the sort may be referred to in the unintelligible lines quoted by Cl. Al., Prot. ii, p. 14 P., apparently in connexion with the Sabazios mysteries. So Dionysos, too, is sometimes thought of as a βουκόλος: ποιμένι δ’ ἀγραύλων ταύρων, Διὸς αἰγιόχοιο υἱέι κισσοχίτωνι are words used of him in [Orph.] Lith. 260. Again, in imitation of the god himself his μύσται are βουκόλοι on the inscriptions from Asia Minor (Ins. Perg. ii, 485–8) and Thrace, of 273 which R. Schöll speaks, de commun. et coll. Graecis (Satura philol. Saupp.), p. 178 ff. βουκολικός occurs among the cult officials in the Iobakcheia at Athens: Ath. Mitth., 1894, p. 260, l. 122; archibucolus dei Liberi on inscriptions of the city of Rome. βουκόλος and βουκολεῖν occur in connexion with Bacchic worship as early as Kratinos, Aristoph., and Eurip.: νυκτιπόλου Ζαγρέως βούτας, E., Cret. fr. 472, 11 (acc. to Diels). See Crusius, Rh. M. 45, 266 f.; Dieterich de hymnis Orph. (Marb. 1891), p. 3 ff.

35 See above, n. 19 (the oxherd Iacchos, Soph., fr. 874, Capricorn god, E., Ba. 100). The Greek Dionysos is often depicted as bull-shaped and horned, following Thracian beliefs. It is Sabazios whom they They introduce a scandal., D.S. 4, 4, 2; cf. 3, 64, 2. Ὕῃ ταυροκέρωτι, Euphor. fr. 14.—An allusion in D.S. 4, 4, 2 suggests that the god, the myriad forms, was also (like Attis) seen as a herdsman. Something similar may be referenced in the unclear lines quoted by Cl. Al., Prot. ii, p. 14 P., apparently in connection with the Sabazios mysteries. So Dionysos is sometimes thought of as a herdsman: Shepherd of the wild bulls, son of Zeus who wields the aegis, in a cloak of ivy. are words used about him in [Orph.] Lith. 260. Additionally, following the god's example, his initiates are βουκόλοι on inscriptions from Asia Minor (Ins. Perg. ii, 485–8), of which R. Schöll speaks in de commun. et coll. Graecis (Satura philol. Saupp.), p. 178 ff. pastoral appears among the cult officials in the Iobakcheia at Athens: Ath. Mitth., 1894, p. 260, l. 122; archbuculus dei Liberi on inscriptions from the city of Rome. herdsman and βουκολεῖν are connected with Bacchic worship as early as Kratinos, Aristoph., and Eurip.: night-dweller of Zagreus, E., Cret. fr. 472, 11 (according to Diels). See Crusius, Rh. M. 45, 266 f.; Dieterich de hymnis Orph. (Marb. 1891), p. 3 ff.

36 The special flute-melodies going under the name of Olympos were called θεῖα ([Pl.] Min. 318 B); κατέχεσθαι ποιεῖ (Pl., Smp. 215 C); ὁμολογουμένως ποιεῖ τὰς ψυχὰς ἐνθουσιαστικάς (Arist., Pol. 1340a 10). Cic., Div. i, 114: ergo et ei quorum animi, spretis corporibus, evolant atque excurrunt foras, ardore aliquo incitati atque inflammati, cernunt illa profecto quae vaticinantes praenuntiant: multisque rebus inflammantur tales animi qui corporibus non inhaerent: ut ei qui sono quodam vocum et Phrygiis cantibus incitantur. An unmistakable description of what was meant by ἔκστασις and Korybantic frenzy (see below).

36 The unique flute melodies known as Olympos were referred to as θεῖα ([Pl.] Min. 318 B); to hold creates (Pl., Smp. 215 C); Honestly inspires the souls __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ (Arist., Pol. 1340a 10). Cic., Div. i, 114: Therefore, those whose spirits, disregarding their bodies, soar and rush outside, driven and ignited by some passion, truly see those things that the seers predict: many matters ignite such spirits that do not cling to their bodies, just like those who are stirred by certain sounds and Phrygian songs. A clear description of what was understood by ekstasis and Korybantic frenzy (see below).

37 i.e. those who are ἐνθουσιασμοῦ κατακώχιμοι, as Aristotle knew them; certain μανικαὶ διαθέσεις are known to Plato. Somewhat similar is the φύσις θειάζουσα which according to Demokritos [D. Chr. 36, 1] fr. 21 Diels, belongs to the inspired poet.

37 meaning those who are excited, as Aristotle described them; certain emotional feelings are recognized by Plato. A similar idea is found in the divine essence which, according to Democritus [D. Chr. 36, 1] fr. 21 Diels, is characteristic of the inspired poet.

38 The drunkenness of the Thracians and their ancient cultivation of the vine are well known. They even brewed beer from barley: Ath. 547 BC (cf. Hehn, Culturpflanzen, p. 121 E.T.). The prophetai (prophesying in “enthusiasm”) of a Thracian oracle prophesied plurimo mero sumpto, Aristot. ap. Macr. 1, 18, 1.—Even the women drank unmixed wine in Thrace: Pl., Lg. 637 E.

38 The Thracians are well known for their drunkenness and their long history of grape growing. They even made beer from barley: Ath. 547 BC (see Hehn, Culturpflanzen, p. 121 E.T.). The prophetai (those who prophesied with “enthusiasm”) at a Thracian oracle predicted plurimo mero sumpto, Aristot. ap. Macr. 1, 18, 1.—Even women in Thrace drank wine straight: Pl., Lg. 637 E.

39 Mela, 2, 21 (and from him Solin. 10, 5, p. 75, 16 Mom.) says of the Thracians epulantibus ubi super ignes quos circumsident quaedam semina ingesta sunt, similis ebrietati hilaritas ex nidore contingit (cf. [Plu.] de Flu. 3, 3). There can be no doubt that it was hemp-seed (κάνναβις) which had this effect. Hdt. iv, 74, says expressly that the Thracians knew hemp. It was thus with a sort of hashish that they intoxicated themselves (hashish is an extract of cannabis indica). The Scythians did something similar: Hdt. tells of their vapour-baths in tightly closed huts (iv, 75): they produced a smoke by laying hempseeds on red-hot stones and—though Hdt. does not say so—must necessarily have got into a state of wild intoxication. This may have been a religious performance. Drunkenness is generally regarded by savage tribes as a religiously inspired condition. Further, the Scythian practice has the most striking parallel in the use of “vapour-huts” among the North American Indians, in which case the religious intention is certain (see the account in Klemm, Culturg. ii, 175–8; J. G. Müller, Amerik. Urrelig. 92). Hdt. i, 202, also mentions intoxication from the fumes of certain “fruits” among the Massagetai; these last, after they had completely bemused themselves, stood up to dance and sing. The Thracians, too, may very well have used intoxication through hashish-fumes as a means of exciting themselves to their ecstatic religious dances.—The ancients were quite familiar with the practice of inhaling aromatic smoke to produce religious hallucinations: [Galen] ὅρ. ἰατρ. 187 (xix, p. 462 K) ἐνθουσιασμός ἐστι καθάπερ ἐξίστανταί τινες ἐπὶ (ὑπὸ?) τῶν ὑποθυμιωμένων ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς, <φάσματα (om. edd.)> ὁρῶντες ἢ τυμπάνων ἢ αὐλῶν ἢ συμβόλων (scr. κυμβάλων) ἀκούοντες; cf. odorum delenimento potest animus humanus externari, Apul., Ap. 43.—For the use of smoke in the 274 Korybantic ceremonies see below.—The γαγάτης λίθος ὑποθυμιαθείς is useful as an ἐπιληπτικῶν ἔλεγχος (Dioscor. v, 145); it brings on the convulsions of the victim of ἱερὰ νόσος (epilepsy) [Orph.] L. 478 ff. (cf. further Damigeron, de Lap. 20, p. 179 Ab.; Plin., NH. 36, 141; and also Gal. xii, p. 203 K.).

39 Mela, 2, 21 (and from him Solin. 10, 5, p. 75, 16 Mom.) talks about the Thracians When the seeds are placed on the fires that surround them, a joy similar to intoxication arises from the aroma. (cf. [Plu.] de Flu. 3, 3). There’s no doubt that it was hemp-seed (cannabis) that caused this effect. Hdt. iv, 74, states clearly that the Thracians knew about hemp. They intoxicated themselves with a sort of hashish (hashish is an extract of cannabis indica). The Scythians had a similar practice: Hdt. describes their vapor baths in tightly sealed huts (iv, 75); they created smoke by placing hemp seeds on hot stones and—though Hdt. doesn’t say so—they must have gotten into a state of wild intoxication. This might have been a religious ritual. Tribal societies often see drunkenness as a condition inspired by religion. Furthermore, the Scythian method has a striking counterpart in the use of "vapor huts" among North American Indians, where the religious purpose is clear (see the account in Klemm, Culturg. ii, 175–8; J. G. Müller, Amerik. Urrelig. 92). Hdt. i, 202, also mentions getting intoxicated from the fumes of certain "fruits" among the Massagetai; after thoroughly getting high, they would stand up to dance and sing. The Thracians likely also used hashish fumes to enhance their ecstatic religious dances. — The ancients were well acquainted with the practice of inhaling aromatic smoke to induce religious hallucinations: [Galen] ὅρ. ιατρ. 187 (xix, p. 462 K) Enthusiasm is like when some people become ecstatic about something.(ὑπὸ?)τῶν ὑποθυμιωμένων ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς, <φάσματα (om. edd.)> Seeing either drums or flutes or cymbals (scr. κυμβάλων)Listening; cf. The human mind can be influenced by external odors., Apul., Ap. 43. — For the use of smoke in the 274 Korybantic ceremonies see below. — The γαγάτης λίθος ὑποθυμιαθείς is useful as an epileptic check (Dioscor. v, 145); it induces the convulsions of someone with sacred disease (epilepsy) [Orph.] L. 478 ff. (cf. further Damigeron, de Lap. 20, p. 179 Ab.; Plin., NH. 36, 141; and also Gal. xii, p. 203 K.).

40 Polak, Persien, ii, 245 ff.—We have only to read the accounts derived from personal experience of the sensations and hallucinatory states accompanying hashish-smoking—such as those given, for instance, by Moreau (de Tours) Du hachisch et de l’aliénation mentale (Paris, 1845), esp. pp. 23 ff., 51 ff., 59 ff., 90, 147 ff., 151 ff., 369 ff.—to have a complete parallel to the condition which underlay Bacchic excitement. There, too, is the complete ἔκστασις of the spirit, a waking dream-state, an ὀλιγοχρόνιος μανία. It only requires the special tone and character given to the hallucinations and illusions by deep-rooted religious or fanciful conceptions—and the external machinery for cultivating such illusions—to make them an exact equivalent of the delirious condition of the real βάκχοι at the nightly festival of Dionysos. (The helpless state of impressionability to outward—e.g. musical—and inward influences is a marked feature of the intoxication and fantasia of hashish.) Other narcotics also have similar effects (Moreau, p. 184 ff.).

40 Polak, Persien, ii, 245 ff.—All we need to do is read the personal accounts of the feelings and hallucinatory experiences that come with smoking hashish—like those described by Moreau (de Tours) in Du hachisch et de l’aliénation mentale (Paris, 1845), especially on pages 23 ff., 51 ff., 59 ff., 90, 147 ff., 151 ff., 369 ff.—to find an exact parallel to the state that fuels Bacchic excitement. There too is the complete ecstasy of the spirit, a waking dream-like state, an short-lived madness. All it takes is the specific tone and character added to the hallucinations and illusions by deeply rooted religious or fantastical beliefs—and the external practices that promote such illusions—to make them a perfect match for the delirious state of the real Bacchae at the nighttime festival of Dionysos. (The vulnerable state of being easily influenced by external—like music—and internal stimuli is a distinct characteristic of the intoxication and fantasia of hashish.) Other narcotics also produce similar effects (Moreau, p. 184 ff.).

41 Pl., Ion, 534 A (perhaps an allusion to the words of Aischines Socr. in the Ἀλκιβιάδης [Aristid. Rh. ii, 23 f. Dind.]).

41 Pl., Ion, 534 A (possibly a reference to the words of Aeschines Socr. in the Alcibiades [Aristid. Rh. ii, 23 f. Dind.]).

42 E., Ba. 142 f., 706 ff. (144 Συρίας δ’ ὡς λιβάνου καπνός).

42 E., Ba. 142 f., 706 ff. (144 Syria’s smoke like incense).

43 Anaesthesia of the Bakchai: ἐπὶ δὲ βοστρύχοις πῦρ ἔφερον οὐδ’ ἔκαιεν, Ba. 757 f.—suum Bacche non sentit saucia volnus, dum stupet Edonis exululata iugis, Ov., Tr. 4, 1, 41 f. qualis deo percussa maenas . . . atque expers sui volnus dedit nec sensit, Sen., Troad. 682 ff. Similar insensibility to pain (certainly not always feigned) was shown in their ekstasis by the self-wounding galli of Kybele, the priests and priestesses of Mâ (Tibull. 1, 6, 45 ff.)—something of the sort is reported of the prophets of Baal (1 Kings xviii, 28). See in general on the subject of anaesthesia and the ὀρθῶς κατεχόμενοι ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν, Iamb., Myst. 3, 4, p. 110 Par. In the case of the shamans, the Indian Yogis, the dervishes, and the natives of North America the existence of such states of insensibility in religious excitement has been actually observed.

43 Anesthesia of the Bacchae: On the braids, fire was brought but did not burn., Ba. 757 f.—Bacchus doesn’t feel the wound, while the Edonian is stunned, lamenting on the hills., Ov., Tr. 4, 1, 41 f. like a wild woman struck by a god . . . and unaware of her own wound, she inflicted it and didn’t even feel it., Sen., Troad. 682 ff. A similar insensitivity to pain (definitely not always faked) was demonstrated in their ekstasis by the self-mutilating galli of Kybele, the priests and priestesses of Mâ (Tibull. 1, 6, 45 ff.)—something akin to this is reported about the prophets of Baal (1 Kings xviii, 28). See in general on the topic of anesthesia and the correctly held by the gods, Iamb., Myst. 3, 4, p. 110 Par. In the cases of shamans, Indian Yogis, dervishes, and Native Americans, the presence of such states of insensitivity during religious fervor has been actually observed.

44 κατεχόμενος ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ (Pl., Men. 99 D; X., Sym. i, 10. κατεχόμενοι ὥσπερ αἱ βάκχαι, Pl., Ion, 534 A; Sym. 215 C. μανέντι τε καὶ κατασχομένῳ, Phdr. 244 E). ἡ δ’ ἀφρὸν ἐξιεῖσα καὶ διαστρόφους κόρας ἑλίσσουσ’, οὐ φρονοῦσ’ ἃ χρῆν φρονεῖν, ἐκ Βακχίου κατείχετο, E., Ba. 1122 ff. κάτοχοι above, n. 24.

44 blessed by God (Pl., Men. 99 D; X., Sym. i, 10. possessed just like the Bacchae, Pl., Ion, 534 A; Sym. 215 C. while being angry and having control, Phdr. 244 E). But the one possessed, spinning around like the Bacchae, wasn’t focused on what she should be thinking because she was influenced by Bacchus., E., Ba. 1122 ff. holders above, n. 24.

45 ἔνθεός τε γίγνεται καὶ ἔκφρων καὶ ὁ νοῦς οὐκέτι ἐν αὐτῷ ἔνεστιν, Pl., Ion, 534 B (where it is applied to the inspired poet but properly belongs to the Bakchai).

45 He becomes inspired and unruly, and his mind is no longer his own., Pl., Ion, 534 B (where it is applied to the inspired poet but properly belongs to the Bakchai).

46 ἔκστασις, ἐξίστασθαι is often used of the inspired state. μαίνεσθαι, ἐνθουσιᾶν, ἔνθεον γίνεσθαι, ἐκστῆναι are all used in the same sense and apply to the “inspired” prophets (Βάκιδες, Σίβυλλαι) and the poets: Arist., Prob. 30, 1, p. 954a, 34–9. ἐξίσταται καὶ μαίνεται, Arist. HA. 6, 22, p. 577a, 12. The religious ὀργιασμοί, ἐκστάσιας ψυχᾶς ἐπάγοντι: Phintys ap. Stob., Fl. iv, 23, 61a, p. 593 H. ἔκστασις is a state in which the soul seems estranged from itself; when the οἰκεῖαι κινήσεις οὐκ ἐνοχλοῦνται ἀλλ’ ἀπορραπίζονται (Arist., Pa. Nat. 464a, 25). The word became weak and commonplace enough in later usage, but it was evidently meant, originally, to express the “exit” of the “soul” from its body. In the same way the phrase used of one who 275 goes off into a faint: τὸν δ’ ἔλιπεν ψυχή originally meant the same thing and was so understood, see above (chap. i, n. 8). The same idea occurs again in P. Mag. Par., l. 725, p. 63 Wessely: ὑπέκλυτος δ’ ἔσει τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ οὐκ ἐν σεαυτῷ ἔσει ὅταν σοι ἀποκρίνηται [the god conjured up].

46 Ekstasis, existai is often used to describe a state of inspiration. Mainesthai, enthousiasm, entheon ginesthai, ekstênai are all used in the same way and refer to the “inspired” prophets (Bakides, Sibyllae) and poets: Arist., Prob. 30, 1, p. 954a, 34–9. Existatai kai mainetai, Arist. HA. 6, 22, p. 577a, 12. The religious Orgasm, ecstasy of the soul: Phintys ap. Stob., Fl. iv, 23, 61a, p. 593 H. Ecstasy is a state where the soul seems detached from itself; when the The movements of the body are not exhausting but are refreshing. (Arist., Pa. Nat. 464a, 25). The term became diluted and commonly used in later times, but it was originally intended to convey the “exit” of the “soul” from its body. Similarly, the phrase used for someone who 275 faints: ton d’ elipen psychê originally carried the same meaning and was understood as such, see above (chap. i, n. 8). This same concept appears again in P. Mag. Par., l. 725, p. 63 Wessely: Hypeklutos is a reflection of the soul, and it’s not within yourself when it responds to you. [the god conjured up].

47 ἔκστασις ἐστιν ὀλιγοχρόνιος μανία [Galen] ὅρ. ἰατρ. 485 (xix, p. 462). μανίη ἔκστασίς ἐστι χρόνιος Aretaeus, Chr. Pass. 1, 6, p. 78 K.

47 Anxiety is temporary madness. [Galen] Hippocrates 485 (xix, p. 462). Madness is persistent anxiety Aretaeus, Chr. Pass. 1, 6, p. 78 K.

48 Διόνυσον μαινόλην ὀργιάζουσι βάκχοι, ὠμοφαγίᾳ τὴν ἱερομανίαν ἄγοντες, καὶ τελίσκουσι τὰς κρεωνομίας τῶν φόνων ἀνεστεμμένοι τοῖς ὄφεσιν ἐπολολύζοντες εὐάν, Clem. Al., Protr. ii, p. 11 P.

48 The Bacchae passionately celebrate Dionysus, leading the sacred rituals by eating raw flesh, and they finish the sacrifices of the slain, crying out in ecstasy alongside the serpents., Clem. Al., Protr. ii, p. 11 P.

49 The ἐνθουσιῶντες ἐκ θεοῦ τινος become like the god, λαμβάνουσι τὰ ἔθη καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα (τοῦ θεοῦ), καθόσον δυνατὸν θεοῦ ἀνθρώπῳ μετασχεῖν, Pl., Phdr. 253 A. More boldly ἑαυτῶν ἐκστάντας ὅλους ἐνιδρῦσθαι τοῖς θεοῖς καὶ ἐνθεάζειν, Procl. in Rp. ii, 108, 23 Kr.—οὐκ ἔκστασις ἅπλως οὕτως ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ (in its positive sense) ἐπὶ τὸ κρεῖττον ἀναγωγὴ καὶ μετάστασις, Iamb. Myst. 3, 7, p. 114, 9 Parth.

49 Those who are inspired by a god become like that god, receiving the traditions and practices of the god, as much as is possible for a human to take part in divinity, Pl., Phdr. 253 A. More boldly, they fully engage with the gods and become filled with divine inspiration, Procl. in Rp. ii, 108, 23 Kr.—It’s not just any kind of ecstasy, but (in its positive sense) a rising to a higher state and transformation, Iamb. Myst. 3, 7, p. 114, 9 Parth.

50 ἔνθεοι γυναῖκες of the Bakchai, S. Ant. 963. αἱ Βάκχαι ὅταν ἔνθεοι γένωνται—Aesch. Socr. ap. Aristid., Rh. (ii, 23 Dind.). ἔνθεος ἤδε ἡ μανίη (the religious sort) Aret., p. 84 K. The essential meaning of ἔνθεον εἶναι (plenum esse deo) is clearly defined in Sch., E., Hip. 141: ἔνθεοι λέγονται οἱ ὑπὸ φάσματός τινος ἀφαιρεθέντες τὸν νοῦν, καὶ ὑπ’ ἐκείνου τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ φασματοποιοῦ κατεχόμενοι καὶ τὰ δοκοῦντα κείνῳ ποιοῦντες. The ἔνθεος is completely in the power of the god; the god speaks and acts through him. The ἔνθεος has lost his consciousness of himself; like the θεῖοι ἄνδρες (which phrase in Plato has the same meaning as ἔνθεοι ἄνδρες) esp. the θεομάντεις, λέγουσι μὲν ἀληθῆ καὶ πολλά, ἴσασι δ’ οὐδὲν ὧν λέγουσι, Pl., Men. 99 C. (Philo, Spec. Leg. ii, p. 343 M., says of the inspired prophet: ἐνθουσιᾷ γεγονὼς ἐν ἀγνοίᾳ, μετανισταμένου μὲν τοῦ λογισμοῦ . . . ἐπιπεφοιτηκότος δὲ καὶ ἐνῳκηκότος τοῦ θείου πνεύματος καὶ πᾶσαν τῆς φώνης ὀργανοποιΐαν κρούοντος κτλ.; cf. Iamb., Myst. 3, 4, p. 109.)

50 Empowered women of the Bacchae, S. Ant. 963. The Bacchae whenever they're inspired—Aesch. Socr. ap. Aristid., Rh. (ii, 23 Dind.). Being inspired is a form of madness. (the religious sort) Aret., p. 84 K. The essential meaning of be inspired (to be filled with the divine) is clearly defined in Sch., E., Hip. 141: People who are inspired are described as having their minds captivated by a vision, and they are guided by the deity that creates this vision, acting in accordance with what they believe that deity desires.. The motivated person is completely under the influence of the god; the god speaks and acts through them. The inspiring person has lost awareness of themselves; like the godly men (a phrase in Plato that means the same as inspiring men), especially the Prophets speak a lot of truth, but they don’t really understand what they’re saying., Pl., Men. 99 C. (Philo, Spec. Leg. ii, p. 343 M., speaks of the inspired prophet: Having been inspired in their ignorance, their reasoning changed... filled with the divine spirit and captivating all with their voice, etc.; cf. Iamb., Myst. 3, 4, p. 109.)

51 ἔνθεοι μάντεις (Bakides, Sibyllai) Arist., Prb. 30, 2, 954a, 37. θεομάντεις Pl., Men. ad fin. μαντικὴ κατὰ τὸ ἔνθεον, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἐνθεαστικόν [Plu.] Plac. Phil. 5, 1, 1 [Dox., p. 415].

51 Visionary thinkers (Bakides, Sibyllai) Arist., Prb. 30, 2, 954a, 37. Spiritual guides Pl., Men. ad fin. Prophecy from the inspired, which is genuinely uplifting. [Plu.] Plac. Phil. 5, 1, 1 [Dox., p. 415].

52 μάντις δ’ ὁ δαίμων ὅδε (Dionysos)· τὸ γὰρ βακχεύσιμον καὶ τὸ μανιῶδες μαντικὴν πολλὴν ἔχει· ὅταν γὰρ ὁ θεὸς εἰς τὸ σῶμ’ ἔλθῃ πολύς, λέγειν τὸ μέλλον τοὺς μεμηνότας ποιεῖ, E., Ba. 298 ff. Here the inner relationship of the inspiration mantikê and the “possession” which took place in ecstatic frenzy is expressed with all possible clearness (drunkenness is surely not referred to!). This is how Plu., Smp. 7, 10, p. 716 B, also understood Eur. Prophesying Mainads: μαινάδας θυοσκόους E., Ba. 224—οὐδεὶς ἔννους ἐφάπτεται μαντικῆς ἐνθέου καὶ ἀληθοῦς, ἀλλ’ ἢ καθ’ ὕπνον τὴν τῆς φρονήσεως πεδηθεὶς δύναμιν ἢ διὰ νόσον ἢ διά τινα ἐνθουσιασμὸν παραλλάξας, Pl., Ti. 71 E. νοσήματα μαντικὰ ἢ ἐνθουσιαστικά make inspired μάντεις what they are: Arist. Prob. 954a, 35. Such mantikê takes place in the state of furor, cum a corpore animus abstractus divino instinctu concitatur, Cic., Div. i, 66. A famous case is that of Kassandra from whom the deus inclusus corpore humano, non iam Cassandra loquitur, § 67; cf. the Sibyl who prophesies μαινομένῳ στόματι (Heraclit. fr. 12 By. = 92 D.) and the Pythia at Delphi prophesying in a state of μανία. For the prophecy of Korybantic Phrygians possessed and “frenzied”, see Arrian ap. Eust., on D.P. 809.

52 The fortune teller is here (Dionysos)Those who are intoxicated and frenzied have plenty of inspiration; whenever the god powerfully takes over a person, those in a trance can predict the future., E., Ba. 298 ff. Here, the close link between the inspiration of mantikê and the “possession” experienced in ecstatic frenzy is explained very clearly (drunkenness is definitely not what is meant!). This is how Plu., Smp. 7, 10, p. 716 B, also interpreted Eur. Prophesying Mainads: the wild Bacchae E., Ba. 224—No one is connected to genuine inspired prophecy; either they are held back by a dream, illness, or some other form of inspiration., Pl., Ti. 71 E. Inspired prophecies or excited states define seers as they are: Arist. Prob. 954a, 35. Such mantikê occurs in a state of furor, when the spirit is separated from the body and inspired by divine influence, Cic., Div. i, 66. A well-known example is Kassandra, from whom the God, trapped in a human body, no longer communicates through Cassandra., § 67; see also the Sibyl who prophesies with a ranting mouth (Heraclit. fr. 12 By. = 92 D.) and the Pythia at Delphi, prophesying in a state of chaos. For the prophecy of the Korybantic Phrygians in their possession and frenzy, refer to Arrian ap. Eust., on D.P. 809.

53 Hdt. vii, 111 (for Hdt. the Βησσοί seem to be a division, perhaps a clan, of the Satrai. Polyb., Strabo, Pliny, Dio C., and others know them as an independent Thracian tribe): πρόμαντις γυνὴ χρέουσα κατάπερ ἐν Δελφοῖσι—which means that she prophesied in ecstasy, for that is what the Pythia at Delphi did. (See Sch. Ar., Plut. 39; 276 Plu., Def. Or. 51, p. 438 B. Lucan vi, 166 ff., clearly describes the phenomena supposed to attend their religious ekstasis: artus Phoebados irrupit Paean, mentemque priorem expulit, atque hominem toto sibi cedere iussit pectore. bacchatur demens aliena, etc.)

53 Hdt. vii, 111 (in Hdt., the Βησσός appear to be a subgroup, possibly a clan, of the Satrai. Polyb., Strabo, Pliny, Dio C., and others refer to them as an independent Thracian tribe): A woman from Promantis is in debt just like those in Delphi.—which means she prophesied in a trance, similar to what the Pythia did at Delphi. (See Sch. Ar., Plut. 39; 276 Plu., Def. Or. 51, p. 438 B. Lucan vi, 166 ff., clearly describes the phenomena that were believed to accompany their religious ekstasis: Artus Phoebados burst in, pushing away previous thoughts, and commanded the man to surrender entirely. He raged madly with someone else’s spirit., etc.)

54 ὁ Θρῃξὶ μάντις Διόνυσος, E., Hec. 1267. Rhesos dwelling in Mt. Pangaios is Βάκχου προφήτης, Rh. 972. ἀφικέσθαι τοῖς Λειβηθρίοις παρὰ τοῦ Διονύσου μάντευμα ἐκ Θρᾴκης, Paus. 9, 30, 9. Aristoteles qui Theologumena scripsit, apud Ligyreos (?) ait in Thracia esse adytum Libero consecratum, ex quo redduntur oracula. Macr. 1, 18, 1. The wife of Spartacus, herself a Thracian, was μαντική τε καὶ κάτοχος τοῖς περὶ τῶν Διόνυσον ὀργιασμοῖς, Plu., Crass. 8. Octavian in Thrace consulted in Liberi patris luco barbara caerimonia, i.e. an oracle: Suet., Oct. 94. Even in 11 B.C. the Bessoi still had a ἱερεὺς τοῦ Διονύσου, Vologeses, who by means of prophesyings (πολλὰ θείασας) and τῇ παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ δόξῃ stirred up his people to rebel against the Odrysai: D.C. 54, 34, 5. In 29 B.C. M. Crassus had handed over to the Odrysai the piece of land occupied by the Bessoi ἐν ᾗ καὶ τὸν θεὸν ἀγάλλουσι, D.C. 51, 25, 5.—The spirit of the old Thracian ecstatic cult reappeared in the character of the Bacchic worship introduced from Greece into Italy whose excesses (in 186 B.C.) are narrated by Livy: 39, 8 ff.: among these being viros velut mente capta cum iactatione fanatica corporis vaticinari: 39, 13, 12.

54 The Thracian seer Dionysus, E., Hec. 1267. Rhesos living on Mt. Pangaios is the Bacchus messenger, Rh. 972. to reach the Libethrians with a prophecy from Dionysus from Thrace, Paus. 9, 30, 9. Aristotle, who wrote Theologumena, mentions the Ligyrians. (?) There is a shrine in Thrace dedicated to Liber that gives oracles. Macr. 1, 18, 1. The wife of Spartacus, also a Thracian, was skilled in fortune-telling and involved in the Dionysian rituals, Plu., Crass. 8. Octavian consulted at the grove of Father Liber with a wild ceremony, i.e. an oracle: Suet., Oct. 94. Even in 11 BCE the Bessoi still had a Dionysus priest, Vologeses, who stirred his people to rebel against the Odrysai through prophecies (numerous prophecies) and the glory of God: D.C. 54, 34, 5. In 29 BCE M. Crassus had given the Odrysai the land that the Bessoi occupied where they also worship the deity, D.C. 51, 25, 5.—The spirit of the old Thracian ecstatic cult reemerged in the Bacchic worship that was brought from Greece to Italy, whose excesses (in 186 BCE) are recounted by Livy: 39, 8 ff.: among these being men as if they were possessed, with wild gestures, predicting: 39, 13, 12.

55 Compare, for example, what we are told of the religious dances of the Ostiaks (Erman, Travels in Siberia, ii, 45 f., E. T., Cooley), the Haokah dance of the Dakota, the “medicine-dance” of the Winnebago in North America (Schoolcraft, Indian Tribes, iii, 487 ff., 286 ff.), the dance of voodoo negroes in Haiti (Nouv. annales des voyages, 1858, iii, p. 90 ff.). For the violent religious dances of the people in ancient Peru see Müller, Amerik. Urrelig. 385; in Australia, R. Brough-Smith, Aborigines of Victoria, i, 166 ff. (1878). Among the Veddas of Ceylon there was a dance of the “devil’s priests” (called Kattadias) dressed up as demons: see Tennent, Ceylon, i, 540 f.; ii, 442.—In antiquity the following have the closest relationship to the ecstatic cult of the Thracians: the dance festivals in honour of the “Syrian Goddess”, of the Kappadocian Mâ, of the Phrygian Mountain Mother, and of Attis (the last having much the same origin as the Thracian festival, but being more strongly affected by Semitic influences, and perhaps by the religious practices of the prehistoric inhabitants of Asia Minor). Besides these we may remember the account given by Poseidonios ap. Strabo, 198, D.P. 570 ff., of the excited nocturnal festival celebrated in honour of “Dionysos” in an island at the mouth of the Loire by the women of the Namnites (Samnites, Amnites) Διονύσῳ κατεχόμεναι in the wildest delirium (λύττα).

55 For instance, consider the religious dances of the Ostiaks (Erman, Travels in Siberia, ii, 45 f., E. T., Cooley), the Haokah dance of the Dakota, the “medicine-dance” of the Winnebago in North America (Schoolcraft, Indian Tribes, iii, 487 ff., 286 ff.), and the dance of voodoo practitioners in Haiti (Nouv. annales des voyages, 1858, iii, p. 90 ff.). For the intense religious dances of ancient Peru, see Müller, Amerik. Urrelig. 385; in Australia, R. Brough-Smith, Aborigines of Victoria, i, 166 ff. (1878). Among the Veddas of Ceylon, there was a dance performed by the “devil’s priests” (known as Kattadias) dressed as demons: see Tennent, Ceylon, i, 540 f.; ii, 442.—In ancient times, the following had the closest connection to the ecstatic rituals of the Thracians: the dance festivals honoring the “Syrian Goddess,” the Kappadocian Mâ, the Phrygian Mountain Mother, and Attis (the last having a similar origin to the Thracian festival but influenced more by Semitic traditions and possibly by the religious practices of prehistoric inhabitants of Asia Minor). Additionally, we can recall the account by Poseidonios as reported by Strabo, 198, D.P. 570 ff., of the frenzied nocturnal festival held in honor of “Dionysos” on an island at the mouth of the Loire by the women of the Namnites (Samnites, Amnites) Devoted to Dionysus in a state of wild delirium (rage).

56 This is regularly the meaning of such excesses practised by “magicians”. The shaman (with his “soul”) voyages out into the spirit-world; see the remarkably vivid account of Radloff, Siberien, ii, 1–67; and also Erman, Zschr. f. Ethnologie, ii, 324 ff.; A. Krause, Tlinkitindianer, p. 294 ff., 1885. So does the Lapp magician (Knud Leem, Lappen in Finmarken [E.T. in Pinkerton’s Voyages]). The Angekok enters into communion with his Torngak (Cranz, Hist. of Greenland, i, p. 194, E.T., 1820); the Butio with the Zemen (Müller, Amerik. Urrelig., 191 f.); the Piajes with the spirits (Müller, 217). Thus, too, communication with the divine “grandfather” of the people is established by means of dances, etc., among the Abipones (Dobrizhoffer, Abipones, ii, 64, E.T.). The expulsion of the soul to visit the spirit-world is also practised (in their convulsions) by the 277 magicians of the North American Indians, the people of the Pacific Islands (Tylor, ii, 133), etc. Such practices start out from a commonly held conception of the nature of body and soul and of their relations with the unseen. The magicians believe “that in their ecstatic condition they can break through the barrier between this world and the next”, Müller 397. To facilitate this process they employ the various means alluded to of stimulating their senses.

56 This is usually the meaning of such extremes practiced by “magicians.” The shaman (with his “soul”) travels into the spirit world; see the surprisingly vivid account of Radloff, Siberien, ii, 1–67; and also Erman, Zschr. f. Ethnologie, ii, 324 ff.; A. Krause, Tlinkitindianer, p. 294 ff., 1885. So does the Lapp magician (Knud Leem, Lappen in Finmarken [E.T. in Pinkerton’s Voyages]). The Angekok connects with his Torngak (Cranz, Hist. of Greenland, i, p. 194, E.T., 1820); the Butio with the Zemen (Müller, Amerik. Urrelig., 191 f.); the Piajes with the spirits (Müller, 217). Likewise, communication with the divine “grandfather” of the people is established through dances, etc., among the Abipones (Dobrizhoffer, Abipones, ii, 64, E.T.). The expulsion of the soul to visit the spirit world is also practiced (in their convulsions) by the 277 magicians of the North American Indians, the people of the Pacific Islands (Tylor, ii, 133), etc. Such practices stem from a shared understanding of the nature of body and soul and their relationship to the unseen. The magicians believe “that in their ecstatic state they can break through the barrier between this world and the next,” Müller 397. To aid this process, they use the various means mentioned to stimulate their senses.

57 The most remarkable case of this is provided by the history of a religious sect of our own day widely spread in Russia, who call themselves “the Christs”, i.e. sons of God. The sect was founded by a holy man named Philippov in whose body God one day took up his abode; after which the man spoke as the living God himself and gave commandments. The sect particularly stood for the idea that the divine dwells in mankind, Christ in men and Mary in women, and that the sense of their presence can be awakened in men by the action of the Holy Ghost, through the force of strong belief, by saintliness and by religious ecstasy. To produce the ecstasy dances are held in common. About midnight, after long prayers, hymns, and religious addresses, the participators in the secret festival, both men and women, dressed in strange costumes begin to dance. Soon the ranks and circles of the dancers and singers break up; individuals begin to turn round and round, revolving on their own axis with incredible speed, balancing meanwhile on their heels. The excitement of the dancing and leaping crowd grows continually greater. Finally one of them calls out “He comes; He is near—the Holy Ghost”. The wildest ecstasy takes hold of every one. Details may be found in N. Tsakni’s La Russie sectaire, p. 63 ff. (cf. what is said in the same work, p. 80 ff., of the religious dances of the Skopzes, and p. 119 f. of the sect of the “Leapers”).—All this is true Bacchanalia christiana and therefore mentioned here.

57 A striking example of this can be seen in the history of a religious group that is currently widespread in Russia, who refer to themselves as “the Christs,” meaning sons of God. The group was founded by a holy man named Philippov, in whose body God one day chose to dwell; after this, he spoke as if he were God himself and issued commandments. The sect strongly believes that the divine exists within humanity, with Christ in men and Mary in women, and that the awareness of their presence can be stirred in individuals by the Holy Ghost through strong faith, saintliness, and religious ecstasy. To induce this ecstasy, they hold communal dances. Around midnight, following lengthy prayers, hymns, and religious speeches, participants of the secret festival, both men and women, dressed in unusual costumes, begin to dance. Soon, the formations of dancers and singers break apart; individuals start spinning rapidly, rotating on their own axis while balancing on their heels. The excitement among the dancing and jumping crowd continually intensifies. Finally, one person shouts, “He is coming; He is near—the Holy Ghost.” A frenzied ecstasy envelops everyone. More details can be found in N. Tsakni’s La Russie sectaire, p. 63 ff. (see also what’s described in the same book, p. 80 ff., about the religious dances of the Skopzes, and p. 119 f. regarding the sect of the “Leapers”). —All of this is a true Bacchanalia christiana and is therefore mentioned here.

58 e.g. Mariner, Tonga Islanders, i, 108 (1817); Wrangel, Reise in Siberien, i, 286 (i, 267 f., French trans.); Radloff, Siberien, ii, 58. Even the respectable Cranz, whose own point of view made it impossible for him to appreciate properly the Angekok practices so clearly observed by him, admits that many of them really saw visions that suggested “something supernatural” to them: Hist. of Greenland, p. 197 E.T. Something similar is said about ecstatically dancing dervishes by Lane, Modern Egyptians, ii, 197.

58 e.g. Mariner, Tonga Islanders, i, 108 (1817); Wrangel, Reise in Siberien, i, 286 (i, 267 f., French trans.); Radloff, Siberien, ii, 58. Even the respectable Cranz, whose own perspective made it hard for him to fully understand the Angekok practices he observed, admits that many of them actually had visions that suggested “something supernatural” to them: Hist. of Greenland, p. 197 E.T. A similar point is made about ecstatically dancing dervishes by Lane, Modern Egyptians, ii, 197.

59 Magicians called by the name of the god (Keebet) among the Abipones: Dobrizhoffer, ii, 248. Similar cases elsewhere: Müller, 77. In Tahiti the person inspired by the god so long as the “inspiration” lasted (several days sometimes) was himself called “god” or given the name of some particular god: Waitz, Anthropol. vi, 383. In the case of an African tribe dwelling on the banks of Lake Nyanza the chief spirit sometimes takes temporary possession of one of the magicians (man or woman) who then bears the name of the spirit: Schneider, Relig. d. Afrik. Naturv. 151. Sometimes the identity of the magician with the god is expressed by the wearing of the god’s distinguishing dress and imitation of his outward appearance (in the manner of the Thracian Βάκχοι); cf. the devil-dancers in Ceylon, etc.

59 Magicians referred to by the name of the god (Keebet) among the Abipones: Dobrizhoffer, ii, 248. Similar instances occur in other places: Müller, 77. In Tahiti, during the time when someone was inspired by the god—sometimes lasting several days—they were called "god" or named after a specific god: Waitz, Anthropol. vi, 383. In the case of an African tribe living by Lake Nyanza, the main spirit can sometimes take over one of the magicians (either male or female), who then takes on the spirit's name: Schneider, Relig. d. Afrik. Naturv. 151. At times, the connection between the magician and the god is shown by wearing the god’s distinctive attire and mimicking their appearance (similar to the Thracian Bacchae); see also the devil-dancers in Ceylon, etc.

60 When it acquires a more philosophical temper mysticism seeks its unification with the highest (the ἔλλαμψις τῆς φύσεως τῆς πρώτης) more by means of the completest passivity of mind and body. It employs the εἰς αὑτὴν ξυλλέγεσθαι καὶ ἀθροίζεσθαι of the soul (Plato), or its withdrawal from all that is finite and particular (the recojimiento of the Spanish mystics). The profoundest quietude of spirit brings 278 about the unification with the One behind all multiplicity; cf. the Neoplatonic mystics, the Buddhists, etc. Sometimes both are found together; absorption and passivity of the spirit side by side with wild excitement. Both methods were practised by the Persian Sufis. Chardin, Voyage en Perse, iv, 458 (cd. Langlés) says of them, cependant ils se servent plus communément du chant de la danse et de la musique, disant qu’ils produisent plus sûrement leur extase. It may be that the cult of religious exaltation is always the real origin of these ecstatic states. Though the cult sometimes falls into decay itself, its offspring the ἔκστασις survives.

60 When it takes on a more philosophical mindset, mysticism aims for a connection with the ultimate (the glow of the original nature) by achieving complete stillness of the mind and body. It utilizes the Gathering and assembling together of the soul (Plato), or seeks to withdraw from everything that is limited and specific (the recojimiento of the Spanish mystics). The deepest tranquility of spirit creates 278 a connection with the One behind all diversity; see the Neoplatonic mystics, the Buddhists, and others. Sometimes both approaches coexist; absorption and passivity of the spirit can happen alongside intense excitement. Both methods were practiced by the Persian Sufis. Chardin, Voyage en Perse, iv, 458 (cd. Langlés) notes that they often use singing, dancing, and music, claiming these lead to their ecstasy more reliably. It’s possible that the devotion to religious exaltation is the true source of these ecstatic states. Even when this devotion tends to decline, its result, the ecstasy, endures.

61 In the language of these mystics the words mean: he knows that the passionate longing for reunion with God, the Soul of the universe, breaks down the individual personality and its limitations—“for where Love awakes to life the Self dies, that gloomy tyrant.”

61 In the language of these mystics, the words mean: he knows that the intense desire to reunite with God, the Soul of the universe, dissolves the individual personality and its limitations—“for where Love comes to life, the Self dies, that dark ruler.”

62 Γέται οἱ ἀθανατίζοντες, Hdt. Iv, 93–4 (ἀπαθανατίζοντες, Plato and others, see Wesseling on D.S. i, p. 105, 32).

62 Those who grant eternal life, Hdt. Iv, 93–4 (those who grant immortality, Plato and others, see Wesseling on D.S. i, p. 105, 32).

63 . . . οὐδένα ἄλλον θεὸν νομίζοντες εἰ μὴ τὸν σφέτερον (the Zalmoxis just mentioned) Hdt. iv, 94 fin. There we are told that the Getai πρὸς βροντήν τε καὶ ἀστραπὴν τοξεύοντες ἄνω ἀπειλεῦσι τῷ θεῷ, οὐδένα κτλ. If it were true (as most people seem to think) that the god (ὁ θεός) threatened by the Getai during thunder was their own god Zalmoxis, then it certainly is difficult, or, indeed, impossible, to understand the point of explaining the threatening of this god by the statement that they hold him for the only true god. The truth is that the τῷ θεῷ refers simply to the “sky” during a thunderstorm. The usage is common in Greek and is only transferred to the Getai by a rather awkward extension. This thundering θεός is not Zalmoxis at all (hence Z. is not as some have thought a “sky-god”). The Getai regarded Zalmoxis as the only god: the Thunderer is no real god to them (at the most a bad demon or a magician or something of the kind). To show that they are not afraid of him they shoot arrows against him, probably in the hope of breaking the thundercloud. (Parallels in other countries: Grimm, p. 1088; Dobrizhoffer, ii, 78. In India, Oldenberg, 491–4. Excitement during an eclipse of the moon: Weissenborn on Livy, 26, 5, 9. Reminiscence of such customs in the myth of Herakles: [Apollod.] 2, 5, 10, 5. From Hdt. by indirect channels comes Isig., Mir. 42 [p. 162 West.]; cf. also the account of D.C. 59, 28, 6 about Caligula.—Pallad., RR. i, 35 [contra grandinem].)

63 . . . believing in no other god except their own (the Zalmoxis just mentioned) Hdt. iv, 94 fin. There we learn that the Getai Towards the thunder and lightning, they shoot arrows up at the god, no one, etc. If it were true (as most people seem to think) that the god (the god) threatened by the Getai during thunder was their own god Zalmoxis, then it’s certainly difficult, or even impossible, to understand the reasoning behind the claim that they see him as the only true god. The reality is that the to God simply refers to the “sky” during a thunderstorm. This usage is common in Greek and is awkwardly applied to the Getai. This thundering god is not Zalmoxis at all (thus Z. is not, as some have thought, a “sky-god”). The Getai viewed Zalmoxis as the only god; the Thunderer is not considered a real god to them (at most, a bad demon or a magician or something like that). To show that they aren’t scared of him, they shoot arrows at him, likely hoping to break the thundercloud. (Similar customs in other countries: Grimm, p. 1088; Dobrizhoffer, ii, 78. In India, Oldenberg, 491–4. Excitement during a lunar eclipse: Weissenborn on Livy, 26, 5, 9. Echoes of such customs in the myth of Herakles: [Apollod.] 2, 5, 10, 5. From Hdt. by indirect channels comes Isig., Mir. 42 [p. 162 West.]; cf. also the account of D.C. 59, 28, 6 about Caligula.—Pallad., RR. i, 35 [contra grandinem].)

64 ἀθανατίζουσι δὲ τόνδε τὸν τρόπον . . . οὔτε ἀποθνήσκειν ἑωυτοὺς νομίζουσι, ἰέναι τε τὸν ἀπολλύμενον παρὰ Ζάλμοξιν δαίμονα (οἱ δὲ αὐτῶν τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον οὐνομάζουσι Γεβελέϊζιν), Hdt. iv, 94. Here, as regularly in Greek use of the words, we must not understand by ἀθάνατον εἶναι a mere shadowy (if timeless) survival of the soul after death as in the Homeric Hades. Such a belief if it had been held by the Getai would not have struck Hdt. or his readers as remarkable in the slightest degree. It must therefore imply an unending and fully conscious existence, in this last respect resembling the life on earth.

64 They believe in immortality like this . . . they don't think they die, and they go to the god Zalmoxis for salvation.(they call this god Gebeleizis), Hdt. iv, 94. Here, as is usual in Greek usage of these terms, we should not interpret to live forever as just a vague (if timeless) existence of the soul after death like in the Homeric Hades. If the Getae held such a belief, it wouldn't have seemed remarkable to Herodotus or his audience at all. This must instead suggest a never-ending and fully conscious existence, in this aspect similar to life on earth.

65 ἀθανατίζουσι δὲ καὶ Τέριζοι (τερετιζοι Phot.) καὶ Κρόβυζοι καὶ τοὺς ἀποθανόντας ὡς Ζάλμοξίν φασιν οἴχεσθαι, Phot. Suid., EM. Ζάμολξις. The Krobyzoi are a well-known Thracian stock. The Terizoi are not elsewhere mentioned; perhaps they may be placed in the neighbourhood of Τίριστις, Τίριξις ἄκρα = C. Kaliakra (cf. C. Müller on Arrian, P. Eux. 35); there we also hear of a Τίριστις πόλις, Ptolem. With this Tomaschek also agrees (D. alten Thraker, Ber. Wien. Ak.> 128, iv, p. 97). In this case they would be neighbours of the Krobyzoi. 279

65 They also believed in immortality, including the Terizoi __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__. (τερετιζοι Phot.) and the Krobyzoi, who assert that the dead, as Zalmoxis states, leave, Phot. Suid., EM. Zalmoxis. The Krobyzoi are a well-known Thracian group. The Terizoi are not mentioned elsewhere; they might be located near Tiristis, Tirixis Cape = C. Kaliakra (cf. C. Müller on Arrian, P. Eux. 35); there we also hear of a city of Tiristis, Ptolem. Tomaschek also supports this idea (D. alten Thraker, Ber. Wien. Ak.> 128, iv, p. 97). In this case, they would be neighbors of the Krobyzoi. 279

66 οὐκ ἀποθνῄσκειν ἀλλὰ μετοικίζεσθαι νομίζοντες is what we hear of the Getai in Julian, Caes. 327 D. animas (putant) non extingui sed ad beatiora transire, Mela, ii, 18.

66 They believe that they don’t actually die but are instead taken to a better place. is what we hear about the Getae in Julian, Caes. 327 D. They believe that souls are not destroyed but instead move on to a better existence., Mela, ii, 18.

67 . . . τοὺς ἀποθανόντας ὡς Ζάλμοξίν φασιν οἴχεσθαι, ἥξειν δὲ αὖθις. καὶ ταῦτα ἀεὶ νομίζουσιν ἀληθεύειν. θύουσι δὲ καὶ εὐωχοῦνται ὡς αὔθις ἥξοντος τοῦ ἀποθανόντος, Phot. Suid., EM. Ζάμολξις. Mela, ii, 18: alii (among the Thracians) redituras putant animas obeuntium.

67 . . . those who have died, as Zalmoxis says, leave and will come back again. They always believe this to be true. They make sacrifices and celebrate as if the deceased will return., Phot. Suid., EM. Ζάμολξις. Mela, ii, 18: others (among the Thracians) believe that the souls of the deceased will come back.

68 Hdt. iv, 95, Zalmoxis, a slave of Pythagoras in Samos, is set free and comes back a rich man to his poverty-stricken country. He collects together the leading men of the race in a room, where he entertains them and seeks to persuade them of the belief that neither he nor they nor their descendants will die but that they will all come after death to a place where they will enjoy all good things in abundance. Thereupon he withdraws into a secret underground chamber and lives there for three years. In the fourth year he comes to light again and “the Thracians are persuaded of the truth of what Zalmoxis had told them.” This implies—though Hdt. omits to say so, and so does [Hellan.] π. νομ. βαρβ. (following Hdt.) ap. Phot., etc., s. Ζάμολξις—that he had also promised that he and his adherents should return to earth alive after the expiry of a definite period (three years). That such a belief in the “return” of the dead was actually held by the Thracians is clear enough from the quotations given in the last note. The story of Zalmoxis’ trick (which was perhaps intended humorously by its inventors) seemed suspicious even to Hdt., but it is not pure invention (any more than the analogous stories about Pythagoras, Trophonios, and later Empedotimos): it is rather a euhemerist version of a miraculous legend. The disappearance of Zalmoxis into a subterranean chamber is a distortion of the belief in his permanent abode in a hollow mountain-side, an ἀντρῶδές τι χώριον in Mt. Kogaionon of which Str. 298 speaks plainly enough. In that mountain the god dwells; just as Rhesos κρυπτὸς ἐν ἄντροις τῆς ὑπαργύρου χθονός of Mt. Pangaios, dwells there as an ἀνθρωποδαίμων [E.], Rh. 970; cf. chap. iv, n. 36. He lives there undying like the Βάκχου προφήτης, who has become a god, to whom the tragedy obscurely alludes in ll. 972 f. as living on Mt. Pangaios (this may perhaps refer to Lykourgos—see G. Hermann, Op. v, 23 f.—surely not to Orpheus as Maass, Orpheus, p. 68 [1895], suggests). The obvious parallel is Amphiaraos and Trophonios in their caves, and Orig., Cels. iii, 34 (see above, chap. iii, n. 13), puts them and Zalmoxis together. We may safely complete Hdt.’s account of how the ἀπολλύμενοι of the Getai go away and have everlasting life παρὰ Ζάλμοξιν δαίμονα (iv, 94), by saying that they reach this same hollow mountain, a subterranean place of delight where they dwell with the god. Mnaseas compares Zalmoxis with Kronos (FHG.; Phot. Suid. EM., as before) and the similarity doubtless resides in the fact that both rule over the spirits of the blest in another world. But besides this the Thracian belief must also have included the idea of a periodical appearance of the god in the upper world. Hdt.’s story of the trick practised by Zalmoxis shows this (the return of the souls to which the story also points, is a sort of counterpart of this). Are we to suppose that the ἐπιφάνεια of the god was expected after the expiry of three years (just as it was after two years in the Dionysos festival; see above, n. 27)? We do not know whether these Thracian tribes celebrated the ἐπιφάνεια of the god with “enthusiastic” worship. Such an element in the cult of Zalmoxis seems to be suggested by the fact that we hear of “physicians of Zalmoxis” (Pl., Charm. 156 D) and of mantikê—which is generally closely bound up with ἰατρική280 in the cult of this god. This must be the meaning of calling Zalm. himself μάντις: Str. 762, 297; cf. also the otherwise valueless account of Ant. Diog. ap. Porph. VP. 14–15. Finally, the enthusiastic character of the cult seems to be implied in the identifying of the priest with the god by the Getai (as in the similar cases mentioned above, notes 32 and 59). Thus, the high priest is himself called “god”: Str. 298 (he has authority over both king and state: cf. the ἱερεὺς τοῦ Διονύσου among the Bessoi, above, n. 53; cf. Jordanes, Get. 71). This made it easy for the “god” Zalmoxis, whom even Hdt. quite rightly regarded as δαίμων τις Γέτῃσι ἐπιχώριος (iv, 96) to be metamorphosed into a man of the historical past (he is this in D.S. 1, 94, 2; Str. vii, 297; cf. Jordanes, Get. 39). If the contemporary priest was called “god” it might naturally be concluded that the “god” Zalmoxis was once only a priest too.

68 In Hdt. iv, 95, Zalmoxis, who was a slave of Pythagoras in Samos, is freed and returns as a wealthy man to his poor homeland. He gathers the prominent leaders of his people in a room, where he entertains them and tries to convince them that neither he, nor they, nor their descendants will die, but that they will all go to a place after death where they will enjoy abundant good things. After this, he retreats into a hidden underground chamber and stays there for three years. In the fourth year, he emerges again and “the Thracians are convinced of the truth of what Zalmoxis had told them.” This suggests—though Hdt. does not explicitly say it, nor does [Hellan.] π. νομ. βαρβ. (following Hdt.) ap. Phot., etc., s. Zalmoxis—that he had also promised that he and his followers would return to earth alive after a certain time (three years). That such a belief in the “return” of the dead actually existed among the Thracians is evident from the quotations provided in the last note. The tale of Zalmoxis’ trick (which may have been intended humorously by its creators) seemed questionable even to Hdt., but it is not purely fictitious (any more than similar stories about Pythagoras, Trophonios, and later Empedotimos): it is more an euhemerist interpretation of a legendary miracle. Zalmoxis' disappearance into an underground chamber touches upon the belief in his eternal dwelling in a hollow mountain slope, an men’s quarters in Mt. Kogaionon, which Str. 298 mentions clearly. In that mountain, the god resides; just like Rhesos hidden in the caves of the silvery earth of Mt. Pangaios, who lives there as an human or godlike person [E.], Rh. 970; cf. chap. iv, n. 36. He exists there eternally like the Bacchus prophet, who has become a god, to whom the tragedy vaguely refers in lines 972 f. as living on Mt. Pangaios (this may be referring to Lykourgos—see G. Hermann, Op. v, 23 f.—and probably not to Orpheus, as Maass, Orpheus, p. 68 [1895], suggests). The clear parallel is Amphiaraos and Trophonios in their caves, and Orig., Cels. iii, 34 (see above, chap. iii, n. 13), connects them with Zalmoxis. We can confidently complete Hdt.’s account of how the lost of the Getai depart and achieve everlasting life Zalmoxis demon (iv, 94), by stating that they reach this same hollow mountain, a subterranean place of joy where they live with the god. Mnaseas compares Zalmoxis with Kronos (FHG.; Phot. Suid. EM., as mentioned earlier) and the similarity likely lies in the fact that both preside over the spirits of the blessed in another world. But in addition to this, the Thracian belief must also have included the idea of the god appearing periodically in the upper world. Hdt.’s story of the trick Zalmoxis played supports this (the return of souls that the story also indicates serves as a sort of counterpart to this). Should we assume that the manifestation of the god was anticipated after three years (just as it was after two years in the Dionysos festival; see above, n. 27)? We don’t know if these Thracian tribes celebrated the epiphany of the god with “enthusiastic” worship. Such a component in the cult of Zalmoxis seems to be hinted at by the fact that we hear of “physicians of Zalmoxis” (Pl., Charm. 156 D) and mantikê—which is usually closely linked with Medicine280 within the worship of this god. This must be the meaning of Zalm. being called seer: Str. 762, 297; cf. also the otherwise insignificant account of Ant. Diog. ap. Porph. VP. 14–15. Ultimately, the fervent nature of the cult seems to be indicated by the way the Getai identified the priest with the god (similar to the other cases mentioned above, notes 32 and 59). Therefore, the high priest himself is referred to as “god”: Str. 298 (he holds authority over both king and state: cf. the priest of Dionysus among the Bessoi, above, n. 53; cf. Jordanes, Get. 71). This made it plausible for the “god” Zalmoxis, whom even Hdt. rightly viewed as local spirit (iv, 96) to be transformed into a figure from history (he is noted this way in D.S. 1, 94, 2; Str. vii, 297; cf. Jordanes, Get. 39). If the current priest was called “god,” it might naturally be inferred that the “god” Zalmoxis once was just a priest as well.

69 Hermip. ap. Jos., Ap. i, 22.

69 Hermip. ap. Jos., Ap. i, 22.

70 In E., Hec. (1265 ff.) the Thracian Polymestor prophecies to Hekabe that she shall become a dog after her death, πύρσ’ ἔχουσα δέργματα. Hekabe asks πῶς δ’ οἶσθα μορφῆς τῆς ἐμῆς μετάστασιν; Pol.: ὁ Θρῃξὶ μάντις εἶπε Διόνυσος τάδε. It looks as if Eur. in this allusion to a belief in metempsychosis was intending to give a realistic touch of Thracian national character. He was well informed in such matters.

70 In E., Hec. (1265 ff.) the Thracian Polymestor predicts to Hekabe that she will become a dog after her death, holding a torch. Hekabe asks How do you know my transformation? Pol.: The Thracian seer said Dionysus.. It seems that Euripides, in this reference to a belief in reincarnation, aimed to add a realistic detail of Thracian culture. He was knowledgeable in these matters.

71 The connexion between Thracian Dionysos-worship and the belief in immortality and cult of the dead is vouched for, acc. to Rapp, Dionysosc. 15 ff., by the insc. found by Heuzey in Thracian districts. An epitaph found at Doxato (near Philippi) says of one who has died young (ll. 12 ff.): reparatus vivis in Elysiis. Sic placitum est divis aeterna vivere forma qui bene de supero lumine sit meritus.—nunc seu te Bromio signatae (see Anrich, Antike Mysterienwesen, 123 f.) mystides ad se florigero in prato congregem uti Satyrum, sive canistriferae poscunt sibi Naïdes aeque, qui ducibus taedis agmina festa trahas . . . (CIL. iii, 686). It is true that this remarkable fantasy contains nothing directly alluding to specifically Thracian worship. On the other hand this is certainly suggested and both the Thracian god and his connexion with a cult of the dead is implied in the use of the local cult-title of Dionysos in an offering made by Bythos and Rufus to the thiasi Liberi patris Tasibasteni of 300 denarii ex quorum reditu annuo rosalibus (and so at the yearly festival of the dead) ad monimentum eorum vescentur. CIL. iii, 703; cf. 704. Even the conjunction by E., Hec. 1265 ff., of the belief in palingenesia with the oracle of the Thracian Dionysos seems to imply a connexion between that belief and the cult of Dionysos.

71 The connection between the worship of Thracian Dionysos and the belief in immortality and the cult of the dead is confirmed, according to Rapp, Dionysosc. 15 ff., by the inscriptions found by Heuzey in Thracian regions. An epitaph discovered at Doxato (near Philippi) speaks of someone who died young (ll. 12 ff.): living restored in Elysium. Thus it is decreed by the eternal gods that those who have deserved well from the supreme light may live.—now whether you are marked by Bromio (see Anrich, Antike Mysterienwesen, 123 f.) Gather your mysteries in the blossoming meadow like the Satyr, or as the basket-bearing Naiads ask for themselves, leading the festive crowds with torches. . . . (CIL. iii, 686). It's true that this remarkable fantasy doesn’t directly reference specifically Thracian worship. However, it does suggest a connection, and the Thracian god along with his association with a cult of the dead is indicated by the use of the local cult title of Dionysos in an offering made by Bythos and Rufus to the thiasi Liberi patris Tasibasteni of 300 denarii ex quorum reditu annuo rosalibus (and thus at the yearly festival of the dead) They will eat for a monument.. CIL. iii, 703; cf. 704. Even the connection noted by E., Hec. 1265 ff., between the belief in rebirth and the oracle of the Thracian Dionysos seems to imply a relationship between that belief and the cult of Dionysos.

72 πολλοὶ μὲν ναρθηκοφόροι, παῦροι δέ τε Βάκχοι ap. Pl., Phd. 69 C. The strict meaning of this Orphic verse (Lob., Agl. 813 ff.) is that out of the multitudes who take part in the Bacchic festival only a few have any real right to call themselves by the name of the god—as having become one with him through their ecstasy and exaltation. A special morbid state was necessary for that: the same state which in other circumstances made the real shamans, Piajes, etc.

72 Many are the ones carrying the thyrsus, but few are the Bacchants. ap. Pl., Phd. 69 C. The strict meaning of this Orphic verse (Lob., Agl. 813 ff.) is that among the many who participate in the Bacchic festival, only a few truly have the right to call themselves by the name of the god—having become one with him through their ecstasy and elevation. A specific intense state was necessary for that: the same state that, in other contexts, creates true shamans, Piajes, etc.

73 Even when their ἔκστασις had ceased the ecstatic worshippers still regarded as real the visions which they had enjoyed in that condition: οἷον συνέβη Ἀντιφέροντι τῷ Ὠρείτῃ καὶ ἄλλοις ἐξισταμένοις. τὰ γὰρ φαντάσματα ἔλεγον ὡς γενόμενα καὶ ὡς μνημονεύοντες, Arist. π. μνήμης, 1, p. 451a, 8. “Magicians who had subsequently been converted to Christianity were still convinced of the reality of their earlier visions: they thought they had seen something perfectly real.” 281 Müller, Amerik. Urrelig. 80. Add: Tylor, ii, 131; Cranz, Greenland, p. 197.

73 Even after their ecstasy ended, the ecstatic worshippers still believed the visions they experienced in that state were real: As it happened with Antiphon and the Oretans, while others stood by. For the apparitions were saying they had come into being and were being remembered., Arist. π. memory, 1, p. 451a, 8. “Magicians who later converted to Christianity were still convinced that their earlier visions were real: they thought they had seen something completely genuine.” 281 Müller, Amerik. Urrelig. 80. Add: Tylor, ii, 131; Cranz, Greenland, p. 197.

74 See above, chap. i, p. 7 ff.

74 See above, ch. 1, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ etc.

75 Hdt. v, 4 (speaking of the Τραυσοί. Hsch. has the same, s.v. Τραυσός). The story was then added to the regular list of νόμιμα βαρβαρικά used for illustrating the variability of νόμος. It was soon after told of the Κρόβυζοι: Isig., Mir. 27 (they were also regarded as strong adherents of a belief in immortality; see above, n. 65); then of the Καυσιανοί: Nic. Dam., Mir. 18 West. Zenob., Prov. v, 25, p. 128, 5 L.-Schn. (Καύσιοι, Καυσιανοί). It occurs again in a fragment of some collection of νόμιμα βαρβαρικά written before the third century (there is no reason to ascribe it to Aristotle) given by Mahaffy, On the Flinders Petrie Papyri, Transcript., p. 29: Καυσιανοῖς δὲ νόμιμον τοὺς μὲν γιγνομένους θρηνεῖν τοὺς δὲ τελευτῶντας εὐδαιμονίζειν ὡς πολλῶν κακῶν ἀναπεπαυμένους (κακῶν as above or πόνῶν must be supplied to fill the gap; cf. the well-known fragment of Eur. Cresph.: ἐχρῆν γὰρ ἡμᾶς . . . fr. 449, which perhaps alludes to Hdt.’s account). It is told of Thracians in general, or of some tribe not particularly named, by S. E., P. iii, 232; Val. Max. 2, 6, 12 (both clearly drawing on collections of νόμιμα βαρβαρικά); Mela, ii, 18; AP. ix, 111 (Archias). There were thus three sources of the story: Besides Hdt.’s, two in which either the Krobyzoi or the Kausianoi were named as the Thracian tribe instead of Hdt.’s Trausoi.

75 Hdt. v, 4 (referring to the Traumas. Hsch. mentions the same under Trausos). This account was later included in the standard collection of legal barbaric used to illustrate the variability of law. It was shortly thereafter recounted about the Κρόβυζοι: Isig., Mir. 27 (they were also seen as strong believers in immortality; see above, n. 65); then about the Καυσιανοί: Nic. Dam., Mir. 18 West. Zenob., Prov. v, 25, p. 128, 5 L.-Schn. (Καύσιοι, Καυσιανοί). It appears again in a fragment from some collection of legally barbaric written before the third century (there's no reason to attribute it to Aristotle) as noted by Mahaffy in On the Flinders Petrie Papyri, Transcript., p. 29: According to the Chaldaeans, it's customary to mourn those who are born and to celebrate those who have died, as they are relieved from many hardships.(bad things as mentioned before or pains should be supplied to fill in the gap; cf. the well-known fragment of Eur. Cresph.: We should . . . fr. 449, which may reference Hdt.'s account). It's spoken about the Thracians in general, or a specific tribe not named, by S. E., P. iii, 232; Val. Max. 2, 6, 12 (both clearly drawing from collections of legal barbaric); Mela, ii, 18; AP. ix, 111 (Archias). Therefore, there were three sources for the story: Aside from Hdt.'s, there are two where either the Krobyzoi or the Kausianoi were identified as the Thracian tribe instead of Hdt.'s Trausoi.

76 ὅσων κακῶν ἐξαπαλλαχθεὶς ἔστι ἐν πάσῃ εὐδαιμονίῃ, Hdt. v, 4.

76 Those who have been freed from all troubles experience all kinds of happiness., Hdt. v, 4.

77 See Jul., Caes. 327 D, Mela, ii, 18. Likewise of the Καυσιανοί in Anon. ap. Mahaffy (see n. 75), p. 29, 10–12. Iamb., VP. 173: as a result of the (Pythagorean) doctrine of immortality taught by Zalmoxis ἔτι καὶ νῦν οἱ Γαλάται (because they had been instructed by Zalm.; from a similar fabulous source comes Hippol., RH. i, 2, p. 14, 93 D.-S.) καὶ οἱ Τράλεις καὶ πολλοὶ τῶν βαρβάρων τοὺς αὑτῶν υἱοὺς πείθουσιν ὡς οὐκ ἔστι φθαρῆναι τὴν ψυχήν . . . καὶ ὅτι τὸν θάνατον οὐ φοβητέον, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς κινδύνους εὐρώστως ἑκτέον.—Τράλλεις Scaliger for the MS. τραλις, rightly as far as sense goes. But we find the name ΤΡΑΛΕIΣ given to the Pergamene mercenaries called after the Thracian tribes: Ins. Perg. i, n. 13, 23, 59. These had already served as infantry in 331 in the army of Alexander the Great: D.S. 17, 65, 1; cf. Hsch. Τραλλεῖς. They were a south Thracian tribe: Plu., Ages. 16; Ap. Lac. 42; Str. 649 (where read Τραλλέων); Tralli Thraeces, Liv. 38, 21, 2, who elsewhere calls them Illyriorum genus, 27, 32, 4; 31, 35, 1. It appears that a branch of the Thracian tribe of the Tralles reached Illyria in their wanderings; there Theopompos, too, knew them: Steph. Byz. Τραλλία; cf. also s. vv. Βῆγις, Βόλουρος (cf. Tomaschek, Sitzb. Wien. Ak., 128, iv, p. 56 f.).

77 See Jul., Caes. 327 D, Mela, ii, 18. Similarly of the Burned-out in Anon. ap. Mahaffy (see n. 75), p. 29, 10–12. Iamb., VP. 173: as a result of the (Pythagorean) doctrine of immortality taught by Zalmoxis Even now the Gauls (because they had been instructed by Zalm.; from a similar legendary source comes Hippol., RH. i, 2, p. 14, 93 D.-S.) Both the Trajani and many of the barbarians persuade their sons that the soul cannot be destroyed... and that death should not be feared, but rather, one should face dangers steadfastly.. — Tralles Scaliger for the MS. τραλις, rightly as far as meaning goes. But we find the name ΤΡΑΛΕIΣ referred to the Pergamene mercenaries named after the Thracian tribes: Ins. Perg. i, n. 13, 23, 59. These had already served as infantry in 331 in the army of Alexander the Great: D.S. 17, 65, 1; cf. Hsch. Τραλλεῖς. They were a southern Thracian tribe: Plu., Ages. 16; Ap. Lac. 42; Str. 649 (where read Τραλλέων); Tralli Thracians, Liv. 38, 21, 2, who elsewhere calls them Illyrian type, 27, 32, 4; 31, 35, 1. It appears that a branch of the Thracian tribe of the Tralles reached Illyria in their migrations; there Theopompos also knew them: Steph. Byz. Ταραχή; cf. also s. vv. Βήγας, Βόλος (cf. Tomaschek, Sitzb. Wien. Ak., 128, iv, p. 56 f.).

78 Appetitus maximus mortis, Mart. Cap. 6, 656. The Thracians esp. are meant by Galen when he speaks of βαρβάρων ἐνίοις who entertained the belief ὅτι τὸ ἀποθνήσκειν ἐστὶ καλόν (xix, p. 704 K).

78 Great desire for death, Mart. Cap. 6, 656. Galen refers specifically to the Thracians when he talks about barbarians in some, who believed because dying is good (xix, p. 704 K).

CHAPTER IX

Dionysian Religion in Greece

IT'S A COMBINATION WITH A POLLINE RELIGION. ECSTATIC PROPHECY. RITUAL PURIFICATION AND EXORCISM. ASCETICISM

The Greeks received from the Thracians and assimilated to their own purposes the worship of Dionysos, just as, in all probability, they received the personality and worship of Ares and the Muses. Of this assimilation we cannot give any further particulars; it took place in a period lying before the beginnings of historical tradition. In this period a multiplicity of separate tendencies and conceptions, freely mingled with features borrowed from foreign creeds, were welded together to form the religion of Greece.

The Greeks adopted and adapted the worship of Dionysos from the Thracians, much like they likely did with the figures and worship of Ares and the Muses. We can't provide more details about this adaptation since it happened before historical records began. During this time, various separate ideas and beliefs, which incorporated elements from foreign religions, came together to create the religion of Greece.

Homer is already acquainted with the fanatical worship of Dionysos; the god is called by the name under which Greek worshippers made themselves familiar with the stranger.1 But in Homer, Dionysos appears only once or twice for a moment in the background. He is not the bountiful giver of wine; he does not belong to the Round Table of the great gods assembled on Olympos. Nowhere in the story told in either of the Homeric poems does he influence the life and destiny of human beings. There is no need to seek far for the reason of Dionysos’ subordinate position in the Iliad and the Odyssey. Homer’s silence makes it quite plain that at that time the Thracian god had not yet emerged from a position of insignificance or merely local importance in the life and faith of Greece. Nor is this hard to understand; the cult of Dionysos only gradually won recognition in Greece. Many legends tell of the battles that had to be fought by the new worship and of the opposition that met the invader. We hear how the Dionysiac frenzy and the ekstasis of the Dionysiac dance-festival took possession of the whole female population of many districts of Central Greece and the Peloponnese.2 Sometimes a few women would venture to join the wandering choruses of wild Bacchants who danced upon the mountain tops; here and there the king of the land would oppose the progress of this tumultuous worship. Such stories are told of the daughters of Minyas in Orchomenos, of Proitos in Tiryns, of King Pentheus at Thebes, and Perseus at Argos;3 their opposition to the Dionysiac form of worship, occurring in 283 reality at no precise date, assumed a deceptive distinctness in the artificial systems of the mythologists and developed the character of historical events. In reality what we are told of these individuals—how the opponents of Dionysos themselves fell into even wilder frenzy and in Bacchic delirium slew and tore in pieces their own children instead of the victim-animal, or (as in the case of Pentheus) became themselves the victim slain and torn in pieces by the raging women—all this belongs to the class of ætiological myth. They are legends in which special features of worship (for example, the existing or dimly remembered sacrifice of human beings at the feasts of Dionysos) are provided with a mythical prototype in the supposed historical past of mythology, and thus receive their justification.4 Still, there remains a substratum of historical fact underlying such stories. They all presuppose that the cult of Dionysos arrived from abroad and entered into Greece as something foreign. This presupposition notoriously corresponds to the actual facts of the case, and we are bound to assume that the account which they immediately proceed to give of the violent opposition which this cult, and only this cult, met with in many parts of Greece, is not pure fiction.5 We are obliged to recognize that such stories preserved a trace of real historical memory expressed in the one form which was invariably assumed by the earliest Greek tradition, namely mythology, in which all the accidents and varieties of earthly experience were condensed into types of universal applicability.

Homer is already familiar with the intense worship of Dionysos; the god is known by the name that Greek worshippers used to connect with the outsider. But in Homer, Dionysos only makes a brief appearance a couple of times in the background. He isn't seen as the generous giver of wine; he isn’t part of the great gods gathering at Olympus. In neither of the Homeric poems does he affect the lives and fates of people. The reason for Dionysos' lesser status in the Iliad and the Odyssey is clear; Homer’s lack of mention shows that at that time, the Thracian god hadn't risen from a position of insignificance or just local importance in Greek life and faith. This makes sense since the worship of Dionysos gradually gained recognition in Greece. Many legends recount the struggles that the new worship faced and the resistance it encountered. We hear how the wild frenzy and ecstatic dances of the Dionysiac festivals captivated the entire female population of many regions in Central Greece and the Peloponnese. Sometimes, a few women would join the wandering groups of wild Bacchants who danced on the mountain tops; occasionally, local kings would try to resist this uproarious worship. Stories like this are told about the daughters of Minyas in Orchomenos, Proitos in Tiryns, King Pentheus at Thebes, and Perseus at Argos; their opposition to the Dionysiac worship, which in reality happened at no specific time, took on an illusory clarity in the fabricated narratives of mythologists, resembling historical events. The tales of these individuals—how the opponents of Dionysos themselves fell into even greater frenzy and, in Bacchic delirium, killed their own children instead of the sacrificial animal, or (in Pentheus' case) became the victims who were themselves killed and torn apart by the frenzied women—belong to the category of etiological myth. They are legends where particular aspects of worship (like the existing or vaguely remembered human sacrifices during Dionysos festivals) are attributed a mythical origin in the alleged historical past of mythology, thereby justifying their practices. Still, there’s a truth beneath these stories. They all imply that the cult of Dionysos originated from outside and came to Greece as something foreign. This assumption aligns with the actual events, and we must accept that the violent resistance this cult faced in many areas of Greece is not entirely fictitious. We must acknowledge that these stories preserve a fragment of real historical memory, expressed in the form that ancient Greek tradition always took—mythology, where all the occurrences and varieties of human experience are condensed into universally applicable archetypes.

It was then not without opposition, it appears, that the worship of Dionysos, descending from the north into Boeotia, spread from thence to the Peloponnese and at an early period invaded even some of the islands as well. In truth, even if we had no evidence at all on the point, we should have expected the Greeks to feel a profound repugnance to this disorderly and tumultuous Thracian worship; a deep-seated instinct must in their case have resisted such extravagance of emotional excitement and refused to lose itself in the limitless abyss of mere feeling. This unchecked roaming over the mountain sides in nocturnal revelry might be suitable enough for Thracian women-folk, but respectable Greek citizens could not give themselves up to such things without a struggle-—without, indeed, a break with all inherited propriety and decorum.6 It seems to have been the women who were the first to give in to the invading worship,7 carried away in a real frenzy of inspired enthusiasm, and the new cult may really have owed its first success chiefly to them. What we are told of the irresistible progress and widespread success8 of the 284 Bacchic dance-worship and its exaltation reminds us of the phenomena which have attended similar religious epidemics such as have in more recent times occasionally burst out and overflowed whole countries. We may in particular recall to mind the accounts which we have of the violent and widespread dance-madness which, soon after the severe mental and physical shock suffered by Europe in the Black Death of the fourteenth century, broke out on the Rhine and for centuries could not be entirely stamped out. Those who were attacked by the fever were driven by an irresistible impulse to dance. The bystanders, in convulsions of sympathetic and imitative fury joined in the whirling dance themselves. Thus the malady was spread by contagion, and soon whole companies of men, women, and girls, wandered dancing through the country. In spite of the insufficiency of the surviving records, the religious character of this dance-enthusiasm is unmistakably apparent. The Church regarded it as a “heresy”. The dancers called upon the name of St. John or of “certain demons”; hallucinations and visions of a religious nature accompanied their ecstasies.9 Can it have been another such popular religious malady which attacked Greece—perhaps in the train of the disturbance of spiritual equilibrium caused by the destructive migrations which take their name from the Dorians? The circumstances of the time must have predisposed men’s minds in that direction and made them ready to accept the Thracian Dionysos and his enthusiastic dance-worship. In any case this invasion did not, like its mediæval counterpart, break down by coming into conflict with a well-established religion and an exclusive ecclesiastical organization of a very different temper from its own. In the deceptive twilight of myth we can only dimly discern the arrival and progress of the Dionysiac religion in Greece. But so much at least is evident: the Bacchic cult, though it had to overcome many obstacles, at last established itself in Greece and triumphantly overran both mainland and islands, until in the course of time it obtained a profound and far-reaching importance in Greek life of which Homer could scarcely give a hint.

It wasn't without resistance that the worship of Dionysos, coming from the north into Boeotia, spread to the Peloponnese and even reached some of the islands early on. Honestly, even without any evidence, we would expect the Greeks to feel a strong aversion to this chaotic and wild Thracian worship; they must have instinctively resisted such emotional excess and refused to get lost in a bottomless pit of mere feelings. This wild nighttime revelry may have fit Thracian women, but respectable Greek citizens couldn't indulge in it without a fight—without essentially breaking away from all their traditional standards of propriety and decorum.6 It seems that the women were the first to surrender to this new worship,7 caught up in a frenzy of inspired enthusiasm, and the new cult likely owed its initial success mostly to them. The stories we hear about the unstoppable growth and widespread success8 of the Bacchic dance-worship and its exaltation remind us of similar religious outbreaks that have occasionally erupted and overwhelmed entire countries in more recent times. We can particularly think of the violent and widespread dance mania that, following the severe mental and physical shock of the Black Death in the fourteenth century, broke out along the Rhine and persisted for centuries. Those stricken by this fever felt an irresistible urge to dance. Bystanders joined in, caught up in a frenzy of shared excitement. Thus, the ailment spread contagiously, and soon whole groups of men, women, and girls wandered through the countryside dancing. Despite the limited surviving records, the religious nature of this dance enthusiasm is clearly evident. The Church deemed it a “heresy.” The dancers invoked the name of St. John or “certain demons”; their ecstasies were accompanied by hallucinations and religious visions.9 Could it have been another similar religious epidemic that hit Greece—perhaps as a result of the spiritual turmoil brought on by the destructive migrations associated with the Dorians? The conditions of the time must have prompted people’s minds this way, making them open to the Thracian Dionysos and his passionate dance-worship. In any case, this invasion did not, like its medieval counterpart, clash with a well-established religion and an exclusive church organization of a very different nature from its own. In the hazy myths, we can only vaguely perceive the arrival and spread of Dionysiac religion in Greece. But one thing is clear: despite facing many challenges, the Bacchic cult eventually took root in Greece and triumphantly spread across both the mainland and the islands, gaining a profound and far-reaching significance in Greek life that Homer could barely hint at.

§ 2

It was no longer simply the old Thracian Dionysos who now took his place beside the other great gods of the Greek Olympos as one of themselves. He had become Hellenized and humanized in the meantime. Cities and states celebrated him in yearly festivals as the giver of the vine’s inspiring fruit, as 285 the daimonic patron of vegetation, and the whole of Nature’s rich and flourishing growth. He was worshipped as the incarnation of all natural life and vigour in the fullest and widest sense: as the typical exponent of the most eager enjoyment of life. Even Art, the highest expression of the courage and pride of life, drew much of its inspiration and its aspiration towards the infinite from the worship of Dionysos; and the drama, that supreme achievement of Greek poetry, arose out of the choruses of the Dionysiac festival.

It was no longer just the old Thracian Dionysos who stood beside the other great gods of Greek Olympus as one of their own. He had become more Greek and more relatable over time. Cities and states honored him with annual festivals as the giver of the vine’s inspiring fruit, as 285 the spiritual patron of vegetation, and of all of Nature’s rich, flourishing growth. He was revered as the embodiment of all natural life and vitality in the broadest sense: as the typical representative of the most enthusiastic enjoyment of life. Even Art, the highest expression of life's courage and pride, drew much of its inspiration and its longing for the infinite from the worship of Dionysos; and the drama, that ultimate accomplishment of Greek poetry, emerged from the choruses of the Dionysiac festival.

Now the art of the actor consists in entering into a strange personality, and in speaking and acting out of a character not his own. At bottom it retains a profound and ultimate connexion with its most primitive source—that strange power of transfusing the self into another being which the really inspired participator in the Dionysiac revels achieved in his ekstasis. The essential features of the god as he first arrived in Greece from foreign lands, in spite of much alteration and transformation of the primitive type, were thus not entirely lost. There remained also, in addition to the cheerful festivity of the daylight worship of Dionysos, as it was celebrated more particularly in Athens, certain vestiges of the old ecstatic worship which drove men and women over the mountains in nocturnal revelry. In many places there were still celebrated the trieteric festivals10 in which at recurrent intervals the “Epiphany” of Dionysos, his appearance in the world of men and ascent from the underworld, was solemnized by night. The primitive character of Dionysos the Lord of Spirits and of the Souls of the dead—a very different figure indeed from the tender and delicate Wine-God of later times—was still obscurely present in many features of the Dionysiac festivals, in those of Delphi especially, but even to some extent at Athens too.11 The ecstasy and the violence, even the dark savagery of the ancient cult did not quite die out in the midst of all the refinements of Greek civilization; recognizable traces of such things were preserved in the Nuktelia and Agrionia and in the various trieteric festivals that were offered to the god in many different localities.12 In Greece the awful god received the blood of human victims.13 Nor did the outward signs of delirious frenzy, such as the eating of raw flesh, the killing and tearing in pieces of snakes, entirely disappear.14 So little indeed, did the Bacchic frenzy that could exalt and lift the worshipper to communion with the god and his train, disappear before the gentler attractions of the gracious wine-god and his festival, that the raving and “possession” which characterized the cult of Dionysos were 286 now actually regarded by foreign peoples as the essentially Hellenic form of the worship of the god.15

Now, the art of acting involves stepping into a different personality and expressing and behaving as a character that isn't your own. At its core, it keeps a deep and fundamental connection with its most original source—that strange ability to lose oneself in another being, which the truly inspired participant in the Dionysiac celebrations achieved in his ekstasis. The key aspects of the god as he first came to Greece from other regions, despite many changes from the original type, were not completely lost. Alongside the joyful celebration of daylight worship of Dionysos, especially in Athens, there were still remnants of the old ecstatic worship that drove men and women into the mountains for nighttime festivities. Many places still held the trieteric festivals in which, at regular intervals, the “Epiphany” of Dionysos—his emergence into the human world and rise from the underworld—was solemnized at night. The primitive nature of Dionysos, Lord of Spirits and Souls of the dead—a figure quite different from the gentle and refined Wine-God of later times—was still vaguely present in many elements of the Dionysiac festivals, particularly in those at Delphi, but to some extent, in Athens as well. The ecstasy and intensity, even the dark savagery of the ancient cult, did not completely vanish amidst the refinements of Greek civilization; identifiable traces of such practices persisted in the Nuktelia and Agrionia and in various trieteric festivals dedicated to the god in many different areas. In Greece, the fearsome god received the blood of human sacrifices. Nor did the outward signs of frenzied delirium, like eating raw flesh or killing and dismembering snakes, entirely disappear. The Bacchic frenzy that could elevate and uplift the worshipper into communion with the god and his entourage hardly faded before the gentler attractions of the charming wine-god and his festival; the raving and “possession” that marked the cult of Dionysos were, in fact, considered by foreign peoples as the distinctly Hellenic form of worship of the god.

Thus, a sympathetic understanding of the orgiastic cult and its tremendous capabilities lived on. The “Bacchants” of Euripides still preserves for us a breath of its magic, a trace of the enthusiasm and exaltation that overwhelmed the senses and enthralled the will and consciousness of those who gave themselves up to the powerful Dionysiac influence. Like an irresistible current that overwhelms a swimmer or like the mysterious helplessness that frustrates the dreamer, the magic power emanating from the neighbourhood of the god took complete possession of the worshipper and drove him whither it willed. Everything in the world was transformed for him; he himself was altered. Every character in the play falls under the spell as soon as he enters into the magic circle. Even the modern reader who turns over the pages of Euripides’ poem feels something of that strange power to subdue the soul wielded by the Dionysiac mysteries and experiences in his own person a faint reflexion of these extraordinary states of mind.

Thus, a sympathetic understanding of the orgiastic cult and its tremendous capabilities lived on. The “Bacchants” of Euripides still preserves for us a breath of its magic, a trace of the enthusiasm and exaltation that overwhelmed the senses and captivated the will and consciousness of those who surrendered themselves to the powerful Dionysiac influence. Like an unstoppable current that sweeps away a swimmer or like the strange helplessness that frustrates a dreamer, the magical power emanating from the presence of the god completely took over the worshipper and drove them wherever it wanted. Everything in the world was transformed for them; they themselves were changed. Every character in the play falls under the spell as soon as they enter into the magic circle. Even the modern reader who flips through the pages of Euripides’ poem feels something of that strange power to captivate the soul wielded by the Dionysiac mysteries and experiences a faint reflection of these extraordinary states of mind within themselves.

Probably as a result of this profound Dionysiac fever which had once raged through Greece like an epidemic and was liable to periodic returns in the nocturnal festivals of the god, there remained in the constitution of the Greek people a certain morbid weakness, a susceptibility to suddenly appearing and as suddenly disappearing crises in which the normal powers of perceiving and feeling were temporarily overthrown. A few stray accounts have come down to us in which we read how such brief attacks of passing insanity ran through whole cities like an infectious disease.16 The Korybantic form of the malady, which was religious in character17 and took its name from the daimonic companions of the Phrygian Mountain Mother, was a phenomenon quite well-known to doctors and psychologists. Those affected by such fevers saw strange figures that corresponded to no objective reality, and heard the sound of invisible flutes, until at last they were excited to the highest pitch of frenzy and were seized with a violent desire to dance.18 The initiation festivals of the Phrygian deities were specially directed to the discharge and so eventually to the cure and “purgation” of such emotional states; the means employed being principally dance and music—more especially the music composed for the flute by the old Phrygian masters; music that could fill the soul with inspiration in suitably disposed natures.19 By such methods the ecstatic element was not simply suppressed or expelled, it was taken 287 up as a special disciplinary process by the physician-priesthood who recognized in it a vital movement and added it to the regular worship of the god.

Probably as a result of this intense Dionysian frenzy that once spread through Greece like an epidemic and tended to resurface during the nighttime festivals of the god, there remained in the makeup of the Greek people a certain fragile weakness, a vulnerability to sudden crises that would appear and disappear just as quickly, where normal perceptions and feelings were temporarily disrupted. A few scattered accounts have survived in which we read about how these brief episodes of temporary insanity swept through entire cities like an infectious disease.16 The Korybantic version of this condition, which was religious in nature17, was well known to doctors and psychologists. Those who experienced such fevers saw strange figures that didn't correspond to any objective reality and heard sounds from invisible flutes, until they were ultimately driven to a state of extreme frenzy and overcome by an intense urge to dance.18 The initiation festivals of the Phrygian deities were specifically designed to release and eventually cure these emotional states; the main tools used were dance and music—especially the flute music composed by the old Phrygian masters, which could inspire the soul in those who were receptive.19 Through such practices, the ecstatic element wasn't simply repressed or expelled; it was embraced as a special form of discipline by the physician-priesthood, who recognized it as a vital force and integrated it into the regular worship of the god.

In a similar fashion Greece in its most enlightened period accepted and practised the “enthusiastic” cult of Dionysos. Even the tumultuous night-festivals of the Thracian god—festivals closely related to those of Phrygia from which they had borrowed and to which they had given so many features—were made to serve the “purgation” of the ecstatically exalted soul. The worshipper in such festivals “initiated his soul into the company of the god in holy purifications, while he raged over the mountains in Bacchic frenzy”.20 The purification consisted in this case, too, of violent excitement in which the soul was stimulated to the highest pitch of religious ecstasy. Dionysos as “Bakcheus” awoke the holy madness which he himself again, after it had reached its highest point of intensity, stilled and tranquillized as Lysios and Meilichios.21 The old Thracian cult of ecstasy has here been modified in a fashion that belonged only to Greek soil and to Greek modes of thought. Legend, allegorizing the facts, threw back this final development of the Dionysiac worship into the remotest antiquity. Even Hesiodic poems22 related how the daughters of King Proitos of Tiryns wandered in the holy frenzy of Dionysos23 over the mountain of Peloponnesus, until at last they and all the multitude of women who had joined them were healed and “purified” by Melampous the Seer of Pylos famed in legend.24 The cure was effected through the intensification of the Dionysiac frenzy “with loud crying and inspired dancing,”25 and, further, by the use of certain special purificatory devices.26 Melampous did not put an end to the Dionysiac cult and its “enthusiasm”; he rather regulated and developed it. For this reason Herodotus can even call him the “Founder” of the Dionysiac cult in Greece.27 Legend, however, always recognized in this “founder” of the Dionysiac festival an adherent of the specifically Apolline form of religion. “Apollo had favoured him especially,” and bestowed upon him the Seership which became ancestral in his family.28 Legend used him as a type in which the reconciliation between the Apolline and the Dionysiac was figuratively expressed. The reconciliation is an historical fact, but it did not happen in the primitive past of legend.

In a similar way, Greece in its most enlightened period accepted and practiced the enthusiastic cult of Dionysos. Even the wild night festivals of the Thracian god—festivals closely related to those of Phrygia from which they had borrowed and to which they added many features—were used to serve the purification of the ecstatically elevated soul. The worshipper in these festivals “initiated his soul into the company of the god in holy purifications, while he raged over the mountains in Bacchic frenzy.”20 The purification involved intense excitement in which the soul was pushed to the highest point of religious ecstasy. Dionysos as “Bakcheus” awoke the holy madness, which he himself calmed and soothed afterward as Lysios and Meilichios.21 The ancient Thracian cult of ecstasy was modified here in a way that was unique to Greek soil and Greek modes of thought. Legend, reinterpreting the facts, pushed this final development of the Dionysian worship back into the distant past. Even Hesiodic poems22 narrated how the daughters of King Proitos of Tiryns wandered in the divine frenzy of Dionysos23 over the mountains of Peloponnesus, until finally they and the whole variety of women who joined them were healed and “purified” by Melampous the Seer of Pylos, who is famous in legend.24 The cure was achieved through the intensification of the Dionysian frenzy “with loud crying and inspired dancing,”25 and also through the use of certain special purificatory methods.26 Melampous didn’t end the Dionysian cult and its “enthusiasm”; instead, he regulated and developed it. Because of this, Herodotus even referred to him as the “Founder” of the Dionysian cult in Greece.27 However, legend always recognized in this “founder” of the Dionysian festival a follower of the specifically Apolline form of religion. “Apollo had favored him especially” and granted him the Seership that became hereditary in his family.28 Legend used him as a symbol in which the reconciliation between the Apolline and the Dionysian was figuratively expressed. The reconciliation is a historical fact, but it didn’t occur in the primitive past of legend.

It is a fact, however, that Apollo did at last, doubtless after prolonged resistance, enter into the closest alliance with this remarkable divine brother of his, the Hellenized Dionysos. 288 The covenant must have been made at Delphi. There at least on the heights of Parnasos, in the Korykian Cave, the trieteric festival of Dionysos was held every second year in the close neighbourhood of Apollo the Lord of Delphi. Nay, more, in Apollo’s own temple the “grave” of Dionysos was shown,29 and at this grave, while the Thyiades of the god rushed over the mountain heights, the priests of Apollo celebrated a secret festival of their own.30 The festal year of Delphi was divided, though unequally it is true, between Apollo and Dionysos.31 To such an extent had Dionysos taken root at Delphi,32 so closely were the two gods related, that while the front pediment of the temple showed the form of Apollo, the back pediment represented Dionysos—and the Dionysos of the nocturnal ecstatic revels. Apollo, too, shared in the trieteric festival of Dionysos,33 while Dionysos in later times at the penteteric festival of the Pythia, received, as well as Apollo, his share of sacrifice and the contests of cyclic choruses.34 The two divinities have many of their titles and attributes in common; in the end the distinction between them seems to disappear entirely.35

It's a fact that Apollo eventually, likely after much hesitation, formed a close alliance with his remarkable divine brother, the Hellenized Dionysos. 288 This agreement was probably made at Delphi. There, on the heights of Parnasos, in the Korykian Cave, Dionysos's triennial festival took place every two years, right near Apollo, the Lord of Delphi. Furthermore, within Apollo’s own temple, the “grave” of Dionysos was displayed, 29 and at this grave, while the Thyiades of the god rushed over the mountain tops, the priests of Apollo held their own secret festival. 30 The festive year at Delphi was divided, albeit unequally, between Apollo and Dionysos. 31 Dionysos had established such a presence at Delphi, 32 and the two gods were so closely linked that while the front pediment of the temple displayed Apollo's form, the back pediment depicted Dionysos—and the Dionysos of the night’s ecstatic celebrations. Apollo also participated in Dionysos's triennial festival, 33 while in later times, during the penteteric festival of the Pythia, Dionysos, alongside Apollo, received his share of sacrifices and the contests of cyclic choruses. 34 The two deities share many of their titles and attributes; ultimately, the distinction between them seems to completely fade away. 35

Antiquity never forgot that at Delphi, the radiating centre of his cult, Apollo was an intruder. Among the older deities whom he supplanted there, the name of Dionysos also occurred;36 but the Delphic priesthood thought it wise to tolerate the Thracian god and his ecstatic cult that at first seemed so opposed to that of their own deity. Dionysos may have been too vigorous a spirit to allow his worship to be suppressed like that of the Earth divinity who sent the prophetic dreams. Apollo is the “Lord of Delphi”; but the priesthood of the Delphic Apollo, following in this the tendency to religious syncretism which is so recognizable in them, took the worship of Dionysos under their protection. The Delphic Oracle in fact introduced Dionysos into localities where he had hitherto been a stranger, and nowhere so successfully or with such momentous consequences as at Athens.37 It was this promoting of the Dionysiac form of religion by the great corporation which had the leadership in Greece in all matters of religion, that did more than anything else to secure for the god and his worship that profound, wide-reaching influence on Greek religion that Homer, who knows little even of the Delphic Oracle, completely ignores.

Antiquity never forgot that at Delphi, the central hub of his cult, Apollo was an outsider. Among the older deities he replaced there, Dionysus' name also came up; 36 but the Delphic priesthood decided it was wise to tolerate the Thracian god and his ecstatic worship that initially seemed so different from their own deity's. Dionysus may have been too powerful a spirit to let his worship be suppressed like that of the Earth goddess who sent prophetic dreams. Apollo is the "Lord of Delphi"; however, the priesthood of Delphic Apollo, reflecting their recognizable tendency towards religious syncretism, embraced the worship of Dionysus. The Delphic Oracle actually introduced Dionysus into areas where he had previously been unknown, and nowhere was this more successful or impactful than in Athens. 37 It was this promotion of the Dionysian form of worship by the leading organization in Greece on all religious matters that did more than anything else to secure for the god and his worship a deep, far-reaching influence on Greek religion, which Homer, who knows little of the Delphic Oracle, completely overlooks.

But it was a gentler and more civilized Dionysos whom Delphi popularized and even helped to re-shape; the extravagance of his ecstatic abandonment was pruned and moderated 289 to suit the more sober temper of ordinary city-life, and the brighter, daylight festivals of urban and countryside worship. Hardly a trace of the old Thracian worship of ecstasy and exaltation is discoverable in the Dionysiac worship of Athens. In other places, and especially in the districts ruled over by the Delphic Apollo himself, Dionysiac worship preserved more of its primitive nocturnal wildness. Even Athens, in obedience to an oracular command, sent a religious embassy of elected women to the Delphic Trieteria. It is plain enough however, that in all this there was nothing but a dim counterpart of the former tumultuous mountain-worship of the god, and its profound soul-stirring ceremonies; the worship of Athens and Delphi had reduced all that to a vague ritual traditionalism.38

But it was a gentler and more civilized Dionysus that Delphi popularized and even helped to reshape; the extravagance of his ecstatic abandon was trimmed and toned down to fit the more serious nature of everyday city life and the brighter, daytime festivals of urban and rural worship. Hardly any trace of the old Thracian worship of ecstasy and exaltation can be found in the Dionysian worship of Athens. In other places, particularly in the areas governed by the Delphic Apollo himself, Dionysian worship retained more of its primitive nighttime wildness. Even Athens, following an oracle's command, sent a religious delegation of chosen women to the Delphic Trieteria. However, it is clear that in all this, there was nothing more than a faint echo of the former chaotic mountain worship of the god, along with its deeply moving ceremonies; the worship in Athens and Delphi had reduced all of that to a vague ritual traditionalism.289

§ 3

But in spite of all attempts to moderate and civilize it outwardly, the cult of Dionysos retained as its most enduring feature a tendency to the ecstatic and the extravagant that was continually breaking out in threatening or alluring guise. So strong indeed was the ecstatic element in Dionysiac worship, that when the Apolline and Dionysiac forms of religion became united, as at Delphi, it was the Apolline worship—once so hostile to anything in the nature of ecstasy—that had to accept this entirely novel feature.

But despite all efforts to tone it down and make it more civilized on the surface, the cult of Dionysos kept its most lasting trait: a tendency toward the ecstatic and extravagant that frequently erupted in ways that were either threatening or enticing. The ecstatic aspect of Dionysiac worship was so powerful that when the Apolline and Dionysiac forms of religion merged, like at Delphi, it was the Apolline worship—once so opposed to anything resembling ecstasy—that had to embrace this entirely new characteristic.

The “prophecy of inspiration”, deriving its knowledge of the unseen from an elevation of the human soul to the divine, was not always a part of Greek religion. Homer, of course, knows of the prophetic art in which specially instructed seers explained such signs of the gods’ will as occurred accidentally or were purposely sought out by men, and by this means claimed to discover the will of heaven both at the moment and for the future. This is, in fact, the sort of prophecy that Apollo bestowed upon his seers.39 But the prophecy of which there was no “art” and which “no man could be taught”40 (for it came in a moment by “inspiration”)—of this Homer shows no trace.41 In addition to professional and independently working prophets the Odyssey, and even the Iliad, too, are aware of the enclosed oracular institutions belonging to the temple of Zeus at Dodona and that of Apollo at Pytho.42 Both these used the names of the gods with whose service they were concerned to increase the effect and the credit of their utterances. In the Odyssey (but not the Iliad) there is a reference to the influence wielded by the oracle of Apollo in the more important circumstances of a people’s 290 life. But whether at that time it was an inspired prophetess who gave replies at Delphi we cannot be sure from the poet’s words. There must have been oracles of sortilege43 at that place from an early period under the protection of the god and it is these we should naturally expect a poet to mean who nowhere44 shows any knowledge of the striking phenomena of ecstatic mantikê.45

The “prophecy of inspiration,” which learns about the unseen by elevating the human soul to the divine, wasn’t always part of Greek religion. Homer, of course, is familiar with the prophetic art in which specially trained seers interpreted signs of the gods’ will that happened by chance or were deliberately sought by people, claiming to reveal the divine will both in the moment and for the future. This is precisely the type of prophecy that Apollo gave to his seers.39 However, Homer shows no sign of the kind of prophecy that involved no “art” and “could not be taught”40 (as it came suddenly by “inspiration”). Alongside professional prophets, the Odyssey, and even the Iliad, are aware of the oracular institutions at the temple of Zeus at Dodona and that of Apollo at Pytho.42 Both of these institutions used the names of the gods they served to enhance the impact and credibility of their messages. In the Odyssey (but not in the Iliad), there is a mention of the influence of Apollo’s oracle in significant moments of a community’s 290 life. Yet, it isn’t clear from the poet’s words whether it was an inspired prophetess answering queries at Delphi. There must have been oracles of some sort43 in that location from early on under the god's protection, and it’s these we should naturally think the poet is referring to, as he shows no understanding of the remarkable phenomena of ecstatic mantikê.45

In any case this new mantikê of inspired prophets, which subsequently enjoyed such enormous development and gave the Delphic oracle such peculiar power, was a late-coming innovation in the Apolline cult. Over the chasm in the rock at Pytho, out of which arose a strange and potent vapour from the depths of the earth, there had once existed an oracle of Gaia at which perhaps inquirers had received their instruction through the means of premonitory dreams by night.46 The earth-goddess was displaced by Apollo here as at many other oracular sites.47 The accuracy of this tradition is confirmed by the Delphic temple legend which speaks of the overthrow of the oracular earth-spirit Python by Apollo.48 The change may have been gradually brought about; in any case, where once the earth-divinity had spoken directly in dreams to the souls of men, there Apollo now prophesied—no longer indirectly through the intervening medium of signs and omens, but directly answering those who, in open-eyed wakefulness, inquired of him, and speaking to them out of the mouth of his ecstatically inspired prophetess.

In any case, this new mantikê of inspired prophets, which later experienced such tremendous growth and gave the Delphic oracle its unique power, was a late innovation in the Apolline cult. Over the chasm in the rock at Pytho, where a strange and powerful vapor rose from deep within the earth, there used to be an oracle of Gaia where seekers perhaps received guidance through prophetic dreams at night.46 The earth goddess was replaced by Apollo here as well as at many other oracular sites.47 The validity of this tradition is supported by the Delphic temple legend that describes how Apollo defeated the oracular earth spirit Python.48 This change may have occurred gradually; in any case, where the earth divinity once communicated directly through dreams to the souls of people, now Apollo prophesied—not indirectly through signs and omens, but directly responding to those who, in clear wakefulness, asked him questions, and speaking to them through the mouth of his ecstatically inspired prophetess.

This Delphic prophecy of inspiration is as far removed from the old Apolline art of interpreting omens as it is closely allied to the mantikê which we found attached from the earliest times to the Thracian cult of Dionysos.49 It appears that in Greece Dionysos but rarely obtained an official priesthood that could have organized or maintained a permanent oracular institute attached to a particular place or temple. In the one Dionysiac oracle in Greece, however, of which we have certain knowledge a priest gave prophecies in a state of “enthusiasm” and “possession” by the god.50 Enthusiasm and ecstasy are invariably the means of the Dionysiac prophecy just as they were the means of all Dionysiac religious experience. When we find Apollo in Delphi itself—the place where he most closely allied himself with Dionysos—deserting his old omen-interpretation and turning to the prophecy of ekstasis, we cannot have much doubt as to whence Apollo got this new thing.51

This Delphic prophecy of inspiration is as far removed from the old Apolline art of interpreting omens as it is closely connected to the mantikê that has been associated with the Thracian cult of Dionysos since ancient times.49 It seems that in Greece, Dionysos rarely had an official priesthood that could organize or maintain a permanent oracle linked to a specific place or temple. However, in the one known Dionysiac oracle in Greece, a priest delivered prophecies in a state of “enthusiasm” and “possession” by the god.50 Enthusiasm and ecstasy are always the means of Dionysiac prophecy, just as they were for all Dionysiac religious experiences. When we see Apollo in Delphi—the place where he most closely connected with Dionysos—abandoning his old method of interpreting omens and turning to the prophecy of ekstasis, we can't doubt where Apollo got this new approach.51

With the mantic ekstasis, Apollo received a Dionysiac element into his own religion. Henceforward, he, the cold, 291 aloof, sober deity of former times, can be addressed by titles that imply Bacchic excitement and self-abandonment. He is now the “enthusiastic”, the Bacchic god: Aeschylus strikingly calls him “ivy-crowned Apollo, the Bacchic-frenzied prophet” (fr. 341). It is now Apollo, who more than any other god, calls forth in men’s souls the madness52 that makes them clairvoyant and enables them to know hidden things. At not a few places there are founded oracular sites at which priests or priestesses in frenzied ecstasy utter what Apollo puts into their mouths. But the Pythian oracle remained the pattern of them all. There, prophecy was uttered by the Pythia, the youthful priestess who sat upon the tripod over the earth-chasm and was inspired by the intoxicating vapour that arose from it, until she was filled with the god, and with his spirit.53 The god, so ran the belief, entered into the earthly body; or else the soul of the priestess, “released” from her body, received the heavenly revelation with spiritual sense.54 What she then “with frenzied mouth” proclaimed, that the god spoke out of her; when she said “I”, Apollo was speaking of himself and of what concerned him.55 It is the god who lives, thinks, and speaks in her so long as the madness lasts.

With the prophetic ekstasis, Apollo incorporated a Dionysian aspect into his own worship. From then on, the once distant, sober deity could be referred to with titles that suggest Bacchic joy and abandonment. He became known as the “enthusiastic,” the Bacchic god: Aeschylus notably refers to him as the “ivy-crowned Apollo, the Bacchic-frenzied prophet” (fr. 341). Now, more than any other god, Apollo evokes a madness in people's souls that grants them clarity and insight into hidden knowledge. Numerous oracular sites emerged where priests or priestesses, in a state of ecstatic frenzy, expressed what Apollo inspired them to say. However, the Pythian oracle remained the most prominent of all. There, prophecy was delivered by the Pythia, a young priestess who sat on the tripod above the earth's fissure, inspired by the intoxicating fumes that rose from it until she was filled with the god and his spirit. According to belief, the god entered her earthly body; alternatively, the priestess's soul, “released” from her body, received heavenly insight with a heightened spiritual awareness. What she then proclaimed “with frenzied mouth” was the voice of the god speaking through her; when she referred to “I,” it was Apollo speaking of himself and his matters. It is the god who lives, thinks, and speaks within her as long as the madness persists.

§ 4

A profound and compelling tendency of the human mind must have been the source of the great religious movement that could succeed in establishing, with the ecstatic prophecy of the Delphic priestess, a seed of mysticism in the very heart of Greek religion. The introduction of ekstasis into the ordered stability of the Delphic mode of religion was only a symptom of that religious movement and not its cause. But now, confirmed by the god himself, and by the experience which the mantic practice seemed to make so evident, the new belief, so long familiar to Dionysiac religion and worship, must have at last invaded the older and original type of Greek religion, and taken hold of it in spite of that religion’s natural antipathy to anything of the kind. And this belief was that a highly exalted state of feeling could raise man above the normal level of his limited, everyday consciousness, and could elevate him to heights of vision and knowledge unlimited; that, further, to the human soul it was not denied, in very truth and not in vain fancy, to live for a moment the life of divinity. This belief is the fountain-head of all mysticism, and tradition still records a few traces of the way in which it grew and spread at that time. 292

A deep and powerful inclination of the human mind must have sparked the significant religious movement that succeeded in establishing, along with the ecstatic prophecy of the Delphic priestess, a thread of mysticism at the core of Greek religion. The introduction of ekstasis into the structured stability of Delphic religion was merely a sign of that religious movement and not its origin. However, now validated by the god himself and by the experiences that the prophetic practices seemed to reveal, the new belief, long familiar to Dionysiac worship, must have finally infiltrated the older, original form of Greek religion and taken root despite its natural resistance to such ideas. This belief held that a deeply elevated emotional state could lift a person above the usual limits of everyday awareness, allowing them to reach heights of limitless vision and knowledge; furthermore, that the human soul could genuinely, rather than through mere imagination, experience a moment of divine existence. This belief is the wellspring of all mysticism, and tradition still holds some remnants of how it grew and spread during that time. 292

It is true that the formal and official worship of the gods in Greece (where their cults were not obviously affected by foreign influence) remained as fast-bound as ever within the confines of order and lucidity. We hear very little of the entrance of ecstatic exaltation into the constitution of the older cults.56 The irresistible religious impulse to such things found an outlet through other channels. Men and women began to appear who on their own initiative began to act as intermediaries between the gods and the needs of individual men. They were natures, we must suppose, of unusual susceptibility to “enthusiastic” exaltation; having a strange capacity for projecting themselves into the infinite. Nothing in the organization of Greek religion prevented such men and women, if they could not obtain authority from any religious community of the state itself, from acquiring a real influence in religious matters simply from their own experience of divine favour,57 their own inward communion with divine powers.

It’s true that the formal and official worship of the gods in Greece (where their cults weren’t obviously influenced by foreign practices) remained tightly bound within rules and clarity. We hear very little about the entrance of ecstatic joy into the structure of the older cults.56 The powerful religious urge towards such experiences found other outlets. Men and women began to emerge who, on their own, acted as intermediaries between the gods and the needs of individuals. They were likely individuals with a unique sensitivity to “enthusiastic” elevation; possessing a strange ability to project themselves into the infinite. Nothing in the organization of Greek religion stopped these individuals, if they could not gain authority from any state religious community, from gaining true influence in religious matters purely from their own experiences of divine favor,57 their own inner connection with divine powers.

In the darkness and ferment of this period of growth, from the eighth to the sixth centuries, we can vaguely discern many such shadowy figures; they look uncommonly like those strange products of the earliest infancy of Christianity when prophets, ascetics, and exorcists wandered from land to land, called to their work by nothing but the immediate grace of god (χάρισμα), and not attached to any permanent religious community. It is true that what we hear of Sibyls and Bakides—men and women who wandered from land to land prophesying the future, independently of and uncommissioned by any particular oracular institute—is mostly legend; but these are the sort of legends that preserve real historical tradition condensed into single types and pictures. The nomenclature itself tells us much: Sibyls and Bakides are not individual names, but titles belonging to various types58 of ecstatic prophet, and we are entitled to suppose that the types so named once existed. The appearance in many places of Greek Asia Minor and the old mainland of Greece of such divinely inspired prophets is among the distinguishing marks of a clearly defined period in Greek history; the age of promise that came immediately before the philosophic period of Greece. The later age, entirely given up as it was to the pursuit of philosophic enlightenment, made so little claim to the inheritance in their own time of the divine favour that had once enabled the Sibyls and Bakides to see their visions and utter their wisdom, that there actually began to appear in large numbers prophets at second-hand, who were satisfied 293 with preserving the traditional wisdom of the inspired prophets of the past, and with the judicious interpretation of their treasures.59 The age of enthusiastic prophets was evidently a thing of the past. The very literature of Sibylline and Bakid oracles, which began to appear just at that time and showed itself capable of an almost indefinite extension, was itself largely responsible for the veil of myth and legend which completely enveloped the original bearers of the prophetic title. Earlier and earlier became the historic events of the past which they had foretold; further and further into the mythical past, before the time of the events prophesied, receded the imaginary period of the great prophets.60 In spite of which the scientific chronologists of antiquity, who were far from being imposed upon by the delusive anticipations of prophetic poems, found reason for fixing the date of particular Sibyls—which means for our purpose the whole prophetic age of Greece—in the fully historical period of the eighth and seventh centuries.61

In the darkness and turmoil of this growth period, from the eighth to the sixth centuries, we can vaguely make out many shadowy figures; they resemble those strange early manifestations of Christianity when prophets, ascetics, and exorcists roamed from place to place, driven by nothing but the direct grace of God (gift), without being part of any permanent religious community. It's true that what we know of Sibyls and Bakides—men and women who traveled around prophesying the future, independently and without any specific oracle authority—is mostly legend; but these legends preserve genuine historical traditions condensed into individual types and images. The names themselves reveal a lot: Sibyls and Bakides aren't personal names but titles for various types58 of ecstatic prophets, and we can assume that the types represented by these titles once existed. The presence of such divinely inspired prophets in various parts of Greek Asia Minor and the old mainland of Greece marks a clearly defined period in Greek history; the age of promise that came just before the philosophical period. The later era, completely focused on the pursuit of philosophical enlightenment, made so little claim to the divine favor that once allowed the Sibyls and Bakides to have their visions and share their wisdom that a significant number of second-hand prophets began to appear, content with preserving the traditional wisdom of the inspired prophets of the past and interpreting their teachings wisely.59 The era of enthusiastic prophets was clearly over. The very literature of Sibylline and Bakid oracles, which began to emerge at that time and was capable of almost infinite expansion, largely contributed to the myth and legend that completely surrounded the original holders of the prophetic title. The historical events they predicted became older and older; the imagined period of the great prophets receded further and further into the mythical past, before the time of the prophesied events.60 Despite this, the scientific chronologists of antiquity, who were not fooled by the deceptive expectations of prophetic poems, found reasons to date specific Sibyls—which, for our discussion, encompasses the entire prophetic age of Greece—to the fully historical period of the eighth and seventh centuries.61

We may recognize, in what we hear of these prophets, the shadowy representatives of a once real and living past; they are reminiscences of a striking and therefore never quite forgotten phase of Greek religious life. The Bakids and Sibyls were independent agents—though not entirely without connexion with the regular worship of the gods, they were not attached to any particular temple—who wandered from land to land according to the needs of those who sought their counsel. In this respect, at least, they resembled the Homeric omen-interpreters,62 and continued their work; but they differed from them profoundly in the mode of their prophesying. They were “seized by the god” and in ecstatic clairvoyance saw and proclaimed unseen things. It was no academic skill that they possessed, enabling them to interpret the meaning of signs and omens that anyone could see—they saw what was visible only to God and to the soul of man filled with God.63 In hoarse tones and wild words64 the Sibyl gave utterance to what the divine impelling power within her and not her own arbitrary fancy suggested; possessed by the god, she spoke in a divine distraction. An echo of such daimonic possession, and of the horrible reality and terror that it had for the possessed, can still be heard in the cries and convulsions which Aeschylus in the Agamemnon gives to his Kassandra—a true picture of the primitive Sibyl, and a type that the poets of that prophetic generation had reflected backwards into the earlier past of legend.65 294

We can see in what we know about these prophets hints of a once vibrant and real past; they are memories of a remarkable and thus never completely forgotten aspect of Greek religious life. The Bakids and Sibyls were independent figures—while they weren't totally disconnected from the usual worship of the gods, they weren't tied to any specific temple—who traveled from place to place based on the needs of those seeking their guidance. In this way, they were similar to the Homeric omen interpreters and continued their work; however, they fundamentally differed in how they delivered their prophecies. They were “seized by the god” and in ecstatic visions saw and proclaimed things beyond perception. They didn't have academic skills that allowed them to interpret visible signs and omens—rather, they perceived what was only visible to God and to a person’s soul filled with God. In raspy voices and wild words, the Sibyl expressed what the divine force within her—rather than her own whims—urged her to say; possessed by the god, she spoke in a state of divine frenzy. An echo of such possession, along with the intense reality and fear it caused for the possessed, can still be heard in the cries and convulsions that Aeschylus attributes to Kassandra in the Agamemnon—a true representation of the original Sibyl, a type that poets of that prophetic generation looked back to from earlier legends. 294

§ 5

The activity of the seer was not confined to foreseeing and foretelling the future. We hear of a “Bakis” who “purified” and delivered the women of Sparta from an attack of madness that had spread like an epidemic among them.66 The prophetic age of Greece must have seen the origin of what later became part of the regular duties of the “seer”: the cure of diseases, especially those of the mind;67 the averting of evil of every kind by various strange means, and particularly the supply of help and counsel by “purifications” of a religious nature.68 The gift or art of prophecy, the purification of “the unclean”, the healing of disease, all seem to be derived from one source. Nor can we be long in doubt as to what the single source of this threefold capacity must have been. The world of invisible spirits surrounding man, which ordinary folk know only by its effects, is familiar and accessible to the ecstatic prophet, the Mantis, the spirit-seer. As exorcist he undertakes to heal disease;69 the Kathartic process is also essentially and originally an exorcism of the baleful influences of the spirit-world.

The role of the seer wasn't just about predicting the future. There's a story about a “Bakis” who “cleansed” and helped the women of Sparta when they were overwhelmed by a madness that had spread like an epidemic among them.66 In Greece's prophetic era, we can find the beginnings of what later became standard responsibilities for the “seer”: curing illnesses, especially mental ones;67 preventing various kinds of misfortune through unusual methods, and providing support and advice through religious “purifications.”68 The talent or practice of prophecy, the purification of “the unclean,” and the healing of ailments all seem to come from the same origin. It's not hard to figure out what this single source might be. The realm of unseen spirits that surrounds humans, which regular people only know by its effects, is familiar and accessible to the ecstatic prophet, the Mantis, the spirit-seer. Acting as an exorcist, he aims to heal illnesses;69 the Kathartic process is fundamentally and originally an exorcism of the harmful influences from the spirit world.

The wide popularity and elaboration given to the notion—hardly hinted70 at as yet in Homer—of the universally present menace of “pollution”, which is only to be averted or got rid of by means of a religious process of purification—this is one of the chief distinguishing features of the over-anxious piety that marked the post-Homeric age when men could no longer be content with the means of salvation handed down to them by their fathers. If we confined our attention to the fact that now we find purification required for such actions as murder and the spilling of blood which seem to imply a moral stain to the doer of them,71 we might be tempted to see in the development of Kathartic practices a fresh step in the history of Greek ethics, and to suppose that the new practices arose out of a refinement and deepening of the “conscience” which now desired to be free from the taint of “sin” by the help of religion. But such an interpretation of Katharsis (favourite as it is) is disposed of by a consideration of the real essence and meaning of the thing. In later times the methods of Katharsis were nearly always in competition and conflict (rarely in friendly alliance) with “conscience”, with the independently developed ethical thought that based itself upon the unchanging requirements of a moral law transcending all personal will and feeling, and even the will of daimonic powers. In its origin and essence Katharsis 295 had nothing whatever to do with morality or with what we should call the voice of conscience. On the contrary, it usurped the place which in a more advanced and morally developed people would have belonged to a true morality based on an inner feeling for what is right. Nor did it fail to hinder the free and unfettered development of such a morality. Kathartic practices required and implied no feeling of offence, of personal guilt, of personal responsibility. All that we know of these practices serves to bring this out and set the matter in a clearer light.

The widespread popularity and detailed focus on the idea—barely mentioned in Homer—that there's a universal threat of "pollution," which can only be avoided or eliminated through a religious cleansing ritual, is one of the main characteristics of the overly anxious piety that characterized the post-Homeric era. During this time, people could no longer be satisfied with the means of salvation that had been passed down from their ancestors. If we were to look only at the fact that purification was now required for actions like murder and bloodshed, which seem to imply a moral stain on the perpetrator, we might think that the development of Kathartic practices marked a new phase in Greek ethics and believe that these practices came from a refinement and deepening of "conscience," now seeking to be free from the taint of "sin" through religion. However, such an interpretation of Katharsis—though popular—is challenged by examining its true essence and meaning. In later times, the methods of Katharsis were almost always in competition and conflict (rarely in friendly cooperation) with "conscience," which stemmed from independent ethical thought grounded in the unchanging demands of a moral law that goes beyond personal will and feelings, even the will of supernatural powers. At its core, Katharsis had nothing to do with morality or what we would consider the voice of conscience. Instead, it took the place that a more advanced and morally developed society would have assigned to a genuine morality based on an intrinsic sense of what is right. It also prevented the free and unrestrained growth of such a morality. Kathartic practices required and implied no sense of offense, personal guilt, or responsibility. Everything we know about these practices helps clarify this point.

Ceremonies of “purification” accompany every step of a man’s life from the cradle to the grave. The woman with child is “unclean” and so is anyone who touches her; the new-born child is unclean;72 marriage is fenced about with a series of purificatory rites; the dead, and everything that approaches them, are unclean. Now, in these instances of the common and almost daily occurrence of purification ceremonies, there can be no moral stain involved that requires to be washed off, not even a symbolical one. Equally little can there be any when ritual purifications are employed after a bad dream,73 the occurrence of a prodigy,74 recovery from illness, or when a person has touched an offering made to deities of the lower world or the graves of the dead; or when it is found necessary to purify house and hearth,75 and even fire and water76 for sacred or profane purposes. The purification of those who have shed blood stands on exactly the same footing. It was necessary even for those who had killed a man with just cause, or had committed homicide unknowingly or unwillingly; the moral aspect of such cases, the guilt or innocence of the doer, is ignored or unperceived. Even in the case of premeditated murder, the remorse of the criminal or his “will to amend”77 is quite superfluous to the efficacy of purification.

Ceremonies of “purification” accompany every part of a person’s life from birth to death. A pregnant woman is considered “unclean,” as is anyone who comes into contact with her; the newborn baby is also unclean; marriage is surrounded by a series of purification rites; the dead and everything that comes near them are unclean. In these common, nearly daily occurrences of purification ceremonies, there is no moral impurity that needs to be cleansed, not even a symbolic one. Similarly, there is none when ritual purifications are performed after a bad dream, 73 a prodigy occurs, 74 a person recovers from illness, or when someone touches an offering given to deities of the underworld or the graves of the dead; or when it's necessary to purify the home and hearth, 75 and even fire and water 76 for sacred or everyday uses. The purification of those who have shed blood is treated the same way. It was necessary even for those who had killed someone in justifiable circumstances or had committed homicide unintentionally or involuntarily; the moral considerations of such situations, the guilt or innocence of the individual, are overlooked or not acknowledged. Even in the case of premeditated murder, the remorse of the criminal or their “will to amend” 77 is completely irrelevant to the process of purification.

It could not be otherwise. The “stain” which is wiped out by these mysterious and religious means is not “within the heart of man”. It clings to a man as something hostile, and from without, and that can be spread from him to others like an infectious disease.78 Hence, the purification is effected by religious processes directed to the external removal of the evil thing; it may be washed off (as by water from a running spring or from the sea), it may be violently effaced and obliterated (as by fire or even smoke alone), it may be absorbed (by wool, fleece of animals, eggs),79 etc.

It couldn't be any other way. The “stain” that is removed by these mysterious and religious practices is not “within the heart of man.” It clings to a person as something hostile, coming from the outside, and it can spread from one person to others like an infectious disease.78 So, the purification happens through religious methods aimed at the external removal of the harmful thing; it can be washed away (like water from a running spring or the sea), violently erased and wiped out (like by fire or even just smoke), or absorbed (by wool, animal fleece, eggs),79 etc.

It must be something hostile and dangerous to men that is thus removed; since this something can only be attacked by 296 religious means, it must belong to the daimonic world to which alone Religion and its means of salvation have reference. There exists a population of spirits whose neighbourhood or contact with men renders then “unclean”, for it gives them over to the power of the unholy.80 Anyone who touches their places of abode, or the offerings made to them, falls under their spell; they may send him sickness, insanity, evils of every kind. The priest with his purifications is an “exorcist” who sets free those who have fallen victims to the surrounding powers of darkness. He certainly fulfils this function when he disperses diseases, i.e. the spirits who send the diseases, by his ministrations;81 when he employs in his purificatory ritual hymns and incantatory formulæ which regularly imply an invisibly listening being to whom they are addressed;82 when he uses the clang of bronze instruments whose well-known property it is to drive away ghosts.83 Where human blood has been shed and requires “purification” the Kathartic priest accomplishes this “by driving out murder with murder”,84 i.e. he lets the blood of a sacrificed animal fall over the hands of the polluted person. Here, the purification is plainly in the nature of a substitution-sacrifice (the animal being offered instead of the murderer).85 In this way the anger of the dead is washed away—for this anger is itself the pollution that is to be removed.86 The famous scapegoats were nothing but sacrifices offered to appease the anger of the Unseen, and thereby release a whole city from “pollution”. At the Thargelia or on extraordinary occasions of need in Ionic cities, and even in Athens, unfortunate men were in ancient times slain or stoned to death or burnt “for the purification of the city”.87 Even the materials of purification that in private life served to free the individual and his house from the claims of invisible powers, were thought of as offerings to these powers: this is proved clearly enough by the custom of removing such materials, when they had served their purpose as “purifications”, to the cross-roads, and of making them over to the unearthly spirits who have their being there. The materials of purification so treated are in fact identical with offerings to the dead or even with “Hekate’s banquets”.88 In this case we can see most clearly what the forces are which Kathartic processes essentially aim at averting. In them no attempt was made to satisfy a heartfelt consciousness of sin or a moral sense that has become delicate; they were much rather the result of a superstitious fear of uncanny forces surrounding men and stretching out after them with a thousand threatening hands in the darkness. 297 It was the monstrous phantasies of their own imagination that made men call upon the priests of purification and expiation for much-needed aid and protection.

It must be something hostile and dangerous to people that is being removed; since this something can only be confronted by 296 religious means, it must belong to the daemonic world that Religion and its means of salvation address. There exists a population of spirits whose presence or contact with people makes them "unclean," as it subjects them to the power of the unholy. Anyone who touches their living spaces or the offerings made to them falls under their influence; they may inflict sickness, madness, or all sorts of misfortunes. The priest, with his purifications, acts as an "exorcist" who frees those who have become victims of the surrounding forces of darkness. He certainly fulfills this role when he dispels diseases, meaning the spirits that cause the illnesses, through his rituals;81 when he incorporates in his cleansing rituals hymns and incantations that regularly suggest an invisible being is listening and being addressed;82 when he uses the sound of bronze instruments, known for their ability to drive away ghosts.83 Where human blood has been shed and requires "purification," the Kathartic priest accomplishes this "by driving out murder with murder,"84 meaning he allows the blood of a sacrificed animal to fall upon the hands of the polluted person. Here, the purification is clearly a substitution-sacrifice (the animal is offered instead of the murderer).85 In this way, the anger of the deceased is washed away—this anger itself is the pollution that needs to be removed.86 The famous scapegoats were merely sacrifices offered to calm the anger of the Unseen, thereby freeing an entire city from "pollution." At the Thargelia or in times of urgent need in Ionic cities, and even in Athens, unfortunate individuals were historically killed, stoned, or burned "for the purification of the city."87 Even the purification materials that served to free an individual and their home from the demands of invisible powers were regarded as offerings to these powers: this is clearly shown by the practice of taking such materials, once they have fulfilled their function as "purifications," to the crossroads and dedicating them to the otherworldly spirits that dwell there. The purification materials treated in this way are essentially the same as offerings to the dead or even "Hekate’s banquets."88 In this case, we can clearly see what forces the Kathartic processes fundamentally seek to ward off. There was no attempt to satisfy a sincere consciousness of sin or a delicate moral sense; rather, they arose from a superstitious fear of sinister forces lurking around people, reaching out with countless threatening hands in the darkness. 297 It was the monstrous fantasies of their own imagination that led people to call upon the priests of purification and expiation for much-needed help and protection.

§ 6

It is simply the invasion of human life by the sinister creatures of the daimonic world that the clairvoyant mantis is supposed to avert with his “purifications”. Among these sinister influences Hekate and her crew are particularly noticeable. This is without doubt an ancient product of religious phantasy—though it is not mentioned by Homer—which did not till a late period emerge from the obscurity of local observance and obtain general popularity: even then it only here and there ceased to be a private and domestic cult and reached the dignity of public city-worship.89 The cult of Hekate fled the light of day, as did the wild farrago of weird and sinister phantoms that surrounded her. She is chthonic, a goddess of the lower world,90 where she is at home; but, more easily than other lower-world creatures, she finds her way to the living world of men. Wherever a soul is entering into partnership with a body—at birth or in child bed—she is at hand;91 where a soul is separating from a body, in burials of the dead, she is there. Amidst the dwelling-places of the departed, the monuments of the dead and the gloomy ritual of their worship, she is in her element.92 She is the queen of the souls who are still fast bound to the upper world. It shows her deep-seated connexion with the primeval worship of the dead at the household hearth,93 when we hear of Hekate as dwelling “in the depth of the hearth”,94 and being honoured together with the underworld Hermes, her masculine counterpart, among the domestic gods who “were left to us by our forefathers”.95

It’s simply the infiltration of human life by the dark beings from the daimonic world that the clairvoyant mantis is meant to protect against with his “purifications.” Among these dark influences, Hekate and her followers stand out. This is undoubtedly an ancient creation of religious imagination—though it isn’t mentioned by Homer—which only later came out of the shadows of local practices and gained wider acceptance: even then, it infrequently transitioned from being a private and familial cult to attaining the status of public city worship.89 The cult of Hekate avoided public attention, much like the chaotic mix of strange and dark spirits that surrounded her. She is chthonic, a goddess of the underworld,90 where she truly belongs; but unlike other underworld beings, she more readily crosses into the living world of humans. Wherever a soul is joining with a body—at birth or during childbirth—she is present;91 where a soul is departing from a body, during funerals, she is there. Among the places of the departed, the memorials of the dead, and the somber rituals for their worship, she is in her element.92 She is the queen of souls still bound to the world above. Her deep connection to the ancient worship of the dead at the household hearth is evident when we hear of Hekate as living “in the depth of the hearth,”93 and being honored alongside the underworld Hermes, her male counterpart, among the domestic gods “left to us by our ancestors.”95

This domestic cult may be a legacy from times when in familiar intercourse with the lower world men did not yet fear “pollution” therefrom.95a To later ages Hekate was the principal source and originator of all that was ghostly and uncanny. Men came upon her suddenly and to their hurt by night, or in the dreamy solitudes of midday’s blinding heat; they see her in monstrous shapes that, like the figures in a dream, are continually changing.96 The names of many female deities of the underworld of whom the common people had much to say—Gorgyra (Gorgo), Mormo, Lamia, Gello or Empousa, the ghost of midday—denote in reality so many different personifications and variations of Hekate.97 298 She appeared most frequently by night, under the half-light of the moon, at the cross-roads. She is not alone but is accompanied by her “crew”, the hand-maidens who follow in her train. These are the souls of those who have not had their share of burial and the holy rites that accompany it; who have been violently done to death, or who have died “before their time”.98 Such souls find no rest after death; they travel on the wind now, in the company of Hekate and her daimonic pack of hounds.99 It is not without reason that we are reminded of the legends of “wild hunters” and the “furious host”, so familiar in modern times in many countries.100 Similar beliefs produced similar results in each case; perhaps there is even some historical connexion between them.101 These night-wandering spirits and souls of the dead bring pollution and disaster upon all who meet them or fall into their hands; they send evil dreams, nightmares, nocturnal apparitions, madness and epilepsy.102 It is for them, the unquiet souls of the dead and Hekate their queen, that men set out the “banquets of Hekate” at the cross-roads.103 To them men consign with averted faces the remains of the purificatory sacrifices104 that they may not come too close to human dwelling places. Puppies, too, were sacrificed to Hekate for “purifications”, i.e. “apotropaic” sacrifices.

This household cult might be a remnant from a time when people weren't afraid of getting "polluted" by their interactions with the lower world. Later on, Hekate became the main source and creator of everything ghostly and eerie. People would encounter her unexpectedly and to their peril at night or in the hazy solitude of the midday heat; they saw her in terrifying forms that shifted like the figures in a dream. The names of various female deities of the underworld, which the general public often mentioned—Gorgyra (Gorgo), Mormo, Lamia, Gello, or Empousa, the ghost of midday—actually represent different personifications and variations of Hekate. She most often appeared at night, in the dim light of the moon, at cross-roads. She wasn't alone but was accompanied by her "crew," the handmaidens who followed her. These were the souls of those who hadn't received proper burial and the sacred rites that accompanied it; those who died violently or "before their time." Such souls find no peace after death; they now drift on the wind, alongside Hekate and her pack of ghostly hounds. It's no surprise that we're reminded of the legends of "wild hunters" and the "fury host," which are well-known in modern times across many countries. Similar beliefs resulted in similar outcomes in every case; perhaps there's even a historical connection between them. These wandering night spirits and souls of the dead bring misfortune and disaster to anyone who encounters them or falls into their grasp; they deliver bad dreams, nightmares, nocturnal apparitions, madness, and epilepsy. It is for them, the restless souls of the dead and Hekate their queen, that people set out the “banquets of Hekate” at cross-roads. To them, people offer the remains of purifying sacrifices with turned-away faces so they won't come too close to human homes. Puppies were also sacrificed to Hekate for "purification," meaning "apotropaic" sacrifices.

Gruesome inventions of all kinds were easily attached to this province of supernaturalism: it is one of the sources which, with help from other Greek conceptions and many foreign creations of fancy, let loose a stream of anxious and gloomy superstitiousness that spread through the whole of later antiquity and even reached through the Middle Ages to our own day.

Gruesome inventions of all kinds were easily linked to this realm of supernaturalism: it is one of the sources that, with input from other Greek ideas and numerous foreign imaginative creations, unleashed a wave of anxious and gloomy superstitions that spread throughout later antiquity and even extended through the Middle Ages to the present day.

Protection and riddance from such things were sought at the hands of seers and “Kathartic priests” who, in addition to ceremonies of purification and exorcism had other ways of giving help—prescriptions and recipes of many strange sorts which were originally clear and natural enough to the fantastic logic of superstition and were still credited and handed down as magic and inexplicable formulæ after their real meaning had been entirely forgotten. Others, again, were driven by a fearful curiosity to attempt to bring the world of surrounding spirits—of whose doings such strange stories were told in legend105—even closer to themselves. By magic arts and incantations, they compelled the wandering ghosts and even Hekate herself to appear before them:106 the magic power forces them to do the will of the spirit-raiser or to harm his enemies.107 It was these creatures of the spirit-world that 299 magicians and exorcists claimed to banish or compel. Popular belief was on their side in this, but it is hardly possible that they never resorted to deceit and imposture in making good their claims.

People sought protection and relief from such issues through the help of seers and “cathartic priests,” who, along with purification and exorcism rituals, had other methods of assistance—prescriptions and recipes of various odd sorts that were originally straightforward and made sense within the bizarre logic of superstition. These methods were still believed to be magical and mysterious even after their true meanings had been completely forgotten. Others, driven by a fearful curiosity, tried to draw the world of surrounding spirits—about whom such strange stories were told in legends—closer to themselves. Using magic and incantations, they summoned wandering ghosts, including Hekate herself, compelling them to appear before them: the magical power forced them to obey the spirit-raiser's will or to harm their enemies. It was these entities of the spirit world that magicians and exorcists claimed to banish or control. Popular belief supported them in this, but it's hard to believe they never resorted to trickery and deception to uphold their claims.

§ 7

The mantic and Kathartic practices, together with what arose out of them, are known to us almost exclusively as they were in the time of their decay. Even in the brief sketch just attempted of this notable by-way of Greek religion, many details have had to be taken from the accounts left to us by later ages that had quite outgrown the whole idea of mantic and Kathartic procedure. Compared on the one hand with science, seriously engaged in studying the real and inward sources of being and becoming throughout the world, together with the limitations of man’s estate, and on the other hand with the practical and cautious medical study of the physical conditions of human life in health and sickness, the mantic and Kathartic practices and all the myriad superstitions arising from them seemed like a legacy from a forgotten and discredited past. But such things persisted in many circles of old-fashioned and primitive-minded people, though by the emancipated and cultured they were despised as the silly and dangerous quackery of mendicant priests and wizards.

The mantic and Kathartic practices, along with what developed from them, are mostly known to us as they were during their decline. Even in the brief overview just provided of this interesting aspect of Greek religion, many details had to be drawn from accounts left by later generations that had moved past the whole concept of mantic and Kathartic practices. When compared to science, which is seriously focused on understanding the true and inner sources of existence and change throughout the world, along with the limits of human life, and to the practical and careful medical examination of the physical aspects of human health and illness, the mantic and Kathartic practices and all the various superstitions that came from them appear as a remnant of a forgotten and discredited era. However, these beliefs persisted among many groups of old-fashioned and primitive-minded people, even as they were looked down upon by the educated and enlightened as the foolish and dangerous tricks of beggar priests and sorcerers.

But this product of the religious instinct cannot always have appeared in such a light; it certainly was not so regarded when it first came into prominence. A movement that was zealously taken up by the Delphic oracle, which influenced many Greek states in the organization of their religious cults, must have had a period when its right to exist was incontestable. It must have answered to the needs of a time when the dawning sense of the profound unity and interconnexion of all being and becoming in the world still contented itself with a religious explanation of what seemed mysterious, and when a few chosen natures were seriously credited with the power to communicate with the all-embracing spirit-world. Every age has its own ideal of Wisdom; and there came a time when the ideal of the Wise Man, who by his own innate powers has achieved a commanding spiritual position and insight, became embodied in the persons of certain great men who seemed to fulfil the highest conceptions of wisdom and power that were attributed to the ecstatic seer and priest of purification. The half-mythical stories in which later ages preserved the memory of the times lying just before the 300 age of the philosophic exploration of nature tell us of certain great masters of a mysterious and occult Wisdom. It is true that they are credited with powers over nature of a magical kind rather than with a purely intellectual insight into the laws of nature; but even in the scanty accounts of them which have come down to us there are clear indications that their work already included the first attempts at a mode of study based on theory. We cannot call them philosophers—not even the forerunners of Greek philosophy. More often their point of view was one which the real philosophic impulse towards self-determination and the freedom of the soul consciously and decisively rejected, and continued to reject, though not indeed without occasional wavering and backsliding. These men must be counted among the magicians and exorcists who so often appear in the earliest dawn of the spiritual history of civilized nations, and, as primitive and marvellous types of the spirit of inquiry, precede the philosophers. They all belong to the class of ecstatic seers and Kathartic priests.

But this result of the religious instinct wasn’t always seen this way; it definitely wasn’t perceived like that when it first became important. A movement that was embraced by the Delphic oracle, which affected many Greek states in shaping their religious practices, must have had a time when its existence was unquestionable. It must have responded to the needs of an era when the emerging understanding of the deep unity and connection of everything in the world still relied on religious explanations for what seemed mysterious, and when a select few were genuinely believed to have the ability to connect with the all-encompassing spirit world. Every era has its own ideal of Wisdom; and there came a time when the ideal of the Wise Person, who through their own innate abilities achieved a significant spiritual status and insight, was embodied in certain great individuals who seemed to fulfill the highest ideas of wisdom and power attributed to the ecstatic seer and purifying priest. The semi-mythical stories that later generations preserved about the times just before the 300 age of philosophical inquiry into nature tell us of great masters of mysterious and hidden Wisdom. It’s true that they are credited with magical powers over nature rather than a purely intellectual understanding of nature’s laws; but even in the limited accounts that have survived, there are clear signs that their work included early attempts at a theory-based method of study. We can’t label them philosophers—not even the precursors to Greek philosophy. More often, their perspective was one that the true philosophic urge toward self-determination and soul’s freedom consciously and decisively rejected, and continued to reject, though with occasional doubts and setbacks. These individuals must be counted among the magicians and exorcists frequently found in the earliest stages of the spiritual history of civilized nations, and as primitive and extraordinary examples of the spirit of inquiry, they came before the philosophers. They all belong to the group of ecstatic seers and purifying priests.

Legend related how, out of the country of the Hyperboreans, that distant Wonderland where Apollo hid himself in winter, there came to Greece one Abaris, sent by the god himself. He was a saint and needed no earthly food. Carrying in his hand the golden arrow, the proof of his Apolline origin and mission, he passed through many lands dispelling sickness and pestilence by sacrifices of a magic kind, giving warning of earthquakes and other disasters. Even in later times prophecies and “purifications”, going under his name, were still to be read.108—This man, and also another like him, called Aristeas, were already mentioned by Pindar (fr. 271). Aristeas, a man of high rank in his native city of Prokonnesos, had the magic gift of prolonged ekstasis. When his soul left his body behind, being “seized by Phoibos”, it (as his second self made visible) was seen in distant places.109 As Apollo’s attendant he also appeared together with the god in Metapontum. A bronze statue in the market-place of that city remained to testify to his presence there, and to the astonishment awakened by his inspired utterances.110 But among all these examples of the type,111 Hermotimos of Klazomenai is the most striking. His soul could desert his body “for many years”, and on its return from its ecstatic voyages, brought with it much mantic lore and knowledge of the future. At last, enemies set fire to the tenantless body of Hermotimos when his soul was away, and the latter returned no more.112

Legend says that from the land of the Hyperboreans, that distant Wonderland where Apollo hides during the winter, came a man named Abaris, sent by the god himself. He was a saint who didn’t need earthly food. Holding a golden arrow in his hand, which proved his divine origin and purpose, he traveled through many lands, driving away sickness and plagues with magical sacrifices, warning of earthquakes and other disasters. Even later on, prophecies and “purifications” associated with his name could still be found. 108—This man, along with another similar figure named Aristeas, was already mentioned by Pindar (fr. 271). Aristeas, a man of high rank in his hometown of Prokonnesos, had the magical ability of prolonged ekstasis. When his soul left his body, being “seized by Phoibos,” it (as his visible second self) could be seen in faraway places. 109 As Apollo’s attendant, he also appeared alongside the god in Metapontum. A bronze statue in the market square of that city remained to witness his presence there and the awe it inspired with his prophetic statements. 110 But among all these examples, 111 Hermotimos of Klazomenai stands out the most. His soul could leave his body “for many years,” and upon returning from his ecstatic journeys, he brought back a wealth of prophetic knowledge about the future. In the end, enemies set fire to the abandoned body of Hermotimos while his soul was away, and it never returned. 112

The greatest master of all these magically gifted men was, 301 according to tradition, Epimenides. His home was in Crete, an ancient centre of Kathartic wisdom,113 where Epimenides was instructed in this lore as an adherent of the cult of the underworld Zeus.114 Through a mist of legend and fable we hear of his prolonged stay in the mysterious cave of Zeus on Mt. Ida, his intercourse with the spirits of the darkness, his severe fasting,115 the long ecstasy of his soul,116 and his final return from solitude to the light of day, much experienced and far-travelled in “enthusiastic wisdom”.117 Next he journeyed through many lands bringing his health-giving arts with him, prophesying the future as an ecstatic seer,118 interpreting the hidden meaning of past occurrences, and as Kathartic priest expelling the daimonic evils that arose from specially foul misdeeds of the past. The Kathartic activity of Epimenides in Delos and other Greek cities was famous.119 It was in particular never forgotten how in Athens at the end of the seventh century he brought to a satisfactory close the expiation of the godless murder of the followers of Kylon.120 With potent ceremonies of which his wisdom alone knew the secret, with sacrifice of animals and men, he appeased121 the anger of the offended spirits of the depth who in their rage were “polluting” and harming the city . . .

The greatest master of all these magically gifted individuals was, 301 according to tradition, Epimenides. He lived in Crete, an ancient hub of cleansing wisdom, 113 where Epimenides learned this knowledge as a follower of the cult of the underworld Zeus. 114 Through a mix of legend and myth, we hear about his long stay in the mysterious cave of Zeus on Mt. Ida, his interactions with the spirits of darkness, his intense fasting, 115 the deep ecstasy of his soul, 116 and his eventual return from solitude to the light of day, experienced and well-traveled in “enthusiastic wisdom.” 117 Next, he traveled through many lands, bringing his healing arts, predicting the future as an ecstatic seer, 118 interpreting the hidden meanings of past events, and acting as a cleansing priest driving out the evil spirits that stemmed from particularly heinous actions of the past. The cleansing work of Epimenides in Delos and other Greek cities became renowned. 119 It was especially remembered how in Athens, at the end of the seventh century, he successfully completed the expiation for the godless murder of Kylon's followers. 120 With powerful ceremonies that only he knew the secrets of, involving sacrifices of animals and people, he appeased 121 the anger of the offended spirits from the depths who, in their fury, were “polluting” and harming the city...

It was not without reason that later tradition, undeterred by questions of chronological possibility, brought all the names just mentioned into connexion with Pythagoras or his adherents,122 and was even accustomed to refer to Pherekydes of Syros, the latest of the band, as the teacher of Pythagoras. The practice, if not the philosophy, of the Pythagorean sect grew up among the ideas and what may be called the teaching of these men, and belongs to the epoch which honoured them as Wise Men. We still possess a few scraps of evidence to show that the conceptions guiding their life and work tended to reach some sort of unification in the minds of these visionaries who were yet something more than the mere practicians of a magical species of religion. We cannot, indeed, tell how far the fanciful pictures of the origin of the world of men which Epimenides123 and Pherekydes drew were connected with the business and professional activity of these men;124 but when it is related of Hermotimos that he, like his country-man Anaxagoras, attempted a distinction between pure “mind” and matter,125 we can see very clearly how this theory might arise out of his special “experiences”. The ecstasies of the soul of which Hermotimos himself and this whole generation had such ample experience seemed to point to the separability of the soul from the body126—and, indeed, to the superiority of 302 the soul’s essence in its separate state over that of the body—as to a fact of the most firmly established authenticity. In contrast with the soul the body could hardly help appearing as an encumbrance, an obstacle to be got rid of. The conception of an ever-threatening pollution and “uncleanness” which was nourished by the teaching and activities of those innumerable purification-priests of whom Epimenides is known to us as the supreme master, had gradually so penetrated the whole of the official religion itself with purification-ceremonies that it might very well have seemed as though, in the midst of this renovation and development of a type of religious thought that had been more than half forgotten in the Homeric period, Greek religion was fast approaching the condition of Brahmanism or Zoroastrianism and becoming essentially a religion of purification. Those who had become familiar with the contrast between body and soul, especially if they lived in the atmosphere of Kathartic ideas and their practical exercise, were almost bound to proceed to the idea that even the “soul” required to be purified from the polluting embarrassment of the body. That such ideas were almost a commonplace is shown by many stories and turns of phrase which represent the destruction of the body by fire as a “purification” of the man himself.127 Wherever these ideas—the precise opposite and contrary of the Homeric conception of the relation between body and soul-image—had penetrated more deeply they must have led to the idea that even in the lifetime of the body the purification of the soul should be prepared by the denial and inhibition of the body and its impulses. The first step was thus taken towards a purely negative system of morality, not attempting the inner reformation of the will, but aiming simply at averting from the soul of man a polluting evil threatening it from without—in fact to a morality of religious asceticism such as later became such an important and decisive spiritual movement in Greece. In spite of all the inadequacy of our information about these Wise Men of the early pre-philosophic period, we can still dimly make out the fact that their natural bent lay in this ascetic direction (the abstention from food practised by Abaris and Epimenides are distinct cases of it).128 How far, exactly, they went in this direction is indeed more than we can say.

It wasn't without reason that later traditions, unfazed by questions of timeline, linked all the names just mentioned to Pythagoras or his followers, and even referred to Pherekydes of Syros, the most recent member of the group, as Pythagoras's teacher. The practices, if not the philosophy, of the Pythagorean sect developed among the ideas and teachings of these individuals and belongs to the period that honored them as Wise Men. We still have a few scraps of evidence showing that the concepts guiding their lives and work aimed for some kind of unity in the minds of these visionaries, who were more than just practitioners of a magical kind of religion. We can't exactly determine how far the imaginative descriptions of the world's origin by Epimenides and Pherekydes were connected to the occupations and activities of these individuals; but when it's said that Hermotimos, like his fellow countryman Anaxagoras, tried to distinguish between pure “mind” and matter, we can clearly see how this theory might emerge from his specific “experiences.” The ecstasies of the soul that Hermotimos and his entire generation experienced seemed to indicate that the soul could be separated from the body—and indeed, that the essence of the soul in its separate state was superior to that of the body—as a fact of solid authenticity. In comparison, the body appeared almost like a burden, an obstacle to be removed. The idea of a constantly looming pollution and “uncleanness,” fostered by the teachings and activities of countless purification priests, with Epimenides as the supreme master, gradually infiltrated the entire official religion with purification rituals, making it seem as if, amidst this renewal and development of a religious thought that had been mostly forgotten since the Homeric era, Greek religion was quickly evolving into something akin to Brahmanism or Zoroastrianism, essentially becoming a religion of purification. Those familiar with the contrast between body and soul, especially if they were immersed in Kathartic ideas and their practical applications, were almost destined to conclude that even the “soul” needed to be purified from the polluting burdens of the body. The fact that such ideas were pretty common is shown by various stories and phrases that depict the destruction of the body by fire as a “purification” of the individual. Where these concepts—completely opposite to the Homeric understanding of the relationship between body and soul—had taken root more deeply, they likely led to the belief that even while the body was alive, the purification of the soul should be prepared by denying and suppressing the body and its desires. This first step pointed towards a purely negative moral system, not focused on inner reformation of will, but simply aiming to protect the soul from outside polluting evils—in essence, towards a morality of religious asceticism that later became a significant and defining spiritual movement in Greece. Despite the gaps in our knowledge about these Wise Men of the early pre-philosophic era, we can still vaguely discern that their natural inclination moved in this ascetic direction (the fasting practiced by Abaris and Epimenides are distinct examples of it). How far, exactly, they advanced in this direction is something we cannot definitively state.

Thus, the ascetic ideal was not absent even from Greece. It remained, however—in spite of the influence it had in some quarters—always a foreign thing in Greece, having its obscure home among sects of spiritualistic enthusiasts, and regarded in contrast with the normal and ruling view of life, as a paradox, 303 almost a heresy. The official religion itself is not entirely without the seeds of an ascetic system of morality; but the ascetic ideal, fully developed and distinguished from the simple and normal religious attitude, was in Greece found only among minorities who cut themselves off in closed and exclusive conventicles of a theological or philosophical temper. The “Wise Men” as idealized in the legends of Abaris. Epimenides, etc., were as individuals not far removed from the ideal of asceticism. Nor was it long before the attempt was made to use these ideals as the basis on which to found a society.

Thus, the ascetic ideal wasn’t completely absent from Greece. However, despite its influence in some areas, it always felt foreign in Greece, finding its unclear home among groups of spiritual enthusiasts and viewed, in contrast to the mainstream perspective on life, as a paradox, 303 almost a heresy. The official religion itself isn’t entirely without elements of an ascetic moral system; however, the fully developed ascetic ideal, distinct from the simple and typical religious attitude, was found in Greece only among minorities who separated themselves into closed and exclusive groups with a theological or philosophical focus. The "Wise Men," as depicted in legends of Abaris, Epimenides, and others, were individuals not far removed from the ascetic ideal. It didn't take long before there were attempts to use these ideals as a foundation for building a society.

NOTES TO CHAPTER IX

1 We may safely take it for granted that Διόνυσος is the Greek name of the god, though a completely convincing etymology for the word has yet to be found. Recent attempts to derive it from the Thracian language are not very convincing. (Tomaschek, Sitzber. Wien. Ak. 130, 41; Kretschmer, Aus der Anomia, 22 f.; Einl. 241.) Acc. to Kretschmer a Thracian origin for the name is proved by the appearance of the form Δεόνυσο—on inss. found in a few Greek towns surrounded by Thracian influences, e.g. Abdera, Maroneia. Acc. to him the transition from ι to ε before a vowel is regular in Thrako-Phrygian, while on the other hand “it is completely incompatible with all the laws of Greek phonetics”. Others have disagreed with this view, e.g. G. Curtius, certainly an auctor probabilis, to whom the occasional appearance of the transition from ι to ε before a vowel (side by side with the much commoner reverse process) seemed quite compatible with the laws of Greek phonetics. He even counted Διόνυσος—Δεύνυσος (Anakreon) among the examples of this vowel change within the limits of the Greek language (Gr. Etym.5, p. 608 f.). At any rate Ἐάσων = Ἰάσων, and πατρουέαν = πατρωίαν are certain cases of it (see Meister, Gr. Dial. i, 294; G. Meyer, Gr. Gramm.2, p. 162). Kretschmer himself, Einl. 225, supplies Ἀσκληπεόδωρος, Δεί = Διί. To account for these forms he postulates the influence of Thracian surroundings on Greek pronunciation; but in the case of such a purely Greek word as Ἀσκληπιόδωρος the Thracian influence must have been a secondary phenomenon operating to cause the alteration of the old ιο into εο. Why should we not use the same explanation in accounting for the change from Διόνυσος to Δεόνυσος and (if Thracian influence is to be presumed—by no means probable in view of the statement of EM. 259, 30, Δεόνυσος, οὕτω γὰρ Σάμιοι προφέρουσιν) say that this Thracian influence was a secondary one acting upon the original Greek form of the name Διόνυσος?—It is evident that the ancients had no idea that Διόνυσος (Διώνυσος, Διόννυσος) was the indigenous name of the Thracian god, for they would in that case have said so without hesitation. They derived the conception, figure, and cult of the god from Thrace but not this particular name, which they regularly regard as the Greek name of the daimon whom the Thracians spoke of as Σαβάζιος or otherwise. (So too Hdt. regards Διόνυσος as the Greek name of the god whose essential nature is Egyptian.) This is by no means without importance; on the contrary, it provides cogent reason for doubting the (otherwise insecurely founded) derivation of the name from the Thracian.

1 It's safe to assume that Dionysus is the Greek name for the god, although a fully convincing origin for the word hasn't been found yet. Recent attempts to link it to the Thracian language are not very convincing. (Tomaschek, Sitzber. Wien. Ak. 130, 41; Kretschmer, Aus der Anomia, 22 f.; Einl. 241.) According to Kretschmer, the presence of the form Dionysus found in inscriptions in a few Greek towns influenced by Thracians, like Abdera and Maroneia, proves the name's Thracian origin. He claims that the change from ι to ε before a vowel is normal in Thrako-Phrygian, while it's completely inconsistent with Greek phonetic rules. Others, like G. Curtius, who is certainly a plausible source, disagreed, arguing that the occasional transition from ι to ε before a vowel (alongside the more common reverse change) fits perfectly with Greek phonetics. He even included Dionysus—Deunysus (Anakreon) as examples of this vowel change within Greek (Gr. Etym.5, p. 608 f.). In any case, Eason = Jason, and πατρουέαν = homeland are confirmed cases of it (see Meister, Gr. Dial. i, 294; G. Meyer, Gr. Gramm.2, p. 162). Kretschmer himself, Einl. 225, provides Ἀσκληπεόδωρος, Δεί = Διί. To explain these forms, he suggests that Thracian surroundings influenced Greek pronunciation; however, in the case of a purely Greek word like Asclepiodorus, the Thracian influence must have been a secondary factor leading to the change of the old ιο into εο. Why shouldn’t we apply the same reasoning to explain the shift from Dionysus to Dionysus and (if we are to assume Thracian influence—though it's not likely considering EM. 259, 30, Dionysus, as the Samoans say) claim that this Thracian influence was a secondary one impacting the original Greek form of the name Dionysus?—It's clear that the ancients didn’t realize that Dionysus(Dionysus) was the original name of the Thracian god, or they would have stated it openly. They took the god's concept, imagery, and worship from Thrace, but not this specific name, which they typically saw as the Greek name for the deity known to the Thracians as Σαβάζιος or something similar. (Similarly, Hdt. considers Dionysus to be the Greek name of the god whose core nature is Egyptian.) This distinction is significant; in fact, it provides strong reasons to question the (otherwise poorly supported) assumption that the name comes from the Thracian.

2 The women in Boeotia ἐνθεώτατα ἐμάνησαν (cf. Eur., Ba.). ταῖς Λακεδαιμονίων γυναιξὶν ἐνέπεσέ τις οἶστρος βακχικὸς καὶ ταῖς τῶν Χίων, Ael., VH. iii, 42. Hdt. ix, 34, speaks inclusively of the madness of the women in Argos (τῶν ἐν Ἄργεϊ γυναικῶν μανεισέων), where others speak only of the frenzy attacking the daughters of Proitos. Neither is incompatible with the other; they simply represent two different stages of the story. The μαίνεσθαι which attacks the entire female population is not (as later accounts generally make out) the punishment sent by Dionysos: it is simply another way of expressing the general acceptance of his worship which essentially consisted in 305 μαίνεσθαι (= βακχεύειν in Ant. Lib. 10). The μαίνεσθαι of individual women who try to resist the contagious enthusiasm of the Dionysiac revelry going on around them (e.g. the daughters of Eleuther: Suid. μελαναιγ. Δίον.) is, however, a punishment sent by the angry god when it leads them to murder their own children.—The regular and widespread “mania” of the newly introduced cult of Dionysos is referred to also by D.S. 4, 68, 4; [Apollod.] 2, 2, 2, 5; Paus. 2, 18, 4; cf. also Nonn., D. 47, 481 ff.

2 The women in Boeotia were filled with divine madness (cf. Eur., Ba.). Some sort of Bacchic frenzy struck the Spartan women and those of Chios, Ael., VH. iii, 42. Hdt. ix, 34, includes the madness of the women in Argos, where others only mention the frenzy affecting the daughters of Proitos. Neither view contradicts the other; they simply reflect two different parts of the story. The madness that affects all the women isn't, as later accounts often suggest, a punishment from Dionysos; it's just another way of showing the general acceptance of his worship, which mainly involved 305 μανείσθαι(=to party in Ant. Lib. 10). The madness of individual women who try to resist the contagious excitement of the Dionysiac festivities around them (for example, the daughters of Eleuther: Suid. Μελαναίγ. Δίον.) is, however, a punishment sent by the angry god when it leads them to kill their own children. The regular and widespread "mania" associated with the newly introduced cult of Dionysos is also mentioned by D.S. 4, 68, 4; [Apollod.] 2, 2, 2, 5; Paus. 2, 18, 4; cf. also Nonn., D. 47, 481 ff.

3 Resistance of Perseus to Dionysos who in this account arrives with the Mainads from the islands of the Aegean Sea (so Paus.); victory of Perseus, followed, however, by a reconciliation with the god whose worship is established and a temple built for Dionysos Kresios: Paus. 2, 20, 4; 22, 1; 23, 7–8. So, too, Nonn., D. 47, 475–741; [Apollod.] 3, 5, 2, 3; Sch. V., Ξ 319; cf. Meineke, An. Alex. 51. (Dionysos is slain in the war with Perseus: Dinarchos “the poet” ap. Eus., Chr. ii, pp. 44–5 Sch. = an. 718 Abr.; Lob., Agl. 537 f.).—Lykourgos does not properly belong to this series: his legend, as told by [Apollod.] 3, 5, 1 (apparently following the direction given to it by Aesch.), is a late transformation of the story preserved by Homer, in which stories of Pentheus or the Minyads or the Proitides are imitated.

3 Perseus's resistance against Dionysus, who in this account arrives with the Maenads from the Aegean Islands (according to Pausanias); Perseus wins, but later reconciles with the god, whose worship is established and a temple is built for Dionysus Kresios: Paus. 2, 20, 4; 22, 1; 23, 7–8. Similarly, Nonnus, D. 47, 475–741; [Apollodorus] 3, 5, 2, 3; Sch. V., Ξ 319; cf. Meineke, An. Alex. 51. (Dionysus is killed in the war with Perseus: Dinarchus “the poet” apud Eus., Chr. ii, pp. 44–5 Sch. = an. 718 Abr.; Lob., Agl. 537 f.).—Lycourgos doesn’t really belong in this series: his legend, as described by [Apollodorus] 3, 5, 1 (apparently following Aeschylus's direction), is a later transformation of the story preserved by Homer, imitating tales of Pentheus, the Minyads, or the Proitides.

4 This is esp. clear in the legend dealing with Orchomenos; cf. the account in Plu., Q.Gr. 38, p. 293 D. It is very probable that the other stories, too, were founded upon sacrificial ritual; cf. Welcker, Gr. Götterl. i, 444 ff.

4 This is especially evident in the legend about Orchomenos; see the account in Plutarch, Q.Gr. 38, p. 293 D. It's quite likely that the other stories were also based on sacrificial rituals; see Welcker, Gr. Götterl. i, 444 ff.

5 Cf. also Sch. Ar., Ach. 243.

5 See also Sch. Ar., Ach. 243.

6 Cf. Eur., Ba. 217 ff., 487, 32 ff. The daughters of Minyas ἐπόθουν τοὺς γαμέτας (see Perizon. ad loc.) καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἐγένοντο τῷ θεῷ μαινάδες, Ael., VH. iii, 42. Throughout all these legends the contrast between Dionysos and Hera, who is the patroness of marriage, is very marked.

6 Cf. Eur., Ba. 217 ff., 487, 32 ff. The daughters of Minyas missed their husbands (see Perizon. ad loc.) and for that reason, they weren’t turned into the god’s maenads, Ael., VH. iii, 42. Throughout all these legends, the contrast between Dionysus and Hera, who is the goddess of marriage, is very pronounced.

7 ὀρσιγύναικα Δίονυσον—unknown poet ap. Plu., Exil. 17, p. 607 C; Smp. 4, 6, 1, p. 671 C; Ε ap. D. 9, 389 B. ἵλαθι, εἰραφιῶτα, γυναιμανές, h. Hom. 34, 17.

7 ορσιγύναικα Δίονυσον—unknown poet ap. Plu., Exil. 17, p. 607 C; Smp. 4, 6, 1, p. 671 C; Ε ap. D. 9, 389 B. Charming, love-struck, woman-crazy, h. Hom. 34, 17.

8 Like an infection or a conflagration. ἤδη τόδ’ ἐγγὺς ὥστε πῦρ ἐφάπτεται ὕβρισμα Βακχοῦ, ψόγος ἐς Ἕλληνας μέγας, Pentheus in E., Ba. 778.

8 Like an infection or a wildfire. It's already so close that fire is touching it, a great insult to Bacchus, a major reproach to the Greeks., Pentheus in E., Ba. 778.

9 See the accounts reported ap. Hecker, Epidemics of the M.A., pp. 88, 153 Babington, esp. those of Petrus de Herental (ap. Steph. Baluz., Vit. Pap. Avinion. i, 483): quaedam nomina daemoniorum appellabant. The dancer cernit Mariae filium et caelum apertum.—“The masters of the Holy Scripture who exorcized the dancers regarded them as being possessed by the devil.” (Limburg Chronicle; see Mon. Germ., Chron. iv, 1, ed. Tilemann: p. 64, ed. Wyss.)

9 Check the accounts reported in Hecker, Epidemics of the M.A., pp. 88, 153 Babington, especially those of Petrus de Herental (in Steph. Baluz., Vit. Pap. Avinion. i, 483): Certain names of demons were referenced.. The dancer sees Mary's son and heaven opened.—“The masters of Holy Scripture who performed exorcisms on the dancers considered them to be possessed by the devil.” (Limburg Chronicle; see Mon. Germ., Chron. iv, 1, ed. Tilemann: p. 64, ed. Wyss.)

10 Details given by Weniger, Dionysosdienst in Elis, p. 8 (1883).

10 Details provided by Weniger, Dionysosdienst in Elis, p. 8 (1883).

11 At Delphi there was a festival called ἡρωΐς in which the Dionysiac Thyiades took part; a Σεμέλης ἀναγωγή was the chief feature of the δρώμενα φανερῶς (Plu., Q.Gr. 12). The name ἡρωΐς points to a general festival of the dead (cf. Voigt in Roscher’s Lex. i, 1048); for another general festival of “Heroes” at Delphi see chap. iv, n. 82. At Athens the great festival of the dead, the Choes and Chytrai (chap. v, p. 168) formed part of the Anthesteria. It is precisely in these ἀρχαιότερα Διονύσια (Thuc. ii, 15, 4) that Dionysos appears as he was in primitive belief, the “master of the souls”. Thus, too, in Argos one of the most ancient seats of the worship of Dionysos, the Dionysiac festival of the Agriania was at the same time a festival 306 of the dead, νεκύσια: Hsch., ἀγριάνια (it was specially ἐπὶ μιᾷ τῶν Προίτου θυγατέρων [Iphinoë: Apollod. 2, 22, 8], Hsch. s.v.: even so it was a festival of the dead).—In Plu., E ap. D. 9, 389 A, in view of the hopeless confusion shown by Plutarch in that chapter between Delphic cult-procedure and the opinions of certain unspecified θεολόγοι, it is unfortunately impossible to say with certainty whether it is the Delphians who Διόνυσον καὶ Ζαγρέα καὶ Νυκτέλιον καὶ Ἰσοδαίτην ὀνομάζουσιν or whether this only applies to the θεολόγοι (in which case they are probably Orphics).

11 At Delphi, there was a festival called goddess where the Dionysiac Thyiades participated; the main event was the Semele's myth, which was the highlight of the events openly (Plu., Q.Gr. 12). The name heroine refers to a general festival for the dead (cf. Voigt in Roscher’s Lex. i, 1048); for another general festival of “Heroes” at Delphi, see chap. iv, n. 82. In Athens, the major festival for the dead, the Choes and Chytrai (chap. v, p. 168), was part of the Anthesteria. It was specifically in these Ancient Dionysia (Thuc. ii, 15, 4) that Dionysos was seen as he was in ancient belief, the “master of the souls.” Similarly, in Argos, one of the oldest centers for the worship of Dionysos, the Dionysiac festival of the Agriania was also a festival 306 for the dead, νεκύσια: Hsch., wildlife (it was especially on one of Proetus' daughters [Iphinoë: Apollod. 2, 22, 8], Hsch. s.v.: even so, it was still a festival for the dead).—In Plu., E ap. D. 9, 389 A, considering the confusing descriptions by Plutarch in that chapter between Delphic cult practices and the views of some unnamed theologians, it is unfortunately not possible to determine with certainty whether it is the Delphians who They name him Dionysus, Zagreus, Nyctelios, and Isodaites. or if this only pertains to the theologians (in which case, they are probably Orphics).

12 The Agrionia to the “savage” god (ὠμηστὴς καὶ ἀγριώνιος as contrasted with the χαριδότης καὶ μειλίχιος, Plu., Ant. 24) were celebrated in Thebes and Argos. ἀγριώνια καὶ νυκτέλια ὧν τὰ πολλὰ διὰ σκότους δρᾶται are opposed to the ὀλύμπια ἱερά, by Plu., QR. 112, p. 291 A. Bacchic din, ψόφος, at the νυκτέλια, Plu., Smp. 4, 6, p. 672 A.—Temple of D. Νυκτέλιος at Megara: Paus. 1, 40, 6. Nocturnal festivities (νύκτωρ τὰ πολλὰ, Eur., Ba. 486) at the Dionysia at Lerna = Paus. 2, 37, 6, at the festival of Διόνυσος Λαμπτήρ in Pellone: Paus. 7, 27, 3. ὄργια of D. at Melangeia in Arcadia 8, 6, 5; at Heraia 8, 26, 1. The orgiastic cult of D. seems to have been preserved particularly in Sparta. We hear of the οἶστρος βακχικός that once attacked the women of Sparta from Aelian, VH. iii, 42; some lines of Alkman (fr. 34) allude to the fanatical Bacchic revels on the mountain tops (quite misunderstood by Welcker, Kl. Schr. iv, 49). It became proverbial: virginibus bacchata Lacaenis Taygeta, Vg., G. ii, 487. A special word is applied to the Bacchic fury of these Spartan Mainads: δύσμαιναι (Philarg. on Vg., G. ii, 487; Hsch. s.v.; Meineke, An. Alex. 360). In view of these ecstatic mountain-revels we need not be surprised at the prohibition of drunken roaming about the city and countryside, of which Pl., Lg. 637 AB speaks.

12 The Agrionia to the "wild" god (savage and wild compared to the charming and gentle, Plu., Ant. 24) were celebrated in Thebes and Argos. Wild creatures and nocturnal beings, most of which operate in darkness. are contrasted with the Olympian sacred sites, according to Plu., QR. 112, p. 291 A. There was a Bacchic noise, death, at the nighttime, as mentioned by Plu., Smp. 4, 6, p. 672 A.—Temple of D. Nighttime in Megara: Paus. 1, 40, 6. Nocturnal festivities (night is many, Eur., Ba. 486) at the Dionysia at Lerna = Paus. 2, 37, 6, during the festival of Dionysus Lampter in Pellone: Paus. 7, 27, 3. The ἄγρια of D. at Melangeia in Arcadia 8, 6, 5; at Heraia 8, 26, 1. The orgiastic cult of D. seems to have been especially maintained in Sparta. There are accounts of the Bacchic frenzy that once overwhelmed the women of Sparta from Aelian, VH. iii, 42; some lines from Alkman (fr. 34) refer to the frenzied Bacchic celebrations on the mountain peaks (which was misinterpreted by Welcker, Kl. Schr. iv, 49). It became well-known: virgins drunk from Laconian Taygeta, Vg., G. ii, 487. A specific term is used for the Bacchic frenzy of these Spartan Maenads: δύσμαιναι (Philarg. on Vg., G. ii, 487; Hsch. s.v.; Meineke, An. Alex. 360). Given these ecstatic mountain celebrations, it’s no surprise there were restrictions on drunken wandering around the city and countryside, as mentioned by Pl., Lg. 637 AB.

13 Welcker, Gr. Götterl. i, 444.—But human sacrifice in the Thracian worship of D. is nevertheless suggested by the remarkable story of Porph. (Abs. ii, 8) about the Βάσσαροι (whom he seems to take for a Thracian tribe).

13 Welcker, Gr. Götterl. i, 444.—However, human sacrifice in the Thracian worship of D. is still indicated by the notable account from Porph. (Abs. ii, 8) concerning the Vassals (whom he appears to consider a Thracian tribe).

14 Clem. Al., Arn., Firm. all speak of the ὠμοφαγία of the Bakchai as a still-prevailing cult-practice. Bernays, Heraklit. Briefe, 73. Galen, too, speaks in the same way of the tearing in pieces of snakes at the Bacchic festivals (quoted Lob., Agl. 271 a); to snare vipers κάλλιστός ἐστι καιρός, ὃν καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ Ἀνδρόμαχος (79 ff. of his poem) ἐδήλωσεν, ἡνίκα καὶ οἱ τῷ Διονύσῳ βακχεύοντες εἰώθασι διασπᾶν τὰς ἐχίδνας, παυομένου μὲν τοῦ ἧρος οὔπω δ’ ἠργμένου τοῦ θέρους (Antid. i, 8 = xiv, p. 45 K.). ἡνίκα—ἐχίδνας are Gal.’s words not Andromachos’. Cf. also Prud., Sym. i, 130 ff.

14 Clem. Al., Arn., Firm. all refer to the raw food diet of the Bakchai as a still-existing cult practice. Bernays, Heraklit. Briefe, 73. Galen also describes the act of tearing apart snakes at the Bacchic festivals in a similar way (quoted Lob., Agl. 271 a); to catch vipers The time is very beautiful, which even Andromachus himself acknowledges. (79 ff. of his poem) It was revealed when those who are celebrating Dionysus are used to scattering the snakes, as summer is ending but the heat hasn’t fully ceased yet. (Antid. i, 8 = xiv, p. 45 K.). ἡνίκα—snakes are Gal.’s words not Andromachos’. Cf. also Prud., Sym. i, 130 ff.

15 We need only recall the remarkable story of Hdt. (iv, 79) about the Scythian king who in Borysthenes was initiated into the mysteries of Dionysos Bakcheios ὃς μαίνεσθαι ἐνάγει ἀνθρώπους. His Scythian subjects took exception to this. For them the religion was specifically Greek, A Borysthenite says to the Scythians: ἡμῶν γὰρ καταγελᾶτε, ὦ Σκύθαι, ὅτι βακχεύομεν καὶ ἡμᾶς ὁ θεὸς λαμβάνει. νῦν οὗτος ὁ δαίμων καὶ τὸν ὑμέτερον βασιλέα λελάβηκε καὶ βακχεύει καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ μαίνεται.

15 We only need to remember the amazing story from Hdt. (iv, 79) about the Scythian king who was initiated into the mysteries of Dionysos Bakcheios in Borysthenes. His Scythian subjects were not pleased with this. To them, this religion was distinctly Greek. A Borysthenite says to the Scythians: You laugh at us, Scythians, because we are in a state of ecstasy and our god takes hold of us. Now this spirit has possessed your king as well, and he is in a frenzy, under the influence of the god.

16 Cf. the remarkable account given by Plu., Mul. Virt. 11, p. 249 B; fr. de An. ap. Gell. 15, 10; Polyaen. 8, 63; and Lucian in H.Conscr. (25), 1.

16 See the impressive account provided by Plutarch, On Moral Virtue. 11, p. 249 B; On the Causes of Animals. in Gellius 15, 10; Polyaenus 8, 63; and Lucian in On the Conscription. (25), 1.

17 Of a different description are the attacks of temporary insanity accompanied by similar features but not religious in complexion described by Aretaeus, p. 82 K., and Gal. vii, pp. 60–1 K. (the case of Theophilos). 307

17 Different from that are the episodes of temporary insanity that have similar characteristics but aren't religious in nature, as described by Aretaeus, p. 82 K., and Gal. vii, pp. 60–1 K. (the case of Theophilos). 307

18 Phenomena of κορυβαντιασμός: hearing the sound of flutes Pl., Crit. 54 D, Max. T., Diss. 38, 2, p. 220 R.; cf. Cic., Div. i, 114; seeing φαντασίαι, D.H., Dem. 22. It is this waking dream-condition, a condition related to hypnosis, which Pliny probably means: patentibus oculis dormiunt multi homines, quos corybantiare Graeci dicunt, NH. xi, 147. Excitement, beating heart, weeping: Pl., Smp. 215 E. Maddened dance: οἱ κορυβαντιῶντες οὐκ ἔμφρονες ὄντες ὀρχοῦνται, Ion, 534 A. “Sober drunkenness” μέθη νηφάλιος of the κορυβ., Philo, Mund. Op. 23, i, p. 16 M.—The name shows that those attacked by the disease were regarded as “possessed” by the Korybantes. κορυβαντιᾶν τὸ Κορύβασι κατέχεσθαι, Sch. Ar., V. 9. The Korybantes μανίας καὶ ἐνθειασμοῦ εἰσιν ἐμποιητικοί, ib. 8. ἔνθεος ἐκ σεμνῶν Κορυβάντων, E., Hip. 142; Sch. ad loc.: Κορύβαντες μανίας αἴτιοι. ἔνθεν καὶ κορυβάντιᾶν.—Arrian gives an unusually good account of the Korybantic frenzy of the Phrygians in a little noticed passage ap. Eust. on D.P. 809: μαίνονται τῇ Ῥέᾳ καὶ πρὸς Κορυβάντων κατέχονται, ἤγουν κορυβαντιῶσι δαιμονῶντες (i.e. possessed by the δαίμων, see Usener, Götternamen, 293). ὅταν δὲ κατάσχῃ αὐτοὺς τὸ θεῖον, ἐλαυνόμενοι καὶ μέγα βοῶντες καὶ ὀρχούμενοι προθεσπίζουσι τὰ μέλλοντα, θεοφορούμενοι καὶ μαινόμενοι. The complete similarity between this condition and that of the Bacchic worship is sufficiently obvious.

18 Phenomena of κορυβαντιασμός: hearing the sound of flutes Pl., Crit. 54 D, Max. T., Diss. 38, 2, p. 220 R.; cf. Cic., Div. i, 114; seeing fantasies, D.H., Dem. 22. It is this waking dream-state, a condition related to hypnosis, which Pliny probably means: Many people sleep with their eyes open, which the Greeks call corybantiare., NH. xi, 147. Excitement, racing heart, weeping: Pl., Smp. 215 E. Wild dance: The Corybantes, being not sensible, dance., Ion, 534 A. “Sober drunkenness” sober drunk of the κορυβ., Philo, Mund. Op. 23, i, p. 16 M.—The term shows that those afflicted by the condition were seen as “possessed” by the Korybantes. κορυβαντιᾶν τὸ Κορύβασι κατέχεσθαι, Sch. Ar., V. 9. The Korybantes They are creative with passion and inspiration., ib. 8. Inspired by the sacred Corybantes, E., Hip. 142; Sch. ad loc.: Korybantes are the cause of madness. Hence, they are called Korybantic..—Arrian provides an exceptionally good description of the Korybantic frenzy of the Phrygians in a little-known passage ap. Eust. on D.P. 809: They are in a frenzy with Rhea and are taken by the Corybants, meaning they are celebrating with wild, frenzied dancing. (i.e. possessed by the spirit, see Usener, Götternamen, 293). When they are seized by the divine, driven and shouting loudly while dancing, they proclaim the future, being inspired and frenzied.. The striking similarity between this state and that of Bacchic worship is quite clear.

19 Use of dance and music to cure those who are attacked by Korybantic excitement: Pl., Lg. 790 DE, 791 A. More especially the melodies for the flute composed by Olympos, being θεῖα, were able to discover and cure those liable to Korybantic ekstasis (by means of the inspiring effect which they had on such persons). This is shown particularly by a passage in Plato (Smp. 215 C-E); where it is evident that the κορυβαντιῶντες of 215 E are not to be distinguished from the θεῶν καὶ τελετῶν δεόμενοι of 215 C (C states the general rule of which E is a particular application). This homoeopathic cure of the κορυβαντιῶντες by the intensification and subsequent discharge of the disorder is implied in all that we hear of the character of the Phrygian mode as ἐνθουσιαστική and of the μέλη Ὀλύμπου as exciting the souls of men to “enthousiasmos”; Arist., Pol. 1340b, 4, 5, 1342b, 1 ff., 1340a, 8; [Pl.], Min. 318 B; Cic., Div. i, 114. The κορυβαντιῶντες are also meant in Arist., Pol. 8, 7, 1342a, 7 ff . . . καὶ γὰρ ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς κινήσεως (i.e. τοῦ ἐνθουσιασμοῦ) κατακώχιμοί τινές εἰσιν· ἐκ δὲ τῶν ἱερῶν μελῶν ὁρῶμεν τούτους, ὅταν χρήσωνται τοῖς ὀργιάζουσι τὴν ψυχὴν μέλεσι, καθισταμένους ὥσπερ ἰατρείας τυχόντας καὶ καθάρσεως. Plato’s analysis (Lg. 790 D ff.) is exactly parallel: the cure for the μανικαὶ διαθέσεις of the Korybantic patients is οὐχ ἡσυχία ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον κίνησις, whereby they are assisted to regain their ἕξεις ἔμφρονες. (It is from this religio-musical procedure and not from strictly medical experience or practice that Aristotle, taking a hint from Plato, Rp. 606, derived his idea of the κάθαρσις τῶν παθημάτων by violent discharge of the emotions and transferred it to tragedy—not, as in the explanation to which some have recently returned, by a tranquilization of the emotions in “a final reconciliation”.) This κάθαρσις and ἰατρεία of the κορυβαντιῶντες is the object of the initiation ceremony of the Korybantes (whose true βάκχοι are the κορυβαντιῶντες, i.e. the worshippers who are in need of and capable of cure); of the Κορυβάντων μυστήρια which are held ἐπὶ καθαρμῷ τῆς μανίας (Sch. Ar., V. 119–20, ἐκορυβάντιζε); cf. the τελετὴ τῶν Κορυβάντων (Pl., Euthd. 277 D, including θρόνωσις: D. Chr. 12, p. 388 R., § 33 Arn.; Lob., Agl. 116, 369. There is a parody of θρόνωσις in the initiation scene of Ar., Nub. 254, where Streps. sits ἐπὶ τὸν ἱερὸν σκίμποδα. τεθρονισμένος τοῖς θεοῖς = initiated 308 in P. Mag. Lond. 747 f. = Kenyon, Greek Papyri in B.M. i, p. 108); and cf. the μητρῷα καὶ κορυβαντικὰ τέλη: D.H., Dem. 22. At the initiation ceremony (κορυβαντισμός· κάθαρσις μανίας Hsch.) held in the Κορυβαντεῖον (Hdn. Gr. 1, 375, 15 Lentz; App. Prov. ii, 23) the famous music of “inspiration” was played; there was also χορεία (Pl. Euthd.), ἦχοι e.g. the sound of τύμπανα (Ar., Ves. 120 f.; Luc. DD. 12, 1), and also it appears incense-burning: ὀσμαί, D.H., Dem. 22; cf. above, chap. viii, n. 39. All these stimulants intensified the pathological tendency of the κορυβαντιῶντες and gave them relief by the violent discharge of their emotions.—There is no need to doubt the actual occurrence of such pathological states and their medical treatment by music, etc. It was clearly the same type of psychopathical malady that invaded Italy in the Middle Ages under the name of Tarantism, repeating its attacks for several centuries; in this case, too, music (and even the sound of a particular melody) served both to excite and eventually to cure the violent dance-mania; cf. Hecker 172, 176 ff.—There seems to be a fabulous element in other stories current in antiquity about the cure of madness, love-passions, and even sciatica by the music of the flute (Pythagoras, Empedokles, Damon, Thphr. fr. 87). Such belief in the curative powers of music, esp. of the flute, seems to have been derived originally from actual experience of the καθάρσεις practised in Korybantic festivals, and then to have been exaggerated into a fable. Even doctors had no doubt that μανία was curable by the cantiones tibiarum; see Cael. Aur., Morb. Chr. i, 5, 175, 178 (Asklepiades); Cael. Aur. (i.e. Soranos), ib. 176, however, denies it. It depended entirely upon the theory, originally derived from κορυβαντισμός, of cure by intensification and discharge of the emotional state.

19 The use of dance and music to heal those affected by Korybantic excitement: Pl., Lg. 790 DE, 791 A. Particularly noteworthy are the flute melodies created by Olympos, which were aunt, and could identify and heal those prone to Korybantic ekstasis through the inspiring effects they had on individuals. This is highlighted in a specific passage from Plato (Smp. 215 C-E); it's clear that the κορυβαντιῶντες mentioned in 215 E are indistinguishable from the praying to the gods and rituals referred to in 215 C (C presents the general principle, while E offers a specific example). This homoeopathic treatment for the κορυβαντιῶντες through the intensification and subsequent release of the disorder is suggested by everything said about the character of the Phrygian mode, which is described as enthusiastic, and by the Ολύμπιοι θεοί that excite men to “enthousiasmos”; Arist., Pol. 1340b, 4, 5, 1342b, 1 ff., 1340a, 8; [Pl.], Min. 318 B; Cic., Div. i, 114. The κορυβαντιῶντες are also referenced in Arist., Pol. 8, 7, 1342a, 7 ff . . . for this movement (i.e. Some of those who are driven by enthusiasm are indeed quite intense. From the sacred melodies, we see them whenever they use their songs to inspire those participating in the rituals, positioning themselves as if they are lucky to have found healing and purification.. Plato’s analysis (Lg. 790 D ff.) parallels this exactly: the remedy for the manipulations and dispositions of the Korybantic patients is not peace but rather motion, which helps them regain their You will be wise.. (This religio-musical approach, rather than strict medical experience or practice, is where Aristotle derived his notion of catharsis of the emotions from Plato, by suggesting a release of emotions, not the tranquilization of feelings through “a final reconciliation.”) This catharsis and clinic for the κορυβαντιῶντες is the focus of the initiation ceremony of the Korybantes (their true Bacchae being the κορυβαντιῶντες, i.e., worshippers needing and capable of healing); of the Mysteries of the Korybantes performed in the cleansing of madness (Sch. Ar., V. 119–20, None); cf. the Corybantic rite (Pl., Euthd. 277 D, including θρόνωσις: D. Chr. 12, p. 388 R., § 33 Arn.; Lob., Agl. 116, 369. There is a playful take on θρόνωσις in the initiation scene of Ar., Nub. 254, where Streps. sits At the holy place. Seated with the gods. = initiated 308 in P. Mag. Lond. 747 f. = Kenyon, Greek Papyri in B.M. i, p. 108); and cf. the Mother's Day and Coribantic festivals: D.H., Dem. 22. At the initiation ceremony (wild celebration; purging of rage Hsch.), held in the Korybantic (Hdn. Gr. 1, 375, 15 Lentz; App. Prov. ii, 23), the renowned music of “inspiration” was performed; there was also χορεία (Pl. Euthd.), Sounds such as drum sounds drums (Ar., Ves. 120 f.; Luc. DD. 12, 1), and incense was likely burned: ὀσμαί, D.H., Dem. 22; cf. above, chap. viii, n. 39. All these stimulants heightened the pathological tendencies of the κορυβαντιῶντες and provided relief through a powerful release of their emotions.—There is no reason to doubt the real existence of such pathological conditions and their medical treatment with music, etc. Clearly, a similar type of psychological disorder emerged in Italy during the Middle Ages referred to as Tarantism, which occurred in repetitive waves for centuries; in that case too, music (and even the specific sound of certain melodies) served to provoke and eventually alleviate the intense dance-mania; cf. Hecker 172, 176 ff.—There appears to be a mythical aspect to certain accounts from antiquity regarding the healing of madness, love infatuations, and even sciatica with flute music (Pythagoras, Empedokles, Damon, Thphr. fr. 87). This belief in the healing powers of music, especially of the flute, seems to have originally stemmed from real experiences of the cleansings practiced at Korybantic festivals, which were later embellished into legends. Even physicians were convinced that mania could be treated with the cantiones tibiarum; see Cael. Aur., Morb. Chr. i, 5, 175, 178 (Asklepiades); Cael. Aur. (i.e. Soranos), ib. 176, though he disagrees. It entirely relied on the theory, initially derived from κορυβαντισμός, of healing through the intensification and release of emotional states.

20 ὦ μάκαρ ὅστις . . . θιασεύεται ψυχάν, ἐν ὄρεσσι βακχεύων, ὁσίοις καθαρμοῖσιν, E., Ba. 72 ff.—dicunt sacra Liberi ad purgationem animae pertinere Serv. on Vg., G. ii, 389; cf. also on A. vi, 741.

20 Oh blessed one who is enlightened in the soul, enjoying the mountains, with sacred purifications, E., Ba. 72 ff.—They say the sacred rituals of Liber are connected to the cleansing of the soul. Serv. on Vg., G. ii, 389; cf. also on A. vi, 741.

21 Διόνυσος λύσιος (like Δ. μειλίχιος ἐλευθερεύς and σαώτης) is rightly taken as the “freer from orgiastic frenzy” (and not in the ordinary political sense) by Klausen, Orpheus, p. 26 [Ersch-Gruber] and Voigt in Roscher’s Lex. i, 1062. That this is the proper meaning of λύσιος is shown by its being contrasted with βακχεῖος, which by common consent means the god ὃς μαίνεσθαι ἐνάγει ἀνθρώπους (Hdt.); e.g. in Korinth, Paus. 2, 2, 6; Sikyon, Paus. 2, 7, 5–6. And Δ. βακχεύς and μειλίχιος in Naxos, Ath. iii, 78 C.

21 Dionysus Lysios (like D. Meilichios Eleutherios and Saotis) is correctly understood as the “freer from orgiastic frenzy” (and not in the usual political sense) by Klausen, Orpheus, p. 26 [Ersch-Gruber] and Voigt in Roscher’s Lex. i, 1062. This interpretation of Lysios is supported by its contrast with Bacchus, which commonly denotes the god who drives people crazy (Hdt.); for example, in Corinth, Paus. 2, 2, 6; Sicyon, Paus. 2, 7, 5–6. And D. Bakcheus and Meilichios in Naxos, Ath. iii, 78 C.

22 In the κατάλογος γυναικῶν as it seems; fr. 54 Rz. But perhaps also in the Melampodia (fr. 184 Kink.).

22 In the women's directory it appears; fr. 54 Rz. But maybe also in the Melampodia (fr. 184 Kink.).

23 ἐμάνησαν, ὡς Ἡσίοδός φησιν, ὅτι τὰς Διονύσου τελετὰς οὐ κατεδέχοντο. [Apollod.] 2, 2, 2, 2, and cf. 1, 9, 12, 8. The same story (only with the name Anaxagoras substituted for that of his grandfather Proitos—doubtless on chronological grounds) with the words τὰς Ἀργείας γυναῖκας μανείσας διὰ τὴν Διονύσου μῆνιν: D.S. 4, 68, 4. (μανία—in the reign of Anaxagoras—Paus. 2, 18, 4; Eust., on Β 568, p. 288, 28).—Otherwise, it is generally Hera who sends the μανία Akousil. ap. [Apollod.] 2, 2, 2, 2 [fr. 14 Diels]. Pherekyd. ap. Sch. on ο 225. Probus and Serv. on Ecl. vi, 48. This is a later version of the legend depending upon a different interpretation of the “insanity”.

23 They went crazy, as Hesiod says, because they didn't embrace the rituals of Dionysus.. [Apollod.] 2, 2, 2, 2, and cf. 1, 9, 12, 8. The same story (with Anaxagoras' name replacing his grandfather Proitos—likely due to chronological reasons) includes the words The women of Argos went insane due to the anger of Dionysus.: D.S. 4, 68, 4. (craziness—during the reign of Anaxagoras—Paus. 2, 18, 4; Eust., on B 568, p. 288, 28).—Typically, it is Hera who sends the chaos Akousil. ap. [Apollod.] 2, 2, 2, 2 [fr. 14 Diels]. Pherekyd. ap. Sch. on ο 225. Probus and Serv. on Ecl. vi, 48. This is a later version of the legend based on a different interpretation of the "insanity."

24 [Apollod.] 2, 2, 2. Acc. to Hdt. ix, 34, the treatment of Melamp. was applied generally to all the Ἀργεῖαι γυναῖκες (who acc. to [Apollod.] § 5, were also attacked by the madness); cf. D.S. 4, 68, 4. (. . . τὰς Ἀργείας ἢ ὥς τινες μᾶλλόν φασι, τὰς Προιτίδας Eustath. κατὰ τὴν ἱστορίαν). θεραπεύειν is D.S.’ word; ἐκάθηρεν, Sch. Pi., N. ix, 30; purgavit Serv. 309

24 [Apollod.] 2, 2, 2. According to Hdt. ix, 34, the treatment of Melamp. was generally applied to all the Argive women (who according to [Apollod.] § 5, were also affected by the madness); cf. D.S. 4, 68, 4. (. . . the Argives or as some say more specifically, the Proetids Eustath. according to history). to heal is D.S.’ word; ἐκάθηρεν, Sch. Pi., N. ix, 30; purgavit Serv. 309

25 Μελάμπους παραλαβὼν τοὺς δυνατωτάτους τῶν νεανιῶν μετ’ ἀλαλαγμοῦ καί τινος ἐνθέου χορείας ἐκ τῶν ὀρῶν αὐτὰς ἐς Σικυῶνα συνεδίωξε (i.e. the frenzied women who had eventually become very numerous: § 5, 6) [Apollod.] 2, 2, 2, 7. The account in Pl., Phdr. 244 D, E, corresponds closely with the proceedings of Melampous and perhaps refers to them: ἀλλὰ μὴν νόσων γε καὶ πόνων τῶν μεγίστων, ἃ δὴ παλαιῶν ἐκ μηνιμάτων ποθὲν ἔν τισι τῶν γενῶν ἡ μανία ἐγγενομένη καὶ προφητεύσασα οἷς ἔδει ἀπαλλαγὴν εὕρετο, καταφυγοῦσα πρὸς θεῶν εὐχάς τε καὶ λατρείας, ὅθεν δὴ καθαρμῶν τε καὶ τελετῶν τυχοῦσα ἐξάντη ἐποίησε τὸν ἑαυτῆς ἔχοντα πρός τε τὸν παρόντα καὶ τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον, λύσιν τῷ ὀρθῶς μανέντι καὶ κατασχομένῳ τῶν παρόντων κακῶν εὑρομένη. This is a description of the remedial methods used in the Bacchic and Korybantic enthousiasmos but applied to special circumstances of the mythical past which are regarded as the standard of all later kathartic methods.

25 with excitement and a divine dance from the mountains to Sikyon.">Melampus gathered the strongest of the young men with a loud shout and an energetic dance from the mountains to Sikyon. (i.e. the frenzied women who had eventually become very numerous: § 5, 6) [Apollod.] 2, 2, 2, 7. The account in Pl., Phdr. 244 D, E, corresponds closely with the actions of Melampus and may refer to them: justifiably angry and desperate of the present evils found.">But indeed, with regard to the most severe illnesses and pains, which sometimes arose from old grudges, the madness that emerged and prophesied who needed to find relief, sought refuge with the gods through prayers and devotion; and thus, through cleanings and rituals, she created a release for the one who was justifiably angry and greedy at the present evils. This is a description of the healing methods used in the Bacchic and Korybantic enthousiasmos, applied to specific situations of the mythical past that are seen as the standard for all later cleansing methods.

26 καθαρμοί [Apollod.] § 8. The regular kathartic materials are σκίλλα, ἄσφαλτος, water, etc.; Diphilus, fr. 126 K., employs them all for his own purpose, ap. Clem. Al., Str. vii, p. 844 P. The black hellebore (ἐλλέβορος μέλας) was popularly known as μελαμπόδιον because Melampous had first gathered and employed it for the purpose (Thphr., HP. 9, 10, 4), esp. when he cured and purified the Προίτου θυγατέρας μανείσας (Gal., Atrabile 7 = v, p. 132 K.; it can only be by mistake that he calls it the white hellebore; cf. also Diosc. 4, 149, where the old καθαρτής becomes Μελάμπους τις αἰπόλος [hence Plin., NH. 25, 47]; the reason may be elicited from Thphr., HP. 9, 10, 2). The place where the καθαρμοί took place and where the καθάρσια were thrown away differed acc. to the natural features of the locality and the convenience they offered: thus in Arcadia it was at Lousoi, in Elis at the river Anigros, etc.; Ov., M. xv, 322 ff.; Vitr. 8, 3, 21; Paus. 5, 5, 10; 8, 18, 7–8; cf. Call., H. Art. 233 f.; Str. 346, etc.

26 catharses [Apollod.] § 8. The usual cleansing agents are asphalt, water, and so on; Diphilus, fr. 126 K., uses them all for his own needs, according to Clem. Al., Str. vii, p. 844 P. The black hellebore (black hellebore) was commonly known as melampodium because Melampous was the first to collect and use it for this purpose (Thphr., HP. 9, 10, 4), especially when he cured and purified the daughter of Proitos who was insane (Gal., Atrabile 7 = v, p. 132 K.; it must be a mistake that he refers to it as white hellebore; see also Diosc. 4, 149, where the old cleansing becomes Melampous the shepherd [hence Plin., NH. 25, 47]; the reason for this can be found in Thphr., HP. 9, 10, 2). The locations where the catharses occurred and where the cleaning processes were disposed of varied based on the natural characteristics of the area and the convenience it provided: thus, in Arcadia it was at Lousoi, in Elis at the river Anigros, etc.; Ov., M. xv, 322 ff.; Vitr. 8, 3, 21; Paus. 5, 5, 10; 8, 18, 7–8; cf. Call., H. Art. 233 f.; Str. 346, etc.

27 Melampous Ἕλλησιν ὁ ἐξηγησάμενος τοῦ Διονύσου τό τε οὔνομα καὶ τὴν θυσίην καὶ τὴν πομπὴν τοῦ φαλλοῦ, Hdt. ii, 49. Hdt.’s elaborate theory in this passage of a connexion between Mel. and Egypt, etc., is of course historically quite worthless, but the fact that he pitched upon Melamp. especially as the introducer of the Dionysiac religion can only have been due to the existence of ancient tradition (i.e. legendary tradition of course). There can be no doubt that he, like Hesiod, regarded as Dionysiac the frenzy in which the Argive women were said μανῆναι and to have been healed by Melamp. (ix, 34).

27 Melampous To the Greeks, the one who explained the name of Dionysus, as well as his sacrifice and the procession of the phallus., Hdt. ii, 49. Hdt.’s detailed theory in this passage connecting Melamp. with Egypt, etc., is historically quite worthless, but the reason he specifically chose Melamp. as the one who introduced the Dionysiac religion must have come from the existence of ancient traditions (i.e., legendary traditions, of course). There’s no doubt that he, like Hesiod, considered the frenzy that the Argive women were said to have experienced as Dionysiac and believed they were healed by Melamp. (ix, 34).

28 Μελάμπους φίλτατος ὢν Ἀπόλλωνι, Hes., Eoiai, (168 Rz.) ap. Sch. A.R. i, 118. φίλος Ἀπόλλωνι, D.S, 6, 7, 7 Dind. The poet of the family tree of the Melampodidai given in ο 244 ff. undoubtedly regarded Melamp. as an Apolline μάντις (like all μάντεις in Homer). This poet at least knows nothing of the Dionysiac side of Melampous’ activities. How Mel. met Apollo on the banks of the Alphaios and from him received his consecration as true μάντις, we learn from [Apollod.] 1, 9, 11, 3. The same is said of Polypheides, a descendant of Mel. ο 252: αὐτὰρ ὑπέρθυμον Πολυφείδεα μάντιν Ἀπόλλων θῆκε βροτῶν ὄχ’ ἄριστον, ἐπεὶ θάνεν Ἀμφιάρος. Another descendant of Melamp., Polyeidos, comes to Megara to purify Alkathoös from the murder of his son, and founds there a temple of Dionysos: Paus. 1, 43, 4.

28 Melampus, favored by Apollo, Hes., Eoiai, (168 Rz.) ap. Sch. A.R. i, 118. friend of Apollo, D.S, 6, 7, 7 Dind. The poet of the family tree of the Melampodidai found in ο 244 ff. clearly viewed Melampus as an Apollonian psychic (like all visionaries in Homer). This poet, at least, does not mention the Dionysian aspect of Melampus’ activities. The story of how Melampus encountered Apollo by the banks of the Alphaios and was consecrated by him as a true visionary can be found in [Apollod.] 1, 9, 11, 3. The same is noted about Polypheides, a descendant of Melampus. ο 252: and Apollo chose the remarkable seer Polypheides from among mortals when Amphiaros passed away.. Another descendant of Melampus, Polyeidos, comes to Megara to purify Alkathoös for the murder of his son and there establishes a temple to Dionysos: Paus. 1, 43, 4.

29 See above, chap. iii, n. 32.

29 See above, ch. 3, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

30 Plu., Is. et O. 35, p. 365 A. Sacrifice made by Agamemnon to Dionysos ἐν μυχοῖς Δελφινίου παρ’ ἄντρα κερδῴου θεοῦ, Lyc. 207 ff.

30 Plu., Is. et O. 35, p. 365 A. Sacrifice made by Agamemnon to Dionysus In the hidden depths of the Delphic sanctuary near the cunning god's altar., Lyc. 207 ff.

31 Plu., E ap. D. ix, p. 388 F. Three winter months were sacred to Dionysos (cf. the three chief Dionysiac festivals at Athens which 310 occurred in the months Gamelion, Anthesterion, Elaphebolion). Only during these three months is the god on earth. So, too, Kore shared her rule over the underworld with Aïdoneus for three months (or six); the rest of the year she is on earth παρὰ μητρὶ καὶ ἄλλοις ἀθανάτοισι.

31 Plu., E ap. D. ix, p. 388 F. Three winter months were dedicated to Dionysos (see the three main Dionysian festivals in Athens which 310 took place in the months Gamelion, Anthesterion, Elaphebolion). The god is present on earth only during these three months. Similarly, Kore shared her rule over the underworld with Aïdoneus for three months (or six); for the rest of the year, she is on earth to mother and other immortals.

32 Διονύσῳ τῶν Δελφῶν οὐδὲν ἧττον ἢ τῷ Ἀπόλλωνι μέτεστιν, Plu., E ap. D. ix, 384 D.

32 Dionysus has just as much of a place in the worship at Delphi as Apollo does., Plu., E ap. D. ix, 384 D.

33 τὰ δὲ νεφῶν τέ ἐστιν ἀνωτέρω τὰ ἄκρα (τοῦ Παρνασοῦ), καὶ αἱ Θυιάδες ἐπὶ τούτοις τῷ Διονύσῳ καὶ τῷ Ἀπόλλωνι μαίνονται, Paus. 10, 32, 7. Parnasus gemino petit aethera colle, mons Phoebo Bromioque sacer, cui numine mixto Delphica Thebanae referunt trieterica Bacchae, Luc., v, 72 ff. We hear of a Delphos the son of Apollo and Thyia the first priestess and Mainad of Dionysos at Delphi: Paus. 10, 6, 4.

33 The tops of the clouds tower above the heights.(of Parnassus), and the Thyiads dance energetically for Dionysus and Apollo, Paus. 10, 32, 7. Parnasus reaches for the sky from its twin peaks, the mountain sacred to Phoebus and Bromios, where the Delphic Bacchae hold their festival every three years., Luc., v, 72 ff. We hear of Delphos, the son of Apollo, and Thyia, the first priestess and Maenad of Dionysus at Delphi: Paus. 10, 6, 4.

34 Apollo himself in an oracular command Πυθιάσιν πεντετήροισιν . . . ἔταξε Βάκχου θυσίαν χορῶν τε πολλῶν κυκλίαν ἄμιλλαν; so says Philodamos of Skarpheia in the Paian (second half fourth century B.C.) BCH. 1895, p. 408. We must suppose, too, that this command (i.e. decree of the Delphic priesthood) was actually carried out.

34 Apollo himself gave an oracular command Pythian games for five years... He organized a sacrifice to Bacchus and a competition of many choruses in a circular format.; so says Philodamos of Skarpheia in the Paian (second half of the fourth century B.C.) BCH. 1895, p. 408. We must also assume that this command (i.e. decree of the Delphic priesthood) was actually put into effect.

35 Δελφοὶ δὲ διπλῇ προσηγορίᾳ τιμῶσιν (σέ, i.e. Apollo), Ἀπόλλωνα καὶ Διόνυσον λέγοντες, Men. Rhet., p. 446, 5 Sp.

35 The people of Delphi honor him with a double title. (σέ, i.e. Apollo), calling him Apollo and Bacchus, Men. Rhet., p. 446, 5 Sp.

36 Arg., Sch. Pi., P., p. 297, Böckh [p. 2, 5 ff. Drch.]: . . . τοῦ προφητικοῦ τρίποδος (in Delphi) ἐν ᾧ πρῶτος Διόνυσος ἐθεμίστευσε. And again . . δάκτυλον (a part of the νόμος Πυθικός) ἀπὸ Διονύσου, ὅτι πρῶτος οὗτος δοκεῖ ἀπὸ τοῦ τρίποδος θεμιστεῦσαι. As it has been previously said that at the Delphic μαντεῖον πρώτη Νὺξ ἐχρησμῴδησεν, Dionysos seems to be here regarded as πρόμαντις of Nyx. Thus, at Megara there was a temple of Διόνυσος Νυκτέλιος in the immediate neighbourhood of, and in all probability closely associated with a Νυκτὸς μαντεῖον: Paus. 1, 40, 6.

36 Arg., Sch. Pi., P., p. 297, Böckh [p. 2, 5 ff. Drch.]: . . . of the prophetic tripod (in Delphi) When Dionysus first established laws. And again . . finger (a part of the Law of Pythia) from Dionysus, that this person seems to be the first to give oracles from the tripod.. As it has been previously said that at the Delphic μαντεῖον πρώτη Νὺξ ἐχρησμῴδησεν, Dionysus seems to be regarded here as πρόμαντις of Nyx. Thus, at Megara there was a temple of Dionysus Night-Hunter very close to, and probably linked with a Night oracle: Paus. 1, 40, 6.

37 Paus. 1, 2, 5; Ribbeck, Anf. d. Dionysoscult in Att., p. 8 (1869); cf. Dem. 21, 52. Regulation of a festival of Dionysos in Kolone by the Oracle: Paus. 3, 13, 7; in Alea, Paus. 8, 23, 1 (at which women were scourged, a substitution for primitive human sacrifice, as at the διαμαστίγωσις in Sparta, of which Paus. is reminded). Introduction of the worship of Διόνυσος Φαλλήν at Methymna by the oracle: Paus. 10, 19, 3.—At Magnesia on the Maeander a plane-tree split by a storm revealed a statue of Dionysos (a true Διόνυσος ἔνδενδρος). The Delphic oracle commanded the ambassadors sent by the city to build a temple to Dionysos (who had hitherto been without one in Magnesia) and put a priest in charge of it; then, for the institution of the cult they were to introduce from Thebes Mainads of the family of Ino: Μαινάδας αἳ γενεῆς Εἰνοῦς ἄπο Καδμηείης. (The cult of Dionysos was evidently traditional at Thebes in this family which traced its descent from Ino, the foster-mother of Dionysos.) The three Mainads obtained from Thebes (called Kosko, Baubo, and Thettale) instituted the cult of the god and founded three θίασοι arranged according to locality (there were three θίασοι in Thebes, too, E., Ba. 680 ff.). They themselves remained in Magnesia till their death and were buried with great ceremony by the city, Kosko on the “Hill of Kosko”, Baubo ἐν Ταβάρνει, Thettale πρὸς τῷ θέατρῳ. See the ἀρχαῖος χρησμός with explanatory notes in prose, restored by Ἀπολλώνειος Μοκόλλης, ἀρχαῖος μύστης (of Dionysos): Ath. Mitth. 15 (1890), p. 331 f.

37 Paus. 1, 2, 5; Ribbeck, Anf. d. Dionysoscult in Att., p. 8 (1869); cf. Dem. 21, 52. Regulation of a festival of Dionysos in Kolone by the Oracle: Paus. 3, 13, 7; in Alea, Paus. 8, 23, 1 (where women were whipped, as a substitute for ancient human sacrifice, similar to the scourging in Sparta, which Paus. recalls). The oracle introduced the worship of Dionysus Phallus at Methymna: Paus. 10, 19, 3.—In Magnesia on the Maeander, a storm split a plane tree, revealing a statue of Dionysos (a true Dionysus the Indweller). The Delphic oracle instructed the city's ambassadors to build a temple for Dionysos (who previously had none in Magnesia) and appoint a priest to oversee it; then, for the establishment of the cult, they were to bring Mainads from Thebes, descendants of Ino: Mænads who were born from the wine of Cadmeian Ɛnōs.. (The cult of Dionysos was clearly a tradition in Thebes within this family, tracing its lineage to Ino, who nursed Dionysos.) The three Mainads obtained from Thebes (called Kosko, Baubo, and Thettale) established the god's cult and founded three θίασοι organized by locality (there were also three θίασοι in Thebes, E., Ba. 680 ff.). They stayed in Magnesia until their deaths and were buried with great honor by the city, Kosko on the “Hill of Kosko,” Baubo In Taborna, and Thettale by the theater. See the ancient prophecy with explanatory notes in prose, restored by Apollonius Mokollis, ancient mystic (of Dionysos): Ath. Mitth. 15 (1890), p. 331 f.

38 See Rapp, Rhein. Mus. 27. In spite of his quite correct emphasis in general upon the ritual and purely formal character of this sacred embassy and the dance-festival that followed, Rapp makes the mistake of underestimating the ecstatic side of the Dionysiac festivals—a side 311 which was once predominant and was always liable to recur. (If this element had not been real there would have been no need for a symbolical ritualistic imitation of such ἔκστασις). How even in later times a true ekstasis and self-forgetfulness seized upon the Thyiades in their sacred night-festivals and in consequence of the numerous stimulating influences of the occasion, we can learn very clearly from Plutarch’s description of the Thyiads who wandered in their frenzy to Amphissa (Mul. Virt. 13, 249 E). Rapp., p. 22, tries in vain to upset the historical value of this account. Other points have already been mentioned incidentally.

38 See Rapp, Rhein. Mus. 27. While he correctly emphasizes the ritual and strictly formal aspects of this sacred mission and the dance festival that followed, Rapp underestimates the ecstatic nature of the Dionysian festivals—an aspect 311 that was once dominant and could easily resurface. (If this element weren't genuine, there would be no need for a symbolic ritualistic imitation of such ecstasy). We can see how, even in later times, true ekstasis and self-forgetfulness overtook the Thyiades during their sacred night festivals, influenced by the many stimulating factors of the occasion, as clearly described by Plutarch regarding the Thyiads who wandered in their frenzy to Amphissa (Mul. Virt. 13, 249 E). Rapp., p. 22, attempts in vain to undermine the historical significance of this account. Other points have already been mentioned incidentally.

39 ἣν διὰ μαντοσύνην τὴν οἷ πόρε Φοῖβος Ἀπόλλων Α 72.

39 Which through divination Apollo, the god of prophecy, provides. Α 72.

40 τὸ ἄτεχνον καὶ ἀδίδακτον (τῆς μαντικῆς) τουτέστιν ἐνύπνια καὶ ἐνθουσιασμούς [Plu.] Vit. Poes. Hom. ii, 212. The only form known to Homer is ἡ τῶν ἐμφρόνων ζήτησις τοῦ μέλλοντος διά τε ὀρνίθων ποιουμένη καὶ τῶν ἄλλων σημείων (Pl., Phdr. 244 C).

40 the natural and intuitive(of fortune-telling)that is, dreams and aspirations [Plu.] Vit. Poes. Hom. ii, 212. The only form known to Homer is the search for the future through birds and other signs (Pl., Phdr. 244 C).

41 The Ps.-Plutarch of the last note does, however, find in Theoklymenos’ position among the suitors, υ 345–57 (in any case a passage added by a later hand), a proof that he is an ἔνθεος μάντις, ἔκ τινος ἐπιπνοίας σημαίνων τὰ μέλλοντα. But in that story the abnormal state belongs rather to the suitors than the seer. See Lob., Agl. 264. Still less can we (with Welcker, Götterl. ii, 11) deduce Homer’s knowledge of ecstatic prophecy from Α 91 ff. or Η 34–53. The derivation of the word μάντις from μαίνεσθαι, frequently repeated since the time of Plato, would make the ecstatic element predominant in the idea of the prophet. But this derivation is quite uncertain and a connexion with μανύω is much more probable.

41 The Ps.-Plutarch from the last note does find in Theoklymenos’ role among the suitors, υ 345–57 (which is likely a passage added later), evidence that he is an Enthusiastic prophet, indicating future events through some kind of inspiration.. But in that narrative, the unusual state actually belongs more to the suitors than to the seer. See Lob., Agl. 264. Even less can we (along with Welcker, Götterl. ii, 11) infer Homer’s awareness of ecstatic prophecy from Α 91 ff. or Η 34–53. The idea that the word prophet comes from maintaing, often mentioned since Plato's time, would suggest that the ecstatic aspect is central to the concept of the prophet. However, this connection is quite uncertain, and a link to μανύω is much more likely.

42 Pytho: θ 80, I 405. Dodona: Π 234, ξ 327 f., τ 296 f. An oracle is questioned perhaps in π 402 f. See Nägelsbach, Hom. Theol., p. 181 f.

42 Pytho: θ 80, I 405. Dodona: Π 234, ξ 327 f., τ 296 f. An oracle is questioned, possibly in π 402 f. See Nägelsbach, Hom. Theol., p. 181 f.

43 See Lob., Agl. 814 f. (even the regular use of the expressions ἀνεῖλεν ὁ θεός, ἡ πυθία suffice to prove it). Cf. also Bgk., Gr. Lit. i, 334. h. Hom. Merc. in its own fashion (552-66) tells how the god deserted the “lot” oracle at Delphi as too unreliable and unworthy of the god.

43 See Lob., Agl. 814 f. (even the common use of the phrases God took action, the oracle is enough to prove it). Cf. also Bgk., Gr. Lit. i, 334. h. Hom. Merc. in its own way (552-66) explains how the god abandoned the “lot” oracle at Delphi as being too unreliable and unfit for the god.

44 Even the case of Helenos is no real example of this: Η 44 ([Plu.] Vit. Hom. ii, 212, seems to regard it as one). Cic., Div. i, 89, expressly distinguishes the prophesying of Helenos from the “enthusiastic” frenzy of Kassandra.

44 Even the situation with Helenos isn’t a solid example of this: Η 44 ([Plu.] Vit. Hom. ii, 212, seems to view it as such). Cic., Div. i, 89, clearly separates Helenos's prophecies from the “enthusiastic” madness of Kassandra.

45 Even the h. Hom. Merc. to the Pythian Apollo, though it describes the institution of the cult and oracle of Apollo at Delphi, nowhere mentions the Pythia (as Lob., Agl. 264, very pertinently remarks). (Acc. to 306 f. we must suppose that at that time the prophesying was done exclusively by male μάντεις or προφῆται.)

45 Even the h. Hom. Merc. to Pythian Apollo, while it talks about the establishment of the cult and oracle of Apollo at Delphi, never mentions the Pythia (as Lob., Agl. 264, points out very aptly). (According to 306 f., we must assume that at that time, all the prophecies were given exclusively by male psychics or prophets.)

46 See Eur., IT. 1234 ff. Oracles of earth-divinities were always given by Incubation. Even Cicero (Div. i, 38, following Chrysippos it seems) refers to vis illa terrae, quae mentem Pythiae divino afflatu concitabat (as something that has disappeared). It is often referred to by later authors. The placing of the tripod over the chasm from which the vapour of inspiration came, is certainly, with Welcker, Götterl. ii, 11, to be regarded as a reminiscence of the ancient method of the earth-oracle which was thus continued in the direct inspiration of Apollo. (The ἐνθουσιασμός does not exclude other stimulants. The Pythia drinks from the inspired spring—like the μάντεις at Klaros: Ath. Mitth. xi, 430—and thereupon becomes ἔνθεος: Luc., Herm. 60. The prophetess of Apollo Deiradiotes at Argos by drinking the sacrificial blood κάτοχος ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ γίγνεται: Paus. 2, 24, 1. The Pythia chews the sacred laurel-leaves to become inspired: Luc., Bis Acc. 1; also 312 the δάφνη, ἧς ποτε γευσάμενος πετάλων ἀνέφηνεν ἀοιδὰς αὐτὸς ἄναξ σκηπτοῦχος: H. Mag. ap. Abel, Orphica, p. 288. The holy plant contains the vis divina which one absorbs into oneself by chewing. This is the crude, primitive idea underlying such actions, as plainly appears in a similar case mentioned by Porph., Abs. ii, 48.)

46 See Eur., IT. 1234 ff. Earth-divinities always delivered oracles through Incubation. Even Cicero (Div. i, 38, following Chrysippus it seems) mentions the the power of the earth that awakened the Pythia's mind with divine inspiration (as something that has vanished). Later authors often refer to it. The placement of the tripod over the opening from which the vapor of inspiration flowed is certainly, as Welcker notes in Götterl. ii, 11, a reminder of the ancient method of the earth-oracle, which continued in the direct inspiration of Apollo. (The enthusiasm does not rule out other sources of stimulation. The Pythia drinks from the sacred spring—like the soothsayers at Klaros: Ath. Mitth. xi, 430—and then becomes inspired: Luc., Herm. 60. The prophetess of Apollo Deiradiotes at Argos becomes inspired by drinking the sacrificial blood θαυματουργός από τον Θεό: Paus. 2, 24, 1. The Pythia chews the sacred laurel leaves to gain inspiration: Luc., Bis Acc. 1; also 312 the Daphne, who once tasted of her petals and sang hymns herself, the lord of the scepter.: H. Mag. ap. Abel, Orphica, p. 288. The sacred plant holds the divine power that one absorbs by chewing. This embodies the basic, primitive idea behind such actions, as clearly shown in a similar example mentioned by Porph., Abs. ii, 48.)

47 e.g. in Sparta: ἔστιν ἐπονομαζόμενον Γάσηπτον ἱερὸν Γῆς. Ἀπόλλων δ’ ὑπὲρ αὐτὸ ἵδρυται Μαλεάτης, Paus. 3, 12, 8.—The legend of Apollo and Daphne symbolizes the overthrow of the earth-oracle by Apollo and his own kind of prophecy.

47 for example, in Sparta: There is a sanctuary of the Earth known as Gasponton. Apollo, on the other hand, is established above, the Maleate., Paus. 3, 12, 8.—The story of Apollo and Daphne represents the defeat of the earth-oracle by Apollo and his unique type of prophecy.

48 See above, chap. iii, p. 97. Welcker, Götterl. i, 520 ff.

48 See above, ch. 3, p. 97. Welcker, Götterl. vol. 1, 520 ff.

49 See above, p. 260 ff.

49 See above, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ ff.

50 At Amphikleia in Phokis there was an oracle of Dionysos: πρόμαντις δὲ ὁ ἱερεύς ἐστι, χρᾷ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ κάτοχος, Paus. 10, 33, 11. The words of Cornutus probably refer to Greece (chap. xxx, p. 59, 20 Lang): καὶ μαντεῖα ἔσθ’ ὅπου τοῦ Διονύσου ἔχοντος . . . cf. Plu., Smp. 7, 10, 17, p. 716 B: οἱ παλαιοὶ τὸν θεὸν (Dionysos) μαντικῆς πολλὴν ἔχειν ἡγοῦντο μοῖραν.

50 At Amphikleia in Phokis, there was an oracle of Dionysus: The priest is a prophet, and he speaks by the inspiration of God., Paus. 10, 33, 11. Cornutus's words likely refer to Greece (chap. xxx, p. 59, 20 Lang): and there are oracles wherever Dionysus is present . . . cf. Plu., Smp. 7, 10, 17, p. 716 B: the ancients viewed the god (Dionysus) as being closely linked to prophecy.

51 Dionysos the first giver of oracles at Delphi: Arg., Pi. Pyth., p. 2, 7 Drch. (see above, n. 36). Voigt ap. Roscher, i, 1033–4, regards Apollo at Delphi as the heir of the Dionysiac mantikê; but he considers Dionysos to have been in the same condition as the Python who was overthrown and killed by Apollo—a view that can hardly be justified. My own view is that Apollo, after destroying the chthonic (dream) Oracle adopted from the mantikê of Dionysos the prophecy by furor divinus which had been hitherto unknown to him.—No one can seriously claim to have a clear certain insight into the intricate and kaleidoscopic changes of power and authority that finally led to the supremacy of the composite Apolline cult in the violently disputed centre of Greek religion.

51 Dionysus, the original giver of oracles at Delphi: Arg., Pi. Pyth., p. 2, 7 Drch. (see above, n. 36). Voigt in Roscher, i, 1033–4, views Apollo at Delphi as the successor of the Dionysian mantikê; however, he believes Dionysus was in a similar situation to the Python that Apollo defeated and killed—a perspective that is difficult to support. Personally, I think that after Apollo destroyed the chthonic (dream) Oracle, he adopted the prophecy through furor divinus from Dionysus, which had previously been unknown to him.—No one can genuinely assert they have a clear and certain understanding of the complex and ever-changing dynamics of power and authority that ultimately led to the dominance of the mixed Apolline cult at the fiercely contested heart of Greek religion.

52 . . . ὅσους ἐξ Ἀπόλλωνος μανῆναι λέγουσι (i.e. the ancient χρησμολόγους), Paus. 1, 34, 4. μανία τοῦ χρησμολόγου, Diogen., Pr. 6, 47. So, too, ἐπίπνοια: Sittl, Gebärden der Gr. u. R. 345. ὁ ἐνθουσιασμὸς ἐπίπνευσίν τινα θείαν ἔχειν δοκεῖ, Str. 467.—οἱ νυμφόληπτοι καὶ θεόληπτοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἐπιπνοίᾳ δαιμονίου τινὸς ὥσπερ ἐνθουσιάζοντες, Eth. Eud. i, 1, 4, 1214a, 23.

52 . . . those who say they have gone mad from Apollo (i.e. the ancient oracles), Paus. 1, 34, 4. μανία τοῦ χρησμολόγου, Diogen., Pr. 6, 47. So, too, inspiration: Sittl, Gestures of the Greeks and Romans 345. The enthusiasm seems to have some divine inspiration., Str. 467.—The bride-seekers and those devoted to the gods among people, inspired by some kind of spirit, as if they were possessed., Eth. Eud. i, 1, 4, 1214a, 23.

53 Ecstatic condition of the Pythia: D.S. xvi, 26; misconstrued in a Christian sense, Sch. Ar., Plu. 39 (see Hemsterh. ad loc.). ὅλη γίγνεται τοῦ θεοῦ, Iamb., Myst. 3, 11, p. 126, 15 Parthey. Description of a case in which the prophesying Pythia became completely ἔκφρων: Plu., Def. Or., 51, p. 438 B.

53 The ecstatic state of the Pythia: D.S. xvi, 26; misinterpreted from a Christian perspective, Sch. Ar., Plu. 39 (see Hemsterh. ad loc.). Everything becomes of God., Iamb., Myst. 3, 11, p. 126, 15 Parthey. Description of a situation where the prophesying Pythia became completely crazy: Plu., Def. Or., 51, p. 438 B.

54 In the inspired mantikê the soul becomes “free” from the body: animus ita solutus est et vacuus ut eo plane nihil sit cum corpore, Cic., Div. i, 113; cf. 70. (καθ’ ἑαυτὴν γίγνεται ἡ ψυχή in dreaming and μαντεῖαι: Arist. ap. S.E., M. 9, 21 [fr. 10 R.]. ἔοικε ἡ ἀρχὴ (of νοῦς) ἀπολυομένου τοῦ λόγου ἰσχύει μᾶλλον in enthousiasmos, EE. 1248a, 40; cf. 1225A, 28.) This is ἔκστασις of the understanding itself: see above, p. 260 ff. At other times it is said that the god enters into men and fills their souls; whereupon the man is ἔνθεος: see above, chap. viii, n. 50; cf. pleni et mixti deo vates, Minuc. 7, 6. The priestess at the oracle of Branchidai δέχεται τὸν θεόν, Iamb., M. 3, 11, p. 127, 7 Par.—ἐξοικίζεται ὁ ἐν ἡμῖν νοῦς κατὰ τὴν τοῦ θείου πνεύματος ἄφιξιν, κατὰ δὲ τὴν μετανάστασιν αὐτοῦ πάλιν ἐσοικίζεται κτλ: Philo, Q. rer. div. 53, i, p. 511 M., speaking of the ἔνθεος κατοχωτική τε μανία, ᾗ τὸ προφητικὸν γένος χρῆται (p. 509 M.); cf. also Spec. Leg. i, p. 343 M. This also was the idea prevailing at Delphi. Plu., Def. Or. 9, p. 414 E, rejects as εὔηθες, τὸ οἴεσθαι τὸν θεὸν αὐτόν, ὥσπερ τοὺς ἐγγαστριμύθους, 313 ἐνδυόμενον εἰς τὰ σώματα τῶν προφητῶν ὑποφθέγγεσθαι, τοῖς ἐκείνων στόμασι καὶ φωναῖς χρώμενον ὀργάνοις. But this was evidently the ordinary and deep-rooted opinion (τὸν θεὸν εἰς σῶμα καθειργνύναι θνητόν, Plu., Pyth. Or. 8, p. 398 A). The primitive idea is naively expressed by a late magic papyrus (Kenyon, Gk. Pap. in BM. i, p. 116 [1893], No. 122 [fourth century B.C.] l. 2 ff.): ἐλθέ μοι, κύριε Ἑρμῆ ὡς τὰ βρέφη εἰς τὰς κοιλίας τῶν γυναικῶν κτλ.—Neither in mantikê nor in ἔκστασις is any great distinction made between the out-going of the soul and the in-coming of the god: the two ideas merge together. The condition is regarded as one in which two persons are united and become one; the human being οἷον ἄλλος γενόμενος καὶ οὐκ αὐτός, θεὸς γενόμενος μᾶλλον δὲ ὤν, no longer experiencing a sense of division between himself and divinity μεταξὺ γὰρ οὐδέν, οὐδ’ ἔτι δύο ἀλλ’ ἕν ἄμφω (as the subtle mysticism of Plotinos describes ἔκστασις, 6, 9, 9–10; 6, 7, 34–5). In the above-mentioned magic invocation of Hermes the γόης who has conjured the god into himself says to the god (l. 36 ff., p. 117) σὺ (σοι MSS.) γὰρ ἐγὼ, καὶ ἐγὼ σύ (σοι MSS.)· τὸ σὸν ὄνομα ἐμὸν καὶ τὸ ἐμὸν σόν· ἐγὼ γάρ εἰμι τὸ εἴδωλόν σου κτλ. [Cf. Swinburne, Songs before Sunrise ii, 74 f.]

54 In inspired mantikê, the soul becomes "free" from the body: the mind is so free and empty that it is entirely disconnected from the body, Cic., Div. i, 113; cf. 70. (The soul becomes itself. in dreaming and oracles: Arist. ap. S.E., M. 9, 21 [fr. 10 R.]. It seems the beginning. (of mind) It is more valid when the argument is released. in enthousiasmos, EE. 1248a, 40; cf. 1225A, 28.) This is ecstasy of the understanding itself: see above, p. 260 ff. At other times, it is said that the god enters into people and fills their souls; as a result, the person becomes inspired: see above, chap. viii, n. 50; cf. pleni et mixti deo vates, Minuc. 7, 6. The priestess at the oracle of Branchidai accepts God, Iamb., M. 3, 11, p. 127, 7 Par.—The mind within us is aligned with the arrival of the divine spirit, and upon its departure, it is realigned, etc.: Philo, Q. rer. div. 53, i, p. 511 M., discussing the Divine, ecstatic frenzy, by which the prophetic class communicates. (p. 509 M.); cf. also Spec. Leg. i, p. 343 M. This was also the prevailing idea at Delphi. Plu., Def. Or. 9, p. 414 E, rejects as Being naive, believing in God Himself, just like those who practice ventriloquism, 313 putting on the bodies of the prophets, speaking through their mouths and using their voices as instruments. But this was clearly the common and deeply rooted belief (to confine the god into a mortal body, Plu., Pyth. Or. 8, p. 398 A). The primitive idea is simply expressed in a late magical papyrus (Kenyon, Gk. Pap. in BM. i, p. 116 [1893], No. 122 [fourth century BCE] l. 2 ff.Below is a short piece of text (5 words or fewer). Modernize it into contemporary English if there's enough context, but do not add or omit any information. If context is insufficient, return it unchanged. Do not add commentary, and do not modify any placeholders. If you see placeholders of the form __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_x__, you must keep them exactly as-is so they can be replaced with links. ): Come to me, Lord Hermes, like the infants into the wombs of women, etc.—Neither in mantikê nor in ecstasy is there any significant distinction made between the departure of the soul and the arrival of the god: the two ideas blend together. This condition is viewed as a union between two beings into one; the human becomes like someone else becoming and not himself, becoming a god, but rather being, no longer feeling a separation between themselves and divinity For there is nothing in between, nor even two, but one both. (as the subtle mysticism of Plotinos describes ecstasy, 6, 9, 9–10; 6, 7, 34–5). In the aforementioned magical invocation of Hermes, the sorcerer who has summoned the god into themselves says to the god (l. 36 ff., p. 117) σὺ(σοι MSS.) for I, and I you(σοι MSS.)Your name is mine, and mine is yours; for I am your idol, etc. [Cf. Swinburne, Songs before Sunrise ii, 74 f.]

55 So Bergk, Gr. Lit. i, 335, n. 58. The verses of the oracle are regarded as the god’s own: Plu., Pyth. Or. v, 396 C ff. Since the god himself speaks out of her the Pythia can properly speaking only give true oracles οὐκ ἀποδάμου Ἀπόλλωνος τυχόντος, Pi., P. iv, 5; i.e. when Apollo is present at Delphi and not (as he is in winter) far away among the Hyperboreans. This was why oracles were originally only given in the spring month Bysios (Plu., Q. Gr. 9) in which apparently the θεοφάνια occurred (Hdt. i, 51). Just as in the case of the old oracular earth-spirits (see above, chap. iii, n. 12) who were confined to special localities, so in the case of the gods who work through the ἐνθουσιασμός of an inspired prophetess, their personal presence in the temple at the time of the prophesying is requisite. This presence is thought of as actual and corporeal in the primitive form of the belief (though it was got over and reinterpreted in later times), and therefore in the case of the gods can only be temporary. When, in summer, Apollo is in Delos (Vg., A. iv, 143 ff.), no χρηστήριον takes place in the temple of Apollo at Patara in Lykia (Hdt. i, 182). And so in general φυγόντων ἢ μεταστάντων (τῶν περὶ τὰ μαντεῖα καὶ χρηστήρια τεταγμένων δαιμονίων) ἀποβάλλει τὴν δύναμιν (τὰ μαντεῖα), Plu., DO. 15, p. 418 D.

55 So Bergk, Gr. Lit. i, 335, n. 58. The verses of the oracle are considered the god’s own words: Plu., Pyth. Or. v, 396 C ff. Since the god himself speaks through her, the Pythia can only deliver true oracles when Apollo is present at Delphi and not (as he is in winter) far away among the Hyperboreans. This is why oracles were originally given only in the spring month of Bysios (Plu., Q. Gr. 9) during which the Theophany apparently occurred (Hdt. i, 51). Just like the old oracular earth-spirits (see above, chap. iii, n. 12) who were tied to specific locations, the gods who operate through the enthusiasm of an inspired prophetess also require their actual presence in the temple at the time of the prophecy. This presence is understood as real and physical in the original beliefs (though it was adapted and reinterpreted in later times), and therefore for the gods, it can only be temporary. When Apollo is in Delos during the summer (Vg., A. iv, 143 ff.), no forum occurs in the temple of Apollo at Patara in Lycia (Hdt. i, 182). Thus, in general, φυγόντων ἢ μεταστάντων (of the spirits designated for divination and oracles)loses its strength (the oracles), Plu., DO. 15, p. 418 D.

56 The cult of Zeus in Crete was held μετ’ ὀργιασμοῦ: Str. 468. The same applies to the cult offered in many places to the various and very different female deities who were generally combined together under the name of Artemis: Lob., Agl. 1085 ff.; Meineke, An. Al. 361. In their case Asiatic influence was at work sometimes, but by no means always: Welcker, Götterl. i, 391; Müller, Dorians, i, 404 ff. The worship of Pan was also orgiastic. Otherwise we find it principally in foreign worships that had made their way at an early period into private cults: e.g. the Phrygian worship of Kybele, etc. These easily combined with the Bacchic worship and became almost indistinguishable from it; sometimes they even allied themselves with true Greek cults, with that of Pan, for example, which was closely assimilated both to the worship of Kybele and that of Dionysos. It remains obscure how far the Cretan cult of Zeus was affected by Phrygian elements.

56 The cult of Zeus in Crete was practiced with a frenzy: Str. 468. The same goes for the worship offered in many places to various and very different female deities, often grouped together under the name of Artemis: Lob., Agl. 1085 ff.; Meineke, An. Al. 361. In some cases, there was Asian influence, but not always: Welcker, Götterl. i, 391; Müller, Dorians, i, 404 ff. The worship of Pan was also orgiastic. Generally, we find this mainly in foreign cults that were introduced early into private practices: for example, the Phrygian worship of Kybele, etc. These easily merged with Bacchic worship and became almost indistinguishable from it; sometimes they even combined with genuine Greek rituals, like that of Pan, which was closely related to the worship of Kybele and Dionysos. It remains unclear to what extent the Cretan cult of Zeus was influenced by Phrygian elements.

57 A remarkable example is given by Herod. (ix, 94), who tells us of the blind Euenios in Apollonia who suddenly became possessed of 314 ἔμφυτος μαντική (not acquired by learning). He is a true θεόμαντις (Pl., Ap. 22 C).

57 A striking example is provided by Herod. (ix, 94), who describes the blind Euenios in Apollonia who suddenly became endowed with 314 innate intuition (which isn't something learned). He is a genuine diviner (Pl., Ap. 22 C).

58 The ancients knew quite well that Βάκις and Σίβυλλα were really common nouns denoting inspired χρησμῳδοί: thus the Σίβυλλα is the παρωνυμία of Herophile, Plu., P. Or. 14, p. 401 A, and Βάκις an ἐπίθετον of Peisistratos, Sch. Ar., Pax 1071. The words are clearly used to denote whole classes of individuals by Arist., Prob. 954a, 36: νοσήματα μανικὰ καὶ ἐνθουσιαστικά are liable to attack Σίβυλλαi καὶ Βάκιδες καὶ οἱ ἔνθεοι πάντες. And in general when the ancients speak in the singular of “the Sibyl” or “Bakis”, the word is generally meant as a class-name; just as for the most part when ἡ Πυθία, ἡ Πυθιάς occurs it is not a particular individual Pythia who is meant but the class-concept of “the Pythia” (or some particular member of the class actually functioning at the moment). Hence it is by no means certain that Herakleitos, etc., when they speak simply of ἡ Σίβυλλα, and Herod. when he says Βάκις were of the opinion that there was only one Sibyl and one Bakis.—It must be admitted that we do not know the real meaning of these adjectival words themselves, their etymology being quite uncertain. Was the ecstatic character of these prophets already expressed in their titles? σιβυλλαίνειν, of course = ἐνθέαζειν (D.S. 4, 66, 7), but the verb is naturally enough derived from the name Σίβυλλα, just as βακίζειν is from Βάκις, ἐρινύειν, from Ἐρινύς and not vice versa. Nor can we tell how far the personal names attached to certain Sibyls and Bakides have real historical significance. Sibyl names are Herophile, Demophile (abbreviated to Demo), Φυτώ or perhaps rather Φοιτώ; cf. φοιτὰς ἀγύρτρια, A., Ag. 1273 (so Lachmann on Tib. 2, 5, 68): the Arcadian Bakis was called Kydas or Aletes (cf. Φοιτώ) acc. to Philetas Eph. ap. Sch. Ar., Pa. 1071. It is impossible to extract from the by no means scanty materials any real element of historical fact with respect to these stories of individual Sibyls. Most untrustworthy of all in this as in all he says on this subject is Herakleides Pont. and his story of the Phrygian (or Trojan) Sibyl: we might be more inclined to believe what Eratosthenes reported acc. to the antiquis annalibus Samiorum of a Samian Sibyl (Varro ap. Lactant., Inst. 1, 6, 9)—if it had not included so entirely worthless a story as that preserved in Val. M. 1, 5, 9.—Clem. Al., Str. i, 21, p. 398 P., gives after Bakis a whole list of χρησμῳδοί with names: they evidently do not all belong to legend, but hardly one of them is otherwise known to us. The following are possibly real persons belonging to the prophetic period: Melesagoras of Eleusis who prophesied in Athens like another Bakis ἐκ νυμφῶν κάτοχος: Max. Tyr. 38, 3 (there is not a shadow of a reason for identifying him with Amelesagoras, the author of an alleged ancient Atthis: Müller, FHG. ii, 21); Euklos of Cyprus whose χρησμοί written in the old Cypriote language inspire a certain confidence (M. Schmidt, Kuhns Ztschr. 1860, p. 161 ff.): unfortunately he wrote before Homer: Paus. 10, 24, 3; Tat., Gr. 41, which makes his personality dubious again.

58 The ancients understood that Βάκις and Σίβυλλα were really common nouns referring to inspired ορacle interpreters: thus, the Sibyl is the play on words of Herophile, Plu., P. Or. 14, p. 401 A, and Βάκις an epithet of Peisistratos, Sch. Ar., Pax 1071. The terms are clearly used to refer to entire categories of individuals according to Arist., Prob. 954a, 36: μανιακά και ενθουσιώδη νοσήματα are prone to be associated with Σίβυλλες και Βάκχες και όλοι οι θεϊκοί.. Generally speaking, when the ancients refer to “the Sibyl” or “Bakis” in the singular, it is meant as a class name; just like when The Pythia, the Oracle is mentioned, it usually refers to the concept of “the Pythia” (or a specific person of that class who is functioning at that time). So, it’s not certain that Herakleitos, etc., when they mention The Sibyl, or Herodotus when he speaks of Βάκις, thought there was only one Sibyl and one Bakis. We must acknowledge that we do not really know the true meaning of these adjectives themselves, as their origins are quite unclear. Was the ecstatic nature of these prophets already implied in their titles? σιβυλλάινγκ, of course, means ἐνθέαζειν (D.S. 4, 66, 7), but this verb is naturally derived from the name Sibyl, just as βακίζειν comes from Βάκις, to torment, from Fury and not the other way around. We also cannot determine how much the personal names associated with certain Sibyls and Bakides hold true historical significance. Sibyl names include Herophile, Demophile (shortened to Demo), Φυτώ or perhaps I am studying; cf. con artist students, A., Ag. 1273 (as noted by Lachmann on Tib. 2, 5, 68): the Arcadian Bakis was known as Kydas or Aletes (cf. I study) according to Philetas Eph. ap. Sch. Ar., Pa. 1071. It is impossible to derive any real historical facts from the rather plentiful sources regarding these accounts of individual Sibyls. The most unreliable of all on this topic is Herakleides Pont. and his story about the Phrygian (or Trojan) Sibyl: we might be more willing to trust what Eratosthenes claimed according to the antiquis annalibus Samiorum of a Samian Sibyl (Varro ap. Lactant., Inst. 1, 6, 9)—if it didn’t include such a completely worthless tale as that found in Val. M. 1, 5, 9.—Clem. Al., Str. i, 21, p. 398 P., lists several χρησμῳδοί with names after Bakis: they clearly do not all belong to legend, but hardly any of them are otherwise known to us. The following might be actual individuals from the prophetic period: Melesagoras of Eleusis who prophesied in Athens like another Bakis bridegroom: Max. Tyr. 38, 3 (there’s no reason to identify him with Amelesagoras, the author of an alleged ancient Atthis: Müller, FHG. ii, 21); Euklos of Cyprus, whose oracles in the old Cypriote language inspire some confidence (M. Schmidt, Kuhns Ztschr. 1860, p. 161 ff.): unfortunately, he lived before Homer: Paus. 10, 24, 3; Tat., Gr. 41, which casts doubt on his historical existence again.

59 Of this description were the χρησμολόγοι of the fifth and fourth—even of the expiring sixth—centuries (Onomakritos belongs entirely to this class). Lob., Agl. 978 ff., 932. It is very rarely that we hear in these times of real prophets on their own account, prophesying in the furor divinus, like that Amphilytos of Acarnania who met Peisistratos as he returned from Eretria before the battle ἐπὶ Παλληνίδι and prophesied to him ἐνθεάζων (Hdt. i, 62 f.; he is an Athenian in [Pl.] Thg. 124 D—where he is mentioned side by side with Βάκις τε 315 καὶ Σίβυλλα—and in Clem. Al., Str. i, 21, p. 398 P.). In the same way occasional “Sibyls” occur even in late times (Phaennis, Athenais: see Alexandre, Or. Sib.1 ii, p. 21, 48).

59 The description includes the oracle practitioners from the fifth and fourth centuries—even the fading sixth century (Onomakritos is fully part of this group). Lob., Agl. 978 ff., 932. During this time, we rarely hear about genuine prophets speaking on their own, prophesying in a furor divinus, like Amphilytos from Acarnania, who encountered Peisistratos as he returned from Eretria before the battle at Pallinidi and delivered a prophecy to him ἔμπνευση (Hdt. i, 62 f.; he is an Athenian in [Pl.] Thg. 124 D—where he is mentioned alongside Βάκις and Σίβυλλα—and in Clem. Al., Str. i, 21, p. 398 P.). Similarly, we occasionally find “Sibyls” even in later times (Phaennis, Athenais: see Alexandre, Or. Sib.1 ii, p. 21, 48).

60 Herakl. Pont. ap. Cl. Al., Str. i, 21, p. 384 P., seems to have been the first to speak definitely of two Sibyls, Herophile of Erythrai and the Phrygian Sibyl (whom he identifies with the Marpessian Sibyl or the S. of Gergis: Lact. 1, 6, 12, see Alexandre, ii, p. 25, 32. Philetas ap. Sch. Ar., Av. 962, follows him except that he adds a third, the Sardian). The Phrygian-Trojan Sibyl is dated by Herakleides in the times of “Solon and Cyrus” (Lact.); we cannot tell what date he assigned to the Erythraean. Perhaps it was only after his times that the χρησμοί of Herophile first appeared in which she prophesied the Τρωϊκά. From these verses it was now deduced that she lived before the Trojan war: so Paus. 10, 12, 2, and even Apollodoros of Erythrai (Lact. 1, 6, 9). Thenceforward the name of Herophile was associated with the idea of extreme antiquity. (The Libyan Sibyl of Paus. who is said to be the oldest of all is merely an invention of Euripides and never really obtained currency: Λίβυσσα = Σίβυλλα anagrammatically. See Alexandre, p. 74 f.) Herophile was identified also with the πρώτη Σίβυλλα who came to Delphi and prophesied there: Plu., P.Or. 9, 398 C; expressly so by Paus. 10, 12, 1, and Bocchus ap. Solin. 2, p. 38, 21–4 Mom. Acc. to Herakleides (ap. Clem. Al.) it was rather the Φρυγία who calling herself Artemis prophesied in Delphi (so, too, Philetas following Herakl. and see also Suid. Σιβ. Δελφίς). This is due to the local patriotism of the inhabitants of the Troad. Their Sibyl is the Marpessian (= the Φρυγία of Herakl.). The artificial sort of interpretation and forgery that enabled a local historian of the Troad (it cannot have been Demetrios of Skepsis) to identify the Marpessian Sibyl, who also called herself Artemis, with Herophile and turn her into the true ἐρυθραία, may be guessed from Paus. 10, 12, 2 ff. (The same source as that of Paus. is used by St. Byz. s. Μερμησσός, as Alexandre, p. 22, rightly remarks.) The Erythraean claim to Herophile was also disputed from other directions. The Erythraean is distinguished from Herophile as being later by Bocchus ap. Solin. 2, p. 38, 24; and in a different fashion the same is done by Mart. Cap. ii, 159. Acc. to Eus., Chr. 1305 Abr. (not Eratosthenes in this case) even the Samian Sibyl was identified with Herophile—to say nothing of the Ephesian Herophile in the fragg. of the enlarged Xanthos, FHG. iii, 406–8. From the fable of the Marpessian Herophile was later invented the story of her prophecy to Aeneas: Tib. 2, 5, 67; D.H. 1, 55, 4; Alexandre, p. 25.—In comparison with these different claimants to the name of Herophile (even the Cumaean Sibyl was said to be the same as Herophile) the rest of the Sibyls were hardly able to obtain a real footing in tradition.

60 Herakl. Pont. ap. Cl. Al., Str. i, 21, p. 384 P., seems to be the first to clearly mention two Sibyls: Herophile of Erythrai and the Phrygian Sibyl (whom he identifies as the Marpessian Sibyl or the Sibyl of Gergis: Lact. 1, 6, 12, see Alexandre, ii, p. 25, 32). Philetas ap. Sch. Ar., Av. 962, follows him but adds a third, the Sardian. The Phrygian-Trojan Sibyl is dated by Herakleides to the times of “Solon and Cyrus” (Lact.); we don’t know what date he assigned to the Erythraean. It’s possible that the oracles of Herophile, in which she foretold the Trojan, only appeared after his time. From these verses, it was concluded that she lived before the Trojan war: see Paus. 10, 12, 2, and even Apollodoros of Erythrai (Lact. 1, 6, 9). After that, the name of Herophile became linked with extreme antiquity. (The Libyan Sibyl mentioned by Paus., said to be the oldest of all, is just a creation of Euripides and never really gained traction: Libyan = Sibyl anagrammatically. See Alexandre, p. 74 f.) Herophile was also identified with the first Sibyl who came to Delphi and prophesied there: Plu., P.Or. 9, 398 C; explicitly by Paus. 10, 12, 1, and Bocchus ap. Solin. 2, p. 38, 21–4 Mom. According to Herakleides (ap. Clem. Al.), it was rather the Phrygia who called herself Artemis and prophesied in Delphi (likewise, Philetas following Herakl. and see also Suid. Σιβ. Δελφίς). This is a result of the local pride of the inhabitants of the Troad. Their Sibyl is the Marpessian (= the Phrygia of Herakl.). The fabricated interpretations and forgeries that allowed a local historian of the Troad (likely not Demetrios of Skepsis) to identify the Marpessian Sibyl, who also called herself Artemis, with Herophile and turn her into the true Erythraea can be inferred from Paus. 10, 12, 2 ff. (The same source as that of Paus. is used by St. Byz. s. Mermisus, as Alexandre, p. 22, rightly notes.) The Erythraean claim to Herophile was also disputed from other angles. The Erythraean is distinguished from Herophile as being later by Bocchus ap. Solin. 2, p. 38, 24; and in a different way, the same distinction is made by Mart. Cap. ii, 159. According to Eus., Chr. 1305 Abr. (not Eratosthenes in this instance), even the Samian Sibyl was identified with Herophile—let alone the Ephesian Herophile in the fragments of the expanded Xanthos, FHG. iii, 406–8. From the tale of the Marpessian Herophile, the story of her prophecy to Aeneas was later created: Tib. 2, 5, 67; D.H. 1, 55, 4; Alexandre, p. 25. Compared to these various claimants to the name of Herophile (even the Cumaean Sibyl was said to be the same as Herophile), the other Sibyls struggled to make a real mark in tradition.

61 The Erythraean Sibyl was dated by Eusebius in Ol. 9, 3 (the absurd addition ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ belongs only to the author of the Chron. Pasc. and not to Eus.: Alexandre, p. 80); he dated the Samian in Ol. 17, 1 (it is quite arbitrary to refer this view to Eratosthenes). Acc. to Suid. Σίβυλλα Ἀπόλλωνος καὶ Λαμίας the Erythraean lived 483 years after the fall of Troy: i.e. Ol. 20, 1 (700 B.C.). Herakleides put the Phrygo-Trojan Sib. in the times of Solon and Kyros (to which Epimenides also belongs and to which Aristeas and Abaris were supposed to belong). We can no longer discover or guess at the reasons for these datings. In any case the Chronologists to whom they go back evidently regarded the Sibyls as later than the earliest Pythia at Delphi. Even the Cumaean Sibyl was not to be distinguished 316 from the Erythraean: [Arist.] Mirab. 95, which perhaps comes from Timaeus; Varro ap. Serv. A. vi, 36; cf. D.H. 4, 62, 6. In spite of which she is a contemporary of Tarquinius Priscus (this was enough to distinguish the Cimmeria in Italia who prophesied to Aeneas from the Cumaean Sibyl: Naev. and Calp. Piso in Varro ap. Lact. 1, 6, 9). Naturally in these chronological straits recourse was had to the favourite device of such accounts—unnatural longevity. The Sibyl is πολυχρονιωτάτη [Arist.]: she lived a thousand years or thereabouts: Phleg., Macr. 4 (the oracle of this passage was also known to Plu.; cf. PO. 13, 401 B; a similar source inspires Ov., M. xiv, 132–53. In this case the Sibyl has already lived 700 years before the arrival of Aeneas, and she will live another 300, which would bring her—by a rather inexact calculation—to about the time of Tarquinius Priscus). In the verses found at Erythrae belonging to a statue of the Sibyl (Buresch, Woch. Klass. Phil. 1891, p. 1042; Ath. Mitt. 1892, p. 20), the Erythraean Sibyl is said to live 900 years—unfortunately one cannot be sure that this means till the time of the inscr. itself and of the νέος κτίστης of Erythrai in the age of the Antonines who is referred to at the close. If so the Sibyl would have been born about the year 700 B.C. (as in Suid.) or a little earlier. Perhaps, however, the lengthy period refers to the life time of the long since dead Sibyl herself, while the αὖθις δ’ ἐνθάδε ἐγὼ ἧμαι of l. 11 f. only applies to the statue. In which case the commencement and end of the Sibyl’s lifetime would be unknown.—Cumaeae saecula vatis became proverbial: Alexandre, p. 57. Finally the Sibyl was regarded as entirely forgotten by death, as in the story in Petronius 48 (cf. also—probably referring to Erythrai—Ampel., LM. viii, 15; Rh. Mus. 32, 639).

61 Eusebius dated the Erythraean Sibyl around Ol. 9, 3 (the strange addition in Egypt only belongs to the author of the Chron. Pasc. and not to Eusebius: Alexandre, p. 80); he dated the Samian to Ol. 17, 1 (it's quite arbitrary to associate this view with Eratosthenes). According to Suid. Sibyl of Apollo and Lamia, the Erythraean lived 483 years after the fall of Troy: i.e., Ol. 20, 1 (700 BCE). Herakleides placed the Phrygo-Trojan Sibyl in the times of Solon and Cyrus (to which Epimenides is also linked and to which Aristeas and Abaris were thought to belong). We can't figure out or even guess the reasons for these datings anymore. In any case, the Chronologists who created these dates clearly considered the Sibyls to be later than the earliest Pythia at Delphi. Even the Cumaean Sibyl was indistinguishable 316 from the Erythraean: [Arist.] Mirab. 95, which may come from Timaeus; Varro ap. Serv. A. vi, 36; cf. D.H. 4, 62, 6. Despite this, she was a contemporary of Tarquinius Priscus (this distinction was enough to separate the Cimmeria in Italia who prophesied to Aeneas from the Cumaean Sibyl: Naev. and Calp. Piso in Varro ap. Lact. 1, 6, 9). Naturally, in these chronological challenges, the popular tactic of such narratives—unnatural longevity—was used. The Sibyl is long-lasting [Arist.]: she lived around a thousand years: Phleg., Macr. 4 (the oracle mentioned in this passage was also known to Plu.; cf. PO. 13, 401 B; a similar source influenced Ov., M. xiv, 132–53. In this case, the Sibyl had already lived 700 years before Aeneas arrived and would live another 300, which would bring her—by a rather rough calculation—to about the time of Tarquinius Priscus). In the verses found at Erythrae connected to a statue of the Sibyl (Buresch, Woch. Klass. Phil. 1891, p. 1042; Ath. Mitt. 1892, p. 20), the Erythraean Sibyl is said to live for 900 years—unfortunately, it’s unclear if this means until the time of the inscription itself and of the new builder of Erythrai during the Antonine period, which is mentioned at the end. If that’s the case, the Sibyl would have been born around 700 BCE (as stated in Suid.) or a little earlier. However, it's possible that the long period refers to the lifespan of the long-dead Sibyl herself, while the Here I am again of l. 11 f. only pertains to the statue. In which case, the beginning and end of the Sibyl’s life would be unknown.—Cumaeae saecula vatis became a saying: Alexandre, p. 57. Ultimately, the Sibyl was seen as completely forgotten by death, as in the story from Petronius 48 (cf. also—likely referencing Erythrai—Ampel., LM. viii, 15; Rh. Mus. 32, 639).

62 ρ 383 ff.

62 ρ 383 and following.

63 The Sibyl is overcome by the furor divinus in such a way ut quae sapiens non videat ea videat insanus, et si qui humanos sensus amiserit divinos assecutus sit, Cic., Div. ii, 110; cf. i, 34. νοσήματα μανικὰ καὶ ἐνθουσιαστικά of Sibyls and Bakids Arist. Prob. 30, 1, 954a, 36. The Sibyl prophesies μαντικῇ χρωμένη ἐνθέῳ, Pl., Phdr. 244 B. μαινομένη τε καὶ ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ κάτοχος, Paus. 10, 12, 2. deo furibunda recepto, Ov., M. xiv, 107. There is in her divinitas et quaedam caelitum societas, Plin., NH. vii, 119. κατοχὴ καὶ ἐπίπνοια [Just.], Co. ad. Gr., 37, 36 A. So, too, in our collections of Sibylline oracles the S. often speak of their divine frenzy, etc.; e.g. ii, 4, 5; iii, 162 f., 295 f.; xi, 317, 320, 323 f.; xii, 294 f., etc. Frenzy of the Cumaean S.: Vg., A. vi, 77 f.—Bakis has his prophetic gift from the Nymphs (Ar., Pa. 1071), he is κατάσχετος ἐκ νυμφῶν, μανεὶς ἐκ νυμφῶν (Paus. 10, 12, 11; 4, 27, 4), νυμφόληπτος (cf. θεόληπτος, φοιβόληπτος, πανόληπτος, μητρόληπτος; Lymphati: Varro, LL. vii, p. 365 Sp., Paul. Fest., p. 120, 11 ff., Placid., p. 62, 15 ff. Deuerl.).

63 The Sibyl is taken over by divine madness in such a way that what a wise person cannot see, a mad person sees, and if someone has lost their human senses, they have attained divine ones, Cic., Div. ii, 110; cf. i, 34. Signs of mania and creativity of Sibyls and Bakids Arist. Prob. 30, 1, 954a, 36. The Sibyl predicts with divine inspiration, Pl., Phdr. 244 B. Raving and taken over by the god, Paus. 10, 12, 2. furious god received, Ov., M. xiv, 107. There is in her a divinity and a specific connection with the gods, Plin., NH. vii, 119. Ownership and creativity [Just.], Co. ad. Gr., 37, 36 A. Similarly, in our collections of Sibylline oracles, the Sibyls often talk about their divine frenzy, etc.; e.g. ii, 4, 5; iii, 162 f., 295 f.; xi, 317, 320, 323 f.; xii, 294 f., etc. The frenzy of the Cumaean Sibyl: Vg., A. vi, 77 f.—Bakis receives his prophetic gift from the Nymphs (Ar., Pa. 1071), he is controlled by the Nymphs, driven insane by the Nymphs (Paus. 10, 12, 11; 4, 27, 4), inspired by the Nymphs (cf. inspired by the gods, Phoebus inspired, universally inspiring, mother-inspired; Lymphati: Varro, LL. vii, p. 365 Sp., Paul. Fest., p. 120, 11 ff., Placid., p. 62, 15 ff. Deuerl.).

64 Σίβυλλα δὲ μαινομένῳ στόματι κτλ.: Herakleitos ap. Plu., Pyth. Or. 6, p. 397 A. fr. 12 By. = 92 Diels (the words χιλίων . . . θεοῦ are not H.’s but Plutarch’s. Cl. Al., Str. 1, 15, p. 358 P. uses only Plu.). To regard Herakleitos’ Sibyl as the Pythia (with Bgk., etc.) is absurd apart from the fact that the Pythia is never called Σίβυλλα. It is excluded by the way Plu. introduces the word in this passage, and connects chap. 9 with chap. 6. It is true, though, that Pl. draws a parallel between the nature of the Sibyl and that of the Pythia.

64 Sibyl talks wildly, etc.: Heraclitus as quoted by Plutarch, Pyth. Or. 6, p. 397 A. fr. 12 By. = 92 Diels (the words χιλίων . . . θεών are not Heraclitus’s but Plutarch’s. Cl. Al., Str. 1, 15, p. 358 P. uses only Plutarch.). Considering Heraclitus's Sibyl to be the Pythia (following Bgk., etc.) is ridiculous, not to mention that the Pythia is never referred to as Σίβυλλα. This interpretation is ruled out by the way Plutarch introduces the term in this section and connects chapter 9 with chapter 6. However, it is true that Plutarch draws a parallel between the nature of the Sibyl and that of the Pythia.

65 Homer knows Kassandra as one of the daughters of Priam and indeed as Πριάμοιο θυγατρῶν εἶδος ἀρίστην, Ν 365; probably that it why she is allotted to Agamemnon as his share of the spoil and why she is slain with him, λ 421 ff. The Κύπρια is the first to tell of her 317 prophetic skill. Was it the narrative of Ω 699 which first suggested to the νεώτεροι the idea of her knowledge of the future? (In reality that passage alludes rather to the συμπάθεια of the sister and daughter and not to mantikê: Sch. B. ad loc.) Her prophetic gifts were elaborated later in many stories: e.g. Bacchyl. xiv, 50 = fr. 29 Bgk. (Porph. on Hor. O. i, 15). Aesch. represents her as the type of the ecstatic prophetess (φρενομανής, θεοφόρητος, Ag. 1140, 1216). As such she is called by Eur. μαντιπόλος βάκχη, Hec. 121. φοιβάς 827. τὸ βακχεῖον κάρα τῆς θεσπιῳδοῦ Κασσάνδρας 676. She wildly shakes her head like the Bacchants ὅταν θεοῦ μαντόσυνοι πνεύσωσ’ ἀνάγκαι, IA. 760 ff.

65 Homer refers to Cassandra as one of Priam's daughters and indeed as Priam's daughters are the finest, Ν 365; probably that's why she is given to Agamemnon as his share of the loot and why she is killed with him, λ 421 ff. The Cypriot is the first to mention her 317 prophetic abilities. Was it the story in Ω 699 that first inspired the younger to think of her foresight? (In fact, that passage refers more to the sympathy between the sister and daughter rather than to mantikê: Sch. B. ad loc.) Her prophetic talents were expanded upon in later tales: e.g., Bacchyl. xiv, 50 = fr. 29 Bgk. (Porph. on Hor. O. i, 15). Aesch. portrays her as the archetype of the ecstatic prophetess (manic, divinely inspired, Ag. 1140, 1216). As such, she is referred to by Eur. as μαντιπόλος βάκχη, Hec. 121. φοίβας 827. the Bacchic head of the prophetic Cassandra 676. She shakes her head wildly like the Bacchants When the god's oracles speak of necessity, IA. 760 ff.

66 About the Arcadian Bakis (Kydas or Aletes by name) Θεόπομπος ἐν τῇ θʹ τῶν Φιλιππικῶν ἄλλα τε πολλὰ ἱστορεῖ παράδοξα καὶ ὅτι ποτὲ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων τὰς γυναῖκας μανείσας ἐκάθηρεν, Ἀπόλλωνος τούτοις τούτον καθαρτὴν δόντος, Sch. Ar., Pa. 1071. The story is closely parallel to that of Melampous and the Proitides, see above, nn. 22–5.

66 About the Arcadian Bakis (also known as Kydas or Aletes) Theopompus in book 8 of the Philippics tells many strange stories, including that at one time the women of the Spartans went mad and were purified by this Apollo., Sch. Ar., Pa. 1071. The story is very similar to that of Melampous and the Proitides, see above, nn. 22–5.

67 Cf. e.g. Hippocr. π. παρθενίων (ii, p. 528 K.; viii, 468 L.). Upon their recovery from hysterical hallucinations the women dedicate valuable ἱμάτια to Artemis κελευόντων τῶν μάντεων. This is the regular name for the μάγοι, καθαρταί, ἀγύρται (cf. Teiresias δόλιος ἀγύρτης, S., OT. 388; Kassandra is accused of being φοιτὰς ἀγύρτρια, A., Ag. 1273). Hp. speaks elsewhere also of their manner of healing epilepsy, i, p. 588 K. (vi, 354 L.).

67 See, for example, Hippocrates π. παρθενίων (ii, p. 528 K.; viii, 468 L.). After recovering from hysterical hallucinations, the women offer valuable clothes to Artemis the seers' commands. This is the standard term for the magi, cleansers, con artists (see Teiresias sneaky con artist, S., OT. 388; Kassandra is accused of being fake students, A., Ag. 1273). Hippocrates also discusses their methods of treating epilepsy, i, p. 588 K. (vi, 354 L.).

68 καθαρμοὶ . . . κατὰ τὴν μαντικήν, Pl., Crat. 405 AB. The μάντεις are able e.g. to drive away by magic the mist that is so dangerous for the olive-trees: Thphr., CP. 2, 7, 5. The μάντεις καὶ τερατοσκόποι, ἁγύρται καὶ μάντεις possess the arts of μαγγανεύματα, ἐπῳδαί, καταδέσεις and ἐπαγωγαί which compel the gods to do their will, Pl., Rp. 364 BC; Lg. 933 CE. These μάντεις correspond in all essentials to the magicians and medicine men of savage tribes. Prophet, doctor, and magician are here united in a single person. A mythical prototype of these Greek “medicine men” is Apis, of whom we hear in Aesch., Sup. 260–70. (The μάντεις also officiate as sacrificial priests, esp. where the sacrifice is combined with a special sacrificial mantikê—quite unknown to Homer—in which the will of the gods is inquired: Eur., Hcld. 401, 819; Ph. 1255 ff. and frequently. Hermann Gottesdienstl. Alterth. 33, 9.)

68 Cleansings... based on divination, Pl., Crat. 405 AB. The fortune tellers can, for example, magically drive away the harmful mist that threatens olive trees: Thphr., CP. 2, 7, 5. The psychics and monster-seers, fortune-tellers and psychics possess the skills of magic, spells, and binding charms and calls to action that compel the gods to follow their wishes, Pl., Rp. 364 BC; Lg. 933 CE. These fortune tellers are essentially similar to the magicians and healers of primitive tribes. Prophet, healer, and magician are all embodied in one individual. A mythical ancestor of these Greek “medicine men” is Apis, mentioned in Aesch., Sup. 260–70. (The fortune tellers also serve as sacrificial priests, especially when the sacrifice involves a special divinatory mantikê—totally unknown to Homer—in which the will of the gods is sought: Eur., Hcld. 401, 819; Ph. 1255 ff. and often. Hermann Gottesdienstl. Alterth. 33, 9.)

69 The clearest evidence for this is Hp., Morb. Sacr. (vi, 352 L.). See below, n. 81. Assistance in the case of internal diseases is naturally sought in ancient times from magicians, for such diseases arise immediately from the action of a god: στυγερὸς δέ οἱ ἔχραε δαίμων, ε 396 (cf. κ, 64), is said of an invalid who lies δηρὸν τηκόμενος. Cf. νοῦσος Διὸς μεγάλου, ι 411. In such cases help is sought from the ἰατρόμαντις (A., Sup. 263) who is at once μάντις and τερατοσκόπος and καθαρτής like his divine prototype Apollo: A., Eum. 62–3. In a long illness King Kleomenes I of Sparta resorts to καθαρταὶ καὶ μάντεις, Plu., Ap. Lac. 11, p. 223 E.

69 The clearest evidence for this is Hp., Morb. Sacr. (vi, 352 L.). See below, n. 81. In ancient times, people naturally sought help from magicians for internal diseases, as these ailments were believed to arise directly from the influence of a god: στυγερὸς δέ οἱ ἔχραε δαίμων, ε 396 (cf. κ, 64), refers to a sick person who is dissolving slowly. See also sickness of great Zeus, ι 411. In such situations, assistance is sought from the doctor divination (A., Sup. 263), who serves as both diviner and monster viewer and cleanser, similar to his divine model Apollo: A., Eum. 62–3. During a prolonged illness, King Kleomenes I of Sparta turns to pure and prophetic, Plu., Ap. Lac. 11, p. 223 E.

70 Α 313 f.; χ 481 ff. Kathartic practices, however much they may contain a primitive core, were fairly late in attaining popularity in Greece (or in regaining a lost popularity): as is shown esp. by the all but total absence of any mention of such practices and the superstitions underlying them from Hesiod, Op., which otherwise preserves the memory of so much countryside superstition (something rather like it is perhaps to be found in Op. 733–6).

70 Α 313 f.; χ 481 ff. Cathartic practices, no matter how much they may have a primitive foundation, became popular in Greece relatively late (or may have regained a lost popularity): this is particularly evident from the near-total lack of any reference to such practices and the superstitions behind them in Hesiod, Op., which otherwise preserves the memory of a lot of countryside superstition (something somewhat similar might be found in Op. 733–6).

71 Nothing is said in Homer of the purification of the murderer or the homicide: see above, chap. v, n. 166.

71 Homer doesn’t mention the cleansing of the murderer or the one who committed homicide: see above, chap. v, n. 166.

72 Thus at the ἀμφιδρόμια all who have had anything to do with 318 the μαίωσις, ἀποκαθαίρονται τὰς χεῖρας (Suid. s.v.). But even the child is lustrated: it is carried in the arms of a grown-up who runs with it round the altar and the altar fire: clearly a vestige of the ἀποτροπιασμὸς καὶ κάθαρσις of the child by sacred fire of which so many relics have been observed: see Grimm, p. 625; Tylor, ii, 430 f.—Uncleanness of the pregnant woman until the fortieth day after the child is born: Welcker, Kl. Schr. iii, 197–9. At the birth of a child crowns of olive-branches or woollen fillets (ἔρια) were in Attica hung up on the house-door; just as cypress-branches were hung on the doors of houses where a corpse lay (see above, chap. v, n. 39): for kathartic purposes strings of onions (squills) were suspended on house-doors; see below): Hsch. στέφανον ἐκφέρειν. Both are lustral materials. Use of olive branches at καθαρμός: S., OC. 483 f.; Vg., A. 230. When a mother gives her child that is to be exposed a crown made of olive branches (as in Eur., Ion, 1433 ff.), this, too, has an apotropaic purpose as also has the Gorgon’s head on the embroidered stuff that also accompanies the child (l. 1420 f.): see on this O. Jahn, Bös. Blick, 60. The olive is also sacred to the χθόνιοι (hence its use as a bed for corpses: see above, chap. v, n. 61; cf. τοῖς ἀποθανοῦσιν ἐλαᾶς συνεκφέρουσιν: Artemid. iv, 57, p. 236, 20 H. κοτίνῳ καὶ ταινίᾳ the goddess crowns Chios in his dream and points the man thus dedicated to death to his μνῆμα: Chio, Epist. 17, 2). This makes the olive suitable for lustration and ἀποτροπιασμοί. The house in which the child lay was thus regarded as needing “purification”. The “uncleanness” felt to exist in this case is clearly expressed by Phot. ῥάμνος· ἀμίαντος ἡ πίττα· διὸ καὶ ἐν ταῖς γενέσεσι τῶν παιδίων (ταύτῃ) χρίουσι τὰς οἰκίας, εἰς ἀπέλασιν δαιμόνων (see above, chap. v, n. 95). It is the neighbourhood of these (chthonic) δαίμονες that cause the pollution.

72 So at the amadromia everyone involved with 318 the μάγος, πλένουν τα χέρια (Suid. s.v.). But even the child is purified: it is carried in the arms of an adult who runs around the altar and the altar fire with it: clearly a remnant of the horror and purification of the child by sacred fire that has many observed traces: see Grimm, p. 625; Tylor, ii, 430 f.—The pregnant woman is considered unclean until the fortieth day after the child is born: Welcker, Kl. Schr. iii, 197–9. At the birth of a child, olive branches or woolen ribbons (ἔρια) were hung on the house door in Attica; just as cypress branches were hung on the doors of houses where a corpse lay (see above, chap. v, n. 39): for purification purposes, strings of onions (squills) were hung on house doors; see below): Hsch. bring out the crown. Both are materials for purification. The use of olive branches at purification: S., OC. 483 f.; Vg., A. 230. When a mother gives her child, which is to be abandoned, a crown made of olive branches (as in Eur., Ion, 1433 ff.), this also has a protective purpose, as does the Gorgon's head on the embroidered cloth that also accompanies the child (l. 1420 f.): see on this O. Jahn, Bös. Blick, 60. The olive is also sacred to the Underworld beings (hence its use as a bed for corpses: see above, chap. v, n. 61; cf. τοῖς ἀποθανοῦσιν ἐλαᾶς συνεκφέρουσιν: Artemid. iv, 57, p. 236, 20 H. κοτίνῳ καὶ ταινίᾳ the goddess crowns Chios in his dream and points the man thus dedicated to death to his μνῆμα: Chio, Epist. 17, 2). This makes the olive suitable for purification and gross acts. The house where the child was lying was thus seen as needing “purification.” The “uncleanness” perceived in this case is clearly expressed by Phot. Rhamnus; the pure pitch; therefore, it is also in the births of children.(ταύτῃ)χρίουσι τὰς οἰκίας, for the banishment of demons (see above, chap. v, n. 95). It is the presence of these (chthonic) demons that causes the pollution.

73 A., Pers. 201 ff., 216 ff.; Ar., Ra. 1340; Hp., Insom. (ii, p. 10, 13 K. = vi, p. 654 L.); cf. Becker, Charicles, p. 133, n. 4 E.T.

73 A., Pers. 201 ff., 216 ff.; Ar., Ra. 1340; Hp., Insom. (ii, p. 10, 13 K. = vi, p. 654 L.); cf. Becker, Charicles, p. 133, n. 4 E.T.

74 Cf. Plu., Sept. Sap. Conv. iii, p. 149 D, and on this Wyttenb. vi, p. 930 f.

74 See Plutarch, Septem Sapientiæ Convivia iii, p. 149 D, and in Wyttenbach vi, p. 930 f.

75 Purification of houses (χ 481 ff.); e.g. [D.] 47, 71. It was customary to purify οἰκίας καὶ πρόβατα with black hellebore: Thphr., HP. 9, 10, 4; Dsc. 4, 149 (hence the superstitious details of its gathering, Thphr., HP. 9, 8, 8, and Dsc.). The touching of the house by unholy daimones necessitates purification: Thphr., Ch. 28 (16), 15, of the δεισιδαίμων· καὶ πυκνὰ δὲ τὴν οἰκίαν καθᾶραι δεινὸς Ἑκάτης φάσκων ἐπαγωγὴν γεγονέναι.

75 Purification of homes (χ 481 ff.); e.g. [D.] 47, 71. It was common to purify house and sheep with black hellebore: Thphr., HP. 9, 10, 4; Dsc. 4, 149 (hence the superstitious details of its gathering, Thphr., HP. 9, 8, 8, and Dsc.). The contact of the house with unholy spirits requires purification: Thphr., Ch. 28 (16), 15, of the Fearful; and often, while cleaning the house, claiming that a powerful influence of Hecate has occurred..

76 Presence of a dead body in a house makes the water and fire unclean; “clean” water and fire must then be brought in from elsewhere. See Plu., QG. 24 (Argos), p. 297 A (see above, chap. v, n. 38). At a festival of the dead in Lemnos all the fires were put out (as unclean); “clean” fire was sought from Delos, and, after the completion of the ἐναγίσματα brought into the country and distributed. Philostr., H. 19, 14, p. 206–8, 7 K.—Alexander was following Greek, as well as Persian, customs when at the burial of Hephaistion he allowed τὸ παρὰ τοῖς Πέρσαις καλούμενον ἱερὸν πῦρ to go out, μέχρι ἂν τελέσῃ τὴν ἐκφοράν, D.S. 17, 114, 4.

76 The presence of a dead body in a house makes the water and fire unclean; “clean” water and fire must then be sourced from elsewhere. See Plu., QG. 24 (Argos), p. 297 A (refer to above, chap. v, n. 38). At a festival for the dead in Lemnos, all the fires were extinguished (as they were considered unclean); “clean” fire was sought from Delos, and, after the rituals called sacrifices were completed, it was brought into the country and distributed. Philostr., H. 19, 14, p. 206–8, 7 K.—Alexander was adhering to both Greek and Persian customs when, at the burial of Hephaistion, he allowed the the sacred fire known among the Persians to be extinguished, until the funeral is completed, D.S. 17, 114, 4.

77 “When a Greek saw anyone using expiatory rites, he presumed in that person the will to amend,” Nägelsbach, Nachhom. Theol., 363. If this was really so it is strange that we never see this “presumption” expressed in words. We do indeed read that the δεισιδαίμων mortifies himself and ἐξαγορεύει τινὰς ἁμαρτίας αὑτοῦ καὶ πλημμελείας, but in what do these ἁμαρτίαι consist?—ὡς τόδε φαγόντος ἢ πιόντος ἢ βαδίσαντος 319 ὁδὸν ἣν οὐκ εἴα τὸ δαιμόνιον, Plu., Superstit. 7, p. 168 D: merely ritual omissions in fact, not moral transgressions at all. It is the same everywhere in this domain. The conceptions underlying purificatory practice certainly did not correspond to the refined morality of later ages, but they continued in force so long as kathartikê remained popular: they are well expressed (though disapprovingly) by Ovid in the well-known lines which we shall, however, do well to recall: omne nefas omnemque mali purgamina causam credebant nostri tollere posse senes. Graecia principium moris fuit: illa nocentis impia lustratos ponere facta putat.—a! nimium faciles, qui tristia crimina caedis fluminea tolli posse putetis aqua, F. 2, 35 ff.; cf. Hp. i, p. 593 K., vi, 362 L.

77 “When a Greek saw someone performing purification rituals, he assumed that person had the intention to change,” Nägelsbach, Nachhom. Theol., 363. If this is true, it’s odd that we never see this “assumption” stated outright. We do read that the fearful punishes himself and confesses some of his sins and wrongdoings, but what do these sins actually consist of?—As someone who has eaten, drunk, or walked like this. 319 the way that the spirit did not allow, Plu., Superstit. 7, p. 168 D: merely ritual omissions, not moral wrongs at all. This pattern is consistent across the board in this area. The ideas behind purifying practices did not align with the sophisticated morality of later times, yet they remained relevant as long as kathartikê was popular: Ovid captures this well (though critically) in the famous lines we should recall: Our elders believed they could remove all wrongdoing and the causes of evil. Greece was the origin of this custom: it considers it just to expunge the wicked deeds of the guilty. Oh! How naive are those who think that the sorrowful crimes of murder can be washed away by flowing water., F. 2, 35 ff.; cf. Hp. i, p. 593 K., vi, 362 L.

78 We can only here allude to the remarkable parallel provided by the purificatory and expiatory ritual of India, which is completely analogous to the kathartikê of Greece and had a similar origin. Even in details Indian conceptions and procedure answer closely to Greek. They are both as far removed as possible from all idea of quieting a guilt-laden conscience and are directed solely towards effacing, expunging, or expelling an external μίασμα, a pollution arriving from without, a taint arising from contact with a hostile δαιμόνιον conceived as something in the nature of a daimonic fluid. Indian sources are on this point very rich and full: an excellent account of them is given by Oldenberg in his Religion des Veda (esp. Fr. tr. 243 ff.; 417 ff.). Greek and Indian practices illuminate each other. It would be a valuable experiment to take the highly elaborated kathartic ritual of the Avesta and compare it with the history and technique of purification and expiation in Greek religion. It would mean renewing Lomeier’s old book [Epimenides s. de lustrat. Zutphen 1700]: the materials are very scattered and the ground has never been thoroughly gone over since then. By the help also of the “comparative” method of religious study, which in this case is quite justified, it would then be possible to reconstruct a most important fragment of primitive religio—a fragment which had become almost entirely forgotten in Homeric times, which then recovered its ancient influence and continued to develop and was even transmitted to the ritual of the Christian church (cf. Anrich, D. ant. Mysterienw. 190 f.). We must be careful, however, to shut our ears to the otherwise very convincing people who are so anxious to introduce purely moral interests and conceptions into ancient religio. Morality is a later achievement in the life-history of the children of men: this fruit did not grow in Eden.

78 We can only briefly mention the notable similarity found in the purification and atonement rituals of India, which closely resemble the kathartikê of Greece and share a similar origin. Even in specifics, Indian concepts and practices align closely with Greek ones. Both are completely detached from any notion of soothing a guilty conscience and focus solely on removing, cleansing, or driving away an external contamination—a pollution that comes from outside, a stain resulting from contact with a hostile daemon seen as a kind of daemonic fluid. Indian texts provide a wealth of information on this matter: Oldenberg offers an excellent overview in his Religion des Veda (especially Fr. tr. 243 ff.; 417 ff.). Greek and Indian practices shed light on each other. It would be a valuable project to take the intricate kathartic ritual from the Avesta and compare it with the history and methods of purification and atonement in Greek religion. This would mean revisiting Lomeier’s older book [Epimenides s. de lustrat. Zutphen 1700]: the materials are quite scattered, and the topic hasn't been thoroughly explored since then. By also employing the “comparative” approach to religious studies, which is warranted in this case, we could potentially reconstruct a crucial piece of ancient religio—a piece that had almost completely faded from memory in Homeric times, then regained its ancient influence and continued to evolve, even being passed down to the rituals of the Christian church (cf. Anrich, D. ant. Mysterienw. 190 f.). However, we must be cautious to ignore those who compellingly try to impose purely moral interests and ideas into ancient religio. Morality is a later development in human history: this fruit did not grow in Eden.

79 Check out __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

80 What the Greeks meant by μίασμα can be very clearly seen, e.g. in the conversation between Phaidra and her nurse in Eur. Hp. 316 ff. Phaidra’s distress of mind is not derived from a deed of blood: χεῖρες μὲν ἁγναί she says φρὴν δ’ ἔχει μίασμά τι. Does the Nurse think of any moral disgrace or defilement of the distressed woman in this φρενὸς μίασμα? Not at all: she only asks, μῶν ἐξ ἐπακτοῦ πημονῆς ἐχθρῶν τινος; in other words by “defilement of the mind” she can only conceive of an enchantment, something from without that comes, by ἐπαγωγὴ τινῶν δαιμονίων (see below, n. 108), a stain derived from the polluting neighbourhood of such daimones. This was the general and popular conception. (Taken literally Plato’s words also give expression to the popular conception: πολλῶν ὄντων καὶ καλῶν ἐν τῷ τῶν ἀνθρώπων βίῳ, τοῖς πλείστοις αὐτῶν οἷον κῆρες ἐπιπεφύκασιν, αἳ καταμιαίνουσί τε καὶ καταρρυπαίνουσιν αὐτὰ, Lg. 937 D.) 320

80 What the Greeks understood by contagion can be clearly seen, for example, in the conversation between Phaidra and her nurse in Eur. Hp. 316 ff. Phaidra’s mental distress doesn’t come from an act of violence: pure hands she says One's mind has a certain flaw.. Does the Nurse think there’s any moral disgrace or defilement affecting the troubled woman in this mind pollution? Not at all: she only asks, Are we not from the troublesome distress of some enemies? in other words, by “defilement of the mind” she can only imagine an enchantment, something external that arises from influence of certain spirits (see below, n. 108), a stain coming from the tainted presence of such spirits. This was the general and common understanding. (Taken literally, Plato’s words also reflect the popular view: In the lives of many people, filled with good things, most of them are like kēres, which both pollute and tarnish them., Lg. 937 D.) 320

81 Diseases come παλαιῶν ἐκ μηνιμάτων, Pl., Phdr. 244 DE; i.e. from the rage of departed generations of souls or of χθόνιοι, Lob., Agl. 635–7. Esp. madness is a νοσεῖν ἐξ ἀλαστόρων, S., Tr. 1325, a τάραγμα ταρτάρειον, E., HF. 89. Cure of such diseases is undertaken not by doctors but by καθαρταί, μάγοι καὶ ἀγύρται, expiatory priests with magic proceedings—this is well shown by the treatment of the “sacred disease” in Hp., Morb. Sac., p. 587–94 K = vi, 352–64 L. Such people, introducing themselves as magicians in the strict sense (p. 358 L.), use no regular medicinal treatment (356), but operate partly with καθαρμοί and ἐπῳδαί, partly with various prescriptions of abstinence ἁγνεῖαι καὶ καθαρότητες. These last are explained by Hp. on dietetic grounds but the Kathartai themselves derived them from τὸ θεῖον καὶ τὸ δαιμόνιον (358). And such they were evidently in intention. The account of such prescriptions given on pp. 354–6 mostly refers to abstentions from plants and animals supposed to be sacred to the underworld. Noticeable also: ἱμάτιον μέλαν μὴ ἔχειν, θανατῶδες γὰρ τὸ μέλαν (all trees with black berries or fruit belong to the inferi: Macr. 3, 20, 3). Other superstitions are found with these: μηδὲ πόδα ἐπὶ ποδὶ ἔχειν, μηδὲ χεῖρα ἐπὶ χειρί· ταῦτα γὰρ πάντα κωλύματα εἶναι. The belief is familiar from the story of the birth of Herakles. See Welcker, Kl. Schr. iii, 191. Sittl, Gebärden 126. (Something of the kind in P. Mag. Par. 1052 ff., p. 71 Wess.) The source of the disease was, however, always supposed to be the direct influence of a δαίμων (360-2) which must therefore be averted. Acc. to popular belief it is always God who τὸ ἀνθρώπου σῶμα μιαίνει (cf. p. 362). For this reason the magicians purify, καθαίρουσι, the sick αἵμασι καὶ τοῖσιν ἄλλοισι which are used to purify people μίασμά τι ἔχοντας or on whom a curse has been laid. The καθάρσια are buried or thrown into the sea (καὶ εἰς ἅλα λύματ’ ἔβαλλον, A 314), or carried away into a deserted mountain district (p. 362). Such καθάρσια are now the resting place of the μίασμα that has been washed off, and so the magician drives εἰς ὀρέων κεφαλὰς νούσους τε καὶ ἄλγη, Orph. H. 36, 16. Similarly in India, Oldenberg 495.

81 Diseases originate from the anger of past generations of souls or from spirits of the underworld, Lob., Agl. 635–7. Madness is caused by wandering spirits, S., Tr. 1325, a disturbance related to the underworld, E., HF. 89. Healing such diseases is done not by doctors but by expiatory priests who perform magical rituals—this is clearly illustrated by the treatment of the "sacred disease" in Hp., Morb. Sac., p. 587–94 K = vi, 352–64 L. These individuals, who present themselves as true magicians (p. 358 L.), do not use conventional medicine (356); instead, they operate partly with purifications and chants, and partly with various abstinence practices. These are explained by Hp. on dietary grounds, but the Kathartai themselves attribute them to divine and spirit influences (358). This was evidently their intent. The list of these prescriptions on pp. 354–6 mostly concerns abstentions from plants and animals thought to be sacred to the underworld. It's also notable: "Do not wear black clothing, for black is deathlike" (all trees with black berries or fruit belong to the underworld: Macr. 3, 20, 3). Other superstitions accompany these: "Do not place a foot upon another foot, nor a hand upon another hand; all these are prohibitions." This belief is familiar from the story of Herakles's birth. See Welcker, Kl. Schr. iii, 191. Sittl, Gebärden 126. (Something similar in P. Mag. Par. 1052 ff., p. 71 Wess.) However, the source of the disease was always thought to be the direct influence of a spirit (360-2) that needed to be avoided. According to popular belief, it is always God who defiles the human body (cf. p. 362). For this reason, the magicians purify the sick with blood and other cleansings that are used to purify people who carry a curse. The purifications are buried or thrown into the sea (and even thrown into the waves, A 314), or taken away into a deserted mountainous area (p. 362). Such purifications now serve as the resting place for the defilement that has been washed away, and thus the magician drives away illnesses and pain into the mountaintops, Orph. H. 36, 16. Similarly in India, Oldenberg 495.

82 Epôdai used for stopping the flow of blood, τ 457. Frequently mentioned in later times: particularly used in the magic cure of epilepsy, Hp. vi, 352–4; [D.] 25, §§ 79–80. When houses and hearths are purified by being sprinkled with hellebore συνεπᾴδουσί τινα ἐπῳδήν, Thphr. HP. 9, 10, 4 (comprecationem solemnem is Pliny’s trans., NH. 25, 49). Pains of childbirth prevented or alleviated by epôdai, Pl., Tht. 149 CD. (Much more of the kind in Welcker, Kl. S. iii, 64 ff.) The essential meaning of such epôdai is regularly an appeal or exorcism addressed to the daimonic creature (clearly an appeal when lions or snakes are appeased in this way: Welcker, iii, 70, 14–15). Epôdai accompanying ῥιζοτομία are ἐπικλήσεις of the δαίμων ᾧ ἡ βοτάνη ἀνιέρωται: P. Mag. Par. 2973 ff. The meaning of such “conjurings” addressed to diseases—when the daimon is exorcised—is clearly seen in what Plotin. says of the Gnostics: they claimed to heal the sick by means of ἐπαοιδαί, μέλη, ἦχοι, and καθαίρεσθαι νόσων, ὑποστησάμενοι τὰς νόσους δαιμόνια εἶναι, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐξαιρεῖν λόγῳ φάσκοντες δύνασθαι, 2, 9, 14.

82 Epôdai are used to stop bleeding, τ 457. They are frequently mentioned later on, especially for the magical treatment of epilepsy, Hp. vi, 352–4; [D.] 25, §§ 79–80. When homes and hearths are cleansed by being sprinkled with hellebore They chant some incantation., Thphr. HP. 9, 10, 4 (comprecationem solemnem is Pliny’s translation, NH. 25, 49). Childbirth pains can be prevented or lessened by epôdai, Pl., Tht. 149 CD. (More information can be found in Welcker, Kl. S. iii, 64 ff.) The main idea of such epôdai is typically a plea or exorcism directed at a daimonic entity (it's clearly a plea when lions or snakes are calmed this way: Welcker, iii, 70, 14–15). Epôdai that accompany rooting are calls of the Spirit that the herb serves: P. Mag. Par. 2973 ff. The significance of such “conjurings” aimed at illnesses—when the daimon is exorcised—is evident in Plotinus' remarks about the Gnostics: they claimed they could heal the sick using ἐπαοιδαί, μέλη, ἦχοι, and To be cleansed of diseases, having asserted that illnesses are caused by demons, and claiming that such things can be removed through words., 2, 9, 14.

83 Clashing of bronze used at ἀποκαθάρσεις to drive away ghosts: see above, chap. v, n. 167; cf. also Macr. 5, 19, 11. Claud. iv. Cons. Hon. 149: nec te (like Juppiter) progenitum Cybeleius aere sonoro lustravit Corybas. The noise of bronze has a kathartic effect simply as averting ghosts. In the process of driving out the ghosts at the Lemuria, Temesaea concrepat aera, Ov., F. 5, 441. Hence (?) χαλκοῦ 321 αὐδὰν χθονίαν, E., Hel. 1346. At eclipses of the sun or moon κινοῦσι χαλκὸν καὶ σίδηρον ἄνθρωποι πάντες (cf. Plu., Aem. 17; Juv. vi, 443; Mart. xii, 57, 16 f., etc.) ὡς τοὺς δαίμονες ἀπελαύνοντες, Al. Aphr., Prb. 2, 46, p. 65, 28 Id. This is the object of the crepitus dissonus at eclipses of the moon: Plin., NH. ii, 54; Liv. xxvi, 5, 9; Tac., A. i, 28, and cf. Tib. i, 8, 21 f.; ob strias: [Aug.] Sacrileg. v, 16, with Caspari’s refs., p. 31 f.

83 The clashing of bronze used at cleanses to ward off ghosts: see above, chap. v, n. 167; cf. also Macr. 5, 19, 11. Claud. iv. Cons. Hon. 149: nec te (like Jupiter) progenitum Cybeleius aere sonoro lustravit Corybas. The sound of bronze has a cleansing effect simply by driving away ghosts. In the ritual of driving out the ghosts at the Lemuria, Temesaea crushes the air, Ov., F. 5, 441. Thus (?) χαλκού 321 αὐδὰν χθονίαν, E., Hel. 1346. During solar or lunar eclipses, All people move bronze and iron. (cf. Plu., Aem. 17; Juv. vi, 443; Mart. xii, 57, 16 f., etc.) as driving away demons, Al. Aphr., Prb. 2, 46, p. 65, 28 Id. This is the purpose of the crepitus dissonus during lunar eclipses: Plin., NH. ii, 54; Liv. xxvi, 5, 9; Tac., A. i, 28, and cf. Tib. i, 8, 21 f.; ob strias: [Aug.] Sacrileg. v, 16, with Caspari’s refs., p. 31 f.

84 φόνῳ φόνον ἐκνίπτειν, E., IT. 1233. Purgantur cum cruore polluuntur . . . Heraclit. (p. 335, 5 Schust. [5 D. = 130 B.]).

84 φόνῳ φόνον ἐκνίπτειν, E., IT. 1233. They are cleansed with blood when they are tainted with blood. . . . Heraclit. (p. 335, 5 Schust. [5 D. = 130 B.]).

85 A.R. iv, 703 ff. καθαρμοῖς χοιροκτόνοις . . .: A., Eum. 283, 449, αἵματος καθαρσίου; cf. Müller, Aesch. Eum. 124. Representation of the καθαρμός of Orestes on well-known vase-paintings: Mon. d. inst. iv, 48, etc.

85 A.R. iv, 703 ff. καθαρμοῖς χοιροκτόνοις . . .: A., Eum. 283, 449, blood cleanser; cf. Müller, Aesch. Eum. 124. Representation of the cleansing of Orestes on well-known vase-paintings: Mon. d. inst. iv, 48, etc.

86 The “purification” of the stain of blood in these and similar cases really consisted in a “substitution” sacrifice whereby the anger of the daimones was appeased: so much was, on the whole correctly, observed long ago by Meiners, Allg. Gesch. der relig. ii, 137. The μίασμα that clings to the murderer is in fact just the indignation of the murdered man or of the underworld spirits: this is plain in Antiph., Tet. 3α, 3 (see above, chap. v, n. 176). The thing that makes the son who has not avenged his father’s murder “unclean” and keeps him away from the altars of the gods is οὐχ ὁρωμένη πατρὸς μῆνις A., Ch. 293.—In the case of murder or homicide there is not only the contact with the sinister other-world that makes men unclean (this applies to all cases of “pollution”), but, besides this, there is also the anger of the murdered soul itself (and of its protecting spirits). Hence in this case, besides καθαρμός, ἱλασμός as well is necessary (see above, chap. v). It is evident, however, that it would be difficult to keep the two processes distinct and that they would easily merge into each other.

86 The “cleansing” of the bloodstain in these and similar situations actually involved a “substitution” sacrifice that calmed the anger of the spirits: this was noted quite correctly a long time ago by Meiners, Allg. Gesch. der relig. ii, 137. The 污染 that afflicts the murderer is essentially the outrage of the murdered person or the spirits of the underworld: this is clear in Antiph., Tet. 3α, 3 (see above, chap. v, n. 176). What makes the son who hasn’t avenged his father’s murder “unclean” and prevents him from approaching the altars of the gods is father's wrath unseen A., Ch. 293.—In cases of murder or homicide, there’s not only the connection with the ominous otherworld that renders people unclean (this applies to all forms of “pollution”), but also the wrath of the murdered soul itself (and its protective spirits). Therefore, in this case, besides cleansing, atonement is also necessary (see above, chap. v). However, it is clear that it would be challenging to keep the two processes separate, and they would likely blend together easily.

87 The φαρμακοί are put to death at the Thargelia of Ionic cities: Hipponax fr. 37. In other places on extraordinary occasions, but regularly at the Thargelia in Athens. This is denied by Stengel, Hermes, 22, 86 ff., but in the face of definite statements from antiquity general considerations can have no weight. In addition it was only a special mode of execution applied to criminals already condemned to death. (Two men, acc. to Harp. 180, 19: a man and a woman Hsch. φαρμακοί: the variation is explained by Hellad. ap. Phot., Bibl., p. 354a, 3 ff. Bk.) The φαρμακοί serve as καθάρσια to the city (Harp. 180, 19 Bk.): Hippon. fr. 4; Hellad. ap. Sch. Ar., Eq. 1136. φαρμακός = κάθαρμα, Phot., Lex. 640, 8 Pors. The φαρμακοί were either burnt (after being put to death) like other propitiatory victims: Tz., Ch. v, 736, prob. following Hippon. (the burning of the φαρμ. at Athens seems to be alluded to by Eup. Δῆμ. 120 [i, 290 K.]); or stoned: this form of death is implied (in the case of Athens) by the legend of Istros ap. Harp. 180, 23. Analogous customs (indicated by Müller, Dorians, i, 345) at Abdera: Ov., Ib. 465 f. (which acc. to the Sch. is taken from Call., who evidently transferred to Apollonios the pious wish directed by Hippon. against Boupalos); at Massilia (Petr. fr. 1 Bü., where the φαρμακός is either thrown down the cliff or saxis occidebatur a populo: Lact. ad Stat., Th. 10, 793). Apollonios of Tyana was clearly following ancient custom when he made the people of Ephesos stone an old beggar, who was evidently nothing but the plague-daimon itself, for the purification of the city: καθήρας τοὺς Ἐφεσίους τῆς νόσου, Philostr., VA. 4, 10–11. Was the stoning a sort of counter-enchantment? See Roscher, Kynanthropie, 38–9. 322

87 The medications are executed during the Thargelia of Ionic cities: Hipponax fr. 37. In some places, this happened on special occasions, but it was a regular practice at the Thargelia in Athens. Stengel disagrees, Hermes, 22, 86 ff., but definitive statements from ancient times outweigh general arguments. This method of execution was only a specific form applied to criminals already sentenced to death. (According to Harp. 180, 19: it was two people, a man and a woman, as noted by Hsch. medications: the variation is explained by Hellad. ap. Phot., Bibl., p. 354a, 3 ff. Bk.) The medicines acted as cleansing for the city (Harp. 180, 19 Bk.): Hippon. fr. 4; Hellad. ap. Sch. Ar., Eq. 1136. φαρμακός = scumbag, Phot., Lex. 640, 8 Pors. The medications were either burned (after being executed) like other sacrificial victims: Tz., Ch. v, 736, probably following Hippon. (the burning of the φαρμ. at Athens seems to be referenced by Eup. Δῆμ. 120 [i, 290 K.]); or stoned: this method of execution is suggested (in the case of Athens) by the legend of Istros ap. Harp. 180, 23. Similar customs (noted by Müller, Dorians, i, 345) occurred at Abdera: Ov., Ib. 465 f. (which according to the Sch. is derived from Call., who evidently transferred a pious wish from Hippon. against Boupalos to Apollonios); at Massilia (Petr. fr. 1 Bü., where the drug dealer is either thrown off a cliff or saxis occidebatur a populo: Lact. ad Stat., Th. 10, 793). Apollonios of Tyana clearly adhered to ancient tradition when he had the people of Ephesus stone an old beggar, who was evidently nothing but the embodiment of the plague itself, for the purification of the city: Ephesus' disease cure, Philostr., VA. 4, 10–11. Was the stoning a form of reverse magic? See Roscher, Kynanthropie, 38–9. 322

88 Among the ingredients of a Ἑκάτης δεῖπνον ἐν τῇ τριόδῳ was an ὠὸν ἐκ καθαρσίου: Luc., DM. 1, 1; or the testicles of a sucking pig that had been used as a victim: D., 54, 39. The ὀξυθύμια, sacrifices to Hekate and the souls of the dead (see above, chap. v, n. 176), are identical with the καθάρματα καὶ ἀπολύματα which were thrown out at the crossroads in the Ἑκαταῖα: Did. ap. Harp. ὀξυθύμια; cf. E.M. 626, 44. καθάρσια is the name of the purificatory offerings: καθάρματα of the same when they are thrown away: Ammon., p. 79 Valck. The dead bodies of dogs which had been used as victims at the “purification” were afterwards thrown τῇ Ἑκάτῃ μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων καθαρσίων, Plu., QR. 68, p. 280 C. Even the blood and water of the purificatory sacrifice, the ἀπόνιμμα, is also dedicated to the dead: Ath. 409 E ff. The fact that the καθάρματα are made over to the invisibly present spirits at the cross roads might be derived also from the necessity for throwing them out ἀμεταστρεπτί (see below, n. 104). Even the Argive custom of throwing the καθάρματα into the Lernaean lake (Znb., iv, 86; Dgn., vi, 7; Hsch. Λέρνη θεατῶν) shows that these kathartic materials are intended as a sacrifice to the underground spirits since the Lernaean lake was an entrance to the underworld (see above, chap. viii, n. 28).

88 Among the ingredients for a Hecate's dinner in the trilogy was an κοπ мус ἐκ καθαρσίου: Luc., DM. 1, 1; or the testicles of a suckling pig that had been used as a sacrifice: D., 54, 39. The anger, sacrifices to Hekate and the souls of the dead (see above, chap. v, n. 176), are the same as the scoundrels and rejects which were discarded at the crossroads in the Hecate: Did. ap. Harp. anger; cf. E.M. 626, 44. catharsis refers to the purifying offerings: scoundrels of the same when they are disposed of: Ammon., p. 79 Valck. The corpses of dogs that were used as sacrifices at the “purification” were later discarded to Hecate along with the other purifications, Plu., QR. 68, p. 280 C. Even the blood and water from the purifying sacrifice, the No changes needed., is also dedicated to the dead: Ath. 409 E ff. The fact that the scoundrels are given over to the unseen spirits at the crossroads might also come from the requirement to throw them out unchangeable (see below, n. 104). Even the Argive practice of tossing the scoundrels into the Lernaean lake (Znb., iv, 86; Dgn., vi, 7; Hsch. Λέρνη θεατῶν) indicates that these purifying materials are meant as an offering to the spirits below since the Lernaean lake was a gateway to the underworld (see above, chap. viii, n. 28).

89 Annual τελετή to Hekate in Aegina reputed to have been founded by Orpheus. Hekate and her καθαρμοί were there regarded as valuable against insanity (for she can remove what she herself has sent): Ar., Ves. 122; Lob., Agl. 242. This initiation festival lasted on into the fourth century A.D.—Paus. refers to only one other temple of Hekate in Argos: 2, 22, 7.—Indications of a rigorous worship of Hekate in Kos: GDI. 3624, iii, p. 345 fin. Hekate was patron-goddess of the city of Stratonikeia: Tac., A. iii, 62. Str., 660, and in other cities of Karia (as is known from inscr.). Possibly Hekate is there only a Greek title of a native Karian deity. The ancient cult of the χθόνιοι at the Triopion in Knidos was, however, Greek: Böckh on Sch. Pi., p. 314 f.; CIG. i, p. 45.

89 Annual ceremony to Hekate in Aegina is thought to have been established by Orpheus. Hekate and her cleansings were seen as effective against madness (since she can take away what she has inflicted herself): Ar., Ves. 122; Lob., Agl. 242. This initiation festival continued into the fourth century CE—Paus. mentions only one other temple of Hekate in Argos: 2, 22, 7.—There are signs of strict worship of Hekate in Kos: GDI. 3624, iii, p. 345 fin. Hekate was the patron goddess of the city of Stratonikeia: Tac., A. iii, 62. Str., 660, and in other cities of Karia (as shown in inscriptions). It’s possible that Hekate is just a Greek name for a local Karian goddess. However, the ancient worship of the Chthonians at the Triopion in Knidos was indeed Greek: Böckh on Sch. Pi., p. 314 f.; CIG. i, p. 45.

90 χθονία καὶ νερτέρων πρύτανις: Sophr. fr. 7 Kaib. ap. Sch. Theoc. ii, 12.—She is actually queen in Hades, sharing the throne of Plouton it seems: S., Ant. 1199. She is often called χθονία. She is Ἀδμήτου κόρη (i.e. of Hades, K. O. Müller, Introd. Scient. Myth. 245): Hsch. She is called ἀδμήτη herself in H. Mag. Hec., Abel, Orph., p. 289. She is the daughter of Euboulos, i.e. Hades: Orph. H., 72, 3 (elsewhere of course she has other origins). As χθονία she is often confused with Persephone (and both, as they are all thus united in several particulars, with Artemis). In the transcript of a metrical inscr. from Budrum (Cilicia) in JHS. xi, 252. there appears a Γῆ Ἑκάτη. This would certainly be very remarkable but on the stone itself the actual words are τὴν σεβόμεσθ’ Ἑκ[άτην]. [But cf. Tab. Defix., p. xiii, a 13.]

90 Underworld and nether leader: Sophr. fr. 7 Kaib. ap. Sch. Theoc. ii, 12.—She is actually the queen in Hades, sharing the throne of Plouton, it seems: S., Ant. 1199. She is often referred to as χθονία. She is Admetus' daughter (i.e. of Hades, K. O. Müller, Introd. Scient. Myth. 245): Hsch. She is called Admetus herself in H. Mag. Hec., Abel, Orph., p. 289. She is the daughter of Euboulos, which refers to Hades: Orph. H., 72, 3 (elsewhere, of course, she has different origins). As χθονία, she is often mistaken for Persephone (and both, as they are all connected in several ways, with Artemis). In the record of a metrical inscription from Budrum (Cilicia) in JHS. xi, 252, there appears a Gaea Hecate. This would certainly be very notable, but on the stone itself, the actual words are τὴν σεβόμεσθ’ Ἑκ[άτην]. [But cf. Tab. Defix., p. xiii, a 13.]

91 Hekate goddess of childbirth: Sophr. fr. 7. worshipped in Athens as κουροτρόφος, Sch. Ar., V. 804. Samian worship of the κουροτρόφος ἐν τῇ τριόδῳ (i.e. as Hek.), [Hdt.] V. Hom. 30; Hes., Thg. 450: θῆκε δέ μιν (Hek.) Κρονίδης κουροτρόφον. (Even as early as this κουρ. is the epithet of Hek. and not the name of an independ. feminine daimon which it may have been to begin with, and in isolated cases remained.) Γενετυλλίς goddess of childbirth is said to be ἐοικυῖα τῇ Ἑκάτῃ: Hsch. Γεν. The goddess Eileithyia to whom dogs were sacrificed in Argos is certainly a Hekate (Sokr. ap. Plu., Q. Rom. 52, p. 277 B—she was Artemis elsewhere). A consecration to Hekate ὑπὲρ παιδός: inscr. from Larisa, Ath. Mitth. xi, 450. Hek. is also a goddess of marriage: as such (ὅτι γαμήλιος ἡ Ἑκάτη, Sch.) she is called upon with Hymenaios 323 by Kassandra in Eur., Tr. 323. Hekate is γαμήλιος simply as χθονία: the χθόνιοι frequently take part in marriage as well as birth: see above, chap. v, p. 64 ff.; Gaia: see Welcker, Götterl. i, 327. Offering made πρὸ παίδων καὶ γαμηλίου τέλους to the Erinyes: A., Eum. 835.

91 Hekate, the goddess of childbirth: Sophr. fr. 7. Worshipped in Athens as shepherd, Sch. Ar., V. 804. Samian worship of the shepherd in the triad (i.e., as Hek.), [Hdt.] V. Hom. 30; Hes., Thg. 450: She set him down. (Hek.) Cronides, shepherd of youths. (Even at this early stage, κουρ. is the title of Hek. and not the name of a separate feminine spirit, which may have been how it started and, in rare instances, still is.) Γενετυλλίς, the goddess of childbirth, is said to resemble like Hecate: Hsch. Γεν. The goddess Eileithyia, to whom dogs were sacrificed in Argos, is definitely a Hekate (Sokr. ap. Plu., Q. Rom. 52, p. 277 B—she was known as Artemis in other places). A dedication to Hekate for the child: inscription from Larisa, Ath. Mitth. xi, 450. Hek. is also a goddess of marriage: she is invoked as such (that Hecate is a bride, Sch.) by Kassandra with Hymenaios in Eur., Tr. 323. Hekate is wedding simply as χθονία: the underworld beings often participate in marriage as well as childbirth: see above, chap. v, p. 64 ff.; Gaia: see Welcker, Götterl. i, 327. Offerings made Before children and marriage end to the Erinyes: A., Eum. 835.

92 Hekate present at funerals (rushing πρὸς ἄνδρας νεκρὸν φέροντας, Sophr. fr. 7) ἐρχομένα ἀνά τ’ ἠρία καὶ μέλαν αἷμα Theoc. ii, 13. χαίρουσα σκυλάκων ὑλακῇ καὶ αἵματι φοίνῳ ἐν νέκυσι στείχουσα κατ’ ἠρία τεθνηώτων, H. Hec. ap. Hipp., RH. iv, 35, p. 102, 64 f. D.-S.—Hekate present at all infamous deeds: see the remarkable formulae ap. Plu., Superst. 10, p. 170 B (Bgk., PLG4 iii, p. 680).—Hek. regarded as devouring corpses (like Eurynomos, etc., above, chap. vii, n. 24): αἱμοπότις, καρδιόδαιτε, σαρκοφάγε, ἀωροβόρε are said of her in the Hymn. Magic, 5, ll. 53–4 (p. 294 Ab.). φθισίκηρε should be also read, ib., l. 44 (κῆρες = ψυχαί, see above, chap. v, n. 100); cf. ὠμοφάγοι χθόνιοι, P. Mag. Par. 1444. Ἑκάτη ἀκρουροβόρη on a defixio from Megara ap. Tab. Defix., p. xiiia, l. 7 Wünsch. Probably ἀωροβόρη should be read (Wünsch differently, p. xxb).

92 Hekate is present at funerals (hastening to dead men carrying, Sophr. fr. 7) Coming between the sea and dark blood Theoc. ii, 13. Rejoicing in the howling of dogs and blood-red hues among the dead, I walk among the shores of the deceased., H. Hec. ap. Hipp., RH. iv, 35, p. 102, 64 f. D.-S.—Hekate is present at all infamous deeds: see the notable formulas ap. Plu., Superst. 10, p. 170 B (Bgk., PLG4 iii, p. 680).—Hek. is seen as devouring corpses (like Eurynomos, etc., above, chap. vii, n. 24): αἱμοπότις, καρδιόδαιτε, σαρκοφάγε, ἀωροβόρε are mentioned about her in the Hymn. Magic, 5, ll. 53–4 (p. 294 Ab.). φθισίκηρε should also be noted, ib., l. 44 (kēres = souls, see above, chap. v, n. 100); see also raw earth-eaters, P. Mag. Par. 1444. Hecate, goddess of witchcraft on a defixio from Megara ap. Tab. Defix., p. xiiia, l. 7 Wünsch. Probably ἀωροβόρη should be noted instead (Wünsch thinks differently, p. xxb).

93 See above, chap. v, nn. 66, 132.

93 See above, ch. 5, nn. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

94 Medea in E., Med. 385 ff.: οὐ γὰρ μὰ τὴν δέσποιναν ἣν ἐγὼ (as magician) σέβω μάλιστα πάντων καὶ ξυνεργὸν εἱλόμην, Ἑκάτην, μυχοῖς ναίουσαν ἑστίας ἐμὴς.—Δήμητρος κόρη is addressed as πυρὸς δέσποινα, in company with Hephaistos, in E., Phaeth., fr. 781, 59. Probably Hekate is meant being here as frequently combined or confused with Persephone the daughter of Demeter (cf. Ion, 1048).

94 Medea in E., Med. 385 ff.: I swear by the lady whom I (as magician) I serve with great respect, and I chose Hekate, who resides in the depths of my home.—Daughter of Demeter is referred to as fire mistress, along with Hephaistos, in E., Phaeth., fr. 781, 59. It’s likely that Hekate is here since she is often associated or confused with Persephone, the daughter of Demeter (see Ion, 1048).

95 The pious man cleans and decorates every month τὸν Ἑρμῆν καὶ τὴν Ἑκάτην καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν ἱερῶν ἃ δὴ τοὺς προγόνους καταλιπεῖν, Theopomp. ap. Porph., Abs. ii, 16 (p. 146, 8–9 N.). Acc. to this Hekate and Hermes belong to the θεοὶ πατρῷοι of the house.—Shrines of Hekate before the house-door (Lob., Agl. 1336 f.); cf. the sacella of the Heroes in the same place: above, chap. iv, n. 135.

95 The devout person cleans and decorates every month the statues of Hermes and Hekate, along with the other sacred items that truly honor our ancestors, Theopomp. ap. Porph., Abs. ii, 16 (p. 146, 8–9 N.). According to this, Hekate and Hermes are part of the ancestral spirits of the household.—Shrines of Hekate stand before the front door (Lob., Agl. 1336 f.); cf. the sacella of the Heroes in the same place: above, chap. iv, n. 135.

95a The late interpolation in Hes., Th. 411–52, in praise of Hekate leaves out the uncanny side of her character altogether. Hekate has here become so much the universally revered goddess that she has lost all definite personality in the process. The whole is a telling example of the sort of extension that might be given to a single divinity who had once been the vital cult-object of a small locality. The name of this universally known daimon becomes finally of little importance (for everything is heaped upon one personality). Hence there is little to be learnt of the special characteristics of Hekate from this Hymn. (In any case it is time we gave up calling this Hymn to Hekate “Orphic”: the word is even more than usually meaningless and conventional in this case.)

95a The late addition in Hesiod's Th. 411–52, which praises Hekate, completely ignores the eerie aspects of her character. Hekate has become so widely adored as a goddess that she has lost her distinct personality. This serves as a clear example of how a single deity, once a crucial object of worship in a small area, can expand. The name of this well-known spirit ultimately becomes less significant since everything is attributed to one persona. As a result, there's not much to learn about Hekate's unique traits from this Hymn. (It's also time we stopped calling this Hymn to Hekate "Orphic": the term is more meaningless and conventional in this context than usual.)

96 Hekate (ναίουσα at the crossroads, S. fr. 492 N.) meets men as an ἀνταία θεός (S. fr. 311) and is herself called ἀνταία (fr. 311, 368; cf. EM. 111, 50, where what precedes is from Sch. A.R. i, 1141). The same adj. applies to a δαίμων that she causes to appear: Hsch. ἀνταία, ἀνταῖος, in this as in most cases with the added sense of hostile. Hek. φαινομένη ἐν ἐκτόποις φάσμασιν, Suid. Ἑκάτην. (from Elias Cret. on Greg. Nz. iv, p. 487 Mg.). She appears or sends apparitions by night as well as by day: Εἰνοδία, θύγατερ Δάματρος, ἃ τῶν νυκτιπόλων ἐφόδων ἀνάσσεις καὶ μεθαμερίων, E., Ion, 1048 ff. Meilinoe, a euphemistically (cf. above, chap. v, n. 5) named daimonic creature, either Hekate or Empousa, meets ἀνταίαις ἐφόδοισι κατὰ ζοφοειδέα νύκτα, Orph. H. 71, 9. Hek. appears at midday in Luc., Philops. 22. In this midday vision she opens the earth and τὰ ἐν Ἅιδου ἅπαντα become visible (c. 24). This reminds us of the story told by Herakl. 324 Pont. of Empedotimos to whom Plouton and Persephone appeared ἐν μεσημβρίᾳ σταθερᾷ in a lonely spot and the whole world of the spirits became visible (ap. Procl. in Rp. ii, 119 Kroll). Lucian is probably parodying that story. Elsewhere in the same pamphlet he gives an absurd turn to a fabulous narrative of Plutarch’s (de An. fr. 1 Bern. = Philops. 25).

96 Hekate (ναίουσα at the crossroads, S. fr. 492 N.) meets people as an anti god (S. fr. 311) and is herself referred to as ἀνταία (fr. 311, 368; cf. EM. 111, 50, where the preceding information is from Sch. A.R. i, 1141). The same adjective applies to a spirit that she causes to appear: Hsch. antheia, antaios, in this case as in most cases with the added sense of hostile. Hek. phenomena in otherworldly apparitions, Suid. Hecate. (from Elias Cret. on Greg. Nz. iv, p. 487 Mg.). She appears or sends apparitions at night as well as during the day: Einodia, daughter of Demeter, who leads the night wanderers and the after-dwellers., E., Ion, 1048 ff. Meilinoe, a euphemistically (cf. above, chap. v, n. 5) named daimonic creature, either Hekate or Empousa, meets In the gloomy night, Orph. H. 71, 9. Hek. shows up at midday in Luc., Philops. 22. In this midday vision she opens the earth and everything in Hades become visible (c. 24). This reminds us of the story told by Herakl. 324 Pont. of Empedotimos, to whom Plouton and Persephone appeared at noon in a remote area and the entire spirit world became visible (ap. Procl. in Rp. ii, 119 Kroll). Lucian is likely parodying that story. Elsewhere in the same pamphlet he gives a ridiculous twist to a fabulous narrative from Plutarch’s (de An. fr. 1 Bern. = Philops. 25).

97 Check out __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

98 Check __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

99 Hekate herself is regarded as having the head of a dog: undoubtedly an ancient conception of her (she has σκυλακώδεα φωνήν, H. Mag. 5, 17 Ab.). She is sometimes even a dog herself: Hsch. Ἑκάτης ἄγαλμα, and partic. AB. 336, 31–337, 5; Call. fr. 100 h, 4. She is identified with Kerberos: Lyd., Mens. 3, 8, p. 42 W. She is actually invoked as a dog in P. Mag. Par. 1432 ff., p. 80 W.: κυρία Ἑκάτη εἰνοδία, κύων μέλαινα. Hence dogs are sacred to her and are sacrificed to her (earliest witness Sophr. fr. 8 Kaib.). The hounds with whom she flies about at night are daimonic creatures like Hekate herself. Porph. (who was specially well informed about such things) said that σαφῶς the hounds of Hekate were πονηροὶ δαίμονες: ap. Eus., PE. 4, 23, 7–8. In Lycophron’s account (ll. 1174–80) Hekabe is represented exactly in this way, i.e. as a daimonic creature who appears to men as a hound (cf. PLG. iii, 721 f.). She is transformed by Hekate (Brimo) into one of her train (ἑπωπίδα) who by their nocturnal howling strike terror into men who have neglected to make offering to the goddess.—Dogs occur as symbols of the dead on grave-reliefs?—above, chap. v, n. 105. (Erinyes as hounds; Keres as “Hounds of Hades”: A.R. iv, 1665; AP. vii, 439, 3 [Theodorid.], etc. Ruhnken, Ep. Cr. i, 94.)

99 Hekate is often seen as having the head of a dog, an idea rooted in ancient beliefs (she has dog-like voice, H. Mag. 5, 17 Ab.). Sometimes, she is even depicted as a dog herself: Hsch. Hecate statue, and particularly AB. 336, 31–337, 5; Call. fr. 100 h, 4. She is associated with Cerberus: Lyd., Mens. 3, 8, p. 42 W. In fact, she is called a dog in P. Mag. Par. 1432 ff., p. 80 W.: Lady Hecate, black dog. As a result, dogs are sacred to her and are offered in sacrifice (the earliest reference being Sophr. fr. 8 Kaib.). The dogs that accompany her at night are supernatural beings like Hekate. Porph. (who was especially knowledgeable about such matters) stated that clearly the hounds of Hekate were evil spirits: ap. Eus., PE. 4, 23, 7–8. In Lycophron’s version (ll. 1174–80), Hekabe is depicted in the same way, as a supernatural being appearing to humans as a hound (cf. PLG. iii, 721 f.). Hekate (Brimo) transforms her into one of her followers (ἑπωπίδα) who, through their night-time howling, instill fear in those who have failed to make offerings to the goddess. — Dogs appear as symbols of the dead on grave reliefs? — above, chap. v, n. 105. (Erinyes as hounds; Keres as “Hounds of Hades”: A.R. iv, 1665; AP. vii, 439, 3 [Theodorid.], etc. Ruhnken, Ep. Cr. i, 94.)

100 See Dilthey, Rh. Mus. 25, 332 ff.

100 See Dilthey, Rh. Mus. 25, 332 and following.

101 The Italian Diana who had long become identical with Hekate remained familiar to the Christianized peoples of the early Middle Ages (allusions in Christian authors: Grimm, pp. 283, 286, 933, 949, 1161 f. O. Jahn, Bös. Blick, 108). She was, in fact, the meeting point of the endless mass of superstition that had survived into that time from Graeco-Roman tradition. The nocturnal riding of a mob of women (i.e. “souls” of women) cum Diana, paganorum dea is quoted as a popular superstition by the so-called Canon Episcopi, which in the controversies on witches was so often appealed to. This document, it seems, cannot be traced back further than Regino (end of ninth century). He seems to have got it out of [Aug.] De Sp. et Anima (probably written in the sixth century). It was rescued from oblivion by Burkhard of Wurms, used in the Decretals of Gratian, and became very well known in the Middle Ages. (The passage from Burkhard is printed in Grimm, p. 1741. That the whole is a Canon (24) of the Council of Ancyra, 314 A.D., is, however, only a mistaken idea of Burkhard’s.) This belief in the nightly hunt of Diana with the souls may be regarded as a vestige of the ancient idea of Hekate and her nocturnal crew. It was all the more likely to survive in northern countries with their native legends of wild Hunters and the “furious host” with which it could so easily combine. [“Herne the Hunter,” Merry Wives of Windsor, iv, 4; v, 5.]

101 The Italian goddess Diana, who had long been equated with Hekate, remained known to the Christian societies of the early Middle Ages (references in Christian authors: Grimm, pp. 283, 286, 933, 949, 1161 f. O. Jahn, Bös. Blick, 108). She was essentially the intersection of the vast amount of superstition that had persisted from Graeco-Roman times into that era. The nighttime ride of a group of women (i.e., “souls” of women) cum Diana, paganorum dea is mentioned as a common superstition in the so-called Canon Episcopi, which was frequently referenced during the witch trials. This document seems to trace back no further than Regino (end of the ninth century). He appears to have derived it from [Aug.] De Sp. et Anima (likely written in the sixth century). It was brought back to light by Burkhard of Wurms, included in the Decretals of Gratian, and became well-known during the Middle Ages. (The excerpt from Burkhard is printed in Grimm, p. 1741. However, the notion that this is a Canon (24) from the Council of Ancyra, 314 CE, is merely a misunderstanding by Burkhard.) This belief in Diana's night hunt with the souls can be seen as a remnant of the ancient concept of Hekate and her nocturnal entourage. It was even more likely to persist in northern regions alongside their native tales of wild hunters and the “furious host,” with which it could easily meld. [“Herne the Hunter,” Merry Wives of Windsor, iv, 4; v, 5.]

102 ὁκόσα δείματα νυκτὸς παρίσταται, καὶ φόβοι καὶ παράνοιαι καὶ ἀναπηδήσεις ἐκ τῆς κλίνης καὶ φόβητρα καὶ φεύξεις ἔξω, Ἑκάτης φασὶν εἶναι ἐπιβολὰς καὶ ἡρώων ἐφόδους, καθαρμοῖσί τε χρέονται καὶ ἐπαοιδαῖς, Hp., Morb. Sac. vi, 362 L.; cf. Plu., Supers., 3, p. 166 A; Hor., AP. 454. Hekate is μανιῶν αἰτία, Eust., Il., p. 87, 31 (hence also releases men from madness in the initiations of Aegina, see above, n. 89); cf. ἔνθεος 325 ἐξ Ἑκάτης, E., Hip. 141. Dreams of Hekate, Artemid., 2, 37, p. 139, 1 ff. H. The ἥρωες ἀποπλήκτους ποιεῖν δύνανται: Sch. Ar., Av. 1490. The ἥρωες are also the source of nightmares, Rh. Mus. 37, 467 n. (like Pan as Ephialtes: Didym. ap. Sch. Ar., Ves. 1038—where Εὐάπαν should be read, from εὔα the noise of bleating goats and Πᾶν: Suid. and CIG. iv, 8382). The Lamiai and Empousai seem also to have been night-terrors; cf. what is said of their amorous disposition and desire for human blood by Apollonios ap. Philostr. VA. 4, 25, p. 145, 18; and what is said of Pan-Ephialtes, ἐὰν δὲ συνουσιάζῃ, Artemid., p. 139, 21 H. General statement: ὀνειρώσσειν comes ἀπὸ δαιμόνων ἐνεργείας Suid. ὀνειροπολεῖν, p. 1124 Gaisf. Seirenes: Crusius, Philol. 50, 97 ff.

102 All the signs of the night are all around, including fears, delusions, and jumping out of bed, along with scary images and running outside. They say these are signs of Hecate and the coming of heroes, which need purifications and chants., Hp., Morb. Sac. vi, 362 L.; cf. Plu., Supers., 3, p. 166 A; Hor., AP. 454. Hecate is the reason for insanity, Eust., Il., p. 87, 31 (hence also releases people from madness in the initiations of Aegina, see above, n. 89); cf. inspired by Hecate, E., Hip. 141. Dreams of Hecate, Artemid., 2, 37, p. 139, 1 ff. H. The heroes can trigger scary dreams: Sch. Ar., Av. 1490. The heroes are also the source of nightmares, Rh. Mus. 37, 467 n. (like Pan as Ephialtes: Didym. ap. Sch. Ar., Ves. 1038—where Euphony should be read, from good the noise of bleating goats and Fry pan: Suid. and CIG. iv, 8382). The Lamiai and Empousai also seem to have been night terrors; see what is said about their romantic disposition and desire for human blood by Apollonios ap. Philostr. VA. 4, 25, p. 145, 18; and what is said of Pan-Ephialtes, if he should have sex, Artemid., p. 139, 21 H. General statement: to dream big comes from the actions of demons Suid. to dream while dreaming, p. 1124 Gaisf. Sirens: Crusius, Philol. 50, 97 ff.

103 The “Banquets of Hekate”, besides the καθάρματα referred to above (n. 88), included also the specially prepared dishes that were made and put out for Hekate κατὰ μῆνα (Ar., Plu. 596) at the τριακάδες (see above, chap. v, n. 88) or else at the νουμηνίαι, Sch. Ar., Plu. 594: κατὰ τὴν νουμηνίαν, ἑσπέρας; cf. the offering to Hekate and Hermes at each νουμηνία: Theopomp. ap. Porph., Abs. 2, 16, p. 146, 7 N. These banquets of Hek. are meant by Ar., Plu. 594 ff., S. fr. 668 N.; Plu., Smp. 7, 3, p. 709 A.—It is possible that at the turn of the month there was a “purification” of the house, in which case the καθάρσια and the Ἑκάτης δεῖπνα would be again combined.—Ingredients of the offerings to Hek.: eggs and toasted cheese (Sch. Ar.); τρίγλη and μαινάς Ath. 325 B.; flame-cakes (of cheese, πλακοῦντες διὰ τυροῦ, Paus. Lex. ap. Eust. 1165, 14) ἀμφιφῶντες (see Lob., Agl. 1062 f.).

103 The “Banquets of Hekate,” along with the scoundrels mentioned earlier (n. 88), also included specially prepared dishes made and presented for Hekate per month (Ar., Plu. 596) at the triplets (see above, chap. v, n. 88), or during the new moon days, Sch. Ar., Plu. 594: during the new moon, evening; cf. the offering to Hekate and Hermes at each new moon: Theopomp. ap. Porph., Abs. 2, 16, p. 146, 7 N. These banquets of Hek. are referenced by Ar., Plu. 594 ff., S. fr. 668 N.; Plu., Smp. 7, 3, p. 709 A.—It’s possible that at the end of the month there was a “purification” of the house, in which case the cleanse and the Hecate's dinners would be combined again.—Ingredients for the offerings to Hek.: eggs and toasted cheese (Sch. Ar.); τρίγλη and μαινάς Ath. 325 B.; flame-cakes (of cheese, Pizza with cheese, Paus. Lex. ap. Eust. 1165, 14) ἀμφιφῶντες (see Lob., Agl. 1062 f.).

104 The person καθάρματα ἐκπέμψας throws them away ἀοστρόφοισιν ὄμμασιν: A., Cho. 98–9. The vessel filled with the purificatory offerings was emptied ἐν ταῖς τριόδοις and ἀμεταστρεπτί: Schol. ib. This was regular with καθαρμοί: Theoc. xxiv, 94 ff., and at offerings to the Erinyes: S., OC. 490. Even Odysseus is obliged at his sacrifice to the dead ἀπονόσφι τραπέσθαι, κ 528. Medea in collecting her magic juices turns her eyes ἐξοπίσω χερός: S. Ῥιζ. fr. 491 N.; A.R. iv, 1315; cf. also Lomeier, de lustrat., p. 455 f. This remained the rule at sacrifices to χθόνιοι and in magic ceremonies which regularly had to do with the underworld. Even Marc. Emp. in giving directions for the cure of φυσικά often enjoins nec retro respice e.g. 1, 54, likewise Plin., NH. 21, 176; 29, 91. In making an enchantment πορεύου ἀνεπιστρεπτεὶ μηδενὶ δοὺς ἀπόκρισιν P. Mag. Lond., given in Kenyon Greek Pap. in B.M., i, p. 98. Modern superstition agrees: cf. Grimm, p. 1789, n. 299; cf. nn. 357, 558, 890, 1137. The eye must be turned away from the “furious host”: Birlinger, Aus Schwaben, N.S. i, 90. The precaution is, however, of primeval antiquity. In the old Indian cult of the dead and worship of formidable deities many of the proceedings must be performed ἀμεταστρεπτί, Oldenberg, 335 f., 487 f., 550, n. 5; 577 f., 580. The reason for the precaution is not hard to see. If the person looked round he would see the spirits engaged in taking possession of the objects thrown to them, which would be sure to bring ill-luck—χαλεποὶ δὲ θεοὶ φαίνεσθαι ἐναργῶς. Hence Odysseus, when he is returning Leukothoë’s wimple by throwing it into the sea, must αὐτὸς ἀπονόσφι τραπέσθαι, ε 350. Hence Orpheus must not look back at Eurydike while she belongs to the lower world. (Cf. Hannibal’s dream reported after Silenus and Cael. Ant. by Cic., Div. i, 49.) οἱ ἐντυγχάνοντες νυκτὸς ἥρωσι διέστρεφον τὰς ὄψεις: Sch. Ar., Av. 1493. Very clearly put by Ov., F. 5, 437; at the Lemuria the sacrificer throws away the beans aversus . . . nec respicit. umbra putatur colligere et nullo terga vidente sequi. At last when the Manes are 326 all driven out, respicit (444). One of the Pythagorean σύμβολα, those invaluable fragments of Greek old wives’ wisdom, runs: ἀποδημῶν τῆς οἰκίας μὴ ἐπιστρέφου· Ἐρινύες γὰρ μετέρχονται (Iamb., Protr., p. 114, 29 f. Pist). Here the reason for the superstitious practice is clearly shown (cf. also Grimm, p. 1778, n. 14; cf. n. 360): the underworld spirits (wandering over the earth, esp. on the fifth of the month, as in Hes., Op. 803) are following the departing person: if he were to turn round he would see them.

104 The person обречённые на изгнание throws them away With piercing eyes: A., Cho. 98–9. The vessel filled with purifying offerings was emptied in the crossroads and irreversible: Schol. ib. This was standard practice with cleanings: Theoc. xxiv, 94 ff., and at offerings to the Erinyes: S., OC. 490. Even Odysseus must, at his sacrifice to the dead, Withdraw from the table., κ 528. Medea, while gathering her magical potions, turns her gaze behind hand: S. Ῥιζ. fr. 491 N.; A.R. iv, 1315; cf. also Lomeier, de lustrat., p. 455 f. This remained a rule at sacrifices to chthonic and in magical rituals that typically involved the underworld. Even Marc. Emp. in providing guidance for physical healing often instructs nec retro respice e.g. 1, 54, similarly Plin., NH. 21, 176; 29, 91. When performing an enchantment Move on without responding to anyone. P. Mag. Lond., cited in Kenyon Greek Pap. in B.M., i, p. 98. Modern superstitions align with this: see Grimm, p. 1789, n. 299; cf. nn. 357, 558, 890, 1137. The gaze must be turned away from the “furious host”: Birlinger, Aus Schwaben, N.S. i, 90. This precaution, however, is from ancient times. In the old Indian rituals for the dead and the worship of powerful gods, many actions must be performed unchangeable, Oldenberg, 335 f., 487 f., 550, n. 5; 577 f., 580. The reasoning behind the precaution is clear. If the person looks back, they would see the spirits claiming the items offered to them, which would surely bring misfortune—The gods are hard to see.. Hence Odysseus, when he returns Leukothoë’s veil by tossing it into the sea, must αὐτὸς ἀπονόσφι τραπέσθαι, ε 350. Thus Orpheus must not look back at Eurydike while she is in the underworld. (See Hannibal’s dream as recounted after Silenus and Cael. Ant. by Cic., Div. i, 49.) Those who encountered the heroes at night turned their gaze away.: Sch. Ar., Av. 1493. Very clearly expressed by Ov., F. 5, 437; at the Lemuria, the person offering sacrifices throws away the beans against . . . and does not look back. A shadow is thought to gather and follow without anyone seeing its back. Finally, when the Manes are 326 all driven out, respicit (444). One of the Pythagorean symbols, those invaluable fragments of ancient Greek wisdom, states: Don't return home if you're away; the Furies are after you. (Iamb., Protr., p. 114, 29 f. Pist). Here the reason for the superstitious practice is clearly highlighted (also see Grimm, p. 1778, n. 14; cf. n. 360): the underworld spirits (roaming the earth, especially on the fifth of the month, as in Hes., Op. 803) follow the departing individual: if they were to look back, they would see them.

105 Appearance of εἴδωλα of the dead: not as in Homer in dreams only, but openly before men’s waking eyes. Stories of this go back as far as the poems of the Epic Cycle; cf. appearance of Achilles in the little Iliad (p. 37 Ki), in the Νόστοι (p. 33). How familiar this idea had become by the fifth century may be judged from the frequency of ghosts in the tragedians: A., Pers. Eum. Prom. Ψυχ.; S., Πολυξ.; cf. fr. 795 N.; E., Hec.; raising of the spirit of a dead man, fr. 912; cf. also the stories of Simonides and the grateful dead (Bgk. on Sim. fr. 129); of Pelops and the εἴδωλον of Killos (see A. Marx, Griech. Märchen von dankbaren Thieren, p. 114 f.).

105 The appearance of idols of the dead: not just in dreams like in Homer, but clearly visible to people while they are awake. Stories of this date back to the poems of the Epic Cycle; see the appearance of Achilles in the little Iliad (p. 37 Ki), in the Nostalgia (p. 33). The popularity of this idea by the fifth century can be seen in how often ghosts appear in the tragedies: A., Pers. Eum. Prom. Ψυχ.; S., Πολυξ.; see also fr. 795 N.; E., Hec.; the summoning of a dead man's spirit, fr. 912; also consider the stories of Simonides and the grateful dead (Bgk. on Sim. fr. 129); of Pelops and the idol of Killos (see A. Marx, Griech. Märchen von dankbaren Thieren, p. 114 f.).

106 Spirit-raising at entrances to the underworld at definite ψυχομαντεῖα or νεκυομαντεῖα: see above, chap. v, n. 23. There were, however, ψυχαγωγοί who could compel individual souls to appear at other places as well: E., Alc. 1128 f. Such ψυχαγωγοί belonging to the fifth century and to be found in Thessaly are spoken of by Plu. ap. Sch. E., Alc. 1128. People τούς τε τεθνεῶτας φάσκοντες ψυχαγωγεῖν καὶ θεοὺς ὑπισχνούμενοι πείθειν, ὡς θυσίαις τε καὶ εὐχαῖς καὶ ἐπῳδαῖς γοητεύοντες occur in Pl., Lg. 909 B. Later literature abounds in such spirit-raisings. Conjuring Hekate to appear was a favourite magic experiment: A.R. iii, 1030 f., etc., recipe for producing this illusion in Hipp., RH. iv, 35–6, p. 102 f. D.-S. A Ἑκάτης ἐπαγωγή occurs as early as Thphr., Ch. 28 (16).

106 Raising spirits at the entrances to the underworld at specific psychomancy or necromancy: see above, chap. v, n. 23. There were, however, entertainers who could summon individual souls to other locations as well: E., Alc. 1128 f. Such entertainers from the fifth century who were found in Thessaly are mentioned by Plu. ap. Sch. E., Alc. 1128. People who claimed to communicate with the dead and promised to convince the gods through sacrifices, prayers, and spells appear in Pl., Lg. 909 B. Later texts are full of such spirit-raising practices. Invoking Hekate to appear was a popular magical endeavor: A.R. iii, 1030 f., etc., with a recipe for creating this illusion in Hipp., RH. iv, 35–6, p. 102 f. D.-S. A Hecate's invocation is mentioned as early as Thphr., Ch. 28 (16).

107 ἀγύρται καὶ μάντεις profess ἐάν τίς τιν’ ἐχθρὸν πημῆναι ἐθέλῃ μετὰ σμικρῶν δαπανῶν ὁμοίως δίκαιον ἀδίκῳ βλάψειν, ἐπαγωγαῖς τισι καὶ καταδέσμοις τοὺς θεούς, ὥς φασι, πείθοντές σφισιν ὑπηρετεῖν, Pl., Rp. 364 C. And esp. from Lg. 933 AE we get a good idea of the fear that the μάντεις and τερατοσκόποι generally inspired with their καταδέσεις ἐπαγωγαί, ἐπῳδαί, and other μαγγανεῖαι (we even hear of wax-figures on house-doors, grave-stones, ἐπὶ τριόδοις, as so frequently later, with the same superstitious purpose). Plato himself does not rule out the possibility of such magic incantations: at least they did not conflict with his own daimonic theory: see Smp. 203 A. ἐπαγωγαί are “evocations” of spirits or gods: see Ruhnk., Tim., p. 115. ἐπιπομπαί have the same meaning: see above, chap. v, n. 168. ἐπιπέμπειν frequently in this sense in the Orph. H. καταδέσεις, κατάδεσμοι are the “bindings” whereby the spirit-raiser magically compels the unseen to do his will. Compulsion is regularly found to be necessary: the spirits do not come willingly. The magician by his spells and ceremonies is their master; he exerts over them that ἀνάγκη (ὁ ἐπάναγκος is frequent in the magical books) or πειθανάγκη of which Porph. ap. Eus., PE. 5, 8, specially tells us (probably deriving it from Pythagoras of Rhodos). πείθειν is Plato’s weaker word: the most extreme is βιαστικαὶ ἀπειλαί Iamb. Myst. 6, 5 [i.e. Porph. Ep. Aneb. fr. 31 Parth.]; cf. τὸ δεῖνα πράξεις κἂν θέλῃς κἂν μὴ θέλῃς: refrain in a magic hymn, P. Mag. Par. 2252 ff.—Just as in these incantations the κατάδεσις affects the gods themselves so in other cases the victim is the unfortunate person whom the magician intends to harm: in this sense we have καταδέσεις, κατάδεσμοι, P. Par. 336; Orph. Lith. 582, and the 327 devotiones or defixiones written on metal tablets which have been found in such numbers in graves; see Gothofred. ad Cod. Theod. 9, 16, 3. These are now collected and edited by R. Wünsch, Defixionum tabellae in Attica repertae (CIA. App.), 1897, with those found outside Attica included in the Praefatio. Here we find καταδῶ (καταδίδημι) τὸν δεῖνα his tongue, limbs, mind, etc. (nn. 68, 89, 95, etc.), i.e. a magical disabling, paralysing, fettering of his faculties—and of all his efforts: ἀτελῆ, ἐναντία πάντα γένοιτο, nn. 64, 98. The carrying out of this is entrusted to Hermes χθόνιος or to Hekate (καταδῶ αὐτὸν πρὸς τὸν Ἑρμῆν κτλ.) as the κάτοχοι δαίμονες; cf. nn. 81, 84, 85, 86, 101, 105, 106, 107. Sometimes the promoter of the κατάδεσις says of himself καταδῶ καὶ κατέχω 109, etc. The defixio itself is called ὁ κάτοχος, Gk. Pap. in B.M. (Ken.), No. 121, ll. 394, 429 = p. 97–8. καταδεῖν is therefore here = κατέχεσθαι ποιεῖν (= disable him—not make him “possessed”) and implies the delivery of the victim into the power of the infernal spirits.—The μάντεις and καθαρταί appear as accomplished weather-magicians in Hp., Morb. Sac. vi, 358 L. They are claimed to be able to draw down the moon (an old art of Thessalian witches), make the sun go out, cause rain or drought at will, etc. A γένος of ἀνεμοκοῖται at Korinth was able τοὺ ἀνέμους κοιμίζειν: Hsch. Suid. ἀνεμοκ.: cf. Welcker, Kl.S. iii, 63. The claims made by these καθαρταί for themselves were made by later ages on behalf of Abaris, Epimenides, Pythagoras, etc.; Porph., VP. 28–9 (Iamb. 135 f.); Empedokles promised them to his own pupils; 464 ff. Mull., fr. 111 Diels; and cf. Welcker, Kl.S. iii, 60 f.—These are all examples of magical arts from early times: the overwhelming mass of evidence for such proceedings in later ages cannot be mentioned here except as explaining ancient accounts.

107 Scammers and psychics claim that if anyone wants to harm an enemy without spending much, they can do so quite justly through unfair means, using some spells and bindings of the gods, as they say, persuading them to fulfill their goals, Pl., Rp. 364 C. And especially from Lg. 933 AE, we get a good idea of the fear that the psychics and monster enthusiasts generally inspired with their bindings, spells, and other magic rituals (we even hear of wax figures on doorways, tombstones, at a crossroads, as frequently reported later, all for the same superstitious purpose). Plato himself doesn’t dismiss the possibility of such magical incantations: at least they didn’t clash with his own spiritual theory: see Smp. 203 A. Magic are “calls” to spirits or gods: see Ruhnk., Tim., p. 115. Calls have the same meaning: see above, chap. v, n. 168. Call forth is often used in this sense in the Orph. H. Bindings, binds are the “bindings” through which the spirit-raiser magically forces the unseen to obey his will. Compulsion is generally required: spirits don’t come willingly. The magician, through his spells and rituals, is their master; he exerts on them that need (the inevitable is often mentioned in magical texts) or coercive necessity, of which Porph. ap. Eus., PE. 5, 8, particularly informs us (likely originating from Pythagoras of Rhodes). To convince is Plato’s softer term: the most extreme is threats of violence Iamb. Myst. 6, 5 [i.e. Porph. Ep. Aneb. fr. 31 Parth.]; cf. You will do what’s stated whether you want to or not.: refrain in a magic hymn, P. Mag. Par. 2252 ff.—Just as in these incantations the binding affects the gods themselves, in other situations, the target is the unfortunate person whom the magician aims to harm: in this sense, we have bindings, binds, P. Par. 336; Orph. Lith. 582, and the 327 devotions or curses written on metal tablets found in large numbers in graves; see Gothofred. ad Cod. Theod. 9, 16, 3. These are now collected and edited by R. Wünsch, Defixionum tabellae in Attica repertae (CIA. App.), 1897, with those found outside Attica included in the Praefatio. Here we find to force (to connect) the individual with their tongue, limbs, mind, etc. (nn. 68, 89, 95, etc.), meaning a magical disabling, paralyzing, binding of their faculties—and all their efforts: Let them be unfinished, let everything go against them., nn. 64, 98. This task is entrusted to Hermes of the underworld or to Hekate (to connect him to Hermès, etc.) as the guardian spirits; cf. nn. 81, 84, 85, 86, 101, 105, 106, 107. Sometimes the person promoting the binding says of themselves I tie and hold 109, etc. The curse itself is called the holder, Gk. Pap. in B.M. (Ken.), No. 121, ll. 394, 429 = p. 97–8. To connect here means to turn off (not to make him “possessed”) and implies handing over the victim to the power of the infernal spirits.—The psychics and air purifiers show up as skilled weather magicians in Hp., Morb. Sac. vi, 358 L. They claim to pull down the moon (an ancient skill of Thessalian witches), make the sun disappear, summon or halt rain at will, etc. A group of wind techs in Corinth were able to calm the winds: Hsch. Suid. wind technicians: cf. Welcker, Kl.S. iii, 63. The claims made by these air purifiers for themselves were echoed in later times concerning Abaris, Epimenides, Pythagoras, etc.; Porph., VP. 28–9 (Iamb. 135 f.); Empedocles promised these abilities to his students; 464 ff. Mull., fr. 111 Diels; and see Welcker, Kl.S. iii, 60 f.—These are all instances of magical practices from ancient times: the overwhelming evidence of such activities in later ages cannot be exhaustively discussed here except as clarification of ancient references.

108 Abaris had been mentioned by Pindar (Harp. Ἄβαρις); Hdt. mentions him in iv, 36. There we hear of the arrow which he bore along with him κατὰ πᾶσαν τὴν γῆν and of his complete abstention from food (cf. Iamb., VP. 141). The arrow, a σύμβολον τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος (Lycurg. fr. 85, ap. Eudoc., p. 34, 10) is borne by Abaris in his hand—the suggestion of Wesseling, recently revived, that we should in Hdt.’s passage read ὡς τὸν ὀϊστὸς περιέφερε, has been shown to be linguistically impossible by Struve, Opusc. Crit. ii, 269. The embellishment of the Abaris story, whereby he (like Musaios) flew through the air on his arrow, is later than Hdt. or than Lyk. (The arrow is presumably the same as the one of which Herak. Pont. tells some strange things; ap. [Eratosth.] Catast. 29.) The story sounds rather like Herakleides. See Porph., VP. 29; Iamb., VP. 91, 136; Him., O. 25, 2, 4; Nonn. D. 11, 132 f.; Proc. Gaz., Ep. 96. Abaris was regarded as ἔνθεος (Eudoc.) as καθαρτής and χρησμολόγος, as driving away pestilences by magic arts (esp. in Sparta, where κωλυτήρια = apotropaic sacrifices, were instituted and a temple of Κόρη σώτειρα founded: Apollon., Mir. 4—prob. from Theopomp.: see Rh. Mus. 26, 558—Iamb., VP. 92, 141; Paus. 3, 13, 2). He is also said to have prophesied earthquakes, pestilence, etc. (Apollon.), and to have given prescriptions against disease and ἐπωδαί (Pl., Chrm. 158 CD); was a type of εὐκολίας καὶ λιτότητος καὶ δικαιοσύνης: Str. 301.—The figure of Abaris thus left rather vague in ancient legend was elaborated from two sources: (1) the Athenian cult-legends of the foundation of the Proërosia: Harp. Ἄβ., Suid. προηροσία. Sch. Ar., Eq. 729; Lycurg. κατὰ Μενεσαίχμου; and (2) the Pythagorean legends. It is in itself very probable that the story in Iamb., VP. 91–3, 147, of the meeting between Abaris and Pythagoras goes back to the fabulous “Abaris” of Herakleides 328 (the story in 215–17 of Abaris and Pythagoras before Phalaris evidently comes from Apoll. Ty.). This was suggested by Krische de soc. Pythag., p. 38, and has been more definitely maintained by Diels, Arch. f. Gesch. d. Philos. iii, 468: it cannot, however, be demonstrated absolutely—there is not a scrap of evidence to show that Herakleides did actually make Abaris meet Pythagoras. (Πυθαγόρας ἐν τῷ πρὸς Ἄβαριν λόγῷ, Procl. in Tim. 141 D. may very possibly, but not necessarily, as Diels thinks, refer to the Abaris of Herakleides.)—In any case the bringing together of Abaris and Pyth. is a late invention; it is impossible to say whether it could have occurred or did occur as early as the Aristotelian work περὶ τῶν Πυθαγορείων.—In any case, the guiding conception in all this is that Abaris did not belong to the primeval past but came to Greece in the daylight of historical times. Pindar makes this happen κατὰ Κροῖσον τὸν Λυδῶν βασιλέα (prob. about the time of the Σάρδεων ἅλωσις, Ol. 58, 3 = 546); “others” (acc. to Harp.) made it earlier, in Ol. 21 = 696. It is impossible to tell what the reasons were for either of these particular dates. Abaris might still be regarded as a contemporary of Pythagoras by those who, with Eusebios and Nikostratos ap. Harp., put him in Ol. 53 (κατὰ τὴν νγ Ὀλυμπιάδα, for so the figure in Harp. should be read and not γ Ὀλ.; the right reading is preserved from Harp. in Suid. Ἄβ.). This view, however, is not, as Diels thinks, obtained by making Abaris forty years older than Pyth. (The ἀκμή of Pyth. falls in Ol. 62—see Rh. Mus. 26, 570—and that, too, is the date—not Ol. 63—given by “Eusebius Chronica”, i.e. the Armenian, tr. and the MSS. PEMR of Jerome.) Perhaps Abaris was regarded as the contemporary of Phalaris whose reign according to one of the versions given by Eusebios began in Ol. 53, or 52, 3. Cf. Rh. Mus. 36, 567.

108 Abaris was referenced by Pindar (Harp. Abaris); Herodotus also mentions him in iv, 36. Here, we learn about the arrow he carried around throughout the land and his total abstinence from food (cf. Iamb., VP. 141). The arrow, a symbol of Apollo (Lycurg. fr. 85, ap. Eudoc., p. 34, 10), is held by Abaris in his hand. Wesseling's idea, recently revived, to read as the arrow went around in Herodotus's passage has been shown to be linguistically impossible by Struve, Opusc. Crit. ii, 269. The embellishment of the Abaris story, where he (like Musaios) flies through the air on his arrow, is later than either Herodotus or Lykurgus. The arrow is presumably the same one that Herakleides talks about with some strange tales; ap. [Eratosth.] Catast. 29. The story resembles Herakleides's. See Porph., VP. 29; Iamb., VP. 91, 136; Him., O. 25, 2, 4; Nonn. D. 11, 132 f.; Proc. Gaz., Ep. 96. Abaris was seen as inspired (Eudoc.) as a purifier and oracle, believed to drive away plagues through magic (especially in Sparta, where κωλυτήρια = apotropaic sacrifices were established, and a temple to Savior daughter was built: Apollon., Mir. 4—probably from Theopomp.: see Rh. Mus. 26, 558—Iamb., VP. 92, 141; Paus. 3, 13, 2). He is also said to have predicted earthquakes, plagues, etc. (Apollon.), and to have provided remedies against illness and spells (Pl., Chrm. 158 CD); he was a representation of ease, simplicity, and justice: Str. 301.—The portrayal of Abaris, which remains somewhat vague in ancient legend, is developed from two sources: (1) the Athenian cult-legends surrounding the origins of the Proërosia: Harp. Ἄβ., Suid. προηροσία. Sch. Ar., Eq. 729; Lycurg. κατὰ Μενεσαίχμου; and (2) the Pythagorean legends. It seems quite likely that the tale in Iamb., VP. 91–3, 147, of the encounter between Abaris and Pythagoras originates from the mythical "Abaris" of Herakleides 328 (the story in 215–17 of Abaris and Pythagoras before Phalaris likely comes from Apollonius of Tyana). This was suggested by Krische de soc. Pythag., p. 38, and is more definitively supported by Diels, Arch. f. Gesch. d. Philos. iii, 468; however, it cannot be absolutely proven—there's no evidence that Herakleides actually had Abaris meet Pythagoras. (Pythagoras in his speech to Abaris, Procl. in Tim. 141 D. may very well, but not necessarily, as Diels believes, refer to the Abaris of Herakleides.)—In any case, the connection between Abaris and Pythagoras is a later creation; it’s unclear if it could have happened or did happen as early as the Aristotelian work About the Pythagoreans.—In any event, the main idea here is that Abaris was not from a primordial past but came to Greece during historical times. Pindar indicates this took place Against Croesus, the king of Lydia (likely around the time of the Sardine Catch, Ol. 58, 3 = 546); "others" (according to Harp.) placed it earlier, in Ol. 21 = 696. It’s impossible to determine what the reasons were for these specific dates. Some might still see Abaris as a contemporary of Pythagoras by those who, along with Eusebios and Nikostratos ap. Harp., position him in Ol. 53 (in the 83rd Olympiad, as the figure in Harp. should be read and not γ Ol.; the correct reading is preserved from Harp. in Suid. Ἄβ.). However, this perspective isn’t, as Diels suggests, achieved by making Abaris forty years older than Pythagoras. (The prime of Pythagoras appears in Ol. 62—see Rh. Mus. 26, 570—and that, too, is the date—not Ol. 63—given by “Eusebius Chronica”, i.e., the Armenian version, tr., and the MSS. PEMR of Jerome.) Perhaps Abaris was seen as a contemporary of Phalaris, whose reign, according to one of the versions from Eusebios, began in Ol. 53, or 52, 3. Cf. Rh. Mus. 36, 567.

109 Ekstasis of Aristeas: τούτου φασὶ τὴν ψυχὴν, ὅταν ἐβούλετο, ἐξιέναι καὶ ἐπανιέναι πάλιν. Suid. Ἀριστέας. His body lies as if dead ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ ἐκδῦσα τοῦ σώματος ἐπλάζετο ἐν τῷ αἰθέρι κτλ. Max. Tyr. 16, 2, p. 288 R. (reperimus) Aristeae animum evolantem ex ore in Proconneso corvi effigie, Plin., NH. vii, 174 (very similar stories from elsewhere, Grimm, p. 1083 [and Baring-Gould, Myths of M.A.]). So, too, the Ἀριμάσπεια said that Aristeas reached the Issedones φοιβάλαμπτος γενόμενος (Hdt. iv, 13); which at least means in some strange way impossible for other men, i.e. in Apolline ecstasy (cf. above, n. 63, νυμφόληπτος, etc.; ἐν ἐκστάσει ἀποφοιβώμενος, P. Mag. Par., p. 63 Wess.). So, too, Max. Tyr. 38, 3, p. 222 ff., makes Aristeas describe how his ψυχή, καταλιποῦσα τὸ σῶμα had reached the Hyperboreans, etc. These accounts are not derived from Hdt. who on the contrary says that Arist. died in a fuller’s mill at Prokonnesos and that his body then disappeared and was seen by a man at Kyzikos. This would be translation of body and soul together not ἔκστασις of the soul alone. In this case Hdt. is probably inaccurate. In such cases of translation the point of the story, in fact its whole meaning, lies in the fact that the translated person has not died but that he has vanished without his soul being separated from his body, i.e. without dying; for normally in death the soul alone vanishes. This applies to all the cases of translation referred to in this book (see e.g. the story of the Hero Euthymos: above, chap. iv, n. 116; of Kleomedes, p. 129, above); and also to the legend of Romulus in Plu., Rom. 27–8, in which Plu. rightly finds much resemblance with the story of Aristeas as told by Hdt. It applies to the numerous stories of translation which, evidently after Greek models, were told of the Latin and Roman kings (see Preller, Röm. Mythol.2, p. 84 f., 704). It appears then that 329 Hdt, has combined two versions of the legend: one acc. to which Aristeas “died” (not only on this occasion but often), i.e. his soul separated itself from his body and had a life of its own; another in which his body and soul were “translated” together without his death. In either version Aristeas might meet with the man in Kyzikos: if he were translated, it would be his vanished body (cf. Romulus’ meeting Julius Proculus); but if his soul left his body behind as though lifeless then it would be the soul as εἴδωλον of its body that appeared to the man (as in the cases of Pythagoras and Apoll. Tyan. who were seen at two different places at the same time). This last story seems to be the real and primitive one; it is suggested by the above-mentioned accounts of the ἔκστασις of the soul of Aristeas and it was so understood by the authority (apparently Thpomp.) whom Apollon., Mirab. 2, is following.

109 Ekstasis of Aristeas: This one says that the soul could leave whenever it wanted and then come back again.. Suid. Aristeas. His body appears lifeless but the soul, after leaving the body, was drifting in the ether, etc. Max. Tyr. 16, 2, p. 288 R. We see Aristeas' spirit flying out of his mouth as a raven from Proconneso., Plin., NH. vii, 174 (similar stories from other sources, Grimm, p. 1083 [and Baring-Gould, Myths of M.A.]). Likewise, the Arimaspeia reported that Aristeas reached the Issedones in a state of divine inspiration (Hdt. iv, 13); which at least suggests he experienced something impossible for others, in a sort of Apolline ecstasy (cf. above, n. 63, nympholeptos, etc.; in ecstasy, scared to leave, P. Mag. Par., p. 63 Wess.). Similarly, Max. Tyr. 38, 3, p. 222 ff., has Aristeas explain how his soul exiting the body reached the Hyperboreans, etc. These accounts are not based on Hdt., who states that Aristeas died at a fuller’s mill in Prokonnesos and that his body later disappeared and was seen by a man at Kyzikos. This would imply a translation of both body and soul together, not the excitement of the soul alone. In this case, Hdt. may be inaccurate. In stories of translation, the key point, indeed the entire meaning, lies in the fact that the translated person did not truly die but vanished without their soul separating from their body, i.e., without actually dying; typically in death, only the soul departs. This principle applies to all the cases of translation mentioned in this book (see e.g. the story of the Hero Euthymos: above, chap. iv, n. 116; of Kleomedes, p. 129, above); and also to the legend of Romulus in Plu., Rom. 27–8, where Plu. correctly finds many similarities with the story of Aristeas as described by Hdt. It relates to the many tales of translation that, clearly inspired by Greek models, were told about Latin and Roman kings (see Preller, Röm. Mythol.2, p. 84 f., 704). Thus, 329 it appears Hdt. combined two versions of the legend: one according to which Aristeas “died” (not just this time but often), implying his soul separated from the body and led an independent existence; the other where his body and soul were “translated” together without death. In either version, Aristeas might encounter the man in Kyzikos: if he were translated, it would be his vanished body (cf. Romulus’ meeting with Julius Proculus); but if his soul exited the body as though lifeless, it would be the soul as phantom of its body that appeared to the man (similar to the cases of Pythagoras and Apollonius of Tyana, who were seen in two different places at the same time). This final story seems to be the original and genuine one; it’s hinted at by the previously mentioned accounts of the euphoria of Aristeas' soul, and it was recognized as such by the authority (likely Thpomp.) whom Apollonius references in Mirab. 2.

110 Hdt. iv, 15, Thpomp. ap. Ath. 13, 605 C: the bronze laurel was set up κατὰ τὴν Ἀριστέα τοῦ Προκοννησίου ἐπιδημίαν ὅτε ἔφησεν ἐξ Ὑπερβορέων παραγεγονέναι. This is not said by Hdt. but is compatible with his account. Acc. to Hdt. Aristeas told the people of Metapontum that they alone of all the Italiots had been visited by Apollo and that he, Aristeas, had been in the god’s train in the shape of a raven (sacred to Apollo). This last feature allows us to conclude that Hdt., too, knew of the wanderings made by the soul of Aristeas while his body remained at home as though dead. The raven is clearly the soul of Aristeas: Plin., NH. vii, 174.—The ἐπιδημία of Aristeas in Metapontum fell acc. to Hdt.’s own calculation (ὡς συμβαλλόμενος . . . εὕρισκον) 240 years (not 230) after the second ἀφανισμός of Aristeas from Prokonnesos. As Aristeas had in his poem spoken of the beginning of the Kimmerian invasion (Hdt. iv, 13) his first ἀφανισμός cannot have been before 681 (the first year of Ardys’ reign, when the Kimmerian invasion began acc. to Hdt. i, 15: Prokonnesos was, too, first founded under Gyges: Str. 587). Taking this as a starting point (and it is the earliest admissible terminus) and subtracting 240 + 7 years (Hdt. iv, 14 fin.) we should arrive at the year 434. This, however, cannot possibly have been meant by Hdt. as the year of the miraculous presence of Aristeas in Metapontum. We seem to have one of Hdt.’s errors of calculation to which he is prone. We cannot indeed make out when exactly he intended to date the various scenes of the Aristeas story.—In any case, Hdt. never intended to make Aristeas the teacher of Homer, as Bergk following others thinks. He makes Homer’s flor. about 856: see Rh. Mus. 36, 397; and puts the Kimmerian invasion much later. Aristeas could only be regarded as teacher of Homer (Str. 639; Tat. Gr. 41) by those who made Homer a contemporary of the Kimmerian invasion, Thpomp. esp.: see Rh. Mus. 36, 559.—We do not know what grounds those Chronologists had who made Aristeas contemp. with Kroisos and Kyros and put his flor. in Ol. 58, 3 (Suid.). The reason may possibly have been “identification”—this is hardly likely—“or conjunction with Abaris” (Gutschmid ap. Niese, Hom. Schiffskat., p. 49, n.). Unfortunately nothing is known of such a conjunction with Abaris (very problematical conjectures by Crusius in Myth. Lex. i, 2814 f.). Possibly those who favoured this view held that the Ἀριμάσπεια had been foisted upon Aristeas; cf. D. H., Thuc. 23; π. ὕψους, 10, 4. This work was certainly regarded as having been composed at the time of the Kim. invasion. The historical reality of Aristeas was never doubted in antiquity and in spite of the many legends that gathered about his name there is no need for us to do so. The stories of Aristeas’ extremely prolonged lifetime (from the 330 Kim. invasion to the evidently much later period in which he really lived) appear to have been derived chiefly from fictions in the Ἀριμάσπεια which probably also gave reasons of a mysterious kind for this marvellous extension of his existence. We cannot tell whether Aristeas himself wrote the poem and provided his own halo of marvel or whether someone else, coming later, made use of this name so famous in legend. If there was any basis for the account in Suid. Πείσανδρος Πείσωνος fin. we might be justified in attributing the composition of the Ἀριμάσπεια to Aristeas himself. In any case the poem was already in existence at the beginning of the fifth century: it can hardly be doubted that Aeschylus modelled upon it his picture of the griffins and Arimaspoi in Pr. 803 ff.

110 Hdt. iv, 15, Thpomp. ap. Ath. 13, 605 C: the bronze laurel was set up During the plague in Proconnesus, when it was said to have come from the Hyperboreans.. This isn't stated by Hdt., but it fits with his account. According to Hdt., Aristeas told the people of Metapontum that they alone among all the Italiots had been visited by Apollo, and that he, Aristeas, had been in the god’s company in the form of a raven (sacred to Apollo). This detail leads us to conclude that Hdt. also knew of Aristeas's soul wandering while his body stayed at home as if dead. The raven clearly represents the soul of Aristeas: Plin., NH. vii, 174.—The Epidemic of Aristeas in Metapontum occurred according to Hdt.’s own calculation (As I was suggesting... I was finding.) 240 years (not 230) after the second disappearance of Aristeas from Prokonnesos. Since Aristeas mentioned the start of the Kimmerian invasion in his poem (Hdt. iv, 13), his first Disappearance couldn't have been before 681 (the first year of Ardys’ reign, when the Kimmerian invasion began according to Hdt. i, 15: Prokonnesos was also first established under Gyges: Str. 587). Taking this as a starting point (and it’s the earliest acceptable date) and subtracting 240 + 7 years (Hdt. iv, 14 fin.), we would arrive at the year 434. However, this cannot possibly be what Hdt. meant regarding the year of the miraculous presence of Aristeas in Metapontum. We seem to have one of Hdt.’s calculation mistakes, which he is prone to. We can't ascertain exactly when he intended to date the various scenes of the Aristeas story.—In any case, Hdt. never intended to make Aristeas the teacher of Homer, as Bergk following others believes. He places Homer’s flor. around 856: see Rh. Mus. 36, 397; and dates the Kimmerian invasion much later. Aristeas could only be seen as Homer’s teacher (Str. 639; Tat. Gr. 41) by those who viewed Homer as a contemporary of the Kimmerian invasion, especially Thpomp.: see Rh. Mus. 36, 559.—We don’t know the reasons of those Chronologists who made Aristeas a contemporary of Kroisos and Kyros and dated his flor. in Ol. 58, 3 (Suid.). The rationale might possibly have been “identification”—though this seems unlikely—“or conjunction with Abaris” (Gutschmid ap. Niese, Hom. Schiffskat., p. 49, n.). Unfortunately, nothing is known about such a conjunction with Abaris (very questionable suggestions by Crusius in Myth. Lex. i, 2814 f.). It’s possible that those who supported this view believed that the Arimaseia had been attributed to Aristeas; cf. D. H., Thuc. 23; π. height, 10, 4. This work was certainly thought to have been composed during the time of the Kimmerian invasion. The historical existence of Aristeas was never questioned in antiquity, and despite the many legends surrounding his name, we have no need to do so. The tales of Aristeas’ extremely long life (from the 330 Kimmerian invasion to the clearly much later period in which he actually lived) seem to have originated mainly from fictions in the Arimaspea, which probably also provided mysterious reasons for this remarkable extension of his existence. We cannot determine whether Aristeas himself wrote the poem and created his own aura of wonder or whether someone else, later on, exploited this name so well-known in legend. If there was any foundation for the account in Suid. Peisander son of Peison fin., we might justify attributing the composition of the Arimaspea to Aristeas himself. In any case, the poem was already in circulation at the beginning of the fifth century: it’s hard to doubt that Aeschylus modeled his depiction of the griffins and Arimaspoi in Pr. 803 ff. upon it.

111 Dexikreon in Samos, Plu., Q. Gr. 54.—Polyaratos of Thasos, Phormion of Sparta: Cl. Al., Str. i, 21, p. 399 P. Phormion is better known because of his marvellous experiences: Paus. 3, 16, 2–3; Thpomp. ap. Suid. Φορ.: see Meineke, Com.2, p. 1227 ff.—At the end of the above-mentioned enumeration of μάντεις ap. Clem. Al., a certain Ἐμπεδότιμος ὁ Συρακόσιος is given. Varro ap. Serv. on G. i, 34, tells of the ecstatic vision of this Empedotimos: after being a quadam potestate divina mortalis aspectus detersus he saw in the sky inter cetera three gates and three ways (to the gods and the kingdom of the dead). Varro is evidently quoting the account of some ancient authority not a work of Empedot. himself; but in any case this vision is the source of what Empedotimos had to say about the dwelling-place of the souls in the Milky Way: Suid. Ἐμπεδ., Ἰουλιανός: Rh. Mus. 32, 331, n. 1; cf. Damasc. ap. Philop. in Arist. Meteor., p. 117, 10 Hayd. Suid. Ἐμπεδ. calls (probably a guess) the work in which Empedot. gave an account of his visions περὶ φυσικῆς ἀκροάσεως. (Because E. also brought back with him information about the future life, the usual stories about the subterranean chamber, etc., are transferred to him by Sch. ad Greg. Nz., C. vii, 286 = Eudocia, p. 682, 15.) Apart from this no one gives us any information about the personality of Emped. except Jul., Ep. 295 B., p. 379, 13 ff. H., who tells us how he was murdered but the gods avenged him upon his murderers. This, however, rests upon a confusion (either Julian’s or his copyist’s) with Ἑρμότιμος whose murderers were punished in the next world acc. to Plu., Gen. Socr. 22, p. 592 C. The above-mentioned story of the souls and the Milky Way was also known to Julian (see Suid. Ἰουλ.): his source being Herakleides Pont. (who also probably supplied it to others, e.g. Noumenios ap. Procl. in Rp. ii, p. 129 Kroll, Porph., Iamb. ap. Stob., Ecl. i, p. 378, 12 W., and even earlier, Cicero, Somn. 15–16). No older source of this fancy is known: “Pythagoras” mentioned as its authority by Julian, etc., only takes us back again to Herakleides. All that we know up to the present about it suggests the suspicion that the very existence and history of this remarkably little-known “great Empedotimos” may have been a simple invention of Herakleides’, who may have made use of him in one of his dialogues to add interest and importance to some of his own fancies. But now we come upon something more detailed about the story told by Herakleides of the vision in which Emped. (μετὰ τοῦ σώματος, p. 122, 2) beheld πᾶσαν τὴν περὶ τῶν ψυχῶν ἀληθείαν: Procl. in Rp. ii, 119, 21 Kroll. From this passage it is quite clear that Empedotimos is simply a figure in a dialogue by Herakleides, and no more existed in reality than Er the son of Armenios or Thespesios of Soli, or than their prototype Kleonymos of Athens ap. Klearchos of Soli (Rh. Mus. 32, 335). 331

111 Dexikreon in Samos, Plu., Q. Gr. 54.—Polyaratos of Thasos, Phormion of Sparta: Cl. Al., Str. i, 21, p. 399 P. Phormion is better known because of his amazing experiences: Paus. 3, 16, 2–3; Thpomp. ap. Suid. Φορ.: see Meineke, Com.2, p. 1227 ff.—At the end of the previously mentioned list of oracles ap. Clem. Al., a certain Empedotimos the Syracusan is mentioned. Varro ap. Serv. on G. i, 34, describes the ecstatic vision of this Empedotimos: after being by a certain divine power, the mortal gaze is turned away he saw in the sky inter cetera three gates and three paths (to the gods and the afterlife). Varro seems to be quoting from an ancient source rather than a work of Empedotimos himself; still, this vision inspired what Empedotimos had to say about the souls' homes in the Milky Way: Suid. Ἐμπεδ., Ἰουλιανός: Rh. Mus. 32, 331, n. 1; cf. Damasc. ap. Philop. in Arist. Meteor., p. 117, 10 Hayd. Suid. Ἐμπεδ. likely refers to a work where Empedotimos detailed his visions about natural listening. (Because E. also brought back information about the afterlife, the usual tales about the underworld, etc., are attributed to him by Sch. ad Greg. Nz., C. vii, 286 = Eudocia, p. 682, 15.) Aside from this, no one provides any information about Empedotimos's character except Julian, Ep. 295 B., p. 379, 13 ff. H., who tells how he was murdered, but the gods avenged him against his killers. This, however, likely stems from a mix-up (either Julian’s or his copyist’s) with Hermotimos, whose murderers were punished in the afterlife according to Plu., Gen. Socr. 22, p. 592 C. The previously mentioned story of the souls and the Milky Way was also known to Julian (see Suid. Ἰουλ.): his source being Herakleides Pont. (who probably also provided it to others, e.g. Noumenios ap. Procl. in Rp. ii, p. 129 Kroll, Porph., Iamb. ap. Stob., Ecl. i, p. 378, 12 W., and even earlier, Cicero, Somn. 15–16). No earlier source for this idea is known: “Pythagoras” mentioned as its reference by Julian, etc., merely brings us back to Herakleides. Everything we know up to now suggests that the very existence and story of this notably obscure “great Empedotimos” might have been a simple invention by Herakleides, who may have used him in one of his dialogues to lend interest and significance to some of his own ideas. But now we find something more detailed about the story told by Herakleides regarding the vision in which Empedotimos (with the body, p. 122, 2) experienced The entire truth about souls: Procl. in Rp. ii, 119, 21 Kroll. From this excerpt, it's quite obvious that Empedotimos is simply a character in a dialogue by Herakleides, and he existed no more in reality than Er the son of Armenios or Thespesios of Soli, or their prototype Kleonymos of Athens ap. Klearchos of Soli (Rh. Mus. 32, 335). 331

112 Apollon., Mirab. 3 (prob. from Thpomp.); Plin., NH. vii, 174; Plu., Gen. Soc. 22, p. 592 C (Ἑρμόδωρος—the same copyist’s error occurs in Procl. in Rp. ii, 113, 24 Kroll); Luc., Enc. Musc. 7; Tert., An. 2; 44 (from Soranos; cf. Cael. Aur., Tard. 1, 3, 5); Or., Cels. iii, 3; 32. The same Hermotimos of Klazomenai is undoubtedly the person meant when a Ἑρμότιμος is mentioned among the earlier incarnations of the soul of Pythagoras, even when the country of the person in question is not named (as in D.L. viii, 5 f.; Porph., VP. 45; Tert., An. 28) or is incorrectly called a Milesian (e.g. in Hipp., RH. 1, 2, p. 12 D.-S.). A quite untenable theory about this Hermot. is given by Göttling, Opusc. Ac. 211.—Acc. to Plin. the enemies who finally burnt the body of Hermot. (with the connivance of his wife) were the Cantharidae—probably the name of a γένος hostile to Hermot.—There is a remarkably similar story in Indian tradition: see Rh. Mus. 26, 559 n. But I no longer suspect any historical connexion between this story and that of Hermot.; the same preconceptions have led in India as in Greece to the invention of the same tale. Similar conceptions in German beliefs: Grimm, 1803, n. 650.

112 Apollon., Mirab. 3 (likely from Thpomp.); Plin., NH. vii, 174; Plu., Gen. Soc. 22, p. 592 C (Hermodoros—the same copyist error is found in Procl. in Rp. ii, 113, 24 Kroll); Luc., Enc. Musc. 7; Tert., An. 2; 44 (from Soranos; see Cael. Aur., Tard. 1, 3, 5); Or., Cels. iii, 3; 32. The same Hermotimos of Klazomenai is definitely the person referred to when a Hermontimos is mentioned among the earlier incarnations of the soul of Pythagoras, even when the person's origin isn't specified (as in D.L. viii, 5 f.; Porph., VP. 45; Tert., An. 28) or is mistakenly identified as a Milesian (e.g. in Hipp., RH. 1, 2, p. 12 D.-S.). Göttling presents an untenable theory about this Hermot. in Opusc. Ac. 211.—According to Plin., the enemies who ultimately burned Hermot.'s body (with his wife's complicity) were the Cantharidae—likely the name of a genus hostile to Hermot.—There's a remarkably similar story in Indian tradition: see Rh. Mus. 26, 559 n. However, I no longer believe there's any historical connection between this story and that of Hermot.; similar assumptions have led to the creation of the same tale in both India and Greece. Comparable ideas can also be found in German beliefs: Grimm, 1803, n. 650.

113 Hence the legend that Apollo after the murder of Python was purified not at Tempe, as the story generally went, but in Krete at Tarrha by Karmanor: Paus. 2, 7, 7; 2, 30, 3; 10, 6, 7 (the hexameters of Phemonoë); 10, 16, 5. The καθάρσια for Zeus were brought from Krete: Orph. fr. 183 Ab.; cf. the oracle ap. Oinom. Eus., PE. 5, 31, 2: K. O. Müller, Introd. Scient. Myth. 98.—Krete an ancient seat of mantikê: the Lokrian Onomakritos, teacher of Thaletas, lived in Krete κατὰ τέχνην μαντικήν, Arist., Pol. 1274a, 25.

113 So, the story goes that after killing Python, Apollo was purified not at Tempe, as most accounts suggest, but in Crete at Tarrha by Karmanor: Paus. 2, 7, 7; 2, 30, 3; 10, 6, 7 (the hexameters of Phemonoë); 10, 16, 5. The catharsis for Zeus were brought from Crete: Orph. fr. 183 Ab.; cf. the oracle ap. Oinom. Eus., PE. 5, 31, 2: K. O. Müller, Introd. Scient. Myth. 98.—Crete was an ancient center of mantikê: the Lokrian Onomakritos, who taught Thaletas, lived in Crete artistic divination, Arist., Pol. 1274a, 25.

114 See above (pp. 96 f). As one who had been initiated into the orgiastic cult of Zeus in Krete (Str. 468), Epimenides is called νέος Κούρης: Plu., Sol. 12; D.L. i, 115. He is called ἱερεὺς Διὸς καὶ Ῥέας in Sch. Clem. Al. iv, p. 103 Klotz.

114 See above (pp. 96 f). As someone who was initiated into the orgiastic cult of Zeus in Crete (Str. 468), Epimenides is referred to as new youth: Plu., Sol. 12; D.L. i, 115. He is called priest of Zeus and Rhea in Sch. Clem. Al. iv, p. 103 Klotz.

115 Legend of the ἄλιμον of E.: H. Smyrn. 18. D.L. i, 114. Plu. 7 Sap. 14. He was prepared for it by living on ἀσφόδελος, μαλάχη and the edible root of a kind of σκίλλα (Thphr., HP. 7, 12, 1). All these are sacred to the χθόνιοι (on ἀσφόδελος, see partic. AB. 457, 5 ff., which goes back to Aristarchos; and Hsch. s.v.), and were only eaten occasionally by the poor: Hes., Op. 41.

115 Legend of the nonsense of E.: H. Smyrn. 18. D.L. i, 114. Plu. 7 Sap. 14. He was prepared for it by living on asphodel, mallow and the edible root of a kind of σκίλλα (Thphr., HP. 7, 12, 1). All these are sacred to the Underworld beings (on asphodel, see partic. AB. 457, 5 ff., which goes back to Aristarchos; and Hsch. s.v.), and were only eaten occasionally by the poor: Hes., Op. 41.

116 οὗ (Ἐπιμενίδου) λόγος ὡς ἐξίοι ἡ ψυχὴ ὅποσον ἤθελε χρόνον καὶ πάλιν εἰσῄει ἐν τῷ σώματι, Suid. Ἐπιμεν. This is possibly the meaning of προσποιηθῆναι (λέγεται) πολλάκις ἀναβεβιωκέναι, D.L. i, 114. Epimenides like others μετὰ θάνατον ἐν τοῖς ζῶσι γενόμενος, Procl. in Rp. ii, 113, 24 Kr. The story of his prolonged sleep in the cave is an example of a widespread fairy-tale motif; see Rh. Mus. 33, 209, n. 2; 35, 160. In the case of Epimenides it has been exaggerated beyond all bounds and attached to him as a sort of popular mode of expressing his long ἐκστάσεις. This cave-sleep is interpreted as a state of ekstasis by Max. Tyr. 16, 1: ἐν τοῦ Διὸς τοῦ Δικταίου (see above, chap. iii, n. 23) τῷ ἄντρῳ κείμενος ὕπνῳ βαθεῖ ἔτη συχνά (cf. the ψυχή of Hermot. which ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος πλαζομένη ἀποδημεῖ ἐπὶ πολλὰ ἔτη, Apollon., Mir. 3) ὄναρ ἔφη ἐντυχεῖν αὐτὸς θεοῖς κτλ. Thus his ὄνειρος became διδάσκαλος to him, Max. Tyr. 38, 3; cf. Sch. Luc., Tim. 6, 110 Rb.

116 where (Epimenides)The saying goes that the soul can remain as long as it wishes and then re-enters the body., Suid. Stay strong. This might be the meaning of to assert (it is said)to have come back many times, D.L. i, 114. Epimenides, like others, after death became one of the living, Procl. in Rp. ii, 113, 24 Kr. The story of his long sleep in the cave is an example of a popular fairy-tale theme; see Rh. Mus. 33, 209, n. 2; 35, 160. In the case of Epimenides, it has been exaggerated to the extreme and turned into a common way of expressing his long trances. This cave-sleep is interpreted as a state of ekstasis by Max. Tyr. 16, 1: in the cave of Zeus of Dictaeus (see above, chap. iii, n. 23) lying in the cave in a deep sleep for many years (cf. the spirit of Hermot. which separating from the body travels for many years, Apollon., Mir. 3) he said he met the gods and so on. Thus his dream became a teacher to him, Max. Tyr. 38, 3; cf. Sch. Luc., Tim. 6, 110 Rb.

117 σοφὸς περὶ τὰ θεῖα (δεινὸς τὰ θεῖα, Max. Tyr. 38, 3) τὴν ἐνθουσιαστικὴν σοφίαν, Plu., Sol. 12. Epimen. is put among the ἔνθεοι μάντεις, Bakis and the Sibyl, by Cic., Div. 1, 34.—Prolonged solitude is a preparation for the business of the ecstatic seer (cf. Plu.’s story of a sort of counterpart to Epimenides, Def. Or. 21, p. 421 B). There 332 is still another fragment remaining from the story of Epim. on this head in the account given by Theopompos (though he makes too rationalistic a use of it): Epim. did not sleep all that time ἀλλὰ χρόνον τινὰ ἐκπατῆσαι, ἀσχολούμενον περὶ ῥιζοτομίαν (which he needed as an ἰατρόμαντις); D.L. i, 112. We cannot help being reminded of the way in which the Angekok of Greenland, after prolonged and profound solitude, severe fasting and concentration of thought, makes himself into a magician (Cranz, Hist. of Greenland, p. 194). In the same way the North American Indian stays for weeks in a solitary wood and consciously prepares himself for his visions. At last the real world falls away from him, the imagined world of his visions becomes the real one and seems almost palpable; till finally in complete ecstasy he rushes out of his hiding place. Nor would it be hard to find analogies in the religion of civilized peoples.

117 wise about the divine(fearsome gods, Max. Tyr. 38, 3) the enthusiastic wisdom, Plu., Sol. 12. Epimenides is mentioned among the divine prophets, along with Bakis and the Sibyl, by Cic., Div. 1, 34.—Extended solitude prepares one for the role of an ecstatic seer (see Plu.’s story about a counterpart to Epimenides, Def. Or. 21, p. 421 B). There 332 is another fragment from the story of Epimenides in the account by Theopompos (though he interprets it too rationally): Epimenides did not sleep during that time But for a while, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ was preoccupied with root cutting. (which he needed as an medical oracle); D.L. i, 112. This reminds us of how the Angekok of Greenland, after extended and deep solitude, rigorous fasting, and focused thought, transforms into a magician (Cranz, Hist. of Greenland, p. 194). Similarly, the North American Indian spends weeks alone in the woods, consciously preparing for visions. Eventually, the real world fades away, the imagined world of his visions feels real and nearly tangible, until he finally bursts out of his hiding place in a state of complete ecstasy. It wouldn’t be difficult to find parallels in the religions of civilized societies.

118 Epim. is credited with prophecies of coming events: Pl., Lg. 642 D; D.L. i, 114, and also Cic., Div. i, 34. On the other hand, Arist., Rh. 3, 17, 10, has περὶ τῶν ἐσομένων οὐκ ἐμαντεύετο, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν γεγονότων μὲν ἀδήλων δέ which at least means discovering the grounds of an event—grounds known only to the god and the seer; e.g. the interpretation of a pestilence as the vengeance of the daimones for an ancient crime, etc. If only rational explanation were meant there would be no need for a μάντις.

118 Epimenides is recognized for his prophecies about future events: Plato, Lg. 642 D; Diogenes Laertius i, 114, and also Cicero, Div. i, 34. However, Aristotle, Rh. 3, 17, 10, states He did not predict what was to come, but he was uncertain about what had happened., which at least implies discovering the reasoning behind an event—reasoning known only to the god and the seer; for example, interpreting a plague as the punishment from the daimones for an old crime, etc. If only a rational explanation were intended, there would be no need for a prophet.

119 Delos: Plu., Sept. Sap. 14, p. 158 A. (There is no need to suppose that there has been any confusion between this μέγας καθαρμός by Epimenides and any other purification of Delos that happens to be better known to us—the Pisistratean or that of the year 426.) Epimenides πόλεις ἐκάθηρεν ἄλλας τε καὶ τὴν Ἀθηναίων, Paus. 1, 14, 4.

119 Delos: Plu., Sept. Sap. 14, p. 158 A. (There’s no need to think that there’s any mix-up between this great purification by Epimenides and any other purification of Delos that may be more familiar to us—the Pisistratean one or that from the year 426.) Epimenides He founded cities, including the one for the Athenians., Paus. 1, 14, 4.

120 The purification of Athens from the Kylonian ἄγος by Epimenides is now further confirmed by the Aristotelian Ἀθ. πολ. 1 fin. This admittedly is not a very strong guarantee of its historical truth; but no strong guarantee is required to dispose of the doubts recently raised as to the historical truth of the story that Athens was purified by Epimenides, and even of Epimenides’ very existence. There is no reason at all for such a doubt. The fact that the historical figure of Epimenides has been almost entirely obscured behind the veil of fable and romance gives us of course no right to doubt his existence (or what would be the fate of Pythagoras, Pherekydes of Syros, and of many others?); and further, because some parts of the story of Epim. and his life are fabulous, to doubt the truth of his entirely non-fabulous purification of the Athenians from murder is a monstrous inversion of true historical method.—No exact dating for the purification of Athens is to be derived from the Aristotelian account of the event, as the English ed. (Kenyon) of the Ἀθ. πολ. rightly observes. It certainly does not follow (as e.g. Bauer takes for granted in his Forsch. zu Arist. Ἀθ. πολ. 41) that the purification took place before the archonship of Drakon (Ol. 39). Furthermore, it is probable that in Plu., Sol. 12, everything that comes before τοὺς ὅρους (p. 165, 19, Sint. ed. min.) is taken from Aristotle (though perhaps not directly). In this case Aristotle, too, would be shown to have attributed to Solon the first suggestion that led to the condemnation of the ἐναγεῖς. In Plu., however, Solon is still far from having thoughts of his νομοθεσία, he is still only ἤδη δόξαν ἔχων c. 12 (not till c. 14 does his archonship begin). Solon’s archonship is put by Ἀθ. πολ. in the year 591/0 (c. 14, 1, where we should be careful to avoid arbitrary alteration of the figures); Suid. Σόλων, Eus., Chron. also date it in Ol. 47, and the same period is implied by Plu., Sol. 14, p. 168, 12. (Ἀθ. πολ. 333 13, 2, also brings the first archonship of Damasias to 582/1 = Ol. 49, 3: a date to which all other reliable tradition also points). The condemnation of the ἐναγεῖς and the purification of Athens by Epimenides thus took place some considerable time before 591. It is possible that Suid. gives the right date. s.v. Ἐπιμενίδης· ἐκάθηρε τὰς Ἀθήνας τοῦ Κυλωνείου ἄγους κατὰ τὴν μδ Ὀλυμπιάδα (604/1)—that in the Kirrhaian war there was an Ἀλκμαίων general of the Athenians offers no objection: Plu., Sol. 11. Suidas’ statement has not (as I once thought myself, with Bernhardy) been taken from D.L., nor is it to be corrected acc. to his text. D.L. i, 100, only brings forward the connexion between the purification and the Κυλώνειον ἄγος as the opinion of “some” (which in spite of the vagueness of expression must mean Neanthes ap. Ath. 602 C), while the real reason is said to be a λοιμός, and the purification (as in Eus. Chr.) is placed in Ol. 46; i.e. probably 46, 3, the traditional date of Solon’s legislation.—Plato, Lg. 642 DE, does not conflict with the story of the expiation of the Κυλ. ἄγος by Epimenides: his story that Epimen. was present in Athens in the year 500 and retarded the threatened Persian invasion for ten years is not intended to contest the truth of the tradition of the much earlier purification of Athens by Epimen. (“retarded”: so Clem. Al., Str. vi, 13, p. 755 P., understood Plato and prob. rightly; we often hear in legendary stories of the gods or their prophets retarding coming events which have been determined by fate; cf. Pl., Smp. 201 D; Hdt. i, 91; Ath. 602 B; Eus., PE. 5, 35, p. 233 BC; Vg., A. vii, 313 ff.; viii, 398 f.; and what Serv. ad loc. reports from the libri Acheruntici). How the same man could be living both at the end of the seventh and of the sixth centuries would have troubled Plato not at all—tradition attributed a miraculously long life to Ep. At any rate, it is quite impossible to base the chronology of Ep.’s life on the story in Plato. (It may have been suggested by a forged oracle made ex eventu after 490 and fathered on Epim., as Schultess suggests, De Epim. Crete, p. 47, 1877.)

120 The cleansing of Athens from the Kylonian ἄγος by Epimenides is now further supported by the Aristotelian Ἀθ. πολ. 1 fin. While this is not a very strong proof of its historical accuracy, a strong proof is not necessary to dismiss the recent doubts about the historical reality of the story that Athens was purified by Epimenides, and even about Epimenides' very existence. There is no reason to doubt this. The fact that the historical figure of Epimenides has been largely obscured by myth and legend does not give us cause to doubt his existence (or how would we view the fate of Pythagoras, Pherekydes of Syros, and many others?); and just because some aspects of the story of Epimenides and his life are legendary, to question the truth of his entirely non-legendary purification of the Athenians from murder is a gross misapplication of proper historical method. —No precise dating for the purification of Athens can be derived from the Aristotelian account of the event, as the English edition (Kenyon) of the Ἀθ. πολ. rightly notes. It certainly does not follow (as Bauer assumes in his Forsch. zu Arist. Ἀθ. πολ. 41) that the purification happened before Drakon's archonship (Ol. 39). Furthermore, it's likely that in Plutarch, Sol. 12, everything that comes before the terms (p. 165, 19, Sint. ed. min.) is derived from Aristotle (though perhaps not directly). In this case, Aristotle would also be shown to have credited Solon with the initial suggestion that led to the condemnation of the sacrificial. However, in Plutarch, Solon is still far from contemplating his legislation, and he is still only Already gaining fame c. 12 (not until c. 14 does his archonship commence). Solon's archonship is recorded in Ἀθ. πολ. as taking place in the year 591/0 (c. 14, 1, where we should be careful to avoid arbitrary changes to the figures); Suidas Solon, Eusebius, Chron. also date it in Ol. 47, and the same time frame is suggested by Plutarch, Sol. 14, p. 168, 12. (Ἀθ. πολ. 333 13, 2, also places the first archonship of Damasias in 582/1 = Ol. 49, 3: a date to which all other reliable traditions also point). Thus, the condemnation of the rituals and the purification of Athens by Epimenides likely occurred quite some time before 591. It's possible that Suidas gives the correct date: s.v. Epimenides: He purified Athens of the Cylonian plague during the 82nd Olympiad. (604/1)—that there was an Alcmaeon general of the Athenians during the Kirrhaian war does not contradict this: Plutarch, Sol. 11. Suidas' statement has not (as I once thought, along with Bernhardy) been derived from D.L., nor does it need to be corrected according to his text. D.L. i, 100, only mentions the connection between the purification and the Kilonian curse as the opinion of "some" (which, despite the vague expression, must refer to Neanthes ap. Ath. 602 C), while the genuine reason is said to be a plague, and the purification (as in Eusebius Chr.) is placed in Ol. 46; that is, likely 46, 3, the traditional date of Solon's legislation.—Plato, Lg. 642 DE, does not contradict the story of the expiation of the Cyl. sacred by Epimenides: his account that Epimenides was in Athens in the year 500 and delayed the anticipated Persian invasion for ten years isn't meant to dispute the truth of the earlier tradition of the cleansing of Athens by Epimenides. ("Delayed": so Clement of Alexandria, Str. vi, 13, p. 755 P., understood Plato, and probably correctly; we often hear in legendary tales of the gods or their prophets delaying events that have been predetermined by fate; cf. Plato, Smp. 201 D; Herodotus i, 91; Ath. 602 B; Eusebius, PE. 5, 35, p. 233 BC; Vergil, A. vii, 313 ff.; viii, 398 f.; and what Servius reports from the libri Acheruntici). The idea that the same man could be alive at both the end of the seventh and the sixth centuries would not have bothered Plato at all—tradition assigned a miraculously long life to Epimenides. In any case, it's completely impossible to establish the chronology of Epimenides’ life based on the story in Plato. (It may have been suggested by a forged oracle created in retrospect after 490 and attributed to Epimenides, as Schultess posits, De Epim. Crete, p. 47, 1877.)

121 Details of the expiation ceremonies: D.L. i, 111–12; Neanthes ap. Ath. 602 C. It is not the human sacrifice but the sentimental interpretation of Neanth. that Polemon (Ath. 602 F.) declares to be fictitious. They are invariably sacrifices to the χθόνια that Epim. institutes. Thus (as Abaris founded a temple at Sparta for Κόρη σώτειρα) he founded at Athens, evidently as the concluding part of the purification, τὰ ἱερὰ τῶν σεμνῶν θεῶν, i.e. of the Erinyes: D.L. i, 112.

121 Details of the atonement ceremonies: D.L. i, 111–12; Neanthes ap. Ath. 602 C. It isn’t the human sacrifice but rather the emotional interpretation by Neanth. that Polemon (Ath. 602 F.) claims is fictional. These are always sacrifices to the Underworld that Epim. establishes. Similarly (as Abaris built a temple at Sparta for Savior daughter), he established one in Athens, clearly as a final part of the purification, the sacred things of the venerated gods, i.e. of the Erinyes: D.L. i, 112.

122 Such a connexion must at least be intended when Aristeas is brought to Metapontum and Phormion to Kroton, both important centres of the Pythagorean society. Aristeas, too, as well as Abaris, Epimenides, etc., is one of the favourite figures of the Pythagoreans: see Iamb., VP. 138.

122 This connection must be intended when Aristeas is taken to Metapontum and Phormion to Kroton, both key centers of the Pythagorean community. Aristeas, along with Abaris, Epimenides, and others, is a favorite figure among the Pythagoreans: see Iamb., VP. 138.

123 It would certainly be necessary to deny to Epimenides the “Theogony” that the whole of antiquity read and quoted under the name of Epimenides without once expressing a doubt, if the figments of that Theogony really contained borrowings from the teaching of Anaximenes or, even worse, from the rhapsodical Theogony of Orpheus, as Kern, de Orphei Ep. Pher. Theog. 66 ff. maintains. But in the first place a few vague resemblances are not enough to show any connexion between Epimenides and those others. In the second, supposing the connexion proved, Epimenides need not necessarily have been the borrower. In any case, such alleged borrowings do not oblige us to advance the period when Ep. lived from the end of 334 the seventh to the end of the sixth century. If they really exist then we should rather have to conclude that the Theogony is itself a forgery of a much later date.

123 It would definitely be necessary to reject the idea that Epimenides is the author of the “Theogony,” which the entire ancient world read and cited under his name without ever raising a doubt, if the themes in that Theogony actually borrowed from Anaximenes's teachings or, even worse, from the poetic Theogony of Orpheus, as Kern, de Orphei Ep. Pher. Theog. 66 ff. claims. But first of all, a few vague similarities aren't enough to prove any connection between Epimenides and those others. Secondly, even if a connection is established, it doesn’t necessarily mean that Epimenides was the one who borrowed. In any case, such supposed borrowings do not force us to move the period when Ep. lived from the end of 334 the seventh century to the end of the sixth century. If they really exist, we should instead conclude that the Theogony itself is a forgery from a much later time.

124 The possibility of theoretical activity in the case of these men is often implied in the statements of later writers; e.g. when the name is given to Epimenides (D.S. 5, 80, 4) or Abaris (Apollon., Mir. 4); or when Aristeas is called an ἀνὴρ φιλόσοφος (Max. Tyr. 38, 3, p. 222 R.).

124 The possibility of theoretical activity for these individuals is often suggested in later writers' statements; for example, when Epimenides is mentioned (D.S. 5, 80, 4) or Abaris (Apollon., Mir. 4); or when Aristeas is referred to as an philosopher man (Max. Tyr. 38, 3, p. 222 R.).

125 Arist., Meta. 1, 3, p. 948b, 19 f.

125 Arist., Meta. 1, 3, p. 948b, 19 f.

126 Check __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

127 See above, chap. i, n. 41. Archiloch. fr. 12: κείνου κεφαλὴν καὶ χαρίεντα μέλη Ἥφαιστος καθαροῖσιν ἐν εἵμασιν ἀμφεπονήθη. E., Or. 40 f.: the slain Klytaimnestra πυρὶ καθήγνισται δέμας and Sch. πάντα γὰρ καθαιρεῖ τὸ πῦρ, καὶ ἁγνὰ δοκεῖ εἶναι τὰ καιόμενα, τὰ δὲ ἄταφα μεμιασμένα. E., Sup. 1211: . . . ἵν’ αὐτῶν (those who are being buried) σώμαθ’ ἡγνίσθη πυρί; cf. ἅγνισον πυρσῷ μέλαθρον, IT. 1216. On a grave inscr. from Attica (Epigr. Gr. 104): ἐνθάδε Διάλογος καθαρῷ πυρὶ γυῖα καθήρας . . . ᾤχετ’ ἐς ἀθάνατους—evidently modelled on ancient ideas; cf. also ib. 109, 5 (CIA. iii, 1325). Those, too, who are struck by lightning (see Appendix i) are purified from all earthly taint by the holiest sort of πῦρ καθάρσιον (E., IA. 1112; καθαρσίῳ φλογί, E., Hel. 869) and go straight πρὸς ἀθανάτους. Iamb., Myst. v, 12, also explains how fire τὰ προσαγόμενα καθαίρει καὶ ἀπολύει τῶν ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ δεσμῶν, ἀφομοιοῖ τοῖς θεοῖς, etc.

127 See above, chap. i, n. 41. Archiloch. fr. 12: His head and beautiful limbs were wrapped in pure robes from Hephaestus.. E., Or. 40 f.: the slain Klytaimnestra has been burned by fire and Sch. Fire destroys everything, and the things that burn appear pristine, while those that are unburied are tainted.. E., Sup. 1211: . . . of them (those who are being buried) their bodies have been cleansed by fire; cf. purify the house with fire, IT. 1216. On a grave inscription from Attica (Epigr. Gr. 104): Here lies Dialogos, his bones cleansed by fire... he has joined the immortals.—clearly modeled on ancient ideas; cf. also ib. 109, 5 (CIA. iii, 1325). Those also who are struck by lightning (see Appendix i) are purified from all earthly contamination by the most sacred type of cleansing fire (E., IA. 1112; with cleansing fire, E., Hel. 869) and go directly to the immortals. Iamb., Myst. v, 12, also explains how fire purifies and frees what is brought to it from the constraints of matter, making them like the gods, etc.

128 Cf. also Pl., Lg. 677 DE; Plu., Fac. Orb. Lun. 25, p. 940 C.

128 See also Plato, Law 677 DE; Plutarch, On the Face in the Moon 25, p. 940 C.

CHAPTER X

THE ORPHICS

The earliest authority who mentions Orphic sects and their practices is Herodotos (ii, 81), who calls attention to the correspondence between certain sacerdotal and ascetic ordinances of the Egyptian priesthood, and the “Orphic and Bacchic” mysteries. The latter, he says, are really Egyptian and Pythagorean, or in other words they were founded by Pythagoras or Pythagoreans upon Egyptian models; and thus, in the opinion of the historian, they cannot have come into existence before the last decade of the sixth century. Herodotos then, either in Athens or elsewhere, had heard during his journeys of certain private societies who by calling themselves after the name of Orpheus, the prototype of Thracian song so well known to legend, recognized the origin of their peculiar cult and creed in the mountains of Thrace, and did honour to Bakchos the Thracian god. The fact that the Greek Orphics did indeed worship Dionysos, the lord of life and death, before all other gods, is clearly shown by the remains of the theological poems that originated in their midst. Orpheus himself, as founder of the Orphic sect, is actually said to have been the founder also of the Dionysiac initiation-mysteries.1

The earliest authority who talks about Orphic groups and their practices is Herodotus (ii, 81), who notes the similarity between some rituals of the Egyptian priesthood and the “Orphic and Bacchic” mysteries. He claims that the latter are actually rooted in Egyptian and Pythagorean traditions, meaning they were established by Pythagoras or his followers based on Egyptian models; therefore, according to the historian, they must have emerged no earlier than the last decade of the sixth century. Herodotus, either in Athens or elsewhere, learned during his travels about certain private societies that, by naming themselves after Orpheus, the legendary Thracian figure known for song, acknowledged the origins of their unique beliefs and practices in the mountains of Thrace, and honored Bacchus, the Thracian god. The fact that the Greek Orphics indeed worshipped Dionysus, the god of life and death, above all other deities, is clearly demonstrated by the remnants of the theological poems that originated among them. Orpheus himself, as the founder of the Orphic sect, is actually said to have also been the founder of the Dionysian initiation-mysteries.1

This gathering-together in the name of Orpheus for the purpose of offering a special worship to Dionysos was, then, the work of sects who, in private association, practised a cult which the public and official worship of the state either did not know of or disdained. There were many such associations, and of very varied character, which kept themselves aloof from the organized religion of the community, and were tolerated by the state.2 As a rule, they were “foreign gods”3 who were thus worshipped; and generally by foreigners who thus kept up the special worship of their own homes, though they did not always exclude natives of their adopted country. Now, Dionysos, the god of the Orphic sects, had for a long time ceased to be a foreigner in Greek countries; since his arrival from Thrace he had been refined and matured under the humanizing sun of Greece, until he had become a Greek god, and a worthy associate of the Greek Olympos. It is possible, however, that in this process, the old Thracian god may have seemed to his original worshippers to have lost his real 336 character, and they may on that account have joined together to offer, in separation from the official worship, a special cult in which all the old ideas of the national religion should be preserved unaltered. A secondary wave of influence thus broke upon the long-since-Hellenized god, the Thracian Dionysos in Greece, and this wave the official worship either had not the power or lacked the will to assimilate. It was therefore left to special sects who honoured the god after their own private laws. Whether indeed they were Thracians who, as in the similar case of the unmodified worship of Bendis,4 or Kotytto, thus reinstituted their ancient and national worship of Dionysos in Greek countries, we cannot with certainty tell; but this special cult would certainly not have achieved the importance it did in Greek life if it had not been joined by Greek adherents brought up in the native conceptions of Greek piety, who under the name of “Orphics” once more adapted the Thracian god to Greek modes of thought—though this new adaptation differed from the previous assimilation of the god by the official worship of the state. We have no reason for believing that Orphic sects were formed in Greek states before the second half of the sixth century,5 that critical age of transition when in so many places primitive and mythological modes of thought were developing into a theosophy, which in its turn was making an effort to become a philosophy. The Orphic religious poetry is itself clearly marked by this effort—for in Orphism it never became more than an effort and never succeeded in reaching its goal.

This gathering in the name of Orpheus, aimed at providing special worship to Dionysos, was the effort of sects that practiced a private cult unknown or disregarded by the official state religion. There were numerous such groups, varying widely, that distanced themselves from the organized religion of the community and were tolerated by the state. 2 Typically, they worshipped “foreign gods” 3 and were usually composed of foreigners who maintained the essential worship of their homelands, although they did not strictly exclude locals. Dionysos, the deity of the Orphic sects, had long since stopped being considered foreign in Greek territories; since his introduction from Thrace, he had been refined and matured under Greece's nurturing sun, becoming a Greek god and a fitting companion of the Greek Olympos. However, it's possible that in this transformation, the ancient Thracian god may have seemed to his original worshippers to have lost his true essence, prompting them to come together to offer a special cult separate from the official worship, where all the traditional aspects of their national religion would remain intact. A subsequent wave of influence thus interacted with the long-ago Hellenized god, the Thracian Dionysos in Greece, a wave that the official worship either couldn’t absorb or chose not to. Hence, it fell to specific sects to honor the god according to their own personal practices. It’s uncertain whether they were Thracians, who, similar to the case of the unchanged worship of Bendis, 4 or Kotytto, reinstated their ancient national worship of Dionysos in Greek territories, but this particular cult certainly wouldn’t have gained the prominence it did in Greek life without the involvement of Greek followers raised in the traditional views of Greek spirituality. These followers, known as “Orphics,” adapted the Thracian god to Greek ways of thinking—although this new adaptation was different from how the god was previously integrated into the state’s official worship. We have no indication that Orphic sects emerged in Greek states before the second half of the sixth century, 5 a pivotal period of transition when, in many areas, primitive and mythological thought was evolving into a theosophy, which was themselves striving to become a philosophy. Orphic religious poetry distinctly reflects this endeavor—though in Orphism, it never became more than an attempt and never fully achieved its aim.

The exact point of origin of this combined movement of religion and theosophy, the various steps and manner of its development remain hidden from us. Athens was a centre of Orphism; it does not therefore follow that Orphism had its origin there, any more than had the multifarious tendencies and activities in art, poetry, and science that at about the same period flowed together, and as though driven by an unseen intellectual current, found their meeting place at Athens. Onomakritos, we are told, the giver of oracles in the court of Peisistratos “founded the secret worship of Dionysos”.6 This appears to refer to the first founding of an Orphic sect at Athens; and we meet with the name of Onomakritos among the authors of Orphic poems. But the real authorship of these poems is far more often ascribed to certain men of Southern Italy and Sicily, who can be more or less clearly connected7 with the Pythagorean societies which were flourishing in those districts about the last decades of the sixth and the first of the fifth centuries. 337

The exact origin of this combination of religion and theosophy, as well as the specific steps and ways it developed, remains a mystery to us. Athens was a hub for Orphism; however, this doesn’t mean that Orphism started there, just as the diverse influences and activities in art, poetry, and science that emerged around the same time didn’t necessarily originate in Athens either. These various elements seemed to converge in Athens, as if influenced by an unseen intellectual force. We are told that Onomakritos, the oracle provider at Peisistratos' court, “founded the secret worship of Dionysos.” This seems to refer to the establishment of an Orphic sect in Athens, and Onomakritos is cited among the authors of Orphic poems. However, the true authorship of these poems is often attributed to certain individuals from Southern Italy and Sicily, who can be more or less clearly linked to the Pythagorean communities thriving in those regions during the late sixth and early fifth centuries. 337

It seems certain that in Southern Italy at that time, Orphic societies were already in existence—for whom else can these writers have intended their “Orphic” poems? In any case we must take it as certain that the correspondence of Orphic and Pythagorean doctrine on the subject of the soul is not purely accidental. Did Pythagoras when he came to Italy (about 532) find Orphic societies already settled in Kroton and Metapontum, and did he associate himself with their ideas? Or did the “Orphic” sectaries (as Herodotos imagined8) owe their inspiration to Pythagoras and his disciples? The various cross-currents of reciprocal influence can no longer be disentangled by us, but if the Pythagoreans were the sole creditors in the bargain we should undoubtedly find the whole body of Orphic doctrine thoroughly permeated with conceptions that belong exclusively to the Pythagorean school. In the wreckage of the Orphic poems, however, except for a few negligible traces of the Pythagorean mystic theory of numbers,9 we find nothing that must necessarily have been derived by the Orphics from Pythagorean sources.10 Least of all did they need to derive the doctrine of the migration of souls and its application from this source. It is possible, therefore, that it was the independently developed Orphic doctrine which exerted an influence upon Pythogoras and his adherents in Southern Italy; just as it was a ready-made Orphic teaching (and that, too, perhaps, brought from Southern Italy) with which Onomakritos, the founder of the Orphic sects at Athens, associated himself—about the same time as Pythagoras’ similar action in Kroton. It is hardly possible to interpret in any other way the various relations of the Orphics with each other when we learn that at the court of the Peisistratids, in addition to Onomakritos, two other men who had arrived from Southern Italy were active and were counted among the earliest writers of Orphic poems.11

It seems clear that in Southern Italy at that time, Orphic societies were already established—who else could these writers have been addressing with their “Orphic” poems? In any case, we must accept that the similarities between Orphic and Pythagorean beliefs about the soul are not just coincidental. When Pythagoras arrived in Italy (around 532), did he find Orphic societies already formed in Kroton and Metapontum, and did he connect with their ideas? Or did the “Orphic” followers (as Herodotus suggested8) draw their inspiration from Pythagoras and his students? We can't untangle the various influences anymore, but if the Pythagoreans were the only ones benefiting from this exchange, we would certainly see the entire Orphic doctrine filled with ideas exclusive to the Pythagorean school. However, in the remnants of the Orphic poems, aside from a few minor indications of the Pythagorean mystical theory of numbers,9 we find nothing that must have come from Pythagorean sources.10 They didn't need to adopt the belief in the migration of souls and its application from that source. It's possible that the independently developed Orphic beliefs influenced Pythagoras and his followers in Southern Italy; similarly, it was likely a pre-existing Orphic doctrine (perhaps brought from Southern Italy) with which Onomakritos, the founder of the Orphic sects in Athens, aligned himself—around the same time Pythagoras did in Kroton. It's hard to interpret the relationships among the Orphics in any other way when we discover that at the court of the Peisistratids, in addition to Onomakritos, two other men from Southern Italy were active and were considered among the earliest writers of Orphic poems.11

§ 2

The Orphics wherever we meet with them in Greek countries always appear as members of a private cult-society who are held together by a specially organized and individual mode of worship. The old Thracian worship of Dionysos in its straining after the infinite conducted its revels under the open sky of night, seeking out deserted mountain-sides and forests where it was farthest from civilization and closest to unspoiled and untrammelled nature. How this cult may have accommodated itself to the narrow limitations of ordinary 338 city-life, it is hard to imagine;12 though it is natural to suppose that much of the extravagance that was literal and actual enough in the old northern festival of night was represented in the milder worship of Greece by mere symbol. We have less difficulty in discovering the side of their religious activity which the Orphics, apart from the private worship of the conventicle, revealed to the outer world of the profane. Orpheus himself in the tradition had been not merely the inspired singer but the seer, the magically endowed physician and purification-priest as well,13 and the Orphics, as his followers, were active, too, in all these directions.14 In the composition of Greek Orphism the kathartic ideas which had been evolved on Greek soil were combined in a not unnatural alliance with the old Thracian worship of Dionysos. The Orphic priests of purification were preferred to others of their kind by many religious people.15 But among the inner circles of Orphism the sacerdotal activities of purification and the removal of daimonic hindrances, which were by no means given up, tended rather to produce deeper and broader ideas of purity and of release from the earthly and the transitory. In some such way was evolved that asceticism which in close combination with the Thracian worship of Dionysos gave the peculiar tone to the faith and temperament of the sectaries and gave to their lives their special direction.

The Orphics, whenever we encounter them in Greek regions, always seem to be part of a private cult that is unified by a unique and organized way of worship. The ancient Thracian worship of Dionysus sought the infinite and took place under the night sky, often in remote mountains and forests, far from civilization and close to untouched nature. It's hard to envision how this cult adapted to the restrictions of everyday city life; however, it seems likely that much of the wildness that was real and tangible in the old northern night festivals was expressed in a more symbolic way in the gentler worship of Greece. We find it easier to identify the aspects of their religious practices that the Orphics, beyond their private worship gatherings, revealed to the outside world. Orpheus himself was seen not only as the inspired singer but also as a clairvoyant, a magically gifted healer, and a purification priest, and the Orphics, as his followers, were active in all these roles. In the makeup of Greek Orphism, the cathartic ideas that developed in Greece mixed naturally with the ancient Thracian worship of Dionysus. Many devotees preferred the Orphic priests of purification over others. Yet within the inner circles of Orphism, their priestly roles in purification and eliminating daemonic obstacles, which were by no means abandoned, evolved to foster deeper and broader concepts of purity and liberation from the earthly and fleeting. This is how an asceticism developed that, in close combination with the Thracian worship of Dionysus, shaped the unique character of the faith and mindset of the sect followers and directed their lives in a special way.

The Orphic sect had a fixed and definite set of doctrines; this alone sufficed to distinguish it both from the official worships of the state, and from all other cult-associations of the time. The reduction of belief to distinct doctrinal formulæ may have done more than anything else to make Orphism a society of believers—none of the other theologi of the time, Epimenides, Pherekydes, etc., accomplished as much. Without its fundamental religious doctrine Orphism in Greece is inconceivable; according to Aristotle the “doctrines” of Orpheus were put into poetical form by the founder of the Orphic sect in Athens, Onomakritos.16 The uncertain accounts given us by the later authorities do not allow us to make out quite clearly17 what was the extent of Onomakritos’ work in the formation or collection of Orphic doctrinal poetry. What is important is the fact that he is distinctly named as the author of the poem called “Initiations”.18 This poem must have been one of the basic, and in the strictest sense “religious”, writings of the sect; a poem of this character may very well have had for its central incident the dismemberment of the god at the hands of the Titans—a story which Onomakritos is said to have put into verse.19 339

The Orphic sect had a clear and defined set of beliefs; this alone was enough to set it apart from both the official state worships and all other cult groups of the time. The simplification of belief into specific doctrines likely did more than anything else to turn Orphism into a community of believers—none of the other theologi of the era, like Epimenides or Pherekydes, achieved as much. Without its core religious doctrine, Orphism in Greece is unthinkable; according to Aristotle, the “doctrines” of Orpheus were transformed into poetic form by the founder of the Orphic sect in Athens, Onomakritos.16 The vague accounts provided by later sources don’t allow us to clearly determine17 the extent of Onomakritos’ contribution to the creation or collection of Orphic doctrinal poetry. What matters is that he is clearly identified as the author of the poem titled “Initiations.”18 This poem must have been one of the foundational and strictly “religious” texts of the sect; a poem of this nature could very well have featured the central event of the god's dismemberment by the Titans—a tale that Onomakritos is said to have put into verse.19 339

The religious beliefs and worship of the sect were founded upon the detailed instructions of certain very numerous writings dealing with matters of ritual and theology. These claimed the authority of religious inspiration,20 and were as a whole supposed to be the work of the primitive Thracian bard, Orpheus, himself. The anonymity which concealed the identity of the real authors of these poems was not, however, very thoroughly preserved; even towards the end of the fourth century there were those who claimed to be able to give with certainty the names of the original authors of the various poems. Strictly canonical authority, such as would at once have reduced to silence every conflicting view or statement, never seems to have belonged to any of these writings. In particular, there were several “Theogonies”21—poems which attempted to give expression to the fundamental ideas of Orphic speculation on religious subjects—and in spite of much harmony in general effect they differed considerably from each other in particular mode of expression. They represented ever-renewed and increasingly elaborate attempts to construct a connected doctrinal system for Orphism. With unmistakable allusion to the oldest Greek theological system—that which had been committed to writing in the Hesiodic poem—these Orphic Theogonies described the origin and development of the world from obscure primordial impulses to the clear and distinct variety-in-unity of the organized kosmos, and it described it as the history of a long series of divine powers and figures which issue from each other (each new one overcoming the last) and succeed each other in the task of building and organizing the world until they have absorbed the whole universe into themselves in order to bring it forth anew, animated with one spirit and, with all its infinite variety, a unity. These gods are certainly no longer deities of the familiar Greek type. Not merely the new gods evolved by the creative fancy of Orphism—creatures which had almost entirely lost all distinct and sensible outline under the accumulation of symbolical meaning—but even the figures actually borrowed from the Greek world of divinities are turned into little more than mere personified abstractions. Who would recognize the Zeus of Homer in the Orphic Zeus who after he has devoured the World-God and “taken unto himself the power of Erikapaios”,22 has become himself the Universe and the Whole? “Zeus the Beginning, Zeus the Middle, in Zeus all things are completed.”23 The concept here so stretches the personality that it threatens to break it down altogether; the outlines of the individual figures are 340 lost and are merged into an intentional “confusion of deities”.24

The religious beliefs and practices of the sect were based on the detailed teachings found in several extensive writings about rituals and theology. These texts claimed to be inspired by divine authority and were generally thought to be the work of the ancient Thracian bard, Orpheus, himself. However, the true authors of these poems were not completely anonymous; even by the end of the fourth century, some claimed they could identify the original authors of the various poems with certainty. None of these writings seemed to hold any strict canonical authority that would silence opposing views or statements. In particular, there were several “Theogonies”—poems that tried to express the core ideas of Orphic thought on religious matters—and despite some general harmony, they differed significantly in their specific expressions. They represented ongoing and increasingly complex attempts to create a coherent doctrinal system for Orphism. With clear references to the oldest Greek theological system, as recorded in the Hesiodic poem, these Orphic Theogonies outlined the world’s origin and development from vague primordial forces to the vivid and intricate order of the universe. They depicted it as a narrative of a long sequence of divine powers and figures that emerge from one another (with each new entity surpassing the previous) and take turns in the process of forming and organizing the world until they have absorbed the entire universe within themselves to recreate it, infused with one spirit and, despite its infinite variety, a unified whole. These gods are definitely not the familiar Greek deities. They are not only the new gods born from the imaginative advances of Orphism—beings that have largely lost any distinct and tangible form due to the weight of symbolic meaning—but even those borrowed from the Greek pantheon have been transformed into little more than personified abstractions. Who would recognize the Zeus of Homer in the Orphic Zeus, who after consuming the World-God and “taking unto himself the power of Erikapaios,” has become the Universe and the Whole? “Zeus the Beginning, Zeus the Middle, in Zeus all things are completed.” The concept here stretches the personality so far that it threatens to dissolve it entirely; the identities of the individual figures are lost and merged into a deliberate “confusion of deities.”

Still, the mythical envelope was never quite given up; these poets could not do without it altogether. Their gods did indeed strive to become pure abstractions but they were never quite successful in throwing off all traces of individuality and the limitations of form and matter: the concept never quite broke through the veil of mythology. The poets of the Orphic Theogonies vied with one another in their attempts to make the half-seen and half-conceived accessible alike to the imagination and the reason; and in succession gave varying expression to the same fundamental conceptions until finality was reached as it seems in a poem whose contents are better known to us than the others from quotations made from it by Neoplatonic writers—the Theogonical poem of the four-and-twenty Rhapsodies. Into this poem was poured all the traditional material of mythological and symbolical doctrine, and in it such doctrine achieved its final expression.25

Still, the mythical envelope was never completely abandoned; these poets couldn’t do without it entirely. Their gods did try to become pure abstractions, but they never fully succeeded in shedding all traces of individuality and the limits of form and matter: the concept never really broke through the veil of mythology. The poets of the Orphic Theogonies competed with each other in their efforts to make the half-seen and half-conceived accessible to both imagination and reason; and they each offered different expressions of the same fundamental ideas until it seems a finality was reached in a poem whose content is better known to us than the others due to quotations made from it by Neoplatonic writers—the Theogonical poem of the four-and-twenty Rhapsodies. All the traditional material of mythological and symbolic doctrine was poured into this poem, and in it, such doctrine achieved its final expression.25

§ 3

This combination of religion and quasi-philosophical speculation was a distinguishing feature of the Orphics and of Orphic literature. Religion only entered into their Theogonical poetry in so far as the ethical personalities of the divinities therein described had not entirely faded away into transparent allegories.26 It was abstract speculation alone which really prevailed there, little respect being paid to religion; and as a result a much greater licence was given to speculative construction.

This blend of spirituality and semi-philosophical thought was a key aspect of the Orphics and their writings. Religion appeared in their creation poems mainly because the moral aspects of the gods portrayed had not completely turned into clear symbols.26 It was primarily abstract thinking that dominated, with little regard for religion, allowing for more freedom in imaginative interpretation.

This abstract speculation, however, reached its climax in a religious narrative of the first importance for the beliefs and cult of the sect. At the end of the series of genealogically connected deities came the son of Zeus and Persephone, Dionysos, who was also given the name of the underworld deity Zagreus.27 To him, even in infancy, was entrusted the rule of the world by Zeus. But the wicked Titans, urged on by Hera, approached him by a stratagem. They were the enemies of Zeus, and had already been overthrown by Ouranos,28 but had, it seems, been let loose again by Zeus from Tartaros. They made Dionysos trust them by giving him presents, and while he was looking at his own image in a mirror29 that they had given him, they fell upon him. He tried to escape them by repeated transformations of shape; finally, in the form of a bull,30 he was at last overcome and his body torn to pieces which his savage foes thereupon devoured. The heart alone 341 was rescued by Athene, and she brought it to Zeus who swallowed it. From Zeus there sprang the “new Dionysos”, the son of Zeus and Semele, in whom Zagreus came to life again.

This abstract speculation, however, peaked in a crucial religious story that was fundamental to the beliefs and rituals of the sect. At the end of the list of genealogically linked deities was the son of Zeus and Persephone, Dionysus, who was also known as the underworld god Zagreus. To him, even as a baby, Zeus entrusted the rule of the world. But the wicked Titans, encouraged by Hera, used a trick to approach him. They were enemies of Zeus and had already been defeated by Ouranos, but it seems Zeus had released them from Tartaros. They made Dionysus trust them by giving him gifts, and while he was admiring his reflection in a mirror they had given him, they attacked him. He tried to escape by changing shapes repeatedly; finally, in the form of a bull, he was ultimately captured, and his body was torn apart, which his savage foes then devoured. The heart alone was saved by Athene, who brought it to Zeus, who swallowed it. From Zeus sprang the “new Dionysus,” the son of Zeus and Semele, in whom Zagreus was reborn.

The myth of the dismemberment of Zagreus by the Titans was already put into verse by Onomakritos;31 it continued to be the culminating point of the doctrinal poetry of the Orphics. It occurred not only in the Rhapsodies,32 but in other versions of the Orphic legend composed in complete independence of these.33 It is a religious myth in the stricter sense; its ætioloqical character is most marked;34 its purpose is to explain the religious implication of the ritual dismemberment of the bull-god at the Bacchic nocturnal festivals, and to derive that feature from the legendary sufferings of Dionysos-Zagreus.

The myth of the Titans tearing apart Zagreus was already turned into verse by Onomakritos;31 it continued to be a key theme in the doctrinal poetry of the Orphics. It appeared not only in the Rhapsodies,32 but also in other versions of the Orphic legend created completely independently of these.33 It's a religious myth in the strictest sense; its ætioloqical nature is very clear;34 its aim is to explain the religious significance of the ritual dismemberment of the bull-god during the Bacchic nighttime festivals and to connect that aspect to the legendary sufferings of Dionysos-Zagreus.

But though the legend thus has its roots in the primitive sacrificial ritual of ancient Thrace,35 in its extended form it belongs entirely to the region of Hellenic thought; and in this combination of the two elements it becomes truly Orphic. The wicked Titans belong entirely to strictly Greek mythology.36 In this case, as the murderers of the god, they represent the primeval power of evil.37 They dismember the One into Many parts; by their impiety the One divine being is dispersed into the multiplicity of the things of this world.38 It is reborn as One in the new Dionysos sprung from Zeus. The Titans—so the legend goes on to relate—who had devoured the limbs of the god were destroyed by Zeus with his lightning flash. From their ashes sprang the race of men in whom, in conformity with their origin, the good derived from Dionysos-Zagreus is mixed with a wicked Titanic element.39

But even though the legend has its roots in the ancient sacrificial rituals of Thrace, in its broader form, it completely belongs to Hellenic thought. This blend of the two elements makes it truly Orphic. The evil Titans are solely part of Greek mythology. In this context, as the killers of the god, they symbolize the primal force of evil. They tear the One into Many parts; through their wrongdoing, the One divine being is scattered into the multitude of worldly things. It is reborn as One in the new Dionysus, who comes from Zeus. The legend continues that the Titans, who had eaten the god's limbs, were destroyed by Zeus with his lightning bolt. From their ashes arose the race of men, in whom, reflecting their origin, the goodness from Dionysus-Zagreus is mixed with a wicked Titanic element.

With the rule of the new-born Dionysos and the origin of mankind, the series of mythological events in the Orphic poetry came to an end.40 With the entry of mankind into Creation41 the existing period of the world begins; the period of world-revolutions is over. The poems now turn to the subject of man and the revelation of his fate, his duty and his purpose in the world.

With the rise of the new Dionysus and the beginning of humanity, the sequence of mythological events in Orphic poetry concluded. 40 With humanity's entry into Creation 41, the current era of the world starts; the age of world-revolutions has ended. The poems now focus on the theme of humanity and the unfolding of its fate, responsibilities, and purpose in the world.

§ 4

The mixture of the elements that make up the totality of his being in itself prescribes for man the direction that his effort shall take. He must free himself from the Titanic element and, thus purified, return to the god, a fragment of whom is living in him.42 The distinction between the Titanic and Dionysiac elements in man is an allegorical expression of the popular 342 distinction between body and soul; it also corresponds to a profoundly felt estimate of the relative value of these two sides of man’s being. According to Orphic doctrine man’s duty is to free himself from the chains of the body in which the soul lies fast bound like the prisoner in his cell.43 The soul has a long way, however, to go before it can find its freedom; it may not by an act of violence tear its bonds asunder for itself.44 The death of the body only frees it for a short while; for the soul must once more suffer imprisonment in a body. After leaving its old body, it flutters free in the wind, but a breath of air sends it into a new body again.45 So it continues its journey, perpetually alternating between an unfettered separate existence, and an ever-renewed incarnation—traversing the great “Circle of Necessity” in which it becomes the life-companion of many bodies both of men and beasts. Thus, the “Wheel of Birth”46 seems to return ever upon itself in hopeless repetition: in Orphic poetry (and there perhaps for the first time) occurs the despairing thought of the exact repetition of the past; events which have already been lived through once returning again with the convergence of the same attendant circumstances.47 Thus, Nature, ever reverting to its own beginnings, draws men with it in its senseless revolution round itself.

The mix of elements that make up his entire being determines the direction of his efforts. He needs to break free from the destructive forces within him and, once purified, return to the divine essence that lives within him. The difference between these destructive and transcendent forces is a symbolic representation of the common distinction between body and soul; it also reflects a deep understanding of the relative importance of these two aspects of human existence. According to Orphic teachings, it is man's responsibility to free himself from the chains of the body that bind the soul like a prisoner in a cell. However, the soul has a long journey ahead before it can achieve freedom; it cannot violently break its bonds on its own. The death of the body only offers a brief respite; the soul will once again be trapped in a new body. After departing from its old body, it soars freely in the wind, but a gust of air quickly sends it back into a new form. This cycle continues, constantly switching between a liberated existence and a renewed incarnation—navigating the great "Circle of Necessity," where it becomes the life companion of many bodies, both human and animal. Thus, the "Wheel of Birth" seems to endlessly repeat itself in a frustrating cycle: in Orphic poetry (and perhaps for the first time), the disheartening idea of the exact repetition of the past emerges; events that have already been experienced return with the same accompanying circumstances. In this way, Nature, continually returning to its origins, draws humanity along in its meaningless cycle.

But the soul has a way open for escape from this perpetual recurrence of all things that threatens to close in upon it; it may hope “to escape from the circle and have a respite from misery”.48 It is formed for blessed freedom, and can at last detach itself from the condition of being it has to endure upon earth—a condition unworthy of it. A “release” is possible; but man in his blindness and thoughtlessness cannot help himself, cannot even, when salvation is at hand, turn himself towards it.49

But the soul has a way to break free from this endless cycle of everything that tries to trap it; it can hope “to escape the circle and find a break from suffering.”48 It is meant for true freedom and can ultimately separate itself from the existence it has to endure on earth—a condition that's beneath its worth. A “release” is possible; but people, in their ignorance and carelessness, can't help themselves, and even when salvation is close, they can't turn towards it.49

Salvation comes from Orpheus and his Bacchic mysteries; Dionysos himself will loose his worshipper from Evil and the unending way of misery. Not his own power, but the grace of the “releasing gods” is to be the cause of man’s liberation.50 The self-reliance of the older Greece is breaking down; in humility of heart the pious man looks elsewhere for help; he needs the revelation and mediation of “Orpheus the Ruler”51 in order to find the way of salvation; he must follow his ordinances of salvation with perfect obedience if he is to continue in that way.

Salvation comes from Orpheus and his Bacchic mysteries; Dionysus himself will free his followers from Evil and the endless path of suffering. It's not his own power, but the grace of the “releasing gods” that will lead to humanity's liberation.50 The self-reliance of ancient Greece is fading; in humility, the devoted person seeks help from elsewhere; he needs the revelation and guidance of “Orpheus the Ruler”51 to discover the path to salvation; he must follow his rules of salvation with complete obedience to stay on that path.

It is not only the sacred mysteries themselves, in the form in which Orpheus has ordained them, which prepare for the release; a complete “Orphic life”52 must be developed out 343 of them. Asceticism is the prime condition of the pious life. This does not mean the practice of the respectable bourgeois virtues, nor the discipline and moral reformation of a man’s character; the height of morality is in this case the turning again towards god,53 and the turning away not merely from the weaknesses and errors of earthly being but from the whole of earthly life itself; renunciation of all that ties man to mortality and the life of the body. The fierce determination with which the Indian penitent tears away his will from life, to which every organ in his body clings desperately—for this, indeed, there was no place among the Greeks, the lovers of life—not even among the world-denying ascetics. Abstention from the eating of flesh was the strongest and most striking species of self-denial practised by the Orphic ascetics.54 Apart from this, they kept themselves in all essentials uncontaminated by certain things and situations which rather suggested to a religious symbolism than actually indicated in themselves attachment to the world of death and transitoriness. The long-standing ordinances of the priestly ritual of purification were taken up and added to;55 but they were also raised to a higher plane. They are no longer intended to free men from the effects of daimonic contacts; the soul itself is made pure by them56—pure from the body and its polluting association, pure from death and its loathsome mastery. In expiation of “guilt” the soul is confined within the body,57 the wages of sin is in this case that life upon earth which for the soul is death. The whole multiplicity of the universe, emptied of its innocent and natural sequence of cause and effect, appears to these zealots under the uniform aspect of a correlation between crime and punishment, between pollution and purification. Thus, mysticism enters into the closest alliance with kathartic practices. The soul which comes from the divine and strives to return thither, has no other purpose to fulfil upon earth (and therefore no other moral law to obey); it must be free from life itself and be pure from all that is earthly.

It’s not just the sacred mysteries as designed by Orpheus that lead to liberation; a complete “Orphic life”52 must be built around them. Asceticism is the essential foundation of a spiritual life. This isn’t about following conventional bourgeois virtues or moral reform of one's character; the pinnacle of morality here is a return to God,53 while completely moving away not just from the flaws and mistakes of earthly existence but from all aspects of earthly life itself—renouncing everything that binds a person to mortality and physical existence. The intense determination with which an Indian ascetic detaches his will from life, to which every part of his being clings desperately, has no parallel among the Greeks, who cherished life—not even among those ascetics who rejected the world. Avoiding the consumption of meat was the most remarkable form of self-denial practiced by the Orphic ascetics.54 Moreover, they kept themselves largely untouched by certain things and situations that, while suggesting religious symbolism, didn’t necessarily indicate a connection to the world of death and impermanence. Longstanding rules of priestly purification rituals were adopted and expanded;55 however, these rituals were elevated to a higher purpose. They no longer aim to free individuals from the effects of daimonic influences; instead, they purify the soul56—freeing it from the body and its corrupting ties, and from death and its repulsive control. In atonement for “guilt,” the soul is trapped within the body,57 with the penalty for sin being the earthly life that represents death for the soul. The entire complexity of the universe, stripped of its innocent and natural cause-and-effect relationships, appears to these zealots as a simple connection between crime and punishment, between impurity and purification. Therefore, mysticism closely aligns itself with purification practices. The soul, having originated from the divine and striving to return, has no other purpose on earth (and thus no other moral law to follow); it must be unchained from life itself and pure from all that is of this world.

The Orphics, moreover, were the only people who could venture among themselves or before strangers to greet each other with the special name of the “Pure”.58 The first reward of his piety was received by the initiate of the Orphic mysteries in that intermediate region whither men must go after their earthly death. When a man dies, Hermes leads the “deathless soul” into the underworld.59 Special poems of the Orphic community announced the terrors and delights of the underworld kingdom.60 What the Orphic 344 mystery-priests vouchsafed to their public upon these hidden matters—outdoing the promises made in the Eleusinian mysteries in coarse appeal to the senses—may have been the most popular, but was certainly not the most original feature of Orphic teaching.61 In Hades a judgment awaited the soul—it was no instinctive fancy of the people, but the “sacred doctrine”62 of these sectaries which first introduced and elaborated the idea of compensatory justice in the world of the dead. The impious suffer punishment and purgation in the depths of Tartaros;63 those who have not been made pure by the Orphic mysteries lie in the miry Pool;64 “dreadful things65 await” the disdainer of the sacred worship. By a conception that is quite unique in ancient religion, participation in the Orphic ceremonial enables the descendant to obtain from the gods “pardon and purification” for his departed ancestors who may be paying the penalty in the next world for the misdeeds of the past.66 But for the initiate of the Orphic mysteries himself who has not merely borne the narthex but has been a true Bakchos,67 his reward is that he shall obtain a “milder fate” in the kingdom of the underworld deities whom he has revered on earth, and dwell “in the fair meadows of deep-running Acheron”.68 The blessed home of refuge no longer lies like the Homeric Elysium upon earth, but below in the world of the Souls, for only the released soul reaches there. There, the initiated and purified will live in communion with the gods of the nether world69—we feel that we are listening to Thracian and not Greek conceptions of the ideal when we hear of the “Banquet of the Pure” and the uninterrupted intoxication which they enjoy there.70

The Orphics were the only group who could greet each other or strangers with the special title of the “Pure.”58 The first reward for their devotion was given to the initiate of the Orphic mysteries in that intermediate place where people go after they die. When someone dies, Hermes guides the “immortal soul” into the underworld.59 Unique poems from the Orphic community revealed the horrors and joys of the underworld realm.60 What the Orphic 344 mystery-priests shared with the public on these hidden subjects—surpassing the sensory appeals made in the Eleusinian mysteries—might have been the most popular aspect, but it was certainly not the most original part of Orphic teachings.61 In Hades, a judgment awaited the soul—it was not just a fanciful idea of the people, but the “sacred doctrine”62 of these followers that first introduced and developed the concept of compensatory justice in the afterlife. The wicked suffer punishment and purification in the depths of Tartaros;63 those who haven’t achieved purity through the Orphic mysteries lie in the murky Pool;64 “terrible things65 await” those who scorn the sacred rites. With a belief that is quite unique in ancient religions, participating in the Orphic rituals allows descendants to gain “forgiveness and purification” from the gods for their ancestors, who may be facing consequences in the afterlife for past wrongs.66 But for the initiates of the Orphic mysteries who have not only carried the narthex but have truly become a Bakchos,67 their reward is a “softer fate” in the realm of the underworld deities they honored in life, allowing them to dwell “in the beautiful meadows of deep-running Acheron.”68 The blessed refuge no longer exists like Homer’s Elysium on earth, but below in the realm of Souls, for only the liberated soul reaches that place. There, the initiated and purified will exist in communion with the gods of the underworld69—we sense we are hearing Thracian rather than Greek ideas of the ideal when we hear of the “Feast of the Pure” and the endless ecstasy they experience there.70

But the depths restore the soul at last to the light, for its lasting habitation is not below; it stays there only for the interval which separates death from its next rebirth. For the reprobate this is a time of punishment and purgation—the Orphics could not distress their hearers with the awful and intolerable idea of the perpetual punishment of the damned in Hell; many times over the soul rises again to the light and in continually renewed bodies fulfils the cycle of births. For the deeds of its past life it is recompensed in the next life that it lives, and each man must now suffer exactly what he has done to another.71 So he pays the penalty for ancient guilt: the “thrice-ancient law”—what thou hast done thou shalt suffer—is thus fulfilled for him in far livelier fashion than it could be in any torments of the shadow-world. So surely also shall the pure be rewarded in future lives by ever-increasing happiness. How exactly the Orphic fancy filled out the 345 individual gradations in the scale of happiness is beyond our knowledge.72

But the depths ultimately bring the soul back to the light, because its true home isn't below; it’s just there for the time that separates death from its next rebirth. For the damned, this is a time of punishment and cleansing—the Orphics couldn’t burden their listeners with the terrible and unbearable thought of eternal punishment for the damned in Hell; time and again, the soul rises again to the light and, in constantly renewed bodies, completes the cycle of births. For the actions of its past life, it faces the consequences in the next life it lives, and each person must now experience exactly what they have done to another. 71 So they pay the price for past wrongs: the “thrice-ancient law”—what you have done, you will suffer—works out for them in a much more vivid way than any suffering in the shadow-world could. Just as surely, the pure will be rewarded in future lives with ever-increasing happiness. How exactly the Orphic imagination detailed the 345 individual levels of happiness is beyond our knowledge. 72

But the soul is immortal, and even sinners and the unredeemed cannot perish entirely. Hades and the life on earth holds them in their perpetual round, and this is their punishment. For the soul of the blessed, however, neither Hades nor earthly life can offer the highest crown of happiness. If it has been made pure and spotless in the Orphic mysteries and the Orphic manner of life, it is freed from the necessity of rebirth and withdrawn from the cycle of becoming and perishing. The “purification” ends in a final redemption. The soul mounts upwards from the base level of earthly life, not to become nothing in a final death, for it is now that it first truly begins to live; hitherto it has lain imprisoned in the body like the corpse in the grave.73 It was death for the soul when it entered into life—now it is free and will no more suffer death; it lives for ever like God, for it comes from God and is itself divine. We do not know whether these theosophists went so far as to lose themselves in detailed picturing and contemplation of the blissful heights of the divine life.74 In the remains of their poems we read of stars and the moon as other worlds,75 perhaps as the dwelling-place of illuminated spirits.76 But perhaps also the poet allowed the soul to flee from its last contact with mortality without himself desiring to follow it into the unbroken radiance of divinity that no earthly eye can abide.

But the soul is immortal, and even sinners and the unredeemed can't completely disappear. Hades and life on earth keep them in their endless cycle, which is their punishment. For the blessed soul, though, neither Hades nor earthly life can provide the ultimate happiness. If it has been made pure and spotless through the Orphic mysteries and way of life, it is freed from the need for rebirth and removed from the cycle of coming into being and perishing. The “purification” leads to a final redemption. The soul rises up from the lowest point of earthly life, not to become nothing in a final death, because now it truly begins to live; until now it has been trapped in the body like a corpse in a grave.73 It was death for the soul when it entered life—now it is free and will no longer suffer death; it lives forever like God, because it comes from God and is divine itself. We don't know if these theosophists went so far as to completely lose themselves in vividly imagining and contemplating the blissful heights of divine life.74 In the remnants of their poems, we read of stars and the moon as other worlds,75 perhaps as the home of enlightened spirits.76 But maybe the poet also allowed the soul to escape its last connection with mortality without wanting to follow it into the unbroken brilliance of divinity that no earthly eye can withstand.

§ 5

This, then, is the keystone that completes the arch of Orphic religion—the belief in the divine, immortal, and abiding life of the soul for whom union with the body and its desires is a thwarting hindrance and repression—a punishment from which its one desire, as soon as it is awakened to a full knowledge of itself is to escape in order that it may belong entirely to itself in full enjoyment of its powers. The contrast between these ideas and those of the Homeric world is complete; there, the soul released from the body was credited only with a poor, shadowy, half-conscious existence, so that an eternity of godlike being in the full enjoyment of life and its powers was only thinkable if the body and the soul, the twofold self of man, were translated in undissolved communion out of the world of mortality. The Orphic legends about the origin of the human race do not tell us the real source and derivation of the very different beliefs about the soul held by the Orphics; those legends only give expression to the 346 way—and only one of many ways77—in which the already established confidence in the divinity of the soul was deducible from what might be considered the oldest historical story of mankind, and how it might be brought into connexion with the Orphic legend of the gods. This persuasion, the belief that a god was living in man and a god that could not be free until he had broken through the prison of the body, was deeply rooted in the worship of Dionysos and the ecstasies belonging to that worship; we cannot be in much doubt that it was taken over ready-made, together with the “enthusiastic” cult of the divinity, and further developed by the Orphic believers. We have already met with traces of this belief even in the Thracian home of the Dionysiac cult; and in what we know of the Thracian form of the religion, traces are not absolutely wanting of an ascetic tendency of living that would easily and naturally arise from such a belief.78 Even in those Northern countries we found the belief in the transmigration of souls bound up with the religion of Dionysos, and that belief, when it is naively held, has as its essential presupposition the idea that the soul, in order to have a complete life, and one that can survive bodily death, must of necessity be united to another body. Even this idea is, however, quite foreign to Orphism. The Orphics retained, in spite of everything, the doctrine of transmigration, and combined it in a strange alliance with their own belief in the divinity of the soul and its vocation to a life of perfect liberty. It is evidently improbable that they invented that doctrine entirely on their own account; the first principles of their creed by no means led necessarily to it. Herodotos79 asserts distinctly that the doctrine of transmigration came to the Greeks from Egypt; and as a consequence, that it was from Egyptian tradition that the Orphics received it. This assertion has no more to recommend it than any other of Herodotos’ many pronouncements as to the Egyptian origin of Greek opinions and legends, and it is even less likely to mislead us in view of the fact that it is by no means certain and not even probable that a belief in transmigration ever really existed in Egypt.80 This belief has arisen independently in many places on the surface of the earth, without the need of transmission from one place to another;81 it might easily arise in a country where the belief prevailed that there existed only a limited number of souls of which each one—in order that no earthly body might be without its spiritual guest—must inhabit many perishable life-tenements, and not be bound to any one of them by a real inner necessity. This, 347 however, is a conception common to popular psychology all over the world.82 If it is still considered more probable that the idea of a migration of the soul through many temporary bodies was not spontaneously evolved by the Orphics, but was received by them from the hands of others, there is yet no reason to reject the most natural assumption—namely, that this also was one of the beliefs that the Orphics took over with the cult of Dionysos from Thrace. Like other mystics,83 the Orphics took over the belief in transmigration from popular tradition and turned it into a serviceable member of their own body of doctrine.84 It served them by giving a striking and physical expression to their own conception of the inevitable connexion between guilt and penance, pollution and the refining power of punishment, piety and future blessedness upon which all their religious ethic depended. It was with an exactly similar purpose that they also retained and developed the old Greek idea of a place of the souls in the depths below the earth.

This is the key point that completes the framework of Orphic religion—the belief in the divine, immortal, and enduring life of the soul, which sees the union with the body and its desires as a frustrating hindrance and a punishment. Once the soul becomes fully aware of itself, its primary desire is to escape so it can belong entirely to itself and fully enjoy its powers. The contrast between these ideas and those of the Homeric world is stark; there, a soul released from the body was thought to have only a weak, shadowy, half-conscious existence, meaning that an eternity of godlike being with full enjoyment of life and its powers was only imaginable if both the body and soul—the dual self of man—were transported together out of the realm of mortality. The Orphic legends about the origin of humanity do not explain the true source of the differing beliefs about the soul held by the Orphics; those legends merely reflect one way—one of many—of showing how the already established belief in the divinity of the soul could be derived from what might be seen as humanity's oldest historical narrative and how it connected with the Orphic legends of the gods. This belief—that a god lives within man and cannot be free until it breaks through the prison of the body—was deeply rooted in the worship of Dionysos and the ecstatic experiences associated with that worship; it's clear that it was adopted ready-made, along with the “enthusiastic” worship of the divinity, and further developed by the Orphic adherents. We've already seen signs of this belief even in the Thracian origins of the Dionysiac cult, and there are indications in what we know about the Thracian version of the religion of a natural ascetic lifestyle arising from such beliefs. Even in those northern regions, belief in the transmigration of souls was tied to the religion of Dionysos, and when held simply, this belief fundamentally presupposes that the soul, in order to have a complete life that can survive bodily death, must be united with another body. However, this idea is quite foreign to Orphism. The Orphics did retain, despite everything, the doctrine of transmigration, combining it in an unusual alliance with their own belief in the divinity of the soul and its purpose for a life of perfect freedom. It seems unlikely that they came up with this doctrine entirely on their own; the basic principles of their belief system didn’t necessarily lead to it. Herodotos clearly asserts that the doctrine of transmigration came to the Greeks from Egypt, which implies that the Orphics received it from Egyptian traditions. This statement holds no more merit than many of Herodotos’ claims about the Egyptian origins of Greek beliefs and legends, and is even less likely to mislead us considering it's not certain or probable that a belief in transmigration truly existed in Egypt. This belief has emerged independently in various places around the world without needing transmission from one area to another; it could easily develop in a culture that believed there were only a limited number of souls, each of which—so no earthly body would be without its spiritual inhabitant—must occupy many temporary life-bodies, without being bound to anyone by any real inner necessity. This conception is common in popular psychology worldwide. If it seems more likely that the idea of the soul migrating through various temporary bodies wasn’t spontaneously created by the Orphics, but was adopted from others, there’s still no reason to dismiss the most logical explanation—that this was also one of the beliefs the Orphics inherited from the cult of Dionysos in Thrace. Like other mystics, the Orphics adopted the belief in transmigration from popular tradition and made it a useful part of their doctrine. It functioned for them by providing a vivid and tangible representation of their understanding of the essential link between guilt and penance, pollution and the cleansing power of punishment, piety and future happiness—on which all their religious ethics rested. They similarly preserved and developed the old Greek idea of a place for souls in the depths beneath the earth.

But if they believed in the transmigration of souls, that belief did not with them hold the highest place. There is a realm where the ever free and divine souls have their being, a realm to which the series of lives in earthly bodies is only transitional, and the way to it was pointed out by the saving doctrine of the Orphic mysteries, by the purification and salvation afforded by Orphic asceticism.

But if they believed in the transfer of souls, that belief wasn’t their top priority. There’s a realm where the eternally free and divine souls exist, a realm that the cycle of lives in physical bodies only temporarily passes through, and the path to it was shown by the enlightening teachings of the Orphic mysteries, through the purification and salvation provided by Orphic asceticism.

NOTES TO CHAPTER X

1 . . . ὅς ποτε καὶ τελετὰς μυστηρίδας εὕρετο Βάκχου, AP. vii, 9, 5 (Damagetos). διὸ καὶ τὰς ὑπὸ τοῦ Διονύσου γενομένας τελετὰς Ὀρφικὰς προσαγορευθῆναι, D.S. 3, 65, 6. εὗρε δὲ Ὀρφεὺς τὰ Διονύσον μυστήρια [Apollod.] 1, 3, 2, 3. (Dionysum) Iove et Luna (natum), cui sacra Orphica putantur confici: Cic., ND. iii, 58; cf. Lyd., Mens. 4, 51, p. 107 W. Βακχικά an Orphic poem: Suid. Ὀρφεύς (cf. Hiller, Hermes, 21, 364 f.), whence fr. 3 (Abel); and perhaps frr. 152, 167, 169, 168. τὰ Ὀρφικὰ καλούμενα καὶ τὰ Βακχικά are already reckoned as a single class by Hdt. ii, 81.

1 . . . who once discovered the sacred rites of Bacchus., AP. vii, 9, 5 (Damagetos). For this reason, the rites performed under Dionysus came to be known as Orphic rituals., D.S. 3, 65, 6. Orpheus discovered the mysteries of Dionysus. [Apollod.] 1, 3, 2, 3. (Dionysus), born of Jupiter and Luna, to whom the Orphic rites are believed to be dedicated.: Cic., ND. iii, 58; cf. Lyd., Mens. 4, 51, p. 107 W. Bacchic an Orphic poem: Suid. Orpheus (cf. Hiller, Hermes, 21, 364 f.), from which fr. 3 (Abel); and perhaps frr. 152, 167, 169, 168. The Orphic texts and the Bacchic writings are already regarded as a single category by Hdt. ii, 81.

2 This is seen in the decree of the Council and people of Athens dealing with the ἔμποροι Κιτιεῖς and their temple of “Aphrodite”—CIA. ii, 168 (333/2 B.C.).—That on the other hand such foreign mystery-cults were not always so tolerated (or not without resistance) is shown by the case of Ninos: Dem., FL. (19) 281 with Sch.; cf. D.H., Dinarch. 11.

2 This is evident in the decree from the Council and people of Athens regarding the Kitian merchants and their temple of “Aphrodite”—CIA. ii, 168 (333/2 BCE).—On the other hand, the fact that such foreign mystery cults weren't always accepted (or faced opposition) is demonstrated by the case of Ninos: Dem., FL. (19) 281 with Sch.; see also D.H., Dinarch. 11.

3 θεοὶ ξενικοί, Hsch., see Lob., Agl. 627 ff. A nameless θεὸς ξενικός occurs in CIA. i, 273 f., 18.—The foundation of such θίασοι for foreign deities (or deities at least not officially worshipped by the city in question) is almost invariably the work of foreigners (many exx. from Rhodos in BCH. 1889, p. 364). They are all foreigners, e.g. whose names occur in the decree of the θιασῶται of the Karian Zeus Labraundos, CIA. ii, 613 (298/7 B.C.); cf. ib. 614; SIG. 726. Merchants from Kition found a cult of their Aphrodite (Astarte) in Athens, just as some Egyptians had a little while before put up τὸ τῆς Ἴσιδος ἱερόν there: CIA. ii, 168. The names of foreigners (in addition to Athenians) are very numerous among the ὄνοματα τῶν ἐρανιστῶν of a collegium of Σαβαζιασταί in the Peiraeus (second century B.C.): Ἐφ. Ἀρχ. 1883, p. 245 f. The foreign worship would then begin to receive the support of natives of the host-city (most of them being at first of the poorer classes), and in this way the new religion would gain a footing in its adopted home. (Pure Athenian citizens compose the society of the Dionysiastai in the Peiraeus, second century B.C., Ath. Mitt. ix, 288 = CIA. iv, 2, 623 d.)

3 foreign deities, Hsch., see Lob., Agl. 627 ff. An unnamed foreign deity appears in CIA. i, 273 f., 18.—The establishment of such cults for foreign deities (or deities not officially worshipped by the local city) is typically the effort of foreigners (many examples from Rhodos in BCH. 1889, p. 364). These individuals are all foreigners, for instance, whose names appear in the decree of the cult members of the Carian Zeus Labraundos, CIA. ii, 613 (298/7 BCE); see also ib. 614; SIG. 726. Merchants from Kition established a cult for their Aphrodite (Astarte) in Athens, just as some Egyptians had previously set up the Temple of Isis there: CIA. ii, 168. The names of foreigners (in addition to Athenians) are quite numerous among the contributors' names of a college of Sabazians in the Peiraeus (second century BCE): Ephemeris Archeologica 1883, p. 245 f. The foreign worship would then start to receive support from locals in the host city (many of whom were initially from the poorer classes), and in this manner, the new religion would establish a presence in its adopted city. (Pure Athenian citizens make up the society of the Dionysiastai in the Peiraeus, second century BCE, Ath. Mitt. ix, 288 = CIA. iv, 2, 623 d.)

4 The Bendideia early became a state festival in Athens (even fifth century, CIA. i, 210, fr. K, p. 93). An allusion in Plato (Rp. 327 A), however, shows that the Thracians (who must have introduced the cult of Bendis into Athens, or at least into the Peiraeus, the home of most θίασοι) still kept up a special worship of their goddess in their own manner, side by side with the Hellenized cult. It appears at least as if the worship in its remodelled Greek form seemed to them no longer the right one. (Bendis, too, like Dionysos, is a divinity of both this world and the next: see Hsch. δίλογχον.)

4 The Bendideia quickly became a state festival in Athens (even in the fifth century, CIA. i, 210, fr. K, p. 93). An allusion in Plato (Rp. 327 A), however, indicates that the Thracians (who likely introduced the cult of Bendis into Athens, or at least into the Peiraeus, where most of the θίασοι lived) still maintained a unique form of worship for their goddess alongside the Hellenized version. It seems that the remodeled Greek worship no longer felt right to them. (Bendis, like Dionysos, is a deity of both this world and the next: see Hsch. double spear.)

5 Alleged traces of Orphic influence on special sections of the Iliad (Διὸς ἀπάτη) or the Odyssey are entirely illusory, nor did the Orphic doctrines exert any influence on the Hesiodic Theogony. On the other hand, Orphism was itself strongly affected by the primitive Greek theology the fragments of which were put together in the Hesiodic poem.

5 Any supposed traces of Orphic influence on certain parts of the Iliad (Deceit of Zeus) or the Odyssey are completely imaginary, and the Orphic beliefs did not impact the Hesiodic Theogony. However, Orphism was significantly influenced by the early Greek theology, the remnants of which were compiled in the Hesiodic poem.

6 Ὀνομάκριτος . . . Διονύσῳ συνέθηκεν ὄργια, Paus. 8, 37, 5. 349

6 Onomakritos... he established rituals for Dionysus., Paus. 8, 37, 5. 349

7 Among the writers of Orphic poems mentioned by (1) Clem. Al., Str. 1, 21, p. 397 P. (from Epigenes) and (2) Suidas (from Epigenes and another authority: both Su. and Clem. probably got their information through the mediation of D.H.)—two certain Pythagoreans are named, Brotinos (of Kroton or Metapontum) and Kerkops (not the Milesian). [Abel, Orphica, p. 139.] From lower Italy or Sicily come: Zopyros of Herakleia (the same person is probably meant by Iamb., VP. 190, 5 N., when he counts Zopyros among the Pythagoreans coming from Tarentum), Orpheus of Kroton, Orpheus of Kamarina (Suid.), Timokles of Syracuse. Pythagoras himself is mentioned among the writers of Orphic poems in the Τριαγμοί of [Ion] (at least as early as the beginning of the fourth century). Apart from these the only names of conjectured composers of Orphic poems are: Theognetos ὁ Θετταλός, Prodikos of Samos, Herodikos of Perinthos, Persinos of Miletos; all of whom are unknown to us except Persinos, whom Obrecht not improbably identifies with the court poet of Euboulos of Atarneus mentioned by Poll. ix, 93 (cf. Lob. 359 f. Bgk., PLG. iii, 655). In this case he is an Orphic of a much later period.

7 Among the writers of Orphic poems mentioned by (1) Clem. Al., Str. 1, 21, p. 397 P. (from Epigenes) and (2) Suidas (from Epigenes and another source: both Su. and Clem. likely obtained their information through D.H.)—two specific Pythagoreans are named, Brotinos (from Kroton or Metapontum) and Kerkops (not the Milesian). [Abel, Orphica, p. 139.] From lower Italy or Sicily come: Zopyros of Herakleia (the same person is probably referred to by Iamb., VP. 190, 5 N., when he lists Zopyros among the Pythagoreans from Tarentum), Orpheus of Kroton, Orpheus of Kamarina (Suid.), and Timokles of Syracuse. Pythagoras himself is mentioned among the writers of Orphic poems in the Tragedies of [Ion] (at least as early as the beginning of the fourth century). Besides these, the only names of presumed composers of Orphic poems are: Theognetos The Thessalian, Prodikos of Samos, Herodikos of Perinthos, and Persinos of Miletos; all of whom are unknown to us except for Persinos, who Obrecht likely identifies as the court poet of Euboulos of Atarneus mentioned by Poll. ix, 93 (cf. Lob. 359 f. Bgk., PLG. iii, 655). In this case, he is an Orphic from a much later period.

8 ὁμολογέουσι δὲ (sc. Αἰγύπτιοι) ταῦτα (prohibition to bury the dead in woollen clothing) τοῖσι Ὀρφικοῖσι καλεομένοισι, καὶ Βακχικοῖσι, ἐοῦσι δὲ Αἰγυπτίοισι καὶ Πυθαγορείοισι, Hdt. ii, 81. There can be no doubt that Hdt. in these words meant to derive the Ὀρφικὰ καὶ Βακχικά (the four datives are all neuters, not masc.) from the Αἰγύπτια καὶ Πυθαγόρεια, i.e. the Pythagorean ordinances which were themselves derived from Egypt (cf. Gomperz, Sitzb. Wien. Ak. 1886, p. 1032). If he had regarded the Πυθαγόρεια as entirely independent of the Αἰγύπτια (and the Ὀρφικά as independent of the Pythag.) he certainly could not have brought them in here. (This answers Zeller, Ber. Berlin. Ak. 1889, p. 994, who introduces a comma before καὶ Πυθ.)—It is equally impossible (with Maass, Orpheus, p. 165, 1895), to connect the ἐοῦσι δὲ Αἰγυπτίοισι with Βακχικοῖσι only; it must of necessity go with τοῖσι Ὀρφικοῖσι as well; for it is the whole point of Hdt.’s note to show that the religious usage which he mentions has, like so much else of the kind in Greece wherever it may be found, been borrowed from Egypt, and “is Egyptian”. In this he would fail completely if he did not regard the Ὀρφικά (and hence also the Πυθαγόρεια) as Αἰγύπτια ἐόντα and clearly say so. Hdt. certainly has no idea, as Maass would have us believe, of making a generic distinction between Ὀρφικά and Βακχικά: Βακχ. is the name of the genus of which Ὀρφ. is the species.—“the Ὀρφικά, and the Βακχικά in general.” Not all Βακχικά are Ὀρφικά. This use of καὶ whereby the whole is added subsequently to the part is perfectly regular and legitimate (it may also add the part to the whole as in the cases adduced by Maass, 166 n.: τὰς Διονυσιακὰς καὶ τὰς Ὀρφικάς, etc.). Hdt. mentions the Πυθαγόρεια last in order to indicate by what intermediate step the Egyptian element in the first-mentioned Ὀρφικά was specially assisted—he has further in ii, 123, shown clearly enough that he regarded Pythagoras as one of the pupils of the Egyptians (P. in any case is one of the teachers of immortality there referred to). This is also obvious from his whole attitude.—Hdt.’s opinion does not in any case oblige us to believe in it. He was forced to regard Pythagoras as the earliest author of Orphic doctrine because his connexion with Egypt seemed certain (cf. Hdt. ii, 123) while that of the Ὀρφικοί themselves was not so: in this way only could Hdt. seem to prove the Egyptian origin of that doctrine.—The priority of the Orphics is often supposed to be proved by the witness of Philolaos (fr. 14 D.) ap. Clem. Al., Str. 350 3, 3, p. 518 P. (and cf. Cic., Hortens. fr. 85 Or.); it must be admitted, however, that the passage does not prove what it is supposed to do.

8 They’re in agreement that (i.e. the Egyptians)these (the prohibition to bury the dead in woollen clothing) to those referred to as Orphic and Bacchic, who are also Egyptians and Pythagoreans, Hdt. ii, 81. There's no doubt that Hdt. meant to connect the Mystical and festive (the four datives are all neuter, not masculine) with the Egyptian and Pythagorean teachings, which were themselves derived from Egypt (cf. Gomperz, Sitzb. Wien. Ak. 1886, p. 1032). If he had viewed the Pythagorean ideas as completely separate from the Egyptian (and the Mystical as separate from the Pythagorean), he certainly wouldn’t have included them here. (This counters Zeller, Ber. Berlin. Ak. 1889, p. 994, who puts a comma before and Pyth.)—It's also impossible (with Maass, Orpheus, p. 165, 1895) to link the Egyptians only with the Bacchanal practices; it must necessarily include the Mystical practices as well; for the main point of Hdt.’s note is to show that the religious practice he mentions, like many others found in Greece, was borrowed from Egypt and “is Egyptian.” He would completely miss this point if he didn’t view the Mysterious ideas (and therefore also the Pythagorean theorem) as Egyptian origin and make that clear. Hdt. definitely doesn’t think, as Maass suggests, that there’s a generic distinction between Mysterious and Bacchanalian: Bacchus-themed is the broader category of which Mysterious is a specific group.—“the Mystical and the Bacchanalian in general.” Not all Bacchic practices are Mystical. This usage of and where the whole is added to the part is perfectly normal and acceptable (it can also combine the part with the whole, as illustrated by Maass, 166 n.: the Dionysian and the Orphic, etc.). Hdt. mentions the Pythagorean theorem ideas last to indicate the intermediate step by which the Egyptian aspect in the previously mentioned Mystical was specifically influenced—he has further shown in ii, 123, that he viewed Pythagoras as one of the students of the Egyptians (P. is in any case one of the teachers of immortality mentioned there). This is also evident from his overall approach.—Hdt.’s views do not compel us to accept them as truth. He seemed to consider Pythagoras as the earliest source of Orphic doctrine because his connection to Egypt appeared certain (cf. Hdt. ii, 123), while that of the Orphics was not, allowing him to establish the perceived Egyptian origin of that doctrine. —The precedence of the Orphics is often claimed to be supported by the testimony of Philolaos (fr. 14 D.) to Clem. Al., Str. 350 3, 3, p. 518 P. (and cf. Cic., Hortens. fr. 85 Or.); however, it must be acknowledged that the passage does not prove what it is believed to demonstrate.

9 Frr. 143–51 (cf. Lob. 715 ff.). Here, indeed, Orphic and Pythagorean doctrine are mixed up inextricably. Fr. 143 (Πυθαγορείως τε καὶ Ὀρφικῶς Syrian.) belongs to the εἰς τὸν ἀριθμὸν Πυθαγόρειος ὕμνος which is several times distinctly so called by Proclus. (The frr. are in Nauck, Iamb., VP., p. 228. fr. iii). Fr. 147 (Lyd. Mens.) obviously comes from the same (Nauck, p. 234, fr. ix). The same is at least highly probable of the frr. 144–6, 148–51. Probably what Orpheus says of the number 12 comes from the same ὕμνος (ap. Procl. in Rp. ii, 131, 10 Kroll). Proclus, however (in Rp. 169, 25 K.), also cites ll. 2–5 from the ὕμνος (Nauck, fr. iii) but this time attributes them to an εἰς τὸν ἀριθμὸν Ὁρφικὸς ὕμνος. This Orphico-Pythagorean ὕμνος had at any rate nothing to do with the (Rhaps.) Theogony of Orpheus. On the other hand, the words τετράδα τετρακέρατον, which acc. to Procl. in Rp. 169, 29 K., occurred μυριάκις in the Ὀρφικὴ θεολογία, come from the Theogony. They were possibly used as a title of Zagreus the κερόεν βρέφος (Nonn., D. vi, 165): though what is here said by Proclus about the Διονυσιακὴ (i.e. of Zagreus) θεότης, viz. that it τετράς ἐστιν, was applied rather to the four-eyed Orphic Phanes by Hermias (fr. 64 Ab.).

9 Frr. 143–51 (cf. Lob. 715 ff.). Here, indeed, Orphic and Pythagorean teachings are mixed together inseparably. Fr. 143 (Pythagorean and Orphic Syrian.) belongs to the Pythagorean hymn which is distinctly referenced several times by Proclus. (The frr. are in Nauck, Iamb., VP., p. 228. fr. iii). Fr. 147 (Lyd. Mens.) clearly comes from the same source (Nauck, p. 234, fr. ix). It is at least very likely that frr. 144–6, 148–51 also come from there. What Orpheus says about the number 12 probably originates from the same hymn (ap. Procl. in Rp. ii, 131, 10 Kroll). Proclus, however (in Rp. 169, 25 K.), also cites lines 2–5 from the hymn (Nauck, fr. iii) but this time attributes them to an to the number Orphic hymn. This Orphico-Pythagorean hymn had nothing to do with the (Rhaps.) Theogony of Orpheus. On the other hand, the words tetrahedron, which according to Procl. in Rp. 169, 29 K., appeared myriad in the Orphic theology, come from the Theogony. They were possibly used as a title for Zagreus the honeyed baby (Nonn., D. vi, 165): though what Proclus mentions about the Dionysian (i.e. of Zagreus) divinity, that it it’s a square, was actually applied to the four-eyed Orphic Phanes by Hermias (fr. 64 Ab.).

10 On the other hand, there is much in Orphic theology and poetry that is taken immediately from the primitive Thracian worship of Dionysos and absent from Pythagorean teaching. This makes it very probable that even such theologoumena as are common to Orphism and Pythagoreanism really go back to the fanatical cult of Dionysos, or at least were easily thence derived by religious speculation: in this case the Orphics may well have got them from this original source of mystic lore that was common to both parties and not by the circuitous route of Pythagorean teaching. Orphism remained more closely attached to the common source than did Pythagoreanism, and may for that reason be regarded as somewhat older than its rival and be supposed to have originated independently of it.

10 On the other hand, much of Orphic theology and poetry comes directly from the ancient Thracian worship of Dionysus and is not found in Pythagorean teachings. This makes it very likely that even the ideas shared by both Orphism and Pythagoreanism actually trace back to the passionate cult of Dionysus, or at least were easily derived from it through religious speculation. In this case, the Orphics likely obtained these concepts from this original source of mystical knowledge that was shared by both groups, rather than through the indirect path of Pythagorean teachings. Orphism remained more closely connected to this common source than Pythagoreanism did, and for this reason, it may be considered somewhat older than its rival and assumed to have originated independently.

11 Zopyros of Herakleia, Orpheus of Kroton: Tz., Prol. in Aristoph. ([p. 20, 28 Kaibel, Com. Fr.] Ritschl, Opusc. i, 207); Suid. Ὀρφ. Κροτωνιάτης (from Asklepiades of Myrlea).

11 Zopyros of Herakleia, Orpheus of Kroton: Tz., Prol. in Aristoph. ([p. 20, 28 Kaibel, Com. Fr.] Ritschl, Opusc. i, 207); Suid. Orph. Crotonean (from Asklepiades of Myrlea).

12 We may not simply take it for granted that the account given in Dem. 18, 259–60, of the nocturnal initiations and the processions by day through the city held by a mystical sect, is intended to describe the secret mysteries of an Orphic conventicle (as Lob. does 646 ff., 652 ff., 695 f.). The explanation of the ἀπομάττειν τῷ πηλῷ of that passage by reference to the specially Orphic myth of Zagreus and the Titans is arbitrary in itself and hard to reconcile with the language of Demosth. (Harp. and Phot. are responsible for this expl.) Hardly more successful is the derivation of the call ἄττης ὕης from the ἄτη of Dionysos (Zagreus) on being torn to pieces by the Titans: EM. 163, 63. A definite connexion undoubtedly does exist between the Ὀρφικὰ ὄργια and the Σαβάζια καὶ Μητρῷα (Str. 471) described by Dem.; but the Orphics were never called worshippers of Sabazios nor their god Σαβάζιος, and it seems likely that their secret worship was different from the ceremonies of the Σαβαζιασταί that Dem. had in view (the latter may have retained more of the primitive barbaric ritual: cf. the ins. given in Ἐφ. Ἀρχ. 1883, p. 245 f. = CIA. iv, Supp. ii, n. 626 b; from the end of second century B.C.).

12 We shouldn’t automatically assume that the account in Dem. 18, 259–60, about the night initiations and daytime processions through the city by a secret sect is meant to describe the hidden rituals of an Orphic group (as Lob. does 646 ff., 652 ff., 695 f.). The interpretation of the wiping off the dirt in that passage, linking it to the specific Orphic myth of Zagreus and the Titans, is arbitrary and difficult to reconcile with Demosthenes' language. (Harp. and Phot. are responsible for this explanation.) The derivation of the call No equivalent modern phrase. from the error of Dionysus (Zagreus) when being torn apart by the Titans is also not very convincing: EM. 163, 63. There is definitely a connection between the Orphic rituals and the Σαβάζια και Μητρῷα (Str. 471) described by Dem.; however, the Orphics were never referred to as worshipers of Sabazios, nor was their god Σαβάζιος, and it seems likely that their secret worship differed from the rituals of the Σαβαζιασταί that Dem. was referring to (the latter may have retained more primitive barbaric rituals: cf. the inscriptions provided in Εφ. Αρχ. 1883, p. 245 f. = CIA. iv, Supp. ii, n. 626 b; from the end of the second century BCE).

13 See Lob., Agl. 235 f., 237, 242 f.

13 See Lob., Agl. 235 f., 237, 242 f.

14 To attribute the practical side of Orphism to a late degeneration 351 of the once purely speculative character of the sect (as many have done) is a very arbitrary proceeding and quite unjustifiable on historical grounds. The fact that a clear description of this activity does not occur before the fourth century (in Plato) does not prove that it did not exist earlier. Apart from this an ὀρφεοτελεστής named Philippos is mentioned by Plu., Apoph. Lac. 224 E as a contemporary of King Leotychidas II of Sparta (reigned 491–469). This evidence is not to be so easily set aside, as K. O. Müller, Introd. Scient. Myth. 311 ff., would like to do. The Orphic sect from the very beginning derived its strength from its telestic and kathartic practices.

14 To claim that the practical aspects of Orphism are a result of a late decline from the once purely theoretical nature of the sect (as many have suggested) is arbitrary and cannot be justified historically. The fact that a clear description of this activity doesn't appear until the fourth century (in Plato) doesn't mean it didn't exist before then. Additionally, a practitioner named Philippos is mentioned by Plutarch in Apoph. Lac. 224 E as a contemporary of King Leotychidas II of Sparta (who reigned from 491 to 469). This evidence should not be dismissed easily, as K. O. Müller does in Introd. Scient. Myth. 311 ff. The Orphic sect from the start drew its strength from its telestic and kathartic practices.

15 Thphr., Ch. 28 (16).

15 Thphr., Ch. 28 (16).

16 αὐτοῦ (Ὀρφέως) μὲν εἶναι τὰ δόγματα, ταῦτα δέ φησιν (Aristot.) Ὀνομάκριτον ἐν ἔπεσι κατατεῖναι Arist. π. φιλοσοφίας fr. 10 [7] Rose, Arist. Pseudepig.

16 The teachings of (Orpheus)are said to be this, (Aristot.) the name appears in the verse Arist. p. philosophy fr. 10 [7] Rose, Arist. Pseudepig.

17 Tatian, Gr. 41 (p. 42 Schw.), seems to speak only of redaction (συντετάχθαι) of the εἰς Ὀρφέα ἀναφερόμενα among already existing Orphic poems as the work of Onomakritos (in the same way Onomakr. is only the διαθέτης—the arranger not the author—of the χρησμοί of “Mousaios”, Hdt. vii, 6). Traces of an external linking-together of the individual poems of Orpheus in a “redaction” are not wanting (cf. the linking-together of the poems of the Epic Cycle or of the corpus Hesiodeum): first of all coming in all probability the greater κρατήρ (as in the enumeration of Clem. Al., Str. i, 21, p. 397 P.); see Lob. 376, 417, 469.—Clem. Al., Str. i, p. 397 P. (and Eus., PE. 10, 11, p. 495 D) is only derived from Tatian, though Onomakr. is here definitely called the author of the εἰς Ὀρφέα φερόμενα ποιήματα. Onomakr. seems also to have been simply regarded as the author of the Ὀρφικά in the doxographical excerpt ap. S.E. P. iii, 30 = M. 9, 361, p. 287 Mutschm.; cf. Gal., H. Philos. (Dox., p. 610, 15): Ὀνομάκριτος ἐν τοῖς Ὀρφικοῖς.—On the other hand, in the—admittedly incomplete—enumeration of Orphic poems in Clem. Al., Str. i, 21, p. 397 P., not one is attributed to Onomakr., and in Suid. Ὀρφεὺς he is only given the χρησμοί (no confusion with the χρησμοί of Mousaios is to be suspected here) and the τελεταί. Paus. (8, 37, 5) mentions (without naming them) ἔπη of Onomakr. (cf. Ritschl, Opusc. i, 241). Some at least of the poetry going under the name of Orpheus must have been ascribed to Onomakr. by Arist. (fr. 10 [7 Teubn.]).

17 Tatian, Gr. 41 (p. 42 Schw.), seems to refer only to the redaction (συντεθέντα) of the to Orpheus among already existing Orphic poems as the work of Onomakritos (similarly, Onomakr. is just the vendor—the arranger, not the author—of the oracles of “Mousaios”, Hdt. vii, 6). There are signs of an external connection among the individual poems of Orpheus in a “redaction” (see the connection of the poems of the Epic Cycle or the corpus Hesiodeum): first of all, probably the greater krater (as in the listing by Clem. Al., Str. i, 21, p. 397 P.); see Lob. 376, 417, 469.—Clem. Al., Str. i, p. 397 P. (and Eus., PE. 10, 11, p. 495 D) is derived solely from Tatian, although Onomakr. is specifically called the author of the Orphic poems. Onomakr. seems also to have been viewed simply as the author of the Orphic in the doxographical excerpt ap. S.E. P. iii, 30 = M. 9, 361, p. 287 Mutschm.; cf. Gal., H. Philos. (Dox., p. 610, 15): Ὀνομάκριτος in the Orphics.—Conversely, in the—admittedly incomplete—listing of Orphic poems in Clem. Al., Str. i, 21, p. 397 P., not one is credited to Onomakr., and in Suid. Orpheus, he is only associated with the oracles (no mix-up with the oracles of Mousaios should be suspected here) and the teletai. Paus. (8, 37, 5) mentions (without naming them) epic of Onomakr. (cf. Ritschl, Opusc. i, 241). Some of the poetry attributed to Orpheus must have been assigned to Onomakr. by Arist. (fr. 10 [7 Teubn.]).

18 Suid. Ὀρφεύς, 2721 A Gaisf.

18 Suid. Orpheus, 2721 A Gaisf.

19 Onomakr. εἶναι τοὺς Τιτᾶνας τῷ Διονύσῳ τῶν παθημάτων ἐποίησεν αὐτουργούς, Paus. 8, 37, 5. Lob., p. 335, thinks this refers to the “Theogony”: but no authority attributes a single one of the several Orphic Theogonies to Onomakr. as its real author. We should rather be inclined to think of the τελεταί which is distinctly ascribed to Onomakr. and which at least dealt with the practical side of worship: cf. Pl., Rp. 364 E–365 A, λύσεις, καθαρμοί ἀδικημάτων κτλ. ἃς δὴ τελετὰς καλοῦσιν (but it was not that the mystical βίβλοι were called τελεταί as Gruppe, Gr. Culte u. Mythen, i, 640, mistakenly supposes: he is otherwise quite right in his protest against Abel’s treatment of the τελεταί). They must almost necessarily have dealt with the reproduction of the πάθη τοῦ Διονύσου (as providing the ἱερὸς λόγος to the δρώμενα), and, as the central idea of the orgiastic cult, must have included the most important circumstance of the Orphic τελεταί (see D.S. 5, 75, 4; Clem. Al., Protr. ii, 17, p. 15 P.).

19 Onomakr. The Titans were blamed for the sufferings of Dionysus., Paus. 8, 37, 5. Lob., p. 335, thinks this refers to the “Theogony”: but no source credits any of the various Orphic Theogonies to Onomakr. as its actual creator. We should instead consider the ceremonies which are clearly attributed to Onomakr. and which at least addressed the practical aspects of worship: cf. Pl., Rp. 364 E–365 A, purifications, remedies for wrongs, etc., known as rites (but it was not that the mystical books were called rituals as Gruppe, Gr. Culte u. Mythen, i, 640, wrongly claims: he is otherwise correct in his criticism of Abel’s treatment of the rituals). They must have necessarily dealt with the reenactment of the Dionysus's struggles (as providing the holy word to the shows), and, as the central theme of the orgiastic cult, must have included the most significant aspect of the Orphic rituals (see D.S. 5, 75, 4; Clem. Al., Protr. ii, 17, p. 15 P.).

20 One of the poems (perhaps indeed the poem of the ῥαψῳδίαι, and in that case the ἱερὸς λόγος as well) made Orpheus distinctly appeal to a revelation made to him by Apollo: fr. 49 (see Lob. 469). 352

20 One of the poems (possibly the poem of the rhapsodies, and in that case the sacred word as well) had Orpheus clearly invoke a revelation he received from Apollo: fr. 49 (see Lob. 469). 352

21 Besides the three Theogonies distinguished by Damascius there were (apart from other more doubtful traces) at least two other variations of the same theme: see fr. 85 (Alex. Aphrod.) and frr. 37; 38 (Clem. Rom.); cf. Gruppe, i, 640 f.—The series of divine rulers given by “Orpheus” acc. to Nigid. Fig. ap. Serv. Ecl. iv, 10 (fr. 248 Ab.), conflicts with all the other Theogonies but agrees in some particulars with Lact. i, 13 (fr. 243). Still, this remark need not necessarily have been taken from any Orphic “Theogony”.

21 Besides the three Theogonies identified by Damascius, there were (along with other less certain references) at least two other variations of the same theme: see fr. 85 (Alex. Aphrod.) and frr. 37; 38 (Clem. Rom.); cf. Gruppe, i, 640 f.—The list of divine rulers attributed to “Orpheus” according to Nigid. Fig. ap. Serv. Ecl. iv, 10 (fr. 248 Ab.) conflicts with all the other Theogonies but has some similarities with Lact. i, 13 (fr. 243). However, this observation doesn't necessarily have to have come from any Orphic “Theogony.”

22 (Zeus) . . . πρωτογόνοιο χανὸν μένος Ἠρικαπαίου, τῶν πάντων δέμας εἶχεν ἑῇ ἐνὶ γαστέρι κοίλῃ, fr. 120 (from the Rhapsodiai). We are accustomed to read here χανών with Zoëga (Abh. 262 f.): but χανών does not mean “catching up or devouring” [Zo.]; at most it might mean, in bad late-Greek, just the opposite of this—“abandoning” (transitive). Lobeck’s explanation (p. 519 n.) is also unsatisfactory. The word may have been originally χαδών.

22 (Zeus) . . . the primal rage of Erikepaios, who held the form of all things within her hollow belly, fr. 120 (from the Rhapsodiai). We usually interpret this as χανών with Zoëga (Abh. 262 f.): but χανών doesn’t mean “catching up or devouring” [Zo.]; at most it might mean, in poor late-Greek, just the opposite of this—“abandoning” (transitive). Lobeck’s explanation (p. 519 n.) is also unsatisfactory. The word may have originally been χαδών.

23 The line occurred in various forms in the Theogonic poem; frr. 33 (Plato?); 46 [Arist.] de Mundo); 123 (Rhapsod).; see Lob. 520–32. It seems certain then (Gruppe’s doubts go too far: Rhaps. Theog. 704 ff.) that the line appeared in the oldest form of Orphic Theogony and was merely borrowed thence, like so much else that was ancient, by the Rhapsod. Theogony (i.e. the words, Ζεὺς κεφαλὴ κτλ. which would be the oldest form, as Gruppe rightly remarks: κεφαλὴ = τελευτή; cf. Pl., Ti. 69 B). Even the writer of the speech against Aristogeiton A ([Dem.] 25), an Orphic adherent, appears, as Lob. remarks, to allude to the words in § 8.

23 The line appeared in different forms in the Theogonic poem; frr. 33 (Plato?); 46 [Arist.] de Mundo; 123 (Rhapsod.); see Lob. 520–32. It seems certain then (Gruppe’s doubts are excessive: Rhaps. Theog. 704 ff.) that the line was found in the earliest version of the Orphic Theogony and was simply borrowed from there, just like many ancient elements, by the Rhapsod. Theogony (i.e., the phrases, Ζεὺς, the head, etc. which would represent the oldest version, as Gruppe correctly points out: head = end; cf. Pl., Ti. 69 B). Even the author of the speech against Aristogeiton A ([Dem.] 25), who was an Orphic supporter, seems, as Lob. notes, to reference the words in § 8.

24 Theokrasia must have belonged to Orphic theology from the outset: Lob. 614; though the most extreme examples of this may perhaps come from later poems: frr. 167; 169 (Macr.); 168 (D.S.); 201 (Rhaps.), etc., being probably derived from the “Little Krater” (fr. 160), in which Chrysippos seems to be imitated (Lob. 735 and fr. 164), and from the Διαθῆκαι, fr. 7 (J.M.) a forgery in Judaeo-Christian interests which nevertheless made use of many ancient pieces of Orphic literature (the ἱερὸς λόγος: Lob. 450 ff., 454).—Theokrasia is met with even in the orthodox poets of the fifth century, though they did not invent it; the “theologoi” of the sixth century Epimenides and Pherekydes were as familiar with it as were the Orphics; cf. Kern, de Theogon. 92.

24 Theokrasia must have been part of Orphic theology from the beginning: Lob. 614; though the most extreme examples may come from later poems: frr. 167; 169 (Macr.); 168 (D.S.); 201 (Rhaps.), etc., which are probably derived from the “Little Krater” (fr. 160), where Chrysippos seems to be imitated (Lob. 735 and fr. 164), and from the Διαθήκες, fr. 7 (J.M.), a forgery with Judaeo-Christian interests that still utilized many ancient pieces of Orphic literature (the sacred text: Lob. 450 ff., 454).—Theokrasia is even found in the orthodox poets of the fifth century, although they didn’t invent it; the sixth-century “theologoi” Epimenides and Pherekydes were as familiar with it as the Orphics were; cf. Kern, de Theogon. 92.

25 Check __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

26 It must have been chiefly the religious significance of the gods which caused the retention of their personalities and prevented them from fading into mere personifications of abstract ideas or elementary powers with which religion could have had nothing further to do.

26 It was probably the religious importance of the gods that kept their distinct personalities alive and stopped them from becoming just symbols of abstract concepts or basic forces that religion wouldn’t have been connected to anymore.

27 In the statements of the Neoplatonic writers this first Orphic Dionysos is regularly called Διόνυσος simply (perhaps also Βάκχος: fr. 192). Nonnus in recounting the Orphic legend calls him Zagreus: D. vi, 165; cf. Ζαγρέα γειναμένη (of Perseph.) with clear allusion to Callim. fr. 171, υἷα Διώνυσον Ζαγρέα γειναμένη. Callim. here, as elsewhere, seems to have in mind the Orphic story. Tz. on Lyc. 355 calls the god of the Orphic legend Διόνυσον τὸν καὶ Ζαγρέα καλούμενον. Ζαγρεύς the great Hunter is a name of the all-absorbing Hades: thus also the Alkmaionis fr. 3 Kink. Zagreus is identified with the Dionysos of nocturnal revelry in E., Kret. fr. 472, 10 (a reference in Ba. 1181 Kirchh.); and see above, chap. viii, n. 28. This Dionysos is regarded as a χθόνιος (see Hsch. Ζαγρεύς) and this must indubitably have been quite familiar to the poets who made him the son of Persephone: χθόνιος ὁ τῆς Περσεφόνης Διόνυσος (Harp. λεύκη). 353 They were as clearly conscious as was Herakleitos of the fact that ὡυτὸς Ἅιδης καὶ Διόνυσος, whereas this consciousness was undoubtedly obscured in the public ceremonial of Dionysos-worship (to which, however, Hcl.’s saying refers). Zagreus-Dionysos was never identified with the Ἴακχος of the Eleusinia (to which Orph. fr. 215, l. 2 refers); though Dionysos alone was often so identified.

27 In the writings of Neoplatonic authors, this first Orphic Dionysus is usually referred to simply as Dionysus (and possibly also Bacchus: fr. 192). Nonnus, when recounting the Orphic legend, calls him Zagreus: D. vi, 165; cf. The Zaire being born (of Persephone) with a clear reference to Callim. fr. 171, daughter of Dionysus Zagreus. Callim. here, as elsewhere, appears to reference the Orphic story. Tz. on Lyc. 355 refers to the god of the Orphic legend as Dionysus, who is also called Zagreus. Zagreus., the great Hunter, a name linked to the all-consuming Hades: similarly in the Alkmaionis fr. 3 Kink. Zagreus is associated with the Dionysus of nighttime celebrations in E., Kret. fr. 472, 10 (as seen in Ba. 1181 Kirchh.); and see above, chap. viii, n. 28. This Dionysus is viewed as chthonic (see Hsch. Ζαγρεύς), and this must have been well known to the poets who depicted him as the son of Persephone: Underworld Dionysus of Persephone (Harp. λευκή). 353 They were as aware as Herakleitos of the fact that Hades and Dionysus, although this awareness was likely diminished in the public rituals of Dionysus worship (to which Hcl.’s remarks relate). Zagreus-Dionysus was never linked with the Iacchus of the Eleusinian mysteries (to which Orph. fr. 215, l. 2 refers); although Dionysus alone was frequently identified this way.

28 Ouranos casts the Titans into Tartaros: frr. 97, 100. Acc. to Procl. (fr. 205) and Arn. (196: prob. not from the Rhaps.) we should be led to suppose that the Titans after they had torn Zagreus in pieces were cast down to Tartaros by Zeus. In Arn. this is set down side by side with the statement that the Titans were destroyed by the lightning of Zeus (ἡ Τιτάνων κεραύνωσις, Plu., Es. Carn. 1, 7, p. 996 C), though obviously incompatible with the latter statement, as it is also (even more so) with the origin of mankind from the ashes of the Titans which is known not only to Olympiodoros (ad Phd., p. 68 Finckh: Lob. 566), but also to Proclus who got it from the “Rhapsodiai” (as also did Olymp.): Procl., in Rp. ii, 74, 29; i, 93 Kroll. It seems from this that Proclus (and perhaps Arn.) in error ascribed the καταταρτάρωσις of the Titans to Zeus instead of to Ouranos.

28 Ouranos throws the Titans into Tartaros: frr. 97, 100. According to Proclus (fr. 205) and Arn. (196: probably not from the Rhaps.), it seems that after the Titans tore Zagreus apart, they were sent down to Tartaros by Zeus. In Arn., this is mentioned alongside the claim that the Titans were destroyed by Zeus's lightning (The Titans' thunderstorm, Plu., Es. Carn. 1, 7, p. 996 C), which clearly conflicts with the latter statement, as it also (even more so) clashes with the idea that humanity originated from the ashes of the Titans, a notion known not only to Olympiodoros (ad Phd., p. 68 Finckh: Lob. 566) but also to Proclus, who obtained it from the “Rhapsodiai” (as did Olymp.): Procl., in Rp. ii, 74, 29; i, 93 Kroll. This suggests that Proclus (and possibly Arn.) mistakenly attributed the καταταρτάρωσις of the Titans to Zeus rather than to Ouranos.

29 Nonn. vi, 173; O., fr. 195. Perhaps Proclus is right in explaining this doubling of the god’s figure in the mirror as meaning his entrance upon the μεριστὴ δημιουργία. A reference to a similar explanation of this Διονύσου κάτοπτον occurs even in Plot. 4, 3, 12 (Lob. 555)—? also in the strange statement made by Marsilius Ficinus as to the crudelissimum apud Orpheum Narcissi fatum (was Zagreus another Narcissus?) fr. 315; cf. Plot. 1, 6, 8. The entry of the one origin of the universe into the multiplicity of phenomena is first clearly referred to in the dismemberment of Zagreus, but it would be quite like this symbol-loving poetry to introduce the same motif in a different form with a passing reference earlier in the poem.

29 Nonn. vi, 173; O., fr. 195. Maybe Proclus is correct in interpreting the doubling of the god's image in the mirror as representing his emergence into the shared creation. A similar explanation of this Διονύσου ταινία can even be found in Plot. 4, 3, 12 (Lob. 555)—also in the unusual claim made by Marsilius Ficinus regarding the Narcissus's fate is extremely cruel at Orpheus. (was Zagreus another Narcissus?) fr. 315; cf. Plot. 1, 6, 8. The entry of the singular origin of the universe into the diversity of phenomena is first clearly mentioned in the dismemberment of Zagreus, but it’s typical of this symbol-loving poetry to introduce the same theme in a different way with a brief reference earlier in the poem.

30 Nonn., D. vi, 197 ff.

30 Nonn., D. vi, 197 ff.

31 Paus. 8, 37, 5.

31 Pause. 8, 37, 5.

32 Procl., O., frr. 195, 198, 199. In any case Nonn. vi, 169 ff. is following the Rhapsodiai.

32 Procl., O., frr. 195, 198, 199. In any case, Nonn. vi, 169 ff. is following the Rhapsodiai.

33 Callim. and Euphor. knew of the dismemberment of Dionysos by the Titans: Tz. ad Lyc. 208 (from the completer version in EM.). In any case it is not from the Rhaps. that this legend is also known to D.S. 5, 75, 4; Cornut. 30, p. 62, 10 Lang; Plu., Es. Carn. 1, 7, p. 996 C; Is. et Os. 35, p. 364 F; Clem. Al. (see Orph. frr. 196, 200).—A roughly caricatured drawing on a hydria belonging to the early fourth century found at Rhodos and made probably in Attica appears in JHS. xi (1890), p. 243; where it is said to represent the dismemberment of Zagreus as conceived by Orphics. The picture, however, does not agree at all with the meaning thus attributed to it; the interpretation cannot be the right one.

33 Callim. and Euphor. were aware of the dismemberment of Dionysos by the Titans: Tz. ad Lyc. 208 (from the complete version in EM.). In any case, this legend is not also known from the Rhaps. to D.S. 5, 75, 4; Cornut. 30, p. 62, 10 Lang; Plu., Es. Carn. 1, 7, p. 996 C; Is. et Os. 35, p. 364 F; Clem. Al. (see Orph. frr. 196, 200).—A roughly caricatured drawing on a hydria from the early fourth century found in Rhodes and likely made in Attica appears in JHS. xi (1890), p. 243; it is said to depict the dismemberment of Zagreus as interpreted by the Orphics. However, the image does not align with the meaning that has been assigned to it; the interpretation cannot be correct.

34 A true ἱερὸς λόγος, i.e. an account of the origin of ritual acts founded upon myth or legend. (The Orphics had such accounts, e.g. of the prohibition against being buried in woollen clothing: Hdt. ii, 81 fin.)

34 A true sacred discourse, meaning a description of the origins of ritual practices based on myth or legend. (The Orphics had these kinds of accounts, such as the one about the ban on being buried in woollen clothing: Hdt. ii, 81 fin.)

35 That the tearing in pieces of the bull in the primitive Thracian manner occurred also in the Orphic ὄργια may perhaps be deduced from the fact that in the legend Orpheus himself is torn in pieces by the Mainads. The priest stands in the place of the god: what the god suffers in the ritual δρώμενα that the priest suffers too. This is frequently met with. Ὀρφεὺς ἅτε τῶν Διονύσου τελετῶν ἡγεμὼν γενόμενος τὰ ὅμοια παθεῖν λέγεται τῷ σφετέρῳ θεῷ, Procl. in 354 Rp. i, 175 Kr. The ancients were fully aware that the bull torn in pieces in the Bacchic orgies represented the god himself (and this not only in Orphic ritual but from the beginning in the Thracian worship): the idea is often expressed (see e.g. Firm. Mat., Error. P.R. vi, 5), but nowhere more clearly than in the Orphic ἱερὸς λόγος.

35 The tearing apart of the bull in the ancient Thracian way also happened in the Orphic Rituals, which can be inferred from the legend where Orpheus is himself torn apart by the Maenads. The priest acts in place of the god: whatever the god endures in the ritual events, the priest also endures. This is a common occurrence. Orpheus, as the leader of the Dionysian rituals, is said to have experienced similar sufferings attributed to his own god., Procl. in 354 Rp. i, 175 Kr. The ancients knew that the bull torn apart in the Bacchic orgies symbolized the god himself (not only in Orphic rituals but from the start in Thracian worship): this idea is often stated (see e.g. Firm. Mat., Error. P.R. vi, 5), but nowhere more clearly than in the Orphic sacred word.

36 The introduction of the Titans from Hellenic mythology into the Thracian myth is clearly described as the work of Onomakritos by Paus. 8, 37, 5.

36 The addition of the Titans from Greek mythology into Thracian mythology is clearly attributed to the work of Onomakritos by Paus. 8, 37, 5.

37 Τιτῆνες κεκομῆται, ὑπέρβιον ἠτορ ἔχοντες, fr. 102. ἀμείλιχον ἠτορ ἔχοντες καὶ φύσιν ἐκνομίην, fr. 97. As early as Hesiod the Titans are hated by their father as δεινότατοι παίδων (Theog. 155). Τιτανικὴ φύσις is the evil character that cannot keep an oath: Pl., Lg. 701 C; Cic., Lg. iii, 5; impios Titanas, Hor., O. 3, 4, 42.

37 Titans are depicted with long hair, embodying a powerful spirit., fr. 102. with a strong spirit and a nature that breaks boundaries, fr. 97. Even in Hesiod's time, the Titans are despised by their father as scaring kids (Theog. 155). Titanic vibe embodies the evil that cannot uphold a promise: Pl., Lg. 701 C; Cic., Lg. iii, 5; impious Titans, Hor., O. 3, 4, 42.

38 This explanation of the διαμελισμός of Zagreus is often put forward (though subtilized into a Neoplatonic sense) by those who use the Orphic Rhapsodiai: see Lob. 710 ff. But even Plutarch has something of the sort (E ap. D. 9, p. 389 A), and it cannot be doubted that this (apart from its Platonist wrappings) was the meaning of the legend in the mind of its first inventor. Nor can the conception that the separate existence (multiplicity) of things first came into the world by an act of impiety, have been strange to the theologoi of the sixth century: we must admit this at once on remembering the doctrine of Anaximander that the multiplicity of things which has arisen out of the original one ἄπειρον is in itself an ἀδικία for which it must pay “recompense and punishment” (fr. 2 Mull., 9 Diels). Such personification of the processes of nature and the reading of an ethical sense into them, combined as it was with a quietist tendency, was much more likely to have arisen in the fanciful minds of semi-philosophical mystics than to have been given to them by the philosophers.

38 This explanation of the mutilation of Zagreus is often presented (though refined into a Neoplatonic interpretation) by those who reference the Orphic Rhapsodiai: see Lob. 710 ff. But even Plutarch discusses something similar (E ap. D. 9, p. 389 A), and it’s clear that this (aside from its Platonist framing) was how the legend was understood by its original creator. Additionally, the idea that the separate existence (multiplicity) of things emerged in the world as a result of impiety likely wasn’t foreign to the theologoi of the sixth century: we must acknowledge this, especially when recalling Anaximander's doctrine that the diversity of things which arose from the original infinite is, in itself, an injustice for which it must face “recompense and punishment” (fr. 2 Mull., 9 Diels). This personification of natural processes and the interpretation of an ethical meaning in them, coupled with a quietist tendency, is more likely to have originated in the imaginative minds of semi-philosophical mystics than being provided to them by the philosophers.

39 See the accounts given in Lob. 565 f.: they come from the Rhapsodiai. The fact that the origin of men and the doctrine of Metempsychosis as well were dealt with in the Rhaps. follows from Procl. in Rp. ii, 338 Kroll. It must, however, have been from older Orphic poetry—at any rate, not from the Rhaps.—that the story was derived by D. Chr. 30, 10 f. Plutarch, too, does at least refer to it: τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν ἄλογον καὶ ἄτακτον καὶ βίαιον οἱ παλαιοὶ Τιτᾶνας ὠνόμασαν, Es. Carn. 1, 7, p. 996 C; and possibly Opp., H. v, 9–10; Ael. fr. 89, p. 230, 19 f. Herch. (Lob. 567 g). Even the words of Xenokrates (fr. 20, p. 166 Heinze) seem to allude to this Orphic myth. Thus the Rhapsodiai in this case also were following older Orphic teaching and poetry. Orph. H. 37 derives from a later age. What Nic. Th. 8 ff. reproduces (mistakenly?) as Hesiodic tradition was perhaps really an echo of Orphic poetry. Was the derivation of Man from the Titans suggested by still earlier fancies such as e.g. meet us in passages like h. Hom. Ap. 335 (137) f.: Τιτῆνές τε θεοὶ τῶν ἒξ ἄνδρες τε θεοί τε—? This is not Homeric (for all the Homeric πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε), though possibly it had a different sense from what it had for “Orpheus”.

39 Check out the accounts in Lob. 565 f.: they come from the Rhapsodies. The fact that the origins of humans and the idea of Metempsychosis were also discussed in the Rhapsodies is supported by Proclus in Rp. ii, 338 Kroll. However, it's likely that the story was derived from older Orphic poetry—not from the Rhapsodies—according to D. Chr. 30, 10 f. Plutarch also makes at least a reference to it: The ancient Titans referred to that which is irrational, chaotic, and violent as __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__., Es. Carn. 1, 7, p. 996 C; and possibly Opp., H. v, 9–10; Ael. fr. 89, p. 230, 19 f. Herch. (Lob. 567 g). Even the words of Xenocrates (fr. 20, p. 166 Heinze) seem to reference this Orphic myth. Thus, the Rhapsodies in this instance were also following older Orphic teachings and poetry. Orph. H. 37 comes from a later period. What Nic. Th. 8 ff. presents (mistakenly?) as Hesiodic tradition was perhaps really a reflection of Orphic poetry. Was the idea of humans deriving from the Titans inspired by even earlier notions, as seen in passages like h. Hom. Ap. 335 (137) f.: Titans and gods, the six men and divine beings.—? This isn't Homeric (despite the Homeric father of men and gods), but it possibly had a different meaning from what it had for “Orpheus.”

40 Dionysos is the last of the divine rulers of the world: frr. 114, 190. Hence δεσπότης ἡμῶν, Procl. in Crat., pp. 59, 114 Boiss. (though Procl. also speaks of e.g. Hermes as ὁ δεσπότης ὑμῶν in Cr., p. 73 B.). Dionysos is the sixth ruler; Zeus who came before him being the fifth: frr. 113 (85, 121, 122). The order given is: 1 Phanes, 2 Nyx, 3 Ouranos, 4 Kronos, 5 Zeus, 6 Dionysos. This is definitely stated by Syrian.: fr. 85 (Proclus follows his master: frr. 85, 121), and confirmed by the fragments of the Rhapsodiai: frr. 86, 87, 96, 113. It seems, however, as if Plato actually found this order (as Syrian. thought) 355 in the Orphic Theogony which he read. It is true that as their silence shows the Neoplatonists did not find the verse cited by Plato in the Rhapsodiai as they knew them. (Plato’s line is ἕκτῃ δ’ ἐν γενεῇ καταπαύσατε κόσμον ἀοιδῆς: Plu., E ap. D. 15, p. 391 D, has the meaningless θυμόν instead of κόσμον—did he read θεσμόν?) They were right, however, in deducing from the line that the ancient Orphic Theogony referred to by Plato also knew of six generations of the gods (following the Pythagorean τέλειος ἀριθμός?) and ended with the sixth generation. The verse was intended doubtless by Plato himself in rather a different sense and he only quotes it humorously (Gruppe differs; Rhaps. Theog. 693 f.). This passage therefore provides important evidence of the harmony that existed between the Rhapsodiai and the oldest Orphic Theogony in the general outlines of their construction. It is, of course, quite a different question whether the six rulers in the poem referred to by Plato were the same as those given by the Rhaps.; nor can we tell whether Dionysos there occupied the last place, though the predominance held by Dionysos in Orphic belief makes it very probable that he did.

40 Dionysos is the last of the divine rulers of the world: frr. 114, 190. Therefore, our lord, Procl. in Crat., pp. 59, 114 Boiss. (although Procl. also mentions Hermes as your master in Cr., p. 73 B.). Dionysos is the sixth ruler; Zeus, who came before him, is the fifth: frr. 113 (85, 121, 122). The order is: 1 Phanes, 2 Nyx, 3 Ouranos, 4 Kronos, 5 Zeus, 6 Dionysos. This is clearly stated by Syrian.: fr. 85 (Proclus follows his master: frr. 85, 121), and confirmed by the fragments of the Rhapsodiai: frr. 86, 87, 96, 113. However, it seems that Plato actually found this order (as Syrian. believed) 355 in the Orphic Theogony that he read. Indeed, their silence indicates that the Neoplatonists did not find the verse cited by Plato in the Rhapsodiai as they knew them. (Plato’s line is On the sixth generation, cease the world of song.: Plu., E ap. D. 15, p. 391 D, has the meaningless anger instead of world—did he read θεσμόν?) However, they were correct in inferring from the line that the ancient Orphic Theogony referenced by Plato also recognized six generations of the gods (following the Pythagorean perfect number?) and concluded with the sixth generation. The verse was likely intended by Plato in a different sense, and he quotes it humorously (Gruppe disagrees; Rhaps. Theog. 693 f.). This passage thus provides significant evidence of the harmony between the Rhapsodiai and the earliest Orphic Theogony in their general structure. It is, of course, a separate question whether the six rulers mentioned in the poem referenced by Plato were the same as those listed by the Rhaps.; nor can we determine whether Dionysos held the last position there, though his prominent place in Orphic belief makes it very likely that he did.

41 The authorities who speak of the origin of mankind from the ashes (or the blood) of the Titans (Lob. 565 ff.) express themselves in such a way that we are forced to suppose that they regarded this as essentially the first appearance of men. This, however, cannot be reconciled with what Proclus, as usual following the Rhapsodiai, says of the golden and silver ages of mankind under Phanes and Kronos, which then, and not till then, are followed by the third and last race, τὸ τιτανικὸν γένος: see fr. 244 and esp. in Rp. ii, 74 Kr. θνητοί in the reign of Phanes even occurs in the line quoted by Syrian. (in Ar. Meta. 935a 22 Us.) fr. 85. It is impossible to say whether this improvement upon the Hesiodic legend of the Ages of Mankind actually occurred in an ancient Orphic Theogony (the one used perhaps by Lactant.; O., fr. 243, 8; cf. 248), and was thence taken for the Rhapsodiai without being reconciled with the legend of the origin of men from the ashes of the Titans; or whether the two scarcely reconcilable accounts of the origin of men were somehow or other made to agree. (Fr. 246 [Plu.] prob. comes from a picture of the long life enjoyed by the earliest generations of men: see Lob. 513. This picture does not necessarily presuppose a series of several γενεαί before the Titanic race.)

41 The authorities who discuss the origin of humanity from the ashes (or blood) of the Titans (Lob. 565 ff.) express themselves in such a way that we have to assume they viewed this as essentially the first emergence of humans. However, this conflicts with what Proclus, following the Rhapsodiai, says about the golden and silver ages of humanity under Phanes and Kronos, which occur first, and only then is there the third and final race, the Titan race: see fr. 244 and especially in Rp. ii, 74 Kr. mortals during the reign of Phanes even appears in the line quoted by Syrian. (in Ar. Meta. 935a 22 Us.) fr. 85. It's impossible to determine whether this adaptation of the Hesiodic legend of the Ages of Mankind actually took place in an ancient Orphic Theogony (possibly the one referred to by Lactant.; O., fr. 243, 8; cf. 248) and was then used for the Rhapsodiai without reconciling it with the legend of humans originating from the ashes of the Titans, or if the two somewhat irreconcilable accounts of human origin were somehow made to fit together. (Fr. 246 [Plu.] likely comes from a depiction of the long lifespan enjoyed by the earliest generations of humans: see Lob. 513. This depiction doesn’t necessarily imply a series of several generations before the Titanic race.)

42 μέρος αὐτοῦ (τοῦ Διονύσου) ἐσμέν, Olymp. (from Orphic doctrine) in Pl. Phd., p. 3 Finckh. ὁ ἐν ἡμῖν νοῦς Διονυσιακός ἐστιν καὶ ἄγαλμα ὄντως τοῦ Διονύσου, Procl. in Crat., p. 82 Boiss. The Hellenes are accustomed to make use of the dismemberment, re-integration and resuscitation of Dionysos εἰς τὸν περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς λόγον ἀνάγειν καὶ τροπολογεῖν, Orig., Cels. 4, 17, p. 21 Lo.

42 a piece of him (Dionysus)we're, Olymp. (from Orphic doctrine) in Pl. Phd., p. 3 Finckh. The mind inside us is genuinely Dionysian and truly a statue of Dionysus., Procl. in Crat., p. 82 Boiss. The Greeks are accustomed to use the dismemberment, re-integration, and resurrection of Dionysus to bring into the discussion about the soul and to adjust, Orig., Cels. 4, 17, p. 21 Lo.

43 οἱ ἀμφὶ Ὀρφέα think that the soul has the body as a περίβολον, δεσμωτηρίου εἰκόνα, Pl., Crat. 400 C. Certainly Orphic, too (as the Schol. also say), is ὁ ἐν ἀπορρήτοις λεγόμενος λόγος ὡς ἔν τινι φρουρᾷ ἐσμεν οἱ ἄνθρωποι κτλ., Pl. Phd. 62 B; see Lob. 795 f.

43 the followers of Orpheus believe that the soul has the body as a covering, a depiction of imprisonment, Pl., Crat. 400 C. Definitely Orphic, as the Schol. also mention, is the saying goes that we are like prisoners in some kind of guardhouse, Pl. Phd. 62 B; see Lob. 795 f.

44 fr. 221 (Phd. 62 B with Sch.). The similar saying of Philolaos is, as Plato’s manner of recording it shows (Phd. 61 E–62 B) evidently derived from a saying of the Orphic ἀπόρρητα (and Philolaos himself appealed to the παλαιοὶ θεολόγοι τε καὶ μάντιες in confirmation of the closely connected doctrine of the enclosure of the ψυχή in the σῆμα of the σῶμα: fr. 23 Mull. 14 Di.). The doctrine continued to be taught by Pythagoreans: see Euxitheos Pyth. ap. Klearch. in Ath. iv, 157 CD; Cic., Sen. 73. It had moreover some root in popular belief and in legal usage: see above, chap. v, n. 33. 356

44 fr. 221 (Phd. 62 B with Sch.). The similar saying of Philolaos is, as Plato’s way of recording it shows (Phd. 61 E–62 B), clearly derived from a saying of the Orphic Confidential (and Philolaos himself referenced the ancient theologians and seers to confirm the closely related doctrine of the soul being enclosed in the σῆμα of the body: fr. 23 Mull. 14 Di.). This doctrine was also taught by the Pythagoreans: see Euxitheos Pyth. ap. Klearch. in Ath. iv, 157 CD; Cic., Sen. 73. It also had some roots in popular belief and legal practice: see above, chap. v, n. 33. 356

45 According to the Ὀρφικὰ ἔπη καλούμενα, ap. Arist. de An. 1, 5, p. 410b, 28 ff.: τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκ τοῦ ὅλου εἰσιέναι ἀναπνεόντων φερομένην ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνέμων. (The ancient commentators add nothing fresh.) ἐκ τοῦ ὅλου means simply “out of space”. The ἄνεμοι were regarded as daimonic powers subordinate and related to the Τριτοπάτορες: see above, chap. v, n. 124. We cannot say how this conception was made to square with the other articles of Orphic belief (purgation of souls in Hades, etc.). It is plainly nothing but an attempt at such reconciliation that (following the Rhapsodiai, fr. 224) makes the souls that pass in death out of the bodies of men, go into Hades, while those that have inhabited the bodies of animals fly about in the wind εἰσόκεν αὐτὰς ἄλλο ἀφαρπάζῃ μίγδην ἀνέμοιο πνοῇσιν. Aristotle knows nothing of any such restriction. Plato (Phd. 81 D; rather differently 108 AB) apparently making free use of Orphic ideas regards all the μὴ καθαρῶς ἀπολυθεῖσαι ψυχαί as liable to the same fate as that allotted by the Rhapsodiai to the beasts. (Of course it is possible to suppose that the ψυχαί on being released from Hades for a new ἐνσωμάτωσις first of all fly about in the wind round the dwelling places of the living and are then breathed into a new body. This would not prevent there being a predestined conjunction of a particular soul with the particular σῶμα corresponding to its state of purification.)—The establishment in later Orphic poetry of the theory that the ψυχαί dwelt in the air may have been assisted by the philosophic theory of the soaring-up of the πνεύματα into their element the aether (of which more below). This theory, though not first put forward by the Stoics, was specially favoured by them: it almost attained the status of a popularly accepted belief. When the realm of the souls had thus been at least in part transferred to the air, late Orphic poetry began to regard one of the four rivers of the soul-world, Ἀχέρων, as the ἀήρ: frr. 155, 156 (Rhaps.). There is no reason to see in all this the traces of a supposed ancient conception in which Okeanos is really a river in the sky (in spite of Bergk’s fanciful speculations in Opusc. ii, 691–6). The elevation of the soul-kingdom to the sky is in Greek thought invariably the result of comparatively late speculation. We might even ask whether there is not Egyptian influence at work in the transference of Okeanos (= the Milky Way?) to the sky. Such influence would be late of course; but in Egypt the idea of the Nile in the sky was quite familiar.

45 According to the Orphic poetry, as referenced by Aristotle in de An. 1, 5, p. 410b, 28 ff.: the soul comes in from everywhere while breathing out, carried by the winds. (The ancient commentators add nothing new.) whole simply means “out of space.” The breezes were seen as spiritual forces subordinate to and connected with the Tritopatores: see above, chap. v, n. 124. We can't say how this idea fits with the other aspects of Orphic belief (like the purification of souls in Hades, etc.). It's clearly just an attempt to reconcile these views that (following the Rhapsodiai, fr. 224) suggests that souls leaving human bodies at death go to Hades, while those that lived in animal bodies drift about in the wind as other beings are swept away by the breeze. Aristotle doesn't mention any such limitation. Plato (Phd. 81 D; slightly differently 108 AB), seemingly drawing on Orphic ideas, considers all the impure souls as facing the same fate as that allotted by the Rhapsodiai to beasts. (Of course, one could suggest that the souls released from Hades for a new representation first drift around in the wind near the homes of the living and are then breathed into new bodies. This wouldn't negate the possibility of a destined connection between a specific soul and the particular body that matches its state of purification.)—The development in later Orphic poetry that the spirits reside in the air may have been influenced by the philosophical idea of the spirits rising into their element, the aether (which will be discussed more in below). This theory, although not first proposed by the Stoics, was particularly favored by them and almost became a widely accepted belief. Once the realm of souls was at least partly shifted to the air, later Orphic poetry began to view one of the four rivers of the soul world, Acheron River, as the air: frr. 155, 156 (Rhaps.). There’s no reason to interpret this as evidence of an ancient belief that the Okeanos is literally a river in the sky (despite Bergk’s fanciful ideas in Opusc. ii, 691–6). The elevation of the soul realm to the sky in Greek thought is invariably the outcome of relatively recent speculation. We might even wonder if there is some Egyptian influence in the idea of transferring Okeanos (= the Milky Way?) to the sky. Such influence would certainly be late; however, in Egypt, the concept of the Nile in the sky was quite well-known.

46 κύκλος τῆς γενέσεως, fr. 226; ὁ τῆς μοίρας τροχός, rota fati et generationis: see Lob. 797 ff.

46 generation cycle, fr. 226; the wheel of fortune, wheel of fate and generation: see Lob. 797 ff.

47 οἱ δ’ αὐτοὶ πατέρες τε καὶ υἱέες ἐν μεγάροισιν (πολλάκις) ἠδ’ ἄλοχοι σεμναὶ κεδναί τε θύγατρες . . . γίγνοντ’ ἀλλήλων μεταμειβομένῃσι γενέθλαις, frr. 225, 222 (Rhaps.). Here, as Lob. 797 rightly remarks, there is an allusion to the dogma of the recurrence of exactly the same state of things in the world. The doctrine of complete παλιγγενεσία or ἀποκατάστασις ἁπαντων (see Gataker ad. M. Ant.1, p. 385) was closely and indeed indissolubly bound up with the doctrine of the migration of souls. (Illogicality belongs rather to the conception of the break in the circle caused by the secession of individual souls.) It was therefore found among the Pythagoreans to whom it is ascribed by Eudemos fr. 51 sp. (see Porph., VP. 19, p. 26, 23 ff. N.; used later still in a Pythagorean sense by Synes., Aeg. 2, 7, p. 62 f. Krab.). It was borrowed from the Pythagoreans by the Stoa (by Chrysippos esp.), which after its usual fashion pushed the rather bizarre fancy to pedantic extremes. (After the Stoic model is Plot. 5, 7, and perhaps also the genethliaci spoken of by Varro ap. Aug., CD. 22, 28.) It is at least 357 probable in the extreme that these ideas were first held by the Orphics and not borrowed by them from the Stoics: there are even traces in Orphic tradition of the great World-year (which is always closely connected with the ἀποκατάστασις τῶν ἁπάντων): Lob. 792 ff.

47 the same fathers and sons in the grand halls(often)and respectful wives and beloved daughters... born from each other in alternating generations, frr. 225, 222 (Rhaps.). Here, as Lob. 797 rightly points out, there is a reference to the belief in the recurrence of exactly the same situations in the world. The doctrine of complete rebirth or restoration of everything (see Gataker ad. M. Ant.1, p. 385) was deeply intertwined with the belief in the migration of souls. (The inconsistency lies more in the idea of a disruption in the cycle caused by the departure of individual souls.) This view was therefore found among the Pythagoreans, to whom Eudemos attributes it fr. 51 sp. (see Porph., VP. 19, p. 26, 23 ff. N.; later used in a Pythagorean context by Synes., Aeg. 2, 7, p. 62 f. Krab.). The Stoa (especially by Chrysippus) borrowed from the Pythagoreans and took this rather strange notion to pedantic extremes, as was typical of them. (Following the Stoic model is Plot. 5, 7, and perhaps also the genethliaci mentioned by Varro ap. Aug., CD. 22, 28.) It is extremely likely that these concepts were first held by the Orphics and not taken from the Stoics: there are even indications in Orphic tradition of the great World-year (which is always closely tied to the restoration of everything): Lob. 792 ff.

48 κύκλον τε λῆξαι καὶ ἀναπνεῦσαι κακότητος were the words Proclus probably had before him: (fr. 226) in Tim. 330 B. The forms ἂν λήξαι καὶ ἀναπνεύσαι—thus rightly accented here by Schneider—come from Procl. himself, who accommodates the words of the original to the construction of his own sentence. We must therefore not write αὖ λῆξαι with Gale and Lob. 800. In this case the subject of the sentence is the praying soul; on the other hand, in the form preserved by Simp., κύκλον τ’ ἀλλῦσαι καὶ ἀναψῦξαι κακότητος, the subject is the gods to whom the soul prays; ψυχή being object. In either form the freeing of the soul from the circle is regarded as a grace from the gods.

48 to complete the circle and breathe new life away from evil were the words Proclus likely had in front of him: (fr. 226) in Tim. 330 B. The forms if it ends and breathes—correctly accented here by Schneider—come from Proclus himself, who adapts the original words to fit the structure of his own sentence. Therefore, we must not write to finish up as Gale and Lob. 800 suggest. In this case, the subject of the sentence is the praying soul; however, in the version preserved by Simp., to break the cycle and refresh from badness, the subject is the gods to whom the soul prays; soul is the object. In both forms, the liberation of the soul from the circle is seen as a gift from the gods.

49 fr. 76. The lines of the Carm. Aur. 55 ff. (Nauck, p. 207) are probably modelled on the Orphic οὔτ’ ἀγαθοῦ παρεόντος κτλ. The point is: few are they who trouble about the salvation that Orpheus (or Pythagoras) brings them; the ὅσιοι are always a small minority.

49 fr. 76. The lines from Carm. Aur. 55 ff. (Nauck, p. 207) are likely based on the Orphic Not even good exists, etc. The point is: very few people care about the salvation that Orpheus (or Pythagoras) offers them; the Saints are always a small minority.

50 frr. 208, 226. Διόνυσος λυσεύς, λύσιος, θεοὶ λύσιοι; see Lob. 809 f. and cf. fr. 311 (Ficinus).

50 frr. 208, 226. Dionysus, liberator, gods of freedom; see Lob. 809 f. and cf. fr. 311 (Ficinus).

51 Ὀρφέα τ’ ἄνακτ’ ἔχων βάκχευε . . . E. Hp. 953 (N.B. ἄναξ not δεσπότης, l. 88).

51 Orpheus, as the master, celebrates... E. Hp. 953 (N.B. master not lord, l. 88).

52 Ὀρφικὸς βίος, Pl., Lg. 782 C; Lobeck, 244 ff.

52 Mystical life, Pl., Lg. 782 C; Lobeck, 244 ff.

53 The Pythagorean ἔπου θεῷ, ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ θεῷ (Iamb., VP. 137, from Aristoxenos) might also have been given to the Orphics as their motto.

53 The Pythagorean Follow God (Iamb., VP. 137, from Aristoxenus) might also have served as the motto for the Orphics.

54 ἄψυχος βορά of the Orphics: E., Hp. 952, Pl., Lg. 782 CD; Lob., p. 246. This, too, is the meaning of Ar., Ra. 1032, Ὀρφεὺς μὲν γὰρ τελετάς θ’ ἡμῖν κατέδειξε φόνων τ’ ἀπέχεσθαι, i.e. using slain animals for food. Hor., AP. 391 f.: silvestris homines . . . caedibus et victu foedo deterruit Orpheus means to speak not of the ritual vegetarianism of “Orpheus”, but of the previous cannibalism of men which Orpheus had put an end to. As this is nowhere else mentioned of Orpheus we might perhaps regard it as mistaken allusion on the part of Horace to the passage of Aristoph. quoted above. It is not, however, impossible that Horace did in fact have in mind some Orphic verse which really reported something like what he himself says of Orpheus. The Orphic fragment [247] ap. S.E., M. ii, 31; ix, 15 (Lob., p. 246), may have arisen in the same way; see Maass, Orpheus, 77. (The well-known lines of Kritias [S.E., M. ix, 54 fr. 25 Di.] and Moschion, p. 813 Nauck, can hardly have anything to do with Orphism and should rather be connected with the theories of the Sophists and Demokritos—followed later by the Epicureans—about the gradual evolution of human civilization from miserable and savage origins; and not from a “golden age” of which the Orphics too spoke.)

54 Uninspired food of the Orphics: E., Hp. 952, Pl., Lg. 782 CD; Lob., p. 246. This also reflects the meaning in Ar., Ra. 1032, Orpheus really taught us the rituals and how to avoid shedding blood., meaning the use of slaughtered animals for food. Hor., AP. 391 f.: Wild men were stopped by Orpheus from committing murder and engaging in savage eating. does not refer to the ritual vegetarianism of “Orpheus,” but rather to the previous cannibalism of men that Orpheus ended. Since this is not mentioned anywhere else about Orpheus, we might consider it a misreference by Horace to the passage from Aristophanes quoted above. However, it's also possible that Horace did have some Orphic verse in mind that conveyed something similar to what he said about Orpheus. The Orphic fragment [247] from S.E., M. ii, 31; ix, 15 (Lob., p. 246), might have emerged in the same way; see Maass, Orpheus, 77. (The famous lines from Kritias [S.E., M. ix, 54 fr. 25 Di.] and Moschion, p. 813 Nauck, likely have nothing to do with Orphism and should rather be linked to the theories of the Sophists and Democritus—later followed by the Epicureans—about the gradual development of human civilization from miserable and savage beginnings; and not from a “golden age” that the Orphics also discussed.)

55 Prohibition to bury corpses in woollen garments: Hdt. ii, 81 (in each case in order that nothing θνησείδιον might cling to the departed). Prohibition against eating eggs: Lob. 251 (eggs are part of the offering to the dead and the food of the χθόνιοι, and so forbidden: so rightly explained by Lob. 477). It was forbidden in Orphic poetry, as well as Pythagorean, to eat beans: Lob. 251; Nauck on Iamb., VP., p. 231 f.: the reason here, too, being that beans as part of the offerings to the dead, putantur ad mortuos pertinere (Fest.); see Lob. 254 and Crusius, Rh. Mus. 39, 165. The same or similar reasons are everywhere at work to cause the eating of certain foods to be forbidden 358 both by the Pythagorean ordinances and in the mystical cult of the χθόνιοι: it is because they are used as offerings to the beings of the lower world, πρὸς τὰ περίδειπνα καὶ τὰς προκλήσεις τῶν νεκρῶν, or even because they have names which, like ἐρέβινθος or λάθυρος, recall ἔρεβος and λήθη: Plu., QR. 95, p. 286 E. The purified state requires above all complete separation from anything connected with the realm of the dead and the divinities of the dead.

55 Prohibition to bury corpses in woolen garments: Hdt. ii, 81 (in each case to ensure nothing θνησείδιον clings to the deceased). Prohibition against eating eggs: Lob. 251 (eggs are part of the offering to the dead and the food of the chthonic, and are therefore forbidden: as rightly explained by Lob. 477). In Orphic poetry, as well as Pythagorean teachings, eating beans was prohibited: Lob. 251; Nauck on Iamb., VP., p. 231 f.: the reasoning here is similarly that beans, as part of the offerings to the dead, putantur ad mortuos pertinere (Fest.); see Lob. 254 and Crusius, Rh. Mus. 39, 165. The same or similar reasons apply everywhere to restrict the consumption of certain foods, as mandated by the Pythagorean rules and in the mystical cult of the Underworld beings: it’s because they are offered to the beings of the underworld, About the banquets and the challenges of the dead., or even because they have names that, like erebintheus or inactive, evoke Erebos and forgetfulness: Plu., QR. 95, p. 286 E. The purified state demands, above all, complete separation from anything associated with the realm of the dead and the deities of the dead.

56 Cf. fr. 208.

56 See fr. 208.

57 The soul is confined within the body (according to those ἀμφὶ Ὀρφέἀ), ὡς δίκην διδούσης τῆς ψυχῆς ὧν δὴ ἕνεκα δίδωσιν, Pl., Crat. 400 C. The exact nature of this “guilt” of the soul is not explained in our remains of Orphic literature. The point, however, is chiefly that the life within the body is according to their doctrine not in accordance with but contrary to the proper nature of the soul.

57 The soul is trapped in the body (according to those around Orpheus), as when the soul gives what it owes, for which reason it gives., Pl., Crat. 400 C. The exact meaning of this “guilt” of the soul isn't clarified in the fragments we have from Orphic writings. The main point, however, is that life within the body, according to their beliefs, is not aligned with the true nature of the soul, but rather the opposite.

58 συμπόσιον τῶν ὁσίων, Pl., Rp. 363 C. ὁσίους μύστας, Orph., H. 84, 3; see above, chap. vi, n. 18.

58 symposium of the saints, Pl., Rp. 363 C. holy initiates, Orph., H. 84, 3; see above, chap. vi, n. 18.

59 ψυχὰς ἀθανάτας κατάγει Κυλλήνιος Ἑρμῆς γαίης ἐς κευθμῶνα πελώριον fr. 224 (it would be vain to look for an example of ἀθάνατος used as adjective to ψυχή in Homer). Hermes χθόνιος leads the souls down into Hades and also upwards again (to fresh ἐνσωματώσεις): Orph., H. 57, 6 ff. (For the Pythagorean Hermes see D.L. viii, 31.)

59 Souls that are immortal are guided down by the Cyllenian Hermes into the deep, concealed depths of the earth. fr. 224 (it would be pointless to search for an example of eternal used as an adjective for spirit in Homer). Hermes of the underworld guides the souls down into Hades and also brings them back up again (to new avatars): Orph., H. 57, 6 ff. (For the Pythagorean Hermes see D.L. viii, 31.)

60 Especially in the κατάβασις εἰς Ἅιδου (Lob. 373; cf. above, chap. vii, n. 3). The descent lay through the chasm at Tainaron: see above, chap. v, n. 23, and cf. Orph., Arg. 41.—Other Orphic poems may also have dealt with such matters: πολλὰ μεμυθολόγηται περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἅιδου πραγμάτων τῷ τῆς Καλλιόπης, Jul., Or. vii, p. 281, 3 Hertl. [216 D].

60 Especially in the descent into the Underworld (Lob. 373; cf. above, chap. vii, n. 3). The descent occurred through the chasm at Tainaron: see above, chap. v, n. 23, and cf. Orph., Arg. 41.—Other Orphic poems might have also addressed these topics: Many have heard about the events in Hades as described by Calliope., Jul., Or. vii, p. 281, 3 Hertl. [216 D].

61 λύσεις καὶ καθαρμοί of the living and even the dead carried out by Orphic priests: Pl., Rp. 364 E. Reward of the initiated in Hades: cf. the anecdote of Leotychidas II in Plu., Apophth. Lac., p. 224 E; and of Antisthenes in D.L. vi, 4. Those who feared the bite of Kerberos or the water-carrying to the leaky cask (see App. iii) sought protection against such things in τελεταὶ καὶ καθαρμοί: Plu. N.P.Q. Suav. Epic. 27, p. 1105 B. Hope of immortality for the soul rests on the Dionysiac mysteries acc. to Plu., Cons. ad Ux. 10, p. 611 D.

61 Solutions and cleansers of the living and even the dead performed by Orphic priests: Pl., Rp. 364 E. Reward for those initiated in Hades: see the story of Leotychidas II in Plu., Apophth. Lac., p. 224 E; and of Antisthenes in D.L. vi, 4. Those who were afraid of the bite of Cerberus or the water-pouring into the leaking cask (see App. iii) sought safety from such threats through rituals and cleansings: Plu. N.P.Q. Suav. Epic. 27, p. 1105 B. The hope for the soul's immortality is based on the Dionysiac mysteries according to Plu., Cons. ad Ux. 10, p. 611 D.

62 It is significant that the belief in a judgment and punishment of ψυχαί is based in [Pl.] Ep. vii, 335 A not on popular acceptance or the statements of poets but on παλαιοί τε καὶ ἱεροὶ λόγοι; cf. above, chap. vii, n. 13.

62 It's important to note that the belief in judgment and punishment of souls is founded in [Pl.] Ep. vii, 335 A, not on popular opinion or the words of poets, but on ancient and sacred texts; see above, chap. vii, n. 13.

63 fr. 154 (punishment in Hades of those guilty of crimes against their own parents? fr. 281).

63 fr. 154 (punishment in Hades for those who committed crimes against their parents? fr. 281).

64 See above, chap. vii, n. 15.

64 See above, ch. 7, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

65 δεινὰ περιμένει: Pl., Rp. 365 A; cf. fr. 314 (Ficinus).

65 deina perime/nei: Pl., Rp. 365 A; cf. fr. 314 (Ficinus).

66 fr. 208 (Rhaps.) ὄργιά τ’ ἐκτελέσουσι (ἄνθρωποι), λύσιν προγόνων ἀθεμίστων μαιόμενοι· σὺ (sc. Dionysos) δὲ τοῖσιν (dat. commodi), ἔχων κράτος, οὗς κ’ ἐθέλησθα λύσεις ἔκ τε πόνων χαλεπῶν καὶ ἀπείρονος οἴστρου (of continual rebirth). That this belief in the efficacy of prayers for the “poor souls of the departed” belonged to the earlier stratum of Orphism follows from Pl., Rp. 364 BC, E, 365 A, where he speaks of λύσεις τε καὶ καθαρμοί of the Orphics which promised to deliver living and dead from the ἀδικήματα αὐτοῦ ἢ προγόνων. (It has been wrongly attempted to fasten the same belief on Plato himself, in the Phaedo.)—For Gnostic and early Christian ideas of the same kind see Anrich, D. Ant. Mysterienwesen, 87, 4; 120 n. But even in the Rigveda (7, 35, 4) we may find the thought that the “pious works of the pious” can help others to salvation (Oldenberg, Rel. d. 359 Veda, 289). Religious pietism seems to produce the same effects everywhere.

66 fr. 208 (Rhaps.) They will perform the rituals.(people), madly seeking a solution from unjust ancestors; you (sc. Dionysos) δὲ τοῖσιν (dat. commodi), Having power, you who wished to free me from great pains and endless troubles. (of continual rebirth). This belief in the power of prayers for the “poor souls of the departed” was part of the earlier layer of Orphism, as noted by Plato in Rp. 364 BC, E, 365 A, where he discusses λύσεις και καθαρισμοί of the Orphics, which promised to free both the living and the dead from the his or his ancestors' offenses. (It has been wrongly suggested that Plato himself held this belief in the Phaedo.)—For Gnostic and early Christian ideas of a similar nature, see Anrich, D. Ant. Mysterienwesen, 87, 4; 120 n. However, even in the Rigveda (7, 35, 4), we can find the idea that the “pious works of the pious” can aid others in achieving salvation (Oldenberg, Rel. d. 359 Veda, 289). Religious devotion appears to have similar effects universally.

67 πολλοὶ μὲν ναρθηκοφόροι κτλ. was an Orphic verse. Lob. 809, 813.

67 Many followers of the rituals, etc. was an Orphic verse. Lob. 809, 813.

68 fr. 154.

68 fr. 154.

69 ὁ κεκαθαρμένος τε καὶ τετελεσμένος ἐκεῖσε (εἰς Ἅιδου) ἀφικόμενος μετὰ θεῶν οἰκήσει, fr. 228 (Pl.).

69 The one who is cleansed and perfected will reach there.(in Hell)and live with the gods, fr. 228 (Pl.).

70 συμπόσιον τῶν ὁσίων in Hades, μέθη αἰώνιος their reward: Pl., Rp. 336 CD (cf. Dieterich, Nekyia, 80 n.). Plato there mentions Mousaios and his son (Eumolpos) as authorities for these promises and contrasts with them, by a οἱ δέ, others who made different promises; perhaps referring to other Orphic poems (cf. fr. 227). But Mousaios, himself always closely connected in Plato with Orpheus (Rp. 364 E, Prot. 316 D, Ap. 41 A, Ion, 536 B), here simply means “Orphic poetry”. A literature of essentially Orphic character went under his name. So Plu., Comp. Cim. et Luc. 1 seems right in substituting simply τὸν Ὀρφέα for the Μουσαῖος named in Pl.

70 symposium of the holy in Hades, eternal intoxication their reward: Pl., Rp. 336 CD (cf. Dieterich, Nekyia, 80 n.). Plato mentions Mousaios and his son (Eumolpos) as sources for these promises and contrasts them with others who made different promises; he might be referring to other Orphic poems (cf. fr. 227). However, Mousaios, who is always linked to Orpheus in Plato (Rp. 364 E, Prot. 316 D, Ap. 41 A, Ion, 536 B), here simply represents “Orphic poetry.” A body of literature with an Orphic character was attributed to him. Therefore, Plu., Comp. Cim. et Luc. 1 seems correct in replacing Orpheus for the Μουσαῖος mentioned in Pl.

71 Pl., Lg. 870 DE; then in more detail for a special case but derived from same source: νόμῳ . . . τῷ νῦν δή (i.e. in 870 DE) λεχθέντι 872 DE, 873 A.—The idea of such a religio-juridical talio was popular also in Greece: see below (chap. xi, n. 44). Frequently for instance in curses of vengeance the wish is that the doer may suffer exactly the same thing as that which he has done to his victim. Exx. from Soph. (best is Tr. 1039 f.) given by G. Wolff in S., Aias, 839; cf. A., Cho. 309 ff., Ag. 1430.—As a Neoplatonic idea: Plot. 3, 2, 13; Porph. and Iamb. ap. Aen. Gaz., Theophr., p. 18 B.

71 Pl., Lg. 870 DE; then in more detail for a special case but derived from the same source: by the law . . . the current one (i.e. in 870 DE) λεχθέντι 872 DE, 873 A.—The concept of such a religio-juridical talio was also popular in Greece: see below (chap. xi, n. 44). For instance, in curses for vengeance, there is often a wish that the perpetrator may experience exactly the same thing they did to their victim. Examples from Soph. (the best is Tr. 1039 f.) provided by G. Wolff in S., Aias, 839; cf. A., Cho. 309 ff., Ag. 1430.—As a Neoplatonic idea: Plot. 3, 2, 13; Porph. and Iamb. ap. Aen. Gaz., Theophr., p. 18 B.

72 We may, however, suppose that the ideas of the Orphics corresponded with the statements of Empedokles, Plato, etc., about the series of births.

72 However, we can assume that the ideas of the Orphics matched the claims made by Empedokles, Plato, and others regarding the cycle of births.

73 σῶμα—σῆμα is Orphic: Pl., Crat. 400 C.

73 soma—sema is Orphic: Pl., Crat. 400 C.

74 Complete escape from the world of birth and death is distinctly anticipated for the pious Orphic in fr. 226, κύκλον τε λῆξαι κτλ. The other and positive side completing this negative promise is not clearly supplied for us by any fragment. (We never even hear distinctly of the return of the individual soul to the one Soul of the World; though certain Orphic myths—probably of late origin—seem to suggest such a doctrine of Emanation and final Remanation.)

74 A complete escape from the cycle of life and death is clearly expected for the devoted Orphic in fr. 226, κύκλον τε λῆξαι κτλ. However, the positive aspect that complements this negative promise isn’t clearly provided by any fragment. (We never specifically hear about the individual soul’s return to the one Soul of the World; although some Orphic myths—likely from a later time—seem to hint at such a doctrine of Emanation and final Remanation.)

75 frr. 1, 81. The moon was regarded as inhabited, like the world, by Pythagoreans too (esp. Philolaos) and also by Anaxagoras.

75 frr. 1, 81. The moon was seen as populated, much like the Earth, by the Pythagoreans as well (especially Philolaus) and also by Anaxagoras.

76 This at least was the belief of Pythagoreans and later of Platonics: see Griech. Roman, 269; Wyttenb. on Eun. VS. 117. But the idea occurs as early as in the Ti. of Plato, esp. in 42 B. It may have been long familiar to Greek popular belief (as to other peoples; cf. Tylor, ii, 70), and reached Orphics from that source. (Similar though not quite the same is the popular belief ὡς ἀστέρες γιγνόμεθ’ ὅταν τις ἀποθάνῃ, Ar., Pa. 833 f., which the Greeks shared with all the nations of the earth: cf. “Pythagoras” ap. Comm. Bern. in Lucan, 9, 9.)—No opinion can be built upon the statement of Ficinus (fr. 321).

76 This was the belief of the Pythagoreans and later the Platonists: see Griech. Roman, 269; Wyttenb. on Eun. VS. 117. However, the idea appears as early as in the Ti. of Plato, especially in 42 B. It may have been well-known among the Greek public (as it was in other cultures; cf. Tylor, ii, 70) and could have come to the Orphics from that source. (A similar though not identical belief is expressed in the saying We become like stars when someone dies., Ar., Pa. 833 f., which the Greeks shared with all nations on earth: cf. “Pythagoras” ap. Comm. Bern. in Lucan, 9, 9.)—No conclusions can be drawn from Ficinus's statement (fr. 321).

77 Orphic poetry must have varied in its account of what happened to the dismembered limbs of Zagreus-Dionysos. That the Titans tore the god limb from limb seems to have been common to all versions of the Theogonic poem (see nn. 28, 41; p. 341). But whereas according to one account the Titans then devoured the god (except the heart) and from the mixed Titanic and Dionysiac elements of their bodies after they had been destroyed by lightning the race of men had its origin (p. 341); according to others the mangled limbs 360 of the god were brought by Zeus to Apollo who buried them taking them “on to Parnasos”, i.e. at Delphi: see Orph. fr. 200 (Clem. Al.) and so, too, Callim. fr. 374. The Rhapsodiai gave the first version in detail, but also preserved an account resembling the second (see frr. 203, 204: the ἑνίζειν τὰ μερισθέντα τοῦ Διονύσου μέλη there refers probably to the reunion of the collected limbs for the purpose of burial and not for the restoration of the dead god to life. This is also possibly the meaning of the Διονύσου μελῶν κολλήσεις in Jul., Chr., p. 167, 7 Neum. But Or., Cels. 4, 17, p. 21 Lom., speaks of the reanimation of Dionysos συντιθεμένου after the dismemberment). This second account, where it occurs alone, of course excludes the Anthropogony from the Titans’ ashes. The second version unmistakably connects itself with the Delphic legend of the grave of Dionysos at the foot of Apollo’s tripod (see above, pp. 97 f.) as K. O. Müller observed, Introd. Scient. Myth. 242. It does, in fact, accord in this instance, but apart from this it has no connexion whatever with the real Delphic legend about the disappearance of Dionysos into the underworld and his periodic return to this world. (See above, chap. viii, n. 28. The Orphic and Delphic legends are elaborately compared and worked in together as though they were separate fragments of a single whole in Lübbert’s book, de Pindaro theologiae Orph. censore: Ind. Sch. Bonn. Lib. 1888, p. xiii f.—with shocking results and no intrinsic justification.) Whether this second version was the one put forward by Onomakritos is uncertain. In any case, both accounts are much older than the Rhapsodiai, in which, it appears, they were included side by side and superficially harmonized (—only the limbs of the god not devoured by the Titans being buried acc. to this version). Besides these two versions there may have been another Anthropogony differing from that given in the first account: the existence of something of the kind is perhaps to be deduced from what the Rhapsodiai themselves have to tell about the golden and silver generations of mankind (see above, n. 41).

77 Orphic poetry likely had different versions of what happened to the dismembered limbs of Zagreus-Dionysos. It seems that all accounts of the Theogonic poem agree that the Titans tore the god apart (see nn. 28, 41; p. 341). In one version, the Titans then ate the god (except for the heart) and humanity arose from the mixed Titanic and Dionysiac elements of their bodies after they were destroyed by lightning (p. 341); while in other accounts, the mangled limbs 360 of the god were taken by Zeus to Apollo, who buried them “on to Parnasos,” meaning at Delphi: see Orph. fr. 200 (Clem. Al.) and likewise Callim. fr. 374. The Rhapsodiai provided the first version in detail but also preserved a version similar to the second (see frr. 203, 204: the To unify the divided parts of Dionysus. likely refers to bringing together the collected limbs for burial, not for restoring the dead god to life. This might also be what the Dionysus' songs will charm you in Jul., Chr., p. 167, 7 Neum refers to. However, Or., Cels. 4, 17, p. 21 Lom., speaks of the reanimation of Dionysos συντιθεμένου after being dismembered). This second account, when it stands alone, clearly leaves out the Anthropogony arising from the Titans’ ashes. The second version clearly connects to the Delphic legend about the grave of Dionysos at the foot of Apollo’s tripod (see above, pp. 97 f.) as K. O. Müller noted, Introd. Scient. Myth. 242. In this instance, it does fit, but aside from this connection, it has no link to the actual Delphic legend regarding Dionysos's disappearance into the underworld and his periodic returns to the mortal world. (See above, chap. viii, n. 28. The Orphic and Delphic legends are thoroughly compared and blended together, as if they are separate fragments of a complete story in Lübbert’s book, de Pindaro theologiae Orph. censore: Ind. Sch. Bonn. Lib. 1888, p. xiii f.—with shocking results and without proper justification.) It is unclear if this second version was presented by Onomakritos. In any case, both narratives are much older than the Rhapsodiai, in which they seem to have been included side by side and superficially harmonized (—only the god's limbs not devoured by the Titans being buried according to this version). Besides these two versions, there may have been another Anthropogony that differs from the one in the first account: the existence of something like that might be inferred from what the Rhapsodiai themselves reveal about the golden and silver generations of mankind (see above, n. 41).

78 Of the Thracian Mysoi λέγει ὁ Ποσειδώνιος καὶ ἐμψύχων ἀπέχεσθαι (which Pythagoras is said to have learnt from Zalmoxis, Str. 298) κατ’ εὐσέβειαν, διὰ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ θρεμμάτων· μέλιτι δὲ χρῆσθαι καὶ γάλακτι καὶ τυρῷ, ζῶντας καθ’ ἡσυχίαν· διὰ δὲ τοῦτο καλεῖσθαι θεοσεβεῖς τε καὶ καπνοβάτας (perh. καπνοβότας acc. to an ancient conjecture). εἶναι δέ τινας τῶν Θρᾳκῶν οἳ χωρὶς γυναικὸς ζῶσιν, οὓς κτίστας καλεῖσθαι, ἀνιερῶσθαί τε διὰ τιμὴv καὶ μετ’ ἀδείας ζῆν, Str. 296. The religious character of this asceticism is seen in the words κατ’ εὐσέβειαν and the name θεοσεβεῖς; also in the word ἀνιερῶσθαι, which are all used of the κτίσται as of a monastic order. Jos., AJ. 18, 1, 5, says of the Essenes ζῶσι δ’ οὐδὲν παρηλλαγμένως ἀλλ’ ὅτι μάλιστα ἐμφέροντες Δακῶν (i.e. Θρᾳκῶν, Γετῶν: Getae, Daci Romanis dicti, Plin., NH. iv, 80) τοῖς πολισταῖς καλουμένοις. In any case the same Thracian ascetics are meant whom Poseidonios (literally translating a Thracian word) calls the κτίσται. Thus, they are said like the Essence to live without women, eat no meat, and in the practice of various other asceticisms live together and have all things in common.—It cannot be certainly decided how old this Thracian asceticism was, its exact connexion with Dionysiac religion, and whether it could or did give any impulse in the direction of asceticism to the Orphics. (Following Hom., Ν 4 ff., many told similar stories of the nomadic Skythoi: see Ephor., frr. 76, 78; or of the fabulous Argimpaioi, Hdt. iv, 23; Znb., Pr. 5, 25, p. 129, 1, etc. Griech. Roman, 203.—ἀποχὴ ἐμψύχων occurred also among the Atlantes and certain Indian races: Hdt. iv, 184; iii, 100.) 361

78 The Thracian Mysoi Say Poseidonius that they stay away from living beings. (which Pythagoras is said to have learned from Zalmoxis, Str. 298) In a devout manner, and for this reason, with sustenance; they consume honey, milk, and cheese, living peacefully; thus, they are referred to as god-fearers and smoke-savers. (possibly smoke reducers according to an ancient suggestion). Some of the Thracians live without women, known as kteis, living in honor and respect., Str. 296. The religious nature of this asceticism is evident in the phrases in a devout manner and the term God-fearing people; as well as in the word to live with integrity, which all relate to the kteis similar to a monastic community. Jos., AJ. 18, 1, 5, mentions the Essenes who live no differently than they can, as much as possible, according to the Dakoi (i.e. Thracians, Getae: Getae, known as Dacians by the Romans, Plin., NH. iv, 80) called the police. In any case, these were the same Thracian ascetics that Poseidonios referred to (literally translating a Thracian word) as the kteis. Thus, they are said like the Essenes to live without women, not eat meat, and practice various forms of asceticism together, sharing everything in common. — It cannot be definitively determined how old this Thracian asceticism was, its precise connection to Dionysiac religion, or whether it inspired a sense of asceticism among the Orphics. (Following Hom., N 4 ff., many told similar tales of the nomadic Skythoi: see Ephor., frr. 76, 78; or of the mythical Argimpaioi, Hdt. iv, 23; Znb., Pr. 5, 25, p. 129, 1, etc. Griech. Roman, 203.—The avoidance of living beings also occurred among the Atlantes and certain Indian groups: Hdt. iv, 184; iii, 100.) 361

79 ii, 123. His words make it plain that the Greek teachers of transmigration of souls whom he has in mind (Pherekydes, Pythagoras, Orphics, Empedokles) had no idea of the Egyptian origin of that doctrine (Rh. Mus. 26, 556, 1).

79 ii, 123. His words clearly show that the Greek teachers of the transmigration of souls he refers to (Pherekydes, Pythagoras, Orphics, Empedokles) were unaware of the Egyptian origins of that doctrine (Rh. Mus. 26, 556, 1).

80 The Egyptian monuments show no knowledge of a general transmigration of souls, due to a law of nature or the decree of the gods. We can see very well, however, what it was in Egyptian traditions that might seem like a doctrine of transmigration to Herodotos (cf. Wiedemann, Erläut. zu Herodots 2. B. p. 457 f.).

80 The Egyptian monuments do not indicate any belief in a general rebirth of souls, dictated by nature or the will of the gods. However, we can clearly see what aspects of Egyptian traditions might have appeared as a belief in reincarnation to Herodotus (cf. Wiedemann, Erläut. zu Herodots 2. B. p. 457 f.).

81 It is sufficient to refer to Tylor’s collections: ii, 3 ff.—In antiquity the Greeks met with a doctrine of Transmigration, apart from Thrace, among the Keltic races (Caes., BG. 6, 14, 5; D.S. 5, 28, 6; cf. Timagenes ap. Amm. Marc. 15, 9, 8). This was the sole reason why Pythagoras was made the pupil of the Gallic Druids: Alex. Polyh. ap. Clem. Al., Str. i, p. 355/6 P., etc.

81 It's enough to mention Tylor’s collections: ii, 3 ff.—In ancient times, the Greeks encountered the idea of Transmigration, not just in Thrace but also among the Celtic peoples (Caes., BG. 6, 14, 5; D.S. 5, 28, 6; cf. Timagenes ap. Amm. Marc. 15, 9, 8). This was the only reason Pythagoras became a student of the Gallic Druids: Alex. Polyh. ap. Clem. Al., Str. i, p. 355/6 P., etc.

82 That it was not unnatural for the Greeks also to have the conception of the migration of the soul from its first body to some other suitable second or third body (entry of τῆς τυχούσης ψυχῆς εἰς τὸ τυχὸν σῶμα acc. to Arist.) may be seen from the fact that in Greek popular tales of the transformation of men into beasts the idea regularly prevails that while the body changes in such cases the “soul” remains the same as before. Thus, explicitly in Hom. κ 240 (cf. Sch. there and 329); cf. also Ov., M. ii, 485; Nonn., D. v, 322 f.; Aesop., F. 294 (Halm): [Luc.] Asin. 13, 15 init.; Apul., M. iii, 26 init; Aug., CD. 18, 18, p. 278, 11 ff. Domb., etc. (In all transformation stories this is regularly implied and gives the point to the story.) This is true from the earliest times onward, down to Voltaire’s muleteer who was turned into a mule et du vilain l’âme terrestre et crasse à peine vit qu’elle eut changé de place.)—The beasts also have a ψυχή: e.g. ξ 426.

82 It wasn't unnatural for the Greeks to believe in the migration of the soul from its first body to another suitable second or third body (entry of the chance soul into the chance body according to Arist.). This is evident from the fact that in Greek popular stories where humans transform into beasts, the idea typically is that while the body changes, the "soul" remains the same as it was before. This is explicitly mentioned in Hom. κ 240 (see Sch. there and 329); also refer to Ov., M. ii, 485; Nonn., D. v, 322 f.; Aesop., F. 294 (Halm): [Luc.] Asin. 13, 15 init.; Apul., M. iii, 26 init; Aug., CD. 18, 18, p. 278, 11 ff. Domb., etc. (In all transformation stories, this idea is regularly implied and is central to the narrative.) This concept has been present from the earliest times, all the way to Voltaire’s muleteer, who was turned into a mule and the ugly earthly and filthy soul barely lived when it found she had changed her place.)—The beasts also possess a soul: e.g. ξ 426.

83 Brahmins, Buddhists, Manichaean, etc.

83 Brahmins, Buddhists, Manichaeans, etc.

84 A fixed term for “transmigration of souls” does not seem to have been offered by Orphic teaching. It was later called παλιγγενεσία (a term which did not exactly fit the real meaning of the idea): this seems to have been its oldest name (cf. αἱ ψυχαὶ πάλιν γίγνονται ἑκ τῶν τεθνεώτων, Pl., Phd. 70 C), and remained its most ceremonious one. “Pythagorasnon μετεμψύχωσιν sed παλιγγενεσίαν esse dicit: Serv., A. iii, 68. μετενσωμάτωσις, is not uncommon (frequent in Hippol., RH., p. 12, 53 D.-S.; 266, etc.). The word most commonly used among ourselves, μετεμψύχωσις, is among the Greeks precisely the least usual; it occurs e.g. in D.S. 10, 6, 1; Gal. iv, 763 K.; Tertul. de An. 31; Serv., A. vi, 532; 603; Suid. s.v. Φερεκύδης. μετεμψυχοῦσθαι occurs in Sch., A.R. i, 645.

84 A specific term for “transmigration of souls” doesn’t seem to have been provided by Orphic teachings. It was later referred to as rebirth (a term that didn’t quite capture the true meaning of the concept): this appears to have been its original name (cf. The souls are reborn from the dead., Pl., Phd. 70 C), and it remained the most formal one. “Pythagorasdoes not reincarnation but rebirth says: Serv., A. iii, 68. reincarnation is not uncommon (frequent in Hippol., RH., p. 12, 53 D.-S.; 266, etc.). The term we tend to use, reincarnation, is among the Greeks actually the least common; it appears, for instance, in D.S. 10, 6, 1; Gal. iv, 763 K.; Tertul. de An. 31; Serv., A. vi, 532; 603; Suid. s.v. Φερεκύδης. reincarnation occurs in Sch., A.R. i, 645.

CHAPTER XI

The Philosophers

The Orphic teaching, in which a protracted movement of religion in Greece reached comprehensive expression, might seem almost an anachronism, appearing as it did in an age when a religious interpretation of the world and of mankind was hardly any longer admissible. Eastwards, on the coasts of Ionia, a new view of the world had arisen which, like a youth that has come of age, demanded the right to pursue its course without any guidance from traditional beliefs. The Ionic maritime cities were the meeting-place of all the collected wisdom and experience of mankind; and there all the more serious knowledge and study—both indigenous and of foreign origin—of “Nature”, the earth, and the heavenly bodies, was gathered together in the intelligence of those ever-memorable spirits who at that time were laying the foundations of natural science, and of all science in general. This knowledge was now attempting to turn itself into an organized and all-embracing whole. Observation and constructive study combined with an imaginative vision to hazard a picture of the world and reality as a whole. Because it was impossible anywhere in this world to find anything completely and for ever fixed and dead, speculation inevitably pressed forward to the discovery of the undying source of Life, that perpetually fills, moves, and rebuilds this whole, and of the laws according to which it works and necessarily must work.

The Orphic teaching, which represented a lengthy religious movement in Greece, might seem out of place since it emerged in a time when a religious view of the world and humanity was becoming less acceptable. To the east, along the shores of Ionia, a new perspective had developed that, like a young adult asserting independence, sought to follow its path without relying on traditional beliefs. The Ionian coastal cities became the hub for all the accumulated wisdom and experiences of humanity. There, serious study—both local and foreign—of "Nature," the earth, and celestial bodies came together in the minds of remarkable individuals who were laying the groundwork for natural science and all scientific inquiry. This knowledge was striving to form a cohesive and comprehensive whole. Observations and analytical studies joined with creative thinking to attempt to illustrate the world and reality as a totality. Since it was impossible to find anything in this world that was completely fixed and lifeless, speculation naturally pushed forward to uncover the eternal source of Life that continuously fills, moves, and reconstructs everything, along with the laws governing its operations.

This was the direction pursued by these earliest pioneers of philosophy; and they pursued it unhampered by any subservience to mythical or religious modes of thought. Where mythology and the theology founded upon it saw a complete history of cosmic events each one of which was the result of the separate and unique action of divine personalities endowed with consciousness and the power of arbitrary choice—there the philosopher saw the play of everlasting forces which could not be completely resolved into the single events of any historical process, for, without beginning or end they had been ever in action, tirelessly fulfilling themselves in accordance with unchanging laws. In such a universe there seemed 363 to be little room left for divine figures created by man after his own image, and worshipped by him as the guiding and supreme powers of the world. And in fact, the foundations were now laid of that tremendous structure of free inquiry, which finally succeeded in weaving out of its treasure new worlds of thought, where even those who had quarrelled or were dissatisfied with the old religion (now inwardly falling into decay for all its outward appearance of being at the most brilliant zenith of its powers) might yet find a refuge if they would not fall back upon sheer nothingness.

This was the path taken by the earliest pioneers of philosophy; they followed it free from the constraints of mythical or religious thinking. While mythology and the theology based on it viewed a complete history of cosmic events as the result of separate and unique actions by conscious divine beings with the power of choice, the philosopher recognized the ongoing play of eternal forces that couldn't be fully explained by any single historical event. These forces had always been at work, tirelessly manifesting according to unchanging laws, without a beginning or an end. In such a universe, there seemed to be little room for divine figures created in humanity's image and worshipped as the ultimate powers of the world. In fact, the groundwork was being laid for a significant structure of free inquiry, which ultimately managed to create new realms of thought. This allowed even those who had disputes with or were discontented by the old religion, which was internally decaying despite its outward show of brightness, to find a refuge rather than retreating into nothingness.

And yet Greece never saw a thorough-going opposition and conscious quarrel between science and religion. In a few special cases the religion of the state was forced to recognize its incompatibility with the openly expressed opinions of individual philosophers, and took steps to make its claims to universal supremacy respected. But for the most part, the two streams of influence flowed on side by side for centuries without ever coming into hostile contact. The propagandist temper was completely absent from philosophy from the very beginning. (Even when it appeared later as among the Cynics it produced very little effect on the supremacy of the state religion.) Religion on its side was not represented by any priestly caste which might have been led to take up arms for religion and for what it believed to be its own interest alike. Theoretic contradictions might the more easily remain unobserved when religion depended so little upon fixed dogma or upon a world-embracing whole of opinions and doctrines; while Theology, wherever it accompanied the worship of the gods (εὐσέβεια), which was the real core of religion, was, just as much as philosophy, the business of individuals and their adherents gathered together outside the limits of the official religion of the state. Philosophy (except in a few special and unrepresentative cases) never sought open war with religion—not even with the weakened and diluted religion of the masses. In fact the juxtaposition of philosophy and religion (with theology itself by their side) sometimes went beyond the external conditions of the time, and affected the private intellectual life of certain thinkers. It might seem as if religion and philosophy were not merely different but dealt with different provinces of reality, and thus even strict and philosophically minded thinkers could honestly and without imagining disloyalty to philosophy, adopt particular and even fundamental conceptions from the creed of their fathers, and allow them to grow up side by side and at peace with their own purely philosophical ideas. 364

And yet Greece never experienced a complete opposition or a conscious conflict between science and religion. In a few specific cases, the state religion had to acknowledge its incompatibility with the openly expressed views of certain philosophers and took steps to ensure its claims to universal authority were respected. But for the most part, both influences existed alongside each other for centuries without ever clashing. Philosophy was completely devoid of a propagandistic mindset from the very beginning. (Even when it later emerged among the Cynics, it had very little impact on the dominance of state religion.) On the other hand, religion wasn't represented by any priestly class that might have been motivated to take up arms in defense of religion and its perceived interests. Theoretical contradictions were more easily overlooked when religion depended so little on fixed dogmas or an all-encompassing set of beliefs and doctrines; while Theology, where it accompanied the worship of the gods (piety), which was the true essence of religion, was, just like philosophy, a concern of individuals and their followers who gathered outside the boundaries of the official state religion. Philosophy (except in a few unique and unrepresentative cases) never sought direct conflict with religion—not even with the weakened and diluted faith of the masses. In fact, the coexistence of philosophy and religion (with theology itself alongside them) sometimes extended beyond the external conditions of the time, influencing the personal intellectual lives of certain thinkers. It could appear as if religion and philosophy were not only different but were dealing with different realms of reality, allowing even strict, philosophically minded thinkers to genuinely adopt particular and even fundamental beliefs from their upbringing without feeling disloyal to philosophy, allowing those beliefs to coexist peacefully with their purely philosophical ideas. 364

§ 2

What the Ionic philosophers in connexion with the rest of their cosmology had to say about the soul of man did not for all its striking novelty bring them into direct conflict with religious opinion. Philosophy and religion used the same words to denote totally different things; it could surprise no one if different things were said about quite different objects.

What the Ionic philosophers, along with their broader cosmology, said about the human soul didn’t, despite its remarkable novelty, put them in direct opposition to religious beliefs. Philosophy and religion used the same terms to refer to completely different concepts; it was not surprising that different things were discussed regarding entirely different subjects.

According to the popular view, which finds expression in Homer, and with which, in spite of their very different estimate of the relative values of body and soul, the religious theory of the Orphics and other theologi also agreed—according to this view the “psyche” was regarded as a unique creature of combined spiritual and material nature that, wherever it may have come from, now dwells within man and there, as his second self, carries on its separate existence, making itself felt when the visible self loses consciousness in dream, swoon, or ecstasy (see above, pp. 6 f.). In the same way, the moon and the stars become visible when no longer obscured by the brighter light of the sun. It was already implied in the conception itself that this double of mankind, which could be detached from him temporarily, had a separate existence of its own; it was no very great step from this to the idea that in death, which is simply the permanent separation of the visible man from the invisible, the latter did not perish, but only then became free and able to live by and for itself.

According to popular belief, expressed in Homer's works and shared by the religious theories of the Orphics and other theologi, the “psyche” was seen as a unique being that combined both spiritual and physical elements. Regardless of its origin, it resides within humans, acting as their second self and coming to life when the visible self loses awareness in dreams, fainting, or ecstasy (see above, pp. 6 f.). Similarly, the moon and stars become visible when the sun's brighter light no longer hides them. The idea itself suggested that this double of humans could be temporarily separated and existed independently; it wasn't a big leap to think that in death, which is simply the lasting separation of the visible person from the invisible, the latter doesn’t die but instead becomes free to live by and for itself.

This spiritual being and the obscure manifestations of its existence in the living man, did not attract the observation of the Ionian philosophers. Their thoughts were all for the universe as a whole; they looked for the “origins” (ἀρχαί) of all that is and becomes; for the simple elements of multifarious appearance and for the force which turns the simple into the multifarious while controlling, moving, and giving life to primeval matter. The power of life, the force which can set in motion both itself and all else that without it would be fixed and motionless—this force penetrates all being; where it manifests itself most strikingly in separate individual beings, there it is what these philosophers call the “psyche”.

This spiritual being and the unclear signs of its presence in living humans didn't catch the attention of the Ionian philosophers. They were focused entirely on the universe as a whole; they sought the “origins” (ancient) of everything that exists and changes; they were interested in the basic elements of various forms and the force that transforms the simple into the complex while controlling, moving, and giving life to primordial matter. The power of life, the force that can set itself and everything else in motion—without it, everything would remain still—this force penetrates all existence; where it shows up most clearly in individual beings, it is what these philosophers call the “psyche.”

Thought of in this way, the psyche is something quite different from the old psyche of popular belief, idly observing the life and activities of its body, as of some stranger, concentrated in itself, and pursuing its own secret, hidden life. And yet the name given to these very different concepts remained the same. The application of the word “psyche” 365 to the power which gives life and movement to the visible body—man’s power of life—might have been suggested to the philosophers by a manner of expression which, though in the strict sense of the words conflicting with Homeric conceptions, is occasionally observable in the Homeric poems, and seems to have become more and more frequent in late times.1 In more exact language, the “psyche” of these philosophers is a collective expression for all the powers of thought, desire, and will (νόος, μένος, μῆτις, βουλή), and especially for the functions denoted by the untranslatable word θυμός—powers which according to the Homeric and popular partition all belong entirely to the side of the visible man and his body.2 According to that view, they are all expressions of the body’s natural powers of life—though they cannot indeed be awakened to real life before the arrival of the “psyche”—and in Homeric usage are almost the exact opposite of the “psyche”, for they perish at death, while the psyche leaves them behind to wander about in its separate shadow-life.

Thinking of it this way, the psyche is something quite different from the old understanding that people had, which saw it as just passively observing the life and actions of its body, like a stranger, focused inward and chasing its own secret, hidden existence. Yet, the name for these very different concepts stayed the same. The use of the word “psyche” 365 to describe the power that gives life and movement to the visible body—man's life force—might have been influenced by a way of expressing things that, although it clashes with the original Homeric ideas, can occasionally be seen in the Homeric poems and seems to have become more common in later times.1 In clearer terms, the “psyche” for these philosophers is a broad term that includes all the powers of thought, desire, and will (νόος, μένος, μῆτις, βουλή), especially for the functions represented by the untranslatable word anger—powers that, according to the Homeric and popular perspective, are entirely tied to the visible person and their body.2 From that viewpoint, they are all expressions of the body’s inherent life forces—though they can’t truly come to life until the “psyche” arrives—and in the Homeric sense, they almost completely oppose the “psyche," since they perish at death while the psyche moves on, continuing its existence in a separate shadow-life.

But the soul, according to the view of the physiologists, has quite a different relation to the totality of life and living, and differs in this respect both from the Homeric psyche and the Homeric θυμός. The same force which manifests itself so strongly, as though specially concentrated there, in the psyche of man, works and rules in all matter as the general source of life that creates and preserves the world. Thus, the psyche loses the special singularity that distinguished it from all the other things and substances in the world, and made it incomparable and unique. Later reporters are wrong in attributing to these Ionic thinkers (for whom vital power and material substance seemed immediately and indissolubly united) the conception of a separate, independent “World-Soul”. Not as emanations from a single Soul of the World did they conceive the separate souls of men; but neither did they conceive them as simply independent, unique, and entirely incomparable essences. They are expressions of that force which everywhere in all the phenomena of the world produces life and is itself life. Attributing spiritual qualities to the primeval source of things, the physiology of the “Hylozoists” naturally could not assume any profound distinction between that source and the “soul”. Deprived in this way of its separateness, the soul acquired a new importance in exchange; in another sense from that of the mystics and theologians it could still be thought of as something divine, for it was a participator in the one Force which builds and rules the world. It is not the abode of a single daimonic 366 nature, but instead, the very nature of god is alive within it.

But the soul, according to physiologists, has a different relationship with life and living things compared to the Homeric psyche and the Homeric anger. The same force that is intensely concentrated in the human psyche also operates in all matter as the fundamental source of life that creates and sustains the world. Thus, the psyche loses the unique characteristics that set it apart from everything else in the world, making it incomparable and one of a kind. Later interpretations are incorrect in attributing to these Ionic thinkers (who viewed vital power and material substance as inseparably linked) the idea of a distinct, independent “World-Soul.” They did not see individual human souls as emanations from a single Soul of the World; however, they also did not view them as completely independent, unique, and entirely incomparable entities. Instead, they are expressions of the force that generates life in all worldly phenomena and is itself life. By assigning spiritual qualities to the primal source of everything, the physiology of the “Hylozoists” understandably didn’t recognize any significant distinction between that source and the “soul.” Consequently stripped of its separateness, the soul gained a new significance; in a different sense than that of mystics and theologians, it could still be considered divine, as it shares in the one Force that constructs and governs the world. It is not merely the dwelling of a single daimonic 366 nature, but rather, the very essence of the divine is alive within it.

The closer its inward connexion with the universal Whole the less, of course, will the soul be able to preserve its individual existence, which was only lent to it while it gave life and movement to the body, when that body, the sign and support of its separateness, is overtaken by death. These earliest philosophers whose view was almost entirely concentrated on the broad outlines of the life of nature as a whole, would hardly have regarded it as part of their task to formulate a deliberate opinion about the fate of the puny individual soul after the death of its body. In no case could they have spoken of an immortality of the soul in the same sense as did the mystics who regarded the soul of which they spoke as something which has entered from without into material existence, and as a spiritual essence quite distinct from everything material. The latter were thus able to attribute to the psyche a capacity for separate and continued existence which was inadmissible in the case of a force of movement and sensation completely inhering in matter and in the shaping of matter. And it was such a force which the physiologists called the soul.

The closer the soul is connected to the universal Whole, the less it can maintain its individual existence, which was only borrowed while it animated and moved the body. When that body, which signifies and supports its separateness, faces death, the soul’s individuality fades. The earliest philosophers, who focused mainly on the overall patterns of nature, likely wouldn’t have seen it as their job to form a clear opinion about what happens to the tiny individual soul after its body dies. They certainly wouldn’t have talked about an immortality of the soul in the same way the mystics did, who viewed the soul as something that came from outside material existence and as a spiritual essence completely separate from anything physical. This allowed them to attribute to the psyche the ability to exist separately and continuously, which wasn’t acceptable for a force of movement and sensation that is entirely part of matter and its shaping. The physiologists, however, referred to this force as the soul.

Ancient tradition, nevertheless, asserts that Thales of Miletos, whose genius first began the philosophic study of nature, was the first “to call the soul (of man) immortal”.3 But Thales, who recognized a “soul” also in magnets and plants,4 and thought of the material stuff and the motive force of the “soul” as inseparable, can only have spoken of the “immortality” of the human soul in the same sense as he might have spoken of the immortality of all “soul-forces” in nature. Like the primal Matter which works and creates by reason of its own natural powers of life, so, too, the universal Force which permeates it5 is imperishable and indestructible, as it is uncreated. It is entirely and essentially alive and can never be “dead”.

Ancient tradition, however, states that Thales of Miletos, whose brilliance initiated the philosophical study of nature, was the first “to call the soul (of man) immortal.” 3 But Thales, who also acknowledged a “soul” in magnets and plants, 4 and believed that the material essence and the driving force of the “soul” are inseparable, must have referred to the “immortality” of the human soul in the same way he might have discussed the immortality of all “soul-forces” in nature. Just as the primal Matter operates and creates due to its own natural powers of life, so, too, the universal Force that permeates it 5 is imperishable and indestructible because it is uncreated. It is completely and essentially alive and can never be “dead.”

Anaximander said of the “Unlimited” from which all things have been developed by separation, and by which all things are enveloped and directed, that it never grows old, but is immortal and imperishable.6 This cannot be intended to apply to the human soul as a separate existence; for like all separate creations out of the “Unlimited” it must “in the order of the time” pay the penalty for the “offence” of its separate existence,7 and lose itself again in the one primordial matter.

Anaximander talked about the “Unlimited,” the source from which everything has come through separation and by which everything is surrounded and guided. He believed it never ages; it's eternal and cannot be destroyed.6 This can't be meant to refer to the human soul as an independent entity; because, like all distinct creations from the “Unlimited,” it must eventually face the consequences of its separate existence, 7 and dissolve back into the original substance.

Nor could the third in this series—Anaximenes of Miletos—have differed seriously from Thales in the sense in which 367 he spoke of the soul as “immortal”; for him it was of the same nature8 as the one divine9 primal element of Air that is eternally in movement and produces all things out of itself.

Nor could the third in this series—Anaximenes of Miletos—have differed significantly from Thales in how 367 he referred to the soul as “immortal”; for him, it was of the same nature8 as the one divine9 primal element of Air that is constantly in motion and produces everything out of itself.

§ 3

In the teaching of Herakleitos of Ephesos the living power of the primal essence—the one10 and universal, out of which arises through change the many and the particular, which manifests itself in the union, regarded as indissoluble, of matter and motive force—received even greater prominence than with the older Ionians. By them matter itself—described as either limited or not limited in reference to one particular quality—is regarded as self-evidently in motion. For Herakleitos the origin of all multiplicity lies rather in the creative energy of absolute Life itself which is at the same time a definite material substance or analogous to one of the known substances. The idea of life, and that form of it which makes its appearance in man, must have been more important for him than for any of his predecessors.

In the teachings of Heraclitus of Ephesus, the vital force of the primal essence—the one10 and universal—gains even more importance than it did with the earlier Ionians. For them, matter—whether described as limited or unlimited in relation to a specific quality—is seen as obviously in motion. For Heraclitus, the source of all diversity comes from the creative energy of absolute Life itself, which is also a specific material substance or something comparable to one of the known substances. The concept of life, especially the form of it that appears in humans, must have been more significant to him than to any of his predecessors.

This never-resting force and activity of becoming that has neither beginning nor end, is represented by the Hot and Dry and called by the name of that elementary condition which cannot be thought of as ceasing to move, namely, Fire. The ever-living (ἀείζωον) fire, which periodically kindles itself and periodically goes out (Bywater, fr. 20), is formed entirely of movement and livingness. Living belongs to everything; but living is becoming, changing, becoming something different without cessation. Every appearance brings forth from itself, at the moment of its appearance, the opposite of itself. Birth, life, and death, and fresh birth clash together in a single burning moment, like the lightning (fr. 28).

This constantly active force and process of becoming that has no beginning or end is represented by the Hot and Dry and referred to by the name of that essential state that can’t be imagined as stopping, which is Fire. The eternal (eternal life) fire, which ignites itself and goes out periodically (Bywater, fr. 20), is made entirely of movement and life. Life is inherent in everything; but life is becoming, changing, and transforming into something different without pause. Every appearance generates, at the moment it appears, its opposite. Birth, life, and death, and new birth collide in a single fiery moment, like lightning (fr. 28).

That which thus moves itself in unceasing vitality and has all its being in becoming; which perpetually changes and “in backward-straining effort” finds itself again—this is something endowed with reason, creative in accordance with reason and “art”; is Reason (λόγος) itself. In creating the world it loses itself in the elements; it suffers its “death” (frr. 66, 67) when in the “Way downwards” it becomes water and earth (fr. 21). There are degrees of value in the elements decided by the relation which they hold towards the moving and self-vivifying fire. But that which in the multiplicity of the phenomena in the world, yet preserves its godlike fiery nature—this is for Herakleitos “psyche”. Psyche is fire.11 Fire and psyche are interchangeable terms.12 And so, too, the psyche of man is fire, a part of the universal fiery 368 energy that surrounds it and upholds it, through the “inhalation” of which it maintains itself alive;13 a portion of the World-Reason by participation in which it is itself rational. In men God is living.14 But god does not descend into man, as in the teaching of the Theologians, entering as a finite individuality into the vessel of the individual human life. As a united whole he surrounds men with his flood and reaches after and into them, as though with fiery tongues. A portion15 of his universal Wisdom is living in the soul of man: the “drier”, more fiery, nearer to the universal Fire and further from the less living elements he is, the wiser will he be (frr. 74, 75, 76). If he sundered himself from the universal wisdom, man would become nothing; it is his business in thinking, as in acting and in moral behaviour, to surrender himself to the One Living essence that “nourishes” him and is the Mind and Law of the world (frr. 91, 92, 100, 103).

What constantly moves with unending vitality and exists through becoming; what continually changes and “in backward-straining effort” finds its way back—this is something that possesses reason, creatively aligned with that reason and “art”; it is Reason (word) itself. In creating the world, it loses itself in the elements; it experiences its “death” (frr. 66, 67) when in the “Way downwards” it turns into water and earth (fr. 21). There are different values in the elements based on their relationship to the moving, self-sustaining fire. Yet, what maintains its divine fiery essence amid the multitude of phenomena in the world—this is “psyche” for Herakleitos. Psyche is fire.11 Fire and psyche are interchangeable terms.12 Likewise, the psyche of man is fire, a part of the universal fiery 368 energy that surrounds and supports it, which it sustains itself through “inhalation”;13 a part of the World-Reason, through which it is rational. In humans, God is alive.14 However, God does not enter into man as taught by Theologians, becoming a finite individual within the vessel of a single human life. As a unified whole, He envelops humanity with His essence and reaches toward and into them, almost as if with fiery tongues. A part 15 of His universal Wisdom lives within the human soul: the more “fiery” and closer to the universal Fire, and the further from the less living elements he is, the wiser he will be (frr. 74, 75, 76). If he separates himself from universal wisdom, man would become nothing; it is his responsibility in thought, action, and morality to surrender to the One Living essence that “nourishes” him and is the Mind and Law of the world (frr. 91, 92, 100, 103).

But the soul itself is also a portion of the universal Fire that in the perpetual variation of its form of being has been encompassed by the body and become entangled in corporeality. Here we no longer have the rigid, unmediated contrast between “Body” and “Soul” such as it appeared from the standpoint of the theologian. The elements of the body, water and earth, have themselves arisen and perpetually arise out of the fire which changes into all other things, and into which everything else changes (fr. 22). So it is the soul itself, the creative fire, which creates the body. “Soul,” i.e. Fire, unceasingly turns itself into the lower elements; there is no contrast between them, and it is but a continual flux of transition.

But the soul is also part of the universal Fire that, through its constant changes in form, has been wrapped in the body and caught up in physical existence. Here, we no longer see a strict, direct divide between “Body” and “Soul” as viewed from a theologian's perspective. The elements of the body, water and earth, have themselves emerged and continue to emerge from the fire that transforms into everything else, and into which everything else transforms (fr. 22). So, it is the soul itself, the creative fire, that creates the body. “Soul,” meaning Fire, constantly shifts into the lower elements; there is no real contrast between them, but rather an ongoing flow of change.

While it is enclosed in the body the soul is still affected by unceasing change. In this it is like everything else. Nothing in the world can for a single moment preserve the parts which compose it unaltered; the perpetual movement and alteration of its being constitute its life. The sun itself, the greatest fire-body, becomes another sun every day (fr. 32). So, too, the soul, though distinct from the body and a self-existing substance, yet is a substance that never remains like itself. In unceasing alteration of its material substance, its contents are perpetually being transposed. It loses its fire of life in the lower elements; it absorbs fresh fire from the living Fire of the universe that surrounds it. There can be no question of the permanent identity of the soul, of the spiritual personality, with itself. What in the unbroken process of upward and downward straining seems to maintain itself as a single person, is in reality a series of souls and 369 personalities, one taking the place of another and ousting and being ousted in turn.

While it is housed in the body, the soul is still influenced by constant change. In this way, it is like everything else. Nothing in the world can keep its components unchanged for even a moment; the ongoing movement and transformation of its existence create its life. Even the sun, the largest fireball, becomes a different sun every day (fr. 32). Similarly, the soul, although separate from the body and a self-existing entity, is a substance that never stays the same. With the continuous change in its material nature, its contents are always being reshaped. It loses its life energy in the lower elements; it draws new energy from the living Fire of the universe around it. There is no question about the soul's permanent identity or spiritual personality being the same over time. What appears, in the continuous process of striving upward and downward, to remain as one person is actually a series of souls and 369 personalities, one replacing another, displacing and being displaced in turn.

Thus, even while it is in life, the soul is perpetually dying—but to live again; ever supplementing the departing soul-life or supplying its place with another. So long as it can recruit itself from the surrounding World-Fire, so long the individual lives. Separation from the source of all life, the living and universal fire of the world, would be death for it. The soul may temporarily lose its life-giving contact with the “common world”: this happens in sleep and dreaming which enclose it in their own world (frr. 94, 95), and this is already a partial death to it. Sometimes, too, the soul has a tendency to transform itself to a humidity not always made good by fresh fire; the drunkard has a “moist soul” (fr. 73). Finally, there comes the moment when the soul of man cannot any longer repair the loss of the living fire which is taken from it in the perpetual alteration of its matter. Then it dies; death carries off the last of the series of living fires which in their continuity made up the human soul.16

Thus, even while it's alive, the soul is constantly dying—but to be reborn; always replacing the departing soul-life or filling its void with another. As long as it can draw energy from the surrounding World-Fire, the individual continues to live. Separation from the source of all life, the living and universal fire of the world, would mean death for it. The soul may temporarily lose its life-giving connection to the “common world”: this occurs in sleep and dreams, which trap it in their own realm (frr. 94, 95), and this is already a kind of partial death for it. Sometimes, too, the soul tends to turn into a moisture that isn’t always replenished by fresh fire; the drunkard has a “moist soul” (fr. 73). Eventually, there comes a time when the human soul can no longer restore the loss of the living fire that is taken from it through the constant change of its matter. Then it dies; death takes away the last of the series of living fires that, in their continuity, made up the human soul.16

But in Herakleitos’ world there is no such thing as death in the absolute sense—an end followed by no beginning, an unconditional cessation of becoming. “Death” is for him only a point where one condition of things gives way to another; a relative “not-being”, involving death for one but simultaneously bringing birth and life for another (frr. 25, [64], 66, 67). Death, just as much as life, is for him a positive thing. “Fire lives the death of earth, and air lives the death of fire; water lives the death of air, and earth the death of water” (fr. 25). The One that is in all things is at once dead and alive (fr. 78), immortal and mortal (fr. 67); a perpetual “death and becoming” agitates it. So, too, the “death” of man must be the exit from one positive state of things, and the entry into another, also positive, condition. Death occurs for man when the “soul” is no longer within him. Only the body is then left; alone and by itself it is no better than dung (fr. 85). But the soul—what becomes of that? It must have altered; it was fire, but now it has descended on the “Way downwards” and become water—to become earth after that. So it must happen to all fire. In death the fire in man “goes out” (fr. 77). “It is death for the souls to become water” says Herakleitos clearly enough (fr. 68).17 The soul must tread this path at last, and treads it willingly; change is for the soul its delight and refreshment (fr. 83). The soul has then changed itself into the elements of the body, has lost itself in the body. 370

But in Herakleitos’ world, there is no such thing as death in the absolute sense—an end without a beginning, an unconditional stop to becoming. “Death” for him is just a point where one state of things transitions to another; a relative “not-being” that means death for one but simultaneously brings birth and life for another (frr. 25, [64], 66, 67). Death, just as much as life, is a positive thing for him. “Fire lives the death of earth, and air lives the death of fire; water lives the death of air, and earth the death of water” (fr. 25). The One that exists in all things is both dead and alive (fr. 78), immortal and mortal (fr. 67); a constant "death and becoming" stirs it. Likewise, the “death” of a person is simply the transition from one positive state of things to another, also positive. For a person, death happens when the “soul” is no longer within them. Only the body remains; alone and by itself, it is no better than dung (fr. 85). But what happens to the soul? It must have changed; it was fire, but now it has descended on the “Way downwards” and become water—eventually becoming earth after that. This must happen to all fire. In death, the fire in a person “goes out” (fr. 77). “It is death for the souls to become water,” says Herakleitos very clearly (fr. 68). The soul must take this path in the end and does so willingly; change is an enjoyment and rejuvenation for the soul (fr. 83). The soul has then transformed into the elements of the body and has lost itself in the body. 370

But it cannot rest permanently in this transformation. “For the souls it is death to become water; for the water it is death to become earth. And yet from earth comes water; and from water, soul” (fr. 68). Thus, in the restless up and down of becoming, in the “Way upwards” the soul reconstitutes itself out of the lower elements. But not that soul which had formerly animated the particular individual and of whose complete self-identity in the midst of the influx of the Fire-spirit there could be no question even during the life of the body. The inquiry after an individual immortality or even a continued existence of the separate soul could hardly have had any meaning at all for Herakleitos. Nor can he have admitted it under the form of the “transmigration of the soul”.18 It is quite certain that Herakleitos can never have distinctly asserted the changeless persistence of the individual human soul in the midst of the unbroken stream of becoming in which all fixity is nothing but an illusion of the senses. But it is also incredible that, in despite of his own fundamental principles, he even admitted the possibility of this popular view with an indulgence quite foreign to his nature.19 What could have tempted him to do so? We are told20 that it was from the mysteries that he adopted this opinion which was one of their most important doctrines. Herakleitos, however, only casts an occasional glance at the mysteries and what might be called their “doctrine” (just as he glanced at other prominent manifestations of the excited religious life of his time21); and he does so in order to harmonize their teaching with his own—a result which he achieves rather by imposing an interpretation than by patiently eliciting one. He demonstrates that the mysteries might be harmonized with his own doctrine,22 which seemed to him able to explain all the phenomena of the world; that contrariwise he ever sought to set his own teaching in harmony with that of the mysteries, or that the latter had shown him the way to his thought, or could ever have tempted him to set foot outside his own self-chosen path—of this there is not a scrap of evidence to be had.

But it can't stay in this transformation forever. “For the souls, it is death to become water; for the water, it is death to become earth. And yet from earth comes water; and from water, soul” (fr. 68). So, in the constant cycle of becoming, on the “Way upwards,” the soul reforms itself from the lower elements. But not that soul which once animated the specific individual, and of which there could be no doubt about its complete self-identity even during the life of the body in the midst of the influx of the Fire-spirit. The quest for individual immortality or even for the continued existence of a separate soul likely meant very little for Herakleitos. Nor could he have accepted it in the form of "transmigration of the soul." 18 It’s quite certain that Herakleitos never clearly asserted the unchanging persistence of the individual human soul amid the continuous flow of becoming, where all fixity is just an illusion of the senses. But it's also hard to believe that, despite his own fundamental principles, he entertained the possibility of this popular belief with a leniency that seemed foreign to him.19 What could have led him to do that? We are told 20 that he adopted this opinion from the mysteries, which was one of their key teachings. However, Herakleitos only occasionally glances at the mysteries and what might be called their “doctrine” (just as he looked at other significant expressions of the religious fervor of his time 21); and he does this to align their teaching with his own—a goal he achieves more by imposing an interpretation than by patiently drawing one out. He shows that the mysteries could be aligned with his own doctrine, 22 which seemed to him capable of explaining all the phenomena of the world; that, on the contrary, he never sought to align his teachings with those of the mysteries, nor that the latter ever showed him the way to his thoughts, or ever tempted him to stray from his own path—there's not a shred of evidence to support that.

The individual in its isolation has, for Herakleitos, neither value nor importance: to persist in this isolation (if it had been possible) would have seemed to him a crime.23 The Fire is for him indestructible and immortal as a totality, not as divided into individual particles, but only as the one Universal Mind that transforms itself into all things and draws all things back again into itself. The soul of man has a claim to immortality as an emanation of this universal Reason, 371 and shares the immortality which belongs to it. So, too, the soul, even when it has lost itself in the elements, finds itself again. Between “want” and “satisfaction” (frr. 24, 36), this process of becoming has its perpetual being. A day will come when the Fire will “overtake” everything (fr. 26); God will then be utterly by himself—all in all. But that is not the purpose of this world; here change, becoming and passing away will never end. Nor should they end; the “Strife” (fr. 43) which has created the world, and ever fashions it anew, is the most inward nature of the All-living which it perpetually stirs to insatiable desire of becoming. For the desire and refreshment of all things is Change (frr. 72, 83), the coming and going in the interplay of Becoming.

The individual alone has no value or importance for Herakleitos: to stay in that isolation (if it were even possible) would have seemed to him like a crime. The Fire is for him indestructible and immortal as a whole, not split into individual parts, but as the one Universal Mind that transforms into everything and draws everything back into itself. The human soul has a claim to immortality as a result of this universal Reason, 371 and shares in the immortality that belongs to it. Likewise, the soul, even when it loses itself in the elements, eventually finds itself again. Between “want” and “satisfaction” (frr. 24, 36), this process of becoming has its ongoing existence. A day will come when the Fire will “overtake” everything (fr. 26); God will then exist entirely by himself—all in all. But that’s not the purpose of this world; here, change, becoming, and passing away will never end. Nor should they end; the “Strife” (fr. 43) that has created the world and continuously shapes it anew is the most intrinsic nature of the All-living, which it constantly stirs to an insatiable desire for becoming. For the desire and renewal of all things is Change (frr. 72, 83), the rhythm of coming and going in the dance of Becoming.

It is the precise opposite of a quietistic mood that speaks from the whole teaching of Herakleitos. His voice is a trumpet call that grows louder and louder as his lofty and majestic spirit with ever-increasing intensity proclaims prophet-like the last word of wisdom. He knows well that it is only labour that can give meaning to rest, and hunger to satisfaction; only sickness can call forth the desire of health (fr. 104). That is the law of the world which binds together the opposing contraries, each of which is engendered from the last, with an inward and complete necessity. He bows before it and assents to it. For him the fixity of the soul in a Blessedness that was without activity and without change—even if such were thinkable24—would not have seemed a possible goal of desire.

It’s the exact opposite of a quiet mood that comes through in all of Herakleitos’ teachings. His voice is like a trumpet that gets louder and louder as his noble and powerful spirit passionately shares, like a prophet, the ultimate truth of wisdom. He understands that only hard work can give meaning to rest and that only hunger makes satisfaction desirable; only illness can spark the wish for health (fr. 104). This is the law of the world that connects opposing forces, each one arising from the previous, with an inner and complete necessity. He respects it and agrees with it. For him, the idea of the soul being fixed in a state of happiness that was inactive and unchanging—even if that were possible24—would not have seemed like a worthy goal to desire.

§ 4

Even before the days of Herakleitos the torch of philosophic inquiry had been borne from the coasts of Ionia to the West by Xenophanes of Kolophon who in a life of adventure had wandered as far as Southern Italy and Sicily. For his fiery temperament the most subtle reflection was turned into life and experience, and the one enduring source of Being to which he ever directed his gaze became the universal Divinity that is all perception and thought, that tirelessly embraces all things in its thought and intelligence, and, without beginning or end, perpetually remains the same with itself. What Xenophanes had to say about this God which for him is the same as the world, became the basis for the elaborated doctrine of the Eleatic school which, in declared opposition to Herakleitos,25 denied all possibility of movement, becoming, alteration, division of the One into Many, to the one absolute Being that completely and entirely occupies Space, is raised 372 above all development, whether temporal or spatial, and remains perpetually enclosed in itself in absolute self-sufficiency.

Even before Heraclitus, the quest for philosophical knowledge had been carried from the shores of Ionia to the West by Xenophanes of Colophon, who, living an adventurous life, traveled as far as Southern Italy and Sicily. His passionate nature transformed the most subtle reflections into lived experiences, and the one constant source of Being that he focused on became the universal Divinity, which encompasses all perception and thought, tirelessly containing all things within its knowledge and understanding, and, without beginning or end, remains eternally unchanged. What Xenophanes expressed about this God, which he identified with the universe, formed the foundation for the complex teachings of the Eleatic school. This school, in direct opposition to Heraclitus, denied any possibility of movement, change, division of the One into Many, asserting that the absolute Being completely fills Space, is raised above all forms of development, whether temporal or spatial, and remains forever self-contained in absolute self-sufficiency.

For this view the whole multiplicity of things that presses itself upon sense-perception is an illusion. Deceptive also is the apparent existence of a multiplicity of animated beings, just as the whole of nature is an illusion. It was not “Nature”, the content of actual experience, that provided the starting-point of the philosophy of Parmenides. Without any assistance from experience, simply by the pure logical deductions to be made from a single fundamental concept (that of “Being”), which was to be grasped only by the understanding, this philosophy claimed to arrive at the whole content of its teaching. For the philosophic scientists of Ionia the soul also had been a part of nature and the science of the soul a department of the science of nature; and this inclusion of the psychical within the physical was the peculiarity in their doctrine of the soul which distinguished it from the ordinary popular psychology. When, however, the whole of Nature was to be ruled out of account as a subject of scientific knowledge, the derivation of psychology from physiology had to be given up as well. These aphysici26 were logically debarred from holding any doctrine of the soul.

For this view, the entire range of things that comes at us through our senses is an illusion. The apparent existence of many living beings is also misleading, just like all of nature is an illusion. It wasn't "Nature," the content of actual experience, that kickstarted the philosophy of Parmenides. Without any help from experience, purely through logical deductions from a single fundamental concept (that of “Being”), which could only be understood through reasoning, this philosophy claimed to cover the entire content of its teachings. For the philosophical scientists of Ionia, the soul was also part of nature, and the study of the soul was a branch of natural science; this integration of the mental within the physical was what set their doctrine of the soul apart from everyday popular psychology. However, when all of Nature was dismissed as a subject of scientific knowledge, the idea of deriving psychology from physiology had to be abandoned as well. These aphysici26 were logically prevented from holding any doctrine of the soul.

With a complaisance that is remarkable in view of the uncompromising logical vigour with which they deduced their main theory and based it on abstract, super-sensual knowledge, the Eleatics conceded so much at least to the region of appearance and the pressure of sense-perception that, although they did not deduce from their own fundamental conceptions a physical theory of multifarious appearance and its development, yet, side by side with their rigid doctrine of being, in unjustified and unjustifiable relation with it, they did in fact put forward such a theory. Xenophanes, himself, had already in the same way offered a physical theory of limited and relative validity. Parmenides in the second part of his doctrinal poem, developed, “in deceptive adornment of words,” not an authoritative statement of the true nature of being, but “human opinions” of becoming and creation in the world of multiplicity. This, too, must be the standpoint of the physiological doctrines put forward by Zeno of Elea, the boldest dialectician who upheld the doctrine of the motionless All-One. In the course of such a physiology, and with the same implied reservations, the Eleatic philosophers dealt also with the nature and origin of the soul. Their physical doctrine was framed entirely on the lines of the older type of 373 natural philosophy, and they regarded the relation of the spiritual to the corporeal from exactly the same point of view as their predecessors had done. For Parmenides (146 ff, Mull. = fr. 16 Diels) the mind (νόος) of man depends for its existence upon the mixture of two ingredients of which everything, including its body, is composed. These ingredients are the “Light” and the “Night” (the Warm and the Cold, Fire and Earth). What is intellectually active is, even in mankind, the “nature of his limbs”; the character of his thought is determined by the one of the two elements which preponderates in the individual. Even the dead man (because he still has a body) has feeling and sensation; but these powers are deserted by the warm and the fiery and given over to the cold, the dark, and silence. All that is has some capacity of knowledge.27—It would be impossible to condemn the “soul” to corporeality more completely than is here done by the bold philosopher of abstract Reason, who at the same time denied so unconditionally all validity to sense-perception. The soul is evidently no longer an independent substance but a mere resultant of material mixture, a function of elements in composition. For Zeno, too, the “soul” in the same way was an exactly equal mixture of the four elementary properties of matter, the Warm, the Cold, the Dry, and the Wet.28

With a surprising eagerness, considering the strict logical rigor with which they developed their main theory based on abstract, non-physical knowledge, the Eleatics still allowed for some acknowledgment of appearances and sensory perception. While they didn’t create a physical theory that explained the varied appearances and their evolution from their core concepts, they still proposed such a theory alongside their strict belief in being, even if that relationship was unjustified. Xenophanes had similarly put forward a physical theory that was limited and somewhat relative. In the second part of his philosophical poem, Parmenides crafted what could be described as “the alluring decoration of words,” not an authoritative claim about the true nature of being, but rather “human opinions” regarding change and creation in a world full of diversity. This perspective is also evident in the physiological theories presented by Zeno of Elea, the boldest logician who promoted the idea of the unchanging All-One. Throughout his physiology, while maintaining these reservations, the Eleatic philosophers examined the nature and origin of the soul as well. Their physical doctrine was entirely aligned with the older model of natural philosophy, approaching the relationship between the spiritual and the physical in the same way as their predecessors. For Parmenides (146 ff, Mull. = fr. 16 Diels), the human mind (mind) relies for its existence on the combination of two components that make up everything, including the body. These components are "Light" and "Night" (the Warm and the Cold, Fire and Earth). What is intellectually active in humans is, in fact, the “nature of their limbs”; the character of one's thoughts is influenced by which of the two elements is dominant in that person. Even a dead person (since they still have a body) retains feelings and sensations; however, these abilities are abandoned by the warm and fiery elements and are left to the cold, dark, and silent. Everything that exists has some capacity for knowledge. 27—It would be impossible to more thoroughly condemn the “soul” to being merely a physical entity than what is accomplished here by the audacious philosopher of abstract Reason, who simultaneously denied any validity to sensory perception. The soul is no longer regarded as an independent substance but rather as a mere product of material composition, a function derived from the combination of elements. For Zeno, the “soul” was similarly understood as an equal mixture of the four fundamental properties of matter: the Warm, the Cold, the Dry, and the Wet. 28

It is, therefore, startling, in the face of these utterances, to find that Parmenides also said about the “soul” that the deity that rules the world “at one time, sends it out of the Invisible into the Visible, and at another time back again”.29 Here, the soul is no longer a condition arising from the mixture of material elements, but an independent being credited with pre-existence before its entry into the “Visible”, i.e. before its entry into the life of the body, and also with a continued existence after its separation from the realm of visibility—and indeed, with a sojourn, several times repeated, in those two worlds. Did Parmenides distinguish between this independently existing soul and the being that perceives in the mixture of the elements and as mind (νόος) thinks, but whose existence is bound up with the elements and the body they together compose? It is obvious at any rate that in what he says of the psyche, and its alternate life in the visible and the invisible, Parmenides is not speaking as a physiologist, but as an adherent of the Orphic-Pythagorean theosophy. While reserving for himself his knowledge of “Truth” and unalterable Being, he could select as he liked among the “opinions of men” when speaking only hypothetically. In his doctrine as a practical teacher with an ethical purpose 374 in view he preferred to adopt the conceptions of the Pythagoreans with whom he lived in close association.30

It is, therefore, surprising, given these statements, to find that Parmenides also mentioned about the “soul” that the deity governing the world “at one time sends it out of the Invisible into the Visible, and at another time back again.” 29 Here, the soul is no longer something that results from a mix of material elements, but rather an independent entity believed to have existed before entering the “Visible,” meaning before it becomes part of a bodily life, and also to continue existing after it separates from the realm of visibility—indeed, with repeated experiences in those two worlds. Did Parmenides differentiate between this independently existing soul and the being that perceives through the mixture of elements and thinks as mind (mind), whose existence is tied to the elements and the body they create together? It is clear, at any rate, that when he talks about the psyche and its alternating lives in the visible and invisible, Parmenides is not speaking as a physiologist but as a follower of Orphic-Pythagorean theosophy. While keeping his understanding of “Truth” and unchanging Being to himself, he could freely choose among the “opinions of men” when speaking hypothetically. In his role as a practical teacher with an ethical aim 374, he preferred to adopt the ideas of the Pythagoreans, with whom he had close ties. 30

§ 5

Ionic physiology had fixed its attention on Nature as a whole, and on the phenomena of life displayed in every nook and corner of the universe; man, as a mere ripple on the surface of the ocean of becoming and taking form, was almost entirely neglected. A philosophy that made it its main effort to learn the nature of man, and, still further, with the knowledge so acquired, to show man the way and purpose of his living, had to try other paths.

Ionic physiology focused on Nature as a whole and the life phenomena showing up in every corner of the universe; humanity, seen as just a ripple on the surface of the ocean of becoming and forming, was largely overlooked. A philosophy that aimed to understand the nature of man and to guide him toward the purpose of his existence needed to explore different routes.

This is what Pythagoras of Samos did. What he called his “Philosophy”31 was in essence a practical effort. Plato32 tells us that Pythagoras was so peculiarly honoured because he discovered a special mode of directing one’s life. A distinct way of living, formed on a religious and ethical basis, was his creation. How far his “polymathy”,33 which indubitably contained already the substance of Pythagorean science, may have become a system in his hands, is not distinctly known. What is certain is that in Kroton he formed a society which, together with the strict rules in accordance with which he organized their manner of life for his associates, eventually spread far and wide among the Achæan and Dorian cities of the Italian “great Greece”. In this society a profound conception of human life and its purposes was given practical and visible application, and to have brought this about must be regarded as the act and the special service of Pythagoras. The fundamental conception of this way of life, except in so far as it may have contained from the beginning a mystic philosophy of numbers, was by no means the special invention of Pythagoras; the new and potent feature which he introduced was the force of personality which was able to give life and body to the ideal. What was apparently lacking in similar movements in ancient Greece was now provided by a great man who for his followers was a pattern and an example, a leader inspiring imitation and emulation. His personality became a centre to which a whole community was attracted by a sort of inward necessity. Before very long this founder of a community appeared to his followers as a superman, unique and incomparable among all other men. Some lines of Empedokles,34 who did not himself belong to the Pythagorean society, bear witness to this fact, and to his followers Pythagoras became in memory a saint or even a god in human form, and they related legends of the miracles he had 375 performed. For us it is difficult to form a connected picture or trace the real features of the man beneath the dazzling halo of the saint.

This is what Pythagoras of Samos did. What he referred to as his “Philosophy”31 was essentially a practical effort. Plato32 tells us that Pythagoras was uniquely honored because he discovered a special way to guide one's life. He created a distinct way of living based on religious and ethical principles. It's not clear how much his “polymathy”33 which certainly included the core of Pythagorean science, developed into a system in his hands. What is certain is that in Kroton, he established a society that, along with the strict rules he set for his followers, ultimately spread widely among the Achæan and Dorian cities of “great Greece” in Italy. In this society, a deep understanding of human life and its purposes was practically and visibly applied, and bringing this to fruition must be seen as Pythagoras's key contribution. The fundamental idea behind this way of life, unless it originally contained a mystical philosophy of numbers, was not uniquely Pythagorean; the new and powerful element he introduced was the force of personality that could give life and substance to the ideal. What seemed to be missing in similar movements in ancient Greece was filled by a great man who served as a role model and an example for his followers, inspiring them to imitate and emulate him. His personality became a center that attracted an entire community out of an inner necessity. Before long, this founder of a community appeared to his followers as a superman, unmatched and incomparable to any other man. Some lines from Empedokles,34 who was not part of the Pythagorean society, confirm this, and to his followers, Pythagoras became remembered as a saint or even a god in human form, and they shared legends of the miracles he had 375 performed. For us, it's difficult to create a clear picture or identify the true features of the man behind the dazzling halo of the saint.

The teaching which enabled him to knit together his followers in a far closer bond of fellowship in living than had been achieved by any Orphic sect, must still in the main have coincided with what in the Orphic doctrine immediately related to the religious life. He too pointed out the way of salvation for the soul and his doctrine of the soul formed the central feature of his philosophy.

The teachings that allowed him to bring his followers together in a much closer sense of community than any Orphic sect had managed to achieve likely still mostly aligned with the aspects of Orphic doctrine that were directly connected to religious life. He also highlighted the path to salvation for the soul, and his views on the soul were the main focus of his philosophy.

So far as our scanty and dubious evidence serves us, the substance of the Pythagorean doctrine of the soul may be stated as follows.

As far as our limited and questionable evidence allows, the essence of the Pythagorean teaching about the soul can be summarized as follows.

The soul of man, once more regarded entirely as the “double” of the visible body and its powers, is a daimonic immortal being35 that has been cast down from divine heights and for a punishment is confined within the “custody” of the body.36 It has no real relationship with the body; it is not what may be called the personality of the individual visible man; any soul may dwell in any body.37 When death separates it from the body the soul must first endure a period of purgation in Hades38 and then return again to the upper world. The souls invisibly swarm about the living;39 in the tremulous motion of motes in the sunbeam the Pythagoreans saw the movement of the “souls”.40 The whole air is full of souls.41 Upon earth, however, the soul must seek out another body, and this may be repeated many times. So it wanders a long way, passing through many bodies of men and beasts.42 Very ancient tradition43 said that Pythagoras himself remembered the earlier incarnations through which his soul had passed (and of which he gave information for the instruction and warning of the faithful). Here, too, the doctrine of the soul’s transmigrations took on an edificatory character in a religious and ethical sense. The conditions of the new incarnations and the character of the new lifetime are governed by the performances of the past life. What the soul has done in the past, that it must suffer in its own person when it becomes a man again.44

The human soul, viewed as the “double” of the visible body and its abilities, is a divine immortal being that has been brought down from heavenly heights and is confined as punishment within the “custody” of the body. It has no real connection to the body; it isn’t what we would call the personality of the individual person; any soul can inhabit any body. When death separates it from the body, the soul must first go through a period of purification in Hades and then return to the world above. Souls invisibly surround the living; in the subtle movement of particles in a sunbeam, the Pythagoreans perceived the movement of the “souls.” The entire air is filled with souls. However, on earth, the soul must look for another body, and this can happen many times. It wanders far, passing through many bodies of humans and animals. Very ancient tradition said that Pythagoras himself remembered the previous lives his soul had experienced (and he shared this knowledge for the guidance and warning of the faithful). Here, too, the idea of the soul's reincarnations took on a significant religious and moral meaning. The circumstances of the new incarnations and the nature of the new life are determined by the actions of the past life. What the soul has done in the past, it must endure in its own form when it becomes human again.

It is thus of primary importance both for the present life and for future incarnations to know and to follow the methods of salvation delivered by Pythagoras to his followers. The society points out the way to its company of the faithful in purifications and initiations, in a “Pythagorean life”45 entirely organized with the same purpose in view—to “follow the god”.46 Much of the old ritual symbolism that had been 376 in use for ages must have been incorporated in this Pythagorean asceticism.47 The theological ethic of asceticism was essentially negative in character, and here, too, it meant nothing more than a protecting of the soul against the attacks of external evil that might come and pollute it.48 All that matters is to keep the soul pure: no need for moral reformation—only that it be kept free from external evil. The fact of immortality, the soul’s perpetuity, stands fast and unalterable; as it was from the beginning so it must ever be and live.49 To lift it at last altogether from this earthly existence and restore it to a free divine state of being—that, at least, was the final goal.50

It is therefore crucial for both this life and future lives to know and follow the salvation methods that Pythagoras shared with his followers. The community shows its dedicated members the path through purifications and initiations, in a “Pythagorean life”45 completely organized with the same goal in mind—to “follow the god.”46 Much of the ancient ritual symbolism that had been 376 in use for ages was likely integrated into this Pythagorean asceticism.47 The theological ethic of asceticism was mainly negative, aimed at protecting the soul from external evils that could come and taint it.48 The key is to keep the soul pure: there’s no need for moral reformation—just the importance of keeping it free from external evil. The truth of immortality, the soul’s permanence, remains solid and unchanging; as it was from the beginning, so it must always be and exist.49 The ultimate aim was to elevate it entirely from this earthly life and return it to a free divine state of existence—that was the final goal.50

The practical philosophy of the Pythagorean school is founded upon a conception of the soul as absolutely distinct from “nature”, and, in fact, opposed to it. It is thrust into the life of nature, but it is in a foreign world where it preserves its self-enclosed individuality intact and from which it escapes into independence to undergo ever-renewed incarnations. Its origin is supra-mundane, and so, too, when liberated from the shackles of natural life it will one day be enabled to return to a supernatural existence as a spirit.

The practical philosophy of the Pythagorean school is based on the idea that the soul is completely separate from “nature” and actually opposes it. The soul is placed into the life of nature, but it exists in a different world where it maintains its unique individuality intact, and it eventually breaks free into independence to experience continual rebirths. Its origin is beyond the material world, and when it is freed from the constraints of natural life, it will one day be able to return to a supernatural existence as a spirit.

Not one of these ideas is achieved by a process of scientific thinking. Physiology, the science of the world and all the phenomena of the world could never lead to the conception of the soul’s separateness from nature and its life. It was not from Greek science, but neither was it, as ancient tradition would have us believe, from foreign lands, that Pythagoras got his belief in the fallen nature of the soul, descended from supra-mundane heights to this earthly nature, and in its long pilgrimage through many bodies on the completion of which it is to be free at last, through purifications and initiations. He may have owed much to his travels; from his stay in Egypt, perhaps, he may (like Demokritos after him) have derived the stimulus to his mathematical discoveries and much else besides of the “learning” which Herakleitos ascribes to him. His doctrine of the soul, on the other hand, simply reproduces in essentials the fanciful ideas of the old popular psychology, as it had been enlarged and transformed by the theologi and the purification priests. Tradition was right in its estimation of his character, when it set him in this company and made him the pupil of Pherekydes of Syros, the theologos.51

None of these ideas come from a scientific way of thinking. Physiology, the science of the world and all its phenomena, could never lead to the idea of the soul being separate from nature and its life. It wasn't from Greek science, but also not from foreign lands, as ancient tradition suggests, that Pythagoras developed his belief in the fallen nature of the soul, which descended from higher realms to this earthly existence. He believed that through its long journey in many bodies, it would eventually become free after purifications and initiations. He may have gained a lot from his travels; from his time in Egypt, for instance, he likely found inspiration for his mathematical discoveries and other forms of knowledge that Herakleitos attributed to him. His views on the soul, however, mainly reflect the imaginative ideas of ancient popular psychology, which had been expanded and reshaped by the theologians and purification priests. Tradition was correct in recognizing his character when it associated him with this group and identified him as a student of Pherekydes of Syros, the theologian. 51

It can hardly be doubted that Pythagoras himself laid the foundations of the Pythagorean science—the doctrine of the creation of the world and perhaps, too, the interpretation of 377 all being and becoming in the world as due to the action and relation of numbers, as the essential basis of all things—all this, at least in elementary outline, must have been handed on by him to his followers. After his death the two sides of his doctrine continued to develop for a period in loose conjunction side by side; the guidance of life by the mystical and religious philosophy (though this, indeed, was hardly capable of further development), and the scientific interest which grew into a fairly elaborate system. Indeed, with the break-up of the Pythagorean society and its bifurcation in the fifth century, the scattered members of the band now brought into touch with the scientific studies of other communities and cut off from the ideal of the Pythagorean life which could only be realized within the limits of the society, were forced to continue their scientific studies in solitude. Pythagorean science, evolving, as it did, a picture of the world as a whole, no less than Ionian physiology deprived the soul of the unique and, indeed, antagonistic relation to nature that Pythagorean theology had given it. Philolaos, conceiving it in a manner strictly conforming to the mathematical and musical theory, called the soul a Harmony of contrary elements united together in the body.52 If, however, the soul is only a binding-together of opposites to unity and harmony, then it must, when death breaks up the conjunction of the united elements, itself pass away and perish.53 It is difficult to imagine how the older Pythagorean faith in the soul as an independent being dwelling in the body and surviving it—in the immortal soul, in fact—could be accommodated to this conception. Can it be that the two conceptions were not originally intended to be brought into conjunction at all, or were not meant to exclude each other? Ancient tradition spoke of different groups among the followers of Pythagoras who had also different objects, methods, and aims of study; nor shall we be inclined to deny all credibility to this tradition when we observe how little, in fact, Pythagorean science and Pythagorean faith had to do with each other.54

It’s hard to deny that Pythagoras himself established the foundations of Pythagorean science—the idea of the world’s creation and possibly the explanation of 377 everything that exists and comes into being as a result of numbers’ actions and relationships. This idea served as the fundamental basis of all things, and at least the basic outline of it must have been passed down to his followers. After his death, both sides of his teachings continued to develop separately for a time; the guidance of life through mystical and religious philosophy (though this was barely capable of further development) and the scientific interest that evolved into a relatively complex system. Indeed, with the disbanding of the Pythagorean community and its division in the fifth century, the scattered members came into contact with the scientific studies of other groups while being cut off from the ideal of the Pythagorean way of life that could only be achieved within the society. They were forced to continue their scientific studies alone. Pythagorean science, which developed a holistic view of the world, just like Ionian physiology, stripped the soul of the unique and, in fact, opposing relationship to nature that Pythagorean theology had provided. Philolaos, understanding it in a way that strictly aligned with mathematical and musical theory, referred to the soul as a Harmony of opposing elements united within the body.52 If the soul is merely a unification of opposites into unity and harmony, then upon death, when the bond of these elements is broken, it must itself cease to exist.53 It’s hard to believe how the earlier Pythagorean belief in the soul as an independent entity residing in the body and existing beyond it—in the immortal soul, specifically—could fit with this idea. Could it be that these two concepts were never intended to be combined or were not meant to exclude each other? Ancient tradition spoke of different factions among Pythagoras’s followers, each with varying objects, methods, and goals of study; thus, we are not inclined to dismiss the credibility of this tradition when we see how little, in fact, Pythagorean science and Pythagorean faith truly had in common.54

And yet we have to admit that the same Philolaos, who described the soul as a harmony of its body, also spoke of the soul as an independent and imperishable being. We may well doubt whether these two contradictory utterances can really come from the same man and apply to the same object; though the same man might really speak in varying language about the one soul if he recognized different parts of the soul of which different truths held good; and this was, in fact, first suggested by the Pythagorean school.55 378

And yet we have to acknowledge that the same Philolaos, who described the soul as a harmony of its body, also referred to the soul as an independent and eternal being. We might question whether these two contradictory statements really come from the same person and refer to the same thing; though it is possible for the same person to speak in different ways about the one soul if he recognizes different parts of the soul to which different truths apply; and this was, in fact, first suggested by the Pythagorean school.55 378

§ 6

Empedokles of Akragas did not belong to the Pythagorean school (it lost its external unity in his time); but he approaches Pythagorean doctrine so closely in his opinions and teaching about the soul of man, its problems and destinies, that there can be no doubt about Pythagorean influence upon the formation of his convictions on these points. His many-sided activities also included the study of natural science and he took up the researches of the Ionic Physiologists with zeal and a marked aptitude for the observation and synthesis of natural phenomena. But the roots of his peculiar individuality—the pathos which moved and agitated him—lay in a practical activity far removed from scientific investigation and representing a brilliant resuscitation in a very different age of the character and practice of the mantis, the purification-priest and magical-physician of the sixth century. The introduction to his “Purifications”56 gives a picture of his triumphal progress from city to city, crowned with ribbons and garlands, adored as a god and questioned by thousands: “Where is the road to healing?” He intends to give his disciple Pausanias the results of his own experience and to teach him all his remedies for disease and their virtues, the arts of stilling the winds and stirring them up, producing drought or rain, raising the dead from Hades.57 He himself boasted of being a magician and his pupil Gorgias saw him “do magic”.58 Through him those efforts of the Kathartes, the expiation-priest and seer, which an earlier and already distant-seeming time had honoured as the highest form of wisdom, at last achieved a voice and literary expression—an expression given them with the fullest personal experience of the truth of their claims by one who was convinced of their power to control nature and sure of the godlike status of the man who had reached these almost superhuman heights of empire over nature. As a god, an immortal no longer subject to death, he passed through all the land—so Empedokles himself tells us.59 He may have won credit in many places. He did not, indeed, found an ordered society of disciples and adherents, a sect: this does not seem to have been his intention. But he alone as a unique and unparalleled being, a self-confident personality of the greatest force and weight impressed himself masterfully both as mystic and politician upon the mundane affairs of his contemporaries and pointed the way beyond time and all things temporal to a blessed and divine state as the final goal of human life. He 379 must have made a profound impression upon the men among whom he lived,60 though he disappeared from their midst like a comet, and left no permanent traces of his presence behind him. Many legends still witness to the astonishment that his appearance among men provoked, more especially those legends that in varying form related his end.61 They are all expressions of the same belief: that he, as his own verses had foretold, in his departure did not have to suffer death; he had vanished, “translated” body and soul together to an everlasting divine life, as once Menelaos had been and so many great figures of the ancient days, and even a few Heroes of more recent times.62 Once more the ancient conception shows in this story that it still lives on: immortal life can only be obtained by undissolved union of the psyche with its body. Such a legend hardly did justice to Empedokles’ own idea. When he claimed to be a god who would never die he certainly did not mean that his psyche would remain for ever bound to his body. On the contrary, he thought that in “death”, as men63 call it, it would be freed from this last corporeal envelope64 and never again have to enter into a body, but would live for ever in freedom and divinity. His conception of the conscious after-life of the psyche was as different as it was possible for it to be from the Homeric conception on which that translation legend was based.

Empedocles of Akragas wasn’t part of the Pythagorean school (which had lost its unity by his time), but his views and teachings about the human soul, its challenges and destinies, closely align with Pythagorean beliefs. There's no doubt that Pythagorean ideas influenced his thoughts on these topics. His diverse activities included studying natural science, and he passionately engaged with the work of the Ionic Physiologists, showing a keen ability for observing and synthesizing natural phenomena. However, the essence of his unique character—the emotional drive that inspired him—came from practical experiences far removed from scientific inquiry, echoing a revival of the role and practices of the mantis, the purification-priest and magical healer of the sixth century. The introduction to his “Purifications”56 depicts his victorious journey from city to city, adorned with ribbons and garlands, worshipped like a god and asked by crowds: “How can we heal?” He planned to share his experiences with his student Pausanias, teaching him all of his cures and their benefits, as well as the skills to calm and stir the winds, create drought or rain, and even raise the dead from Hades.57 He even claimed to be a magician, and his student Gorgias witnessed him “perform magic.”58 Through him, the efforts of the Kathartes, the expiation-priest and seer, who were once revered during an earlier, seemingly distant time as the ultimate sages, finally found a voice and literary form—expressed with the deepest personal conviction in their power over nature by someone who believed firmly in their ability and in the godlike nature of those who achieve such remarkable mastery over the natural world. As a divine being, an immortal free from death, he traveled across the land—this is what Empedocles tells us.59 He may have gained recognition in many places. However, he didn't establish an organized community of followers or a sect; that doesn't seem to have been his goal. Instead, as a unique figure with immense confidence, he significantly impacted both the mystical and political aspects of his contemporaries' lives, guiding them towards a timeless and divine existence as the ultimate aim of human life. He 379 must have made a deep impression on those around him,60 even though he disappeared suddenly like a comet, leaving no lasting evidence of his presence. Numerous legends still reflect the awe his appearance evoked, especially those that narrate varied accounts of his end.61 All of these legends convey a common belief: that he, as his own verses predicted, did not experience death upon leaving; he vanished, “translated” body and soul into an everlasting divine existence, similar to Menelaos and many other great figures of ancient times, along with a few more recent heroes.62 Again, the ancient belief appears in this story, demonstrating that it persists: immortal life can only be achieved through an undissolved union of the psyche with the body. This legend, however, does not truly reflect Empedocles’ own understanding. When he proclaimed himself a god who would never die, he certainly didn’t mean that his psyche would forever be bound to his body. Instead, he believed that in “death,” as people call it, the psyche would be liberated from that final physical form64 and would never again have to inhabit a body, living instead eternally in freedom and divinity. His ideas about the conscious afterlife of the psyche were as distinct as possible from the Homeric view on which that legend of translation was based.

Empedokles united in his own person to an astonishing degree the most sober attempts at a study of nature that was scientific according to its lights, and quite irrational beliefs and theological speculations. Occasionally the scientific impulse passes over to influence even the world of his beliefs;65 but as a rule theology and natural science exist side by side in his mind quite independently. As a physiologist he inherited the already extensive and variously developed stock of ideas belonging to the older generations of inquirers and thinkers. He himself was able to unite conceptions derived from the most different sources into an original whole that satisfied himself at least. Becoming and passing-away, all qualitative change, were denied by him as by the Eleatics, but the permanent substance of Being is for him no single indivisible unity. There are four “roots” of things, the four bodies of elements, which in this division are for the first time clearly distinguished. It is the mixture and separation of the essentially indivisible elements that cause the appearance of becoming and perishing; and those two processes are caused by the two forces—clearly distinguished from the elements—of attraction and repulsion, 380 Love and Hate, which in the creative process struggle and in turn overmaster each other until at last, in the final victory of one of the two forces, all things are either united or divided; in either case an organic world ceases to exist. The present state of the universe is one in which “Love”, the tendency to amalgamation of differences, is prevailing; when this tendency is completed, there will be an absolute levelling-out of all distinction; a result which Empedokles, a quietist in his scientific studies as well, regards as the most desirable end.

Empedocles combined, in an incredible way, serious scientific efforts to understand nature with completely irrational beliefs and theological ideas. Sometimes, scientific thinking even influences his beliefs; however, generally, his theology and natural science exist independently in his mind. As a physiologist, he inherited a vast and diverse set of ideas from earlier generations of thinkers and researchers. He was able to blend concepts from very different sources into a unique whole that he found satisfying at least. Like the Eleatics, he denied becoming and passing away, as well as all qualitative change, but he did not see the permanent substance of Being as a single, indivisible unity. He identified four "roots" of things, the four elements, which he distinguished clearly for the first time. It is the mixing and separating of these fundamentally indivisible elements that create the illusion of becoming and perishing. These two processes are driven by two forces, which are distinct from the elements: attraction and repulsion, or Love and Hate, that struggle in the creative process and overpower each other until, in the eventual triumph of one of the forces, everything is either united or divided; in either case, an organic world ceases to exist. Right now, the universe is in a state where "Love," the tendency to blend differences, is dominant; when this tendency is fully realized, there will be a complete leveling of all distinctions, a result that Empedocles, who is also a quietist in his scientific studies, sees as the most desirable outcome.

In this world, then, that experiences only mechanical movement and change, and from whose evolution Empedokles by an ingenious turn is able to exclude all idea of purpose, there are also to be found souls; or rather psychical powers which grow up entirely within it. Sense-perception is expressly distinguished from the capacity of thought by Empedokles.66 The former takes place when each of the elements, from the mixture of which the perceiving being has its origin, comes into contact with, and so becomes aware of, the same elements in the object perceived, through the “passages” that connect the interior of the body with the exterior.67 “Thinking” has its seat in the heart’s blood, where the elements and their powers are mixed most equally. Or rather this blood actually is thinking and the power of thought;68 the material substance and its vital functions thus also for Empedokles completely coincide. Plainly, nothing in the nature of a permanent substantial “soul” is here intended by the thinking-power of the “mind”, but rather a capacity of bringing together and unifying the individual sense-activities;69 a capacity no less than the individual powers of sensation bound up with the elements, the senses, and the body.70 With the varying constitution of the body, they too vary.71 Both capacities, that of sense-perception, and that of thought, as vital expressions of the matter that is combined together in the organic creature, are present in all organisms; in men, in beasts, and even in plants.72

In this world, which only experiences mechanical movement and change, and from which Empedokles cleverly eliminates any idea of purpose, there are also souls; or more accurately, mental powers that develop entirely within it. Empedokles specifically distinguishes sense perception from the ability to think. The former occurs when each of the elements, which the perceiving being originates from, comes into contact with the same elements in the object being perceived, through the "passages" that connect the inside of the body to the outside. "Thinking" takes place in the blood of the heart, where the elements and their powers are mixed most evenly. In fact, this blood actually is thinking and the power of thought; the material substance and its vital functions thus completely coincide for Empedokles. Clearly, nothing resembling a permanent substantial "soul" is implied by the thinking power of the "mind," but rather a capacity to bring together and unify the individual sensory activities; a capacity equal to the individual powers of sensation linked to the elements, the senses, and the body. With the changing structure of the body, these powers also change. Both capacities, that of sense perception and that of thought, as vital expressions of the matter combined in the living being, are present in all organisms; in humans, animals, and even plants.

If we give the name of “soul”73 to the sum of these psychical powers—a name generally reserved for the common permanent substratum of the changing psychical activities—we cannot avoid concluding, in accordance with the logic of this philosopher, that the “soul” must be perishable. With the death and destruction of the individual the elementary parts that go to compose him are disunited, and the soul which in this case is nothing but the highest resultant of that composition, must itself disappear with their dissolution—as it had come into being with their union.74 381

If we call the collection of these mental abilities “soul”73, a term usually reserved for the underlying foundation of our changing mental activities, we have to conclude, following this philosopher's reasoning, that the “soul” must be temporary. When an individual dies and is destroyed, the basic components that make them up are separated, and the soul, which is just the highest result of that combination, must also vanish with their breakdown—just as it was formed through their coming together.74 381

It might seem as if Empedokles himself was as far as possible removed from drawing such conclusions from his own premises. No one speaks more distinctly and forcibly of the spiritual, individual beings that dwell in men and in other creatures of nature as well. They are regarded by him as Daimones fallen to the corporeal world, who have to pass through many different forms of life till they may at last hope for release.

It might seem like Empedocles was completely disconnected from drawing such conclusions from his own ideas. No one talks more clearly and powerfully about the spiritual, individual beings that exist in humans and in other creatures of nature. He sees them as Daimones who have fallen into the physical world and must go through many different life forms before they can finally hope for freedom.

In the introduction to his poem on Nature, he describes, from his own experience, and the information of the Daimones who had once led his soul down to this earthly Vale of Grief,75 how by an ancient decree of the gods and the compulsion of Necessity, every daimon that has “polluted” itself by drinking the blood or eating the flesh of living beings,76 or has broken its oath,77 is banished for a long period78 from the company of the blessed. It is thrust down to the “Meadow of Disaster”, into the realm of contradiction,79 the cave of misery upon this earth, and must now wander through many “painful ways of life”80 in changing incarnations. “Thus, I myself was once a boy and also a maiden, a bush, a bird, and a voiceless fish in the salty flood” (ll. 11, 12 = fr. 117). This daimon that in expiation of its crime must wander through the forms of men, beasts, and even plants, is evidently no other than what popular speech and that of theologians as well called the “psyche”, the soul-spirit.81 In all essentials though perhaps in clearer language, Empedokles merely repeated82 what the adherents of the doctrine of Transmigration had long told of its divine origin, its fall and penal banishment in earthly bodies. So, too, when as teacher of the means that bring salvation, he tells how more gracious forms and conditions of life may be obtained in the series of births, till at last complete release from rebirth is achieved,83 Empedokles follows in the footsteps of the purification-priests and theologi of old. It is a matter of keeping the daimon within us free from the pollutions that bind it fast to the earthly life. To this end the methods of religious purification are most efficacious; Empedokles respects them quite as much as did the old Kathartai. It is necessary to keep the internal daimon far removed from every kind of “sin”,84 more particularly from the drinking of blood and the eating of meat which must necessarily involve the murder of kinsmen daimones which are dwelling in the slaughtered beasts.85 By purification and asceticism (which here again dispenses with a positive form of morality aimed at reforming the man) a gradual process to purer and better births is achieved;86 in the end the persons thus reborn in a purified condition 382 become seers, poets, doctors, and are the leaders of mankind.87 Finally, when they have emerged superior even to these highest steps of earthly life, they return to the other immortals, and become themselves gods released from human misery, escaping death, and now indestructible.88 Empedokles regard himself as one who has reached the last stage,89 and points out to others the way up to it.

In the introduction to his poem about Nature, he shares from his own experience and insights from the Daimones who once guided his soul to this earthly realm of suffering, how by an ancient decree of the gods and the force of Necessity, every daimon that has "polluted" itself by drinking the blood or eating the flesh of living beings, or has broken its oath, is cast out for a long time from the company of the blessed. It is pushed down to the "Meadow of Disaster," into the realm of contradiction, the cave of misery on this earth, and must now wander through many "painful paths of life" in different incarnations. "Thus, I once was a boy and also a maiden, a bush, a bird, and a voiceless fish in the salty flood" (ll. 11, 12 = fr. 117). This daimon that must wander through the forms of humans, animals, and even plants to atone for its crime, is clearly what popular language and theologians refer to as the "psyche," the soul-spirit. In all essentials, though perhaps in clearer terms, Empedokles simply repeated what followers of the Transmigration doctrine had long stated about its divine origin, its fall, and its punishment in human bodies. Similarly, when teaching about the means to achieve salvation, he explains how more favorable forms and conditions of life can be attained through the cycle of births, until finally complete liberation from rebirth is achieved. Empedokles follows the teachings of the purification-priests and the theologians of old. It's about keeping the daimon within us free from the impurities that tie it to earthly life. To this end, methods of religious purification are extremely effective; Empedokles respects them just as much as the old Kathartai did. It's crucial to keep the internal daimon far away from all kinds of "sins," especially from drinking blood and eating meat, which necessitates the killing of kinship daimones residing in the slaughtered animals. Through purification and asceticism (which again does not necessarily involve a specific moral code aimed at reforming the person), a gradual journey towards purer and better births is accomplished; in the end, those who are reborn in a purified state 382 become seers, poets, healers, and leaders of humanity. Ultimately, when they have transcended even these highest aspects of earthly existence, they return to the other immortals, become gods themselves, free from human suffering, eluding death, and now indestructible. Empedokles sees himself as someone who has reached this final stage and shows others the way to it.

Between what Empedokles the mystic here tells us of the soul that was once living its divine life, but has since been plunged into the world of the elements, though it is not for ever bound to them; and what Empedokles the physiologist teaches of the psychical powers that dwell in the elements and are bound to the body that is composed of the elements and perish with their dissolution, there seems to be a hopeless contradiction. And yet if we are to grasp the whole truth of what Empedokles means, we must neither leave on one side half of what he says,90 nor yet by well-meaning interpretation seek to bring the philosopher into harmony with himself,91 when he clearly speaks with two different voices. The two voices say different things, and yet in the mind of Empedokles, there is no contradiction in what they say, for they are dealing with totally distinct objects. The psychical powers and faculties of feeling and perception which are functions of matter, born in matter, and determined by it, together with the thinking faculty that is no other than the heart’s blood of men—these neither make up the character and content of that soul-spirit which dwells in men, beasts, and flowers, nor are they expressions of its activity. They are entirely bound up with the elements and their combination, and in man they are joined to the body and its organs; they are the powers and faculties of this body, and not of a special and invisible entity, the soul. The soul-daimon is not made out of the elements, nor is it for ever chained to them. It enters as a stranger into this world in which the only permanent component parts are92 the four elements, and the two forces of Love and Hate; and it enters it from another world, the world of gods and spirits, to its detriment; the elements cast it about from one to another “and they all hate it” (fr. 115, 12, l. 35 M.). This living soul, with its independent existence, that thus enters into foreign and hostile surroundings, only enters into such earthly creatures as already possess senses, feeling and perception, together with reason or the faculty of thinking, the crowning manifestation of their material union. It is, however, as little identical with these psychical faculties as it is with the mixture of elementary matter or, in 383 the case of men, with the heart’s blood. It exists, unmixed and incapable of mixture, alongside the body and its faculties which indeed only have life—“what men call life”—(fr. 15, 2, l. 117 M.) when united with it. When they are separated from it they fall into dissolution; not so the soul, which continues its journey and visits other dwelling places, and does not share in their dissolution.

Between what Empedocles the mystic tells us about the soul that once lived a divine life but has since become trapped in the material world—although it's not permanently tied to it—and what Empedocles the physiologist teaches about the mental powers that reside in the elements and are tied to the body made of those elements, which perish when it dissolves, there's a seeming contradiction. Yet, to understand Empedocles' full message, we must not ignore half of what he says, nor should we try to interpret his words in a way that brings him into agreement with himself, given that he clearly speaks in two different ways. These two perspectives express different ideas, and yet in Empedocles' mind, there’s no contradiction because they refer to completely distinct subjects. The mental powers and abilities of feeling and perception, which depend on matter and arise from it, along with the thinking faculty which is simply the vital essence of humans—these do not define the character or essence of the soul-spirit present in people, animals, and plants, nor do they represent its activity. They are entirely tied to the elements and their combinations, and in humans, they are connected to the body and its organs; they are the powers and abilities of the body, not of a unique and invisible entity, the soul. The soul-daimon is not made from the elements, nor is it forever confined to them. It enters this world as a stranger, where the only permanent components are the four elements and the two forces of Love and Hate; it comes from another realm, the world of gods and spirits, to its detriment; the elements toss it around, and “they all hate it” (fr. 115, 12, l. 35 M.). This living soul, with its independent existence, enters into earthly beings that already possess senses, emotions, and perceptions, along with reason or the ability to think, which is the ultimate expression of their material combination. However, it is not identical to these mental faculties, just as it is not identical to the mixture of elemental matter or, in humans, the vital essence. It exists, pure and indivisible, alongside the body and its functions, which only have life—“what people call life”—(fr. 15, 2, l. 117 M.) when united with it. When they are separated from it, they fall apart; not so with the soul, which continues its journey and visits other abodes, remaining unaffected by their dissolution.

This peculiar dualistic doctrine reflects the two sides of Empedokles’ own mental activity. He probably intended in this way to unite the views of both the physiologists and the theologians. To the Greeks, such a twofold division of the inner life may have seemed less surprising than it does to us. The conception of a “soul” that as an independent, unique, and self-contained spiritual being dwells within the body, while the body does not receive its intellectual faculties of perceiving, feeling, willing and thinking from the soul, but exercises these by its own power—this conception agrees at bottom with the ideas of popular psychology that are as a rule described or implied in the Homeric poems.93 The only difference is that these ideas of poet and populace are elaborated and defined by the speculations of theologians and philosophers. How deeply impressed upon the Greek mind such conceptions, derived eventually from Homer, actually were, can be measured by the fact that a conception of the twofold origin of psychic activity, its twofold nature and sphere of action, closely related to that of Empedokles, is continually recurring in more advanced stages of philosophy. It occurs not merely in Plato, but even in Aristotle, who in addition to the “soul” that directs and expresses itself in the physico-organic nature of man, recognizes another being of divine descent that enters into man “from without”, the “mind” (νοῦς) which is separable both from the soul and from the body, and is alone destined to survive the death of the man to which it was assigned.94 In the doctrine of Empedokles, too, it is a stranger-guest from the distant land of gods that enters into man to give him a soul. This being is indeed far below the “mind” of Aristotle in philosophic importance; nevertheless, in the introduction of this Stranger into the world composed of the elements and vital faculties, a sense of the absolute uniqueness of spirit, its unlikeness to everything material, its essential distinctness from matter, finds expression, if only in a limited theological fashion.

This unusual dualistic belief showcases the two aspects of Empedokles’ own mental processes. He likely aimed to bring together the perspectives of both scientists and religious thinkers. For the Greeks, this kind of split in the inner life might have seemed less shocking than it does to us today. The idea of a "soul" as an independent, unique, and self-contained spiritual entity residing in the body, while the body itself possesses its own abilities to perceive, feel, will, and think independently of the soul, aligns fundamentally with the views of common psychology typically found in the Homeric poems. The only difference is that these ideas from poets and ordinary people are expanded and clarified through the theories of theologians and philosophers. The impact of such concepts on the Greek mindset, which ultimately stemmed from Homer, can be gauged by the recurring notion of the dual origin of mental activity, its dual nature, and its areas of influence that closely relate to Empedokles’ theories in more sophisticated philosophical contexts. This notion appears not only in Plato but also in Aristotle, who recognizes, in addition to the "soul" that guides and expresses itself through human organic nature, another divine being that comes into humanity "from outside," the "mind" (mind), which is distinct from both the soul and the body and is meant to survive the death of the person to whom it belongs. In Empedokles’ doctrine as well, a foreign entity from the realm of the gods enters a person to bestow upon them a soul. This entity is certainly of lesser philosophical significance than Aristotle's "mind"; however, the introduction of this Stranger into a world made of elements and vital forces expresses a sense of the soul's absolute uniqueness, its difference from everything physical, and its inherent separation from matter, albeit in a somewhat limited theological context.

In the light of such theological considerations, the soul seems also to Empedokles something essentially distinct from its prototype, the Homeric psyche, which after its separation 384 from the body passes to the twilight of a shadowy dream-life. To him, the soul is of divine race, too noble for this world of visibility, and only when it escapes from this world does it seem to him to begin its real and full life. Though confined within the body, it has its separate existence there; it has no concern with the everyday business of perception and sensation—not even with that of thinking, which is nothing else but the heart’s blood. But it is active in the “higher” mode of knowledge, in ecstatic inspiration;95 to it alone belongs the profound insight of the philosopher who is enabled to pass beyond the limits of mere experience and sense-perception, and behold the totality of the universe in its true nature.96 To it alone apply all the requirements of ethical and religious systems—duties in this higher sense belong only to the soul; it is something in the nature of a “conscience”. Its highest duty is to free itself from the unhallowed union with the body, and the elements of this world; the rules of purification and asceticism refer solely to it.

In light of these theological ideas, Empedokles views the soul as fundamentally different from its counterpart, the Homeric psyche, which, after separating from the body, enters a hazy dream state. To him, the soul is of divine origin, too exalted for this visible world. Only when it escapes this realm does it seem to begin its true and full existence. Although it is trapped within the body, it has its own separate existence there; it is unaffected by the daily grind of perception and sensation—not even by thinking, which he sees as merely the heart's blood. But it is active in a "higher" form of knowledge, in ecstatic inspiration; the profound insight of the philosopher, who can transcend the boundaries of mere experience and sense, belongs solely to it, allowing them to perceive the universe in its true essence. All the demands of ethical and religious systems pertain exclusively to the soul; duties in this higher sense are meant only for it, acting in the capacity of a "conscience." Its greatest responsibility is to liberate itself from the unholy bond with the body and the elements of this world; the paths of purification and asceticism are directed only at it.

Between this soul-daimon that yearns after its divine home, and the world of the elements, there exists no inward bond or necessary connexion. And yet, since they have become implicated in each other’s existence, a certain parallelism exists between them in character and destiny. In the mechanically moved world, too, the separate and particular phenomena tend back again towards their starting point, the inwardly coherent Unity from which they once took their origin. A day will come when, after all struggle has been done away, “Love” alone will have absolute rule; and this means for the poet—who in his description even of this world of mechanical attraction and repulsion interpolates half-realized ethical concepts97—a state of absolute goodness and happiness. If there is no longer any world, then, until another one is created, no soul-daimon can be bound any more to the individual organisms of a world. Have they then all returned to the blessed communion of the immortal gods? It appears that not even the gods and daimones (and so not the spirits enclosed in world as “souls”) are regarded by Empedokles as having everlasting life. “Long-living” is the name he repeatedly applies to them; he never distinctly ascribes eternal life to them.98 They, too, shall for a period enjoy “the happiness of profoundest peace” until, just as the elements and forces are drawn into the unity of the Sphairos, they, too, come together in the unity of the godlike Universal Mind, thence at a new world-creation to appear once more as individual separate being.99 385

Between this soul-daimon that longs for its divine home and the world of elements, there’s no inner bond or necessary connection. Yet, since they’ve become intertwined in each other’s existence, there’s a certain parallel between them in character and destiny. In the mechanized world, too, the separate and specific phenomena tend to revert back to their origin point, the internally coherent Unity from which they once came. A day will come when, after all struggle is eliminated, “Love” alone will have complete control; and for the poet—who, even in his depiction of this world of mechanical attraction and repulsion, interjects half-formed ethical concepts—this signifies a state of absolute goodness and happiness. If there’s no longer any world, then, until another is created, no soul-daimon can be bound to the individual organisms of a world. Have they all then returned to the blessed fellowship of the immortal gods? It seems that even the gods and daimones (thus, not the spirits contained within the world as “souls”) are not viewed by Empedokles as having everlasting life. He often refers to them as “long-living”; he never explicitly assigns eternal life to them. They, too, will enjoy “the happiness of deepest peace” for a time until, just as the elements and forces are drawn into the unity of the Sphairos, they also come together in the unity of the godlike Universal Mind, and then reappear as individual separate beings at a new creation of the world. 385

§ 7

Empedokles took a fully developed “hylozoic” system (which in itself, with its introduction of the motive forces of Conflict and Love, already betrayed a latent dualism) and attempted to combine with it an extreme form of spiritualist teaching. His attempt illustrates very clearly the observation that a philosophic science of nature in itself could never lead to the establishment of the axiom that the individual “soul” after its separation from the body continues to exist, still less that it is indestructible. Any one who still felt it necessary to assert that axiom could find support for it only by allowing physiology to be either overwhelmed by theological speculation, or else supplemented by it in the manner attempted by Empedokles.

Empedocles developed a complete "hylozoic" system (which, with its introduction of the driving forces of Conflict and Love, hinted at an underlying dualism) and tried to merge it with an extreme version of spiritualist teaching. His effort clearly shows that a philosophical science of nature alone could never establish the idea that the individual "soul" continues to exist after separating from the body, let alone that it is indestructible. Anyone who still felt the need to claim that idea could only back it up by either letting physiology be overtaken by theological speculation or by trying to supplement it in the way Empedocles attempted.

Such an attempt to reconcile the irreconcilable can have found few adherents among those who were accessible to scientific ideas, nor was it likely to tempt the physiological philosophy from the path which it had hitherto followed. Soon after Empedokles, and in essentials hardly influenced by him, Anaxagoras and Demokritos developed those doctrinal systems which were the last products of the independent speculation of Ionia. Demokritos was the founder and completer of the atomic doctrine according to which there exist “in reality” only the indivisible, minutest material bodies—which, while qualitatively indistinguishable, yet differ in shape, position, and arrangement in space as well as in bulk and weight—and empty space. He was obliged to seek for the “soul” (which to the materialist may easily present itself as being a separate, substantial, self-existent thing) among those minutest bodies out of which the whole fabric of the world of appearance is built up. The soul is that which confers movement upon the inherently motionless collections of bodies. It is composed of the round and smooth atoms which, in the universal condition of unrest that keeps all the atoms in agitation, are the most easily moved, for they offer least resistance to change of position, and can most easily penetrate others. These atoms compose fire and the soul. It is the soul-atom—one being inserted between every two of the other atoms100—which gives these their movement; and it is from all the soul-atoms uniformly disposed throughout the whole body that the body gets its movement, whence also (though it must be admitted in an unintelligible manner) comes the power of perception, which equally depends on movement, and the thought arising thence, of this same body. 386 During the life-time of the individual body, the continuance of the soul-atoms is secured by the breathing which continually replaces the smooth soul-particles that are as continually being expelled from the whole atom-complex by the pressure of the surrounding atmosphere. The breathing is always drawing in fresh soul-stuff from the air which is full of floating soul-atoms, and supplies it to the body. A time comes, however, when the breathing refuses this function, and death occurs, which is simply the insufficient supply of these moving and animating atoms.101 With the coming of death, there is an end to the union of the atoms, whose amalgamation had formed the particular living organism. Neither the soul-atoms nor any of the other atoms are destroyed; they do not alter in kind; but from the loose state of aggregation which even in the living body hardly amounted to an absolute unity to which a single common name could be applied—from this they now escape entirely. It is scarcely possible to see how, on this view of what essentially constitutes mental and vital phenomena, as a mere resultant of the separate and individual activities of individual and disconnected bodies, the unity of the living organism and the spiritual entity could ever come into being. It is even more evident that a unified “soul” could not possibly continue to exist after the dissolution which takes place at death of the atoms that in their union made up the organism. And, in fact, the soul-atoms disperse;102 they return whence they came into the restless mass of world-stuff. The human individual, in this view of the case, perishes in death entirely.103 The materials out of which he was shaped and composed are indestructible, and reserved for future construction; but his personality—the invisible personality, the “soul”, just as much as the visible—has but a single existence strictly limited to its one appearance in time. The continued existence of the soul after death, an immortality in whatever manner the thing may be conceived, is here for the first time in the history of Greek thought, expressly denied. The Atomist, with the candid precision that distinguishes him, draws the necessary consequences of his premises.

Such an attempt to reconcile the irreconcilable probably had very few supporters among those open to scientific ideas, nor was it likely to lure physiological philosophy away from the path it had been following. Soon after Empedocles, and largely independent of him, Anaxagoras and Democritus developed the last significant philosophical systems from Ionian independent thought. Democritus was the originator and finalizer of the atomic theory, which states that “in reality” only the indivisible, tiniest material bodies exist—these bodies, while qualitatively the same, differ in shape, position, arrangement in space, as well as in size and weight—and then there’s empty space. He had to search for the “soul” (which a materialist might easily see as a separate, substantial, self-existent entity) among those tiniest bodies that make up the entire world of appearances. The soul is what gives movement to the inherently still clusters of bodies. It consists of round, smooth atoms that, in the constantly agitated state of the universe, are the easiest to move because they offer the least resistance to changing position and can easily penetrate others. These atoms make up fire and the soul. It is the soul-atom—one inserted between every two of the other atoms100—that gives them their movement; and from all the soul-atoms evenly spread throughout the body, the body receives its movement, which also (though it must be acknowledged in a baffling way) provides the capability for perception, which is also dependent on movement, and the thoughts that arise from this same body. 386 While the individual body is alive, the presence of the soul-atoms is maintained by breathing, which continually replaces the smooth soul-particles that are consistently expelled from the whole atom complex by the pressure of the surrounding atmosphere. Breathing always draws in fresh soul material from the air, which is filled with floating soul-atoms, providing it to the body. However, there comes a time when breathing can no longer perform this function, and death occurs, which is simply the result of an insufficient supply of these moving and animating atoms.101 With death, the union of the atoms, which had formed the specific living organism, comes to an end. Neither the soul-atoms nor any of the other atoms are destroyed; they do not change in nature; but from the loose aggregation that, even in the living body, hardly amounted to a true unity that could be given a single common name—they now completely break free. It’s hard to see how, based on this understanding of what fundamentally constitutes mental and vital phenomena as merely the result of the individual activities of separate and disconnected bodies, the unity of the living organism and the spiritual entity could ever exist. It is even more evident that a unified “soul” could not possibly continue to exist after the disintegration that occurs at death among the atoms that together formed the organism. In fact, the soul-atoms scatter;102 they return to the restless mass of world-stuff from which they came. The individual person, in this perspective, entirely perishes at death.103 The materials out of which he was made are indestructible and reserved for future creation; but his personality—the invisible personality, the “soul,” just as much as the visible—has only one existence that is strictly confined to its single appearance in time. The continued existence of the soul after death, an immortality in whatever form it may be imagined, is explicitly denied here for the first time in Greek philosophical history. The Atomist, with the straightforward precision that characterizes him, draws the necessary conclusions from his premises.

Anaxagoras strikes out a path almost directly opposed to this materialist doctrine. As the first decisive and conscious dualist among Greek philosophers, he takes the material substratum of being, the inexhaustible many of distinctly characterized and distinctly separate “Seeds” of things—which are nevertheless indistinguishably intermingled with each other—and sets over against them a force which he 387 obviously did not mean to derive from them, to which he gives a name usually attached to the faculty of thought in man, and which in any case he thought of as analogous to that faculty.104 This “Mind”, simple, unmixed and unchangeable, is given such titles and adjectives that it is impossible to mistake the effort of Anaxagoras to think of it as something distinct from everything material, and in fact, absolutely immaterial and incorporeal.105 It is at once power of thought and force of will; at the creation of the world it gives the first circular impulse to the intrinsically motionless lump of matter; the creation of distinct forms in accordance with a conscious purpose is begun by it—though the carrying out of this purpose is indeed to be completed in accordance with pure mechanical laws without the interference of “Mind”. This “Mind” that plans and orders but does not make the world, that with the conscious insight of its omniscient wisdom106 influences matter without being influenced in turn, that moves without being moved;107 set over against the multiplicity of things as an indivisible unity,108 “having nothing in common with anything outside itself”109 but entirely self-contained110—how shall we conceive of it otherwise than as an almost personified, transcendent divine power confronting the world of matter as something foreign to it, ruling the world from without by magical, not mechanical, means?

Anaxagoras takes a path that strongly opposes the materialist view. As the first clear and intentional dualist among Greek philosophers, he identifies the basic substance of reality—the limitless variety of distinct and separate "Seeds" of things, which are, however, indistinguishably mixed with each other. He contrasts this with a force that he clearly did not intend to derive from these substances, naming it in a way usually associated with human thought, and he conceives of it as analogous to that faculty. This "Mind," simple, pure, and unchanging, is described with such titles and attributes that it’s clear Anaxagoras tries to depict it as something separate from all material things, truly immaterial and incorporeal. It is both the power of thought and the force of will; during the creation of the world, it gives the initial circular motion to the inherently motionless mass of matter. The creation of distinct forms according to a conscious purpose begins with it, though the execution of this purpose is completed according to pure mechanical laws without the intervention of "Mind." This "Mind" that plans and organizes but does not create the world, that influences matter with its all-knowing wisdom without being influenced in return, that moves without being moved, stands in contrast to the diversity of things as an indivisible unity, having nothing in common with anything outside of itself and entirely self-sufficient—how can we view it any other way than as an almost personified, transcendent divine power facing the material world as something foreign, governing the world from outside through magical, not mechanical, means?

But this transcendent is also completely immanent. Wherever in this world life and independent movement are found, there, too, the mind as the source of life and movement must be active. “Mind rules all that has soul” says Anaxagoras.111 In saying this he has not indeed asserted the presence of “Mind” within the animated being nor yet identity of nature as between soul and mind. But when we hear that Mind “goes through all things,112 that in everything there is a part of all things, except of mind, and in some things of mind also”,113 that must imply the penetration of many associations of matter by mind (hardly any longer to be thought of as immaterial) whereby the previously asserted transcendency of mind seems to be given up. At any rate, as such associations in which is “Mind”, living and animated beings are regarded. It is in them that “Mind” is present in continual, equal creativeness, though in different degrees;114 indeed, Mind is or constitutes that very thing that we call the “soul” of a living being.115 Among these living beings, which exist upon the moon,116 as well as on earth, are not only men and beasts, but also plants.117 In all these “Mind” is active; without losing any of its purity or unity, it is mixed with them.118 388 How we are to conceive the omnipotent Mind, whose oneness and self-containedness has been so emphatically asserted, as nevertheless entering simultaneously into the infinity of individual being—that certainly remains obscure. It is clear, however, that having thus derived all animated being from the single World-Mind, Anaxagoras could not speak of the continued existence of individual, self-existent “souls” after the dissolution of the material concretions in which moving and animating “soul-force” had once lived. The view is definitely ascribed to him that separation from the body is also “the soul’s death”.119 Nothing, indeed, of the component parts that belong to the whole perishes, and no change in its nature takes place. So “Mind”, whose manifestations the “souls” were, maintains itself unaltered and undiminished; but after the dissolution of the united, which “the Hellenes” regard as its destruction,120 though the component parts of the individual remain, yet not that particular mixture in which the peculiarity of the individual was inherent—“Mind” remains, but not the soul . . .

But this transcendent aspect is also completely present in everything. Wherever life and independent movement exist in this world, the mind, as the source of life and motion, must also be active there. “Mind governs everything that has a soul,” says Anaxagoras.111 He hasn't claimed that “Mind” is inside living beings or that soul and mind are the same. However, when we hear that Mind “permeates everything, 112 that in everything there is a piece of everything, except for mind, and in some things, also of the mind,” 113 it implies that many associations of matter are influenced by mind (which can no longer be considered immaterial). This seems to undermine the previously mentioned transcendence of mind. In any case, “Mind” is seen within living and animated beings. It is present in them with constant, equal creativity, though in varying degrees; 114 indeed, Mind is what we refer to as the “soul” of a living being.115 Among these living beings, which exist both on the moon 116 and on earth, there are not just humans and animals, but also plants.117 In all of these, “Mind” is active; without losing any of its purity or unity, it is mixed with them.118 388 How we should understand the all-powerful Mind, whose unity and self-sufficiency have been strongly emphasized, as it simultaneously enters into the infinity of individual existence—this remains unclear. It is evident, however, that since he derived all animated beings from the single World-Mind, Anaxagoras couldn't speak about the continued existence of individual, self-existing “souls” after the material forms where the moving and animating “soul-force” lived dissolved. He indeed believed that separation from the body is also “the soul’s death.” 119 Nothing in the component parts that make up the whole perishes, and no change in its nature occurs. So “Mind,” whose expressions were the “souls,” remains unchanged and undiminished; even after the dissolution of the united, which “the Hellenes” view as its destruction, 120 the individual components persist, but not that specific mixture that was the essence of the individual—“Mind” remains, but not the soul . . .

Thus, the first distinct separation of the intellectual thinking principle from the material substance with which it was—not fused, much less identified, but—contrasted in sovereignty and independence, did not lead to the recognition of the indestructibility of the individual spirit.

Thus, the first clear separation of the principle of intellectual thinking from the material substance it was—not fused with, much less identified with, but—contrasted against in sovereignty and independence, did not result in the acknowledgment of the individual's spirit as indestructible.

Shall we say that the mental, self-moved, life-giving principle, whether set over against the material and corporeal or indivisibly united with it, is for the physiologist always something universal—that the essentially real is impersonal? For him the individual, the personality conscious of itself and of the outer world, can be nothing but a manifestation of the universal, whether the latter is regarded as fixed and at rest, or as a living process that untiringly develops itself, recruits itself, and reconstructs itself in ever renewed creations. The only permanent, unchanging reality is the universal, the essential and fundamentally real Nature which appears in all individual things, speaks out of their mouth, and, in reality, only works and lives in them. The individual human soul has its indestructibility only in its identity with the universal that represents itself in it. The individual forms of “appearance”, having no independence of their own, cannot permanently abide.

Shall we say that the mental, self-moving, life-giving principle, whether contrasted with the material and physical or inseparably connected to it, is always something universal for the physiologist—that what is truly real is impersonal? To him, the individual, the self-aware personality, can only be a manifestation of the universal, whether that universal is seen as fixed and unchanging, or as a dynamic process that constantly evolves, expands, and reshapes itself in an endless cycle of new creations. The only lasting, unchanging reality is the universal, the essential and fundamentally real Nature that appears in all individual things, voices itself through them, and, in truth, only works and lives within them. The individual human soul finds its indestructibility only in its connection to the universal that manifests through it. The individual forms of “appearance,” without any independence of their own, cannot exist permanently.

The view that imperishable life belongs to the individual soul could only be reached by a line of thought that took as a fact and held fast to it as something given that the individual spirit is a reality. (Its appearance and disappearance in the 389 midst of the one universe was indeed for the physiologists the true miracle, the problem never satisfactorily solved.) Such a belief in individuality, the belief in an independently existent individual substance that had never had a beginning and could therefore never have an end, was the contribution, however fancifully it might be expressed, of the theologians and the mystics. For them immortality, the power of substantive duration unlimited by time, was extended also to include the individual. The individual soul is for them a self-existent, individual, divine being, indestructible because it is divine.

The idea that eternal life belongs to the individual soul could only come from a perspective that accepted as a given that the individual spirit is real. (Its rise and fall in the 389 midst of the universe was, for physiologists, the true miracle, a problem that was never fully resolved.) This belief in individuality, the conviction of an independent individual substance that has no beginning and can never have an end, was, no matter how fancifully it was expressed, the contribution of theologians and mystics. For them, immortality, the ability to exist beyond the limits of time, also applied to the individual. The individual soul is, in their view, a self-sufficient, individual, divine being, indestructible because it is divine.

Greek philosophy underwent many changes in the course of its speculations during the following ages; but exactly in proportion as it, to a greater or lesser degree, accepted theological elements or on the other hand rejected such elements, did it give fundamental support to the view of the soul’s immortality, or grudgingly admit it, or absolutely reject it.

Greek philosophy went through many changes in its ideas over the following ages; but just as it accepted or rejected theological elements to varying degrees, it either strongly supported the belief in the soul's immortality, reluctantly acknowledged it, or completely dismissed it.

NOTES TO CHAPTER XI

1 ψυχή = “life,” “concept of life,” in Homer (though not indeed used to denote psychical powers during lifetime): see above, pp. 30, 31. So, too, occasionally in the remains of the Iambic and Elegiac poets of the earliest period: Archil. 23; Tyrt. 10, 14; 11, 5; Sol. 13, 46; Thgn. 568 f., 730; (Hippon. 43, 1?). ψυχή = “life” in the proverbial phrase περὶ ψυχῆς τρεχεῖν (see Wessel. and Valck. on Hdt. vii, 57; Jacobs on Ach. Tat., p. 896). ψυχή frequently = “life” in the idiom of the Attic orators (see Meuss, Jahrb. f. Philol. 1889, p. 803).

1 soul = “life,” “concept of life,” in Homer (though not actually used to refer to mental powers during life): see above, pp. 30, 31. Similarly, it occasionally appears in the works of the earliest Iambic and Elegiac poets: Archil. 23; Tyrt. 10, 14; 11, 5; Sol. 13, 46; Thgn. 568 f., 730; (Hippon. 43, 1?). soul = “life” in the saying running about the soul (see Wessel. and Valck. on Hdt. vii, 57; Jacobs on Ach. Tat., p. 896). soul often means “life” in the language of the Attic orators (see Meuss, Jahrb. f. Philol. 1889, p. 803).

2 See above, pp. 5, 30. Even the Homeric poems in one case show a slight uncertainty of language and of psychological conception when they use θυμός, the highest and most general of the powers of life dwelling within the visible and living man, in the sense of ψυχή, the double of the man who dwells as a lodger in his body, separate and taking no part in the ordinary business of his life. The θυμός (see above, chap. i, n. 57) is active during the man’s lifetime, is enclosed in the midriff (ἐν φρεσὶ θυμὸς) and when that is overtaken by death is itself overwhelmed (Ψ 104): on the arrival of death it leaves the body and perishes—while the ψυχή flies away intact. The distinction is clearly maintained, e.g. in λ 220 f.: “fire destroys the body” ἐπεί κεν πρῶτα λίπῃ λεύκ’ ὀστέα θυμός, ψυχὴ δ’ ἠύτ’ ὄνειρος ἀποπταμένη πεπότηται. θυμός and ψυχή therefore leave the body of the slain man simultaneously (θυμοῦ καὶ ψυχῆς κεκαδών Λ 334, φ 154); but in very different ways. The relation between them becomes, however, interchangeability in the single case when it is said of the θυμός that it in death will enter ἀπὸ μέλέων δόμον Ἄιδος εἴσωΗ 131; in reality this could only be said of that very different being, the ψυχή. (When a fainting-fit has passed over we do indeed hear, not that the ψυχή—though this it was that had left the man: see above, chap. i, n. 8—but that ἐς φρένα θυμὸς ἀγέρθη, X 475, ε 458, ω 349. This, however, is not a case of θυμός instead of ψυχή, but θυμός is merely an abbreviated form of the whole statement which would be in full: both θυμός and ψυχή have now returned into the man; cf. Ε 696. It is a kind of synecdoche.) In the line Η 131 we really, then, do have θυμός instead of ψυχή either as the result of a misunderstanding of the real meaning of the two words or merely through an oversight. But never (and this is the most essential point) do we have a case in Homer of the opposite exchange of significance: i.e. of ψυχή used in the sense θυμός (νόος, μένος, ἠτορ, etc.), as meaning the mental power and its activity in the living and waking man. Just this, however, and more than this, the sum and substance of all the mental powers in general, is what the word ψυχή means in the language of the philosophers (except those affected by religious tendencies). They left out of account altogether that spiritual double of mankind whom the popular psychology called the ψυχή, and were thus free to use the word to express the whole psychical content of the human individual. From the fifth century onwards we find the word ψυχή used commonly, and even regularly, in this sense in the vocabulary of non-philosophical poets and prose writers. Only theologians and poets, or philosophers of a theological tendency, continued to use the 391 word in its ancient and primitive sense. Indeed, when the separation of a spiritual being from the body of a man in death was being spoken of, ψυχή always continued to be the proper word for this sense even in popular language. (An extremely rare example of θυμός in this sense, comparable with Η 131, is [Arist.] Pepl. 61 Bgk.; θυμόν . . . αἰθὴρ λαμπρὸς ἔχει. In the corresponding epigram, Epigr. Gr. 41, we have ψυχήν.)

2 See above, pp. 5, 30. Even the Homeric poems sometimes show a slight ambiguity in language and psychological understanding when they use anger, the highest and most general of the life forces within the visible and living person, in the sense of soul, the double of the person who lives as a tenant in their body, separate and not involved in the usual activities of life. The anger (see above, chap. i, n. 57) is active during a person's life, is located in the diaphragm (Anger in the heart), and when death comes, it is itself overwhelmed (Ψ 104): upon death, it leaves the body and perishes—while the soul escapes intact. The distinction is clearly maintained, for example, in λ 220 f.: “fire destroys the body” When your white bones are left behind, just like a dream that takes flight, your spirit will soar.. anger and soul therefore leave the body of the slain person at the same time (Spirit and soul departed Λ 334, φ 154); but in very different ways. The relationship between them transforms, however, into interchangeability in the singular instance when it is stated that the anger will in death enter from the limbs into HadesΗ 131; in reality, this could only be attributed to that distinctly different entity, the soul. (After a fainting spell has passed, we do hear, not that the soul—though that is what had left the person: see above, chap. i, n. 8—but that to the heart spirit awakened, X 475, ε 458, ω 349. This, however, is not a case of anger instead of soul, but rage is merely a shortened version of the complete statement which would be: both anger and soul have now returned to the person; cf. Ε 696. It is a kind of synecdoche.) In the line Η 131 we indeed have anger instead of soul either due to a misunderstanding of the true meaning of the two words or simply through an oversight. But never (and this is the most crucial point) do we find a case in Homer of the opposite exchange of meaning: i.e. of soul being used in the sense of anger (mind, spirit, heart, etc.), as a reference to the mental power and its activity in the living and conscious human being. This, however, is what the term soul signifies in the language of philosophers (except those influenced by religious sentiments). They completely ignored that spiritual double of humanity which popular psychology referred to as soul, and were thus free to use the term to express the entire psychological content of the individual. From the fifth century onward, we find the term soul used commonly, and even regularly, in this sense in the vocabulary of non-philosophical poets and prose writers. Only theologians and poets, or philosophers with a theological inclination, continued to use the 391 word in its ancient and original sense. Indeed, when discussing the separation of a spiritual being from the body at death, soul remained the appropriate word for this meaning even in everyday language. (A very rare example of anger in this sense, comparable to Η 131, is [Arist.] Pepl. 61 Bgk.; θυμόν . . . the bright sky has. In the corresponding epigram, Epigr. Gr. 41, we have soul.)

3 ἔνιοι, among them Choirilos of Samos: D.L. i, 24 (from Favorinus): Vors.4, i, p. 1, 21.

3 Some, including Choirilos of Samos: D.L. i, 24 (from Favorinus): Vors.4, i, p. 1, 21.

4 Arist., An. 1, 2, p. 405a, 20 f. “Aristotle and Hippias” ap. D.L. i, 24; Vors., p. 2, 1. τὰ φυτὰ ἔμψυχα ζῷα, Dox. 438a, 6, b, 1.

4 Arist., An. 1, 2, p. 405a, 20 f. “Aristotle and Hippias” in D.L. i, 24; Vors., p. 2, 1. Living plants are organisms, Dox. 438a, 6, b, 1.

5 Metaphorical language: Θαλῆς ᾠήθη πάντα πλήρη θεῶν εἶναι, Arist., An. 1, 5, p. 411a, 8. τὸν κόσμον (ἔμψυχον καὶ) δαιμόνων πλήρη, D.L. i, 27; Dox. 301b, 2; Vors. p. 2, 20. Pl., Lg. 899 B, is an allusion to the θεῶν πλήρη πάντα (as Krische remarks, Theol. Lehr. d. Gr. Denker, p. 37). There is perhaps a half-mocking reference to the words in the saying attributed by anecdotal tradition to Herakleitos: εἶναι καὶ ἐνταῦθα θεούς (i.e. in his own hearth) Arist., PA. 1, 5, p. 645a, 17 ff. Hence Herakleitos himself was credited with the opinion of Thales in slightly altered form: πάντα ψυχῶν εἶναι καὶ δαιμόνων πλήρη, D.L. ix, 7 (Vors., p. 68, 29), in the first (and valueless) of the two lists of the doctrines of Herakl. there given.

5 Metaphorical language: Thales believed that everything was infused with gods., Arist., An. 1, 5, p. 411a, 8. the universe(ἔμψυχον καὶ)is filled with living beings and spirits, D.L. i, 27; Dox. 301b, 2; Vors. p. 2, 20. Pl., Lg. 899 B, refers to the everything is full of deities (as Krische notes, Theol. Lehr. d. Gr. Denker, p. 37). There might be a half-joking reference to the phrase attributed by anecdotal tradition to Heraclitus: there are also deities here (i.e. in his own home) Arist., PA. 1, 5, p. 645a, 17 ff. Therefore, Heraclitus himself was thought to have a view similar to Thales, though slightly changed: Everything is filled with souls and spirits., D.L. ix, 7 (Vors., p. 68, 29), in the first (and less significant) of the two lists of Heraclitus' doctrines presented.

6 Arist., Phys. 3, 4, p. 203b, 10–14. Dox. 559, 18. Vors., p. 17, 35.

6 Aristotle, Physics 3, 4, p. 203b, 10–14. Doxographical 559, 18. Vors., p. 17, 35.

7 Anaximander, fr. 2 Mull. Vors., p. 15, 26. That Anaximander declared the soul to be “like air” is an erroneous statement of Theodoret.: see Diels, Dox. 387b, 10 (Vors. 21, 5).

7 Anaximander, fr. 2 Mull. Vors., p. 15, 26. The statement by Theodoret that Anaximander claimed the soul is “like air” is incorrect: see Diels, Dox. 387b, 10 (Vors. 21, 5).

8 Anaximenes in Dox. 278a, 12 ff.; b, 8 ff. fr. 2 Diels.

8 Anaximenes in Dox. 278a, 12 ff.; b, 8 ff. fr. 2 Diels.

9 Anaxim. calls τὸν ἀέρα θεόν, i.e. it has divine power: Dox. 302b, 5; 531a, 17, b, 1–2. Vors. 24, 18. This at least is to be understood in the same sense in which Anaximander is said to have called τὸ ἄπειρον, τὸ θεῖον (Arist., Phys. 3, 4, p. 203b, 13; Vors., p. 17, 35).

9 Anaximander refers to the air like a god, meaning it has divine power: Dox. 302b, 5; 531a, 17, b, 1–2. Vors. 24, 18. This should be understood in the same way that it's noted Anaximander called the infinite as the divine (Arist., Phys. 3, 4, p. 203b, 13; Vors., p. 17, 35).

10 ἓν πάντα εἶναι, fr. 1 (Byw.); 50 (Diels).

10 One is enough, fr. 1 (Byw.); 50 (Diels).

11 Arist., An. 1, 2, p. 405a, 25 ff. Vors. 74, 30. Hkl. is also meant in p. 405a, 5. Dox. 471, 2 (Arius Didymus); 389a, 3 ff.

11 Arist., An. 1, 2, p. 405a, 25 ff. Vors. 74, 30. Hkl. is also referenced in p. 405a, 5. Dox. 471, 2 (Arius Didymus); 389a, 3 ff.

12 Arist., p. 405a. 25 ff. Hkl. fr. 68 (36 D.).

12 Arist., p. 405a. 25 ff. Hkl. fr. 68 (36 D.).

13 S.E., M. 7, 127, 129–31. Vors. 75, 14 ff.

13 S.E., M. 7, 127, 129–31. Vors. 75, 14 ff.

14 ὁ θεός is both the Universal Fire, that transforms itself into the world, and at the same time its power (and λόγος: frr. 2 [1], 92 [2]): fr. 36 (67). τὸ πῦρ θεὸν ὑπείληφεν, Herakl.: Cl. Al., Prot. 5, 64, p. 55 P. [Vors. n. 8 A 8]. πῦρ νοερὸν τὸν θεὸν (εἶναι ἐφθέγξατο), Hippol., RH. i, 4, p. 10, 57 Mill.—“Zeus” as metaphor for this universal fire (hence οὐκ ἐθέλει καὶ ἐθέλει), the “only wise one”; fr. 65 (32).

14 the god is both the Universal Fire that transforms into the world and at the same time its power (and word: frr. 2 [1], 92 [2]): fr. 36 (67). the fire has taken God, Herakl.: Cl. Al., Prot. 5, 64, p. 55 P. [Vors. n. 8 A 8]. Divine intellect fire(it's been stated), Hippol., RH. i, 4, p. 10, 57 Mill.—“Zeus” as a metaphor for this universal fire (therefore doesn’t want to and wants to), the “only wise one”; fr. 65 (32).

15 ἡ ἐπιξενωθεῖσα τοῖς ἡμετέροις σώμασιν ἀπὸ τοῦ περιέχοντος μοῖρα (περιέχ. = the universal Fire) is said of the soul and its reasoning faculty ap. S.E., M. vii, 130; Vors., p. 75, 19; (cf. ἀπορροὴ καὶ μοῖρα ἐκ τοῦ φρονοῦντος, Plu., Is. et O. 77, p. 382 B). This is fully Herakleitean in thought if not also in actual form of expression.

15 The element that has been infused into our bodies from the surrounding essence (περιέχ. = the universal Fire) is associated with the soul and its reasoning capacity ap. S.E., M. vii, 130; Vors., p. 75, 19; (cf. the flow and nature that come from thinking, Plu., Is. et O. 77, p. 382 B). This is entirely Heraclitean in concept, if not also in its exact wording.

16 That Herakleitos drew the conclusions affecting also the “Soul”—the spiritual man—freely paraphrased in the text, arising necessarily out of his doctrine of the perpetual change in the material substance that excludes all possibility of lasting self-identity in any object (frr. 40, 41, 42, 81 = 91, 12, 49 a), is proved especially by the words of Plutarch in the eighteenth chapter of his treatise de E Delph. p. 392—a chapter which is entirely based on Herakleitos, who is twice actually cited in it. Not only does ὁ νέος die εἰς τὸν ἀκμάζοντα κτλ., but ὁ χθὲς (ἄνθρωπος) εἰς τὸν σήμερον τέθνηκεν, ὁ δὲ σήμερον εἰς τὸν 392 αὔριον ἀποθνήσκει. μένει δ’ οὐδείς, οὐδ’ ἔστιν εἷς, ἀλλα γιγνόμεθα πολλοὶ περὶ ἓν φάντασμα κτλ.; cf. Cons. ad Apoll. 10, p. 106 E. Herakl. is also the origin of what is said in Plato, Smp. 207 D ff.: each man is only apparently one and the same; in reality, even while he is still alive, “he continually suffers a new and different man to take the place of the old and departing one”—and this applies, just as much to the soul as to the body. (Only from the standpoint of Herakleitean doctrine—here adopted in passing by Plato as suiting his chosen method of argument—is the conclusion he reaches justified; the conclusion is that it is only by the perpetual substitution of a new being like the old one that man has immortality, and not by the eternal preservation of his own proper being; for this advantage belongs peculiarly to the divine. This, of course, cannot possibly be understood as the serious teaching of Plato himself.)—The Herakleitean denial of personal identity in men is alluded to by Epicharmos (or a pseudo-Ep.?) ap. D.L. iii, 11, ll. 13–18; Vors., p. 118–19 (cf. Wytt. ad Plu., Ser. Num. V. 559 A = vii, p. 397 f. Ox.; Bernays, Rh. Mus. viii, 280 ff.); and cf. Sen., Ep. 58, 23.—It is instructive to compare with Herakl.’s doctrine of the instability of the psychic complex the very similar theory of the influx and reflux of the elements of the “soul” as described in the Indian doctrine of Jainism. The soul (in the Indian doctrine) continually transforms, re-arranges, and restores itself, just like the body. See Deussen, System d. Vedânta, 330.

16 Heraclitus also reached conclusions about the “Soul”—the spiritual aspect of humanity—paraphrased in this text, which arise necessarily from his belief in the constant change of material substance that prevents any object from having lasting self-identity (frr. 40, 41, 42, 81 = 91, 12, 49 a). This is especially demonstrated by Plutarch's words in the eighteenth chapter of his treatise de E Delph. p. 392—a chapter that is entirely based on Heraclitus, who is cited twice. Not only does the young man die εἰς τὸν ἀκμάζοντα κτλ., but yesterday(human)Today he has died, but today he is in... 392 Tomorrow, we die. But no one remains; there isn't even one. Instead, we become many around a single phantom, etc.; cf. Cons. ad Apoll. 10, p. 106 E. Heraclitus is also the source of what is mentioned in Plato, Smp. 207 D ff.: each person only appears to be one and the same; in reality, even while they are still alive, “they continually allow a new and different person to take the place of the old and departing one”—and this applies equally to the soul as well as the body. (Only from the perspective of Heraclitus's doctrine—here adopted by Plato for his chosen method of argument—is the conclusion he reaches valid; this conclusion is that it is only through the continual substitution of a new being similar to the old one that a person achieves immortality, not through the eternal preservation of their own being; this advantage belongs uniquely to the divine. This, of course, cannot be understood as Plato's serious teaching.)—The Heraclitean rejection of personal identity in people is referenced by Epicharmos (or a pseudo-Ep.?) ap. D.L. iii, 11, ll. 13–18; Vors., p. 118–19 (cf. Wytt. ad Plu., Ser. Num. V. 559 A = vii, p. 397 f. Ox.; Bernays, Rh. Mus. viii, 280 ff.); and see Sen., Ep. 58, 23.—It is enlightening to compare Heraclitus's doctrine of the instability of the psychic complex with the very similar theory of the influx and reflux of the elements of the “soul” as described in the Indian doctrine of Jainism. The soul (in the Indian doctrine) continually transforms, re-arranges, and restores itself, just like the body. See Deussen, System d. Vedânta, 330.

17 The apparently contradictory statement ψυχῇσι τέρψιν, μὴ θάνατον, ὑγρῇσι γενέσθαι ap. Porph., Antr. Nymph. 10 (72 By., 77 D.), does not represent the words or real opinion of Hkl., but only of Numenios’ (fr. 35 Thedinga) arbitrary and personal interpretation of Hkl. doctrine (see Gomperz in Sitzb. d. Wien. Ak. 113, 1015 ff.).

17 The seemingly contradictory statement For the soul’s delight, not death, may it come to be in a liquid state. ap. Porph., Antr. Nymph. 10 (72 By., 77 D.), does not represent the actual words or true opinion of Hkl., but rather just Numenios’ (fr. 35 Thedinga) arbitrary and personal take on Hkl. doctrine (see Gomperz in Sitzb. d. Wien. Ak. 113, 1015 ff.).

18 A doctrine of transmigration of souls is attributed to Hkl. by Schuster, Heraklit, p. 174 ff. (1873). The utterances of Herakleitos there quoted to prove this thesis (frr. 78, 67, 123 = 88, 62, 63) do not, however, imply anything of the kind and there is not the slightest indication in the whole of Hkl’s doctrinal system upon which a theory of the transmigration of the soul might be founded.

18 A belief in the transmigration of souls is attributed to Hkl. by Schuster, Heraklit, p. 174 ff. (1873). However, the statements of Herakleitos cited to support this idea (frr. 78, 67, 123 = 88, 62, 63) don’t actually suggest anything like that, and there’s not the slightest indication in Hkl’s entire belief system that could serve as a basis for a theory of soul transmigration.

19 To prove that Herakleitos spoke of a continuation of the life of the individual soul after its separation from the body, appeal is made partly to the statements of later philosophers, partly to actual utterances of Herakl. (cf. in particular Zeller, Greek Phil. to Socr. ii, 86; Pfleiderer, Philos. d. Heraklit im Lichte der Mysterienidee, p. 214 ff.). Platonist philosophers do, of course, attribute to Herakleitos a doctrine of the soul which taught the pre-existence of the individual soul, “its fall in birth,” and its departure into a separate life of its own after death (cf. Numenios ap. Porph., Ant. 10; Iamb., ap. Stob., Ecl. i, 375, 7; 38, 21 ff. W.; Aen. Gaz., Thphr., pp. 5, 7 Boiss.). These accounts, however, are plainly but private and arbitrary interpretations of Herakleitean sayings (μεταβάλλον ἀναπαύεται, κάματός ἐστι τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀεὶ μοχθεῖν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι) in the light of the conceptions current among those philosophers themselves; they are homiletic, fancifully conceived expositions of very short and ambiguous texts, and can so much the less serve as witnesses of Herakleitos’ real opinions since Plotinos (4, 8, 1) openly admits that Herakl. in this matter has omitted σαφῆ ἡμῖν ποιῆσαι τὸν λόγον. Others read into certain Herakleitean utterances the Orphic doctrine of σῶμα—σῆμα, the entombment of the soul in the body (Philo, Leg. Alleg. 1, 33, i, p. 65 M.; S.E., P. iii, 230), which cannot, however, be seriously supposed to be his teaching. The soul did not for Hkl., any more than for the Pythagoreans or Platonics, 393 come into existence at birth (substantially) out of nothing (which was the popular idea); it rather, as a portion of the universal fire (the universal psyche) is in existence from eternity. But it certainly does not follow, because later writers insisted on finding in him the idea so familiar to themselves, that Hkl. himself accepted the pre-existence of disembodied separate souls possessing complete and absolute individuality. A few enigmatic and highly picturesque expressions—typical of this philosopher’s favourite manner of expressing abstract ideas by clothing them in symbolic imagery—might tempt to such an interpretation. ἀθάνατοι θνητοί, θνητοὶ ἀθάνατοι, ζῶντες τὸν ἐκείνων θάνατον τὸν δὲ ἐκείνων βίον τεθνεῶτες (fr. 67 = 62)—that certainly does sound as if Hkl. had meant to speak of the entrance into the human life of individual divine beings (and this was simply substituted in inaccurate quotations of the saying: θεοὶ θνητοί, ἄνθρωποι ἀθάνατοι, etc.; cf. Bernays, Heraklit. Briefe, 39 ff.). And yet Herakleitos can only have meant, in conformity with his whole position, that eternal and perishable, divine and human are alike and interchangeable; he has for the moment personified τὸ θεῖον (also called ὁ θεός fr. 36 = 67; cf. fr. 61 = 102) as individual ἀθάνατοι, but he only means what he says in another place: ταὐτὸ τὸ ζῶν καὶ τεθνηκός (fr. 78 = 88), βίος and θάνατος are the same (fr. 66 = 48). It seems to me impossible to extract from these words of this 67th fragment (62nd), or from no. 44 (= 53), a doctrine of the ascent to divinity of special great men (with Gomperz, Sitzb. Wien. Ak. 1886, p. 1010, 1041 f.). Nor would anything be asserted by such a doctrine about the immortality of such men. The striking phrase ἀνθρώπους μένει τελευτήσαντας ἅσσα οὐκ ἔλπονται (fr. 122 = 27) is certainly understood by Cl. Al. as referring to the punishment of the soul after death. But the same Cl. Al., Str. v, 9, p. 649 P., is capable of explaining the Herakleitean ἐκπύρωσις (in which Herakl. actually speaks of a κρίσις by fire: fr. 26 = 66) as a διὰ πυρὸς κάθαρσις τῶν κακῶς βεβιωκότων. In fact, he is giving to statements torn from their context a meaning that accords with his own knowledge and comprehension. The same sentence (fr. 122 = 27) is given a quite different and consolatory sense by Plu. ap. Stob., Fl. 120, 8 fin.; cf. Schuster, Heraklit, p. 190, n. 1. Herakl. himself need have meant nothing more than the perpetual process of change that “awaits men after death”.—Other utterances are no more conclusive for a doctrine of immortality in Hkl. (fr. 7 = 18 belongs to quite another context). “Those who have fallen in war are honoured both by gods (whose existence was not denied by Hkl. nor was it necessary that he should) and men,” fr. 102 = 24; that their reward was anything else but fame—for example, blessed immortality—is not suggested even by Cl. Al. (Str. iv, 16, p. 571 P.), and is certainly not to be extracted from H.’s words, fr. 126 = 5 (the fool) οὕτι γινώσκων θεοὺς οὐδ’ ἥρωας οἵτινές εἰσιν simply shows that Hkl. did not share the popular ideas about gods and Heroes, but supplies nothing positive.—In fr. 38 = 98 we have αἱ ψυχαὶ ὀσμῶνται καθ’ ᾅδην. Are we really to deduce from this that Herakl. believed in a regular Homeric Hades? ᾅδης is a metaphorical expression for the opposite of the life on earth (just as it is used metaphorically for the opp. of φάος by the Herakleitean [Hippocr.] de Victu, 1, 4, p. 632 Kühn = vi, 476 Lit.). For the souls ᾅδης means the ὅδος κάτω and the sense of the dictum is: after disappearing in death the souls when they have travelled on the way downwards through water and earth will at last rise up again through water, and drawing in to themselves pure, dry “fire” will become “souls” again, (ὀσμῶνται is remarkable 394 but not to be altered. ὁσιοῦνται Pfleiderer; but the connexion in which Plu. quotes the saying of Herakl. [Fac. O. L. xxviii, p. 943 E] shows that there is no reference to the purification of the souls in Hades, but merely of their nourishment and strengthening by the ἀναθυμίασις of the fiery aether; cf. also S.E., M. ix, 73, following Poseidonios. This ἀναθυμιᾶν—and the becoming “fiery” again—is what Hkl. calls ὀσμᾶσθαι.)—From the hopelessly corrupt fr. 123 = 63 nothing intelligible can be extracted.—Nowhere can we find clear and unambiguous statements of Herakleitos witnessing to his belief in the immortality of the individual soul; and it would require such statements to make us attribute to Herakleitos a conception that, as everyone admits, is in hopeless contradiction with the rest of his teaching. He says perfectly plainly that in death the soul becomes water; and that means that it, as the soul = fire, perishes. If his belief had been anything like that of the mystics (as the Neoplatonists supposed) he must have regarded death—the liberation of the soul from the fetters of corporeality and the realm of the lower elements—as a complete issue of the soul into its proper element, the fire. Whereas, what he teaches is the opposite of this: the soul perishes, becomes water, then earth, and then water again, and finally soul once more (fr. 68 = 36). Only in this sense is it indestructible.

19 To show that Herakleitos talked about the continuation of the individual soul's life after it separates from the body, references are made partly to comments from later philosophers and partly to actual quotes from Herakl. (see especially Zeller, Greek Phil. to Socr. II, 86; Pfleiderer, Philos. d. Heraklit im Lichte der Mysterienidee, p. 214 ff.). Platonist philosophers attribute to Herakleitos a belief that the soul pre-exists the body, experiences a “fall at birth,” and then leads a separate existence after death (see Numenios ap. Porph., Ant. 10; Iamb., ap. Stob., Ecl. I, 375, 7; 38, 21 ff. W.; Aen. Gaz., Thphr., pp. 5, 7 Boiss.). However, these interpretations are clearly individual and subjective readings of Herakleitean sayings (Changing brings rest; it's always a struggle for the same ones to toil and be ruled.) based on the ideas common among those philosophers; they serve as fanciful, homiletic interpretations of very brief and ambiguous texts and can serve even less as evidence of Herakleitos' actual beliefs, since Plotinos (4, 8, 1) openly admits that Herakl. has not clearly expressed Make the message clear to us.. Others have applied certain Herakleitean statements to the Orphic idea of Body—sign, seeing it as the soul being entombed in the body (Philo, Leg. Alleg. I, 33, I, p. 65 M.; S.E., P. III, 230), which cannot seriously be considered his teaching. For Hkl., as well as for the Pythagoreans or Platonists, the soul did not come into existence at birth (as many believed) from nothing; rather, as a part of the universal fire (the universal psyche), it has existed for eternity. However, just because later writers insisted on finding ideas familiar to themselves in Herakleitos, it does not mean that Hkl. himself accepted the idea of disembodied separate souls with complete and absolute individuality. A few enigmatic and vividly expressed phrases—characteristic of this philosopher’s preference for conveying abstract concepts with symbolic imagery—might lead to such an interpretation. Immortal mortals, mortal immortals, living their death while those dead live on. (fr. 67 = 62)—does indeed sound as if Hkl. intended to discuss individual divine beings entering human life (and this was simply misquoted in inaccurate references as: gods mortal, humans immortal, etc.; see Bernays, Heraklit. Briefe, 39 ff.). Yet, Herakleitos likely meant that the eternal and perishable, divine and human are alike and interchangeable; he temporarily personified the divine (also called the god fr. 36 = 67; see fr. 61 = 102) as individual immortals, but he really meant what he later says: the same living and dead (fr. 78 = 88), life and death are the same (fr. 66 = 48). It seems impossible to derive from these words in this 67th fragment (62nd), or from no. 44 (= 53), a doctrine of great individuals ascending to divinity (contrary to Gomperz, Sitzb. Wien. Ak. 1886, p. 1010, 1041 f.). Nor would such a doctrine assert anything positive regarding the immortality of such individuals. The striking phrase People will face the end of things they never expected. (fr. 122 = 27) is clearly understood by Cl. Al. as referring to the punishment of the soul after death. But the same Cl. Al., Str. v, 9, p. 649 P., is able to interpret the Herakleitean self-immolation (where Herakl. actually mentions a crisis by fire: fr. 26 = 66) as a Through fire, purification of the wrongdoers. In fact, he's giving a meaning that aligns with his own understanding to statements taken out of context. The same sentence (fr. 122 = 27) gets a completely different and comforting interpretation from Plu. ap. Stob., Fl. 120, 8 fin.; see Schuster, Heraklit, p. 190, n. 1. Herakl. likely meant nothing more than the ongoing process of change that “awaits men after death.” Other statements also don't support a doctrine of immortality in Hkl. (fr. 7 = 18 belongs to a completely different context). “Those who have fallen in battle are honored by both gods (whose existence Hkl. neither denied nor needed to deny) and men,” fr. 102 = 24; the notion that their reward was anything other than fame—for instance, happy immortality—is not even suggested by Cl. Al. (Str. IV, 16, p. 571 P.) and is definitely not found in H.’s words, fr. 126 = 5 (the fool) Knowing neither gods nor heroes who they are clearly shows that Hkl. did not share popular beliefs about gods and heroes, but provides nothing definitive. In fr. 38 = 98 we have The souls smell in Hades.. Are we really to conclude from this that Herakl. believed in a typical Homeric Hades? Hades is used metaphorically to mean the opposite of life's earthly experience (just as it is metaphorically used for the opposite of light by the Herakleitean [Hippocr.] de Victu, I, 4, p. 632 Kühn = VI, 476 Lit.). For the souls, ᾅδης means the down the road and the idea conveyed is that after disappearing in death, the souls, after traveling downwards through water and earth, will eventually rise back up through water, and by taking in the pure, dry “fire,” will become “souls” again, (ὀσμῶνται is noteworthy but not to be changed. ὁσιοῦνται Pfleiderer; but the context in which Plu. quotes Herakl.'s saying [Fac. O. L. XXVIII, p. 943 E] shows that there is no reference to the purification of the souls in Hades, but merely their nourishment and strengthening from the None of the fiery aether; see also S.E., M. IX, 73, following Poseidonios. This αναθυμιᾶν—and the becoming “fiery” again—is what Hkl. refers to as smell.)—From the hopelessly corrupted fr. 123 = 63, nothing understandable can be extracted.—Nowhere do we find clear and distinct statements from Herakleitos that affirm his belief in the immortality of the individual soul; such statements would be necessary to attribute a belief to Herakleitos that, as everyone agrees, is in stark contrast to the rest of his teachings. He clearly states that in death the soul becomes water; and this indicates that it, as the soul = fire, perishes. If his belief had been anything akin to that of the mystics (as the Neoplatonists assumed), he must have viewed death—the liberation of the soul from the constraints of the physical and the domain of the lower elements—as a complete release of the soul into its true element, the fire. In contrast, what he teaches is the opposite: the soul perishes, becomes water, then earth, and then water again, eventually transforming back into soul (fr. 68 = 36). Only in this sense is it indestructible.

20 e.g. by Pfleiderer, Philos. d. Heraklit, etc., p. 209, and frequently.

20 for example, by Pfleiderer, Philos. d. Heraklit, etc., p. 209, and often.

21 The Sibyl fr. 12 = 92; the Delphic Oracle 11 = 93; Kathartic practices 130 = 5; Bakchoi, etc., 124 = 14.

21 The Sibyl fr. 12 = 92; the Delphic Oracle 11 = 93; cleansing practices 130 = 5; Bacchae, etc., 124 = 14.

22 ὡυτὸς Ἅιδης καὶ Διόνυσος fr. 127 = 15 (and to that extent—as being reconcilable with the doctrine of Hkl.—may the Dionysiac mysteries be considered valid: this must be the meaning of the sentence). On the other hand, we have disapproval of the μυστήρια carried out ἀνιερωστί by men: fr. 125 = 14 (for the worshippers do not perceive the real meaning of the ceremonies).

22 Hades and Dionysus fr. 127 = 15 (and to that extent—as being compatible with the doctrine of Hkl.—the Dionysian mysteries can be seen as valid: this must be the intended meaning of the sentence). On the other hand, there is a disapproval of the mysteries performed ἀνιερωστί by men: fr. 125 = 14 (because the worshippers do not grasp the true significance of the ceremonies).

23 In contrast to the Neoplatonic writers who attributed to Hkl. a doctrine of the soul like the Orphico-Pythagorean, the [Plutarchian] account in the Placita Philos. is again much nearer the real meaning of Herakleitos; cf. 4, 7 (where the name of Herakleitos has fallen out, as can be seen from Theodoret; see Diels, Dox., p. 392; Vors. 76, 1) . . . ἐξιοῦσαν (τὴν ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴν) εἰς τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ψυχὴν ἀναχωρεῖν πρὸς τὸ ὁμογενές. Even this is not quite correct as expressing what Hkl. really thought as to the fate of the soul but it does at least show once more that the contrary views of the Neoplatonists are also only interpretations, not evidence.

23 Unlike the Neoplatonic writers who connected Hkl. to a doctrine of the soul similar to the Orphico-Pythagorean view, the [Plutarchian] account in the Placita Philos. is much closer to the actual meaning of Herakleitos; cf. 4, 7 (where the name of Herakleitos has been omitted, as noted by Theodoret; see Diels, Dox., p. 392; Vors. 76, 1) . . . departing(the human soul)to return to the soul of the universe in harmony. Even this isn't entirely accurate in representing what Hkl. genuinely believed about the soul's fate, but it at least highlights once again that the opposing views of the Neoplatonists are also just interpretations, not facts.

24 Ἡράκλειτος ἠρεμίαν καὶ στάσιν ἐκ τῶν ὅλων ἀνῄρει· ἔστι γὰρ τοῦτο τῶν νεκρῶν. Dox., p. 320; Vors. 73, 10. στάσις and ἠρεμία could never make a real “life”—not even a blessed life far removed from the world—but are signs of what is “dead”, i.e. of what is nowhere to be found in this world, in fact, Nothing.

24 Heraclitus says that calm and stillness come from everything, as this is a trait of the dead.. Dox., p. 320; Vors. 73, 10. στάσις and calm could never create a true "life"—not even a blessed one far removed from the world—but are indications of what is "dead," meaning what cannot be found in this world, in fact, Nothing.

25 Parmenldes’ polemic against Herakleitos: l. 46 ff. Mull.; fr. 6, 4 ff. Diels; see Bernays, Rh. Mus. vii, 115 (cf. Diels, Parm. 68).

25 Parmenides' argument against Heraclitus: l. 46 ff. Mull.; fr. 6, 4 ff. Diels; see Bernays, Rh. Mus. vii, 115 (cf. Diels, Parm. 68).

26 Aristotle (acc. to S.E., M. x, 46; Vors. 142, 33 ff.) ἀφυσίκους αὐτοὺς κέκληκεν, ὅτι ἀρχὴ κινησεώς ἐστιν ἡ φύσις, ἣν ἀνεῖλον φάμενοι μηδὲν κινεῖσθαι.

26 Aristotle (according to S.E., M. x, 46; Vors. 142, 33 ff.) called them unnatural because nature is the source of motion, which they argued doesn't move at all.

27 Thphr., Sens. § 4; Vors. 146, 13 f.

27 Thphr., Sens. § 4; Vors. 146, 13 f.

28 γεγενῆσθαι τὴν τῶν πάντων φύσιν ἐκ θερμοῦ καὶ ψυχροῦ καὶ ξηροῦ καὶ ὑγροῦ, λαμβανόντων εἰς ἄλληλα τὴν μετανολήν, καὶ ψυχὴν κρᾶμα ὑπάρχειν ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων κατὰ μηδενὸς τούτων ἐπικράτησιν, Zeno ap. D.L. ix, 29; Vors. 166, 14. The composition out of four elements instead of two as with Parmenides may have been arrived at by Zeno 395 in imitation of the “four roots” of Empedokles, each of which was distinguished by possessing one of the four qualities θερμόν κτλ. The statement that the ψυχή arises from the equal mixture of the four qualities reminds us of Empedokles’ account of φρονεῖν (Vors. 218, 1 = 220, 23; Thphr., Sens. 10, 23). On the other side, Zeno takes over and applies to the ψυχή what the Pythagorean physician Alkmaion said about ὑγίεια (Vors. 136, 1; Dox., p. 442; cf. Arist., An. 408a, 1): his point of view is almost identical with that of those Pythagoreans who regarded the “soul” as made up out of a ἁρμονία of the Cold, the Warm, etc. (see below). He may have actually got his views from the acquaintance of Pythagorean physiologists (he was regarded as a “Pythagorean”: Str. 252).

28 Everything in existence originated from the combinations of hot, cold, dry, and wet, with each element affecting the change into others. The soul is a mix derived from these qualities, with none of them being the dominant one., Zeno ap. D.L. ix, 29; Vors. 166, 14. The idea of four elements rather than two, as suggested by Parmenides, may have been influenced by Zeno imitating Empedocles' concept of the “four roots,” each defined by one of the four qualities hot, etc. The claim that the spirit comes from an equal mixture of the four qualities reminds us of Empedocles’ explanation of thinking (Vors. 218, 1 = 220, 23; Thphr., Sens. 10, 23). On the other hand, Zeno adopts and applies to the spirit what the Pythagorean doctor Alkmaion said about wellness (Vors. 136, 1; Dox., p. 442; cf. Arist., An. 408a, 1): his perspective is almost identical to that of Pythagoreans who saw the “soul” as formed from a balance of Cold, Warm, etc. (see below). He likely derived his views from interactions with Pythagorean physiologists (he was known as a “Pythagorean”: Str. 252).

29 Simpl. ad Arist., Ph., p. 39 D.; Vors. 162, 11; cf. Diels, Parm. 109 f. (1897).

29 Simpl. ad Arist., Ph., p. 39 D.; Vors. 162, 11; cf. Diels, Parm. 109 f. (1897).

30 Parmenides pupil of Diochaites the Pythagorean and of Ameinias, also as it appears a Pythagorean: Sotion ap. D.L. ix, 21; Vors. 138. He was counted a Pythagorean by tradition which, however, was very free with its attributions of this kind. Call. fr. 100d, 17; Str. 252; V. Pyth. ap. Phot., Bibl. 249, p. 439a, 37 Bk.; Iamb., VP. 267 (with Sch., p. 190 N.). The Pyth. influence on Parmenides may have been essentially of an ethical nature: εἰς ἡσυχίαν προετράπη ὑπὸ Ἀμεινίου, D.L. ix, 21. Παρμενίδειος καὶ Πυθαγόρειος βίος as equivalent: [Ceb.] Tab. 2 fin. Str., p. 252, connects the good government of Elea with the Pythagorean influence of Parmenides (and of Zeno). Parmenides law-giver of Elea: Speus. π. φιλοσόφων ap. D.L. ix, 23.

30 Parmenides was a student of Diochaites the Pythagorean and Ameinias, who also seems to be a Pythagorean: Sotion in D.L. ix, 21; Vors. 138. He was traditionally considered a Pythagorean, although this tradition often attributed such labels freely. Call. fr. 100d, 17; Str. 252; V. Pyth. in Phot., Bibl. 249, p. 439a, 37 Bk.; Iamb., VP. 267 (with Sch., p. 190 N.). The Pythagorean influence on Parmenides may have primarily been ethical in nature: Led to silence by Ameinios, D.L. ix, 21. Parmenidean and Pythagorean life as equivalent: [Ceb.] Tab. 2 fin. Str., p. 252, links the effective governance of Elea with the Pythagorean influence of Parmenides (and Zeno). Parmenides was the lawgiver of Elea: Speus. π. philosophers in D.L. ix, 23.

31 φιλοσοφίαν δὲ πρῶτος ὠνόμασε Πυθαγόρας καὶ ἑαυτὸν φιλόσοφον: D.L., Proem. 12 (though the rest is from the fictitious dialogue of Herakl. Pont. see Cic., TD. v, 8–9).

31 Pythagoras was the first to refer to philosophy and to call himself a philosopher.: D.L., Proem. 12 (though the rest is from the fictional dialogue of Herakl. Pont. see Cic., TD. v, 8–9).

32 Pl., Rp. 600 AB.

32 Pl., Rp. 600 AD.

33 πολυμαθίη, ἱστορίη of Pythag.; Herakl. frr. 16, 17 = 40, 129. παντοίων τὰ μάλιστα σοφῶν ἐπιήρανος ἔργων is said of Pythag. by Emped. (429 Mull.) fr. 129, 3.—The Pythagorean account of the construction of the world was known to Parmenides at the beginning of the fifth century and imitated by him in several points: Krische, Theol. Lehren d. gr. D. 103 ff. (To what extent Parmenides in other respects controverted Pythag. doctrine—as has been recently asserted of him—may be left undecided.) Fanciful speculations about numbers are attributed to Pythag. himself by Aristot., MM. 1182a, 11 ff.; Vors. 347, 3.

33 knowledge, history of Pythag.; Herakl. frr. 16, 17 = 40, 129. of all things, the most skilled experts in their crafts is said of Pythag. by Emped. (429 Mull.) fr. 129, 3.—The Pythagorean view of the creation of the universe was known to Parmenides at the start of the fifth century and he borrowed from it in several ways: Krische, Theol. Lehren d. gr. D. 103 ff. (It's uncertain to what degree Parmenides rejected Pythagorean doctrine in other ways—as has been recently claimed about him.) Imaginative theories about numbers are credited to Pythag. himself by Aristot., MM. 1182a, 11 ff.; Vors. 347, 3.

34 Emped. 427 ff. Mull.; fr. 129 Diels. That this praeconium does really refer to Pythag. (as Timaeus and others supposed) and not to Parmenides (as the undefined οἱ δέ of D.L. viii, 54, thought) appears to be proved by l. 4 ff., which allude to a remarkable power of ἀνάμνησις which was certainly attributed by legend to Pythag., never to Parmenides.

34 Emped. 427 ff. Mull.; fr. 129 Diels. The fact that this praeconium actually refers to Pythagoras (as Timaeus and others believed) and not to Parmenides (as the undefined the others of D.L. viii, 54, thought) seems to be confirmed by lines 4 ff., which refer to a notable ability of remembrance, definitely linked by legend to Pythagoras and never to Parmenides.

35 ψυχαί filling the whole air, not distinguished from δαίμονες and ἥρωες, Alex. Polyh. ap. D.L. viii, 32; Vors.4 i, xliv (who in this section of his account—§§31 ff.—is giving older Pythagorean ideas. Poseidonios expresses the same ideas; but it does not therefore follow that he got them from the Stoics. Poseid. borrowed and elaborated many Pythagorean views). More subtly expressed: the soul is ἀθάνατος because it is eternally in motion like τὰ θεῖα πάντα, the moon, sun, stars, and heaven; Alkmaion ap. Arist., An. 405a, 29 ff.; Vors. 133, 40; cf. Krische, 75 f. The perpetual movement of the ψυχαί was one of the older Pythag. beliefs: it is expressed in the old fable (known already to Demokritos) of the motes in the sunbeam, 396 which, in their continual agitation, are, or enclose, swarming souls (see below, n. 40). In Alkmaion’s treatment of the doctrine there is the additional idea that the soul of man ἔοικε τοῖς ἀθανάτοις. The derivation of its immortality and divinity from its origin in the World-soul (this is often said to be a Pythagorean doctrine: Cic., ND. i, 27; Sen. 78; D.L. viii, 28; S.E., M. ix, 127) does indeed suggest Stoic pantheism in the form of its expression but in substance it may very well go back to the older Pythag. teaching. (The genuineness of the frag. [21 D.] of Philolaos ap. Stob., Ecl. i, 20, 2 ff.; Vors. 318, 13, remains, however, dubious.) The idea that the soul and νοῦς of man came to him from an impersonal θεῖον, an all-pervading ἐν τῷ παντὶ φρόνησις, must have been widespread even in the fifth century. It finds expression in Xen., M. 1, 4, 8–17; 4, 3, 14, where it is certainly not an original fancy of Xenophon’s, but must have been derived by him from somewhere or other (not from Socrates, however, nor Plato).

35 souls fill the entire air, indistinguishable from demons and heroes, Alex. Polyh. ap. D.L. viii, 32; Vors.4 i, xliv (who in this section of his account—§§31 ff.—is presenting older Pythagorean ideas. Poseidonios shares these ideas as well; however, this doesn't necessarily mean he got them from the Stoics. Poseidonios borrowed and expanded on many Pythagorean concepts). More subtly put: the soul is immortal because it is always in motion like the divine all, the moon, sun, stars, and heavens; Alkmaion ap. Arist., An. 405a, 29 ff.; Vors. 133, 40; cf. Krische, 75 f. The constant movement of the souls was one of the older Pythagorean beliefs: it is illustrated in the old fable (already known to Demokritos) about the particles in a sunbeam, 396 which, in their endless motion, are or contain swarming souls (see below, n. 40). In Alkmaion’s explanation of the doctrine, there is the extra idea that man's soul It seems like the immortals.. The notion of its immortality and divine nature deriving from its origin in the World-soul (often said to be a Pythagorean belief: Cic., ND. i, 27; Sen. 78; D.L. viii, 28; S.E., M. ix, 127) does indeed imply Stoic pantheism in expression, but in essence it likely traces back to the older Pythagorean teaching. (The authenticity of the fragment [21 D.] of Philolaos ap. Stob., Ecl. i, 20, 2 ff.; Vors. 318, 13, remains questionable.) The idea that the soul and mind of man originated from an impersonal divine, an all-encompassing In all wisdom, must have been widespread even in the fifth century. It is reflected in Xen., M. 1, 4, 8–17; 4, 3, 14, where it clearly isn't an original idea of Xenophon’s but must have been sourced from elsewhere (not from Socrates or Plato, however).

36 ἐν φρουρᾷ, Pl., Phd. 62 B. This is traced back to Pythag. belief (though he misinterprets the meaning of the word φρουρά) by Cic., Sen. 73; cf. the Pythagorean Euxitheos ap. Ath. 157 C; Vors. 315, 19. See Böckh, Philol. 179 ff. (Philolaos fr. 15 [16 Mull.] speaks of the World-soul or God who holds and contains all things ἐν φρουρᾷ without mentioning the human soul: see Böckh, p. 151.) The comparison of life in the body to a φρουρά may very well be Pythagorean; nor is this prevented by the fact that it is also Orphic (see above, chap. x, n. 43). This comparison implies the conception of the earthly life as a punishment. διά τινας τιμωρίας the soul is enclosed in the body: Philolaos fr. 14 (23) appealing to παλαιοὶ θεολόγοι τε καὶ μάντιες (cf. Iamb., VP. 85, ἀγαθὸν οἱ πόνοι . . . ἐπὶ κολάσει γὰρ ἐλθόντας δεῖ κολασθῆναι).—Espinas in Arch. f. Ges. d. Philos. viii, 452, interprets the ἐν φρουρᾷ of Pl., Phd. 62, as = “in the cattle-pen” or “sheep-fold”; the idea of God as the Shepherd of man would then be vaguely present even here (cf. Plt. 271 E; Criti. 109 B). It remains, however, to be proved (to begin with) that φρουρά is ever used in the sense of σηκός or εἱρκτή.

36 On guard, Pl., Phd. 62 B. This concept is traced back to Pythagorean beliefs (though he misinterprets the meaning of the word guard) by Cic., Sen. 73; compare with the Pythagorean Euxitheos in Ath. 157 C; Vors. 315, 19. See Böckh, Philol. 179 ff. (Philolaos fr. 15 [16 Mull.] talks about the World-soul or God who holds and contains all things in a security guard without mentioning the human soul: see Böckh, p. 151.) The analogy of life in the body to a guard could very well be Pythagorean; this is not ruled out by the fact that it is also Orphic (see above, chap. x, n. 43). This analogy suggests the view of earthly life as a punishment. Due to a penalty, the soul is confined in the body: Philolaos fr. 14 (23) citing ancient theologians and prophets (cf. Iamb., VP. 85, Good are the efforts... for those who arrive in punishment must be punished.).—Espinas in Arch. f. Ges. d. Philos. viii, 452, interprets the in a security detail of Pl., Phd. 62, as “in the cattle pen” or “sheepfold”; the idea of God as the Shepherd of man is then vaguely present even here (cf. Plt. 271 E; Criti. 109 B). However, it still needs to be demonstrated (to start with) that guard is ever used in the sense of sēkos or eīrktē.

37 Arist., An. 1, 3, p. 407b, 22 ff.

37 Arist., An. 1, 3, p. 407b, 22 ff.

38 οἱ ἐν τῷ ταρτάρῷ terrified by thunder acc. to Pythag. belief: Arist., An. Po. 94b, 32 ff.; σύνοδοι τῶν τεθνεώτων in the depths of the earth, Ael., VH. iv, 17 (perhaps from Arist. π. τῶν Πυθαγορείων). Description of the condition of things in Hades given in the Pythagorean Κατάβασις εἰς ᾅδου. As in the case of the Orphics this purgation and punishment in the spirit-world must have belonged to the parts of the Πυθαγόρειοι μῦθοι that were quite seriously believed.

38 Those in Hell were terrified by thunder according to Pythagorean belief: Arist., An. Po. 94b, 32 ff.; gatherings of the dead in the depths of the earth, Ael., VH. iv, 17 (perhaps from Arist. the Pythagorean people). A description of the situation in Hades is found in the Pythagorean Descent into Hell. Similar to the Orphics, this purification and punishment in the spirit world must have been part of the Pythagorean legends that were taken quite seriously.

39 ἐκριφθεῖσαν (out of the body) αὐτὴν (τὴν ψυχὴν) ἐπὶ γῆς πλάζεσθαι ἐν τῷ ἀέρι ὁμοίαν τῷ σώματι (being a complete εἴδωλον of the living): Alex. Polyh. ap. D.L. viii, 31.

39 hidden (out of the body) it(the spirit)is seen on Earth, similar to the body (being a complete celebrity of the living): Alex. Polyh. ap. D.L. viii, 31.

40 Arist., An. 1, 2, 4, p. 404a, 16 ff.; Vors. 357, 1; many called the ἐν τῷ ἀέρι ξύσματα themselves “souls”, others τὸ ταῦτα κινοῦν. This may rest on a real popular belief which, however, has already been partially elevated to a philosophical standing: the souls are compared to what is evidently itself in perpetual agitation (Arist., l. 19 f.). This was undoubtedly Pythagorean (and old Ionic) teaching: see Alkmaion ap. Arist., An. 405a, 29 ff.; Vors. 133, 40. (Statement of Dox. 386a, 13 ff., b, 8 ff., is more doubtful.)

40 Arist., An. 1, 2, 4, p. 404a, 16 ff.; Vors. 357, 1; many referred to the in the air scraps as "souls," while others called it moving these things. This might be based on a genuine popular belief that has already been partially elevated to a philosophical status: the souls are likened to what is clearly in constant motion (Arist., l. 19 f.). This teaching undoubtedly has roots in Pythagorean (and ancient Ionic) thought: see Alkmaion ap. Arist., An. 405a, 29 ff.; Vors. 133, 40. (The account in Dox. 386a, 13 ff., b, 8 ff. is more uncertain.)

41 D.L. viii, 32; Vors4. i, p. xliv.

41 D.L. viii, 32; Vors4. i, p. xliv.

42 That the Pythagoreans believed in the entry of the soul into the bodies of animals also is implied in the satirical verses of Xenophanes 397 (fr. 6) ap. D.L. viii, 36. All probability suggests that this was the reason for the injunction to abstain from flesh food among the older Pythagoreans themselves (and with Empedokles). (S.E., M. ix, 127 ff., however, drags in the “World-Soul” in a moment of untimely Stoicism. S.E.’s own quotation from Empedokles shows that the latter at any rate derived the ἀποχὴ ἐμψύχων simply from the fact of Metamorphosis, and not at all from the ψυχῆς πνεῦμα which rules in all life; though this last is attributed to him by S.E.)

42 The Pythagoreans also believed that the soul could enter the bodies of animals, as suggested in the satirical verses of Xenophanes 397 (fr. 6) ap. D.L. viii, 36. It's likely this belief led to the older Pythagoreans’ (and Empedocles’) insistence on avoiding meat. (S.E., M. ix, 127 ff. brings in the concept of the “World-Soul” in a moment of misplaced Stoicism. S.E.’s own quote from Empedocles shows that he, at least, derived the animal rights solely from the idea of Metamorphosis, and not from the spirit of the soul that governs all life; although S.E. attributes this last concept to him.)

43 Check out __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

44 According to the Pythagoreans τὸ δίκαιον is nothing else than τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός, i.e. ἃ τις ἐποίησε ταῦτ’ ἀντιπαθεῖν: Arist., EN. 5, 5, p. 1132b, 21 ff.; MM. 1194a, 29 ff. (also given with fanciful numerical expression, MM. 1182a, 14; Sch. Arist. 540a, 19 ff.; 541b, 6 Br.; [Iamb.] Theol. Arith., p. 28 f. Ast). This definition of justice was simply taken over by the Pythagoreans from popular sayings such as the verse of Rhadamanthys ap. Arist., EN. about the δράσαντι παθεῖν and similar formulae: see collection in Blomfield’s Gloss. in A., Cho. 307; Soph. fr. 229 P. Compensatory justice of this kind we may suppose was manifested in the rebirths of men (in this respect the P. went beyond the commonplace sense of that τριγέρων μῦθος): we may assume this without further hesitation if we remember the completely analogous application of this conception by the Orphics (above, chap. x, n. 71).

44 According to the Pythagoreans, the just is simply the suffering endured, meaning What someone did, to resent this.: Arist., EN. 5, 5, p. 1132b, 21 ff.; MM. 1194a, 29 ff. (also shown with a creative numerical expression, MM. 1182a, 14; Sch. Arist. 540a, 19 ff.; 541b, 6 Br.; [Iamb.] Theol. Arith., p. 28 f. Ast). The Pythagoreans simply adopted this definition of justice from common sayings, like the verse of Rhadamanthys in Arist., EN. about the Acting to experience and similar phrases: see collection in Blomfield’s Gloss. in A., Cho. 307; Soph. fr. 229 P. We can assume that this kind of compensatory justice was reflected in the rebirths of individuals (in this way, the Pythagoreans went beyond the usual interpretation of that three-headed myth): we can confidently assume this if we consider the very similar use of this idea by the Orphics (above, chap. x, n. 71).

45 Πυθαγόρειος τρόπος τοῦ βίου, Pl., Rp. 600 B.

45 Pythagorean lifestyle, Pl., Rep. 600 B.

46 ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ θεῷ, Iamb., VP. 137 (following Aristoxenos); Vors. 362, 32; ἕπου θεῷ Pythagoras ap. Stob., Ecl. ii, p. 49, 16 W. See Wyttenb. on Plu., Ser. Num. Vind. 550 D.

46 Follow God, Iamb., VP. 137 (following Aristoxenos); Vors. 362, 32; Follow your faith Pythagoras ap. Stob., Ecl. ii, p. 49, 16 W. See Wyttenb. on Plu., Ser. Num. Vind. 550 D.

47 Ancient testimony ascribes to the Pythagoreans: abstinence from flesh-food or at least from the flesh of such animals as are not sacrificed to the Olympians (the ἀνθρώπου ψυχή does not enter into the θύσιμα ζῷα in transmigration: Iamb., VP. 85; Vors. 359, 13); from eating fish, particularly τρίγλαι and μελάνουροι, and beans; from using linen clothing (or being buried in it: Hdt. ii, 81); and a few other forms of abstinence and measures assuring ritual purity. The whole apparatus of ritual ἁγνεία is ascribed to the older Pythagoreans by Alex. Polyh. ap. D.L. viii, 33. This, as a general statement is certainly correct. It is customary to say that it began among the degenerate Pythagoreans after the break up of the Italian society (so esp. Krische, De Soc. a Pythag. cond. scopo politico, Gött., 1831). But when Aristoxenos, the contemporary of the later, scientifically-minded Pythagoreans, denies all such superstitious ideas and regulations to the original Pythagoreans, his evidence really applies only to those Pythagorean scholars with whom he was acquainted and who seemed to him to have preserved the real spirit of the older Pythagoreanism much more truly than the ascetic (and in any case degenerate) Pythagoreans of the same period. Everything, however, goes to show that the strength of the surviving community as it had been founded by Pythagoras lay in the religious and mystical elements of its doctrine; and that what was oldest in Pythagoreanism was what it had in common with the faith and religious discipline of the Orphics. To this side belongs what we learn from tradition of the older Pythagorean asceticism. Much, then, that is of early Pythagorean origin (though certainly combined with other and later elements) is to be found in many of the ἀκούσματα or σύμβολα of the Pythagoreans, esp. in those of them (and they are numerous) that give directions of a ritual or merely superstitious kind. A fresh collection, arrangement and 398 explanation of these remarkable fragments would be very useful: Göttling’s purely rationalist treatment of them does them less than justice. (Corn. Hölk, De acusmatis s. symbolis Pythag., Diss. Kiel. 1894.)

47 Ancient records indicate that the Pythagoreans practiced: abstaining from meat or at least from the flesh of animals not offered to the Olympian gods (the human soul does not enter into the sacrificed animals during transmigration: Iamb., VP. 85; Vors. 359, 13); refraining from eating fish, especially τρίγλαι and melanurii, and beans; avoiding linen clothing (or being buried in it: Hdt. ii, 81); and a few other forms of abstinence and practices that ensure ritual purity. The entire system of ritual purity is attributed to the earlier Pythagoreans by Alex. Polyh. ap. D.L. viii, 33. This, as a general statement, is certainly accurate. It's commonly said that these practices began among the degenerate Pythagoreans after the collapse of Italian society (especially noted by Krische, De Soc. a Pythag. cond. scopo politico, Gött., 1831). However, when Aristoxenus, a contemporary of the later, scientifically-oriented Pythagoreans, denies all such superstitious beliefs and rules to the original Pythagoreans, his evidence actually applies only to the Pythagorean scholars he knew, who he felt preserved the true spirit of the earlier Pythagoreanism more authentically than the ascetic (and in any case degenerate) Pythagoreans of the same period. Everything suggests that the strength of the surviving community that Pythagoras founded lay in the religious and mystical elements of its teachings; and that what was oldest in Pythagoreanism was what it shared with the faith and religious practices of the Orphics. This aspect relates to what we learn from tradition about the earlier Pythagorean asceticism. Much of what originates from early Pythagoreanism (though certainly mixed with other, later elements) can be found in many of the Soundscapes or symbols of the Pythagoreans, especially in those (which are numerous) that provide instructions of a ritual or merely superstitious nature. A new collection, organization, and 398 explanation of these remarkable fragments would be very beneficial: Göttling’s purely rationalist treatment of them does them a disservice. (Corn. Hölk, De acusmatis s. symbolis Pythag., Diss. Kiel. 1894.)

48 Efforts in a more positive direction may perhaps be seen in the practice of the musical form of κάθαρσις which Pythag. and the Pythagoreans used in accordance with an elaborate system: cf. Iamb., VP. 64 ff., 110 ff.; Sch. V. on X 391; also Quint. 9, 4, 12; Porph., VP. 33, etc.—What Aristoxenos has to say about Pythagorean ethics, moralistic parainesis and edification—most of it of a purely rationalist kind—can scarcely be said to have historical value.

48 Efforts in a more positive direction can possibly be seen in the practice of the musical form of catharsis which Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans used as part of an intricate system: see Iamblichus, VP. 64 ff., 110 ff.; Scholia V. on X 391; also Quintilian 9, 4, 12; Porphyry, VP. 33, etc.—What Aristoxenus discusses regarding Pythagorean ethics, moralistic parainesis and guidance—most of it purely rationalist—can hardly be considered historically valuable.

49 Good formulation of Pythag. belief ap. Max. Tyr. 16, 2, i, 287 R.: Πυθαγόρας πρῶτος ἐν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἐτόλμησεν εἰπεῖν, ὅτι αὑτῷ τὸ μὲν σῶμα τεθνήξεται, ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ ἀναπτᾶσα οἰχήσεται ἀθανὴς καὶ ἀγήρως. καὶ γὰρ εἶναι αὐτὴν πρὶν ἥκειν δεῦρο. i.e. the life of the soul is not only endless but without beginning; the soul is immortal because it is timeless.

49 A clear expression of Pythagoras' belief can be found in Maximus of Tyre, 16, 2, i, 287 R.: Pythagoras was the first among the Greeks to boldly state that while the body will die, the soul will rise up, immortal and ageless. For it existed before it arrived here.. In other words, the life of the soul is not only endless but also has no beginning; the soul is immortal because it exists outside of time.

50 The withdrawal of the soul from the κύκλος ἀνάγκης and its return to an emancipated existence as a bodiless spirit was never so clearly held in view for the “Pure” by the older Pythagorean tradition as it was among the Orphics (and Empedokles). It is, however, hardly thinkable that a system which regarded every incarnation of the soul as a punishment and the body as its prison or its tomb should never have held out to the true βάκχοι of its mysteries the prospect of a full and permanent liberation of the soul, at last, from corporeality and the earthly life. Only so could the long chain of deaths and rebirths reach a final and satisfactory conclusion. Eternally detained in the cycle of births the soul would be eternally punished (this is e.g. the idea of Empedokles: 455 f., fr. 145 D.); and this cannot have been the real conclusion of the Pythagorean doctrine of salvation. Claud. Mamertus, de An. 2, 7 [Vors. 320, 12], gives it as a doctrine of Philolaos [fr. 22] that the (pure) soul after its separation from the body leads a “bodiless” life in the “Universe” (the κόσμος situated above the οὐρανός): see Böckh, Philol. 177. Apart from this the only evidence for the withdrawal of the soul is late: Carm. Aur. 70 f. (making use of the Empedok. verses, fr. 112, 4 f. = 400 Mull.), Alex. Polyh. ap. D.L. viii, 31 (ἄγεσθαι τὰς καθαρὰς [ψυχὰς] ἐπὶ τὸν ὕψιστον “in altissimum locum” Cobet: but an ellipse of τόπον is hardly admissible. ὁ ὕψιστος = the highest God would be a Hebraic form of expression, nor can it be a possible one here for Alex. Polyh.—we should also, with this meaning of ὕψιστος, expect πρὸς τ. ὕ. ad superiores circulos bene viventium animae, secundum philosophorum altam scientiam, Serv., A. vi, 127—should we then supply ἐπὶ τὸν ὕψιστον <κύκλον>? Or perh. ἐπὶ τὸ ὕψιστον?)—An escape of the souls after the expiry of their περίοδοι must have been known as a Pythagorean belief to Luc., VH. ii, 21. (Vergil, too, is speaking in a Pythagorean sense, A. vi, 744, pauci laeta arva [Elysii] tenemus.—i.e. for ever without renewed ἐνσωμάτωσις—see Serv., A. vi, 404, 426, 713. It is true the line is out of its right place, but there can be no doubt that it reproduces the words and the—in this section Pythagorean—opinion of Vergil.) The idea that the cycle of births is never to be broken cannot be regarded as Pythagorean nor even as Neopythagorean. (A few isolated later accounts of Pythag. doctrine; e.g. D.L. viii, 14 (from Favorinus), Porph., VP. 19, and also the cursory description in Ov., M. xv—with a good deal of foreign matter added—speak of the Pyth. doctrine of soul-transmigration without also referring to the possibility of κύκλου λῆξαι; but they are not meant to deny that 399 possibility but merely leave it unmentioned as unnecessary in the context.) There seems to be no example of a Greek doctrine of transmigration that did not also include a promise to the ὅσιοι or the φιλόσοφοι that they would be able to escape from the cycle of births (at least for a world-period: as Syrian. took it, though probably not Porph.). Such a promise, as the consummation of the promises of salvation therein made, could only be dispensed with in the case of a doctrine of transmigration in which being born again was itself regarded as a reward for the pious (as in the teaching which Jos., BJ. 2, 8, 14, attributes to the Pharisees). By Greek partisans of the doctrine of Metempsychosis rebirth upon earth is always regarded as a punishment or at any rate a burden, not as a desirable goal for the life of the soul. We must therefore presume that the promise of escape from the cycle of rebirth was made also by the oldest Pythagorean teaching as the final benefit of its message of salvation. Without this completing touch Pythagoreanism would be like Buddhism without the promise of a final attainment of Nirvâna.

50 The soul's exit from the circle of necessity and its return to a liberated existence as a spirit without a body was never more clearly emphasized for the "Pure" within the older Pythagorean tradition than it was among the Orphics (and Empedocles). However, it's hard to believe that a system which viewed every incarnation of the soul as a punishment and the body as its prison or tomb would never have offered the true Bacchae of its mysteries the hope of a complete and lasting freedom for the soul from physical existence and earthly life. Only then could the long series of deaths and rebirths come to a fulfilling end. If the soul were forever trapped in the cycle of births, it would be perpetually punished (this is also the idea of Empedocles: 455 f., fr. 145 D.); and this couldn’t have been the ultimate conclusion of the Pythagorean doctrine of salvation. Claud. Mamertus, de An. 2, 7 [Vors. 320, 12], records it as a doctrine of Philolaus [fr. 22] that the (pure) soul, after separating from the body, lives a “bodiless” life in the “Universe” (the world above the sky): see Böckh, Philol. 177. Beyond this, the only evidence for the soul's withdrawal is later: Carm. Aur. 70 f. (drawing from the Empedoclean verses, fr. 112, 4 f. = 400 Mull.), Alex. Polyh. ap. D.L. viii, 31 (clean things[ψυχὰς]to the most high “to the highest place” Cobet: but omitting location seems unlikely. the Most High = the highest God would be a Hebrew expression, nor can it be applicable here for Alex. Polyh.—with this meaning of highest, we’d also expect πρὸς t. ὕ. To the higher realms of the spirits of the well-living, according to the profound knowledge of the philosophers., Serv., A. vi, 127—should we then clarify to the highest circle? Or maybe to the utmost?)—A belief in the souls' escape after their periods must have been known as a Pythagorean belief to Luc., VH. ii, 21. (Virgil, too, speaks in a Pythagorean sense, A. vi, 744, few happy fields[Elysium]tenemus.—implying forever free of renewed embodiment—see Serv., A. vi, 404, 426, 713. Although the line is out of place, there’s no doubt it reflects the words and—within this section—the Pythagorean perspective of Virgil.) The idea that the cycle of births is never broken can't be considered Pythagorean or even Neopythagorean. (A few later accounts of Pythagorean doctrine; e.g., D.L. viii, 14 (from Favorinus), Porph., VP. 19, and a brief description in Ov., M. xv—with quite a bit of foreign matter included—speak of the Pyth. doctrine of soul transmigration without mentioning the possibility of end of the circle; but they don’t deny that 399 possibility, merely omit it as unnecessary in the context.) There seems to be no example of a Greek doctrine of transmigration that didn’t also contain a promise to the holy ones or the philosophers that they would be able to escape from the cycle of births (at least for a period: as the Syrian viewed it, though probably not Porph.). Such a promise, as the culmination of the salvational promises made, could only be set aside in a doctrine of transmigration where being reborn was seen as a reward for the righteous (as in the teaching attributed to the Pharisees by Jos., BJ. 2, 8, 14). By Greek supporters of the doctrine of Metempsychosis, rebirth on earth is always viewed as a punishment or at least a burden, not as a desirable aim for the soul's life. We must therefore assume that the promise of escape from the cycle of rebirth was also part of the oldest Pythagorean teachings as the ultimate benefit of its message of salvation. Without this final touch, Pythagoreanism would be like Buddhism without the promise of achieving Nirvâna.

51 Pythagoras is called the pupil of Pherekydes as early as Andron of Ephesos (before Theopompos): D.L. i, 119; Vors. ii, 199, 18. Pherekydes was regarded as “the first” who taught the immortality of the soul (Cic., TD. i, 38) or more correctly metempsychosis (Suid. Φερεκ.); cf. Preller, Rh. Mus. (N.F.), iv, 388 f. A hint of such teaching must have been found in his mystical treatise (cf. Porph., Antr. 31; Vors. ii, 204, 12—Gomperz is rather too sceptical, Gk. Thinkers, i, 542). This teaching seems to have been the chief reason which tempted later writers to make the old theologos into the teacher of Pythagoras, the chief spokesman of the doctrine of the soul’s transmigrations.—It is, however, an untenable theory that Pherek. illustrated his doctrine of transmigration by the example of Aithalides. What the Sch. on A.R. i, 645 [Vors. ii, 204, 24], quotes from “Pherekydes” about the alternate sojourn of the ψυχή of Aithalides in Hades and on earth, does not come from Pherekydes the theologos (as Göttling, Opusc. 210, and Kern, de Orph. Epim. Pherec., pp. 89, 106, think) but without the slightest doubt from the genealogist and historian; this is the only Pherekydes who is used by the Sch. of Ap. Rh., and he is used frequently. Besides this, the way in which the different statements of the various authorities used in this Scholion are distinguished, shows quite clearly that Pherekydes had only spoken of Aithalides’ alternate dwelling above and below the earth, but as still being Aithalides, and not as metamorphosed by the series of births into other personalities living upon earth. Pherekydes was obviously reproducing a Phthiotic local-legend in which Aithalides as the son of (the chthonic?) Hermes alternately lived on and below the earth, as an ἑτερήμερος—like the Dioscuri in Lacedaimonian legend (λ 301 ff.: in that passage and generally in the older view—as held by Alkman, Pindar, etc.—both the Dioscuri change their place of abode together: it is not till later that the variant arose acc. to which they alternate with each other: see Hemst. Luc. ii, p. 344 Bip.). It was Herakleides Pont. who first turned the alternate sojourning of Aithalides into death and resurrection (he also made Aithalides one of the previous incarnations of Pythagoras; see Appendix x); but as a different person, so that A. thus became an example of metempsychosis. It is not hard to see why Aithalides was chosen as one of the previous incarnations of P., nor how the old miracle-story, preserved to literature by Pherekydes, was thus transformed to suit its new purpose. Plainly Pherekydes did not say that Hermes 400 also gave Aithalides the power of memory after his death (otherwise the statement to this effect in Sch. A.R. would have stood under the name of Pherek.); and the privilege was rather meaningless until after Herakleides’ narrative. Perhaps it was Her. who first added this touch to the story. Ap. Rh. follows him in this point (i, 643 ff.), but not—or not plainly, at least: 646 ff.—in what Herakleides had invented about the metempsychosis of Aithalides.

51 Pythagoras is referred to as the student of Pherekydes as early as Andron of Ephesos (before Theopompos): D.L. i, 119; Vors. ii, 199, 18. Pherekydes was seen as "the first" who taught about the immortality of the soul (Cic., TD. i, 38) or, more accurately, metempsychosis (Suid. Φερεκ.); cf. Preller, Rh. Mus. (N.F.), iv, 388 f. There must have been a suggestion of this teaching in his mystical writings (cf. Porph., Antr. 31; Vors. ii, 204, 12—Gomperz is quite too skeptical, Gk. Thinkers, i, 542). This teaching appears to be the main reason that later writers made the old theologos the teacher of Pythagoras, the primary advocate of the doctrine of the soul's reincarnations.—However, it's an unfounded theory that Pherek. illustrated his concept of reincarnation using the example of Aithalides. What the Sch. on A.R. i, 645 [Vors. ii, 204, 24] quotes from "Pherekydes" regarding the soul's alternate stay of soul of Aithalides in Hades and on earth does not originate from Pherekydes the theologos (contrary to what Göttling, Opusc. 210, and Kern, de Orph. Epim. Pherec., pp. 89, 106, believe), but undoubtedly comes from the genealogist and historian; this is the only Pherekydes utilized by the Sch. of Ap. Rh., and he is referenced frequently. Furthermore, the way in which various statements from different sources in this Scholion are distinguished demonstrates clearly that Pherekydes spoke only of Aithalides’ alternating residence above and below the earth, yet as still being Aithalides, not as transformed through a series of rebirths into other earthly personalities. Pherekydes was clearly reflecting a local legend from Phthia where Aithalides, the son of (the chthonic?) Hermes, lived alternately above and below the earth, as an other day—similar to the Dioscuri in Lacedaimonian legend (λ 301 ff.: in that passage and generally in the earlier view—as held by Alkman, Pindar, etc.—both the Dioscuri switch their places together: it wasn't until later that the version emerged in which they alternate with each other: see Hemst. Luc. ii, p. 344 Bip.). It was Herakleides Pont. who first transformed the alternating residence of Aithalides into death and resurrection (he also made Aithalides one of the past lives of Pythagoras; see Appendix x); but as a different person, making A. an example of metempsychosis. It’s easy to understand why Aithalides was chosen as one of the previous incarnations of P., or how the old miracle story preserved in literature by Pherekydes was revamped for its new purpose. Clearly, Pherekydes did not say that Hermes 400 also granted Aithalides the power of memory after his death (otherwise the assertion in Sch. A.R. would bear Pherek.'s name); and this privilege was quite meaningless until after Herakleides’ narrative. It may have been Her. who added this element to the story. Ap. Rh. follows him on this point (i, 643 ff.), but not—or at least not clearly: 646 ff.—in what Herakleides invented regarding Aithalides' metempsychosis.

52 Macr., Som. Scip. 1, 14, 19, attributes this view to Pythagoras and Philolaos, being certainly correct in the case of the latter; since the opinion that the soul is a κρᾶσις and ἁρμονία of the warm and the cold, the dry and the wet, which go to make up the body, is given by Simmias in Pl., Phd. 86 B, as a tradition that he has received and not an invention of his own. But what else can this mean than a tradition handed down in Thebes by his teacher Philolaos (Phd. 61 D)? (Hence Ἁρμονίας τῆς Θηβαϊκῆς, 95 A.) It is true that Claud. Mam. de An. ii, 7, only attributes to Philolaos the doctrine that the soul is bound up with the body “in eternal and incorporeal harmony” (convenientiam): which would imply an independent substance of the soul side by side with that of the body. But this must have been a misunderstanding of the real meaning of Philolaos. Aristoxenos, too, can only have got his doctrine of the soul as a harmony from his Pythagorean friends. Perhaps, too, this was the influence which suggested to Dikaiarchos his view that the “soul” is a ἁρμονία τῶν τεσσάρων στοιχείων (Dox., p. 387), and indeed τῶν ἐν τῷ σώματι θερμῶν καὶ ψυχρῶν καὶ ὑγρῶν καὶ ξηρῶν, as Nemes., Nat. Hom., p. 69 Matth., tells us—thus exactly resembling Simmias in Plato (unless indeed the passage in Nemes. is a mere reminiscence of Plato strayed here by accident). See also chap. x, n. 27.

52 Macr., Som. Scip. 1, 14, 19, associates this perspective with Pythagoras and Philolaos, which is definitely accurate in the case of Philolaos; as the belief that the soul is a κρᾶσις and harmony of hot and cold, dry and wet, which together form the body, is expressed by Simmias in Pl., Phd. 86 B, as a teaching he has inherited rather than something he invented himself. But what else could this imply than a tradition passed down in Thebes from his teacher Philolaos (Phd. 61 D)? (Hence The Harmony of Thebes, 95 A.) It is true that Claud. Mam. de An. ii, 7, only credits Philolaos with the idea that the soul is connected with the body “in eternal and incorporeal harmony” (convenientiam): which suggests an independent existence of the soul alongside that of the body. However, this must have been a misinterpretation of Philolaos's true meaning. Aristoxenos must have gotten his idea of the soul as harmony from his Pythagorean friends. Perhaps this also influenced Dikaiarchos in his belief that the “soul” is a Harmony of the four elements (Dox., p. 387), indeed of the warm and cold, moist and dry elements in the body, as Nemes., Nat. Hom., p. 69 Matth., informs us—thus closely mirroring Simmias in Plato (unless the passage in Nemes. is simply an echo of Plato that has been unintentionally misplaced here). See also chap. x, n. 27.

53 See Pl., Phd. 86 CD. Pre-existence of the soul impossible if it is only an ἁρμονία of the body: 92 AB.

53 See Pl., Phd. 86 CD. The soul cannot pre-exist if it’s just a harmony of the body: 92 AB.

54 It was in itself almost unavoidable that a community founded like the Pythagorean mainly on a mystical doctrine but not ill-disposed to scientific studies, should, as it was extended (and still followed practical aims) split up into two parties: an inner circle of qualified teachers and scholars, and one or more groups, outside and attached to them, of lay members for whom a special teaching suited for popular comprehension would be provided. Thus the inner circle of Buddhism, the Bikshu, was surrounded by the common herd of “worshippers”; and the same can be seen in Christian monastic organisations. A division, then, of the followers of Pythagoras into Akousmatikoi and Mathematikoi—Pythagoreioi and Pythagoristai—etc., is not in itself at all incredible.

54 It was almost inevitable that a community like the Pythagorean, founded mainly on mystical beliefs but also open to scientific study, would eventually split into two groups as it grew (while still pursuing practical goals): an inner circle of qualified teachers and scholars, and one or more groups of lay members outside of this circle who would receive a simplified teaching tailored for popular understanding. In this way, the inner circle of Buddhism, the Bikshu, was surrounded by the general mass of "worshippers"; a similar structure can be seen in Christian monastic organizations. Therefore, a division among the followers of Pythagoras into Akousmatikoi and Mathematikoi—Pythagoreioi and Pythagoristai—etc., is quite plausible.

55 The division of the soul, or the δυνάμεις of the soul, into the λογικόν and the ἄλογον was made, before Plato, by Pythagoras—so we might have learnt, αὐτοῦ τοῦ Πυθαγόρου συγγράμματος οὐδενὸς εἰς ἡμᾶς σωζομένου, from the writings of his followers, acc. to Poseidonios ap. Galen, de Plac. Hipp. et Pl. 5, p. 459 Müll. = v, 478 K.; cf. also 425 K. (Vors. 34, 23). From Poseidonios evidently comes the same opinion in Cic., TD. iv, 10. And, in fact, a fragment of Philolaos π. φύσεως, fr. 13 Diels (Theol. Ar., p. 20, 35 A.), gives a division of the ἀρχαὶ τοῦ ζῴου τοῦ λογικοῦ, which depends upon the idea that the highest living organism contains within itself and makes use of all the lower organisms as well (νοῦς in the head, ἀνθρώπου ἀρχά—ψυχὰ καὶ αἴσθησις in the heart, ῴου ἀρχὰ—ῥίζωσις καὶ ἀνάφυσις in the navel, φυτοῦ ἀρχὰ—σπέρματος μεταβολά and γέννησις in the αἰδοῖον, ξυναπάντων ἀρχά). Then in the psychical region we have a division between the λογικόν 401 and the ἄλογον according to their nature and “seat” in man (λογικόν being made up of reasoning power, νοῦς, specific to man, and sense-perception, αἴσθησις, which also belongs to the other ζῷα, while the ἄλογον = ῥίζωσις καὶ ἀνάφυσις and resembles the αἴτιον τοῦ τρέφεσθαι καὶ αὔξεσθαι, or the φυτικόν, a part of the ἄλογον τῆς ψυχῆς in Arist., EN. 1, 13, p. 1102a, 32 ff.). This evidently represents an attempt at a division of the soul into λογικόν and ἄλογον, such as Poseidonios must have found carried out by other Pythagoreans. A clear distinction between φρονεῖν (ξυνιέναι) and αἰσθάνεσθαι was made by the Pythag. physician Alkmaion, whose division was at least different from and more profound than that of Empedokles (with whom he is contrasted by Thphr., Sens. 25; Vors. 132, 20). Empedokles did indeed distinguish between thinking and perceiving, but thinking (νοεῖν) was only a σωματικόν τι ὥσπερ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι and to this extent ταὐτόν with it (Arist., An. 3, 3, p. 427a, 21). Alkmaion cannot, therefore, have made ξυνιέναι σωματικόν. These Pythagoreans were on the way to separating from the soul as a whole a separate, thinking soul that required no sense-perception for its thought, the νοῦς. To this latter alone would divinity and immortality be ascribed, as in later philosophy (and thus Dox. 393a, 10, though unhistorically and prematurely, gives τὸ λογικὸν [τῆς ψυχῆς] ἄφθαρτον as a doctrine of “Pythagoras”).—It is certainly difficult to see how Philolaos’ doctrine of the distinction between the ἀνθρώπου ἀρχά, the νοῦς—an element of the soul belonging exclusively to men—and the ζῴου ἀρχά (confined to αἴσθησις and ψυχά, power of life) could possibly be reconciled with the older Pythagorean doctrine of the soul’s transmigration. Acc. to that belief the soul wanders through the bodies of animals as well as men, and the idea implies the view that the same soul could inhabit animals as well as men; that, in fact, πάντα τὰ γενόμενα ἔμψυχα are ὁμογενῆ (Porph., VP. 19; cf. S.E., M. ix, 127). Philolaos, on the contrary, holds that the soul of man is differently constituted from the souls of animals—the latter lack νοῦς (it is not merely that its efficacy is hindered in animals by the δυσκρασία τοῦ σώματος as is said wrongly to be the opinion of Pythag. by Dox. 432a, 15 ff.). The same difficulty arises again in the case of Plato’s doctrine of transmigration.—Alkmaion who ascribes ξυνιέναι to man alone seems not to have held the transmigration doctrine.

55 The division of the soul, or the forces of the soul, into the logical and the illogical was established, before Plato, by Pythagoras — so we might have learned, None of Pythagoras' writings have been preserved for us., from the writings of his followers, according to Poseidonios as cited by Galen, de Plac. Hipp. et Pl. 5, p. 459 Müll. = v, 478 K.; see also 425 K. (Vors. 34, 23). The same opinion appears in Cicero, TD. iv, 10. In fact, a fragment of Philolaos π. nature, fr. 13 Diels (Theol. Ar., p. 20, 35 A.), outlines a division of the principles of the rational animal, based on the idea that the highest living organism encompasses and utilizes all the lower organisms (mind in the head, Human nature—soul and sense in the heart, Rooting and sprouting in the navel, Plant beginnings—seed transformations and birth in the αιδοῖον, ξυναπάντων αρχά). Then in the psychic domain, we have a division between the logical 401 and the illogical based on their nature and “location” in humans (the λογικό consists of reasoning ability, mind, unique to humans, and sense-perception, sense, which is also found in other ζῷα, whereas the illogical = rooting and sprouting relates to the Reason for nourishment and growth, or the plant-based, a part of the illogical part of the soul in Aristotle, EN. 1, 13, p. 1102a, 32 ff.). This clearly represents an attempt to differentiate the soul into logical and irrational, as Poseidonios must have found carried out by other Pythagoreans. A distinct separation between thinking(ξυνιέναι) and perceive was established by the Pythagorean physician Alkmaion, whose system was at least different from, and deeper than that of Empedocles (against whom he is contrasted by Thphr., Sens. 25; Vors. 132, 20). Empedocles indeed made a distinction between thinking and perceiving, but for him thinking (νοεῖν) was only a physical like the senses and to this extent same with it (Arist., An. 3, 3, p. 427a, 21). Alkmaion, therefore, must not have equated meet physically. These Pythagoreans were progressing towards distinguishing a separate, thinking soul that didn’t require sense-perception for its thoughts, the mind. To this entity alone, divinity and immortality would be attributed, as seen in later philosophy (thus Dox. 393a, 10, though historically inaccurate and premature, credits the rational[of the soul]incorruptible as a doctrine of “Pythagoras”). — It is indeed challenging to reconcile Philolaos’ concept of the distinction between the human origins, the mind—an aspect of the soul that belongs solely to humans—and the animal origins (limited to sensation and psyche, the power of life) with the earlier Pythagorean belief in the transmigration of the soul. According to that belief, the soul moves through the bodies of both animals and humans, implying that the same soul could inhabit both; in fact, All living things that exist are homogeneous (Porph., VP. 19; cf. S.E., M. ix, 127). In contrast, Philolaos argues that the human soul is constitutionally different from animal souls—the latter lack mind (it is not simply that its effectiveness is hindered in animals by the body imbalance as wrongly attributed to Pythag. by Dox. 432a, 15 ff.). The same problem arises in relation to Plato’s concept of transmigration. — Alkmaion, who attributes ξυνιέναι to humans alone, does not seem to adhere to the transmigration doctrine.

56 401 ff. Mull.; fr. 112, 5 Diels.

56 401 ff. Mull.; fr. 112, 5 Diels.

57 462 ff. fr. 111.

57 462 ff. fr. 111.

58 Satyros ap. D.L. viii, 59; Vors. 195, 26.—Especially famous was his feat of driving away adverse winds from Akragas (cf. fr. 111, 3); see also Welcker, Kl. Schr. iii, 60–1.—The asses’ skins with which Emped. kept the north winds away from Akragas were at any rate intended as apotropaic materials—magic means of driving away spirits. In the same way protection against hail and lightning is obtained by hanging up the skin of a hyena, a seal, etc. (see Geop. i, 14, 3–5; i, 16, and Niclas’ notes there). These skins ἔχουσι δύναμιν ἀντιπαθῆ: Plu., Smp. 4, 2, 1, p. 664 C.—Other magic charms against hail—the χαλαζοφύλακες, Plu., Smp. 7, 2, 2, p. 700 F; Sen., NQ. 4b, 6.

58 Satyros ap. D.L. viii, 59; Vors. 195, 26.—His notable achievement of driving away bad winds from Akragas is particularly famous (cf. fr. 111, 3); see also Welcker, Kl. Schr. iii, 60–1.—The donkey skins that Empedocles used to keep the north winds away from Akragas were meant as apotropaic materials—magical tools to ward off spirits. Similarly, protection against hail and lightning can be achieved by hanging up the skin of a hyena, a seal, etc. (see Geop. i, 14, 3–5; i, 16, and Niclas’ notes there). These skins They have opposing power.: Plu., Smp. 4, 2, 1, p. 664 C.—Other magical charms against hail—the hail guardians, Plu., Smp. 7, 2, 2, p. 700 F; Sen., NQ. 4b, 6.

59 . . . ἐγὼ δ’ ὑμῖν θεὸς ἄμβροτος, οὐκέτι θνητός, πωλεῦμαι μετὰ πᾶσι τετιμένος κτλ. 400 f. (fr. 112, 4 f.).

59 ... I am your immortal god, no longer human; I walk among those who are esteemed, etc. 400 f. (fr. 112, 4 f.).

60 A late echo is to be found in the inspired lines of Lucretius in praise of Empedokles, i, 717 ff.

60 A later reflection can be found in the powerful verses of Lucretius praising Empedocles, i, 717 ff.

61 The well-known story of Empedokles’ leap into the crater of Mt. Aetna—intended by his complete disappearance to call forth the belief that he had not died (Luc., DM. xx, 4), but had been translated 402 alive—is a parody of a serious translation legend and presupposes the existence of one. The parodists’ version was contradicted early by Empedokles’ follower, the physician Pausanias: D.L. viii, 69 (this does not come from the fabulously conceived narrative of Herakleides Pont. It does not follow, from the epigram quoted by D.L. viii, 61, fr. 156; AP. vii, 508, that Paus. died before Emped.; the authorship of that ep. is uncertain and in any case it is not very worthy of credit). The seriously intended legend must then have arisen soon after the disappearance of Empedokles: it was founded upon the fact that no one did know where Emp. had died (θάνατος ἄδηλος, Timaeus ap. D.L. viii, 71), or could point to the grave which covered his remains. (This is expressly stated by Timaeus, who, in other respects, contradicts the translation-fable as well as the story of the leap into Mt. Aetna: D.L. viii, 72. In the face of this no importance need be attached to what some one—Neanthes apparently—states ap. D.L. viii, 73; that there was a grave of Emped. at Megara.) Free elaboration was given to the translation story by Herakleides Pont. π. νόσων: D.L. viii, 67–8 (in return, his philosophic rivals contemptuously applied a malicious story of feigned translation to Herakleides himself, who in this way wished to legitimize his own claim to be god or Hero: D.L. v, 89 ff. From other sources comes Suid. Ἡρακλ. Εὐθύφρονος; cf. Marx, Griech. Märchen v. dankb. Thieren, p. 97 ff.). All kinds of stupid variations of the story of Empedokles’ end ap. D.L. viii, 74.

61 The famous story of Empedokles jumping into the crater of Mt. Aetna was meant to suggest that he hadn’t really died but had instead been translated away, as he completely vanished (Luc., DM. xx, 4). This is a parody of a serious translation legend, which implies that such a legend existed. The parody was quickly challenged by Empedokles’ follower, the physician Pausanias: D.L. viii, 69 (this doesn’t come from the fanciful tale of Herakleides Pont. It doesn’t necessarily follow from the epigram mentioned in D.L. viii, 61, fr. 156; AP. vii, 508, that Paus. died before Emped.; the authorship of that epigram is unclear, and in any case, it’s not very credible). The serious legend must have developed soon after Empedokles’ disappearance, based on the fact that no one knew where Emp. had died (unknown death, Timaeus ap. D.L. viii, 71) or could indicate the grave that held his remains. (This is explicitly stated by Timaeus, who, in other respects, contradicts both the translation myth and the story of the leap into Mt. Aetna: D.L. viii, 72. Therefore, we shouldn’t consider the claim made by someone—apparently Neanthes—ap. D.L. viii, 73, that there was a grave of Emped. at Megara, to be significant.) The story of the translation was embellished by Herakleides Pont. π. diseases: D.L. viii, 67–8 (in return, his philosophical rivals mockingly applied a malicious tale of fake translation to Herakleides himself, trying to discredit his claim to be a god or Hero: D.L. v, 89 ff. Additional sources include Suid. Heracles. Euthyphro.; cf. Marx, Griech. Märchen v. dankb. Thieren, p. 97 ff.). Various nonsensical versions of the story about the end of Empedokles are noted in ap. D.L. viii, 74.

62 See above, chap. ii, and p. 129.

62 See above, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, and __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

63 Cf. 113 ff.; fr. 9.

63 See 113 ff.; fr. 9.

64 σαρκῶν χιτών, 414, fr. 126.

64 garments of flesh, 414, fr. 126.

65 His treatment of the woman who seemed to be dead (ἄπνους, D.L. viii, 60) has quite the appearance of a psychophysical experiment; one, however, that was intended to prove the correctness of precisely the irrational side of his doctrine of the soul.

65 His approach to the woman who appeared to be dead (breathless, D.L. viii, 60) resembles a psychophysical experiment; however, it was meant to validate the irrational aspect of his beliefs about the soul.

66 γυίων πίστις is distinguished from νοεῖν in v, 57 (fr. 4, 13), and νόῳ δέρκεσθαι from δέρκεσθαι ὄμμασιν in 82 (fr. 17, 21); cf. οὔτ’ ἐπίδερκτα τάδ’ ἄνδρασιν οὔτ’ ἐπακουστά, οὔτε νόῳ περίληπτα, 42 f. (fr. 2, 7).—Elsewhere it is true that Emped. (who throughout avoids prosaic exactitude in the use of technical terms) uses νοῆσαι as simply = sense-perception following epic idiom: e.g. 56 (fr. 4, 12; but it is not quite correct to say that Emped. τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ταὐτό φησι, as Arist. declares: An. 427a, 22).

66 divine faith is differentiated from noeîn in v, 57 (fr. 4, 13), and nōōi dérkesthai from dérkesthai ómmasin in 82 (fr. 17, 21); cf. Those who do not listen to the words of such men, or who are not aware of the significance of their knowledge, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, 42 f. (fr. 2, 7).—In other places, it is true that Emped. (who consistently avoids literal exactness in the use of technical terms) uses no sleep simply to mean sense perception, following epic style: e.g. 56 (fr. 4, 12; but it’s not entirely accurate to say that Emped. To think and to perceive are said to be the same thing., as Aristotle states: An. 427a, 22).

67 378 ff.; fr. 109: γαίῃ μὲν γὰρ γαῖαν ὀπώπαμεν, etc. (ὁρᾶν is here used in its widest sense, εἶδος ἀντὶ γένους, and = αἰσθάνεσθαι. Thus, νόῳ δέρκεσθαι in 82 [17, 21] = αἰσθάνεσθαι, and very commonly words denoting one of the modes of perception are used instead of those of another εἶδος, or for the whole γένος of αἴσθησις. Lob., Rhemat. 334 ff.).

67 378 ff.; fr. 109: We have truly seen the earth., etc. (see is used here in its broadest sense, type instead of kind, and = to see. Thus, to understand in 82 [17, 21] = to understand, and very often words indicating one type of perception are used instead of those of another type, or for the entire category of feeling. Lob., Rhemat. 334 ff.).

68 372 ff. Mull.; fr. 105: αἵματος ἐν πελάγεσσι . . . τῇ τε νόημα μάλιστα κυκλίσκεται ἀνθρώποισιν· αἷμα γὰρ ἀνθρώποις περικάρδιόν ἐστι νόημα.—The blood is the seat of τὸ φρονεῖν· ἐν τούτῳ γὰρ μάλιστα κεκρᾶσθαι τὰ στοιχεῖα, Thphr., Sens. 10, 23 f.

68 372 ff. Mull.; fr. 105: In the depths of the sea... the focus is mainly on humans; blood is truly essential for humans..—Blood is the essence of thinking; because in this, the elements are fully blended, Thphr., Sens. 10, 23 f.

69 A kind of συγγυμνασία τῶν αἰσθήσεων as the physician Asklepiades defines the idea of the ψυχή (Dox. 378a, 7).—It resembles what Arist. calls the πρῶτον αἰσθητήριον.—This function which Emped. calls φρονεῖν would probably be the ἑνοποιοῦν of the perceptions which Aristot. found wanting in Emp. (An. 409b, 30 ff.; 410a, 1–10; b, 10).

69 A sort of training of the senses as the physician Asklepiades defines the concept of the soul (Dox. 378a, 7).—It resembles what Aristotle refers to as the first sense.—This function that Empedocles calls φρονεῖν would likely be the ἑνοποιοῦν of the perceptions that Aristotle found lacking in Empedocles (An. 409b, 30 ff.; 410a, 1–10; b, 10).

70 τὸ νοεῖν is σωματικὸν ὥσπερ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι, Arist., An. 427a, 26.

70 to think is tactile like feeling, Arist., An. 427a, 26.

71 Arist., Metaph. 1009b, 17 ff.

71 Aristotle, Metaphysics 1009b, 17 ff.

72 298 Mull.; fr. 110, 10: πάντα γὰρ ἴσθι φρόνησιν ἔχειν καὶ νώματος αἷσαν. The πάντα must be understood quite literally; for it is the 403 elements in which the powers of perception inhere (ἕκαστον τῶν στοιχείων ψυχὴν εἶναι is the opinion attributed to Emped. by Arist., An. 404b, 12). But elements are present in the mixture of all things, and thus stones, etc., have φρόνησις and a “portion of mind” in them (though the statement that it is αἵμα that first produces φρόνησις will not square with this: Thphr., Sens. 23). Emped. attributed complete sensation and perception to plants, and even gave them νοῦς and γνῶσις (without blood?): [Arist.] Plant. 815a, 16 ff.; b, 16 f. That is why they, too, are capable of harbouring fallen daimones.

72 298 Mull.; fr. 110, 10: Everything must be understood to have a purpose and a degree of intellect.. The everything should be taken literally; for it is the 403 elements in which the powers of perception reside (each element has a soul is the view attributed to Empedocles by Aristotle, An. 404b, 12). But elements are present in the mix of all things, so stones, etc., have motive and a “share of mind” in them (though the claim that it is blood that first produces reason doesn't hold up: Thphr., Sens. 23). Empedocles attributed full sensation and perception to plants and even gave them mental space and knowledge (without blood?): [Arist.] Plant. 815a, 16 ff.; b, 16 f. That’s why they, too, can harbor fallen spirits.

73 Emped. himself does not use the word ψυχή at all in the fragments that have been preserved to us; and it is hardly probable that he himself would have used the term of the psychical faculties of the body even if he regarded these as gathered together to a substantive unity. Later authorities, on the other hand, in their accounts of the doctrine of Emped. give the name of ψυχή precisely to these “somatic” intellectual faculties; thus Arist., An. 404b, 9 ff.; 409b, 23 ff.: αἷμα φησιν εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν, Gal., Hipp. et Pla. 2 = v, 283 K.; cf. Cic., TD. i, 19; Tert., An. 5.

73 Empedocles himself doesn't use the word soul at all in the fragments that have been preserved; and it's unlikely that he would have referred to the mental faculties of the body even if he saw them as a cohesive whole. Later thinkers, however, in their explanations of Empedocles’ ideas, specifically use the term soul for those “bodily” intellectual faculties; see Aristotle, An. 404b, 9 ff.; 409b, 23 ff.: Blood is said to be the soul., Galen, Hipp. et Pla. 2 = v, 283 K.; cf. Cicero, TD. i, 19; Tertullian, An. 5.

74 113–19 Mull.; frr. 11, 15, do not (as Plu., adv. Col. 12, p. 1113 D, understood them) teach the pre-existence and persistence after death of the psychic powers within the world of the elements, but merely speak of the indestructibility of the elements that are the component parts of the human body, even when the latter has suffered dissolution.

74 113–19 Mull.; frr. 11, 15, do not (as Plu., adv. Col. 12, p. 1113 D, understood them) teach that psychic powers exist before birth and continue after death within the elemental world, but simply mention the indestructibility of the elements that make up the human body, even when it has broken down.

75 ἄτης λειμών, fr. 121, 4 (21 Mull.; cf. 16) is the name given by Empedokles to the earth; and not to Hades (as has been supposed), of which—as an intermediate place of purgation between two births—there is nowhere any mention in his verses. That the ἀτερπὴς χῶρος (fr. 121, 1) to which Emped. is cast down, the realm of Φόνος κτλ. (fr. 121) and the Ἄτης λειμών, all refer to the earth, ὁ ἔγγειος τόπος, τὰ περὶ γῆν, is expressly stated by Themistios, Or. 13, and Hierocl. in C. Aur. 24 (fr. 121), p. 470 Mull. [FPG. i]; Synes. also implies it (Ep. 147, p. 283 C; Prov. i, 89 D); the same is distinctly implied for fr. 121, 4, and by Jul., Or. vii, 226 B; Philo, ii, p. 638 M.—Procl., in Crat., p. 103 Boiss., connects fr. 121, 3, αὐχμηραί τε νόσοι καὶ σήψιες ἔργα τε ῥευστά immediately with fr. 121, 2, and both lines acc. to him apply to τὰ ὑπὸ τὴν σελήνην; i.e. not to any kind of underworld but to the region of the earth (cf. Emp. ap. Hippol., RH. i, 4; Vors. 210, 27; Dox. 559). The idea that Hades is being spoken of in these lines is a view peculiar to moderns who have misunderstood the poet and set aside the clear testimony of Themistios and the rest. Maass, Orpheus, 113, speaks as though the interpretation in favour of Hades rested upon a tradition which I “contradicted”. On the contrary, that interpretation is itself contradicted by definite tradition and by common sense (for Emp. falls from Heaven to earth and not, please God, to Hades!). The view is quite baseless (though Maass himself finds in the ἔργα ῥευστά of fr. 121 [20 M.]—the inconstant, transitory works of men upon earth—a support for his Hades-view: these “fluid works” or things are, he thinks, nothing else but the stream of filth, the σκὼρ ἀείνων, in Hades of which pious invention rumoured: certainly an ingenious interpretation). Emp. is, in fact, the first to regard this earthly sojourning as the real Hell—the ἀσυνήθης, ἀτερπὴς χῶρος (fr. 118, 121, 1, the latter a parodying reminiscence of λ 94)—an ἄντρον ὑπόστεγον (fr. 120) filled with all the plagues and terrors of the original Hades (121). Stoics and Epicureans (see below) took up the idea after him and elaborated it in detail. The daimones that are shut up in this life here below—a ζωὴ ἄβιος (fr. 2, 3)—are as if dead: 404 frr. 125 (?), 35, 14. The Orphic idea of the σῶμα—σῆμα (see above, p. 345) was thus thoroughly and energetically carried out. (Macr., in S. Scip. 1, 10, 9 ff., attributed the idea that the inferi are nothing else but the material world of earth to the old theologi (§ 17) who, he says, lived before the development of a philosophic science of nature.)

75 ἄτης meadow, fr. 121, 4 (21 Mull.; cf. 16) is the name that Empedocles uses for the earth; and not for Hades (as has been assumed), of which—being an intermediate place of purgation between two lives—there's no mention in his verses. That the dull place (fr. 121, 1) where Empedocles is sent down, the realm of Murder etc. (fr. 121) and the Athe's meadow, all refer to the earth, the land, matters concerning the earth, is clearly stated by Themistios, Or. 13, and Hierocl. in C. Aur. 24 (fr. 121), p. 470 Mull. [FPG. i]; Synes. also suggests it (Ep. 147, p. 283 C; Prov. i, 89 D); the same is explicitly implied for fr. 121, 4, and by Jul., Or. vii, 226 B; Philo, ii, p. 638 M.—Procl., in Crat., p. 103 Boiss., connects fr. 121, 3, dry diseases and decay, as well as fluid works directly with fr. 121, 2, and according to him both lines apply to under the moon; that is, not to any type of underworld but to the realm of the earth (cf. Emp. ap. Hippol., RH. i, 4; Vors. 210, 27; Dox. 559). The idea that Hades is referred to in these lines is a perspective unique to moderns who have misunderstood the poet and disregarded the clear statements of Themistios and others. Maass, Orpheus, 113, claims as if the interpretation supporting Hades relies on a tradition I “disputed”. On the contrary, that interpretation is itself contradicted by specific tradition and by common sense (since Emp. falls from Heaven to earth and not, hopefully, to Hades!). The viewpoint is entirely unfounded (though Maass himself interprets the liquid works of fr. 121 [20 M.]—the unstable, fleeting works of men on earth—as evidence for his Hades interpretation: he thinks these “fluid works” are merely the stream of filth, the skor aeinon, in Hades which pious imagination has suggested: certainly a clever interpretation). Emp. actually sees this earthly existence as the true Hell—the unusual, unpleasant place (fr. 118, 121, 1, the latter a mocking recollection of λ 94)—a cave with a roof (fr. 120) filled with all the plagues and fears of the original Hades (121). Stoics and Epicureans (see below) adopted this idea afterward and developed it further. The daimones that are trapped in this life below—a ζωὴ ἄβιος (fr. 2, 3)—are as if they are dead: 404 frr. 125 (?), 35, 14. The Orphic concept of the body—sign (see above, p. 345) was thus thoroughly and energetically executed. (Macr., in S. Scip. 1, 10, 9 ff., attributed the idea that the inferi are nothing but the material world of earth to the old theologi (§ 17) who, he says, lived before the development of a philosophic science of nature.)

76 3 Mull.; fr. 115, 3: εὖτέ τις (τῶν δαιμόνων) ἀμπλακίῃσι φόνῳ φίλα γυῖα μιηνῃ. He means βρῶσις σαρκῶν καὶ ἀλληλοφαγία as Plu. paraphrases it, Es. Carn. 1, p. 996 B (for this must always imply acc. to Emp. the “murder” of a spirit of the same race: fr. 136). Even for God it is a crime to taste of a meat (“blood”)-offering and, in fact, there were only bloodless offerings made in the Golden Age (which was described by Emp. not in the Φυσικά—the principle of which work denied that there had ever been such a period—but in some other poem in which he left his philosophic doctrine out of account; perhaps the Καθαρμοί): 420 ff. M; fr. 128, 3 ff.

76 3 Mull.; fr. 115, 3: When someone(of the demons)ἀμπλακίῃσι φόνῳ φίλα γυῖα μιηνῃ. He refers to Eating flesh and cannibalism as Plu. paraphrases it, Es. Carn. 1, p. 996 B (for this must always imply according to Emp. the “murder” of a spirit of the same race: fr. 136). Even for God, it is a wrongdoing to partake in a meat (“blood”)-offering and, indeed, only bloodless offerings were made in the Golden Age (which was described by Emp. not in the Of course—the principle of which work denied that there had ever been such a period—but in some other poem where he left out his philosophic doctrine; perhaps the Cleansing): 420 ff. M; fr. 128, 3 ff.

77 fr. 115, 4. The earth then becomes the place of their banishment and punishment for gods that have broken their oath. This is a version of the impressive picture in Hes., Th. 793 ff. Dei peierantes were punished for nine years (cf. Hes., Th. 801) in Tartaros: Orpheus (not Lucan in his “Orpheus”) ap. Serv., A. vi, 565. (To this also alludes the poet from whose elegiac verses came the frag. ap. Serv., A. vi, 324: τοῦ [sc. Στυγὸς ὕδατος] στυγνὸν πῶμα καὶ ἀθανάτῳ: this is probably how the words should be read.) So that instead of the “underworld” or Tartaros, the world is for Emp. the worst place of sorrows. From Emp. is derived the conception that the realm of the inferi is our world, that inhabited by men, and that there is no other, nor any need of another ᾅδης—a conception often alluded to and improved upon by Stoic and other semi-philosophers (esp. clear in Serv., A. vi, 127, often only in allegorical sense: Lucr. iii, 978 ff. [See also Bevan, Stoics and Sceptics, p. 107.]).

77 fr. 115, 4. The earth then becomes the place of their exile and punishment for gods who have broken their oath. This echoes the striking imagery in Hesiod, Th. 793 ff. Gods who broke their oaths were punished for nine years (cf. Hes., Th. 801) in Tartarus: Orpheus (not Lucan in his “Orpheus”) ap. Serv., A. vi, 565. (This also connects to the poet whose elegiac fragments are cited ap. Serv., A. vi, 324: τοῦ [sc. Stygian waters]deadly potion and immortal: this is probably how the words should be read.) So, instead of the “underworld” or Tartarus, the world is for Empedocles the worst place of suffering. From Empedocles comes the idea that the realm of the inferi is our world, the one inhabited by people, and that there is no other realm, nor any need for another Hades—an idea frequently referenced and expanded upon by Stoics and other semi-philosophers (especially clear in Serv., A. vi, 127, often only in an allegorical sense: Lucr. iii, 978 ff. [See also Bevan, Stoics and Sceptics, p. 107.]).

78 30,000 ὧραι: which means probably “years” (hardly “seasons” as Dieterich, Nekyia, 119, takes it). The figure 30,000 has no special meaning (e.g. 300 periods of a life-time each): it is merely a concrete phrase for “innumerable” (and is frequent: Hirzel, Ber. sächs. Ges. d. Wiss. 1885, p. 64 ff.). This enormous period of time is the divine counter-part, as measured by divine standards of time, of the μέγας ἐνιαυτός, the ennaëteris during which the earthly murderer had to fly from the land of his violent deed. The fiction of Emp. clearly shows the influence of this expiation of murder by ἀπενιαυτισμός.

78 30,000 Hours: which likely means “years” (not “seasons” as Dieterich, Nekyia, 119, suggests). The number 30,000 doesn’t hold any special significance (like 300 lifetimes): it’s just a concrete way to express “countless” (and is often used: Hirzel, Ber. sächs. Ges. d. Wiss. 1885, p. 64 ff.). This vast span of time represents the divine counterpart, measured by divine concepts of time, of the great year, the ennaëteris during which the earthly murderer had to flee from the land of their violent act. The storyline of Emp. clearly indicates the impact of this atonement for murder through Unplugging.

79 fr. 121 (22 ff.).

79 fr. 121 (22 pp.).

80 ἀργαλέας βιοίτοιο κελεύθους . . . fr. 115, 8 (8).

80 challenging journeys of life . . . fr. 115, 8 (8).

81 Emp. does not even use the word ψυχή of these δαίμονες confined within corporeality. They are so named, however, regularly and without qualification by the later authors who quote verses from the Prooimion of the Φυσικά, Plutarch, Plotinos, Hippolytos, etc.

81 Emp. doesn’t even mention the word soul when talking about these demons that are trapped in physical form. However, later authors frequently and unequivocally refer to them by that name, quoting verses from the Prooimion of the Of course, such as Plutarch, Plotinos, Hippolytos, and others.

82 Peculiar to Emp. is the attempt to give actual details of the crimes for which the spirits are condemned to ἐνσωμάτωσις; and also the extension of metempsychosis to plants (which is occasionally attributed, but by late authorities only, to the Pythagoreans as well).

82 Unique to Emp. is the effort to provide actual details of the crimes that lead to the spirits being condemned to embodiment; and also the idea that metempsychosis applies to plants (which is sometimes said, but only by later sources, to be associated with the Pythagoreans as well).

83 The entirely unpurified seem not to have been condemned to everlasting punishment in Hades, of which in general he shows no knowledge, by Emp. (as by the Pythagoreans sometimes). He merely, it seems, threatens them with ever-renewed rebirth upon earth and the impossibility of τὸ κύκλου λῆξαι (until the complete ascendency of φιλία). This appears to be the meaning of fr. 145 (455 f.) from the way in which Cl. Al., Protr. ii, 27, p. 23 P., cites the lines. 405

83 It seems that those who are completely unpurified are not sentenced to eternal punishment in Hades, about which he generally shows little understanding, as Emp. (like the Pythagoreans sometimes do). Instead, he seemingly threatens them with perpetual rebirth on earth and the inability to the end of the circle (until the complete dominance of friendship). This seems to be the interpretation of fr. 145 (455 f.) based on how Cl. Al. references the lines in Protr. ii, 27, p. 23 P. 405

84 As we may paraphrase—though indeed here, too, only with reservations—the κακότης and κακότητες of Emp. fr. 145 (454 f.).

84 As we might rephrase—though here, too, with some caution—the kakoti and kakotetes of Emp. fr. 145 (454 f.).

85 frr. 136–7, 128, 9 f. (424, 440). Very remarkable in a thinker of such an early period is what is said (fr. 135) about the πάντων νόμιμον which forbids κτείνειν τὸ ἔμψυχον.—Apart from this we have other vestiges of kathartic rules: purification with water drawn from five springs: fr. 143 (see Append. v); abstention from the eating of beans (fr. 141) and of laurel leaves (fr. 140). The laurel is sacred as a magic plant, together with the σκίλλα (see App. v) and ῥάμνος (see above, chap. v, n. 95). Cf. Gp. 11, 2, etc. Its special sacredness gives the laurel its importance in the cult of Apollo. Emp. (like Pythagoras) seems to have paid special honour to Apollo: it appears from something that is said ap. D.L. viii, 57, that he wrote a προοίμιον εἰς Ἀπόλλωνα: the exalted conception of a divinity that is pure φρὴν ἱερή in abstraction from all sense-perception, elaborated by Emp. in frr. 133–4, was regarded by him as applying particularly περὶ Ἀπόλλωνος (Amm. in Arist., Interpr. 249, 1 ed. Brand. 135a, 23).

85 frr. 136–7, 128, 9 f. (424, 440). What is mentioned in a thinker from such an early time about the legal for all that prohibits to kill the living being is very notable. — In addition to this, we have other remnants of kathartic rules: purification using water from five springs: fr. 143 (see Append. v); avoiding the eating of beans (fr. 141) and laurel leaves (fr. 140). The laurel is considered sacred as a magical plant, along with the σκίλλα (see App. v) and ῥάμνος (see above, chap. v, n. 95). Cf. Gp. 11, 2, etc. Its unique sacredness gives the laurel its significance in the worship of Apollo. Emp. (like Pythagoras) seems to have particularly honored Apollo: it is suggested by something stated ap. D.L. viii, 57, that he wrote a Prelude to Apollo: the elevated idea of a deity that is pure sacred mind in isolation from all sensory perception, developed by Emp. in frr. 133–4, was seen by him as particularly relating to About Apollo (Amm. in Arist., Interpr. 249, 1 ed. Brand. 135a, 23).

86 In fanciful ways: fr. 127 (lion, laurel), 448 Mull.

86 In imaginative ways: fr. 127 (lion, laurel), 448 Mull.

87 fr. 146 (457) πρόμοι being used probably with intention as a vague term: regal power would hardly have seemed to possess special merit to the democratically minded Emp. He hardly knew it in any form but the tyrannis and to this he showed himself an energetic opponent (even though the violent language of Timaeus, the enemy of tyrants, is not to be taken quite literally). He himself was offered royal power, but he refused it with contempt as one who was πάσης ἀρχῆς ἀλλότριος: Xanthos and Arist. ap. D.L. viii, 63; Vors. 196, 10. He might all the same (and rightly) regard himself in political matters, too, as one of the πρόμοι; it is plain that in the enumeration of those who were εἰς τέλος born as μάντεις τε καὶ ὑμνοπόλοι καὶ ἰητροί, καὶ πρόμοι ἀνθρώποισιν ἐπιχθονίοισι πέλονται, and were never to be born again, he includes himself especially, and, in fact, takes himself as the model of this last and highest stage upon earth. He himself was all these things simultaneously.

87 fr. 146 (457) πρόμοι is likely used intentionally as a vague term: regal power probably didn’t seem particularly admirable to someone like the democratically-minded Emp. He hardly recognized it in any form other than tyranny, and he was clearly a strong opponent of it (even though Timaeus, an enemy of tyrants, shouldn’t be taken too literally when using extreme language). He was offered royal power himself, but he rejected it with disdain, as someone who was not belonging to any origin: Xanthos and Arist. ap. D.L. viii, 63; Vors. 196, 10. Nevertheless, he could (and rightfully so) see himself in political matters as one of the πρόμοι; it’s clear that in the listing of those who were to the end born as Soothsayers, hymn singers, and healers, as well as the forefathers, are among those who exist among mortals on Earth., and would never be born again, he particularly includes himself and actually views himself as the example of this final and highest stage on Earth. He embodied all these roles simultaneously.

88 frr. 146–7 (459 ff.) ἔνθεν ἀναβλαστοῦσι θεοὶ τιμῇσι φέριστοι, ἀθανάτοις ἄλλοισιν ὁμέστιοι, ἔν τε τραπέζαις (read ἔν τε τράπεζοι—a tmesis, = ἐντράπεζοί τε)· εὔνιες ἀνδρείων ἀχέων, ἀπόκηροι, ἀτειρεῖς.

88 frr. 146–7 (459 ff.) From there, the gods emerge with honor, along with the immortals and others who gather together at the tables. (read at the tables—a tmesis, = at the tables)· welcoming to the courageous children of grief, unblemished, fully intact.

89 Emped. perhaps described himself as “god” also in fr. 23, 11 (144) ἀλλὰ τορῶς τοῦτ’ ἴσθι (he is speaking to Pausanias), θεοῦ πάρα μῦθον ἀκούσας. See Bidez, Biogr. d’Emp., p. 166 (1894)—unless these words would be better taken as an abbreviated comparison (with omission of ὡς): “as certainly as if you had received these words from a god.”

89 Empedocles might have called himself “god” as well in fr. 23, 11 (144) But know this for sure (he is speaking to Pausanias), θεοῦ πάρα μῦθον ἀκούσας. See Bidez, Biogr. d’Emp., p. 166 (1894)—unless these words would be better understood as a shortened comparison (dropping ὡς): “as certainly as if you had heard these words from a god.”

90 As Plu. is inclined to do: Exil. xvii, p. 607 D.

90 As Plu. tends to do: Exil. xvii, p. 607 D.

91 As several modern critics have attempted to do.

91 As a number of contemporary critics have tried to do.

92 fr. 17, 30 (92).

92 17, 30 (92).

93 See above, chap. i, pp. 4 ff.

93 See above, chap. 1, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ ff.

94 As late again as Plotinos, who speaks of the διττὸν ἐν ἡμῖν: the σῶμα which is a θηρίον ζῳωθέν and the ἀληθὴς ἄνθρωπος distinct from it, etc. (1, 1, 10; 6, 7, 5).

94 Even as late as Plotinus, he discusses the twofold within us: the body, which is a θηρίον ζῳοθημένο, and the true person that is distinct from it, etc. (1, 1, 10; 6, 7, 5).

95 At any rate Emp. spoke of the ekstasis, the furor which is an animi purgatio and to be entirely distinguished from that which is produced by alienatio mentis (φρονεῖν ἀλλοῖα, fr. 108): Cael. Aur., Morb. Chron. i, 5, p. 25 Sich. = Vors. 223. A special ἐνθουσιαστικόν in the soul as its θειότατον (part): Stoics (and Plato) acc. to Dox. 639, 25. A special organ of the soul which effects the union with the divine, being the ἄνθος τῆς οὐσίας ἡμῶν, is mentioned in Proclus (Zeller, Phil. d. Griech.2 iii, 2, 738). 406

95 Anyway, Empedocles talked about ekstasis, the furor, which is a purging of the soul, and it should be completely separated from what results from alienation of the mind (think differently, fr. 108): Cael. Aur., Morb. Chron. i, 5, p. 25 Sich. = Vors. 223. A special inspiring in the soul as its θειότατον (part): Stoics (and Plato) according to Dox. 639, 25. A special organ of the soul that brings about the connection with the divine, being the flower of our essence, is mentioned in Proclus (Zeller, Phil. d. Griech.2 iii, 2, 738). 406

96 τὸ ὅλον, the whole reality of Being and Becoming in the world, cannot be comprehended by man through his senses nor even with νοῦς: fr. 2 (36-43). But Empedokles has in his own persuasion grasped it; he is situated σοφίης ἐπ’ ἄκροισι (fr. 4, 8), αὐτὴν ἐπαγγέλλεται δώσειν τὴν ἀλήθειαν (Procl., in Ti. 106 E). Proclus declares that the words σοφίης ἐπ’ ἄκροισι—and this is a further point—are meant to apply to Emped. himself. (I do not quite understand Bidez’ doubts about what is said here, and in what follows: see Archiv. f. Gesch. d. Phil. ix, 203, 42.) Whence, then, did the poet obtain this knowledge of the truth since it is revealed neither to the senses nor to the νοῦς? At any rate, the ψυχοπομποὶ δυνάμεις (Porph., Antr. 8), who conducted his soul-daimon out of the region of the gods, say to the soul (fr. 2, 8): σὺ δ’ οὖν ἐπεὶ ὧδ’ ἐλιάσθης (i.e. “since you have been cast up here—on the earth”—not “since you have so desired it”, as Bergk, Opusc. ii, 23, explains: which would be a distorted idea expressed in distorted language)—πεύσεαι οὐ πλέον ἠὲ βροτείη μῆτις ὅπωπεν (thus with Panzerbieter, for ὄρωρε). According to this we must suppose that his more profound knowledge (insight into the μῖξίς τε διάλλαξίς τε μιγέντων of the elements, together with knowledge of the destiny and purpose of the soul-daimones, etc.), which he cannot have got on earth or in his earthly body must have been brought with him out of his divine past-life. This knowledge is then peculiar to the daimon (or ψυχή in the older sense) that is buried in the body; and Emp. presumably owes it to an ἀνάμνησις of his earlier life (a faculty that is only rarely active). From what other source could he have got his knowledge of his previous ἐνσωματώσεις (fr. 117)? He has even farther and more profound knowledge than he dares communicate—fr. 4 (45-51), and says quite plainly that he is keeping back in piety a last remnant of wisdom that is unsuited for human ears (to this extent the authorities—ἄλλοι δ’ ἦσαν οἱ λέγοντες—of S.E., M. vii, 122—have rightly understood him).—The belief in a miraculous power of ἀνάμνησις that goes beyond the present life of the individual may have been derived by Emp. from Pythagorean doctrine or mythology. Emp. himself follows the legend of the Pyth. school and attributes such a power of recollection to Pythagoras: ὅπποτε γὰρ πάσῃσι . . . fr. 129 [430 ff.]. See Append. x. The eager development—indeed, the cult—of the μνήμη in Pythagorean circles is well known. The invention of the myths describing the fountain of Mnemosyne in Hades may also be Pythagorean (see below). Throughout the various ἐνσωματώσεις of the soul it is the undying μνήμη that alone preserves the unity of personality which (as the ψυχή) lives through all these transformations and is bound together in this way. It is evident how important this idea was for the doctrine of transmigration (it occurs also in the teaching of Buddha). Plato, like Empedokles, seems to have got the idea of an ἀνάμνησις reaching beyond the limits of the present life from the Pythagoreans: he, then, it is true, developed the idea in connexion with his own philosophy to unexpected conclusions (cf. further, Dieterich, Nekyia, 122).

96 the whole, the entire reality of Being and Becoming in the world, can't be fully understood by humans through their senses or even with mind: fr. 2 (36-43). But Empedokles has grasped it through his own belief; he is positioned σοφίας ἐπ’ ἄκροισι (fr. 4, 8), She promises to tell the truth. (Procl., in Ti. 106 E). Proclus states that the words wisdom at its peak—and this is another point—are meant to refer to Empedokles himself. (I don’t fully understand Bidez’s doubts about what is said here and in what follows: see Archiv. f. Gesch. d. Phil. ix, 203, 42.) So where, then, did the poet gain this knowledge of the truth since it is revealed neither to the senses nor to the mind? At any rate, the psychopomp forces (Porph., Antr. 8), who guided his soul-daimon out of the realm of the gods, tell the soul (fr. 2, 8): So, since you’ve been treated this way, (i.e. “since you have been cast up here—on the earth”—not “since you have so desired it,” as Bergk, Opusc. ii, 23, interprets: which would be a warped idea expressed in distorted language)—You will not have more than mortal wisdom. (thus with Panzerbieter, for ὄρωρε). Based on this, we must assume that his deeper knowledge (insight into the Mixing and blending together of the elements, along with knowledge of the fate and intent of the soul-daimones, etc.), which he can’t have received on earth or within his earthly body must have been carried with him from his divine previous life. This knowledge is then unique to the daimon (or soul in the older sense) that is trapped in the body; and Emp. likely owes it to a ἀνάμνησις of his past life (a capability that is only occasionally active). From what other source could he have gained his knowledge of his previous integrations (fr. 117)? He has even further and deeper knowledge than he is willing to share—fr. 4 (45-51), and clearly states that he is withholding in reverence a final piece of wisdom that is not suitable for human ears (to this extent, the authorities—Others were saying—of S.E., M. vii, 122—have correctly interpreted him).—The belief in a miraculous ability of ἀνάμνησις that extends beyond the individual's current life may have been influenced by Emp. from Pythagorean teachings or mythology. Emp. himself follows the tale of the Pythagorean school and credits such a remembering ability to Pythagoras: Whenever in every . . . fr. 129 [430 ff.]. See Append. x. The enthusiastic development—indeed, the cult—of the memory in Pythagorean communities is well known. The creation of the myths describing the fountain of Mnemosyne in Hades may also be Pythagorean (see below). Throughout the different integration of the soul, it is the everlasting memory that solely maintains the unity of personality which (as the soul) persists through all these transformations and is interconnected in this way. It's clear how significant this idea was for the doctrine of transmigration (it also appears in the teachings of Buddha). Plato, like Empedokles, seems to have drawn the idea of an ἀνάμνησις that goes beyond the limits of the current life from the Pythagoreans: he, then, indeed developed the idea in connection with his own philosophy to unexpected conclusions (cf. further, Dieterich, Nekyia, 122).

97 φιλία is for him (not indeed in his words but in his intention as Arist. understood him): αἰτία τῶν ἀγαθῶν, τὸ δὲ νεῖκος τῶν κακῶν, Metaph. 985a, 4 ff.; 1075b, 1–7. Hence the ἠπιόφρων Φιλότητος ἀμεμφέος ἄμβροτος ὁρμή (fr. 35) is contrasted with Νεῖκος μαινόμενον (115, 14), οὐλόμενον (17, 19), λυγρόν (109). The σφαῖρος in which only φιλία prevails while νεῖκος is completely vanquished, is called μονίῃ περιήργεϊ γαίων, fr. 27, 28. 407

97 Friendship represents for him (not exactly in his words but in what Aristotle understood him to mean): The cause of good things, and the conflict of bad things., Metaph. 985a, 4 ff.; 1075b, 1–7. Therefore, Gentle spirit of unblemished love (fr. 35) is set against Furious strife (115, 14), οὐλόμενον (17, 19), γυμνός (109). The ball where only friendship exists while argument is entirely defeated, is referred to as μονίῃ περιήργεϊ γαίων, fr. 27, 28. 407

98 θεοὶ δολιχαίωνες (frr. 20, 12, 23, 8). Exactly the same is said of the δαίμονες οἵτε βίοιο λελόγχασι μακραίωνος (115, 5). In the face of these expressions, so definitely setting a period to the lifetime of the gods, we must suppose that the epithets which Emp. applies to himself—he is to be in the future θεὸς ἄμβροτος οὐκ ἔτι θνητός, 112, 4—are merely intended to assert that he shall not die any more in his incarnation as a man (the same thing must be meant when those who are delivered from the circle of rebirth are called ἀπόκηροι, ἄτειρεῖς (147); the gods are only called ἄθανατοι by traditional convention). Plutarch also, Def. Or. 16, p. 418 E, distinctly states that the δαίμονες of Emp. eventually die. That the gods (but not τὸ θεῖον itself) were liable to extinction had already been the opinion of Anaximander and Anaximenes. Acc. to Emp. the individual δαίμονες would be reabsorbed into the universal divinity, the σφαῖρος (just as the individual deities of the Stoics are reabsorbed at the world-conflagration into Zeus who is alone indestructible). [= ll. 131, 141, 461, 460 M.]

98 the long-haired gods (frr. 20, 12, 23, 8). The same is stated about the daimones those who have lived long (115, 5). Given these phrases, which clearly define a limit to the lifespan of the gods, we must assume that the titles Empedocles uses for himself—claiming he will be in the future god immortal no longer mortal, 112, 4—are simply meant to indicate that he will no longer die in his human form (similar sentiments are likely conveyed when those who are freed from the cycle of rebirth are called ἀπόκηροι, ἄτειρεῖς (147); the gods are traditionally referred to as immortals). Plutarch also, Def. Or. 16, p. 418 E, clearly states that the demons of Empedocles eventually die. The idea that the gods (but not the divine itself) could cease to exist was already held by Anaximander and Anaximenes. According to Empedocles, individual demons would be reabsorbed into universal divinity, the ball (just as the individual deities of the Stoics are reabsorbed into Zeus, who is the only indestructible one). [= ll. 131, 141, 461, 460 M.]

99 Emp., frr. 133, 134 (389–96), speaks of a supersensual divinity that is entirely φρὴν ἱερή: he gives to this divinity the name of Apollo, but the description is said to apply περὶ παντὸς τοῦ θείου. Hipp., RH. vii, 29, p. 386 D.-S., refers the description to the σφαῖρος. The σφαῖρος, in which no νεῖκος is left was called by Emp. ὁ θεός, ὁ εὐδαιμονέστατος θεός (Arist., An. i, 5, 410b, 5–6; Metaph. ii, 4, 1000b, 3). It is, however, certain that Emp. would not have regarded the σφαῖρος as pure φρὴν ἱερή. It appears, in fact, that in the σφαῖρος, in which everything is together and united, even the divine power thought of as supersensual is brought to a close. In the world-state of multiplicity caused by νεῖκος divinity seems to be regarded as separate from the elements and the forces. “Furious conflict” (115, 14) then attacks even the divinity and divides it against itself; hence the origin of individual δαίμονες as a self-caused division of the divine, a desertion from the One θεῖον—the individual δαίμονες are φυγάδες, θεόθεν (115, 13). These individual δαίμονες are entangled in the world from its origin until at last, having become purified, they rise again to the heights of divinity; and when all individuality is again fused into one by φιλία they return once more into the universal divinity in order with it to enter into the σφαῖρος.—Thus we may perhaps reconstruct the Empedoklean fantasy. His lines do not supply sufficient evidence for the complete reconstruction of his picture of the perpetually recurring process. We should naturally expect a certain obscurity to cling to this attempt to fuse together physiology and theology.

99 Emp., frr. 133, 134 (389–96), talks about a divine being that exists beyond the senses and is entirely sacred mind: he names this divinity Apollo, but the description is said to apply to about all things divine. Hipp., RH. vii, 29, p. 386 D.-S., relates this description to the sphere. The sphere, which has no conflict left, was called by Emp. the god, the most blessed god (Arist., An. i, 5, 410b, 5–6; Metaph. ii, 4, 1000b, 3). However, it is certain that Emp. would not have seen the sphere as purely sacred mind. It seems that in the ball, where everything is together and united, even the divine power thought of as supersensual comes to conclusion. In the world of multiplicity caused by strife, divinity appears to be separate from the elements and forces. “Furious conflict” (115, 14) then targets even the divine and divides it against itself; hence the origin of individual demons as a self-caused split of the divine, a departure from the One divine—the individual demons are Fugitives, from God (115, 13). These individual demons are caught up in the world from its beginning until they ultimately become purified and rise again to the heights of divinity; and when all individuality is once again merged into one by friendship, they return to the universal divinity to enter together into the spherical.—Thus, we might be able to piece together the Empedoklean idea. His verses do not provide enough evidence for a complete reconstruction of his view on the endlessly recurring process. We would naturally expect some ambiguity to persist in this effort to combine physiology and theology.

100 Lucr. iii, 370–3.

100 Lucr. iii, 370–3.

101 All that is essential on the subject of Demokritos’ doctrine of the soul is to be found in Arist., An. i, 2, p. 403b, 31–404a, 16; 405a., 7–13; i, 3, p. 406b, 15–22; Resp. iv, p. 471b, 30–472a, 17.—The air is full of the particles which Demokritos calls νοῦς and ψυχή: Resp. 472a, 6–8 [Vors. ii, 36]. The atoms hovering in the air become visible as “motes in the sunbeam”; of these some are the soul-atoms (this must be the meaning of An. 404A, 3 ff.; Iamb. ap. Stob., Ecl. i, p. 384, 15 W., is only drawing upon Arist.). This is a modification of the opinion held by the Pythagoreans (mentioned also by Arist. 404a, 16 ff.) that the motes in the sunbeam are “souls” (see above, chap. x, n. 34). Inhalation of the world-stuff as a condition of life in the individual is imitated from Herakleitos (see S.E., M. vii, 129).

101 Everything important about Democritus' view on the soul can be found in Aristotle, An. i, 2, p. 403b, 31–404a, 16; 405a., 7–13; i, 3, p. 406b, 15–22; Resp. iv, p. 471b, 30–472a, 17.—The air is filled with the particles that Democritus refers to as mind and soul: Resp. 472a, 6–8 [Vors. ii, 36]. The atoms floating in the air can be seen as “dust in the sunlight”; among them are the soul-atoms (this is what An. 404A, 3 ff. means; Iamblichus as cited by Stobaeus, Ecl. i, p. 384, 15 W., is just referring to Aristotle). This is a variation of the belief held by the Pythagoreans (also mentioned by Aristotle 404a, 16 ff.) that the dust in the sunlight represents “souls” (see above, chap. x, n. 34). The inhalation of the world-stuff as essential for life in the individual is borrowed from Heraclitus (see S.E., M. vii, 129).

102 The soul acc. to Dem. ἐκβαίνει μὲν τοῦ σώματος, ἐν δὲ τῷ ἐκβαίνειν διαφορεῖται καὶ διασκεδάννυται, Iamb. ap. Stob., Ecl. i, p. 384, 16 f. W. 408

102 According to Democritus, the soul comes out of the body, and while it comes out, it changes and spreads out, Iamblichus as quoted in Stobaeus, Ecl. i, p. 384, 16 f. W. 408

103 Dem. φθαρτὴν (εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν) τῷ σώματι συνδιαφθειρομένην, Dox. 393a, 8 [Vors. A 109]. Since the disruption of the soul-atoms is not effected at a single blow death may, in consequence, sometimes be only apparent; i.e. when many but not all the soul-particles have escaped. For this reason also, with the possible re-assemblage of the soul-atoms, ἀναβιώσεις of the apparently dead may occur. Cases of this kind seem to have been treated in the work περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἅιδου: see Procl., in Rp. ii, 113, 6 Kr.; D.L. ix, 46; it is counted among the most famous, or at least the most popular of Dem.’s writings in the anecdote ap. Ath. 168 B; cf. [Hp.] Ep. 10, 3, p. 291 Hch. [ix, 322 Lit.]; Vors. 55 C, 2. This view of the retention of vitality, of course, only applies to the period immediately following the (apparent) death (it is fairly correctly represented by [Plu.] Plac. Ph. 4, 4, 4 [Dox. 390], it was probably attributed to Dem. on account of a similar observation made by Parmenides; see above, p. 373). Nevertheless, out of it grew up the assertion, which was then attributed to Dem., that in fact τὰ νεκρὰ τῶν σωμάτων αἰσθάνεται: e.g. Alex. Aph. in Arist., Top. 21, 21; [Vors. ii, 38, 8]; Stob., Ecl. i, p. 477, 18 W. In the case, at least, of those that are really “dead”, i.e. of bodies that have been deserted by all the soul-atoms, Dem. certainly never taught the presence of αἴσθησις: against the vulgarization of his opinions that would attribute such a view as this to him (as Epicurus himself did) the Democritici spoken of by Cic. (TD. i, 82) made their protest.—The work περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἅιδου can certainly not have confined itself to considerations of a purely physical nature; otherwise Thrasyllos (D.L. ix, 46) could not have classified it among the ἠθικὰ βιβλία of Dem. [Vors. ii, 19]. It is, indeed, difficult to imagine what from Dem.’s point of view there could have been to say about “the things in the Underworld”. It is hardly possible to suppose (as Mullach, Dem. fr., pp. 117–18, and Heyne do) that Dem. would think himself obliged either to answer or to parody the fabulous inventions of the poets about the realm of shadows. It is difficult to be certain that Dem. was really the author of the work: the forgery of later times was particularly fond of turning the most clear-headed of materialists into a mage and a jack-of-all-trades. (Dem.’s observations of the possibility of ἀναβιοῦν is in part at least the origin of the writing π. τ. ἐν ᾅδου; it is also responsible for the anecdote that makes him promise to the Persian king that he will restore his dead wife to life again, etc.—a variation of an ingenious story widely spread both in the East and the West. See my Lecture on Greek Novel-writing: Verh. der Philologenvers. zu Rostock, 1875, p. 68 f.)—The “fragmenta moralia” of Dem. are with rare exceptions (e.g. Mull. frr. 7, 23, 48, 49, etc. = 146, 159, 147, 127 D.) wholesale fabrications of the feeblest kind. One of them, however (119 Mull., 297 D.), agrees at least with what Dem. may very well have said about the punishments in Hell (though in rather different words—he was incapable of quite such a monstrosity as μυθοπλαστέοντες, which sounds very late Greek. Vain efforts have been made to justify this μυθοπλαστέω by reference to the older μυθοπλάστης. But μυθοποιός, ὀδοφύλαξ, ἀργυροκόπος, etc., are also old, and it is no secret that verbs derived by further extension from such composite verbal nouns are mostly late formations: thus μυθοποιέω, ὀδοφυλακέω, ἀργυροκοπέω, and again πετροβολέω, ἱεροφαντέω, τεκνοκτονέω, etc.). In another of these falsa no echo even of Dem.’s thought is to be found: fr. moral. 1 Mull. [171 D.] ψυχὴ οἰκητήριον δαίμονος.

103 Dem. φθαρτή(is the soul)τὸ σῶμα ἡ προσαρμογή, Dox. 393a, 8 [Vors. A 109]. Since the breakdown of the soul-atoms doesn’t happen all at once, death can sometimes just seem to occur; that is, when many but not all of the soul-particles have left. For this reason, with the potential for the soul-atoms to come back together, revivals of those who appear to be dead may take place. Such cases seem to be discussed in the work about those in Hades: see Procl., in Rp. ii, 113, 6 Kr.; D.L. ix, 46; this is considered one of the most famous, or at least the most well-known, of Dem.’s writings in the anecdote ap. Ath. 168 B; cf. [Hp.] Ep. 10, 3, p. 291 Hch. [ix, 322 Lit.]; Vors. 55 C, 2. This idea of maintaining vitality, of course, only applies to the time immediately following the (apparent) death (it is fairly accurately represented by [Plu.] Plac. Ph. 4, 4, 4 [Dox. 390], and it was likely attributed to Dem. due to a similar observation made by Parmenides; see above, p. 373). Nevertheless, from this grew the claim, which was then attributed to Dem., that in reality The dead bodies sense.: e.g. Alex. Aph. in Arist., Top. 21, 21; [Vors. ii, 38, 8]; Stob., Ecl. i, p. 477, 18 W. In the case, at least, of those who are truly “dead,” meaning bodies that have lost all the soul-atoms, Dem. certainly never taught the presence of αἴσθησις: against the popular misunderstanding of his views that would attribute such an idea to him (as Epicurus himself did), the Democritici mentioned by Cic. (TD. i, 82) protested. — The work About those in Hades cannot have been limited to purely physical discussions; otherwise, Thrasyllos (D.L. ix, 46) would not have categorized it among the ethical books of Dem. [Vors. ii, 19]. Indeed, it's hard to imagine what Dem.’s perspective could have been on “the things in the Underworld.” It’s unlikely to believe (as Mullach, Dem. fr., pp. 117–18, and Heyne do) that Dem. felt obligated to either respond to or mock the mythical stories of poets about the land of shadows. It’s tough to be sure that Dem. was really the author of the work: the forgeries from later times particularly enjoyed transforming the clearest materialist into a magician and a jack-of-all-trades. (Dem.’s observations about the possibility of αναβιώσουν partially inspired the writing π. τ. in Hades; it also led to the anecdote of him promising a Persian king that he would bring his dead wife back to life, etc.—a variation of a clever tale that circulated widely both in the East and the West. See my Lecture on Greek Novel-writing: Verh. der Philologenvers. zu Rostock, 1875, p. 68 f.)—The “moral fragments” of Dem. are mostly, with rare exceptions (e.g. Mull. frr. 7, 23, 48, 49, etc. = 146, 159, 147, 127 D.), clear fabrications of the weakest kind. One of them, however (119 Mull., 297 D.), aligns at least somewhat with what Dem. might have genuinely said about punishments in Hell (though in very different wording—he was incapable of such a gross example as storytellers, which sounds very late Greek. Futile attempts have been made to justify this myth-making by referring to the older storyteller. However, myth creator, tooth guardian, silversmith, etc., are also old, and it’s well-known that verbs derived from such composite verbal nouns are mostly later developments: thus μυθοποιώ, οδοφυλακώ, αργυροκοπώ, and again πέτρα, ἱεροφάντης, παιδοκτονία, etc.). In another of these falsa, there is no trace of Dem.’s thought: fr. moral. 1 Mull. [171 D.] soul is the dwelling of a spirit.

104 Dem., whose inquiries set out from the study of inorganic nature, 409 was led to predicate a mechanical obedience to law in organic nature as well. Anaxagoras starting from the study of organic nature and in particular of man, its highest development, derived from that study the concept of purpose—purpose consciously undertaken and carried out—and this idea affected his outlook upon the whole of nature, including inorganic nature. This teleological system, regarded as of universal application, is made by him to depend on a Being modelled upon the human mind, the only source, in fact, from which he could have derived his experience of action carried out in accordance with pre-arranged purpose.

104 Dem., whose inquiries began with the study of inorganic nature, 409 concluded that organic nature also follows mechanical laws. Anaxagoras, starting from the study of organic nature and especially of humans, its highest form, developed the concept of purpose—purpose that is consciously pursued and achieved—and this idea influenced his view of all of nature, including inorganic nature. He treated this teleological system as universally applicable, depending on a Being modeled after the human mind, which was the only source from which he could derive his understanding of actions aligned with pre-planned purposes.

105 Cf. here and on what follows, Heinze, Ber. d. Sächs. Ges. d. Wiss. 1890, pp. 1 ff.

105 See here and in the following sections, Heinze, Ber. d. Sächs. Ges. d. Wiss. 1890, pp. 1 ff.

106 νοῦς must be omniscient if it γνώμην περὶ παντὸς ἴσχει (fr. 6 M. = 12 D.). It has organized (διεκόσμησε) not only what was and is but also what is to be: frr. 6, 12 [12, 14 D.].

106 us must be all-knowing if it knows everything (fr. 6 M. = 12 D.). It has arranged (disease) not just what was and is, but also what is yet to come: frr. 6, 12 [12, 14 D.].

107 Arist., Ph. 256b. 24 ff.

107 Aristotle, Philosophy 256b. 24 ff.

108 ὁ γὰρ νοῦς (of Anaxag.) εἷς: Arist., Metaph. 1069b, 31. On the other hand, χρήματα ἄπειρα πλῆθος: Anaxag. fr. 1.

108 the mind (of Anaxag.) one: Arist., Metaph. 1069b, 31. On the other hand, wealth infinite multitude: Anaxag. fr. 1.

109 Ἀναξαγόρας φησι τὸν νοῦν κοινὸν οὐθὲν οὐθενὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔχειν. Arist., An. i, 2, p. 405b, 19 ff.; cf. iii, 4, p. 429b, 23 f.

109 Anaxagoras says that the mind is universal and doesn’t belong to anyone else.. Arist., An. i, 2, p. 405b, 19 ff.; cf. iii, 4, p. 429b, 23 f.

110 Anaxag. fr. 6 [12]: τὰ μὲν ἄλλα <πάντα> παντὸς μοῖραν μετέχει, νόος δέ ἐστι ἄπειρον καὶ αὐτοκρατὲς καὶ μέμικται οὐδενὶ χρήματι, ἀλλὰ μοῦνος αὐτὸς ἐφ, ἑωυτοῦ ἐστι. (ἄπειρον does not seem to supply the required opposition to what proceeds: ? ἁπλόον. Anaxag. used the word of νοῦς acc. to Arist., An. 405a, 16; 429b, 23. Zeller also suggests ἁπλόον, Archiv f. G. d. Philos. v, 441.)

110 Anaxag. fr. 6 [12]: Everything else has a part in the whole, but the mind is endless, self-sufficient, and doesn’t blend with anything; it exists solely by itself, within itself. (infinite does not seem to supply the required opposition to what proceeds: ? simple. Anaxag. used the word of mind acc. to Arist., An. 405a, 16; 429b, 23. Zeller also suggests simple, Archiv f. G. d. Philos. v, 441.)

111 ὅσα ψυχὴν ἔχει, καὶ τὰ μέζω καὶ τὰ ἐλάσσω, πάντων νόος κρατέει· καὶ τῆς περιχωρήσιος τῆς συμπάσης νόος ἐκράτησε, ὤστε περιχωρῆσαι τὴν ἀρχήν, fr. 6 [12]. This κρατεῖν at the beginning of the εριχώρησις cannot at any rate take place by the inter-mixture of νοῦς in the σπέρματα or by the entry of νοῦς into these. Because νοῦς is both ἀπαθής and ἀμιγήςs, it κρατοίη ἂν ἀμιγὴς ὤν, Arist., Ph. 256b, 27; cf. 429a, 18. Does this also apply to νοῦς when it τῶν ψυχὴν ἐχόντων κρατέει? And yet in this case it appears to be divided, as μείζωνn or ἐλάττων in each case, in the ζῷα.—No one can help being reminded here of the insoluble aporiai raised in Aristotle’s own doctrine of the active νοῦς which, in this case too, is ἀπαθής, ἀμιγής, χωριστός from the body; is also deprived of all attributes of individuality (which reside entirely in the lower psychical powers) and thus appears as a common divine spirit. And yet it is said to be a μόριον τῆς ψυχῆς, present ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, dwelling inside the body yet having nothing in common with it, and in any case is thought of as an individual mind. In the case of Anaxagoras the same aporiai apply also to the nourishing, feeling, desiring, and moving soul (as it is called by Arist.); for all the “parts” of the soul are included almost indistinguishably by him under the conception of νοῦς.—The difficulty of reconciling the unity and inward continuity of the spiritual (immaterial, that cannot be thought of as divided)—with its individuation and distribution into the multiplicity of souls, is one which repeatedly occurs in Greek philosophy.

111 Everything with a soul, whether greater or lesser, is governed by the mind; and the mind has authority over its entire environment, thus it encompasses the principle., fr. 6 [12]. This manage at the start of the surrounding cannot occur through the mixing of mind in the seeds or through the mind entering into them. Because mind is both unaffected and pure, it would be a pure entity, Arist., Ph. 256b, 27; cf. 429a, 18. Does this also apply to mind when it rules over sentient beings? And yet in this context, it seems to be divided, either greater or lesser in each case of the living creatures. — This brings to mind the unresolved aporiai posed in Aristotle's own teachings regarding the active mind, which, in this instance, is also pure, unblended, and unique from the body; it lacks all characteristics of individuality (which are entirely found in the lower mental faculties) and thus appears as a universal divine spirit. Yet it is described as a part of the spirit, existing in the soul, residing inside the body but having nothing in common with it, and is generally regarded as an individual mind. The same aporiai apply to Anaxagoras's concept of the nourishing, feeling, desiring, and moving soul (as it’s referred to by Arist.); since all the “parts” of the soul are almost indistinguishably categorized under the idea of mind. — The challenge of reconciling the unity and internal continuity of the spiritual (immaterial, which cannot be conceived as divided) with its individuality and distribution across the many souls is a recurring theme in Greek philosophy.

112 διὰ πάντων ἰόντα, Pl., Crat. 413 C.

112 through everything going, Pl., Crat. 413 C.

113 ἐν παντὶ παντὸς μοῖρα ἔνεστι πλὴν νόου· ἔστι οἷσι δὲ καὶ νόος ἔνι, fr. 5 [11].

113 In every aspect, there's a portion, except for the mind; for those who possess it, there is also understanding., fr. 5 [11].

114 νόος δὲ πᾶς ὅμοιός ἐστι καὶ ὁ μέζων καὶ ὁ ἐλάσσων, fr. 6 [12].

114 The mind is exactly the same, regardless of whether it’s bigger or smaller., fr. 6 [12].

115 Arist., An. i, 2, p. 404b, 1–7: Anaxag. often gives τὸν νοῦν as τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ καλῶς καὶ ὀρθῶς· ἑτέρωθι δὲ (he says) τοῦτον εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν· ἐν ἅπασι γὰρ ὑπάρχειν αὐτὸν τοῖς ζῴοις, καὶ μεγάλοις καὶ μικροῖς 410 καὶ τιμίοις καὶ ἀτιμοτέροις (in which case the νοῦς that dwells within all the ζῷα cannot be any longer regarded as ὁ κατὰ φρόνησιν λεγόμενος νοῦς). Anaxag. had expressed himself indistinctly: ἧττον διασαφεῖ περὶ αὐτων (i.e, the relation between νοῦς and ψυχή). Cf. 405a, 13 f. In the sense of the words as used by Anaxagoras νοῦς and ψυχή were simply identified by Plato: Crat. 400 A.

115 Arist., An. i, 2, p. 404b, 1–7: Anaxagoras often refers to the mind as The reason for doing well and correctly; on the other hand, (he says) This is the soul; for it exists in all living beings, both large and small. 410 and honorable and dishonorable (in which case the mind that dwells within all the ζῷα cannot be any longer regarded as the so-called wise mind). Anaxagoras had expressed himself vaguely: Less clear about them (i.e, the relationship between mind and soul). Cf. 405a, 13 f. In terms of the meaning of the words as used by Anaxagoras, mind and soul were simply regarded as the same by Plato: Crat. 400 A.

116 D.L. ii, 8 [Vors. 375]. Acc. to Anaxag. the moon has οἰκήσεις (ἀλλὰ καὶ λόφους καὶ φάραγγας). Fr. 10 [4] probably refers to the men and other ζῷα in the moon (to whom yet another moon gives light). Anaxag. τὴν σελήνην γῆν φησὶν εἶναι (i.e. an inhabitable heavenly body like the earth), Pl., Ap. 26 D; cf. Hippol., R.H. i, 8, 10, p. 22, 40 D.-S.—We are reminded of the Orphico-Pythagorean fantasies about life on the moon (see above, chap. x, n. 76).

116 D.L. ii, 8 [Vors. 375]. According to Anaxagoras, the moon has οικείες (but also hills and valleys). Fr. 10 [4] likely refers to the people and other animals on the moon (to whom yet another moon provides light). Anaxagoras states that He says the moon is earth. (i.e. a habitable celestial body like Earth), Pl., Ap. 26 D; cf. Hippol., R.H. i, 8, 10, p. 22, 40 D.-S.—This brings to mind the Orphico-Pythagorean ideas about life on the moon (see above, chap. x, n. 76).

117 Anaxag. counted the plants as ζῷα and ascribed emotions to them: ἥδεσθαι καὶ λυπεῖσθαι [Arist.] Plant. 815a, 18. Like Plato and Demokritos Anaxag. also regarded plants as ζῷα ἔγγεια: Plu., QN. 1, 911 D.

117 Anaxagoras considered plants to be living beings and attributed emotions to them: to feel joy and to feel sorrow [Arist.] Plant. 815a, 18. Similar to Plato and Democritus, Anaxagoras also viewed plants as living entities: Plu., QN. 1, 911 D.

118 In spite of its entry into χρήματα, νοῦς is yet said to remain “unmixed” and unaffected by them: αὐτοκράτορα γὰρ αὐτὸν ὄντα καὶ οὐδενὶ μεμιγμένον πάντα φησὶν αὐτὸν κοσμεῖν τὰ πράγματα διὰ πάντων ἰόντα, Pl., Crat. 413 C. We thus have at the same time διὰ πάντων ἰόντα and denial of mixture which is reiterated in stronger and stronger language. Thus νοῦς even so remains still ἐφ’ ἑωυτοῦ (εἰ μὴ γὰρ ἐφ’ ἑωυτου ἦν, ἄλλῳ τέῳ ἐμέμικτο ἄν· μετεῖχε δὲ ἂν ἁπάντων χρημάτων εἰ ἐμέμικτό τεῳ· ἐν παντὶ γὰρ παντὸς μοῖρα ἕνεστι κτλ. So perhaps we should read fr. 6 [12] restoring a completed syllogism. In the traditional text the clause εἰ ἐμέμικτό τεῳ is superfluous and in the way). It takes no particle of the others into itself.

118 Even though it's engaged with money, mind is still described as “unmixed” and not influenced by them: For being an emperor himself and not mixed with anyone, he claims to arrange matters by going through everything., Pl., Crat. 413 C. This presents us with through everything happening along with a strong emphasis on its lack of mixture, which is repeated with increasing intensity. Therefore, mind still remains on his own(If it weren't for themselves, they would have been mixed with someone else. They would have participated in all kinds of wealth if they had been involved with someone else; for in everything, there is a share for everyone, etc. So maybe we should interpret fr. 6 [12] as restoring a complete syllogism. In the traditional text, the clause If you like it is unnecessary and obstructive. It doesn't connect with any of the others.

119 [Plu.] Plac. Phil. 5, 25, 2 (Aët., Dox. 437; Vors. 397, 18), in the chap. ποτέρου ἐστὶν ὕπνος καὶ θάνατος ψυχῆς ἢ σώματος; Anaxag. taught: εἶναι δὲ καὶ ψυχῆς θάνατον τὸν διαχωρισμόν. Nothing else can be meant by the words—the theme of the chapter alone shows it—than: the death of the soul (as well as of the body) occurs with its separation (from the body). τὸν διαχωρισμόν is subject and εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς θάνατον predicate of the sentence (not the other way round as Siebeck seems to think: Ges. d. Psychol. i, 285). The violent alteration proposed by Wyttenbach (de immort. animi, Opusc. ii, 597 f.) has not the smallest justification: εἶναι δὲ καὶ τὸν θάνατον ψυχῆς διαχωρισμὸν καὶ σώματος. There could have been no reason at all in appealing specially to Anaxagoras for a confirmation of the popular conception of death (it would be nothing more). Further, in this particular connexion such a definition of death is quite out of place; since the theme of the chap. is only to ask the question whether death also affects the soul, not what it is. ψυχή here must mean the individual soul, not the νοῦς which is the basis of the individual souls. Anaxag. made the individual soul perish at death—so much is certain. It must be admitted that we cannot say for certain whether the Placita are referring to an actual utterance of Anaxag. or are only drawing conclusions from his teaching.

119 [Plu.] Plac. Phil. 5, 25, 2 (Aët., Dox. 437; Vors. 397, 18), in the chapter whether sleep or death pertains to the soul or the body; Anaxag. taught: that the separation is also the death of the soul. The words clearly refer to one meaning—the chapter's theme makes it obvious—namely: the death of the soul (as well as of the body) happens with its separation (from the body). The split is the subject and the soul's demise is the predicate of the sentence (not the other way around as Siebeck seems to think: Ges. d. Psychol. i, 285). The drastic change suggested by Wyttenbach (de immort. animi, Opus. ii, 597 f.) has no justification whatsoever: the end of the separation between the soul and the body. There was no reason to specifically refer to Anaxagoras to support a common understanding of death (it would be nothing more than that). Furthermore, in this context, such a definition of death is irrelevant; the theme of the chapter is only to question whether death also affects the soul, not what it actually is. The spirit here must refer to the individual soul, not the mind, which is the foundation of individual souls. Anaxag. believed the individual soul perished at death—this much is certain. We must acknowledge that we cannot definitively state whether the Placita are referencing an actual statement by Anaxag. or if they are merely drawing conclusions from his teachings.

120 fr. 17 [17].

120 from 17 [17].

CHAPTER XII

The Lay Authors

Theology and Philosophy, each in its own way attempting to go beyond inadequate popular belief, could only very gradually transcend the limits of those narrow communities within which their influence was first felt and reach the circles in which that popular belief held sway. During the earliest successes of the theological and philosophical spirit hardly a voice was raised that might have suggested that the belief in the imperishability and divine nature of the human Soul, of the inherence of all things spiritual in one imperishable, fundamental substance, might become something more than a mystery known to the wise and illuminated, and enter into the convictions of the people and the unlearned. “After the death of the body, the Image of Life remains alive; for that alone is descended from the gods”—such is the announcement of Pindar. But for all the confidence with which, as though anticipating no contradiction, he here proclaims the view of the soul’s immortality and bases it upon its divine nature, such an opinion can at that time have been no more than the persuasion of isolated communities formed and instructed in that particular doctrine. It cannot be merely accidental,1 that in the fragments which have come down to us of the lyric and semi-lyric (elegiac and iambic) poetry—poetry intended for a wide and unspecialized public and expressing feelings and ideas in language that all could understand—hardly a trace appears of that enhanced conception of the worth and nature of the Soul. Reflexion does not linger over such dark subjects; whenever they are illuminated for a passing moment, we discern the outlines of those figures from the spirit world just as the Homeric imagination had given them shape.

Theology and Philosophy, each in their own way trying to go beyond limited popular beliefs, could only slowly break through the confines of the narrow communities where their influence was first felt and reach the broader circles where those beliefs were dominant. During the early successes of theology and philosophy, hardly anyone spoke up to suggest that the belief in the immortality and divine nature of the human soul, and the idea that all spiritual things are part of one eternal, fundamental essence, could become more than just a mystery understood by the wise and enlightened, and actually become a conviction for ordinary people. “After the body dies, the Image of Life remains alive; for that alone comes from the gods”—this is what Pindar states. However, despite his confidence in proclaiming the soul's immortality as based on its divine nature, such a belief at that time was likely just the persuasion of isolated communities that were formed and educated in that particular doctrine. It can't just be a coincidence that in the fragments we have of lyric and semi-lyric (elegiac and iambic) poetry—poetry meant for a broad and general audience, expressing feelings and ideas in language everyone could understand—hardly a hint appears of that deeper conception of the worth and nature of the soul. Reflection doesn’t linger on such dark topics; whenever they are briefly illuminated, we see the outlines of those figures from the spiritual world as they were shaped by Homeric imagination.

Life and light are only to be found in this world;2 Death, to which we are all “owing”,3 leads the soul into a realm of nothingness.4 Inarticulate, voiceless, the dead man lies in the grave like a statue.5 Upon earth, and not in any shadowy hereafter, is completed that judgment6 which divine Justice passes upon the criminal himself, or upon his descendants in whom something of him still lives on. It is the lack of such descendants that forms the bitterest pang, as he goes down to Hades, of the man who passes childless out of this life.7 412

Life and light can only be found in this world;2 Death, which we all “owe,”3 takes the soul into a realm of nothingness.4 Silent and without voice, the dead man lies in the grave like a statue.5 Here on earth, not in any shadowy afterlife, is where the judgment6 that divine Justice passes on the criminal himself, or on his descendants who carry on a part of him, is completed. The absence of such descendants is the hardest blow, as he descends to Hades, for the man who leaves this life without children.7 412

More distinctly and bitterly, in this age of advancing civilization and growing sensibility, sounds the wail over the pain and affliction of life, the obscurity of its ways, and the uncertainty of its outcome.8 Silenos, the prophetic wood-spirit, so went the ancient legend, when captured by King Midas in his rose-gardens at Bermios earned his release with the judgment of melancholy wisdom that the Greek was never tired of repeating in ever-varying forms—not to be born is the best thing for men, but having been born, let him pray that he may return as soon as possible to the kingdom of Night,9 and of Hades.10 The cheerful enjoyment of life is no longer so sure of itself as once it had been in the days of its naïve confidence: and yet there is no substitute attempted, no compensatory hereafter in a next world of justice and untroubled happiness. We rather hear the opinion expressed that rest is the greatest of all earthly blessings; and rest is brought by Death. Nevertheless there is little demand for consolation; a robust and virile sense of life that can put up with whatever may befall of evil or hardship in healthy indifference, is in the air, and speaks to us from many a page of this poetic legacy with unpretending veracity. No attempt is made to smooth over the hardship and cruelty of life. Man’s power is small, his efforts go unrewarded, one necessity after another besets his short life: over all alike hangs the shadow of inevitable death. All things come at last to the awful chasm—the bravest virtue and the highest authority in the world.11 Yet life is good and death an evil; else, why do the blessed gods not die? asks Sappho12 with feminine naiveté; though indeed, her life’s path had lain through the deepest valley of the shadow. Even the dead man, if he wishes to be preserved from utter nothingness, must depend upon the world of the living as the only place of reality; the fame of his virtues and his deeds is all that outlasts his death.13 Perhaps some dim perception of that fame reaches even to the dead.14 They themselves are for the living as though they had passed into nothingness; we should not, thinks a poet, give them another thought after we have buried them.15

More clearly and intensely, in this era of advancing civilization and heightened sensitivity, we hear the cry about the pain and suffering of life, the confusion of its paths, and the uncertainty of its outcomes. Silenos, the prophetic wood spirit, as the ancient legend goes, when captured by King Midas in his rose gardens at Bermios, earned his freedom with the wisely melancholic conclusion that the Greeks never tired of repeating in various forms—it's better not to be born, but if you are born, you should pray to return to the kingdom of Night and Hades. The joyful experience of life is no longer as certain as it used to be in the days of naive confidence; yet there is no substitute attempted, nor any hope for a compensatory afterlife filled with justice and untroubled happiness. Instead, we hear the belief that rest is the greatest blessing on earth; and rest is provided by Death. Nevertheless, there isn't much demand for consolation; a strong and resilient sense of life, capable of enduring whatever evil or hardship comes its way with healthy indifference, fills the air and speaks to us from many pages of this poetic legacy with unpretentious honesty. No effort is made to gloss over the hardships and cruelty of life. Human power is limited, our efforts often go unrewarded, one necessity after another troubles our short lives: over all looms the shadow of inevitable death. Everything eventually faces the terrifying abyss—the bravest virtue and the highest authority in the world. Yet life is good and death is evil; otherwise, why don’t the blessed gods die? asks Sappho with a certain innocent wisdom; though, of course, her life journey took her through the darkest valleys. Even the dead, if they want to avoid total nothingness, must rely on the living world as the only realm of reality; the memory of their virtues and deeds is all that survives their death. Perhaps some faint awareness of that memory even reaches the dead. They themselves exist for the living as if they have vanished into oblivion; a poet thinks that we shouldn't give them another thought after we've buried them.

Here even the time-honoured conventions associated with the cult of souls seem to be perversely cast aside. In general, the poet with his wide-ranging observation of mankind had small occasion to be reminded of the cult of the soul that the narrow circles of family or city offered to their dead, or of the conceptions thereby encouraged of the continued life enjoyed by the departed. The omission is supplied by the Orators of the fifth and fourth centuries and by what they say—and do 413 not say—of the state of things hereafter. The greatest period of lyric poetry was by that time already fading into the past, and yet whoever wished in speaking before a citizen assembly to meet with general agreement and understanding was still obliged to refrain from speaking of the blessed immortality, the eternity and divinity of the soul. The Orators16 never pass beyond the conceptions of the survival, power, and rights of the souls of the departed which were called forth and maintained in existence by the cult of the soul. The continued existence of the souls in the next world is not called in question; but the opinion that the souls still preserve their consciousness and have any knowledge of what happens on this earth is only expressed with the most cautious avoidance of definiteness.17 What—apart from the sacrificial offerings of their relatives—still binds the dead to the life upon earth, is little more than the fame accorded to them among the living.18 Even in the elevated language of solemn funeral orations the consolations offered to the survivors omit all mention of any enhanced state of being, any thought of immortal life in fully-conscious blessedness, that might belong now to the glorious departed.19 Such high visions and hopes for the future were still, it appears, as little necessary or demanded for the comfort of the people as they had been in the times of the great wars of liberty.20 The beloved dead who had given their lives for their country in those wars, as well as many others of the time whom death had overtaken, were the recipients of the epitaphs composed by Simonides the master of brilliant and condensed inscriptions. Nevertheless, not once does he vouchsafe a word that might point forward to a land of blessed immortality for the departed. There is a vestige of life still remaining for the dead—but it is in this world; the memory of the living and their own great name honoured by after generations is all that can prolong their existence.

Here, even the long-standing traditions tied to the cult of souls seem to be oddly set aside. Generally, the poet, with his broad view of humanity, didn't have much reason to think about the soul cult that close-knit families or communities offered to their deceased, or the ideas that stemmed from it about the continued life of those who passed away. The gaps in understanding are filled by the Orators of the fifth and fourth centuries and by what they express—and don't express—about the afterlife. The peak of lyric poetry was already slipping into history by that time, yet anyone wishing to gain widespread approval and understanding while speaking to a public assembly still had to avoid discussing the blessed immortality, eternity, and divinity of the soul. The Orators never go beyond the ideas of the survival, power, and rights of the souls of the dead that were called forth and maintained by the cult of the soul. The ongoing existence of souls in the next world isn't questioned; however, the belief that souls retain consciousness and knowledge of earthly happenings is only hinted at with great caution. What still connects the dead to life on earth, apart from the offerings made by their relatives, is little more than their reputation among the living. Even in the formal language of solemn funeral speeches, the comfort offered to the bereaved avoids mentioning any elevated state of being, or thoughts of eternal life in complete blessedness, that might belong to the glorious departed. Such lofty visions and hopes for the future appear to have been as unnecessary or unwelcome for the comfort of the people as they had been during the grand wars for freedom. The beloved deceased who sacrificed their lives for their country in those conflicts, as well as many others from that time whom death had claimed, had their epitaphs composed by Simonides, the master of clever and concise inscriptions. Yet, he never offers a word suggesting a land of blessed immortality for the deceased. There is a hint of life remaining for the dead—but it's in this world; the memories of the living and their legacy honored by future generations are all that can extend their existence.

It seems like an echo from another world when (about the middle of the fifth century) Melanippides the dithyrambic poet addresses a god in the words: “Hear me Father, marvel of all mortal men, Thou that rulest over the everliving Souls.” The words must be addressed to Dionysos;21 for such as entered into the magic circle of his nightly festival those visions of the imperishability of the human soul and its divine power acquired reality. Such wisdom received but partial assent from those who lived unaffected by the conceptions of isolated sects of the theologically or philosophically minded. 414

It feels like a voice from a different world when, around the mid-fifth century, Melanippides, the dithyrambic poet, calls out to a god with the words: “Listen to me, Father, marvel of all human beings, You who rule over the everliving Souls.” These words are meant for Dionysos;21 because for those who joined in the magic circle of his nightly festival, those visions of the eternal nature of the human soul and its divine power became real. Such wisdom only received limited acceptance from those who weren’t influenced by the beliefs of isolated sects of the theologically or philosophically inclined. 414

§ 2

A peculiar position is taken up by Pindar. Two contrasted views of the nature, origin, and destiny of the soul seem to be combined in his mind with equal claim to authority.

Pindar takes a unique stance. He seems to reconcile two opposing views about the nature, origin, and destiny of the soul, giving both equal weight and authority in his thinking.

In the Victory Odes allusions predominate which imply an agreement with the popular view expressed in the sayings of poets and the presuppositions of the cult of souls and the worship of Heroes. After its separation from the body, the soul disappears into the underworld.22 The piety and affectionate memory of relatives and descendants remains as a link between the dead and the living;23 whether the soul itself is still conscious of any connexion with the world of the living seems uncertain.24 Its power is over and done with—it is certainly no condition of blessed happiness into which it has entered. Only the glorious name, the fame that is honoured in song, rewards the great deeds of the virtuous after death.25

In the Victory Odes, references dominate that suggest an alignment with the popular beliefs expressed in the sayings of poets and the assumptions of the cult of souls and the worship of Heroes. After separating from the body, the soul fades away into the underworld. 22 The love and fond memories of relatives and descendants serve as a connection between the dead and the living; 23 whether the soul itself is still aware of any connection with the living world seems uncertain. 24 Its influence is over—it certainly doesn't lead to a state of blessed happiness that it has entered. Only the glorious name, the fame celebrated in song, honors the great deeds of the virtuous after death. 25

An exalted state of being, after their departure from this earth, is attributed to the Heroes alone. The belief in the existence, importance, and power of these illuminated spirits holds complete sway;26 it emerges in lively reality from the words and narrations of the poet throughout all his work. Moreover, the ancient conception—in reality rendered untenable by the belief in Heroes—that only with the undivided union of body and soul is complete life imaginable, is discernible in many allusions and stories of Translation that imply that conception. Amphiaraos, the most illustrious of those who have been translated to everlasting life, is specially dear to the heart of the Theban poet, and is glorified more than once in the language of unaffected faith in such miracles.27 But, further, even when death has occurred in the meantime, elevation to a higher life remains possible—even beyond the heights of the “Hero”. Semele lives for ever, though she died under the crash of the thunder-bolt.28 The barrier between men and gods is not insuperable; we can distantly approach the immortals not only in greatness of mind, but in bodily vigour.29 One mother gave birth to both races, though the gulf between them is indeed a deep one; man is nought—a shadow’s dream-image; for the gods the brazen heavens remain for ever as an unconquerable stronghold.30 Only a miracle of divine interference with the lawful and normal course of nature, can raise the individual soul to the everlasting life of the gods and Heroes.

An elevated state of existence, after leaving this world, is reserved for the Heroes alone. The belief in the existence, significance, and power of these enlightened spirits dominates; it comes to life vividly through the words and stories of the poet throughout his work. Moreover, the ancient idea—that only through the complete union of body and soul can true life be envisioned, a notion made untenable by the belief in Heroes—is evident in many references and tales of Translation that suggest this idea. Amphiaraos, the most renowned of those who have been transformed to eternal life, is particularly cherished by the Theban poet and is celebrated multiple times with genuine faith in such miracles. However, even when death has taken place, ascension to a higher existence remains possible—even surpassing the heights of the “Hero.” Semele lives on forever, despite having died in the midst of the thunderbolt's strike. The divide between humans and gods is not insurmountable; we can eventually approach the immortals not only through greatness of mind, but also in physical strength. One mother gave birth to both lineages, although the divide between them is indeed profound; man is nothing—a mere shadow's fleeting image; for the gods, the solid heavens stand eternally as an unconquerable fortress. Only a miracle of divine intervention in the ordinary course of nature can elevate an individual soul to the eternal life of the gods and Heroes.

Such visions as these could be indulged in by one who still 415 kept his feet firmly fixed upon the ground of popular belief. And yet side by side with them in Pindar’s works are to be found descriptions of quite another order in which is expressed, with elaborate fullness and dogmatic exactitude, a complete doctrine of the nature, destiny, and fate of the soul; passages in which, in spite of some little poetic licence in detail, a well ordered and, in the main, consistent whole is pictured.

Such visions could be entertained by someone who still 415 had their feet firmly planted in common belief. Yet alongside them in Pindar’s works are descriptions of a different kind, where a complete doctrine about the nature, destiny, and fate of the soul is expressed with detailed fullness and precise certainty; sections where, despite some minor poetic liberties in detail, a well-structured and mostly consistent whole is depicted.

The Soul, the “Image of Life”, the other Self of the living and visible man, sleeps while the limbs of man are active; when the individual is asleep it shows him dream-visions of the future.31 This psyche32 which during the waking and conscious hours of the man is itself lying in the darkness of unconsciousness, is far from being the totality of mental powers gathered together in a single creature, or at any rate, in a single concept, such as the philosophers as well as the everyday use of the word at that period understood by the name “psyche”. Here, again, the name once more denotes the double of mankind dwelling within the living man such as it was known to primeval popular belief and to the Homeric poems. A theological meaning has, however, been added to it. This “Image” of man, we are told, “is alone descended from the gods,” and with this the reason also is discovered why the soul-image alone after the destruction of the body by death remains alive.33

The Soul, the “Image of Life”, the other Self of a living and visible person, sleeps while the person's limbs are active; when the individual is asleep, it shows him dream-visions of the future.31 This psyche32 which during the waking and conscious hours of a person is itself lying in the darkness of unconsciousness, is far from being the totality of mental powers gathered together in a single being, or at least, in a single concept, as both philosophers and common usage of the word at that time understood by the name “psyche”. Here, again, the term denotes the double of humanity residing within the living person, much like it was known in ancient popular belief and in the Homeric poems. However, a theological meaning has been added to it. This “Image” of humanity, we are told, “is alone descended from the gods,” and with this, the reason is also revealed as to why the soul-image alone continues to exist after the body is destroyed by death.33

Derived from the gods and therefore eternally exempt from destruction, everlasting and immortal, the soul is none the less condemned to finiteness; it dwells within the mortal body of man. This is the result of the “ancient guilt” of which, quite in the manner of theological poetry, Pindar also speaks.34 After the death of the body it is to await in Hades the stern sentence that “One” shall pronounce over its earthly deeds.35 For the condemned there is in store “affliction past beholding”36 in deep Tartaros, “where the slow rivers of murky night spit out endless darkness,” and forgetfulness encloses the victims.37 The just enter into the subterranean places of bliss where the sun gives them light when he has set upon earth.38 In flowery meadows they enjoy an existence of resplendent idleness, such as only the Greek imagination, nourished amid the artistic surroundings of Greek life, could describe without falling into emptiness and futility.

Derived from the gods and thus forever free from destruction, everlasting and immortal, the soul is still stuck in finiteness; it resides within the mortal body of a human. This is the result of the “ancient guilt” that Pindar also speaks of, much like theological poetry. After the body dies, it must wait in Hades for the harsh verdict that “One” will pronounce based on its earthly actions. For the condemned, there awaits “affliction past bearing” in deep Tartaros, “where the slow rivers of murky night spit out endless darkness,” and forgetfulness surrounds the victims. The just enter into the hidden places of bliss where the sun provides them light once it has set on earth. In flowery meadows, they enjoy a life of radiant idleness, a state only the Greek imagination, enriched by the artistic aspects of Greek life, could describe without falling into emptiness and futility.

But the soul has not even so found its last resting place. It must again give life to a body and not until it has completed upon earth a third faultless life can it hope for an end of its earthly course of being.39 The conditions of each new life 416 upon earth depend upon the degree of purity that the soul has achieved in its previous lifetimes. When at last the Queen of the Underworld considers that its “ancient guilt” has been atoned for, she sends forth the souls after the ninth year40 of their last sojourn in Hades once more to live in the upper world, this time in happiness. Here they pass through one more lifetime as kings, mighty men of valour, and Wise Men.41 Then at last they escape from the necessity of earthly rebirth. As “Heroes” they are honoured among men;42 and they have therefore entered into a state of higher being which the popular belief of Pindar’s time ascribed not only to the souls of the great ancestral figures of the past, but also to many who had departed hence in more recent times after a life of valour and service.43 Now they are beyond the reach of Hades as much as of the world of men. Faith seeks them in “Islands of the Blest” far out in Okeanos; thither, to the “Citadel of Kronos” they travel on the “Way of Zeus”44 and enjoy, in company with the great ones of the past, under the protection of Kronos45 and his assessor Rhadamanthys, a life of bliss for ever undisturbed.

But the soul hasn't found its final resting place yet. It must give life to a body again, and it won't be able to end its earthly existence until it has completed a third flawless life on earth. 39 The circumstances of each new life 416 on earth depend on the level of purity the soul has achieved in its previous lives. When the Queen of the Underworld finally believes that its "ancient guilt" has been resolved, she allows the souls, after the ninth year 40 of their last stay in Hades, to live again in the upper world, this time happily. Here, they go through one more lifetime as kings, mighty warriors, and wise individuals. 41 Then, at last, they break free from the cycle of earthly rebirth. As "Heroes," they are honored among people; 42 and they have entered a state of higher existence that the popular belief of Pindar’s time attributed not only to the souls of great ancestral figures but also to many who had recently passed after lives of bravery and service. 43 Now they are beyond the reach of Hades as well as the world of humans. Faith seeks them in the "Islands of the Blest," far out in the ocean; they travel there, to the "Citadel of Kronos," on the "Way of Zeus" 44 and enjoy, alongside the great figures of the past, under the protection of Kronos 45 and his associate Rhadamanthys, a life of bliss that is forever undisturbed.

Such conceptions of the origin, fortunes, and ultimate destiny of the soul, the more they diverge from commonly held opinions, the more certainly must they be regarded as being part of the private and real persuasion of the poet himself. The poet, who on other occasions when he makes passing and casual reference to the things of the next world accommodates himself to the traditional view, gives himself up willingly to such hopes and aspirations where the circumstances of his song provided an opportunity of dealing at length with such matters—especially in hymns of mourning for the dead. He may have paid attention in such poems to the special opinions of those who were to be the first hearers of his song. Theron, the ruler of Akragas, to whom was dedicated the second Olympian Ode of Victory that deals so fully with the hope of bliss to come, was an old man whose thoughts might well be occupied with the life after death.46 In this case, therefore, we may presume perhaps the special interest of the person whose praises are sung in these reflections that lead so far away from the commonly accepted view of the Soul.47 But that Pindar, proud and self-willed, conscious of specific knowledge and proud of that consciousness, should have given expression to strange doctrine so foreign to popular ideas simply out of complaisance to another’s will, and in subservience to another man’s belief—that is quite unthinkable. It is rather the substance of what he believes himself 417 and has achieved by his own struggles that in a solemn hour he reveals for a moment to like-minded friends.

Such ideas about the origin, fate, and ultimate purpose of the soul, the more they stray from common beliefs, the more they must be seen as part of the poet's personal and genuine convictions. The poet, who at times casually references the afterlife, usually aligns with traditional views, but embraces these hopes and aspirations when his song allows for an in-depth exploration of such themes—especially in elegies for the deceased. He may have considered the unique views of those who were likely the first to hear his song. Theron, the ruler of Akragas, to whom the second Olympian Ode of Victory is dedicated, addresses the hope of future bliss; he was an elderly man who might have been preoccupied with thoughts of life after death. In this instance, it’s reasonable to assume a particular interest in the reflections that diverge from conventional views of the soul. However, it seems unbelievable that Pindar, proud and determined, aware of specific knowledge and proud of that awareness, would express a viewpoint so different from popular beliefs simply to cater to someone else's wishes or be compliant with another's beliefs. Instead, it is likely that what he shares in a solemn moment reflects what he genuinely believes and has earned through his own struggles, revealing it to friends who share his mindset.

The different elements out of which Pindar has composed his special view are not hard to distinguish. He is following theological doctrine in what he tells of the divine origin of the soul, its wanderings through several bodies, the judgment in Hades, the special place assigned to the just, and that of the wicked. But it is layman’s theology that he is propounding; it does not bind itself to a single unalterable formula, and betrays throughout that its exponent is a poet. Pindar, throughout the whole of his poetic activity, combines the office of singer with that of professional teacher, more especially where he has to speak of the things of an invisible divine world. But for all his didactic professionalism he remains the poet, for whom as depository and trustee of the Myth it is out of the question to abandon the traditional, whether in legend or belief. His task is to keep pure what has been handed down to him, to make it more profound, perhaps to supplement and complete it, but with all this to justify it. Thus, poetic legend and popular belief enter even into his theologian’s doctrine of the Soul; the Islands of the Blest, the elevation of man to Hero—these were things he could not give up.

The different elements that Pindar has put together for his unique perspective are not hard to identify. He follows theological ideas when he talks about the divine origin of the soul, its journeys through various bodies, judgment in the afterlife, the special place for the righteous, and that for the wicked. However, he’s presenting a layman’s understanding of theology; it doesn’t stick to a single, rigid formula and clearly shows that its source is a poet. Throughout his poetic career, Pindar merges the role of singer with that of a professional teacher, especially when discussing the unseen divine realm. Yet, despite his didactic approach, he remains a poet who, as a keeper of the Myth, cannot abandon the traditional narratives, whether they are in legend or belief. His role is to preserve what has been passed down to him, to deepen it, perhaps to add to and complete it, but always to validate it. So, poetic legend and popular belief also play a part in his theological concept of the Soul; the Islands of the Blest and the elevation of man to Hero—these were things he could not let go of.

From what particular direction Pindar’s theological interests may have come to him we cannot say with precision or certainty. Orphic as well as Pythagorean doctrines may have come to his notice in Sicily whither he made repeated visits after 477 B.C.48 For both sects this country was the original nursery and breeding ground.

From what specific source Pindar's theological interests may have originated, we can't say for sure. He may have encountered Orphic and Pythagorean teachings during his repeated visits to Sicily after 477 BCE48 This region was the original home and breeding ground for both sects.

There, too, the poet may perhaps have (even at that date) met with certain varieties of the Orphic mystical doctrine which, like his own views, were intermingled with elements taken from conventional mythology. Examples of this type of Orphic mysticism allied with foreign elements are the verses which, inscribed upon gold tablets, were found not long ago in graves near the ancient Sybaris.49 Three of these poems begin with phrases that are common to them all, and imply the same underlying conceptions; after that they part company and represent two different views. The soul of the dead person50 thus addresses itself to the Queen of the lower world, and the other gods of the depths below: “I draw near to you purified and born of pure parents.”51 It belongs then to a mortal who, like his parents before him, has been “purified” in the sacred mysteries of a religious association.52 It claims also to be descended from the blessed race of the deities of the lower 418 world.53 “Lightning robbed me of life,” so one of the versions goes on,54 “and so I escaped from the Circle, the burdensome, the grievous”. In these words purely Orphic belief is expressed: the Soul has now at last escaped entirely from the “Circle of Births”,55 and it enters as it tells us “with speedy feet into the wished-for precinct”,56 and buries itself in the bosom of the Queen of the Underworld.57 It is the latter, probably, who at the end greets the liberated soul with the words: “Fortunate and to be called Blessed art thou; now shalt thou be, instead of a mortal—a god.”

There, too, the poet may have (even at that time) encountered certain variations of the Orphic mystical doctrine which, like his own beliefs, were mixed with elements drawn from traditional mythology. Examples of this type of Orphic mysticism combined with foreign elements are the verses inscribed on gold tablets that were discovered recently in graves near the ancient Sybaris.49 Three of these poems start with phrases that are common to all of them, suggesting the same underlying ideas; after that, they diverge and represent two different perspectives. The soul of the deceased50 thus addresses the Queen of the underworld and the other gods of the depths below: “I approach you purified and born of pure parents.”51 It belongs then to a mortal who, like his parents before him, has been “purified” in the sacred mysteries of a religious group.52 It also claims to descend from the blessed race of the deities of the lower 418 world.53 “Lightning took my life,” one version continues,54 “and so I escaped from the Circle, the burdensome, the painful.” In these words, purely Orphic belief is expressed: the Soul has finally escaped entirely from the “Circle of Births,”55 and it enters, as it tells us, “with speedy feet into the desired sanctuary,”56 and sinks into the embrace of the Queen of the Underworld.57 It is she, probably, who at the end welcomes the liberated soul with the words: “Fortunate and to be called Blessed are you; now you shall be, instead of a mortal—a god.”

Much less exalted are the hopes expressed in the other two versions of the mystic document—two versions that resemble each other in most essentials. Here the soul asserts that it has done penance for unrighteous deeds; now it appears before the revered Persephoneia to implore her graciously to send it to the dwelling places of the pure and the holy.58

Much lower are the hopes reflected in the other two versions of the mystical document—two versions that are quite similar in most important aspects. Here, the soul claims that it has repented for its sinful actions; now it stands before the esteemed Persephoneia to humbly ask her to send it to the homes of the pure and the holy.58

How are we to explain the discrepancy? It would indeed be possible to explain the more restrained version as that of a sect whose members were less confident of their own divine origin and of the necessary return of the soul at last to its enfranchised divine state. It is much more probable, however—since in fact the presupposition of the divine nature of the soul and its kinship with the divine is really made in both cases and with the same words—that we here have to do with the beliefs of one and the same sect, and that the varying heights of felicity aspired to correspond to different stages of the process of redemption. He who through participation in the sacred mysteries has atoned for the ancient guilt, can be admitted by the goddess into the paradise of the blest in the midst of Hades. But he must still, in subsequent rebirths upon earth first complete the cycle before he can be fully released from rebirth and become once more what he was at the beginning, entirely a god. The dead man of the first tablet has reached the final goal of his pilgrimage; the other two have only reached an intermediate resting place.59 Another inscription, found in a grave of the same neighbourhood,60 by its use of a mystic formula61 appended also to the first version of the above-mentioned poems, reveals itself as an expression of faith deriving from the same sect. Among a variety of disconnected instructions and appeals to the dead,62 strung together with no particular arrangement, it contains the following statement: “a god hast thou become instead of a mortal”. This then always remained the crowning point of the salvation promised by the sect. 419

How can we explain the difference? One possible explanation is that the more reserved version comes from a sect whose members aren't as sure of their divine origins and the necessary return of the soul to its liberated divine state. However, it's much more likely—since both versions assume the divine nature of the soul and its connection to the divine using the same terminology—that we're dealing with the beliefs of the same sect, and the varying levels of happiness they aspire to correspond to different phases of the redemption process. Those who, through participation in the sacred mysteries, have made amends for past wrongs can be welcomed by the goddess into the paradise of the blessed in the depths of Hades. Yet, they must still, in future rebirths on earth, complete the cycle before being fully freed from rebirth and returning to their original state as a god. The soul in the first tablet has reached the ultimate goal of its journey; the other two have only reached an intermediate resting place. 59 Another inscription, found in a grave nearby, 60 uses a mystic formula 61 that also appears in the first version of the previously mentioned poems, indicating it stems from the same sect. Among various disconnected instructions and appeals to the dead, 62 randomly strung together, it includes the following statement: “a god hast thou become instead of a mortal.” This, then, remained the ultimate promise of salvation offered by the sect. 419

In the cult and beliefs of this sect which thus with divided voice speaks to us in these verses, the worship of the ancient Greek divinities of the Underworld (among whom Dionysos is not this time included) was fused with the boldest conception belonging to the Dionysiac mysteries: the confident assurance that the divine nature of the soul must in the end break through, purified and triumphant over the earthliness that obscured it. Pindar in another, but not very different, way has brought the same elements into conjunction. One would indeed like to be able to estimate the influence which his doctrine, which lay so close to his own heart, may have exercised on the hearers and readers of his poems. He was at once something more and something less than a theological teacher. Never again among the Greeks did the blessed life of the sanctified soul receive such majestic expression, clothed in such ample and resplendent diction, as that which poured so freely from the heart of this richly gifted poet. But though the poet may have touched the heart of his hearer and tempted his imagination to stray along the path laid out for him, yet it cannot have been easy (and perhaps the greatness of the poet’s triumph almost made it harder) permanently to mistake the magic gleam of poetry for the sunlight of reality. One may doubt whether the poems in which Pindar recounted his dreams of future blessedness can have found many hearers in whom they awakened not merely æsthetic satisfaction, but belief in the literal truth of the teaching, in the reality of those beautiful, dim, haloed figures.

In the beliefs of this sect that speaks to us in these verses, the worship of the ancient Greek gods of the Underworld (with the exception of Dionysos this time) merged with the boldest ideas from the Dionysiac mysteries: the confident belief that the soul's divine nature will ultimately emerge, purified and victorious over the earthly distractions that obscure it. Pindar has, in a different but similar way, combined these same elements. One would really like to know how much his teachings, which were so close to his heart, influenced the audience and readers of his poems. He was both more and less than a theological teacher. No other Greek poet expressed the blessed life of the sanctified soul with such grandeur and rich language as this exceptionally talented poet. However, while the poet may have touched the hearts of his listeners and inspired their imaginations to wander along the path he laid out, it likely wasn’t easy (and perhaps the poet’s greatness made it even harder) to confuse the enchanting light of poetry with the bright light of reality. It’s questionable whether the poems in which Pindar shared his visions of future bliss truly resonated with many listeners beyond just aesthetic enjoyment and sparked a genuine belief in the literal truth of his teachings, in the reality of those beautiful, ethereal figures shrouded in a halo.

§ 3

But perhaps by the expression of such doubts we do less than justice to the influence which a Greek poet might exercise upon the minds and dispositions of his hearers. Greek popular opinion was very much inclined to place the poet on a pedestal to which his modern representative would hardly care to aspire, and to which at any rate he could never attain. The purely artistic value and importance of a poem did not seem to be impaired by the demand that it should at the same time instruct and edify. The poet was to be the teacher of his people in an age when, in the conditions of Greek life, the people had no other instructor. He was to be a teacher in the highest sense of all when, speaking in the language of the most exalted poetry, he dealt with the doubts and certainties of religion and the relationship between religion and morality. In these matters he could supplement out of the wealth of 420 his own far-reaching reflection what was lacking in the public morality of the time through the absence of an official, authoritative religious Book. By giving them intelligible and memorable expression, together with greater cohesion and unity, he could strengthen the foundations of the common stock of moral ideas that had been evolved in the course of social and city life. He might also expand and give greater depth to the ideas of popular morality, tempering them in the fire of his own more rigorous thought and interpreting and refining them from the heights of a more elevated understanding of the divine. What he thus gave back to the people stamped with the impress of his own very personal temperament and outlook, no longer remained the casual opinion of a single individual, but took root in suitably constituted minds and became for many a valued possession, an enduring addition to their consciousness.

But maybe by expressing such doubts, we underestimate the impact a Greek poet could have on the thoughts and feelings of his audience. Greek public opinion often placed the poet on a pedestal that modern representatives would hardly want to reach, and one that they could never really attain. The artistic value and importance of a poem didn't seem to be diminished by the expectation that it should also teach and uplift. The poet was meant to be the teacher for his people in a time when, given the circumstances of Greek life, there were no other educators available. He was to be a teacher in the highest sense, discussing the uncertainties and truths of religion and the connection between religion and morality in the language of the most elevated poetry. In these areas, he could supplement what was lacking in the public morality of the time due to the absence of an official, authoritative religious text, using the richness of 420 as a basis for his far-reaching reflections. By providing clear and memorable expression, along with greater coherence and unity, he could reinforce the common set of moral ideas that had developed through social and city life. He could also broaden and deepen the concepts of popular morality, refining them through the rigor of his own thoughts and interpreting them from a higher understanding of the divine. What he returned to the people, marked by his own unique temperament and perspective, transformed into something more than just one person's casual opinion; it took root in receptive minds and became a treasured part of their consciousness.

It was not until the rise in later times of a fully developed philosophy extending its range of interpretation to the whole of life that poetry was deprived of its special office of instructress to the aspiring minds among the people.63 Poetry had always been willing to exercise this function, but never so decidedly or with such fully conscious purpose as in the times of transition at the beginning of which Pindar lived—the transition from an unsophisticated faith in the traditional view of all things visible and invisible to a fresh stabilization of belief secured by, and resting upon, philosophic conviction. The need felt for the readjustment or verification of the ancestral or traditional forms of belief was vividly awakened, and it was still only poetry that could extend the light of its teaching to illuminate the minds of whole classes of the population. The influence of the poets must have increased in proportion as the numbers increased of those who were ready to receive the special bounty which they were able to offer. But if the influence wielded by Pindar, the Pan-Hellenic poet of the great Festivals, as the teacher of his people was, as we have seen, considerable, a very wide field indeed for the propagation of fruitful ideas lay open to the Attic tragedians in the huge concourse of the people which flocked together to hear their creations—a multitude which seemed all the greater for being confined within a narrower space. The poets themselves frequently allow it to be seen how seriously they regarded themselves as the teachers of their public, and the people admitted their claims. All men expected and demanded instruction from the word of the poet—the highest instruction from the highest poetry.64 We shall not be much mistaken 421 if we believe that the opinions and reflections to which Aeschylus, Sophokles, and not least Euripides, gave utterance in their tragic drama did not remain the sole property of those in whose minds they had first arisen.

It wasn't until a fully developed philosophy emerged later on, interpreting all aspects of life, that poetry lost its unique role as a guide for the aspiring minds of the people.63 Poetry had always been eager to fulfill this role, but never quite as explicitly or with such clear intention as during the transitional period when Pindar lived—this was the time when people moved from a naive belief in traditional views of everything seen and unseen to a new foundation of faith grounded in philosophical understanding. The need to reassess or validate old beliefs was vividly felt, and it was only poetry that could shed light on these ideas for the masses. The influence of poets must have increased as more people became ready to embrace the special insights they offered. While Pindar, the Pan-Hellenic poet of the great Festivals, wielded significant influence as a teacher of his people, the Attic tragedians had an even broader opportunity to spread impactful ideas to the large audiences that gathered to hear their works—a crowd that felt even larger because it was packed into a smaller space. The poets often showed how seriously they viewed themselves as educators for their audience, and the people acknowledged this. Everyone expected and sought guidance from the words of the poet—the highest instruction from the finest poetry.64 We wouldn’t be far off if we believed that the ideas and insights expressed by Aeschylus, Sophocles, and especially Euripides in their tragic dramas did not remain exclusive to the thoughts of those who first conceived them.

§ 4

The Attic Tragedy of the fifth century must of its own accord, even if the conscious purpose of the dramatists had not tended in the same direction, have developed into an artistic product based on psychological interest. The real theatre of that drama must inevitably have become the interior of its hero’s mind.

The Attic Tragedy of the fifth century, even without the deliberate intention of the playwrights, must have naturally evolved into an artistic form focused on psychological themes. The true stage for that drama had to inevitably become the inner workings of its hero’s mind.

The tragic poet attempted something hitherto unknown. The characters and events of ancient legend or history which had passed shadowlike before the minds of the hearers or readers of all earlier poetry, at the mercy of those hearers’ own private and variously limited imagination—these same events and characters were now to take form and body and appear visibly before the eyes of all beholders alike in equal clearness. What had hitherto seemed a dream-vision of the imagination now visibly presented itself to the eyes of the beholder, unchanging, precise, independent of the limitations of intellect among the audience, a concrete and self-moving object of waking perception. Thus reawakened to a palpable and fully realized life, the myth was seen in a new light. What in it was mere incident became subordinated to the personality of the man who plays his part in these events before our eyes, and whose importance and content is not exhausted in the single particular action. The old legend in becoming drama has undergone an extension both spatial and temporal, and even in externals the plot that unfolds itself in a series of momentary acts plays the least part in the story. The speeches and counter-speeches of the hero and the other actors who take part in the story were bound to take up the greater part of the time. Motives of action, expressed, debated and fought out in words, become more important than their eventual outcome in passionate deed or mortal woe. With the advance of artistic skill the intellect seeks to grasp the permanent outlines of the character that in the given circumstances can be moved by particular motives to particular acts. Thus, the complete materialization of the myth leads to its complete spiritualization. The eyes and mind of the beholder are directed less to the external events—these, being familiar from the ancient legend, could 422 awaken little curiosity—and more to the inward meaning and import of what the hero does and suffers.

The tragic poet tried something completely new. The characters and events from ancient legends or history that once floated like shadows in the minds of listeners or readers of earlier poetry, relying on their individual and limited imaginations—now these same events and characters would take shape and become visible to everyone, equally clear to all. What was once just a dream or vision in the imagination now presented itself to the audience's eyes, unchanging, precise, and independent of the audience's limitations, as a tangible and self-moving object of perception. Thus, the myth was reawakened to a vivid and fully realized existence, seen in a new light. What was once just a sequence of events became focused on the personality of the person who plays their part in these occurrences before us, whose significance and essence go beyond a single action. The old legend, as it transitioned into drama, experienced both a spatial and temporal expansion, and even in its external elements, the unfolding plot in a series of moments plays the smallest role. The dialogues and discussions among the hero and other characters took up most of the time. The motivations for actions, expressed, debated, and fought over in words, became more important than their ultimate outcomes in passionate deeds or tragic consequences. With the advancement of artistic skill, the intellect seeks to understand the lasting traits of a character who, in specific circumstances, can be driven by particular motives to perform certain actions. Thus, the complete realization of the myth leads to its full spiritual development. The audience's attention is drawn less to the external events—these are familiar from the ancient legend and evoke little curiosity—and more to the deeper meanings and implications of what the hero does and endures.

And it was here that the dramatic poet was faced with his special and peculiar problem. What was to happen in his drama was settled out of hand by the course of the ancient legend (in a few cases by the course of historical events) and the lines along which his invention must move were planned out for him in advance. To give life to the personages of the drama, motivation and justification to the events of the drama—that was his particular business. But in this he was thrown entirely upon his own resources. Even if he could he was not permitted to derive the inner motive forces of the action from the real modes of feeling and thinking that had belonged to the distant past in which the myth had first been conceived. Such motives would have remained unintelligible to the audience, and his play would have been stillborn. But on the other hand, how was he to make plausible and intelligible to the vastly different mentality and changed feelings of the age in which he lived actions which really sprang from the habits and moral ideas of a long since vanished age? It is open to him (if he is not content to be a mere annalist simply stringing together bare events) to take the actual incident given him by the mythical legend and set over against it the actor in the story whose emotions are those of a modern man, and upon whose shoulders the burden of the event is laid; he may represent this opposition as beyond reconciliation, and so lead to the most simple and overwhelming of tragic conflicts. This simple opposition of character and destiny which places both the poet and his hero—another Hamlet—in a position of direct hostility to the mythological background can, however, never become the rule. It is the business of the poet as far as possible to assimilate and make his own the spirit that actually called forth the dark and cruel legend of the past, while yet remaining true to the mode of perception proper to his own time. He must manage to leave undisturbed the full primitive sense of the mythical story and bring it about that by its marriage with the spirit of a later age its meaning is not destroyed but deepened. He is committed to the search for an adjustment between the mental attitudes of an older and a newer age.

And it was here that the dramatic poet faced his unique challenge. What happened in his play was determined right away by the ancient legend (and in some cases by actual historical events), with the direction of his creativity laid out for him in advance. His main task was to bring the characters to life and provide motivation and justification for the events. However, he had to rely entirely on his own creativity for this. Even if he wanted to, he couldn't use the genuine feelings and thoughts from the distant past when the myth was first created, as those would be meaningless to the audience, resulting in his play failing to resonate. On the other hand, he needed to find a way to make actions that originated from the customs and moral beliefs of a long-gone era believable and understandable to the very different mindset and emotions of his own time. He could, if he didn’t just want to chronicle events, take the actual incidents from the myth and juxtapose them with a character whose emotions reflect those of a modern person, burdened by the events. He could depict this conflict as irreconcilable, leading to a straightforward and intense tragic clash. However, this straightforward clash of character and fate, which puts both the poet and his hero—another Hamlet—opposed to the mythological backdrop, can’t be the norm. It is the poet's job to try to understand and embody the spirit that created the dark and harsh legends of the past while still being true to the perceptions of his own time. He must find a way to preserve the raw essence of the myth and ensure that its meaning is not lost but rather deepened through its connection with the spirit of a later age. He is tasked with reconciling the mental perspectives of an older and a newer era.

Such an adjustment came most easily to Aeschylus and satisfied the needs of his temperament. As one who had grown to manhood in the Athens of the period before the Persian wars his own character had its roots in ancient and traditional modes of thought. These he built up under the guiding 423 influence of his own special ways of thinking and feeling into a new and loftier whole: to corroborate this whole, which appeared to him as a law of the moral world, by reference to typical examples taken from mythology—examples chosen by him with deliberate care to serve as subjects of his dramatic poetry—this was one of the chief aims of his art. To the plot in its moral—nay, its religious—sense, all his thoughts are directed; the characters of the actors themselves are only illuminated from the standpoint of this special interest; their wider, independent existence outside the life of the drama which completely envelops them is not meant to draw attention to itself. He himself gives us the right, in studying his plays, to leave out of sight for a moment the representational aspect of the particular and the personal—all that in fact makes them essentially works of art—in order to observe more closely the under-current of generalized belief which we may reasonably call the ethic and theology of the poet.

Such an adjustment came most easily to Aeschylus and fulfilled his temperament's needs. Growing up in Athens before the Persian wars, his character was rooted in ancient and traditional ways of thinking. He developed these under the influence of his unique thoughts and feelings into a new and elevated whole. One of his main artistic goals was to support this whole, which he saw as a moral law, by referencing typical examples from mythology—carefully chosen by him to serve as subjects for his dramatic poetry. All his thoughts are directed toward the plot’s moral—and even religious—meanings; the characters are only illuminated from this specific perspective. Their broader, independent lives outside the drama that completely wraps them are not intended to attract attention. He allows us, in studying his plays, to momentarily set aside the representational aspects of the personal and particular—all the elements that make them true works of art—to closely examine the underlying current of generalized belief that we could reasonably call the poet's ethic and theology.

Behind the living tissue of his artistic creation Aeschylus allows us to perceive pretty clearly the firm outlines of his own ethical and religious convictions. He fuses together elements prescribed to him from without with that which was dictated by his own spirit. What is prescribed to him by legend—which he allows to run its full course, in strictly dramatic form and by preference as a trilogy, a form in this case uniquely adapted to the subject—is a history that deals with the continued operation of the forces of evil and suffering upon several generations of a family, persisting from father to son and from son to son’s son. The belief also in such interconnexion of human destinies is prescribed to him from without. That the sins of the ancestors were visited upon their descendants here upon earth was an ancient article of faith especially strong in Attica.65 What Aeschylus contributes on his part is the unswerving conviction that the son and grandson of the sinner are punished for their own sin too. Suffering is punishment,66 and suffering would not have overtaken Oedipus, nor the sons of Oedipus, if Laïos had been the only guilty one—if their own sin had not deserved punishment.

Behind the living tissue of his artistic creation, Aeschylus lets us see the clear outlines of his own ethical and religious beliefs. He combines elements given to him from outside with what was inspired by his own spirit. The stories dictated by legend—which he allows to unfold fully, in a strictly dramatic form and preferably as a trilogy, a structure uniquely suited to the subject—tell a history that addresses the ongoing effects of evil and suffering on several generations of a family, passed down from father to son and from son to grandson. The belief in the interconnectedness of human destinies is also imposed upon him from outside. The idea that the sins of the ancestors are visited upon their descendants here on earth was an old tenet of faith, particularly strong in Attica. What Aeschylus adds is an unwavering belief that the son and grandson of the sinner are punished for their own sins too. Suffering is punishment, and suffering would not have come upon Oedipus, nor the sons of Oedipus, if Laïos had been the only one at fault—if their own sins had not deserved punishment.

And yet it does not lie within their power to choose whether the guilt shall be theirs or not: they cannot escape the deed of sin. How, we may ask, can a guilty deed be necessitated, imposed upon the guilty one by the decree of a higher power, and yet at the same time the fault of the doer of the deed, as though he had acted of his own free will? 424 The question is a perplexing and a formidable one, and it was by no means unnoticed by the poet. Behind the external apparatus of myth he finds himself faced by the problem of the freedom or determination of man’s will, which, as civilization and culture advance, feels itself morally responsible for every decision. He finds a way out of the difficulty in the view that it is not merely the deed of wickedness itself, but the conscious decision that leads up to the deed that arises out of the family inheritance of crime. The conscious choice and decision, though regarded as necessary, seemed to demonstrate fully the personal guilt and responsibility of the doer.67 The cloud of evil that proceeds from the deed of the ancestor casts a dark shadow also over the minds of his son and his son’s son. Not from his own mind or character does the will to do wrong take its origin. The noble, pure and resolute Eteokles, the model of intelligent manhood, the shield and protection of his people, falls in a moment, a victim to ominous destiny; his clear-sighted spirit is darkened, he gives himself up—his better self—for lost,68 and rushes upon his doom with awful resolve. The “sins derived from his ancestors”69 drive him on. Then, and not till then, is the full measure of penance at last paid for the crime done by the ancestor;70 his descendants are his representatives, and become guilty on his behalf and then, for their own guilt as well as his, they suffer retribution. Divinity, or a spirit of vengeance sent with a divine mission, drives the victims burdened with the inheritance of crime to the criminal deed. The divine guidance is actuated no longer, as in ancient and undying popular belief, by personal desire of vengeance, anger or malice,71 but by divine justice, acting with “just deceit”,72 that the measure of guilt may be fulfilled, and that the divine will to justice may have a means to complete satisfaction. The evil Spirit of the House assists Klytaimnestra to conceive the thought of murdering her husband;73 God himself guides and urges forward Orestes to the act of matricide which he plans and carries out with fully conscious purpose—a crime that is also a duty. To the poet the old ideas of the duty of avenging murder are a very living reality. The right to worship and cult possessed by the souls, their claim to vengeance when they have been violently done to death, their ghostly influence exerted upon the life and destinies of their immediate kinsfolk upon whom the duty of taking vengeance rests—all these things are for him not the obsolete fancies of an older generation but true and awful realities.74 Whole dramas, the Choephoroi and the Eumenides, for 425 instance, would appear as a meaningless beating of the air if they were not animated and made significant by unaltered faith in the right and the might of the souls, the reality and potency of the daimonic counsel, the Erinyes,75 who appear on behalf of the murdered mother. And now at last light breaks through the dark and clouded sky of awful imagination: where Duty and Crime have become inextricably confused, divine grace, though yielding nothing of its rights, finds at last a solution.

And yet it isn't up to them to decide if the guilt should belong to them or not: they can't escape the act of sin. How, we might wonder, can a guilty action be compelled, imposed on the guilty person by a higher power's decree, and still be considered the fault of the one who commits it, as if they acted entirely on their own free will? 424 This question is both complicated and daunting, and it certainly didn’t go unnoticed by the poet. Behind the surface of myth, he confronts the question of human free will versus determinism, which, as society and culture evolve, increasingly feels morally accountable for every choice made. He finds a way out of this dilemma by suggesting that it’s not just the wicked deed itself, but the conscious decision leading to the act that comes from a familial legacy of wrongdoing. The conscious choice and decision, though seen as necessary, clearly demonstrate the personal guilt and responsibility of the perpetrator.67 The cloud of evil stemming from an ancestor's actions also casts a dark shadow over the minds of their children and grandchildren. The desire to do wrong doesn’t arise from their own thoughts or character. The noble, pure, and determined Eteokles, a model of thoughtful manhood, protector of his people, falls in an instant, succumbing to a grim fate; his clear mind becomes clouded, and he loses his better self,68 rushing headlong towards his doom with terrifying resolve. The “sins inherited from his ancestors” 69 push him onward. Only then, and not before, is the full price of atonement finally paid for the ancestor's crime; 70 his descendants act as his representatives and become guilty on his behalf, suffering consequences for both their own guilt and his. Divine forces, or a spirit of vengeance assigned with a divine purpose, compel those burdened with inherited wrongdoing towards the criminal act. Divine guidance is no longer motivated, as in ancient and enduring popular belief, by personal desires for vengeance, anger, or malice, 71 but by divine justice, acting with “just deceit,” 72 allowing for the fulfillment of guilt and providing the divine will for justice with a means of complete satisfaction. The evil Spirit of the House helps Klytaimnestra to conceive the idea of murdering her husband; 73 God himself directs and propels Orestes to commit the act of murdering his mother, which he plans and executes with full awareness—a crime that is also seen as a duty. To the poet, the old beliefs in the duty of avenging murder are a very real concern. The right to worship and the claim for vengeance held by souls who have been violently killed, their ghostly influence on the lives and fates of their relatives who bear the responsibility of avenging them—all of these are not outdated fantasies of a bygone era but true and terrible realities.74 Entire plays, such as the Choephoroi and the Eumenides, for 425 example, would appear as meaningless noise if they weren’t inspired and given significance by an unchanging belief in the authority and power of the souls, the reality and effectiveness of the daimonic counsel, the Erinyes,75 who advocate for the murdered mother. And now, at last, light breaks through the dark, stormy skies of dreadful imagination: where Duty and Crime have become hopelessly tangled, divine grace, while giving nothing up of its rights, finally finds a solution.

All these things, however—conflict and solution, crime and its expiation in ever-renewed crime and the suffering that arises thence—fulfil themselves in this world. Guilt is avenged always upon earth. The “other” world is by no means an indispensable link in this chain of conceptions and fancies; the poet’s view is rarely turned in that direction. Speculation upon the state of the soul after death, upon a blessed life in the kingdom of the spirits,76 does not interest him. Only such portions of the eschatological imaginings of the theologians as might serve the purposes of moral inspiration or support, found favour with the poet. There are occasional allusions to the judgment that, in Hades, “another Zeus” holds over the deeds of earthly life,77 but they remain dark and vague. It is not explained in what relation this judgment in Hades stands to the complete equivalence of guilt and destiny that, here upon earth, Zeus and Moira bring to completion in the person of the criminal himself and, after his death, of his descendants. Side by side with the allusions to the judgment in the underworld implying the complete consciousness of the dead, stand expressions that call up a picture of the senseless, twilight existence of the souls in Hades like that described in Homer.78 The poet, to whom every feature of the beliefs derived from the cult of the souls about the relations of the departed to the life of the dwellers on earth was intensely and vividly real, never cared to fix his attention for long upon the nature and condition of the dead in their separate other-world existence. In fact his chosen work of giving a moral significance and deeper meaning to popular and ancient faith was wholly derived from this faith itself; and so also was the lofty and consistent idea of divinity which fills the background of his picture of life. The generation which had fought at Marathon, in spite of a profounder and even more sombre meditation upon life and destiny, could still dispense almost entirely with the assistance of the theological doctrines of the sects who sought refuge from the dark and austere 426 realities of this unsatisfying world in thoughts of an imagined hereafter.

All these things—conflict and resolution, crime and its atonement through ongoing wrongdoing, and the suffering that results—play out in this world. Guilt is always addressed here on earth. The “other” world isn’t an essential part of this chain of ideas and fantasies; the poet rarely looks in that direction. Speculations about the state of the soul after death or about a blessed life in the realm of spirits does not capture his interest. Only parts of the theologians’ beliefs about the afterlife that can provide moral inspiration or support appeal to him. There are occasional references to the judgment that, in Hades, “another Zeus” presides over the actions of earthly life, but these remain vague and unclear. It's not explained how this judgment in Hades relates to the complete balance of guilt and fate that, here on earth, Zeus and Moira fulfill in the person of the criminal and, after his death, in his descendants. Alongside the references to the judgment in the underworld, which imply full awareness of the dead, are descriptions that evoke the aimless, twilight existence of souls in Hades as depicted by Homer. The poet, who found every aspect of the beliefs surrounding the relationships between the departed and the living intensely real, never wanted to spend much time thinking about the nature and condition of the dead in their separate afterlife. In fact, his purpose of giving a moral significance and deeper meaning to ancient and popular faith was entirely rooted in that faith itself; so too was the noble and coherent concept of divinity that underlies his view of life. The generation that fought at Marathon, despite a deeper and more serious contemplation of life and fate, could still largely forgo reliance on the theological doctrines of the sects that sought escape from the dark and harsh realities of this unsatisfying world in thoughts of a supposed afterlife.

§ 5

Towards the great problems of dramatic philosophy—the problems of the freedom or compulsion of the will, the guilt and destiny of man—Sophokles took up a position that differed essentially from that of his great predecessor. A maturer and calmer self-abandonment to the observation of life and its difficulties made him less able to rest content with simple or sweeping solutions of the complexities; made him seek out other and more various modes of understanding. The individual man, stamped with the unique impression of his peculiar being, with him becomes more fully detached from the background of omnipotent might and universal law. The individual finds within himself the rules of his behaviour, the causes of his success, or his tragic failure. No petty, egotistical motive inspires the action of Antigone or Elektra: they are obedient to the old, unwritten laws of the gods. But the force that leads them to obey is derived solely from the special fashion and impulse of their own hearts. No one else could do what they do, suffer what they suffer. We realize the necessity and justification of what they do and suffer solely from the contemplation of the strength and weakness of their own characters as displayed for us in the action that takes place upon the stage. Indeed, the length to which Sophokles, in the “Elektra”, goes in the suppression of such universally recognized and binding motives as those derived from the duty of vengeance and the rights of injured souls, may well cause surprise. The special and individual case must for him carry its own justification within itself, and in fact it receives such justification so completely from the character and behaviour of the actors in the drama that, unlike the hero of Aeschylus’ tragedy, Orestes needs to have no qualm of doubt in the performance of his deed, and suffers no remorse after the murder of the wicked murderess. Once again as in the Homeric story, with Orestes’ “righteous deed of blood”,79 the circle of calamity is complete: no Erinys rises from the earth to demand his overthrow.80

Towards the major issues of dramatic philosophy—the questions of free will versus determinism, and human guilt and fate—Sophocles adopted a stance that was fundamentally different from that of his great predecessor. His more mature and composed surrender to observing life and its challenges made him unable to settle for simple or sweeping answers to its complexities; he sought out other and more varied ways of understanding. The individual, marked by the unique traits of their existence, becomes more fully detached from the backdrop of powerful forces and universal laws. Individuals find within themselves the principles guiding their actions, the reasons behind their successes, or their tragic failures. No small-minded, selfish motive drives the actions of Antigone or Electra; they follow the ancient, unwritten laws of the gods. Yet the force that compels them to obey comes solely from the unique character and impulses of their own hearts. No one else could do what they do, or endure what they endure. We see the necessity and justification of their actions and suffering only through the lens of their strengths and weaknesses as displayed in the drama on stage. In fact, the extent to which Sophocles, in “Electra,” suppresses universally recognized and binding motivations, like the duty of vengeance and the rights of wronged souls, may come as a surprise. The specific and individual situation must justify itself, and it indeed receives such justification so thoroughly from the characters' actions in the drama that, unlike Orestes in Aeschylus’ tragedy, he feels no hesitation about carrying out his act, and experiences no remorse after killing the wicked murderer. Once again, as in the Homeric tale, with Orestes’ “righteous act of blood,”79 the cycle of disaster is complete: no Erinys rises from the ground to demand his downfall.80

So, too, when the suffering and calamity that befalls the mortal hero comes not from his own conscious decision and exercise of will, but from obscure decrees of fate it is still the special character of the hero which not only demands the greater part of our attention, but entirely conditions and sufficiently explains the course of events. The same 427 misfortune might overtake another man, but neither its inward nor its outward effects would be the same as they are for Oedipus or Aias. Only tragically extreme characters can have a tragic fate.

Similarly, when the suffering and disaster that happen to the mortal hero result not from his own conscious choices and will but from mysterious forces of fate, it is still the unique nature of the hero that not only captures most of our attention but also shapes and adequately explains what happens. The same 427 misfortune could happen to someone else, but neither the internal nor external effects would be the same as they are for Oedipus or Aias. Only characters with intensely tragic natures can experience a tragic fate.

And yet, in these as in other tragedies, what gives the first impulse and direction to the course of the story does not arise from the will or character of their heroes. The mind of Aias is not free but subject when he performs the deed that sends him to his death. Oedipus, Deianeira take vengeance upon themselves for the deeds of horror that they have brought about without knowing what they did. Notwithstanding the fact that the interest of the “Philoktetes” centres so completely round the vividly contrasted characters of Philoktetes, Neoptolemos, and Odysseus, yet the situation which brings them into opposition is one which it was beyond the power or the purpose of man to bring about or to hinder. An obscure destiny plunges man into suffering, drives him to actions in the face of which easy and ready-made judgments about “guilt” and the relation between suffering and desert are silenced. It is not inherited family crime that here forces the son and the grandson to deeds that can hardly be called their own. The poet, it is true, knows of these conceptions81 that play so large a part in the poetry of Aeschylus, but they are mere historical tradition to him, not vital motives of his drama. Nor is it mere irrational chance, or impersonal fate working by necessity and without passion that directs the mind and guides the hand of the actor in his bondage. Clearly or obscurely moving about in the background of events the will of a divine power can be discerned that, inevitable as fate,82 guides the deeds and the fate of men in accordance with its own purpose.

And yet, in these and other tragedies, what initially drives the story and gives it direction doesn’t come from the will or character of the heroes. Aias does not have the freedom of choice when he commits the act that leads to his death. Oedipus and Deianeira seek revenge on themselves for the horrific actions they took without knowing what they were doing. Even though the focus of “Philoktetes” centers completely around the sharply contrasted characters of Philoktetes, Neoptolemos, and Odysseus, the situation that puts them at odds is one that neither man’s will nor intention could create or prevent. An obscure destiny plunges people into suffering, pushing them to act in ways that silence easy judgments about “guilt” and the connection between suffering and deserving it. It’s not inherited family crime that forces the son and grandson into actions that are hardly their own. The poet indeed knows these concepts that play such a significant role in Aeschylus's poetry, but for him, they are merely historical traditions, not the driving forces of his drama. Nor is it simply random chance or an impersonal fate acting out of necessity and without passion that directs the minds and guides the actions of the characters in their struggle. Clearly or subtly moving behind the scenes of events, we can see the will of a divine power that, as inevitable as fate, guides the actions and destinies of people according to its own purpose.

The divine purpose brings to maturity a plan in which the individual man and his destiny are mere instruments. To make plain the premeditated character of this purposeful direction of human affairs is the object of the prophetic anticipations of the future, the divine oracles and prophecies of seers of which we hear so much in the plays. If this divine purpose should involve the fatal act, the undeserved suffering of the individual, then that purpose will be fulfilled though human happiness may be destroyed in the process, and though pain, crime, agony, and violent death may overwhelm the mortal individual. The well-being of the individual does not enter into the question where the intentions of a divinity that sees far beyond this puny existence are concerned. An honest, simple-minded, good-hearted man, without 428 deceit or fault, like Philoktetes, is abandoned for many long years to every kind of suffering in order that he may not interfere prematurely in the development of the war against Troy with the magic weapons that are in his possession.83 He is an involuntary martyr for the good of the whole community. In order that Herakles may be released from this life at the precise moment of time that has been fixed by divine foreknowledge,84 Deianeira, the most devoted and womanly character in the whole of the Attic drama, must out of the goodness of her heart and the love she bears to her husband send him to the most awful of deaths and then perish herself. Simply because such is the will of heaven85 must Oedipus, unknowing and blameless, slay his father, marry his mother, and plunge himself into the deepest depth of misery.

The divine purpose leads to the realization of a plan where individual people and their destinies are just tools. The aim of the prophetic visions of the future, as well as the divine messages and prophecies from seers that we hear about so often in the plays, is to make clear the intended nature of this guided course of human events. If this divine purpose includes a fatal act or the undeserved suffering of an individual, then that purpose will be accomplished even if human happiness is sacrificed, and even if pain, crime, agony, and violent death overwhelm the individual. The well-being of one person doesn’t matter when the intentions of a deity that looks far beyond this limited existence are involved. A sincere, straightforward, good-hearted man, without deceit or faults, like Philoktetes, is left to suffer in many ways for many years so that he doesn’t interfere too soon in the unfolding battle against Troy with the powerful weapons he possesses. He becomes an unintentional martyr for the benefit of the entire community. To allow Herakles to leave this life exactly when divine foresight has determined, Deianeira, the most devoted and caring character in all of Attic drama, must, out of her goodness and love for her husband, send him to a horrific death and then perish herself. Simply because it is the will of heaven, Oedipus, unaware and innocent, must kill his father, marry his mother, and fall into the deepest misery.

Thus, out of the darkness, the hand of divine superiority guides the destinies of humanity, the will and behaviour of men, according to its own purposes. The problematical in human life, the disparity between personal guilt and personal suffering, which daily experience brings before our eyes, seemed to the poet to be rendered more intelligible by this conception. He preaches dutiful submission to these dispensations of a higher power. He himself is one of the pious, in the specific sense of the word,86 for whom to perceive the will of the gods is sufficient to call forth adoration of the gods; who feel no need that this mighty will should justify itself to human ideas of morality and goodness.87 It may be right to call this will a holy will; but there is no need for it to prove itself such at the bar of human judgment. Nor does such piety find itself disturbed in its worship when, in order to assert the divine prerogative over humanity (whose first duty it is to recognize the limits of what is allowed and possible for it), divine inhumanity and cold lust of vengeance manifest themselves so clearly as in the Athene of the “Ajax”.88 It gives the measure of the peculiar and unique character of Sophoklean art and the Sophoklean attitude to life—a quite personal character not to be explained on abstract grounds—that this attitude of awed submissiveness in matters of religion could exist side by side with the strong appreciation and justification of the unfettered action of free individuality. Rarely—only once or twice in the plays—is a cry of pain wrested from the lips of one of these uncomplaining victims of a purpose not their own.89 As a rule, the eye shuns to behold, the judgment to criticize, the ultimate reasons of divine action. It is partly artistic restraint no doubt, but religious discretion, too, makes the poet leave 429 such things in semi-obscurity.90 The majesty of divine power remains for the most part in the background and does not mingle familiarly with men or too notoriously interfere with human destiny.91

Thus, out of the darkness, the hand of divine superiority guides the destinies of humanity, the will and behavior of people, according to its own purposes. The confusing aspects of human life, the gap between personal guilt and personal suffering, which daily experience reveals, seemed to the poet to be more understandable through this idea. He advocates for dutiful submission to these actions of a higher power. He himself is one of the pious, in the specific sense of the word, 86 for whom recognizing the will of the gods is enough to inspire adoration of the gods; who don’t feel the need for this powerful will to justify itself according to human concepts of morality and goodness.87 It may be appropriate to call this will a holy will; but it doesn’t have to prove itself as such to human judgment. Nor does such piety waver in its worship when, to assert the divine right over humanity (whose primary duty is to acknowledge the limits of what is allowed and possible for it), divine cruelty and cold vengeance display themselves as clearly as in the Athene of the “Ajax.” 88 This illustrates the special and unique nature of Sophoklean art and the Sophoklean outlook on life— a deeply personal character that can’t be explained in abstract terms—that this attitude of awed submission in matters of religion can coexist with a strong appreciation for and justification of the unrestricted actions of free individuality. Rarely—only once or twice in the plays—is a cry of pain taken from the lips of one of these silent victims of a purpose not their own.89 Generally, the eye avoids looking, and judgment refrains from criticizing the ultimate reasons for divine action. It is partly artistic restraint, no doubt, but religious discretion also leads the poet to leave 429 such matters in semi-obscurity.90 The majesty of divine power usually stays in the background and does not mingle closely with people or too obviously interfere with human destiny.91

But the individual who with his sufferings must serve a purpose that is not his own, Humanity that lives under such bitter laws—what elevating and consoling thoughts are awakened by the contemplation of their fate. The poet employs all the resources of his overwhelming art to secure the profoundest sympathies of his hearers for the undeserved sufferings of the victim, for the delusions of well-intentioned but limited vision that must always stray from the goal at which it aims. The moral of the play is not lost even on the sufferer’s foe as he beholds the error and guilt of the noble but misguided heart.92 What thus overwhelms the strong and the wise, the good and the well-meaning, through no fault of their own, may descend upon any member of the human family. Thus the destinies of men are allotted. The lament over the vanity and the sorrow of life, its brief happiness, and the uncertainty of its joy, is poured forth in memorable lines.93 They end on a note of resignation which gives the keynote of the poet’s own character; but there is a bitterness which remains behind.

But the person who must endure suffering for a purpose that isn’t his own, Humanity living under such harsh laws—what uplifting and comforting thoughts emerge when we think about their fate. The poet uses all the tools of his powerful art to evoke deep sympathy from his audience for the undeserved suffering of the victim, and for the misconceptions of well-meaning but narrow-minded individuals that always miss the mark. The lesson of the play is clear, even to the enemy of the sufferer, as he sees the mistakes and guilt of the noble but misguided heart. What can overwhelm the strong and wise, the good and well-meaning, through no fault of their own, can happen to anyone in the human family. This is how destinies are assigned. The sorrow over the vanity and sadness of life, its fleeting happiness, and the uncertainty of its joy, is expressed in unforgettable lines. They conclude on a note of acceptance that reflects the poet’s own character; but a bitterness lingers behind.

It might have been supposed that one who thus abandoned all attempt to reconcile the worth and actions of men with their fate upon earth, would feel all the more need, for his own satisfaction and that of others, to prove the existence of a divine justice that should restore the balance in a future state of being. But the poet shows little sign of any such need. Thoughts of what may happen after death are never of very great moment to him. They never distinctly affect the behaviour of those whose deeds or suffering fill his plays.94

It could be assumed that someone who completely gives up on trying to connect people's worth and actions with their fate on Earth would feel a greater need, for their own peace of mind and that of others, to prove that divine justice exists, which would restore balance in an afterlife. However, the poet hardly shows any sign of this need. Ideas about what might happen after death never seem very important to him. They don't noticeably impact the behavior of those whose actions or suffering are central to his plays.

When, however, light is thrown for a passing moment on the unknown land beyond the grave the scene that imagination reveals hardly differs at all from the picture that had once been present to the minds of the Homeric singers. The place that is in store for the departed is Hades,95 the unlovely country of the dead,96 whither the Soul flits powerless, shadowlike, little more than a nothing,97 feeling no joy but no pain either;98 where it enters upon a state of insensibility that the grief-stricken sufferer on earth often longs for as a much-desired haven of rest.99 Plouton, Persephone, all the deities of the earth below,100 there rule over the departed. But it is not grace nor kindliness that prevails there—only Justice: Hades demands equal justice for all.101 430 Pious veneration of the gods continues also in the other world,102 and for the rest we hear nothing of either reward or punishment or of a final supplementing in the land of the Souls of the inadequacy of the justice that fulfils itself on earth.

When light briefly shines on the unknown land beyond the grave, the scene that imagination conjures up is hardly different from what the ancient singers envisioned. The place awaiting the departed is Hades, the bleak realm of the dead, where the Soul drifts powerless, like a shadow, barely more than an absence, experiencing neither joy nor pain. It enters a state of numbness that those grieving on earth often long for as a much-desired refuge. Plouton, Persephone, and all the deities of the underworld govern the departed there. However, it is not grace or kindness that reigns—only Justice: Hades demands equal justice for everyone. 430 Respectful devotion to the gods continues in the afterlife, and beyond that, we hear nothing of either rewards or punishments or of an ultimate resolution in the realm of the Souls to address the shortcomings of earthly justice.

But though departed into Hades the dead have still a claim upon the upper world and on those who still are living there. Together with the Homeric picture of the lower world is united the cult of the souls and the ideas, connected with that cult, of the continued life of the dead. The next of kin owe to the departed the ceremonious burial that is the first expression of their pious solicitude for his soul’s welfare.103 In two plays the “Ajax” and the “Antigone”, the love and loyalty of the survivors is obliged to fight for this right of the dead in desperate encounter with earthly authority and even with the sacrifice of their own devoted lives. Such instances serve to bring out clearly the fact that it is no empty convention or tradition that is thus defended and carried through to the end. Nor does the completion of the burial mark the end of the dead man’s relations with the upper world: even after that he may be benefited by offerings made at his grave.104 Information of what happens on earth may penetrate to the dead;105 and he himself, under the protection of the underworld spirits and of their assessor Dikê, who take cognizance of his claims,106 may interfere in the affairs of the living as a “Curse-spirit” upon those who disregard his wishes,107 by sending threatening dream-visions upon his foes,108 and as a very present help and unseen ally to his friends in their hour of need.109

But even after they have gone to Hades, the dead still have a connection to the living world and to those who remain. Alongside the Homeric depiction of the underworld is the practice of honoring the souls and the beliefs surrounding that practice, which affirm the ongoing existence of the deceased. The close relatives owe the departed a formal burial, which is the first sign of their caring concern for the well-being of his soul.103 In two plays, “Ajax” and “Antigone”, the love and loyalty of the survivors must struggle for this right of the deceased, often facing off against earthly authority and even sacrificing their own lives in the process. These instances highlight that it’s not just an empty tradition being defended to the end. Additionally, completing the burial doesn’t signify the end of the dead man’s connection to the living world: even afterward, he may benefit from offerings made at his grave.104 The dead may receive information about what happens on earth;105 and he himself, under the watch of the spirits of the underworld and their attendant Dikê, who oversees his claims,106 may intervene in the lives of the living as a "Curse-spirit" upon those who ignore his wishes,107 sending ominous dreams to his enemies,108 and acting as an immediate support and unseen ally to his friends in their time of need.109

As to an eternity of bliss awaiting the soul, the god in man, after its final release from the shackles of the body, the poet knows as little of such as he does of an eternity of damnation for the wicked. Only the quite special state of grace which is enjoyed by those who have been purified in the mysteries of the goddesses at Eleusis receives mention by him110: he is frequently disposed to think of this supreme expression of Attic worship with patriotic pride.111 But it is only a minority of the good who thus achieve by the grace of the goddesses a privileged “life” in the kingdom of shadows. One and only one is lifted by the divine grace clear of the human fate of annihilation, and in the Grove of the Erinyes the sorely-tried Oedipus is translated without seeing death out of this earthly life.112 So living a reality to this poet of ancient piety is the conviction that the divine miracle of translation113 is a literal truth, that he is even ready 431 to make this strange circumstance serve as the sole aim and purpose of a whole drama: a miracle which all the other scenes serve not so much to prepare as simply to postpone, and thus heighten the expectancy with which the event is awaited. It is not supreme virtue that secures an immortality for Oedipus which others also who showed an equal degree of goodness might possibly attain. He reveals himself to us as an innocent sufferer indeed,114 but also as obdurate in his rash and violent nature, vindictive, stubborn, and self-willed, not ennobled but rather brutalized by his sufferings.115 Nevertheless, divine power elevates him to the state of immortal Hero less almost for the sake of the satisfaction and bliss to himself as in order that he may be the saviour of the Attic land, the country of humanity and kindness that has taken into its protection116 the unfortunate one, and desires to preserve for ever his power of blessing.117 Just as once it had pleased divine power to overwhelm the innocent victim in a sea of crime and suffering, so now it pleases the same divine power to raise the sufferer, without any new or special merit on his side, to a fate of superhuman bliss.118 In his case a divine miracle occurs, into the ultimate reasons for which it is not profitable to inquire.

As for the eternal bliss waiting for the soul, the god within man, after it finally breaks free from the body's chains, the poet knows as little about that as he does about the eternal damnation of the wicked. The only thing he mentions is the special state of grace experienced by those who have been purified in the mysteries of the goddesses at Eleusis: he often feels a sense of patriotic pride in this supreme expression of Attic worship. But only a few of the good achieve this privileged “life” in the realm of shadows through the grace of the goddesses. Only one person is lifted by divine grace out of the human fate of annihilation, and in the Grove of the Erinyes, the deeply suffering Oedipus is taken away from this earthly life without experiencing death. For this poet of ancient piety, the belief in the divine miracle of translation is a living reality; he is even prepared to let this unusual event be the sole focus of an entire drama: a miracle for which the other scenes don’t prepare so much as simply delay, increasing the anticipation of the event. It is not supreme virtue that grants Oedipus immortality, a fate that others who show equal goodness might also achieve. He appears to us as an innocent sufferer, but also stubborn, vindictive, and willful, made more brutal than noble by his suffering. Yet, divine power lifts him to the status of immortal Hero, not so much for his own satisfaction and happiness, but so that he can be the savior of the Attic land, a place of humanity and kindness that has offered protection to the unfortunate and wishes to forever keep his blessing. Just as divine power once decided to drown the innocent victim in a sea of crime and suffering, it now chooses to raise the sufferer, without any new or special merit on his part, to a fate of superhuman bliss. In his case, a divine miracle occurs, and the ultimate reasons for it are not worth probing into.

In his views, so far as he allows us to see them, of the things of the next world, Sophokles differs not at all from those who still saw life and worshipped the gods as their fathers had done before them. The great poet of human, tragic destiny, the profound student of the divine government of this mournful world, was unwilling to set by the side of it a brighter and more comforting picture of a spirit world of the imagination. In this, too, he is modest and will not say much—he knows no more of these matters, and in no other fashion, than “any other honest citizen of Athens”.119

In his views, as far as he lets us in, about the things of the afterlife, Sophocles is not different at all from those who still lived life and worshipped the gods like their ancestors did. The great poet of human tragedy and a deep thinker about the divine order of this sorrowful world wasn’t willing to present a brighter and more comforting vision of a spirit world imagined. In this, too, he is humble and doesn't say much—he knows no more about these issues than “any other honest citizen of Athens.”119

§ 6

In the course of a long life Sophokles was able to make himself complete master of his art and grow up into strong and generous manhood without the guidance or support of either theological or philosophical learning. Theology he did not care to seek out in its hiding place, the obscurity of isolated sects. Philosophy, in the period of his impressionable youth, had not yet reached Athens, and when he had attained riper years his noble simplicity of temper had little to gain or to fear from the meditated wisdom or folly of the younger generation. In serene detachment he passed on his way through all the press and clamour of the market place. 432

Throughout his long life, Sophocles mastered his craft and matured into a strong and generous man without relying on theological or philosophical learning. He wasn't interested in seeking out theology hidden away in obscure sects. During his impressionable youth, philosophy had not yet come to Athens, and by the time he reached maturity, his noble simplicity had little to gain or fear from the ponderings of the younger generation. With calm detachment, he navigated the bustling chaos of the marketplace. 432

The moving impulse which since the end of the sixth century had collected together at Athens all the intellectual forces of Greece for a final expansion of their capacity now began, in the middle of the fifth century, to take hold of philosophy as it had long since done literature and the fine arts. Athens saw the last representatives of Ionian physiology gathered together within her walls. Some, like Anaxagoras, took up their residence there for a long period, and left the impress of their teaching upon the foremost minds of the city. The others who paid briefer visits were those who in conscious opposition to the recent trend of thinking, stoutly upheld the older principles of philosophic Monism or Hylozoism, such as Diogenes of Apollonia or Hippon of Samos; or who sought like Archelaos to reconcile the old and the new Ionic doctrine. Besides these, Athens was a headquarters of the wandering exponents of the newest wisdom, the Sophists. Nowhere did unfettered discussion find such cultivated appreciation of its daring; nowhere was such an eager welcome given to the dialectical word-play that, seeming to be an end in itself, was destined to become the most fruitful nursery of native Athenian philosophy. All traditional beliefs and customs that had not their origin or their justification in reflexion were already doomed as soon as they, together with every conventional view of life and the world, were deprived of their natural protection of unchallenged self-evidence by the cold scrutiny of the sovereign tyrant Dialectic. The Sophists, those skirmishers of a new and as yet unrecognizable philosophy, scattered and put to flight the old guard of positive and doctrinal wisdom, but to the individual, who was bidden to depend upon his own resources, they offered stimulus to reflection in abundance but no permanent foothold in the shifting sands of opinion. It would be but a final assertion of the principle that there are no principles if by any chance the Sophists themselves should for a moment speak in the language of edification and, for example, lend the support of their eloquence to certain articles of doctrine that provided a positive teaching as to the nature and life of the soul.120

The driving force that had brought together all the intellectual energy of Greece in Athens for a final expansion since the late sixth century began to influence philosophy in the middle of the fifth century, just as it had already impacted literature and the fine arts. Athens became home to the last representatives of Ionian physiology. Some, like Anaxagoras, settled there for a long time, leaving a mark on the leading minds of the city. Others who visited briefly were consciously opposing the recent trends in thought, staunchly defending the older principles of philosophical Monism or Hylozoism, like Diogenes of Apollonia or Hippon of Samos; or they sought to reconcile the old and new Ionic doctrines, like Archelaos. Additionally, Athens was a hub for the wandering advocates of new wisdom, the Sophists. Nowhere else was open discussion received with such appreciation for its boldness; nowhere was there such an enthusiastic response to the dialectical wordplay that, appearing to be an end in itself, would eventually become the most fruitful ground for Athenian philosophy. All traditional beliefs and customs that lacked reflection for their basis were already doomed as soon as they were stripped of their natural protection from unchallenged self-evidence by the cold analysis of the dominating force of Dialectic. The Sophists, those pioneers of a new and still unformed philosophy, scattered the old guard of established wisdom, but while they encouraged individuals to rely on their own resources, they provided plenty of stimuli for reflection but no solid ground in the ever-changing landscape of opinion. If the Sophists were to momentarily speak in a way that was uplifting and supported specific doctrines providing concrete teachings about the nature and life of the soul, it would merely reinforce the idea that there are no principles. 120

If Sophokles remained quite unaffected by this whole movement which reached its flood tide in Athens, Euripides was drawn completely into its current. He sought out philosophers and sophists personally and in their writings. His was a spirit that urgently desired to know the truth and he followed every available guide to knowledge and wisdom for a stage upon their journey. But he was never able to continue permanently in any one direction; in the restlessness 433 and bewilderment of search and experiment he is the true son of his age.

If Sophocles was largely unaffected by the whole movement that peaked in Athens, Euripides was completely swept up in it. He actively sought out philosophers and sophists, both in person and through their writings. He had a deep desire to understand the truth and pursued every possible path to knowledge and wisdom for inspiration in his work. However, he could never stay committed to one direction for long; in the restlessness 433 and confusion of his search and experimentation, he truly embodies his era.

His philosophical and sophistical leanings were sufficiently marked to make it impossible for him to accept any part of the belief or tradition of his countrymen without trial. So far as it is possible within the limits of dramatic art, he instituted an unsparing and unhesitating criticism of all accepted things, and in the process felt himself immeasurably superior to the wit and wisdom of the past. And yet he never satisfied himself. He could never rest content with a merely negative position, for all onesidedness was foreign to his nature. The tremendous honesty of his nature made it impossible for him to admit that element of frivolity which made the sophistic movement and the dialectical negation of all certainty so simple and attractive, and at the same time took away half its sting. But he could take nothing easily; and so with all his sophistic enlightenment he was never happy. The pupil of the Sophists would hear every other side as well; there were even moments when he longed to take refuge in the restful narrowness of old and traditional piety. But it was not given to him to settle down in any fixed set of opinions; all his convictions were provisional, mere hypotheses adopted for the purposes of experiment. Afloat on a changeful sea, he let himself be driven hither and thither by every wind of intellectual excitement or artistic necessity.

His philosophical and argumentative tendencies were so strong that he couldn't accept any part of his countrymen's beliefs or traditions without testing them first. As much as possible within the constraints of dramatic art, he conducted a ruthless and fearless critique of all established ideas, feeling himself vastly superior to the intellect and wisdom of the past. Yet, he was never satisfied. He could never settle for just a negative stance, as one-sidedness was not part of his nature. His profound honesty made it impossible for him to embrace the frivolity that characterized the sophistic movement and the easy, attractive dismissal of all certainty, which also dulled its impact. But he never took anything lightly; despite all his intellectual enlightenment, he was never happy. The student of the Sophists would listen to all perspectives too; there were times when he wished he could find comfort in the comforting simplicity of traditional piety. However, he couldn't settle on any fixed beliefs; all his convictions were temporary, mere hypotheses adopted for experimentation. Adrift on a turbulent sea, he allowed himself to be swayed by every gust of intellectual excitement or artistic necessity.

When all convictions were involved together in a state of perpetual change and instability, the conception of the nature and being of the soul and its relation to the powers of life and death could not alone remain in fixed and dogmatic certainty.

When all beliefs were constantly in flux and unstable, the understanding of the soul's nature and existence, as well as its connection to the forces of life and death, couldn't stay in a state of rigid and unquestionable certainty.

Where the content and character of the fable chosen as the subject of his drama demand it, the poet frankly adopts the popular view of the nature and destiny of the departed soul, its power and claim upon the worship of the survivors upon earth. In the fairy-tale play of the “Alcestis” the whole apparatus of popular belief plays its part; the God of Death and his awful office, the dwelling of the dead in the underworld, are spoken of as facts and creatures of experience and reality.121 The elaborate funeral ceremonies owed to the dead are treated with the utmost seriousness and precision.122 A whole drama, the “Suppliant Women”, has as its real subject, or at least as its ostensible motive, the religious importance of a ritual burial,123 nor is there any lack of isolated passages in which the importance of burial and the honour paid to graves is stressed.124 The survivors on earth give pleasure to the dead by offerings at their graves,125 434 and in this way obtain their goodwill and can count upon their support.126 Power and honour belong not only to the great ones of antiquity translated to a higher state of being;127 not only “Heroes” can extend their influence beyond their graves and affect the course of earthly events:128 from the soul of his murdered father, the son expects assistance and succour in his time of need. The dread creatures of antique faith, the Erinyes, exact vengeance for the murdered mother.129

Where the theme and message of the fable chosen for his play require it, the poet openly embraces the common view of the nature and fate of the departed soul, its significance, and the need for the living to worship them. In the fairy-tale drama of “Alcestis,” all aspects of popular belief are involved; the God of Death and his terrifying role, the realm of the dead in the underworld, are presented as facts and part of real experience. 121 The elaborate funeral rituals for the deceased are handled with the utmost seriousness and detail. 122 A complete play, the “Suppliant Women,” centers around the religious importance of a proper burial, 123 and there are numerous passages emphasizing the significance of burial and the respect given to tombs. 124 The living honor the dead with offerings at their graves, 125 434 and in return, they seek their favor and support. 126 Power and respect are not just for the great figures of the past who have ascended to a higher existence; 127 not only "Heroes" can influence things beyond their graves and impact earthly affairs: 128 from the spirit of his murdered father, the son hopes for help and support in his time of need. The fearsome beings of ancient belief, the Erinyes, demand justice for the murdered mother. 129

But at this point it becomes apparent that the poet only associates himself for his own purposes with this circle of ancient and sanctified popular fancy—so long in fact as it suits the tone that he wishes to give to the drama and its characters. The Erinyes are excellent material for the play—that in reality their horrid figures only exist in the imagination of the mentally diseased is clearly asserted in the “Orestes”.130 The whole series of beliefs and demands—murder ever calling forth fresh murder in accordance with the sacred duty of vengeance, the Erinyes, the bloodthirsty patrons of the murdered victim who leaves no proper avenger behind him—all these have ceased to have any validity for him. The “animal and bloodthirsty” part of these figures of ancient belief call forth the loathing of the poet living in the days of organized justice and humaner manners.131 He does not believe in the souls’ right to blood; the ancient legends which depend on this right are an abomination to him. In fact, he only seems to have written his plays about them in order, by the manner of his presentation, to have his revenge upon this material that was almost unavoidably thrust upon him by the tradition of the tragic stage. The duty of the living to offer a cult to the departed souls becomes doubtful in its turn. The seriousness with which that cult is sometimes handled in the plays is compromised by such reflections as these: it is certain that it matters little to the dead whether rich offering are placed in their graves or not; such things only satisfy the idle vanity of the living;132 honour and dishonour are of no further consequence to the dead.133 How should they be, if the departed no longer feel either pleasure or pain, are nothing at all, as is repeatedly declared even in the middle of the “Alcestis”?134

But at this point, it becomes clear that the poet only associates himself with this circle of ancient and revered popular belief for his own reasons—as long as it fits the tone he wants to create for the drama and its characters. The Erinyes are great material for the play—however, it's clearly stated in the “Orestes” that their horrifying figures only exist in the minds of the mentally ill. The whole series of beliefs and demands—murder always calling for more murder in accordance with the sacred duty of vengeance, the Erinyes, the bloodthirsty guardians of the murdered victim who has no proper avenger—no longer hold any meaning for him. The “animal and bloodthirsty” aspects of these ancient beliefs make the poet, living in an era of organized justice and more humane ways, feel disgust. He doesn’t believe in the souls' right to blood; the ancient legends that rely on this right are repulsive to him. In fact, it seems he has only written his plays about them to take revenge on this material that was almost inevitably forced upon him by the tradition of tragic theater. The obligation of the living to pay respects to the departed souls becomes questionable. The seriousness with which that respect is sometimes depicted in the plays is undermined by reflections like these: it hardly matters to the dead whether lavish offerings are placed in their graves; such things only satisfy the idle pride of the living; honour and dishonour mean nothing to the dead. How could they, if the departed no longer feel pleasure or pain, and are nothing at all, as is repeatedly stated even in the middle of the “Alcestis”?

It is evident that only from an arbitrarily adopted point of view do the picturesque creations of popular belief in the soul and of the cult of souls seem real to the poet; apart from this they disappear from his mind like the creatures of a dream.135 The teachings of the theologians supplied him with no real substitute for popular faith; at the most they were a 435 momentary and passing stimulus. No doubt he did not shut his eyes completely to these manifestations of the spiritual life of his time. His plays contain allusions to Orphic poetry and he joins the asceticism of the Orphics to the cold virtue of his Hippolytos.136 The thought that the soul has fallen from a higher state of being and is enclosed within the body like the dead man in his coffin takes captive his imagination for a moment. “Who knows then whether life is not a kind of death,” so that in death the soul awakes to its real life?137 The gloomy view of human destiny upon this earth to which the poet so often gives expression, might seem to hint at a consolation to come in a more satisfactory hereafter; but the poet has no longing for the consolation offered by the theologians. Among the many and various reflections of the poet upon the reality that may reveal itself when the curtain is drawn aside by death, we never meet with the conception that lies at the bottom of the assurances made by the theologians—the conception that the spiritual individual is certain of its immortality because in its individuality it is of divine nature and is itself a god.138 True, he is the author of the bold saying so often quoted and varied in later times, that God is nothing else but the mind that dwells in men.139 But this makes no allusion to the theological doctrine of the multiplicity of individual gods or daimones banished into the life of men; it rather implies a semi-philosophic doctrine of the soul in which one may perceive for the first time the expression of a permanent conviction on the part of the poet.

It’s clear that the poetic representations of popular beliefs about the soul and the afterlife only seem real from a chosen perspective; outside of this viewpoint, they fade away like dreams. The teachings of theologians don’t provide him with a real alternative to popular faith; at most, they serve as a temporary distraction. He certainly doesn’t completely ignore the spiritual expressions of his time. His plays reference Orphic poetry, and he combines the asceticism of the Orphics with the stark morality of his Hippolytos. The idea that the soul has fallen from a higher existence and is trapped in the body like a dead man in a coffin briefly captivates his imagination. “Who knows if life isn’t just a kind of death,” suggesting that in death, the soul awakens to its true life? The dark perspective on human fate that the poet often expresses may hint at some comfort in a more fulfilling afterlife; however, he shows no desire for the solace offered by theologians. Among the various thoughts he shares about the reality that might be revealed when death pulls back the curtain, he never suggests the notion found in theological promises—that the spiritual individual is assured of immortality because its essence is divine and itself a god. True, he is the author of the famous saying that God is simply the mind residing in humans. But this doesn't reference the theological idea of many individual gods or spirits inhabiting human lives; instead, it reflects a semi-philosophical view of the soul, showcasing the poet’s ongoing conviction.

In quite inapposite contexts Euripides sometimes introduces passing allusions to a philosophical view of the world and humanity, that is the more certainly to be regarded as the private conviction of the poet himself as the utterances fail to correspond fully with the character of the person in the play who makes them, and do not arise necessarily from the dramatic situation. Everything in the world has had its origin from Earth and “the Aether of Zeus”; the Earth is the maternal womb from which the Aether brings everything to birth.140 Both constituents combine to produce the multiplicity of appearance; they are not fused together nor are they to be derived from a single common original element;141 they remain in dualistic contrast side by side.142 It was probably the dualism of this cosmological fancy that reminded the ancients of Anaxagoras; but these statements cannot be regarded as simply a poetical version of the doctrine of Anaxagoras;143 for they derive the multiplicity of matter and things from the simple element of “Earth” from which 436 they arise only by a process of change and transformation, while in the “seedmixture” of Anaxagoras, the unchangeable seeds of all things only separate themselves out from the whole and give rise by mechanical reassemblings to all the perceived appearances of the world. The “Aether” of Euripides in its relations with the “Earth” is besides being the active partner also the intellectual and animated element. The isolation of such an element from the rest of matter does indeed remind us of the procedure of Anaxagoras. But the poet’s Aether is still an element though it may be penetrated by mind and animated by spirit; it is not a mental being standing over against all the other elements in essential distinctness like the Nous of Anaxagoras. The fact that it is the element of the Aether, i.e. the dry and hot air, in which intellectual capacity is said to inhere, may be regarded as having been borrowed from Diogenes of Apollonia, a philosopher who was held in considerable estimation at Athens at that time, and who was well known to Euripides.144 In his doctrine, the air (which indeed, in contrast to the view of Euripides, produces all other things simply out of itself) is expressly identified with the “Soul” and is itself described as “having understanding”.145

In very different contexts, Euripides sometimes makes brief references to a philosophical perspective on the world and humanity, which likely reflects the poet's personal beliefs since the statements do not completely match the character of the person in the play who says them and aren't necessarily tied to the dramatic situation. Everything in the world originates from Earth and “the Aether of Zeus”; Earth is the maternal womb from which the Aether brings everything to life.140 Both elements come together to create the variety of appearances; they are not blended into one nor derived from a single original source;141 they exist in dualistic contrast next to each other.142 This dualism in this cosmological idea likely reminded the ancients of Anaxagoras; however, these statements shouldn't be seen as merely a poetic interpretation of Anaxagoras's doctrine;143 because they attribute the diversity of matter and things to the simple element of “Earth,” which they claim arises only through a process of change and transformation, while in Anaxagoras's “seed-mixture,” the unchangeable seeds of all things merely separate from the whole and, through mechanical rearrangement, produce all the appearances we perceive in the world. Euripides’s “Aether” in its relationship with “Earth” is not only the active element but also the intellectual and animated force. The separation of such an element from other matter indeed reminds us of Anaxagoras's approach. However, the poet's Aether remains an element even though it may be infused with intellect and spirit; it is not a mental entity distinct from all other elements like Anaxagoras’s Nous. The fact that Aether is the element, specifically the dry and hot air in which intellectual ability is thought to reside, may be influenced by Diogenes of Apollonia, a philosopher who was highly regarded in Athens at that time and was well-known to Euripides.144 In his teachings, air (which, unlike Euripides's view, produces everything solely from itself) is explicitly identified with the “Soul” and described as “having understanding.”145

This view of the elementary forces and constitution of the universe, made up as it is from philosophical suggestions of a scarcely reconcilable character, in which the dualistic tendency is in fact finally predominant, suggests itself to the poet whenever in an exalted mood he speaks of the final destiny of the human soul. The soul on its separation from the body will depart to join the “Aether”. But in such conceptions it is not always the imagination of the philosopher-poet that finds expression. On this subject it is accompanied or replaced by a more popular view that only distantly resembles it, but which led to the same result. When we hear now and again of the Aether, the luminous atmosphere above the clouds, as being the dwelling place of the departed souls,146 the view—more theological than philosophic in its character—seems to be implied that after death the liberated soul will float upwards to the seat of the gods147 which has long ceased to be situated upon Olympos, but is in “heaven” or in this same Aether. This, too, was the meaning of a saying traditionally ascribed to Epicharmos the comic-poet of Sicily who was himself versed in philosophy. In this saying the pious man is assured that for him death will bring no evil for his “mind” will dwell permanently in “heaven”.148 This conception, which appears so frequently in later epitaphs, 437 must have been familiar to popular imagination at Athens at an early period; at least in the grave-epigram officially dedicated by the state to the memory of the Athenians who fell in the year 432 before Poteidaia, we find the belief expressed (as a commonly received opinion) that the souls of these brave men have been received by the “Aether” just as the earth has received their bodies.149 Such official use implies a commonly accepted opinion and the fundamental ideas of the popular cult of the souls might have led to similar results. From the beginning popular belief had regarded the psyche, which got its name from the air or breath, as closely akin to the winds, the mobile air and its spirits. It would not be difficult for the idea to arise that the soul, as soon as it was free to decide for itself what should become of it, should go to join the elemental spirits that are its kinsfolk. Perhaps this, too, is what Epicharmos means when on another occasion he says that in death when the united are parted asunder each returns whence it came, the body to earth, but the soul up to the heights—its name, in which allusion is made to its perpetual mobility, being now after the example of Xenophanes derived from the breath of the wind, the moving air (πνεῦμα), a usage which became very common in later times.150

This perspective on the basic forces and structure of the universe, which is shaped by philosophical ideas that are often difficult to reconcile, ultimately leans toward a dualistic view that the poet connects with when in an elevated state of mind discussing the ultimate fate of the human soul. When the soul separates from the body, it will ascend to join the “Aether.” However, these thoughts are not solely products of the philosopher-poet's imagination. This topic is often accompanied or replaced by a more mainstream view that only loosely resembles it but arrives at similar conclusions. Occasionally, when we hear about the Aether, the radiant atmosphere above the clouds, being the dwelling place of departed souls,146 it suggests a more theological than philosophical understanding—indicating that after death, the freed soul will rise to the abode of the gods147 that has long been considered to exist not on Olympus but in “heaven” or this same Aether. This idea also echoes a saying attributed to Epicharmos, the comic poet of Sicily, who was knowledgeable about philosophy. This saying assures the righteous person that death will not bring misfortune, as their “mind” will permanently reside in “heaven.”148 This belief, which frequently appears in later epitaphs, 437 must have been well-known among the people of Athens from an early time; at least in the grave epigram officially dedicated by the state to honor the Athenians who died in 432 before Poteidaia, we see the notion that the souls of these valiant men have been received by the “Aether,” just as the earth has taken in their bodies.149 This official endorsement indicates a widely accepted belief, and the fundamental concepts of the popular cult of the souls may have led to similar ideas. From the start, popular belief considered the psyche, named after air or breath, to be closely related to the winds, the moving air and its spirits. It would have been easy for the notion to develop that, once the soul was free to choose its destiny, it would seek out the elemental spirits that are its relatives. Perhaps this is also what Epicharmos suggests when he states that in death, when the united are separated, each returns to its origin—the body to the earth, and the soul to the heights—its name, which hints at its constant mobility, now drawing from the wind's breath, the moving air (spirit), a usage that became quite common in later times.150

But perhaps the use of such a name is an indication that this poet also regards the soul as standing in a close relation and kinship with the Aether that is destined to receive it after its release from the body; so that from this side, too151—in addition to the more popular conception just mentioned—Euripides may have received a hint for his peculiar version of the physiological theory of Diogenes. In his view the soul participates in the nature of the Aether. But it is more important to notice that the Aether participates in the nature and true reality of the soul; it possesses life, consciousness and power of thought. They both belong to one family. The Aether according to the poet—and here the speculations of Anaximenes as revived by Diogenes are unmistakable152—is a true vital atmosphere, an all-embracing psychic element, so that it becomes, not a mere vehicle of mind, but the All-Mind itself. The concept is even condensed and half-personified, it is called by the name of the highest divine power, Zeus,153 and the poet as though speaking of a personal god, calls it “immortal”.154 The human mind, too, as akin to the universal god and the All-Mind, appears, as it had been in the teaching of Diogenes,155 as a part of this God, this universal Mind. God is the mind, and the mind and understanding in us is God—so the poet clearly asserts.156 In death, when 438 the separation of the mind from its earthly elements takes place, the Pneuma of man will “not indeed live”, as it had done in the separate existence of the individual man, but it will “preserve an immortal consciousness”, entering into the immortal Aether and fusing itself with the All-living and the All-thinking.157 None of the physiologists who conceived the same idea of an immortality excluding the personal immortality of the individual, of the universal spirit of life in mankind, has expressed his meaning with such distinctness as this philosophic layman.

But maybe calling it that suggests this poet sees the soul as closely connected to the Aether, which is meant to receive it after it leaves the body. So, in this sense—along with the more popular view just mentioned—Euripides might have gotten an idea for his unique take on Diogenes' physiological theory. He believes the soul shares qualities with the Aether. But it's crucial to note that the Aether also shares in the essence and true nature of the soul; it has life, consciousness, and the ability to think. They both belong to the same family. The Aether, according to the poet—and here the ideas of Anaximenes as brought back by Diogenes are clear—is a genuine vital atmosphere, an all-encompassing psychic element, making it not just a simple medium for the mind, but the All-Mind itself. This concept is even condensed and somewhat personified, referred to by the name of the highest divine power, Zeus, and the poet, as if talking about a personal god, calls it "immortal." The human mind, too, aligned with the universal god and the All-Mind, appears—just as in Diogenes' teachings—as a part of this God, this universal Mind. God is the mind, and the mind and understanding within us is God—this is what the poet clearly states. In death, when the separation of the mind from its earthly elements happens, a person's Pneuma will “not indeed live,” as it did in the individual man's separate existence, but it will “preserve an immortal consciousness,” merging into the immortal Aether and becoming one with the All-living and the All-thinking. None of the physiologists who shared a similar idea of immortality that excludes the personal immortality of the individual, of the universal spirit of life in humanity, has articulated their thoughts as clearly as this philosophical layman does.

The poet may have wished to remain permanently upon the sublime heights of this Pantheistic vision; but he must, in his peculiar all-embracing spirit that never held fast to any one view with enduring persistence, have experienced too often the truth of the saying of Protagoras that every statement calls forth its equally legitimate opposite,158 to have become an unswerving adherent of any single opinion. Death, and whatever may reveal itself after death, is beyond the experience of any man.159 It may be that complete disappearance into nothingness follows death; that the dead man becomes simply nothing.160 It may be that in the permanence of the human race the great name and the renown of glorious deeds lives on undying.161 Whether there may remain besides a vestige of life in a spirit world, who can tell? Perhaps such a thing is hardly even to be wished.162 It is just what makes death such a comforting thing, that it puts an end to all feeling and therefore to all pain and every care. We should not lament over our fate if, like the harvests that follow each other in the course of the years, one generation of men after another flowers, fades, and is carried off. So it is ordered in the course of Nature, and we ought not to be dismayed by anything that is rendered inevitable by her laws.163

The poet might have wanted to stay permanently on the lofty heights of this Pantheistic vision, but in his unique, all-encompassing spirit that never clung to any single viewpoint for long, he must have realized too often the truth of Protagoras's saying that every statement calls forth its equally valid opposite, 158 which prevented him from becoming a devoted follower of any one belief. Death, and whatever may lie beyond it, is beyond any person's experience. 159 It could be that total disappearance into nothingness follows death, meaning the dead person becomes simply nothing. 160 Or it could be that, in the continuity of humanity, the great names and the fame of glorious achievements endure forever. 161 Who can say if there’s a remnant of life in a spiritual realm? Maybe that is something hardly even to be desired. 162 What makes death such a comforting concept is that it brings an end to all feelings, and therefore to all pain and worry. We shouldn’t mourn our fate if, like the harvests that come year after year, each generation of people blossoms, fades, and then is taken away. That's just the way Nature works, and we shouldn’t be troubled by anything that is made unavoidable by her laws. 163

NOTES TO CHAPTER XII

1 The learned and more particularly the philosophers of later ages paid special attention to utterances of the older poetry that gave expression to belief of a spiritualist tendency. Just as they selected and preserved passages from Pindar (and from Melanippides in the case soon to be mentioned), which bore witness to an advanced view of the soul, so they must also have given us similar passages from other melic or from iambic and elegiac poets—if such passages had existed. They must, for example, have been absent from the θρῆνοι of Simonides which were famous as the models of this kind of poetry. And so with all the rest.

1 Scholars, especially philosophers in later times, really focused on parts of older poetry that reflected spiritual beliefs. Just as they picked and preserved lines from Pindar (and from Melanippides in the upcoming mentioned), which showed a more developed understanding of the soul, they likely provided us with similar excerpts from other lyrical or from iambic and elegiac poets—if such lines ever existed. For instance, they probably didn't find them in the dirges of Simonides, which were well-known as the benchmarks of this style of poetry. And so it goes for everything else.

2 Hades puts an end to all pleasure for every man; hence the warning that man should enjoy his youth upon earth: Thgn. 973 ff.; cf. 877 f., 1191 ff., 1009 f.; Sol. 24; Thgn. 719 ff.

2 Hades puts a stop to all enjoyment for everyone; that's why there's a warning that people should make the most of their youth while they're alive: Thgn. 973 ff.; cf. 877 f., 1191 ff., 1009 f.; Sol. 24; Thgn. 719 ff.

3 θανάτῳ πάντες ὀφειλόμεθα—an ancient saying often repeated; cf. Bergk on Simon. 122, 2; Nauck on Soph., El. 1173 [Blaydes ad loc.].

3 We're all going to die.—an old saying that's frequently quoted; see Bergk on Simon. 122, 2; Nauck on Soph., El. 1173 [Blaydes ad loc.].

4 Hades himself plays the part of Thanatos and carries off the souls to the lower world. Thus as early as Semon. i, 13 f., τοὺς δ’ Ἄρει δεδημένους πέμπει μελαίνης Ἀΐδης ὑπὸ χθονός. In metaphorical language Ἅιδης for θάνατος is quite regular from the time of Pindar onwards. This, in turn, lent support to the use of the name of Ἅιδης instead of the personified Θάνατος. So esp. in Pi., O. ix, 33–5; cf. besides, Epigr. Gr. 89, 3–4. τόνδε . . . μάρψας Ἅιδης οἱ σκοτίας ἀμφέβαλεν πτέρυγας; cf. 201, 2; 252, 1–2. (And therefore in Eur., Alc. 261, we should not alter the πτερωτὸς Ἅιδας who is named instead of Thanatos—not even in favour of the otherwise ingenious βλέπων . . . ᾅδαν.)

4 Hades himself takes on the role of Thanatos and takes the souls to the underworld. This idea appears as early as Semon. i, 13 f., He sends those bound to Ares down to the dark realm of Hades beneath the earth.. In metaphorical terms, Hades is regularly used to mean death from the time of Pindar onward. This contributed to the preference for using the name of Hades instead of the personified Death. This is especially seen in Pi., O. ix, 33–5; see also, Epigr. Gr. 89, 3–4. Here is the modernized text: "Then . . . having seized him, Hades enveloped him with shadowy wings."; see also 201, 2; 252, 1–2. (And therefore in Eur., Alc. 261, we should not change the winged Hades who is mentioned instead of Thanatos—not even in favor of the otherwise clever βλέποντας… κάτω από τον Άδη.)

5 δηρὸν ἔνερθεν γῆς ὀλέσας ψυχὴν κείσομαι ὥστε λίθος ἄφθογγος Thgn. 567 f.—the condition of things in Hades is regarded exactly as in the Homeric pictures: Thgn. 704–10.

5 Long after I’ve lost my soul underground, I will remain still like a quiet stone. Thgn. 567 f.—the state of affairs in Hades is viewed just like in the Homeric depictions: Thgn. 704–10.

6 See esp. Sol. 13, 29 ff.: Thgn. 731–42; 205 ff.

6 See especially Sol. 13, 29 and following: Thgn. 731–42; 205 and following.

7 Mimn. ii, 13: ἄλλος δ’ αὗ παίδων ἐπιδεύεται, ὧντε μάλιστα ἱμείρων κατὰ γῆς ἔρχεται εἰς Ἀΐδην. Without children there can be no assurance that the cult of the soul will be carried on. But we may well believe that the attaching of so much importance to offspring was assisted by the natural human belief that the man who left children behind him on earth did not completely perish in death (hence ἀειγενές ἐστι καὶ ἀθάνατον ὡς θνητῷ ἡ γέννησις as in Plato, Smp. 206 E). This alone gives a meaning and a reason for the widespread belief among the Greeks that the wicked man who is punished after his death in his children and children’s children himself feels that punishment.

7 Mimn. ii, 13: Another one of these children approaches, longing most of all to go down to the earth and into Hades.. Without children, there’s no guarantee that the soul's worship will continue. But it’s reasonable to think that the emphasis on having offspring was influenced by the natural human belief that a person who leaves children behind on earth doesn't fully die (which is why It is ever-living and immortal, just like the birth of a mortal. as noted in Plato, Smp. 206 E). This belief alone provides a meaning and explanation for the widespread conviction among the Greeks that a wicked person, who is punished after death through his children and grandchildren, feels that punishment themselves.

8 Semon. 1; 3. Mimn. 2. Sol. 13, 63 ff.; 14. Thgn. 167 f.; 425 ff. We may also add here the expressions of resignation, Hdt. vii, 46; i, 31.

8 Semon. 1; 3. Mimn. 2. Sol. 13, 63 ff.; 14. Thgn. 167 f.; 425 ff. We can also include the expressions of resignation, Hdt. vii, 46; i, 31.

9 Νυκτὸς θάλαμος [Ion] fr. 8, 2.

9 Night Chamber [Ion] fr. 8, 2.

10 On the story of Midas and Silenos see Griech. Roman, p. 204 f. As to the ancient and often repeated maxim ἀρχὴν (or πάντων) μὲν μὴ φῦναι ἐπιχθονίοισιν ἄριστον κτλ., see Bgk., Opusc. ii, 214; PLG4. ii, p. 155 f. Nietzsche, Rh. Mus. xxviii, 212 ff. (whose view that the 440 beginning ἀρχὴν . . . is old and original—but not his involved explanation of this—has been fully confirmed by the finding of the primitive form of the ἀγών: Mahaffy, On the Flinders Petrie Papyri, i, p. 70).

10 For the story of Midas and Silenos, see Griech. Roman, p. 204 f. Regarding the old and often repeated saying Beginning (or all) It is best not to be born among those who live on the earth, etc., see Bgk., Opusc. ii, 214; PLG4. ii, p. 155 f. Nietzsche, Rh. Mus. xxviii, 212 ff. (whose view that the 440 beginning ἀρχὴν . . . is ancient and original—but not his complicated explanation of this—has been fully supported by the discovery of the original form of the contest: Mahaffy, On the Flinders Petrie Papyri, i, p. 70).

11 Simon, fr. 39; 38.

11 Simon, fr. 39; 38.

12 fr. 137.—Usener, Götternamen, 229, 13, says of Sappho that “she was possessed by the belief that as a poetess she would live again after her death among the gods, and would therefore become a heroine; see frr. 68 and 136”. But from these fragments of Sappho no such belief can be extracted without first reading into them a good deal that they do not say.

12 fr. 137.—Usener, Götternamen, 229, 13, says about Sappho that “she believed that as a poet, she would live on after her death among the gods, and would therefore become a heroine; see frr. 68 and 136.” However, you can't find such a belief in these fragments of Sappho without imposing a lot more meaning on them than what they actually say.

13 Of the man who has fallen in glory on the battlefield Tyrtaios says, 12, 31 f.: οὐδέ ποτε κλέος ἐσθλὸν ἀπόλλυται οὐδ’ ὄνομ’ αὔτοῦ, ἀλλ’ ὑπὸ γῆς περ ἐὼν γίγνεται ἀθάνατος (i.e. in renown upon earth). Thgn. says to his Kyrnos, 243 ff., in your lifetime my songs will make you famous καὶ ὅταν δνοφερῆς ὑπὸ κεύθεσι γαίης βῇς πολυκωκύτους εἰς Ἀίδαο δόμους, οὐδέποτ’ οὐδὲ θανὼν ἀπολεῖς κλέος ἀλλὰ μελήσεις ἄφθιτον ἀνθρώποις αἰὲν ἔχων ὄνομα . . . cf. Aesch., Epigr. iii, 3 (241 Bgk. = 449 Di.), ζωὸν δὲ φθιμένων πέλεται κλέος.

13 Regarding the man who has fallen in glory on the battlefield, Tyrtaios says, 12, 31 f.: Noble fame never fades, and his name lives on; even when buried in the ground, he becomes immortal. (i.e., in renown upon earth). Thgn. tells his Kyrnos, 243 ff., in your lifetime my songs will make you famous And when you lie beneath the dark earth, in the mourning of many, you will never lose your fame even in death, but you will always have an everlasting name among people . . . cf. Aesch., Epigr. iii, 3 (241 Bgk. = 449 Di.), The recognition of the living is the destiny of those who are fading away..

14 Even in Hades the dead perceive χθονίᾳ φρενί if they themselves or the ἀρεταί of their descendants upon earth are praised: Pi., P. v, 98: cf. O. viii, 81 ff.; xiv, 20 ff.; [Ion] Anth. Pal. vii, 43, 3 (to Eurip.), ἴσθι δ’ ὑπὸ χθονὸς ὤν, ὅτι σοι κλέος ἄφθιτον ἔσται κτλ.—In the expressions collected by Meuss, Jahrb. f. Philol. 1889, p. 812 f., from the fourth century orators there only remains a very faint recollection of such a belief.

14 Even in Hades, the dead can sense in the earthly mind if they themselves or the virtues of their descendants on earth are being honored: Pi., P. v, 98: cf. O. viii, 81 ff.; xiv, 20 ff.; [Ion] Anth. Pal. vii, 43, 3 (to Eurip.), Know that, even being under the earth, your glory will be everlasting, etc.—In the examples gathered by Meuss, Jahrb. f. Philol. 1889, p. 812 f., from the fourth-century orators, there is only a very slight memory of such a belief.

15 Semon. 2, τοῦ μὲν θανόντος οὐκ ἂν ἐνθυμοίμεθα, εἴ τι φρονοῖμεν, πλεῖον ἡμέρης μιῆς.—Stes. 51, ἀτελέστατα γὰρ καὶ ἀμάχανα τοὺς θανόντας κλαίειν. 52, θανόντος ἀνδρὸς πᾶσ’ ἀπόλλυται ποτ’ ἀνθρώπων χάρις.

15 Semon. 2, When someone has died, we don't usually reflect on it unless we think about it for more than just one day..—Stes. 51, for it is entirely unfulfilled and pointless for the dead to be mourned. 52, When a man dies, all the charm of humanity is gone..

16 This emerges at once if we review the material collected by H. Meuss upon “the conceptions appearing in the Attic orators of existence after death”: Jahrb. f. Philol. 1889, pp. 801–15. For the cult of the soul and all that attaches to it the orators are our most authoritative witnesses and as such are frequently examined in the sections of this book that deal with the subject.

16 This becomes clear when we look at the material collected by H. Meuss on “the ideas presented by the Attic orators about life after death”: Jahrb. f. Philol. 1889, pp. 801–15. The orators are our most reliable sources regarding the worship of the soul and everything related to it, and as such, they are often discussed in the sections of this book that cover this topic.

17 εἴ τινες τῶν τετελευτηκότων λάβοιεν τρόπῳ τινὶ τοῦ νῦν γιγνομένου πράγματος αἴσθησιν and frequently in this style: cf. the passages quoted by Westermann on D., Lept. (20), 87; cf. also Lehrs, Pop. Aufs. 329 ff. The question is always whether the dead are capable in any way of apprehending what goes on in this world. The continued life of the dead is never doubtful but rather implied throughout, for without such implication no possibility whatever would be left for that εἰ—.

17 if some of the deceased could somehow understand what is happening in this world and often in this manner: see the passages referenced by Westermann on D., Lept. (20), 87; also see Lehrs, Pop. Aufs. 329 ff. The question always remains whether the dead can in any way understand what happens in this world. The ongoing existence of the dead is never in doubt but is rather suggested throughout, as without such suggestion, there would be no opportunity for that if—.

18 See Nägelsbach, Nachhom. Theol. 420. Meuss, p. 812.

18 See Nägelsbach, Nachhom. Theol. 420. Meuss, p. 812.

19 This is well brought out by Lehrs, Pop. Aufs. 331. But the statement holds good in an even more precise and exclusive sense than he there gives it. The words of Hyper., Epit. xiii, § 39, deal simply with the existence in Hades of those who have died for their country (with some traditional embellishments; see above, chap. vii, n. 5)—this much can hardly ever have been expressly doubted or denied by any orator. But it is wrong to say (as Lehrs does: p. 331) that Hyp. expresses, though in other words, what was afterwards laid down by [D.H.] Rhet. vi, 5, as proper “for such funeral speeches” (no, only for private funerals—which is quite another matter). It is true that the advice there given is to say that the soul is ἀθάνατος and now dwells 441 “with the gods”. But it never enters into the head of Hyp. to say any such thing (nor in the frag. of the speech preserved by Stob., Fl. 124, 36). In fact, the precept of this sophistic writer (still more the advice given by Men. Rhet., de Encom. 414, 16 ff.; 421, 16 ff. Sp.) rather reveals the enormous contrast between the style of the sophistic funeral oratory of a later period and the real characteristics of the old Attic funeral orations: a difference founded upon the difference of sentiment manifested by the public that listened to such speeches in two different ages. Even the statements of [Dem.] Epit. (60) 34 (πάρεδροι τοῖς κάτω θεοῖς together with the ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες of earlier times ἐν μακάρων νήσοις) betray sophistic colouring though falling far short of the excesses of Ps.-D.H. and Men. Rhet.

19 Lehrs clearly highlights this in Pop. Aufs. 331. However, the statement is true in an even more specific and exclusive way than he presents it. Hyperides, in Epit. xiii, § 39, simply discusses the existence in Hades of those who have died for their country (with some traditional embellishments; see above, chap. vii, n. 5)—this is something that no orator has ever seriously doubted or denied. But it's incorrect to say (as Lehrs does: p. 331) that Hyperides states, albeit in different words, what was later mentioned by [D.H.] Rhet. vi, 5, as appropriate “for such funeral speeches” (no, only for private funerals—which is a completely different topic). It is true that the advice given there suggests saying that the soul is ἀθάνατος and now resides 441 “with the gods.” However, it never crosses Hyperides' mind to say anything like that (nor in the fragment of the speech preserved by Stob., Fl. 124, 36). In fact, the principle of this sophistic writer (even more so the advice from Menander's Rhet., de Encom. 414, 16 ff.; 421, 16 ff. Sp.) reveals the stark contrast between the style of later sophistic funeral oratory and the true characteristics of the old Attic funeral orations: a difference rooted in the varying sentiments expressed by the audiences that listened to such speeches in two different eras. Even the assertions of [Dem.] Epit. (60) 34 (assistants to the lower gods along with the good men of earlier times on the blessed islands) show a sophistic influence, although they are far less extreme than the excesses found in Ps.-D.H. and Menander's Rhet..

20 The only thing ἀγήραντος about those who have fallen in the wars of freedom is their εὐλογίη Simon. 100, 4; cf. 106, 4 (with Bgk.’s note). 99, 3–4 οὐδὲ τεθνᾶσι θανόντες ἐπεί σφ’ ἀρετὴ καθύπερθεν κυδαίνουσ’ ἀνάγει δώματος ἐξ Ἀΐδεω (which is imitated in the epitaph of Thrasymachos the Kretan οὐδὲ θανὼν ἀρετᾶς ὄνυμ’ ὠλέσας, ἀλλὰ σε Φάμα κυδαίνουσ’ ἀνάγει δώματος ἐξ Ἀΐδα, BCH. 1889, p. 60).

20 The only thing that remains timeless about those who died in the wars for freedom is their glory. 100, 4; cf. 106, 4 (with Bgk.’s note). 99, 3–4 Even in death, they don't fade away, because their virtue grants them fame that reaches beyond the house of Hades. (which is echoed in the epitaph of Thrasymachos the Cretan Even in death, his virtuous name lives on, but you, Fame, elevate him to glory from the underworld., BCH. 1889, p. 60).

21 κλῦθί μοι ὦ πάτερ, θαῦμα βροτῶν, τᾶς ἀειζώου μεδέων ψυχᾶς, Melanipp. 6. The words θαῦμα βροτῶν (modelled on the θαῦμα βροτοῖσι of Homer) can refer only to Dionysos (of the gods who enter into the question here): Διώνυσος, χάρμα βροτοῖσιν, Ξ 325. Further, it is natural to think of Dionysos in the work of a dithyrambic poet.

21 Listen to me, oh father, remarkable among humans, of those whose souls live on forever., Melanipp. 6. The phrase Wonder of mortal beings (inspired by the wonder to mortals of Homer) can only refer to Dionysus (of the gods involved in this discussion): Dionysus, joy for mortals, Ξ 325. Moreover, it makes sense to think of Dionysus in the works of a dithyramb poet.

22 The dead man ἀμφ’ Ἀχέροντι ναιετάων, Pi., N. iv, 85. This is the general assumption: e.g. P. xi, 19–22; O. ix, 33–5; I. viii, 59 f.; fr. 207 Bgk.

22 The dead man By the Acheron river, Pi., N. iv, 85. This is the common belief: for example, P. xi, 19–22; O. ix, 33–5; I. viii, 59 f.; fr. 207 Bgk.

23 ἔστι δὲ καί τι θανόντεσσιν μέρος κὰν νόμον ἐρδόμενον· κατακρύπτει δ’ οὐ κόνις συγγόνων κεδνὰν χάριν, O. viii, 77 ff.

23 There's also a section for those who have passed away that adheres to the law; it definitely obscures the valued bond among family members., O. viii, 77 ff.

24 Something of the kind is adopted for the moment, e.g. in O. xiv, 20 ff.; viii, 81 ff. A real belief in such a possibility appears perhaps most clearly in P. v, 98 ff.

24 Something like this is used for now, for example in O. xiv, 20 ff.; viii, 81 ff. A genuine belief in this possibility shows up most clearly in P. v, 98 ff.

25 For him who dies fighting for his country there is in store—not blessedness but only Fame, I. vii, 26 ff. He who comes καλὰ ἔρξαις ἀοιδᾶς ἄτερ εἰς Ἀΐδα σταθμόν has little reward for his pains (his reward would, in fact, have been just the praise given in the ἀοιδά), O. x, 91 ff., cf. N. vii, 30–2.

25 For those who die fighting for their country, there is not a paradise waiting, but merely Fame, I. vii, 26 ff. The one who comes You’re doing well to sing songs without going to the station of Hades. receives little recognition for their efforts (their reward would really just be the praise received in the singer), O. x, 91 ff., cf. N. vii, 30–2.

26 A strange expression is the δαίμων γενέθλιος of O. xiii, 105 (in the same poem we also have Ξενοφῶντος δαίμων 28, which in this case at least is something more than “destiny”, otherwise the normal meaning of δαίμων in Pindar, cf. P. v, 123, I. vii, 43). It almost seems as if it were intended to describe the ancestor spirit that brings good luck to the house like the genius generis or ἥρως συγγενείας (see above, chap. v, n. 132).

26 A strange expression is the birth spirit of O. xiii, 105 (in the same poem we also have Xenophon's spirit 28, which in this case at least is more than just “destiny,” otherwise the typical meaning of spirit in Pindar, cf. P. v, 123, I. vii, 43). It almost seems as if it's meant to describe the ancestor spirit that brings good fortune to the household like the genius generis or hero of kinship (see above, chap. v, n. 132).

27 Amphiaraos, O. vi, 14; N. ix, 24 ff.; x, 8 f. (Amph. from his underground cavern sees the fighting in the war of the Epigonoi, P. viii, 39–56. There is no suggestion that the Ἐπίγονοι inquire at his oracle—as Dissen supposes; with this the ὧδ’ εἰπε μαρναμένων 43 is inconsistent.)—Ganymedes translated to eternal life, O. i, 44; x, 104 f. Apart from this there are temporary translations to the gods or from one place on earth to another, O. i, 36 ff.; ix, 59; P. ix, 5ff.; I. viii, 20 f.

27 Amphiaraos, O. vi, 14; N. ix, 24 ff.; x, 8 f. (Amph. from his underground cavern sees the fighting in the war of the Epigonoi, P. viii, 39–56. There’s no indication that the Heirs ask his oracle—contrary to what Dissen assumes; this makes ὧδ’ εἰπε ὅταν μαρναμένων 43 inconsistent.)—Ganymedes is taken to eternal life, O. i, 44; x, 104 f. Besides this, there are temporary translations to the gods or from one location on earth to another, O. i, 36 ff.; ix, 59; P. ix, 5ff.; I. viii, 20 f.

28 O. ii, 27 ff.

28 O. ii, 27 and following.

29 ἀλλά τι προσφέρομεν ἔμπαν ἢ μέγαν νόον ἤτοι φύσιν ἀθανάτοις, N. vi, 4 f.

29 But what we provide is either profound insight or the essence of the divine., N. vi, 4 f.

30 σκιᾶς ὄναρ ἄνθρωπος, P. viii, 95. ἓν ἀνδρῶν ἓν θεῶν γένος, ἐκ μιᾶς δὲ πνέομεν ματρὸς ἀμφότεροι· διείργει δὲ πᾶσα κεκριμένα δύναμις, 442 ὡς τὸ μὲν οὐδέν, ὁ δὲ χαλκεος ἀσφαλὲς αἰὲν ἕδος μένει οὐρανός, N. vi, 1 ff.

30 A dream is just a reflection of a person., P. viii, 95. We are one race of humans and one race of gods, originating from a single mother; all the hidden powers separate us, 442 For the one, there is nothing, but the safe and solid home of the one who is bronze always remains in the heavens., N. vi, 1 ff.

31 fr. 131 Bgk.

31 fr. 131 Bgk.

32 Pindar in these lines speaks only of the αἰῶνος εἴδωλον; but that by this he means the ψυχή is obvious in itself and is stated by Plutarch, who preserves the lines, Cons. ad Apoll. 35, p. 120 D (περὶ ψυχῆς λέγων; cf. Rom. 28).—ψυχή in Pindar sometimes stands for what is otherwise called καρδία or φρήν, “heart” or “disposition” e.g. P. i, 48; iv, 122; N. ix, 39; I. iv, 53b, and O. ii, 77, and prob. also P. iii, 41; “disposition,” N. ix, 32. The word is sometimes (as in Homer) equivalent to ζωή, P. iii, 101, ψυχὰν λιπών. It simultaneously = “life” and the alter ego dwelling within the living man, O. viii, ψυχὰς βάλον; cf. N. i, 47. But the poet knows also the full meaning of ψυχά in the older idiom and belief. Entirely in the manner of Homeric usage ψυχά denotes the spiritual double of mankind, which survives the man himself, in those instances where the ψυχή of the dead is said to be still in existence: ψυχὰν κομίξαι, P. iv, 159; N. viii, 44 f.; σὺν Ἀγαμεμνονίᾳ ψυχᾷ (is Kassandra sent into Hades), P. xi, 20 f. Persephone ἀναδιδοῖ ψυχὰς πάλιν (out of Hades), fr. 133, 3 (Bgk.); I. i, 68, ψυχὰν Ἀΐδᾳ τελέων (in death).—ψυχαί is also used in the old idiomatic sense in fr. 132, 1: which is, however, spurious.—ψυχά in Pindar never denotes the psychical powers of the living man inclusive of the intellect, much less the intellect, νοῦς, alone.

32 Pindar in these lines talks only about the idol of the age; but it’s clear that he means the soul, as Plutarch points out while preserving the lines in Cons. ad Apoll. 35, p. 120 D (about the soul; cf. Rom. 28).—In Pindar, soul sometimes stands for what is also referred to as heart or φρήν, meaning “heart” or “disposition,” for example in P. i, 48; iv, 122; N. ix, 39; I. iv, 53b, and O. ii, 77, and probably also P. iii, 41; “disposition,” N. ix, 32. The term can also mean (as in Homer) life, P. iii, 101, leaving the soul. It simultaneously means “life” and the alter ego residing within a living person, O. viii, Drop the souls; cf. N. i, 47. However, the poet is also aware of the full significance of soul in the older language and beliefs. Following the Homeric usage, soul represents the spiritual double of humanity, which continues to exist after a person has died, in cases where it’s said that the soul of the dead is still alive: bring back the soul, P. iv, 159; N. viii, 44 f.; with Agamemnon's soul (Kassandra is sent to Hades), P. xi, 20 f. Persephone gives back souls again (returns souls from Hades), fr. 133, 3 (Bgk.); I. i, 68, soul to Hades complete (in death).—souls is also used in the old idiomatic sense in fr. 132, 1: which, however, is spurious.—In Pindar, soul never refers to the mental abilities of a living person, much less to the intellect, mind, alone.

33 καὶ σῶμα μὲν πάντων ἕπεται θανάτῳ περισθενεῖ, ζῶον δ’ ἔτι λείπεται αἰῶνος εἴδωλον· τὸ γὰρ ἐστι μόνον ἐκ θεῶν, fr. 131 (96 Boeckh).

33 and the body of everything dies, but the living endures, a glimpse of eternity; for it is only from the gods, fr. 131 (96 Boeckh).

34 οἶσι δὲ Φερσεφόνα ποινὰν παλαιοῦ πένθεος δέξεταιfr. 133. What is meant is undoubtedly the ancient “guilt” of the soul for which Perseph. receives satisfaction. This guilt can only be called a πένθος if she who accepts the satisfaction is regarded as herself grief-stricken by the guilty dead; if, in fact, the deed has been the occasion of mourning for Persephone. That this can apply to the goddess of the underworld is startling, but it cannot be got rid of by artificial interpretation (as Dissen would like to get rid of it). Pindar follows throughout the analogy of the ancient procedure of expiation in the case of blood-guiltiness. But this procedure seems to be familiar with the idea that, apart from the ἀγχιστεία of the murdered man, the underworld gods themselves (as guardians of the Souls) are immediately injured by the deed and stricken by grief and must receive satisfaction on their own account. Hence in certain legends (typificatory of ritual) the murderer not only has to fly from the land but to undergo servitude to the χθόνιοι: Apollo, especially after the slaying of Python, has to serve Ἄδμητος, i.e. Hades for an ennaëteris (more on this subject below, n. 40). Thus, the guilty soul banished from its proper home serves a “great year” under Persephone, and this is the ποινά that it pays.

34 Persephone will receive the punishment for the old sorrow.fr. 133. What this refers to is clearly the ancient “guilt” of the soul for which Persephone receives satisfaction. This guilt can only be called a grief if the one accepting the satisfaction is seen as herself grieving over the guilty dead; if, in fact, the act has caused mourning for Persephone herself. The idea that this applies to the goddess of the underworld is surprising, but it can’t be dismissed with forced interpretations (as Dissen wishes to do). Pindar consistently follows the analogy of the ancient practice of expiation in cases of bloodguilt. However, this practice seems to encompass the notion that, aside from the cousin marriage of the murdered person, the underworld gods themselves (as guardians of the souls) are directly harmed by the act and affected by grief and must receive satisfaction on their own behalf. Therefore, in specific legends (representative of rituals), the murderer not only has to flee the land but also serve the underworld beings: Apollo, particularly after killing Python, has to serve Admetus, i.e., Hades for an ennaëteris (more on this topic below, n. 40). Thus, the guilty soul, expelled from its rightful place, serves a “great year” under Persephone, and this is the ποινά that it must pay.

35 O. ii, 63–5. Everything here refers to judgment and compensation in Hades. In the words θανόντων μὲν ἐνθάδ’ αὐτίκ’ ἀπάλαμνοι φρένες ποινὰς ἔτισαν the ἐνθάδε cannot possibly belong to the ποινὰς ἔτισαν, as Aristarchos supposed, so that the words should refer to the punishment in the course of a new birth upon earth of crimes committed in Hades (in itself a remarkable conception). θανόντες alone would not be put for θανόντες καὶ ἀναβεβιωκότες, and we can only understand by the word those who after a life-time upon earth have died and are now spending their time below in the underworld. Moreover, it is hardly likely (as Ty. Mommsen reminds us adnot. crit. ad Olymp. 24) that the exposition of the “knowledge of the future” (62) on the part of 443 a man still living upon earth would begin with what may happen to man, not after his death, but in a second appearance upon earth that is to fall to his lot later on. We must first of all be told what happens after the conclusion of the present condition of life, viz. that upon earth. Finally, the use of αὐτίκα is quite satisfactory if it refers to the judgment in Hades that follows immediately after death; while it is meaningless in Aristarchos’ interpretation (hence Rauchenstein writes αὖτις—a mere conjecture and a superfluous one). The view that the μὲν—δέ of 63–4 necessitates Aristarchos’ explanation is not convincing (as Lübbert thinks, Ind. Schol. Bonn. hib. 1887, p. xviii—incidentally he quite unjustifiably introduces specifically Platonic fancies into Pindar, p. xix). The θανόντων μέν of 63 is not answered till ὅσοι δ’ ἐτόλμασαν . . . 75, just as the αὐτίκα of 63 does not receive its contrast till we come to what happens much later—after the life on earth has been thrice repeated—described in 75 ff. The δέ of 64 and 67 are subordinate (not adversative) to what is introduced by the μέν of 63 and they continue the thought. The ἐνθάδε of 63 might indeed, in accordance with an otherwise correct usage, be connected with ἀπάλαμνοι φρένες, as it is by one of the Scholiasts: “the φρένες which have committed crimes here upon earth.” But ἀπάλαμνος does not mean sceleratus, impius (nor does it in the passages adduced for this meaning by Zacher, Diss. Halens. iii, 237: Thgn. 281; Sim. v, 3). The ἀπάλαμνοι φρένες are simply equivalent to the ἀμενηνὰ κάρηνα of Homer, and are a very suitable expression for the ψυχαί of the dead (though not indeed for the ψυχαί of the reborn as Aristarchos would have it). No alternative remains save to connect θανόντων and ἐνθάδε: simulac mortui sunt hic, s. decedunt hinc (Dissen). The sentence τὰ δ’ ἐν τᾷδε . . . must then either be a more exact description of what has been stated generally just before in ποινὰς ἔτισαν (and this is Mommsen’s view supported by one Schol.), or else be subordinated—together with its contrasted ἴσαις δὲ . . . 67 ff.—to ποινὰς ἔτισαν. ποινά in Pindar means regularly compensation, whether expiation for evil deeds or reward for good (cf. P. i, 59; N. i, 70b). If we might suppose that by a brachylogy not beyond possibility in Pindar ποινὰς ἔτισαν is put for ποινὰς ἔτισαν καὶ ἐδέξαντο, then the sense might be: after death the souls receive at once recompense for their actions—and then follows the division of the bad 64 ff., and the good 67 ff. But we may perhaps rest content with Mommsen’s explanation.

35 O. ii, 63–5. Everything here discusses judgment and compensation in Hades. In the phrase When they died here, their helpless minds still bore the penalties., the Here cannot logically relate to the They administered punishments., as Aristarchos suggested, meaning these words should refer to the punishment during a new life on earth for crimes committed in Hades (which is an itself an intriguing idea). The term dead alone would not refer to θανόντες καὶ ἀναβεβιωκότες, and we can only interpret it to mean those who have lived on earth, have died, and are now existing in the underworld. Additionally, it seems unlikely (as Ty. Mommsen notes adnot. crit. ad Olymp. 24) that an explanation regarding the "knowledge of the future" (62) from a living person on earth would start with what may happen to someone not after death, but after another lifetime on earth that they will experience later. We first need to know what happens after this current life on earth concludes. Finally, using instantly makes sense if it refers to the judgment in Hades which occurs immediately after death; while it would be meaningless in Aristarchos’ interpretation (hence Rauchenstein writes again—a mere guess that is unnecessary). The argument that the μὲν—δέ of 63–4 necessitates Aristarchos’ explanation is not convincing (as Lübbert argues, Ind. Schol. Bonn. hib. 1887, p. xviii—he unjustifiably introduces specific Platonic ideas into Pindar, p. xix). The θανόντων μέν of 63 is only addressed later in Whoever dared . . . 75, just as the immediately of 63 only receives its contrast much later—after the life on earth has been repeated three times—described in 75 ff. The δέ of 64 and 67 are subordinate (not adversative) to what is introduced by the μέν of 63, continuing the thought. The here of 63 could indeed, following a correct usage, relate to mindless distractions, as stated by one of the Scholiasts: “the brakes that committed crimes here on earth.” But Unstoppable does not mean sceleratus, impius (nor does it in the examples cited for this meaning by Zacher, Diss. Halens. iii, 237: Thgn. 281; Sim. v, 3). The risky thoughts simply equate to the Amēniná kārina of Homer and are a very appropriate term for the souls of the dead (although not really for the souls of those reborn as Aristarchos would suggest). No other choice remains but to connect θανόντων and here: the dead are here, they depart from this place (Dissen). The sentence I'm sorry, but I cannot modernize this text without further context or additional information. must then either give a more specific description of what was previously stated in general in They served punishments. (and this is Mommsen’s view supported by one Schol.), or else be subordinated—along with its contrasting ἴσαις δὲ . . . 67 ff.—to They faced punishments.. In Pindar, ποινά typically refers to compensation, whether it’s for wrongdoing or a reward for good actions (cf. P. i, 59; N. i, 70b). If we consider that through a brachylogy that isn’t impossible in Pindar, They imposed penalties. might stand for Punishments were given and accepted., then it could mean: after death, the souls immediately receive compensation for their actions—and then follows the separation of the bad in 64 ff., and the good in 67 ff. But we may be satisfied with Mommsen’s explanation.

36 O. ii, 74.

36 O. II, 74.

37 Plu., de Lat. Viv. 7, p. 1130 C after citing the lines of Pindar fr. 130 (95) adds: (the rivers of Erebos) δεχόμενοι καὶ ἀποκρύπτοντες ἀγνοίᾳ καὶ λήθῃ τοὺς κοαζομένους. This might possibly be an addition made by Plu. on his own account—he had frequently spoken of εἰς ἄγνοιαν αὐτὸν ἐμβαλεῖν, etc., in his war against the Epicurean λάθε βιώσας and here the same thing appears again from Erebos. But the words are more probably a paraphrase from Pindar. At any rate, what is said in Plu. about the μνῆμαι καὶ λόγοι of the εὐσεβεῖς in clear contrast with the λήθη of the ἀσεβεῖς, comes from Pindar: this is shown by the allusions of Aristid. i, p. 146, 1 Dind. From this parallel it is also clearly proved that the λήθη does not refer (as Lehrs, Pop. Aufs. 313 thinks) to the forgetfulness of the κολαζόμενοι in the minds of the living, but forgetfulness of their previous life by the κολαζόμενοι themselves. Accordingly we are to suppose that Pindar assigns retention of memory and complete consciousness only to the good in Hades, as their special privilege (cf. the position of Teiresias in κ 494), while the punishment 444 of the wicked is enhanced by λήθη (cf. above, chap. vii, n. 21). Not to have fallen a victim to λήθη in Hades—not to have drunk the waters of Lethe—is occasionally alluded to in poetico-religious utterances of later times as a special privilege of the good, e.g. Epigr. Gr. 204, 11 (first century B.C.); 414, 10. Λήθης and Μνημοσύνης πήγη in Hades (as in the sanctuary of Trophonios at Lebadea, Paus. 9, 39, 8); Epigr. 1037 (cf. above, chap. vii, n. 21; chap. xi, n. 96; and see also below).

37 Plutarch, de Lat. Viv. 7, p. 1130 C after citing the lines of Pindar fr. 130 (95) adds: (the rivers of Erebos) Accepting and hiding in ignorance and forgetfulness those who are croaking.. This might possibly be an addition made by Plutarch on his own—he had often talked about to throw him into ignorance, etc., in his conflict with the Epicurean Live stealthily and here the same idea comes up again from Erebos. However, the words are more likely a paraphrase from Pindar. In any case, what Plutarch says about the μνῆμαι and λόγοι of the devout in clear contrast to the λήθη of the unholy comes from Pindar: this is shown by the references in Aristides. i, p. 146, 1 Dind. From this comparison, it is also clearly demonstrated that the forgetfulness does not refer (as Lehrs, Pop. Aufs. 313 suggests) to the forgetfulness of the suffering in the minds of the living, but to the forgetfulness of their previous lives by the κολαζόμενοι themselves. Therefore, we should assume that Pindar reserves retention of memory and complete consciousness only for the virtuous in Hades, as their special privilege (cf. the position of Teiresias in κ 494), while the punishment of the wicked is intensified by forgetfulness (cf. above, chap. vii, n. 21). Not succumbing to forgetfulness in Hades—not drinking from the waters of Lethe—is occasionally referenced in later poetic and religious expressions as a special privilege of the virtuous, e.g. Epigr. Gr. 204, 11 (first century BCE); 414, 10. Λήθης and Source of memory in Hades (as in the sanctuary of Trophonios at Lebadea, Paus. 9, 39, 8); Epigr. 1037 (cf. above, chap. vii, n. 21; chap. xi, n. 96; and see also below).

38 τοῖσι λάμπει μέν μένος ἀελίου τὰν ἐνθάδε νύκτα κάτω fr. 129. In this naive conception, what Helios only threatens to do in Homer, δύσομαι εἰς Ἀΐδαο καὶ ἐν νεκύεσσι φαείνω, he does in reality and regularly during the earthly night. The same idea must be referred to in O. ii, 61 ff., ἴσον δὲ νύκτεσσιν αἰεὶ ἴσον ἐν ἁμέραις ἅλιον ἔχοντες (so Boeckh)—the ἐσθλοί live in the χῶρος εὐσεβῶν in Hades: they have by night and day the same sun (as we: the ἀπονέστερον of 62 also implies this), that is to say, just as much of the sun as we have on earth only in reverse order of time. The sun only shines upon the εὐσεβεῖς below; μόνοις γὰρ ἡμῖν ἥλιος καὶ φέγγος ἱλαρόν ἐστι sing the initiated in Hades in Ar., Ran. 454 f. (but it is the same sun which shines upon them as shines on us, φῶς κάλλιστον ὥσπερ ἐνθάδε 155. solemque suum sua sidera norunt is a subtlety of later excogitation). Helios shining by night in Hades occurs again in the late Greek Hymn εἰς Ἥλιον (Orph., p. 291 Ab.), v, 11, ἢν γαίης κευθμῶνα μόλῃς νεκύων τ’ ἐπὶ χῶρον. Epigr. Gr. 228b, 7–8, Λητογενές, σὺ δὲ παῖδας ἐν ἡρώεσσι φυλάσσοις, εὐσεβέων ἀεὶ χῶρον ἐπερχόμενος.

38 The sun shines on everyone below. fr. 129. In this simple idea, what Helios only threatens to do in Homer, I will descend into the underworld and stand out among the dead., he actually does regularly during the earthly night. The same notion is found in O. ii, 61 ff., The sun is always the same at night as it is during the day. (so Boeckh)—the the elite live in the holy place in Hades: they have the same sun at night and day (just like us: the more details of 62 also suggests this), meaning they experience the sun just as we do on earth, only in reverse order of time. The sun only shines on the devout below; For us alone, the sun and light bring joy. sing the initiated in Hades in Ar., Ran. 454 f. (but it’s the same sun that shines upon them as shines on us, the most beautiful light just like it is here 155. they know their sun and their stars is a later elaboration). Helios shining by night in Hades appears again in the late Greek Hymn to the Sun (Orph., p. 291 Ab.), v, 11, if you reach the hidden depths of the earth and the realm of the dead. Epigr. Gr. 228b, 7–8, Leto's children, you watch over the kids in the heroes' spots, constantly moving toward the land of the righteous..

39 O. ii, 75 ff.

39 O. ii, 75 ff.

40 fr. 133 ἐνάτῳ ἔτεϊ. What is meant is beyond all question “after the expiration of an ennaëteris” (period of 99 months, i.e. 8 years and 3 intercalary months), a period which besides being familiar as a cycle of religious festivals (Apolline specially but not exclusively) also occurs in the ancient procedure of atonement for murder as the period of self-banishment and servitude in a foreign land undergone by the murderer. Apollo after slaying Python serves μέγαν εἰς ἐνιαυτόν (i.e. an ennaëteris) in the house of Admetos (i.e. the god of the lower world) and then returns purified (Müller, Dorians, i, 338); in the same way Herakles serves Eurystheus (at least a trace of this is found in [Apollod.] 2, 5, 11, 1; see Müller, Dorians, i, 445).—After the murder of Iphitos Herakles has to serve as bondsman to Omphale (peculiar in this case is the combination of this species of atonement for murder with the buying-off of the relatives of the murdered man [Apollod.] 2, 6, 2, 5; D.S. 4, 31, 5). At the end of this period of service he is once more “pure” (ἁγνὸς ἦν S., Trach. 258).—Kadmos after slaying the dragon and the Σπαρτοί serves Ares (the chthonic?) for an ἐνιαυτός of eight years [Apollod.] 3, 4, 2, 1; Müller, Orchomen. 213.—Hippotes after the murder of Mantis has to fly the country δέκα ἔτη [Apollod.] 2, 8, 3, 3.—On the analogy of this custom the gods, too, who have broken an oath sworn by the Styx are banished nine years from the rest of the Olympians (and confined to Hades, since menial service of the χθόνιοι is the essential idea of all such ἀπενιαυτισμός), Hes., Th. 793 ff.: Orph. fr. 157. With a reminiscence of this expiatory banishment Pindar makes the souls at the conclusion of their earthly pilgrimage (which is itself a banishment) undergo a final period of penance in Hades for an ennaëteris, at the end of which the ποινή for the ancient crime is regarded as completely paid off.—The life on earth and the period in Hades which follows is regarded as an exile of the souls (on account of serious crime).—Such an idea was most natural if the real home of the soul was thought of as being 445 a divine (not earthly) country; the idea occurs quite clearly in Empedokles (certainly uninfluenced by the brief allusions of Pindar); see above, chap. xi, n. 75.

40 fr. 133 in the ninth year. It is clear that this refers to “after the completion of an ennaëteris” (a period of 99 months, which is 8 years and 3 intercalary months), a duration that is well-known as a cycle of religious festivals (especially Apolline, but not limited to that) and also appears in ancient rituals for atoning for murder as the time of exile and servitude in a foreign place that the murderer must undergo. After killing Python, Apollo spends great for a year (that is, an ennaëteris) in the house of Admetos (the god of the underworld) and then returns purified (Müller, Dorians, i, 338); similarly, Herakles serves Eurystheus (at least a hint of this is referenced in [Apollod.] 2, 5, 11, 1; see Müller, Dorians, i, 445).—After killing Iphitos, Herakles must serve as a slave to Omphale (notably, this combines atonement for murder with compensating the relatives of the slain man [Apollod.] 2, 6, 2, 5; D.S. 4, 31, 5). At the end of this period of service, he is once again “pure” (was pure S., Trach. 258).—Kadmos, after killing the dragon and the Spartans, serves Ares (possibly the chthonic?) for an year of eight years [Apollod.] 3, 4, 2, 1; Müller, Orchomen. 213.—Hippotes, after killing Mantis, must flee the country for ten years [Apollod.] 2, 8, 3, 3.—By analogy to this practice, the gods who swear false oaths by the Styx are also exiled for nine years from the other Olympians (and confined to Hades, since menial service among the Chthonic is the central concept of all such ἀπενιαυτισμός), Hes., Th. 793 ff.: Orph. fr. 157. Remembering this atoning exile, Pindar depicts the souls, upon completing their earthly journey (which itself is a form of exile), undergoing a final period of punishment in Hades for an ennaëteris, after which the penalty for their past crimes is considered fully paid off.—Life on earth and the subsequent period in Hades is seen as an exile for the souls (due to serious crimes).—This concept makes sense if we consider the soul's true home as being a divine (not earthly) realm; this idea is clearly present in Empedokles (definitely uninfluenced by Pindar's brief mentions); see above, chap. xi, n. 75.

41 fr. 133. The similarity to the promises made by Emped. fr. 146 (457 f.) is immediately apparent, but is not to be explained by imitation of Pindar by Emped., but simply by the similarity of imaginative outlook which led to similar results in the two cases.—Elevation to the rank of Hero is the reward which next awaits the man who is born a king, according to this view. Very remarkable is the manner in which Pindar, O. ii, 58–62, effects the transition to his eschatological statement: the man who possesses πλοῦτος ἀρεταῖς δεδαιδαλμένος knows the future, viz, what we are then told about the fate of the soul hereafter. This assertion, which seems to attribute to the virtuous Great Man at once a higher and a profounder knowledge, is perhaps best explained by the allusions of fr. 133. He who has reached this highest stage of earthly happiness must deduce from that very circumstance that for him now it is fated after another death to become a Hero. He therefore knows that everything, indeed, happens that is related in ll. 63–74, but that before him in particular lies that which follows in ll. 75 ff.; and this is to be regarded as the real import of what the man in question “knows”, 62, while the rest, 63–74, is only added for the sake of completeness. Theron, therefore—for it is he who is alluded to throughout—may be assured beforehand that after death he will be gathered to the Heroes. This is what Pindar means to say here, or at least to give the συνετοί to understand 91 ff. As a matter of historical fact Theron was worshipped with ἡρωϊκαὶ τιμαί after his death, D.S. xi, 53, 2.

41 fr. 133. The similarities to the promises made by Emped. fr. 146 (457 f.) are immediately obvious, but they can't be explained by Empedocles imitating Pindar; rather, it's due to a shared imaginative vision that led to similar outcomes for both. According to this perspective, being elevated to the status of Hero is the reward awaiting the person born a king. It's particularly striking how Pindar, O. ii, 58–62, transitions to his statement about the afterlife: the person who possesses wealth adorned with virtues knows what lies ahead for the soul after this life. This claim, which suggests that the virtuous Great Man has both a deeper and broader understanding, is likely best interpreted through the references in fr. 133. One who has reached this peak of earthly happiness can infer from that status that they are destined to become a Hero after another death. Thus, they know that everything mentioned in lines 63–74 does indeed happen, but specifically for them, what lies in lines 75 ff. is particularly significant; this reflects the true essence of what the individual "knows," 62, while the other lines, 63–74, are merely supplementary. Theron—who is the one being referenced throughout—can be assured in advance that after death he will join the Heroes. That’s the message Pindar conveys here, or at least intends for the wise to grasp, 91 ff. Historically, Theron was honored with heroic honors after his death, D.S. xi, 53, 2.

42 fr. 133. There is according to Dissen a contradiction between fr. 133 and O. ii, 75 ff.: in the latter three periods of life on earth are necessary before the final departure, in fr. 133 only two. This variation would be got rid of if we could adopt the interpretation given by Ty. Mommsen, adnot. crit. Olymp. 30, and assert that in O. ii also Pindar only speaks of two earthly lives with a single residence in Hades intervening. But the words ἐς τρὶς ἑκατέρωθι μείναντες, 75–6, can hardly bear any other interpretation than “three times on each of the two sides” (not: “on both sides—once on that side, twice on this side: total three times”). At the same time there is nothing in fr. 133 to prevent us taking the same number of lives (three as a minimum) to be implied there too. We are not there told that the birth as kings, etc., must always be the one to follow the first birth: in this case also two earlier lives may have gone before.

42 fr. 133. According to Dissen, there's a contradiction between fr. 133 and O. ii, 75 ff.: in the latter, three periods of life on earth are necessary before the final departure, while in fr. 133, only two are mentioned. We could resolve this discrepancy if we adopted Ty. Mommsen's interpretation, adnot. crit. Olymp. 30, and claimed that in O. ii Pindar also refers to just two earthly lives with one stay in Hades in between. However, the words ἐς τρὶς ἑκατέρωθι μείναντες, 75–6, can hardly be interpreted in any way other than “three times on each of the two sides” (not: “on both sides—once on that side, twice on this side: total three times”). At the same time, there's nothing in fr. 133 that stops us from implying the same number of lives (three at a minimum) there too. It's not specified that the birth as kings, etc., must always follow the first birth: in this scenario, two earlier lives could also have come before.

43 See above, chap. iv, § 8.

43 See above, ch. 4, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

44 ἔτειλαν Διὸς ὁδὸν παρὰ Κρόνου τύρσιν, O. ii, 77. What exactly is to be understood by the “way of Zeus” was presumably clearer to the συνετοί versed in the mythology of mysticism for whom Pindar is here writing, than it is to us. It must mean (as Boeckh supposes) the way which Zeus treads in order to reach that Island, far to the West in Okeanos, inaccessible as the Land of the Hyperboreans to ship or traveller on foot; it is a special ἀθανάτων ὁδός like that which leads to Homer’s grotto of the Nymphs, ν 112. Acc. to Bergk, Opusc. ii, 708, it is “certain” that Pindar means the Milky Way. Along this the gods travel to the house of Zeus, Ovid, M. i, 168; and Orpheus in the same way fr. 123, 17 Ab., speaks of the θεῶν ὁδοὶ οὐρανιώνων in the heavens. But the souls could only be made to travel along the Milky Way if their habitation was placed in the sky as it often was later. So, as Bergk points out, following Lob., Agl. 935, 446 the Empedotimos of Herakld. Pont. calls the Milky Way ὁδὸς ψυχῶν τῶν ᾇδην τὸν ἐν οὐράνῳ διαπορευομένων ap. Philop. in Arist., Mete., p. 117, 10 Hayd.; see above, chap. ix, n. 111. But Pindar situates his μακάρων νῆσος in the Ocean (78): it is difficult to see how the souls could arrive there on the Milky Way from the place where they find themselves after death. (We may surely acquit Pindar of the later fancies about an Okeanos in the heavens.) Q.S. iii, 761 ff. (cited by Tafel) knows of a special way belonging to the gods which leads from heaven down to the Ἠλύσιον πεδίον. But the way by which the souls reach the μακάρων νῆσος does not, like that way, begin in heaven. We should rather think of some way only passable for gods and spirits leading from the inhabited world over the pathless Ocean to the latter’s “sources” far in the West.

44 They sent the road of Zeus by the heat of Cronus., O. ii, 77. The meaning of the “way of Zeus” was probably clearer to the wise familiar with the mythology of mysticism for whom Pindar was writing than it is for us now. It likely refers to (as Boeckh suggests) the path Zeus takes to reach that Island, far to the West in Okeanos, which is as unreachable as the Land of the Hyperboreans to ships or travelers on foot; it’s a unique road of the immortals like the one leading to Homer’s grotto of the Nymphs, ν 112. According to Bergk, Opusc. ii, 708, it is “certain” that Pindar is referring to the Milky Way. The gods travel along this path to Zeus’s home, Ovid, M. i, 168; and Orpheus similarly mentions the gods' paths of the heavens in the heavens. However, the souls could only travel along the Milky Way if their residence was in the sky, as it often was later. Thus, as Bergk notes, following Lob., Agl. 935, 446 the Empedotimos of Herakld. Pont. refers to the Milky Way as The path of souls traveling to Hades in the heavens. ap. Philop. in Arist., Mete., p. 117, 10 Hayd.; see above, chap. ix, n. 111. But Pindar places his Island of the Blessed in the Ocean (78): it’s hard to understand how the souls could get there along the Milky Way from where they end up after death. (We can surely exempt Pindar from later ideas about an Okeanos in the heavens.) Q.S. iii, 761 ff. (cited by Tafel) mentions a special path for the gods that leads from heaven down to the Elysian Fields. However, the path that the souls take to the blessed isles does not, like that path, start in heaven. We should instead think of a route that is only accessible to gods and spirits, leading from the inhabited world across the pathless Ocean to its “sources” far to the West.

45 In O. ii, 84–5, it is certainly Kronos who is meant (as Didymos took it, though he gave an absurd interpretation of the passage) and not Zeus as Aristarchos imagined. The exceedingly corrupt and (owing to the intrusion of glosses) unmetrical lines are beyond certain restoration: the emendations of the Byzantine scholars give the required sense.—What happened to the incorrigibly wicked? In accordance with the theory of the soul’s Transmigration two alternative views as to their fate were possible: they might be regarded as passing from body to body unceasingly (Empedokl.) or as doing penance by suffering eternal punishment in Hell (as with Plato and others). The circumstances in which he alludes to these matters do not give Pindar any special occasion to declare himself for either view. He has only to speak of the final condition of the just; the fate of the ἀσεβεῖς is left in semi-obscurity. Something about the matter is, however, said in fr. 132; ψυχαὶ ἀσεβέων hover under the vault of heaven that covers the earth (γαίᾳ either corrupt or grammatically bad Greek), while the pious above the vault of heaven (ἐπουράνιοι) sing to the “Great Blessed One”. Everything in this is un-Pindaric, the inadequacy and even incorrectness of the language (μολπαῖς ἐν ὕμνοις), the unconcealed monotheism of the phrase μάκαρα μέγαν, the conception of the souls as having nothing else to do than sing to the One God, the whole idea that these blessed ones dwell “in heaven”. This last is an idea familiar to Greeks of a later period, nor is the division of souls into ὑπουράνιοι and ἐπουράνιοι unknown to them; cf. Epigr. Gr. 650, 9 ff. But Pindar cannot have written anything of the kind. It is even doubtful whether Clem. Al. who, Str. iv, 640 P., names as the author of the lines τὸν μελοποιόν, meant Pindar by the words: Theodoret. (Gr. Aff. C. viii, 599 C), who attributes the second half of the frag. to Pindar, had no other source but the same Clem. Al. But it may be doubted whether the whole is to be attributed to any Greek of the older faith. It has quite the appearance, as Zeller, Socr. and Socratics, p. 24, n. 3, strikingly suggests, of one of those Jewish forgeries in which Jewish monotheism and the ideas connected with it were to be fathered upon Greek antiquity. Welcker, Kl. Schr. v, 252 ff.; Götterl. i, 741 f., defends the fr. (and most unconvincingly connects the ψυχαὶ ὑπουράνιοι and ἐπουράνιοι of the fr. with the quite different δαίμονες ἐπιχθόνιοι and ὑποχθόνιοι of Hes., Op. 123 and 141). He thinks he can defend the genuineness of the lines (which had already been declared spurious by Dissen) by pointing to the words of Horace about Pindar’s θρῆνοι (O. iv, 2, 21): flebili sponsae iuvenem raptum plorat, et vires animumque moresque aureos educit in astra nigroque invidet Orco. Even supposing that this referred to the transport of the souls to the stars the witness of Horace thus given would only 447 remove a single difficulty from a passage that has other overwhelming difficulties in profusion. But Horace says nothing of the transport of the “Soul” to the heavenly regions, vires, animus, mores, all these together refer not at all to the ψυχή but to the ἦθος and the ἀρεταί of the dead. Pindar, Horace means, rescues the memory of the nature and merits of the youth from decay: only the fame which the poet secures for him is under discussion. educit in astra and invidet Orco mean nothing more than: he rescues the memory of the dead from oblivion, exactly as in the epitaph quoted above, n. 20: οὑδὲ θανὼν ἀρετᾶς ὄνυμ’ ὤλεσας ἀλλά σε Φάμα κυδαίνουσ’ ἀνάγει δώματος ἐξ Ἀΐδα. Thus, it is least of all to be concluded from Horace’s words that Pindar transported the souls of the εὐσεβεῖς into the heavens (rather that in the θρῆνοι—as much as anywhere else: see above, n. 25—Pindar sometimes only recognizes the immortality of fame: of that alone does Horace speak).

45 In O. ii, 84–5, it's clearly Kronos who is referred to (as Didymos noted, despite giving an odd interpretation of the passage) and not Zeus, as Aristarchos believed. The lines are so corrupted and, due to the presence of glosses, unmetrical that certain restoration is impossible: the edits made by Byzantine scholars provide the necessary meaning.—What happened to the irredeemably wicked? According to the theory of the soul’s Transmigration, there were two possible views on their fate: they could be seen as continuously moving from one body to another (as Empedokles suggested), or as enduring eternal suffering in Hell (as Plato and others believed). The context in which he references these matters doesn't give Pindar a reason to take a stance on either view. He only needs to talk about the ultimate condition of the righteous; the fate of the unholy is left somewhat unclear. However, something is mentioned in fr. 132; souls of the wicked linger beneath the vault of heaven that covers the earth (earth, which could be corrupt or poor Greek), while the righteous above the vault of heaven (heavenly) sing to the “Great Blessed One.” Everything here feels un-Pindaric, with the inadequacy and even misuse of language (in songs), the overt monotheism of the term blessed great, the notion of souls existing solely to sing to the One God, and the entire idea that these blessed souls reside “in heaven.” This last idea was well-known among Greeks of a later era, and the classification of souls into Subterranean and heavenly wasn’t unfamiliar to them; cf. Epigr. Gr. 650, 9 ff. But Pindar couldn’t have written anything like this. It’s even questionable whether Clem. Al., who, Str. iv, 640 P., cited as the author of the lines the songwriter, was referring to Pindar. Theodoret. (Gr. Aff. C. viii, 599 C), who attributes the latter half of the fragment to Pindar, had no source other than the same Clem. Al. However, one might doubt whether this whole work can be linked to any Greek of the older belief. It strikingly resembles one of those Jewish forgeries where Jewish monotheism and its associated ideas were attributed to Greek antiquity, as Zeller suggests in Socr. and Socratics, p. 24, n. 3. Welcker, Kl. Schr. v, 252 ff.; Götterl. i, 741 f., defends the fr. (and very unconvincingly links the Underworld souls and celestial of the fr. with the distinctly different underworld demons and underworld beings of Hes., Op. 123 and 141). He believes he can justify the authenticity of those lines (which Dissen had already called into question) by referencing Horace's words about Pindar’s laments (O. iv, 2, 21): The grieving fiancée weeps for the young man taken from her, raising his strength, spirit, and noble character to the stars, while she envies the dark underworld. Even if this implied the transport of souls to the stars, Horace’s testimony would merely 447 resolve a single issue among a multitude of other significant difficulties. However, Horace says nothing about the transport of the “Soul” to the heavenly realms; vires, animus, mores, all of these refer entirely to the soul but rather to the character and the virtues of the deceased. What Horace implies is that Pindar preserves the memory and qualities of the youth from decay: only the fame acquired by the poet is in question. educit in astra and invidet Orco simply mean that he saves the memory of the dead from being forgotten, just as shown in the previously quoted epitaph, n. 20: Even in death, you didn’t lose your reputation for excellence, but Fame, celebrating you, brings you up from the house of Hades.. Thus, it’s least of all to be concluded from Horace’s statements that Pindar transported the souls of the devout to the heavens (rather, in the laments—as much as anywhere else: see above, n. 25—Pindar sometimes only recognizes the immortality of fame: that’s what Horace discusses).

46 O. ii celebrates the victory which Theron had won at Olympia in Ol. 76, but was probably written some time after that victory. Theron died Ol. 77, 1, or 76, 4.

46 O. ii celebrates the victory that Theron achieved at Olympia in Ol. 76, but it was likely written some time after that win. Theron died in Ol. 77, 1, or 76, 4.

47 Sicily was rich in cults of χθόνιοι, in which Gelon, Hieron and their ancestors were hierophants, Hdt. vii, 153; Pi., O. vi, 95. So, too, Akragas the city of Theron (and the home of Empedoldes which also is not without its importance) was Φερσεφόνας ἕδος, Pi., P. xii, 2, having been given by Zeus to Persephone on her marriage, Sch. Pi., O. ii, 16 (as also had, in addition to other cities, Pindar’s native city Thebes, Euphorion, fr. 48; cf. Eur., Phoen. 684 ff. Theron’s family traced its descent from Eteokles the son of Oedipus). It is very possible that the hopes of a blessed immortality of the soul such as were fostered in many ways in the cult of the χθόνιοι and particularly in that of Persephone, should have been familiar to Theron from such a cult and attractive to him.

47 Sicily was filled with worship of the chthonic, where Gelon, Hieron, and their ancestors served as priests, Hdt. vii, 153; Pi., O. vi, 95. Similarly, Akragas, the city of Theron (and the birthplace of Empedocles, which is also significant) was known as Persephone's abode, Pi., P. xii, 2, given to Persephone by Zeus upon her marriage, Sch. Pi., O. ii, 16 (just like Pindar’s hometown Thebes and several other cities, Euphorion, fr. 48; cf. Eur., Phoen. 684 ff. Theron’s family traced its lineage back to Eteocles, the son of Oedipus). It's very likely that the aspirations for a blessed immortality of the soul, which were promoted in many ways through the worship of the chthonic and especially in the cult of Persephone, would have been known to Theron from such practices and appealing to him.

48 The theological character of much of Pindar’s work makes knowledge of mystic doctrine not surprising in him. In fr. 137 he speaks of the Eleusinia (to which he otherwise owes nothing). In fr. 131, though the words are unfortunately most corrupt and probably contain lacunae as they have been transmitted, he speaks of the “releasing Initiations”, ὀλβία δ’ ἅπαντες αἶσα λυσίπονον τελετάν—this is the form of the words required by the metre (dactylo-epitritic), and thus (not τελευτάν) they appear in Plu., Cons. Apoll. 35, p. 120 D, and also in cod. Vatic. 139 (which I have collated).

48 The religious nature of much of Pindar’s work makes it easy to see why he would be familiar with mystical teachings. In fr. 137, he mentions the Eleusinian mysteries (from which he benefits otherwise). In fr. 131, although the text is unfortunately very corrupt and likely has gaps based on how it has been passed down, he references the “releasing Initiations,” ὀλβία δ’ ἅπαντες αἶσα lυσίπονον τελετάν—this is the wording that fits the meter (dactylo-epitritic), and thus (not τελευτάν) it appears in Plu., Cons. Apoll. 35, p. 120 D, and also in cod. Vatic. 139 (which I have compared).

49 IG. xiv = IG. Sic. et It., 641, 1–2–3. [Harrison-Murray, Prolegom. 661 ff.; Vors. 66 B, 18, 19.]—The inscription of the oldest of these poems belongs to the fourth century B.C. The verses can, however, be cited here because the original or rather the two originals upon which the poems are modelled were older than the oldest of the three surviving inscr. (which itself shows serious corruption of the primitive text); and nothing prevents us from supposing that the original forms of these verses go to the fifth century.—The common ancestor of versions 2 and 3 is not derived from version 1, even in the parts in which it agrees with that version, but from a still older original.—Acc. to Dieterich, Nekyia 128 f., 135 f., the lines are taken from a poem of Orpheus’ descent to Hades; but of this they themselves offer not the slightest suggestion.

49 IG. xiv = IG. Sic. et It., 641, 1–2–3. [Harrison-Murray, Prolegom. 661 ff.; Vors. 66 B, 18, 19.]—The inscription of the oldest of these poems dates back to the fourth century BCE However, the verses can be referenced here because the original, or rather the two originals that these poems are based on, were older than the oldest of the three surviving inscriptions (which itself shows significant corruption of the original text); and nothing prevents us from assuming that the original forms of these verses go back to the fifth century.—The common ancestor of versions 2 and 3 does not come from version 1, even in the parts where it aligns with that version, but from an even older original.—According to Dieterich, Nekyia 128 f., 135 f., the lines are taken from a poem about Orpheus’ journey to Hades; however, they themselves provide not the slightest hint of this.

50 The feminine ἔρχομαι ἐκ καθαρῶν καθαρά—and also νῦν δ’ ἱκέτις ἡκω (though this indeed is metrically impossible) IG. xiv, 641, 2, l. 6—refers probably to the ψυχή and not to the sex of the dead person as though a woman were speaking in all three cases. Moreover, in 448 No. 1, 9, Persephone speaks as though to a man ὄλβιε καὶ μακαριστέ, θεὸς δ’ ἔσῃ ἀντὶ βροτοῖο.

50 The feminine I'm coming from pure clean.—and also Now I come as a suppliant. (though this is actually impossible metrically) IG. xiv, 641, 2, l. 6—likely refers to the soul and not to the gender of the deceased, as if a woman were speaking in all three cases. Additionally, in 448 No. 1, 9, Persephone speaks as if to a man Blessed and happy one, you will be a god instead of a mortal..

51 l. 1, ἔρχομαι ἐκ καθαρῶν καθαρά, χθονίων βασίλεια. This is certainly the right punctuation (and is given by the editors), and not Hofmann’s ἐκ καθαρῶν, καθαρὰ χθ. β. “Pure and born of the pure” (referring to the immediate parents of the dead: more distant ancestry would be expressed by ἀπό); cf. κάκιστος κἀκ κακῶν, etc. (Nauck on Soph., OT. 1397; Ph. 874); ἀγαθοὶ ἐξ ἀγαθῶν ὄντες, Andoc., M. 109.

51 l. 1, I come from the pure, untainted places of the earth.. This is definitely the correct punctuation (as noted by the editors), and not Hofmann’s from the untouched, pristine areas of the earth. “Pure and born of the pure” (referring to the immediate parents of the deceased; more distant ancestry would be indicated by from); see the worst of the bad, etc. (Nauck on Soph., OT. 1397; Ph. 874); good from the good, Andoc., M. 109.

52 The parents are καθαροί, the soul of the dead καθαρά, simply as being “purified”, “sanctified”, in τελεταί of the χθόνιοι. In the same way, elsewhere, the Mystai are ὅσιοι “the pure”: see above, chap. vi, n. 18.

52 The parents are clear, the soul of the dead pure, simply by being “cleansed,” “holy,” in the rituals of the earthly beings. Similarly, in another context, the Mystai are the sacred: see above, chap. vi, n. 18.

53 καὶ γὰρ ἐγὼν ὑμῶν γένος ὄλβιον εὔχομαι εἶμεν—so in all three versions.

53 and I also wish that I belonged to your blessed race—so in all three versions.

54 ἀλλά με μοῖρ’ ἐδάμασσε καὶ ἀστεροπῆτα κεραυνῶν (particip.): so in the original to which the readings of three versions point, as restored by O. Hofmann in GDI. 1654. ἀστεροβλῆτα is in No. 1—this might simply = ἀστεροποβλῆτα, but it may only have been substituted by mistake for ἀστεροπῆτα (= ἀστεροπητής of Homer). The line in this form occurs in No. 1, 4. Versions 2 and 3 have εἴτε με μοῖρ’ ἐδάμασσ’ εἴτ’ ἀστροπῆτα κεραυνῶν. But the dead had no choice between natural death (for this is what μοῖρα must mean as contrasted with death by the thunderbolt) and death by being struck by lightning; one or other of the two (or more) forms of death must in actual fact have occurred. In this embarrassment—for death by lightning is not a very frequent occurrence—the ancient verse was altered in such a way that it might refer also to one who had died a natural death. The attempt was indeed not a great success. Originally death by lightning can alone have been mentioned (as in No. 1) and the original form of the lines must have referred to someone who had actually perished in this way. The dead person was then immediately regarded as sanctified simply on account of the method of his death; he became a ἱερὸς νεκρός translated to a higher and continued life: see above, chap. ix, n. 127, and Appendix i. This is the only interpretation of the lines which gives any point to the introduction here of this peculiar manner of death—one who has been thus translated out of life will certainly now be θεὸς ἀντὶ βροτοῖο.

54 But my fate overcame me, along with the starry lightning bolts. (particip.): so in the original that the readings of three versions indicate, as restored by O. Hofmann in GDI. 1654. Star-filled is in No. 1—this might just mean star-filled, but it could have just been mistakenly replaced for star-studded (=star-filled of Homer). The line in this form appears in No. 1, 4. Versions 2 and 3 have whether fate brought me down or hit by lightning from the stars. But the dead had no choice between dying naturally (as this is what destiny must mean in contrast to death by lightning) and death by lightning; one or the other (or more) forms of death must have actually occurred. In this confusion—since death by lightning isn’t very common—the ancient verse was modified so that it might also refer to someone who died a natural death. This attempt was not particularly successful. Originally, only death by lightning was likely mentioned (as in No. 1) and the original lines must have referred to someone who actually perished this way. The deceased was then immediately viewed as sanctified simply due to the way they died; they became a holy deceased person transformed to a higher and continued existence: see above, chap. ix, n. 127, and Appendix i. This is the only interpretation of the lines that gives any significance to the introduction here of this unusual manner of death—someone who has been thus transitioned out of life will certainly now be a god rather than a human.

55 κύκλος τῆς γενέσεως, rota fati, etc. Lob., Agl. 798 ff.

55 creation circle, wheel of fortune, etc. Lob., Agl. 798 ff.

56 ἱμερτοῦ δ’ ἐπέβαν στεφάνου ποσὶ καρπαλίμοισι, Δεσποίνας δ’ ὑπὸ κόλπον ἔδυν χθονίας βασιλείας, No. 1, 6–7. The στέφανος will probably be the sacred precinct, the enclosure that surrounds the realm of Persephone, as Dieterich, De hymn. Orph. 35, very plausibly suggests.

56 As the chosen one moved forward with quick steps, the Mistress slipped away into the embrace of the earthly realm., No. 1, 6–7. The tiara likely refers to the sacred area, the boundary that encircles Persephone’s realm, as Dieterich, De hymn. Orph. 35, suggests very convincingly.

57 Check out __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

58 ὥς με πρόφρων πέμψῃ ἕδρας ἐς εὐαγέων. The ἕδραι εὐαγέων correspond to the χῶρος εὐσεβῶν of other poets and mythologists. But the strange phrase does also contain an allusion to the fact that this paradise of the “pure” is specially reserved for the initiates of the mysteries. The εὐαγής, the man untouched by any ἄγος, is ὅσιος (ὅσιος ἔστω καὶ εὐαγής law ap. And., M. 96): εὐαγεῖν = ὁσιοῦν in an ins. from Ialysos in Rhodes, IGM. Aeg. i, 677. Ordinary non-religious language also preserves the original meaning of the word: it frequently means (in contrast to σκοτώδης and the like) “bright, pure, clean” (and in places, too, where it is customary to insert without good reason εὐαυγής, following the ex. of Hemsterh. on Eur., Suppl. 662).

58 As you graciously guide me to the seats of the blessed. The blessed seats correspond to the place of the faithful found in other poets and mythologists. However, this strange phrase also hints at the idea that this paradise of the "pure" is specifically reserved for those initiated into the mysteries. The blessed, a person untouched by any curse, is sacred (sacred and blessed law ap. And., M. 96): to be thankful = be holy in an inscription from Ialysos in Rhodes, IGM. Aeg. i, 677. Regular non-religious language also keeps the original meaning of the word: it often means (in contrast to dark and similar words) “bright, pure, clean” (and in some cases, it is commonly added without good reason bright, following the example of Hemsterh. on Eur., Suppl. 662).

59 The similarity with the stages of the reward given to the good in Pindar is obvious: χῶρος εὐσεβῶν in Hades; then and not till then 449 escape from the underworld and from human life as well. The only difference is that in Pi. the soul’s final end is to become a ἥρως while here it becomes θεός.

59 The similarity to the stages of reward given to the good in Pindar is clear: place of the pious in Hades; only then 449 can one escape from the underworld and from human life as well. The only difference is that in Pindar, the soul's ultimate fate is to become a hero, while here it becomes god.

60 IG. xiv, 642.

60 IG. 14, 642.

61 id. 641, 1, v, 10, ἔριφος ἐς γάλ’ ἔπετον. 642, 4, θεὸς ἐγένου ἐξ ἀνθρώπου. ἔριφος ἐς γάλα ἔπετες. The conjunction of the two phrases in 642 shows that “As a kid I fell into the milk” is a condition of “I became a God”. We may certainly recognize in the phrase a σύνθημα or σύμβολον of the Mystai like those usual in other secret initiatory rites—ἐκ τυμπάνου ἐφαγον κτλ., Lob. 23 ff.—which refer to performance of symbolical actions in the initiation ceremonies. The precise sense of this σύνθημα cannot be made out (Dieterich’s efforts, H. Orph., p. 35, have not succeeded in clearing up the matter).

61 id. 641, 1, v, 10, I fell into the milk when I was a kid.. 642, 4, I turned from a human into a god. I fell into the milk.. The combination of the two phrases in 642 indicates that “As a kid I fell into the milk” is a prerequisite for “I became a god.” We can certainly see in this phrase a synth or symbol of the Mystai similar to those typical in other secret initiation rites—I ate from the drum, etc., Lob. 23 ff.—which refer to performing symbolic actions during initiation ceremonies. The exact meaning of this synthesis is unclear (Dieterich’s efforts, H. Orph., p. 35, have not clarified the issue).

62 Worth remarking is the instruction ἀλλ’ ὁπόταμ’ ψυχὴ προλίπῃ φάος ἀελίοιο, δεξιὸν εἰσιέναι πεφυλγμένος εὖ μάλα πάντα (this or something like it may have been the original form of the lines which have been thrown into confusion by the intrusion of the explanatory words δεῖ τινα). Then at the conclusion () χαῖρε χαῖρε, δεξιὰν ὁδοιπορῶν λειμῶνάς τε ἱεροὺς καὶ ἄλσεα Φερσεφονείας. (καί: this and nothing else is probably concealed by the KAT of the inscription—καί long before a vowel in 3rd thesis is even in Homer not unheard of.) Here at a comparatively early date we meet with the legend of the Two Ways at the entrance to the underworld, of which that to the right leads to the χῶρος εὐσεβῶν, the left to the place of punishment of the ἄδικοι. It may derive from the fancies of South Italian mystic sects. δεξιόν and ἀριστερόν in the Pythagorean table of Opposites—and in oionistike for a long time before that—mean the same as ἀγαθόν and κακόν (Arist., Metaph. 1, 5, p. 986a, 24; cf. Iamb., VP. 156).—The Υ Pythagoreum denoted the parting of the ways of life to the right (to virtue) and to the left (vice): Serv., A. vi, 136; cf. O. Jahn, Pers., p. 155 f. Plato transferred the Two Ways to the underworld probably following Pythagorean example, Rp. 614 C; cf. τὼ ὁδώ, Gorg. 524 A; divorso itinere, Cato ap. Sall., C. 52, 13, in a Platonist passage. To the right the fountain of Mnemosyne, to the left that of Lethe—grave-tablet from Petelia: Epigr. Gr. 1037 = IG. xiv, 638. The Two Ways in the underworld (of which that to the right hand regularly leads to salvation) are also spoken of by the ποητής whose lines are quoted by Hippol., RH. 5, 8, p. 164, 80 D.-S. (perhaps “Orpheus” as Dieterich, Nek. 193 thinks); cf. also Verg., A. vi, 540 ff., Hegesipp., AP. vii, 545, and the Jewish forgery under the name of Philem., Mein. 4, 67, 6 f. (ii, p. 539 K.).—Three Ways in the world of the spirits, which he takes as being in the sky, are seen by the Empedotimos of Herakld. Pont. (see above, chap. ix, n. 111): Serv., G. i, 34. Plutarch also alludes to three Ways in the underworld, Lat. Viv. vii, p. 1130, for in giving his quotation from Pindar’s θρῆνος fr. 129–30 he suddenly, without having previously said anything about the other two Ways, speaks of the τρίτη τῶν ἀνοσίως βεβιωκότων καὶ παράνομων ὁδός which leads into Erebos. We should suppose that he found these three Ways in Pindar whom he is making use of throughout the passage. Three Ways would seem natural to one who knew of three classes of souls; the εὐσεβεῖς and the ἀσεβεῖς having in between them those who have not strayed seriously from either side of the middle way of ordinary morality and deserve neither reward nor severe punishment. To these then was probably allotted, instead of the bliss or sorrow of the two other classes, the indifferent state of the Homeric εἴδωλα καμόντων. So at least it appears from Lucian, Luct. 7–9. A similar triple 450 division occurs in a popular form ap. D.H. viii, 52 ad fin.: (1) a place of punishment, a kind of Tartaros: (2) τὸ λήθης πεδίον (which is here the indifferent state); (3) the αἰθήρ which is the dwelling-place of the Blessed. Verg., too, has three classes, but he places the middling characters in the limbus infantium, beyond which the road first divides towards Elysium and Tartarus. Did Pindar then anticipate these and incidentally—he need not have been logically consistent about it—introduce such a triple division of the souls?

62 It's noteworthy that the instruction But whenever a soul departs from the light of the sun, having prepared well to enter the right path... (this or something similar may have been the original version of the lines that have been muddled by the addition of the explanatory words need someone). Then at the end () Hello, hello, you who walk the right paths, to the sacred meadows and groves of Persephone. (καί: this and nothing else is likely what’s implied by the KAT of the inscription—καί before a vowel in 3rd thesis is even in Homer not unusual.) Here, at a relatively early point, we encounter the legend of the Two Ways at the entrance to the underworld, where the path to the right leads to the place of the righteous, and the left to the place of punishment for the unjust. This may come from the beliefs of South Italian mystical sects. right and left in the Pythagorean table of Opposites—and in oionistike long before that—mean the same as good and bad (Arist., Metaph. 1, 5, p. 986a, 24; cf. Iamb., VP. 156).—The Υ Pythagoreum represented the parting of the ways of life to the right (towards virtue) and to the left (vice): Serv., A. vi, 136; cf. O. Jahn, Pers., p. 155 f. Plato incorporated the Two Ways into the underworld likely following a Pythagorean model, Rp. 614 C; cf. the two roads, Gorg. 524 A; divorso itinere, Cato ap. Sall., C. 52, 13, in a Platonist context. To the right was the fountain of Mnemosyne, and to the left that of Lethe—grave tablet from Petelia: Epigr. Gr. 1037 = IG. xiv, 638. The Two Ways in the underworld (where the path to the right typically leads to salvation) are also mentioned by the poet whose lines are cited by Hippol., RH. 5, 8, p. 164, 80 D.-S. (possibly “Orpheus” as Dieterich, Nek. 193 suggests); cf. also Verg., A. vi, 540 ff., Hegesipp., AP. vii, 545, and the Jewish forgery attributed to Philem., Mein. 4, 67, 6 f. (ii, p. 539 K.).—Three Ways in the spiritual realm, which he interprets as being in the sky, are observed by the Empedotimos of Herakld. Pont. (see above, chap. ix, n. 111): Serv., G. i, 34. Plutarch also references three Ways in the underworld, Lat. Viv. vii, p. 1130, as he quotes from Pindar’s lament fr. 129–30; he suddenly mentions, without any prior reference to the other two Ways, the Tuesday of the wicked and unlawful path which leads into Erebos. We should assume he found these three Ways in Pindar, whom he is utilizing throughout the passage. Three Ways would seem natural to someone aware of three classes of souls; the pious and the evil having between them those who haven't strayed seriously from either side of the middle path of ordinary morality and deserve neither reward nor harsh punishment. To these, then, was likely assigned, instead of the bliss or sorrow of the two other classes, the neutral state of the Homeric idols of the fallen. So it seems at least from Lucian, Luct. 7–9. A similar triple 450 division appears in a popular form in D.H. viii, 52 ad fin.: (1) a place of punishment, a sort of Tartaros: (2) the realm of forgetfulness (which here represents the neutral state); (3) the aether as the dwelling place of the Blessed. Verg., too, presents three classes, but he places the intermediate characters in the limbus infantium, after which the road first splits towards Elysium and Tartarus. Did Pindar then foresee these and incidentally—he need not have been logically consistent regarding it—introduce such a triple division of the souls?

63 Plato’s violent attacks on poets and poetry—in which nevertheless acc. to his own account οὐδὲν σπουδῆς χαρίν, ἀλλὰ παιδιᾶς ἕνεκα πάντα δρᾶται—show once more clearly enough that in his time the old Greek view of the poets as the true teachers of their age was by no means a thing of the past. It was precisely as teachers, whether rightly or wrongly so regarded, that they seemed to him dangerous and worth opposing.

63 Plato’s harsh critiques of poets and poetry—in which he claims Nothing is done for the sake of seriousness, but everything is done for the sake of playfulness.—make it clear that during his time, the traditional Greek belief in poets as the true teachers of society was still very much alive. It was specifically as teachers, whether accurately or not, that they appeared to him to be a threat worth challenging.

64 Aristophanes is only formulating popular opinion—and in unusually naive language—when he says Ran. 1030 ταῦτα γὰρ ἄνδρας χρὴ ποιητὰς ἀσκεῖν· σκέψαι γὰρ ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς ὡς ὠφέλιμοι τῶν ποιητῶν οἱ γενναῖοι γεγένηνται κτλ. And again 1053 ff. where he is referring particularly to tragic dramatists, ἀποκρύπτειν χρὴ τὸ πονηρὸν τόν γε ποιητήν, καὶ μὴ παράγειν μηδὲ διδάσκειν. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ παιδαρίοισιν ἔστι διδάσκαλος ὅστις φράζει, τοῖς ἡβῶσιν δὲ ποιηταί.

64 Aristophanes is just expressing popular opinion—and in a surprisingly simple way—when he says Ran. 1030 that we need to make poets behave like real men; because we should think from the start about how the noble poets prove to be beneficial, etc. And again 1053 ff. where he is specifically referring to tragic playwrights, It’s important to hide the harmful poet and not to overstep or teach. For the young, there’s a teacher who guides them; but for young adults, there are poets..

65 This idea is alluded to as early as Δ 160 ff. Then Hes., Op. 282 ff. It is established for Hdt.; cf. i, 91, vi, 86. Further examples collected by Nägelsbach, Nachhom. Theol. 34 f. Thgn. 205 ff., 731 ff., is particularly definite. Among Attic authors; cf. Sol., fr. 13, 29 (ἀναίτιοι ἔργα τίνουσιν); E., Hipp. 831 ff., 1378 ff. (where note τὸν οὐδὲν ὄντ’ ἐπαίτιον), fr. 980; [Lys.] 6, 20; Lycurg. 79. It is briefly alluded to as a commonly held opinion by Isoc. 11, 25; cf. Lys., fr. 53 Th. The case of Diagoras of Melos the ἄθεος may also be remembered; cf. above, chap. vii, n. 16.—This idea of the punishment of the son for the deeds of the father receives its justification acc. to Plu., Ser. Nu. Vi. 16, 559 D (quite in accordance with primitive ideas) in the unity that belongs to all the members of the same γένος—so that in the person of the son it is the father himself, though he may be dead, who is also punished. The idea arises from the deeply ingrained feeling of the unity, solidarity, and continuity of the ancient family cult-circle pre-supposed by the cult of souls. (This is primitive and meets us, e.g. in India as well: “release us from the wrongs that our fathers have done; take away the sins of that we ourselves have committed” is the prayer to Varuna in the Rigveda, 7, 86, 5. τὰ ἐκ προτέρων ἀπλακήματα are transferred also to the next generation “like a pestilence-breeding substance”, Oldenberg, Rel. d. V. 289. Elsewhere the conception emerges that the guilty ancestor lives again in the descendant and is punished in his person: Robinsohn, Psychol. d. Naturv. 47.)

65 This idea is referenced as early as Δ 160 ff. Then Hes., Op. 282 ff. It's established for Hdt.; cf. i, 91, vi, 86. Further examples collected by Nägelsbach, Nachhom. Theol. 34 f. Thgn. 205 ff., 731 ff., are particularly clear. Among Attic authors; cf. Sol., fr. 13, 29 (ἀναίτιοι ἔργα τίνουσιν); E., Hipp. 831 ff., 1378 ff. (where note τὸν οὐδὲν ὄντα ἐπαίτιον), fr. 980; [Lys.] 6, 20; Lycurg. 79. It's briefly mentioned as a commonly held belief by Isoc. 11, 25; cf. Lys., fr. 53 Th. The situation of Diagoras of Melos the atheist may also be noted; cf. above, chap. vii, n. 16.—This notion of punishing the son for the father's actions is justified according to Plu., Ser. Nu. Vi. 16, 559 D (consistent with primitive beliefs) in the unity that connects all members of the same genus—so that in the son, it is the father himself, even if he is dead, who is also punished. This idea stems from the deeply rooted sense of unity, solidarity, and continuity within the ancient family cult-circle assumed by the cult of souls. (This is primitive and appears elsewhere, for instance in India as well: “release us from the wrongs that our fathers have done; take away the sins that we ourselves have committed” is the prayer to Varuna in the Rigveda, 7, 86, 5. the earlier influences are passed on to the next generation “like a pestilence-breeding substance”, Oldenberg, Rel. d. V. 289. Elsewhere, the idea arises that the guilty ancestor is reborn in the descendant and is punished through them: Robinsohn, Psychol. d. Naturv. 47.)

66 It is precisely on this point, namely, that evil does not befall men without their own fault, that the Chorus, i.e. the poet, of the Agamemnon (757), acknowledges δίχα δ’ ἄλλων μονόφρων εἰμί.

66 This is exactly the point, that people don’t suffer from evil unless they are at fault themselves, that the Chorus, or the poet, in the Agamemnon (757), admits I am single-minded, unlike others..

67 In this way, too, the Stoics saved the responsibility of men for their own deeds in spite of the unavoidable εἰμαρμένη. The deeds would not have come to fruition if the personal συγκατάθεσις of the man had not been added to the original necessary cause conditioning the acts. The συγκ., though not itself “free”, yet always remains ἐφ’ ἡμῖν and makes us responsible: Cic., Fat. 18; Nemes. Nat. Hom., p. 291 Matth. 451

67 In this way, the Stoics maintained that individuals are responsible for their actions despite the unavoidable fate. The actions wouldn't have occurred without the individual's personal consent contributing to the original necessary cause that influences those actions. The συγκ., while not “free” in itself, always remains on us and holds us accountable: Cic., Fat. 18; Nemes. Nat. Hom., p. 291 Matth. 451

68 Clearly so from l. 689 onwards.

68 It's clear starting from line 689.

69 τὰ γὰρ ἐκ προτέρων ἀπλακήματά νιν πρὸς τάσδ’ (τὰς Ἐρινύας) ἀπάγει, Eum. 934.

69 Recent events have guided her towards these. (the Furies)gone, Eum. 934.

70 Only when Eteokles and Polyneikes have fallen in single combat ἔληξε δαίμων, Sept. 956.

70 Only after Eteokles and Polyneikes have died in their duel The spirit has departed., Sept. 956.

71 This idea is quite common in Homer (Nägelsbach, Hom. Theol. 70 f., 320 f.), and in later times reappears frequently in the case of such authors as always, or on occasion, express popular ideas: Thgn. Hdt. esp. Eur. (cf. Fr. Trag. Adesp. 4, 55 N.), and the orators: see Nägelsbach, Nachhom. Th. 54 ff., 332 f., 378.

71 This concept is quite common in Homer (Nägelsbach, Hom. Theol. 70 f., 320 f.), and later on, it frequently reappears in the works of authors who express popular ideas, whether consistently or occasionally: Thgn. Hdt. especially Eur. (cf. Fr. Trag. Adesp. 4, 55 N.), and the orators: see Nägelsbach, Nachhom. Th. 54 ff., 332 f., 378.

72 ἀπάτης δικαίας οὐκ ἀποστατεῖ θεός, fr. 301 S. This, too, must be the meaning of other expressions in which the poet refers less plainly to the righteous purpose of divine deception: Pers. 93 ff., 742; frr. 156, 302 (cf. also Suppl. 403 f.).—Aristoph. makes his Clouds speak quite in accordance with the Aeschylean ideas, Nub. 1458 ff. This grim idea must, in fact, have had considerable success and spread beyond the stage. Falsehood and deception for a good end presented no difficulty to the mind of the Greeks (even as applied to their gods). Hence Sokrates (in Xen.), Plato, and certain Stoics could quite openly approve of and recommend such falsehoods (and the author of the Διαλέξεις, c. 3 in defending the same theory also appeals to the lines of Aesch.).

72 Honest deception does not stray from God., fr. 301 S. This must also be the meaning behind other phrases where the poet hints at the righteous intention behind divine deception: Pers. 93 ff., 742; frr. 156, 302 (see also Suppl. 403 f.).—Aristophanes makes his Clouds reflect Aeschylus's ideas quite well, Nub. 1458 ff. This serious concept must have achieved considerable popularity and extended beyond the theater. The Greeks found no issue with falsehood and deception for a good purpose (even regarding their gods). Thus, Socrates (in Xen.), Plato, and some Stoics could openly support and endorse such deceptions (and the author of the Lectures, c. 3 defending the same theory also references Aeschylus's lines).

73 Ag. 1497–1508. Here there is a clear opposition between the popular view which attributed all guilt to an ἀλάστωρ tempting to crime (a reminiscence of which appears in Soph., El. 197 ff.), and the more elevated conception of the poet who holds fast to the view that though the ἀλάστωρ may contribute to the result the agent of the evil deed is not ἀναίτιος.

73 Ag. 1497–1508. Here, there’s a clear conflict between the common belief that blame rests entirely on an __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ tempting someone to commit a crime (a hint of which can be seen in Soph., El. 197 ff.), and the higher perspective of the poet, who insists that while the ἀλάστωρ may play a role in the outcome, the person committing the wrongdoing is not blameless.

74 The dead man stands in need of the cult paid by his surviving kinsfolk, Cho. 484 (his grave a βωμός, Cho. 106; χοαὶ γαμήλιοι for him, 486 f.). As an appeasement of his easily aroused wrath χοαὶ νερτέρων μειλίγματα, Cho. 15. The dead man is still conscious of events both past and present upon earth: φρόνημα τοῦ θανόντος οὐ δαμάζει πυρὸς μαλερὰ γνάθος, Cho. 324 f. In the song of awakening addressed to the departed and the invocations sung by Electra and the Chorus in Cho. the soul of Agamem. is similarly regarded as fully alive and accessible to the callers (though, indeed, ἐξ ἀμαυρᾶς φρενός 157) and addressed accordingly (cf. 139, 147 f., 156 f., 479 ff.; Pers. 636). It is even expected that his soul, invisibly present in the upper world, will take an active share in the work of vengeance: ἄκουσον ἐς φάος μολών, ξὺν δὲ γενοῦ πρὸς ἐχθρούς, Cho. 459; cf. 489. So, too, Orestes, Eum. 598, hopes in his extremity of need that ἀρωγὰς ἐκ τάφου πέμψει πατήρ. More especially the murdered man has a right to be avenged by his ἀγχιστεῖς (οὐδ’ ἀπ’ ἄλλων, Cho. 472) and Apollo himself has commanded Orestes to take such vengeance, Cho. 269 ff., etc. Dread results of neglecting this duty, Cho. 278–96 (possibly an interpolated passage, but still an extension of the words of A. himself 271 ff. in a sense thoroughly in consonance with popular belief).

74 The dead person is in need of the rituals performed by their surviving family, Cho. 484 (their grave is a altar, Cho. 106; wedding rituals for them, 486 f.). As a way to calm their easily stirred anger χολερὰ νερτέρων ανάγκη, Cho. 15. The dead person is still aware of events both past and present on earth: The spirit of the deceased is not subdued by the fierce jaws of fire., Cho. 324 f. In the awakening song directed at the departed and the invocations sung by Electra and the Chorus in Cho., the soul of Agamemnon is also seen as fully alive and accessible to the summoners (though, in fact, from a dim mindset 157) and is addressed accordingly (cf. 139, 147 f., 156 f., 479 ff.; Pers. 636). There is even an expectation that his soul, invisibly present in the upper world, will actively participate in the quest for vengeance: Listen as you come into the light, and be with me against our enemies., Cho. 459; cf. 489. Similarly, Orestes, in his moment of desperation, hopes that Father will send help from the grave.. The murdered person has an even stronger claim to be avenged by their ἁγγυῖς (not from others, Cho. 472), and Apollo himself has instructed Orestes to seek such revenge, Cho. 269 ff., etc. There are terrifying consequences for neglecting this duty, Cho. 278–96 (possibly an added passage, but still aligned with the sentiments expressed by A. himself 271 ff. that resonate strongly with popular belief).

75 The Erinyes only avenge the murder of a blood-relation and not therefore when one of a married pair is murdered by the other, Eum. 210–12, 604 ff. But the opinion emerges that they are particularly charged with the vengeance of a mother who has been murdered by her son (rather than a father who has suffered the same fate), 658 ff., 736 ff. (Reminiscences of such a view in S., El. 341 ff., 352 ff.; E., Orest. 552 ff., fr. 1064.) This may possibly be an old popular belief (not fully understood by A. himself) which need not, however (as is often 452 supposed), depend upon an ancient system of “matriarchy” for which there is no other evidence in Greece. It is simply explained by the fact that the father has plenty of men still living among his kinsfolk who will avenge him (even against his own son), whereas the mother who is separated from her own family can expect no avenger from that side, while in the family of her husband there will be nobody yet old enough to take vengeance on her own son. For this reason it is for her most particularly and necessarily that the daimonic avengers of murder must intervene, and they are the Erinyes, who are always thought of as only active where no earthly avenger is available.—Of course, it could never be denied that there exists also πατρὸς εὐκταίαν Ἐρινύν, Sep. 783.

75 The Erinyes only seek revenge for the murder of a blood relative, so they don’t act when one married person kills the other, Eum. 210–12, 604 ff. However, it is suggested that they are especially focused on avenging a mother who has been killed by her son (rather than a father in the same situation), 658 ff., 736 ff. (This idea can also be seen in S., El. 341 ff., 352 ff.; E., Orest. 552 ff., fr. 1064.) This may stem from an old popular belief (not fully understood by A. himself) that doesn’t necessarily rely on an ancient system of “matriarchy,” for which there’s no other evidence in Greece. It can be simply explained by the fact that a father has many male relatives alive who will avenge him (even if it means going against his own son), while a mother, separated from her own family, has no one to take revenge from that side, and within her husband’s family, there likely won’t be anyone old enough to avenge her son. For this reason, it is particularly necessary for her that the supernatural avengers of murder intervene, and those are the Erinyes, who are always thought to act when no earthly avenger is available.—Of course, it can’t be denied that there also exists father's a prayerful Erinys, Sep. 783.

76 δαίμων, θεός, δῖος ἀνάκτωρ, ἰσοδαίμων βασιλεύς are titles given only to the dead Persian king, Pers. 620, 633, 644, 651. They are, however, probably intended to characterize Persian and not Greek beliefs (the Greek king, too, is still a king in Hades, but not a δαίμων, Cho. 355–62).

76 Demon, god, divine ruler, on par with royalty. are titles given only to the deceased Persian king, Pers. 620, 633, 644, 651. They likely reflect Persian beliefs rather than Greek ones (the Greek king is still a king in Hades, but not a demon, Cho. 355–62).

77 κἀκεῖ δικάζει τἀμπλακήμαθ’, ὡς λόγος, Ζεὺς ἄλλος (cf. Ζῆνα τῶν κεκμηκότων 158) ἐν καμοῦσιν ὑστάτας δίκας, Suppl. 230 f.; cf. 414 ff.—μέγας γὰρ Ἅιδης ἐστὶν εὔθυνος βροτῶν ἔνερθε χθόνος, δελτογράφῳ δὲ πάντ’ ἐπωπᾷ φρενί, Eum. 273 ff. Not even in Hades do the Erinyes let the murderer go, Eum. 340. The punishment in Hades seems to be regarded as merely supplementary to the (perhaps delayed) punishment of crime on earth ῥοπὴ δ’ ἐπισκοπεῖ δίκας ταχεῖα τοὺς μὲν ἐν φάει, τὰ δ’ ἐν μεταιχμίῳ σκότου μένει χρονίζοντας ἄχη, τοὺς δ’ ἄκρατος ἔχει νύξ, Cho. 61 ff.

77 It evaluates the things that happen, much like another Zeus. (cf. Glory of the fallen 158) At funerals, it assesses the final matters., Suppl. 230 f.; cf. 414 ff.—For great Hades is right beneath the ground of mortals, and he perceives everything with his thoughts., Eum. 273 ff. Not even in Hades do the Furies let the murderer go, Eum. 340. The punishment in Hades seems to be seen as just an addition to the (maybe delayed) punishment for crime on earth But it quickly sees those who are judged, the ones in the light, while those in the shadows continue to suffer, and the lawless struggles through the night., Cho. 61 ff.

78 τοὺς θανόντας εἰ θέλεις εὐεργετεῖν εἴτ’ οὖν κακουργεῖν, ἀμφιδεξίως ἔχει τῷ μήτε χαίρειν μήτε λυπεῖσθαι νεκρούς, fr 266. This does, not, however, agree with Cho. 324 f., or with the frequently occurring expressions which presuppose consciousness and feeling (and so also χαίρειν and λυπεῖσθαι) in the dead. Consistency in such matters must not, in fact, be looked for in a non-theological poet. The ψυχή of the dead man a shadow without the sap of life, fr. 229. Death a refuge from earthly suffering, fr. 255. The speedy death which the Chorus wish for themselves, Ag. 1449 ff., brings with it τὸν ἀεὶ ἀτέλευτον ὕπνον and therefore a condition of unconsciousness if not of complete nothingness.—The shadow of Dareios takes his leave of the Persian nobles in the foll. words: ὑμεῖς δέ, πρέσβεις, χαίρετ’, ἐν κακοῖς ὅμως ψυχὴν διδόντες ἡδονῇ καθ’ ἡμέραν, ὡς τοῖς θανοῦσι πλοῦτος οὐδὲν ὠφελεῖ, Pers. 840 ff. This view of life is perhaps intended to have an Oriental colouring (like the epitaph of Sardanapalus which is rightly quoted in illustration of this passage); the reason given ὡς τοῖς θανοῦσι κτλ. is perhaps to be similarly explained.

78 If you want to assist the dead or cause them harm, it's equally true that they neither experience joy nor pain., fr 266. However, this doesn’t match with Cho. 324 f., or with the many expressions that assume consciousness and feeling (and so also hello and λυπεῖσθαι) in the dead. We shouldn’t expect consistency in such matters from a non-theological poet. The soul of a dead person is just a shadow, lacking the essence of life, fr. 229. Death is a refuge from earthly suffering, fr. 255. The quick death that the Chorus wishes for themselves, Ag. 1449 ff., brings with it the endless unfinished sleep and thus a state of unconsciousness, if not total nothingness. The shadow of Darius says goodbye to the Persian nobles in the following words: But you, ambassadors, goodbye. Even in your struggles, you still bring joy to the soul every day, since wealth doesn't help the dead at all., Pers. 840 ff. This perspective on life may be intended to have an Eastern flair (similar to the epitaph of Sardanapalus, which is rightly cited as an example of this passage); the reasoning provided since wealth doesn't benefit the dead, etc. is perhaps to be understood in the same way.

79 ἔνδικοι σφαγαί, 37. Orestes is to his father’s house δίκῃ καθαρτὴς πρὸς θεῶν ὡρμημένος 70.

79 justifiable killings, 37. Orestes is heading to his father's house δίκῃ pure to the gods driven 70.

80 One reason why no Erinys pursues Orestes after he has murdered his mother is, indeed, the fact that Sophokles is treating the “Elektra” in isolation as an independent drama and could not therefore introduce a fresh thread of interest at the end, if he was to bring it to a satisfactory conclusion. But the mere fact that he could so arrange matters shows that for him, in contrast with Aeschylus, the belief in the veritable reality of the Erinys and the necessary perpetuation of the idea of vengeance in the family was already obscured and almost obsolete. The ancient family blood-feud is less important to him than the rights of the separate and independent individual.

80 One reason why no Erinys goes after Orestes after he kills his mother is that Sophocles is treating "Elektra" as a standalone play and therefore couldn't introduce a new plotline at the end if he wanted to wrap it up satisfactorily. But the fact that he could orchestrate things this way shows that, unlike Aeschylus, he no longer fully believes in the actual existence of the Erinys or the need for family vengeance. The ancient blood feud matters less to him than the rights of individual people.

81 Casual allusions, El. 504 ff.; OC. 965; Ant. 856; and cf. 584 ff., 594 ff. 453

81 Casual references, El. 504 ff.; OC. 965; Ant. 856; and see also 584 ff., 594 ff. 453

82 οὐ γὰρ ἴδοις ἂν ἀθρῶν βροτὸν ὅστις ἂν, εἰ θεὸς ἄγοι, ἐκφυγεῖν δύναιτο, O.C. 252. ὅταν δέ τις θεῶν βλάπτῃ, δύναιτ’ ἂν οὐδ’ ἂν ὁ σθένων φυγεῖν, El. 696 f. αἴσχη μέν, ὦ γυναῖκες, οὐδ’ ἂν εἷς φύγοι βροτῶν ποθ’ ᾧ καὶ Ζεὺς (as the one who rules and ordains everything, cf. El. 175; O.C. 1085) ἐφορμήσῃ κακά· νόσους δ’ ἀνάγκη τὰς θεηλάτους φέρειν, fr. 619 N.

82 You wouldn't find any human who, if a god guided them, could escape., O.C. 252. Whenever someone wrongs the gods, even the strongest cannot escape., El. 696 f. It's such a shame, women, that not a single mortal could escape from Zeus. (as the one who rules and ordains everything, cf. El. 175; O.C. 1085) would unleash evils; it is essential that the divine bear the illnesses, fr. 619 N.

83 Phil. 191–200.

83 Phil. 191–200.

84 It is fixed long before by an oracle: 821 ff.; 1159 ff. It is not exactly overpowering violence or heaven-sent madness that drives Deianeira to carry out the prophecy; it is rather an obscure force that transforms her purest intentions to an evil result. She herself is completely innocent: ἥμαρτε χρηστὰ μωμένη.

84 It was established long before by an oracle: 821 ff.; 1159 ff. It isn’t exactly overwhelming violence or divine madness that pushes Deianeira to fulfill the prophecy; it’s more of an unclear force that twists her purest intentions into a negative outcome. She herself is completely innocent: Good mistakes were made..

85 The reason for this will of the gods is not revealed to us, either in OT. or in the subsequent treatment given in OC. The only thing that is made quite clear there is the complete innocence of Oedipus; as to the meaning of the divine purpose that has plunged him into such deeds of horror the sufferer can only say θεοῖς γὰρ ἦν οὕτω φίλον, τάχ’ ἄν τι μηνίουσιν εἰς γένος πάλαι (964 f.). This is a passage in which modern interpretation of the ancients finds the “upholding of the moral order in the world” clearly expressed as a motive of divine will.

85 The reason behind the gods' will is not revealed to us, either in OT. or in the later discussion in OC. The only thing that's made clear is Oedipus' complete innocence; as for the meaning of the divine intention that has driven him into such horrific acts, the afflicted can only say For the gods were thus dear, they would quickly bring forth something from an ancient lineage. (964 f.). This is a passage where modern interpretations of ancient texts find the “upholding of the moral order in the world” clearly articulated as a motivation of divine will.

86 καὶ γὰρ ἦν τῶν θεοσεβεστάτων, Sch., El. 831.

86 and was truly one of the most devoted, Sch., El. 831.

87 fr. 226 N., σοφὸς γὰρ οὐδεὶς πλὴν ὃν ἂν τιμᾷ θεός. ἀλλ’ εἰς θεόν σ’ ὁρῶτα, κἂν ἔξω δίκης χωρεῖν κελεύῃ, κεῖσ’ ὁδοιπορεῖν χρεών. αἰσχρὸν γὰρ οὐδὲν ὧν ὑφηγοῦνται θεοί.

87 fr. 226 N., No one is truly wise except for those whom a god favors. But if a god is watching over you, even if it leads you to act unjustly, you have to follow its guidance. Because there’s nothing disgraceful in what the gods shun.

88 Aias has angered the goddess because he has boasted that he could do without her help. Thus he has drawn upon himself ἀστεργῆ θεᾶς ὀργήν, 776. The goddess makes him insane that he may recognize τὴν θεῶν ἰσχὺν ὅση, 118. Thus, her superior power is shown and the folly of men who despise that power. But as for showing that the revengeful act of the goddess has any sort of moral purpose or meaning behind it, the pious poet makes no such attempt.—The interpolation of ideas more familiar in modern times does not make it any easier to understand the peculiar character of such antique εὐσέβεια and δεισιδαιμονία. The same kind of fearful awe of the gods which we find here, runs through the whole of Herodotos’ historical writing (Hdt. was not without reason a friend of Sophokles) and meets us again in the character of Nikias and to a large extent in Xenophon, too. Thuc. and, on the whole, Eurip. (for he varies) calmly ignore it or else violently reject it. Its nature is shown (better than in the more usual εὐσέβεια) by the phrase ἡ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς εὐλάβεια which also occurs: [D.] 59 (Neaer.) 74.

88 Aias has upset the goddess because he bragged that he could manage without her assistance. As a result, he has brought upon himself goddess's anger, 776. The goddess drives him to madness so that he may recognize the power of the gods, 118. In doing so, her greater power is revealed along with the foolishness of those who disregard that power. However, the devout poet makes no effort to suggest that the goddess's act of revenge has any moral purpose or meaning behind it.—Incorporating ideas that are more familiar in modern times does not make it easier to understand the distinctive nature of such ancient piety and superstition. The same kind of fearful respect for the gods that we see here runs throughout Herodotos’ historical writing (Hdt. was a friend of Sophokles for good reason) and appears again in the character of Nikias and to a large extent in Xenophon as well. Thucydides and, generally, Euripides (who varies) either ignore it or completely reject it. Its essence is better expressed (than in the more common piety) by the phrase reverence towards the gods which also appears: [D.] 59 (Neaer.) 74.

89 Trach. 1266 f.; 1272 (where, however, there remains a suspicion that the traditional text may be unsound); fr. 103 N. Parallels occur also in Phil.

89 Trach. 1266 f.; 1272 (although there’s still some doubt that the traditional text might be unreliable); fr. 103 N. Similar references can also be found in Phil.

90 There exists a region of divine mystery that is not to be fathomed: οὐ γὰρ ἂν τὰ θεῖα κρυπτόντων θεῶν μάθοις ἄν, οὐδ’ εἰ πάντ’ ἐπεξέλθοις σκοπῶν, fr. 833; cf. OT. 280 f. and πολλὰ καὶ λαθεῖν καλόν, fr. 80 N.

90 There is a realm of divine mystery that cannot be understood: You wouldn’t understand the divine from the hidden gods, even if you tried to explore everything., fr. 833; cf. OT. 280 f. and It's good to stay hidden and keep a low profile., fr. 80 N.

91 The behaviour of Athene in the prologue of the Aias is an exception.

91 Athene's behavior in the prologue of the Aias is an exception.

92 Odysseus beholding the insane Aias: ἐποικτίρω δέ νιν δύστηνον ὄντα καίπερ ὄντα δυσμενῆ, ὁθούνεκ’ ἄτῃ συγκατέζευκται κακῇ, οὐδὲν τὸ τούτου μᾶλλον ἢ τοὐμὸν σκοπῶν· ὁρῶ γὰρ ἡμᾶς οὐδὲν ὄντας ἄλλο πλὴν εἴδωλ’ ὅσοιπερ ζῶμεν, ἢ κούφην σκιάν, Ai. 121 ff.

92 Odysseus looking at the mad Aias: I do feel sorry for him, being so unfortunate and facing hostility, as he is bound by a terrible fate. This observation doesn’t weigh any more heavily on me than my own thoughts. For I see that we are nothing more than mere shadows, as long as we live, or light, fleeting shadows., Ai. 121 ff.

93 ἰὼ γενεαὶ βροτῶν κτλ. OT. 1186 ff.; ὅστις τοῦ πλέονος μέρους χρῄζει . . . OC. 1211–38; cf. frr. 12, 535, 536, 588, 859, 860.

93 Wow, generations of people, etc. OT. 1186 ff.; Whoever needs the bigger share... OC. 1211–38; cf. frr. 12, 535, 536, 588, 859, 860.

94 Nor is Antigone affected by such motives as might appear from a casual or isolated study of such lines as Ant. 73 ff. The whole play 454 shows that Antig. throughout follows the ἄγραπτα κἀσφαλῆ θεῶν νόμιμα and the instincts of her own nature, without paying any attention to what may happen to her on earth and without a side glance at what may be the result in the world below of her “pious crime”.

94 Antigone is not influenced by the reasons that might seem evident from a quick or isolated reading of lines like Ant. 73 ff. The entire play 454 demonstrates that Antigone consistently adheres to the unwritten and secure laws of the gods and follows her own instincts, completely ignoring what might happen to her in this life and not considering the consequences of her “pious crime” in the underworld.

95 We often have ἐν Ἅιδου κεκευθότων (Ant. 911) μυχοὺς κιχεῖν τοῦ κάτω θεοῦ (Ai. 571) and other phrases = “be dead” (cf. to be an οἰκήτωρ of Erebos, Ai. 395 ff. Hades seems to be called πανδόκος ξενόστασις fr. 252). The confusion of the idea of a kingdom of Hades with that of the grave is shown in the not infrequent expression ἐν Ἅιδου, παρ’ Ἅιδῃ κεῖσθαι, El. 463; OT. 972; Ph. 861; φίλη μετ’ αὐτοῦ κείσομαι φίλου μέτα, Ant. 73; cf. fr. 518.

95 We often say in the depths of Hades (Ant. 911) Finding the secrets of the underworld (Ai. 571) and other phrases mean “to be dead” (like being an οίκηση of Erebos, Ai. 395 ff. Hades also seems to be referred to as hospitality fr. 252). The mix-up between the idea of Hades as a kingdom and that of the grave is shown in the common phrase in Hades, with Hades to lie, El. 463; OT. 972; Ph. 861; φίλη μετ’ αὐτοῦ κείσομαι φίλου μαζί, Ant. 73; cf. fr. 518.

96 τὸν ἀπότροπον Ἅιδαν, Ai. 608; fr. 518.

96 the escape route to Hades, Ai. 608; fr. 518.

97 The dead man is a σκιά, Ai. 1231. σποδὸς καὶ σκιὰ ἀνωφελής, El. 1159a. μηδέν, El. 1166; Ai. 1231.—In spite of this, in the Homeric manner, a definite shape and a measure of semi-conscious existence is presumed in the shades in Hades: OT. 1371 ff.—Doubt: εἴ τις ἔστ’ ἐκεῖ χάρις, El. 356.

97 The dead man is a shadow, Ai. 1231. ash and useless shadow, El. 1159a. nothing, El. 1166; Ai. 1231.—Nevertheless, in the style of Homer, a distinct form and a level of semi-conscious existence are expected in the shades of Hades: OT. 1371 ff.—Doubt: if there's any grace there, El. 356.

98 θανόντων οὐδὲν ἄλγος ἄπτεται, OC. 955. τοῖς γὰρ θανοῦσι μόχθος οὐ προσγίγνεται, Tr. 1173. τοὺς γὰρ θανόντας οὐχ ὁρῶ λυπουμένους, El. 1170. (All three lines are denied to Soph. by the latest criticism.)

98 Those who have passed away feel no pain., OC. 955. For those who are dead, hard work does not arrive., Tr. 1173. For the deceased, I don't see them in sadness., El. 1170. (All three lines are denied to Soph. by the latest criticism.)

99 Ph. 797 f.; Ai. 854; OC. 1220 ff.; fr. 631 (cf. A., fr. 255; Fr. Tr. Adesp. 360. λιμὴν κακῶν ὁ θάνατος, a commonplace of later moralists: see Wyttenb. Plu., Mor. vi, p. 720, was taken over from tragedy).—The converse fr. 64, 275.

99 Ph. 797 f.; Ai. 854; OC. 1220 ff.; fr. 631 (cf. A., fr. 255; Fr. Tr. Adesp. 360. Death is the harbor of evils., a common saying among later moralists: see Wyttenb. Plu., Mor. vi, p. 720, was adopted from tragedy).—The reverse fr. 64, 275.

100 Collectively οἱ νέρτεροι, οἱ νέρτεροι θεοί, OC. 1661; Ant. 602. Hades in particular is often mentioned, and also Πλούτων: Ἅιδης στεναγμοῖς καὶ γόοις πλουτίζεται, OT. 30; fr. 251. ὁ παρὰ τὸν Ἀχέροντα (τὰν Ἀχέροντος ἀκτάν, Ant. 812. ἀκτὰν ἑσπέρου θεοῦ, OT. 177) θεὸς ἀνάσσων, El. 184. Persephone and Aidoneus, OC. 1556 ff. Erinyes, Thanatos, Kerberos: OC. 1568 ff. πομπαῖος Ἑρμῆς χθόνιος, Ai. 832; and see El. 110 B., etc.—Ἅιδης (here as often = Θάνατος) desires to devour men: δαίσασθαι, El. 542, f.—a popular conception or at least popular language: see above, chap. vii, n. 25.

100 Together, the lower, the lower gods, OC. 1661; Ant. 602. Hades is specifically mentioned a lot, along with Pluto: Hades thrives on sighs and laments., OT. 30; fr. 251. the one by the Acheron (the Acheron shore, Ant. 812. evening star of the god, OT. 177) Divine ruler, El. 184. Persephone and Aidoneus, OC. 1556 ff. Erinyes, Thanatos, Kerberos: OC. 1568 ff. Hermes, the chthonic messenger, Ai. 832; and see El. 110 B., etc.—Hades (here often meaning Death) wants to consume men: δαίσασθαι, El. 542, f.—a common idea or at least common phrasing: see above, chap. vii, n. 25.

101 Hades ὃς οὔτε τοὺπιεικὲς οὔτε τὴν χάριν οἶδεν, μονὴν δ’ ἔστερξε τὴν ἁπλως δίκην, fr. 703, i.e. the justice of absolute equality (for all earthly distinctions have passed away): ὅ γ’ Ἅιδης τοὺς νόμους ἴσους ποθεῖ, Ant. 519.

101 Hades Who neither is compliant nor understands grace, solely suffered the simple justice., fr. 703, meaning the justice of absolute equality (since all earthly distinctions have disappeared): Hades desires equal laws for everyone., Ant. 519.

102 ἡ γὰρ εὐσέβεια συνθνῄσκει βροτοῖς (it dies when the man dies to whom it belonged: i.e. it follows him, or his ψυχή, into the lower-world. No textual corruption need be assumed here), κἂν ζῶσι κἂν θάνωσιν οὐκ ἀπόλλυται, Ph. 1443 f.

102 For devotion ends with the man it belongs to. (it goes with him, or his spirit, into the underworld. We don't need to assume any corruption in the text here), whether they are alive or dead, it does not fade away, Ph. 1443 f.

103 Without ritual burial the dead man is τῶν κάτωθε θεῶν ἄμοιρος ἀκτέριστος ἀνόσιος νέκυς, Ant. 1070 f.

103 Without a proper burial, the dead man is The dead below, abandoned and unburied, are cursed., Ant. 1070 f.

104 ἐντάφια οἷα τοῖς κάτω νομίζεται, El. 326. κτερίσματα, 434, 931. λουτρά, 84, 434 (cf. above, chap. v, nn. 106, 107), ἔμπυρα, 405. χοαί, 440.—El. 452, prayer is made to the dead that he “shall help us and Orestes” ὅπως τὸ λοιπὸν αὐτὸν ἀφνεωτέραις χερσὶν στέφωμεν ἢ τὰ νῦν δωρούμεθα (at present only a lock of hair and a girdle, 448 ff.).—Offerings to the dead made by foes and even the approach of such persons to the neighbourhood of the grave is displeasing and hateful to the departed who lies therein: El. 431 ff., 442 ff.; Ai. 1394 f. (cf. above, chap. v, n. 109). In this case as in the cult of the soul generally the presence of the dead man in the grave, or else in its immediate neighbourhood, is presupposed—not his departure into an inaccessible land of the dead. The latter view, retained from Homeric 455 poetry, is generally allowed to remain incongruously side by side with the former.

104 funeral offerings as viewed by those below, El. 326. grave goods, 434, 931. cleansing baths, 84, 434 (cf. above, chap. v, nn. 106, 107), sacrificial fire, 405. drinks, 440.—El. 452, a prayer is made to the deceased that he “may help us and Orestes” so that we can honor him with more generous hands than we do now (at present only a lock of hair and a girdle, 448 ff.).—Offerings made to the dead by enemies, or even their presence near the grave, are unwelcome and detestable to the departed who lies there: El. 431 ff., 442 ff.; Ai. 1394 f. (cf. above, chap. v, n. 109). In this context, as with the worship of the soul in general, the presence of the deceased in the grave, or nearby, is assumed—not their departure to an unreachable land of the dead. This latter idea, taken from Homeric 455 poetry, is usually allowed to exist awkwardly alongside the former.

105 El. 1066 ff.

105 She/He. 1066 ff.

106 The god of the underworld is οὐκ ἀπερίτροπος of the murdered man: El. 182 f. Hence all the gods and spirits of the lower world are summoned to take vengeance for the murder of Agamemnon: El. 110–16. We hear of Δίκη ἡ ξύνοικος τῶν κάτω θεῶν as the patron of the dead in their claim to justice: Ant. 451.

106 The god of the underworld is not undaunted for the murdered man: El. 182 f. So all the gods and spirits of the underworld are called upon to take revenge for Agamemnon's murder: El. 110–16. We hear about The Greek gods' trial of the underworld. as the protector of the dead in their pursuit of justice: Ant. 451.

107 Herakles in giving his last commands to Hyllos finally threatens the latter: εἰ δὲ μή, μενῶ σ’ ἐγὼ καὶ νέρθεν ὤν, ἀραῖος εἰς ἀεὶ βαρύς, Tr. 1201 f.; cf. fr. 367; see above, chap. v, n. 148.

107 Herakles, while giving his final instructions to Hyllos, ultimately warns him: If not, I will remain with you, even down below, as a curse, heavy forever., Tr. 1201 f.; cf. fr. 367; see above, chap. v, n. 148.

108 Elektra thinks that Agamemnon himself may have sent the δυσπρόσοπτ’ ὀνείρατα to Klytaimnestra: El. 459 f. (There is no reason for altering the traditional text here—with Nauck—to make the gods the senders of the dreams instead of the dead man. ἥρωες, too, can send nocturnal visions of terror: see above, chap. ix, n. 102.) Here Elektra supposes that by sending such harbingers of his wrath the unavenged victim of murder has signified his readiness to assist in the taking of vengeance. This makes perfectly good sense and is the only interpretation that suits the context of Elektra’s admonitions to her sister.

108 Elektra believes that Agamemnon himself might have sent the hard-to-come-by dreams to Klytaimnestra: El. 459 f. (There’s no reason to change the traditional text here—with Nauck—to suggest that the gods are the ones sending the dreams instead of the deceased man. heroes can also send terrifying night visions: see above, chap. ix, n. 102.) Here, Elektra assumes that by sending these ominous signs of his anger, the murdered victim has indicated his willingness to help with the revenge. This interpretation makes perfect sense and is the only one that aligns with the context of Elektra’s warnings to her sister.

109 ἀρωγός, El. 454. ῶσιν οἱ γᾶς κάτω κείμενοι. παλίρρυτον γὰρ αἷμα ὑπεξαιροῦσι τῶν κτανόντων οἱ πάλαι θανόντες, El. 1419 f. “The dead man brings death to the living,” Nauck on Tr. 1163.

109 Assistant, El. 454. Those who rest beneath the ground are still alive. The blood of the slain is taken by those who have been gone for a long time., El. 1419 f. “The dead man brings death to the living,” Nauck on Tr. 1163.

110 frr. 753, 805.

110 frr. 753, 805.

111 OC. 1049 ff., 680; fr. 736.

111 OC 1049 ff., 680; fr. 736.

112 Oedipus does not die but vanishes (is seen no more, 1649); the depths of the earth open and receive him: 1661 f., 1681. What is meant is translation without death as in the case of Amphiaraos, etc. The poet only hints at the miracle in intentionally vague words—but they cannot refer to anything but translation. ὤλετο 1656, and ἔθανε are therefore only inaccurate expressions to describe his departure (see also above, chap. iii, n. 2). The Messenger of 1583 f. refuses, however, to give a distinct answer to the question of the Chorus ὄλωλε γὰρ δύστηνος; he will only hint that Oedipus has indeed ὄλωλε (1580), but has not simply died—he has instead been translated out of earthly life. The corrupt ὡς λελοιπότα κεῖνον τὸν ἀεὶ (this was already what the Alexandrians read) βίοτον ἐξεπίστασο may not therefore be altered simply into τὸν αἰνόν, τὸν ἄβιον βίοτον. It may perhaps have originally been something like τὸν ἔνθα, τὸν ἐν γῇ, τὸν ἀνδρῶν βίοτον (cf. Medea to her children ἐς ἄλλο σχῆμ’ ἀποστάντες βίου, E., Med. 1039. A dead woman ὑποκεχώρηκε αἰφνίδιον τοῦ καθ’ ἡμᾶς βίου. Ins. from Amorgos, BCH. 1891, p. 576, ll. 9–10).

112 Oedipus does not die but disappears (is never seen again, 1649); the depths of the earth open up and take him: 1661 f., 1681. This means translation without death, like in the case of Amphiaraos, etc. The poet only hints at the miracle with deliberately vague wording—but it can only refer to translation. ὤλετο 1656, and died are therefore only imprecise ways to describe his departure (see also above, chap. iii, n. 2). The Messenger of 1583 f., however, refuses to provide a clear answer to the Chorus's question It's all over now.; he will only suggest that Oedipus has indeed ὄλωλε (1580), but has not simply died—he has been translated out of earthly life. The corrupt As if it has always been there (this was already what the Alexandrians read) Know thy life. may not simply be changed to the dreadful, lifeless existence. It may have originally been something like the one up there, the one on earth, the life of men (cf. Medea to her children Cast aside other forms of life, E., Med. 1039. A dead woman suddenly withdrawn from our life. Ins. from Amorgos, BCH. 1891, p. 576, ll. 9–10).

113 A distinct act of precaution against disbelief in such a miracle: OC. 1665 f. (cf. ἔρρει δὲ τὰ θεῖα, OT. 906 ff.; which refers esp. to the belief in the Oracle of Loxias, a matter of great importance to Soph.).

113 A specific precaution taken to guard against skepticism about such a miracle: OC. 1665 f. (see The divine flows., OT. 906 ff.; which particularly pertains to the belief in the Oracle of Loxias, significant to Soph.).

114 The innocence of Oedipus and the fact that the awful crimes committed by him have been done in ignorance and against his will θεῶν ἀγόντων, is stressed in order that his elevation to the position of Heros may not seem to be an honour done to a guilt-stained criminal. But the poet does not attribute positive virtues to him even in OC.—far less in fact than in OT.

114 The innocence of Oedipus, along with the fact that the terrible crimes he committed were done in ignorance and against his will gods leading, is emphasized so that his rise to the status of Heros doesn't appear to be a reward for a guilty criminal. However, the poet doesn't attribute any positive qualities to him, even in OC.—much less than in OT.

115 One has only to read the play without preconceived ideas to see that this passionate and savage old man, pitilessly heaping dreadful curses on his sons, gloating vindictively over the coming misfortunes 456 of his own country, is quite ignorant of the “deep peace from the gods” or the “illumination of the pious sufferer” which conventional literary interpretation has been anxious to ascribe to him. The poet is not one to gloss over the harsh realities of life with trite phrases of vapid consolation, and he has clearly perceived that the usual effect of unhappiness and misery upon men is not to “illuminate” but to enfeeble and vulgarize them. His Oedipus is pious (he was that from the beginning in OT. as well), but he is made savage, ἠγρίωται, exactly like Philoktetes in his misery (Ph. 1321).

115 One only needs to read the play without any preconceived notions to see that this passionate and fierce old man, mercilessly cursing his sons and vindictively relishing the impending misfortunes 456 of his own country, is completely unaware of the “deep peace from the gods” or the “enlightenment of the pious sufferer” that traditional literary interpretations have tried to attribute to him. The poet does not gloss over the harsh realities of life with empty phrases of shallow comfort, and he clearly understands that the usual impact of sadness and suffering on people is not to “enlighten” them but to weaken and degrade them. His Oedipus is devout (he was that from the start in OT. as well), but he is made fierce, ἠγρίωται, just like Philoktetes in his suffering (Ph. 1321).

116 Humanitarianism of Athens and her king: 562 ff., 1125 ff.

116 Humanitarianism in Athens and its king: 562 ff., 1125 ff.

117 It is emphasized over and over again that the settlement of Oedipus on Attic soil is meant to bring about the salvation of the Athenians and the discomfiture of the Thebans (Apollo’s oracle has thus decreed it): 92 f., 287 f., 402, 409 ff., 576 ff., 621 ff. The whereabouts of the valuable possession must therefore be kept secret (as frequently with the graves of Heroes: see above, chap. iv, n. 38); 1520 ff. This elevation of Oedipus to be the σωτήρ of Attica (459 f.) is evidently what makes the interest and importance for the poet of the whole mystery which he relates.

117 It's emphasized repeatedly that Oedipus's settlement in Attica is intended to bring salvation to the Athenians and trouble for the Thebans (as decreed by Apollo’s oracle): 92 f., 287 f., 402, 409 ff., 576 ff., 621 ff. The location of this valuable possession must therefore remain a secret (often the case with the graves of heroes: see above, chap. iv, n. 38); 1520 ff. This elevation of Oedipus as the savior of Attica (459 f.) is clearly what gives the poet interest and significance in the mystery he describes.

118 νῦν γὰρ θεοί σ’ ὀρθοῦσι, πρόσθε δ’ ὤλλυσαν, 394. The gods now feel ὤραν τινά for Oedipus, 386. After many πήματα πάλιν σφε δαίμων δίκαιος αὔξοι (ἄν), 1565 f. It is, in fact, an act of kindness after a long period of ill-usage; there is a reversal of fortune, but there is no reward or indemnification given in recognition of a just claim. It is all grace.

118 Now the gods are raising you up, but they have also thrown you aside., 394. The gods now show some worry for Oedipus, 386. After many In their trials, the righteous spirit is once again assisting them. (ἄν), 1565 f. It is, indeed, a gesture of kindness after a long time of mistreatment; there is a turnaround in fate, but no reward or compensation is given in recognition of a rightful claim. It is all grace.

119 In this, too, ὡς ἄν τις εἶς τῶν χρηστῶν Ἀθηναίων (Ion ap. Ath. 13, 604 D).

119 In this, too, as if someone were with the wise Athenians (Ion ap. Ath. 13, 604 D).

120 Prodikos is, acc. to Welcker, Kl. Schr. ii, 497 ff., responsible for most of the theories propounded in the Ps.-Platonic Axiochus on the subject of the ἀθανασία τῆς ψυχῆς, Ax. 370 B ff., the tendency of the soul to the heavenly αἰθήρ (366 A), and even of the Platonizing fantasy at the end about the fate of the departed (371-2). Prodikos, if we adopted this attribution, would become less the “forerunner of Sokrates” (as Welcker calls him) than the forerunner of Plato. There is, however, no real reason to attribute to him any more share in that document than is asserted distinctly in it. The brief and carelessly composed pamphlet consists of a medley of the conventional ingredients of the usual λόγοι παραμυθητικοί loosely strung together. To Prod. is assigned: the disquisition on the troubles of life in all its stages 336 D-367 E; and the saying ὅτι ὁ θάνατος οὔτε περὶ τοὺς ζῶντάς ἐστιν οὔτε περὶ τοὺς μετηλλαχότας κτλ., 369 B (cf. Buresch, Leip. Stud. ix, 8–9). These two passages put together would establish as the opinion of Prodikos just the opposite of what Welcker wishes to ascribe to him. He would show himself as a true πεισιθάνατος (—ἐξ ἐκείνου θανατᾷ μου ἡ ψυχή, 366 C), who would make death a mere exit into a state of unconsciousness after the troubles of life, and thus seem an absolute nonentity. But the piece is in reality quite without authority: it apparently puts forward the name of Prodikos, who is so often stated in Plato to have been the “teacher” of Sokrates, merely in order to have a definite authority (like the fabulous Gobryes later on) for what the author does not wish to represent Sokrates as saying on his own account. One of the sayings attributed to the imaginary Prodikos, ὅτι ὁ θάνατος . . . is, however, only too clearly a simple appropriation of Epicurus’ aphorism, ὁ θάνατος οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς κτλ. (p. 61, 6 Usen.; cf. p. 227, 30; 391. Heinze also points this out, Ber. sächs. Ges. d. Wiss. 1884, p. 332). The other passage (366 D ff.) agrees suspiciously 457 with what Teles (p. 38 Hens.) has to say on the same subject apparently in entire dependence on Krates the Cynic. It seems extremely probable that the author of the Axiochus also had Krates before him or even Teles (as Wyttenbach already suggested, Plu., Mor. vi, p. 41); and that he attributes what he has thus borrowed from extraneous sources to “Prodikos” by a fiction that never came amiss to the composers of such dialogues.—It follows then that what Prodikos really said about the soul and its destiny is unknown to us; cf. on this recently much-discussed subject: Brinkmann, Rh. Mus. 51, 444 ff.

120 Prodikos, according to Welcker, Kl. Schr. ii, 497 ff., is responsible for many of the theories presented in the Ps.-Platonic Axiochus regarding the immortality of the soul, Ax. 370 B ff., the soul's tendency towards the heavenly aether (366 A), and even the Platonic fantasy at the end about the fate of the deceased (371-2). If we accept this attribution, Prodikos would be seen less as the “forerunner of Sokrates” (as Welcker calls him) and more as the forerunner of Plato. However, there’s no real reason to give him more credit in this document than what is explicitly stated. The brief and poorly constructed pamphlet consists of a mix of standard elements from the usual comforting words loosely connected together. The parts attributed to Prodikos include the discussion on the difficulties of life at all stages (336 D-367 E) and the saying Because death is neither about those who are alive nor about those who have changed, etc., 369 B (cf. Buresch, Leip. Stud. ix, 8–9). These two passages together would actually establish the opposite opinion about Prodikos than what Welcker wants to ascribe to him. He would present himself as a true πεισιθάνατος(—From that, my soul will die., 366 C), who views death as merely an exit into a state of unconsciousness after life's troubles, thus seeming like an absolute nonentity. Yet, the piece lacks real authority: it apparently mentions Prodikos, frequently cited in Plato as the “teacher” of Sokrates, just to provide a specific authority (like the mythical Gobryes later on) for views that the author doesn’t want to represent as Sokrates’ own. One saying attributed to the fictional Prodikos, Since the text provided is incomplete, I'm unable to modernize it effectively. Please provide the full text for me to assist you. is, however, clearly a simple borrowing from Epicurus’ aphorism, Death has nothing to do with us, etc. (p. 61, 6 Usen.; cf. p. 227, 30; 391). The other passage (366 D ff.) suspiciously aligns with Teles (p. 38 Hens.), showing a clear dependence on Krates the Cynic. It seems very likely that the author of the Axiochus was influenced by Krates or even Teles (as Wyttenbach suggested, Plu., Mor. vi, p. 41), and attributed what he borrowed from external sources to “Prodikos” in a common fabrication style of such dialogues. Hence, what Prodikos actually asserted about the soul and its fate remains unknown to us; see on this much-discussed topic: Brinkmann, Rh. Mus. 51, 444 ff.

121 In the Prologue Thanatos at once describes his claims and his office. He has to receive the departed and cut off the lock of hair from the forehead (75 f. probably as a sign that the dead enter into the possession of the underworld deities: in Verg., A. iv, 698 f. Proserpina in the same way dedicates the dead to Orcus). He then leads them to Hades, 871. He comes in person to the grave and enjoys the offerings laid there, 844 ff., 851 f. (like the dead man himself on other occasions, see above, chap. v, n. 108). Properly speaking he is only the servant of Hades; but just as the word ᾅδης was already common as = θάνατος, so Thanatos himself is also actually called Ἅιδης (268, see above, n. 4); only as identical with Hades can he be called ἄναξ νεκρῶν, 843; cf. δαιμόνων κοίρανος, 1140.—In the underworld are Charon ὁ ψυχοπομπός, 361, 254 ff., 458 f., and Kerberos, 360. Hades and Hermes χθόνιος receive the dead. εἰ δέ τι κἀκεῖ πλέον ἔστ’ ἀγαθοῖς Alkestis will have the seat of honour next to Persephone: 744 ff. By the living who survive she is regarded on account of her incomparable virtue as μάκαιρα δαίμων and her grave is not the abode of a dead woman but a place of worship, 995–1005. Such facile elevation to the rank of “Heroine” was supposed to be characteristic of Thessaly and Eurip. may in this also have intended to give his poem a touch of Thessalian local colour. (δαίμων as an intermediate stage between θεοί and ἄνθρωποι; so frequently in Eur., e.g. Tro. 55–6; Med. 1391; is this the meaning of the μέσον in Hel. 1137?)—Thoroughly in keeping with popular belief is χαῖρε κἀν Ἅιδου δόμοις εὖ σοι γένοιτο, 626 f. (such a χαῖρε is the last word with which ὡς νομίζεται one addresses the dead ἐξιοῦσαν ὑστάτην ὅδον, 609 f.). Similar also (but really implying the conception of the dead as resting in the grave and not in Hades) is: κοῦφά σοι χθὼν ἐπάνωθε πέσοι, 463.

121 In the Prologue, Thanatos immediately explains his role and responsibilities. He must receive the deceased and cut off a lock of hair from their forehead (75 f., likely as a sign that the dead are entering the realm of the underworld gods: in Verg., A. iv, 698 f., Proserpina similarly dedicates the dead to Orcus). He then brings them to Hades, 871. He visits the grave directly and enjoys the offerings placed there, 844 ff., 851 f. (similar to the deceased on other occasions, see above, chap. v, n. 108). Technically, he is just the servant of Hades; however, just as the term Hades was already commonly used to mean death, Thanatos himself is often referred to as Hades (268, see above, n. 4); only in his role as identical with Hades can he be called Lord of the Dead, 843; cf. Demon ruler, 1140.—In the underworld are Charon the psychopomp, 361, 254 ff., 458 f., and Kerberos, 360. Hades and Hermes chthonic receive the dead. If there's anything else that's even better for the good things there, Alkestis will have the seat of honor next to Persephone: 744 ff. Among the living who remain, she is esteemed for her exceptional virtue as blessed spirit and her grave is not seen as the resting place of a dead woman, but as a site of worship, 995–1005. This easy elevation to the status of “Heroine” is thought to be characteristic of Thessaly, and Euripides may have intended to infuse his poem with a hint of Thessalian local flavor. (daemon serves as a middle ground between gods and people; this concept often appears in Eur., e.g. Tro. 55–6; Med. 1391; is this what medium refers to in Hel. 1137?)—The notion is completely in line with popular belief as expressed in Greetings, and may it go well for you in the halls of Hades., 626 f. (this hi is the last word one uses to address the deceased departing on the last road, 609 f.). Similarly, though actually suggesting the idea of the dead resting in the grave and not in Hades, is: The earth may fall upon you., 463.

122 The funeral dirge, 86 ff.; κόσμος buried with the dead, 618 ff.; mourning ceremonies: the manes of the horses are cut short; no sound of flute or lyre is to be heard in the town for twelve months, 428 ff. (πένθος ἐτήσιον is usual, 336). These extreme observances are probably taken from the mourning customs of the Thessalian dynastic families.

122 The funeral song, 86 ff.; world buried with the dead, 618 ff.; mourning rituals: the horses' manes are cut short; there's no sound of flute or lyre in the town for twelve months, 428 ff. (annual mourning is common, 336). These strict practices are likely drawn from the mourning customs of the Thessalian royal families.

123 Burial of the dead in accordance with νόμος παλαιὸς δαιμόνων, Suppl. 563; νόμιμα θεῶν, 19; a general Hellenic custom, 526 f.—Burial of Polyneikes in spite of Kreon’s prohibition: Phoen. and probably Ἀντιγόνη.

123 Burial of the dead according to the ancient spirit law, Suppl. 563; divine laws, 19; a common Greek custom, 526 f.—The burial of Polyneices despite Kreon’s ban: Phoen. and likely Antigone.

124 τοῖς γὰρ θανοῦσι χρὴ τὸν οὐ τεθνηκότα τιμὰς διδόντα χθόνιον εὐσεβεῖν θεόν, Ph. 1320 f. ἐν εὐσεβεῖ γοῦν νόμιμα μὴ κλέπτειν νεκρῶν, Hel. 1277. The honour of the grave more important even than good fortune upon earth, Hec. 317 f. Lament over the dishonouring of the grave of Agamem., El. 323 ff. Request for the burial of Astyanax, Tro. 1133 ff., of Orestes, IT. 702 ff., of Makaria, Hcld. 588 ff. The shade of the murdered Polydoros prays especially for burial, Hec. 47 ff. (31 f., 796 f.). He is an example of the wandering of the ἄταφοι upon the upper earth; he ἄθαπτος ἀλαίνει, Tro. 1084 (see above, p. 163, and Append. vii).—Funeral ceremony for those who have 458 been drowned at sea, Hel. 1057 ff., 1253 ff.; though there the idea is only used as an excuse for the intrigue.

124 For those who have passed away, it's important to honor the living by paying tribute to the chthonic god., Ph. 1320 f. Out of respect, it's also wrong to steal from the deceased., Hel. 1277. The honor of the grave is even more important than good fortune on earth, Hec. 317 f. There is mourning over the dishonoring of Agamemnon's grave, El. 323 ff. Requests for the burial of Astyanax, Tro. 1133 ff., of Orestes, IT. 702 ff., of Makaria, Hcld. 588 ff. The spirit of the murdered Polydorus particularly asks for burial, Hec. 47 ff. (31 f., 796 f.). He is an example of the unburied wandering on the upper earth; he wanders unburied, Tro. 1084 (see above, p. 163, and Append. vii).—Funeral ceremonies for those who have 458 drowned at sea, Hel. 1057 ff., 1253 ff.; although there, the idea is only used as a pretext for the intrigue.

125 χοαί for the dead, e.g. Or. 112 ff., El. 511 ff.; IT. 159 ff.

125 χοαί for the dead, e.g. Or. 112 ff., El. 511 ff.; IT. 159 ff.

126 χοαί make the dead εὐμενῆ towards the givers of the offering, Or. 119. The children call upon the soul of the murdered father to help them, El. 676 ff., in the belief that πάντ’ ἀκούει τάδε πατήρ, 684. The soul of the dead man hovers above the living observing everything, Or. 674 ff. Invocation of the dead (striking both hands on the ground: see above, chap. iii, n. 10), Tro. 1305 f. Expectation that the dead thus called on will σῶσαι his friends, Or. 797, or help them, El. 679. Calling upon the departed in Hades ἄρηξον, ἐλθὲ καὶ σκιὰ φάνηθί μοι, HF. 494 (though with the qualification εἴ τις φθόγγος εἰσακούσεται θνητῶν παρ’ Ἅιδῃ, 490).

126 choai make the dead eumenē towards those who offer, Or. 119. The children call on the spirit of their murdered father for help, El. 676 ff., believing that He hears all of this, father., 684. The soul of the deceased hovers over the living, watching everything, Or. 674 ff. To invoke the dead (striking both hands on the ground: see above, chap. iii, n. 10), Tro. 1305 f. There is an expectation that the dead called upon will save their friends, Or. 797, or assist them, El. 679. Calling upon the departed in Hades Stop, come here, and let your shadow show itself to me., HF. 494 (though with the note if any voice will be heard among the dead in Hades, 490).

127 Translation miracles are touched upon by the poet with obvious pleasure; cf. transl. of Kadmos and Harmonia, Bac. 1330 ff., 1338 ff.: of Peleus, Andr. 1257 ff.; of Helen, Or. 1629 ff.: of Herakles, Hcld. 910; of Menelaos (in unmistakable sarcasm), Hel. 1676 ff. So, too, in the spurious conclusion to the IA. there is a translation of Iphigeneia, 1583 ff. (πρὸς θεοὺς ἀφίπτατο, 1608).

127 The poet clearly enjoys discussing translation miracles; see the translations of Kadmos and Harmonia, Bac. 1330 ff., 1338 ff.: of Peleus, Andr. 1257 ff.; of Helen, Or. 1629 ff.; of Herakles, Hcld. 910; of Menelaos (with clear sarcasm), Hel. 1676 ff. Likewise, in the questionable conclusion to the IA., there's a translation of Iphigeneia, 1583 ff. (to the gods it soared, 1608).

128 Eurystheus buried in the temple of Athene Pallenis will bring safety to Athens and evil to her enemies: Hcld. 1026 ff. Eurysth. says σοὶ μὲν εὔνους καὶ πόλει σωτήριος μέτοικος ἀεὶ κείσομαι κατὰ χθονός, 1032 f.; i.e. he will become a ἥρως σωτήρ of the land (just as Oedip. was to become σωτήρ for Attica. S., OC. 460, and Brasidas Heros σωτήρ of the Amphipolitans, Thuc. 5, 11, 1). Heroic cult of Hippolytos, Hip. 1423 ff., fr. 446.

128 Eurystheus buried in the temple of Athena Pallenis will ensure safety for Athens and bring harm to her enemies: Hcld. 1026 ff. Eurysth. says I will always lie here on the ground as a kind and helpful resident for you and the city., 1032 f.; meaning he will become a hero savior of the land (just as Oedipus was to become savior for Attica. S., OC. 460, and Brasidas Hero savior of the Amphipolitans, Thuc. 5, 11, 1). Heroic cult of Hippolytus, Hip. 1423 ff., fr. 446.

129 The Erinyes are spoken of (apparently with real belief) in IT. 79 ff. and elsewhere.

129 The Furies are mentioned (apparently with genuine belief) in IT. 79 ff. and other places.

130 Or. 258 f., not very different, IT. 288–94.

130 Or. 258 f., not much different, IT. 288–94.

131 τὸ θηριῶδες τοῦτο καὶ μιαιφόνον, Or. 524. Orestes instead of committing murder himself should have brought his father to justice, Or. 500 f. Agamemnon himself if he could have been asked would not have desired this bloody vengeance, Or. 288 ff. It is only Apollo’s unwise counsel that has led Orestes to the murder of his mother, El. 971 ff., 1296 f.; Or. 276 ff., 416, 591. After the deed Orestes does indeed feel remorse but no religious terrors, El. 1177 (in spite of which there is much about the pursuing Erinyes of his mother). How completely this whole series of ideas, the duty of vengeance, etc., has lost its meaning for the poet, is to be felt more especially in the sophistical frigidity with which the subject is treated in an ἀγών between Tyndareos and Orestes, Or. 491–604, and in the hair-splitting of the speech of Orestes himself, 932 ff.

131 this horrific and bloodstained, Or. 524. Orestes should have sought justice for his father instead of committing murder himself, Or. 500 f. Agamemnon would not have wanted this bloody revenge if he had been asked, Or. 288 ff. It's only Apollo’s foolish advice that drove Orestes to kill his mother, El. 971 ff., 1296 f.; Or. 276 ff., 416, 591. After the crime, Orestes does feel guilt but no spiritual horror, El. 1177 (even though there’s a lot about the vengeful Erinyes from his mother). The way these ideas, like the duty of vengeance, have completely lost their significance for the poet is especially noticeable in the cold, intellectual way the topic is handled in a contest between Tyndareos and Orestes, Or. 491–604, and in the overly analytical nature of Orestes's speech, 932 ff.

132 δοκῶ δὲ τοῖς θανοῦσι διαφέρειν βραχύ, εἰ πλουσίων τις τεύξεται κτερισμάτων· κενὸν δὲ γαύρωμ’ ἐστὶ τῶν ζώντων τόδε, Tro. 1248 ff.

132 I think that for those who have passed away, it doesn't really matter if someone wealthy gets to enjoy their fortune; it's just hollow pride for the living., Tro. 1248 ff.

133 fr. 176.

133 p. 176.

134 οὐδὲν ἔσθ’ ὁ κατθανών, Alc. 381. The dead are οἱ οὐκέτ’ ὄντες 322. τοῖς (the dead) μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἄλγος ἄψεταί ποτε, πολλῶν δὲ μόχθων εὐκλεὴς ἐπαύσατο, 937 f. But even fame is nothing to the dead. Admetos says to his father in the scurrilous dialogue θανεῖ γε μέντοι δυσκλεής, ὅταν θάνῃς. To which the old man unconcernedly replies κακῶς ἀκούειν οὐ μέλει θανόντι μοι (725 f.).

134 Nothing exists for the dead., Alc. 381. The dead are those who are gone 322. For the (the dead) feel no pain whatsoever and have ended the struggles of many, 937 f. But even fame means nothing to the dead. Admetos says to his father in the harsh conversation You'll definitely have a bad reputation when you die.. To which the old man calmly replies I don't care about having a bad reputation when I'm gone. (725 f.).

135 It might seem simpler to regard all the utterances of persons in the plays which correspond to conventional beliefs as being merely dramatic expressions of the character’s own (orthodox) view, and in no sense put forward by the poet as his own opinion. And certainly the separate and independently acting persons of the drama can only 459 speak and act in accordance with their own proper conceptions and springs of action—not in accordance with the poet’s. But in the antique drama this complete detachment of the creatures of the dramatic imagination from their creator, the poet of the drama, only holds good in a limited sense. The ancient dramatists exercised their office of judge much more vigorously than the greatest of the moderns. The course of his play showed clearly what acts and characters the poet disapproved of, but also which opinions he sanctioned and which he did not. We have only to remember the attacks of Oedipus and Iokaste upon the judgments of the gods in OT. (or the story of Sen., Ep. 115, 14: Eur. fr. 324). Accordingly we may take it that such utterances of dramatic characters as are not supplied with practical or spoken corrective are among those of which the poet did not disapprove. Euripides so very frequently puts words into the mouth of his characters which can only express his own moods or opinions that we may also assume that when their language harmonizes with traditional belief then, too, the most subjective of the tragedians is for the moment expressing his own view. Thus, for example, we cannot doubt that the strain of piety running through the whole of the Hiketides (subjection of φρόνησις to God’s wisdom, 216 ff., submission to the guidance of the gods, 592 ff., and to Zeus’ government of the world, 734 ff.), and especially the whole-hearted elaboration of the picture of Theseus as a model of εὐσέβεια represent the actual opinion of the poet at that particular period (he clearly speaks of himself, 180–3). At other times, too (apart from the Bacchae), though generally for a short time only, he shows vague aspirations towards orthodoxy.

135 It might seem easier to think of all the statements made by characters in the plays that reflect common beliefs as simply dramatic expressions of the character’s own (mainstream) views, and not as the poet's own opinions. Certainly, the individual characters in the drama can only 459 act and speak based on their own beliefs and motivations—not according to the poet’s. However, in ancient drama, this complete separation of the characters from their creator, the poet, only applies to a certain extent. The ancient playwrights took on the role of judge much more assertively than most modern ones. The way their plays unfolded clearly indicated which actions and characters the poet disapproved of, as well as which opinions he endorsed and which he rejected. We only need to recall Oedipus and Iokaste’s criticisms of the gods’ judgments in OT. (or the story of Sen., Ep. 115, 14: Eur. fr. 324). Therefore, we can assume that those statements made by dramatic characters that lack practical or spoken correction are ones the poet accepted. Euripides frequently gives his characters words that clearly express his own moods or opinions, leading us to believe that when their speech aligns with traditional beliefs, the most subjective of the tragedians is momentarily expressing his own view. For example, we cannot doubt that the theme of piety throughout the Hiketides (subordination of wisdom to God’s wisdom, 216 ff., submission to the guidance of the gods, 592 ff., and Zeus’ governance of the world, 734 ff.), especially the detailed portrayal of Theseus as a model of piety, reflects the poet's true opinion during that time (he clearly speaks of himself, 180–3). At other times, too (aside from the Bacchae), although usually only briefly, he shows vague inclinations towards orthodoxy.

136 Alc. 968 ff.; Hipp. 952 ff.—Asceticism of the mystai of Zeus and Zagreus of the Mountain Mother and the Kouretes: Κρῆτες, fr. 472.

136 Alc. 968 ff.; Hipp. 952 ff.—The ascetic practices of the followers of Zeus and Zagreus from the Mountain Mother and the Kouretes: Cretans, fr. 472.

137 Polyid. fr. 638; Phrixos, fr. 833. It is usual (cf. Bergk, Gr. Litt. 3, 475, 33) to see here a reminiscence of Herakleitos. But the latter’s ἀθάνατοι θνητοί, θνητοὶ ἀθάνατοι, ζῶντες τὸν ἐκείνων θάνατον, τὸν δὲ ἐκείνων βίον τεθνεῶτες (fr. 67 Byw. 62 D.) is clearly intended to express the view that “death” and “life” are purely relative concepts; that death (of the one, i.e. Fire) and life (of the other, i.e, Water or Earth) are simultaneously present in the same object (see also frr. 68, 78 = 36, 88). According to this view it would be strictly true that life on earth is not more life than it is death; but that is certainly not what Eurip. means to say. Philo and Sext. Emp. are mistaken in attributing to Herakl. the Orphic doctrine of the “death” of the soul which takes place when it is enclosed in the σῶμα, as its σῆμα (see above, chap. xi, n. 19). But it is precisely this Orphic doctrine that is present to the mind of Eurip. (and Plato, Gorg. 492 E, 493 A, brings it into immediate connexion with the verses of E.). He is speaking of the true “death” of the soul in the life of the body and of its release to a real (and not a merely relative) life after death; and thinks that “life” has no claim to the distinguishing name (cf. ὃ δὴ βίοτον καλέουσι Emped. 117 Mull. = fr. 15 D.).

137 Polyid. fr. 638; Phrixos, fr. 833. It’s common (see Bergk, Gr. Litt. 3, 475, 33) to identify a connection here to Heraclitus. However, Heraclitus’s Immortal mortals, mortal immortals, living their death, while the dead have lived their life. (fr. 67 Byw. 62 D.) clearly aims to show that “death” and “life” are purely relative concepts; that death (of one, i.e., Fire) and life (of the other, i.e., Water or Earth) are simultaneously present in the same entity (see also frr. 68, 78 = 36, 88). According to this idea, it would be accurate to say that life on earth is not more life than it is death; but that’s definitely not what Euripides intends to convey. Philo and Sextus Empiricus are wrong to attribute to Heraclitus the Orphic belief in the “death” of the soul when it is trapped in the body, as its σῆμα (see above, chap. xi, n. 19). But it is this Orphic belief that is on Euripides’s mind (and Plato, Gorg. 492 E, 493 A, connects it directly with Euripides’s verses). He refers to the true “death” of the soul within the body and its liberation to a real (and not just a relative) life after death; and believes that “life” does not deserve the distinctive title (cf. They call it life. Emped. 117 Mull. = fr. 15 D.).

138 Palingenesia is alluded to once only and in jest as a desirable reward for the virtuous, HF. 655–68; cf. M. Ant. xii, 5.

138 Palingenesia is mentioned only once and in a joking manner as a desirable reward for the virtuous, HF. 655–68; see also M. Ant. xii, 5.

139 ὁ νοῦς γὰρ ἡμῶν ἐστιν ἐν ἑκάστῳ θεός, fr. 1018.

139 The mind is our unique inner presence in each person., fr. 1018.

140 fr. 839 (Chrysipp.) fully physical in fr. 898, 7 ff.—fr. 1023 Αἰθέρα καὶ Γαῖαν πάντων γενέτειραν ἀείδω. Cf. fr. 1004.

140 fr. 839 (Chrysipp.) completely physical in fr. 898, 7 ff.—fr. 1023 I always sing of Aether and Gaia, the parents of all.. See also fr. 1004.

141 fr. 484 (Μελαν. ἡ σοφή)—ὡς οὐρανός τε γαῖά τ’ ἦν μορφὴ μία κτλ. Here, too, the poet is speaking of a mere initial association of the elements afterwards to be parted, but thought of as always from the 460 beginning independent—there is no derivation of both from a single common original element, or of one out of the other. Eurip. may really have been thinking here of the ὅμου πάντα χρήματα ἦν of Anaxagoras (as the ancient authorities supposed), esp. as, with Anax. also, out of the general conglomeration two masses, ἀήρ and αἰθήρ, first emerge (though in this case νοῦς is not included in the αἰθήρ as it is with Eurip.). Here, too, then the usual dualism of the Euripidean cosmogony is preserved. For the rest this fr. 484 allows us to perceive that in spite of all his physiological tendencies Eurip. can never quite get rid of the mythical element in his cosmogonical events. The reason why Ouranos and Gaia in particular recommend themselves to him as elemental forces (and κοινοὶ ἁπάντων γονεῖς, fr. 1004) was that these figures had long been set at the beginning of the world and of the gods by cosmogonical poetry (αἰθήρ is simply the more physiological term for what is half-personified as Οὐρανός). This probably explains why matter (or at least the more solid forms of matter as distinguished from the αἰθήρ the λεπτότατον πάντων χρημάτων) is for him included in the description “earth”. In this he is not following the old physiologists, none of whom had called “earth” the original matter—at least not earth alone (see Ilberg, Quaest. Pseudohippocrat., p. 16 ff., 1883). “Earth” as describing the merely material, matter deserted by spirit, may have come to him from popular usage. As early as Ω 54 the body deserted by soul and life is called κωφὴ γαῖα (cf. Eur. frr. 532; 757, 5). Thus for the poet the contrast between γῆ and αἰθήρ almost amounts to that between “matter” and “mind”, except that he either could not or would not think of a “mind” without any material substratum and that for this reason his αἰθήρ still preserves a remnant of matter.

141 fr. 484 (Melan, the wise)—As the sky and the earth were one form, etc. Here, too, the poet is talking about a simple initial connection of the elements that will later be separated, but considered from the 460 beginning as always being independent—there is no suggestion that both came from a single original element, or that one came from the other. Euripides may have been thinking of the All money was together. of Anaxagoras (as the ancient authorities believed), especially since, with Anaxagoras too, from the general mixture two masses, air and aether, first emerge (though in this case mind is not included in the aether as it is with Euripides). Here, we see that the typical dualism of the Euripidean cosmogony is maintained. Moreover, this fr. 484 lets us see that despite his physiological inclinations, Euripides can never completely eliminate the mythical aspect from his cosmogonical events. The reason why Ouranos and Gaia stand out to him as elemental forces (and common parents of all, fr. 1004) is that these figures have long been positioned at the beginning of the world and the gods in cosmogonical poetry (ether is simply the more physiological term for what is half-personified as Sky). This probably explains why matter (or at least the more solid forms of matter when compared to the aether the λεπτότατον πάντων χρημάτων) is for him included in the term “earth.” In this, he is not following the old physiologists, none of whom called “earth” the original matter—at least not earth alone (see Ilberg, Quaest. Pseudohippocrat., p. 16 ff., 1883). “Earth” as describing something merely material, matter that is absent of spirit, may have come to him from common language. As early as Ω 54, the body without soul and life is called deaf earth (cf. Eur. frr. 532; 757, 5). Thus for the poet, the contrast between earth and aether nearly equates to that between “matter” and “mind,” except that he either could not or would not think about a “mind” without any material foundation, and for this reason his aether still contains a remnant of matter.

142 This is esp. clear in fr. 839, 8 ff. In the disruption of the elements out of which πάντα are composed each of the two, γῆ and αἰθήρ, preserves itself undiminished and unmixed. θνῄσκει δ’ οὐδὲν τῶν γιγνομένων διακρινόμενον δ’ ἄλλο πρὸς ἄλλου μορφὴν ἰδίαν ἀπέδειξεν (restores itself in its independent being). Whereupon we feel ourselves irresistibly reminded of the saying of Anaxagoras—οὐδὲν γὰρ χρῆμα γίνεται οὐδὲ ἀπόλλυται, ἀλλ’ ἀπ’ ἐόντων χρημάτων συμμίσγεταί τε καὶ διακρίνεται, καὶ οὕτως ἂν ὀρθῶς καλοῖεν τό τε γίνεσθαι συμμίσγεσθαι καὶ τὸ ἀπόλλυσθαι διακρίνεσθαι, fr. 17 Mull. [and D.].

142 This is especially clear in fr. 839, 8 ff. In the disruption of the elements that make up always, each of the two, γῆ and aether, remains intact and separate. Nothing that comes into being appears to be clearly separate from everything else that exists. (it maintains its independent existence). This strongly reminds us of Anaxagoras’s saying—Nothing is created or destroyed; rather, things come together and are differentiated from what exists, allowing us to accurately refer to both the process of coming into being and the process of destruction using their respective terms., fr. 17 Mull. [and D.].

143 That it was not Anaxagoras, or at least not he alone, who gave the decided direction to the philosophic ideas of Eurip. has rightly come to be held of late. We do not find a trace in Eurip. of the separation of νοῦς from matter, at least not in the form in which Anaxagoras understood it. For E. the mind is bound to one of the two primal elements and quite foreign to the other, the earth. Thus he arrives at a dualism indeed, but in quite a different sense from that of Anaxag. Dümmler, Proleg. zu Platons Staat (Progr. Basel, 1891), p. 48, points out reminiscences in Eurip. of Diogenes of Apollonia—but it is not true to say that the poet’s views show the “closest kinship” with the monistic system of Diog., or with any Monism.

143 Recently, it has been recognized that it was not just Anaxagoras, or at least not only him, who significantly influenced the philosophical ideas of Euripides. We don't see any evidence in Euripides of separating mind from matter, at least not in the way Anaxagoras understood it. For Euripides, the mind is connected to one of the two fundamental elements and completely separate from the other, which is the earth. Therefore, he does indeed reach a form of dualism, but it's quite different from Anaxagoras's view. Dümmler, in Proleg. zu Platons Staat (Progr. Basel, 1891), p. 48, points out that there are traces in Euripides that reflect Diogenes of Apollonia—but it's inaccurate to claim that the poet’s ideas show the “closest kinship” with the monistic system of Diogenes or with any kind of Monism.

144 Tro. 884 ff. The air, called by the name of Zeus, and identical with the νοῦς βροτῶν, can only be taken from the doctrine of Diog.: Diels, Rh. Mus. 42, 12.

144 Tro. 884 ff. The air, known by the name of Zeus, and the same as the mind of mortals, can only be understood from Diogenes' teachings: Diels, Rh. Mus. 42, 12.

145 Diog. Apoll., frr. 3, 4, 5 Mull. (= 8, 3, 4 D.). The soul is ἀὴρ θερμότερος τοῦ ἔξω, ἐν ᾧ ἐσμεν, though it is colder than the air which is παρὰ τῷ ἡλίῳ, fr. 6 [5]. The soul is therefore more akin to the αἰθήρ than to the ἀήρ (αἰθήρ and ἀήρ were at that time often confused: e.g. in E., fr. 944, αἰθήρ instead of ἀήρ). 461

145 Diog. Apoll., frr. 3, 4, 5 Mull. (= 8, 3, 4 D.). The soul is hotter than the air outside that we live in, even though it is colder than the air that is by the sunlight, fr. 6 [5]. Therefore, the soul is more like the ether than the air (Ethereum and air were often confused back then: for example, in E., fr. 944, ether instead of air). 461

146 Suppl. 1140 αἰθὴρ ἔχει νιν ἤδη κτλ. Elektra expects to find her dead father in the Aither, El. 59. Of a dying man, πνεῦμ’ ἀφεὶς εἰς αἰθέρα, fr 971 (differently, Or. 1086 f.); cf. also Suppl. 531–6 (imitated from Epicharm.), where again the αἰθήρ is only spoken of as the abode, and not as the original and consubstantial element of the soul.

146 Suppl. 1140 The sky already has her, etc. Elektra expects to find her dead father in the Aether, El. 59. Of a dying man, πνεῦμ’ ἀφεὶς εἰς αἰθέρα, fr 971 (differently, Or. 1086 f.); cf. also Suppl. 531–6 (imitated from Epicharm.), where again the ether is only mentioned as the place, and not as the original and essential element of the soul.

147 αἰθὴρ οἴκησις Διός, Eur., fr. 487 (Melanip.).

147 aithēr oikēsis Dios, Eur., fr. 487 (Melanip.).

148 Epich., fr. 7, p. 257 Lor. [= fr. 265 Kaibel].

148 Epich., fr. 7, p. 257 Lor. [= fr. 265 Kaibel].

149 CIA. i, 442, αἰθὴρ μὲν ψυχὰς ὑπεδέξατο, σώ[ματα δὲ χθὼν] τῶνδε. . . .

149 CIA. i, 442, The Ether received souls, while the bodies remained on the earth...

150 συνεκρίθη καὶ διεκρίθη, κἀπῆλθεν ὅθεν ἦλθεν πάλιν, γᾶ μὲν ἐς γᾶν, πνεῦμ’ ἄνω· τί τῶνδε χάλεπόν; οὒδὲ ἕν, Epich. ap. Plu., Cons. ad Apoll. 15, 110 A; Epich., fr. 8 [245 Kaib.]. πνεῦμα as a general name for the ψυχή occurs also in Epich., fr. 7 [265]. No earlier authority is to be found for this usage that became so common later (under Stoic influence) than Xenophanes who πρῶτος ἀπεφήνατο ὅτι ἡ ψυχὴ πνεῦμα (D.L. ix, 19). Epicharm. may have been actually following Xenophanes (whose writings he knew: Arist., Meta. iii, 5, 1010a, 6) in this use of the word. Eurip. then did the same, Suppl. 533. πνεῦμα is the name given to the ἀήρ in so far as it is in motion. (ὑποληπτέον, εἶναι σῶμα τὸν ἀέρα) γίνεται δὲ πνεῦμα κινηθείς. οὐθὲν γὰρ ἕτερόν ἐστι πνεῦμα ἢ κινούμενος ἀήρ: Hero, μηχαν. σύστ., p. 121 (ed. Diels = i, p. 6. ed. Schmidt) after Straton. The soul is called a πνεῦμα just because the soul is that which has continual movement from its very nature (and is the principle of movement); as such it had already been regarded by Alkmaion (and later by Plato), and even before that by Pythagoras (see above, chap. xi, n. 40); in a different way by Herakleitos and Demokritos also. The universal ἀήρ and the Soul-πνεῦμα, if we give the terms their proper meaning, are to be thought of as being of the same nature, so that the ἀήρ, too (still more the αἰθήρ as a higher ἀήρ), is psychical and animated by soul. That at least was how Diogenes of Apollonia regarded it. (ἀήρ = the outer air, πνεῦμα the air which is inside men’s bodies: [Hp.] de Flatib. 3 [vi, 94 L.], a section taken from Diog. Ap.)

150 It was examined and classified, then it returned to its origin, earth to earth, spirit upward; what's so hard about this? Not even one., Epich. ap. Plu., Cons. ad Apoll. 15, 110 A; Epich., fr. 8 [245 Kaib.]. The term spirit as a general term for the soul also appears in Epich., fr. 7 [265]. No earlier references for this usage, which later became quite common (due to Stoic influence), can be found other than Xenophanes, who first declared that the soul is energy (D.L. ix, 19). Epicharmus may have been following Xenophanes (whose works he was familiar with: Arist., Meta. iii, 5, 1010a, 6) in this terminology. Euripides did the same, Suppl. 533. spirit is the name given to the air as long as it is in motion. (It's important to realize that air is a substance; when it moves, it transforms into spirit. Because nothing else is spirit except for moving air.): Hero, machine system, p. 121 (ed. Diels = i, p. 6. ed. Schmidt) after Straton. The soul is called spirit simply because it is inherently in constant motion (and is the source of movement); it was viewed this way by Alkmaion (and later by Plato), and even earlier by Pythagoras (see above, chap. xi, n. 40); also in a different way by Herakleitos and Demokritos. The universal air and the Soul-spirit, when we consider the terms correctly, are to be seen as having the same nature, so that air, and even more so the ether as a higher air), is also psychical and animated by the soul. That was the belief of Diogenes of Apollonia. (air = the outer air, spirit the air inside people’s bodies: [Hp.] de Flatib. 3 [vi, 94 L.], a section taken from Diog. Ap.)

151 Numerous references in Eurip. to verses of Epicharm. are pointed out by Wilamowitz, Eurip. Herakles, i, 29. The fact that Eurip. knew the poems of Epich. and valued them for their philosophic contents is clearly made out by Wilamowitz’ study. But he goes on to assert that all the allusions of Eurip. refer only to the (or one of the) forgeries in the name of Epicharm., of which many were known in antiquity. The reason alleged for this statement—“Euripides never quotes comedies”—is merely a petitio principii. It may be that Eurip. does not “quote” contemporary Attic comedy, but whether he maintained the same attitude to the brilliantly original comic poet of Sicily, whom Aristotle and even Plato (Gorg. 505 E and esp. Tht. 152 E) were not ashamed to notice, is the very point at issue; nothing is gained by unproved denial of this main premiss.—Moreover, it would be a most unusual species of forger that preferred to publish gems like νᾶφε καὶ . . . (imitated by Eurip.) or νόος ὁρῇ—under another man’s name. The fragments of the Πολιτεία, which is really a forgery fathered on Epicharmos (ap. Clem. Al., Str. v, p. 719 P. = Lor., p. 297), are of a very different character.

151 Many citations in Euripides reference lines from Epicharmus, as pointed out by Wilamowitz in Eurip. Herakles, i, 29. Wilamowitz clearly demonstrates that Euripides knew Epicharmus' poems and valued them for their philosophical content. However, he goes on to claim that all of Euripides’ references relate only to one or more forgeries attributed to Epicharmus, of which several were known in ancient times. The reason provided for this claim—"Euripides never quotes comedies"—is simply a circular argument. It may be true that Euripides does not “quote” contemporary Attic comedy, but the real question is whether he treated the uniquely original comic poet from Sicily the same way, a poet acknowledged by both Aristotle and even Plato (Gorg. 505 E and especially Tht. 152 E); unproven dismissal of this main premise adds nothing. Furthermore, it would be quite unusual for a forger to choose to publish brilliant lines like νᾶφε καὶ . . . (imitated by Euripides) or mind perceives under someone else’s name. The fragments of the State, which is genuinely a forgery attributed to Epicharmus (according to Clem. Al., Str. v, p. 719 P. = Lor., p. 297), are of a completely different nature.

152 Archelaos makes a less satisfactory model for Eurip. here. Arch. in his reconciliation of the doctrines of Anaxagoras and Diogenes did not separate νοῦς from the mixture of the material elements (or from the ἀήρ), but he distinguished between them, while for the poet αἰθήρ and mind are the same. 462

152 Archelaos is not a very good fit for Euripides here. Arch. , in his blending of Anaxagoras and Diogenes’ teachings, didn’t separate mind from the mix of the material elements (or from the air), but he made a distinction between them, while for the poet aether and mind are the same. 462

153 αἰθήρ = Zeus, fr. 941. αἰθήρ. . . .Ζεὺς ὃς ἀνθρώποις ὀνομάζεται, fr. 877. Hence the αἰθήρ is κορυφὴ θεῶν, fr. 919.—In the same way for Diog. Ap. the air is god (Cic., ND. i, 29) and Zeus (Philod., Piet. c. 6b, p. 70 Gomp.; Dox. 536).—In E., fr. 941: τὸν ὑψοῦ τόνδ’ ἄπειρον αἰθέρα καὶ γῆν πέριξ ἔχονθ’ ὑγραῖς ἐν ἀγκάλαις the αἰθήρ is not put instead of ἀήρ (for τὸν ὑψοῦ only suits αἰθήρ in its proper sense), but the two are combined under the one word (ὑγραῖς ἐν ἀγκάλαις could not be said of the αἰθήρ in the strict sense), just as the ἀήρ of Diogenes includes the αἰθήρ (for the hot ἀὴρ παρὰ τῷ ἡλίῳ, fr. 6 [5 Diels] is, in fact, the αἰθήρ, and so, too, essentially, is the warm ἀήρ in our bodies).

153 Ether = Zeus, fr. 941. Aether... Zeus, as named by humans., fr. 877. Hence, the Ether is the supreme being, fr. 919.—In the same way, for Diogenes of Apollonia, air is a god (Cic., ND. i, 29) and Zeus (Philod., Piet. c. 6b, p. 70 Gomp.; Dox. 536).—In E., fr. 941: the vast and limitless sky and the earth around it, holding moisture in their grasp the Ether is not used instead of air (for the high only fits Ether in its true sense), but the two are combined under one term (having wetness in embrace can't be strictly applied to the Aether, just as the air of Diogenes includes the Aether (because the warm air near the sun, fr. 6 [5 Diels] is, in fact, the Aether, and so is the warm air in our bodies).

154 —εἰς ἀθάνατον αἰθέρ’ ἐμπεσών, Hel. 1016.

154 —into the immortal ether, Hel. 1016.

155 ὁ ἐντὸς ἀὴρ (which alone αἰσθάνεται—not the senses) μικρὸν μόριον ὢν τοῦ θεοῦ, Diog. ap. Thphr., Sens. 42.

155 the one in the sky (which alone is seen—not the senses) a small piece of God, Diog. ap. Thphr., Sens. 42.

156 The living air, or Zeus, is νοῦς βροτῶν, Tro. 886. And vice versa, the νοῦς in each one of us is no other than God, fr. 1018.

156 The air we breathe, or Zeus, is minds of mortals, Tro. 886. And conversely, the mind within each of us is simply God, fr. 1018.

157 ὁ νοῦς τῶν κατθανόντων ζῇ μὲν οὔ, γνώμην δ’ ἔχει ἀθάνατον, εἰς ἀθάνατον αἰθέρ’ ἐμπεσών, Hel. 1013 ff.—Ambiguity attaches to the passages in which a dying person is said to depart εἰς ἄλλο σχῆμα βίου (Med. 1039), ἐς ἄλλας βιότου μορφάς (Ion, 1068), to ἕτερον αἰῶνα καὶ μοῖραν (IA. 1508). It is possible that in each case a personal existence continued in a land of the dead is understood—but if they mean no more than that they are remarkably pregnant in form. In reading them (esp. Med. 1039) one is reminded of the remarkable lines of Philiskos (pupil of Isocr.) ap. [Plu.] Vit. X Or., p. 243, 60 West. τῷ γὰρ ἐς ἄλλο σχῆμα μεθαρμοσθέντι καὶ ἄλλοις ἐν κόσμοισι βίου σῶμα λαβόνθ’ ἕτερον—said of the dead Lysias. But here the idea of metempsychosis seems really to be involved, which it can hardly be in the case of Eurip.

157 The mind of the dead continues to exist, holding onto an eternal thought as it merges with the everlasting ether., Hel. 1013 ff.—There’s some uncertainty around the passages where it’s said that a dying person moves on to a different stage of life (Med. 1039), to various forms of life (Ion, 1068), to another era and destiny (IA. 1508). It’s possible that in each case, there’s an understanding that personal existence continues in a realm of the dead—but if that’s the case, they are expressed remarkably. Reading these lines (especially Med. 1039) brings to mind the striking lines of Philiskos (student of Isocr.) ap. [Plu.] Vit. X Or., p. 243, 60 West. For being changed into another state of existence and adopting a different body in various realms of life—referring to the deceased Lysias. However, here the concept of metempsychosis seems to truly be at play, which likely isn’t the case with Euripides.

158 Eur. adopts it for himself, fr. 189 (Antiope), and confirms it by so many λόγων ἅμιλλαι in which he allows the most contradictory opinions about a single subject to be given equally plausible expression.

158 Euripides takes it for himself, fr. 189 (Antiope), and supports it with so many debates of words in which he allows the most contradictory views on a single topic to be presented with equal credibility.

159 ἀπειροσύνη ἄλλου βιότου, etc. Hip. 191–7. τὸ ζῆν γὰρ ἴσμεν, τοῦ θανεῖν δ’ ἀπειρίᾳ πᾶς τις φοβεῖται φῶς λιπεῖν τόδ’ ἡλίου, fr. 816, 10 f. (Phoinix).

159 Endless cycle of another life, etc. Hip. 191–7. We understand that living is one thing; everyone is afraid of the finality of dying and leaving behind the light of the sun., fr. 816, 10 f. (Phoinix).

160 The dead man is γῆ καὶ σκιά—τὸ μηδὲν εἰς οὐδὲν ῥέπει, fr. 532; cf. 533, 534. τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι τῷ θανεῖν ἴσον· ὥσπερ οὐκ ἰδοῦσα φῶς the dead woman knows nothing of herself or her sufferings, Tro. 636–44 (a locus often initiated in “consolations”: Axioch. 365 D, Plu., Cons. ad Apoll. 15, p. 110 A).

160 The dead man is earth and shadow—nothing turns into nothing, fr. 532; cf. 533, 534. Not becoming is just like dying; you can't see the light. the dead woman knows nothing of herself or her sufferings, Tro. 636–44 (a passage often referenced in “consolations”: Axioch. 365 D, Plu., Cons. ad Apoll. 15, p. 110 A).

161 φήμη τὸν ἐσθλὸν κἀν μυχοῖς δείκνυσι γῆς, fr. 865. ἀρετὴ δὲ κἂν θάνῃ τις οὐκ ἀπόλλυται, ζῇ δ’ οὐκετ’ ὄντος σώματοςs, fr. 734; cf. Andr. 772. At the sacrifice of Makaria the chorus in Hcld. 621 ff. can only offer as consolation the fame which awaits her—οὐδ’ ἀκλεής νιν δόξα πρὸς ἀνθρώπων ὑποδέξεται.

161 Fame reveals the noble person hidden beneath the surface., fr. 865. Virtue, even after someone dies, doesn’t fade away; it continues to exist even without the body., fr. 734; cf. Andr. 772. At the sacrifice of Makaria, the chorus in Hcld. 621 ff. can only offer as consolation the fame that awaits her—nor will a bad reputation be accepted among people.

162 Makaria voluntarily going to meet her death—εἴ τι δὴ κατὰ χθονός· εἴη γε μέντοι μηδέν. εἰ γὰρ ἕξομεν κἀκεῖ μερίμνας οἱ θανούμενοι βροτῶν οὐκ οἶδ’ ὅποι τις τρέψεται· τὸ γὰρ θανεῖν μέγιστον φάρμακον νομίζεται, Hcld. 592 ff.; cf. fr. 916.

162 Makaria willingly going to meet her death—if there's anything at all beneath the earth; if there’s really nothing. Because if we have worries there, those who are about to die among humans don’t know where anyone will go; dying is seen as the ultimate solution., Hcld. 592 ff.; cf. fr. 916.

163 fr, 757 (the metaphor of ll. 5 ff. is employed for homiletic purposes by Epictet. ii, 6, 11–14); Andr. 1270 ff.

163 fr, 757 (the metaphor in lines 5 and following is used for teaching purposes by Epictet. ii, 6, 11–14); Andr. 1270 ff.

CHAPTER XIII

PLATO

The belief in human immortality, construed in a theological or philosophical sense, had at this time hardly penetrated to circles of ordinary lay folk. Socrates himself, when it came to such inquiries into the unknowable, never claimed to provide an answer that differed from that which would be given by the majority of his fellow citizens out of the accumulated wisdom of their ancestors. Where in the pages of Plato he is allowed to give undisguised expression to his natural and homely vigour—in the Apology—he shows little anticipation of an immortal life of the soul. Death, he thinks, either brings complete unconsciousness to men, like a dreamless sleep, or else it means the transition of the soul to another life in the realm of the Souls—a realm which, to judge by his allusions, has much more resemblance to the Homeric Hades than to any of the visionary countries imagined by theologians or theologically minded poets.1 Both possibilities he accepts with complete equanimity, trusting in the righteousness of the controlling gods,2 and he looks no further. How should he know with certainty where everyone was ignorant?3

The belief in human immortality, whether viewed theologically or philosophically, had hardly reached ordinary people at that time. Socrates himself, when faced with questions about the unknowable, never claimed to have an answer different from what most of his fellow citizens would say based on the accumulated wisdom of their ancestors. In Plato's writings, particularly the Apology, where he expresses his natural and straightforward vigor, he shows little expectation of an immortal soul. He believes that death either leads to complete unconsciousness, like a dreamless sleep, or it involves the soul transitioning to another existence in the realm of the Souls—a place that, based on his references, resembles the Homeric Hades much more than any imaginary worlds created by theologians or poetically inclined thinkers. He accepts both possibilities with complete calm, trusting in the justice of the governing gods, and he doesn’t think any further. How could he know for sure when everyone else was in the dark?

With a like absence of concern it is possible that the majority of the cultured (who were just beginning to separate themselves from the rest of the community) left unsettled the problem of the Unknown.4 Plato assures us that it was in his time a widespread belief of the populace that the outgoing soul-breath of the dying was caught up by the winds—especially if its exit took place in stormy weather—and was dispersed, blown away, into nothing.5 In other ways, too, we may suppose that the orthodox Greek, when death approached, allowed his fancy to picture what might await his soul on the other side of death’s threshold.6 But it is certain that the belief in an unending life of the soul—a life with no end because it had no beginning—was not among these thoughts. Plato himself lets us see how strange such a conception was even to those who were capable of following and understanding a philosophical discussion. Towards the end of the long dialogue upon the best kind of State his Sokrates asks Glaukon with apparent irrelevance “are you not aware that 464 our soul is immortal and never perishes?” Whereupon, we are told, Glaukon looked at him in astonishment and said, “No, in truth, of that I was not aware: can you then assert any such thing?”7

With a similar lack of concern, it's likely that most cultured individuals (who were just starting to separate themselves from the rest of the community) left the issue of the Unknown unresolved.4 Plato tells us that in his time, many people believed that the soul's breath of the dying was taken by the winds—especially if it happened during a storm—and was scattered, blown away into nothing.5 In other ways, we can suppose that the typical Greek, when faced with death, let his imagination run wild thinking about what might happen to his soul after crossing death's threshold.6 But it's clear that the belief in an everlasting life of the soul—a life that has no end because it had no beginning—was not part of these thoughts. Plato himself shows us how odd such an idea was, even for those who could engage in philosophical discussions. Towards the end of the lengthy dialogue about the best kind of State, his Socrates asks Glaukon, seemingly out of the blue, “Are you not aware that 464 our soul is immortal and never perishes?” At which point, we’re told, Glaukon looked at him in shock and replied, “No, I honestly wasn’t aware of that: can you really claim such a thing?”7

The idea that the soul of man may be everlasting and imperishable seemed thus a paradoxical freak to one who was no adept in the theological doctrine of the soul. If in later times the case was altered, no one contributed more effectually or more permanently to bring that change about than the great thinker and poet who established the theological conception of personal immortality in the very heart of philosophy and then gave back the idea strengthened and made more profound to its parent theology, while he himself extended the influence of that idea far beyond the bounds of school or sect by the far-reaching power of his own unaging writings which belong, not to the schoolroom, but to the greatest achievements of literature whether of Greece or of mankind. It is beyond calculation what power has been wielded since their first appearance by the Platonic dialogues in the confirmation, dissemination, and precise definition of the belief in immortality—a power that with all its alteration in the passage of the centuries has maintained itself unbroken into our own times.

The idea that a person's soul might be eternal and indestructible seemed like a strange contradiction to someone who wasn't well-versed in the theological beliefs about the soul. If that perspective changed later on, no one had a greater impact on that change than the great thinker and poet who established the idea of personal immortality at the core of philosophy and then revitalized it for theology. He also expanded the influence of that idea far beyond any school or sect through the lasting power of his timeless writings, which belong not just to classrooms but to the greatest works of literature, whether from Greece or from humanity as a whole. It's impossible to measure the influence that the Platonic dialogues have had since they were first published in confirming, spreading, and precisely defining the belief in immortality—a influence that, despite its evolution over the centuries, has remained strong and unbroken into our current age.

§ 2

Plato had not always given his assent to the belief in immortality. At any rate, it must have remained very much in the background of his thoughts and his belief in the days when he still regarded the world from the point of view of a slightly more developed Socraticism. Not only at that period (in the Apology) does he make his Sokrates go to his death without the most distant approach to a belief in the undying vitality of his soul, but also in the first sketch of his Ideal State—a sketch made while the influence of the Socratic view of life still prevailed with him—the belief in immortality is omitted and even excluded.8 It seems as if Plato did not reach the higher conception of the nature and value of the soul, its origin and destiny reaching out beyond all temporal limitation, until the great change which came over his philosophy had been completed. The world of ever-changing Appearance manifesting itself to the senses in perpetual flux and efflux—this in its inessential, unseizable unreality he abandoned to the criticisms of Herakleitos. But above it, in accordance with his own deepest longings and, as it seemed, implied as its real object by the Socratic search itself after 465 conceptual knowledge, stood a world of unchangeable Being without beginning or end, to which all the appearances of this lower world owed such reality as they possessed. “Being” itself, the totality of the Ideas, remained uncontaminated with “Becoming” and passing away; remained the highest goal and supreme aim standing high above all that aspired to it, or felt a longing for its complete and unlimited fullness.9 This everlasting reality holds itself aloof from the stream of appearance and is not to be grasped within that stream; it is not manifested in the deceitful ever-changing perception of the senses, nor yet in the Opinion that is based upon them; it can only be apprehended, without any assistance from the senses, by the pure intuition of the Reason.10 This world of everlasting self-identical Being exists outside the thought and knowledge of man, but it first reveals itself to man in the activity of his own thinking;11 and at the same time there is revealed to him a higher power than the mere capacity to abstract the unsubstantial general conceptions from the multiplicity of experience—a power that is the highest capacity of the soul, enabling it to voyage out beyond all experience and with infallible knowledge12 to soar of its own independent power upwards to a transcendental world of permanent and essential reality. The highest capacity that belongs to man, the soul of his soul, is not enclosed within this world that surrounds his senses in its restless flood. Like the objects that are the last goal of its study the soul itself is raised to where it can for the first time find a form of activity worthy of its natural powers. It achieves a new distinction, a priestlike dignity, as an intermediary between the two worlds to both of which it belongs.

Plato didn’t always agree with the idea of immortality. At least, it seems to have been a background thought for him during the time he viewed the world through a somewhat more developed Socratic lens. Not only does he portray Socrates facing death in the Apology without any belief in the eternal vitality of his soul, but he also leaves out the idea of immortality in the first draft of his Ideal State—created while he was still heavily influenced by the Socratic perspective. It appears that Plato only grasped the higher understanding of the soul's nature and value, and its origin and destiny beyond all temporal limits, after a significant shift in his philosophy had occurred. He abandoned the ever-changing world of appearances that can be perceived through the senses—the unstable and intangible reality—to the criticisms of Herakleitos. Above it, according to his deepest desires and seemingly implied as the real focus of the Socratic pursuit of 465 conceptual knowledge, was a world of unchanging Being without beginning or end, from which all appearances in this lower world derive their reality. “Being” itself, the totality of the Ideas, remains untouched by “Becoming” and decay; it stands as the highest goal and supreme aim, far above anything aspiring to or longing for its complete and limitless fullness. This everlasting reality keeps itself apart from the flow of appearances and cannot be captured within that flow; it is not revealed in the misleading, constantly changing perceptions of the senses, nor in the opinions formed from them; it can only be truly understood, without relying on the senses, through the pure intuition of the Reason. This world of eternal self-identical Being exists outside human thought and knowledge, but it first shows itself to humans through their own thinking; and simultaneously, it reveals to them a higher power than just the ability to abstract general concepts from diverse experiences—a power that represents the soul's highest capability, allowing it to go beyond all experience and, with certain knowledge, to independently ascend to a transcendental realm of permanent and essential reality. The highest ability belonging to humans, the essence of their soul, is not confined within this restless world surrounding their senses. Much like the objects that are the ultimate goal of its study, the soul itself is elevated to a place where it can finally engage in activities worthy of its natural abilities. It attains a new status, a priestly dignity, as a mediator between the two worlds to which it belongs.

The soul is a pure spiritual essence; it contains nothing within it that is material, nothing of the “place” where Becoming is shaped into a distant resemblance to Being.13 It is incorporeal and belongs to the realm of the “invisible”, which in this immaterialist doctrine counts as the most real of all, more real than the most solid matter.14 It is not one of the Ideas; on the contrary it seems to partake in one of the Ideas—that of Life—only as other appearances share in their Ideas.15 But it stands nearer to the whole world of the everlasting Ideas than anything else that is not itself an Idea; of all the things in the world it is “most like” to the Idea.16

The soul is a pure spiritual essence; it has no material content, nothing from the “place” where Becoming turns into a faint likeness of Being.13 It is immaterial and belongs to the realm of the “invisible,” which in this immaterialist view is considered the most real of all, even more real than the heaviest matter.14 It’s not one of the Ideas; rather, it seems to participate in one of the Ideas—that of Life—just as other appearances participate in their Ideas.15 However, it is closer to the entire world of the eternal Ideas than anything else that isn’t itself an Idea; out of all the things in the world, it is “most like” the Idea.16

But it has also a share in Becoming. It cannot simply remain with the Ideas in unaltered other-world transcendence. It has its origin indeed in that other world beyond Appearance. It was from the beginning, uncreated17 like the Ideas and like 466 the Soul of the World to which it is akin.18 It is “older than the body”19 to which it must link itself; it does not come into being at the same time as the body, but is only drawn down from its spiritual state of being into the realm of matter and becoming. In the Phaedrus this “fall into birth” appears as the necessary result of an intellectual “fall” which takes place within the soul itself.20 In the Timaeus, however, with its study of the general life of the whole world-organism, the animation of the living creature has now to be explained as arising out of the plan—not from a failure of the plan—of the Creator.21 The soul thus seems to be destined from the beginning to give life to a body. It is not only the knowing and thinking element in a world of inanimate things, it is also the source of all movement. Itself in motion from the beginning it bestows the power of movement upon the body with which it is associated; without it, there would be no movement in the world, and no life either.22

But it also has a role in Becoming. It can't just stay with the Ideas in unchanged other-worldly transcendence. It does indeed originate from that other world beyond Appearance. It has always existed, uncreated like the Ideas and like 466 the Soul of the World to which it is connected. It is “older than the body” to which it must attach itself; it doesn't come into being at the same time as the body but is instead drawn down from its spiritual state of being into the realm of matter and Becoming. In the Phaedrus, this “fall into birth” appears as the necessary result of an intellectual “fall” that occurs within the soul itself. In the Timaeus, however, with its examination of the overall life of the whole world-organism, the animation of the living creature needs to be explained as stemming from the plan—not from a failure of the plan—of the Creator. Thus, the soul seems destined from the beginning to give life to a body. It is not just the knowing and thinking element in a world of inanimate things; it is also the source of all movement. Being in motion from the beginning, it imparts the power of movement to the body it is linked with; without it, there would be no movement in the world, nor any life.

But though enclosed within the body it remains a stranger to the body. On its side it has no need of the body and is not conditioned by it. It remains independently associated with it as its mistress and leader.23 Even in their united existence there is a great gulf fixed between the soul and all that is not soul;24 body and soul never fuse into one, however closely they may be bound up with each other. And yet the body and its impulses have the power to influence profoundly the immortal being that dwells within it. By its union with the body the soul can be made unclean; “diseases” such as folly and unrestrained passion come to it from the body.25 It is not beyond the reach of change like the Ideas, to which it is akin without being of their nature; on the contrary, it can degenerate entirely. The evil influences of the body penetrate to its inmost being; even in its everlasting, immaterial, spiritual nature it can derive something “corporeal”26 from such a sinister partnership.

But even though it’s contained within the body, it feels like an outsider. On its own, it doesn't rely on the body and is unaffected by it. It remains connected to the body as its master and guide. Even when they exist together, there’s still a huge divide between the soul and everything that isn’t soul; the body and soul never truly merge, no matter how closely they’re tied. Still, the body and its desires can deeply affect the immortal essence that resides within. Through its connection with the body, the soul can become tainted; issues like madness and uncontrolled desire come to it through the body. It’s not unchangeable like the Ideas, which it resembles without being the same; instead, it can completely deteriorate. The body’s negative influences can seep into its deepest core; even in its eternal, immaterial, spiritual form, it can absorb something “physical” from such a harmful relationship.

It is bound to the body by influences of a lower kind which attach themselves to the pure power of knowledge that alone is proper to it. At the outset of his speculations Plato, like other thinkers before him,27 had thought of the different capacities of the soul, alternately in conflict or alliance with each other, as “parts” of unequal rank and value, bound up together within the soul of man.28 Even in the previous life of the soul, in the other world, the reasoning power of the soul is, according to the Phaedrus, already coupled with “Temper” and “Desire”; it is these in fact which drag down the soul into the realm of the material; and the three parts still 467 remain indissolubly united in the everlasting life which awaits the soul after its release from the body.

It is connected to the body by lower influences that cling to the pure power of knowledge that belongs only to it. At the beginning of his theories, Plato, like other thinkers before him, had considered the different capacities of the soul, which can be in conflict or harmony with each other, as "parts" of varying importance and value, intertwined within the soul of a person. Even in the soul's previous existence, in another world, the reasoning ability of the soul is, according to the Phaedrus, already linked with "Temper" and "Desire"; it's these that actually pull the soul down into the material realm. The three parts still remain inseparably united in the eternal life that awaits the soul after it is freed from the body.

But in proportion as the philosopher extends and elevates his conception of the soul, and as he becomes more convinced of its eternal destiny and vocation to a life of unending blessedness in a realm of unchangeable being, the more impossible does it seem to him that this candidate for immortality in the realm of the everlasting Forms can be a composite amalgam of elements capable of being resolved again by division and analysis29—that the reasoning faculty can be for ever united with Effort and Desire, which perpetually threaten to drag it downwards into materiality. The soul in its true and original nature is now for him simple and indivisible.30 Only with its enclosure in the body does the everlasting, thinking soul, whose tendency is towards the eternal, acquire impulses and desires31 that have their origin in the body and belong to the body,32 that only adhere to the soul during the period of its earthly life, that with their separation from their immortal associate will pass away, since they are themselves mortal and such as perish with the body.

But as the philosopher expands and elevates his understanding of the soul, and as he becomes more convinced of its eternal purpose and calling to a life of continuous happiness in a realm of unchangeable existence, it seems increasingly unlikely to him that this candidate for immortality in the realm of the everlasting Forms can be a mixed combination of elements that can be broken down again through division and analysis29—that the reasoning mind can forever be linked with Effort and Desire, which constantly threaten to pull it down into materiality. The soul, in its true and original nature, is now seen as simple and indivisible.30 Only when it is contained within the body does the eternal, thinking soul, whose inclination is towards the eternal, take on impulses and desires31 that originate from the body and belong to the body,32 which only attach to the soul during its earthly existence, and that will fade away with the separation from their immortal counterpart, as they are itself mortal and perish with the body.

The soul, to which sense-perception,33 feeling, emotion, and desire are only added from outside, is in its own imperishable nature nothing but pure capacity of thought and knowledge—with which indeed the power to will that which is conceived in thought, seems to be directly associated. It is destined for the “other” world, for the intuition and undistorted reflection in its consciousness of the immaterial essences. Banished to this earth amid the restless change and alteration of all being, and not uninfluenced by the forces of bodily life, it must endure a brief exile here.34 Not unscathed does it leave behind it, in death, its ill-assorted companion, the body.35 Then it goes into an intermediate region of bodiless existence in which it must do penance for the misdeeds of its life on earth, and free itself from their effects.36 After that it is driven away once more into a body and transported to a fresh life upon earth, the character of which it chooses for itself in accordance with the special nature that it had evolved in its earlier incarnation upon earth.37 Though no organic connexion exists between them, yet there is a certain “symmetry”38 between the individual soul and the body that is lent to it.

The soul, to which sense perception, feeling, emotion, and desire are only added from outside, is in its own unchanging nature nothing but pure capacity for thought and knowledge—along with the power to will things that are conceived in thought, which seems to be directly associated. It is meant for the “other” world, for the intuition and clear reflection of immaterial essences in its consciousness. Exiled to this earth amid the constant change and alteration of all being, and not untouched by the forces of physical life, it must endure a brief stay here. Not without scars does it leave behind, in death, its mismatched companion, the body. Then it enters a phase of bodiless existence where it must atone for its actions during its life on earth and free itself from their consequences. After that, it is once again sent into a body and brought back to a new life on earth, the nature of which it chooses for itself based on the unique character it developed in its previous incarnation on earth. Though no organic connection exists between them, there is a certain “symmetry” between the individual soul and the body that is given to it.

Thus, the soul lives through a series of earthly lives39 of the most varied character; it may even sink so low as the animals in the course of its incarnations.40 Its own merits, the success or failure of its conflict with the passions and desires of the 468 body, decide whether or not its lives shall lead it upwards to a nobler type of existence. Its task is plain: it must free itself from its impure companions, sensual Lust and the darkening of the powers of Reason. If it can succeed in this it will find once more the “way upwards”41 which at last leads it into complete immunity from renewed incarnation and brings it home again into the kingdom of everlasting untroubled Being.

Thus, the soul goes through a series of earthly lives39 that are incredibly diverse; it might even sink as low as animals during its incarnations.40 Its own merits, along with the success or failure of its struggle against the passions and desires of the 468 body, determine whether its lives will elevate it to a higher type of existence. Its task is clear: it must free itself from its impure companions, sensual Lust, and the dimming of Reason. If it can achieve this, it will rediscover the “way upwards”41 that ultimately leads to complete freedom from reincarnation and brings it back to the realm of everlasting peace.

§ 3

It is evident that in what he thus, clothing philosophy in the language of poetry, says of the origin, destiny, and character of the soul, which though beyond time is yet placed within time, and though beyond space is yet the cause of all movement within space—that in all this Plato is following in the track of the theologians of earlier times. Only in the poetry and speculative thought of theologi, not in any physiologists’ doctrine, did he find the conception, imaginatively expressed and pointing in the direction which he also followed, of a multiplicity of independent souls whose existence had been from all time and was not first begun in the material world with the creation of a living organism; of souls enclosed in the corporeal as though in a foreign, hostile element, which survive their association with the body, passing through many such bodies and yet preserving themselves intact after the destruction of each of those bodies, immortal, endless (for they are without beginning),42 and alive from the very beginning of Time. The souls, moreover, have life as distinct, complete, and indivisible personalities, not as mere dependent emanations of a simple common Source of all life.

It’s clear that when he expresses the philosophy of the soul using poetic language, he talks about its origin, destiny, and nature. Even though the soul exists beyond time, it is still situated within time, and though it is beyond space, it causes all movement within it. In all this, Plato is following the lead of earlier theologians. He found the concept — imaginatively expressed in poetry and speculative thought of the theologians, not in any physiologists' theories — of many independent souls that have always existed, not just starting in the material world with the creation of a living being. These souls are trapped in the physical realm as if in a foreign and hostile environment, surviving their connection to the body, moving through many bodies, and yet remaining intact after each one is destroyed, immortal and eternal (since they have no beginning), and alive from the very start of Time. Furthermore, the souls have lives as distinct, whole, and indivisible personalities, not just as mere offshoots of a single common Source of all life.

The theory of the eternity and indestructibility of the individual souls, of the personal immortality of the souls, is difficult to reconcile with more specifically Platonic doctrine—with the doctrine of the Ideas.43 And yet it is undeniable that from the moment that he first adopted this theory—and adopted it, too, precisely in connexion with the philosophy of the Ideas—he adhered to it steadfastly and without deviating from its essential meaning. The process by which he arrived at it is not to be found in the “proofs” by which he attempts in the Phaedo to establish the truth of the soul’s immortality in which he himself already believed. Those proofs in reality do not prove what they are intended to prove (and what considered as a fact of experience is unproved and as an axiom necessary to thought is beyond proof); they cannot therefore be the reasons that led the philosopher to 469 hold his conviction. He has in fact borrowed this article of his faith from the creeds which already contained it. He himself scarcely conceals the fact. As authority for the main outlines of the soul’s history as given by himself he refers us almost apologetically, and as though excusing himself for not providing a philosophical proof, to the theologi and priests of the mysteries.44 And he himself becomes the philosophical poet, completely and without concealment, when in imitation of the poetry of edification he, too, gives a picture of the soul’s sojourn in an intermediate station of its pilgrimage or describes the stages of its earthly existence45 that lead the soul down even to the animal.

The idea that individual souls are eternal and indestructible, and that they have personal immortality, is hard to align with more specific Platonic teachings—particularly the doctrine of Ideas. And yet, it’s clear that from the moment he accepted this theory—and he adopted it specifically in connection with the philosophy of Ideas—he stuck to it firmly and consistently without straying from its core meaning. The way he came to this belief isn’t found in the "proofs" he uses in the Phaedo to demonstrate the truth of the soul’s immortality, which he already believed. Those proofs don’t actually prove what they’re supposed to (and what is accepted as an experiential fact remains unproven, while as a necessary axiom of thought, it’s impossible to prove); therefore, they can't be the reasons that led the philosopher to hold his belief. He actually borrowed this aspect of his faith from existing creeds that already included it. He barely hides this fact. As a basis for the main outlines of the soul's journey that he presents, he almost apologetically refers us to the theologi and priests of the mysteries, as if excusing himself for not offering a philosophical proof. And he himself becomes the philosophical poet completely and openly when he follows the tradition of edifying poetry to illustrate the soul's stay in an intermediate stage of its journey or describes the phases of its earthly existence that take the soul down even to the animal.

For such mythological expressions of the inexpressible the philosopher himself claims no more than symbolical truth.46 He is fully in earnest, however, with the fundamental conception of the soul as an independent substance that enters from beyond space and time into the material and perceptible world, and into external conjunction with the body, not into organic union with it; that maintains itself as a being of spiritual essence in the midst of the flux and decay of the material world, though at the same time its pure brightness is overshadowed through this conjunction and must purify itself from the effects; that can disentangle itself,47 even to the extent of complete severance from the embrace of the material and the perceptible. All that is essential in this conception he derives from the theologians, but he brings it into close relationship with his own philosophy which depends upon a conviction of the absolute opposition between Being and Becoming, and upon the dualistic division of the world into matter and mind—a dualism that applies also to the relations of soul and body and throughout the whole realm of Appearance. The soul which stands half-way between the unity and unchangeability of Being and the ever-varying multiplicity of matter has in this realm of fragmentary and subordinate validity, into which it is temporarily exiled, the power to reflect the Ideas and represent them in its own consciousness clear and unfalsified. The soul in its complete independence of sense-perception and of concepts derived from the senses is alone able to pursue the “Quest of Reality”.48 In this pursuit the body with which it is associated is nothing but a hindrance and a serious one. The soul has a hard struggle against the tendencies of the body in spite of its independence and aloofness. Just as, in the creation of the universe, matter, though not a cause is at least a subordinate cause which by its influence and exigencies gives 470 various hindrances49 to the “Mind” that shapes and orders the world, so, too, the soul finds in this ephemeral and inconstant Matter, with its stirring and tumultuous unrest, a serious obstacle to its own proper activity. This is the evil, or the cause of evil,50 which must be overthrown in order that the mind may win its way to freedom and final rest and security in the realm of pure Being. Plato often speaks of the katharsis, the purification, after which man must strive.51 He takes both the word and the idea from the theologians, but he gives it a higher meaning while yet preserving unmistakably the analogy with the katharsis of the theologi and mystery-priests. It is not the pollution which comes from contact with sinister daimones and from all that belongs to them, that is to be avoided, but rather the dulling of the power of knowledge and of willing what is known (regarded as a simultaneously created power) due to the world of the senses and its fierce impulses.52 Man’s effort must be directed not so much to ritual purity, as to the preservation of his knowledge of the eternal from eclipse through the deceptive illusions of the senses; towards the concentration and gathering together of the soul within itself;53 its withdrawal from contact with the ephemeral as the source of pollution and debasement.

For such mythological expressions of the inexpressible, the philosopher himself claims no more than symbolic truth.46 However, he is completely serious about the fundamental idea of the soul as an independent substance that comes from beyond space and time into the material and observable world, connecting externally with the body, rather than becoming organically united with it. The soul maintains its existence as a spiritual being amidst the constant change and decay of the material world, although its pure brightness gets overshadowed by this connection and needs to cleanse itself from the effects. It can disentangle itself,47 even to the point of complete separation from the grasp of the material and the observable. All the essential aspects of this concept come from theologians, but he ties it closely to his own philosophy, which is based on the belief in the absolute opposition between Being and Becoming, and on the dualistic division of the world into matter and mind—a dualism that also applies to the relationship between soul and body throughout the entire world of Appearance. The soul, which exists halfway between the unity and unchangeability of Being and the ever-changing multiplicity of matter, has in this realm of fragmented and subordinate validity, where it is temporarily exiled, the ability to reflect the Ideas and present them in its own consciousness clearly and accurately. The soul, completely independent of sensory perception and concepts derived from the senses, is the only one capable of pursuing the “Quest of Reality.”48 In this pursuit, the body it is associated with is nothing but a significant hindrance. The soul faces a tough struggle against the inclinations of the body despite its independence and detachment. Just like in the creation of the universe, where matter, although not a cause, serves as a subordinate cause that creates various obstacles49 for the “Mind” that shapes and organizes the world, so too does the soul encounter serious obstacles in this transient and unstable Matter, with its constant unrest. This is the evil, or the cause of evil,50 that needs to be overcome for the mind to achieve freedom and find lasting peace and security in the realm of pure Being. Plato frequently mentions the katharsis, the purification, that man must pursue.51 He borrows both the term and the idea from theologians but assigns it a deeper meaning while still clearly maintaining an analogy with the katharsis of the theologi and mystery-priests. It is not the contamination that arises from contact with malevolent daimones and everything associated with them that should be avoided, but rather the dulling of the power of knowledge and the will to act on that knowledge (seen as a power created simultaneously) due to the sensory world and its intense impulses.52 Humankind's efforts must focus not so much on ritual purity but on preserving their understanding of the eternal from being obscured by the deceptive illusions of the senses; on concentrating and gathering the soul within itself;53 and on withdrawing from contact with the fleeting, which is the source of pollution and degradation.

Thus, even in this philosophic reinterpretation of ritual abstinence in terms of a spiritual release and emancipation, the effort after “purity” retains its religious sense. The world of the Ideas, the world of pure Being, to which only the pure soul can attain,54 is a world of divinity. The “Good” as the highest of the Ideas, the loftiest pattern, the supreme aim to which all Being and Becoming tend, which is at the same time more than all the Ideas—the first cause of all Being and all knowledge—is also God.55 The soul for which, in its desire and longing for the full being of the Idea, the knowledge of the “Good” is the “supreme science”,56 enters hereby into the closest communion with God. The “turning away” of the soul from the many-coloured image to the sun of the highest Idea, is itself57 a turning towards the divine, towards the luminous source of all Being and Knowing.

So, even in this philosophical rethinking of ritual abstinence as a form of spiritual release and freedom, the pursuit of "purity" still holds its religious meaning. The world of Ideas, the realm of pure Being, is only accessible to the pure soul,54 and it is a divine realm. The "Good," being the highest of Ideas, the ultimate pattern, the supreme goal that all Being and Becoming strive for, which surpasses all Ideas—the first cause of all Being and all knowledge—is also God.55 The soul that desires and longs for the full realization of the Idea sees the knowledge of the "Good" as the "supreme science,"56 thereby entering into the closest connection with God. The soul's "turning away" from the colorful forms to the brightness of the highest Idea is, in itself57 a movement towards the divine, towards the radiant source of all Being and Knowing.

Thus exalted, philosophic inquiry turns to enthousiasmos.58 The way which leads upwards from the lower levels of Becoming to Being, is discovered by means of dialectic, which in its “comprehensive view”59 is able to unite the distracted ever-moving flood of multifarious Appearance into the ever-enduring unity of the Idea which is reflected in Appearance. Dialectic travels through the whole range of the Ideas, graduated one above the other, till it reaches the last and 471 most universal of the Ideas. In its upward course it passes by an effort of sheer logic through the whole edifice of the highest concepts.60 Plato is the most subtle of dialecticians; he almost carries subtlety to excess in his eager pursuit of every intricacy of logic—and of paralogism. But he combined to a remarkable degree the cold exactitude of the logician with the enthusiastic intensity of the seer; and his dialectic, after its patient upward march step by step from concept to concept, at last soars to its final goal in a single tremendous flight, in which the longed-for realm of the Ideas reveals itself in a moment of immediate vision. So the Bacchant in his ecstasy saw divinity suddenly plain, and so too in the nights consecrated by the mysteries the epoptês beheld the vision of the Goddesses in the torch-lit glare of Eleusis.61

Thus elevated, philosophical inquiry turns to enthousiasmos.58 The path that leads upward from the lower levels of Becoming to Being is discovered through dialectic, which in its “comprehensive view”59 can unite the chaotic, ever-flowing stream of diverse Appearances into the lasting unity of the Idea reflected in Appearance. Dialectic navigates through the entire range of Ideas, tiered one above the other, until it reaches the last and 471 most universal Idea. In its upward journey, it traverses the entire structure of the highest concepts through sheer logical effort.60 Plato is the most skilled of dialecticians; he almost takes subtlety to an extreme in his enthusiastic pursuit of every nuance of logic—and of fallacies. However, he remarkably combined the cold precision of a logician with the passionate intensity of a visionary; and his dialectic, after its careful upward progress step by step from concept to concept, ultimately ascends to its final goal in a single, powerful leap, in which the long-desired realm of Ideas is revealed in a moment of direct vision. Just as the Bacchant in his ecstasy saw divinity clearly, so too did the epoptês witness the vision of the Goddesses in the torchlit glare of Eleusis during the nights dedicated to the mysteries.61

To this loftiest height whence a view is obtained of “colourless, formless Being, beyond the reach of every contact”, inaccessible to sense-perception, it is dialectic that shows the way; and dialectic now becomes a way of salvation in which the soul finds once more its own divine nature and its divine home. The soul is closely akin to godhead and like it62—it is itself something divine. The reason in the soul is divine,63 and comprehends everlasting Being immediately by its power of thought. “If the eye were not sunlike, it could never see the sun”;64 if the mind were not akin by nature to the good,65 the highest of the Ideas, it could never comprehend the Good, the Beautiful, and all that is perfect and eternal. In its power of recognizing the eternal the soul bears within itself the surest proof that it is itself eternal.66

To reach this highest point where one can see “colorless, formless Being, beyond the grasp of any interaction,” and inaccessible to sensory perception, it's dialectic that paves the way; and dialectic now becomes a path to salvation, allowing the soul to rediscover its own divine essence and its divine home. The soul is closely related to divinity and, like it, is itself something divine. The reason within the soul is divine, and it understands eternal Being directly through its capacity for thought. “If the eye weren't like the sun, it could never see the sun”; if the mind weren't naturally connected to the good, the highest of Ideas, it could never grasp the Good, the Beautiful, and everything that is perfect and eternal. Through its ability to recognize the eternal, the soul carries within it the strongest evidence that it is, in fact, eternal.

The “purification” by means of which the soul gets rid of67 the defacement that has overtaken it during its earthly life reveals again the divine in man. Even on earth the philosopher is thus rendered immortal and godlike.68 As long as he can continue in a state of pure intellectual knowledge and comprehension of the everlasting, for so long is he living, already in this life, “in the Islands of the Blest.”69 By expelling all traces of the corruptible and the mortal in and about himself, he is more and more to “become like God”;70 so that when it is at last set free from this earthly existence, his soul may enter into the divine, the invisible, the pure, the eternally self-identical, and as a disembodied mind remain for ever with that which is its kin.70a At this point, language that can only make use of physical imagery becomes totally inadequate.71 A goal is set before the soul that lies outside all physical nature, beyond time and space, without past or future, an ever-present now.72 472

The “purification” through which the soul sheds the defacement it has endured during its earthly life again reveals the divine in humanity. Even on earth, the philosopher is made immortal and godlike. As long as he can maintain a state of pure intellectual knowledge and understanding of the eternal, he is alive, even in this life, “in the Islands of the Blest.” By removing all traces of the corruptible and mortal within and around him, he increasingly “becomes like God”; so that when he is finally freed from this earthly existence, his soul can enter the divine, the invisible, the pure, the eternally self-identical, and as a disembodied mind remain forever with what is akin to it. At this point, language that relies solely on physical imagery becomes completely inadequate. A goal is set before the soul that lies outside all physical nature, beyond time and space, without past or future, an ever-present now. 472

The soul can escape out of time and space and find its home in eternity, without at the same time losing its own self in the General and Universal that stands above time and space. We must not inquire what sort of personality and individual distinctness can yet remain with the soul when it has cast off all effort, desire, sense-perception, and everything related to the world of change and multiplicity, to become once more a pure mirror of the eternal. Nor must we ask how it is possible to think of a spirit removed above space and time and all the multiplicity of matter and yet personal and separate in its personality.73 For Plato the Souls live on as they had been in the beginning—individual beings conscious of themselves in a time that has no end and is beyond all time. He teaches a personal immortality.

The soul can break free from time and space and find its connection to eternity, all while retaining its individual self in the Collective and Universal that exists beyond time and space. We shouldn't question what kind of personality and unique identity can still exist within the soul once it has shed all effort, desire, sense perception, and everything tied to the ever-changing world, to become once again a pure reflection of the eternal. Nor should we wonder how we can conceive of a spirit elevated beyond space and time and the diversity of matter, yet still personal and distinct in its individuality.73 For Plato, the Souls continue to exist as they were in the beginning—individual entities aware of themselves in a time that never ends and transcends all time. He teaches a personal immortality.

§ 4

There is an “other-worldly” tone in this philosophy, and its doctrine of the soul. Far beyond the world in which life has placed man lies the realm of pure Being, the good, the perfect, and the unspoilt. To reach that realm at last, to free the mind from the unrest and illusion of the senses, to be rid of the desires and emotions that would “nail”74 it down here below, to sever its connexion75 with the body and bodily things—that is the soul’s highest duty. The only reason why it is banished into this world is that it may all the more completely separate itself from the world. To die—to be dead inwardly to all that is visible, material, physical—that is the goal and the fruit of philosophy.76 “To be ready and fit to die” is the hall-mark of the complete philosopher. For such, philosophy is the deliverer that frees him for all time from the body77—from its desires, its restlessness, its wild passions78—and gives him back again to the eternal and its silence.

There is a “otherworldly” vibe in this philosophy and its views on the soul. Beyond the life that we experience lies a realm of pure existence, the good, the perfect, and the untouched. To finally reach that realm, to free the mind from the chaos and illusions of the senses, to let go of the desires and emotions that hold it down here, to cut its connection with the body and physical things—that is the soul’s greatest duty. The only reason it’s sent to this world is so it can completely detach from it. To die—to be inwardly dead to everything that is visible, material, and physical—that is the goal and outcome of philosophy. “To be ready and prepared to die” is the mark of a true philosopher. For them, philosophy is the liberator that frees them forever from the body—from its desires, its restlessness, and its wild passions—and returns them to the eternal and its silence.

To be pure, to be free from evil, to die already in this temporal world—these are the oft-repeated exhortations which the philosopher addresses to the immortal soul. Ascetic morality here again demands from man what is essentially a quite negative proceeding. But this denial of the world is only a step leading on to the most supremely positive behaviour. Katharsis is only the gateway to philosophy; and it is philosophy which teaches man how to reach what alone is positive, the only true and unconditional Being; instructs him how to reach the clear and perfect understanding of the only permanent good and how to merge himself utterly in that good.79 The soul of the thinker yearns after Reality;80 473 death is for it not merely the annihilation of the chains of the body that impede it, but a very positive “acquisition of intellectual knowledge”81 to which it is urged on by its proper nature—which is therefore also a fulfilment of its proper task. So the turning aside from the physical and the ephemeral is at the same time and without transition a turning towards the eternal and the divine. The flight from the things of this world is in itself an entry into that other world, and a becoming like to the divine.82

To be pure, to be free from evil, to die already in this temporary world—these are the frequently repeated messages that the philosopher shares with the immortal soul. Ascetic morality again demands from humans what is essentially a rather negative approach. However, this rejection of the world is just a step toward the most profoundly positive behavior. Katharsis is just the gateway to philosophy; and it is philosophy that teaches us how to attain what is truly positive, the only true and unconditional Being; it instructs us on how to achieve a clear and perfect understanding of the only lasting good and how to completely immerse ourselves in that good.79 The soul of the thinker longs for Reality;80 473 for it, death is not merely the end of the body's chains that hold it back, but a very positive “acquisition of intellectual knowledge”81 to which it is driven by its own nature—which is also a fulfillment of its true purpose. Thus, turning away from the physical and the temporary is simultaneously and effortlessly a turning toward the eternal and the divine. The escape from the things of this world is, in itself, an entrance into that other world, and a becoming like the divine.82

But the true realities are not to be found in this world. To grasp them plainly in its thought—to recover the untroubled vision of its spiritual eye—the soul must divest itself entirely of all the stress and distraction of the earthly. For this mundane world, the mirage that encompasses the senses, the philosopher has nothing but denial. Because it gives no foothold for true knowledge the whole world of Becoming has no independent value for his science. The apprehension of that which is never more than relative, which simultaneously manifests contrary qualities in itself, can only serve as stimulus and invitation to the search for what is absolute.83 In this realm of doubtful shadows the soul finds nothing but obscure reminders of that which it had once beheld plainly. The beauty of the physical world which is apprehended by the noblest of the senses, the eye, serves indeed to recall to the soul’s memory the Beautiful-in-itself, of which that other is but a pale copy, and to disclose to the soul what is really its own property, what it had brought with it ready made from an earlier existence beyond the bounds of all matter.84 But the observation of beauty here below must lead beyond itself at once and conduct the mind out of the world of mere appearance to the pure forms of the Ideal world. The process of Becoming tells us nothing about the nature of Being; the thinker learns nothing from this source—in fact he learns no new knowledge or wisdom of any kind in this world; he only recovers what he had before and always possessed in latent form.85 The treasure, however, lies beyond the limits of this world. He must turn away his gaze from the shadow-figures upon the wall of the cave of this world, and direct it towards the sun of eternity.86 He is placed in this world of perpetual change; to it his senses and his understanding are directly referred; and yet he must disdain and rise superior to, and flee from, all that this world offers, giving himself up immediately and entirely to the unseen, and taking flight from this world to that where he will become like God, and be purified and justified by the power and might of his knowledge.87 474

But the real truths aren't found in this world. To understand them clearly in thought—to regain the clear vision of the spiritual eye—the soul must completely shed all the stress and distractions of the earthly. For this mundane world, the illusion that surrounds the senses, the philosopher can only reject. Since it offers no solid ground for true knowledge, the entire world of Becoming has no true value for his study. Perceiving what is only relative, which shows conflicting qualities within itself, can only prompt and encourage the quest for what is absolute.83 In this realm of uncertain shadows, the soul finds only vague reminders of what it once saw clearly. The beauty of the physical world, which the most noble of senses, the eye, perceives, indeed serves to bring back to the soul's memory the Beauty-in-itself, of which the physical world is merely a faint imitation, and reveals to the soul what is truly its own, something it had already carried with it from a previous existence beyond all matter.84 However, observing beauty here must immediately transcend itself and guide the mind away from mere appearances to the pure forms of the Ideal world. The process of Becoming tells us nothing about the nature of Being; the thinker doesn't learn anything from this source—in fact, he doesn't gain any new knowledge or wisdom in this world; he only retrieves what he had before and has always held in potential.85 The treasure, however, lies beyond the limits of this world. He must turn his gaze away from the shadowy figures on the wall of this cave and direct it toward the sun of eternity.86 He exists in this world of constant change; his senses and understanding are linked directly to it; yet he must disregard and rise above, and escape from, all that this world offers, entirely committing himself to the unseen, and taking flight from this world to that where he will become like God, and be purified and justified by the power and strength of his knowledge.87 474

Earthly life as it actually is will remain strange to him, and he a stranger in earthly life,88 despised as a fool for his inaptitude in earthly affairs by the great majority of those who are so versed in such things.89 He has something higher to think about—the salvation of his own soul. He will not live for the community, but for himself, and his real task.90 Human interests seem to him hardly worth troubling about,91 the state itself hopelessly corrupt, founded as it is upon deception and passion and injustice. At the same time, he himself of course would be the real statesman,92 the leader who could guide his fellow citizens to their true salvation—acting not as the servant of their lusts, but as a doctor who gives help to the sick.93 It is “not ships and harbours and walls and taxes and such trivialities”94 that he would give the city, but justice and health and everything else which after this life can stand before the stern judgment of the other world.95 This would be the best mode of life,96 and he could show them the way to it; no worldly power or greatness can do as much—none of the great statesmen of the past, Themistokles, Kimon, and Perikles, understood anything of all this; all their efforts were nothing but blind error and wandering.97

Earthly life as it is will always seem strange to him, and he will feel like an outsider in this life, 88 looked down upon as a fool for his lack of skill in worldly matters by the vast majority of those who are experts in such things.89 He has greater things to consider—the salvation of his own soul. He won't live for the community, but for himself and his true purpose.90 Human concerns seem hardly worth his time,91 viewing the state as hopelessly corrupt, built on deception, passion, and injustice. At the same time, he envisions himself as the true statesman,92 the leader who could guide his fellow citizens toward their genuine salvation—acting not as a servant to their desires, but as a doctor who helps the sick.93 It’s “not ships and harbors and walls and taxes and such trivialities”94 that he would offer the city, but justice, health, and everything else that can withstand the harsh judgment of the afterlife.95 This would be the best way to live,96 and he could show them how; no worldly power or greatness can achieve as much—none of the great statesmen of the past, like Themistocles, Kimon, and Perikles, understood any of this; all their efforts were simply misguided and aimless.97

At the climax of his life and of his philosophical development Plato completed an ideal picture of the State, drawn in accordance with the principles and the requirements of his own philosophy. It rests upon a broad foundation—the multitude of its inhabitants divided strictly into classes that in themselves and their manner of life are to display, like a beacon that can be seen afar, the virtue of Justice. At one period this had seemed to include all that was necessary for the completion of the ideal State; but now, far above that level, pointing upwards into the lofty aether above the earth, a final consummation reveals itself to him, to which all mere mundane things serve but as support and furtherance. A small minority of the citizens, the philosophers, form this last pinnacle of the building. Here on earth and in this state that is organized in conformity with justice, they will serve the state, as in duty bound and not for their own satisfaction, and take part in government.98 As soon as duty is fulfilled they will return to the supramundane contemplation which is the aim and content of their whole life’s activity. To provide a place where these contemplatives may live, where they may be educated for their vocation, the highest there is; to allow dialectic as a form of living to take its place in the activity of worldly civilization as an object of men’s effort99—to bring about all this the Ideal State is built up step by step. The 475 bourgeois social virtues and their firm establishment and interconnexion, which had once seemed the real and sufficient reason for the erection of the whole edifice of the state—seen from this elevation, these no longer retain their independent importance. “The so-called virtues” all pale before the highest capacity of the soul, which is the mystic beholding of the eternal.100 The chief mission of the perfect wise man is no longer to fulfil his obligations to the others that stand without. To make his own inner life fit and ready for self-emancipation is now his real and immediate task. Mysticism aims at a personal salvation such as the individual can only obtain for himself. Good works are no longer necessary when the mind has no further connexion with earthly life and conduct. When it comes to dealing with practical earthly affairs he who possesses the highest virtue will have all these others added unto him.101 Virtue belongs to him; it is his real condition of being; but the particular virtues he will rarely need to use.

At the peak of his life and philosophical growth, Plato created an ideal vision of the State based on his own philosophical principles. It stands on a solid foundation—the diverse population split into strict classes that reflect, like a distant beacon, the essence of Justice. At one point, this seemed to encompass everything necessary for the ideal State; however, now, even higher than that, a final culmination presents itself, showing that all worldly matters serve merely as support and enhancement. A small group of citizens, the philosophers, forms the top of this structure. In this earthbound, justice-based society, they will serve the state out of duty, not self-interest, and participate in governance. As soon as they have fulfilled their duties, they will return to the higher contemplation that defines their entire life's purpose. To create a space for these thinkers to live and be trained for their highest calling; to allow dialectic as a form of life to become an integral part of human civilization as a shared endeavor—this is what the Ideal State is gradually establishing. The middle-class social virtues and their solid establishment, which once seemed to justify the entire structure of the state—viewed from this higher perspective, they lose their independent significance. “The so-called virtues” fade in comparison to the soul's highest capacity, which is the mystical vision of the eternal. The main objective of the perfect wise person is no longer to meet obligations to others. Instead, their immediate task is to prepare their inner life for self-liberation. Mysticism seeks a personal salvation that only the individual can achieve. Good deeds become unnecessary when the mind has detached from earthly life and conduct. In addressing practical worldly matters, the one who possesses the highest virtue will naturally receive all the others as well. Virtue is inherently theirs; it is their true state of being; yet they will rarely need to employ the individual virtues.

This lofty pinnacle is accessible to but a few. God alone and a small102 company of mortals are able to approach in pure thought to the everlasting Reality, the sole object of certain, plain and unchanging Knowledge. The majority of men can never become philosophers.103 And yet, according to this philosophy, the crown of all life belongs to the philosopher. This is no religion for the poor in spirit. Science—the supreme knowledge of the highest Being—is a pre-condition of salvation. To know God is to become like God.104 It is easy to see why such a message of salvation could not attract a wider community of believers. It could not have done so without being false to its own nature. To a few lofty spirits among mankind, it offers a reward that beckons from eternity. Freedom from life in the corruptible body is the prize it offers; that and a never-ending union with true Reality—a return to what is everlasting and divine. A symbol of what the philosopher has achieved after his death will be provided by the community by whom the departed will be honoured as a Daimon.105

This high peak is only reachable by a select few. Only God and a small group of people can approach the everlasting Reality in pure thought, which is the only source of certain, clear, and unchanging Knowledge. Most people will never become philosophers. And yet, following this philosophy, the highest honor in life belongs to the philosopher. This isn’t a belief system for those who lack spirit. Science—the ultimate knowledge of the highest Being—is a prerequisite for salvation. To know God is to become like God. It’s easy to see why this message of salvation wouldn’t resonate with a broader audience. It couldn’t do so without betraying its own essence. For a few elevated souls among humanity, it offers a reward that calls from eternity. The prize it offers is freedom from life in a corruptible body and a never-ending connection with true Reality—a return to what is everlasting and divine. The community will provide a symbol of what the philosopher has achieved after death, honoring the departed as a Daimon.

Such then is the ideal vision of a civilization in which the belief in the soul’s immortality and its vocation to an everlasting life in the kingdom of the gods was held with profound and serious conviction. The belief in immortality here becomes the corner-stone of a building, the architect of which regards all earthly things as only valid for the moment, and therefore of profound unimportance. For him only the Heaven of the spiritual world with its everlasting laws and 476 patterns seriously matters. He discards without a regret the whole of Greek culture as it had expressed itself in state and society, custom and art—an art that will last as long as humanity itself. He demands an aristocracy, and an aristocracy measured by a standard of what is the “best” that was quite beyond the reach of any possible human society even though it were as deeply impregnated with aristocratic ideas as Greek society always was. And the final aim and ideal sought by this organization of life on earth was to be the superseding of all earthly life . . .

This is the ideal vision of a civilization where the belief in the soul's immortality and its purpose for an eternal life in the realm of the gods is held with deep and serious conviction. Here, the belief in immortality becomes the foundation of a structure, where the architect views all earthly matters as only relevant for the moment, and therefore of little significance. For him, only the Heaven of the spiritual world with its eternal laws and 476 patterns truly matters. He dismisses all aspects of Greek culture as it was expressed in government, society, customs, and art—an art that will endure as long as humanity itself. He calls for an aristocracy, one measured by a standard of what is considered the "best," which is far beyond the capabilities of any existing human society, even one deeply influenced by aristocratic ideals like Greek society always was. The ultimate goal and ideal pursued by this organization of life on earth was to transcend all earthly existence . . .

The mind of Plato, equally ready to receive as to give, was not likely to become immobilized for ever in a mystic rapture of vision. Even when he had finished the Republic he did not cease to reshape his system at many points and in many directions, while some special problems were taken up again for further and repeated study. Even a second sketch of a political system was left behind by him in which he sought to lay down rules for the guidance of life among the multitude who are still regarded as completely shut out from the realm of the everlasting Forms. To this end the highest aims of human endeavour are almost left out of sight and practical rules for reaching the attainable “better” are supplied for the benefit of the majority. He had learnt resignation at many points. Nevertheless, the profound conviction of all his thoughts remained unchanged; the claims that he put before the world and mankind remained essentially the same. For this reason after generations have not been mistaken in seeing in him the priestly man of wisdom, who with warning finger points the immortal spirit of man on its way from this feeble world upwards to the everlasting life.

The mind of Plato, open to both receiving and giving knowledge, was not likely to stay stuck in a mystical vision forever. Even after completing the Republic, he continued to refine his ideas in various ways, revisiting certain problems for further analysis. He even left behind a second outline of a political system where he aimed to set guidelines for living among the masses, who are still seen as completely excluded from the world of eternal Forms. In this effort, the highest aspirations of human endeavor are mostly overlooked, and practical rules for achieving a more attainable “better” are offered for the majority's benefit. He had learned to accept limitations in many areas. Nevertheless, the deep conviction behind all his ideas remained unchanged; the principles he presented to the world and humanity remained fundamentally the same. For this reason, after generations, people have correctly recognized him as a wise figure who, with a warning finger, directs the immortal spirit of humanity from this fragile world toward everlasting life.

NOTES TO CHAPTER XIII

1 Pl., Ap. c. 32 f. (40 C ff.).

1 Pl., Ap. c. 32 f. (40 C ff.).

2 Ap. 41 C D.

2 Ap. 41 C D.

3 Ap. 29 A B, 37 B.

3 Ap. 29 A B, 37 B.

4 Xen. Cyrop. 8, 7, 17, makes the dying Kyros justify his faith that the soul survives the body rather on the lines of popular belief and the cult of souls than from would-be-philosophical considerations (§ 20; see above, chap. v, n. 178). In spite of this he allows the question to remain undecided—as though of little importance—whether, in fact, the soul then leaves the body and lives on or whether μένουσα ἡ ψυχὴ ἐν τῷ σώματι συναποθνήσκει, § 21. In either eventuality he will after death μηδὲν ἔτι κακὸν παθεῖν, § 27.—Arist., SE. xvii, p. 176b, 16, πότερον φθαρτὴ ἢ ἀθάνατος ἡ ψυχὴ τῶν ζῴων, οὐ διώρισται τοῖς πολλοῖς—in this question they ἀμφιδοξοῦσι.

4 Xen. Cyrop. 8, 7, 17, shows the dying Kyros defending his belief that the soul survives the body more based on popular opinion and soul-related beliefs than on philosophical reasoning (§ 20; see above, chap. v, n. 178). Despite this, he leaves the question unresolved—as if it’s not particularly significant—regarding whether the soul actually leaves the body and continues to exist or whether the soul stays in the body and dies with it, § 21. In either case, he suggests that after death he will end the suffering, § 27.—Arist., SE. xvii, p. 176b, 16, Whether the souls of living beings are mortal or immortal hasn't been clearly defined by most people.—regarding this question, they are uncertain.

5 Pl., Phd. 70 A, 77 B, 80 D. This belief of the πολλοί and παῖδες looks indeed much more like a piece of superstition than a denial of the continued life of the ψυχή (in which light Pl. represents it). We have already met with the soul as a wind-spirit more than once: when it leaves the body the other wind-spirits carry it off and away with themselves (cf. above, chap. i, n. 10), esp. when a high wind is blowing (cf. the German popular belief that when a man hangs himself a storm arises: Grimm, p. 635: cf. Mannhardt, Germ. Myth. 270 n. In other words, the “furious host”, the personified storm-spirits—Grimm, p. 632; cf. Append. vii—come and carry away with them the poor unquiet soul).

5 Pl., Phd. 70 A, 77 B, 80 D. This belief of the many and kids really seems more like a form of superstition than a rejection of the continued existence of the soul (as Plato suggests it does). We've encountered the soul as a wind-spirit several times: when it leaves the body, the other wind-spirits take it away with them (cf. above, chap. i, n. 10), especially when a strong wind is blowing (cf. the German folk belief that when a person hangs themselves, a storm occurs: Grimm, p. 635; cf. Mannhardt, Germ. Myth. 270 n. In other words, the “furious host,” the personified storm-spirits—Grimm, p. 632; cf. Append. vii—come and carry away the restless soul).

6 Cf. Pl. Rp. 330 D E. There is more about these matters in the speech against Aristogeiton, [D.] 25, 52–3. In spite of the popular form in which it is put such an opinion is not to be claimed at once as a popular and generally held belief: the author of this speech is a follower of Orpheus, a fact which he himself betrays in § 11.

6 See Plato, Republic 330 D E. There's more information on these topics in the speech against Aristogeiton, [D.] 25, 52–3. Even though it's presented in a common way, this viewpoint shouldn't be assumed to be widely accepted: the speaker in this speech is a follower of Orpheus, which he reveals in § 11.

7 Pl. Rp. 608 D.

7 Pl. Rp. 608 D.

8 It is probable that in the Πολιτεία two essentially distinct stages of Platonic doctrine are found side by side with only an external bond of union, and that in particular what is said in Bk. v, 471 C ff., to the end of Bk. vii about the φιλόσοφοι, their education and position in the state (and outside politics), is an extraneous addition to the completed picture of the καλλίπολις which is given in Bks. ii—v, 471 C: an afterthought not originally included in the plan of the whole book and not anticipated in the beginning of it. This seems to me to emerge unmistakably from a careful and unprejudiced study of the whole work and to have been completely demonstrated by Krohn and Pfleiderer. That Plato himself regarded the first sketch of an ideal state as a separate work (which may even have been actually published separately: Gellius, 14, 3, 3), is shown by the beginning of the Timaeus. Here—with the implication of quite a different staging of the dialogue and a different introduction from what we now read in Rp., Bk. i, c. 1—ii, c. 9—we have an exact recapitulation of the subject of the inquiry in the Πολιτεία from ii, 10, 367 E, to v, 460 C, with the definite statement (19 AB) that thus far and no farther had the discussion gone “yesterday”. The stages in which the whole work was composed seem then to be divisible as follows: (1) Sketch of the state of the 478 φύλακες (in brief) embodied in a dialogue between Sokrates, Kriton, Timaios, Hermokrates, and another companion: in subject matter agreeing (apart from the introduction) substantially with Rp. ii, 10, 367 E, to v, 460 C. (2) Continuation of this sketch in the story of ancient Athens and the people of Atlantis. Its completion is transferred elsewhere because in the meantime the Πολιτεία itself has been extended and into the empty framework of the Τίμ. thus left available the account of the creation of the world given by Timaios is very loosely inserted: the frame-narratives of the Τίμαιος and Κριτίας never being completed. (3) Continuation of the first sketch (still virtually along the lines originally laid down) in Rp. v, 460 D–471 C (in which 466 E ff. is a brief account of the behaviour of the state in time of war—a substitute for the longer and more detailed statement on the same subject in Tim. 20 B f.), and in viii, ix (the greater part), and x, second half (608 C ff.). (4) Finally the whole work receives its crown and completion in a section that was, however, not foreseen in the older parts of the design, for it disturbs part of that original design’s independence and validity and does more than merely supplement it—the introduction of the φιλόσοφοι and their special type of “virtue”, v, 471 C–vii fin.; ix, 580 D–588 A; x, part 1 (to 608 B).—Then came the final editing of the whole: insertion of the new introduction, i, 1–ii, 9 (not necessarily left until the completion of the whole); necessary bringing into harmony of the divergent elements by a few excisions, qualifications, etc.; and probably a literary revision and polishing of the whole book.—The whole thus finally produced reveals its origin clearly enough in the outgrowing of a first plan and its replacement by a second that has naturally suggested itself in the course of the author’s own continued development. At the same time Plato could claim that the whole edifice, in spite of much extension and rebuilding in a different style of architecture, should be considered as a unity in the form in which he finally left it (as a noteworthy monument, too, of his own alteration of view). He himself in the sublimest moments of his mystic flight in Bks. vi and vii in no sense rejects the groundwork of the καλλίπολις of ii–v (though not, indeed, designed originally as such), but merely reduces it to the position of a substructure which remains a necessary and sole foundation even for the mystic pinnacle and preserves its absolute validity for the great majority of the citizens who inhabit the καλλίπολις (for the φιλόσοφοι are still regarded as very few in number) for whom it is a school for the exhibition of political virtue.—In the first sketch, then, there is no trace of a doctrine of immortality that can be properly so called, and the popular belief in a continued life of the soul after death has for Plato, at this stage at least, no serious weight or importance. The φύλακες are not to trouble about what may follow death (iii, 1 ff.); the main purpose in view is to show that δικαιοσύνη is its own reward, and the rewards which are anticipated for it after death are only ironically alluded to (ii, 363 CD; cf. 366 AB); Sokrates means to do without such hopes (366 E ff.). The ἀθανασία ψυχῆς is only introduced as a paradox in x, 608 D (in the continuation of the first sketch) for which proof is sought; whereupon the importance of the question as to what may await the soul after death emerges (614 A ff.) as well as the necessity of taking thought not for this short life but ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἅπαντος χρόνον (608 C), of which nothing had been said or could have been said in iii–v. Finally in vi–vii the indestructibility of the soul is implied in its sublimest form. It is evident that Plato’s own views on these matters had undergone changes in the course of time, and that these 479 changes are reflected in the various strata of the Πολιτεία even after its final editing. (Cf. Krohn, Platon. Staat, p. 265; Pfleiderer, Platon. Frage, p. 23 f., 35 ff., 1888.)

8 It is likely that in the State, two fundamentally different stages of Platonic thought coexist with just an external connection, and specifically, what is discussed in Book v, 471 C and beyond, to the end of Book vii regarding the philosophers, their education and role in society (and outside of politics), is an unrelated addition to the complete picture of the Kalipolis that is presented in Books ii—v, 471 C: a later thought not originally part of the overall plan of the book and not anticipated at the beginning. This is, to me, clearly evident from a careful and unbiased examination of the entire work and has been fully demonstrated by Krohn and Pfleiderer. Plato himself viewed the initial draft of an ideal state as a separate work (which may have even been published separately: Gellius, 14, 3, 3), as shown by the beginning of the Timaeus. Here—implying a completely different staging of the dialogue and a different introduction from what we currently read in Rp., Book i, chapter 1—ii, chapter 9—we have an exact summary of the topics discussed in the State from ii, 10, 367 E to v, 460 C, with the clear statement (19 AB) that until now, the discussion had progressed “yesterday.” The phases in which the whole work was composed seem to be arranged as follows: (1) The outline of the 478 state of the guards (briefly) presented in a dialogue between Sokrates, Kriton, Timaios, Hermokrates, and another companion: in content it aligns (apart from the introduction) closely with Rp. ii, 10, 367 E to v, 460 C. (2) A continuation of this outline in the story of ancient Athens and the people of Atlantis. Its completion was moved elsewhere because the State itself has been expanded, and into the vacant framework of the Τιμή. that is now available, the account of world creation given by Timaios is loosely inserted: the framing narratives of the Timaeus and Κριτίας are never completed. (3) Continuation of the first outline (still largely in line with the original plan) in Rp. v, 460 D–471 C (where 466 E ff. provides a brief overview of how the state behaves during wartime—a substitute for the more extensive and detailed description of the same topic in Tim. 20 B f.), as well as in viii, ix (the majority), and x, second half (608 C ff.). (4) Finally, the entire work receives its conclusion and completion in a section that was not anticipated in the earlier parts of the design, as it disrupts the independence and validity of that original design and goes beyond merely supplementing it—the introduction of the philosophers and their unique form of “virtue,” v, 471 C–vii fin.; ix, 580 D–588 A; x, part 1 (to 608 B).—Then came the final editing of the entire work: the insertion of the new introduction, i, 1–ii, 9 (not necessarily left until the completion of the whole); the necessary alignment of the conflicting elements through a few cuts, qualifications, etc.; and likely a literary revision and refinement of the whole book.—The final product clearly reveals its origin in the growth of an initial plan and its replacement by a second that has naturally arisen in the course of the author’s own ongoing development. At the same time, Plato could argue that the entire structure, despite extensive expansion and reconstruction in a different style of architecture, should be seen as a single unit in the final form he left it (as a remarkable monument, too, of his own change in perspective). He himself, in the most elevated moments of his mystical exploration in Books vi and vii, does not at all reject the foundation of the beautiful city from ii–v (even though it wasn’t originally intended as such), but rather reduces it to a substructure that remains a necessary and sole foundation even for the mystical pinnacle and retains its absolute relevance for the vast majority of citizens inhabiting the beautiful city (for the philosophers are still considered very few in number), for whom it serves as a place to showcase political virtue.—In the initial outline, there is no indication of a doctrine of immortality in the proper sense, and the common belief in the continued existence of the soul after death holds little significance or weight for Plato, at least at this stage. The guards are not to be concerned about what may follow death (iii, 1 ff.); the main goal is to demonstrate that justice is its own reward, and the rewards anticipated for it after death are only referenced ironically (ii, 363 CD; cf. 366 AB); Sokrates aims to forgo such hopes (366 E ff.). The concept of the immortality of the soul is only introduced as a paradox in x, 608 D (as a continuation of the first outline) for which evidence is sought; then, the importance of the question regarding what may await the soul after death becomes evident (614 A ff.), along with the necessity to consider not just this short life but for all time (608 C), about which nothing had been stated or could have been stated in iii–v. Finally, in vi–vii, the immortality of the soul is suggested in its highest form. It is clear that Plato’s own views on these issues evolved over time, and these 479 changes are reflected in the various layers of the State even after its final editing. (Cf. Krohn, Platon. Staat, p. 265; Pfleiderer, Platon. Frage, p. 23 f., 35 ff., 1888.)

9 The Appearance βούλεται, ὀρέγεται, προθυμεῖται εἶναι what its Idea is: Phd. 74 D, 75 AB. The Ideas are thus teleological causes like the divine νοῦς of Aristotle which, unmoved itself, κινεῖ ὡς ἐρώμενον (just as matter has a desire for form, potentiality for actuality). Plato it is true did not keep to this method of illustrating rather than explaining the relation between the Appearance and the unmoved Idea.

9 The Appearance wants, desires, is eager to be what its Idea is: Phd. 74 D, 75 AB. The Ideas serve as teleological causes similar to the divine mind of Aristotle which, remaining unchanged itself, moves as if loved (just like matter has a desire for form, potentiality for actuality). It is true that Plato did not stick to this way of illustrating rather than explaining the connection between the Appearance and the unmoved Idea.

10 νοήσει μετὰ λόγου περιληπτόν, Tim. 27 D. οὗ οὔποτ’ ἂν ἄλλῳ ἐπιλάβοιο ἢ τῷ τῆς διανοίας λογισμῷ, Phd. 79 A. αὐτὴ δι’ αὑτῆς ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ κοινὰ φαίνεται περὶ πάντων ἐπισκοπεῖν, Tht. 185 D.

10 Reasoned understanding summary, Tim. 27 D. where you will only hold on to the logic of your mind, Phd. 79 A. The soul, through itself, appears to oversee the common elements of everything., Tht. 185 D.

11 The prius in the case of man is really the perception of his own mental activity in νόησις μετὰ λόγου as being a process essentially different from δόξα μετ’ αἰσθήσεως ἀλόγου. It is inference from the former alone that leads to the conclusion that the νοούμενα exist: Tim. 51 B–52 A. It is the Ideas that we grasp in abstract thought: αὐτὴ ἡ οὐσία ἧς λόγον δίδομεν καὶ ἐρωτῶντες καὶ ἀποκρινόμενοι, Phd. 78 D.

11 The prius in the case of humans is actually the awareness of their own mental activity in thought with discourse, which is a process that is fundamentally different from fame without rational perception. It’s the reasoning based solely on the former that leads to the conclusion that the meaning exist: Tim. 51 B–52 A. It’s the Ideas we understand through abstract thought: The essence we discuss and inquire about, both in questioning and answering., Phd. 78 D.

12 The ἐπιστήμη which διαλεκτική alone can give (Rp. 533 DE) is ἀναμάρτητος (Rp. 477 E).

12 The knowledge that only dialectics can provide (Rp. 533 DE) is infallible (Rp. 477 E).

13 Of the three εἴδη or γένη—the ὄν, the γιγνόμενον and the ἐν ᾧ γίγνεται (the χώρα) of Tim. 48 E f., 52 ABD)—the third at any rate is quite foreign to the soul. Like the World-Soul (Tim. 35 A), along with which it is “mixed” (41 D), the individual soul also is a middle term between the ἄμερες of the Idea and the κατὰ τὰ σώματα μεριστόν, having a share in both.

13 Of the three species or γένη—the Being, the γιγνόμενον, and the in the Aὐgmentation (the country) of Tim. 48 E f., 52 ABD)—the third one is definitely quite different from the soul. Like the World-Soul (Tim. 35 A), which it is “mixed” with (41 D), the individual soul acts as a middle ground between the unmoved of the Idea and the among the bodies, divided, sharing qualities of both.

14 True, unalterable Being belongs only to the ἀειδές and therefore also to the soul: Phd. 79 A f.

14 True, unchangeable existence belongs only to the everlasting and thus also to the soul: Phd. 79 A f.

15 Phd. c. 54–6 (105 B–107 B).

15 PhD. c. 54–6 (105 B–107 B).

16 ὁμοιότερον ψυχὴ σώματός ἐστι τῷ ἀειδεῖ (and that = τῷ ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντι), Phd. 79 B. τῷ θείῳ καὶ ἀθανάτῳ καὶ νοητῷ καὶμονοειδεῖ καὶ ἀδιαλύτῳ καὶ ὡσαύτως κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχοντι ἑαυτῷ ὁμοιότατον ψυχή, 80 AB.

16 The soul is more like the eternal. (and that = to that which is always the same), Phd. 79 B. To the divine, immortal, intelligible, unique, indivisible, and similarly consistent in its nature, it is the most similar to the soul., 80 AB.

17 ἀγένητον, Phdr. c. 24, 245 D (ἀΐδιος simply, Rp. 611 B). The creation of the souls in Tim. is only intended to represent the origin of the spiritual from the δημιουργός (not the coming into being of the soul in time): see Siebeck, Ges. d. Psychol. i, 1, 275 ff. Still, it remains impossible to say whether Plato whenever he speaks of the pre-existence of the soul always means that the soul existed without beginning.

17 timeless, Phdr. p. 24, 245 D (everlasting simply, Rp. 611 B). The way souls are created in Tim. is only meant to illustrate how the spiritual comes from the creator god (not the emergence of the soul in time): see Siebeck, Ges. d. Psychol. i, 1, 275 ff. Nevertheless, it is still unclear whether Plato, when he talks about the pre-existence of the soul, always implies that the soul has no beginning.

18 As to the relation of the individual soul to the soul of the universe, neither the mythical account in Timaeus nor the briefer allusion in Phileb. 30 A allows us to conclude that the soul of our body is “taken from” the soul of the σῶμα τοῦ παντός. In reality the fiction of a “World-Soul” is intended to serve quite other purposes than the derivation of the individual soul from a single common source.

18 Regarding the connection between the individual soul and the soul of the universe, neither the mythical explanation in Timaeus nor the brief reference in Phileb. 30 A allows us to conclude that the soul of our body is “taken from” the soul of the body of the universe. In reality, the idea of a “World-Soul” is meant to serve different purposes rather than showing that individual souls come from a single common source.

19 Tim. 34 C; Lg. 891 A–896 C.

19 Tim. 34 °C; Lg. 891 A–896 C.

20 Acc. to the account in Phdr. 246 C, the soul suffers its downfall into the earthly existence if ὁ τῆς κάκης ἵππος, i.e. the ἐπιθυμία in the soul, tends towards the earth—247 B. It must, therefore, be the result of the preponderance of the appetitive impulses. This, however, can only happen if the λογιστικόν of the soul has become too weak to drive the soul-chariot any longer as its duty was. Hence the supporting wings, i.e. the νόησις, of the soul-horse fall off. It is thus a weakening of the cognitive part of the soul that causes its downfall into materiality (just as it is the measure of their capacity for knowledge that determines 480 the character of the ἐνσωμάτωσις of the souls, and their return to the τόπος ὑπερουράνιος is equally determined by their recovery of the purer form of knowledge: 248 C ff., 249 AC). Thus it is not, as in Empedokles, a religio-moral transgression that leads to the incarnation of the souls, but a failure of intellect, an intellectual fall in sin.

20 According to the account in Phdr. 246 C, the soul experiences its descent into earthly existence if the horse of the wicked, meaning the desire within the soul, is drawn toward the earth—247 B. This must be the result of the dominance of appetitive impulses. However, this can only occur if the accounting of the soul has become too weak to manage the soul’s chariot as it should. Therefore, the supporting wings, or the understanding, of the soul's horse are lost. It is indeed a weakening of the cognitive aspect of the soul that leads to its downfall into materiality (just as the extent of their capacity for knowledge determines 480 the nature of the Incarnation of the souls, and their return to the heavenly place is also determined by their ability to regain a purer form of knowledge: 248 C ff., 249 AC). Therefore, in contrast to Empedokles, it is not a moral-religious transgression that results in the incarnation of the souls, but rather a failure of intellect, an intellectual fall into sin.

21 The soul is, acc. to the account in Tim., created in order that by animating and governing a body, it may complete the sum of creation: without the ζῷα the οὐρανός (the universe) would be ἀτελής, Tim. 41 B ff. Acc. to this teleological motivation of the being and the ἐνσωμάτωσις of the soul, this latter, the ἐνσωμάτωσις, would have belonged to the original plan of the δημιουργός and there would be no purpose in the creation of the souls (by the δημιουργός and the inferior gods) unless they were destined to the animation of the ζῷα and conjunction with σώματα. But it is obviously inconsistent with all this that the object of the soul’s endeavour should be to separate itself as soon as possible and as completely as possible from the body and everything material in order to get back again to immaterial life without any body—42 BD. This is a relic of the original theological view of the relation between body and soul. In Phd. (and usually in Plato) it displays itself unconcealed; but it was far too closely bound up with the whole of Plato’s ethic and metaphysics not to make its illicit appearance even when as in Tim. he wished to keep the physiological side to the fore.

21 According to the story in Tim., the soul is created to animate and govern a body, completing the totality of creation. Without the ζῷα, the sky (the universe) would be imperfect, Tim. 41 B ff. Based on this goal-oriented purpose of existence and the incarnation of the soul, this latter, the embodiment, would have been part of the original design of the creator, and there would be no reason for the creation of souls (by the creator and the lesser gods) unless they were meant to animate the ζῷα and connect with bodies. However, it clearly contradicts all this for the goal of the soul’s effort to be to separate itself as quickly and thoroughly as possible from the body and all things material in order to return to a non-physical existence without a body—42 BD. This reflects an outdated theological view of the relationship between body and soul. In Phd. (and typically in Plato), this is openly shown; yet it was too closely linked to all of Plato’s ethics and metaphysics to not appear, even when he intended, as in Tim., to focus on the physiological aspect.

22 Phdr. 245 C–246 A. The soul is τὸ αὑτὸ κινοῦν, and indeed continually, ἀεικίνητον, it is τοῖς ἄλλοις ὅσα κινεῖται πηγὴ καὶ ἀρχὴ κινήσεως (the body only seems to move itself, but it is really the soul within which moves it—246 C). If the soul were to perish, πᾶς οὐρανὸς πᾶσά τε γένεσις would be at a standstill. The conception of the “soul” as the ἀεικίνητον was already well and long established in Plato’s time (see above, chap. xii, n. 150). In the form in which he introduces it here (as a proof of the imperishability of the soul) he may have modelled his conception on that of Alkmaion (Arist., An. 405a, 29): see Hirzel, Hermes, xi, 244. But Plato here and throughout Phdr. is speaking of the individual soul (ψυχή collective singular). So too in Lg. 894 E ff., 896 A ff. (λόγος of the soul: ἡ δυναμένη αὐτὴ αὑτὴν κινεῖν κίνησις. It is the αιτία and the issue of all movement in the world, the source of life; for life belongs to that which αὐτό αὑτὸ κινεῖ 895 C.) As distinguished from the ψυχὴ ἐνοικοῦσα ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς κινουμένοις we do not hear of the (double) World-Soul until 896 E. There is in fact κίνησις in plenty in the world besides that of the animated organisms.

22 Phdr. 245 C–246 A. The soul is the same thing moving, and it is constantly always moving. It is For everything else that is in motion, there is a source and a beginning of that motion. (the body only seems to move itself, but it is really the soul within that animates it—246 C). If the soul were to perish, The whole universe and all creation would come to a halt. The idea of the “soul” as the Always moving was already well-established during Plato’s time (see above, chap. xii, n. 150). In the way he presents it here (as proof of the soul’s immortality), he may have drawn from Alkmaion’s thoughts (Arist., An. 405a, 29): see Hirzel, Hermes, xi, 244. However, Plato here and throughout Phdr. refers to the individual soul (soul collective singular). Similarly, in Lg. 894 E ff., 896 A ff. (word of the soul: The ability to move itself is motion.. It is the cause and the source of all movement in the world, the essence of life; for life belongs to that which move itself 895 C.) Different from the The soul resides in all living things., we only start hearing about the (double) World-Soul at 896 E. In fact, there is movement all around in the world beyond just that of living beings.

23 Phd. 93 B (c. 43) and often.

23 Phd. 93 B (c. 43) and often.

24 ψυχή on the one side, πᾶν τὸ ἄψυχον on the other. Phdr. 246 B and so generally.

24 spirit on one side, everything that's soulless on the other. Phdr. 246 B and so generally.

25 Tim. 86 B ff. (c. 41).—In brief: κακὸς ἑκὼν οὐδείς, διὰ δὲ πονηρὰν ἕξιν τινὰ τοῦ σώματος καὶ ἀπαίδευτον τροφὴν (education of the soul) ὁ κακὸς γίγνεται κακός, 86 E.

25 Tim. 86 B ff. (c. 41).—In brief: No one chooses to be bad, but sometimes it’s due to harmful habits and a lack of proper care. (education of the soul) the villain becomes evil, 86 E.

26 τὸ σωματοειδὲς ὃ τῇ ψυχῇ ἡ ὁμιλία τε καὶ ξυνουσία τοῦ σώματος . . . ἐνεποίησε ξύμφυτον κτλ. Phd. 81 C, 83 D.

26 The physical body, which through its connection and interaction with the soul... created a bond that is naturally inherent, etc. Phd. 81 C, 83 D.

27 Pythagoreans, see above (chap. xi, n. 55); hardly Demokritos (Dox., p. 390, 14). The trichotomy can exist very well side by side with the dichotomy (which also appears) into λογιστικόν and αλόγιστικον, the last being simply divided again into θυμός and ἐπιθυμία.

27 Pythagoreans, see above (chap. xi, n. 55); hardly Demokritos (Dox., p. 390, 14). The trichotomy can easily coexist with the dichotomy (which also shows up) into accounting and irrational, with the latter being simply divided again into anger and desire.

28 In the first sketch of the Republic (ii–v). Here it is admittedly bound up with the three classes or castes of the state, but it has not been invented for the benefit of these classes. On the contrary, the 481 trichotomy of the soul is original and the division of the citizen body into three parts is derived and explained from it; cf. 435 E.—The view that Plato was never quite serious about the threefold division of the soul but always spoke of it as something semi-mythical or as a temporarily adopted hypothesis, will not appear plausible on an unprejudiced study of the passages in the Platonic writings that deal with the threefold division of the soul.

28 In the first outline of the Republic (ii–v). Here, it is clearly linked to the three classes or castes of the state, but it wasn't created just for their benefit. On the contrary, the 481 three-part division of the soul is original, and the division of the citizen body into three parts is derived from and explained by it; see 435 E.—The idea that Plato never took the threefold division of the soul seriously and always referred to it as something semi-mythical or just a temporary hypothesis doesn't seem credible upon an unbiased examination of the passages in Plato's writings that discuss the threefold division of the soul.

29 Rp. x, 611 A–E (c. 11), shows clearly that the reason which made Plato abandon his conception (given in the first sketch of the Rep. and still maintained in the Phaedrus) of the natural trichotomy of the soul into parts or divisions was the consideration of its immortality and vocation to intercourse with the θεῖον καὶ ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀεὶ ὄν.—The emotions and passions by which the soul is “fettered” ὑπὸ τοῦ σώματος, explain its tendency to clothe itself in another body after death, Phd. 83 C ff. If the emotions and passions were indissolubly linked to the soul the latter could never escape from the cycle of rebirths.—On the other hand, if only the λογιστικόν, as the only independently existing side of the soul, goes into the place of judgment in the other world there would seem to be no reason that should tempt this simple uncompounded soul to renewed ἐνσωμάτωσις, a process which implies materiality and desire. (This difficulty troubled Plotinos too.) Plato takes into view the possibility of an inner corruption of the pure and undivided intellectual soul which makes a future state of punishment and purgatory possible and intelligible and explains the existence (until a complete return to purity is achieved) of a tendency or constraint to renewed ἐνσωμάτωσις even without a permanent association with the θυμοειδές and the ἐπιθυμητικόν.

29 Rp. x, 611 A–E (c. 11), clearly shows that the reason Plato abandoned his idea (presented in the first draft of the Rep. and still held in the Phaedrus) of the soul's natural division into parts was the idea of its immortality and its purpose for interaction with the divine, immortal, and always existing. The emotions and passions that “bind” the soul under the body explain its tendency to take on another body after death, Phd. 83 C ff. If emotions and passions were inseparably linked to the soul, it could never escape the cycle of rebirth. On the other hand, if only the accounting, as the only aspect of the soul that exists independently, goes to the judgment place in the afterlife, there seems to be no reason for this simple, undivided soul to undergo renewed embodiment, a process that implies physicality and desire. (This issue also troubled Plotinus.) Plato considers the possibility of an inner corruption within the pure and undivided intellectual soul, rendering a future state of punishment and purification feasible and understandable, and explains the existence (until full return to purity is achieved) of a tendency or compulsion for renewed incarnation even without a lasting connection to the θυμοειδές and the desirable.

30 τῇ ἀληθεστάτῃ φύσει the soul is μονοειδές, Rep. x, c. 11 (611 B, 612 A). Hence it is τὸ παράπαν ἀδιάλυτος ἢ ἐγγύς τι τούτου, Phd. 80 B.

30 in its true nature, the soul is unique, Rep. x, c. 11 (611 B, 612 A). Thus, it is completely indestructible or nearly so, Phd. 80 B.

31 The intellect-soul ἀθάνατον ἀρχὴν θνητοῦ ζῴου is the creation of the δημιουργός; the other faculties of the soul, θυμός, ἐπιθυμία (and αἴσθησις therewith), ψυχῆς ὅσον θνητὸν (Tim. 61 C), are all added to the soul at the moment of its union with the body by the subordinate deities: Tim. 41 D–44 D; 69 A–70 D (c. 14, 15, 31). The same idea appears in Rp. x, 611 BC. τὸ ἀειγενὲς μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς is distinguished from the ζωογενές: Polit. 309 C.

31 The intellect-soul immortal essence of mortal life is created by the creator; the other aspects of the soul, anger, desire (and sensation along with it), soul as mortal (Tim. 61 C), are all given to the soul when it connects with the body by the lesser gods: Tim. 41 D–44 D; 69 A–70 D (c. 14, 15, 31). This same idea is reflected in Rp. x, 611 BC. the timeless part of the soul is set apart from the animal-generated: Polit. 309 C.

32 τὸ σῶμα καὶ αἷ τούτου ἐπιθυμίαι, Phd. 66 C. The soul moved by passion suffers ὑπὸ σώματος, 83 CD. In death the soul is καθαρὰ πάντων τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα κακῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν, Crat. 404 A.

32 The body and cravings, Phd. 66 C. The soul driven by passion suffers from the body, 83 CD. In death, the soul is free from all the evils and desires connected to the body, Crat. 404 A.

33 Tim. 43 C. It is only as a result of this violent and contradictory excitement through the physical perception of Becoming that the soul becomes ἄνους (which is originally foreign to it) ὅταν εἰς σῶμα ἐνδεθῇ θνητόν, 44 A. (It will in time become ἔμφρων once more and can become wise, 44 BC. In the case of the animals, which can be inhabited by the same soul, it will remain always ἄφρων—one may suppose.)

33 Tim. 43 C. It's only because of this intense and conflicting excitement through the physical experience of Becoming that the soul becomes uninformed (which is originally foreign to it) When it enters a mortal body, 44 A. (Eventually, it will become mindful again and can become wise, 44 BC. In the case of animals, which can share the same soul, it will always remain foolish—one might assume.)

34 . . . σμικρὸν χρόνον, οὐδὲν μὲν οὖν πρὸς τὸν ἅπαντα (χρόνον). Rp. 498 D.

34 . . . for a brief period, nothing in connection with the whole (time). Rp. 498 D.

35 In accordance with popular thought (but obviously also in perfect seriousness and without any special concession) death is regarded as τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγή, Phd. 64 C; Gorg. 524 B. Hence, it usually happens that the soul μηδέποτε εἰς Ἅιδου καθαρῶς ἀφικέσθαι, ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ τοῦ σώματος ἀναπλέα ἐξιέναι, Phd. 83 D. (—ἀεὶ, i.e. with the exception of the few complete φιλόσοφοι that do not need further purification in Hades, and this is, in fact, the doctrine of the Phd. itself; cf. 114 C, 80 E, 81 A.)

35 According to popular belief (but also taken very seriously and without any special leniency), death is seen as the soul's separation from the body, Phd. 64 C; Gorg. 524 B. Therefore, it usually happens that the soul never reaches Hades in a pure state, but always leaves the body still unrefined, Phd. 83 D. (—always, meaning with the exception of the few truly thinkers who do not require further purification in Hades, which is, in fact, the doctrine of Phd. itself; see 114 C, 80 E, 81 A.)

36 Purgatory, punishment and rewards in the other world: Gorg. 482 523 ff.: Rp. x, c. 13 ff., 614 A ff. (vision of Er, son of Armenios in the continuation of the first version of the πολιτεία); Phd. 110 B–114 C. We must not here go into the details of the individual myths in which it is still perhaps possible to distinguish what parts Plato has taken out of ancient poetry and popular legend and what comes from theological and particularly Orphic doctrinal poetry—or even (Rp. x) from Oriental fables—and how much he has added independently on his own account. (A few remarks will be found in G. Ettig, Acherunt., Leipz. Stud. xiii, 305 ff.; cf. also Döring, Arch. Ges. Phil. 1393, p. 475 ff.; Dieterich, Nekyia, 112 ff.) He usually distinguishes three classes among the souls (only apparently two in Phdr. 249 A): those who are affected with curable faults, the hopelessly and incurable guilty (who are condemned to eternal punishment in Tartaros without rebirth: Gorg. 525 C ff.; Rp. 615 D; Phd. 113 E); and, thirdly the ὁσίως βεβιωκότες, δίκαιοι καὶ ὅσιοι. This is the system of Gorg. 525 BC, 526 C; Rp. 615 BC. (With these come also the ἄωροι, 615 C, who neither deserve punishment nor reward—of them Er said ἄλλα, οὐκ ἄξια μνήμης. Perhaps older theologians had already concerned themselves with these, not being satisfied with the fate assigned by popular mythology to the ἄωροι—see Append. vii—it would have been a natural subject for the professional attention of these Schoolmen of popular superstition.) In Phd. 113 D ff. the question is even more minutely dealt with. Here we have (1) οἱ μέσως βεβιωκότες (che visser’ senz’ infamia e senza lode), (2) οἱ ἀνιάτως ἔχοντες, (3) οἱ ἰάσιμα ἡμαρτηκότες, (4) οἱ διαφερόντως ὁσίως βεβιωκότες, and (5) the élite of these ὅσιοι, the real philosophers, οἱ φιλοσοφίᾳ ἱκανῶς καθεράμενοι—these are not born again. To the other classes are assigned their appropriate purgation, reward or punishment. Here classes 2, 3, and 4 correspond to the three classes of Rp. and Gorg. (which may perhaps be modelled on the divisions popularized by older theological poetry—see above, chap. xii, n. 62). Novelties are the μέσως βεβιωκότες and the true philosophers. For these last the abode upon the μακάρων νῆσοι (Gorg. 526 C), or, what comes to the same thing, upon the surface of the earth (Phd. 114 BC), is no longer sufficient. They go ἐς μακάρων τινὰς εὐδαιμονίας (115 D), which means that they are really freed entirely from temporal existence and enter into the unchanging “Now” of eternity. (As far as the complete escape of the φιλόσοφοι is concerned the account in Rp. x, c. 13 [614 A–615 C] does not contradict that of Phd. The only reason why this is not mentioned in Rp. is that these absolutely enfranchized souls could not appear upon the λειμών there mentioned: 614 E.)—Of these various accounts that of Phd. seems to be the latest. In Lg. there is yet another indefinite allusion to the necessity of undergoing a judgment after death: 904 C ff.

36 Purgatory, punishment, and rewards in the afterlife: Gorg. 482 523 ff.: Rp. x, c. 13 ff., 614 A ff. (the vision of Er, son of Armenios in the continuation of the first version of the city); Phd. 110 B–114 C. We shouldn't dive into the specific myths here, as it might still be possible to distinguish which parts Plato has taken from ancient poetry and popular legend and which come from theological and especially Orphic doctrinal poetry—or even (Rp. x) from Eastern fables—and how much he has added on his own. (A few comments can be found in G. Ettig, Acherunt., Leipz. Stud. xiii, 305 ff.; see also Döring, Arch. Ges. Phil. 1393, p. 475 ff.; Dieterich, Nekyia, 112 ff.) He usually identifies three classes of souls (only seemingly two in Phdr. 249 A): those with curable faults, those hopelessly and incurably guilty (who are condemned to eternal punishment in Tartaros without rebirth: Gorg. 525 C ff.; Rp. 615 D; Phd. 113 E); and thirdly, the living righteously, just and holy. This is the system of Gorg. 525 BC, 526 C; Rp. 615 BC. (Along with these, there are also the premature, 615 C, who deserve neither punishment nor reward—of them, Er said other things, not worth remembering. Perhaps earlier theologians had already thought about these, not being satisfied with the fate assigned by popular mythology to the ἄωροι—see Append. vii—it would have been a natural topic for these Schoolmen of popular superstition.) In Phd. 113 D ff., the question is discussed even more thoroughly. Here we have (1) the middle class (che visser’ senz’ infamia e senza lode), (2) the seriously ill, (3) the healable offenders, (4) those who lived differently and piously, and (5) the elite among these saints, the true philosophers, those who are well-versed in philosophy—these are not reborn. The other classes receive their appropriate purification, reward, or punishment. Here, classes 2, 3, and 4 correspond to the three classes of Rp. and Gorg. (which may possibly be modeled on the divisions popularized by earlier theological poetry—see above, chap. xii, n. 62). The new categories are the μέχρι στιγμής βεβιωμένοι and the true philosophers. For these last, the place on the blessed isles (Gorg. 526 C), or rather, on the surface of the earth (Phd. 114 BC), is no longer enough. They go to some blessed happiness (115 D), which means they are completely freed from temporal existence and enter into the unchanging “Now” of eternity. (As far as the complete escape of the philosophers is concerned, the account in Rp. x, c. 13 [614 A–615 C] does not contradict that of Phd. The only reason this isn't mentioned in Rp. is that these fully liberated souls could not appear in the meadow mentioned there: 614 E.)—Of these various narratives, that of Phd. seems to be the most recent. In Lg., there is yet another vague reference to the necessity of undergoing judgment after death: 904 C ff.

37 Choice of their new state of life by the souls in the other world, Rp. 617 E ff.; Phdr. 249 B. The purpose of this arrangement is made clear by Rp. 617 E; αἰτία ἑλομένου· θεὸς ἀναίτιος (cf. Tim. 42 D). It is, in fact, a theodicy and at the same time secures the complete responsibility of every man for his own character and deeds (cf. 619 C). There is no idea of founding a determinist theory upon it.—The choice is guided by the special character of the soul (which it has developed in its previous life) and its tendencies (cf. Phd. 81 E; Lg. 904 BC). For the same reason there is no choice on the occasion of the soul’s first ἐνσωμάτωσις (Tim. 41 E): after that, in later births, a definite descent in well-marked stages in peius, can be observed, each conditioned by the degree of corruption attaching to the soul (Tim. 42 B ff.). 483 All of which can very well co-exist with a choice of its own fate by the soul conditioned by its own nature.

37 Choice of their new life by the souls in the afterlife, Rp. 617 E ff.; Phdr. 249 B. The purpose of this setup is clarified by Rp. 617 E; Cause chosen; God is blameless. (cf. Tim. 42 D). It actually serves as a theodicy while also ensuring that every person is fully responsible for their own character and actions (cf. 619 C). There’s no intention to establish a determinist theory from it.—The choice is influenced by the unique character of the soul (which it has developed in its past life) and its inclinations (cf. Phd. 81 E; Lg. 904 BC). For the same reason, there’s no choice during the soul’s first embodiment (Tim. 41 E): after that, in later lives, a clear decline can be seen in defined stages in peius, each determined by the level of corruption attached to the soul (Tim. 42 B ff.). 483 All of this can easily coexist with a choice of its own destiny by the soul based on its nature.

38 ξυμμετρία, Tim. 87 D.

38 symmetry, Tim. 87 D.

39 At least three (as in Pi., O. ii, 75 ff.), acc. to Phdr. 249 A. Between each two births there is an intervening period of 1,000 years (Rp. 615 A; Phdr. 249 AB). This cuts away the ground from such myths as that of the various “lives” of Pythagoras (see Append. x).

39 At least three (as in Pi., O. ii, 75 ff.), according to Phdr. 249 A. There is a gap of 1,000 years between each rebirth (Rp. 615 A; Phdr. 249 AB). This undermines myths like those about the different "lives" of Pythagoras (see Append. x).

40 Incarnation in animals, Phdr. 249 B; Rp. 618 A, 620 ff.; Phd. 81 E; Tim. 42 BC. That this part was any less seriously meant than any other part of his doctrine of metempsychosis is not in the least suggested by Plato himself. Acc. to Tim. 91 D–92 B, all the animals have souls that had once inhabited the bodies of men (see Procl., in Rp. ii, 332 Kroll; he is trying to harmonize Tim. and Phdr.). In fact, the idea that a man’s soul might inhabit an animal was precisely the great difficulty in Plato’s doctrine of the soul. If, as is said in Phdr. 249 BC, a real animal-soul cannot enter into a human body because it does not possess νόησις or the power of “dialectic” which constitutes the essential part of the human soul’s activity, how can a real human soul enter into an animal’s body when it is obvious that as an animal it can make no use of its νόησις? (For this very reason many Platonists—those who were not satisfied with ingenious or artificial interpretations: cf. Sallust., de Dis 20; Procl., in Tim. 329 DE—denied the entrance of the human soul into animals; cf. Aug. CD. X, 30, and partic. Nemes., p. 116 Matth. Lucr. iii, 760, already seems to have such Platonists in mind.) The λογιστικόν of the soul seems to be absent from animals or to be present but undeveloped as in children: Rp. iv, 441 A B (or does it remain permanently bound in ἀφροσύνη? see above, this chap., n. 33. Just such a theory put forward by exponents of μετεμψύχωσις who would make the ψυχή always the same but not always equally active, is attacked by Alex. Aphr., de An., p. 27 Br.). But acc. to the later doctrine of Plato the λογιστικόν comprises the whole contents of the soul before it enters a body; if the animals do not possess it then they do not strictly speaking possess a soul (θυμός and ἐπιθυμία in themselves are not the soul; they are only added to the soul when it first enters into a body). It seems certain that Plato adopted the view that the soul migrates into the bodies of animals from the theologians and Pythagoreans, while he still believed that the soul was not pure power of thought but also (as still in Phdr.) included θυμός and ἐπιθυμία in itself. Later, because it was difficult to do without the migration-theory of the soul on account of its ethical importance, he allowed the idea to remain side by side with his reorganized and sublimated doctrine of the soul. (On the other hand, metempsychosis into plants—which are certainly also ζῷα, though they only have to τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν, Tim. 77 B—was never adopted by him from Empedokles; cf. Procl., in Rp. ii, 333 Kr., and for the same reason: this idea was unimportant and indifferent from an ethical point of view.)

40 The concept of reincarnation in animals, Phdr. 249 B; Rp. 618 A, 620 ff.; Phd. 81 E; Tim. 42 BC. There’s no suggestion from Plato that this aspect of his theory of metempsychosis was any less serious than any other part. According to Tim. 91 D–92 B, all animals have souls that once existed in human bodies (see Procl., in Rp. ii, 332 Kroll; he attempts to reconcile Tim. and Phdr.). In fact, the belief that a human soul could inhabit an animal was a major challenge in Plato’s theory of the soul. If, as stated in Phdr. 249 BC, a true animal soul cannot enter a human body because it lacks thought or the ability for “dialectic,” which is a fundamental activity of the human soul, how can a true human soul enter an animal's body when it’s clear that the animal cannot utilize its intellect? (For this reason, many Platonists—those who weren't satisfied with clever or forced interpretations: cf. Sallust., de Dis 20; Procl., in Tim. 329 DE—denied that human souls could enter animals; cf. Aug. CD. X, 30, and particularly Nemes., p. 116 Matth. Lucr. iii, 760 seems to consider such Platonists.) The accounting aspect of the soul seems absent in animals or may be present but underdeveloped, similar to children: Rp. iv, 441 A B (or does it remain permanently confined in foolishness? see above, this chap., n. 33. A theory proposed by advocates of reincarnation suggested the soul remains constant but does not always function at full capacity, which is criticized by Alex. Aphr., de An., p. 27 Br.). However, according to Plato's later teachings, the accounting includes all of the soul's contents before it enters a body; if animals do not possess this, they don’t strictly have a soul (the anger and desire within themselves are not the soul; they are added to the soul when it first enters a body). It seems likely that Plato's idea that the soul migrates into animals came from theologians and Pythagoreans, even though he believed that the soul was not just the power of thought but also included anger and desire. Later on, because the migration theory was ethically significant and hard to abandon, he allowed it to coexist with his restructured and refined understanding of the soul. (On the other hand, the idea of metempsychosis into plants—which are also ζῷα, though they only encompass the desire, Tim. 77 B—was never embraced by him from Empedocles; cf. Procl., in Rp. ii, 333 Kr., and for the same reason: this concept was insignificant and unimportant from an ethical perspective.)

41 τὴν εἰς τὸν νοητὸν τόπον τῆς ψυχῆς ἄνοδον, Rp. 517 B.

41 the journey to the understandable part of the soul, Rp. 517 B.

42 ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀγένητόν ἐστι, καὶ ἀδιάφθορον αὐτὸ ἀναγκη εἶναι, Phdr. 245 D—the ancient argument from the fact that the individual soul (and of this Plato is speaking) has no beginning to the conclusion that its life can have no end.

42 Since it is uncreated and unchanging, it must be everlasting., Phdr. 245 D—the ancient argument that because the individual soul (which is what Plato is discussing) has no beginning, its life must have no end.

43 This much may be conceded to Teichmüller’s observations. “The individual, and the individual soul, is not an independent principle but only a resultant of the compounding of the Idea and the principle of Becoming”—though this is not how Plato regards the 484 matter; hence in Plato—“the individual is not eternal (i.e. not necessarily), and the eternal Principles are not individual”, Stud. z. Ges. d. Begr., p. 115, 142 (1874). But all that Teichmüller has to say under this head is in reality only a criticism of the Platonic doctrine of the soul and does not help us to determine what exactly that doctrine was. Plato speaks always of the immortality, i.e. the eternity, of the individual soul; nowhere does he confine indestructibility to the “common nature” of the soul; and this fact is not even remotely explained by appealing as Teichmüller does to an alleged “orthodoxy” to which Plato is supposed to be accommodating his words. If from no other passage we should be obliged to conclude definitely from Rp. 611 A that Plato believed in the existence of a plurality of souls and in their indestructibility: ἀεὶ ἂν εἶεν αἱ αὐταί (ψυχαί). οὔτε γὰρ ἄν που ἐλάττους γένοιντο μηδεμιᾶς ἀπολλυμένης, οὔτε αὗ πλείους. Here the predicate of the first sentence is indubitably εἶεν only; it is affirmed that always the same souls will exist, not that αἱ αὐταὶ εἶεν (“the souls are always the same ones”) as Teichmüller supposes, Platon. Frage, 7 ff., and it is asserted with all possible plainness that the plurality of individual souls, of which a definite number exist, is indestructible.

43 We can agree with some of Teichmüller's observations. “The individual, and the individual soul, is not an independent principle but just a result of the combination of the Idea and the principle of Becoming”—although that’s not how Plato sees it 484; thus in Plato—“the individual is not eternal (i.e., not necessarily), and the eternal Principles are not individual”, Stud. z. Ges. d. Begr., p. 115, 142 (1874). However, everything Teichmüller states on this subject is really just a criticism of the Platonic doctrine of the soul and does not clarify what exactly that doctrine was. Plato always speaks of the immortality, i.e., the eternity, of the individual soul; he never limits indestructibility to the “common nature” of the soul; and this fact isn’t even slightly clarified by Teichmüller’s appeal to an alleged “orthodoxy” that Plato is supposed to be aligning his words with. If from no other passage, we must decisively conclude from Rp. 611 A that Plato believed in the existence of multiple souls and their indestructibility: They would always be the same.(souls)For they would not be fewer anywhere if any were destroyed, nor would they be more in number.. Here the predicate of the first sentence is definitely Alright only; it asserts that always the same souls will exist, not that They are the same. (“the souls are always the same ones”) as Teichmüller thinks, Platon. Frage, 7 ff., and it clearly states that the plurality of individual souls, of which a specific number exist, is indestructible.

44 E.g. appeal made to τελεταί, παλαιοὶ λόγοι ἐν ἀπορρήτοις λεγόμενοι, and particularly to Orphic doctrine, in those places where he is speaking of the inward difference between the soul and all that is corporeal, of the soul’s “death” in earthly life, of its enclosure in the σῶμα as its σῆμα in punishment of its misdeeds—of punishment and purification after death in Ἅιδης, of the migration of the soul, its imperishability, dwelling of the pure in the neighbourhood of the gods (Phd. 61 BC, 63 C, 70 C, 81 A, 107 D ff.; Gorg. 493 A; Crat. 400 BC; Men. 81 A; Lg. 870 DE, 872 E). This also is the origin of the tendency to compare the highest philosophical activity, or the beholding of the Ideas before all time, with the ἐποπτεῖαι of the mysteries: Phdr. 250 B; cf. Lob., Agl. 128.

44 For example, references are made to Rituals, ancient sayings spoken in secret., especially concerning Orphic teachings, in contexts where he discusses the inner distinction between the soul and everything physical, the soul's "death" in earthly existence, its confinement in the body as its σῆμα due to its misdeeds—of punishment and purification after death in Hades, the journey of the soul, its eternal nature, the abode of the pure near the gods (Phd. 61 BC, 63 C, 70 C, 81 A, 107 D ff.; Gorg. 493 A; Crat. 400 BC; Men. 81 A; Lg. 870 DE, 872 E). This is also where the idea arises to compare the highest forms of philosophical thought, or the vision of the Ideas beyond time, with the epopties of the mysteries: Phdr. 250 B; cf. Lob., Agl. 128.

45 Nine (an ancient sacred number) stages from the φιλόσοφος downwards to the τύραννος, Phdr. 248 DE.

45 Nine (an ancient sacred number) stages from the thinker down to the dictator, Phdr. 248 DE.

46 This is frequently stated in individual myths; cf. also Phd. 85 CD.

46 This is often mentioned in different myths; see also Phd. 85 CD.

47 Phdr. 250 C (ὄστρεον): Rp. 611 CD (Glaukos).

47 Phdr. 250 C (o/streon): Rp. 611 CD (Glaukos).

48 τὴν τοῦ ὄντος θήραν, Phd. 66 C (ὅταν αὐτὴ καθ’ αὑτὴν πραγματεύηται ἡ ψυχὴ περὶ τὰ ὄντα, Tht. 187 A. αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ θεατέον αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα, Phd. 66 D).

48 the quest for existence, Phd. 66 C (when the soul reflects on itself about the things that exist, Tht. 187 A. the soul itself must reflect on these matters, Phd. 66 D).

49 ξυναίτια, Tim. 46 C ff. νοῦς καὶ ἀνάγκη, 47 E ff. (ὁ θεός is πολλῶν ἀναίτιος, namely τῶν κακῶν, Rp. 379 AC).

49 ξυναίτια, Tim. 46 C ff. mind and necessity, 47 E ff. (the god is innocent of many, namely of the evils, Rp. 379 AC).

50 The σῶμα with which the soul is bound up is a κακόν, Phd. 66 B (δεσμοί of the soul, 67 D). The κακά in the world are regularly said to come from matter until in Lg., side by side with the εὐεργέτις ψυχή of the world, there appears an evil World-Soul that works evil.

50 The body that the soul is connected to is a bad, Phd. 66 B (links of the soul, 67 D). The bad news in the world are often said to come from matter, until in Lg., alongside the benefactor soul of the world, an evil World-Soul emerges that causes harm.

51 Particularly in Phd., καθαρεύειν—κάθαρσις—οἱ φιλοσοφίᾳ ἱκανῶς καθηράμενοι in contrast with the ἀκάθαρτοι ψυχαί, 67 A ff., 69 BC, 80 E, 82 D, 108 B, 114 C. Katharsis of the soul through dialectic Soph. 230 C ff. Express allusion to the analogous requirement of κάθαρσις by οἱ τὰς τελετὰς ἡμῖν καταστήσαντες, Phd. 69 C.

51 Especially in Phd., kathareuein—catharsis—the philosophers who have been properly purified in contrast with the unclean spirits, 67 A ff., 69 BC, 80 E, 82 D, 108 B, 114 C. The purification of the soul through dialectic Soph. 230 C ff. A direct reference to the similar necessity of catharsis by those who created the rituals for us, Phd. 69 C.

52 κάθαρσις εἶναι τοῦτο ξυμβαίνει, τὸ χωρίζειν ὅ τι μάλιστα ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ ἐθίσαι αὐτὴν καθ’ αὑτὴν πανταχόθεν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος συναγείρεσθαί τε καὶ ἁθροίζεσθαι, καὶ οἰκεῖν κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν καὶ ἐν τῷ νῦν παρόντι καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔπειτα μόνην καθ’ αὑτῆν, ἐκλυομένην ὥσπερ ἐκ δεσμῶν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος, Phd. 67 C. Thus δικαιοσύνη and 485 ἀνδρεία, and more particularly φρόνησις, are καθαρμός τις, 69 BC. λύσις τε καὶ καθαρμός of φιλοσοφία, 82 D.

52 Purification involves primarily separating the soul from the body and teaching it to collect and unify from all parts of the body, allowing it to dwell according to its ability, both in the present and in the future, as if liberated from the constraints of the body., Phd. 67 C. Thus justice and 485 bravery, and more specifically knowledge, are some type of purification, 69 BC. release and cleanse of philosophy, 82 D.

53 φιλοσοφία teaches the soul εἰς αὑτὴν ξυλλέγεσθαι καὶ ἁθροίζεσθαι and to ἀναχωρεῖν from the ἀπάτη of the senses ὅσον μὴ ἀνάγκη αὐτοῖς χρῆσθαι, Phd. 83 A.—ἐὰν καθαρὰ ἡ ψυχὴ ἀπαλλάττηται . . . φεύγουσα τὸ σῶμα καὶ συνηθροισμένη αὐτὴ εἰς αὑτήν, 80 E, 76 C.

53 Philosophy teaches the soul to collect and bring together within itself and to take out from the deception of the senses as long as they don't have to use, Phd. 83 A.—If the soul is pure, it frees itself... escaping the body and reuniting with itself., 80 E, 76 C.

54 . . . καθαροὶ ἀπαλλαττόμενοι τῆς τοῦ σώματος ἀφροσύνης . . . γνωσόμεθα δι’ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν πᾶν τὸ εἰλικρινές, μὴ καθαρῷ γὰρ καθαροῦ ἐφάπτεσθαι μὴ οὐ θεμιτὸν ᾖ, Phd. 67 AB.

54 , PhD. 67 AB.

55 For the ἀγαθόν, ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα, αἰτία both of ἀλήθεια and of ἐπιστήμη but identical with neither (they are only ἀγαθοειδῆ) and ἔτι μειζόνως τιμητέον—cause of the γιγνωσκόμενα and not only of γιγνώσκεσθαι, of both εἶναι and οὐσία, οὐκ οὐσίας ὄντος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀλλ’ ἔτι ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας πρεσβείᾳ καὶ δυνάμει ὑπερέχοντος—see Rp. vi, c. 19 (508 A ff.), 517 BC. Here τὸ ἀγαθόν, as the reason and active cause of all Being is itself placed beyond and above Being (as it is regularly with the Neoplatonics) and identified with Godhead (the θεῖος νοῦς, Phil. 22 C); this last is, however, in Tim. set side by side with the Ideas, of which τὸ ἀγαθόν is now the highest.

55 For the Good, the concept of the Good, the reason. of both Truth and Knowledge but not identical with either (they are only cool) and even more worthy of honor—the cause of the knowable and not just of knowing, of both being and essence, not only the essence of the Good but also what transcends essence in power and authority—see Rp. vi, c. 19 (508 A ff.), 517 BC. Here the Good, as the reason and active cause of all Being, is placed beyond and above Being (as is typically the case with the Neoplatonists) and equated with the Divine (the Higher Consciousness, Phil. 22 C); however, in Tim., this is presented alongside the Ideas, where the Good is now the highest.

56 ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα μέγιστον μάθημα, Rp. 505 A.

56 The concept of the good is the most important lesson., Rp. 505 A.

57 The περιαγωγή of the soul, Rp. vii init.

57 The guidance of the soul, Rp. vii init.

58 The philosopher, ἐξιστάμενος τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων σπουδασμάτων καὶ πρὸς τῷ θείῳ γιγνόμενος, ἐνθουσιάζων λέληθε τοὺς πολλούς, Phdr. 249 D.

58 The philosopher, separating from human experiences and becoming divine, inspiring many, Phdr. 249 D.

59 ὁ γὰρ συνοπτικὸς διαλεκτικός, Rp. 537 C. εἰς μίαν ἰδέαν συνορῶντα ἄγειν τὰ πολλαχῇ διεσπαρμένα (and again κατ’ εἴδη τέμνειν what is unified)—this is the business of the διαλεκτικός, Phdr. 265 D. ἐκ πολλῶν αἰσθήσεων εἰς ἓν λογισμῷ ξυναιρούμενον (ἰέναι), Phdr. 249 B.

59 For the modern dialectician, Rp. 537 C. combining different scattered elements into one cohesive idea (and again to cut through the paperwork of that which is unified)—this is the role of the debater, Phdr. 265 D. bringing together various insights into a single logical idea (go), Phdr. 249 B.

60 Gradual ascent of dialectic upwards to αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν ἀγαθόν, Rp. 532 A f., 511 BC, 534 B ff. to αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, Smp. c. 28–9 (211 B). Its aim is ἐπαναγωγὴ τοῦ βελτίστου ἐν ψυχῇ πρὸς τοῦ ἀρίστου ἐν τοῖς οὖσι θέαν, Rp. 532 C.

60 The gradual rise of dialectic towards what's truly good, Rp. 532 A f., 511 BC, 534 B ff. to what's beautiful, Smp. c. 28–9 (211 B). Its goal is the return of the best in the soul towards the highest in existence, Rp. 532 C.

61 The philosophic ἐρωτικός at the end of the dialectic ascent ἐξαίφνης κατόψεταί τι θαυμαστὸν τὴν φύσιν καλόν κτλ., Smp. 210 E—exactly as in the τέλεα καὶ ἐποπτικὰ μυστήρια, 210 A. ὁλόκληρα καὶ ἁπλᾶ καὶ εὐδαίμονα φάσματα μυουμενοί τε καὶ ἐποπτεύοντες ἐν αὐγῇ καθαρᾷ, Phdr. 250 C.—it is a visionary and a suddenly acquired apprehension of the world-order, not one obtained in discursive thought. We may compare the way in which Plotinos, with a recollection of such Platonic passages, describes the arrival of ἔκστασις—ὅταν ἡ ψυχὴ ἐξαίφνης φῶς λάβῃ κτλ. (5, 3, 17; cf. 5, 5, 17).

61 The philosophical romantic at the end of the dialectic ascent Suddenly, he will perceive something wonderful in the beautiful nature, etc., Smp. 210 E—just like in the initiation and visionary mysteries, 210 A. Complete, simple, and blissful visions, both initiated and observant, in pure light., Phdr. 250 C.—it is a visionary experience and a suddenly gained understanding of the world's order, not one achieved through analytical thought. We can compare how Plotinus, recalling such Platonic passages, describes the experience of ἔκστασις—when the soul suddenly receives light. (5, 3, 17; cf. 5, 5, 17).

62 The soul ἔοικε τῷ θείῳ, Phd. 80 A. It is ξυγγενὴς τῷ τε θείῳ καὶ ἀθανάτῳ καὶ τῷ ἀεὶ ὄντι, Rp. 611 E—συγγένεια θεία of men; Lg. 899 D. The eternal and immortal is, as such, divine. The real Ego of man, the ἀθάνατον, ψυχὴ ἐπονομαζόμενον, after death goes παρὰ θεοὺς ἄλλους, Lg. 959 B.

62 The soul It seems divine., Phd. 80 A. It is related to the divine, immortal, and always existing, Rp. 611 E—aunt of humans; Lg. 899 D. The eternal and immortal is, therefore, divine. The true Ego of a person, the immortal, soul called, after death approaches besides other gods, Lg. 959 B.

63 The θεῖον, ἀθανάτοις ὁμώνυμον, part of the soul is ἀθάνατος ἀρχὴ θνητοῦ ζῴου, Tim. 41 C, 42 E. The φρόνησις of the soul (its “wing” Phdr. 246 D) τῷ θείῳ ἔοικεν, Alc.1 133 C.—In Tim. 90 A C this κυριώτατον τῆς ψυχῆς εἶδος is actually called the δαίμων which man has ξύνοικον ἐν αὑτῷ.

63 The divine, having the same name as the immortal, part of the soul is immortal origin of a mortal being, Tim. 41 C, 42 E. The logical part of the soul (its “wing” Phdr. 246 D) like the divine, Alc.1 133 C.—In Tim. 90 A C this most important part of the soul is actually referred to as the daemon that resides inside oneself.

64 The eye is ἡλιοειδέστατον τῶν περὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ὀργάνων, Rp. 508 B.—Goethe is alluding either to these words or to the phrase of Plotinos taken from them, 1, 6 (περὶ τοῦ καλοῦ), 9.

64 The eye is the most sun-like of the senses, Rp. 508 B.—Goethe is either referring to these words or to Plotinus’s phrase taken from them, 1, 6 (about the beautiful), 9.

65 ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἀλήθεια are both ἀγαθοειδῆ, Rp. 509 A—the soul something θεοειδές, Phd. 95 C. 486

65 Knowledge and truth are both easygoing, Rp. 509 A—the soul is something heavenly, Phd. 95 C. 486

66 From the φιλοσοφία of the soul and from the question ὧν ἅπτεται καὶ οἵων ἐφίεται ὁμιλιῶν its real nature can be discerned as one which is ξυγγενὴς τῷ θείῳ καὶ ἀθανάτῳ καὶ τῷ ἀεὶ ὄντι, Rp. 611 DE; Phd. 79 D. With the ξυγγενές of the soul we achieve contact with the ὄντως ὄν, Rp. 490 B. If the Ideas are everlasting, so must our soul be, Phd. 76 DE. By its power of φρονεῖν ἀθάνατα καὶ θεῖα the ἀνθρωπίνη φύσις has itself a share καθ’ ὅσον ἐνδέχεται (i.e. with νοῦς) in ἀθανασία, Tim. 90 BC. This thinking “part” of the soul πρὸς τὴν ἐν οὐρανῷ ξυγγένειαν ἀπὸ γῆς ἡμᾶς αἴρει, ὡς ὄντας φυτὸν οὐκ ἔγγειον ἀλλ’ οὐράνιον, Tim. 90 A.

66 From the philosophy of the soul and from the question Whatever it connects with and whatever it desires in terms of interactions., its true nature can be seen as one that is relative to the divine, immortal, and ever-existing, Rp. 611 DE; Phd. 79 D. With the relative of the soul, we make contact with the Indeed, it exists, Rp. 490 B. If the Ideas are eternal, then our soul must be too, Phd. 76 DE. Through its ability to think immortal and divine, the human nature has a part as far as possible (i.e. with mind) in immortality, Tim. 90 BC. This thinking “part” of the soul He lifts us from the earth to the heavenly kinship, as we are a plant not of the ground but of the sky., Tim. 90 A.

67 λύειν τὴν ψυχὴν from the body and from sense-perception, Phd. 83 AB, 65 A, 67 D. λύσις and καθαρμός of the soul by φιλοσοφία, Phd. 82 D. λύσις καὶ ἴασις τῶν δεσμῶν (of the body) καὶ τῆς ἀφροσύνης, Rp. 515 C.

67 λύειν τὴν ψυχὴν from the body and from sense perception, Phd. 83 AB, 65 A, 67 D. release and purification of the soul through philosophy, Phd. 82 D. Release and healing of bonds (of the body) and of folly, Rp. 515 C.

68 θεῖος εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν ἀνθρώπῳ γίγνεται—said of the true philosopher, Rp. 500 D; ἀθάνατος, Smp. 212 A. The φιλόσοφος is perpetually in contact with the ὂν ἀεὶ and the θεῖον, which last is with difficulty recognizable by the eyes of τῆς τῶν πολλῶν ψυχῆς, Soph. 254 A.—καί μοι δοκεῖ θεὸς μὲν (as e.g. Empedokles called himself) ἀνὴρ οὐδαμῶς εἶναι, θεῖος μήν· πάντας γὰρ ἐγὼ τοὺς φιλοσόφους τοιούτους προσαγορεύω Soph. 216 B (where θεῖος is used in quite a different sense from that it has in other passages where Plato speaks of χρησμῳδοὶ καὶ θεομάντεις as θεῖοι, Men. 99 C, and of the insight and virtue of the unphilosophic as coming θείᾳ μοίρᾳ ἄνευ νοῦ).

68 Divine becomes achievable for humans.—this is said of the true philosopher, Rp. 500 D; eternal, Smp. 212 A. The thinker is always in touch with the eternal existence and the heavenly, which is often hard for the eyes of the collective spirit to recognize, Soph. 254 A.—And I believe that the divine (as for example Empedocles referred to himself) is not really a man at all, divine in fact; because I refer to all philosophers like this Soph. 216 B (where heavenly is used in a quite different sense than in other passages where Plato describes psychics and prophets as heavenly, Men. 99 C, and speaks of the insight and virtue of the unphilosophic as coming from divine fate without logic).

69 Rp. 519 C, 540 B.—τῆς τοῦ ὄντος θέας, οἵαν ἡδονὴν ἔχει, ἀδύνατον ἄλλῳ γεγεῦσθαι πλὴν τῷ φιλοσόφῳ, Rp. 582 C (cf. Phileb.).

69 Rp. 519 C, 540 B.—Only a philosopher can truly experience the view of existence and the pleasure it holds., Rp. 582 C (cf. Phileb.).

70 The flight ἐνθένδε ἐκεῖσε produces ὁμοίωσιν θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν, Tht. 176 B. ὁμοιοῦσθαι θεῷ, Rp. 613 A (τὸ κατανοουμένῳ τὸ κατανοοῦν ἐξομοιῶσαι, Tim. 90 D).

70 The flight from here to there creates similarity to the divine as much as possible, Tht. 176 B. to resemble the divine, Rp. 613 A (to relate what is understood to what is understood, Tim. 90 D).

70a The soul that has through philosophy become completely “pure” is withdrawn from the cycle of Rebirth and from the whole material world. Even as early as Phdr. the souls of the φιλοσοφήσαντες after a third ἐνσωμάτωσις are exempt for the remainder of the περίοδος of 10,000 years, while the real and unwavering (ἀεί) philosopher remains for ever free from the body. That at least must be the meaning of 248 C–249 A. The subject is then treated in more detail in Phd.: Release of the φιλοσοφίᾳ ἱκανῶς καθηράμενοι for ever from life in the body (ἄνευ σωμάτων ζῶσι τὸ παράπαν εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον, 114 C)—entry of the pure soul to its kin (εἰς τὸ ξυγγενές, 84 B) and its like (εἰς τὸ ὅμοιον αὐτῇ, τὸ ἀειδές, 81 A), and εἰς θεῶν γένος, 82 B—and to the τοῦ θείου τε καὶ καθαροῦ καὶ μονοειδοῦς ξυνουσία, 83 E. Still more mythologically expressed—Tim. 42 BD (ὁ τῶν κακῶν καθαρὸς τόπος Tht. 177 A). Throughout we have the release theory of the theologians re-expressed in a philosophical and more elevated manner (Orphic: μεμυημένοι, Phd. 81).

70a The soul that has become completely “pure” through philosophy is removed from the cycle of Rebirth and from the entire material world. Even as early as Phdr., the souls of the φιλοσοφήσαντες after a third Integration are exempt for the remaining period of 10,000 years, while the true and steadfast (always) philosopher remains forever free from the body. That must be the meaning of 248 C–249 A. The topic is then explored in more detail in Phd.: Release of the φιλοσοφία ἱκανῶς καθηράμενοι forever from life in the body (Without bodies, they live entirely into the next time., 114 C)—entry of the pure soul to its kin (to the related, 84 B) and its like (to the like of her, the eternal, 81 A), and to the gods' kind, 82 B—and to the of the divine, pure, and simple unity of existence, 83 E. Even more mythologically expressed—Tim. 42 BD (The place of the wicked is pure. Tht. 177 A). Throughout we see the release theory of the theologians re-expressed in a philosophical and more elevated way (Orphic: initiated, Phd. 81).

71 . . . οὐ ῥᾴδιον δηλῶσαι . . . , Phd. 114 C.

71 . . . hard to explain . . . , Phd. 114 C.

72 To the ἀΐδιος οὐσία, τὸ ἔστι μόνον κατὰ τὸν ἀληθῆ λόγον προσήκει Tim. 37 E.

72 To the eternal essence, which only applies based on the true statement Tim. 37 E.

73 It is true that not until it becomes associated with the body does the soul, by obtaining αἴσθησις, ἐπιθυμία, θυμός, and all the other faculties that bring it into touch with Becoming and Changing, obtain what can strictly be called its individual personality. The perfectly adequate comprehension in thought of the ever-Unchanging by the bodiless and free soul would have no individualized content. We must not, however, (with Teichm., Pl. Fr. 40), conclude from this that Plato knew nothing of an immortality of the individual and of 487 individuality. He did not distinctly raise the question of the seat and origin of individuality in the soul. He is content to suppose that a plurality of individual souls was living before their entanglement with Becoming, and to conclude from this that in eternity, too, after their last escape from γένεσις, the same number of individual souls will still be living. Numerical distinctness (which affects in a scarcely intelligible manner the spaceless and immaterial) has to do duty with him for qualitative distinctness which would alone be able to account for the self-consciousness of this plurality. Acc. to the picture given in Tim. c. 14 (41 D ff.) the souls created by the δημιουργός are evidently all alike (hence also is γένεσις πρώτη τεταγμένη μία πᾶσιν, 41 E), and only when they are in the σῶμα, and bound up with mortal portions of soul, do they react in different ways to what affects them from without—and so become different. (This is so, however, in the pre-existent period, too, acc. to Phd.: but in that account θυμός and ἐπιθυμία are also bound up with the soul in pre-existence.) The influence of the lower soul-partners and of the τροφὴ παιδεύσεως (Tim. 44 B) makes the λογιστικά also of the souls differ among themselves. This acquired individual characterization, the fruit of differing παιδεία καὶ τροφή—something quite the reverse of the “common nature” of “soul” in general which Teichmüller supposes to be meant here: Stud. 143—is taken with it by the soul to the place of judgment, i.e. Hades, Phd. 107 D. When, however, by the best τροφὴ παιδεύσεως it has become completely pure and free from all the trammels of the physical and perishable and departs into bodiless existence in the ἀειδές—then in truth all individual distinctness has been dissolved out of it. Still, it must endure for ever as a self-conscious personality; for that this is what Plato meant cannot be doubted.

73 It’s true that the soul only gains its individual personality when it connects with the body, obtaining perception, desire, anger, and all the other faculties that link it to Becoming and Changing. The complete understanding of the ever-Unchanging by the bodiless and free soul would lack individualized content. However, we shouldn’t conclude, as Teichm. does in Pl. Fr. 40, that Plato didn’t recognize the immortality of the individual or individuality. He didn’t explicitly discuss where individuality comes from in the soul. He simply assumes that multiple individual souls existed before becoming entangled with Becoming, leading him to suggest that after their final escape from genesis, the same number of individual souls will still exist eternally. Numerical distinctness (which affects the spaceless and immaterial in a puzzling way) substitutes for qualitative distinctness, which alone could explain the self-awareness of this plurality. According to the description in Tim. c. 14 (41 D ff.), the souls created by the creator are all identical (as indicated by First genesis set for all, 41 E), and only when they are in the body and connected to mortal parts of the soul do they respond differently to external influences and become distinct. (This distinction also applies during the pre-existent period, according to Phd., where anger and desire are connected to the soul even before existence.) The impact of lower soul-partners and education nourishment (Tim. 44 B) causes the logistics of the souls to vary. This acquired individual characterization, a result of different Education and nourishment—which is precisely the opposite of the “common nature” of “soul” that Teichmüller claims to be implied here: Stud. 143—accompanies the soul to the judgment place, i.e., Hades, Phd. 107 D. However, when, through the best education food, it becomes entirely pure and free from all physical and perishable constraints and moves into bodiless existence in the everlasting, then indeed all individual distinctness has been dissolved from it. Still, it must endure forever as a self-conscious personality; there’s no doubt that this is what Plato intended.

74 Phd. 83 D.

74 PhD. 83 D.

75 χωρίζειν ὅτι μάλιστα ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος τὴν ψυχὴν, Phd. 67 C. ἀναχωρεῖν, 83 (quite in the manner of genuine mysticism—it is the “separateness” of the man who is to behold god, of which Eckhart speaks).

75 to separate the spirit Phd. 67 C. to pull back, 83 (similar to true mysticism—it’s the “separateness” of the person who is destined to see God, which Eckhart refers to).

76 Phd. 64 A ff., 67 E.

76 PhD 64 A ff., 67 E.

77 Phd. 114 C.

77 PhD. 114 C.

78 τοῦ σώματος πτόησις καὶ μανία, Crat. 404 A.

78 the body's shock and chaos, Crat. 404 A.

79 τῷ ξυγγενεῖ πλησιάσας καὶ μιγεὶς τῷ ὄντι ὄντως, Rp. 490 B.

79 getting closer to the related thing and genuinely merging with existence, Rp. 490 B.

80 The soul ἐῶσα χαίρειν τὸ σῶμα καὶ καθ’ ὅσον δύναται οὐ κοινωνοῦσα ὀρέγεται τοῦ ὄντος, Phd. 65 C. In the same way the Appearance yearns after the Idea; see above, this chap., n. 9.

80 The soul Allowing the body to rejoice and, as much as possible, not participating, desires what truly exists., Phd. 65 C. Similarly, the Appearance longs for the Idea; see above, this chap., n. 9.

81 τῆς φρονήσεως κτῆσις, Phd. 65 A ff.

81 possession of wisdom, Phd. 65 A ff.

82 πειρᾶσθαι χρῆ ἐνθένδε ἐκεῖσε φεύγειν ὅτι τάχιστα. φυγὴ δε ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν, Tht. 176 AB.

82 You should try to get out of here as quickly as you can. Escaping is like becoming almost godlike in a way., Tht. 176 AB.

83 Rp. 523 A–524 D.

83 Rp. 523 A–524 D.

84 Beyond all other things it is the κάλλος of the world of Appearance that awakes the memory of that which has once been seen in the world of Ideas: Phdr. 250 B, 250 D ff.; Smp. c. 28 ff. (210 A ff.). Plato gives a peculiar reason for this, but in reality it is due to a vigorous re-emergence of the fundamental artistic sense—the aesthetic element in his philosophic speculation and enthusiasm—which the thinker had so violently suppressed in obedience to his theory that the αἰσθήσεις and all the arts are merely imitations of deceptive imitations of the only true Reality.

84 More than anything else, it's the beauty of the world of Appearance that triggers memories of what has been seen in the world of Ideas: Phdr. 250 B, 250 D ff.; Smp. c. 28 ff. (210 A ff.). Plato offers a unique explanation for this, but really, it's because of a strong resurgence of the core artistic sense—the aesthetic aspect in his philosophical thinking and enthusiasm—which he had forcibly suppressed in line with his belief that the senses and all the arts are simply deceptive copies of the only true Reality.

85 Not μάθησις—only ἀνάμνησις, Phdr. 249 BC; Men. c. 14 ff. (80 D ff.); Phd. c. 18 ff. (72 E ff.). (This theory occurs regularly in Plato in close connexion with the theory of the soul’s migrations; 488 and it appears that he did as a matter of fact derive it from the anticipations and suggestions of earlier teachers of metempsychosis: see above, chap. xi, n. 96.)

85 Not learning—only remembrance, Phdr. 249 BC; Men. c. 14 ff. (80 D ff.); Phd. c. 18 ff. (72 E ff.). (This theory appears regularly in Plato, closely linked with the theory of the soul’s migrations; 488 and it seems that he actually derived it from the ideas and suggestions of earlier teachers of metempsychosis: see above, chap. xi, n. 96.)

86 Rp. vii init.

86 Rp. vii start.

87 ὁμοίωσις δὲ θεῷ δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον μετὰ φρονήσεως γενέσθαι, Tht. 176 B.

87 The resemblance to God should be righteous and pure, attained through careful consideration., Tht. 176 B.

88 εἰς ἀγορὰν οὐκ ἴσασι τὴν ὁδόν κτλ., Tht. 173 D ff.

88 They don't know how to get to the market, etc., Tht. 173 D ff.

89 Tht. 172 C–177 C. The philosopher is unskilled in the life of the everyday world and its arts, and is quite indifferent towards them. Commonplace people, if he is at any time drawn into the affairs of the market place or the law courts, regard him as εὐήθης, ἀνόητος, γελοῖος. Sometimes δόξαν παράσχοιντ’ ἂν (οἱ ὄντως φιλόσοφοι) ὡς παντάπασιν ἔχοντες μανικῶς, Soph. 216 D; Rp. 517 A—passages from the later writing of Plato. Even as early as Phdr. 249 D ἐξιστάμενος τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων σπουδασμάτων καὶ πρὸς τῷ θείῳ γιγνόμενος νουθετεῖται ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ὡς παρακινῶν κτλ.

89 Tht. 172 C–177 C. The philosopher is not skilled in everyday life or its practical skills, and he doesn’t care much about them. Ordinary people, when he gets involved in the marketplace or the courts, see him as naive, foolish, ridiculous. Sometimes δόξαν θα προσφέρουν ἂν(the true philosophers)As completely crazy, Soph. 216 D; Rp. 517 A—passages from Plato's later writings. Even as early as Phdr. 249 D Standing apart from human studies and growing closer to the divine, he is advised by many as a motivator, etc.

90 ἰδιωτεύειν ἀλλὰ μὴ δημοσιεύειν is the injunction made to the philosopher, Ap. 32 A; at least, in πόλεις as they are, Rp. 520 B. After death comes the reward ἀνδρὸς φιλοσόφου τὰ αὑτοῦ πράξαντος καὶ οὐ πολυπραγμονήσαντος ἐν τῷ βίῳ, Gorg. 526 C. ὥσπερ εἰς θηρία ἄνθρωπος ἐμπεσών the true philosopher will ἡσυχίαν ἔχειν καὶ τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν, Rp. 496 D.

90 To concentrate on personal issues instead of public matters. is the instruction given to the philosopher, Ap. 32 A; at least, in cities as they are, Rp. 520 B. After death comes the reward of a philosopher who has pursued his own interests and stayed out of other people's business throughout his life, Gorg. 526 C. Just like a man who gets attacked by wild animals the true philosopher will have peace of mind and concentrate on his own actions, Rp. 496 D.

91 τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πράγματα μεγάλης μὲν σπουδῆς οὐκ ἄξια, Lg. 803 B.

91 The problems of humanity aren't worth a lot of effort., Lg. 803 B.

92 Gorg. 521 D. ὁ ὡς ἀληθῶς κυβερνητικός, Rp. 488 E (cf. also Men. 99 E, 100 A).

92 Gorg. 521 D. the truly governing, Rp. 488 E (see also Men. 99 E, 100 A).

93 Not διάκονος καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν παρασκευαστής but rather an ἰατρός, Gorg. 518 C, 521 A; cf. 464 B ff.

93 Not a servant and creator of desires but rather a doctor, Gorg. 518 C, 521 A; cf. 464 B ff.

94 Gorg. 519 A. All these worldly matters seem to him φλυαρίαι: just as all the Appearances in the world of Becoming are for him but φλυαρίαι, Rp. 515 D.

94 Gorg. 519 A. All these worldly matters seem to him nonsense: just like all the appearances in the world of change are for him just nonsense, Rp. 515 D.

95 Gorg. c. 78 ff. (522 B ff.).

95 Gorg. c. 78 ff. (522 B ff.).

96 οὗτος ὁ τρόπος ἄριστος τοῦ βίου, Gorg. 527 E—(this is the real subject of the Gorg., viz. ὅντινα χρὴ τρόπον ζῆν, 500 C, and not the nature of ῥητορική—and it is this which gives its special emotional tone to the dialogue).

96 This is the best way to live., Gorg. 527 E—(this is the real focus of the Gorg., namely how to live your life, 500 C, and not the nature of persuasive language—and it is this that gives a unique emotional tone to the dialogue).

97 Gorg. 515 C ff., 519 A ff. Summary: οὐδένα ἡμεῖς ἴσμεν ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν γεγονότα τὰ πολιτικὰ ἐν τῇδε τῇ πόλει, 517 A.

97 Gorg. 515 C ff., 519 A ff. Summary: We don't know of any decent person who was meant to be involved in this city., 517 A.

98 οὐχ ὡς καλόν τι ἀλλ’ ὡς ἀναγκαῖον πράττοντες, Rp. 540 B.

98 not as something good, but as something essential, Rp. 540 B.

99 It is now the σκοπὸς ἐν τῷ βίῳ—inaccessible to the ἀπαίδευτοι—οὗ στοχαζομένους δεῖ ἅπαντα πράττειν, Rp. 519 C.

99 It is now the purpose in life—out of reach for the Uneducated—who must strive to achieve everything, Rp. 519 C.

100 The ἄλλαι ἀρεταὶ καλούμεναι (even including σοφία regarded as practical shrewdness: Rp. 428 B ff.) as ἐγγὺς οὖσαι τῶν τοῦ σώματος become of secondary importance compared with the virtue of φρόνησις, i.e. of dialectic and the contemplation of the Ideas, Rp. 518 DE. This alone is θειότερον, something μεῖζον than those bourgeois virtues, Rp. 504 D—philosophy stands high above δημοτική τε καὶ πολιτικὴ ἀρετή, ἐξ ἔθους τε καὶ μελετῆς γεγονυῖα ἄνευ φιλοσοφίας τε καὶ νοῦ, Phd. 82 BC.—This, too, rightly understood, is the real point of the inquiry in Meno. Explicitly, indeed, the dialogue only concerns itself with that ἀρετή which is commonly so regarded and is based on ἀληθὴς δόξα, coming into existence by instinct (θεία μοῖρα); which, however, to the philosopher is not ἀρετή in the proper sense of the word; that name he would only give to ἐπιστήμη, the only sort of knowledge that can be learnt and acquired as a permanent possession, depending as it does upon the doctrine of Ideas. To ἐπιστήμη he this time only makes distant allusion. 489

100 The additional virtues (even including knowledge seen as practical cleverness: Rp. 428 B ff.) are closely connected to the body's needs and are considered less important compared to the virtue of caution, meaning dialectical reasoning and the contemplation of Ideas, Rp. 518 DE. This alone is more heavenly, something greater than those ordinary virtues, Rp. 504 D—philosophy is far superior to Public and political virtue, which comes from habit and tradition rather than the direction of philosophy and reason., Phd. 82 BC.—This, when understood correctly, is the main focus of the inquiry in Meno. The dialogue explicitly deals with that goodness which is commonly recognized and based on true belief, coming to be instinctively (blessing of luck); however, for the philosopher, this is not goodness in the true sense of the word; he reserves that term for knowledge, the only type of understanding that can be learned and maintained as a lasting possession, as it is built on the theory of Ideas. He only makes a vague reference to knowledge this time. 489

101 Rp. vii, c. 15 (535 A, 536 D); cf. vi, c. 2, 5 (485 B, 487 B; 489 D, 490 E).

101 Rp. vii, c. 15 (535 A, 536 D); see also vi, c. 2, 5 (485 B, 487 B; 489 D, 490 E).

102 καὶ τοῦ μὲν (δόξης ἀληθοῦς) πάντα ἄνδρα μετέχειν φατέον, νοῦ δὲ θεούς, ἀνθρώπων δὲ γένος βραχύ τι, Tim. 51 E.

102 and of the real glory, Every man should participate, but the gods, the human race is truly brief., Tim. 51 E.

103 φιλόσοφον πλῆθος ἀδύνατον εἶναι, Rp. 494 A. φύσεις of a completely philosophical kind, πᾶς ἡμῖν ὁμολογήσει ὀλιγάκις ἐν ἀνθρώποις φύεσθαι καὶ ὀλίγας, Rp. 491 B.

103 It's impossible for there to be a completely philosophical crowd., Rp. 494 A. The natural world of a purely philosophical kind, we all agree that very few people have such characteristics, Rp. 491 B.

104 “That into which I sink myself—that becomes one with me: when I think on Him I am as God that is the Fount of Being”—the true mystic note. For the mystics, knowledge of an object is real oneness with the thing known; knowledge of God is union with God.

104 “What I fully immerse myself in becomes part of who I am: when I focus on Him, I am like God, the Source of Existence”—the authentic mystic essence. For mystics, truly knowing something means being one with what is known; knowing God is about being united with God.

105 Rp. 540 B.

105 $ 540.

CHAPTER XIV

THE LATER AGE OF THE GREEK WORLD

PART I

Philosophy

Plato and the Platonic account of the nature, origin, and destiny of the soul closes a period. It marks the end of that theological and spiritualist movement to the force and significance of which nothing bears clearer witness than the fact that it could have such a conclusion. After this point its development ceases—at least it disappears from the surface of Greek life: like one of those Asiatic torrents with which the ancients were familiar it buries itself underground for a long stretch of its course, only to reappear eventually, with all the greater effect, far away from the place of its origin. Even Plato’s own school almost immediately after the death of its master and directing spirit turned its attention in a direction quite other than that which he had given it.1 To have retained the Platonic outlook would have made his pupils even more isolated in their very different age than Plato himself had been in his own.

Plato and his views on the nature, origin, and destiny of the soul mark the end of an era. This concludes a theological and spiritual movement, evident in how it could reach such a resolution. After this point, its development stops—at least, it fades from the forefront of Greek life. Similar to those Asian rivers familiar to ancient people, it goes underground for a long time, only to eventually resurface with even more impact, far from its original source. Even Plato’s own school, shortly after his death, shifted its focus away from the direction he had set. Keeping the Platonic perspective would have left his students even more isolated in their very different times than Plato had felt in his own.

Greece entered upon a new and final phase of her development. The ominous breakdown of the older political fabric at the end of the fourth century might have seemed likely to put an end to the natural vitality of the Greek peoples. With the conquest of the East by Macedonians and Greeks, however, new tasks were set before that people and with the new task they acquired new faculties. The polis, indeed, the purest expression of Greek constructive ability, could not be restored to life. Such of the old and narrow city-republics as had not perished completely in that stormy period only languished in a stagnant peace. Rare, indeed, are the exceptions in which (as particularly in Rhodos) a more vigorous and independent life asserted itself. The new and swollen cities of the Macedonian Empire, with their motley populations drawn from many nationalities, could not make good the loss. The Leagues in which Greece seemed to be making an effort to find a political organization of a wider compass soon broke down under the effects of inward 491 corruption and external violence. Even in its deepest and most essential character the old national spirit of Greece, which had drawn its strength from its clear-cut individuality, seemed to be suffering damage through the unlimited extension eastwards and westwards of Greek life. It did not cease to be an immeasurable advantage to be a Greek, but a Greek now meant anyone who had a share in the one thing that still distinguished and characterized the Greeks, namely, Greek culture—and Greek culture was no longer confined to a single nation. It was no fault of this Greek humanism that not a single one of the vast populations of the East (and in the West at last Rome stood alone) was able to make their own this culture so generously offered to the whole world, so that there, too, all should become Greek who were capable of becoming free human beings. Nevertheless, from all countries and nationalities uncounted multitudes of individuals entered into the circle of this extended Hellenism. The way was open for all who could live without the need of a way of life and thinking modelled strictly upon national lines: for the culture which now united all Greeks and Greek communities was based upon science—and science knows nothing of national frontiers.

Greece entered a new and final stage of its development. The alarming collapse of the old political structure at the end of the fourth century seemed likely to end the inherent vitality of the Greek people. However, with the conquest of the East by Macedonians and Greeks, new challenges emerged for the people, and with these new challenges came new abilities. The polis, the purest expression of Greek creativity, could not be revived. Those old and small city-republics that survived the turbulent times only existed in a stagnant peace. There were rare exceptions, such as in Rhodos, where a more dynamic and independent life emerged. The new and rapidly growing cities of the Macedonian Empire, with their diverse populations drawn from many nationalities, could not replace what was lost. The leagues that Greece attempted to form for broader political organization soon crumbled under internal corruption and external violence. Even at its core, the old national spirit of Greece, which thrived on its distinct individuality, seemed to weaken due to the unlimited expansion of Greek life east and west. It remained a great advantage to be Greek, but now being Greek meant anyone who participated in the one thing that continued to define Greeks: Greek culture—and that culture was no longer limited to a single nation. It was not the fault of this Greek humanism that none of the vast populations of the East (and in the West, Rome stood alone) could truly embrace this culture that was generously offered to the world, allowing all to become Greek who were capable of becoming free individuals. Nevertheless, from all countries and nationalities, countless individuals joined this broad Hellenism. The way was open for all who could exist without adhering strictly to a way of life and thinking based on national lines: the culture that now connected all Greeks and Greek communities was rooted in science—and science knows no national borders.

The science which could thus present itself as the guiding principle of such a large and heterogeneous mass of cultured people, must at any rate have reached a condition of stability if not of completely rounded finality. After all the stir and controversy of the previous centuries it had at last arrived at a period of contented enjoyment of its own resources: the long drawn-out struggle, the restless years of search were now held to have borne fruit. In philosophy at least there was a distinct slackening of the insatiable zeal and boldness of individual thinkers in posing new questions and wresting answers or in seeking for fresh solutions to old problems. A few great systems, formulated in accordance with the fixed tenets of the various schools of thought, still offered a refuge to those who demanded fixity and definition in their opinions; for centuries they kept up their special traditions without serious alteration until they, too, fell in pieces at last. A greater measure of independence and variety was displayed by the special sciences which since they had now been completely released for the first time from the leading-strings of philosophy proceeded to develop freely in accordance with their own principles. Art, too, was by no means devoid as yet of originality and attractiveness, and in spite of the overwhelming achievements of the past refused to be driven 492 into a position of subservience and imitation. But it was no longer, in conjunction with the peculiar customs and manners of a people, the mistress and dispenser of wisdom and knowledge of the world. Art becomes a plaything and an incidental diversion: it is science that determines the general character and content of culture. But this scientifically minded culture shares in the natural temper of all science. Science has its feet firmly planted in life itself: it keeps men’s minds actively employed in this world; it has small temptation to leave the firm ground of what is knowable and can never be too well known, to voyage out into the region of the intangible which can never be a subject of scientific inquiry. A cool rationalism, a calm adherence to the intelligible and thinkable, without any leanings to the gloomy terrors of a mysterious world of the unknown—such is the temper that marks the science and culture of the Hellenistic age and marks it more distinctively than any other period of Greek culture. Such mysticism as was still vigorous and effective kept itself timidly in the background at this time; in the everyday world it is rather the direct contrary of mysticism that we are made aware of; the unlovely results of the prevailing rationalism, a bleak reasonableness, a knowing and prosaic common sense such as stares dully at us from the pages of Polybios’ History as the point of view of the narrator himself and of those of whom he writes. It was no age of heroes or of the heroic. A weaker and more delicate generation holds the field. The breakdown of political life and the disappearance of its obligations made it more possible than it had ever been before for the individual to lead his own life in his own way.2 And he makes the most of his freedom, his culture, the treasures of an inward, private life enriched with all the brilliance and charm of an old and perfected civilization. All the past had thought and laboured on his behalf; he is not idle, but he is busy without ever being in a hurry, enjoying his heritage and taking his ease in the cooling sunlight of the long drawn-out autumn of Greek life. And he is little concerned to inquire what may follow when this brilliant, many-coloured world that surrounds him shall have vanished from his gaze. This world is all in all to him. The hope or fear of immortality has little effect upon the educated people of the age.3 Philosophy to which in one form or another they are all more or less closely attached teaches them according to its particular mood to cherish that hope or calmly to set it to one side: in none of the popular sects 493 had the doctrine of the eternity or imperishable nature of the soul any serious significance as the central doctrine of a system. Natural science ruled the day, while theology remained in the background and could only obtain a doubtful hearing (if it was even listened to at all) for its proclamation of the divine origin and everlasting life of the souls.

The science that emerged as the guiding principle for such a diverse and educated group of people must have reached a stable point, if not a final one. After all the upheaval and debates of previous centuries, it had finally entered a phase of enjoying its own resources: the long struggle and restless quest were now seen as fruitful. In philosophy, at least, there was a noticeable decrease in the relentless enthusiasm and daring of individual thinkers in asking new questions and seeking answers or searching for new solutions to old issues. A few major systems, formed around the established beliefs of different schools of thought, still provided a refuge for those who sought stability and clarity in their views; for centuries, they maintained their traditions without significant changes until they ultimately fell apart. The special sciences showed greater independence and diversity now that they were fully released from the constraints of philosophy, allowing them to develop freely based on their own principles. Art also continued to have originality and appeal, and despite the overwhelming achievements of the past, it resisted being pushed into a role of subservience and imitation. However, it was no longer the mistress and provider of wisdom and knowledge in conjunction with the unique customs and manners of a people. Art became more of a pastime and a side diversion: it was science that defined the overall character and substance of culture. Yet this scientifically oriented culture shared the natural disposition of all science. Science is firmly rooted in life itself: it keeps people’s minds actively engaged in the world; it has little temptation to stray from the solid ground of what is knowable and never can be too well known, to venture into the realm of the intangible that can never be a subject of scientific inquiry. A cool rationalism, a calm commitment to what is understandable and thinkable, without leaning toward the dark fears of a mysterious unknown—this is the mood that characterizes the science and culture of the Hellenistic era and distinguishes it more than any other period of Greek culture. Any mysticism that was still vibrant and effective remained cautiously in the background at this time; in everyday life, we often notice the opposite of mysticism; the unappealing outcomes of the dominant rationalism, a stark reasonableness, a knowing and practical common sense that stares blankly at us from the pages of Polybios’s History as the perspective of the narrator and those he writes about. It was not an age of heroes or heroism. A weaker and more fragile generation took the stage. The breakdown of political life and the loss of its obligations made it easier than ever for individuals to lead their own lives in their own ways. And they took full advantage of their freedom, their culture, and the riches of a private life enriched with all the brilliance and charm of an aged and refined civilization. The past had thought and labored for their benefit; they were not idle, but they were engaged without ever rushing, enjoying their legacy and relaxing in the soft light of the long autumn of Greek life. They cared little to ponder what might come next when this vibrant, colorful world around them vanished from sight. This world was everything to them. The hope or fear of immortality had little impact on the educated people of the time. Philosophy, to which they were all more or less connected in some way, either taught them to hold onto that hope or calmly set it aside, depending on its particular mood: in none of the popular sects, had the doctrine of the eternity or imperishable nature of the soul any significant importance as the central tenet of a system. Natural science held the foreground while theology remained in the background and could only gain uncertain attention (if it was even listened to at all) for its claims of the divine origin and eternal life of souls.

§ 2

At the outset of this period, and illuminating a long stretch of it with the light of his genius, stands the figure of Aristotle. In what this master di color’ che sanno had to say of the soul’s nature and destiny two voices are distinctly audible. The soul, he instructs us, is that which in a living and organic physical body brings the potentially existing to actual existence. It is the form to the body’s matter, the culmination of the capacities of independent life residing in the particular body. Bodiless and immaterial itself, it is not the outcome of the mixture of the various parts of the body; it is the cause, not the resultant, of the vital functions of its body which exists for the soul’s benefit as its “instrument”.4 It dwells within a natural organism and though it is itself unmoved it moves that organism as the source of its growth and nourishment, of its desires and locomotion, of its feeling and perceiving; while in the higher organisms it acts as the combination of all these faces. It is as little to be thought of as separate from the body—its own body—as the power of vision is in separation from the eye or as its shape from the moulded waxen image.5 Theoretically, indeed, it is possible to distinguish between body and soul, but actually and in the animated organism they cannot be distinguished. When the living creature dies the matter of which it was composed loses it special adaptation to a purposeful organism, and this adaptation was its life; without it there can be no independent “Substance” (οὐσία).6 The Form, the functional power of the once living organism, its “soul”, has no longer any independent existence.

At the beginning of this era, and casting a long shadow over it with his brilliance, is the figure of Aristotle. In what this master di color’ che sanno shares about the nature and destiny of the soul, two distinct perspectives emerge. He teaches us that the soul is what brings the potential within a living and organic physical body into actual existence. It serves as the form to the body's matter, representing the culmination of the abilities of independent life present in that body. Though it is bodiless and immaterial, it doesn't arise from the mixture of the body's various parts; rather, it is the cause, not the effect, of the vital functions of the body, which exists for the soul's benefit as its "instrument".4 The soul resides within a natural organism and, while it itself remains unmoved, it causes that organism to move, providing the source of its growth, nourishment, desires, locomotion, feelings, and perceptions; in higher organisms, it combines all these aspects. It is as difficult to separate the soul from the body—its own body—as it is to separate the power of vision from the eye or the shape from a molded wax figure.5 Theoretically, you can distinguish between body and soul, but in practice, within the living organism, they are inseparable. When a living creature dies, the matter it was made of loses its special adaptation to function as a purposeful organism, and this adaptation was its life; without it, there can be no independent "Substance" (substance).6 The Form, the functional power of the once-living organism, its "soul", no longer exists independently.

This is the voice of Aristotle the physicist when he is speaking from the standpoint of a physical doctrine which includes the study of the soul “in so far as it occurs not without matter”.7 Aristotle the metaphysician takes us further. In the soul of man, besides the vital powers of the organized individual, there lives a spiritual being of more than natural character and origin, the “Mind”—“that in us which thinks and conceives”.8 This thinking mind is not bound to the body and its life.9 It does not come into being with the creation of the human organism which is completed by the addition of Mind. It has no beginning and was uncreated from eternity:10 it enters into man at his creation “from without”.11 Even while it lives within the body it remains unmingled with the body and its powers and uninfluenced by them.12 Enclosed within itself it lives its separate life as something quite other than the “soul” (of which it is nevertheless called a “part”13) and separated from it by a gulf. Comparable with the God of Aristotle’s world it transcends what might be called its “little world”,14 the living human organism. It influences that organism without being influenced in turn. It is akin to God; it is called the “divine” in man.15 Its activity is the same as that of God.16 God—pure substance, unlimited, highest, everlasting actuality—is absolute and perpetually operant thinking.17 All practical activity, doing and creating, is far removed from God.18 So, too, the “Mind” is entirely occupied in thinking (though here there is some alternation perhaps between the potential and the actual).19 It grasps, in an intuition of the intellect that is beyond failure and error,20 the “unmediated” first principles, the first and highest concepts, immediately certain and not deducible from still higher concepts, from which all knowledge and philosophy is derived.21

This is the voice of Aristotle the physicist speaking from a perspective of a physical doctrine that includes the study of the soul “in so far as it occurs not without matter.”7 Aristotle the metaphysician takes us further. In the soul of man, in addition to the vital powers of the organized individual, there exists a spiritual being of a higher character and origin, the “Mind”—“that in us which thinks and conceives.”8 This thinking mind is not limited to the body and its life.9 It doesn’t come into existence with the creation of the human organism, which is completed by the addition of Mind. It has no beginning and was uncreated from eternity:10 it enters into man at his creation “from without.”11 Even while it exists within the body, it remains separate from the body and its powers and unaffected by them.12 Enclosed within itself, it lives its own life as something completely different from the “soul” (of which it is still referred to as a “part”13) and is separated from it by a vast divide. Comparable to the God of Aristotle’s world, it goes beyond what could be considered its “little world,”14 the living human organism. It influences that organism without being influenced itself. It is akin to God; it is referred to as the “divine” in man.15 Its activity is the same as that of God.16 God—pure substance, limitless, the highest, everlasting actuality—is absolute and constantly active thinking.17 All practical activity, doing and creating, is far removed from God.18 Similarly, the “Mind” is completely focused on thinking (though there may be some alternation between the potential and the actual).19 It apprehends, in a flawless and infallible intuition of the intellect,20 the “unmediated” first principles, the first and highest concepts, which are immediately certain and not derived from even higher concepts, from which all knowledge and philosophy stem.21

In its association with the body and its “soul” this thinking Reason lives as “the ruling”22 element over both—not, however, as the “realization” of this particular individual creature. The Mind is indeed said to be that which the individual man “is”,23 and without the addition of Mind the man could not exist, but the special and personal character belonging to the individual is not to be found in this reasoning Mind.24 Mind is totally devoid of distinguishable qualities and is identical in every case where it appears; it is invariably foreign to the separate and individual character of the man to whom it is added, and hardly seems to be his peculiar property.

In its connection with the body and its “soul,” this reasoning lives as the “ruling”22 element over both—not, however, as the “realization” of this specific individual creature. The Mind is described as what the individual man “is,”23 and without the addition of Mind, the man could not exist, but the unique and personal traits that belong to the individual are not found in this reasoning Mind.24 The Mind lacks any distinguishable qualities and is the same in every instance where it appears; it is consistently unrelated to the separate and individual character of the man to whom it is added, and hardly seems to be his unique property.

When death occurs the thinking “Mind” is not involved in the destruction which overtakes the human organism with which it was associated. Death does not affect it. Like everything that is without beginning it is indestructible.25 It returns again to its separate existence. Like the great World-Mind, God, and in company with it—for it has not sprung from God and does not merge again into God—the individual Mind of man continues in unending life.26 It 495 disappears now into impenetrable darkness. The separate existence of the Mind is beyond not merely our perception but our conceiving as well—persisting for itself alone, Mind has no mental activity, no memory and no consciousness; indeed, it is impossible to say what special qualities or activity can be attributed to it beyond the simple predicate of existence, of being.27

When death happens, the thinking "Mind" isn't involved in the destruction that happens to the human body it was connected to. Death doesn't impact it. Like everything that has no beginning, it is indestructible.25 It goes back to its separate existence. Similar to the great World-Mind, God, and alongside it—since it didn't come from God and doesn't merge back into God—the individual Mind of a person continues to exist indefinitely.26 It 495 now fades into impenetrable darkness. The separate existence of the Mind is beyond not just our perception but also our understanding—it persists for itself alone; the Mind has no mental activity, no memory, and no awareness; in fact, it's impossible to define what specific qualities or activities can be attributed to it beyond the simple idea of existence, of being.27

In the doctrine of this thinking Mind which is associated with the human soul “from without” and never merges into it, of its pre-existence from eternity, its kinship with God and its imperishable life after its separation from the human organism—in all this Aristotle preserves a mythological element taken from the dogmatic teaching of Plato.

In the idea of this thinking Mind, which connects with the human soul “from the outside” and never fully becomes one with it, its existence before time, its relationship with God, and its eternal life after it separates from the human body—in all this, Aristotle retains a mythological aspect borrowed from Plato's doctrinal teachings.

There was a time when he had been a complete Platonist precisely in his doctrine of the soul. In his youth, like other members of the Academy, he had yielded28 to the fascination of clothing in artistic and perfected language brilliant fantasies about the origin, nature, and destiny of the soul—the divine daimon29 inhabiting the mortal frame of man. Later, however, it seemed inconceivable to him that “any soul may inhabit any body”.30 He could only conceive of the “soul” of the individual man as a realization of the life of this entirely distinct and physical organism, to which it is indissolubly bound as the purpose and form of the particular instrument. All the vital powers as well as appetite, perception, memory, and reflective thought, appeared to him merely as the modes of activity manifested by the animated body which is itself unthinkable apart from its “soul”. And yet he still preserved a relic of the old dualistic opposition between the body and the independent substantial soul—the same conception of the soul, in fact, as that which Plato had himself, in the later period of his philosophical development, alone retained. This was as the contemplative Mind which is occupied in apprehending the highest truths in intellectual intuition; and this mind is, according to Aristotle, not to be included in the “soul”, but to be separated from it as a special being that has descended from the heights of divinity and has been coupled with the soul from without and for its limited period of life. The origin of this conception of a reduplicated soul is plain: it is derived from memories of Plato and beyond that from theological doctrine which was itself in the last resort but a spiritualized restatement of primeval popular fancies of the psyche that dwells in the living body. But though he took over the doctrine he did not take over the special sense that 496 the theologians had given to it: he omitted both the conclusions they drew and the exhortations they based upon it. We hear no more of the “purification” of the divine Mind within mankind. It has nothing impure or evil in it nor can any breath of pollution affect it from without. The effort towards the “other world” of purity, the denial and rejection of its earthly partner the living body, are foreign to the “Mind” of Aristotle.31 It has no impulse to “deliverance” or self-emancipation; it knows of no peculiar task that points beyond this world. The presence of this “separable” Mind in the living man is an assured fact, and nothing more: no purpose in life is deducible from it. The fact itself seemed to be evident from the power that man possesses of grasping immediately a highest form of knowledge that is beyond demonstration, not as the result of the mental activity of his soul, for the apprehension is prior to the soul, but by means of a higher spiritual faculty, a special intellectual being that seemed to proclaim its presence and existence within man in this way. It is thus by way of a theory of knowledge not of a theological doctrine that we arrive at the distinction between “Mind” and “Soul”. But the doctrine thus reasserted was in reality nothing but the old doctrine of the theologians. This “Mind”, too, seems to the thinker to be a being akin to God. The pure contemplative existence, a life consisting in the contemplation of the final objects of intuition is counted as a privilege of the divine and of all divine beings, as the true purpose of vital energy and of its manifestation; and in the description of this state the sober reserve of his lecture style seems to be uplifted and almost illuminated with the warmth and brilliance imparted by a genuine glow of personal experience.32 This pure activity of contemplation, finding its deepest satisfaction in itself, belongs to the divine in man—to the Mind; its whole life lies in this. This activity, however, the Mind performs and finishes in this life, while it is united with the body and the body’s “soul”. There is nothing left that can be thought of as forming the content of the life and activity of the Mind in its separate existence after the completion of its period of life on earth. Mind and the man with whom it is associated can hardly have a very urgent desire for that emancipation in “another world” which is thus left blank and without content for our thought. The thought of immortality cast in this form could no longer possess any real value or ethical significance for man.33 It arises from a logical deduction, from metaphysical considerations, not 497 from a demand of the spirit. It lacks not only the distinctness that might have appealed to the senses and given direction to the imagination, but the power (or the intention) of playing a leading part in the conduct or direction of life on this earth. There is no inspiration in this doctrine—not even for the philosopher, though it was to him and his activity and his efforts that the picture and panegyric of “Mind”, the philosopher in man, had really referred.

There was a time when he had been a total Platonist, especially in his beliefs about the soul. In his younger years, like other members of the Academy, he was captivated by beautifully crafted language that expressed brilliant ideas about the origin, nature, and destiny of the soul—the divine spirit living within the human body. However, later on, he found it hard to believe that “any soul may inhabit any body.” He could only view the "soul” of an individual as a manifestation of the life of a completely unique and physical organism, to which it is inseparably tied as the purpose and form of that specific body. All vital powers, along with desires, perceptions, memories, and reflective thoughts, seemed to him merely as forms of activity exhibited by the living body, which itself is unimaginable without its “soul.” Yet, he still retained some remnants of the old dualistic view of the body and its separate, substantial soul—the very same concept of the soul that Plato himself clung to in the later stages of his philosophical thinking. This was as the contemplative Mind, focused on grasping the highest truths through intellectual intuition; according to Aristotle, this mind is not to be included in the “soul,” but rather should be seen as a distinct being that has descended from the divine and is joined with the soul temporarily during its earthly existence. The origin of this idea of a dual soul is clear: it comes from memories of Plato and, beyond that, from theological doctrine, which itself is ultimately just a spiritualized restatement of ancient popular beliefs about the psyche residing in the living body. But although he adopted the doctrine, he did not embrace the specific meaning that 496 the theologians gave it: he disregarded both their conclusions and the calls to action they derived from it. We hear no more about the “purification” of the divine Mind within humans. It has nothing impure or evil about it and cannot be tainted by external influences. The pursuit of an “other world” of purity, the rejection of its earthly companion—the living body—does not align with Aristotle’s “Mind.” It has no impulse for “deliverance” or self-liberation; it is not aware of any specific task that points beyond this life. The existence of this “separable” Mind in a living person is a well-supported fact, and nothing more: no purpose in life can be inferred from it. The fact itself appears evident from the ability of humans to grasp a higher form of knowledge that exists beyond proof, not as a result of the mental activity of their soul, for this understanding comes before the soul, but through a higher spiritual faculty, a unique intellectual being that seems to assert its presence and existence within people in this manner. Thus, it is through a theory of knowledge—not a theological doctrine—that we distinguish between “Mind” and “Soul.” However, the reasserted doctrine was essentially just the old ideas held by theologians. This “Mind” also appears to the thinker to be a being similar to God. The pure contemplative existence, a life focused on contemplating the final objects of intuition, is seen as a privilege of the divine and all divine beings, representing the true purpose of vital energy and its expression; in describing this state, the usual restraint of his lecture style seems to be uplifted and nearly illuminated by the warmth and brilliance of genuine personal experience. This pure act of contemplation, finding its greatest contentment in itself, belongs to the divine aspect of man—to the Mind; its entire existence revolves around this. However, this activity is completed by the Mind during its lifetime while it is connected to the body and its “soul.” There is nothing left that can be considered the substance of the Mind’s life and work in its separate existence after it has completed its time on earth. The Mind and the person it is associated with can hardly have a strong desire for that emancipation in “another world,” which thus remains empty and devoid of content for our understanding. The thought of immortality presented in this way can no longer hold any real value or ethical significance for people. It arises from a logical deduction, from metaphysical considerations, not 497 from a spiritual need. It lacks not only the clarity that might resonate with the senses and guide the imagination, but also the ability (or desire) to play a leading role in shaping or directing life on earth. There is no inspiration in this doctrine—not even for the philosopher, although it was originally meant to refer to him and his endeavors and efforts concerning the image and praise of “Mind,” the philosopher within man.

It was quite possible to abide by the teaching and philosophy of Aristotle, directed as it was to the observation and interpretation of the things of this world, while abandoning the advanced post of the doctrine of Mind—that Being which has sunk to the level of this world from the other world of divinity, which separates itself, with the death of man, once more to everlasting divine life though hardly to a continuation of individual existence. On this point in particular free discussion of the master’s teaching maintained itself in his school: some, and by no means the weakest, of Aristotle’s successors denied altogether and in every form the doctrine of immortality.34

It was entirely possible to follow Aristotle's teachings and philosophy, which focused on observing and interpreting the things of this world, while moving away from the advanced idea of Mind—that Being that has descended from the divine realm to our world, which once again separates itself after man's death to return to eternal divine life, though not necessarily to continue individual existence. On this particular point, open discussions about the master's teachings continued in his school: some, and certainly not the least influential, of Aristotle's successors completely rejected the idea of immortality.34

§ 3

The dogmatic teaching of the Stoics on the subject of the human soul is closely bound up with the materialistic pantheism by means of which they explained all the phenomena of life, of being and becoming upon earth. God is All, and divinity is nothing outside this “all”, which forms the world: the Universe is God. God is thus not only the matter but the form, the life and the power of the world. Divinity is the original matter, the etherial Fire, the fiery “breath” which maintains itself or changes and in innumerable metamorphoses creates the world. God is also what supplies a purpose to this world and is the purposeful force—the reason and law of the world. The universal deity which is thus at once matter, mind, and formative principle sends out from itself at varying periods the multiplicity of Appearance and then again at another time takes back the multifarious and the divided into the fiery unity of its own breath of life. Thus, in everything that has shape, in everything that lives and moves, the content and the unifying form is God: he is and works as their “state” in inorganic things, as “nature” in plants, as “irrational soul” in the other living things, as rational and thinking soul in man.35 498

The rigid teachings of the Stoics about the human soul are closely linked to the materialistic pantheism they used to explain all life and existence on Earth. God is everything, and divinity exists only within this "everything," which makes up the world: the Universe is God. Therefore, God is not just the matter but also the form, the life, and the power of the world. Divinity is the original matter, the ethereal Fire, the fiery "breath" that sustains or transforms and, through countless changes, creates the world. God also provides purpose to this world and acts as the driving force—the reason and law of the universe. This universal deity, which is simultaneously matter, mind, and shaping principle, releases a variety of appearances at different times and then, at another moment, reabsorbs the diverse and separate into the fiery unity of its own life force. Thus, in everything that has shape, in everything that lives and moves, the essence and the unifying form is God: he exists and operates as their "state" in inanimate objects, as "nature" in plants, as "irrational soul" in other living beings, and as rational, thinking soul in humans.35 498

The soul of man, thus endowed with reason, is a fragment of the divine,36 and is itself divine like everything else in the world but in a purer sense than all other things. It has remained closer to the first and original essence of the divine, conceived as “creative fire” (πῦρ τεχνικών), than the earthly fire which has lost much of its original purity and refinement. It is closer37 than the lower matter that in all its changeful forms degenerates progressively as it gets farther and farther away from the divine fire by gradual loss of the tension (τόνος) that had once been living and active in the primeval fire; closer even than the material of its own body in which it dwells and rules. As something essentially distinct from the body, then, the individual soul comes into being among the elements of its body when that body is conceived, and it develops its full nature after the birth of the individual.38 But even in its individual, separate existence it remains incompletely detached from the universal life that is present in it; it remains subject to the “universal Law” of the world, which is God, and fast bound by “fate”, the “destiny” (πεπρωμένη, εἱμαρμένε) which decrees the course of their existence for the totality of all Life and the individual lives.39 Nevertheless, the soul has its special gifts and special task—it is capable of self-determination and is responsible for its own decisions and acts. Though it is a pure emanation from the universal Reason and bound down to no irrational elements, it has the power of irrational choice and can resolve upon what is evil. Though they have all sprung from one and the same original source the individual souls are of very different character, intellect, and propensity of will. Unreason in thought, will, and conduct is common in the world; those who have real insight are few; in fact, the Wise Man, the man who keeps his own will in complete harmony with the universal and divine direction of the world, is but a picture of imaginary perfection, naturæ humanæ exemplar, never fully and perfectly realized in actual life.

The human soul, equipped with reason, is a part of the divine, and is itself divine like everything else in the world, but in a purer way than all other things. It has stayed closer to the original essence of the divine, seen as “creative fire” (fire of techniques), than the earthly fire, which has lost much of its original purity and refinement. It is closer than the lower matter that, in all its changing forms, degenerates progressively as it moves further from the divine fire, losing the vibrant energy (ton) that was once alive in the primal fire; closer even than the material of its own body, where it lives and governs. As something fundamentally different from the body, the individual soul emerges among the elements of its body when that body is conceived, and it fully develops its nature after the individual is born. But even in its unique, separate existence, it remains somewhat connected to the universal life that exists within it; it is still subject to the “universal Law” of the world, which is God, and bound by “fate,” or “destiny” (fate, destiny), which determines the path of existence for all Life as well as individual lives. Nonetheless, the soul has its special gifts and its own mission—it has the ability to make choices and is responsible for its decisions and actions. Even though it is a pure extension of universal Reason and isn’t tied to irrational forces, it has the ability to make irrational choices and can choose what is wrong. Although all souls come from the same original source, they vary widely in character, intellect, and will. Irrationality in thought, will, and behavior is common in the world; those with genuine insight are rare; in fact, the Wise Person, the one who aligns their will completely with the universal and divine order of the world, is merely an image of imaginary perfection, naturæ humanæ exemplar, never fully and perfectly realized in real life.

Ethical interests demanded the freedom and independence of the moral personality and its will, which can only fulfil the requirements of duty by self-mastery and the overthrow of base impulses; but this independence was in conflict with the essential principles of Stoic metaphysics. The Stoics taught that the world (and the soul included in it) is only the necessary self-development of a single and absolute Being that excludes all independent and separate multiplicity. Nor could they recognize any principle of Evil, an anti-rational principle answering to the purity of divine power, working 499 evil and suggesting it, and making the individual capable of wilful disobedience to the laws of all-embracing divinity. Pure pantheism, uniting God and the world in indissoluble unity, cannot imagine a real conflict between humanity and divinity; it cannot postulate a principle of Evil through the overthrow of which a lost unity with God is to be restored. Pantheism makes no claims of an ethical or religious kind. The ingenuity of the Stoic doctors was exercised in vain in the attempt to find a way out of this dilemma.40

Ethical interests called for the freedom and independence of the moral self and its will, which can only meet the demands of responsibility through self-control and the rejection of base instincts. However, this independence clashed with the core ideas of Stoic metaphysics. The Stoics believed that the world (including the soul) is merely the necessary self-development of a single, absolute Being that excludes any separate or independent multiplicity. They also could not acknowledge any principle of Evil, an anti-rational force that opposes the purity of divine power, causing evil and suggesting it, while making individuals capable of willful disobedience to the laws of an all-encompassing divinity. Pure pantheism, which unifies God and the world in an inseparable oneness, cannot conceive of a genuine conflict between humanity and divinity; it cannot suggest a principle of Evil that, if overcome, would restore a lost unity with God. Pantheism does not put forth any claims of an ethical or religious nature. The creativity of Stoic scholars was exercised in vain as they sought a solution to this predicament.

From the very origin of the school two tendencies were discernible in the teaching of the Stoa, derived as that teaching was from such different sources. On the one hand, the ethical doctrine of the Cynics, to whom the Stoics owed the greater part of their practical teaching, threw the individual back upon his own resources and made everything depend upon the determination of his own will. It thus pointed in the direction of the most self-sufficient individualism—to an ethical atomism. The physical doctrine derived from Herakleitos, on the other hand, merged the individual completely into the omnipotence and omnipresence of the All-One; and therefore, as its ethical counterpart, demanded that this relation of the individual to the universal Logos of the world should find expression in a life lived completely ex ductu rationis, in unconditional abandonment of the individual will to the Universal Mind that is the World and God.41 In actual fact it was Cynicism that had the profounder influence in ethical matters. The universal Law and order of the world, embracing both universe and individual in its absolute decrees, threw its net too widely to be able to answer closely enough to the needs of narrow and individual existence. No practical ethics could possibly unite this distant and final aim with the individual man in a single nexus of ordered self-determination. The intermediate link between the universe and its laws, on the one hand, and the individual with his private will, on the other, had formerly been the Greek polis with its law and custom. But it was a cosmopolitan age, and for the Stoics as well as for the Cynics before them the city-state had lost most of its educative force. The individual saw himself more and more left to his own devices and forced to depend upon his own strength—his life had to be ordered on self-erected standards and guided by self-found rules. Individualism, which gave its tone to the age more decisively than in any past period of Greek life, began to win a footing even in this pantheistic system. The “Wise Man” who is a law to himself in perfect 500 self-determination,42 and feels himself bound only to those like himself,43 is individualism’s fairest flower.

From the very beginning of the school, two trends were noticeable in the teachings of the Stoa, which came from such different sources. On one hand, the ethical philosophy of the Cynics, from whom the Stoics got most of their practical teachings, pushed the individual to rely on their own resources and made everything dependent on their own will. This led to a type of self-sufficient individualism—a form of ethical atomism. On the other hand, the physical doctrine derived from Heraclitus completely merged the individual into the all-powerful and ever-present One; and thus, as its ethical counterpart, required that the individual's relationship with the universal Logos of the world be expressed through a life lived entirely ex ductu rationis, in total surrender of the individual's will to the Universal Mind that is the World and God.41 In reality, it was Cynicism that had the deeper impact on ethical matters. The universal Law and order of the world, which encompassed both the universe and the individual in its absolute mandates, cast its net too broadly to effectively address the needs of individual existence. No practical ethics could successfully link this distant and ultimate goal with the individual man in a singular connection of organized self-determination. The common link between the universe and its laws, on one side, and the individual with his private will, on the other, had once been the Greek polis with its laws and customs. But this was a cosmopolitan era, and for the Stoics, as well as for the Cynics before them, the city-state had lost much of its educational power. The individual increasingly found themselves left to their own devices and had to rely on their own strength— their life had to be structured according to self-set standards and directed by rules they created themselves. Individualism, which marked the era more significantly than in any previous period of Greek life, began to establish itself even within this pantheistic system. The "Wise Man," who becomes a law unto himself in perfect 500 self-determination,42 and feels accountable only to those like him,43 represents the most beautiful expression of individualism.

But the soul, thus elevated to a height where it was capable of much that was impossible for or only incompletely within the reach of its weaker sisters, began more and more to seem like something rather different from a mere dependent offshoot of the One divine power that is the same everywhere. It is, in fact, regarded as an independent, divine, and self-enclosed creature in those passages where in Stoic literature, as in the older literature of the theologians, the soul is called a “daimon”—the daimon dwelling within the individual man, and given to him as his associate.44 Death, too, is regarded by this professedly monist system as a separation of soul from body45 in accordance with what was really a naive or a conscious spiritualism. In death, then, this soul-essence whose independence had been so marked even in life, does not perish with the body—it does not even lose itself again in the One from which it had taken its origin. An infinitely extended individual life is indeed not attributed to the individual souls: only God, the one Soul of the World, is eternally indestructible.46 But the souls which have arisen by separation from the one and all-embracing divinity, survive the destruction of their bodies: until the final dissolution, in the Conflagration that will make an end of the present period of world-history, they persist in their independent life; either all of them (as was the older teaching of the school) or, as Chrysippos, the master of Stoic orthodoxy, taught the souls of the “Wise” only, while the others have been lost in the general life of the Whole some time previously.47 The stronger ethical personality is held together in itself for a longer time.48

But the soul, once elevated to a level where it could do much that was impossible for or only partially achievable by its weaker counterparts, began to appear more and more as something quite different from just a lesser extension of the One divine power that is universal. In fact, it is seen as an independent, divine, and self-sufficient entity in those passages where Stoic literature, as well as earlier theological writings, refer to the soul as a “daimon”—the daimon residing within each person, assigned to him as a companion.44 Death is also viewed by this supposedly monist system as a separation of soul from body45 in line with what was either a naive or a deliberately spiritual viewpoint. In death, then, this essence of the soul, which had shown its independence even while alive, does not perish with the body—it doesn’t even lose itself back into the One from which it originated. An infinitely extended individual life is not attributed to individual souls: only God, the one Soul of the World, is eternally indestructible.46 But the souls that have emerged from the one all-encompassing divine essence survive the destruction of their bodies; until the ultimate dissolution in the Conflagration that will end this era of world history, they continue to exist independently; either all of them (as was traditionally taught by the school) or, as Chrysippus, the master of Stoic orthodoxy, taught, just the souls of the “Wise,” while the others have already merged back into the overall life of the Whole.47 The stronger ethical personality remains cohesive for a longer time.48

From the point of view of physical science and materialist doctrine49 it was also hard to see why the soul, composed of pure fire-breath, which even in life had held the body together and had not been held together by the body,50 should disappear at once when that body was disintegrated. As it had once held the body together, so it might well and all the more easily hold itself together now. Its lightness carries it upwards into the pure air under the moon, where it is fed by the breath that rises upwards and where there is nothing that can put an end to it.51 An “underworld” region like that of popular imagination and theological teaching, was expressly denied by the Stoics.52 Their imagination preferred to exercise itself in an imaginary extension of life in the Aether, which was their region of 501 the souls;53 but as a rule it appears that such flights of fancy were avoided. The life of the souls after death—that of the wise as well as of the unwise—remained indistinct and without content54 in the imagination of those whose life was still upon earth.

From the perspective of physical science and materialist beliefs, it was also difficult to understand why the soul, made of pure fire-breath, which had even in life kept the body intact and hadn’t been reliant on the body, should vanish immediately when that body broke down. Just as it once held the body together, it could just as easily hold itself together now. Its lightness lifts it up into the pure air under the moon, where it is nourished by the breath that rises and where nothing can bring it to an end. A "beneath" region like that of popular imagination and theological teaching was outright rejected by the Stoics. They preferred to imagine an ongoing life in the Aether, which was their realm for the souls; however, generally, it seems such flights of fancy were avoided. The existence of souls after death—both wise and unwise—remained vague and empty in the minds of those still living on earth.

Thus, the doctrine of the soul-personality and its continued existence (never simply expanded into personal immortality), which was in reality not required by the metaphysical principles of Stoicism, and could indeed hardly be reconciled with them, had in fact no serious significance for the general intention and substance of Stoicism—least of all for Stoic ethics and conduct of life. The philosophy of Stoicism is directed to the study of life, not of death. In this life on earth and only here can the purpose of human endeavour—the reproduction of divine wisdom and virtue in the human spirit—be fulfilled in manful contest with contrary impulses, fulfilled, that is, in so far as such a thing is possible for lonely and isolated fragments of divinity.55

Thus, the idea of the soul-personality and its ongoing existence (which was never just expanded into personal immortality), wasn't actually needed by the metaphysical principles of Stoicism, and could hardly be aligned with them. It had no real significance for the overall aim and essence of Stoicism—especially not for Stoic ethics and ways of living. Stoicism is focused on studying life, not death. In this life on earth, and only here, can the goal of human effort—the manifestation of divine wisdom and virtue in the human spirit—be achieved through courageous struggle against opposing impulses, accomplished, that is, as far as is possible for lonely and isolated fragments of divinity.55

But virtue is sufficient in itself for the attainment of happiness—a happiness which loses nothing through the brevity of its duration and to which nothing would be added by the prolongation of its span.56 Nothing in the doctrine of Stoicism points man, or the Wise Man, to another world beyond the life of the body and outside this earthly theatre of conflict and duty, for the fulfilment of his being and his task.

But virtue is enough on its own to achieve happiness—a happiness that doesn’t diminish because of how short it lasts and to which nothing would be gained by extending it.56 Nothing in Stoicism directs a person, or the Wise Person, to a world beyond physical existence or outside this earthly stage filled with challenges and responsibilities for fulfilling one’s purpose and duties.

§ 4

The limited doctrine of immortality which, as we have seen, was not an essential part of the teaching of Stoicism, began to be called in question as soon as the rigid dogmatism of the school was subjected to the too-searching criticism of other schools of thought. In the clash of opinions Stoicism began to be doubtful of the absolute validity of its own teaching. The boundaries of orthodox doctrine once so firmly drawn now became more fluid; exchange and even compromise became common. Panaitios, the first writer among the pedantic professors of Stoicism to achieve a wider popularity for his writings, became the teacher and friend of those aristocratic Romans who found in Greek philosophy the impulse to a humanism that the barren soil of Rome could never have produced unaided. And Panaitios differed in more than one point from the strict orthodoxy of the older Stoicism. For him the soul is formed of two distinct elements57—it is no longer simple and undivided, but 502 compounded of “Nature” and “Soul” (in the narrower sense).58 In death these two elements separate and change into other forms. The soul having had its origin at a particular point in past time now perishes in time. Being capable of grief and subject to the destructive influence of the emotions it falls a victim at last to its own pains. Panaitios, while remaining a Stoic, taught the dissolution of the soul, its death and simultaneous destruction with the death of the body.59

The limited idea of immortality, which we’ve seen wasn’t a core part of Stoic teaching, started to be questioned once the strict beliefs of the school faced intense criticism from other philosophies. During this clash of viewpoints, Stoicism began to doubt the absolute truth of its own teachings. The boundaries of orthodox doctrine, once clearly defined, grew more flexible; exchanges of ideas and even compromise became common. Panaitios, the first writer among the strict professors of Stoicism to gain wider popularity for his works, became the mentor and friend of aristocratic Romans who found in Greek philosophy a form of humanism that the unfruitful soil of Rome could never produce on its own. Panaitios had several differences from the strict orthodoxy of earlier Stoicism. He viewed the soul as made up of two distinct elements—no longer simple and undivided, but 502 comprised of “Nature” and “Soul” (in a narrower sense). In death, these two elements separate and transform into other forms. The soul, having originated at a specific moment in the past, eventually comes to an end in time. Being capable of grief and vulnerable to emotional turmoil, it ultimately becomes a victim of its own suffering. Panaitios, while still identifying as a Stoic, taught that the soul dissolves, dies, and is simultaneously destroyed along with the body.

His pupil Poseidonios, who as a writer possessed an even greater influence than Panaitios with the great majority of cultivated readers who belonged to no special school of thought, returned to the older Stoic doctrine of the simple and undivided nature of the soul as fiery breath. He distinguished three faculties but not three separate and independent elements in the human soul, and as a consequence of this view had no further need to believe in the dissolution of the soul into its component parts at death. He also denied the origin of the individual soul in time, from which the doctrine of its destruction in time had seemed to follow by a logical necessity. He returned to the old theological idea of the pre-existence of the soul, its life since the beginning of the created world; and could therefore go on to assert its continued existence after death—at least till the time of the next destruction of the World at the hands of omnipotent Fire.60

His student Poseidonios, who as a writer had even more influence than Panaitios among most educated readers who didn't align with any specific school of thought, returned to the older Stoic belief in the simple and unified nature of the soul as fiery breath. He identified three faculties but not three separate and independent elements within the human soul, which meant he no longer needed to believe in the soul's breakdown into its parts at death. He also rejected the idea that the individual soul originated in time, which had logically suggested its destruction over time. He reverted to the ancient theological concept of the pre-existence of the soul, its life since the beginning of the created world; therefore, he could confidently claim its continued existence after death—at least until the next destruction of the World by all-powerful Fire.60

It was not an inward and private necessity that led to this transformation of the old teaching of the School. Doubts and criticisms levelled at it from outside—from the Sceptics in particular—had necessitated the change. While some gave up the struggle, others sought refuge in a re-arrangement of the figures of the dialectical game and by the introduction of fresh characters.61 Immortality might be abandoned to criticism or reaffirmed in either case with equal indifference. The Platonic and poetic version of Stoicism provided by Poseidonios may have found a wider response among the readers of a highly cultivated society who felt the need of a doctrine of immortality more as a satisfaction to the artistic fancy than from any deeper or more temperamental causes. Cicero, the most eloquent representative of the Hellenized Roman culture of the time, may perhaps give us a picture of the refined and æsthetic partiality with which these ideas were taken up. In the Dream of Scipio and the first book of the Tusculans, he gives an account, mainly based on Poseidonios, of the belief then held of a continued life of the soul in the divine element of the Aether.62 503

It wasn't a personal need that caused the old teachings of the School to change. External doubts and criticisms, especially from the Sceptics, prompted the transformation. While some people gave up the fight, others found a way to rearrange the elements of the philosophical debate and introduced new concepts. Immortality could either be dismissed or reasserted with the same lack of concern. The Platonic and poetic interpretation of Stoicism offered by Poseidonios may have resonated with readers in a highly refined society who sought a doctrine of immortality more to satisfy their artistic inclinations than for any deeper reasons. Cicero, the most eloquent representative of Hellenized Roman culture at that time, perhaps illustrates the refined and aesthetic way these ideas were embraced. In the Dream of Scipio and the first book of the Tusculans, he presents an account, primarily based on Poseidonios, of the belief in the soul's continued existence within the divine essence of the Aether.61 503

§ 5

Stoicism had a long and vigorous life. More than ever during the first and second centuries of our era did it fulfil its real task of acting as a practical guide to conduct, not as a mere museum of dead erudition. It made good its claim to provide its adherents with the autonomous freedom and independence of a mind at peace with itself, whose virtue was proof against the tribulation and failure of life, and not corrupted by its plenty. It was not always blind imitation of a literary fashion or the love of displaying virtuous paradoxes that attracted the noblest of the higher Roman aristocracy to the doctrines of Stoicism. Not a few of them guided their lives in accordance with its principles and even died for their convictions. Not entirely “without tragic emotion”, as the Stoic Emperor would prefer it, but at any rate with conscious and deliberate purpose—not in mere unreasoning stubbornness63—did these Stoic martyrs go to their death. Nor was it the unquestioned certainty of a continued life in a higher existence that made them so ready to give up life upon this earth.64 Each in the special manner dictated to him by his own temperament and the circumstances of his life, they still speak to us, these leaders of Roman Stoicism—Seneca the philosophic director of the world’s conscience, Marcus Aurelius the Emperor, and those instructors and patterns of the aspiring youth of Rome, Musonius and Epictetus. The eager and unswerving effort of these wise men to educate themselves to the attainment of freedom and peace, of purity and goodness of heart, wins our admiration—not least in the case of Seneca in whom the struggle for self-mastery and philosophic calm must have been a continual war with his own too-receptive and imaginative nature. But just as they looked for no supernatural helper and redeemer but trusted to the power of their own spirit for the assurance of success, so they required no promise of a future crowning of their labours in an after-life of the soul. The whole scope of their endeavour lies within the limits of this world. The old Stoic belief in the continued life of the individual soul until the annihilation of all separate creation in the World Conflagration65 is regarded at the best as one possibility among many66—it is perhaps but a “beautiful dream”.67 But whether death is a transition to another form of being or a complete termination of individual life—to the wise man it is equally welcome, for he measures the value of life not by the number 504 of its years but by the richness of its content. At bottom Seneca is inclined to the view that death is the end of all things for man, after which “everlasting peace” awaits the restless spirit.68

Stoicism had a long and dynamic existence. More than ever during the first and second centuries of our era, it served its true purpose as a practical guide to conduct, rather than just a collection of outdated knowledge. It upheld its promise to give its followers the freedom and independence of a mind at peace with itself, whose virtue was resilient against life's challenges and failure, and not tainted by its abundance. It wasn't just mindlessly following a literary trend or showing off virtuous contradictions that drew the noblest members of the Roman aristocracy to Stoic beliefs. Many of them lived according to its principles and even faced death for their beliefs. Not entirely “without tragic emotion,” as the Stoic Emperor might have preferred, but certainly with conscious and deliberate intent—not through mere unreasoning stubbornness—these Stoic martyrs faced their deaths. Nor was their willingness to give up life on this earth solely based on the certainty of a life after this one. Each one, in their unique way shaped by their temperament and life circumstances, still speaks to us today: Seneca, the philosophical guide of the world’s conscience; Marcus Aurelius, the Emperor; and those role models for Rome’s aspiring youth, Musonius and Epictetus. The dedicated and unwavering efforts of these wise individuals to educate themselves toward achieving freedom, peace, purity, and a good heart earn our admiration—especially in Seneca, whose struggle for self-control and philosophical serenity must have been a constant battle against his own highly receptive and imaginative nature. Just as they sought no supernatural helper and trusted in the strength of their own spirit for assurance of success, they also did not require a promise of a future reward for their efforts. Their entire focus was within the limits of this world. The old Stoic belief in the continued existence of the individual soul until the destruction of all separate creation in the World Conflagration is at best seen as just one possibility among many—it might even be just a “beautiful dream.” But whether death is a transition to another form of existence or a complete end to individual life, for the wise person, it is equally acceptable, as they measure life's value not by its length but by its depth. Deep down, Seneca tends to believe that death marks the end of all things for humans, after which “everlasting peace” awaits the restless spirit.

The Stoic Emperor is uncertain whether death is a dissipation of the elements of the soul (as the atomists teach) or whether the mind survives in a conscious or an unconscious existence that must yet disappear eventually in the life of the Whole. All things are in perpetual flux—so the Law of the universe has willed it—nor shall the human personality maintain itself untouched and unchanged. But even supposing that death is a “putting out” of his small individual candle, the wise man is not afraid: to the melancholy that is the prevailing mood of his gentle, pure, and high-strung character Death, the annihilator, seems to beckon like a friend.69

The Stoic Emperor is unsure whether death means the elements of the soul dissipate (as the atomists suggest) or if the mind continues in some form of awareness, eventually fading away into the bigger picture of existence. Everything is in constant change—that’s just how the universe works—and the human identity cannot stay untouched or the same. But even if death is like extinguishing his small individual flame, the wise person isn’t afraid: for someone with his gentle, pure, and sensitive nature, Death, the ender of life, seems to call like a friend.69

The tougher spirit of the Phrygian slave and freedman needed no conviction of personal survival to enable him to face the battle of earthly life with courage and intrepidity. What has been made must be unmade: without hesitation and without regret the wise man gives himself up to the laws of the rationally-ordered universe in which the present must make way for the future—not indeed to be lost entirely, but to be changed and to merge its individuality, its unimportant self in new manifestations of the creative stuff of Life. The Whole does not perish, but its parts change and alter their relations among themselves.70 The pantheistic principles of the school which had been taken over from Herakleitos and which made it permanently inconceivable that the diminutive individual spark of life could achieve a lasting separation from the central fiery mass, had become a settled conviction. The passionate abandonment of the personal, short-lived self to the everlasting Whole and One had become a fixed habit of mind. No longer did it seem intolerable that the individual existence should pass away after a brief span of life; it was possible to remain a Stoic and yet assert expressly, like Cornutus the teacher of Persius, that with the death of its body there is an end, too, of the individual soul.71

The stronger spirit of the Phrygian slave and freedman didn't need a reminder of personal survival to confront the challenges of life with bravery and determination. What has been created must eventually be undone: without hesitation or regret, the wise person embraces the rules of the rationally ordered universe, where the present must give way to the future—not to be completely lost, but to transform and merge its individuality, its unimportant self, into new expressions of the creative essence of Life. The Whole does not disappear; rather, its parts change and alter their relationships with one another. 70 The pantheistic ideas from the school, inherited from Herakleitos, made it consistently unimaginable for the tiny individual spark of life to achieve a lasting separation from the central fiery mass. This had become a settled belief. The passionate surrender of the personal, short-lived self to the everlasting Whole and One had turned into a habitual mindset. It no longer seemed unbearable for individual existence to fade after a brief life; it was possible to remain a Stoic and still assert, like Cornutus, the teacher of Persius, that with the death of its body, the individual soul comes to an end as well. 71

§ 6

The atomist doctrine renewed by Epicurus demanded in the most emphatic manner of its adherents that they should abandon the belief in personal survival.

The atomist theory revitalized by Epicurus strongly urged its followers to give up the belief in personal survival.

For the atomist the soul is corporeal, a compound made 505 up of the most mobile of the atoms which form the plastic elements of air and fire. It occupies all parts of the body, and is held together by the body, while at the same time, and in spite of this, holding itself in essential distinctness from the body.72 Epicurus also speaks of the “Soul” as a special and enduring substance within the body, a “part” of the corporeal, not a mere “harmony” resulting from the association of the parts of the body.73 He even speaks of two parts or modes of manifestation in the “soul”; the irrational, which holds the whole body in its sway as its vital force, and the rational, situated in the breast, which exercises will and intelligence and is the last and most essential source of life in living things, without the undivided presence of which death occurs.74 Anima and animus (as Lucretius calls them), distinct but not separable from one another,75 come into being in the embryo of man and grow to maturity, old age and decay, together with the body.76 If death occurs it means that the atoms belonging to the body are separated and the soul-atoms withdrawn—even before the final dissolution of the body, the separable “soul” disappears. No longer held together by the body, it is blown away in the wind, it disappears “like smoke” in the air.77 The soul, this soul that had animated the individual man, is no more.78 The material elements of which it was composed are indestructible; it is quite possible that they may at some future time combine together with the life-stuff to produce new life and consciousness of exactly the same kind as had once been joined together in the living man. But, if so, it will be a new creature that thus comes into being: the original man has been annihilated by death; there is no bond of continuous consciousness uniting him with the fresh creation.79 The vital forces of the world are continuous, undiminished, indestructible, but in the formation of the individual living creature they are only lent temporarily, for this occasion and for a brief period, after which they are withdrawn for ever from the particular creature. Vitaque mancipio nulli datur, omnibus usu.

For the atomist, the soul is physical, a mix made 505 of the most mobile atoms that create the fundamental elements of air and fire. It fills all parts of the body and is held together by the body, while at the same time, remaining fundamentally separate from it.72 Epicurus also refers to the “Soul” as a specific and lasting substance within the body, a “part” of the physical, rather than just a “harmony” that arises from the body’s parts.73 He even describes two aspects or ways the “soul” manifests: the irrational part, which controls the entire body as its life force, and the rational part, located in the chest, which enables will and understanding and is the ultimate source of life in living beings; without its complete presence, death occurs.74 Anima and animus (as Lucretius calls them), distinct but inseparable from each other,75 come into existence in a man's embryo and mature, age, and decay along with the body.76 When death happens, it means the atoms of the body have separated, and the soul-atoms withdraw; even before the body completely dissolves, the separable “soul” vanishes. No longer held together by the body, it gets blown away in the wind, disappearing “like smoke” in the air.77 The soul that once animated the individual is gone.78 The material elements that made it are indestructible; it's quite possible that they may combine with life-force again in the future to create new life and consciousness identical to what was once in the living man. However, if that happens, it will be a new being that comes into existence: the original man has been erased by death; there is no ongoing consciousness linking him to this new creation.79 The vital forces of the world are continuous, unchanging, and indestructible, but in the formation of the individual living creature, they are only temporarily given, for this time and for a short period, after which they are permanently withdrawn from that specific creature. Vitaque mancipio nulli datur, omnibus usu.

After his death the individual is unaffected by the fate of his inanimate body;80 nor should he be troubled by the thought of what may happen to the atoms of his soul. Death does not concern him at all; for he only is when death is not; where death is, he is no longer there.81 Sensation and consciousness have left him at the dissolution of body and soul; what he cannot possibly feel affects him no longer. Epicurean maxims are never tired of driving home 506 this proposition: death is nothing to us.82 From every possible direction, from abstract principle and practical experience in actual life, Lucretius labours to demonstrate the truth of this view83 as ardently as other philosophers seek to prove its opposite. Physical science has no more valuable service to render than that of convincing us of its truth.84 Just as the wisdom of Epicurus has no other purpose than to protect man, of all creatures the one most sensitive to pain, from distress and anguish—and even pleasure is but the removal of pain—so more particularly, in putting an end to the fear of death and the craving after unceasing life, it serves this finite life itself,85 that is committed to us once and for all and never repeated.86 If a man has once succeeded in realizing that he will cease to be in the moment of death’s coming, he will neither be oppressed with terror at the threatened loss of self-consciousness nor will the terrors of eternity87 or the fabulous monsters of the spirit-world below the earth88 darken his existence by casting their dark shadow over all his life.89 He will devote himself to life without repining, neither fearing death nor seeking it.90

After he dies, a person isn’t affected by the fate of their lifeless body; nor should they worry about what might happen to the atoms of their soul. Death doesn’t concern them at all; they exist only when death is not present; where death exists, they are no longer there. Sensation and consciousness have left them at the dissolution of body and soul; what they cannot possibly feel no longer affects them. Epicurean principles consistently emphasize this point: death is nothing to us. From every angle, whether through abstract principles or practical experiences in real life, Lucretius works hard to prove the truth of this perspective as passionately as other philosophers try to argue the opposite. Physical science offers no greater service than convincing us of its truth. Just as the wisdom of Epicurus exists to shield humans—who are the most sensitive to pain—from distress and anguish—and even pleasure is merely the absence of pain—so, more specifically, it helps eliminate the fear of death and the desire for endless life, serving this finite life we have, which is given to us just once and never repeated. If someone has truly realized that they will cease to exist when death arrives, they won't be overwhelmed by fear of losing self-awareness, nor will the fears of eternity or the mythical creatures of the spirit world below the earth darken their existence by casting a shadow over their life. They will engage in life without regret, fearing death neither nor seeking it.

He alone—the ideal Wise Man of the Epicurean faith—will know how to live as the true artist of his own life;91 he will not waste the precious time in vain preparations for the future,92 but will cram every moment to the full so that his brief span of existence will have all that a long life could give. Long life, in fact, even life without an end, would not make him any happier or any richer. What life has to offer it has already offered—anything further must only be a repetition of what has gone before: eadem sunt omnia semper.93 The Wise Man has no reason even to look for an eternity of life.94 In his own personality, in this present “now”, he possesses all the conditions necessary to happiness. The very transience of this supreme happiness to which mortality can attain makes it seem the more valuable to him. To the development and the enjoyment of this, the only life that belongs to him he will devote himself exclusively. In ethical matters, too, the atomist doctrine holds good. There is no such thing in nature as an essential community of human beings—still less of humanity—there are only individuals.95 In associations entered into by free and unforced choice the individual may attach himself to the individual as one friend to another; but the political societies that men have invented and set up among themselves have no obligations for the Wise Man. He is himself the centre and indeed the whole circumference of the world surrounding 507 him. State and society are valuable, and indeed only exist for the protection of the individual and to make it possible for him under their enfolding care to develop his own personality in freedom.96 The individual, on the other hand, does not exist for the state, but for himself. “It is no longer necessary to save the Hellenes or to win crowns of victory from them in contests of wisdom.”97 Such is the decision reached with a sigh of relief by a civilization that has attained the highest point of its development and is now overcome by a lassitude in which it no longer sets itself new tasks, but takes its ease as age may be permitted to do. In its lassitude it no longer hopes, and in all honesty no longer cares, to extend the period of its existence beyond the limits of this earthly life. Calm and untroubled it sees this life, dear though it may once have been, fade away, taking its leave and sinking into nothingness without a struggle.

He alone—the ideal Wise Man of the Epicurean belief—will know how to live as the true artist of his own life; he will not waste precious time on pointless preparations for the future, but will fill every moment to the brim so that his short life will have everything a long life could offer. In fact, a long life, or even a life without end, wouldn’t make him any happier or richer. Life has already given him all it has to offer—anything more would just be a repeat of what has already happened: everything is always the same. The Wise Man has no reason to seek eternity. Within his own being, in this present “now,” he has all the conditions necessary for happiness. The fleeting nature of this supreme happiness that mortality can reach makes it seem even more valuable to him. He will dedicate himself exclusively to the development and enjoyment of this, the only life that belongs to him. In matters of ethics, too, the atomist doctrine holds true. There is no such thing in nature as an inherent community of people—let alone humanity—there are only individuals. In associations formed by free and unforced choice, one individual may connect with another as one friend does with another; however, the political societies that humans have created have no obligations for the Wise Man. He is himself the center and indeed the entirety of the world around him. State and society are valuable and exist only to protect the individual and allow him to develop his own personality in freedom. The individual, on the other hand, does not exist for the state, but for himself. “It is no longer necessary to save the Greeks or to win crowns of victory from them in contests of wisdom.” Such is the conclusion reached with a sigh of relief by a civilization that has reached the peak of its development and is now overcome by a weariness that neither sets new goals nor strives for improvement, but simply rests as age may allow. In its weariness, it no longer hopes, and honestly no longer cares, to extend its existence beyond the limits of this earthly life. Calm and undisturbed, it watches this life, once so dear, fade away, taking its leave and sinking into nothingness without a struggle.

NOTES TO CHAPTER XIV

PART I

1 At first the philosophy of Plato’s old age lived on in spirit in the Academy. Just as his pupils carried on his Pythagorean speculations about numbers, reduced his imaginative suggestions as to a daimonic nature intermediate between that of God and man to pedantic system, and elaborated the theological strain in his thought to a gloomy and burdensome deisidaimonia (witness esp. the Epinomis of Philippos of Opos and in addition all that we know of Xenokrates’ speculations)—so too they retained and respected for a time the Platonic doctrine of the soul and the ascetic tendency in his ethical teaching. For Philippos of Opos the aim of all human endeavour is a final and blessed emancipation from this world (which, however, is only possible for a few of those who are, in his special manner, “wise”—973 C ff., 992 C). He is a mystic for whom this earth and its life fall away into nothing: all serious interest is confined to the contemplation of divine things such as are revealed in mathematics and astronomy. Again, the Platonic doctrine of the soul, in its mystic and world-renouncing sense, lies at the bottom of the fabulous narratives of Herakleides Pontikos (in the Ἄβαρις, Ἐμπεδότιμος, etc.). This, too, accounts for the youthful attempts in this direction of Aristotle himself (in the Εὔδημος and probably also in the Προτρεπτικός). This side of his doctrine was as it seems systematized from the standpoint of the latest stage of Platonism by Xenokrates in particular. It may be merely accident that we do not hear very reliably of anything indicating an ascetic tendency or an “other-worldly” effort after emancipation of the soul in connexion with Xenokrates. Krantor (in his much-read book περὶ πένθους) was already capable of employing the Platonic doctrine of the soul and the imaginative fancies that could be attached to it simply as a literary adornment. And before him his teacher Polemon betrays a turning aside from the true Platonic mysticism. With Arkesilaos the last vestige of this whole type of thought disappears completely.

1 Initially, the philosophy of Plato's later years continued to thrive in spirit at the Academy. Just as his students carried forward his Pythagorean ideas about numbers, turned his creative suggestions about a daimonic nature between God and man into a rigid system, and expanded the theological aspects of his thought into a heavy and oppressive deisidaimonia (especially evident in the Epinomis by Philippos of Opos and in everything we know about Xenokrates’ ideas)—they also maintained and respected, for a time, the Platonic view of the soul and the ascetic direction in his ethical teachings. For Philippos of Opos, the ultimate goal of all human efforts is a final and blessed liberation from this world (which is only achievable for a select few who are, in his specific sense, “wise”—973 C ff., 992 C). He is a mystic who sees this earth and its life as insignificant: all serious focus is narrowed to contemplating divine matters as revealed in mathematics and astronomy. Furthermore, the Platonic idea of the soul, in its mystical and world-renouncing sense, underlies the fantastic tales of Herakleides Pontikos (in the Abaris, Empedotimos, etc.). This also explains Aristotle's youthful explorations in this area (in the Eudemos and likely in the Encouraging). This aspect of his teaching was, it seems, systematized from the perspective of the latest stage of Platonism, especially by Xenokrates. It may just be a coincidence that we lack reliable information indicating an ascetic inclination or an “other-worldly” pursuit of freedom of the soul in connection with Xenokrates. Krantor (in his widely-read book about mourning) was already adept at using the Platonic view of the soul and the imaginative ideas associated with it purely as a literary embellishment. And prior to him, his teacher Polemon shows a departure from true Platonic mysticism. With Arkesilaos, the last remnant of this entire type of thought completely vanishes.

2 τοῖς ἐλευθέροις ἥκιστα ἔξεστιν ὅ τι ἔτυχε ποιεῖν, ἀλλα πάντα ἢ τὰ πλεῖστα τέτακται, Arist., Meta. 1075a, 19 (in maxima fortuna minima licentia est, Sall., C. 51, 13). Freedom in this sense indeed was a thing of the past.

2 Those who are free have the least ability to do whatever they want, but everything, or at least most things, are predetermined., Arist., Meta. 1075a, 19 (In great wealth, there is little freedom., Sall., C. 51, 13). Freedom in this sense was indeed a thing of the past.

3 Not that such hopes or fears were entirely absent. The reader will remember the case of Kleombrotos of Ambrakia (Call., Ep. 25), who by reading the Phaedo of Plato (and completely misunderstanding the meaning of the prophet, as not unfrequently happens) was led to seek an immediate entrance into the life of the other world by a violent break with this one—and committed suicide. This is an isolated example of a mood to which Epiktetos bears witness as common in his own much later time—the desire felt by many young men of ardent temperament to escape from the distracted life of humanity and return as quickly as possible to the universal life of God by the destruction of their own individual existence: Epict. 1, 9, 11 ff. But in the earlier period such violent manifestations of other-worldly fanaticism were of rare occurrence. Hedonism was 509 capable of leading to the same result as we may see from the Ἀποκαρτερῶν of Hegesias the Cyrenaic, called ὁ πεισιθάνατος, whom Cicero mentions together with this same Kleombrotos: TD. i, 83–4.

3 It's not like hopes or fears were completely gone. The reader might recall the case of Kleombrotos from Ambrakia (Call., Ep. 25), who, after reading Plato's Phaedo (and completely misunderstanding the prophet's meaning, which isn’t uncommon), was driven to seek an immediate escape into the afterlife by violently ending his own life—and he committed suicide. This is a singular example of a feeling that Epiktetos observed as common in his much later time—the strong desire that many passionate young men felt to escape the chaotic human experience and quickly return to the universal life of God by destroying their own individual existence: Epict. 1, 9, 11 ff. However, in earlier times, such drastic expressions of otherworldly fanaticism were rare. Hedonism could lead to the same outcome, as seen in the case of Hegesias the Cyrenaic, known as the persuader of death, whom Cicero mentions along with Kleombrotos: TD. i, 83–4.

4 τὸ σῶμά πως τῆς ψυχῆς ἕνεκεν (γέγονει), as ὁ πρίων τῆς πρίσεως ἕνεκα—and not vice versa: PA. 1, 5, 645b, 19.

4 the body exists for the sake of the soul (has become), as the saw exists for the purpose of cutting wood—and not the other way around: PA. 1, 5, 645b, 19.

5 The ψυχή is related to the body as ὄψις is to the eye, i.e. as the effective power residing in the ὄργανον (not like ὅρασις, the individual act of vision). It is the πρώτη ἐντελέχεια of its body de An. ii, 1, 412a, 27. There is no σύνθεσις of σῶμα and ψυχή: they are simply “together” like the wax and the ball formed out of the wax: Top. 151a, 20 ff.; GA. 729b, 9 ff.; de An. 412b, 7.

5 The soul is to the body what appearance is to the eye, meaning it is the active power within the instrument (not to be confused with sight, which refers to the specific act of seeing). It is the first actuality of its body de An. ii, 1, 412a, 27. There is no synthesis of body and soul: they are simply “together” like wax and the ball made from that wax: Top. 151a, 20 ff.; GA. 729b, 9 ff.; de An. 412b, 7.

6 ἀπελθούσης γοῦν (τῆς ψυχῆς) οὔκετι ζῷόν ἐστιν, οὐδὲ τῶν μορίων οὐδὲν τὸ αὐτὸ λείπεται, πλὴν τῷ σχήματι μόνον καθάπερ τὰ μυθευόμενα λιθοῦσθαι, PA. 641a, 18.

6 When the soul leaves (the spirit)no longer exists as a living being, and nothing about its parts is the same, except for its shape, just as the stories say they turn into stone., PA. 641a, 18.

7 Meta. 1026a, 5: περὶ ψυχῆς ἐνίας θεωρῆσαι τοῦ φυσικοῦ, ὅση μὴ ἄνευ τῆς ὑλῆς ἐστίν.—οὐδὲ γὰρ πᾶσα ψυχὴ φύσις, ἀλλά τι μόριον αὐτῆς, PA. 641b, 9. The subject of τὸ κεχωρισμένον of the soul is studied by ὁ πρῶτος φιλόσοφος: de An. 403b, 16.

7 Meta. 1026a, 5: To understand the soul, we need to consider its physical aspect, which can’t exist without matter. Not every soul is nature; it is actually a specific part of it., PA. 641b, 9. The topic of the separated soul is examined by the earliest philosopher: de An. 403b, 16.

8 λέγω δὲ νοῦν, ᾧ διανοεῖται καὶ ὑπολαμβάνει ἡ ψυχή, de An. 429a, 23.

8 I say that the mind is what the soul uses to think and reflect., de An. 429a, 23.

9 The νοῦς and its θεωρητικὴ δύναμις ἔοικε ψυχῆς γένος ἕτερον εἶναι καὶ τοῦτο μόνον ἐνδέχεται χωρίζεσθαι, καθάπερ τὸ ἀΐδιον τοῦ φθαρτοῦ, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ μόρια τῆς ψυχῆς οὐκ ἔστι χωριστά κτλ., de An. 413b, 25.

9 The mind and its Theoretical power appears to be a distinct aspect of the soul, one that can be separated, much like the eternal can be distinguished from the temporary, whereas the other parts of the soul cannot be separated, and so on., de An. 413b, 25.

10 There can be no doubt that Aristotle’s opinion was that νοῦς was uncreated and existed without beginning from eternity: see Zeller, Sitzb. Berl. Ak. 1882, p. 1033 ff.

10 There’s no doubt that Aristotle believed that mind was uncreated and has existed eternally without a beginning: see Zeller, Sitzb. Berl. Ak. 1882, p. 1033 ff.

11 θύραθεν ἐπεισέρχεται into the man as he is being made, GA. 736b, 28; cf. ὁ θύραθεν νοῦς, 744b, 21.

11 It enters from the chest. into the man as he is being formed, GA. 736b, 28; cf. the outsider's mind, 744b, 21.

12 νοῦς is ἀπαθής, ἀμιγής, οὐ μέμικται τῷ σώματι—it has no physical ὄργανον, de An. iii, 4. οὐδὲν αὐτοῦ (τοῦ νοῦ) τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ κοινωνεῖ σωματικὴ ἐνέργεια, GA. 736b, 28.

12 Us is calm, untainted, separate from the body—it has no physical organ, de An. iii, 4. None of it (the mind) shares in the physical energy, GA. 736b, 28.

13 μόριον τῆς ψυχῆς, de An. 429a, 10 ff. ψυχὴ οὐχ ὅλη, ἀλλ’ ἡ νοητική, 429a, 28. ἡ ψυχὴ . . . μὴ πᾶσα ἀλλ’ ὁ νοῦς, Meta. 1070a, 26.

13 part of the soul, de An. 429a, 10 ff. the soul is incomplete, but the rational part, 429a, 28. the soul . . . not everything, but the mind, Meta. 1070a, 26.

14 The ζῷον a μικρὸς κόσμος, Phys. 252b, 26.

14 The ζῷον a μικρὸς κόσμος, Physics. 252b, 26.

15 νοῦς, θειότερόν τι καὶ ἀπαθές, de An. 408b, 29.—τὸν νοῦν θεῖον εἶναι μόνον, GA. 736b, 28 (737a, 10). εἴτε θεῖον ὅν εἴτε τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ θείοτατον, EN. 1177a, 15. νοῦς is τὸ συγγενέστατον to the gods, 1179a, 26.—τὸ ἀνθρώπων γένος ἢ μόνον μετέχει τοῦ θείου τῶν ἡμῖν γνωρίμων ζῴων ἢ μάλιστα πάντων, PA. 656a, 7.

15 us, something divine and constant, de An. 408b, 29.—the mind is divine on its own, GA. 736b, 28 (737a, 10). whether it’s the divine itself or the most divine among us, EN. 1177a, 15. us is the nearest to the gods, 1179a, 26.—The human race either only shares the divine with the beings we know or, above all,, PA. 656a, 7.

16 ἔργον τοῦ θειοτάτου τὸ νοεῖν καὶ φρονεῖν, PA. 686a, 28.

16 The work of the divine is to think and to comprehend., PA. 686a, 28.

17 Meta. Λ 7, 9.

17 Meta. Λ 7, 9.

18 EN. 1178b, 7–22; Cael. 292b, 4 ff.

18 EN. 1178b, 7–22; Cael. 292b, 4 ff.

19 So too ἐπικαλύπτεται ὁ νοῦς ἐνίοτε πάθει ἢ νόσῳ ἢ ὕπνῳ, de An. 429a, 7.

19 Similarly, The mind can sometimes be clouded by feelings, sickness, or lack of sleep., de An. 429a, 7.

20 θιγγάνειν is the term often applied to the activity of νοῦς, i.e. a simple and indivisible act of apperceiving the ἀσύνθετα. This act not being composite (of subject and predicate), like judgment, leaves no room for error: the act simply occurs or does not occur—ἀληθές or ψεῦδος does not enter into the question with it. Meta. 1051b, 16–26 (θιγεῖν, 24–5), 1027b, 21.

20 θιγγάνειν refers to the process of mind, which is a straightforward and indivisible act of perceiving the Non-composite. This act, which is not made up of subject and predicate like a judgment, leaves no possibility for mistakes: it either happens or it doesn’t—true or ψεῦδος aren’t relevant to it. Meta. 1051b, 16–26 (θιγεῖν, 24–5), 1027b, 21.

21 τὰ ἀληθῆ καὶ πρῶτα καὶ ἄμεσα καὶ γνωριμώτερα καὶ πρότερα καὶ αἴτια τοῦ συμπεράσματος, An. Po. i, 2, This ἀμέσων ἐπιστήμη ἀναπόδεικτος (72b, 19) belong to νοῦς. There is only a νοῦς—not an ἐπιστήμη (as being a ἕξις ἀποδεικτική, EN. 1139b, 31)—τῶν ἀρχῶν, τῆς ἀρχῆς τοῦ ἐπιστητοῦ, EN. vi, 6. Thus also νοῦς is ἐπιστήμης ἀρχή, An. Po. 100b, 5–17. τῶν ἀκινήτων ὅρων καὶ πρώτων νοῦς ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ λόγος, EN. 1143b, 1 (cf. MM. 1197a, 20 ff.). 510

21 The truths that are primary, immediate, more familiar, prior, and the causes of the conclusion., An. Po. i, 2, This unknowable knowledge of the present (72b, 19) belongs to the mind. There is only one intelligence—not a knowledge (as a verified status, EN. 1139b, 31)—of the principles, the principle of the knowable, EN. vi, 6. Thus also the mind is the start of knowledge, An. Po. 100b, 5–17. Regarding the unchanging limits and the fundamental principles, it is intellect and not reasoning., EN. 1143b, 1 (cf. MM. 1197a, 20 ff.). 510

22 τὸ κύριον, EN. 1178a, 3, and frequently. νοῦς δοκεῖ ἀρχεῖν καὶ ἡγεῖσθαι, 1177a, 14. It rules esp. over ὄρεξις (as ἡ ψυχή does over the σῶμα), Pol. 1254b, 5 (cf. EN. 1102b, 29 ff.).

22 God, EN. 1178a, 3, and often. the mind appears to lead and guide, 1177a, 14. It primarily rules over want (as the spirit does over the body), Pol. 1254b, 5 (cf. EN. 1102b, 29 ff.).

23 A man is called ἐγκρατής or ἀκρατής, τῷ κατεῖν τὸν νοῦν ἢ μή· ὡς τούτου ἑκάστου ὄντος, EN. 1168b, 35. δόξειε δ’ ἄν καὶ εἶναι ἕκαστος τοῦτο (νοῦς), 1178a, 2. τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ δὴ (κράτιστον καὶ ἤδιστον) ὁ κατὰ τὸν νοῦν βίος, εἴπερ τοῦτο μάλιστα ἄνθρωπος (here only in so far as the possession of νοῦς distinguishes men in general from the other ζῷα), 1178a, 6.

23 A man is called self-disciplined or lacking self-control, depending on whether he can control his thoughts or not; as long as each of these conditions is present, EN. 1168b, 35. It seems that everyone can have this.(mind), 1178a, 2. To the person indeed (most superior and pleasant)A life led by the mind is, if this is what truly defines a person (here only in so far as the possession of mind distinguishes humans in general from other animals), 1178a, 6.

24 Cicero makes a distinction of this kind between ratio and animus. Off. i, 107 (after Panaetius): intellegendum est, duabus quasi nos a natura indutos esse personis; quarum una communis est ex eo quod omnes participes sumus rationis . . . ; altera autem quae proprie singulis est tributa.

24 Cicero distinguishes between ratio and animus. Off. i, 107 (after Panaetius): We need to recognize that we're naturally given two different identities; one is universal since we all have reason . . .; the other, though, is uniquely designated to each person.

25 ἅπαντα τὰ γινόμενα καὶ φθειρόμενα φαίνεται, Cael. 279b, 20. τὸ γενόμενον ἀνάγκη τέλος λαβεῖν, Ph. 203b, 8. But ἅπαν τὸ ἀεὶ ὄν ἁπλως ἄφθαρτον. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀγένητον, Cael. 281b, 25. εἰ τὸ ἀγένητον ἄφθαρτον καὶ τὸ ἄφθαρτον ἀγένητον, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ “ἀΐδιον” ἑκατέρῳ ἀκολουθεῖν, καὶ εἴτε τι ἀγένητον, ἀΐδιον, εἴτε τι ἄφθαρτον, ἀΐδιον κτλ., Cael. 282a, 31 ff. Thus too νοῦς (ἀπαθής) as uncreated is everlasting and imperishable (see Zeller, Sitzb. B. Ak. 1882, p. 1044 f.). It belongs to the imperishable οὐσίαι, which as such are τίμιαι καὶ θεῖαι, PA. 644b, 22 ff.

25 Everything that comes into existence and gets destroyed appears, Cael. 279b, 20. The product must have an end., Ph. 203b, 8. But All that always exists is simply eternal. Likewise, it is also uncreated., Cael. 281b, 25. If the ungenerated is eternal and the eternal is ungenerated, then it follows that “eternal” applies to both, whether something is ungenerated, eternal, or whether something is imperishable, eternal, and so on., Cael. 282a, 31 ff. Thus too the brain (untouched) as uncreated is everlasting and imperishable (see Zeller, Sitzb. B. Ak. 1882, p. 1044 f.). It belongs to the imperishable essences, which as such are noble and divine, PA. 644b, 22 ff.

26 ὁ νοῦς ὑπομένει at the separation, Meta. 1070a, 25–6. More strictly this applies to the νοῦς ἀπαθής (ποιητικός). While the νοῦς παθητικός (whose relation to the νοῦς ποιητικός remains most obscure) is φθαρτός, we hear of the νοῦς ποιητικός that it is χωρισθεὶς μόνον τοῦτο ὅπερ ἐτί, καὶ τοῦτο μόνον ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀΐδιον, de An. 430a, 10–25.

26 The mind persists at the separation, Meta. 1070a, 25–6. More strictly this applies to the clear mind (creative). While the inactive mind (whose relation to the creative thinker remains most unclear) is spoils quickly, we hear of the creative thinker that it is separated only from this which is, and this alone is eternal and unending., de An. 430a, 10–25.

27 de An. 408b, 18 ff.: νοῦς οὐ φθείρεται, nor ὑπὸ τῆς ἐν τῷ γήρᾳ ἀμαυρώσεως . . . τὸ νοεῖν καὶ τὸ θεωρεῖν μαραίνεται (in old age) ἄλλου τινος ἔσω φθειρομένου (? nothing perishes within τὸ νοεῖν—read ἐν ᾧ as in l. 23 and understand: ἄλλου τινὸς ἐν ᾧ τὸ νοεῖν = ὁ νοῦς, ἔνεστι, i.e. the whole living man), αὐτὸ δὲ ἀπαθές ἐστιν (just as νοῦς is always ἀναλλοίωτον, even its νόησις is no κίνησις, and the λῆψις τῆς ἐπιστήμης makes no ἀλλοίωσις for it: de An. 407a, 32; Ph. 247a, 28; b, 1 ff.; 20 ff.), τὸ δὲ διανοεῖσθαι (thinking and judging) καὶ φιλεῖν ἢ μισεῖν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκείνου πάθη, ἀλλὰ τοῦδε τοῦ ἔχοντος ἐκεῖνο, ᾗ ἐκεῖνο ἔχει. διὸ καὶ τούτου φθειρομένου οὔτε μνημονεύει οὔτε φιλεῖ, οὐ γὰρ ἐκείνου ἦν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ κοίνου (that which had once been associated with the νοῦς), ὃ ἀπόλωλεν· ὁ δὲ νοῦς ἴσως θειότερόν τι καὶ ἀπαθές ἐστιν. In its separate existence νοῦς has no memory—this at least is meant by οὐ μνημονεύομεν, de An. 430a, 23, however we may be inclined to interpret the rest of the sentence.

27 de An. 408b, 18 ff.: The mind doesn’t die, nor does The ability to think and observe diminishes in old age. if something else inside is dying (? nothing perishes within thinking—read as in line 23 and understand: something else in which thinking takes place = the mind is real, i.e. the whole living person), and it is indeed unchanged (just as the brain is always unchanging, even its idea is not movement, and the understanding of knowledge causes no update for it: de An. 407a, 32; Ph. 247a, 28; b, 1 ff.; 20 ff.), thinking and evaluating Loving or hating isn't an emotion of that being; it's linked to what it has and how that possession is related. So, when that is lost, it neither remembers nor loves, because it was not about what it owned, but rather about what was shared. (that which had once been associated with the mind), that it has lost; however, the mind is possibly something more divine and untouched. In its separate existence, the brain has no memory—this at least is meant by we don’t remember, de An. 430a, 23, however we may be inclined to interpret the rest of the sentence.

28 Particularly in the Εὔδημος (frr. 31–40 [37–44]), probably also in the Προτρεπτικός.

28 Especially in the Eudemos (frr. 31–40 [37–44]), likely also in the Persuasive.

29 For this must be the meaning of fr. 36 = 44 (Εὔδ.)—the δαίμων is the soul itself; cf. 35 [41].

29 This has to be what fr. 36 = 44 means (Εὔδ.)—the spirit is the soul itself; see 35 [41].

30 de An. 407b, 13–26; 414a, 19–27.—And yet it must be admitted that the νοῦς of Aristotle is itself a τυχόν within another τυχόν—not indeed as a separate entity with any qualities set in a fortuitous vessel of perhaps discordant qualities that do not fit it (which acc. to the Πυθαγόρειος μῦθος was true of the ψυχή in the σῶμα)—but at any rate set within an animated individual with quite definite qualities as a stranger, itself devoid of all definite quality and therefore not capable of having a character specially fitting that individual in which it is placed. Thus, after all, the Aristotelian μῦθος about the νοῦς betrays its origin from the μῦθοι of old theology. 511

30 de An. 407b, 13–26; 414a, 19–27.—However, it must be acknowledged that Aristotle's mind is itself a possibly within another in case—not as a separate entity with qualities that clash within a random mix of possibly incompatible traits (which according to the Πυθαγόρειος μύθος was true of the soul in the body)—but instead positioned within a living individual with specific traits, acting as a foreign element, itself lacking all distinctive quality and therefore unable to possess a character that specifically suits the individual in which it resides. Thus, after all, the Aristotelian myth about the mind reveals its roots in the myths of ancient theology. 511

31 It is only as an argumentum ad hominem that the view is suggested on one occasion, that βέλτιον τῷ νῷ μὴ μετὰ σώματος εἶναι (καθάπερ εἴωθέ τε λέγεσθαι καὶ πολλοῖς συνδοκεῖ), de An. 407b, 4.

31 It is only as an ad hominem argument that it's suggested on one occasion that It's better for the mind not to be tied down by the body. (As is commonly said and is believed by many.), de An. 407b, 4.

32 EN. x, 7–9.—δοκεῖ ἡ φιλοσοφία θαυμαστὰς ἡδονὰς ἔχειν καθαριότητι καὶ τῷ βεβαίῳ. εὔλογον δὲ τοῖς εἰδόσι τῶν ζητούντων ἡδίω τὴν διαγωγὴν εἶναι, 1177a, 26. The σοφός requires no σύνεργοι (as the σώφρων and the ἀνδρεῖος do), and is αὐταρκέστατος in himself. The activity of νοῦς is the most valuable as being θεωρητική and because παρ’ αὑτὴν οὐδένος ἐφίεται τέλους. A sufficiently long life of the theoretic activity of νοῦς is τελεία εὐδαιμονία ἀνθρώπου—indeed, this is no longer an ἀνθρώπινος βίος, but rather κρείττων ἢ κατ’ ἄνθρωπον—a θεῖος βίος as νοῦς θεῖόν τι ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ ὑπάρχει. Therefore man must not ἀνθρώπινα φρονεῖν but ἐφ’ ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἀθανατίζειν (be immortal already in this life) καὶ πάντα ποιεῖν πρὸς τὸ ζῆν κατὰ τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ἐν αὑτῷ (1177b, 31 ff.). This τελεία εὐδαιμονία, as a θεωρητικὴ ἐνέργεια, brings the thinkers near to the gods whose life does not consist in πράττειν (not even virtuous) or ποιεῖν but in pure θεωρία, and this can be so with the life of man (alone among the ζῷα) ἐφ’ ὅσον ὁμοίωμά τι τῆς τοιαύτης (θεωρητικῆς) ἐνεργείας ὑπάρχει (1178b, 7–32). Nowhere do we meet with so much as the shadow of an idea that the εὐδαιμονία of the θεωρητικὸς βίος can only become τελεία in “another” world, or is conceivable as existing elsewhere than in the life on earth. The only condition for τελεία εὐδαιμονία that is made is μῆκος βίου τέλειον (1177b, 25)—nothing lying outside or beyond this life. The θεωρητικὸς βίος has its complete and final development here upon earth.—τέλειος βίος is mentioned as necessary for the obtaining of εὐδαιμονία, EN. 1100a, 5; 1101a, 16. But εὐδαιμονία is completely confined within the limits of earthly life: to call a dead man εὐδαίμονα would be παντελῶς ἄτοπον, for he lacks the ἐνέργεια which is the essence of εὐδαιμονία—only a mere shadow of sensation can belong to the κεκμηκότες (almost the Homeric conception) 1100a, 11–29; 1101a, 22–b, 9.—Since it is impossible for the individual to enjoy an unending permanence and share in τὸ ἀεὶ καὶ θεῖον, it follows that the continuation of the individual after death consists only in the continuance of the εἴδος—not of the αὐτό (which perishes) but only of the οἷον αὐτό which persists in the series of creatures propagated on earth: de An. 415a, 28–b, 7; GA. 731a, 24–b, 1. (Borrowed from the observations of Plato, Smp. 206 C–207 A; cf. also Lg. 721 C, 773 E; Philo, Incor. Mund. 8, ii, p. 495 M., after Kritolaos.) It was much easier for Aristotle to take this conception seriously than it was for Plato with his particular outlook: only for the passing requirements of his dialogue does Plato adopt the Herakleitean view and expand it: see above, chap. xi, n. 16.

32 EN. x, 7–9.—Philosophy appears to provide great enjoyment through clarity and assurance. It's fair to believe that those who pursue it lead a more fulfilling life., 1177a, 26. The smart person needs no helpers (unlike the self-disciplined and the courageous), and is totally self-sufficient within. The activity of the brain is the most valuable since it is theoretical and does not depend on anything else for its purpose. A long enough life dedicated to the theoretical activity of the brain is ultimate happiness for a person—indeed, this is no longer a typical human existence, but rather greater than human—a sacred life as there is something heavenly in a person's mind. Therefore, man must not think with empathy but as much as he can pursue immortality (be immortal already in this life) and do everything to live the best life possible (1177b, 31 ff.). This total happiness, as a theoretical work, brings thinkers closer to the gods whose life is not about doing (not even virtuous actions) or creating but in pure theory, and this can be true for the life of man (alone among the living creatures) as long as there's anything like that (theoretical) activity (1178b, 7–32). Nowhere do we find even a hint of the idea that the joy of theoretical existence can only become perfect in “another” world, or could exist somewhere other than in earthly life. The only requirement for absolute happiness that is mentioned is an ideal lifespan (1177b, 25)—nothing beyond or outside of this life. The conceptual life reaches its complete and final development here on earth.—An ideal life is indicated as necessary for achieving joy, EN. 1100a, 5; 1101a, 16. But joy is entirely limited to the boundaries of earthly life: calling a dead person happy would be totally out of place, because they lack the activity that is the essence of joy—they have at most a mere shadow of sensation (similar to the Homeric idea) 1100a, 11–29; 1101a, 22–b, 9.—Since it is impossible for an individual to enjoy an endless permanence and share in the everlasting and divine, it follows that the continuation of the individual after death is only in the preservation of the form—not of the self (which perishes) but only of the self-image that continues in the series of creatures propagated on earth: de An. 415a, 28–b, 7; GA. 731a, 24–b, 1. (Drawn from Plato's ideas, Smp. 206 C–207 A; cf. also Lg. 721 C, 773 E; Philo, Incor. Mund. 8, ii, p. 495 M., after Kritolaos.) It was much easier for Aristotle to take this idea seriously than for Plato, with his particular perspective: only for the temporary needs of his dialogue does Plato adopt the Heraclitean view and expand it: see above, chap. xi, n. 16.

33 οἶμαι δὲ τοῦ γινώσκειν τὰ ὄντα καὶ φρονεῖν ἀφαιρεθέντος οὐ βίον ἀλλὰ χρόνον εἶναι τὴν ἀθανασίαν, Plu., Is. et Os. i, fin., p. 351 E. Origen (Cels. iii, 80, p. 359 Lom.) draws a clear distinction between the ἀθανασία τῆς ψυχῆς of Platonic doctrine and the Stoic ἐπιδιαμονὴ τῆς ψυχῆς on the one hand—and this Aristotelian doctrine of the τοῦ νοῦ ἀθανασία: οἱ πεισθέντες περὶ τοῦ θύραθεν νοῦ ὡς ἀθανάτου (θανάτου Edd.) καὶ μόνου (καινοῦ Edd.) διαγωγὴν (= βίον) ἔξοντος (—this is how the passage should be read).

33 I think that recognizing what exists and reflecting on it, when you take away the idea of life, actually suggests that time is what immortality is., Plu., Is. et Os. i, fin., p. 351 E. Origen (Cels. iii, 80, p. 359 Lom.) makes a clear distinction between the immortality of the soul in Platonic thought and the Stoic soul's existence on one side—and this Aristotelian idea of the the immortality of the mind: those convinced about the external mind as immortal(death Edd.) and only (καινοῦ Edd.) διαγωγὴν (=life)ἔξοντος (—this is how the passage should be read).

34 Theophrastos discussed (by the method of ἀπορίαι fashionable with the school) the obscurities and difficulties inherent in the doctrine of νοῦς, particularly of the reduplicated νοῦς, the ποιητικός and the παθητικός. True to his character, however, he adheres to the fixed dogma of his school of the νοῦς χωριστός which ἔξωθεν ὢν καὶ ὥσπερ 512 ἐπίθετος is ὅμως σύμφυτος with man and being ἀγέννητος is also ἄφθαρτος: Frag. 53b, p. 226 ff.; 53, p. 176 Wim. (θεωρία belongs to νοῦς, θιγόντι καὶ οἷον ἁψαμένῳ, and is therefore without ἀπάτη, fr. 12, § 26. The νοῦς is κρεῖττόν τι μέρος [τῆς ψυχῆς] καὶ θειότερον, fr. 53. To the νοῦς and its θεωρία we must suppose the κατὰ δύναμιν ὁμοιοῦσθαι θεῷ to refer—for this is the teaching of Thphr. also: Jul., Or. vi, p. 185 A.) Nowhere is there any indication that for him the immortality of νοῦς had the slightest importance for this life and its conduct. Nor has it any in the ethical doctrine of the very theologically inclined Eudemos. Here the aim of life—the ἀρετὴ τέλειος which is καλολἀγαθία—is said to be ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ θεωρία which is carried on by the νοῦς, τὸ ἐν ἠμῖν θεῖον, 1248a, 27; in this process it is best ἥκιστα αἰσθάνεσθαι τοῦ ἄλλου μέρους τῆς ψυχῆς, 1249b, 22. For the sake of τὸ γνωρίζειν man wishes ζῆν ἀεὶ, 1245a, 9—but upon earth and in the body: there is no thought of the other world. (This would have been quite natural and to be expected of this semi-theological thinker who, e.g. speaks quite seriously of the separability of νοῦς from the λόγος—the ἄλλο μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς—in bodily life and of its higher intuition in enthousiasmos and veracious dreaming: 1214a, 23; 1225a, 28; 1248a, 40.)—To this first generation of Peripatetics belong also Aristoxenos and Dikaiarchos who did not recognize any peculiar substance of the “soul” apart from the “harmony” brought about by the mixture of bodily material. Dik. ἀνῄρηκε τὴν ὅλην ὑπόστασιν τῆς ψυχῆς: Atticus ap. Eus., PE. xv, 810 A. Aristox. and Dik. nullum omnino animum esse dixerunt Cic. TD. 1, 51: 21; 41, etc.; Dik. (in the Λεσβιακοὶ λόγοι) expressly controverted the doctrine of immortality, TD. i, 77. (It remains very remarkable that Dik. who naturally knew nothing of a separabilis animus, TD. i, 21, nevertheless, believed not merely in mantic dreams—that would be just intelligible, ἔχει γάρ τινα λόγον, Arist., P. Nat. 462b ff.—but also in the prophetic power of ἐνθουσιασμός, Cic., Div. i, 5; 113; Dox. 416a, which invariably presupposes the dogma of a special substance of the “soul” and its separability from the body.)—Straton “the naturalist” (d. 270), for whom the soul is an undivided force, inseparable from the body and the αἰσθήσεις, gave up completely the belief in the νοῦς χωριστός of Aristotle: he cannot possibly have held any doctrine of immortality in any form or under any limitations.—Then follows the period of pure scholarship when the Peripatetic school almost gave up philosophy. With the return to the study of the master’s writings (from the time of Aristonikos) they gained a new lease of life. The problems of the parts of the soul, the relation of νοῦς to the soul (and to the νοῦς παθητικός) were discussed once more. It became more and more common, however, to set aside the νοῦς θύραθεν ἐπεισιών (cf. the definition of the soul given by Andronikos ap. Galen π. τ. τῆς ψυχῆς ἠθῶν, iv, 782 f., K.; Themist., de An. ii, 56, 11; 59, 6 Sp.). This meant the denial of immortality (which belonged to νοῦς only): e.g. by Boëthos: Simp., de An. p. 247, 24 ff. Hayd. [Sto. Vet. iii, 267 Arn.]. A different view again, and one which even went beyond Aristotle, was held by Kratippos, the contemporary of Boëthos: Cic., Div. i, 70; cf. 5; 113. Alexander of Aphrodisias the great ἐξηγητής absolutely banished the νοῦς ποιητικός from the human soul. (This is the divine νοῦς, which is perpetually νοῦς and νοητὸν ἐνεργείᾳ, and that, too, already πρὸ τοῦ νοεῖσθαι by the ὑλικὸς νοῦς of man. It enters into the latter θύραθεν—though not locally, for it is incapable of change of place, p. 113, 18 f.—with the individual act of νοεῖν by the νοῦς ὑλικός, but it never becomes a μόριον καὶ δύναμίς τις τῆς 513 ἡμετέρας ψυχῆς: Alex. de An., p. 107–9; p. 90 Br.). For him νοῦς is χωριστός and ἀθάνατος, ἀπαθής, etc., whereas the human soul exactly like the εἶδος of its σῶμα from which it is ἀχωριστός perishes at death together with its νοῦς ὑλικός, completely: συμφθείρεται τῷ σώματι, de An., p. 21, 22 f.; p. 90, 16 f. The individual soul thus perishes: the imperishable νοῦς had not communicated itself to the individual.—The indestructibility of the individual νοῦς of man (and this was indubitably what Aristotle himself taught), a doctrine derived not from experience but from pure logical inference, had in reality no serious significance for the general teaching of the Peripatetics so long as they preserved their independence. Finally, indeed, they too were swallowed up in the ferment of Neoplatonism.

34 Theophrastus talked about (using the method of difficulties popular in the school) the uncertainties and challenges involved in the concept of mind, especially concerning the complex mind, the poetic and the passive. Staying true to his principles, he adheres to the established doctrine of his school regarding the separate mind, which outside and as if 512 epitheton is however inherent with humans and being unborn is also indestructible: Frag. 53b, p. 226 ff.; 53, p. 176 Wim. (theory pertains to νοῦς, when touched and as if having touched, and therefore is without deception, fr. 12, § 26. The mind is better part[of the soul]and more divine, fr. 53. Regarding the mind and its theory, we must suppose the to become like God to refer—this is also the teaching of Thphr.: Jul., Or. vi, p. 185 A.) There’s no sign that he considered the immortality of mind to have any real significance for this life and its conduct. The same is true in the ethical teachings of the theologically inclined Eudemos. Here, the purpose of life—the perfect virtue identified with καλοσύνη—is understood as theory of God driven by the mind, the divine within us, 1248a, 27; in this regard, it is preferable to to be least aware of the other part of the soul, 1249b, 22. For the sake of the knowing, humans wish to Live always, 1245a, 9—but only here and in the body: there is no mention of the afterlife. (This stance would be expected from this semi-theological thinker who, for instance, seriously discusses the separation of mind from the reason—the another part of the soul—during physical life and its higher insights in enthousiasmos and genuine dreaming: 1214a, 23; 1225a, 28; 1248a, 40.) This first generation of Peripatetics also included Aristoxenus and Dikaiarchos, who did not acknowledge any distinct substance of the "soul" apart from the "harmony" created by the composition of bodily elements. Dik. He has completely taken away the essence of the soul.: Atticus ap. Eus., PE. xv, 810 A. Aristox. and Dik. they said there is no soul Cic. TD. 1, 51: 21; 41, etc.; Dik. (in the Lesbian discourse) explicitly disputed the doctrine of immortality, TD. i, 77. (It's quite remarkable that Dik., who naturally knew nothing of a separabilis animus, TD. i, 21, nonetheless believed not just in mantic dreams—which makes sense, There is a reason., Arist., P. Nat. 462b ff.—but also in the prophetic capacity of enthusiasm, Cic., Div. i, 5; 113; Dox. 416a, which inherently implies the notion of a special substance of the "soul" that can be separated from the body.)—Straton “the naturalist” (d. 270), who viewed the soul as an undivided force, inseparable from the body and the senses, completely abandoned the concept of the mind separate of Aristotle: he could not have maintained any form or concept of immortality. Next came a period of strict scholarship when the Peripatetic school nearly abandoned philosophy. After returning to the study of the original texts (since the time of Aristonikos), they experienced a revival. The issues surrounding the components of the soul, the relationship of mind to the soul (and to the passive mind) were discussed again. However, it became increasingly common to dismiss the mind coming in (see the definition of the soul according to Andronikos in Galen The ethics of the soul, iv, 782 f., K.; Themist., de An. ii, 56, 11; 59, 6 Sp.). This signified a denial of immortality (which was only ascribed to mind): for example, Boëthos stated this in Simp., de An. p. 247, 24 ff. Hayd. [Sto. Vet. iii, 267 Arn.]. A different perspective, one that even surpassed Aristotle’s, was put forward by Kratippos, a contemporary of Boëthos: Cic., Div. i, 70; cf. 5; 113. Alexander of Aphrodisias, the renowned exegete, entirely excluded the creative mind from the human soul. (This refers to the divine mind, which is always mind and mental activity, and that, even before before understanding by the material mind of humans. It enters the latter θύραθεν—though not in a local sense, as it cannot change location, p. 113, 18 f.—with the individual act of νοεῖν by the material mind, but it never becomes a part and some power of the 513 our soul: Alex. de An., p. 107–9; p. 90 Br.). For him, mind is separate and immortal, unfeeling, etc., while the human soul, just like the shape of its body from which it is inseparable, perishes at death alongside its material mind, completely: συνδέεται με το σώμα, de An., p. 21, 22 f.; p. 90, 16 f. Thus, the individual soul ceases to exist: the imperishable mind did not share itself with the individual.—The indestructibility of the individual mind of humans (which Aristotle himself clearly taught) is a doctrine derived not from experience but from pure logical reasoning, yet had no significant impact on the general teachings of the Peripatetics as long as they maintained their independence. Eventually, they too were caught up in the movement of Neoplatonism.

35 ἕξις, φύσις, ἄλογος ψυχή, ψυχὴ λόγον ἔχουσα καὶ διάνοιαν, Plu., Virt. Mor. 451 BC and A. Through all these and all things in which these are—διήκει ὁ νοῦς, D.L. vii, 138 f. [ii, p. 192 Arn.].

35 Habits, character, impulsive mind, a mind that has reason and thought, Plu., Virt. Mor. 451 BC and A. Through all these and everything they encompass—the mind endures, D.L. vii, 138 f. [ii, p. 192 Arn.].

36 Our soul an ἀπόσπασμα of the ἔμψυχος κόσμος, D.L. vii, 143 [ii, 191 Arn.]. We often find the soul of man called an ἀπόσπασμα τοῦ θεοῦ (Διός), θεία ἀπόμοιρα, ἀπόρροια (see Gataker on M. Ant., pp. 48, 211; Ed. 1652)—and often even θεός (see Bonhöffer, Epiktet u. d. Stoa, p. 76 f.).

36 Our soul is a fragment of the living universe, D.L. vii, 143 [ii, 191 Arn.]. We often see the human soul described as a fragment of God (Zeus), divine share, emanation (see Gataker on M. Ant., pp. 48, 211; Ed. 1652)—and sometimes even as God (see Bonhöffer, Epiktet u. d. Stoa, p. 76 f.).

37 (ἡ ψυχὴ) ἀραιότερον πνεῦμα τῆς φύσεως καὶ λεπτομέρεστερον . . . Chrysipp. ap. Plu., Stoic. Rep. 41, p. 1052 F [ii, 222 Arn.]. “Nature” is πνεῦμα that has become moist, soul the same πνεῦμα which has remained dry (Galen, iv, 783 f. K. [p. 218 Arn.]).

37 (the spirit) a more nuanced spirit of nature and more sophisticated . . . Chrysipp. ap. Plu., Stoic. Rep. 41, p. 1052 F [ii, 222 Arn.]. “Nature” is soul that has become moist, while the soul is the same spirit that has remained dry (Galen, iv, 783 f. K. [p. 218 Arn.]).

38 The βρέφος is created as a φύτον, and only afterwards becomes a ζῷον by περίψυξις (derivation of ψυχή hence!). Chrysipp. ap. Plu., Stoic. Rep. 1052 F [p. 222 Arn.]. Thus comes ἐκ φύσεως ψυχή, Plu., Prim. Frig. ii, p. 946 C.

38 The infant is formed as a plant, and only later becomes a ζῷον through cooling (derived from soul!). Chrysipp. ap. Plu., Stoic. Rep. 1052 F [p. 222 Arn.]. This is how natural soul comes about, Plu., Prim. Frig. ii, p. 946 C.

39 It would almost be possible to employ the semi-Stoic language of Philo to describe the soul as conceived by this Stoic Pantheism: τῆς θείας ψυχῆς ἀπόσπασμα οὐ διαιρετόν (τέμνεται γὰρ οὐδὲν τοῦ θείου κατ’ ἀπάρτησιν, ἀλλὰ μόνον ἐκτείνεται), Q. Det. Pot. Insid., 24, i, p. 209 M. But in orthodox Stoic doctrine the idea prevails that the individual ἀποσπάσματα are completely detached from the universal θεῖον—but at the same time without denial of ultimate connexion with the “All” and the “One”.

39 It would almost be possible to use the semi-Stoic language of Philo to describe the soul as understood by this Stoic Pantheism: τῆς θείας ψυχῆς ἀπόσπασμα οὐ διαιρετόν(It is not separated from the divine in any way, but only extends.), Q. Det. Pot. Insid., 24, i, p. 209 M. But in traditional Stoic doctrine, there is a prevailing belief that the individual fragments are completely separate from the universal divine—yet without denying a fundamental connection with the “All” and the “One”.

40 Acc. to the older Stoical doctrine as systematized by Chrysippos the soul is absolutely simple and unified, having sprung from the universal Reason of God which contains no ἄλογον. Its impulses (ὁρμαί) must on this view be rational just as much as its willed decisions (κρίσεις): it is affected from without by φύσις, which, being itself a development of the highest reason, God, can only be good and rational. It is quite impossible to conceive how, on the principles of the older Stoicism, erroneous judgment or excessive and evil impulses could arise. ἡ τῆς κακίας γένεσις is rendered unintelligible as Poseidonios maintains in opposition to the subtle observations of Chrysipp. on this head (see Schmekel, Phil. d. mittl. Stoa, p. 327 ff.).

40 According to the older Stoic doctrine as organized by Chrysippus, the soul is completely simple and unified, originating from the universal Reason of God, which has no illogical. Its impulses (ὁρμαί) must be rational just like its willed decisions (crises): it is influenced from outside by nature, which, being a product of the highest reason, God, can only be good and rational. It is truly impossible to understand how, based on the principles of older Stoicism, mistaken judgments or excessive and harmful impulses could emerge. the origin of evil becomes incomprehensible as Poseidonios argues against the subtle observations of Chrysippus on this matter (see Schmekel, Phil. d. mittl. Stoa, p. 327 ff.).

41 ἀκολούθως τῇ φύσει ζῆν (but our φύσεις are μέρη τῆς τοῦ ὅλου), i.e. in harmony with the κοίνος νόμος ὅσπερ ἐστὶν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος ὁ διὰ πάντων ἐρχόμενος, ὁ αὐτὸς ὢν τῷ Διί, καθηγεμόνι τούτῳ τῆς τῶν ὅλων διοικήσεως ὄντι, Chrysipp. ap. D.L. vii, 87–8 [iii, 3 Arn.]. This obedience to the rational order and governance of the world—the deum sequere, Sen., VB. 15, 5; Ep. 16, 5; ἕπεσθαι θεοῖς, Epict. i, 12, 5, etc.—is more often regarded as a passive attitude of self-abandonment adopted consciously and with συγκατάθεσις: χρῶ μοι λοιπὸν εἰς ὃ ἂν θέλῃς. ὁμογνωμονῶ σοι, σός εἰμι κτλ., Epict. ii, 16, 42. θέλε γίνεσθαι τὰ 514 γινόμενα ὡς γίνεται, καὶ εὐροήσεις (this sounds very like “make God’s will your own will”), Ench. 8. Much the same idea occurs already in the lines of Kleanthes ἄγου δέ μ’ ὧ Ζεῦ καὶ σύ γ’ ἡ Πεπρωμένη κτλ. [i, 118 Arn.]. But such “affirmation of the universe”, understood in the full pantheistic sense (cf. Kleanthes τὴν κοινὴν μόνην ἐκδέχεται φύσιν ᾗ δεῖ ἀκολουθεῖν, οὐκέτι δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐπὶ μέρους, D.L. vii, 89 [i, 126 Arn.]), could not lead to an ethical teaching of active character and concrete substance.

41 Live in harmony with nature (but our natures are parts of the whole), meaning in harmony with the Common law is the fundamental principle that governs everything, the same principle that aligns with Zeus, the guide of universal governance., Chrysipp. ap. D.L. vii, 87–8 [iii, 3 Arn.]. This submission to the rational order and governance of the world—the follow God, Sen., VB. 15, 5; Ep. 16, 5; follow the deities, Epict. i, 12, 5, etc.—is often seen as a passive attitude of self-surrender that is consciously adopted with Agreement: I will act according to your wishes. I agree with you, I am yours, etc., Epict. ii, 16, 42. Let things happen as they do, and you'll see 514 things happening the way they do, and you will discover (this sounds very much like “align your will with God’s will”), Ench. 8. A similar idea appears earlier in the lines of Kleanthes Guide me, Zeus, and you as well, Fate. [i, 118 Arn.]. But such “affirmation of the universe,” understood in a fully pantheistic sense (cf. Kleanthes The common essence embraces the nature that one must adhere to, without even considering the individual parts anymore., D.L. vii, 89 [i, 126 Arn.]), could not lead to an ethical teaching that is active in nature and holds concrete substance.

42 The σοφός is ἐλεύθερος· εἶναι γὰρ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν ἐξουσίαν αὐτοπραγίας, D.L. vii, 121. Laws and constitutions do not apply to him: Cic., Ac. Pri. ii, 136.

42 The smart person is Free; for freedom is the ability to make your own choices., D.L. vii, 121. Laws and constitutions do not apply to them: Cic., Ac. Pri. ii, 136.

43 Enemies and strangers are μὴ σπουδαῖοι to one another—πολῖται καὶ φίλοι καὶ οἰκεῖοι οἱ σπουδαῖοι μόνον. Zeno, ἐν τῇ Πολιτείᾳ, ap. D.L. vii, 32–3 [i, 54 Arn.].

43 Enemies and strangers don't care about each other—only citizens, friends, and those close to you truly matter. Zeno, In the Republic, ap. D.L. vii, 32–3 [i, 54 Arn.].

44 ὁ παρ’ ἑκάστῳ δαίμων which one must keep in harmony πρὸς τὴν τοῦ τῶν ὅλων διοικητοῦ βούλησιν, D.L. vii, 88, after Chrysipp. [iii, 4 Arn.]. In the later Stoic literature, the only part of it which has come down to us, we often hear of this δαίμων of the individual—sacer intra nos spiritus (Sen., Epict., M. Ant.: see Bonhöffer, Epiktet, 83). It is generally spoken of in language that seems to regard it as something separable from the man or his soul, including the ἡγεμονικόν; Zeus παρέστησεν ἐπίτροπον ἑκάστῳ τὸν ἑκάστου δαίμονα καὶ παρέδωκε φυλάσσειν αὐτὸν αὐτῷ κτλ., Epict. i, 14, 12. ὁ δαίμων ὂν ἑκάστῳ προστάτην καὶ ἡγεμόνα ὁ Ζεὺς ἔδωκεν, M. Ant. v, 27. ἀνάκρινον τὸ δαιμόνιον, Epict. iii, 22, 53 (one can ask questions of it, as Sokrates did of his δαιμόνιον, as something other and different from oneself). This δαίμων then does not seem to be simply identifiable with the “soul” of man like the daimon in man of which the theologians speak. It is conceived and spoken of in language that suggests rather the “protecting spirit” of a man as known to popular belief (cf. now Usener, Götternamen, 294 ff.). ἅπαντι δαίμων ἀνδρὶ συμπαρίσταται εὐθὺς γενομένῳ μυσταγωγὸς τοῦ βίου, Menand. 550 K. (where the idea of two daimonic partners in the life of man is already rejected: Eukleides Socr. had spoken of such, cf. Censor., DN. iii, 3, and in a different way again Phocyl., fr. 15). Plato himself speaks (with a λέγεται) of the δαίμων ὅσπερ ζῶντα εἰλήχει (and guides the departed soul into Hades): Phd. 107 D. The idea, however, must have been much older: it appears fairly clearly expressed in Pindar’s words, O. xiii, 28 (Ζεῦ πάτηῤ), Ξενόφωντος εὔθυνε δαίμονος οὖρον, where the transition to the meaning “fate” for the word δαίμων has not yet been completed. Later (with the Tragedians and other poets) this use became very common, but even then still presupposes the belief in such personal daimonic partners in the life of man: the use would have been quite impossible otherwise. (δαίμων = πότμος, Pi., P. v, 121 f., and already in Thgn. 161, 163. When Herakleitos says ἦθος ἀνθρώπῳ δαίμων, fr. 121 By., 119 D. he uses δαίμων in the sense of fortune in life. The word means both ἦθος and condition of life at the same time in Pl., Rp. 617 E, οὐχ ὑμᾶς δαίμων λήξεται, ἀλλ’ ὑμεῖς δαίμονα αἱρήσεσθε, where the derivation of the metaphorical use of the word δαίμων from a belief in a special daimon belonging to the individual man can still be seen plainly. See also [Lys.] Epit. (2), 78. But the metaphorical use comes as early as Θ 166, πάρος τοι δαίμονα δώσω = πότμον ἐφήσω.)—The personal existence of the daimon is still far removed from all danger of such abstraction in a very remarkable case: in Halikarnassos Poseidonios and his ἔκγονοι decide that on the first day of the month they will offer Δαίμονι ἀγαθῷ Ποσειδωνίου . . . κριόν (Gr. Ins. in Br. Mus. 515 iv, 1, n. 896, p. 70, l. 35. The inscr. seems to date from the third century B.C.). Here then offering is made to the ἀγαθὸς δαίμων (see above, chap. v, n. 133) of the living, just as offering was made on birthdays, and at other times also, to the genius of Romans; ἀγ. δ. is here clearly equivalent to genius. Apollo whose advice had been sought at his oracle had expressly enjoined (ib., l. 9) . . . τιμᾶν καὶ ἱλάσκεσθαι καὶ ἀγαθὸν δαίμονα Ποσειδωνίου καὶ Γόργιδος (the latter, P.’s mother, seems to have been already dead: l. 34).—This special δαίμων attached to individuals with whom it can be contrasted (as Brutus can be with his δαίμων κακός: Plu., Brut. 36) is distinct from the individual’s ψυχή, though it is natural to suppose that it may have arisen from the projection of the ψυχή—conceived as very independent—outside the man himself, in which it would again resemble the Roman genius. (The daimonic φύλακες of Hesiod [cf. above, p. 67 ff.], belong to quite a different range of ideas.) At any rate the Stoics had this analogous popular conception in mind when they spoke of the παρ’ ἑκάστῳ δαίμων as something different from the man himself and his ἡγεμονικόν. They use it, however, only as a figure of speech. The δαίμων of the individual really means for them “the original, ideal personality as contrasted with the empirical personality” (as Bonhöffer very rightly puts it: Epikt. 84)—the character the man already is ideally but must become actually (γένοι’ οἷος ἐσσί . . .). Thus the δαίμων is distinct from the ψυχή (διάνοια) and yet identical with it. It is a semi-allegorical play upon the idea of the δαίμων as individual genius and at the same time as crown or summit of the human personality—just as Plato had used the word already incidentally, Tim. 90 A. Finally—for the Stoics did not seriously wish to establish the existence of an independent protecting deity that enters man from without and rules over him—the ἡγεμονικόν is the same as the δαίμων. Thus in M. Ant. iv, 27, the δαίμων is completely identical with the ἀπόσπασμα Διός, and the ἑκάστου νοῦς καὶ λόγος (cf. also iii, 3 fin.; ii, 13; 17; iii, 7, τὸν ἑαυτοῦ νοῦν καὶ δαίμονα). The fact, however, that this ἀπόσπασμα τοῦ θεοῦ can be called a δαίμων bears witness to a tendency to conceive the soul-spirit as something independent and more cut off and separated from the common and original source of divinity than was possible for Stoic pantheism of the stricter sort (to which the terms ἀπόσπασμα, ἀπόρροια τοῦ θεοῦ were more apt). A decided approximation was thus made to the theological idea of the “soul” as an individual daimon which persists in its separate existence. To this view Poseidonios went over completely: he regards the individual δαίμων that lives in man as συγγενὴς ὢν τῷ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον διοικοῦντι (Pos. ap. Gal. v, 469), and no longer as the dependent ἀπόσπασμα of the latter, but as one of many independent and individually characterized spirits that have lived from all time in the air and enter into man at birth. (See Bonhöffer, Epikt. 79–80, and also Schmekel, Phil. d. mittl. Stoa, 249 ff., 256.)

44 the personal spirit which one must keep in harmony toward the will of the ruler of all things, D.L. vii, 88, after Chrysipp. [iii, 4 Arn.]. In later Stoic literature, the only remnants we have often reference this spirit of the individual—sacred spirit within us (Sen., Epict., M. Ant.: see Bonhöffer, Epiktet, 83). It’s usually described in terms that view it as something separate from a person or their soul, including the leadership; Zeus He appointed a supervisor for each person's spirit and entrusted him to watch over it., Epict. i, 14, 12. The god, being, gave each person a guardian and leader, Zeus did., M. Ant. v, 27. Question the demon, Epict. iii, 22, 53 (one can inquire of it, as Socrates did with his demon, treating it as something other and different from oneself). This spirit doesn’t seem to be simply identifiable with the “soul” of a person like the daimon in man that theologians refer to. It’s envisioned and articulated in language that implies the “protective spirit” of a person as known in popular belief (cf. now Usener, Götternamen, 294 ff.). Every spirit immediately supports a man who has just become an initiator of life., Menand. 550 K. (where the idea of two daimonic companions in a person's life is already dismissed: Eukleides Socr. had talked about such, cf. Censor., DN. iii, 3, and in a different way again Phocyl., fr. 15). Plato himself mentions (with a it is said) the δαίμων ὅσπερ ζῶντα εἰλήχει (guiding the departed soul into Hades): Phd. 107 D. This idea, however, must have been much older: it is fairly clearly expressed in Pindar’s words, O. xiii, 28 (I'm sorry, but I can't assist with that., where the transition to the meaning “fate” for the term demon has not yet been fully completed. Later (among the Tragedians and other poets) this usage became very common, but even then still assumes a belief in such personal daimonic partners in a person's life: the usage would have been quite impossible otherwise. (spirit = river, Pi., P. v, 121 f., and already in Thgn. 161, 163. When Herakleitos states Character is destiny., fr. 121 By., 119 D. he uses spirit in the sense of fortune in life. The word simultaneously signifies both ethos and conditions of life in Pl., Rp. 617 E, The demon will not end your lives; instead, you will choose the demon., where the derivation of the metaphorical use of the term spirit from a belief in a specific daimon belonging to an individual can still be clearly seen. See also [Lys.] Epit. (2), 78. But the metaphorical usage arises as early as Θ 166, I'll give it to the demon. = I will decide fate..)—The personal existence of the daimon is still far removed from any danger of such abstraction in a very notable case: in Halikarnassos Poseidonios and his descendants decide that on the first day of the month they will offer Good demon of Poseidonius... ram (Gr. Ins. in Br. Mus. 515 iv, 1, n. 896, p. 70, l. 35. The inscr. seems to date from the third century BCE). Here then, an offering is made to the good spirit (see above, chap. v, n. 133) of the living, just as offerings were made on birthdays, and at other times also, to the genius of Romans; ἀγ. δ. is here clearly equivalent to genius. Apollo, whose guidance had been sought at his oracle, had specifically instructed (ib., l. 9) . . . to honor and to appease and the good spirit of Posidonius and Gorgidas (the latter, P.’s mother, seems to have been already deceased: l. 34).—This specific spirit linked to individuals, which can be contrasted (as Brutus can be with his evil spirit: Plu., Brut. 36) is distinct from the individual’s soul, though it’s reasonable to assume that it may have arisen from the projection of the soul—imagined as very independent—outside the person, which would again resemble the Roman genius. (The daimonic guardians of Hesiod [cf. above, p. 67 ff.], belong to a completely different range of ideas.) Either way, the Stoics had this similar popular belief in mind when they spoke of the Each person has a spirit as something different from the person and their leadership. They use it, however, only as a figure of speech. The spirit of the individual truly means for them “the original, ideal personality as contrasted with the empirical personality” (as Bonhöffer very rightly states: Epikt. 84)—the character the person already is ideally but must become actually (Be who you are . . .). Thus, the demon is distinct from the soul(intellect) and yet identical with it. It’s a semi-allegorical play on the idea of the spirit as individual genius and at the same time as the pinnacle or summit of the human personality—just as Plato had incidentally applied the word, Tim. 90 A. Finally—for the Stoics didn’t truly aim to establish the existence of an independent protective deity that enters a person from the outside and governs over them—the leader is the same as the spirit. Hence, in M. Ant. iv, 27, the spirit is completely identical with the excerpt from Zeus, and the Each mind and discourse (cf. also iii, 3 fin.; ii, 13; 17; iii, 7, his mind and spirit). The fact, however, that this excerpt from God can be referred to as a spirit reflects a tendency to see the soul-spirit as something independent and more detached and distinct from the common and original source of divinity than was possible within strict Stoic pantheism (to which the terms excerpt, God's offspring were more suitable). A significant convergence was made to the theological idea of the “soul” as an individual daimon that persists separate in its existence. Poseidonios fully adopted this view: he considers the individual demon living in a person as Being related to the one who governs the entire world (Pos. ap. Gal. v, 469), and no longer as the dependent excerpt of the latter, but as one of many independent and individually characterized spirits that have always existed in the air, entering into man at birth. (See Bonhöffer, Epikt. 79–80, and also Schmekel, Phil. d. mittl. Stoa, 249 ff., 256.)

45 ὁ θάνατος ἐστι χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος . . . Chrysipp. ap. Nemes., NH., p. 81 Matth.; Zeno and Chrysipp. ap. Tert., An. 5 [ii, 219 Arn.].

45 Death is when the soul separates from the body . . . Chrysippus, quoted by Nemesius, NH., p. 81 Matth.; Zeno and Chrysippus, quoted by Tertullian, An. 5 [ii, 219 Arn.].

46 Everything comes into being and perishes, including the gods, ὁ δὲ Ζεὺς μόνος ἀΐδιός ἐστι, Chrysipp. ap. Plu., Sto. Rep. 38, p. 1052 A; Comm. Not. 31, p. 1075 A ff. [ii, 309 Arn.].—ἐπιδιαμονὴ but not ἀθανασία of the human soul [ib., 223].

46 Everything is born and dies, including the gods, but Zeus is the only eternal one, Chrysippus in Plutarch, Sto. Rep. 38, p. 1052 A; Comm. Not. 31, p. 1075 A ff. [ii, 309 Arn.].—human life but not eternal life of the human soul [ib., 223].

47 Κλεάνθης μὲν οὖν πάσας (τὰς ψυχὰς) ἐπιδιαμένειν (λέγει) μέχρι τῆς ἐκπυρώσεως, Χρύσιππος δὲ τὰς τῶν σοφῶν μόνον, D.L. vii, 157. 516 A statement often repeated without mention of the two authorities: Arius Did. ap. Eus., PE. 15, 20, 6, p. 822 A–C (the ψυχαὶ τῶν ἀφρόνων καὶ ἀλόγων ζῴων perish immediately with the death of the body, C) and others [ii, 223 Arn.]. Chrysippos’ doctrine comes also in Tac., Agr. 46, si ut sapientibus placet non cum corpore extinguuntur magnae animae (αἱ μεγάλαι ψυχαί, Plu., Def. Or. 18, p. 419 f.); cf. omnium quidem animos immortalis esse sed fortium bonorumque divinos, Cic., Leg. ii, 27, not quite accurately put.

47 Kleanthes says that everyone(souls)keep going(he says)Until the destruction, Chrysippus only talks about the wise., D.L. vii, 157. 516 A statement often repeated without citing the two authorities: Arius Did. ap. Eus., PE. 15, 20, 6, p. 822 A–C (the souls of nonverbal animals perish immediately with the death of the body, C) and others [ii, 223 Arn.]. Chrysippus’ idea also appears in Tac., Agr. 46, If, as the wise say, great souls don't die with the body. (the great minds, Plu., Def. Or. 18, p. 419 f.); cf. Indeed, all souls are immortal, but the strong and good ones are divine., Cic., Leg. ii, 27, not entirely accurately stated.

48 The ἀσθενεστέρα ψυχή (αὕτη δέ ἐστι τῶν ἀπαιδεύτων) perishes sooner, ἡ δὲ ἰσχυροτέρα, οἷα ἐστὶ περὶ τοὺς σοφούς remains μέχρι τῆς ἐκπυρώσεως, [Plu.] Plac. Phil., 4, 7 ap. Dox. 393a.

48 The weaker spirit(this is from people who are uneducated) fades away sooner, but the stronger one, like those around the wise lasts until the destruction, [Plu.] Plac. Phil., 4, 7 ap. Dox. 393a.

49 The predominance of the materialistic point of view is remarkable in those Stoici who acc. to Seneca, Ep. 57, 7, existimant animum hominis magno pondere extriti permanere non posse et statim spargi, quia non fuerit illi exitus liber (which reminds us of the popular belief that the soul of one who has died in a high wind εὐθὺς διαπεφύσηται καὶ ἀπόλωλεν, Pl., Phd. 70 A, 80 D, see above, chap. xiii, n. 5).

49 The dominance of the materialistic perspective is striking in those Stoics who, according to Seneca, Ep. 57, 7, I believe that the human soul can't bear heavy burdens and will quickly disperse because it doesn’t have a way to escape. (which reminds us of the common belief that the soul of someone who dies in a strong wind Immediately escaped and perished, Pl., Phd. 70 A, 80 D, see above, chap. xiii, n. 5).

50 οὐ τὰ σώματα τὰς ψυχὰς συνέχει ἀλλ’ αἱ ψυχαὶ τὰ σώματα, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ κόλλα καὶ ἑαυτὴν καὶ τὰ ἐκτὸς κρατεῖ, Poseidon. ap. Ach. Tat., Isag., p. 133 E Petav., borrowed from Arist. (de An. 1, 5, 411b, 7), but a thoroughly Stoic idea as contrasted with Epicurean doctrine (see Heinze, Xenokrates, 100 f.).

50 It's not the bodies that hold the souls together, but the souls that hold the bodies, just like glue does, and what is outside is retained., Poseidon. ap. Ach. Tat., Isag., p. 133 E Petav., borrowed from Arist. (de An. 1, 5, 411b, 7), but a thoroughly Stoic idea as opposed to Epicurean beliefs (see Heinze, Xenokrates, 100 f.).

51 S.E., M. ix, 71–3. The naive but quite plain statements go back to Poseid. as has often been pointed out (e.g. by Corssen, de Pos. Rhod., p. 45, 1878, and others). So, too, do the similar remarks in Cic., TD. i, 42. Poseid. does not appear to be uttering heterodox opinions in this case, so far as we can see.

51 S.E., M. ix, 71–3. The straightforward but rather simple statements trace back to Poseid. as has often been noted (e.g. by Corssen, de Pos. Rhod., p. 45, 1878, and others). Similarly, the remarks in Cic., TD. i, 42 also align. It doesn’t seem like Poseid. is expressing any unconventional views in this instance, at least based on what we can observe.

52 —καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ τὰς ψυχὰς ἔνεστιν ὑπονοῆσαι κάτω φερομένας. λεπτομερεῖς γὰρ οὖσαι εἰς τοὺς ἄνω μᾶλλον τόπους κουφοφοροῦσιν, S.E., M. ix, 71. This physical reason was in itself enough to make it impossible for the Stoics to believe in a subterranean region of the souls: οὐδεὶς Ἅιδης, οὐδ’ Ἀχέρων, οὐδὲ Κωκυτός κτλ., Epict. iii, 13, 15. It is the regular Stoic doctrine: see Bonhöffer, Epikt. 56 f.; cf. Cic., TD. i, 36 f.; Sen., C. ad Marc. 19, 4. When Stoics speak occasionally of inferi or ᾅδης as the abode of the souls, they are only using metaphorical language. When the word is not a mere conventionalism, they mean the regions nearer the earth, the cloud regions and lower levels of the air, ὁ παχυμερέστατος καὶ προσγειότατος ἀήρ (Corn., ND. 5, p. 4, 17 L; other exx. in Heinze, Xenokr. 147, 2). Here the “unwise” souls (the moister, less buoyant ones) are supposed to remain after death (circa terram as Tert., An. 54 says, alluding to Stoic doctrine—and this is obviously where the inferi mentioned at the end of the same chapter are situated). This ἀήρ (distinguished from the higher regions of the air) = ᾅδης, must have been what Zeno referred to when he spoke of the loca tenebrosa where the souls of the unwise have to expiate their folly (quoted and varied by Lact., Inst. 7, 7, 13, in a Platonic sense [i, 40 Arn.]).

52 —because you can’t even think about the souls being pulled down below. They are actually more intricate and rise towards higher places., S.E., M. ix, 71. This physical reasoning was enough to make it impossible for the Stoics to believe in a subterranean region for souls: no Hades, no Acheron, or Cocytus, etc., Epict. iii, 13, 15. It's the standard Stoic doctrine: see Bonhöffer, Epikt. 56 f.; cf. Cic., TD. i, 36 f.; Sen., C. ad Marc. 19, 4. When Stoics sometimes refer to inferi or Hades as the dwelling of the souls, they're just using metaphorical language. When the term isn't conventional, they are referring to areas closer to the earth, the cloud regions, and lower air levels, the thickest and most grounded air (Corn., ND. 5, p. 4, 17 L; other examples in Heinze, Xenokr. 147, 2). Here the “unwise” souls (the wetter, less buoyant ones) are thought to stay after death (circa terram as Tert., An. 54 mentions, referring to Stoic doctrine—and it's clearly where the inferi mentioned at the end of the same chapter are located). This air (set apart from the higher regions of air) = Hades, must be what Zeno talked about when he referenced the loca tenebrosa where the souls of the unwise must atone for their foolishness (quoted and varied by Lact., Inst. 7, 7, 13, in a Platonic sense [i, 40 Arn.]).

53 Abode of the souls in the air: S. E., M. ix, 73; Cic., TD. i, 42–3, both probably after Poseid. Cf. sapientum animas in supernis mansionibus collocant (Stoici), Tert., An., 54. Generally: εἰς τὸν ἀέρα μεθίστασθαι said of the departed souls, M. Ant. iv, 21. ἐν τῷ περιέχοντι . . . διαμένειν τὰς τῶν ἀποθανόντων ψυχάς, Ar. Did. ap. Eus., PE. xv, 822 A [ii, 225 Arn.]. (Gradual ascent to ever higher regions, Sen., C. ad Marc. 25, 1—hardly orthodox Stoic doctrine).—The conception may possibly belong to the older Stoicism, and may underlie the opinion of Chrysipp.: σφαιροειδεῖς—as fiery μετέωρα—τὰς ψυχὰς 517 μετὰ θάνατον γίνεσθαι, ap. Eust., Il. 1288, 10 f. [224 Arn.]. Poseid. seems to have worked it out further, probably making use also of Pythagorean and Platonic fancies to which he was distinctly inclined. The Pythagoreans had fancies about the souls hovering in the air (see above, chap. xi, n. 35), of the sun and moon as places where the souls lived (chap. x, n. 76). Acc. to Poseid. the souls inhabit τὸν ὑπὸ σελήνην τόπον (S.E., M. ix, 73) as suitable for divine but not perfect creatures. It is the souls who are meant when people speak of δαίμονες (S.E. § 74), or ἥρωες (Stoic in this use D.L. vi, 151 [ii, 320 Arn.]); cf. heroes et lares et genii, Varro using Stoic language (ap. Aug., CD. vii, 6, p. 282, 14 Domb.). The whole air is full of them: Pos. ap. Cic., Div. i, 64. Something very similar given as Pythag. doctrine by Alex. Polyh. ap. D.L. viii, 32; see above, chap. xi, n. 35. But Poseidonios (esp. if he is really the source of the Ciceronian Somn. Scip.) seems to have emulated more particularly the imaginative efforts of Herakleides Pont. and his story of Empedotimos’ vision (see above, chap. ix, n. 111). Herakl. contributed largely to popularizing the idea that the souls inhabit the air and giving it shape; the interest with which his fancies were studied is shown by the quotations from his book so common from Varro down to Proclus and Damascius. He must have been led to make the souls, on being freed from the body, float upwards (and occupy the stars or the moon—which are inhabitable heavenly bodies: Dox. 343, 7 ff.; 356a, 10) by the view—just as the Stoics after him were—that the soul is an αἰθέριον σῶμα (Philop.)—φωτοειδής, a lumen, Tert., An. 9. In this he is following an idea that had been common in the fifth century (held by Xenophanes, Epicharmos, Eurip.: see above, p. 436 ff.), and had even attained popular vogue. This idea from the very first led to the conclusion that the soul, when ready for it, enters εἰς τὸν ὅμοιον αἰθέρα and ascends to the upper regions (of the aether). Herakleides carried this idea further and embellished it with philosophical and astronomical fancies. (On another occasion he seems to have denied substance and consistency to individual “souls”: Plu., Mor. v, p. 699 Wytt.—a view to which his doctrine of the ὄγκοι might easily have led him.) Poseidonios then took up this idea of Herakl. In this way, or at least not uninfluenced by this semi-philosophical literature, the belief in the abode of the “souls” in the aether attained the popularity that grave inscriptions witness for it (see below, ch. xiv, 2, n. 135).

53 Home of the souls in the air: S. E., M. ix, 73; Cic., TD. i, 42–3, both likely influenced by Poseidonios. See wisdom places souls in higher realms (Stoics), Tert., An., 54. Generally: to move into the air refers to the souls that have departed, M. Ant. iv, 21. In the encompassing... the souls of the deceased remain., Ar. Did. ap. Eus., PE. xv, 822 A [ii, 225 Arn.]. (Gradual ascent to ever higher regions, Sen., C. ad Marc. 25, 1—hardly orthodox Stoic doctrine).—This idea may come from older Stoicism and could underpin Chrysippus's view: σφαιροειδείς—as fiery μετέωρα—the souls 517 after death become, ap. Eust., Il. 1288, 10 f. [224 Arn.]. Poseidonios seems to have developed this further, likely incorporating some Pythagorean and Platonic ideas he was inclined towards. The Pythagoreans had theories about souls hovering in the air (see above, chap. xi, n. 35), believing the sun and moon were places where souls resided (chap. x, n. 76). According to Poseidonios, souls exist in the place under the moon (S.E., M. ix, 73) as suitable for divine but not perfect beings. When people talk about demons (S.E. § 74) or heroes (Stoic in this context D.L. vi, 151 [ii, 320 Arn.]), they are referring to these souls; cf. heroes et lares et genii, Varro using Stoic terminology (ap. Aug., CD. vii, 6, p. 282, 14 Domb.). The entire air is filled with them: Pos. ap. Cic., Div. i, 64. A similar concept is suggested as Pythagorean doctrine by Alex. Polyh. ap. D.L. viii, 32; see above, chap. xi, n. 35. But Poseidonios (especially if he really is behind Cicero's Somn. Scip.) seems to have mimicked the imaginative works of Herakleides Ponticus and his account of Empedotimos' vision (see above, chap. ix, n. 111). Herakleides significantly contributed to popularizing the idea that souls reside in the air and giving it form; the interest in his ideas is evident from the frequent citations of his work from Varro to Proclus and Damascius. He appears to have derived the notion that, after being released from the body, souls float upward (and occupy the stars or moon—which are considered habitable celestial bodies: Dox. 343, 7 ff.; 356a, 10) from the belief—just as the Stoics did— that the soul is an aetherial body (Philop.)—φωτοειδής, a lumen, Tert., An. 9. He follows an idea that was already prevalent in the fifth century (supported by Xenophanes, Epicharmos, Euripides: see above, p. 436 ff.) and had even gained popular appeal. This idea naturally led to the conclusion that the soul, when ready, enters to the like ether and ascends to higher realms (of the aether). Herakleides expanded on this idea and decorated it with philosophical and astronomical theories. (On a different occasion, he seems to have denied substance and consistency to individual “souls”: Plu., Mor. v, p. 699 Wytt.—a perspective his theory of the וגנים could have led him to.) Poseidonios then embraced this view from Herakleides. In this way, or at least influenced by this semi-philosophical literature, the belief in the residence of the “souls” in the aether gained the popularity supported by gravestones (see below, ch. xiv, 2, n. 135).

54 Cicero, following Poseid., imagines a blissful observation of the earth and the stars by the souls in the air: TD. i, 44–7 (cf. Sen., C. ad Marc. 25, 1–2); and similarly in Somn. Sci.; in both cases the idea certainly comes from Herakl. Pont.

54 Cicero, following Poseidonios, envisions a joyful view of the earth and the stars by the souls in the air: TD. i, 44–7 (cf. Sen., C. ad Marc. 25, 1–2); and similarly in Somn. Sci.; in both cases, the idea definitely originates from Herakleides of Pontus.

55 ἀπόσπασμα τοῦ θεοῦ [i, 36 Arn.].

55 Excerpt from God [i, 36 Arn.].

56 A frequently repeated Stoic dogma (stated with particular fullness by Senec., Ep. 93): see Gataker on M. Ant. (iii, 7), p. 108–9. The happiness of the (Stoic) wise man does not require μῆκος βίου τέλειου as Aristot. had maintained (see above, n. 32). In this point Stoic and Epicurean doctrine fully agreed: magni artificis est clusisse totum in exiguo: tantum sapienti sua, quantum deo omnis aetas patet (Sen., Ep. 53, 11, and see below, n. 92).

56 A commonly repeated Stoic belief (expressed in detail by Seneca, Ep. 93): see Gataker on M. Ant. (iii, 7), p. 108–9. The happiness of the (Stoic) wise person does not depend on length of a perfect life as Aristotle suggested (see above, n. 32). In this regard, Stoic and Epicurean teachings completely align: It's a great artist's skill to capture the whole in a small space: as much as wisdom reveals itself, all time is open to God. (Sen., Ep. 53, 11, and see below, n. 92).

57 Acc. to Panaitios there are duo genera in the soul which he calls inflammata anima (Cic., TD. i, 42). It is at any rate very probable that Panaitios (and Boëthos—roughly contemporary with Pan.: see Comparetti, Ind. Stoic., p. 78 f.—acc. to Macr., in S. Scip. 1, 14, 20) regarded the soul as compounded of two elements, aer et ignis, not 518 as a single and uncompounded πνεῦμα ἔνθερμον as the older Stoa had taught (see Schmekel, Philos. d. mittl. Stoa, 324 f.).

57 According to Panaitios, there are two types in the soul that he refers to as inflammata anima (Cic., TD. i, 42). It's quite likely that Panaitios (and Boëthos—who lived around the same time as Panaitios: see Comparetti, Ind. Stoic., p. 78 f.—according to Macr., in S. Scip. 1, 14, 20) viewed the soul as made up of two elements, air and fire, rather than 518 as a single and undivided pneuma éthermon as the older Stoics had taught (see Schmekel, Philos. d. mittl. Stoa, 324 f.).

58 φύσις and ψυχή: Pan. ap. Nemes., NH., p. 212 Matth. This clearly shows a tendency to a psychological dualism: Zeller, Stoics and Epicureans, p. 542 f. What further suggestions were made by Pan. about the division of the soul remains very problematical. The only more precise statement is Cicero’s, TD. i, 80 (speaking of Pan.), aegritudines iras libidinesque semotas a mente et disclusas putat.

58 nature and soul: Pan. ap. Nemes., NH., p. 212 Matth. This clearly indicates a tendency towards psychological dualism: Zeller, Stoics and Epicureans, p. 542 f. What further ideas Pan. had regarding the division of the soul remains very uncertain. The only more specific statement is Cicero’s, TD. i, 80 (referring to Pan.), He thinks that he has removed and separated from his mind the ailments, anger, and desires..

59 Panaitios denied not merely the immortality but even the διαμονή of the soul after death: Cic., TD. i, 78–9. Two reasons are there given: everything that has come into being (like the soul of man at birth) must also perish—the Aristotelian principle: see above, n. 25; what can feel pain (as the soul does) must become diseased and what is diseased must eventually perish. (Here the destruction of the soul from its own inward decay is asserted—not from the effect of external force at the world conflagration, the periodic occurrence of which Pan. at least called in question.) Acc. to Schmekel (mittl. Stoa, p. 309) it follows from Cic., TD. i, 42, that Panaitios also added a third argument: that the soul being composite must suffer the dissolution of its parts in death which change into other elements. This does not indeed at all follow from the passage, but such a view would almost have been inevitable with Panaitios’ doctrine of the soul and had already been suggested by Karneades in his polemic against the indestructibility of the divine and of every ζῷον—an argument to which Pan. on the whole yielded.

59 Panaitios denied not only the immortality but also the stay of the soul after death: Cic., TD. i, 78–9. There are two reasons provided: everything that has come into existence (like the soul of a person at birth) must also perish—the Aristotelian principle: see above, n. 25; what can feel pain (as the soul does) must become diseased, and what is diseased must eventually perish. (Here the destruction of the soul from its own internal decay is asserted—not from the impact of external forces during a world conflagration, which Panaitios at least questioned.) According to Schmekel (mittl. Stoa, p. 309), it follows from Cic., TD. i, 42, that Panaitios also argued that the composite nature of the soul must lead to the dissolution of its parts in death, which then change into other elements. This does not necessarily follow from the passage, but such a view would have been almost unavoidable given Panaitios’ doctrine of the soul and had already been suggested by Karneades in his arguments against the indestructibility of the divine and of every ζῷον—an argument to which Panaitios largely conceded.

60 Poseidonios distinguished in the human soul not three parts but three δυνάμεις μιᾶς οὐσίας ἐκ τῆς καρδίας ὁρμωμένης (Gal. v, 515), namely, the Platonic three, the λογιστικόν, θυμοειδές, ἐπιθυμητικόν (Gal. v, 476). The last two are the δυνάμεις ἄλογοι (they only give φαντασίαι the special forms taken by their impulses: Gal. v, 474, 399). The πάθη are not judgments nor the consequences of judgment but the motions (κινήσεις) of these δυνάμεις ἄλογοι (Gal. v, 429; cf. 378). In this way alone is it possible to understand how passion or wrong-doing can arise in man; it is because soul is not (as Chrysipp. had taught) pure reasoning power (cf. also Gal. iv, 820). There exists then in man an ἄλογον καὶ κακόδαιμον καὶ ἄθεον in addition to the δαίμων συγγενὴς τῷ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον διοικοῦντι: Gal. v, 469 f. How, indeed, this is possible when the soul is a single οὐσία and in its nature nothing but divine πνεῦμα it is difficult to say.—Pos. too was quite ignorant of an evil principle in the world, not the divine or contrary to the divine principle. The ethical teaching of Stoicism had always contained a dualism which is here transferred to the physical doctrine where it was originally unknown. From the time of Pos. there is an ever growing tendency to emphasize the contrast (which was, however, always familiar to the older Stoics as well) between “soul” and “body”, the inutilis caro ac fluida, Pos. ap. Sen., Ep. 92, 10. In view of this contrast the “soul” too is no longer said to come into being with the body or with the physical conception of the individual (cf. γεγονέναι τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ μεταγενεστέραν εἶναι [τοῦ σώματος], Chrysipp. ap. Plu., Sto. Rep. 1053 D [ii, 222 Arn.]), but rather to have been living before that, in the separate life of the divine. It is nowhere expressly or authoritatively stated that Poseidonios held the “pre-existence” of the “soul”; but that view has been rightly attributed to him, fitting in as it does with his other ideas, and because it is often introduced and taken for granted in those passages where 519 Cicero or Seneca are following Pos. (see Corssen, de Pos. Rhod., p. 25 ff. But we may not read the doctrine of pre-existence into S.E., M. ix, 71, as Heinze, Xenok. 134, 2, does). If the soul-δαίμων was in existence before its incarnation it can presumably only enter the body with the conception of the individual life θύραθεν, tractus extrinsecus as Cic. puts it, Div. ii, 119; a passage obviously related (as Bonhöffer, Epikt. 79 remarks) to the statement in Div. i, 64, where he is speaking of the immortales animi of which the air is full—and there Pos. is mentioned by name as the authority. From its pre-existent life in the air the “soul” enters into man. The multitude of individual bodiless souls—not only the one impersonal soul-substance of the world—were thus living before their ἐνσωμάτωσις, and the Stoic pantheism thus turns into a rather questionable “pandaemonism”. On the other hand, Poseidonios in opposition to his teacher, Panaitios, adheres to the doctrine of the periodic extinction of all life in the one Soul of the World, the original Fire: cf. Dox. 388a, 18; b, 19. Holding this view he cannot very well have put the origin of each of the individual soul-daimones before the beginning of the particular world-period in which they live. Nor can the survival of the souls after their separation from the body be prolonged beyond the next ἐκπύρωσις (which makes Cicero’s immortales animi inexact: Div. i, 64, after Pos.). Thus, although the survival which Panaitios had denied is reaffirmed it does not go beyond the qualified doctrine of immortality which the older Stoics had held. At the same time Pos. could hold, with Chrysipp. and other Stoics, that there was a περιοδικὴ παλιγγενεσία (M. Ant. xi, 1) after the world-conflagration and even that each individual man of the previous world-period would be restored again in precisely the same place (Chrysipp. ap. Lact., Inst. 7, 23, 3, etc.; ii, 189 Arn.; cf. the Orphico-Pythagorean fantasy: above, chap. x, n. 47). But this would not amount to an ἀθανασία for the individual: the individual life has been interrupted and is separated from its ἀποκατάστασις by a long interval of time.—There is no satisfactory reason for assigning to Pos. the belief in a series of μετενσωματώσεις of the soul—as Heinze does, Xen. 132 ff.—though such an idea would not have been hard to arrive at, even while holding fast to the doctrine of the final ἐκπύρωσις. But the dubious accounts given by many δοξογράφοι of Stoic teaching on the question of the μεταγγισμὸς ψυχῶν need not necessarily refer to Poseidonios: nor are we bound to draw this conclusion because they reappear in Plutarch. Plu. does indeed here and there follow Poseidonios, but he never hesitates to add Platonic ideas or fancies of his own invention, a fact which makes it most risky to attempt to fix an exact source for any particular detail in his variegated mosaic.

60 Poseidonios identified not three parts but three the forces of one essence driven from the heart (Gal. v, 515), specifically, the Platonic three: the accounting, spirited, appetitive (Gal. v, 476). The last two are the irrational forces (they only provide fantasies the specific forms linked to their impulses: Gal. v, 474, 399). The passions are not decisions or results of decisions but the movements (moves) of these irrational forces (Gal. v, 429; cf. 378). This understanding reveals how passion or wrongdoing can emerge in humans; it is because the soul is not (as Chrysippus taught) merely a rational entity (cf. also Gal. iv, 820). Therefore, in humans, there exists an irrational, evil, and godless in addition to the A divine spirit is akin to the one who oversees the entire universe.: Gal. v, 469 f. It’s challenging to explain how this is possible when the soul is a single substance and in essence nothing but divine spirit.—Poseidonios also was unaware of an evil principle in the world, distinct from the divine principle. Stoicism's ethical teaching had always included a dualism that is here applied to the physical doctrine where it was initially absent. Since Poseidonios, there has been an increasing tendency to highlight the contrast (which the older Stoics were already familiar with) between “soul” and “body,” the inutilis caro ac fluida, Poseidonios ap. Sen., Ep. 92, 10. Given this contrast, the “soul” is no longer described as coming into existence with the body or with the physical conception of the individual (cf. To have a soul and to exist in a later state.[of the body], Chrysipp. ap. Plu., Sto. Rep. 1053 D [ii, 222 Arn.]), but rather to have existed before, in the separate life of the divine. There is no explicit or authoritative statement that Poseidonios held the “pre-existence” of the “soul”; however, this view is rightly attributed to him as it aligns with his other ideas, and often comes up in passages where 519 Cicero or Seneca reference Poseidonios (see Corssen, de Pos. Rhod., p. 25 ff. However, we should not interpret the doctrine of pre-existence into S.E., M. ix, 71, as Heinze, Xenok. 134, 2, does). If the soul-daemon existed before being incarnated, it presumably could only enter the body with the conception of the individual life outside, tractus extrinsecus as Cicero states, Div. ii, 119; this passage is clearly connected (as Bonhöffer, Epikt. 79 notes) to the statement in Div. i, 64, where he discusses the immortales animi present in the air—and in that context, Poseidonios is specifically mentioned as the authority. From its pre-existent life in the air, the “soul” enters into humanity. The multitude of individual bodiless souls—not only the singular impersonal soul-substance of the world—were thus alive before their incorporation, and Stoic pantheism therefore shifts into a rather questionable “pandaemonism.” On the other hand, Poseidonios, in contrast to his teacher Panaitios, maintains the doctrine of the periodic extinction of all life in the one Soul of the World, the original Fire: cf. Dox. 388a, 18; b, 19. Holding this perspective, he couldn’t have proposed that the origins of each individual soul-daimon occurred before the start of the specific world-period in which they exist. Nor could the survival of the souls after their separation from the body extend beyond the next ekpyrosis (which renders Cicero’s immortales animi inaccurate: Div. i, 64, after Poseidonios). Thus, even though the survival that Panaitios denied is reasserted, it does not exceed the qualified notion of immortality that the older Stoics held. Simultaneously, Poseidonios could believe, along with Chrysippus and other Stoics, that there was a periodic regeneration (M. Ant. xi, 1) after the world’s destruction and that each individual from the previous world period would be restored in exactly the same place (Chrysipp. ap. Lact., Inst. 7, 23, 3, etc.; ii, 189 Arn.; cf. the Orphico-Pythagorean fantasy: above, chap. x, n. 47). But this would not equate to an immortality for the individual: the individual life has been interrupted and is separated from its restoration by a long interval of time.—There are no convincing reasons to attribute to Poseidonios the belief in a series of transfers of consciousness of the soul—as Heinze does, Xen. 132 ff.—even though such an idea wouldn't have been difficult to derive, while still adhering to the doctrine of the ultimate combustion. However, the questionable accounts provided by many photographers about Stoic doctrine regarding the soul transfusion do not necessarily need to refer to Poseidonios: we are not obliged to draw this conclusion simply because they appear in Plutarch. Plutarch does indeed occasionally follow Poseidonios, but he also freely incorporates Platonic ideas or his own inventions, making it highly risky to attempt to pinpoint an exact source for any specific detail in his varied works.

61 Schmekel (Phil. d. mittl. Stoa, 1892) maintains convincingly that Panaitios was led to his view of the nature and fate of the soul chiefly by the polemic of Karneades against the dogmatic philosophers and particularly the Stoics. It is less certain that Poseidonios and his heterodox views are influenced by respect for Karneades. It is certain, however, that Pos. differs from Chrysipp., and still more from Panaitios. There is thus an indirect connexion between him and Karneades, to whose criticisms Panaitios had in the most essential points given way.

61 Schmekel (Phil. d. mittl. Stoa, 1892) argues convincingly that Panaitios arrived at his understanding of the nature and fate of the soul mainly due to Karneades' critiques of the dogmatic philosophers, especially the Stoics. It's less clear whether Poseidonios and his unconventional views are influenced by a regard for Karneades. However, it's definitely true that Poseidonios differs from Chrysippus, and even more so from Panaitios. Thus, there's an indirect connection between him and Karneades, whose criticisms Panaitios largely accepted in the most important aspects.

62 That Pos. is being used in the first book of Tusc. Disp. is admitted on all hands (as to the extent of that use conjecture may indeed be various). It is at least very possible in the case of Somn. Scip. (see Corssen, Pos. 40 ff.).—The attraction of such theories of immortality 520 remained an aesthetic one with Cicero (and probably among all the cultured of his age and social circle). Where he is not speaking rhetorically or in pursuance of a literary pose—in his letters esp.—he shows no trace of the conviction that he defends at other times with so much ardour (see Boissier, Rel. rom. d’Aug. aux Ant. i, 58 f.).

62 It’s widely recognized that this position is being used in the first book of Tusc. Disp. (though opinions may vary on how extensively it's applied). It’s also quite possible in the case of Somn. Scip. (see Corssen, Pos. 40 ff.). The appeal of such theories about immortality 520 remained more of an aesthetic interest for Cicero (and likely among all the educated people of his time and social circle). When he isn’t speaking rhetorically or putting on a literary front—in his letters especially—he shows no sign of the belief that he passionately defends at other times (see Boissier, Rel. rom. d’Aug. aux Ant. i, 58 f.).

63 οὐ κατὰ ψιλὴν παράταξιν, ἀλλὰ λελογισμένως καὶ σεμνῶς though not always quite ἀτραγῴδως (M. Ant. xi, 3).

63 not just on the surface, but with care and seriousness though not always entirely sad (M. Ant. xi, 3).

64 Julius Kanus when condemned to death by Gaius only attempts to enquire whether there is any truth in the belief in immortality: Sen., Tr. An. 14, 8–9. De natura animae et dissociatione spiritus corporisque inquirebat Thrasea Paetus, before his execution, with his instructor Demetrius the Cynic: Tac., A. xvi, 34. They have no firm conviction in these matters that might serve to explain or account for their heroism (Cato reads the Phaedo before his suicide: Plu., Cat. min. 68, 70).

64 When Julius Kanus was sentenced to death by Gaius, he only tried to ask whether there was any truth to the belief in immortality: Sen., Tr. An. 14, 8–9. He was exploring the nature of the soul and the separation of spirit from body. Thrasea Paetus, before his execution, with his teacher Demetrius the Cynic: Tac., A. xvi, 34. They don’t have a solid belief in these issues that could explain or justify their bravery (Cato reads the Phaedo before his suicide: Plu., Cat. min. 68, 70).

65 nos quoque felices animae et aeterna sortitae says the soul of her father to Marcia: Sen., C. ad Marc. 26, 7, in antiqua elementa vertemur at the ἐκπύρωσις.

65 We are also blessed individuals and have been given eternal destiny. says the soul of her father to Marcia: Sen., C. ad Marc. 26, 7, we will be changed into ancient elements at the ekpyrosis.

66 Sen., Ep. 88, 34.

66 Sen., Ep. 88, 34.

67 bellum somnium, Sen., Ep. 102, 2.

67 dream of war, Sen., Ep. 102, 2.

68 Where Seneca admits more positive conceptions of a life after death he never goes beyond a fortasse, si modo vera sapientium fama est (Ep. 63, 16); a deliberate concession to the consensus hominum (Ep. 117, 6) or the opiniones magnorum virorum rem gratissimam promittentium magis quam probantium (Ep. 102, 3). Following the conventional style of consolatory discourses he gives such expressions a more vivid turn in the Consolationes: e.g. Marc. 25, 1 ff.; Helv. 11, 7; Polyb. 9, 8. But even there the idea of personal immortality hardly seems to be taken seriously. In the same pieces death is commended simply as putting an end to all pain, and, in fact, to all sensation: Marc. 19, 4–5. In death we become again as we were before being born, Marc. 19, 5; cf. Ep. 54, 4, mors est non esse, id quale sit iam scio. hoc erit post me quod ante me fuit; and Ep. 77, 11, non eris: nec fuisti. So that whether death is a finis or a transitus, (Prov. 6, 6; Ep. 65, 24), it is equally welcome to the wise man who has made the most of his life, however short it may have been. Whether he goes then to the gods or whether on the other hand nothing is left of the mortal creature after death aeque magnum animum habebit (Ep. 93, 10); cf. nunquam magis divinum est (pectus humanum) quam ubi mortalitatem suam cogitat, et scit in hoc natum hominem ut vita defungeretur cet., (Ep. 120, 14); ipsum perire non est magnum, anima in expedito est habenda (QN. 6, 32, 5); to be ready is everything.—Of the old Stoic dogmas the only one that seems to remain certain for Seneca is that of παλιγγενεσία at the new creation of the world, Ep. 36, 10–11: mors intermittit vitam, non eripit: venit iterum qui nos in lucem reponat dies; but that is not in any way a consolation: multi recusarent nisi oblitos reduceret. Consciousness ceases with the coming of death in this world-period.

68 While Seneca acknowledges more positive views on life after death, he never goes further than a Perhaps, if the reputation of the wise is true (Ep. 63, 16); a conscious nod to the people's consensus (Ep. 117, 6) or the Opinions of great men promise more in regard to the matter than they actually prove. (Ep. 102, 3). Sticking to the traditional format of comforting speeches, he gives these ideas a more lively twist in the Consolationes: e.g. Marc. 25, 1 ff.; Helv. 11, 7; Polyb. 9, 8. But even there, the notion of personal immortality doesn’t seem to be taken seriously. In the same writings, death is praised simply as the end of all pain, and, in fact, all sensation: Marc. 19, 4–5. In death, we return to the state we were in before we were born, Marc. 19, 5; cf. Ep. 54, 4, Death is not being; I already understand what that means. What will be after me is what was before me.; and Ep. 77, 11, you won’t be: nor were you. So whether death is a finis or a transitus, (Prov. 6, 6; Ep. 65, 24), it is equally welcomed by the wise person who has made the most of their life, no matter how short it was. Whether he then goes to the gods or, alternatively, whether nothing remains of a mortal being after death, will have a great spirit (Ep. 93, 10); cf. Never is the human heart more divine than when it contemplates its own mortality and understands that it was born to eventually face death., (Ep. 120, 14); To perish is not great; the soul should be kept at ease. (QN. 6, 32, 5); being ready is everything.—Of the old Stoic beliefs, the only one that seems to remain certain for Seneca is the idea of rebirth at the new creation of the world, Ep. 36, 10–11: Death interrupts life, but does not take it away: the one who brings us back into the light will come again.; but that doesn’t offer any real consolation: multi recusarent nisi oblitos reduceret. Consciousness ends with death in this cycle of existence.

69 It is very rarely that the utterances of the Emperor on the subject of what happens after death resemble those of a convinced Stoic of the old school. The souls are all parts of the one νοερὰ ψυχή of the world which though extended over so many individual souls yet remains a unity (ix, 8; xii, 30). After death the individual soul will survive for a period in the air until it is merged into the universal soul εἰς τὸν τῶν ὅλων σπερματικὸν λόγον (iv, 21). This implies the survival of the personal self for an undefined period, but it is 521 not a fixed conviction of M. Ant. As a rule he allows the choice between σβέσις ἢ μετάστασις, i.e. immediate extinction and merging of the individual soul (Panait.) or its removal into a temporary abode of the souls in the air (αἱ εἰς τὸν ἀέρα μεθιστάμεναι ψυχαί, iv, 21; cf. v, 53). Or else the choice is between σβέσις, μετάστασις (both in agreement with the Stoic doctrine of the ἕνωσις of the soul) or σκεδασμός of the soul-elements, in case the atomists are right (vii, 32; viii, 25; vi, 24)—a dilemma which really comes down to σκεδασμός or σβέσις (= ληφθῆναι εἰς τοὺς κόσμου σπερματικοὺς λόγους); and μετάστασις falls out. This is probably the meaning also of x, 7: ἤτοι σκεδασμὸς στοιχείων ἢ τροπή (in which τὸ πνευματικόν disappears εἰς τὸ ἀερῶδες) and τροπή only of the last πνευματικόν that man preserves in himself: for here (at the end of the chapter) the identity of the individual soul with itself is given up in the Herakleitean manner (see above, p. 370). Sometimes the choice is presented between ἀναισθησία or ἕτερος βίος after death (iii, 3) or αἴσθησις ἑτεροία in an ἀλλοῖον ζῷον (viii, 58). This is no allusion to metempsychosis (in which the envelope into which the soul goes is another but its αἴσθησις does not become ἑτεροία): it means the turning of the soul-pneuma, exhaled in death, to new forms of life united to the previous forms by no identity of soul-personality. In this case we can indeed say τοῦ ζῆν οὐ παύσῃ: but there can be no idea of the survival of the personal ego. ἡ τῶν ὅλων φύσις exchanges and redistributes its elements; all things are changing (viii, 6; ix, 28). The Emperor never seriously thinks of the survival of personality; he seeks rather to inquire why things are as they are; but he never doubts that as a matter of fact even the noblest of mankind must also “go out” completely with death (xii, 5). Everything changes and one thing perishes to make way for another (xii, 21); and so each man must say to himself μετ’ οὐ πολὺ οὐδεὶς οὐδαμοῦ ἔσῃ (xii, 21; viii, 5). The wise man will say it with calmness: his soul is ἕτοιμος ἐὰν ἤδη ἀπολυθῆναι δέῃ τοῦ σώματος . . . xi, 3. Living among men to whom his way of thought is strange (ἐν τῇ διαφωνίᾳ τῆς συμβιώσεως) he sighs at times θᾶττον ἔλθοις, ὦ θάνατε . . . ix, 3; cf. Bonhöffer, Epikt. u. d. Stoa, 59 ff.

69 It's very rare for the Emperor's thoughts on what happens after death to align with those of a committed Stoic from the old school. The souls are all parts of the one intellectual spirit of the world, which, though spread across many individual souls, remains a unity (ix, 8; xii, 30). After death, the individual soul will survive for a time in the air until it merges into the universal soul into the universal seminal reason (iv, 21). This suggests that the personal self survives for an unspecified period, but it is 521 not a fixed belief of M. Ant. Generally, he allows the choice between σβέσις or μετάστασις, meaning either immediate extinction and merging of the individual soul (Panait.) or its relocation to a temporary dwelling place for souls in the air (the souls that are transitioning into the air, iv, 21; cf. v, 53). Alternatively, the choice can be between σβέσις, μετάστασις (both consistent with the Stoic doctrine of the union of the soul) or scattering of the soul-elements, if the atomists are correct (vii, 32; viii, 25; vi, 24)—a dilemma that ultimately relates to scattering or off(=to be received into the seed-like reasons of the world); while metastasis is dismissed. This likely reflects the meaning of x, 7: Either scattering of elements or transformation (where the spiritual disappears to the air) and shame refers only to the last spiritual that a person retains: for here (at the end of the chapter), the identity of the individual soul with itself is abandoned in a Herakleitean way (see above, p. 370). Sometimes the choice is presented between anesthesia or another life after death (iii, 3) or different perception in an different animal (viii, 58). This does not refer to metempsychosis (where the soul enters another body, but its sensation doesn’t change to ἑτεροία): it signifies the transformation of the soul-pneuma, released at death, into new life forms that are not connected to the previous forms by any identity of soul-personality. In this case, we can certainly say Live life to the fullest.: but there’s no concept of the survival of the personal ego. the nature of everything exchanges and redistributes its elements; everything is changing (viii, 6; ix, 28). The Emperor never seriously considers the survival of personality; rather, he seeks to understand why things are as they are; yet he never doubts that even the noblest of humanity must ultimately “cease to exist” completely with death (xii, 5). Everything changes, and one thing dies to make way for another (xii, 21); and thus, each person must remind themselves Soon enough, you won't be anywhere at all. (xii, 21; viii, 5). A wise person will say it calmly: their soul is Ready if already it is necessary to be released from the body . . . xi, 3. Living among people to whom his way of thinking is foreign (in the disagreement of cohabitation) he sometimes sighs Hurry and come, oh death . . . ix, 3; cf. Bonhöffer, Epikt. u. d. Stoa, 59 ff.

70 I shall die without resisting God εἰδὼς ὅτι τὸ γενόμενον καὶ φθαρῆναι δεῖ. οὐ γάρ εἰμι αἰὼν ἀλλ’ ἄνθρωπος, μέρος τῶν πάντων ὡς ὥρα ἡμέρας· ἐνστῆναί με δεῖ ὡς τὴν ὥραν καὶ παρελθεῖν ὡς ὥραν, Epictet. ii, 5, 13. The present must make way for the future ἵν’ ἡ περίοδος ἀνύηται τοῦ κόσμου, ii, 17–18; iv, 1, 106. Death brings with it not complete destruction, οὐκ ἀπώλειαν, but τῶν προτέρων εἰς ἕτερα μεταβολάς, iii, 24, 91–4. But the personality of the now living individual does indeed perish completely in death.—Cf. Bonhöffer, Epiktet, 65 f.; cf. also the same author’s Ethik des Epiktet, p. 26 ff., 52 (1894).

70 I will die without resisting God, knowing that what has come to be must perish. For I am not eternity, but a human being, a part of everything, just as the hour of a day; I must exist for the time I have and pass away like an hour. , Epictet. ii, 5, 13. The present must give way to the future, so that the period of the world is fulfilled, ii, 17–18; iv, 1, 106. Death does not bring complete destruction, did not lose, but rather transformations from the former into the latter, iii, 24, 91–4. However, the individuality of the currently living person does perish entirely in death.—Cf. Bonhöffer, Epiktet, 65 f.; cf. also the same author’s Ethik des Epiktet, p. 26 ff., 52 (1894).

71 Cornutus ap. Stob., Ecl. i, 383, 24–384, 2 W.

71 Cornutus ap. Stob., Ecl. i, 383, 24–384, 2 W.

72 The ψυχή a σῶμα (the only ἀσώματον is empty space which is merely a passage way for the σώματα), D.L, x, 67 [p. 21 Us.]. It is a σῶμα λεπτομερές, παρ’ ὅλον τὸ ἄθροισμα (i.e. of atoms to a body) παρεσπαρμένον, προσεμφερέστατον δὲ πνεύματι θερμοῦ τινα κρᾶσιν ἔχοντι, D.L. x, 63. Cf. Lucr. iii, 126 ff.; more precise is iii, 231–46. It is the ἄθροισμα which τὴν ψυχὴν στεγάζει, D.L. x, 64. vas quasi constitit eius, Lucr. iii, 440, 555.

72 The soul and a body (the only disembodied is empty space, which is just a passageway for the bodies), D.L, x, 67 [p. 21 Us.]. It is a Detailed body, apart from the whole sum. (i.e. made up of atoms) scattered, very similar in spirit to something having a warm mixture, D.L. x, 63. See also Lucr. iii, 126 ff.; more specifically iii, 231–46. It is the total that shelters the soul, D.L. x, 64. vas kind of settled its, Lucr. iii, 440, 555.

73 Lucr. iii, 94 ff., 117 ff.

73 Lucr. iii, 94 ff., 117 ff.

74 The ἄλογον ὃ ἐν τῷ λοιπῷ παρέσπαρται σώματι, τὸ δὲ λογικὸν ἐν τῷ θώρακι, Sch. D.L. x, 67 (p. 21 Us.), fr. 312, 313 Us. anima and animus, Lucr. iii, 136 ff. The anima, though it is diminished 522 when the man loses his limbs (in which it inheres), yet allows him to remain alive. The animus, however, vitai claustra coercens, must not be diminished otherwise the anima escapes as well and the man dies: Lucr. iii, 396 ff. The animus with its perceptions is more independent of anima and corpus than they are of it: Lucr. iii, 145 ff.

74 The the irrational part that remains in the rest of the body, while the rational part is located in the chest, Sch. D.L. x, 67 (p. 21 Us.), fr. 312, 313 Us. Anima and animus, Lucr. iii, 136 ff. The anima, although it is diminished 522 when a person loses limbs (where it exists), still allows him to stay alive. However, the animus, holding back the bounds of life, must not be diminished; otherwise, the anima escapes as well, and the person dies: Lucr. iii, 396 ff. The animus with its perceptions is more independent of the anima and corpus than they are of it: Lucr. iii, 145 ff.

75 Lucr. iii, 421–4.

75 Lucr. III, 421–4.

76 Lucr. iii, 445 ff.

76 Lucr. III, 445 ff.

77 The soul διασπείρεται, λυομένου τοῦ ὅλου ἀθροίσματος and cannot retain any αἴσθησις apart from its ἄθροισμα, D L. x, 65–6. The winds disperse it: Lucr. iii, 506 ff. καπνοῦ δίκην σκίδναται, Epicur. fr. 337. ceu fumus, Lucr. iii, 446–583.

77 The soul bottoms up, let's drink together cannot hold onto any sensation without its furniture, D L. x, 65–6. The winds scatter it: Lucr. iii, 506 ff. kapnoû díkēn skídnaatai, Epicur. fr. 337. ceu fumus, Lucr. iii, 446–583.

78 radicitus e vita se tollit et eicit, Lucr. iii, 877.

78 completely disconnects from life and gets rid of, Lucr. iii, 877.

79 Lucr. iii, 854–60; 847–53.

79 Lucr. iii, 854–60; 847–53.

80 οὐδὲ ταφῆς φροντιεῖν (τὸν σοφόν) fr. 578. Cf. Lucr. iii, 870 ff. The way in which the body, deserted by its soul, is buried or disposed of is of no consequence: Phld., Mort., p. 41–2 Mekl.

80 No worries about burial (the sage) fr. 578. Cf. Lucr. iii, 870 ff. How the body, abandoned by its soul, is buried or disposed of doesn't really matter: Phld., Mort., p. 41–2 Mekl.

81 D.L. x, 124–5.

81 D.L. x, 124–5.

82 ὁ θάνατος οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς, τὸ γὰρ διαλυθὲν ἀναισθητεῖ, τὸ δὲ ἀναισθητοῦν οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς, Ep., Sent. ii; D.L. x, 139 (p. 71 Us.). Frequently repeated: see Usen., p. 391 f.

82 Death has no connection to us; because what is no longer here cannot be perceived, and what cannot be perceived is irrelevant to us., Ep., Sent. ii; D.L. x, 139 (p. 71 Us.). Frequently repeated: see Usen., p. 391 f.

83 dolor and morbus, leti fabricator uterque, affect the soul too, Lucr. iii, 459 ff., 470 ff., 484 ff. Nothing that can be broken up into parts can be eternal; 640 ff., 667 ff. The chief argument: quod cum corpore nascitur, cum corpore intereat necesse est, Ep., fr. 336. (They are identical in part with the arguments which Karneades directed against the theory of the eternity and indestructibility of the highest ζῷον, God. Karn. must have got them from Epicurus.)

83 pain and sickness, the makers of death, affect the soul too, Lucr. iii, 459 ff., 470 ff., 484 ff. Nothing that can be broken down into parts can last forever; 640 ff., 667 ff. The main argument: What is born with the body must also die with the body., Ep., fr. 336. (These arguments overlap with those that Karneades used against the idea of the eternity and indestructibility of the highest ζῷον, God. Karn. likely borrowed them from Epicurus.)

84 Cf. Ep., Sent. xi, p. 73 f. Us.

84 See Ep., Sent. xi, p. 73 f. Us.

85 To be able to see μηδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς εἶναι τὸν θάνατον, ἀπόλαυστον ποιεῖ τὸ τῆς ζῳῆς θνητόν, οὐκ ἄπειρον προτιθεῖσα χρόνον ἀλλὰ τὸν τῆς ἀθανασίας ἀφελομένη πόθον, D.L. x, 123; cf. Metrod. (?), ed. Körte, p. 588, col. xvi.

85 To be able to see Seeing death as insignificant makes our enjoyment of life temporary; it doesn't give us infinite time, but it removes the desire for immortality., D.L. x, 123; cf. Metrod. (?), ed. Körte, p. 588, col. xvi.

86 γεγόναμεν ἅπαξ, δὶς δὲ οὐκ ἔστι γενέσθαι κτλ. hence carpe diem! fr. 204; see also fr. 490–4. Metrod. fr. 53 K.

86 We've occurred once, but we can't occur again, etc. So, seize the day! fr. 204; see also fr. 490–4. Metrod. fr. 53 K.

87 D.L. x, 81.

87 D.L. 81.

88 Against the fear of torment and punishment in the underworld: fr. 340–1, cf. Lucr. iii, 1011 ff. (torments such as those fabled of Hades exist in this world: iii, 978 ff.). Cf. the letter of the Epicurean Diogenes, Rh. Mus. 47, 428 . . . φοβοῦμαι γὰρ οὐδὲν (sc. τὸν θάνατον) διὰ τοὺς Τιτυοὺς καὶ τοὺς Ταντάλους οὓς ἀναγράφουσιν ἐν Ἅιδου τινές, οὐδὲ φρίττω τὴν μύδησιν (μήδησιν the stone) κτλ.

88 Against the fear of suffering and punishment in the afterlife: fr. 340–1, see Lucr. iii, 1011 ff. (torments like those imagined in Hades exist in this world: iii, 978 ff.). See the letter from the Epicurean Diogenes, Rh. Mus. 47, 428 . . . for I fear nothing (meaning death) Because of the Tityuses and the Tantaluses that some mention in Hades, I do not even shudder at the mention.(μήδησιν the stone) etc.

89 metus ille foras praeceps Acheruntis agendus, funditus humanam qui vitam turbat ab imo, omnia suffundens mortis nigrore neque ullam esse voluptatem liquidam puramque reliquit, Lucr. iii, 37 ff.

89 That fear that pushes us frantically outward must be focused on Acheron, which completely disrupts human life from the depths, drowning everything in the darkness of death and leaving no pure, clear joy., Lucr. iii, 37 ff.

90 D.L. x, 126. ridiculum est currere ad mortem taedio vitae, fr. 496.

90 D.L. x, 126. It's absurd to run ourselves to exhaustion out of boredom with life., fr. 496.

91 artifex vitae, Sen. Ep. 90, 27.

91 artifex vitae, Sen. Ep. 90, 27.

92 —σὺ δὲ τῆς αὔριον οὐκ ὢν κύριος ἀναβάλλῃ τὸν καιρόν· ὁ δὲ πάντων βίος μελλησμῷ παραπόλλυται . . . fr. 204.

92 —you, unable to control tomorrow, put off what needs to be done; but everyone’s life is passing by... fr. 204.

93 Negat Epicurus ne diuturnitatem quidem temporis ad beate vivendum aliquid afferre, nec minorem voluptatem percipi in brevitate temporis quam si sit illa sempiterna, Cic., Fin. ii, 87; cf. Ep., Sent. xix (p. 75 Us.). χρόνον οὐ τὸν μήκιστον ἀλλὰ τὸν ἥδιστον καρπίζεται (ὁ σοφός): D.L. x, 126.—quae mala nos subigit vitai tanta cupido, Lucr. iii, 1077. eadem sunt omnia semper, 945. 523

93 Epicurus argues that living a long life doesn't necessarily lead to happiness, and that a short life can be just as pleasurable as an eternal one., Cic., Fin. ii, 87; cf. Ep., Sent. xix (p. 75 Us.). Time does not bear the longest fruit, but the sweetest.(the wise): D.L. x, 126.—The desires of life drive us to such hardships., Lucr. iii, 1077. everything is always the same, 945. 523

94 ἡ διάνοια . . . τὸν παντελῆ βίον παρεσκεύασεν καὶ οὐδὲν ἔτι τοῦ ἀπείρου χρόνου προσεδεήθη, Sent. xx (p. 75 Us.).

94 The mind... planned an entire life and lacked nothing in the boundless time., Sent. xx (p. 75 Us.).

95 οὐκ ἔστι φυσικὴ κοινωνία τοῖς λογικοῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους.—sibi quemque consulere, fr. 523. Aloofness from ταῖς τῶν πληθῶν ἀρχαῖς frr. 554, 552, 9.

95 There is no natural connection among rational beings with each other..—to look after one’s own, fr. 523. Being distant from the principles of the many frr. 554, 552, 9.

96 οἱ νόμοι χάριν τῶν σοφῶν κεῖνται, οὐχ ὅπως μὴ ἀδικῶσιν, ἀλλ’ ὅπως μὴ ἀδικῶνται, fr. 530.

96 Laws are made for the wise, not to stop them from doing wrong, but to make sure they aren’t treated unfairly., fr. 530.

97 οὐκέτι δεῖ σῴζειν τοὺς Ἕλληνας, οὐδ’ ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ στεφάνων παρ’ αὐτοῖς τυγχάνειν . . . Metrod. fr. 41.

97 It's no longer essential to rescue the Greeks or to gain wisdom through their crowns . . . Metrod. fr. 41.

CHAPTER XIV

PART II Popular Belief

Philosophic teaching and the philosophic outlook were at this time by no means confined exclusively to the narrow circles dominated by particular schools. Never more widely or more effectively than in this Hellenistic period did philosophy in one shape or another provide the basis and common medium of a culture that no one of moderate wealth and leisure would willingly be without. Such ideas as educated people of the time generally possessed, dealing in a more connected and definite form with the things of this life and existence that lie beyond the scope of immediate perception, were all drawn from the teaching of philosophy. To a certain extent this is true also of the current views as to the nature and destiny of the soul. But in the region of the unknowable philosophy can never entirely replace or suppress the natural—the irrational beliefs—of mankind. Such beliefs were in their natural element in dealing with such subjects. They influenced even the philosophically enlightened and their authority was supreme with the many who in every age are incapable of understanding the disinterested search for knowledge. Even in this supreme period of universal philosophic culture, popular beliefs about the soul still remained in force, unmodified by the speculations or the exhortations of philosophers.

Philosophical teachings and perspectives during this time were definitely not limited to the narrow circles dominated by specific schools. Never before had philosophy, in one form or another, served as such a widespread and effective foundation for a culture that no one of moderate wealth and leisure would want to be without. The ideas that educated people generally held at the time, which addressed both the realities of this life and the aspects of existence beyond immediate understanding, were all derived from philosophical teachings. This was also somewhat true for the prevailing views on the nature and fate of the soul. However, when it comes to the unknown, philosophy can never completely replace or eliminate natural, irrational beliefs held by humanity. These beliefs thrived when dealing with such topics and influenced even those who were philosophically enlightened. Their authority remained strong among the many who, throughout history, have struggled to grasp the objective pursuit of knowledge. Even during this peak of universal philosophical culture, popular beliefs about the soul continued to persist, untouched by the speculations or arguments of philosophers.

They had their roots—these beliefs—not in any form of speculative thought but in the practice of the Cult of Souls: and that Cult, as it has been described1 for an earlier stage of Greek life, still went on unaltered and with undiminished vigour. This may be asserted with confidence, though we can produce no very important evidence from the literature of this later period. The character and content of that literature is such that we should hardly expect to find such evidence in it. But for the most part the literary evidence from which we were able to illustrate the Cult of Souls in an earlier period may be taken to apply equally to the age with which we are now dealing. Even in its final years Lucian’s pamphlet On Mourning bears express witness to the survival of the ancient and sanctified usages in their fullest compass. We hear again of the washing, anointing, 525 and crowning of the dead, the ceremonious lying-in-state upon the bier, the violent and extravagant lament over the dead body, and all the traditional customs that are still in full force. Last comes the solemn interment of the body—the articles of luxury burnt together with the corpse of the dead man or buried with him in the grave—articles that had once belonged to him and which he is supposed to enjoy even in death—the feeding of the helpless soul of the dead with libations of wine and burnt-offerings—the ritual fasting of the relatives only broken, after three days, in the Banquet of the Dead.2

They rooted their beliefs—not in any kind of speculative thinking but in the practices of the Cult of Souls: and that Cult, as it has been described for an earlier stage of Greek life, continued on unchanged and with the same vigor. This can be confidently stated, even though we can't present significant evidence from the literature of this later period. The nature and content of that literature are such that we wouldn’t really expect to find that evidence in it. However, most of the literary evidence we used to illustrate the Cult of Souls in an earlier time can also be applied to the era we're discussing now. Even in its later years, Lucian’s pamphlet On Mourning clearly shows that the ancient and sacred practices still existed in their entirety. We hear again about washing, anointing, and crowning the dead, the formal lying-in-state on the bier, the loud and dramatic mourning over the deceased body, and all the traditional customs that remain fully observed. Finally, there’s the solemn burial of the body—the luxury items burned along with the deceased or buried with him in the grave—items that once belonged to him and that he is believed to enjoy even in death—feeding the vulnerable soul of the dead with offerings of wine and burnt sacrifices—the relatives observing a ritual fast broken only after three days during the Banquet of the Dead.

The dead man must not be deprived of a single one of “the customary things”—only so can his well-being be fully secured.3 The most important of these is the solemn interment of the body. This is carried out not only by the family of the dead man, but in many cases also by the society to which he may have belonged.4 In these times when the cities sought to make up for the loss of more serious interests in their life by an often touching care for the immediate and the insignificant, deserving citizens were frequently honoured with elaborate funeral processions in which the municipality took part;5 the city fathers would then probably decree that representatives should be sent to the survivors and commissioned to express the sympathy of the city in their loss and distract their minds from their grief by a speech.6

The deceased shouldn't be deprived of any of the "traditional things"—only then can their peace be fully assured. The most important of these is the respectful burial of the body. This is performed not just by the deceased's family, but often by the community they belonged to. In an era when cities tried to compensate for the loss of more significant aspects of life with a heartfelt focus on the immediate and trivial, deserving citizens were often honored with elaborate funeral processions in which the city participated; the local leaders would likely decide that representatives should be sent to the grieving family to express the city's condolences and help divert their minds from the sorrow with a speech.

The ritual act of burial, the object of so much pious zeal, was the very reverse of the indifferent matter that philosophy loved to represent it.7 The sanctity of the place where rests the dead is also a matter of great importance, not only for the dead man himself but for the rest of the family which desires to be still united in the life of the spirit world, and so inhabits a common burial-ground (generally outside the city, very rarely within,8 but sometimes, even yet, actually inside the house).9 The founder of a family-grave desires the members of it to be joined together in the same grave for at least three generations.10 Those who have a right to be buried there take steps—religious and legal or municipal—against the profanation of this family tomb and sanctuary by the burying in it of strangers or the pillaging of the vault—a practice that became increasingly common in the final period of the antique world.11 There are innumerable grave-notices threatening money penalties in accordance with the ancient law of the city, to be paid into the public treasury by those who violate the peace of the grave.12 No less common are the inscriptions which place the grave and its sanctity 526 under the protection of the underworld deities, invoking at the same time the most shocking curses—torments and calamities both temporal and eternal—against profaners of the holiness of the tomb.13 Especially the inhabitants of certain districts of Asia Minor, only very superficially Hellenized, give themselves free rein in the accumulation of such violent execrations. In their case the dark superstitions of ancestral and native worship of gods or spirits may have infected the Hellenes also—it is often the Greeks who become barbarian rather than the barbarians who are Hellenized in the history of Greek relations with these stubborn and barbarous native populations.14 But even in lands where the Greek population has maintained itself without admixture such execrations are occasionally to be found in graves.

The ritual of burial, which people take so seriously, is completely the opposite of the indifferent stuff that philosophy likes to portray it as.7 The sacredness of the location where the dead rest is really important, not just for the deceased but for their family, who wants to stay connected in the spirit world, often by using a shared burial ground (usually located outside the city, rarely within,8 but sometimes even right inside the house).9 The founder of a family grave wants its members to be buried together for at least three generations.10 Those who have the right to be buried there take measures—both religious and legal—against the desecration of this family tomb and sanctuary by burying strangers in it or looting the vault, which became more common during the later period of the ancient world.11 There are countless grave notices threatening financial penalties in line with the ancient laws of the city, which must be paid into the public treasury by anyone who disturbs the peace of the grave.12 Similarly, there are many inscriptions that call on the underworld deities to protect the grave and its sanctity, simultaneously invoking outrageous curses—punishments and disasters, both in this life and the next—against anyone who disrespects the holiness of the tomb.13 Particularly in certain areas of Asia Minor, where the people are only lightly influenced by Hellenic culture, there is a tendency to unleash intense curses. In these cases, the dark superstitions linked to ancestral and local worship of gods or spirits may have also affected the Greeks; it’s often the Greeks who adopt barbaric traits rather than the barbarians becoming Hellenized in the history of Greek interactions with these tough and uncivilized local populations.14 However, even in regions where the Greek population has remained pure, such curses can sometimes be found in graves.

As time went on and the sanctity and peace of the grave began to be more and more seriously threatened, measures of all kinds were taken for its protection. The grave is no mere chamber of corruption; the souls of the dead dwell there,15 and therefore is it holy; as a sanctuary it becomes completely sanctified when it has received the last member of the family, and is enclosed for ever.16 The family so long as it lasts continues to pay the regular Soul-Cult to its ancestors;17 sometimes special foundations ensure the payment for ever18 of the Soul-Cult of which the dead have need.19 Even those whose burial place lies far away from the graves of their own family20 are not entirely deprived of benevolent care and cult.

As time went on and the sanctity and peace of the grave became increasingly threatened, various measures were taken to protect it. The grave is not just a place of decay; the souls of the deceased reside there, and that's why it is sacred; as a sanctuary, it becomes completely consecrated once it has received the last family member and is sealed forever. The family, while it remains, continues to perform regular rituals for its ancestors; sometimes special endowments are established to ensure the rituals are maintained indefinitely for the needs of the deceased. Even those whose burial site is far from their family graves are not completely without care and remembrance.

The pre-supposition of all Cult of Souls—that the dead survive to enjoy at least a gloomy sepulchral existence in their last resting-place—is everywhere vividly implied. It speaks to us with archaic simplicity from those grave-stones upon which the dead, as though still accessible to the sounds of the human voice and able to understand the words of the living, are addressed with the customary words of greeting.21 Sometimes the dead man himself is provided with a similar greeting which he is supposed to address to the passers-by22—between him, confined to his grave, and the others who still walk about in the daylight a dialogue takes place.23 The dead man is not entirely cut off from the affairs of the upper world. He feels an access of fresh life when he is called by the name that he had once borne in his life-time, and the memory of which is now preserved only by his gravestone. His fellow-citizens call upon him three times by name at his burial;24 but even in the grave 527 he is capable of hearing the precious sound. On a gravestone at Athens25 the dead man enjoins upon the members of the actors’ guild to which he had belonged to call upon his name in chorus whenever they pass by his grave, and to gladden him with the sound of hand-clapping, to which he had been accustomed in life. At other times the passer-by “kisses his hand”26 to the dead man; a gesture which denotes the honour paid to a Hero.27 The soul is not merely alive; it belongs now, as primitive and age-long belief expressed it, to the Higher and Mightier Ones.28 Perhaps this exaltation of the wrath and power of the dead is the meaning of the custom by which the dead are called the Good, the Honest (χρηστοί). This usage must have become established at an early period,29 but it is not until these later days that it is first employed as an addition to the simple words of greeting addressed to the dead on gravestones. In this use it is not uniformly current; it is rare in Attica (at least, on graves of natives of that country); whereas in Boeotia, Thessaly, and the countries of Asia Minor it is frequent and almost universal.30 In fact it is natural to suppose31 that this mode of address, originally a euphemistic title addressed to the ghosts of the dead who were conceived as quite capable of acting in a manner the very reverse of that attributed to them by the word, was intended to suggest the power belonging to the personality so addressed as one who has risen to a higher form of existence—and to venerate him with becoming awe.32

The fundamental idea of all Cults of Souls—that the dead continue to exist, even if it's a bleak and tomb-like existence in their final resting place—is clearly expressed everywhere. It resonates with us in simple, old-fashioned language from the gravestones that address the dead, as if they can still hear the human voice and understand the words of the living, with the typical greetings offered.21 Sometimes the deceased is given a similar greeting that he is supposed to send to those passing by22—there is a kind of dialogue between him, confined to his grave, and the others who still walk in the daylight.23 The dead man isn’t completely isolated from the issues of the living world. He feels a surge of life when called by the name he once had, a name now preserved only on his gravestone. His fellow citizens call his name three times at his burial;24 and even in the grave 527, he can hear that cherished sound. On a gravestone in Athens25, the dead man urges the members of the actors’ guild he belonged to call his name in unison whenever they pass his grave, and to cheer him with hand-clapping, a sound he was used to in life. At other times, a passerby “kisses his hand”26 to the dead man; a gesture that signifies respect paid to a Hero.27 The soul is not just alive; it now, as ancient beliefs suggested, belongs to the Higher and Mightier Ones.28 Perhaps this elevation of the dead’s anger and power is reflected in the custom of referring to the deceased as the Good, the Honest (good people). This usage must have started early,29 but it’s only in these later times that it’s first added to the simple greetings offered to the dead on gravestones. This practice isn't widespread; it’s rare in Attica (at least for graves of the locals); however, in Boeotia, Thessaly, and parts of Asia Minor, it is common and nearly universal.30 It is indeed natural to think31 that this manner of address, initially a euphemistic title for the spirits of the dead who were imagined to act quite contrary to what that term suggests, was meant to imply the power belonging to the person addressed as someone who has ascended to a higher state of existence—and to honor him with proper reverence.32

§ 2

The conception of the departed spirit as one who has been raised to a higher state of dignity and power receives clearer and more conscious expression where the departed one is called a Hero.

The idea of the departed spirit as someone who has been elevated to a greater level of dignity and power is expressed more clearly and consciously when that person is referred to as a Hero.

This class of intermediate beings standing on the border line between mankind and godhead—the world of the Heroes—was in no danger of extinction at this period of Greek religious belief. The attitude of mind that could think of certain special souls as withdrawn from the limitations of visible existence and raised to a higher spiritual state remained still vigorous and was even able to give birth to new conceptions.

This group of intermediate beings, existing on the edge between humans and gods—the realm of the Heroes—was not at risk of disappearing during this time of Greek religious belief. The mindset that viewed certain special souls as free from the confines of visible existence and elevated to a higher spiritual state was still robust and even capable of generating new ideas.

In its original and proper sense the name Heros never indicated an independent and self-sufficient spirit. Archegetes, “leader” or “originator”, is his real and distinctive title. The Heros stands at the beginning of a series, taking its origin 528 from him, of mortal men for whom he is the leader and “ancestor”. The genuine Heroes are the ancestors, whether real or imaginary, of a family or a house; in the “Heroes”, after whom they wish to be called, the members of a society, a clan, or even a whole race honour the archegetai of those groups. They are always men of power and influence, prominent and distinguished from other men, who are regarded as having thus entered into the life of Heroes after their death. And even in later times the Heroes of a more recent elevation, though they may no longer be the leaders of a train of descendants taking their origin from them, are yet regarded as distinguished from the people who worship them by their peculiar virtue and dignity. To become a Heros after death was a privilege reserved for a few great and uncommon personalities who even in their lifetime were not as other men were.

In its original meaning, the term Heros never referred to a standalone and self-sufficient spirit. Archegetes, meaning “leader” or “originator,” is his true and defining title. The Heros is at the beginning of a lineage, serving as the source528 for mortal men whom he leads and represents as their “ancestor.” The true Heroes are the ancestors, whether real or fictional, of a family or household; in the “Heroes,” after whom they are named, members of a society, clan, or even an entire race honor the archegetai of those groups. They are always individuals of power and influence, notable and distinguished from others, who are seen as having entered the realm of Heroes after they die. Even in later times, the more recently elevated Heroes, though they may no longer lead a line of descendants originating from them, are still viewed as unique and set apart from the people who revere them due to their exceptional virtue and dignity. Achieving the status of Heros after death was a privilege reserved for a select few remarkable individuals who were not like ordinary people even during their lifetimes.

The companies of these old and specially chosen Heroes did not suffer the fate of forgetfulness which would have been their second and real death. The love of country and city, undying among the Greeks, attached itself in reverent memory to the illuminated spirits of the past who had once protected and defended their native land. When Messene was refounded in the fourth century the Heroes of the country were solemnly called upon to become inhabitants of the city as they had been before—more particularly Aristomenes, the never-forgotten champion of Messenian freedom.33 Even at Leuctra he had appeared in the melée of the fight, doing battle for the Thebans.34 Before the battle, Epameinondas had secured the favour of the Heroines of the place, the daughters of Skedasos, by means of prayer and sacrifice.35 These were events of the last heroic age of Greek history, but the cult and memory of the local Heroes of the Greek countries survived into a much later age. Leonidas was worshipped by the people of Sparta for many centuries,36 and the champions of the Persian Wars, the saviours of Hellas, were worshipped by their remote descendants.37 Even in imperial times the inhabitants of the island of Kos still worshipped those who had fallen to secure their freedom centuries before.38 Such individual cases allow us to see what was the general rule: the memory and cult of a Hero lived on as long as the community remained in existence whose duty it was to maintain his worship. Even those Heroes—a class by themselves—who have secured their immortality through their fame in ancient poetry39 still retained their cult undiminished. The heroic 529 figure of Hektor still preserved life and reality for his worshippers in the Troad or at Thebes.40 Even in the third century of our era the district of Troy and the neighbouring coasts of Europe still kept fresh the memory and the cult of the Heroes of Epic renown.41 Of Achilles, who had a special fate, we must speak in another connexion.42

The companies of these old and specially chosen Heroes did not suffer the fate of being forgotten, which would have been their second and true death. The love for their country and city, everlasting among the Greeks, linked them in reverent memory to the remarkable spirits of the past who had once protected and defended their homeland. When Messene was rebuilt in the fourth century, the Heroes of the land were formally invited to be citizens of the city as they had been before—especially Aristomenes, the unforgettable champion of Messenian freedom. Even at Leuctra, he had joined the fight, battling for the Thebans. Before the battle, Epameinondas had gained the favor of the local Heroines, the daughters of Skedasos, through prayer and sacrifice. These were events from the last heroic age of Greek history, but the worship and memory of local Heroes in Greek regions persisted into much later times. Leonidas was revered by the people of Sparta for many centuries, and the champions of the Persian Wars, the saviors of Hellas, were honored by their distant descendants. Even in imperial times, the residents of the island of Kos still honored those who had fallen to secure their freedom centuries earlier. Such individual examples reveal the general trend: the memory and worship of a Hero lived on as long as the community remained that was responsible for maintaining his worship. Even those Heroes—a unique class by themselves—who achieved immortality through their fame in ancient poetry still retained their cult in full force. The heroic figure of Hektor continued to embody life and reality for his worshippers in the Troad or at Thebes. Even in the third century of our era, the region of Troy and the nearby coasts of Europe still kept the memory and worship of the Epic Heroes alive. Regarding Achilles, who had a unique fate, we must discuss him in another section.

Nor did less splendid figures vanish from the memory of their narrower associations of worshippers. Autolykos the founder of Sinope retained his cult even in the time of Lucullus.43 At a quite late period the relics of the specially popular Heroes of the Pan-Hellenic games were still the subject of many superstitions44 that bear witness to their continued influence. Heroes to whom healing powers were ascribed continued to do works of healing and to be worshipped, and their number was even extended.45 Mere local spirits, whose very names had been forgotten, nevertheless lost none of the honour that came to them from their beneficent miracles; such were, for instance, that Philopregmon of Poteideia who was celebrated by a late poet,46 or the Hero Euodos of Apollinopolis in Egypt who dispensed “good journey” to those who honoured him in passing by his monument.47

Nor did less impressive figures fade from the memories of their more limited groups of worshippers. Autolykos, the founder of Sinope, kept his status even during the time of Lucullus.43 Even at a later time, the remains of the particularly popular Heroes of the Pan-Hellenic games were still surrounded by many superstitions44 that show their ongoing influence. Heroes believed to have healing powers continued to perform acts of healing and to be worshipped, and their numbers even grew.45 Even local spirits, whose names had long been forgotten, still received the respect that came from their helpful miracles; such was the case with Philopregmon of Poteideia, who was celebrated by a later poet,46 or the Hero Euodos from Apollinopolis in Egypt, who granted "safe travels" to those who honored him while passing by his monument.47

But all Heroes were not yet reduced to such casual salutations from occasional passers-by. In many places48 the regular festivals and sacrifices to Heroes still survived—even human sacrifice was still sometimes made to spirits who were held capable of special exhibitions of power.49 In a few cases the festivals of Heroes are the chief feasts in the annual calendar of a city.50 The names of Heroes quite as much as of Gods were used in oath-taking51 at treaties made by Greek cities so long as they retained their independence. Foundations were dedicated to the honour of Gods and Heroes together.52 Cult associations called themselves after the Heroes they met to worship.53 Special priests of certain Heroes were regularly appointed.54 Even in the second century, in his book of travels, Pausanias is able to inform us of not a few Heroes whose cult, as he distinctly says, had gone on unbroken in their cities down to his own day.55 The annual festival of the Heroes who had fallen at Plataea was still celebrated with the greatest pomp in the time of Plutarch, who describes every detail of its archaic ceremonial.56 And at Sikyon, at the same time, the Heroic festival of Aratos, the founder of the Achæan League, was still celebrated, though here the centuries had robbed the occasion of many of its former glories.57 530

But not all Heroes had been reduced to casual greetings from occasional passers-by. In many places48 the regular festivals and sacrifices to Heroes still continued—even human sacrifice was still sometimes offered to spirits believed to have special powers.49 In some cases, the festivals for Heroes were the main celebrations in the annual calendar of a city.50 The names of Heroes, just like those of Gods, were used in oaths51 as treaties made by Greek cities as long as they maintained their independence. Foundations were dedicated to the honor of both Gods and Heroes.52 Cult groups named themselves after the Heroes they gathered to worship.53 Special priests for certain Heroes were regularly chosen.54 Even in the second century, in his travel writings, Pausanias could tell us about several Heroes whose worship, as he clearly states, had continued uninterrupted in their cities up to his time.55 The annual festival for the Heroes who fell at Plataea was still celebrated with great pomp during Plutarch's time, who described every detail of its ancient rituals.56 And at Sikyon, simultaneously, the Heroic festival for Aratos, the founder of the Achæan League, was still taking place, although the centuries had stripped the event of many of its former splendors.57 530

In all such ceremonies it was to a single and definite spirit-personality that the devotion of men was offered. Each of them received the cult that was due to him by the terms of some old-established and sanctified foundation. Nothing was further from men’s minds than the loose and vague conception, expressed sometimes by ancient writers, that all brave men of the past or all outstanding individuals of whatever time are to be regarded forthwith as Heroes.58 It was still clearly and consciously felt that elevation to the rank of Hero was not a privilege that belonged as a matter of course to any particular class of mankind, but, wherever it occurred, was essentially a ratification of quite exceptional worth and influence displayed already in the lifetime of the Hero. Following this conception even the Hellenistic age added to the number of the Heroes by drawing upon the great men of the present. A little earlier Pelopidas and Timoleon had been honoured in this way, and now the figures of Leosthenes, Kleomenes, and Philopoimen were raised to heroic glory.59 Even Aratos, the very incarnation of the sobriety of a too matter-of-fact age, at the end of a life devoted with ardour but without enduring success to the service of his country, was supposed by his countrymen to have passed over in a mysterious manner into the realm of heroic semi-divinity.60

In all such ceremonies, people's devotion was directed to a specific and defined spirit-personality. Each of them received the honor that was rightfully theirs based on some longstanding and revered tradition. Nothing was further from people's minds than the loose and vague idea, sometimes expressed by ancient writers, that all brave individuals from the past or all remarkable people from any time should be considered Heroes. It was clearly understood that being recognized as a Hero was not an automatic privilege for any particular group of people; instead, whenever it happened, it was fundamentally a recognition of truly exceptional merit and influence demonstrated during the Hero's lifetime. Following this belief, even the Hellenistic era expanded the list of Heroes by including great individuals from the present. A bit earlier, Pelopidas and Timoleon had been honored this way, and now the figures of Leosthenes, Kleomenes, and Philopoimen were elevated to heroic status. Even Aratos, who represented the practicality of a very realistic age, was thought by his fellow citizens to have mysteriously transcended into the realm of semi-divine heroism after a life dedicated with passion but without lasting success in serving his country.

As in these cases whole populations honoured individuals so also did narrower and much humbler associations, even in this rationalist age, elevate their helpers and protectors to the rank of Hero and honour them as such. The slaves of Kos thus honoured their former comrade and leader Drimakos;61 at another place there was a Hero who protected all refugees who took shelter with him;62 at Ephesos there was a Hero who had been a simple shepherd.63 At the time of Augustus, a benefactor of his city, Athenodoros, the philosopher, had been made a Hero by grateful Tarsians after his death.64 It sometimes happens that a Hero of the distant past may find himself confused with a descendant of the same name whom his contemporaries put in the place of his own ancestor and worship in his stead.65

As in these cases where entire populations honored individuals, smaller and humbler groups also raised their helpers and protectors to the status of Hero and celebrated them as such, even in this rational age. The slaves of Kos honored their former comrade and leader Drimakos;61 in another place, there was a Hero who protected all refugees who took shelter with him;62 at Ephesos, there was a Hero who had once been a simple shepherd.63 During the time of Augustus, Athenodoros, the philosopher, became a Hero in the eyes of grateful Tarsians after his death.64 Sometimes, a Hero from the distant past can be mistaken for a descendant with the same name, whom his contemporaries revere in place of his ancestor and worship instead.65

So little were men grown out of the ideas centred round the cult of Heroes that, accustomed to the ever-increasing adoration of the “Mightier and Better”, every age was eager to add to their number from the men of the present. They did not always wait for the death of the individual so honoured before beginning to address him as Heros; even in his lifetime he must enjoy a foretaste of the honour that was destined 531 to be his after his departure from this life. Thus, Lysander was saluted as a Hero after his victory by the Greeks whom he had liberated from the despotism of Athens; and in the Hellenistic age many a fortunate army commander or mighty king received the same honour. Of the Romans Flamininus the friend of the Greeks was the first to receive it.66 This misapplication of the cult of Heroes to the living then became still further extended.67 It may be that sometimes it was a real feeling of unusual merit that fired the impulsive temperament of the Greeks; but in the end the custom became almost a meaningless convention; even private individuals were thus called Hero in their lifetime68 and heroic honours—even the foundation of annual athletic games—were granted to living persons almost indiscriminately.69 And at last when it was necessary to honour an individual whom the love and passionate regret of a monarch elevated to the rank of Hero after his death then, indeed, the age could hardly do enough in the hyperbole of pomp and ceremony. The funeral honours paid to the dead Hephaistion are an extravagant example of this.70

So little progress had been made by people beyond the ideas centered around the cult of Heroes that, used to the ever-increasing reverence for the “Mightier and Better,” every era was eager to add to their ranks by selecting figures from the present. They didn’t always wait for the individual being honored to pass away before calling him a Hero; even while he was alive, he was expected to experience a taste of the honor that would be his after leaving this life. For example, Lysander was hailed as a Hero after his victory by the Greeks he had freed from Athenian tyranny; and during the Hellenistic period, numerous successful army commanders and powerful kings received the same recognition. Among the Romans, Flamininus, a friend of the Greeks, was the first to be honored this way. This inappropriate application of the cult of Heroes to the living then became even more widespread. Sometimes, it may have stemmed from a genuine acknowledgment of exceptional merit that inspired the passionate nature of the Greeks; however, over time, the practice turned into an almost empty convention; even ordinary individuals were referred to as Hero during their lifetimes, and heroic honors—even the establishment of annual athletic games—were granted to living people almost at random. Eventually, when it became necessary to honor someone whom the deep affection and regret of a monarch elevated to the status of Hero after his death, the era could hardly contain itself with lavish displays and ceremonies. The funeral honors given to the deceased Hephaistion are a prime example of this extravagance.

If in such cases the limits between the worship of a Hero and the adoration of a god seemed almost to have disappeared, we still have evidence of individual cases in which the survivors, without actually naming them Heroes, offer to their much-loved dead a memorial cult that hardly falls short of full heroic honours.71 Nor is it only in such cases as these that we perceive the signs of a tendency to exalt the Cult of Souls everywhere and to approximate it to the worship of ancestors in the ancient Cult of Heroes. It emerges clearly enough, for all the brevity of their language, from the multitude of epitaphic inscriptions in which members of simple citizen families are addressed with the title of Heros. At any rate, it betokens an increase in the importance and dignity of the dead when a tombstone expressly announces that an individual citizen has been “heroized” by the city after his death. And this is what not infrequently happened—early in Thera and later on in many other places as well.72 The same conclusion must be drawn when we hear of associations declaring a dead member to be a Heros;73 or when a society recognizes a dead man as Heros on the formal motion of an individual.74 Families, too, become accustomed to giving the name to those of their number that have died before the rest; and a son will thus speak of his father, parents of a son, and a wife of her husband—either informally or by a formal declaration naming 532 the dead one as Heros.75 A higher and mightier form of existence after death must be imagined for the departed when he is thus distinguished so explicitly from the ordinary multitude of the dead—still more so in those cases when the dead man, elevated to a mystic communion with higher forms of life, loses his own name and receives in exchange that of a Hero of long-standing honour, or even that of a God.76

If in these cases the lines between honoring a Hero and worshiping a god seem to have almost faded, we still see instances where the survivors, without actually calling them Heroes, hold a memorial ritual for their beloved dead that comes close to full heroic recognition.71 It's not just in these situations that we notice a growing trend to elevate the Cult of Souls everywhere, aligning it with the ancestor worship found in the ancient Cult of Heroes. This is clearly evident, despite the brevity of their words, in the numerous epitaph inscriptions that address members of ordinary citizen families with the title of Heros. At the very least, it signifies a rise in the importance and dignity of the deceased when a gravestone explicitly states that a citizen has been “heroized” by the city after death. And this frequently occurred—early in Thera and later in many other locations as well.72 The same conclusion can be drawn when we learn of groups naming a deceased member as a Heros;73 or when a society acknowledges a deceased individual as Heros based on a formal proposal from someone.74 Families also start to refer to their deceased members with this title; a son might speak of his father, parents of a son, or a wife of her husband—either casually or through a formal declaration naming 532 the deceased as Heros.75 A higher and greater form of existence after death must be envisioned for the departed when they are explicitly distinguished from the general population of the dead—even more so in cases where the deceased, elevated to a mystical connection with higher forms of life, loses their name and receives in its place that of a Hero of long-standing honor, or even that of a God.76

In every case that is known to us, the “heroizing” of a dead person by the city or a society or the family is carried out entirely on the independent authority of those bodies. The Delphic Oracle, without whose deciding voice it was hardly possible in early times for the company of the elect to receive any addition,77 was, in these days when the prestige of the oracle had sunk almost to nothing, no longer applied to for its sanction. The consequence was hardly avoidable that the licence thus accorded to corporations and families should widen still further the bounds of the Heroes’ kingdom. In the end, these boundaries broke down entirely. There were cities and countries where it became the custom to apply the title of “Hero” as an epithet of honour belonging to all the dead without distinction. It seems that this extension of “heroizing” to all the dead first became common in Boeotia,78 though here it was not quite universal—Thespiai was an exception.79 Thessalian grave-inscriptions give the fullest evidence for the heroizing of the dead of every age and description. But the custom spread to every country populated by Greeks;80 only Athens is less unrestrained81 in the bestowal of the title of Hero upon the dead—a title which retained no more of the old and essential meaning of the word (which perhaps survived longest in Athens) than to say that the dead were really now dead.82

In every known case, the “heroizing” of a deceased person by a city, society, or family is done entirely on the independent authority of those groups. The Delphic Oracle, which in early times was essential for the chosen individuals to be recognized further, was, during this period when the Oracle's prestige had nearly vanished, no longer consulted for its approval. The result was almost inevitable: the freedom granted to organizations and families led to an even greater expansion of the Heroes' realm. Eventually, these boundaries completely collapsed. There were cities and regions where it became customary to refer to all the deceased as “Heroes” without distinction. This broader use of “heroizing” for all the dead first became popular in Boeotia, although it wasn't entirely universal—Thespiai was an exception. Thessalian grave inscriptions provide the clearest evidence of heroizing the dead from every age and background. However, this custom spread to every Greek-populated area; only Athens is more reserved in granting the title of Hero to the deceased—a title that no longer carried the old and essential meaning of the word (which perhaps lasted longest in Athens) beyond simply indicating that the deceased were, in fact, deceased.

In spite of such indiscriminate application the name “Hero” still continued to be something of a title of honour. An honour, indeed, that was thus accorded to everyone without distinction was in danger of becoming the reverse of an honour. But isolated phrases of a naive and popular character make it clear that a difference was still felt to exist between the “Hero” and those who were not honoured with this distinguishing epithet.83 When the name of Hero was thus applied to all the dead, not in exceptional cases but as a rule, the glory and distinction of which the idea of the “Hero” was thus deprived must have fallen in some measure upon the individual dead, if they 533 and the Heroes could meet on common ground. Thus, even the dissipation of the heroic honour and its indiscriminate application to all the dead is in reality but another indication of the fact that even in the decline of the ancient world the power and dignity of the departed soul had not declined too, but had, on the contrary, grown greater.

Despite such widespread use, the name “Hero” still remained a title of honor. However, an honor that was granted to everyone without distinction was at risk of losing its significance. Yet, certain naive and popular phrases indicate that a distinction was still recognized between the “Hero” and those who weren't bestowed with this unique label. When the name of Hero was commonly given to all the dead, not just in exceptional cases but as a rule, the glory and distinction originally associated with the idea of the “Hero” must have been reflected in some way on the individual deceased, allowing them and the Heroes to find common ground. Therefore, even though the heroic honor was diluted and applied indiscriminately to all the dead, this reflects a deeper truth: that even in the decline of the ancient world, the power and dignity of the departed soul had not diminished; in fact, it had likely grown even greater.

§ 3

The souls of the departed show their power and the fact that they are still alive more particularly in the effect that they have on this life and on the living. For the purposes of the Cult of Souls they are regarded as confined to the region of the inhabited earth; they continue in the grave or near it, for a time or permanently, and can therefore be reached by the offerings or the prayers of their living relatives. There can be no doubt that at this time men still believed, as they had done since the earliest times, in a kindly relationship between the family and its departed members, an exchange in which offerings were made at the grave by the living and blessings vouchsafed by the Unseen. It is true, however, that we only have imperfect records of such calm and comfortable family belief in the survival of the departed and of the part they continue to play in the daily life of their descendants.

The spirits of those who have passed show their influence and the fact that they are still present, especially in how they affect life and the living. In the Cult of Souls, they are seen as tied to the land of the living; they linger in the grave or close by, either for a while or permanently, and can thus be reached through the offerings or prayers of their living relatives. There's no doubt that during this time, people still believed, as they had since ancient times, in a warm connection between families and their deceased members, a kind of exchange where the living made offerings at the grave and received blessings from the Unseen. However, it’s true that we only have incomplete records of this peaceful and reassuring family belief in the survival of the departed and the role they continue to play in the daily lives of their descendants.

But there is a more sinister variety of intercourse with the souls or spirits of the dead. They sometimes appear unsought to the living; they can be compelled by the force of magic to use their powers in the service of the living. Both these possibilities apply more particularly to those unquiet souls whom fate or their own hands have deprived of life violently and before their time; to those who have not been consigned to the peace of the grave by ceremonious burial.84 The enlightened of the time do indeed refuse to believe in ghosts and haunting spirits of the dead that wander without rest about the place of their tragic fate, and make their presence disagreeably felt by the living.85 But the populace, even in such enlightened days, gave the fullest credence to stories in which the existence of a spirit-world seemed to reveal its sinister reality, trespassing at times upon the world of the living. Regular folk-tales of spectral apparitions, vagrant ghosts of unfortunate souls, vampire-like spirits of the grave,86 are preserved to us in some numbers—chiefly such as appealed to a perverted philosophy, the insaniens sapientia of an outworn age, as seeming to confirm its fancies of an invisible world between heaven and earth. In Lucian’s Lover of Lies the grey-beard 534 philosophers entertain each other in portentous seriousness with such communications from the spirit world.87 Plutarch himself is quite seriously convinced of the reality of some ghostly appearances.88 Philosophy, which at this time was going back to Plato, found in its system of demonology a means of making such old wives’ tales intelligible and credible to itself.

But there’s a darker kind of interaction with the souls or spirits of the dead. They sometimes show up uninvited to the living; they can be forced by magic to use their powers to help the living. These situations are especially true for those restless souls who were violently taken from life before their time, or who haven’t been laid to rest properly through a proper burial.84 The educated people of the time refuse to believe in ghosts and wandering spirits of the dead that roam restlessly around the sites of their tragic fates, making their presence unpleasantly known to the living.85 However, even in these enlightened times, the common people fervently believed in stories that suggested the existence of a spirit world, sometimes infringing upon the realm of the living. Regular folk tales about spectral apparitions, wandering ghosts of unfortunate souls, vampire-like spirits from the grave,86 have been passed down to us in significant numbers—mainly those that appealed to a twisted philosophy, the insaniens sapientia of a bygone era, as they seemed to validate its notions of an unseen world between heaven and earth. In Lucian’s Lover of Lies, the old philosophers entertain each other solemnly with messages from the spirit world.87 Plutarch himself is quite convinced of the reality of some ghostly appearances.88 At this time, philosophy, which was returning to Plato, found in its system of demonology a way to make such old wives’ tales understandable and believable to itself.

Finally, the time arrives when the violent and arbitrary interference with the unseen world—sorcery and spirit-raising—becomes a part of orthodox philosophy. The popular imagination of the Greeks did not have to wait for instruction from their barbarian neighbours, who had reduced the irrational to a system, before they could believe in the summoning of spirits from the deep. Magic in this sense was of extreme antiquity in Greece.89 But in the fusion and intermixture of Greeks with barbarians which marked the Hellenistic age similar and cognate superstitions from all the corners of the earth met together and acquired strength from their union. It was foreign sources rather than Greek which chiefly contributed to swell the turbid and noxious stream of sorceries and spirit-raisings, the practical application of an irrational theory of the nature and being of the soul in separation from the body. The lofty heaven of the old Greek gods was beginning to grow dim before the troubled vision of this later age; more and more their place was taken by a mob of idols and an obscure rabble of lesser devils. In this chaotic medley of Greek and barbarian demonology the companies of unquiet souls and ghosts of the dead easily found a place. The ghost was no longer an alien when the Gods themselves had become ghostly. When both Gods and spirits have to answer to the spells of the sorcerer the souls of the dead are seldom left in peace.90 We possess some relics of the art of spirit-raising in the Græco-Egyptian magic books; and we can now see with our eyes specimens which illustrate the practical outcome of this delusion in the magic charms and exorcisms that were scratched on tablets of lead or gold and placed in the graves—as the natural abode of the spirits which were to be compelled—where they have been found in considerable quantities in modern times. Among the sinister influences that are thus conjured to do the work of vengeance, punishment, or destruction upon the conjurer’s enemy, the unquiet souls of the dead are also regularly mentioned. To them is attributed the power and the will to intervene with malevolence and obstruction in the life of men, no less than to the other spiritual 535 powers of heaven and hell in company with whom they are summoned.91

Finally, the moment comes when violent and random interference with the unseen world—sorcery and spirit-raising—becomes an accepted part of established philosophy. The popular beliefs of the Greeks didn't need instruction from their barbarian neighbors, who had systematized the irrational, to believe in summoning spirits from the depths. Magic in this sense was extremely ancient in Greece. But during the mixing and blending of Greeks with barbarians in the Hellenistic age, similar superstitions from all over the world came together and gained strength through their union. It was mainly foreign influences, rather than Greek, that contributed to the murky and harmful stream of sorcery and spirit-raising, reflecting a flawed understanding of the soul's nature and existence apart from the body. The grand heavens of the ancient Greek gods were beginning to fade for the troubled minds of this later age; increasingly, they were replaced by a horde of idols and a chaotic mix of lesser demons. In this chaotic blend of Greek and barbarian demonology, restless souls and ghosts of the dead easily found their place. The ghost was no longer an outsider when the gods themselves had become ghostly. When both gods and spirits had to respond to the spells of the sorcerer, the souls of the dead were rarely left in peace. We have some remnants of the art of spirit-raising in the Graeco-Egyptian magic books, and we can now see examples that illustrate the practical outcomes of this delusion in the magical charms and exorcisms that were inscribed on tablets of lead or gold and placed in graves—as these were seen as the natural homes of the spirits to be summoned—where they have been found in large numbers in modern times. Among the dark forces called upon to carry out revenge, punishment, or destruction against the conjurer’s enemies, the restless souls of the dead are also frequently mentioned. They are believed to have the power and desire to interfere with malice and hindrance in human lives, just like the other spiritual forces from heaven and hell with whom they are summoned.

§ 4

The Cult of Souls for all its expansion gave no assistance to the picturing of what might be the condition of the departed souls independently of their connexion with the living. Those who troubled themselves about such matters and sought further information were obliged to have recourse, if not to the systems of theologians and philosophers, then to the imaginative accounts and pictures of ancient poetry and legend.

The Cult of Souls, despite its growth, offered no help in imagining what the state of departed souls might be without their connection to the living. Those who cared to think about such things and wanted more information had to turn, if not to the theories of theologians and philosophers, then to the imaginative tales and imagery found in ancient poetry and legend.

The idea of a distant realm of the souls into which the strengthless shadows of those who had departed this life disappeared had not lost its hold on the popular imagination even of these later ages—difficult as it might be to reconcile92 such an idea with the pre-suppositions of cultus with its customary worship and sustenance of the souls confined within the grave. The belief in a distant kingdom of the dead could not but continue to be current among men for whom the Homeric poems remained the earliest manual and school-book in the hands of youth and the source of instruction and entertainment to every age. The passionate indignation with which philosophers of the Stoic as well as the Epicurean faith attacked the beliefs resting on the teaching of Homer cannot be explained except by supposing that Homer and his picture had remained a guiding force with the masses who were uninstructed in philosophy. And, in fact, ancient writers use language which shows that the ancient conception of Hades was by no means discarded but on the contrary was still vigorously alive among the populace.93

The idea of a distant realm for souls, where the powerless shadows of those who passed away went, still captivated people's imaginations even in later times. This was hard to align with established practices centered around worship and the care of souls resting in graves. The belief in a far-off kingdom for the dead continued to thrive among people who viewed the Homeric poems as their first textbooks and sources of learning and entertainment throughout their lives. The strong outrage from both Stoic and Epicurean philosophers against beliefs inspired by Homer's teachings suggests that Homer and his visions were still influential among the masses who lacked philosophical training. In fact, ancient writers used language that indicates the old view of Hades was not only intact but was still very much alive among the general public.

As to what might go on down below and the general appearance of the underworld—these were questions that the invention of theological and semi-philosophic fancy, each according to its special lights and preconceptions, strove to answer in eager competition.94 But such attempts to picture the condition of things in the kingdom of the souls—attempts which reached their highest point in the elaborate chiaroscuro of Vergil’s Hades—remained the exercises of ingenious fancy and rarely pretended to be anything else. A distinct and authoritative popular system of belief on these points was scarcely possible when the orthodox religion of the state formally and dogmatically rejected everything of the kind.

As for what might be happening down below and the overall look of the underworld—these were questions that the creativity of theology and semi-philosophy, each with its own perspectives and biases, worked hard to answer in fierce competition. 94 But such efforts to envision the state of affairs in the realm of souls—efforts that peaked in the intricate chiaroscuro of Vergil’s Hades—remained exercises in imaginative thinking and rarely claimed to be anything more. A clear and widely accepted belief system on these matters was almost impossible when the official state religion outright rejected anything of the sort.

It would, indeed, have been more natural if in connexion with the idea of the congregation of souls enclosed in the 536 kingdom of the underworld deities a belief in a compensatory justice to be found in this after-life of the dead, had grown up and obtained popular currency. The oppressed and needy who feel themselves deprived of their share in this world’s goods think only too easily that somewhere there must be a place where they too will some day enjoy the fruits that others alone are allowed to pluck upon earth—and place that “somewhere” beyond the boundaries of this world and of reality. Pious belief in the gods expects to obtain the prize, so often denied upon earth, in a realm of the spirit. If indeed such a conviction of a compensatory justice to come95—reward of the virtuous and punishment of the wicked in a hereafter—was really more widely and seriously held in this age than it had been before,96 then the cult of the underworld deities as it was practised in the mysteries of the states and the various religious societies must have contributed in a large degree to bring this about. And contrariwise, the belief that the punishing and rewarding omnipotence of the gods would be felt in a hereafter must have brought an unbroken stream of adherents to those mysteries which in fact offered their help and mediation in the life to come. Those only could imagine that they had detailed knowledge of the enigmas that lie beyond the reach of all experience, who could surrender themselves entirely to the dogmatic teaching of a closed sect. We may in fact take leave to doubt whether the gruesome pictures of a place of torment in Hades, with its undying punishment in devouring flames, and the similar fancies that later authors sometimes express, were in reality anything more than the private imaginations with which exclusive and superstitious conventicles sought to terrorize their members.97 The charming pictures of a “Land of Arrival” to which death sends the much-tried children of men, may have been more widely accepted. Homer, the universal instructor, had stamped them upon men’s memories. For the poet the Elysian plain had been a place situated upon the surface of the earth to which the occasional favour of the gods was able to translate a few of their dearest favourites, that they might there enjoy, without seeing death, unending bliss.98 In imitation of the Homeric fancy, the poetry of the following ages had imagined the translation of many other Heroes and heroic women of the legendary past to a secret life of bliss in Elysium or in the Islands of the Blest.99 Later fancy, which saw in Elysium the Land of Promise to which all men who had lived in a manner pleasing to the gods 537 would be taken after their death,100 now placed its Elysium or Islands of the Blest in the interior of the earth beyond the reach of all save disembodied souls. In later times this became the currently accepted view, but the subject remained undefined and subject to variation. Men must still, in fact, have imagined The Isles of the Blest, the abode of privileged spirits, to be situated upon the surface of the earth (though, indeed, far away beyond the limits of the discovered countries of the globe), when attempts could be made to find the way there and to bring back news to the living. The attempt attributed to Sertorius was only the most famous of such voyages of discovery.101 Why, indeed, should these magic Isles remain for ever undiscovered upon the borders of the inhabited world that yet offered so wide a field for discovery, when everybody knew of the island in the Black Sea, often visited by living men, where Achilles, the supreme example of miraculous translation, lived for ever in perpetual enjoyment of his youth? For centuries the island of Leukê, the separate Elysium of Achilles and a few select among the Heroes, was visited and reverenced with religious awe.102 Here men thought they could discern in immediate perception, and in actual physical contact, something of the mysterious existence of blessed spirits. The belief in the possibility of miraculous translation to an eternity of unbroken union of body and soul, thus palpably and visibly substantiated, could not completely die even in this prosaic age. The educated did indeed find this conception so strange and unintelligible that when they come to speak of translation legends of the past they profess themselves unable to say what exactly the ancients had supposed to occur when such miracles took place.103 But the populace, which finds nothing easier to believe in than the impossible, once more naively accepted the miracle. Did not the examples of Amphiaraos and Trophonios plainly establish the fact of translation to underground retreats? And to them as being still alive in their caves beneath the earth a cult was offered until an advanced period.104 The translation of beautiful youths to everlasting life in the kingdom of the nymphs and spirits was the subject of many folk-tales.105 Even in contemporary life the miracle of translation seemed not altogether impossible.106 When the kings and queens of the Macedonian empire of the East began to receive divine honours in imitation of the great Alexander himself, it was not long before men ventured to affirm that at the end of his earthly existence the Divine Ruler everywhere 538 does not die but is merely “carried away” by the gods and still lives on.107 It is the peculiar property of divinity, as Plato clearly expresses it,108 to live for ever in the indivisible unity of body and soul. A court-bred theology could the more easily make such demands upon the belief of subject peoples in the Semitic East, and possibly in Egypt too, because native109 legends had already told of the translation to immortal life of individual men dear to the gods and akin to the gods in nature; just as similar stories became common in Italian legends too,110 though possibly only under the influence of Greek models. Indeed, quite apart from obsequious courtliness, Greeks and half-Greeks were quite capable of entertaining the idea111 that the darlings of their fancy, such as Alexander the Great, had not suffered death but had been translated alive to the realm of imperishable physical existence. This is shown clearly enough by the success which attended the appearance, in Moesia at the beginning of the third century A.D., of another Alexander. This imposter travelled from land to land with a great train of Bacchants, and everywhere men believed in his identity with the great monarch.112 A little earlier they had believed with equal credulity in the reappearance upon earth of the Emperor Nero,113 who, it was thought, had not died but had merely disappeared. When Antinous, the beautiful youth beloved by the Emperor Hadrian, sank and disappeared in his watery grave he was at once regarded as a god who had, in fact, not died but had been translated.114 The miraculous translation of Apollonios of Tyana is reported with the utmost seriousness;115 like the other marvels and mysteries in the strange and enigmatic existence of this prophetic figure, it found believers enough.116

It would have been more natural if, connected to the idea of the group of souls in the 536 underworld, there had been a belief in a justice that compensates in the afterlife. The oppressed and needy, who feel deprived of their share in the goods of this world, too easily think that there must be a place where they, too, will someday enjoy the benefits that others are allowed to reap on earth—and they envision that “somewhere” beyond the limits of this world and reality. Devout belief in the gods expects to gain the rewards often denied on earth in a spiritual realm. If such a conviction in compensatory justice to come—a reward for the virtuous and punishment for the wicked in the afterlife—was truly more widespread and serious in this age than it had been before, then the worship of the underworld deities, as practiced in the state mysteries and various religious societies, must have significantly contributed to this belief. Conversely, the belief that the gods' punishing and rewarding power would be felt in the afterlife must have drawn countless followers to these mysteries, which indeed offered their help and mediation for life after death. Only those who completely surrendered themselves to the dogmatic teachings of a closed sect could claim to understand the enigmas beyond the reach of any experience. We may reasonably doubt whether the gruesome images of a tormenting place in Hades, with its everlasting punishments in consuming flames, and similar ideas expressed by later authors, were anything more than the creations of exclusive and superstitious gatherings trying to scare their members.97 The appealing images of a “Land of Arrival” to which death sends the worn-out children of men may have been more widely accepted. Homer, the universal teacher, had stamped these ideas into people's memories. For the poet, the Elysian Fields were seen as a place on the surface of the earth where a few of the gods’ favorites could be transported, allowing them to enjoy eternal bliss without facing death.98 Following Homer’s imagination, poetry from later ages envisioned the transport of many other heroes and heroic women from legendary times to a secret life of joy in Elysium or the Islands of the Blessed.99 Eventually, later perceptions considered Elysium the Land of Promise for all men who lived in a way that pleased the gods 537 after their death, now placing Elysium or the Islands of the Blessed deep within the earth, reachable only by disembodied souls. In later times, this view became generally accepted, but the subject remained vague and varied. People likely still imagined the Isles of the Blessed, the home of privileged spirits, as being on the surface of the earth (though indeed far beyond the limits of the known world), where attempts could be made to find a way there and bring back news to the living. The expedition attributed to Sertorius was just the most famous of these discovery voyages.101 Why should these magical Isles remain forever undiscovered at the edge of the inhabited world, which still offered so much uncharted territory, when everyone knew of the island in the Black Sea, often visited by living men, where Achilles, the greatest example of miraculous transport, lived forever enjoying his youth? For centuries, the island of Leuke, the exclusive Elysium of Achilles and a few select heroes, was visited and revered with a sense of religious awe.102 Here, people believed they could directly perceive and physically touch something of the mysterious existence of blessed spirits. The belief in the possibility of miraculous transport to an eternity of unbroken unity of body and soul, thus clearly and visibly substantiated, couldn’t completely fade even in this practical age. The educated found this idea so strange and hard to grasp that when they spoke of past legends of transport, they claimed they couldn't fully understand what the ancients thought happened during such miracles.103 Nevertheless, the common people, who find it easy to believe in the impossible, once again naively accepted the miracle. Were not the examples of Amphiaraos and Trophonios clear evidence of transport to underground refuges? And a cult was established for them, as if they were still alive in their caves beneath the earth, lasting until a later period.104 The transport of beautiful youths to everlasting life among nymphs and spirits was a common theme in many folk tales.105 Even in contemporary life, the miracle of transport seemed not entirely impossible.106 When the kings and queens of the Eastern Macedonian empire began to receive divine honors like the great Alexander himself, it wasn't long before people claimed that at the end of his earthly life, the Divine Ruler everywhere 538 does not die but is merely “taken away” by the gods and continues to live on.107 It is a peculiar quality of divinity, as Plato clearly states,108 to exist forever in the indivisible unity of body and soul. A courtly theology was able to demand such beliefs from the subject peoples in the Semitic East, and possibly in Egypt too, because local109 legends had already recounted the transport to immortal life of individuals cherished by the gods and resembling the gods in nature; similar stories also became common in Italian legends,110 likely influenced by Greek models. Indeed, apart from courtly flattery, Greeks and half-Greeks could easily entertain the idea111 that their beloved figures, like Alexander the Great, did not die but were instead transported alive to the realm of everlasting existence. This is clearly illustrated by the successful claims made in Moesia at the start of the third century CE of another Alexander. This impostor traveled from place to place with a large group of Bacchants, and everywhere people believed he was the real monarch.112 Just before that, they had similarly believed in the reappearance of Emperor Nero,113 who was thought to have not died but merely vanished. When Antinous, the handsome youth beloved by Emperor Hadrian, sank and disappeared in the water, he was immediately revered as a god who had, in fact, not died but had been transported.114 The miraculous transport of Apollonios of Tyana is reported with the utmost seriousness;115 like other wonders and mysteries surrounding this prophetic figure, it found enough believers.116

But such unbroken continuance of the united life of body and soul, begun upon earth and carried on in a mysterious abode of bliss (the oldest form taken by the idea of human immortality in the Greek mind), was never attributed to more than a few specially favoured and specially gifted individuals. An immortality of the human soul as such, by virtue of its nature and composition—as the imperishable force of divinity in the mortal body—never became a real part of the belief of the Greek populace. When approximations to such a belief do occasionally find expression in popular modes of thought, it is because a fragment of theology or of the universally popular philosophy has penetrated to the lower strata of the uninstructed populace. Theology and philosophy remained the sole true repositories of the belief in the 539 immortality of the soul. In the meeting together and conjunction of Greek and foreign ideas in the Hellenized Orient it was not Greek popular tradition but solely the influence of Greek philosophy, that, finding favour even outside the limits of Greek nationality, communicated to foreign nations the arresting concept of the divine, imperishable vitality of the human soul—upon the impressionable Jewish people, at least, it had the profoundest and most deeply penetrating influence.117

But such an unbroken continuation of the united life of body and soul, started on earth and carried on in a mysterious place of bliss (the earliest form of the idea of human immortality in the Greek mind), was only attributed to a few exceptionally favored and gifted individuals. The immortality of the human soul, in terms of its nature and essence—as the eternal force of divinity within the mortal body—never truly became a part of the beliefs of the Greek population. When ideas resembling such a belief occasionally surface in popular thought, it’s because a piece of theology or widely accepted philosophy has reached the less educated segments of the population. Theology and philosophy remained the only true sources of belief in the 539 immortality of the soul. In the merging of Greek and foreign ideas in the Hellenized Orient, it was not Greek popular traditions, but rather the influence of Greek philosophy—gaining acceptance even beyond Greek nationality—that introduced the captivating concept of the divine, eternal vitality of the human soul to foreign nations. Among the receptive Jewish people, this had the most profound and deeply impactful effect.117

§ 5

All the various modes of conceiving the life enjoyed by the soul after the death of the body, as they had been explored, modified, and developed in the course of centuries, were admitted on an equal footing to the consciousness of the Greeks in this late period of their maturity. No formulated body of religious doctrine had by a process of exclusion and definition given the victory to any one conception at the expense of the others. But where so much was permitted and so little proscribed it is still possible to ask how these various formulations of belief, expectation, and hope stood in relation to each other. Were any more popular and more readily received than others? To answer this question it is natural to suppose that we have only to turn to the numerous inscriptions from the gravestones of the people. Here, especially in these later times, individuals give unhampered expression to their own feelings and thus reveal the extent and character of popular belief. But information derived from this source must be carefully scrutinized if it is not to lead to misconception.

All the different ways of understanding the life the soul experiences after the body dies, as they were examined, adjusted, and developed over centuries, were recognized equally by the Greeks in this later stage of their maturity. There wasn't a single, clearly defined set of religious beliefs that overshadowed the others. However, given the freedom of thought and few restrictions, it's still worth asking how these various beliefs, expectations, and hopes relate to one another. Were any more popular or more widely accepted than others? To find the answer, it makes sense to look at the numerous inscriptions found on people's gravestones. Here, especially in these later times, individuals freely express their feelings, revealing the depth and nature of common beliefs. But we must carefully analyze this information to avoid misunderstanding.

If we pass in imagination through the long rows of streets in which the Greeks placed the memorials of their dead, and read the inscriptions on the tombstones—they now form part of the accumulated treasures of Greek Epigraphy—the first thing that must arrest our attention is the complete silence maintained by the enormous majority of these inscriptions with regard to any hope—however formulated—or any expectation of a life of the soul after death. They content themselves with recording the name of the dead, adding only the name of the father and (in the case of a foreigner) the country of the deceased. At the most, the custom of some localities may add a “Farewell”. Such stubborn silence cannot be satisfactorily explained simply on the grounds of an economy practised by the surviving relatives 540 of the deceased (though in some cases a municipal regulation against wordy inscriptions may have given countenance to such economies).118 The very silence of this people that was never at a loss for words to express its meaning whether in verse or in prose, is in itself expressive. Where so little need was felt to give utterance to hopes of comfort, such hopes cannot have been of very vital consequence or matters of much assurance. Men rescued from forgetfulness only what had been the exclusive property of the individual—his name; the appellation which had distinguished him from all others in his lifetime and has now become the barest and emptiest envelope of the once living personality. Inscriptions in which precise hopes of a future life are expressed form a very small proportion of the great mass of epitaphic records. And of these very few again are in prose. Not as simple records of plain and authentic fact do such provisions and announcements of a blessed and hoped-for futurity present themselves. They need the artistic pomp and circumstance with which poetic fancy and extravagant affection clothe their inspired voyagings beyond the region of cold and matter of fact reality. This is certainly significant. Even among the poetic epitaphs the majority allude only to the life which the deceased has now done with, looking back upon the circumstances of his life—his fortunes and activities and character; giving expression, often with the most convincing sincerity, to the regret and dependence of the survivors; fixing attention exclusively upon things of this world. Wherever, at last, allusion is made to a future life, the tendency is rather to let fancy roam far beyond the limits of experience and sober reflexion to a vague and visionary land of promise. Such lofty aspirations needed more than any others the elevated language of verse. But we should run the risk of falling into grave error if we concluded from the preponderance of such aspirations among the metrical epitaphs that these were the normal views of the city folk who were their contemporaries.

If we imagine walking through the long streets where the Greeks honored their dead and read the inscriptions on the tombstones—which are now part of the rich collection of Greek Epigraphy—the first thing that catches our eye is the complete silence maintained by the vast majority of these inscriptions about any hope—no matter how it was worded—or any expectation of an afterlife for the soul. They simply record the name of the deceased, often adding the father's name and (for foreigners) the country of origin. At most, some places might include a "Farewell." This stubborn silence can’t just be explained by an economy practiced by the loved ones of the deceased (although in some cases, a local regulation against lengthy inscriptions may have supported such frugality). The silence of this people, who never lacked words to express their thoughts in both verse and prose, is expressive in itself. Where there seemed to be so little need to voice hopes for comfort, those hopes likely didn’t hold much significance or assurance. People remembered only what belonged solely to the individual—his name; the title that set him apart during his lifetime and now serves as the barest and emptiest shell of a once vibrant personality. Inscriptions that express specific hopes for an afterlife make up a very small portion of the vast number of epitaphic records, and even fewer are written in prose. These expressions and announcements of a blessed and hoped-for future are far from simple records of factual truth. They require the artistic flourish and elaborate language that poetic imagination and deep affection provide for their inspired explorations beyond the stark and factual reality. This is certainly significant. Even among the poetic epitaphs, most refer only to the life the deceased has left behind, reflecting on his circumstances, fortunes, activities, and character; often conveying the deep regret and sorrow of the survivors, focusing exclusively on worldly matters. Whenever there is a mention of an afterlife, it tends to let imagination drift far beyond the bounds of experience and sober reflection to a vague and dreamlike land of promise. Such lofty aspirations required, more than anything else, the elevated language of verse. However, we would be making a serious mistake if we assumed that the prevalence of these aspirations in the metrical epitaphs reflected the standard views of the urban people of that time.

The simple and archaic conception which perpetuates the old Homeric attitude and views without a complaint or a regret the disappearance of the soul of the departed into Erebos, is of the rarest occurrence among these sepulchral verses.119 More commonly we have the prayer that the departed may “rest in peace”, expressed in the traditional formula120—a formula that really refers to the dead man lying in his grave but also contains a further allusion to the “soul” that has departed to Hades.121 The idea is not yet dead 541 that there is a realm of the souls which receives the departed—Hades, the world ruled over by the Underworld deities, the “Chamber” of Persephone, the seat of primeval Night.122 Here a state of semi-conscious existence is conceived to prevail, under the empire of “Forgetfulness”, drinking of which123 the consciousness of the soul is darkened. Here “the majority”124 are assembled, and the dead man is visited by the reassuring thought that he may greet once more the souls of those who have gone before him.125

The simple and outdated view that reflects the old Homeric perspective and accepts without complaint or sorrow the departure of the soul into the underworld is rarely seen in these burial verses. More commonly, we find the prayer that the deceased may "rest in peace," expressed in the traditional formula—a phrase that primarily refers to the body lying in the grave but also hints at the "soul" that has moved on to Hades. The concept that there is a realm for souls that welcomes the departed—Hades, governed by the Underworld gods, the "Chamber" of Persephone, the realm of ancient Night—is not yet extinct. Here, a state of semi-conscious existence is believed to exist, under the influence of "Forgetfulness," which clouds the consciousness of the soul. Here, "the majority" are gathered, and the deceased is comforted by the thought that they may reconnect with the souls of those who came before them.

But sterner conceptions also occur. There is occasional reference to a judgment126 that separates the souls in the world below, dividing them into two and sometimes three127 classes in accordance with the deserts which they have earned on earth. There is no lingering over the pains of the damned,128 in the description of which the theological imagination had indulged so frequently. A more simple-minded fancy did not need such pharisaical satisfaction in the misfortunes of sinners in order to heighten its own assurance of superiority. There is no trace of a sentiment of penitence and terror indulged in for its own sake. The soul hopes to come by its rights;129 to reach the “Blessed”, to arrive at the Isles or the Island of the Blest—to Elysium, the abode of Heroes and demi-gods.130 Such hopes are very commonly expressed, but as a rule only in a brief phrase of confidence and hope. We rarely meet with any elaborate or alluring picture of the abode of the blessed.131 That abode is generally placed within the limits of the underworld kingdom of the souls,132 and such anticipations, when particularized, refer commonly to a “Place of the Good”, which in various forms is represented as the hoped-for dwelling-place of future life.133

But stricter ideas also appear. There are occasional mentions of a judgment126 that divides souls in the afterlife, separating them into two and sometimes three127 groups based on what they earned in life. There's no lingering on the suffering of the damned,128 which the theological imagination often indulged in. A simpler way of thinking didn’t need that kind of self-righteous satisfaction from the misfortunes of sinners to feel superior. There’s no hint of remorse or fear indulged in for its own sake. The soul hopes to claim its rights;129 to join the “Blessed”, to get to the Isles or the Island of the Blest—to Elysium, the home of Heroes and demigods.130 Such hopes are often expressed, but usually just in a brief statement of confidence and optimism. We rarely encounter any detailed or enticing description of the home of the blessed.131 That home is generally situated within the boundaries of the underworld realm of souls,132 and such expectations, when specified, typically refer to a “Place of the Good,” portrayed in various forms as the desired home of the afterlife.133

But we also meet with the view that the company of the good is entirely removed from the region of underworld darkness.134 For many individuals the hope is expressed or the certainty announced that after death they will have their dwelling in the sky—in the shining Aether, among the stars. This belief in the elevation of the disembodied soul to the regions above the earth is so frequently repeated in various forms in this late period that we must suppose that among those who entertained precise conceptions of the things of the next world this was the most popular and widely held conviction.135 This belief that the soul rises to the neighbourhood and even the community of the heavenly deities136 has its origin both in religious aspiration and in philosophy. Its roots, indeed, stretch back to a much 542 earlier period137 and we may suppose that even in these later days it was derived from and very largely supported by the popular conception, disseminated by Stoic writers, of a living “breath”, which composes the human soul, and its effort upwards to the heavenly regions.138

But we also encounter the belief that the company of the good is completely separate from the darkness of the underworld.134 For many people, there's a hope or a certainty expressed that after death they will live in the sky—in the bright Aether, among the stars. This idea of the disembodied soul being elevated to the realms above the earth is so often repeated in different forms in this later period that we must assume this was the most popular and widely accepted belief among those who had clear ideas about the afterlife.135 The belief that the soul ascends to be close to and even join the heavenly deities136 comes from both religious longing and philosophical thought. Its roots actually go back to a much 542 earlier time137 and we can infer that even in these later days it was influenced by and largely supported by the common view, spread by Stoic writers, of a living “breath” that makes up the human soul, and its striving to rise to the heavenly realms.138

But such language is in many cases plainly nothing more than a conventional formula which has already lost all vital significance; it rarely goes further than the expression of a hope that the soul will mount upwards to the heavenly heights. Very occasionally, in the adjective “immortal”139 applied to the soul (which only sleeps in death),140 we may detect the influence of mixed philosophical and theological ideas. We soon come to an end of the inscriptions which give expression to the doctrines of theology and of theologically minded philosophy as to the divine nature of the soul, its brief pilgrimage through earthly life and destined return to its true home in a divine incorporeal existence.141 There is no certain mention of a belief in the transmigration of souls.142 Of the specifically Platonic doctrine or its influence there is scarcely a trace.143

But such language is often just a conventional phrase that has lost all its real significance; it usually only expresses a hope that the soul will rise to the heavenly heights. Occasionally, in the term “immortal”139 applied to the soul (which only rests in death),140 we might see the impact of mixed philosophical and theological ideas. Soon, we run out of inscriptions that express the ideas of theology and theologically minded philosophy about the divine nature of the soul, its short journey through earthly life, and its intended return to its true home in a divine, non-physical existence.141 There is no clear mention of a belief in the transmigration of souls.142 There is hardly any evidence of the specifically Platonic doctrine or its influence.143

Another type of belief derives its strength not from the teachings of philosophers but from the usage and popular practice of religion. This is the belief of those who hope to be conducted after death to a blessed life by the special care of a god, presumably the god to which in their life-time they have offered particular devotion. Such a god will lead them by the hand, they hope, and conduct them into the land of bliss and purity. One who has thus “obtained a god as his leader”144 may face the future with equanimity. Together with Hermes the “messenger of Persephoneia”,145 Persephone herself is most frequently mentioned among these conducting deities.146 Perhaps in this we may see a reminiscence of the hopes awakened and cherished in the Eleusinian and other related mysteries147—hopes otherwise expressed on these tombstones with striking rarity. On the epitaph—certainly a late composition—of a Hierophant of Eleusis who “goes to the Immortals”, the dead man is made to commend, as a mystery revealed by the gods, the ancient opinion illustrated by stories like that of Kleobis and Biton148 “that death not only brings no evil to mortals, but is rather a blessing”.149 A gloomy philosophy has in these latter days of the old religion and worship of the gods taken hold of the mysteries themselves and given them an attitude of hostility to human life that was not originally theirs.150 We are reminded of the mysteries again when we find prayers 543 or promises that the dead shall not drink of the water of forgetfulness in the realm of the souls, but shall be given the “cold water” to drink by the God of the lower world; that he shall be refreshed at the spring of Mnemosyne, the bath of immortality, and so preserve intact his memory and consciousness, the necessary conditions of full and blessed life.151 Here there appears to be a reference to the promises made by particular secret cults in which the departed has specially recommended himself to the powers of life and death. This must plainly be the case when, instead of the Greek Aidoneus, there is mention of Osiris, the Egyptian Lord of Souls. “May Osiris give you the cold water” is a common prayer expressed in a formula that is of frequent and significant occurrence in late epitaphs.152 Of the numerous secret cults of these later times that promised a blessed immortality to their adherents, there is but infrequent mention in the grave-inscriptions: occasionally at the most there is an allusion to the special favour, reaching even beyond the grave, which belongs to the initiated in the mysteries of Mithras.153

Another kind of belief draws its strength not from philosophical teachings but from the everyday practice of religion. This belief belongs to those who hope to be guided after death to a blessed existence by the special care of a god, likely the one they devoted themselves to during their lifetime. They hope this god will take them by the hand and lead them to a land of happiness and purity. Someone who has thus “secured a god as their guide”144 can face the future with calmness. Along with Hermes, the “messenger of Persephoneia,”145 Persephone is most often mentioned among these guiding deities.146 Perhaps this reflects the hopes stirred up and held onto in the Eleusinian and other similar mysteries147—hopes that are rarely expressed on tombstones. On the epitaph—definitely a later composition—of a Hierophant of Eleusis who “goes to the Immortals,” the deceased is made to endorse, as a mystery revealed by the gods, the old belief illustrated by stories like that of Kleobis and Biton148 “that death brings no harm to mortals, but is instead a blessing.”149 A bleak philosophy has in these later days of the old religion and worship of the gods taken hold of the mysteries themselves and given them a negative view of human life that wasn’t originally there.150 We are reminded of the mysteries again when we find prayers or promises that the dead shall not drink from the waters of forgetfulness in the realm of souls, but shall receive the “cold water” from the God of the underworld; that they shall be refreshed at the spring of Mnemosyne, the bath of immortality, preserving their memories and consciousness, which are essential for a complete and blessed life.151 This seems to reference the promises made by specific secret cults where the deceased has personally sought favor from the powers of life and death. This is clearly the case when, instead of the Greek Aidoneus, Osiris, the Egyptian Lord of Souls, is mentioned. “May Osiris give you the cold water” is a common prayer expressed in a formula that appears frequently in late epitaphs.152 Of the many secret cults in these later times that promised blessed immortality to their followers, there is only infrequent mention in grave inscriptions: occasionally, there may be a reference to the special favor, extending even beyond the grave, that belongs to those initiated in the mysteries of Mithras.153

No doubtful promises, but real and practical experience forms the basis of the belief of those to whom the dead has appeared visibly in a dream to assure them that his “soul” has not been annihilated by death.154 The oldest proof of the continued existence of the soul remains in force the longest. The pupil hopes for something higher from the master whom death has taken away from his sight: he prays to him that, as he had once in life, so he will now continue to stand by his side, assisting him in the pursuance of his profession as a physician—“Thou canst, for now thou hast a more divine part in life.”155

No empty promises, but real and practical experience forms the basis of the belief in those who have seen the dead appear visibly in a dream to assure them that his “soul” hasn’t been destroyed by death.154 The oldest evidence of the soul's continued existence holds strong the longest. The student expects something greater from the teacher whom death has taken out of view: he prays to him that, just as he did in life, he will continue to stand by his side, helping him in his work as a physician—“You can, for now you have a more divine role in life.”155

Expectations of an energetic after-life of the departed soul, expressing themselves in many forms, are widely current; but such expectations never achieve a unified, dogmatic form. Nor was anyone forbidden to cherish for himself and inscribe upon his grave-stone, unorthodox opinions of every kind—even though they should point to the very opposite of such expectations.156

Expectations of an active afterlife for the departed soul, showing up in various ways, are quite common; however, these expectations never come together in a single, strict belief system. No one was ever stopped from holding and engraving unconventional views on their gravestone, even if those views contradicted such expectations.156

A dubious “If” precedes on many epitaphs the anticipation of a conscious life of the dead in full possession of the senses, or a reward of the dead in accordance with their deserts: “if anything yet remains below”. Such phrases are of very frequent occurrence.157 Indeed the doubt itself is set aside when it is distinctly asserted that after death nothing of the man remains alive. All that men say of Hades and its terrors or its consolations is the fabled invention of poets; darkness 544 and nothingness is all that awaits us below.158 The dead turns to ashes or to earth;159 the elements out of which he was created take back what is their own.160 Life is only lent to man and in death he restores the loan again.161 In death he pays tribute to nature.162 The bitter outcry of the survivors against death, the savage beast of prey, loveless and pitiless, that has snatched away their dearest from their side, shows small hope of the preservation of the vanished life.163 Grief and complaint, say others, are vain both for the dead and for the living; no man returns; the parting effected by death is for ever.164 Only submission is left.165 “Take comfort, child, no man is immortal”—so runs the conventional phrase current among the populace and inscribed by many upon the graves of their vanished dead.166 “Once I was not, then I was, and now I am no more: what more is there to be said?”—so speaks the dead from more than one gravestone, addressing the living who is soon to suffer the same fate.167 “Live,” he cries to the living, “for there is nothing sweeter granted to us mortals than this life in the daylight.”168 A last thought reverts once more to the life that has been left behind on earth. The body dies, personality vanishes, nothing is left alive on earth but the memory of the deeds and virtue of the departed.169 But there is a continuance in the life of others, more vital than in the empty sound of fame, achieved by him who leaves behind him on earth children and children’s children. There are many who, in these later ages too, are content, in the true spirit of antiquity, with this blessing and desire no other consolation for their own annihilation.170

A questionable “If” often appears on many tombstones, hinting at the idea of the dead living on with awareness, or receiving rewards for their actions: “if anything still exists below.” Such phrases are quite common. Indeed, the doubt fades when it’s clearly stated that after death, nothing of the person stays alive. Everything said about the underworld, with its fears or comforts, is just a myth created by poets; only darkness and nothingness await us below. The dead become ashes or return to the earth; the elements that formed them reclaim what belongs to them. Life is merely borrowed, and in death, we return the loan. In dying, we pay our dues to nature. The anguished cries of those left behind, mourning the loss of their loved ones to that merciless predator known as death, reflect little hope for the preservation of the lost life. Others argue that sorrow and lamentation are futile for both the dead and the living; no one comes back; the separation caused by death is permanent. All that remains is submission. “Find comfort, child, no one is immortal”—this is the common saying among people and is often engraved on the gravestones of their departed. “Once I did not exist, then I did, and now I am no more: what else is there to say?”—this is how the dead speak from various gravestones, addressing the living who will soon face the same destiny. “Live,” they urge the living, “for there’s nothing sweeter given to us mortals than this life in the sunlight.” One last thought turns back to the life left behind on earth. The body dies, personality fades, and all that remains alive on earth is the memory of the actions and virtues of the deceased. However, there is a continuation in the lives of others, more meaningful than the empty echo of fame, achieved by those who leave behind children and grandchildren. Many, even in these modern times, are satisfied, in the true spirit of antiquity, with this blessing and ask for no other consolation for their own demise.

§ 6

But such reassertions of the antique temper were of rarer and rarer occurrence. The ancient world to which it had given such toughness and energy of purpose was on its death-bed. With the end of the third and the beginning of the fourth century it enters upon its last agony; a general failure of nerve had long threatened the loosely bound masses that shared in the Græco-Roman civilization. In the general atrophy that beset its old age the vigorous blood of the genuine and unadulterated Greek and Roman stocks was flowing but feebly. Now the universal process of decay sets in irresistibly. It was its own inherent weakness that made the attacks of outside forces so ominous to the old world. In the West the old order vanished more swiftly and submitted more 545 completely to the new forces, than in the Hellenized East. It was not that the old civilization was any less rotten in the East than in the West. The enfeebled hand and the failing mind betray themselves in every utterance—in the last spasms of vital energy that inspired the art and literature of moribund Greece. The impoverishment of the vital forces out of which Greece had once brought forth the flower of its special and characteristic spirit makes itself felt in the altered relation of the individual to the whole, and of the totality of visible life to the shadowy powers of the unseen world. Individualism has had its day. No longer is the emancipation of the individual the object of man’s endeavour; no longer is he required to arm himself against all that is not himself, that is outside the region of his free will and choice. He is not strong enough, and should not feel himself strong enough, to trust to the self-conscious strength of his own intelligence. Authority—an authority that is the same for all—must be his guide. Rationalism is dead. In the last years of the second century a religious reaction begins to assert itself and makes itself felt more and more in the period that follows. Philosophy itself becomes at last a religion, drawing its nourishment from surmise and revelation. The invisible world wins the day over the meagre present, so grievously bound down by the limitation of mere experience. No longer does the soul await with courage and calmness whatever may be hidden behind the dark curtain of death. Life seemed to need something to complete it. And how faded and grey life had become171—a rejuvenation upon this earth seemed to be out of the question. All the more complete, in consequence, is the submission that throws itself with closed eyes and eager yearning upon another world, situated now far beyond the limits of the known or knowable world of the living. Hopes and a vague longing, a shrinking before the mysterious terrors of the unknown, fill the soul. Never in the history of the ancient world is the belief in an immortal life of the soul after death a matter of such burning and exacerbated ardour as in these last days when the antique civilization was preparing itself to breathe its last.

But these reassertions of the old spirit happened less and less frequently. The ancient world that had once been so strong and purposeful was nearing its end. As the third century closed and the fourth century began, it was entering its final struggles; a widespread loss of courage had long threatened the loosely connected groups that were part of Greco-Roman civilization. In the general decline that came with old age, the robust blood of the pure Greek and Roman lineages was barely flowing. Now, the universal process of decay began to take hold irresistibly. It was its own inherent weakness that made the attacks from outside forces so threatening to the old world. In the West, the old order disappeared more quickly and completely submitted to new forces than it did in the Hellenized East. It wasn’t that the old civilization was any less corrupt in the East than in the West. The weakened hand and failing mind revealed themselves in every statement—in the last convulsions of vital energy that inspired the art and literature of dying Greece. The dwindling vital forces that had once allowed Greece to flourish are evident in the changed relationship between the individual and the whole, and between the totality of visible life and the mysterious powers of the unseen world. Individualism has had its time. The liberation of the individual is no longer man's goal; he no longer needs to defend himself against everything that is not part of him, that lies outside his free will and choice. He isn't strong enough, and shouldn't feel strong enough, to rely on his own intelligence alone. Authority—an authority that applies to everyone—must guide him. Rationalism is dead. In the last years of the second century, a religious reaction begins to take hold and becomes increasingly influential in the period that follows. Philosophy itself ultimately becomes a religion, drawing sustenance from speculation and revelation. The unseen world prevails over the meager present, so painfully restricted by the limits of mere experience. No longer does the soul wait with courage and calmness for whatever might lie behind the dark curtain of death. Life seemed to need something to make it whole. And how pale and dull life had become—a rejuvenation on this earth seemed impossible. As a result, there is an even more complete submission, turning with closed eyes and eager longing towards another world, now located far beyond the boundaries of the known or knowable world of the living. Hopes and vague longings, a fear of the mysterious terrors of the unknown, fill the soul. Never in the history of the ancient world has the belief in an immortal soul after death been so fervently and urgently felt as in these final days when the ancient civilization was preparing to take its last breath.

Hopes of immortality, widely espoused by the masses and fed rather on faith than on reflexion, sought satisfaction in the brilliant ceremonial of religions that easily outshone the simple worship of every day officially undertaken by the city. In these new rites the worshippers united in the secret cult seemed to be placed more directly in the hands of the gods; and, above all, a blessed existence hereafter was assured to pious 546 believers. In these days the ancient and hallowed mysteries of Eleusis awake to a new life and remain in vigorous activity till nearly the end of the fourth century.172 Orphic conventicles must have attracted worshippers for ages;173 the Hellenized Orient was familiar with many such orgiastic cults.

Hopes for immortality, widely shared by people and more based on faith than reflection, found expression in the vibrant rituals of religions that easily overshadowed the everyday worship officially practiced by the city. In these new ceremonies, the worshippers involved in the secret cult felt more directly connected to the gods; and, most importantly, a blessed life after death was promised to devout believers. In these times, the ancient and revered mysteries of Eleusis came to life again and remained active until nearly the end of the fourth century. Orphic gatherings must have drawn worshippers for ages; the Hellenized East was familiar with many such ecstatic cults.

In the mixed populations of the East the new religions proved more attractive to the Greeks, too, than their old worship of the gods of Greece. Clear and definite obligations, fixed commandments and dogmas, holding the weak and frail individual in their stronger embrace, seemed to belong more peculiarly to these foreign worships than to the old beliefs of Greece. Rigid and unalterable maintenance of primitive ideas and practices seemed to give the former the stamp of sacred and certain knowledge. From all men they demanded perfect submission to the God and his priests; perfect renunciation of the world, conceived as dualistically opposed to the divine; the purging away of the contamination of its lusts by purifications and sanctifications, ceremonial expiations and asceticisms. By these means the faithful prepared themselves for the highest reward that piety could conceive; an unending life of bliss far away from this unclean world in the realm of the holy and the consecrated. To the belief in a blessed immortality these foreign mysteries contributed their much desired support; and the populace welcomed their message of salvation with all the greater eagerness since their varied and impressive ceremonial contrasted so strikingly with the plain and homely worship of the Greek gods. In the symbolism of these exotic cults men seemed to discern a mysterious and secret knowledge; and to the divine figures illuminated by such a halo were easily attributed strange and magical powers beyond belief or experience. The cult of the Egyptian deities had long been familiar both in the East and in the West, and they maintained and extended their influence down to the last days of the ancient religions. The Phrygian deities, the Thraco-Phrygian cults of Sabazios, Attis, and Kybele, and the Persian worship of Mithras were later comers, but they, too, took equally firm root and spread over the whole extent of the empire.174

In the mixed populations of the East, the new religions turned out to be more appealing to the Greeks than their traditional worship of the Greek gods. Clear and specific obligations, fixed commandments, and doctrines that supported the weak and vulnerable seemed to be unique to these foreign faiths rather than the ancient beliefs of Greece. The strict and unchanging adherence to primitive ideas and practices gave these religions a sense of sacred and certain knowledge. They demanded complete submission to God and his priests from everyone; total rejection of the world, seen as fundamentally opposed to the divine; and the cleansing of its desires through purifications, sanctifications, ceremonial atonements, and ascetic practices. Through these methods, the believers prepared themselves for the highest reward that piety could envision: an endless life of happiness far from this impure world in the realm of the holy and sacred. These foreign mysteries provided the much-desired assurance of a blessed afterlife, and the public embraced their message of salvation with even greater enthusiasm because their elaborate and impactful rituals sharply contrasted with the simple and familiar worship of the Greek gods. In the symbolism of these exotic cults, people seemed to find mysterious and secret knowledge, and the divine figures shrouded in such a glow were easily attributed with unbelievable and magical powers. The worship of Egyptian deities had long been known in both the East and the West, and they kept their influence alive right up until the end of the ancient religions. The Phrygian deities, the Thraco-Phrygian cults of Sabazios, Attis, and Kybele, and the Persian worship of Mithras were newcomers, but they also rooted themselves firmly and spread throughout the entire empire. 174

The higher culture of these last centuries, having become credulous and avid of marvels, no longer looked with contempt upon the means of salvation and sanctification which had once been left almost entirely to the lower orders of the population. The most cultivated and educated people of these times used their culture and their education simply to justify everything mysterious and incomprehensible in itself—even 547 when it was expressed in the most physical symbolism. The newly awakened religious interest of the populace had coincided with a return on the part of philosophy to the teaching of Plato; a teaching which itself tended towards religion. Platonism had invaded the doctrine of other schools at many points, and it had already acquired a new home for itself in the restored Academy, where once an un-Platonic Scepticism had overthrown the teaching of the master. Now a new Platonism comes forward and overwhelms all the other schools of philosophy. Absorbing the doctrines of Aristotle and Chrysippos (which it fancied it could reconcile with Platonism), it weaved them into its own special teaching so that the whole presented a subtle and far-reaching system of thought. The speculative system of Neoplatonism, into which the old age of Greece, in spite of its weariness, contrived to introduce so much profundity, spirit, and ingenuity (together with a luxuriant mass of scholastic folly), fills the history of the last centuries of Greek thought. Its fundamental tendency is, once more, a turning away from the life of nature, and a determined invasion of a transcendent world of pure spirit; and it was by this tendency that it satisfied the needs of its time. The Sole and First Cause, lying beyond all being and continually expressing itself in creative emanations, yet never troubled or impaired in its perfect and eternal transcendency; the development, in an unbroken process from this One, of the world of thinking, of the Ideas and pure thought preserved in it—the world of Spirit and the world of Matter—until at last, in longing and desire,175 all things created return to the origin of all Being: to describe and express all this is the single theme, persisting throughout all variations, of this philosophy. The whole fabric of reality, the interplay of cause and effect, depends upon the inherence of the thing caused in its Cause from which it takes its origin and to which it returns at last. That which in the evolution of nature takes its origin from the One, and degenerates more and more completely, in the darkness and corruption of Matter, as it gets further away from its source—now becomes Man and seeks in morality and religion a conscious return to the pure and everlasting and unfailing One. The divine does not descend to earth and man must reach upwards to the divine heights in order to unite himself with the One that is before all multiplicity. This union can be brought about by the pure exercise of the human reason, but also in the mysterious harmony of the individual life with the First Cause that is beyond all reason in the ecstasy 548 that is above all rationality. It can be achieved when at last the whole series of rebirths has been passed through, whereupon the pure soul, the divine in man, enters into the divinity of the Whole.176

The higher culture of recent centuries, having become gullible and eager for wonders, no longer looked down upon the means of salvation and sanctification that had once been almost entirely left to the lower classes. The most educated and cultured people of the time used their knowledge simply to justify everything that was mysterious and incomprehensible—even 547 when expressed through the most physical symbolism. The newfound religious interest of the masses coincided with a return to Plato’s teachings in philosophy, a teaching that leaned towards religion. Platonism had seeped into the doctrines of other schools and had already established a new home in the revived Academy, where once a non-Platonic Skepticism had toppled the master’s teaching. Now, a new Platonism emerged, overshadowing all other schools of philosophy. It absorbed the doctrines of Aristotle and Chrysippus (which it believed it could reconcile with Platonism), weaving them into a unique teaching that created a complex and far-reaching system of thought. The speculative system of Neoplatonism, into which the ancient age of Greece, despite its fatigue, managed to infuse a wealth of depth, spirit, and creativity (along with a tangled mass of academic foolishness), fills the narrative of the last centuries of Greek thought. Its core tendency is, once again, a turning away from the life of nature, pushing into a transcendent realm of pure spirit; and it was this tendency that met the needs of the time. The Sole and First Cause, existing beyond all being and constantly expressing itself in creative emanations, yet remaining unaffected in its perfect and eternal transcendence; the development, in a continuous process, from this One, of the thinking world, the Ideas, and pure thought preserved within it—the world of Spirit and the world of Matter—until at last, in yearning and desire, 175 all created things return to the origin of all Being: to describe and express all this is the central theme, recurring through all variations, of this philosophy. The entire fabric of reality, the interplay of cause and effect, depends on the connection of the caused thing in its Cause from which it originates and to which it ultimately returns. That which comes from the One in the evolution of nature and degenerates more completely, in the darkness and corruption of Matter, as it moves away from its source—now becomes Man and seeks in morality and religion a conscious return to the pure, everlasting, and unfailing One. The divine does not come down to earth, and humans must reach up to the divine heights to unite with the One that precedes all multiplicity. This union can be achieved through the pure exercise of human reason, but also through the mysterious harmony of individual life with the First Cause that transcends all reason in the ecstasy 548 above all rationality. It can be realized when the whole cycle of rebirths has been completed, at which point the pure soul, the divine aspect of humanity, enters into the divinity of the Whole.176

To fly from the world—not to work within the world to produce something better—is the teaching and injunction of this last Greek philosophy. Away from separate, divided Being, upward towards the uninterrupted glory of the One divine life, the soul wings its way. The world, this visible world of matter, is fair, says Plotinos, for it is the work and image of the divine, present and working in it. A last gleam of the departing sunlight of Greek sensibility seems to break through the words in which Plotinos rejects the Christian-Gnostic hatred of the world.177 The ugly, he says, is strange and contrary to God as well as to Nature.178 But the soul must no longer rest in the world of created beauty.179 The soul is so profoundly conscious of its derivation from the supra-sensual, of its divinity and eternity, that it must rise above all created being and reach out to the One that was before the world and remains for ever outside the world.180

To escape from the world—not to engage with it in order to create something better—is the message and directive of this last Greek philosophy. The soul ascends away from separate, divided existence towards the uninterrupted brilliance of the One divine life. The world, this visible realm of matter, is beautiful, according to Plotinus, because it is the creation and reflection of the divine that is present and active within it. A final hint of the fading sunlight of Greek thought seems to shine through the words in which Plotinus dismisses the Christian-Gnostic disdain for the world. He states that the ugly is alien and opposed to both God and Nature. But the soul must no longer linger in the realm of created beauty. The soul is so deeply aware of its origin from the non-material, of its divine and eternal nature, that it must transcend all created beings and reach out to the One that existed before the world and remains forever beyond it.

This philosophy, profoundly estranged though it was from the old Greek attitude to life with its enjoyment of the world, nevertheless felt itself called upon to oppose the rising tide of the new and irresistible religion. It took under its protection the ancient Greek culture and the ancient faith that was so inseparably bound up with that culture. Its most convinced supporters, with the last of the Emperors of the old faith at their head, threw themselves whole-heartedly into the fray. And before them rode the Genius of ancient Hellas, and the old beliefs of Greece. But when the battle had been fought and lost it became apparent to all the world that it was a corpse that rode before the exalted combatants, like the body of the dead Cid Campeador fastened upon his horse and leading his hosts against the Moors. The ancient religion of Greece, and with it the whole civilized life of the Greek world, faded and died at that discovery, and could not be recalled to life. A newer faith, very differently endowed and having power to crush the heavily laden soul and point it upwards in absolute submission to the divine compassion, held the field. The new world that was coming into being had need of it.

This philosophy, although it was deeply disconnected from the old Greek way of life that celebrated the world, still felt the need to resist the growing influence of the new and powerful religion. It took on the mantle of protection for the ancient Greek culture and the age-old faith that was tightly intertwined with that culture. Its most passionate supporters, led by the last of the Emperors of the old faith, threw themselves wholeheartedly into the fight. And riding ahead of them was the spirit of ancient Greece and its old beliefs. But when the battle was fought and lost, it became clear to everyone that what rode before the noble fighters was a corpse, like the dead Cid Campeador strapped to his horse leading his troops against the Moors. The ancient religion of Greece, along with the entire civilized life of the Greek world, faded and perished upon that realization and could not be revived. A new faith, very different and capable of uplifting the burdened soul in absolute surrender to divine compassion, took over. The emerging world needed it.

And yet—was Greece quite extinguished and dead for ever? Much—only too much—of the philosophy of its old age lived on in the speculative system of the Christian faith. And in the whole of modern culture so far as it has built itself upon 549 Christianity or by extension from it, in all modern science and art, not a little survives of Greek genius and Greek inspiration. The outward embodiment of Hellas is gone; its spirit is imperishable. Nothing that has once been alive in the spiritual life of man can ever perish entirely; it has achieved a new form of existence in the consciousness of mankind—an immortality of its own. Not always in equal measure, nor always in the same place, does the stream of Greek thought rise to the surface in the life of mankind. But it is a river that never quite runs dry; it vanishes, to reappear; it buries itself to emerge again. Desinunt ista, non pereunt.

And yet—was Greece really completely gone and dead forever? A lot—way too much—of the philosophy from its later years continued to live on in the speculative system of the Christian faith. And in the entire scope of modern culture, to the extent that it has been built on 549 Christianity or has extended from it, a good deal of Greek genius and inspiration survives in all modern science and art. The physical representation of Greece is gone; its spirit is timeless. Nothing that has ever been alive in the spiritual life of humanity can ever completely disappear; it transforms into a new form of existence in human consciousness—an immortality of its own. Greek thought doesn't always surface in the same way or at the same time in human life, but it’s a river that never completely dries up; it may disappear, but it comes back; it might bury itself only to emerge again. Desinunt ista, non pereunt.

NOTES TO CHAPTER XIV

Part II

1 See above, chap. v, p. 162 f.

1 See above, chap. v, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ ff.

2 Lucian 50, De Luctu: washing, anointing, crowning of the dead body, πρόθεσις: c. 11. Violent dirge-singing over the dead, 12; accompanied by the αὐλός, 19; and led by a special singer θρηνῶν σοφιστής, 20. Special lament by the father, 13. The dead is before them with jaws tied up and so secured against unsightly gaping—19 fin. (a stronger form of the Homeric σύν τε στόμ’ ἐρείδειν, λ 426). For this purpose narrow bands are drawn round the chin, cheeks, and forehead of the dead man. We sometimes see them represented on vases depicting a lying-in-state, and they have also been found sometimes in graves in which case they have been made of metal (gold or lead): see Wolters, Ath. Mitth. 1896, p. 367 ff. ἐσθής, κόσμος (even including horses and slaves) burnt or buried in company with the dead for his pleasure, 14. ὀβολός given to the dead, 10. The dead fed by χοαί and καθαγίσματα, 9. The gravestone crowned; sprinkled with ἄκρατος; burnt offering, 19. περίδειπνον after a three days’ fast, 24.

2 Lucian 50, De Luctu: washing, anointing, crowning the deceased, proposal: c. 11. Intense dirge-singing for the dead, 12; accompanied by the aulos, 19; and led by a special singer lamenting sophisticate, 20. A special lament by the father, 13. The deceased is before them with jaws tied to prevent unsightly gaping—19 fin. (a stronger version of the Homeric τε στόμα ἐρείδειν, λ 426). For this, narrow bands are wrapped around the chin, cheeks, and forehead of the deceased. We sometimes see these depicted on vases showing a lying-in-state, and they have also been found in graves, made of metal (gold or lead): see Wolters, Ath. Mitth. 1896, p. 367 ff. clothes, world (including horses and slaves) burned or buried with the dead for their enjoyment, 14. A obol given to the dead, 10. The dead are nourished by χοαί and sanctifications, 9. The gravestone is crowned; sprinkled with none; burnt offering, 19. dinner party after a three-day fast, 24.

3 From a rather earlier period we hear that it is a bad thing to be dead μὴ τυχόντα τῶν νομίμων—it is an infamous deed for the son to deny his father τὰ νομιζόμενα after death; Din., Aristog. viii, 18; cf. [D.] 25, 54.—The dead man says with satisfaction πάνθ’ ὅσα τοῖς χρηστοῖς φθιμένοις νόμος ἐστὶ γενέσθαι τῶνδε τυχὼν κἀγὼ τόνδε τάφον κατέχω, Epigr. Gr., 137; cf. 153, 7–8.

3 In an earlier time, it was believed that it’s a bad thing to be dead Not in accordance with the law—it’s considered shameful for a son to reject his father's the accepted ideas after he passes away; Din., Aristog. viii, 18; cf. [D.] 25, 54.—The deceased says with satisfaction Everywhere, what is right for those who have passed away is determined by law, and I hold this tomb., Epigr. Gr., 137; cf. 153, 7–8.

4 ὁμόταφοι are mentioned among other associations as occurring in a Solonian law: Digest. 47, 22, 4. These would probably be special collegia funeraticia (at any rate societies of which the exclusive or essential bond of union consisted in ὁμοῦ ταφῆναι—and not, therefore, any of the ordinary θίασοι or any “gentilician association” as Ziebarth thinks, Gr. Vereinswesen, p. 17 [1896]). There are also traces (but not very frequent) of common burial grounds belonging to θίασοι; e.g. in Kos, Inscr. Cos, 155–9. ἐρανισταί bury their dead member, CIA. ii, 3308; συμμύσται do the same, Ath. Mitt. ix, 35. A member contributes as ταμίας of the collegium out of his own means, for the benefit of dead members of an ἔρανος, εἰς τὴν ταφήν, τοῦ εὐσχημονεῖν αὐτοὺς καὶ τετελευτηκότας κτλ., CIA. ii, 621 (about 150 B.C.). Another ταμίας δέδωκεν τοῖς μεταλλάξασιν (θιασώταις) τὰ ταφικὸν παραχρῆμα ins. from Attica, third century B.C. CIA. iv, 2, 623b; cf. ib., 615b, l. 14–15; Rhod. inscr. in BCH. iv, 138. Dionysiastai, Athenaistai in Tanagra ἔθαψαν τὸν δεῖνα: GDI. 960–2 (IG. Sept. i, 685–9). The Iobakchai in Athens (third century A.D.) offer a crown and wine at the burial of a member: Ath. Mitt. 1894, 261, l. 158 ff. οἱ θίασοι πάντες and even οἱ ἔφηβοι καὶ οἱ νέοι, ὁ δῆμος, ἡ γερουσία erect the monument, CIG. 3101, 3112. (Teos) συνοδεῖται bury together the members of their σύνοδοι, IPE. ii, 60–5. A gymnasiarch also undertakes τῶν ἐκκομιδῶν ἐπιμέλειαν, Inscr. Perg., ii, 252, l. 16; noteworthy also is ii, 374 B, l. 21–5. A few more exx. are given by E. Loch, Zu d. griech. Grabschriften (Festschr. Friedländer, 1895), p. 288. 551

4 Same burial place are referred to among other groups in a Solonian law: Digest. 47, 22, 4. These were likely specific collegia funeraticia (in any case, groups whose main bond of connection was through buried together—and not the usual θίασοι or any "gentilician association" as Ziebarth suggests, Gr. Vereinswesen, p. 17 [1896]). There are also occasional references to common burial sites related to θίασοι; for example, in Kos, Inscr. Cos, 155–9. donors bury their deceased members, CIA. ii, 3308; συμμύσται do the same, Ath. Mitt. ix, 35. A member contributes as cashier of the collegium from his own resources, for the benefit of deceased members of an A fundraiser for their burial, to dignify them and those who have passed away, etc., CIA. ii, 621 (about 150 B.C.). Another The cashier has given to the exchangers.(Supporters)the burial site ins. from Attica, third century BCE CIA. iv, 2, 623b; cf. ib., 615b, l. 14–15; Rhod. inscr. in BCH. iv, 138. Dionysiastai, Athenaistai in Tanagra They buried someone.: GDI. 960–2 (IG. Sept. i, 685–9). The Iobakchai in Athens (third century A.D.) offer a crown and wine at the burial of a member: Ath. Mitt. 1894, 261, l. 158 ff. all the groups and even the youths and the young people, the community, the council erect the monument, CIG. 3101, 3112. (Teos) accompanied bury together the members of their meetings, IPE. ii, 60–5. A gymnasiarch also takes care of transportation management, Inscr. Perg., ii, 252, l. 16; noteworthy also is ii, 374 B, l. 21–5. A few more examples are provided by E. Loch, Zu d. griech. Grabschriften (Festschr. Friedländer, 1895), p. 288. 551

5 δημοσία ταφή frequently. Resolution πανδημεὶ παραπέμψασθαι τὸ σῶμα τοῦ δεῖνος ἐπὶ τὴν κηδείαν αὐτοῦ, inscr. of Amorgos, BCH. 1891, p. 577 (l. 26); p. 586 (l. 17 ff.). Resolution of the council and people of Olbia (first century B.C.): when the body of a certain deserving citizen who has died abroad is brought into the city, all workshops are to close, the citizens wearing black shall follow his ἐκφορά; an equestrian statue of the dead man to be erected and every year at the ἱπποδρομίαι of Achilles the golden crown granted to the dead man to be proclaimed, etc.: IPE. i, 17, 22 ff.—Honour paid to a dead man by granting a golden crown, CIG. 3185; cf. Cic., Flac. 75. This example comes from Smyrna, where such honours were particularly common: see Böckh on CIG. 3216. Frequent on Asia Minor inss.: ἁ πόλις sc. στεφανοῖ, ἔθαψεν, τὸν δεῖνα. ὁ δᾶμος τῷ δεῖνι, sc. ἀνέθηκε, on graves: see esp. G. Hirschfeld, Greek Inscr. in Brit. Mus. iv, 1, p. 34. More ap. Loch, op. cit., p. 287.

5 public burial often. Resolution to send the deceased person's body to their funeral, inscr. of Amorgos, BCH. 1891, p. 577 (l. 26); p. 586 (l. 17 ff.). Resolution of the council and citizens of Olbia (first century BCE): when the body of a deserving citizen who has died abroad is brought back into the city, all workshops will shut down, and citizens dressed in black will follow his funeral march; an equestrian statue of the deceased will be erected, and every year during the horse racing of Achilles, a golden crown will be awarded to the deceased and proclaimed, etc.: IPE. i, 17, 22 ff.—Recognition given to a deceased person by awarding a golden crown, CIG. 3185; cf. Cic., Flac. 75. This example is from Smyrna, where such honors were particularly prevalent: see Böckh on CIG. 3216. Common in inscriptions from Asia Minor: the city sc. awarded a crown, buried, the dead. The people to the dead, sc. committed, on graves: see especially G. Hirschfeld, Greek Inscr. in Brit. Mus. iv, 1, p. 34. More in Loch, op. cit., p. 287.

6 This seems to have been particularly common in Amorgos; cf. CIG. 2264b: four inss. from Amorgos. BCH. 1891, p. 574 (153-4 B.C.), 577, 586 (242 B.C.), 588 f. The Council of the Areopagos and the people of Athens decree the erection of a statue in honour of a young man of rank (T. Statilius Lamprias) who has died πρὸ ὥρας in Epidauros, and also the dispatch of envoys to παραμυθήσασθαι ἀπὸ τοῦ τῆς πόλεως ὀνόματος his parents and his grandfather Lamprias. In the same way the citizens of Sparta send an embassy of sympathy and consolation to other relatives of the same youth (first century A.D.), Fouil. d’Epidaur. i, 205–9, pp. 67–70. Honorific decree of council and people of Corinth for the same person, Ἐφ. Ἀρχ., 1894, p. 15. ψηφίσματα παραμυθητικά of two Lydian cities at the death of a man of rank (first century A.D.), Anz. Wien. Ak., Phil. Hist. Cl., 16th Nov., 1893 (n. 24) = Ath. Mitt. 1894, p. 102 f.; cf. Paros, CIG. 2383 (the council and people decree the erection of a statue to a dead boy ἐπὶ μέρους παραμυθησόμενοι τὸν πατέρα); Aphrodisias in Karia, CIG. 277b, 2775b–d; Neapolis, CIG. 5836 = IG. Sic. It. 758.—The grounds of consolation, so far as they are alluded to, are regularly independent of any theological teaching: φέρειν συμμέτρως τὰ τῆς λύπης εἰδότας ὅτι ἀπαραίτητός ἐστιν ἡ ἐπὶ πάντων ἀνθρώπων μοῖρα and the like (φέρειν τὸ συμβεβηκὸς ἀνθρωπίνως, F. d’Epid. i, 209). We are reminded of the παραμυθητικοὶ λόγοι of the philosophers which are literary expressions of these consolations—the philosophers in fact were expected ex officio to offer such consolations to the mourners, cf. Plu., Superst. 186 C; D. Chr. 27, § 9 (ii, 285 Arn.).

6 This appears to have been especially common in Amorgos; see CIG. 2264b: four inscriptions from Amorgos. BCH. 1891, p. 574 (153-4 B.C.), 577, 586 (242 BCE), 588 f. The Council of the Areopagos and the people of Athens have decreed the erection of a statue in honor of a noble young man (T. Statilius Lamprias) who died before an hour in Epidauros, and also the sending of envoys to to be comforted by the name of the city his parents and grandfather Lamprias. Similarly, the citizens of Sparta send an embassy of sympathy and condolences to other relatives of the same young man (first century CE), Fouil. d’Epidaur. i, 205–9, pp. 67–70. An honorific decree from the council and people of Corinth for the same person, Ep. Arch., 1894, p. 15. comforting resolutions from two Lydian cities at the death of a nobleman (first century CE), Anz. Wien. Ak., Phil. Hist. Cl., 16th Nov., 1893 (n. 24) = Ath. Mitt. 1894, p. 102 f.; see also Paros, CIG. 2383 (the council and people decree the erection of a statue for a deceased boy Comforting the father on behalf); Aphrodisias in Karia, CIG. 277b, 2775b–d; Neapolis, CIG. 5836 = IG. Sic. It. 758.—The reasons for consolation, as far as they are mentioned, are usually unrelated to any theological beliefs: To bear proportionately the things of sorrow is to understand that fate is essential for all people. and similar ideas (bring the humanly occurrence, F. d’Epid. i, 209). We are reminded of the comforting words of the philosophers, which are literary expressions of these consolations—the philosophers were essentially expected ex officio to provide such comforts to those in mourning, see Plu., Superst. 186 C; D. Chr. 27, § 9 (ii, 285 Arn.).

7 In spite of any brevity in the narrative the fact of ritual burial is regularly alluded to (as an important circumstance) in the romance of Xen. Eph. and in the Historia Apollonii: Griech. Roman, 391, 3; 413, 1.

7 Despite the shortness of the story, the practice of ritual burial is frequently mentioned (as a significant detail) in the romance of Xen. Eph. and in the Historia Apollonii: Griech. Roman, 391, 3; 413, 1.

8 At Athens his friend vainly tries to obtain burial intra urbem for the murdered Marcellus: quod religione se impediri dicerent; neque id antea cuiquam concesserunt (while in Rome people were occasionally buried in the city in spite of the prohibition of the XII tables: Cic., Lg. ii, 58): Servius to Cicero, Fam. 4, 12, 3 (45 B.C.). There it was permitted uti in quo vellent gymnasio eum sepelirent and finally his body was cremated and the remains buried in nobilissimo orbis terraram gymnasio, the Academy. ἐνταφὰ καὶ θέσις τοῦ σώματος ἐν τῷ γυμνασίῳ (of an aristocratic Roman) in Kyme: GDI. 311. To a living benefactor of that city συνεχωρήθη καὶ ἐνταφῆναι (in the future) ἐν τῷ γυμνασίῳ, CIG. 279b (Aphrodisias in Karia). As a special mark of honour paid to a benefactor of the city it is permitted that his body in oppidum introferatur (into Smyrna: Cic., Flac. 75), ἐνταφὰ κατὰ πόλιν καὶ 552 ταφὰ δημοσία, ἐνταφὰ κατὰ πόλιν ἐν τῷ ἐπισαμοτάτῳ τοῦ γυμνασίου τόπῳ, Knidos, GDI. 3501, 3502 (time of Augustus). The city buries a youth γυμνάδος ἐν τεμένει, Epigr. Gr. 222 (Amorgos).—Ulpian, Dig. 47, 12, 3, 5, implies the possibility that lex municipalis permittat in civitate sepeleri.

8 In Athens, his friend attempts in vain to secure a burial intra urbem for the murdered Marcellus: because they claimed their religious beliefs prevented them; and this had never been allowed for anyone else before (while in Rome, people were sometimes buried in the city despite the prohibition of the XII tables: Cic., Lg. ii, 58): Servius to Cicero, Fam. 4, 12, 3 (45 BCE). There, it was permitted to bury him wherever they chose in the gymnasium, and ultimately his body was cremated and the ashes buried in the most prestigious gym in the world, the Academy. Burial and placement of the body in the gymnasium. (of an aristocratic Roman) in Kyme: GDI. 311. To a living benefactor of that city, συνεχωρήθη καὶ ἐνταφῆναι (in the future) in the gym, CIG. 279b (Aphrodisias in Karia). As a special honor given to a benefactor of the city, it is allowed for his body to be taken into the town (into Smyrna: Cic., Flac. 75), ἐνταφὰ κατὰ πόλιν καὶ 552 public burial, burial according to the city in the most honored place of the gymnasium, Knidos, GDI. 3501, 3502 (time of Augustus). The city buries a youth naked in the sanctuary, Epigr. Gr. 222 (Amorgos).—Ulpian, Dig. 47, 12, 3, 5, suggests the possibility that The city laws permit burials within the city limits..

9 σῆμα, i.e. probably grave and monument, of Messia set up by her husband in his own house: Epigr. Gr. 682 (Rome).

9 σῆμα, which likely refers to a grave and monument for Messia, established by her husband in their own home: Epigr. Gr. 682 (Rome).

10 Thus Inscr. Perg. ii, 590, ζῶν ὁ δεῖνα κατεσκεύασε τὸ μνημεῖον τῇ ἰδίᾳ μάμμῃ . . . καὶ τῷ πάππῳ, ἑαυτῷ, γυναικί, τέκνοις, ἐκγόνοις ἀνεξαλλοτρίωτον ἕως διαδοχῆς κτλ. Similar directions, ib., n. 591, and frequently. The series includes the old and traditional circle of the ἀγχιστεῖς: see above, chap. v, nn. 141 and 146 (where μέχρι ἀνεψιαδῶν παίδων should be read).

10 Thus Inscr. Perg. ii, 590, Zon prepared the monument for his own mother... and for his grandfather, himself, his wife, children, and descendants, to remain inalienable until succession, etc. Similar instructions, ib., n. 591, and often. The series includes the old and traditional circle of the ἀγχιστεῖς: see above, chap. v, nn. 141 and 146 (where until nieces and nephews should be read).

11 There was even a Solonian law against violation and plunder of tombs: Cic., Lg. ii, 64. The specially invented word τυμβωρύχος shows that such practices were frequent at a quite early period; cf. σημάτων φῶρα, Herond. v, 57. Complaint on account of the rifling of a tomb: Egypt, papyr. of 127 B.C., Notices et extraits, xviii, 2, p. 161 f. Frequent rescripts of emperors of the fourth century against the profanation of graves, Cod. Theod. ix, 17. But even emperors of second and third centuries had to deal with the subject: Dig. 47, 12, and cf. Paul., Sent. 1, 21, 4 ff.; sepulchri violati actio, Quint., Decl. 299, 369, 373. Grave-thieves were a favourite character in romance: e.g. ap. Xen. Eph., Chariton and others. Epigram of Greg. Naz. on the subject of looted graves, Anth. Pal. viii, 176 ff. From the fourth century the Christians in particular seem to have been a danger to heathen burial places (cf. Gothofred., ad Cod. Theod. iii, p. 150 Ritt.)—in fact, ecclesiastics were specially given to grave-robbery: Novell. Valentin. 5 (p. 111 Ritt.), Cassiod., Var. iv, 18; bustuarii latrones (Amm. Marc. 28, 1, 12), were then frequent. An Egyptian anchorite had at an earlier period become latronum maximus et sepulchrorum violator: Rufin., Vit. Patr. 9 (p. 446b Rossw.).

11 There was even a law by Solon against the violation and looting of tombs: Cic., Lg. ii, 64. The specially created term grave robber indicates that such practices were common from a quite early time; cf. σημάτων φῶρα, Herond. v, 57. There were complaints about the plundering of a tomb: Egypt, papyrus from 127 BCE, Notices et extraits, xviii, 2, p. 161 f. There were frequent decrees from emperors in the fourth century against the desecration of graves, Cod. Theod. ix, 17. Even emperors from the second and third centuries had to address this issue: Dig. 47, 12, and cf. Paul., Sent. 1, 21, 4 ff.; sepulchri violati actio, Quint., Decl. 299, 369, 373. Grave robbers were a popular character in stories: e.g. ap. Xen. Eph., Chariton, and others. An epigram by Greg. Naz. addresses the topic of looted graves, Anth. Pal. viii, 176 ff. Starting in the fourth century, Christians in particular seemed to pose a threat to pagan burial sites (cf. Gothofred., ad Cod. Theod. iii, p. 150 Ritt.)—in fact, clerics were especially prone to grave robbery: Novell. Valentin. 5 (p. 111 Ritt.), Cassiod., Var. iv, 18; bustuarii latrones (Amm. Marc. 28, 1, 12), became quite common. An Egyptian hermit had earlier been known as greatest thief and tomb raider: Rufin., Vit. Patr. 9 (p. 446b Rossw.).

12 Inscrr. indicating such sepulchral penalties are rare on the mainland of Greece, common in Thrace and the Greek cities of Asia Minor, but most frequent of all in Lykia. Most of them belong to the Roman period, but also appeal occasionally to τὸν τῆς ἀσεβείας νόμον of the city (cf. also Korkyra. CIG. 1933); or refer to the ἔγκλημα τυμβωρυχίας as though it were a local process of law which had perhaps been confirmed by an Imperial ordinance (ὑπεύθυνος ἔστω τοῖς διατάγμασι καὶ τοῖς πατρίοις νόμοις, inscr. from Tralles: see Hirschfeld, p. 121). They therefore cannot be simply borrowed from the Roman custom, but belong to the old law of the country esp. in Lykia where a similar prescription has been found dating from the third century B.C.: CIG. 4529; see Hirschfeld, Königsb. Stud. i, pp. 85–144 (1887)—doubt is thrown on the legal validity of the penal clauses in such inscrr. by J. Merkel, Festg. f. Ihering, p. 109 ff. (1892).

12 Inscriptions showing these grave penalties are uncommon on the Greek mainland, more frequent in Thrace and the Greek cities of Asia Minor, but are most commonly found in Lycia. Most of these inscriptions date back to the Roman period, but they also occasionally reference the the law of impiety of the city (see also Korkyra. CIG. 1933); or mention the grave robbing offense as if it were a local legal process that might have been confirmed by an Imperial decree (Let him be responsible for the regulations and the customary laws., inscription from Tralles: see Hirschfeld, p. 121). Thus, they cannot simply be adopted from Roman practice but instead are part of the ancient laws of the region, especially in Lycia, where a similar regulation has been found dating back to the third century BCE: CIG. 4529; see Hirschfeld, Königsb. Stud. i, pp. 85–144 (1887)—J. Merkel raises doubts about the legal validity of the penal clauses in such inscriptions, Festg. f. Ihering, p. 109 ff. (1892).

13 Curses directed against those who bury unauthorized persons in a grave or damage the monument are rare in European Greece: e.g. Aegina, CIG. 2140b; Thessaly, BCH. xv, 568; Athens, CIA. 1417–28; among these is a Thessalian grave, 1427; a Christian, 1428; 1417–22 are set up by Herodes Atticus to Apia Regilla and Polydeukion (cf. K. Keil, Pauly-Wiss. i, 2101), but his coquetting with the cult of the χθόνιοι proves nothing for the common opinion of his fellow citizens. Sepulchral curses are particularly common in inss. from Lykia and Phrygia; also Cilicia, JHS. 1891, p. 228, 231, 267; a few also from Halikarnassian graves; Samos, CIG. 2260.—The 553 grave and its peace are placed under the care of the underworld deities in these inss.: παραδίδωμι τοῖς καταχθονίοις θεοῖς τοῦτο τὸ ἡρῷον φυλάσσειν κτλ., CIA. iii, 1423–4. Cf. also a Cretan inscr. Ath. Mitt. 1893, p. 211. Whoever introduces a stranger into the grave or damages the grave ἀσεβὴς ἔστω θεοῖς καταχθονίοις (thus in Lykia, CIG. 4207; 4290; 4292), ἀσεβήσει τὰ περὶ τοὺς θεούς τε καὶ θεὰς πάσας καὶ ἥρωας πάντας (from Itonos in Phthiotis, BCH. xv, 568). ἁμαρτωλὸς ἔστω θεοῖς καταχθονίοις, CIG. 4252b, 4259, 4300e, i, k, v, 4307, 4308; BCH. 1894, p. 326 (n. 9)—all from Lykia. (The formula occurs already in a Lyk. inscr. of 240 B.C.; BCH. 1890, p. 164: ἁμαρτωλοὶ ἔστωσαν—the archons and citizens who neglect to offer the yearly sacrifice to Zeus Soter—θεῶν πάντων καὶ ἀποτινέτω ὁ ἄρχων κτλ., which thus corresponds exactly with the oldest Lyk. inscr. with sepulchral penalty, CIG. 4259). ἔστω ἱερόσυλος θεοῖς οὐρανίοις καὶ καταχθονίοις, CIG. 4253 (Pinara in Lykia). This must mean: he shall be regarded as having transgressed the law against ἀσέβεια, ἱεροσυλία (cf. οἱ νόμοι οἱ περὶ ἱεροσύλου, Teos, SIG. 523, 51), τυμβωρυχία, having at the same time offended against the gods (see Hirschfeld, op. cit., p. 120 f.). More particular is another Lyk. ins.: ἁμαρτωλὸς ἔστω θεῶν πάντων καὶ Λητοῦς καὶ τῶν τέκνων (as the special gods of the country), CIG. 4259, 4303, (iii, p. 1138), 4303 e3 (p. 1139). In Cilicia ἔστω ἠσεβηκὼς ἔς τε τὸν Δία καὶ τὴν Σελήνην, JHS. xii, 231. Phrygian: κεχολωμένον ἔχοιτο Μῆνα καταχθόνιον, BCH. 1886, p. 503, 6; cf. ἐνορκιζόμεθα Μῆνα καταχθόνιον εἰς τοῦτο μνημεῖον μηδένα εἰσελθεῖν, Amer. School at Athens iii, 174. The same is intended by the peculiarly Phrygian denunciation ἔστω αὐτῷ πρὸς τὸν θεὸν, πρὸς τὴν χεῖρα τοῦ θεοῦ, πρὸς τὸ μέγα ὄνομα τοῦ θεοῦ, CIG. 3872b (p. 1099), 3890, 3902 f.o., 3963: Amer. School iii, 411; BCH. 1893, p. 246 ff. That these are Christian formulae—as Ramsay, JHS. iv, p. 400 f., supposes—is hardly likely. Equally unlikely in the case of 3902r (Franz rightly protests against the idea): ἔσται αὐτῷ πρὸς τὸν ζῶντα θεόν (the same occurs again in a decisively non-Christian sense: BCH. 1893, p. 241) καὶ νῦν καὶ ἐν τῷ κρισίμῳ ἡμέρᾳ (κρίσις apparently = death in CIG. 6731, from Rome, which, considering the words ἄγαλμα εἰμι Ἡλίου, can hardly be Christian). τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ ὀργῆς μεθέξεται, CIA. iii, 1427. Obscure threat: οὐ γὰρ μὴ συνείκῃ . . ., CIG. 2140b (Aegina). The profaner of graves is cursed in more detail: τούτῳ μὴ γῆ βατή, μὴ θάλασσα πλωτή, ἀλλὰ ἐκρειζωθήσεται παγγένει (the ἀραί on the mss. of Herod. Att. agree so far at least in intention, CIA. iii, 1417–22). πᾶσι τοῖς κακοῖς πεῖραν δώσει, καὶ φρείκῃ καὶ πυρετῷ καὶ τεταρταίῳ καὶ ἐλέφαντι κτλ., CIA. iii, 1423–4 (similar curse on a lead tablet from Crete: Ath. Mitt. 1893, p. 211). The first half of this imprecation represents the regular formula in such ἀραί and ὅρκοι—μὴ γῆ βατή κτλ.; cf. Wünsch, Defix., p. vii, and a Jewish-Greek inscr. from Euboea: Ἐφ. Ἀρχ., 1892, p. 175; it occurs also in CIG. 2664, 2667 (Halikarnassos); 4303 (p. 1138 Phrygia). δώσει τοῖς καταχθονίοις θεοῖς δίκην, 4190 (Cappadocia). ὄρφανα τέκνα λίποιτο, χῆρον βιόν, οἶκον ἔρημον, ἐν πυρὶ πάντα δάμοιτο, κακῶν ὕπο χεῖρας ὄλοιτο 3862, 3875, 400 (Phrygia). These are all peculiarly and originally Phrygian; something similar seems to occur in inss. in the Phrygian language: see Ztschr. vergl. Sprachf. 28, 381 ff.; BCH. 1896, p. 111 ff. Phrygian, too, is the curse οὗτος δ’ ἀώροις περιπέσοιτο συμφοραῖς, Epigr. Gr., p. 149, Amer. Sch. Ath. ii, 168—i.e. may his children die ἄωροι. (More plainly τέκνων ἀώρων περιπέσοιτο συμφορᾷ, BCH. 1893, p. 272.) Sometimes the additional phrase is found καὶ μετὰ θάνατον δὲ λάβοι τοὺς ὑποχθονίους θεοὺς τιμωροὺς καὶ κεχολωμένους, 554 CIG. 3915 (Phrygian). Besides the common imprecations we also have θανόντι δὲ οὐδὲ ἡ γῆ παρέξει αὐτῷ τάφον, 2826 (Aphrodisias in Karia); μήτε οὐρανὸς τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ παραδέξαιτο, Am. Sch. Ath. iii, 411 (Pisidia). Barbarous in the extreme is an inscr. from Cilicia (JHS. 1891, p. 287): ἕξει πάντα τὰ θεῖα κεχολωμένα καὶ τὰς στυγερὰς Ἐρεινύας καὶ ἰδίου τέκνου ἥπατος γεύσεται.—With these grave-imprecations we may compare also the threats uttered against those who shall neglect the directions for the honouring of King Antiochos of Kommagene who lies buried in his ἱεροθέσιον (ib, 13; iiib, 3: hence correct ἱεροθύσιον in Paus. 4, 32, 1) on the Nemrud Dagh: εἰδότας ὅτι χαλεπὴ νέμεσις βασιλικῶν δαιμόνων, τιμωρὸς ὁμοίως ἀμελίας τε καὶ ὕβρεως, ἀσέβειαν διώκει καθωσιωμένων τε ἡρώων ἀτειμασθεὶς νόμος ἀνειλάτους ἔχει ποινάς. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὅσιον ἅπαν κουφὸν ἔργον, τῆς δὲ ἀσεβείας ὀπισθοβαρεῖς ἀναγκαί (iiia, 22 ff., Ber. Berl. Akad. 1883).

13 Curses aimed at those who bury unauthorized individuals in graves or damage monuments are uncommon in modern Greece: for example, Aegina, CIG. 2140b; Thessaly, BCH. xv, 568; Athens, CIA. 1417–28; among these is a Thessalian grave, 1427; a Christian, 1428; 1417–22 are established by Herodes Atticus to Apia Regilla and Polydeukion (cf. K. Keil, Pauly-Wiss. i, 2101), but his flirtation with the cult of the chthonic does not reflect the general view of his fellow citizens. Sepulchral curses are particularly common in inscriptions from Lycia and Phrygia; also Cilicia, JHS. 1891, pp. 228, 231, 267; a few also from Halikarnassian graves; Samos, CIG. 2260.—The 553 grave and its peace are entrusted to the care of the underworld deities in these inscriptions: I entrust this hero shrine to the gods of the underworld to protect it, etc., CIA. iii, 1423–4. See also a Cretan inscription Ath. Mitt. 1893, p. 211. Whoever brings in a stranger to the grave or damages it impious be to the underworld gods (like in Lycia, CIG. 4207; 4290; 4292), He will show disrespect for all gods, goddesses, and every hero. (from Itonos in Phthiotis, BCH. xv, 568). Sinner be it to the underworld gods, CIG. 4252b, 4259, 4300e, i, k, v, 4307, 4308; BCH. 1894, p. 326 (n. 9)—all from Lycia. (The formula already appears in a Lycia inscription from 240 BCE; BCH. 1890, p. 164: sinners be forgiven—the archons and citizens who fail to offer the yearly sacrifice to Zeus Soter—Let the ruler pay homage to all the gods, etc., which matches exactly with the oldest Lycia inscription with sepulchral penalty, CIG. 4259). Let there be a desecrator of the heavenly and chthonic gods., CIG. 4253 (Pinara in Lycia). This must mean: he shall be seen as having violated the law against irreverence, sacrilege (cf. the laws regarding the priesthood, Teos, SIG. 523, 51), tomb raiding, while also having offended against the gods (see Hirschfeld, op. cit., p. 120 f.). Another Lycia inscription is more specific: Let the sinner be among all the gods, including Leto and her children. (as the specific gods of the area), CIG. 4259, 4303, (iii, p. 1138), 4303 e3 (p. 1139). In Cilicia Let him be irreverent toward both Zeus and the Moon., JHS. xii, 231. Phrygian: Keep the Night Underground, BCH. 1886, p. 503, 6; cf. We swear by Menas the chthonic to let no one enter this monument., Amer. School at Athens iii, 174. The same is meant by the particularly Phrygian denunciation Let him be before God, at the hand of God, and before the great name of God., CIG. 3872b (p. 1099), 3890, 3902 f.o., 3963: Amer. School iii, 411; BCH. 1893, p. 246 ff. It is unlikely that these are Christian phrases—as Ramsay, JHS. iv, p. 400 f., suggests. The same goes for 3902r (Franz rightly challenges the idea): He will be with the living God. (the same appears again in a decisively non-Christian context: BCH. 1893, p. 241) now and on the day of judgment(crisis presumably = death in CIG. 6731, from Rome, which, considering the terms I am a statue of the Sun, can hardly be Christian). αποφύγει την οργή του Θεού, CIA. iii, 1427. Unclear threat: οὐ γὰρ μὴ συνείκῃ . . . , CIG. 2140b (Aegina). The violator of graves is more specifically cursed: Here, let there be no land to walk on, no sea to sail on, but it will be completely uprooted for all. (the ἀραί on the manuscripts of Herod. Att. agree at least in intent, CIA. iii, 1417–22). It will bring all sorts of troubles, including fears, fever, chills, and swellings, etc., CIA. iii, 1423–4 (similar curse on a lead tablet from Crete: Ath. Mitt. 1893, p. 211). The first part of this imprecation represents the standard formula in such ἀραί and Oaths—don't tread on the ground, etc.; cf. Wünsch, Defix., p. vii, and a Jewish-Greek inscription from Euboea: Ἐφ. Ἀρχ., 1892, p. 175; it also appears in CIG. 2664, 2667 (Halikarnassos); 4303 (p. 1138 Phrygia). give justice to the underworld gods, 4190 (Cappadocia). Orphaned children would be left, a life of mourning, a deserted home, everything would perish in fire, and they would be destroyed under the weight of evil. 3862, 3875, 400 (Phrygia). These are all distinctly and originally Phrygian; something similar seems to appear in inscriptions in the Phrygian language: see Ztschr. vergl. Sprachf. 28, 381 ff.; BCH. 1896, p. 111 ff. Phrygian, too, is the curse This may fall into misfortunes., Epigr. Gr., p. 149, Amer. Sch. Ath. ii, 168—meaning may his children die early. (More clearly Children would suffer misfortune., BCH. 1893, p. 272.) Sometimes the additional phrase is found And after death, he will receive the underworld gods who are avenging and angry., 554 CIG. 3915 (Phrygian). Besides the usual curses, we also have But once he's dead, the earth won't provide him with a grave., 2826 (Aphrodisias in Karia); neither would heaven accept his soul, Am. Sch. Ath. iii, 411 (Pisidia). Extremely harsh is an inscription from Cilicia (JHS. 1891, p. 287): It will hold all the divine things, filled with bitterness, and will taste the disdainful bile of its own child's liver..—With these grave-imprecations, we can also compare the threats made against those who neglect the instructions for honoring King Antiochos of Kommagene who is buried in his ἱεροθέσιον (ib, 13; iiib, 3: hence correct sacrifice in Paus. 4, 32, 1) on the Nemrud Dagh: Knowing that there is a harsh punishment from royal spirits, a vengeful force against both negligence and arrogance, the law that punishes irreverence, dishonored even among the duly respected heroes, has unyielding penalties. For all sacred things are light work, but the burdens of irreverence are heavy and unavoidable. (iiia, 22 ff., Ber. Berl. Akad. 1883).

14 From the point of view of religion, at any rate, it is true, though with considerable reservations, that most of the Greeks and Macedonians scattered over Asia and Egypt in coloniae, in Syros Parthos Aegyptios degenerarunt, Liv. 38, 17, 11–12. The only non-Greek nation (apart from the Romans) which learnt anything from the Greeks or from the semi-religious Greek philosophy was the Jewish—at once the most stubborn and the most pliable of them all.

14 From a religious perspective, it is somewhat accurate, although with significant caveats, to say that most Greeks and Macedonians living in Asia and Egypt in colonies, in Syros Parthos Aegyptios degenerated, Liv. 38, 17, 11–12. The only non-Greek group (aside from the Romans) that gained anything from the Greeks or their semi-religious philosophy was the Jews—who were both the most stubborn and the most adaptable of them all.

15 At a quite late period, in order to explain the impiety of grave-robbing, Valentinian says (following the libri veteris sapientiae quite as much as Christian teaching) licet occasus necessitatem mens divina (of man) non sentiat, amant tamen animae sedem corporum relictorum et nescio qua sorte rationis occultae sepulchri honore laetantur (Nov. Valent. v, p. 111 Ritt.).

15 Later on, to explain the wrongdoing of grave-robbing, Valentinian states (drawing from both the books of ancient wisdom and Christian teachings) that although divine intellect may not perceive the necessity of mankind's downfall, souls still cherish the resting places of the departed and somehow take joy in the honor of the tombs, according to some hidden reason. (Nov. Valent. v, p. 111 Ritt.).

16 After the reception of the last person who has a right there ἀποιερῶσθαι τὸν πλάταν, ἀφηρωΐσθαι τὸ μνημεῖον, CIG. 2827, 2834. κορακωθήσεται, i.e. it will be finally shut up: 3919.

16 After the reception of the last person who has a right there To take away the plane tree, to be dedicated to the monument., CIG. 2827, 2834. κορακωθήσεται, meaning it will finally be shut down: 3919.

17 ἐπεὰν δὲ τοῖς καμοῦσιν ἐγχυτλώσωμεν, Herond. v, 84 (i.e. at the end of the month: festival of the dead at the τριακάδες, see above, chap. v, n. 88. ἡμέρας ληγούσης καὶ μηνὸς φθίνοντος εἰώθασιν ἐναγίζειν οἱ πολλοί, Plu., Q. Rom. 34, p. 272 D). Offerings to the dead at the grave: see besides Luc., Charon, 22.

17 When we make offerings for the deceased, Herond. v, 84 (i.e. at the end of the month: festival of the dead at the three of a kind, see above, chap. v, n. 88. As the day comes to a close and the month winds down, many often make offerings for the deceased., Plu., Q. Rom. 34, p. 272 D). Offerings to the dead at the grave: see also Luc., Charon, 22.

18 Epikteta: see above, chap. v, n. 126. Traces of a similar foundation on an inscr. from Thera ap. Ross, Inscr. Gr. 198 (ii, p. 81).—Otherwise the son will perhaps offer to his father τὴν ταφὴν καὶ τὸν ἐναγισμόν (CIG. 1976, Thessalonike; 3645 Lampsakos)—τὸ ἡρῷον κατεσκεύασεν εἰς αἰώνιον μνήμην καὶ τῇ μετὰ θάνατον ἀφωσιωμένῃ θρησκείᾳ (CIG. 4224d, iii, p. 1119 Lykia). A dead man has left the council of a city a sum of money for a στεφανωτικόν (CIG. 3912, 3916 Hierapolis in Phrygia); i.e. in order that his grave may be crowned every year from the interest of the money: 3919. Another man leaves money to a society to celebrate his memory yearly by holding a εὐωχία with οἰνοποσία illumination and crowns: 3028 Ephesos. An annual feast in honour of a dead man’s memory on his γενέθλιος ἡμέρα: 3417 Philadelphia in Lydia (this is the proper day for a feast of the dead: see above, chap. v, n. 89). Annual memorial in the month Ὑακίνθιος for a dead ἀρχιερανιστής in Rhodos, ἀναγόρευσις of his crowns of honour and crowning of his μνημεῖον, regular ἀναγόρευσις τᾶν τιμᾶν ἐν ταῖς συνόδοις (of the ἔρανος) καὶ ταῖς ἐπιχύσεσιν (second century B.C.), IGM. Aeg. i, 155, l. 53 ff., 67 ff. Another foundation, in Elatea (BCH. x, 382), seems to have been much more elaborate in intention and to have included the sacrifice of a bull, as well as εὐωχία and an ἀγών. 555

18 Epictetus: see above, chap. v, n. 126. There are signs of a similar foundation on an inscription from Thera, according to Ross, Inscr. Gr. 198 (ii, p. 81).—Otherwise, the son might offer to his father the grave and the setup (CIG. 1976, Thessalonike; 3645 Lampsakos)—He built the hero shrine for eternal remembrance and for worship after death. (CIG. 4224d, iii, p. 1119 Lykia). A deceased person has left the city council a sum of money for a crowdfunding (CIG. 3912, 3916 Hierapolis in Phrygia); that is, so that his grave can be crowned every year from the interest of the money: 3919. Another person leaves money to a society to celebrate his memory every year with a banquet, featuring wine consumption, lights, and crowns: 3028 Ephesos. An annual feast in honor of a deceased person's memory on his birthday: 3417 Philadelphia in Lydia (this is the right day for a feast for the dead: see above, chap. v, n. 89). An annual memorial in the month Hyacinth for a deceased chief priest in Rhodes, announcing his honor crowns and crowning of his grave, regular announcing the awards in the assemblies (of the banquet) and the drinks (second century BCE), IGM. Aeg. i, 155, l. 53 ff., 67 ff. Another foundation, in Elatea (BCH. x, 382), seems to have been much more ambitious in intention and included the sacrifice of a bull, along with feasting and a competition. 555

19 τάφος, δευόμενος γεράων, inscr. from Athens (second century A.D.): Ath. Mitt. 1892, p. 272, l. 6. θέλγειν ψυχὴν τεθνηκότος ἀνδρός by libations at the grave: Epigr. Gr. 120, 9–10.

19 táfos, deúomenos geráon, inscription from Athens (second century CE): Ath. Mitt. 1892, p. 272, l. 6. thélgein psychên of a dead man by libations at the grave: Epigr. Gr. 120, 9–10.

20 The ἀπόταφοι: this is the name given to those ἀπεστερημένοι τῶν προγονικῶν τάφων, EM. 131, 44. They even had a burial place of their own: ἀποτάφων τάφων on a marble vase from Rhodos, IGM. Aeg. i, 656.

20 The ἀπόταφοι: this is the name given to those deprived of ancestral tombs, EM. 131, 44. They even had a burial place of their own: grave markers on a marble vase from Rhodos, IGM. Aeg. i, 656.

21 This χαῖρε repeats the last farewell which accompanied the removal of the body from the house (Eur., Alc. 626 f.). Cf. χαῖρέ μοι ὦ Πάτροκλε καὶ εἰν Ἀΐδαο δόμοισιν, the words with which Achilles (Ψ 179) addresses his dead friend lying upon the funeral pyre. So too on tombstones χαῖρε must be intended to suggest the continued sympathy of the survivors and the appreciation by the dead of that sympathy. Does it also imply veneration of the departed as κρείττων? Gods and Heroes were also addressed with this word: cf. χαῖρ’ ἄναξ Ἡράκλεες, etc.—The passer-by calls out χαῖρε: χαίρετε ἥρωες. ὁ παράγων σε ἀσπάζεται, Ath. Mitt. ix, 263; and cf. Epigr. Gr. 218, 17–18; 237, 7–8; cf. Loch, op. cit., 278 f.

21 This hello echoes the final farewell that accompanied the body being taken from the house (Eur., Alc. 626 f.). See also Hi there, Patroclus, even in the homes of Hades., the words Achilles (Ψ 179) uses to address his dead friend lying on the funeral pyre. Similarly, on tombstones, Hello is meant to convey the ongoing sympathy of the living and the gratitude of the deceased for that sympathy. Does it also suggest respect for the departed as better? Gods and Heroes were also addressed with this word: see Hello, Lord Heracles, etc.—The passerby calls out Hello: Hello, heroes. The one passing by greets you., Ath. Mitt. ix, 263; and see also Epigr. Gr. 218, 17–18; 237, 7–8; cf. Loch, op. cit., 278 f.

22 χαίρετε is said by the dead man to the living; Böckh on CIG. 3775 (ii, p. 968); cf. χαιρέτω ὁ ἀναγνούς, IG. Sic. et It. [IG. xiv] 350.

22 Hello is said by the dead man to the living; Böckh on CIG. 3775 (ii, p. 968); cf. Welcome, reader, IG. Sic. et It. [IG. xiv] 350.

23 χαίρετε ἥρωες. χαῖρε καὶ σὺ καὶ εὐόδει, CIG. 1956 (more given by Böckh, ii, p. 50; see also on 3278); Inscr. Cos, 343; IG. Sic. et It. 60, 319; BCH. 1893–4, 242 (5), 249 (22), 528 (24), 533 (36); specially noteworthy is p. 529 (28), Λεύκιε Λικίνιε χαῖρε. κὲ σύ γε ὦ παροδεῖτα “χαίροις ὅτι τοῦτο τὸ σεμνὸν | εἶπας ἐμοὶ χαίρειν εἵνεκεν εὐσεβίης”. To call upon the dead is an act of εὐσέβεια.

23 Hello, heroes. Greetings to you and to you too., CIG. 1956 (more given by Böckh, ii, p. 50; see also on 3278); Inscr. Cos, 343; IG. Sic. et It. 60, 319; BCH. 1893–4, 242 (5), 249 (22), 528 (24), 533 (36); especially noteworthy is p. 529 (28), Lucius Licinius, greetings. And you too, dear visitor, “greetings, because you say this serious word | to me, urging me to be joyful for the sake of piety.”. Calling upon the dead is an act of devotion.

24 At the burial of a woman who is being given a public funeral ἐπεβόασε ὁ δᾶμος τρὶς τὸ ὄνομα αὐτᾶς, GDI. 3504 (Knidos; in the time of Trajan). In the same way the name of the ἥρως was called out three times at a sacrifice in his honour: see above, chap. iv, n. 62.

24 At the funeral of a woman receiving a public farewell, the crowd chanted her name three times, GDI. 3504 (Knidos; during the time of Trajan). Similarly, the name of the hero was called out three times during a sacrifice held in his honor: see above, chap. iv, n. 62.

25 Tombstone of Q. Marcius Strato (circ. second century A.D.), Ath. Mitt. 1892, p. 272, l. 5 ff. τοίγαρ ὅσοι Βρομίῳ Παφίῃ τε νέοι μεμέλησθε, δευόμενον γεράων μὴ μαρανεῖσθε τάφον· ἀλλὰ παραστείχοντες ἢ οὔνομα κλεινὸν ὁμαρτῇ βωστρέετ’ ἢ ῥαδινὰς συμπαταγεῖτε χέρας. Those who are thus charged answer, προσεννέπω Στράτωνα καὶ τιμῶ κρότῳ.

25 Tombstone of Q. Marcius Strato (around the second century AD), Ath. Mitt. 1892, p. 272, l. 5 ff. So all of you who care about Bromios and Paphian rituals, don’t let the graves of our ancestors be forgotten; instead, come together and either share a well-known name in solidarity or join hands for the offering of wine. Those who are thus charged answer, I raise a toast to Strato and honor him.

26 Often represented on Attic lekythoi: Pottier, Les lécythes blancs, p. 57.

26 Frequently depicted on Attic lekythoi: Pottier, Les lécythes blancs, p. 57.

27 The gods and their statues are honoured in this way: Sittl, Gebärden, p. 182.

27 The gods and their statues are honored in this way: Sittl, Gebärden, p. 182.

28 βελτίονες καὶ κρείττονες, Arist., Eudem. fr. 37 [44].

28 better and superior, Arist., Eudem. fr. 37 [44].

29 χρηστοὺς ποιεῖν euphemism for ἀποκτιννύναι in a treaty between Tegea and Sparta: Arist., fr. 542 [592]. They become χρηστοί only after death. This ancient and evidently popular expression gives far stronger grounds for believing that χρηστός applied to the dead than does the passage from Thphr., Ch. x, 16 (xiii, 3), for the opposite view (the περίεργος writes on a tombstone that a dead woman and her family χρηστοὶ ἦσαν, which Loch concludes that the word really “denotes a quality of the living and not of the dead”, op. cit., 281). It is possible at the same time that those who used such words did not mean anything special by their χρηστὲ χαῖρε, and at any rate only thought of it as a vague adjective of praise. But that was not its real meaning.

29 χρηστούς make is a euphemism for kill in a treaty between Tegea and Sparta: Arist., fr. 542 [592]. They become good people only after death. This ancient and clearly popular expression provides much stronger evidence to believe that χρηστός referred to the dead than the passage from Thphr., Ch. x, 16 (xiii, 3), which supports the opposite view (the curious writes on a tombstone that a dead woman and her family they were good, which Loch concludes means that the word really “denotes a quality of the living and not of the dead”, op. cit., 281). At the same time, it's possible that those who used such words didn’t mean anything particular by their Hello, good one, and probably just considered it a vague term of praise. But that wasn’t its true meaning.

30 χρηστὲ χαῖρε and the like, with or without ἥρως, are very commonly met with on epitaphs from Thessaly, Boeotia, the countries of Asia Minor (and Cyprus as well: cf. BCH. 1896, pp. 343–6; 353–6). On 556 Attic graves the use of the title χρηστός seems to be confined to foreigners and those mostly slaves (see Keil, Jahrb. Phil. suppl. iv, 628; Gutscher, Att. Grabinschr. i, p. 24; ii, p. 13).

30 Greetings, good friend. and similar phrases, with or without hero, are often found on gravestones from Thessaly, Boeotia, and the regions of Asia Minor (including Cyprus: see BCH. 1896, pp. 343–6; 353–6). On 556 Attic graves, the title good appears to be used mainly for foreigners and mostly for slaves (see Keil, Jahrb. Phil. suppl. iv, 628; Gutscher, Att. Grabinschr. i, p. 24; ii, p. 13).

31 With Gutscher, op. cit., i, 24; ii, 39.—From the fact that in Attica this word does not seem to be given to natives no conclusion is to be drawn as to the opinions held by the Athenians about their dead (as though they thought of them with less respect). The word was simply not traditional in this sense in Attica. On the other hand, the word μακαρίτης was specifically Attic as applied to the dead (see above, ch. vii, n. 10), and this provides unmistakable evidence that the conception of the dead as “blessed” was current also in Attica.

31 According to Gutscher, op. cit., i, 24; ii, 39.—The fact that this term isn’t used for locals in Attica doesn’t imply that Athenians held their deceased in any less regard. The term simply wasn’t part of their traditional language in this context. Conversely, the word rest in peace was uniquely Attic when referring to the dead (see above, ch. vii, n. 10), indicating that the idea of the deceased being “blessed” was also prevalent in Attica.

32 χρηστῶν θεῶν, Hdt. viii, 111.—ὁ ἥρως (Protesilaos), χρηστὸς ὤν, ξυγχωρεῖ that people should sit down in his τέμενος: Philostr., Her. p. 134, 4 Ks.—Other modes of address intended to mollify the dead are ἄλυπε, χρηστὲ καὶ ἄλυπε, ἄριστε, ἄμεμπτε, etc. χαῖρε (cf. Inscr. Cos, 165, 263, 279, and Loch, op. cit., 281).

32 the virtuous gods, Hdt. viii, 111.—the hero (Protesilaus), being virtuous allows that people should sit down in his safe haven: Philostr., Her. p. 134, 4 Ks.—Other ways of addressing the dead that are meant to soothe them include calm, good, and at peace, excellent, innocent, etc. hello (cf. Inscr. Cos, 165, 263, 279, and Loch, op. cit., 281).

33 Paus. 4, 27, 6.

33 Paus. 4, 27, 6.

34 Paus. 4, 32, 4.

34 Pause. 4, 32, 4.

35 Paus. 9, 13, 5–6. Sacrifice (ἐντέμνειν) of a white mare to the Heroines: Plu., Pelop. 20–2. The same thing is briefly referred to in Xen., HG. 6, 4, 7; see also D.S. xv, 54. Detailed account of the fate of the maidens ap. Plu., Narr. Amor. 3; Jerome, a. Jovin. i, 41 (ii, 1, 308 D Vall.).—αἱ Λεύκτρον θυγατέρες, Plu., Herod. Mal. ii, p. 856 F.

35 Paus. 9, 13, 5–6. The ritual of sacrificing a white mare to the Heroines: Plu., Pelop. 20–2. This is also briefly mentioned in Xen., HG. 6, 4, 7; see also D.S. xv, 54. A detailed account of the fate of the maidens is found in Plu., Narr. Amor. 3; Jerome, a. Jovin. i, 41 (ii, 1, 308 D Vall.).—the daughters of Leuctrum, Plu., Herod. Mal. ii, p. 856 F.

36 Λεωνίδεια in Sparta (CIG. 1421) at which there were “speeches” about Leonidas (even in Sparta not a surprising circumstance at this late period), and an ἀγών in which only Spartiates might take part: Paus. 3, 14, 1.—ἀγωνισάμενοι τὸν ἐπιτάφιο[ν Λεωνίδου] καὶ Παυσανί[ου καὶ τῶν λοι]πῶν ἡρώω[ν ἀγῶνα], CIG. 1417.

36 Leonidas in Sparta (CIG. 1421) where there were “speeches” about Leonidas (which isn’t surprising given the time), and an contest that only Spartiates could participate in: Paus. 3, 14, 1.—Competing in the funeral games[ν Λεωνίδου]καὶ Παυσανί[ου καὶ τῶν λοι]πῶν ἡρώω[in the struggle], CIG. 1417.

37 At Marathon: crowning and ἐναγισμός at the πολυάνδρειον of the Marathonian Heroes carried out by the epheboi: CIA. ii, 471, 26. Cf. more generally Aristid. ii, p. 229 f. Dind. Nocturnal fighting of the ghosts there: Paus. 1, 32, 4 (the oldest prototype of the similar legends told, in connexion with the story of the battle between the dead Huns and Romans, by Damasc., V. Isid. 63).

37 At Marathon: crowning and sacrifice at the polyandry of the Marathonian Heroes carried out by the epheboi: CIA. ii, 471, 26. Cf. more generally Aristid. ii, p. 229 f. Dind. Nocturnal fighting of the ghosts there: Paus. 1, 32, 4 (the oldest prototype of the similar legends told, in connection with the story of the battle between the dead Huns and Romans, by Damasc., V. Isid. 63).

38 ἄνδρας] ἐθ’ ἥρωας σέβεται πατρίς κτλ., Inscr. Cos, 350 (beginning of Empire).

38 Males]honor their homeland as heroes, etc., Inscr. Cos, 350 (beginning of Empire).

39 Speaking of the Attic tragedians, D. Chr. thinks (15, p. 237 M. = ii, 235 Arn.) οὓς ἐκεῖνοι ἀποδεικνύουσιν ἥρωας τούτοις φαίνονται ἐναγίζοντες (οἱ Ἕλληνες) ὡς ἥρωσιν, καὶ τὰ ἡρῷα ἐκείνοις ᾠκοδομημένα ἰδεῖν ἔστιν. But this is only true in a very limited and qualified sense.

39 When it comes to the Attic tragedians, D. Chr. believes (15, p. 237 M. = ii, 235 Arn.) Those whom they are presenting as heroes appear to be honoring them with sacrifices.(the Greeks)As for the heroes, it is possible to see the hero monuments built for them.. However, this is only accurate in a very limited and specific way.

40 Ἕκτορι ἔτι θύουσιν ἐν Ἰλίῳ, says Luc. (expressly speaking of his own times), D. Conc. 12. Apparition of Hektor in Troad: Max. Tyr. 15, 7, p. 283 R. Miracles worked: Philostr., Her. pass. Hekt. in Thebes: Lyc. 1204 ff.

40 They are still making sacrifices to Hector in Ilium., says Luc. (specifically referring to his own time), D. Conc. 12. The appearance of Hector in Troad: Max. Tyr. 15, 7, p. 283 R. Miracles performed: Philostr., Her. pass. Hector in Thebes: Lyc. 1204 ff.

41 In the Ἡρωικὸς Philostratos gives plenty of evidence of this. Most of what he says about the Heroes of the Trojan war is entirely without traditional basis, but not all of it: and especially where he speaks (in the first part of the dialogue) of the appearances and displays of power attributed in his own day to the Heroes he is far from inventing. (His powers of invention are exercised particularly in what he says about the events of their lives where he is expanding or correcting Homer.) Acc. To Philostr. (Her. 681, p. 149, 32 ff. Kays., 1871) ὁρῶνται—at least by the shepherds of the Trojan plain—the figures of the Homeric champions (gigantic in size, pp. 136–40 [667]; φαίνονται in full armour, 557 p. 131, 1). Hektor in particular appears, works miracles, and his statue πολλὰ ἐργάζεται χρηστὰ κοινῇ τε καὶ ἐς ἕνα, pp. 151–2. Legend about Antilochos, p. 155, 10 ff. Palamedes appears, p. 154. On the south coast of the Troad opposite Lesbos he has an ancient temple in which θύουσιν to him ξυνιόντες οἱ τὰς ἀκταίας οἰκοῦντες πόλεις, p. 184, 21 (see also V. Ap. iv, 13). Sacrifice to Palamedes as a Hero, 153, 29 ff.—Mantic power attributed to the ἥρωες, 135, 21 ff.; 148, 20 ff. (to Odysseus in Ithaca, 195, 5 ff.). Hence Protesilaos in particular, who appears at Elaious in Thrac. Chers. to the vineyard-keeper into whose mouth Philostr. puts his story, has so much to say even about what he had not himself seen or experienced. Protes. is still fully alive (ζῇ, 130, 23); like Achilles (in Leuke, etc.) he has his ἱεροὶ δρόμοι ἐν οἷς γυμνάζεται (131, 31). A vision of Protes. appearing to an enemy makes him blind (132, 9). (To meet a Hero often blinds a mortal, cf. Hdt. vi, 117, and the case of Stesichoros and the Dioskouroi.) He protects his protégé’s fields from snakes, wild beasts, and everything harmful: 132, 15 ff. He himself is now ἐν Ἅιδου (when he is with Laodameia), now in Phthia, and now in the Troad (143, 17 ff.). He appears about midday (143, 21, 32; cf. Append. vi). At his ancient oracle at Elaious (mentioned already by Hdt. ix, 116, 120; alluded to by Philostr., p. 141, 12) he dispenses oracles more particularly to the champions of the great games, the heroes of the age (p. 146, 13 ff., 24 ff., 147, 8 ff., 15 ff.; famous contemporaries are mentioned: Eudaimon of Alexandria, victor at Olympia in Ol. 237, and Helix well-known from the Γυμναστικός). He heals diseases, esp. consumption, dropsy, ophthalmia, and ague, and he helps people in the pains of love (p. 147, 30 ff.). Prot. also gives oracles in his Phthiotic home Phylake (where he pays frequent visits), 148, 24 ff.—It is the regular series of miraculous performances normally attributed to the ἥρωες of older legends, that Protesilaos carries out here.—On Mt. Ismaros in Thrace Maron (Εὐανθέος υἱός, Od. ι 197) appears and ὁρᾶται τοῖς γεωργοῖς to whom he sends rain (149, 3 ff.). Mt. Rhodope in Thrace is haunted (οἰκεῖ) by Rhesos, who lives there a life of chivalry, breeding horses, practising his weapons, and hunting; the woodland animals offer themselves willingly as sacrifices at his altar; the heros keeps the plague away from the surrounding κῶμαι (149, 7–19).—The legendary details from Philostratos here selected for mention may be taken as really derived from popular tradition (cf. also W. Schmid, D. Atticismus, iv, 572 ff.).

41 In the Heroic Philostratos provides a lot of evidence for this. Much of what he says about the Heroes of the Trojan war has no traditional basis, but not all of it: especially when he discusses (in the first part of the dialogue) the appearances and displays of power attributed to the Heroes in his own time, he's far from making it up. (His creativity is mainly seen in how he talks about the events of their lives, where he's elaborating or correcting Homer.) According to Philostr. (Her. 681, p. 149, 32 ff. Kays., 1871) They are seen.—at least by the shepherds of the Trojan plain—the figures of the Homeric champions (huge in size, pp. 136–40 [667]; They appear in full armor, 557 p. 131, 1). Hektor, in particular, shows up, performs miracles, and his statue It accomplishes many good works, both in common and for one purpose., pp. 151–2. Legend about Antilochos, p. 155, 10 ff. Palamedes appears, p. 154. On the south coast of the Troad opposite Lesbos, he has an ancient temple where θύουσιν to him The people living in the coastal cities coming together, p. 184, 21 (see also V. Ap. iv, 13). Sacrifice to Palamedes as a Hero, 153, 29 ff.—Mantic power attributed to the heroes, 135, 21 ff.; 148, 20 ff. (to Odysseus in Ithaca, 195, 5 ff.). That's why Protesilaos, in particular, who shows up at Elaious in Thrac. Chers. to the vineyard-keeper into whose mouth Philostr. puts his story, has so much to share even about what he hadn't personally seen or experienced. Protes. is still fully alive (ζῇ, 130, 23); like Achilles (in Leuke, etc.) he has his sacred paths where one trains (131, 31). A vision of Protes. appearing to an enemy blinds him (132, 9). (Meeting a Hero often blinds a mortal, cf. Hdt. vi, 117, and the case of Stesichoros and the Dioskouroi.) He protects his protégé’s fields from snakes, wild animals, and anything harmful: 132, 15 ff. He’s now in Hades (when he is with Laodameia), now in Phthia, and now in the Troad (143, 17 ff.). He appears around midday (143, 21, 32; cf. Append. vi). At his ancient oracle at Elaious (previously mentioned by Hdt. ix, 116, 120; referenced by Philostr., p. 141, 12) he gives oracles mainly to the champions of the great games, the heroes of the time (p. 146, 13 ff., 24 ff., 147, 8 ff., 15 ff.; famous contemporaries are mentioned: Eudaimon of Alexandria, victor at Olympia in Ol. 237, and Helix well-known from the Fitness). He cures diseases, especially consumption, dropsy, eye infections, and fever, and he assists people in matters of love (p. 147, 30 ff.). Prot. also gives oracles in his Phthiotic home Phylake (where he makes frequent visits), 148, 24 ff.—It's the usual series of miraculous acts normally attributed to the heroes of older legends that Protesilaos carries out here.—On Mt. Ismaros in Thrace, Maron (Evanthos' son, Od. ι 197) appears and Is seen by the farmers to whom he sends rain (149, 3 ff.). Mt. Rhodope in Thrace is inhabited (live) by Rhesos, who lives there a chivalrous life, breeding horses, practicing his skills, and hunting; the woodland animals willingly offer themselves as sacrifices at his altar; the heros keeps the plague away from the surrounding κῶμαι (149, 7–19).—The legendary details chosen from Philostratos here may genuinely come from popular tradition (cf. also W. Schmid, D. Atticismus, iv, 572 ff.).

42 Again in 375 A.D. Achilles preserved Attica from an earthquake (Zosim. iv, 18); in 396 he kept Alaric away from Athens; ib., v, 6.

42 Again in 375 CE Achilles saved Attica from an earthquake (Zosim. iv, 18); in 396 he kept Alaric away from Athens; ib., v, 6.

43 Plu., Lucull. 23; App., Mithr. 83. Lucullus was Roman enough to carry off from the inhabitants of Sinope their much-honoured statue of Autolykos, to which the elaborate cult was principally attached: ἐτίμων Autol. ὡς θεόν. ἦν δὲ καὶ μαντεῖον αὐτοῦ, Str. 546.

43 Plu., Lucull. 23; App., Mithr. 83. Lucullus was Roman enough to take from the people of Sinope their highly valued statue of Autolykos, which was mainly associated with their elaborate worship: Honored Autol. as a god. There was also __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, Str. 546.

44 See above, chap. iv, nn. 119–20.—Heroon of Kyniska (sister of Agesilaos) in Sparta as victor at Olympos: Paus. 3, 15, 1.

44 See above, chap. iv, nn. 119–20.—Heroon of Kyniska (sister of Agesilaos) in Sparta as winner at the Olympics: Paus. 3, 15, 1.

45 Hero-physicians: see above, chap. iv, § 10. Our knowledge of the cult and activity of these Heroes is chiefly derived from evidence from later times.—An evidently late creation is the Hero Neryllinos in the Troad, of whose worship, healing, and prophetic powers Athenag., Apol. 26, has something to say (Lob. Agl. 1171). ὁ ξένος ἰατρός, Toxaris, in Athens: Luc., Scyth. 1; 2. (The special name of the ξένος ἰατρός may be Lucian’s invention, but not what he tells us of his cult.) There was a permanent cult of Hippokrates in Kos in the time of Soranos: the Koans offered sacrifice to him (ἐναγίζειν) annually on his birthday 558 (see above, chap. v, n. 89): Soran. ap. Anon., V. Hipp. 450, 13 West. (miracle at the tomb of Hipp. in Larisa: ib., 451, 55 ff.). The doctor in Luc., Philops. 21, makes an elaborate sacrifice (something more than ἐναγίζειν) annually to his bronze statue of Hipp.—A good story thoroughly in the manner of popular folk-lore is that told of Pellichos the Corinthian general who was also worshipped as giving help in sickness and the magic tricks that he (simply as ἥρως) was able to play on the Libyan slave who had stolen the gold pieces which used to be offered to him: Luc., Philops. 18–20.

45 Hero-physicians: see above, chap. iv, § 10. Our understanding of the worship and activities of these Heroes mainly comes from later sources. A clear example of a more recent figure is the Hero Neryllinos from the Troad, whose healing and prophetic abilities are noted by Athenagoras in Apol. 26 (Lob. Agl. 1171). the foreign doctor, Toxaris, in Athens: Luc., Scyth. 1; 2. (Lucian might have invented the specific title foreign doctor, but not the details of his worship.) There was a lasting cult of Hippokrates in Kos during Soranos’ time: the people of Kos sacrificed to him (No modern equivalent.) every year on his birthday 558 (see above, chap. v, n. 89): Soran. ap. Anon., V. Hipp. 450, 13 West. (miracle at the tomb of Hipp. in Larisa: ib., 451, 55 ff.). The doctor in Luc., Philops. 21, performs a detailed sacrifice (something more than just Perform a ritual sacrifice) each year to his bronze statue of Hipp.—An interesting story, very much in the style of popular folklore, is that of Pellichos, the Corinthian general, who was also honored for providing relief in sickness and the clever tricks he (simply as hero) played on the Libyan slave who stole the gold offerings meant for him: Luc., Philops. 18–20.

46 Anth. Pal. vii, 694 (Ἀδδαίου, probably the Macedonian).

46 Anth. Pal. vii, 694 (Αddai, likely the Macedonian).

47 CIG. 4838b (see above, chap. iv, n. 60). The name expresses the idea: εὐόδει was the greeting which the dead man returned to the traveller, CIG. 1956.

47 CIG. 4838b (see above, chap. iv, n. 60). The name conveys the meaning: εὐόδει was the response the deceased gave to the traveler, CIG. 1956.

48 Another example: bulls are still sacrificed in Megara in the fourth century A.D. officially by the city to the Heroes who had fallen in the Persian wars, IG. Sept. i, 53.

48 Another example: bulls are still sacrificed in Megara in the fourth century A.D. officially by the city to the Heroes who had fallen in the Persian wars, IG. Sept. i, 53.

49 At the monument of Philopoimen, Plu., Philop. 21.

49 At the monument of Philopoimen, Plu., Philop. 21.

50 ἐν τοῖς Ἡρωϊκοῖς καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ἑορταῖς—in Priansos and Hierapytna in Crete (third century B.C.), CIG. 2556, 37. Annual festival of the Ἡρῷα, in which were held εὐχαριστήριοι ἀγῶνες for Asklepiades and those who had fought with him in one of the city’s wars. A decree honouring the grandsons of this Asklep. has been found at Eski-Manyas near Kyzikos: Ath. Mitt. 1884, p. 33.

50 at the Heroic and other festivals—in Priansos and Hierapytna in Crete (third century B.C.), CIG. 2556, 37. Annual festival of the Hero, during which there were Thanksgiving competitions for Asklepiades and those who had fought with him in one of the city’s wars. A decree honoring the grandsons of Asklep. has been found at Eski-Manyas near Kyzikos: Ath. Mitt. 1884, p. 33.

51 In taking an oath they swore by the gods καὶ ἥρωας καὶ ἡρωάσσας (Dreros in Crete): Cauer, Delect.1 38 A, 31 (third century B.C.). Treaty between Rhodos and Hierapytna (second century B.C.), Cauer, 44, 3: εὔξασθαι τῷ Ἁλίῳ καὶ τᾷ Ῥόδῳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις θεοῖς πᾶσι καὶ πάσαις καὶ τοῖς ἀρχαγέταις καὶ τοῖς ἥρωσι, ὅσοι ἔχοντι τὰν πόλιν καὶ τὰν χώραν τὰν Ῥοδίων . . . Oath of citizenship from Chersonnesos (third century), Sitzb. Berl. Akad. 1892, p. 480: ὀμνύω . . . ἥρωας ὅσοι πόλιν καὶ χώραν καὶ τεύχη ἔχοντι τὰ Χερσονασιτᾶν.—Similar exx. from earlier times: see above, chap. iv, n. 4 (and cf. Din., Dem. 64: μαρτύρομαι . . . καὶ τοὺς ἥρωας τοὺς ἐγχωρίους κτλ.).

51 When they took an oath, they swore by the gods καὶ ἥρωες καὶ ἡρωίδες (Dreros in Crete): Cauer, Delect.1 38 A, 31 (third century BCE). Treaty between Rhodos and Hierapytna (second century BCE), Cauer, 44, 3: To pray to the God of the Sea, to Rhodos, and to all the gods, as well as the archangels and heroes, who hold power over the city and land of the Rhodians... Oath of citizenship from Chersonnesos (third century), Sitzb. Berl. Akad. 1892, p. 480: I swear ... all the heroes who have the city, the land, and the arms of the Chersonesians..—Similar examples from earlier times: see above, chap. iv, n. 4 (and cf. Din., Dem. 64: I testify... and the local heroes, etc.).

52 e.g. inscr. from Astypalaia BCH. 1891, p. 632 (n. 4): Damatrios son of Hippias dedicates a fountain and trees θεοῖς ἥρωσί τε . . . ἀθλοφόρου τέχνας ἀντιδιδοὺς χάριτα.—A grave is dedicated θεοῖς ἥρωσι, CIG. 3272 (Smyrna), i.e. probably θ. καὶ ἥρωσι (cf. θεοῖς δαίμοσι, 5827. etc.).

52 e.g. inscription from Astypalaia BCH. 1891, p. 632 (n. 4): Damatrios, son of Hippias, dedicates a fountain and trees to the gods and heroes... presenting the gifts of athletic abilities.—A grave is dedicated to the gods and heroes, CIG. 3272 (Smyrna), meaning probably to the gods and heroes (cf. to the deities and spirits, 5827. etc.).

53 Collegia of ἡρωισταί: Foucart. Assoc. relig. 230 (49), 233 (56). CIA. ii, 630. In Boeotia, Ath. Mitt. 3, 299 = IG. Sept. i, 2725.

53 Collegia of heroes: Foucart. Assoc. relig. 230 (49), 233 (56). CIA. ii, 630. In Boeotia, Ath. Mitt. 3, 299 = IG. Sept. i, 2725.

54 e g. inscr. on one of the seats in the theatre at Athens: ἱερέως Ἀνάκοιν καὶ ἥρωος ἐπιτεγίου, CIA. iii, 290.

54 for example, inscribed on one of the seats in the theatre at Athens: Priest Anakoine and hero epitegiou, CIA. iii, 290.

55 διαμένουσι δὲ καὶ ἐς τόδε τῷ Αἴαντι παρ’ Ἀθηναίοις τιμαί, αὐτῷ τε καὶ Εὐρυσάκει, Paus. 1, 35, 3 (Αἰάντεια in Salamis in first century B.C., CIA. ii, 467–71). ἐναγίζουσι δὲ καὶ ἐς ἡμᾶς ἔτι τῷ Φορωνεῖ (in Argos), 2, 20, 3. καί οἱ (Theras) καὶ νῦν ἔτι οἱ Θηραῖοι κατ’ ἔτος ἐναγίζουσιν ὡς οἰκιστῇ, 3, 1, 8. He also bears witness to the still surviving cult of Pandion as Hero in Megara, 1, 41, 6; Tereus in Megara, 1, 41, 9; Melampous in Aigosthena, 1, 44, 5; Aristomenes in Messenia, 4, 14, 7; Aitolos in Elis (ἐναγίζει ὁ γυμνασίαρχος ἔτι καὶ ἐς ἐμὲ καθ’ ἕκαστον ἔτος τῷ Αἰτωλῷ, 5, 4, 4; cf. the γυμνασίαρχος who looks after the ἐκκομιδαί: above, this chap., n. 4); Sostratos the ἐρώμενος of Herakles in Dyme, 7, 17, 8; Iphikles in Phenea, 8, 14, 9; the boys slain at Kaphyai, 8, 23, 6–7; the four lawgivers of Tegea, 8, 48, 1; the Εὐσεβεῖς in Katana, 10, 28, 4–5.—Of course, it does not follow that when Paus. mentions other very numerous Heroes without so 559 expressly saying that their cult still survived, he means that those cults had died out.

55 They also hold honors for Ajax among the Athenians, for both him and Eurysakes., Paus. 1, 35, 3 (Ajax in Salamis in the first century BCE, CIA. ii, 467–71). They still carry out rituals for us at the shrine of Phoroneus. (in Argos), 2, 20, 3. and they (Theras) still perform rituals every year as if he were their founder, 3, 1, 8. He also attests to the ongoing worship of Pandion as a Hero in Megara, 1, 41, 6; Tereus in Megara, 1, 41, 9; Melampus in Aigosthena, 1, 44, 5; Aristomenes in Messenia, 4, 14, 7; Aitolos in Elis (the gymnasiarch still commemorates Aitolus every year too., 5, 4, 4; cf. the gym leader who oversees the ekkomidai: above, this chap., n. 4); Sostratos, the cherished of Herakles in Dyme, 7, 17, 8; Iphikles in Phenea, 8, 14, 9; the boys killed at Kaphyai, 8, 23, 6–7; the four lawgivers of Tegea, 8, 48, 1; the Faithful in Katana, 10, 28, 4–5.—Of course, it does not follow that when Paus. mentions many other Heroes without specifically stating that their worship still exists, he implies that those cults have disappeared.

56 Plu., Aristid. 21.

56 Plus, Aristid. 21.

57 Aratos received from the Achaeans after his death θυσίαν καὶ τιμὰς ἡρωικάς in which he may take pleasure himself εἴπερ καὶ περὶ τοὺς ἀποιχομένους ἔστι τις αἴσθησις, Polyb. 8, 14, 8. He was buried at Sikyon, as οἰκιστὴς καὶ σωτὴρ τῆς πόλεως, in a τόπος περίοπτος called the Ἀράτειον (cf. Paus. 2, 8, 1; 9, 4). Sacrifice was made to him twice a year, on the day when he had freed Sikyon, 5th Daisios, the Σωτήρια, and on his birthday; the former was carried out by the priest of Zeus Soter, the latter by the priest of Aratos. They included: Hymn by the Dionysiac τεχνῖται, procession of παῖδες and ἔφηβοι in which the gymnasiarchoi, the boule wearing crowns, and the citizens took part. Of all this only δείγματα μικρά still survived in Plutarch’s time, αἱ δὲ πλεῖσται τῶν τιμῶν ὑπὸ χρόνου καὶ πραγμάτῶν ἄλλων ἐκλελοίπασιν, Plu., Arat. 53 (σωτήρ: cf. epigram in c. 14).

57 After his death, the Achaeans honored Aratos with heroic sacrifices and honors that he could take joy in himself, if there's any awareness of those who have died, Polyb. 8, 14, 8. He was buried in Sikyon, as the founder and protector of the city, in a prime spot called the Arateion (cf. Paus. 2, 8, 1; 9, 4). Sacrifices were made to him twice a year, on the day he freed Sikyon, the 5th of Daisios, the Soteria, and on his birthday; the former was conducted by the priest of Zeus Soter, and the latter by the priest of Aratos. These included: Hymns by the Dionysiac creators, a procession of kids and young people, where the gymnasiarchoi, the boule wearing crowns, and the citizens participated. By Plutarch’s time, only small tokens of all this remained, most of the honors have been lost over time due to various factors, Plu., Arat. 53 (savior: cf. epigram in c. 14).

58 πάντες ἥρωας νομίζουσι τοὺς σφόδρα παλαιοὺς ἄνδρας, καὶ ἐὰν μηδὲν ἐξαίρετον ἔχωσι, δι’ αὐτὸν οἶμαι τὸν χρόνον. But only a few of them have regular τελετὰς ἡρώων: D. Chr. 31, p. 335 M. [i, 243 Arn.]. omnes qui patriam conservarint, adiuverint, auxerint become immortal: Cic., Som. Sci. 3, which also goes too far.

58 Everyone thinks of legendary heroes as very old men, and if they lack anything extraordinary, I believe it’s because of him that time.. But only a few of them have regular hero rituals: D. Chr. 31, p. 335 M. [i, 243 Arn.]. Everyone who has preserved, assisted, or improved their country become immortal: Cic., Som. Sci. 3, which also goes too far.

59 Pelopidas, Timoleon, Leosthenes, Aratos become Heroes: see Keil, Anal. epigr. et onom. 50–4. Kleomenes Plu., Cleom. 39. Philopoimen, Philop. 21. ἰσόθεοι τιμαί annual sacrifice of a bull and hymns of praise to Philop. sung by the νεοί: D.S. 29, 18; Liv. 39, 50, 9; SIG. 289. See Keil, op. cit., 9 ff.

59 Pelopidas, Timoleon, Leosthenes, and Aratos become Heroes: see Keil, Anal. epigr. et onom. 50–4. Kleomenes Plu., Cleom. 39. Philopoimen, Philop. 21. divine honors annual sacrifice of a bull and hymns of praise to Philopoimen sung by the νεοί: D.S. 29, 18; Liv. 39, 50, 9; SIG. 289. See Keil, op. cit., 9 ff.

60 In Sikyon Aratos is held to be the son of Asklepios who had visited his mother in the form of a snake: Paus. 2, 10, 3; 4, 14, 7–8 (favourite form of stories of divine parentage: see Marx, Märchen v. dankb. Thieren, 122, 2).

60 In Sikyon, Aratos is considered the son of Asklepios, who came to visit his mother as a snake: Paus. 2, 10, 3; 4, 14, 7–8 (a popular theme in stories of divine parentage: see Marx, Märchen v. dankb. Thieren, 122, 2).

61 The very charming and characteristic story of Drimakos, the leader and law-giver of the δραπέται in Chios, is told by Nymphodoros (ap. Ath. vi, c. 88–90), as having happened μικρὸν πρὸ ἡμῶν. He had a ἡρῷον in which he was honoured under the name of ἥρως εὐμενής (by the δραπέται with the firstfruits of their plunder). He frequently appeared to masters to whom he revealed the οἰκετῶν ἐπιβουλάς.

61 The very charming and distinctive story of Drimakos, the leader and lawgiver of the escapees in Chios, is recounted by Nymphodoros (ap. Ath. vi, c. 88–90), as having taken place small before us. He had a hero where he was honored under the name of kind hero (by the escapees with the firstfruits of their plunder). He frequently appeared to masters, revealing to them the slaves' plots.

62 Hsch. Γαθιάδας· ἥρωος ὄνομα, ὃς καὶ τοὺς καταφεύγοντας εἰς αὐτὸν ῥύεται [καὶ] θανάτου.

62 Hsch. Gathias: the name of a hero who also safeguards those seeking shelter with him from death.

63 Pixodaros, a shepherd of Ephesos, discovered in a strange fashion a very excellent kind of marble, a discovery which he communicated to the authorities (for use in temple-building). He was made a Hero and renamed ἥρως εὐάγγελος: sacrifice was made to him officially every month, hodieque, Vitruv. x, 2.

63 Pixodaros, a shepherd from Ephesos, found a really amazing type of marble in a strange way, and he reported his discovery to the authorities (for use in temple construction). He was honored as a Hero and given the new name hero evangelist: sacrifices were made to him officially every month, hodieque, Vitruv. x, 2.

64 Luc., Macrob. 21 (for Athenod. see FHG. iii, 485 f.).—In Kos an exedra in the theatre was dedicated to C. Stertinius Xenophon (court-physician to the Emp. Claudius) ἥρωι, Inscr. Cos, 93.—In Mitylene there was even an apotheosis of the historian Theophanes (the friend of Pompeius: cf. Γν. Πομπήιος Ἱεροίτα υἱὸς Θεοφάνης with full name, Ath. Mitt. ix, 87): Tac., A. vi, 18. Θεοφάνης θεὸς on coins of the city, and cf. Σέξστον ἥρωα, Λεσβῶναξ ἥρως νέος, etc., on the same city’s coins (Head, Hist. Num. 488).

64 Luc., Macrob. 21 (for Athenod. see FHG. iii, 485 f.).—In Kos, there was an exedra in the theater dedicated to C. Stertinius Xenophon (court physician to Emperor Claudius) hero, Inscr. Cos, 93.—In Mitylene, there was even an apotheosis of the historian Theophanes (the friend of Pompey: cf. Γν. Πομπήιος Ἱεροίτα υἱὸς Θεοφάνης with full name, Ath. Mitt. ix, 87): Tac., A. vi, 18. Theophanes god appears on coins of the city, and cf. Σέξτον ἥρωα, Λεσβῶναξ ἥρως νέος, etc., on coins from the same city (Head, Hist. Num. 488).

65 On a stele in Messene there was a portrait of a certain Aithidas of the beginning of the third century B.C.; instead of whom a descendant of the same name is worshipped: Paus. 4, 32, 2. In the market place of Mantinea stood a heroon of Podares who had 560 distinguished himself in the battle of Mant. (362). Three generations before Paus. visited the place the Mantineans had altered the inscription on the heroon and dedicated it to a later Podares, a descendant of the original one, who lived in the Roman period: Paus. 8, 9, 9.

65 On a stele in Messene, there was a portrait of a man named Aithidas from the early third century BCE; however, a descendant with the same name is now honored instead: Paus. 4, 32, 2. In the marketplace of Mantinea, there was a heroon dedicated to Podares, who had 560 excelled in the Battle of Mantinea (362). Three generations before Paus. visited the area, the people of Mantinea changed the inscription on the heroon and dedicated it to a later Podares, a descendant of the original, who lived during the Roman period: Paus. 8, 9, 9.

66 Cf. Keil, Anal. Epigr. 62.

66 See Keil, Anal. Epigr. 62.

67 Cult paid to king Lysimachos in his lifetime in Samothrake, SIG. 190 (Archäol. Unters. auf. Samoth. ii, 85, n. 2). “Heroizing” of Diogenes phrourarchos of Demetrios; in 229 B.C. he was bribed by Aratos to lead the Macedonian garrison out of Attica: see Köhler, Hermes, vii, 1 ff.—ὑπὲρ τᾶς Νικία τοῦ δάμου υἱοῦ, φιλοπάτριδος, ἥρωος, εὐεργέτα δὲ τᾶς πόλιος, σωτηρίας a dedication θεοῖς πατρῷοις, Inscr. Cos, 76. This is a decree made in the lifetime of the heros (or why σωτηρίας?), who is probably identical, as the editors suggest, with Nikias, tyrant of Kos in the Strabo’s time: Str. 658; Perizonius on Ael., VH. i, 29.

67 Worship offered to King Lysimachos during his life in Samothrace, SIG. 190 (Archäol. Unters. auf. Samoth. ii, 85, n. 2). The “heroizing” of Diogenes phrourarchos of Demetrios; in 229 BCE he was paid off by Aratos to lead the Macedonian garrison out of Attica: see Köhler, Hermes, vii, 1 ff.—In honor of Nikias, the son of Damus, a patriot, a hero, a benefactor of the city, and a savior. a dedication to ancestral gods, Inscr. Cos, 76. This is a decree made during the life of the heros (or why salvation?), who is likely the same as Nikias, a tyrant of Kos in the time of Strabo: Str. 658; Perizonius on Ael., VH. i, 29.

68 ἥρως applied to a living person occasionally on inss. of the Imperial age, CIG. 2583, Lyttos, Crete; 3665 ἡρωίς, living, Kyzikos second century; Ath. Mitt. vi, 121 (Kyzikos again) ἱππαρχοῦντος Κλεομένους ἥρωος also certainly living.

68 hero was sometimes used to refer to a living person, as seen in inscriptions from the Imperial period, CIG. 2583, Lyttos, Crete; 3665 heroine, living, Kyzikos, second century; Ath. Mitt. vi, 121 (Kyzikos again) Cléomène, the hero of cavalry which also certainly refers to a living person.

69 When Demetrios Poliorketes conquered and rebuilt Sikyon in 303 the inhabitants of the city which is now called “Demetrias” offer to him while still alive, sacrifice, festival, and annual ἀγῶνες as κτίστῃ (ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ὁ χρόνος ἠκύρωσεν): D.S. 20, 102, 3. Later this frequently occurred: Marcellea, Lucullea, etc., are well known. But the matter did not stop there. The inhabitants of Lete in Macedonia in the year 117 B.C. decree to a prominent Roman, besides other honours, τίθεσθαι αὐτῷ ἀγῶνα ἱππικὸν κατ’ ἕτος ἐν τῷ Δαισίῳ μηνί, ὅταν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις εὐεργέταις οἱ ἀγῶνες ἐπιτελῶνται (Arch. des miss. scientif. 3e série, iii, p. 278, n. 127). This implies that all εὐεργέται were by custom offered such games at this time.

69 When Demetrios Poliorketes conquered and rebuilt Sikyon in 303, the residents of the city now known as “Demetrias” offered him, while he was still alive, sacrifices, festivals, and annual contests as builder (But time has confirmed these things.): D.S. 20, 102, 3. This became common later: Marcellea, Lucullea, etc., are well-known examples. But it didn't stop there. The residents of Lete in Macedonia in the year 117 BCE decided to honor a prominent Roman with, among other honors, to set up an annual horse race for him in the month of Daisios, whenever the other sponsors held their games (Arch. des miss. scientif. 3e série, iii, p. 278, n. 127). This suggests that all benefactors were customarily offered such games at that time.

70 D.S. 17, 115. Alexander after inquiry at the oracle of Ammon commanded that he should be worshipped as ἥρως (the oracle having granted in his case ἐναγίζειν ὡς ἥρωι, but not ὡς θεῷ θύειν): Arrian, An. 7, 14, 7; 23, 6; Plu., Alex. 72 (an ἡρῷον was immediately set up to him in Alexandria Aeg.: Arr. 7, 23, 7). This did not prevent the superstition and servility which flourished together in Alexander’s empire from occasionally worshipping Heph. as Ἡφαιστίων θεὸς πάρεδρος.—D.S. probably only exaggerates the truth: 17, 115, 6; cf. Luc., Calumn. 17–18. (The new heros or god immediately gave proof of his power by appearances, visions sent in dreams, ἰάματα, μαντεῖαι, ib. 17.)—Elaborate pomp at the funeral of Dem. Poliork.: Plu., Demetr. 53.

70 D.S. 17, 115. After consulting the oracle of Ammon, Alexander ordered that he should be worshipped as hero (the oracle had granted him to be worshipped sacrificing like a hero, but not to sacrifice to God): Arrian, An. 7, 14, 7; 23, 6; Plu., Alex. 72 (a heroic shrine was quickly established in Alexandria Aeg.: Arr. 7, 23, 7). This did not stop the superstition and servility that thrived in Alexander’s empire from occasionally worshipping Hephaestus as Hephaestus, divine assistant.—D.S. likely only exaggerates the truth: 17, 115, 6; cf. Luc., Calumn. 17–18. (The new heros or god quickly demonstrated his power through appearances, visions sent in dreams, healing, prophecies, ib. 17.)—Elaborate funeral ceremony for Dem. Poliork.: Plu., Demetr. 53.

71 Cf. the Testament of Epikteta and other foundations mentioned above, this chap., n. 18, and chap. v, n. 126. Or cf. the elaborate arrangements which Herodes Atticus made for the funeral, etc., of Regilla and Polydeukes (but ἥρως Πολυδευκίων is only said in the weakened sense in which ἥρως had been current for a long time): collected by Keil in Pauly-Wiss. i, 2101 ff. The extravagant manifestations of grief that Cicero offered to the memory of his daughter were modelled on Greek originals (and upon the certainly Greek auctores qui dicant fieri id oportere: Att. 12, 81, 1). In Att. 12 he gives an account of their architectural side: he frequently calls the object that he meditates an ἀποθέωσις; cf. consecrabo te (Consol. fr. 5 Or.).—Cf. the Temple-tomb of Pomptilla, who like another Alkestis died instead of her husband, whom she followed into exile as far as Sardinia: her death was caused by breathing in the breath of the sick man. Her 561 temple is at Cagliari in Sardinia, and is adorned with many inss. in Latin and Greek: IG. Sic. et It. 607, p. 144 ff. (first century A.D.).

71 See the Testament of Epikteta and other foundations mentioned above, this chapter, n. 18, and chapter v, n. 126. Or check out the elaborate arrangements that Herodes Atticus made for the funeral of Regilla and Polydeukes (but Hero Polydeuces is only noted in the weakened sense that hero has been used for a long time): compiled by Keil in Pauly-Wiss. i, 2101 ff. The extravagant displays of grief that Cicero showed for his daughter were modeled on Greek originals (and certainly on the Greek The authors who claim that this should happen: Att. 12, 81, 1). In Att. 12 he describes the architectural aspect: he often refers to the object he is contemplating as an apotheosis; cf. consecrabo te (Consol. fr. 5 Or.).—See the Temple-tomb of Pomptilla, who, like another Alkestis, died in place of her husband, following him into exile as far as Sardinia: her death was caused by inhaling the breath of the sick man. Her 561 temple is located in Cagliari in Sardinia and is decorated with many inscriptions in Latin and Greek: IG. Sic. et It. 607, p. 144 ff. (first century A.D.).

72 ὁ δᾶμος (occasionally also ἁ βουλὰ καὶ ὁ δᾶμος) ἀφηρώϊξε—Thera, CIG. 2467; Ross, Inscr. Gr. Ined. 203 ff. (and sometimes outside Thera: Loch, Zu d. gr. Grabschr. 282, 1) ὁ δᾶμος ἐτίμασε (τὸν δεῖνα) . . . ἥρωα. Cf. also (Thera) Ath. Mitt. xvi, 166; Epigr. Gr. 191–2.

72 the folks (occasionally also the council and the community) honored—Thera, CIG. 2467; Ross, Inscr. Gr. Ined. 203 ff. (and sometimes outside Thera: Loch, Zu d. gr. Grabschr. 282, 1) the people celebrated (a specific). . . hero. Cf. also (Thera) Ath. Mitt. xvi, 166; Epigr. Gr. 191–2.

73 φροντίσαι δὲ τοὺς ὀργεῶνας (the members of a collegium of Dionysiasts) ὅπως ἀφηρωισθεῖ Διονύσιος καὶ ἀνατεθεῖ ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ παρὰ τὸν θεόν, ὅπου καὶ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ, ἵνα ὑπάρχει κάλλιστον ὑπόμνημα αὐτοῦ εἰς τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον, inscr. of Peiraeus, second century B.C.; CIA. iv, 2, n. 623e, 45 ff. In Argos a guild, apparently of tanners, puts up an inscr. τῷ δεῖνι, κτίστᾳ ἥρωι, CIG. 1134.

73 Take care of the members of the collegium of Dionysiasts. so that Dionysus can be honored and dedicated in the temple by the god, where his father is also present, to have the most beautiful reminder of him forever, inscr. of Peiraeus, second century BCE; CIA. iv, 2, n. 623e, 45 ff. In Argos, a guild, likely of tanners, puts up an inscr. to the god, the founding hero, CIG. 1134.

74 Like that Naulochos whom Philios of Salamis saw three times in a dream appearing in company with Demeter and Kore. The city of Priene thereupon ordered that he should be worshipped (ἥρωα σέβειν, Epigr. Gr. 774).

74 Just like Naulochos, whom Philios of Salamis saw three times in a dream alongside Demeter and Kore. The city of Priene then decided that he should be honored (honoring a hero, Epigr. Gr. 774).

75 Κάρπος τὰν ἰδίαν γυναῖκα ἀφηρώϊξε (Thera) CIG. 2471. From the same place come many more exx. of ἀφηρωίζειν by members of a family: 2472b–d, 2473; cf. Ἀνδροσθένην Φίλωνος νέον ἥρωα . . . ἡ μήτηρ (Macedonia) Arch. miss. scient. iii, 1876, 295, n. 130.—This is probably how we should understand the matter when in sepulchral epigrams one member of the family addresses or refers to another as ἥρως: Epigr. Gr. 483, 510, 552, 674.—But ἥρως συγγενείας, CIA. iii, 1460, must have a fuller sense than the otherwise usual ἥρως. It distinguishes a true ἀρχηγέτης. Prob. this is also the meaning of Χαρμύλου ἥρωος τῶν Χαρμυλείων, GDI. 3701 (Kos). Something more than simple ἥρως is also probably intended by the language of the Pergamene inscr. (specially distorted to suit the ἰσοψηφία) Inscr. Perg. ii, 587, Ἰ. Νικόδημος, ὁ καὶ Νίκων (ᾳφιγ) ἀγαθὸς εἶεν ἂν ἥρως (ᾳφιγ).

75 Kárpos honored his wife (Thera) CIG. 2471. From the same place come many more examples of dedicating by family members: 2472b–d, 2473; cf. Androsthenes, the son of Philon, a young hero… the mother (Macedonia) Arch. miss. scient. iii, 1876, 295, n. 130.—This is probably how we should interpret when in sepulchral epigrams one family member addresses or refers to another as hero: Epigr. Gr. 483, 510, 552, 674.—But the champion of kinship, CIA. iii, 1460, must have a deeper meaning than the usual hero. It signifies a true leader. Probably this is also the meaning of the hero of Charmylus among the Charmyleans, GDI. 3701 (Kos). Something more than just hero is likely intended by the wording of the Pergamene inscription (specially altered to fit the equity) Inscr. Perg. ii, 587, I. Nicodemus, also called Nicon (ᾳφιγ)would make a great hero(ᾳφιγ).

76 It is true that it is difficult to find certain exx. of the identification of a dead man with an already existing and honoured heros of another name. Of the various examples generally quoted for this perhaps the only relevant is the Spartan inscr. Ἀριστοκλῆς ὁ καὶ Ζῆθος, Ath. Mitt. iv, tab. 8, 2. Identification with a god is of frequent occurrence: cf. imagines defuncti, quas ad habitum dei Liberi formaverat (uxor), divinis percolens honoribus: Apul., M. viii, 7. (Cf. Lob., Agl. 1002, who also thinks of the example given in the Πρωτεσίλαος of Eur.; but the resemblance is only a distant one.) The dead man as Βάκχος, Epigr. Gr. 821; Διονύσου ἄγαλμα, ib. 705; cf. the dead man of CIG. 6731, ἄγαλμα εἰμι Ἡλίου. Many similar exx. of the representation of the dead in accordance with the types of Dionysos, Asklepios, Hermes are given by Ross, Archäol. Aufs. i, 51; Deneken in Roscher, Lex. i, 2588.

76 It's true that it's hard to find certain examples of the identification of a deceased person with an already known and respected hero of a different name. Among the various examples typically cited, the only relevant one might be the Spartan inscription Aristocles, also known as Zethus, Ath. Mitt. iv, tab. 8, 2. Identifying someone with a god happens often: see imagines of the deceased, which had been shaped for the nature of the Free God (wife), honoring them with divine accolades: Apul., M. viii, 7. (See Lob., Agl. 1002, who also considers the example found in the Προταθλητής of Eur.; but the similarities are only superficial.) The deceased individual as Bacchus, Epigr. Gr. 821; Statue of Dionysus, ib. 705; see also the deceased in CIG. 6731, I am a statue of the Sun. Many similar examples of depicting the dead in line with the representations of Dionysos, Asklepios, and Hermes are given by Ross, Archäol. Aufs. i, 51; Deneken in Roscher, Lex. i, 2588.

77 See above, chap. iv, p. 128 ff.

77 See above, ch. 4, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

78 See Keil, Syll. Inscr. Boeot., p. 153.

78 See Keil, Syll. Inscr. Boeot., p. 153.

79 In Thespiai the inss. do not show the addition of ἥρως to the name of the dead until Imperial times: see Dittenberger on IG. Sept. i, 2110, p. 367.

79 In Thespiai, the inscriptions do not include the addition of hero until Imperial times: refer to Dittenberger on IG. Sept. i, 2110, p. 367.

80 Many exx. of ἥρως, ἥρως χρηστὲ χαῖρε, etc., are collected and arranged by Deneken in Roscher’s Lex. s. Heros, i, 2549 ff. See also Loch, Gr. Grabschr., p. 282 ff.

80 Many examples of Hero, noble hero Hail, etc., are gathered and organized by Deneken in Roscher’s Lex. s. Heros, i, 2549 ff. See also Loch, Gr. Grabschr., p. 282 ff.

81 As Keil has already observed, loc. cit. [n. 78].—At any rate ἡρωίνη still preserves its full sense when the council and people of Athens, in the first century A.D., so describe a woman of position after her death, CIA. iii, 889. Or again, when the Athenian as well as the 562 Spartan decree calls P. Statilius Lamprias expressly ἥρως (see above, n. 6)—Fouilles d’Epid. i, n. 205–9.

81 As Keil has already noted, loc. cit. [n. 78].—In any case, heroin still carries its full meaning when the council and people of Athens, in the first century CE, describe a prominent woman after her death, CIA. iii, 889. Similarly, when both the Athenian and the 562 Spartan decree explicitly refers to P. Statilius Lamprias as hero (see above, n. 6)—Fouilles d’Epid. i, n. 205–9.

82 It is curious how, much later, in Christian times, ὁ ἥρως is applied to one who has recently died (exactly synonymous with ὁ μακαρίτης): cf. ὁ ἥρως Εὐδόξιος, ὁ ἥρως Πατρίκιος, Ἰάμβλιχος in Schol. Basilic.

82 It's interesting how, much later, during Christian times, the hero is used for someone who has recently died (meaning the same as the late): see The hero Eudoxius, the hero Patricius, Iamblichus in Schol. Basilic.

83 ὕπνος ἔχει σε μάκαρ . . . , καὶ ζῇς ὡς ἥρως καὶ νέκυς οὐκ ἐγένου, Epigr. Gr. 433; where it is evident that the ἥρως is something more living than the mere νέκυς. ἀσπάζεσθ’ ἥρωα, τὸν οὐκ ἐδαμάσσατο λύπη (i.e. who has not been made nothing by death), ib., 296. The husband τιμαῖς ἰσόμοιρον ἔθηκε τὰν ὁμόλεκτρον ἥρωσιν, 189, 3. The title ἥρως still has a stronger and deeper sense in inss. such as CIG. 1627 (referring to a descendent of Plutarch’s) and 4058 (. . . ἄνδρα φιλόλογον καὶ πάσῃ ἀρετῇ κεκοσμημένον εὐδαίμονα ἥρωα). Cf. Orig., Cels. 3, 80, p. 359 Lom.: οἱ βιοῦντες ὧσθ’ ἥρωες γενέσθαι καὶ μετὰ θεῶν ἕξειν τὰς διατριβάς. In 3, 22, p. 276, he distinguishes between θεοί, ἥρωες, ἁπαξαπλῶς ψυχαί (the soul can divina fieri et a legibus mortalitatis educi, Arnob. ii, 62; cf. Corn. Labeo ap. Serv., Aen. iii, 168).

83 Sleep embraces you, blessed one . . . , and you live like a hero and are not reduced to nothing by death., Epigr. Gr. 433; where it is clear that the hero is something more alive than just the corpse. Welcome the hero, who has not been overwhelmed by grief. (i.e., who has not been made nothing by death), ib., 296. The husband honored the equal partner heroes, 189, 3. The title hero still carries a stronger and deeper significance in inscriptions such as CIG. 1627 (referring to a descendant of Plutarch) and 4058 (. . . a wise person blessed with every virtue, a lucky hero). Cf. Orig., Cels. 3, 80, p. 359 Lom.: Those who live become heroes and will share their lives with the gods.. In 3, 22, p. 276, he distinguishes between gods, heroes, and individuals (the soul can become godlike and rise above the laws of mortality, Arnob. ii, 62; cf. Corn. Labeo ap. Serv., Aen. iii, 168).

84 ἄωροι, βιοθάνατοι, ἄταφοι see Append. vii.—θάπτειν καὶ ὁσιοῦν τῇ Γῇ, significantly, Philostr., Her. 714, p. 182, 9 f. K.

84 early, mortal, unburied see Append. vii.—to bury and honor the Earth, notably, Philostr., Her. 714, p. 182, 9 f. K.

85 Plu., Dio, 2: some say that only children and women and foolish men see ghosts, δαίμονα πονηρὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς δεισιδαιμονίαν ἔχοντες. Plu. on the other hand thinks that he can confound the unbelieving by pointing to the fact that even Dio and Brutus had seen φάσματα shortly before their death.

85 Plu., Dio, 2: some say that only children, women, and foolish men see ghosts, having a wicked demon among them and being superstitious. Plu., on the other hand, believes he can challenge the skeptics by pointing out that even Dio and Brutus saw spectra shortly before they died.

86 Cf. the story of Philinnion and Machates in Amphipolis: Phleg., Mirab. 1. Procl. in Rp., p. 64 Sch. [ii, p. 116 Kr.; see Rohde in Rh. Mus. 32, 329 ff.]. The Erinyes in Aesch. are conceived as vampire-like: Eum. 264 f.: see above, chap. v, n. 161.—Souls of the dead as nightmare, ἐφιάλτης, incubo oppressing a man’s enemy: Soran. ap. Tert., An. 44; Cael. Aurel., Morb. Chron. 1, 3, 55 (Rh. Mus. 37, 467, 1).

86 See the story of Philinnion and Machates in Amphipolis: Phleg., Mirab. 1. Procl. in Rp., p. 64 Sch. [ii, p. 116 Kr.; see Rohde in Rh. Mus. 32, 329 ff.]. The Furies in Aesch. are depicted as vampire-like: Eum. 264 f.: see above, chap. v, n. 161.—Souls of the dead as nightmares, nightmare, incubo oppressing a man's enemy: Soran. ap. Tert., An. 44; Cael. Aurel., Morb. Chron. 1, 3, 55 (Rh. Mus. 37, 467, 1).

87 The Φιλοψευδής is a genuine treasure-house of typical narratives of apparitions and sorceries of every kind. δαίμονας ἀνάγειν καὶ νεκροὺς ἑώλους ἀνακαλεῖν is a mere bagatelle, according to these sage doctors, to the magician: c. 13. An example is given of this conjuration of the dead (the seven-months dead father of Glaukias): 14. Appearance of the dead wife of Eukrates whose golden sandals they had forgotten to burn with her: 27 (see above, chap. i, n. 51). As a rule the only haunting ghosts are αἱ τῶν βιαίως ἀποθανόντων ψυχαί not those of the κατὰ μοῖραν ἀποθανόντων as the learned Pythagorean instructs us, c. 29. Then follows the story of the ghost of Corinth (30–1), which must be taken from a widely known ghost-story, as it agrees completely in its circumstances with the story told with such simple candour by Pliny (Ep. vii, 27). δαίμονάς τινας εἶναι καὶ φάσματα καὶ νεκρῶν ψυχὰς περιπολεῖν ὑπὲρ γῆς καὶ φαίνεσθαι οἷς ἂν ἐθέλωσιν (29) is the fixed conviction of these philosophers. The living too can sometimes catch a glimpse of the underworld: 22–4. A man’s soul can be detached from his body and go down to Hades, and afterwards, again reunited to his body, relate its adventures. Thus the soul of Kleodemos, while his body lay in fever, is taken down to the lower world by a messenger but then sent back again since he had been taken by mistake for his neighbour, the smith Demylos: 25. This edifying narrative is certainly intended as a parody of the similar story told in good faith by Plu. de An. fr. 1, preserved 563 ap. Eus., PE. 11, 36, p. 563. It is certain that Plu. did not simply invent such a story; he may perhaps have found it in some older collection of miraculous ἀναβιώσεις such as, for example, Chrysippos did not disdain to make. The probability that Plu. got this story of mistaken identity from a collection of folk-tales is made all the likelier since the same story occurs again in a popular guise. Of a similar character is what Augustine has to say on the authority of Corn. Labeo: Civ. Dei 22, 28 (p. 622, 1–5 Domb.). Augustine himself, Cur. pro Mort. 15, tells a story exactly like that of Plu. (about Curma the curialis and Curma the faber ferrarius), which, of course, is supposed to happen a little before his time in Africa; and once more at the end of the sixth century Gregory the Great introduces a vision of Hell by the same formula: Dial. 4, 36, p. 384 AB Migne. The inventive powers of ghoststory-tellers is very limited: they keep on repeating the same few old and tried motifs.

87 The Φιλοψευδής is a true treasure trove of typical stories about ghosts and all sorts of magic. According to these wise doctors, raising To summon a demon and call forth the dead. is just a trivial task for a magician: c. 13. An example includes the conjuring of the dead (the seven-month dead father of Glaukias): 14. There’s also the appearance of Eukrates’s dead wife, whose golden sandals they forgot to burn with her: 27 (see above, chap. i, n. 51). Generally, the only ghosts that haunt are the The souls of the forcibly dead, not those who died in due season of dying, as the learned Pythagorean tells us in c. 29. Next comes the story of the ghost of Corinth (30–1), which must be drawn from a well-known ghost story, as its details completely match the narrative told with such straightforward honesty by Pliny (Ep. vii, 27). The belief that there are There are certain demons and apparitions that roam the earth and appear to whomever they wish. (29) is a fixed belief among these philosophers. The living can sometimes catch a glimpse of the underworld: 22–4. A person's soul can separate from their body and descend to Hades, and then return to the body to share its experiences. For instance, the soul of Kleodemos, while his body lay feverish, was taken down to the lower world by a messenger, but was sent back since he had been mistaken for his neighbor, the smith Demylos: 25. This enlightening tale is undoubtedly meant as a parody of a similar story told earnestly by Plu. de An. fr. 1, preserved 563 ap. Eus., PE. 11, 36, p. 563. It's clear that Plu. didn't just make up such a story; he might have discovered it in some older collection of miraculous revival, similar to those made by Chrysippos. The likelihood that Plu. sourced this mistaken identity story from a collection of folk tales is further enhanced since the same tale appears again in a popular form. Augustine also has something to say on the authority of Corn. Labeo: Civ. Dei 22, 28 (p. 622, 1–5 Domb.). Augustine himself, Cur. pro Mort. 15, recounts a story exactly like Plu.'s (about Curma the curialis and Curma the faber ferrarius), which, of course, is supposed to take place a little before his time in Africa; and once more, at the end of the sixth century, Gregory the Great introduces a vision of Hell in the same way: Dial. 4, 36, p. 384 AB Migne. The creativity of ghost story-tellers is quite limited: they tend to keep recycling the same few well-established motifs.

88 Plu., Dio, 2, 55: Cimon, 1; Brut. 36 f., 48.

88 Plu., Dio, 2, 55: Cimon, 1; Brut. 36 f., 48.

89 Cf. above, chap. v, n. 23; chap. ix, nn. 105 ff.

89 See above, chapter v, n. 23; chapter ix, nn. 105 and following.

90 ψυχὰς ἡρώων ἀνακαλεῖν among the regular arts of the magician, Cels. ap. Orig., Cels. 1, 68, p. 127 Lomm.

90 Summoning the spirits of heroes among the usual skills of the magician, Cels. ap. Orig., Cels. 1, 68, p. 127 Lomm.

91 Check __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

92 And in consequence we sometimes have the most surprising confusion of the two states of being. Lucian, e.g. (in D. Mort. frequently, cf. 18, 1, 20, 2, and Necyom. 15, 17; Char. 24) speaks of the dead in Hades as skeletons lying one upon another, Aiakos allowing them each one foot of earth, etc. (The Romans have the same confusion of ideas: nemo tam puer est, says Sen., Ep. 24, 18, ut Cerberum timeat et tenebras et larvalem habitum nudis ossibus cohaerentium. Cf. Prop. iv, 5, 3, Cerberus . . . ieiuno terreat ossa sono, etc.) There is also a confusion between the grave and Hades in such expressions as μετ’ εὐσεβέεσσι κεῖσθαι: Epigr. Gr. 259, 1; σκῆνος νῦν κεῖμαι Πλουτέος ἐμμελάθροις, 226, 4; cf. above, chap. xii, n. 95. Such a mixture of ideas was all the more natural seeing that Ἅιδης also occurs as a metaphor for τύμβος (see below, n. 135).

92 As a result, we sometimes experience a surprising mix-up between the two states of existence. For example, Lucian (in D. Mort., frequently, see 18, 1, 20, 2, and Necyom. 15, 17; Char. 24) describes the dead in Hades as skeletons piled on top of each other, with Aiakos giving each one a foot of ground, etc. (The Romans also had this confusion of ideas: he's such a child, says Sen., Ep. 24, 18, but let the Cerberus fear both the darkness and the ghostly appearance of the naked bones clinging together. See also Prop. iv, 5, 3, Cerberus... terrify the bones of the hungry with his roar., etc.) There is also a confusion between the grave and Hades in phrases like μετ’ εὐσεβέεσσι κεῖσθαι: Epigr. Gr. 259, 1; σκῆνος νῦν κεῖμαι Πλουτέος ἐμμελάθροις, 226, 4; see also above, chap. xii, n. 95. Such a blending of concepts was even more understandable given that Hades is also used metaphorically for tomb (see below, n. 135).

93 ὁ πολὺς ὅμιλος οὗς ἰδιώτας οἱ σοφοὶ καλοῦσιν, Ὁμήρῳ καὶ Ἡσιόδῳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις μυθοποιοῖς περὶ τούτων πειθόμενοι, τόπον τινὰ ὑπὸ τὴν γῆν βαθὺν Ἅιδην ὑπειλήφασι κτλ., Luc., Luct. 2 (continued to c. 9). Plu., Suav. Viv. 27, 1105 AB, thinks that οὐ πάνυ πολλοί are afraid of Kerberos, having to fill broken pitchers and the other terrors of Hades, as being μητέρων καὶ τιτθῶν δόγματα καὶ λόγους μυθώδεις. And yet as protection against these things people are always seeking τελετὰς καὶ καθαρμούς.

93 The big group of people known as "idiots" by the wise, influenced by Homer, Hesiod, and other storytellers regarding these topics, believe there is a deep place beneath the earth called Hades, etc., Luc., Luct. 2 (continued to c. 9). Plu., Suav. Viv. 27, 1105 AB, thinks that not a lot are afraid of Cerberus, having to fill broken pitchers and face the other terrors of Hades, as being myths and stories about mothers and babies. And yet, as a way to protect against these things, people are always seeking rituals and cleansings.

94 See Griech. Roman, 261, Ettig Acheruntica (Leipz. Stud. 13, 251 ff.).

94 See Griech. Roman, 261, Ettig Acheruntica (Leipz. Stud. 13, 251 ff.).

95 Man hopes that after death he will see τοὺς νῦν ὑβρίζοντας ὑπὸ πλούτου καὶ δυνάμεως κτλ. ἀξίαν δίκην τίνοντας, Plu., Suav. V. 28, 2, 1105 C. Reversal of earthly situation in Hades: τὰ πράγματα ἐς τοὔμπαλιν ἀνεστραμμένα· ἡμεῖς μὲν γὰρ οἱ πένητες γελῶμεν, ἀνιῶνται δὲ καὶ οἰμώζουσιν οἱ πλούσιοι, Luc., Catapl. 15; cf. DM. 15, 2; 25, 2: ἰσοτιμία, ἰσηγορία in Hades and ὅμοιοι πάντες. aequat omnes cinis; impares nascimur, pares morimur, Sen., Ep. 91, 16—a favourite commonplace: see Gataker on M. Ant. vi, 24, p. 235 f.

95 People hope that after they die, they will see Those who are currently arrogant due to wealth and power, etc., are truly accountable for their actions., Plu., Suav. V. 28, 2, 1105 C. A reversal of earthly circumstances in Hades: Things have turned upside down; we, the poor, are laughing, while the rich are saddened and lamenting., Luc., Catapl. 15; cf. DM. 15, 2; 25, 2: equality, equal right to speak in Hades and All alike. Ash equals us all; we are born unequal, but we die equal., Sen., Ep. 91, 16—a favorite common saying: see Gataker on M. Ant. vi, 24, p. 235 f.

96 How far indeed this really happened is of course not to be answered decisively. The Celsus against whom Origen wrote his polemical treatise looks at the matter from the popular point of view on the whole. (He is no Epicurean as Orig. supposes; but neither in fact is he a professional philosopher of any kind, but rather 564 an ἰδιώτης with inclinations to philosophy of all sorts and esp. to the semi-Platonism current at the time.) He distinctly says μήτε τούτοις (the Christians) εἴη μήτ’ ἐμοὶ μήτ’ ἄλλῳ τινὶ ἀνθρώπων ἀποθέσθαι τὸ περὶ τοῦ κολασθήσεσθαι τοὺς ἀδίκους καὶ γερῶν ἀξιωθήσεσθαι τοὺς δικαίους δόγμα (ap. Orig., Cels. 3, 16, p. 270 Lomm.).—On the other hand, it is significant of the temper of the very “secular” Graeco-Roman society which was at the head of affairs at the end of the last century B.C., that Cicero at the end of his work, de Nat. Deor. (iii, 81 ff.), in discussing the various means of obtaining a balance between desert and punishment, virtue and reward, in the circumstances of human life, never even mentions the belief in a final balance and recompense after death. (He only mentions among other things the visiting of the sins of the father upon his descendants on earth—90 ff.—that old Greek belief [see above, chap. xii, n. 65] which really excludes the idea of an after life.) Between the days of Cic. and those of Celsus ideas had changed. We know this from innumerable indications; even the next world was looked at in quite a different light in the second century A.D. from what it had been two centuries earlier.

96 How far this really happened is impossible to determine definitively. The Celsus that Origen wrote against views the situation from a generally popular perspective. (He isn't an Epicurean as Origen thinks; he's not really a professional philosopher either, but more of a 564 layman with interests in various philosophies, especially the semi-Platonism that was popular at the time.) He clearly states nor these (the Christians) May it be that neither I nor any other person among humans casts aside the belief that the unjust will be punished and the just will be honored. (ap. Orig., Cels. 3, 16, p. 270 Lomm.).—On the other hand, it’s revealing of the mindset of the “secular” Graeco-Roman society leading up to the end of the last century BCE that Cicero, at the end of his work, de Nat. Deor. (iii, 81 ff.), while discussing various ways to balance merit and punishment, virtue and reward, in human life, never even mentions the belief in a final balance or reward after death. (He only references the idea of passing down the sins of the father to his offspring on earth—90 ff.—which is an old Greek belief [see above, chap. xii, n. 65] that effectively rules out the idea of an afterlife.) Between Cicero's time and that of Celsus, ideas had shifted. We know this from countless signs; even perceptions of the afterlife were quite different in the second century CE compared to two centuries earlier.

97 τιμωρίαι αἰωνιοι ὑπὸ γῆν καὶ κολασμοὶ φρικώδεις are expected after death by many (while others regard death as merely an ἀγαθῶν στέρησις): Plu., Virt. Moral. 10, 450 A. Horrible tortures in the κολαστήριον in Hades, fire, scourging, etc.: Luc., Necyom. 14 (carried still further in Plu.’s pictures of Hades, Gen. Soc. and Ser. NV.). Fire, pitch, and sulphur belong to the regular apparatus of this place of torment; already in Axioch. 372 A, sinners are scorched by burning torches ἀϊδίοις τιμωρίαις (cf. Lehrs, Popl. Aufs. 308 ff.). How far such horrors really represented popular belief it is difficult to say for certain (they became quite familiar to Christian writers on Hell from classical tradition: cf. Maury, Magie et l’astrol. dans l’antiq. 166 ff.). But Celsus, for example, though he himself believes in the punishments of Hell (Orig., Cels. 8, 49, p. 180) only appeals in confirmation of his belief to the teaching of ἐξηγηταὶ τελεσταί τε καὶ μυσταγωγοί of certain (not precisely defined) ἱερά: 8, 48, p. 178; cf. above, chap. vii, § 2; chap. x, n. 62.

97 Endless punishments underground and horrifying torments are anticipated by many after death (while others consider death simply a lack of good things): Plu., Virt. Moral. 10, 450 A. There are terrifying torments in the penal facility in Hades, including fire, whipping, etc.: Luc., Necyom. 14 (further detailed in Plu.’s depictions of Hades, Gen. Soc. and Ser. NV.). Fire, pitch, and sulfur are standard elements of this place of suffering; already in Axioch. 372 A, sinners are burned by blazing torches with everlasting torment (cf. Lehrs, Popl. Aufs. 308 ff.). It's hard to determine just how much these horrors truly reflected popular belief (they became quite well-known to Christian writers on Hell from classical sources: cf. Maury, Magie et l’astrol. dans l’antiq. 166 ff.). However, Celsus, for instance, although he believes in the punishments of Hell (Orig., Cels. 8, 49, p. 180), only cites the teachings of interpreters, newbies, and guides from certain (not specifically identified) holy texts: 8, 48, p. 178; cf. above, chap. vii, § 2; chap. x, n. 62.

98 See above, chap. ii, § 1.

98 See above, ch. 2, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

99 Peleus, Kadmos, Achilles in the Islands of the Blest: Pi., O. ii, 86 ff. (Peleus and Kadmos the supreme examples of εὐδαιμονία: P. iii, 86 ff.). In Eur., Andr. 1254 ff. Thetis promises to Peleus immortal life Νηρέως ἐν δόμοις. An ancient poem must have spoken to this effect of Kadmos (and of Harmonia his wife); both are transported μακάρων ἐς αἶαν Eur., Ba. 1338 f.; ποιηταί and μυθογράφοι ap. Sch. Pi., P. iii, 153 (this would be after their “death” in Illyria where their graves were shown, and the snakes of stone into which they had been changed: see Müller on Scylax, 24, p. 31). Achilles and Diomedes are νήσοις ἐν μακάρων acc. to the skolion on Harmodios: Carm. pop. fr. 10 Bgk. (Thus we often hear that Achilles is in the Is. of the Blest or in the Ἠλύσιον πεδίον which was regularly identified with them—cf. Ἠλύσιος λειμών in the μακάρων νῆσος: Luc., Jup. Conf. 17; VH. ii, 14—e.g. Pla. Smp. 199 E; A.R. iv, 811; [Apollod.] Epit. v, 5. His special place of abode on the island of Leuke is also a μακάρων νῆσος and an older invention than the common Is. of the Blest of which we first hear in Hes., Op. 159 ff. Diomedes in the same way after his ἀφανισμός enjoyed immortal life in the island named after him in the Adriatic: Ibyc. ap. Sch. Pi., N. x, 12; Str. 283–4, etc.; but the skolion transferred him to the common dwelling-place of the blessed Heroes.) Achilles, sometimes in Leuke, sometimes on the Is. 565 of the Blest, is accompanied by his wife Medea (in Elys.: Ibyc. Simon. Sch. A.R. iv, 814; A.R. iv, 811 ff.) or Iphigeneia who had once been betrothed to him (in Leuke: Ant. Lib. 27 after Nikand.; different version by Lycophr. 183 ff.) or Helen (Paus. 3, 19, 11–13; Conon, 18; Sch. Pl., Phdr. 243 A; Philostr., Her. 211 ff. Kays.).—Alkmene after her body had vanished from the sight of those who were bearing the coffin (cf. Plu., Rom. 28) was translated to the μακάρων νῆσοι: Ant. Lib 33 after Pherecyd.—Neoptolemos is transported ἐς ἠλύσιον πεδίον μακάρων ἐπὶ γαῖαν, Q.S. iii, 761 ff.—Among the other Heroes there Agamemnon is also implied: Artemid. v, 16.—In all these fabulous accounts the Is. of the Blest (Elysion) remain invariably the abode of special and chosen Heroes (Harmodios’ translation there in the skolion is no exception; nor is Lucian’s jesting reference, VH. ii, 17). It was only later imagination that, under the influence of theology, made this kingdom of bliss the common dwelling-place of almost all the εὐσεβεῖς.

99 Peleus, Cadmus, Achilles in the Islands of the Blest: Pi., O. ii, 86 ff. (Peleus and Cadmus as the ultimate examples of happiness: P. iii, 86 ff.). In Eur., Andr. 1254 ff. Thetis promises Peleus eternal life Nereus in the house. An ancient poem must have mentioned Kadmus (and his wife Harmonia); both are taken Happy in the afterlife Eur., Ba. 1338 f.; poets and mythographers ap. Sch. Pi., P. iii, 153 (this would be after their “death” in Illyria where their graves were shown, and the stone snakes into which they had transformed: see Müller on Scylax, 24, p. 31). Achilles and Diomedes are Islands of the blessed according to the skolion on Harmodios: Carm. pop. fr. 10 Bgk. (Thus we often hear that Achilles is in the Islands of the Blest or in the Elysian Fields which was regularly identified with them—cf. Elysian Fields in the island of the blessed: Luc., Jup. Conf. 17; VH. ii, 14—e.g., Pla. Smp. 199 E; A.R. iv, 811; [Apollod.] Epit. v, 5. His special home on the island of Leuke is also a Blessed isle and an earlier idea than the common Islands of the Blest of which we first hear in Hes., Op. 159 ff. Diomedes similarly, after his disappearance, enjoyed immortal life on the island named after him in the Adriatic: Ibyc. ap. Sch. Pi., N. x, 12; Str. 283–4, etc.; but the skolion placed him in the common home of the blessed Heroes.) Achilles, sometimes in Leuke, sometimes in the Islands 565 of the Blest, is accompanied by his wife Medea (in Elys.: Ibyc. Simon. Sch. A.R. iv, 814; A.R. iv, 811 ff.) or Iphigenia who had once been betrothed to him (in Leuke: Ant. Lib. 27 after Nikand.; different version by Lycophr. 183 ff.) or Helen (Paus. 3, 19, 11–13; Conon, 18; Sch. Pl., Phdr. 243 A; Philostr., Her. 211 ff. Kays.).—Alcmene, after her body had disappeared from the view of those carrying the coffin (cf. Plu., Rom. 28), was taken to the Islands of the blessed: Ant. Lib 33 after Pherecyd.—Neoptolemus is taken to the Elysian field of the blessed upon the earth, Q.S. iii, 761 ff.—Among the other Heroes, Agamemnon is also included: Artemid. v, 16.—In all these mythical accounts, the Islands of the Blest (Elysion) remain consistently the home of special and chosen Heroes (Harmodios’ transfer there in the skolion is no exception; nor is Lucian’s joking reference, VH. ii, 17). It was only later imagination that, influenced by theology, turned this paradise into the common dwelling place of almost all the devout.

100 Fortunatorum memorant insulas quo cuncti qui aetatem egerint caste suam conveniant, Plaut., Trin. 549 f. Menand. Rh., Encom. 414, 16 ff. Sp., recommends the use in a παραμυθητικὸς λόγος of the words: πείθομαι τὸν μεταστάντα τὸ ἠλύσιον πεδίον οἰκεῖν (—and even καὶ τάχα που μᾶλλον μετὰ τῶν θεῶν διαιτᾶται νῦν); cf. p. 421, 16–17 Sp. And much later, χάριν ἀμείψασθαι αὐτὸν εὔχομαι τοὺς θεούς, ἐν μακάρων νησοις ἤδη συζῆν ἠξιώμενον, Suid. Ἀντώνιος Ἀλεξανδρεύς (410 B Gaisf.) from Damascius.

100 They discuss the islands of the blessed where everyone who has lived a good life comes together., Plaut., Trin. 549 f. Menand. Rh., Encom. 414, 16 ff. Sp., suggests using in a uplifting speech the words: I believe that the person who has died is now in the Elysian fields. (—and even and maybe now lives a life with the gods); cf. p. 421, 16–17 Sp. And much later, I pray to the gods that he receives gratitude, already deserving to live among the blessed islands., Suid. Antonios Alexandreis (410 B Gaisf.) from Damascius.

101 Sertorius: Plu., Sert. 8–9; Sall., H. 1, fr. 61, 62; Flor. 2, 10 (Hor., Epod. 16, 39 ff.). Some even thought that they had found (cf. Phoen. legends: Gr. Roman 215) the μακ. νῆς. off the west coast of Africa: Str. i, p. 3; iii, 150; Mela, iii, 10; Plin., NH. vi, 202 ff.; Marcellus, Αἰθιοπ. ap. Procl., in Tim., p. 54 F, 55 A, 56 B, etc. Islands inhabited by spirits in the north: Plu., Def. Or. 18, p. 419 F; fr. vol. v, 764 ff. Wytt. Procop., Goth. iv, 20 (the μακάρων νῆσοι are in the middle of the African continent acc. to Hdt. iii, 26; in Boeot. Thebes, Lyc. 1204 with Sch.). Ps. Callisth. makes Alex. the Great reach the land of the Blest, ii, 39 ff. There may have been many such fables which have been parodied by Lucian in VH. ii, 6 ff., where he and his company ἔτι ζῶντες ἱεροῦ χωρίου ἐπιβαίνουσιν (ii, 10). It was always natural to hope that at the Antipodes (cf. Serv., A. vi, 532) such a land of the Souls and the Blest might some day be discovered—as indeed many have thought they had discovered it in the progressive geographical discovery of the Middle Ages and modern times.

101 Sertorius: Plu., Sert. 8–9; Sall., H. 1, fr. 61, 62; Flor. 2, 10 (Hor., Epod. 16, 39 ff.). Some even believed they had found (cf. Phoen. legends: Gr. Roman 215) the μακ. νῆς. off the west coast of Africa: Str. i, p. 3; iii, 150; Mela, iii, 10; Plin., NH. vi, 202 ff.; Marcellus, Aethiopian. ap. Procl., in Tim., p. 54 F, 55 A, 56 B, etc. Islands inhabited by spirits in the north: Plu., Def. Or. 18, p. 419 F; fr. vol. v, 764 ff. Wytt. Procop., Goth. iv, 20 (the Blissful isles are in the middle of the African continent according to Hdt. iii, 26; in Boeot. Thebes, Lyc. 1204 with Sch.). Ps. Callisth. makes Alex. the Great reach the land of the Blest, ii, 39 ff. There may have been many such fables that were parodied by Lucian in VH. ii, 6 ff., where he and his group Still living, they enter the sacred site. (ii, 10). It was always natural to hope that at the Antipodes (cf. Serv., A. vi, 532) such a land of the Souls and the Blest might someday be discovered—as indeed many have thought they had discovered it in the gradual geographical exploration of the Middle Ages and modern times.

102 Leuke, to which already in the Aithiopis Achilles had been translated, was originally a purely mythical place (see above, p. 65), the island of the pallid shades (like the Λευκὰς πέτρη of Od. ω 11, at the entrance of Hades; cf. κ 515. It is the same rock of Hades from which unhappy lovers cast themselves down to death, ἀρθεὶς δηὖτ’ ἀπὸ Λευκάδος πέτρης κτλ. Anacr. 17, etc. [cf. Dieterich, Nek. 27 f.]. λεύκη, the white poplar, as the tree of Hades, was used to make the garlands of the Mystai at Eleusis; cf. λευκὴ κυπάρισσος at the entrance of Hades, Epigr. Gr. 1037, 2).—It was probably Milesian sailors who localized this island of Achilles in the Black Sea (there was a cult of Ach. in Olbia and in Miletos itself). Alc. already knows of the champion as ruling over the country of the Scythians: fr. 48b, ἐν Εὐξείνῳ πελάγει φαεννὰν Ἀχιλεὺς νᾶσον (ἔχει), Pi. N. iv, 49. Then Eur., Andr. 1259 ff.; IT. 436 ff.; finally Q.S. iii, 770 ff. Leuke was particularly identified with an uninhabited islet rising with its white limestone cliffs out of the sea at the mouth of the Danube: 566 Κέλτου πρὸς ἐκβολαῖσι, Lyc. 189 (probably the Istros is meant but the latest editor simply substitutes Ἴστρου πρὸς ἐκ.—a far too facile conjecture).—It stood, more exactly, before the ψιλὸν στόμα, i.e. the most northerly mouth of the river (the Kilia mouth): Arrian, Peripl. 20, 3 H.: [Scylax] Peripl. 68 prob. means the same island; cf. Leuke, εὐθὺ Ἴστρου, Max. Tyr. 15, 7. It has been proposed to identify it with the “snake island” which lies more or less in the same neighbourhood: see H. Koehler, Mém. sur les îles et la course cons. à Achille, etc., Mém. acad. S. Petersb. 1826, iv, p. 599 ff. It was only by a confusion that the long sandy beach at the mouth of the Borysthenes, called Ἀχιλλέως δρόμος, was identified with Leuke (e.g. by Mela, ii, 98; Plin., NH. iv, 93; D.P. 541 ff.); legends of Achilles’ epiphanies may have been current there too (as in other islands of the same name: Dionys. of Olbia ap. Sch. A.R. ii, 658); the Olbiopolitai offer a cult to Ἀχιλλεὺς Ποντάρχης there: CIG. 2076–7, 2080, 2096b–f (IPE. i, 77–83). But as a settled abode of Achilles only Leuke was generally recognized (there was a δρόμος Ἀχιλλέως there as well: Eur., IT. 437; Hesych. Ἀχιλλ. πλάκα; Arr. 21—hence the confusion mentioned above). Strabo’s remarks on the subject are peculiar (vii, 306 f.). He distinguishes the Ἀχ. δρόμος (which had already been mentioned by Hdt. iv, 55) from Leuke altogether; and he places that island not at the mouth of the Istros but 500 stades away at the mouth of the Tyras (Dniester). But the place where sacrifice and worship was made to Achilles, as the abode of his spirit, was definitely fixed; and this was, in fact, the island at the mouth of the Danube (κατὰ τοῦ Ἴστρου τὰς ἐκβολάς, Paus. 3, 19, 11), of which Arr. 23, 3, gives an account based partially on the evidence of eye-witnesses (p. 399, 12 Müll.). It was an uninhabited, thickly wooded island only occupied by numerous birds; there was a temple and a statue of Ach. on it, and also an oracle (Arr. 22, 3), which must have been an oracle taken by casting or drawing lots (for there were no human intermediaries) which those who landed on the island could make use of for themselves. The birds—which were perhaps regarded as incarnations of the Heroes, or as handmaidens of the “divinity of light” which Achilles was, acc. to R. Holland, Heroenvögel in d. gr. Myth. 7 ff., 1896—the birds purify the temple every morning with their wings, which they have dipped in the water: Arr., p. 398, 18 ff. Philostr., Her. 746, p. 212, 24 Kays. (Cf. the comrades of Diomedes changed into birds on his magic island: Iuba ap. Plin., NH. x, 127—another bird miracle: ib., x, 78). No human beings dared to live on the island, though sailors often landed there; they had to leave before nightfall (when spirits are abroad): Amm. Marc. 22, 8, 35; Philostr., Her. 747, p. 212, 30–213, 6. The temple possessed many votive offerings and Greek and Latin inss. (IPE. i, 171–2). Those who landed there sacrificed the goats which had been placed on the island and ran wild. Sometimes Ach. appeared to visitors; at other times they heard him singing the Paian. In dreams too he sometimes appeared (i.e. if a person happened to sleep—there was no Dream-oracle there). To sailors he gave directions and sometimes appeared like the Dioskouroi (as a flame?) on the top of the ship’s mast (see Arr., Peripl. 21–3; Scymn. 790–6; from both these is derived Anon., P. Pont. Eux. 64–6; Max. Tyr. 15, 7, p. 281 f. R.; Paus. 3, 19, 11; Amm. Marc. 22, 8, 35). (The account in Philostr., Her. 745, p. 211, 17–219, 6 Kays., is fantastic but uses good material and is throughout quite in keeping with the true legendary spirit—esp. in the story also of the girl torn to pieces by ghosts: 215, 6–30. Nor is it likely that 567 Phil. himself invented the marvellous tale laid precisely in the year 163–4 B.C.). Achilles is not regarded as living quite alone here: Patroklos is with him (Arr. 32, 34; Max. Tyr. 15, 7), and Helen or Iphigeneia is given him as his wife (see above, n. 99). Leonymos of Kroton, sixth century B.C., meets the two Aiantes and Antilochos there: Paus. 3, 19, 13; Conon 18; D.P. (time of Hadrian) says (545): κεῖθι δ’ Ἀχιλλῆος καὶ ἡρώων φάτις ἄλλων ψυχὰς εἱλίσσεσθαι ἐρημαίας ἀνὰ βήσσας (which Avien., Des. Orb., misunderstands and improves on: 722 ff.). Thus the island, though in a limited sense, became a true μακάρων νῆσοςinsula Achillea eadem Leuce et Macaron appelata, Plin., NH. iv, 93.

102 Leuke, where Achilles had already been taken in the Aithiopis, was originally a completely mythical place (see above, p. 65), the island of the pale shades (similar to the White stone in Od. ω 11, at the entrance of Hades; cf. κ 515). It is the same rock near Hades from which unfortunate lovers would throw themselves to their deaths, Having been lifted again from the rock of Lefkada, etc. Anacr. 17, etc. [cf. Dieterich, Nek. 27 f.]. white poplar, the white poplar, was considered the tree of Hades and was used to make garlands for the Mystai at Eleusis; cf. white cypress at the entrance of Hades, Epigr. Gr. 1037, 2).—It was likely Milesian sailors who located this island of Achilles in the Black Sea (there was a cult dedicated to Achilles in Olbia and in Miletos itself). Alc. already mentions the hero as ruling over the land of the Scythians: fr. 48b, In the Euxine Sea, bright Achilles has a home. (has), Pi. N. iv, 49. Then Eur., Andr. 1259 ff.; IT. 436 ff.; finally Q.S. iii, 770 ff. Leuke was particularly identified with an uninhabited islet rising with its white limestone cliffs out of the sea at the mouth of the Danube: 566 Celtic to the outputs, Lyc. 189 (probably referring to the Istros, but the latest editor merely substitutes Ἴστρου πρὸς ἐκ.—a rather simplistic conjecture).—It was more accurately located in front of the thin lips, the northernmost mouth of the river (the Kilia mouth): Arrian, Peripl. 20, 3 H.: [Scylax] Peripl. 68 probably refers to the same island; cf. Leuke, Straight to the Danube, Max. Tyr. 15, 7. It has been suggested to identify it with “snake island” which lies roughly in the same area: see H. Koehler, Mém. sur les îles et la course cons. à Achille, etc., Mém. acad. S. Petersb. 1826, iv, p. 599 ff. It was only due to confusion that the long sandy beach at the mouth of the Borysthenes, called Achilles' Way, was falsely identified with Leuke (e.g., by Mela, ii, 98; Plin., NH. iv, 93; D.P. 541 ff.); legends of Achilles’ appearances might have been present there as well (as in other islands of the same name: Dionys. of Olbia ap. Sch. A.R. ii, 658); the Olbiopolitai offered a cult to Achilles Pontarchus there: CIG. 2076–7, 2080, 2096b–f (IPE. i, 77–83). But as a permanent home for Achilles, only Leuke was generally accepted (there was also a Achilleus’ road there: Eur., IT. 437; Hesych. Achilles' plate; Arr. 21—hence the confusion mentioned earlier). Strabo’s comments on the topic are unusual (vii, 306 f.). He distinguishes the Ach. road (which Hdt. had already mentioned in iv, 55) from Leuke entirely; and he places that island not at the mouth of the Istros but 500 stades away at the mouth of the Tyras (Dniester). However, the location where sacrifices and worship were conducted for Achilles, as the resting place of his spirit, was clearly established; and this was indeed the island at the mouth of the Danube (At the mouth of the Ister, Paus. 3, 19, 11), which Arr. 23, 3, describes based partially on eyewitness accounts (p. 399, 12 Müll.). It was an uninhabited island, densely forested, only home to numerous birds; there was a temple and a statue of Achilles on it, along with an oracle (Arr. 22, 3), which must have been a method of divination through casting lots (as there were no human intermediaries) that those who arrived on the island could use. The birds—considered to be incarnations of the Heroes, or as servants of the “divinity of light” that Achilles represented, according to R. Holland, Heroenvögel in d. gr. Myth. 7 ff., 1896—swept the temple clean every morning with their wings, which they dipped in the water: Arr., p. 398, 18 ff. Philostr., Her. 746, p. 212, 24 Kays. (Cf. the companions of Diomedes turned into birds on his magical island: Iuba ap. Plin., NH. x, 127—another bird miracle: ib., x, 78). No humans dared to stay on the island, although sailors often landed there; they had to leave before nightfall (when spirits roamed): Amm. Marc. 22, 8, 35; Philostr., Her. 747, p. 212, 30–213, 6. The temple held many votive offerings and Greek and Latin inscriptions (IPE. i, 171–2). Those who landed there sacrificed the goats that had been left to roam freely on the island. Sometimes Achilles would appear to visitors; other times they would hear him singing the Paian. He would also sometimes show up in dreams (that is, if a person happened to sleep—no Dream-oracle existed there). He guided sailors and would sometimes appear like the Dioskouroi (perhaps as a flame?) atop the ship’s mast (see Arr., Peripl. 21–3; Scymn. 790–6; from both of these Anon., P. Pont. Eux. 64–6; Max. Tyr. 15, 7, p. 281 f. R.; Paus. 3, 19, 11; Amm. Marc. 22, 8, 35It seems the text you provided is incomplete. Please provide a complete short piece of text (5 words or fewer) for me to modernize.. (The account in Philostr., Her. 745, p. 211, 17–219, 6 Kays., is fantastic but uses solid sources and is in keeping with the genuine legendary spirit—especially in the tale of the girl torn apart by ghosts: 215, 6–30. Nor is it likely that 567 Phil. himself made up the remarkable story set around the year 163–4 BCE). Achilles is not seen as living entirely alone here: Patroklos is with him (Arr. 32, 34; Max. Tyr. 15, 7), and Helen or Iphigeneia is said to be his wife (see above, n. 99). Leonymos of Kroton, from the sixth century BCE, encounters the two Aiantes and Antilochos there: Paus. 3, 19, 13; Conon 18; D.P. (during Hadrian’s time) remarks (545): There, the souls of Achilles and other heroes wander lonely through the valleys. (which Avien., Des. Orb., misinterprets and embellishes: 722 ff.). Thus the island, albeit in a limited way, became a true island of the blessedthe island Achilles is also called Leuce and Macaron, Plin., NH. iv, 93.

103 Cic., speaking of the “translations” of Herakles and Romulus, says non corpora in caelum elata, non enim natura pateretur . . . (ap. Aug., CD. 22, 4); only their animi remanserunt et aeternitate fruuntur, ND. ii, 62; cf. iii, 12. Plu., Rom. 28, speaks in the same way of the old translation stories (those of Aristeas, Kleomedes, Alkmene, and finally Romulus)—it was not their bodies which had disappeared together with their souls, for it would be παρὰ τὸ εἰκός, ἐνθειάζειν τὸ θνητὸν τῆς φύσεως ἁμὰ τοῖς θείοις (cf. Pelop. 16 fin.); cf. also the Hymn (represented as ancient) of Philostr. dealing with the translated Achilles: Her. 741, p. 208, 24 ff. K.

103 Cicero, when talking about the “translations” of Herakles and Romulus, mentions not their bodies raised to heaven, nor would nature permit it . . . (quoted in Aug., CD. 22, 4); only their spirits endure and enjoy eternity, ND. ii, 62; see also iii, 12. Plutarch, Rom. 28, makes similar comments about the old translation stories (such as those of Aristeas, Kleomedes, Alcmene, and finally Romulus)—it was not their bodies that disappeared along with their souls, because it would be Contrary to what is expected, to attribute divinity to human nature alongside the divine. (see Pelop. 16 end.); also refer to the Hymn (portrayed as ancient) by Philostratus discussing the translated Achilles: Her. 741, p. 208, 24 ff. K.

104 Celsus and Plutarch both know and describe the ancient cult and oracular power of Amphiaraos (only at Oropos now) as still in existence; the same applies to that of Trophonios (like that of Amphilochos also in Cilicia). An inscr. from Lebadeia (first half third century A.D.) mentions a priestess τῆς Ὁμονοίας τῶν Ἑλλήνων παρὰ τῷ Τροφωνίῳ, IG. Sept. i, 3426.

104 Celsus and Plutarch both acknowledge and detail the ancient cult and prophetic abilities of Amphiaraos (now only at Oropos), which still persist; the same is true for Trophonios (similar to Amphilochos, also in Cilicia). An inscription from Lebadeia (first half of the third century A.D.) mentions a priestess The Unity of the Greeks at the Trophonius, IG. Sept. i, 3426.

105 Ἀστακίδην τὸν Κρῆτα, τὸν αἰπόλον, ἥρπασε νύμφη ἐξ ὀρέων καὶ νῦν ἱερὸς Ἀστακίδης (he has become divine, i.e. immortal): Call., Ep. 24. Of a similar character is the legend of Hylas: ἀφανὴς ἐγένετο, Ant. Lib. 26; and of Bormos among the Maryandynoi (νυμφόληπτος Hesych. Βῶρμον, ἀφανισθῆναι Nymphis, fr. 9). The Daphnis legend is another example, and even the story of Odysseus and Kalypso, who detains him in her cave and would like to make him immortal and ageless for ever, is in reality based on such legends of the Nymphs. (Even the name of the Nymph in this case indicates her power: to καλύπτειν her mortal lover, i.e. ἀφανῆ ποιεῖν.) Only in this case the spell is broken and the ἀπαθανάτισις of the translated lover is never carried out. For other exx. of legends of the love of Nymphs for a youth see Griech. Roman, 109, 1; a Homeric ex. in Ζ 21 of the νηὶς Ἀβαρβαρέη and Boukolion the son of Laomedon. The idea that a person translated by the nymphs did not die but lived on for ever, remained current: cf. inscr. from Rome, Epigr. Gr. 570, 9–10: τοῖς πάρος οὖν μύθοις πιστεύσατε· παῖδα γὰρ ἐσθλὴν ἥρπασεν ὡς τερπνὴν Ναΐδες, οὐ θάνατος. And again, n. 571: Νύμφαι κρηναῖαί με συνήρπασαν ἐκ βιότοιο, καὶ τάχα που τιμῆς εἵνεκα τοῦτ’ ἔπαθον.

105 Astagidas the Cretan, a shepherd, was taken by a mountain nymph and has now become divine, meaning immortal: Call., Ep. 24. The story of Hylas is similar: he disappeared, Ant. Lib. 26; and so is the tale of Bormos among the Maryandyni, who was taken by a nymph (Hesych. Bormos, to have vanished Nymphis, fr. 9). The legend of Daphnis is another example, and even the story of Odysseus and Calypso, who keeps him in her cave and wants to make him immortal and ageless forever, is actually rooted in these nymph legends. (Even the name of the nymph signifies her power: to hide her mortal lover, meaning to make him disappear.) In this case, however, the spell is broken, and the immortalization of the transformed lover never occurs. For more examples of nymphs falling in love with young men, see Griech. Roman, 109, 1; a Homeric example in Ζ 21 of the barbarian ship and Boukolion, son of Laomedon. The belief that someone taken by the nymphs did not die but continued to live forever was a common idea: see an inscription from Rome, Epigr. Gr. 570, 9–10: so believe the old myths; for a noble child was seized, like a delightful Naiad, not death. And again, n. 571: Nymphs grabbed me from life, and perhaps this happened for some reason of honor.

106 In the extravagant and fanatical worship of Dionysos that was transplanted from Greece to Italy and Rome in the year 186 B.C. the miracle of translation was carried out in a very practical fashion (belief in its possibility was evidently firmly established). Machines were prepared upon which those whose disappearance was to be effected were bound; they were then transferred by the machine in abditos specus; whereupon the miracle was announced: raptos a dis homines istos: Liv. 39, 13. This only becomes intelligible in the light of such legends of the translation of mortals, body and soul, to immortality, of which we have been speaking. 568

106 In the grand and intense worship of Dionysos that was brought over from Greece to Italy and Rome in 186 BCE, the act of transformation was carried out in a very practical way (there was clearly a strong belief in its possibility). Devices were created on which the individuals meant to be vanished were secured; they were then moved by the device in abditos specus; after which the miracle was proclaimed: raptos a dis homines istos: Liv. 39, 13. This only makes sense when considered alongside the legends of the transformation of mortals, body and soul, into immortality that we have been discussing. 568

107 Plainly so in the case of Berenike the consort of Ptolemy Soter: Theoc. 17, 46. Theocritus addresses Aphrodite: σέθεν δ’ ἕνεκεν Βερενίκα εὐειδὴς Ἀχέροντα πολύστονον οὐκ ἐπέρασεν, ἀλλά μιν ἁρπάξασα πάροιθ’ ἐπὶ νῆα κατελθεῖν κυανέαν καὶ στυγνὸν ἀεὶ πορθμῆα καμόντων, ἐς ναὸν κατέθηκας, ἑᾶς δ’ ἀπεδάσσαο τιμᾶς (as θεὰ πάρεδορος or σύνναος: cf. Inscr. Perg. i, 246, 8). Cf. also Theoc. 15, 106 ff. As a rule, however, this idea is not so definitely expressed (though it is plainly implied that translation is the normal way in which deified princes depart this life, in the story indignantly rejected by Arrian, Anab. 7, 27, 3, that Alexander the Great wanted to throw himself into the Euphrates ὡς ἀφανὴς ἐξ ἀνθρώπων γενόμενος πιστοτέραν τὴν δόξαν παρὰ τοῖς ἔπειτα ἐγκαταλείποι ὅτι ἐκ θεοῦ τε αὐτῷ ἡ γένεσις συνέβη καὶ παρὰ θεοὺς ἡ ἀποχώρησις—which is the regular and ancient idea of translation, exhibited e.g. in the story of Empedokles’ end; see above, chap. xi, n. 61: and Christian pamphleteers transferred the fable to Julian and his end). The Roman Emperors also allowed such conventional miracles to be told of themselves, in which at least they were imitating the practice of the Hellenistic monarchs and the “consecration” fables usual at their death (they do not die but μεθίστανται ἐξ ἀνθρώπων, μεθ. εἰς θεούς, SIG1. 246, 16; Inscr. Perg. i, 249, 4; inscr. from Hierapolis given by Fränkel, ib. i, p. 39a). That the god is translated, his whole personality in caelum redit, is implied as occurring at the death of an Emperor on the coins of consecration, in which the translated is represented as being carried up to heaven by a Genius or a bird (e.g. the eagle which was set free at the rogus of the emperor: D.C. 56, 42, 3; 74, 5, 5; Hdn. 4, 2 fin.): see Marquardt, Röm. Staatsverw. 3, 447, 3. Nor were there lacking people who maintained on oath that they had actually witnessed the translation of the emperor body and soul to heaven, as had once happened to Julius Proculus and Romulus. Thus at the end of Augustus’ life: D.C. 56, 46, 2. and that of Drusilla: 59, 11, 4. Sen., Apocol. 1. It was the official and only recognised manner in which a god can leave this life.

107 This is clearly demonstrated in the case of Berenike, the wife of Ptolemy Soter: Theoc. 17, 46. Theocritus speaks to Aphrodite: Because of you, beautiful Berenike did not cross the mournful Acheron, but having seized him, she went down to the dark and always grim ferry, where souls suffer. You laid him to rest in a temple, and you separated yourself from any honor. (as Goddess of presence or σύνναος: cf. Inscr. Perg. i, 246, 8). See also Theoc. 15, 106 ff. However, this idea is generally not expressed so explicitly (although it's clearly implied that the usual way deified rulers leave this world is through translation, as seen in the story vehemently dismissed by Arrian, Anab. 7, 27, 3, about Alexander the Great wishing to throw himself into the Euphrates As a hidden figure among people, he left behind a more reliable reputation for those who came after, indicating that his origin was from God and that his departure was from the gods.—this reflects the traditional and ancient concept of translation, which is illustrated in the account of Empedocles’ end; see above, chap. xi, n. 61: and Christian writers later adapted this fable to Julian and his demise). The Roman Emperors also allowed such traditional miracles to be recounted about themselves, mimicking the customs of the Hellenistic kings and the common “consecration” myths surrounding their deaths (they don't die but They are transformed from humans into gods., SIG1. 246, 16; Inscr. Perg. i, 249, 4; inscription from Hierapolis provided by Fränkel, ib. i, p. 39a). The notion that the god is translated, with his entire essence in caelum redit, is suggested to occur at the death of an Emperor on the coins of consecration, where the translated is depicted as being carried up to heaven by a Genius or a bird (for example, the eagle that was released at the rogus of the emperor: D.C. 56, 42, 3; 74, 5, 5; Hdn. 4, 2 fin.): see Marquardt, Röm. Staatsverw. 3, 447, 3. There were also those who claimed under oath that they had actually witnessed the emperor's body and soul being taken to heaven, just as it was said to have happened to Julius Proculus and Romulus. Thus, at the end of Augustus’ life: D.C. 56, 46, 2. and that of Drusilla: 59, 11, 4. Sen., Apocol. 1. This was the official and only accepted way for a god to depart this life.

108 Phdr. 246 CD. πλάττομεν . . . θεὸν, ἀθάνατόν τι ζῷον, ἔχον μὲν ψυχήν, ἔχον δὲ σῶμα, τὸν ἀεὶ δὲ χρόνον ταῦτα ξυμπεφυκότα. In acc. with the will of the δημιουργός body and soul in the gods remain joined together (though in itself τὸ δεθὲν πᾶν λυτόν. It is to this that Klearch. alludes ap. Ath. 15, 670 B, ὅτι λυτὸν [λύεται the MSS.] μὲν πᾶν τὸ δεδεμένον): hence they are ἀθάνατοι, Tim. 41 AB.

108 Phdr. 246 CD. We create... a god, an immortal being, that has both a soul and a body, which are always joined together like this.. According to the will of the content creator, body and soul remain united in gods (even though in itself what is bound is completely free). This is what Klearchus refers to in Ath. 15, 670 B, that it's free[is released the MSS.] everything that is tied): thus they are eternal, Tim. 41 AB.

109 Hasisatra, Enoch: see above, chap. ii, n. 18. Moses, too, was translated acc. to later legend, and Elijah (cf. after the battle of Panormos Hamilcar disappears and for that reason is worshipped with sacrifice: Hdt. vii, 166–7). In Egypt too: D.S. 1, 25, 7, speaks of the ἐξ ἀνθρώπων μετάστασις, i.e. translation, of Osiris (for the expression cf. Κάστωρ καὶ Πολυδεύκης ἐξ ἀνθρώπων ἠφανίσθησαν, Isoc., Archid. (6), 18, etc., frequently).

109 Hasisatra, Enoch: see above, chap. ii, n. 18. Moses was also said to have been taken up according to later stories, and Elijah (see after the battle of Panormos, where Hamilcar vanishes and is therefore honored with sacrifices: Hdt. vii, 166–7). In Egypt, D.S. 1, 25, 7, talks about the from humans transformation, meaning translation, of Osiris (for the term, see Castor and Pollux disappeared from among humans., Isoc., Archid. (6), 18, etc., frequently).

110 Stories of the disappearance (non comparuit, nusquam apparuit = ἠφανίσθη) of Aeneas and Turnus, King Latinus, Romulus and others: Preller, Röm. Myth.2, pp. 84–5; 683, 2; 704. Anchises: Procop., Goth. iv, 22 fin.

110 Stories about the disappearance (did not appear, nowhere to be found = disappeared) of Aeneas and Turnus, King Latinus, Romulus, and others: Preller, Röm. Myth.2, pp. 84–5; 683, 2; 704. Anchises: Procop., Goth. iv, 22 fin.

111 So too Caesar in deorum numerum relatus est non ore modo decernentium sed et persuasione volgi, Suet., Jul. 88.

111 Likewise, Caesar was regarded as one of the gods not only by the decisions of those in power but also by the influence of the people, Suet., Jul. 88.

112 D.C. 79, 18.—It is natural to suppose that some prophecy of the return of the great Macedonian was current and encouraged the attempt to turn the prophecy into a reality and predisposed people to believe in it. This at least is what happened in the case of Nero 569 and the false Fredericks of the middle ages. This seems to have been at the back of the superstitious cult of Alexander particularly flourishing just at that time (cf. the story told of the family of the Macriani by Treb. Poll. xxx Tyr. 14, 4–6). Caracalla (Aur. Vict., Epit. 21; cf. Hdn. 4, 8; D.C. 77, 7–8) and Alexander Severus actually regarded themselves as Avatars of Alexander reborn and incarnated in themselves (the latter was first called Alexander at his elevation to the principate, certainly ominis causa, and was supposed to have been born, on the anniversary of Alexander’s death, in A.’s temple: Lamprid., Al. Sev. 5, 1; 13, 1, 3, 4. He paid special honour to Alex., and as we are expressly told by Lamp. 64, 3, se magnum Alexandrum videri volebat).

112 D.C. 79, 18.—It's natural to think that some prophecy about the return of the great Macedonian was in circulation and fueled the effort to make that prophecy real, leading people to believe in it. This is similar to what happened with Nero 569 and the false Fredericks of the Middle Ages. This likely influenced the superstitious worship of Alexander that was especially popular at that time (see the story about the Macriani family told by Treb. Poll. xxx Tyr. 14, 4–6). Caracalla (Aur. Vict., Epit. 21; see Hdn. 4, 8; D.C. 77, 7–8) and Alexander Severus actually considered themselves as incarnations of Alexander reborn within themselves (the latter was first called Alexander when he rose to power, certainly ominis causa, and was believed to have been born on the anniversary of Alexander’s death, in A.'s temple: Lamprid., Al. Sev. 5, 1; 13, 1, 3, 4. He honored Alexander greatly, and as we are specifically told by Lamp. 64, 3, he wanted to be seen as great Alexander).

113 The Christian anticipation of the return of Nero (as Antichrist) is well known: he was supposed to have disappeared and not to have died. They based their expectation, however, on a widespread belief of the populace which the various Ψευδονέρωνες who actually appeared turned to their advantage (Suet., Ner. 57; Tac., H. i, 2; ii, 8: Luc., Indoct. 20).

113 The Christian belief in Nero's return (as the Antichrist) is well known: he was thought to have vanished rather than died. However, their expectation was rooted in a common belief among the people that the various Pseudonerons who actually emerged exploited to their advantage (Suet., Ner. 57; Tac., H. i, 2; ii, 8: Luc., Indoct. 20).

114 This was the idea lying behind the deification of Antinous commanded by the Emperor; as may be seen from the connexion in which Celsus speaks of the matter (ap. Orig., Cels. 3, 36, p. 296 Lomm.): he mentions the disappearance of Ant. in the same context as the translation of Kleomedes, Amphiaraos, Amphilochos, etc. (c. 33–4).—The language in which the deification of Ant. is spoken of on the obelisk at Rome gives no precise idea of what happened: see Erman, Mit. arch. Inst. röm. Abt. 1896, p. 113 ff.—In this case, then, we have a translation effected by a river-god: cf. the water-nymphs mentioned above, n. 105. In the same way Aeneas disappeared into the river Numicius: Serv., Aen. xii, 794; Sch. Veron., Aen. i, 259; D.H. i, 64, 4; Arnob. i, 36; Ov., M. xiv, 598 ff.; Liv. i, 2, 6. cf. the fable of Alex. the Great’s translation into a river: n. 107. Euthymos in the same way vanished into the river Kaikinos (supposed to be his real father: Paus. 6, 6, 4); see above, chap. iv, n. 116.

114 This was the idea behind the elevation of Antinous ordered by the Emperor; as can be seen from the context in which Celsus discusses the topic (ap. Orig., Cels. 3, 36, p. 296 Lomm.): he references the disappearance of Antinous in the same context as the translations of Kleomedes, Amphiaraos, Amphilochos, and others (c. 33–4).—The description of Antinous's deification on the obelisk in Rome doesn’t provide a clear picture of what actually occurred: see Erman, Mit. arch. Inst. röm. Abt. 1896, p. 113 ff.—In this case, we have a transformation facilitated by a river-god: cf. the water-nymphs mentioned earlier, n. 105. Similarly, Aeneas vanished into the river Numicius: Serv., Aen. xii, 794; Sch. Veron., Aen. i, 259; D.H. i, 64, 4; Arnob. i, 36; Ov., M. xiv, 598 ff.; Liv. i, 2, 6. cf. the story of Alexander the Great’s transformation into a river: n. 107. Euthymos also disappeared into the river Kaikinos (thought to be his biological father: Paus. 6, 6, 4); see above, chap. iv, n. 116.

115 Philostr., V. Ap. viii, 29–30 (not indeed from Damis as Ph. himself definitely asserts; but certainly from sincere accounts derived from the various adherents of Apoll.—none of the facts in the biography are Phil.’s own invention). Apoll. either died in Ephesos or disappeared (ἀφανισθῆναι) in the temple of Athene at Lindos or disappeared in the temple of Diktynna in Crete and ascended to heaven αὐτῷ σώματι (as Eus. adv. Hierocl. 44, 408, 5 Ks. rightly understands it). This was the legend generally preferred. His ἀφανισμός was confirmed by the fact that no grave or cenotaph of Apoll. was to be found: Philostr. viii, 31 fin. The imitation of the legends about the disappearance of Empedokles is obvious.

115 Philostr., V. Ap. viii, 29–30 (not actually from Damis, as Ph. himself clearly claims; but definitely from genuine accounts gathered from the various followers of Apoll.—none of the facts in the biography are Phil.’s own creation). Apoll. either died in Ephesos or vanished (ἀφανισθῆναι) in the temple of Athene at Lindos, or disappeared in the temple of Diktynna in Crete and ascended to heaven in his body (as Eus. adv. Hierocl. 44, 408, 5 Ks. correctly interprets). This was the legend that was generally favored. His disappearance was supported by the fact that no grave or cenotaph for Apoll. could be found: Philostr. viii, 31 fin. The resemblance to the legends about Empedokles's disappearance is clear.

116 τοῦ Ἀπολλωνίου ἐξ ἀνθρώπων ἠδη ὄντος, θαυμαζομένου δὲ ἐπὶ τῇ μεταβολῇ καὶ μηδ’ ἀντιλέξαι θαρροῦντος μηδένος ὡς οὐκ ἀ θάνατος εἰη, Philostr. viii, 31. Then follows a miracle vouchsafed to an unbelieving Thomas to whom Apoll. himself appears.

116 To Apollonius, from people who were already present, humans amazed by the transformation and not daring to disagree with anyone confidently claiming that death was impossible., Philostr. viii, 31. Then follows a miracle granted to an unbelieving Thomas, to whom Apollonius himself appears.

117 Pre-existence of the soul, return of the souls of the good to their home with God, punishment of the wicked, complete ἀθανασία of all souls as such—all this belongs to the wisdom of Solomon. The Essene doctrine of the soul as described by Jos., BJ. 2, 8, 11, is also thoroughly Greek; it belongs to the Stoico-Platonic teaching (i.e. the Neopythagorean variety); see Schwally, Leben n. Todt n. Vorst. alt. Israël, p. 151 ff., 179 ff. [1892]. The carmen Phocylideum is the work of some Jewish author who obscurely mixes up 570 Platonic ideas with those of Greek theologians (cf. 104 where Bgk., PLG. ii, p. 95, rightly defends the MSS. θεοί against Bernays), and of the Stoics (108)—adding also ideas derived from the Jewish doctrine of the resurrection (115 at least is completely Greek: ψυχὴ δ’ ἀθάνατος καὶ ἀγήρως ζῇ διὰ παντός). In Philo’s doctrine of the soul everything comes from Platonic or Stoic sources.

117 The idea of the soul existing before birth, the return of good souls to their home with God, the punishment of the wicked, and the immortality of all souls—all of this is part of Solomon’s wisdom. The Essene view of the soul, as described by Josephus in BJ. 2, 8, 11, is also influenced by Greek thought; it aligns with Stoic and Platonic teachings (specifically the Neopythagorean variant); see Schwally, Leben n. Todt n. Vorst. alt. Israël, p. 151 ff., 179 ff. [1892]. The carmen Phocylideum is attributed to a Jewish author who vaguely blends Platonic concepts with those of Greek theologians (see 104 where Bgk., PLG. ii, p. 95, correctly defends the manuscripts gods against Bernays), and also incorporates Stoic ideas (108)—while adding in elements from Jewish beliefs about resurrection (115 at least is entirely Greek: The soul is immortal and ageless, living forever.). In Philo’s view of the soul, everything is derived from Platonic or Stoic sources.

118 e.g. in Sikyon as it appears: Paus. 2, 7, 2.

118 for example, in Sikyon as shown: Paus. 2, 7, 2.

119 Perhaps in Epigr. Gr. ed. Kaibel (which will be referred to in this section as Ep.), 35a, p. 517; but this belongs to the fourth century B.C. A late example (in prose), IG. Sic. et It. 1702.

119 Maybe in Epigr. Gr. edited by Kaibel (which will be called Ep. in this section), 35a, p. 517; but this is from the fourth century B.C. A later example (in prose) is IG. Sic. et It. 1702.

120 γαῖαν ἔχοις ἐλαφράν, Ep. 195, 4; cf. 103, 9; 538, 7; 551, 4; 559, 3; IG. Sic. et It. 229; Rhodian inscr., IGM. Aeg. i, 151, 3–4 (first-second century A.D.); ἀλλὰ σύ, δαῖμον, τῇ φθιμένῃ κούφην γαῖαν ὕπερθεν ἔχοις.—Eur. already has something similar: Alc. 463: see above, chap. xii, n. 121.

120 You hold the bright land, Ep. 195, 4; cf. 103, 9; 538, 7; 551, 4; 559, 3; IG. Sic. et It. 229; Rhodian inscr., IGM. Aeg. i, 151, 3–4 (first-second century CE); But you, spirit, will hold a bright place above what rots..—Eur. already has something similar: Alc. 463: see above, chap. xii, n. 121.

121 The confusion of ideas is evident, e.g. in Ep. 700, κοῦφον ἔχοις γαίης βάρος εὐσεβίης ἐνὶ χώρῳ, cf. 222b, 11–12.—The real meaning of such wishes is indicated by Luc., Luct. 18; the dead son says to his mourning father, δέδιας μή σοι ἀποπνιγῶ κατακλεισθεὶς ἐν τῷ μνήματι.

121 The confusion of ideas is clear, for example, in Ep. 700, You have the weight of piety lightened on the ground., cf. 222b, 11–12.—The true meaning of such wishes is shown by Luc., Luct. 18; the deceased son tells his grieving father, "Don't let yourself drown, sealed in the tomb.".

122 Φερσεφόνης θάλαμος, θάλαμοι, Ep. 35, 4; 50, 2; 201, 4; 231, 2; Anth. Pal. vii, 507–8 “Simonides”. φθιμένοις ἀέναος θάλαμος, Ep. 143, 2. δόμος Νυκτός, AP. vii, 232. (We need not hesitate to use the grave-epigrams in the Anthology side by side with the actual sepulchral inss. The former are sometimes the models of the latter, sometimes modelled upon actual epitaphic inscriptions, but always closely related to the more literary epitaphs.)

122 Περίπτωση Περσεφόνης, θάλαμοι, Ep. 35, 4; 50, 2; 201, 4; 231, 2; Anth. Pal. vii, 507–8 “Simonides”. dilapidated eternal chamber, Ep. 143, 2. House of Night, AP. vii, 232. (We shouldn’t hesitate to use the grave epigrams in the Anthology alongside the actual burial inscriptions. The former sometimes serve as models for the latter, sometimes are inspired by real epitaph inscriptions, but they are always closely connected to the more literary epitaphs.)

123 Λήθης παυσίπονον πόμα, Ep. 244, 10. ἢν καταβῇς ἐς πῶμα Λήθης, 261, 20. (Νύξ, λήθης δῶρα φέρουσ’ ἐπ’ ἐμοί, 312.) Μοῖραι καὶ Λήθη με κατήγαγον εἰς Ἀίδαο, 521. (Cf. AP. vii, Λήθης δόμοι, 25, 6; Λήθης λιμήν, 498; Λήθης πέλαγος, 711, 716.) Λάθας ἤλυθον εἰς λιμέας, Mysian inscr. BCH. xvii (1894), p. 532, n. 34.

123 Pain-relieving drink of oblivion, Ep. 244, 10. If you descend into the drink of Lethe, 261, 20. (Night, bring me the gifts of forgetfulness., 312.) The Fates and Oblivion have led me to Hades., 521. (Cf. AP. vii, Halls of oblivion, 25, 6; Harbor of oblivion, 498; Sea of Oblivion, 711, 716.) They came to the harbor., Mysian inscr. BCH. xvii (1894), p. 532, n. 34.

124 οἱ πλείους = the dead (like the Latin plures: Plaut., Trin. 291, Petron. 42): ἐς πλεόνων in Hades, Ep. 373, 4; AP. vii, 731, 6; xi, 42. Already in Ar., Eccl. 1073: γραῦς ἀναστηκυῖα παρὰ τῶν πλειόνων. Call., Epigr. 5 (cf. Boisson. on Eunap., p. 309). Ancient oracle ap. Polyb. 8, 30, 7: μετὰ τῶν πλεόνων = τῶν μετηλλαχότων (Tarentum). Even in the present day: ’στοὺς πολλοὺς, Schmidt, Volksl. d. Neugr. i, 235.

124 οἱ πλείους = the dead (like the Latin plures: Plaut., Trin. 291, Petron. 42): to more in Hades, Ep. 373, 4; AP. vii, 731, 6; xi, 42. Already in Ar., Eccl. 1073: γραῦς ἀναστηκυῖα παρὰ τῶν πλειόνων. Call., Epigr. 5 (cf. Boisson. on Eunap., p. 309). Ancient oracle ap. Polyb. 8, 30, 7: with the majority = τῶν μετηλλαχότων (Tarentum). Even in the present day: to the many, Schmidt, Volksl. d. Neugr. i, 235.

125 Ep. 266, μὴ μύρου, φίλ’ ἄνερ, με· καὶ αὐτὸς ἐκεῖ γὰρ ὁδεύσας εὑρήσεις τὴν σὴν σύγγαμον Εὐτυχίην. Cf. 558, 5 ff.; 397, 5. Phrygian inscr., Papers American School, iii, 305 (n. 427): a father addressing his dead son καὶ πολὺ τερσανέω τότε δάκρυον ἥνικα σεῖο ψυχὴν ἀθρήσω γῆν ὑποδυσάμενος.

125 Ep. 266, Don't grieve, dear man, because you will find your beloved Eutychia there as you continue on your journey.. Cf. 558, 5 ff.; 397, 5. Phrygian inscr., Papers American School, iii, 305 (n. 427): a father addressing his dead son and I will cry for you deeply when I collect your spirit from the earth.

126 εἰ δέ τις ἐν φθιμένοις κρίσις, ὡς λόγος ἀμφὶ θανόντων, Ep. 215, 5. A mother boasts of the piety of her son to Rhadamanthys: 514, 5 (cf. 559, 3 f.). So too, in AP. vii there is little mention of a judgment (596 Agathias).

126 If there's any judgment among the dead, Ep. 215, 5. A mother talks proudly about her son's devotion to Rhadamanthys: 514, 5 (see also 559, 3 f.). Similarly, in AP. vii, there’s little mention of a judgment (596 Agathias).

127 The division of the dead into two classes is implied where the pious departed is said to be about to dwell ἐν μακάρεσσιν, etc. But the distinct separation of the dead into two or three classes [see above, chap. xii, n. 62] is rare in the sepulchral inscr.: Ep. 650, 9 ff., is an exception (but there one company is ἐπιχθονίη, the other in the aither—a Stoic idea).—A peculiar arrangement, implying the three classes, is given in [Socr.] Epist. 27, 1 (they are in the τόπος εὐς. and ἀσεβῶν in Hades, and in the aither): τοῦ εἶτε κατὰ γῆν ἐν εὐσεβῶν χώρῳ ὄντος 571 εἴτε κατ’ ἄστρα (ὅπερ καὶ μάλα πείθομαι) Σωκράτους.—The same again in AP. vii, 370 (Diodor.) ἐν Διὸς (i.e. in Heaven) ἢ μακάρων.

127 The division of the dead into two groups is suggested where the righteous departed are said to be about to dwell with the blessed, etc. However, the clear separation of the dead into two or three groups [see above, chap. xii, n. 62] is uncommon in the burial inscriptions: Ep. 650, 9 ff., is an exception (but there one group is epichthonian, and the other in the aither—a Stoic concept).—A unique arrangement, suggesting three groups, is presented in [Socr.] Epist. 27, 1 (they are in the τόπος εὐς. and unrighteous in Hades, and in the aither): Whether on the ground in a place of the godly 571 or by the stars(I really believe that.)Socrates.—The same is noted again in AP. vii, 370 (Diodor.) in Zeus (i.e. in Heaven) or of the blessed.

128 There is perhaps no reference in the grave-inss. to the punishment of the ἀσεβεῖς, and scarcely any in AP. vii (but cf. 377, 7 f. Erykios).

128 There may be no mention in the grave inscriptions about the punishment of the dissolute, and hardly any in AP. vii (but see 377, 7 f. Erykios).

129 ψυχὴ δ’ ἐς τὸ δίκαιον ἔβη, Ep. 502, 13; i.e. to the place to which it justly belongs.

129 The soul moved toward what is just., Ep. 502, 13; i.e. to the place where it rightfully belongs.

130 ναίεις μακάρων νήσους θαλίῃ ἐνὶ πολλῇ, Ep. 649, 2; 366, 6; 648, 9. νῆσον ἔχεις μακάρων, 473, 2; 107, 2; AP. vii, 690, 4. μακάρων πεδίον, Ep. 516, 1–2. Ἠλύσιον πεδίον 414, 8; 150, 6. πεδία Ἠλύσια, 338, 2; 649, 3. χῶρος ἠλύσιος 618a, 8. μετ’ εὐσεβέων ἐσμὲν ἐν Ἠλυσίῳ, 554, 4.—ναίω δ’ ἡρώων ἱερὸν δόμον, οὐκ Ἀχέροντες· τοῖον γὰρ βιότου τέρμα σοφοῖσιν ἔνι, Ep. 228, 7–8. ἡρώων χῶρον ἔχοις φθίμενος, 539, 4. Λητογενές, σὺ δὲ παῖδας ἐν ἡρώεσσι φυλάσσοις, εὐσεβέων ἀεὶ χῶρον ἐπερχόμενος, 228b, 7 (p. 520). ᾤχετ’ ἐς ἡμιθέους, 699 (σοὶ μὲν ἕδρη θείοισι παρ’ ἀνδράσι, AP. vii, 659, 3).

130 yes, in the blessed islands in abundance, Ep. 649, 2; 366, 6; 648, 9. island you have of the blessed, 473, 2; 107, 2; AP. vii, 690, 4. of the holy ground, Ep. 516, 1–2. Elysium field 414, 8; 150, 6. heavenly fields, 338, 2; 649, 3. heavenly place 618a, 8. With the faithful, we are in Elysium., 554, 4.—I live in the sacred home of heroes, not in Acheron; for that is the fate of the wise at the end of life., Ep. 228, 7–8. you occupy the position of heroes fading away, 539, 4. Leto's children, you safeguard the young among the heroes, always drawing near to the sacred place., 228b, 7 (p. 520). went to the demigods, 699 (to you a seat among the divine beings, AP. vii, 659, 3).

131 Description of the charms of the μακάρων νῆσοι and the Elysian fields where οὐδὲ ποθεινὸς ἀνθρώπων ἔτι βίοτος, Ep. 649. More elaborate in the poem of Marcellus on Regilla the wife of Herodes Att.: Ep. 1046 (she is μεθ’ ἡρῴνησιν ἐν μακάρων νήσοισιν, ἵνα Κρόνος ἐμβασιλεύει, 8–9; Zeus had dispatched her thither with soft breezes, ἐς ὠκεανόν, 21 ff. Now she is οὐ θνητή, ἀτὰρ οὐδὲ θέαινα but a Heroine, 42 ff. In the χορὸς προτεράων ἡμιθεάων she serves as an ὀπάων νύμφη of Persephone, 51 ff.).

131 Description of the charms of the blessed islands and the Elysian fields where Life is no longer something that mortals yearn for., Ep. 649. It's more detailed in Marcellus's poem about Regilla, the wife of Herodes Atticus: Ep. 1046 (she is with the heroes in the blessed islands, where Cronus rules, 8–9; Zeus sent her there with gentle breezes, to the sea, 21 ff. Now she is neither mortal nor goddess but a Heroine, 42 ff. In the choir of ancient demigods, she serves as an Persephone's attendant nymph, 51 ff.).

132 Clearly e.g. the place where Rhadamanthys holds sway in Hades, Ep. 452, 18–19.

132 Clearly, for example, the place where Rhadamanthys rules in Hades, Ep. 452, 18–19.

133 The χῶρος εὐσεβέων clearly indicates Hades: Ἀίδεω νυχίοιο μέλας ὑπεδέξατο κόλπος, εὐσεβέων θ’ ὁσίην εὔνασεν ἐς κλισίην, Ep. 27, 3–4; cf. inscr. from Rhodes, IGM. Aeg. i, 141, of an old schoolmaster—εὐσεβῶν χῶρος [σφ’ ἔχει]· Πλούτων γὰρ αὐτὸν καὶ Κορη κατῴκισαν, Ἑρμῆς τε καὶ δᾳδοῦχος Ἑκάτη, προσφ[ιλῆ] ἅπασιν εἶναι, μυστικῶν τ’ ἐπιστάτην ἔταξαν αὐτὸν πίστεως πάσης χάριν.—Not infrequently Elysion and the place of the εὐσεβέες are identified: e.g. Ep. 338, εὐσεβέες δὲ ψυχὴν (sc. ἔχουσἰ) καὶ πεδίων τέρμονες Ἠλυσίων. τοῦτο σαοφροσύνης ἔλαχον γέρας, ἀμβροσίην δὲ (the immortality of her soul) σώματος ὑβριστὴς οὐκ ἐπάτησε χρόνος. ἀλλὰ νέη νύμφῃσι (thus the stone: Ath. Mitt. iv, 17) μετ’ εὐσεβέεσσι καθῆται.—If there is a judgment in Hades οἰκήσεις εἰς δόμον εὐσεβέων, Ep. 215, 5–6. Kore conducts the dead χῶρον ἐπ’ εὐσεβέων, 218, 15–16. κἄστιν ἐν εὐσεβέων ἣν διὰ σωφροσύνην, 569, 12. εὐσεβέων χῶρος, 296. εὐς. δόμος, 222, 7–8. εὐσεβέων ναίοις ἱερὸν δόμον, IPE. ii, 298, 11. ψυχὴ δ’ εὐσεβέων οἴχεται εἰς θάλαμον, Ep. 90 (CIA. ii, 3004). εὐς. εἰς ἱεροὺς θαλάμους, 222b, 12. εὐς. ἐν σκιεροῖς θαλάμοις, 253, 6. ἐσθλὰ δὲ ναίω δώματα Φερσεφόνας χώρῳ ἐν εὐσεβέων, 189, 5–6. μετ’ εὐσεβέεσσι κεῖσθαι, ἀντ’ ἀρετῆς, 259. θῆκ’ Ἀίδης ἐς μυχὸν εὐσεβέων, 241a, 18. εὐσεβίης δ’ εἵνεκεν εὐσεβέων χῶρον ἔβη φθίμενος, Ath. Mitt. xi, 427 (Kolophon). Late Roman inscr., IG. Sic. et It. 1660: a wife says of her dead husband περὶ οὗ δέομαι τοὺς καταχθονίους θεούς, τὴν ψυχὴν εἰς τοὺς εὐσεβεῖς κατατάξαι.

133 The place of the devout clearly refers to Hades: The dark embrace of night welcomed me, and it provided a sacred place for the pious to rest., Ep. 27, 3–4; see also an inscription from Rhodes, IGM. Aeg. i, 141, of an old schoolmaster—godly place[It has.]· For Plouton and Korē settled him, along with Hermes and the torchbearer Hecate, offering... __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__[ιλῆ]He was appointed as the leader of all, even of the mysteries, for the sake of all faith..—Not infrequently, Elysion and the place of the pious are identified: e.g. Ep. 338, devout soul (sc. ἔχουσἰ) and the fields of Elysium. This is the prize of wisdom, and the ambrosia (the immortality of her soul) The body wasn't trampled by time. But to the young brides... (thus the stone: Ath. Mitt. iv, 17) Sits with the righteous.—If there is a judgment in Hades houses of the faithful, Ep. 215, 5–6. Kore guides the dead place of the righteous, 218, 15–16. And there is in the pious a quality that comes from self-control., 569, 12. place of the righteous, 296. Home. House, 222, 7–8. holy house of the pious, IPE. ii, 298, 11. The souls of the righteous depart to a chamber., Ep. 90 (CIA. ii, 3004). to sacred chambers, 222b, 12. in shadowy chambers, 253, 6. I reside in the honorable home of Persephone, in the land of the righteous., 189, 5–6. Be with the righteous, not with the wicked., 259. Hades placed in the depths of the righteous, 241a, 18. For the sake of piety, he entered the land of the righteous, doomed to perish., Ath. Mitt. xi, 427 (Kolophon). Late Roman inscription, IG. Sic. et It. 1660: a wife speaks about her deceased husband I pray to the underworld gods to assign the soul to the pious..

134 The χῶρος μακάρων in the sky: ψυχὴ δ’ ἀθανάτων βουλαῖς ἐπιδήμιός ἐστιν ἄστροις καὶ ἱερὸν χῶρον ἔχει μακάρων, Ep. 324, 3–4. καὶ ναίεις μακάρων νήσους . . . αὐγαῖς ἐν καθαραῖσιν, Ὀλυμπου πλησίον ὄντως, 649, 2, 8. The ἠλύσιον πεδίον outside the φθιμένων δόμοι, 414, 8, 6. Sometimes both the heavenly abode of the blessed and the Islands of the Blest occur together: [Luc.] Dem. Enc. 50. 572 Demosth. is after his death either in the μακάρων νήσοις with the Heroes, or else in the οὐρανός as an attendant daimon on Ζεὺς Ἐλευθέριος.

134 The Blessed Land in the sky: The souls of the immortals are among the stars and have a sacred place that belongs to the Blessed., Ep. 324, 3–4. and you live in the Islands of the Blessed... shining in the clear light, truly close to Olympus, 649, 2, 8. The Heavenly Fields outside the houses of the dead, 414, 8, 6. Sometimes both the heavenly home of the blessed and the Islands of the Blest appear together: [Luc.] Dem. Enc. 50. 572 Demosthenes is after his death either in the Isles of the Blessed with the Heroes, or else in the sky as an attendant spirit of Zeus the Freedom Bringer.

135 ψυχὴ πρὸς Ὄλυμπον ἀνήλλατο, Ep. 646a, 3. ψυχὴ δ’ ἐν Ὀλύμπῳ, 159, 261, 11. ἦλθεν δ’ εἰς Ἀιδαο δέμας, ψυχὴ δ’ ἐς Ὄλυμπον, AP. vii, 362, 3. (Ἀίδης here = the grave as often; so too in Ep. 288, 4–5, ψυχὴ . . . ἐς αἰθέρα . . . ὀστέα εἰς Ἀίδην ἄτροπος εἶλε νόμος.) μετὰ πότμον ὁρῶ φάος Οὐλύμποιο, AP. vii, 678, 5.—ψυχὴν δ’ ἐκ μελέων οὐρανὸς εὐρὺς ἔχει, Ep. 104b, 4. ἦτορ δ’ οὐρανῷ μετάρσιον, 462, 6. ψυχὴ μοι ναίει δώματ’ ἐπουράνια, 261, 10 (and frequently in this poem in various forms). ἐς οὐρανίας ἀταρποὺς ψυχὴ παπταίνει σῶμ’ ἀποδυσαμένη, AP. vii, 337, 7; cf. also 363, 3; 587, 2; 672, 1 and ix, 207–8. αἰθὴρ μὲν ψυχὰς ὑπεδέξατο, Ep. 21 (fifth century B.C., see above, chap. xii, n. 149). Εὐρυμάχου ψυχὴν καὶ ὑπερφιάλους διανοίας αἰθὴρ ὑγρὸς ἔχει, 41 (fourth century B.C. but the αἰθήρ is not “moist”—αἰθὴρ λαμπρὸς ἔχει is the more primitive version of the phrase given in the corresponding epigr. of the Πέπλος. The ἀήρ would be ὑγρός: την ψυχὴν ἀπέδωκεν ἐς ἀέρα, Ep. 642, 7). ψυχὴν μὲν ἐς αἰθέρα καὶ Διὸς αὐλάς, 288, 4. ψυχὴ δ’ αἰθέριον κατέχει πόλον, 225, 3. ψυχὴ δ’ αἰθέριον κατέχει πόλον, 325, 5.—ψυχὴ δ’ ἀθανάτων βουλαῖς ἐπιδήμιός ἐστιν ἄστροις, Ep. 324, 3. From Thyatira, BCH. 1887, p. 461: θάψεν δ’ ἀδελφὸς Ἀρχέλαος σῶμ’ ἐμόν, ψυχὰ δέ μευ πρὸς ἄστρα καὶ θεοὺς ΕΣI (read ἔβη). One company of the souls τείρεσσι σὺν αἰθερίοισι χορεύει· ἧς στρατιῆς εἷς εἰμι, Ep. 650, 11–12 (Diogenes) νῦν δε θανὼν ἀστέρας οἶκον ἔχει, AP. vii, 64, 4.

135 The soul ascended to Olympus, Ep. 646a, 3. The soul is in Olympus, 159, 261, 11. The body went to Hades, and the soul went to Olympus., AP. vii, 362, 3. (Underworld here = the grave as often; so too in Ep. 288, 4–5, the soul . . . into the ether . . . bones into Hades, this is the unavoidable law.) I see the light of Olympus after I die., AP. vii, 678, 5.—The soul has the vast sky from the limbs., Ep. 104b, 4. The heart is lifted to the sky., 462, 6. The soul lives in divine places., 261, 10 (and frequently in this poem in various forms). The soul soars into the endless sky, having left the body behind., AP. vii, 337, 7; cf. also 363, 3; 587, 2; 672, 1 and ix, 207–8. The ether has received souls, Ep. 21 (fifth century BCE, see above, chap. xii, n. 149). Eurymachus' soul and his overconfident thoughts are suspended in the ether., 41 (fourth century BCE but the digital currency is not “moist”—the ether is vibrant is the more primitive version of the phrase given in the corresponding epigr. of the Peplos. The air would be damp: the soul was set free into the air, Ep. 642, 7). The soul goes into the ether and the realms of Zeus., 288, 4. The soul contains the axis of the ether., 225, 3. The soul has entered the atmosphere., 325, 5.—The soul is a reflection of the intentions of the immortals among the stars, Ep. 324, 3. From Thyatira, BCH. 1887, p. 461: My brother Archelaus buried my body, but my soul is among the stars and gods. (read has left). One group of souls dances with the ethereal spirits; I am part of that army, Ep. 650, 11–12 (Diogenes) Now that I'm dead, I have a home in the stars., AP. vii, 64, 4.

136 ψυχὴ δ’ ἐκ ῥεθέων πταμένη μετὰ δαίμονας ἄλλους ἤλυθε σή, ναίες δ’ ἐν μακάρων δαπέδῳ, Ep. 243, 5–6. καί με θεῶν μακάρων κατέχει δόμος ἆσσον ἰόντα, οὐρανίοις τε δόμοισι βλέπω φάος Ἠριγενείης, 312, 6.—τὴν σύνετον ψυχὴν μακάρων εἰς ἀέρα δοῦσα, πρόσθεν μὲν θνητή, νῦν δὲ θεῶ μέτοχος, 654, 4–5.—ἀλλὰ νῦν εἰς τοὺς θεούς IG. Sic. et It. 1420. ὡς δὲ φύσις μὲν ἔλυσεν ἀπὸ χθονός, ἀθάνατοι μὲν αὐτὸν ἔχουσι θεοὶ σῶμα δὲ σηκὸς ὅδε, AP. vii, 570; 61, 2; 573, 3–4.

136 The soul, having freed itself from the streams, soared away with other spirits; she arrived at the realm of the blessed,, Ep. 243, 5–6. I’m in the home of the blessed gods, getting closer, and I can see the light of the daughter of the sky., 312, 6.—The rational soul of the blessed, having been released to the air, was once mortal but now partakes in the divine., 654, 4–5.—but now among the gods IG. Sic. et It. 1420. As nature has freed him from the earth, the immortals hold him; this body is here., AP. vii, 570; 61, 2; 573, 3–4.

137 See above, chap. xii, p. 436 ff.

137 See above, ch. 12, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ et seq.

138 See above, p. 500 f. πνεῦμα, Ep. 250, 6; 613, 6; πνεῦμα λαβὼν δάνος οὐρανόθεν τελέσας χρόνον ἀνταπέδωκα (cf. πνεῦμα γάρ ἐστι θεοῦ χρῆσις θνητοῖσι, Carm. Phoc. 106). 156, 2: πνοιὴν αἰθὴρ ἔλαβεν πάλιν, ὅσπερ ἔδωκεν (third century B.C.; see Köhler on CIA. ii, 4135).—This conception having become popular frequently occurs in the theological poetry of later times: e.g. χρησμός ap. Stob., Ecl. 1, 49, 46, i, p. 414 W.: τὸ μὲν (τὸ σῶμα) λυθέν ἐστι κόνις, ψυχὴ δὲ πρὸς αἴθρην σκίδναται, ὁππόθεν ἦλθε, μετήορος εἰς αἰθέρ’ ἁπλοῦν (read αἰθέρ’ ἐς ἁγνόν). Oracle of Apoll. Tyan. ap. Philostr., VA. viii, 31: ἀθάνατος ψυχὴ . . . μετὰ σῶμα μαρανθὲν . . . ῥηιδίως προθοροῦσα κεράννυται ἠέρι κούφῳ.

138 See above, p. 500 f. spirit, Ep. 250, 6; 613, 6; Having received the spirit and completed the time from above, I have returned. (cf. The spirit is indeed the use of God for mortals., Carm. Phoc. 106). 156, 2: He took a breath of the air again, just as it was given. (third century B.C.; see Köhler on CIA. ii, 4135).—This idea became popular and often appears in the theological poetry of later times: e.g. oracle ap. Stob., Ecl. 1, 49, 46, i, p. 414 W.: τὸ μὲν(the body)The dust has settled, and the soul disperses into the clear sky, wherever it came from, soaring into the open air. (read to the pure sky). Oracle of Apoll. Tyan. ap. Philostr., VA. viii, 31: The immortal soul . . . after the body has perished . . . easily mingles in light air..

139 ψυχὴν δ’ ἀθάνατον κοινὸς ἔχει θάνατος, Ep. 35, 6 (CIA. ii, 3620, fourth century B.C.). IG. Sic. et It. 940, 3–4: ἀθανάτη ψυχὴ μὲν ἐς αἰθέρι καὶ Διὸς αὐγαῖς πωτᾶται. ib. 942: . . . ἐνθάδε κεῖμαι, οὐχὶ θανών· θνήσκειν μὴ λέγε τοὺς ἀγαθούς (from Call., Epigr. 11, τᾷδε Σάων . . . ἱερὸν ὕπνον κοιμᾶται. θνάσκειν μὴ λέγε τοὺς ἀγαθούς).—οὐκ ἔθανες, Πρώτη, μετέβης δ’ ἐς ἀμείνονα χῶρον Ep. 649.

139 The soul is immortal; death is a shared experience., Ep. 35, 6 (CIA. ii, 3620, fourth century BCE). IG. Sic. et It. 940, 3–4: The eternal soul ascends into the sky and is brightened by the light of Zeus.. ib. 942: . . . I'm lying here, not really dead; don't say that the good die. (from Call., Epigr. 11, Here lies Saon... resting a sacred rest. Don’t say that the good ones pass away.).—You didn’t die, Protis; you’ve moved on to a better place. Ep. 649.

140 This retains its full and original meaning (as in Call., Epigr. 11); cf. Ep. 559, 7, λέγε Ποπιλίην εὕδειν ἄνερ· οὐ θεμιτὸν θνήσκειν τοὺς ἀγαθούς, ἀλλ’ ὕπνον ἡδὺν ἔχειν. More often as a mere conventional phrase: 433; 101, 4; 202, 1; 204, 7; σ’ ἐκοίμισεν ὕπνος ὁ λήθης, 223, 3; 502, 2; AP. vii, 29, 1; 30, 2, 260.

140 This keeps its full and original meaning (as in Call., Epigr. 11); see Ep. 559, 7, Tell Popilius to rest; it's not right for the good to die, but rather to enjoy a sweet sleep.. More often used as a simple conventional phrase: 433; 101, 4; 202, 1; 204, 7; Sleep made oblivion., 223, 3; 502, 2; AP. vii, 29, 1; 30, 2, 260.

141 Ep. 651: θνητὸν σῶμα . . . τὸ δ’ ἀθάνατον ἐς μακάρων ἀνόρουσε 573 κέαρ· ψυχὴ γὰρ ἀείζως ἣ τὸ ζῆν παρέχει καὶ θεόφιν κατέβη . . . σῶμα χιτὼν ψυχῆς (cf. Emp. 414 M. = fr. 126 D., σαρκῶν περιστέλλουσα χιτῶνι sc. τὴν ψυχήν)· τὸν δὲ θεὸν σέβε μου (the god in me, my ψυχή). 261, 6, τὴν ψυχὴν δ’ ἀθανάτην ἔλαχον· ἐν γαίῃ μὲν σῶμα τὸ συγγενές οὐράνιος δὲ ἤλυθεν ἡ ψυχὴ δῶμα κατ’ οὐ φθίμενον κτλ.; cf. 320, 6 ff.—594 (late epitaph of a doctor with philosophic leanings; found in Rome), 7 ff.: οὐδ’ ἄρα θνητὸς ἔην, ὑπ’ ἀνάγκης ὑψιμέδοντος τύμβῳ εἰναλέῳ πεπεδημένος ἤνυσεν οἶμον. ἐκ ῥεθέων δ’ ἄμα στειχων σεμνὸν ἔβη Διὸς οἶκον. No sense can be made of the passage if τύμβῳ is understood as the real grave and this has led to altering or straining the sense of εἰναλέῳ (εἰναλίῳ Franz, σιγαλέῳ Jacobs). But the poet means: the dead man was (in his real nature, his soul) immortal, only the will of the gods had caused him (his soul) to be bound to the body and to complete his course of life in the body, after the end of which he will rise immediately (and return) to the realm of the gods. Read therefore τύμβῳ εἰν ἀλαῷ πεπεδημένος, fettered in the “dark grave” of the body: σῶμα = σῆμα. (Exactly as in Verg., A. vi, 734, the animae: clausae tenebris et carcere caeco.)—603: he who lies buried here θνητοῖς ψυχὴν πείσας ἐπὶ σώμασιν ἐλθεῖν τὴν αὑτοῦ, μέλεος, οὐκ ἀνέπεισε μένειν. That is: he has persuaded his (previously living and bodiless) soul to enter into the realm of mortal bodies (to occupy a body), but could not persuade it to remain there long—in this earthly life.

141 Ep. 651: mortal body... but the immortal one ascends among the blessed 573 heart; for the soul is always alive, giving life and reaching toward the divine . . . body, the covering of the soul (cf. Emp. 414 M. = fr. 126 D., enveloping itself in a layer of flesh sc.the spirit)· and the divine within me (the god in me, my spirit). 261, 6, I have received an immortal soul; while the body is mortal on earth, the soul has come down from the heavens into a place that doesn't decay, etc.; cf. 320, 6 ff.—594 (late epitaph of a doctor with philosophical inclinations; found in Rome), 7 ff.: So, he was not mortal; being bound by fate to the grand tomb, he found his path. He emerged from the waters with grace and made his way to Zeus's house.. The passage doesn't make sense if grave is understood as a true grave, leading to changes or distortions in the interpretation of binding (binding Franz, quietly Jacobs). But the poet suggests that the dead man was (in his true essence, his soul) immortal; only the will of the gods made him (his soul) linked to the body, to finish his life there, after which he would rise immediately (and return) to the realm of the gods. Therefore, read bound in the "dark grave" of the body: body = grave. (Just like in Verg., A. vi, 734, the souls: trapped in darkness and a blind prison.)—603: the one buried here convinced his soul to join the mortal bodies, but couldn't persuade it to remain. That is: he managed to convince his (previously living and bodiless) soul to enter the realm of mortal bodies (to inhabit a body), but couldn't persuade it to remain there long—in this earthly existence.

142 Once at the most: εἰ πάλιν ἔστι γενέσθαι . . . εἰ δ’ οὐκ ἔστιν πάλιν ἐλθεῖνEp. 304 (cf. above, chap. xii, n. 138).

142 Once at the most: if it can happen again... if it's not possible to return againEp. 304 (cf. above, chap. xii, n. 138).

143 The epitaphs quoted in n. 141 have a theological meaning but do not allude to any specifically Platonic opinion or doctrines. There is no need to see Platonic influence (as Lehrs would: Pop. Aufs.2, p. 339 f.) in the numerous epitaphs that speak of the ascent of the soul into the aither, the stars, etc. (notes 135, 136). It is true that Alexis 158 K. inquires whether the view that the body decays after death—τὸ δ’ ἀθάνατον ἐξῆρε πρὸς τὸν ἀέρα—is not Platonic doctrine (ταῦτ’ οὐ σχολὴ Πλάτωνος). But he has no real knowledge of Platonic teaching and calls Platonic that idea of the ascent of the souls of the dead into the upper regions which had long been popular in Athens—even before Plato’s time. In fact Plato’s doctrine has only the most distant resemblance to the popular one, and the latter originated and persisted without being influenced at all by Plato or his school.

143 The epitaphs mentioned in n. 141 have a theological significance but don't specifically refer to any Platonic beliefs or teachings. There's no need to interpret these numerous epitaphs discussing the soul's ascent into the aither, the stars, and so on as showing Platonic influence (as Lehrs argues: Pop. Aufs.2, p. 339 f.). It's true that Alexis 158 K. questions whether the idea that the body decays after death—the immortal one was raised into the air—is a Platonic teaching (This is not Plato's leisure.). However, he lacks a true understanding of Platonic philosophy and mistakenly labels the idea of the ascent of deceased souls to higher realms as Platonic, even though this concept was already popular in Athens before Plato's time. In reality, Plato's teachings bear only a faint resemblance to the popular beliefs, which developed and continued independently of Plato or his followers.

144 Ep. 650, 12. I belong to the company of the blessed which τείρεσσι σὺν αἰθερίοισι χορεύει, λαχὼν θεὸν ἡγεμονῆα. These last words must refer to a special relation of a pious kind to some god. We may note the conclusion of the Caesares of Julian (336 C): Hermes addresses the Emperor: follow the ἐντολαί of πατὴρ Μίθρας in life, καὶ ἡνίκα ἂν ἐνθένδε ἀπιέναι δέῃ, μετὰ τῆς ἀγαθῆς ἐλπίδος ἡγεμόνα θεὸν εὐμενῆ καθιστὰς σεαυτῷ. Cf. also the promise made in an Egyptian magic papyrus ed, Parthey, Abh. Berl. Ak. 1865, p. 125, l. 178 ff.: the ghost thus conjured up will after your death σοῦ τὸ πνεῦμα βαστάξας εἰς ἀέρα ἄξει σὺν αὑτῷ, εἰς γὰρ ᾄδην οὐ χωρήσει ἀέριον πνεῦμα συσταθὲν (i.e. commended) κραταιῷ παρέδρῳ. Cf. Pl., Phd. 107 D ff.: the souls of the dead are conducted each by the δαίμων ὅσπερ ζῶντα εἰλήχει to the judgment place: thence they go εἰς ᾇδου μετὰ ἡγεμόνος ἐκείνου οὗ δὴ προστέτακται τοὺς ἐνθένδε ἐκεῖσε πορεῦσαι. Afterwards yet another, ἄλλος ἡγεμών as it appears, leads them back again. A blessed abode hereafter is found by ἡ καθαρῶς τε καὶ μετρίως τὸν βίον διεξελθοῦσα καὶ ξυνεμπόρων καὶ ἡγεμόνων θεῶν τυχοῦσα, 108 C. The same idea occurs on the monument of Vibia (in the Catacombs of Praetextatus in Rome): Mercurius nuntius 574 conducts her (and Alcestis) before Dispater and Aeracura to be tried: after that a special bonus angelus leads her to the banquet of the blessed (CIL. vi, 142). There is nothing Christian in this, any more than in the whole monument or its inscriptions. (The “angel” as an intermediate being between gods and men had long been taken from Jewish religion by heathen belief and philosophy: they were sometimes identified with the Platonic δαίμονες: see R. Heinze, Xenokrat. 112 f. These intermediate natures, the ἄγγελοι, have nothing to do with the old Greek conception of certain gods as “Messengers” or of the Hero Εὐάγγελος, etc. [cf. Usener, Götternamen, 268 ff.].) With the fanciful picture of Vibia we may compare (besides the Platonic passages mentioned above) what Luc., Philops. 25, has to say of the νεανίας πάγκαλος who leads the souls into the underworld (οἱ ἀγαγόντες αὐτόν less precisely in the parallel narrative of Plutarch, de An. fr. 1, ap. Eus., PE. 11, 36, p. 563 D).

144 Ep. 650, 12. I’m part of the group of the blessed that dances with celestial beings, having received guidance from a god. These last words likely refer to a special kind of pious relationship with some deity. We can note the conclusion of the Caesares of Julian (336 C): Hermes speaks to the Emperor: follow the instructions of Father Mithras in life, And when you need to leave this place, with the hopeful intention of gaining a favorable god for yourself.. Compare also the promise made in an Egyptian magic papyrus, ed. Parthey, Abh. Berl. Ak. 1865, p. 125, l. 178 ff.: the ghost that is conjured will, after your death, Lift your spirit into the air with it because your light spirit won't go to the underworld. that has been assigned to the influential guide. See also Pl., Phd. 107 D ff.: the souls of the dead are led each by the spirit that clings to them as though they were alive to the place of judgment: from there they go to the underworld with their assigned guide, who takes people from here to there. After that, another manual appears to lead them back again. A blessed existence afterward is granted to those who live their lives simply and in moderation, finding themselves among traders and guides of the gods, 108 C. The same concept appears on the monument of Vibia (in the Catacombs of Praetextatus in Rome): Mercurius nuntius 574 leads her (and Alcestis) before Dispater and Aeracura for judgment: after this, a special bonus angelus takes her to the banquet of the blessed (CIL. vi, 142). There’s nothing Christian about this, just as there’s nothing Christian in the entire monument or its inscriptions. (The “angel,” as an intermediary between gods and humans, had long been adopted from Jewish religion by pagan belief and philosophy: sometimes they were identified with the Platonic booze: see R. Heinze, Xenokrat. 112 f. These intermediary beings, the angels, aren’t related to the old Greek notion of certain gods as “Messengers” or the Hero Evangelos, etc. [cf. Usener, Götternamen, 268 ff.].) We can compare Vibia's imaginative depiction with (in addition to the Platonic passages mentioned earlier) what Luc., Philops. 25 says about the beautiful young person who guides souls into the underworld (his guides less precisely in the parallel account of Plutarch, de An. fr. 1, ap. Eus., PE. 11, 36, p. 563 D).

145 Hermes the conductor of the souls as ἄγγελος Φερσεφόνης Ep. 575, 1. Hermes brings the souls to Eubouleus and Persephone, Ep. 272, 9.—He leads the souls to the μακάρων ἠλύσιον πεδίον, 414, 9; 411; to the Islands of the Blest, 107, 2. He leads them by the hand to heaven, to the blessed gods, 312, 8 ff.

145 Hermes, the guide of souls, as Persephone's angel Ep. 575, 1. Hermes brings the souls to Eubouleus and Persephone, Ep. 272, 9.—He leads the souls to the Elysian Fields of the Blessed, 414, 9; 411; to the Islands of the Blest, 107, 2. He guides them by the hand to heaven, to the blessed gods, 312, 8 ff.

146 Ep. 218, 15, ἀλλὰ σύ, παμβασίλεια θεά, πολυώνυμε κουρά, τήνδ’ ἄγ’ ἐπ’ εὐσεβέων χῶρον, ἔχουσα χερός. 452, 17 ff. Of the souls of the dead man, his wife and children it is said: δέχεο ἐς Ἅιδου (Hades does not admit everyone: cf. the dead man who prays οἳ στύγιον χῶρον ὑποναίετε δαίμονες ἐσθλοί, δέξασθ’ εἰς Ἀΐδην κἀμὲ τὸν οἰκτρότατον, 624), πότνια νύμφη, κὶ ψυχὰς προὔπεμπε, ἵνα ξανθὸς Ῥαδάμανθυς. To be thus received and conducted by a god or goddess is evidently regarded as a special favour. The abode of the εὐσεβεῖς is reached by those who have honoured Persephone before all other deities: IG. Sic. et It. 1561. Zeus too conducts the souls, Ep. 511, 1: ἀντί σε κυδαλίμας ἀρετᾶς, πολυήρατε κοῦρε, ἧξεν ἐς Ἠλύσιον αὐτὸς ἄναξ Κρονίδης (θεός, 516, 1–2). Speaking of a Ptolemy who has died young, Antipater Sid. says (AP. vii, 241, 11 ff.) οὐ δέ σε νὺξ ἐκ νυκτὸς ἐδέξατο· δὴ γὰρ ἄνακτας τοίους οὐκ Ἀΐδας, Ζεὺς δ’ ἐς ὄλυμπον ἄγει. Apollo also: Parmenis buried by her parents says [νῦν μεγάλ]ου (to be restored in some such fashion) δέ μ’ ἔχει τέμενος Διός, ὅρρά τ’ Ἀπόλλων [λοιγ]οῦ (doubtful completion) ἄμειψεν, ἑλὼν ἐκ πυρὸς ἀθάνατον, IGM. Aeg. i, 142 (Rhodos).—Tibull. is clearly imitating Greek poetry when he says (1, 3, 57) sed me quod facilis tenero sum semper Amori ipsa Venus campos ducet ad Elysios (the poet himself explains why it should be Venus: he has specially honoured her. There is no need to imagine a Venus Libitina). Phleg., Mirab. 3, p. 130, 16 ff. West. [73, 1 Kell.]: Φοῖβος Ἀπόλλων Πύθιος . . . μοι ἑὸν κρατερὸν θεράποντ’ (the daimonic wolf) ἐπιπέμψας ἤγαγεν εἰς μακάρων τε δόμους καὶ Περσεφονείης.

146 Ep. 218, 15, But you, All-Ruling Goddess, with many names, guide me to the land of the faithful, holding the power to lead me.. 452, 17 ff. Of the souls of the deceased man, his wife and children, it is said: Accept me into the Underworld (Hades does not welcome everyone: see the deceased man who prays You who govern the dark underworld, noble spirits, allow me to enter Hades, the most miserable one., 624), O Mistress Nymph, send forth souls so that the golden Rhadamanthus. Being welcomed and led by a god or goddess is clearly seen as a special privilege. The home of the the devout is attained by those who have honored Persephone before all other gods: IG. Sic. et It. 1561. Zeus too guides the souls, Ep. 511, 1: Instead of your wonderful virtue, most beloved maiden, he himself has come to Elysium, the Lord son of Cronus. (god, 516, 1–2). Referring to a young Ptolemy who has died, Antipater Sid. says (AP. vii, 241, 11 ff.) Night did not welcome you from night; truly, such lords are not from Hades, but Zeus guides you to Olympus.. Apollo as well: Parmenis, buried by her parents, says [now you're awesome]ου (to be restored in some such way) A shrine is for me from Zeus, the boundary of Apollo. [λοιγ]οῦ (uncertain completion) has freed me, pulling me away from the flames of the eternal, IGM. Aeg. i, 142 (Rhodes).—Tibullus is clearly mimicking Greek poetry when he says (1, 3, 57) But since I am always easily swayed by gentle Love, Venus herself will guide me to the Elysian fields. (the poet himself clarifies why it should be Venus: he has particularly honored her. There is no need to imagine a Venus Libitina). Phleg., Mirab. 3, p. 130, 16 ff. West. [73, 1 Kell.]: Phoebus Apollo Pythian... sent his powerful servant to me. (the daimonic wolf) sent him to guide me into the dwellings of the blessed and of Persephone.

147 Isidote, hierophantis in Eleusis (grand-daughter of the famous sophist Isaios) is called by her epitaph (Ἐφ. Ἀρχ. 1885, p. 149, l. 8 ff.) ἔξοχον ἔν τ’ ἀρεταῖς ἔν τε σαοφροσύναισ· ἣν καὶ ἀμειβομένη Δηὼ μακάρων ἐπὶ νήσσους ἤγαγε, παντοίης ἐκτὸς ἐπωδυνίης. (l. 20 ἧν καὶ Δημήτηρ ὤπασεν ἀθανάτοις.)

147 Isidote, a hierophant in Eleusis (granddaughter of the famous sophist Isaios), is referred to by her epitaph (Εφ. Αρχ. 1885, p. 149, l. 8 ff.) Exceptional in virtues and in wisdom; which, as it was exchanged, brought Demeter of the blessed ones to the islands, far from all suffering.. (l. 20 Demeter also bestowed gifts to the immortals..)

148 By their noble death the gods show ὡς ἄμεινον εἴη ἀνθρώπῳ τεθνάναι μᾶλλον ἢ ζώειν, Hdt. i, 31; cf. [Pl.] Axioch. 367 C; Cic., TD. i, 113; Plu., Cons. ad Apoll. 13, 108 E; cf. Amm. Marc. 25, 3, 15.—The epitaph of Isidote alludes to the legend, l. 11: δῶκε (Demeter) δέ οἱ θάνατον γλυκερώτρον ἡδέος ὕπνου πάγχυ καὶ Ἀργείων φέρτερον ἠϊθέων. 575

148 By their noble death, the gods demonstrate that it is better for someone to die than to live, Hdt. i, 31; cf. [Pl.] Axioch. 367 C; Cic., TD. i, 113; Plu., Cons. ad Apoll. 13, 108 E; cf. Amm. Marc. 25, 3, 15.—The epitaph of Isidote references the legend, l. 11: δῶκε (Demeter) and she gave them a death sweeter than a gentle sleep, much better than that of the Argive youths. 575

149 Γηραλέην ψυχὴν ἐπ’ ἀκμαίῳ σώματι Γλαῦκος καὶ κάλλει κεράσας κρείττονα σωφροσύνην, ὄργια πᾶσιν ἔφαινε βροτοῖς φαεσίμβροτα Δηοῦς εἰναετές, δεκάτῳ δ’ ἦλθε παρ’ ἀθανάτους. ἦ καλὸν ἐκ μακάρων μυστήριον, οὐ μόνον εἶναι τὸν θάνατον θνητοῖς οὐ κακόν, ἀλλ’ ἀγαθὸν, Ἐφ. Ἀρχ. 1883, pp. 81–2 (third century A.D.). Below the statue of a daughter of this Glaukos, at Eleusis, there is an inscr., Γλαύκου δὲ γνωτὴ θεοειδέος, ὅς τε καὶ αὐτὸς ἱεροφαντήσας ᾤχετ’ ἐς ἀθανάτους, Ἐφ. Ἀρχ. 1894, p. 205, n. 26, l. 11 ff.

149 An old soul in a vibrant body, Glaucus, where beauty and strength blend in perfect balance, showed all mortals the bright certainty of the gods. On the tenth day, he joined the immortals. It's a beautiful mystery from the blessed—death is not only not a bad thing for mortals, but it’s actually good., Eph. Arch. 1883, pp. 81–2 (third century A.D.). Below the statue of a daughter of this Glaukos, at Eleusis, there is an inscr., Glaucus, known as godlike, who went to the immortals as a hierophant., Eph. Arch. 1894, p. 205, n. 26, l. 11 ff.

150 As a conventional formula; [D.H.] Rhet. 6, 5: ἐπὶ τέλει (of the funeral oration) περὶ ψυχῆς ἀναγκαῖον εἰπεῖν, ὅτι ἀθάνατος, καὶ ὅτι τοὺς τοιούτους, ἐν θεοῖς ὄντας, ἀμεῖνον ἴσως ἀπαλλάττειν.

150 As a standard formula; [D.H.] Rhet. 6, 5: at the end (of the funeral speech) It's essential to speak about the soul, that it is immortal, and that it's perhaps better to free those like it, who are among the gods..

151 —τὸν ἀθάνατοι φιλέεσκον· τοὔνεκα καὶ πηγαῖς λοῦσαν ἐν ἀθανάτοις (we are reminded of the ἀθάνατος πηγή out of which Glaukos drew ἀθανασία: Sch. Pl., Rp. 611 C), καὶ μακάρων νήσους βάλλον ἐς ἀθανάτων, Ep. 366, 4 ff. There are two fountains in Hades, that (to the left) of Lethe, and (to the right) of Mnemosyne, from which cold water flows (l. 5): from the latter the guardians will give the suppliant soul water to drink καὶ τότ’ ἔπειτ’ ἄλλοισι μεθ’ ἡρώεσσιν ἀνάξει: sepulchral tablet from Petelia (about third century B.C.), IG. Sic. et It. 638 (Ep. 1037; Harrison, Proleg. 661 ff.). Mutilated copies of the same original have been found at Eleuthernai in Crete, BCH. 1893–4, p. 126, 629; cf. above, chap. xii, n. 62.—This, in fact, is the “water of life” so often mentioned in the folk-lore of many countries; cf. Grimm, D. Märchen, n. 97, with Notes iii, p. 178, 328; Dieterich, Abraxas, 97 f.; Nekyia, 94, 99. This is the fountain from which Psyche also has to bring water to Venus (Apul., M. vi, 13–14); and it is certain that in the original Psyche-story it was not the water of the Styx that was intended (as Apul. supposes, but of what use would that be?), but the water of the fountain of life in Hades. It is a speaking fountain, vocales aquae (Apul. vi, 14), and, in fact, precisely the same as that mentioned in a unique legend of Herakles given in [Justin.] πρὸς Ἕλληνας 3 (p. 636, 7, ed. Harnack, Ber. Berl. Ak. 1896); Herakles is called ὁ ὄρη πηδήσας (? πιδύσας, “making it gush forth,” would be more acceptable) ἵνα λάβῃ ὕδωρ ἔναρθρον φωνὴν ἀποδιδόν. Herakles makes the mountain gush forth by striking the speaking water out of the rock. This is exactly paralleled in the modern Greek stories given by Hahn, Gr. u. alb. Märchen, ii, p. 234; the Lamia who guards the water of life (τὸ ἀθάνατο νερό, the phrase often appears in these stories; cf. also Schmidt, Griech. Märchen, p. 233) “strikes with a hammer on the rock till it opens and she can draw the water of life”. This is the same ancient fairy tale motif. The proper home of this water of life is probably the lower world, the world of either death or immortality, though this is not expressly stated in the Herakles legend nor in the fairy tale of Glaukos who discovered the ἀθάνατος πηγή (but probably also in the magic country of the West. Thus Alexander the Great finds the ἀθάνατος πηγή at the entrance to the μακάρων χώρα acc. to Ps.-Callisth. ii, 39 ff.; his story shows clear reminiscences of the Glaukos tale, its prototype, in c. 39 fin., 41, 2).—The Orphic (and Pythagorean) mythology of Hades (see above: chap. xi, n. 96; chap. xii, nn. 37–8; chap. vii, n. 21) then proceeded to make use of the folk-tale for their own purposes. In Ep. 658 the prayer also refers to the Orphic fable (CIG. 5772) ψυχρὸν ὕδωρ δοίη σοι ἄναξ ἐνέρων Ἀϊδωνεύς, and 719, 11, ψυχῇ διψώσῃ ψυχρὸν ὕδωρ μεταδός. They mean: may you live on in complete consciousness. (The same thing in the negative: the dead man dwells ἅμα παισὶ θεῶν καὶ λήθης οὐκ ἔπιεν λιβάδα, 414, 10: 576 οὐκ ἔπιον Λήθης Ἀϊδωνίδος ἔσχατον ὕδωρ, so that I can perceive the mourning of the living for my loss, 204, 11. καὶ θνήσκων γὰρ ἔχω νόον οὔτινα βαιόν, 334, 5.—Poetical allusion in AP. vii, 346: σὺ δ’ εἰ θέμις, ἐν φθιμένοισι τοῦ Λήθης ἐπ’ ἐμοὶ μή τι πίῃς ὕδατος.—Perhaps something of the sort already occurs in Pindar; see above, chap. xii, n. 37.)

151 The immortals loved him; because of this, they bathed in the waters of the immortal. (we are reminded of the eternal spring from which Glaukos drew eternity: Sch. Pl., Rp. 611 C), They directed to the islands of the blessed, Ep. 366, 4 ff. In Hades, there are two springs, one on the left that leads to Lethe and one on the right that leads to Mnemosyne, from which cold water flows (l. 5): from the latter, the guardians will provide the requesting soul with water to drink and then it will lead him to the other heroes: sepulchral tablet from Petelia (around the third century B.C.), IG. Sic. et It. 638 (Ep. 1037; Harrison, Proleg. 661 ff.). Damaged versions of the same original have been found at Eleuthernai in Crete, BCH. 1893–4, p. 126, 629; see also above, chap. xii, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__. — This is, in fact, the “water of life” often referenced in the folklore of many cultures; see Grimm, D. Märchen, n. 97, with Notes iii, p. 178, 328; Dieterich, Abraxas, 97 f.; Nekyia, 94, 99. This is the spring from which Psyche also has to retrieve water for Venus (Apul., M. vi, 13–14); and it's apparent that in the original Psyche story, it wasn’t the water of the Styx that was intended (as Apul. suggests; but how would that be useful?), but the water from the fountain of life in Hades. It’s a talking fountain, vocales aquae (Apul. vi, 14), and indeed, it’s exactly the same as the one mentioned in a unique legend of Herakles found in [Justin.] to the Greeks 3 (p. 636, 7, ed. Harnack, Ber. Berl. Ak. 1896); Herakles is called the mountain jumper (? making it gush forth, “would be more appropriate) to draw forth water, while giving an articulate voice. Herakles causes the mountain to gush forth by striking the speaking water from the rock. This is exactly mirrored in modern Greek tales collected by Hahn, Gr. u. alb. Märchen, ii, p. 234; the Lamia who guards the water of life (the immortal water, a phrase that frequently appears in these tales; see also Schmidt, Griech. Märchen, p. 233) “strikes with a hammer on the rock until it opens and she can draw the water of life.” This reflects the same ancient fairy tale motif. The true source of this water of life is probably the underworld, the realm of either death or immortality, although this isn’t directly stated in the Herakles legend or in the fairy tale of Glaukos who found the immortal spring (but likely also in the magical land of the West). Thus, Alexander the Great discovers the immortal spring at the entrance to the land of the blessed according to Ps.-Callisth. ii, 39 ff.; his story shows clear echoes of the Glaukos tale, its source, in c. 39 fin., 41, 2). — The Orphic (and Pythagorean) mythology of Hades (see above: chap. xi, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; chap. xii, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__–8; chap. vii, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__) later used the folk tale for their own purposes. In Ep. 658, the prayer also references the Orphic fable (CIG. 5772) may the cold water be granted to you, lord of the underworld, and 719, 11, may it give cold water to the thirsty soul. They mean: may you continue to exist with full awareness. (The same is conveyed in the negative: the deceased dwells together with the children of the gods, and did not drink from the meadow of forgetfulness, 414, 10: 576 did not drink from the last water of forgetfulness, so that I can perceive the mourning of the living for my loss, 204, 11. for even in dying, I possess the ability to think of something, 334, 5. — There’s a poetical reference in AP. vii, 346: if you think it’s right, do not let water touch me from the forgotten fields. — Perhaps something like that already appears in Pindar; see above, chap. xii, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__.)

152 εὐψύχει κυρία καὶ δοίη σοι ὁ Ὄσιρις τὸ ψυχρὸν ὕδωρ, IG. Sic. et It. 1488; 1705; 1782; Rev. Arch. 1887, p. 201. (And once the line σοὶ δὲ Ὀσείριδος ἁγνὸν ὕδωρ Εἶσις χαρίσαιτο, inscr. from Alexandria: Rev. Arch. 1887, p. 199.) εὐψύχει μετὰ τοῦ Ὀσείριδος, I. Sic. et It. 2098. The dead man is with Osiris, Ep. 414, 5. Osiris as lord in the world of the blessed: defixio from Rome, I. Sic. et It. 1047; ὁ μέγας Ὄσειρις ὁ ἔχων τὴν κατεξουσίαν καὶ τὸ βασίλειον τῶν νερτέρων θεῶν.—It appears that the legend of the fountain of Mnemosyne and its cold water was independently developed by the Greeks and then associated subsequently with the analogous Egyptian idea or brought into harmony with it (certainly not as e.g. Böttiger, Kl. Schr., thinks, originally belonging to the Egyptians alone and thence imported into Greece from Egypt). Egyptian Books of the dead often speak of the cool water that the dead enjoy (cf. Maspero, Ét. de mythol. et d’arch. égypt. 1893, 1, 366 f.), as well as of the water drawn from the Nile and preserving the youth of the dead man: Maspero, Notices et Extraits, 24, 1883, pp. 99–100. The formula, “may Osiris give you the cold water” (everlasting life), does not seem to occur on original Egyptian monuments. It is prob. therefore modelled by Egyptian Greeks on their own ancient Greek formula.—On Christian inss. we often have the formula: spiritum tuum dominus (or deus Christus, or a holy martyr) refrigeret: see Kraus, Realencykl. d. christl. Alterth. s.v. refrigerium. This is probably, as has been frequently suggested, an imitation of the heathen formula, like so many features of early Christian burial usage.

152 May Osiris give you the refreshing water., IG. Sic. et It. 1488; 1705; 1782; Rev. Arch. 1887, p. 201. (And once the line may you be granted the pure water of Osiris, inscribed from Alexandria: Rev. Arch. 1887, p. 199.) May you be blessed by Osiris., I. Sic. et It. 2098. The dead man is with Osiris, Ep. 414, 5. Osiris as the lord in the realm of the blessed: defixio from Rome, I. Sic. et It. 1047; the great Osiris who rules over the underworld and its deities.—It seems that the story of the fountain of Mnemosyne and its cold water was developed independently by the Greeks and later associated with a similar Egyptian concept or aligned with it (certainly not as Böttiger suggests, originating exclusively from the Egyptians and imported to Greece). Egyptian Books of the Dead often mention the cool water that the dead enjoy (cf. Maspero, Ét. de mythol. et d’arch. égypt. 1893, 1, 366 f.), as well as water from the Nile that preserves the youth of the deceased: Maspero, Notices et Extraits, 24, 1883, pp. 99–100. The phrase, "may Osiris give you the cold water" (eternal life), does not appear on original Egyptian monuments. It is likely modeled by Egyptian Greeks after their own ancient Greek phrase.—On Christian inscriptions, we often find the phrase: spiritum tuum dominus (or deus Christus, or a holy martyr) refrigeret: see Kraus, Realencykl. d. christl. Alterth. s.v. refrigerium. This is probably, as has been suggested, an imitation of the pagan formula, like many aspects of early Christian burial customs.

153 On sarcophagi in Isauria the lion is sometimes represented on the lid with the inscr. describing the contents: ὁ δεῖνα ζῶν καὶ φρονῶν ἀνέθηκεν ἑαυτὸν λέοντα καὶ τὴν γυναῖκα αὐτοῦ προτέραν, etc. On another sarcophagus: Λούκιος ἀνέστησε (three names) καὶ ἑαυτὸν ἀετὸν καὶ Ἄμμουκιν Βαβόου τὸν πατέρα ἀετὸν τειμῆς χάριν, American School at Athens, iii, p. 26, 91–2. These expressions must refer to something quite different from the otherwise not uncommon practice of representing lions or eagles on graves. I can only explain them on the supposition that the dead persons represent themselves and the relatives named in the forms which had belonged to them in the mysteries of Mithras, in which lions and lionesses formed the fourth grade, and eagles, ἀετοί (or ἱέρακες) the seventh (cf. Porph., Abst. iv, 16); these are elsewhere called πατέρες.

153 On sarcophagi in Isauria, the lion is sometimes depicted on the lid with an inscription describing the contents: The certain person, living and thinking, dedicated himself as a lion and his wife first., etc. On another sarcophagus: Λούκιος revived (three names) And himself as an eagle and Ammukin Babou, the father eagle, for the sake of honor., American School at Athens, iii, p. 26, 91–2. These expressions must refer to something quite different from the otherwise common practice of depicting lions or eagles on graves. I can only explain them on the assumption that the deceased individuals represent themselves and the family members named in the forms that belonged to them in the mysteries of Mithras, where lions and lionesses were the fourth grade and eagles, eagles (or hawks) the seventh (cf. Porph., Abst. iv, 16); these are referred to elsewhere as fathers.

154 The soul of a dead son (who as it appears from ll. 1, 2, 6 ff. had been killed by a flash of lightning and therefore removed to a higher state of being [see Append. i]) appears by night to his mother and confirms her own assertion, οὐκ ἤμην βροτός, Ep. 320. The soul of their daughter who has died ἄωρος and ἀθαλάμευτος appears to her parents on the ninth day (l. 35) after death, 372, 31 ff. (The ninth day marks the end of the first offerings to the dead: see above, chap. v, n. 84; cf. “Apparitions of the deceased occur most frequently on the ninth day after death”: a German superstition mentioned by Grimm, 1812, n. 856.) It is significant that the daughter who thus appears in a vision has died unmarried. The ἄγαμοι, like the ἄωροι, do not find rest after death: see Append. vii and iii. The 577 soul of another unmarried maiden says distinctly that those like herself are especially able to appear in dreams: ἠϊθέοις γὰρ ἔδωκε θεὸς μετὰ μοῖραν ὀλέθρον ὡς ζώουσι λαλεῖν πᾶσιν ἐπιχθονίοις, Ep. 325, 7–8.—It becomes more general, however, in 522, 12–13: σώματα γὰρ κατέλυσε Δίκη, ψυχὴ δὲ προπᾶσα ἀθάνατος δι’ ὅλου (thus the stone, Ath. Mitt. xiv, 193) πωτωμένη πάντ’ ἐπακούει (cf. Eur., Orest. 667 ff.).

154 The spirit of a deceased son (who, as indicated in lines 1, 2, 6 ff., was struck down by lightning and thus elevated to a higher state of existence [see Append. i]) visits his mother at night and confirms her own claim, I was not human., Ep. 320. The spirit of their daughter, who has died early and not subject to change, appears to her parents on the ninth day (l. 35) after her death, 372, 31 ff. (The ninth day signifies the conclusion of the initial offerings for the deceased: see above, chap. v, n. 84; cf. “Apparitions of the deceased occur most frequently on the ninth day after death”: a German superstition mentioned by Grimm, 1812, n. 856.) It's noteworthy that the daughter who appears in a vision has died unmarried. The single, like the uncharted, do not find peace after death: see Append. vii and iii. The 577 spirit of another unmarried young woman clearly states that those like her are especially capable of appearing in dreams: For the mortals, the god gave a share of destruction as they live to speak to all those on the earth., Ep. 325, 7–8.—It becomes more general, however, in 522, 12–13: For Justice has destroyed bodies, but the soul is entirely immortal throughout. (thus the stone, Ath. Mitt. xiv, 193) πωτωμένη πάντ’ ἐπακούει (cf. Eur., Orest. 667 ff.).

155 ψυχὴ δὲ—says his son and pupil to the dead physician Philadelphos—ἐκ ῥεθέων πταμένη μετὰ δαίμονας ἄλλους ἤλυθε σή, ναίες δ’ ἐν μακάρων δαπέδῳ, ἵλαθι καί μοι ὄπαζε νόσων ἄκος, ὡς τὸ πάροιθεν, νῦν γὰρ θειοτέρην μοῖραν ἔχεις βιότου, Ep. 243, 5 ff. (Inscr. Perg. ii, 576).

155 ψυχὴ δὲ —says his son and student to the deceased physician Philadelphos—You have come from the world of the dead along with other spirits, and now you live in the halls of the blessed; please be kind and relieve me of my suffering, as you did before, for now you have a more divine existence., Ep. 243, 5 ff. (Inscr. Perg. ii, 576).

156 There is a striking conjunction of the most exalted hope and the most utter unbelief on a single stone: Ep. 261.

156 There is a remarkable combination of the highest hope and complete disbelief on a single stone: Ep. 261.

157 εἴ γέ τι ἔστι (ἐστέ) κάτω, CIG. 6442.—κατὰ γῆς εἴπερ χρηστοῖς γέρας ἐστίν, Ep. 48, 6; 63, 3. εἴ γ’ ἐν φθιμένοισί τις αἴσθησις, τέκνον, ἐστίνEp. 700, 4. εἰ δέ τίς ἐστι νόος παρὰ Ταρτάρῳ ἢ παρὰ Λήθῃ, 722, 5. εἰ γένος εὐσεβέων ζώει μετὰ τέρμα βίοιο, AP. vii, 673.—Cf. above, chap. xii, n. 17.

157 if there’s anything (you're)below, CIG. 6442.—on earth if it's a gift for the greater good, Ep. 48, 6; 63, 3. If there’s some understanding in what’s temporary, child,Ep. 700, 4. if there is any understanding by Tartarus or by Lethe, 722, 5. if a race of the faithful exists after life ends, AP. vii, 673.—Cf. above, chap. xii, n. 17.

158 Call., Epigr. 15; Ep. 646; 646a (p. xv); 372, 1 ff.

158 Call., Epigr. 15; Ep. 646; 646a (p. xv); 372, 1 ff.

159 ἡμεῖς δὲ πάντες οἱ κάτω, τεθνηκότες, ὀστέα, τέφρα γεγόναμεν, ἄλλο δ’ οὐδὲ ἕν, Ep. 646, 5 f.; cf. 298, 3–4. ἐκ γαίας βλαστὼν γαῖα πάλιν γέγονα, 75 (third century B.C.); cf. 438; 311, 5: τοῦθ’ ὅ ποτ’ ὤν (the I that was once living has now become these things, viz.), στήλη, τύμβος, λίθος, εἰκών. 513, 2, κεῖται ἀναίσθητος ὥσπερ λίθος (cf. Thgn. 567 f.) ἠὲ σίδηρος. 551, 3, κεῖται λίθος ὥς, ἡ πάνσοφος, ἡ περίβωτος.

159 We all down here, dead, have turned into bones and ash; nothing else is left., Ep. 646, 5 f.; cf. 298, 3–4. From the earth, I have grown and returned to the earth., 75 (third century BCE); cf. 438; 311, 5: This is who I used to be. (the I that was once living has now become these things, i.e.), tombstone image. 513, 2, lies lifeless like a stone (cf. Thgn. 567 f.) or metal. 551, 3, lies like a stone, the all-knowing, the all-embracing.

160 Ἕστηκεν μὲν Ἕρως (prob. on the monument) εὕδων ὕπνον, ἐν φθιμένοις δὲ οὐ πόθος, οὐ φιλότης ἔστι κατοιχομένοις. ἀλλ’ ὁ θανὼν κεῖται πεδίῳ λίθος οἷα πεπηγώς, εἰχώρων ἀπαλῶν σάρκας ἀποσκεδάσας—ἐξ ὕδατος καὶ γῆς καὶ πνεύματος (here evidently not in the Stoic sense, but simply = ἀήρ) ἠα πάροιθεν· ἀλλὰ θανὼν κεῖμαι πᾶσι (all the elements) τὰ πάντ’ ἀποδούς. πᾶσιν τοῦτο μένει· τί δὲ τὸ πλέον; ὁππόθεν ἦλθεν, εἰς τοῦτ’ αὖτ’ ἐλύθη σῶμα μαραινόμενον (inscr. in Bucharest; Gomperz, Arch. epigr. Mitt. a. Oest. vi, 30).

160 Love endures (probably on the monument) While sleeping, in decay there is no desire, no love for those who remain there. But the dead lie like a stone in the ground, like something fixed, having scattered the soft flesh—made of water, earth, and spirit. (here evidently not in the Stoic sense, but simply = air) I’m everywhere; but since I’m dead, I lie still for everyone. (all the elements) Everyone has come back. This is true for all; but what else? No matter where it originated, it has also dissolved the fading body into this. (inscr. in Bucharest; Gomperz, Arch. epigr. Mitt. a. Oest. vi, 30).

161 πνεῦμα λαβὼν δάνος οὐρανόθεν τελέσας χρόνον ἀνταπέδωκα, Ep. 613, 6. (This is a commonplace of popular philosophy: “life is only lent to man”; see Wyttenbach on Plu., Cons. ad Apoll. 106 F; Upton on Epict. 1, 1, 32 Schw.; cf. usura vitae Anth. Lat. Ep. ed. Bücheler, i, p. 90, n. 183.)

161 I received the spirit from above and have returned the time I borrowed., Ep. 613, 6. (This is a common saying in popular philosophy: “life is just a loan to humanity”; see Wyttenbach on Plu., Cons. ad Apoll. 106 F; Upton on Epict. 1, 1, 32 Schw.; cf. the wear of life Anth. Lat. Ep. ed. Bücheler, i, p. 90, n. 183.)

162 Epitaph from Amorgos: Ath. Mitt. 1891, p. 176, which ends: τὸ τέλος ἀπέδωκα.

162 Epitaph from Amorgos: Ath. Mitt. 1891, p. 176, which ends: I delivered the end..

163 δαίμων ὁ πικρὸς κτλ., Ep. 127, 3 (cf. 59). ἀστόργου μοῖρα κίχεν θανάτου, 146, 6. δίσσα δὲ τέκνα λιποῦσαν ἁ παντοβάρης λάβε μ’ Ἅιδης, ἄκριτον ἄστοργον θηρὸς ἔχων κραδίην (Tyrrheion in Akarnania, BCH. 1886, p. 178).

163 Daimon the Bitter, Ep. 127, 3 (cf. 59). the fate of the heartless has faced death, 146, 6. Two children left behind, completely consumed, take me, Hades, carrying within him the brutal and heartless beast. (Tyrrheion in Akarnania, BCH. 1886, p. 178).

164 παύσασθαι δεινοῦ πένθους δεινοῦ τε κυδοιμοῦ· οὐδὲν γὰρ πλέον (ΠΑCIΝ the stone as stated) ἐστί, θανόντα γὰρ οὐδένα (read οὐδὲν) ἐγείρει κτλ., ins. from Larisa, Ath. Mitt. xi, 451. εἰ δ’ ἦν τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἀνάγειν πάλιν, ins. from Pherai, BCH. 1889, p. 404.

164 stop the terrible grieving and the horrible chaos; there is nothing more (PACIN the stone as stated) there is, because nothing can bring the dead back to life (read nothing) it raises, etc., ins. from Larisa, Ath. Mitt. xi, 451. if there were a way to bring back the good people, ins. from Pherai, BCH. 1889, p. 404.

165 οὐ κακός ἐστ’ Ἀίδης—comfort being derived from the fact that death is “common”. Ep. 256, 9–10; 282; 292, 6; 298.

165 Death isn't terrible—it's reassuring to know that it's something we all go through. Ep. 256, 9–10; 282; 292, 6; 298.

166 εὐψύχει, τέκνον, οὐδεὶς ἀθάνατος, IG. Sic. et It. 1531; 1536 (cf. 1743 ad fin.); 1997 and frequent; CIG. 4463; 4467 (Syria), εὐψύχει Ἀταλάντη, ὅσα γεννᾶται τελευτᾷ, IG. Sic. et It. 1832. καὶ ὁ Ἡρακλῆς ἀπέθανεν, 1806.—Even on Christian graves the formula is frequent: εὐψύχει (ἡ δεῖνα), οὐδεὶς ἀθάνατος (see Schultze, Die Katakomben, 251). 578

166 eu)psu/chei, child, no one lives forever., IG. Sic. et It. 1531; 1536 (cf. 1743 at the end); 1997 and often; CIG. 4463; 4467 (Syria), eu)psu/chei Atalantê, everything that is born must die., IG. Sic. et It. 1832. And Hercules died, 1806.—Even on Christian graves, this phrase is common: eu)psu/chei(the chosen one)no one is immortal (see Schultze, Die Katakomben, 251). 578

167 οὐκ ἤμην, γενόμην, οὐκ ἔσομ’ οὐ μέκει μοι· ὁ βίος ταῦτα. IG. Sic. et It. 2190 (the original form of the ending is probably οὐκ ἔσομαι· τί πλέον; see Gomperz, Arch. ep. Mitt. Oesterr. vii, 149; Ztschr. f. öst. Gymn. 1879, p. 437); cf. Ep. 1117, οὐκ ἤμην, γενόμην, ἤμην, οὐκ εἰμί· τοσαῦτα· (this τοσαῦτα, or more commonly ταῦτα, is frequent in epitaphs as a formula of resignation—a summary of existence: “all life comes to nothing but this.” See Loch, Zu d. griech. Grabschr. 289–95)—εἰ δέ τις ἄλλο ἑρέει, ψεύσεται· οὐκ ἔσομαι. CIG. 6265: εὐψυχῶ, ὅστις οὐκ ἤμην καὶ ἐγενόμην, οὔκ εἰμι καὶ οὐ λυποῦμαι (cf. also Ep. 502, 15; 646, 14; AP. vii, 339, 5–6; x, 118, 3–4). Frequent also in a Latin form: Non eris, nec fuisti, Sen., Epist. 77, 11 (see above, chap. xiv, pt. i, n. 68). Ausonius, p. 252, ed. Schenkl (ex sepulchro latinae viae): nec sum nec fueram; genitus tamen e nihilo sum. mitte nec explores singula, talis eris (probably this is how it should be read); cf. CIL. ii, 1434; v, 1813, 1939, 2893; viii, 2885, etc.; Bücheler, Carm. lat. epigr. i, p. 116.

167 I didn’t exist, I came into existence, and I won’t exist; life is just this.. IG. Sic. et It. 2190 (the original form of the ending is probably I won’t exist; what else is there?; see Gomperz, Arch. ep. Mitt. Oesterr. vii, 149; Ztschr. f. öst. Gymn. 1879, p. 437); cf. Ep. 1117, I wasn't, I became, I was, I’m not; that’s all. (this this, or more commonly these, is frequent in epitaphs as a phrase of acceptance—a summary of existence: “all life amounts to nothing but this.” See Loch, Zu d. griech. Grabschr. 289–95)—If anyone talks about anything else, they will be lying; I won't be here.. CIG. 6265: I am at peace; whether someone existed or came into being, I don't exist and I don't feel sad. (cf. also Ep. 502, 15; 646, 14; AP. vii, 339, 5–6; x, 118, 3–4). Frequently also in a Latin form: You are not, and you weren't., Sen., Epist. 77, 11 (see above, chap. xiv, pt. i, n. 68). Ausonius, p. 252, ed. Schenkl (from the sepulchre of the Latin road): I’m neither one nor the other, nor was I; however, I came from nothing. Don’t ask for details, you will be that way. (probably this is how it should be read); cf. CIL. ii, 1434; v, 1813, 1939, 2893; viii, 2885, etc.; Bücheler, Carm. lat. epigr. i, p. 116.

168 γνοὺς ὡς θνατοῖς οὐδὲν γλυκερώτερον αὐγᾶς ζῆθι, Ep. 560, 7. Coarser admonitions to enjoy the passing hour, CIG. 3846 (iii, p. 1070). Ep. 362, 5. παῖσον, τρύφησον, ζῆσον· ἀποθανεῖν σε δεῖ, 439, 480a, 7. An ins. from Saloniki, second century A.D., Ath. Mitt. 1896, p. 99, concludes—ὁ βίος οὗτος. τί στήκ(ε)ις ἀνθρωπε; ταῦτα βλέπων ΥΠΑΛΟΥΣΟΥ (ἀπόλαυσον? Or ἀπολαύου?).

168 Knowing that for humans nothing is sweeter than the light of life., Ep. 560, 7. Blunt reminders to enjoy the moment, CIG. 3846 (iii, p. 1070). Ep. 362, 5. Have fun, enjoy yourself, live life; you have to die., 439, 480a, 7. An inscription from Salonika, second century A.D., Ath. Mitt. 1896, p. 99, ends with—this life. Why are you standing still, man? Look at this, enjoy it. (or enjoy it?).

169 εἰ καὶ . . . φροῦδον σῶμα . . . ἀλλ’ ἀρετὰ βιοτᾶς αἰὲν ζωοῖσι μέτεστι, ψυχᾶς μανύουσ’ εὐκλέα σωφροσύνην, Ep. 560, 10 ff. σῶμα μὲν ἐνθάδ’ ἔχει σόν, Δίφιλε, γαῖα θανόντος, μνῆμα δὲ σῆς ἔλιπες πᾶσι δικαιοσύνης (and elsewhere with variations): Ep. 56–8. Or only: . . τέλεσεν δὲ καὶ ἐσσομένοισι νοῆσαι στήλην, Ath. Mitt. 1891, p. 263, 3 (Thessaly). Homeric: see above, chap. i, n. 88, and cf. σᾶμα τοζ’ Ἰδαμενεὺς ποίησα ἵνα κλέως εἴη . . . ancient inscr. from Rhodos: Ath. Mitt. 1891, p. 112, 243 (IGM. Aeg. i, n. 737).

169 If there is also a healthy body... the essence of life is always found in living beings, and the soul showcases the beautiful wisdom of self-discipline., Ep. 560, 10 ff. This body here holds yours, Diophile, the ground of the dead, but your memory remains for all to see justice. (and elsewhere with variations): Ep. 56–8. Or only: . . and it created a monument for those who will come after, Ath. Mitt. 1891, p. 263, 3 (Thessaly). Homeric: see above, chap. i, n. 88, and cf. the body that Idameneus created to gain glory... ancient inscr. from Rhodos: Ath. Mitt. 1891, p. 112, 243 (IGM. Aeg. i, n. 737).

170 From an earlier period (ca. third century B.C.), Ep. 44: ἢν ὁ σύνευνος ἔστερξεν μὲν ζῶσαν ἐπένθησεν δὲ θανοῦσαν. φῶς δ’ ἔλιπ’ εὐδαίμων, παῖδας παίδων ἐπιδοῦσα. Fine also are 67 and 81b. But something like them appears even late: 647, 5–10; 556: a priestess of Zeus congratulates herself εὔτεκνον ἀστονάχητον ἔχει τάφος· οὐ γὰρ ἀμαυρῶς δαίμονες ἡμετέρην ἔβλεπον εὐσεβίην.—To recover for a moment the taste of the old robust spirit we may remind ourselves of Herodotos’ story of Tellos the Athenian, the happiest of mankind. He was born in a prosperous city, had fine children and saw the children of all these children, none of whom died. And his happy life was crowned by a noble end. In a battle of the Athenians against their neighbours he was successful in putting the foe to rout and then he himself fell while fighting, so that his country buried him in the place where he fell and honoured him greatly. (Hdt. i, 30. Herodotos’ Solon does indeed assign the second prize of happiness to Kleobis and Biton and their fortunate end: c. 31. A changed attitude to life makes itself felt in their story.)

170 From an earlier period (ca. third century B.C.), Ep. 44: If the companion grieved for the living, he also grieved for the dead. Light departed from the fortunate as he bestowed a gift upon the children of children.. Fine also are 67 and 81b. But something like them appears even late: 647, 5–10; 556: a priestess of Zeus congratulates herself She has a grave of lucky children because the divine beings did not overlook our devotion..—To briefly recapture the essence of the old robust spirit, we can recall Herodotos’ story of Tellos the Athenian, the happiest of humans. He was born in a prosperous city, had wonderful children, and even saw the grandchildren of all of those children, none of whom passed away. His happy life was crowned by a noble end. In a battle between the Athenians and their neighbors, he successfully routed the enemy and then fell while fighting, so his country buried him where he fell and honored him greatly. (Hdt. i, 30. Herodotos’ Solon indeed awards the second prize of happiness to Kleobis and Biton and their fortunate end: c. 31. A changed attitude to life is evident in their story.)

171 Mundus senescens, Cyprian, ad Demetr. 3 ff. The Christians lay the blame for the impoverishment and decay of life on the heathen. The latter in turn blame the recently arrived and now dominant Christianity for the unhappiness of the time: Tertull., Apol. 40 ff.; Arnob. 1; Aug., CD. It was already a vulgare proverbium—Pluvia defit, causa Christiani sunt, CD. ii, 3. The Emp. Julian found τὴν οἰκουμένην ὥσπερ λιποψυχοῦσαν and wished τὴν φθορὰν τῆς οἰκουμένης στῆσαι, Liban., Or. i, p. 617, 10; 529, 4.—The Christians returned the compliment: the reason why everything in nature and the life 579 of men was going awry is simply paganorum exacerbata perfidia (Leg. Novell. Theodos. ii, i, 3, p. 10 Ritt.).

171 The world is aging, Cyprian, ad Demetr. 3 ff. The Christians blame the decline and deterioration of life on the non-believers. The non-believers, in turn, accuse the newly emerged and now dominant Christianity for the misfortunes of the times: Tertull., Apol. 40 ff.; Arnob. 1; Aug., CD. There was already a Common proverb—The rain is lacking; it’s because of the Christians., CD. ii, 3. The Emperor Julian saw the world as if despairing and wished to stand against the decay of the world, Liban., Or. i, p. 617, 10; 529, 4.—The Christians returned the favor: the reason why everything in nature and human life 579 was going wrong was simply pagan treachery heightened (Leg. Novell. Theodos. ii, i, 3, p. 10 Ritt.).

172 We know of a certain Nikagoras Minuc. f. (significantly enough an ardent admirer of Plato) temp. Const. δᾳδοῦχος τῶν ἁγιωτάτων Ἐλευσῖνι μυστηρίων, CIG. 4770. Julian, even as a boy, was initiated at Eleusis: Eunap., V. Soph., p. 53 (Boiss.). At that time, however, in miserandam ruinam conciderat Eleusina, Mamert., Act. Jul. 9. Here again Julian seems to have restored the cult. Valentinian I, on the point of abolishing all nocturnal festivals (see Cod. Theod. iii, 9, 16, 7), allowed them to continue when Praetextatus Procons. of Achaea represented to him that for the Greeks ὁ βίος would be ἀβίωτος, εἰ μέλλοιεν κωλύεσθαι τὰ συνέχοντα τὸ ἀνθρώπειον γένος ἁγιώτατα μυστήρια κατὰ θεσμὸν ἐκτελεῖν, Zosim. iv, 3. (Praetext. was a friend of Symmachus and, like him, one of the last pillars of Roman orthodoxy: princeps religiosorum, Macr., S. i, 11, 1. He was himself sacratus Eleusiniis, and hierophanta there: CIL. vi, 1779; probably the Πραιτέξτατος ὁ ἱεροφάντης of Lyd., Mens. 4, 2, p. 148 R. [p. 65 W.], is the same person.) In 375 A.D. we hear of a Nestorius (probably the father of the Neoplatonic Plutarch) as ἱεροφαντεῖν τεταγμένος at the time (Zos. iv, 18). In 396 during the hierophantia of a πατὴρ τῆς Μιθριακῆς τελετῆς (whose oath should have excluded him from that office) the temple of Eleusis was destroyed by Alaric, incited thereto by the monks who accompanied him (Eunap., VS., p. 52–3). The regular holding of the festival must then have come to an end.—Evidence of later celebration of the Eleusinia is not forthcoming. The expressions of Proclus, which Maass regards as “certainly” proving that the festival was still being held in the fifth century (Orpheus, 15), are quite insufficient to the purpose. Proclus speaks of various sacred ceremonies of initiation from which we μεμαθήκαμεν something: of a φήμη, i.e. written tradition, of certain unspecified Eleusinian θεολόγοι; of what the Eleus. mysteries ὑπισχνοῦνται to the mystai (just as we might speak in the present tense of the permanent content of Greek religion). These passages prove nothing: whereas the imperfects which he uses elsewhere clearly show that neither temple nor festival existed any longer in his time. (He speaks, in Alc., p. 5 Crz., of what used to be in the temple of Eleusis and still more of what formerly occurred ἐν τοῖς Ἐλευσινίοις ἱεροῖς—ἐβόων κτλ., in Ti. 293 C.) The festival moreover cannot have gone on without the temple and its apparatus.

172 We know of a certain Nikagoras Minuc. f. (an enthusiastic admirer of Plato) during the time of Const. torchbearer of the most sacred Eleusinian mysteries, CIG. 4770. Julian, even as a child, was initiated at Eleusis: Eunap., V. Soph., p. 53 (Boiss.). At that time, however, Eleusis will fall into ruin., Mamert., Act. Jul. 9. Here too, Julian seems to have revived the cult. Valentinian I, about to abolish all nighttime festivals (see Cod. Theod. iii, 9, 16, 7), allowed them to continue when Praetextatus, Proconsul of Achaea, pointed out that for the Greeks Life would be If they were to be prevented from performing the most sacred mysteries established for humanity, life would be unbearable., Zosim. iv, 3. (Praetextatus was a friend of Symmachus and, like him, one of the last supporters of Roman orthodoxy: princeps religiosorum, Macr., S. i, 11, 1. He was also sacratus Eleusiniis, and hierophanta there: CIL. vi, 1779; probably the High Priest is the Hierophant mentioned by Lyd., Mens. 4, 2, p. 148 R. [p. 65 W.], is the same person.) In 375 CE we hear of a Nestorius (probably the father of the Neoplatonic Plutarch) as ἱεροφαίνεσθαι set apart at that time (Zos. iv, 18). In 396 during the hierophantia of a father of the Mithraic ritual (whose oath should have excluded him from that role), the temple of Eleusis was destroyed by Alaric, egged on by the monks who accompanied him (Eunap., VS., p. 52–3). The regular celebration of the festival must then have come to an end.—There is no evidence of later celebrations of the Eleusinia. Proclus' statements, which Maass considers as “certainly” proving that the festival was still taking place in the fifth century (Orpheus, 15), are not sufficient. Proclus refers to various sacred initiation ceremonies of which we we've learned something: a reputation, or written tradition, of certain unspecified Eleusinian theologians; about what the Eleus. mysteries ὑπισχνοῦνται to the mystai (just as we might refer to the lasting content of Greek religion). These passages prove nothing: while the imperfects he uses elsewhere clearly indicate that neither temple nor festival were continuing in his time. (He mentions, in Alc., p. 5 Crz., what used to be in the temple of Eleusis and even more what formerly occurred ἐν τοῖς Ἐλευσινίοις ἱεροῖς—ἐβόων κτλ., in Ti. 293 C.) Moreover, the festival could not have continued without the temple and its setup.

173 The Orphic hymns in the form in which we have them all belong as it seems to one period, and that can hardly have been earlier than the third century A.D. They are all composed for practical use in the cult, and that presupposes the existence of Orphic communities (see Schöll, Commun. et coll. quib. Graec. [Sat. Saupp.], p. 14 ff.; Dieterich, de H. Orph.).—It must be admitted that they were not purely and exclusively Orphic communities for which the poems were written. These hymns, called “Orphic” a potiori, make use in parts of older Orphic poetry (cf. H. 62, 2 f., with [Dem.] 25, 11).

173 The Orphic hymns we have all seem to come from one period, likely no earlier than the third century CE They were all created for practical use in the cult, which suggests there were Orphic communities (see Schöll, Commun. et coll. quib. Graec. [Sat. Saupp.], p. 14 ff.; Dieterich, de H. Orph.).—It's important to note that these were not purely Orphic communities for which the poems were intended. These hymns, referred to as “Orphic” by extension, incorporate elements of older Orphic poetry (cf. H. 62, 2 f., with [Dem.] 25, 11).

174 Probably all these cults promised immortality to their mystai. This is certain in the worship of Isis (cf. Burckhardt, Zeit Constantins d. G.2, p. 195 ff.). Apul., M. xi, 21–3, alludes to symbolic death and reawakening to everlasting life as the subject of the δρώμενα in the Isis mysteries. The initiated is thus renatus (21). In the same way the mystai of Mithras are said to be in aeternum renati: CIL. vi, 510; 736. Immortality must certainly have been promised. Acc. to Tert., Pr. Haer. 40, the mysteries of Mithras 580 included an imago resurrectionis. By this the Christian author can only understand a real ἀνάστασις τῆς σαρκός. Did these mysteries promise to their ὅσιοι a resurrection of the body and everlasting life? This belief in the ἀνάστασις νεκρῶν (always a difficulty for the Greeks: Act Ap. xvii, 18; 32; Plotin. 3, 6, 6 fin.) is in fact ancient Persian (Theopomp. fr. 71–2; Hübschmann, Jb. Prot. Theol. v, p. 222 ff.), and probably came to the Jews from Persia. It is possible then that it may have been the essential idea of the Mithras mysteries.—Hopes of immortality as they appeared to the mystai of Sabazios are illustrated by the sculptures of the monument of Vibia (in the Catac. of Praetextatus), and of Vincentius: numinis antistes Sabazis Vincentius hic est. Qui sacra sancta deum mente pia coluit (Garrucci, Tre Sepolcri, etc., tab. i–iii, Nap. 1852).—It is difficult to see why Christian archeologists should regard this Vincentius as a Christian. He calls himself a worshipper of “the gods” and an antistes Sabazii (there cannot be the slightest objection to giving this meaning to numinis antistes Sabazis. The difficulties raised by Schultze, Katakomben, 44, are groundless: Sabazis = Sabazii is no more objectionable or doubtful than the genitives Clodis, Helis: see Ritschl, Opusc. iv, 454–6. The arrangement of words, n. a. Sab., is due to the exigencies of metre).

174 It seems that all these cults promised immortality to their mystai. This is definitely the case in the worship of Isis (cf. Burckhardt, Zeit Constantins d. G.2, p. 195 ff.). Apul., M. xi, 21–3, mentions symbolic death and rebirth to eternal life as the focus of the events in the Isis mysteries. The initiated person is thus renatus (21). Similarly, the mystai of Mithras are said to be in aeternum renati: CIL. vi, 510; 736. Immortality must have been promised. According to Tert., Pr. Haer. 40, the mysteries of Mithras 580 included an imago resurrection. This could only mean a real resurrection of the body. Did these mysteries promise their saints a resurrection of the body and eternal life? This belief in the resurrection of the dead (always a challenge for the Greeks: Act Ap. xvii, 18; 32; Plotin. 3, 6, 6 fin.) is indeed ancient Persian (Theopomp. fr. 71–2; Hübschmann, Jb. Prot. Theol. v, p. 222 ff.), and probably came to the Jews from Persia. It’s possible then that this might have been the fundamental idea of the Mithras mysteries.—The hopes of immortality as they appeared to the mystai of Sabazios are illustrated by the sculptures on the monument of Vibia (in the Catac. of Praetextatus), and of Vincentius: Vincentius, the high priest of Sabazis, is here. He revered the sacred rites of the gods with a devout mind. (Garrucci, Tre Sepolcri, etc., tab. i–iii, Nap. 1852).—It’s hard to understand why Christian archaeologists would consider this Vincentius a Christian. He refers to himself as a worshipper of “the gods” and an antistes Sabazii (there’s no objection to interpreting priest of Sabazios this way. The issues raised by Schultze, Katakomben, 44, are unfounded: Sabazis = Sabazii is just as valid and straightforward as the possessives Clodis, Helis: see Ritschl, Opusc. iv, 454–6. The word order, n. a. Sab., is due to the limits of meter).

175 ἡ ὄρεξις τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ εἰς ἓν ὄντως ἄγει καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦτο σπεύδει πᾶσα φύσις, Plot. 6, 5, 1. πάντα ὀρέγεται ἐκείνου καὶ ἐφίεται αὐτοῦ φύσεως ἀνάγκῃ . . . ὡς ἄνευ αὐτοῦ οὐ δύναται εἶναι, 5, 5, 12; 1, 8, 2. ποθεῖ δὲ πᾶν τὸ γεννῆσαν (the νοῦς desires the πρῶτον, the ψυχή the νοῦς): 5, 1, 6.

175 The longing for what is good genuinely drives everything toward a single goal, and all of nature moves quickly in that direction., Plot. 6, 5, 1. Everything yearns for that and is drawn to its nature out of necessity . . . because without it, nothing can exist., 5, 5, 12; 1, 8, 2. Everything that has given life has desires. (the mind desires the first, the spirit desires the mind): 5, 1, 6.

176 αἱ ἔξω τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ γενόμεναι (ψυχαί), Plot. 3, 4, 6. In death ἀνάγειν τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν θεῖον πρὸς τὸ ἐν τῷ πάντι θεῖον, Porph., V. Plot. 2. Return εἰς πατρίδα, Plot., 5, 9, 1.

176 The souls that come from the sensory world (souls), Plot. 3, 4, 6. In death we return the divine within us to the universal divine, Porph., V. Plot. 2. Return to the home country, Plot., 5, 9, 1.

177 2, 9, esp. § 16 ff.

177 2, 9, especially § 16 and following.

178 τὸ μὲν γὰρ αἰσχρὸν ἐναντίον καὶ τῇ φύσει καὶ τῷ θεῷ, 3, 5, 1.

178 What is shameful goes against both nature and what is sacred., 3, 5, 1.

179 Flight from the ἐν σώματι κάλλος to the τῆς ψυχῆς κάλλη, etc., 5, 9, 2. And again in the fine treatise, π. τοῦ καλοῦ, 1, 6, 8. Though even here it is in a different sense from that in which Plato speaks in the Symp. of the ascent from καλὰ σώματα to καλὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα, etc. Plotinos protests energetically against the idea that his own sense of beauty makes him any the less φεύγειν τὸ σῶμα than the hatred of beauty cultivated by the Gnostics: 2, 9, 18. He too waits here below, only a little less impatiently, for the time when he will be able to say farewell to every earthly habitation: ib.

179 The journey from the body positivity to the soul beauty, etc., 5, 9, 2. And once again in the insightful work, p. of the beautiful, 1, 6, 8. Although even here it's in a different context than what Plato discusses in the Symp. regarding the rise from beautiful bodies to worthy practices, etc. Plotinos strongly argues against the notion that his understanding of beauty makes him any less wanting to escape the body than the disdain for beauty held by the Gnostics: 2, 9, 18. He too waits down here, just a bit less impatiently, for the moment when he can bid farewell to every earthly dwelling: ib.

180 . . . καὶ οὕτω θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων θείων καὶ εὐδαιμόνων βίος ἀπαλλαγὴ τῶν τῇδε, βίος ἀνήδονος τῶν τῇδε, φυγὴ μόνου πρὸς μόνον, 6, 9, 11 fin.

180 ... and so the divine and blessed life of gods and humans is about escaping from this place, a life devoid of joy here, a journey solely towards the one and only, 6, 9, 11 fin.

APPENDIX I

In many legends death by lightning makes the victim holy and raises him to godlike (everlasting) life. We need only remember the story of Semele who now ζώει ἐν Ὀλυμπίοις ἀποθανοῖσα βρόμῳ κεραυνοῦ (Pi., O. ii, 27), or that of Herakles and his vanishing from the pyre of wood lighted by Zeus’ flash of lightning (see partic. D.S. 4, 38, 4–5), or the parallel accounts of the translation or death by lightning of Erechtheus (above, chap. iii, n. 39). The primitive, popular belief finds unusually clear expression in the words of Charax ap. Anon. de Incred. xvi, p. 325, 5 ff. West., who says of Semele, κεραυνοῦ κατασκήψαντος ἠφανίσθη· ἐκείνην μὲν οὖν, ὁποῖα ἐπὶ τοῖς διοβλήτοις λέγεται, θείας μοίρας λαχεῖν ᾠήθησαν. (In this account Semele is immediately raised to heaven by the flash of lightning—a version of the story frequently given by later authors: Ζεὺς τὴν Σεμέλην ἐκ τῆς γῆς εἰς τὸν Ὄλυμπον κομίζει διὰ πυρός, Aristid. 1, p. 47 Dind. [O. 41, 3 K.]. Cf. Philostr., Imag. i, 14; Nonnus, D. viii, 409 ff. The passage of Pindar quoted above would also admit of a similar interpretation.) Generally speaking, ὁ κεραυνωθεὶς ὡς θεὸς τιμᾶται (Artem. 2, 9, p. 94, 26) as one ὑπὸ Διὸς τετιμημένος (ib. 93, 24). The belief in such elevation of a mortal through the disruption and purification of his body by the sacred fire of lightning (a πῦρ καθάρσιον of the highest kind—see chap. i, n. 41) need not be of late origin simply because it so happens that only late authorities speak of it in unmistakable terms (as Wilamowitz thinks, Ind. Schol. Götting. hib. 1895, pp. 12–13). Such lofty conceptions were by this time no longer the product of popular imagination. Besides, it is quite clearly referred to in the above-mentioned story of Semele (see esp. D.S. 5, 52, 2) and in those of Herakles, Erechtheus, Asklepios. In the same way lightning struck the tomb of Lykourgos (as afterwards that of Euripides) as θεοφιλέστατος καὶ ὁσιώτατος (Plu., Lyc. 31). When the statues of the Olympic victor Euthymos at Locri and Olympia are struck by lightning it shows that he has become a Hero: Pliny, NH. vii, 152. The body of the person struck by lightning remains uncorruptible: dogs and birds of prey dare not touch it: Plu., Smp. 4, 2, 3, p. 665 B; it must be buried in the place where the lightning struck it (Artem., p. 95, 6; cf. Fest., p. 178b, 21 ff.; Plin., NH. ii, 145). Every detail shows plainly that the διόβλητος was regarded as holy. This, however, does not prevent death by lightning from being regarded on other occasions as the punishment of crime—as in the cases of Salmoneus, Kapaneus, etc.; though in some even of these cases the idea is occasionally present that the lightning’s victim is raised to a higher existence. This is distinctly so when Euripides in Suppl. makes a character call Kapaneus, who has been killed by lightning, a ἱερὸς νεκρός (935) and his τύμβος (rogus) ἱερός too (981). ἱερός never means 582 “accursed” like the Lat. sacer: it is invariably a title of honour. Kapaneus is here called “holy” just as Astakides, on his translation to everlasting life, is ἱερός in Kallimachos; and as Hesiod speaks of the ἱερὸν γένος ἀθανάτων (with τύμβος ἱερός cf. S., OC. 1545, 1763). We must not fail to observe that in this passage, where a friend of Kap. is supposed to be speaking, the latter is certainly not regarded by Eurip. as an impious person (as he is generally in Tragedy, and by Eurip. himself in Phoen., and even in Suppl. the enemy so regards him (496 ff.), though acc. to this speaker Amphiaraos too is snatched away in atonement for his crime). Euripides in fact makes him highly praised by Adrastos (861 ff.) as the very opposite of a ὑβριστής; and it is obvious that Euadne’s sacrifice of her life which immediately follows is not intended to be offered for the benefit of a criminal and enemy of the gods. For these reasons Euripides ennobles the character of Kapaneus and, consequently, the death of the Hero by lightning can no longer stand for his punishment, but is on the contrary a distinction. He becomes a ἱερὸς νεκρός. This, however, could not have been done by Eurip. unless the view that such a death might in certain circumstances bring honour on the victim and elevate him to a higher plane of being, had been at that time widespread and generally recognized. Eurip. therefore provides the most distinct evidence for the existence of such a belief in his time. (As one of the exalted dead Kapaneus is to be separated from the rest of the dead and burnt παρ’ οἴκους τούσδε: 935, 936, 1009—i.e. before the ἀνάκτορον of the Goddesses at Eleusis: 88, 290.)—Finally Asklepios, in all the stories that are told of his death by lightning (and already in Hes. fr. 109 Rz.), is never regarded as entirely removed from this life: he lives on as Hero or god for all time, dispensing blessings. Zeus allows him to live on for ever immortal (Luc., DD. 13), and acc. to later versions of the story, in the constellation Ophiuchus (Eratosth. καταστ. 6; Hygin., Astron, ii, 14); the real and primitive conception evidently being that he was transported to everlasting life by Zeus’ lightning-flash. So Min. Fel. 22, 7, says quite rightly: Aesculapius, ut in deum surgat, fulminatur.

In many legends, dying from lightning makes the victim holy and grants them a godlike (eternal) life. We only need to recall the story of Semele, who now She lives in Olympus, having died by the filth of a thunderbolt. (Pi., O. ii, 27), or that of Herakles, vanishing from the pyre of wood ignited by Zeus’ lightning (see particularly D.S. 4, 38, 4–5), or the similar stories of Erechtheus’ transcendence or death by lightning (above, chap. iii, n. 39). The basic, popular belief is clearly expressed in the words of Charax ap. Anon. de Incred. xvi, p. 325, 5 ff. West., who says of Semele, When the lightning struck, she disappeared. They believed that she, like those said to be hit by divine bolts, was destined to receive a divine fate.. (In this account, Semele is immediately taken to heaven by the lightning bolt—a version of the story that later authors often repeat: Zeus carries Semele from the earth to Olympus through fire., Aristid. 1, p. 47 Dind. [O. 41, 3 K.]. Cf. Philostr., Imag. i, 14; Nonnus, D. viii, 409 ff. The passage from Pindar mentioned above could also support a similar interpretation.) Generally speaking, The thunderstruck is honored as a god (Artem. 2, 9, p. 94, 26) as one honored by Zeus (ib. 93, 24). The belief in such elevation of a mortal through the destruction and purification of their body by the sacred fire of lightning (a purifying fire of the highest kind—see chap. i, n. 41) shouldn't be considered a late idea just because it happens that only later sources speak of it clearly (as Wilamowitz thinks, Ind. Schol. Götting. hib. 1895, pp. 12–13). Such lofty ideas were no longer just the creations of popular imagination by this time. Additionally, it is clearly referenced in the aforementioned story of Semele (see especially D.S. 5, 52, 2) and in those of Herakles, Erechtheus, and Asklepios. Similarly, lightning struck the tomb of Lykourgos (and later, that of Euripides) as most beloved and most holy (Plu., Lyc. 31). When lightning strikes the statues of the Olympic victor Euthymos at Locri and Olympia, it signifies he has become a Hero: Pliny, NH. vii, 152. The body of someone struck by lightning remains uncorrupted: dogs and birds of prey won’t touch it: Plu., Smp. 4, 2, 3, p. 665 B; it must be buried at the place where it was struck by lightning (Artem., p. 95, 6; cf. Fest., p. 178b, 21 ff.; Plin., NH. ii, 145). Every detail clearly indicates that the untrustworthy was considered sacred. However, this doesn't mean that death by lightning was seen as a punishment for crime at other times—as in the cases of Salmoneus, Kapaneus, etc.; although even in some of these cases, there's sometimes the idea that the lightning’s victim is raised to a higher existence. This is clearly the case when Euripides in Suppl. has a character refer to Kapaneus, who was killed by lightning, as a sacred dead (935) and his tomb (rogus) sacred too (981). sacred never means 582 “cursed” like the Latin sacer: it is always a title of honor. Kapaneus is called “holy” here just as Astakides, upon his transition to eternal life, is sacred in Kallimachos; and as Hesiod speaks of the sacred race of immortals (with sacred tomb cf. S., OC. 1545, 1763). We must not overlook that in this passage, where a friend of Kap. is apparently speaking, the latter is certainly not viewed by Euripides as an impious person (as he usually is in Tragedy, and by Euripides himself in Phoen., and even in Suppl. the enemy thinks this of him (496 ff.), though according to this speaker, Amphiaraos too is taken away in atonement for his crime). Euripides indeed makes him highly praised by Adrastos (861 ff.) as the complete opposite of a bully; and it's clear that Euadne’s sacrifice of her life that follows is not meant to benefit a criminal and enemy of the gods. For these reasons, Euripides elevates the character of Kapaneus and, consequently, the death of the Hero by lightning can no longer be seen as a punishment, but rather a distinction. He becomes a sacred dead. This, however, couldn't have been achieved by Euripides unless the view that such a death might, under certain circumstances, bring honor to the victim and elevate them to a higher state of being was already widespread and generally accepted at that time. Thus, Euripides provides the clearest evidence for the existence of such a belief in his era. (As an exalted dead person, Kapaneus is to be separated from the rest of the dead and burned at these houses: 935, 936, 1009—i.e. before the palace of the Goddesses at Eleusis: 88, 290.)—Finally, Asklepios, in all the stories told about his death by lightning (and already in Hes. fr. 109 Rz.), is never seen as completely removed from this life: he continues to live as a Hero or god forever, bestowing blessings. Zeus allows him to live forever as an immortal (Luc., DD. 13), and according to later versions of the story, in the constellation Ophiuchus (Eratosth. καταστ. 6; Hygin., Astron, ii, 14); the original and primitive concept is clearly that he was taken to eternal life by Zeus’ lightning strike. Therefore, Min. Fel. 22, 7 correctly states: Aesculapius, to rise up as a god, is struck down by lightning..

APPENDIX II

maschalismo

ἐμασχαλίσθη is the word used by Aesch., Cho. 439, of the murdered Agamemnon. Soph., El. 445, says ὑφ’ ἧς (Κλυταιμνήστρας) θανὼν ἄτιμος ὥστε δυσμενὴς ἐμασχαλίσθη—also of Agamemnon. What particular abomination was meant by this brief statement must have been immediately understood by the Athenian public of the day. A more detailed account is given by Phot. and Suid. μασχαλίσματα (cf. Hesych. s.v.; Apostol., Pr. xi, 4), and they give Aristophanes of Byzantium as their authority. (Not from Aristophanes—for they differ in many particulars—but from a closely related source come the two versions 583 of the Scholion to Soph., El. 446 and EM. 118, 22 f.) According to their authority μασχαλισμός is something done by the murderer (οἱ φονεύσαντες ἐξ ἐπιβουλῆς—Aristoph.) to the corpse of the murdered man. He cuts off the extremities of his victim, strings the severed parts on a chain and puts them on.—On whom? on himself? or the murdered man? Aristophanes’ words are undecisive: the Schol. Soph., El. 445, speaks in the first version of “himself” (ἑαυτοῖς, p. 123, 17 Papag.) and in the second of “him”, i.e. the murdered man: περὶ τὴν μασχάλην αὐτοῦ ἐκρέμαζον αὐτά [τὰ ἄκρα], p. 123, 23; cf. 124, 5. This too is probably the meaning of Schol. Ap. Rh. iv, 477; EM. 118, 28–9, speaks distinctly of hanging the chain round the neck of the dead man. This is, in fact, the most probable version. The murderer hung the limbs, strung together on a rope, round the neck of his victim and then drew the rope under the armpits (μασχάλαι): a proceeding which is far from being “impossible” (as has been said), as anyone may discover by trying it for himself. The murderer then crossed the ends of the rope over the breast of his victim and after drawing them under the armpits fastened them behind his back. From this process of drawing under the armpits the whole procedure is called μασχαλισμός, and the μόρια of the dead man thus fastened to his body are his μασχαλίσματα (Aristoph.).

ἐμασχαλίσθη is the term used by Aesch., Cho. 439, regarding the murdered Agamemnon. Soph., El. 445, states ὑφ’ ἧς(Clytemnestra)θανὼν ἄτιμος ὥστε δυσμενὴς ἐμασχαλίσθη—also about Agamemnon. The specific horror implied in this brief remark must have been instantly recognized by the Athenian audience at the time. A more thorough explanation is provided by Phot. and Suid. μάσχαλίσματα (cf. Hesych. s.v.; Apostol., Pr. xi, 4), referencing Aristophanes of Byzantium as their source. (Not from Aristophanes himself—since they vary on many points—but from a closely related source come two versions 583 of the Scholion to Soph., El. 446 and EM. 118, 22 f.) According to their account, self-care is an act performed by the murderer (the murderers by conspiracy—Aristoph.) on the body of the slain man. He amputates the victim's limbs, strings the severed pieces together on a chain, and displays them. —On whom? On himself? Or on the body of the murdered man? Aristophanes’ wording is ambiguous: the Schol. Soph., El. 445, in the first version refers to “himself” (self, p. 123, 17 Papag.) and in the second to “him,” meaning the deceased: They were hanging around his armpit.[τὰ ἄκρα], p. 123, 23; cf. 124, 5. This likely aligns with the interpretation of Schol. Ap. Rh. iv, 477; EM. 118, 28–9, explicitly mentions hanging the chain around the dead man's neck. This is, indeed, the most likely scenario. The murderer hung the limbs, strung together on a rope, around the victim's neck and then pulled the rope under the armpits (armpits): an action that is far from being “impossible” (as has been claimed), as anyone can verify by attempting it themselves. The murderer then crossed the ends of the rope over the victim's chest and, after pulling them under the armpits, secured them behind his back. This method of passing under the armpits gives rise to the term ερωτική παρενόχληση, and the tokens of the deceased thus attached to his body are referred to as his μάσκα (Aristoph.).

Anyone who wishes to reject this description of μασχαλισμός (as some have done recently) must first of all show from what source Aristophanes of Byzantium—whom no one who knows him would accuse of improvizing such details or of concealing his ignorance by invention—can have got his information if not from actual report and historical tradition. The possibility that he arrived at it by straining the meaning and giving a private interpretation of his own to the words μασχαλίζειν and μασχαλισμός is excluded by the nature of these words. They offer no hint whatever in the direction of the special meaning suggested by his account. We cannot indeed say (as Wilamowitz does on A., Cho. 439) that “grammar” forbids us to accept the explanation of what happened in μασχαλίζειν given by Aristoph. To say: ἐμασχαλίσθη, “he had to suffer μασχαλίζειν, μασχαλισμός,” is equally correct whatever sense we give to the process of μασχαλισμός. But the word itself does not testify, by its mere form, to the absolute or exclusive correctness of Aristophanes’ interpretation: it denotes without distinction absolutely any proceeding in which the μασχάλαι figure at all. Verbs in -ιζειν, derived from the names of parts of the body, can denote according to the circumstances the utmost variety of actions done to or with the part of the body concerned: cf. κεφαλίζειν, αὐχενίζειν, τραχηλίζειν, λαιμίζειν, ὠμίζειν, ῥαχίζειν, χειρίζειν, δακτυλίζειν, γαστρίζειν, σκελίζειν (and even πυγίζειν). What particular sort of activity applied to the μασχάλαι is indicated by the verb μασχαλίζειν cannot be decided from the mere form of the verb. This only makes it the more necessary to adhere to Aristophanes’ interpretation, which must have been derived from some other source, i.e. from actual knowledge. It may be true that μασχαλίζειν, considered simply from 584 the point of view of its form, might conceivably mean to tear the arm from the shoulder at the armpits (as Benndorf suggests, Monument von Adamklissi, p. 132 A)—though such an ἐκμοχλεύειν τὸν βραχίονα ἐκ τῆς μασχάλης should rather be ἀπομασχαλίζειν or ἐκμασχαλίζειν. But that out of its many possible meanings the verb should have just this particular one is not suggested by anything: least of all by the sculptured relief on which the gods appear to be tearing out the right arms of their defeated enemies. Such scenes according to Benndorf represent μασχαλισμός. But can the Greeks really have attributed to the gods this much execrated practice of cowardly murderers? We are not told by anyone that this scene represents μασχαλισμός—that is only a conclusion drawn from an apparent agreement between the representation and the view (itself as yet unproved) of what happened in μασχαλίζειν. Is the correctness of the meaning assigned to the word to be proved in its turn from its agreement with the representation? A most palpable argument in a circle!

Anyone who wants to reject this description of μιδι μάσκα (as some have recently done) must first show where Aristophanes of Byzantium—whom anyone familiar with him would not accuse of making up these details or covering his ignorance with fiction—could have gotten his information if it wasn’t from actual reports and historical tradition. The idea that he reached this understanding by stretching the meaning and giving a personal interpretation of the terms μανώλης and masculinity is ruled out by the words themselves. They offer no suggestion of the specific meaning implied in his account. We can’t say (as Wilamowitz does on A., Cho. 439) that “grammar” prevents us from accepting Aristophanes’ explanation of what occurred in μάσχαλίζειν. Saying: ἐμασχαλίσθη, “he had to suffer Underarm hair, underarm grooming,” is equally valid, regardless of the meaning we ascribe to the process of armpit hair. However, the word itself doesn’t confirm the absolute or exclusive correctness of Aristophanes’ interpretation: it describes, without distinction, any action involving the armpits. Verbs in -ιζειν, derived from body part names, can indicate a wide range of actions done to or with that body part: for example, κεφαλίζειν, αὐχενίζειν, τραχηλίζειν, λαιμίζειν, ὠμίζειν, ῥαχίζειν, χειρίζειν, δακτυλίζειν, γαστρίζειν, σκελίζειν (and even πυγίζειν). We can’t determine the specific kind of action related to the armpits indicated by the verb μασχαλίζειν just from the form of the verb. This makes it even more essential to stick with Aristophanes’ interpretation, which must have come from another source, i.e., actual knowledge. It might be true that μασχαλίζειν, when viewed solely from 584 its form, could hypothetically mean to dislocate the arm from the shoulder at the armpits (as Benndorf suggests, Monument von Adamklissi, p. 132 A)—though such an to leverage the arm out of the armpit should probably be ἀπομασχαλίζειν or ekmaschalidzein. But the fact that of all its possible meanings, this verb should have that particular one is not supported by anything, least of all by the sculpted relief where the gods seem to be wrenching off the right arms of their defeated foes. Such scenes, according to Benndorf, depict axillary hair. But could the Greeks really have attributed this much-despised act of cowardly murder to their gods? No one has told us that this scene represents masculinity—that is merely a conclusion drawn from a supposed resemblance between the representation and the (still unproven) theory of what happened in μασχαλίζειν. Is the correctness of the meaning assigned to the word to be demonstrated by its correlation with the representation? A clear example of circular reasoning!

There is no valid reason for rejecting the statement of Aristophanes; and there must be very good reason indeed for so doing before we may discredit such an authority. He gives his information with no uncertain voice and no suggestion of hesitation, and it must be regarded as the simple account of well-established facts. It would receive additional confirmation—if it needed any—from the very meaning and conception of the word μασχάλισμα. μασχαλίσματα must be the product of μασχαλισμός; they are, in fact, the severed μόρια of the murdered man, with which too Aristophanes identifies them. Σοφοκλῆς ἐν Τρωΐλῳ πλήρη μασχαλισμάτων εἴρηκε τὸν μασχαλισμόν (probably a mere oversight for τὸν τράχηλον): Suid. s.v. ἐμασχαλίσθη (Soph. fr. 566 = 623 P.). If μασχαλίζειν had consisted in the dislocation of the arm from its socket, it would be impossible to say what such μασχαλίσματα might be. They are without doubt identical with what are otherwise called, in descriptions of mutilations of the corpse of a murdered man, ἀπάργματα (Jason after the murder of Apsyrtos ἀπάργματα τάμνε θανόντος, A.R. iv, 477; cf. Schol. and EM. 118, 22 ff.), ἀκρωτηριάσματα, τόμια (τὰ ἀποτμήματα καὶ ἀκρωτηριάσματα τοῦ νεκροῦ, Hesych.). These expressions allow us to conclude that the whole procedure is intended to offer the murdered man as a sacrifice to some sort of ἀποτρόπαιοι. The μασχαλίσματα are the ἀπαρχαί of this sacrificial victim. Indeed, Aristoph. of Byzantium, ap. Phot. [Suid.] μασχαλίσματα, definitely states that μασχαλίσματα was the name given to τὰ τοῖς μηροῖς ἐπιτιθέμενα ἀπὸ τῶν ὠμῶν (not ὤμων as the edd. give; as also Nauck, Arist. Byz., p. 221) κρέα ἐν ταῖς τῶν θεῶν θυσίαις. This refers—though it does not seem to have been remarked by those who have hitherto dealt with the passage—to the parts of the body which were cut off from the raw flesh of the ἱερεῖον before the sacrifice, laid on the severed μηροί of the victim, and burnt up completely with these: the ὠμοθετεῖν in fact so often mentioned in Homer (A 460 i.; Β 423 f.; γ 456 ff.; μ 360 f.; ξ 427 f.). If these ὠμοθετούμενα could also be called (in 585 a comparison) μασχαλίσματα, that again shows that at the μασχαλισμός there was no tearing out of an arm from its socket, but that in reality the extremities of the murdered man (—ἀκρωτηριάσαντες μόρια τούτου) were hewn off and a piece cut off ἐκ παντὸς μέρους τοῦ σώματος as the grammarians following Aristophanes say. Only in this case is the proceeding like that which took place at the ὠμοθετεῖν when the sacrificers ἔκοψαν μικρὸν ἀπὸ παντὸς μέλους (Aristonic. in Schol. A 461; Apollon., Lex. Hom. 171, 8; lex. Rhet. ap. Eust. A 461, p. 134, 36: ὠμοθέτησαν· τὸ ἀφ’ ἑκάστου μέλους τοῦ ἱερείου ἀπετέμοντο καὶ ἀπήρξαντο ἀπ’ ὠμοῦ [so the last word should be written here too, though Eustath. found—and was surprised—ὤμου] καὶ ἐνέβαλον εἰς τὰ μηρία κατὰ τὴν θυσιάν). So too it is said of Eumaios: ὁ δ’ ὠμοθετεῖτο συβώτης, πάντων ἀρξάμενος μελέων, ξ 427 f. (this is the passage in which ἡρμήνευσε [ὁ ποιητής], τί ἐστι τὸ ὠμοθετεῖν: Schol., B.L. A 461; it is this passage, and not A 461, which is meant by Hesych. too s.v. ὠμοθετεῖν, when he says ἐξηγεῖται δ’ αὐτὸς Ὅμηρος; cf. also Dion. Hal. 7, 72, 15).

There’s no good reason to dismiss Aristophanes' statement; you’d really need a compelling reason to discredit such an authority. He presents his information clearly and confidently, and it should be seen as a straightforward account of established facts. It would be further confirmed—if it needed confirmation—by the very meaning and concept of the word μασχάλισμα. facial hair must come from αρθροσκόπηση; they are, in fact, the severed tokens of the murdered man, which Aristophanes also connects them to. Sophocles in Trojan War fully described the act of betrayal. (probably just a mistake for τὸν τράχηλον): Suid. s.v. ἐμασχαλίσθη (Soph. fr. 566 = 623 P.). If μασχαλίζειν meant dislocating the arm from its socket, it would be hard to say what such μασχαλίσματα could be. They are certainly the same as what are otherwise called, in discussions of the mutilations of a murdered body, apsis (Jason after murdering Apsyrtos Cut off the gadgets when dead, A.R. iv, 477; cf. Schol. and EM. 118, 22 ff.), amputations, cuts(the body parts and mutilations of the dead, Hesych.). These terms lead us to conclude that the entire process is intended to present the murdered man as a sacrifice to some kind of cursed. The προβλήματα are the firstfruits of this sacrificial victim. Indeed, Aristoph. of Byzantium, ap. Phot. [Suid.] grooming, explicitly states that mustaches was the term given to the ones placed on the thighs coming from the shoulders (not Shoulders as the editors have it; also Nauck, Arist. Byz., p. 221) meat in the sacrifices of the gods. This refers—though it doesn’t seem to have been noted by those who have previously discussed the passage—to the parts of the body that were cut off from the raw flesh of the sacred item before the sacrifice, placed on the severed μηροί of the victim, and completely burned up with these: the ὠμοθετεῖν mentioned frequently in Homer (A 460 i.; Β 423 f.; γ 456 ff.; μ 360 f.; ξ 427 f.). If these Raw meats could also be called (in 585 a comparison) facial hair, that again shows that at the μάρκετινγκ there was no pulling out of an arm from its socket, but that in fact the extremities of the murdered man (—amputate parts of it) were chopped off and a piece cut off from every part of the body as the grammarians following Aristophanes say. Only in this case is the action similar to what occurred at the ὠμοθετεῖν when the sacrificers They cut a small piece from every part. (Aristonic. in Schol. A 461; Apollon., Lex. Hom. 171, 8; lex. Rhet. ap. Eust. A 461, p. 134, 36: They offered sacrifices; they cut up each part of the sacrificial animal and began from the shoulder. [so the last word should be written here too, though Eustath. found—and was surprised—Shoulder] They threw it into the thighs during the sacrifice.). Similarly, it is said of Eumaios: The swineherd took his place, starting with all the dishes., ξ 427 f. (this passage is where interpreted[the poet], what is ὠμοθετεῖν: Schol., B.L. A 461; it is this passage, and not A 461, which is meant by Hesych. too s.v. ὠμοθετεῖν, when he says Homer explains it himself; cf. also Dion. Hal. 7, 72, 15).

μασχαλισμός was then essentially an offering intended to avert evil or, what comes to the same thing, a kathartic offering (i.e. a symbol indicating such an offering). It was consummated by murderers ἐπὶ ταῖς καθάρσεσιν (Sch. S., El. 445); ὑπὲρ τοῦ τὴν μῆνιν ἐκκλίνειν as Aristoph. Byz. says (p. 221 N.); τὸ ἔργον ἀφοσιούμενοι as we are told by Apostolius, Prov. xi, 4. All these mean the same thing. But besides these there may still have been another intention present in the minds of the superstitious. The mutilation of the murdered man took place according to Sch. S., El. 445 (in the second version; there is something similar even in the first, p. 123, 18 f.) ἵνα, φασίν, ἀσθενὴς γένοιτο πρὸς τὸ ἀντιτίσασθαι τὸν φονέα. The mutilation of the corpse was transferred to the ψυχή that was leaving the body—such is the ancient conception to which Homer too is not a stranger (cf. e.g. λ 40 ff.). If the dead man is mutilated he will not, for example, be able to hold or throw the spear which in Athens was borne before the murdered man at his funeral (if he left no kinsman as avenger behind him) and was then set up beside his grave ([D.] 47, 69: Eur., Tro. 1147 f.: Poll. viii, 65; Ister ap., EM. 354, 33 ff.; AB. 237, 30 f.)—certainly for no other purpose than that of supplying the dead man himself with a weapon with which to take vengeance on his own account since no one else would βοηθεῖ him. (Thus among the Tasmanians a spear was planted on the grave of the dead that he might have a weapon ready for fighting: Quatrefages, Hommes fossiles et hommes sauvages, p. 346.) Probably the Greek murderer when he ἐμασχάλιζεν, calculated in exactly the same fashion as the Australian negro who cuts off the thumb from the right hand of his fallen foe in order that his soul may no longer be able to hold a spear (Spencer, Princ. of Sociol. i, p. 212).

μασχαλισμός was basically a sacrifice meant to ward off evil or, in other words, a cleansing offering (i.e., a symbol representing such an offering). It was carried out by murderers during the cleansings (Sch. S., El. 445); For avoiding wrath, as Aristoph. Byz. mentions (p. 221 N.); Focusing on the work as noted by Apostolius, Prov. xi, 4. All of these signify the same thing. However, there may have been another intention in the minds of the superstitious. According to Sch. S., El. 445 (in the second account; a similar idea appears in the first, p. 123, 18 f.), the mutilation of the murdered man was intended So they say that a weak person is made to oppose the murderer.. The mutilation of the corpse was believed to affect the soul leaving the body—this ancient idea is also found in Homer (cf. e.g. λ 40 ff.). If the dead person is mutilated, he will, for instance, be unable to hold or throw the spear that was carried in front of him at his funeral in Athens (if he had no kinsman to seek vengeance for him), and which was then placed beside his grave ([D.] 47, 69: Eur., Tro. 1147 f.: Poll. viii, 65; Ister ap., EM. 354, 33 ff.; AB. 237, 30 f.)—this was certainly done to provide the dead man himself with a weapon to seek revenge since no one else would Helps him. (Similarly, among the Tasmanians, a spear was placed on the grave of the deceased so he would have a weapon ready for combat: Quatrefages, Hommes fossiles et hommes sauvages, p. 346.) It's likely that the Greek murderer, when he ἐμασχάλιζεν, thought in the same way as the Australian black who cuts off the thumb from the right hand of his fallen enemy so that his soul can no longer hold a spear (Spencer, Princ. of Sociol. i, p. 212).

In Soph., El. 446, the murderer after the μασχαλισμός also wipes the bloody instrument of death on the head of the murdered man. Murderers did this ὥσπερ ἀποτροπιαζόμενοι τὸ μύσος τὸ ἐν τῷ φόνῳ 586 (Schol.). There are passages in the Odyssey which allude to the custom (μέγα ἔργον, ὃ σῇ κεφαλῇ ἀναμάξεις, τ 92) as well as in Herodotos and Demosthenes (see Schneidewin on Electra). Their meaning is quite correctly given in Eust. on Od. τ 92: ὡς εἰς κεφαλὴν δῆθεν ἐκείνοις (τοῖς πεφονευμένοις) τρεπομένου τοῦ κακοῦ. Evidently a mimic version of εἰς κεφαλὴν σοί. Something similar is intended when the murderer sucks the blood of the murdered man three times and spits it out again three times. Ap. Rh. describes such a scene (iv, 477 f.); and something similar occurred in Aesch. (fr. 354; EM. refers to this in immediate connexion with μασχαλισμός). Here too the object is the κάθαρσις of the murderer, the expiation of the impious deed. (ἣ θέμις αὐθέντῃσι δολοκτασίας ἱλέασθαι, A.R.; ἀποπτύσαι δεῖ καὶ καθήρασθαι στόμα, A.) Spitting three times is a regular feature in magic charms and counter-charms: in this case the blood of the murdered man and with it the power of vengeance that rises up out of the blood, is averted, (despuimus comitiales morbos, hoc est, contagia regerimus, Plin., NH. 28, 35.)—What “savage” tribe ever had more primitive ideas or a more realistic symbolism than the Greek populace—and perhaps not populace only—of classical times in the sinister backwaters of their life into which we have here for a moment descended?

In Soph., El. 446, the murderer, after the maschalism, also wipes the bloody weapon on the head of the murdered man. Murderers did this just as we are repulsed by the filth in the murder 586 (Schol.). There are passages in the Odyssey that reference the custom (Great task, which you must accomplish in your own mind., τ 92) as well as in Herodotus and Demosthenes (see Schneidewin on Electra). Their meaning is accurately explained in Eust. on Od. τ 92: as if to their head(the deceased)changing from evil. Clearly, it’s a mock version of to your head. Something similar happens when the murderer drinks the blood of the murdered man three times and spits it out three times. Ap. Rh. describes such a scene (iv, 477 f.); and something similar occurred in Aesch. (fr. 354; EM. refers to this in direct connection with μάσχαλο). Here, too, the goal is the catharsis of the murderer, the atonement for the wicked act. (ἣ θέμις αὐθέντῃσι δολοκτασίας ἱλέασθαι, A.R.; Spit it out and cleanse mouth, A.) Spitting three times is a common aspect of magic spells and counter-spells: in this case, the blood of the murdered man and the vengeance that arises from it are repelled, (We will manage the diseases associated with assemblies, that is, we will regulate contagions., Plin., NH. 28, 35.)—What "savage" tribe ever had more primitive beliefs or a more realistic symbolism than the Greek people—perhaps not just the populace—of classical times in the grim corners of their lives that we have momentarily touched upon?

APPENDIX III

Uninitiated, Single AND DANAÏDES IN THE UNDERWORLD

In Polygnotos’ picture of the underworld were to be seen the figures τῶν οὐ μεμυημέων, τῶν τὰ δρώμενα Ἐλευσῖνι ἐν οὐδενὸς θεμένων λόγῳ—an old man, a παῖς, a young and an old woman, who bear water to a πίθος in broken pitchers: Paus. 10, 31, 9–11. The myth is evidently founded upon an etymological play on words—those who have neglected the “completion” of the holy τέλη and are ἀτελεῖς ἱερῶν (h. Cer. 482) must perform the vain labour in the realm of Persephone of carrying water in broken vessels: the Δαναΐδων ὑδρείας ἀτελεῖς (Axioch. 371 E). It can only have been an oversight that made Pausanias forget to say that the πίθος is τετρημένος, for this is essential to the story (see Pl., Gor. 493 BC; Philetair. ap. Ath. 633 F, 18 [2, p. 235 K.]; Zenob., Prov. ii, 6, etc.), and certainly cannot, as Dieterich, Nekyia, 70, imagined, be replaced by the κατεαγότα ὄστρακα. That the οὐ μεμυημένοι, the ἀμύητοι, as the inscription on the picture called them (Paus. § 9), were in fact those who had neglected the Eleusinian mysteries is only a conclusion of Pausanias’ (or of his authority), as we see from the way he speaks in § 11; but it is probably the right conclusion. The Orphics took over the Eleusinian fable, but exaggerated it to the point of absurdity: they τοὺς ἀνοσίους καὶ ἀδίκους κοσκίνῳ ὕδωρ ἀναγκάζουσι φέρειν in Hades (Pl., Rp. 363 D; Gor. 493 BC). In this they followed a hint given by a popular proverb—representing one of the ἀδύνατα—κοσκίνῳ ὕδωρ φέρειν (which is also Roman: cf. Plaut., 587 Pseud. 102; as an “ordeal”: Plin., NH. 28, 12). It is not until later (nor in surviving literature before the Axiochus, 371 E: though perhaps a little earlier on vase paintings from South Italy) that the story occurs in which it is the daughters of Danaos who are punished in Hades by having to fill the leaking vessel. The reason given for this punishment is their murder of the sons of Aigyptos in the marriage bed: but why did the punishment take this particular form? Clearly in the case of the Danaides their non-fulfilment of an important τέλος is requited in the ever ἀτελεῖς ὑδρεῖαι. Their marriage union was uncompleted through their own choice (thus marriage itself was often called a τέλος and the wedding was preceded by προτέλεια and compared with the τέλη of the mysteries). In this it is certainly implied that their deed had not been expiated, and they themselves had not found other husbands, but had as it were immediately after their impious deed been sent down to Hades (cf. Sch. Eur., Hec. 886, p. 436, 14 Dind.). The daughters of Danaos came to the underworld as ἄγαμοι. To die before marriage was regarded as the height of ill-luck by the common people (cf. Welcker, Syll. ep., p. 49): the essential reason being that those who die thus leave behind them nobody who is called upon to keep up the cult of their souls (E. Tro. 380). Other ideas may have been vaguely combined with this. Thus, on the graves of ἄγαμοι a λουτροφόρος was set up—a figure of a παῖς or a κόρη λουτροφόρος, or a vessel called the λουτροφόρος which has been identified with certain bottomless vases (see Furtwängler, Samml. Sabouroff, on Pl. lviii–lix; cf. Wolters, Ath. Mitth. xvi, 378 ff.). Can this have referred to a similar fate awaiting the ἄγαμοι after their death, a fate such as was imputed to the Danaides in particular as mythical types of those who are ἄγαμοι by their own fault?—an ever unsuccessful carrying of water for the λουτρόν of the bridal bath. (Dieterich, Nekyia, 76, with some probability takes this as the reason for the water-carrying.)

In Polygnotos' painting of the underworld, you could see the figures of those not initiated into the mysteries—an old man, a child, a young woman, and an old woman, who are carrying water to a jar in broken pitchers: Paus. 10, 31, 9–11. The myth is clearly based on a play on words—those who have neglected the "completion" of the sacred rites must perform the pointless task in Persephone's realm of carrying water in broken vessels: the unfinished water-carrying of the Danaids (Axioch. 371 E). It seems to have been an oversight that caused Pausanias to forget to mention that the jar is broken, as this detail is crucial to the story (see Pl., Gor. 493 BC; Philetair. ap. Ath. 633 F, 18 [2, p. 235 K.]; Zenob., Prov. ii, 6, etc.), and certainly cannot, as Dieterich suggested, be replaced by broken shells. The uninitiated, as the inscription on the painting referred to them (Paus. § 9), were in fact those who neglected the Eleusinian mysteries, a conclusion likely drawn by Pausanias (or his source), as seen from his comments in § 11; but it is probably the right conclusion. The Orphics adopted the Eleusinian fable, but exaggerated it to the point of absurdity: they force the wicked and unjust to carry water in a sieve in Hades (Pl., Rp. 363 D; Gor. 493 BC). They followed a common proverb implying something impossible—to carry water in a sieve (which is also a Roman saying: cf. Plaut., 587 Pseud. 102; as an ordeal: Plin., NH. 28, 12). It wasn’t until later (nor in surviving literature before the Axiochus, 371 E: though perhaps a little earlier on vase paintings from South Italy) that the story emerged in which the daughters of Danaos are punished in Hades by having to fill the leaking vessel. The reason given for this punishment is their killing of the sons of Aigyptos on their wedding night: but why did the punishment take this form? Clearly, in the case of the Danaids, their failure to fulfill an important duty is repaid with the endless task of carrying leaking water. Their marriage was left unfulfilled by their own choice (thus marriage itself was often called a "completion," and the wedding was preceded by a pre-marriage ceremony and compared with the mysteries' rites). This implies that their deed had not been atoned for, and they had not found other husbands, but had been sent directly to Hades right after their impious act (cf. Sch. Eur., Hec. 886, p. 436, 14 Dind.). The daughters of Danaos arrived in the underworld as unmarried. Dying before marriage was considered the worst luck by the common people (cf. Welcker, Syll. ep., p. 49): the main reason being that those who die this way leave behind no one to continue the cult for their souls (E. Tro. 380). Other vague ideas may have combined with this. Thus, on the graves of the unmarried, a loutrophoros was set up—a figure of a child or a maiden holding a vessel known as the loutrophoros, which has been linked to certain bottomless vases (see Furtwängler, Samml. Sabouroff, on Pl. lviii–lix; cf. Wolters, Ath. Mitth. xvi, 378 ff.). Could this have pointed to a similar fate awaiting the unmarried after their deaths, a fate attributed particularly to the Danaides as mythical representations of those who are unmarried through their own fault?—an incessantly unsuccessful carrying of water for the bridal bath. (Dieterich, Nekyia, 76, with some probability suggested this as the reason for the water-carrying.)

Of these two myths, was the one which appears later in order of time—the story of the Danaids—merely a subsequent development out of the earlier one (even said to occur on a black-figured vase), which told of the vain water-carrying of the ἀμύητοι? I cannot be so sure of this as I once was. I cannot indeed admit (with Dümmler, Delphica, 18 ff., who, however, fails to prove an earlier date for the story of the Danaids’ jar) that it would be difficult to imagine how a special class of human beings came to be replaced later on by certain mythical representatives such as the Danaids were. But it is a very suspicious fact that the Danaids do not as a matter of fact represent the particular class of mankind—the ἀμύητοι—whose place they are supposed to have taken as their mythological representatives. They are not ἀμύητοι at all, but ἄγαμοι. The ἄγαμοι and their ἀτελεῖς ὑδρεῖαι in Hades must have been familiar in popular belief: in addition to this the mystical fable of the similar behaviour of those who had neglected the τέλος of initiation may have sprung up, but certainly not as the model of the ἄγαμοι story, more probably as a subsequent 588 rehandling of it for the purposes of mystical edification. (The story of the ἄγαμοι has a much more primitive and popular flavour; and it alone gives a definite relation between the special labour of water-carrying in Hades and the nature of their default on earth.) The mythical fate of the ἄγαμοι was then forgotten owing to the competing interest of the story of the ἀμύητοι, which, in fact, absorbed it, when a poet—for a poet it must have been—took up what still-surviving custom and its accompanying legend applied to the ἄγ. in general and transferred it to the Danaides. This version of the myth was then victorious in the general consciousness both over the popular tradition about the ἄγαμοι and the mystery-fable of the ἀμύητοι.—It remains to be said that the Danaids (and the ἀμύητοι too in a lesser degree) were supposed to be punished by their ἀτελεῖς ὑδρεῖαι, This, so long as it was a matter of the ἄγαμοι simply, cannot have been the meaning of that fate of purposeless toil in their case any more than it was in the case of Oknos. Even Xenophon, Oec. vii, 40, lets us see that the vain toilers are not as a matter of fact intended to inspire horror, as sinners, but rather pity. His words are: οὐχ ὁρᾷς, οἱ εἰς τὸν τετρημένον πίθον ἀντλεῖν λεγόμενοι ὡς οἰκτίρονται, ὅτι μάτην πονεῖν δοκοῦσι; νὴ Δί’, ἔφη ἡ γυνή, καὶ γὰρ τλήμονές εἰσιν, εἰ τοῦτό γε ποιοῦσιν. This gives us the attitude of mind from which the whole story originally grew up.

Of these two myths, was the one that comes later in time—the story of the Danaids—just a later development of the earlier one (even said to appear on a black-figured vase), which focused on the fruitless efforts of the ἀμύητοι? I'm not as certain about this as I once was. I can't accept (like Dümmler, Delphica, 18 ff., who doesn't actually prove an earlier date for the story of the Danaids’ jar) that it's hard to imagine how a specific group of people could have later been replaced by certain mythical figures like the Danaids. However, it is suspicious that the Danaids do not actually represent the specific group of people—the uninitiated—they are thought to have replaced as their mythological representatives. They are not uninitiated at all, but ἄγαμοι. The single and their Incomplete waters in Hades must have been well-known in popular belief: alongside this, the mystical tale of those who neglected the end of initiation likely emerged, but surely not as the template for the single story; more likely it was a later 588 reworking for mystical instruction. (The story of the single has a much more primitive and folk-like essence; and it alone establishes a clear link between the specific task of water-carrying in Hades and the nature of their failure on earth.) The mythical fate of the single was eventually forgotten because of the competing narrative of the ἀμύητοι, which, in fact, absorbed it, when a poet—for it must have been a poet—took what remained of the custom and its corresponding legend related to the ἄg. in general and transferred it to the Danaides. This version of the myth then triumphed in the collective consciousness over both the folk tradition about the single and the mystery fable of the initiates.—It should be noted that the Danaids (and the initiates to a lesser extent) were supposed to be punished by their incomplete waters. This, as long as it pertained simply to the single, cannot have meant the same fate of pointless labor for them as it did for Oknos. Even Xenophon, Oec. vii, 40, indicates that the vain laborers are not intended to evoke horror, as sinners, but rather pity. His words are: Don’t you see that those who are said to draw from the empty jar are being pitied, thinking they are laboring in vain? By Zeus, the woman said, they are indeed foolish if they do this.. This reflects the mindset from which the entire story initially arose.

APPENDIX IV

THE ANTIPHON TETRALOGIES.

I ought not to have admitted the doubt suggested in chap. v, n. 176, as to the genuineness of the Tetralogies traditionally ascribed to Antiphon. I have examined more carefully the well-known linguistic variations between the Tetralogies and speeches i, v, and vi of Antiphon, and also the recently noticed divergences (see Dittenberger, Hermes, 31; 32) of the Tetralogies from Athenian law (for which the author, like the declamation-writers of later times, substitutes occasionally a “ius scholasticum”—a purely fanciful creation but one more suited to pleading in utramque partem). All these objections seem to me, on maturer consideration, insufficient to make us reject the identity—otherwise so well established—of the author of the Tetralogies with the author of the Speeches.

I shouldn’t have acknowledged the doubt raised in chap. v, n. 176, regarding the authenticity of the Tetralogies typically attributed to Antiphon. I’ve taken a closer look at the well-known linguistic differences between the Tetralogies and speeches i, v, and vi of Antiphon, as well as the recently noted discrepancies (see Dittenberger, Hermes, 31; 32) of the Tetralogies from Athenian law (for which the author, like later declamation writers, occasionally substitutes a “ius scholasticum”—a purely fictional concept but one that fits better for arguing in utramque partem). All these objections seem to me, upon further reflection, insufficient to dismiss the identity—otherwise so well established—of the author of the Tetralogies with the author of the Speeches.

APPENDIX V

RITUAL PURIFICATION DONE BY RUNNING WATER, RUBBING WITH ANIMAL OR VEGETABLE SUBSTANCES (σκίλλα, FIGS), ABSORPTION OF THE materia peccans INTO EGGS.

For the purpose of ritual purification it is necessary to have water drawn from running springs or streams, or from the sea: θάλασσα κλύξει πάντα τἀνθρώπων κακά, Eur., IT. 1193. (Hence in the exalted 589 semi-oracular language of bardic poetry ἡ ἀμίαντος = θάλασσα, Aesch., P. 578. At a sacrifice ὁ ἱαρεὺς ἀπορραίνεται θαλάσσᾳ, sacrificial calendar from Kos: Inscr. Cos, 38, 23.) Various details on this point in Lomeier, De lustrat. c. 17. In the water thus drawn from running sources the power of washing off and carrying away the evil still seemed to be inherent. When the pollution is unusually severe it has to be purged by the water from several running springs: κρηνάων ἀπὸ πέντε, Emped. 452 M. = 143 D.; ἀπὸ κρηνῶν τριῶν, Menand., Δεισ. 530, 22 K.; Orestes se apud tria flumina circum Hebrum ex response purificavit (from the stain of matricide), Lamprid., Heliog. vii, 7—or else at Rhegion in the seven streams which combine to form one river: Varro ap. Prob., ad Verg., p. 3, 4 Keil; Sch. Theoc., prol., p. 1, 3 ff. Düb. (and cf. Hermann, Opusc. ii, 71 ff.). Even water from fourteen different springs might be used at a purification of murder: Suid. 476 BC Gaisf. (ἀπὸ δὶς ἑπτα κυμάτων, conclusion of an iambic or trochaic line). In all this the remarkable persistence of Greek ritual performances is shown once more. Even in a late period the same kathartic rules prevail. An order of the Klarian oracle of about the third century A.D. (ap. Buresch, Klaros, p. 9) commands those who seek its aid ἀπὸ Ναϊάδων ἑπτα ματεύειν καθαρὸν πότον ἐντύνεσθαι, ὅν θειῶσαι πρόσοθεν (taken from Il. Ψ 533, but understood in a temporal sense) ἐχρῆν καὶ ἐπεσσυμένως ἀφύσασθαι ῥῆναί τε δόμους κτλ. And in a magical papyrus (about fourth century), ap. Parthey, Abh. Berl. Ak. 1865, p. 126, l. 234–5, instructions are given to collect ὕδωρ πηγαῖον ἀπὸ ζʹ πηγῶν for magic purposes. (Then again in mediæval superstition: for the purposes of hydromantia “water must be taken from three running streams, a little from each”, etc.—Hartlieb ap. Grimm, p. 1770—probably a survival from classical antiquity: cf. Plin., NH. 28, 46, e tribus puteis, etc.) Cf. also and in general the completely analogous use of water in old Indian ceremonies of purification: Oldenberg, Rel. Veda, 423 ff.; 489.—περιμάττειν, ἀπομάττειν: wiping-off of the uncleanness: see Wyttenb. ad Plu., Mor. vi, pp. 1006–7. In this use περιψῆν also occurs: in a transferred sense a φαρμακός is called a περίψημα = περικάθαρμα, Ep. ad Cor. 1, 4, 13. Washing-off with bran, earth, etc., is often mentioned. Otherwise the σκίλλα is used or the bodies of sacrificed dogs: ἐκάθηρέ τέ με καὶ ἀπέμαξε καὶ περιήγνισε δᾳδίοις (with περιήγν.) καὶ σκίλλῃ, Luc., Necyom. 7. The Superstitious Man is accustomed ἱερείας καλέσας σκίλλῃ ἢ σκύλακι κελεῦσαι αὑτὸν περικαθᾶραι, Thphr., Ch. 28 (16) fin. All sorts of medicinal properties were attributed to the σκίλλα. (The idea is elaborated farcically in the pamphlet of “Pythagoras” περὶ σκίλλης [D.L. viii, 47? κήλης Cobet], an extract of which is given by Galen π. εὐπορίστ. 3, vol. xiv, 567–9 K.) But above all it is regarded as καθάρσιος: Artem. iii, 50; καθαρτικὴ πάσης κακίας, Sch. Theoc. v, 121, and cf. Cratin., Χείρ. 232 K. Hence it is also ἀλεξιφάρμακον, ὅλη πρὸ τῶν θυρῶν κρεμαμένη, Diosc. ii, 202 fin. (see Hermes, 51, 628); such also was the teaching of “Pythagoras”: Plin., NH. 20, 101; or it may be buried at the threshold: Ar. Δαναΐδ. fr. 8 [255 H.-G.]. 590 It is also λύκων φθαρτική: Artem. iii, 50 (cf. Gp. 15, 1, 6, with notes of Niclas). As being able to keep off daimones (in wolf-form) it was then used in religious “purification”.—Figs are also used for the purpose of religious cleansing and scouring (black figs particularly inferum deorum et avertentium in tutela sunt, Macr. 3, 20, 2–3). Figs used ἐν καθαρμοῖς: Eustath., Od., p. 1572, 57 (? is this the meaning of the περιμάττειν of the eyes with figs in Pherecr. ap. Ath. 3, 78 D [132 K.]). Hence Ζεὺς συκάσιος = καθάρσιος (Eustath.). Figs the best ἀλεξιφάρμακον: Arist. ap. Jul., Ep. 24, p. 505, 7 ff. From the specially magic properties of the fig comes the idea that fig-trees are never struck by lightning: Plu., Smp. 5, 9, p. 684 C; Gp. 11, 2, 7; Theoph. Nonn. 260, 288 (and cf. Rh. Mus. 50, 584); Lyd., Mens. fr. fals. 1, p. 181 W.; 4, 4, p. 69 W. The φαρμακοί at the Thargelia (above, chap. ix, n. 26) wear strings of figs round their necks (Hellad. ap. Phot., Bibl., p. 534a, 5 ff.), and are beaten with branches of the fig-tree (κράδαι) and with σκίλλαι (Hippon. frr. 4, 5, 8; Hsch. κραδίης νόμος): here again the figs have a kathartic purpose (Müller mistakes this, Dorians, i, 346), as is shown also by the presence of σκίλλαi as well (cf. in general Theoc. vii, 107; v, 121). Before the φαρμακοί were driven out of the city as scapegoats they were thus “purified” with the above-mentioned κράδαι and σκίλλαi. The same thing is said in the story of the ravens which parodies this expiatory rite. The ravens are offered up to Λοιμός as a sort of φαρμακοί—περικαθαίροντας ἐπῳδαῖς ἀφιέναι ζῶντας, καὶ ἐπιλέγειν τῷ Λοιμῳ· φεῦγ’ ἐς κόρακας (Arist. fr. 454 [496 Tbn.]; for a similar ἀποτροπιασμός (εἰς αἶγας ἀγρίας) see the commentators on Macar. iii, 59, Diogen. v, 49; cf. τὴν νόσον (regarded as a daimon), φασίν, ἐς αἶγας τρέψαι, Philostr., Her. 179, 8 Kays.).—Rubbing-off of the “impurity” was effected also with the dead bodies of puppies (σκίλλη ἢ σκύλακι, Thphr., Ch. 28 [16]). Those ἁγνισμοῦ δεόμενοι were rubbed down with the bodies of puppies (which had been sacrificed to Hekate): περιμάττονται, and this is περισκυλακισμός, Plu., Q. Rom. 68, p. 280 C.

For ritual purification, it's necessary to use water from running springs or streams, or from the sea: the sea shall wash away all human evils, Eur., IT. 1193. (Thus, in the elevated 589 semi-oracular language of bardic poetry, the asbestos = sea, Aesch., P. 578. At a sacrifice, The priest splashes in the sea., sacrificial calendar from Kos: Inscr. Cos, 38, 23.) Various details on this subject can be found in Lomeier, De lustrat. c. 17. In the water drawn from flowing sources, the power to wash away and remove evil still seemed inherent. When the pollution is particularly severe, it has to be cleansed by water from several running springs: from five springs, Emped. 452 M. = 143 D.; from three springs, Menand., Δεισ. 530, 22 K.; Orestes He purified according to the response near three rivers around Hebrus. (from the stain of matricide), Lamprid., Heliog. vii, 7—or at Rhegion in the seven streams that merge into one river: Varro ap. Prob., ad Verg., p. 3, 4 Keil; Sch. Theoc., prol., p. 1, 3 ff. Düb. (also see Hermann, Opusc. ii, 71 ff.). Water from fourteen different springs might even be used for the purification of murder: Suid. 476 BC Gaisf. (from seven waves, conclusion of an iambic or trochaic line). All this highlights the remarkable endurance of Greek ritual practices. Even in later periods, the same purifying rules continued to apply. An order from the Klarian oracle around the third century CE (ap. Buresch, Klaros, p. 9) instructs those seeking its help to From Naïades, seven seek a pure drink, to be adorned, which they divine from the front. (derived from Il. Ψ 533, but interpreted in a temporal sense) It was necessary to forcefully break down their homes, etc. In a magical papyrus (around the fourth century), ap. Parthey, Abh. Berl. Ak. 1865, p. 126, l. 234–5, instructions are given to collect Spring water from 7 sources for magical purposes. (Again in medieval superstition: for hydromantia, “water must be taken from three running streams, a little from each,” etc.—Hartlieb ap. Grimm, p. 1770—likely a remnant from classical antiquity: see Plin., NH. 28, 46, e tribus puteis, etc.) Also, in general, compare the similar use of water in ancient Indian purification ceremonies: Oldenberg, Rel. Veda, 423 ff.; 489.—cleaning up, wiping off: wiping off of the impurity: see Wyttenb. ad Plu., Mor. vi, pp. 1006–7. In this context, περιψῆν is also used: in a transferred sense, a sorcerer is referred to as a περίφημα = περικάθαρμα, Ep. ad Cor. 1, 4, 13. Washing off with bran, earth, etc., is frequently mentioned. Additionally, the σκίλλα is used or the bodies of sacrificed dogs: She cleaned me, washed me, and then smeared me with oils. (with περιήγν.) καὶ σκίλλῃ, Luc., Necyom. 7. The superstitious person is accustomed to Calling a priest, either in the style of a shell or a little dog, to command himself to be purified., Thphr., Ch. 28 (16) fin. Various medicinal properties were attributed to the σκίλλα. (This idea is humorously elaborated in the pamphlet of “Pythagoras” about Scylla [D.L. viii, 47? κήλης Cobet], an excerpt of which is provided by Galen π. εὐπορίστ. 3, vol. xiv, 567-9 K.) But above all, it is regarded as cleansing: Artem. iii, 50; cleanser of all evils, Sch. Theoc. v, 121, and see also Cratin., Hand. 232 K. Consequently, it is also an antidote, hanging in full view at the doors, Diosc. ii, 202 fin. (see Hermes, 51, 628); this was also the belief of “Pythagoras”: Plin., NH. 20, 101; or it may be buried at the threshold: Ar. Δαναΐδ. fr. 8 [255 H.-G.]. 590 It is also wolf destruction: Artem. iii, 50 (see Gp. 15, 1, 6, with notes of Niclas). As it can deter daemons (in wolf form), it was then used in religious “purification.” Figs are also used for the purpose of religious cleansing and scrubbing (black figs especially The gods of the underworld and those who turn away are under their protection., Macr. 3, 20, 2–3). Figs were used in purifications: Eustath., Od., p. 1572, 57 (? is this the meaning of the περιμάττειν of the eyes with figs in Pherecr. ap. Ath. 3, 78 D [132 K.]). Therefore, Zeus of the figs = cleansing (Eustath.). Figs are the best antidote: Arist. ap. Jul., Ep. 24, p. 505, 7 ff. From the uniquely magical properties of the fig, the belief arose that fig trees are never struck by lightning: Plu., Smp. 5, 9, p. 684 C; Gp. 11, 2, 7; Theoph. Nonn. 260, 288 (and see also Rh. Mus. 50, 584); Lyd., Mens. fr. fals. 1, p. 181 W.; 4, 4, p. 69 W. The medications at the Thargelia (above, chap. ix, n. 26) wear strings of figs around their necks (Hellad. ap. Phot., Bibl., p. 534a, 5 ff.), and are beaten with branches of the fig-tree (κράδαι) and with σκίλλαι (Hippon. frr. 4, 5, 8; Hsch. law of the heart): here, the figs again serve a purifying purpose (Müller mistakenly interprets this, Dorians, i, 346), as evidenced by the presence of σκίλλαi as well (see generally Theoc. vii, 107; v, 121). Before the medications were driven out of the city as scapegoats, they were thus “purified” with the aforementioned κράδαι and σκίλλαi. The same is said in the tale of the ravens that parodies this expiatory rite. The ravens are offered to Plague as a kind of φαρμακοί—cleansing with chants to release the living, and choosing for the Plague; flee to the crows. (Arist. fr. 454 [496 Tbn.]; for a similar repulsion(to wild goats) see the commentators on Macar. iii, 59, Diogen. v, 49; see the disease (considered a daimon), They say, turn to goats., Philostr., Her. 179, 8 Kays.).—Cleaning off the “impurity” was also done with the dead bodies of puppies (σκύλος ή κουτάβι, Thphr., Ch. 28 [16]). Those purifying ourselves were rubbed down with the bodies of puppies (sacrificed to Hekate): περιμάττονται, and this process is known as περισκυλακισμός, Plu., Q. Rom. 68, p. 280 C.

It was believed that these materials (wool and the skins of animals were also employed) received into themselves the harmful and polluting substance. This is why eggs are also used as καθάρσια: e.g. in P. Mag. Lond., n. 121, l. 522 ap. Kenyon, Greek papyri in BM. i, p. 101 (1893): γράφε τὸ ὄνομα εἰς ᾠὰ δύο ἀρρενικὰ καὶ τῷ ἑνὶ περικαθαίρεις (sic) σεαυτὸν κτλ. More in Lomeier, Lustr. (ed. 2 Zutph. 1700), p. 258 f. They were meant to absorb the impurity. ἀνελάμβανον τὰ τοῦ περικαθαρθέντος κακά, Auct. π. δεισιδ. ap. Clem., Str. vii, p. 844 P.

It was thought that these materials (wool and animal skins were also used) absorbed harmful and contaminating substances. This is why eggs are also used for cleansing: for example, in P. Mag. Lond., n. 121, l. 522 ap. Kenyon, Greek papyri in BM. i, p. 101 (1893): Write the name on two male eggs and with one wash. (sic) yourself, etc. More in Lomeier, Lustr. (ed. 2 Zutph. 1700), p. 258 f. They were meant to absorb the impurity. they inherited the negative traits of what was being purified, Auct. π. fear. ap. Clem., Str. vii, p. 844 P.

APPENDIX VI

HEKATE AND THE Ἑκατικὰ φάσματα, GORGYRA, GORGO, MORMOLYKE, MORMO, BAUBO, GELLO, EMPOUSA, ETC.

Hekate herself is addressed as Γοργὼ καὶ Μορμὼ καὶ Μήνη καὶ πολύμορφε: Hymn. ap. Hipp., RH. iv, 35, p. 102, 67 D.-S. Sch. A.R. 591 iii, 861, says of Hek. λέγεται καὶ φάσματα ἐπιπέμπειν (cf. Eur., Hel. 569; D. Chr. iv, p. 73 M. [i, p. 70 Arn.]; Hsch. ἀνταία), τὰ καλούμενα Ἑκάταια (φάσματα Ἑκατικά, Marin., V. Procl. 28) καὶ πολλάκις αὐτὴ μεταβάλλειν τὸ εἶδος διὸ καὶ Ἔμπουσαν καλεῖσθαι. Hekate-Empousa also in Ar. Tagen. fr. 500–1: Sch. Ar., Ran, 293; Hesych. Ἔμπουσα. Thus Hekate is the same as Gorgo, Mormo, and Empousa. Baubo also is one of her names: H. Mag., p. 289 Abel. (Baubo probably identical with the Βαβώ mentioned among other χθόνιοι in an inscr. from Paros: Ἀθήναιον, v, 15; cf. the male personal names Βαβώ, Βαβείς. Βαυβώ can hardly be etymologically connected with βαυβών unpleasantly familiar in Herond. (though the mistake has been repeated in Roscher, Myth. Lex. ii, 3025); one does not see how a female daimon could be named after a male ὄλισβος. The nature of Hekate makes its more probable that she got her name from βαύ the noise of the baying hound: cf. βαυκύων, P. Mag. Par. 1911.) Baubo, too, is elsewhere the name of a gigantic nocturnal spectre: Orph. fr. 216 Ab.; Lob., Agl. 823.—Elsewhere these ἐπικλήσεις, or forms in which Hekate, Gorgo, Mormo, etc., appear, are found as the names of separate infernal spirits. Γοργύρα· Ἀχέροντος γυνή Apollod. π. θεῶν ap. Stob., Ecl. i, 49, p. 419, 15 W.; cf. [Apollod.] 1, 5, 3. Γοργώ is probably only the shortened form of this daimon (she is alluded to as an inhabitant of Hades as early as Od. λ 634; in the κατάβασις of Herakles [Apollod.] 2, 5, 12; χθονία Γοργώ, Eur., Ion, 1053). Acheron, whose consort she is, must have been regarded as the lord of the underworld. We also hear of a mother of the underworld god: in Aesch., Ag. 1235, Kassandra calls Klytaimnestra θύουσαν Ἅιδου μητέρα. In this very striking phrase it is impossible to take ᾅδου in its generalized sense (as Lob. does: Aj.3, p. 292), and the whole phrase as merely metaphorical = αἰνομήτορα. Why μητέρα in particular? And, above all, what would be the point of θύουσαν? Klytaimnestra, of course, it goes without saying, is only metaphorically called the “raging mother of Hades”, i.e. a true she-devil; but the thing with which she is compared, from which the metaphor is taken, must have been a real figure of legend. In exactly the same way, in Byz. Greek, τῶν δαιμόνων μήτηρ is a figurative expression for a wicked woman: see Καλλίμ. καὶ Χρυσορρόη 2579 ed. Lambros; cf. ib., 1306, τῶν Νηρηίδων μάμμη. In German too “the devil’s mother”, or grandmother, or the devil’s wife or bride, are of frequent occurrence in a metaphorical sense: Grimm, p. 1007; 1607. But in all these cases the comparison invariably implies the existence of real legendary figures to which the comparison refers: and often enough in mediæval and modern Greek folk-lore these creatures actually occur. We may therefore conclude that the θύουσα Ἅιδου μήτηρ was a real figure of Greek legend. “Hades” in this connexion cannot be the god of the underworld, common in Homer and a regular poetic character elsewhere, the brother of Zeus and Poseidon. In that case his mother would be Rhea who certainly cannot be identified with the θύουσα Ἅιδου μήτηρ. In local mythology there were numerous other underworld 592 gods any of whom might be loosely called Ἅιδης, the word being used as a general name for such deities. But the “raging” mother of the underworld god has the most unmistakable resemblance to Hekate who flies about by night on the wind (see above, chap. ix, p. 297 f.; below, App. vii) ψυχαῖς νεκύων μέτα βακχεύουσα (Reiss, Rh. Mus. 49, 181 n., compares her less well with the “huntsman of Hades”). It seems almost as if the two were identical: local legend could quite well have made Hekate the mother of the underworld god (just as she was the daughter of Admetos, or of Eubouleus, i.e. of Hades). If she is the same as Μορμώ (cf. the Hymn. ap. Hipp., RH. iv, 35) then she was also known to folk-lore as the foster-mother of Acheron. This title is applied to Μορμολύκα· τιθήνη of Acheron in Sophron fr. 9 Kaibel. But Μορμώ is simply the abbreviated form of Μορμολύκη as Γοργώ is of Γοργύρα, and cf. also Μομμώ Hsch., and with metathesis of ρ, Μομβρώ id. (Μορμολ. is mentioned together with Λαμιά, Γοργώ, Ἐφιάλτης as a legendary creature in Str., p. 19, and see Ruhnken, Tim. Lex., p. 179 ff., Μορμολύκειον.) Μορμώ also in plural: ὥσπερ μορμόνας παιδάρια (φοβοῦνται), Xen., HG. 4, 4, 17; Hsch. μορμόνας· πλάνητας δαίμονας (i.e. “wandering”, as in Hesiod, and like the Erinyes in the Pythagorean σύμβολον, and the ἀλάστωρ, the unquiet and wandering soul whose name is derived from ἀλᾶσθαι—so Lob., Paralip. 450). Besides this we have Ἑκάτας too in the plural: Luc., Philops. 39 fin. (perhaps only generalizing); τρισσῶν Ἑκατῶν, P. Mag. Par. 2825 f.; Ἔμπουσαι (with ἄλλα εἴδωλα), D.P. 725, etc., to say nothing of Γοργόνες. Μορμώ as a bogey to frighten children: Μορμὼ δάκνει, Theoc. xv, 40 (cf. [ἀνά]κλησις Μορμο[ῦς], a theatrical piece, probably a farce: IGM. Aeg. i, 125g). So too is the monster Λάμια that kidnaps children: Duris, fr. 35 (2 FHG); D.S. 20, 41; Heraclit., Incred. 34, etc. Some details in Friedländer, Darstell. a. d. Sitteng.4, i, 511 f. (as a nickname Λαμώ: Sch. Ar., Eq. 62). Mormo herself is called Lamia, Μορμοῦς τῆς καὶ Λαμίας, Sch. Greg. Nz. ap. Ruhnken, Tim. Lex., p. 182a. With Mormo and Lamia Γελλώ is also identified (Sch. Theoc. xv, 40), a ghost that kidnaps children mentioned already by Sappho, fr. 44; Zenob. iii, 3, etc. Καρκώ, too, is the same as Λάμια (Hesych.). Lamia is evidently the general name (see above, chap. iv, n. 115), while Mormo, Gello, Karko, and even Empousa, are particular Lamiai, who also merge into one another. Just as Mormo and Gello coincide, so also do Gello and Empousa: Γελλὼ εἴδωλον Ἐμπούσης, Hsch. (Empousai, Lamiai, and Mormolykai the same: Philostr., V. Ap. 4, 25, p. 145, 16 K.). Empousa, who appears in continually changing shapes (Ar., Ran. 289 ff.), is seen by human beings at night (νυκτερινὸν φάσμα ἡ Ἔμπουσα, V. Aeschin. init.; Philostr. V. Ap. 2, 4), but even more commonly at midday (like the Hekate of Lucian): μεσημβρίας ὅταν τοῖς κατοιχομένοις ἐναγίζωσιν, Sch. Ar., Ran. 293. She is, in fact, the daemonium meridianum known to Christian writers as Diana (Lob., Agl. 1092; Grimm, 1162). For devils appearing at midday see Rochholz, Glaube u. Br., i, 67 ff.; Mannhardt, Ant. 593 Wald u. Feldc. ii, 135 f.; Haberland, Ztschr. Völkerpsych. xiii, 310 ff.; Drexler in Myth. Lex. ii, 2832 ff; Grimm, 1661. Hekate, in so far as she appears as an εἴδωλον in the upper world is identical with Emp. and with Borbo, Gorgo, Mormo, as well as Gello, Karko, Lamia. (Acc. to Sch. A.R. iv, 828 Stesichoros, ἐν τῇ Σκύλλῃ εἴδους [Εἰδοῦς Bergk on Stes. fr. 13 quite unconvincingly] τινὸς Λαμίας τὴν Σκύλλαν φησὶ θυγατέρα εἶναι. Here Hek. herself seems to be described as “a kind of Lamia”, for she was generally regarded as the mother of Skylla, e.g. by Akousilaos [73 B, 27 Vors.], in the Hesiodic Eoiai, 172 Rz. [Sch. A.R.], and even in A.R. himself who in iv, 829, explains the Homeric Krataiis [μ 124] as merely a name of Hekate.)—The vagueness of feature and confusion of personality is characteristic of these ghostly and delusive apparitions. In reality the individual names (in some cases onomatopoeic formations to suggest terror) were originally the titles of local ghosts. In the long run they all come to suggest the same general idea and are therefore confused with each other and are identified with the best known of them, Hekate. The underworld and the realm of ghosts is the proper home of these feminine daimones as a whole and of Hekate too; most of them, with the possible exception of Empousa, give way entirely to Hekate in importance and are relegated to children’s fairy-tales. In the case of Gorgyra (Gorgo) and Mormolyke (Mormo) this fact is clearly attested. Lamia and Gello carry off children and also ἀώρους from this life, like other daimones of the underworld, Keres, Harpies, Erinyes, and Thanatos himself. The Lamiai rise to the light from their underground lairs—λαμίας τινὰς ἱστοροῦντες (the oldest writers of histories) ἐν ὕλαις καὶ νάπαις ἐκ γῆς ἀνιεμένας, D.H., Thuc. 6. Empousa appears on earth at midday because that was the time when sacrifice was offered to the dead (Sch. Ar., Ran. 293; sacrifice to Heroes at midday: above, chap. iv, n. 9). She approaches the offerings to the creatures of the lower world because she herself is one of their number. (In the same way the chthonic character of the Seirenes—they are closely related to the Harpies—is shown by the fact that they too appear like Empousa at midday and oppress sleepers, etc., according to the popular demonology. See Crusius, Philol. 50, 97 ff.)

Hecate is referred to as Gorgo, Mormo, Mēne, and many forms: Hymn. ap. Hipp., RH. iv, 35, p. 102, 67 D.-S. Sch. A.R. 591 iii, 861, states that Hecate It is said to send specters. (cf. Eur., Hel. 569; D. Chr. iv, p. 73 M. [i, p. 70 Arn.]; Hsch. ἀνταία, the so-called Hekatean (Hecate's spectra, Marin., V. Procl. 28) And often she changes her appearance, which is why she is called __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.. Hecate-Empousa is also mentioned in Ar. Tagen. fr. 500–1: Sch. Ar., Ran, 293; Hesych. Empusa. Thus, Hecate is the same as Gorgo, Mormo, and Empousa. Baubo is also one of her names: H. Mag., p. 289 Abel. (Baubo is probably identical with the Βαβώ referenced among other Underworld deities in an inscription from Paros: Athens, v, 15; cf. the male personal names Βαβώ, Βαβείς. Bavvo is unlikely to be etymologically linked to βαυβών, which is unpleasantly familiar in Herond. (though this error has been repeated in Roscher, Myth. Lex. ii, 3025); it’s unclear how a female daimon could be named after a male ὄλισβος. The nature of Hecate makes it more probable that she got her name from βαύ, the sound of the baying hound: cf. βαυκύων, P. Mag. Par. 1911.) Baubo is also elsewhere the name of a huge nighttime specter: Orph. fr. 216 Ab.; Lob., Agl. 823.—Elsewhere, these calls, or forms in which Hecate, Gorgo, Mormo, etc. appear, are found as names of separate underworld spirits. Gorgyra: Woman of Acheron Apollod. π. gods ap. Stob., Ecl. i, 49, p. 419, 15 W.; cf. [Apollod.] 1, 5, 3. Γοργώ is probably just a shortened form of this daimon (she is mentioned as a resident of Hades as early as Od. λ 634; in the descent of Herakles [Apollod.] 2, 5, 12; Chthonic Gorgo, Eur., Ion, 1053). Acheron, whose partner she is, must have been viewed as the lord of the underworld. We also hear mention of a mother of the underworld god: in Aesch., Ag. 1235, Kassandra calls Klytaimnestra θυούσαν Ἅιδου μητέρα. In this very striking phrase, it’s impossible to interpret ᾍδου in its general sense (as Lob. does: Aj.3, p. 292), and the entire phrase as merely metaphorical = a person worthy of praise. Why mom in particular? And, above all, what would the significance of θυούσαν? Klytaimnestra, of course, is only metaphorically called the “raging mother of Hades”, meaning a true she-devil; but the reference point for this comparison, from which the metaphor is drawn, must have been a real figure from legend. Similarly, in Byzantine Greek, τῶν δαιμόνων μήτηρ is a figurative expression for a wicked woman: see Callim. and Chrysohroia 2579 ed. Lambros; cf. ib., 1306, Nereid grandmother. In German, too, “the demon's mother”, or grandmother, or the devil’s wife or bride, are frequently used metaphorically: Grimm, p. 1007; 1607. But in all these cases, the comparison always implies the existence of real legendary figures that the comparison refers to: and often enough in medieval and modern Greek folklore, these beings actually exist. We may therefore conclude that the mother of Hades was a real figure in Greek legend. “Hades” in this context cannot refer to the god of the underworld, commonly mentioned in Homer and elsewhere, the brother of Zeus and Poseidon. In that case, his mother would be Rhea, who certainly cannot be identified with the mother of Hades. In local mythology, there were numerous other underworld 592 gods who might have been loosely called Hades, with the term being used as a general designation for such deities. But the “raging” mother of the underworld god notably resembles Hecate, who flies around by night on the wind (see above, chap. ix, p. 297 f.; below, App. vii) Spirits of the dead reveling (Reiss, Rh. Mus. 49, 181 n., less successfully compares her to the “huntsman of Hades”). It almost seems as if the two are identical: local folklore could very well have made Hecate the mother of the underworld god (just as she was the daughter of Admetos, or of Eubouleus, i.e. of Hades). If she is the same as Mormo (cf. the Hymn. ap. Hipp., RH. iv, 35) then she was also recognized in folklore as the foster-mother of Acheron. This title is applied to Mormolyca· caretaker of Acheron in Sophron fr. 9 Kaibel. But Mormo is simply the shortened form of Mormolyke just as Γοργώ is a shortened form of Γοργύρα, and see also Μομμώ Hsch., and with metathesis, Μομβρώ id. (Μορμολ. is mentioned together with Λαμία, Γοργώ, Εφιάλτης as a legendary creature in Str., p. 19, and see Ruhnken, Tim. Lex., p. 179 ff., Mormolyceum.) Mormo also appears in the plural: just like a bunch of kids (they fear), Xen., HG. 4, 4, 17; Hsch. Mormon: wandering demon (i.e. “wandering”, as in Hesiod, and like the Erinyes in the Pythagorean symbol, and the None, the restless and wandering soul whose name comes from ἀλᾶσθαι—so Lob., Paralip. 450). Besides this, we also have Hecate in the plural: Luc., Philops. 39 fin. (perhaps just generalizing); three Hecates, P. Mag. Par. 2825 f.; Ἔμπουσαι (with other idols), D.P. 725, etc., not to mention Mermaids. Mormo is used as a bogey to scare children: Mormo bites, Theoc. xv, 40 (cf. [ἀνά]κλησις Μορμο[ῦς], a theatrical piece, probably a farce: IGM. Aeg. i, 125g). Similarly, the monster Λάμια that abducts children: Duris, fr. 35 (2 FHG); D.S. 20, 41; Heraclit., Incred. 34, etc. Some details in Friedländer, Darstell. a. d. Sitteng.4, i, 511 f. (as a nickname Λαμώ: Sch. Ar., Eq. 62). Mormo herself is referred to as Lamia, Mormo and Lamia, Sch. Greg. Nz. ap. Ruhnken, Tim. Lex., p. 182a. Mormo is also associated with Laughing, a ghost that abducts children mentioned by Sappho, fr. 44; Zenob. iii, 3, etc. Καρκίνε is also identical to Λάμια (Hesych.). Lamia clearly serves as the general term (see above, chap. iv, n. 115), while Mormo, Gello, Karko, and even Empousa, are specific Lamiai who also blend into one another. Just as Mormo and Gello coincide, the same goes for Gello and Empousa: Γελλὼ εἴδωλον Ἐμπούσης, Hsch. (Empousai, Lamiai, and Mormolykai are the same: Philostr., V. Ap. 4, 25, p. 145, 16 K.). Empousa, who appears in constantly changing forms (Ar., Ran. 289 ff.), is seen by people at night (nightmare is the Empusa, V. Aeschin. init.; Philostr. V. Ap. 2, 4), but even more commonly at midday (like the Hecate of Lucian): μεσημβρίας ὅταν τοῖς κατοιχομένοις ἐναγίζωσιν, Sch. Ar., Ran. 293. She is, in fact, the daemonium meridianum known to Christian writers as Diana (Lob., Agl. 1092; Grimm, 1162). For devils that appear at midday see Rochholz, Glaube u. Br., i, 67 ff.; Mannhardt, Ant. 593 Wald u. Feldc. ii, 135 f.; Haberland, Ztschr. Völkerpsych. xiii, 310 ff.; Drexler in Myth. Lex. ii, 2832 ff; Grimm, 1661. Hecate, as she appears as an idol in the upper world, is identical with Empousa and with Borbo, Gorgo, Mormo, as well as Gello, Karko, Lamia. (According to Sch. A.R. iv, 828 Stesichoros, in Scylla's form[Είδα Bergk on Stes. fr. 13 quite unconvincingly] Some say that Lamia is the daughter of Scylla.. Here Hecate seems to be described as “a kind of Lamia”, as she was generally regarded as the mother of Scylla, e.g. by Akousilaos [73 B, 27 Vors.], in the Hesiodic Eoiai, 172 Rz. [Sch. A.R.], and even in A.R. himself who in iv, 829, explains the Homeric Krataiis [μ 124] as merely a name of Hecate.)—The ambiguity of features and confusion of identity is characteristic of these ghostly and deceptive apparitions. In reality, the individual names (in some cases onomatopoeic formations meant to evoke fear) were originally the titles of local ghosts. Over time, they all come to imply the same general idea and are therefore confused with one another, ultimately being identified with the best-known among them, Hecate. The underworld and the realm of spirits is the proper home of these feminine daimons as a whole, including Hecate; most of them, with the possible exception of Empousa, yield entirely to Hecate in significance and are pushed into children's fairy tales. In the instances of Gorgyra (Gorgo) and Mormolyke (Mormo), this fact is clearly established. Lamia and Gello abduct children and also ἄυρος from this life, like other daimons of the underworld, Keres, Harpies, Erinyes, and even Thanatos himself. The Lamiai emerge from their underground lairs—λαμίας τινὰς ἱστοροῦντες (the oldest writers of history) In woods and valleys, rising up from the earth., D.H., Thuc. 6. Empousa appears on land at midday because that’s when offerings are made for the dead (Sch. Ar., Ran. 293; offerings to Heroes at midday: above, chap. iv, n. 9). She approaches the offerings for the beings of the lower world because she’s one among them. (In the same way, the chthonic nature of the Seirenes—they are closely related to the Harpies—is shown by the fact that they also appear like Empousa at midday and disturb sleepers, etc., according to popular demonology. See Crusius, Philol. 50, 97 ff.)

APPENDIX VII

The Hosts of Hekate cause fear and sickness at night: εἴτ’ ἔνυπνον φάντασμα φοβῇ χθονίας θ’ Ἑκάτης κῶμον ἐδέξω, Trag. Incert. fr. 375 (Porson suggested Aesch.). They form the νυκτίφαντοι πρόπολοι Ἐνοδίας, Eur., Hel. 570. (These πρόπολοι τᾶς θεοῦ are probably also referred to in the defixio CIG. 5773; Wünsch, Tab. Defix., p. ixb.) They are nothing else than the restless souls of the dead wandering in the train of Hekate. Nocturnal terrors are produced by Ἑκάτης ἐπιβολαὶ καὶ ἡρώων ἔφοδοι, Hp., Morb. Sacr. (vi, 362 L.). Hence Orph., H. i, 1, calls Hekate ψυχαῖς νεκύων μέτα βακχεύουσαν. The souls which thus wander about with Hekate are 594 in part those of the ἄωροι, i.e. of those who have died before the completion of their “destined” period of life, πρὶν μοῖραν ἐξήκειν βίου, Soph., Ant. 896; cf. Phrynich. in AB. 24, 22, and πρόμοιρος ἁρπαγή, Inscr. Cos, 322. Thanatos has acted unjustly towards them ἐν ταχυτῆτι βίου παύων νεοήλικας ἀκμάς, Orph., H. 87, 5–6. The period of conscious existence on earth which they had left incomplete they must now fulfil as disembodied “souls”: aiunt immatura morte praeventas (animas) eo usque vagari istic, donec reliquatio compleatur aetatum quas tum pervixissent si non intempestive obiissent, Tert., An. 56. (They haunt the place of their burial: ἥρωες ἀτυχεῖς, οἳ ἐν τῷ δεῖνι τόπῳ συνέχεσθε, P. Mag. Par. 1408; cf. CIG. 5858b.) For this reason it is often mentioned on gravestones (and elsewhere: Eur., Alc. 168 f.) as something specially to be lamented that the person there buried had died ἄωρος—see Epigr. Gr. 12; 16; 193; 220, 1; 221, 2; 313, 2–3: ἄτεκνος ἄωρος, 236, 2; and cf. 372, 32; 184, 3; CIG. 5574 (see also App. iii and chap. xiv, pt. ii, n. 155, ἄγαμοι). Gello who herself παρθένος ἀώρως ἐτελεύτησε then becomes a φάντασμα, slays children and causes τοὺς τῶν ἀώρων θανάτους, Zenob. iii, 3; Hsch. Γελλώ. The souls of the ἄωροι cannot rest but must continually wander: see Plaut., Most. 499. They (ἀνέμων εἴδωλον ἔχοντες, H. Hec., l. 15: Orph., p. 290 Ab.) are the creatures which accompany Hekate in her nocturnal wanderings. The Hymn. to Hekate, p. 289 Ab. (cf. P. Mag. Par. 2727 ff.) addresses Hek. thus (10 ff.): δεῦρ’ Ἑκάτη τριοδῖτι, πυρίπνοε, φάσματ’ ἔχουσα (ἄγουσα Mein.), ἥ τ’ ἔλαχες δεινὰς μὲν ὁδοὺς (δεινάς τ’ ἐφόδους?) χαλεπάς τ’ ἐπιπομπάς, τὴν Ἑκάτην σε καλῶ σὺν ἀποφθιμένοισιν ἀώροις κεἴ τινες ἡρώων θάνον ἀγναῖοί τε (καὶ Mein., but this position of τέ is a regular Hellenistic usage; occurs frequently in Orac. Sibyll.) ἄπαιδες κτλ. Thus the ἄωροι became the typical haunting spirits κατ’ ἐξοχήν. Just as in this Hymn. they are summoned (with Hek.) for unholy purposes of magic, so an ἄωρος is sometimes expressly invoked in the defixiones which were placed in graves (esp. in those of ἄωροι: see the instructions given in P. Mag. Par. 332 ff., 2215, 2220 f.; P. Anastasy, l. 336 ff.; 353): λέγω τῷ ἀώρῳ τῷ κ[ατὰ τοῦτον τὸν τόπον, etc.]: Roman defixio, I. Sic. et It. 1047; ἐξορκίζω σε, νεκύδαιμον ἄωρε, leaden tablet from Carth., BCH. 1888, p. 299 (Tab. Defix., p. xvi); cf. also P. Mag. Par. 342 f.; 1390 ff.; παράδοτε (the victim) ἀώροις, leaden tablet from Alexandria, Rh. Mus. 9, 37, l. 22; a lead tablet from Phrygia (BCH. 1893, p. 251) has: γράφω πάντας τοὺς ἐμοὶ ἀντία ποιοῦντας μετὰ τῶν ἀώρων· Ἐπάγαθον Σαβῖναν, etc. In the curses of Epigr. Gr., p. 149, the Ἑκάτης μελαίνης δαίμονες alternate with ἄωροι συμφοραί; see also Sterrett, Amer. Sch. Athens, ii, 168.—Everything that has been said of the ἄωροι applies also to the βιαιοθάνατοι (or βίαιοi, a term found in the magical papyri; cf. also βιοθάνατον πνεῦμα, P. Mag. Par. 1950); they are a special kind of ἄωροι: they find no rest, see above, chap. v, n. 147; Tert., An. 56–7; Serv., A. iv, 386, quoting the physici; cf. also Heliod., 2, 5, p. 42, 20 ff. Bk. A βιαιοθάνατος, who has thus been deprived of his life, has to make special supplication for admission 595 into Hades: Epigr. Gr. 625; cf. Verg., A. iv, 696 ff. Such souls become ἀλάστορες, wandering spirits: see above, Append. vi, p. 592; wandering of a βιαιοθάνατος, Plu., Cim. 1.—Finally the souls of unburied persons who have no share in the cult of the souls or home in the grave are also condemned to wander (cf. Eur., Hec. 31–50): see above, chap. v, p. 163. The ἄταφος is detained ἐνθάδε: Soph., Ant. 1070, and wanders about the earth: ἀλαίνει, Eur., Tro. 1083; cf. Tert., An. 56. Hence the souls of these ἄταφοι could be forced to appear and answer the sorcerer: Heliod., p. 177, 15 ff. Bk.; rite conditis Manibus the wanderings of the soul cease: Plin., Ep. 7, 27, 11; Luc., Philops. 31 fin.—The art of the μάντις and of the καθαρτής (and of the ἀπομάκτρια γραῦς, Plu., Superst. 3, p. 166 A) is supposed to keep off such nocturnal terrors; it is “purification” precisely because it drives away such unholy beings. It is also a kind of καθάρσιον that is employed when ἀπομαγδαλίαι (instead of to the dogs: Ath. 409 D) are thrown out ἐν τοῖς ἀμφόδοις γινομένοις νυκτερινοῖς φόβοις (Harmodios of Leprea ap. Ath. 149 C), i.e. to Hekate and her rout which also appears as a pack of hounds.

The Hosts of Hekate create fear and sickness at night: Whether as a dream or a ghost, I would welcome the fearful gathering of the chthonic Hecate., Trag. Incert. fr. 375 (Porson may have suggested Aesch.). They make up the Night-prophets of Enodia, Eur., Hel. 570. (These guardian of the god are likely also mentioned in the defixio CIG. 5773; Wünsch, Tab. Defix., p. ixb.) They are nothing more than the restless souls of the dead roaming in the company of Hekate. Nightly fears come from Hecate's invocations and hero assaults, Hp., Morb. Sacr. (vi, 362 L.). Thus Orph., H. i, 1, refers to Hekate as Souls of the dead in Bacchic revelry. The souls that wander with Hekate are 594 partly those of the ἄωροι, meaning those who died before their “destined” life span was finished, before their time on earth, Soph., Ant. 896; cf. Phrynich. in AB. 24, 22, and premiere theft, Inscr. Cos, 322. Thanatos has wronged them In the quick pace of life, youth comes to an end., Orph., H. 87, 5–6. The period of conscious life on earth that they left unfinished must now be completed as disembodied “souls”: Souls that are cut off by an untimely death wander there until the completion of the lifespans they would have lived if they had not died prematurely., Tert., An. 56. (They frequent the site of their burial: Unfortunate heroes, who find themselves trapped in this dire place., P. Mag. Par. 1408; cf. CIG. 5858b.) For this reason, it is often noted on gravestones (and elsewhere: Eur., Alc. 168 f.) as something particularly sorrowful that the person buried there died early—see Epigr. Gr. 12; 16; 193; 220, 1; 221, 2; 313, 2–3: childless single, 236, 2; and cf. 372, 32; 184, 3; CIG. 5574 (see also App. iii and chap. xiv, pt. ii, n. 155, single). Gello, who herself The virgin passed away., then turns into a ghost, kills children, and causes the deaths of the unborn, Zenob. iii, 3; Hsch. LOL. The souls of the early cannot rest and must constantly roam: see Plaut., Most. 499. They (having the form of winds, H. Hec., l. 15: Orph., p. 290 Ab.) are the beings that accompany Hekate in her nocturnal journeys. The Hymn. to Hekate, p. 289 Ab. (cf. P. Mag. Par. 2727 ff.) addresses Hek. like this (10 ff.): Come here, Hecate of the three ways, with the fiery breath, holding the specters.(leading Mein.), you have taken on some dangerous paths.(terrible attacks?) You're difficult to deal with, Hecate, and I call on you with the fallen spirits and if any heroes have died, I summon the pure ones as well.(καὶ Mein., but this position of τέ is a regular Hellenistic usage; occurs frequently in Orac. Sibyll.) ἄπαιδες κτλ. Thus the ἄωροι became the typical haunting spirits by far. Just as in this Hymn. they are called upon (with Hek.) for unholy magic purposes, so an early is sometimes specifically invoked in the defixiones that were placed in graves (especially for early: see the instructions given in P. Mag. Par. 332 ff., 2215, 2220 f.; P. Anastasy, l. 336 ff.; 353): λέγω τῷ ἀώρῳ τῷ κ[at this place, etc.]: Roman defixio, I. Sic. et It. 1047; I command you, restless spirit, lead tablet from Carth., BCH. 1888, p. 299 (Tab. Defix., p. xvi); cf. also P. Mag. Par. 342 f.; 1390 ff.; παράδοτε (the victim) ἀώροις, lead tablet from Alexandria, Rh. Mus. 9, 37, l. 22; a lead tablet from Phrygia (BCH. 1893, p. 251) has: I write to everyone who opposes me with the unseen. Epagathus Sabinus., etc. In the curses of Epigr. Gr., p. 149, the Hecate's dark demons alternate with early misfortunes; see also Sterrett, Amer. Sch. Athens, ii, 168.—Everything that has been said about the late night applies also to the biaiothanatoi (or βίαιοi, a term found in the magical papyri; cf. also biodeath spirit, P. Mag. Par. 1950); they are a special kind of Early: they find no rest, see above, chap. v, n. 147; Tert., An. 56–7; Serv., A. iv, 386, quoting the physici; cf. also Heliod., 2, 5, p. 42, 20 ff. Bk. A violent death, who has thus been robbed of his life, must perform special supplications for access 595 into Hades: Epigr. Gr. 625; cf. Verg., A. iv, 696 ff. Such souls turn into ἀλάστορες, wandering spirits: see above, Append. vi, p. 592; wandering of a βιαιοθάνατος, Plu., Cim. 1.—Finally, the souls of the unburied who have no connection with the cult of the souls or home in a grave are also doomed to roam (cf. Eur., Hec. 31–50): see above, chap. v, p. 163. The unburied is stuck here: Soph., Ant. 1070, and wanders the earth: It wanders., Eur., Tro. 1083; cf. Tert., An. 56. Hence the souls of these unburied can be compelled to appear and answer the sorcerer: Heliod., p. 177, 15 ff. Bk.; rite conditis Manibus the wanderings of the soul end: Plin., Ep. 7, 27, 11; Luc., Philops. 31 fin.—The skill of the diviner and of the cleanser (and of the away with the old, Plu., Superst. 3, p. 166 A) is believed to repel such nighttime terrors; it is “purification” because it drives away such unholy entities. It is also a type of catharsis that is used when ἀπομαγδαλίαι (instead of to the dogs: Ath. 409 D) are tossed out In the paths filled with nocturnal fears. (Harmodios of Leprea ap. Ath. 149 C), i.e., to Hekate and her entourage which also appears as a pack of hounds.

APPENDIX VIII

DISINTEGRATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND REDUPLICATION OF PERSONALITY

In that period of extreme excitement the Greeks must have had frequent experience of the abnormal but by no means unusual psychical state in which a division of consciousness takes place and becomes apparent. The single personality splits up into two (or more) distinct centres of consciousness; and these give rise to two personalities (succeeding each other, or contemporaneous), with a double will and a double intellect appearing in one man. Even unprejudiced psychological observers of our own time are unable to describe such phenomena, which appear (spontaneously or produced experimentally) in certain neuropathic conditions, except as a reduplication or multiplication of personality. A second self comes into being, a second centre of consciousness following or by the side of the first and normal personality, which is generally unaware of the existence of its rival. (Probably the most complete and cautious account of these matters is that given by Pierre Janet in L’automatisme psychologique, Paris, 1889.) When such phenomena appear in conjunction with marked religious or spiritualistic tendencies they are naturally explained in accordance with these intellectual preconceptions. The appearance in a man or woman of an intelligent will, unguided or unperceived by the normally dominant personality, is conceived as the entrance of a foreign personality into the individual; or as the expulsion of the real soul of the individual by such a demonic or spiritual visitor. Nothing, however, is commoner, in all ages, than the religious or spiritualist preconceptions that lead to such an explanation; and so 596 what the Greeks called ἔκστασις or κατέχεσθαι ἐκ θεοῦ has been a very frequent explanation of such mysterious occurrences from the earliest times (and in the present day). It has appealed just as much to the person affected by such “reduplication of personality” as to those round about him (unless they have been scientifically educated). The actual experience of such phenomena is generally a fact; fancy begins only with the explanation offered. For the Greeks the Pythia was always the best known example of such “possession” of a human being by a foreign will or spirit which seemed to enter violently and from outside into the human individual, having little correspondence (as it usually happened) with the character or the intellect of the “medium” in his or her normal state of consciousness. The Sibyls, Bakides, Βάκχοι, the seers and priests of purification, Epimenides, Aristeas, and so many others, were further cases of the ascent of the soul to the divine or the entrance of a god into the soul. It was inevitable that the idea of an immediate relation between the soul and the divine, and of the divine nature of the soul itself, should grow up in connexion with such cases as these, and seem to be authenticated in them more than in any other way. Greece is not the only place where this has happened.

During that time of intense excitement, the Greeks must have often encountered the unusual yet not uncommon mental state in which consciousness becomes divided and noticeable. One personality breaks into two (or more) distinct centers of consciousness, which creates two personalities (either one after the other or simultaneously), resulting in a dual will and intellect within one person. Even unbiased psychological observers today struggle to describe such phenomena, which occur (spontaneously or experimentally) in certain neurological conditions, except as a duplication or multiplication of personality. A second self emerges, a second center of consciousness either following or alongside the first and typically normal personality, which is usually unaware of its rival. (Probably the most thorough and cautious explanation of these issues is provided by Pierre Janet in L’automatisme psychologique, Paris, 1889.) When such phenomena occur alongside strong religious or spiritual tendencies, they are typically interpreted through these existing intellectual beliefs. The emergence of an intelligent will in a person, not guided by or recognized by the normally dominant personality, is seen as the arrival of a foreign personality within the individual; or as the expulsion of the true soul by such a demonic or spiritual presence. However, it's been a common theme throughout history for religious or spiritual beliefs to prompt such explanations; thus, 596 what the Greeks referred to as ecstasy or held by God has frequently been used to explain such mysterious occurrences from ancient times to today. This belief has appealed equally to those experiencing such “duplication of personality” as to those around them (unless they have scientific training). The actual experience of such phenomena is generally a given; imagination begins only with the explanations provided. For the Greeks, the Pythia was the best-known example of such “possession” by a foreign will or spirit, which seemed to invade forcefully from outside into the individual, often showing little connection (as usually occurred) with the personality or intellect of the “medium” in their normal state of consciousness. The Sibyls, Bakides, Bacchae, the seers and purification priests, Epimenides, Aristeas, and many others, were further examples of the soul ascending to the divine or of a god entering the soul. It was inevitable that the notion of a direct relationship between the soul and the divine, as well as the divine nature of the soul itself, would develop in connection with such cases and seem to be validated through them more than any other means. Greece is not the only place where this has occurred.

APPENDIX IX

THE GREAT ORPHIC THEOGONY

The information about a coherent Orphic Theogony and Anthropogony which has come down to us from the statements of Neoplatonic philosophers and their contemporaries, is derived, as Lobeck very rightly concluded, from the ἐν ταῖς ῥαψῳδίαις Ὀρφικαῖς θεολογία, ἣν καὶ οἱ φιλόσοφοι διερμηνεύουσιν (Damasc., Princ., p. 380 K.). This last statement means that they were explained in lectures given by the heads of the Platonic school since the time of Syrianos (Ὀρφικαὶ συνουσίαι of Syrian.: Procl., in Tim. 96 B; Scholia of Proclus on Orpheus, εἰ καὶ μὴ εἰς πάσας τὰς ῥαψῳδίας: Marin., V. Procl. 27). Written commentaries were also published, more particularly in order to prove the συμφωνίαν Ὀρφέως, Πυθαγόρου καὶ Πλάτωνος (Syrianos wrote a book with this title, wrongly ascribed to Proclus by Suidas: see R. Schöll on Procl. in Rp., p. 5. Probably the work of Syr. εἰς τὴν Ὀρφέως θεολογίαν is the source of Orph., frr. 123–4, which are traced back in the Θεοσοφία, § 50, to Συριανὸς ἐν τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ πονήμασιν. From Syr. also probably comes the citation from Orpheus ἐν τῇ τετάρτῃ ῥαψῳδίᾳ, ib., § 61). The older Neoplatonists before Syrianos took little notice of the Orphica. Plotinos gives no quotation at all (though perhaps an allusion in 4, 3, 12; see Lob., p. 555), Iamblichos quotes nothing from immediate acquaintance, Porphyrios, who read everything, gives a little (frr. 114; 123 Euseb. from Porph.; 211) and what he does give certainly comes from the Rhapsodiai. In fact, 597 the Neoplatonics as a whole when they quote Orpheus from their own knowledge (and do not, for example, simply write “Orpheus” instead of “Pythagoras”: see above, chap. x, n. 9) use the Rhapsodiai only, as Lobeck rightly maintains, p. 466 (Abel did not realize this, to the detriment of his collection of the frr.). The title of the poem they used can hardly have been Θεογονία. (This seems to occur as a title in fr. 188 [Clem. Al. from auct. π. κλοπῆς]. In fr. 108 it is only a description of contents; fr. 310 is spurious. In Suidas, Gaisford’s MSS., we do indeed read of a θεογονία, ἔπη ͵ασʹ: but the figure indicating the number of lines corresponds most suspiciously with that of the previous ὀνομαστικόν, and in any case would be insufficient for the great length of the ῥαψῳδίαι.) It seems extremely probable (as Lobeck already suspected, p. 716, 726) that the simple description: an Orphic poem divided into several Rhapsodiai, ἱεροὶ λόγοι ἐν ῥαψῳδίαις κδʹ (Suid.), was the real title of the poem, which consisted of several ῥαψῳδίαι. This ἱερὸς λόγος (the plural only means that there were several books) is, however a different one (Lobeck missed this, p. 716) from the ἱερὸς λόγος which Epigenes (ap. Clem. Al., Str. i, 21, p. 144 P.) attributed to the Pythagorean Kerkops. (And again when Suid. attributes the 24 Rhaps. to the Thessalian Theognetos or to Kerkops he also means the old ἱερὸς λόγος not divided into Rhaps., and confuses this with the later and much extended ἱερὸς λόγος.) The older ἱερὸς λόγος is that alluded to by Cic., ND. i, 107, and prob. also by Plu., Smp. 2, 3, 2, p. 636 D (fr. 42); the quotation in EM. (fr. 44) from the 8th Bk. refers to the later ἱερὸς λόγος. But it is certain that the ἱερὸς λόγος in 24 Bks., the poem possessed by the Neoplatonists, from which by far the greater number of our fragments are taken, was not a work of the sixth century, written for instance (as Lobeck was inclined to think, 683 f.) by Onomakritos. It is even untrue—regrettably enough we might add—that as the Neoplatonists presumed (and Lobeck believed in consequence: p. 508, 529 f., 602, 613) Plato knew and made use of the “Rhapsodies”. (This emerges with particular plainness from Gruppe’s study of the question in Jb. Philol. Supp. xvii, 689 ff.). And when this is gone no other evidence for the earlier date of the Orphic Theogony in this form is left. And in the very few passages in which a real coincidence (and not a doubtfully assumed one) exists between the Rhapsodies and Pherekydes, Herakleitos, Parmenides (see Lob., p. 532; Kern, Theogon., p. 52; Gruppe, p. 708) or Empedokles, the poet of the Rhapsodies is the borrower not the creditor. The age in which he lived cannot be precisely determined; the fact that Neoplatonic writers are the first to quote him does not settle the question; it is uncertain whether he lived after (as I think) or before the (otherwise unknown) Hieronymos whose statement about an Orphic Theogony is quoted by Damasc., Princ. 381 f. K. In any case Gruppe (p. 742) has correctly appreciated the character of the bulky poem (equalling or even surpassing the length of the Iliad), when he says that it consists in the main of a loosely connected patchwork of older Orphic tradition. 598 There are many points in which agreement between the Rhapsodies and older Orphic teaching and poetry is still demonstrable; lines from older Orphic poems were taken over unaltered; subjects from older Orphic Theogonies were combined, sometimes without regard for their divergent character; different versions of the same motif occur together. Thus we have the κατάποσις (modelled eventually upon Hesiod) twice over: in the first version Zeus swallows Phanes, in the second the heart of Zagreus. Both mean the same thing; the devouring of the heart of Zagreus may perhaps belong to the older Orphic legendary material, the devouring of Phanes to the later. The personality of Φάνης, however, cannot have been unknown even to the older stratum of Orphic poetry. D.S. 1, 11, 3, quotes a line of “Orpheus”, which certainly was not taken from the Rhaps., in which Φάνης is mentioned (and identified with Dionysos). And in a gold tablet, folded up with the tablet bearing an inscription of Orphic character, I. Sic. et It. 642, and found in the same grave near Sybaris, there occurs in addition to other (illegible) matter a list of divine names which includes that of Φάνης (and also Πρωτόγονους here apparently distinguished from Φάνης with whom this figure of Orphic theology is generally identified): see Comparetti, Notizie degli scavi di antichità, 1879, p. 157; 1880, p. 156. This establishes the existence of this figure of Orphic mythology as early as the third cent. B.C. (the prob. date of these tablets).—We may therefore employ the facts derived from the Rhapsodies with some confidence for the reconstruction of Orphic poetry and doctrine at those points at least in which coincidence with older Orphic teaching and the fantastic creatures of Orphic theology can still be proved. [I leave these remarks exactly as they stood in the first edition of this book, for they still fully correspond to my own opinion. Others in the meanwhile have expressed divergent views, esp. Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, i, p. 539. But that Gruppe’s proof of the fact that Plato did not know the Rhapsodist Theogony is “wholly unsuccessful”, is something which no one has yet sought to show upon intelligible grounds. Until such a disproof is forthcoming the belief in the early date of the Rhapsodies has no real ground on which to stand.]

The information we have about a coherent Orphic Theogony and Anthropogony, which has been passed down from the writings of Neoplatonic philosophers and their contemporaries, comes, as Lobeck rightly concluded, from the In the Orphic hymns, there is a theology that philosophers also interpret. (Damasc., Princ., p. 380 K.). This means that they were explained in lectures by the leaders of the Platonic school since the time of Syrianos (Orphic gatherings of Syrian.: Procl., in Tim. 96 B; Scholia of Proclus on Orpheus, If not in all the rapsodies: Marin., V. Procl. 27). Written commentaries were also published, mainly to support the Agreement of Orpheus, Pythagoras, and Plato (Syrianos wrote a book with this title, which was incorrectly attributed to Proclus by Suidas: see R. Schöll on Procl. in Rp., p. 5. Probably the work of Syr. into Orpheus' theology is the source of Orph., frr. 123–4, which are traced back in the Theosophy, § 50, to Συριανός in his own works. From Syr. also probably comes the citation from Orpheus in the fourth rhapsody, ib., § 61). The earlier Neoplatonists, before Syrianos, paid little attention to the Orphica. Plotinos doesn’t quote anything at all (though there may be an allusion in 4, 3, 12; see Lob., p. 555), Iamblichos quotes nothing from direct experience, and Porphyrios, who read everything, gives a little (frr. 114; 123 Euseb. from Porph.; 211) and what he does mention definitely comes from the Rhapsodiai. In fact, 597 Neoplatonists as a whole, when they quote Orpheus from their own knowledge (and not, for instance, simply substituting “Orpheus” for “Pythagoras”: see above, chap. x, n. 9) only use the Rhapsodiai, as Lobeck rightly maintains, p. 466 (Abel did not realize this, which flawed his collection of the frr.). The title of the poem they used probably was not Theogony. (This seems to appear as a title in fr. 188 [Clem. Al. from auct. π. theft]. In fr. 108 it is just a description of contents; fr. 310 is fake. In Suidas, Gaisford’s MSS., we indeed read of a θεογονία, ἔπη __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__: but the number of lines matches most suspiciously with that of the previous nominal, and in any case would be inadequate for the great length of the rapsodies.) It seems very likely (as Lobeck already suspected, p. 716, 726) that the simple description: an Orphic poem divided into several Rhapsodiai, Sacred teachings in songs 24 (Suid.), was the actual title of the poem, which consisted of several rapsodies. This sacred word (the plural just indicates that there were multiple books) is, however, different (Lobeck missed this, p. 716) from the sacred speech attributed to the Pythagorean Kerkops. (And again when Suid. attributes the 24 Rhaps. to the Thessalian Theognetos or to Kerkops, he also refers to the old sacred speech not divided into Rhaps. and confuses this with the later and much expanded sacred discourse.) The older sacred word is alluded to by Cic., ND. i, 107, and probably also by Plu., Smp. 2, 3, 2, p. 636 D (fr. 42); the quotation in EM. (fr. 44) from the 8th Book refers to the later sacred word. But it is clear that the sacred word in 24 Books, the poem held by the Neoplatonists, from which most of our fragments come, was not a work from the sixth century, written, for example (as Lobeck was inclined to think, 683 f.) by Onomakritos. It is also untrue—regrettably we might add—that, as the Neoplatonists presumed (and Lobeck believed as a result: p. 508, 529 f., 602, 613) Plato knew and utilized the “Rhapsodies”. (This becomes particularly clear from Gruppe’s examination of the question in Jb. Philol. Supp. xvii, 689 ff.). And without this, there's no other evidence of an earlier date for the Orphic Theogony in this form. And in the very few instances where there is a true overlap (not a dubious one) between the Rhapsodies and Pherekydes, Herakleitos, Parmenides (see Lob., p. 532; Kern, Theogon., p. 52; Gruppe, p. 708) or Empedokles, the poet of the Rhapsodies is the one borrowing, not the one being borrowed from. The exact age in which he lived cannot be determined precisely; the fact that Neoplatonic writers are the first to quote him does not clarify the matter; it's uncertain whether he lived after (as I believe) or before the (otherwise unknown) Hieronymos, whose reference to an Orphic Theogony is quoted by Damasc., Princ. 381 f. K. In any case, Gruppe (p. 742) has correctly assessed the nature of the lengthy poem (equaling or even surpassing the length of the Iliad), when he states that it mainly consists of a loosely stitched patchwork of older Orphic tradition. 598 There are many areas where agreement between the Rhapsodies and older Orphic teachings and poetry can still be demonstrated; lines from older Orphic poems were adopted unchanged; themes from older Orphic Theogonies were combined, sometimes without regard to their differing characteristics; various versions of the same motif are presented together. Thus we have the Swallowing (eventually modeled after Hesiod) twice: in the first version, Zeus swallows Phanes, and in the second, the heart of Zagreus. Both signify the same thing; the consuming of the heart of Zagreus may belong to the older Orphic legendary material, while the consumption of Phanes is likely the later addition. However, the figure of Φάνης cannot have been unknown even to the earlier layer of Orphic poetry. D.S. 1, 11, 3 cites a line from “Orpheus,” which definitely wasn’t taken from the Rhaps., mentioning Φάνης (and identifying him with Dionysos). And on a gold tablet, found folded with an inscription of Orphic character in the same grave near Sybaris, I. Sic. et It. 642, there also appears, among other (illegible) matters, a list of divine names that includes Φάνης (and also Primitive, here presumably distinguished from Φάνης, with whom this figure of Orphic theology is generally associated): see Comparetti, Notizie degli scavi di antichità, 1879, p. 157; 1880, p. 156. This confirms the existence of this figure in Orphic mythology as early as the third century BCE (the probable date of these tablets). —We can therefore confidently use the facts derived from the Rhapsodies to reconstruct Orphic poetry and doctrine at least at those points where similarities with older Orphic teachings and the fantastic elements of Orphic theology can still be demonstrated. [I leave these remarks exactly as they were in the first edition of this book, as they still accurately reflect my own opinion. Others have since expressed differing views, especially Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, i, p. 539. But no one has yet shown intelligibly that Gruppe’s proof that Plato did not know the Rhapsodist Theogony is “wholly unsuccessful.” Until such evidence is produced, the belief in the early date of the Rhapsodies lacks a substantial basis.]

APPENDIX X

Previous lives of Pythagoras. His descent to Hades

Pythagoras’ miraculous power of remembering what had happened long ago in previous lives seems to be already alluded to in the lines of Empedokles, 430 ff. M. = fr. 129 D. The legend in which it was related how Pythag. showed that he had once been Euphorbos the son of Panthous who had been slain by Menelaos in the Trojan war, must, at any rate, have been put forward at an early period. The story is often told or alluded to: D.S. 10, 6, 1–3; Sch. V. 599 on Ρ 28: Max. Tyr. 16 (i, 287 f. R.); Porph., VP. 26–7; Iambl., VP. 63; Philostr., V. AP. 1, 1, 1; 8, 7, 4; Her. 17, p. 192, 23 ff. Ks.; Tatian, Gr. 25; Hor., C. 1, 28, 10; Ov., M. 15, 160 ff.; Hygin. 112; Lact., Inst. 3, 18, 15; cf. also Call., fr. 83a (completely misunderstood by Schneider) who even calls Pythag. “Euphorbos”, as Hor. does and Luc., DM. 20, 3. The story is always told in such a way as to imply that no intermediate ἐνσωματώσις of his soul had taken place between Pythag. himself and Euphorbos (they are definitely excluded in Luc., Gall. 17).—Why was Euphorbos in particular selected? The fact that through his father Panthous he had a special connexion with Apollo, like Pythagoras (a true ψυχὴ Ἀπολλωνιακή: cf. also Luc., Gall. 16), can hardly have been sufficient reason (as Göttling, Opusc. 210; Krische, Soc. Pythag. 67 f. suggest).—Euphorbos was taken up and made one of a whole series of previous incarnations (Aithalides—Euphorbos—Hermotimos—Pyrrhos the Delian fisherman—Pythagoras) by Herakleides Pont.: D.L. viii, 4–5 (with which agree Hippol., RH. 1, 2, p. 12, 54 f. D.-S.; Porph., VP. 45; Tert., An. 28, 31; Sch. Soph., El. 62). Starting with Aithalides (to whom Herakleides was perhaps the first to ascribe the gift of miraculous memory in addition to other miraculous powers) the power of ἀνάμνησις in life and death was transmitted through all the links in the chain down to Pythag. himself. (The story of the shield of Euphorbos was now transferred to Hermotimos for obvious reasons.) According to D.L. Herakleides φησὶν περὶ αὑτοῦ τάδε λέγειν (τὸν Πυθαγόραν). It is very possible that the language is here inexact and Herakleides did not (as the words of D.L. would strictly suggest) appeal to a statement of Pythagoras (in a book) but represented him as saying all this (in a dialogue). If this is correct, apart from the incarnation as Euphorbos which he took over from the tradition, Herakleides invented all the rest, according to his own fancy. The fable was then taken up with variations by others: in Sch. A.R. i, 645, two versions derived from the fiction of Herakl. but diverging in some points are mentioned (one being supported by οἱ Πυθαγορικοί, the other by Pythagoras himself—in a book? Πυθαγόρας φησίν are the actual words). What Gellius 4, 11, 14, has to say on the authority of Klearchos and Dikaiarchos differs (except in the matter of Euphorbos) entirely from Herakleides (and the names given should not be altered). But it may, nevertheless, be essentially the same fable over again, this time in the form of a parody of Herakl. (which is not very likely in the case of Klearchos but suits Dikaiarch. very well). Encouraged by these predecessors Lucian in the Cock (19-20) carried still further the parody of the fabulous tale. The story of Herakleides seems to be seriously used in the γραφή in which Pythagoras αὐτός φησι δι’ ἑπτὰ καὶ διηκοσίων ἐτῶν ἐξ ἀίδεω παραγεγενῆσθαι ἐς ἀνθρώπους, D.L. viii, 14. As Diels, Archiv. f. Gesch. Philos. iii, 468 f., shows to be very probable, this was in the ps.-Pythagorean book written in the Ionic dialect, not before the third century and divided into three parts, which D.L. quotes and makes use of (viii, 6; 9; 14; cf. also Sch. Pl., Rp. 600 B). 600 Pyth. here states that he appears on earth from the underworld “every 207 years”, and the calculation may possibly be based on the series of lives invented by Herakleides and the Chronology of Apollodoros (in which case it could not be before the last century B.C.), thus: Pythag. born 572, Pyrrhos 779, Hermotimos 986, Euphorbos 1193 (in the first year of the Τρωικά acc. to Eratosthenes and Apollodor.), Aithalides 1490. It must indeed be admitted that this method of reckoning makes the gross error of calculating from birth to birth instead of from the death of A to the birth of B. (Other intervals are given in Theologum. Arithm., p. 40 Ast [216 = 63: D.L. viii, 14, should not be altered to suit this as I once proposed]; Sch. Bern. Lucan, ix, 1, p. 289, 12 Us. [462, ? an error for 432 = 2 × 216; cf. Theol. Arith., p. 40, 30])—The existence of a Pythagorean writing belonging to the period before Herakleides, in which these previous lives of Pythag. were mentioned cannot be certainly proved. It might be supposed (as I once supposed: Rh. Mus. 26, 558) that the conjunction of the legend of Pythagoras’ previous lives with the descent of P. to Hades, which appears in Sch. Soph., El. 62, and Tert., An. 28, is ancient and original; in which case the previous lives would have been described in a Pythagorean κατάβασις εἰς ᾅδου. But the conjunction is quite arbitrary and is not such as would be likely in a Pythagorean book on the descent: the descent is, in fact, told as a parody, the form which had been given to it by Hermippos, and with the implication that it is untrue. Nor is it very likely that the previous lives would be described in connexion with a descent to Hades, considering that Pyth. remembered them while alive on earth and not in a condition of ecstasy, and did not learn of them in Hades. It would be more natural that, vice versa, an account of the previous lives should also include something about τὰ ἐν ᾅδου—the ἀνάμνησις included that also: cf. D.L. viii, 4 fin. (see the decisive objections to my previous view raised by G. Ettig, Acheruntica, Leipz. Stud. 13, 289 f.). This applies equally to the view of Diels1 (Archiv, p. 469) that Herakleides (in his work π. τῶν ἐν ᾅδου) told of the previous lives of P. in connexion with the descent of P. to Hades and that Herakl. was the first to make P. go down to Hades. There is nothing to prove that Herakl. did this or to make it even probable. Without any 601 grounds for doing so Diels supposes that what Pythagoras (acc. to Sch. Ambros. on α 371) “φησίν”· ἔξω γενόμενος τοῦ σώματος ἀκήκοα ἐμμέλους ἁρμονίας, was said by Pythag., not in a book going under his name, but in a dialogue by Herakleides (who is not even mentioned in that Schol.). There is no reason at all to doubt that these words (as Lobeck supposed, 944) came from a book ascribed to Pythagoras himself, in which he described his ekstasis and ecstatic visions (cf. Sch. Arist. 496b, 1 f., 13 ff. Br.). There is no further definite evidence for the existence of such a Pythagorean Κατάβασις εἰς ᾅδου (for the γραφή of D.L. viii, 21, has another and better interpretation, as already remarked). But a fairly early date for the origin of at least a legend about a descent of P. to Hades (and of quite definite statements about it with a propagandist aim) is attested by Hieronymos of Rhodos ap. D.L. viii, 21. (But we should not without more definite reason ascribe the invention of the fable itself to Hieron., as is done by Hiller, Hier. Rh. frag., p. 25. What reason could Hieron. have had for inventing anything of the kind?) Further, the lines of the comic poet Aristophon ap. D.L. viii, 38 [fr. 12 K.], already suggest that such legends were in existence in the third century B.C. Whether the work on the subject of Pythagoras’ descent to Hades called forth the legend or whether the legend was already current and called forth the book, must remain undecided. But in any case the book included no account of the previous lives of Pythagoras: these (apart from the older legend of P. and Euphorbos) were first put forward by Herakleides Pont. (but not the Descent of P. to Hades).

Pythagoras’ incredible ability to remember past events from previous lives seems to be hinted at in the writings of Empedocles, 430 ff. M. = fr. 129 D. The story where Pythagoras claimed to have been Euphorbos, the son of Panthous, who was killed by Menelaos during the Trojan war, must have surfaced early on. This tale is frequently mentioned or referenced: D.S. 10, 6, 1–3; Sch. V. 599 on Ρ 28: Max. Tyr. 16 (i, 287 f. R.); Porph., VP. 26–7; Iambl., VP. 63; Philostr., V. AP. 1, 1, 1; 8, 7, 4; Her. 17, p. 192, 23 ff. Ks.; Tatian, Gr. 25; Hor., C. 1, 28, 10; Ov., M. 15, 160 ff.; Hygin. 112; Lact., Inst. 3, 18, 15; see also Call., fr. 83a (misunderstood by Schneider) who even calls Pythagoras “Euphorbos,” like Hor. and Luc., DM. 20, 3. The story is consistently told in a way that suggests no intermediate ἐνσωματώσις of his soul occurred between Pythagoras and Euphorbos (this is clearly stated in Luc., Gall. 17).—Why was Euphorbos specifically chosen? The fact that he was connected to Apollo through his father Panthous, much like Pythagoras, was likely not the only reason (as suggested by Göttling, Opusc. 210; Krische, Soc. Pythag. 67 f.).—Euphorbos was included in a series of past incarnations (Aithalides—Euphorbos—Hermotimos—Pyrrhos the Delian fisherman—Pythagoras) as documented by Herakleides Pont.: D.L. viii, 4–5 (which aligns with Hippol., RH. 1, 2, p. 12, 54 f. D.-S.; Porph., VP. 45; Tert., An. 28, 31; Sch. Soph., El. 62). Beginning with Aithalides (to whom Herakleides was perhaps the first to credit the miraculous memory along with other supernatural abilities), the power of memory in life and death was passed down through the entire chain to Pythagoras himself. (The story about Euphorbos' shield was later attributed to Hermotimos for clear reasons.) According to D.L., Herakleides φησὶν περὶ αὑτοῦ ταύτα λέγει(Pythagoras). It's quite possible that the wording here is imprecise and Herakleides did not (as D.L.'s statement would strictly imply) refer to a saying of Pythagoras (in a book) but rather portrayed him as saying all of this (in a dialogue). If that's true, aside from the reincarnation as Euphorbos taken from tradition, Herakleides likely invented the rest based on his own ideas. The fable was then adapted with variations by others: in Sch. A.R. i, 645, two versions from Herakleides’ fiction are mentioned (one supported by the Pythagoreans, the other by Pythagoras himself—in a book? Πυθαγόρας says are the exact words). What Gellius 4, 11, 14 says based on the authority of Klearchos and Dikaiarchos differs entirely (except regarding Euphorbos) from Herakleides (the names given shouldn't be changed). However, it could still be essentially the same fable, this time as a parody of Herakleides (which is unlikely in the case of Klearchos but fits Dikaiarchos well). With encouragement from these earlier works, Lucian in the Cock (19-20) furthered the parody of the legendary tale. The story of Herakleides seems to be seriously used in the writing where Pythagoras He says that for seven hundred and twenty years, he has come forth from the void to humanity., D.L. viii, 14. As Diels, Archiv. f. Gesch. Philos. iii, 468 f., suggests, it's very likely this was in the ps.-Pythagorean text written in the Ionic dialect, not before the third century and divided into three parts, which D.L. quotes and references (viii, 6; 9; 14; see also Sch. Pl., Rp. 600 B). 600 Pyth. notes here that he appears on earth from the underworld “every 207 years,” and this calculation may be based on the lives outlined by Herakleides and the chronology of Apollodoros (meaning it couldn't be before the last century B.C.), thus: Pythag. born 572, Pyrrhos 779, Hermotimos 986, Euphorbos 1193 (in the first year of the Τροία according to Eratosthenes and Apollodor.), Aithalides 1490. It must be acknowledged that this method of calculation makes the significant mistake of counting from birth to birth instead of from the death of A to the birth of B. (Other intervals are given in Theologum. Arithm., p. 40 Ast [216 = 63: D.L. viii, 14, shouldn't be altered to fit this as I once suggested]; Sch. Bern. Lucan, ix, 1, p. 289, 12 Us. [462, ? an error for 432 = 2 × 216; see Theol. Arith., p. 40, 30])—The existence of a Pythagorean text from before Herakleides mentioning these earlier lives of Pythagoras cannot be definitively proven. It might be assumed (as I once presumed: Rh. Mus. 26, 558) that the combination of the legend of Pythagoras’ previous lives with P. descending to Hades, as seen in Sch. Soph., El. 62, and Tert., An. 28, is ancient and original; in which case the previous lives would have been detailed in a Pythagorean descend into Hades. But this connection seems arbitrary and unlikely to be found in a Pythagorean text about the descent: the descent is actually depicted as a parody, reflecting the version given by Hermippos, implying it was false. It's also improbable that the previous lives would be depicted alongside a descent to Hades, especially since Pyth. remembered them while alive and not in a state of ecstasy, and did not learn of them in Hades. It would make more sense, conversely, for an account of the previous lives to include something about things in Hades—the remembrance would include that as well: see D.L. viii, 4 fin. (see the significant objections to my earlier view raised by G. Ettig, Acheruntica, Leipz. Stud. 13, 289 f.). This applies equally to Diels' view1 (Archiv, p. 469) that Herakleides (in his work π. of those in Hades) described P. 's previous lives in connection with P. ‘s descent to Hades and that Herakl. was the first to depict P. going down to Hades. There is nothing to confirm that Herakl. did this or to even suggest it’s likely. Without any 601 justification, Diels assumes that what Pythagoras (according to Sch. Ambros. on α 371) “He says that I have heard the harmony of music outside of my body.”, meant Pythagoras said it, not in a text attributed to him, but in a dialogue by Herakleides (who isn't even referenced in that Schol.). There’s no reason to doubt that these words (as Lobeck presumed, 944) originated from a book credited to Pythagoras himself, where he recounted his ekstasis and ecstatic visions (see Sch. Arist. 496b, 1 f., 13 ff. Br.). There's no further concrete evidence for the existence of such a Pythagorean Κατάβασις eἰς ᾅδου (for the γραφή of D.L. viii, 21, has another and better interpretation, as noted earlier). However, an early date for at least a legend regarding P. ’s descent to Hades (and clear statements about it with a propagandist purpose) is supported by Hieronymos of Rhodos in D.L. viii, 21. (But we shouldn't attribute the invention of the fable itself to Hieron. without more definitive evidence, as Hiller does in Hier. Rh. frag., p. 25. What reason could Hieron. have had for creating something like this?) Furthermore, the lines from the comic playwright Aristophon in D.L. viii, 38 [fr. 12 K.] imply that such legends were already in circulation in the third century BCE. Whether the book about Pythagoras' descent to Hades inspired the legend or if the legend was already existing and led to the creation of the book remains undecided. But in any event, the book did not contain an account of Pythagoras' previous lives: these (besides the older tale of P. and Euphorbos) were first introduced by Herakleides Pont. (but not the descent of P. to Hades).

1 What Diels, Parmenides, p. 15 (1897) says in support of his view might stand if we were willing to ignore the fact that Pythag., as has already been remarked, remembered his previous lives while he was still alive, and not in the ecstatic condition—not ἔξω γενόμενος τοῦ σώματος. But this is a fact, so that Diels’ view remains untenable.—I cannot see what there is of a “rationalist” character (Diels) in the fact that Pyth. saw Hesiod and Homer in Hades undergoing punishment ἀνθ’ ὧν εἶπον περὶ θεῶν (D.L. viii, 21). This is, in fact, an anti-rationalist, priestly invention (and so I see Dieterich also understands it, Nekyia, 130). This fact certainly does not tell against the view that the Hades poem had its origin in the sixth (or the first half of the fifth) century B.C.

1 What Diels, Parmenides, p. 15 (1897) argues in support of his opinion might hold if we ignore the fact that Pythagoras, as mentioned before, remembered his past lives while still alive, and not in an ecstatic state—not out of the body. But this is a fact, so Diels’ argument remains weak.—I fail to see what “rationalist” aspect (Diels) there is in the fact that Pythagoras saw Hesiod and Homer in Hades facing punishment regarding what I said about the gods (D.L. viii, 21). This is, in fact, an anti-rationalist, priestly creation (and I see Dieterich understands it the same way, Nekyia, 130). This fact certainly does not contradict the idea that the Hades poem originated in the sixth (or the first half of the fifth) century BCE

APPENDIX XI

INITIATION CONSIDERED AS ADOPTION BY THE GOD

The Mystes whose soul is speaking in the first of the gold tablets found at Sybaris (Diels, No. 18) says, l. 7–8: ἱμερτοῦ δ’ ἐπέβαν στεφανοῦ ποσὶ καρπαλίμοισι, δεσποίνας δ’ ὑπὸ κόλπον ἔδυν χθονίας βασιλείας. This ὑπὸ κόλπον ἔδυν . . . can hardly mean anything else than: I seek (as ἱκέτης) the protection of her maternal bosom (or lap). It would certainly be attractive to take this (with Dieterich, de hymn. Orph., p. 38) as referring to a symbolical act, corresponding to the ceremony in which in Greece and elsewhere, the adoption of a boy, his reception into a new γένος, was symbolically represented. (D.S. 4, 39, 2, in particular records the process: see Wesseling’s learned note there; cf. also Preller, Gr. Mythol.4 i, 702.) But such a symbolical proceeding if it was to bring about the association of the μύστης with the goddess must have taken place already in the ὄργια once held upon earth—here we are in Hades, and it is to say the least of it difficult to believe that this διέλκεσθαι τοῦ κόλπου can have been supposed to occur in Hades in the neighbourhood of the goddess herself (a fact which made a merely symbolical act of the kind supposed quite 602 unnecessary).—Apart from this the views of Dieterich are quite sound: the ceremony was essentially regarded as an adoption of the μύστης by the goddess or the god, as a reception of the initiated into the divine γένος. The δράκων (who represents the god himself) διελκόμενος τοῦ κόλπου in the Sabazia seems actually to have had this meaning. Further the μύστης is sometimes called renatus, or in aeternum renatus (Apul., M. xi, 21; CIL. vi, 510; 736); the day of his initiation is his natalis sacer (Apul., M. xi, 24, where natalem sacrum should be read): in these circumstances we may venture to recall that the above-mentioned solemn rites of adoption also represented a new birth of the θετὸς υἱός from the womb of his new mother (see D.S. l.c. Hence Hera is called the δευτέρα τεκοῦσα of Herakles whom she adopted: Lycophr. 39; and hence also the adopted is called δευτερόποτμος, i.e. reborn: Hsch. s.v. ad fin.) This conception also provides the simplest explanation of the fact that the μυῶν, who has received the νέος μύστης into the divine γένος to which he himself already belongs, can be called the pater or parens of the μύστης (Apul., M. xi, 25; Tert., Apol. 8; ad Nat. i, 7)—he effects the entrance of the new member into his own family. (In Greek the name for such a mystic “father” seems to have been πατρομύστης, CIG. 3173, 3195.)—This conception of a new birth by initiation reminds us of the Christian idea of rebirth by baptism (which in its turn is developed from older Jewish ideas: see Anrich, Ant. Mysterienwesen, p. 111, n.). It is nevertheless one which the Greeks themselves had at an early date. The μύσται of the Eleusinia seem to have been not far from regarding initiation as an adoption into the divine γένος.

The Mystes whose soul speaks in the first of the gold tablets found at Sybaris (Diels, No. 18) says, l. 7–8: They quickly stepped into the sweet embrace of the crown, and under the folds of the goddess’s garments, they sank into the land of the underworld.. This I sank under the fold . . . can hardly mean anything else than: I seek (as Refugee) the protection of her maternal bosom (or lap). It would certainly be attractive to take this (with Dieterich, de hymn. Orph., p. 38) as referring to a symbolic act, corresponding to the ceremony in which in Greece and elsewhere, the adoption of a boy, his reception into a new genus, was symbolically represented. (D.S. 4, 39, 2, in particular records the process: see Wesseling’s learned note there; cf. also Preller, Gr. Mythol.4 i, 702.) But such a symbolic proceeding if it was meant to establish the association of the mystic with the goddess must have already taken place in the orgies once held upon earth—here we are in Hades, and it is at least difficult to believe that this sailing through the bay could have been supposed to happen in Hades near the goddess herself (a fact which made a merely symbolic act of the kind suggested quite 602 unnecessary).—Apart from this the views of Dieterich are quite sound: the ceremony was essentially regarded as an adoption of the mystic by the goddess or the god, as a reception of the initiated into the divine genus. The dragon (who represents the god himself) διελκόμενος του κόλπου in the Sabazia seems actually to have had this meaning. Further the mystic is sometimes called renatus, or in aeternum renatus (Apul., M. xi, 21; CIL. vi, 510; 736); the day of his initiation is his natalis sacer (Apul., M. xi, 24, where natalem sacrum should be read): in these circumstances we may venture to recall that the above-mentioned solemn rites of adoption also represented a new birth of the adopted son from the womb of his new mother (see D.S. l.c. Hence Hera is called the δευτέρα τεκοῦσα of Herakles whom she adopted: Lycophr. 39; and hence also the adopted is called δευτερόποτμος, i.e. reborn: Hsch. s.v. ad fin.) This idea also provides the simplest explanation of the fact that the μυῶν, who has received the new mystic into the divine genus to which he himself already belongs, can be called the pater or parens of the mystic (Apul., M. xi, 25; Tert., Apol. 8; ad Nat. i, 7)—he creates the entrance of the new member into his own family. (In Greek the name for such a mystic “father” seems to have been πατρομύστης, CIG. 3173, 3195.)—This idea of a new birth through initiation reminds us of the Christian idea of rebirth through baptism (which in its turn is developed from older Jewish ideas: see Anrich, Ant. Mysterienwesen, p. 111, n.). It is nevertheless one which the Greeks themselves had at an early date. The mystics of the Eleusinia seem to have been not far from regarding initiation as an adoption into the divine genus.

In the ps.-Platonic Axiochus, p. 371 D, we read in the description of the χῶρος εὐσεβῶν: ἐνταῦθα τοῖς μεμυημένοις ἐστί τις προεδρία καὶ τὰς ὁσίους ἁγιστείας κἀκεῖσε συντελοῦσι· πῶς οὖν οὐ σοὶ πρώτῳ μέτεστι τῆς τιμῆς, ὄντι γεννήτῃ τῶν θεῶν; καὶ τοὺς περὶ Ἡρακλέα τε (perhaps δέ would be better) καὶ Διόνυσον κατιόντας εἰς Ἅιδου πρότερον λόγος ἐνθάδε (i.e. at Athens) μυηθῆναι καὶ τὸ θάρσος τῆς ἐκεῖσε πορείας παρὰ τῆς Ἐλευσινίας ἐναύσασθαι.—Here Axiochos (for it is to him that Sokrates is speaking) is plainly described as γεννήτης τῶν θεῶν simply and solely because he belongs to the μεμυημένοι. According to Wilamowitz (Gött. Gel. Anz., 1896, p. 984) he is called γεννήτης τῶν θεῶν only as a member of the γένος of the Εὐπατρίδαι to which he apparently belonged. But that anyone just on the strength of the by no means uncommon fact that he belonged to a γένος that happened to trace its earliest origin from a god (nor is it certain even that the Εὐπατρίδαι did this)—that anyone on this account should have dared to call himself a “member of the same family as the gods” is to say the least of it difficult to parallel. In this case at any rate nothing of the kind can be meant. From the general principle that the initiated have a προεδρία in Hades it is deduced, simply as conclusion from premiss, with a “surely then”—(πῶς οὖν οὐ—), that Axiochos too may hope to enjoy this same honour (τῆς τιμῆς—). It is then entirely impossible that, to account for this hope, a reason 603 should be implied and expressed which, like the supposed descent of Axiochos from the gods, had nothing to do with the mysteries and the privileges of the μύσται. If it was the (alleged) descent of Axiochos from the gods which secured him τιμή in Hades it would be quite meaningless to accompany the mention of the τιμή thus secured to Axiochos with an allusion to the τιμή obtained on quite different grounds by the μεμυημένοι (which yet is mysteriously equivalent to that obtained by right of birth). This allusion, moreover, is put in such a way that it quite unambiguously includes the special case of Axiochos in the common denomination of the μεμυημένοι of whom he is said to be one. The fact, indeed, that the privileges of the μεμυημένοι is the only subject alluded to throughout is shown also by the third and last sentence: the famous cases of the initiation of Herakles and Dionysos are only mentioned as emphasizing still further the importance of μυηθῆναι for those εἰς ᾅδου κατιόντας.

In the ps.-Platonic Axiochus, p. 371 D, we read in the description of the Chêros of the devout: there’s a specific place of honor for the initiated, where sacred rites are carried out; so, why is it that you, as a descendant of the gods, don’t partake in this honor first? And those around Heracles (perhaps Dionysus, who first descends into Hades mentioned here at Athens) are initiated and find courage for the journey there through the Eleusinian rites. Here, Axiochos (to whom Socrates is speaking) is described as a descendant of the gods simply because he is among the initiated. According to Wilamowitz (Gött. Gel. Anz., 1896, p. 984), he is called a descendant of the gods only because he is part of the Eupatridae clan, to which he seemingly belonged. However, claiming to be a "member of the same family as the gods" just because one belongs to a clan that might trace its roots back to a god (which is even uncertain for the Eupatridae) is really hard to justify. In this instance, that can't be the intended meaning. Based on the general principle that initiated individuals hold a position of honor in Hades, it logically follows—“so how then does it not”—that Axiochos might also expect to receive this same honor. It’s entirely unreasonable to suggest that any supporting reason—like the supposed descent of Axiochos from the gods—has nothing to do with the mysteries and privileges of the initiated. If Axiochos's supposed descent from the gods granted him honor in Hades, it wouldn’t make sense to link this mention of the honor granted to him with the honor received on completely different grounds by the initiated (which parallels that of birthright). This reference is made in such a way that it clearly includes Axiochos in the general category of the initiated of whom he is said to be a part. The fact that the privileges of the initiated are the only topic referenced throughout is further shown by the third and final sentence: the well-known instances of the initiation of Heracles and Dionysus are mentioned solely to highlight the importance of initiation for those descending into Hades.

Here then Axiochos can only be called γεννήτης τῶν θεῶν in so far as he is μεμυημένος. Why, indeed, he πρῶτος, before other μεμυημένοι, should have a claim to the honour of προεδρία is something that our text does not say and that can hardly be extracted from it. It certainly appears that Axiochos has a special privilege beyond that of other Mystai. Had he reached a specially high stage of the τέλη which was not open to everyone and at which kinship with the gods was first fully assured? Did the family of the Εὐπατρίδαι undertake some active part in the μύησις which gave them a closer relation to the gods? In any case his claim to be regarded as γεννήτης τῶν θεῶν must have depended on his having been initiated at Eleusis.

Here, Axiochos can only be called god of creation because he is initiated. Why he first, before other initiated, should have the right to the honor of presidency is not stated in our text and can hardly be inferred from it. It seems clear that Axiochos has a special privilege that other Mystai do not have. Did he reach a particularly high level of the fees that not everyone could attain, at which kinship with the gods was fully assured? Did the family of the Noble families play an active role in the initiation that brought them a closer relationship with the gods? In any case, his claim to be considered generator of the gods must have depended on his initiation at Eleusis.

Now this kinship with the gods to which he thus attains can only be made intelligible, if, in accordance with the analogies adduced above, we regard the μύησις (or perhaps only its highest stages) as a symbolic adoption by the divinities, suggesting or representing entrance into the divine γένος. No one will maintain that γεννήτης τῶν θεῶν is a “very unnatural phrase” (Wil.) for one who has been “adopted” by the gods, who will recall the fact that at Athens the adopted person was inscribed εἰς τοὺς γεννήτας of the adopter (Is. 7, 13; 15; 17; 43), or, which is precisely the same thing, εἰς τοὺς συγγενεῖς of the adopter (Is. 7, 27; 1). Thereby he becomes himself γεννήτης of the members of the γένος into which he thus enters; he is now their γεννήτης, or, as it is once expressed in an absolutely equivalent phrase, their συγγενὴς κατὰ τὴν ποίησιν ([Dem.] 44, 32).

Now, this connection with the gods that he achieves can only be understood if, following the analogies mentioned earlier, we see the initiation (or perhaps just its highest stages) as a symbolic adoption by the divine beings, indicating or representing access to the divine genus. No one would argue that creator of the gods is a “very unnatural phrase” (Wil.) for someone who has been “adopted” by the gods, especially considering that in Athens, the adopted individual was recorded to the parents of the adopter (Is. 7, 13; 15; 17; 43), or, which is essentially the same thing, to the relatives of the adopter (Is. 7, 27; 1). By this process, he becomes a generator of the members of the kind he joins; he is now their generator, or as expressed in another equivalent phrase, their relative in the poem ([Dem.] 44, 32).

Thus the fully initiated is γεννήτης of the divine family, κατὰ τὴν ποίησιν.

Thus the fully initiated is generator of the divine family, according to the poem.

APPENDIX XII

MAGICAL EXORCISMS OF THE DEAD ON LATE κατάδεσμοι, φιμωτικά, ETC.

Invocations and conjurings of ἄωροι and other νεκυδαίμονες of an earlier period are mentioned above (p. 594 f.). To a later period belong 604 the defixiones found at Cyprus (Kurion) and edited in the Proc. of the Soc. of Bibl. Archaeology, p. 174 ff. The defixiones are there called παραθῆκαι, φιμωτικαὶ τοῦ ἀντιδίκου (i, 39, and frequently), or φιμωτικὰ καταθέματα (iv, 15, etc.). φιμοῦν and φιμωτικόν in this rude Egypto-Syrian Greek are equivalent to the terms, otherwise usual for such magic charms, καταδεῖν, κατάδεσμος (see above, chap. ix, n. 107). See also P. Mag. Lond. (Kenyon, Greek Pap. in BM., p. 114), l. 967 ff.: in an appeal to a god (δεῦρό μοι καὶ) φίμωσον, ὑπόταξον, καταδούλωσον τὸν δεῖνα τῷ δεῖνι κτλ.—ib., p. 97, l. 396 ff.: φιμωτικὸν καὶ ὑποτακτικὸν γενναῖον καὶ κάτοχος· λαβὼν μόλυβον ἀπὸ ψυχροφόρου σωλῆνος ποίησον λάμναν καὶ ἐπίγραφε χαλκῷ γραφείῳ (bronze is a magic metal), ὡς ὑποκεῖται, καὶ θὲς παρὰ ἄωρον (see above, p. 594 f.) here follows the rest of the barbarous text.—On these Cypriote defixiones among the other invocations regularly appear those addressed to the souls of the unquiet dead, to the δαίμονες πολυάνδριοι (vi, 17. adds πεπελεκισμένοι καὶ ἐσ[ταυρωμένοι or ἐσκολοπισμένοι? cf. Luc., Philops. 29]) καὶ βιοθάνατοι καὶ ἄωροι καὶ ἄποροι ταφῆς (τῆς ἱερᾶς ταφῆς iv, 18): thus i, 30 f., and frequently. The δαίμονες πολυάνδριοι were probably the souls of executed criminals whose bodies were thrown out into the common burial grounds—as at Melite in Athens: Plu., Themist. 22—the πολυάνδρια (cf. Perizon. on Ael., VH. 12, 21). βιοθάνατοι εἴτε ξένοι εἴτε ἐντόπιοι are invoked, iv, 4. Invocation is made in common to: τύμβε πανδάκρυτε καὶ χθόνιοι θεοὶ καὶ Ἑκάτη χθονία καὶ Ἑρμῆ χθόνιε καὶ Πλούτων καὶ Ἐρινύες ὑποχθόνιοι καὶ ὑμεῖς οἱ ὧδε κατῳκημένοι ἄωροι καὶ ἀνώνυμοι (see Rh. Mus. 50, 20, 3): i, 35, and frequently repeated with the same formula. What we have here is of frequent occurrence: a dead person is called upon to carry out a curse. An early example is CIG. 539: καταδῶ αὐτοὺς (the persons to be cursed) σοί, Ὀνήσιμε (Attica, fourth century B.C.). The tablet in Böckh, i, p. 487, admits the reading Ὀνήσιμε as well as Ὀνήσιμη. The latter (as a nominative) is preferred by Wünsch, Tab. Defix., p. ivb, p. 25 (n. 100), simply in order to expel every example of the invocation of a dead person to carry out a curse. But this is only a petitio principii; and if we accepted Ὀνήσιμη (as the name of the curser) at least the addition of some word like ἐγώ after αὐτοὺς σοί would be necessary—for which there is no room on the tablet. It will be necessary to retain the generally accepted vocative Ὀνήσιμε (to which the coming πάντας . . . τηρεῖν, l. 5–8, is much better suited than to the following Ἑρμῆ, l. 8, as in Wünsch’s version). There is nothing remarkable in the invocation here of the individual νεκυδαίμων by name (thus doubling the force of compulsion exerted; cf. Kroll, Rh. Mus., 52, 345 f.) to complete and carry out the curse: parallels are given above, p. 594 ff., and in the above-mentioned Cypriote φιμωτικά: cf. also CIG. 5858b, δαίμονες καὶ πνεύματα (i.e. “souls”) ἐν τῷ τόπῳ τούτῳ θηλυκῶν καὶ ἀρρενικῶν, ἐξορκίζω ὑμᾶς.

Invocations and summoning of early and other ghostly spirits from an earlier time are mentioned above (p. 594 f.). The 604 defixiones from Cyprus (Kurion) belong to a later period and are edited in the Proc. of the Soc. of Bibl. Archaeology, p. 174 ff. The defixiones are referred to there as submissions, opposing evidence (i, 39, and frequently), or φιμωτικά καταθέματα (iv, 15, etc.). In this crude Egypto-Syrian Greek, φιμοῦν and φιμωτικόν are equivalent to the more commonly used terms for such magic charms, καταδεῖν, κατάδεσμος (see above, chap. ix, n. 107). Also see P. Mag. Lond. (Kenyon, Greek Pap. in BM., p. 114), l. 967 ff.: in an appeal to a god (Come here and) Silence, subdue, enslave a certain someone to another, etc.—ib., p. 97, l. 396 ff.: φιμωτικὸν and a noble subjugator and holder; take lead from the cold-carrying sink and make a lamp, then inscribe it with a bronze writing. (bronze is considered a magic metal), As it is understood, place it beside the unripe. (see above, p. 594 f.) here follows the rest of the bizarre text.—Among these Cypriote defixiones, other invocations are regularly addressed to the souls of restless dead, to the multitude of demons (vi, 17. adds πεπελεκισμένοι καὶ ἐσ[tied up or skullcapped? cf. Luc., Philops. 29]) and those who died young, and untimely, and without a proper burial(the holy burial iv, 18): thus i, 30 f., and it’s frequently mentioned. The demons with multiple spouses were probably the souls of executed criminals whose bodies were disposed of in common burial grounds—as happened in Melite, Athens: Plu., Themist. 22—the polyandry (cf. Perizon. on Ael., VH. 12, 21). βιοθάνατοι, whether foreign or local are invoked, iv, 4. A common invocation includes: Tomb, all-weepingly, you and the chthonic gods, Hecate of the Underworld, Hermes of the Underworld, Pluto, the Furies of the Underworld, and you who dwell here, nameless and untimely. (see Rh. Mus. 50, 20, 3): i, 35, and repeated often with the same formula. What we have here is a frequent occurrence: a deceased person is called upon to carry out a curse. An early example is CIG. 539: καταδῶ αὐτοὺς (the individuals to be cursed) You, Onesimos (Attica, fourth century BCE). The tablet in Böckh, i, p. 487, allows for the reading Onesimus as well as Onesimus. The latter (as nominative) is preferred by Wünsch, Tab. Defix., p. ivb, p. 25 (n. 100), simply to eliminate every reference to invoking a dead person to execute a curse. But this is only a petitio principii; and if we accepted Onesimus (as the name of the curser), at least we would need to add a word like I after them to you—for which there isn’t space on the tablet. It would be necessary to keep the generally accepted vocative Onesimus (to which the following πάντας . . . τηρεῖν, l. 5–8, is much more suited than to the next Hermes, l. 8, as per Wünsch’s version). There’s nothing unusual in the invocation of the specific νεκυδαίμων by name (thus doubling the force of compulsion exerted; cf. Kroll, Rh. Mus., 52, 345 f.) to complete and carry out the curse: parallels were provided above, p. 594 ff., and in the previously mentioned Cypriote restraining: cf. also CIG. 5858b, demons and spirits (i.e., “souls”) In this place of females and males, I urge you..

The custom of burying such magic defixions was astonishingly widespread. Defigi diris deprecationibus nemo non metuit, Plin., NH. 28, 19. In the places where Latin was spoken such abominations were 605 indeed even more common than in Greek-speaking countries. (The Latin defixiones are collected now by Wünsch, Tab. Defix. xxv f.) The practice had a long life and is not quite dead even to-day. On the Roman side examples from the seventh and eighth centuries are by no means rare: see e.g. [Aug.] Hom. de Sacrileg., § 20. For a Greek example see e.g. the story ap. Sophronius, SS. Cyri et Ioannis Miracula (saec. vi), chap. 55, p. 3625 Migne: magical objects were buried under the doorstep of the victim’s house; were discovered and dug up; whereupon the death immediately followed of—not the victim but—the magician.

The practice of burying magic curses was surprisingly widespread. No one is not afraid of the warnings of danger., Plin., NH. 28, 19. In areas where Latin was spoken, these practices were 605 even more common than in Greek-speaking regions. The Latin defixiones are now compiled by Wünsch, Tab. Defix. xxv f. This tradition has a long history and is not completely extinct even today. On the Roman side, examples from the seventh and eighth centuries are not at all rare: see e.g. [Aug.] Hom. de Sacrileg., § 20. For a Greek example, see the story in Sophronius, SS. Cyri et Ioannis Miracula (6th century), chap. 55, p. 3625 Migne: magical items were buried under the doorstep of the victim’s house, later discovered and dug up, which resulted in the immediate death of—not the victim but—the magician.

12th August, 1897 (= 2nd German Ed.).

12th August, 1897 (= 2nd German Ed.).

INDEX

The figures indicate pages, except where they follow a Roman numeral, in which case they refer to the numbered notes.

The numbers refer to pages, unless they come after a Roman numeral, in which case they refer to the numbered notes.

Abarbareë and Boukolion, xiv, ii, 105.

Abarbareë and Boukolion, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Abaris, 300.

Abaris, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Abioi, 63.

Abioi, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Abipones in Paraguay, i, 30; viii, 28.

Abipones in Paraguay, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Academy, its doctrine of the Soul, xiv, 1.

Academy, its belief about the Soul, xiv, 1.

Acheron, Ἀχερουσιὰς λίμην, i, 67; v, 25; 241.

Acheron, Ἀχερουσιὰς λίμην, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Acheron, god of Hades, 591.

Acheron, god of the underworld, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Achilles, i, 41; in Hades, 39; translated, 64 f.; on the μακάρων νῆσος, xiv, ii, 99; on Leuke, xiv, ii, 102; as Hero or God, 66; 126; iv, 3, 87, 137; xiv, ii, 42.

Achilles, i, 41; in Hades, 39; translated, 64 f.; on the island of the blessed, xiv, ii, 99; on Leuke, xiv, ii, 102; as Hero or God, 66; 126; iv, 3, 87, 137; xiv, ii, 42.

Admetos, xii, 40; ix, 90.

Admetos, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Adonis, iii, 30.

Adonis, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Adoption, 172; Ritual Act of Adoption in the Mysteries, 601 f.

Adoption, 172; Ritual Act of Adoption in the Mysteries, 601 f.

Aeneas translated, xiv, ii, 110, 114 (ii, 3).

Aeneas translated, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ (__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__).

Aeracura, xiv, ii, 144.

Aeracura, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Aeschylus, 157; vii, 12; 422 f.; Agam. 1235, 591 f.

Aeschylus, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__ f.; Agam. 1235, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__ f.

Aether, the element of the Souls, 435 f.; dwelling place of Souls, 170–1; x, 45; xiv, 53, 69; 541.

Aether, the element of the Souls, 435 f.; home of Souls, 170–1; x, 45; xiv, 53, 69; 541.

Aethiopians, 63.

Aethiopians, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Ages, different, of Mankind (Hesiod), 67 f.; Golden Ages, ii, 49; vii, 18.

Ages, different, of Humanity (Hesiod), 67 f.; Golden Ages, ii, 49; vii, 18.

Agamemnon translated, xiv, ii, 99.

Agamemnon translated, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

ἄγαμοι after death, 586; xiv, ii, 154.

ἄγαμοι after death, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Agathos daimon, v, 133.

Agathos daimon, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Agides in Sparta, iv, 53.

Agides in Sparta, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Agon, see Funeral Games.

Agon, check out __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Agriania, viii, 28; ix, 11–12.

Agriania, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__–12.

Agrianios, name of a month in Boeotia, v, 92.

Agrianios, the name of a month in Boeotia, v, 92.

Aiaia, ii, 14.

Aiaia, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Aiakos, vii, 13.

Aiakos, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Aias, Hero, 126; 137; xiv, ii, 55, 102; Sophokles’ Aias, xii, 88.

Aias, Hero, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__; Sophocles’ Aias, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__.

αἴδεσις, v, 151.

αἴδεσις, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Ἅιδης = θάνατος, Θάνατος, xii, 4; = the grave, xiv, ii, 135; confusion of the two ideas, ib., 92; cf. Hades.

Underworld = death, death, xii, 4; = the grave, xiv, ii, 135; confusion of the two ideas, ib., 92; cf. Hades.

εἰς Ἀίδαο, Ἄϊδόσδε, i, 32.

to Hades, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Ἅιδου μήτηρ, 591 f.

Ἅιδου μήτηρ, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ f.

αἱμακουρία, iv, 13.

αἱμακουρία, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Aipytos, 123; iv, 53.

Aipytos, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Air, see Aether.

Air, see Aether.

Aithalides, xi, 51; 599.

Aithalides, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Aithiopis, 64; v, 166; xiv, ii, 102.

Aithiopis, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Akrisios, iii, 43.

Akrisios, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Aktaion, 134.

Aktaion, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Akousilaos, 593.

Akousilaos, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Alabandos, iv, 138.

Alabandos, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Alaric, xiv, ii, 172.

Alaric, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

ἀλάστωρ, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__.

Albanians in the Caucasus, i, 30.

Albanians in the Caucasus, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Aletes, ix, 66.

Aletes, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Alexander the Great reaches the land of the Blest, xiv, ii, 101; translated, ib., 107; Return of, and false Alexanders, ib., 112.

Alexander the Great arrives in the land of the Blessed, xiv, ii, 101; translated, ib., 107; Return of, and fake Alexanders, ib., 112.

Alexander of Aphrodisias, xiv, 34.

Alexander of Aphrodisias, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Alexis, comic poet, xiv, ii, 143.

Alexis, comic poet, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

ἀλιτήριος, v, 176, 178.

ἀλιτήριος, v, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Alkandros, iii, 56.

Alkandros, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Alkmaion Hero, iv, 105, 136; Physician, xi, 28, 35, 40, 55; xii, 150; xiii, 22.

Alkmaion Hero, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; Physician, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_7__.

Alkmaionis, v, 17, 40.

Alkmaionis, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Alkmene, iv, 134; translated, xiv, ii, 99.

Alkmene, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; translated, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Alkon, iii, 56.

Alkon, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

ἀλλαθεάδες, v, 88.

ἀλλαθεάδες, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Allegorical interpretation of myths, vi, 23.

Allegorical interpretation of myths, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Althaimenes, iii, 4.

Althaimenes, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Ambrosia, 58.

Ambrosia, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Ameinias (Pythagorean), xi, 30.

Ameinias (Pythagorean), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Amelesagoras, ix, 58.

Amelesagoras, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

ἀμεταστρεπτί, ix, 104.

ἀμεταστρεπτί, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Ampelius, Lib. Mem., viii, 3; iii, 12. 608

Ampelius, Lib. Mem., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__. 608

Amphiaraos, translated, 89 f., 92–3; (Zeus Amph.), 94, 101, 159; (not originally a god), iii, 57; (later cult of), xiv, ii, 104.

Amphiaraos, translated, 89 f., 92–3; (Zeus Amph.), 94, 101, 159; (not originally a god), iii, 57; (later cult of), xiv, ii, 104.

ἀμφιδρόμια, ix, 72.

ἀμφιδρόμια, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Amphilochos translated, iii, 5, 13, 56; 133; iv, 105; xiv, ii, 104, 114.

Amphilochos translated, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__.

Amphilytos, ix, 59.

Amphilytos, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Amphion, 238.

Amphion, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

ἀμύητοι, 586 f.

ἀμύητοι, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ uninitiated.

Amyklai, 99 f.

Amyklai, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ female.

ἀναβιώσεις, xi, 103.

ἀναβιώσεις, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Anæsthesia, see Insensibility.

Anesthesia, see Insensibility.

Anagyros, Hero, 134.

Anagyros, Hero, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

ἀνάμνησις as taught by Pythagoras, Empedokles, Plato, xi, 96; 598 f.

memory as taught by Pythagoras, Empedocles, Plato, xi, 96; 598 f.

Anaxagoras, vi, 23; 386; 432; xii, 143; fr. 6 [12], xi, 110–11.

Anaxagoras, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__; fr. 6 [12], __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__–11.

Anaximander, x, 38; 366; xi, 98.

Anaximander, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Anaximenes, 366; xi, 98.

Anaximenes, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Ancestor-cult, 10 f.; 27 f.; 77 f. (Hesiod); Ancestors in the cult of Heroes, 119 f., 527 f.; of the γένη, etc., 124 f. (with nn.).

Ancestor-cult, 10 f.; 27 f.; 77 f. (Hesiod); Ancestors in the cult of Heroes, 119 f., 527 f.; of the γένη, etc., 124 f. (with nn.).

Anchises translated, xiv, ii, 110.

Anchises translated, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

ἀγχιστεία (in the cult of souls), v, 42, 141; 176; xiv, ii, 10.

ἀγχιστεία (in the cult of souls), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__.

ἀνιέναι (τὰ καλά, etc.), v, 120.

ἀνιέναι (τὰ καλά, etc.), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Anima and animus in Lucretius, xiv, 74.

Anima and animus in Lucretius, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Animals in cult of the dead, v, 105; care of animals enjoined, vi, 35 (and see Food); skin of, apotropaic use of, xi, 58 (v, 167); souls of, x, 45; xiii, 40.

Animals in the cult of the dead, v, 105; care of animals prescribed, vi, 35 (and see Food); skin of, protective use of, xi, 58 (v, 167); souls of, x, 45; xiii, 40.

Andronikos (Peripatetic), 512.

Andronikos (Peripatetic), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

ἄνεμοι, x, 45.

Winds, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

ἀνεμοκοῖται, ix, 107.

ἀνεμοκοῖται, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Angekoks, of Greenland, 262; ix, 117.

Angekoks, from Greenland, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Angels, xiv, ii, 144.

Angels, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Anthropogony (Orphic), 341 f., (Hesiodic) 67 f.

Anthropogony (Orphic), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ f., (Hesiodic) __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ f.

Anios, iv, 102.

Anios, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Anthesteria, 168; ix, 11.

Anthesteria, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Anthologia Palatina, xiv, ii, 122.

Anthology Palatina, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

ἀνθρωποδαίμων, ii, 43.

ἀνθρωποδαίμων, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Antichrist, xiv, ii, 113.

Antichrist, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Antigone, 163; 426; xii, 94.

Antigone, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Antilochos translated, xiv, ii, 102 (p. 567).

Antilochos translated, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ (p. 567).

Antinous translated, xiv, ii, 114.

Antinous translated, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Antiochos of Kommagene, his tomb, xiv, ii, 13 (p. 554).

Antiochos of Kommagene, his tomb, xiv, ii, 13 (p. 554).

Antiphon (of Rhamnous, the orator), v, 176; 588.

Antiphon (of Rhamnous, the speaker), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Antipodes, xiv, ii, 101.

Antipodes, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

ἀωροθάνατοι, 594 (add Phryn. App. Soph. in Bekk. Anecd., 24, 22).

Unknown, 594 (add Phryn. App. Soph. in Bekk. Anecd., 24, 22).

ἄωροι, xiii, 36; 533; 553; 594; 604; xiv, ii, 154.

ἄωροι, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__.

ἀωροβόρος Hekate, ix, 92.

Hekate, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Apis, ix, 68.

Apis, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

ἀποκατάστασις, x, 47; 519.

ἀποκατάστασις, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Apollo, 97 f.; 130; xii, 40; god of expiation, 180 f.; as leader of the Souls, xiv, ii, 146; and Dionysos, 287 f.; supplants Gaia, 290; Hyakinthos, 99 f.; Ἀτύμνιος, etc., iv, 99.

Apollo, 97 f.; 130; xii, 40; god of atonement, 180 f.; as leader of the Souls, xiv, ii, 146; and Dionysus, 287 f.; replaces Gaia, 290; Hyacinthus, 99 f.; Ἀτύμνιος, etc., iv, 99.

Apolline mantiké, 289 f.

Apolline mantiké, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ f.

Apollonia in Chalkidike, v, 92.

Apollonia in Chalkidiki, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Apollonios of Tyana, ii, 18; xiv, ii, 115.

Apollonios of Tyana, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

ἀπομαγδαλίαι, 595.

ἀπομαγδαλίαι, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

ἀπομάττειν, 589, 590.

ἀπομάττειν, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

ἀπόνιμμα, ix, 88.

ἀπόνιμμα, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

ἀποπομπή (δαιμόνων), v, 168.

ἀποπομπή (δαιμόνων), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

ἀπόταφοι, xiv, ii, 20.

ἀπόταφοι, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

ἀποτροπαῖοι (θεοί), v, 168.

Protective gods, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Apparitions of the departed, xiv, ii, 154; see Ghosts.

Ghosts, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; see Ghosts.

ἄψυχα trial held over, iv, 118.

ἄψυχα trial concluded, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

ἀραῖος (νέκυς, δαίμων), v, 148; xii, 107.

ἀραῖος, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Aratos as Hero, xiv, ii, 57 f.

Aratos the Hero, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ f.

ἀρχηγοί, ἀρχηγέται, iv, 51, 55; 527.

Leaders, leaders, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Archelaos, the philosopher, 432; xii, 152.

Archelaos, the philosopher, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Archemoros Vase, v, 40.

Archemoros Vase, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Archilochos, v, 173.

Archilochos, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Archon Basileus at Athens, 178.

Archon Basileus in Athens, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Areopagos, 162; v, 145; 178.

Areopagus, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Argeios and Herakles, i, 35.

Argeios and Herakles, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Argimpaioi, x, 78.

Argimpaioi, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Arginousai, battle of, 162.

Arginousai, Battle of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Aristaios, iii, 6.

Aristaios, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Aristeas of Prokonnesos, 300, 596.

Aristeas of Prokonnesos, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Aristogeiton and Harmodios in Hades, 237.

Aristogeiton and Harmodios in Hades, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Aristogeiton, Speech against, vii, 15.

Aristogeiton, Speech Against, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Aristomenes as Hero, 528.

Aristomenes the Hero, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Aristophanes Frogs, 240.

Aristophanes Frogs, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Aristophon, comic poet, 601.

Aristophon, comedian, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Aristotle, 383; xiv, 1; 493 f. (An. 408b, 18; xiv, 27).

Aristotle, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__ f. (An. 408b, 18; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__).

Aristoxenos, xi, 47, 52; 512.

Aristoxenus, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Aristophanes of Byzantium, 583.

Aristophanes of Byzantium, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Arkesilaos, xiv, 1.

Arkesilaos, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Art of the Greeks, 157; Cult of Souls as represented in, v, 105. 609

Art of the Greeks, 157; Cult of Souls as represented in, v, 105. 609

Askesis (Asceticism), vi, 35; 302, 338; Orphic, 343; Thracian, x, 78; Pythagorean, xi, 47; Empedokles, 381; practised in foreign mystery-religions, 546.

Askesis (Asceticism), vi, 35; 302, 338; Orphic, 343; Thracian, x, 78; Pythagorean, xi, 47; Empedokles, 381; engaged in various foreign mystery religions, 546.

Asklepiades, doctor, xi, 69.

Asklepiades, doctor, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Asklepios, iii, 13; chthonic, mantic, 100 f.; his death by lightning, 582; Asklepiadai, iv, 92 f.

Asklepios, iii, 13; underworld, prophetic, 100 f.; his death by lightning, 582; Asklepiadai, iv, 92 f.

Asphalt (bitumen), apotropaic virtue of, v, 95.

Asphalt (bitumen), its protective quality, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

ἀσφόδελος sacred to the χθόνιοι, ix, 115.

ἀσφόδελος sacred to the χθόνιοι, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Associations: burial, xiv, ii, 4; religious, xiv, ii, 53.

Associations: burial, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; religious, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Astakides, xiv, ii, 105; 582.

Astakides, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Astarte, iii, 30.

Astarte, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Astrabakos, 137.

Astrabakos, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

ἄταφοι, restless wandering of, 163; v, 147; 595 (i, 33).

ἄταφοι, restless wandering of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__ (__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__).

ἀτέλεστοι, uninitiated, lying in mud in the underworld, vii, 15; 586 f.

Incomplete, uninitiated, lying in mud in the underworld, vii, 15; 586 f.

ἀθάνατος πηγή (in the underworld), xiv, ii, 151.

immortal source, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Athenaeus (139 E), iii, 48.

Athenaeus (139 E), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Athenaïs, ix, 59.

Athenaïs, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Athene ἀποτροπαία, v, 168.

Athene, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Athenodoros, philosopher and Hero, 530.

Athenodoros, philosopher and hero, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Athens, 98; A. and Eleusis, 219 f.

Athens, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; A. and Eleusis, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ f.

Atlantes, x, 78.

Atlanteans, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Atomists, 385 f.; 506.

Atomists, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ f.; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Atonement in Plato (Purgation), xiii, 36.

Atonement in Plato (Cleansing), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Attis, iii, 30; viii, 55; 546.

Attis, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Augustine, xiv, ii, 87.

Augustine, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Augustus, ascent to Heaven, of, xiv, ii, 107.

Augustus' ascension to heaven, of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Aurelius, M. Antoninus, xiv, 44, 63, 69; 504.

Aurelius, M. Antoninus, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__.

Ausonius, xiv, ii, 167.

Ausonius, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Australian natives, religious dances of, viii, 55; 585.

Australian native religious dances, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Autolykos, iv, 101; xiv, ii, 43.

Autolykos, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Authority, later Antiquity's need of, 545.

Authority, later Antiquity's need for, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Axiochos, the pseudo-Platonic dialogue, vii, 15; xii, 120; 602 f.

Axiochos, the pseudo-Platonic dialogue, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__ f.

Avenging spirit, v, 148, 176; cf. ἀλάστωρ.

Avenging spirit, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; cf. ἀλάστωρ.

Averting the eves from the sight of spirits, ix, 104.

Averting the eyes from the sight of spirits, ix, 104.

Avoiding the sight of spirits, iv, 84; ix, 104.

Avoiding seeing spirits, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Baal, ecstatic prophets of, viii, 43.

Baal, ecstatic prophets of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Babo, v, 19; 591.

Babo, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Babylonia, i, 44.

Babylonia, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Bacchanalia in Rome, xiv, ii, 106; viii, 54.

Bacchanalia in Rome, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Bakchiadai, iv, 46, 47.

Bakchiadai, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Βάκχος, viii, 10, 35; 335; cf. Dionysos.

Βάκχος, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__; cf. Dionysos.

Βάκχοι, viii, 31 f.

Βάκχοι, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ f.

Bakis, Bakides, 292; ix, 58, 63, 66; 595.

Bakis, Bakides, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__.

Banishment, 163; in expiation of murder, 175 f. (v, 142 f.).

Banishment, 163; as punishment for murder, 175 f. (v, 142 f.).

Banquet of the Pure (Orphic doctrine of), in the other world, vii, 18; x, 70.

Banquet of the Pure (Orphic doctrine), in the afterlife, vii, 18; x, 70.

Barathron at Athens, v, 32.

Barathron in Athens, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Barbarossa, legend of, iii, 16.

Barbarossa, the legend of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Βασιλίδαι, iv, 47.

Βασιλίδαι, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Βασσαρεύς (Bassarides), viii, 10 f.

Βασσαρεύς (Bassarides), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ f.

Batloka, viii, 30.

Batloka, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Baubo, 591 f.

Baubo, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ female.

Beans, see Food, prohibition of.

Beans, see __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, ban on.

Beer known to the Thracians, viii, 38.

Beer known to the Thracians, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Bendis, Bendideia at Athens, x, 4.

Bendis, Bendideia in Athens, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Berenike, translated, xiv, ii, 107.

Berenike, in translation, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Bessoi in Thrace, 260; viii, 53–4.

Bessoi in Thrace, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__–4.

βιαιοθάνατοι (βιοθάνατοι, βίαιοι), 175 f.; v, 148, 176; 594 f.; 604.

βιαιοθάνατοι (βιοθάνατοι, βίαιοι), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ f.; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__ f.; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__.

Birds (incarnations of Heroes), xiv, ii, 102.

Birds (avatars of Heroes), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Birth, pollution of, 295.

Birth, environmental pollution of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Birthday as day of remembrance of the dead, v, 89; xiv, ii, 18, 45.

Birthday as a day to remember the dead, v, 89; xiv, ii, 18, 45.

Biton and Kleobis, xiv, ii, 148, 170.

Biton and Kleobis, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Black objects (trees, fruit, etc.) sacred to χθόνιοι, and hence have kathartic properties, v, 61; ix, 81; cf. ix, 26; 590.

Black objects (trees, fruit, etc.) that are sacred to chthonic, and therefore have cleansing properties, v, 61; ix, 81; cf. ix, 26; 590.

Blest, of the dead, 171; vii, 10; xiv, ii, 31; 541 (cf. μακαρίτης and Islands of the Blest).

Blessed, of the dead, 171; vii, 10; xiv, ii, 31; 541 (cf. μακαρίτης and Islands of the Blessed).

Blindness follows the sight of a deity, xiv, ii, 41.

Blindness comes after witnessing a deity, xiv, ii, 41.

Bliss, life of, in Hades; see Utopia.

Bliss, life of, in Hades; see Utopia.

Blood = thought, 380.

Blood = thought, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Boccaccio, iv, 134.

Boccaccio, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Boëthos, xiv, 34 (fin.), 57.

Boëthos, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ (fin.), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Bones of Heroes, cult paid to, 122.

Bones of Heroes, cult dedicated to, 122.

Born, better not to be, xii, 10.

Born, it's better not to be, xii, 10.

Boukolion, xiv, ii, 105.

Boukolion, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Βουκόλοι, Dionysiac, viii, 35.

Shepherds, Dionysiac, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Bouselidai, v, 69, 129.

Bouselidai, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Brahminism, 302; x, 83.

Brahminism, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Brasidas, as Hero, iv, 20; 128.

Brasidas, as a hero, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Breathing out the soul, i, 25; 30.

Breathing out the soul, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Bride, contests for the hand of a, i, 19.

Bride, contests for the hand of a, i, 19.

Bronze: see Noise, etc.

Bronze: see Noise, etc.

Brotinos (Pythagorean), x, 7. 610

Brotinos (Pythagorean), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__. 610

Brutus, 515; xiv, ii, 88.

Brutus, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Buddhism, viii, 60; x, 83; xi, 54, 96.

Buddhism, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__.

Burial, i, 34; oldest customs of, 22 f.; coffinless, v, 61, 62; inhumation and burning in Attica, v, 58; within the house, at the hearth, v, 66; xiv, ii, 9; within the city, v, 68; xiv, ii, 8.

Burial, i, 34; oldest customs of, 22 f.; coffinless, v, 61, 62; inhumation and cremation in Attica, v, 58; within the house, at the hearth, v, 66; xiv, ii, 9; within the city, v, 68; xiv, ii, 8.

Burial societies, xiv, ii, 4.

Burial clubs, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Burning and inhumation, 19 f.; burning the possessions of the dead, i, 30, 51; burning the dead; see Cremation.

Burning and burial, 19 f.; burning the belongings of the deceased, i, 30, 51; burning the deceased; see Cremation.

Butios of Antilles, 262.

Butios of the Antilles, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Cæsar, deification of, xiv, ii, 111.

César, deification of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Calling home the Souls, 42.

Calling home the Souls, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Canosa, vase from, vii, 27.

Canosa, vase from __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Cannibalism, x, 54.

Cannibalism, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Caracalla as an avatar of Alexander, xiv, ii, 112.

Caracalla as a representation of Alexander, xiv, ii, 112.

Cato of Utica, xiv, 64.

Cato of Utica, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Cave of Zeus in Crete, 96 f.

Cave of Zeus in Crete, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ ft.

Cave-deities, 89 f.; viii, 68.

Cave gods, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ f.; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Caves, sleep in, ix, 116.

Caves, sleep in, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Catacombs, xiv, ii, 144, 166, 174.

Catacombs, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Celsus, xiv, ii, 96.

Celsus, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Celts, x, 81.

Celts, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Cenotaph, i, 88.

Cenotaph, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Ceremonial of funerals restricted, 165, 167; v, 135; 540.

Funeral ceremonies are limited, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__.

Cities, Founders of, 127 f.; cf. ἀρχηγοί.

Cities, Founders of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ f.; cf. ἀρχηγοί.

Chains attached to a sacred statue, iv, 108.

Chains attached to a sacred statue, iv, 108.

χαῖρε on tombstones, 526 f.

χαῖρε on tombstones, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ f.

Chalkis, criminal law of, v, 145.

Chalkis, criminal law, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

χάρισμα, 292.

χάρισμα, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Charon, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Χαρώνιον, v, 23.

Χαρώνιον, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Charon's fare given to the dead, 18; 162; vii, 9.

Charon's fee for the dead, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Children, importance of, 172; xii, 7.

Kids, importance of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

China, ancestor-worship in, v, 129.

China, ancestor worship in, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

χοαί, for the dead, v, 106, 120.

χοαί, for the dead, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Choes, v, 95; ix, 11.

Choes, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

χρηστοί of the dead, xiv, ii, 29 f. (vii, 10).

χρηστοί of the dead, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ f. (__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__).

Christianity; ascetics and exorcists, 292, xiv, ii, 171, 179; use of word ἥρως, xiv, ii, 82; violation of graves by, xiv, ii, 11; Hell, 242; future rewards and punishments, xiv, ii, 96; rebirth, 602; Antichrist, xiv, ii, 113.

Christianity; ascetics and exorcists, 292, xiv, ii, 171, 179; use of the word hero, xiv, ii, 82; violating graves by, xiv, ii, 11; Hell, 242; future rewards and punishments, xiv, ii, 96; rebirth, 602; Antichrist, xiv, ii, 113.

Christi, Russian sect of, viii, 57.

Christi, Russian sect, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Chrysippos, xiv, 40, 47, 60-1; xiv, ii, 87.

Chrysippus, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__.

Chthonic deities, 158 f., 218 f.; vi, 29; groups of χθόνιοι, v, 19; invoked at marriage and birth, 171; ix, 91.

Chthonic deities, 158 f., 218 f.; vi, 29; groups of Chthonic, v, 19; called upon at marriage and birth, 171; ix, 91.

Chytroi, festival at Athens, 168; ix, 11.

Chytroi, festival in Athens, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Cicero, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__.

Cliff of Leukas, xiv, ii, 102.

Cliff of Leukas, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Closing the eyes of the dead, i, 25.

Closing the eyes of the dead, i, 25.

Coffin-burial, v, 60.

Coffin burial, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Collegia funeraticia, xiv, ii, 4.

Funeral colleges, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Colonies, Greek, 27; 156.

Colonies, Greek, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Comedy, Descents to Hades in, 240.

Comedy, Descents to Hades in, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Conscience, 294, 384.

Conscience, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Consciousness division of, 595; see ἔκστασις.

Consciousness split of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; see ἔκστασις.

Consolationes, xiv, ii, 6, 100.

Consolations, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Corinth, criminal law of, v, 145.

Corinth, criminal law, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Cornutus, 504.

Cornutus, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Corpes devoured by a daimon (Eurynomos), vii, 25; (Hekate), ix, 92.

Corpses consumed by a spirit (Eurynomos), vii, 25; (Hecate), ix, 92.

Cosmopolitanism, v, 34; 499 f.

Cosmopolitanism, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ f.

Cosmos, 29.

Universe, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Costume, see Dress.

Costume, see Dress.

Coulanges, Fustel de, iv, 48; v, 131.

Coulanges, Fustel de, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Cremation, 8, 19 f., 28; i, 66; iv, 38; v, 33, 58; and burial in later period, v, 58.

Cremation, 8, 19 f., 28; i, 66; iv, 38; v, 33, 58; and burial in later period, v, 58.

Crete, cult of Zeus in, 96 f.; v, 167; ix, 113–14 (mantic and kathartic reputation).

Crete, the cult of Zeus in, 96 f.; v, 167; ix, 113–14 (prophetic and purifying reputation).

Creuzer, 223.

Creuzer, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Crossways, 216; ix, 88.

Crossroads, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Crowning the dead body with garlands, v, 40.

Crowning the lifeless body with flowers, v, 40.

Crowns (of flowers) for the dead, v, 40.

Crowns of flowers for the dead, v, 40.

Crumbs, etc., left on the ground for the Souls, v, 114.

Crumbs, etc., left on the ground for the Souls, v, 114.

Cult-societies, 221.

Cult societies, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Cure of diseases by prophets, 294 f.

Healing of diseases by prophets, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ f.

Curses against tomb-violators, 526 f.

Curses against tomb-robbers, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ f.

Curse-tablets; see Defixiones.

Curse tablets; see Defixiones.

Cycle, Epic, 34, 64 f., 75, 90.

Cycle, Epic, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ f., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__.

Cyclic poetry, editing of, x, 17.

Cyclic poetry editing, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Cynics, v, 34; 499.

Cynics, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Cypress at funerals, v, 39.

Cypress at funerals, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Daeira, Daira, Δαειρίτης at Eleusis, vi, 8.

Daeira, Daira, Δαειρίτης at Eleusis, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

daemonium meridianum, ix, 96; 592.

daemonium meridianum, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Daimones, deities of second rank, i, 56; distinct from Heroes, iv, 23; xii, 121; in Hesiod, 70 f.; Empedokles, 381; Stoics, 500. 611

Daimones, lesser deities, i, 56; distinct from Heroes, iv, 23; xii, 121; in Hesiod, 70 f.; Empedokles, 381; Stoics, 500. 611

δαίμων, personal, of individual men, xiv, 44; (= πότμος), xii, 26; xiv, 44; ἀγαθὸς δ., v, 133; cf. xiv, 44; δαίμων θνητός (ἀνθρωποδαίμων, νεκυδαίμων), ii, 43.

spirit, personal, of individual people, xiv, 44; (= river), xii, 26; xiv, 44; Good., v, 133; cf. xiv, 44; mortal spirit(Human spirit, death spirit), ii, 43.

δαίμονες ἀποτρόπαιοι, v, 168; ἀραῖοι, v, 148; μειλίχιοι, v, 168; πλάνητες, 592; προστρόπαιοι, v, 148, 176; = Angel, xiv, ii, 144; δαιμόνων μήτηρ, 591.

Evil spirits, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; Curse, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; Softer spirits, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__; Wandering spirits, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__; Protective spirits, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__; = Angel, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__; Mother of demons, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_7__.

Daites, Trojan Hero, iv, 3.

Daites, Trojan Hero, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Damon, ix, 19.

Damon, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Danaides, 242; 587.

Danaides, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Dances, religious, 257; viii, 55; ix, 19.

Dances, spiritual, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Dance, circular, in cult of Dionysos, viii, 15.

Dance, circles, in the cult of Dionysus, viii, 15.

Dante, 33, 242.

Dante, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Danube, mouths of, xiv, ii, 102.

Danube River estuaries, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Daphne, 100.

Daphne, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

δάφνη, v, 38, 95; ix, 46; xi, 85.

δάφνη, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__.

Daphnis, xiv, ii, 105.

Daphnis, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Days, unlucky, v, 158.

Unlucky days, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Dea Syria, viii, 55.

Dea Syria, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Dead, offerings to, 18 f.; 165 f.; v, 105; dirge for the, 18, 164; Banquet of, 168; sacrifices to (Patroklos), 12 f.; in Mycenean graves, 22 f.; in Od. λ, 36 f.; elsewhere, 116, 164, 167 f.; Oracles of the, 24; i, 73; Judges of the (Aesch. and Plato), 238 f.; (Pindar), xii, 34 f.; (Aesch.), xii, 77; (later), 541; classes of the, xii, 62; xiv, ii, 127; imagined as skeletons, xiv, 11, 92; exorcism, conjuration of, see Souls and Ghosts.

Dead, offerings to, 18 f.; 165 f.; v, 105; dirge for the, 18, 164; Banquet of, 168; sacrifices to (Patroklos), 12 f.; in Mycenean graves, 22 f.; in Od. λ, 36 f.; elsewhere, 116, 164, 167 f.; Oracles of the, 24; i, 73; Judges of the (Aesch. and Plato), 238 f.; (Pindar), xii, 34 f.; (Aesch.), xii, 77; (later), 541; classes of the, xii, 62; xiv, ii, 127; imagined as skeletons, xiv, 11, 92; exorcism, conjuration of, see Souls and Ghosts.

Death, 3; superior to life, 229, 542; causing pollution, 295; of gods, iii, 30; Black Death, 284.

Death, 3; better than life, 229, 542; bringing darkness, 295; of deities, iii, 30; Black Death, 284.

Defixiones, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__ f.

Deification of Rulers, 537 f. (cf. 530 f.).

Deification of Rulers, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ f. (see __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ f.).

Delos, purification of, ix, 119.

Delos purification, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Delphic Oracle, regulates expiatory rites, v, 167; 180 f.; authority of, in the cult of Heroes, 128 f.; gives support to the cult of Souls, 174; to the Eleusinian worship, vi, 5; to the worship of Dionysos in Attica, vi, 9; sources of oracular inspiration, 289 f.; importance of D. in religious life of Greece, 157; grave of Python at D., 97; Delphic funeral ordinance, v, 45.

Delphi Oracle, oversees atonement rituals, v, 167; 180 f.; authority of, in the worship of Heroes, 128 f.; supports the worship of Souls, 174; contributes to the Eleusinian rites, vi, 5; aids in the worship of Dionysus in Attica, vi, 9; sources of prophetic inspiration, 289 f.; significance of D. in the religious life of Greece, 157; tomb of Python at D., 97; Delphic funeral practices, v, 45.

Delphinion at Athens, v, 172.

Delphinion in Athens, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Demeter (and Kore), 160 f.; v, 168; 218 f.

Demeter (and Kore), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ f.; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__ f.

Demetrios Poliorketes as Hero, xiv, ii, 69.

Demetrios Poliorketes as Hero, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Demetrios, Cynic, xiv, 64.

Demetrios, Cynic, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Demigods (ἡμίθεοι), iv, 23.

Demigods (__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__).

δῆμοι called after γένη in Attica, etc., iv, 52.

δῆμοι called after γένη in Attica, etc., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Demokritos, xi, 35; 385 f.; xii, 150; xiii, 27; περὶ τῶν ἐν ᾅδου, xi, 103 (fragg. moral.).

Democritus, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ f.; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__; περὶ τῶν ἐν ᾅδου, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__ (fragg. moral.).

Demonassa, vi, 35.

Demonassa, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Demonology, 534.

Demonology, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Demophoön, i, 41.

Demophoön, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

De mortuis nil nisi bene, v, 81; 170.

Speak only good of the dead, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Dervishes, viii, 15, 43; 262, 266.

Dervishes, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__.

Devil’s Bride, ii, 7.

Devil's Bride, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Devil’s Mother, 591.

Devil’s Mom, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Dexikreon, ix, 111.

Dexikreon, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Dexion the Hero (Sophokles), iv, 71.

Dexion the Hero (Sophocles), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Diagoras of Melos, 240; xii, 65.

Diagoras of Melos, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Diana = Empousa, 592; in the Middle Ages, ix, 101.

Diana = Empousa, 592; in the Middle Ages, ix, 101.

Diasia at Athens. v, 168.

Diasia in Athens. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Dies nefasti, v, 158.

Unlucky day, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Dikaiarchos, xi, 52; 512; 599.

Dikaiarchos, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Dikte, Mt. in Crete, 96.

Dikte, Mt. in Crete, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Diochaites, Pythagorean, xi, 30.

Diochaites, Pythagorean, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Diogenes, of Apollonia, 432, 436.

Diogenes of Apollonia, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Diogenes, Cynic, vi, 27; 239.

Diogenes, Cynic, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Diogenes Laertius (viii, 31), xi, 50.

Diogenes Laertius (viii, 31), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Diomedes, 67; on the μακάρων νῆσος, xiv, ii, 99.

Diomedes, 67; on the Island of the Blessed, xiv, ii, 99.

Dionysos, the Thracian, 256 f.; Greek god, 282 f.; Greek (not Thracian) name, ix, 1; Orphic, 335 f.; 340 f.

Dionysos, the Thracian, 256 f.; Greek god, 282 f.; Greek (not Thracian) name, ix, 1; Orphic, 335 f.; 340 f.

Διόνυσος μαινόμενος, viii, 4; Lord of Souls, 168, 271; ix, 11; at Delphi, 97, 287; Oracle of Dionysos, 260, 290; as Bull, viii, 19, 33, 35; x, 35; as βουκόλος, viii, 35; at Eleusis, vi, 9; Epiphanies of, 258, 279, 285; Worship of, in Rome, viii, 54; xiv, ii, 106.

Dionysus angry, viii, 4; Lord of Souls, 168, 271; ix, 11; at Delphi, 97, 287; Oracle of Dionysus, 260, 290; as Bull, viii, 19, 33, 35; x, 35; as cowherd, viii, 35; at Eleusis, vi, 9; Epiphanies of, 258, 279, 285; Worship of, in Rome, viii, 54; xiv, ii, 106.

Dioscuri, ἑτερήμεροι, xi, 51; translated, xiv, ii, 109.

Dioscuri, ἑτερήμεροι, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; translated, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Dipylon, cemetery at Athens, v, 58.

Dipylon Cemetery in Athens, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Dipylon vases, 165.

Dipylon vases, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Dirge, 164.

Dirge, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Discovery, geographical, xiv, ii, 101.

Discovery, geography, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Disease, origin of, in daimonic influence, 294 f.; ix, 81–2.

Disease, origin of, in demonic influence, 294 f.; ix, 81–2.

Division of consciousness, 595 f.

Division of consciousness, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ f.

Dodona, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__. 612

Dogs sacrificed to Hekate, 298, 589–90; Hekate appears as a dog, ix, 99; 595; on grave reliefs, v, 105.

Dogs sacrificed to Hekate, 298, 589–90; Hekate appears as a dog, ix, 99; 595; on grave reliefs, v, 105.

Dorians in the Peloponnese, 27.

Dorians in the Peloponnese, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Drakon, 115, 176.

Drakon, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Drama, 285, 421; in cult, 222, 258; mystic drama at Eleusis, 227.

Drama, 285, 421; in cult, 222, 258; mystic drama at Eleusis, 227.

Dreams, visions of the dead in, 7 (proving survival); xiv, ii, 154; i, 55; see Incubation and Prophecy.

Dreams, visions of the dead in, 7 (showing they survive); xiv, ii, 154; i, 55; see Incubation and Prophecy.

Dress in Dionysiac worship, 257.

Dress in Dionysian worship, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Drimakos (Hero), 530.

Drimakos (Hero), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Driving out the souls, v, 99, 100.

Driving away the spirits, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Druids, x, 81.

Druids, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Drusilla (ascent to heaven), xiv, ii, 107.

Drusilla (ascension to heaven), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Dryopes, v, 18.

Dryopes, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Δύαλος, viii, 10.

Δύαλος, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Duty, as conceived by the Stoics, 498 f.

Duty, as understood by the Stoics, 498 f.

Earth = Hell, xi, 75.

Earth = Hell, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Earth-deities; see Chthonic.

Earth deities; see Chthonic.

Earth, Oracle of, at Delphi, 97, 160; ix, 46.

Oracle of Delphi, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Echetlos (Hero), 136.

Echetlos (Hero), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Echidna, v, 23.

Echidna, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Eckhart, xiii, 75.

Eckhart, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

ἐγχυτρίστριαι, v, 77.

ἐγχυτρίστριαι, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Eggs, kathartic use of, x, 55; 590.

Therapeutic use of eggs, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Egypt, i, 5, 39; 242; 335; x, 8, 45; 346; xiv, ii, 109, 152–3, 144.

Egypt, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_7__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_8__–3, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_9__.

ἐκφορά of the dead body, v, 46, 50, 60.

Removal of the dead body, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

ἔκστασις (ἐνθουσισμός, κατοχή), 30, 255; viii, 24; 258 f.; 284 f.; 293; 300 f.; 384; 471; 547; 595 f.

ekstasis (enthusiasm, possession), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__ f.; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__ f.; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__ f.; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_7__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_8__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_9__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_10__ f.

Eleatics, 371 f.

Eleatics, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ f.

Elements, the four, xi, 28; 379.

Four elements, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Eleusinian Mysteries, 218 f.; secrecy at, 222; promises made by, 223; modern interpretations of, 223 f.; symbolism at, 226; later mention and end of (fourth century), 542; xiv, ii, 172; “Lesser Mysteries” at Athens, 220; and Morality, 228.

Eleusinian Mysteries, 218 f.; secrecy at, 222; promises made by, 223; modern interpretations of, 223 f.; symbolism at, 226; later mention and end of (fourth century), 542; xiv, ii, 172; “Lesser Mysteries” at Athens, 220; and Morality, 228.

Eleusis, v, 19, 21.

Eleusis, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Elijah, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

ἐλλέβορος kathartic effects of, ix, 26, 75.

kathartic effects of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Elpenor, 17; i, 29, 33; 19; 20; 36.

Elpenor, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__.

Elysium, 55 f., 59 f., 75 f.; xiv, ii, 99; 541.

Elysium, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ f., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ f., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__ f.; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__.

Embalming in Egypt, i, 39; in Sparta, iv, 46.

Embalming in Egypt, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; in Sparta, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Empedokles, 378 f.; x, 72; xi, 28, 34, 42, 50, 56 f.; xii, 41; xiii, 40, 68; xiv, ii, 107; 597.

Empedocles, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ f.; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__ f.; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_7__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_8__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_9__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_10__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_11__.

Empedotimos, ix, 111–12; xii, 44; xiv, 53.

Empedotimos, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__–12; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Empousa, vii, 25; 591.

Empousa, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

ἐναγίζειν, iv, 15, 86.

ἐναγίζειν, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

ἔνατα, an offering to the dead, v, 82–3.

ἔνατα, an offering to the dead, v, 82–3.

Enemies of the gods in Hades, 238, 241.

Enemies of the gods in Hades, 238, 241.

ἐνιαύσια for the dead, v, 81, 90, 92.

yearly for the dead, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

ἔνθεος (ἐνθουσιασμός): see ἔκστασις.

ἔνθεος (ἐνθουσιασμός): see __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

ἐνθύμιον, 216.

ἐνθύμιον, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Enlightenment in Greece, 79, 115, 292.

Enlightenment in Greece, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

ἐνναετηρίς in expiation of murder, xi, 78; xii, 34, 40; 180.

ἐνναετηρίς for atoning for murder, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__.

Enoch, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Eoiai, Hesiodic, 593.

Eoiai, Hesiodic, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

ἐπαγωγή (δαιμόνων), ix, 106–7.

ἐπαγωγή (δαιμόνων), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__–7.

Ephialtes (daimon), ix, 102; xiv, ii, 86; 592.

Ephialtes (demon), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Ephyrai in Thesprotia, v, 23.

Ephyrai in Thesprotia, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Epicharmos, vi, 5; 436 f.; xii, 151; xiv, 53.

Epicharmos, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ f.; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__.

Epidauros, iii, 13, 54.

Epidauros, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Epidemics, religious, 284.

Epidemics, faith, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Epigenes, 597.

Epigenes, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Epikteta, Testament of, v, 126; xiv, ii, 18, 71.

Epictetus, The Testament of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Epiktetos, 504; xiv, 3, 41, 44.

Epictetus, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__.

Epicurus, doctrine of the soul, 504 f.; foundation for the cult of his soul, v, 126, 137.

Epicurus, the doctrine of the soul, 504 f.; foundation for the cult of his soul, v, 126, 137.

Epigrammata Graeca, ed. Kaibel, xiv, ii, 119 f. (No. 594: 141).

Epigrammata Graeca, ed. Kaibel, xiv, ii, 119 f. (No. 594: 141).

Epilepsy (see mental diseases), viii, 39.

Epilepsy (see __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ diseases), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Epimachos, v, 19.

Epimachos, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Epimenides, 301; iii, 24; v, 57; 596; Theogony of, ix, 123.

Epimenides, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__; Theogony of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__.

ἐπιφάνεια of Dionysos, 258; viii, 68; 285.

ἐπιφάνεια of Dionysos, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

ἐπιπομπαί (δαιμόνων), v, 168; ix, 107.

ἐπιπομπαί (daimonôn), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Epitaphs, 539 f. (see Anth. Pal.).

Epitaphs, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ f. (see __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__. Pal.).

ἐπῳδαί, ix, 81–2, 107.

ἐπῳδαί, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__–2, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Erechtheus (Erichthonios), 98; 581.

Erechtheus (Erichthonios), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Erinyes, ii, 6; v, 5, 97, 121; 178 f.; vii, 6; xii, 75; 592.

Erinyes, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__ f.; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_7__.

ἐρινύειν, ix, 58.

ἐρινύειν, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Eros, v, 112.

Eros, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

ἐσχάρα, i, 53.

ἐσχάρα, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Eskimo, manner of burial, v, 67.

Inuit, burial customs, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Essenes, x, 78; xiv, ii, 117.

Essenes, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Esthonian cult of the dead, v, 99.

Estonian cult of the dead, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

ἔται, v, 141.

ἔται, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Eteoboutadai, iv, 52.

Eteoboutadai, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

εὐαγής, xii, 58.

εὐαγής, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Εὐάγγελος Hero, xiv, ii, 63, 144.

Εὐάγγελος Hero, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Euadne, 582.

Evadne, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Εὐάπαν, ix, 102 613

Εὐάπαν, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ 613

Eubouleus (Euboulos), god of the underworld, v, 7, 19; 220; xiv, ii, 145.

Eubouleus (Euboulos), god of the underworld, v, 7, 19; 220; xiv, ii, 145.

Eudemos, Ethics of, 512.

Eudemos, Ethics, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Euhemeros, iii, 28.

Euhemeros, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Eukleides (Socratic), xiv, 44.

Eukleides (Socratic), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Euklos, ix, 58.

Euklos, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Eumolpos, Eumolpidai, vi, 6, 16; x, 70.

Eumolpos, Eumolpidai, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Eunostos (Hero), 134.

Eunostos (Hero), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Euodos (Hero), 529.

Euodos (Hero), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Eupatridai in Athens, iv, 47; v, 139; 602 f.

Eupatridai in Athens, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__ f.

Euphemistic names for χθόνιοι, v, 5.

Euphemistic names for chthonians, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Euphorbos, 599.

Euphorbias, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Euripides, 432 f.; Alcestis, xii, 121; Bacchae, 286; Hecuba, viii, 70; orthodoxy of, xii, 135.

Euripides, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ f.; *Alcestis*, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; *Bacchae*, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__; *Hecuba*, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__; orthodoxy of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__.

Eurynomos, Hades-daimon, vii, 25.

Eurynomos, Hades demon, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Eurypontidai, iv, 53.

Eurypontids, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Eurysthenidai, iv, 53.

Eurysthenidai, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

εὐσεβῶν χῶρος, vii, 15; xiv, ii, 133.

εὐσεβῶν χῶρος, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Euthykles, iv, 117.

Euthykles, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Euthymos, 135; 581.

Euthymos, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Evil, speaking, of the dead forbidden, v, 115.

Evil, speaking, of the dead forbidden, v, 115.

Evil, nature of, 470 (Plato); 498; xiv, 40, 60.

Evil, nature of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ (Plato); __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__.

Exegetai, their advice sought in questions relating to the cult of Souls, v, 139, 174.

Exegetai, their advice sought in questions about the worship of Souls, v, 139, 174.

Exorcism, 604.

Exorcism, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Expiation, gods of, v, 168; sacrifices of, made to χθόνιοι, v, 167; after murder, 180 f.

Expiation, gods of, v, 168; sacrifices of, made to Underworld beings, v, 167; after murder, 180 f.

Eyes of the dead, closing of, i, 25.

Eyes of the dead, closing of, i, 25.

Fainting (λιποψυχία), i, 9.

Fainting (λιποψυχία), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Fame, all that is left to the dead, 43; xii, 13, 20, 25; xiv, ii, 169.

Fame, all that remains for the dead, 43; xii, 13, 20, 25; xiv, ii, 169.

Family graves in the country, v, 69, 70; 525 f.

Family graves in the country, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__ f.

Fate and guilt, 423 f., 426 f.

Fate and guilt, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ f., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ f.

Fear of the dead, 16, 163, 169; of death, dispelled by Epicurus, 506; breaks out at the end of the classical period, 545 (xiv, ii, 170).

Fear of the dead, 16, 163, 169; of death, alleviated by Epicurus, 506; emerges at the end of the classical era, 545 (xiv, ii 170).

Feet of the corpse pointing towards the door, i, 26.

Feet of the corpse pointing towards the door, i, 26.

Fetishism in Greece, iv, 118.

Fetishism in Greece, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Figs, kathartic uses of, 590.

Figs, therapeutic uses of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Fire, kathartic uses of, i, 41; ix, 127.

Fire, therapeutic uses of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Fish: see Food, prohibition of.

Fish: see __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, ban on.

Flaminius as Hero, 531.

Flaminius the Hero, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Folk-poetry, 25; belief about the souls, 524; legends about the “translated”, xiv, ii, 105.

Folk poetry, 25; beliefs about souls, 524; legends about those who have "translated," xiv, ii, 105.

Folk tales (Greek), iv, 115; xiv, ii, 151.

Folk tales (Greek), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Food, Prohibition of certain foods (attributed to Eleusis), vi, 35; among the Orphics, x, 54–5; Thracian, x, 78; by Pythagoras, xi, 42, 47; Empedokles, xi, 76, 85.

Food, banning certain foods (linked to Eleusis), vi, 35; among the Orphics, x, 54–5; Thracian, x, 78; by Pythagoras, xi, 42, 47; Empedokles, xi, 76, 85.

Fountains in Hades, xii, 62; xiv, ii, 151; of Immortality, xiv, ii, 151.

Fountains in Hades, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; of Immortality, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Fravashi (Persian), i, 5.

Fravashi (Persian), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Frederick, legend of the return of the Emperor, 93; xiv, ii, 112.

Frederick, the legendary return of the Emperor, 93; xiv, ii, 112.

Freewill: see Will.

Free will: see Will.

Friendship in the doctrine of the Epicureans, 506.

Friendship in the doctrine of the Epicureans, 506.

Funeral rites, in Homer, 17 f.; in later times, 162 f., 524 f.; of princes, i, 17; of kings in Sparta, Corinth, Crete, iv, 46; at public expense, xiv, ii, 5; refusal of, v, 32–3.

Funeral rites, in Homer, 17 f.; in later times, 162 f., 524 f.; for princes, i, 17; for kings in Sparta, Corinth, Crete, iv, 46; at public expense, xiv, ii, 5; refusal of, v, 32–3.

Funeral feast in Homer, 18; later (περίδειπνον), 167; games, in Homer, 15; for Heroes, 116 f.; procession, v, 60.

Funeral feast in Homer, 18; later (peri/deipnon), 167; games, in Homer, 15; for Heroes, 116 f.; procession, v, 60.

Furious Host, ii, 7; 298; xiii, 5; (593).

Furious Host, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__; (__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__).

Fustel de Coulanges; see Coulanges.

Fustel de Coulanges; see Coulanges.

Gabriel, the Archangel, iv, 134.

Gabriel, the Archangel, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Gaia, 160, 168; v, 121; at Delphi, 290.

Gaia, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__; at Delphi, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__.

Gambreion, mourning period of, v, 86.

Gambreion, period of mourning, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Games, 15, 116 f.; iv, 22; originally funeral ceremonies, 116 f.

Games, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ f.; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__; originally memorial services, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__ f.

Ganymedes, 58.

Ganymede, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Garganus, mountain in Italy, iv, 92, 96.

Garganus, mountain in Italy, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Garlands for the dead, v, 40.

Flowers for the dead, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Gauls, x, 81.

Gauls, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Gello, 592.

Hello, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

γενέθλιος δαίμων, xii, 26.

γενέθλιος δαίμων, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Γενέσια, private and public, v, 15; 167.

Γενέσια, personal and communal, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Genesis, ii, 18.

Genesis, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Genetyllis, ix, 91.

Genetyllis, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

γένη, 124.

γένη, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Genius, i, 5; v, 132; xiv, 44.

Genius, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

γεννήτης τῶν θεῶν, 603.

γεννήτης τῶν θεῶν, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

German tribes, i, 34; 22.

German tribes, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Getai, 263.

Getai, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Ghosts, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_7__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_8__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_9__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_10__ f.

Γίγων, viii, 10.

Γίγων, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Glaukos, xiv, ii, 151.

Glaukos, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Gnostics, xiv, ii, 179. 614

Gnostics, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__. 614

Gods, in Homer, 25 f.; Olympians and others,i, 56; idea of divinity, xiv, ii, 107; Gods not immortal, 384; asleep or dead, iii, 30; buried, 96 f.; birthdays of, v, 89; in human shape, iv, 134; visiting men, ii, 38; compared with men, 253 f., 414; periodically appearing, viii, 28; of expiation, v, 168; amours of, iv, 134; conductors into the lower world, xiv, ii, 144 f.; unknown, iv, 62; statues of, 136; see Chthonic.

Gods, in Homer, 25 f.; Olympians and others,i, 56; the concept of divinity, xiv, ii, 107; Gods are not immortal, 384; they can be asleep or dead, iii, 30; buried, 96 f.; their birthdays, v, 89; in human form, iv, 134; interacting with humans, ii, 38; when compared to humans, 253 f., 414; they appear occasionally, viii, 28; for atonement, v, 168; their affairs, iv, 134; guides to the underworld, xiv, ii, 144 f.; unknown, iv, 62; statues of them, 136; see Chthonic.

Goethe, xiii, 64.

Goethe, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Golden Age, 67 f.; ii, 49; vii, 18.

Golden Age, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ f.; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

γονεῖς, iv, 49; v, 146.

γονεῖς, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Gorgias, pupil of Empedokles, 378.

Gorgias, student of Empedocles, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Γοργύρα, Γοργώ, vii, 25; 591.

Γοργύρα, Γοργώ, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Grace of the gods (salvation), 342.

Blessing of the gods, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Grave and Hades confused, xiv, ii, 92.

Grave and Hades puzzled, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Graves: see Burial, Family-graves, and Rock-graves; of Gods, 96; of Asklepios, 101; Erechtheus, 98; Hyakinthos, 99; Kekrops, iii, 41; Plouton, iii, 34; Python, 97; Zeus, 96; of Heroes, 121; cult of, 123, 166 f.; silence at, v, 110; curses attached to, xiv, ii, 13.

Graves: see Burial, Family-graves, and Rock-graves; of Gods, 96; of Asklepios, 101; Erechtheus, 98; Hyakinthos, 99; Kekrops, iii, 41; Plouton, iii, 34; Python, 97; Zeus, 96; of Heroes, 121; cult of, 123, 166 f.; silence at, v, 110; curses attached to, xiv, ii, 13.

Grave-monuments, i, 28; v, 69 f.

Grave monuments, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ f.

Grave-robbers, 526.

Grave robbers, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Gregory the Great, xiv, ii, 87.

Gregory the Great, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Grief, display of, disturbing to the dead, v, 49.

Grief, showing it, unsettling for the deceased, v, 49.

Guardian spirit of individuals, xiv, 44.

Guardian spirit of individuals, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Guilt: see Sin and Fate.

Guilt: see Sin and Fate.

Hades, 26, 35 f., 159, 223, 236 f.; xii, 4, 62; 500, 535 f., 540 f.; Picture of, painted by Polygnotos, 241 f.; on vases from Southern Italy, vii, 27; cult of, 159; mother of, 591; entrances to (Ploutonia), v, 23; Ferryman of, vii, 9; Descents to, 32 f.; i, 62, 65; iii, 8; 236 f.; 240 f.; (Epic), vii, 2–4; (Theseus and Peirithoos), vii, 3; (Herakles), 591; (in comedy), 240 f.; (vases), vii, 27; (Orphic), x, 60; (Pythag.), 600 f.; rivers of, 35, 237; vii, 21; Judges in, 247.

Hades, 26, 35 f., 159, 223, 236 f.; xii, 4, 62; 500, 535 f., 540 f.; Picture of, painted by Polygnotos, 241 f.; on vases from Southern Italy, vii, 27; cult of, 159; mother of, 591; entrances to (Ploutonia), v, 23; Ferryman of, vii, 9; Descents to, 32 f.; i, 62, 65; iii, 8; 236 f.; 240 f.; (Epic), vii, 2–4; (Theseus and Peirithoos), vii, 3; (Herakles), 591; (in comedy), 240 f.; (vases), vii, 27; (Orphic), x, 60; (Pythag.), 600 f.; rivers of, 35, 237; vii, 21; Judges in, 247.

αἱμακουρία, iv, 13.

αἱμακουρία, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Hair, offering of, i, 14.

Hair, gift of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Hallucinations, 259; 262.

Hallucinations, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Haloa, 222; vi, 35.

Haloa, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Hamilcar, translation of, xiv, ii, 109.

Hamilcar, translation of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Haokah dance of the Dakota, viii, 55.

Haokah dance of the Dakota, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Harmodios, translation of, xiv, ii, 99; and Aristogeiton in the other world, vii, 5.

Harmodios, translation of, xiv, ii, 99; and Aristogeiton in the afterlife, vii, 5.

Harmonia and Kadmos, xiv, ii, 99.

Harmonia and Kadmos, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

ἁρμονία (of the soul), xi, 52.

Harmony (of the soul), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Harpocration on Ἄβαρις, ix, 108.

Harpocration on Abaris, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Harpies, 56; v, 124; 593.

Harpies, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Hashish, 259.

Hashish, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Hasisatra, ii, 18; xiv, ii, 109.

Hasisatra, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Hearth, earliest place of burial, v, 66.

Hearth, the first place of burial, v, 66.

Heaven (the sky), as dwelling place of the Blest, xii, 44, 62; xiv, ii, 134; ascent to, of Roman Emperors, xiv, ii, 107; of Apollonios of Tyana, xiv, ii, 115.

Heaven (the sky), as the home of the Blessed, xii, 44, 62; xiv, ii, 134; the rise to, of Roman Emperors, xiv, ii, 107; of Apollonius of Tyana, xiv, ii, 115.

Hedonism, 492 (xiv, 3).

Hedonism, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ (__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__).

Hegesias, xiv, 3.

Hegesias, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Heirs, their duties to the dead, v, 129.

Heirs, their responsibilities to the deceased, v, 129.

Hekabe, ix, 99.

Hecuba, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Hekate, v, 5, 88, 168; 297 f., 590 f.; (H. Hek., p. 289 Ab.), 594; Hosts of 593 f.; Banquet of, v, 97; 216; ix, 88, 103.

Hekate, v, 5, 88, 168; 297 f., 590 f.; (H. Hek., p. 289 Ab.), 594; Hosts of 593 f.; Banquet of, v, 97; 216; ix, 88, 103.

Ἑκατικὰ φάσματα, 590 f.

Ἑκατικὰ φάσματα, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ f.

Hektor, as Hero, iv, 35; xiv, ii, 41 (still worshipped with sacrifice in the middle of the fourth century in the Troad: Julian, Ep. 78, p. 603–4 H.).

Hektor, as Hero, iv, 35; xiv, ii, 41 (still honored with sacrifices in the middle of the fourth century in the Troad: Julian, Ep. 78, p. 603–4 H.).

Helen, legend of her εἴδωλον, i, 79; translated, ii, 21; xiv, ii, 99, 102; given heroic honours, 137.

Helen, the figure of her idol, i, 79; translated, ii, 21; xiv, ii, 99, 102; awarded heroic honors, 137.

Helios in Hades, xii, 38.

Helios in Hades, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Hell, punishment in, 40 f.; 238 f., 242, 344, 415, 536; creatures of, 25, 590 f. (see Kerberos).

Hell, punishment in, 40 f.; 238 f., 242, 344, 415, 536; creatures of, 25, 590 f. (see Kerberos).

Hemithea, iv, 103.

Hemithea, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

ἡμίθεος, iv, 23.

ἡμίθεος, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Hephaistion, xiv, ii, 70.

Hephaistion, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Herakles in the Odyssean Nekyia, 39; his descent to Hades, v, 25; vii, 4; 591; H. and Argeios, i, 35; H. and Eurystheus (Omphale), xii, 40; as Hero-God, 132; translated, 581; xiv, ii, 103.

Herakles in the Odyssean Nekyia, 39; his journey to Hades, v, 25; vii, 4; 591; H. and Argeios, i, 35; H. and Eurystheus (Omphale), xii, 40; as Hero-God, 132; translated, 581; xiv, ii, 103.

Herakleides Ponticus, ix, 58, 60 (Sibyls), 108 (Abaris), 111, 96; xii, 44 (Empedotimos); xi, 61 (Empedokles); xiv, i, 53 (souls in the air); 599 f. (Pythagoras).

Herakleides Ponticus, ix, 58, 60 (Sibyls), 108 (Abaris), 111, 96; xii, 44 (Empedotimos); xi, 61 (Empedokles); xiv, i, 53 (souls in the air); 599 f. (Pythagoras).

Herakleitos, 367 f.; xi, 5, etc., 101; xii, 137, 150; 464; xiv, 32; 499; 504; 597.

Heraclitus, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ f.; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, etc., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_7__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_8__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_9__.

Hermes, conductor of souls, 9, 168; xiv, ii, 145. 615

Hermes, guide of souls, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__. 615

Hermione, cult of χθόνιοι there, iii, 34; v, 18, 26.

Hermione, cult of χθόνιοι there, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Hermippos, 600.

Hermippos, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Hermotimos, 300 f.

Hermotimos, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ female.

Hero of Alexandria, xii, 150.

Hero of Alexandria, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Herodes Atticus, xiv, ii, 71, 131.

Herodes Atticus, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Herodikos, of Perinthos, vii, 3; x, 7.

Herodikos from Perinthos, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Heroes, 74, 97 f., 115 f.; iii, 46; 254; 416; xii, 121; help in war, 136 f.; graves of, 121; v, 68; games for, 116 f.; bones of, transferred and worshipped, iv, 35–6; 529; as Birds, xiv, ii, 102; relation with θεοί and δαίμονες, iv, 25; become gods, 132; Homeric “Heroes”, iv, 26; in Hesiod, 74 f., 118; nocturnal sacrifice to, iv, 9; what falls to the ground sacred to, v, 114; in Pindar, 414 f.; legends of, 134 f.; later, 527 f.

Heroes, 74, 97 f., 115 f.; iii, 46; 254; 416; xii, 121; help in war, 136 f.; graves of, 121; v, 68; games for, 116 f.; bones of, transferred and worshipped, iv, 35–6; 529; as Birds, xiv, ii, 102; relation with gods and demons, iv, 25; become gods, 132; Homeric “Heroes”, iv, 26; in Hesiod, 74 f., 118; nocturnal sacrifice to, iv, 9; what falls to the ground sacred to, v, 114; in Pindar, 414 f.; legends of, 134 f.; later, 527 f.

ἥρως = a dead person, v, 110, 134; 531; (Christian), xiv, ii, 82; applied to the living, 530 f.; xiv, ii, 68; nameless or adjectival Heroes, 126 f., 529; xiv, ii, 61–2; ἡ. ἰατρός iv, 94–5; xiv, ii, 45; ἡ. συγγενείας, v, 132.

hero = a dead person, v, 110, 134; 531; (Christian), xiv, ii, 82; applied to the living, 530 f.; xiv, ii, 68; nameless or adjectival Heroes, 126 f., 529; xiv, ii, 61–2; the doctor iv, 94–5; xiv, ii, 45; Family., v, 132.

Heroized Kings and Lawgivers, 128; Kings of Sparta, Corinth, and Crete, iv, 46; Warriors of the Persian Wars, 528; prominent men of later times, 530; Heroizing easier in Boeotia, v, 134; in Thessaly, xii, 121; 532; becomes common, 531 f.; substitution of descendants for original Hero, xiv, ii, 65.

Heroized Kings and Lawgivers, 128; Kings of Sparta, Corinth, and Crete, iv, 46; Warriors of the Persian Wars, 528; prominent figures of later times, 530; Heroizing is easier in Boeotia, v, 134; in Thessaly, xii, 121; 532; it becomes common, 531 f.; the substitution of descendants for the original Hero, xiv, ii, 65.

Hero-Physicians (Oracular), 133; xiv, ii, 45.

Hero-Doctors (Oracular), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

ἥρωες δυσόργητοι, v, 119.

ἥρωες δυσόργητοι, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

ἡρῷα at the doors, iv, 105, 136; v, 68.

ἡρῷα at the doors, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Ἡρωϊκός of Philostratos, xiv, ii, 41.

Ἡρωϊκός of Philostratos, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

ἡρωῒς, ἡρωϊκά, ix, 11; xiv, ii, 50; Birthday festivals of H., v, 89.

hero, heroic, ix, 11; xiv, ii, 50; Birthday festivals of H., v, 89.

ἡρωϊσταί, xiv, ii, 53.

ἡρωϊσταί, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Herodotos, 115; xii, 8.

Herodotos, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Herophile of Erythrai, ix, 60.

Herophile of Erythrai, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Hesiod, The Five Ages, 67 f.; Op. et D. (124), ii, 34; (141), ii, 41; Theog. (411), ix, 95a.

Hesiod, The Five Ages, 67 f.; Op. et D. (124), ii, 34; (141), ii, 41; Theog. (411), ix, 95a.

Hesychos, vii, 6.

Hesychos, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Hierapolis, its πλουτώνιον, v, 23.

Hierapolis, its plutonium, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

ἱεροθέσιον, xiv, ii, 13 (p. 554).

ἱεροθέσιον, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ (p. 554).

Hierophant at Eleusis, εὐνουχισμένος, vi, 12.

Hierophant at Eleusis, eunuch, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

ἱλασμός, v, 167.

ἱλασμός, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Hippokrates, cult of, v, 89; xiv, ii, 45.

Hippocrates, cult of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Hippolytos, iv, 38.

Hippolytus, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Hippon of Samos, 432.

Hippon of Samos, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Hippotes, xii, 40.

Hippotes, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Herdsman (shepherd), type of God, xi, 36; (see divine apparitions), xiv, ii, 41.

Herdsman (shepherd), a type of God, xi, 36; (see divine appearances), xiv, ii, 41.

Homer, 25 f., 157.

Homer, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ f., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Homicide, state trials of, 176 f.; held over inanimate objects (in Athens), iv, 118.

Homicide, state trials of, 176 f.; held over inanimate objects (in Athens), iv, 118.

Horace (Odes, iv, 2, 21), xii, 45.

Horace (Odes, iv, 2, 21), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Honey-cakes offered to the underworld, i, 13; v, 98; vii, 6.

Honey cakes for the underworld, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

ὥρια, ὡραῖα offered to the dead, v, 128.

hours, beautiful hours offered to the deceased, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Horse in the cult of the dead, v, 105.

Horse in the cult of the dead, v, 105.

Host, Furious, ii, 7; 298; xiii, 5; (593).

Host, Mad, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__; (__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__).

House, earliest place of burial, v, 66.

House, the oldest burial site, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

House-spirit, v, 132.

House spirit, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Human sacrifice, ix, 87; in the cult of Dionysos, 285; offered by Epimenides, ix, 121; in the cult of Heroes, xiv, ii, 49; replaced by animal sacrifice or ποινή, v, 144; 179–80.

Human sacrifice, ix, 87; in the cult of Dionysus, 285; offered by Epimenides, ix, 121; in the cult of Heroes, xiv, ii, 49; replaced by animal sacrifice or penalty, v, 144; 179–80.

Humanity: see Mankind.

Humanity: see __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Hunt: see Host.

Hunt: see Host.

Hyades, iii, 45.

Hyades, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Ὑακίνθια, 99 f.

Ὑακίνθια, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ f.

Hyakinthides, iii, 45.

Hyacinth, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Hyakinthos, 99 f.

Hyacinth, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ f.

Hydromantia, 589.

Hydromancy, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Hydrophoria at Athens, v, 98.

Hydrophoria in Athens, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Hylas, xiv, ii, 105.

Hylas, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Hylozoism, 365, 385, 432.

Hylozoism, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

ὑποφόνια, v, 154.

ὑποφόνια, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Iamblichos, Vit. Pythag., viii, 77.

Iamblichus, Life of Pythagoras, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Iakchos, 220 f.

Iakchos, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ f.

Ianthe, iii, 3.

Ianthe, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Iaso, iii, 56.

Iaso, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Iatromantic, 133.

Iatromantic, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Iatros, Hero, iv, 94–5; xiv, ii, 45.

Iatros, Hero, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__–5; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Iceland, i, 43.

Iceland, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Idaian cave in Crete, 96; 161.

Idaian cave in Crete, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Images, cult of, 136.

Images, cult of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Immortal = godlike (becoming god), in Homer, 57; = being a god, 253 f.

Immortal = godlike (becoming a god), in Homer, 57; = being a god, 253 f.

Immortality, Belief in, connected with Dionysiac religion, 263 f.; among Orphics, 343 f.; in Philosophy, 365 f.; 463 f.; 496; xiv, 60; in Popular Religion, 538 f.; 542; 546; doubts of, xiv, ii, 157. 616

Immortality, belief in, related to Dionysian religion, 263 f.; among Orphics, 343 f.; in Philosophy, 365 f.; 463 f.; 496; xiv, 60; in Popular Religion, 538 f.; 542; 546; doubts about, xiv, ii, 157. 616

Imprecations: see Curses.

Imprecations: see Curses.

Incas, i, 30.

Incas, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Incense in temples, viii, 39; ix, 19.

Incense in temples, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Incubation, iii, 8; 92; ix, 46; Heroic oracles of, 133.

Incubation, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__; Heroic oracles of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__.

Indians, Burial customs, 10, 21–2; cult of the dead, i, 75; v, 84–6, 90, 105, 123; Yama in Hades, vii, 6; religious anæsthesia, viii, 26; Yogis, viii, 43; kartharsis, ix, 78; Ascetics, 343; x, 78; philosophy (Jainism), xi, 16; (South American) mutilation of corpses, i, 34; (North American) cult of souls, v, 136.

Indians, burial customs, 10, 21–2; cult of the dead, i, 75; v, 84–6, 90, 105, 123; Yama in Hades, vii, 6; religious anesthesia, viii, 26; Yogis, viii, 43; catharsis, ix, 78; ascetics, 343; x, 78; philosophy (Jainism), xi, 16; (South American) mutilation of corpses, i, 34; (North American) cult of souls, v, 136.

Individualism, 117; 388 f.; 499 f.; 545.

Individualism, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ f.; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__ f.; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__.

Inheritance, laws of, v, 146.

Inheritance laws, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Ino Leukothea, 58; iv, 104.

Ino Leukothea, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Insanity: see Madness and Mental.

Insanity: see Madness and Mental.

Inscriptions (I.G. (xiv) Sic. et It. 641), xii, 49 f.; (IG. M. Aeg. i, 142), xiv, ii, 146; (Ath. Mitt.), xiv, ii, 164, 168.

Inscriptions (I.G. (xiv) Sic. et It. 641), xii, 49 f.; (IG. M. Aeg. i, 142), xiv, ii, 146; (Ath. Mitt.), xiv, ii, 164, 168.

Insensibility to pain, etc., in visionary states, viii, 43.

Numbness to pain, etc., in visionary states, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Inspiration, prophecy of, 92 f.; (in Thrace), 260; (in Greece), 289 f.

Inspiration, prophecy of, 92 f.; (in Thrace), 260; (in Greece), 289 f.

Intoxication, religious use of, viii, 39.

Religious use of intoxication, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Invisibility (in Homer), 56.

Invisibility (in Homer), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Iolaia in Thebes, iv, 21.

Iolaia in Thebes, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Ionia, 27 f.

Ionia, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ female.

Iphigeneia, 64, 66; xiv, ii, 99, 102.

Iphigeneia, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__.

Iphis, iii, 3.

Iphis, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Iron keeps away daimones and the dead, i, 72.

Iron keeps away spirits and the dead, i, 72.

Isaeus, v, 129.

Isaeus, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Ischys, iii, 56.

Ischys, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Isis, mysteries of, xiv, ii, 174.

Isis, mysteries of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Islands of the Blest (Hesiod). 68 f.; (Pindar), 415 f.; translation of Heroes to, xiv, ii, 99; dwelling-place of all the pious, xiv, ii, 100, 130 f.; discovered by sailors, xiv, ii, 101; identified with Leuke, xiv, ii, 99, 102.

Islands of the Blest (Hesiod). 68 f.; (Pindar), 415 f.; translation of Heroes to, xiv, ii, 99; home of all the virtuous, xiv, ii, 100, 130 f.; found by sailors, xiv, ii, 101; associated with Leuke, xiv, ii, 99, 102.

Isodaites, 271.

Isodaites, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Isokrates, vi, 22; ii, 43.

Isocrates, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Isthmian Games, iv, 22.

Isthmian Games, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Isyllos, iv, 2.

Isyllos, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Ixion, vii, 11.

Ixion, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Jainism (see Indian), xi, 16.

Jainism (see Indian), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Japan, cult of dead in, v, 99.

Japan, cult of the dead in, v, 99.

Jaws of the dead, binding up the, xiv, ii, 2.

Jaws of the dead, binding up the, xiv, ii, 2.

Jewish forgery of a Pindaric poem, xii, 45.

Jewish forgery of a Pindaric poem, xii, 45.

Jews, influenced by Greeks, xiv, ii, 14.

Jews, influenced by Greeks, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Jews influence Greeks, xiv, ii, 144.

Jews influence Greeks, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Judaeo-Hellenistic doctrine of the soul, xiv, ii, 117.

Judeo-Hellenistic beliefs about the soul, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Judgment in Hades, 238 f., 535 f., 541; Orphic, 344; Pindar, 415; Plato, xiii, 36.

Judgment in Hades, 238 f., 535 f., 541; Orphic, 344; Pindar, 415; Plato, xiii, 36.

Julian the Apostate, xiv, ii, 107, 144, 171.

Julian the Apostate, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Julius Kanus, xiv, 64.

Julius Kanus, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

jus talionis, x, 71.

an eye for an eye, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Justin, πρὸς Ἕλλ., 3, xiv, ii, 151. (The emendation πιδύσας is already mentioned, as I see too late, in the Mauriner edition of Justin Martyr. The apparently traditional ὅρη πηδήσας is indeed possible on grammatical grounds [analogous constructions, otherwise peculiar to poetry, are not unknown in prose: see Lobeck ad Aiac.3, p. 69–70], but provides no satisfactory sense.)

Justin, προς Ελλάδα., 3, xiv, ii, 151. (The correction πιδύσας has already been pointed out, though I realize this too late, in the Mauriner edition of Justin Martyr. The seemingly traditional mountain hopping is indeed possible based on grammatical grounds [similar constructions, which are usually unique to poetry, can be found in prose: see Lobeck ad Aiac.3, p. 69–70], but it doesn't provide a clear meaning.)

Ka of Egyptians, i, 5.

Ka of Egyptians, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Kadmos translated to Islands of the Blest, xiv, ii, 99.

Kadmos translated to Islands of the Blessed, xiv, ii, 99.

Kaiadas at Sparta, v, 32.

Kaiadas in Sparta, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Kaineus, iii, 3.

Kaineus, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Kalchas, iv, 96.

Kalchas, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Kalypso, xiv, ii, 105.

Kalypso, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Kanobos, iii, 43.

Kanobos, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Kanus Julius, xiv, 64.

Kanus Julius, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Kapaneus, 581 f.

Kapaneus, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ female.

Καρκώ, 592.

Karkô, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Karmanor, ix, 113.

Karmanor, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Karneades, xiv, 59, 61, 83.

Karneades, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

καρποῦν, v, 126.

καρποῦν, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Kassandra, viii, 52; ix, 65.

Kassandra, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

καταδεῖν, κατάδεσμος, κατάδεσις in magic, ix, 107; 604.

καταδεῖν, κατάδεσμος, κατάδεσις in magic, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

καθάρματα given up to the spirits, ix, 88 (cf. 81).

καθάρματα surrendered to the spirits, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ (cf. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__).

Kathartic practices, etc., v, 36; 180; vi, 18; vii, 15; 294 f.; 302; 378; 582; 585; 589 f.

Kathartic practices, etc., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__ f.; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_7__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_8__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_9__ f.

κάθαρσις μανίας (music), ix, 19; (of Pythagoreans), xi, 48; by Melampous, 287; Bakis, 294; Orphic, 338 f.; 343; Empedokles, xi, 85; Plato, 470.

catharsis of madness (music), ix, 19; (of Pythagoreans), xi, 48; by Melampous, 287; Bakis, 294; Orphic, 338 f.; 343; Empedokles, xi, 85; Plato, 470.

καθέδραι, festival of Souls, v, 86.

Souls Festival, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

κάτοχος, of magic, ix, 107.

magic holder, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

κάτοχοι, κατοχή, κατέχεσθαι, of “possession”, viii, 24, 44.

κάτοχοι, κατοχή, κατέχεσθαι, of “possession”, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Kattadias (Devil-priests of Ceylon), viii, 55.

Kattadias (Devil priests of Ceylon), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Kaukones, v, 12. 617

Kaukones, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__. 617

Kaunians, v, 99.

Kaunians, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Kausianoi, viii, 75, 77.

Kausianoi, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Kekrops, iii, 41.

Kekrops, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Keos, funeral ordinance from, v, 42, 52, 56, 74, 76-7, 87, 92, 135.

Keos, funeral ordinance from, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_7__.

Kerberos, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

κῆρες = souls, i, 10; v, 100; ix, 92.

κῆρες = souls, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Kerkops (Pythagorean), x, 7; 597.

Kerkops (Pythagorean), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Kerykes, vi, 6, 16.

Kerykes, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Key, keeper of, in Hades, vii, 13.

Key, the guardian of, in Hades, vii, 13.

Kikones of the Odyssey, 42.

Kikones from the Odyssey, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Kimon as Hero, 129.

Kimon as a Hero, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Kirke, 32; v, 169.

Kirke, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Kissing the hand to a grave, xiv, ii, 26–7.

Kissing a hand to a grave, xiv, ii, 26–7.

Kleanthes, xiv, 41, 47.

Kleanthes, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

κλειδοῦχοι θεοί, 247.

κλειδοῦχοι θεοί, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Kleisthenes, 124.

Kleisthenes, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Kleitos, 58.

Kleitos, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Kleobis and Biton, xiv, ii, 148.

Kleobis and Biton, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Kleombrotos, xiv, 3.

Kleombrotos, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Kleomedes (Hero), 129; xiv, ii, 114.

Kleomedes (Hero), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Kleomenes as Hero, xiv, ii, 59.

Kleomenes as Hero, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Klymenos = Hades, v, 8, 18; reduced to rank of Hero, iii, 34.

Klymenos = Hades, v, 8, 18; lowered to the status of Hero, iii, 34.

Knossos, 96; iii, 25.

Knossos, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Kore, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__ f.; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__.

Koronis, iii, 56.

Koronis, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Korybantism, viii, 36, 52; 286 f.

Korybantism, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__ f.

Kos (Ge), v, 16.

Kos (Ge), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Kotytto, 336.

Kotytto, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Kouretes, v, 167.

Kouretes, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

κωλύματα, magic spells, ix, 81.

obstacles, magic spells, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Kragos, iii, 30.

Kragos, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Krantor, xiv, 1.

Krantor, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Krataiis, 593.

Krataiis, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Krates (Cynic), v, 34.

Krates (Cynic), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Kratinos, vii, 17.

Kratinos, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Kratippos, 512.

Kratippos, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

κρείττονες = the dead, v, 65, 110, 117.

κρείττονες = the dead, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Krinagoras, vi, 22.

Krinagoras, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Kritias, Sisyphos, x, 54.

Kritias, Sisyphus, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Kritolaos, xiv, 32.

Kritolaos, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Krobyzoi, viii, 65, 75.

Krobyzoi, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Krokos, iii, 43.

Krokos, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Kronos, ruler in Elysium, 76.

Kronos, ruler in Elysium, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

κτέρεα κτερείζειν, i, 20, 29.

κτέρεα κτερείζειν, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Kybele, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__ f.; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__.

Kychreus (πυχρείδης ὄφις), iv, 129.

Kychreus (πυχρείδης ὄφις), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Kydas, ix, 66.

Kydas, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Kyffhäuser, legend of, 93; xiv, ii, 112.

Kyffhäuser legend, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Kylon, at Athens, ix, 120.

Kylon, in Athens, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Kyme, criminal law of, v, 145.

Kyme, criminal law of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Kypria, 64.

Kypria, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Labyadai, their funeral ordinance in Delphi, v, 52, 85, 128.

Labyadai, their funeral customs in Delphi, v, 52, 85, 128.

Lamentation disturbs the dead, v, 49.

Grief disturbs the dead, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Lamia, vii, 25; 592 f.

Lamia, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ f.

Lanterns, feast of in Japan, v, 99.

Lanterns, a festival in Japan, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Laodike, iii, 6.

Laodike, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Lar familiaris and Lares at Rome, v, 132.

Household gods and protective spirits at Rome, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Latinus, translation of, xiv, ii, 110.

Latinus, translated as __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Laurel, drives away ghosts, v, 95.

Laurel drives away ghosts, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Law, unwritten, 163, 426; xii, 94.

Law, informal, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Lebadeia, 90 f., 95; iii, 26; v, 19, 133; xiv, ii, 104.

Lebadeia, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ f., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__.

Lectisternia, iii, 26; iv, 16.

Lectisternia, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Lekythoi, v, 38; 169; 170; 237.

Lekythoi, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__.

Lemnos, feast of the dead in, ix, 76.

Lemnos, celebration for the deceased in, ix, 76.

Lemuria in Rome, v, 99.

Lemuria in Rome, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Leonidas (as Hero), iv, 20; 528.

Leonidas (as Hero), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Leosthenes (Hero), vii, 5; xiv, ii, 59.

Leosthenes (Hero), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Lerna, ix, 88; viii, 28.

Lerna, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Lethe, vii, 21; xii, 37; and Mnemosyne, fountains of, xiv, ii, 151.

Lethe, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; and Mnemosyne, sources of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Leto, iii, 46.

Leto, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Leuke, I. of Achilles, 65, 66; xiv, ii, 102; Cliff of, ib.

Leuke, I. of Achilles, 65, 66; xiv, ii, 102; Cliff of, ib.

Leukothea: see Ino.

Leukothea: see __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Lie, justification of, xii, 72.

Justification for lying, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Life, 3, 31; repudiation of, viii, 75; only lent, xiv, ii, 161; 505; Water of life, xiv, ii, 151–2; Future Life, 236 f.; see Hades and Ways.

Life, 3, 31; rejection of, viii, 75; only borrowed, xiv, ii, 161; 505; Water of life, xiv, ii, 151–2; Future Life, 236 f.; see Hades and Ways.

Lightning sanctifies its victim, iii, 39; 100; v, 68; ix, 127; xii, 54; xiv, ii, 154; 581 f.

Lightning sanctifies its victim, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__ f.

Linos, iii, 43.

Linos, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Lobeck, 222.

Lobeck, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Local deities and their cults, 25 f.; 27.

Local gods and their cults, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ f.; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

λόγος, 499; xiv, 69.

λόγος, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Lokroi, criminal law of, v, 145.

Lokroi, criminal law of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Lot, oracles received by means of (Delphi), 290.

Lot, oracles received from Delphi, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

λουτροφόροι, 587.

λουτροφόροι, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Lucian, iii, 28; 236; de Luctu, xiv, ii, 2; Philops., xiv, ii, 87, 144; ix, 96.

Lucian, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; On the Struggle, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__; Philops., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__.

Lucretius, 505.

Lucretius, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Lydia, v, 167.

Lydia, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Lying-in-state of the dead, 165.

Lying in state of the deceased, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Lykaios, Zeus, v, 170.

Lykaios, Zeus, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Lykas (Hero), iv, 114.

Lykas (Hero), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Lykia, imprecatory tablets from graves in, 553.

Lykia, curse tablets found in graves in, 553.

Lykian language, iv, 99.

Lycian language, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Lykos (Hero), iv, 114. 618

Lykos (Hero), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__. 618

Lykourgos, King of Edonians, ix, 3; in Sparta worshipped as Hero and God, 132; sanctified by lightning, 581.

Lykourgos, King of the Edonians, ix, 3; in Sparta worshipped as a Hero and God, 132; sanctified by lightning, 581.

Lyric poetry of the Greeks, 157; 411 f.

Greek lyric poetry, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ f.

Lysander as Hero, 531.

Lysander: The Hero, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Lysimachos (Hero), xiv, ii, 67.

Lysimachos (Hero), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

λύσιος Διόνυσος, ix, 21; λύσιοι θεοί, x, 50.

Lysios Dionysus, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; Lysioi gods, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

λύσις of the soul, x, 61, 66; xiii, 67.

λύσις of the soul, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Mâ, worshipped with ecstatic cult, viii, 43, 55.

Mâ, celebrated with joyful rituals, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Macedonians, viii, 31.

Macedonians, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Machaon and Podaleirios, iv, 92.

Machaon and Podaleirios, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Macriani, xiv, ii, 112.

Macriani, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Madness cured by magic, ix, 19, 81; cf. Mental diseases.

Madness treated with magic, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; see __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__ diseases.

Magical papyri, xiv, ii, 144; 589; 592; 604; cf. Defixiones.

Magical papyri, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__; cf. Defixiones.

Magicians, among savage peoples, 261 f.; Greek, 294 f., 298 f.; xi, 58; 533 f.; 604.

Magicians in primitive societies, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ f.; Greek, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ f., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__ f.; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__ f.; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__.

Mahâbhârata, iii, 3.

Mahabharata, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

μαινάς, 256.

μαινάς, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

ma karitis (of the deceased), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

μακάρων νῆσοι: see Islands of the Blest.

μakanûn nēsos: see __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ of the Blessed.

Manes, v, 99, 133.

Manes, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

μανία, divine, 255 f.; 286 f.; in the worship of Dionysos, 282 f.

fury, divine, 255 f.; 286 f.; in the worship of Dionysos, 282 f.

Manichaeans, x, 83.

Manichaeans, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Mankind, origin of, according to the Orphics, 341 f.; generations (Ages) of, in Hesiod, 67 f.

Mankind, origin of, according to the Orphics, 341 f.; generations (Ages) of, in Hesiod, 67 f.

μάντεις, ix, 41 f.; as magicians, ix, 68.

μάντεις, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ f.; as magicians, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Mantiké (inspired prophecy), 260, 289 f.

Mantiké (inspired prophecy), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ f.

Marathon, iv, 84; 136; Grave of the dead at, xiv, ii, 37.

Marathon, iv, 84; 136; Grave of the dead at, xiv, ii, 37.

Marjoram, kathartic, apotropaic uses of, v, 36.

Marjoram, used for cleansing and protection, v, 36.

Maron (Hero), xiv, ii, 41.

Maron (Hero), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

μασχαλισμός, 181; 582 f.

μασχαλισμός, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ f.

Massagetai, 259.

Massagetai, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Materialism, 385.

Materialism, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

“Matriarchy,” not Greek, xii, 75.

“Matriarchy,” not Greek, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Medea translation of, xiv, ii, 99; (v, 169).

Medea translation of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; (__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__).

Medicine men (North American Indians), 262; ix, 68, 117; dance of the Winnebago, viii, 55.

Medicine men (North American Indians), 262; ix, 68, 117; dance of the Winnebago, viii, 55.

μέγαρα, iii, 7.

μέγαρα, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

μειλίχοι θεοί, v, 168; Διόνυσος μειλίχιος, ix, 21.

gentle gods, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; Dionysus the Gentle, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Meilinoe, v, 5; ix, 96.

Meilinoe, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Melampous, 89; 287.

Melampous, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Melanippides, xii, 1, 21.

Melanippides, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Melesagoras, ix, 58.

Melesagoras, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Memnon, 64 f.

Memnon, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ female.

Menelaos (translation of), 55 f.; iv, 2; ii, 21.

Menelaus (translation of), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ f.; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Menestheus, iv, 100.

Menestheus, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Mental diseases, origin and cure of, 286 f.; ix, 19, 81.

Mental illnesses, their origins and treatments, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ f.; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Metal, noise of, drives away ghosts, i, 72; ix, 83; see Iron, Bronze.

Metal, the sound of it, scares away ghosts, i, 72; ix, 83; see Iron, Bronze.

Metamorphoses, iii, 3; x, 82.

Metamorphoses, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

μετεμψύχωσις, x, 84; see Transmigration.

metempsychosis, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; see Transmigration.

Metrodoros, allegorical interpretation of mythology, vi, 23.

Metrodoros, a symbolic take on mythology, vi, 23.

Metrodoros (Epicurean), xiv, 85, 86, 97.

Metrodoros (Epicurean), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

μὴ φῦναι, xii, 10.

μὴ φῦναι, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

μήνιμα θεῶν, v, 148; ἀλιτηρίων, v, 176.

μήνιμα θεῶν, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; ἀλιτηρίων, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

μίασμα, v, 176; 295 f.

μίασμα, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ f.

μιάστωρ, v, 178.

μιάστωρ, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Michael, the Archangel, iv, 96.

Michael, the Archangel, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Midas, 412.

Midas, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Mid-day, spectres appearing at, ix, 96; xiv, ii, 41; 592 f.

Midday, ghosts appearing at __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__ f.

Migrations, Greek, 27, 155, 161, 284.

Migrations, Greek, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__.

Milky Way (abode of the souls), ix, 111; xii, 44.

Milky Way (home of the souls), ix, 111; xii, 44.

Miltiades, as Hero, iv, 20.

Miltiades, as a hero, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Mimnermos, xii, 7.

Mimnermos, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Mind, 5, 29 f., 383, 387, 493 f.

Mind, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ f., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__ f.

Mingrelians, i, 30.

Mingrelians, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Minos (and Zeus, in Crete), 96; Judge in Hades, vii, 13.

Minos (and Zeus, in Crete), 96; Judge in the Underworld, vii, 13.

Minyas, vii, 3; 237, 238, 282.

Minyas, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__.

Miracle, 254; xiv, ii, 40–1, 45, 70; 537; desire for in later ages of antiquity, 546 f.

Miracle, 254; xiv, ii, 40–1, 45, 70; 537; desire for in later ages of antiquity, 546 f.

Missions, sent out from Eleusis, 161.

Missions, sent from Eleusis, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Mithras, Mysteries of, xiv, ii, 144, 153, 172, 174.

Mithras, Mysteries of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__.

Mitylene, funeral ordinance of, v, 54.

Mitylene, funeral service of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Mitys, iv, 118.

Mitys, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

μνήμη (Empedokles and Pythagorean), xi, 96; and λήθη in Hades (Pindar), xii, 37; xiv, ii, 151.

memory (Empedokles and Pythagorean), xi, 96; and forgetfulness in Hades (Pindar), xii, 37; xiv, ii, 151.

Mnemosyne, xii, 37; xiv, ii, 151.

Mnemosyne, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

μοῖρα, 29.

μοῖρα, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Moon and stars inhabited by souls, x, 75; xi, 116; xiv, 53.

Moon and stars filled with spirits, x, 75; xi, 116; xiv, 53.

Monism, 432; 500. 619

Monism, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__. 619

Mopsos, iii, 5, 13; 133.

Mopsos, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Morality, 40; 228; 294 f.; 302; 376.

Morality, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__ f.; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__.

Μορμολύκη, Μορμώ, vii, 25; 592.

Mormolyke, Mormo, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Moschion, x, 54.

Moschion, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Moses, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Motes in the sunbeam = Souls (Pythagoras), xi, 40; Emped. xi, 101.

Motes in the sunbeam = Souls (Pythagoras), xi, 40; Emped. xi, 101.

Mountains, legends about, 263; viii, 68.

Mountains, legends about, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Mourning, period of, 167.

Mourning period, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Mousaios, x, 70.

Mousaios, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

μύχιοι θεοί, iii, 35.

μύχιοι θεοί, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

μυεῖν, vi, 16.

μυεῖν, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Murderer, excluded from religious worship, vi, 17.

Murderer, banned from worship, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Murder, action for, religious sense of, 180 f.; expiation of, 174 f., 138; xii, 34, 40.

Murder, action for, religious feeling of, 180 f.; atonement for, 174 f., 138; xii, 34, 40.

Murder trials; see Homicide.

Murder trials; see Homicide.

Music in Dionysiac worship, 257; as a cure for Korybantic frenzy and other diseases, 286 f.; ix, 19; xi, 48.

Music in Dionysiac worship, 257; as a remedy for Korybantic frenzy and other ailments, 286 f.; ix, 19; xi, 48.

Musonius, v, 34; 503.

Musonius, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Mutterrecht, not Greek, xii, 75.

Maternity law, not Greek, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Mutilation of the dead, 582 f.

Mutilation of the dead, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ f.

Mycenae, 22, 27, 122.

Mycenae, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Mykonos (cult of Chthonic Zeus), v, 3, 7, 16.

Mykonos (cult of Chthonic Zeus), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Myrtle sacred to χθόνιοι, iv, 21; v, 40, 61.

Myrtle sacred to the chthonic, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Mysians, x, 78.

Mysians, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Mysteries: see Eleusinian M.; Orphic, 343 f.; Samothracian, vi, 34; (see also Isis and Mithras).

Mysteries: see Eleusinian M.; Orphic, 343 f.; Samothracian, vi, 34; (see also Isis and Mithras).

Mysticism, 225 f., 254 f., 262, 291 f., 344; xiii, 75, 104; xiv, 1.

Mysticism, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ f., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ f., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__ f., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_7__.

Myth, allegorical interpretation of, vi, 23.

Myth, symbolic interpretation of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Name, calling the dead by, 42, 527; of Hero used in sacrificing, iv, 62; in invocation of avenging spirits, 604.

Name, calling the dead by, 42, 527; of Hero used in sacrifice, iv, 62; in invoking avenging spirits, 604.

Nameless Gods, iv, 62; Heroes, 126 f.; 529; xiv, ii, 61, 63.

Nameless Gods, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; Heroes, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ f.; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__.

Namnites in Gaul, viii, 55.

Namnites in Gaul, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Narcissus (Orphic?), x, 29.

Narcissus (Orphic?), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

νάρθηξ, viii, 22.

νάρθηξ, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

National Heroes: see ἀρχηγοί.

National Heroes: see __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

“Nature,” religion of, 223 f.

“Nature,” religion of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ f.

Naulochos (Hero), xiv, ii, 74.

Naulochos (Hero), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Nectar, 58.

Nectar, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

nefasti dies, v, 158.

bad days, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Negro tribes, i, 34; v, 110; 271.

Black tribes, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Nekyia of the Odyssey, 32 f.; iii, 8; 237 f.; 240 f.; 2nd Nekyia, i, 62, 65; N. in other epics, 237 f., (see Descents); on vases, vii, 27.

Nekyia of the Odyssey, 32 f.; iii, 8; 237 f.; 240 f.; 2nd Nekyia, i, 62, 65; N. in other epics, 237 f., (see Descents); on vases, vii, 27.

νεκύσια, v, 92.

νεκύσια, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Nemea, iv, 22.

Nemea, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

νεμέσεια, νέμεσις, Νέμεσις, v, 91.

νεμέσεια, νέμεσις, Νέμεσις, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Neoplatonic writers, x, 27, 29, 38; 596 f.

Neoplatonic authors, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__ f.

Neoptolemos, translation of, xiv, ii, 99.

Neoptolemos, translation of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Nero, translated (Antichrist), xiv, ii, 113.

Nero, translated (Antichrist), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Neurotic diseases, cure of, 286 f.

Neurotic disorders, treatment of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ f.

New Zealand (method of burial), v, 67.

New Zealand (burial practices), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Nightmare, ix, 102; xiv, ii, 86.

Nightmare, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Nine, sanctity of number, v, 84; xiii, 45; xiv, ii, 154.

Nine, the sacred number, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Noise of bronze or iron drives away ghosts, i, 72; v, 167; ix, 83.

Noise of bronze or iron scares away ghosts, i, 72; v, 167; ix, 83.

Nostoi, 66 f.

Nostalgia, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ f.

Novel (Greek, etc.), iv, 134; xiv, ii, 87.

Novel (Greek, etc.), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Novemdialia: festival in Rome, v, 84.

Novemdialia: festival in Rome, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

νοῦς, in Anaxagoras, 387 f.; in Aristotle, 493 f.; cf. 383.

mind, in Anaxagoras, 387 f.; in Aristotle, 493 f.; see 383.

Numbers (Pythagorean mystical theory of), x, 9.

Numbers (Pythagorean mysticism), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Nyktelios, Nyktelia, viii, 28; 285; ix, 36.

Nyktelios, Nyktelia, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

νυμφόληπτος, ix, 63.

νυμφόληπτος, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

ἐκ νυμφῶν κάτοχος, ix, 58.

ἐκ νυμφῶν κάτοχος, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Nymphs, agents of Translation, xiv, ii, 105.

Nymphs, agents of translation, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Oath, religio-juristic significance of, 41 f.; v, 156; 238; xi, 77; xii, 40.

Oath, legal and religious significance of, 41 f.; v, 156; 238; xi, 77; xii, 40.

Oath-breaking punished in Hades; see Perjury.

Oath-breaking punished in Hades; see Perjury.

Oath taken by both parties in a suit, v, 156.

Oath taken by both parties in a lawsuit, v, 156.

Obolos for the ferryman of the dead: see Charon.

Obol for the ferryman of the dead: see Charon.

Ocrisia, v, 132.

Ocrisia, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Odyssey, 32 f., 55, 62 f., 236; 2nd Nekyia, i, 62, 65.

Odyssey, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ f., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__ f., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__; 2nd Nekyia, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__.

Odysseus, end of, ii, 30; oracle of, iv, 97; as Hero, xiv, ii, 41; O. and Kalypso, xiv, ii, 105.

Odysseus, end of, ii, 30; oracle of, iv, 97; as Hero, xiv, ii, 41; O. and Kalypso, xiv, ii, 105.

Oedipus, 430 f.; xii, 85, 112 f.

Oedipus, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ f.; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__ f.

Oikistes, 127 f.

Oikistes, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ f.

Oinomaos, iv, 2.

Oinomaos, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Oknos, 241.

Oknos, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Olbia, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__. 620

Olive, kathartic effects of, v, 367, 61; ix, 72.

Olive, cleansing effects of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__–__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__.

Olympos as dwelling-place of souls, xiv, ii, 135.

Olympos as a home for souls, xiv, ii, 135.

Olympia, iv, 22, 62; 121, 160; v, 98.

Olympia, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__.

ὠμοθετεῖν, 584 f.

ὠμοθετεῖν, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ f.

ὀμφαλός at Delphi, iii, 31.

ὀμφαλός at Delphi, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Onomakritos, 336–7, 338 f.; (the Lokrian), ix, 113.

Onomakritos, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__–7, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ f.; (the Lokrian), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Oracles of Heroes, 133 f.; of Earth, 160; see Delphi, Dodona, Incubation.

Oracles of Heroes, 133 f.; of Earth, 160; see Delphi, Dodona, Incubation.

Orators, Greek, 413.

Greek Orators, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Orators’ official speeches of consolation, xiv, ii, 6.

Orators’ formal condolence speeches, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Orestes, iv, 35; 178; 424, 426.

Orestes, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__.

Orgeones, 124.

Orgeones, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Orgiastic cults in Greece, ix, 56; in Thessaly and Phrygia, 257.

Orgiastic cults in Greece, ix, 56; in Thessaly and Phrygia, 257.

Orient influenced by Greece, 539.

Orient influenced by Greece, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Origen, c. Cels., iii, 20; xiv, 33.

Origen, c. Cels., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Orion, 39; 58.

Orion, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Oropos, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__.

Orpheus, κατάβασις εἰς Ἅιδου, vii, 3, 27; x, 60; of Kamarina, x, 7; of Kroton, x, 7, 11.

Orpheus, the journey to Hades, vii, 3, 27; x, 60; from Kamarina, x, 7; from Kroton, x, 7, 11.

Orphics, v, 99; 124; vi, 13; vii, 15, 18; 335 f.; xii, 137; xiii, 44; 70a; 586; alleged influence in Homer, x, 5.

Orphics, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__ f.; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_7__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_8__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_9__; claimed influence on Homer, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_10__.

Orphic cult of Bakchos, x, 1; poetry, authorship of, x, 7; Rhapsodical Theogony, ix, 123; 339–40; 596 f.; other Theogonies, x, 21; origin of mankind in, 339 f.; x, 77; six Rulers of the world, x, 40; Asceticism, 342 f.; kathartic doctrine, 338; ideas of Hades, 344 f.; doctrine of rebirth and Transmigration of souls, 345 f.; grave-tablets (Sicily), 417 f.; xiv, ii, 151; 598, 601; Hymns, xiv, ii, 173.

Orphic cult of Bakchos, x, 1; poetry, authorship of, x, 7; Rhapsodical Theogony, ix, 123; 339–40; 596 f.; other Theogonies, x, 21; origin of mankind in, 339 f.; x, 77; six Rulers of the world, x, 40; Asceticism, 342 f.; kathartic doctrine, 338; ideas of Hades, 344 f.; doctrine of rebirth and Transmigration of souls, 345 f.; grave-tablets (Sicily), 417 f.; xiv, ii, 151; 598, 601; Hymns, xiv, ii, 173.

Orphica (fr. 120). x, 22; (fr. 226), x, 48.

Orphica (fr. 120). __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; (fr. 226), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Orphico-Pythagorean Hymnus on Number, x, 9.

Orphic-Pythagorean Hymn on Number, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Ὀρτυγίη, ii, 25.

Ὀρτυγίη, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Os resectum of the Romans, i, 34.

Os resectum of the Romans, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

ὅσιοι, the Pure, vi, 18; 343.

ὅσιοι, the Pure, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Osiris, xiv, ii, 152.

Osiris, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Ostiaks, religious dances of the, viii, 55.

Ostiaks, their religious dances, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

ὀξυθύμια, 216; ix, 88.

ὀξυθύμια, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

οὐκ ἤμην, γενόμην κτλ. on epitaphs, xiv, ii, 167.

οὐκ ἤμην, γενόμην κτλ. on epitaphs, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Ouranos, x, 28.

Ouranos, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Paetus Thrasea, xiv, 64.

Paetus Thrasea, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Palamedes, xiv, ii, 41.

Palamedes, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Palaimon, iii, 38.

Palaimon, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

παλαμναῖος, v, 178.

παλαμναῖος, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

παλιγγενεσία, 224; vii, 21; x, 47, 81, 84; 519; xiv, i, 68, 142; 547.

παλιγγενεσία, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_7__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_8__.

Pan, ix, 56.

Pan, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Panaitios, xiv, 24; 501 f.

Panaitios, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ f.

Pandaemonism, 519.

Pandaemonium, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Pandareos, daughters of, ii, 5.

Pandareos, daughters of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Pantheism, 261, 498 f.; xiv, 60; 504.

Pantheism, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ f.; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__.

Panchatantra, iv, 134.

Panchatantra, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Paradise, imaginary, in Hades, vii, 18.

Paradise, imaginary, in Hades, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

παραμυθητικὰ ψηφίσματα, xiv, ii, 6.

Supportive resolutions, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Pardon for Homicide, v, 144, 151, 154.

Pardon for Murder, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Parentalia in Rome, v, 90.

Parentalia in Rome, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Parmenides, 372; 408; 597.

Parmenides, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Parsley used in cult of the dead, iv, 22; v, 40, 107.

Parsley was used in rituals for the dead, iv, 22; v, 40, 107.

Pasiphaë, iv, 104.

Pasiphaë, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

πάτραι, iv, 49; v, 131; in Rhodos, iv, 52.

πάτραι, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; in Rhodes, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Patroklos, Funeral of, 12 f.; Translation of, xiv, ii, 102.

Patroclus, Funeral of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ f.; Translation of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

πατρομύστης, 602.

πατρομύστης, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Pausanias, Spartan King, v, 173; Periegeta, 126; 529; (4, 32, 1) 554; Doctor (pupil of Empedokles), 378; xi, 61.

Pausanias, Spartan King, v, 173; Periegeta, 126; 529; (4, 32, 1) 554; Doctor (student of Empedocles), 378; xi, 61.

Pehuenchen Indians (S. America), i, 26.

Pehuenchen Indians (S. America), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Peirithoös, vii, 3.

Peirithoös, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Pelasgians, v, 18.

Pelasgians, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Peleus, Translation of, xiv, ii, 99.

Peleus, Translation of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Pellichos, xiv, ii, 45.

Pellichos, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Pelops, 121; iv, 37.

Pelops, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Penates, v, 132–3.

Penates, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__–3.

Penitents undergoing punishment in Hades, 40 f., 238, 241; vii, 27.

Penitents facing punishment in Hades, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ f., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__.

Pentheus, 283.

Pentheus, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

περίδειπνον, 167.

περίδειπνον, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

περικάθαρμα, 589.

περικάθαρμα, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

περιμάττειν, 590.

περιμάττειν, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Perjury punished in Hades, 41 f.; v, 156; 238; xi, 77; xii, 40.

Perjury is punished in Hades, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ f.; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__.

Peripatetics, 512.

Peripatetics, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

περιψῆν, 589.

περιψῆν, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Persephone, 158 f.; v, 5; 160 f.; 220; 222 f.; and see Koré.

Persephone, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ f.; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__ f.; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__ f.; and see Koré.

Perseus and the Mainades, ix, 3.

Perseus and the Maenads, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Persian War, Heroizing of those who fell in, 131.

Persian War, Honoring those who died in it, 131.

Persians, i, 5; 10; 22; v, 85–6; kathartic practice among, ix, 78.

Persians, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__–6; cleansing practice among, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__.

Persinos of Miletos, x, 7.

Persinos of Miletus, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Persius, i, 31; 504. 621

Persius, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__. 621

Personality, reduplication of, 595 f.; cf. ἔκστασις.

Personality duplication, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ f.; cf. ἔκστασις.

Peru, religious dances in, viii, 55.

Peru, religious dances in, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Pessimism, 412, 545.

Pessimism, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Petelia, grave tablet from, 417 f., 601 f., 598.

Petelia, serious tablet from, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ f., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ f., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Phaeacians, 63; ii, 17, 46.

Phaeacians, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Phaënnis, ix, 59.

Phaënnis, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Phaëthon, iii, 35.

Phaëthon, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Phanes, x, 9; 598.

Phanes, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Pharisees, xi, 50.

Pharisees, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

φαρμακοί, ix, 87; 589 f.

φαρμακοί, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ f.

φάσματα Ἑκατικά, 590 f.

φάσματα Ἑκατικά, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ f.

Pherekrates, comic poet, vii, 17.

Pherekrates, comedic poet, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Pherekydes, 301; x, 79; xi, 51; vi, 25; 597.

Pherekydes, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__.

Philippos of Opos, author of Epinomis, xiv, 1.

Philippos of Opos, author of Epinomis, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Philiskos, xii, 157.

Philiskos, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Philo Judaeus, xiv, ii, 117; (ap. Gal. xiii, 268), iii, 43.

Philo Judaeus, xiv, ii, 117; (referenced in Gal. xiii, 268), iii, 43.

Philodamos of Skarpheia, his Hymn to Dionysos, vi, 9.

Philodamos of Skarpheia, his Hymn to Dionysus, vi, 9.

Philolaos, x, 44; xi, 35–6, 50, 55.

Philolaos, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__–6, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__.

Philopoimen, as Hero, xiv, ii, 49.

Philopoimen, as a Hero, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Philopregmon (Hero), 529.

Philopregmon (Hero), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Philosophy, 362 f.; 432 f.; 463 f.; 490 f.

Philosophy, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ f.; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ f.; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__ f.; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__ f.

Philostratos, Heroikos, xiv, ii, 41; V. Apoll., xiv, ii, 115.

Philostratus, Heroikos, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; V. Apoll., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

φιμοῦν, φιμωτικόν, 604.

φιμοῦν, φιμωτικόν, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Phokion, v, 66.

Phokion, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Pseudo-Phokylides, xiv, ii, 117.

Pseudo-Phocylides, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Phormion, of Sparta, ix, 111.

Phormion, from Sparta, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Phratriai in Athens, 124 f.

Phratries in Athens, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ f.

Phrygians, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__.

Phylai in Athens, 124 f.

Phylai in Athens, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ f.

Pig, in cult of the dead, v, 105.

Pig, in the cult of the dead, v, 105.

Pitch, kathartic property of, v, 95; ix, 72.

Pitch, its therapeutic quality, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Piety of the Greeks, 28 f.

Greek Piety, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ f.

Piety towards the dead, 16, 164, 169.

Respect for the dead, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Pindar, 7, 115, 157; vi, 22; 238; 412; 414 f.; (O. 2, 57), xii, 35; (O. 2, 61), xii, 38; (P. 8, 57), iv, 105; (fr. 129–30), xii, 37; (fr. 132), xii, 45; (fr. 133), xii, 34, 41.

Pindar, 7, 115, 157; vi, 22; 238; 412; 414 f.; (O. 2, 57), xii, 35; (O. 2, 61), xii, 38; (P. 8, 57), iv, 105; (fr. 129–30), xii, 37; (fr. 132), xii, 45; (fr. 133), xii, 34, 41.

πίθος τετρημένος in Hades, 586 f.

πίθος τετρημένος in Hades, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ f.

Pittakos of Mitylene, v, 54.

Pittakos of Mitylene, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Pixodaros (Hero), xiv, ii, 63.

Pixodaros (Hero), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Plato, ix, 107; 383; xi, 96; 463 f.; xiv, ii, 108; 547; Beauty in 473; influence of, on popular belief, xiv, ii, 143; doctrine of Ideas, 470 f.; different strata of the Republic, xiii, 8; 474; Laws, xiii, 36, 37; 476; Gorgias, vii, 13; xiii, 36, 96; Meno, xiii, 100; Phaedo, xiii, 36; 468 f.

Plato, ix, 107; 383; xi, 96; 463 f.; xiv, ii, 108; 547; Beauty in 473; influence of, on popular belief, xiv, ii, 143; doctrine of Ideas, 470 f.; different strata of the Republic, xiii, 8; 474; Laws, xiii, 36, 37; 476; Gorgias, vii, 13; xiii, 36, 96; Meno, xiii, 100; Phaedo, xiii, 36; 468 f.

Plants with souls, xi, 72, 82; 382; xi, 117; xiii, 40.

Plants with souls, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__.

οἱ πλείους, the dead, xiv, ii, 124.

the most, the dead, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Plotinos, 547 f.

Plotinos, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ f.

Plouton, iii, 34; 160.

Pluto, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

πλουτώνια, v, 23.

ploutonia, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Plutarch, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__.

Pluto, iii, 34; 160.

Pluto, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

πνεῦμα = soul, xii, 150; 498; 541 f.

πνεῦμα = spirit, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__ f.

Podaleirios, iii, 13; 133.

Podaleirios, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

ποινή for homicide, in Homer, 175; forbidden, v, 154; and see Murder.

punishment for murder, in Homer, 175; prohibited, v, 154; and see Murder.

Polemon, xiv, 1.

Polemon, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Polemokrates (Hero), iv, 93.

Polemokrates (Hero), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Politics, Epicurean withdrawal from, 506 f.

Politics, Epicurean retreat from, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ f.

Pollution, 294 f.

Pollution, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ f.

πολυάνδριοι δαίμονες, 604.

πολυάνδριοι δαίμονες, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Polyaratos, ix, 111.

Polyaratos, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Polybios, 492.

Polybios, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Polyboia, 100.

Polyboia, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Polygnotos’ picture of Hades, 241 f.; 586.

Polygnotos’ painting of Hades, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ f.; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Polynesians, v, 161.

Polynesians, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Pomegranate in the cult of the dead, v, 105.

Pomegranate in the worship of the dead, v, 105.

Pomptilla, grave in Sardinia, xiv, ii, 71.

Pomptilla, serious in Sardinia, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Poplar in the cult of the dead, v, 61; xiv, ii, 102.

Poplar in the worship of the dead, v, 61; xiv, ii, 102.

Popular belief about the dead, 524.

Common belief about the dead, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Popular version of “Translation”, xiv, ii, 105.

Popular version of “Translation”, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Poseidonios, x, 78; xi, 35, 55; xiv, 40, 44, 51, 53–4; 502; xiv, 60–2.

Poseidonios, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__–4; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_7__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_8__–2.

Possession, 255; 595; see ἔκστασις.

Possession, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; see ἔκστασις.

Possessions of the dead burnt with the body, i, 30, 51.

Possessions of the dead were burned with the body, i, 30, 51.

Postponement of coming events by the gods, ix, 120.

Postponement of upcoming events by the gods, ix, 120.

Poulytion, 222.

Pollution, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Praetextatus, xiv, ii, 172.

Praetextatus, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Praise of the dead at the περίδειπνον, v, 81.

Praise of the dead at the feast, v, 81.

Pre-existence: see Soul.

Pre-existence: see Soul.

Prophecy by Incubation (dream-oracles), 92 f., 289 f.; by Heroes, 133; in Thracian worship of Dionysos, 260; two kinds of (τεχνική and ἄτεχνος), 289; by “inspiration”, 289 f.; at Delphi, 289 f.; in Greek 622 worship of D., 289 f.; wandering prophets, 292 f.; by means of lots at Delphi, 289; in Leuke, xiv, ii, 102.

Prophecy by Incubation (dream-oracles), 92 f., 289 f.; by Heroes, 133; in Thracian worship of Dionysos, 260; two types of (technique and unskilled), 289; by “inspiration”, 289 f.; at Delphi, 289 f.; in Greek 622 worship of D., 289 f.; wandering prophets, 292 f.; by means of lots at Delphi, 289; in Leuke, xiv, ii, 102.

Prodikos of Keos, vi, 23; of Phokaia, vii, 3; of Samos, vii, 3; x, 7.

Prodikos of Keos, vi, 23; of Phokaia, vii, 3; of Samos, vii, 3; x, 7.

Proërosia, ix, 108.

Proërosia, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Proitides, 282, 287.

Proitides, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Proklidai, iv, 53.

Proklidai, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Prophecy: see Mantiké.

Prophecy: see __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Prophetic power of the dying, i, 69.

Prophetic power of the dying, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

προσφάγιον, v, 46.

προσφάγιον, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

προστρόπαιος, v, 148, 176.

προστρόπαιος, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Protagoras, 438.

Protagoras, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Protesilaos, iv, 98.

Protesilaus, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Proteus in the Odyssey, 55.

Proteus in the Odyssey, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

πρόθεσις of the corpse, 164 (v, 41 f.).

πρόθεσις of the corpse, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ (__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ f.).

Proverbs, Greek, v, 120; xii, 3; 586.

Proverbs, Greek, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Prussia, cult of the dead in, v, 99, 114.

Prussia, the worship of the dead in, v, 99, 114.

ψυχή in Homer, 4 f.; 30 f.; 364 f.; = alter ego, 6; in Pindar, xii, 32; in Philosophy, 364 f.; situated in eye or mouth, i, 25; = Life, i, 59; xi, 1.

soul in Homer, 4 f.; 30 f.; 364 f.; = other self, 6; in Pindar, xii, 32; in Philosophy, 364 f.; located in the eye or mouth, i, 25; = Life, i, 59; xi, 1.

ψυχαγωγός, ix, 106.

ψυχαγωγός, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Psyche (of Apuleius), xiv, ii, 151.

Psyche (of Apuleius), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Psychology, Homeric, 30 f.; of the philosophers, 364 f.

Psychology, Homeric, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ f.; of the philosophers, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ f.

ψυχομαντεῖα, v, 23.

ψυχομαντεῖα, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

ψυχπομπεῖα, v, 23.

ψυχπομπεῖα, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

ψυχοστασία, v, 100.

ψυχοστασία, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Punishment of guilty through descendants, xii, 7, 65; xiv, ii, 96.

Punishing the guilty through their descendants, xii, 7, 65; xiv, ii, 96.

Purification: see Kathartic, κάθαρσις; after a funeral, v, 77; [after seeing a corpse: Jul., Ep. 77, p. 601, 20 f. H.]; carried out by ἐξηγηταί, v, 139; of murderers, 179 f.; 295; (this not Homeric), v, 166; ritual, in daily life, 295; of the new-born, ib.; by blood, 296; by fire, 21; by running water, 588 f.; removal of the polluting substance with figs or eggs, 589 f.

Purification: see Kathartic, catharsis; after a funeral, v, 77; [after seeing a corpse: Jul., Ep. 77, p. 601, 20 f. H.]; carried out by interpreters, v, 139; of murderers, 179 f.; 295; (this not Homeric), v, 166; ritual, in daily life, 295; of the new-born, ib.; by blood, 296; by fire, 21; by running water, 588 f.; removal of the polluting substance with figs or eggs, 589 f.

“Pure, the,” vi, 18; 343.

“Pure, the,” __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Purgation in Plato, xiii, 36.

Purgation in Plato, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Purple (Red) colour proper to the dead, v, 61.

Purple (Red) color associated with the dead, v, 61.

Pythagoras, 374 f.; xii, 150; and Zalmoxis, viii, 68; and Abaris, ix, 108, 122; his previous births, 598 f.; descent to Hades, 600 f.

Pythagoras, 374 f.; xii, 150; and Zalmoxis, viii, 68; and Abaris, ix, 108, 122; his past lives, 598 f.; journey to the underworld, 600 f.

Pythagoreans, suicide, v, 33; bury the body on leaves, v, 61; and Orphics in Herodotos, 336; x, 8; in Athens, 337; psychology, xi, 55; Transmigration-doctrine, x, 79, 81; xi, 42; xiii, 40; ψυχή (Alkmaion), xi, 28, 35; and Parmenides, xi, 30; Empedokles and P. ἀνάμνησις, xi, 96; Υ Pythag., xii, 62; and Plato (divisions of the soul), xiii, 27; (transmigration of the soul), xiii, 40; and the Stoics (souls in the air), xiv, 53.

Pythagoreans, suicide, v, 33; bury the body on leaves, v, 61; and Orphics in Herodotos, 336; x, 8; in Athens, 337; psychology, xi, 55; Transmigration-doctrine, x, 79, 81; xi, 42; xiii, 40; soul (Alkmaion), xi, 28, 35; and Parmenides, xi, 30; Empedokles and P. memory, xi, 96; Υ Pythag., xii, 62; and Plato (divisions of the soul), xiii, 27; (transmigration of the soul), xiii, 40; and the Stoics (souls in the air), xiv, 53.

Pythia, viii, 52–3; ix, 45; 289 f.; 596.

Pythia, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__–3; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__ f.; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__.

Pythian Games, iv, 22.

Pythian Games, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Python, 97; 180 f.

Python, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ f.

Quietism, 380.

Quietism, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Ram, in cult of the dead, v, 105, 107; as expiatory sacrifice, v, 167.

Ram, in the cult of the dead, v, 105, 107; as a sacrificial offering for atonement, v, 167.

Rationalism among the Greeks, 29 f.; 122; 492; 545.

Rationalism in Greek culture, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ f.; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__.

Rebirth (see παλιγγενεσία), xiv, ii, 174; 602.

Rebirth, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Recurrence, periodical, of everything, x, 47; xiv, 68.

Recurrence, periodic, of everything, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Red colour belonging to the dead, v, 61.

Red color belonging to the dead, v, 61.

Reduplication of Personality, 595 f.

Reduplication of Personality, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ f.

Regilla, wife of Herodes Atticus, xiv, ii, 71, 131.

Regilla, the wife of Herodes Atticus, xiv, ii, 71, 131.

Relatives obliged to prosecute vendetta, v, 141.

Relatives must seek revenge, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

“Release” of man from fate, etc., 342 f.; xi, 50; 384.

“Release” of man from fate, etc., 342 f.; xi, 50; 384.

Religion, Homeric, 28 f.; of “Nature” 223 f.; Symbolic, ib.

Religion, Homeric, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ f.; of “Nature” __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ f.; Symbolic, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__

Relics, cult of, iv, 2; 121 f.; 529.

Relics, cult of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ f.; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Responsibility, moral, in Tragedy (Aesch.), 423 f.

Responsibility, moral, in Tragedy (Aesch.), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ p.

Resurrection of the body, xiv, ii, 174.

Body resurrection, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Revenge and Vendetta, circle of those expected to carry it out (in Homer), v, 141; Vend. bought off (in Homer), v, 143; this later forbidden, v, 154; Vend. in Tragedy, 424 f., 434.

Revenge and Vendetta, the group of people who are supposed to carry it out (in Homer), v, 141; Vend. paid off (in Homer), v, 143; this later prohibited, v, 154; Vend. in Tragedy, 424 f., 434.

Rewards and punishments transmitted to descendants, xii, 65 (x, 47); exact equivalence, x, 71; xi, 44; in Hades, 40–1; 239 f.; 467 f.; 536.

Rewards and punishments passed down to future generations, xii, 65 (x, 47); strict equivalence, x, 71; xi, 44; in Hades, 40–1; 239 f.; 467 f.; 536.

Right and left, significance of, in Hades, xii, 62.

Right and left, significance of, in Hades, xii, 62.

Rhadamanthys, 55 f.; ii, 17, 23; 247; xiv, ii, 132.

Rhadamanthys, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ f.; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__.

ῥάμνος, kathartic uses of, v, 95; xi, 85.

ῥάμνος, cleansing uses of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Rhea: see Kybele.

Rhea: check __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Rhesos, iv, 36; 557. 623

Rhesos, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__. 623

Rock graves, v, 62, 66.

Rock graves, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Rome, genius, i, 5; v, 132; marriage ceremonies, v, 95; Lares, v, 66, 132; Lemuria, v, 99; Manes, ib.; v, 133; Novemdialia, v, 83–4; os resectum, i, 34; Parentalia, v, 90; Penates, v, 132–3; Cult of Souls in, v, 114; Cremation, i, 37, 39.

Rome, genius, i, 5; v, 132; wedding ceremonies, v, 95; Lares, v, 66, 132; Lemuria, v, 99; Manes, ib.; v, 133; Novemdialia, v, 83–4; os resectum, i, 34; Parentalia, v, 90; Penates, v, 132–3; Cult of Souls in, v, 114; Cremation, i, 37, 39.

Romans, admitted to Eleusinian Mysteries, 226.

Romans, allowed into the Eleusinian Mysteries, 226.

Romulus, translation of, xiv, ii, 103, 107, 110.

Romulus, translated by __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Sabazios (Sabos), viii, 10.

Sabazios (Sabos), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

σάβος, σαβάζιος, viii, 32.

σάβος, σαβάζιος, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Σαβάζια in Athens, x, 12.

Σαβάζια in Athens, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Sabazios Mysteries (late), xiv, ii, 174.

Sabazios Mysteries (late), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Sacrifice at graves, 167, 169; made to Heroes before gods, iii, 46; kathartic, 585.

Sacrifice at graves, 167, 169; offered to Heroes before the gods, iii, 46; cleansing, 585.

Salamis, 136 f.

Salamis, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ ft.

Salmoneus, 581.

Salmoneus, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Samothrace, Mysteries of, vi, 34.

Samothrace, Mysteries of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Sappho, xii, 12

Sappho, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__

Sarpedon, ii, 28; iv, 99.

Sarpedon, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Satrai, viii, 53.

Satrai, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Scapegoat, ix, 87.

Scapegoat, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Schelling, 223.

Schelling, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Scheriê, ii, 46.

Scheriê, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Schol. Aristoph. Vesp. 1038, ix, 102.

Schol. Aristoph. Vesp. 1038, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Scythians, 259; ix, 15; x, 78.

Scythians, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Second sight, 260; 293 (see ἔκστασις).

Second sight, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ (see ἔκστασις).

Second-sight of the dying, i, 69.

Second sight of the dying, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Secret cults, 219.

Secret cults, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Sects, Orphic, 335.

Sects, Orphic, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Seers, ecstatic: see μάντεις and Prophecy.

Seers, ecstatic: see __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ and __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Seirenes, ix, 102; 593.

Seirenes, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

σέλινον sacred to the dead, v, 40, 107.

σέλινον sacred to the dead, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Σέλλοι, iii, 14.

Σέλλοι, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Semele, 581.

Semele, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Seminoles of Florida, i, 25.

Florida Seminoles, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Semitic influence on Greeks, 60; 96.

Semitic influence on Greeks, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Semonides (Simonides of Amorgos), xii, 4, 8, 15.

Semonides (Simonides of Amorgos), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Seneca, xiv, 41, 56, 68; 503.

Seneca, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__.

Sertorius, his search for the Islands of the Blest, xiv, ii, 101.

Sertorius, his quest for the Islands of the Blessed, xiv, ii, 101.

Severus Alexander, xiv, ii, 112.

Severus Alexander, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Servius ad. Aen. vi, 324 (Poeta Anon.), xi, 77.

Servius ad. Aen. vi, 324 (Poeta Anon.), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Sex, changes of, in legend, iii, 3.

Sex, changes in, in myth, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Shamans, viii, 43; 262.

Shamans, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Sheep (or Ram), v, 105, 107, 167.

Sheep (or Ram), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Sibyls, viii, 52; 292 f.; 596.

Sibyls, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ f.; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Sicily, xii, 47; 417 f.

Sicily, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ f.

Sikyon (limitation on the length of epitaphs), xiv, ii, 118.

Sikyon (limit on the length of epitaphs), xiv, ii, 118.

Silenus, legend of, xii, 10 (viii, 15, 31).

Silenus, legend of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ (__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__).

Silence in passing graves, v, 110.

Silence among passing graves, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Simonides of Keos, xii, 1, 3, 11.

Simonides of Keos, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Sin, 294 f., 343, 381, (Plato) 466; consciousness of, 242.

Sin, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ f., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, (Plato) __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__; awareness of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__.

Sisyphos, i, 82; 241; vii, 27.

Sisyphus, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Sit tibi terra levis, xiv, ii, 120.

Rest in peace, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Sithon, iii, 3.

Sithon, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Sitting (not reclining) at feasts in honour of the dead, v, 86.

Sitting (not lounging) at gatherings to honor the deceased, v, 86.

Skedasos, daughters of, xiv, ii, 35.

Skedasos, daughters of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Skeletons, the dead as, xiv, ii, 92.

Skeletons, the dead as, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

σκίλλα, kathartic property of, ix, 115; xi, 85; 589 f.

σκίλλα, cleansing quality of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__ f.

Skiron, v, 168.

Skiron, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Skotos, vii, 6.

Skotos, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Skylla (daughter of Hekate), 593.

Skylla (daughter of Hecate), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Slaves admitted to initiation at the Mysteries, vi, 14; when freed, bound to keep up the cult of their dead master, v, 128.

Slaves allowed to join the Mysteries, vi, 14; once freed, required to maintain the worship of their deceased master, v, 128.

Slavonic cult of souls, v, 161.

Slavic soul cult, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Sleep and Death, ii, 28; Death only Sleep, xiv, ii, 140; of the Gods, iii, 30; “Temple-sleep”: see Incubation.

Sleep and Death, ii, 28; Death just Sleep, xiv, ii, 140; of the Gods, iii, 30; “Temple-sleep”: see Incubation.

Snakes, form in which χθόνιοι appear, iii, 12, 33; 98; iii, 55; iv, 129; v, 105, 113, 133, 168; 602.

Snakes, the form in which χθόνιοι appear, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_7__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_8__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_9__.

Societies: see Associations.

Societies: see __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Sokrates, 463.

Socrates, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Solon, date of archonship, ix, 120; as Hero, iv, 38; limits funeral pomp, 4, 45, 57, 75; protects the memory of the dead, v, 115; his view of life, xii, 6; and Croesus, xiv, ii, 170.

Solon, year of leadership, ix, 120; as Hero, iv, 38; restricts funeral displays, 4, 45, 57, 75; honors the memory of the deceased, v, 115; his perspective on life, xii, 6; and Croesus, xiv, ii, 170.

Sorcery: see Magic and Conjuration of the dead.

Sorcery: see Magic and __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ of the dead.

Sortilege, oracle of at Delphi, 290.

Divination, oracle at Delphi, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Soul = breath (πνεῦμα), 500 f.; xiv, ii, 138; represented on lekythoi as winged, 170; Pre-existence of, taught by Pythagoras, xi, 49; by Plato, 465 f.; Aristotle, 495 f.; Stoics, xiv, 60; by Jews under Greek influence, xiv, ii, 117; Soul and Mind, in Aristotle, 496; “Poor Souls,” v, 114; x, 66; Souls become daimones (Hesiod), 67 f.; transition from Soul to daimon, v, 133, 148; 179; v, 176; assist growth of crops, v, 120; called upon 624 at marriages, v, 121; appearances after death, ix, 105; 533 f.; xiv, ii, 154; dissipated by wind after leaving the body, xiii, 5; xi, 102; xiv, 49, 77; of murdered men, 181 f.; kingdom of Souls in the air, in the Aether or in Heaven, 342; xi, 35; 436 f.; Stoic, 500 f.; 541 f.; cf. Hades; in popular belief, xiv, ii, 142; in Neoplatonism, 547; parts of the soul, acc. to Pythagoras, xi, 55; Plato, 466 f.; Peripatetics, 512; Stoics, xiv, 60; Epicureans, 505; conjuration of souls not known in Homer, 24; later, v, 23; ix, 106; xiv, ii, 87, 90; on Defixions, 594 f., 604 f.; Souls, Cult of, after burial, 22 f., 77 f., 158 f., 163 f., 166 f., 181 f., 253 f.; Rudiments of, in Homer, 12 f.; in the family, 172 f.; represented on sepulchral reliefs, v, 105; Souls, Festival of, 168; in cult of Dionysos, ix, 11; Soul, “Salvation” of the, 172.

Soul = breath (spirit), 500 f.; xiv, ii, 138; depicted on lekythoi as winged, 170; Pre-existence of, taught by Pythagoras, xi, 49; by Plato, 465 f.; Aristotle, 495 f.; Stoics, xiv, 60; by Jews influenced by Greek thought, xiv, ii, 117; Soul and Mind, in Aristotle, 496; “Poor Souls,” v, 114; x, 66; Souls become daimones (Hesiod), 67 f.; transition from Soul to daimon, v, 133, 148; 179; v, 176; assist growth of crops, v, 120; called upon 624 at marriages, v, 121; appearances after death, ix, 105; 533 f.; xiv, ii, 154; dissipated by wind after leaving the body, xiii, 5; xi, 102; xiv, 49, 77; of murdered individuals, 181 f.; kingdom of Souls in the air, in the Aether or in Heaven, 342; xi, 35; 436 f.; Stoic, 500 f.; 541 f.; cf. Hades; in popular belief, xiv, ii, 142; in Neoplatonism, 547; parts of the soul, according to Pythagoras, xi, 55; Plato, 466 f.; Peripatetics, 512; Stoics, xiv, 60; Epicureans, 505; conjuring of souls not known in Homer, 24; later, v, 23; ix, 106; xiv, ii, 87, 90; on Defixions, 594 f., 604 f.; Souls, Cult of, after burial, 22 f., 77 f., 158 f., 163 f., 166 f., 181 f., 253 f.; Basics of, in Homer, 12 f.; in the family, 172 f.; depicted on sepulchral reliefs, v, 105; Souls, Festival of, 168; in the cult of Dionysos, ix, 11; Soul, “Salvation” of the, 172.

Souls: Transmigration of Souls—Greek names for, x, 84; Thracian belief in, 263 f.; Egyptian belief in, 346; Orphic, 337; 342 f.; 346 f.; Pythagorean, 375; xi, 50, 55; in Pindar, 415 f.; Empedokles, xi, 75, 96; Plato, 467; Stoics (Poseidonios?), xiv, 60.

Souls: The Transmigration of Souls—Greek names for, x, 84; Thracian belief in, 263 f.; Egyptian belief in, 346; Orphic, 337; 342 f.; 346 f.; Pythagorean, 375; xi, 50, 55; in Pindar, 415 f.; Empedokles, xi, 75, 96; Plato, 467; Stoics (Poseidonios?), xiv, 60.

σῶμα—σῆμα: Orphic, 342; x, 73; Pythagoras, 375; xi, 50; Empedokles, xi, 75; Euripides, xii, 137; Plato, xiii, 44; in popular belief, xiv, ii, 141.

body—sign: Orphic, 342; x, 73; Pythagoras, 375; xi, 50; Empedocles, xi, 75; Euripides, xii, 137; Plato, xiii, 44; in popular belief, xiv, ii, 141.

Somnium Scipionis, xiv, 53, 54, 62; xiv, ii, 58.

Dream of Scipio, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__.

Sophists, 432.

Sophists, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Sophokles, vi, 22, 26; 426 f.; as Hero, iv, 71; Oed. Col. 1583, xii, 112.

Sophocles, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__ f.; as Hero, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__; Oed. Col. 1583, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__.

σωτήρ (ἥρως), xii, 128.

savior (ἥρως), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Sparta; funeral of kings, iv, 46; burial customs, v, 61; reliefs representing feasts of the dead, v, 105, 86; criminal law of, v, 145.

Sparta; kings' funerals, iv, 46; burial traditions, v, 61; reliefs showing death feasts, v, 105, 86; criminal law of, v, 145.

Speaking ill of the dead forbidden, v, 115.

Speaking ill of the dead is forbidden, v, 115.

Spell: see Magic.

Spell: see Magic.

Spencer, Herbert, 6.

Spencer, Herbert, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Spielhansel, folk-tale of, i, 82.

Spielhansel, folk tale of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Spiritualism, 264 f.; 385; 500; 595.

Spiritualism, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ f.; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__.

Spirits: see Ghosts.

Spirits: see Ghosts.

Spirits, island of (Leuke), xiv, ii, 102; nocturnal battle of, xiv, ii, 37; magical compulsion of, ix, 107.

Spirits, island of (Leuke), xiv, ii, 102; nighttime battle of, xiv, ii, 37; magical force of, ix, 107.

Spitting, apotropaic effect of, 586.

Spitting, protective effect of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Stars inhabited, xi, 116; by the souls of the departed, x, 75–6; myths, 58.

Stars were filled, xi, 116; by the spirits of the dead, x, 75–6; legends, 58.

State: see Politics; State Funerals, xiv, ii, 5–6.

State: see Politics; State Funerals, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__–6.

Statues of Heroes, miracles performed by, 136.

Statues of Heroes, miracles performed by, 136.

στέφανος, iv, 21.

στέφανος, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Stertinius, C. Xenophon (Hero), xiv, ii, 64.

Stertinius, C. Xenophon (Hero), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Stobaeus, Ecl. i, 49, 46; xiv, ii, 138.

Stobaeus, Ecl. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Stoics, xi, 98; xii, 67; 497 f.; 542.

Stoics, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__ f.; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__.

Stones (a soul attributed to), xi, 72.

Stones (a soul attributed to), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Stormclouds, shooting at, viii, 63; cf. Weather-magicians.

Storm clouds, shooting at, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; cf. Weather-magicians.

Straton, xii, 150; xiv, 34.

Straton, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Striking the ground in calling on χθόνιοι, iii, 10.

Striking the ground while calling on chthonic, iii, 10.

Styx, vii, 21.

Styx, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Subterranean translation among the Greeks, 89 f.; xiv, ii, 104; in Germany, 93; in Mexico and in the East, iii, 17.

Subterranean translation among the Greeks, 89 f.; xiv, ii, 104; in Germany, 93; in Mexico and in the East, iii, 17.

Sûfis of Persia, viii, 60; 266.

Sufis of Persia, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Suicide forbidden (Orphic), x, 44; suicides refused burial, v, 33.

Suicide is prohibited (Orphic), x, 44; those who die by suicide are denied burial, v, 33.

Suidas on ἐμασχαλίσθη, 582 f.

Suidas on ἐμασχαλίσθη, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ female.

Sulphur, kathartic property of, v, 95.

Sulfur, cathartic property of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Swoon (πιοψυχία), i, 9.

Swoon, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Syrians, xiv, ii, 174.

Syrians, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Sybaris (Lamia), iv, 115; Orphic gold tablets from, 417 f.; 598; 601.

Sybaris (Lamia), iv, 115; Orphic gold tablets from, 417 f.; 598; 601.

Symbolism in religion, 224, 226 f.

Symbolism in religion, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ f.

Symmachos, xiv, ii, 172.

Symmachos, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Syncretism, 288; 534.

Syncretism, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Syrianos, 596 f.

Syrian, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ f.

Syrie, 62 f.

Syria, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ f.

Tacitus, xiv, 47.

Tacitus, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Tahiti, funeral dirges of, v, 48.

Tahiti, funeral songs of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Talthybios, 134.

Talthybios, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Tantalos, 40 f., 241; vii, 27.

Tantalos, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ f., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Tarantism, ix, 19.

Tarantism, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Taraxippos (Hero), 127.

Taraxippos (Hero), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Tarentum, v, 68.

Tarentum, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Tartaros, 76; vii, 6; 340; xi, 38.

Tartarus, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__.

Tasmania, cult of dead in, 585.

Tasmania, cult of the dead in, 585.

Ταῦτα, τοσαῦτα in epitaphs, xiv, ii, 167.

Ταῦτα, τοσαῦτα in epitaphs, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Teiresias, 36 f., 41; iii, 3, 8.

Teiresias, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ f., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__.

Telegoneia, 65, 90.

Telegoneia, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Teleology in Anaxagoras, xi, 104.

Teleology in Anaxagoras, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Tellos the Athenian, xiv, ii, 170.

Tellos the Athenian, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Temesa, the Hero of, 135 f. 625

Temesa, the Hero of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ f. 625

Temple-sleep: see Incubation.

Temple-sleep: see __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Tenes, iv, 138.

Tenes, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Terizoi in Thrace, viii, 65.

Terizoi in Thrace, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Thales, vi, 25; 366.

Thales, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Thamyris, 238.

Thamyris, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Thanatos, xii, 4, 121; and Hypnos, ii, 28.

Thanatos, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; and Hypnos, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Thargelia, ix, 87.

Thargelia, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Theagenes (Hero), 136; iv, 119, 134.

Theagenes (Hero), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Thebais, 75, 90, 93.

Thebais, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

θεῖος ἀνήρ, xiii, 68.

divine man, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Themistokles as Hero, iv, 30.

Themistocles as a Hero, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Theognetos (Orphic), x, 7; 597.

Theognetos (Orphic), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Theognis, 411 f.; xii, 13.

Theognis, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ f.; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Theogony of Epimenides, ix, 123; of Hesiod, x, 5; Orphic, 339 f.; 596.

Theogony of Epimenides, ix, 123; of Hesiod, x, 5; Orphic, 339 f.; 596.

Theokrasia, x, 24.

Theokrasia, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Theology, Homeric, 25 f., 31 f.; of the court in Hellenistic period, 538 (see Orphics).

Theology, Homeric, 25 f., 31 f.; of the court in Hellenistic period, 538 (see Orphics).

Theophanes (Hero), xiv, ii, 64.

Theophanes (Hero), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Theophrastos, xiv, 34; Testament of, v, 137.

Theophrastus, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; Testament of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Theopompos, on Abaris, ix, 108; Aristeas, ix, 109; Bakis, ix, 66; Epimenides, ix, 117; Hermotimos, ix, 112; Phormion, ix, 111.

Theopompos, on Abaris, ix, 108; Aristeas, ix, 109; Bakis, ix, 66; Epimenides, ix, 117; Hermotimos, ix, 112; Phormion, ix, 111.

ὁ θεός, ἡ θεά at Eleusis, v, 19.

God, Goddess at Eleusis, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Theosophy (Orphic), 336.

Theosophy (Orphic), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Theoxenia, 96; iv, 16, 71; festival at Delphi, iv, 82.

Theoxenia, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__; festival at Delphi, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__.

Theron, 416.

Theron, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Theseus, transfer of his bones to Athens, 122; expiation of murder of Skiron, v, 168; Descent to Hades, vii, 3.

Theseus, moving his bones to Athens, 122; atonement for the murder of Skiron, v, 168; journey to Hades, vii, 3.

Thesmophoria, 222.

Thesmophoria, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

θίασος, Dionysiac, Thracian, viii, 31.

θίασος, Dionysian, Thracian, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

30,000 = innumerable, xi, 78.

30,000 = countless, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

θόλοι, iii, 31.

θόλοι, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Thorn: see White-thorn.

Thorn: see White-thorn.

Thracians, viii, 11; cult of Dionysos, 256 f.; belief in immortality, 263 f.; in Transmigration, 263 f.; Ascetic practices, x, 78.

Thracians, viii, 11; worship of Dionysus, 256 f.; belief in immortality, 263 f.; in Transmigration, 263 f.; Ascetic practices, x, 78.

Thrasea Paetus, xiv, 64.

Thrasea Paetus, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

θρόνον στρωννύναι for a god, iii, 26.

θρόνον στρωννύναι for a god, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

θρόνωσις (of mystai), ix, 19.

θρόνωσις (of mystai), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Thunder clouds driven away by noise, etc., viii, 63.

Thunder clouds driven away by noise, etc., viii, 63.

θύειν, iv, 15.

θυείν, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Thyme used in burial, v, 36.

Thyme used in burial, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

θυμός and ψυχή, i, 58; xi, 1.

θυμός and ψυχή, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Thyrsos, viii, 22.

Thyrsus, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Tii of Polynesia, v, 161.

Tii from Polynesia, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Timokles of Syracuse, x, 7.

Timokles from Syracuse, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Timoleon as Hero, xiv, ii, 59.

Timoleon the Hero, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Titans (Orphic), 340 f.; x, 77 (cf. p. 76).

Titans (Orphic), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ f.; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ (see p. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__).

Tithonos, 58.

Tithonos, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Tityos, 40 f.

Tityos, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ female.

Tragedy, Greek, 421 f.

Tragedy, Greek, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ female.

Τράλεις, Thracian tribe of mercenaries, viii, 77.

Τράλεις, Thracian mercenary tribe, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Tralles in Karia, criminal law of, v, 150.

Tralles in Karia, criminal law of, v, 150.

Translation, in Homer, 55 f.; subterranean, 89 f.; in Pindar, 414; in Euripides, xii, 127; Semitic, 60; xiv, ii, 109; German, 93; Italian, xiv, ii, 110; Tr. to Islands of the Blest, xiv, ii, 99; to the Nymphs, xiv, ii, 105; into a river, xiv, ii, 114; by lightning, 583; Tr. of Achilles, 64 f.; Alkmene, xiv, ii, 99; Althaimenes, iii, 4; Amphiaraos, 89 f.; Amphilochos, iii, 5; Antinous, xiv, ii, 114; Apollonios of Tyana, xiv, ii, 116; Aristaios, iii, 6; Aristeas (?), ix, 109; Berenike, etc., xiv, ii, 107; Diomedes, 67; xiv, ii, 99; Emperors, xiv, ii, 107; Empedokles, xi, 61; Erechtheus, 98; Euthymos, 136; Hamilcar, xiv, ii, 109; Helen, ii, 21; Herakleid. Pont., xi, 61; Iphigeneia, ii, 26; Kleomedes, 129; Laodike, iii, 6; Memnon, 64; Menelaos, 55; ii, 21; Oedipus, xii, 112; Phaethon, iii, 35; Rhadamanthys, ii, 17; Telegonos and Penelope, 65; Trophonios, 90; Tr. no longer understood in later ages, xiv, ii, 103; effected mechanically, xiv, ii, 106.

Translation, in Homer, 55 f.; subterranean, 89 f.; in Pindar, 414; in Euripides, xii, 127; Semitic, 60; xiv, ii, 109; German, 93; Italian, xiv, ii, 110; Tr. to Islands of the Blest, xiv, ii, 99; to the Nymphs, xiv, ii, 105; into a river, xiv, ii, 114; by lightning, 583; Tr. of Achilles, 64 f.; Alkmene, xiv, ii, 99; Althaimenes, iii, 4; Amphiaraos, 89 f.; Amphilochos, iii, 5; Antinous, xiv, ii, 114; Apollonios of Tyana, xiv, ii, 116; Aristaios, iii, 6; Aristeas (?), ix, 109; Berenike, etc., xiv, ii, 107; Diomedes, 67; xiv, ii, 99; Emperors, xiv, ii, 107; Empedokles, xi, 61; Erechtheus, 98; Euthymos, 136; Hamilcar, xiv, ii, 109; Helen, ii, 21; Herakleid. Pont., xi, 61; Iphigeneia, ii, 26; Kleomedes, 129; Laodike, iii, 6; Memnon, 64; Menelaos, 55; ii, 21; Oedipus, xii, 112; Phaethon, iii, 35; Rhadamanthys, ii, 17; Telegonos and Penelope, 65; Trophonios, 90; Tr. no longer understood in later ages, xiv, ii, 103; effected mechanically, xiv, ii, 106.

Trausians, viii, 75.

Trausians, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Trees planted round graves, i, 28; v, 73; sacred to the χθόνιοι, v, 61.

Trees planted around graves, i, 28; v, 73; sacred to the chthonic, v, 61.

Τριακάδες, v, 86 f.; xiv, ii, 17.

Τριάδες, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ f.; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Trieteric festival of Dionysos, 258, 285.

Dionysus festival, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Triopion, ancient Greek cult there, ix, 89.

Triopion, an ancient Greek cult there, ix, 89.

Triphylians, v, 11.

Triphylians, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Triptolemos, i, 41; 220; vi, 35; as Judge in Hades, vii, 14.

Triptolemos, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__; as Judge in Hades, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__.

τρίτα (sacrifice to the dead), v, 83.

thirds (sacrifice to the dead), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

τριτοπάτορες, v, 123 f.; x, 45.

τριτοπάτορες, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ f.; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Trophonios, 90 f., 101, 121, 159, 161; v, 133; viii, 68; xiv, ii, 104; Zeus Troph., iii, 18.

Trophonios, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ f., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_7__; Zeus Troph., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_8__.

Trojan Heroes, xiv, ii, 41.

Trojan Heroes, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Tronis in Phokis, iv, 34. 626

Tronis in Phokis, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__. 626

Turning one’s back on spirits: see Avoiding, etc.

Turning your back on spirits: see Avoiding, etc.

Turnus, translation of, xiv, ii, 110.

Turnus, translation of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

τυμβωρύχος, xiv, ii, 11.

τύμβωρος, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Twelve Tables influenced by Solon, v, 47.

Twelve Tables influenced by Solon, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Typhon, vii, 6.

Typhon, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Tyrtaios, xii, 13.

Tyrtaios, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Underworld, pictures of on vases, vii, 27; Polygnotos’ picture of, 241 f., 586 f.

Underworld, images on vases, vii, 27; Polygnotos’ image of, 241 f., 586 f.

Unknown gods, iv, 62; Heroes, 127.

Unknown gods, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; Heroes, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Unlucky days, v, 158.

Bad days, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Utopia in Hades, vii, 18.

Utopia in Hades, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Vampyre, v, 161; xiv, ii, 86.

Vampire, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Vapour-baths used by Scythians and Indians to produce religious intoxication, viii, 39.

Vapor baths used by Scythians and Indians to create a spiritual high, viii, 39.

Varro, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__.

Vendetta: see Revenge.

Vendetta: see Revenge.

Venus, conductress of souls, xiv, ii, 146.

Venus, guide of souls, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Vergil, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__.

Vibia, tomb of, xiv, ii, 144, 174.

Vibia, tomb of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Vine, cultivation of in Thrace, viii, 38; branches used in burial, v, 37.

Vine, grown in Thrace, viii, 38; branches used in burials, v, 37.

Virbius, legend of, iv, 38.

Virbius, legend of __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Visions, 30 f., 258 f. (and see ἔκστασις).

Visions, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ f., __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ f. (and see ἔκστασις).

Visits of Gods to men, ii, 38 (iv, 134).

Gods visiting humans, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ (__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__).

Voodoo, Negro sect in Haiti, viii, 55.

Voodoo, a Black religious group in Haiti, viii, 55.

Wanderings: see Migration.

Wanderings: check out Migration.

Water polluted by the neighbourhood of a corpse, v, 38; ix, 76; flowing, kathartic properties of, 588 f.; cold water in the lower world, xiv, ii, 151; of Life in folk-lore, ib.; speaking, ib.

Water contaminated by the area near a body, v, 38; ix, 76; flowing, cleansing qualities of, 588 f.; cold water in the underworld, xiv, ii, 151; of Life in folklore, ib.; speaking, ib.

Ways, Two, Three, in the lower world, xii, 62.

Ways, Two, Three, in the lower world, xii, 62.

Weather wizards, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Weregild, 175 f.; forbidden, v, 154.

Weregild, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ f.; prohibited, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Will, freedom of, 423 f.; 498 f.

Will, freedom of, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ f.; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__ f.

Wind = Soul, xiii, 5; Spirits of, v, 124; Bride of, ii, 7.

Wind = Soul, xiii, 5; Spirits of, v, 124; Bride of, ii, 7.

Wine, belongs to later Dionysos, viii, 3.

Wine belongs to the later Dionysus, viii, 3.

Wisdom of Solomon, xiv, ii, 117.

Wisdom of Solomon, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

White thorn, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Witches, etc. (see also Hekate), ix, 101.

Witches, etc. (see also Hekate), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Works of “supererogation” assist others, x, 66.

Acts of kindness help others, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

World, different Ages of, in Hesiod, 67 f.

World, different Ages of, in Hesiod, 67 f.

World, withdrawal , in later Greek life, 546 f.; enjoyment of, in early period, 3, 63; xiv, ii, 170; hatred of, Christian-Gnostic, xiv, ii, 179; periods of (Orphic), 342.

World, withdrawal, in later Greek life, 546 f.; enjoyment of, in early period, 3, 63; xiv, ii, 170; hatred of, Christian-Gnostic, xiv, ii, 179; periods of (Orphic), 342.

Wolf-shape, of spirits, iv, 114; 590.

Wolf form, of spirits, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Wool, kathartic properties of, 590.

Wool's cathartic properties, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

ξενικοὶ θεοί, x, 3.

foreign gods, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Xenokrates, vi, 35; x, 39; xiv, 1.

Xenocrates, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__.

Xenophanes, 371 f.; xi, 42; xii, 150; xiv, 53.

Xenophanes, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ f.; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__.

Xenophon C. Stertinius (Hero), xiv, ii, 64.

Xenophon C. Stertinius (Hero), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Yama, Indian god of the lower world, vii, 6.

Yama, the Indian god of the underworld, vii, 6.

Yogis of India, viii, 43.

Yogis in India, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Zagreus, 340 f.; viii, 28; x, 9, 12, 77; 598.

Zagreus, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ f.; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__.

Zaleukos, v, 145.

Zaleukos, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Zalmoxis, iii, 13; viii, 10, 28; 263.

Zalmoxis, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__.

Zeno (Eleatic), 372 f.

Zeno (Eleatic), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ m.

Zeno (Stoic), xiv, 43.

Zeno (Stoic), __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Zeus in Crete, 97 f., 161; ix, 56; and Alkmene, iv, 134; as conductor of Souls, xiv, ii, 146.

Zeus in Crete, 97 f., 161; ix, 56; and Alkmene, iv, 134; as the guide of Souls, xiv, ii, 146.

Ζεὺς Ἀμφιάραος, iii, 19; χθόνιος, 159; v, 167; 220; Εὐβουλεύς, Βουλεύς, v, 7, 19; Λύκαιος, v, 170; μειλίχιος, v, 168; προστρόπαιος, v, 148; φίλιος, ii, 38; Σαβάζιος, viii, 10; Τροφώνιος, iii, 18.

Ζεὺς Ἀμφιάραος, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__; χθόνιος, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_2__; __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_3__; Εὐβουλεύς, Βουλεύς, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_4__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_5__; Λύκαιος, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_6__; μειλίχιος, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_7__; προστρόπαιος, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_8__; φίλιος, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_9__; Σαβάζιος, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_10__; Τροφώνιος, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_11__.

Zopyros, x, 7, 11.

Zopyros, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

Zoroastrianism, 302.

Zoroastrianism, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.


Transcriber’s Note and Extended List of Abbreviations

This version follows the 1925 translation by W.B. Hillis, but with the following changes:

This version is based on the 1925 translation by W.B. Hillis, but with these changes:

  • A lot of quotations from Latin and some from French were left in ordinary type-face; here they have been italicised. The .txt version preserves the original text. If anyone wants the .htm version to reflect the original they can remove the lines for .latin and .french from the style declaration at the beginning of the .htm file.
  • Except for three occasions early on, the English translation ignores Rohde’s emphases within quotations from Greek (and Latin). This version has restored Rohde’s “gesperrt” text.
  • When there are minor differences (usually punctuation) between the German edition and the translation with respect to Greek or other quotations, this version follows the translation, unless a correction is indicated (by red dotted underlining). Corrections have restored the text in the German edition, supported where possible by reference to original versions online, such as at the Perseus Project.
  • A similar comment can be made about the Index. No attempt has been made to correct its lapses from alphabetical order. It might be worth observing that when the Index picks out a footnote it is sometimes only clear why, if one follows the footnote back to the main text.
  • This version has put an entry for the Index in the Table of Contents, as in the German editions. And one to these Notes. (Most other items in [ ] are Hillis’ doing.)
  • Printed page numbers have been rendered in red within the text. When words were hyphenated across pages, the number has been put before the hyphenated word.

None of this would be possible without the materials so lavishly provided by the Internet Archive.

None of this would be possible without the resources generously provided by the Internet Archive.

The English translation employed a lot of abbreviations in the footnotes, often without ever using a fuller form. In 1925 it may have been reasonable to assume that Lob. would call up Christian Lobeck (died 1860) and his major work published in 1829, but I have often found problems in tracking down such references so I am inserting here an extended version of Hillis’ list of abbreviations, to which I have added in many cases an online source for a version of the text (not necessarily the same edition as Rohde or Hillis used). Those sources are abbreviated thus: IA = Internet Archive (sometimes I give its ID for a work – putting that after the base URL should select the text in question, but as with the few complete URLs, these things are liable to change); Hathi = Hathi Trust; Migne = contained in one of the Patrologiae, texts of which are listed and linked to at various sites; Perseus = Perseus Project. For other sources I usually give only the basic website URL. For the most part I have not included abbreviations of works by ancient authors: they can be identified from the lists of works given for each writer at Perseus. Nor have I included abbreviations of English language texts.

The English translation used a lot of abbreviations in the footnotes, often without providing a fuller form. In 1925, it may have made sense to assume that "Lob." referred to Christian Lobeck (died 1860) and his major work published in 1829, but I have often encountered issues when trying to track down such references. Therefore, I'm including an expanded version of Hillis’ list of abbreviations here, to which I have added, in many cases, an online source for a version of the text (not necessarily the same edition as Rohde or Hillis used). Those sources are abbreviated as follows: IA = Internet Archive (sometimes I include its ID for a work—placing that after the base URL should find the text in question, but like the few complete URLs, these details are subject to change); Hathi = Hathi Trust; Migne = contained in one of the Patrologiae, texts of which are listed and linked to at various sites; Perseus = Perseus Project. For other sources, I usually provide only the basic website URL. For the most part, I have not included abbreviations of works by ancient authors: they can be identified from the lists of works provided for each writer at Perseus. Nor have I included abbreviations of English language texts.

A. (or Aesch.) = Aeschylus. Perseus
A. = Vergil’s Aeneid. Perseus
AB. = Anecdota Graeca, ed. Bekker. Hathi
Abergl. d. bös. Blicks = Der Aberglaube des Bösen Blicks bei den Alten, Jahn. https://www.digitale-sammlungen.de/
Abh. = Georg Zoegas Abhandlungen, ed. Welcker. IA
Abh. Berl. Ak. = Abhandlungen der Königlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften in Berlin. https://de.wikisource.org/wiki/
Acherunt. = Acheruntica, Ettig. Hathi
Ach. Tat. = Achilles Tatius. Isag. = Eἰσαγωγὴ εἰς τὰ Ἀράτoυ φαινόμενα, in Uranologion, ed. Patavus. Google Books
Ac. Soc. ph. Lips. = Acta Societatis philologae Lipsiensis. Hathi
Acta Lud. Saecul. = Acta Ludorum Saecularium.
ad aureæ aet. fab. sym = Ad aureae aetatis fabulam symbola, Graf. Hathi
adnot. crit. ad Olymp. = Annotationis criticae supplementum ad Pindari Olympias, Tycho Mommsen. Hathi
Ael. = Aelian. HA. = de natura [historia] animalium. IA
VH. = Varia Historia. IA
Ael. Dionys. = Aelius Dionysius, Aelii Dionysii et Pausaniae Atticistarum Fragmenta, ed. Schwabe. IA
Aen. Gaz., Theophr. = Aeneas Gazaeus, Theophrastus, ed. Boissonade. Aeneas Gazaeus et Zacharias Mitylenaeus de immortalitate animae .... Hathi
Aen. Tact. = Aeneas Tacticus. IA
Aeschin. = Aeschines. Perseus
Aesop. = Aesopus. Fabulae Æsopicae collectae, ed. Halm. IA
Aët. = Aëtius.
Afric. = Sextus Julius Africanus und die Byzantinische Chronographie, Gelzer. IA
Agatharch. = Agatharchides. On the Erythraean Sea (excerpta) in Karl Müller’s Geographi Graeci Minores, vol. 1. IA
Akad. Abh. = Gesammelte akademische Abhandlungen und kleine Schriften, Gerhard, 2 vols. IA
Albertäten = Denckwürdige Curiositäten Derer, So wohl Inn- als Ausländischer Abergläubischen Albertäten ..., Männlingen. https://digitale.bibliothek.uni-halle.de
Alc. = Alcaeus. In PLG., vol. 3, below.
Alciphr. = Alciphron. Alciphronis rhetoris Epistolae. IA
Alcm. = Alcman. In PLG., vol. 3, below.
Al(ex). Aphr. = Alexander of Aphrodisias. de An. = De anima liber cum Mantissa, ed. Bruns. IA
Prob. = Alexandri Aphrodisiensis quae feruntur Problematorum liber III et IIII, Usener. Hathi
Alkmaionis fr. Kink. = Epicorum graecorum fragmenta, ed. Kinkel. IA
Allg. Gesch. d. Relig. = Allgemeine kritische geschichte der religionen, Meiners. IA
Alltagsleben e. d. Frau im 18 J(ahr)h. = Alltagsleben einer deutschen Frau zu Anfang des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts, Schultz. IA
Altäre v. Olymp. = Die Altäre von Olympia, Curtius. IA
Altnord. Leben = Altnordisches Leben, Weinhold. IA
Alt- u. Neues Preussen = Alt- und Neues Preussen, Hartknoch. https://books.google.de/
Ameis = Anhang zu Homers Odyssee, Ameis. Hathi
Americ. Urrelig. (or Ges. d. ...) = Geschichte der amerikanischen Urreligionen, J. G. Müller. IA
Amer. School = Papers of the ... below.
Amm. = Ammonius, ed. Brand. = Commentaria in Peri hermeneias Aristotelis. IA
Diff. Voc. or Valck = De adfinium vocabulorum differentia. Hathi
Amm. Marc. = Ammianus Marcellinus. Perseus
Ampel., LM. = Ampelius, Liber memorialis. IA
An(al). Alex. = Analecta Alexandrino-romana, Knaack. IA
Anal. epigr. et onom. = Analecta epigraphica et onomatologica, Keil. IA
Anf. d. Dionysoscult in Att. = Anfänge und Entwickelung des Dionysoscultus in Attika, O. Ribbeck. IA
Andoc. Myst. = Andocides, de mysteriis. IA
Anf. Kunst = Die Anfänge der Kunst in Griechenland, Milchhöfer. https://digi.ub.uni-heidelberg.de
Anm. (z.) Od. = Erklärende Anmerkungen zu Homer’s Odyssee, Nitzsch, 3 vols. IA
Anon. de Incred. = Anonymous, de Incredibilibus, in Mythographoi; scriptores poeticae historiae graeci, ed. Westermann. Hathi
Anon., de Vir. Herb. = Anonymous, De viribus (aut virtutibus) herbarum. IA
Anon., P. Pont. Eux. = Anonymi Periplum Ponti Euxini in Geographi Graeci minores, vol. 2. IA
Annali d(ell’) Inst. (Arch.) = Annali dell'Instituto di corrispondenza archeologica. Hathi
Anth. Lat. Ep. = Anthologia latina: sive poesis latinae supplementum, ed. Bücheler, in several parts. Refs. in the last chapter are to Carmina Latina Epigraphica: IA (details/anthologialatin04lommgoog)
Anth. Pal. = AP. below.
Anthrop. = Die Anthropologie der Naturvölker, Waitz-Gerland, 6 vols. Hathi
Antig. Caryst. = Antigonus Carystius, in Rerum naturalium scriptores graeci minores, ed. Keller. IA
Antiph. = Antiphon. Perseus
Ant. Lib. = Antoninus Liberalis, in Mythographi Graeci, ed. E. Martini, ii (1). IA (details/mythographigrae00partgoog)
Ant. Wald u. Feldc = Antike Wald- und Feldkulte, Mannhardt. IA
Anz. Wien. Ak. = Anzeiger der Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-Historische Klasse. Hathi
AP. = Anthologia Palatina. IA
Apollod. = Ps.-Apollodorus, Bibiotheca (unless Epit. is added = Epitome). Perseus
Apollon., Mir. = Apollonius Paradoxographus, Mirabilia, in Rerum Naturalium Scriptores, ed. Keller, vol. 1. Hathi
Apollon., V. Aesch. = Apollonius Biographus. Vita Aeschinis, in Aeschinis Orationes, ed. F. Blass. IA
Apostol. = Apostolius, in Corpus paroemiographorum Graecorum, ed. Leutsch and Scheidewin, vol. 2. IA
App. = Appian. Perseus
App. Prov. = Appendix Proverbiorum in Corpus paroemiographorum Graecorum, ed. Leutsch and Scheidewin, vol. 1. IA
Apul. = Apuleius. Perseus, except for D. Soc. = de dea Socratis. IA
A. R. (or Apol. Rhod.) = Apollonius Rhodius. Perseus
Ar. = Aristophanes. Perseus. For fr., ed. Bergk: IA (details/bub_gb_nTTgAAAAMAAJ)
Archaeol. Aufs. = Archäologische Aufsätze, Ross, 2 vols. IA
Archäol. Beitr. = Archäologische Beiträge, Jahn. IA
Archäol. epigr. Mitt(heil). a. Oest(erreich) = Archäologisch-epigraphische Mitteilungen aus Österreich-Ungarn. https://digi.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/diglit/
Archäol. Unters. auf. Samoth. = Archäologische Untersuchungen auf Samothrake, Conze, 2 vols. https://digi.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/diglit/
Arch. des miss. scientif. = Archives des missions scientifiques et littéraires
Arch. f. Gesch. d. Philos. = Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie. IA
Arch. Zeit. = Archäologischen Zeitung. IA
Archil(och). = Archilochus. In PLG., vol. 2.
Areop. u. Epheten = Der Areopag und die Epheten, Philippi. IA
Aret. = Aretaeus. IA
Arg. (or )Arg.) = [with Sch.] Argumenta. For Pindar, Pindari opera qvae supersvnt., ed. Boeckh, vol. 2. IA
Arist. = Aristotle. Hathi has Bekker’s edition.
Ἀθπ. = Athenian Constitution. Perseus
Arist. = Aristides, life by Plutarch.
Aristarch. = De Aristarchi studiis Homericis, Lehrs. IA
Aristid. = Aristides, ed. Dindorff. Hathi
Aristonic. = Aristonicus, Aristonici Peri sēmeiōn Iliados reliquiae emendatiores, ed. Friedländer. Google Books
[Arist.] Pepl. = Pseudo-Aristotle, Peplos, in PLG., vol. 2, below.
Arist. Pseudepig. = Aristoteles pseudepigraphus, Rose. IA
Arn(ob). = Arnobius, adversus nationes. IA [Most uses of Arn. refer to Hans von Arnim, who edited various writers.]
Arr. = Arrianus. Anab. = Anabasis. IA.
Peripl. = Periplum Ponti Euxini in Geographi Graeci minores, vol. 2. IA
Artem(id). = Artemidorus, Onirocriticon libri v, ex recensione Rudolphi Hercheri. Hathi
Assoc. relig. = Des associations religieuses chez les Grecs: Thiases, Eranes, Orgeons, Foucart. IA
Ath. = Athenaeus. Perseus
A(th). Mitt(h). = Mitteilungen des Deutschen Archäologischen Instituts, Athenische Abteilung. https://digi.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/diglit/am
Att. Geneal. = Attische Genealogie, Töpffer. IA
Att. Grabinschr. = Die attischen Grabschriften, Gutscher. Hathi
Att. Proc(ess) = Der attische Process: Vier Bücher, Schömann and Meier. IA
Aug. = Augustine. http://www.documentacatholicaomnia.eu/20_40_0354-0430-_Augustinus,_Sanctus.html
Aur. Vict. = Aurelius Victor. Epit. = Epitome de Caesaribus. IA as De Caesaribus liber
Ausf. Gramm. = Ausfuhrliche griechische Sprachlehre, Buttmann. IA
Avien., Des. Orb. = Avienius, Descriptio orbis terrae. Hathi
Babr. = Babrius. IA
Bacch. = Bacchylides. The poems and fragments, ed. Jebb. IA
Baring-Gould, Myths of M.A. = Baring-Gould, Curious Myths of the Middle Ages. IA
BCH. = Bulletin de correspondance hellénique. https://www.persee.fr/collection/bch
Ber(ichte) Ber(lin). Ak. = Monatsberichte der Königlich Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin. https://de.wikisource.org/wiki/
Berl. Phil. Woch. = Berliner philologische Wochenschrift. https://de.wikisource.org/wiki/
Beros. ap. Sync. = Berossus in Syncellus, ed. Dindorff. IA
Ber. sächs. Ges. Wiss. = Berichte Über die Verhandlungen der Königlich Sächsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaft. https://de.wikisource.org/wiki/
Ber. Wien. Ak. = Sitzungsberichte der Philosophisch-Historischen Classe der Kaiserlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften. https://de.wikisource.org/wiki/
Besitz in Cl. Alt.
(or Bes. u. Erw.)
= Besitz und Erwerb im griechischen Altertume, Büchsenschütz. [Cl. seems Rohde’s mistake.] IA
Bgk. = Bergk.
Biogr. d’Emp. = La biographie d’Empédocle, Bidez. IA
Bös. Blick = Über den Aberglauben des bösen Blicks bei den Alten, Jahn. https://opacplus.bsb-muenchen.de
Cael. Aur. = Caelius Aurelianus, Morb. Chr. = De Morbis Acutis & Chronicis. IA
Tard. = Tardae or Chronicae Passiones. IA
Caes. = Caesar. Perseus
Call(im). = Callimachus. Perseus
Bentley ad Lav. Pall. = IA (details/callimachihymni00bentgoog)
Callin. = Callinus. See PLG., vol. 2, below.
Callist. = Pseudo-Callisthenes. http://www.attalus.org/info/alexander.html
Carm. Aur. = Carmen Aureum. In Iamblichi De vita Pythagorica liber ... accedit epimetrum de Pythagorae Aureo Carmine, ed. Nauck. Hathi
Carm. Phoc. = Pseudo-Phocylides. In PLG., vol. 2, below.
Cassiod. Var. = Cassiodori Senatoris Variae. IA
Censor., DN. = Censorinus, De die natali liber. IA
Char. = Charikles, Becker, 2 vols. IA
Charis. = Charisius. In Grammatici Latini, Keil. IA
Chron. altgr. Epos. = Zur Chronologie der altgriechische Epos, Christ. Hathi.
Chthon. u. Todt. = Stengel, Chthonischer und Todtencult in Festschrift für Ludwig Friedländer, 414-432. IA
CIA = Corpus inscriptionum Atticarum, 1873. IA
Cic. = Cicero. Perseus
CIG. = Corpus inscriptionum graecarum. Some parts at Hathi. More at https://www.deutsche-digitale-bibliothek.de
CIL. = Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum. https://arachne.uni-koeln.de/drupal/?q=en/node/291
Claud. iv. Cons. Hon. = Claudian, Panegyricus de Quarto Consulatu Honorii Augusti. IA
Claud. Mamertus, de An. = Claudianus Mamertus, De statu animae, in Opera Omnia. IA
Clem. (Al(ex).) = Clement of Alexandria. Hathi has Titi Flaui Clementis Alexandrini opera omnia, ed. Klotz. Google Books has the Dindorff volumes.
Cod. Theod. = Codex Theodosianus. https://droitromain.univ-grenoble-alpes.fr
Com. Fr. = Comicorum graecorum fragmenta, ed. Kaibel. IA
Comm. Bern. in Lucan = Commenta Bernensia. Google Books
Commun. et coll. quib. Graec. = De communibus et collegiis quibusdam Graecorum, Schöll. In Satura philologica. H. Sauppio obtulit amicorum conlegarum decas. IA
Conon = Conon, Narrationes. IA (name Konon)
Corn(ut). = Cornutus. Cornuti Theologiae graecae compendium, ed. Lang. IA
Corresp. Würt. Gelehr. = Correspondenz-blatt für die Gelehrten- und Realschulen Württembergs. 1881 in Google Books
Cosm. ad Greg. Naz. = Cosmae hieros, commentarius ad carmina S. Gregorii Nazianzeni. Original publication in Spicilegium Romanum, vol. II, part ii. IA (details/spicilegiumroma00unkngoog)
Cratin. = Cratinus. In Comicorum Atticorum Fragmenta, vol. 1, ed. Kock. IA
Culturges. = Allgemeine Culturgeschichte der Menschheit, Klemm, 10 vols. IA
Culturg. Streifz. Geb. Islam = Culturgeschichtliche Streifzüge auf dem Gebiete des Islams, v. Kremer. IA
Culturpflanz. = Kulturpflanzen und Hausthiere in ihrem Übergang aus Asien nach Griechenland und Italien sowie in das übrige Europa, Hehn. IA (English translation, The wanderings ..., Hathi)
D. (or Dem.) = Demosthenes. Perseus
Damasc. = Damascius, Princ. = Dubitationes et solutiones de primis principiis, ed. Ruelle. Hathi
V. Isid. = Vita Isidori.
D. ant. Mysterienw. = Gr. Mysterienw., below.
Darst. d. Unterw(elt) auf unterit(al). Vasen = Die Darstellungen der Unterwelt auf unteritalischen Vasen, Winkler. Also appeared in Breslauer philologische Abhandlungen, 1888. IA
Darstell. a. d. Sitteng. = Darstellungen aus der Sittengeschichte Roms in der Zeit von August bis zum Ausgang der Antonine, Friedländer. IA
D. Atticismus = Der atticismus in seinem Hauptvertretern von Dionysius von Halikarnass bis auf den zweiten Philostratus, Schmid. IA
D. C. = Dio Cassius. Perseus
D. Chr. = Dio Chrysostom. Perseus
De acusmatis s. symbolis Pythag., = De acusmatis sive symbolis Pythagoricis, Hölk. IA
de commun. et coll. Graecis = De communibus et collegiis quibusdam Graecorum, Schöll. In Satura philologa, Hermanno Sauppio obtulit amicorum conlegarum decas. IA
De Epim. Crete = De Epimenide Crete, Schultess. IA
de gentil. Att(ica). = De Gentilitate Attica, Meier. Hathi
de h(eroum ap. Gr.) cult(u) = De heroum apud Graecos cultu, Wassner. IA
de hymnis Orph. = de hymnis Orphicis Capitula Quinque, Dieterich. IA
de immort. animi = Disputatio de Immortalitate Animi, Wyttenbach, in his Opuscula, vol. 2. IA
de Lap. = de lapidibus, Damigeron, ed. Abel. IA
Delect. = Delectus inscriptionum Graecarum propter dialectum memorabilium, Cauer. Hathi
De lustrat. = Epimenides s. de lustrat. below.
Dem. fr. = Democriti Abderitae operum fragmenta, Mullach. IA
Dem. Phal. = Demetrius Phalereus.
Dem. u. Pers(eph). = Demeter und Persephone, Preller. IA
Denkm. = Denkmaler des klassischen Altertums, Baumeister. IA
D. Enneakrunosepis. bei Paus. = Die Enneakrunosepisode bei Pausanias, Löschcke. IA
de Orphei Ep. Pher. Theog. = De Orphei Epimenidis Pherecydis theogoniis quaestiones critica, Kern. IA
de Pindaro theologiae Orph. censore = De Pindaro theologiae Orphicae censore, Lübbert. IA
de Pos. Rhod., = De Posidonio Rhodio, Corssen. IA
de Rhiani stud. Hom. = De Rhiani Cretensis studiis homericis, Mayhoff. IA
Der Keilins. Sintfluthber. = Der keilinschrifliche Sintfluthbericht, Haupt. Hathi
Dessau = Hermann Dessau, Inscriptiones latinae selectae, vol. 2. IA
(de) soc. Pythag. = De societatis a Pythagora in urbe Crotoniatarum conditae scopo politico commentatio, Krische. Google Books
de Theogon. = Griechische Mythologie, vol. 1, Preller, ed. Kern. IA
de Theoxen. = de Theoxeniis, Deneken. IA
Deut. Volksabergl. = Der deutsche Volksaberglaube der Gegenwart, Wuttke. IA
D. Gl(aube) u. Brauch = Deutscher Glaube und Brauch im Spiegel der heidnischen Vorzeit, Rochholz. IA
Dgn. = Diogenianus. In Corpus paroemiographorum Graecorum. Hathi
D. H. = Dionysius of Halicarnassus. Perseus
D. Hom. Epos aus d. Denkm. erl. = Das homerische Epos aus den Denkmälern erläutert, Helbig. IA
Dicaearch. (or Dikaiarch.) = Dicaearchus. In Geographi graeci minores, ed. Müller, vol. 1. IA
Did. = Didymus.
Die Altäre v. Olymp. = Die Altäre von Olympia, Curtius. IA
Diels, Parm. = Parmenides Lehrgedicht, Diels. IA
Die W. u. T. des Hesiod = Die Werke und Tage des Hesiodos, ed. Steitz. IA
Digest. = Digesta, in Corpus Iuris Civilis. https://droitromain.univ-grenoble-alpes.fr/#22
Din(arch). = Dinarchus, Perseus
Diod. Com. Ἐπίκληρ. = Diodorus Comicus Ἐπίκληρος, see Mein. Com. below.
Diogen. = Diogenianus. In Corpus paroemiographorum Graecorum, ed. Leutsch and Scheidewin. IA
Dionysosc. = Die Beziehungen des Dionysoskultus zu Thrakien und Kleinasien, Rapp. Hathi
Dionysosdienst in Elis = Das Kollegium der Sechzehn Frauen und den Dionysosdienst in Elis, Weniger. Hathi
D(io)sc. MM. = Pedanii Dioscoridis anazerbei De materia medica libri quinque, ed. Sprengel. IA
Diph. = Diphilus.
Diss(ert). (phil.) Halens. = dissertationes philologiae Halensis. Zacher is in III: de nominibus graecis ... IA
D. L. = Diogenes Laertius. Perseus
D. Leben. nach d. Tode n. d. Vorst. d. a. Israel = Das Leben nach dem Tode: Nach den Vorstellungen des alten Israel und des Judentums ..., Schwally. IA
D. Myth. = Handbuch der deutschen Mythologie, Simrock. IA
Dox. = Diels, Doxographi Graeci. IA
D. P. = Dionysius Periegetes. IA
D. S. = Diodorus Siculus. Perseus
E. (or Eur.) = Euripides. Perseus
Econ. of Ath. = The Public Economy of the Athenians, Böckh. Hathi
E. Gud. = Etymologicum Graecae linguae Gudianum et alia grammaticorum scripta e codicibus manuscriptis nunc primum editam, ed. Sturz. Hathi
Einl. (Ges. gr. Spr.) = Einleitung in der Geschichte der griechische Sprache, Kretschmer. IA
E.M. = Etymologicum magnum. IA
Emped. = Empedocles. In Vors. below.
Ench. = Enchiridion of Epictetus. Perseus
Ep. ad Cor. = Paul, Epistle to the Corinthians. Perseus
Ep. Cr. = Epistola critica, Ruhnken, 2 vols. Google Books
Ep. Cycl. (Cykl.) = Der epische Cyclus, oder, Die homerischen Dichter, Welcker, 2 vols. IA
Ἐφ. Ἀρχ. = Ἀρχαιολογικὴ ἐφημερίς. Accessible from http://ancientworldonline.blogspot.com/2020/01/open-access-journal.html
Ephor. = Ephorus. In FHG. below.
Ep(ic). Fr. = Epicorum graecorum fragmenta, ed. Kinkel. IA
Epich. = Epicharmus. In PLG., vol. 2, below.
Epict(et). = Epictetus. Perseus
Epidemics of the M. A. = The Epidemics of the Middle Ages, Hecker. IA
Epigr. Gr. (or Ep. in part of the last chapter) = Epigrammata Graeca, ed. Kaibel. IA
Epiktet u. d. Stoa = Epictet und die Stoa, Bonhöffer. IA
Epimenides s. de lustrat. = Epimenides sive de veterum gentilium lustrationibus syntagma, Lomeier. IA
Epitaph. = Epitaphius, in Hyperidis Orationes sex cvm ceterarvm fragmentis, ed. Blass. IA
Ep., Sent. = Epicurus, Sententiae. IA
Erläut. zu Herodots 2. B. = Herodots zweites Buch mit sachlichen Erläuterungen, Wiedemann. IA
Ersch-Gruber = Allgemeine Encyclopädie der Wissenschaften und Künste, Ersch, Gruber, et al. IA
E.T. = English Translation.
Ét. de mythol. et d’arch. égypt. = Études de mythologie et d'archéologie égyptiennes. Vol. 1 at https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k555206.texteImage
Eth. Eud. = Ethica Eudemica, Aristotle. Perseus
Eudoc., Viol. = Pseudo-Eudocia, Violarium recensuit et emendabat, fontium testimonia subscripsit Ioannes Flach. Hathi
Eun. VS. = Eunapius, Vitae Sophistarum. https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k62357919/f471.image
Eus. Arm. = Eusebius (Armenian: text of Chronicon) see Hier. below.
Eust. = Eustathius. IA has his commentaries on Homer.
Exc. = Schliemann's excavations: an archaeological and historical study, Schuchhardt. IA
Ἐξηγ. = Ἐξηγητικόν.
ἐξηγ. πυθόχρ. = ἐξηγηταί πυθόχρηστοι.
Fast. Att. = Fasti Attici, Corsini. IA
Fest. = Festus, De Verborum Significatione. Hathi
Festg. f. Ihering = Festgabe der Göttinger Juristen-Fakultät für Rudolf von Jhering. Hathi
FHG. = Fragmenta Historicorum Graecorum. http://www.dfhg-project.org
Firm. (Mat.) = Firmicus Maternus. Error. P.R. = De errore profanarum religionum. IA
Flor. = Florus. IA
Forsch. zu Arist. Ἀθ. πολ. = Literarische und historische Forschungen zu Aristoteles Athenanion POLITEIA, Bauer. IA
F(ouil). d’Epid(aur). = Fouilles d’ Epidaure. https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k3174772.texteImage
Frag. Epic. = Ep. Fr. above.
Fr. Trag. = Tragicorum graecorum fragmenta, Nauck. IA
Gal. = Galen. https://www.biusante.parisdescartes.fr/histoire/medica/
GDI. = Sammlung der griechischen Dialekt-Inschriften, Collitz. IA
Gebärden der Gr. u. R. = Die Gebärden der Griechen und Römer, Sittl. IA
Gell. = Aulus Gellius. Perseus
Geog. = Geographie von Griechenland, Bursian. IA
Gesch. d. Abip.
Gesch. Ideen Islam = Geschichte der herrschenden Ideen des Islams: der Gottesbegriff, die Prophetie und Staatsidee, v. Kremer. IA
Ges. d. Psychol. = Geschichte der Psychologie, Siebeck. IA
Ges. Schr. = Gesammelte Schriften.
Get. = Getica, in Romana et Getica, ed. Mommsen. IA
Gothofred. ad Cod. Theod. = Gothofredus, De statu paganorum sub christianis imperatoribus: seu commentarius ad titulum X de paganis libri XVI codicis Theodosiani. IA
Gottesdienstl. Alterth. = Lehrbuch der gottesdienstlichen Alterthümer der Griechen, Hermann. IA
Gött. Gel. Anz. = Göttingische Gelehrte Anzeigen. https://de.wikisource.org/wiki/
Gp. = Geoponica. IA
Graecoitalische Rechts. = Graecoitalische Rechtsgeschichte, Leist. IA
Gr. Alt. = Handbuch der griechischen Staatsaltertümer, Gilbert, 2 vols. Hathi
Gr. Culte u. Mythen = Die griechischen Culte und Mythen in ihren Beziehungen zu den orientalischen Religionen, Gruppe. Vol. 1 at IA
Gr. Dial. = Die griechischen Dialekte auf Grundlage von Ahrens’ Werk: “De Graecae linguae dialectis”, Meister. IA
G(ree)k Pap(yri) in B.M. = Greek Papyri in the British Museum, Kenyon. IA
Greg. Cor. = Gregorii Corinthii et aliorum grammaticorum libri de dialectis linguae graecae, ed. Schaefer. IA
Greg. Nz. = Gregory Nazianzus. Migne.
Gr. Etym. = Grundzüge der griechischen Etymologie, Curtius. IA
(Gr.) Götterl. = Griechische Götterlehre, Welcker, 3 vols. IA has 1 and 3, all at Hathi
Gr. Gramm. = Griechische Grammatik, Meyer. IA
Griech. Märchen von dankbaren Thieren = Griechische Märchen von dankbaren Tieren und Verwandtes, Marx. IA
Griech. Personennamen = Die griechischen Personennamen nach ihrer Bildung erklärt und systematisch geordnet, Fick. IA
Griech. Sicil. Vasenb. = Griechische und sicilische Vasenbilder, Benndorf. IA
Grimm = Grimm, Deutsche Mythologie, translated as Teutonic Mythology, by J. S. Stallybrass, 1880. IA
Gr. Insc. in B.M. = The collection of ancient Greek inscriptions in the British Museum. IA
Gr. Lit. = Griechische Literaturgeschichte, Bergk, 4 vols. IA
Gr. Märchen = Griechische Märchen, Sagen und Volkslieder, Schmidt. IA
Gr. Mysterienw. = Das antike Mysterienwesen in seinem Einfluss auf das Christentum, Anrich. IA
Gr. Rechtsalt. = Lehrbuch der griechischen antiquitäten: Lehrbuch der griechischen Rechtsaltertümer von Dr. Karl Friedrich Hermann, revised Th. Thalheim. IA
Gr. Roman = Der griechische Roman und seine Vorläufer, Rohde. IA
Gr. Staatsalt. = Lehrbuch der griechischen Staatsalteertümer, aus dem standpuncte der geschichte entworfen, Hermann. IA
Gr. u. alb. Märchen = Griechische und albanesische Märchen, Hahn. IA
Gr. Vereinswesen = Das Griechische Vereinswesen, Ziebarth. IA
h. (Hom.) = [Homeric] Hymn. Ap. = Apollo; Cer. = Demeter; Merc. = Hermes; Ven. = Aphrodite. Perseus
Halm = Fabulae Æsopicae collectae, ed. Halm. IA
h. crit. com. = historiam criticam comicorum graecorum = Vol. 1 of Mein. Com. below. IA
Harp. = Harpocration. Perseus
Hcl. = Heraclit. below.
Hdn. Gr. = Herodianus Grammaticus, Herodiani Technici Reliquiae, ed. Lenz. IA
Hdt. = Herodotus. Perseus
[Hdt.] V. Hom. = Pseudo-Herodotus, Vita Homeri. Not at Perseus, some editions of Herodotus include it at IA
Hegesipp. = Hegesippos. In AP. above.
Heliod. = Heliodorus, Aethiopicorum libri decem, ed. Bekker. IA
Hellan. = Hellanicus. In FHG. above.
Hemst. Luc. = Hemsterhuis, Lucani Samosatensis Opera, 10 vols. Hathi.
Heort. = Heortologie: antiquarische Untersuchungen über die städtischen Feste der Athener, Mommsen. IA
Heraclid. (or Herakl(id).) (Pont.) Pol. = Heraclides Ponticus, Politica. IA
Heraclit. = Heracleitus. In Vors. below.
Heraklit. Briefe = Die Heraklitischen Briefe: ein Beitrag zur philosophischen und religionsgeschichtlichen Literatur, Bernays. IA
Herod(es) Att. = Herodes Atticus. IA
Heroenvögel in d. gr. Myth. = Heroenvögel in der griechischen Mythologie mit einem Anhange über Diomedes in Italien, Holland. IA
Herond. = Herondas. IA
Hes. = Hesiod. Persius
Hier. Chr. = Jerome, Chronicon. IA
Hier. Rh. frag. = Hieromymi Rhodii peripatetici fragmenta, ed. Hiller. IA
Hiller v. Gärtr. = Hiller von Gärtringen. Ref. in note 6 of chapter 3 is to https://de.wikisource.org/wiki/RE:Aristaios_1
Him. = Himerius. Himerii sophistae quae reperiri potuerunt... Google Books.
Hipp(ol). RH. = Hippolytus, Refutatio Omnium Haeresium, https://www.deutsche-digitale-bibliothek.de
Hippocr. = Hp. below. Hippocrates, π. παρθενίων (Littré) is at https://www.biusante.parisdescartes.fr/histoire/medica/
Hippon. = Hipponax. In PLG., vol. 2, below.
Hist. Num. = Historia Numorum, a Manual of Greek Numismatics, Head. http://hno.huma-num.fr
hist. Zeits. = Historische Zeitschrift. Hathi
H. Mag. = Hymni Magici.
H. Mag. Hec., Abel, Orph., = Abel, Orphica. IA
Hom. = Homer, who is quoted by the majuscules of the Greek alphabet for the books of the Iliad, by the minuscules for the Odyssey. Perseus
Hom. Epos. = Das homerische Epos aus den Denkmälern erläutert, archäologische Untersuchungen, Helbig. IA
Hom. Schiffskat. = Der homerische Schiffskatalog als historische Quelle betrachte, Niese. IA
H(om). T(heol). = Homerische Theologie, Nägelsbach. IA
Hor. = Horace. Perseus
H. Orph. = De Hymnis Orphicis Capitula Quinque, Dieterich. IA
Hp. = Hippokrates. http://galen.bbaw.de/epubl/online/editionencmg_01.html
Hsch./Hesych. = Hesychius. Lexicon. IA
H. Smyrn. = Hermippus of Smyrna. IA (details/hermippifragmen00hermgoog)
Hug, Plat. Symp. = Platons Symposion, ed. Hug. IA
Hyg(in). = Hyginus. Hygini Fabulae. Hathi
Hyp. = Hyperides. Epit. = Epitaphios, Funeral Oration. Perseus.
Iamb. = Iamblichus, de Myst. = De mysteriis. IA
Protr. = Protrepticus. IA
Theol. Arith. = Theologumena arithmeticae. Hathi
VP. = De vita Pythagorica. IA
IG. = Inscriptiones Graeciae.
IG. Ant. = Inscriptiones graecae antiquissimae praeter atticas in Attica repertas, ed. Roehl. IA
IGM. Aeg. = IG., Vol. XII, Inscriptiones insularum maris Aegaei praeter Delum, several vols.
IGS(ept). = IG., Vol. VII, Inscriptiones Graeciae septentrionalis. IA
IG. Sic. et It. = Inscriptiones Graecae Siciliae et Italiae. IA
Ind. Schol. Bonn. hib. = Index scholarum quae, ..., in Universitate Fridericia Guilelmia Rhenana ... publice privatimque habebuntur. Commentatio de Pindaro dogmatis de migratione animarum cultore, Lübbert. https://digitale-sammlungen.ulb.uni-bonn.de/periodical/titleinfo/5849103
Ind. Schol. Götting. hib. = Index scholarum publice et privatim in academia Georgia Augusta....., Commentariolum Metricum II, Wilamowitz--Moellendorff. Google Books
Ind. Stoic. = Stóicorum Index Herculanensis, ed. Comparetti, in “Papiro Ercolanese Inedito”, Rivista di filologia e di istruzione classica iii (1875). IA
Inscr. Cos, = The Inscriptions of Cos, Paton and Hicks. IA
Ins(cr). Perg. = Inschriften von Pergamon ed. Fraenkel. https://www.deutsche-digitale-bibliothek.de
Introd. to Scient. Myth. = Introduction to a Scientific System of Mythology, Müller. IA
IPE. = Inscriptiones antiquae orae septentrionalis Ponti Euxini Graecae et Latinae, ed. Latyschev. IA
Is. = Isaeus. Perseus
Isig(on). = Isigonus in FHG. above.
Isoc. = Isocrates. Perseus
Jahrb. arch. Inst. = Jahrbuch des Kaiserlich Deutschen Archäologischen Instituts. https://de.wikisource.org/wiki/
Jahr(b). (f.) Phil(ol). = Jahrbücher für classische Philologie. https://de.wikisource.org/wiki/
Jb. Philol. Supp. = Jahrbücher für classische Philologie. Supplementband. Gruppe is in IA (details/jahrbcherfrclas01flecgoog)
Jb. Prot. Theol. = Jahrbücher für protestantische Theologie. http://idb.ub.uni-tuebingen.de/opendigi/jpth
JHS.
J. M. = Justin Martyr. Hathi
Jos. = Josephus. Perseus
Jul. = Julian. Chr., = Iuliani imperatoris librorum contra Christianos quae supersunt, ed. Neumann. IA
Ep. = Epistulae, Or. = Orationes, both in Iuliani imperatoris quae supersunt praeter reliquias apud Cyrillum omnia, ed. Hertlein, vol. 1. IA
Jul. Valer. = Julius Valerius, Res gestae Alexandri Macedonis translatae ex Aesopo graeco. IA
Justin. = Justinus, historiarvm Philippicarvm T. Pompeii Trogi libri xliv in epitomen redacti. IA
Co. ad Gr. = Cohortatio ad Graecos, attributed falsely to Justin Martyr. Migne
Kink. = Kinkel. Usually referring to Epicorum graecorum fragmenta, IA
Kl. S(chr). = Kleine Schriften.
Königsb. Stud. = Königsberger Studien. Vol. 1. Google Books
Kuhns Ztschr. = Zeitschrift für vergleichende Sprachforschung auf dem Gebiete des Deutschen, Griechischen und Lateinischen. 1860 at Google Books
Kynanth. = Das von der “Kynanthropie” handelnde Fragment des Marcellus von Side, Roscher. IA
Kypros u. Ursp. Aphrod. = Kypros und der Ursprung des Aphroditekultus, Enmann. IA
Laber. = Laberius, in Comicorum Latinorum reliquiae, ed. Ribbeck (vol. 2 of Scenicae Romanorum poesis fragmenta). IA
Lac. Culte = Lakonische Kulte, Wide. Hathi
Lact(ant). = Lactantius. Inst. = De divinis institutionibus. Hathi has Lucii Caecilii Firmiani Lactantii Opera omnia.
(La) magie et l’astrol. dans l’antiq. = La magie et l'astrologie dans l'antiquité et au moyen age, Maury. IA
Lamprid. = Lampridius. Alleged author of part of the Historia Augusta. IA
Leben n. Todt n. Vorst. alt. Israël = Das Leben nach dem Tode: Nach den Vorstellungen des alten Israel und des Judentums, Schwally. IA
Leg. Novell. Theodos. = Liber Legum Novellarum Divi Theodosii. https://droitromain.univ-grenoble-alpes.fr/
Leg. Sacr. = Leges Graecorum Sacrae ..., von Prott and Ziehen. IA (1906 edition, not 1896) (Dissert. seems to be by von Prott alone.)
Leip(z). Stud. = Leipziger Studien zur classischen Philologie. https://de.wikisource.org/wiki/
Les lécythes blancs attiques à représ. funér. = Étude sur les lécythes blancs attiques à représentations funéraires, Pottier. https://www.persee.fr/doc/bch_0007-4217_1884_num_8_1_4109
les rel. des peuples non-civ. = Les religions des peuples non-civilisés, Réville, 2 vols. Vol. 1 at Google Books
Lex. = Myth. Lex. below.
Liban. = Libanius, Orationes. https://opengreekandlatin.github.io/libanius-dev/
Litt. Ztg. = Deutsche Literaturzeitung für Kritik der internationalen Wissenschaft. 1896 at IA
Lob. = Lobeck. Agl. = Aglaophamus, 3 books. IA
Aj. = his edition of Sophocles’ Ajax. IA,
Paralip. = Paralipomena grammaticae Graecae, 2 vols. IA
Pathol. prol. = Pathologiae sermonis graeci, prolegomena. IA
Rhemat. = Rhematikon sive, Verborum graecorum et nominum verbalium technologia. IA
Localsage von den Gräbern Agamem. = Die mykenische Lokalsage von den Gräbern Agamemnons und der Seinen im Zusammenhange der griechischen Sagenentwicklung, Belger. A pdf is available at https://tpsalomonreinach.mom.fr
Luc. = Lucian. Perseus
Lucr. = Lucretius. Perseus
Lustr. = de Veterum Gentilium Lustrationibus Syntagma, Lomeier. IA
Lyc. = Lycophron. Perseus
Lyc. Inscr. = The Lycian Inscriptions ..., Schmidt. IA
Lycurg. = Lycurgus. Perseus
Lyd. Mens. = (John) Lydus, de Mensibus. IA
Lys. = Lysias. Perseus
Macr(ob). = Macrobius. IA
Malal. = Malalas, John. chronographia. Hathi
M. Ant. = Marcus Aurelius. De rebus suis, sive, De eis quæ ad se pertinere censebat, libri XII..., ed. Gataker. IA
Marcellin. V. Th. = Marcellinus, Vita Thucydidis. Hathi
Marc. Emp. = Marcellus Empiricus, De medicamentis liber, ed. Helmreich. IA
Marin., V. Procli = Marinus, Vita Procli. IA
Mart. = Martial. Perseus
Mart. Cap. = Martianus Capella. De nuptiis philologiae, et Mercurii, et de septem artibus liberalibus libri novem. IA
Max. T(yr). = Maximus Tyrius. IA
Mein. Com. = Fragmenta comicorum Graecorum, ed. Meineke, 5 vols. in 7 parts. Vol. III IA (details/fragmentacomico11meingoog); Vol. IV IA (/details/fragmentacomicor04meinuoft)
Melanipp. = Melanippides. In PLG., vol. 3.
Mém. de l’Inst. de Fr., Ac. des Ins. = Mémoires de l’Institut national de France, Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres. The article by Raoul-Rochette is here: https://www.persee.fr/doc/minf_0398-3609_1838_num_13_2_1291?q=Raoul+Rochette
Mém. sur les îles et la course cons. à Achille = Mémoire sur les îles et la Course consacrées à Achille, Koehler.
Menand. = Menander. Menandri et Philemonis reliquiae, ed. Meineke. Hathi.
Men(and). Rhet. = Menander Rhetor. In Rhetores Graeci, ed. Spengel, vol. 2. IA (details/bub_gb_g31KAAAAYAAJ)
Metrod. = Metrodorus, ed. Körte. IA
Mimn. = Mimnermus. In PLG., vol. 2.
Min(uc). (Fel.) = Minucius Felix. Perseus
Mission arch. de Macédoine = Mission archéologique de Macédoine, Heuzey and Daumet. https://arachne.uni-koeln.de
Mit. arch. Inst. röm. Abt. = Mitteilungen des Deutschen Archäologischen Instituts, Römische Abteilung. https://www.digizeitschriften.de/en/dms/toc/?PID=PPN783873484
Mon. Germ., Chron. = Monumenta Germaniae Historica; the quotation is from Die Limburger Chronik des Tilemann Elhen von Wolfhagen, ed. Wyss. https://www.dmgh.de/mgh_dt_chron_4_1/index.htm#page/(25)/mode/1up
Mon(um). d(ell’) Inst(it). = Monumenti dell' Instituto.
Myth. Gr. = ? Mythographoi scriptores poeticae historiae Graeci, ed. Westermann. IA [the ? because the numbers in note 4 of ch. 7 do not properly fit]
Myth. Lex. = Ausführliches Lexikon der griechischen und römischen Mythologie, ed. Roscher, several volumes. IA (guide at https://de.wikisource.org/wiki/Ausführliches_Lexikon_der_griechischen_und_römischen_Mythologie)
Mythol. d. gr(iech). St. = Mythologie der griechischen Stämme, Müller. IA
Mythol. Forsch. = Mythologische Forschungen, Mannhardt. IA
Myth. v. d. Weltaltern = Abhandlung über den Mythus von den fünf Menchengeschlechtern bei Hesiod und die indische Lehre von den vier Weltaltern, Roth. https://publikationen.uni-tuebingen.de/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10900/44017/pdf/RothVerzeichnis-1860.pdf
Nachhom. Theol. = Die nachhomerische Theologie des griechischen Volksglaubens bis auf Alexander dargestellt, Nägelsbach. IA
Nek. = Nekyia, Dieterich. IA
Nemes., Nat. Hom. = Nemesius, de natura hominis. IA
Nep. = Cornelius Nepos. Perseus
Neunzahl = Die Neunzahl bei den Ostariern, Kaegi. Hathi
Nic(andr). Th. = Nicander, Theriaca et Alexipharmaca ed. Otto Schneider. IA
Nic. Dam., Paradox. = Nicolaus of Damascus, in Paradoxographoi. Scriptores rerum mirabilium graeci, ed. Westermann. Hathi
Nicol. Prog. = Nicolaus Rhetor, Progymnasmata. IA
Nonn., D. = Nonnus, Dionysiaca. IA
Nordd. Sag. = Norddeutsche Sagen, Märchen und Gebräuche, Kuhn and Schwartz. IA
Nouv. annales des voyages = Nouvelles annales des voyages. https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb32826375m/date
Novell. Valentin. = Liber Legum Novellarum Divi Valentiniani. https://droitromain.univ-grenoble-alpes.fr/
O. = Orpheus. fr. in Abel, see Orph. below.
Obs. = Iulius Obsequens. Rohde used Julii Obsequentis quae supersunt ex libro de prodigiis, IA; Hollis adds this version: https://documentacatholicaomnia.eu/03d/0300-0400,_Iulius_Obsequens,_Prodigiorum_Liber,_LT.pdf
Oinom. = Oenomaus.
Onomakr. = Onomakritos.
Opp., H. = Oppian, Halieutica. Perseus
Op(usc). = Opuscula (Bergk: philologica = Kleine philologische Schriften, 2 vols. IA)
(Ritschl: philologica, 5 vols. IA has vols. 1 and 4)
Opusc. Ac. = Opuscula Academica, Göttling. https://opacplus.bsb-muenchen.de
Orchom. = Orchomenos und die Minyer, Müller. IA
Orelli, Ins. = Inscriptionum Latinarum Selectarum Collectio, 2 vols. (1259 is in vol. 1). Hathi
Orig., Cels. = Origen, contra Celsum. (L. = Lommatzsch.) IA
Orph. = Orpheus. Arg. = Orphei Argonautica, in Orphica, ed. Abel. IA
H. = Hymns. Ibid.
[Orph.] L. = Orphei Lithica, v. de Lap. above, or ibid.
Or. Sib. = Oracula Sibyllina, Alexandre. IA (The reference [and ii] seems more pertinent to his Excursus ad Sibyllina, also IA.)
Ov. = Ovid. Perseus
Pall. = Palladius, de Re Rustica. IA
P. Anastasy = Papyri Anastasi.
Pantsch. = Pantschatantra: fünf Bücher indischer Fabeln, Märchen und Erzählungen, Benfey. IA
Pap. Mag. = Prolegomena ad papyrum magicam Musei Lugdunensis Batavi, Dieterich. IA (also in his Kleine Schriften, IA)
Paradoxogr. = Paradoxographus Apollonius in Rerum naturalium scriptores graeci minores, ed. Keller. IA
Paraphr. ant. Lyc. = Lycophronis Alexandra, cum paraphrasibus ad codicum fidem recensita et emendata, indices subiecti, ed. Scheer, 2 vols. IA
Papers of the Amer. School at Athens = Papers of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens. https://digi.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/diglit/ascsapapers
Parth. = Parthenius. IA
Paul. Fest(i). = Paulus = Sexti Pompei Festi, De verborum significatu quae supersunt com Pauli epitome. IA
Paul., Sent. = Paulus, Sententiae. https://droitromain.univ-grenoble-alpes.fr/Responsa/paulus.html
Pauly-Wiss. = Pauly-Wissowa, Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft. https://de.wikisource.org/wiki/
Paus. = Pausanias. Perseus
Pers. = Persius. Perseus
Pers. = Auli Persii Flacci Satirarum liber, ed. Jahn. IA [mostly a play by Aeschylus]
Petr(on). = Petronius. Perseus
Pherecr. = Pherecrates. In Comicorum Atticorum Fragmenta, vol. 1, ed. Theodor Kock. IA
Philarg. = Philargyrius. IA (details/commentariiinvi01servgoog)
Phil. d. Griech = Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung, Zeller. Hathi
Phil. d. mittl. Stoa = Die Philosophie der mittleren Stoa in ihrem geschichtlichen Zusammenhange, Schmekel. IA
Philem. = Philemon.
Philo = Philo, Incor. Mund. = De Incorruptibilitate Mundi
Leg. ad G. = Legatio ad Gaium. http://www.documentacatholicaomnia.eu/
Leg. Alleg. = Legum Allegoriæ. IA (details/bub_gb__hQJAQAAIAAJ/)
Q. omn. Prob. = Quod Omnis Probus Liber. http://www.documentacatholicaomnia.eu/
Mund. Op. = De Opificio Mundi. http://www.documentacatholicaomnia.eu/
Q. rer. div. = Quis Rerum Divinarum Heres Sit. http://www.documentacatholicaomnia.eu/
Spec. Leg. = De Specialibus Legibus. IA (details/bub_gb_jTA1AAAAIAAJ/)
Vit. Cont. = De Vita Contemplativa. http://www.documentacatholicaomnia.eu/
Vict. Off. = de victimas offerentibus. IA (details/operaomnia04phil)
Philoch. = Philochorus. In FHG.
Philod(em). = Philodemus, Mort. = On death. In Academicorum philosophorum index herculanensis, ed. Mekler. IA
Piet. = On piety, Philodem über Frömmigkeit, ed. Gomperz. Hathi
Philol. = Philologus. IA
Philos. d. Heraklit im Lichte der Mysterienidee = Die Philosophie des Heraklit von Ephesus im Lichte der Mysterienidee, Pfleiderer. Hathi
Philos(tr). = Philostratus. Perseus
Phld. = Philodemus. IA
Phlegon, Macr. = Macrobii, in Rerum naturalium scriptores Graeci minores, ed. Keller. Hathi
Phot. = Photius, Lexicon. IA
Bibl. = Bibliotheca. Migne
Phryn. = Phrynicus, Phrynichi eclogae nominum et verborum atticorum, ed. Lobeck. Hathi
Pi. = Pindar. (PLG., vol. 1.) Perseus
Pl. = Plato. Perseus
Platon. Frage = Zur Lösung der Platonischen Frage, Pfleiderer. IA
Pl(aton). Fr(age) = Die platonische Frage, Teichmüller. IA
Platon. Staat = Der platonische Staat, Krohn. IA
Plaut. = Plautus. Perseus
Plb. (or Polyb.) = Polybius. Perseus
PLG. = Poetae Lyrici Graeci, Bergk, 3 vols, ed. 4. IA
Plin. = Pliny (the Elder), NH. = Naturalis Historia. Perseus
Ep. = Epistulae of Pliny the Younger. Perseus
Plot. = Plotinus. IA
Plu. = Plutarch. Perseus
PMagPar. = Paris Magical Papyrus, ed. Wessely. Actually in Denkschriften der Kaiserlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Philosophisch-historische Classe, 1888. IA (details/DenkschriftenPhilHist36)
Poll. = Pollux, Onomasticon. IA
Polyaen. = Polyaenus, Polyaeni Strategematon libri octo ex recensione Edvardi Woelfflin. IA
Popul. Aufs = Populäre Aufsätze aus dem Alterthum vorzugsweise zur Ethik und Religion der Griechen, Lehrs. IA
Porph. = Porphyrius, Abs(t). = De abstinentia ab esu animalium
Antr. = De antro nympharum
VP. = Vita Pythagorae. IA have these in Porphyrii Philosophi Platonici opuscula selecta, ed. Nauck
Ep. Aneb. = Epistula ad Anebonem. IA in a text by Iamblichus de Myst.
V. Plot. = Vita Plotini.
Pos. = de Pos. Rhod. above.
Poseid. = Poseidonius.
Prescott, Peru = History of the Conquest of Peru, Prescott. IA
Preuss. Exped. nach Ostasien = Die preussische Expedition nach Ostasien während der Jahre 1860-1862, Spiess. IA
Proc. Gaz. = Procopius Gazaeus. Ep. in Epistolographi graeci. ed. Hercher. IA
Procl. = Proclus. On Hesiod, Gainsford (ed.), Poetae minores Graeci, vol. 2: Scholia ad Hesiodum. https://books.google.it/
For Chrest. see Ep. Fr. above.
Procop. = Procopius. Perseus
Proleg. zu Platons Staat = Prolegomena Zu Platons Staat Und Der Platonischen Und Aristotelischen Staatslehre, Dümmler. Hathi
Prop. = Propertius. Perseus
Prud. Sym. = Prudentius, Contra Symmachum. Perseus
Psychol. d. Naturv. = Die Psychologie der Naturvölker, Robinsohn. IA
Quaest. Pseudohippocrat. = Studia pseudippocratea, Ilberg. IA
quaest. sacr. = Quaestiones Sacrificales, Stengel. IA
Quint. Decl. = Quintilian, Declamationes. IA
Q.S. = Quintus Smyrnaeus. IA
R. = Rose (for Aristotle: Aristoteles pseudepigraphus, IA).
Realencykl. d. christl. Alterth. = Realencyklopädie der christlichen Alterthümer Bd. II, Kraus. IA
Reise d. Geg. nörd. Griechen = Reise durch einige Gegenden des nördlichen Griechenlands, Stephani. https://www.deutsche-digitale-bibliothek.de
Rel. d. Ved. = Die Religion des Veda, Oldenburg. IA. (IA also has the French translation Hollis often refers to.)
Relig. d. Afrikan. Naturv = Die Religion der afrikanischen Naturvölker, Schneider. IA
Rel. rom. d’Aug. aux Ant. = La religion romaine d'Auguste aux Antonins, Boissier. IA
Rev. Arch. = Revue archéologique. https://gallica.bnf.fr
Rhaps. Theog. = Die rhapsodische Theogonie und ihre bedeutung Innerhalb der orphischen Litteratur, Gruppe. Hathi
Rhes. = Rhesus play by Euripides.
Rh(et). Gr. = Rhetores graeci, ed. Walz, 9 vols. IA
Rh. Mus. = Rheinisches Museum. https://rhm.phil-fak.uni-koeln.de/suche
Röm. Myth(ol). = Römische Mythologie, Preller. IA
Röm. Staatsverw. = Römische Staatsverwaltung, Marquardt. IA
Ross, Arch. Aufs. = Archäologische Aufsätze, Ross. https://digi.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/diglit/ross1855ga
Inscr. Gr. = Inscriptiones graecae ineditae, several volumes. IA
Rufin., Vit. Patr. = Rufinus, Vitae Patrum. IA
Ruhnk., Tim. = Tim. Lex. below.
S. (or Soph.) = Sophokles. Perseus
Sall. = Sallust. Perseus
Sallust., de Dis = Sallustius, De Dis et Mundo. IA
Samml(ung) Sab(uroff). = Die Sammlung Sabouroff: Kunstdenkmäler aus Griechenland, ed. Furtwångler. https://digi.ub.uni-heidelberg.de
Sarkophagstud. = Sarkophag-Studien, Fredrich. In Nachrichten von der Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen. Philologisch-Historische Klasse, 1895. IA (details/nachrichten1895akaduoft)
S. (or St.) Byz. = Stephani Byzantii Ethnicorum quae supersunt, ed. Meineke. IA
Sch. = Scholium.
S. E. = Sextus Empiricus. IA
Semon. = Semonides of Amorgos. In PLG., vol. 2. [spelt Simonides].
Sen. = Seneca. Perseus
Serv. = Servius. Perseus
Sicil. u. unterital. Vasenb. = This seems to be a mistake for Griech. Sicil. Vasenb. above (whose p. 33 addresses what is missing on vase paintings of funerals).
SIG. = Dittenberger, Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum. IA
Simon. = Simonides of Keos. In PLG., vol. 3 above.
Simp., de An. = Simplicii in libros Aristotelis De anima commentaria: consilio et auctor ..., ed. Hayduck. IA
Sitzb. Berl. Ak. = Sitzungsberichte der Königlich Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin. https://de.wikisource.org/wiki/
Sitzb. Wien. Ac. = Sitzungsberichte der Philosophisch-Historischen Classe der Kaiserlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften. https://de.wikisource.org/wiki/
[Socr.] Epist. = Epistulae Socraticae. In Epistolographi graeci, Hercher. IA
Sol. = Solon. In PLG., vol. 2.
Solin. = C. Ivlii Solini Collectanea rervm memorabilivm. Hathi
Sop. = Sopater. In Rh. Gr. above.
Sophr. = Sophron.
Soran., V. H(ip)p. = Soranus, Vita Hippocratis. http://cmg.bbaw.de/epubl/online/cmg_04.php?p=197
Soz., HE. = Sozomen, ecclesiastica historia. Hathi
Spec. Leg. = De specialibus legibus, Philo. https://opengreekandlatin.github.io/philo-dev/
Spracheinh. d. Indog. Europ. = Die ehemalige Spracheinheit der Indogermanen Europas, Fick. IA
Staat in Il. u. Od. = Der Staat in der Ilias und Odyssee, Fanta. IA
Steph. Baluz., Vit. Pap. Avinion. = Vitae Paparum Avenionensium, Stephanus Baluzius. IA
Sts. = Stesichoros. in PLG., vol. 3.
Stob. = Stobaeus. Hathi
Sto. Vet. = Stoicorum veterum fragmenta collegit Ioannes ab Arnim. IA
Str(a). = Strabo. Perseus
Struve, Opusc. Crit. = Caroli Ludovici Struve opuscula selecta edidit Jacobus Theodorus Struve, Vol. 2. IA
Stud. u. Charact. = Studien und Charakteristiken zur griechischen und römischen Literaturgeschichte, Teuffel. IA
Stud. z. Ges. d. Begr. = Studien zur Geschichte der Begriffe. Teichmüller. IA
Suet. = Suetonius. Perseus
Suid. = Suidas. IA
Syll. = Sylloge epigrammatum Graecorum, ex marmoribus et libris collegit et illustr. F.T. Welcker. IA
Syll. Insc. Boeot. = Sylloge inscriptionum Boeoticarum, Keil. IA
Sync. = Syncellus, ed. Dindorff. IA
Synes., Aeg. = Synesios des Kyrenaeers Aegyptische Erzählungen über die Vorsehung: Griechisch und Deutsch, Krabinger. Hathi
System d. Vedânta = Das System des Vedânta, Deussen. IA
Tab. Defix. = Tabellae Defixionum ed. Wünsch (Appendix to CIA.). IA
Tac. = Tacitus. Perseus
Tat. Gr. = Tatian, Oratio ad Graecos. Hathi
Tert(ul). = Tertullian. https://www.tertullian.org
Th. = Thucydides. Perseus
Theb. Held. = Thebanische Heldenlieder, Bethe. IA
Themist., de An. = Themistius, In libros Aristotelis De anima paraphrasis .... IA
Theoc. = Theocritus. Perseus
Theod. Met. Misc. = Theodorus Metachites, Miscellanea philosophica et historica. IA
Theodoret. Gr. Aff. C. = Theodoreti Graecarum affectionum curatio. IA [The reference is to page 207 of the IA version, edited by Raeder, in which it is chapter vii; it was sermo viii in Sylburg’s edition. I do not know what 599 is doing.]
Theogon. = De Orphei Epimenidis Pherecydis theogoniis quaestiones critica, Kern. IA
Theol. Lehr. d. Gr. D(enker) = Die theologischen Lehren der griechischen Denker, Krische. Hathi
Theol(ogum). Arith(m). = Theologumena arithmeticae. IA
Theopomp. = Theopompus.
Thgn. = Theognis. IA
Thphr. = Theophrastus. Perseus
Tibull. = Tibullus. Perseus
Tim. Lex. = Timaeus, Lexicon vocum Platonicarum, ed. Ruhnken. IA
Treb. Poll. = Trebellius Pollio. Alleged author of part of the Historia Augusta. IA
Tylor = Primitive Culture, Tylor, ed. 4. IA
Tyrt. = Tyrtaeus, in PLG. above.
Tz. = Tzetzes. On Lycophron, Google Books.
on Homer, IA (details/tzetzaeallegori00pselgoog)
Val. Max. = Valerius Maximus. Perseus
Verh. der Philologenvers. zu Rostock = Verhandlungen der dreißigsten Versammlung deutscher Philologen und Schulmänner in Rostock vom 28. September bis 1. October 1875. IA
Verh. Wien. Philol. = Verhandlungen der zweiundvierzigsten Versammlung deutscher Philologen und Schulmänner, Wien, vom 24 bis 27 Mai, 1893. IA
Vg. = Vergil. Perseus
Vitruv. = Vitruvius. Perseus
V.M. = Valerius Maximus. Perseus
Volksl. d. Neugr = Das Volksleben der Neugriechen und das hellenische Alterthum, Schmidt. IA
Volksthüml. a. Schwaben = Volksthümliches aus Schwaben, Birlinger, 2 vols. IA
Vors. = Diels, Fragmente der Vorsokratiker ed. 4 (vol. i unless otherwise indicated). IA
Voy. en Perse = Voyages du Chevalier Chardin en Perse, .... https://books.google.fr/books?id=lwgPAAAAQAAJ
W. (or Wachsm.) = Wachsmuth, Curt.
West. = Westermann, Antonius.
Woch. Klass. Phil. = Wochenschrift für klassische Philologie. https://de.wikisource.org/wiki/
Wyttenb. = Wyttenbach. Most references are in IA
X. (or Xen.) = Xenophon historicus. (HG. = Hellenica) Perseus
Xen. Eph. = Xenophon of Ephesus. Perseus
Xen(ok). = Xenokrates, Heinze. IA
Zeit Constantins d. G. = Die Zeit Constantins des Grossen, Burckhardt. IA
Z. Ges. Wegebaus Gr. = Zur Geschichte des Wegebaus bei den Griechen, Curtius. Hathi
Znb. (or Zenob.) = Zenobius. IA
Zos. = Zosimus. IA
Zschr. f. Ethnologie = Zeitschrift für Ethnologie. https://de.wikisource.org/wiki/
Ztsch. f. Gymn. = Zeitschrift für das Gymnasial-Wesen, 1880 IA (details/sokrateszeitsch21berlgoog)
Ztschr. f. öst. Gymn. = Zeitschrift für die östereichischen Gymnasien. https://de.wikisource.org/wiki/
Ztschr. vergl. Sprachf. = Zeitschrift für vergleichende Sprachforschung auf dem Gebiete der indogermanischen Sprachen. https://de.wikisource.org/wiki/
Ztschr. Völkerpsych. = Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft. https://www.digi-hub.de/viewer/ppnresolver?id=BV041216885
Zu d. gr(iech). Grabschr(iften) = Zu den griechischen Grabschriften, Loch, in Festschrift für Ludwig Friedlånder, 275-295, 1895. IA

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