SUN TZU
ON THE
ART OF WAR

The seventh volume of “Memoirs about the history, sciences, arts, customs, and practices of the Chinese, etc.”^[1] focuses on the Art of War and includes, among other writings, “The Thirteen Articles of Sun-Tse,” translated from Chinese by Jesuit Father Joseph Amiot. Father Amiot seems to have had quite a reputation as a sinologist in his time, and his work was certainly extensive. However, his so-called translation of Sun Tzŭ, when compared to the original, is clearly more of a misrepresentation. It includes a lot that Sun Tzŭ didn’t actually write and very little of what he did. Here’s a good example from the opening sentences of chapter 5:—

Throughout the nineteenth century, which saw significant advancements in the study of Chinese literature, no translator dared to take on Sun Tzŭ, even though his work was recognized as the oldest and best compilation of military science in China. It wasn't until 1905 that the first English translation, by Capt. E. F. Calthrop, R.F.A., was published in Tokyo under the title “Sonshi” (the Japanese version of Sun Tzŭ)^[2]. Unfortunately, it was clear that the translator's understanding of Chinese was insufficient to deal with the many challenges of Sun Tzŭ’s text. He openly admits that without the assistance of two Japanese gentlemen, “the accompanying translation would have been impossible.” One can only wonder why, with their help, the translation turned out to be so poor. It wasn’t just a matter of simple mistakes, which everyone makes. Omissions were common; difficult passages were willfully misrepresented or glossed over. Such errors are less forgivable. They wouldn’t be accepted in any edition of a Greek or Latin classic, and a similar standard of integrity should be expected in translations from Chinese.

I believe this translation is free from flaws of this kind. It wasn't done because I have an inflated view of my abilities; rather, I felt that Sun Tzŭ deserved better than what had happened to him, and I knew I could at least do a better job than my predecessors. At the end of 1908, a new and revised edition of Capt. Calthrop’s translation was published in London, but this time without acknowledging his Japanese collaborators. By then, my first three chapters were already with the printer, so the criticisms from Capt. Calthrop refer to his earlier edition. In the later chapters, I've focused on the second edition. Overall, it's an improvement, although there are still many issues that are unacceptable. Some of the major mistakes have been fixed and gaps filled, but some new errors have appeared as well. The very first sentence of the introduction is shockingly incorrect; and later on, while it mentions “an army of Japanese commentators” on Sun Tzŭ (who are they, anyway?), it doesn't mention the Chinese commentators, who I believe make up a much larger and significantly more important “army.”

A few special features of this volume are worth noting. First, the text has been divided into numbered paragraphs to make cross-referencing easier and to help students overall. The division generally follows Sun Hsing-yen’s edition, but I have sometimes combined two or more of his paragraphs into one. When quoting from other works, Chinese authors usually only provide the title as a reference, which can really hinder research. To address this issue regarding Sun Tzŭ, I’ve included a complete concordance of Chinese characters, inspired by Legge’s exemplary work; however, I have opted for an alphabetical arrangement instead of the radical system he used. Another aspect taken from “The Chinese Classics” is that the text, translation, and notes are printed on the same page; the notes are placed immediately after the relevant passages, following the Chinese method. From the extensive native commentary, I aimed to select only the best parts, occasionally adding the Chinese text when it seemed to highlight interesting literary points. Although this commentary is an important part of Chinese literature, very little of it has been directly made accessible through translation.

X

I can conclude by saying that, since I printed my sheets as I finished them, this work hasn’t had the chance for a final revision. Looking back at the whole piece, without changing the essence of my criticisms, I might have softened some of their harshness in a few places. However, having chosen to be blunt, I won't complain if I get more than just a gentle reprimand in return. In fact, I’ve made sure to equip future critics with plenty of references by providing either the text or a citation for every translated passage. I would even welcome a harsh review, even from that Shanghai critic who looks down on “mere translations.” After all, the worst fate I fear is something like what happened to the clever paradoxes of George in The Vicar of Wakefield.

Ssŭ-ma Ch‘ien provides this biography of Sun Tzŭ:^[4]—

About Sun Tzŭ himself, this is all that Ssŭ-ma Ch‘ien has to say in this chapter. But he goes on to provide a biography of his descendant, 孫臏 Sun Pin, who was born about a hundred years after his famous ancestor’s death and was also a remarkable military genius of his time. The historian refers to him as Sun Tzŭ, and in his preface, we read: Sun Tzu on warfare strategy “Sun Tzŭ had his feet cut off and yet continued to discuss the art of war.”^[6] It seems likely, then, that “Pin” was a nickname given to him after his injury, unless the story was made up to explain the name. The defining moment of his career, the decisive defeat of his treacherous rival P‘ang Chüan, is briefly described on p. 40.

{XIII}

To go back to the older Sun Tzŭ. He's referenced in two other parts of the Shih Chi:—

This is the most recent date on record for Sun Wu. It seems he did not survive his patron, who died from a wound in 496.

In the chapter titled Legal code (the earlier part of which M. Chavannes thinks is a fragment of a treatise on Military Weapons), there's this passage:^[11]

{XIV}

It’s clear that Ssŭ-ma Ch‘ien had no doubt about Sun Wu being a real historical figure; and with one exception, which will be pointed out shortly, he is by far the most significant source on this period. Thus, it won’t be necessary to discuss a work like the Wu Yue Spring and Autumn Wu Yüeh Ch‘un Ch‘iu, supposedly written by 趙曄 Chao Yeh in the 1st century A.D. The attribution is somewhat uncertain; but even if it were reliable, his account would hold little value since it’s based on the Shih Chi and filled with romantic embellishments. The story of Sun Tzŭ can be found, for what it’s worth, in chapter 2. The only new points worth noting are: 1) Sun Tzŭ was first recommended to Ho Lu by Wu Tzŭ-hsü. 2) He is identified as a native of Wu.^[14] 3) He had previously lived a secluded life, and his contemporaries were unaware of his talents.^[15]

The following passage occurs in Huainanzi Huai-nan Tzŭ: “When rulers and ministers act with a twisted mindset, it's impossible even for a Sun Tzŭ to face the enemy.”^[16] Assuming this work is authentic (and so far, no doubts have been raised about it), this is the earliest direct mention of Sun Tzŭ, as Huai-nan Tzŭ passed away in 122 B.C., many years before the Shih Chi was published.

劉向 Liu Hsiang (80 B.C.–9) in his New Introduction says: “The reason why Sun Wu, leading 30,000 men, defeated Ch‘u with 200,000 is that the latter were undisciplined.”^[17]

鄧明世 Têng Ming-shih in his Surname Verification Certificate (finished in 1134) tells us that the surname Grandchild was given to Sun Wu’s grandfather by 景公 Duke Ching of Ch‘i [547–490 B.C.]. Sun Wu’s father, Sun 馮 P‘ing, became a Minister of State in Ch‘i, and Sun Wu himself, whose styled name was Long Qing Ch‘ang-ch‘ing, fled to Wu because of a rebellion started by the family of Abalone T‘ien Pao. He had three sons, the second of whom, named 明 Ming, was the father of Sun Pin. According to this account, Pin was the grandson of Wu, which, considering that Sun Pin’s victory over 魏 Wei happened in 341 B.C., may be seen as chronologically impossible. I don’t know where Têng Ming-shih got this information, but clearly, it cannot be trusted at all.

An interesting document that has survived from the end of the Han period is the brief preface written by the great Cao Cao Ts‘ao Ts‘ao, or Cao Cao Wei Wu Ti, for his edition of Sun Tzŭ. I will provide it in full:—

One thing to note in the above is the clear statement that the 13 chapters were specifically written for King Ho Lu. This is backed up by the internal evidence of I. § 15, where it appears obvious that a ruler is being addressed.

In the bibliographical section of the Han Shu,^[31] there’s an entry that has sparked a lot of debate: 吳孫子八十二篇圖九卷 “The works of Sun Tzŭ of Wu in 82 p‘ien (or chapters), with diagrams in 9 chüan.” It’s clear that this can’t just be the 13 chapters known to Ssŭ-ma Ch‘ien or the ones we have today. Chang Shou-chieh, in his Shiji Zhengyi, mentions an edition of Sun Tzŭ’s military strategy where the “13 chapters” were the first chüan, noting that there were two other chüan as well.^[32] This has led to the theory that most of these 82 chapters were other writings by Sun Tzŭ—we might call them apocryphal—similar to the QA Wên Ta, including a section about the Nine Situations^[33] preserved in the 通典 T‘ung Tien, and another in Ho Shih’s commentary. It is suggested{XVIII} that before his meeting with Ho Lu, Sun Tzŭ had only written the 13 chapters, but afterwards created a sort of interpretation in the form of a question-and-answer dialogue with the King. 畢以珣 Pi I-hsün, author of the Sun Tzu's records Sun Tzŭ Hsü Lu, supports this with a quote from the Wu Yüeh Ch‘un Ch‘iu: “The King of Wu called on Sun Tzŭ and asked him questions about the art of war. Each time he presented a chapter of his work, the King couldn’t find enough words to praise him.”^[34] As he points out, if the entire work was explained at the same level as the previously mentioned fragments, the total number of chapters would undoubtedly be substantial.^[35] Additionally, many other treatises attributed to Sun Tzŭ^[36] might also be included. The fact that the Han Chih mentions no work of Sun Tzŭ other than the 82 p‘ien, while the Sui and T‘ang bibliographies list other titles in addition to the “13 chapters,” is strong evidence, according to Pi I-hsün, that all of these were part of the 82 p‘ien. Without relying entirely on the accuracy of the details provided by the Wu Yüeh Ch‘un Ch‘iu, or accepting the authenticity of any of the treatises cited by Pi I-hsün, we can view this theory as a likely explanation of the mystery. Between Ssŭ-ma Ch‘ien and Pan Ku, there was plenty of time for a thriving collection of forgeries to arise under the famous name of Sun Tzŭ, and the 82 p‘ien may very well represent a gathered edition of these alongside the original work.{XIX} It's also possible, though less likely, that some of them existed during the time of the earlier historian and were intentionally overlooked by him.^[37]

Tu Mu, who is the most significant commentator on Sun Tzŭ after Ts‘ao Kung, wrote the preface to his edition^[38] around the middle of the ninth century. After a somewhat lengthy defense of military strategy,^[39] he finally addresses Sun Tzŭ and makes a couple of surprising statements: “The writings of Sun Wu,” he claims, “originally contained several hundred thousand words, but Ts‘ao Ts‘ao, the Emperor Wu Wei, edited out all the unnecessary parts and summarized the essence into one book with 13 chapters.”^[40] He goes on to note that Ts‘ao Ts‘ao’s commentary on Sun Tzŭ leaves some issues unexplained. In Tu Mu’s view, this doesn’t necessarily mean he was incapable of providing a complete commentary.^[41] According to the Wei Chih, Ts‘ao himself authored a book on warfare of over 100,000 words, known as the New book. It seems to have been of such outstanding quality that he suspects Ts‘ao might have utilized extra materials he found in Sun Tzŭ for it. However, he concludes by stating: “The Hsin Shu is now lost, so the truth can't be determined for sure.”^[42]

Tu Mu’s guess seems to be based on a passage{XX} in the 漢官解詁 “Wei Wu Ti put together Sun Wu’s Art of War,”^[43] which might have come from misunderstanding Ts‘ao Kung’s final words in his preface: So it's written as a brief explanation.. As Sun Hsing-yen points out,^[44] this is just a simple way of saying he created an explanatory paraphrase,^[45] or in other words, wrote a commentary on it. Overall, the theory has received very little acceptance. Thus, the Siku Quanshu states:^[46] “The mention of the 13 chapters in the Shih Chi shows that they existed before the Han Chih, and that any later additions should not be seen as part of the original work. Tu Mu’s claim can certainly not be considered proof.”^[47]

There is every reason to believe, then, that the 13 chapters existed during the time of Ssŭ-ma Ch‘ien pretty much as we have them today. He clearly states that the work was well known: “Sun Tzŭ’s 13 Chapters and Wu Ch‘i’s Art of War are the two books that people commonly refer to regarding military matters. Both are widely available, so I won’t discuss them here.”^[48] However, as we look further back, significant challenges begin to appear. The key issue we must confront is that the Tso Chuan, the major contemporary record, does not mention Sun Wu at all, either as a general or a writer. It’s understandable, given this awkward situation, that many scholars would not only question the story of Sun Wu as presented in the Shih Chi, but also openly doubt the existence of the man altogether. The strongest argument for this perspective can be found in the following discussion by 葉水心 Yeh Shui-hsin:^[49]—

Yeh Shui-hsin suggests that Ssŭ-ma Ch‘ien said Sun Wu defeated Ch‘u and entered Ying. That's not entirely accurate. While it might seem like Sun Wu was at least involved in these actions, the actual subjects of the verbs 破, 入, 威, and 顯 are clearly 家庭, as indicated by the following phrase: Sun Tzu and powerful allies.^[65] This point might be significant or not, but the Shih Chi never explicitly states that Sun Tzŭ was the general during the capture of Ying on{XXIII} or even that he was there at all. Additionally, since we know Wu Yüan and Po P‘ei were involved in the campaign, and that the success was largely due to the bravery and initiative of 夫槩 Fu Kai, Ho Lu’s younger brother, it's hard to see how another general could have had a major role in the same operation.

陳振孫 Ch‘ên Chên-sun of the Sung dynasty has the note:^[66]—

He also says:—

It's clear that both Yeh Shui-hsin and Ch‘ên Chên-sun, while dismissing Sun Wu's character as portrayed in Ssŭ-ma Ch‘ien’s history, tend to accept the date traditionally attributed to the work that bears his name. The author of the Hsü Lu overlooks this distinction, and as a result, his harsh criticism of Ch‘ên Chên-sun misses the point. However, he does make one or two valid arguments that support the ancient origins of our “13 chapters.” “Sun Tzŭ,” he states, “must have lived during the era of Ching Wang [519–476], because he is often referenced in later works from the Chou, Ch‘in, and Han dynasties.”^[69]{XXIV} The two most blatant offenders in this regard are Wu Ch‘i and Huai-nan Tzŭ, both significant historical figures of their time. The former lived just a century after the supposed date of Sun Tzŭ, and his death is recorded as occurring in 381 B.C. According to Liu Hsiang, it was to him that 曾申 Tsêng Shên presented the Tso Chuan, which had been entrusted to him by its author.^[70] The fact that quotes from the Art of War, whether credited or not, appear in works by various authors from different periods strongly suggests there was a common source that predated them all—in other words, that Sun Tzŭ’s treatise was already in existence toward the end of the 5^th century B.C. Further evidence of Sun Tzŭ’s age is shown by the outdated or entirely obsolete meanings of several words he uses. A list of these, which could likely be expanded, is found in the Hsü Lu; and while some interpretations may be questionable, the main argument remains largely unchallenged.^[71] Additionally, it should not be overlooked that Yeh Shui-hsin, a top-tier scholar and critic, asserts that the style of the 13 chapters belongs to the early part of the fifth century. Given that he is actually trying to refute the existence of Sun Wu himself, we can be confident that he would not hesitate to assign a later date to the work if he had genuinely believed it to be so. This is precisely the kind of insight that carries the most weight with an educated Chinese person. Other internal evidence is easily accessible. For example, in XIII. § 1, there is a clear reference to the ancient land-tenure system that had already disappeared by the time of Mencius, who wanted to see it revived in a modified way.^[72] The only type of warfare Sun Tzŭ discusses is that conducted among the various feudal princes (Lords), where armored chariots are prominently featured. Their use seems to have completely vanished before the end of the Chou dynasty. He writes from the perspective of a man from Wu, a state that ceased to exist as early as 473 B.C. I will touch on this point shortly.

But if you refer to the work from the 5^th century or earlier, the chances of it being anything other than a bonâ fide production are significantly reduced. The peak era of forgeries didn’t come until much later. It’s particularly unlikely that it was forged in the period right after 473, since, generally, people don’t rush to associate themselves with a lost cause. Regarding Yeh Shui-hsin’s theory that the author was a literary recluse, that seems completely unreasonable to me. If there's one thing that's clear after reading Sun Tzŭ’s maxims, it's that their essence comes from a wealth of personal observation and experience. They illustrate the mind of not only a natural strategist, with a rare ability to generalize, but also of a practical soldier closely familiar with the military conditions of his time. Not to mention that these sayings have been recognized and endorsed by all the greatest military leaders in Chinese history, they represent a blend of freshness and sincerity, sharpness and common sense, which completely rules out the idea that they were artificially created in a study. If we accept that the 13 chapters were genuinely produced by a military man living towards the end of the "Ch‘un Ch‘iu" period, shouldn’t we, despite the silence of the Tso Chuan, accept Ssŭ-ma Ch‘ien’s account entirely? Given his high reputation as a serious historian, shouldn’t we be cautious in assuming that the records he relied on for Sun Wu’s biography were false and untrustworthy? Unfortunately, the answer must be no. There is still one serious, if not fatal, objection to the timeline presented in the account in the Shih Chi, which, as far as I know, no one has pointed out yet. There are two passages in Sun Tzŭ where he references contemporary events. The first is in VI. § 21:—

The other is in __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__:—

These two paragraphs are extremely valuable as evidence of when the work was composed. They link the work to the time of the conflict between Wu and Yüeh. Pi I-hsün has noted this. However, what has not been recognized so far is that they also seriously undermine the credibility of Ssŭ-ma Ch‘ien’s narrative. As mentioned earlier, the first specific date connected with Sun Wu is 512 B.C. He is referred to as a general, serving as a trusted adviser to Ho Lu, which means his supposed introduction to that king had already happened,{XXVII} and of course the 13 chapters must have been written even earlier. But at that time, and for several years afterwards, until the capture of Ying in 506, 楚 Ch‘u, not Yüeh, was the main hereditary enemy of Wu. The two states, Ch‘u and Wu, had been in constant conflict for over fifty years, whereas the first war between Wu and Yüeh occurred only in 510, and even then it was just a brief interruption amidst the intense struggle with Ch‘u. Now Ch‘u is not mentioned at all in the 13 chapters. The natural conclusion is that they were written at a time when Yüeh had become Wu's main adversary, that is, after Ch‘u had experienced the significant defeat in 506. At this point, a table of dates may be helpful.

The sentence quoted above from VI. § 21 doesn't seem like something that could have been written right after a big victory. It suggests that, for the time being at least, the advantage had shifted away from Wu, and she was losing in the fight. So, we can infer that our treatise didn't exist in 505, since before that, Yüeh doesn't seem to have achieved any significant success against Wu. Ho Lu died in 496, so if the book was written for him, it must have been during the period from 505 to 496, when there was a break in the fighting, as Wu was likely worn out from its major effort against Ch‘u. Conversely, if we decide to ignore the tradition linking Sun Wu with Ho Lu, it could have easily been written between 496 and 494, or possibly during the years 482 to 473, when Yüeh was becoming a serious threat again.^[76] We can be quite sure that the author, whoever he was, wasn't someone of great importance in his own time. On this matter, the negative evidence from the Tso Chuan far outweighs any little bit of credibility still associated with the Shih Chi, especially if we discount its other facts. Sun Hsing-yen does make a weak attempt to explain why his name is missing from{XXIX} the significant commentary. He says it was Wu Tzŭ-hsü who received all the credit for Sun Wu’s accomplishments, because the latter (being an outsider) didn't get any official position in the State.^[77]

How did the Sun Tzŭ legend start? It's possible that the growing popularity of the book gradually gave its author a kind of fake fame. It seemed only fair that someone so knowledgeable about the art of war should have real accomplishments to back him up. The capture of Ying was certainly the greatest military achievement during Ho Lu’s reign; it made a strong and lasting impact on all the neighboring states and elevated Wu to the peak of its power, albeit briefly. So, as time went on, it makes sense that the well-known strategist, Sun Wu, would become closely associated with that campaign, initially perhaps just in the sense that he conceived and planned it; later on, it was thought that he actually led the execution of it along with Wu Yüan, Po P‘ei, and Fu Kai?

It’s clear that any effort to piece together even the basics of Sun Tzŭ’s life has to rely mostly on guesswork. With that said, I would suggest that he likely started working for Wu around the time Ho Lu came to power and gained experience, though only as a subordinate officer, during the intense military activity that characterized the first half of that prince’s reign.^[79] If he did become a general at any point, he certainly was never on the same level as the three{XXX} mentioned earlier. He was probably present during the siege and takeover of Ying and saw Wu’s sudden downfall the following year. Yüeh’s attack at this critical moment, when its rival was struggling on all fronts, seems to have made him realize that this emerging kingdom was the major threat that would require all efforts to combat moving forward. Sun Wu was thus an experienced warrior when he began writing his famous book, which I believe must have been published towards the end, rather than the beginning, of Ho Lu’s rule. The tale of the women may have originated from some real event happening around that time. Since we don’t hear anything more about Sun Wu from any source after this, it's unlikely that he outlived his patron or took part in the fierce struggle with Yüeh, which started with the disaster at Tsui-li.

If these conclusions are roughly right, there’s a certain irony in the fact that China’s most famous advocate for peace lived at the same time as her greatest war writer.

I’ve found it tough to learn much about the history of Sun Tzŭ’s text. The quotes from early authors suggest that the “13 chapters” mentioned by Ssŭ-ma Ch‘ien were basically the same as the ones we have today. He assures us that they were widely circulated in his time, and it’s a shame he didn’t elaborate on them for that reason. ^[80] Sun Hsing-yen says in his preface:—

As we’ve already discussed, there’s no good reason to believe that Ts‘ao Kung altered the text. However, the text itself is often quite unclear, and the number of editions that emerged after that time, particularly during the T‘ang and Sung dynasties, was so vast that it would be surprising if many mistakes hadn’t slipped in. By the middle of the Sung period, when all the major commentaries on Sun Tzŭ existed, a certain 吉天保 Chi T‘ien-pao published a work in 15 chüan called 十家孙子会注 “Sun Tzŭ with the collected commentaries of ten writers.” ^[82] Another text, which included different readings, was proposed by Chu Fu of DAXING Ta-hsing, ^[83] and it also had its supporters among scholars of that time; but in the Ming editions, Sun Hsing-yen informs us, these readings were strangely no longer circulated. ^[84] Thus, until the end of the 18^th century, the only version of the text widely available came from Chi T‘ien-pao’s edition, although no actual copy of that important work was known to have survived. Therefore, that is the version of Sun Tzŭ found in the War section of the great Imperial encyclopedia printed in 1726, the Collection of Ancient and Modern Books Ku Chin T‘u Shu Chi Ch‘êng. Another version I have, which is practically the same text with minor variations, is contained in the Zhou and Qin's Eleven Sons “Eleven philosophers of the Chou and Ch‘in dynasties” {XXXII} [1758]. The Chinese printed in Capt. Calthrop’s first edition seems to be a similar version that has passed through Japanese channels. Things stayed this way until 孫星衍 Sun Hsing-yen [1752–1818], a notable antiquarian and classical scholar, ^[85] who claimed to be a direct descendant of Sun Wu, ^[86] stumbled upon a copy of Chi T‘ien-pao’s long-lost work during a visit to the library of the 华阴 Hua-yin temple. ^[87] Attached to it was the 遺言 I Shuo by 鄭友賢 Chêng Yu-hsien, mentioned in the T‘ung Chih, which was also believed to have been lost. ^[88] This is what Sun Hsing-yen refers to as the Used book or Originally “original edition (or text)”—a rather misleading term, as it cannot genuinely present the text of Sun Tzŭ in its original clarity. Chi T‘ien-pao was a careless compiler, ^[89] and he seems to have been satisfied with reproducing the somewhat corrupted version that was common in his time, without making an effort to compare it with the earliest editions available then. Fortunately, two versions of Sun Tzŭ, even older than the newly found work, were still around, one hidden in the T‘ung Tien, Tu Yu’s extensive treatise on the Constitution, and the other similarly enshrined in the T‘ai P‘ing Yü Lan encyclopedia. In both, the complete text can be found, although divided into fragments, mixed with other content, and scattered across various sections. Considering that the Yü Lan dates back to the year 983, and the T‘ung Tien about 200 years earlier, to the middle of the T‘ang dynasty, the significance of these early transcripts of Sun Tzŭ is immense. Yet, the idea of using them doesn’t seem to have crossed anyone's mind until Sun Hsing-yen, acting under Government orders, took on a comprehensive review of the text. This is his own account:—

The three individuals mentioned here had clearly been working on the text of Sun Tzŭ before Sun Hsing-yen's commission, but we remain unsure about the actual work they completed. Regardless, the new edition, when finally released, was credited to Sun Hsing-yen and only one co-editor, 吴人驥 Wu Jên-chi. They used the “original text” as their foundation and, through careful comparison with older versions, as well as existing commentaries and other sources of information such as {XXXIV} the I Shuo, managed to restore a significant number of unclear passages, ultimately producing what must be considered the closest version we are likely to get to Sun Tzŭ’s original work. This will henceforth be referred to as the “standard text.”

The copy I used is from a reissue dated 1877. It's in 6 pên, part of a well-printed set of 23 early philosophical works in 83 pên. ^[91] It starts with a preface by Sun Hsing-yen (mostly quoted in this introduction), defending the traditional view of Sun Tzŭ’s life and achievements, and summarizing the evidence in support of it remarkably well. Following that is Ts‘ao Kung’s preface to his edition, along with the biography of Sun Tzŭ from the Shih Chi, both translated above. Next are, first, Chêng Yu-hsien’s I Shuo, ^[92] including the author’s preface, and then a brief collection of historical and bibliographical information titled The Art of War Sun Tzŭ Hsü Lu, compiled by 畢以珣 Pi I-hsün. Regarding the main text, each separate sentence is followed by a note on the text, if needed, and then by various related commentaries arranged in chronological order. We will now discuss these briefly, one by one.

Sun Tzŭ has an incredibly long and impressive list of commentators that would be worthy of any classic. 歐陽修 Ou-yang Hsiu comments on this, even though he wrote before the story was finished, and cleverly explains it by saying that the methods of warfare, being{XXXV} endless, can be approached in many different ways.^[93]

1. Cao Cao Ts‘ao Ts‘ao or Cao Cao Ts‘ao Kung, later known as Cao Cao Wei Wu Ti [A.D. 155–220]. There’s little doubt that the earliest commentary on Sun Tzŭ actually came from this remarkable individual, whose biography in the San Kuo Chih^[94] reads like a novel. He was one of the greatest military strategists in history, comparable to Napoleon in the scale of his operations, especially known for the incredible speed of his movements, which is captured in the saying Talk about the devil, he's here. “Speak of Ts‘ao Ts‘ao, and Ts‘ao Ts‘ao will show up.” Ou-yang Hsiu describes him as a great leader who “matched his strength against Tung Cho, Lü Pu, and the two Yüan, father and son, and defeated them all; afterward, he divided the Han Empire with Wu and Shu and made himself king. It’s noted that whenever Wei held a war council before a major campaign, he had all his strategies ready; those generals who followed them didn't lose more than one battle in ten; those who ignored them saw their armies swiftly beaten and routed.”^[95] Ts‘ao Kung’s notes on Sun Tzŭ, marked by strict brevity, are so typical of the stern leader known to history that it’s hard to imagine them as the work of a mere littérateur. Sometimes, due to extreme{XXXVI} conciseness, they are barely understandable and require commentary just like the original text.^[96] As noted, Ts‘ao Kung is believed to be the author of the New book, a military book of over 100,000 words, now lost, but referenced in the 魏志.^[97]

2. Meng's Mêng Shih. The commentary we have from him is quite limited, and we don’t know anything about the author. His personal name hasn’t been recorded either. Chi T‘ien-pao’s edition places him after Chia Lin, and 鼂公武 Ch‘ao Kung-wu also assigns him to the T‘ang dynasty, but that’s clearly a mistake since his work is mentioned in the Sui Shu: Catalog of Classics. In Sun Hsing-yen’s preface, he is referred to as Mêng Shih of the Liang dynasty [502–557]. Others would link him with Meng Kang Mêng K‘ang of the 3^rd century. In the Song History Arts and Literature, he is listed as the last of the 五家 “Five Commentators,” with the others being Wei Wu Ti, Tu Mu, Ch‘ên Hao, and Chia Lin.

3. 李筌 Li Ch‘üan of the 8^th century was a well-known writer on military tactics. His 太白阴经 has been widely used up to the present day. The History Records mentions 閫外的春秋 (lives of famous generals from the Chou to the T‘ang dynasty) as written by him.^[100] He is also widely believed to be the true author of the popular Taoist text, the 陰符經. According to Ch‘ao Kung-wu and the T‘ien-i-ko catalogue,^[101] he followed the Taiyi Dunjia text of Sun Tzŭ, which is quite different from those{XXXVII} available today. His notes are mostly brief and direct, and he often illustrates his points with anecdotes from Chinese history.

4. 杜佑 Tu Yu (died 812) didn’t write a separate commentary on Sun Tzŭ; instead, his notes came from the T‘ung Tien, the comprehensive work on the Constitution that was his life’s work. His notes mostly repeat the ideas of Ts‘ao Kung and Mêng Shih, and it’s thought that he also referenced the ancient commentaries of Wang Ling Wang Ling and others. Due to the unique organization of the T‘ung Tien, he has to explain each passage on its own merits, outside of the overall context, and sometimes his explanations don’t match Ts‘ao Kung’s, whom he always cites first. Although he isn’t strictly considered one of the “Ten Commentators,” he was added to their list by Chi T‘ien-pao, being mistakenly placed after his grandson Tu Mu.

5. 杜牧 Tu Mu (803–852) is probably best known as a poet—a shining star even in the magnificent era of the T‘ang dynasty. According to Ch‘ao Kung-wu, even though he had no real military experience, he loved discussing the topic and was well-versed in the military history of the Ch‘un Ch‘iu and Chan Kuo periods.^[102] His notes are therefore very valuable. They are extensive and filled with historical comparisons. He summarizes the essence of Sun Tzŭ’s work as follows: “Emphasize kindness and justice, but also fully utilize strategy and practical measures.”^[103] Additionally, he stated that all the military{XXXVIII} successes and failures over the thousand years since Sun Wu’s death would, upon closer inspection, consistently support and confirm the principles found in his book.^[104] Tu Mu’s somewhat bitter criticism of Ts‘ao Kung has already been addressed elsewhere.

6. 陳皥 Ch‘ên Hao seems to have been a contemporary of Tu Mu. Ch‘ao Kung-wu mentions that he felt the need to write a new commentary on Sun Tzŭ because Ts‘ao Kung’s was too obscure and subtle, while Tu Mu’s was too long-winded and diffuse.^[105] Ou-yang Hsiu, writing in the middle of the 11^th century, refers to Ts‘ao Kung, Tu Mu, and Ch‘ên Hao as the three main commentators on Sun Tzŭ (Three houses), and notes that Ch‘ên Hao is constantly criticizing Tu Mu’s weaknesses. His commentary, while not without value, is generally considered to be inferior to those of his predecessors.

7. 賈林 Chia Lin is known to have lived during the Tang dynasty, as his commentary on Sun Tzu is mentioned in the Tang Shu and was later republished by 紀燮 Chi Hsieh of the same dynasty, alongside those of Meng Shi and Tu Yu.^[106] It is somewhat thin in content, and in terms of quality, it might be the least valuable of the eleven.

8. 梅堯臣 Mei Yao-ch‘ên (1002–1060), commonly known by his “style” as Mei 聖兪 Shêng-yü, was, like Tu Mu, a distinguished poet. His commentary was published with a praise-filled preface by the renowned Ou-yang Hsiu, from which we can extract the following:—

Considering the enthusiasm of friendship, I’m inclined to agree with this positive opinion, and I would definitely rate him higher than Ch‘ên Hao in terms of merit.

{XL}

9. 王晳 Wang Hsi, also from the Sung dynasty, has some truly original interpretations, but he’s not as discerning as Mei Yao-ch‘ên, and overall, he's not a very reliable guide. He often compares his own commentary to that of Ts‘ao Kung, but those comparisons usually don’t come out in his favor. From Ch‘ao Kung-wu, we learn that Wang Hsi revised the ancient text of Sun Tzŭ, filling in gaps and correcting errors.^[110]

10. 何延锡 Ho Yen-hsi of the Sung dynasty. This commentator's personal name is stated as above by 鄭樵 Chêng Ch‘iao in the T‘ung Chih, written around the middle of the twelfth century, but he is simply referred to as 何氏 Ho Shih in the Yü Hai, and Ma Tuan-lin quotes Ch‘ao Kung-wu as saying that his personal name is unknown. There seems to be no reason to doubt Chêng Ch‘iao’s statement; otherwise, I would have been inclined to guess and identify him with one 何去非 Ho Ch‘ü-fei, the author of a short treatise on war entitled Additional notes, who lived in the latter part of the 11^th century.^[111] Ho Shih’s commentary, according to the T‘ien-i-ko catalogue, 有帮助 “contains helpful additions” here and there, but is mainly notable for the extensive extracts taken, in adapted form, from the dynastic histories and other sources.

11. 張預 Chang Yü. The list concludes with a commentator who may not be particularly original, but possesses remarkable skills in clear explanation. His commentary builds on that of Ts‘ao Kung, taking his concise sentences and expertly expanding and elaborating on them. Without Chang Yü, it’s fair to say that much of Ts‘ao Kung’s commentary would have remained hidden in its original obscurity and thus worthless. His work isn't mentioned in the Sung history, the T‘ung K‘ao, or{XLI} the Yü Hai, but it is noted in the T‘ung Chih, which also identifies him as the author of the Baijiang Chuan “Lives of Famous Generals.”^[112]

It’s quite remarkable that the last four all thrived in such a short time. Ch‘ao Kung-wu explains it by saying: “During the early years of the Sung dynasty, the Empire enjoyed a long period of peace, and people stopped practicing the art of war. But when [Chao] Yüan-hao’s rebellion happened [1038–42] and the frontier generals kept getting defeated, the Court started a thorough search for skilled military leaders, and military topics became the trend among high officials. That’s why the commentators of Sun Tzŭ in our dynasty mainly come from that era.”^[113]

Besides these eleven commentators, there are several others whose work hasn’t survived. The Sui Shu mentions four, namely 王凌 Wang Ling (often quoted by Tu Yu as Prince), 張子尙 Chang Tzŭ-shang, 賈詡 Chia Hsü of 魏 Wei, and 沈友 Shên Yu of 吳 Wu. The T‘ang Shu adds 孫鎬 (Sun Hao) Sun Hao, and the T‘ung Chih includes 蕭吉 Hsiao Chi, while the T‘u Shu mentions a Ming commentator, 黃潤玉 Huang Jun-yü. It’s possible that some of these were just collectors and editors of other commentaries, like Chi T‘ien-pao and Chi Hsieh, mentioned above. Certainly in the case of the latter, the entry 紀夑注孫子 in the T‘ung K‘ao, without the following note, would lead one to believe that he had written an independent commentary of his own.

There are two works, described in the Ssu K‘u Ch‘üan{XLII} Shu^[115] and likely extremely rare, that I would really like to see. One is titled 孫子參同, in 5 chüan. It contains selections from four new commentators, probably from the Ming dynasty, in addition to the eleven we already know. The names of the four are 解元 Hsieh Yüan; 張鏊 Chang Ao; Li Village Li Ts‘ai; and 黃治徵 Huang Chih-chêng. The other work is 孫子兵法 in 4 chüan, compiled by 鄭端 Chêng Tuan of the current dynasty. It is a compilation of information on ancient warfare, specifically about Sun Tzŭ’s 13 chapters.

Sun Tzŭ has held a strong fascination for some of China's greatest minds. Among the well-known generals who studied his work with great enthusiasm are Han Xin Han Hsin (d. B.C. 196), ^[116] 馮異 Fêng I (d. A.D. 34), ^[117] 呂蒙 Lü Mêng (d. 219), ^[118] and Yue Fei Yo Fei (1103–1141). ^[119] The views of Ts‘ao Kung, who competes with Han Hsin for the top spot in Chinese military history, have already been noted. ^[120] Even more notable, in another sense, is the acknowledgment from purely literary figures, like 蘇洵 Su Hsün (the father of Su Tung-p‘o), who wrote several essays on military subjects, all of which draw their main inspiration from Sun Tzŭ. The following brief passage from him is found in the Yü Hai: ^[121]—

{XLIII}

The Ethics and principles summary, ch. 17, contains the following extract from the Art garden compromise “Impartial Judgments in the Garden of Literature” by 鄭厚 Chêng Hou:—

Chu Hsi, commenting on this, fully acknowledges the first part of the criticism, although he dislikes the bold comparison to the respected classical works. He says language like this “encourages a ruler’s inclination toward relentless warfare and reckless militarism.”^[127]

Though we tend to see China as the most peace-loving country in the world, we risk forgetting that its history with war is unparalleled by any modern nation. China’s extensive military history goes back so far that it’s shrouded in time’s fog. She constructed the Great Wall and maintained a massive standing army along her borders centuries before the first Roman soldier arrived on the Danube. With the constant conflicts among the ancient feudal states, the brutal battles against the Huns, Turks, and other invaders following the centralization of government, the violent disruptions that came with the fall of numerous dynasties, along with the innumerable rebellions and minor uprisings that have sparked and faded away, it’s hardly an exaggeration to say that the sound of battle has never truly stopped echoing in some part of the Empire.

No less impressive is the lineup of renowned leaders that China can take pride in. As in all nations, the greatest heroes emerge during the most critical moments of her history. For instance, Po Ch‘i stands out prominently during the time when Ch‘in was beginning its final conflict with the remaining independent states. The tumultuous years that followed the collapse of the Ch‘in dynasty are marked by the extraordinary talent of Han Hsin. When the House of Han is also on the brink of collapse, the formidable and ominous figure of Ts‘ao Ts‘ao takes center stage. And in the founding of the T‘ang dynasty, one of the most significant achievements in human history, the incredible drive of Li Shih-min (later known as Emperor T‘ai Tsung) was complemented by the brilliant tactics of Li Ching. None of these generals need to shy away from comparisons with the greatest figures in European military history.

Despite all this, the overall attitude in China, from Lao Tzŭ onwards, particularly as seen in Confucian literature, has been consistently peaceful and strongly opposed to militarism in any form. It's quite rare to find any scholars{XLV} defending war on principle, so I thought it would be worthwhile to gather and translate a few passages where the unconventional view is presented. The following excerpt from Ssŭ-ma Ch‘ien illustrates that, despite his deep admiration for Confucius, he was not an advocate of peace at any cost:—

The next section is from Tu Mu’s introduction to his commentary on Sun Tzŭ:—

We have seen that the great Chu Hsi had a high regard for Sun Tzŭ. He also references the authority of the Classics:—

Sun Hsing-yen, the editor of Sun Tzŭ, writes in a similar way:—

{L}

The following are the oldest Chinese texts on warfare, after Sun Tzŭ. The notes on each have mainly been taken from the 四库全书简明目录 Ssŭ k‘u ch‘üan shu chien ming mu lu, ch. 9, fol. 22 sqq.

1. 吳子 Wu Tzŭ, in 1 chüan or 6 篇 chapters. By Wu Qi Wu Ch‘i (d. B.C. 381). A genuine work. See Shih Chi, ch. 65.

2. Sima Method Ssŭ-ma Fa, in 1 chüan or 5 chapters. Incorrectly attributed to 司馬穰苴 Ssŭ-ma Jang-chü from the 6^th century B.C. However, its date must be early, as the customs of the three ancient dynasties are frequently referenced throughout its pages.^[158] See Shih Chi, ch. 64.

The Ssŭ K‘u Ch‘üan Shu (ch. 99, f. 1) notes that the three oldest texts on warfare, Sun Tzŭ, Wu Tzŭ, and Ssŭ-ma Fa, mainly focus on essential military topics—how to train, organize, and manage troops, along with the right strategies for planning, logistics, and soldier management^[159]—which is a sharp contrast to later works that often mix military science with metaphysics, fortune-telling, and various magical practices.

3. Six Strategies Liu T‘ao, in 6 chüan or 60 chapters. Attributed to 呂望 Lü Wang (or Lü 尙 Shang, also known as Tai Gong T‘ai Kung) of the 12^th century B.C.^[160] But{LI} its style does not fit the era of the Three Dynasties.^[161] 陸德明 Lu Tê-ming (550–625 A.D.) mentions the work and lists the headings of the six sections: 文, 武, Tiger, Leopard, Dragon, and Dog, indicating that the forgery could not have been later than the Sui dynasty.

4. 尉繚子 Wei Liao Tzŭ, in 5 chüan. Attributed to Wei Liao (4^th century B.C.), who studied under the famous Guiguzi Kuei-ku Tzŭ. The 漢志, under Military strategies, mentions a book by Wei Liao in 31 chapters, whereas the version we have contains only 24. Its content is generally solid, although the strategic methods are quite different from those of the Warring States period.^[162] It has been accompanied by a commentary from the renowned Sung philosopher 張載 Chang Tsai.

5. Three Strategies San Lüeh, in 3 chüan. This work is attributed to Yellowstone President Huang-shih Kung, a legendary figure said to have shared it with Chang Liang (d. B.C. 187) during a meeting on a bridge.^[163] However, the style doesn't match that of works from the Ch‘in or Han period. The Han Emperor Kuang Wu [A.D. 25–57] seems to quote it in one of his proclamations; however, that particular passage may have been added later to establish the work's authenticity. It's reasonable to suggest that it originated during the Northern Sung period [420–478 A.D.], or possibly even a bit earlier.^[164]

{LII}

6. 李卫公问答 Li Wei Kung Wên Tui, in 3 sections. It's written as a dialogue between T‘ai Tsung and his great general 李靖 Li Ching, and is generally credited to Li Ching. However, experts believe it to be a forgery, even though the author clearly had a strong understanding of military strategy.^[165]

7. Li Jing's military strategy Li Ching Ping Fa (not to be confused with the previous one) is a brief work in 8 chapters, kept in the T‘ung Tien, but not published on its own. This is why it is not included in the Ssŭ K‘u Ch‘üan Shu.

8. 握奇经 Wu Ch‘i Ching,^[166] in 1 chüan. It’s attributed to the legendary minister Wind behind Fêng Hou, with commentary by 公孫宏 Kung-sun Hung from the Han dynasty (d. B.C. 121), and it’s said that the famous general 馬隆 Ma Lung (d. A.D. 300) praised it. The earliest reference to it is in the 宋志. Even though it’s a forgery, the work is well-constructed.^[167]

Considering the high regard in which Zhuge Liang Chu-ko Liang has always been held, it's not surprising to find more than one work on warfare attributed to him. These include (1) the Sixteen Strategies Shih Liu Ts‘ê (1 chüan), preserved in the Yongle Encyclopedia Yung Lo Ta Tien; (2) 將苑 Chiang Yüan (1 ch.); and (3) Heartfelt letter Hsin Shu (1 ch.), which heavily borrows from Sun Tzŭ. None of these works can genuinely be considered authentic.

{LIII}

Most of the large Chinese encyclopedias include detailed sections focused on war literature. The following references might be helpful:—

通典 T‘ung Tien (circa 800 A.D.), ch. 148–162.

Taiping Yulan T‘ai P‘ing Yü Lan (983), ch. 270–359.

Literature overview Wên Hsien T‘ung K‘ao (13^th cent.), ch. 221.

玉海 Yü Hai (13th cent.), ch. 140, 141.

Three Talents Diagram Compilation San Ts‘ai T‘u Hui (16^th cent.), HR ch. 7, 8.

The Encyclopedia of Vast Knowledge Kuang Po Wu Chih (1607), ch. 31, 32.

潛藏類書 Ch‘ien Ch‘io Lei Shu (1632), ch. 75.

淵鑑類函 Yüan Chien Lei Han (1710), ch. 206–229.

Comprehensive Collection of Ancient and Modern Books Ku Chin T‘u Shu Chi Ch‘êng (1726), section XXX, esp. ch. 81–90.

續文獻通考 Hsü Wên Hsien T‘ung K‘ao (1784), ch. 121–134.

Dynastic Governance Writings Huang Ch‘ao Ching Shih Wên Pien (1826), ch. 76, 77.

The bibliographical sections of some historical works also deserve mention:—

前漢書 Records of the Former Han, ch. 30.

隋書 Sui Shu, ch. 32-35.

Old Book of Tang Chiu T‘ang Shu, ch. 46, 47.

新唐書 Hsin T'ang Shu, ch. 57–60.

宋史 Song History, ch. 202–209.

通志 T‘ung Chih (circa 1150), ch. 68.

To these, of course, must be added the great Catalog of the Imperial Library:—

Four Treasuries Catalog Summary Ssŭ K‘u Ch‘üan Shu Tsung Mu T‘i Yao (1790), ch. 99, 100.

This is the only possible meaning of 計, which M. Amiot and Capt. Calthrop incorrectly translate as “Foundations of military art” and “First principles” respectively. Ts‘ao Kung says it refers to the discussions in the temple chosen by the general for his temporary use, or as we would say, in his tent. See § 26.

1. Sun Tzu said, warfare is a nation's major matter.

Sun Tzu said: The art of war is extremely important to the nation.

2. Life and death must be observed.

It's a matter of life and death, a path leading either to safety or to disaster. So, it's a topic that must not be ignored.

3. Check and calculate it for details.

The art of war is governed by five constant factors that should be considered during your analysis when trying to understand the conditions on the battlefield.

The old text of the T‘ung Tien has 故经之以五校之计, and so on. Later editors added 事 after 五, and 以 before 計. The first change might be unnecessary, but the second seems essential for clarity and is backed by the common reading in § 12, where the same words appear again. However, I tend to believe that the entire sentence from 校 to 情 is an addition and doesn’t belong here at all. If it is kept, Wang Hsi must be right in saying that 計 refers to the “seven considerations” in § 13. 情 refers to the circumstances or conditions that could lead to victory or defeat. The subject of the first 之 is Warriors; the subject of the second is 五. 校{2} carries the idea of “comparison with the enemy,” which isn’t easily conveyed here but will be seen in § 12. All in all, even though it’s challenging, the passage isn’t so corrupt that it would justify Capt. Calthrop in ignoring it completely.

4. One is the Way, two is Heaven, three is Earth, four is the General, five is the Law.

These are: (1) The Moral Law; (2) Heaven; (3) Earth; (4) The Commander; (5) Method and discipline.

It seems from what comes next that Sun Tzŭ means by 道 a principle of harmony, similar to the Tao of Lao Tzŭ in its moral sense. One might think to translate it as “morale,” if it weren't seen as a quality of the ruler in § 13.

5. The way encourages unity with leaders.

6. So they can live or die, and the people do not fear danger.

The Moral Law inspires the people to fully align with their ruler, so that they will follow him no matter what, unafraid of any danger.

The original text leaves out 令人民, adds an 以 after each 可, and omits 民 after 而. Capt. Calthrop translates: “If the ruling authority is fair, the people are united”—a nice thought, but completely inappropriate for what claims to be a translation of Sun Tzŭ.

7. The heavens regulate yin, yang, and the seasons.

Heaven represents night and day, cold and heat, times and seasons.

The commentators, I think, create an unnecessary mystery around Yin and Yang. Mêng Shih defines the terms as 柔中帶剛, meaning “the hard and the soft, waxing and waning,” which doesn't really clarify things for us. However, Wang Hsi might be correct in saying that it refers to Universal Law, meaning “the general economy of Heaven,” which includes the five elements, the four seasons, wind and clouds, and other phenomena.

地形的远近危险和宽窄影响生死

Earth consists of vast and tiny distances; risk and safety; open spaces and tight routes; the possibilities of life and death.

Life and death (omitted by Capt. Calthrop) might have been included here because the safety of an army really relies on how quickly it can take advantage of these geographical features.

{3}

9. Those with wisdom, trust, compassion, courage, and discipline.

The Commander represents the values of wisdom, honesty, kindness, bravery, and discipline.

The five core virtues of the Chinese are (1) 仁 humanity or kindness; (2) 義 integrity; (3) 礼 respect for oneself, self-control, or “appropriate feelings;” (4) 智 wisdom; (5) Letter honesty or trustworthiness. Here, 智 and Letter are prioritized over 仁, and the two military virtues of “bravery” and “discipline” replace 義 and 礼.

10. Lawmaker's jurisdiction on official roads

By Method and discipline we mean organizing the army into its appropriate divisions, establishing ranks among the officers, keeping the roads maintained for supply delivery to the army, and managing military spending.

The Chinese in this sentence is so concise that it's almost impossible to understand without some explanation. I've followed Ts‘ao Kung's interpretation, who connects 曲制 and Main use again. Others view each of the six predicates separately. 曲 has the less common meaning of “cohort” or division of an army. Capt. Calthrop translates it as: “Partition and ordering of troops,” which only addresses 曲制.

11. Those who know these five will prevail, while those who do not will not.

These five principles should be known by every general: whoever understands them will succeed; whoever does not will fail.

12. Use strategy to understand the situation

Therefore, in your discussions, when trying to understand the military conditions, use them as a basis for comparison like this:—

The Yü Lan includes an additional 五 before 計. It's clear, though, that the Five things listed can't be described as 計. Capt. Calthrop, needing to provide some interpretation of the words he left out in § 3, appears quite confused: “Additionally, regarding these and the next seven issues, we need to compare the enemy's condition with our own.” He doesn't seem to realize that the seven questions or considerations that follow are directly linked to the Five heads, rather than being additional points.

{4}

13. Who has the way? Who has the ability? Who commands the law of heaven and earth? Who leads the troops? Who strengthens the soldiers? Who trains them? Who is clear about rewards and punishments?

(1) Which of the two rulers embodies the Moral law?

I.e., “is in tune with his subjects.” Cf. § 5.

(2) Which of the two generals has the most skill?

(3) Who benefits from the advantages given by Heaven and Earth?

See __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

(4) On which side is discipline enforced the most?

Tu Mu refers to the incredible story of Ts‘ao Ts‘ao (A.D. 155–220), who was such a strict disciplinarian that once, according to his own harsh rules against harming standing crops, he sentenced himself to death for allowing his horse to stray into a cornfield! However, instead of losing his head, he was convinced to express his sense of justice by cutting off his hair. Ts‘ao Ts‘ao’s own comment on this situation is notably brief: Offend and you must be punished “when you make a law, ensure it's followed; if it's broken, the offender must be executed.”

Which army is more powerful?

Morally and physically. As Mei Yao-ch‘ên puts it, 內外附, which can be interpreted as “esprit de corps and ‘big battalions.’”

(6) Which side has better-trained officers and soldiers?

Tu Yu quotes Prince as saying: “Without regular practice, the officers will feel anxious and unsure when called to battle; without regular practice, the general will be indecisive and uncertain when a crisis arises.”

(7) In which army is there more consistency in both rewards and punishments?

明, literally “clear;” that is, which side is the most certain that good actions will be rewarded and wrongdoings will be swiftly punished?

14. I know the outcome now.

With these seven factors, I can predict success or failure.

{5}

15. Those who follow my plan will win; those who ignore it will lose.

The general who listens to my advice and acts on it will win:—let that person stay in charge! The general who ignores my advice and doesn't take action will lose:—let that person be fired!

The structure of this paragraph reminds us that Sun Tzŭ’s treatise was written specifically for the benefit of his patron 闔閭 Ho Lü, king of the Wu State. However, it's not necessary to interpret 我 before 留之 (as some commentators do), or to take 將 as “generals under my command.”

16. Profits are made by listening to leverage for external assistance.

While considering the benefit of my advice, also take advantage of any helpful situations that go beyond the usual rules.

Capt. Calthrop completely messes up this sentence: “So, regarding the above, since the advantage is ours, and the generals agree, we’re creating a situation that looks promising for victory.” Basic logic should have prevented him from writing such ridiculous nonsense.

17. The powerful control authority for gain.

Depending on the circumstances, you should adjust your plans.

Sun Tzu, as a practical soldier, dismisses the “bookish theory.” He warns us not to rely on abstract principles; “because,” as Chang Yu puts it, “while the main laws of strategy can be expressed clearly for everyone's benefit, you must be guided by the enemy's actions when trying to secure a favorable position in real warfare.” Before the battle of Waterloo, Lord Uxbridge, in charge of the cavalry, approached the Duke of Wellington to understand his plans for the next day, explaining that he might suddenly need to take command and wouldn’t have time to come up with new plans in a critical moment. The Duke listened calmly and then asked: “Who will attack first tomorrow—I or Bonaparte?” “Bonaparte,” replied Lord Uxbridge. “Well,” the Duke continued, “Bonaparte hasn’t given me any indication of his plans; and since my plans will depend on his, how can you expect me to tell you what mine are?”^[168]

{6}

18. All warfare is based on deception.

All warfare depends on deception.

The truth of this short and deep saying will be acknowledged by every soldier. Col. Henderson tells us that Wellington, who excelled in many military traits, was particularly noted for “the exceptional skill with which he hid his movements and fooled both friends and enemies.”

19. Showing the capable as incapable, showing the usable as unusable, showing the near as far, and showing the far as near.

So, when we can attack, we should act like we can’t; when we deploy our forces, we need to appear idle; when we’re close, we should make the enemy think we’re far away; when we’re far away, we need to make them believe we’re close.

20. 利诱和混乱来获取

Lure the enemy with traps. Pretend to be disorganized, and then defeat him.

取, as frequently seen in Sun Tzŭ, means 擊. It's quite interesting that almost all commentators, except for Chang Yü, link Chaos to the enemy: “when he's disordered, take him down.” However, it seems more logical to think that Sun Tzŭ is continuing to demonstrate the role of deception in warfare.

21. Be prepared and avoid it

If he's strong in every way, be ready for him. If he's more powerful, avoid him.

The meaning of 實 becomes clear from chap. VI, where it contrasts with 虚, meaning “weak or vulnerable spots.” 强, according to Tu Yu and other commentators, refers to both the cleverness of the troops and their numeric advantage. Capt. Calthrop provides an incredibly convoluted translation: “If there are flaws, create an illusion of perfection to intimidate the enemy. Act strong to make the enemy steer clear of you!”

22. Anger leads to humiliation and arrogance

If your opponent has a short temper, try to annoy him. Act weak so he'll become overconfident.

I follow Chang Yü in my interpretation of Anger. 卑 is expanded by Mei Yao-ch‘ên into Show humility. Wang Tzŭ, as quoted by Tu Yu,{7} says that a skilled tactician plays with their opponent like a cat plays with a mouse, starting off by pretending to be weak and stationary, and then suddenly pouncing.

23. Leave it to the parents and distance yourself.

If he’s relaxing, don’t let him take it easy.

This is probably the meaning, though Mei Yao-ch‘ên has the note: 以我之佚待彼之劳 “while we are relaxing, wait for the enemy to exhaust himself.” The Yü Lan has 引而勞之 “Lure him on and tire him out.” This also appears to have been Ts‘ao Kung’s text, judging by his comment 以利勞之.

If his troops are united, break them apart.

Less believable is the interpretation preferred by most commentators: “If the ruler and the ruled are in agreement, create a separation between them.”

Attack when they are unprepared.

Attack him when he’s not ready, show up where he doesn’t expect you.

25. This military victory cannot be disclosed in advance.

These military strategies, which lead to victory, must not be revealed in advance.

This seems to be how Ts‘ao Kung understood the passage, and it might be the clearest interpretation of the text as it is. Most commentators provide the following explanation: “You can’t establish rules for warfare before you encounter the enemy.” This would make sense if it didn’t overlook 此, which clearly refers to the principles that Sun Tzŭ has been outlining. It's possible, of course, that 此 is a later addition, in which case the sentence would essentially mean: “Success in warfare can’t be taught.” Alternatively, I would suggest that a second 不 may have been omitted after 可, resulting in: “These maxims for succeeding in war are the first that should be taught.”

26. The husband who calculates victory before battle has a better chance of winning. Those who don't will find victory harder. It's clear victory and defeat can be seen through this lens.

Now the general who wins a battle makes a lot of calculations in his mind before the battle takes place.

{8}

Chang Yü tells us that in ancient times, it was common to set up a temple for a general who was preparing for battle, so he could develop his campaign plan there. Captain Calthrop misinterprets it as “the shrine of the ancestors” and provides a loose and inaccurate version of the entire passage.

The general who loses a battle makes very few plans in advance. Many calculations can lead to victory, while few calculations can lead to defeat; how much more so when there are no calculations at all! By paying attention to this, I can predict who is likely to win or lose.

Ts'ao Kung notes: 想打仗必先算成本 “He who wishes to fight must first count the cost,” which sets us up to realize that the focus of the chapter is not what we might anticipate from the title, but rather a discussion of methods and resources.

1. Sun Tzu said that using military strategy involves a thousand chariots, a thousand armored vehicles, ten thousand troops, and sufficient provisions for a long distance, which incurs costs for both internal and external needs, guest hospitality, supplies for vehicles and armor, and daily expenses amounting to a thousand gold coins, only then can an army of ten thousand be mobilized.

Sun Tzu said: In the conduct of war, when there are a thousand fast chariots, as many heavy chariots, and a hundred thousand armored soldiers,

The racing car were lightweight and, according to Chang Yü, used for attacks; the 革新交通 were heavier and meant for defense. Li Ch‘üan does claim that the latter were light, but that seems unlikely. Capt. Calthrop translates them as “chariots” and “supply wagons,” but he doesn’t have support from any commentators. It's interesting to note the similarities between early Chinese warfare and that of the Homeric Greeks. In both cases, the war chariot was a crucial element, forming the core around which a certain number of foot soldiers were organized. Regarding the numbers mentioned here, we learn that each swift chariot was backed by 75 foot soldiers, and each heavy chariot by 25 foot soldiers, leading to the whole army being divided into a thousand battalions, each consisting of two chariots and a hundred men.

with enough supplies to take them a thousand li,

2.78 modern li is equivalent to a mile. The length may have changed a bit since Sun Tzŭ's era.

the spending at home and on the front, including hosting guests, small items like glue and paint,{10} and expenses for chariots and armor, will add up to a total of a thousand ounces of silver each day.

則, which comes after Food in the textus receptus, is significant as it indicates the apodosis. In the version used by Capt. Calthrop, it is left out, leading him to produce this nonsensical translation of the opening sentence: “Now the requirements of War are such that we need 1,000 chariots,” etc. The second 費, which is unnecessary, is missing in the Yü Lan. Priceless, like Thousand miles mentioned earlier, is intended to imply a large but unspecified quantity. Since the Chinese have never had gold coins, it's inaccurate to translate it as “1000 pieces of gold.”

Such is the price of raising an army of 100,000 soldiers.

Capt. Calthrop adds, “You have the tools for success,” which he seems to derive from the first five characters of the next sentence.

2. 使用久了则武器钝，攻击城池则力量受挫。

When you get into real fighting, if victory takes too long to arrive, the soldiers' weapons will become dull and their enthusiasm will fade.

The Yü Lan skips 勝; but while 勝久 is definitely a bold choice, it’s probably more accurate than not. In this instance and in § 4, the T‘ung Tien and Yü Lan use 頓 (meaning “to injure”) instead of 鈍.

If you attack a town, you will wear yourself out.

As synonyms to 屈 are 盡, 殫, 窮, and 困.

3. Long-term war depletes resources

Again, if the campaign drags on, the State's resources won't be able to handle the pressure.

久暴師 literally means, “If the army has been exposed for a long time.” In this context, K‘ang Hsi references an example from the biography of 竇融 Tou Jung in the Hou Han Shu, where the commentary defines it as 露. Also, see the following from the The Strategies of the Warring States: 將軍長期暴露在外 “General, you have long been exposed to all the elements.”

{11}

4. If the husband is dull and the soldiers are weak, then the lords will take advantage of their wealth and rise. Even wise ones cannot manage the aftermath.

Now, when your weapons are worn out, your enthusiasm is low, your energy is drained, and your resources are exhausted, other leaders will emerge to take advantage of your situation. At that point, no one, no matter how wise, will be able to prevent the consequences that will follow.

Following Tu Yu, I understand 善 as “to make good,” meaning to repair or improve. However, Tu Mu and Ho Shih interpret it as “to make good plans” for the future.

5. Old soldiers haven't seen skill for a long time.

Thus, while we've heard of reckless speed in war, intelligence has never been seen linked with long delays.

This short and tricky sentence isn't explained well by any of the commentators. Ts'ao Kung, Li Ch'üan, Mêng Shih, Tu Yu, Tu Mu, and Mei Yao-ch'ën all suggest that a general, even if naturally dull, can still achieve victory through sheer speed. Ho Shih states: “Haste might be foolish, but it saves energy and resources; prolonged campaigns may be smart, yet they bring disaster.” Wang Hsi sidesteps the issue by noting: “Long campaigns mean an aging army, dwindling wealth, an empty treasury, and suffering for the people; true wisdom avoids these disasters.” Chang Yü says: “As long as victory is achieved, hasty actions are better than clever delays.” Sun Tzŭ doesn’t explicitly say that reckless haste is better than clever but slow actions. Instead, he implies that while speed can sometimes be unwise, being slow is always foolish—if only because it drains the nation's resources. Capt. Calthrop allows his imagination to roam with this thought: “So it’s accepted that war shouldn’t drag on too long. But even when executed with the greatest skill, a lengthy campaign inevitably leads to misfortunes.” It's hardly worth mentioning that the term hasty is completely absent from this precious mix. When considering the point raised by Sun Tzŭ, the well-known example of Fabius Cunctator comes to mind. That general intentionally measured Rome's endurance against Hannibal's isolated army because he believed Hannibal’s forces were more likely to suffer from a long campaign in unfamiliar territory. However, it's debatable whether his strategies would have been successful in the long term. Their failure did indeed lead to Cannae, but this only provides a negative assumption in their favor.

{12}

6. Military alliances don't benefit nations.

There’s no example of a country benefiting from extended warfare.

The Yü Lan has 圖 instead of 國—clearly a scribe's error.

7. Those who do not fully understand the harms of war cannot fully understand its benefits either.

Only someone who is fully aware of the horrors of war can truly grasp the most effective way to conduct it.

That is, quickly. Only someone who understands the terrible consequences of a long war can recognize how crucial it is to end it swiftly. Only two commentators seem to support this view, but it makes sense in the context, while the interpretation, “He who does not know the evils of war cannot appreciate its benefits,” is clearly meaningless.

8. Wise generals don't drain supplies.

The skilled soldier doesn't call for a second draft, nor are his supply wagons loaded more than twice.

Once war is declared, he won't waste valuable time waiting for reinforcements or turning his army back for fresh supplies; instead, he'll cross the enemy's border without hesitation. This may seem like a bold approach to suggest, but for all great strategists, from Julius Caesar to Napoleon Bonaparte, the importance of time—specifically, being slightly ahead of your opponent—has been more significant than having a numerical advantage or the most precise plans for logistics. N/A is used in the sense of 賦. The T‘ung Tien and Yü Lan have the inferior reading 藉. The commentators explain 不三载 by saying that the wagons are loaded once before crossing the border, and that the army is met by an additional supply delivery on the return trip. However, the Yü Lan also reads 再 here.

9. Use for national army food can be sufficient against enemy.

Bring your own supplies from home, but gather what you need from the enemy. That way, the army will have enough food to meet its needs.

用, “things to be used,” in the broadest sense. It includes all the gear of an army, aside from food supplies.

{13}

10. A nation poor in teachers is far away; when teachers are distant, the people are poor.

The lack of funds in the State's treasury forces an army to be supported by contributions from afar. Funding an army from a distance leads to the people becoming poorer.

The start of this sentence doesn't match up properly with the next one, even though it's clearly meant to. The structure is so awkward that I can't help but suspect there's something wrong with the text. Chinese commentators never seem to consider that a correction might be necessary for clarity, and we’re not getting any help from them this time. Sun Tzŭ states that the reason for the people's poverty is Export; therefore, it's evident that these words refer to a system where farmers sent their grain contributions directly to the army. But why should they be responsible for supporting the army in this way, unless the State or Government is too poor to do it? Assuming that 貧困 should come first in the sentence to balance with 近 (the fact that the two words rhyme is significant), and thus removing Nation's, we still have At the teacher's, which seems to me an obvious error for 國. “Poverty in the army” is an unusual phrase, especially since the general has just been warned not to burden his army with excessive supplies. If we assume that Teacher was mistakenly written here instead of 國 (which is quite easy to imagine, since we have 近乎导师 in the next sentence), and that later someone, noticing a mistake, added the gloss Nation of to 貧困, without erasing Teacher's regard, that might explain the confusion. My revised text would then be 国の貧困者, etc.

11. Close to the teacher is expensive; expensive means the people are drained of wealth.

On the other hand, having an army nearby drives prices up; and high prices deplete the people's resources.

近, which Wang Hsi interprets as referring to the time before the army has left its own territory. Ts‘ao Kung understands it as an army that has already crossed the border. Capt. Calthrop omits the 於, reading Mentoring person, but even so, his translation “Repeated wars cause high prices” cannot be justified.

12. Financial exhaustion leads to desperation

When their resources are depleted, the farmers will suffer from heavy burdens.

{14}

Cf. Mencius VII. 2. xiv. 2, where Hill people has the same meaning as 丘役. Hill was an ancient measure of land. The full table, as given in the Sima's Law, may not be out of place here: 6 尺 = 1 步; 100 step = 1 畝; 100 畝 = 1 Husband; 3 Husband = 1 Home; 3 屋 = 1 井; 4 井 = 1 邑; 4 邑 = 1 Hill; 4 Hill = 1 甸. According to the Chou Li, there were nine husbandmen to a 井, which would assign to each man the generous allowance of 100 Plot (of which 6.6 now go to an acre). What the values of these measures were in Sun Tzŭ’s time is not known with any certainty. The lineal 尺, however, is thought to have been about 20 cm. 急 may include levies of men, as well as other exactions.

13. Resources deplete, burdening families.

14. Government expenses for vehicles and armor, losing six out of ten.

With this loss of substance and exhaustion of strength, the people's homes will be left empty, and thirty percent of their incomes will be wasted;

The Yü Lan leaves out 財產. I suggest the corrected reading Strength yields to balance, etc. Considering we have Resource depletion in the two previous paragraphs, it seems likely that 財 is a scribe’s mistake for 則, with 殫 added later to clarify the meaning. Home is empty in the Central Plains., literally: “Within the central plains, there is emptiness in the homes.” For Central Plains, see Shih Ching II. 3. vi. 3 and II. 5. ii. 3. Regarding Seven out of ten, Tu Mu states: The family business is struggling., and Wang Hsi: 生活开销太高了; meaning the people lose not 3⁄10, but 7⁄10, of their income. However, this is difficult to extract from our text. Ho Shih has a notable saying: A nation is built on its people; food is essential for life. Those in power should cherish this. “The people are regarded as the foundation of the State, and food as the people’s essential need; shouldn't those in power value and take care of both?”

while government spending on damaged chariots, worn-out horses, breastplates and helmets, bows and arrows, spears and shields, protective covers, draft oxen, and heavy wagons will account for forty percent of its total revenue.

{15}

The Yü Lan has several different readings here, the more significant of which are Tired for the less common 罷 (read p‘i²), 干 for 蔽, and Beef cattle for 丘牛, which, if correct, must mean “oxen from the countryside” (cf. supra, § 12). For the meaning of 櫓, see note on III, § 4. Capt. Calthrop fails to translate 丘牛大车.

15. Food for the enemy for one hour is equal to our twenty hours; one unit of food for the enemy equals our twenty units.

A smart general knows the importance of raiding the enemy for supplies. One cartload of the enemy’s food is worth twenty loads of your own, and just one picul of their fodder is as valuable as twenty from your own reserves.

Because twenty cartloads will be used up while transporting one cartload to the front. According to Ts‘ao Kung, a 鍾 = 6 斛 4 㪷, or 64 㪷, but according to Mêng Shih, 10 斛 make a 鍾. The 石 picul consisted of 70 斤 catties (Tu Mu and others say 120). 𦮼秆, literally, “beanstalks and straw.”

16. Killing enemies brings anger; taking their benefits is profit.

Now, to defeat the enemy, our soldiers need to be fired up with anger; for there to be benefits from defeating the enemy, they should be rewarded.

These are two challenging sentences, which I have translated according to Mei Yao-ch‘ên’s paraphrase. We might hastily dismiss Capt. Calthrop’s unusual translation of the first: “It must be forbidden to wantonly kill and destroy the enemy.” Ts‘ao Kung quotes a saying popular in his time: No rewards, no soldiers; no soldiers, no rewards.. Tu Mu states: “Rewards are essential to help soldiers understand the benefits of defeating the enemy; therefore, when you seize goods from the enemy, they must be used as rewards so that all your men feel a strong desire to fight for their own sake.” Chang Yü interprets 利 as the direct object of 取, which is not as preferable.

17. The victorious chariots receive ten vehicles, rewarding those who excel and changing their flags, mixing the vehicles, and nurturing the soldiers.

Therefore, in chariot racing, when ten or more chariots have been captured, those who took the first should be rewarded.

{16}

Capt. Calthrop’s interpretation is: “Those who first get their hands on more than ten of the enemy's chariots should be encouraged.” We would have expected the brave captain to recognize that such impressive strength deserves more than just encouragement. The T‘u Shu leaves out N/A and uses Above instead of the older 已上.

Our flags should replace those of the enemy, and the chariots should be mixed and used together with ours. The captured soldiers should be treated kindly and kept.

胜敌而增加实力

This is referred to as using the defeated enemy to boost one's own power.

19. Winning is valued over endurance.

In war, make your main goal victory, not long campaigns.

As Ho Shih says: 兵不可玩，武不可黷 “Soldiers shouldn’t be treated like toys. War isn’t something to be taken lightly.” Sun Tzŭ emphasizes the key lesson that this chapter aims to convey.

20. Knowing that the military leader is the guardian of the people's fate and the protector of the nation's safety.

So it can be understood that the leader of the armies is the one who decides the fate of the people, the person on whom it relies whether the nation will be in peace or in danger.

In the original text, there is a 生 before the 民.

1. Sun Tzu says: The best way to use military force is to prioritize the whole nation, then to break the country; next is the entire army, then to break the army; then the whole corps, then to break the corps; next is the whole squad, then to break the squad; finally, the whole unit, then to break the unit.

Sun Tzu said: In the practical art of war, the best approach is to take the enemy’s territory completely and intact; breaking and destroying it is not ideal. Similarly, it is better to capture an entire army than to annihilate it, and to capture a regiment, a unit, or a company fully rather than to wipe them out.

A Military "army corps," according to the Ssŭ-ma Fa, typically had 12,500 soldiers; according to Ts‘ao Kung, a Travel included 500 soldiers, a 卒 could be anywhere from 100 to 500 soldiers, and a 伍 could be from 5 to 100 soldiers. For the last two, however, Chang Yü provides the specific counts of 100 and 5 respectively.

2. 所以百战百胜不是最好的， 不打而屈人之兵才是最好的。

So, winning all your battles isn't the highest achievement; true excellence is in defeating the enemy's will without engaging in combat.

Here again, no modern strategist would disagree with the words of the old Chinese general. Moltke’s greatest victory, the surrender of the massive French army at Sedan, was achieved almost without bloodshed.

3. The best strategy is to attack plans first, then alliances, then forces, and lastly political tactics against cities.

Thus, the best strategy in leadership is to thwart the enemy’s plans;

{18}

I.e., as Li Ch‘üan says (Start planning it out), right from the start. Maybe the word “baulk” doesn’t fully capture the intensity of 伐, which suggests not just a defensive stance, where one might just block the enemy’s schemes one by one, but instead a proactive strategy of counter-attack. Ho Shih expresses this clearly in his note: “When the enemy has prepared a plan to attack us, we need to get ahead of him by launching our own attack first.”

the next best thing is to stop the enemy's forces from joining together;

Isolating him from his allies. We must not forget that Sun Tzŭ, when discussing conflicts, always considers the many states or regions that made up China in his time.

the next step is to attack the enemy’s army in the field;

When he is at his full strength.

and the worst strategy of all is to surround walled cities.

The use of the word 政 is somewhat unusual, which may account for the reading of the modern text: Attack the city beneath..

4. 攻城之法爲不得已修櫓轒轀具器械三月而後成距闉又三月而後已

The rule is not to surround walled cities if it can be avoided.

Another solid piece of military theory. If the Boers had followed it in 1899 and not wasted their resources in front of Kimberley, Mafeking, or even Ladysmith, it's very likely they would have been in control of the situation before the British were prepared to seriously challenge them.

The preparation of mantlets, movable shelters, and various tools for war will take a full three months;

It's not very clear what タワー were. Ts‘ao Kung simply defines them as Shield "large shields," but we get a better understanding from Li Ch‘üan, who says they were used to protect the heads of those attacking the city walls up close. This seems to suggest something like a Roman testudo, already assembled. Tu Mu mentions they were “what are now referred to as 彭浦” (wheeled vehicles used to repel attacks, according to K‘ang Hsi), but Ch‘ên Hao disputes this. See supra, II. 14. The term is also used for turrets on city walls. For 轒轀 (fên yün), we receive{19} a pretty clear description from several commentators. They were wooden, missile-proof structures on four wheels, powered from inside, covered with raw hides, and used in sieges to transport teams of men to and from the walls to fill the surrounding moat with dirt. Tu Mu adds that they are now called 木驢 “wooden donkeys.” Capt. Calthrop incorrectly translates the term as “battering-rams.” I agree with Ts‘ao Kung in interpreting 具 as a verb, coordinating and synonymous with 修. Those commentators who consider 修 as an adjective meaning 長 “long” generally interpret 具 as a noun.

and the accumulation of mounds against the walls will take three more months.

The 距闉 (or 堙 in the modern text) were large mounds or earthworks built up to the height of the enemy’s walls to identify weak spots in their defenses, as well as to take out the fortified turrets referred to in the previous note. Tu Yu cites the Tso Chuan: 楚司马子反乘堙而窥宋城也.

5. This attack caused them to lose a third of their soldiers without breaching the city, which fueled their rage.

The general, unable to hide his frustration, will send his troops into the attack like swarming ants,

Capt. Calthrop inexplicably leaves out this striking comparison, which, as Ts‘ao Kung points out, comes from watching an army of ants climbing a wall. The idea is that the general, growing impatient with the extended wait, might make a hasty attempt to attack the place before his war machines are prepared.

with the result that a third of his men are killed, while the town still remains unconquered. These are the terrible consequences of a siege.

We remember the terrible losses the Japanese faced before Port Arthur during the most recent siege recorded in history. The T‘ung Tien states 无法压制的愤怒 ... 則殺士兵 ... Siege disaster. For 其怒, the Yü Lan uses Anger. Capt. Calthrop doesn't translate 城不拔者 and incorrectly translates This attack disaster.

6. A good strategist uses deception instead of fighting, captures cities without attacking, and destroys nations without prolonging conflict.

Therefore, a skilled leader defeats the enemy's forces without any fighting; he takes their cities without besieging them; he topples their kingdom without protracted campaigns on the battlefield.

Chia Lin points out that he only brings down the 國, meaning the Government, but he doesn't hurt any individuals. A classic example is Wu Wang, who, after ending the Yin dynasty, was celebrated as the "Father and Mother of the People."

7. Must fully contend for the world, hence the army does not hesitate, and benefits can be completely achieved; this is the strategy of attack.

With his forces intact, he will challenge the control of the Empire, and so, without losing a single soldier, his victory will be absolute.

Owing to the double meanings of 兵, 頓 [= 鈍] and 利, the latter part of the sentence can have a completely different meaning: “And so, since the weapon isn’t dulled by use, its sharpness stays perfect.” Chang Yü states that 利 is “the advantage of a prosperous kingdom and a strong army.”

This is the strategy for attacking using deception.

8. Ten rules of warfare: encircle, double the attack, and divide.

It’s the rule in war that if our forces are ten times larger than the enemy’s, we should surround them; if we have five times their number, we should attack them;

Straight away, without waiting for any extra opportunity.

if we were twice as many, to split our army in two.

Note that 之 does not refer to the enemy, as in the two previous clauses. This sudden change of subject is quite common in Chinese. Tu Mu disagrees with the saying; and at first glance, it seems to break a fundamental rule of war. However, Ts‘ao Kung gives insight into Sun Tzŭ’s meaning: Two against one, one is regular, one is special. “When we are two against one, we can use one part of our army in a standard way, and the other for a special tactic.” [For explanation of 正 and 奇, see V. 3, note.] Chang Yü further clarifies the point: “If our force is twice as strong as the enemy's, it should be divided into two groups, one to engage the enemy head-on, and one to attack from the back; if he counters the front assault, he can be overwhelmed from behind; if he defends against the rear attack, he can be overwhelmed in front. This is what is meant by saying that ‘one part may be used in the regular way, and the other for some special diversion.’” Tu Mu does not realize that dividing one’s army is simply an irregular strategy, just as concentrating it is the standard tactical approach, and he is too quick to label this as a mistake.”

{21}

9. If the enemy is strong, fight; if weak, escape; if inferior, avoid.

If we're evenly matched, we can take on a fight;

Li Ch‘üan, followed by Ho Shih, offers this paraphrase: The good are the true warriors. “If the attackers and defenders are evenly matched in strength, only a skilled general will engage in battle.” He interprets can as if it were 能人, which is a bit awkward.

if we are slightly outnumbered, we can avoid the enemy;

The T‘u Shu uses 守 instead of Escape, which is barely different in meaning from 避 in the next part. The idea, “we can watch the enemy,” is definitely a significant improvement on the previous statement; however, there doesn’t seem to be strong evidence supporting the alternative. Chang Yü reminds us that this saying only applies if all other factors are equal; a slight difference in numbers can often be more than offset by greater energy and discipline.

if we are completely unequal in every way, we can escape from him.

10. Defeating a small enemy leads to capturing a bigger one.

Therefore, even though a determined resistance can be put up by a small group, ultimately it will be overcome by the larger force.

In other words: “It’s beautiful; but this isn't war.”

11. A supportive husband strengthens the nation; a neglectful one weakens it.

Now the general is the fortress of the State: if the fortress is solid at every point, the State will be strong; if the fortress has flaws, the State will be weak.

Gap can't just be limited to something specific like what Capt. Calthrop’s translation says, “divided in his allegiance.” It’s really just maintaining the metaphor suggested by 周. As Li Ch‘üan succinctly puts it: Weakness comes from lack of preparation. “Ch‘i, gap, signifies a deficiency; if the general’s skills aren’t up to par (meaning if he’s not fully knowledgeable in his field), his army will be weak.”

12. The reasons your lord is troubled by the army are three

There are three ways a ruler can bring trouble to his army:—

{22}

不知军之不可进而谓之进，不知军之不可退而谓之退，这叫束缚军队。

(1) By ordering the army to move forward or pull back, without realizing that it can’t actually do that. This is called hindering the army.

Ts‘ao Kung vaguely defines 縻 as 御 “control,” “direct.” Cf. § 17 ad fin. But actually, it's one of those vivid metaphors that occasionally shed light on Sun Tzŭ’s work, and it’s appropriately explained by Li Ch‘üan as = bonds. He adds the comment: 如羈絆的馬無法馳騁. “It’s like tying together the legs of a thoroughbred, so it can’t gallop.” One would typically think of “the ruler” in this context as being at home, trying to control the movements of his army from afar. However, the commentators interpret it the opposite way, quoting T‘ai Kung’s saying: A nation cannot be governed from outside; the military cannot be controlled from within. “A kingdom shouldn’t be governed from the outside, and an army shouldn’t be directed from the inside.” Indeed, during a battle, or when closely engaged with the enemy, a general should stand a little apart from his troops. Otherwise, he may misjudge the overall situation and issue incorrect orders.

14. Ignoring the army's affairs while sharing its politics will confuse the soldiers.

(2) By trying to manage an army the same way he runs a kingdom, without understanding the realities of military life. This creates unease in the soldiers' minds.

Ts‘ao Kung’s note is: Military and state can't coexist;礼不治兵., which can be freely translated as: “The military and civilian worlds are completely separate; you can’t treat an army delicately.” And Chang Yü says: “Humanity and justice (Benevolence and righteousness) are the foundations for running a state, but not for an army; instead, opportunism and adaptability (Agility) are more suited to military matters than civic ones.” 同三军之政, “to align the governance of an army”—with that of a State, understood. The T‘ung Tien has 欲 added before 同, here and in § 15.

{23}

15. Not knowing the army's authority while sharing its responsibilities leads to soldier doubts.

(3) By using the officers in his army without bias,

That is, he doesn't take care to put the right person in the right position.

through a lack of understanding of the military principle of adapting to circumstances. This undermines the soldiers' confidence.

I follow Mei Yao-ch‘ên here. The other commentators interpret Not sure etc. not to refer to the ruler, as in §§ 13, 14, but to the officers he employs. Thus, Tu Yu states: If you don't know adaptability, don't take on power. “If a general does not understand the principle of adaptability, he should not be given a position of authority.” Tu Mu cites Yellowstone King: “A skilled employer of people will hire the wise, the brave, the greedy, and the foolish. The wise person loves to establish their merit, the brave likes to showcase their courage in action, the greedy is quick to seize opportunities, and the foolish has no fear of death.” The T‘ung Tien reads 軍隊に対する疑念, which Tu Yu explains as 覆敗 “is utterly defeated.” Capt. Calthrop provides a very inaccurate translation: “Ignorant of the situation of the army, to interfere in its arrangements.”

16. When the three armies are confused and doubtful, the lords will find it hard to arrive; this is called a disordered army that leads to victory.

But when the army is uneasy and suspicious, trouble is bound to arise from the other feudal lords. This just introduces chaos into the army and throws away victory.

Most commentators interpret 引 to mean 奪, which it apparently also means in the Li Chi, 玉藻, I. 18. [却 is given as its equivalent there, but Legge still tries to keep the more common meaning, translating it as “draw ... back,” which is difficult to defend.] However, Tu Mu and Wang Hsi believe 引勝 signifies “leading to the enemy’s victory.”

17. Knowing victory has five aspects: knowing when to fight and when not to fight; knowing the value of numbers; knowing the unity of intent; knowing how to prepare for the unexpected; and knowing the capability of the commanders when the ruler does not intervene. These five are the principles of knowing victory.

Thus we may know that there are five essentials{24} for victory: (1) The one who wins is the one who knows when to fight and when to back down.

Chang Yü says: “If he can fight, he moves forward and takes the offensive; if he can’t fight, he pulls back and stays on the defensive. The one who knows when it’s right to be offensive or defensive will always win.”

(2) He will win who knows how to manage both stronger and weaker forces.

This isn't just about the general's ability to accurately assess numbers, as Li Ch‘üan and others suggest. Chang Yü explains it better: “By using the strategies of war, you can defeat a larger force with a smaller one, and vice versa. The key is having a good sense of the terrain and not missing the right moment. So Wu Tzŭ says: ‘When you have a superior force, choose easy terrain; when you have a weaker one, choose difficult terrain.’”

(3) He will win whose army is filled with the same spirit across all its ranks.

Ts‘ao Kung refers 上下 less clearly to rulers and their subjects.

(4) He will win who, having prepared himself, waits to catch the enemy off guard.

(5) The one who has military skill and isn't hindered by authority will prevail.

Tu Yu quotes Prince as saying: 指示在你，决战在将也 “It is the sovereign’s role to give overall directions, but deciding on the battle is the general's role.” There's no need to elaborate on the military failures caused by unnecessary interference from the home government in field operations. Napoleon undoubtedly owed much of his remarkable success to the fact that he wasn't restricted by any central authority—that he was, in reality, 將 and You combined.

Victory lies in understanding these five points.

Literally, “These five things are the understanding of the key to winning.”

18. If you know your enemy and yourself, you will not be in danger in a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not your enemy, you will win one and lose one. If you neither know your enemy nor yourself, you will always be in danger.

Hence the saying: If you know your enemy and know yourself, you don't need to be afraid of the outcome of a hundred{25} battles. If you know yourself but not your enemy, for every win you achieve, you will also face a loss.

Li Ch‘üan mentions the case of 苻堅 Fu Chien, prince of 秦 Ch‘in, who in 383 A.D. led a massive army against the 晋 Chin Emperor. When cautioned not to underestimate an enemy who could rely on the talents of figures like 謝安 Hsieh An and 桓沖 Huan Ch‘ung, he arrogantly responded: “I have the population of eight provinces supporting me, with an army of a million infantry and cavalry; they could even block the Yangtze River just by throwing their whips into the water. What danger could I possibly face?” However, shortly afterward, his troops were decisively defeated at the 淝 Fei River, forcing him to retreat in haste.

If you don't know the enemy or yourself, you'll lose every battle.

The modern text, represented by the 北堂书抄 and T‘u Shu, has 必敗, which I would prefer over 殆 here, even though both the T‘ung Tien and Yü Lan use the latter. Chang Yü provides the best commentary on Know yourself and know others.. He explains that these words “relate to attack and defense: knowing the enemy allows you to take the offensive, knowing yourself allows you to defend.” He adds: 攻是守之机，守是攻之策 “Attack is the key to defense; defense is the strategy for attack.” It's hard to find a more concise summary of the fundamental principle of war.

形 is a very broad and somewhat ambiguous term. Literally meaning “form” or “body,” it comes to signify “appearance,” “attitude,” or “disposition;” and here it's best understood as something that lies between, or perhaps combines, “tactics” and “troop disposition.” Ts‘ao Kung explains it as 軍之形也，我動彼應兩敵相察情也 “marching and counter-marching by both armies to understand each other’s situation.” Tu Mu states: “It is through the 形 dispositions of an army that its condition can be assessed. Keep your dispositions hidden (Intangible), and your condition will stay secret, leading to victory; reveal your dispositions, and your condition will be obvious, leading to defeat.” Wang Hsi observes that a good general can Change its form to defeat the enemy. “achieve success by adapting his tactics to counter those of the enemy.” In the modern text, the chapter title appears as military form, which Capt. Calthrop incorrectly translates as “the order of battle.”

1. Sun Tzu said: The skillful warrior first makes himself invincible, and then awaits the moment of defeat for the enemy.

Sun Tzu said: The best fighters from the past first made sure they couldn't be defeated, and then looked for a chance to defeat their opponent.

Cannot win by oneself, but can win by defeating the enemy.

To protect ourselves from losing is in our control, but the chance to defeat the enemy is given to us by the enemy himself.

That is, of course, due to a mistake on his part. Capt. Calthrop has: “The causes of defeat come from within; victory is born in the enemy’s camp,” which, although definitely an improvement on his earlier attempt, is still wrong.

{27}

3. A skilled warrior wins without being invincible; they can't make the enemy certain to win.

Thus the skilled fighter can protect himself against losing,

“By hiding the arrangement of his troops, covering his tracks, and taking constant precautions” (Chang Yü).

but can't be sure of defeating the enemy.

The original text reads 使敌之可胜, which the modern text has further modified into Make sure to defeat the enemy.. Capt. Calthrop interprets this as “and further make the enemy incapable of victory.”

4. Therefore, victory is predictable but cannot be forced.

Hence the saying: One may know how to conquer without being able to do it.

Capt. Calthrop translates: “The conditions needed for victory might be there, but they can't always be secured,” which is pretty much unclear.

不可胜者守也可胜者攻也

Security against defeat means using defensive tactics; the ability to defeat the enemy requires taking the offensive.

For 不可勝, I keep the meaning it clearly has in §§ 1–3, even though all the commentators disagree with me. The interpretation they offer, “He who cannot conquer takes the defensive,” is reasonable enough, but it’s very unlikely that 勝 would suddenly take on an active role like that. A mistaken version in the Yü Lan is 不可胜则守可胜则攻.

Not enough defense, too much attack

Standing on the defensive shows a lack of strength; attacking shows an abundance of strength.

7. The good defender hides underground, the good attacker moves in the skies, allowing them to protect themselves and achieve complete victory.

The general who is good at defense hides in the most secret places on earth;

Literally, “hides under the ninth earth,” which is a metaphor indicating extreme secrecy and concealment, so that the enemy cannot know{28} his location. The Nine Lands in this passage are not related to the Nine Lands “Nine situations” of chap. XI.

The one who is skilled in attacking comes down from the highest peaks of heaven.

Another metaphor suggests that he strikes his opponent like a thunderbolt, leaving no time to prepare. This is the view of most commentators, although Ts‘ao Kung, followed by Tu Yu, interprets 地 as the hills, rivers, and other natural features that provide shelter or protection to the one under attack, and Sky as the weather conditions that the attacking party can exploit. Capt. Calthrop’s “The skilled in attack push to the topmost heaven” conveys no meaning at all.

So, on one hand, we have the ability to protect ourselves; on the other hand, a victory that is total.

Capt. Calthrop has a vivid imagination for this: “If you follow these guidelines, success is guaranteed.”

8. 不要以他人的看法定义善恶。

Seeing victory only when it's within reach of the average person is not the peak of excellence.

As Ts‘ao Kung points out, When seen, not yet sprouted “the key is to see the plant before it has germinated,” anticipating the event before any action takes place. Li Ch‘üan references the story of Han Hsin who, when preparing to attack the much stronger army of 趙 Chao, which was heavily fortified in the city of 成安 Ch‘êng-an, said to his officers: “Gentlemen, we are going to destroy the enemy, and we’ll meet again for dinner.” The officers hardly took him seriously and responded with skepticism. However, Han Hsin had already devised a smart plan in his mind, which allowed him to capture the city and deliver a devastating defeat to his opponent. For the full story, see Book of the Former Han, chap. 34, The Legend of Han Xin. Capt. Calthrop again makes a significant mistake by saying: “A victory, even if celebrated by the common people, may not be a true success.”

9. Winning and the world says good not the goodness of goodness

It's not the ultimate achievement if you fight and win, and the entire Empire says, “Great job!”

True excellence is, as Tu Mu says: Subtle schemes conquer without bloodshed. "To plan in secret, to act stealthily,{29} to thwart the enemy’s plans and disrupt his strategies, ensuring that victory can be achieved without spilling a drop of blood.” Sun Tzŭ only praises those things that

10. 故举秋毫不为多力见日月不为明目闻雷霆不为聪耳

To lift an autumn leaf is no sign of great strength;

autumn feathers refers to the fur of a hare, which is at its softest in autumn, when it starts to grow back. This phrase is widely used among Chinese authors. See Mencius, I. 1. vii. 10, and Chuang Tzŭ, Know the North Trip, et al.

Seeing the sun and moon doesn't mean you're sharp-sighted; hearing the noise of thunder doesn’t mean you have a quick ear.

Ho Shih provides real examples of strength, keen eyesight, and acute hearing: Wu Huo, who could lift a tripod weighing 250 stones; Li Chu, who could see objects as small as a mustard seed from a hundred paces away; and Shih K‘uang, a blind musician who could hear a mosquito's footsteps.

11. The ancient saying: good warriors easily win.

What the ancients referred to as a smart fighter is someone who not only wins, but does so effortlessly.

The original text, followed by the T‘u Shu, has 勝過容易的贏家. But this is a change obviously made to smooth out the awkwardness of 勝勝易勝者也, which literally means: “one who, conquering, excels in easy conquering.” Mei Yao-ch‘ên says: “Someone who only sees what's on the surface wins his battles with difficulty; someone who looks deeper into things wins easily.”

12. A good strategist wins without intelligence, fame, or bravery.

His victories bring him neither a reputation for wisdom nor recognition for bravery.

Tu Mu explains this really well: “Since his victories are achieved over circumstances that haven’t been revealed, the world knows nothing about them, and he earns no reputation for wisdom; since the opposing state surrenders before any blood is shed, he gets no credit for courage.”

{30}

13. So the victorious, without fail, must have strategies that ensure success, while the defeated are already lost.

He wins his battles by not making any mistakes.

Ch‘ên Hao says: “He doesn’t plan unnecessary marches, and he doesn’t come up with pointless attacks.” Chang Yü explains the connection of ideas: “Someone who tries to conquer purely by strength, no matter how skilled he is at winning battles, can still be defeated at times; while someone who can foresee the future and understand conditions that are not yet clear will never make a mistake and will always win.” Li Ch‘üan believes that the character 忒 should be 貳 meaning “to have doubts.” But it’s better not to alter the text, especially when it doesn’t clarify the meaning.

Avoiding mistakes is what guarantees victory, as it means beating an enemy that's already been defeated.

The T‘u Shu leaves out 必. 措 is equivalent to 置. Chia Lin suggests it’s a replacement for 錯 in the context of 雜; however, that interpretation seems forced. Capt. Calthrop completely overlooks the significant word 忒.

14. A good warrior stands undefeated without losing to the enemy.

Therefore, the skilled fighter positions themselves in a way that makes defeat impossible and seizes the opportunity to defeat the enemy.

A Not a feasible plan “counsel of perfection,” as Tu Mu rightly points out. 地 doesn't have to be limited just to the actual ground where the troops are stationed. It encompasses all the plans and preparations a smart general will implement to enhance the safety of his army.

Winning soldiers win first and then seek battle; defeated soldiers engage first and then seek victory.

So, in war, the successful strategist only looks for a fight after the victory is already secured, while the one destined to lose jumps into battle first and then hopes for victory.

Ho Shih explains the paradox: “In warfare, first devise plans that guarantee victory, and then lead your army into battle; if you don’t start with strategy and just depend on brute strength, victory will not be guaranteed.”

{31}

16. A skilled strategist practices the way and upholds the law to manage victory and defeat.

The ideal leader promotes ethical principles and consistently follows established methods and rules;

For Path and Law, see supra, I. 4 sqq. I believe that Chang Yü is mistaken in changing their meanings here, interpreting them as The way of war and Defeating the enemy strategy respectively.

Thus, he has the power to control success.

17. Strategy: Measure, Quantify, Count, Balance, Win

In terms of military strategy, we have, first, Measurement; second, Estimation of quantity; third, Calculation; fourth, Balancing of chances; and fifth, Victory.

18.地生度度生量量生數數生稱稱生勝

Measurement exists because of Earth; Estimation of quantity comes from Measurement; Calculation is based on Estimation of quantity; Balancing chances relies on Calculation; and Victory results from Balancing chances.

It's not easy to clearly distinguish the four terms 度量单位. The first appears to be surveying and measuring the land, which helps us 量 estimate the enemy’s strength, and to 數 make calculations based on the data we've gathered; this leads us to 稱 a general evaluation or comparison of the enemy’s chances against our own; if the latter outweighs the former, then 勝 victory follows. The main challenge lies in 數, which some commentators interpret as a calculation of numbers, almost making it synonymous with 量. Perhaps 量 considers the enemy’s general position or condition (情 or situation), while 數 estimates his numerical strength. On the other hand, Tu Mu defines 數 as 機數, adding: Strength and weakness determined, then use strategy. "once the question of relative strength is settled, we can employ various cunning strategies." Ho Shih supports this interpretation, which, however, is undermined by the fact that 稱 logically follows 數; this certainly suggests that the latter involves a calculation of numbers. The less said about Capt. Calthrop’s version, the better.

{32}

19. If the winning army values a tael as a grain, the defeated army values a grain as a tael.

A victorious army facing a defeated one is like a pound on one side of a scale compared to a single grain on the other.

Literally, “a victorious army is like an 鎰 i (20 oz.) weighed against a 銖 shu (1⁄24 oz.); a defeated army is like a shu weighed against an i.” The point is simply the huge advantage a disciplined, victorious force has over a demoralized, defeated one. Legge, in his note on Mencius, I. 2. ix. 2, states that the 鎰 is 24 Chinese ounces, correcting Chu Hsi's claim that it was only equal to 20 oz. However, Li Ch‘üan of the T‘ang dynasty provides the same figure as Chu Hsi here.

20. 勝者之戰民也若決積水於千仞之谿者形也

The surge of a conquering army is like a flood breaking loose into a deep abyss. That’s it for tactical arrangements.

The structure here is a bit awkward and indirect, but the overall meaning is clear. The T‘u Shu leaves out People. A 仞 equals 8 尺 or Chinese feet.

埶 is considered an older version of 勢; however, Sun Tzŭ seems to have used the former to mean “power,” and the latter only to mean “circumstances.” The complete title military forces appears in the T‘u Shu and in the modern text. Wang Hsi expands it to Changing trends, meaning “the application, in various ways, of accumulated power;” and Chang Yü states: Use strength to achieve victory. “When the soldiers’ energy has reached its peak, it can be used to achieve victory.”

1. Sun Tzu said managing many is like managing few; it's all about ratios.

Sun Tzŭ said: Managing a large group of people is fundamentally the same as managing a small group; it just comes down to how you divide them up.

That is, breaking the army into regiments, companies, etc., with subordinate officers in charge of each. Tu Mu reminds us of Han Hsin’s famous response to the first Han Emperor, who once asked him, “How large an army do you think I could lead?” “No more than 100,000 men, your Majesty.” “And you?” asked the Emperor. “Oh!” he replied, “the more, the better” (More is better). Chang Yü provides the following interesting breakdown of the subdivisions of an army:—5 men make a 列; 2 列 make a 火; 5 火 make a 隊; 2 隊 make a 官; 2 官 make a 曲; 2 曲 make a 部; 2 部 make a 校; 2 校 make a 裨; 2 裨 make a Military. An army corps, or 軍隊, thus consists of 3,200 men. But cf. III. § 1, note. For 曲, see I. § 10. It’s possible that 官 in that paragraph may also be used in that technical sense.

2. Fighting the many is like fighting the few.

Fighting with a large army under your command is no different from fighting with a small one; it's just a matter of using signs and signals.

{34}

One should be careful not to translate 争斗 as “fighting against a large number,” since there’s no implication of an enemy. 形 is explained by Ts‘ao Kung as referring to flags and banners, which help each soldier identify his specific regiment or company, preventing confusion. 名 is described as drums and gongs, which have been used since ancient times to signal advances and retreats. Tu Mu defines 形 as 陳形 “arranging the troops in order,” and interprets Name as the flags and banners. Wang Hsi also disagrees with Ts‘ao Kung, relating 形 to the organization of the troops through banners, drums, and gongs, and 名 to the different names used to identify the regiments. This perspective has a lot of merit.

3. The troops can face the enemy without defeat, that's the essence.

To make sure that your entire force can handle the impact of the enemy's attack and stay steady—this is achieved through both direct and indirect maneuvers.

For 必, there is another reading 畢, “all together,” used by Wang Hsi and Chang Yü. We now reach one of the most interesting sections of Sun Tzŭ’s treatise, the discussion of the 正 and the 奇. Since these two terms are not easy to fully understand or translate consistently into good English, it may be helpful to summarize some of the commentators’ remarks on the topic before moving on. Li Ch‘üan: 當敵為正傍出為奇 “Facing the enemy is chêng, making lateral diversions is ch‘i.” Chia Lin: 當敵人用常規陣型取勝時，用奇兵反擊。 “In the presence of the enemy, your troops should be arranged normally, but to achieve victory, you must utilize unconventional tactics.” Mei Yao-ch‘ên: Act in response to stillness; wait for movement to conquer it. “Ch‘i is active, chêng is passive; passivity means waiting for an opportunity, while activity brings the victory.” Ho Shih: I make the strange seem just; I make the just seem strange. “We must make the enemy see our straightforward attack as one that is secretly designed, and vice versa; thus, chêng can also be ch‘i, and ch‘i can also be chêng.” He cites the famous incident of Han Hsin, who, while marching apparently towards 臨晉 Lin-chin (now 朝邑 Chao-i in Shensi), unexpectedly sent a large force across the Yellow River in wooden tubs, completely unsettling his opponent. [Ch‘ien Han Shu, ch. 34.] Here, we learn that the march on Lin-chin was 正, and the surprise maneuver was 奇. Chang Yü provides the following summary of opinions on the terms: “Military writers{35} do not all agree on the meanings of ch‘i and chêng. 尉繚子 Wei Liao Tzŭ [4^th cent. B.C.] states: 正兵在前，奇兵在後 ‘Direct warfare favors frontal attacks, while indirect warfare attacks from the rear.’ Ts‘ao Kung says: ‘Going straight to engage in battle is a direct operation; appearing at the enemy’s rear is an indirect maneuver.’ Li Weigong Li Wei-kung [6^th and 7^th cent. A.D.] says: ‘In war, marching straight ahead is chêng; turning movements, on the other hand, are ch‘i.’ These writers simply see chêng as chêng, and ch‘i as ch‘i; they do not recognize that the two are interchangeable and blend into each other like the two sides of a circle [see infra, § 11]. A comment from the T‘ang Emperor T‘ai Tsung gets to the heart of the matter: ‘A ch maneuver can be chêng if we can make the enemy view it as chêng; thus our actual attack will be ch‘i, and vice versa. The entire secret lies in confusing the enemy, so he cannot discern our true intent.’” To clarify a bit more: any attack or operation is 正 when the enemy is focused on it; whereas what takes him by surprise or comes from an unexpected direction is 奇. If the enemy recognizes a movement intended to be 奇, it immediately becomes 正.

4. The army's strategy is like throwing an egg at a rock, it's about weakness and strength.

That the impact of your army may be like a grindstone smashing against an egg—this is achieved through the knowledge of weak points and strong ones.

Reality and illusion, literally “the hollow and the solid,” is the title of chap. VI. 碫 tuan is the T‘u Shu reading, while 碬 hsia is the reading from the standard text. According to K‘ang Hsi, there has been a lot of confusion between the two characters, and it's likely that one has mistakenly found its way into the language as a substitute for the other.

Engage with strategy to win.

In any combat, a straightforward approach can be taken to engage in battle, but alternative strategies will be necessary to achieve success.

Chang Yü says: Surprise attack or strike from behind “Gradually use indirect tactics, either by hitting the enemy's sides or attacking from behind.” A great example of “indirect tactics” that changed the outcome of a campaign was Lord Roberts’ night march around the Peiwar Kotal in the second Afghan war.^[169]

{36}

6. Those who excel in surprising creativity are inexhaustible like heaven and earth, unceasing like rivers that end and restart. So it is with the sun and moon, life after death, and the four seasons.

Indirect tactics, when used effectively, are as endless as the sky and the earth, and as constant as the flow of rivers and streams;

奇 is the universally accepted correction for 兵, as read in the Northern Hall Book Stipends.

like the sun and moon, they end only to start again; like the four seasons, they fade away but come back once more.

Tu Yu and Chang Yü understand the variations of 奇 and 正. But right now, Sun Tzŭ isn't talking about 正 at all, unless we assume, as 鄭友賢 Chêng Yu-hsien suggests, that a part related to it is missing from the text. Of course, as mentioned earlier, the two concepts are so closely connected in all military operations that they can't really be looked at separately. Here, we simply have a figurative expression of the nearly limitless resourcefulness of a great leader.

7. The sound cannot exceed five sounds.

There are no more than five musical notes,

宮商角微羽.

yet the combinations of these five create more melodies than anyone could ever hear.

8. There are countless variations of colors.

There are no more than five primary colors,

青黄赤白黑 blue, yellow, red, white, and black.

yet together they create more colors than can ever be seen.

9. The flavor changes are endless.

There are no more than five basic tastes,

sour, acrid, salty, sweet, bitter.

yet combinations of them produce more flavors than can ever be experienced.

{37}

10. Strategies vary endlessly in war.

In battle, there are only two ways to attack—the direct and the indirect; however, when these two are combined, they create an endless range of maneuvers.

11. The interplay of Yin and Yang is like an endless cycle, who can exhaust it?

The direct and the indirect connect to each other in sequence. It's like going in a circle—you never reach an end. Who can fully explore the possibilities of their combination?

The T‘u Shu adds 哉. The final 之 may refer to either the circle or, more likely, to the The change of odd and even understood. Capt. Calthrop is mistaken when he says, “They are a mystery that no one can understand.”

12. Flooding causes debris to float.

The arrival of troops is like the rush of a flood that can even carry rocks along with it.

13. The falcon's sickness leads to destruction.

The quality of a decision is like a falcon making a perfectly timed dive that allows it to catch and kill its prey.

For 疾, the Yü Lan reads 擊, which is also backed up by a quote in the Lüshi Chunqiu [3^rd cent. B.C.]. In this context, 節 is a term that really challenges the translator’s skills. Tu Mu states that it is similar to Distance measurement “the measurement or estimation of distance.” However, this interpretation doesn’t quite capture the illustrative simile in § 15. When related to the falcon, it seems to refer to the instinct of self-restraint that prevents the bird from diving on its prey until the precise moment, along with the ability to recognize when that moment has come. The comparable quality in soldiers is the crucial ability to hold their fire until the exact instant when it will be most impactful. When the “Victory” engaged at Trafalgar at barely drifting speed, she was exposed to a barrage of shots and shells for several minutes before firing a single gun. Nelson calmly waited until he was at close range, at which point the broadside he unleashed inflicted severe damage on the enemy’s closest ships. That was a case of 節.

{38}

14. Therefore, a good warrior knows when to take risks and when to hold back.

Therefore, a skilled fighter will be fierce in their attack and quick in making decisions.

Tu Yu defines 節 here using the word 斷, which is quite similar to “decision” in English. 短 is definitely used in a very unusual way, even if, as the commentators suggest, it means 近. This would relate to the measurement of distance mentioned earlier, allowing the enemy to get close before striking. However, I can't help but think that Sun Tzŭ intended to use the word in a figurative sense akin to our expression “short and sharp.” Compare with Wang Hsi’s note, which, after describing how a falcon attacks, states: No changes needed. “This is exactly how the ‘psychological moment’ should be seized in war.” I don’t agree with Capt. Calthrop’s translation: “The spirit of the good fighter is terrifying, his occasions sudden.”

15. 似乎强弩节如发机

Energy can be compared to the tension in a crossbow, while decision is like pulling the trigger.

“Energy” seems to be the best match here for 埶, because the comparison suggests that the force is potential, stored in the bent crossbow until it's released by the finger on the trigger. None of the commentators seem to understand the real meaning of the simile.

16. Confused and chaotic yet unbroken, round and intact yet indestructible.

Amid the chaos and disturbance of battle, there may appear to be disorder, but in reality, there is none; in the midst of confusion and chaos, your formation may seem disorganized, yet it will be resilient against defeat.

Round shape, literally "circular formation," is described by Li Ch‘üan as 无向背也 "without front or back." Mei Yao-ch‘ên states: "Once the army's subdivisions have been established and the various signals agreed upon, the separating and joining, the scattering and gathering that happen during a battle might seem chaotic, but real chaos is not possible. Your formation can lack a clear front or back, and your arrangements can seem completely mixed up, yet a rout of your forces is out of the question." It's somewhat tricky to determine whether Conflict and Round shape should be interpreted as commands: "fight in disorder (to deceive the enemy), and you will avoid true chaos." Cf. I. § 20: Chaos and take it..

{39}

17. Chaos arises from order, fear from courage, weakness from strength

Simulated chaos suggests perfect control; simulated fear suggests bravery; simulated weakness suggests strength.

To make the translation understandable, we need to soften the starkly contradictory nature of the original. Ts‘ao Kung hints at the meaning in his brief note: Everyone hides their true feelings. “These things all serve to destroy formation and hide one’s condition.” However, Tu Mu is the first to express it clearly: “If you want to pretend to be confused to draw the enemy in, you must first be perfectly disciplined; if you want to show fear to trap the enemy, you must have tremendous courage; if you want to show weakness to make the enemy overconfident, you need to possess great strength.”

18. Order and chaos are brave, fear grows strong and weak.

Hiding order under the guise of disorder is just a matter of breaking things down;

See above, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

concealing courage behind a facade of shyness assumes there's a reserve of hidden strength;

It’s quite odd that the commentators interpret 埶 here as “circumstances”—a meaning that is completely different from what it has meant earlier in this chapter. As Tu Mu puts it: Seeing an advantage but not acting makes the enemy think I'm scared. “seeing that we are in a favorable position and yet don’t take action, the enemy will think that we are genuinely afraid.”

Masking strength with weakness should be achieved through strategic arrangements.

Chang Yü shares this story about Kao Tsu, the first Han Emperor: “Wanting to defeat the Hsiung-nu, he sent out spies to gather information on their situation. But the Hsiung-nu, forewarned, cleverly hid all their strong men and well-fed horses, only letting infirm soldiers and starving cattle be seen. As a result, all the spies recommended that the Emperor launch an attack.” 婁敬 Lou Ching was the only one who disagreed, saying: “When two countries go to war, it's natural for them to show off their strength. Yet our spies have only seen weakness and old age. This is definitely a trick by the enemy, and it would be foolish for us to attack.” The Emperor, however, ignored this advice, fell into the trap, and found himself surrounded at 白登 Po-têng.

{40}

19. To effectively engage the enemy, one must understand their movements and take advantage of their weaknesses.

So, someone who is good at keeping the enemy constantly moving creates misleading appearances, based on which the enemy will react.

Ts‘ao Kung’s note is Look at the frail figure. “Show a façade of weakness and need,” but Tu Mu correctly points out that 形 doesn’t only mean weakness: “If our strength happens to be greater than the enemy’s, we can pretend to be weak to draw them in; but if we are weaker, we must make it seem like we are strong to keep them at bay. In fact, all the enemy’s actions should be influenced by the signals we decide to send them.” The following story about 孫臏 Sun Pin, a descendant of Sun Wu, is told in detail in the Records of the Grand Historian, chap. 65: In 341 B.C., the 齐 Ch‘i State was at war with 魏 Wei and sent 田忌 T‘ien Chi and Sun Pin to face the general 龐涓 P‘ang Chüan, who happened to be a personal enemy of Sun Pin. Sun Pin said, “The Ch‘i State has a reputation for being cowardly, which is why our enemy looks down on us. Let’s use this to our advantage.” So, when the army entered Wei territory, he ordered them to light 100,000 campfires on the first night, 50,000 on the next, and only 20,000 on the final night. P‘ang Chüan chased them vigorously, thinking to himself, “I knew these Ch‘i men were cowards: their numbers have already dropped by more than half.” During their retreat, Sun Pin reached a narrow pass, predicting that his pursuers would arrive after dark. Here, he stripped a tree of its bark and wrote on it: “P‘ang Chüan will die under this tree.” As night fell, he positioned a strong group of archers in ambush nearby, instructing them to shoot as soon as they saw a light. Later, P‘ang Chüan arrived at the site, noticed the tree, and lit a fire to read what was written. He was instantly hit by a hail of arrows, throwing his entire army into chaos. [The above is Tu Mu’s version of the story; the Shih Chi, while less dramatic, likely reflects more historical accuracy, stating that P‘ang Chüan took his own life in despair after the defeat of his army.]

He gives up something so that the enemy can grab it.

予 here = 與.

20. 以利動之以卒待之

By using bait, he keeps him moving forward; then with a group of elite soldiers, he sets a trap for him.

This seems to be the meaning if we keep 卒, which Mei Yao-ch‘ên explains as Elite troops “men of spirit.” The T‘u Shu reads 本,{41} an edit suggested by 李靖 Li Ching. The meaning would then be, “He lies in wait with the main body of his troops.”

21. A good strategist relies on the position, not the person, so they can choose the right people for the role.

The smart fighter focuses on the power of teamwork and doesn’t rely too heavily on individuals.

Tu Mu says: “First, he looks at the overall strength of his army; then he considers individual skills and assigns roles based on what each person can do. He doesn’t expect perfection from those who lack talent.”

Hence his ability to identify the right people and to harness collective energy.

Another reading has 之 instead of 埶. It would be interesting if Capt. Calthrop could tell us where the following occurs in the Chinese: “yet, when an opening or advantage shows, he pushes it to its limits.”

22. A strategist is like a piece of wood or stone; it is still when stable and moves when threatened, stops when faced with obstacles, and moves freely in open space.

When he uses combined energy, his warriors become like rolling logs or stones. A log or stone stays still on flat ground and moves when on an incline; if it has corners, it stops, but if it's round, it rolls downhill.

Ts‘ao Kung calls this Go with the flow. “the use of natural or inherent power.” Capt. Calthrop completely ignores the last part of the sentence. Instead, he says: “So await the opportunity, and act when the opportunity arrives”—another entirely unnecessary addition. The T‘ung Tien leaves out 任.

23. Good warriors skillfully maneuver like rolling stones down a steep mountain.

Thus, the energy generated by skilled fighters is like the momentum of a round stone rolling down a mountain thousands of feet tall. That’s all on the topic of energy.

The T‘ung Tien leaves out Goodness. According to Tu Mu, the main lesson of this chapter is the crucial role of quick changes and sudden attacks in warfare. “You can achieve great results,” he points out, “even with small forces.”

Chang Yü tries to explain the order of the chapters like this: “Chapter IV, on Tactical Dispositions, talked about offense and defense; chapter V, on Energy, covered direct and indirect approaches. A good general first learns the theory of attack and defense, then focuses on direct and indirect methods. He studies how to mix and match these two approaches before moving on to weak and strong points. The choice between direct and indirect methods comes from offense and defense, and identifying weak and strong points relies on those methods. So, the current chapter follows right after the chapter on Energy.”

1. Sun Tzu said: Those who position themselves first on the battlefield and wait for the enemy are at ease; those who arrive late and rush into battle are exhausted.

Sun Tzu said: Whoever gets to the battlefield first and waits for the enemy will be ready for the fight; whoever arrives second and has to rush into battle will be worn out.

Instead of 處, the Yü Lan uses the stronger word 據 in both clauses. For the contrast between 佚 and 劳, see I. § 23, where 劳 is used as a verb.

Good fighters focus on others, not themselves.

So, the smart fighter makes his own demands on the opponent, but doesn’t let the opponent dictate what he should do.

The next paragraph clarifies that To doesn’t just mean, as Tu Mu says, 让敌人来吧 “to make the enemy come to me,” but actually means to direct him wherever I want. It's basically synonymous with 制. See Tu Mu’s own note on V. § 19. One sign of a great soldier is that he fights on his own terms or not at all.^[170]

{43}

3. It can benefit by making the enemy come and harm by preventing the enemy from coming.

By offering him benefits, he can make the enemy come closer on their own; or, by causing harm, he can ensure that the enemy cannot get near.

In the first case, he will lure him in with a trap; in the second, he will target a crucial point that the enemy will need to protect.

4. Old enemy can exhaust them, nourish them, soothe them, and move them.

If the enemy is relaxed, he can trouble him;

This passage can be used as evidence against Mei Yao-Ch‘ên’s interpretation of I. § 23.

if he has enough food, he can wait him out;

Hungry is likely an older version than 饑, which is how it’s read in the original text. Both are mentioned in the 說文.

if quietly camped, he can make him move.

The subject to 能 is still Good warrior; but these statements would sound better as direct instructions, and in the next sentence, we see Sun Tzŭ subtly shifting into the imperative.

5. Go where it's needed, unexpected paths

Show up where the enemy has to rush to defend; move quickly to areas where you aren't anticipated.

The original text, adopted by the T‘u Shu, has 出其不意; it has been changed to fit the context and the commentaries of Ts‘ao Kung and Ho Shih, who clearly read 必須. The other interpretation would mean: “Appear at places the enemy can't rush to;” but in this situation, the use of 趨 is a bit awkward. Capt. Calthrop is mistaken, of course, with “appearing where the enemy is not.”

6. Travel far without effort in uninhabited lands.

An army can travel long distances without trouble if it moves through areas where the enemy isn’t present.

We need to be careful not to interpret No man's land as “uninhabited country.” Sun Tzŭ often uses 人 to mean Enemy, e.g. supra, § 2.{44} Ts‘ao Kung summarizes this well: Attack when they're unprepared. “Come out of nowhere [q.d. like 'a bolt from the blue'], hit weak points, avoid defended areas, and attack from unexpected angles.” It's important to note the difference in meaning between 空 and 虚.

7. Attack where they're unguarded; defend where they're not attacking.

You can be confident you'll succeed in your attacks if you only target places that are unprotected.

Not keeping it is obviously an exaggeration; Wang Hsi accurately describes it as "weak points; that is, where the leader lacks ability, or the soldiers lack motivation; where the defenses aren't strong enough or the measures aren't strict enough; where help arrives too late, or supplies are too limited, or the defenders are in disagreement with each other."

You can keep your defenses safe if you only take positions that can’t be attacked.

I.e., where there are none of the weak points mentioned above. There's actually an interesting interpretation of this latter clause. Tu Mu, Ch‘ên Hao, and Mei Yao-ch‘ên believe it means: “To make your defense completely secure, you need to defend even those areas that are unlikely to be attacked;” and Tu Mu adds: “How much more should you defend those that will be attacked.” However, this interpretation doesn’t fit as smoothly with the previous statement—something that's always important in the highly contrasting style typical of Chinese writing. Chang Yü, therefore, seems to get closer to the point by saying: “The person skilled in attack strikes from the highest heights of heaven [see IV. § 7], making it impossible for the enemy to guard against him. Because of this, the places I will attack are exactly those that the enemy cannot defend.... The one skilled in defense hides in the deepest recesses of the earth, making it impossible for the enemy to determine his location. So, the places I will hold are precisely those that the enemy cannot attack.”

8. Good attackers leave the enemy unaware of their defense; good defenders leave the enemy unaware of their attack.

So, a general is good at attacking when their opponent is unsure about what to defend; and they are good at defending when their opponent is unclear about what to attack.

A saying that sums up the entire art of war.

{45}

9. So subtle it's almost invisible; so mysterious it's almost silent, thus can command the fate of enemies.

O divine art of subtlety and secrecy! Through you we learn to be invisible, through you inaudible;

Literally, "without form or sound," but it's obviously referring to the enemy. Chang Yü, whom I follow, doesn't make a clear distinction between 微 and God, but Tu Mu and others believe that 微 represents the secrecy required for defense, while God indicates the swiftness needed for attack. The Yü Lan text varies quite a bit from ours, reading: 微乎微乎故能隐于常形神乎神乎故能为敌司命.

and so we can control the enemy's fate.

The T‘ung Tien states N/A. Capt. Calthrop’s translation of this paragraph is so impressive that I have to quote it completely: “The secrets of the art of offense aren't easily grasped like a certain shape or sound can be perceived by our senses; however, once these secrets are understood, the enemy is defeated.”

10. The unguarded is vulnerable; the swift cannot be chased.

You can move forward and be completely unstoppable if you target the enemy's weak spots; you can fall back and stay safe from being chased if you are faster than the enemy.

The second part of the sentence is weak because Out of reach is almost redundant with No trace left.. The Yü Lan reads 遠 instead of 速.

11. Therefore, I want to fight the enemy, even though they have strong fortifications and deep moats, they must engage with me where they are most vulnerable.

If we want to engage in battle, we can force the enemy into a fight even if they're protected by a tall wall and a deep ditch. All we have to do is launch an attack somewhere else that they will have to defend.

Tu Mu says: “If the enemy is the invading force, we can disrupt their communication lines and take control of the routes they need to retreat; if we are the invaders, we can target the sovereign directly.” It’s evident that Sun Tzŭ, unlike some generals in the late Boer War, didn't believe in direct assaults.

{46}

12. I don't want to fight; drawing a line and guarding it means the enemy can't engage me.

If we don’t want to fight, we can keep the enemy from coming after us, even if our camp is just marked out on the ground. All we have to do is put something strange and unexpected in their path.

To maintain the parallelism with § 11, I prefer to follow the T‘u Shu text, which adds 雖然 before 畫地. This very brief expression is clearly paraphrased by Chia Lin: 雖未修圍牆 “even though we have built neither wall nor ditch.” The core of the passage is in Stay in your place.. Here, 之 means 至. Ts‘ao Kung explains Good girl with the term 戾, which might be a case of obscurum per obscurius. However, Li Ch‘üan states: Create something strange and question it. “we confuse him with strange and unusual methods;” and Tu Mu finally clarifies the meaning with three illustrative anecdotes—one featuring Zhuge Liang Chu-ko Liang, who, while holding 陽平 Yang-p‘ing and about to be attacked by Sima Yi Ssŭ-ma I, unexpectedly lowered his flag, stopped the drums, and opened the city gates, revealing only a few men sweeping and sprinkling the ground. This surprising move had the desired effect; Ssŭ-ma I, fearing an ambush, actually withdrew his army. Thus, what Sun Tzŭ is promoting here is simply the strategic use of “bluff.” Capt. Calthrop translates: “and prevent the enemy from attacking by keeping him in suspense,” which indicates that he hasn't fully understood the meaning of Good boy/girl..

13. I am formless while they are shaped, so I focus while my enemies are divided.

By figuring out the enemy's positions and staying hidden ourselves, we can keep our forces united, while the enemy's forces have to be split up.

The conclusion might not be very clear, but Chang Yü (after Mei Yao-ch‘ên) correctly explains it this way: "If we can see the enemy’s plans, we can move together against them; however, if we keep our own plans hidden, the enemy will have to split their forces to defend against attacks from all sides." 形 is used here as an active verb: "to make appear." See IV, note on heading. Capt. Calthrop’s interpretation of “making feints” is completely incorrect.

{47}

14. I specialize in dividing one enemy into ten, so ten share one, thus I have many while the enemy is few.

We can come together as one united group, while the enemy will have to break into smaller pieces. So, we will have one whole facing off against various smaller parts.

The original text has 以敌攻其一也, which according to the T‘ung Tien and Yü Lan has been changed as mentioned above. I prefer the more plausible interpretation from the T‘u Shu: 因此十攻其一, even though I have to interpret 十 as referring to us and not the enemy. Thus, Tu Yu and Mei Yao-ch‘ên both view 十 as a unified force made up of many parts, and 一 as each isolated part of the enemy. The change of 攻 to 共 is unlikely to be correct, even though the original text could have possibly been 十人合力攻其一.

which means that we will be many against the enemy's few.

15. 能以众击寡者则吾之所与战者约矣

And if we can attack a weaker force with a stronger one, our opponents will be in serious trouble.

For 擊, the T‘ung Tien and Yü Lan have Enemy. Tu Yu, followed by the other commentators, randomly defines 約 as Fewer and easier to win “few and easy to conquer,” but this makes the sentence totally meaningless. As for Capt. Calthrop’s translation: “In superiority of numbers there is economy of strength,” its meaning is likely known only to him. To support my own interpretation of 約, I would reference Lun Yü IV. 2 and VII. 25 (3).

16. The battleground is unknown; if unknown, the enemy's preparations are many; if the enemy's preparations are many, the forces I engage with are few.

The location where we plan to fight should remain secret; otherwise, the enemy will have to get ready for a potential attack at various points.

Sheridan once explained the reason for General Grant’s victories by saying that “while his opponents were busy wondering what he was going to do, he was focused on figuring out what he was going to do himself.”

and with his forces spread out in many directions, the number we'll have to confront at any point will be relatively small.

{48}

17. Proper preparation prevents poor performance.

If the enemy fortifies the front, he will compromise the back; if he bolsters the back, he will undermine the front; if he strengthens the left, he will weaken the right; if he boosts the right, he will diminish the left. If he sends support to every area, he will end up weak everywhere.

In Frederick the Great’s Instructions to his Generals we read: “A defensive war often leads us to spread ourselves too thin. Less experienced generals try to defend every single point, while those who know their trade better focus on the main goal, protecting against a major attack, and are willing to accept smaller setbacks to prevent bigger ones.”

18. The few prepare for others; the many prepare others for themselves.

Numerical weakness comes from needing to prepare for potential attacks; numerical strength comes from forcing our opponent to prepare against us.

The best leadership, according to Col. Henderson, is “to force the enemy to break up his army, and then to focus greater strength against each part one at a time.”

19. Know the terrain and timing to engage in battle from afar.

Knowing where and when the upcoming battle will take place, we can gather from far away to prepare for the fight.

There’s nothing about “defeating” anyone in this sentence, as Capt. Calthrop translates. What Sun Tzŭ clearly means is the careful calculation of distances and the skillful use of strategy that allow a general to split his army for a long and quick march, and then bring them together at exactly the right place and time to face the enemy with overwhelming force. Among many successful reunions that military history documents, one of the most dramatic and decisive was Blücher’s arrival right at the critical moment on the battlefield of Waterloo.

{49}

20. If you don't know the battlefield or the days of battle, then the left can't save the right, the right can't save the left, the front can't save the back, and the back can't save the front. How can distant ones help when they are tens of miles away and close ones only several miles?

But if neither the time nor the place is known, then the left wing will be unable to support the right, the right will be equally unable to support the left, the front won't be able to help the back, nor will the back be able to support the front. How much worse will it be if the farthest parts of the army are even less than a hundred li apart, and the closest ones are separated by several li!

The Chinese in this last sentence is a bit unclear, but the mental image we need to create is likely that of an army moving toward a specific meeting point in separate groups, each with orders to arrive by a set date. If the general lets the different units move randomly without clear instructions on when and where to meet, the enemy will be able to wipe out the army piece by piece. Chang Yü’s note is worth quoting here: “If we don’t know where our opponents plan to gather or the day they will engage in battle, our unity will be lost due to our defensive preparations, and our positions will be vulnerable. If we unexpectedly encounter a strong enemy, we will find ourselves in battle unprepared, and there will be no mutual support between the wings, vanguard, or rear, particularly if there’s a significant gap between the front and back divisions of the army.”

21. I believe that even if the soldiers of the Yue are numerous, it won’t help with victory or defeat, so it’s said that victory is achievable.

Though I believe the soldiers of Yüeh outnumber us, that won't give them any advantage when it comes to winning.

Capt. Calthrop skips By my estimate, and his translation of the rest is weak and inaccurate. Since Sun Tzŭ served the 吳 Wu State, some suggest reading 吳 instead of 吾—which is an unnecessary alteration of the text. Yüeh roughly aligned with today's province of Chehkiang. Li Ch‘üan oddly interprets 越 not as a proper name, but as 過 “to surpass.” No other commentator agrees with him. Win or lose falls into a group of expressions like Distance “distance,” Size “magnitude,” etc., that the Chinese use{50} to articulate abstract ideas of degree. The T‘u Shu, however, leaves out Defeat.

I say that victory is possible.

Sadly for these courageous words! The long-standing conflict between the two states ended in 473 B.C. with the complete defeat of Wu by 勾践 Kou Chien and its absorption into Yüeh. This certainly took place long after Sun Tzŭ’s death. Compare his current assertion with IV. § 4: 勝が分かるができない (which is the obviously incorrect interpretation from the Yü Lan here). Chang Yü is the only one to highlight the apparent contradiction, which he explains as follows: “In the chapter on Tactical Dispositions, it is stated, ‘One may know how to conquer without being able to do it,’ whereas here we have the claim that ‘victory can be achieved.’ The explanation is that, in the previous chapter, where offense and defense are discussed, it is stated that if the enemy is fully prepared, one cannot be sure of defeating him. But this passage specifically refers to the soldiers of Yüeh who, according to Sun Tzŭ’s analysis, will be kept unaware of the time and place of the upcoming battle. That is why he states here that victory can be achieved.”

22. Even if the enemy is many, you can avoid battle by strategizing and understanding gains and losses.

Even though the enemy has more people, we can stop him from fighting.

Capt. Calthrop unjustifiably translates: “If the enemy is numerous, stop him,” etc.

Figure out his plans and how likely they are to succeed.

This is the first of four similar sentences, all of which pose significant challenges. Chang Yü explains Know the risks and rewards as Understand the gains and losses of the plan. This might be the best interpretation of the words, although Chia Lin, referring 計 to us rather than the enemy, suggests an alternative: I know all strategies and plans. “Know in advance all strategies that lead to our success and the enemy’s failure.”

23. Understand the principles of motion and stillness by doing; understand the realm of life and death by observing.

Wake him up, and find out the reason for his actions or lack of actions.

Instead of 作, the T‘ung Tien, Yü Lan, and also Li Ch‘üan’s text use 候, which the latter explains as “the observation of omens,” and Chia Lin simply as “watching and waiting.” 作 is defined by Tu Mu{51} as Intense creation, and Chang Yü tells us that by observing the joy or anger displayed by the enemy when disturbed, we can determine whether their strategy is to stay low or not. He cites the example of Chu-ko Liang, who sent the mocking gift of a woman’s head-dress to Ssŭ-ma I to provoke him out of his cautious tactics.

Make him show his true self to uncover his weak points.

Two commentators, Li Ch‘üan and Chang Yü, interpret Shape of as 示之 meaning “put on deceptive appearances.” The former states: “You can either mislead the enemy by pretending to be weak—lowering your flags and quieting your drums; or by pretending to be strong—creating a false impression with campfires and regimental banners.” The latter references V. 19, where Shape it definitely appears to mean this. On the flip side, I would point to § 13 of this chapter, where 形 must also surely be active. It’s tough to decide between the two interpretations, but the context here aligns better, I believe, with the one that I have chosen. Another challenge comes from Life and death, which most commentators, likely thinking of dead end in XI. § 1, refer to the actual ground on which the enemy is camped. However, the notes of Chia Lin and Mei Yao-ch‘ên seem to support my perspective. The same phrase carries a slightly different meaning in I. § 2.

24. Know the strengths and weaknesses

Carefully compare the enemy army with your own,

Tu Yu is correct, I believe, in connecting this force to 角; Ts‘ao Kung defines it simply as 量. Capt. Calthrop really outdid himself with the surprising translation “Flap the wings”! Could the Latin cornu (in its figurative sense) have influenced him?

so that you can understand where strength is plentiful and where it is lacking.

Cf. __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

25. The ultimate form of strategy is formless; when formless, it becomes deep and unfathomable, making it impossible to discern or plan against.

In planning your tactics, the best you can do is to keep them hidden;

The sharpness of the paradox disappears in translation. Intangible is maybe less about actual invisibility (see supra, § 9) and more about “showing no sign” of what you intend to do, of the plans that are made in your mind.

{52}

Keep your intentions hidden, and you'll be safe from the prying eyes of even the cleverest spies and the schemes of the smartest minds.

深閒 is expanded by Tu Mu into 有人有空来窥探我. [For 閒, see XIII, note on heading.] He explains Wise person in a similar way: Even knowledgeable people can't outsmart me. “even if the enemy has smart and capable officers, they won't be able to devise any plans against us.”

26. Because of appearances, many are misled and do not know.

How victory can be achieved for them using the enemy's own tactics—that's what the crowd can't understand.

All the commentators except Li Ch‘üan interpret 形 as referring to the enemy. So Ts‘ao Kung says: Stand strong against the enemy.. 錯 is defined as 置. The T‘u Shu uses 措, which has the same meaning. See IV. § 13. The Yü Lan reads 作, apparently a gloss.

27. Everyone knows my strategy for winning, but no one understands my methods for achieving victory.

All men can see the tactics I use to win, but what no one can see is the strategy that leads to victory.

I.e., everyone can easily see how a battle is won on the surface; what they can't see is the long sequence of plans and combinations that came before the battle. It seems reasonable, then, to translate the first 形 as “tactics” and the second as “strategy.”

28. Thus, victory never returns and manifests endlessly.

Do not rely on the same tactics that brought you one victory; instead, adjust your methods according to the endless variety of circumstances.

As Wang Hsi wisely points out: “There is only one fundamental principle (理) behind victory, but the tactics (形) that lead to it are countless.” Compare this with Col. Henderson: “The rules of strategy are few and straightforward. They can be learned in a week. They can be taught through familiar examples or a dozen diagrams. But this knowledge won’t teach someone to lead an army like Napoleon any more than knowing grammar will help them write like Gibbon.”

{53}

29. The soldier avoids the high ground and goes low.

Military tactics are like water; water naturally flows away from high places and rushes downward.

行 is 劉晝子 Liu Chou-tzŭ’s interpretation of 形 in the original text.

30. Avoid the strong and attack the weak

So in war, the strategy is to avoid what is strong and to attack what is weak.

Like water, following the path of least resistance.

31. Water flows according to the terrain; soldiers win based on the enemy.

Water follows its path based on the type of surface it flows over;

The T‘ung Tien and Yü Lan read Molding,—the latter also 行動. The current text is based on Chêng Yu-hsien.

the soldier figures out his victory in relation to the enemy he is facing.

32. The soldier's power is not constant, and water has no fixed shape.

Therefore, just like water has no fixed shape, in warfare, there are no stable conditions.

33. Adaptable to enemy changes is victory.

A person who can adjust their strategies according to their opponent and succeed in winning can be considered a naturally gifted leader.

34. 五行无常，四季无位，日有短长，月有死生

The five elements

Water, fire, wood, metal, earth.

are not always equally dominant;

That is, as Wang Hsi says: No changes needed. “they take turns being dominant.”

{54}

the four seasons take turns coming and going.

Literally, "have no fixed seat."

There are short days and long ones; the moon has its phases of getting smaller and bigger.

Cf. V. § 6. The point of the passage is just to show the lack of stability in war due to the constant changes in Nature. However, the comparison isn't very effective because the regularity of the events that Sun Tzŭ mentions is not at all similar to what happens in war.

The commentators, along with the following text, clearly indicate that this is the true meaning of military conflict. Li Ch‘üan states that 争 means 追求利益 “rapidly moving to seize an advantage”; Wang Hsi says: Competing for profit leads to victory. “‘Striving’ means striving for an advantage; with this gained, victory will come;” and Chang Yü notes: 兩軍對峙爭取利益 “The two armies face each other, each striving to gain a tactical advantage over the other.” According to the latter commentator, the scenario is similar to two wrestlers maneuvering for a “hold” before actually grappling. In any case, we must be careful not to translate 争 as “fighting” or “battle,” as if it were the same as 戦. Capt. Calthrop makes this error.

1. Sun Tzu said the command in warfare is given by the ruler.

Sun Tzu said: In war, the general gets his orders from the ruler.

For You, there's another interpretation, Sky, which Li Ch‘üan explains as Divine punishment is upon us "being the respectful agent of Heaven's punishment."

2. Form alliances, gather, and negotiate

Having gathered an army and assembled his forces, he needs to unite and coordinate the different elements before setting up his camp.

Ts‘ao Kung interprets 和 as referring to the main gate of the military camp, known as 和门. Tu Mu explains that this was made with a couple of flags hung across. [Cf. Chou Li, ch. xxvii. fol. 31 of the Imperial edition: Straight Flag Gate.] 交和 would then mean “setting up his 和式门 opposite that of the enemy.” However, Chia Lin’s explanation, which I've adopted{56} above, is generally simpler and better. Chang Yü, while agreeing with Ts‘ao Kung, adds that the words can also mean “establishing harmony and trust between the higher and lower ranks before going into battle;” and he quotes a saying from Wu Tzŭ (chap. 1 ad init.): “Without harmony in the State, no military expedition can be undertaken; without harmony in the army, no battle formation can be created.” In the historical romance Eastern Zhou States, chap. 75, Sun Tzŭ is depicted saying to 伍员 Wu Yüan: 通常出征前应先解决内部问题 “As a general rule, those waging war should resolve all domestic issues before attacking external enemies.” 舍 is defined as 止. Here it conveys the idea of encamping after having taken the field.

3. 战争最难的在于用曲折代替直接，用困扰代替利益。

After that, comes tactical maneuvering, which is more difficult than anything else.

I have slightly deviated from the traditional interpretation of Ts‘ao Kung, who states: 從始受命至於和平軍爭難也 “From the moment we receive the sovereign’s orders until we set up camp against the enemy, the tactics to be used are extremely challenging.” To me, the Military competition tactics or maneuvers can hardly be considered to start until the army has gone out and set up camp, and Ch‘ên Hao’s note supports this perspective: “When it comes to raising, concentrating, coordinating, and fortifying an army, there are many established rules that apply. The real challenge arises when we engage in tactical operations.” Tu Yu also points out that “the greatest challenge is to outmaneuver the enemy in securing advantageous positions.”

The challenge of tactical maneuvering lies in making the complicated straightforward, and turning setbacks into advantages.

以迂为直 is one of those short, somewhat puzzling phrases that Sun Tzŭ likes. Ts‘ao Kung explains it like this: 示以远速其道里先敌至也 “Make it seem like you are far away, then move quickly and get there before your enemy.” Tu Mu says: “Trick the enemy into being careless and slow while you speed along as fast as you can.” Ho Shih offers a slightly different take: “Even if you have tough terrain and natural obstacles to face, this can actually be turned into an advantage through quick movement.” Notable examples of this idea are seen in the two famous crossings of the Alps—first by Hannibal, which left Italy vulnerable, and later by Napoleon, which led to his significant victory at Marengo.

4. Hence, take a detour and entice them with benefits; this is how future generations understand the strategy of indirectness and directness.

So, by taking a long and roundabout path, after drawing the enemy away, and even though starting after him, managing to reach the goal before him demonstrates an understanding of the trick of deviation.

Chia Lin sees 途 as the enemy’s route, saying: “If our opponent’s path is really short and we can divert him from it (迂之) by pretending to be weak or by offering some minor advantage, we can beat him to favorable positions.” This is a reasonable perspective, although no other commentator agrees with it. 人 obviously means enemy, and 後 and First should be understood as verbs. Tu Mu references the famous march of 趙奢 Chao Shê in 270 B.C. to relieve the town of 閼與 O-yü, which was closely besieged by a 秦 Ch'in army. [It should be noted that the pronunciation of 閼與 is accurately given in the commentary on the Ch‘ien Han Shu, ch. 34. Giles' dictionary states “Yü-yü,” while Chavannes, on uncertain authority, prefers “Yen-yü.” The name is completely omitted from Playfair's “Cities and Towns.”] The King of Chao first consulted Liang Po Lien P‘o about the wisdom of trying to mount a relief effort, but Lien thought the distance too far and the terrain too rough and challenging. His Majesty then turned to Chao Shê, who acknowledged the risky nature of the march but ultimately said: “We’ll be like two rats fighting in a corner—and the braver one will win!” So, he left the capital with his army but had only travelled 30 li when he halted and began building fortifications. For 28 days, he continued to strengthen his defenses and ensured that spies would inform the enemy of his actions. The Ch'in general was thrilled and assumed his opponent's delay was because the besieged city was in Han State, and not actually part of Chao territory. But as soon as the spies left, Chao Shê embarked on a forced march lasting two days and one night, arriving at the battlefield with such incredible speed that he secured a dominant position on 北山 “North hill” before the enemy {58} caught wind of his movements. The Ch'in forces suffered a devastating defeat and were forced to lift the siege of O-yü and retreat across the border. [See Records of the Grand Historian, chap. 81.]

5. Old army fighting for profit, people struggling for safety.

Managing an army is beneficial; dealing with a disorganized crowd is extremely risky.

I adopt the interpretation from the T‘ung Tien, Chêng Yu-hsien, and the T‘u Shu, where 衆 provides the exact nuance needed to make sense. In contrast, the standard text, which repeats Military, seems somewhat pointless. The commentators suggest that maneuvers can be beneficial or risky; it all depends on the general's skill. Capt. Calthrop translates Public debate as “the wrangles of a multitude”!

6. When the whole army competes for profit, it cannot match the delegation that competes for profit, as it results in losses.

If you send a fully equipped army into action to gain an advantage, you're likely going to be too late.

The original text has 故 instead of 舉; but a verb is needed to balance 委.

On the other hand, detaching a flying column for this purpose means sacrificing its baggage and supplies.

委军 is clearly confusing to the Chinese commentators, who rephrase the sentence as if it started with abandon supplies. The complete redundancy in the outcome can only be avoided by making an unreasonably subtle distinction between 棄 and Donate. I present my own interpretation without much enthusiasm, as I believe there is some fundamental corruption in the text. Overall, it’s clear that Sun Tzŭ does not support undertaking a long march without supplies. Cf. infra, § 11.

7. So roll up your armor and hurry day and night without stopping, traveling a hundred miles while competing for profit, then capture the three generals.

Thus, if you tell your men to roll up their jackets,

None does not mean “to discard one’s armor,” as Capt. Calthrop translates, but rather suggests that it should be carried with you. Chang Yü says: 猶悉甲也 “This means, in full armor.”

{59}

and make forced marches without stopping day or night, covering twice the usual distance in one go,

The typical daily journey, according to Tu Mu, was 30 li; however, on one occasion, while chasing Liu Bei Liu Pei, Ts‘ao Ts‘ao reportedly covered an astonishing distance of 300 li in just twenty-four hours.

doing a hundred li to gain an advantage, the leaders of all three of your divisions will be captured by the enemy.

8. The strong go first, the weak follow; this is the method of eleven.

The stronger men will lead the way, the weary ones will lag behind, and with this strategy, only a mere ten percent of your army will make it to their destination.

For End., see II. § 14. The lesson is, as Ts‘ao Kung and others highlight: Don’t march a hundred li just to gain a tactical edge, whether you have obstacles or not. Movements like this should be limited to short distances. Stonewall Jackson said: “The hardships of forced marches are often more painful than the dangers of battle.” He rarely asked his troops for extreme efforts. It was only when he planned a surprise or when a quick retreat was crucial that he pushed everything for speed.^[171]

9. Fifty miles for profit, the general falters; his method is half complete.

If you march fifty li to outmaneuver the enemy, you'll lose the leader of your first division, and only half of your troops will make it to the goal.

蹶 is explained as having a meaning similar to 挫: literally, “the leader of the first division will be torn away.” Cf. Tso Chuan, 襄 19^th year: 蹶其本 “This is an example of [the falling tree] ripping up its roots.”

10. Thirty miles for profit means two-thirds of the way.

If you march thirty li with the same goal, two-thirds of your army will make it.

In the T‘ung Tien it is added: 了解军队争斗的难处 “From this we can understand the challenges of maneuvering.”

{60}

11. 因此，如果军队没有后勤支持就会灭亡，没粮食也会灭亡，没储备也会灭亡

We can assume that an army without its supply train is doomed; without food, it is doomed; without supply bases, it is doomed.

委积 is explained by Tu Yu as 不明 “fodder and the like;” by Tu Mu and Chang Yü as Goods “goods in general;” and by Wang Hsi as 薪盐蔬菜相关 “fuel, salt, foodstuffs, etc.” But I think what Sun Tzŭ meant was “stores accumulated in dépôts,” as distinguished from supply train and food, the various impedimenta accompanying an army on its march. Cf. Chou Li, ch. xvi. fol. 10: 委托人 ... Collect firewood and other materials..

12. Therefore, those who don't know the lords' plans can't engage in advance.

We can't form alliances until we understand the plans of our neighbors.

豫 = 先. Li Ch‘üan interprets it as 備 “guard against,” but that doesn't capture the full meaning. An original interpretation of 交 is provided by Tu Mu, who states it represents Engaging in battle or Battle “join in battle.”

13. Those who don't understand the terrain can't march.

We aren’t ready to lead an army on the move unless we know the lay of the land—its mountains and forests, its dangers.

Danger, defined as trench (Ts‘ao Kung) or 坑坎 (Chang Yü).

and cliffs,

阻, defined as one high, one low.

its wetlands

沮, defined as waterlogged vegetation.

and swamps.

澤, defined as the place where many waters converge and do not flow.

14. 不用乡导者不能得地利

We won't be able to take advantage of natural resources unless we use local guides.

__A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__ are repeated in chapter __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_1__.

{61}

15. Use deception to gain advantage

In war, practice deception, and you will succeed.

According to Tu Mu, 立 represents Li Sheng. Cf. I. § 18. In Turenne's tactics, misleading the enemy, particularly regarding the size of his forces, played a major role. ^[172]

Move only if there's a real benefit to be gained.

This is the interpretation of all the commentators except Wang Hsi, who has the brief note 誘うことです “Entice out the enemy” (by offering him some apparent advantage).

16. Change is based on division and unity.

The decision to focus or split your troops depends on the situation.

疾如風, 徐如林

Let your speed be like the wind,

The comparison works on two levels, because the wind is not only quick but, as Mei Yao-ch‘ên points out, Intangible evidence “invisible and leaves no tracks.”

your compactness resembles that of the forest.

It’s almost impossible to interpret 徐 here in the regular sense of “calm,” like Tu Yu tries to do. Mêng Shih gets closer with his note Slow movement requires a line “When moving slowly, order and ranks must be maintained”—to protect against surprise attacks. However, natural forests don’t grow in rows; instead, they tend to be dense or compact. I believe Mei Yao-ch‘ên uses the appropriate word when he says 如林之森然.

Pillaging like fire, unyielding like a mountain

In raiding and looting, be like fire,

Cf. Shih Ching, IV. 3. iv. 6: 如火烈烈则莫敢问 “Fierce as a blazing fire that no one can control.”

as unmovable as a mountain.

That is, when you're maintaining a position where the enemy is trying to push you out, or maybe, as Tu Yu suggests, when they are trying to lure you into a trap.

{62}

19. Hard to know, like shadows and thunder

Let your plans be as mysterious and impenetrable as night, and when you act, strike like a thunderbolt.

The original text has 震 instead of 霆. Cf. IV. § 7. Tu Yu mentions a saying from T‘ai Kung that has become a proverb: 疾雷不及掩耳疾電不及瞑目 “You can’t cover your ears from the thunder or your eyes from the lightning—they’re that fast.” Similarly, an attack should be launched so quickly that it can't be blocked.

20. Divide communities to share benefits

When you raid a countryside, make sure the loot is shared among your guys;

The interpretation by Tu Yu, Chia Lin, and seemingly Ts‘ao Kung is 指向群体, which is explained as referring to the division of the army, mentioned in V. §§ 1, 2, through the use of banners and flags, indicating (指) to each person the direction they should take (向). However, this seems quite forced, and the omission is significant, even for Sun Tzŭ. Fortunately, the T‘ung Tien and Yü Lan have the variant 嚮, which not only hints at the correct reading 乡, but also provides some insight into how the error originated. An early commentator may have inserted 向 as sounding like 乡, leading the two to be later read as a single character; and since this was interchangeable with 向, Village must eventually have been lost completely. Meanwhile, 掠 would have been changed to 指 to make sense. Regarding 分众, I believe that only Ho Shih has understood the true meaning, while other commentators interpret it as “splitting the men into groups” to hunt for loot. Sun Tzŭ aims to reduce the excesses of random plundering by emphasizing that all spoils should be combined into a common pool, which can then be fairly distributed among everyone.

When you take new land, divide it into parcels for the benefit of the soldiers.

The meaning can be understood from Tu Mu’s note: Open territory and reward contributors. The Three Strategies offers the same guidance: 獲地裂之. 廓 means “to enlarge” or “extend”—at the enemy's expense, as understood. Cf. Shih Ching, III. 1. vii. 1: Hate its style “hating all the great States.” Ch‘ên Hao also says 屯兵种蒔 “station your soldiers on the land, and let them sow and plant{63} it.” By following this principle and farming the lands they invaded, the Chinese have been able to execute some of their most notable and successful campaigns, like that of 班超 Pan Ch‘ao who reached the Caspian Sea, and in more recent years, those of 福康安 Fu-k‘ang-an and Zuo Zongtang Tso Tsung-t‘ang.

21. Act on your rights

Think and discuss

Note that both of these words, like the Chinese Ownership, are actually metaphors that come from using scales.

before you take action.

Chang Yü cites 尉繚子 saying that we shouldn't break camp until we've assessed the enemy's strength and the skill of their general. See the “seven comparisons” in I. § 13. Capt. Calthrop leaves this sentence out.

22. The prophet's strategy outmatches this military conflict.

He will succeed who has mastered the skill of diversion.

See above, __A_TAG_PLACEHOLDER_0__.

Such is the skill of maneuvering.

With these words, the chapter would naturally come to an end. But now there is a long appendix in the form of an excerpt from an earlier book on War, which is now lost but seems to have existed when Sun Tzŭ wrote. The style of this fragment is not noticeably different from that of Sun Tzŭ himself, and no commentator questions its authenticity.

23. The military government said that because they do not hear each other, they use drums; because they do not see each other, they use banners.

The Book of Army Management states:

It’s interesting that none of the earlier commentators provide any details about this work. Mei Yao-ch‘ên refers to it as Military old traditions “an ancient military classic,” and Wang Hsi calls it Ancient military texts “an old book on war.” Considering the vast amount of fighting that occurred for centuries before Sun Tzŭ’s time among the different kingdoms and regions of China, it’s not surprising that a collection of military maxims might have been compiled and documented at an earlier time.

{64}

On the battlefield,

Implied, but not actually in the Chinese.

the spoken word doesn’t travel far enough: that's why we have gongs and drums.

I have kept the words Drums from the original text, which appear in the next paragraph, instead of using the alternative reading 鼓锣 "drums and bells," which can be found in the T‘ung Tien, Pei T‘ang Shu Ch‘ao, and Yü Lan. 鐸 refers to a bell with a clapper. See Lun Yü III. 24, Chou Li XXIX. 15, 29. 金 obviously includes both gongs and bells of all types. The T‘u Shu adds a 之 after each 为.

Nor can everyday objects be seen clearly enough: hence the use of banners and flags.

24. The drums and banners are the eyes and ears of the people.

Gongs and drums, banners and flags, are ways to engage the ears and eyes of the host

The original text, followed by the T‘u Shu, uses 人 for 民 here and in the next two paragraphs. However, as we've noted, 人 is typically used by Sun Tzŭ to refer to the enemy.

may be focused on one particular point.

Note the use of 一 as a verb. Chang Yü says: 視聽一致則百萬之眾進退如一矣 “If sight and hearing focus at the same time on the same object, the movements of a million soldiers will be like those of one person”!

25. When the people are united, the brave cannot advance alone, and the timid cannot retreat alone. This applies the principle of the crowd.

The host, forming a single united group, makes it impossible for the brave to move forward alone or for the cowardly to back away alone.

Chang Yü quotes a saying: N/A “Equally guilty are those who advance against orders and those who retreat against orders.” Tu Mu tells a story related to this about 吳起 Wu Ch‘i, when he was fighting against the Ch‘in State. Before the battle began, one of his soldiers, a man known for his unmatched bravery, charged out on his own, captured two enemy heads, and{65} returned to camp. Wu Ch‘i had the soldier executed immediately, prompting an officer to protest, saying, “This man was a good soldier and shouldn’t have been beheaded.” Wu Ch‘i replied, “I absolutely believe he was a good soldier, but I had him executed because he acted without orders.”

This is the skill of managing large groups of people.

26. Night battles have many drums, day battles have many banners, thus changing the people's perception.

In nighttime battles, use a lot of signal fires and drums, and in daytime battles, use flags and banners to capture the attention of your troops.

The T‘ung Tien has the incorrect variant 便 for 變. Regarding the latter word, I believe I’ve captured the right meaning; the whole phrase is slightly elliptical and suggests “influencing the movements of the army through their senses of sight and hearing.” Li Ch‘üan, Tu Mu, and Chia Lin certainly seem to interpret it this way. However, other commentators take 民 (or 人) to mean the enemy, and 變 as equivalent to 迷惑 or chaos, meaning “to perplex” or “confound.” This interpretation doesn’t align as well with what has been previously stated, although it does make the transition to § 27 less abrupt. The whole issue, I think, relies on the alternative readings 民 and Person. The latter would almost certainly refer to the enemy. Ch‘ên Hao mentions 李光弼 Li Kuang-pi’s night ride to 河阳 Ho-yang at the head of 500 mounted troops; they made such an impressive display with torches that, although the rebel leader 史思明 Shih Ssŭ-ming had a large army, he did not dare to challenge their passage. [Ch‘ên Hao gives the date as Late Tianbao A.D. 756; but according to the New Book of Tang New T‘ang History, Biographies 61, it must have been later than this, probably 760.]

27. The army can take morale, the general can take heart.

A whole army can lose its motivation;

“In war,” says Chang Yü, “if you can get everyone in the army to feel angry at the same time, their attack will be unstoppable. The enemy soldiers will be most fired up when they first show up, so we shouldn’t engage them right away. Instead, we should wait until their excitement and enthusiasm fade, and then strike. This way, we can take away their fighting spirit.” Li Ch‘üan and others share a story (found in the Tso Chuan,{66} Zhuang Gong year 10, § 1) about 曹劌 Ts‘ao Kuei, a close associate of Duke Chuang of Lu. The state was attacked by Ch‘i, and the Duke was ready to fight at long spoon Ch‘ang-cho after the enemy’s drums had beaten for the first time, when Ts‘ao said: “Not yet.” Only after the drums had sounded for the third time did he order the attack. They fought, and the Ch‘i soldiers were completely defeated. When the Duke asked Ts‘ao Kuei why he delayed, Ts‘ao replied: “In battle, having a courageous spirit is everything. The first drumbeat generates that spirit, the second one sees it start to fade, and by the third, it’s completely gone. I attacked when their spirit was gone and ours was at its peak. That’s why we won.” Wu Zi (chap. 4) emphasizes “spirit” as the most important of the “four significant influences” in war, stating: The army of a million's strength relies on one person, known as morale. “The power of an entire army—a force of a million men—rests on one person alone: that’s the impact of spirit!”

A commander-in-chief can lose their focus.

Capt. Calthrop goes seriously off track with “defeat his general’s ambition.” Chang Yü says: The mind governs all things; chaos and courage depend on it. “Presence of mind is the general’s most valuable asset. It's the trait that allows him to manage chaos and instill courage in those who are panicking.” The great general Li Jing Li Ching (A.D. 571–649) has a saying: The attacker doesn't just assault the city and army; they must have strategies to attack the mind as well. “Attacking isn’t just about storming fortified cities or engaging an army in formation; it also involves the skill of undermining the enemy’s mental stability.” [問對, pt. 3.]

28. Therefore, energy is strong in the morning, lazy in the afternoon, and returns in the evening.

Now a soldier’s spirit is sharpest in the morning;

Always assuming, I guess, that he has had breakfast. In the battle of the Trebia, the Romans were foolishly allowed to fight on an empty stomach, while Hannibal’s men had taken their time to have breakfast. See Livy, XXI, liv. 8, lv. 1 and 8.

by noon it starts to lose energy; and in the evening, he is focused only on getting back to camp.

29. The skillful use of troops avoids their sharpness and strikes at their weakness; this is how to manage their energy.

A smart general, therefore,

{67}

The 故, which definitely seems necessary here, is missing in the T‘u Shu.

avoids an army when its morale is high, but attacks it when it is tired and likely to retreat. This is the skill of understanding emotions.

The T‘ung Tien, because of avoidance “avoidance of personal names of the reigning dynasty,” uses 理 instead of 治 in this and the next two paragraphs.

30. Calm chaos with order; the heart is treated with peace.

Disciplined and calm, waiting for disorder and chaos to appear among the enemy—this is the skill of keeping your composure.

31. Stay close to the distant, rest while laboring, be full while hungry. This is the power of governance.